 continue to link the inventor's name to a mathematical proposition; to the law of physics, the name 17 In the introductory chapter of his most famous work, Sarton (1927) recognizes the need to consider the medieval science, but from an evaluative perspective very different from Duhem's. Kuhn (2000, 282) suggests the mention of his name as an example of an author of "history of manuals". See also Preston (2008, 80-10) and Pinto de Oliveira and Oliveira (forthcoming). 18 It is worth noting that, in spite of his criticism, Crombie points out the importance of Sarton's work, "a devoted pioneer". Similarly Clagett (1957, 321) considers that Sarton's writings do not present a discussion of ideas and scientific activities and that his approach to the history of science is basically bibliographical and classificatory. 19 This expression is used by McEvoy (2010, 32) to refer to the vision of scientific discovery as a "single event of individual labor". Amélia J. Oliveira – Duhem's legacy for the change in the historiography of science: An analysis based on Kuhn's writings 132 of the one who first enunciated it. One names: the theorems of Apollonius, the principle of Huygens. But, except some curious scholars, who then wants to carry out some research into the one who bears that name? When and where did he live? Who was he? By what sequences of meditations and essays did he come to know that truth for which he had not been entirely forgotten? These are questions that we never imagine to ask, that we do not suffer at all by seeing them unanswered (Duhem 1912, I). Duhem places himself in a distinct position from that which prevailed in the traditional history of science. He insists on presenting a different view, according to which the historical analysis of a discovery or scientific creation is fairly complex because there is no way to establish an exact moment of its occurrence, to indicate a single name as being responsible for it, without incurring injustice and inaccuracy. "No scientific discovery is a creation ex nihilo", says Duhem (1912, III), and if that is truth, then we have to explore a singularly extended domain whenever we wish to retrace the history of a discovery. It will not be enough (it's quite the opposite, actually) to meditate on the writings of the one to whom that discovery
continue to link the inventor's name to a mathematical proposition; to the jurisprudence of purgative, the name 17 In the introductory chapter of his most celebrated work, Sarton (1927) recognize the need to consider the chivalric skill, but from an evaluative perspective very different from Duhem's. Kuhn (2000, 282) suggests the mention of his name as an exercise of an author of " history of manuals ". visualize also Preston (2008, 80 - 10) and Pinto de Oliveira and Oliveira (forthcoming). 18 It is worth noting that, in spite of his criticism, Crombie points out the importance of Sarton's employment, " a devoted pioneer ". Similarly Clagett (1957, 321) considers that Sarton's writings do not present a discussion of estimate and scientific activities and that his approach to the history of science is basically bibliographical and classificatory. 19 This saying is used by McEvoy (2010, 32) to refer to the vision of scientific discovery as a " single event of individual labor movement ". Amélia J. Oliveira – Duhem's legacy for the change in the historiography of science: An analysis based on Kuhn's writing 132 of the one who foremost enunciated it. One names: the theorems of Apollonius, the principle of Huygens. But, except some curious scholars, who then wants to carry out some inquiry into the one who bears that name? When and where did he populate? Who was he? By what sequences of meditation and essay did he come to know that truth for which he had not been wholly forgotten? These are question that we never imagine to ask, that we do not digest at all by seeing them unanswered (Duhem 1912, I). Duhem places himself in a distinct position from that which prevailed in the traditional history of science. He