 neuroscientific data of this world 7 See, for example, Lynne Rudder Baker, 'Need a Christian Be a Mind/Body Dualist?' Faith and Philosophy 12, no. 4 (1995), pp. 498-504; 'Christian Materialism in a Scientific Age', International Journal of Philosophy of Religion (January), pp. 1-13; Trenton Merricks, Objects and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Peter van Inwagen, Material Beings (Cornell University Press, 1990); and Kevin Corcoran, Rethinking Human Nature (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2006). 8 Warren S. Brown and Brad D. Strawn, The Physical Nature of Christian Life: Neuroscience, Psychology, and the Church (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 9 See for example, Lewis Ayers, "The Soul and the Reading of Scripture: A Note on Henri De Lubac," Scottish Journal of Theology 61(2) (2008): 173–190; Dallas Willard, "Spiritual Disciples, Spiritual Formation, and the Restoration of the Soul," Journal of Psychology & Theology 26 (1998): 101-109. Reprinted in Dallas Willard, The Great Omission (San Francisco, CA: Harper Collins, 2006); and JP Moreland, "Restoring the Substance of the Soul to Psychology," Journal of Psychology and Theology 26 (1) (1998): 29-43. 10 Brown and Strawn, 69. obtain. That is a considerable constraint on God's creative capacity. This strikes us as highly implausible, and Brown and Strawn do not give us reason to think otherwise. Hence, the incompatibility thesis can make only the much weaker claim, that the conjunction of dualism and the neuroscientific data is improbable or less probable than the conjunction of Christian physicalism and the neuroscientific data. So, how do they defend this thesis? We must recognize that Christian physicalists cannot make use of popular objections to dualism, especially the conservation of energy11 and causal closure arguments, which rely on an in-principle rejection of causation between the physical and the non-physical and the causal closure of the physical. Christianity is necessarily committed to causation between the non-physical and the physical, at least with respect to God and his creation.12 Sanctification, for example, requires the causal interaction of the Holy Spirit with human persons (e.g., Gal 5:16–24). Hence
neuroscientific data of this world 7 See, for example, Lynne Rudder Baker,' Need a Christian Be a Mind / soundbox Dualist?' Faith and Philosophy 12, no. 4 (1995), pp. 498 - 504;' Christian Materialism in a Scientific old age', International Journal of Philosophy of Religion (January), pp. 1 - 13; Trenton Merricks, Objects and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Peter van Inwagen, Material Beings (Cornell University Press, 1990); and Kevin Corcoran, Rethinking Human Nature (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2006). 8 Warren S. Brown and Brad D. Strawn, The Physical Nature of Christian Life: Neuroscience, Psychology, and the Church (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 9 See for example, Lewis Ayers, " The Soul and the Reading of bible: A Note on Henri De Lubac, " Scottish Journal of Theology 61(2) (2008 ): 173–190; Dallas Willard, " Spiritual Disciples, Spiritual Formation, and the Restoration of the Soul, " Journal of Psychology & Theology 26 (1998 ): 101 - 109. Reprinted in Dallas Willard, The Great Omission (San Francisco, CA: Harper Collins, 2006); and JP Moreland, " restore the Substance of the Soul to Psychology, " Journal of Psychology and Theology 26 (1) (1998 ): 29 - 43. 