 claim that natural classification is the aim of science. He noted that the natural classification of experimental laws is a "limiting form" that the theory tends to achieve, through "its successive advancements" (1906, 297). He insisted that if a scientist is not an "intransigent positivist", he or she will come to see that "physical theory advances gradually toward its limiting form" (ibid.). Now, one point that Rey insisted on was that Duhem's resistance to neo-scepticism will come to nothing if the history of science showed that attempts to unify the theoretical image of the world had been a failure. Duhem (1906, 295) responded to this criticism by acknowledging it and by saying that, ultimately, the issue at stake is empirical: it is up to the history of science [...] to tell us whether men, ever since physics took on a scientific form, have exhausted themselves in vain efforts to unite into a coordinated system the innumerable laws discovered by experimenters; or else, on the other hand, whether these efforts through slow and continuous progress have contributed to fusing together pieces of theory, which were isolated at first, in order to produce an increasingly unified and ampler theory. Duhem's verdict was that the history of science has tilted the balance towards unity: "diversity fusing into a constantly more comprehensive and more perfect unity, that is the great fact summarizing the whole history of physical doctrines" (1906, 296). What's also important to stress is that there is a contingent mark for a classification being natural, viz., the ability of theory to yield novel predictions; that is, the ability of theories to anticipate experiment, establishing novel predictions like prophets would reveal the future: The highest test, therefore, of our holding a classification as a natural one is to ask it to indicate in advance things which the future alone will reveal. And when the experiment is made and confirms the predictions obtained from our theory, we feel strengthened in our conviction that the relations established by our reason among abstract notions truly correspond to relations among things (1906, 28). Still, the very idea that a theory is (or tends to be) a natural classification cannot be justified by the narrow positivist method that Duhem himself canvassed. All the more so for his anti-scepticism. Far from yielding to scepticism Duhem relied on a broader conception of justification which, we might say, relies on explanatory considerations: it is truth that explains perfection and it is perfection that explains why unification
claim that natural classification is the aim of science. He note that the lifelike classification of experimental laws is a " specify shape " that the theory tends to achieve, through " its consecutive advancements " (1906, 297). He insisted that if a scientist is not an " intransigent positivist ", he or she will arrive to see that " physical hypothesis advances gradually toward its limiting form " (ibid .). Now, one distributor point that Rey insisted on was that Duhem's resistance to neo - scepticism will come to nothing if the history of science read that attempts to unify the theoretical image of the worldly concern had been a failure. Duhem (1906, 295) responded to this criticism by acknowledging it and by saying that, ultimately, the topic at stake is empirical: it is up to the history of science [... ] to tell us whether men, always since physics took on a scientific form, have exhausted themselves in vain efforts to unify into a coordinated system the innumerable laws discovered by experimenters; or else, on the other hand, whether these efforts through slow and continuous progress have lend to fusing together piece of hypothesis, which were isolate at first, in order to grow an increasingly unified and ampler theory. Duhem's verdict was that the history of science has tilted the balance wheel towards unity: " diversity fusing into a constantly more comprehensive and more perfect unity, that is the great fact summarize the whole history of physical doctrines " (1906, 296). What's also authoritative to stress is that there cost a contingent mark for a classification being natural, viz. , the ability of theory to yield novel prediction; that is, the ability of theories to anticipate experiment, establishing fresh predictions like prophet would reveal the future: The highest examination, therefore, of our halt a classification as a natural one is to necessitate it to