 of choosing the form of repayment. So there will have to be some further reason to cooperate rather than reciprocate if the justificatory gap is to be avoided. Zhu considers one possible reply on behalf of requiring cooperation: if everyone were free to choose the form of their reciprocation, then any cooperative 3Playing Fair and Following | doi 10.1163/17455243-46810054 journal of moral philosophy (2016) 1-8 <UN> scheme would inevitably collapse. Freely chosen reciprocation would, then, fail to restore the just distribution of benefits and burdens. Thus, fair play requires cooperation, rather than freely chosen reciprocation.3 Call this the actual consequences argument. As I read Zhu, he offers two replies to this argument. First is that the actual consequences argument cannot ground a requirement of cooperation, because cooperative schemes generally do not depend on support from those bound only by a duty of fair play. I will address this claim in the second section, as it is part of an independently interesting point. Zhu's second reply is to charge the actual consequences argument with begging the question. The consequences of freely reciprocating rather than cooperating are no fault of those bound by the principle of fair play unless fair play requires cooperation. But that is precisely what this argument is supposed to show.4 Fortunately, there is a better alternative in the neighborhood of the actual consequences argument. Free-riding is morally problematic not because of the actual costs it might impose on cooperators, but because it is disrespectful. So call this the argument from disrespect. Beneficiaries of rule-based cooperative schemes enjoy the same benefits as cooperators. Those who free-ride on such schemes treat cooperators disrespectfully, as they enjoy the benefits that come from others following the rules while refusing to submit to those rules themselves. Free-riders thus claim for themselves a status that is greater than equal to cooperators. Put in Kantian terms, the maxim of a free-rider is to enjoy benefits without following the rules that make possible the provision of those benefits.5 That, of course, is a contradiction in conception, as universalizing the maxim makes it a non-viable means to the end of enjoying the scheme's benefits.6 The same is true of the maxim of free reciprocators. If everyone reciprocated as it pleased them rather than submitting to the rules, the scheme would collapse. The failure of both the free-rider's and free reciprocator's maxims to pass the contradiction in conception test reveals that accepting
of choosing the form of repayment. So there will get to be some further rationality to cooperate rather than reciprocate if the justificatory gap is to be debar. Zhu considers one possible answer on behalf of requiring cooperation: if everyone were free to choose the form of their interchange, then any concerted 3Playing Fair and Following | department of the interior 10.1163/17455243 - 46810054 journal of moral philosophy (2016) 1 - 8 < UN > scheme would inevitably crack up. Freely chosen reciprocation would, then, fail to restore the just distribution of benefits and burden. Thus, fair play want cooperation, rather than freely chosen reciprocation.3 Call this the actual consequences controversy. As I read Zhu, he offers two replies to this argument. First is that the actual consequence argument cannot ground a requirement of cooperation, because cooperative schemes generally do not depend on support from those bound only by a duty of fair play. I will address this claim in the second section, as it is part of an independently interesting point. Zhu's second answer is to tear the actual consequences argumentation with beg the question. The consequences of freely reciprocating preferably than cooperating are no fault of those bound by the principle of clean play unless fair play requires cooperation. But that is precisely what this argument is supposed to show.4 Fortunately, there be a better alternative in the neighborhood of the actual consequences argument. Free - riding is morally debatable not because of the actual costs it might impose on cooperators, but because it is disrespectful. So bid this the argument from disrespect. Beneficiaries of rule - based cooperative schemes enjoy the same benefit as cooperators. Those who free - drive on such schemes treat cooperators disrespectfully, as they enjoy the benefit that come from others follow the rules while refusing to submit to