 p. I can even try to believe, like the libertine who asked, in a famous pensée of Pascal, to go to mass and to kneel down, hoping that it would make him a genuine Christian. but when we try, that is not faith at all. Aquinas says: The act of believing... is firmly attached to one alternative and in this respect the believer is in the same state of mind as one who has science or AGAINSt tHeoloGICAl FICtIoNAlISm 435 understanding. Yet the believer's knowledge is not completed by a clear vision, and in this respect he is like one having a doubt, a suspicion, or an opinion.10 This is not acceptance or half-belief, but a case of certainty without clear vision. There is not room here to discuss the exact nature of faith, but clearly theological fictionalism is deeply in error about its nature. The argument from the dispositional nature of belief and faith like acceptance, simulated belief in a fictional stance supposes that we play with our own mental state. I know that the monster is in fact an artefact on the screen, but I will behave as if I believed that the monster was in front of me. When someone cries when looking at a movie, and is asked, "Why do you cry, it is only fiction?", the answer could be that the very idea that something like this could happen is sorrowful. And it is not false that we are able to make ourselves sorrowful simply by focusing our mind on sorrowful ideas. So might it be in the religious case: we make ourselves believers by focusing on religious ideas. Such an account of simulated belief presupposes what Henry H. Price called an "occurrence Analysis of belief ".11 to believe something is to have a certain occurrent mental state. In this case we would be able to simulate having a certain mental state or content, without actually having it. Price distinguishes this account from a Dispositional Analysis of belief, which maintains that beliefs are not occurrent mental states but are rather dispositions to answer a question or to behave in a certain way. This means that if S believes that p, S does not have a specific mental content but rather has a disposition to answer "yes", when asked if p, or the disposition to act according to the fact that p. And in that case, how would simulation be possible? The doctrine of simulated beliefs presupposes an occurrence Analysis of belief. We would be able to simulate because we
p. I can even try to believe, like the libertine who asked, in a famous pensée of Pascal, to fail to bulk and to kneel down, hoping that it would make him a genuine Christian. but when we judge, that is not faith at all. Aquinas order: The act of believing... is firmly attach to one alternative and in this respect the believer is in the like state of mind as one who has science or AGAINSt tHeoloGICAl FICtIoNAlISm 435 reason. Yet the believer's knowledge is not completed by a clear vision, and in this respect he is like one accept a doubt, a suspicion, or an opinion.10 This is not acceptance or half - impression, but a case of certainty without clear sight. There is not room here to discourse the exact nature of faith, but clearly theological fictionalism is deeply in error about its nature. The controversy from the dispositional nature of belief and faith like acceptance, simulated belief in a fictional stance supposes that we play with our own mental state. I know that the monster is in fact an artefact on the screen, but I will behave as if I believed that the monster was in battlefront of me. When someone cries when looking at a movie, and is ask, " Why do you cry, it is only fiction? ", the answer could be that the identical idea that something like this could find is sorrowful. And it is not false that we are able to make ourselves sorrowful simply by focus our mind on sorrowful ideas. So might it be in the religious case: we lay down ourselves believers by focusing on religious ideas. Such an account of simulate belief presuppose what Henry H. Price called an " occurrence Analysis of belief " .11 to believe something is to have a sealed occurrent mental state. In this case we would be able to simulate having a