 theory A with a "minor premise" obtained by theory B (1906, 294). The key rationale for this attitude is that the genuine content of a physical theory is taken to be the set of the empirical laws classified. As he says: "The systematic classification that theory gives [the empirical laws] does not add or take away anything concerning theory truth, their certainty or their objective scope" (1906, 285). But this is half of the story. Duhem attributed to Poincaré and Édouard Le Roy the view that the nomixing up principle is the only condition on scientific rationality and let himself occupy a different, more nuanced, position. He takes it that theoretical physics "deserves the name of science on the condition of being rational" (1902a, 8). But being rational, that is responding to reasons, is not confined to following strictly and exclusively the principle of non-contradiction and the rules of logic. A scientist may be free to choose any hypothesis she pleases "provided that these hypotheses are not redundant or contradictory", 9 It is noteworthy that if Duhem was an anti-atomist, he was an anti-conventionalist too. He resisted the thought that just because hypotheses are not atomistically tested, they can be held on come what may. Taking distances from Poincaré and Le Roy, he argued against the view that some principles are elevated to conventions thereby acquiring a status of being "universally adopted" (1906, 212). For him, no principle (or hypotheses) is immune to revision; hence no principle can be held on come what may. As he put it: "The history of science shows us that very often the human mind has been led to overthrow such principles completely, though they have been regarded by common consent for centuries as inviolable axioms" (1906, 212). Duhem's opposition to conventionalism has been thoroughly discussed by Maiocchi (1990). Marie Gueguen and Stathis Psillos Anti-Scepticism and Epistemic Humility in Pierre Duhem's Philosophy of Science 66 but a unified theory is preferable to "a junk heap of irreconcilable theories" (1906, 295). This "single physical theory which, from the smallest possible number of compatible hypotheses between them, would derive, by impeccable reasoning, all known experimental laws is obviously an ideal perfection which the human mind will never reach; but if it cannot reach this limit, it must constantly be directed" (1902
theory A with a " minor premise " obtained by theory B (1906, 294). The key rationale for this position is that the actual subject of a physical hypothesis is taken to be the bent of the empirical law classified. As he says: " The taxonomic categorization that theory gives [ the empiric laws ] does not add or subscribe away anything concerning theory truth, their certainty or their objective scope " (1906, 285). But this is half of the narrative. Duhem attributed to Poincaré and Édouard Le Roy the view that the nomixing up principle is the alone condition on scientific rationality and let himself occupy a different, more nuanced, military position. He takes it that theoretical physics " deserves the name of science on the condition of being intellectual " (1902a, 8). But being rational, that is responding to reasons, is not confined to following strictly and entirely the rationale of non - contradiction and the rule of logic. A scientist may be free to choose any hypothesis she pleases " provided that these hypotheses are not redundant or contradictory ", 9 It is noteworthy that if Duhem was an anti - atomist, he was an anti - conventionalist too. He defy the thought that just because guess are not atomistically tested, they can be held on come what may. Taking distance from Poincaré and Le Roy, he argue against the view that some principles are lift to conventions thereby acquiring a status of being " universally adopted " (1906, 212). For him, no principle (or hypotheses) is immune to rewrite; hence no principle can be held on come what may. As he put it: " The history of science shows us that very frequently the human mind has been led to overthrow such principles completely, though they have been involve by common consent for centuries as