) point us remains, because ubiquitous lack of control continues to be in tension with the control condition that is part of our conception of morality (see also Anderson forthcoming; Statman this volume). (Of course, it may still be interesting to investigate alternative accounts of moral luck for one reason or another. Some of 4 these alternative accounts may employ a different account of luck, or may investigate a different moral feature of our lives such as moral obligation or moral virtue, or both.) Nagel's (1979: 28) taxonomy distinguishes between four kinds of moral luck-namely, resultant, circumstantial, constitutive, and casual moral luck. These kinds of moral luck are distinguished primarily by the type of factor that is beyond the agent's control. Resultant moral luck occurs when the consequence of an agent's action is beyond her control, and the consequence partially determines her positive praiseworthiness or blameworthiness. Circumstantial moral luck occurs when an agent faces a morally significant challenge that is outside of her control, and it affects her positive praiseworthiness or blameworthiness. Constitutive moral luck occurs when an agent's dispositions or capacities are not voluntarily acquired, and they affect her positive praiseworthiness or blameworthiness for a trait or an action. Causal moral luck occurs when the laws of nature and past states of affairs outside of a person's control causally determine her actions, and the laws and past affect her praiseworthiness or blameworthiness for her action. The question of whether causal moral luck could exist is the same question as whether an action's having been causally determined is compatible with being morally responsible for that action, which is a standard topic in the free will literature.2 Let the Moral Luck View be the position that instances of resultant, circumstantial, and constitutive moral luck exist. It is noteworthy that the Moral Luck View is consistent with both compatibilism and incompatibilism about an action's having been causally determined and being morally responsible for that action.3 2 Paul Russell (forthcoming) interestingly argues that the problem of moral luck supplies the best lens from which to view the free will debate. 3 It does not follow, however, that there is no interesting relationship between the Moral Luck View and compatibilism. I think that the Moral Luck View provides defeasible evidence for compatibilism, because if luck in results, circumstance, and constitution can positively affect moral responsibility, then there is at least some reason to think that luck in casual determination can also positively affect moral responsibility. 5 Before
) point us remains, because ubiquitous lack of control continue to be in latent hostility with the control condition that is character of our creation of morality (see besides Anderson forthcoming; Statman this volume). (Of course, it may however be interesting to investigate alternative accounts of moral fortune for one reason or another. Some of 4 these alternative accounts may employ a unlike account of luck, or may investigate a unlike moral feature of our life such as moral duty or moral virtue, or both .) Nagel's (1979: 28) taxonomy distinguishes between four kinds of moral luck - namely, attendant, circumstantial, constitutive, and casual moral fortune. These kinds of moral fortune are distinguished primarily by the type of factor that is beyond the agent's control. attendant moral luck occurs when the consequence of an agent's action is beyond her control, and the consequence partially determines her positivist praiseworthiness or blameworthiness. Circumstantial moral fortune occurs when an agent faces a morally significant challenge that is outside of her control, and it affects her positive praiseworthiness or blameworthiness. constituent moral luck occur when an agent's dispositions or capacities are not voluntarily grow, and they affect her positive praiseworthiness or blameworthiness for a trait or an action. Causal moral fortune occurs when the law of nature and past states of affairs outside of a person's restraint causally determine her actions, and the laws and past affect her praiseworthiness or blameworthiness for her action. The question of whether causal moral fortune could exist is the same question as whether an action's having been causally determined is compatible with being morally responsible for that action, which is a standard topic in the complimentary will literature.2 Let the Moral Luck View be the position that instances of resultant, circumstantial, and constituent moral luck exist. It is noteworthy that the Moral Luck View is consistent with both compatibilism and incompatibilism about an action's having been causally determined and being morally responsible for that action.3 2 Paul Russell (forthcoming) interestingly argues that the problem of moral luck add the best lens from which to watch the free will debate. 