 theories. In his work, Pierre Duhem analyzed the nature of physical theory in particular. One of his main theses establishes that the purpose of physical theories is not to explain natural phenomena, but to construct a "natural classification" of experimental laws (Duhem 1991, chap.1-2). In other words, the role of theories is simply the systematic coordination of experimental laws, or to make the experience more easily assimilable and manipulable without the pretense of increasing to some degree the content of truth that experience provides (Duhem 1991, 327). As the author himself admits, this understanding finds parallels in Mach's work, which related the goal of physical theory to a principle of "economy of thought". The purpose of physical theory would be to "replace experience with the shortest possible operations" or to provide a synthesis of a large set of experimental laws in a unique and economical formulation (Duhem 1991, 327). For Duhem, therefore, Newton could not even have deduced the universal gravity from Kepler's phenomena, for that is not how physical science works. What Newton effectively did was to construct a theory that is the synthesis of a significant number of experimental laws, like Kepler's laws, the Galilean law of the falling bodies, the laws of motion, pendulums, motions of the Moon, and so on. The theory of universal gravitation would be a "natural classification of experimental laws," and not a rigorous deductive or inductive result from Kepler's laws, as Newton suggested in the General Scholium. Objections to Duhem's Criticisms to the Newtonian Method Duhem's criticism of Newtonian method became influential among important twentieth-century philosophers of science. Karl Popper, for example, stated "it is impossible to derive Newton's theory from either Galileo's or Kepler's, or both, whether by deduction or by induction. For neither a deductive nor an inductive inference can ever proceed from consistent premises to a conclusion that formally contradicts these premises" (Popper 1983, 140). Similarly, Imre Lakatos stated that "Newton's compartmentalized mind cannot be better characterized by contrasting Newton, the methodologist, who claimed that he derived his laws from Kepler's 'phenomena', with Newton, the scientist, who knew very well that his laws directly contradicted these phenomena" (Lakatos 1978, 210). Similar comments can be found in Feyrabend (1970, 164, note 11). However, in the face of the more detailed historical studies of Newtonian science
theories. In his work, Pierre Duhem analyzed the nature of physical hypothesis in especial. One of his main theses prove that the determination of physical theories is not to excuse natural phenomena, but to construct a " lifelike categorization " of experimental laws (Duhem 1991, chap.1 - 2). In other password, the role of theories is simply the taxonomic coordination of experimental laws, or to make the experience more well assimilable and manipulable without the pretension of increase to some degree the content of truth that experience put up (Duhem 1991, 327). As the author himself admits, this understanding finds analogue in Mach's work, which related the goal of physical theory to a rationale of " economy of thought ". The purpose of physical theory would be to " replace experience with the shortest potential process " or to provide a synthesis of a large set of experimental laws in a unique and economical formulation (Duhem 1991, 327). For Duhem, therefore, Newton could not even have deduce the universal gravity from Kepler's phenomenon, for that is not how forcible skill works. What Newton effectively did was to construct a theory that is the synthesis of a significant number of experimental laws, like Kepler's law, the Galilean law of the falling bodies, the laws of motion, pendulums, motion of the Moon, and so on. The theory of universal gravity would be a " natural categorization of experimental laws, " and not a rigorous deductive or inductive result from Kepler's laws, as Newton suggested in the General Scholium. Objections to Duhem's Criticisms to the Newtonian Method Duhem's criticism of Newtonian method become influential among important twentieth - century philosophers of skill. Karl Popper, for example, submit " it is impossible to derive Newton's theory from either Galileo's or Kepler's, or both, whether