 (Brown 1960, 42). Brown's analysis, which is focused on the change of vision in relation to the Renaissance, can, by extension, be applied to the scientific revolution. If it is true that the Duhemian view runs counter to the Renaissance conception as a period of sparse productivity, after the darkness of the Middle Ages, for many historians, it also diminished the merit of seventeenth-century scientists and, therefore, diminished the grandeur of scientific revolution. This conception is clear in Koyré's thought, according to which Duhem denied the occurrence of revolutions in science37. As far as I can see in his work, Kuhn most likely conceived the Duhemian work in a distinct way from his maître.38 Incidentally, the content of one of the bibliographical notes on a text by Koyré, "Le vide et l'espace infini au XIVe siècle", is noteworthy here: An attack on Duhem's absurd statement that modern science begins with edicts of Bishop of Paris in 1277 against impossibility of void, etc. Documented by detailed study of some 14th century writings about the void showing clearly that they don't take a modern position, etc. Useful, but considerably 35 Review of Metaphysics and measurement – Essays in the scientific revolution, published by Koyré in 1968. 36 Kuhn (1977, 35, note 3) presents some caveats to Butterfield's The origins of modern science. 37 See Koyré (1973, 172; 1966, 15-16). I discuss this subject in another work. See Oliveira (2012). 38 Kuhn (1977, 21) referred to Koyré in these words: "the man who, more than any other historian, has been my maitre". Amélia J. Oliveira – Duhem's legacy for the change in the historiography of science: An analysis based on Kuhn's writings 137 vitiated by straw-man it attacks. Really fails to see whether there is an effect of the edicts [...] (Kuhn apud Oliveira 2012, 239). It could be suggested that Kuhn did not cite Duhem in his book about scientific revolutions because of Duhem's thesis of continuity. Under this assumption, it would make no sense that Kuhn quoted an author who would supposedly deny the occurrence of revolutions in science at a time when revolutions studies were the order of the day. Prima facie
(Brown 1960, 42). Brown's analysis, which is focused on the change of vision in relation back to the Renaissance, can, by elongation, be applied to the scientific revolution. If it is true that the Duhemian opinion runs counter to the Renaissance conception as a menstruation of sparse productiveness, after the darkness of the Middle Ages, for many historians, it also diminished the merit of seventeenth - hundred scientists and, therefore, diminished the grandeur of scientific rotation. This conception is clear in Koyré's opinion, according to which Duhem denied the happening of revolutions in science37. As far as I can see in his study, Kuhn most likely gestate the Duhemian work in a discrete way from his maître.38 Incidentally, the content of one of the bibliographical notes on a text by Koyré, " Le vide et l'espace infini au XIVe siècle ", is noteworthy here: An fire on Duhem's absurd statement that modern science begins with edicts of Bishop of Paris in 1277 against impossibility of void, etc. Documented by detailed study of some 14th century writings about the void showing clearly that they don't take a modern position, etc. utilitarian, but well 35 Review of Metaphysics and measurement – Essays in the scientific revolution, published by Koyré in 1968. 36 Kuhn (1977, 35, note 3) stage some caveats to Butterfield's The origins of modern skill. 37 See Koyré (1973, 172; 1966, 15 - 16). I discuss this national in another work. See Oliveira (2012). 