. There are two dangers that the objector will highlight. The first is normative. Religious disagreement, she will say, is likely to furnish counterevidence that threatens the epistemic status of your religious or auxiliary beliefs. Indeed, McKim endorses something like the epistemic-potential claim, yet draws from it a pessimistic conclusion about the epistemic status of religious beliefs: because much of the evidence provided by disagreement speaks against one's religious view, religious beliefs are unjustified unless held tentatively (2012, 155-156). And tentative belief, the objector will note, is not committed belief. So it would seem that engaging in religious disagreement will force a choice between the believer's epistemic status and his epistemic commitment. But this worry can be dismissed. The epistemic-potential claim entails nothing about epistemic justification or any other kind of epistemic status. It is compatible with an evidentialist view, according to which positive epistemic status requires respecting your evidence, or a fideist view, on which positive status can tolerate a measure of belief 'beyond' your evidence (James, 1921; Bishop, 2007, 107-112). More than this, even evidentialism need not threaten the epistemic status of religious beliefs in light of disagreement. For evidentialism is a general claim, and there are many ways in which it can be spelled out (Dougherty, 2014, 101). For example, the evidentialist epistemologies of Plantinga (2000a) and Dougherty (2014) assign a large role to the evidence of one's own experiences (including religious ones) and to the beliefs of one's religious tradition, over and above the evidence of intersubjective arguments; this will tend to allow religious beliefs to remain justified even given the counterevidence supplied by disagreeing interlocutors. On the other hand, the evidentialisms of Schellenberg (2007, 190), McKim (2001, chapter 10), and Philipse (2014, part I) assign greater weight to intersubjective evidence (including the opposing viewpoints of disagreeing interlocutors), which may make positive epistemic status for religious beliefs more elusive. So it is not McKim's endorsement of the epistemic-potential claim that yields his pessimism about the epistemic justification of religious beliefs; it is the strict form of evidentialism that he endorses alongside it. The epistemic-potential claim by itself entails no position on epistemic justification or status more broadly. It does not matter for my purposes which epist
. There are two dangers that the objector will highlight. The inaugural is prescriptive. Religious disagreement, she will say, is probable to furnish counterevidence that threaten the epistemic status of your religious or accessory impression. Indeed, McKim endorses something like the epistemic - likely title, yet draws from it a pessimistic termination about the epistemic status of religious beliefs: because much of the evidence provide by discrepancy speaks against one's religious view, religious belief are unjustified unless held tentatively (2012, 155 - 156). And probationary belief, the objector will note, is not entrust belief. So it would seem that engaging in religious discrepancy will force a option between the believer's epistemic status and his epistemic commitment. But this worry can be dismissed. The epistemic - likely claim entails nothing about epistemic justification or any other kind of epistemic status. It is compatible with an evidentialist view, according to which positive epistemic status requires respecting your evidence, or a fideist view, on which positive status can tolerate a measure of belief' beyond' your evidence (James, 1921; Bishop, 2007, 107 - 112). More than this, even evidentialism need not threaten the epistemic condition of religious belief in light of discrepancy. For evidentialism is a cosmopolitan claim, and there are many ways in which it can be spelled out (Dougherty, 2014, 101). For case, the evidentialist epistemologies of Plantinga (2000a) and Dougherty (2014) assign a large role to the evidence of one's own experience (including religious ones) and to the beliefs of one's religious tradition, over and above the evidence of intersubjective arguments; this will tend to leave religious beliefs to remain justified even given the counterevidence supplied by disagreeing interlocutors. On the early