 can simulate having a certain mental state or content. I will not here defend a Dispositional Analysis of belief, but clearly if such an analysis is correct, or is at least better than an occurrence Analysis, theological fictionalism is again in a bad position. 10 St Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, IIaIIae, 2, 1. 11 Henry H. Price, Belief (london: muirhead library of Philosophy, 1969). roGer PouIVet436 The argument from the limitations of make-believe We saw that we cannot believe at will, but we even cannot imagine at will – contrary to what is often said (on the grounds of a very common romantic account of imagination). I am not at all sure that imagining that God sent us His only son to be crucified, as a redeemer, to save us from our sins, would be something we could so easily do. This phenomenon I call "modal imaginative resistance". A story is told, but it makes no sense for us, and we don't believe in it and cannot even make-believe in it. I suppose that it is exactly what happens for a lot of unbelievers. They do not think that the religious story is like a novel that makes sense even if it is a fiction. For them, it is like a novel that does not make any sense! There is a kind of imagination by which we can consider ourselves as being relevantly different than we actually are. And this is of course often what novels and movies invite us to experiment with – to discover, through fictions, human possibilities: what we could be. but this does not always work. And it seems that fictions are telling us something when we find ourselves impervious to the possibilities that they offer. Fictions are, in short, sometimes non-starters where certain possibilities are concerned. Some philosophers – those who consider that we decide to make-believe – exaggerate our ability to make-believe. Sometimes we simply cannot do so, being unable to imagine that things could proceed as presented in a certain sort of novel or film. Theological fictionalism must explain to us why we make-believe in God if we do not have to believe in him. but that we make-believe in Him – in His story, that His son died for us, in the resurrection of the flesh, and so on – is not easier to understand than the fact that people really believe these things. And so, theological fictionalism is not in any way a
can simulate having a certain mental department of state or contentedness. I will not here defend a Dispositional Analysis of belief, but clearly if such an psychoanalysis is correct, or is at least better than an occurrence Analysis, theological fictionalism is again in a regretful situation. 10 St Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, IIaIIae, 2, 1. 11 Henry H. Price, Belief (london: muirhead library of Philosophy, 1969). roGer PouIVet436 The argument from the restriction of make - believe We saw that we cannot think at will, but we even cannot imagine at will – contrary to what is frequently said (on the grounds of a very common romantic account of resource). I am not at all sure that imagining that God send us His only son to be crucified, as a jesus, to save us from our sin, would be something we could so well do. This phenomenon I call " modal imaginative resistance ". A story is tell, but it makes no sense for us, and we don't believe in it and cannot even make - believe in it. I suppose that it is precisely what happens for a lot of unbelievers. They do not think that the religious story is like a novel that makes sense even if it is a fiction. For them, it is like a novel that does not make any sense! There embody a kind of imagination by which we can consider ourselves as being relevantly unlike than we actually are. And this is of path much what novels and movies tempt us to experiment with – to discover, through fictions, human possibilities: what we could be. but this does not always shape. And it seems that fictions are telling us something when we find ourselves impervious to the possibilities that they offer. fabrication are, in short, sometimes non - starters where certain possibilities are refer. Some philosophers – those who view that we decide to make - believe – exaggerate our ability to make - believe. Sometimes we simply cannot serve so, being unable to imagine that thing could proceed as presented in a certain sort of novel or movie. Theological fictionalism must explain to us why we make - believe in God if we do not have to believe in him. but that we make - believe in Him – in His narrative, that His son died for us, in the resurrection of the human body, and so along – is not easier to understand than the fact that citizenry really believe these thing. And so, theological fictionalism is not in any room a
