one ever acts wrongly, or has reason to do anything, since '[t]here would be the same sum total of good and of evil throughout the worlds', no matter how we act. But there are versions of consequentialism that can give substantive advice even on the assumption that the total amount of goodness (and evil) is infinite, and will be infinite no matter what we do. For example, consequentialists who follow Kagan and Vallentyne (1997) will make claims like this: if for each living being x and interval of time t, x would be at least as well off during t if you did action A as it would be if you did anything else, and there is at least one x and t such that x would be better off during t if you did A than it would be if you did anything else, then you ought to do A. This principle seems quite in 52Things would be even neater if we strengthened Reduplication to the claim that absolutely everything has infinitely many qualitative duplicates. But this would require some very unorthodox mereology. Classical mereology entails that there is exactly one fusion of all blue things-since being a fusion of all blue things is a qualitative property, this fusion cannot have any qualitative duplicates. Even opponents of classical mereology might balk at the idea that the blue things have infinitely many fusions which differ solo numero. But there is nothing especially counterintuitive about the claim that if I had fused the blue things, the thing that actually fuses the blue things would not have fused the blue things. What seemed puzzling was the claim that even my instantiating quite "close" qualitative profiles would require objects spatiotemporally separated from me to change their qualitative properties. 30 keeping with the spirit of universalistic ethics. And a modal realist who endorses it can claim that there are some things we ought not to do: for if life will be better for people in Cosmo if I do A than if I do B, and everyone outside Cosmo will have exactly the same qualitative properties whether I do A or B, it will follow that I ought not do B. According to Lewis, If I had acted otherwise, for instance by taking to a life of crime, each and every good or evil that is present somewhere in the totality of worlds would still have been present, and none would have been added. It is wrong to think: then this world would have been a little worse, and the rest would have been no different, so the totality
one ever acts wrongly, or has rationality to cause anything, since' [ t]here would be the same sum total of estimable and of evil throughout the worlds', no matter how we act. But there be translation of consequentialism that can give substantial advice even on the assumption that the total sum of goodness (and evil) is infinite, and will be countless no matter what we do. For example, consequentialists who adopt Kagan and Vallentyne (1997) will make claims like this: if for each life being x and interval of prison term t, x would be at least as well off during t if you did action A as it would be if you make anything else, and there is at least one x and t such that x would be better off during t if you did A than it would be if you perform anything else, then you ought to do A. This principle seems quite in 52Things would be even neater if we strengthened Reduplication to the title that absolutely everything has infinitely many qualitative duplicates. But this would require some very unorthodox mereology. Classical mereology entails that there is exactly one fusion of all blue thing - since being a fusion of all blue thing is a qualitative place, this coalition cannot have any qualitative duplicates. Even opponents of classical mereology might balk at the idea that the blue things have boundlessly many fusions which differ solo numero. But there is nothing especially counterintuitive about the claim that if I had fused the blue things, the thing that actually fuses the blue things would not have fuse the blue thing. What seem puzzling was the claim that even my instantiating quite " cheeseparing " qualitative profiles would require objects spatiotemporally discriminate from me to change their qualitative properties. 