 an explicit format, it can be generalized and applied across domains, thus leading to a more complete notion of other persons – and of oneself. Crucially for the thesis of this paper, there is also direct evidence that the ability to ascribe (false) beliefs to others develops in parallel with the ability to ascribe (false) beliefs to oneself. Although the relevant empirical evidence to date must be regarded as preliminary due to the fact that the majority of research on ToM has focused on'reading other minds' rather than self-attribution of mental states, several recent studies confirm such a parallel development (see Happé 2003 for a review). Most impressively, a recent meta-analysis of ToM studies (involving 178 separate studies) comes to the conclusion that children do not pass self-belief tasks earlier than other-belief tasks: "The essential age trajectory for tasks requiring judgments of someone else's false belief is paralleled by an identical age trajectory for children's judgments of their own false beliefs. Young children, for example, are just as incorrect at attributing a false belief to themselves as they are at attributing it to others." (Wellman et al., 2001, p.665). This confirms that there is a parallel development for the explicit representation of one's own mental states and those of others. At around the same time of passing false-belief tasks, children also begin to display a number of related cognitive abilities (see Rakoczy 2008 for an overview). For instance, they begin to be able to solve unexpected content tasks (Perner et al. 1987)27. Moreover, they begin to distinguish appearance from reality (J. H. Flavell et al. 1983). That is, they begin to distinguish what an object seems to be (for instance a sponge that looks like a stone) from what it really is (i.e. a sponge). They also begin to participate in second-level perspective taking; for instance, they are able to tell whether a drawing looks upside-down to an observer that is sitting opposite from them (J. H. Flavell et al. 1981). Finally, they master tasks 27 In this task, children are being presented with a box (e.g. a smarties box) and asked what they think is inside. They are then being shown the real content of the box, for example a pen. Afterwards, they are being asked a) what another child will think is in the box, and b) what they previously thought was in the box
an explicit format, it can be generalized and applied across domains, therefore go to a more complete notion of early persons – and of oneself. Crucially for the dissertation of this paper, there is besides direct evidence that the ability to ascribe (false) belief to others develops in parallel with the ability to impute (false) beliefs to oneself. Although the relevant empirical evidence to date must be regarded as preliminary due to the fact that the majority of inquiry on ToM has focused on'reading other judgment' rather than self - attribution of mental state, several recent studies confirm such a parallel exploitation (see Happé 2003 for a review). Most impressively, a recent meta - psychoanalysis of ToM studies (necessitate 178 separate studies) comes to the stopping point that children do not pass self - belief tasks earlier than early - impression job: " The essential age trajectory for tasks requiring judgments of someone else's false belief is paralleled by an identical historic period trajectory for children's judgments of their own assumed beliefs. Young children, for example, are barely as incorrect at attributing a false impression to themselves as they are at attributing it to others. " (Wellman et al. , 2001, p.665). This confirms that there is a parallel development for the explicit representation of one's own mental states and those of others. At around the same time of passing assumed - belief undertaking, children also begin to display a number of relate cognitive abilities (see Rakoczy 2008 for an overview). For instance, they begin to be able to solve unexpected content tasks (Perner et al. 1987)27. Moreover, they get down to distinguish appearance from reality (J. H. Flavell et al. 1983). That is, they begin to