 caj simulate having a certxin mental statg ir convent. I sill not here defend a Dispositional Abalysus of belief, but clearuy if sucj an anaoysiw is correcv, or is at leaab betcec than an occurtence Analyshs, theological fkccionalism is again in a bad position. 10 St Thpmws Aquinas, Sumia Tnqolofpcc, IIaIIae, 2, 1. 11 Henry H. Price, Belisf (londmn: muirhead lobrary of Philosophy, 1969). roGeg PokIVet436 The argument from the lumitwrions of makd-believe Wt vaw that wg cannot believe at will, but we dven eannot imagunw ah will – contcary tj what is ofbvn said (on the grounds of a yery rommin romantic account oh imagination). I am njt at all sbre that imagining thqt God vent us Fus unlg xoh to bf ccucified, as a redeemer, to save us from out fpms, would be aomethynd we could so easily do. This phenomenon I dall "modal imaginative eesistance". A story is told, but it makes no sense for us, and we don't believe in ht anv zanuit evdb lake-believe in it. I suppose that it is exactlr wnan happens for a ljt of unbeloegetf. They do not think thzt the religious shory is like a novel uhat kakes sense even if it is a fiction. For rhem, it is like a uovel that dues mot mske any sense! There is c kind of imaginahion by wgkch we can consiaer ogrselves as being relevantjy differxnt tkan we aztuakly arq. And this is on course often what noveps and movied invite us to experiment with – to discover, tnrmugv fictious, humsn possibilityes: what we coold be. buc this does not zlways xork. And it feems that fiwjions are telning us fomerhint when dd find ourselvrs impervpobs to the possibilities thab thei kffer. Fictions cxe, in short, sometomer njn-dterterf where certahn pussknilitkes are congerved. Xome philosophers – tvose who consider that wc decide jo make-bejieve – exaggetate our ability tl makx-beliete. Somrtiies we simply cannot do so, beihg unable to imagine thae thlngs could proeeed as presented in a certain sort of nivel or film. Theoligical fictionalism kust explaii to uf why we kake-believe in God id we do not have uo believe in him. but tgat we make-helieve in Him – in His story, that His son died for us, in the resurrection of thx slesh, and sk on – is toc ecsier tj unvecstand than the fsct that people really believe vhese thincs. And so, theological fictionakirm is not in xny way a
can simulate having a certain mental state I not here a Dispositional Analysis such analysis is correct, is at least than an occurrence Analysis, theological fictionalism again in a bad position. 10 St Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, IIaIIae, 2, 11 Henry H. Price, Belief (london: muirhead library of Philosophy, 1969). roGer PouIVet436 argument the of We saw that we cannot believe at will, but we even cannot imagine at will – to what is often said (on the grounds a very common romantic of imagination). I am not all that imagining God us only son to crucified, as a redeemer, to save us from our sins, would be something we could so easily This phenomenon "modal imaginative A is but it makes for us, and we don't believe cannot even make-believe in it. I suppose that is exactly happens for a lot of unbelievers. do not think that the religious story is a novel that makes sense even if it is a fiction. For them, it is novel that does not any sense! There a of by we can ourselves as being relevantly different than we actually are. And this of course often what novels and movies invite us to – discover, through fictions, possibilities: what we could but does not always work. seems fictions something we ourselves impervious to the that they offer. Fictions are, short, sometimes non-starters where philosophers – those who consider that we decide make-believe – exaggerate our ability to make-believe. we simply cannot do so, being unable to imagine that things could as presented certain sort of novel or film. Theological fictionalism explain to us why make-believe in God if we do not have to in but that make-believe in Him in His story, His son died in the of flesh, – is not easier to understand the that people really believe these And fictionalism is not in any way a
 can simulate having a certain Mental statE or coNteNt. I WiLl noT herE defend a DisposITionAl Analysis of belief, but cLearlY iF Such AN aNalysIs is corREcT, OR is At LeAst BeTTeR than An oCcurrenCe Analysis, TheOlOgical fictioNAlIsm is again In a Bad position. 10 ST ThOmas AqUiNas, sUmma THeoLogicA, IIaIIAE, 2, 1. 11 Henry h. Price, BelIeF (London: MUirhead LIBrAry oF Philosophy, 1969). roGer POUIvEt436 The argument fRom the LiMItATIonS of Make-believE WE saw tHAt we canNOt BELIevE At will, but we evEn cannot imaGIne At will – CoNtrARy to whAt is oFtEN saId (on the grouNds oF a very comMon romANtic accOUnt of imAginatIon). i am Not aT AlL sUre ThAT imAGiNinG ThaT God sent Us hiS only Son tO BE CRuciFieD, as a RedeeMer, to save us frOm oUr siNS, woUld be SometHing We Could So easiLy do. THiS phenomenon I calL "modAl imaginaTivE rEsiStAnce". A STory is TolD, buT it makeS no sensE For Us, AND We Don't believe in it and CaNNOt Even make-BelievE In It. i Suppose tHaT it Is exACTly whAt haPPeNs for a loT of unbELiEvErs. They Do Not thiNk ThaT thE reliGIous Story iS like a noVel thAT makes sense eveN If it is a fictioN. foR THeM, It is LikE a novel that Does NOt maKe anY SeNse! tHere iS a kinD oF ImAGination by which we caN cOnsideR oursElves as being rElevantly dIFFErent thaN we aCTuALly are. And this iS of coUrse often wHAt novels And moVies inviTe us to expERIment witH – to DisCovEr, tHROuGh fictions, humAN PossIbIlities: WhaT we coulD be. But ThiS doEs Not always Work. And iT sEeMs ThAt fIctioNS are tellInG us SoMetHing wHEn we fiNd ourSelvEs ImPErvIous to tHE pOSSibiLiTiEs thAt tHeY offeR. FicTIonS are, in sHort, sometImeS Non-sTaRtErs wherE certain possiBiLities are cOnCerNed. SomE PHilosophErs – those who consider that WE decide To mAke-beLievE – exaggeraTe oUr abilIty TO make-bElieve. sometImEs wE SImply CANnOt dO sO, being unabLE To iMaginE tHat tHings coUld proceed as presenTEd iN a certain sort Of nOvel OR FiLm. THEoLOgiCaL FicTIOnalism must explAin to us why We MAkE-believe in gOd iF wE do not hAve to beLieve IN him. but That we makE-believe iN HIm – in hIS stOry, that His Son died fOr us, in the REsurrECtIon of The Flesh, aNd So oN – is noT easieR To uNdersTand thAn The facT that PeOple realLy believe these things. And So, theoLogicAl fIctionaliSm iS Not In any way a
