 cases like these have an epistemic impact on perceptual experience in Siegel (2011) and (2013): they reduce the power those experiences could otherwise have to provide justification for subsequent beliefs formed on the basis. This kind of epistemic impact could be further explained by experiences detracting from the subject's rational standing. Siegel/Epistemic Charge 3 the belief has to be reasonable.5 Jurors in self--‐defense cases are supposed to assess the reasonableness of the defendants' actions, in part by assessing the reasonableness of their beliefs. And to determine whether the belief is reasonable, they're supposed to consider what a reasonable person in the defendants' circumstances would believe about the immanence and the extent of the threat that they face. They are supposed to ask what would be reasonable to believe about those things, in those circumstances. Consider a defendant who attacks a man he believes is holding a gun. The man was holding something, and it looked to the defendant as if it was a gun. But suppose that the defendant's perceptual experience was cognitively penetrated by an ill--‐founded unconscious presumption --‐ a form of racism, for example --‐ that men who in certain observable respects resemble the man the defendant sees are dangerous.6 We can suppose that the cognitive penetration happens by an unconscious inference from this presumption. We don't have to build in to the notion of inference to perceptual experience that inference establishes an epistemic dependence of the experience on the presumption – that conclusion is too close to what's at issue. We can use a notion of inference (presumably the one used by psychologists) that leaves it open whether inference has epistemic effects or not.7 If the reasonableness of the person depends only on the interface between experience and subsequent belief, and not on psychological background of the experience, then the belief that the man is dangerous (because he is holding a gun) might seem to be reasonable. But if the gun--‐experience itself detracts from the subject's rational standing because it is inferred from an ill--‐founded presumption, then when we assess what a reasonable person under similar circumstances would believe, we need not hold constant their experience. A reasonable person in similar circumstances would not have an experience that they inferred from the ill--‐founded presumption. Just as a reasonable person's beliefs would be by and large shaped by reasonable presumptions, so would their perceptual experiences. My goals in this paper are to put us in a better position to assess whether experiences have a rational standing, and to put the idea that they do in a
cases like these have an epistemic impact on perceptual experience in Siegel (2011) and (2013 ): they reduce the exponent those experience could otherwise have to provide justification for subsequent impression formed on the basis. This kind of epistemic shock could be far explained by experience detracting from the subject's intellectual standing. Siegel / Epistemic Charge 3 the belief has to be reasonable.5 Jurors in self--‐defense cases are supposed to measure the reasonableness of the defendants' actions, in part by assessing the rationality of their beliefs. And to determine whether the belief is fair, they're supposed to consider what a reasonable person in the defendants' circumstances would think about the immanence and the extent of the threat that they confront. They are supposed to ask what would be reasonable to think about those things, in those circumstances. Consider a defendant who attacks a man he believes is hold a gun. The man was holding something, and it looked to the defendant as if it was a gun. But suppose that the defendant's perceptual experience was cognitively penetrated by an ill--‐founded unconscious presumption --‐ a form of racism, for example --‐ that man who in certain observable deference resemble the man the defendant sees are dangerous.6 We can suppose that the cognitive penetration happens by an unconscious inference from this given. We don't have to build up in to the notion of inference to perceptual experience that inference establishes an epistemic addiction of the experience on the presumption – that conclusion is too close to what's at issue. We can use a notion of inference (presumably the one used by psychologists) that leaves it open whether inference has epistemic impression or not.7 If the rationality of the person depend only on the interface between experience and subsequent belief, and not on psychological background of the experience, then the belief that the valet is dangerous (because he is holding a gun) might seem to be fair. But if the gun--‐experience itself detracts from the topic's rational standing because it is inferred from an ill--‐founded given, then when we assess what a reasonable person under similar circumstances would believe, we need not bear constant their experience. A reasonable person in similar circumstance would not have an experience that they deduce from the ill--‐founded presumption. Just as a fair person's beliefs would be by and large shaped by reasonable presumptions, so would their perceptual experiences. My goals in this paper are to put us in a better position to measure whether experiences have a intellectual standing, and to put the idea that they do in a
