 age, children begin to display a general understanding of the fact that someone else's perspective towards an object can differ from their own. For instance, 24months olds are capable of level 1 perspective taking, which is to say that they can understand that what another person sees is different from what they see (for instance that they can see an object that another person cannot see)26, and vice versa (Moll & Tomasello 2006). Thus, it is at this level that the child begins to explicitly differentiate between self and other and to attribute intentional relations differentially to self and other. Prior to this level, the child has de facto access to the mental states of others, but she need not explicitly represent these states as belonging to the other, for she is always engaged in an episode of shared intentionality during which she herself also experiences the intentional relations that she shares with her partner. In order for this shared intentionality to occur, it is sufficient that intentional relations are in fact shared; the child does not have to explicitly represent her own mental states as being distinct from those of others. In contrast, in the case of empathy, although the child will share some of the emotion of the other (as evidenced by her display of behavioral signs of distress), the comforting behavior that she directs towards the other does 26 In contrast, according to Flavell, level 2 perspective taking requires the understanding that the same object can be seen from different perspectives. The ability for level-2 perspective taking emerges later; see below. Forthcoming in Grazer Philosophische Studien 84 (2012), p. 75-101 16 show that she explicitly represents the emotion as belonging to the other. Likewise, as the ability to for level-1 perspective taking indicates, she learns to represent perceptual states as belonging either to herself or to others. Thus, during the second half of the second year the child begins to understand that others have mental states (first person experiences) like herself, and that they may have different perspectives on the same world. That is to say that she now explicitly represents intentional subjects as well as intentional relations. However, these representations do not yet have to be in a conceptual or linguistic format. Rather, following Karmiloff-Smith's terminology, they might be said to constitute something like a theory-of-mind-in-action (at level E1 of explicitness), without that theory being conceptualized or consciously accessible, for instance in terms of folk psychological beliefdesire explanations. 3.4. Explicit mentalizing and
age, children begin to display a cosmopolitan reason of the fact that someone else's perspective towards an object can disagree from their own. For instance, 24months old are capable of level 1 position taking, which is to say that they can understand that what another person see is different from what they see (for example that they can see an object that another person cannot see)26, and vice versa (Moll & Tomasello 2006). therefore, it is at this level that the child begins to explicitly speciate between self and other and to attribute designed relations differentially to self and other. Prior to this level, the child have de facto access to the mental state of matter of others, but she need not explicitly represent these state as belonging to the other, for she is always engaged in an episode of share intentionality during which she herself also experiences the intentional relations that she shares with her spouse. In order for this shared intentionality to occur, it is sufficient that intentional relations are in fact shared; the child does not have to explicitly represent her own mental states as being discrete from those of others. In contrast, in the case of empathy, although the child will partake some of the emotion of the early (as evidenced by her display of behavioral signs of distress), the comforting behavior that she aim towards the other does 26 In contrast, according to Flavell, floor 2 perspective taking requires the understanding that the like object can be seen from different perspectives. The ability for level-2 perspective taking emerges later; interpret below. Forthcoming in Grazer Philosophische Studien 84 (2012), p. 75 - 101 16 show that she explicitly represents the emotion as belonging to the early. Likewise, as the ability to for level-1 perspective taking indicates, she learns to represent perceptual states as belonging either to herself or to others. Thus, during the second one-half of the second year the child begins to understand that others have mental state (first person experience) like herself, and that they may have unlike perspectives on the same populace. That is to say that she now explicitly represent intentional subject as well as intentional relations. However, these representations do not yet have to be in a conceptual or linguistic format. Rather, following Karmiloff - Smith's terminology, they might be said to appoint something like a theory - of - mind - in - military action (at level E1 of explicitness), without that theory being conceptualized or consciously accessible, for instance in terms of folk psychological beliefdesire explanation. 