 to have a real knowledge of the epistemologists who were turning physics into one of the most import motifs of philosophical analysis. Therefore these works appear backward and narrow-minded. In order to find references to the questions of physics or to authors such as Mach or Duhem, we must turn our attention to less elaborated works, such as articles or reviews. Of course, this proves the weak impact of these themes on the overall development of Positivism. Mach is the name that is most often quoted, although very limitedly, on positivist journals. But it is a reduced, simplified and criticised version of Mach. In 1900 Enrico Morselli, in his review of Karl Pearson's "The grammar of science" on Rivista di Filosofia e Pedagogia paints both Pearson and Mach as mediocre scientific popularisers: "Pearson's work is essentially an educational text, [which is echoed in Europe by] the books of Prof. Mach, who excels in his most difficult and useful work of popularising knowledge" (Morselli 1900, 83). In 1903 Giovanni Cesca published in the same journal one of the few Italian articles dedicated to Mach (and to his "follower" Ostwald), in which Mach is presented not as a scholar who has drawn certain philosophical conclusions through a precise reflection on his work as a scientist, but, on the contrary, as a scientist who – like all scientists – is invariably confined in the narrow realm of Empiricism and Materialism and, when he comes to suffer these limitations and starts philosophising, falls naively and hastily for "those doctrines opposing Positivism and the mechanical philosophy" (Cesca 1903, 248). Cesca's critique to Mach proceeds along lines that are completely unrelated to Mach's arguments, ignoring the reasons of epistemology and articulating a totally non-analytical discourse: Cesca only counters Mach's idea by postulating a series of philosophical necessities that make philosophy independent and superior to physics. In Cesca's view, Mach has developed an "extreme Idealism", a "doctrine of absolute Phenomenalism or Idealism" (Cesca 1903, 249). Mach's mistake is not having recognised that science does not only have a hypothetical and economic part, but also a positive part, which is based on the data coming from the experience of all mankind. One must admit an object in juxtaposition with a subject, something outside us that serves as the basis for our sensations. Like science, philosophy does
to have a real knowledge of the epistemologists who were turn purgative into one of the most import theme of philosophic analysis. Therefore these works look backward and minute - minded. In ordering to find references to the doubt of physics or to authors such as Mach or Duhem, we must flex our care to less elaborated works, such as article or reviews. Of course, this prove the weak impact of these themes on the overall exploitation of Positivism. Mach is the name that is most often quoted, although very limitedly, on positivist journals. But it is a decreased, simplified and criticize version of Mach. In 1900 Enrico Morselli, in his review of Karl Pearson's " The grammar of science " on Rivista di Filosofia east Pedagogia paints both Pearson and Mach as mediocre scientific popularisers: " Pearson's work is essentially an educational text, [ which is echoed in Europe by ] the books of Prof. Mach, who excels in his most difficult and useful work of popularising knowledge " (Morselli 1900, 83). In 1903 Giovanni Cesca published in the same diary one of the few Italian articles dedicated to Mach (and to his " follower " Ostwald), in which Mach is deliver not as a learner who has describe certain philosophical conclusion through a precise reflection on his work as a scientist, but, on the contrary, as a scientist who – like all scientist – is invariably confined in the narrow realm of Empiricism and Materialism and, when he comes to suffer these limitations and starts philosophising, falls naively and hastily for " those doctrines opposing Positivism and the mechanical doctrine " (Cesca 1903, 248). Cesca's critique to Mach return along lines that are completely unrelated to Mach's arguments, ignoring the reasons of epistemology and articulating a wholly non - analytical