indicate in advance things which the future alone will reveal. And when the experiment is reach and confirms the prediction obtained from our theory, we feel strengthened in our conviction that the relations establish by our reason among abstract notions truly correspond to relations among things (1906, 28). Still, the very idea that a hypothesis is (or tends to be) a natural categorization cannot be justified by the narrow positivist method that Duhem himself canvass. All the more so for his anti - scepticism. Far from yielding to scepticism Duhem relied on a broader conception of justification which, we might say, relies on explanatory considerations: it is accuracy that explains perfection and it is paragon that excuse why unification
 clwim that natural classiflcation is the ann of srience. Ge noted that the natural classificavion of ezperimental laws is a "uimiting vorm" thar tht theory tends to achieve, throufm "its wuccessive advsncements" (1906, 297). He insisted dhxt if a scientist is not an "intransigqnt posotlvist", he or shg wilk coms to see that "physical theory advahces gredually toward ots limiting form" (ibid.). Now, one point that Rey indisted on wqs trqt Duhem's reristance to neo-scepticjsm will come to nothing if the histpry of sciguxe dvowed that ettempns to unify tmv theoratical omage of the wprlv hae been a failure. Duhek (1906, 295) responded to tris critiwiam by acknowledgibg it atd bf sahung thzt, umtimatfly, the issue at stake iw empirical: it is uk tj the history kf sciqnse [...] to tell us whether men, ever since pvysjcs took on a scientifix form, have exhausted themselvqs in vain efforts to unite into a coordinated syvtem vhd iukmmerxvlf laws discovered by experimenters; or else, on fht onher hand, whether these effottd yrrough slow avd concjnhous progress have contrifuted to fusind tobether pieces of theory, whixh were isolctee at first, in ordex to produce an oncressingly unified and ampuer fheory. Duhel's verdicf was that the hirtogy ox scienct has tilted the bwlance toxards unity: "aivetsity ftsing into a cokvtantly more comprfhensnve atd more pegfect unity, that is the great fert summarizinb dhe whole hnstory of physical qoctrines" (1906, 296). Whct's also impoftant to snress is vhat there if a contingend mark for a rlassificwtiob beung natjfal, viz., the abolity of nhtory to yiwld novel predictipns; fhat is, the abioiti of theories tp avtisiiatx expqsiment, estabnishkng movel predicunonw likr prophets would revaal fhe future: The higneft test, jherefore, of our holdimg a classificatioj as e natucal onr if to ask it to indicate in advznce thinhs rhich the fueure alone will xeveal. And when the experiment is made aid confirms the predicjions obtained from oor uheory, we feek strqngthened in our conviction tyat the relations established by our rsason dmong abstract notions truly correspond to relations among things (1906, 28). Still, the cery ivew that a thsory is (og tzndx to bq) a iavural classificatpon cannot be justified by the nerrow posidirist method that Duhem himselg zanvassed. All the more so for his antj-scepticosm. Far from yielding to sceptivism Duhem relied on a bvoader cobceptjon of jusvification which, we kight vay, rwlies ob exilanatory conskdetabions: it id trnth that explains perfection and it is peeffction that expleins why uninigation
claim that natural classification is the aim He that the classification of experimental that theory tends to through "its successive (1906, 297). He insisted that if scientist is not an "intransigent positivist", he or she will come to see "physical theory advances gradually toward its limiting form" (ibid.). Now, one point that insisted was Duhem's to neo-scepticism will come to nothing if the history of science showed that attempts to unify theoretical image of the world had been a Duhem (1906, 295) responded this criticism by acknowledging it by that, ultimately, issue stake empirical: it is to the history of science [...] to tell us whether men, ever since physics took on a form, have in vain to into coordinated system the discovered by experimenters; or else, on whether these efforts through slow and continuous progress contributed to together pieces of theory, which were at first, in order to produce an increasingly and ampler theory. Duhem's verdict was that the history of science has tilted the balance "diversity fusing into a more comprehensive and perfect that the fact summarizing whole history of physical doctrines" (1906, 296). What's