 donkey as part-no utopian analysis of 'talking donkey' in terms of arrangements of particles is required. (OPW 156) The claim at the end rests on the controversial assumption that 'talking donkey' is qualitative. Once we give that up, we see that Lewis and the linguistic ersatzer are in structurally similar situations: to say what it is for it to be possible that there is a talking donkey, both require analyses of 'talking donkey' in terms of some favoured vocabulary- the language of "arrangements of particles" in the ersatzer's case, the "well-behaved" language in Lewis's. It may not be utopian to hope that we can find the kind of analysis Lewis needs, but as I have pointed out, it is far from straightforward. The second, and more important reason for dwelling on this point is to draw attention to a larger class of programmes for analysing modality which are like counterpart theory except that they involve a different specification of the "well-behaved" language to which the algorithm is to be applied. Consider Lewis's unit set: call it Lucky. Suppose for example that you think that what it is for Lucky to contain a philosopher is for Lewis to be a philosopher. Then you will think it is necessary-absolutely, unrestrictedly, necessary-that Lucky contains a philosopher iff Lewis is a philosopher. So you can't accept counterpart theory. But you might still consider accepting a theory like counterpart theory, except that it applies only to sentences in a more restrictive language in which the only non-qualitative expressions are terms referring to non-sets. Moreover, if you think that every sentence can be analysed in terms of such a language, you may think that this restriction of counterpart theory tells the full story about the meaning of modal operators, just as counterpart theorists think their theory tells the full story about the meaning of modal operators despite the fact that not every sentence is well-behaved. This thought can be taken quite far. Even if you believe that ordinary objects are involved in all kinds of interesting de re metaphysical necessities, you might think that there are some special objects-elementary particles, say-such that (i) there are no interesting de re metaphysical necessities involving them, and (ii) every sentence has an analysis (perhaps infinitary) in which the only referring terms refer to them. (The view is reminiscent of Wittgenstein's Tractatus.) Then you may still accept the restriction of counterpart theory to these
donkey as part - no utopian analysis of' talking domestic ass' in term of arrangements of particle is ask. (OPW 156) The claim at the end rest on the controversial assumption that' talking domestic ass' is qualitative. Once we contribute that up, we see that Lewis and the linguistic ersatzer are in structurally exchangeable situations: to say what it is for it to be potential that there is a talking domestic ass, both require analysis of' talking donkey' in terms of some favoured vocabulary- the terminology of " arrangements of particles " in the ersatzer's case, the " well - behaved " speech in Lewis's. It may not be utopian to hope that we can find the kind of analysis Lewis needs, but as I have pointed out, it is far from straightforward. The second, and more authoritative reason for dwelling on this point is to draw attention to a larger class of programmes for analysing modality which are like counterpart theory except that they involve a different specification of the " well - behaved " language to which the algorithm is to be applied. Consider Lewis's unit of measurement set: call it Lucky. presuppose for case that you think that what it is for Lucky to contain a philosopher is for Lewis to be a philosopher. Then you will think it is necessary - absolutely, unrestrictedly, necessary - that Lucky hold a philosopher iff Lewis is a philosopher. therefore you can't accept counterpart theory. But you might however consider accepting a theory like counterpart theory, except that it applies only to conviction in a more restrictive language in which the only non - qualitative expressions are terms refer to non - sets. furthermore, if you remember that every sentence can be analysed in terms of such a language, you may remember that this restriction of counterpart theory tells the wide story about the meaning of modal operators, just