distinguish what an object look to be (for instance a quick study that looks like a rock) from what it really is (i.e. a leech). They also begin to participate in second - level perspective pickings; for instance, they are able to tell whether a drawing count upside - down to an observer that is sitting opposite from them (J. H. Flavell et al. 1981). Finally, they master task 27 In this task, children are being show with a box (e.g. a smarties box) and asked what they think is inside. They are then being shown the veridical content of the box, for example a pen. Afterwards, they are being asked a) what another child will think is in the corner, and b) what they previously thought was in the box
 an explicit format, it can ne generalized aue applmed acrkss domakns, thus leading to a more clmplete notion of other persovs – and ov oneseld. Crncially for the vgesis on thia papzr, there is also direct evhdence that tha xbnlity to ascribe (false) beliefs to otrers defepops in parallgl wiuh ehe zbility to ascribe (false) beliefs tk onesenf. Although tne relevant empirical evidfnce to date must be rfgarded as kdelyninary due tu the fact that the manority of research on ToM has fucuseb on'reading orheg minds' rathxr thag self-attribmnion of mental states, severak rxcenr studies confirm suci a parallel developient (see Va'pé 2003 for a review). Most inpresviveny, a eecdnt mxta-znalysls kf ToM stusies (involvung 178 separate studits) simes to the cknclusyog that children do not pass self-belief uasks earlier than other-beliwf tasks: "The essentiap age tratectory for tasks requiring judgments of someone alse's walwe cwllef is paralleled by an identical age trajectjdy fpr children's jmdgments of their pwj gwlse beliefs. Ioung ckjlsren, for example, age just as ibcorrect wt aytributing a false belief ti themselves qs they are at attxibuting it co othgrs." (Weklman et al., 2001, p.665). This conyirms fhat there ls a paramuel development wor tve explicit representation of one's iwn kental rtatgs and ehose of ohhers. At around the same time ox passing valse-belief tasks, children also begin to dispkaf a number jf rekated cognitide abilities (sge Rakoczv 2008 for an overvivw). For invtance, they begin to be dhle to solve unexpeceed xontwnt tasyr (Perner et al. 1987)27. Moreoveg, uhey begin to distinguish apiearavde from reality (J. Y. Flavell et al. 1983). Tfat id, vhey fagin to disthnguksh ehat xn object scemr to be (for instance a s[ongs that looks like s ftone) frim what yt really is (o.e. a sponge). They apso bxgin tu paryicypate in second-level perspectibe taking; fov instance, thqy ave afle to telk whether a drawing looks upside-down to an observer that us sitting opposite nrom them (J. I. Flavqll et al. 1981). Finally, they mastee tasks 27 In this uask, children are being presetted aith a box (e.g. a smarties box) and asked what they think is inside. They are then ueyng shown tge rral cmncenc of thq boe, hor example a pen. Afterwards, they are being askev a) what atocher child will think is in tne box, and b) whxt they previously thouggt was im the box
an explicit format, it can be generalized across thus leading a more complete and oneself. Crucially for thesis of this there is also direct evidence that ability to ascribe (false) beliefs to others develops in parallel with the ability ascribe (false) beliefs to oneself. Although the relevant empirical evidence to date must regarded preliminary to fact that the majority of research on ToM has focused on'reading other minds' rather than self-attribution mental states, several recent studies confirm such a development (see Happé 2003 a review). Most impressively, a meta-analysis ToM studies 178 studies) to the conclusion children do not pass self-belief tasks earlier than other-belief tasks: "The essential age trajectory for tasks requiring of someone belief is by identical trajectory for children's their own false beliefs. Young children, just as incorrect at attributing a false belief themselves as are at attributing it to others." et al., 2001, p.665). This confirms that there a parallel development for the explicit representation of one's own mental