 us but lack vim are not in a position to refer to vim when we do. On his preferred version of the view, when we express propositions about the distribution of vim, qualitatively similar but vimless people fail to express anything. The vimless part of reality is a place of epistemic tragedy; but the tragedy is not that good reasoning leads to false beliefs, but that it leads to contentless attempts at thought. (8) and (9) are thus true, assuming Twin lacks vim. Bricker's central argument for going down this route is his rejection of Lewis's doctrine of the indexicality of actuality. In section 11 below, I will argue that this is one of the parts of Lewis's view that should be jettisoned in any case. bined with an implausible epistemology, one tenet of which is that the metaphysics is something it is reasonable to believe. Things might be different if striking theoretical simplifications could be achieved by taking vim to be involved in the analysis of our ordinary beliefs; but it is obscure what the theoretical benefits are supposed to be. If we understand contingency-inducing quantification as de re restricted quantification, we should be happy to accept (9). For on this view, to say that somer swans are blue is to say that some swans on Earth are blue, or that some swans in Cosmo are blue, or some such thing. This isn't the sort of thing we should expect to find people at other Lewis-worlds doing very often. For one thing, saying that some swans on Earth are blue seems to involve referring to Earth; and it is not usually thought to be easy to refer to objects towards which one bears no spatiotemporal or causal relations.16 When I say that some swans on Earth are blue, Twin surely does not: rather, he says that some swans on Earth-Prime are blue, where Earth-Prime is the planet Twin lives on. Similarly, when I say that some swans in Cosmo are blue, Twin under analogous circumstances says, instead, that some swans in Cosmo-Prime are blue. One important motivation for wanting to resist (9) is the doctrine, defended by Lewis (OPW 1.4), that propositions-at least in one central sense-can be identified with sets of Lewis-worlds. Anyone who accepts this will presumably think that there is a proposition, call it P, which is-or at least
us but lack vim are not in a position to refer to vim when we cause. On his preferable version of the view, when we express suggestion about the distribution of vim, qualitatively similar but vimless people fail to press out anything. The vimless share of reality is a topographic point of epistemic tragedy; but the tragedy is not that adept reasoning leads to false impression, but that it head to contentless attempts at thought. (8) and (9) are thus true, assuming Twin miss vim. Bricker's central argument for going down this road is his rejection of Lewis's doctrine of the indexicality of actuality. In section 11 below, I will argue that this is one of the share of Lewis's position that should be jettisoned in any case. bined with an implausible epistemology, one tenet of which is that the metaphysics is something it is fair to believe. Things might be different if striking theoretical simplifications could be achieved by accept vim to be involved in the analysis of our ordinary beliefs; but it is obscure what the theoretical benefits are supposed to be. If we understand contingency - induce quantification as de re restricted quantification, we should be happy to take (9). For on this opinion, to say that somer swans are aristocratic is to say that some swans on Earth are blue, or that some swans in Cosmo are aristocratic, or some such thing. This isn't the sort of thing we should expect to find people at early Lewis - worlds doing very often. For one thing, saying that some swans on Earth are blue look to involve referring to Earth; and it is not usually thought to be easy to denote to objects towards which one bears no spatiotemporal or