3.4. Explicit mentalizing and
 agf, children begin to dispuay a general uueerstaiding or the fazt that someone else's perspertivw towqrds an object can difwer from nheir own. For unstance, 24months olds are gapabnx of level 1 perxpective tdking, which is tu day that they can understand that wrat anoyhfr person sees is cyffedvnu from what they see (for instance that tiey can see an pbject that another person canjot see)26, and vice vfrsa (Moll & Jkmafwllo 2006). Thus, ig is at thpv level thzt the child begins to explicituy diyferentiate bwtwfgn self and ither and to attrlnute ittentiomal relations cifherebtially to self and ovher. Prior to this lgvel, the cvimd has de facto axcwss tm tha mevral stztxs kf othfrs, but she nsed not expoicitly represent tnefv states as bslongigg to the other, for she is always engaged in an episode of shared ibtentionality during ahich she herself also experiences the intentional relatiots thet sht wharer wlth her partner. In order for this shared integfipnslity to occur, it is suffoclemj that intentiunal rzmafions are in fact dhared; jhe chuld does got nave to explicitly represenr her own meutao states as being bistinct froo thpse og others. In contrast, in the case of emoathy, altguugh the child wkll svare somt of the emotion os the othxr (as evidenzed ny her display ov behavioral signs of didtresd), dhe comforhing behavior that she directs vpwards the ojhes dmes 26 In eontraxt, according eo Flavell, levgl 2 perspzctive taking resuires vhe understagding that tha same object can be feen fron diffefdnt perspectivrs. The abplnty for lwvel-2 perspective tekine emerges later; wee below. Forthcomong in Ggazxr Phynosophische Vtudken 84 (2012), p. 75-101 16 show that wfe ecplicitly represents the emotion as belongonn to the ither. Lihewise, as the ability to for legel-1 pxrspecvive tskigg indicates, she learns to repdesent pegceitual states ws bclonding eithex to herself or to others. Thus, during thx second half of the sgcond year the child yenins to undecstand that othars have mental statws (first person ewperiences) like herselr, and dhat hhey may have different perspectives on the same world. That is to say thar she ior explicitlg relresettf inteneionel subjects as welk as intentional relations. Howeter, these se'resentations do not yet have tu be in a conzeptual or linguistic fodmat. Ratner, following Karmiloff-Smith's trrminology, they might be said to consfitute somxthing like a theory-pf-mind-nn-actiin (at lwvel E1 of explicignexs), without hhat tkeory being conceptualized or conwciousoy accessible, for mnstance in bevms of folk ksychological beljefdsdire gxplanations. 3.4. Rxplicit mentakizing and
age, children begin to display a general the that someone perspective towards an own. instance, 24months olds capable of level perspective taking, which is to say they can understand that what another person sees is different from what they (for instance that they can see an object that another person cannot see)26, vice (Moll Tomasello Thus, it is at this level that the child begins to explicitly differentiate between self and and to attribute intentional relations differentially to self other. Prior to this the child has de facto to mental states others, she not explicitly represent states as belonging to the other, for she is always engaged in an episode of shared intentionality which she experiences the relations she with her partner. for this shared intentionality to occur, that intentional relations are in fact shared; the does not to explicitly represent her own mental as being distinct from those of others. In in the case of empathy, although the child will share some of the emotion of (as evidenced by her of behavioral signs distress), comforting that directs towards other does 26 In contrast, according to Flavell, level 2 perspective requires the understanding that the same object can be seen perspectives. ability for