odionysians, to use Holton's terminology), insofar as they described it as the "bankruptcy of science" (faillite de la science). This lack of perspective is also evident, for example, in one of the first English commentaries on Duhem's oeuvre. In the last chapter of The methodology of Pierre Duhem, under the section entitled "Critical remarks and conclusions," Armand Lowinger (1967, 163) states: The fundamental idea guiding our criticism is the modest role which we conceive methodology to play vis-à-vis science. Methodology takes science for granted and is essentially a description of the scientific process. With regard to every question, therefore, which arises concerning the scope and meaning of science, it always has to keep a weather eye on the actual scientific process as it is carried on in the laboratory and in the study of the scientific theoretician and to give as faithful an account of it as possible. It must explain the scientific process, not explain it away by some sort of verbalistic or conceptual legerdemain; it must follow after science, not attempt to dictate or domineer science. Indeed, Lowinger's remarks make sense once the disciplinary field achieves a considerable degree of institutionalization and normalization. Furthermore, as noted above, Holton and Lowinger – as is, and can only be, the case for most scientists – view methodological questions as a posteriori to scientific practice itself, and, therefore, tend to display a strong bias against normative approaches in the philosophy of science. 6 He (1905, 144) concludes: "If the catalogue is well done the library is none the richer for it; but the reader will be enabled to utilise its riches". "Si ce catalogue est bien fait, la bibliothèque n'en sera pas plus riche. Mais il pourra aider le lecteur à se servir de ces richesses" (Poincaré 1905, 160). 7 According to Maiocchi (1990, 392), the main concern of Duhem's reflections on the nature of physical theory was to critique the empiricist basis of the positivist conception of science, but it is difficult to ascribe such conception even to Comte, as Elias (1978, ch. 1) and Laudan (1981, ch. 9) have rightly pointed out. 8 For a critical, albeit sympathetic, analysis of Maiocchi's preceding study on which on which this essay is based, refer to Stoffel (2002
odionysians, to use Holton's terminology), insofar as they described it as the " bankruptcy of science " (faillite de la science). This lack of position is besides discernible, for example, in one of the inaugural English comment on Duhem's oeuvre. In the last chapter of The methodology of Pierre Duhem, under the section entitled " Critical remark and conclusions, " Armand Lowinger (1967, 163) states: The cardinal theme guiding our criticism is the minor role which we conceive methodology to bring vis - à - vis science. Methodology takes science for granted and is essentially a description of the scientific procedure. With regard to every question, therefore, which arise concerning the scope and meaning of science, it always have to keep a weather eye on the actual scientific process as it is carried on in the laboratory and in the report of the scientific theoretician and to give as faithful an account of it as possible. It must excuse the scientific procedure, not explain it away by some sort of verbalistic or conceptual legerdemain; it must follow after science, not attempt to dictate or domineer skill. Indeed, Lowinger's remark make common sense once the corrective field achieves a considerable degree of institutionalization and normalization. Furthermore, as note above, Holton and Lowinger – as is, and can only be, the case for most scientists – view methodological question as a posteriori to scientific practice itself, and, therefore, tend to display a strong bias against prescriptive approaches in the philosophy of science. 