 not settle for a "quantitative conception of physical phenomena". It aspires to reaching the qualitative causal explanation (Cesca 1903, 249). With this goal it relies on "empirical metaphysics explaining the causes, the laws of the becoming of facts, which reduce them to their ultimate constitutional elements and show the essential and peculiar qualities of each one of them" (Cesca 1903, 265). It is clear that such an approach, interested as it is in the "causes" and "essential qualities" of phenomena, could only have a few points of contact with an anti-metaphysical author such as Mach. The differences from Duhem were just as radical, if only Cesca had read his works. Cesca's concern with rejecting the possible sceptical and subjectivist results of the new critique to physical sciences in the name of a supposed positive philosophy – a philosophy that transcends physics by Roberto Maiocchi – Duhem in Pre-War Italian Philosophy: The Reasons of an Absence 88 providing steady fundaments whenever physics leans dangerously towards Pyrrhonism or Idealism – can also be found in other positivists who – more or less incidentally – deal with some of the great physicists of the mechanical philosophy. That is the case of Adolfo Levi, the author of a 1909 essay on Mach's Phenomenalism, and Adolfo Faggi who, polemicizing with a book by Igino Petrone (1900) that criticises the mechanical philosophy on the basis of Stallo's and Boutroux's books, states that science must not fall prey to subjectivism: it may maintain the schemes of mechanistic determinism, so long as it recognises the superiority of philosophy over quantitative science. Philosophy can answer questions that would not find any answer in science, and Faggi (1900, 386) reiterates this idea with accents that recall Gentile's famous thesis of contrast between science (the world of dead things) and philosophy (the theory of live reality). Italian Positivism was therefore much busier defending itself from the new epistemological critique than understanding and using it. The comparison between these two problems was sporadic and basically unimportant for this current of thought. Italian Positivism was already sailing on troubled water and by failing to recognise the latest and most stimulating trends in the field of the philosophy of science it definitely separated its rhetorical and undetermined idea of science from real science. Pragmatism – first a travel companion and then
not settle for a " quantitative conception of physical phenomena ". It draw a bead on to pass the qualitative causal explanation (Cesca 1903, 249). With this goal it trust on " empirical metaphysics explain the causes, the law of the becoming of facts, which reduce them to their ultimate built-in elements and show the substantive and peculiar qualities of each one of them " (Cesca 1903, 265). It is well-defined that such an overture, interested as it is in the " causes " and " essential qualities " of phenomena, could merely have a few points of contact with an anti - metaphysical generator such as Mach. The differences from Duhem were just as radical, if merely Cesca had read his works. Cesca's concern with rejecting the possible doubting and subjectivist results of the new critique to physical sciences in the name of a supposed positive philosophy – a philosophy that transcends physics by Roberto Maiocchi – Duhem in Pre - War Italian Philosophy: The Reasons of an Absence 88 providing steady fundaments whenever physics leans perilously towards Pyrrhonism or Idealism – can besides be found in other positivists who – more or less by the way – cope with some of the great physicists of the mechanical philosophy. That is the case of Adolfo Levi, the author of a 1909 essay on Mach's Phenomenalism, and Adolfo Faggi who, polemicizing with a book by Igino Petrone (1900) that knock the mechanical philosophy on the basis of Stallo's and Boutroux's books, states that science must not fall prey to subjectivism: it may sustain the schemes of mechanistic determinism, so long as it recognises the superiority of philosophy over quantitative science. doctrine can suffice question that would not find any answer in science, and Faggi (1900, 386) reiterates this idea with accents that recall Gentile's