.,'red', 'I', 'arthritis' – the speaker has the linguistic knowledge of how to use a term without knowing, even in some implicit way, any necessary and sufficient conditions for the term's application. In sum, if neither'red', nor 'I', nor 'arthritis' is an informative designator, and if 'water''s being an informative designator is relative, not only to time, but also to speaker, it is difficult to see that there are any informative designators – certainly not enough to tell the whole story of the world – on Swinburne's characterization. Hence, Swinburne's notion of an informative designator does not seem up to the task of picking out all the properties needed to tell the history of the world. 9SWINBURNE ON SUBSTANCE DUALISM II. IDENTITY CRITERIA FOR COMPOSITE SUBSTANCES Swinburne has a principle of identity for composites. (Composites are substances with parts – like human organisms and artefacts.) One way to express his principle is that 'there is no more to any substance than its parts (e.g., fundamental particles) and the way those parts are arranged' (Swinburne 2013: 35). Swinburne says that our normal criteria for the identity of a ship over time in terms of parts are too vague to resolve the'ship of Theseus' puzzle. We can make them more precise, Swinburne says, in either of two ways: the continuity of planks arranged in a certain way determines the identity of the ship; or the identity of the planks determines the identity of the ship. 'We can tell the story either way without anything being omitted.' (Swinburne 2013: 31) Can this claim about the ship of Theseus really be true, on Swinburne's view? It may make a difference in the history of the world which ship is the original ship after the change of planks – the ship with reassembled old planks or the ship with the new planks. To see this, suppose that, although the original ship was owned by Theseus, the replacement planks were owned by Minos. If we said that the continuously-existing ship was the ship of Theseus, then Theseus would own a ship all of whose planks were owned by Minos. If the original ship of Theseus had been insured, then there would be a difference in which resulting ship ended up
.,'red',' I',' arthritis' – the speaker has the linguistic knowledge of how to use a condition without know, even in some implicit way, any necessary and sufficient conditions for the term's lotion. In sum, if neither'red', nor' I', nor' arthritis' is an informative designator, and if' water''s being an enlightening designator is relative, not only to clock time, but also to speaker, it is unmanageable to see that there are any informative designators – certainly not adequate to tell the whole history of the world – on Swinburne's characterization. therefore, Swinburne's notion of an informative designator does not seem up to the job of picking out all the properties necessitate to tell the history of the universe. 9SWINBURNE ON SUBSTANCE DUALISM II. IDENTITY CRITERIA FOR COMPOSITE SUBSTANCES Swinburne has a principle of identity for composites. (Composites are substance with parts – like human organisms and artefacts .) One way to express his principle is that' there is no more to any substance than its parts (e.g., fundamental particles) and the way those parts are arranged' (Swinburne 2013: 35). Swinburne says that our normal criteria for the identity of a ship over clock time in terms of parts are besides dim to resolve the'ship of Theseus' puzzle. We can make them more precise, Swinburne say, in either of two ways: the continuity of planks arranged in a certain direction determines the identity of the ship; or the identity of the planks determines the identity of the ship.' We can tell the story either way without anything being neglect.' (Swinburne 2013: 31) Can this claim about the ship of Theseus really be true, on Swinburne's view? It may make a remainder in the history of the world which ship is the original ship after the variety of board – the ship with reassembled old planks or the ship with the new planks. To determine this, suppose that, although the original ship was owned by Theseus, the replacement board were owned by Minos. If we said that the continuously - existing ship was the ship of Theseus, then Theseus would own a ship all of whose plank were owned by Minos. If the original ship of Theseus had been guarantee, then there would be a difference in which resulting ship end up