30 keeping with the spirit of universalistic ethic. And a modal realist who endorses it can claim that there are some thing we ought not to do: for if animation will be better for citizenry in Cosmo if I do deoxyadenosine monophosphate than if I do B, and everyone outside Cosmo will receive exactly the same qualitative properties whether I do A or B, it will follow that I ought not do B. According to Lewis, If I had acted otherwise, for instance by take to a life of crime, each and every dear or evil that is present somewhere in the totality of worlds would still have been present, and none would have been added. It is wrong to think: then this world would have been a short worse, and the rest would have been no different, so the totality
one ever acts wrongly, or har reason to do cbythinj, since '[t]here wuuld be the same sum total oh goid ane of evil throughout tfe worlds', no mattwr hiq we act. Bnf there are vsvsionv of consequentlalism that can give subsdavtnve advice even on the assumption thwt the yohal amount of doodmqss (znd evil) is infinite, and will be ihfinite no matter whst we do. For example, conseeuenhialists who folloa Kagan and Valjwntyne (1997) will make claims like this: if for each living being x and intexval of timg f, d would be av leasn as well off during d if yoi did action A as it would be if you did enything else, and thgre is at necst one x and t such rhqt x foulg be vetger ohf suring t mf you did Z than it wiuld be if you did snrnning else, thsn you otght to do A. This principle seems quite in 52Things would be even nwater if we strengthejed Redupjication to the claim that absolutely everything vas iifkniueoy mavt eualitative duplicates. But this would require aoke very unorthodjx mereologu. Flsfsical mereolugy enczims that there is edactly jne fysion of wll nlue things-since being a fuwion of all yluw things is a qualntative propzrty, tnis fision cannot have any qbalitafive duplicwtes. Even upponents of clarsibal kereology might balk at thq idea thet thz blue tfingx have infinitelj mann fusions which difver sllm numero. Bkt there is nothing especially rpunterintuitova atout the claik that if I hwd fused the bkue thiugs, thd thing thzt actuelly fuses tre blue thingv would not heve fused the bluw thingr. What seemed pizzling wcf thw claim that even ky khstantiating qunue "xlose" qualitatife orosipex rmuld require objdctr spatkotemporalln sdparsted from me to chance tgeir qualitative ptoierties. 30 jeeping rith the spirot of universalistlc etiics. Aid a mpdaj realist who endorses it can dlaim thah tmere are some thikgs re ought npt to do: for if life will be better for people in Cosmo id I do A than if I bo B, and everbone ottside Covmo will have exactlt the same qualitstive properties whetger I go A lr B, it will follow that I ought not do B. According to Lewis, If I had actwd othxrrise, for inatanve by tckiug to a lifx uf crime, each anc every good or evil that is prxsent somefhzre in the totality of worlds wuuld still haxe been present, and none would hsve been added. It is wrong to tnink: then this world woukd have veen z little wurse, and the rest eould kave bwen no eiffcrent, so the tutakiby
one ever acts wrongly, or has reason anything, '[t]here would the same sum evil the worlds', no how we act. there are versions of consequentialism that give substantive advice even on the assumption that the total amount of goodness evil) is infinite, and will be infinite no matter what we do. For consequentialists follow and (1997) will make claims like this: if for each living being x and interval of time x would be at least as well off t if you did A as it would be you anything else, there at one x and such that x would be better off during t if you did A than it would be you did then you to A. principle seems quite would be even neater if we the claim that absolutely everything has infinitely many duplicates. But would require some very unorthodox mereology. mereology entails that there is exactly one fusion all blue things-since being a fusion of all blue things is a qualitative property, this have any qualitative duplicates. opponents of classical might at idea the blue have infinitely many fusions which differ solo numero. But there is especially counterintuitive about the claim that if I had fused things, thing that actually the blue things would have the blue things. What was claim instantiating "close" profiles would require objects separated from me to change qualitative properties. 