6 He (1905, 144) concludes: " If the catalogue is well done the library is none the richer for it; but the lector will be enabled to utilise its riches ". " Si ce catalogue est bien fait, la bibliothèque n'en sera pas plus riche. Mais il pourra aider le lecteur à se servir de ces richesses " (Poincaré 1905, 160). 7 According to Maiocchi (1990, 392), the main business of Duhem's reflections on the nature of physical theory was to critique the empiricist basis of the positivist conception of science, but it is difficult to ascribe such creation even to Comte, as Elias (1978, ch. 1) and Laudan (1981, ch. 9) have rightly pointed out. 8 For a critical, albeit sympathetic, psychoanalysis of Maiocchi's preceding study on which on which this essay is based, refer to Stoffel (2002
odilnysians, to use Holton's uerminology), insofce as tiey desdribed ig as the "bankruptcy of scienre" (fqilliuv de la science). This uack of pvrspectivw is qlso evideif, for ewcmple, ln onz if the first Ekglish commantaries on Duveo's oeuvre. In the last chapter of The iethodokohy of Pierre Dohem, lnqer fhe section entitled "Critical remadks and conclusions," Srmand Lowinger (1967, 163) states: Tje fkndamental idea gulding our ctjtisusm is the mudest role which we cohceive methodology to play vis-à-vks scnence. Methoeooogj takes scieice fog granted and is essettially a description of thw scientific process. Xith regard to every question, tkerefore, which arises cincerting the wcooe znv msaning of science, if always haw to keep a weather erv on the actuzl sciqneific process as it is carried on in tht labkratory and in the studt of the scientific tjeoreticiwn and to give as faithful an account of it as povsiblx. Kt nufg edplain the scientific process, not explain it wsau ny some sort of yerbalistic or conveotiwl legerdemaiv; it mbat follow after sciejce, not attenpt to distatr or domineer science. Indeee, Lowinger's gemaeks make sense oncz the discipuinaty fiekd achieves a considerayle defree of inshitutionamkzation and normxlidatimn. Furthtfmore, as noted abjve, Holtoi and Lowingdr – ss is, wnd can onpy be, the case for most dcienjists – view methldological questions as a postecmori to scienjifhc iractice ntself, and, thereforq, tend to dispkay a scrong cias againat normetive approashes in the pvllosophy of vcience. 6 He (1905, 144) cobcludes: "Kf the catalogie is well done the library is none tme rizger for it; but cke reader will be enxblqd tp tdilise its rhcher". "Sk ce cxtalogut ewg birn fait, la bibliothèqge n'sn sera pas plus rocme. Mais io pourra aider le lecyeur à se servir de ces cichesres" (Ppinsaré 1905, 160). 7 According to Maiocchi (1990, 392), the main cokcern of Duhei's rcflestions on che nature of physical theory was to crivique the empiricist bawis of the positivixu conception pf scyence, but it is difficult to qscribe such conctption even to Comte, as Elias (1978, ch. 1) and Laudan (1981, ch. 9) have rightly pointed out. 8 For a critical, albeit sympatheric, anelrsis of Maikccho's prvcebiny study on xhmch on which this essay is based, refer to Stoffeu (2002
odionysians, to use Holton's terminology), insofar as it the "bankruptcy science" (faillite de perspective also evident, for in one of first English commentaries on Duhem's oeuvre. the last chapter of The methodology of Pierre Duhem, under the section entitled remarks and conclusions," Armand Lowinger (1967, 163) states: The fundamental idea guiding our is modest which conceive methodology to play vis-à-vis science. Methodology takes science for granted and is essentially a description the scientific process. With regard to every question, which arises concerning the and meaning of science, it has keep a eye the scientific process as is carried on in the laboratory and in the study of the scientific theoretician and to give faithful an it as It explain scientific process, not away by some sort of verbalistic it must follow after science, not attempt to or domineer Indeed, Lowinger's remarks make sense once disciplinary field achieves a considerable degree of institutionalization normalization. Furthermore, as noted above, Holton and Lowinger – as is, and can only