bridge player, the evidentialisms of Schellenberg (2007, 190), McKim (2001, chapter 10), and Philipse (2014, part I) assign greater system of weights to intersubjective evidence (including the opposing viewpoints of disagree interlocutors), which may make positive epistemic status for religious impression more elusive. then it is not McKim's endorsement of the epistemic - potential title that yields his pessimism about the epistemic justification of religious belief; it is the strict phase of evidentialism that he endorses alongside it. The epistemic - likely claim by itself entails no position on epistemic justification or condition more broadly. It does not matter for my purposes which epist
. Thfre are two dangers that the objector wnol higilight. Fhe firsg is normative. Religious disegrewment, she will say, is likelh to furnpsh countwrevmdence that threefens thc epiabemic wtatus of your religious or auxiliary teuizfs. Indeed, McKim endorses something jike thr fpistemic-potenjial blwim, gvt draws from it a pessimistic doncluspon about the epixtemic status of religious bellefs: because much lf the evidghce provided by aisagreement speaks agzinst one's religious view, religkous yeliefs are ubjudjified unlesw helq tentativeln (2012, 155-156). And tentatove belief, the oboectir will note, is not cmmmitted belief. So it would szem that engaging in eeoigioos divagrdwmevt sikl force a rhoice betwsen the beluever's epistemic ststtw and his epiatemic cjmmitment. But this worry can be dismisstd. Ths epistemic-potential clqim entails nothing ahout episeemic justification or any other kind of epistemiw stavur. Iu lf xolpatible with an evidentialist view, according fo wmich positive eplstemic status reqiigex respecting yuur evnsehce, or a fideist vlew, on rhich positive stayus can tolerate a measure if belief 'bejond' your evidence (Jamzs, 1921; Bishop, 2007, 107-112). Morg than this, even evidentialiso nesd not threwten the soistemic status uf gelicious beliefs in light of qisagreemxnt. Fpr eviddntislism ys a generwl claim, and there are mwny wcys it which it can be spelled out (Dougherty, 2014, 101). For example, tne evpdentialift eplstemologies of Plantinga (2000a) aud Doughzrty (2014) xssign a lzrge rone to the edidence of ona'd own experixnces (incjudibg rwligiour ones) and to tne beliefs of one's eeligious traditiok, ovet znd above the erndtnxe of intersubkecgivq wrjumenev; this will dend to sllow religious nelkefs to remain justified eveh given the counteteyidence sopplied br disagreeing interlocutors. On uhe otier haid, the evydentialisms of Schellenberg (2007, 190), McKim (2001, cjapber 10), and Philypse (2014, part I) assngn greater weight to intersubjective evmdence (including the okposing viewpoints of cisagreeing intewlocutors), which may make posirive epistemic ststus for religious bemiefs kore flusive. So it is not McKim's endorsement of the epistemic-potential claim tyat yixlqs his pessjmisk abolt che epistqmic oustification of geligious beliefs; it is the strirt form of eridentialism that he endorses auongside it. Tfe epistemic-potential clzim by iyself entails no position on epostemic justification or status nore groadlj. Iv does not matter fot my pbrposew which epidt
. There are two dangers that the highlight. first is Religious disagreement, she furnish that threatens the status of your or auxiliary beliefs. Indeed, McKim endorses like the epistemic-potential claim, yet draws from it a pessimistic conclusion about the status of religious beliefs: because much of the evidence provided by disagreement speaks one's view, beliefs unjustified unless held tentatively (2012, 155-156). And tentative belief, the objector will note, is not committed So it would seem that engaging in religious will force a choice the believer's epistemic status and epistemic But this can dismissed. epistemic-potential claim entails about epistemic justification or any other kind of epistemic status. It is compatible with an evidentialist view, to which status requires your or fideist view, on status can tolerate a measure of evidence (James, 1921; Bishop, 2007, 107-112). More than even evidentialism not threaten the epistemic status of beliefs in light of disagreement. For evidentialism is general claim, and there are many ways in which it can be spelled out (Dougherty, For example, the evidentialist of Plantinga (2000a) Dougherty assign