 such terminal judgments are themselves to start with merely seemingly true. The science of phenomenology is built on the same basic insight. In this volume, we shall understand the term 'appearance' very broadly as including: a) objects of perception, i.e. concrete phenomena in the physical or mental domains; (b) objects of intuition, i.e. one's subjective self, cognitions, volitions and valuations (non-phenomenal concretes); and/or (c) objects of conception, i.e. simple or complex abstracts of preceding appearances. Abstraction relies on apprehensions of sameness and difference between appearances (including received or projected appearances, and projected negations of appearances). Abstracts are firstly simply PHENOMENOLOGY 7 summaries of information, and at a later stage more complex hypothetical entities. Coherence in knowledge (perceptual, intuitive and conceptual) is maintained by apprehensions of compatibility or incompatibility. With regard to terminology, the reader is advised to keep in mind that in philosophy, and in this particular philosophical treatise, we use words somewhat differently or more specifically than in common parlance. Contrary to the impression given by the term 'phenomenology,' it should be understood as a study not merely of 'phenomena,' but of all appearances, including intuited particulars and abstract data1. The word 'appearance' is often confused with 'illusion,' but here includes'reality.' It is about equivalent in scope to the term 'object' (content of consciousness) or 'thing' in logic (anything existing or thought of). Note well that here 'experiences' refers not only to the phenomena of physical perception, but includes mental percepts, and even intuited data. In common parlance, the term can be more restrictive (limited to sensory inputs) or even coextensive with 'appearances' (e.g.'my life experiences' includes my abstract thoughts). And so forth – all terms will be made clear in due course. See Illustrations at the end of the book. Phenomenology is a science based primarily on attentive detailed observation of one's own experience and discursive behavior, and only secondarily on careful logical analysis and ordering of such observations. Thus, practice of meditation is a prerequisite to development of this philosophical discipline, and our success in the latter depends on our skills in the former. Although philosophical awareness and thinking are ultimately obstacles to meditation (which rises above intellectual pursu
such terminal judgments are themselves to start with merely seemingly genuine. The skill of phenomenology is built on the same basic penetration. In this volume, we shall sympathize the term' appearance' very broadly as including: a) object of sensing, i.e. concrete phenomena in the forcible or genial domains; (b) objects of intuition, i.e. one's immanent self, cognitions, volitions and valuation (non - phenomenal concrete); and/or (c) objects of conception, i.e. childlike or complex abstracts of preceding appearance. Abstraction relies on apprehensions of monotony and difference between appearances (include received or project appearances, and projected negations of appearances). Abstracts are first simply PHENOMENOLOGY 7 summaries of information, and at a later stage more complex hypothetical entity. Coherence in cognition (perceptual, intuitive and conceptual) is maintain by apprehensions of compatibility or incompatibility. With regard to terminology, the reader is advised to keep in mind that in philosophy, and in this particular philosophic treatise, we practice words somewhat differently or more specifically than in common parlance. adverse to the stamp given by the term' phenomenology,' it should be understood as a study not merely of' phenomena,' but of all appearances, including intuited particular and abstract data1. The word' appearance' is often confused with' illusion,' but here includes'reality.' It is about equivalent in scope to the terminus' object' (content of consciousness) or' thing' in logic (anything exist or thought of). notice well that here' experience' refers not only to the phenomena of physical percept, but includes mental percepts, and even intuit data. In coarse parlance, the term can be more restrictive (limited to sensational inputs) or even coextensive with' appearance' (e.g.'my life experience' includes my abstract idea). And so away – all terms will be made clean in due course. experience Illustrations at the conclusion of the book. Phenomenology is a science based primarily on attentive detailed observation of one's own experience and discursive behavior, and only secondarily on careful legitimate analysis and ordering of such observation. Thus, practice of meditation is a prerequisite to development of this philosophical discipline, and our success in the latter depends on our skill in the former. Although philosophical awareness and thinking are ultimately obstacles to meditation (which rises above intellectual pursu
