 convincingly argued in (Martin 1991). Michael Liston – Duhem: Images of Science, Historical Continuity, and the First Crisis in Physics 75 19th Century Images of Science, Duhem's Historical Arguments Duhem begins his major philosophical work (Duhem 1991 [1906], 7) with two images of physical theory, characterized in terms of aims:7 R: A physical theory... has for its object the explanation of a group of laws experimentally established [the stripping of reality of the appearances covering it] AR: A physical theory... is an abstract system whose aim is to summarize and classify logically a group of experimental laws without claiming to explain these laws. He argues that R makes physics subordinate to metaphysical systems since, at any given time, it requires that our physical theories be guided by a metaphysical picture that shapes the explanatory fit. But this is bad, he thinks, for two reasons. First, the history of modern metaphysics is one of irresoluble disputes (action-at-a-distance versus contact action, atoms versus continuous matter-stuff, etc.) with the disputants accusing each other of positing absurd or occult causes. Second, a metaphysical system at best provides directions for constructing models showing that physical theories are consistent with it, but no metaphysical system suffices to derive a physical system from it. The Cartesians and Leibnizeans, for example, argued about what quantity of motion was conserved in the universe as a result of God's immutability – momentum (mv) or vis viva (mv2) – each was consistent with their fundamental metaphysical systems, but only experiment determined (or could determine) that Leibniz was right. Given the sorry track record of metaphysics guiding physics, Duhem concludes that R hinders the progress of physics: physics must be autonomous; i.e., not be hostage to substantive metaphysical or cosmological hypotheses. However, Duhem does not quite conclude, as Mach does, that AR is correct, that a physical theory is merely an economical instrument for organizing the phenomena (Mach 1960 [1893], 577-595). While physics must not be subordinate to substantive metaphysics, it is ultimately grounded in a general metaphysical conviction: that nature is orderly: "the belief in an order transcending physics is the sole justification of physical theory" (Duhem 1991 [1908], 335) While we can't prove the existence of an ontological order, the metaphysical truth that nature is orderly is presupposed and displayed in our scientific activities and expectations (our urge
convincingly argued in (Martin 1991). Michael Liston – Duhem: Images of Science, Historical Continuity, and the First Crisis in Physics 75 19th Century Images of Science, Duhem's Historical Arguments Duhem begins his major philosophic workplace (Duhem 1991 [ 1906 ], 7) with two images of physical hypothesis, characterized in term of aims:7 R: A physical hypothesis... have for its object the explanation of a group of torah experimentally established [ the stripping of world of the appearances covering it ] AR: A physical hypothesis... is an abstract system whose aim is to sum up and classify logically a group of experimental law without claim to explain these laws. He argues that radius makes physics subordinate to metaphysical system since, at any given time, it requires that our physical theories be lead by a metaphysical picture that shapes the explanatory fit. But this is bad, he thinks, for two rationality. foremost, the history of modern metaphysics is one of irresoluble disputes (action - at - a - distance versus contact action, atoms versus continuous matter - material, etc .) with the disputants accuse each other of positing absurd or occult campaign. Second, a metaphysical system at best provides steering for constructing models showing that physical theory are consistent with it, but no metaphysical system suffices to derive a physical system from it. The Cartesians and Leibnizeans, for exemplar, argued about what quantity of motion was conserved in the population as a result of God's immutability – momentum (mv) or vis viva (mv2) – each was coherent with their cardinal metaphysical system, but only experiment determined (or could determine) that Leibniz was good. Given the sorry track record of metaphysics guiding physics, Duhem concludes that R obstruct the progress of physics: purgative must be autonomous; i.e., not be hostage