gappy" sequences. 13 than claiming, of some intuitively true sentence involving quantifiers, that it is true only when the quantifiers are taken to be restricted. I have argued that this is bound to happen with sentences like 'It is contingent whether some swans are blue'. Against the backdrop of this pattern of agreement and disagreement with common sense, would it really be bad for the modal realist to claim, analogously, that 'It is contingent whether something is identical with me' is false when its quantifier is taken unrestrictedly, so long as they go on to point out that it can be made true by interpreting the quantifier as restricted? The restriction could be to things on Earth, for example. While have not yet considered how to analyse multiply de re sentences like 'Possibly, nothing on Earth is identical to me', there is no reason to worry that they are false. Or the restriction could be to things in Cosmo: however we end up accounting for the truth of 'Possibly, nothing on Earth is identical to me', we should be able to account in a parallel way for the truth of 'Possibly, nothing in Cosmo is identical to me.' The claim that I could have failed to be in Cosmo is lousy as a paraphrase of the commonsense thought that I could have failed to exist. This thought is surely inconsistent with the claim that I could not have failed to be a flesh-and-blood living being; whereas this claim is perfectly consistent with the claim that I could have failed to be part of Cosmo. I think it is quite plausible that the 'exists' in such contexts expresses the property of being identical to something, unrestrictedly speaking. The point I am making is just that once we have departed from common sense to the extent of accepting claims of the form 'If something is F, then necessarily something is F, unrestrictedly speaking' when F is qualitative, we should not be much perturbed if we also decide to accept the instances where F is of the form 'identical to x'. Having been deeply unpopular for decades, NE has recently been vigorously defended by Zalta and Linsky (1994) and Timothy Williamson (1998, 2002, MS). Part of Williamson's defence involves the claim that ordinary concrete objects could fail to be concrete. According to Williamson, commonsense claims about the possible nonexistence of concrete objects are often true if 'exists' in them is replaced with 'is concrete'. So for example, Caesar could have been non-
gappy " sequences. 13 than claiming, of some intuitively true sentence imply quantifier, that it is true only when the quantifiers are take to be restricted. I have argued that this is bind to find with sentences like' It is contingent whether some swans are blue'. Against the backdrop of this pattern of agreement and disagreement with coarse sense, would it really be regretful for the modal realist to claim, analogously, that' It is contingent whether something is identical with me' is false when its quantifier is taken unrestrictedly, so long as they go on to point out that it can be made true by interpret the quantifier as restricted? The restriction could be to things on Earth, for exercise. While have not yet considered how to analyse multiply de re sentences like' Possibly, nothing on Earth is identical to me', there be no reason to worry that they are false. Or the restriction could be to things in Cosmo: however we end up report for the truth of' Possibly, nothing on Earth is identical to me', we should be able to account in a parallel way for the truth of' Possibly, nothing in Cosmo is identical to me.' The claim that I could have failed to be in Cosmo is lousy as a paraphrase of the commonsense thought that I could have failed to exist. This thought is surely inconsistent with the claim that I could not have failed to be a flesh - and - blood living being; whereas this title is perfectly consistent with the call that I could have fail to be part of Cosmo. I think it is quite plausible that the' exists' in such context expresses the property of being identical to something, unrestrictedly speaking. The point I am lay down is just that once we have departed from common sense to the extent of accepting claims of the form' If something is F, then necessarily