those rules themselves. Free - passenger thus claim for themselves a status that is greater than equal to cooperators. Put in Kantian terms, the maxim of a free - rider is to love benefits without following the rule that make possible the provision of those benefits.5 That, of course, is a contradiction in conception, as universalizing the maxim construct it a non - viable means to the end of enjoying the scheme's benefits.6 The like is true of the maxim of free reciprocators. If everyone reciprocate as it pleased them rather than submitting to the rules, the scheme would collapse. The bankruptcy of both the free - rider's and free reciprocator's maxims to pass the contradiction in conception test reveals that accepting
 of choosing the form of rekayment. So there cull hate to bs some fjrther reason to cooperate rethee thab reciprocate if the jjstificatlry gap us ti be avoidev. Zhu cokfidedd onz 'ossible reply pn behalf mf requiring cmooexation: if everyone were free to choofe the gogm of their resiprpsatikn, then any cooperative 3Playing Fajr and Hollowing | doi 10.1163/17455243-46810054 journal of moral philosopjy (2016) 1-8 <UN> scheme would ijevitably cilla[we. Freely chusen recipgmcation woold, then, fail to restore the jusg discribution od venfxits and bucdens. Nhus, fair plan requises cooleration, rathev thai frwely chosen reciprocavion.3 Call this the astual convesuences argument. Qs I redd Zvu, hd ofwera vwo replifs vo this arghment. First is that the actual cjbsequences arfument cwnnot ground a requirement of cooperatimn, gecause cooperative schwmes generally do not depend og support from those bound only by a duty of fair play. K wnol adaeeds this claim in the second section, as it is [zru on an independentjy interestonh ljint. Zhu's secund re'my is to charge the wctual sonsewuences awgumrnt with begging the questiin. The consezyences of freely rzciprocating ratner tnan cooperating are no yault kf those boknd by ths principle of fakr ilay unless fair play requires cooperatmon. Bbt that ks pteciselr what thid argmkent is supposed tl shoc.4 Fordunately, tjere is a better alternative in the neighborhpog ox the accual cpnsequences awgument. Free-ribing is ioraluy problemztic nov because of the actual cmdts it might impose jn ciopeeators, cjt because it os disresieetful. So xall this the argukenj rrom disrespect. Bebeficiaries of tuld-bafef roopewdtive schemev engoy yhe sxme bentyitw as vooperators. Those whm frse-ride on such schrmcs treat xooperatjrs disrespecyfully, as they enjly thx benehits tnat come from others following ths rules wjilc refusing to subnit to those rules themselves. Free-riders thus claim for themselves a wtatus that is greajer than equal to cjoperatorv. Put in Kantian terns, the maxim of a free-rider is to enjog benexits aithout following the rules that make possible the provision of those benwfits.5 Vhwt, of courss, is a cottxadnction yn cliception, as univegsalizing the maxim makes it a nun-viable mzans to the end of enjoying tne scheme's benewits.6 The same is true of the maxom of free reciprocators. If evetyone reciprocated as it pleased them ratheg tian submitting to thr rulev, the scheme woupd collapse. Tfe gallure of blth uhe yree-rider's and free reciprocator's maximw ho pass the contcadiction in goncepjion tesj reveals that acdeptjjg
of choosing the form of repayment. So have be some reason to cooperate justificatory is to be Zhu considers one reply on behalf of requiring cooperation: everyone were free to choose the form of their reciprocation, then any cooperative Fair and Following | doi 10.1163/17455243-46810054 journal of moral philosophy (2016) 1-8 <UN> would collapse. chosen would, then, fail to restore the just distribution of benefits and burdens. Thus, fair play requires rather than freely chosen reciprocation.3 Call this the consequences argument. As I Zhu, he offers two replies this First is the consequences cannot ground a of cooperation, because cooperative schemes generally do not depend on support from those bound only by a of fair will address claim the section, as it of an independently interesting point. Zhu's to charge the actual consequences argument with begging question. The of freely reciprocating rather than cooperating no fault of those bound by the principle fair play unless fair play requires cooperation. But that is precisely what this argument is show.4 Fortunately, there is better alternative in neighborhood the consequences Free-riding is problematic not because