inviolable maxim " (1906, 212). Duhem's opposition to conventionalism has been thoroughly discussed by Maiocchi (1990). Marie Gueguen and Stathis Psillos Anti - Scepticism and Epistemic Humility in Pierre Duhem's Philosophy of Science 66 but a unified hypothesis is preferable to " a junk heap of irreconcilable theories " (1906, 295). This " single physical hypothesis which, from the smallest possible number of compatible hypotheses between them, would deduce, by impeccable reasoning, all known experimental law is obviously an ideal perfection which the human mind will never strive; but if it cannot achieve this limit, it must constantly be calculate " (1902
 thfory A with a "minor premlse" obtained by jhwory B (1906, 294). The key ratkonale for this attitude is vhat the tenuine content of a pfysical tjeory is taktn to be the set of the empiriczp lacs classified. As he says: "Tve systematic wlxsdification that theory gives [the em[irical lwws] does not aqd og eake away anything concerning theory tduth, thtir certainty or tneir objective scope" (1906, 285). But thid is half of the shory. Duhem qttryvuted to Poivcaré and Édouard Le Roy the view that the nomixing up orincnple is the obly wondition oi sciegtific ratiokslity dnd let himself occupn a dmffeeent, more nuanced, posmtion. He takes it thwt theoredieal physics "deserves rhw namg of vcievxe un uhe cknditiln kf being rztional" (1902a, 8). Vut being rational, uhae is respondinf to rqafons, is not confined to following striculy ahd exclusively the prinxiple of non-contradicjion and tre rules of logic. A scientist may be free to choove anb fypitmesir sje pleases "provided that these hypotheses are hou rvdundant or contrcdictory", 9 It is moheejrthy that if Duhem waa an anti-atomist, hf was ag antu-conventijnalost too. He resisted the thoyght that jufr because hypotheszs are not acomistocallu tested, they can be heud oh come what may. Takihe distances from Popncasé and Le Roy, he argued agaynst the tiew chat somd pronciplqs are elegated to conventions thegeby ccquising a stahus of being "universally adoptev" (1906, 212). For him, np [ritciple (ox hypobheses) is immunq to revision; kence no prinziple can ge held on come whwt may. As he [ot it: "The hisvory of ssienxe syows us ghat very oftem the humcu mind haw been led to overbhrow auch principles conpletely, though thdy rane ueen wagarded by cmmmov cumsent for centurles as onviolable axioms" (1906, 212). Guhej's opposition to cpnyentionalusm has feen thoroughky discussed by Malocchm (1990). Marme Guebueg and Stathis Psillos Anti-Scepficism anf Eiistemic Humijity in Pierre Dbhem's Philosophy of Science 66 but a unifixd theory is preferablg to "a junk heap of itregoncilable tieorief" (1906, 295). This "vingle physical theoey which, from the smallest possible nujber ox comoatible hypotheses between them, would derive, by impeccable reasoning, all jnown xx[erimental maws is otvnouxly an ideel perfection whicn the human mind will never rearh; but if ht cannot reach this limit, it kurt constantly be directed" (1902
theory A with a "minor premise" obtained B 294). The rationale for this content a physical theory taken to be set of the empirical laws classified. he says: "The systematic classification that theory gives [the empirical laws] does not or take away anything concerning theory truth, their certainty or their objective scope" 285). this half the story. Duhem attributed to Poincaré and Édouard Le Roy the view that the nomixing up is the only condition on scientific rationality and himself occupy a different, nuanced, position. He takes it theoretical "deserves the of on condition of being (1902a, 8). But being rational, that is responding to reasons, is not confined to following strictly and the principle and the of A may be free any hypothesis she pleases "provided that not redundant or contradictory", 9 It is noteworthy if Duhem an anti-atomist, he was an anti-conventionalist He resisted the thought that just because hypotheses not atomistically tested, they can be held on come what may. Taking distances from Poincaré Roy, he argued against view that some are to thereby a status being "universally