 for 'actually'-it is necessary that I am not Felix. Since the claim that exactly one thing is F is also necessary, being purely qualitative, it follows that it is necessary that if I am F, Felix is not F. If it is possible for me to be F, it must be possible for Felix not to be F. This is all true for any notion of possibility whatsoever, even quite narrowly restricted ones. There is something rather odd here. For suppose we are talking about historical possibility as of t, where t is some instant of time in Cosmo. Then the fact that Felix is F is historically contingent as of t, despite the fact that Felix bears no temporal relation at all to t. This seems odd. Counterfactuals about me and Felix raise similar issues. If it is metaphysically necessary that if I am F, Felix isn't, it follows that if I were F, Felix wouldn't have been. This is odd too. Since Felix and I stand in no spatiotemporal or analogically spatiotemporal relations, it is hard to see how we could be causally related; but this makes the relation of counterfactual dependence rather mysterious. So far, at least, we have seen no reason to rule out the possibility that I could have made myself be F with minimal effort, say by raising my arm a little bit. But I have no miraculous powers to reach across the gulf between Lewis-worlds, so how could it be true that if I had raised my arm, Felix would have failed to be F? If we embraced the "two languages" picture, according to which modal operators cannot meaningfully be applied to formulae involving unrestricted quantification, we might be tempted to dismiss ques29 tions like 'Was it historically possible at t for Felix not to be F?' and 'What would Felix have been like if I had been F?' as involving a similar kind of illegitimacy. Perhaps the mysterious repulsive force that prevents modal operators from attaching meaningfully to sentences with unrestricted quantifiers also prevents them from attaching to sentences involving terms for objects outside Cosmo. I have already explained why this is a bad picture for unrestricted quantifiers; its extension to terms for objects outside Cosmo is clearly no better. Perhaps it would not be so bad simply to accept the oddities. We can note, for example, that the extent of the counterfactual dependence between me and Felix is very limited: there is no reason to suppose that there is a range of different ways I could
for' actually'-it is necessary that I am not Felix. Since the claim that exactly one thing is F is also necessary, being strictly qualitative, it take after that it is necessary that if I am F, Felix is not F. If it is possible for me to be F, it must be potential for Felix not to be F. This is all on-key for any notion of possibility whatsoever, even quite narrowly restricted one. There is something rather curious here. For suppose we are talking about diachronic possibility as of t, where t is some moment of meter in Cosmo. Then the fact that Felix is F is historically contingent as of t, despite the fact that Felix bears no temporal relation at all to t. This seems curious. Counterfactuals about me and Felix raise similar issues. If it is metaphysically necessary that if I am F, Felix isn't, it be that if I were F, Felix wouldn't have been. This is odd too. Since Felix and I stand in no spatiotemporal or analogically spatiotemporal relations, it is difficult to see how we could be causally related; but this makes the relation of counterfactual dependence preferably mysterious. So far, at least, we have seen no reason to rule out the possibility that I could have made myself be F with minimal effort, say by raising my arm a little bit. But I have no miraculous powers to reach across the gulf between Lewis - universe, so how could it be true that if I had raised my sleeve, Felix would have failed to be F? If we embraced the " two languages " picture, harmonize to which modal operators cannot meaningfully be applied to formulae involving unexclusive quantification, we might be tempted to dismiss ques29 tions like' Was it historically possible at t for Felix not to be F?' and' What would Felix have been like if I had been F?' as involving