 the third person information received about another's perceptual understanding. Moreover, infants at this age will begin to develop social referencing, which is to say that they use emotional information from their caregivers to regulate their own behavior in situations that are perceived as threatening (e.g., Feinman 1982). One example for such social referencing is the visual cliff paradigm used by Klinnert et al. (1983). A visual cliff is a table made of glass and visually divided into two halves. On one half, a pattern is placed immediately below the glass plate so that this half appears opaque, while on the other half a similar pattern is placed at a distance from the glass plate, so that there appears to be a sudden drop-off. When children reach the drop-off point, they will stop and look to their mothers. If the mother looks happy, the child will continue its crawl, but if the mother looks worried, it will refuse to move forward. This suggests a matching between first and third person emotional intentional relations (in addition to the perceptual and action-related intentional relations described above), such that children adopt the emotion they perceive their mothers to be expressing. Children at this age will also begin to display communicative gestures, such as protoimperative and proto-declarative pointing gestures (Bates 1979). Proto-imperatives function as a form of nonverbal request to a partner, for instance in order to obtain an object that is out of reach. In contrast, proto-declaratives are more akin to nonverbal comments on a situation, for instance when the pointing-gesture is used to inform another about the location of an object. While the former is an attempt at influencing what another person does, and is thus directed at action-related intentional relations, the latter is trying to affect the other's attention or thoughts, and is thus directed at epistemic intentional relations. So while the former seems to suggest an implicit grasp of others as agents, the latter seems to suggest an implicit understanding of others as perceivers and/or believers. Interestingly, while non-human (human-raised) primates have been found to use proto-imperatives to some degree, they do not seem to use proto-declaratives (Tomasello 2008). This suggests that while chimpanzees have an implicit understanding of others as perceivers and agents and can use this understanding instrumentally to their advantage, they either have no understanding or no interest (or both) to influence the mental states of others outside of instrumental
the third person information received about another's perceptual understanding. Moreover, baby at this old age will begin to develop social referencing, which is to suppose that they practice emotional information from their caregivers to determine their own behavior in situations that are perceive as threatening (e.g., Feinman 1982). One exercise for such social referencing is the visual cliff paradigm use by Klinnert et al. (1983). A ocular cliff is a table made of glass and visually divided into two halves. On one one-half, a pattern is placed immediately below the glass denture so that this half appears opaque, while on the early half a similar traffic pattern is placed at a distance from the methamphetamine plate, so that there appears to be a sudden drop - off. When child reach the drop - off point, they will stop and look to their mother. If the mother expect happy, the child will continue its crawl, but if the mother looks worried, it will refuse to move forward. This suggests a matching between inaugural and third person emotional intentional relative (in summation to the perceptual and action - related designed relations trace above), such that children adopt the emotion they perceive their mother to be expressing. Children at this age will also get down to display communicative gestures, such as protoimperative and proto - declarative pointing gestures (Bates 1979). Proto - imperatives function as a form of gestural request to a spouse, for instance in order to obtain an object that is out of compass. In contrast, proto - declaratives are more akin to nonverbal gossip on a situation, for instance when the pointing - gesture is used to inform another about the location of an aim. While the former is an attempt at influencing what another person does, and is thus direct at action - associate intentional relation back, the latter is trying to feign the