30 keeping ethics. And a modal realist who endorses it claim that there are some things we not to do: for if life will be better for people in if I than if I do B, and everyone outside will have exactly the qualitative properties whether I do A or B, it follow I ought do B. According Lewis, If I acted otherwise, for taking to life crime, good or evil that is present in totality of worlds would still been none would have been added. It is wrong to think: then this world would have little worse, and the would been no different, so the totality
one ever acts wrongly, or has reAson to do anYthinG, siNce '[T]hEre wOuld Be the same sum toTAl of Good and of evil throughouT the wOrLDs', no MAtTer hoW we act. BUT tHERe aRe VeRsiOnS Of ConseQueNtialisM that can giVe sUbStantive adviCE eVen on the asSumPtion that the TotAl amouNt Of gOOdnesS (anD evil) Is infiNIte, and Will be infInITe no maTTer what WE Do. for eXample, consequentiALiSTs who follow KagAn and VAlLEnTYNe (1997) wIll Make claims LiKe thiS: If for eaCH lIVINg bEIng x and intervAl of time t, x wOUld Be at leAsT as WEll off DurinG t IF yoU did action A As it Would be if You did ANything ELse, and tHere is At lEasT one X AnD t SucH tHAt x WOuLd bE BetTer off duRiNg T if yoU did a THAN it wOulD be iF you dId anything elsE, thEn yoU OugHt to dO A. ThiS priNcIple sEems quIte in 52thIngs would be even NeatEr if we strEngThEneD REduplICation To tHe cLaim thaT absoluTEly EvERYThIng has infinitely maNy QUAlItative dUplicaTEs. buT This woulD rEquIre sOME very UnorTHoDox mereoLogy. ClASsIcAl mereoLoGy entaIlS thAt tHere iS ExacTly one Fusion of All blUE things-since beINg a fusion of alL BlUE ThINgs iS a qUalitative pRopeRTy, thIs fuSIoN caNNot haVe any QuALiTAtive duplicates. Even OpPonentS of clAssical mereolOgy might baLK AT the idea That THe BLue things have iNfiniTely many fuSIons whicH diffEr solo nuMero. But thERE is nothiNg eSpeCiaLly COUnTerintuitive aBOUt thE cLaim thaT if i had fusEd tHe bLue ThiNgS, the thing That actuAlLy FuSeS thE blue THings wouLd Not HaVe fUsed tHE blue tHings. what SeEmED puZzling wAS tHE ClaiM tHaT eveN my InStantIatiNG quIte "closE" qualitatIve PRofiLeS wOuld reqUire objects spAtIotemporalLy SepArated FROm me to chAnge their qualitative proPErties. 30 kEepIng wiTh thE spirit of UniVersalIstIC ethicS. And a mOdal rEaLisT WHo endORSeS it CaN claim that THEre Are soMe ThinGs we ougHt not to do: for if life WIll Be better for peOplE in COSMo If I DO A THan If i Do B, AND everyone outsidE Cosmo will HaVE eXactly the sAMe qUaLitativE properTies wHEther I dO A or B, it wiLl follow tHaT I ouGHT noT do B. AccordIng to LewIs, If I had aCTed otHErWise, fOr iNstancE bY taKing tO a life OF crIme, eaCh and eVeRy good Or eviL tHat is preSent somewhere in the totalIty of wOrlds WouLd still haVe bEEn pResent, and None Would have bEen AddEd. It iS wrONg to tHink: THeN thIS worlD wouLD have been A LiTtlE WOrSe, and the resT WOUld Have bEen NO diffeRent, So the totality
one ever acts wrongly, orhas reason  to d o a nyt hi ng,sinc e '[t]here wou l d be  the same sum total of  good  a n d of ev il th roughou t  t h e  wo rl ds ',no ma tterhow  we act . But ther e a re  versions of co nsequentia lis m that can g ive  subst an tiv e  advi ceevenon the assump tion that  t h e tota l  amount o fgood ness (and evil) i s  i n finite, and wi ll bein f in i t e n o m atter what  w e do. For exa m pl e , con s equentialists  who follow Kag an and  V all e ntyne(1997 )w ill  make claim s li ke this:if for each li v ing bei ng x a ndint erva l  o ftim et , x wo uld beat least  a swelloffd u r i ng t  if  you  didaction A as i t w ould beif yo u did  any th ing e lse, a nd th er e is at least o ne x  and t su chth atxwould be bet ter  of f durin g t ify oudi d A  t han it would be if  y o u  d id anyth ing el s e,  t h en you o ug htto d o A. Th is p r in ciple se ems qu i te  i n 52Thi ng s woul dbeeve n nea t er i f we s trengthe ned R e duplication to the claim tha t  a b s ol u tely  ev erything ha s in f init elym an y q u alita tivedu p li c ates. But this woul drequir e som e very unorth odox mereo l o g y. Class ical me r eology entails  that  there ise xactly o ne fu sion ofall bluet h ings-sin cebei nga f u s io n of all blue t hing sis a qu ali tativepro per ty,  th is  fusion c annot ha ve  a ny  q ual itati v e duplic at es.  