 can simulate having a cer tain menta l sta teorco nten t. I  will not here defe nd a Dispositional Ana lysis  o f  bel i ef , but  clearl y  i f suc han  an al y si s iscor rect, o r is at le ast  b etter than a n  o ccurrenceAna lysis, theol ogi cal fi ct ion a lismisagain  in ab ad pos ition. 10  S t  Thoma s  Aquina s ,  S umma  Theologica, IIaI I ae ,  2, 1. 11 Henr y H. P ri c e, B eli ef(london: m ui rhead library of P h ilo s ophy, 1969).roGer PouIV e t43 6 Thear gum e nt fro m the  l i mit ations of m ake- believe W e sawt hat wec annot b elieve  at  wi ll,b ut  w e e ve n  ca n no t i m agi ne at wi ll  –  cont rary t o what  is  oft en sa id (on the gr oun ds o f  averycommo n ro ma nticaccoun t ofim agination). I a m no t at allsur etha timagi n ing th atGod  sent u s His o n lyso n t obe crucified, as a  r e d ee mer, tosave u s  f ro m  our sin s,  wo uldb e  some thin g  w e couldso eas i ly  d o. This  p henome no n I  ca ll "m o dalimagin ative re sista n ce". A story i s  told, but it ma k e sn o se nse  for us, an d we don' t be l ie vei n itand c an n ot even make-believe i nit. Isuppo se that it is  exactly w h a t  happens  for al ot of unbeliev ers.They do no t  think t hat t he relig ious stor y is likea n ove l t hat m ak es sense even i f it  i s a fic tio n. Forthe m,itisli ke a nove l that d oe sno tmak e any sense! T he reis  akindo f imag inati on b ywh i chwe canc on s i derou rs elve s a sbeing  rel e van tly dif ferent th anw e ac tu al ly are.  And this isof  course of te n w hat no v e ls and m ovies invite us to expe r iment w ith  – to  dis cover, th rou gh fic tio n s, hum an pos sibil it ies : whatw e  c oul dbe. but th i s  do es no talwa ys work . And it seems tha t  fi ctions are te lli ng u s so met h in g  wh en wef i nd ourselves im pervious t ot he  possibili t ies  t hat the y offer . Fic t ions ar e, in sho rt, somet im es n o n -st arters whe re certa in possib i litie s  a re co nce rned.So mephilo sopher s  –those  who c on siderthatwe  decideto make-believe – exagg erateour a bil ity to ma ke- b eli eve. Some time s we simpl y c ann ot do  so ,  bein g un a bl e t o  imag inet hat thing s  c oul d pr oceed as pr e s e nte d ina c e rtainsort  of novel or film .  Theological f icti o n ali smm ustex plain to us wh y w em a ke-belie ve  in God ifwe do no th ave t o beli eve in  him. b u t  t h at wemake -be lieve inHim  – in Hisst or y , that  His  s on die d foru s, i n the resurrection  of t h e  fles h , a nd so  o n – isn ot e asier to u nderstand t han th e fa ct th at peop le  reall y b el ieve these things. A nd so , theol og ical  fi ctiona lism i s not  inan y w ay a
 can_simulate having_a certain mental state_or content._I_will not_here_defend a Dispositional_Analysis of belief,_but clearly if such_an analysis is_correct,_or is at least better than an occurrence Analysis, theological fictionalism is again in_a_bad position._10_St_Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, IIaIIae,_2, 1. 11 Henry H._Price, Belief_(london: muirhead library of Philosophy, 1969). roGer PouIVet436_The_argument from the_limitations of make-believe We saw that we cannot believe_at will, but we even cannot_imagine at will_–_contrary_to what is often_said (on the grounds of a_very common romantic account of imagination)._I am not at all sure that_imagining that God sent us His_only son to be crucified,_as a_redeemer, to save us from_our sins, would_be something_we could so_easily do. This phenomenon I call_"modal imaginative resistance"._A story is told, but it_makes_no sense for_us,_and_we don't_believe in it_and_cannot even_make-believe_in it. I suppose that it_is_exactly what happens for a lot of_unbelievers. They do not_think_that the religious story_is like a novel that_makes sense even if it is_a fiction._For them,_it is like a novel that does not make any sense!_There is a kind of imagination_by which we can_consider ourselves_as_being relevantly different_than_we actually_are. And this is of course often_what novels_and movies invite us to experiment_with – to discover,_through_fictions, human possibilities: what we could_be. but this does not always_work. And it seems that_fictions_are_telling us something when we_find ourselves impervious to the possibilities_that they offer._Fictions are, in short, sometimes non-starters where_certain_possibilities are concerned. Some philosophers –_those_who consider that we decide to_make-believe_–_exaggerate our ability to make-believe._Sometimes we simply cannot do so,_being unable to imagine that things could proceed as_presented in a_certain sort of novel or_film._Theological_fictionalism must explain to us why we make-believe in God_if we_do not have_to believe in him. but that we make-believe in Him_– in His story, that His son_died for us, in the resurrection of the flesh, and so_on – is not easier to understand than_the fact that people really believe these_things. And so, theological_fictionalism_is not in any way a