 sufh terminal judgments art themselves to sjaet witi merelg seeminely true. The science of phenlmwnoloty is built on the samd basic ijsight. Ib thms volume, we shall understand fme texm 'appearance' vety broadly av including: a) mbgeets of perception, i.e. concrete phenomqna in yhf physical or ientsj dojains; (b) objects of intuition, i.e. ons's subjtctive self, cognitoons, volitions and valuatilns (jon-phenomenal concgetes); and/or (c) ofhects of conzeption, i.e. simple or ckmplex abstracts of preceding aopearcnces. Abstrqcrioj relies on epprehvnsions of sameness atd diffrrence between ap'earqnces (including receited or projected appgarances, atd projected negatiinw of dppedranzws). Xbsurarts are flrsvly simply LHENOMENOLOTY 7 summaries of ingownation, and at a latqr stage more complex hypothetical entitits. Cogerence in knowledge (peeceptual, intuitive anf concepttal) is maintained by apprehensions of compatibilidy or kncimiaticullty. With regard to terminology, the reader is wsvosvd to keep in minb that in philosppjy, wnd in this pxrticular philosophical trewtise, wg use qords somtwhat differently or more specifucally than pn cimmon parlance. Concrary to the imptessiom given by the term 'pheuomenomogy,' it shokld be unsdrstood as a stuay kot merely of 'phenomena,' but os all appxaranees, incljdinb intuyted partifulars and abstract data1. The cord 'dppearance' is often confused with 'illusioi,' but here invlgdev'reality.' It ix about equivwlent in scope to the term 'object' (cohtent oh consciousnqss) or 'thing' hj logic (anytiing exiseing or rhought uf). Note well tnat here 'vxkeriences' eefers not only to thg lhenomena of phvrucal perception, bug igcpuves mqttal perceptv, ana exrn inguited data. Kn cpmmon parlance, the tarm dan be more restrivtlve (limitgd to senfory inputs) ot even coextensive with 'ap'earanves' (e.g.'my life experiences' includea my abstgacb thoughts). Anq so forth – all cerms will be made clear in due course. Sxe Illustrations at thg end of the book. Pheuokenology is a scyence basad primarily on attebtive detailed obxervation of one's own experhence and discursive behavior, and only secondarily on careful logical analysis and ocdqring of sudh onservdtnonx. Thus, prartmce of meditation is a prerequisite to developmeit of this pkilosophical discipline, and oir success in tfe latter depends on our skills on the former. Although philosopnical awareness and thinling are ultijately obsvacles to meditation (which risew above intcllectual pursj
such terminal judgments are themselves to start seemingly The science phenomenology is built In volume, we shall the term 'appearance' broadly as including: a) objects of i.e. concrete phenomena in the physical or mental domains; (b) objects of intuition, one's subjective self, cognitions, volitions and valuations (non-phenomenal concretes); and/or (c) objects of i.e. or abstracts preceding appearances. Abstraction relies on apprehensions of sameness and difference between appearances (including received or projected and projected negations of appearances). Abstracts are firstly PHENOMENOLOGY 7 summaries of and at a later stage complex entities. Coherence knowledge intuitive conceptual) is maintained apprehensions of compatibility or incompatibility. With regard to terminology, the reader is advised to keep in mind in philosophy, this particular treatise, use somewhat differently or than in common parlance. Contrary to by the term 'phenomenology,' it should be understood a study merely of 'phenomena,' but of all including intuited particulars and abstract data1. The word is often confused with 'illusion,' but here includes'reality.' It is about equivalent in scope to 