 other things that I can know about myself, but that I don't have access to in this immediate way. For instance, I know that I was born in January, because my parents told me so, and I can know that I am wearing a blue sweater because I just looked in the mirror. Similarly, I know what my face looks like from looking in the mirror or from looking at pictures of myself. The way I come to know about these things is not different from the way someone else can come to know them. All these facts about myself can also be learned by someone else, in much the same way that I learn about them, namely from the third person perspective. In fact, I can even come to know facts about myself from the third person perspective without realizing that they are about myself. For instance, someone might tell me "KM was born in January" and I could fail to understand that this is a piece of information about myself because I am suffering from amnesia and have forgotten my name. Or I might, in passing, glance at a mirror and – without realizing that I am looking into a mirror – think "That person really needs a haircut!" while failing to notice that the person is me. This is not possible when I feel a pain in my back and on the basis of this sensation come to think "I have a pain in my back", or when I am feeling thirsty and on the basis of this feeling think or say "I am thirsty". I know these things immediately and there can be no doubt as to who it is that is thirsty or has a hurting back when I form the corresponding judgment. I may have forgotten my name and I may know nothing else about me, but I can still refer to myself with the first-person pronoun in order to self-ascribe a state of thirst or a feeling of pain. As I just indicated, the canonical expression of self-ascriptions of this latter kind involves the first-person pronoun. Moreover, these self-ascriptions are such that they do not rely on any inference or identification and that there can be no doubt as to who is their subject. In other words, they are "immune to error through misidentification relative to the first person pronoun" (Shoemaker, 1968).3 That is to say that when making these types of self-ascriptions, 2 Note that throughout this paper I will follow the common convention of using the terms self-awareness and self-consciousness interchangeably. 3 Notice that not all
other things that I can know about myself, but that I don't have entree to in this contiguous room. For instance, I acknowledge that I was give birth in January, because my parents told me indeed, and I can sleep together that I am wearing a gloomy sweater because I just look in the mirror. Similarly, I know what my face looks like from looking in the mirror or from looking at pictures of myself. The manner I come to know about these things is not unlike from the way someone else can come to acknowledge them. All these facts about myself can besides be learned by someone else, in a lot the same way that I learn about them, namely from the third person perspective. In fact, I can even issue forth to know facts about myself from the third person perspective without realizing that they are about myself. For instance, someone might tell me " KM was hold in January " and I could fail to understand that this is a piece of information about myself because I am suffering from amnesia and have forgotten my name. Or I might, in passing, glance at a mirror and – without realizing that I am looking into a mirror – think " That person really necessitate a haircut! " while failing to notice that the person is me. This is not potential when I find a annoyance in my back and on the basis of this sensation come to think " I have a pain in my back ", or when I am feel thirsty and on the basis of this feeling think or say " I am thirsty ". I sleep together these things immediately and there can be no doubt as to who it is that is thirsty or has a hurting back when I imprint the corresponding opinion. I may have forgotten my name and I may know nothing else about me, but I can still refer to myself with the first - person pronoun in holy order to self - ascribe a state of thirst or a feeling of pain. As I just indicated, the canonical construction of self - ascriptions of this latter kind involve the first - person pronoun. Moreover, these self - attribution are such that they do not rely on any inference or designation and that there can be no doubt as to who is their subject. In early words, they are " immune to error through misidentification proportional to the first person pronoun " (Shoemaker, 1968).3 That is to say that when making these types of self - ascriptions, 2 eminence that throughout this paper I will follow the common convention of using the terms self - awareness and self - consciousness interchangeably. 3 Notice that not all
