 insured. If an insurance claim were filed, which ship was identical to the ship of Theseus would make a difference in the history of the world. So, we couldn't tell the story 'either way without anything being omitted'. Swinburne holds that we can tell the history of the world with stories in terms of fundamental particles, and also with stories in terms of 'organisms and artefacts' (and, I assume, mental substances). (Swinburne 2013: 32) However, if substances are no more than their parts in certain arrangements, it seems to follow that artefacts cannot be substances. The exclusion of artefacts as substances so construed can be illustrated by a fanciful example of two (non-identical) kinds of artefacts made of duplicate qualitatively identical parts arranged in the same way: Suppose that someone invented a device that mixed water and air and was used in a process of making soft drinks; call the device a 'drinkalator'. Suppose that it turned out that exactly the same physically possible structures that could be drinkalators could also be carburettors. But drinkalators are not identical to carburettors, which mix gasoline and air in automobiles; both types of artefacts are distinguished by the intentions and practices of the 10 LYNNE RUDDER BAKER designers, manufacturers, and users. The identity of an artefact is not determined by its parts and their arrangement: 'X is a carburettor' and 'X is a drinkalator' have different truth conditions. (Baker 1995: 195–99) No carburettor is identical to a drinkalator. So, either carburettors and drinkalators – and artefacts generally – fail to be substances or Swinburne's principle of the identity of composites is incorrect. Other terminological matters: Swinburne defines a mental property 'as one to whose instantiation in it a substance necessarily has privileged access on all occasions of its instantiation' (Swinburne 2013: 67). And 'A mental substance is one for which the possession of some mental property is essential' (Swinburne 2013: 43). A physical property is defined 'as one to whose instantiation in it a substance necessarily has no privileged access on any occasion of its instantiation' (Swinburne 2013: 68). A pure mental property is defined as one 'whose instantiation in a substance does not entail the instantiation of any metaphysically contingent physical property in that
insured. If an insurance claim were filed, which ship was identical to the ship of Theseus would seduce a remainder in the history of the world. So, we couldn't tell the floor' either way without anything being omitted'. Swinburne oblige that we can tell the history of the world with narrative in terms of fundamental particle, and also with stories in term of' organisms and artefacts' (and, I assume, mental substances). (Swinburne 2013: 32) However, if substance are no more than their parts in certain arrangements, it seem to follow that artefacts cannot be substances. The exclusion of artifact as substances indeed construed can be illustrated by a fanciful example of two (non - identical) kind of artefacts made of duplicate qualitatively identical parts arranged in the same way: presuppose that someone invented a device that mixed water and air and was used in a process of making soft drinks; call the device a' drinkalator'. think that it turned out that exactly the like physically potential structures that could be drinkalators could also be carburettors. But drinkalators are not identical to carburettors, which shuffle gasoline and air in automobiles; both types of artefacts are identify by the intentions and practices of the 10 LYNNE RUDDER BAKER designers, manufacturers, and exploiter. The identity of an artefact is not determined by its parts and their arrangement:' ten is a carburettor' and' ten is a drinkalator' have different truth conditions. (Baker 1995: 195–99) No carburettor is identical to a drinkalator. therefore, either carburettors and drinkalators – and artefacts generally – fail to be meaning or Swinburne's principle of the identity of composites is incorrect. Other terminological matter: Swinburne defines a genial property' as one to whose instantiation in it a substance necessarily has privileged access on all juncture of its instantiation' (Swinburne 2013: 67). And' A mental kernel is one for which the possession of some genial property is essential' (Swinburne 2013: 43). A physical place is defined' as one to whose instantiation in it a substance necessarily has no privileged access on any occasion of its instantiation' (Swinburne 2013: 68). A pure mental property is defined as one' whose instantiation in a substance does not fee-tail the instantiation of any metaphysically contingent physical property in that
 indured. If an insurance clxim were filed, cyich siip was identicxl to the ship of Theseus wonld nake q difference in the hirtory of nhe world. So, xe couldn't tell vge storn 'eitgcr wav xithout anythinn being omidted'. Swinburne hulbs that we can tell the history of tre worlc aith stories ig tegmf of fundamental particles, and also wifh storpes in terms of 'otganisms and artefacts' (and, I adsume, mental substwnces). (Swinbodne 2013: 32) However, if substances are no morg than their parts in certain arfangekents, it sgzns hm follow thet artvfacts cannot be subsdances. Yhe exclusion pf ertedacts as substances sm construed can be illustradeb by a fanciful exampoe of tfo (nmn-iddbtizal) kmnda of agtehacts made kf duplicatw qualitatively idemtybsl parts arrznged yn the same way: Suppose that someone invettes a device that mixed wqter and air and was osed in a [rocess of making soft drinks; call the device a 'dsinkamxtox'. Suppuwe that it turned out that exactly the same phyfjcslky possible stvuctures that coulc he qrinkalators zould cmsk be carburettors. Hut drigkalarors are got odentical to carburettors, wyich mix gasjoine and air in aucomobiles; boch typgs of srtefacts are distinguirhed by the intfntions aha practices of tfe 10 LFNNE RUDDER BAKER designerf, manufacvurerx, and urers. The iqentity of an avdefact is not detegmineb by hts parts wnd their arrangement: 'X is a cacuurettor' and 'C hs d drinkajator' have differegt truth condijions. (Bakzr 1995: 195–99) Nu carburetnor is idxntical to a drinkalator. Vl, either caruurettors and dribkalatofr – and artefacys generally – fail ro be substances ov Swivgurne's principlz if the identity of coiplsmtes yv incorrect. Mthef tdtminouogical matberr: Swonburne defines a mettal property 'as one tp rhose inwtantiatyon in it a sibstance necessaripy hav pcivilebed access on all occasions of ita instantlatlon' (Swinburne 2013: 67). Akd 'A mental suystance is one for which the possession if some mental property is essential' (Xeinburne 2013: 43). E physycal proparty is defined 'as obe to whose instaktiation in it a substznce nacesswrily has no privileged access on any occasion of its instantiation' (Swinbyrne 2013: 68). A pure mentzl ptoperny ns befined as lie 'whose instantistion in a substance does not eitail the hnftantiation of any metaphysivauly contingenj physical property in thaf
insured. If an insurance claim were filed, was to the of Theseus would history the world. So, couldn't tell the 'either way without anything being omitted'. holds that we can tell the history of the world with stories in of fundamental particles, and also with stories in terms of 'organisms and artefacts' I mental (Swinburne 32) However, if substances are no more than their parts in certain arrangements, it seems to that artefacts cannot be substances. The exclusion of as substances so construed be illustrated by a fanciful of (non-identical) kinds artefacts of qualitatively identical parts in the same way: Suppose that someone invented a device that mixed water and air and was in a making soft call device 'drinkalator'. Suppose that out that exactly the same physically could be drinkalators could also be carburettors. But are not to carburettors, which mix gasoline and in automobiles; both types of artefacts are distinguished the intentions and practices of the 10 LYNNE RUDDER BAKER designers, manufacturers, and users. The an artefact is not by its parts their 'X a and 'X a drinkalator' have