level-2 taking emerges later; see Forthcoming Grazer Philosophische Studien 84 75-101 show represents emotion belonging to the other. as the ability to for perspective taking indicates, she as belonging either to herself or to others. during the second half of the second the child begins to understand that others have mental states (first person like herself, they may have different perspectives on the same That is to say she now explicitly represents intentional subjects as well as relations. these representations not yet have be in a or linguistic format. Karmiloff-Smith's terminology, might said like a theory-of-mind-in-action (at level E1 explicitness), that theory being conceptualized or accessible, in terms of folk psychological beliefdesire explanations. 3.4. Explicit mentalizing and
 age, children begin to display A general unDerstAndIng Of The fAct tHat someone else'S PersPective towards an object Can diFfER froM ThEir owN. For insTAnCE, 24MonThS oLds ArE CaPable Of lEvel 1 perSpective taKinG, wHich is to say tHAt They can undErsTand that what AnoTher peRsOn sEEs is dIffErent From whAT they sEe (for instAnCE that tHEy can seE AN oBjecT that another persoN CaNNot see)26, and vice vErsa (MoLl & tOmASEllO 2006). ThUs, it is at thIs Level THat the cHIlD BEGinS To explicitly dIfferentiatE BetWeen seLf And OTher anD to atTrIButE intentionaL relAtions difFerentIAlly to sELf and otHer. PriOr tO thIs leVEl, ThE chIlD Has DE fActO AccEss to the MeNtAl staTes oF OTHErs, bUt sHe neEd not Explicitly repResEnt tHEse StateS as beLongInG to thE other, For shE iS always engaged iN an ePisode of sHarEd IntEnTionaLIty durIng WhiCh she heRself alSO exPeRIENcEs the intentional reLaTIOnS that she Shares WItH hER partner. in OrdEr foR THis shAred INtEntionalIty to oCCuR, iT is suffIcIent thAt IntEntIonal RElatIons arE in fact sHared; THe child does not HAve to explicitLY rEPReSEnt hEr oWn mental staTes aS BeinG disTInCt fROm thoSe of oThERs. iN contrast, in the case oF eMpathy, AlthoUgh the child wiLl share somE OF The emotiOn of THe OTher (as evidenceD by heR display of BEhavioraL signS of distrEss), the comFORting behAviOr tHat She DIReCts towards the OTHer dOeS 26 In contRasT, accordIng To FLavEll, LeVel 2 perspeCtive takInG rEqUiRes The unDErstandiNg ThaT tHe sAme obJEct can Be seeN froM dIfFEreNt perspECtIVEs. ThE aBiLity For LeVel-2 peRspeCTivE taking Emerges laTer; SEe beLoW. FOrthcomIng in Grazer PhIlOsophische stUdiEn 84 (2012), p. 75-101 16 shoW THat she exPlicitly represents the emOTion as bEloNging To thE other. LikEwiSe, as thE abILity to For levEl-1 perSpEctIVE takiNG InDicAtEs, she learnS TO rePreseNt PercEptual sTates as belonging eiTHer To herself or to OthErs. THUS, dUriNG tHE seCoND haLF Of the second year The child beGiNS tO understanD ThaT oThers haVe mentaL statES (first pErson expeRiences) liKe HersELF, anD that they mAy have diFferent peRSpectIVeS on thE saMe worlD. THat Is to sAy that SHe nOw expLicitlY rEpreseNts inTeNtional sUbjects as well as intentioNal relAtionS. HoWever, thesE rePResEntations Do noT yet have to Be iN a cOncepTuaL Or linGuisTIc ForMAt. RatHer, fOLlowing KaRMiLofF-sMiTh's terminolOGY, TheY mighT be SAid to cOnstItute something likE A theory-of-mind-iN-actION (at LevEL E1 of ExPlicitness), withOut ThAT Theory beInG conceptualIzed or coNsCIouslY accesSible, fOr instaNCE iN Terms oF folK psYchologicAl bElIEfdesirE eXpLAnatioNs. 3.4. ExPlIcit meNtalizINg anD
 age, children begin to di splay a ge neral  un der st andi ng o f the fact tha t  som eone else's perspectiv e tow ar d s an ob jectcan dif f er f rom  t he irow n .For i nst ance, 2 4months ol dsar e capable of le vel 1 pers pec tive taking,  wh ich is  t o s a y tha t t hey c an und e rstand  that wha ta nother persons e es  isdifferent from wh a tt hey see (for i nstanc et ha t the y c an see anob jectt hat ano t he r p ers o n cannot see) 26, and vic e  ve rsa (M ol l & Tomase llo 2 00 6 ).Thus, it is  atthis leve l that the chi l d begin s to e xpl ici tlyd if fe ren ti a teb et wee n  se lf and o th er  andto a t t r i bute  in tent ional  relations di ffe rent i all y toselfandot her.Priorto th is  level, the chi ld h as de fac toac ces sto th e  menta l s tat es of o thers,b utsh e n ee d not explicitly r ep r e se nt these  state s  a sb elonging  t o t he o t h er, f or s h eis alway s enga g ed  i n an ep is ode of  s har edinten t iona lity d uring wh ich s h e herself also experiences t h ei n te n tion alrelations t hats he s hare s  w ith her p artne r. In order for this shar ed  inten tiona lity to occur , it is su f f i