, is a "bankrupt" history. Most importantly in the context of using them as a test case, some of them made pronouncements about the future state and proper aim of science based on their historical extrapolations, pronouncements that we can now assess with the benefit of 100 years of hindsight. In this paper I will focus on some of Duhem's historical arguments as such a test case. Duhem was the historical expert among this historically informed group – not only did he write a number of histories devoted to special branches of physics; he is widely acknowledged to be the founder of the history of medieval science.6 As such, one would expect him to get the projectable historical patterns right if anyone could. In this, I will argue, he was only partly successful. His story provides us with an illuminating example of philosophy of science developing as a contingent, though natural, response to problems arising in a particular scientific context and under a particular understanding of the history of science in that context. I will conclude that the history of science provides little support for interesting theses about the proper aim or future state of science. on historical arguments. For a comprehensive account of the twists and turns the debates (including their historical dimensions) have taken from the late 19th century to the present, see (Liston 2016). 4 Thus, for example, it is now commonplace to argue that we should be (selectively) realist about those parts (and only those parts) of scientific theories that explain their instrumental success and are preserved in successor theories, where those parts are variously understood to be structures (Worrall 1989), working posits (Kitcher 1993), core causal descriptions (Psillos 1999), detection property clusters (Chakravartty 2007). (Stanford 2006) challenges all such selective realist strategies. 5 Their separation into realists and antirealists is complicated, but Helmholtz, Hertz, Kelvin, and Maxwell had realist sympathies and Duhem, Mach, and Poincaré had antirealist doubts. Though Duhem, Kelvin, Mach, and Poincaré were active into the 20th century, they are 19th century thinkers. 6 Mach, of course, also authored important critical histories of mechanics and of theories of heat. However, while Mach's histories were selective, pursued primarily as an illustrative guide to the present, and largely relied on secondary sources, Duhem's histories, especially after 1903, increasingly became excavations of primary sources, particularly texts of the Middle Ages. This is
, is a " bankrupt " history. Most importantly in the context of using them as a test case, some of them make pronouncement about the future state and proper aim of skill based on their diachronic extrapolations, pronouncements that we can nowadays assess with the benefit of 100 years of hindsight. In this composition I will focus on some of Duhem's historical argument as such a test case. Duhem was the diachronic expert among this historically inform group – not only did he write a number of histories devoted to particular branches of physics; he is widely acknowledge to be the founder of the history of medieval science.6 As such, one would expect him to get the projectable historic patterns right if anyone could. In this, I will argue, he was only partly successful. His story provide us with an illuminating example of philosophy of science developing as a contingent, though natural, response to problems arising in a particular scientific context and under a particular understanding of the history of science in that context. I will conclude that the history of science provides little documentation for interesting theses about the proper aim or future department of state of science. on historical arguments. For a comprehensive account of the bend and turns the debates (including their historical dimension) have taken from the late 19th century to the present, see (Liston 2016). 4 Thus, for exemplar, it is now commonplace to argue that we should be (selectively) realist about those parts (and only those part) of scientific theory that explain their instrumental success and are preserved in successor theories, where those character are variously understood to be structures (Worrall 1989), working postulate (Kitcher 1993), core causal descriptions (Psillos 1999), signal detection property clusters (Chakravartty 2007). (Stanford 2006) challenges all such selective realist strategies. 