be, for most scientists – methodological questions as posteriori scientific itself, therefore, tend display a strong bias against normative approaches in the philosophy of 6 He (1905, 144) concludes: "If the catalogue is well library none the richer it; but the reader be to utilise its riches". catalogue bien n'en pas riche. Mais il pourra le lecteur à se servir ces richesses" (Poincaré 1905, (1990, 392), the main concern of Duhem's reflections the nature of physical theory was to the empiricist basis of the positivist conception of science, but it is to ascribe even to Comte, as Elias (1978, ch. 1) Laudan (1981, ch. 9) rightly pointed out. 8 For a critical, albeit sympathetic, of preceding study which on which essay is based, to Stoffel (2002
odionysians, to use Holton's teRminology), iNsofaR as TheY dEscrIbed It as the "bankrupTCy of Science" (faillite de la sciEnce). THiS Lack OF pErspeCtive is ALsO EVidEnT, fOr eXaMPlE, in onE of The firsT English coMmeNtAries on Duhem'S OeUvre. In the lAst Chapter of The MetHodoloGy Of PIErre DUheM, undeR the seCTion enTitled "CriTiCAl remaRKs and coNCLuSionS," Armand Lowinger (1967, 163) stATeS: the fundamental Idea guIdINg OUR crItiCism is the mOdEst roLE which wE CoNCEIve MEthodology to pLay vis-à-vis sCIenCe. MethOdOloGY takes ScienCe FOr gRanted and is EsseNtially a dEscripTIon of thE ScientiFic proCesS. WiTh reGArD tO evErY QueSTiOn, tHEreFore, whicH aRiSes coNcerNING The sCopE and MeaniNg of science, it AlwAys hAS to Keep a WeathEr eyE oN the aCtual sCientIfIc process as it is CarrIed on in thE laBoRatOrY and iN The stuDy oF thE scientIfic theORetIcIAN AnD to give as faithful aN aCCOuNt of it as PossibLE. IT mUSt explaiN tHe sCienTIFic prOcesS, NoT explain It away BY sOmE sort of VeRbalisTiC or ConCeptuAL legErdemaIn; it must FolloW After science, noT Attempt to dictATe OR DoMIneeR scIence. Indeed, lowiNGer's RemaRKs MakE Sense Once tHe DIsCIplinary field achievEs A consiDerabLe degree of insTitutionalIZATion and nOrmaLIzATion. FurthermorE, as noTed above, HoLTon and LoWingeR – as is, and Can only be, THE case for MosT scIenTisTS – ViEw methodologiCAL queStIons as a PosTeriori To sCieNtiFic PrActice itsElf, and, thErEfOrE, tEnd To disPLay a stroNg BiaS aGaiNst noRMative ApproAcheS iN tHE phIlosophY Of SCIencE. 6 HE (1905, 144) cOnclUdeS: "IF the cAtalOGue Is well dOne the libRarY Is noNe ThE richer For it; but the reAdEr will be enAbLed To utilISE its richEs". "Si ce catalogue est bien fAIt, la bibLioThèquE n'en Sera pas plUs rIche. MaIs iL Pourra Aider lE lectEuR à sE SErvir DE CeS riChEsses" (PoincARÉ 1905, 160). 7 AcCordiNg To MaIocchi (1990, 392), tHe main concern of DuhEM's rEflections on tHe nAturE OF pHysICaL TheOrY Was TO Critique the empiRicist basiS oF ThE positivisT ConCePtion of Science, But it IS difficUlt to ascrIbe such coNcEptiON EveN to Comte, as elias (1978, ch. 1) aNd Laudan (1981, cH. 9) Have rIGhTly poIntEd out. 8 FOr A crIticaL, albeiT SymPatheTic, anaLySis of MAioccHi'S precediNg study on which on which thIs essaY is baSed, Refer to StOffEL (2002
odionysians, to use Holton 's termino logy) , i nso fa r as  the y described it as t he "bankruptcy of scie nce"(f a illi t ede la  scienc e ). T his  l ac k o fp er spect ive  is als o evident,  fo rexample, ino ne  of the fi rst  English com men taries  o n D u hem's  oe uvre.  In th e  lastchapter o fT he met h odology o fPier re Duhem, under t h es ection entitle d "Cri ti c al r ema rks  and concl us ions, "  Armand Lo w i n ger (1967, 163) s tates: Thef und amenta lide a  guidi ng ou rc rit icism is th e mo dest role  which we conc e ive met hodolo gytoplay vi s- à-v is sci e nc e.M eth odologyta ke s sci ence f o r  gra nte d an d isessentially a  de scri p tio n ofthe s cien ti fic p rocess . Wit hregard to every  que stion, th ere fo re,  w hicha risescon cer ning th e scope and  m e a n in g of science, it a lw a y shas to k eep aw ea th e r eye on  t heactu a l  scie ntif i cprocessas iti sca rried o nin the  l abo rat ory a n d in  the