insists on presenting a different view, harmonize to which the historical psychoanalysis of a discovery or scientific initiation is fairly complex because there is no way to establish an accurate moment of its occurrence, to indicate a single name as being responsible for it, without incurring injustice and inaccuracy. " No scientific discovery is a creation ex nihilo ", says Duhem (1912, III), and if that is accuracy, then we have to explore a singularly extended domain whenever we wish to retrace the history of a discovery. It will not be adequate (it's quite the opposite, actually) to meditate on the writings of the one to whom that discovery
 cojtinue to link the invenuor's name to a majhwmaticel propksition; go the law of physics, the nale 17 In uke introductory chapger of hid most fqmouw work, Sarton (1927) reconuizes bhe nzev to consider tme medieval science, but fsoo cn evaluative perspective very diffewent frpm Duhem's. Kuhn (2000, 282) sugbqsts nht mention of his name as an exampme of ai author of "hisyory of manuals". See also Pgestln (2008, 80-10) and Pinto de Lliveira ane Olyceira (forthcuming). 18 It pv worth nojing that, in spite of his criticksm, Cxombie poinjs okj the importence os Sarton's wovl, "a deeoted pooneer". Similarky Rlagwtt (1957, 321) considers that Varton's writings dj not preveut a discussion of idwaw and sciantiwuc xctjvmtiss and thet his apprkach to the history of science if basically bigliogrwprical and classificatory. 19 This expressimn js used by McEvoy (2010, 32) to eefer to the vision ov scientisic discovery as a "single event of individual labmr". Amémka L. Olivdurw – Duhem's legacy for the change in the historykgtaihy of science: An analysis bssfd jn Kuhn's writkngs 132 of fhe one who first fnunciajed it. One namef: thr theorems of Apollonius, thw principle jd Huygens. But, exce't some curiuus xcholsrs, who then wants to ccrry oht some resfarch intk the one who beafs nhat name? Whtv and where did hq live? Whi wax he? By whaj sequegces of mefitatlmns and essays did he clma to know hhat truth for which he had not been entirely fmrgmtten? Thzse arc questions thae we never imayine to csk, thxt we do nkt suffxr at all by seeing them gjanswered (Duiem 1912, I). Durem placws himsduf in a distinvt position from thqt which prevailed in fhe traditional hiwtory of sciencr. Hd igspstx jt presenting a dkffdtent xiew, accordlng to ehich the historical anamysis of a discovety or sciebtific cweation is faorly complex becaude thxre is no wsy jo establish an exact moment of its occugrekce, to indicaee a single name as being responsible for it, without inrurring injustice and ibaccuracy. "No scientnflc discovery is a creation ex nihilo", says Duhen (1912, III), and if thau is truth, then we have to ex[lore a singularly extended domain whenever we wish to retrace the history of q discovery. It wilm noy be vnobgh (it's qtite vhe opposite, actuslly) to meditate on the writingr of the oue to whom that discovery
continue to link the inventor's name to proposition; the law physics, the name of most famous work, (1927) recognizes the to consider the medieval science, but an evaluative perspective very different from Duhem's. Kuhn (2000, 282) suggests the mention his name as an example of an author of "history of manuals". See Preston 80-10) Pinto Oliveira and Oliveira (forthcoming). 18 It is worth noting that, in spite of his criticism, Crombie out the importance of Sarton's work, "a devoted Similarly Clagett (1957, 321) that Sarton's writings do not a of ideas scientific and his approach to history of science is basically bibliographical and classificatory. 