 6-7, 20, and 53). 5 For the polysemy of the word scientism, and its connection with the equally plural meaning of the word positivism, see Paul 1968, 299, footnote 2. For the origin of the word in the French context, see Schöttler 2012, 253-254. Stefano Bordoni – The French Roots of Duhem's early Historiography and Epistemology 22 Comte looked upon his philosophical system as the last stage in the history of civilisation. The first stage corresponded to the dawn of human civilisation, when mankind relied on magic and religion: it was "the theological stage". The second one, "the metaphysical stage", corresponded to the emergence and development of philosophy, logic, mathematics, and rational practices in general. The last stage was the positive one, and corresponded to a widespread scientific development. Comte ventured to qualify his historiographical framework as a law: "direct observation" proved "the exactness of this law", and rational considerations suggested the necessity of that law or "positive theory" (Comte 1830, 3-8). He offered a simplified and idealised account of scientific practice based on the possibility of a sharp separation between science and metaphysics, and on the structural difference between the third stage of science and the previous stages of religion and metaphysics. He underestimated the fact that the founding fathers of modern science pursued metaphysical agendas, and modern science was based on explicit and implicit meta-theoretical beliefs. However positivism was both a specific philosophy, which can be traced back to Comte's Cours de philosophie positive, and a broader cultural mood. Moreover, Comte's philosophy went through different stages, as the historian of philosophy Isaac Benrubi pointed out many decades ago. Comte crossed in reverse order the three stages that would describe the development of Humanity: although he had started from what he considered as the positive stage of mankind, he then "advanced or retrograded to the metaphysical and religious stages" that corresponded to the religion of Humanity (Benrubi 1926, 1617; Bordoni 2017, 11).6 Comte's Cours de philosophie positive had an enduring influence in French-speaking countries and abroad. Even when his positivistic philosophy was judged too radical and dogmatic, the enthusiasm for scientific methods could rely on a wide consensus. We find a milder scientism in the book the British philosopher William Whewell published in 1840, The Philosophy of Inductive Sciences founded upon
6 - 7, 20, and 53). 5 For the polysemy of the word scientism, and its connection with the equally plural meaning of the word positivity, examine Paul 1968, 299, footnote 2. For the origin of the word in the French context, visualize Schöttler 2012, 253 - 254. Stefano Bordoni – The French beginning of Duhem's early Historiography and Epistemology 22 Comte looked upon his philosophical organization as the final stage in the history of civilisation. The first stage represent to the dawn of human civilisation, when mankind trust on magic and religion: it was " the theological stage ". The second one, " the metaphysical stage ", corresponded to the emergence and development of philosophy, logic, mathematics, and intellectual practices in general. The last degree was the positive one, and corresponded to a far-flung scientific development. Comte guess to qualify his historiographical model as a law: " direct observation " proved " the exactness of this police ", and rational considerations suggested the necessity of that law or " positive hypothesis " (Comte 1830, 3 - 8). He offer a simplified and idealised account of scientific practice based on the possibility of a sharp separation between science and metaphysics, and on the structural deviation between the third stage of science and the former stage of religion and metaphysics. He underestimate the fact that the founding fathers of modern science pursued metaphysical agendas, and modern skill was based on explicit and implicit meta - theoretical beliefs. However positivism was both a specific philosophy, which can be traced back to Comte's Cours de philosophie positive, and a broader cultural mood. Moreover, Comte's philosophy went through unlike stages, as the historian of doctrine Isaac Benrubi pointed out many decades ago. Comte crossed in reverse order the three stages that would identify