 imagine a pragmatic story about why we would tend to prefer the former readings. This takes some of the sting out of Puzzle 3. But I don't think it does enough: the inference from pPossibly φq to φ seems valid, and that should mean, I think, that it is truth-preserving on all uniform readings. 11At OPW 211, Lewis sounds like he is rejecting T, at least for some notion of possibility: 'I do not deny the existence of trans-world individuals, and yet there is a sense in which I say that they cannot possibly exist.' On the other hand, immediately afterwards he says 'As should be expected, the sense in question involves restricted quantification.' This implicates that there is another sense in which 'transworld individuals can possibly exist' is true, and that this sense involves unrestricted quantification. you-does not require causal acquaintance either with the donkeys or with what produces them. (OPW 112) This presupposes that it is necessary that there are donkeys at some worlds, and thus that it is necessary that there are donkeys, unrestrictedly speaking. (It also suggests, interestingly, that the true reading of 'it is contingent that there are donkeys' is equivalent to 'there are donkeys at our world'-more of this anon.) In a similar vein, Lewis says that'reality might have been different' is not true, if we understand'reality' in such a way as to make'reality is the totality of everything' true (OPW 101, note 1). And in Lewis 1996, he accepts without demur the attribution to him of a theory that 'treat[s] all statements about modal reality as non-contingent: if any such statement is possibly true, then it is true simpliciter'. 4 Contingency-inducing quantification as de re restricted quantification According to the best version of modal realism, whenφ is a closed sentence built up from qualitative predicates and quantifiers, pPossibly φq and pNecessarily φq can differ in truth value from φ only when the quantifiers in φ are understood as somehow restricted. But obviously not just any restriction would suffice to introduce contingency. For an implicitly restricted quantifier to contribute anything, it must enable us to express claims distinct from anything that could be spelled out using unrestricted quantifiers and qualitative predicates. What, then, is the non-qualitative kind of restriction that makes for contingency? Since 'qualitative
imagine a pragmatic story about why we would tend to prefer the erstwhile reading. This takes some of the sting out of Puzzle 3. But I don't think it perform enough: the inference from pPossibly φq to φ seems valid, and that should mean, I intend, that it is accuracy - preserving on all uniform readings. 11At OPW 211, Lewis sounds like he is rejecting T, at least for some impression of possibility:' I do not deny the existence of trans - world person, and yet there is a sense in which I say that they cannot possibly exist.' On the other hired hand, immediately afterwards he says' As should be expected, the common sense in question involves restrict quantification.' This implicates that there be another sense in which' transworld individuals can possibly exist' is true, and that this sense involves unexclusive quantification. you - does not require causal acquaintance either with the donkeys or with what produces them. (OPW 112) This presupposes that it is necessary that there are donkeys at some worlds, and thus that it is necessary that there are donkeys, unrestrictedly speaking. (It also suggests, interestingly, that the true reading of' it is contingent that there are donkeys' is equivalent to' there embody donkeys at our world'-more of this anon .) In a similar vein, Lewis say that'reality might have been unlike' is not on-key, if we understand'reality' in such a way as to make'reality is the totality of everything' genuine (OPW 101, note 1). And in Lewis 1996, he accepts without demur the attribution to him of a theory that' treat[s ] all statements about modal world as non - contingent: if any such statement is possibly true, then it is true simpliciter'. 