as counterpart theorists intend their theory assure the full story about the meaning of modal operator despite the fact that not every sentence is well - act. This thought can be consider quite far. Even if you believe that average objects are involved in all kinds of interesting de re metaphysical necessity, you might think that there be some special objects - elementary particles, say - such that (i) there are no interesting de re metaphysical necessities involving them, and (ii) every sentence have an analysis (perhaps infinitary) in which the alone referring terms consult to them. (The view is reminiscent of Wittgenstein's Tractatus .) Then you may still accept the restriction of counterpart theory to these
 dojkey as part-no utopian akalysis of 'talkiut donkxy' in tsrms of xrrangements of particles is rwquirtb. (OPW 156) The claim at ghe end rvsts on tye cibtroversial assumpbnon tgwt 'tcljing donkey' is qualitatiee. Once we giva ghct up, we see that Lewis and the lingtistic rrdatzer are in ftrubttralmj wimilar situations: to say whaf it is for it to be possible that there is a halklng donkey, both reeuire analywes jd 'talking dovkey' in tegks of some favoured vocabulary- the languaee of "arrangemebtw ov particles" mn the ersatzer's case, the "fell-behsved" language ln Lexis's. It may not be utopiai to hope that we cag find tha iind of analysis Oeqis ngeds, tut xw I habe pkinted ouv, it is far from straithtforward. The secomd, qnd more impodtant wewson for dwelling on this point is to dgaw zttention to a larger coass of programmes fot analysind modality which are like counterpart theory exce[t thet thty invouce a different specification of the "well-behaved" mamglage to which the algorithm os tp be applied. Cunsidex Lswis's unit set: calp it Lusky. Syppose fow exsmple that you think that wyat it is fog Luxky to contain a pkilosopher ir fot Lewix to be a philosopher. Tken yoh will thinn it is nszessary-absolutelh, ukrevtrictedly, necessary-that Ltcky conteins c philosuphet iff Lqwis is a ohilosopher. So you can't wccepj counderpart thfory. But you might still considxc accepting a tveogy like cjuntevpart theory, exsept that it akplies onjy to sentences in a mmre restriceive language ln which the only nog-quaoitarive exofessions are trrms refegrnng to nob-sets. Moreover, if nou tfjnk that every wenuebce can be anakysdd yn txrms jx such a lancuagd, yui may think ukat ghis restriction of counderpzrt theory tells tne full stiry aboue the meaning of modal operatord, jusv as cuuntetpatt theorists think their theory tells thf fmll story abott tme mganing of mpdal operators despite the fact that nov every sentence is welo-behaved. This thougkt can be takxn quiee far. Evan if you believe thqt ordinary objecus are involved in all iinds mf inheresting de re metaphysical necessities, you might think that there are sime spxcyal objects-slemrntarj pcrtncles, swy-surh that (i) there arv no interesting de re metaphysiral necesshtnes involving them, and (ii) evety sentence has an analysis (perhaps infjnitary) on which the only referring terks refer to them. (The viee is remuniscsnt of Witvgenstein's Tractatus.) Then vou mat still acccpt the restriztipn of countfrpact cheory to these
donkey as part-no utopian analysis of 'talking terms arrangements of is required. (OPW end on the controversial that 'talking donkey' qualitative. Once we give that up, see that Lewis and the linguistic ersatzer are in structurally similar situations: to what it is for it to be possible that there is a talking both analyses 'talking in terms of some favoured vocabulary- the language of "arrangements of particles" in the ersatzer's case, "well-behaved" language in Lewis's. It may not be to hope that we find the kind of analysis needs, as I pointed it far from straightforward. second, and more important reason for dwelling on this point is to draw attention to a larger of programmes modality which like theory that they involve specification of the "well-behaved" language to is to be applied. Consider Lewis's unit set: it Lucky. for example that you think that it is for Lucky to contain a philosopher for Lewis to be a philosopher. Then you will think it is necessary-absolutely, unrestrictedly, necessary-that a philosopher iff Lewis a philosopher. So can't counterpart But might still accepting a theory like counterpart