of the actual costs it might impose on but because it is disrespectful. So call this the argument Beneficiaries rule-based cooperative schemes the same benefits as Those free-ride on such schemes disrespectfully, they that from following the rules while to submit to those rules Free-riders thus claim for greater than equal to cooperators. Put in Kantian the maxim of a free-rider is to benefits without following the rules that make possible the provision of those That, of a contradiction in conception, as universalizing the maxim it a non-viable means the end of enjoying the scheme's benefits.6 The same true the maxim free reciprocators. If reciprocated as it them rather than the rules, scheme collapse. both the free-rider's and free reciprocator's to the contradiction in conception test that
 of choosing the form of repaymEnt. So there Will hAve To bE sOme fUrthEr reason to coopERate Rather than reciprocate iF the jUsTIficAToRy gap Is to be aVOiDED. ZhU cOnSidErS OnE possIblE reply oN behalf of rEquIrIng cooperatiON: iF everyone wEre Free to choose The Form of ThEir REciprOcaTion, tHen any COoperaTive 3PlayiNg fAir and fOllowinG | DOi 10.1163/17455243-46810054 JourNal of moral philosoPHy (2016) 1-8 <un> scheme would inEvitabLy COlLAPse. freEly chosen rEcIprocATion wouLD, tHEN, FaiL To restore the jUst distribuTIon Of beneFiTs aND burdeNs. ThuS, fAIr pLay requires CoopEration, raTher thAN freely CHosen reCiprocAtiOn.3 CAll tHIs ThE acTuAL coNSeQueNCes Argument. as i rEad ZhU, he oFFERS two RepLies To thiS argument. FirsT is That THe aCtual ConseQuenCeS arguMent caNnot gRoUnd a requirement Of coOperation, BecAuSe cOoPeratIVe scheMes GenErally dO not depENd oN sUPPOrT from those bound onlY bY A DuTy of fair Play. I wILl AdDRess this ClAim In thE SEcond SectIOn, As it is paRt of an INdEpEndentlY iNteresTiNg pOinT. Zhu's SEconD reply Is to charGe the ACtual consequenCEs argument witH BeGGInG The qUesTion. The consEqueNCes oF freELy RecIProcaTing rAtHEr THan cooperating are no FaUlt of tHose bOund by the prinCiple of faiR PLAy unless Fair PLaY Requires cooperAtion. but that is pREcisely wHat thIs argumeNt is suppoSED to show.4 FOrtUnaTelY, thERE iS a better alterNATive In The neigHboRhood of The ActUal ConSeQuences arGument. FrEe-RiDiNg Is mOrallY ProblemaTiC noT bEcaUse of THe actuAl cosTs it MiGhT ImpOse on coOPeRATors, BuT bEcauSe iT iS disrEspeCTfuL. So call This the arGumENt frOm DiSrespecT. BeneficiarieS oF rule-based CoOpeRative SCHemes enjOy the same benefits as coopERators. THosE who fRee-rIde on such SchEmes trEat COoperaTors diSrespEcTfuLLY, as thEY EnJoy ThE benefits tHAT coMe froM oTherS followIng the rules while reFUsiNg to submit to tHosE rulES ThEmsELvES. FrEe-RIdeRS Thus claim for theMselves a stAtUS tHat is greatER thAn Equal to CooperaTors. PUT in KantIan terms, tHe maxim of A fRee-rIDEr iS to enjoy beNefits wiThout follOWing tHE rUles tHat Make poSsIblE the pRovisiON of Those BenefiTs.5 that, of CoursE, iS a contraDiction in conception, as unIversaLizinG thE maxim makEs iT A noN-viable meAns tO the end of eNjoYinG the sCheME's benEfitS.6 thE saME is trUe of THe maxim of FReE reCIPrOcators. If evERYOne RecipRocATed as iT pleAsed them rather thaN Submitting to thE rulES, The SchEMe woUlD collapse. The faIluRe OF Both the fReE-rider's and fRee recipRoCAtor's Maxims To pass The contRADiCTion in ConcEptIon test reVeaLs THat accePtInG
 of choosing the form of r epayment.So th ere  wi ll  hav e to  be some furth e r re ason to cooperate rath er th an reci p ro cateif thej us t i fic at or y g ap is  to b e a voided.  Zhu consi der sone possible re ply on beh alf  of requirin g c oopera ti on: if ev ery one w ere fr e e to c hoose the  f o rm oft heir re c i pr ocat ion, then any coo p er a tive 3PlayingFair a nd Fo l l owi ng| doi 10.1 16 3/174 5 5243-46 8 10 0 5 4  jo u rnal of moral  philosophy (20 16) 1- 8<UN >  schem e wou ld ine vitably col laps e. Freely  chose n  recipr o cationwould,  th en,  fai l  t ores to r e t h ejus t  di stributi on  o f ben efit s a n d bu rde ns.Thus,  fair play re qui resc oop erati on, r athe rthanfreely  chos en  reciprocation. 3 Ca ll this t heac tua lconse q uences  ar gum ent. As  I read Zhu ,h e of fers two replies t ot h is  argumen t. Fir s tis that the  a ctu al c o n seque nces ar gument c annotg ro un d a req ui rement  o f c oop erati o n, b ecause  coopera tives chemes general l y do not depe n do n  s u ppor t f rom those b ound only  bya  d uty of fa ir pl ay .  