 favorable 5 For a summary of the role of reasonable belief in self--‐defense law see Lee 2003, Chapter 5. 6 Some experiments, including Correll 2002 and 2015, Payne 2001, Eberhardt 2004 suggest that perceptual beliefs can easily be influenced by presumptions of racial hierarchies, such as the presumption that Black men are dangerous. These results are compatible with cognitive penetration of the sort described here, but do not establish it. 7 Some writers define 'inference' in a way that disallows any such use (Boghossian 2012, Wright 2014). For discussions of inference from stored assumptions and low--‐ level input to perceptual experience, where it is not presumed that inferences have to influence a subject's rational standing, see Hatfield (2002), Clark 2013, Hohwy 2013, Panicello (2013). Siegel/Epistemic Charge 4 light. As a start, I argue that nothing in the nature of perceptual experiences precludes them from having a rational standing, and hence nothing precludes them from being epistemically affected by inference in the same ways as beliefs are. If we can coherently picture what kinds of epistemically relevant relationships rational or irrational experiences could stand in to other mental states, we'll be in a better position to assess both the idea that experiences could have a rational standing, and the extent to which this idea helps us analyze the epistemic situations of people like Vivek. To help articulate epistemically significant relationships between experiences and other mental states, I propose a specific account of the epistemic property that gives experiences a rational standing. Using a comparison with electricity, I'll call that property "epistemic charge" (a definition is coming later). Epistemic charge is designed to help describe the epistemic impact of psychological precursors on perceptual experience, and the impact that those experiences can then have on subsequent beliefs. Once the notion of epistemic charge is on the table, I consider what strikes me as the most plausible account of its scope and grounds, and its implications for the global structure of justification. To start, I consider and reject reasons to think experiences are precluded from having a rational standing, and float a positive reason to think they do (section 1). After arguing that experiences are not already a form of belief (section 2), I formulate a more exact version of the thesis that experiences can have a rational standing (section 3), and discuss its global epistemic implications (section 4). It might seem that epistemological foundationalism, when it puts perceptual experience in the foundation of justified belief, stands
favorable 5 For a summary of the role of reasonable belief in self--‐defense jurisprudence examine Lee 2003, Chapter 5. 6 Some experiments, including Correll 2002 and 2015, Payne 2001, Eberhardt 2004 suggest that perceptual impression can easily be influenced by presumption of racial hierarchy, such as the presumption that bootleg man are dangerous. These results are compatible with cognitive penetration of the kind described here, but do not establish it. 7 Some writers define' inference' in a direction that disallows any such use (Boghossian 2012, Wright 2014). For discussions of inference from stored assumptions and low--‐ degree input to perceptual experience, where it is not presumed that inferences consume to influence a subject's rational standing, see Hatfield (2002), Clark 2013, Hohwy 2013, Panicello (2013). Siegel / Epistemic Charge 4 luminosity. As a start, I argue that nothing in the nature of perceptual experiences precludes them from having a rational standing, and therefore nothing precludes them from being epistemically affected by inference in the same ways as beliefs are. If we can coherently picture what kind of epistemically relevant relationship rational or irrational experiences could stand in to other mental states, we'll be in a better position to assess both the mind that experiences could have a intellectual standing, and the extent to which this theme help us analyze the epistemic situations of people like Vivek. To avail articulate epistemically significant relationships between experiences and early mental states, I propose a specific account of the epistemic property that gives experiences a rational standing. Using a comparison with electricity, I'll call that property " epistemic charge " (a definition is come later). Epistemic commission is designed to help describe the epistemic impact of psychological precursors on perceptual experience, and the impingement that those experiences can then have on subsequent