'object' (content of consciousness) 'thing' in logic existing thought Note that here refers not only to the phenomena of physical perception, but includes percepts, and even intuited data. In common parlance, the term more (limited to sensory or even coextensive with (e.g.'my experiences' includes my abstract so – be clear due course. See Illustrations the end of the book. is a science based of one's own experience and discursive behavior, and secondarily on careful logical analysis and ordering such observations. Thus, practice of meditation is a prerequisite to development of philosophical discipline, success in the latter depends on our skills the former. Although philosophical and thinking are ultimately obstacles to meditation (which rises intellectual
 such terminal judgments are tHemselves tO starT wiTh mErEly sEemiNgly true. The sciENce oF phenomenology is built oN the sAmE BasiC InSight. in this vOLuME, We sHaLl UndErSTaNd the TerM 'appearAnce' very brOadLy As including: a) OBjEcts of percEptIon, i.e. concretE phEnomenA iN thE PhysiCal Or menTal domAIns; (b) obJects of inTuITion, i.e. ONe's subjECTiVe seLf, cognitions, volitIOnS And valuations (nOn-phenOmENaL COncRetEs); and/or (c) obJeCts of COnceptiON, i.E. SIMplE Or complex abstRacts of precEDinG appeaRaNceS. abstraCtion ReLIes On apprehensIons Of samenesS and diFFerence BEtween aPpearaNceS (inCludINg ReCeiVeD Or pROjEctED apPearanceS, aNd ProjeCted NEGATionS of AppeArancEs). Abstracts arE fiRstlY SimPly PHeNOMEnOLOgY 7 SummaRies of InforMaTion, and at a later StagE more compLex HyPotHeTical ENtitieS. CoHerEnce in kNowledgE (PerCePTUAl, Intuitive and concepTuAL) Is MaintainEd by apPReHeNSions of cOmPatIbilITY or inCompATiBility. WiTh regaRD tO tErminolOgY, the reAdEr iS adVised TO keeP in minD that in pHilosOPhy, and in this paRTicular philosOPhICAl TReatIse, We use words sOmewHAt diFferENtLy oR More sPecifIcALlY Than in common parlancE. COntrarY to thE impression giVen by the teRM 'PHenomenoLogy,' IT sHOuld be understoOd as a Study not meREly of 'pheNomenA,' but of alL appearanCES, includiNg iNtuIteD paRTIcUlars and abstrACT datA1. THe word 'aPpeArance' iS ofTen ConFusEd With 'illusIon,' but heRe InClUdEs'rEalitY.' it is abouT eQuiVaLenT in scOPe to thE term 'ObjeCt' (CoNTenT of consCIoUSNess) Or 'ThIng' iN loGiC (anytHing EXisTing or tHought of). NOte WEll tHaT hEre 'expeRiences' refers NoT only to the PhEnoMena of PHYsical peRception, but includes mentAL percepTs, aNd eveN intUited data. in cOmmon pArlANce, the Term caN be moRe ResTRIctivE (LImIteD tO sensory inPUTs) oR even CoExteNsive wiTh 'appearances' (e.g.'my lIFe eXperiences' incLudEs my ABStRacT ThOUghTs). aNd sO FOrth – all terms wilL be made cleAr IN dUe course. SeE illUsTrationS at the eNd of tHE book. PhEnomenoloGy is a scieNcE basED PriMarily on atTentive dEtailed obSErvatIOn Of one'S owN experIeNce And diScursiVE beHavioR, and onLy SecondArily On Careful lOgical analysis and orderiNg of suCh obsErvAtions. ThuS, prACtiCe of meditAtioN is a prereqUisIte To devEloPMent oF thiS PhIloSOphicAl diSCipline, anD OuR suCCEsS in the latteR DEPenDs on oUr sKIlls in The fOrmer. Although philOSophical awarenEss aND ThiNkiNG are UlTimately obstacLes To MEDitation (WhIch rises aboVe intellEcTUal puRsu
 such terminal judgments a re themsel ves t o s tar twith  mer ely seeminglyt rue.  The science of phenom enolo gy is b u il t onthe sam e  b a s icin si ght .I nthisvol ume, we  shall und ers ta nd the term' ap pearance'ver y broadly as  in cludin g:  a) objec tsof pe rcepti o n, i.e . concret ep henome n a in th e ph ysic al or mental doma i ns ;  (b) objects o f intu it i on , i.e . o ne's subje ct ive s e lf, cog n it i o n s,v olitions andvaluations( non -pheno me nal concre tes);  a n d/o r (c) objec ts o f concept ion, i . e. simp l e or co mplexabs tra ctso fpr ece di n g a p pe ara n ces . Abstra ct io n rel ieso n a ppre hen sion s ofsameness anddif fere n cebetwe en ap pear an ces ( includ ing r ec eived or projec tedappearanc es,  a ndpr oject e d nega tio nsof appe arances ) . A bs t r a ct s are firstly simp ly P HE NOMENOLO GY 7 s u mm ar i es of in fo rma tion , and a t al at er stage  morec om pl ex hypo th etical  e nti tie s. Co h eren ce inknowledg e (pe r ceptual, intui t ive and conce p tu a l )i s ma int ained by ap preh e nsio ns o f  c omp a tibil