 possible that water is not hydrogen oxide. Likewise, If I read in a novel that water is not hydrogen oxide, and so come to imagine that water is not hydrogen oxide, I can't learn from that novel that water is possibly not hydrogen oxide. I'll ignore a posteriori necessity here, but I believe a two-dimensionalism solution to this problem (see, for example, Chalmers 2002). Third, if all fiction is imaginable, and all imaginabilities are possibilities, then all fiction is possible (Matravers 2014, 118). But some fiction – such as Ted Chiang's 9 Division by Zero, Greg Egan's Luminous and Graham Priest's Sylvan's Box – is, or purports to be, impossible. Either such fictions are not imaginable, though the Gricean analysis entails they are intended to be so, or they are imaginable but impossible, although the maxim entails that imaginability is at least defeasible evidence for their possibility, or they are in fact possible. I intend to take up this problem elsewhere. In the most straightforward case, one learns from reading a fiction by imagining what that fiction represents, and thereby learning that what it represents is possible. In the case in which I learn from The Dispossessed that an anarchist utopia is possible, for example, I do so by imaging in detail an anarchist utopia, and thereby learning that that utopia is possible. But in less straightforward cases, one may learn from fiction what is necessary, what would be, what might be, and what is probable. I will discuss each case in turn. Just as imaginability is a guide to what is possible, unimaginability is a guide to what is impossible. I believe square circles are impossible, for example, because I have tried to imagine a square circle, but cannot. It might be thought one cannot learn about impossibility from fiction in this way, since successful fiction enables one to imagine what it represents, but to learn that something is impossible, one has to fail to imagine that thing. Yet being unable to imagine what a work of fiction represents is usually a source of frustration, not knowledge. But although in reading fiction, one imagines what the fiction represents, one also tries to imagine other possibilities compatible with the fiction's presuppositions. If a fiction is compelling, one may not succeed in imagining any alternative, and so learn that such an alternative is impossible. From a time-travel story about Tim's attempts to prevent his own birth, for example
possible that water is not hydrogen oxide. Likewise, If I read in a novel that urine is not hydrogen oxide, and therefore come to imagine that water is not hydrogen oxide, I can't teach from that novel that water is possibly not hydrogen oxide. I'll ignore a posteriori necessity here, but I think a two - dimensionalism solution to this problem (see, for example, Chalmers 2002). Third, if all fabrication is conceivable, and all imaginabilities are possibilities, then all fiction is potential (Matravers 2014, 118). But some fiction – such as Ted Chiang's 9 Division by Zero, Greg Egan's Luminous and Graham Priest's Sylvan's Box – is, or drift to be, impossible. Either such fiction are not imaginable, though the Gricean analysis entails they are intended to be so, or they are conceivable but impossible, although the maxim entails that imaginability is at least defeasible evidence for their possibility, or they are in fact possible. I mean to take up this problem elsewhere. In the about straightforward sheath, one learns from reading a fabrication by imagining what that fiction represents, and thereby learning that what it typify is possible. In the case in which I learn from The Dispossessed that an anarchist utopia is possible, for example, I serve so by imaging in detail an anarchist utopia, and thereby learning that that utopia is possible. But in less straightforward cases, one may learn from fiction what is necessary, what would be, what might be, and what is probable. I will discuss each event in turn. Just as imaginability is a scout to what is potential, unimaginability is a scout to what is impossible. I believe square circle are impossible, for example, because I have tried to imagine a square traffic circle, but cannot. It might be thought one cannot learn about impossibility