 there would never be a single hypothesis compatible with this law. In fact, there would be an infinity of hypotheses whose consequences could fit the experience. Thus, in order to be able to compare the consequences of a hypothesis with experience, the physicist would first have to make a "symbolic transformation" in the experimental laws. This transformation involves the translation of these laws into a single mathematical version that can then be compared with theoretical results. However, this procedure comprises the prior admission of a set of hypotheses and additional theories that support the scientist's choice. In the light of the foregoing, Duhem argues that there are two basic characteristics in the laws used by theoretical physics: they are "symbolic" and "approximate". Physical theory is fundamentally a symbolic construction representing laws of experimental origin. As Duhem said, physicists do not "conceive an experimental fact without simultaneously making it correspond to the abstract and schematic expression that theory gives it" (Duhem 1996 [1894], 80). But what is the form of expression capable of providing abstract and symbolic representations that replace the data of experience? The French thinker states that this language of theoretical physics is mathematical analysis. Analysis taken not as an end, but as an instrument to derive hypotheses through which theory must be subjected to the control of experience. On the other hand, mathematics also allows one to represent, through an algebraic or geometric quantity, the most immediate properties of the corresponding physical notions. Thus, for example, the mathematical Duhem's Analysis of Newtonian Method and the Logical Priority of Physics over Metaphysics Eduardo Salles O. Barra – Ricardo Batista dos Santos 13 properties of the physical notion of "temperature" represent the experimental properties of the notion of "heat." Mathematical analysis relates the experimental laws to each other, using these symbolic representations of the physical notions. In the case of gravitation, in order for Newton's theory to suggest the principle of universal gravitation, it is necessary that the laws collected by Kepler from astronomical observations be transformed in a way such that properties of the force exerted on the planets by the Sun become objects of a mathematical analysis. Such a symbolic transformation of Kepler's observational statements involves the physical notions of mass and force, whose meaning derive from dynamic laws. Thus, the translation of Kepler's laws into symbolic laws, the only ones useful to theory, presuppose "prior adherence to a whole set of hypotheses" (Duhem 1991, 195). The requirement for a "holistic consistency" imposes itself again to show that "
there would never be a single hypothesis compatible with this law. In fact, there would be an infinity of guess whose consequence could fit the experience. Thus, in order to be able to compare the consequence of a hypothesis with experience, the physicist would first hold to make a " symbolic transformation " in the experimental torah. This transformation involves the translation of these law into a single mathematical translation that can then be compare with theoretical results. However, this procedure comprises the prior admission of a stage set of hypotheses and additional theories that subscribe the scientist's choice. In the light of the foregoing, Duhem argues that there are two basic feature in the laws used by theoretical physics: they are " symbolic " and " approximate ". Physical hypothesis is fundamentally a symbolic construction representing laws of experimental origin. As Duhem say, physicists do not " conceive an experimental fact without simultaneously making it correspond to the abstract and schematic expression that theory gives it " (Duhem 1996 [ 1894 ], 80). But what is the form of expression adequate to of providing abstract and symbolic representation that supplant the data of experience? The French thinker states that this language of theoretical purgative is mathematical psychoanalysis. Analysis taken not as an end, but as an musical instrument to derive hypotheses through which theory must be subjected to the control of experience. On the other hand, mathematics also allows one to represent, through an algebraic or geometric quantity, the about immediate property of the comparable forcible notions. Thus, for example, the mathematical Duhem's Analysis of Newtonian Method and the Logical Priority of Physics over Metaphysics Eduardo Salles O. Barra – Ricardo Batista dos Santos 13 properties of the physical notion of " temperature " constitute the experimental properties of the notion of " heat. " Mathematical psychoanalysis relates the experimental laws to each other, using these symbolic representation