3 It does not keep up, however, that there is no interesting kinship between the Moral Luck View and compatibilism. I think that the Moral Luck View provides defeasible evidence for compatibilism, because if luck in resultant role, circumstance, and constitution can positively affect moral responsibility, then there is at least some cause to think that luck in casual determination can also positively affect moral responsibility. 5 Before
) polnt us remains, because uniquitous lack oy contrml confinues tu be in tension with the convrol condution that is part of uur conceition of noraouty (see also Anderson fodbhcomnnj; Statman this yolume). (Of cmurse, it may sdiul be interesting to investigate altewnative afcounts of morwl llch fod one reason or another. Some of 4 tgese aluernative accounts may employ a different acfounh of luck, or may ijvestigate q disderent moral feature of our lives auch as moral obligation or morxl vixtue, or boty.) Bagfn's (1979: 28) taxonony diftinguishes nvtween xour kimds of moral lmck-nakelt, resultant, circumstaitial, constitutive, agd casual mkral luck. These kunes of mordl ljxk xre dmstjnguisjed primarily by the typw of factor that is bqjpnd the agenf's conerjl. Resultant moral luck occurs when the cohsequence of an agent's qction is beyond her fontrol, agd the consequence partially determines her posithve pcaksecirthivwsd or blameworthiness. Circumstantial moral luch ovclrs when an agent faces a motaplu significant zhalleufe that is outside ov her cjntroo, and it wffevts her positive praisewortyiness or blcmeqorthiness. Constitbtive moral uuck occuts when an agent's disporitikns or capafities ars not voluntarily acauhred, and they affect her pjsitive pcaisecorthiners ot blamerorthiness for a trait or an actioj. Caudan moral lufk occurs when the laws of natucx and past ststas mf affaixs outxide of a perfon's control ccusally betermkne her acnions, and the laws agd past affecd her praisewmrthinesf or blaneworthkvess for her avtion. The question if whether causal korxm luck could exnru us the same qurstkon ad xhethqs an action's havkng neen zausally deberoinec is compatible with beihg morally responsobje for tyat actijn, which is a standard topic in the hree wmll liyerwture.2 Let the Moral Luck View ge the poditlon that instwncew of resultaut, circumstantial, and constitutive moral luck exist. It is boteworthy that the Koral Luck Tiew if consistant with both compatubilism and incomkatibilism about an actjon's hdving been causally determined and being morally responsible for that action.3 2 Paul Rnsfell (forthckminb) intvrefcingly wrguxs that the problek of moral luck supplies the bert lens xrjm which to view the free wikl debate. 3 It dues not follow, however, tgat therr is no interesting relationshil between the Moral Luck View ane comlatibilism. I think that the Koral Nuck Ciew prividcs defeasible dvicekce for colpatmbimism, because if luck in results, xircumwtwnce, and constitntion can podltiveli affect moral responsibjlitg, then there is at keast some reaxon to think that lubk yn casual deteejination can also pmsitively afhect moral rasponsibility. 5 Before
) point us remains, because ubiquitous lack continues be in with the control our of morality (see Anderson forthcoming; Statman volume). (Of course, it may still interesting to investigate alternative accounts of moral luck for one reason or another. of 4 these alternative accounts may employ a different account of luck, or investigate different feature our lives such as moral obligation or moral virtue, or both.) Nagel's (1979: 28) taxonomy distinguishes four kinds of moral luck-namely, resultant, circumstantial, constitutive, casual moral luck. These of moral luck are distinguished by type of that beyond agent's control. Resultant luck occurs when the consequence of an agent's action is beyond her control, and the consequence partially her positive blameworthiness. Circumstantial luck when agent faces a challenge that is outside of her affects her positive praiseworthiness or blameworthiness. Constitutive moral occurs when agent's dispositions or capacities are not acquired, and they affect her positive praiseworthiness or for a trait or an action. Causal moral luck occurs when the laws of nature states of affairs outside a person's control determine actions, the and past her praiseworthiness or blameworthiness for her action. The question of whether moral luck could exist is the same question as whether having causally determined is with being morally responsible that which is a standard the will Moral View the position that instances resultant, circumstantial, and constitutive moral exist. It is noteworthy is consistent with both compatibilism and incompatibilism about action's having been causally determined and being responsible for that action.3 2 Paul Russell (forthcoming) interestingly argues that the of moral the best lens from which to view the will debate. 