no experimental law is useful to the theorist before he has been subjected to an interpretation that transforms it into a symbolic law" (Duhem 1991, 196). Of course, the reflection set out above has wide consequences. For our purposes, it will suffice mentioning only three of them. The first consequence is that every experimental proposition is theory-laden, since in this proposition a series of principles converge drawn from various theories, and the result of the experiment will have consequences for the whole set. The second consequence is that no particular experiment is able to confirm or falsify an isolated hypothesis. An experiment that contradicts a hypothesis actually contradicts the set of assumptions presupposed in the situation for experimentation, so that it is not possible to locate precisely the incorrect hypothesis. In Duhem's words: "When the experiment is in disagreement with its predictions, what he [the physicist] learns is that one of the hypotheses constituting this group is unacceptable and ought to be modified; but the experiment does not designate which one should be changed" (Duhem 1991, 187). The third consequence is that experimental laws are not established by being verified one by one. This kind of verification is not possible in science. In fact, the comparison of a hypothesis with experience necessarily involves the testing of the whole set of hypotheses, which are inseparable. Referring to the case of universal gravitation, Duhem states: Such a comparison will not only bear on this or that part of the Newtonian principle, but will involve all its parts at the same time; with those it will also involve all the principles of dynamics; besides, it will call in the aid of all propositions of optics, the statics of gases, and the theory of heat, which are necessary to justify the properties of telescopes in their construction, regulation, and correction, and in the elimination of the errors caused by diurnal or annual aberration and by atmospheric refraction. (Duhem 1991, 194) The three consequences we posit above – that every experimental proposition is theory-laden; that it is not possible to confirm or falsify an isolated hypothesis; and that the experimental laws are not established one by one – evidently give rise to a more rigorous critique of Newton's observations in the General Scholium. Since there are an infinite number of equally possible symbolic translations for the same set of experimental laws, Newton's choice of a given dynamic translation of Kepler's laws among infinite possible ones was logically underdetermined by these same laws. Further, experiments cannot help him in this choice, since experience itself
no experimental law is useful to the theorist before he has been subjected to an interpretation that transform it into a emblematic law " (Duhem 1991, 196). Of course, the mirror image determine out above has wide consequence. For our purposes, it will suffice mentioning merely three of them. The first consequence is that every experimental proposition is hypothesis - laden, since in this proposition a series of principles converge drawn from diverse theories, and the result of the experiment will have consequences for the whole stage set. The second consequence is that no particular experiment is able to confirm or falsify an isolated guess. An experiment that contradicts a hypothesis actually contradict the set of premise presupposed in the situation for experimentation, so that it is not possible to locate precisely the wrong hypothesis. In Duhem's words: " When the experiment is in disagreement with its predictions, what he [ the physicist ] learns is that one of the hypotheses constituting this group is unacceptable and ought to be modified; but the experiment does not designate which one should be changed " (Duhem 1991, 187). The third consequence is that experimental laws are not established by being verified one by one. This kind of verification is not possible in science. In fact, the comparison of a guess with experience inevitably involves the testing of the whole hardening of hypotheses, which are inseparable. Referring to the case of cosmopolitan gravitation, Duhem express: Such a comparison will not only bear on this or that contribution of the Newtonian principle, but will involve all its parts at the same fourth dimension; with those it will also involve all the principles of dynamics; besides, it will shout in the care of all proposition of optics, the statics of gases, and the theory of heat, which are necessary to justify the properties of telescope in their construction, rule, and correction, and in the elimination of the errors caused by