by subtraction or by induction. For neither a deductive nor an inductive inference can ever continue from consistent premise to a conclusion that formally contradicts these premises " (Popper 1983, 140). Similarly, Imre Lakatos stated that " Newton's compartmental mind cannot be better characterized by contrast Newton, the methodologist, who claimed that he deduce his laws from Kepler's' phenomenon', with Newton, the scientist, who knew very well that his laws directly contradicted these phenomena " (Lakatos 1978, 210). alike comments can be found in Feyrabend (1970, 164, eminence 11). However, in the face of the more detailed historical study of Newtonian science
 thfories. In his work, Pierrt Duhem analyzed jhw natuce of pgysical gheory in particular. One of iis nain ukeses establishes thxt the pugpose of physmcal theories is not to crplaih natbrel phenomena, buj to construwt a "natural cnarsnfication" of experimental laws (Duhem 1991, chap.1-2). On other words, tre rpje or theories is simply the systematid coordpnation of experikental laws, or to make the expfrience more easilj assimilaboe age manipulabld without uhz pretense kf increasing to some degree thd concent of trujk thwj experience provpdes (Duhem 1991, 327). As the agthor homself admits, bhis nndeestanding finds paralnels in Mach's work, which renaced the goal of physixao themry do a privcikle or "econlmy of thoughf". The purpowe of physical theoty qould be to "rsplace evperience with the shortest possible optratikns" or to provide a synrhesis of a large set of experymental laws in a unique and economical formulatimn (Duieo 1991, 327). Fjf Dkhem, therefore, Newton could not even have dedtdec nhe universal grayity from Kepler's lhfnpiena, for that is noc hkw physical sciencf works. What Newton esfecyively did was to construct a theory thct us the synthesis oy a significcnt nukber pf experimental laws, liye Kspler's laws, the Galimdan law of the fxllpng todies, the laws of motion, [endulums, motnons of ghe Koon, agd so on. Tje thcmry of universal ggavitction would be w "natural classification of expxcimental laws," atd tot a riyorous deductive or inductive resolt from Heplef's laws, as Newton suggested yn the Generan Scholium. Oboections eo Dyhem'w Critizksms to the Neetonian Mvtkod Duhem'w criticism of Newboniav method became nufouential among ompurtwnn txentiqdh-century phhlosuphdts of scienct. Kcru Polper, for example, staded "jt is impossible tp qerive Ngwton's thqory from eitner Galileo's or Kekler's, mr uoth, wnetrer by deduction or by inductikn. For nelthcr a deductivq nov an inductive inference can ever proceed from consisvent premises to a concousion that formalli cpntradicts vhese [remises" ([opper 1983, 140). Similarly, Inre Lakatos statec that "Newton's comparfmentanized mind cannot be better characterized by contrasting Newton, the methodologust, who claimed thzt hr derpveb hns laws frol Kepler's 'phenomema', with Newton, the scientist, whu knew varv well that his laws directly cuntradicted tfese phenomena" (Lakatos 1978, 210). Similar comments can be found in Feyranend (1970, 164, note 11). However, in bhe face if ths more deteiled historical stucies oy Newtinian sxienge
theories. In his work, Pierre Duhem analyzed of theory in One of his purpose physical theories is to explain natural but to construct a "natural classification" experimental laws (Duhem 1991, chap.1-2). In other words, the role of theories is the systematic coordination of experimental laws, or to make the experience more easily and without pretense increasing to some degree the content of truth that experience provides (Duhem 1991, 327). As the himself admits, this understanding finds parallels in Mach's which related the goal physical theory to a principle "economy thought". The of theory be to "replace with the shortest possible operations" or to provide a synthesis of a large set of experimental laws a unique formulation (Duhem 327). Duhem, Newton could not deduced the universal gravity from Kepler's is not how physical science works. What Newton did was construct a theory that is the of a significant number of experimental laws, like laws, the Galilean law of the falling bodies, the laws of motion, pendulums, motions of and so on. The of universal gravitation be "natural of laws," and a rigorous deductive or inductive result from Kepler's laws, as Newton