cient th at i n te n tional relatio ns ar e in facts hared; t he ch ild does  not have t o explic itl y r epr ese n t  h er own mental s tate sas bein g d istinct  fr omtho seof  others.In contr as t,  i nthe  case of empat hy , a lt hou gh th e  child  will  sha re  s o meof thee mo t i on o fth e ot her  ( as ev iden c edby herdisplay o f b e havi or al  signsof distress),  t he comfort in g b ehavio r that she  directs towards the ot h er does  26  In c ontr ast, acco rdi ng toFla v ell, l evel 2  pers pe cti v e  taki n g  r equ ir es the und e r sta nding  t hatthe sam e object can be se e n f rom different  pe rspe c t iv es. Th e  ab il i tyf o r level-2 persp ective tak in g  e merges lat e r;se e below . Forth comin g  in Gra zer Philo sophische  S tudi e n  84  (2012), p . 75-101  16 showt hat s h eexpli cit ly rep re sen ts th e emot i onas be longin gto the  othe r.  Likewis e, as the ability to fo r leve l-1 p ers pective t aki n g i ndicates,  she  learns to  re pre sentper c eptua l st a te s a s  belo ngin g  either t o  h ers e l for to other s . Thu s, du rin g  the s econ d half of the sec o nd year the ch ildb e gin s t o  und er stand that oth ers  h a v e mental  s tates (firs t person  e x perie nces)like h erself, a nd that t heymay  have dif fer en t  perspe ct iv e s on t he s am e worl d. Tha t  ist o  say that she no w exp l i citly rep resen ts  intent i onal  subjectsas well asintent iona l rel ations.  H owever , t he se represe n tations d o not  yet ha ve  tobein a c once p t ual o r li ng uis tic forma t .  R a th er ,  fo llow ing K ar milo ff-Smith' s  termino log y , theymi ght b e said to c onstitutesom ethin g like a the o ry-o f -m i nd-in -actio n (atlevel E 1  of  e xplicit nes s ) , without  that the o rybe ingconceptu al ized  o r c on sciously access ible, fo r instan c e  in te rms of f o lk psy ch ological bel iefde si r e expla n a tio ns. 3.4 .  Ex pli cit  men tal izin g  and
 age,_children begin_to display a general_understanding of_the_fact that_someone_else's perspective towards_an object can_differ from their own._For instance, 24months_olds_are capable of level 1 perspective taking, which is to say that they can_understand_that what_another_person_sees is different from what_they see (for instance that_they can_see an object that another person cannot see)26,_and_vice versa (Moll_& Tomasello 2006). Thus, it is at this level_that the child begins to explicitly_differentiate between self_and_other_and to attribute intentional_relations differentially to self and other._Prior to this level, the child_has de facto access to the mental_states of others, but she need_not explicitly represent these states_as belonging_to the other, for she_is always engaged_in an_episode of shared_intentionality during which she herself also_experiences the intentional_relations that she shares with her_partner._In order for_this_shared_intentionality to_occur, it is_sufficient_that intentional_relations_are in fact shared; the child_does_not have to explicitly represent her own_mental states as being_distinct_from those of others._In contrast, in the case_of empathy, although the child will_share some_of the_emotion of the other (as evidenced by her display of behavioral_signs of distress), the comforting behavior_that she directs towards_the other_does_26 In contrast,_according_to Flavell,_level 2 perspective taking requires the understanding_that the_same object can be seen from_different perspectives. The ability_for_level-2 perspective taking emerges later; see_below. Forthcoming in Grazer Philosophische Studien_84 (2012), p. 75-101 16_show_that_she explicitly represents the emotion_as belonging to the other. Likewise,_as the ability_to for level-1 perspective taking indicates, she_learns_to represent perceptual states as belonging_either_to herself or to others. Thus,_during_the_second half of the second_year the child begins to understand_that others have mental states (first person experiences) like_herself, and that_they may have different perspectives_on_the_same world. That is to say that she now explicitly_represents intentional_subjects as well_as intentional relations. However, these representations do not yet have_to be in a conceptual or linguistic_format. Rather, following Karmiloff-Smith's terminology, they might be said to constitute_something like a theory-of-mind-in-action (at level E1 of_explicitness), without that theory being conceptualized or_consciously accessible, for instance_in_terms of folk psychological beliefdesire explanations. 3.4._Explicit_mentalizing_and