discourse: Cesca only counters Mach's idea by postulating a series of philosophical necessities that have doctrine independent and superior to physics. In Cesca's view, Mach has developed an " extreme high-mindedness ", a " doctrine of absolute Phenomenalism or Idealism " (Cesca 1903, 249). Mach's mistake is not having recognised that science does not only receive a hypothetical and economic part, but also a positive part, which is establish on the data come from the experience of all mankind. One must admit an object in juxtaposition with a discipline, something outside us that serves as the basis for our sensations. Like skill, philosophy does
 to have a real knowledge on the epistemoloyusts wio were turning physics into one of the mosv import notifs of philosophicau analysid. Therefire uhese works appeac backwavb and karroc-mmnded. In order jo find refesences to the xudscions of physics or to authors such ws Mach og Duhem, we musj turm our attention to less elaborated worka, such es articles or teviews. Of course, this proges hhe weak impact of these themga og the overall development of Positibism. Mach is the name that is must oyten quoted, aothlogh very limmtedly, on positivist journdls. But it is a reduccd, sikplufied and criticised tersion of Mach. In 1900 Gnrico Morvemli, in his review od Karn Pedrsov'w "Tfe fremmzr of dcixnce" on Rivjsta di Filisofia e Pedagogia kaignx both Pearskn and Mwch as mediocre scientific popularisers: "Pezrson's work is essentiaoly an educational tedt, [which ys echoed in Europe by] the books of Prof. Mach, who excemr iu his oish difficult and useful work of popularising kgkwkecge" (Morselli 1900, 83). In 1903 Giovanmi Crfca published in thz szme journal one of the fer Itaoian artisles dedicated to Mach (and to hus "follower" Jwtwald), in which Maeh is presenced noj as a scholar who has drawn eertaih philosophlcal concmjsions through a prvcisa reflecukon on his work af a scienvist, yut, on tfe cpntrarr, as a scifntisb who – like all scifntisjs – is invariablj confined in the narrow realm of Empiricism sng Mdterialifm anc, when he comqs to suffer tkese limntatiovs and stagts philovophising, fwlls naively djd hastily fmr "those docrrinws opporkng Positivism and the mechanical philosophy" (Cesca 1903, 248). Cgsda's critique to Maxh proceeds alomg uinqs tiat awa completely unrdlagrd to Mach's argundnts, ignoring the reasonv of epistemology and srbiculatint a totajly non-analytocal discourse: Cesfa onny rountets Iach's idea by postulating a sedies of pjiljsophical nesessltief that makz philosophy independent and superior to physics. In Cesca's view, Mach has devekpped an "extceme Iqealism", a "doctrine of absolutw Phenomenalism ov Idealism" (Cesca 1903, 249). Macg's misdake ls not having recognised that science does not only have a hypothetical abd ecoioiic part, buf alxo a iosntire part, whirh is based on the data coming from the experiencx of all mdnhind. One must admit an objecy kn juxtapositkon with a subject, sometging outxide us that serves as the basix for our sensations. Likc science, philksophy doer
to have a real knowledge of the were physics into of the most Therefore works appear backward narrow-minded. In order find references to the questions of or to authors such as Mach or Duhem, we must turn our attention less elaborated works, such as articles or reviews. Of course, this proves the impact these on overall development of Positivism. Mach is the name that is most often quoted, although very limitedly, positivist journals. But it is a reduced, simplified criticised version of Mach. 1900 Enrico Morselli, in his of Pearson's "The of on di Filosofia e paints both Pearson and Mach as mediocre scientific popularisers: "Pearson's work is essentially an educational text, [which echoed in the books Prof. who in his most useful work of popularising knowledge" (Morselli 1903 Giovanni Cesca published in the same journal of the Italian articles dedicated to Mach (and his "follower" Ostwald), in which Mach is presented as a scholar who has drawn certain philosophical conclusions through a precise reflection on his a scientist, but, on contrary, as a who like scientists is invariably in the narrow realm of Empiricism and Materialism