theory, except that it applies only sentences in a more restrictive language in which the only are referring to non-sets. if you think that sentence be analysed in terms a you this of theory tells the full about the meaning of modal just as counterpart theorists full story about the meaning of modal operators the fact that not every sentence is This thought can be taken quite far. Even if you believe that objects are all kinds of interesting de re metaphysical necessities, might think that there some special objects-elementary particles, say-such that (i) there are interesting re metaphysical involving them, and every sentence has analysis (perhaps infinitary) the only terms to is reminiscent of Wittgenstein's Tractatus.) Then may accept the restriction of counterpart to
 donkey as part-no utopian analYsis of 'talkIng doNkeY' in TeRms oF arrAngements of parTIcleS is required. (OPW 156) The claim At the EnD RestS On The coNtroverSIaL ASsuMpTiOn tHaT 'TaLking DonKey' is quAlitative. ONce We Give that up, we SEe That Lewis aNd tHe linguistic ErsAtzer aRe In sTRuctuRalLy simIlar siTUationS: to say whaT iT Is for iT To be posSIBlE thaT there is a talking dONkEY, both require anAlyses Of 'TAlKINg dOnkEy' in terms oF sOme faVOured voCAbULARy- tHE language of "arRangements oF ParTicles" In The ERsatzeR's casE, tHE "weLl-behaved" laNguaGe in Lewis'S. It may NOt be utoPIan to hoPe that We cAn fInd tHE kInD of AnALysIS LEwiS NeeDs, but as I HaVe PointEd ouT, IT IS far FroM strAightForward. The secOnd, And mORe iMportAnt reAson FoR dwelLing on This pOiNt is to draw attenTion To a larger ClaSs Of pRoGrammES for anAlySinG modaliTy which ARe lIkE COUnTerpart theory excepT tHAT tHey involVe a difFErEnT SpecificAtIon Of thE "WEll-beHaveD" LaNguage to Which tHE aLgOrithm iS tO be appLiEd. COnsIder LEWis's Unit seT: call it LUcky. SUPpose for examplE That you think tHAt WHAt IT is fOr LUcky to contaIn a pHIlosOpheR Is For lEwis tO be a pHiLOsOPher. Then you will thinK iT is necEssarY-absolutely, unRestrictedLY, NEcessary-That lUcKY contains a philOsophEr iff Lewis IS a philosOpher. so you can'T accept coUNTerpart tHeoRy. BUt yOu mIGHt Still consider ACCeptInG a theorY liKe countErpArt TheOry, ExCept that iT applies OnLy To SeNteNces iN A more resTrIctIvE laNguagE In whicH the oNly nOn-QuALitAtive exPReSSIons ArE tErms RefErRing tO non-SEts. moreoveR, if you thiNk tHAt evErY sEntence Can be analysed In Terms of sucH a LanGuage, yOU May think That this restriction of coUNterparT thEory tElls The full stOry About tHe mEAning oF modal OperaToRs, jUST as coUNTeRpaRt Theorists tHINk tHeir tHeOry tElls the Full story about the mEAniNg of modal operAtoRs deSPItE thE FaCT thAt NOt eVERy sentence is welL-behaved. ThIs THoUght can be tAKen QuIte far. EVen if yoU beliEVe that oRdinary obJects are iNvOlveD IN alL kinds of inTerestinG de re metaPHysicAL nEcessItiEs, you mIgHt tHink tHat theRE arE some SpeciaL oBjects-ElemeNtAry partiCles, say-such that (i) there arE no intErestIng De re metapHysICal NecessitiEs inVolving theM, anD (ii) Every SenTEnce hAs an ANaLysIS (perhAps iNFinitary) iN WhIch THE oNly referrinG TERms Refer To tHEm. (The vIew iS reminiscent of WitTGenstein's TractAtus.) tHEn yOu mAY stiLl Accept the restrIctIoN OF counterPaRt theory to tHese
 donkey as part-no utopian  analysisof 't alk ing  d onke y' i n terms of arr a ngem ents of particles is r equir ed .  (OP W  1 56) T he clai m  a t the  e nd  re st s  o n the  co ntrover sial assum pti on  that 'talki n gdonkey' is  qu alitative. O nce  we gi ve  th a t up,  we  seethat L e wis an d the lin gu i stic e r satzera r ein s tructurally simil a rs ituations: tosay wh at it i s f orit to be p os sible that th e re i s  at alking donkey , both requ i reanalys es  of 'talki ng do nk e y'in terms of  som e favoure d voca b ulary-t he lang uage o f " arr ange m en ts  of  p a rti c le s"i n t he ersat ze r' s cas e, t h e " well -be have d" la nguage in Lew is' s. I t  ma y not  be u topi an  to h ope th at we  c an find the kin d of  analysis  Le wi s n ee ds, b u t as I  ha vepointed  out, i t  is  f a r fr om straightforward .T h esecond,and mo r eim p ortant r ea son  for d welli ng o n  t his poin t is t o  d ra w atten ti on toalar ger  clas s  ofprogra mmes for  anal y sing modalityw hich are like co u n te r part  th eory except  tha t  the y in v ol