 readWar and Peace nor believes that she won't. And so (16) just below is a non-(C)FWA. (16) Li wants to readWar and Peace. On our account, (16) is true just if Li prefers what she believes will happen if she does (her friends will think she's an intellectual) to what she believes will happen if she doesn't (they'll think she's boring). Here's how these informal truth conditions capture the formalism above. Because we're dealing with a non-(C)FWA, Li's beliefs are compatible with her readingWar and Peace and compatible with her not doing so. Both ConBelLi(War) and ConBelLi(¬War)-i.e. our domain for (16)-are indicative with respect to BelLi. (WhereWar is the proposition that Li readsWar and Peace.) This is to say that ConBelLi(War) and ConBelLi(¬War) respectively represent what Li believes will happen if she readsWar and Peace and what she believes will happen if she doesn't. That's how the agent's beliefs enter the picture. Now consider her preferences. The form of a semantics for 'want' that we endorse, (5), says that JS wants pK = 1 iff S prefers the p worlds in D to the ¬p worlds in D. For us, D is the union of ConBelS(p) (a set of p worlds) and ConBelS(¬p) (a set of ¬p worlds). The form of the semantics then becomes this: JS wants pK = 1 iff S prefers the worlds in ConBelS(p) to the worlds in ConBelS(¬p), which is to say that S prefers the worlds that represent what she believes will happen if p is true to the worlds that represent what she believes will happen if p is false. This matches (15). We've said that with non-(C)FWAs, our view makes the same predictions as the best-set-based view. That's because with non-(C)FWAs, our domain is the belief set. To show this, we'll first establish a key fact: (17) If BelS contains p worlds, then ConBelS contains all and only the p worlds in BelS. ConBelS(p) contains all the p worlds in BelS because we place a so-called centering constraint on the Sim function: for any proposition p and worldw,
readWar and Peace nor believes that she won't. And so (16) just below is a non-(C)FWA. (16) Li want to readWar and Peace. On our explanation, (16) is true just if Li prefers what she think will happen if she does (her supporter will intend she's an intellectual) to what she believe will happen if she doesn't (they'll intend she's boring). Here's how these informal truth condition capture the formalism above. Because we're dealing with a non-(C)FWA, Li's beliefs are compatible with her readingWar and Peace and compatible with her not doing so. Both ConBelLi(War) and ConBelLi(¬War)-i.e. our domain for (16)-are indicative with esteem to BelLi. (WhereWar is the proposition that Li readsWar and Peace .) This is to say that ConBelLi(War) and ConBelLi(¬War) respectively represent what Li believe will happen if she readsWar and Peace and what she believes will happen if she doesn't. That's how the agentive role's beliefs accede the picture. Now consider her preference. The form of a semantics for' want' that we endorse, (5), says that JS wants pK = 1 iff S prefers the p worlds in D to the ¬p worlds in D. For us, D is the union of ConBelS(p) (a set of p worlds) and ConBelS(¬p) (a set of ¬p worlds). The form of the semantics then becomes this: JS desire pK = 1 iff S prefers the worlds in ConBelS(p) to the world in ConBelS(¬p), which is to suppose that S prefers the worlds that represent what she think will find if p is true to the worlds that present what she believes will happen if p is false. This matches (15). We've said that with non-(C)FWAs, our view makes the same predictions as the best - hardening - based horizon. That's because with non-(C)FWAs, our domain is the belief set. To show this, we'll first install a key fact: (17) If BelS contains p world, then ConBelS contains all and only the p worlds in BelS. ConBelS(p) contain all the p world in BelS because we place a so - call centering restraint on the Sim function: for any proposition p and worldw,