different truth conditions. (Baker 1995: 195–99) No carburettor identical to a drinkalator. So, either carburettors and drinkalators – generally fail to be or Swinburne's principle of identity composites is incorrect. Other Swinburne a one whose in it a substance has privileged access on all of its instantiation' (Swinburne substance is one for which the possession of mental property is essential' (Swinburne 2013: 43). physical property is defined 'as one to whose instantiation in it a necessarily has access on any occasion of its instantiation' (Swinburne 68). A pure mental is defined as one 'whose instantiation in a substance not the instantiation any metaphysically contingent property in that
 insured. If an insurance claim Were filed, wHich sHip Was IdEntiCal tO the ship of ThesEUs woUld make a difference in thE histOrY Of thE WoRld. So, We couldN'T tELL thE sToRy 'eItHEr Way wiThoUt anythIng being omIttEd'. swinburne holDS tHat we can teLl tHe history of tHe wOrld wiTh StoRIes in TerMs of fUndameNTal parTicles, and AlSO with sTOries in TERmS of 'oRganisms and artefaCTs' (ANd, I assume, mentaL substAnCEs). (sWInbUrnE 2013: 32) However, if SuBstanCEs are no MOrE THAn tHEir parts in cerTain arrangeMEntS, it seeMs To fOLlow thAt artEfACts Cannot be subStanCes. The excLusion OF artefaCTs as subStanceS so ConStruED cAn Be iLlUStrATeD by A FanCiful exaMpLe Of two (Non-iDENTIcal) KinDs of ArtefActs made of dupLicAte qUAliTativEly idEntiCaL partS arranGed in ThE same way: Suppose That Someone inVenTeD a dEvIce thAT mixed WatEr aNd air anD was useD In a PrOCESs Of making soft drinks; CaLL ThE device a 'DrinkaLAtOr'. sUppose thAt It tUrneD OUt thaT exaCTlY the same PhysicALlY pOssible StRucturEs ThaT coUld be DRinkAlatorS could alSo be cARburettors. But dRInkalators are NOt IDEnTIcal To cArburettors, WhicH Mix gAsolINe And AIr in aUtomoBiLEs; BOth types of artefacts ArE distiNguisHed by the intenTions and prACTIces of thE 10 LYNne RudDER BAKER desigNers, mAnufactureRS, and userS. The iDentity oF an artefaCT Is not detErmIneD by Its PARtS and their arraNGEmenT: 'X Is a carbUreTtor' and 'x is A drInkAlaToR' have diffErent truTh CoNdItIonS. (BakeR 1995: 195–99) no carburEtTor Is IdeNticaL To a driNkalaTor. SO, eItHEr cArburetTOrS ANd drInKaLatoRs – aNd ArtefActs GEneRally – faIl to be subStaNCes oR SWiNburne's Principle of thE iDentity of cOmPosItes is INCorrect. OTher terminological matteRS: SwinbuRne DefinEs a mEntal propErtY 'as one To wHOse insTantiaTion iN iT a sUBStancE NEcEssArIly has privILEgeD acceSs On alL occasiOns of its instantiatIOn' (SWinburne 2013: 67). And 'A mEntAl suBSTaNce IS oNE foR wHIch THE possession of soMe mental prOpERtY is essentiAL' (SwInBurne 2013: 43). A pHysical PropeRTy is defIned 'as one To whose inStAntiATIon In it a substAnce neceSsarily haS No priVIlEged aCceSs on anY oCcaSion oF its inSTanTiatiOn' (SwinBuRne 2013: 68). A puRe menTaL propertY is defined as one 'whose insTantiaTion iN a sUbstance dOes NOt eNtail the iNstaNtiation of Any MetAphysIcaLLy conTingENt PhySIcal pRopeRTy in that
 insured. If an insuranceclaim were  file d,whi ch  shi p wa s identical to theship of Theseus wouldmakead iffe r en ce in  the hi s to r y  of  t he  wo rl d .So, w e c ouldn't  tell thesto ry  'either way wi thout anyt hin g being omit ted '. Swi nb urn e  hold s t hat w e cant ell th e history  o f  the w o rld wit h st orie s in terms of fun d am e ntal particles , andal s ow i thsto ries in te rm s of' organis m sa n d  ar t efacts' (and,  I assume,m ent al sub st anc e s). (S winbu rn e  20 13: 32) How ever , if subs tances are nom ore tha n thei r p art s in ce rt ain  a r ran g em ent s , i t seemsto  f ollow  tha t a r tefa cts  can not b e substances.  Th e ex c lus ion o f art efac ts  as s ubstan ces s oconstrued can b e il lustrated  by  a  fa nc ifule xample  of  tw o (non- identic a l)ki n d s  o f artefacts made o fd u pl icate qu alitat i ve ly identica lpar ts a r r anged  int he  same wa y: Sup p os ethat so me one in ve nte d a  devi c e th at mix ed water  anda ir and was use d  in a process of m ak i ng s oft  drinks; ca ll t h e de vice a'dr i nkala tor'.  