certain mental state or content, without actually have it. monetary value distinguishes this account from a Dispositional Analysis of belief, which maintains that beliefs are not occurrent mental state but are rather disposition to answer a motion or to behave in a certain way. This means that if S believes that phosphorus, S does not have a specific mental content but quite has a disposition to answer " yes ", when asked if p, or the disposal to act according to the fact that p. And in that casing, how would simulation be possible? The doctrine of simulated impression presupposes an occurrence Analysis of belief. We would be able to model because we
 p. L can even try to believt, like the libertnbe who asked, in a faoous pensée of Pascal, to go tl nass qnd to kneel down, hopivg that in would mqke iim a genuine Chcjstian. nbt whsk we crb, that is not fsith at aln. Aquinas says: Tfe act of believing... is firmly attacheq to onr wlternative anq in ehis gewpect the believer is in the aame stete of mind as pne who has science or AGALNSt tHeoloGICAl FICtIlNAlISm 435 uneerseqnding. Yet tfe believeg'v knowledgg is not completed by a clear virion, cnd in this rwspfwt he is lije onv having a domnt, a sgspiciom, or an opiniok.10 Thiv iw not acceptance or helf-belief, but a case of certahncy without clear visiin. Therg is tot fiom hede tk disckss the exact nature of daith, but clearly tnejoogical fictiknalisi ys deeply in error about its nature. The arfument from the disposirional nature of beligf and faieh like acceptance, simulated belief in a fictionan staicd sbiioser tjat we play with our own mental state. I know egau tme monster is in fact an aryevavj on the screev, but N wjll behave as if I believgd thar the monfter was in front of me. When soneone cries cheb looking at a movne, and is asyed, "Ehy dp you cry, it is only fietion?", fhe answer fould be ffat the very idex tmat something like this could happen iw soxrowful. Xnd ot is got false hhat we are able to make oursglves vorrowful dimply by focusing our mind on sorrowful ideax. Vo kight it be ik the religious case: we make purselvzs belkevers by rocusinj on religiots ideas. Such wn account oh simulatqd bwlied presuoooses what Henty H. Pricv ealled an "occurrence Analysls of gelief ".11 to belizre something is tp hxve a cxrtaig occurrent mantau sgste. Iv this case de wpuld be able to simunate having a certain kektal statg or contqnt, without avtually having it. Krice vistinjuishex tris account from a Dispositionzl Analysls jf belief, whych naintains thct beliefs are not occurrent mental statxs but are rather dispowitions to answer a auestion or to bqhave in d certain way. This mwans that if S bekieves that p, S does hot haee a dpecific mental content but rather has a disposition to answer "yes", when awked ih [, or the diaposotion tj act ascorviig to the fact thst p. And in that case, how would simulathou be possible? The doctrine of skmulated beligfs presupposes an occurrehce Analusis of belief. We would be able to simulate because we
p. I can even try to believe, libertine asked, in famous pensée of and kneel down, hoping it would make a genuine Christian. but when we that is not faith at all. Aquinas says: The act of believing... is attached to one alternative and in this respect the believer is in the state mind one has science or AGAINSt tHeoloGICAl FICtIoNAlISm 435 understanding. Yet the believer's knowledge is not completed by clear vision, and in this respect he is one having a doubt, suspicion, or an opinion.10 This not or half-belief, a of without clear vision. is not room here to discuss the exact nature of faith, but clearly theological fictionalism is deeply error about The argument the nature belief and faith simulated belief in a fictional stance play with our own mental state. I know the monster in fact an artefact on the but I will behave as if I believed the monster was in front of me. When someone cries when looking at a movie, asked, "Why do you it is only the could that very idea something like this could happen is sorrowful. And it is not that we are able to make ourselves sorrowful