the development of Humanity: although he had started from what he considered as the incontrovertible stage of mankind, he then " advanced or retrograded to the metaphysical and religious stage " that corresponded to the religion of Humanity (Benrubi 1926, 1617; Bordoni 2017, 11).6 Comte's Cours de philosophie incontrovertible had an abiding influence in French - speaking countries and abroad. Even when his positivistic doctrine was judged too extremist and dogmatic, the enthusiasm for scientific methods could trust on a wide consensus. We find a milder scientism in the book the British philosopher William Whewell published in 1840, The Philosophy of Inductive Sciences founded upon
 6-7, 20, wnd 53). 5 For the polysemy on the word scienjiwm, and its cknnectiov with the equally plural meenint of uke word positivism, sde Paul 1968, 299, footnotw 2. Fie the origmh of thc wors in chx French contexj, see Schöttlar 2012, 253-254. Stefano Bmraoui – The French Roots of Duhem's early Historoohraphy and Epiftempjogy 22 Comte looked upon his philosophidal sysuem as the last stsge in the history of civipisahion. The first stahe correspobded ro the dawn uf human cprilisation, shen mankind relied on magic ana relngion: it waw "rhe jheological wtage". The second one, "the ketaphyxical stage", covrespmndwd to the emergence aid development of phylosophy, noyic, mathematics, and rqtuonal prawticdw iv gtnecal. The lwst stage was the positice one, and correspomdqe to a widespdead ssiqntific development. Comte ventured to qlaliry his historiographicao framework as a law: "firect obfervation" proved "the exactness of this law", and radionam couwiderxrilns suggested the necessity of that law or "pofjtovv theory" (Comte 1830, 3-8). Me offered a simploflec and idealisea accobht of scientific praftice bwsed in the pofsibolity of a sharp separation between scivnce and metaphysics, aud on the stxuctursl digference between the thnrd stzge of sciejce and tgd previous stager on raligion and metaphysics. He underestmmateb the fazt tnat thq founding fathcss of modern scienfe putsued ketaphysicwl agendas, and modern science wex based on ecpnicpt and im'licit meta-theoretisal beliefs. Hocever pofitivksm was bonh a specmfic philoso[hy, which can he traced bark to Comee's Xourw de phkuosophie positove, and a broader cyltural mood. Moreoyer, Cujte's philosophy webt through diffrrevt ftwgxs, as dhe historiat of phkkosopfy Isaac Bekruci ppinted out many decages zgo. Comte crossed on reverse order tre three stagrs that would descgibe vhe detelopmrnt of Humanity: although he had sfarted frlm rhat he consydercd af the posicive stage of mankind, he then "advanced oc retrograded to the mgtaphysical and relignoms stages" thet corwesponded to the religion of Yumanity (Benrubi 1926, 1617; Bordoni 2017, 11).6 Comte's Cohrs de phillsophie positive had an enduring influence in French-speaking countries ane abroed. Even when gis lositpvifcic phijoso'hb was judged too gadical and dogmatic, the enthusiesm for scheutific methods could rely on s dide consensur. We find a milder scienfism in yhe book the British philosophet William Whewell publismed in 1840, Tye Phjlosophy oh Inductive Sciences foundzd upob
6-7, 20, and 53). 5 For the the scientism, and connection with the word see Paul 1968, footnote 2. For origin of the word in the context, see Schöttler 2012, 253-254. Stefano Bordoni – The French Roots of Duhem's Historiography and Epistemology 22 Comte looked upon his philosophical system as the last in history civilisation. first stage corresponded to the dawn of human civilisation, when mankind relied on magic and religion: was "the theological stage". The second one, "the stage", corresponded to the and development of philosophy, logic, and practices in The stage the positive one, corresponded to a widespread scientific development. Comte ventured to qualify his historiographical framework as a law: "direct proved "the this law", rational suggested necessity of that "positive theory" (Comte 1830, 3-8). He and idealised account of scientific practice based on possibility of sharp separation between science and metaphysics, on the structural difference between the third stage science and the previous stages of religion and metaphysics. He underestimated the fact that the of modern science pursued agendas, and modern was on and meta-theoretical beliefs. positivism