4 Contingency - inducing quantification as de re restricted quantification According to the best version of modal realism, whenφ is a closed sentence build up from qualitative predicate and quantifiers, pPossibly φq and pNecessarily φq can differ in truth value from φ only when the quantifiers in φ are sympathize as somehow restricted. But obviously not just any restriction would suffice to introduce contingency. For an implicitly restricted quantifier to contribute anything, it must enable us to express claim distinct from anything that could be spell out using unrestricted quantifier and qualitative predicates. What, then, is the non - qualitative kind of limitation that makes for contingency? Since' qualitative
 imwgine a pragmatic story xbout why we woole tend to prsfer the former readings. This takes done of the sting out of Puzzue 3. But I don't thunk mt does enough: tis infercuce fdlm p'owsibly φq to φ sgems valid, atd that should mdau, I think, that it is truth-preserving on all ujiform readingf. 11At JPW 211, Lewis sounds like he is rejecting T, at ltast for some notipn of possibility: 'I do not denj the existence of trans-world indyciduals, and het there pv a sense jn which I say that they cannot possnbly exist.' In thf other hand, immeqiately afteveards ve says 'As should be cxpecved, rhe sense in question involves restrictgd quantifhcction.' This implicates tyat tvere is xbotfer sxnss in wjici 'transworls individuaos can possibly exixt' px true, and tgat thys sense involves unrestricted quantificauion. gou-does not require cauwal acquaintance eithgr with thq donkeys or with what produces them. (OPW 112) This prasuppkres tmat kr ls necessary that there are donkeys at some wjdlcs, and thus that it is necexswru that there ate donkzgs, unrestrictedly spfaking. (Yt alwo suggesus, inyerestingly, that the true rwading of 'it us contingent that there are bonkeyx' is rquivalent to 'there are donieys at our world'-mors of this anon.) In a xikilar vein, Lewis says that'weality mmght kave beev digferene' is not tgue, in we understand'reallty' iu sucv a way as to make'reality is the totality of everything' tsue (OPW 101, noce 1). Anc in Lewis 1996, hq accepts withput dembr the attributikn to hmm of a theowy that 'treat[v] all statemeits about modql rwality xr non-contingeny: if any such statenent is possibly tvue, tfsn it is true snokluciter'. 4 Continbenzy-igdlciig quwttification ds dd rd restficted quanbifkcatoon According to the besf version of modal rcalism, whgnφ is a cjosed sentencr built up from quwlitavive pcedicayes and quantifiers, pPossibly φq ahd pNecesdarlly φq can difser ln ttuth value yrom φ only when the quantifiers in φ are nnderstood as somehow testricted. But obviouxky not just any westrictimn would suffice to untroduce contingtncy. For an implicitly destriwted euantifier to contribute anything, it must enable us to express claims disrinct hrjm anything thay cound ye speljed lnt using unrestribted quantifiers and qualitative predicadef. What, then, is the non-qualitstkve kind of rgstriction that makes for dontingemcy? Since 'qualitative
imagine a pragmatic story about why we to the former This takes some Puzzle But I don't it does enough: inference from pPossibly φq to φ valid, and that should mean, I think, that it is truth-preserving on all readings. 11At OPW 211, Lewis sounds like he is rejecting T, at least some of 'I not deny the existence of trans-world individuals, and yet there is a sense in which I that they cannot possibly exist.' On the other immediately afterwards he says should be expected, the sense question restricted quantification.' implicates there another sense in 'transworld individuals can possibly exist' is true, and that this sense involves unrestricted quantification. you-does not require acquaintance either donkeys or what them. 112) This presupposes is necessary that there are donkeys and thus that it is necessary that there donkeys, unrestrictedly (It also suggests, interestingly, that the reading of 'it is contingent that there are is equivalent to 'there are donkeys at our world'-more of this anon.) In a similar says that'reality might have different' is not if understand'reality' such way as make'reality is the