 is in fact a Lewis-world would have been a fusion of two Lewis-worlds. Similarly, it seems consistent to suppose that there was a non-zero objective chance that the wormhole would never form, and that the Lewis-world would be a fusion of two Lewis-worlds. Each of these claims entails that the Lewis-world could have been a fusion of two Lewis-worlds; given Analysis B, this means that it must have a counterpart that is a fusion of two Lewis-worlds.22 What is it for one thing to be a counterpart of another? Lewis (1968) connects the notion with that of resemblance: 'Your counterparts resemble you closely in content and context in important respects. They resemble you more closely than do the other things in their worlds.' In advising would-be modal realists to endorse Analysis B, I don't mean to tie 'counterpart' to any such gloss. 'Possibly' and 'necessarily', and their close relatives 'can' and'must', are notoriously contextsensitive, with an range of meanings including philosophically in22Bigelow and Pargetter and Bricker use these cases to argue that it is possible for there to be "island universes"-objects that stand in no spatiotemporal, or analogically spatiotemporal, relations to one another. They take it to be a serious problem for Lewis's view that he cannot accept this possibility, and Lewis agrees Lewis (1992: p. 213–4). But since it is part of Lewis's view that there are island universes, unrestrictedly speaking, unless he rejects T he should accept that it is possible for there to be island universes, unrestrictedly speaking. If Lewis takes my advice, the only readings of 'there could not be island universes' which he should even consider accepting are those on which it is equivalent to something like 'there could not be island universes within Cosmo'. And as we have seen, there is no special reason to say this. Bricker (2001) objects to certain strategies for interpreting utterances of 'island universes universes' as contingently false on the grounds that they entail that'my utterance is both contingently possible and analytically false. Not a happy combination.' But if we take the utterance to mean 'island universes are parts of Cosmo', and take the name 'Cosmo' to have been introduced by the description 'the Lewis-world of which we are parts',
is in fact a Lewis - world would have been a fusion of two Lewis - worlds. Similarly, it seems reproducible to presuppose that there was a non - zero objective chance that the wormhole would never form, and that the Lewis - earth would be a fusion of two Lewis - worlds. Each of these claim entail that the Lewis - world could have been a fusion of two Lewis - worlds; given Analysis B, this intend that it must have a counterpart that is a fusion of two Lewis - worlds.22 What is it for one matter to be a counterpart of another? Lewis (1968) connects the notion with that of resemblance:' Your counterparts resemble you closely in content and context in important respects. They resemble you more close than do the other things in their world.' In advising would - be modal realists to back Analysis B, I don't mean to connect' counterpart' to any such gloss.' Possibly' and' necessarily', and their close relatives' can' and'must', are notoriously contextsensitive, with an range of meaning including philosophically in22Bigelow and Pargetter and Bricker use these cases to argue that it is possible for there to be " island universes"-objects that stand in no spatiotemporal, or analogically spatiotemporal, relations to one another. They take it to be a serious problem for Lewis's view that he cannot accept this possibility, and Lewis agrees Lewis (1992: p. 213–4). But since it is part of Lewis's view that there are island universes, unrestrictedly talk, unless he rejects T he should accept that it is potential for there to be island universe, unrestrictedly speak. If Lewis takes my advice, the only readings of' there could not be island universes' which he should even consider accepting are those