also important to is that there is a contingent mark for a classification viz., ability of theory yield novel predictions; that the of theories to anticipate novel like the The test, therefore, of our a classification as a natural is to ask it which the future alone will reveal. And when experiment is made and confirms the predictions from our theory, we feel strengthened in our conviction that the relations by our abstract notions truly correspond to relations among things 28). Still, the very that a theory is (or tends to be) a classification be justified the narrow positivist that Duhem himself All the more his anti-scepticism. from to on a broader conception of justification we say, relies on explanatory considerations: is explains perfection and it is perfection that explains why unification
 claim that natural classificAtion is the Aim of SciEncE. HE notEd thAt the natural clASsifIcation of experimental lAws is A "lIMitiNG fOrm" thAt the thEOrY TEndS tO aChiEvE, ThRough "Its SuccessIve advanceMenTs" (1906, 297). he insisted thAT iF a scientisT is Not an "intransIgeNt posiTiVisT", He or sHe wIll coMe to seE That "phYsical theOrY AdvancES graduaLLY tOwarD its limiting form" (iBId.). nOw, one point that rey insIsTEd ON Was ThaT Duhem's resIsTance TO neo-scePTiCISM wiLL come to nothinG if the histoRY of SciencE sHowED that aTtempTs TO unIfy the theorEticAl image of The worLD had beeN A failurE. Duhem (1906, 295) ResPonDed tO ThIs CriTiCIsm BY aCknOWleDging it aNd By SayinG thaT, ULTImatEly, The iSsue aT stake is empirIcaL: it iS Up tO the hIstorY of sCiEnce [...] tO tell uS whetHeR men, ever since phYsicS took on a sCieNtIfiC fOrm, haVE exhauSteD thEmselveS in vain EFfoRtS TO UnIte into a coordinateD sYSTeM the innuMerablE LaWs DIscovereD bY exPeriMENters; Or elSE, oN the otheR hand, wHEtHeR these eFfOrts thRoUgh SloW and cONtinUous prOgress haVe conTRibuted to fusinG Together pieceS Of THEoRY, whiCh wEre isolated At fiRSt, in OrdeR To ProDUce an IncreAsINgLY unified and ampler thEoRy. DuheM's verDict was that thE history of SCIEnce has tIlteD ThE Balance towards Unity: "Diversity fUSing into A consTantly moRe comprehENSive and mOre PerFecT unITY, tHat is the great FACt suMmArizing The Whole hiStoRy oF phYsiCaL doctrineS" (1906, 296). What's alSo ImPoRtAnt To strESs is that ThEre Is A coNtingENt mark For a cLassIfIcATioN being nATuRAL, viz., ThE aBiliTy oF tHeory To yiELd nOvel preDictions; tHat IS, the AbIlIty of thEories to anticIpAte experimEnT, esTablisHINg novel pRedictions like prophets wOUld reveAl tHe futUre: THe highest TesT, thereForE, Of our hOlding A clasSiFicATIon as A NAtUraL oNe is to ask iT TO inDicatE iN advAnce thiNgs which the future aLOne Will reveal. And WheN the EXPeRimENt IS maDe ANd cONFirms the predictIons obtainEd FRoM our theory, WE feEl StrengtHened in Our coNViction That the reLations esTaBlisHED by Our reason aMong abstRact notioNS trulY CoRrespOnd To relaTiOns Among Things (1906, 28). sTilL, the vEry ideA tHat a thEory iS (oR tends to Be) a natural classificatioN cannoT be juStiFied by the NarROw pOsitivist MethOd that DuheM hiMseLf canVasSEd. All The mORe So fOR his aNti-sCEpticism. FAR fRom YIElDing to sceptICISm DUhem rEliED on a brOadeR conception of justIFication which, wE migHT Say, RelIEs on ExPlanatory consiDerAtIONs: it is trUtH that explaiNs perfecTiON and iT is perFectioN that exPLAiNS why unIficAtiOn
 claim that natural classi fication i s the  ai m o fscie nce.  He noted that thenatural classification  of e xp e rime n ta l law s is a" li m i tin gfo rm"  t h at  thethe ory ten ds to achi eve ,through "its su ccessive a dva ncements" (1 906 , 297) .Hei nsist edthatif a s c ientis t is notan "intra n sigentp o si tivi st", he or she wi l lc ome to see tha t "phy si c al t heo ryadvances g ra duall y  toward it s l imi t ing form" (ib id.). Now,o nepointth atR ey ins isted  o n  wa s that Duhe m'sresistanc e to n e o-scept i cism wi ll com e t o n othi n gif  th eh ist o ry  of sci ence sho we dthatatte m p t s  touni fy t he th eoretical ima geof t h e w orldhad b eenafailu re. Du hem ( 19 06, 295) respon dedto this c rit ic ism  b y ack n owledg ing  it  and by  saying tha t, u l ti mately, the issueat s ta ke is em pirica l :it is up to  t hehist o r y ofscie n ce  [...] t o tell us  w hetherme n, eve rsin cephysi c s to ok ona scient ificf orm, have exha u sted themselv e si n  v a in e ffo rts to unit e in t o acoor d in ate d  syst em th ei nn u merable laws discov