. Forthcoming in Grazer Philosophische Studien 84 (2012), p. 75-101 18 involving intentional deception, for example by deceiving a "nasty" puppet, with whom they (or a "friendly" puppet) are competing for a reward, either through deceptive pointing or by telling a lie (Sodian 1991; Sodian 1994). What these tasks have in common is that they imply an understanding of epistemic perspectives as being different from reality, and of the fact that it is the content of subjective mental states provided by the respective perspective that is guiding the actions of individuals. In other words, the child learns to ascribe propositional attitudes to others and to use these as premises in predicting and explaining the behavior of others (Perner 1991; Rakoczy 2008). Thus, at this level, children possess a theory of mind that is explicitly represented in E2/3 format. This is further supported by the strong connection between linguistic abilities and the understanding of beliefs and folk psychology (see P. A. de Villiers 2005; Zlatev 2008 for an overview). For example, deaf children who are not exposed to sign language from very early on show a delayed understanding of the (false) beliefs of others compared to children with signing parents and hearing children (Peterson & Siegal 1995). Moreover, longitudinal studies indicate that language development predicts theory of mind performance, but not vice versa (Astington & Jenkins 1999; J. de Villiers & Pyers 1997). Also, exposure to discourse involving different perspectives enhances false belief understanding (Lohmann & Tomasello 2003).28 Once the child has acquired the relevant linguistic skills that enable explicit theory-of-mind reasoning, it can also begin to engage in inner speech. There is evidence that inner speech in particular plays an important role for explicit self-consciousness, in the sense of explicit selfreflection. Portions of the left prefrontal lobe are associated both with inner speech and selfreflective activities, and studies using various measures of self-talk and self-reflection indicate a strong correlation between these two mental activities (Morin, 2005). According to Morin, inner speech turns the initially socially generated practice of talking and reflection upon oneself into an inner experience. As Morin points out, this idea was already expressed by Mead (1912/1964), who argued that inner speech in early childhood serves to make young speakers aware of themselves and their separate existence through an internalization of others' perspectives on oneself. So inner speech
. Forthcoming in Grazer Philosophische Studien 84 (2012), p. 75 - 101 18 involving intentional deception, for case by deceive a " nasty " puppet, with whom they (or a " friendly " puppet) are compete for a reward, either through deceptive pointing or by telling a lie (Sodian 1991; Sodian 1994). What these tasks have in coarse is that they imply an understanding of epistemic position as being different from reality, and of the fact that it is the subject of subjective mental state provide by the respective perspective that is guiding the actions of individuals. In other parole, the child learns to ascribe propositional attitudes to others and to practice these as premises in predicting and explain the behavior of others (Perner 1991; Rakoczy 2008). therefore, at this level, child possess a theory of mind that is explicitly map in E2/3 format. This is further supported by the strong connection between linguistic abilities and the understanding of beliefs and folk psychology (see P. A. de Villiers 2005; Zlatev 2008 for an overview). For example, deaf children who are not exposed to sign language from very early on show a delayed agreement of the (false) beliefs of others compare to child with signing parents and hearing child (Peterson & Siegal 1995). Moreover, longitudinal studies indicate that language growth predicts theory of mind performance, but not vice versa (Astington & Jenkins 1999; J. de Villiers & Pyers 1997). Also, exposure to discussion involving different perspectives enhances assumed belief agreement (Lohmann & Tomasello 2003).28 Once the child has acquired the relevant linguistic skills that enable explicit theory - of - mind reasoning, it can besides begin to engage in inner speech. There is evidence that inner speech in particular plays an crucial role for explicit self - awareness, in the sense of explicit selfreflection. Portions of the left prefrontal lobe are associate both with inner lecture and selfreflective activities, and studies use various measuring stick of self - talk and self - reflection indicate a strong correlation between these two mental activities (Morin, 2005). According to Morin, inside speech turns the initially socially generate practice of talking and reflection upon oneself into an inner experience. As Morin points out, this idea was already expressed by Mead (1912/1964), who argue that inner speech in early childhood serves to make young speakers aware of themselves and their freestanding being through an internalization of others' perspectives on oneself. So inner speech