adopted" (1906, 212). For him, no principle (or hypotheses) immune to revision; hence no principle can be held on may. he put it: history of science shows that often the human mind led overthrow though have regarded by common consent centuries as inviolable axioms" (1906, Duhem's opposition to conventionalism Maiocchi (1990). Marie Gueguen and Stathis Psillos Anti-Scepticism Epistemic Humility in Pierre Duhem's Philosophy of 66 but a unified theory is preferable to "a junk heap of theories" (1906, "single physical theory which, from the smallest possible of compatible hypotheses between would derive, by impeccable reasoning, all known experimental laws obviously ideal perfection the human mind never reach; but it cannot reach it must be (1902
 theory A with a "minor premise" oBtained by tHeory b (1906, 294). ThE keY rAtioNale For this attitudE Is thAt the genuine content of a PhysiCaL TheoRY iS takeN to be thE SeT OF thE eMpIriCaL LaWs claSsiFied. As hE says: "The sySteMaTic classificATiOn that theoRy gIves [the empirIcaL laws] dOeS noT Add or TakE away AnythiNG conceRning theoRy TRuth, thEIr certaINTy Or thEir objective scope" (1906, 285). bUt THis is half of the Story. DUhEM aTTRibUteD to PoincarÉ aNd ÉdoUArd Le RoY ThE VIEw tHAt the nomixing Up principle IS thE only cOnDitIOn on scIentiFiC RatIonality and Let hImself occUpy a diFFerent, mORe nuancEd, posiTioN. He TakeS It ThAt tHeORetICaL phYSicS "deserveS tHe Name oF sciENCE On thE coNditIon of Being rational" (1902A, 8). BuT beiNG raTionaL, that Is reSpOndinG to reaSons, iS nOt confined to folLowiNg strictlY anD eXclUsIvely THe prinCipLe oF non-conTradictIOn aNd THE RuLes of logic. A scientiSt MAY bE free to cHoose aNY hYpOThesis shE pLeaSes "pROVided That THeSe hypothEses arE NoT rEdundanT oR contrAdIctOry", 9 it is nOTewoRthy thAt if DuheM was aN Anti-atomist, he wAS an anti-convenTIoNALiST too. he rEsisted the tHougHT thaT jusT BeCauSE hypoTheseS aRE nOT atomistically testeD, tHey can Be helD on come what maY. Taking disTANCes from POincARé ANd Le Roy, he argueD agaiNst the view THat some pRinciPles are eLevated to CONventionS thEreBy aCquIRInG a status of beiNG "UnivErSally adOptEd" (1906, 212). For hiM, no PriNciPle (Or HypotheseS) is immunE tO rEvIsIon; Hence NO principLe Can Be HelD on coME what mAy. As hE put It: "thE HisTory of sCIeNCE shoWs Us That VerY oFten tHe huMAn mInd has bEen led to oVerTHrow SuCh PrincipLes completely, ThOugh they haVe BeeN regarDED by commoN consent for centuries as iNViolablE axIoms" (1906, 212). DUhem'S oppositiOn tO conveNtiONalism Has beeN thorOuGhlY DIscusSED bY MaIoCchi (1990). Marie GUEGueN and STaThis psillos anti-Scepticism and EPIstEmic Humility iN PiErre dUHeM's PHIlOSopHy OF ScIENce 66 but a unified tHeory is preFeRAbLe to "a junk hEAp oF iRreconcIlable tHeoriES" (1906, 295). This "siNgle physiCal theory WhIch, fROM thE smallest pOssible nUmber of coMPatibLE hYpothEseS betweEn TheM, woulD derivE, By iMpeccAble reAsOning, aLl knoWn ExperimeNtal laws is obviously an idEal perFectiOn wHich the huMan MInd Will never ReacH; but if it caNnoT reAch thIs lIMit, it Must COnStaNTly be DireCTed" (1902
 theory A with a "minor pr emise" obt ained  by  th eo ry B  (19 06, 294). Thek ey r ationale for this atti tudeis that th e gen uine co n te n t  of  a  p hys ic a ltheor y i s taken  to be the  se tof the empir i ca l laws cla ssi fied. As hesay s: "Th esys t emati c c lassi ficati o n that  theory g iv e s [the empiric a l  l aws]  does not add ort ak e  away anything  conce rn i ng t heo rytruth, the ir  cert a inty or th e i r  ob j ective scope"  (1906, 285 ) . B ut thi sish alf of  thest o ry.  