something is F, unrestrictedly speaking' when F is qualitative, we should not be much perturb if we also decide to bear the instances where F is of the form' identical to x'. Having been deeply unpopular for decades, NE has recently been vigorously defended by Zalta and Linsky (1994) and Timothy Williamson (1998, 2002, MS). contribution of Williamson's defence involves the claim that ordinary concrete objects could fail to be concrete. According to Williamson, commonsense claims about the possible nonexistence of concrete object are often dependable if' exists' in them is replaced with' is concrete'. So for model, Caesar could have been non-
gapoy" sequences. 13 than claimlng, of some intunrively true aentence involving quantifiers, that mt iw trut only when the quavtifiers wre takeb to ve restricvsd. I hayz arghcd thct this is bound to happen with sentencev uine 'It is contingent whether some swwns are bpue'. Against thg baclqrop of this pattern of agreement and sisagretment with common xense, would it really be bwd flr the modal realidt to claim, anajigously, that 'It is conuiugent whethgr something is identical with md' is yalse when utw qkdntifier is takeg unrestrictccly, so long ax they go on tp pminr out that it can be kade true by interkreting tha suantifier as resrructed? The resgeicgioh roumd be ho vhings on Ezrth, for exqmple. While have nou yqn considered gow to agalyse multiply de re sentences like 'Povsigly, nothing on Earth is identical to me', therg is no rewson to worry that they are false. Or the restricthon ckjld bc to rhlngs in Cosmo: however we end up accounting fow tne truth of 'Posslbly, nothing on Eattj of identical tu me', wz sgould be able to afcount yn a parallel ray gor the truth of 'Possibly, nithing in Cofno is identical to me.' The clanm thaj I coild have failed to be iu Cosmk is lousy ws a paralfrase of the comoonxetse thought that I could hwve failev to zxist. Thks tnought is surely incokvistent with the cpaim jhat I could not have failed to be a flesh-and-blood living beimg; whvreas thif clalm is perfectly consistent wijh the clcim thxt I could have feiled to be [art of Cosmo. L think it iv quite [lauwiblw that gfe 'exists' in sich conteqtf expresses the properby of geing identical to something, unrextrkctqdpy s[aaking. The pmint I xk makkng is just ghat once we have departad fdom common sense tp bhe extenj of acce[ting claims pf the form 'If somtthing is F, thrn gecessarily something is F, unrsstrictedpy fpeaking' wheg F ls qoalitative, ce should not be much perturbed if we alwo decide to accekt the instances wherg F is of the horm 'iqentical do x'. Having been deeply unpopular for decades, NE has recenfly bean vihorously defended by Zalta and Linsky (1994) and Timothy Williamson (1998, 2002, MS). Part od Willmaison's defende imvolvvs che claim thav urdinary concretv objects could fail to be concrxte. Accordhny to Williamson, commonsense ckakms about the possible nonexistence or concreye objects are often true if 'exosts' in them is replaced with 'is concdete'. So foc example, Caesar coukd havz been non-
gappy" sequences. 13 than claiming, of some sentence quantifiers, that is true only to restricted. I have that this is to happen with sentences like 'It contingent whether some swans are blue'. Against the backdrop of this pattern of and disagreement with common sense, would it really be bad for the modal to analogously, 'It contingent whether something is identical with me' is false when its quantifier is taken unrestrictedly, so as they go on to point out that can be made true interpreting the quantifier as restricted? restriction be to on for While have not considered how to analyse multiply de re sentences like 'Possibly, nothing on Earth is identical to me', is no worry that are Or restriction could be in Cosmo: however we end up truth of 'Possibly, nothing on Earth is identical me', we be able to account in a way for the truth of 'Possibly, nothing in is identical to me.' The claim that I could have failed to be in Cosmo as a paraphrase of commonsense thought that could failed exist. thought is inconsistent with the claim that I could not have failed to a flesh-and-blood living being; whereas this claim is perfectly consistent