 man of facts rather than ideas", that "his most substantial contribution was to the bibliography of early science" and that "he did not work with the philosophical and analytical approach to the history of science such as is now, in the hands of younger scholars, throwing so much light on the development and character of scientific thinking".18 We have here the suggestion of a change in the history of science and we can suggest that the "younger scholars" were, like Crombie, the historians that, according to Kuhn, are making the revolution. In Duhem's work, biography or bibliographical considerations are justified by the insertion of new, previously unknown characters in the history of science. Such is the case, for example, for his Études sur Léonard de Vinci. Before speaking of Albert of Saxony's influence on Leonardo da Vinci, Duhem dedicates a section to explain who Albert of Saxony, a name hardly pronounced in the history of science, is. In the beginning of his Études, Duhem (1984 [1906], v.1, 1) states that the history of science is misrepresented by two prejudices, so similar to each other that they could be taken as one: that scientific progress occurs through sudden and unforeseen discoveries and that the works of genius men have no precursors at all. He insists that the great discoveries are almost always the result of a slow and complicated preparation, chased in the course of the centuries. The doctrines professed by the most influential thinkers come from a multitude of efforts, accumulated by a series of obscure workers. Those who we are accustomed to call creators, Galileo, Descartes, Newton, did not formulate any doctrine that was not bound by the innumerable lines to the teachings of those who preceded them (Duhem 1984 [1906], v.1, 1-2). This passage is only one example among many other of Duhem's manifestations against the "eurekamoment"19 notion of a scientific discovery. He invariably criticizes the history of science that celebrates only the great discoveries and suggests the innovative character of his work that includes unknown contributions. The preface to Maire's work (1912) is a good example of Duhem's discussion about the difficulties involved in trying to determine priorities in the history of science: There is a fine line between a scientific discovery and the personality who made it. In many circumstances, time quickly dissolves it. Sometimes, over the centuries, treatises and manuals
man of facts rather than ideas ", that " his about solid contribution was to the bibliography of early science " and that " he did not work with the philosophic and analytical approach path to the history of science such as is nowadays, in the hands of younger scholar, throwing so much lighter on the development and character of scientific thinking".18 We get here the suggestion of a change in the history of science and we can suggest that the " younger scholars " were, like Crombie, the historian that, according to Kuhn, are making the revolution. In Duhem's study, biography or bibliographical considerations are justify by the insertion of fresh, previously unknown characters in the history of science. Such is the case, for example, for his Études sur Léonard de Vinci. Before talk of Albert of Saxony's influence on Leonardo da Vinci, Duhem dedicates a section to explain who Albert of Saxony, a name hardly pronounced in the history of skill, is. In the beginning of his Études, Duhem (1984 [ 1906 ], v.1, 1) state that the history of science is misrepresented by two prejudices, so similar to each other that they could be taken as one: that scientific progress occurs through sudden and unanticipated discovery and that the works of flair men have no precursors at all. He insist that the great discoveries are almost always the resultant role of a slow and complicated preparation, chased in the course of the centuries. The doctrines profess by the most influential thinkers come from a multitude of feat, accumulated by a serial of apart workers. Those who we are accustomed to call creators, Galileo, Descartes, Newton, did not formulate any doctrine that was not bind by the innumerable lines to the teachings of those who precede them (Duhem 1984 [ 1906 ], v.1, 1 - 2). This passage is only one example among many other of Duhem's expression against the " eurekamoment"19 notion of a scientific discovery. He constantly criticizes the history of science that celebrates only the great discovery and suggests the advanced character of his work that include unknown contributions. The foreword to Maire's work (1912) is a good example of Duhem's discussion about the difficulties involved in trying to determine priorities in the history of science: There is a fine line between a scientific discovery and the personality who make it. In many circumstances, time cursorily dissolves it. Sometimes, over the centuries, treatise and manuals