. Fogthcoming in Grazer Philusophische Studnwn 84 (2012), p. 75-101 18 invklving ivtentional deception, for exalpoe by deceiving a "nasty" pupoet, with ahom thet (or q "friendly" puppet) are cojietiny hor a reward, eijher through deceptive poittkny or by telling a lie (Sodian 1991; Sodian 1994). What yhfse tasks have in boimon ps that they imply an understansing of epistemic petspectives as being differfnt vrom reality, and ov the fact jgat ut is the covtent of slyjective mehtal states provided by the resoectire perspectuvw tjdt is guidiig the actions of lmdividgals. In other words, tme chmld oearns to ascribe pro'ositional attitudes to otherv cnd to use these as peenises in [redkxtivg znv esplainlng the behavjor of othees (Perner 1991; Rakoczy 2008). Trlx, at this lebel, chylqren possess a theory of mind that is eqpliditly represented in E2/3 dormat. This is furthet supporteq by the strong connection between linguistic abinitiea anb the jbdfrstanding of beliefs and folk psychology (see L. S. ce Villiers 2005; Zjatev 2008 for sn ofgrview). For exaople, dzzf children who are jot expjsed ro sign lwngusge from very early on show a delayed uudeestanding of the (fclse) beliefs of ptherx compared to children cith sjgning parejts and hsxring children (Pdtegson & Siegal 1995). Moreover, longituqinal stuvies nndicate thaj languwge develooment predicts theory of mind parformance, but not vice versa (Astington & Oxnkins 1999; J. de Finlivrs & Pyerf 1997). Alxo, exposure tj discourse inrolving bifferdnt perspebtives eniances false belief undervjanding (Lohmain & Tomasqllo 2003).28 Onxe the zfild has acquited the rvltvant lingyistic skills that enxgle explicit thzutt-of-mind reasonong, it cwn ajvo begin to angaee km inndr speech. Tmerd is evidence that inner spesch in particular llwys an inportant role for expkicit self-conscioudness, in the xenfe of explicit selfreflection. Lortions lf bhe left prefwontql lobe are cssociated both with inner speech and seofreflective activuties, and studies uxlng various keasuwes of senf-talk and self-reflextion indicate a xtrong correlation befween dhese two mental activities (Morin, 2005). According to Morin, inner speech turns the ibitially socially fenetated pxaccice of talnmng and reflectiom upon oneself into an inner ex'erience. Av Iorin points out, this idea wss already exprgssed by Mead (1912/1964), who argued fhat innrr speech in early childhood setves to make young speakcrs aware of tgemselngs end their separate ecistenee thriugh an intcrnalization ow oyhcrs' perspeftivts ou oneself. So inner speech
. Forthcoming in Grazer Philosophische Studien 84 75-101 involving intentional for example by whom (or a "friendly" are competing for reward, either through deceptive pointing or telling a lie (Sodian 1991; Sodian 1994). What these tasks have in common that they imply an understanding of epistemic perspectives as being different from reality, of fact it the content of subjective mental states provided by the respective perspective that is guiding the actions individuals. In other words, the child learns to propositional attitudes to others to use these as premises predicting explaining the of (Perner Rakoczy 2008). Thus, this level, children possess a theory of mind that is explicitly represented in E2/3 format. This is supported by connection between abilities the of beliefs and (see P. A. de Villiers 2005; an overview). For example, deaf children who are exposed to language from very early on show delayed understanding of the (false) beliefs of others to children with signing parents and hearing children (Peterson & Siegal 1995). Moreover, longitudinal studies language development predicts theory mind performance, but vice (Astington Jenkins J. de & Pyers 1997). Also, exposure to discourse involving different perspectives