claim I could have to be part of I it is quite plausible 'exists' such property being to something, unrestrictedly speaking. point I am making is that once we have the extent of accepting claims of the form something is F, then necessarily something is unrestrictedly speaking' when F is qualitative, we should not be much perturbed we also accept the instances where F is of the 'identical to x'. Having deeply unpopular for decades, NE has recently been vigorously by and Linsky and Timothy Williamson 2002, MS). Part Williamson's defence involves that ordinary objects fail According to Williamson, commonsense claims about possible of concrete objects are often if them is replaced with 'is concrete'. So for example, Caesar could have been non-
gappy" sequences. 13 than claiminG, of some intUitivEly TruE sEnteNce iNvolving quantiFIers, That it is true only when thE quanTiFIers ARe Taken To be resTRiCTEd. I HaVe ArgUeD ThAt thiS is Bound to Happen with SenTeNces like 'It is COnTingent wheTheR some swans arE blUe'. AgaiNsT thE BackdRop Of thiS patteRN of agrEement and DiSAgreemENt with cOMMoN senSe, would it really be BAd FOr the modal realIst to cLaIM, aNALogOusLy, that 'It is CoNtingENt whethER sOMEThiNG is identical wIth me' is falsE WheN its quAnTifIEr is taKen unReSTriCtedly, so lonG as tHey go on to Point oUT that it CAn be madE true bY inTerPretINg ThE quAnTIfiER aS reSTriCted? The rEsTrIctioN couLD BE To thIngS on EArth, fOr example. WhilE haVe noT Yet ConsiDered How tO aNalysE multiPly de Re Sentences like 'PoSsibLy, nothing On EArTh iS iDentiCAl to me', TheRe iS no reasOn to worRY thAt THEY aRe false. Or the restriCtION cOuld be to Things IN COsMO: however We End Up acCOUntinG for THe Truth of 'POssiblY, NoThIng on EaRtH is ideNtIcaL to Me', we sHOuld Be able To accounT in a pARallel way for thE Truth of 'PossibLY, nOTHiNG in COsmO is identicaL to mE.' the cLaim THaT I cOUld haVe faiLeD To BE in Cosmo is lousy as a pArAphrasE of thE commonsense tHought that i COUld have fAileD To EXist. This thoughT is suRely inconsIStent witH the cLaim that i could not HAVe failed To bE a fLesH-anD-BLoOd living being; WHEreaS tHis claiM is PerfectLy cOnsIstEnt WiTh the claiM that I coUlD hAvE fAilEd to bE Part of CoSmO. I tHiNk iT is quITe plauSible That ThE 'eXIstS' in such COnTEXts eXpReSses The PrOpertY of bEIng IdenticAl to sometHinG, UnreStRiCtedly sPeaking. The poiNt i am making iS jUst That onCE We have deParted from common sense to THe extenT of AccepTing Claims of tHe fOrm 'If sOmeTHing is f, then nEcessArIly SOMethiNG Is f, unReStrictedly SPEakIng' whEn f is qUalitatIve, we should not be muCH peRturbed if we alSo dEcidE TO aCcePT tHE inStANceS WHere F is of the forM 'identical To X'. haVing been deEPly UnPopular For decaDes, NE HAs recenTly been viGorously dEfEndeD BY ZaLta and LinsKy (1994) and TimOthy WilliAMson (1998, 2002, Ms). paRt of WIllIamson'S dEfeNce inVolves THe cLaim tHat ordInAry conCrete ObJects couLd fail to be concrete. AccorDing to williAmsOn, commonsEnsE ClaIms about tHe poSsible noneXisTenCe of cOncREte obJectS ArE ofTEn truE if 'eXIsts' in theM Is RepLACeD with 'is concRETE'. So For exAmpLE, CaesaR couLd have been non-
gappy" sequences. 13 thanclaiming,of so meint ui tive ly t rue sentence i n volv ing quantifiers, thatit is  t r ue o n ly  when  the qu a nt i f ier sar e t ak e nto be  re stricte d. I havearg ue d that thisi sbound to h app en with sent enc es lik e'It is co nti ngent  wheth e r some  swans ar eb lue'.A gainstt h eback drop of this patt e rn of agreement a nd dis ag r ee m e ntwit h common s en se, w o uld itr ea l l y  be bad for the m odal realis t  to  claim ,ana l ogousl y, th at 'It  is conting entwhether s omethi n g is id e nticalwith m e'isfals e  w he n i ts qua n ti fie r  is  taken u nr es trict edly , s o  lon g a s th ey go  on to pointout  tha t  it  canbe ma de t ru e byinterp retin gthe quantifieras r estricted ? T he  re st ricti o n coul d b e t o thing s on Ea r th,  f o r ex ample. While haveno t ye t consid ered h o wto analysemu lti plyd e  re s ente n ce s like ' Possib l y,  n othingon  Earth  i s i den tical to m e', th ere is n o rea s on to worry th a t they are fa l se . Or theres triction co uldb e to  thi n gs  in Cosmo : how ev e rw e end up accounting  f or the  trut h of 'Possibl y, nothing o n  Earth i s id e nt i cal to me', we  shou ld be able to accou nt in  a paral lel way f o r  the tru thof'Po ssi b l y,  nothing in C o s mo i sidentic alto me.'  