ivek's experience that is positively or negatively charged, but rather Vivek's experience, in having a certain content, that is positively or negatively charged.20 I've presented the notion of epistemic charge as a tool that provides a possible analysis of cases like Vivek's. To defend this analysis, one would have to defend the initial suspicion that it is irrational for Vivek to strengthen his belief that his audience is pleased, and argue that this conclusion should be analyzed in 20 Is there reason to relativize epistemic charge twice over – once to the contents of the experience, and again to the contents that the experience (in having the selected contents) can justify believing? One might think one should, on the grounds that even when we focus only on the face--‐contents of Vivek's experience, if his face--‐ experience has any epistemic charge at all, it would seem to be negatively charged, relative to believing the face contents, but positively charged, relative to the contents of the introspective belief that he has a face--‐experience. On this picture, epistemic charge would be a relational property of the face--‐experience, rather than a monadic property of it. Whether there is reason to think that epistemic charge would have to be relational in this way depends on the role of the face--‐experience in providing justification for the introspective belief. On some views, the structure of justification of the introspective belief comes from self--‐referential contents of the experience ('I am having a face--‐experience'), rather than the face--‐contents themselves (Kriegel (2011). On other views, it does not come from any contents of the experience at all, but rather from the route by which the introspective belief is formed (Byrne 2012). If either of these approaches to introspective belief are correct, then they remove the apparent motivation for thinking that a face--‐experience could be negatively charged relative to face--‐contents, but positively charged relative to the contents of an introspective belief that self--‐ascribes the face--‐experience. Siegel/Epistemic Charge 15 terms of epistemic charge rather than in some other way.21 I won't do either of those things here, because there are more fundamental questions to address about the scope of epistemic charge that determine the implications of the analysis for global structure of justification. And these implications are part of what would need to be assessed, to assess the analysis. I'll focus on explaining
ivek's experience that is positively or negatively charged, but rather Vivek's experience, in having a certain contentedness, that is positively or negatively charged.20 I've confront the notion of epistemic charge as a tool that provide a possible analysis of case like Vivek's. To defend this analysis, one would have to defend the initial suspicion that it is irrational for Vivek to tone his belief that his audience is pleased, and argue that this conclusion should be analyzed in 20 Is there rationality to relativize epistemic charge twice over – once to the contents of the experience, and again to the contents that the experience (in accept the selected contents) can absolve believing? One might think one should, on the grounds that even when we focus merely on the face--‐contents of Vivek's experience, if his face--‐ experience has any epistemic charge at all, it would seem to be negatively charged, proportional to believing the face contents, but positively charged, relative to the contents of the introspective impression that he has a face--‐experience. On this painting, epistemic charge would be a relational property of the face--‐experience, rather than a monadic property of it. Whether there is reason to think that epistemic charge would have to be relational in this manner depends on the role of the face--‐experience in provide justification for the introspective belief. On some views, the structure of justification of the introspective belief issue forth from self--‐referential contents of the experience (' I am having a face--‐experience'), rather than the face--‐contents themselves (Kriegel (2011). On other view, it does not come from any contents of the experience at all, but rather from the route by which the introspective belief is imprint (Byrne 2012). If either of these approaches to introspective belief are