of the physical impression. In the case of gravity, in order for Newton's theory to indicate the principle of universal gravity, it is necessary that the laws collected by Kepler from astronomical observations be transformed in a way such that properties of the force exerted on the planets by the Sun become objects of a mathematical psychoanalysis. Such a symbolic transformation of Kepler's observational affirmation involves the physical notions of mass and force, whose meaning derive from dynamic laws. therefore, the translation of Kepler's laws into symbolic laws, the only ones useful to theory, presuppose " anterior adherence to a whole set of hypotheses " (Duhem 1991, 195). The requirement for a " holistic consistency " imposes itself again to show that "
 thfre would never be a sinnle hypothesis compatibne witg this lxw. In fact, there would be an ibfiniuj of hypotheses whose consequejces couod fmt the experiencx. Thus, ik ordsv to ye able to compate the consexuences of a hfputkesis with experience, the physicist rould fordt have to makg a "sjmfolid transformation" in the experimentzl laws. This transfotmation involves the transpatiln of these laws ijto a singlg maeyematical vefsion that can then be compared with theoretical resuuts. Hpwever, thiw profgdure compriwes tre prior admlxsion mf a sey of hypothesex aid aeditional theories thet support the scienjist's choiwe. In the light of rhw forggoinc, Dufwm xrghex fhat tjerx are two bzsic characreristics in the laes lxed by theorstical prysics: they are "symbolic" and "approximatt". Phyaical theory is fundamebtally a symbolic condtruction representing laws of experimental origin. As Duhek saiv, ohywigistr dl not "conceive an experimental fact without syjuktsneously makinn it correspond to tje wbstract and rchemacjc expression that tjeory gyves ut" (Duhem 1996 [1894], 80). Bit what is the form of exprwssion capabjw of providing abscract and syoboloc relresentations that replcce ths data of edperience? Ghe French thinkdr xtdtes thau this language of theoretiral pkysics ir majhematisal analysls. Analysis taken not as an eud, bud as an indtrument to derive hypotheses ticough which tnemry must be subjccted to the cogtrol of expernence. On the uther hand, mathemetics also ajlows one to sgpresent, throngh an aldebrqic ir geomdgric quantity, yhe most pmiediqte properties of bhe cudresponding phywicql notions. Thus, fof evalpke, dhe mathemathcal Dufrm's Avalysis of Kewgonisn Method and the Locicam Priority of Physocf over Mgtaphysicf Eduardo Salkes O. Barra – Ricarfo Bavista vos Samtof 13 properties of the physical hotion of "teiperature" re[rescnt jhe experimzntal properties of the notion of "heat." Methematical analysis rglates the experimentcl laws to earh othqr, using dhese symbolic reprewentations of the physical notions. In fhe cave of gravitation, in order for Newton's theory to suggest the principle of univwrsal jrwvitation, if is necevscry that ehe pews collected by Lepler from astronomical observetions be drcnsformed in a way such that lruperties of tfe force exerted on the llanets ny the Sun become objects of a kathematical analysis. Sugh a symbilic fransformavion of Kepler's obsetvatioual stqtementw inyolves the phyricsl notions lf mess and force, whose meaning derive drom dtnwmic laws. Thus, tie translatilk of Kgpler's lwws into symbolid lasd, the only ones usrful to theory, presuppose "prior advewence to a whoov set of hypojheses" (Dlhem 1991, 195). The reauirement fmr a "holistic consistency" imposes itself again to sgow that "
there would never be a single hypothesis this In fact, would be an could the experience. Thus, order to be to compare the consequences of a with experience, the physicist would first have to make a "symbolic transformation" in experimental laws. This transformation involves the translation of these laws into a single version can be with theoretical results. However, this procedure comprises the prior admission of a set of hypotheses and theories that support the scientist's choice. In the of the foregoing, Duhem that there are two basic in laws used theoretical they "symbolic" and "approximate". theory is fundamentally a symbolic construction representing laws of experimental origin. As Duhem said, physicists do not an experimental simultaneously making correspond the and schematic expression gives it" (Duhem 1996 [1894], 80). the form of expression capable of providing abstract symbolic representations replace the data of experience? The thinker states that this language of theoretical physics mathematical analysis. Analysis taken not as an end, but as an instrument to derive hypotheses theory must be subjected the control of On other mathematics allows one represent, through an algebraic or geometric quantity, the most immediate properties the corresponding physical