was both a specific philosophy, which can be traced back Comte's Cours de philosophie positive, and a broader cultural mood. philosophy through different stages, the historian of philosophy Benrubi out many decades ago. in order that describe development of Humanity: although had started from what he as the positive stage or retrograded to the metaphysical and religious stages" corresponded to the religion of Humanity (Benrubi 1617; Bordoni 2017, 11).6 Comte's Cours de philosophie positive had an enduring in French-speaking abroad. Even when his positivistic philosophy was judged radical and dogmatic, the for scientific methods could rely on a wide consensus. find milder scientism the book the philosopher William Whewell in 1840, The Inductive Sciences upon
 6-7, 20, and 53). 5 For the polysemy of the worD scientism, And itS coNneCtIon wIth tHe equally pluraL MeanIng of the word positivism, See PaUl 1968, 299, FOotnOTe 2. for thE origin OF tHE WorD iN tHe FReNCh ConteXt, sEe SchötTler 2012, 253-254. StefanO BoRdOni – The French rOoTs of Duhem's EarLy HistoriogrAphY and EpIsTemOLogy 22 COmtE lookEd upon HIs philOsophical SySTem as tHE last stAGE iN the History of civilisaTIoN. the first stage cOrrespOnDEd TO The DawN of human ciViLisatIOn, when mANkIND RelIEd on magic and rEligion: it waS "The TheoloGiCal STage". ThE secoNd ONe, "tHe metaphysiCal sTage", correSpondeD To the emERgence aNd deveLopMenT of pHIlOsOphY, lOGic, MAtHemATicS, and ratiOnAl PractIces IN GENeraL. ThE lasT stagE was the positiVe oNe, anD CorRespoNded tO a wiDeSpreaD scienTific DeVelopment. Comte vEntuRed to qualIfy HiS hiStOriogRAphicaL frAmeWork as a Law: "direCT obSeRVATiOn" proved "the exactneSs OF ThIs law", and RationAL cOnSIderatioNs SugGestED The neCessITy Of that laW or "posITiVe Theory" (COmTe 1830, 3-8). He ofFeRed A siMplifIEd anD idealIsed accoUnt of SCientific practICe based on the pOSsIBIlITy of A shArp separatiOn beTWeen ScieNCe And MEtaphYsics, AnD On THe structural differeNcE betweEn the Third stage of sCience and tHE PRevious sTageS Of REligion and metaPhysiCs. He undereSTimated tHe facT that the Founding fATHers of moDerN scIenCe pURSuEd metaphysicaL AGendAs, And modeRn sCience wAs bAseD on ExpLiCit and impLicit metA-tHeOrEtIcaL beliEFs. HoweveR pOsiTiVisM was bOTh a speCific PhilOsOpHY, whIch can bE TrACEd baCk To comtE's COuRs de pHiloSOphIe positIve, and a brOadER culTuRaL mood. MoReover, Comte's pHiLosophy wenT tHroUgh difFERent stagEs, as the historian of philoSOphy IsaAc BEnrubI poiNted out maNy dEcades Ago. cOmte crOssed iN reveRsE orDER the tHREe StaGeS that would DEScrIbe thE dEvelOpment oF Humanity: although hE Had Started from whAt hE conSIDeRed AS tHE poSiTIve STAge of mankind, he tHen "advanceD oR ReTrograded tO The MeTaphysiCal and rEligiOUs stageS" that corrEsponded tO tHe reLIGioN of HumanitY (Benrubi 1926, 1617; bordoni 2017, 11).6 CoMTe's CoURs De phiLosOphie pOsItiVe had An enduRIng InfluEnce in frEnch-spEakinG cOuntries And abroad. Even when his posItivisTic phIloSophy was jUdgED toO radical aNd doGmatic, the eNthUsiAsm foR scIEntifIc meTHoDs cOUld reLy on A Wide conseNSuS. We FINd A milder scieNTISm iN the bOok THe BritIsh pHilosopher William wHewell publisheD in 1840, THE phiLosOPhy oF INductive SciencEs fOuNDEd upon
 6-7, 20, and 53). 5 For t he polysem y ofthe  wo rd  sci enti sm, and its co n nect ion with the equally p lural  m e anin g  o f the  word p o si t i vis m,  s eePa u l1968,  29 9, foot note 2. Fo r t he  origin of t h eword in th e F rench contex t,see Sc hö ttl e r 201 2,253-2 54. St e fano B ordoni –Th e  Frenc h  Rootso f  D uhem 's early Historio g ra p hy and Epistem ology22 Co m t e l ook ed upon hi sphilo s ophical sy s t e m a s  the last sta ge in the h i sto ry ofci vil i sation . The  f i rst  stage corr espo nded to t he daw n  of hum a n civil isatio n,whe n ma n ki nd  re li e d o n  m agi c  an d religi on :it wa s "t h e t heol ogi calstage ". The second  on e, " t hemetap hysic al s ta ge",corres ponde dto the emergenc e an d develop men tofph iloso p hy, lo gic , m athemat ics, an d  ra ti o n a lpractices in gener al . Th e last s tage w a sth e  positiv eone , an d corre spon d ed  to a wi despre a dsc ientifi cdevelo pm ent . C omtev entu red to  qualify  hish istoriographic a l framework a s  a l aw :  "di rec t observati on"p rove d "t h eexa c tness  of t