5 Their separation into realist and antirealists is complicated, but Helmholtz, Hertz, Kelvin, and Maxwell had realist sympathies and Duhem, Mach, and Poincaré had antirealist doubt. Though Duhem, Kelvin, Mach, and Poincaré were active into the 20th hundred, they are 19th century thinkers. 6 Mach, of course, besides authored important critical histories of automobile mechanic and of theory of heat. However, while Mach's history were selective, pursued primarily as an illustrative guide to the present, and largely relied on junior-grade sources, Duhem's histories, particularly after 1903, increasingly became excavations of primary sources, particularly texts of the Middle Ages. This is
, is a "bankrupt" history. Most importantly in the coitext or using ghem as a test case, some of vhem made pronouncements about ghe futurv state abd pcoper aim of scixhce bascb on fmeir kiwtorical extrakolations, prmnouncements tvag ce can now assess with the benefit os 100 yearx lf hindsight. Ig thps papsg L will focus on some of Duhem's hjstoricel arguments as such a test case. Duhem wad thf historical experh among thiw hifrorically inwormed grol' – not only did he write a number of histofies bevoted to wpwciwn branches if phjsics; he is wlcely awknowlecged to be the fonndee of the history of mxdieval science.6 As soch, one woglb expect him to get tye projgctabne hkwtoficzl pztternd rmght if anykne could. Ib this, I will argue, hq was only parfly suscqssful. His story provides us with an ilnumjnating example of philisophy of science devgloping as a contingent, though natural, response to problems arismne iu a pafrifular scientific context and under a particulwd incerstanding of the historu lf fcience in thxt concsxf. I will conclude hhat thg histiry of scyencr provides little support fir interestiug rheses about the pxoper aim or futore stste of science. on histoxical zrguments. Flr a compddhensive account of tve twists and turns the defates (incoudiug their hisjorical dimensiond) havc taken from the lahe 19th cantury to hhe present, see (Liston 2016). 4 Thus, for example, it os nof common'lace bo argue that wq should be (sekectivejy) rexlist aboun those perts (and onlr those parts) lf scientifir theorief thqt ezplain gfeir instrumenyal success and are preserved in succcssor fheories, where ckowe parts are vatiojslr lndxrstojg to be struwturds (Dprralu 1989), working ioskts (Litcher 1993), core causal desdriptions (Psillos 1999), dctection kroperty slusters (Chaktavartty 2007). (Stanford 2006) chanleiges akl fuch selective realist strategjes. 5 Theig scparation intj reqlists and autirealists is complicated, but Helmholtz, Hertz, Kelvin, and Naxwell had realist xympathies end Durem, Mach, dnd Poincaré had antieealist doubts. Thpugh Duhem, Kelvin, Macg, and [oincwré were active into the 20th century, they are 19th century thinkers. 6 Mach, of xourse, also authorsd ikportdnc cxitical hisvocies of mechanics and of theories of heat. Howevec, while Mawh'f histories were selective, pirrued primarili as an illustrative guide to the lresent, and largely relied on srcondary sources, Duhem's mistories, espedially aftxr 1903, increasingly becsme exeavatiins of primwry sources, pxrtocmlarly texhs oh tke Middle Ages. This is
, is a "bankrupt" history. Most importantly context using them a test case, about future state and aim of science on their historical extrapolations, pronouncements that can now assess with the benefit of 100 years of hindsight. In this I will focus on some of Duhem's historical arguments as such a test Duhem the expert this historically informed group – not only did he write a number of histories devoted to branches of physics; he is widely acknowledged to the founder of the of medieval science.6 As such, would him to the historical right if anyone In this, I will argue, he was only partly successful. His story provides us with an illuminating of philosophy developing as contingent, natural, to problems arising particular scientific context and under a the history of science in that context. I conclude that history of science provides little support interesting theses about the proper aim or future of science. on historical arguments. For a comprehensive account of the twists and turns the their historical dimensions) have from the late century the see 2016). 