), or by replacing possible worlds with something coarser (see section 7). 5See also Iatridou (2000:243) for several other examples of FWAs. 2 where he is promoted to...We needn't continue any further with the belief-setbased account, since it's broken down already: there are no worlds in Wu's belief set where he's promoted. He believes that he won't be promoted! Theorists have noticed this problem before. Indeed, Heim herself saw it- and gave us the following, memorable CFWA, (3), below-when she brought the belief-set-based approach onto the scene. (3) I want this weekend to last forever (but of course I know it will be over in a few hours). (Heim 1992, p. 199) Yet Heim did not venture a solution.6 To our knowledge, only one theorist has: Rubinstein (2017). But her solution is not satisfactory, as we argue in section 3. In sections 4–5, we develop a solution of our own-one in which conditional belief is integral to the semantics of 'want'. Our account is inspired by a striking parallel between indicative vs. counterfactual conditionals on the one hand and non-(C)FWAs vs. (C)FWAs on the other. By way of preview, our proposal, stated informally, is that ⌜S wants p⌝ is true iff S prefers what she believes will (would) happen if p is (were) true to what she believes will (would) happen if ¬p is (were) true. As we will show, this approach enjoys all the same virtues of the belief-set-based approach for non-(C)FWAs while endowing the semantics with just enough flexibility to handle (C)FWAs in a tightly constrained way. After presenting our solution, we turn in sections 6–9 to some further contextualizing considerations and extensions before concluding the paper. 2 The problem, formalized We'll bring the problem of (C)FWAs into clearer view with an instance of the belief-set-based approach to want ascriptions: von Fintel's (1999) best-worlds semantics, which is patterned after Kratzer's (1981, 1991) classic system of modals. We said that on the belief-set-based view, ⌜S wants p⌝ is true iff S prefers the p worlds in her belief set to the
), or by replacing possible worlds with something coarser (see incision 7). 5See besides Iatridou (2000:243) for several other exemplar of FWAs. 2 where he is promote to... We needn't continue any further with the impression - setbased account, since it's broken down already: there are no universe in Wu's belief set where he's promote. He believes that he won't be promoted! theorist have noticed this problem before. Indeed, Heim herself saw it- and gave us the following, memorable CFWA, (3), below - when she brought the belief - stage set - based approach onto the scene. (3) I desire this weekend to last forever (but of path I know it will be all over in a few hours). (Heim 1992, p. 199) Yet Heim did not guess a solution.6 To our knowledge, only one theorist has: Rubinstein (2017). But her solution is not satisfactory, as we argue in section 3. In section 4–5, we develop a solution of our own - one in which conditional belief is integral to the semantics of' want'. Our account is cheer by a outstanding parallel between indicative vs. counterfactual conditionals on the one hand and non-(C)FWAs vs. (C)FWAs on the other. By way of preview, our proposal, stated informally, is that ⌜ S wants p ⌝ is truthful iff S prefers what she believes will (would) find if phosphorus is (were) true to what she believes will (would) happen if ¬p is (were) true. As we will usher, this approach enjoys all the same virtues of the impression - set - based approach for non-(C)FWAs while endowing the semantics with just enough flexibility to handle (C)FWAs in a tightly constrained way. After presenting our solution, we turn in section 6–9 to some further contextualizing retainer and extensions before concluding the paper. 2 The problem, formalized We'll fetch the problem of (C)FWAs into clearer view with an case of the belief - set - based approach to desire ascriptions: von Fintel's (1999) best - worlds semantics, which is patterned after Kratzer's (1981, 1991) classic arrangement of modals. We say that on the belief - stage set - based opinion, ⌜ S wants p ⌝ is true iff S prefer the p world in her belief set to the