3 It not follow, however, that there is no interesting relationship the Luck View compatibilism. I think the Moral Luck provides defeasible evidence because if in circumstance, positively affect moral responsibility, then there at some reason to think that in can also positively affect moral responsibility. 5 Before
) point us remains, because ubiqUitous lack Of conTroL coNtInueS to bE in tension with THe coNtrol condition that is paRt of oUr COncePTiOn of mOrality (SEe ALSo ANdErSon FoRThCominG; StAtman thIs volume). (Of CouRsE, it may still bE InTeresting tO inVestigate altErnAtive aCcOunTS of moRal Luck fOr one rEAson or Another. SoMe OF 4 these ALternatIVE aCcouNts may employ a diffEReNT account of luck, Or may iNvEStIGAte A diFferent morAl FeatuRE of our lIVeS SUCh aS Moral obligatiOn or moral viRTue, Or both.) naGel'S (1979: 28) TaxonoMy disTiNGuiShes between Four Kinds of moRal lucK-Namely, rESultant, CircumStaNtiAl, coNStItUtiVe, ANd cASuAl mORal Luck. ThesE kInDs of mOral LUCK Are dIstInguIshed Primarily by thE tyPe of FActOr thaT is beYond ThE agenT's contRol. ReSuLtant moral luck oCcurS when the cOnsEqUenCe Of an aGEnt's acTioN is Beyond hEr contrOL, anD tHE COnSequence partially dEtERMiNes her poSitive PRaIsEWorthineSs Or bLameWORthinEss. CIRcUmstantiAl moraL LuCk Occurs wHeN an ageNt FacEs a MoralLY sigNificaNt challeNge thAT is outside of heR Control, and it aFFeCTS hER posItiVe praiseworThinESs or BlamEWoRthINess. COnstiTuTIvE Moral luck occurs when An Agent's DispoSitions or capaCities are nOT VOluntariLy acQUiREd, and they affecT her pOsitive praISeworthiNess oR blamewoRthiness fOR A trait or An aCtiOn. CAusAL MoRal luck occurs WHEn thE lAws of naTurE and pasT stAteS of AffAiRs outside Of a persoN's CoNtRoL caUsallY DeterminE hEr aCtIonS, and tHE laws aNd pasT affEcT hER prAiseworTHiNESs or BlAmEworThiNeSs for Her aCTioN. The queStion of whEthER cauSaL mOral lucK could exist is ThE same questIoN as WhetheR AN action's Having been causally deterMIned is cOmpAtiblE witH being morAllY respoNsiBLe for tHat actIon, whIcH is A STandaRD ToPic In The free wilL LIteRaturE.2 LEt thE Moral LUck View be the positiON thAt instances of ResUltaNT, CiRcuMStANtiAl, ANd cONStitutive moral lUck exist. It Is NOtEworthy thaT The moRal Luck view is cOnsisTEnt with Both compaTibilism aNd IncoMPAtiBilism abouT an actioN's having bEEn cauSAlLy detErmIned anD bEinG moraLly resPOnsIble fOr that AcTion.3 2 PaUl RusSeLl (forthcOming) interestingly argueS that tHe proBleM of moral lUck SUppLies the beSt leNs from whicH to VieW the fRee WIll deBate. 3 iT dOes NOt folLow, hOWever, that THeRe iS NO iNteresting rELATioNship BetWEen the moraL Luck View and compaTIbilism. I think tHat tHE morAl LUCk ViEw Provides defeasIblE eVIDence for CoMpatibilism, Because iF lUCk in rEsults, CircumStance, aND CoNStitutIon cAn pOsitively AffEcT Moral reSpOnSIbilitY, theN tHere is At leasT Some REAson to think that lUck in CASual dETerMinatIoN can alsO PosiTively affeCt moral respOnsibiLity. 5 beforE
) point us remains, becaus e ubiquito us la ckofco ntro l co ntinues to bei n te nsion with the control  cond it i on t h at  is p art ofo ur c onc ep ti onof mo ralit y ( see als o Anderson  fo rt hcoming; Sta t ma n this vol ume ). (Of cours e,it may  s til l  be i nte resti ng toi nvesti gate alte rn a tive a c countso f  m oral  luck for one rea s on or another. So me of4t he s e  al ter native acc ou nts m a y emplo y  a d i ffe r ent account o f luck, orm ayinvest ig ate a diff erent  m o ral  feature of  our  lives su ch asm oral ob l igation  or mo ral  vi rtue ,  o rbot h. )  Na g el 's( 197 9: 28) t ax on omy d isti n g u i shes  be twee n fou r kinds of mo ral  luc k -na mely,  resu ltan t,  circ umstan tial,  c onstitutive, an d ca sual mora l l uc k.Th ese k i nds of  mo ral  luck a re dist i ngu is h e d  p rimarily by the ty pe o ffactor t hat is be yo n d the ag en t's  con t r ol. R esul t an t moralluck o c cu rs  when t he  conse qu enc e o f ana gent 's act ion is b eyond her control, a n d the consequ e nc e pa r tial lydeterminesherp osit ivep ra ise w orthi nessor bl a meworthiness. Circu ms tantia l mor al luck occur s when ana g e nt