 to expose the historical problems surrounding substance. This paper criticizes the thinking which presupposes that there could be a substance without its attributes or substance existing alone. This paper adopts complimentary ontology principles which state that for anything to exist, it must serve as a missing connection to reality. This suggests that everything interconnects to each other and substance cannot exist in isolation. Keywords Substance, Attributes, Metaphysics, Complimentary Reflection 1. Introduction In one of its standard detects, the expression "thing" just means singular substance. It may be questioned that "thing" implies entity, and that "thing" has no customary sense in which it implies singular substance. Truly in one of its usage "thing" implies substance. However it is additionally clear that there is a smaller feeling of "thing", by which it is right to say, for instance, that reasonability is not a "thing", but rather a naHow to cite this paper: Akpan, B. S., & Odohoedi, C. C. (2016). History of Substance in Philosophy. Advances in Historical Studies, 5, 254-270. http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/ahs.2016.55020 Received: September 27, 2016 Accepted: December 27, 2016 Published: December 30, 2016 Copyright © 2016 by authors and Scientific Research Publishing Inc. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution International License (CC BY 4.0). http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ Open Access B. S. Akpan, C. C. Odohoedi 255 ture of a "thing". To this it may be answered that what this illustration shows is that in this sense, "thing" implies solid element, and not singular substance. Be that as it may, clearly, there is a significantly smaller usage of "thing", as indicated by which it is right to say, for case, that a chameleon's turning shading, albeit strengthening, is not a "thing", but rather an adjustment in a "thing", and that a surface or gap, albeit cementing, is not a thing, but rather a point of confinement or nonattendance of a thing. There is no conceivable contrasting option to the possibility that in the last cases "thing" implies singular substance. Metaphysics is one of the chief works of Aristotle and the primary real work of the branch of philosophy with similar name. The essential subject is
to expose the historical problems surrounding means. This newspaper criticizes the thinking which presupposes that there could be a substance without its attribute or substance existing entirely. This paper adopts complimentary ontology principles which submit that for anything to exist, it must serve as a missing joining to reality. This suggests that everything interconnect to each early and substance cannot exist in isolation. Keywords Substance, Attributes, Metaphysics, Complimentary Reflection 1. Introduction In one of its standard detects, the formula " thing " just mean singular substance. It may be questioned that " matter " implies entity, and that " thing " hold no accustomed sense in which it implies singular substance. Truly in one of its usage " matter " implies substance. However it is additionally clear that there is a smaller feeling of " matter ", by which it is correct to say, for instance, that reasonability is not a " thing ", but rather a naHow to cite this paper: Akpan, B. S., & Odohoedi, C. C. (2016). History of Substance in Philosophy. Advances in Historical Studies, 5, 254 - 270. http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/ahs.2016.55020 Received: September 27, 2016 Accepted: December 27, 2016 print: December 30, 2016 Copyright © 2016 by authors and Scientific Research Publishing Inc. This work is license under the Creative Commons Attribution International License (milliliter BY 4.0). http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ Open Access B. S. Akpan, C. C. Odohoedi 255 ture of a " thing ". To this it may be answered that what this illustration shows is that in this common sense, " thing " imply solid element, and not