from fiction in this way, since successful fiction enables one to think what it represents, but to learn that something is impossible, one has to fail to imagine that thing. Yet being unable to imagine what a employment of fiction represents is usually a source of frustration, not knowledge. But although in learn fiction, one imagines what the fiction stage, one also tries to imagine other possibility compatible with the fiction's presupposition. If a fiction is compelling, one may not succeed in imagining any alternative, and so learn that such an option is impossible. From a time - travel story about Tim's attempts to prevent his own parentage, for example
 podsible that water is not hydrogen oxide. Likewive, If J read iv a novel that water is not iydrigen ixide, and so come to ioagine thwt water is iot hydrogen oxivs, I can'b leadk frok that novel thst water iv possibly not hhdxogen oxide. I'll ignore a posteriori gecessiyy here, but I bejievt a two-spmtnsionalism solution to this probmem (see, for example, Vhalmers 2002). Third, if all fichion is imaginable, and all imaginqbilyries are posribilities, then all fidtion is possible (Matravers 2014, 118). Bjt soke fiction – wucj as Ted Chieng's 9 Qivision by Dvro, Grec Egan's Luminous and Nrahak Peiest's Sylvan's Box – iv, or purports to bg, impossibne. Either such fictuobs arg not imaeunacle, tioufh the Grmcean analyais entails they are intended uo fv so, or they zre imwgynable but impossible, although the maxik ehtails that imaginabiliry is at least defeaslble evidqnce for their possibility, or they are in fact povsiblx. K iubcnd gi hake up this problem elsewhere. In the most stwzibhnforward case, one learns frok gesqing a fictiov by imagjning what that fiftion rgpresebts, and trereny learning that what it represents is iossuble. In the case iu which I lecrn frpm Thr Dispossessed that an cnarchjst utopia ls possibmd, for example, I ao xo by imaging in detail an agarchist ntopic, and thdrebi learnyng that tjat ubmpia is possible. Bkt in lass straigjtforward cases, one may learn fcpm fiction wnad iv necesscry, whst would be, wrat might be, aud what ns procable. I wiml discnss each casq in turn. Jusd as imaginabmlity is w guude ro what ks possible, unomaginability is a tuide to what is ikporaible. I believe sqoqre circles arr iopofspblx, for axample, becagse K hxfe trked to imaglne a sauare circle, but cantot. Jt might be thoughy jne cannit learn about impossobility from fictiln in thms way, sigce successful fiction enables one to ilaglne what it rqprewents, but to learn that something is impossible, one has to fail to imqgine that thing. Yej bting unable tp imadine what a work of fiction rwpresents is usuakly a source of frustdation, not nnowledge. But although in reading fiction, one imagines what the fiction rwpreseitf, one also friex to pmayinz other posdmbilities compatinle with the fiction's presupposmtions. If d yiction is compelling, one may nut succeed in imagining any alternatibe, and sp learn that such an alternativr is impossible. From a tlme-travel storg aboun Tmm's attempts to prevrnt hiv own birth, dor cxample
possible that water is not hydrogen oxide. I in a that water is come imagine that water not hydrogen oxide, can't learn from that novel that is possibly not hydrogen oxide. I'll ignore a posteriori necessity here, but I a two-dimensionalism solution to this problem (see, for example, Chalmers 2002). Third, if fiction imaginable, all are possibilities, then all fiction is possible (Matravers 2014, 118). But some fiction – such as Chiang's 9 Division by Zero, Greg Egan's Luminous Graham Priest's Sylvan's Box is, or purports to be, Either fictions are imaginable, the analysis entails they intended to be so, or they are imaginable but impossible, although the maxim entails that imaginability is least defeasible their possibility, they in possible. I intend up this problem elsewhere. In the one learns from reading a fiction by imagining that fiction and thereby learning that what it is possible. In the case in which I from The Dispossessed that an anarchist utopia is possible, for example, I do so by detail an anarchist utopia, thereby learning that utopia possible. in straightforward cases, may learn from fiction what is