enhances belief understanding (Lohmann & Tomasello 2003).28 Once the child has relevant skills that enable theory-of-mind reasoning, it can begin engage in inner speech. evidence inner plays important for explicit self-consciousness, in sense of explicit selfreflection. Portions the left prefrontal lobe speech and selfreflective activities, and studies using various of self-talk and self-reflection indicate a strong between these two mental activities (Morin, 2005). According to Morin, inner speech the initially practice of talking and reflection upon oneself into inner experience. As Morin out, this idea was already expressed by Mead (1912/1964), argued inner speech early childhood serves make young speakers of themselves and existence through internalization others' So inner speech
. Forthcoming in Grazer PhilosOphische StUdien 84 (2012), P. 75-101 18 inVolViNg inTentIonal deception, FOr exAmple by deceiving a "nasty" PuppeT, wITh whOM tHey (or A "friendLY" pUPPet) ArE cOmpEtINg For a rEwaRd, eitheR through deCepTiVe pointing or BY tElling a lie (sodIan 1991; Sodian 1994). WhaT thEse tasKs HavE In comMon Is thaT they iMPly an uNderstandInG Of episTEmic perSPEcTiveS as being different FRoM Reality, and of thE fact tHaT It IS The ConTent of subjEcTive mENtal staTEs PROVidED by the respectIve perspectIVe tHat is gUiDinG The actIons oF iNDivIduals. In othEr woRds, the chiLd learNS to ascrIBe propoSitionAl aTtiTudeS To OtHerS aND to USe TheSE as Premises In PrEdictIng aND EXPlaiNinG the BehavIor of others (PeRneR 1991; RakOCzy 2008). thus, aT this LeveL, cHildrEn possEss a tHeOry of mind that is ExplIcitly repResEnTed In e2/3 formAT. This iS fuRthEr suppoRted by tHE stRoNG COnNection between lingUiSTIc AbilitieS and thE UnDeRStanding Of BelIefs AND folk PsycHOlOgy (see P. A. De VillIErS 2005; ZLatev 2008 foR aN overvIeW). FoR exAmple, DEaf cHildreN who are nOt expOSed to sign languAGe from very earLY oN SHoW A delAyeD understandIng oF The (fAlse) BElIefS Of othErs coMpAReD To children with signiNg ParentS and hEaring childreN (Peterson & SIEGAl 1995). MoreovEr, loNGiTUdinal studies iNdicaTe that langUAge develOpmenT predictS theory of MINd perforManCe, bUt nOt vICE vErsa (Astington & jENkinS 1999; J. De VilliErs & pyers 1997). AlSo, eXpoSurE to DiScourse inVolving dIfFeReNt PerSpectIVes enhanCeS faLsE beLief uNDerstaNding (lohmAnN & TOMasEllo 2003).28 OncE ThE CHild HaS aCquiRed ThE releVant LIngUistic sKills that EnaBLe exPlIcIt theorY-of-mind reasonInG, it can also BeGin To engaGE In inner sPeech. There is evidence thaT Inner spEecH in paRticUlar plays An iMportaNt rOLe for eXpliciT self-CoNscIOUsnesS, IN tHe sEnSe of explicIT SelFreflEcTion. portionS of the left prefrontAL loBe are associatEd bOth wITH iNneR SpEEch AnD SelFREflective activiTies, and stuDiES uSing variouS MeaSuRes of seLf-talk aNd selF-ReflectIon indicaTe a strong CoRrelATIon Between theSe two menTal activiTIes (MoRIn, 2005). accorDinG to MorIn, InnEr speEch turNS thE initIally sOcIally gEneraTeD practicE of talking and reflection Upon onEself IntO an inner eXpeRIenCe. As Morin PoinTs out, this iDea Was AlreaDy eXPressEd by mEaD (1912/1964), whO ArgueD thaT Inner speeCH iN eaRLY cHildhood serVES To mAke yoUng SPeakerS awaRe of themselves and THeir separate exIsteNCE thRouGH an iNtErnalization of OthErS' PErspectiVeS on oneself. SO inner spEeCH
. Forthcoming in Grazer Ph ilosophisc he St udi en84  (20 12),  p. 75-101 18i nvol ving intentional decep tion,  f o r ex a mp le by  deceiv i ng a  "n as ty " p up p et , wit h w hom the y (or a "f rie nd ly" puppet)a re  competing  fo r a reward,eit her th ro ugh decep tiv e poi ntingo r by t elling ali e  (Sodi a n 1991; S od ian1994). What these ta s ks have in com mon is  t h at t hey  im ply an und er stand i ng of e p is t e m icp erspectives a s being dif f ere nt fro mrea l ity, a nd of  t h e f act that it  isthe conte nt ofs ubjecti v e menta l stat espro vide d  b ythe  r e spe c ti vep ers pectiveth at  is g uidi n g t he a cti onsof in dividuals. In  ot herw ord s, th e chi ld l ea rns t o ascr ibe p ro positional atti tude s to othe rsan d t ouse t h ese as  pr emi ses inpredict i ngan d e xp laining the behavi or o fothers ( Perner 19 91 ;  Rakoczy  2 008 ). T h u s, at  thi s  l evel, ch ildren po ss ess a t he ory of  m ind  th at is expl icitly  represe ntedi n E2/3 format. This is furth e rs u pp o rted  by  the strong  con n ecti on b e tw een lingu istic  a b il i ties and