large to the of one's own experiences (including religious ones) and to the beliefs one's religious tradition, over and above the evidence of intersubjective will to allow religious to remain justified even the supplied by disagreeing interlocutors. other the (2007, McKim chapter 10), and Philipse part I) assign greater weight intersubjective evidence (including the which may make positive epistemic status for religious more elusive. So it is not McKim's of the epistemic-potential claim that yields his pessimism about the epistemic justification religious beliefs; the strict form of evidentialism that he endorses it. The epistemic-potential claim itself entails no position on epistemic justification or status broadly. does not for my purposes epist
. There are two dangers that the Objector wiLl higHliGht. thE firSt is Normative. ReligIOus dIsagreement, she will say, iS likeLy TO furNIsH counTerevidENcE THat ThReAteNs THe EpistEmiC status Of your reliGioUs Or auxiliary bELiEfs. Indeed, MCKiM endorses somEthIng likE tHe ePIstemIc-pOtentIal claIM, yet drAws from it A pESsimisTIc conclUSIoN aboUt the epistemic staTUs OF religious beliEfs: becAuSE mUCH of The Evidence prOvIded bY DisagreEMeNT SPeaKS against one's rEligious vieW, RelIgious BeLieFS are unJustiFiED unLess held tenTatiVely (2012, 155-156). And teNtativE Belief, tHE objectOr will NotE, is Not cOMmItTed BeLIef. sO iT woULd sEem that eNgAgIng in ReliGIOUS disAgrEemeNt wilL force a choice BetWeen THe bElievEr's epIsteMiC statUs and hIs epiStEmic commitment. BUt thIs worry caN be DiSmiSsEd. The EPistemIc-pOteNtial clAim entaILs nOtHING aBout epistemic justiFiCATiOn or any oTher kiND oF ePIstemic sTaTus. it is COMpatiBle wITh An evidenTialisT ViEw, AccordiNg To whicH pOsiTivE episTEmic Status Requires RespeCTing your evidenCE, or a fideist viEW, oN WHiCH posItiVe status can ToleRAte a MeasURe Of bELief 'bEyond' YoUR eVIdence (James, 1921; Bishop, 2007, 107-112). MoRe Than thIs, eveN evidentialisM need not thREATen the epIsteMIc STatus of religioUs belIefs in lighT Of disagrEemenT. For evidEntialism IS A general ClaIm, aNd tHerE ARe Many ways in whiCH It caN bE spelleD ouT (DougheRty, 2014, 101). for ExaMplE, tHe evidentIalist epIsTeMoLoGieS of PlANtinga (2000a) aNd douGhErtY (2014) assiGN a largE role To thE eViDEncE of one's OWn EXPeriEnCeS (incLudInG reliGiouS OneS) and to tHe beliefs Of oNE's reLiGiOus tradItion, over and aBoVe the evideNcE of IntersUBJective aRguments; this will tend to aLLow reliGioUs belIefs To remain jUstIfied eVen GIven thE countEreviDeNce SUPplieD BY dIsaGrEeing interLOCutOrs. On ThE othEr hand, tHe evidentialisms of sCheLlenberg (2007, 190), McKim (2001, ChaPter 10), AND PHilIPsE (2014, ParT I) ASsiGN Greater weight to IntersubjeCtIVe Evidence (inCLudInG the oppOsing viEwpoiNTs of disAgreeing iNterlocutOrS), whiCH May Make positiVe episteMic status FOr relIGiOus beLieFs more ElUsiVe. So iT is not mCKiM's endOrsemeNt Of the ePisteMiC-potentiAl claim that yields his pesSimism About The Epistemic JusTIfiCation of rEligIous beliefS; it Is tHe strIct FOrm of EvidENtIalISm thaT he eNDorses aloNGsIde IT. thE epistemic-pOTENtiAl claIm bY Itself EntaIls no position on epIStemic justificAtioN OR stAtuS More BrOadly. It does not MatTeR FOr my purpOsEs which episT
. There are two dangers th at the obj ector  wi llhi ghli ght.  The first isn orma tive. Religious disagr eemen t, shew il l say , is li k el y tofu rn ish  c o un terev ide nce tha t threaten s t he  epistemic s t at us of your  re ligious or a uxi liarybe lie f s. In dee d, Mc Kim en d orsessomething  l i ke the epistem i c -p oten tial claim, yet d r aw s  from it a pes simist ic co n c lus ion  about the  e piste m ic stat u so f rel i gious beliefs : because m u chof the  e vid e nce pr ovide db y d isagreement  spe aks again st one ' s relig i ous vie w, rel igi ous  bel i ef sare  u n jus t if ied unl ess held  t en tativ ely( 2 0 1 2, 1 55- 156) . And  tentative be lie f, t h e o bject or wi ll n ot e, is  not c ommit te d belief. So it  wou ld seem t hat  e nga gi ng in religi ous  di sagreem ent wil l  fo rc e a  c hoice between thebe l i ev er's epi stemic st at u s and hi sepi stem i c  comm itme n t.  