notions. Thus, for example, the mathematical Duhem's Newtonian and the Logical of Physics over Metaphysics Salles Barra – Ricardo Batista 13 of of represent experimental properties of the of "heat." Mathematical analysis relates experimental laws to each of the physical notions. In the case of in order for Newton's theory to suggest principle of universal gravitation, it is necessary that the laws collected by from astronomical transformed in a way such that properties of force exerted on the by the Sun become objects of a mathematical analysis. a transformation of observational statements involves physical notions of and force, whose from dynamic Thus, translation into symbolic laws, the only ones to presuppose "prior adherence to a set (Duhem 1991, 195). The requirement for a "holistic consistency" imposes itself again to show that
 there would never be a single hYpothesis cOmpatIblE wiTh This Law. IN fact, there woulD Be an Infinity of hypotheses whOse coNsEQuenCEs Could Fit the eXPeRIEncE. THuS, in OrDEr To be aBle To compaRe the conseQueNcEs of a hypotheSIs With experiEncE, the physicisT woUld firSt HavE To makE a "sYmbolIc tranSFormatIon" in the eXpERimentAL laws. ThIS TrAnsfOrmation involves tHE tRAnslation of theSe laws InTO a SINglE maThematical VeRsion THat can tHEn BE COmpARed with theoreTical resultS. howEver, thIs ProCEdure cOmpriSeS The Prior admissIon oF a set of hyPothesES and addITional tHeorieS thAt sUppoRT tHe SciEnTIst'S ChOicE. in tHe light oF tHe ForegOing, dUHEM argUes That There Are two basic chAraCterIStiCs in tHe lawS useD bY theoReticaL physIcS: they are "symboliC" and "ApproximaTe". PHySicAl TheorY Is fundAmeNtaLly a symBolic coNStrUcTION rEpresenting laws of eXpERImEntal oriGin. As DUHeM sAId, physicIsTs dO not "CONceivE an eXPeRimental Fact wiTHoUt SimultaNeOusly mAkIng It cOrresPOnd tO the abStract anD scheMAtic expression THat theory giveS It" (dUHeM 1996 [1894], 80). but wHat Is the form of ExprESsioN capABlE of PRovidIng abStRAcT And symbolic represenTaTions tHat rePlace the data oF experiencE? tHE French tHinkER sTAtes that this laNguagE of theoretICal physiCs is mAthematiCal analysIS. analysis TakEn nOt aS an END, bUt as an instrumENT to dErIve hypoTheSes throUgh WhiCh tHeoRy Must be subJected to ThE cOnTrOl oF expeRIence. On tHe OthEr HanD, mathEMatics Also aLlowS oNe TO rePresent, THrOUGh an AlGeBraiC or GeOmetrIc quANtiTy, the moSt immediaTe pROperTiEs Of the coRresponding phYsIcal notionS. THus, For exaMPLe, the matHematical Duhem's Analysis OF NewtonIan methoD and The LogicaL PrIority Of PHYsics oVer MetAphysIcS EdUARdo SaLLEs o. BaRrA – Ricardo BaTISta Dos SaNtOs 13 prOpertieS of the physical notiON of "Temperature" rePreSent THE eXpeRImENtaL pROpeRTIes of the notion oF "heat." MatheMaTIcAl analysis RElaTeS the expErimentAl lawS To each oTher, using These symbOlIc rePREseNtations of The physiCal notionS. in the CAsE of grAviTation, In OrdEr for newton'S TheOry to SuggesT tHe prinCiple Of UniversaL gravitation, it is necessaRy that The laWs cOllected bY KePLer From astroNomiCal observaTioNs bE tranSfoRMed in A way SUcH thAT propErtiES of the forCE eXerTED oN the planets BY THe SUn becOme OBjects Of a mAthematical analysIS. Such a symbolic TranSFOrmAtiON of KEpLer's observatioNal StATEments inVoLves the physIcal notiOnS Of masS and foRce, whoSe meaniNG DeRIve froM dynAmiC laws. Thus, The TrANslatioN oF KEPler's lAws iNtO symboLic lawS, The oNLY ones useful to theOry, prESUpposE "PriOr adhErEnce to a WHole Set of hypotHeses" (Duhem 1991, 195). THe requIremEnt foR a "holisTiC consiSteNcY" imposes itSElf again tO show That "
 there would never be a si ngle hypot hesis  co mpa ti blewith  this law. Inf act,  there would be an inf inity  o f  hyp o th eseswhose c o ns e q uen ce scou ld fi t the  ex perienc e. Thus, i n o rd er to be abl e  t o comparethe  consequence s o f a hy po the s is wi thexper ience, the ph ysicist w ou l d firs t  have t o ma ke a  "symbolic transf o rm a tion" in the e xperim en t al l aws . T his transf or matio n  involv e st h e  tr a nslation of t hese laws i n toa sing le  ma t hemati cal v er s ion  that can t henbe compar ed wit h  theore t ical re sults.  Ho wev er,t hi spro ce d ure co mpr i ses  the pri or  a dmiss iono f a  set  of  hyp othes es and additi ona l th e ori es th at su ppor tthe s cienti st'sch oice. In the li ghtof the fo reg oi ng,  D uhema rguestha t t here ar e two b a sic  c h a r ac teristics in the l aw s us ed by th eoreti c al  p h ysics: t he y a re " s y mboli c" a n d"approxi mate". Ph ys ical th eo ry isfu nda men tally a sy mbolic  constru ction representing l a ws of experim e nt a l  o r igin . A s Duhem sai d, p h ysic ists do  no t  "con ceive  a n  e x perimental fact wit ho ut sim ultan eously making  it corres p o n d to the  abs t ra c t and schemati c exp ression th a t theory  give s it" (D uhem 1996 [ 1894], 8 0).  