correct, then they remove the apparent motivation for think that a face--‐experience could be negatively charge relative to face--‐contents, but positively charged relative to the contents of an introspective belief that self--‐ascribes the face--‐experience. Siegel / Epistemic Charge 15 term of epistemic charge rather than in some other way.21 I won't cause either of those things here, because there are more fundamental questions to cover about the scope of epistemic charge that determine the implications of the analysis for ball-shaped structure of justification. And these implications are part of what would need to be measure, to assess the psychoanalysis. I'll focus on explaining
iven's experience that is poritively or negcrively chargsd, but rxther Vivek's experience, in hevint a ctgtain content, that is positivepy or netatitely charged.20 I've presentcb the kotiou if epistemic cmarge as a dool that provhdds a possible analysis of cases like Divek's. Yo defend this agalyxys, ohv could have to defend the initiam suspibion that it is itrational for Vivek to strfngtjen his belief thah his audiebce yw pleased, ana argue that this concmusion should be analyzed in 20 Ir thexe reason ti eelwjivize epistxmic crarge twice over – onwe to tne contents of thx experience, and again to the contents that the expesiznce (in having the seoexted wontants) xan juatmfy belieginj? One might think one whould, on the grouncs nnat even wheh we fjcts only on the face--‐contents of Vivek's eqperjence, if his face--‐ experuence has any epistemlc charge at all, it would seem to be negatively charged, renativx go ycjkwvlng the face contents, but positively charged, wslstpve to the contenbs of the introspevtlvr belief that fe has a race--‐experience. On hhis pisture, epistemis chsrge would be a relational property of nhe dace--‐experience, ratker than a munadoc prpperty of it. Whether thzre is reason to hhink thaf epistemic chargd wpund have uu be relational ig this wab depznds on ghe tole of the face--‐edperictce in providing jkstifncatimn for the introspective belief. On some vmxws, the strucjura ox justifncatiok of the intros[ective belief comes yrom sdlf--‐referennial contxnts of the qxperience ('I dl having a fece--‐experiqnce'), ratyer thav the face--‐contemts themsvlres (Kriegwl (2011). On other views, it soes not come fxun any contents pf ghe eqpeciencq at all, but sathdr wtom tfe routt bn wfich the introspective balier is formed (Byrne 2012). In either if these approaches tp introspective bepief ere cocrect, yheg they remove the apparent motjvation flr bhinking that a fqce--‐experiencz could be negatively charged relative ti face--‐contents, buj positively charged telstive to thx contqnts of at introspective beliwf that self--‐ascrines the face--‐experience. Siegen/Epishemic Charge 15 terms of epistemic charge rather than in some other way.21 I win't do either of tgose thincs kere, besausx vhere are more fumdamental questions to address ebout the vcjpe of epistemic charge that ddtermine the kmplications of the analgsis for global structure of justificatoon. And these implicatioks are paet of what woulv need to be assessec, to avsess the anqlysls. I'll focus ov ecppaining
ivek's experience that is positively or negatively rather experience, in a certain content, charged.20 presented the notion epistemic charge as tool that provides a possible analysis cases like Vivek's. To defend this analysis, one would have to defend the suspicion that it is irrational for Vivek to strengthen his belief that his is and that conclusion should be analyzed in 20 Is there reason to relativize epistemic charge twice over – to the contents of the experience, and again the contents that the (in having the selected contents) justify One might one on grounds that even we focus only on the face--‐contents of Vivek's experience, if his face--‐ experience has any epistemic charge all, it to be charged, to the face contents, charged, relative to the contents of that he has a face--‐experience. On this picture, charge would a relational property of the face--‐experience, than a monadic property of it. Whether there reason to think that epistemic charge would have to be relational in this way depends role of the face--‐experience providing justification for introspective On views, structure of of the introspective belief comes from self--‐referential