S u pp o se that it turned o ut  thatexact ly the same p hysicallyp o s sible st ruct u re s  that could be  drin kalators c o uld also  be c arburett ors. Butd r inkalato rsare  no t i d e nt ical to carbu r e ttor s,  whichmix  gasoli neand  ai r i nautomobil es; both  t yp es  o f a rtefa c ts are d is tin gu ish ed by the in tenti onsan dp rac tices o f  t h e  10LY NN E RU DDE RBAKER  des i gne rs, man ufacturer s,a nd u se rs . The i dentity of an  a rtefact is  n otdeterm i n ed by it s parts and their arran g ement:'Xis acarb urettor'and  'X is  ad rinkal ator'havedi ffe r e nt tr u t hcon di tions. (Ba k e r 1 995:19 5–99 ) No ca rburettor is ident i cal  to a drinkal ato r. S o ,  e ith e rc arb ur e tto r s  and drinkalato rs – and a rt e fa cts genera l ly–fail to  be sub stanc e s or Sw inburne's  principl eof t h e  id entity ofcomposit es is inc o rrect .  O therter minolo gi cal  matt ers: S w inb urnedefine sa ment al pr op erty 'as  one to whose instantia tion i n ita s ubstancenec e ssa rily haspriv ileged acc ess  on  allocc a sions  ofi ts  in s tanti atio n ' (Swinbu r ne  20 1 3 :67). And 'A m e nta l sub sta n ce isonefor which the pos s ession of some  men t a l p rop e rtyis  essential' (S win bu r n e 2013:43 ). A physic al prope rt y  is d efined  'as o ne to w h o se instan tiat ion  in it asub st a nce nec es sa r ily ha s no  p rivile ged ac c esso n  any occasion of  itsi n stant i ati on' ( Sw inburne 2013 : 68). A p ure mentalproper ty i s def ined as  o ne 'wh ose  i nstantiati o n in a su bstan ce does  n ot e nta il the  ins t a ntiat ionof  an y metaphy s i ca l ly  c o nti ngen t phy si calpropertyi n that
 insured._If an_insurance claim were filed,_which ship_was_identical to_the_ship of Theseus_would make a_difference in the history_of the world._So,_we couldn't tell the story 'either way without anything being omitted'. Swinburne holds that_we_can tell_the_history_of the world with stories_in terms of fundamental particles,_and also_with stories in terms of 'organisms and artefacts'_(and,_I assume, mental_substances). (Swinburne 2013: 32) However, if substances are no_more than their parts in certain_arrangements, it seems_to_follow_that artefacts cannot be_substances. The exclusion of artefacts as_substances so construed can be illustrated_by a fanciful example of two (non-identical)_kinds of artefacts made of duplicate_qualitatively identical parts arranged in_the same_way: Suppose that someone invented_a device that_mixed water_and air and_was used in a process of_making soft drinks;_call the device a 'drinkalator'. Suppose_that_it turned out_that_exactly_the same_physically possible structures_that_could be_drinkalators_could also be carburettors. But drinkalators_are_not identical to carburettors, which mix gasoline_and air in automobiles;_both_types of artefacts are_distinguished by the intentions and_practices of the 10 LYNNE RUDDER_BAKER designers,_manufacturers, and_users. The identity of an artefact is not determined by its_parts and their arrangement: 'X is_a carburettor' and 'X_is a_drinkalator'_have different truth_conditions._(Baker 1995:_195–99) No carburettor is identical to a_drinkalator. So,_either carburettors and drinkalators – and_artefacts generally – fail_to_be substances or Swinburne's principle of_the identity of composites is incorrect._Other terminological matters: Swinburne defines_a_mental_property 'as one to whose_instantiation in it a substance necessarily_has privileged access_on all occasions of its instantiation' (Swinburne_2013:_67). And 'A mental substance is_one_for which the possession of some_mental_property_is essential' (Swinburne 2013: 43)._A physical property is defined 'as_one to whose instantiation in it a substance necessarily_has no privileged_access on any occasion of_its_instantiation'_(Swinburne 2013: 68). A pure mental property is defined as_one 'whose_instantiation in a_substance does not entail the instantiation of any metaphysically contingent_physical property in that