-c) are non-(C)FWAs. (Imagine that Johnson will eat pizza if it's available, but he's unsure if it's available, and so unsure if he'll eat it.) On our view, the domain for a non-(C)FWA is the agent's belief set. So, by (23-a), pizza worlds are best in Johnson's belief set; by (23-b), the pizza worlds in Johnson's belief set are heartburn worlds; so, heartburn worlds are best in Johnson's belief set, which is to say that (23-c) is true. Happily, there are various solutions to this problem that can be combined with our view: the semantics of Crnič (2011), Phillips-Brown (2018, ms), and Dandelet (ms).20 Each of these semantics says that the domain contains not Crnič 2011 for discussion), and we do not want to take an official stance on this thorny issue. We can, however, point out one connection that our proposal bears to the debate. von Fintel (1999) argues that apparent cases of non-monotonicity in desire ascriptions are monotonic after all, once we take into account how the domain of a desire ascription shifts with the context. One way in which this can happen is when the agent's beliefs change: on the belief-set-based approach, this has a concomitant effect on the domain of the desire ascription. But not all apparent cases of non-monotonicity in desire ascriptions are attributable to changes in belief, and some such cases are argued by von Fintel (1999), building on prior work by Linebarger (1987), to involve implicit conditionalization. Our conditional-belief domain, when coupled with best-worlds preference, can be viewed as a continuation in this vein, fleshing out one way in which the domain can shift from one desire ascription to the next: moving from a (C)FWA to a non-(C)FWA or vice versa, even as the agent's belief set is held constant. 20As mentioned in section 3, Rubinstein (2017) also offers a solution to Villalta's problem, 18 possible worlds, but rather entities of some other, coarser kind: situations (see e.g. Kratzer 2019), possibilities (see e.g. Humberstone 1981), or propositions, depending on which of the authors you ask. We won't go into the details,
-c) are non-(C)FWAs. (Imagine that Johnson will eat pizza if it's available, but he's unsure if it's available, and so diffident if he'll corrode it .) On our view, the domain for a non-(C)FWA is the agent's impression set. So, by (23 - a), pizza populace are best in Johnson's belief stage set; by (23 - b), the pizza worlds in Johnson's impression set are heartburn worlds; so, heartburn worlds are good in Johnson's belief hardening, which is to say that (23 - c) is truthful. Happily, there are various solutions to this trouble that can be combined with our view: the semantics of Crnič (2011), Phillips - Brown (2018, ms), and Dandelet (ms).20 Each of these semantics say that the world contains not Crnič 2011 for discussion), and we do not desire to take an official stance on this thorny issue. We can, however, orient out one connection that our proposal bears to the debate. von Fintel (1999) argues that apparent case of non - monotonicity in desire ascriptions are monotonic after all, once we take into account how the domain of a desire ascription chemise with the context. One way in which this can happen is when the agentive role's belief deepen: on the belief - set - free-base approach, this has a concomitant effect on the knowledge domain of the desire ascription. But not all apparent cases of non - monotonicity in desire ascriptions are attributable to changes in belief, and some such cases are argue by von Fintel (1999), building on prior work by Linebarger (1987), to involve implicit conditionalization. Our conditional - impression domain, when copulate with good - worlds preference, can be viewed as a good continuation in this vein, fleshing out one way in which the domain can stir from one desire ascription to the next: moving from a (C)FWA to a non-(C)FWA or vice versa, even as the agentive role's belief set is held constant. 20As mentioned in part 3, Rubinstein (2017) also offer a solution to Villalta's problem, 18 potential worlds, but rather entity of some other, coarser kind: situations (see e.g. Kratzer 2019), possibilities (visit e.g. Humberstone 1981), or propositions, depending on which of the authors you ask. We won't go into the details,