in the General Scholium. Objections to Duhem's Criticisms to the Duhem's of Newtonian method influential among important twentieth-century of Karl Popper, for example, is to from Galileo's Kepler's, or both, whether deduction or by induction. For a deductive nor an from consistent premises to a conclusion that formally these premises" (Popper 1983, 140). Similarly, Imre stated that "Newton's compartmentalized mind cannot be better characterized by contrasting Newton, methodologist, who he derived his laws from Kepler's 'phenomena', with the scientist, who knew well that his laws directly contradicted these phenomena" (Lakatos 210). comments can found in Feyrabend 164, note 11). in the face more detailed studies Newtonian
 theories. In his work, Pierre DuHem analyzeD the nAtuRe oF pHysiCal tHeory in particuLAr. OnE of his main theses establIshes ThAT the PUrPose oF physicAL tHEOriEs Is Not To EXpLain nAtuRal phenOmena, but to ConStRuct a "natural CLaSsificatioN" of Experimental LawS (Duhem 1991, ChAp.1-2). IN Other WorDs, the Role of THeorieS is simply ThE SystemATic coorDINaTion Of experimental lawS, Or TO make the experiEnce moRe EAsILY asSimIlable and mAnIpulaBLe withoUT tHE PRetENse of increasiNg to some degREe tHe contEnT of TRuth thAt expErIEncE provides (DuHem 1991, 327). AS the authoR himseLF admits, THis undeRstandIng FinDs paRAlLeLs iN MACh's WOrK, whICh rElated thE gOaL of phYsicAL THEory To a PrinCiple Of "economy of thOugHt". ThE PurPose oF physIcal ThEory wOuld be To "repLaCe experience witH the Shortest pOssIbLe oPeRatioNS" or to pRovIde A syntheSis of a lARge SeT OF ExPerimental laws in a uNiQUE aNd economIcal foRMuLaTIon (Duhem 1991, 327). foR DuHem, tHEReforE, NewTOn Could not Even haVE dEdUced the UnIversaL gRavIty From KEPler'S phenoMena, for tHat is NOt how physical sCIence works. WhaT neWTOn EFfecTivEly did was to ConsTRuct A theORy ThaT Is the SynthEsIS oF A significant number oF eXperimEntal Laws, like KepleR's laws, the GALILean law oF the FAlLIng bodies, the laWs of mOtion, penduLUms, motioNs of tHe Moon, anD so on. The tHEOry of uniVerSal GraVitATIoN would be a "natuRAL claSsIficatiOn oF experiMenTal LawS," anD nOt a rigoroUs deductIvE oR iNdUctIve reSUlt from KEpLer'S lAws, As NewTOn suggEsted In thE GEnERal scholiuM. obJECtioNs To duheM's CRiTicisMs to THe NEwtoniaN Method DuHem'S CritIcIsM of NewtOnian method beCaMe influentIaL amOng impORTant twenTieth-century philosopherS Of scienCe. KArl PoPper, For examplE, stAted "it Is iMPossibLe to deRive NEwTon'S THeory FROm EitHeR Galileo's oR kEplEr's, or BoTh, whEther by Deduction or by inducTIon. for neither a deDucTive NOR aN inDUcTIve InFEreNCE can ever proceed From consisTeNT pRemises to a COncLuSion thaT formalLy conTRadicts These premIses" (PoppeR 1983, 140). SImilARLy, IMre Lakatos Stated thAt "Newton's COmparTMeNtaliZed Mind caNnOt bE bettEr charACteRized By contRaSting NEwton, ThE methodoLogist, who claimed that he dErived His laWs fRom Kepler'S 'phENomEna', with NeWton, The scientiSt, wHo kNew veRy wELl thaT his LAwS diREctly ContRAdicted thESe PheNOMeNa" (Lakatos 1978, 210). SiMILAr cOmmenTs cAN be fouNd in feyrabend (1970, 164, note 11). HoweVEr, in the face of tHe moRE DetAilED hisToRical studies of newToNIAn sciencE
 theories. In his work, Pi erre Duhem  anal yze d t he  nat ureof physical th e oryin particular. One ofhis m ai n  the s es  esta blishes th a t  th epu rpo se of  phys ica l theor ies is not  to  e xplain natur a lphenomena,  bu t to constru cta "nat ur alc lassi fic ation " of e x perime ntal laws  ( D uhem 1 9 91, cha p . 1- 2).In other words, t h er ole of theorie s is s im p ly t hesys tematic co or dinat i on of e x pe r i m ent a l laws, or to  make the e x per iencemo ree asilyassim il a ble  and manipu labl e without  the p r etenseo f incre asingtosom e de g re ethe  c o nte n toft rut h that e xp er ience  pro v i d e s (D uhe m 19 91, 3 27). As the a uth or h i mse lf ad mits,  thi sunder standi ng fi nd s parallels inMach 's work,whi ch  re la ted t h e goal  of  ph ysicaltheoryt o a  p r i n ci ple of "economy of  t h o ug ht". The  purpo s eof physical  t heo ry w o u ld be  to" re place ex perien c ewi th thesh ortest  p oss ibl e ope r atio ns" or  to prov ide a synthesis of a large set ofe xp e r im e ntal  la ws in a uni quea nd e cono m ic alf ormul ation  ( D uh e m 1991, 327). For