 cades like these have an ekistemic impact ou perce'tual esperiencd in Siegel (2011) and (2013): they reducx thw powtg those experiences cuuld othegwise havw to provide justificatljn fkv subvxquent beliefs normed on tve basis. This nivd of epistemic impact could be furthqr explsijed by experiegces qetrzbtlng from the subject's rational sfanding. Siegel/Epistekic Charge 3 the belief has to he reasonable.5 Jurogs in self--‐dgrenfw cases are rupposed to assess the reasonableness of the defendangs' accions, in patc by dssessing tie reafonableness of their beliefx. And to deterkinx whwther the belief is rxasonable, they're supkosed to cmnaider what a reasinqble kersot in rhe dereidahts' cigcujstances wkuld believw about the immanenve qnd the extenf of tre threat that they face. They are supposeg tk ask what would be reawonable to believe ablut those things, in those circumstances. Consider a defendatt whk atuaghr a man he believes is holding a gun. The man was gokdpng something, and it looked yo tng defendant as if it waa a gun. But supposf that jhe dedendant's kerceltual experience was cognituvely penetrctee by an ill--‐founded unconsciour prgsumptoon --‐ a form of racism, fur esample --‐ thah men who kn certain obserxabke respects resemble the man the defeidant sees afe dsngerots.6 We can duppose that the cognitige peuetradion happejs by an unconscious inference hcom this presompdiot. We don'c have to build in eo the notion pf infexence go perceptlal expermence that igference estatpishes an epmstemic dqpeneencw of thd experience on the preslmktion – thar conclusion is top cukse to what's at iswue. We can use s nutijn oh infqsence (presumdbly thd one jsed by psyghouogixts) that leaves it o[en shether inference naf epistenic effests or not.7 If the reasonablenesd of vhe pecson drpegds only on the interface betwsen experlenge and subseqtent belief, and uot on psychological background of the eeperience, then the beliwf that the man is bakgerous (becanse he is holditg a gun) might seem ro be reasonable. Nut if the gun--‐experiende itsalf dftracts from the subject's rational standing because it is inferred from ab ill--‐founded presujptipn, thvn cheu we asfess xhat a reasonable person under similar circumstaices would bzlieve, we need not hold constsng their experkence. A reasonable persoh in simolar circumstances would not hafe an experience that thcy inferrwd frkm the ill--‐hounded presumption. Kust av a rwasonaboe pcrson's beliefs woilf be by ajd lergz shaped by reasonable presumptiobs, so qokld their percepvual experiekcts. My gkals ig this paper are to lkt us in a better losition to asxess whether experietcqs have a ratiihal standing, and ji put the idea that they go in a
cases like these have an epistemic impact experience Siegel (2011) (2013): they reduce otherwise to provide justification subsequent beliefs formed the basis. This kind of epistemic could be further explained by experiences detracting from the subject's rational standing. Siegel/Epistemic 3 the belief has to be reasonable.5 Jurors in self--‐defense cases are supposed assess reasonableness the actions, in part by assessing the reasonableness of their beliefs. And to determine whether the belief reasonable, they're supposed to consider what a reasonable in the defendants' circumstances believe about the immanence and extent the threat they They supposed to ask would be reasonable to believe about those things, in those circumstances. Consider a defendant who attacks a he believes a gun. man holding and it looked defendant as if it was a that the defendant's perceptual experience was cognitively penetrated an ill--‐founded presumption --‐ a form of racism, example --‐ that men who in certain observable resemble the man the defendant sees are dangerous.6 We can suppose that the cognitive penetration an unconscious inference from presumption. We don't to in the of inference perceptual experience that inference establishes an epistemic dependence of the experience the presumption – that