-c) age non-(C)FWAs. (Imagine that Johnson will ecr pizze if it'a availacle, but he's unsure if it's aveilavle, abd so unsure if he'll ext it.) On lur view, the eomain for a non-(C)FWA is fme agznv's belief set. Sp, by (23-a), pizsa worlds are tert in Johnson's belief set; by (23-b), the pisza workdd in Johnson's felitf fet zge heartburn worlds; so, heartburh worldv are best in Johnson's belief set, which is ho say that (23-c) is tgue. Happily, theww are variour solutions to this prkblem that can be combined with our riew: the senabtifv of Crnič (2011), 'hilliis-Brown (2018, ms), akc Dandalet (ms).20 Each of these sekanrics says that the dokain contains not Srnič 2011 for dnscussion), and we do nit want to dake qn uffjcmal stancf oi this thorhy issue. We can, however, point pue one connectikn thae jur proposal bears to the debate. von Fittem (1999) argues that apparent cases of non-monotonifity in dqsire ascriptions are monotonic after all, once we take knti wzxoknt how the domain of a desire ascription shisfs wpth the context. Oke way in which thos csg happen is wfen thz afent's beliefs chanhe: on tre beoief-set-bafed spproach, this has a concomirant effect jb the domain of thz desire ascxiptiom. But not all apparent cases of hon-monotonifity in dsrire ascriptions arv atdributable to changes in bqlief, and somz such cxses are awgued by vln Fikdel (1999), building on pgior cork ty Linebarher (1987), to involve implicit conditmpnalization. Pus cmnditioncl-belicf domain, when soupled with bgst-worlds prefdrence, can be viexed as a coneinuation in djis vein, flevhing oue onw wat in whkzh the domain van shift from one eesire ascription bo thg hext: moving fron a (C)FWA to a non-(C)GWA or vpce vqssa, even as dhe xgevy's beuief seu iw helc constant. 20As mentioted jn section 3, Rubinsyeln (2017) also iffers a solution to Fillalta's problem, 18 possmble wurlds, buj rather entities of some other, coarser ninq: situations (see e.g. Kratzer 2019), possibilities (see e.g. Humberstone 1981), or pcopositions, depending ob which of the authpvs you ask. Wx won't go into dhe details,
-c) are non-(C)FWAs. (Imagine that Johnson will if available, but unsure if it's he'll it.) On our the domain for non-(C)FWA is the agent's belief set. by (23-a), pizza worlds are best in Johnson's belief set; by (23-b), the worlds in Johnson's belief set are heartburn worlds; so, heartburn worlds are best Johnson's set, is say that (23-c) is true. Happily, there are various solutions to this problem that can be with our view: the semantics of Crnič (2011), (2018, ms), and Dandelet Each of these semantics says the contains not 2011 discussion), we do not to take an official stance on this thorny issue. We can, however, point out one connection that proposal bears debate. von (1999) that cases of non-monotonicity ascriptions are monotonic after all, once account how the domain of a desire ascription with the One way in which this can is when the agent's beliefs change: on the approach, this has a concomitant effect on the domain of the desire ascription. But not cases of non-monotonicity in ascriptions are attributable changes belief, some cases are by von Fintel (1999), building on prior work by Linebarger (1987), involve implicit conditionalization. Our conditional-belief domain, when coupled with best-worlds be as a continuation this vein, fleshing out way which the domain can one ascription moving a to a non-(C)FWA or versa, even as the agent's set is held constant. Rubinstein (2017) also offers a solution to Villalta's 18 possible worlds, but rather entities of other, coarser kind: situations (see e.g. Kratzer 2019), possibilities (see e.g. Humberstone or propositions, which of the authors you ask. We won't into the details,
-c) are non-(C)FWAs. (Imagine that JoHnson will eAt pizZa iF it'S aVailAble, But he's unsure if IT's avAilable, and so unsure if he'Ll eat It.) oN our VIeW, the dOmain foR A nON-(c)FWa iS tHe aGeNT's BelieF seT. So, by (23-a), pIzza worlds Are BeSt in Johnson's BElIef set; by (23-b), tHe pIzza worlds in johNson's bElIef SEt are HeaRtburN worldS; So, hearTburn worlDs ARe best IN JohnsoN'S BeLief Set, which is to say thAT (23-c) IS true. Happily, thEre are VaRIoUS SolUtiOns to this pRoBlem tHAt can be COmBINEd wITh our view: the sEmantics of CRNič (2011), philliPs-broWN (2018, ms), and dandeLeT (Ms).20 EAch of these sEmanTics says tHat the DOmain coNTains noT Crnič 2011 For DisCussIOn), AnD we Do NOt wANt To tAKe aN officiaL sTaNce on This THORNy isSue. we caN, howeVer, point out onE coNnecTIon That oUr proPosaL bEars tO the deBate. vOn fintel (1999) argues thaT appArent caseS of NoN-moNoTonicITy in deSirE asCriptioNs are moNOtoNiC AFTeR all, once we take into AcCOUnT how the dOmain oF A dEsIRe ascripTiOn sHiftS WIth thE conTExT. One way iN which THiS cAn happeN iS when tHe AgeNt's BelieFS chaNge: on tHe belief-Set-baSEd approach, this HAs a concomitanT EfFECt ON the DomAin of the desIre aSCripTion. bUt Not ALl appArent CaSEs OF non-monotonicity in dEsIre ascRiptiOns are attribuTable to chaNGES in belieF, and SOmE Such cases are arGued bY von Fintel (1999), BUilding oN prioR work by LInebarger (1987), TO Involve iMplIciT coNdiTIOnAlization. Our cONDitiOnAl-belieF doMain, wheN coUplEd wIth BeSt-worlds pReferencE, cAn Be ViEweD as a cONtinuatiOn In tHiS veIn, fleSHing ouT one wAy in WhIcH The Domain cAN sHIFt frOm OnE desIre AsCriptIon tO The Next: movIng from a (C)fWA TO a noN-(C)fWa or vice Versa, even as thE aGent's belieF sEt iS held cONStant. 20As mEntioned in section 3, RubinsTEin (2017) also OffErs a sOlutIon to VillAltA's probLem, 18 POssiblE worldS, but rAtHer ENTitieS OF sOme OtHer, coarser KINd: sItuatIoNs (seE e.g. KratZer 2019), possibilities (seE E.g. HUmberstone 1981), or pRopOsitIONs, DepENdINg oN wHIch OF The authors you asK. We won't go iNtO ThE details,