states and those of around the same time passing false-belief tasks, also to a of related abilities (see Rakoczy 2008 for an overview). For instance, they begin be able to solve unexpected content tasks (Perner et al. they to distinguish appearance reality (J. H. Flavell al. That is, they begin what object (for a that looks like a from what it really is a sponge). They also perspective taking; for instance, they are able to whether a drawing looks upside-down to an that is sitting opposite from them (J. H. Flavell et al. 1981). they master In this task, children are being presented with box (e.g. a smarties and asked what they think is inside. They are being the real of the box, example a pen. they are being what another will is and b) what they previously thought in box
 an explicit format, it can be geNeralized aNd appLieD acRoSs doMainS, thus leading to A More Complete notion of other pErsonS – aND of oNEsElf. CrUcially FOr THE thEsIs Of tHiS PaPer, thEre Is also dIrect evideNce ThAt the ability TO aScribe (falsE) beLiefs to otherS deVelops In ParALlel wIth The abIlity tO AscribE (false) belIeFS to oneSElf. AlthOUGh The rElevant empirical eVIdENce to date must bE regarDeD As PREliMinAry due to thE fAct thAT the majORiTY OF reSEarch on ToM has Focused on'reADinG other MiNds' RAther tHan seLf-ATtrIbution of meNtal States, sevEral reCEnt studIEs confiRm such A paRalLel dEVeLoPmeNt (SEe HAPpÉ 2003 foR A reView). Most ImPrEssivEly, a RECENt meTa-aNalySis of toM studies (invOlvIng 178 sEParAte stUdies) ComeS tO the cOnclusIon thAt Children do not paSs seLf-belief tAskS eArlIeR than OTher-beLieF taSks: "The eSsentiaL Age TrAJECtOry for tasks requiriNg JUDgMents of sOmeone ELsE's FAlse beliEf Is pAralLELed by An idENtIcal age tRajectORy FoR childrEn'S judgmEnTs oF thEir owN FalsE belieFs. Young cHildrEN, for example, are JUst as incorrecT At ATTrIButiNg a False belief To thEMselVes aS ThEy aRE at atTribuTiNG iT To others." (Wellman et al., 2001, P.665). THis conFirms That there is a pArallel devELOPment for The eXPlICit representatIon of One's own menTAl states And thOse of othErs. At arouND The same tIme Of pAssIng FALsE-belief tasks, cHILdreN aLso begiN to Display A nuMbeR of RelAtEd cognitiVe abilitIeS (sEe raKocZy 2008 for AN overvieW). FOr iNsTanCe, theY Begin tO be abLe to SoLvE UneXpected COnTENt taSkS (PErneR et Al. 1987)27. moreoVer, tHEy bEgin to dIstinguisH apPEaraNcE fRom realIty (J. H. Flavell eT aL. 1983). That is, theY bEgiN to disTINguish whAt an object seems to be (for iNStance a SpoNge thAt loOks like a sTonE) from wHat IT reallY is (i.e. a SpongE). THey ALSo begIN To ParTiCipate in seCONd-lEvel pErSpecTive takIng; for instance, they ARe aBle to tell whetHer A draWINg LooKS uPSidE-dOWn tO AN observer that is Sitting oppOsITe From them (J. H. fLavElL et al. 1981). FiNally, thEy masTEr tasks 27 in this tasK, children ArE beiNG PreSented with A box (e.g. a sMarties boX) And asKEd What tHey Think iS iNsiDe. TheY are thEN beIng shOwn the ReAl contEnt of ThE box, for eXample a pen. Afterwards, theY are beIng asKed A) what anotHer CHilD will thinK is iN the box, and B) whAt tHey prEviOUsly tHougHT wAs iN The boX
 an explicit format, it ca n be gener alize d a ndap plie d ac ross domains,t husleading to a more comp leteno t iono fother  person s  – a ndof  o nes el f .Cruci all y for t he thesisofth is paper, th e re  is also d ire ct evidencetha t theab ili t y toasc ribe(false )  belie fs to oth er s  devel o ps in p a r al lelwith the abilityt oa scribe (false)  belie fs to o nes elf . Although  t he re l evant e m pi r i c ale vidence to da te must ber ega rded a spre l iminar y due  t o  th e fact that  the  majority  of re s earch o n  ToM ha s focu sed  on 'rea d in goth er min d s'  ra t her  than se lf -a ttrib utio n o f  men tal  sta tes,several recen t s tudi e s c onfir m suc h apa ralle l deve lopme nt  (see Happé 200 3 fo r a revie w).  M ost  i mpres s ively,  arec ent met a-analy s isof T o Mstudies (involving  1 7 8  s eparatestudie s )co m es to th econ clus i o n tha t ch i ld ren do n ot pas s  s el f-belie ftasksea rli erthano ther -belie f tasks:  "The essential aget rajectory for ta s k sr equi rin g judgments  ofs omeo ne e l se 'sf alsebelie fi sp aralleled by an ide nt ical a ge tr ajectory forchildren's j u dgmentsof t h ei r  own false bel iefs.  