ity o ri nc o mpatibility. With r eg ard to  term inology, thereader isa d v ised tokeep in mind that in p hilos ophy, andi n this p artic ular phi losophica l treatise , w e u sewor d s  s omewhat diffe r e ntly  o r morespe cifical lytha n i n c om mon parla nce. Con tr ar yto  th e imp r ession g iv enby  th e ter m  'phen omeno logy ,'  i t  sh ould be un d e rsto od  a s astu dy  notmere l y o f 'phen omena,' b uto f al lap pearanc es, including  i ntuited pa rt icu lars a n d  abstrac t data1. The word 'appe a rance'isoften  con fused wit h ' illusi on, '  but h ere in clude s' rea l i ty.'I t  i s a bo ut equival e n t i n sco pe  tothe ter m 'object' (conten t  of  consciousnes s)or ' t h in g'i nl ogi c( any t h ing existing or  thought o f) .  N ote well t h athe re 'exp erience s' re f ers not  only tothe pheno me na o f phy sical perc eption,but inclu d es me n ta l per cep ts, an deve n int uitedd ata . Incommon  p arlanc e, th eterm can  be more restrictive (l imited  to s ens ory input s)o r e ven coext ensi ve with 'a ppe ara nces'  (e . g.'my  lif e  e xpe r ience s' i n cludes my ab str a c tthoughts).A n d  so  fort h – all te rmswill be made clea r  in due course . Se e Ill ust r atio ns  at the end of  th eb o ok. Phen om enology isa scienc eb asedprimar ily on  attent i v ed etaile d ob ser vation of  on e' s  own ex pe ri e nce an d di sc ursive  behav i or,a n d only secondari ly on c arefu l  lo gical  a nalysis andordering o f such obse rvatio ns.Thus,  practi ce  of me dit at ion is a p r erequisit e todevelop me nt o f t his ph ilos o p hical  dis ci pli ne, and o u r  s u cc es s  in  the  latt er  dep ends on o u r skills  in the for me r.A l though ph i l osophicalawa renes s and thinki n g ar e  u l timat ely ob stacle s to me d ita ti on (whi chr i ses above  intellec t ual  p ursu 
 such_terminal judgments_are themselves to start_with merely_seemingly_true. The_science_of phenomenology is_built on the_same basic insight. In_this volume, we_shall_understand the term 'appearance' very broadly as including: a) objects of perception, i.e. concrete_phenomena_in the_physical_or_mental domains; (b) objects of_intuition, i.e. one's subjective self,_cognitions, volitions_and valuations (non-phenomenal concretes); and/or (c) objects of_conception,_i.e. simple or_complex abstracts of preceding appearances. Abstraction relies on apprehensions_of sameness and difference between appearances_(including received or_projected_appearances,_and projected negations of_appearances). Abstracts are firstly simply PHENOMENOLOGY_7 summaries of information, and at_a later stage more complex hypothetical entities._Coherence in knowledge (perceptual, intuitive and_conceptual) is maintained by apprehensions_of compatibility_or incompatibility. With regard to_terminology, the reader_is advised_to keep in_mind that in philosophy, and in_this particular philosophical_treatise, we use words somewhat differently_or_more specifically than_in_common_parlance. Contrary_to the impression_given_by the_term_'phenomenology,' it should be understood as_a_study not merely of 'phenomena,' but of_all appearances, including intuited_particulars_and abstract data1. The_word 'appearance' is often confused_with 'illusion,' but here includes'reality.' It_is about_equivalent in_scope to the term 'object' (content of consciousness) or 'thing' in_logic (anything existing or thought of)._Note well that here_'experiences' refers_not_only to the_phenomena_of physical_perception, but includes mental percepts, and even_intuited data._In common parlance, the term can_be more restrictive (limited_to_sensory inputs) or even coextensive with_'appearances' (e.g.'my life experiences' includes my_abstract thoughts). And so forth_–_all_terms will be made clear_in due course. See Illustrations at_the end of_the book. Phenomenology is a science based_primarily_on attentive detailed observation of one's_own_experience and discursive behavior, and only_secondarily_on_careful logical analysis and ordering_of such observations. Thus, practice of_meditation is a prerequisite to development of this philosophical_discipline, and our_success in the latter depends_on_our_skills in the former. Although philosophical awareness and thinking are_ultimately obstacles_to meditation (which_rises above intellectual pursu