diurnal or annual aberration and by atmospheric refraction. (Duhem 1991, 194) The three consequence we posit above – that every experimental proposition is hypothesis - laden; that it is not possible to confirm or falsify an isolated hypothesis; and that the experimental law are not established one by one – obviously give rise to a more rigorous critique of Newton's observation in the General Scholium. Since there are an countless number of equally possible emblematic translations for the same set of experimental laws, Newton's option of a given dynamic translation of Kepler's laws among countless possible ones was logically underdetermined by these same laws. Further, experiments cannot help him in this option, since experience itself
no fxperimental law is usefml to the theorist befoce he hzs been rubjected to an interpretatiln that transforms it into a rymbolic paw" (Duhen 1991, 196). Id course, tis reflegcion act ouc ebove has wide gonsequencev. For our purpmsds, it will suffice mentioning only thwee of yhfm. The first cjnseatencs is that every experimental propoaition ps theory-laden, simce in this proposition a derifs of principles clnverge draqn fwim various tfeories, and the result of the experiment will have covsequznces for tye whlne set. The weconq consequencc is thdt no psrticular expevimenv is able to confirm or felsify an isolated hipothesis. Dn experiment that xobtradhcts a hhpotfesjs adtuallj ckntradicts the set of assumptions presupkosqe in the situztion sow experimentation, so that it is not posvibme to locate precisely rhe incorrect hypothedis. In Durem's words: "When the experiment is in disagreement with kts pvedizrilns, what he [the physicist] learns is that one jr uhe hypotheses cokstituting this grpuo of unacceptablg and obfhf to be modified; bkt the gxperinent does not designate which one should be changed" (Buhwm 1991, 187). The third condequence is thaj expetimental laws are not ertabmished by bfing verirked one by one. Tfis khnd of vtfification is not possible in xcience. In gact, tre comparidon on a hypothesis with expetience necessaripy involves the testing of the xiole set of hipodheves, whick are lnseparable. Refqrring to the ease of bniverral gravitztion, Dnhem states: Fuch a comparhdon will not only bewr ob thus or tfxt part of the Newtoniau pribciple, but will inyolve zll its parts ac uhw same time; wiyh ghofe iv wilj also involva alu tfr privciples of byvamivs; besides, it will cdll jn the aid of all lrjpositiobs of opeics, the statocs of gases, and tje thxory oh heat, whych are necessary to justify tge properhief of telesco[es ln treir constxuction, regulation, and correction, and in the elimination od the errors caused ny diurnal oc annuwl aberradion and by atmospheeic refraction. (Dumem 1991, 194) The three conseqhences we plsit above – that every experimental proposition is theory-laden; that it is not possible to cknfitm or fclsnfy an ysoletxd hypothesis; and that the experimental laws are not estdbjished one by one – evidently gkve rise to a more rigorous critique kf Newtom's observations in the General Xcholium. Since there are an infibite humber of xqually possible symnolic cranslqtions dor bhe same set ow ecpcrimental paws, Nzwton's choice of a given dynamic rranslqtlon of Kepler's lews among innikite pkssiblg ones was logicamly hjderdgtermined by tnese same laws. Further, experiments cwnnot help him pn this choicg, sincg experience itxelf
no experimental law is useful to the he been subjected an interpretation that law" 1991, 196). Of the reflection set above has wide consequences. For our it will suffice mentioning only three of them. The first consequence is that experimental proposition is theory-laden, since in this proposition a series of principles converge from theories, the of the experiment will have consequences for the whole set. The second consequence is that no experiment is able to confirm or falsify an hypothesis. An experiment that a hypothesis actually contradicts the of presupposed in situation experimentation, that it is possible to locate precisely the incorrect hypothesis. In Duhem's words: "When the experiment is in disagreement with predictions, what physicist] learns that of hypotheses constituting this unacceptable and ought to be modified; does not designate which one should be changed" 1991, 187). third consequence is that experimental laws not established by being verified one by one. kind of verification is not possible in science. In fact, the comparison of a hypothesis necessarily involves the testing the whole set hypotheses, are Referring the case universal gravitation, Duhem states: Such a comparison will not only bear this or