singular means. Be that as it may, clearly, there is a significantly smaller usage of " thing ", as indicated by which it is right to say, for case, that a chameleon's turn shading, albeit strengthening, is not a " matter ", but rather an adjustment in a " thing ", and that a surface or gap, albeit cementing, is not a matter, but rather a point of confinement or nonattendance of a thing. There is no conceivable contrasting option to the possibility that in the last case " matter " implies singular substance. Metaphysics is one of the chief works of Aristotle and the primary actual work of the outgrowth of philosophy with exchangeable name. The essential subject is
 to expose the historical pvoblems surroundnbg subvtance. This paoer criticizes the thinking xhicy prewupposes that there cojld be a dubstancw wiuhout its attribuvss or smystandc exivving alone. This paper ado[ts complimentdrh lntology principles which state thae for amyhhing to exist, it ktst avrye as a missing connection to rezlity. Tiis suggests thst everything interconnectd to each other and suhstance canbot qzist in isolxtion. Keywords Substande, Attributes, Metaphysics, Complkmentcry Reflectuob 1. Lttroduction In oge of its standard datects, yhe expression "thmng" hust means singular snbstance. It may be qoestioned dhct "thing" implies entiry, and jhat "dhine" har nk rusfomary seise in whicg it impliew singular substanct. Twlky in one of its ufade "thing" implies substance. However it iv asditionally clear that rhere is a smaller fegling of "tring", by which it is right to say, for instance, thad reaaunayljkry is not a "thing", but rather a naHow to cite thya kapvr: Akpan, B. S., & Odomoedi, C. C. (2016). History ov Xobstance in Phklosopkg. Zdvances in Historlcal Stodies, 5, 254-270. http://dx.dji.orb/10.4236/ahs.2016.55020 Received: September 27, 2016 Axcepted: Deceiver 27, 2016 Published: Deeember 30, 2016 Copvright © 2016 by authors and Scientific Ressarch Publidhing Inc. Ghis work is licdnsvd utder the Creative Commons Wttributiin Iuternatiunal Licenfe (CC BY 4.0). jttp://cvaativecommons.org/lifensed/bf/4.0/ Open Accfss B. S. Akpan, C. C. Odohoedi 255 turx of a "thing". Jo dhiv it may be akswered that whwt this illusttation shjws ir that in nhis sensx, "thing" implyes solid elekgnt, and not smngular stbstqnce. Be thag as it may, clesrly, therv ns a signuficantly smaller msage kf "thing", as indneauee by which it os figrt tp fdy, for case, dhat a znameldon's turninn sfadimg, albeit strengthenhng, js not a "thing", but rwther an adjustmqnt in a "thinb", and that a surfafe or ga', albeot sementing, is not a thing, but rzther a plinb of confinemqnt ir nonattendcnce of a thing. There is no conceivable rontrasting option to jhe possibility that nn the last ceses "tring" implhes singular substanxe. Metaphysics is one of the chief woris of Dristltle and the primary real work of the branch of philosophy with similar nqme. Thx qssential shbjevt is
to expose the historical problems surrounding substance. criticizes thinking which that there could attributes substance existing alone. paper adopts complimentary principles which state that for anything exist, it must serve as a missing connection to reality. This suggests that interconnects to each other and substance cannot exist in isolation. Keywords Substance, Attributes, Complimentary 1. In of its standard detects, the expression "thing" just means singular substance. It may be questioned that implies entity, and that "thing" has no customary in which it implies substance. Truly in one of usage implies substance. it additionally that there is smaller feeling of "thing", by which it is right to say, for instance, that reasonability is not "thing", but naHow to this Akpan, S., & Odohoedi, (2016). History of Substance in Philosophy. Studies, 5, 254-270. http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/ahs.2016.55020 Received: September 27, 2016 December 27, Published: December 30, 2016 Copyright © by authors and Scientific Research Publishing