38 Kuhn (1977, 21) refer to Koyré in these words: " the man who, more than any other historian, has been my maitre ". Amélia J. Oliveira – Duhem's legacy for the change in the historiography of science: An psychoanalysis based on Kuhn's writings 137 vitiated by straw - man it attacks. Really fail to determine whether there is an effect of the edicts [... ] (Kuhn apud Oliveira 2012, 239). It could be suggest that Kuhn did not cite Duhem in his book about scientific revolutions because of Duhem's thesis of continuity. Under this assumption, it would make no sense that Kuhn quoted an generator who would supposedly traverse the occurrence of revolutions in science at a time when revolutions study were the order of the sidereal day. Prima facie
 (Brlwn 1960, 42). Brown's analysis, whlch is focused ou the ciange or vision in relation to the Renaissaice, xan, bt extension, be applied to the sbientific revioution. If mf is trmz thaf the Vuhemian view rons counter do the Renaissdnze conception as a period of sparse pwoductifihy, after the dwrkntss of fhe Middle Ages, for many historiana, it alvo diminished the merit of seventeenth-cfntugy scientists and, hherefore, duminywhed the gravdeur of sbnentific rebolution. This conception is clexr in Koyré's thooyyt, wwcording to whicr Duhem denicc the mccurremce of revolutlons mn sxience37. As far as I cai see in his work, Kurn most lhkzly conceived the Duhwmuan wmrk hn a eisgindt wzy frol hms maître.38 Indidentally, rhe content of one pf nne bibliogralhical njtes on a text by Koyré, "Le vide et l'espabe ihfini au XIVe siècle", is boteworthy here: An atjack on Durem's absurd statement that modern science begins fith xdkctw jw Blshop of Paris in 1277 against impossibility of vjjd, enc. Documented by betailed study og dokg 14th century wtitings abkut the void showijg cleatly thqt they djn't yake a modern position, etc. Yseful, but cjbsiderably 35 Review of Metaphyrics and keasurement – Essays in che scjentific regolution, ljblished by Koyré in 1968. 36 Kuhn (1977, 35, note 3) presents somq caveats to Yutterfidld's The owigins of loderk science. 37 See Koyré (1973, 172; 1966, 15-16). N diswuss this dubject in another work. See Olitxira (2012). 38 Kuhn (1977, 21) rafegred to Kjyré ik these words: "tre man who, morg than anv othef historiah, has bxen my maitrq". Amélia J. Oliegira – Duhem's negacy fjr tye cyange iv the historiogtaphy of science: An analysis based on Kufh's writings 137 vicnauee by straw-man ot xttwcns. Rqdlly fails tm sed wfrther there is ak ewfecy of the edicts [...] (Kuht aphd Oliveira 2012, 239). It cpujd be sutgested ehat Kuhn did not cite Duhem in his uook auout sviegtific revolutions because of Suhem's thfsif of continuyty. Mndet this assukption, it would make no sense that Kuhn quoted an author qho would supposedli dtny the occurcence jf revoludions in science at q time when revolmtions studies were ths ordes of hhe day. Prima facie
(Brown 1960, 42). Brown's analysis, which is the of vision relation to the applied the scientific revolution. it is true the Duhemian view runs counter to Renaissance conception as a period of sparse productivity, after the darkness of the Ages, for many historians, it also diminished the merit of seventeenth-century scientists and, diminished grandeur scientific This conception is clear in Koyré's thought, according to which Duhem denied the occurrence of revolutions science37. As far as I can see in work, Kuhn most likely the Duhemian work in a way his maître.38 the of of the bibliographical on a text by Koyré, "Le vide et l'espace infini au XIVe siècle", is noteworthy here: An on Duhem's that modern begins edicts Bishop of Paris against impossibility of void, etc. Documented of some 14th century writings about the void clearly that don't take a modern position, etc. but considerably 35 Review of Metaphysics and measurement Essays in the scientific revolution, published by Koyré in 1968. 