10 Brown and Strawn, 69. obtain. That is a considerable constraint on God's creative capability. This strikes us as highly implausible, and Brown and Strawn do not collapse us reason to think differently. Hence, the incompatibility thesis can make only the much weaker claim, that the concurrence of dualism and the neuroscientific data is improbable or less probable than the conjunction of Christian physicalism and the neuroscientific datum. So, how do they defend this dissertation? We must recognize that Christian physicalists cannot lay down use of democratic objections to dualism, especially the conservation of energy11 and causal closure arguments, which trust on an in - principle rejection of causation between the physical and the non - physical and the causal closure of the physical. Christianity is necessarily committed to causation between the non - physical and the physical, at least with respect to God and his creation.12 Sanctification, for example, requires the causal interaction of the Holy Spirit with human persons (e.g., Gal 5:16–24). Hence
 nekroscientific data of thls world 7 See, fot wxamplx, Lynne Rudder Caker, 'Need a Christian Be a Libd/Bodt Dualist?' Faith and Phklosophy 12, no. 4 (1995), pp. 498-504; 'Chcistian Materialmam in a Scienflfic Cgx', International Journal ox Philosophy ox Fepigion (January), pp. 1-13; Trenton Merricks, Objectx wnd Persons (Oxsord: Jxfodd University Press, 2001); Peter van Inwzgen, Mauerial Beings (Cornrll University Press, 1990); and Nevij Corcoran, Rethinklng Human Nqturq (Grand Rapidr, MI: Baker Academic, 2006). 8 Sarren S. Brown and Brad D. Strawv, The Physical Barurf of Christien Lifv: Neurosciencc, Psychmlogy, amd the Church (Kew Ymrk, NY: Cambridge Universmty Press, 2012). 9 See for gxample, Lefia Ayers, "The Soul qne the Reaging if Rcrjpvurs: A Nohe kn Henri Ds Lubac," Scortish Journal of Thtoljty 61(2) (2008): 173–190; Dallas Sillarq, "Fpiritual Disciples, Spiritual Formation, ans the Restoration of thw Soul," Journal of Psyfhology & Eheology 26 (1998): 101-109. Reprinted in Dallas Willard, The Great Omisakon (Swv Fgancisco, CA: Harper Collins, 2006); and JP Moreland, "Rqatprpng the Substance of the Souk ho Ksychology," Joutnal of Psgchology and Theollgy 26 (1) (1998): 29-43. 10 Broqn and Stwawn, 69. obtain. That is a considerqble constrapnt in God's creative ccpacity. This strokes is as highly implausiblz, and Grown and Shrawn do hut give us reasov tp dhink otherwise. Hence, the yncompatiuilitv thesis can make jnly the mkch wcdker claim, that thf conluncthon of duapism and the neuroscientific dave is improbabke or less prjbablc than the conjtnction of Chrnstian pkysicauism and tge neurmscientific data. So, how gl they defenv this thqsis? We nust rezugnize that Chtistian pkvsicalistw cannot make use pf kolular objectionw ti dualism, especoaluy ehv cpnfarvation of anerey11 xmd cajsal closurc afgumrnts, which rely on at in-lrinciple rejectiom jf causajion betwqen the physival and the non-phydical anv the vaufal closure of the physical. Chdistianitj if necessarilr conmitted to ccusation between the non-physical and the physical, at leasj with respect to God snd his creetion.12 Fanctificdtion, for example, rewuires the causal interaction of the Hkly Sphrit aith human persons (e.g., Gal 5:16–24). Hence
neuroscientific data of this world 7 See, Lynne Baker, 'Need Christian Be a 12, 4 (1995), pp. 'Christian Materialism in Scientific Age', International Journal of Philosophy Religion (January), pp. 1-13; Trenton Merricks, Objects and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Peter van Inwagen, Material Beings (Cornell University Press, 1990); and Kevin Corcoran, Rethinking Nature Rapids, Baker 2006). 8 Warren S. Brown and Brad D. Strawn, The Physical Nature of Christian Life: Neuroscience, and the Church (New York, NY: Cambridge University 2012). 9 See for Lewis Ayers, "The Soul and Reading Scripture: A on De Scottish Journal of 61(2) (2008): 173–190; Dallas Willard, "Spiritual Disciples, Spiritual Formation, and the Restoration of the Soul," Journal of & Theology 101-109. Reprinted Dallas The Omission (San Francisco, Collins, 2006); and JP Moreland, "Restoring the Soul to Psychology," Journal of Psychology and 26 (1) 29-43. 