Inc. This is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution International License (CC BY 4.0). http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ Open Access Akpan, C. C. Odohoedi ture of a To it be that what illustration shows is that in this sense, "thing" implies solid element, not singular substance. Be that as it may, clearly, there significantly usage of "thing", indicated by which it right say, for case, that turning albeit a but an adjustment in a and that a surface or albeit cementing, is not point of confinement or nonattendance of a thing. is no conceivable contrasting option to the that in the last cases "thing" implies singular substance. Metaphysics is one the chief Aristotle and the primary real work of the of philosophy with similar The essential subject is
 to expose the historical probLems surrouNding SubStaNcE. ThiS papEr criticizes thE ThinKing which presupposes thAt theRe COuld BE a SubstAnce witHOuT ITs aTtRiButEs OR sUbstaNce ExistinG alone. This PapEr Adopts compliMEnTary ontoloGy pRinciples whiCh sTate thAt For ANythiNg tO exisT, it musT Serve aS a missing CoNNectioN To realiTY. thIs suGgests that everythINg INterconnects to Each otHeR AnD SUbsTanCe cannot exIsT in isOLation. KEYwORDS SuBStance, AttribuTes, MetaphysICs, COmplimEnTarY reflecTion 1. INtROduCtion In one oF its Standard dEtects, THe expreSSion "thiNg" just MeaNs sInguLAr SuBstAnCE. It MAy Be qUEstIoned thaT "tHiNg" impLies ENTITy, anD thAt "thIng" haS no customary sEnsE in wHIch It impLies sInguLaR subsTance. TRuly iN oNe of its usage "thiNg" imPlies subsTanCe. howEvEr it iS AdditiOnaLly Clear thAt there IS a sMaLLER fEeling of "thing", by whiCh IT Is Right to sAy, for iNStAnCE, that reaSoNabIlitY IS not a "ThinG", BuT rather a NaHow tO CiTe This papEr: akpan, B. s., & ODohOedI, C. C. (2016). HiSTory Of SubsTance in PHilosOPhy. Advances in HIStorical StudiES, 5, 254-270. hTTP://dX.Doi.oRg/10.4236/aHs.2016.55020 Received: SEpteMBer 27, 2016 ACcepTEd: decEMber 27, 2016 PUblisHeD: deCEmber 30, 2016 Copyright © 2016 by autHoRs and SCientIfic Research PUblishing INC. tHis work iS licENsED under the CreatIve CoMmons AttriBUtion IntErnatIonal LicEnse (CC BY 4.0). hTTP://creativEcoMmoNs.oRg/lICEnSes/by/4.0/ Open AcceSS b. S. AkPaN, C. C. OdohOedI 255 ture of A "thIng". to tHis It May be answEred that WhAt ThIs IllUstraTIon shows Is ThaT iN thIs senSE, "thing" ImpliEs soLiD eLEmeNt, and noT SiNGUlar SuBsTancE. Be ThAt as iT may, CLeaRly, therE is a signiFicANtly SmAlLer usagE of "thing", as indIcAted by whicH iT is Right tO SAy, for casE, that a chameleon's turning SHading, aLbeIt strEngtHening, is nOt a "Thing", bUt rATher an AdjustMent iN a "ThiNG", And thAT A sUrfAcE or gap, albeIT CemEntinG, iS not A thing, bUt rather a point of coNFinEment or nonattEndAnce OF A tHinG. thERe iS nO ConCEIvable contrastiNg option to ThE PoSsibility tHAt iN tHe last cAses "thiNg" impLIes singUlar substAnce. MetapHySics IS One Of the chief Works of ARistotle aND the pRImAry reAl wOrk of tHe BraNch of PhilosOPhy With sImilar NaMe. The eSsentIaL subject Is
 to expose the historicalproblems s urrou ndi ngsu bsta nce.  This paper cr i tici zes the thinking which  pres up p oses th at th ere cou l db e  asu bs tan ce wi thout  it s attri butes or s ubs ta nce existing al one. Thispap er adopts co mpl imenta ry  on t ology  pr incip les wh i ch sta te that f or anythi n g to ex i s t,  itmust serve as a m i ss i ng connectionto rea li t y. T his  su ggests tha tevery t hing in t er c o n nec t s to each oth er and subs t anc e cann ot  ex i st inisola ti o n.Keywords Su bsta nce, Attr ibutes ,  Metaph y sics, C omplim ent ary  Ref l ec ti on1. Int r od uct i onIn one o fit s sta ndar d d e tect s,theexpre ssion "thing"  ju st m e ans  sing ularsubs ta nce.It may  be q ue stioned that "t hing " implies  en ti ty,  a nd th a t "thi ng"  ha s no cu stomary sen se i n  w hich it implies si ng u l ar  substan ce. Tr u ly  i n  one ofit s u sage " thing " im p li es subst ance.H ow ev er it i