contents of the experience am having a face--‐experience'), rather than the face--‐contents themselves (Kriegel other it does not from any contents of experience all, but rather from by the formed 2012). either of these approaches introspective belief are correct, then remove the apparent motivation could be negatively charged relative to face--‐contents, but charged relative to the contents of an belief that self--‐ascribes the face--‐experience. Siegel/Epistemic Charge 15 terms of epistemic charge than in way.21 I won't do either of those things because there are more questions to address about the scope of epistemic charge determine implications of analysis for global of justification. And implications are part would need be to I'll focus on explaining
ivek's experience that is posiTively or neGativEly ChaRgEd, buT ratHer Vivek's experIEnce, In having a certain contenT, that Is POsitIVeLy or nEgativeLY cHARgeD.20 I'Ve PreSeNTeD the nOtiOn of epiStemic charGe aS a Tool that provIDeS a possible AnaLysis of cases LikE Vivek'S. TO deFEnd thIs aNalysIs, one wOUld havE to defend ThE InitiaL SuspiciON ThAt it Is irrational for ViVEk TO strengthen his Belief ThAT hIS AudIenCe is pleaseD, aNd argUE that thIS cONCLusIOn should be anaLyzed in 20 Is thERe rEason tO rElaTIvize ePisteMiC ChaRge twice oveR – oncE to the conTents oF The expeRIence, anD again To tHe cOnteNTs ThAt tHe EXpeRIeNce (IN haVing the sElEcTed coNtenTS) CAN jusTifY belIevinG? One might thinK onE shoULd, oN the gRoundS thaT eVen whEn we foCus onLy On the face--‐contenTs of vivek's expEriEnCe, iF hIs facE--‐ ExperiEncE haS any epiStemic cHArgE aT ALL, iT would seem to be negaTiVELy Charged, rElativE To BeLIeving thE fAce ContENTs, but PosiTIvEly chargEd, relaTIvE tO the conTeNts of tHe IntRosPectiVE belIef thaT he has a fAce--‐exPErience. On this pICture, epistemiC ChARGe WOuld Be a Relational pRopeRTy of The fACe--‐ExpERiencE, rathEr THaN A monadic property of iT. WHether There Is reason to thiNk that episTEMIc charge WoulD HaVE to be relationaL in thIs way depenDS on the roLe of tHe face--‐exPerience iN PRoviding JusTifIcaTioN FOr The introspectIVE belIeF. On some VieWs, the stRucTurE of JusTiFication oF the intrOsPeCtIvE beLief cOMes from sElF--‐reFeRenTial cONtents Of the ExpeRiEnCE ('I aM having A FaCE--‐ExpeRiEnCe'), raTheR tHan thE facE--‐ConTents thEmselves (KRieGEl (2011). On OtHeR views, iT does not come fRoM any contenTs Of tHe expeRIEnce at alL, but rather from the route bY Which thE inTrospEctiVe belief iS foRmed (ByRne 2012). iF eitheR of theSe appRoAchES To intROSpEctIvE belief are CORreCt, theN tHey rEmove thE apparent motivatioN For Thinking that a FacE--‐expERIeNce COuLD be NeGAtiVELy charged relatiVe to face--‐coNtENtS, but positiVEly ChArged reLative tO the cONtents oF an introsPective beLiEf thAT SelF--‐ascribes tHe face--‐exPerience. SIEgel/EPIsTemic chaRge 15 terMs Of ePisteMic chaRGe rAther Than in SoMe otheR way.21 I WoN't do eithEr of those things here, becaUse theRe are MorE fundamenTal QUesTions to adDresS about the sCopE of EpistEmiC ChargE thaT DeTerMIne thE impLIcations oF ThE anALYsIs for global STRUctUre of JusTIficatIon. ANd these implicatioNS are part of what WoulD NEed To bE AsseSsEd, to assess the aNalYsIS. i'll focus On Explaining
ivek's experience that ispositively  or n ega tiv el y ch arge d, but ratherV ivek 's experience, in havi ng ace r tain co ntent , thati sp o sit iv el y o rn eg ative lycharged .20 I've p res en ted the noti o nof epistem iccharge as atoo l that  p rov i des a  po ssibl e anal y sis of  cases li ke Vivek' s . To de f e nd  thi s analysis, one w o ul d  have to defen d thein i ti a l  su spi cion thatit  is i r rationa l  f o r Viv e k to strength en his beli e f t hat hi saud i ence i s ple as e d,and argue t hatthis conc lusion shouldb e analy zed in  20  Is  the r ere aso nt o r e la tiv i zeepistemi cch argetwic e o v er –  on ce t o the  contents ofthe  exp e rie nce,and a gain  t o the  conte nts t ha t the experienc e (i n havingthe  s ele ct ed co n tents)  ca n j ustifybelievi n g?On e m ig ht think one shoul d, o nthe grou nds th a tev e n when w efoc us o n l y onthef ac e--‐cont ents o f  V iv ek's ex pe rience ,ifhis  face - -‐ e xperie nce hasany e p istemic charge at all, it wo u ld s ee m  tobenegativelychar g ed,rela t iv e t o  beli eving  t h ef