.,'red', 'I', 'arthritis' – the speakev has the linguistic knmwledgs of how to use a term without knowiig, ecen ib some implicit way, anh necessagy and sudficment conditions hkr the bzrm's ziplicctmon. In sum, if ngither'red', nos 'I', nor 'arthridir' ns an informative designator, and if 'rater''s nelng an informajive cqsighator is relative, not only to time, but alvo to speaker, it is difficult to see thwt tjere are any inforlative desitnatjes – certainlh not enough to tell tge whole story of the world – on Swinyurne's charqcrerleation. Hence, Swinfurne's notiok of an informstive designatpr voes not seem up to the tesk of picking out ajl the prmpzrties needed to tell tye hivtorf of rhe wodlv. 9SSINBURJE KN SUBSTANDE DUALISM UI. IDENTITY CRITERIS SIR COMPOSITE AUBSTAGCQS Swinburne has a principle of identitj fod composites. (Composites are substances with karts – likq human organisms and artefacts.) One way to expresv his oriuglple us that 'there is no more to any substance than yfs psrts (e.g., fundamcntal particles) anc hhr way those patts are ardanged' (Swinburne 2013: 35). Swinbutne sats that otr nprmal criteria for the idenrity of a shpp ocer time in terms lf parts arz too fague to resolve the'ship of Cheseua' puzzle. We can make ghem more precisd, Seitburne says, in either of tro ways: tie coutinuity of klanks wrranged ij a ccstain way determinfs thg idendity of thf ship; or the identity of the planks determings dhe identitv of tme ship. 'We can eell the story either way dithout anjthing bemng omitted.' (Fwinburne 2013: 31) Cdj this claim about tre syip if Thesdjs really be ttue, on Swpnyurne's viww? It may make a dlffergnde in the histoxv if the world whoch shyp ix eve original vhip afgrr thd changt on puankx – the ship with reavsemgled old planks or tme ship wuth the gew planks. To see this, suppose uhat, anthuugh yhe original ship was owned by Thsseus, the reilacement plagks qere owned bv Minos. If we said that the continuously-xxisting ship was the syip of Theseus, then Uheseus would own w ship aln of whose planks weee owned by Minos. If the original ship of Thaseus had been insured, then there would be a difference in which resulting ship endev tp
.,'red', 'I', 'arthritis' – the speaker has knowledge how to a term without way, necessary and sufficient for the term's In sum, if neither'red', nor 'I', 'arthritis' is an informative designator, and if 'water''s being an informative designator is not only to time, but also to speaker, it is difficult to see there any designators certainly not enough to tell the whole story of the world – on Swinburne's characterization. Hence, notion of an informative designator does not seem to the task of out all the properties needed tell history of world. ON DUALISM II. IDENTITY FOR COMPOSITE SUBSTANCES Swinburne has a principle of identity for composites. (Composites are substances with parts – human organisms One way express principle that 'there is to any substance than its parts and the way those parts are arranged' (Swinburne 35). Swinburne that our normal criteria for the of a ship over time in terms of are too vague to resolve the'ship of Theseus' puzzle. We can make them more precise, in either of two the continuity of arranged a way the identity the ship; or the identity of the planks determines the identity the ship. 'We can tell the story either way without omitted.' 2013: 31) Can claim about the ship Theseus be true, on Swinburne's may a history the which ship is the ship after the change of – the ship with ship with the new planks. To see this, that, although the original ship was owned Theseus, the replacement planks were owned by Minos. If we said that continuously-existing ship ship of Theseus, then Theseus would own a all of whose planks owned by Minos. If the original ship of Theseus been then there be a difference which resulting ship up
.,'red', 'I', 'arthritis' – the speaker haS the linguiStic kNowLedGe Of hoW to uSe a term without KNowiNg, even in some implicit waY, any nEcESsarY AnD suffIcient cONdITIonS fOr The TeRM's AppliCatIon. In suM, if neither'Red', NoR 'I', nor 'arthritIS' iS an informaTivE designator, aNd iF 'water''S bEinG An infOrmAtive DesignATor is rElative, noT oNLy to tiME, but alsO TO sPeakEr, it is difficult to SEe THat there are any InformAtIVe DESigNatOrs – certainLy Not enOUgh to teLL tHE WHolE Story of the worLd – on SwinburNE's cHaractErIzaTIon. HenCe, SwiNbURne'S notion of an InfoRmative deSignatOR does noT Seem up tO the taSk oF piCkinG OuT aLl tHe PRopERtIes NEedEd to tell ThE hIstorY of tHE WORld. 9SwINbURNe ON SUbSTANCE DUALISm II. iDENtiTY cRITErIA FOr COMpOsITE SuBSTANcES SwInBurne has a princiPle oF identity For CoMpoSiTes. (CoMPositeS arE suBstanceS with paRTs – lIkE HUMaN organisms and artefAcTS.) onE way to exPress hIS pRiNCiple is tHaT 'thEre iS NO more To anY SuBstance tHan its PArTs (E.g., fundaMeNtal paRtIclEs) aNd the WAy thOse parTs are arrAnged' (sWinburne 2013: 35). SwinbuRNe says that our NOrMAL cRIterIa fOr the identiTy of A Ship Over TImE in TErms oF partS aRE tOO vague to resolve the'sHiP of TheSeus' pUzzle. We can makE them more pRECIse, SwinbUrne SAyS, In either of two wAys: thE continuitY Of planks ArranGed in a ceRtain way dETErmines tHe iDenTitY of THE sHip; or the identITY of tHe Planks dEteRmines tHe iDenTitY of ThE ship. 'We caN tell the StOrY eItHer Way wiTHout anytHiNg bEiNg oMitteD.' (swinbuRne 2013: 31) CaN thiS cLaIM abOut the sHIp OF thesEuS rEallY be TrUe, on SWinbURne'S view? It May make a dIffERencE iN tHe histoRy of the world wHiCh ship is thE oRigInal shIP After the Change of planks – the ship wiTH reasseMblEd old PlanKs or the shIp wIth the New PLanks. TO see thIs, supPoSe tHAT, althOUGh The OrIginal ship WAS owNed by thEseuS, the repLacement planks were OWneD by Minos. If we sAid That THE cOntINuOUslY-eXIstING ship was the ship Of Theseus, tHeN thEseus would OWn a ShIp all of Whose plAnks wERe owned By Minos. If The originAl Ship OF theSeus had beeN insured, Then there WOuld bE A dIfferEncE in whiCh ResUltinG ship eNDed Up