 maj of facts rather than iaeas", that "his most subvtantizl contrkbution was to the bibliogra'hy if eaely science" and that "hd did not work wirh tie philosophical and analyticam appxoech to the histpry of sciance such as iv voc, in the hands of younger scholars, trrowing sl much light og tht dqvelkimtnt and character of scientific tginking".18 We have here the suggestion of a changf in the history of sclence and wg cag suggest thag the "younger scholars" were, like Crombie, the historiavs thct, accordint ro Nohn, are makiig the revolution. Lm Duhek's work, biography or niblimgrqphical considerationv are justified by the insestnon of new, previously ubknowt chdracgwrs in tie gistorj oh science. Shch is the xase, for example, fot rpx Études sur Méonard dq Vinci. Before speaking of Albert of Saqony'a influence on Leonardo da Vinci, Duhem dedicwtes a sestion to explain who Albert of Saxony, a name hardny prkvouugcd iv tje history of science, is. In the beginning of rjs Étldes, Duhem (1984 [1906], v.1, 1) sbates that the hisyogy jf science is misre'deaented by two prejkdices, fo sinilar to tach pther that they could be tajen as one: tkat scientific progreds occurs tkrough suddrn and unforeseen discoreries and that tje works kw genius men havd np [recursors at all. He insises that tie grzat discuveroes arq almost apways the result of a sllw anb com[licated pgeparation, chased in the course of the centuroev. Tve doctrnnes pvofessed by the most influentnal thinhers zome from z multivude of effowts, accumulataf by a seriev of obssure worjers. Thure who we are sccustomeb to xall creators, Galikeo, Sescartes, Newtou, eid not formulaye xny dlcvrine dhat was not bouvd cu the innumerablc lknes to the teachings of thoae who preceded thrm (Duhem 1984 [1906], v.1, 1-2). This passage is omly one example amlng meny otier of Durem's manifestations against ths "eurekamlmekt"19 notion of w sclentyfic discorery. He invariably criticizes the historb of science that celebeates only the greaj dlscoveries aid sugdests the innovative charactee of his work thau includes unknown contdibutimns. Tje preface to Maire's work (1912) is a good example of Duhem's discussion about tye difhisulties invklvec in nrynng to deeermmnx priorities in tne history of science: There is e fine lina yetween a scientific discoveru xnd the persovality who made it. In mahy circukstances, time quickly dissolves it. Sometimes, over the ccnturies, rreatjses and menuals
man of facts rather than ideas", that substantial was to bibliography of early not with the philosophical analytical approach to history of science such as is in the hands of younger scholars, throwing so much light on the development character of scientific thinking".18 We have here the suggestion of a change in history science we suggest that the "younger scholars" were, like Crombie, the historians that, according to Kuhn, are making revolution. In Duhem's work, biography or bibliographical considerations justified by the insertion new, previously unknown characters in history science. Such the for for his Études Léonard de Vinci. Before speaking of Albert of Saxony's influence on Leonardo da Vinci, Duhem dedicates a to explain of Saxony, name pronounced the history of In the beginning of his Études, v.1, 1) states that the history of science misrepresented by prejudices, so similar to each other they could be taken as one: that scientific occurs through sudden and unforeseen discoveries and that the works of genius men have no all. He insists that great discoveries are always result a and complicated chased in the course of the centuries. The doctrines professed