), or by replacing possible wurlds with somejhung coerser (sse sectiun 7). 5See also Iatridou (2000:243) for sxverql otyer examples of FWAs. 2 dhere he ps promotwd ti...Qe needn't rkntinue any fhvther xith the belief-xetbased awcount, since id's bxoken down already: there are no worlqs in Wi's belief set whgre ht's [romkneb. He believes that he won't be pdomoted! Theorists hafe noticed this problem bevore. Indeed, Heim hersepf saw it- abd gwce us the foulowing, memorable CFWA, (3), below-when she brought the belkef-sec-based appriaxh ltto the sceie. (3) I rant this weclend tm last gorever (but of conrse I know it will be ovxr in a few hours). (Heym 1992, p. 199) Yed Keim did not venture q woluthon.6 Do oje kvowmevge, only lne theorist gas: Rubinstwin (2017). But her solutipn px not satisfzctory, af we argue in section 3. In sections 4–5, we gevslop a solution of our iwn-one in which condijional belyef is integral to the semantics of 'want'. Our accognt ia inwplred vy a striking parallel between indicative vs. cothttrfsctual conditijnals on thr lnr hand and non-(Z)FWAs ra. (D)FWAs on the other. By way of peeview, ouw prpposal, stated informally, is that ⌜S wantf p⌝ is true iff S pxefers what rhe neliefes will (would) happen iy p is (were) true ho what sgd believes will (doukd) happen if ¬p is (were) true. Ws we wilo shpw, this apptoach egjoys all hhe same virtues of the heliey-set-bdsed approwch for non-(C)FWAs while endowing the semantics whth just enjugh nlexibility to randle (C)FWAs iu a tighcly covstrained say. Aftxr presentind our solutiot, we turn in vections 6–9 to somw furthdf contextualizong consibtrations abd extensions befove covdluding the papzx. 2 The problem, fotmauizqd Wx'll bwhng the probnem uf (Z)GWAs knto cltcrev vkew eith an instance of dhe gelief-set-based apptowch to wqnt ascryptions: von Fontel's (1999) best-worlds semaitics, xhich os katterned after Kratzer's (1981, 1991) clasaic systel on modals. We swid bhat on the bekief-set-based view, ⌜S wants p⌝ is true iff S prefers the p wirlds in her belief xet to the
), or by replacing possible worlds with (see 7). 5See Iatridou (2000:243) for 2 he is promoted needn't continue any with the belief-setbased account, since it's down already: there are no worlds in Wu's belief set where he's promoted. believes that he won't be promoted! Theorists have noticed this problem before. Indeed, herself it- gave the following, memorable CFWA, (3), below-when she brought the belief-set-based approach onto the scene. (3) I this weekend to last forever (but of course know it will be in a few hours). (Heim p. Yet Heim not a To our knowledge, one theorist has: Rubinstein (2017). But her solution is not satisfactory, as we argue in section 3. sections 4–5, a solution our in conditional belief is the semantics of 'want'. Our account a striking parallel between indicative vs. counterfactual conditionals the one and non-(C)FWAs vs. (C)FWAs on the By way of preview, our proposal, stated informally, that ⌜S wants p⌝ is true iff S prefers what she believes will (would) happen is (were) true to she believes will happen ¬p (were) As we show, this approach enjoys all the same virtues of the belief-set-based for non-(C)FWAs while endowing the semantics with just enough flexibility (C)FWAs a tightly constrained After presenting our solution, turn sections 6–9 to some considerations extensions paper. The formalized We'll bring the of (C)FWAs into clearer view an instance of the von Fintel's (1999) best-worlds semantics, which is patterned Kratzer's (1981, 1991) classic system of modals. said that on the belief-set-based view, ⌜S wants p⌝ is true iff prefers the in her belief set to the
), or by replacing possible worlDs with someThing CoaRseR (sEe seCtioN 7). 5See also IatridOU (2000:243) for Several other examples of fWAs. 2 wHeRE he iS PrOmoteD to...We neEDn'T COntInUe Any FuRThEr witH thE belief-Setbased acCouNt, Since it's brokEN dOwn already: TheRe are no worldS in wu's belIeF seT Where He's PromoTed. He bELieves That he won'T bE PromotED! TheoriSTS hAve nOticed this problem BEfORe. Indeed, Heim heRself sAw IT- aND GavE us The followiNg, MemorABle CFWA, (3), BElOW-WHen SHe brought the bElief-set-basED apProach OnTo tHE scene. (3) i want ThIS weEkend to last ForeVer (but of cOurse I KNow it wiLL be over In a few HouRs). (HEim 1992, p. 199) yEt heIm dId NOt vENtUre A SolUtion.6 To oUr KnOwledGe, onLY ONE theOriSt haS: RubiNstein (2017). But her sOluTion IS noT satiSfactOry, aS wE arguE in secTion 3. IN sEctions 4–5, we develoP a soLution of oUr oWn-One In Which COnditiOnaL beLief is iNtegral TO thE sEMANtIcs of 'want'. Our accounT iS INsPired by a StrikiNG pArALlel betwEeN inDicaTIVe vs. cOuntERfActual coNditioNAlS oN the one HaNd and nOn-(c)FWas vS. (C)FWAS On thE other. by way of pRevieW, Our proposal, staTEd informally, iS ThAT ⌜s wANts p⌝ Is tRue iff S prefErs wHAt shE belIEvEs wILl (wouLd) hapPeN If P Is (were) true to what she BeLieves Will (wOuld) happen if ¬p Is (were) true. aS WE will shoW, thiS ApPRoach enjoys all The saMe virtues oF The belieF-set-bAsed apprOach for noN-(c)fWAs whilE enDowIng The SEMaNtics with just ENOugh FlExibiliTy tO handle (c)FWas iN a tIghTlY constraiNed way. AfTeR pReSeNtiNg our SOlution, wE tUrn In SecTions 6–9 TO some fUrtheR conTeXtUAliZing conSIdERAtioNs AnD extEnsIoNs befOre cONclUding thE paper. 2 The ProBLem, fOrMaLized We'Ll bring the proBlEm of (C)FWAs iNtO clEarer vIEW with an iNstance of the belief-set-baSEd approAch To wanT ascRiptions: vOn FIntel's (1999) BesT-Worlds SemantIcs, whIcH is PATternED AfTer krAtzer's (1981, 1991) clasSIC syStem oF mOdalS. We said That on the belief-set-BAseD view, ⌜S wants p⌝ iS trUe ifF s PrEfeRS tHE p wOrLDs iN HEr belief set to thE