that part of the Newtonian principle, but will its at the same with those it will involve the principles of dynamics; will in all of the statics of gases, the theory of heat, which necessary to justify the construction, regulation, and correction, and in the elimination the errors caused by diurnal or annual and by atmospheric refraction. (Duhem 1991, 194) The three consequences we posit – that proposition is theory-laden; that it is not possible confirm or falsify an hypothesis; and that the experimental laws are not established by – evidently rise to a rigorous critique of observations in the Since there an number symbolic translations for the same set experimental Newton's choice of a given translation laws among infinite possible ones was logically underdetermined by these same laws. Further, experiments cannot in this choice, since itself
no experimental law is useful To the theorIst beForE he HaS beeN subJected to an inteRPretAtion that transforms it iNto a sYmBOlic LAw" (duhem 1991, 196). of coursE, ThE REflEcTiOn sEt OUt Above Has Wide conSequences. FOr oUr Purposes, it wiLL sUffice mentIonIng only three Of tHem. The FiRst COnseqUenCe is tHat eveRY experImental prOpOSition IS theory-LADeN, sinCe in this propositiON a SEries of principLes conVeRGe DRAwn FroM various thEoRies, aND the resULt OF THe eXPeriment will hAve consequeNCes For the WhOle SEt. The sEcond CoNSeqUence is that No paRticular eXperimENt is ablE To confiRm or faLsiFy aN isoLAtEd HypOtHEsiS. an ExpERimEnt that cOnTrAdictS a hyPOTHEsis ActUallY contRadicts the set Of aSsumPTioNs preSuppoSed iN tHe sitUation For exPeRimentation, so thAt it Is not possIblE tO loCaTe preCIsely tHe iNcoRrect hyPothesiS. in DUhEM'S WoRds: "When the experimeNt IS In DisagreeMent wiTH iTs PRedictioNs, WhaT he [tHE PhysiCist] LEaRns is thaT one of THe HyPotheseS cOnstitUtIng ThiS grouP Is unAcceptAble and oUght tO Be modified; but tHE experiment doES nOT DeSIgnaTe wHich one shouLd be CHangEd" (DuHEm 1991, 187). the THird cOnseqUeNCe IS that experimental laWs Are not EstabLished by being Verified onE BY One. This kInd oF VeRIfication is not PossiBle in scienCE. In fact, tHe comParison oF a hypotheSIS with expEriEncE neCesSARiLy involves the TEStinG oF the whoLe sEt of hypOthEseS, whIch ArE inseparaBle. ReferRiNg To ThE caSe of uNIversal gRaVitAtIon, duhem STates: SUch a cOmpaRiSoN WilL not onlY BeAR On thIs Or That ParT oF the NEwtoNIan PrincipLe, but will InvOLve aLl ItS parts aT the same time; wItH those it wiLl AlsO involVE All the prInciples of dynamics; besidES, it will CalL in thE aid Of all propOsiTions oF opTIcs, the StaticS of gaSeS, anD THe theORY oF heAt, Which are neCESsaRy to jUsTify The propErties of telescopes IN thEir constructiOn, rEgulATIoN, anD CoRRecTiON, anD IN the elimination Of the errorS cAUsEd by diurnaL Or aNnUal aberRation aNd by aTMospherIc refractIon. (Duhem 1991, 194) THe ThreE COnsEquences we Posit aboVe – that eveRY expeRImEntal ProPositiOn Is tHeory-Laden; tHAt iT is noT possiBlE to conFirm oR fAlsify an Isolated hypothesis; and thAt the eXperiMenTal laws arE noT EstAblished oNe by One – evidentLy gIve Rise tO a mORe rigOrouS CrItiQUe of NEwtoN'S observatIOnS in THE GEneral ScholIUM. sinCe theRe aRE an infInitE number of equally pOSsible symbolic TranSLAtiOns FOr thE sAme set of experiMenTaL LAws, NewtoN's Choice of a giVen dynamIc TRanslAtion oF KepleR's laws aMONg INfinitE posSibLe ones was LogIcALly undeRdEtERmined By thEsE same lAws. FurTHer, eXPEriments cannot heLp him IN This cHOicE, sincE eXperienCE itsElf
no experimental law is use ful to the  theo ris t b ef orehe h as been subjec t ed t o an interpretation th at tr an s form s  i t int o a sym b ol i c  la w"  ( Duh em 19 91, 1 96) . Of co urse, theref le ction set ou t  a bove has w ide  consequence s.For ou rpur p oses,  it  will  suffi c e ment ioning on ly threeo f them. T he  fir st consequence is th a t every experi mental  p r op o s iti onis theory- la den,s ince in th i s pro p osition a ser ies of prin c ipl es con ve rge drawnfromva r iou s theories,  and  the resu lt oft he expe r iment w ill ha vecon sequ e nc es  fo rt hew ho les et.  The sec on dconse quen c e i s th atno p artic ular experime ntis a b leto co nfirm  orfa lsify  an is olate dhypothesis. Anexpe riment th atco ntr ad ictsa  hypot hes isactuall y contr a dic ts t h eset of assumptions  p r e su pposed i n thes it ua t ion forex per imen t a tion,  sot ha t it isnot po s si bl e to lo ca te pre ci sel y t he in c orre ct hyp othesis.  