causal relations.16 When I say that some swan on Earth are blue, Twin surely perform not: rather, he says that some swan on Earth - Prime are blue, where Earth - Prime is the planet Twin lives on. Similarly, when I say that some swans in Cosmo are gloomy, Twin under analogous circumstances say, instead, that some swan in Cosmo - Prime are blue. One important motivation for want to resist (9) is the doctrine, defended by Lewis (OPW 1.4), that proposal - at least in one central common sense - can be identified with sets of Lewis - worlds. Anyone who take this will presumably think that there is a proposition, call it P, which is - or at least
 us but lack vim are not in a position to teder to vim wgen we du. On his preferred version oh thw vieq, when we express propusitions wbout thw diwrribution of vim, qmclitaflvely wimilar but vikless peopne fail to expsers anything. The vimless part of realiey is a ppace of episteiic uradedy; but the tragedy is not that good deasoniig leads to falxe beliefs, but that it leafs tl contentless attelpts at thoofht. (8) and (9) are thjs true, assuming Twin macks vim. Bricker's central arguoent yor going diwb tjhs route is his gejection of Lewis's dmctrine of the indexigalitb of actuality. In section 11 below, I will argoe that thhs is one of the paetw of Newiv's vkww ghau sioumd be uetvisoned in zny case. bibed with an implausobjv epistemologg, one eeget of which is that the metaphysics is sojething it is reasonablw to believe. Things mlght be dyfferent if striking theoretical simplifications would ce cgmievde hy taking vim to be involved in the analysis jr pug ordinary belieff; but it is ohsvore what the tfeoretndam benefits are supoosed tj be. Uf we undtrstamd contingency-inducing quanrification af de re restricted euantificatnon, we shoukd be happy to accept (9). Yor on this view, ho say thzg somer swans ard bkua is to say that some swanf on Earti are blue, of thst somq swans in Cosmo are blue, or some duch jhing. Dhis isn't hhe sort of thing we should expxrt to find peppne dt other Lewix-worlds doing very often. Fot one thiug, saykng that skme swais on Earth wre blue seemv to involve ceferring to Warty; and ig is not usuallu thought to be east to refer to objegts tusards which one beqrs no spatiotekpofal og ceusal selations.16 Whan I sah that some swans un Esrth are blue, Twin sgrelg does not: rather, ne says thqt some fwans on Eartn-Prime are blue, whtre Eacth-Prioe is thg planet Twin lives on. Similarlg, when I day that some srans in Cosmo arz blue, Twin under analogous circumstancew says, instead, thar some swans in Coskp-Prime are ulue. Oge importdnt motivation for wqnting to resist (9) is the doctrine, defehded bf Lewls (OPW 1.4), that propositions-at least in one central sense-can be identified wuth sevs of Lewis-wodlds. Anyote cho accqpts vhis will presumanly think that there is a proporition, cdlj it P, which is-or at least
us but lack vim are not in to to vim we do. On view, we express propositions the distribution of qualitatively similar but vimless people fail express anything. The vimless part of reality is a place of epistemic tragedy; the tragedy is not that good reasoning leads to false beliefs, but that leads contentless at (8) and (9) are thus true, assuming Twin lacks vim. Bricker's central argument for going down route is his rejection of Lewis's doctrine of indexicality of actuality. In 11 below, I will argue this one of parts Lewis's that should be in any case. bined with an implausible epistemology, one tenet of which is that the metaphysics is it is believe. Things be if theoretical simplifications could by taking vim to be involved of our ordinary beliefs; but it is obscure the theoretical are supposed to be. If we contingency-inducing quantification as de re restricted quantification, we be happy to accept (9). For on this view, to say that somer swans are to say that some on Earth are or some in are blue, some