er ed byexper imenters; orelse, on t h e other ha nd,w he t her these effo rts t hrough slo w  and con tinuo us progr ess havec o ntribute d t o f usi ngt o ge ther pieces o f theo ry , which  we re isol ate d a t f irs t,  in order  to prod uc ean  i ncr easin g ly unifi ed  an damp ler t h eory.Duhem 's v er di c t w as that th e hist or yof s cie nc e has  til t edthe bal ance towa rds unit y:  " diversi ty fusing int oa constant ly  mo re com p r ehensive  and more perfect unity ,  that i s t he gr eatfact summ ari zing t hew hole h istory  of p hy sic a l  doct r i ne s"(1 906, 296). W hat 's al so  imp ortantto stress is thatt her e is a contin gen t ma r k  f ora  c l ass if i cat i o n being natural , viz., th ea bi lity of th e ory  t o yield  novelpredi c tions;that is,the abili ty  oft h eor ies to ant icipateexperimen t , est a bl ishin g n ovel p re dic tions  likep rop hetswouldre veal t he fu tu re: Thehighest test, therefore , of o ur ho ldi ng a clas sif i cat ion as anatu ral one is  to  as k ittoi ndica te i n  a dva n ce th ings which the fu tur e al one will re v e a l.And w hen the ex peri ment is made andc onfirms the pr edic t i ons  ob t aine dfrom our theor y,we f eel stre ng thened in o ur convi ct i on th at the  relat ions es t a bl i shed b y ou r r eason amo ngab s tract n ot io n s trul y co rr espond  to re l atio n s  among things (1 906,2 8 ). St i ll,  theve ry idea that  a theoryis (or tend s to b e) a  natu ral cla ss ificat ion  c annot be j u stified b y the  narrow  p osit ivi st met hodt h at Du hemhi mse lf canvas s e d. Al lt hemore  so f or  his  anti-sce p ticism.Far from yi el din g to sce p ti c i sm Duhem r eli ed on a  broader c o ncep t io n  of j ustifi cation  which, wemi ght say , r e l ies on ex planatory con si dera tions: i tis t ru thth at explains per fectionand it i s perfec tio n  tha t  expla in s why unific ation 
 claim_that natural_classification is the aim_of science._He_noted that_the_natural classification of_experimental laws is_a "limiting form" that_the theory tends_to_achieve, through "its successive advancements" (1906, 297). He insisted that if a scientist is_not_an "intransigent_positivist",_he_or she will come to_see that "physical theory advances_gradually toward_its limiting form" (ibid.). Now, one point that_Rey_insisted on was_that Duhem's resistance to neo-scepticism will come to nothing_if the history of science showed_that attempts to_unify_the_theoretical image of the_world had been a failure. Duhem_(1906, 295) responded to this criticism_by acknowledging it and by saying that,_ultimately, the issue at stake is_empirical: it is up to_the history_of science [...] to tell_us whether men,_ever since_physics took on_a scientific form, have exhausted themselves_in vain efforts_to unite into a coordinated system_the_innumerable laws discovered_by_experimenters;_or else,_on the other_hand,_whether these_efforts_through slow and continuous progress have_contributed_to fusing together pieces of theory, which_were isolated at first,_in_order to produce an_increasingly unified and ampler theory._Duhem's verdict was that the history_of science_has tilted_the balance towards unity: "diversity fusing into a constantly more comprehensive_and more perfect unity, that is_the great fact summarizing_the whole_history_of physical doctrines"_(1906,_296). What's_also important to stress is that there_is a_contingent mark for a classification being_natural, viz., the ability_of_theory to yield novel predictions; that_is, the ability of theories to_anticipate experiment, establishing novel predictions_like_prophets_would reveal the future: The_highest test, therefore, of our holding_a classification as_a natural one is to ask it_to_indicate in advance things which the_future_alone will reveal. And when the_experiment_is_made and confirms the predictions_obtained from our theory, we feel_strengthened in our conviction that the relations established by_our reason among_abstract notions truly correspond to_relations_among_things (1906, 28). Still, the very idea that a theory_is (or_tends to be)_a natural classification cannot be justified by the narrow positivist_method that Duhem himself canvassed. All the_more so for his anti-scepticism. Far from yielding to scepticism Duhem_relied on a broader conception of justification which,_we might say, relies on explanatory considerations:_it is truth that_explains_perfection and it is perfection that explains_why_unification