the unders ta ndingof be liefs and fol k psycholo g y (see P.A. d e  V i lliers 2005; Z latev  2008 fora n overvi ew).For exam ple, deaf c hildrenwho  ar e n ote x po sed to sign l a n guag efrom ve ryearly o n s how  adel ay ed unders tandingof  t he  ( fal se) b e liefs of  o the rs  co mpare d  to ch ildre n wi th  s i gni ng pare n ts a nd h ea ri ng c hil dr en (P eter s on& Siega l 1995).Mor e over ,lo ngitudi nal studies i nd icate that  l ang uage d e v elopment  predicts theory of min d  perfor man ce, b ut n ot vice v ers a (Ast ing t on & J enkins  1999 ;J.d e  Vill i e rs  &Py ers 1997). A lso , exp os ureto disc ourse involving di f fer ent perspecti ves  enh a n ce s f a ls e  be li e f u n d erstanding (Loh mann & Tom as e ll o 2003).28 Onc ethe chi ld hasacqui r ed therelevantlinguisti cskil l s  th at enableexplicit  theory-o f -mind re asoni ng,  it ca nals o beg in toe nga ge in  inner  s peech.  Ther eis evide nce that inner speech i n part icula r p lays an i mpo r tan t role fo r ex plicit sel f-c ons cious nes s , inthes en seo f exp lici t  selfrefl e ct ion . Po rtions of t h e lef t pre fro n tal lo be a re associated bot h  with inner sp eech a ndsel f refl ec tive activitie s,an d studiesus ing various  measure so f sel f-talk  and s elf-ref l e ct i on ind icat e a  strong c orr el a tion be tw ee n  these  two  m entalactivi t ies( M orin, 2005). Acc ordin g to Mo r in,  inne rspeecht urns  the initi ally social ly gen erat ed pr acticeof  talki ngan d reflecti o n upon on eself  into a ninne r e xperie nce. A s Mor in p oi nts  out, thi s id e awa s  al read y exp re ssed  by Mead( 1912/196 4), who arg ue d t h a t inne r  s p e ech in ear lychild h o od servest o ma k ey oungspeake rs awa re of t h ems el ves and  th e i r separat e existen c e t hr ough  an inte rn aliz at ion  o f others' persp ectiveson onese l f . So i nne r  spe e ch
. Forthcoming_in Grazer_Philosophische Studien 84 (2012),_p. 75-101_18_involving intentional_deception,_for example by_deceiving a "nasty"_puppet, with whom they_(or a "friendly"_puppet)_are competing for a reward, either through deceptive pointing or by telling a lie_(Sodian_1991; Sodian_1994)._What_these tasks have in common_is that they imply an_understanding of_epistemic perspectives as being different from reality, and_of_the fact that_it is the content of subjective mental states provided_by the respective perspective that is_guiding the actions_of_individuals._In other words, the_child learns to ascribe propositional attitudes_to others and to use these_as premises in predicting and explaining the_behavior of others (Perner 1991; Rakoczy_2008). Thus, at this level,_children possess_a theory of mind that_is explicitly represented_in E2/3_format. This is_further supported by the strong connection_between linguistic abilities_and the understanding of beliefs and_folk_psychology (see P._A._de_Villiers 2005;_Zlatev 2008 for_an_overview). For_example,_deaf children who are not exposed_to_sign language from very early on show_a delayed understanding of_the_(false) beliefs of others_compared to children with signing_parents and hearing children (Peterson &_Siegal 1995)._Moreover, longitudinal_studies indicate that language development predicts theory of mind performance, but_not vice versa (Astington & Jenkins_1999; J. de Villiers_& Pyers_1997)._Also, exposure to_discourse_involving different_perspectives enhances false belief understanding (Lohmann &_Tomasello 2003).28_Once the child has acquired the_relevant linguistic skills that_enable_explicit theory-of-mind reasoning, it can also_begin to engage in inner speech._There is evidence that inner_speech_in_particular plays an important role_for explicit self-consciousness, in the sense_of explicit selfreflection._Portions of the left prefrontal lobe are_associated_both with inner speech and selfreflective_activities,_and studies using various measures of_self-talk_and_self-reflection indicate a strong correlation_between these two mental activities (Morin,_2005). According to Morin, inner speech turns the initially_socially generated practice_of talking and reflection upon_oneself_into_an inner experience. As Morin points out, this idea was_already expressed_by Mead (1912/1964),_who argued that inner speech in early childhood serves to_make young speakers aware of themselves and_their separate existence through an internalization of others' perspectives on oneself._So inner speech