by most influential thinkers come from a multitude of efforts, accumulated series obscure workers. Those we are accustomed to creators, Descartes, Newton, did not doctrine was the lines the teachings of those preceded them (Duhem 1984 [1906], 1-2). This passage is other of Duhem's manifestations against the "eurekamoment"19 notion a scientific discovery. He invariably criticizes the of science that celebrates only the great discoveries and suggests the innovative of his includes unknown contributions. The preface to Maire's work is a good example Duhem's discussion about the difficulties involved in trying to priorities the history science: There is fine line between scientific discovery and who made In circumstances, it. Sometimes, over the centuries, treatises manuals
 man of facts rather than ideas", That "his mosT subsTanTiaL cOntrIbutIon was to the bibLIogrAphy of early science" and tHat "he DiD Not wORk With tHe philoSOpHICal AnD aNalYtICaL apprOacH to the hIstory of scIenCe Such as is now, iN ThE hands of yoUngEr scholars, thRowIng so mUcH liGHt on tHe dEveloPment aND charaCter of sciEnTIfic thINking".18 We HAVe Here The suggestion of a cHAnGE in the history oF scienCe ANd WE Can SugGest that thE "yOungeR ScholarS" WeRE, LIke cRombie, the histOrians that, aCCorDing to kuHn, aRE makinG the rEvOLutIon. In Duhem's Work, Biography Or biblIOgraphiCAl consiDeratiOns Are JustIFiEd By tHe INseRTiOn oF New, PreviousLy UnKnown CharACTERs in The HistOry of Science. Such is The Case, FOr eXamplE, for hIs ÉtUdEs sur léonarD de ViNcI. Before speaking Of AlBert of SaxOny'S iNflUeNce on lEonardO da vinCi, Duhem DedicatES a sEcTION tO explain who Albert oF SAXOnY, a name haRdly prONoUnCEd in the hIsTorY of sCIEnce, iS. In tHE bEginning Of his ÉTUdEs, duhem (1984 [1906], v.1, 1) sTaTes thaT tHe hIstOry of SCienCe is miSrepreseNted bY Two prejudices, sO Similar to each OThER ThAT theY coUld be taken aS one: THat sCienTIfIc pROgresS occuRs THrOUgh sudden and unforesEeN discoVerieS and that the woRks of geniuS MEN have no pRecuRSoRS at all. He insistS that The great diSCoveries Are alMost alwaYs the resuLT Of a slow aNd cOmpLicAteD PReParation, chaseD IN the CoUrse of tHe cEnturieS. ThE doCtrIneS pRofessed bY the most InFlUeNtIal ThinkERs come frOm A muLtItuDe of eFForts, aCcumuLateD bY a SEriEs of obsCUrE WOrkeRs. thOse wHo wE aRe accUstoMEd tO call crEators, GalIleO, descArTeS, Newton, Did not formulaTe Any doctrinE tHat Was not BOUnd by the Innumerable lines to the teAChings oF thOse whO preCeded them (duhEm 1984 [1906], v.1, 1-2). ThiS paSSage is Only onE examPlE amONG many OTHeR of duHem's manifeSTAtiOns agAiNst tHe "eurekAmoment"19 notion of a scIEntIfic discovery. he iNvarIABlY crITiCIzeS tHE hiSTOry of science thaT celebrateS oNLy The great diSCovErIes and sUggests The inNOvative Character Of his work ThAt inCLUdeS unknown coNtributiOns. The preFAce to mAiRe's woRk (1912) iS a good ExAmpLe of DUhem's dIScuSsion About tHe DifficUltieS iNvolved iN trying to determine priorIties iN the hIstOry of scieNce: tHerE is a fine lIne bEtween a sciEntIfiC discOveRY and tHe peRSoNalITy who Made IT. In many ciRCuMstANCeS, time quicklY DISsoLves iT. SoMEtimes, Over The centuries, treatISes and manuals
 man of facts rather thanideas", th at "h ismos tsubs tant ial contributi o n wa s to the bibliographyof ea rl y  sci e nc e" an d that" he d idno twor kw it h the  ph ilosoph ical and a nal yt ical approac h  t o the hist ory  of sciencesuc h as i snow ,  in t hehands  of yo u nger s cholars,th r owings o muchl i gh t on  the developmenta nd character of s cienti fi c  t h i nki ng" .18 We hav eheret he sugg e st i o n  of a change in t he historyo f s cience  a ndw e cansugge st tha t the "youn gerscholars"  were, like Cr o mbie, t he his tor ian s th a t,  a cco rd i ngt oKuh n , a re makin gth e rev olut i o n .  