E ven  oppo n ents o f cla ssic al  m e reo logy mi g ht b alkat  t he i dea  t hat t he b l uethingshave infi nit e ly m an yfusions  which differ  s olo numero .But  there i s nothin g especially counterint u itive a bou t the  cla im that i f I  had f use d  the b lue th ings,  t het h ing t h a tact ua lly fusest h e b lue t hi ngswould n ot have fused theb lue  things. What  se emed p uz zli n gw asth e  cl a i m that even myinstantiat in g  q uite "clos e " q ua litativ e profi les w o uld req uire obje cts spati ot empo r a lly  separated  from me  to chang e  thei r  q ualit ati ve pro pe rti es. 3 0 keep i ngwiththe sp ir it ofunive rs alisticethics. And a modal rea list w ho en dor ses it ca n c l aim  that the re a re some th ing s w e oug htn ot to  do: fo r i f  life  wil l  be bette r  f orp e op le in Cosmo i f  Ido Atha n  if Ido B , and everyone ou t side Cosmo wil l ha v e  ex act l y th esame qualitati vepr o p erties w he ther I do A  or B, i tw ill f ollowthat I  oughtn o td o B. A ccor din g to Lewi s,If I had a ct ed otherw ise,  f or ins tanceb y ta k i ng to a life ofcrime , eacha ndevery  g ood ore vilthat is pr esent somew here i n th e tot ality o fworlds  wo ul d still ha v e been pr esent , and n on e wo uld  havebeen a dded.  Itis  wr ong to th i n k: th en thi s wo rld w ou ld h ave beena  littlewor s e, andth e r e s t woul d  h a v e been nodif feren t ,  so the to t alit y 
one ever_acts wrongly,_or has reason to_do anything,_since_'[t]here would_be_the same sum_total of good_and of evil throughout_the worlds', no_matter_how we act. But there are versions of consequentialism that can give substantive advice_even_on the_assumption_that_the total amount of goodness_(and evil) is infinite, and_will be_infinite no matter what we do. For example,_consequentialists_who follow Kagan_and Vallentyne (1997) will make claims like this: if_for each living being x and_interval of time_t,_x_would be at least_as well off during t if_you did action A as it_would be if you did anything else,_and there is at least one_x and t such that_x would_be better off during t_if you did_A than_it would be_if you did anything else, then_you ought to_do A. This principle seems quite_in_52Things would be_even_neater_if we_strengthened Reduplication to_the_claim that_absolutely_everything has infinitely many qualitative duplicates._But_this would require some very unorthodox mereology._Classical mereology entails that_there_is exactly one fusion_of all blue things-since being_a fusion of all blue things_is a_qualitative property,_this fusion cannot have any qualitative duplicates. Even opponents of classical_mereology might balk at the idea_that the blue things_have infinitely_many_fusions which differ_solo_numero. But_there is nothing especially counterintuitive about the_claim that_if I had fused the blue_things, the thing that_actually_fuses the blue things would not_have fused the blue things. What_seemed puzzling was the claim_that_even_my instantiating quite "close" qualitative_profiles would require objects spatiotemporally separated_from me to_change their qualitative properties. 30 keeping with_the_spirit of universalistic ethics. And a_modal_realist who endorses it can claim_that_there_are some things we ought_not to do: for if life_will be better for people in Cosmo if I_do A than_if I do B, and_everyone_outside_Cosmo will have exactly the same qualitative properties whether I_do A_or B, it_will follow that I ought not do B. According to_Lewis, If I had acted otherwise, for_instance by taking to a life of crime, each and every_good or evil that is present somewhere in_the totality of worlds would still have_been present, and none_would_have been added. It is wrong to_think:_then_this_world would have_been a little_worse, and the_rest would_have been no_different, so_the totality