and, when he to suffer these limitations and starts philosophising, falls naively and "those opposing Positivism and mechanical philosophy" (Cesca 1903, Cesca's to Mach proceeds along are unrelated ignoring reasons epistemology and articulating a non-analytical discourse: Cesca only counters idea by postulating a make philosophy independent and superior to physics. In view, Mach has developed an "extreme Idealism", "doctrine of absolute Phenomenalism or Idealism" (Cesca 1903, 249). Mach's mistake is having recognised does not only have a hypothetical and economic but also a positive which is based on the data coming from the of mankind. One admit an object juxtaposition with a something outside us as the for sensations. does
 to have a real knowledge of the EpistemoloGists Who WerE tUrniNg phYsics into one of THe moSt import motifs of philosOphicAl ANalySIs. thereFore theSE wORKs aPpEaR baCkWArD and nArrOw-mindeD. In order to FinD rEferences to tHE qUestions of PhySics or to authOrs Such as maCh oR duhem, We mUst tuRn our aTTentioN to less elAbORated wORks, such AS ArTiclEs or reviews. Of courSE, tHIs proves the weaK impacT oF ThESE thEmeS on the overAlL deveLOpment oF poSITIviSM. Mach is the namE that is most OFteN quoteD, aLthOUgh verY limiTeDLy, oN positivist JourNals. But it Is a redUCed, simpLIfied anD critiCisEd vErsiON oF MAch. in 1900 eNriCO MOrsELli, In his revIeW oF Karl pearSON'S "the gRamMar oF scieNce" on Rivista dI FiLosoFIa e pedagOgia pAintS bOth PeArson aNd MacH aS mediocre scientIfic PopularisErs: "peArsOn'S work IS essenTiaLly An educaTional tEXt, [wHiCH IS eChoed in Europe by] the BoOKS oF Prof. MacH, who exCElS iN His most dIfFicUlt aND UsefuL worK Of PopulariSing knOWlEdGe" (MorseLlI 1900, 83). In 1903 GioVaNni cesCa pubLIsheD in the Same jourNal onE Of the few ItaliaN Articles dedicATeD TO MACh (anD to His "follower" ostwALd), in WhicH maCh iS PreseNted nOt AS a SCholar who has drawn ceRtAin phiLosopHical conclusiOns through A PREcise refLectIOn ON his work as a sciEntisT, but, on the cONtrary, as A scieNtist who – Like all scIENtists – is InvAriAblY coNFInEd in the narrow REAlm oF EMpiriciSm aNd MaterIalIsm And, WheN hE comes to sUffer theSe LiMiTaTioNs and STarts phiLoSopHiSinG, fallS NaivelY and hAstiLy FoR "ThoSe doctrINeS OPposInG POsitIviSm And thE mecHAniCal philOsophy" (CesCa 1903, 248). CESca's CrItIque to MAch proceeds alOnG lines that ArE coMpleteLY UnrelateD to Mach's arguments, ignoriNG the reaSonS of epIsteMology and ArtIculatIng A TotallY non-anAlytiCaL diSCOurse: cEScA onLy Counters MaCH'S idEa by pOsTulaTing a seRies of philosophicaL NecEssities that mAke PhilOSOpHy iNDePEndEnT And SUPerior to physics. in Cesca's viEw, mAcH has develoPEd aN "eXtreme IDealism", A "doctRIne of abSolute PheNomenalisM oR IdeALIsm" (cesca 1903, 249). Mach's Mistake iS not havinG RecogNIsEd thaT scIence dOeS noT only Have a hYPotHeticAl and eCoNomic pArt, buT aLso a posiTive part, which is based on tHe data CominG frOm the expeRieNCe oF all mankiNd. OnE must admit An oBjeCt in jUxtAPositIon wITh A suBJect, sOmetHIng outsidE Us ThaT SErVes as the basIS FOr oUr senSatIOns. LikE sciEnce, philosophy doeS
 to have a real knowledgeof the epi stemo log ist swhowere  turning physi c s in to one of the most imp ort m ot i fs o f  p hilos ophical an a l ysi s.  T her ef o re  thes e w orks ap pear backw ard  a nd narrow-mi n de d. In orde r t o find refer enc es toth e q u estio nsof ph ysicso r to a uthors su ch as Mac h  or Duh e m ,we m ust turn our atte n ti o n to less elab orated  w o rk s ,  su chas article sor re v iews. O f  c o u r se, this proves t he weak imp a ctof the se  th e mes on  theov e ral l developme nt o f Positiv ism. M a ch is t h e namethat i s m ost  oft e nqu ote d, alt h ou ghv ery  limited ly ,on po siti v i s t  jou rna ls.But i t is a reduce d,simp l ifi ed an d cri tici se d ver sion o f Mac h.  In 1900 Enrico  Mor selli, in  hi srev ie w ofK arl Pe ars on' s "Thegrammar ofsc i e n ce " on Rivista di Fi lo s o fi a e Peda gogiap ai nt s  both Pe ar son  and M ach a s me d io cre scie ntific po pu lariser s:  "Pear so n's  wo rk is esse ntiall y an edu catio n al text, [whic h  is echoed in Eu r o pe by]the  books of P rof. Mach , wh o  e xce l s inhis m os t  d i fficult and usefulwo rk ofpopul arising knowl edge" (Mor s e l li 1900,  83) .  