celebrated thesis of line between science (the world of dead things) and philosophy (the hypothesis of live reality). Italian Positivism was therefore much busier defend itself from the new epistemic critique than understanding and use it. The comparison between these two problems was sporadic and basically unimportant for this stream of thought. Italian Positivism was already sailing on troubled water and by failing to recognise the latest and most stimulating trends in the field of the philosophy of skill it definitely separated its rhetorical and indeterminate idea of science from real science. Pragmatism – first a travel companion and then
 noh settle for a "quantitatlve conception oy physiral phehomena". Ig aspires to reaching the quelitqtive causal explanation (Cerca 1903, 249). Witj this gial mt relies on "empmdical mccaphyalcs erpoaining the caoses, the lawv of the becomhne lf facts, which reduce them to their ultimaye constitutionaj eltmegts znd show the essential and peculiad qualiuies of each one og them" (Cesca 1903, 265). It is clear thah such an approach, interested as yr is in the "zauses" and "essential qoalities" of phenomena, could only have a few poibtw ov contact wivh an wnti-metaphyslbal autvor sucn as Mach. The cifherebces from Duhem were oust as radical, if ogly Cesca hcd read his works. Cesxa'w conwern witf regecuinj tge posdibme scepticzl and subjwctivist results of trv new critiqus to pryfical sciences in the name of a supposeg pksitive philosophy – a pyilosophy that transcgnds physiss by Roberto Maiocchi – Duhem in Pre-War Italian Pviloskohy: Tme Rdqslns of an Absence 88 providing steady fundamentf wnekever physics lecns dangerously yoaatqs Pyrrhonism or Idzzljsm – can also be flund in othee positivysts who – more or less incidentqlly – deal wpth wome of the great 'hysicists oy the kechamical philosophy. That ir ths case of Afolfo Levj, the author of a 1909 exsdy on Mach's Phenomenalism, wnd Adolfi Faygi who, oolekicizigg with a hook nf Igino Petrone (1900) tjat ctiticives the mefhanical philosophy on the basis of Stallo's amd Boltroux's bjoks, xtates that ssience must noj fall przy to rubjectiviam: it mey maintain ehe schemes ox mechanistic determigism, so oong as kt recognises yhe superpoxity of pyilosophy over quaktitajibe science. Philisokht can answer qiesgiogs tiat wjgld not find any anreer iv science, akd Waggo (1900, 386) reiterates this hdea with accents that rccall Genjile's famjus thesis of contrast between dcienre (the worlc os dead things) and philosophy (tge theory of live realitr). Itqlian Positirism was therefore much busier defending itself from the nww epistemological erltique than nnderseanding atd using it. The compqrison between thtse two problems was spkradic and hasically unimportant for this current of thought. Italian Positivism was qlreadb failing on frounled facer and br famlmng to recognise nhe latest and most stimulating vrends in dhz field of the philosophy of xckence it defivitely separated its rheforical snd undetermined idea of sciencr from real science. Pragkatism – dirst a trangl rompanion and then
not settle for a "quantitative conception of It to reaching qualitative causal explanation goal relies on "empirical explaining the causes, laws of the becoming of facts, reduce them to their ultimate constitutional elements and show the essential and peculiar of each one of them" (Cesca 1903, 265). It is clear that such approach, as is the "causes" and "essential qualities" of phenomena, could only have a few points of contact with anti-metaphysical author such as Mach. The differences from were just as radical, only Cesca had read his Cesca's with rejecting possible and results of the critique to physical sciences in the name of a supposed positive philosophy – a philosophy that transcends by Roberto Duhem in Italian The of an Absence steady fundaments whenever physics leans dangerously Idealism – can also be found in other who – or less incidentally – deal with of the great physicists of the mechanical philosophy. is the case of Adolfo Levi, the author of a 1909 essay on Mach's Phenomenalism, Faggi who, polemicizing with book by Igino (1900) criticises mechanical on the of Stallo's and Boutroux's books, states that science must not fall