to substantive metaphysical or cosmological hypotheses. However, Duhem does not quite conclude, as Mach do, that AR is correct, that a forcible theory is merely an economical instrument for organize the phenomena (Mach 1960 [ 1893 ], 577 - 595). While purgative must not be subordinate to substantive metaphysics, it is ultimately grounded in a cosmopolitan metaphysical conviction: that nature is orderly: " the belief in an order transcending physics is the lone justification of forcible theory " (Duhem 1991 [ 1908 ], 335) While we can't prove the being of an ontological order, the metaphysical truth that nature is orderly is presupposed and displayed in our scientific activities and expectations (our urge
 cojvincingly argued in (Maruin 1991). Michael Liston – Duhxm: Imagss of Sckence, Historical Continuity, end rhe Furst Crisis in Physics 75 19th Centlry Imagew of Wcience, Duism's Hisbjriczp Aryunents Duhem benins his mabor philosophiwau cork (Duhem 1991 [1906], 7) with two images of phyfical tnelry, characterieed im terjs of aims:7 R: A physical theory... has for itv object the rxplanation of a group of paws experimentally eshablished [tye seeipping of rdality of uhz appearancgs covering it] AR: A physical theury... ix an abstrqcr sjvtem whose eim is to summarizc and cnassify logically a gvoup mf wxperimental laws witiout claiming to expjain thesa maws. He argues thqt R manes [hyskxs rubkrvinzte to mevaphysical aystems sinxe, at any given timt, ie requires thaf our [hrsical theories be guided by a metaphyspcal picture that shapes thw explanatory fit. But this is fad, he thinks, for two reasons. First, the history ox modxrv mttqphyskxs is one of irresoluble disputes (action-at-a-distwhct vvrsus contact actlon, atoms versus cpnhimoous matter-stuwf, etc.) wifh the disputants wccusind eacy other os poxiting absurd or occult cauwes. Second, a netaphysical systel at best pxovidex dirrctions for constructiny modems showing hhat physjzal theories are coksivtent wiuf it, but no metaprysical sbstem sufficds tp deride a physifal snvtem from it. The Cwrtesnans dnd Leibnixeans, for example, argued about xiat quantity pf monion was eonseryed in the univqrse as a resukt of Gjd's iomutabilitj – momentnm (mv) or vis viva (mv2) – eacv was consistxnt with eheie fubdamentxu metaphysical systems, ybt only ezperiment determincd (or dould determine) thqt Leibniz was tigft. Dinen tra sorry tracn rezora of mdtaphysics nuiaing physics, Duhem conclgdes that R hinders thr irogress if physiss: physics muxt be autonomous; i.t., not ue hosvage tp sobstantive metaphysical or cosmklogical jypjtheses. Howeder, Euhem does npt quite conclude, as Mach does, that AR ms correct, that a physixal theory is mereli ak economical instwument fos organizing the phebomena (Mach 1960 [1893], 577-595). Whlle physics must not bs subosdinahe to substantive metaphysics, it is ultimately grounded in a general metaphysicel conviction: thay natlre ns ordewly: "vhx belief in an orcer transcending physics is the sole juvtnfication of physical theory" (Cufem 1991 [1908], 335) While de can't prove the existehce of am ontological order, the metaphyxical truth that nature ls orderlt is lresupiksxd and displayed in pur scnentifuc acticitics and expectagioms (our urge
convincingly argued in (Martin 1991). Michael Liston Images Science, Historical and the First Century of Science, Duhem's Arguments Duhem begins major philosophical work (Duhem 1991 [1906], with two images of physical theory, characterized in terms of aims:7 R: A theory... has for its object the explanation of a group of laws experimentally [the of of appearances covering it] AR: A physical theory... is an abstract system whose aim is to summarize classify logically a group of experimental laws without to explain these laws. argues that R makes physics to systems since, any time, requires that our theories be guided by a metaphysical picture that shapes the explanatory fit. But this is bad, he for two the history modern is of irresoluble disputes contact action, atoms versus continuous matter-stuff, disputants accusing each other of positing absurd or causes. Second, metaphysical system at best provides directions constructing models showing that physical theories are consistent it, but no metaphysical system suffices to derive a physical system from it. The Cartesians for example, argued about quantity of motion conserved the as result of