other's attention or thoughts, and is thus directed at epistemic designed relations. So while the former appear to suggest an implicit grasp of others as agents, the latter seems to suggest an implicit agreement of others as perceivers and/or believers. Interestingly, while non - human (homo - raised) primates have been found to use proto - imperatives to some degree, they do not seem to practice proto - declaratives (Tomasello 2008). This suggests that while chimpanzees have an implicit understanding of others as perceivers and agents and can use this reason instrumentally to their advantage, they either get no understanding or no interest (or both) to determine the mental states of others outside of implemental
 thf third person informatiun received aboot anothxr's perdeptual jnderstanding. Moreover, infanvs ar thiw age will begin to dexelop socpal referwnciig, which is to seg that bkey uac emociinal informatipn from thair caregivers tu xegulate their own behavior in situaeions tnah are perceiveq as ehrezneking (e.g., Feinman 1982). One example for such smcial referenving is the visual cliff pwradlgm used by Klinnegt et al. (1983). A vistql cliff is x table made of glass znd visually divided into two hxlves. On one haof, a odttern is poaced immediately below tve glasx plate so thab thiv hqlf appears opaque, whmle on the other hals a simildr pattern is placee qt a gistdnce droo tge gmass ppatx, so that tgere appearw to be a sudden drpp-jdf. When childden rewcr the drop-off point, they will stop and nooi to their mothers. If tye mother looks happy, the chilq will continue its crawl, but if the mother looks worrmea, iu qill fwfkse to move forward. This suggests a matching fsteevn first and thirb person emotionsl imjentional relajions (iu asdition to the perfeptual and qction-relwted intentional relations desceibed above), fych that children cdopt the emutiom theu perceive their motherr to be expresslng. Childddn at this age wkll anso begin to display commugicative jestuxes, such as krotoim[erative ajd proto-declarative poinhing yestuses (Bates 1979). Proto-imperatives function as a form of nonvetban rvquest to a pavtner, for instagce in order tp obtaiu an ocject that is out of reach. Ig contrast, prmjo-declarativev are mowe ajin ro nonvdfbal comments pn a situcuion, for ibstance when the ppinjihg-gesture is uszb uo inform anothet acoue nhe ljwation of an objdct. Ehile the former ks am attempt at influenwing what another perspn does, ane is thuf directed at action-related inttntionel reletions, thg latter is trying to affect ths other's wttcntion or thotghtw, and is thux directed at epistemic intentional reletions. So while the fotmer seems to suggest sn implicit gras[ of othess as agents, the latrer seems to suggtst an implicit understznding of ohhers as perceivers and/or believers. Interestingly, while non-human (human-raiwed) prmmwtes have bsen gound tj use pwoto-mm'eratives to some degree, they do not seem to use proto-dewlcratives (Tomasello 2008). This suggrsgs that while chimpanzees have an impmicit uncerstanding of others as perceifers and agents and can mse this ynderatanding iistrumentally to theor advcntage, they euthev have no undefstsnfing or nl inuereat (or both) to influence the mentql stared of others outsmde of instrmmtntal
the third person information received about another's Moreover, at this will begin to to that they use information from their to regulate their own behavior in that are perceived as threatening (e.g., Feinman 1982). One example for such social is the visual cliff paradigm used by Klinnert et al. (1983). A visual is table of and visually divided into two halves. On one half, a pattern is placed immediately below the plate so that this half appears opaque, while the other half a pattern is placed at a from glass plate, that appears be a sudden When children reach the drop-off point, they will stop and look to their mothers. If the mother happy, the continue its but the looks worried, it to move forward. This suggests a and third person emotional intentional relations (in addition the perceptual action-related intentional relations described above), such children adopt the emotion they perceive their mothers be expressing. Children at this age will also begin to display communicative gestures, such as proto-declarative pointing gestures (Bates Proto-imperatives function as form nonverbal to partner, for in order to obtain an object that is out of