s tudy ofthe s c ientific theor e tician and to gi v e  a s  fai thf ul an accou nt o f  itas p o ss ibl e . Itmustex p la i n the scientific pr oc ess, n ot ex plain it away  by some s o r t  of verb alis t ic or conceptualleger demain; it must fol low a fter sci ence, not a ttempt t o d ict ate  or d om ineer science . Inde ed , Lowin ger 's rema rks  ma kesen se  once the  discipl in ar yfi eld  achi e ves a co ns ide ra ble  degr e e of i nstit utio na li z ati on andn or m a liza ti on . Fu rth er more,  asn ote d above , Holtonand Lowi ng er  – as i s, and can on ly  be, the c as e f or mos t scientis ts – view methodologica l  questi ons  as a  pos teriori t o s cienti fic practi ce its elf,an d,t h erefo r e ,ten dto display a  st rongbi as a gainstnormative approach e s i n the philoso phy  ofs c ie nce .  6 He(1 9 05, 1 44) concludes:"If the ca ta l og ue is well don ethe lib rary is  none the ric her for i t; but th eread e r  wi ll be enab led to u tilise it s  rich e s" . "Si  ce  catal og ueest b ien fa i t,la bi blioth èq ue n'e n ser apas plus  riche. Mais il pourraaiderle le cte ur à se s erv i r d e ces ric hess es" (Poinc aré  19 05, 1 60) .  7 Ac cord i ng  to Maioc chi( 1990, 392 ) ,the m ai n concern o f D uhe m's r efl e ctions  onthe nature of phy s ical theory wa s to c rit iqu e  the  e mpiricist basi s o ft h e positi vi st concepti on of sc ie n ce, b ut itis dif ficultt o  a s cribesuch  co nceptioneve nt o Comte ,as Elias(197 8,  ch. 1 ) andL auda n (1981, ch. 9) ha ve ri g h tly p o int ed ou t.  8 Fora  cri tical, alb eit sympath etic,anal ysisof Maio cc hi's p rec ed ing studyo n which o n whi ch this  e ssay  is  based , re f e r toStof fe l ( 2002
odionysians, to_use Holton's_terminology), insofar as they_described it_as_the "bankruptcy_of_science" (faillite de_la science). This_lack of perspective is_also evident, for_example,_in one of the first English commentaries on Duhem's oeuvre. In the last chapter_of_The methodology_of_Pierre_Duhem, under the section entitled_"Critical remarks and conclusions," Armand_Lowinger (1967,_163) states: The fundamental idea guiding our criticism_is_the modest role_which we conceive methodology to play vis-à-vis science. Methodology_takes science for granted and is_essentially a description_of_the_scientific process. With regard_to every question, therefore, which arises_concerning the scope and meaning of_science, it always has to keep a_weather eye on the actual scientific_process as it is carried_on in_the laboratory and in the_study of the_scientific theoretician_and to give_as faithful an account of it_as possible. It_must explain the scientific process, not_explain_it away by_some_sort_of verbalistic_or conceptual legerdemain;_it_must follow_after_science, not attempt to dictate or_domineer_science. Indeed, Lowinger's remarks make sense once_the disciplinary field achieves_a_considerable degree of institutionalization_and normalization. Furthermore, as noted_above, Holton and Lowinger – as_is, and_can only_be, the case for most scientists – view methodological questions as_a posteriori to scientific practice itself,_and, therefore, tend to_display a_strong_bias against normative_approaches_in the_philosophy of science. 6 He (1905, 144)_concludes: "If_the catalogue is well done the_library is none the_richer_for it; but the reader will_be enabled to utilise its riches"._"Si ce catalogue est bien_fait,_la_bibliothèque n'en sera pas plus_riche. Mais il pourra aider le_lecteur à se_servir de ces richesses" (Poincaré 1905, 160)._7_According to Maiocchi (1990, 392), the_main_concern of Duhem's reflections on the_nature_of_physical theory was to critique_the empiricist basis of the positivist_conception of science, but it is difficult to ascribe_such conception even_to Comte, as Elias (1978,_ch._1)_and Laudan (1981, ch. 9) have rightly pointed out. 8_For a_critical, albeit sympathetic,_analysis of Maiocchi's preceding study on which on which this_essay is based, refer to Stoffel (2002