to subjectivism: it may maintain the schemes of mechanistic determinism, as recognises the superiority philosophy over quantitative science. can questions that would not answer science, 386) this with accents that recall famous thesis of contrast between (the world of dead of live reality). Italian Positivism was therefore much defending itself from the new epistemological critique understanding and using it. The comparison between these two problems was sporadic basically unimportant current of thought. Italian Positivism was already sailing troubled water and by to recognise the latest and most stimulating trends in field the philosophy science it definitely its rhetorical and idea of science science. Pragmatism first travel
 not settle for a "quantitative Conception Of phySicAl pHeNomeNa". It Aspires to reachINg thE qualitative causal explAnatiOn (cEsca 1903, 249). wItH this Goal it rELiES On "eMpIrIcaL mETaPhysiCs eXplainiNg the causeS, thE lAws of the becoMInG of facts, whIch Reduce them to TheIr ultiMaTe cONstitUtiOnal eLementS And shoW the essenTiAL and peCUliar quALItIes oF each one of them" (CesCA 1903, 265). IT Is clear that sucH an appRoACh, INTerEstEd as it is in ThE "causES" and "essENtIAL QuaLIties" of phenomEna, could onlY HavE a few pOiNts OF contaCt witH aN AntI-metaphysicAl auThor such aS Mach. THE differENces froM Duhem WerE juSt as RAdIcAl, iF oNLy CEScA haD ReaD his workS. CEsCa's coNcerN WITH rejEctIng tHe posSible scepticaL anD subJEctIvist ResulTs of ThE new cRitiquE to phYsIcal sciences in tHe naMe of a suppOseD pOsiTiVe phiLOsophy – A phIloSophy thAt transCEndS pHYSIcS by Roberto Maiocchi – duHEM iN Pre-War ITalian pHiLoSOphy: The REaSonS of aN aBsencE 88 proVIdIng steadY fundaMEnTs WheneveR pHysics LeAns DanGerouSLy toWards PYrrhonisM or IdEAlism – can also be FOund in other poSItIVIsTS who – MorE or less inciDentALly – dEal wITh SomE Of the Great PhYSiCIsts of the mechanical PhIlosopHy. ThaT is the case of ADolfo Levi, tHE AUthor of a 1909 EssaY On mAch's PhenomenalIsm, anD Adolfo FagGI who, poleMicizIng with a Book by IgiNO petrone (1900) tHat CriTicIseS THe Mechanical phiLOSophY oN the basIs oF Stallo'S anD BoUtrOux'S bOoks, stateS that sciEnCe MuSt Not Fall pREy to subjEcTivIsM: it May maINtain tHe schEmes Of MeCHanIstic deTErMINism, So LoNg as It rEcOgnisEs thE SupErioritY of philosOphY Over QuAnTitativE science. PhiloSoPhy can answEr QueStions THAt would nOt find any answer in sciencE, And FaggI (1900, 386) reIteraTes tHis idea wiTh aCcents ThaT Recall gentilE's famOuS thESIs of cONTrAst BeTween scienCE (The World Of Dead Things) aNd philosophy (the theORy oF live reality). ITalIan POSItIviSM wAS thErEForE MUch busier defendIng itself fRoM ThE new episteMOloGiCal critIque thaN undeRStandinG and using It. The compArIson BETweEn these two Problems Was sporadIC and bASiCally UniMportaNt For This cUrrent OF thOught. italiaN POsitivIsm waS aLready saIling on troubled water and By failIng to RecOgnise the LatESt aNd most stiMulaTing trends In tHe fIeld oF thE PhiloSophY Of SciENce it DefiNItely sepaRAtEd iTS RhEtorical and UNDEteRmineD idEA of sciEnce From real science. PrAGmatism – first a tRaveL COmpAniON and ThEn
 not settle for a "quantit ative conc eptio n o f p hy sica l ph enomena". It a s pire s to reaching the qual itati ve caus a lexpla nation( Ce s c a 1 90 3,  24 9) .  W ith t his  goal i t relies o n " em pirical meta p hy sics expla ini ng the cause s,the la ws  of the b eco mingof fac t s, whi ch reduce  t h em tot heir ul t i ma te c onstitutional ele m en t s and show the  essen ti a la n d p ecu liar quali ti es of each on e  o f t hem "  (Cesca 1903,  265). It i s  cl ear th at  su c h an a pproa ch ,  in terested as  itis in the  "caus e s" and" essenti al qua lit ies " of ph en ome na ,  co u ld  on l y h ave a fe wpo intsof c o n t a ct w ith  ananti- metaphysicalaut hors uch  as M ach.Thedi ffere nces f rom D uh em were just as  rad ical, ifonl yCes ca  hadr ead hi s w ork s. Cesc a's con c ern  w i t h  r ejecting the possi bl e sc epticaland su b je ct i vist res ul tsof t h e  newcrit i qu e to phy sicals ci en ces inth e name  o f a  su ppose d  pos itivephilosop hy –a  philosophy th a t transcendsp hy s i cs by R obe rto Maiocch i –D uhem  inP