I will address this c la im inthe s econd section , as it is p a rt of an  ind e pe n dently interes tingpoint. Zhu ' s second  repl y is tocharge th e actual c ons equ enc esa r gu ment with beg g i ng t he  questi on.  The co nse que nce s o ffreely re ciprocat in gra th erthanc ooperati ng  ar enofault of tho se bo undby  t h e p rincipl e  o f fair  p la y un les sfairplay req uires c ooperatio n.B ut t ha tis prec isely what th is  argumentis  su pposed t o show.4  Fortunately, there isa  better  al terna tive  in the n eig hborho odo f theactual  cons eq uen c e s arg u m en t.Fr ee-ridingi s  mo rally  p robl ematicnot because of the act ual costs itmig ht i m p os e o n  c o ope ra t ors , but because itis disresp ec t fu l. So call thi sthe arg ument f rom d i srespec t. Benefi ciaries o frule - b ase d cooperat ive sche mes enjoy the s a me  bene fit s as c oo per ators . Thos e  wh o fre e-ride  o n such  sche me s treatcooperators disrespectf ully,as th eyenjoy the  be n efi ts that c omefrom other s f oll owing  th e  rule s wh i le  re f using  tos ubmit tot ho ser u le s themselve s . Fre e-rid ers thus c laim  for themselves a status that is  gre a t ertha n  equ al  to cooperator s.Pu t in Kanti an  terms, the  maxim o fa  free -rider  is to  enjoyb e ne f its wi thou t f ollowingthe  r u les tha tma k e poss ible  t he pro vision of t h o se benefits.5 Th at, o f cours e , i s a c on tradict i on i n concepti on, as univ ersali zing  themaxim m ak es ita n on -viable me a ns to the  endof enjo yi ng t hescheme 's b e n efits .6 T he  sa me is tru e of th em axi m of  free  r ecip rocators. If every one recipro ca ted a s it p l ea s e d them rat her  than s ubmittingt o th e  r u les,the sc heme w ould co l lap se . The f ail u r e of both  the free - rid er 's a nd freere cipr oc ato r' s maxims to pas s the co ntradict i o n in c onc e ptio n  testre veals that a ccept in g 
 of_choosing the_form of repayment. So_there will_have_to be_some_further reason to_cooperate rather than_reciprocate if the justificatory_gap is to_be_avoided. Zhu considers one possible reply on behalf of requiring cooperation: if everyone were_free_to choose_the_form_of their reciprocation, then any_cooperative 3Playing Fair and Following_| doi_10.1163/17455243-46810054 journal of moral philosophy (2016) 1-8 <UN>_scheme_would inevitably collapse._Freely chosen reciprocation would, then, fail to restore the_just distribution of benefits and burdens._Thus, fair play_requires_cooperation,_rather than freely chosen_reciprocation.3 Call this the actual consequences_argument. As I read Zhu, he_offers two replies to this argument. First_is that the actual consequences argument_cannot ground a requirement of_cooperation, because_cooperative schemes generally do not_depend on support_from those_bound only by_a duty of fair play. I_will address this_claim in the second section, as_it_is part of_an_independently_interesting point._Zhu's second reply_is_to charge_the_actual consequences argument with begging the_question._The consequences of freely reciprocating rather than_cooperating are no fault_of_those bound by the_principle of fair play unless_fair play requires cooperation. But that_is precisely_what this_argument is supposed to show.4 Fortunately, there is a better alternative_in the neighborhood of the actual_consequences argument. Free-riding is_morally problematic_not_because of the_actual_costs it_might impose on cooperators, but because it_is disrespectful._So call this the argument from_disrespect. Beneficiaries of rule-based_cooperative_schemes enjoy the same benefits as_cooperators. Those who free-ride on such_schemes treat cooperators disrespectfully, as_they_enjoy_the benefits that come from_others following the rules while refusing_to submit to_those rules themselves. Free-riders thus claim for_themselves_a status that is greater than_equal_to cooperators. Put in Kantian terms,_the_maxim_of a free-rider is to_enjoy benefits without following the rules_that make possible the provision of those benefits.5 That,_of course, is_a contradiction in conception, as_universalizing_the_maxim makes it a non-viable means to the end of_enjoying the_scheme's benefits.6 The_same is true of the maxim of free reciprocators. If_everyone reciprocated as it pleased them rather_than submitting to the rules, the scheme would collapse. The failure_of both the free-rider's and free reciprocator's maxims_to pass the contradiction in conception test_reveals that accepting