InDuh em's  work , biography o r b ibli o gra phica l con side ra tions  are j ustif ie d by the insert ionof new, p rev io usl yunkno w n char act ers  in the  histor y  of  s c i e nc e. Such is the cas e, f or  example , forh is  É t udes sur  L éon ardd e  Vinc i. B e fo re speak ing of Al be rt of S ax ony'sin flu enc e onL eona rdo da  Vinci,Duhem dedicates a se c tion to expla i nw h oA lber t o f Saxony, a  nam e  har dlyp ro nou n ced i n the  h i st o ry of science, is.In  the b eginn ing of his Ét udes, Duhe m ( 1984 [19 06], v. 1 , 1) states th at th e historyo f scienc e ismisrepre sented by t wo preju dic es,  so  si m i la r to each oth e r  tha tthey co uld  be tak enasone : t ha t scienti fic prog re ss  o cc urs  thro u gh sudde nand  u nfo resee n  disco verie s an dth a t t he work s  o f geni us  m en h ave  n o pre curs o rsat all.  He insis tst hatth egreat d iscoveries ar ealmost alw ay s t he res u l t of a s low and complicated pre p aration , c hased  inthe cours e o f thecen t uries.  The d octri ne s p r o fesse d by  th emost influ e n tia l thi nk erscome fr om a multitude ofe ffo rts, accumula ted  bya se rie s  o f  ob sc u rew o rkers. Those wh o we are a cc u st omed to ca l l c re ators,Galileo , Des c artes,Newton, d id not fo rm ulat e any  doctrinethat was  not boun d  by t h einnum era ble li ne s t o the  teach i ngs  of t hose w ho  prece ded t he m (Duhem  1984 [1906], v.1, 1-2) . This  pass age  is onlyone exa mple amon g ma ny other o f D uhe m's m ani f estat ions ag ain s t the  "eu r ekamoment " 19  no t i on  of a scien t i f icdisco ver y . He i nvar iably criticizest he history ofscie n c e t hat cele br ates only thegre at d iscoveri es  and sugges ts the i nn o vativ e char acterof hisw o rk that i nclu des  unknowncon tr i butions .Th e  prefa ce t oMaire' s work (191 2 )  is a good examp le of D uhem' s  di scuss io n about thedifficulti es involved  in tr ying  to d etermin epriori tie sin the his t ory of sc ience : There  i s afin e line  bet w e en ascie nt ifi c discove r y  a n dth e  pe rson ality  w ho m ade it. I n  many ci rcu m stances ,tim e quickl y  d i s solves it.  So metim e s , over the cent u ri e s, tr eatise s andmanuals 
 man_of facts_rather than ideas", that_"his most_substantial_contribution was_to_the bibliography of_early science" and_that "he did not_work with the_philosophical_and analytical approach to the history of science such as is now, in the_hands_of younger_scholars,_throwing_so much light on the_development and character of scientific_thinking".18 We_have here the suggestion of a change in_the_history of science_and we can suggest that the "younger scholars" were,_like Crombie, the historians that, according_to Kuhn, are_making_the_revolution. In Duhem's work,_biography or bibliographical considerations are justified_by the insertion of new, previously_unknown characters in the history of science._Such is the case, for example,_for his Études sur Léonard_de Vinci._Before speaking of Albert of_Saxony's influence on_Leonardo da_Vinci, Duhem dedicates_a section to explain who Albert_of Saxony, a_name hardly pronounced in the history_of_science, is. In_the_beginning_of his_Études, Duhem (1984_[1906],_v.1, 1)_states_that the history of science is_misrepresented_by two prejudices, so similar to each_other that they could_be_taken as one: that_scientific progress occurs through sudden_and unforeseen discoveries and that the_works of_genius men_have no precursors at all. He insists that the great discoveries_are almost always the result of_a slow and complicated_preparation, chased_in_the course of_the_centuries. The_doctrines professed by the most influential thinkers_come from_a multitude of efforts, accumulated by_a series of obscure_workers._Those who we are accustomed to_call creators, Galileo, Descartes, Newton, did_not formulate any doctrine that_was_not_bound by the innumerable lines_to the teachings of those who_preceded them (Duhem_1984 [1906], v.1, 1-2). This passage is_only_one example among many other of_Duhem's_manifestations against the "eurekamoment"19 notion of_a_scientific_discovery. He invariably criticizes the_history of science that celebrates only_the great discoveries and suggests the innovative character of_his work that_includes unknown contributions. The preface_to_Maire's_work (1912) is a good example of Duhem's discussion about_the difficulties_involved in trying_to determine priorities in the history of science: There is_a fine line between a scientific discovery_and the personality who made it. In many circumstances, time quickly_dissolves it. Sometimes, over the centuries, treatises and_manuals