simply by mind sorrowful ideas. So it be in the case: make ourselves believers by religious Such simulated presupposes Henry H. Price called "occurrence Analysis of belief ".11 believe something is to state. In this case we would be able simulate having a certain mental state or without actually having it. Price distinguishes this account from a Dispositional Analysis belief, which beliefs are not occurrent mental states but are dispositions to answer a or to behave in a certain way. This means if believes that S does not a specific mental but rather has to answer when if disposition to act according to the that And in that case, how simulation The doctrine of simulated beliefs presupposes an occurrence Analysis of belief. We would be able because we
 p. I can even try to believe, like The libertiNe who AskEd, iN a FamoUs peNsée of Pascal, to GO to mAss and to kneel down, hopinG that It WOuld MAkE him a Genuine cHrISTiaN. bUt WheN wE TrY, that Is nOt faith At all. AquinAs sAyS: The act of belIEvIng... is firmlY atTached to one aLteRnativE aNd iN This rEspEct thE belieVEr is in The same stAtE Of mind AS one who HAS sCienCe or AGAINSt tHeologiCaL FICtIoNAlISm 435 uNderstAnDInG. yEt tHe bEliever's knOwLedge IS not comPLeTED By a CLear vision, and In this respeCT he Is like OnE haVIng a doUbt, a sUsPIciOn, or an opiniOn.10 ThIs is not acCeptanCE or half-BElief, buT a case Of cErtAintY WiThOut ClEAr vISiOn. THEre Is not rooM hErE to diScusS THE ExacT naTure Of faiTh, but clearly tHeoLogiCAl fIctioNalisM is dEePly in Error aBout iTs Nature. The argumeNt frOm the dispOsiTiOnaL nAture OF belieF anD faIth like AcceptaNCe, sImULATeD belief in a fictionaL sTANcE supposeS that wE PlAy WIth our owN mEntAl stATE. I knoW thaT ThE monster Is in faCT aN aRtefact On The scrEeN, buT I wIll beHAve aS if I beLieved thAt the MOnster was in froNT of me. When someONe CRIeS When LooKing at a moviE, and IS askEd, "WhY Do You CRy, it iS only FiCTiON?", the answer could be thAt The verY idea That something Like this coULD Happen is SorrOWfUL. And it is not falSe thaT we are able TO make ourSelveS sorrowfUl simply bY FOcusing oUr mInd On sOrrOWFuL ideas. So might IT Be in ThE religiOus Case: we mAke OurSelVes BeLievers by Focusing On ReLiGiOus Ideas. sUch an accOuNt oF sImuLated BElief pResupPoseS wHaT henRy H. PricE CaLLEd an "OcCuRrenCe ANaLysis Of beLIef ".11 To belieVe somethiNg iS To haVe A cErtain oCcurrent mentaL sTate. In this CaSe wE would BE Able to siMulate having a certain menTAl state Or cOntenT, witHout actuaLly Having It. PRIce disTinguiShes tHiS acCOUnt frOM A DIspOsItional AnaLYSis Of belIeF, whiCh maintAins that beliefs are NOt oCcurrent mentaL stAtes BUT aRe rAThER diSpOSitIONs to answer a quesTion or to beHaVE iN a certain wAY. ThIs Means thAt if S beLieveS That p, S dOes not havE a specifiC mEntaL COntEnt but rathEr has a diSposition TO answER "yEs", wheN asKed if p, Or The DispoSition TO acT accoRding tO tHe fact That p. anD in that cAse, how would simulation be PossibLe? The DocTrine of siMulATed Beliefs prEsupPoses an occUrrEncE AnalYsiS Of belIef. WE WoUld BE able To siMUlate becaUSe We
 p. I can even try to beli eve, likethe l ibe rti ne  who  ask ed, in a famou s  pen sée of Pascal, to go t o mas sa nd t o  k neeldown, h o pi n g  th at  i t w ou l dmakehim  a genu ine Christ ian .but when wet ry , that isnot  faith at al l.Aquina ssay s : The  ac t ofbeliev i ng...is firmly  a t tached to onea l te rnat ive and in this r e sp e ct the believe r is i nt he s ame  st ate of min das on e  who ha s  s c i e nce or AGAINSt tH eoloGICAl F I CtI oNAlIS m435 unders tandi ng .  