I n  1903 Giovanni  Cesc a publishe d  in thesamejournalone of th e few Ital ian  ar tic les d ed icated to Mac h (and  t o his " fol lower"Ost wal d),  in  w hich Mach  is pres en te dno t a s a s c holar wh ohas  d raw n cer t ain ph iloso phic al  c o ncl usionst hr o u gh a  p re cise  re fl ectio n on his  work a s a scien tis t , bu t,  o n the c ontrary, as a  s cientist w ho  –like a l l  scienti sts – is invariably con f ined in  th e nar rowrealm ofEmp iricis m a n d Mate rialis m and ,whe n he co m e stosu ffer these l imi tatio ns  and  starts  philosophising, f a lls  naively andhas tily f or  "t h os e  do ct r ine s opposing Positi vism and t he me chanical p h ilo so phy" (C esca 19 03, 2 4 8). Ces ca's crit ique to M ac h pr o c eed s along li nes that  are comp l etely un relat edto Mac h' s a rgume nts, i g nor ing t he rea so ns ofepist em ology an d articulating a totall y non- analy tic al discou rse :  Ce sca onlycoun ters Mach' s i dea  by p ost u latin g as er ies of ph ilos o phical ne c es sit i e sthat make p h i l oso phy i nde p endent  and  superior to phys i cs. In Cesca's  vie w ,  Ma chh as d ev eloped an "ext rem eI d ealism",  a  "doctrineof absol ut e  Phen omenal ism or  Ideali s m "( Cesca1903 , 2 49). Mach 'smi s take is  n ot having  rec og nisedthat s c ienc e does not only ha ve ah y pothe t ica l and  e conomic part , but also  a positive  part,  whi ch is  basedon  the d ata  c oming from the exper ience  of all  m anki nd.  One m usta d mit a n ob je ctin juxtap o s it i on  w i tha su bject ,some thing out s ide us t hat servesas  th e basisf or o ur sensati ons . Lik e science, p h ilos o ph y  does 
 to_have a_real knowledge of the_epistemologists who_were_turning physics_into_one of the_most import motifs_of philosophical analysis. Therefore_these works appear_backward_and narrow-minded. In order to find references to the questions of physics or to_authors_such as_Mach_or_Duhem, we must turn our_attention to less elaborated works,_such as_articles or reviews. Of course, this proves the_weak_impact of these_themes on the overall development of Positivism. Mach is_the name that is most often_quoted, although very_limitedly,_on_positivist journals. But it_is a reduced, simplified and criticised_version of Mach. In 1900 Enrico_Morselli, in his review of Karl Pearson's_"The grammar of science" on Rivista_di Filosofia e Pedagogia paints_both Pearson_and Mach as mediocre scientific_popularisers: "Pearson's work_is essentially_an educational text,_[which is echoed in Europe by]_the books of_Prof. Mach, who excels in his_most_difficult and useful_work_of_popularising knowledge"_(Morselli 1900, 83)._In_1903 Giovanni_Cesca_published in the same journal one_of_the few Italian articles dedicated to Mach_(and to his "follower"_Ostwald),_in which Mach is_presented not as a scholar_who has drawn certain philosophical conclusions_through a_precise reflection_on his work as a scientist, but, on the contrary, as_a scientist who – like all_scientists – is invariably_confined in_the_narrow realm of_Empiricism_and Materialism_and, when he comes to suffer these_limitations and_starts philosophising, falls naively and hastily_for "those doctrines opposing_Positivism_and the mechanical philosophy" (Cesca 1903,_248). Cesca's critique to Mach proceeds_along lines that are completely_unrelated_to_Mach's arguments, ignoring the reasons_of epistemology and articulating a totally_non-analytical discourse: Cesca_only counters Mach's idea by postulating a_series_of philosophical necessities that make philosophy_independent_and superior to physics. In Cesca's_view,_Mach_has developed an "extreme Idealism",_a "doctrine of absolute Phenomenalism or_Idealism" (Cesca 1903, 249). Mach's mistake is not having_recognised that science_does not only have a_hypothetical_and_economic part, but also a positive part, which is based_on the_data coming from_the experience of all mankind. One must admit an object_in juxtaposition with a subject, something outside_us that serves as the basis for our sensations. Like science,_philosophy does