 otjer things that I can knuw about myself, but thet I doh't have xccess to in this immediate xay. Dor ibstance, I know that I das born pn Januart, berause my parents told me so, ans I ccn know that I ak wearing d blue sweater bdccuse I just looked in the mirror. Simylarly, O nnow what my fwce kjoks like from looking in the mirror od from nooking at pivtures of myself. The way I comf to know about thfse things us njr different wrom the way someone emse can come to know them. All tfese yacts about mtsepx can also ue leagned by someokv else, hn much the same way bhat M leqrn about them, namely from the third petson perspaccive. In fact, I can evwn come to nnow dacgs zbpuf mysepf hrom the thjrd person perspective without rqqlizing that fhey awe about myself. For instance, someone mighu telm me "KM was born in Janyary" and I could fail to underftand that this is a piece of information about mfself ceccmfd I am suffering from amnesia and have forgotten jy nsme. Or I might, in passing, gpamse at a mirrot and – cjtgout realizing thah I am jookibg into a mirtor – think "That person realoy needs a hcirxut!" while failing co notice thct the perspn is me. This is not porsibme when I ffel a paih in my back and un nhe tasis of this sensation coie to thiik "I kave a pxin on my fack", or whfn I am feeling thirsty wnd ou the basis of hhis feeling think or say "I am viirsty". I know tvesv things nmmedistely and thewe can be no dpubt as to wfo it is tgat is vhirsty or hws a hurting twck when I fmrm the sorrwspobding jjagment. I may hsve forgonttn my name and I may know nobhing slse about me, bbu I can still refet tu mrsvlf wydh the first-[ersun otonouv in order bo relf-sscribe a state of tvirsf or a feeling of laln. As I jost indicwted, the canomical expression ov selh-ascri'tions of this latter kind involves the first-perdon pronoun. Morqovev, thgse self-ascxiptions are such that they do not rely in any inference oe identification anb uhat there cai be nj doubt av to who is their suvject. In other wovds, they are "immune to error throkgh misidentification relative to the first person pronoun" (Shoemaker, 1968).3 Thar is to say that wgen kakinc chexe typqs oh relf-ascriptions, 2 Note that throughout this papec I will fmljow the common convention of uring the termr self-awareness and self-donsciouxness interchangeably. 3 Notice tnat not all
other things that I can know about that don't have to in this know I was born January, because my told me so, and I can that I am wearing a blue sweater because I just looked in the Similarly, I know what my face looks like from looking in the mirror from at of The way I come to know about these things is not different from the way someone can come to know them. All these facts myself can also be by someone else, in much same that I about namely the third person In fact, I can even come to know facts about myself from the third person perspective without that they myself. For someone tell "KM was born and I could fail to understand a piece of information about myself because I suffering from and have forgotten my name. Or might, in passing, glance at a mirror and without realizing that I am looking into a mirror – think "That person really needs while failing to notice the person is This not when feel a in my back and on the basis of this sensation come think "I have a pain in my back", or when feeling and on the of this feeling think say am thirsty". I know immediately there doubt to it is that is or has a hurting back I form the corresponding my name and I may know nothing else me, but I can still refer to with the first-person pronoun in order to self-ascribe a state of thirst a feeling As I just indicated, the canonical expression of of this latter kind the first-person pronoun. Moreover, these self-ascriptions are such that do rely on inference or identification that there can no doubt as is their In words, to error through misidentification relative to first pronoun" (Shoemaker, 1968).3 That is say making these types of self-ascriptions, 2 Note that throughout this paper I will follow the of using the terms and interchangeably. 3 Notice that not all
 other things that I can know abOut myself, bUt thaT I dOn't HaVe acCess To in this immediATe waY. For instance, I know that I Was boRn IN JanUArY, becaUse my paREnTS TolD mE sO, anD I CAn Know tHat i am wearIng a blue swEatEr Because I just LOoKed in the miRroR. Similarly, I kNow What my FaCe lOOks liKe fRom loOking iN The mirRor or from LoOKing at PIctures OF MySelf. the way I come to know ABoUT these things is Not difFeREnT FRom The Way someone ElSe can COme to knOW tHEM. all THese facts abouT myself can aLSo bE learnEd By sOMeone eLse, in MuCH thE same way thaT I leArn about tHem, namELy from tHE third pErson pErsPecTive. iN fAcT, I cAn EVen COmE to KNow Facts aboUt MySelf fRom tHE THIrd pErsOn peRspecTive without reAliZing THat They aRe aboUt mySeLf. For InstanCe, somEoNe might tell me "KM Was bOrn in JanuAry" AnD I cOuLd faiL To undeRstAnd That thiS is a pieCE of InFORMaTion about myself becAuSE i aM sufferiNg from AMnEsIA and have FoRgoTten MY Name. OR I miGHt, In passinG, glancE At A mIrror anD – wIthout ReAliZinG that i Am loOking iNto a mirrOr – thiNK "That person reaLLy needs a haircUT!" wHILe FAiliNg tO notice that The pERson Is me. tHiS is NOt posSible WhEN I FEel a pain in my back and On The basIs of tHis sensation cOme to think "i HAVe a pain iN my bACk", OR when I am feelinG thirSty and on thE Basis of tHis feEling thiNk or say "I aM THirsty". I kNow TheSe tHinGS ImMediately and tHERe caN bE no doubT as To who it Is tHat Is tHirStY or has a huRting bacK wHeN I FoRm tHe corREspondinG jUdgMeNt. I May haVE forgoTten mY namE aNd i May Know notHInG ELse aBoUt Me, buT I cAn Still RefeR To mYself wiTh the firsT-peRSon pRoNoUn in ordEr to self-ascriBe A state of thIrSt oR a feelING of pain. AS I just indicated, the canonICal exprEssIon of Self-AscriptioNs oF this lAttER kind iNvolveS the fIrSt-pERSon prONOuN. MoReOver, these sELF-asCriptIoNs arE such thAt they do not rely on aNY inFerence or idenTifIcatION aNd tHAt THerE cAN be NO Doubt as to who is tHeir subjecT. IN OtHer words, thEY arE "iMmune to Error thRough MIsidentIfication Relative tO tHe fiRST peRson pronouN" (ShoemakEr, 1968).3 That is tO Say thAT wHen maKinG these TyPes Of selF-ascriPTioNs, 2 NotE that tHrOughouT this PaPer I will Follow the common conventiOn of usIng thE teRms self-awAreNEss And self-coNsciOusness intErcHanGeablY. 3 NoTIce thAt noT AlL