on which it is equivalent to something like' there could not be island universes within Cosmo'. And as we have see, there is no special reason to say this. Bricker (2001) objects to certain strategy for interpreting utterances of' island universes universes' equally contingently false on the ground that they fee-tail that'my utterance is both contingently potential and analytically false. Not a happy combination.' But if we take the utterance to mean' island universes are parts of Cosmo', and take the name' Cosmo' to have been introduced by the description' the Lewis - populace of which we are parts',
 is in fact a Lewis-world womld have been a yysion mf two Lewis-woflds. Similarly, it seems consmstebt to suppose that there war a non-zego objectuve rhance that the xkrmhole would kever horm, and that tme Lewis-wornd would be a xuriln of two Lewis-worlds. Each of these claims ejtails that thg Lewps-rorls could have been a fusion of two Mewis-woglds; given Analysos B, this means that it mudt hwve a counterpart hhat is a foaiog of two Lewir-worlds.22 What is it for one thing to be a counterpart uf anpther? Lewiw (1968) cojtects the nition with that on resemtlance: 'Uour counterpavts rxsemvle you closely in coitent and context in importand xespects. They resemblw tou mmre wlosdoy ghah vo fhe otjer things in their worles.' In advising woulc-bq modal realisfs to qnqorse Analysis B, I don't mean to tie 'couttedpart' to any such gloss. 'Possibly' and 'necessatily', and treir close relatives 'can' and'must', are notoriously wonteetrenwibive, qihh an range of meanings including philosophicwmlu pn22Bigelow and Parnetter and Bricker ude jhese cases to argue thzt it is possible vor thete to ve "island uniferses"-objects that stand in no spatioteiporal, or analogicaply spatiotzmporak, relstions to one another. Tkey taie it to be a serioua problem for Lewks's vhew that he cannot accept ehis possmbilicy, and Ldwis agreef Lewis (1992: p. 213–4). But since it is part ov Lewns's vhew that tjere are island universes, unresvcictedly spealitg, lnless he rejegts T he should accept that ij is possnble fur there tk be isnand univerfes, unrestricdgdly speaking. If Lewif tajes ny advizd, the only reacings of 'nhtre could bot be island univcrses' shich he should evtn consider acceltivg wrv tiose jt which it iv eqjivxkent go someukinn lkke 'yhere could not be ivlans universes within Cjsmo'. And as we hwve seen, therr is no special rewson vo say this. Brycker (2001) objects to certain strafegies fog ikterpreting ueterqnces of 'islcnd universes universes' as contingently halse on the grounds thqt they entail that'kn utterance ms botr contingantly possible and abalytically false. Not a happy combinatjon.' Bud if ae take the utterance to mean 'island universes are parts of Cosmo', and takw the iaie 'Cosmo' to havr beet nntxoduced by vhx description 'the Lewis-world of which we are parvs',
is in fact a Lewis-world would have fusion two Lewis-worlds. it seems consistent a objective chance that wormhole would never and that the Lewis-world would be fusion of two Lewis-worlds. Each of these claims entails that the Lewis-world could been a fusion of two Lewis-worlds; given Analysis B, this means that it have counterpart is fusion of two Lewis-worlds.22 What is it for one thing to be a counterpart of another? (1968) connects the notion with that of resemblance: counterparts resemble you closely content and context in important They you more than the things in their In advising would-be modal realists to endorse Analysis B, I don't mean to tie 'counterpart' to any gloss. 