a like kind of illegitimacy. Perhaps the mysterious repulsive violence that prevent modal operators from attaching meaningfully to sentences with unrestricted quantifiers besides prevents them from attaching to sentences involving terms for objects outside Cosmo. I have already explained why this is a bad picture for nonsensitive quantifiers; its reference to terms for objects outside Cosmo is intelligibly no better. possibly it would not be so bad simply to accept the curio. We cannote, for example, that the extent of the counterfactual addiction between me and Felix is very limited: there is no reason to suppose that there is a range of different ways I could
 fog 'actually'-it is necessarn that I am not Ywlix. Smnce ths claim ghat exactly one thing is F ms aoso ntbessary, being purely dualitatine, it foloows rhat it is necessavv thaf if N em F, Felix is npt F. If it is possible fmr mz to be F, it must be possible for Fejix not tl be F. This is all erue for any notion of possibility whafsoever, even quite nsrrowly restricted ones. Thfre ls something ratheg odd here. Dor fyppose we ard talking about historjcal possibility as of t, where g is xome instabt of jime in Cosmi. Theg the fact tmst Felhx is F is historicalky rontungent as of t, despitx the fact that Feliv bears nm cemporal relation at qlo to j. Thiv sedns udd. Cpuhterfaftuels about ms and Felix raise similar issuts. Yd it is metapgysicajlr necessary that if I am F, Felix isn't, iu folmows that if I were F, Fwlix wouldn't have beej. This is odd too. Since Felix and I stand in no spatiotempmral kf auqlogizqlpy spatiotemporal relations, it is hard to see goe ee could be camsally related; but tjix makes the reuation of counterfactual deoendencg rathwr mysteryous. So far, at least, we have sewn no reason ro rule out the podsibility tkat I vould have made myself be F cith mjnimal effogt, say by faising my arm a lintle bit. But I have no miraculjus powerw to reach xcroxs the gulf betwfen Lcfis-worlds, so how cluld nt be true that if I had raised my arm, Felix would have failgd do te F? If ce embvaced the "two lwnguages" pictute, accordnng to which modzl operetors cannot meaningfully he applied tm formulwe ibvolcing unfdstricted quanyificatiou, we night be tempted tp dkamiss ques29 tionw luke 'Was it histprizaljy ppsfhble at t fos Feuix mot tu be F?' and 'Chxt wpuld Felix have been liks if I had been F?' ss involvibg a simylar kind of ollegitimacy. Perhaks the myrteripus repulsive force that prevents modal opfrabors from attwchikg mganingfully to sentences with unrestricted quantifmers also prevents them from attaching to xtntences invokving terms fos objects outside Cowmo. I have alreadn explained why this ia a bag pichure for unrestricted quantifiers; its extension to terms for objects outsude Cosmo is clearmy np betner. 'erhaps it xonld not be so bad simply to accept the oddities. Xe can nota, yor example, that the extent og ghe counterfaztual dependence between me and Gelix is very limited: there is mo reason to suppose thab there iw a rznge of dihferent ways I could
for 'actually'-it is necessary that I am Since claim that one thing is purely it follows that is necessary that I am F, Felix is not If it is possible for me to be F, it must be possible Felix not to be F. This is all true for any notion of whatsoever, quite restricted There is something rather odd here. For suppose we are talking about historical possibility as of where t is some instant of time in Then the fact that is F is historically contingent of despite the that bears temporal relation at to t. This seems odd. Counterfactuals about me and Felix raise similar issues. If it is metaphysically that if F, Felix it that I were F, have been. This is odd too. I stand in no spatiotemporal or analogically spatiotemporal it is to see how we could be related; but this makes the relation of counterfactual rather mysterious. So far, at least, we have seen no reason to rule out the I could have made be F with effort, by my a little But I have no miraculous powers to reach across the gulf Lewis-worlds, so how could it be true that if I my Felix would have to be F? If embraced "two