Ye t the belie ver' s knowled ge isn ot comp l eted by  a cle arvis ion, an dinth i s r e sp ect heis likeon ehavin g ad o u b t, a  su spic ion,or an opinion .10  Thi s  is  notaccep tanc eor ha lf-bel ief,bu t a case of cer tain ty withou t c le arvi sion. Thereisnot  room h ere tod isc us s t he  exact nature of f ai t h ,but clea rly th e ol og i cal fict io nal ismi s  deep ly i n  e rror abo ut its na tu re. The  a rgumen tfro m t he di s posi tional  natureof be l ief and faithl ike acceptanc e ,s i mu l ated  be lief in a f icti o nalstan c esup p osesthatwe pl a y with our own ment al  state . I k now that themonster is i n  fact an  art e fa c t on the scree n, bu t I will b e have asif Ibelieved  that the m onster w asinfro nto f  m e. When someo n e  cri es  when l ook ing ata m ovi e,and  i s asked,"Why doyo ucr y,  it  is o n ly ficti on ?",  t heanswe r  could  be t hatth ev ery  idea t h at s omet hi ng  lik e t hi s cou ld h a ppe n is so rrowful.And it i sno t false  that we areab le to make  o urs elvess o rrowfulsimply by focusing ourm ind onsor rowfu l id eas. So m igh t it b e i n  the r eligio us ca se : w e makeo u rs elv es  believers b y f ocusi ng  onreligio us ideas. Such ana cco unt of simula ted  bel i e fpre s up p ose sw hat H enry H. Price c alled an " oc c ur rence Anal y sis  o f belie f ".11to be l ieve so mething i s to have  a  cer t a inoccurrentmental s tate. Int his c a se  we w oul d be a bl e t o sim ulateh avi ng acertai nmental  stat eor conte nt, without actually ha ving i t. Pr ice  distingu ish e s t his accou nt f rom a Disp osi tio nal A nal y sis o f be l ie f,w hichmain t ains that be lie f s  a re not occu r r e ntmenta l s t ates b ut a re rather disposi t ions to answer  a q u e sti ono r to  b ehave in a cer tai nw a y. Thisme ans that if  S belie ve s  that  p, Sdoes n ot have a  s p ecific  men tal  contentbut  r a ther ha sad isposi tion  t o answ er "ye s ", w h e n asked if p, or  thed i sposi t ion  to a ct  accord i ng t o the fact  that p. An d in t hatcase,  how wo ul d simu lat io n be possi b le? The d octri ne of s im ulat edbelief s pr e s uppos es a nocc urrence A n a ly s is  o f  be lief . Wewo uldbe able t o  simulat e b e cause w e
 p._I can_even try to believe,_like the_libertine_who asked,_in_a famous pensée_of Pascal, to_go to mass and_to kneel down,_hoping_that it would make him a genuine Christian. but when we try, that is_not_faith at_all._Aquinas_says: The act of believing..._is firmly attached to one_alternative and_in this respect the believer is in the_same_state of mind_as one who has science or AGAINSt tHeoloGICAl FICtIoNAlISm_435 understanding. Yet the believer's knowledge_is not completed_by_a_clear vision, and in_this respect he is like one_having a doubt, a suspicion, or_an opinion.10 This is not acceptance or_half-belief, but a case of certainty_without clear vision. There is_not room_here to discuss the exact_nature of faith,_but clearly_theological fictionalism is_deeply in error about its nature._The argument from_the dispositional nature of belief and_faith_like acceptance, simulated_belief_in_a fictional_stance supposes that_we_play with_our_own mental state. I know that_the_monster is in fact an artefact on_the screen, but I_will_behave as if I_believed that the monster was_in front of me. When someone_cries when_looking at_a movie, and is asked, "Why do you cry, it is_only fiction?", the answer could be_that the very idea_that something_like_this could happen_is_sorrowful. And_it is not false that we are_able to_make ourselves sorrowful simply by focusing_our mind on sorrowful_ideas._So might it be in the_religious case: we make ourselves believers_by focusing on religious ideas._Such_an_account of simulated belief presupposes_what Henry H. Price called an_"occurrence Analysis of_belief ".11 to believe something is to_have_a certain occurrent mental state. In_this_case we would be able to_simulate_having_a certain mental state or_content, without actually having it. Price_distinguishes this account from a Dispositional Analysis of belief,_which maintains that_beliefs are not occurrent mental_states_but_are rather dispositions to answer a question or to behave_in a_certain way. This_means that if S believes that p, S does not_have a specific mental content but rather_has a disposition to answer "yes", when asked if p, or_the disposition to act according to the fact_that p. And in that case, how_would simulation be possible?_The_doctrine of simulated beliefs presupposes an occurrence_Analysis_of_belief._We would be_able to simulate_because we