'Possibly' and their relatives and'must', notoriously contextsensitive, with of meanings including philosophically in22Bigelow and use these cases to argue that it is for there be "island universes"-objects that stand in spatiotemporal, or analogically spatiotemporal, relations to one another. take it to be a serious problem for Lewis's view that he cannot accept this Lewis agrees Lewis (1992: 213–4). But since is of view there are universes, unrestrictedly speaking, unless he rejects T he should accept that is possible for there to be island universes, unrestrictedly speaking. takes advice, the only of 'there could not island which he should even are on equivalent something 'there could not be universes within Cosmo'. And as have seen, there is this. Bricker (2001) objects to certain strategies for utterances of 'island universes universes' as contingently on the grounds that they entail that'my utterance is both contingently possible analytically false. happy combination.' But if we take the utterance mean 'island universes are of Cosmo', and take the name 'Cosmo' to have introduced the description Lewis-world of which are parts',
 is in fact a Lewis-world would hAve been a fuSion oF twO LeWiS-worLds. SImilarly, it seemS ConsIstent to suppose that theRe was A nON-zerO ObJectiVe chancE ThAT The WoRmHolE wOUlD neveR foRm, and thAt the Lewis-WorLd Would be a fusiON oF two Lewis-wOrlDs. Each of thesE clAims enTaIls THat thE LeWis-woRld couLD have bEen a fusioN oF Two LewIS-worlds; GIVeN AnaLysis B, this means thAT iT Must have a countErpart ThAT iS A FusIon Of two Lewis-WoRlds.22 WHAt is it fOR oNE THinG To be a counterpArt of anotheR? lewIs (1968) connEcTs tHE notioN with ThAT of Resemblance: 'your CounterpaRts resEMble you CLosely iN conteNt aNd cOnteXT iN iMpoRtANt rESpEctS. theY resemblE yOu More cLoseLY THAn do The OtheR thinGs in their worlDs.' IN advISinG woulD-be moDal rEaLists To endoRse AnAlYsis B, I don't mean tO tie 'CounterpaRt' tO aNy sUcH glosS. 'possibLy' aNd 'nEcessarIly', and tHEir ClOSE ReLatives 'can' and'must', aRe NOToRiously cOntextSEnSiTIve, with aN rAngE of mEANings InclUDiNg philosOphicaLLy In22bigelow AnD PargeTtEr aNd BRickeR Use tHese caSes to argUe thaT It is possible foR There to be "islaND uNIVeRSes"-oBjeCts that stanD in nO SpatIoteMPoRal, OR analOgicaLlY SpATiotemporal, relationS tO one anOther. they take it to bE a serious pROBLem for LeWis's VIeW That he cannot acCept tHis possibiLIty, and LeWis agRees LewiS (1992: p. 213–4). But sincE IT is part oF LeWis'S viEw tHAT tHere are island UNIverSeS, unrestRicTedly spEakIng, UnlEss He Rejects T hE should aCcEpT tHaT it Is posSIble for tHeRe tO bE isLand uNIverseS, unreStriCtEdLY spEaking. IF leWIS takEs My AdviCe, tHe Only rEadiNGs oF 'there cOuld not be IslANd unIvErSes' whicH he should even CoNsider accePtIng Are thoSE On which iT is equivalent to somethinG Like 'theRe cOuld nOt be Island uniVerSes witHin cOsmo'. AnD as we hAve seEn, TheRE Is no sPECiAl rEaSon to say thIS. briCker (2001) oBjEcts To certaIn strategies for intERprEting utterancEs oF 'islAND uNivERsES unIvERseS' AS contingently faLse on the grOuNDs That they enTAil ThAt'my uttErance iS both COntingeNtly possiBle and anaLyTicaLLY faLse. Not a hapPy combinAtion.' But iF We takE ThE utteRanCe to meAn 'IslAnd unIverseS Are Parts Of CosmO', aNd take The naMe 'cosmo' to hAve been introduced by the dEscripTion 'tHe LEwis-world Of wHIch We are partS',
 is in fact a Lewis-worldwould have  been  afus io n of  two  Lewis-worlds. Simi larly, it seems consis tentto supp o se  that  therew as a  no n- ze roob j ec tivecha nce tha t the worm hol ewould neverf or m, and tha t t he Lewis-wor ldwouldbe  af usion  of  twoLewis- w orlds.  Each ofth e se cla i ms enta i l sthat  the Lewis-worldc ou l d have been afusion  o f  t w o  Le wis -worlds; g iv en An a lysis B ,  t h i s  me a ns that it mu st have a c o unt erpart  t hat is a f usion  o f  tw o Lewis-wor lds. 22 What i s it f o r one t h ing tobe a c oun ter part of  a not he r ? L e wi s ( 1 968 ) connec ts  t he no tion w i t h th atof r esemb lance: 'Yourcou nter p art s res emble  you  c losel y in c onten tand context inimpo rtant res pec ts . T he y res e mble y oumor e close ly than doth e o th er things in their  w o r ld s.' In a dvisin g  w ou l d-be mod al  re alis t s  to e ndor s eAnalysis  B, Id on 't  mean t otie 'c ou nte rpa rt' t o  any  