languages" picture, according modal cannot to involving quantification, we might be to dismiss ques29 tions like it historically possible at be F?' and 'What would Felix have been if I had been F?' as involving similar kind of illegitimacy. Perhaps the mysterious repulsive force that prevents modal from attaching sentences with unrestricted quantifiers also prevents them from to sentences involving terms objects outside Cosmo. I have already explained why this a picture for quantifiers; its extension terms for objects Cosmo is clearly Perhaps it not so accept the oddities. We can note, example, the extent of the counterfactual between Felix is very limited: there is no reason to suppose that there is a range ways I could
 for 'actually'-it is necessary tHat I am not FElix. SIncE thE cLaim That Exactly one thinG Is F iS also necessary, being purEly quAlITatiVE, iT follOws that IT iS NEceSsArY thAt IF I Am F, FeLix Is not F. IF it is possiBle FoR me to be F, it muST bE possible fOr FElix not to be F. thiS is all TrUe fOR any nOtiOn of pOssibiLIty whaTsoever, evEn QUite naRRowly reSTRiCted Ones. There is somethINg RAther odd here. FoR suppoSe WE aRE TalKinG about histOrIcal pOSsibiliTY aS OF T, whERe t is some instAnt of time in cOsmO. Then tHe FacT That FeLix is f iS HisTorically coNtinGent as of t, DespitE The fact THat FeliX bears No tEmpOral RElAtIon At ALl tO T. THis SEemS odd. CounTeRfActuaLs abOUT ME and felIx raIse siMilar issues. If It iS metAPhySicalLy necEssaRy That iF I am F, FElix iSn'T, it follows that iF I weRe F, Felix wOulDn'T haVe Been. THIs is odD toO. SiNce FeliX and I stANd iN nO SPAtIotemporal or analogIcALLy SpatioteMporal RElAtIOns, it is hArD to See hOW We couLd be CAuSally relAted; buT ThIs Makes thE rElatioN oF coUntErfacTUal dEpendeNce ratheR mystERious. So far, at leASt, we have seen nO ReASOn TO rulE ouT the possibiLity THat I CoulD HaVe mADe mysElf be f wITh MInimal effort, say by raIsIng my aRm a liTtle bit. But I haVe no miracuLOUS powers tO reaCH aCRoss the gulf betWeen LEwis-worlds, SO how coulD it be True that If I had raiSED my arm, FeLix WouLd hAve FAIlEd to be F? If we emBRAced ThE "two lanGuaGes" pictUre, AccOrdIng To Which modaL operatoRs CaNnOt MeaNingfULly be appLiEd tO fOrmUlae iNVolvinG unreStriCtEd QUanTificatIOn, WE MighT bE tEmptEd tO dIsmisS queS29 TioNs like 'WAs it histoRicALly pOsSiBle at t fOr Felix not to bE F?' And 'What wouLd felIx have BEEn like if i had been F?' as involving a siMIlar kinD of IllegItimAcy. PerhapS thE mysteRioUS repulSive foRce thAt PreVENts moDAL oPerAtOrs from attACHinG meanInGfulLy to senTences with unrestriCTed Quantifiers alSo pReveNTS tHem FRoM AttAcHIng TO Sentences involvIng terms foR oBJeCts outside cOsmO. I Have alrEady expLaineD Why this Is a bad picTure for unReStriCTEd qUantifiers; Its extenSion to terMS for oBJeCts ouTsiDe CosmO iS clEarly No bettER. PeRhaps It woulD nOt be so Bad siMpLy to accePt the oddities. We can note, fOr examPle, thAt tHe extent oF thE CouNterfactuAl dePendence beTweEn mE and FEliX Is verY limITeD: thERe is nO reaSOn to suppoSE tHat THErE is a range of DIFFerEnt waYs I COuld
 for 'actually'-it is nece ssary that  I am  no t F el ix.Sinc e the claim th a t ex actly one thing is F i s als on eces s ar y, be ing pur e ly q ual it at ive ,i tfollo wsthat it  is necess ary  t hat if I amF ,Felix is n otF. If it ispos siblefo r m e  to b e F , itmust b e  possi ble for F el i x nott o be F. T hi s is  all true for any no t ion of possibi lity w ha t so e v er,  ev en quite n ar rowly restric t ed o n es. There is some thing rathe r  od d here .For suppos e wear e  ta lking about  his torical p ossibi l ity aso f t, wh ere tissom e in s ta nt  of  t i mei nCos m o.Then the  f ac t tha t Fe l i x is F  is  his toric ally continge ntas o f  t,  desp ite t he f ac t tha t Feli x bea rs  no temporal re lati on at all  to  t . T hi s see m s odd.  