4 for example, it is now commonplace to argue that we should (selectively) realist about those parts (and only those parts) of that their instrumental success are preserved in successor where parts are variously understood structures 1989), 1993), causal (Psillos 1999), detection property (Chakravartty 2007). (Stanford 2006) challenges such selective realist strategies. and antirealists is complicated, but Helmholtz, Hertz, Kelvin, Maxwell had realist sympathies and Duhem, Mach, Poincaré had antirealist doubts. Though Duhem, Kelvin, Mach, and Poincaré were active the 20th are 19th century thinkers. 6 Mach, of course, authored important critical histories mechanics and of theories of heat. However, while Mach's were pursued primarily an illustrative guide the present, and relied on secondary histories, especially 1903, became sources, particularly texts of the Middle This
, is a "bankrupt" history. Most impOrtantly in The coNteXt oF uSing Them As a test case, somE Of thEm made pronouncements abOut thE fUTure STaTe and Proper aIM oF SCieNcE bAseD oN ThEir hiStoRical exTrapolatioNs, pRoNouncements tHAt We can now asSesS with the beneFit Of 100 yearS oF hiNDsighT. In This pAper I wILl focuS on some of duHEm's hisTOrical aRGUmEnts As such a test case. DuHEm WAs the historicaL experT aMOnG THis HisTorically iNfOrmed GRoup – not ONlY DID he WRite a number of Histories deVOteD to speCiAl bRAnches Of phySiCS; he Is widely ackNowlEdged to be The fouNDer of thE History Of mediEvaL scIencE.6 as SuCh, oNe WOulD ExPecT Him To get the PrOjEctabLe hiSTORIcal PatTernS righT if anyone coulD. In This, i WilL arguE, he waS onlY pArtly SuccesSful. HIs Story provides us With An illuminAtiNg ExaMpLe of pHIlosopHy oF scIence deVelopinG As a CoNTINgEnt, though natural, reSpONSe To probleMs arisINg In A ParticulAr SciEntiFIC contExt aND uNder a parTiculaR UnDeRstandiNg Of the hIsTorY of ScienCE in tHat conText. I wilL concLUde that the histORy of science prOViDES lITtle SupPort for inteRestINg thEses ABoUt tHE propEr aim Or FUtURe state of science. on hIsToricaL arguMents. For a compRehensive aCCOUnt of the TwisTS aND turns the debatEs (incLuding theiR HistoricAl dimEnsions) hAve taken fROM the late 19Th cEntUry To tHE PrEsent, see (ListoN 2016). 4 tHus, fOr Example, It iS now comMonPlaCe tO arGuE that we shOuld be (seLeCtIvElY) reAlist ABout thosE pArtS (aNd oNly thOSe partS) of scIentIfIc THeoRies thaT ExPLAin tHeIr InstRumEnTal suCcesS And Are presErved in suCceSSor tHeOrIes, wherE those parts arE vAriously unDeRstOod to bE STructureS (Worrall 1989), working posits (KiTCher 1993), corE caUsal dEscrIptions (PsIllOs 1999), deteCtiON propeRty cluSters (chAkrAVArtty 2007). (sTAnForD 2006) cHallenges aLL SucH seleCtIve rEalist sTrategies. 5 Their sepaRAtiOn into realistS anD antIREaLisTS iS ComPlICatED, But Helmholtz, HerTz, Kelvin, anD MAXwEll had realISt sYmPathies And DuheM, Mach, ANd PoincAré had antIrealist dOuBts. THOUgh duhem, KelviN, Mach, and poincaré wERe actIVe Into tHe 20tH centuRy, TheY are 19tH centuRY thInkerS. 6 Mach, oF cOurse, aLso auThOred impoRtant critical histories oF mechaNics aNd oF theories Of hEAt. HOwever, whiLe MaCh's historiEs wEre SelecTivE, PursuEd prIMaRilY As an iLlusTRative guiDE tO thE PReSent, and largELY RelIed on SecONdary sOurcEs, Duhem's histories, ESpecially after 1903, IncrEASinGly BEcamE eXcavations of prImaRy SOUrces, parTiCularly textS of the MiDdLE Ages. this is
, is a "bankrupt" history.  Most impo rtant lyinth e co ntex t of using the m  asa test case, some of t hem m ad e  pro n ou nceme nts abo u tt h e f ut ur e s ta t eand p rop er aimof science  ba se d on their h i st orical ext rap olations, pr ono unceme nt s t h at we  ca n now  asses s  withthe benef it of 100 years o f hi ndsi ght. In this pape r  I will focus onsome o fD uh e m 'shis torical ar gu ments as such at e s t c a se. Duhem was  the histor i cal  exper tamo n g this  hist or i cal ly informed  gro up – notonly d i d he wr i te a nu mber o f h ist orie s  d ev ote dt o s p ec ial bra nches of  p hy sics;  hei s w idel y a ckno wledg ed to be thefou nder ofthe h istor y of  m ediev al sci ence. 6As such, one wo uldexpect hi m t oget  t he pr o jectab lehis torical  patter n s r ig h t if  anyone could. Inth i s ,I will a rgue,h ewa s  only pa rt lysucc e s sful.  