vea  diff erent  s p ec i fication of the "we ll -behav ed" l anguage to wh ich the al g o r ithm isto b e  a p plied. Conside r Lew is's units et: call  it L ucky. Su ppose for e xample t hat  yo u t hin k th at what it is f or L uc ky to c ont ain a p hil oso phe r i sfor Lewis  to be a  p hi lo so phe r. Th e n you wi ll  th in k i t isn ecessa ry-ab solu te ly ,  un restric t ed l y , ne ce ss ary- tha tLucky  con t ain s a phi losopheriff Lewi sis  a phil osopher. So y ou  can't acc ep t c ounter p a rt theor y. But you might stillc onsider  ac cepti ng a  theory l ike  count erp a rt the ory, e xcept  t hat i t app l i es  on ly  to senten c e s i n a m or e re stricti ve language in whi c h t he only non-q ual itat i v eexp r es s ion sa ret e rms referring t o non-sets .M or eover, ify outh ink tha t every  sent e nce can  be analy sed in te rm s of s uch  a languag e, you m ay thinkt hat t h is  rest ric tion o fcou nterp art th e ory  tell s thefu ll sto ry ab ou t the me aning of modal operator s, jus t ascou nterpartthe o ris ts thinkthei r theory t ell s t he fu lls toryabou t  t hem eanin g of modal ope r at ors d es pite the fa c t tha t not  ev e ry sen tenc e is well-behaved .  This thoughtcanb e  ta ken quit efar. Even if y oube l i eve that  o rdinary obj ects are  i n volve d in a ll kin ds of i n t er e stingde r e m etaphysic alne c essitie s,  y o u migh t th in k that  there ares o me special objec ts-el e m entar y  pa rticl es , say-s u ch t hat (i) th ere are nointere stin g dere meta ph ysical  ne ce ssities in v olving th em, a nd (ii)  e very  se ntence  has a n ana lysi s(pe rhaps inf i n it a ry )i n w hich  theon ly r eferringt erms ref ert o them.  ( The v iew is re m i niscent of  Wi ttgen s t ein's Trac t atus . )T hen y ou may  still  accept the  r estrict ion o f counter part theo r y t othes e
 donkey_as part-no_utopian analysis of 'talking_donkey' in_terms_of arrangements_of_particles is required._(OPW 156) The_claim at the end_rests on the_controversial_assumption that 'talking donkey' is qualitative. Once we give that up, we see that_Lewis_and the_linguistic_ersatzer_are in structurally similar situations:_to say what it is_for it_to be possible that there is a talking_donkey,_both require analyses_of 'talking donkey' in terms of some favoured vocabulary-_the language of "arrangements of particles"_in the ersatzer's_case,_the_"well-behaved" language in Lewis's._It may not be utopian to_hope that we can find the_kind of analysis Lewis needs, but as_I have pointed out, it is_far from straightforward. The second,_and more_important reason for dwelling on_this point is_to draw_attention to a_larger class of programmes for analysing_modality which are_like counterpart theory except that they_involve_a different specification_of_the_"well-behaved" language_to which the_algorithm_is to_be_applied. Consider Lewis's unit set: call_it_Lucky. Suppose for example that you think_that what it is_for_Lucky to contain a_philosopher is for Lewis to_be a philosopher. Then you will_think it_is necessary-absolutely,_unrestrictedly, necessary-that Lucky contains a philosopher iff Lewis is a philosopher._So you can't accept counterpart theory._But you might still_consider accepting_a_theory like counterpart_theory,_except that_it applies only to sentences in a_more restrictive_language in which the only non-qualitative_expressions are terms referring_to_non-sets. Moreover, if you think that_every sentence can be analysed in_terms of such a language,_you_may_think that this restriction of_counterpart theory tells the full story_about the meaning_of modal operators, just as counterpart theorists_think_their theory tells the full story_about_the meaning of modal operators despite_the_fact_that not every sentence is_well-behaved. This thought can be taken_quite far. Even if you believe that ordinary objects_are involved in_all kinds of interesting de_re_metaphysical_necessities, you might think that there are some special objects-elementary_particles, say-such_that (i) there_are no interesting de re metaphysical necessities involving them, and_(ii) every sentence has an analysis (perhaps_infinitary) in which the only referring terms refer to them. (The_view is reminiscent of Wittgenstein's Tractatus.) Then you_may still accept the restriction of counterpart_theory to these