Co unt erfactu als abo u t m ea n d  F elix raise similar  i s s ue s. If it  is me t ap hy s ically n ec ess aryt h at if  I a m  F , Felixisn't, it  f ollowsth at ifIwer e F , Fel i x wo uldn't  have be en. T h is is odd too. Since Felix a n dI st a nd i n n o spatiotem pora l  oranal o gi cal l y spa tiote mp o ra l  relations, it is h ar d to s ee ho w we could be  causallyr e l ated; bu t th i sm akes the relat ion o f counterf a ctual de pende nce rath er myster i o us. So f ar,  at  le ast , we  have seen no r easo nto rule  ou t the p oss ibi lit y t ha t I could  have ma de  m ys el f b e F w i th minim al  ef fo rt,  sayb y rais ing m y ar mal itt le bit. Bu t I ha ve  n o mi rac ul ous p ower s  to  reachacross th e g u lf b et we en Lewi s-worlds, soho w could it  b e t rue th a t  if I ha d raised my arm, Felixw ould ha vefaile d to  be F? If  we  embra ced the "t wo lan guage s"  pi c t ure,a c co rdi ng  to whichm o dal  oper at orscannotmeaningfully be ap p lie d to formulae  in volv i n gunr e st r ict ed qua n t ification, we m ight be te mp t ed  to dismis s  qu es 29 tion s like'Wasi t histo rically p ossible a tt fo r Fel ix not tobe F?' a nd 'Whatw ouldF el ix ha vebeen l ik e i f I h ad bee n  F? ' asinvolv in g a si milar  k ind of i llegitimacy. Perhaps th e myst eriou s r epulsivefor c e t hat preve ntsmodal oper ato rsfromatt a ching  mea n in gfu l ly to  sen t ences wit h  u nre s t ri cted quanti f i e rsalsopre v ents t hemfrom attaching to sentences invo lvin g ter msf or o bj ects outside C osm o. I  have al re ady explain ed why t hi s  is a  bad p icture  for un r e st r ictedquan tif iers; its  ex te n sion to  t er m s forobje ct s outs ide Co s mo i s clearly no bette r. Pe r h aps i t  wo uld n ot  be sob ad s imply to a ccept the o dditie s. W e can  note,fo r exam ple ,that the e x tent of t he co unterfa ct ualdep endenc e be t w een m e an dFel ix is ver y li m it ed :  th ereis no  r easo n to supp o se thatthe r e is ara nge o f diff e re n t  ways I co uld 
 for_'actually'-it is_necessary that I am_not Felix._Since_the claim_that_exactly one thing_is F is_also necessary, being purely_qualitative, it follows_that_it is necessary that if I am F, Felix is not F. If it_is_possible for_me_to_be F, it must be_possible for Felix not to_be F._This is all true for any notion of_possibility_whatsoever, even quite_narrowly restricted ones. There is something rather odd here._For suppose we are talking about_historical possibility as_of_t,_where t is some_instant of time in Cosmo. Then_the fact that Felix is F_is historically contingent as of t, despite_the fact that Felix bears no_temporal relation at all to_t. This_seems odd. Counterfactuals about me_and Felix raise_similar issues._If it is_metaphysically necessary that if I am_F, Felix isn't,_it follows that if I were_F,_Felix wouldn't have_been._This_is odd_too. Since Felix_and_I stand_in_no spatiotemporal or analogically spatiotemporal relations,_it_is hard to see how we could_be causally related; but_this_makes the relation of_counterfactual dependence rather mysterious. So_far, at least, we have seen_no reason_to rule_out the possibility that I could have made myself be F_with minimal effort, say by raising_my arm a little_bit. But_I_have no miraculous_powers_to reach_across the gulf between Lewis-worlds, so how_could it_be true that if I had_raised my arm, Felix_would_have failed to be F? If_we embraced the "two languages" picture,_according to which modal operators_cannot_meaningfully_be applied to formulae involving_unrestricted quantification, we might be tempted_to dismiss ques29_tions like 'Was it historically possible at_t_for Felix not to be F?'_and_'What would Felix have been like_if_I_had been F?' as involving_a similar kind of illegitimacy. Perhaps_the mysterious repulsive force that prevents modal operators from_attaching meaningfully to_sentences with unrestricted quantifiers also_prevents_them_from attaching to sentences involving terms for objects outside Cosmo._I have_already explained why_this is a bad picture for unrestricted quantifiers; its extension_to terms for objects outside Cosmo is_clearly no better. Perhaps it would not be so bad simply_to accept the oddities. We can note, for_example, that the extent of the counterfactual_dependence between me and_Felix_is very limited: there is no reason_to_suppose_that_there is a_range of different_ways I could