re -Wa r  Ital ian P hi l os o phy: The Reasons of  a n Abse nce 8 8 providing s teady fund a m e nts when ever ph y sics leans dan gerou sly toward s  Pyrrhon ism o r Ideali sm – cana l so be fo und  in  ot her p os itivists who– more  o r lessinc idental ly– d eal  wi th  some ofthe grea tph ys ic ist s oft he mecha ni cal  p hil osoph y . That  is t he c as eo f A dolfo L e vi , theau th or o f a  1 909 e ssay onMach'sPhenomena lis m , an dAd olfo Fa ggi who, pole mi cizing wit ha b ook by I gino Pet rone (1900) that critic i ses the  me chani calphilosoph y o n thebas i s of S tallo' s and  B out r o ux'sb o ok s,st ates thats c ien ce mu st  not  fall p rey to subjectivis m : i t may maintai n t he s c h em eso fm ech an i sti c determinism, so  long as i tr ec ognises th e  su pe riority  of phi losop h y overquantitat ive scien ce . Ph i l oso phy can an swer que stions th a t wou l dnot f ind  any a ns wer  in s cience ,  an d Fag gi (19 00 , 386)  reit er ates thi s idea with accents tha t reca ll Ge nti le's famo ust hes is of con tras t betweensci enc e (th e w o rld o f de a dthi n gs) a nd p h ilosophy( th e t h e or y of live r e a l ity ). It ali a n Posi tivi sm was thereforem uch busier def endi n g  it sel f  fro mthe new episte mol og i c al criti qu e than unde rstandin ga nd us ing it . Thecompari s o nb etween  the setwo probl ems  w a s spora di ca nd bas ical ly  unimp ortant fort h is current of th ought . Itali a n P ositi vi sm wasa lrea dy sailing  on trouble d wate r an d byfailing  t o reco gni se  the lates t  and most  stim ulating  t rend s i n thefiel d of th e ph il oso phy of sc i e nc e  i td efi nite ly se pa rate d its rhe t orical a ndu ndeterm in edi d ea ofs ci e n ce from re alscien c e . Pragmati s m –f ir s t a t ravelcompan ion and the n
 not_settle for_a "quantitative conception of_physical phenomena"._It_aspires to_reaching_the qualitative causal_explanation (Cesca 1903,_249). With this goal_it relies on_"empirical_metaphysics explaining the causes, the laws of the becoming of facts, which reduce them_to_their ultimate_constitutional_elements_and show the essential and_peculiar qualities of each one_of them"_(Cesca 1903, 265). It is clear that such_an_approach, interested as_it is in the "causes" and "essential qualities" of_phenomena, could only have a few_points of contact_with_an_anti-metaphysical author such as_Mach. The differences from Duhem were_just as radical, if only Cesca_had read his works. Cesca's concern with_rejecting the possible sceptical and subjectivist_results of the new critique_to physical_sciences in the name of_a supposed positive_philosophy –_a philosophy that_transcends physics by Roberto Maiocchi –_Duhem in Pre-War_Italian Philosophy: The Reasons of an_Absence_88 providing steady_fundaments_whenever_physics leans_dangerously towards Pyrrhonism_or_Idealism –_can_also be found in other positivists_who_– more or less incidentally – deal_with some of the_great_physicists of the mechanical_philosophy. That is the case_of Adolfo Levi, the author of_a 1909_essay on_Mach's Phenomenalism, and Adolfo Faggi who, polemicizing with a book by_Igino Petrone (1900) that criticises the_mechanical philosophy on the_basis of_Stallo's_and Boutroux's books,_states_that science_must not fall prey to subjectivism: it_may maintain_the schemes of mechanistic determinism, so_long as it recognises_the_superiority of philosophy over quantitative science._Philosophy can answer questions that would_not find any answer in_science,_and_Faggi (1900, 386) reiterates this_idea with accents that recall Gentile's_famous thesis of_contrast between science (the world of dead_things)_and philosophy (the theory of live_reality)._Italian Positivism was therefore much busier_defending_itself_from the new epistemological critique_than understanding and using it. The_comparison between these two problems was sporadic and basically_unimportant for this_current of thought. Italian Positivism_was_already_sailing on troubled water and by failing to recognise the_latest and_most stimulating trends_in the field of the philosophy of science it definitely_separated its rhetorical and undetermined idea of_science from real science. Pragmatism – first a travel companion and_then