10 Brown and Strawn, 69. That is a considerable constraint on God's creative This strikes us as highly implausible, and Brown and Strawn do not give us reason otherwise. Hence, the incompatibility can make only much claim, the of dualism the neuroscientific data is improbable or less probable than the conjunction Christian physicalism and the neuroscientific data. So, how do they thesis? must recognize that physicalists cannot make use popular to dualism, especially the energy11 causal rely an rejection of causation between physical and the non-physical and causal closure of the to causation between the non-physical and the physical, least with respect to God and his Sanctification, for example, requires the causal interaction of the Holy Spirit with persons (e.g., Hence
 neuroscientific data of this World 7 See, foR examPle, lynNe ruddEr BaKer, 'Need a ChristIAn Be A Mind/Body Dualist?' Faith aNd PhiLoSOphy 12, NO. 4 (1995), pP. 498-504; 'ChriStian MaTErIALisM iN a sciEnTIfIc Age', intErnatioNal Journal Of PHiLosophy of RelIGiOn (January), pP. 1-13; TrEnton MerrickS, ObJects aNd perSOns (OxForD: OxfoRd UnivERsity PRess, 2001); Peter VaN inwageN, materiaL bEiNgs (COrnell University PREsS, 1990); And Kevin CorcorAn, RethInKInG hUmaN NaTure (Grand RApIds, MI: bAker AcaDEmIC, 2006). 8 wArrEN S. Brown and BraD D. Strawn, The pHysIcal NaTuRe oF christIan LiFe: nEurOscience, PsyCholOgy, and the church (nEw York, Ny: cambridGe UnivErsIty presS, 2012). 9 seE fOr eXaMPle, lEwIs AYErs, "the Soul aNd ThE ReadIng oF sCRIptuRe: A note On HenRi De Lubac," ScotTisH JouRNal Of TheOlogy 61(2) (2008): 173–190; dallAs willaRd, "SpirItual diSciples, SpirituaL ForMation, and The reStoRaTion oF The SouL," JoUrnAl of PsyChology & tHeoLoGY 26 (1998): 101-109. rEpRinted in Dallas WillArD, tHe great OmiSsion (SAN FRaNCisco, CA: HArPer collINS, 2006); and Jp MorELaNd, "RestorIng the sUbStAnce of tHe soul to psYchOloGy," JouRNal oF PsychOlogy and theolOGy 26 (1) (1998): 29-43. 10 Brown and StraWN, 69. obtain. That is A CoNSIdERablE coNstraint on GOd's cREatiVe caPAcIty. tHis stRikes Us AS hIGhly implausible, and BRoWn and STrawn Do not give us reAson to thinK OTHerwise. HEnce, THe INcompatibility ThesiS can make onLY the much WeakeR claim, thAt the conjUNCtion of dUalIsm And The NEUrOscientific daTA Is imPrObable oR leSs probaBle ThaN thE coNjUnction of christiaN pHySiCaLisM and tHE neuroscIeNtiFiC daTa. So, hOW do theY defeNd thIs ThESis? we must rECoGNIze tHaT CHrisTiaN pHysicAlisTS caNnot makE use of popUlaR ObjeCtIoNs to duaLism, especiallY tHe conservaTiOn oF energY11 ANd causal Closure arguments, which reLY on an in-PriNciplE rejEction of cAusAtion bEtwEEn the pHysicaL and tHe Non-PHYsicaL ANd The CaUsal closurE OF thE physIcAl. ChRistianIty is necessarily coMMitTed to causatioN beTweeN THe Non-PHySIcaL aND thE PHysical, at least wIth respect To gOd And his creaTIon.12 saNctificAtion, foR examPLe, requiRes the cauSal interaCtIon oF THe HOly Spirit wIth human Persons (e.g., gAl 5:16–24). HenCE
 neuroscientific data of t his world7 See , f orex ampl e, L ynne Rudder Ba k er,'Need a Christian Be a  Mind /B o dy D u al ist?'  Faitha nd P hil os op hy12 ,  n o. 4(19 95), pp . 498-504;  'C hr istian Mater i al ism in a S cie ntific Age',  In ternat io nal Journ alof Ph ilosop h y of R eligion ( Ja n uary), pp. 1-1 3 ;  T rent on Merricks, Obje c ts and Persons (O xford:  O x fo r d  Un ive rsity Pres s,  2001 ) ; Peter va n I nwa g en, MaterialBeings (Cor n ell  Unive rs ity Press,  1990 ); and  Kevin Corc oran , Rethink ing Hu m an Natu r e (Gran d Rapi ds,  MI : Ba k er  A cad em i c,2 00 6). 8 W arren S.  B ro wn an d Br a d D . St raw n, T he Ph ysical Nature  of  Chr i sti an Li fe: N euro sc ience , Psyc holog y,  and the Church  (Ne w York, N Y:Ca mbr id ge Un i versit y P res s, 2012 ). 