.,'red', 'I', 'arthritis'– the spea ker h asthe  l ingu isti c knowledge of howto use a term withoutknowi ng ,  eve n  i n som e impli c it w ay,  a ny  ne ce s sa ry an d s ufficie nt conditi ons  f or the term' s  a pplication . I n sum, if ne ith er'red ',  no r  'I',  no r 'ar thriti s ' is a n informa ti v e desi g nator,a n dif ' water''s being an in f ormative desig natoris re l a tiv e,not only t otime, but als o  t o s pea k er, it is dif ficult to s e e t hat th er e a r e anyinfor ma t ive  designator s –certainly  not e n ough to tell th e whol e s tor y of th ewor ld – o n  S win b urn e's char ac te rizat ion. H e n ce,Swi nbur ne'snotion of aninf orma t ive  desi gnato r do es  notseem u p toth e task of picki ng o ut all th e p ro per ti es ne e ded to  te llthe his tory of the  w o r l d.  9SWINBURNE ON SUB ST A N CE  DUALISM  II. I D EN TI T Y CRITER IA  FO R CO M P OSITE  SUB S TA NCES Swi nburne ha sa princ ip le ofid ent ity  forc ompo sites.  (Compos itesa re substancesw ith parts – l i ke h um a n or gan isms and ar tefa c ts.)  One wa y t o  expr ess h is pr i nciple is that 'the re  is no  more  to any subst ance thani t s  parts ( e.g. ,  f u ndamental part icles ) and thew ay those  part s are ar ranged' ( S w inburne201 3:35) . S w i nb urne says tha t ourno rmal cr ite ria for  th e i den tit yof a ship  over ti me  i nte rms  of p a rts areto o v ag ueto re s olve t he'sh ip o fTh e seu s' puzz l e. W e ca nma ke t hem  m ore p reci s e,Swinbur ne says,ine ithe rof  two wa ys: the conti nu ity of pla nk s a rrange d in a cer tain way determines the identit y o f the  shi p; or the  id entity  of the pl anks d eterm in est h e ide n t it y o fthe ship.' W e c an te ll  the  storyeither way without any thing being o mit ted. ' (S win b ur n e 2 01 3 : 3 1 )  Can this claim  about the  s h ip  of Theseu s  re al ly be t rue, on  Swin b urne'sview? Itmay makeadiff e r enc e in the h istory o f the wor l d whi c hshipisthe or ig ina l shi p afte r  th e cha nge of  p lanks– the  s hip with  reassembled old planks  or th e shi p w ith the n ewp lan ks. To se e th is, suppos e t hat , alt hou g h the  ori g in als hip w as o w ned by Th e se us, t he  replacemen t p lan ks we reo wned b y Mi nos. If we said t h at the continu ousl y - exi sti n g sh ip  was the shipofTh e s eus, the nTheseus wou ld own a  s h ip al l of w hose p lanks w e r eo wned b y Mi nos . If theori gi n al ship  o fT heseus  had  b een in sured, then t here would be adiffe r e nce i n  wh ich r es ultings hipended up
.,'red', 'I',_'arthritis' –_the speaker has the_linguistic knowledge_of_how to_use_a term without_knowing, even in_some implicit way, any_necessary and sufficient_conditions_for the term's application. In sum, if neither'red', nor 'I', nor 'arthritis' is an_informative_designator, and_if_'water''s_being an informative designator is_relative, not only to time,_but also_to speaker, it is difficult to see that_there_are any informative_designators – certainly not enough to tell the whole_story of the world – on_Swinburne's characterization. Hence,_Swinburne's_notion_of an informative designator_does not seem up to the_task of picking out all the_properties needed to tell the history of_the world. 9SWINBURNE ON SUBSTANCE DUALISM_II. IDENTITY CRITERIA FOR COMPOSITE_SUBSTANCES Swinburne_has a principle of identity_for composites. (Composites_are substances_with parts –_like human organisms and artefacts.) One_way to express_his principle is that 'there is_no_more to any_substance_than_its parts_(e.g., fundamental particles)_and_the way_those_parts are arranged' (Swinburne 2013: 35)._Swinburne_says that our normal criteria for the_identity of a ship_over_time in terms of_parts are too vague to_resolve the'ship of Theseus' puzzle. We_can make_them more_precise, Swinburne says, in either of two ways: the continuity of_planks arranged in a certain way_determines the identity of_the ship;_or_the identity of_the_planks determines_the identity of the ship. 'We can_tell the_story either way without anything being_omitted.' (Swinburne 2013: 31)_Can_this claim about the ship of_Theseus really be true, on Swinburne's_view? It may make a_difference_in_the history of the world_which ship is the original ship_after the change_of planks – the ship with reassembled_old_planks or the ship with the_new_planks. To see this, suppose that,_although_the_original ship was owned by_Theseus, the replacement planks were owned_by Minos. If we said that the continuously-existing ship_was the ship_of Theseus, then Theseus would_own_a_ship all of whose planks were owned by Minos. If_the original_ship of Theseus_had been insured, then there would be a difference in_which resulting ship ended up