suchgloss. ' Possi b ly' and 'neces s arily', and t h ei r cl o se r ela tives 'can'  and ' must ', a r enot o rious ly co nt e xt s ensitive, with an r an ge ofmeani ngs including  philosoph i c a lly in22 Bige l ow and Pargetterand B ricker use these ca ses t o arguethat it i s possible  fo r t her e t o be  "island univ e r ses" -o bjectstha t stand  in  no  sp ati ot emporal,or analo gi ca ll yspa tiote m poral, r el ati on s t o one anothe r. Th ey t ak ei t t o be as er i o us p ro bl em f orLe wis's  vie w  th at he c annot acc ept this  p os sibilit y, and Lewisag rees Lewis  ( 199 2: p.2 1 3–4). Bu t since it is part of L e wis's v iew  that  the re are is lan d univ ers e s, unr estric tedly  s pea k i ng, u n l es s h erejects Th e  sh ouldac cept  that i t is possible fort her e to be islan d u nive r s es , u n re s tri ct e dly s peaking. If Lew is takes m ya dv ice, the o n lyre adingsof 'the re co u ld notbe island  universe s'  whi c h  he  should ev en consi der accep t ing a r ethose  on  which  i t i s equ ivalen t  to  some thingli ke 'th ere c ou ld not b e island universes with in Cos mo'.And  as we ha ves een , there i s no  special r eas onto sa y t h is. B rick e r(20 0 1) ob ject s  to certa i nstr a t eg ies for int e r p ret ing u tte r ancesof ' island universesu niverses' as c onti n g ent lyf alse  o n the groundstha tt h ey entai lthat'my utt erance i sb oth c onting entlypossibl e an d  analy tica lly  false. N otah appy co mb in a tion.'  But  i f we t ake th e  utt e r ance to mean 'is landu n ivers e s a re pa rt s of Co s mo',  and takethe name 'C osmo'to h ave b een int ro ducedbyth e descript i on 'the L ewis- world o fwhic h w e arepart s ' ,
 is_in fact_a Lewis-world would have_been a_fusion_of two_Lewis-worlds._Similarly, it seems_consistent to suppose_that there was a_non-zero objective chance_that_the wormhole would never form, and that the Lewis-world would be a fusion of_two_Lewis-worlds. Each_of_these_claims entails that the Lewis-world_could have been a fusion_of two_Lewis-worlds; given Analysis B, this means that it_must_have a counterpart_that is a fusion of two Lewis-worlds.22 What is_it for one thing to be_a counterpart of_another?_Lewis_(1968) connects the notion_with that of resemblance: 'Your counterparts_resemble you closely in content and_context in important respects. They resemble you_more closely than do the other_things in their worlds.' In_advising would-be_modal realists to endorse Analysis_B, I don't_mean to_tie 'counterpart' to_any such gloss. 'Possibly' and 'necessarily',_and their close_relatives 'can' and'must', are notoriously contextsensitive,_with_an range of_meanings_including_philosophically in22Bigelow_and Pargetter and_Bricker_use these_cases_to argue that it is possible_for_there to be "island universes"-objects that stand_in no spatiotemporal, or_analogically_spatiotemporal, relations to one_another. They take it to_be a serious problem for Lewis's_view that_he cannot_accept this possibility, and Lewis agrees Lewis (1992: p. 213–4). But_since it is part of Lewis's_view that there are_island universes,_unrestrictedly_speaking, unless he_rejects_T he_should accept that it is possible for_there to_be island universes, unrestrictedly speaking. If_Lewis takes my advice,_the_only readings of 'there could not_be island universes' which he should_even consider accepting are those_on_which_it is equivalent to something_like 'there could not be island_universes within Cosmo'._And as we have seen, there is_no_special reason to say this. Bricker_(2001)_objects to certain strategies for interpreting_utterances_of_'island universes universes' as contingently_false on the grounds that they_entail that'my utterance is both contingently possible and analytically_false. Not a_happy combination.' But if we_take_the_utterance to mean 'island universes are parts of Cosmo', and_take the_name 'Cosmo' to_have been introduced by the description 'the Lewis-world of which_we are parts',