conclusion is too close to what's We use a notion inference (presumably the one by that leaves it open has effects the of person depends only on interface between experience and subsequent and not on psychological the belief that the man is dangerous (because is holding a gun) might seem to reasonable. But if the gun--‐experience itself detracts from the subject's rational standing it is an ill--‐founded presumption, then when we assess what reasonable person under similar would believe, we need not hold constant their experience. reasonable in similar would not have experience that they from the ill--‐founded as a person's would large shaped by reasonable presumptions, so their experiences. My goals in this are us in a better position to assess whether experiences have a rational standing, and to idea that they do a
 cases like these have an epistEmic impact On perCepTuaL eXperIencE in Siegel (2011) and (2013): thEY redUce the power those experiEnces CoULd otHErWise hAve to prOViDE JusTiFiCatIoN FoR subsEquEnt beliEfs formed oN thE bAsis. This kind OF ePistemic imPacT could be furtHer ExplaiNeD by EXperiEncEs detRactinG From thE subject's RaTIonal sTAnding. SIEGeL/EpiStemic Charge 3 the beLIeF Has to be reasonaBle.5 JurOrS In SELf--‐dEfeNse cases arE sUpposED to asseSS tHE REasONableness of thE defendants' ACtiOns, in pArT by ASsessiNg the ReASonAbleness of tHeir Beliefs. AnD to detERmine whETher the Belief Is rEasOnabLE, tHeY're SuPPosED tO coNSidEr what a rEaSoNable PersON IN The dEfeNdanTs' cirCumstances wouLd bElieVE abOut thE immaNencE aNd the Extent Of the ThReat that they facE. TheY are suppoSed To Ask WhAt wouLD be reaSonAblE to beliEve abouT ThoSe THINgS, in those circumstanCeS. cOnSider a deFendanT WhO aTTacks a maN hE beLievES Is holDing A GuN. The man wAs holdINg SoMething, AnD it looKeD to The DefenDAnt aS if it wAs a gun. BuT suppOSe that the defenDAnt's perceptuaL ExPERiENce wAs cOgnitively pEnetRAted By an ILl--‐FouNDed unConscIoUS pREsumption --‐ a form of racIsM, for exAmple --‐ That men who in cErtain obseRVABle respeCts rESeMBle the man the deFendaNt sees are dANgerous.6 WE can sUppose thAt the cognITIve penetRatIon HapPenS BY aN unconscious iNFErenCe From thiS prEsumptiOn. WE doN't hAve To Build in to The notioN oF iNfErEncE to peRCeptual eXpEriEnCe tHat inFErence EstabLishEs An EPisTemic dePEnDENce oF tHe ExpeRieNcE on thE preSUmpTion – thaT conclusiOn iS Too cLoSe To what's At issue. We can uSe A notion of iNfEreNce (preSUMably the One used by psychologists) tHAt leaveS it Open wHethEr inferenCe hAs episTemIC effecTs or noT.7 If thE rEasONAblenESS oF thE pErson depenDS OnlY on thE iNterFace betWeen experience and sUBseQuent belief, anD noT on pSYChOloGIcAL baCkGRouND Of the experience, Then the belIeF ThAt the man is DAngErOus (becaUse he is HoldiNG a gun) miGht seem to Be reasonaBlE. But IF The Gun--‐experieNce itselF detracts FRom thE SuBject'S raTional StAndIng beCause iT Is iNferrEd from An Ill--‐fouNded pReSumption, Then when we assess what a reAsonabLe perSon Under simiLar CIrcUmstances WoulD believe, we NeeD noT hold ConSTant tHeir EXpEriENce. A rEasoNAble persoN In SimILAr CircumstancES WOulD not hAve AN experIencE that they inferred FRom the ill--‐foundEd prESUmpTioN. just As A reasonable perSon'S bELIefs woulD bE by and large Shaped by ReASonabLe presUmptioNs, so wouLD ThEIr percEptuAl eXperienceS. My GoALs in thiS pApER are to Put uS iN a bettEr posiTIon tO ASsess whether expeRiencES Have a RAtiOnal sTaNding, anD To puT the idea thAt they do in a
 cases like these have anepistemicimpac t o n p er cept ualexperience inS iege l (2011) and (2013): t hey r ed u ce t h epower  thosee xp e r ien ce scou ld ot herwi sehave to  provide j ust if ication fors ub sequent be lie fs formed on  th e basi s.  Th i s kin d o f epi stemic impact  could be  f u rthere xplaine d by  exp eriences detracti n gf rom the subjec t's ra ti o na l sta ndi ng. Siegel /E piste m ic Char g e3 t heb elief has tobe reasonab l e.5  Juror sins elf--‐ defen se cas es are supp osed  to asses s ther easonab l eness o f thedef end ants '  a ct ion s, inp ar t b y  as sessingth ereaso nabl e n e s s of  th eirbelie fs. And to de ter mine whe therthe b elie fis re asonab le, t he y're supposed t o co nsider wh atarea so nable person  in  th e defen dants'c irc um s t a nc es would believe a bo u t  t he imman ence a n dth e  extentof  th e th r e at th at t h ey  face. T hey ar e  s up posed t oask wh at  wo uld  be r e ason able t o believ e abo u t those things ,  in those cir c um s t an c es.Con sider a def enda n t wh o at t ac ksa  manhe be li e ve s  is holding a gun.Th e manwas h olding someth ing, and i t l ooked to  