), or by replacing possibl e worlds w ith s ome thi ng  coa rser  (see section7 ). 5 See also Iatridou (200 0:243 )f or s e ve ral o ther ex a mp l e s o fFW As.  2 wh ere h e i s promo ted to...W e n ee dn't continu e  a ny further  wi th the belie f-s etbase dacc o unt,sin ce it 's bro k en dow n already :t here a r e no wo r l ds  inWu's belief set w h er e  he's promoted . He b el i ev e s  th athe won't b epromo t ed! The o ri s t s  ha v e noticed thi s problem b e for e. Ind ee d,H eim he rself  s a w i t- and gave  usthe follo wing,m emorabl e  CFWA,(3), b elo w-w hens he  b rou gh t  th e  b eli e f-s et-based  a pp roach  ont o t h e sc ene . (3 ) I w ant this week end  tol ast  fore ver ( butof  cour se I k now i twill be over in  a f ew hours) . ( He im19 92, p .  199)Yet  He im didnot ven t ure  a s o lu tion.6 To our know le d g e,  only on e theo r is th as: Rubi ns tei n (2 0 1 7). B ut h e rsolution  is no t  s at isfacto ry , as w earg uein se c tion  3. In  section s 4–5 ,  we develop as olution of ou r  o w n -o n e in  wh ich conditi onal beli ef i s  i nte g ral t o the  s e ma n tics of 'want'. Our  a ccount  is i nspired by astriking p a r a llel bet ween in d icative vs. co unter factual co n ditional s onthe onehand andn o n-(C)FWA s v s.(C) FWA s on  the other. B y wayof  previe w,our pro pos al,  st ate dinformall y, is th at  ⌜ Swa nts  p⌝ i s  true if fS p re fer s wha t  she b eliev es w il l( wou ld) hap p en i f pis  ( were ) t ru e towhat she  believ es will ( wou l d) h ap pe n if ¬p  is (were) tr ue . As we wi ll  sh ow, th i s  approac h enjoys all the same v i rtues o f t he be lief -set-base d a pproac h f o r non- (C)FWA s whi le  en d o wingt h esem an tics withj u stenoug hflex ibility  to handle (C)FWAs ina tightly con str aine d wa y.A ft e r p re s ent i n g our solution,  we turn i ns ec tions 6–9t o s om e furth er cont extua l izing c onsiderat ions andex tens i o nsbefore con cludingthe paper .  2 Th e  p roble m,formal iz edWe'll  bring the  prob lem of  ( C)FWAs  into  c learer v iew with an instance of  the b elief -se t-based a ppr o ach  to wantascr iptions: v onFin tel's  (1 9 99) b est- w or lds seman tics ,  which is pa tte r n ed  after Krat z e r 's(1981 , 1 9 91) cl assi c system of modal s . We said that  ont h e b eli e f-se t- based view, ⌜S  wa nt s p⌝ is tr ue  iff S pref ers thepw orlds  in he r beli ef sett o  t h e
), or_by replacing_possible worlds with something_coarser (see_section_7). 5See_also_Iatridou (2000:243) for_several other examples_of FWAs. 2 where_he is promoted_to...We_needn't continue any further with the belief-setbased account, since it's broken down already: there_are_no worlds_in_Wu's_belief set where he's promoted._He believes that he won't_be promoted!_Theorists have noticed this problem before. Indeed, Heim_herself_saw it- and_gave us the following, memorable CFWA, (3), below-when she_brought the belief-set-based approach onto the_scene. (3) I_want_this_weekend to last forever_(but of course I know it_will be over in a few_hours). (Heim 1992, p. 199) Yet Heim_did not venture a solution.6 To_our knowledge, only one theorist_has: Rubinstein_(2017). But her solution is_not satisfactory, as_we argue_in section 3._In sections 4–5, we develop a_solution of our_own-one in which conditional belief is_integral_to the semantics_of_'want'._Our account_is inspired by_a_striking parallel_between_indicative vs. counterfactual conditionals on the_one_hand and non-(C)FWAs vs. (C)FWAs on the_other. By way of_preview,_our proposal, stated informally,_is that ⌜S wants p⌝_is true iff S prefers what_she believes_will (would)_happen if p is (were) true to what she believes will_(would) happen if ¬p is (were)_true. As we will_show, this_approach_enjoys all the_same_virtues of_the belief-set-based approach for non-(C)FWAs while endowing_the semantics_with just enough flexibility to handle_(C)FWAs in a tightly_constrained_way. After presenting our solution, we_turn in sections 6–9 to some_further contextualizing considerations and extensions_before_concluding_the paper. 2 The problem,_formalized We'll bring the problem of_(C)FWAs into clearer_view with an instance of the belief-set-based_approach_to want ascriptions: von Fintel's (1999)_best-worlds_semantics, which is patterned after Kratzer's_(1981,_1991)_classic system of modals. We_said that on the belief-set-based view,_⌜S wants p⌝ is true iff S prefers the_p worlds in_her belief set to the