9 Se e  fo re x a mp le, Lewis Ayers, " Th e So ul and t he Rea d in go f Script ur e:A No t e  on H enri De  Lubac,"  Scott i sh  J ournalof  Theol og y 6 1(2 ) (20 0 8):173–19 0; Dalla s Wil l ard, "Spiritua l  Disciples, S p ir i t ua l  For mat ion, and th e Re s tora tion of  th e  Soul ," Jo ur n al of Psychology & The ol ogy 26  (199 8): 101-109.Reprintedi n Dallas W illa r d, The Great Omis sion(San Franc i sco, CA:  Harp er Colli ns, 2006) ; and JP M ore lan d,"Re s t or ing the Subst a n ce o fthe Sou l t o Psych olo gy, " J our na l of Psyc hology a nd  T he ol ogy  26 ( 1 ) (1998) :29- 43 . 1 0 Bro w n andStraw n, 6 9.  o b tai n. That is a  con si de rabl e c on strai nt o n  Go d's cre ative cap aci t y. T hi sstrikes  us as highly  i mplausible ,and  Brown a nd Straw n do not give us reason to thin k o therw ise.  Hence, t heincomp ati b ilitythesis  canma keo n ly th e mu chwe aker claim , tha t the  c onju nctionof dualism and the neu roscientificdat a is i mp rob a bl e  or  l e ssp r obable than the  conjuncti on of  Christian phy si calismand the  neur o scienti fic data.  So, howdo  the y def end this t hesis? W e must re c ogniz e  t hat C hri stianph ysi calis ts can n otmakeuse of  p opular  obje ct ions todualism, especially the  conse rvati onof energy 11a ndcausal cl osur e argument s,whi ch re lyo n anin-p r in cip l e rej ecti o n of caus a ti onb e tw een the phy s i c aland t hen on-phy sica l and the causalc losure of thephys i c al.  Ch r isti an ity is necessa ril yc o mmittedto  causationbetweenth e  non- physic al and  the ph y s ic a l, atleas t w ith respe ctto God and  h is creati on.1 2Sancti ficati o n, f o r  example, requir es th e causa l  in terac ti on of t h e Ho ly Spiritwith humanperson s (e .g.,Gal 5:1 6– 24). H enc e
 neuroscientific_data of_this world 7 See,_for example,_Lynne_Rudder Baker,_'Need_a Christian Be_a Mind/Body Dualist?'_Faith and Philosophy 12,_no. 4 (1995),_pp._498-504; 'Christian Materialism in a Scientific Age', International Journal of Philosophy of Religion (January),_pp._1-13; Trenton_Merricks,_Objects_and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University_Press, 2001); Peter van Inwagen,_Material Beings_(Cornell University Press, 1990); and Kevin Corcoran, Rethinking_Human_Nature (Grand Rapids,_MI: Baker Academic, 2006). 8 Warren S. Brown and_Brad D. Strawn, The Physical Nature_of Christian Life:_Neuroscience,_Psychology,_and the Church (New_York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2012)._9 See for example, Lewis Ayers,_"The Soul and the Reading of Scripture:_A Note on Henri De Lubac,"_Scottish Journal of Theology 61(2)_(2008): 173–190;_Dallas Willard, "Spiritual Disciples, Spiritual_Formation, and the_Restoration of_the Soul," Journal_of Psychology & Theology 26 (1998):_101-109. Reprinted in_Dallas Willard, The Great Omission (San_Francisco,_CA: Harper Collins,_2006);_and_JP Moreland,_"Restoring the Substance_of_the Soul_to_Psychology," Journal of Psychology and Theology_26_(1) (1998): 29-43. 10 Brown and Strawn,_69. obtain. That is_a_considerable constraint on God's_creative capacity. This strikes us_as highly implausible, and Brown and_Strawn do_not give_us reason to think otherwise. Hence, the incompatibility thesis can make_only the much weaker claim, that_the conjunction of dualism_and the_neuroscientific_data is improbable_or_less probable_than the conjunction of Christian physicalism and_the neuroscientific_data. So, how do they defend_this thesis? We must_recognize_that Christian physicalists cannot make use_of popular objections to dualism, especially_the conservation of energy11 and_causal_closure_arguments, which rely on an_in-principle rejection of causation between the_physical and the_non-physical and the causal closure of the_physical._Christianity is necessarily committed to causation_between_the non-physical and the physical, at_least_with_respect to God and his_creation.12 Sanctification, for example, requires the_causal interaction of the Holy Spirit with human persons_(e.g., Gal 5:16–24)._Hence