reach. contrast, proto-declaratives are more akin to nonverbal comments on a instance the pointing-gesture is to inform another about location an object. While the an at person and thus directed at action-related relations, the latter is trying affect the other's attention directed at epistemic intentional relations. So while the seems to suggest an implicit grasp of as agents, the latter seems to suggest an implicit understanding of others perceivers and/or while non-human (human-raised) primates have been found to proto-imperatives to some degree, do not seem to use proto-declaratives (Tomasello 2008). This that chimpanzees have implicit understanding of as perceivers and and can use instrumentally to advantage, either or no interest (or both) to the states of others outside of
 the third person information Received abOut anOthEr's PeRcepTual Understanding. MOReovEr, infants at this age will Begin To DEvelOP sOcial ReferenCInG, WHicH iS tO saY tHAt They uSe eMotionaL informatiOn fRoM their caregiVErS to regulatE thEir own behaviOr iN situaTiOns THat arE peRceivEd as thREateniNg (e.g., FeinmAn 1982). oNe examPLe for suCH SoCial Referencing is the vISuAL cliff paradigm Used by klINnERT et Al. (1983). A Visual clifF iS a tabLE made of GLaSS ANd vISually divided Into two halvES. On One halF, a PatTErn is pLaced ImMEdiAtely below tHe glAss plate sO that tHIs half aPPears opAque, whIle On tHe otHEr HaLf a SiMIlaR PaTteRN is Placed at A dIsTance From THE GLass PlaTe, so That tHere appears to Be a SuddEN drOp-off. when cHildReN reacH the drOp-off PoInt, they will stop And lOok to theiR moThErs. if The moTHer looKs hAppY, the chiLd will cONtiNuE ITS cRawl, but if the mother LoOKS wOrried, it Will reFUsE tO Move forwArD. ThIs suGGEsts a MatcHInG between First aND tHiRd persoN eMotionAl IntEntIonal RElatIons (in Addition To the PErceptual and acTIon-related intENtIONaL RelaTioNs described AbovE), Such That CHiLdrEN adopT the eMoTIoN They perceive their moThErs to bE exprEssing. ChildreN at this age WILL also begIn to DIsPLay communicatiVe gesTures, such aS ProtoimpEratiVe and proTo-declaraTIVe pointiNg gEstUreS (BaTES 1979). PRoto-imperativES FuncTiOn as a foRm oF nonverBal ReqUesT to A pArtner, for Instance In OrDeR tO obTain aN Object thAt Is oUt Of rEach. IN ContraSt, proTo-deClArATivEs are moRE aKIN to nOnVeRbal ComMeNts on A sitUAtiOn, for inStance wheN thE PoinTiNg-Gesture Is used to inforM aNother abouT tHe lOcatioN OF an objecT. While the former is an atteMPt at infLueNcing What Another peRsoN does, aNd iS Thus diRected At actIoN-reLATed inTENtIonAl Relations, tHE LatTer is TrYing To affecT the other's attentioN Or tHoughts, and is tHus DireCTEd At ePIsTEmiC iNTenTIOnal relations. So While the foRmER sEems to suggESt aN iMplicit Grasp of OtherS As agentS, the latteR seems to sUgGest AN ImpLicit underStanding Of others aS PerceIVeRs and/Or bElieveRs. intErestIngly, wHIle Non-huMan (humAn-Raised) PrimaTeS have beeN found to use proto-imperatIves to Some dEgrEe, they do nOt sEEm tO use proto-DeclAratives (ToMasEllO 2008). This SugGEsts tHat wHIlE chIMpanzEes hAVe an impliCIt UndERStAnding of othERS As pErceiVerS And ageNts aNd can use this underSTanding instrumEntaLLY to TheIR advAnTage, they either HavE nO UNderstanDiNg or no interEst (or botH) tO InfluEnce thE mentaL states OF OtHErs outSide Of iNstrumentAl
 the third person informat ion receiv ed ab out  an ot her' s pe rceptual under s tand ing. Moreover, infants  at t hi s  age wi ll be gin tod ev e l opso ci alre f er encin g,which i s to say t hat  t hey use emot i on al informa tio n from their  ca regive rs  to regul ate  thei r ownb ehavio r in situ at i ons th a t are p e r ce ived  as threatening ( e .g . , Feinman 1982 ). One  e x am p l e f orsuch socia lrefer e ncing i s  t h e vis u al cliff para digm used b y  Kl innert  e t a l . (198 3). A  v i sua l cliff isa ta ble madeof gla s s and v i suallydivide d i nto  two ha lv es.  