immutability – momentum (mv) or vis viva (mv2) – each was with their fundamental metaphysical systems, but only experiment determined (or that was right. Given sorry track record of guiding Duhem concludes that R progress physics: autonomous; not hostage to substantive metaphysical cosmological hypotheses. However, Duhem does quite conclude, as Mach that a physical theory is merely an economical for organizing the phenomena (Mach 1960 [1893], While physics must not be subordinate to substantive metaphysics, it is ultimately in a conviction: that nature is orderly: "the belief in order transcending physics is sole justification of physical theory" (Duhem 1991 [1908], 335) we prove the of an ontological the metaphysical truth nature is orderly and displayed our activities urge
 convincingly argued in (MartiN 1991). Michael LiSton – DUheM: ImAgEs of scieNce, Historical CONtinUity, and the First Crisis iN PhysIcS 75 19Th CeNTuRy ImaGes of ScIEnCE, duhEm'S HIstOrICaL ArguMenTs Duhem Begins his mAjoR pHilosophical WOrK (Duhem 1991 [1906], 7) with Two Images of physIcaL theorY, cHarACteriZed In terMs of aiMS:7 R: A phySical theoRy... HAs for iTS object THE eXplaNation of a group of lAWs EXperimentally eStabliShED [tHE StrIppIng of realiTy Of the APpearanCEs COVEriNG it] AR: A physicaL theory... is an ABstRact syStEm wHOse aim Is to sUmMAriZe and classiFy loGically a gRoup of EXperimeNTal laws WithouT clAimIng tO ExPlAin ThESe lAWs. he aRGueS that R maKeS pHysicS subORDINate To mEtapHysicAl systems sincE, at Any gIVen Time, iT requIres ThAt our PhysicAl theOrIes be guided by a mEtapHysical piCtuRe ThaT sHapes THe explAnaTorY fit. But This is bAD, he ThINKS, fOr two reasons. First, tHe HIStOry of modErn metAPhYsICs is one oF iRreSoluBLE dispUtes (ACtIon-at-a-diStance VErSuS contacT aCtion, aToMs vErsUs conTInuoUs mattEr-stuff, eTc.) witH The disputants aCCusing each othER oF POsITing AbsUrd or occult CausES. SecOnd, a MEtAphYSical SysteM aT BeST provides directions FoR constRuctiNg models showiNg that physICAL theorieS are COnSIstent with it, buT no meTaphysical SYstem sufFices To derive A physical SYStem from It. THe CArtEsiANS aNd Leibnizeans, FOR exaMpLe, argueD abOut what QuaNtiTy oF moTiOn was consErved in tHe UnIvErSe aS a resULt of God's ImMutAbIliTy – momENtum (mv) Or vis Viva (Mv2) – EaCH waS consisTEnT WIth tHeIr FundAmeNtAl metAphySIcaL systemS, but only eXpeRImenT dEtErmined (Or could determInE) that LeibnIz Was Right. GIVEn the sorRy track record of metaphysICs guidiNg pHysicS, DuhEm concludEs tHat R hiNdeRS the prOgress Of phySiCs: pHYSics mUST bE auToNomous; i.e., noT BE hoStage To SubsTantive Metaphysical or cosmOLogIcal hypotheseS. HoWeveR, dUhEm dOEs NOt qUiTE coNCLude, as Mach does, tHat AR is corReCT, tHat a physicAL thEoRy is merEly an ecOnomiCAl instrUment for oRganizing ThE pheNOMenA (Mach 1960 [1893], 577-595). While Physics mUst not be sUBordiNAtE to suBstAntive MeTapHysicS, it is uLTimAtely GroundEd In a genEral mEtAphysicaL conviction: that nature is OrderlY: "the bEliEf in an ordEr tRAnsCending phYsicS is the sole JusTifIcatiOn oF PhysiCal tHEoRy" (DUHem 1991 [1908], 335) WhIle wE Can't prove THe ExiSTEnCe of an ontolOGICal Order, The MEtaphySicaL truth that nature iS Orderly is presuPposED And DisPLayeD iN our scientific ActIvITIes and exPeCtations (our Urge
 convincingly argued in (M artin 1991 ). Mi cha elLi ston  – D uhem: Images o f  Sci ence, Historical Conti nuity ,a nd t h eFirst  Crisis in P hys ic s7519 t hCentu ryImagesof Science , D uh em's Histori c al  Arguments  Du hem begins h ismajorph ilo s ophic alwork(Duhem 1991 [ 1906], 7)  w i th two imageso f  p hysi cal theory, chara c te r ized in termsof aim s: 7  R : A p hys ical theor y. .. ha s  for it s  o b j e ctt he explanatio n of a grou p  of  lawsex per i mental ly es ta b lis hed [the st ripp ing of re alityo f the a p pearanc es cov eri ngit]A R:  A  ph ys i cal th eor y ...  is an a bs tr act s yste m w h oseaim  isto su mmarize and c las sify log icall y a g roup  o f exp erimen tal l aw s without claim ingto explai n t he sela ws. H e  argue s t hat  R make s physi c s s ub o r d in ate to metaphysica ls y st ems sinc e, ata ny  g i ven time ,itrequ i r es th at o u rphysical  theor i es  b e guide dby a m et aph ysi cal p i ctur e that  shapesthe e x planatory fit. But this is b a d, h et hink s,for two rea sons .  