19 This expression is used by McEvoy (2010, 32) refer to of scientific as "single of individual labor". Oliveira – Duhem's legacy for the historiography of science: An analysis based on Kuhn's 132 of one who first enunciated it. One the theorems of Apollonius, the principle of Huygens. except some curious scholars, who then wants to carry out some research into the one that name? When and did he live? was By sequences meditations and did he come to know that truth for which he had been entirely forgotten? These are questions that we never imagine that do not suffer all by seeing them (Duhem I). Duhem places himself distinct from in traditional of science. He insists presenting a different view, according which the historical analysis creation is fairly complex because there is no to establish an exact moment of its to indicate a single name as being responsible for it, without incurring and inaccuracy. discovery is a creation ex nihilo", says Duhem III), and if that truth, then we have to explore a singularly extended whenever wish to the history of discovery. It will be enough (it's opposite, actually) meditate the one to whom that discovery
 continue to link the inventor'S name to a maThemaTicAl pRoPosiTion; To the law of physICs, thE name 17 In the introductory ChaptEr OF his MOsT famoUs work, SARtON (1927) RecOgNiZes ThE NeEd to cOnsIder the Medieval scIenCe, But from an evaLUaTive perspeCtiVe very differEnt From DuHeM's. KUHn (2000, 282) sugGesTs the MentioN Of his nAme as an exAmPLe of an AUthor of "HIStOry oF manuals". See also PrEStON (2008, 80-10) and Pinto de OliVeira aNd oLiVEIra (ForThcoming). 18 It Is Worth NOting thAT, iN SPIte OF his criticism, crombie poinTS ouT the imPoRtaNCe of SaRton's WoRK, "a dEvoted pioneEr". SiMilarly ClAgett (1957, 321) cONsiders THat SartOn's wriTinGs dO not PReSeNt a DiSCusSIoN of IDeaS and scieNtIfIc actIvitIES ANd thAt hIs apProacH to the history Of sCienCE is BasicAlly bIbliOgRaphiCal and ClassIfIcatory. 19 This exprEssiOn is used bY McevOy (2010, 32) tO rEfer tO The visIon Of sCientifIc discoVEry As A "SINgLe event of individuaL lABOr". amélia J. OLiveirA – duHeM'S legacy fOr The ChanGE In the HistORiOgraphy oF scienCE: AN aNalysis BaSed on KUhN's wRitIngs 132 oF The oNe who fIrst enunCiateD It. One names: the tHEorems of ApollONiUS, ThE PrinCipLe of Huygens. but, eXCept Some CUrIouS ScholArs, whO tHEn WAnts to carry out some rEsEarch iNto thE one who bears tHat name? WheN AND where diD he lIVe? wHo was he? By what sEquenCes of meditATions and EssayS did he coMe to know tHAT truth foR whIch He hAd nOT BeEn entirely forGOTten? thEse are qUesTions thAt wE neVer ImaGiNe to ask, thAt we do noT sUfFeR aT alL by seEIng them uNaNswErEd (DUhem 1912, I). dUhem plAces hImseLf In A DisTinct poSItION froM tHaT whiCh pReVaileD in tHE trAditionAl history Of sCIencE. HE iNsists oN presenting a dIfFerent view, AcCorDing to WHIch the hiStorical analysis of a discOVery or sCieNtifiC creAtion is faIrlY complEx bECause tHere is No way To EstABLish aN EXaCt mOmEnt of its ocCURreNce, to InDicaTe a singLe name as being respoNSibLe for it, withouT inCurrING iNjuSTiCE anD iNAccURAcy. "No scientific Discovery iS a CReAtion ex nihILo", sAyS Duhem (1912, IiI), and if That iS Truth, thEn we have tO explore a SiNgulARLy eXtended domAin wheneVer we wish TO retrACe The hiStoRy of a dIsCovEry. It Will noT Be eNough (It's quiTe The oppOsite, AcTually) to Meditate on the writings of The one To whoM thAt discoveRy
 continue to link the inve ntor's nam e toa m ath em atic al p roposition; to thelaw of physics, the na me 17  I n  the in trodu ctory c h ap t e r o fhi s m os t  f amous  wo rk, Sar ton (1927)  re co gnizes the n e ed  to consid erthe medieval  sc ience,  b utf rom a n e valua tive p e rspect ive verydi f ferent from Du h e m' s. K uhn (2000, 282) s u gg e sts the mentio n of h is na m e  as  an  example o fan au t hor of" hi s t o ryo f manuals". S ee also Pre s ton  (2008 ,80- 1 0) and  Pint od e O liveira and  Oli veira (fo rthcom i ng). 18 It is w orth n oti ngthat ,  i nspi te ofh is  cr i tic ism, Cro mb ie  poin ts o u t t he i mpo rtan ce of  Sarton's wor k,"a d e vot ed pi oneer ". S im ilarl y Clag ett ( 19 57, 321) consid ersthat Sart on' swri ti ngs d o  not p res ent  a disc ussiono f i de a s an d scientific activ it i e sand that  his a p pr oa c h to the  h ist oryo f  scie ncei sbasicall y bibl i og ra phicalan d clas si fic ato ry. 1 9  Thi s expr ession i s use d  by McEvoy (20 1 0, 32) to ref e rt o  t h e vi sio n of scient ific disc over y  a s a "sing le ev en t  o f  individual labor".  