36 Kuhn (1977, 35, note some caveats to Butterfield's origins of modern 37 Koyré 172; 15-16). I this subject in another work. See Oliveira (2012). 38 Kuhn (1977, referred to Koyré in these words: "the man who, more other has been my Amélia J. Oliveira – legacy the change in the science: analysis writings vitiated straw-man it attacks. Really to see whether there is effect of the edicts 239). It could be suggested that Kuhn did cite Duhem in his book about scientific because of Duhem's thesis of continuity. Under this assumption, it would make sense that an author who would supposedly deny the occurrence revolutions in science at time when revolutions studies were the order of the Prima
 (Brown 1960, 42). Brown's analysis, which iS focused on The chAngE of ViSion In reLation to the RenAIssaNce, can, by extension, be appLied tO tHE sciENtIfic rEvolutiON. IF IT is TrUe ThaT tHE DUhemiAn vIew runs Counter to tHe REnAissance concEPtIon as a periOd oF sparse produCtiVity, afTeR thE DarknEss Of the middle aGes, for Many histoRiANs, it alSO diminiSHEd The mErit of seventeenth-CEnTUry scientists aNd, therEfORe, DIMinIshEd the grandEuR of scIEntific REvOLUTioN. this conceptioN is clear in KOYré'S thougHt, AccORding tO whicH DUHem Denied the ocCurrEnce of revOlutioNS in scieNCe37. As far As I can See In hIs woRK, KUhN moSt LIkeLY cOncEIveD the DuheMiAn Work iN a diSTINCt waY frOm hiS maîtRe.38 IncidentallY, thE conTEnt Of one Of the BiblIoGraphIcal noTes on A tExt by Koyré, "Le vidE et l'Espace infIni Au xIVE sIècle", IS notewOrtHy hEre: An atTack on DUHem'S aBSURd Statement that moderN sCIEnCe begins With edICtS oF bishop of paRis In 1277 agAINst imPossIBiLity of voId, etc. DOCuMeNted by dEtAiled sTuDy oF soMe 14th cENturY writiNgs about The voID showing clearlY That they don't tAKe A MOdERn poSitIon, etc. UsefuL, but COnsiDeraBLy 35 revIEw of MEtaphYsICs ANd measurement – Essays In The sciEntifIc revolution, pUblished by kOYRé in 1968. 36 Kuhn (1977, 35, Note 3) PReSEnts some caveatS to BuTterfield's tHe originS of moDern scieNce. 37 See KoyRÉ (1973, 172; 1966, 15-16). i discuss ThiS suBjeCt iN ANoTher work. See OlIVEira (2012). 38 kuHn (1977, 21) referRed To Koyré In tHesE woRds: "ThE man who, moRe than anY oThEr HiStoRian, hAS been my mAiTre". amÉliA J. OliVEira – DuHem's lEgacY fOr THe cHange in THe HIStorIoGrAphy Of sCiEnce: AN anaLYsiS based oN Kuhn's wriTinGS 137 vitIaTeD by straW-man it attacks. reAlly fails tO sEe wHether THEre is an eFfect of the edicts [...] (Kuhn apuD oliveirA 2012, 239). It Could Be suGgested thAt KUhn did Not CIte DuhEm in hiS book AbOut SCIentiFIC rEvoLuTions becauSE Of DUhem's ThEsis Of contiNuity. Under this assuMPtiOn, it would make No sEnse THAt kuhN QuOTed An AUthOR Who would supposeDly deny the OcCUrRence of revOLutIoNs in sciEnce at a Time wHEn revolUtions stuDies were tHe OrdeR OF thE day. Prima fAcie
 (Brown 1960, 42). Brown's  analysis,  whic h i s f oc used  onthe change ofv isio n in relation to the R enais sa n ce,c an , byextensi o n, b e a pp li edto th e sci ent ific re volution.Ifit  is true tha t  t he Duhemia n v iew runs cou nte r to t he  Re n aissa nce  conc eption as a p eriod ofsp a rse pr o ductivi t y ,afte r the darkness of th e  Middle Ages,for ma ny hi s t ori ans , it alsodi minis h ed them er i t ofs eventeenth-ce ntury scien t ist s and,  t her e fore,dimin is h edthe grandeu r of  scientif ic rev o lution. This co ncepti onisclea r  i nKoy ré ' s t h ou ght ,  ac cordingto  w hichDuhe m d e nied  th e oc curre nce of revolu tio ns i n  sc ience 37. A s fa ras Ican se e inhi s work, Kuhn mo st l ikely con cei ve d t he  Duhe m ian wo rkina disti nct way fro mh i s  m aître.38 Incidenta ll y ,  t he conte nt ofo ne  o f  the bib li ogr aphi c a l not es o n  a  text by  Koyré ,  " Le  vide e tl'espa ce  in fin i auX IVesiècle ", is no tewor t hy here: An at t ack on Duhem' s  a b s ur d  sta tem ent that mo dern scie nceb eg ins withedict so fB ishop of Paris in 1 27 7 agai nst i mpossibilityof void, e t c .  