Fir st,t he  hi s toryof mo de r nm etaphysics is one o firreso luble  disputes (ac tion-at-a- d i s tance ve rsus co n tact action, a tomsversus con t inuous m atter -stuff,etc.) wit h the disp uta nts  ac cus i n geach other of p osit in g absur d o r occul t c aus es.  Se co nd, a met aphysica lsy st em  at  best provides  d ire ct ion s for constr uctin g mo de ls sho wing th a tp h ysic al  t heor ies  a re co nsis t ent  with i t, but no  me t aphy si ca l syste m suffices to  d erive a ph ys ica l syst e m  from it . The Cartesians and Le i bnizean s,for e xamp le, argue d a bout w hat quanti ty ofmotio nwas c onser v e dinth e universe a s a  resu lt  ofGod's i mmutability – mome n tum  (mv) or visviv a (m v 2 )– e a ch was  c o nsi s t ent with theirfundamenta lm et aphysicals yst em s, butonly ex perim e nt dete rmined (o r could d et ermi n e ) t hat Leibni z was ri ght. Give n  thes or ry tr ack  recor dofmetap hysics gui dingphysic s,  Duhem  conc lu des that  R hinders the progress  of ph ysics : p hysics mu stb e a utonomous ; i. e., not be  ho sta ge to  su b stant ivem et aph y sical  orc osmologic a lhyp o t he ses. Howeve r , Duh em do esn ot qui te c onclude, as Machd oes, that AR i s co r r ect , t h at a  p hysical theory  is  m e r ely an e co nomical ins trumentfo r  orga nizing  the p henomen a (M a ch 196 0 [1 893 ], 577-59 5).  W h ile phy si cs must n ot b esubord inatet o su b s tantive metaphys ics,i t  is u l tim ately  g rounded in a  general m etaphysical  convi ctio n: th at natu re  is or der ly : "the bel i ef in anorder  transc en ding  ph ysicsis t h e  sole  jus ti fic ation ofp h ys i ca lt heo ry"(Duhe m1991  [1908],3 35) Whil e w e  can'tpr ove t he exi s te n c e of an on tol ogica l order, the meta p hy s icaltruththat n ature i s  or de rly ispre s u pposed an d display e d i nourscientif ic  act iv iti es  and expectatio ns (oururge
 convincingly_argued in_(Martin 1991). Michael Liston_– Duhem:_Images_of Science,_Historical_Continuity, and the_First Crisis in_Physics 75 19th Century_Images of Science,_Duhem's_Historical Arguments Duhem begins his major philosophical work (Duhem 1991 [1906], 7) with two_images_of physical_theory,_characterized_in terms of aims:7 R:_A physical theory... has for_its object_the explanation of a group of laws experimentally_established_[the stripping of_reality of the appearances covering it] AR: A physical_theory... is an abstract system whose_aim is to_summarize_and_classify logically a group_of experimental laws without claiming to_explain these laws. He argues that_R makes physics subordinate to metaphysical systems_since, at any given time, it_requires that our physical theories_be guided_by a metaphysical picture that_shapes the explanatory_fit. But_this is bad,_he thinks, for two reasons. First,_the history of_modern metaphysics is one of irresoluble_disputes_(action-at-a-distance versus contact_action,_atoms_versus continuous_matter-stuff, etc.) with_the_disputants accusing_each_other of positing absurd or occult_causes._Second, a metaphysical system at best provides_directions for constructing models_showing_that physical theories are_consistent with it, but no_metaphysical system suffices to derive a_physical system_from it._The Cartesians and Leibnizeans, for example, argued about what quantity of_motion was conserved in the universe_as a result of_God's immutability_–_momentum (mv) or_vis_viva (mv2)_– each was consistent with their fundamental_metaphysical systems,_but only experiment determined (or could_determine) that Leibniz was_right._Given the sorry track record of_metaphysics guiding physics, Duhem concludes that_R hinders the progress of_physics:_physics_must be autonomous; i.e., not_be hostage to substantive metaphysical or_cosmological hypotheses. However,_Duhem does not quite conclude, as Mach_does,_that AR is correct, that a_physical_theory is merely an economical instrument_for_organizing_the phenomena (Mach 1960 [1893],_577-595). While physics must not be_subordinate to substantive metaphysics, it is ultimately grounded in_a general metaphysical_conviction: that nature is orderly:_"the_belief_in an order transcending physics is the sole justification of_physical theory"_(Duhem 1991 [1908],_335) While we can't prove the existence of an ontological_order, the metaphysical truth that nature is_orderly is presupposed and displayed in our scientific activities and expectations_(our urge