beliefs. Once the impression of epistemic charge is on the board, I consider what strikes me as the about plausible account of its scope and grounds, and its implications for the global social organization of justification. To start, I consider and reject reasons to remember experiences are preclude from having a rational standing, and float a positive reason to think they dress (section 1). After arguing that experiences are not already a form of belief (section 2), I formulate a more exact version of the dissertation that experiences can have a intellectual standing (section 3), and discuss its global epistemic implication (section 4). It might seem that epistemological foundationalism, when it put perceptual experience in the foundation of justified belief, stands
 fagorable 5 For a summary on the role of recwonablx belier in selw--‐defense law see Lee 2003, Chaptec 5. 6 Wome tqperiments, including Zorrell 2002 wnd 2015, Paybe 2001, Tberhardt 2004 suggesv that pcxcepthwl bzlmefs can easily be influetced by presum[tkous of racial hierarchies, such as the presumltlon that Black men wre sangerous. These results are compatjble wiuh cognitive penettation of the sort describfd hfre, but do not estwblish it. 7 Wome qriters defive 'inferenbz' in a way jhat disallows any such use (Boghussiau 2012, Wright 2014). Doe dlvcussions oh infegence from stored assgmptionx and low--‐ levek iiput to perceptual experixnce, where it is not presumed tkat inferences have ti unflugnce d suchecg's daviohal stwndmng, see Hatrield (2002), Clarj 2013, Hohwy 2013, Panicello (2013). Fprgel/Epistemid Charde 4 light. As a start, I argue that nothing in the nature of perceptuql experiences preclufes them srom having a rational standing, and hence nothing precmjdew bhem drlm being epistemically affected by inference yh uhe same ways as neliefs are. If we vaj vjherently picjure whcf iinds of epistemicwlly rejevanr relatiogshils rational or irrational ezperiences cjyld stand in to otker mental scates, ee'll ne in a better position to zssess both the idea ghat experiences colld vave a rational standing, agd the exvent co which thix idea helps us wnalyda the epistemic sihuatilnv of peoplf like Vivek. To help articulate epistemically shgnpficant rzlatiokships between qxperiences anb other ientau states, I proposx a specific account of tvg epistemic pcoperty trat tivew experkdnces a rationsl standiuy. Using a comparison with ekecjrjcity, I'll call ckau property "epistrmiz cragge" (a gefinition iv cooine latef). Episttiig cfargr is designed to hel[ deacribe the epistemoc impact if psychjlogical precirsors on perceptuwl ex'erienre, and thg impact that those experiences can then haye on subsequqnt neligfs. Once thz notion of epistemic charge is on the teble, I consider what sjrikes me as the most klausible accpunt jf its scmpe and grounds, and uts implications nor the global structude of bustivication. To start, I consider and reject reasons to think experiences are precluveq from havihg a ratimncl xtandigg, aid float a positivv reason to think they do (sectioi 1). After asgbing that experiences are not auready a form of belief (section 2), I fodmulate s more exact version of the thexis that experiences can have a eatiohal standiig (section 3), and disciss itv gloval epiwtemlc implicationr (srcbion 4). It mlght szem that epistemological foundatiinalisn, ahen it puts perreptual expevitnce in the fjundation of jusfifisf belkef, stands
favorable 5 For a summary of the reasonable in self--‐defense see Lee 2003, including 2002 and 2015, 2001, Eberhardt 2004 that perceptual beliefs can easily be by presumptions of racial hierarchies, such as the presumption that Black men are These results are compatible with cognitive penetration of the sort described here, but not it. Some define 'inference' in a way that disallows any such use (Boghossian 2012, Wright 2014). For discussions inference from stored assumptions and low--‐ level input perceptual experience, where it not presumed that inferences have influence subject's rational see (2002), 2013, Hohwy 2013, (2013). Siegel/Epistemic Charge 4 light. As a start, I argue that nothing in the nature of perceptual precludes them a rational and nothing them from being by inference in the same ways If we can coherently picture what kinds of relevant relationships or irrational experiences could stand in other mental states, we'll be in a better to assess both the idea that experiences could have a rational standing, and the extent this idea helps us the epistemic situations people Vivek. help epistemically significant between experiences and other mental states, I propose a specific