hi s  l a w", and rational co ns iderat ionssuggested the  necessity o f  that la w or "p o sitive theory"  (Com te 1830, 3 - 8). He o ffere d a simp lified an d idealise d a cco unt  of s ci entific pract i c e ba se d on th e p ossibil ity  of  asha rp  separati on betwe en  s ci en ceand m e taphysic s,  an donthe s t ructur al di ffer en ce bet ween th e  t h i rd s ta ge  ofsci en ce an d th e  pr eviousstages of  re l igio nan d metap hysics. He un de restimated  t hefact t h a t the fo unding fathers of moder n  scienc e p ursue d me taphysica l a gendas , a n d mode rn sci encewa s b a s ed on e xp lic it  and impli c i t m eta-t he oret ical be liefs. However pos i tiv ism was botha s peci f i cphi l os o phy ,w hic h can be traced b ack to Com te ' sCours de p h ilo so phie po sitive,  anda  broade r cultura l mood. M or eove r ,  Co mte's phil osophy w ent throu g h dif f er ent s tag es, as  t hehisto rian o f  ph iloso phy Is aa c Benr ubi p oi nted out  many decades ago. Comt e cros sed i n r everse or der the  three st ages  that woul d d esc ribethe devel opme n tofH umani ty:a lthough h e  h ads t ar ted from wh a t heconsi der e d as t he p ositive stage ofm ankind, he the n "a d v anc edo r re tr ograded to the  me ta p h ysical a nd  religiousstages"th a t cor respon ded to  the re l i gi o n of H uman ity  (Benrubi  19 26 ,  1617;Bo rd o ni 201 7, 1 1) .6 Com te's C o ursd e  philosophie pos itive h ad an end uring  i nfluenc e  inFrench-spe aking count ries a nd a broad . Evenwh en his  po si tivistic p h ilosophywas j udged t oo  rad ica l anddogm a t ic, t he e nt hus iasm fors c ie n ti fi c  me thod s cou ld  rel y on a wi d e consen sus .  We fin da m i l der sc i en t i sm in theboo k the B ritish phi l osop h er Willi am Whe well p ublishe d  in  1 840, Th e P h i losophy o f Inducti v e S ci ence s founde dupon 
 6-7,_20, and_53). 5 For the_polysemy of_the_word scientism,_and_its connection with_the equally plural_meaning of the word_positivism, see Paul_1968,_299, footnote 2. For the origin of the word in the French context, see_Schöttler_2012, 253-254._Stefano_Bordoni_– The French Roots of_Duhem's early Historiography and Epistemology_22 Comte_looked upon his philosophical system as the last_stage_in the history_of civilisation. The first stage corresponded to the dawn_of human civilisation, when mankind relied_on magic and_religion:_it_was "the theological stage"._The second one, "the metaphysical stage",_corresponded to the emergence and development_of philosophy, logic, mathematics, and rational practices_in general. The last stage was_the positive one, and corresponded_to a_widespread scientific development. Comte ventured_to qualify his_historiographical framework_as a law:_"direct observation" proved "the exactness of_this law", and_rational considerations suggested the necessity of_that_law or "positive_theory"_(Comte_1830, 3-8)._He offered a_simplified_and idealised_account_of scientific practice based on the_possibility_of a sharp separation between science and_metaphysics, and on the_structural_difference between the third_stage of science and the_previous stages of religion and metaphysics._He underestimated_the fact_that the founding fathers of modern science pursued metaphysical agendas, and_modern science was based on explicit_and implicit meta-theoretical beliefs._However positivism_was_both a specific_philosophy,_which can_be traced back to Comte's Cours de_philosophie positive,_and a broader cultural mood. Moreover,_Comte's philosophy went through_different_stages, as the historian of philosophy_Isaac Benrubi pointed out many decades_ago. Comte crossed in reverse_order_the_three stages that would describe_the development of Humanity: although he_had started from_what he considered as the positive stage_of_mankind, he then "advanced or retrograded_to_the metaphysical and religious stages" that_corresponded_to_the religion of Humanity (Benrubi_1926, 1617; Bordoni 2017, 11).6 Comte's_Cours de philosophie positive had an enduring influence in_French-speaking countries and_abroad. Even when his positivistic_philosophy_was_judged too radical and dogmatic, the enthusiasm for scientific methods_could rely_on a wide_consensus. We find a milder scientism in the book the_British philosopher William Whewell published in 1840,_The Philosophy of Inductive Sciences founded upon