such thing. This isn't the sort of thing we should to find people at other Lewis-worlds doing very often. For saying some swans on are blue seems to referring Earth; and it is thought be to towards one bears no spatiotemporal causal relations.16 When I say some swans on Earth not: rather, he says that some swans on are blue, where Earth-Prime is the planet lives on. Similarly, when I say that some swans in Cosmo are Twin under says, instead, that some swans in Cosmo-Prime are One important motivation for to resist (9) is the doctrine, defended by Lewis 1.4), propositions-at least one central sense-can identified with sets Lewis-worlds. Anyone who will presumably that is it P, which is-or at least
 us but lack vim are not in a posiTion to refeR to viM whEn wE dO. On hIs prEferred version OF the View, when we express propoSitioNs ABout THe DistrIbution OF vIM, QuaLiTaTivElY SiMilar But Vimless People fail To eXpRess anything. tHe Vimless parT of Reality is a plAce Of episTeMic TRagedY; buT the tRagedy IS not thAt good reaSoNIng leaDS to falsE BElIefs, But that it leads to cONtENtless attempts At thouGhT. (8) AnD (9) ARe tHus True, assumiNg twin lACks vim. BRIcKER'S ceNTral argument fOr going down THis Route iS hIs rEJectioN of LeWiS'S doCtrine of the IndeXicality oF actuaLIty. In seCTion 11 belOw, I wilL arGue That THiS iS onE oF The PArTs oF lewIs's view tHaT sHould Be jeTTISOned In aNy caSe. binEd with an implaUsiBle ePIstEmoloGy, one TeneT oF whicH is thaT the mEtAphysics is sometHing It is reasoNabLe To bElIeve. THIngs miGht Be dIfferenT if striKIng ThEOREtIcal simplificationS cOULd Be achievEd by taKInG vIM to be invOlVed In thE ANalysIs of OUr Ordinary BeliefS; BuT iT is obscUrE what tHe TheOreTical BEnefIts are Supposed To be. IF We understand coNTingency-inducINg QUAnTIficAtiOn as de re resTricTEd quAntiFIcAtiON, we shOuld bE hAPpY To accept (9). For on this viEw, To say tHat soMer swans are blUe is to say tHAT Some swanS on EARtH Are blue, or that sOme swAns in Cosmo ARe blue, or Some sUch thing. this isn't tHE Sort of thIng We sHouLd eXPEcT to find people AT OtheR LEwis-worLds Doing veRy oFteN. FoR onE tHing, sayinG that somE sWaNs On earTh are BLue seems To InvOlVe rEferrINg to EaRth; anD it iS nOt USuaLly thouGHt TO Be eaSy To RefeR to ObJects TowaRDs wHich one Bears no spAtiOTempOrAl Or causaL relations.16 WheN I Say that somE sWanS on EarTH Are blue, TWin surely does not: rather, hE Says thaT soMe swaNs on earth-PrimE arE blue, wHerE earth-PRime is The plAnEt TWIN liveS ON. SImiLaRly, when I saY THat Some sWaNs in cosmo arE blue, Twin under analOGouS circumstanceS saYs, inSTEaD, thAT sOMe sWaNS in cOSmo-Prime are blue. one importaNt MOtIvation for WAntInG to resiSt (9) is the DoctrINe, defenDed by LewiS (OPW 1.4), that pRoPosiTIOns-At least in oNe centraL sense-can BE idenTIfIed wiTh sEts of LEwIs-wOrlds. anyone WHo aCceptS this wIlL presuMably ThInk that tHere is a proposition, call iT P, whicH is-or At lEast
 us but lack vim are not i n a positi on to  re fer  t o vi m wh en we do. On h i s pr eferred version of the  view ,w henw eexpre ss prop o si t i ons  a bo utth e  d istri but ion ofvim, quali tat iv ely similarb ut  vimless p eop le fail to e xpr ess an yt hin g . The  vi mless  parto f real ity is apl a ce ofe pistemi c tr aged y; but the traged y  i s  not that good  reaso ni n gl e ads  to  false bel ie fs, b u t thati tl e a dst o contentless  attempts a t  th ought.  ( 8)a nd (9)  areth u s t rue, assumi ng T win lacks  vim.B ricker' s  centra l argu men t f or g o in gdow nt his ro ute ishis reje ct io n ofLewi s ' s doct rin e of  theindexicalityofactu a lit y. In  sect ion11  belo w, I w ill a rg ue that this is  one  of the p art sofLe wis's view t hat  sh ould be  jettis o ned  i n a ny  case. bined withan i mp lausible  epist e mo lo g y, one t en etof w h i ch is  tha t  t he metap hysics is  s omethin git isre aso nab le to beli eve. T hings mi ght b e  different ifs triking theor e ti c a ls impl ifi cations cou ld b e  ach ieve d  b y t a kingvim t ob ei nvolved in the anal ys is ofour o rdinary belie fs; but it i s  obscure  wha t  t h e theoreticalbenef its are su p posed to  be.If we un derstandc o ntingenc y-i ndu cin g q u a nt ification asd e  rere stricte d q uantifi cat ion , w e s ho uld be ha ppy to a cc ep t(9 ).For o n  this vi ew , t osay  that somerswans  are  b lu e  is  to say th a t  som esw ansonEa rth a re b l ue,  or tha t some sw ans in C os mo  are bl ue, or some s uc h thing. T hi s i sn't t h e  sort of  thing we should expect to find  pe opleat o ther Lewi s-w orldsdoi n g very  often . For  o net h ing,s a yi ngth at some sw a n s o n Ear th  are  blue s eems to involve re f err ing to Earth;  an d it i snot us u all yt hou g h t to be easy to  refer toob j ec ts towards whi ch  one be ars nospati o tempora l or caus al relati on s.16 W hen  I say tha t some s wans on E a rth a r eblue,  Tw in sur el y d oes n ot: ra t her , hesays t ha t some  swan son Earth -Prime are blue, whereEarth- Prime  is  the plan etT win  lives on . Si milarly, w hen  Isay t hat someswan s  i n C o smo a re b l ue, Twinu nd era n al ogous circu m s t anc es sa ys, instea d, t hat some swans in Cosmo-Prime ar e bl u e . O nei mpor ta nt motivationfor  w a n ting tore sist (9) is  the doc tr i ne, d efende d by L ewis (O P W  1 . 4), th at p rop ositions- atle a st in o ne  c e ntralsens e- can be  ident i fied w ith sets of Lewi s-wor l d s. An y one  whoac cepts t h is w ill presum ably thinkthat t here  is a  propos it ion, c all  i t P, which is-or atleast 
 us_but lack_vim are not in_a position_to_refer to_vim_when we do._On his preferred_version of the view,_when we express_propositions_about the distribution of vim, qualitatively similar but vimless people fail to express anything._The_vimless part_of_reality_is a place of epistemic_tragedy; but the tragedy is_not that_good reasoning leads to false beliefs, but that_it_leads to contentless_attempts at thought. (8) and (9) are thus true,_assuming Twin lacks vim. Bricker's central_argument for going_down_this_route is his rejection_of Lewis's doctrine of the indexicality_of actuality. In section 11 below,_I will argue that this is one_of the parts of Lewis's view_that should be jettisoned in_any case._bined with an implausible epistemology,_one tenet of_which is_that the metaphysics_is something it is reasonable to_believe. Things might_be different if striking theoretical simplifications_could_be achieved by_taking_vim_to be_involved in the_analysis_of our_ordinary_beliefs; but it is obscure what_the_theoretical benefits are supposed to be. If_we understand contingency-inducing quantification_as_de re restricted quantification,_we should be happy to_accept (9). For on this view,_to say_that somer_swans are blue is to say that some swans on Earth_are blue, or that some swans_in Cosmo are blue,_or some_such_thing. This isn't_the_sort of_thing we should expect to find people_at other_Lewis-worlds doing very often. For one_thing, saying that some_swans_on Earth are blue seems to_involve referring to Earth; and it_is not usually thought to_be_easy_to refer to objects towards_which one bears no spatiotemporal or_causal relations.16 When_I say that some swans on Earth_are_blue, Twin surely does not: rather,_he_says that some swans on Earth-Prime_are_blue,_where Earth-Prime is the planet_Twin lives on. Similarly, when I_say that some swans in Cosmo are blue, Twin_under analogous circumstances_says, instead, that some swans_in_Cosmo-Prime_are blue. One important motivation for wanting to resist (9)_is the_doctrine, defended by_Lewis (OPW 1.4), that propositions-at least in one central sense-can_be identified with sets of Lewis-worlds. Anyone_who accepts this will presumably think that there is a proposition,_call it P, which is-or at least