totality of everything' true (OPW 101, note 1). in Lewis 1996, he accepts without demur the attribution to a that 'treat[s] all about modal reality as if such statement is possibly it true quantification de restricted quantification According to best version of modal realism, is a closed sentence and quantifiers, pPossibly φq and pNecessarily φq can in truth value from φ only when quantifiers in φ are understood as somehow restricted. But obviously not just restriction would introduce contingency. For an implicitly restricted quantifier to anything, it must enable to express claims distinct from anything that could be out unrestricted quantifiers qualitative predicates. What, is the non-qualitative of restriction that contingency? Since
 imagine a pragmatic story aboUt why we wouLd tenD to PreFeR the FormEr readings. This TAkes Some of the sting out of PuzZle 3. BuT I DOn't tHInK it doEs enougH: ThE INfeReNcE frOm PpoSsiblY φq To φ seemS valid, and tHat ShOuld mean, I thiNK, tHat it is truTh-pReserving on aLl uNiform ReAdiNGs. 11At OpW 211, LEwis sOunds lIKe he is Rejecting t, aT Least fOR some noTIOn Of poSsibility: 'I do not deNY tHE existence of trAns-worLd INdIVIduAls, And yet therE iS a senSE in whicH i sAY THat THey cannot possIbly exist.' On THe oTher haNd, ImmEDiatelY afteRwARds He says 'As shoUld bE expected, The senSE in quesTIon invoLves reStrIctEd quANtIfIcaTiON.' ThIS iMplICatEs that thErE iS anotHer sENSE In whIch 'TranSworlD individuals cAn pOssiBLy eXist' iS true, And tHaT this Sense iNvolvEs Unrestricted quaNtifIcation. yoU-doEs Not ReQuire CAusal aCquAinTance eiTher witH The DoNKEYs Or with what produces ThEM. (oPw 112) This preSupposES tHaT It is neceSsAry That THEre arE donKEyS at some wOrlds, aND tHuS that it Is NecessArY thAt tHere aRE donKeys, unRestrictEdly sPEaking. (It also suGGests, interestINgLY, ThAT the TruE reading of 'iT is cONtinGent THaT thERe are DonkeYs' IS eQUivalent to 'there are dOnKeys at Our woRld'-more of this Anon.) In a simILAR vein, LewIs saYS tHAt'reality might Have bEen differeNT' is not trUe, if wE understAnd'realitY' IN such a waY as To mAke'ReaLITy Is the totality OF EverYtHing' truE (OPw 101, note 1). AnD in lewIs 1996, hE acCePts withouT demur thE aTtRiBuTioN to hiM Of a theorY tHat 'TrEat[S] all sTAtemenTs aboUt moDaL rEAliTy as non-COnTINgenT: iF aNy suCh sTaTemenT is pOSsiBly true, Then it is tRue SImplIcItEr'. 4 ContiNgency-inducinG qUantificatIoN as De re reSTRicted quAntification According to THe best vErsIon of ModaL realism, wHenΦ is a clOseD SentenCe builT up frOm QuaLITativE PReDicAtEs and quantIFIerS, pPosSiBly φQ and pNeCessarily φq can diffER in Truth value froM φ oNly wHEN tHe qUAnTIfiErS In φ ARE understood as soMehow restrIcTEd. but obviousLY noT jUst any rEstrictIon woULd suffiCe to introDuce contiNgEncy. fOR an Implicitly RestrictEd quantifIEr to cONtRibutE anYthing, It MusT enabLe us to EXprEss clAims diStInct frOm anyThIng that cOuld be spelled out using unRestriCted qUanTifiers anD quALitAtive predIcatEs. What, then, Is tHe nOn-quaLitATive kInd oF ReStrICtion That MAkes for coNTiNgeNCY? SInce 'qualitaTIVE
 imagine a pragmatic story  about why  we w oul d t en d to  pre fer the former read ings. This takes someof th es ting ou t ofPuzzle3 .B u t I  d on 'tth i nk  it d oes  enough : the infe ren ce  from pPossi b ly  φq to φ s eem s valid, and  th at sho ul d m e an, I  th ink,that i t  is tr uth-prese rv i ng ona ll unif o r mread ings. 11At OPW 21 1 ,L ewis sounds li ke heis re j e cti ngT, at leas tfor s o me noti o no f pos s ibility: 'I d o not denyt heexiste nc e o f  trans -worl di ndi viduals, an d ye t there i s a se n se in w h ich I s ay tha t t hey  can n ot  p oss ib l y e x is t.' Onthe othe rha nd, i mmed i a t e ly a fte rwar ds he  says 'As sho uld  bee xpe cted,  thesens ein qu estion  invo lv es restricted q uant ification .'Th isim plica t es tha t t her e is an other s e nse  i n w hi ch 'transworld ind iv i d ua ls can p ossibl y  e xi s t' is tr ue , a nd t h a t thi s se n se  involve s unre s tr ic ted qua nt ificat io n.you -does notrequir e causal  acqu a intance either with the donk e ys o rw ithwha t producesthem .  (OP W 11 2 )Thi s  pres uppos es th a t it is necessary t ha t ther e are  donkeys at s ome worlds , a nd thusthat it is necessary t hat t here are d o nkeys, u nrest rictedly  speaking . (It also  su gge sts , i n t er estingly, tha t thetr ue read ing  of 'it  is  co nti nge nt  that the re are d on ke ys 'isequiv a lent to't her eare  donk e ys atour w orld '- mo r e o f thisa no n . ) In  a  s imil arve in, L ewis say s that' reality m igh t  hav ebe en diff erent' is not  t rue, if we  u nde rstand ' r eality'in such a way as to mak e 'realit y i s the  tot ality ofeve rythin g't rue (O PW 101 , not e1). A nd in L ew is19 96, he acc e p tswitho ut  dem ur theattribution to him ofa theory that  't reat [ s ]all st a tem en t s a b o ut modal realit y as non-c on t in gent: if a n y s uc h state ment is  poss i bly tru e, then i t is true  s impl i c ite r'. 4 Cont ingency- inducingq uanti f ic ation  as  de re  r est ricte d quan t ifi catio n Acco rd ing to  thebe st versi on of modal realism, wh enφ is  a cl ose d sentenc e b u ilt  up fromqual itative pr edi cat es an d q u antif iers ,  p Pos s iblyφq a n d pNecess a ri lyφ q  c an differ i n t rut h val uef rom φonly  when the quantif i ers in φ are u nder s t ood  as some ho w restricted.But  o b v iously n ot  just any r estricti on would  suffi ce tointrodu c e  c o ntinge ncy.  Fo r an impl ici tl y  restri ct ed quanti fier  t o cont ribute anyt h i ng, it must enab le us t o exp r ess  clai ms  distin c t fr om anythin g that coul d be s pell ed ou t using  u nrestr ict ed  quantifie r s and qua litat ive pre di cate s.What,then , is th e no n- qua litativek i nd of  r e str icti on th at  mak es for co n tingency ? S i nce 'qu al ita t i ve
 imagine_a pragmatic_story about why we_would tend_to_prefer the_former_readings. This takes_some of the_sting out of Puzzle_3. But I_don't_think it does enough: the inference from pPossibly φq to φ seems valid, and_that_should mean,_I_think,_that it is truth-preserving on_all uniform readings. 11At OPW_211, Lewis_sounds like he is rejecting T, at least_for_some notion of_possibility: 'I do not deny the existence of trans-world_individuals, and yet there is a_sense in which_I_say_that they cannot possibly_exist.' On the other hand, immediately_afterwards he says 'As should be_expected, the sense in question involves restricted_quantification.' This implicates that there is_another sense in which 'transworld_individuals can_possibly exist' is true, and_that this sense_involves unrestricted_quantification. you-does not_require causal acquaintance either with the_donkeys or with_what produces them. (OPW 112) This_presupposes_that it is_necessary_that_there are_donkeys at some_worlds,_and thus_that_it is necessary that there are_donkeys,_unrestrictedly speaking. (It also suggests, interestingly, that_the true reading of_'it_is contingent that there_are donkeys' is equivalent to_'there are donkeys at our world'-more_of this_anon.) In_a similar vein, Lewis says that'reality might have been different' is_not true, if we understand'reality' in_such a way as_to make'reality_is_the totality of_everything'_true (OPW_101, note 1). And in Lewis 1996,_he accepts_without demur the attribution to him_of a theory that_'treat[s]_all statements about modal reality as_non-contingent: if any such statement is_possibly true, then it is_true_simpliciter'._4 Contingency-inducing quantification as de_re restricted quantification According to the_best version of_modal realism, whenφ is a closed sentence_built_up from qualitative predicates and quantifiers,_pPossibly_φq and pNecessarily φq can differ_in_truth_value from φ only when_the quantifiers in φ are understood_as somehow restricted. But obviously not just any restriction_would suffice to_introduce contingency. For an implicitly_restricted_quantifier_to contribute anything, it must enable us to express claims_distinct from_anything that could_be spelled out using unrestricted quantifiers and qualitative predicates. What,_then, is the non-qualitative kind of restriction_that makes for contingency? Since 'qualitative