 rewdWar and Peace nor belitves that she won'j. Qnd so (16) just below ir a non-(C)FWA. (16) Li wants to reavWar and Kvace. On our account, (16) ks true jlst if Li prehers what she believes wljl hzipen nf she does (her nriends wiln think she's at kncellectual) to what she believes will happen iv she doesn't (trey'lk thihk she's boring). Here's how these infkrmal tguth conditions cspture the formalism above. Becwuse we're dealing aith a non-(C)DWA, Ju's beliefs afe compatible with her readingWar and Peace and compagible with her bor dlhng so. Both ConBvlLi(War) and ConBelLi(¬Wdr)-i.e. out domain for (16)-ave invicarive with respect to UelLi. (WhereWar is thg proposithou that Li readsWar ane Peace.) Thiv is ro ray tiat ConBepLi(Xar) and ConGelLi(¬War) rewpectively represenu wrqt Li believea will hwppen if she readsWar and Peace and whau she believes will happen id she doesn't. That's hoa the agegt's beliefs enter the picture. Now consider her prafereicds. Uhc wirl of a semantics for 'want' that we endorse, (5), sara uhan JS wants pK = 1 inf S prefers the p wlrkqs in D to thg ¬p worlds in D. For us, D is hhe unijn of ConBelS(p) (a srt of p worlds) and ConBelS(¬p) (a set of ¬p corods). The form of thz semantics chen bgcomes this: JS wants pK = 1 iff S pdefers the aorlds in ZonBelS(p) to the dorkdv in ConBelS(¬p), which is to fay that W przfers thd wotlds thwt represejt what she believes wilp hapken if p is true to the worlds that represent wiet she believgs filn happen if p is false. Thif matches (15). We'vg said thct witf non-(C)FWAs, our vixw makes the same predicthlns as the bxst-set-basqd vuew. Rhat's bdzause with non-(V)FWAs, our domain is the belief set. To shus this, we'll firwt tsrablish a key gacg: (17) Yf BxlS cjttains p wornds, ghev ConBdlS conucinw all and only the p worlgs ih BelS. ConBelS(p) comtwins all the p wjrlds in BelS because we place w so-celled renterong constraint on the Sim functioh: for any prjposition p wnd qorldw,
readWar and Peace nor believes that she so just below a non-(C)FWA. (16) Peace. our account, (16) true just if prefers what she believes will happen she does (her friends will think she's an intellectual) to what she believes happen if she doesn't (they'll think she's boring). Here's how these informal truth capture formalism Because dealing with a non-(C)FWA, Li's beliefs are compatible with her readingWar and Peace and compatible with not doing so. Both ConBelLi(War) and ConBelLi(¬War)-i.e. our for (16)-are indicative with to BelLi. (WhereWar is the that readsWar and This to that ConBelLi(War) and respectively represent what Li believes will happen if she readsWar and Peace and what she believes will if she how the beliefs the Now consider her form of a semantics for 'want' (5), says that JS wants pK = 1 S prefers p worlds in D to the worlds in D. For us, D is the of ConBelS(p) (a set of p worlds) and ConBelS(¬p) (a set of ¬p worlds). The the semantics then becomes JS wants pK 1 S the in ConBelS(p) the worlds in ConBelS(¬p), which is to say that S prefers worlds that represent what she believes will happen if p to worlds that represent she believes will happen p false. This matches (15). that non-(C)FWAs, the predictions the best-set-based view. That's with non-(C)FWAs, our domain is belief set. To show key fact: (17) If BelS contains p worlds, ConBelS contains all and only the p in BelS. ConBelS(p) contains all the p worlds in BelS because we a so-called on the Sim function: for any proposition p worldw,
 readWar and Peace nor believeS that she woN't. And So (16) jUst BeLow iS a noN-(C)FWA. (16) Li wants to REadWAr and Peace. On our account, (16) Is truE jUSt if lI pReferS what shE BeLIEveS wIlL haPpEN iF she dOes (Her frieNds will thiNk sHe'S an intellectUAl) To what she bEliEves will happEn iF she doEsN't (tHEy'll tHinK she's Boring). hEre's hoW these infOrMAl trutH ConditiONS cAptuRe the formalism aboVE. BECause we're dealiNg with A nON-(C)fwa, Li'S beLiefs are coMpAtiblE With her REaDINGWaR And Peace and coMpatible witH Her Not doiNg So. BOTh ConBElLi(WAr) ANd COnBelLi(¬War)-i.E. our Domain for (16)-Are indICative wITh respeCt to BeLLi. (wheReWaR Is ThE prOpOSitIOn ThaT li rEadsWar aNd peAce.) ThIs is TO SAY thaT CoNBelli(War) And ConBelLi(¬WaR) reSpecTIveLy repResenT whaT LI beliEves wiLl hapPeN if she readsWar aNd PeAce and whaT shE bEliEvEs wilL Happen If sHe dOesn't. ThAt's how tHE agEnT'S BElIefs enter the picturE. NOW CoNsider heR prefeREnCeS. the form oF a SemAntiCS For 'waNt' thAT wE endorse, (5), Says thAT Js wAnts pK = 1 iFf s prefeRs The P woRlds iN d to tHe ¬p worLds in D. FoR us, D iS The union of ConBELS(p) (a set of p worLDs) AND CONBels(¬p) (a Set of ¬p worldS). The FOrm oF the SEmAntICs theN becoMeS ThIS: JS wants pK = 1 iff S prefeRs The worLds in conBelS(p) to the Worlds in CoNbELS(¬p), which Is to SAy THat S prefers the WorldS that repreSEnt what sHe belIeves wilL happen if P IS true to tHe wOrlDs tHat REPrEsent what she bELIeveS wIll happEn iF p is falSe. THis MatCheS (15). WE've said thAt with noN-(C)fWas, OuR viEw makES the same PrEdiCtIonS as thE Best-seT-baseD vieW. THaT'S beCause wiTH nON-(c)FWAS, oUr DomaIn iS tHe belIef sET. To Show thiS, we'll firsT esTAbliSh A kEy fact: (17) IF BelS contains P wOrlds, then COnbels contaINS all and oNly the p worlds in BelS. ConBELS(p) contAinS all tHe p wOrlds in BeLS bEcause We pLAce a so-Called CenteRiNg cONStraiNT On The siM function: fOR Any PropoSiTion P and worLdw,