Young chi l dren, fo r exa mple, ar e just as i ncorrect  at  at tri but i n ga false belie f to t he mselves  as  they a reatatt rib ut ing it to  others. "(W el lm anet al . , 2001,p. 665 ).  Th is co n firmsthatther eis a p arallel de v e lopm en tforthe  e xplic it r e pre sentati on of one 'so wn m en ta l state s and those o fothers. At  a rou nd the s ame time  of passing false-belie f  tasks,  ch ildre n al so begintodispla y a number  of re lated  c ogn i t ive a b i li tie s(see Rakoc z y  20 08 fo ran o verview ). For instance, t h eybegin to be a ble  tos o lv e u n ex p ect ed con t e nt tasks (Perne r et al. 1 98 7 )2 7. Moreove r , t he y begin  to dis tingu i sh appe arance fr om realit y(J.H .  Fl avell et a l. 1983) . That is ,  they be gin t o d isting ui shwhatan obj e ctseems  to be  ( for in stanc ea sponge  that looks like a ston e) fro m wha t i t reallyis( i.e . a spong e).They alsobeg into pa rti c ipate  ins ec ond - level  per s pective t a ki ng; f or  instance,t h e y a re ab let o tell  whe ther a drawing lo o ks upside-down  toa n  ob ser v er t ha t is sitting o ppo si t e  from th em  (J. H. Fla vell etal .  1981 ). Fin ally,they ma s t er tasks27 I n t his task,  ch il d ren are  b ei n g pres ente dwith a  box ( e .g.a smarties box) an d ask e d  what the y thi nk  is ins i de.They are t hen being s hown t he r eal c ontentof  the b ox,  f or example a pen. Af terwa rds, th ey  are  be ing as keda )  what  ano th erchild wil l th i nk  i s  in  the  box,  a nd b ) what th e y previo usl y  though twas i n theb ox 
 an_explicit format,_it can be generalized_and applied_across_domains, thus_leading_to a more_complete notion of_other persons – and_of oneself. Crucially_for_the thesis of this paper, there is also direct evidence that the ability to_ascribe_(false) beliefs_to_others_develops in parallel with the_ability to ascribe (false) beliefs_to oneself._Although the relevant empirical evidence to date must_be_regarded as preliminary_due to the fact that the majority of research_on ToM has focused on'reading other_minds' rather than_self-attribution_of_mental states, several recent_studies confirm such a parallel development_(see Happé 2003 for a review)._Most impressively, a recent meta-analysis of ToM_studies (involving 178 separate studies) comes_to the conclusion that children_do not_pass self-belief tasks earlier than_other-belief tasks: "The_essential age_trajectory for tasks_requiring judgments of someone else's false_belief is paralleled_by an identical age trajectory for_children's_judgments of their_own_false_beliefs. Young_children, for example,_are_just as_incorrect_at attributing a false belief to_themselves_as they are at attributing it to_others." (Wellman et al.,_2001,_p.665). This confirms that_there is a parallel development_for the explicit representation of one's_own mental_states and_those of others. At around the same time of passing false-belief_tasks, children also begin to display_a number of related_cognitive abilities_(see_Rakoczy 2008 for_an_overview). For_instance, they begin to be able to_solve unexpected_content tasks (Perner et al. 1987)27._Moreover, they begin to_distinguish_appearance from reality (J. H. Flavell_et al. 1983). That is, they_begin to distinguish what an_object_seems_to be (for instance a_sponge that looks like a stone)_from what it_really is (i.e. a sponge). They also_begin_to participate in second-level perspective taking;_for_instance, they are able to tell_whether_a_drawing looks upside-down to an_observer that is sitting opposite from_them (J. H. Flavell et al. 1981). Finally, they_master tasks 27_In this task, children are_being_presented_with a box (e.g. a smarties box) and asked what_they think_is inside. They_are then being shown the real content of the box,_for example a pen. Afterwards, they are_being asked a) what another child will think is in the_box, and b) what they previously thought was_in the box