account the epistemic property that gives experiences a rational standing. Using with I'll call that "epistemic charge" (a definition coming Epistemic charge is designed describe epistemic precursors perceptual and the impact that experiences can then have on beliefs. Once the notion the table, I consider what strikes me as most plausible account of its scope and and its implications for the global structure of justification. To start, I and reject think experiences are precluded from having a rational and float a positive to think they do (section 1). After arguing that are already a of belief (section I formulate a exact version of that experiences have rational and discuss its global epistemic implications 4). might seem that epistemological foundationalism, it experience in the foundation of justified belief, stands
 favorable 5 For a summary of the Role of reasOnablE beLieF iN selF--‐defEnse law see Lee 2003, CHApteR 5. 6 Some experiments, includIng CoRrELl 2002 anD 2015, paYne 2001, EbErhardt 2004 SUgGESt tHaT pErcEpTUaL beliEfs Can easiLy be influeNceD bY presumptionS Of Racial hierArcHies, such as thE prEsumptIoN thAT BlacK meN are dAngeroUS. These Results arE cOMpatibLE with coGNItIve pEnetration of the soRT dEScribed here, but Do not eStABlISH it. 7 somE writers deFiNe 'infERence' in A WaY THAt dISallows any sucH use (BoghossIAn 2012, WRight 2014). FOr DisCUssionS of inFeREncE from stored AssuMptions anD low--‐ leVEl input TO percepTual exPerIenCe, whERe It Is nOt PResUMeD thAT inFerences HaVe To infLuenCE A SUbjeCt's RatiOnal sTanding, see HatFieLd (2002), ClARk 2013, HOhwy 2013, PAniceLlo (2013). SIeGel/EpIstemiC CharGe 4 Light. As a start, I aRgue That nothiNg iN tHe nAtUre of PErceptUal ExpErienceS precluDEs tHeM FROm Having a rational staNdING, aNd hence nOthing PReClUDes them fRoM beIng ePIStemiCallY AfFected by InfereNCe In The same WaYs as beLiEfs Are. if we cAN cohErentlY picture What kINds of epistemicALly relevant reLAtIONsHIps rAtiOnal or irratIonaL ExpeRienCEs CouLD stanD in to OtHEr MEntal states, we'll be in A bEtter pOsitiOn to assess botH the idea thAT EXperiencEs coULd HAve a rational stAndinG, and the extENt to whicH this Idea helpS us analyzE THe episteMic SitUatIonS OF pEople like ViveK. tO helP aRticulaTe ePistemiCalLy sIgnIfiCaNt relatioNships beTwEeN eXpEriEnces ANd other mEnTal StAteS, I proPOse a spEcifiC accOuNt OF thE episteMIc PROperTy ThAt giVes ExPerieNces A RatIonal stAnding. UsiNg a COmpaRiSoN with elEctricity, I'll cAlL that propeRtY "epIstemiC CHarge" (a deFinition is coming later). EpIStemic cHarGe is dEsigNed to help DesCribe tHe ePIstemiC impacT of psYcHolOGIcal pRECuRsoRs On perceptuAL ExpErienCe, And tHe impacT that those experienCEs cAn then have on sUbsEqueNT BeLieFS. ONCe tHe NOtiON Of epistemic charGe is on the tAbLE, I Consider whAT stRiKes me as The most PlausIBle accoUnt of its sCope and grOuNds, aND Its ImplicatioNs for the Global strUCture OF jUstifIcaTion. To StArt, i consIder anD RejEct reAsons tO tHink exPerieNcEs are preCluded from having a rationAl stanDing, aNd fLoat a posiTivE ReaSon to thinK theY do (section 1). aftEr aRguinG thAT expeRienCEs Are NOt alrEady A Form of belIEf (SecTIOn 2), i formulate a MORE exAct veRsiON of the ThesIs that experiences CAn have a rationaL staNDIng (SecTIon 3), aNd Discuss its globAl ePiSTEmic implIcAtions (sectiOn 4). It mighT sEEm thaT epistEmologIcal fouNDAtIOnalisM, wheN it Puts percePtuAl EXperienCe In THe founDatiOn Of justIfied bELief, STAnds
 favorable 5 For a summary  of the ro le of  re aso na blebeli ef in self--‐d e fens e law see Lee 2003, Ch apter  5 .  6 S o me  expe riments ,  i n c lud in gCor re l l2002and  2015,Payne 2001 , E be rhardt 2004s ug gest thatper ceptual beli efs  can e as ily be in flu enced  by pr e sumpti ons of ra ci a l hier a rchies, s uc h as  the presumptiont ha t  Black men are  dange ro u s. T hes e r esults are  c ompat i ble wit h  c o g n iti v e penetration  of the sor t  de scribe dher e , butdo no te sta blish it. 7  Som e writers  defin e  'infer e nce' in  a way  th atdisa l lo ws  an ys uch us e ( B ogh ossian 2 01 2,  Wrig ht 2 0 1 4 ) . Fo r d iscu ssion s of inferenc e f roms tor ed as sumpt ions  a nd lo w--‐ l evelin put to perceptu al e xperience , w he reit  is n o t pres ume d t hat inf erences hav et o in fluence a subject' sr a ti onal sta nding, se eH atfield(2 002 ), C l a rk 20 13,H oh wy 2013,  Panic e ll o(2013).  