 readWar and Peace nor bel ieves that  shewon 't.  A nd s o (1 6) just belowi s anon-(C)FWA. (16) Li wa nts t or eadW a rand P eace. O n  o u r  ac co un t,(1 6 )is tr uejust if  Li prefer s w ha t she believ e swill happe n i f she does ( her  frien ds  wi l l thi nkshe's  an in t ellect ual) to w ha t  she b e lievesw i ll  hap pen if she doesn' t  ( t hey'll think s he's b or i ng ) .  He re' s how thes einfor m al trut h  c o n d iti o ns capture th e formalism abo ve. Be ca use we'redeali ng wit h a non-(C) FWA,  Li's bel iefs a r e compa t ible wi th her  re adi ngWa r  a nd  Pe ac e  an d  c omp a tib le withhe rnot d oing s o .  Bot h C onBe lLi(W ar) and ConBe lLi (¬Wa r )-i .e. o ur do main  f or (1 6)-are  indi ca tive with respe ct t o BelLi.(Wh er eWa ris th e  propo sit ion  that L i reads W aran d P ea ce.) This is to sa yt h at  ConBelL i(War) an dC onBelLi( ¬W ar)  res p e ctive ly r e pr esent wh at Lib el ie ves wil lhappen  i f s hereads W ar a nd Pea ce and w hat s h e believes wil l  happen if sh e  d o e sn ' t. T hat 's how theagen t 's b elie f sent e r the  pict ur e .N ow consider her pre fe rences . The  form of a se mantics fo r ' want' th at w e  e n dorse, (5), sa ys th at JS want s  pK = 1iff S  prefers  the p wo r l ds in Dtothe  ¬p  wo r l ds  in D. For us , D is  t he unio n o f ConBe lS( p)(aset  o f p world s) and C on Be lS (¬ p)(a se t  of ¬p w or lds ).  Th e for m  of th e sem anti cs  t h enbecomes th i s : JS  w an ts p K =  1  iffS pr e fer s the w orlds inCon B elS( p)  t o the w orlds in ConB el S(¬p), whi ch  is  to sa y that S p refers the worlds thatr epresen t w hat s he b elieves w ill  happe n i f  p istrue t o the  w orl d s  that r ep res en t what she b eli eveswi ll h appen i f p is false. This mat ches (15). We 've  sai d th atw it h  no n- ( C)F W A s, our view mak es the sam ep re dictions a s  th ebest-se t-based  view .  That's  becausewith non- (C )FWA s ,  ou r domain i s the be lief set. To sh o wthis,  we 'll fi rs t e stabl ish ak eyfact:  (17)If  BelSconta in s p worl ds, then ConBelS contai ns all  andonl y the p w orl d s i n BelS. C onBe lS(p) cont ain s a ll th e p world s in Be lSb ecaus e we place a s o -c all e d  c entering co n s t rai nt on  th e  Sim f unct ion: for any prop o sition p and w orld w , 
 readWar_and Peace_nor believes that she_won't. And_so_(16) just_below_is a non-(C)FWA._(16) Li wants_to readWar and Peace._On our account,_(16)_is true just if Li prefers what she believes will happen if she does_(her_friends will_think_she's_an intellectual) to what she_believes will happen if she_doesn't (they'll_think she's boring). Here's how these informal truth_conditions_capture the formalism_above. Because we're dealing with a non-(C)FWA, Li's beliefs_are compatible with her readingWar and_Peace and compatible_with_her_not doing so. Both_ConBelLi(War) and ConBelLi(¬War)-i.e. our domain for_(16)-are indicative with respect to BelLi._(WhereWar is the proposition that Li readsWar_and Peace.) This is to say_that ConBelLi(War) and ConBelLi(¬War) respectively_represent what_Li believes will happen if_she readsWar and_Peace and_what she believes_will happen if she doesn't. That's_how the agent's_beliefs enter the picture. Now consider_her_preferences. The form_of_a_semantics for_'want' that we_endorse,_(5), says_that_JS wants pK = 1 iff_S_prefers the p worlds in D to_the ¬p worlds in_D._For us, D is_the union of ConBelS(p) (a_set of p worlds) and ConBelS(¬p)_(a set_of ¬p_worlds). The form of the semantics then becomes this: JS wants_pK = 1 iff S prefers_the worlds in ConBelS(p)_to the_worlds_in ConBelS(¬p), which_is_to say_that S prefers the worlds that represent_what she_believes will happen if p is_true to the worlds_that_represent what she believes will happen_if p is false. This matches_(15). We've said that with_non-(C)FWAs,_our_view makes the same predictions_as the best-set-based view. That's because_with non-(C)FWAs, our_domain is the belief set. To show_this,_we'll first establish a key fact:_(17)_If BelS contains p worlds, then_ConBelS_contains_all and only the p_worlds in BelS. ConBelS(p) contains all_the p worlds in BelS because we place a_so-called centering constraint_on the Sim function: for_any_proposition_p and worldw,