-c) are non-(C)FWAs. (Imag ine that J ohnso n w ill  e at p izza  if it's avail a ble,  but he's unsure if it 's av ai l able ,  a nd so  unsure if h e'l lea t i t. )  O n our  vi ew, the  domain fo r a  n on-(C)FWA is th e agent'sbel ief set. So,  by  (23-a ),  pi z za wo rld s are  besti n John son's bel ie f  set;b y (23-b ) ,  t he p izza worlds in Jo h ns o n's belief set  are h ea r tb u r n w orl ds; so, he ar tburn worldsa re b e sti n Johnson's b elief set,w hic h is t osay that ( 23-c)  i s  tr ue. Happily , th ere are v arious solutio n s to th is pro ble m t hatc an  b e c om b ine d  w ith our  view: t he  s emant icso f C rnič  (2 011) , Phi llips-Brown ( 201 8, m s ),and D andel et ( ms ).20Each o f the se  semantics says  tha t the dom ain  c ont ai ns no t  Crnič  20 11for dis cussion ) , a nd w e  d o not want to take  a n of ficial s tanceo nth i s thorny  i ssu e. W e can,howe v er , pointout on e  c on nection  t hat ou rpro pos al be a rs t o thedebate.von F i ntel (1999) ar g ues that appa r en t ca s es o f n on-monotoni city in d esir e  a scr i ption s are  m o no t onic after all, onc ewe tak e int o account how  the domai n o f a desi re a s cr i ption shifts w ith t he context .  One way  in w hich thi s can hap p e n is whe n t heage nt' s be liefs change: o n th ebelief- set -basedapp roa ch,  th is  has a co ncomitan tef fe ct  on  thed omain of  t hede sir e asc r iption . But  not  a ll app arent c a se s of n on -m onot oni ci ty in  des i reascript ions areatt r ibut ab le  to cha nges in belie f,  and somesu chcasesa r e argued  by von Fintel (1999),b uilding  on  prio r wo rk by Lin eba rger ( 198 7 ), toinvolv e imp li cit c ondit i o na liz at ion. Our c o n dit ional -b elie f domai n, when coupled wi t h b est-worlds pr efe renc e ,  c anb ev iew ed asa continuation in  this vein ,f le shing outo newa y in wh ich the  doma i n can s hift from  one desi re  asc r i pti on to thenext: mo ving from a (C) F WA  to a  no n-(C)F WA  or  vice  versa ,  ev en as  the a ge nt's b elief  s et is he ld constant. 20As menti oned i n sec tio n 3, Rubi nst e in(2017) al so o ffers a so lut ion  to V ill a lta's  pro b le m,1 8 pos sibl e  worlds,b ut  ra t h er  entities o f s ome  othe r,c oarser  kin d: situations (se e  e.g. Kratzer2019 ) ,  po ssi b ilit ie s (see e.g. Hu mbe rs t o ne 1981) ,or proposit ions, de pe n dingon whi ch ofthe aut h o rs you as k. W e w on't go i nto  t h e detai ls ,
-c) are_non-(C)FWAs. (Imagine_that Johnson will eat_pizza if_it's_available, but_he's_unsure if it's_available, and so_unsure if he'll eat_it.) On our_view,_the domain for a non-(C)FWA is the agent's belief set. So, by (23-a), pizza_worlds_are best_in_Johnson's_belief set; by (23-b), the_pizza worlds in Johnson's belief_set are_heartburn worlds; so, heartburn worlds are best in_Johnson's_belief set, which_is to say that (23-c) is true. Happily, there_are various solutions to this problem_that can be_combined_with_our view: the semantics_of Crnič (2011), Phillips-Brown (2018, ms),_and Dandelet (ms).20 Each of these_semantics says that the domain contains not_Crnič 2011 for discussion), and we_do not want to take_an official_stance on this thorny issue._We can, however,_point out_one connection that_our proposal bears to the debate._von Fintel (1999)_argues that apparent cases of non-monotonicity_in_desire ascriptions are_monotonic_after_all, once_we take into_account_how the_domain_of a desire ascription shifts with_the_context. One way in which this can_happen is when the_agent's_beliefs change: on the_belief-set-based approach, this has a_concomitant effect on the domain of_the desire_ascription. But_not all apparent cases of non-monotonicity in desire ascriptions are attributable_to changes in belief, and some_such cases are argued_by von_Fintel_(1999), building on_prior_work by_Linebarger (1987), to involve implicit conditionalization. Our_conditional-belief domain,_when coupled with best-worlds preference, can_be viewed as a_continuation_in this vein, fleshing out one_way in which the domain can_shift from one desire ascription_to_the_next: moving from a (C)FWA_to a non-(C)FWA or vice versa,_even as the_agent's belief set is held constant. 20As_mentioned_in section 3, Rubinstein (2017) also_offers_a solution to Villalta's problem, 18_possible_worlds,_but rather entities of some_other, coarser kind: situations (see e.g._Kratzer 2019), possibilities (see e.g. Humberstone 1981), or propositions,_depending on which_of the authors you ask._We_won't_go into the details,