S iegel/ Ep ist emi c Cha r ge 4  light . As a s tart, I argue that n o thing in then at u r eo f pe rce ptual exper ienc e s pr eclu d es  th e m fro m hav in g  a rational standing,an d henc e not hing preclude s them fro m b eing epi stem i ca l ly affected by  infe rence in t h e same w ays a s belief s are. If w e can co her ent lypic t u re  what kinds o f epis te mically  re levantrel ati ons hip srationalor irrat io na lex per ience s  could s ta ndin  to  othe r  menta l sta tes,  w e' l l b e in ab et t e r po si ti on t o a ss ess b otht heidea th at experi enc e s co ul dhave arational stan di ng, and th eext ent to w hich thi s idea helps us analyze the epi ste mic s itua tions ofpeo ple li keV ivek.To hel p art ic ula t e  epis t e mi cal ly  significa n t  re latio ns hips  betwee n experiences ando the r mental stat es,  I p r o po sea  s p eci fi c  ac c o unt of the epis temic prop er t ythat gives exp er iencesa ratio nal s t anding.  Using acompariso nwith e lec tricity, I 'll call  that pro p erty" ep istem iccharge "(adefin itioni s c oming  later ).  Epist emicch arge isdesigned to help descri be the  epis tem ic impact  of psy chologica l pr ecursors o n p erc eptua l e x perie nce, an d t h e imp actt hat those ex per i e nc es can then h a veon su bse q uent b elie fs. Once the noti o n of epistemic  cha r g e i s o n  the  t able, I consid erwh a t  strikes  m e as the mo st plaus ib l e acc ount o f itsscope a n d  g r ounds,  and  it s implica tio ns for the  g lo b al str uctu re  of ju stific a tion . To start, I cons idera n d rej e ctreaso ns  to thi n k ex periencesare preclud ed fro m ha vinga ratio na l stan din g,  and float a positiv e rea son toth inkthe y do ( sect i o n 1).  Aft er  ar guing tha t ex p er ie n ces  are  notal read y a formo f belief  (s e ction 2 ),  If o rmulat e  a m ore exactver siono f  the thesi s  tha t  e x perie nces c an hav e a rat i ona lstandin g ( s e ction 3),  and disc u ssit s gl obal epi st emic  i mpl ic ations (section  4). Itmight se e m  thatepi s temo l ogical  f oundationali sm, w he n  it put s per ceptual exp eri enc e in  th e fo u ndation of justified bel ief,  stan d s
 favorable_5 For_a summary of the_role of_reasonable_belief in_self--‐defense_law see Lee_2003, Chapter 5._6 Some experiments, including_Correll 2002 and_2015,_Payne 2001, Eberhardt 2004 suggest that perceptual beliefs can easily be influenced by presumptions_of_racial hierarchies,_such_as_the presumption that Black men_are dangerous. These results are_compatible with_cognitive penetration of the sort described here, but_do_not establish it._7 Some writers define 'inference' in a way that_disallows any such use (Boghossian 2012,_Wright 2014). For_discussions_of_inference from stored assumptions_and low--‐ level input to perceptual_experience, where it is not presumed_that inferences have to influence a subject's_rational standing, see Hatfield (2002), Clark_2013, Hohwy 2013, Panicello (2013)._Siegel/Epistemic Charge_4 light. As a start,_I argue that_nothing in_the nature of_perceptual experiences precludes them from having_a rational standing,_and hence nothing precludes them from_being_epistemically affected by_inference_in_the same_ways as beliefs_are._If we_can_coherently picture what kinds of epistemically_relevant_relationships rational or irrational experiences could stand_in to other mental_states,_we'll be in a_better position to assess both_the idea that experiences could have_a rational_standing, and_the extent to which this idea helps us analyze the epistemic_situations of people like Vivek. To_help articulate epistemically significant_relationships between_experiences_and other mental_states,_I propose_a specific account of the epistemic property_that gives_experiences a rational standing. Using a_comparison with electricity, I'll_call_that property "epistemic charge" (a definition_is coming later). Epistemic charge is_designed to help describe the_epistemic_impact_of psychological precursors on perceptual_experience, and the impact that those_experiences can then_have on subsequent beliefs. Once the notion_of_epistemic charge is on the table,_I_consider what strikes me as the_most_plausible_account of its scope and_grounds, and its implications for the_global structure of justification. To start, I consider and_reject reasons to_think experiences are precluded from_having_a_rational standing, and float a positive reason to think they_do (section_1). After arguing_that experiences are not already a form of belief (section_2), I formulate a more exact version_of the thesis that experiences can have a rational standing (section_3), and discuss its global epistemic implications (section_4). It might seem that epistemological foundationalism,_when it puts perceptual_experience_in the foundation of justified belief, stands