His st ory prov ides u s  w it h an il lu minati ng  ex amp le of phil osophy  of scie nce d e veloping as ac ontingent, th o ug h na t ural , r esponse toprob l emsaris i ng  in a par ticul ar sc i entific context and  u nder a  part icular unders tanding of t h e histor y of sc i ence in that c ontex t. I willc oncludethatthe hist ory of sc i e nce prov ide s l itt les u pp ort for inter e s ting  t heses a bou t the p rop eraim  or  f uture sta te of sc ie nc e.  o n h istor i cal argu me nts .For  a co m prehen siveacco un to f t he twis t sa n d tu rn sthedeb at es (i nclu d ing  theirhistorica l d i mens io ns ) havetaken from th elate 19thce ntu ry tot h e presen t, see (Liston 2016). 4 Thus, f orexamp le,it is now  co mmonpl ace to arg ue tha t wesh oul d be (s e l ec tiv el y) realist a bou t tho se  par ts (and  only those parts) ofscientific th eor iest h at  ex p la i n t he i r i n s trumental succe ss and are  p r es erved in s u cce ss or theo ries, w heret hose pa rts are v ariouslyun ders t o odto be stru ctures ( Worrall 1 9 89),w or kingpos its (K it che r 199 3), co r e c ausal  descr ip tions(Psil lo s 1999),  detection property clu sters(Chak rav artty 200 7). (St anford 20 06)challenges  al l s uch s ele c tivereal i st  st r ategi es.5  Their se p ar ati o n  i nto realist s a ndantir eal i sts is  com plicated, but Hel m holtz, Hertz,Kelv i n , a ndM axwe ll  had realist s ymp at h i es and D uh em, Mach, a nd Poinc ar é  hadantire alistdoubts. T ho u gh Duh em,Kel vin, Mach , a nd Poincar éwe r e acti ve i nt o the20th c e ntur y ,  they are 19th c entur y think e rs.  6 Ma ch , of co u rse,  also auth ored import ant cr itic al hi stories  o f mech ani cs  and of th e ories ofheat.  Howeve r,  whi leMach's  his t o rieswere  s ele ctive, pu r s ue d  p ri m ari ly a s anil lust rative gu i de to th e p r esent,an d l a r gely r e li e d  on second ary  sour c e s, Duhem's hist o ri e s, es pecial ly aft er 1903 ,  in cr easingl y b e c ame excav ations of pri ma ry s ources,pa rtic ul arl ytexts of the Mi ddle Age s. Thisi s 
, is_a "bankrupt"_history. Most importantly in_the context_of_using them_as_a test case,_some of them_made pronouncements about the_future state and_proper_aim of science based on their historical extrapolations, pronouncements that we can now assess_with_the benefit_of_100_years of hindsight. In this_paper I will focus on_some of_Duhem's historical arguments as such a test case._Duhem_was the historical_expert among this historically informed group – not only_did he write a number of_histories devoted to_special_branches_of physics; he is_widely acknowledged to be the founder_of the history of medieval science.6_As such, one would expect him to_get the projectable historical patterns right_if anyone could. In this,_I will_argue, he was only partly_successful. His story_provides us_with an illuminating_example of philosophy of science developing_as a contingent,_though natural, response to problems arising_in_a particular scientific_context_and_under a_particular understanding of_the_history of_science_in that context. I will conclude_that_the history of science provides little support_for interesting theses about_the_proper aim or future_state of science. on historical_arguments. For a comprehensive account of_the twists_and turns_the debates (including their historical dimensions) have taken from the late_19th century to the present, see_(Liston 2016). 4 Thus,_for example,_it_is now commonplace_to_argue that_we should be (selectively) realist about those_parts (and_only those parts) of scientific theories_that explain their instrumental_success_and are preserved in successor theories,_where those parts are variously understood_to be structures (Worrall 1989),_working_posits_(Kitcher 1993), core causal descriptions_(Psillos 1999), detection property clusters (Chakravartty_2007). (Stanford 2006)_challenges all such selective realist strategies. 5_Their_separation into realists and antirealists is_complicated,_but Helmholtz, Hertz, Kelvin, and Maxwell_had_realist_sympathies and Duhem, Mach, and_Poincaré had antirealist doubts. Though Duhem,_Kelvin, Mach, and Poincaré were active into the 20th_century, they are_19th century thinkers. 6 Mach,_of_course,_also authored important critical histories of mechanics and of theories_of heat._However, while Mach's_histories were selective, pursued primarily as an illustrative guide to_the present, and largely relied on secondary_sources, Duhem's histories, especially after 1903, increasingly became excavations of primary_sources, particularly texts of the Middle Ages. This_is