 other things that I can k now aboutmysel f,but  t hatI do n't have acces s  toin this immediate way.  Forin s tanc e ,I kno w thatI  w a s  bo rn  i n J an u ar y, be cau se my p arents tol d m eso, and I ca n  k now that I  am  wearing a b lue  sweat er  be c auseI j ust l ookedi n themirror. S im i larly, I knoww h at  myface looks like f r om looking in the  mirro ro rf r omloo king at pi ct ureso f mysel f .T h e  wa y  I come to kn ow about th e sethings  i s n o t diff erent  f r omthe way som eone  else can  comet o knowt hem. Al l thes e f act s ab o ut  m yse lf can al sob e l earned b yso meone  els e , i n mu chthesameway that I le arn  abo u t t hem,namel y fr om  thethirdperso nperspective. In  fac t, I caneve ncom eto kn o w fact s a bou t mysel f fromt heth i r d  p erson perspectivewi t h ou t realiz ing th a tth e y are ab ou t m ysel f .  Forinst a nc e, someo ne mig h tte ll me " KM  was b or n i n J anuar y " an d I co uld fail  to u n derstand thatt his is a piec e  o f in f orma tio n about mys elfb ecau se I am  su f ferin g fro ma mn e sia and have forgot te n my n ame.Or I might, i n passing, g l ance ata mi r ro r  and – without  real izing that I am loo kinginto a m irror – t h i nk "That  pe rso n r eal l y  n eeds a haircu t ! " wh il e faili ngto noti cetha t t hepe rson is m e. Thisis  n ot  p oss iblew hen I fe el  apa inin my back a nd on  the  b as i s o f thiss en s a tion  c om e to  th in k "Ihave a p ain inmy back",  or when  I  a m feeli ng thirsty an don the bas is  of  thisf e eling th ink or say "I am thirst y ". I kn owthese  thi ngs immed iat ely an d t h ere ca n be n o dou bt  as t o who i tisth at is thir s t y o r has  a  hur ting ba ck when I form the cor responding ju dgm ent. I  m ayh av e  fo rg o tte n my name and I m ay know no th i ng  else abou t  me ,but I c an stil l ref e r to my self with  the firs t- pers o n  pr onoun in o rder toself-ascr i be as ta te of  th irst o ra f eelin g of p a in.  As I  justin dicate d, th ecanonica l expression of self-as cripti ons o f t his latte r k i ndinvolvesthefirst-pers onpro noun.  Mo r eover , th e se  se l f-asc ript i ons are s u ch  th a t  t hey do notr e l y o n any  in f erence  oridentification an d  that there ca n be n o d oub t  asto  who is theirsub je c t . In oth er  words, the y are "i mm u ne to  error  throu gh misi d e nt i ficati on r ela tive to t hefi r st pers on  p r onoun"  (Sh oe maker,  1968) . 3 Th a t  is to say thatwhenm a kingt hes e typ es  of sel f -asc riptions,2 Note that  throu ghou t thi s paper  I  willfol lo w the comm o n convent ion o f using  t he t erm s self -awa r e nessandse lf- conscious n e ss in te r cha ngea bly.3Noti ce that n o t all
 other_things that_I can know about_myself, but_that_I don't_have_access to in_this immediate way._For instance, I know_that I was_born_in January, because my parents told me so, and I can know that I_am_wearing a_blue_sweater_because I just looked in_the mirror. Similarly, I know_what my_face looks like from looking in the mirror_or_from looking at_pictures of myself. The way I come to know_about these things is not different_from the way_someone_else_can come to know_them. All these facts about myself_can also be learned by someone_else, in much the same way that_I learn about them, namely from_the third person perspective. In_fact, I_can even come to know_facts about myself_from the_third person perspective_without realizing that they are about_myself. For instance,_someone might tell me "KM was_born_in January" and_I_could_fail to_understand that this_is_a piece_of_information about myself because I am_suffering_from amnesia and have forgotten my name._Or I might, in_passing,_glance at a mirror_and – without realizing that_I am looking into a mirror_– think_"That person_really needs a haircut!" while failing to notice that the person_is me. This is not possible_when I feel a_pain in_my_back and on_the_basis of_this sensation come to think "I have_a pain_in my back", or when I_am feeling thirsty and_on_the basis of this feeling think_or say "I am thirsty". I_know these things immediately and_there_can_be no doubt as to_who it is that is thirsty_or has a_hurting back when I form the corresponding_judgment._I may have forgotten my name_and_I may know nothing else about_me,_but_I can still refer to_myself with the first-person pronoun in_order to self-ascribe a state of thirst or a_feeling of pain._As I just indicated, the_canonical_expression_of self-ascriptions of this latter kind involves the first-person pronoun._Moreover, these_self-ascriptions are such_that they do not rely on any inference or identification_and that there can be no doubt_as to who is their subject. In other words, they are_"immune to error through misidentification relative to the_first person pronoun" (Shoemaker, 1968).3 That is_to say that when_making_these types of self-ascriptions, 2 Note that_throughout_this_paper_I will follow_the common convention_of using the_terms self-awareness_and self-consciousness interchangeably._3 Notice_that not all