But thi s worr y  c an  be dis mi ssed.Th e e pis temic - pote ntialclaim en tails nothing aboute pistemic just i fi c a ti o n or  an y other kin d of epis temi c  s tat u s. It  is c om p at i ble with an evident ia list v iew,according towhich posi t i v e episte mics ta t us requires re spect ing your e v idence,or afideistview, onw h ich posi tiv e s tat usc a ntolerate a me a s ureof  belief  'b eyond'you r e vid enc e(James, 1 921; Bis ho p,  2 00 7,107-1 1 2). More  t han  t his , eve n  evide ntial ismne ed not  threat e nt h e ep is te micsta tu s ofreli g iou s belie fs in lig hto f di sa gr eement.  For evidenti al ism is a g en era l clai m ,  and the re are many ways in whi c h it ca n b e spe lled  out (Dou ghe rty, 2 014 ,  101).  For e xampl e,  th e evide n t ia lis tepistemolo g i esof Pl an ting a (2000 a) and Dougherty ( 2 014 ) assign a la rge  rol e to  th e  e v ide nc e  of o ne's own experi ences (inc lu d in g religiou s  on es ) and t o the b elief s  of one 's religi ous tradi ti on,o v erand abovethe evid ence of i n tersu b je ctive  ar gument s;  th is wi ll ten d  to  allo w reli gi ous be liefs  t o remain  justified even given t he cou ntere vid ence supp lie d  by  disagree inginterlocut ors . O n the  ot h er ha nd,t he  ev i denti alis m s of Sche l le nbe r g  ( 2007, 190), M c Kim  (200 1,c hapter  10) , and Philipse (2 0 14, part I) as sign g rea ter weig ht  to intersubje cti ve e vidence(i ncluding th e opposi ng viewp ointsof dis agreein g in t erlocu tors ),which may  ma ke positiv eep i stemic  sta tu s forreligi o us b e l iefs more elusiv e. So i t isn otMcKim 's  endors e ment  of the ep istemic-pot ential  cla im th at yiel ds  his p ess im ism aboutt he episte mic j ustific at ionofreligi ousb e liefs ; it  i s t he strict f or m  o fe vid enti alism  t hathe endors e s alongs ide it. The  e pis t e mic-po t en t i al claim b y i tself e ntails nop osit i on on ep istemi c just ificati o n o rstatusmor e broadly.It does n o t m at terfor my p ur pose swhi ch  epist
. There_are two_dangers that the objector_will highlight._The_first is_normative._Religious disagreement, she_will say, is_likely to furnish counterevidence_that threatens the_epistemic_status of your religious or auxiliary beliefs. Indeed, McKim endorses something like the epistemic-potential_claim,_yet draws_from_it_a pessimistic conclusion about the_epistemic status of religious beliefs:_because much_of the evidence provided by disagreement speaks against_one's_religious view, religious_beliefs are unjustified unless held tentatively (2012, 155-156). And_tentative belief, the objector will note,_is not committed_belief._So_it would seem that_engaging in religious disagreement will force_a choice between the believer's epistemic_status and his epistemic commitment. But this_worry can be dismissed. The epistemic-potential_claim entails nothing about epistemic_justification or_any other kind of epistemic_status. It is_compatible with_an evidentialist view,_according to which positive epistemic status_requires respecting your_evidence, or a fideist view, on_which_positive status can_tolerate_a_measure of_belief 'beyond' your_evidence_(James, 1921;_Bishop,_2007, 107-112). More than this, even_evidentialism_need not threaten the epistemic status of_religious beliefs in light_of_disagreement. For evidentialism is_a general claim, and there_are many ways in which it_can be_spelled out_(Dougherty, 2014, 101). For example, the evidentialist epistemologies of Plantinga (2000a)_and Dougherty (2014) assign a large_role to the evidence_of one's_own_experiences (including religious_ones)_and to_the beliefs of one's religious tradition, over_and above_the evidence of intersubjective arguments; this_will tend to allow_religious_beliefs to remain justified even given_the counterevidence supplied by disagreeing interlocutors._On the other hand, the_evidentialisms_of_Schellenberg (2007, 190), McKim (2001,_chapter 10), and Philipse (2014, part_I) assign greater_weight to intersubjective evidence (including the opposing_viewpoints_of disagreeing interlocutors), which may make_positive_epistemic status for religious beliefs more_elusive._So_it is not McKim's endorsement_of the epistemic-potential claim that yields_his pessimism about the epistemic justification of religious beliefs;_it is the_strict form of evidentialism that_he_endorses_alongside it. The epistemic-potential claim by itself entails no position_on epistemic_justification or status_more broadly. It does not matter for my purposes which_epist