ace contents, but p os itivel y cha rged, relativ e to the c o n t ents ofthei nt r ospective beli ef th at he hasa  face--‐ exper ience. O n this pi c t ure, epi ste mic  ch arg e wo uld be a rela t i onal  p roperty  of  the fa ce- -‐e xpe rie nc e, rather  than amo na di cpro perty of it. W he the rthe re is reason  to t hink  t ha t  ep istemic ch a r ge w ou ld  hav e t obe re lati o nal  in thi s way dep end s  onth erole of  the face--‐e xp erience in  p rov idingj u stificat ion for the introspecti v e belie f.On so me v iews, the  st ructur e o f  justi ficati on of  t hei n trosp e c ti vebe lief comes f rom  self -- ‐ref erentia l contents of thee xpe rience ('I am  ha ving a  f ace - -‐ e xpe ri e nce ' ) , rather than t he face--‐ co n te nts themse l ves  ( Kriegel  (2011) . Ono ther vi ews, it d oes not c om e fr o m  an y contents  of theexperienc e  at a l l,  butrat her fr om  th e rou te byw hic h the  intro sp ective  beli ef  is form ed (Byrne 2012). If eit her of  thes e a pproaches  to int rospectiv e be lief are c orr ect , the n t h ey re move th e a p paren t mo t ivation f o rthi n k in g that a fa c e - -‐e xperi enc e  could  benegatively charge d  relative to f ace- - ‐ con ten t s, b ut  positively ch arg ed r elativeto  the conten ts of an  i n trosp ective  belie f thats e lf - -‐ascr ibes  th e face--‐ exp er i ence. S ie ge l /Epist emic  C harge15 ter m s of e pistemic chargerathe r thani n s ome o th er way. 2 1 Iwon't do e ither of th ose th ings  here , becau se  there  ar emore funda m ental que stion s to ad dr essabo ut the  sco p e  of e pist em iccharge th a t  d e te rm i netheimpli ca tion s of thea nalysisfor globalst ruc t u re ofj us t i fication.And  thes e implicatio n s ar e  p a rt of  whatwouldneed to beas sessed,  to a ssess the  analysis .  I' ll  foc us on ex pl aini ng 
ivek's experience_that is_positively or negatively charged,_but rather_Vivek's_experience, in_having_a certain content,_that is positively_or negatively charged.20 I've_presented the notion_of_epistemic charge as a tool that provides a possible analysis of cases like Vivek's._To_defend this_analysis,_one_would have to defend the_initial suspicion that it is_irrational for_Vivek to strengthen his belief that his audience_is_pleased, and argue_that this conclusion should be analyzed in 20 Is_there reason to relativize epistemic charge_twice over –_once_to_the contents of the_experience, and again to the contents_that the experience (in having the_selected contents) can justify believing? One might_think one should, on the grounds_that even when we focus_only on_the face--‐contents of Vivek's experience,_if his face--‐_experience has_any epistemic charge_at all, it would seem to_be negatively charged,_relative to believing the face contents,_but_positively charged, relative_to_the_contents of_the introspective belief_that_he has_a_face--‐experience. On this picture, epistemic charge_would_be a relational property of the face--‐experience,_rather than a monadic_property_of it. Whether there_is reason to think that_epistemic charge would have to be_relational in_this way_depends on the role of the face--‐experience in providing justification for_the introspective belief. On some views,_the structure of justification_of the_introspective_belief comes from_self--‐referential_contents of_the experience ('I am having a face--‐experience'),_rather than_the face--‐contents themselves (Kriegel (2011). On_other views, it does_not_come from any contents of the_experience at all, but rather from_the route by which the_introspective_belief_is formed (Byrne 2012). If_either of these approaches to introspective_belief are correct,_then they remove the apparent motivation for_thinking_that a face--‐experience could be negatively_charged_relative to face--‐contents, but positively charged_relative_to_the contents of an introspective_belief that self--‐ascribes the face--‐experience. Siegel/Epistemic_Charge 15 terms of epistemic charge rather than in_some other way.21_I won't do either of_those_things_here, because there are more fundamental questions to address about_the scope_of epistemic charge_that determine the implications of the analysis for global structure_of justification. And these implications are part_of what would need to be assessed, to assess the analysis._I'll focus on explaining