Bu t w hat i sthe form of e x p ress io n capab leof prov idi ngabs tra ct  and symb olic rep re se nt at ion s tha t  replace  t heda taof ex p erienc e? Th e Fr en ch thi nker st a te s that  t hi s la ngu ag e oftheo r eti cal phy sics is m ath e mati ca lanalysi s. Analysis t ak en not asan  en d, but a s an ins trument to derive hypot h eses th rou gh wh ichtheory mu stbe sub jec t ed tothe co ntrol  o f e x p erien c e .Onth e other ha n d , m athem at icsalso al lows one to repres e nt,  through an a lge brai c or  ge o me t ric  q u ant i t y, the most imm ediate pro pe r ti es of thec orr es ponding  physic al no t ions. T hus, forexample,th e ma t h ema tical Duhe m's Anal ysis of N e wtoni a nMetho d a nd the  L ogi cal P riorit y  of  Phys ics ov er  Metap hysic sEduardoSalles O. Barra – Ricar do Bat istados  Santos 1 3 p r ope rties ofthephysical n oti onof "t emp e ratur e" r e pr ese n t the  exp e rimentalp ro per t i es  of the not i o n  of  "hea t." Mathem atic al analysis relat e s the experime ntal l aws  to each  o ther, using th ese  s y m bolic re pr esentations  of theph y sical  notio ns. In  the ca s e  o f  gravi tati on,  in order  fo rN ewton's  t he o ry tosugg es t theprinci p le o f universal gravit ation , it is nec essar ythat th e  law s collecte d by Kepler  fromastr onomi cal obs er vation s b etransforme d  in a way  such  that p ro pert ies  of th e fo r c e exe rted  o n t he planet s by th eS unbeco me ob je ctsof a math e maticalana l ysis. S uc h a s ymboli c  t r a nsformatio n o f Kep l e r's observ a tion a ls tatem ents i nvolve s the p h ysi ca l notio nso f  mass and  force, w h ose  m eani ng deriv efrom  d yna mi c laws. Thus, t he trans lation o f Kepler 'sl awsi nto sy mb olic laws, t he on ly ones us e f ulto theo r y,pre sup pose  "p rior adherence to a whole set  ofhypot h ese s" (D uhem19 91, 195) .  The  require m ent for a "ho listic consiste n cy" impo ses it se lf againtos how t hat"
 there_would never_be a single hypothesis_compatible with_this_law. In_fact,_there would be_an infinity of_hypotheses whose consequences could_fit the experience._Thus,_in order to be able to compare the consequences of a hypothesis with experience,_the_physicist would_first_have_to make a "symbolic transformation"_in the experimental laws. This_transformation involves_the translation of these laws into a single_mathematical_version that can_then be compared with theoretical results. However, this procedure_comprises the prior admission of a_set of hypotheses_and_additional_theories that support the_scientist's choice. In the light of_the foregoing, Duhem argues that there_are two basic characteristics in the laws_used by theoretical physics: they are_"symbolic" and "approximate". Physical theory_is fundamentally_a symbolic construction representing laws_of experimental origin._As Duhem_said, physicists do_not "conceive an experimental fact without_simultaneously making it_correspond to the abstract and schematic_expression_that theory gives_it"_(Duhem_1996 [1894],_80). But what_is_the form_of_expression capable of providing abstract and_symbolic_representations that replace the data of experience?_The French thinker states_that_this language of theoretical_physics is mathematical analysis. Analysis_taken not as an end, but_as an_instrument to_derive hypotheses through which theory must be subjected to the control_of experience. On the other hand,_mathematics also allows one_to represent,_through_an algebraic or_geometric_quantity, the_most immediate properties of the corresponding physical_notions. Thus,_for example, the mathematical Duhem's Analysis_of Newtonian Method and_the_Logical Priority of Physics over Metaphysics_Eduardo Salles O. Barra – Ricardo_Batista dos Santos 13 properties_of_the_physical notion of "temperature" represent_the experimental properties of the notion_of "heat." Mathematical_analysis relates the experimental laws to each_other,_using these symbolic representations of the_physical_notions. In the case of gravitation,_in_order_for Newton's theory to suggest_the principle of universal gravitation, it_is necessary that the laws collected by Kepler from_astronomical observations be_transformed in a way such_that_properties_of the force exerted on the planets by the Sun_become objects_of a mathematical_analysis. Such a symbolic transformation of Kepler's observational statements involves_the physical notions of mass and force,_whose meaning derive from dynamic laws. Thus, the translation of Kepler's_laws into symbolic laws, the only ones useful_to theory, presuppose "prior adherence to a_whole set of hypotheses"_(Duhem_1991, 195). The requirement for a "holistic_consistency"_imposes_itself_again to show_that "