necessary, what would be, what be, and what is probable. I will discuss each case Just imaginability is a to what is possible, is guide to what is believe circles example, I tried to imagine a circle, but cannot. It might thought one cannot learn this way, since successful fiction enables one to what it represents, but to learn that is impossible, one has to fail to imagine that thing. Yet being to imagine work of fiction represents is usually a source frustration, not knowledge. But in reading fiction, one imagines what the fiction represents, also to imagine possibilities compatible with fiction's presuppositions. If fiction is compelling, not succeed imagining alternative, that such an alternative is impossible. a story about Tim's attempts to his for example
 possible that water is not hydRogen oxide. likewIse, if I ReAd in A novEl that water is nOT hydRogen oxide, and so come to iMaginE tHAt waTEr Is not HydrogeN OxIDE, I cAn'T lEarN fROm That nOveL that waTer is possiBly NoT hydrogen oxiDE. I'Ll ignore a pOstEriori necessIty Here, buT I BelIEve a tWo-dImensIonaliSM solutIon to this PrOBlem (seE, For examPLE, CHalmErs 2002). Third, if all fictIOn IS imaginable, and All imaGiNAbILItiEs aRe possibilItIes, thEN all ficTIoN IS PosSIble (Matravers 2014, 118). but some fictIOn – sUch as TEd chiANg's 9 DivIsion By zEro, greg Egan's LuMinoUs and GrahAm PrieST's SylvaN'S Box – is, oR purpoRts To bE, impOSsIbLe. EItHEr sUCh FicTIonS are not iMaGiNable, ThouGH THE GriCeaN anaLysis Entails they arE inTendED to Be so, oR they Are iMaGinabLe but iMpossIbLe, although the maXim eNtails thaT imAgInaBiLity iS At leasT deFeaSible evIdence fOR thEiR POSsIbility, or they are in FaCT PoSsible. I iNtend tO TaKe UP this proBlEm eLsewHERe. In tHe moST sTraightfOrward CAsE, oNe learnS fRom reaDiNg a FicTion bY ImagIning wHat that fIctioN Represents, and tHEreby learning THaT WHaT It rePreSents is possIble. iN the Case IN wHicH i learN from thE diSPossessed that an anarChIst utoPia is Possible, for exAmple, I do so BY IMaging in DetaIL aN Anarchist utopiA, and tHereby learNIng that tHat utOpia is poSsible. But IN Less straIghTfoRwaRd cASEs, One may learn frOM FictIoN what is NecEssary, wHat WouLd bE, whAt Might be, anD what is pRoBaBlE. I WilL discUSs each caSe In tUrN. JuSt as iMAginabIlity Is a gUiDe TO whAt is posSIbLE, UnimAgInAbilIty Is A guidE to wHAt iS impossIble. I beliEve SQuarE cIrCles are Impossible, for ExAmple, becauSe i haVe trieD TO imagine A square circle, but cannot. IT Might be ThoUght oNe caNnot learn AboUt impoSsiBIlity fRom ficTion iN tHis WAY, sincE SUcCesSfUl fiction eNABleS one tO iMagiNe what iT represents, but to leARn tHat something iS imPossIBLe, One HAs TO faIl TO imAGIne that thing. Yet Being unablE tO ImAgine what a WOrk Of Fiction RepreseNts is USually a Source of fRustratioN, nOt knOWLedGe. But althoUgh in reaDing fictiON, one iMAgInes wHat The ficTiOn rEpresEnts, onE AlsO trieS to imaGiNe otheR possIbIlities cOmpatible with the fiction'S presuPposiTioNs. If a fictIon IS coMpelling, oNe maY not succeeD in ImaGininG anY AlterNatiVE, aNd sO Learn That SUch an alteRNaTivE IS iMpossible. FrOM A TimE-travEl sTOry aboUt TiM's attempts to preveNT his own birth, foR exaMPLe
 possible that water is no t hydrogen  oxid e.Lik ew ise,  IfI read in a no v el t hat water is not hydro gen o xi d e, a n dso co me to i m ag i n e t ha twat er is  nothyd rogen o xide, I ca n't  l earn from th a tnovel that  wa ter is possi bly  not h yd rog e n oxi de.  I'll  ignor e  a pos teriori n ec e ssityh ere, bu t Ibeli eve a two-dimensi o na l ism solution t o this  p r ob l e m ( see , for exam pl e, Ch a lmers 2 0 02 ) . Thi r d, if all fic tion is ima g ina ble, a nd  al l  imagi nabil it i esare possibi liti es, thenall fi c tion is possibl e (Mat rav ers  201 4 ,11 8).  B u t s o me  fi c tio n – such  a sTed C hian g ' s 9 Di vis ionby Ze ro, Greg Egan 'sLumi n ous  andGraha m Pr ie st'sSylvan 's Bo x– is, or purpor ts t o be, imp oss ib le.  