D uh em, th erefo re, Newton co uld not ev e n have ded uced th e  universal gra vityfrom Keple r 's pheno mena,  for tha t is noth o w physic alsci enc e w o r ks . What Newton e ffec ti vely di d w as to c ons tru cta t he ory thatis the s yn th es is  of  a si g nificant  n umb er  of  expe r imenta l law s, l ik eK epl er's la w s, t he G al il eanlaw  o f the  fal l ing  bodies , the law s o f  mot io n,  pendul ums, motionsof  the Moon,  a ndso on. T he theor y of universal gravitat i on woul d b e a " natu ral class ifi cation  of experi mental  laws ,"  an d not a r ig oro us  deductive o r i nduct iv e re sult fr om Kepler's laws,a s N ewton suggest edin t h e  G ene r al Sch ol i um. O bjections to Du hem's Crit ic i sm s to the N e wto ni an Meth od Duhe m's c r iticism  of Newto nian meth od  bec a m e i nfluential  among i mportantt wenti e th -cent ury  philo so phe rs of  scien c e.KarlPopper ,for ex ample ,stated " it is impossible to der ive Ne wton' s t heory fro m e i the r Galileo 's o r Kepler's , o r b oth,whe t her b y de d uc tio n  or b y in d uction. F o rnei t h er  a deductiv e n oran in duc t ive in fere nce can ever proc e ed from consis tent p rem ise s  toaconclusion tha t f or m a lly cont ra dicts these  premise s" (Popp er 198 3, 140 ). Simi l a rl y , Imre  Lak ato s statedtha t" Newton' sco m partme ntal iz ed min d cann o t be b etter characteri zed b y contr a sti ng Ne wt on, the meth odologist,  who claime d that  hederiv ed hisla ws fro m K ep ler's 'phe n omena', w ith N ewton,th e sc ien tist,whok n ew ve ry w el l t hat his l a w sd ir ec t lycont radic te d th ese pheno m ena" (La kat o s 1978,  2 10) . Simila r  c o m ments canbefound i n Feyraben d  (19 7 0, 164,note 1 1). Ho wever,i n t he  face o f t h e  more det ailed his t ori ca l st udies of  N ewto ni ansc ience
 theories._In his_work, Pierre Duhem analyzed_the nature_of_physical theory_in_particular. One of_his main theses_establishes that the purpose_of physical theories_is_not to explain natural phenomena, but to construct a "natural classification" of experimental laws_(Duhem_1991, chap.1-2)._In_other_words, the role of theories_is simply the systematic coordination_of experimental_laws, or to make the experience more easily_assimilable_and manipulable without_the pretense of increasing to some degree the content_of truth that experience provides (Duhem_1991, 327). As_the_author_himself admits, this understanding_finds parallels in Mach's work, which_related the goal of physical theory_to a principle of "economy of thought"._The purpose of physical theory would_be to "replace experience with_the shortest_possible operations" or to provide_a synthesis of_a large_set of experimental_laws in a unique and economical_formulation (Duhem 1991,_327). For Duhem, therefore, Newton could_not_even have deduced_the_universal_gravity from_Kepler's phenomena, for_that_is not_how_physical science works. What Newton effectively_did_was to construct a theory that is_the synthesis of a_significant_number of experimental laws,_like Kepler's laws, the Galilean_law of the falling bodies, the_laws of_motion, pendulums,_motions of the Moon, and so on. The theory of universal_gravitation would be a "natural classification_of experimental laws," and_not a_rigorous_deductive or inductive_result_from Kepler's_laws, as Newton suggested in the General_Scholium. Objections_to Duhem's Criticisms to the Newtonian_Method Duhem's criticism of_Newtonian_method became influential among important twentieth-century_philosophers of science. Karl Popper, for_example, stated "it is impossible_to_derive_Newton's theory from either Galileo's_or Kepler's, or both, whether by_deduction or by_induction. For neither a deductive nor an_inductive_inference can ever proceed from consistent_premises_to a conclusion that formally contradicts_these_premises"_(Popper 1983, 140). Similarly, Imre_Lakatos stated that "Newton's compartmentalized mind_cannot be better characterized by contrasting Newton, the methodologist,_who claimed that_he derived his laws from_Kepler's_'phenomena',_with Newton, the scientist, who knew very well that his_laws directly_contradicted these phenomena"_(Lakatos 1978, 210). Similar comments can be found in Feyrabend_(1970, 164, note 11). However, in the_face of the more detailed historical studies of Newtonian science