Th e c lai m t ha t I could  have fa il ed  t obein Co s mo is lo us y a sa p araph r ase of  thecomm on se n sethought th a t  I c ou ld  hav e f ai led t o ex i st.  This t hought is  su r elyin co nsisten t with the cl ai m that I c ou ldnot ha v e  failedto be a flesh-and-blood livingbei ng; w here as this c lai m is p erf e ctly c onsist ent w it h t h e  clai m th atIcould have f ail ed to  b e pa rt of C osmo. I think it i s  qu ite plausible  th at t h e  ' exi s ts '  in  s u chc o ntexts expresse s the prop er t yof being i d ent ic al to s omethin g, un r estrict edly spea king. The  p oint I  am  making is  just th at once w e  have de parte d f rom co mm onsense  to th e  ex tentof acc ep ting c laims  o f the fo rm 'If something is F,then n ecess ari ly someth ing isF, unrest rict edly speak ing ' w hen F  is quali tati v e,  we shoul d no t  be muchp er tur b e dif we alsod e c ide  to a cce p t theinst ances where F iso f the form 'id enti c a l t o x ' . Ha vi ng been deeply  un po p u lar forde cades, NE h as recen tl y  been  vigor ouslydefende d by ZaltaandLin sky (1994 ) a nd Timothy  W il l iamson  (19 98 , 2002 , MS). Part o f Williamson's d efenc e invol v esthe c la im that ordi nary concr ete objects  could  fai l tobe conc re te. Ac cor di ng to Will i amson, co mmons ense cl ai ms a bou t theposs i b le no nexi st enc e of conc r e te ob je c tsareoften  t rueif 'exist s ' in the m i s  replac ed  wi t h  'is c o nc r e te'. So fo r e xampl e ,  Caesar co u ld h a ve beennon-
gappy" sequences._13 than_claiming, of some intuitively_true sentence_involving_quantifiers, that_it_is true only_when the quantifiers_are taken to be_restricted. I have_argued_that this is bound to happen with sentences like 'It is contingent whether some_swans_are blue'._Against_the_backdrop of this pattern of_agreement and disagreement with common_sense, would_it really be bad for the modal realist_to_claim, analogously, that_'It is contingent whether something is identical with me'_is false when its quantifier is_taken unrestrictedly, so_long_as_they go on to_point out that it can be_made true by interpreting the quantifier_as restricted? The restriction could be to_things on Earth, for example. While_have not yet considered how_to analyse_multiply de re sentences like_'Possibly, nothing on_Earth is_identical to me',_there is no reason to worry_that they are_false. Or the restriction could be_to_things in Cosmo:_however_we_end up_accounting for the_truth_of 'Possibly,_nothing_on Earth is identical to me',_we_should be able to account in a_parallel way for the_truth_of 'Possibly, nothing in_Cosmo is identical to me.'_The claim that I could have_failed to_be in_Cosmo is lousy as a paraphrase of the commonsense thought that_I could have failed to exist._This thought is surely_inconsistent with_the_claim that I_could_not have_failed to be a flesh-and-blood living being;_whereas this_claim is perfectly consistent with the_claim that I could_have_failed to be part of Cosmo._I think it is quite plausible_that the 'exists' in such_contexts_expresses_the property of being identical_to something, unrestrictedly speaking. The point_I am making_is just that once we have departed_from_common sense to the extent of_accepting_claims of the form 'If something_is_F,_then necessarily something is F,_unrestrictedly speaking' when F is qualitative,_we should not be much perturbed if we also_decide to accept_the instances where F is_of_the_form 'identical to x'. Having been deeply unpopular for decades,_NE has_recently been vigorously_defended by Zalta and Linsky (1994) and Timothy Williamson (1998,_2002, MS). Part of Williamson's defence involves_the claim that ordinary concrete objects could fail to be concrete._According to Williamson, commonsense claims about the possible_nonexistence of concrete objects are often true_if 'exists' in them_is_replaced with 'is concrete'. So for example,_Caesar_could_have_been non-