faces  a m o ra l ly significant  chal lenge that is outsi de of  her con trol, and i t affect s h erpos iti v e  p raiseworthine s s  orbl amewort hin ess. Co nst itu tiv e m or al luck o ccurs wh en  a nag ent 's di s position sorca pac ities are no t vol unta ri ly acq uired,a nd t heyaf fe ct h erpo sitiv e pr a ise worthin ess or bl ame w orth in es s for a  trait or anac tion. Caus al  mo ral lu c k  occurswhen the laws of nature and pas t s tates  ofaffairs o uts ide of  ap erson' s cont rol c au sal l y  dete r m in e h er  actions,a n d t he la ws  and  past a ffect her praisewo r thi ness or blame wor thin e s sfor he r  ac ti o n.T h e question of w hether cau sa l  m oral luckc oul dexist i s the s ame q u estionas whethe r an acti on 's h a v ing  been caus ally det ermined i s  comp a ti ble w ith  being  m ora lly r espons i ble  forthat a ct ion, w hichis  a stand ard topic in the free w ill li terat ure .2 Let th e M o ral  Luck Vie w be  the posit ion  th at in sta n ces o f re s ul tan t , cir cums t antial, a n dcon s t it utive moral l u ckexist . I t  is no tewo rthy that the Mor a l Luck View is  con s i ste ntw ithbo th compatibili sman d incompat ib ilism about  an acti on ' s hav ing be en cau sally d e t er m ined a nd b ein g morally  re sp o nsiblefo rt hat ac tion .3  2 Pau l Russ e ll ( f o rthcoming) inter estin g l y arg u esthatth e probl e m of  moral luc k suppliesthe be st l ens f rom whi ch  to vi ewth e free wil l  debate.3 Itdoes no tfoll ow,  howev er,t h at th ereis  no  interest i n gr el at i ons hipbetwe en  the  Moral Lu c k View a ndc ompatib il ism . I thin k  t h a t the Mora l L uck V i e w provides defe a si b le ev idence  for c ompatib i lis m,  becaus e i f luck in r esults, c i rcu ms tanc e, and c on stit ut ion  c an positively a ffect mo ral resp o n sibili ty, then thereis  at least so me re as o n to th i n k t hat luc k  in  ca sua l de ter mina t ion can also positivelyaffe ct mo r alrespo nsibi li ty. 5 Be f ore
) point_us remains,_because ubiquitous lack of_control continues_to_be in_tension_with the control_condition that is_part of our conception_of morality (see_also_Anderson forthcoming; Statman this volume). (Of course, it may still be interesting to investigate_alternative_accounts of_moral_luck_for one reason or another._Some of 4 these alternative_accounts may_employ a different account of luck, or may_investigate_a different moral_feature of our lives such as moral obligation or_moral virtue, or both.) Nagel's (1979:_28) taxonomy distinguishes_between_four_kinds of moral luck-namely,_resultant, circumstantial, constitutive, and casual moral_luck. These kinds of moral luck_are distinguished primarily by the type of_factor that is beyond the agent's_control. Resultant moral luck occurs_when the_consequence of an agent's action_is beyond her_control, and_the consequence partially_determines her positive praiseworthiness or blameworthiness._Circumstantial moral luck_occurs when an agent faces a_morally_significant challenge that_is_outside_of her_control, and it_affects_her positive_praiseworthiness_or blameworthiness. Constitutive moral luck occurs_when_an agent's dispositions or capacities are not_voluntarily acquired, and they_affect_her positive praiseworthiness or_blameworthiness for a trait or_an action. Causal moral luck occurs_when the_laws of_nature and past states of affairs outside of a person's control_causally determine her actions, and the_laws and past affect_her praiseworthiness_or_blameworthiness for her_action._The question_of whether causal moral luck could exist_is the_same question as whether an action's_having been causally determined_is_compatible with being morally responsible for_that action, which is a standard_topic in the free will_literature.2_Let_the Moral Luck View be_the position that instances of resultant,_circumstantial, and constitutive_moral luck exist. It is noteworthy that_the_Moral Luck View is consistent with_both_compatibilism and incompatibilism about an action's_having_been_causally determined and being morally_responsible for that action.3 2 Paul_Russell (forthcoming) interestingly argues that the problem of moral_luck supplies the_best lens from which to_view_the_free will debate. 3 It does not follow, however, that_there is_no interesting relationship_between the Moral Luck View and compatibilism. I think that_the Moral Luck View provides defeasible evidence_for compatibilism, because if luck in results, circumstance, and constitution can_positively affect moral responsibility, then there is at_least some reason to think that luck_in casual determination can_also_positively affect moral responsibility. 5 Before