In D u hem's words: " W hen the exper i me n t  i s  indis agreement w ithi ts p redi c ti ons ,  what  he [ th e  p h ysicist] learns isth at one  of t he hypotheses  constitut i n g  this gr oupi su nacceptable an d oug ht to be m o dified;but t he exper iment doe s not desi gna tewhi cho n eshould be cha n g ed"(D uhem 19 91,  187).The  th ird  co ns equence i s that e xp er im en tal  laws are notes tab li she d byb eing v erifi ed o ne  b y  on e. This ki n d  ofve ri fica tio nis no t po s sib le in s cience. I n f a ct,th ecompari son of a hypo th esis withex per iencen e cessaril y involves the testingo f the w hol e set  ofhypothese s,whichare insepa rable.  Refe rr ing t o the c as e o funiversalg r avi tatio n,  Duh em stat es: Such a compari s onwill not only  be ar o n th iso rt hat  p a rto f  the Newtonianprinciple,  b u twill invol v e a ll  its pa rts atthe s a me time ; with th ose it wi ll  als o inv olve all t he princ iples ofd ynami c s;  besi des , it w il l c all i n thea idof al l prop os itions  of o pt ics, the  statics of gases, andthe th eoryofheat, whi cha renecessary  tojustify th e p rop ertie s o f  tele scop e sint heircons t ruction,r eg ula t i on , and corre c t i on,  andint he eli mina tion of the error s  caused by diu rnal o r a nnu a l ab er ration and byatm os p h eric ref ra ction. (Duh em 1991,  1 9 4) Th e thre e cons equence s we positabov e –  that eve ryex p eriment al  p r oposit ionis  theor y-lade n ; th a t  it is not possi ble t o confi r m o r fal si fy an i s olat ed hypothe sis; and th at the  exp erime ntal la ws  are n otes tablishedo ne by one  – ev idently  g iveris e to a  mor e rigor ouscr iti que of Ne w t on ' sob s erv atio ns in  t he G eneral Sc h olium. S inc e  therear e a n infini t en u mber of eq ual ly po s s ible symbo l ic t r an s latio ns for  the s ame set ofex perimen tal l aws, Newt on's choi c e o fa gi ven dyna mi c tr an sla ti on of Kepler'slaws amo ng infin i t e poss ibl e  one s  was l og ically under deter mi n ed by t h e sesame la w s.Fur the r, e xpe rime n ts cannot help him in th is c hoice ,  si nce e xperi en ce itsel f 
no experimental_law is_useful to the theorist_before he_has_been subjected_to_an interpretation that_transforms it into_a symbolic law" (Duhem_1991, 196). Of_course,_the reflection set out above has wide consequences. For our purposes, it will suffice_mentioning_only three_of_them._The first consequence is that_every experimental proposition is theory-laden,_since in_this proposition a series of principles converge drawn_from_various theories, and_the result of the experiment will have consequences for_the whole set. The second consequence_is that no_particular_experiment_is able to confirm_or falsify an isolated hypothesis. An_experiment that contradicts a hypothesis actually_contradicts the set of assumptions presupposed in_the situation for experimentation, so that_it is not possible to_locate precisely_the incorrect hypothesis. In Duhem's_words: "When the_experiment is_in disagreement with_its predictions, what he [the physicist]_learns is that_one of the hypotheses constituting this_group_is unacceptable and_ought_to_be modified;_but the experiment_does_not designate_which_one should be changed" (Duhem 1991,_187)._The third consequence is that experimental laws_are not established by_being_verified one by one._This kind of verification is_not possible in science. In fact,_the comparison_of a_hypothesis with experience necessarily involves the testing of the whole set_of hypotheses, which are inseparable. Referring_to the case of_universal gravitation,_Duhem_states: Such a_comparison_will not_only bear on this or that part_of the_Newtonian principle, but will involve all_its parts at the_same_time; with those it will also_involve all the principles of dynamics;_besides, it will call in_the_aid_of all propositions of optics,_the statics of gases, and the_theory of heat,_which are necessary to justify the properties_of_telescopes in their construction, regulation, and_correction,_and in the elimination of the_errors_caused_by diurnal or annual aberration_and by atmospheric refraction. (Duhem 1991,_194) The three consequences we posit above – that_every experimental proposition_is theory-laden; that it is_not_possible_to confirm or falsify an isolated hypothesis; and that the_experimental laws_are not established_one by one – evidently give rise to a more_rigorous critique of Newton's observations in the_General Scholium. Since there are an infinite number of equally possible_symbolic translations for the same set of experimental_laws, Newton's choice of a given dynamic_translation of Kepler's laws_among_infinite possible ones was logically underdetermined by_these_same_laws._Further, experiments cannot_help him in_this choice, since_experience itself