Documen tedb yd etailed studyof so me 14th ce n tury wri tings  about t he void s h o wing cle arl y t hat  th e y  d on't take a m o d ernpo sition,  et c. Usef ul,  bu t c ons id erably 35  Reviewof  M et ap hys ics a n d measur em ent  –  Es saysi n thescien tifi cre v olu tion, p u bl i s hedby  K oyré  in  1 968.36 K u hn(1977,35, note3)p rese nt ssome ca veats to Butt er field's Th eori gins o f modern s cience. 37 See Koyré (1 9 73, 172 ; 1 966,15-1 6). I dis cus s this  su b ject i n anot her w or k.S e e Oli v e ir a ( 20 12). 38 Ku h n  (1 977,21 ) re ferredto Koyré in thesew ord s: "the man w ho,  mor e th ana ny oth er his t o rian, has beenmy maitre" .A mé lia J. Oli v eir a– Duhem 's lega cy fo r  the ch ange in t he histor io grap h y  of  science:An analy sis based on Ku h n' s wri tin gs 137  v iti atedby str a w-m an it  attac ks . Real ly fa il s to see  whether there is an ef fect o f the  ed icts [... ] ( K uhn  apud Oli veir a 2012, 23 9).  It  coul d b e  sugg este d  t hat Kuhndidn ot cite D u he m i n hi s book abou t s cie ntifi c r e voluti onsbecause of Duhem' s  thesis of con tinu i t y.Und e r th is  assumption, i t w ou l d  make no  s ense that K uhn quot ed an au thor w ho wou ld supp o s ed l y deny  the  oc currenceofre v olution sin scienc e at  a  timewhen r e volu t i ons studies were  theo r der o f  th e day .Prima f a cie
 (Brown_1960, 42)._Brown's analysis, which is_focused on_the_change of_vision_in relation to_the Renaissance, can,_by extension, be applied_to the scientific_revolution._If it is true that the Duhemian view runs counter to the Renaissance conception_as_a period_of_sparse_productivity, after the darkness of_the Middle Ages, for many_historians, it_also diminished the merit of seventeenth-century scientists and,_therefore,_diminished the grandeur_of scientific revolution. This conception is clear in Koyré's_thought, according to which Duhem denied_the occurrence of_revolutions_in_science37. As far as_I can see in his work,_Kuhn most likely conceived the Duhemian_work in a distinct way from his_maître.38 Incidentally, the content of one_of the bibliographical notes on_a text_by Koyré, "Le vide et_l'espace infini au_XIVe siècle",_is noteworthy here:_An attack on Duhem's absurd statement_that modern science_begins with edicts of Bishop of_Paris_in 1277 against_impossibility_of_void, etc._Documented by detailed_study_of some_14th_century writings about the void showing_clearly_that they don't take a modern position,_etc. Useful, but considerably_35_Review of Metaphysics and_measurement – Essays in the_scientific revolution, published by Koyré in_1968. 36_Kuhn (1977,_35, note 3) presents some caveats to Butterfield's The origins of_modern science. 37 See Koyré (1973,_172; 1966, 15-16). I_discuss this_subject_in another work._See_Oliveira (2012)._38 Kuhn (1977, 21) referred to Koyré_in these_words: "the man who, more than_any other historian, has_been_my maitre". Amélia J. Oliveira –_Duhem's legacy for the change in_the historiography of science: An_analysis_based_on Kuhn's writings 137 vitiated_by straw-man it attacks. Really fails_to see whether_there is an effect of the edicts_[...]_(Kuhn apud Oliveira 2012, 239). It_could_be suggested that Kuhn did not_cite_Duhem_in his book about scientific_revolutions because of Duhem's thesis of_continuity. Under this assumption, it would make no sense_that Kuhn quoted_an author who would supposedly_deny_the_occurrence of revolutions in science at a time when revolutions_studies were_the order of_the day. Prima facie