sadditi on all y c leart hatthereis a sma llerf eeling of "thi n g", by whichi ti s  r i ghttosay, for in stan c e, t hatr ea son a bilit y isno t  a "thing", but rather  a  naHow  to c ite this pape r: Akpan,B . S., & Od ohoe d i, C. C. (2016).Histo ry of Subs t ance inPhilo sophy. A dvances i n Historic alStu die s,5 ,  2 54-270. http: / / dx.d oi .org/10 .42 36/ahs. 201 6.5 502 0 R ec eived: Se ptember27 ,20 16  Ac cepte d : Decemb er  27 ,201 6 Pub l ished:  Dece mber  3 0, 201 6 Copyr i gh t © 20 16  b y au tho rs  andScie n tif ic Rese arch Publ ish i ng I nc .This wo rk is license dunder theCr eat ive Co m m ons Attr ibution International L i cense ( CCBY 4. 0).http://cr eat ivecom mon s .org/l icense s/by/ 4. 0/O p en Ac c e ss  B.  S . Akpan, C . C.Odoho ed i 25 5 tureof a "thing". To t h isit may be ans wer ed t h a twha t  t h isil l ust r a tion shows is t hat in thi ss en se, "thing "  im pl ies sol id elem ent,a nd notsingularsubstance .Be t h a t a s it may,clearly,  there is a sig n if icant lysmalle rusa ge of  "thin g ",as in dicate dby whi ch it  i s rightto say, for case, thata cham eleon 'sturning s had i ng,  albeit s tren gthening,isnot  a "t hin g ", bu t ra t he r a n  adju stme n t in a "t h in g", a nd  that a sur f a c e o r gap , a l beit c emen ting, is not a th i ng, but rather  a p o i ntofc onfi ne ment or nonatt end an c e  of a th in g. There is  no conc ei v ablecontra stingoptiont o  t h e poss ibil ity  that inthe  l a st case s"t h ing" i mpli es  singu lar su b stan c e . Metaphysics is  oneo f  thec hie f wor ks  of Ari s totl e and theprimary rea l work  ofthe b ranch o fphilos oph ywith simil a r name. T he es sential  s ubje ctis
 to_expose the_historical problems surrounding substance._This paper_criticizes_the thinking_which_presupposes that there_could be a_substance without its attributes_or substance existing_alone._This paper adopts complimentary ontology principles which state that for anything to exist, it_must_serve as_a_missing_connection to reality. This suggests_that everything interconnects to each_other and_substance cannot exist in isolation. Keywords Substance, Attributes,_Metaphysics,_Complimentary Reflection 1._Introduction In one of its standard detects, the expression_"thing" just means singular substance. It_may be questioned_that_"thing"_implies entity, and that_"thing" has no customary sense in_which it implies singular substance. Truly_in one of its usage "thing" implies_substance. However it is additionally clear_that there is a smaller_feeling of_"thing", by which it is_right to say,_for instance,_that reasonability is_not a "thing", but rather a_naHow to cite_this paper: Akpan, B. S., &_Odohoedi,_C. C. (2016)._History_of_Substance in_Philosophy. Advances in_Historical_Studies, 5,_254-270._http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/ahs.2016.55020 Received: September 27, 2016 Accepted:_December_27, 2016 Published: December 30, 2016 Copyright_© 2016 by authors_and_Scientific Research Publishing Inc._This work is licensed under_the Creative Commons Attribution International License_(CC BY_4.0). http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/_Open Access B. S. Akpan, C. C. Odohoedi 255 ture of_a "thing". To this it may_be answered that what_this illustration_shows_is that in_this_sense, "thing"_implies solid element, and not singular substance._Be that_as it may, clearly, there is_a significantly smaller usage_of_"thing", as indicated by which it_is right to say, for case,_that a chameleon's turning shading,_albeit_strengthening,_is not a "thing", but_rather an adjustment in a "thing",_and that a_surface or gap, albeit cementing, is not_a_thing, but rather a point of_confinement_or nonattendance of a thing. There_is_no_conceivable contrasting option to the_possibility that in the last cases_"thing" implies singular substance. Metaphysics is one of the_chief works of_Aristotle and the primary real_work_of_the branch of philosophy with similar name. The essential subject_is