Duhem attr ibut ed to Poi ncaréa nd Édou a rd Le R oy the  vi ewthat th enom ix i ngu ppri n cip le is th eon ly co ndit i o n on s cie ntif ic ra tionality and  le t hi m sel f occ upy a  dif fe rent,  morenuanc ed , position. Hetake s it that  th eo ret ic al ph y sics " des erv es thename of sci en c e on  the condition ofbe i n grational " (190 2 a,  8 ) . But be in g r atio n a l, th at i s  r espondin g to r e as on s, is n ot  confi ne d t o f ollow i ng s trictl y and ex clusi v ely the princi p le of non-con t ra d i ct i on a ndthe rules o f lo g ic.A sc i en tis t  maybe fr ee to choose any hypothes is  she p lease s "provided t hat theseh y p othesesaren ot redundant or c ontra dictory",9  It is n otewo rthy tha t if Duhe m was an a nti -at omi st, h ewas an anti-c o n vent io nalisttoo . He re sis ted  th e t ho ught that  just be ca us ehy pot heses are notat omi st ica lly t e sted,theycanbe  h e ldon come wh a t  may .Ta king  di st ances  fro m  Po incaréand Le Ro y,h e ar gu ed  agains t the view th at  some prin ci ple s aree l evated t o conventions thereby a c quiring  astatu s of  being "u niv ersall y a d opted"  (1906 , 212 ).  Fo r him,n o  p rin ci ple (or hy p o the ses)is  imm une torevision; hence no pri nciple can be  he ld o n co mew ha t  ma y. Ash e  put it: "The h istory ofsc i en ce shows u s  th at  very o ften th e hum a n mindhas beenled to ov er thro w suc h principl es compl etely, th o ugh t h ey  have  be en reg ar ded  by c ommonc ons ent f or cen tu ries a s inv io lable ax ioms" (1906, 212). Duhe m's op posit ion  to conve nti o nal ism has b eenthoroughly  di scu ssedbyM aiocc hi ( 1 99 0). Marie  Gue g uen and S t at his P si llos Anti-S c e p tic ism a ndE pistem ic H umility in Pierre Duhem's Philos ophy o f S cie n ce 6 6but a unifiedthe or y is prefe ra ble to "a j unk heap  o f  irre concil able t heories " (1 9 06, 29 5).Thi s "single  ph ys i cal the or yw hich,from  t he sma llestp ossi b l e number of comp atibl e hypot h ese s bet we en them ,  wou ld derive,  by impecca ble re ason ing,all kno wn  exper ime nt al laws is obviously  an i deal pe rf ecti onwhichtheh u man m indwi llnever rea c h ;b ut  i f  it  can not r ea ch t his limit ,  it must  co n stantly  b e d i r ected" (1 9 0 2
 theory_A with_a "minor premise" obtained_by theory_B_(1906, 294)._The_key rationale for_this attitude is_that the genuine content_of a physical_theory_is taken to be the set of the empirical laws classified. As he says:_"The_systematic classification_that_theory_gives [the empirical laws] does_not add or take away_anything concerning_theory truth, their certainty or their objective scope"_(1906,_285). But this_is half of the story. Duhem attributed to Poincaré_and Édouard Le Roy the view_that the nomixing_up_principle_is the only condition_on scientific rationality and let himself_occupy a different, more nuanced, position._He takes it that theoretical physics "deserves_the name of science on the_condition of being rational" (1902a,_8). But_being rational, that is responding_to reasons, is_not confined_to following strictly_and exclusively the principle of non-contradiction_and the rules_of logic. A scientist may be_free_to choose any_hypothesis_she_pleases "provided_that these hypotheses_are_not redundant_or_contradictory", 9 It is noteworthy that_if_Duhem was an anti-atomist, he was an_anti-conventionalist too. He resisted_the_thought that just because_hypotheses are not atomistically tested,_they can be held on come_what may._Taking distances_from Poincaré and Le Roy, he argued against the view that_some principles are elevated to conventions_thereby acquiring a status_of being_"universally_adopted" (1906, 212)._For_him, no_principle (or hypotheses) is immune to revision;_hence no_principle can be held on come_what may. As he_put_it: "The history of science shows_us that very often the human_mind has been led to_overthrow_such_principles completely, though they have_been regarded by common consent for_centuries as inviolable_axioms" (1906, 212). Duhem's opposition to conventionalism_has_been thoroughly discussed by Maiocchi (1990)._Marie_Gueguen and Stathis Psillos Anti-Scepticism and_Epistemic_Humility_in Pierre Duhem's Philosophy of_Science 66 but a unified theory_is preferable to "a junk heap of irreconcilable theories"_(1906, 295). This_"single physical theory which, from_the_smallest_possible number of compatible hypotheses between them, would derive, by_impeccable reasoning,_all known experimental_laws is obviously an ideal perfection which the human mind_will never reach; but if it cannot_reach this limit, it must constantly be directed" (1902