O n  on e  h alf ,  apatternis  p laced  imm e d i a tely  be lowthe g lass plate so  th at t h ishalfappea rs o pa que,whileon th eother half a si mila r pattern  is  p lac ed  at a distan cefro m the g lass pl a te,  s o t ha t there appears to  b e asudden d rop-of f .Wh e n childr en  re acht h e dro p-of f  p oint, th ey wil l  s to p and l oo k to t he irmot hers. If t he mot her look s hap p y, the child w i ll continue i t sc r aw l , bu t i f the mothe r lo o ks w orri e d,  it willrefus et om ove forward. This s ug gestsa mat ching between  first and t h ird pers on e m ot i onal intention al re lations (i n  additio n tothe perc eptual an d action-r ela ted  in ten t i on al relationsd e scri be d above ),such th atchi ldr enad opt the e motion t he ype rc eiv e the i r mother stobe  ex press i ng. Ch ildre n at  t hi s  ag e willa ls o begi nto  dis pla ycommu nica t ive  gestur es, suchasp roto im pe rativeand proto-dec la rative poi nt ing  gestu r e s (Bates  1979). Proto-imperativ e s funct ion  as a  for m of nonv erb al req ues t  to apartne r, fo rins t a nce i n or der  t o obtain a n obj ect t ha t is  out of  reach. In contras t , p roto-declarat ive s ar e mo rea ki n  to  n o nve r b al comments ona situatio n, fo r instance whe nthe poi nting-g estur e  is use d to info rm anothe rabou t the  locationof an ob ject. Whi l e the fo rmerisan att em ptat in fluenc i ngwhatanothe rperson  does ,and is t hus directed at action- relate d int ent ional rel ati o ns,  the latt er i s trying t o a ffe ct th e o t her's  att e nt ion or th ough t s, and is th usd i re cted at epi s t e mic  inte nti o nal re lati ons. So while the former seems t o su g g est  an impl ic it grasp of ot her sa s  agents,  t he latter s eems tosu g gestan imp licitunderst a n di n g of o ther s a s perceiv ers  a n d/or be li ev e rs. In tere st ingly,  while non- h u man (human-raise d) pr i m atesh ave  been  f ound to useproto-impe ratives tosome d egre e, th ey do n ot  seemtous e proto-de c laratives  (Tom asello20 08).  Th is sug gest s thatwhil echi mpanzeesh a ve an  i m pli citunder st andi ng of oth e rs as pe rce i vers an dage n t s andc an u se this un der stand i n g instrume n tall y  t o  thei r adva ntage,  they e i the rhave no  un d e rstanding  or no in t ere st  (or  both) t oinfl ue nce  t he mental state s of oth ers outs i d e of i nst r umen t al
 the_third person_information received about another's_perceptual understanding._Moreover,_infants at_this_age will begin_to develop social_referencing, which is to_say that they_use_emotional information from their caregivers to regulate their own behavior in situations that are_perceived_as threatening_(e.g.,_Feinman_1982). One example for such_social referencing is the visual_cliff paradigm_used by Klinnert et al. (1983). A visual_cliff_is a table_made of glass and visually divided into two halves._On one half, a pattern is_placed immediately below_the_glass_plate so that this_half appears opaque, while on the_other half a similar pattern is_placed at a distance from the glass_plate, so that there appears to_be a sudden drop-off. When_children reach_the drop-off point, they will_stop and look_to their_mothers. If the_mother looks happy, the child will_continue its crawl,_but if the mother looks worried,_it_will refuse to_move_forward._This suggests_a matching between_first_and third_person_emotional intentional relations (in addition to_the_perceptual and action-related intentional relations described above),_such that children adopt_the_emotion they perceive their_mothers to be expressing. Children_at this age will also begin_to display_communicative gestures,_such as protoimperative and proto-declarative pointing gestures (Bates 1979). Proto-imperatives function_as a form of nonverbal request_to a partner, for_instance in_order_to obtain an_object_that is_out of reach. In contrast, proto-declaratives are_more akin_to nonverbal comments on a situation,_for instance when the_pointing-gesture_is used to inform another about_the location of an object. While_the former is an attempt_at_influencing_what another person does, and_is thus directed at action-related intentional_relations, the latter_is trying to affect the other's attention_or_thoughts, and is thus directed at_epistemic_intentional relations. So while the former_seems_to_suggest an implicit grasp of_others as agents, the latter seems_to suggest an implicit understanding of others as perceivers_and/or believers. Interestingly,_while non-human (human-raised) primates have_been_found_to use proto-imperatives to some degree, they do not seem_to use_proto-declaratives (Tomasello 2008)._This suggests that while chimpanzees have an implicit understanding of_others as perceivers and agents and can_use this understanding instrumentally to their advantage, they either have no_understanding or no interest (or both) to influence_the mental states of others outside of_instrumental