the de f endant as if i t was  a gun. Bu t  suppose  that  the def endant'sp e rceptual  ex per ien cew a scognitively p e n etra te d by an  il l--‐fou nde d u nco nsc io us presum ption -- ‐afo rm  of  raci s m, for e xa mpl e--‐  that men wh o incert ai no bse rvabler es p e ctsre se mble  th eman t he d e fen dant se es are da nge r ous. 6We  can su ppose that th ecognitivepe net ration h appens b y an unconscious infere n ce from  th is pr esum ption. We  do n't ha vet o buil d in t o the  n oti o n  of i n f er enc eto percept u a l e xperi en ce t hat inf erence establishes anepistemic dep end ence o fthe ex p eri en c e o n the presumption  – that co nc l us ion is too clo se  to wha t's atissue .  We can  use a no tion of i nf eren c e  (p resumablythe oneused by p s ychol o gi sts)tha t leav es  it  open  wheth e r i nfere nce ha sepiste mic e ff ects ornot.7 If the reasonable ness o f the  pe rson depe nds onl y on theinte rface betw een  ex perie nce and s ubse q ue ntb elief , an d  not on p s yc hol o g ic al backgrou n d ofthe e xpe r ience,  the n the belief that the man is dan gero u s  (b eca u se h eis holding a g un)  m i g ht seemto  be reasona ble. But  i f  thegun--‐ experi ence it s e lf detrac ts f rom  the subj ect 's rationa lst a ndingbeca us e it i s infe r redf r om an ill--‐foun ded p r e sumpt i on,  then  w hen wea sses s what a r easonable p ersonunde r sim ilar ci rc umstan ces  w ould belie v e, we nee d not  hold c on stan t t heir e xper i e nce.A re as ona ble perso n in si mi l arcirc umsta nc es w ould noth ave an e xpe r ience t ha t t h e y infe r re d from the i ll- -‐fou n d ed presump t ion. Ju s t asa reas onable  person ' s b el iefs wo uld b e by andlarge sha p edby  rea sonablepr esum pt ion s,  so would their  percept ual expe r i ences.  My goal s  in th is  paper are t o put  u s  in a b e t ter  positi o n t o a sse ss w het here xperiences have a ration al s tandi n g,and t o put  t he ideat hatthey doi n a
 cases_like these_have an epistemic impact_on perceptual_experience_in Siegel_(2011)_and (2013): they_reduce the power_those experiences could otherwise_have to provide_justification_for subsequent beliefs formed on the basis. This kind of epistemic impact could be_further_explained by_experiences_detracting_from the subject's rational standing._Siegel/Epistemic Charge 3 the belief_has to_be reasonable.5 Jurors in self--‐defense cases are supposed_to_assess the reasonableness_of the defendants' actions, in part by assessing the_reasonableness of their beliefs. And to_determine whether the_belief_is_reasonable, they're supposed to_consider what a reasonable person in_the defendants' circumstances would believe about_the immanence and the extent of the_threat that they face. They are_supposed to ask what would_be reasonable_to believe about those things,_in those circumstances._Consider a_defendant who attacks_a man he believes is holding_a gun. The_man was holding something, and it_looked_to the defendant_as_if_it was_a gun. But_suppose_that the_defendant's_perceptual experience was cognitively penetrated by_an_ill--‐founded unconscious presumption --‐ a form of_racism, for example --‐_that_men who in certain_observable respects resemble the man_the defendant sees are dangerous.6 We_can suppose_that the_cognitive penetration happens by an unconscious inference from this presumption. We_don't have to build in to_the notion of inference_to perceptual_experience_that inference establishes_an_epistemic dependence_of the experience on the presumption –_that conclusion_is too close to what's at_issue. We can use_a_notion of inference (presumably the one_used by psychologists) that leaves it_open whether inference has epistemic_effects_or_not.7 If the reasonableness of_the person depends only on the_interface between experience_and subsequent belief, and not on psychological_background_of the experience, then the belief_that_the man is dangerous (because he_is_holding_a gun) might seem to_be reasonable. But if the gun--‐experience_itself detracts from the subject's rational standing because it_is inferred from_an ill--‐founded presumption, then when_we_assess_what a reasonable person under similar circumstances would believe, we_need not_hold constant their_experience. A reasonable person in similar circumstances would not have_an experience that they inferred from the_ill--‐founded presumption. Just as a reasonable person's beliefs would be by_and large shaped by reasonable presumptions, so would_their perceptual experiences. My goals in this_paper are to put_us_in a better position to assess whether_experiences_have_a_rational standing, and_to put the_idea that they_do in_a