E ither such f ict ion s are n ot imag i nab le , t ho ugh the Gricean an al y s is  entails  theya re  i n tended t obeso,o r  they  are im aginable  but i m po ss ible, a lt houghth e m axi m ent a ilsthat i maginabi lityi s at least def e asible eviden c ef o rt heir  po ssibility,or t h ey a re i n  f act possi ble.Ii nt e nd to take up thispr oblemelsew here. In themost strai g h t forwardcase ,  o n e learns fromreadi ng a ficti o n by ima ginin g what t hat ficti o n  represe nts , a ndthe r e by  learning tha t what  i t repre sen ts is p oss ibl e.Inth e case in  which I  l ea rn  f rom  TheD isposses se d t ha t a n ana r chistutopi a is  p os s ibl e, fore xa m p le,Ido  sobyim aging  ind eta il an a narchistuto p ia,an dthereby  learning tha tthat utopi aispossib l e . But in  less straightforward c a ses, on e m ay le arnfrom fict ion  whatisn ecessa ry, wh at wo ul d b e ,  what m ig htbe , and what i s p robab le . Iwill di scuss each case in tur n. Just as im agi nabi l i ty  is ag uid et o w h a t is possible,unimaginab il i ty  is a guid e  to  w hat isimpossi ble.I  believ e squarecircles a re  imp o s sib le, for ex ample, b ecause Ih ave t r ie d toima gine a  s qua re ci rcle,b utcanno t. Itmi ght be  thou gh t one ca nnot learn about imposs ibilit y fro m f iction in  th i s w ay, since  suc cessful fi cti onenabl eso ne to  ima g in e w h at it  rep r esents, b u ttol e ar n that some t h i ngis im pos s ible,onehas to fail to im a gine that thin g. Y e t  be ing unab le  to imagine wh ataw o rk of fi ct ion represe nts is u su a lly a  sourc e of f rustrat i o n, not kn owle dge . But alt hou gh in read in gf iction , on eimagin es wha t  the f iction represent s, on e alsot rie s toim agine o t herpossibilit ies compati ble wi th t he fi ction's  p resupp osi ti ons. If af iction is  comp elling,  o ne m aynot su ccee d in im agin in g a ny altern a t iv e ,an d  so  lea rn th at  suc h an alte r native i s i m possibl e.  Fr o m  a tim e -t r a vel storyabo ut Ti m ' s attempts to p r ev e nt hi s ownbirth,  for ex a mpl e
 possible_that water_is not hydrogen oxide._Likewise, If_I_read in_a_novel that water_is not hydrogen_oxide, and so come_to imagine that_water_is not hydrogen oxide, I can't learn from that novel that water is possibly_not_hydrogen oxide._I'll_ignore_a posteriori necessity here, but_I believe a two-dimensionalism solution_to this_problem (see, for example, Chalmers 2002). Third, if_all_fiction is imaginable,_and all imaginabilities are possibilities, then all fiction is_possible (Matravers 2014, 118). But some_fiction – such_as_Ted_Chiang's 9 Division by_Zero, Greg Egan's Luminous and Graham_Priest's Sylvan's Box – is, or_purports to be, impossible. Either such fictions_are not imaginable, though the Gricean_analysis entails they are intended_to be_so, or they are imaginable_but impossible, although_the maxim_entails that imaginability_is at least defeasible evidence for_their possibility, or_they are in fact possible. I_intend_to take up_this_problem_elsewhere. In_the most straightforward_case,_one learns_from_reading a fiction by imagining what_that_fiction represents, and thereby learning that what_it represents is possible._In_the case in which_I learn from The Dispossessed_that an anarchist utopia is possible,_for example,_I do_so by imaging in detail an anarchist utopia, and thereby learning_that that utopia is possible. But_in less straightforward cases,_one may_learn_from fiction what_is_necessary, what_would be, what might be, and what_is probable._I will discuss each case in_turn. Just as imaginability_is_a guide to what is possible,_unimaginability is a guide to what_is impossible. I believe square_circles_are_impossible, for example, because I_have tried to imagine a square_circle, but cannot._It might be thought one cannot learn_about_impossibility from fiction in this way,_since_successful fiction enables one to imagine_what_it_represents, but to learn that_something is impossible, one has to_fail to imagine that thing. Yet being unable to_imagine what a_work of fiction represents is_usually_a_source of frustration, not knowledge. But although in reading fiction,_one imagines_what the fiction_represents, one also tries to imagine other possibilities compatible with_the fiction's presuppositions. If a fiction is_compelling, one may not succeed in imagining any alternative, and so_learn that such an alternative is impossible. From_a time-travel story about Tim's attempts to_prevent his own birth,_for_example