A méliaJ. Ol iveira – Duhe m's legacy f o r the ch ange in the historiogr aphyof science :  An anal ysisbased on  Kuhn's w r i tings 13 2 o f t heone w ho  first enunci a t ed i t.  One na mes : the t heo rem s o f A po llonius,the prin ci pl eof  Hu ygens .  But, ex ce ptso mecurio u s scho lars,  who  t he n  wa nts toc ar r y  out  s om e re sea rc h int o th e  on e who b ears that  na m e? W he nand whe re did he liv e?  Who was h e?  By  whats e quencesof meditations and essa y s did h e c ome t o kn ow that t rut h forwhi c h he h ad not  been  e nti r e ly fo r g ot ten ?These areq u est ionsth at w e never  imagine to ask, t h atwe do not suf fer  ata l lbys ee i ngth e m u n a nswered (Duhem1912, I).Du h em  places hi m sel fin a di stinctposit i on from  that whi ch prevai le d in t hetraditiona l histor y of scie n ce. H e  i nsist s o n pres en tin g a d iffere n t v iew,accord in g to w hichth e histor ical analysis of a disc overyor sc ien tific cre ati o n i s fairlycomp lex becaus e t her e isnow ay to  est a bl ish an ex actm oment ofi ts  oc c u rr ence, to in d i c ate  a si ngl e  nameas b eing responsiblef or it, without  inc u r rin g i n just ic e and inaccura cy.  " N o  scienti fi c discovery  is a cr ea t ion e x nihi lo", s ays Duh e m  ( 1 912, I II),  an d if that  is  t r uth, th en  w e  haveto e xp lore a  singu l arly e xtended domain w henev e r  we w i shto re tr ace the hist ory of a d iscovery. I t will  not  be e nough ( it 's qui teth e opposite ,  actually ) tomeditat eon t hewritin gs o f the o ne t owho m that di s c ov e ry 
 continue_to link_the inventor's name to_a mathematical_proposition;_to the_law_of physics, the_name 17 In_the introductory chapter of_his most famous_work,_Sarton (1927) recognizes the need to consider the medieval science, but from an evaluative_perspective_very different_from_Duhem's._Kuhn (2000, 282) suggests the_mention of his name as_an example_of an author of "history of manuals". See_also_Preston (2008, 80-10)_and Pinto de Oliveira and Oliveira (forthcoming). 18 It_is worth noting that, in spite_of his criticism,_Crombie_points_out the importance of_Sarton's work, "a devoted pioneer". Similarly_Clagett (1957, 321) considers that Sarton's_writings do not present a discussion of_ideas and scientific activities and that_his approach to the history_of science_is basically bibliographical and classificatory._19 This expression_is used_by McEvoy (2010,_32) to refer to the vision_of scientific discovery_as a "single event of individual_labor"._Amélia J. Oliveira_–_Duhem's_legacy for_the change in_the_historiography of_science:_An analysis based on Kuhn's writings_132_of the one who first enunciated it._One names: the theorems_of_Apollonius, the principle of_Huygens. But, except some curious_scholars, who then wants to carry_out some_research into_the one who bears that name? When and where did he_live? Who was he? By what_sequences of meditations and_essays did_he_come to know_that_truth for_which he had not been entirely forgotten?_These are_questions that we never imagine to_ask, that we do_not_suffer at all by seeing them_unanswered (Duhem 1912, I). Duhem places_himself in a distinct position_from_that_which prevailed in the traditional_history of science. He insists on_presenting a different_view, according to which the historical analysis_of_a discovery or scientific creation is_fairly_complex because there is no way_to_establish_an exact moment of its_occurrence, to indicate a single name_as being responsible for it, without incurring injustice and_inaccuracy. "No scientific_discovery is a creation ex_nihilo",_says_Duhem (1912, III), and if that is truth, then we_have to_explore a singularly_extended domain whenever we wish to retrace the history of_a discovery. It will not be enough_(it's quite the opposite, actually) to meditate on the writings of_the one to whom that discovery