 primary with respect to causality, understanding, definition, perfection, predication and time; it is not genus or motion; it cannot be augmented nor diminished; it is prior to the accidents but is perceived B. S. Akpan, C. C. Odohoedi 261 by means of the accidents (Yablo, 1992: p. 408). Amid the Modern Period, there developed an extraordinary enthusiasm for the issue of substance. Descartes characterized substance as that which exists requiring nothing else to exist10. Thusly, a substance is what exists all alone. He proposed three sorts of substances: God, mind and matter. Spinoza worked out the ramifications of this definition by Descartes. He presumes that the main substance is God, since it is just God that requires no other being than himself to exist. Whatever name Descartes provides for the three sorts of substances proposed by Descartes, Spinoza contends that they are all the same names for God. Everything is parts of this one reality: matter and mind. According to Spinoza, God, Nature and substance are three different names for the same reality. It is the totality of reality and it has infinite attributes although we know only two of them. These are spirit and matter and it is through these two attributes that we know it. All things are modifications of this substance and are parts of it (Stumpf & Fieser, 2003: p. 82). Spinoza denied Descartes "distinction" between mind and matter. Substance, as indicated by Spinoza, is one and unified, however has various "attributes". In any case, "attribute" is "the thing that we consider as constituting the [single] embodiment of substance". We may think about the single embodiment of the one substance as material furthermore, reliably, as mental. Our world, together with everyone in it, is imminent in God: consequently the acclaimed expression deus sive natura ("God, or Nature"). Spinoza, theory endures degeneration into polytheism (Cook, 2003: p. 560). Farabi's discussion of substance can be found mainly in his commentary on Aristotle's Categories. He claimed that the structure of beings has a necessary character derived from the First being, whereby they all have within themselves some fragment of God and are comprehended by God's knowledge of the world (Druart, 1987). All beings below the heavenly bodies are composed of the two elements of matter and form. Matter is the first
primary with respect to causality, understanding, definition, perfection, postulation and meter; it is not genus or motion; it cannot be augmented nor decrease; it is prior to the accident but is perceived B. S. Akpan, C. C. Odohoedi 261 by means of the accident (Yablo, 1992: p. 408). Amid the Modern Period, there develop an extraordinary enthusiasm for the topic of substance. Descartes characterized message as that which exists requiring nothing else to exist10. thus, a substance is what exists all alone. He proposed three sorts of substances: God, mind and topic. Spinoza worked out the ramifications of this definition by Descartes. He presumes that the independent substance is God, since it is just God that necessitate no other organism than himself to exist. Whatever name Descartes provides for the three sort of substances proposed by Descartes, Spinoza contends that they are all the like names for God. Everything is parts of this one reality: matter and mind. According to Spinoza, God, Nature and means are three different names for the same reality. It is the totality of reality and it has infinite attributes although we know merely two of them. These are spirit and matter and it is through these two attribute that we acknowledge it. All things are modifications of this substance and are character of it (Stumpf & Fieser, 2003: p. 82). Spinoza denied Descartes " distinction " between mind and matter. means, as indicated by Spinoza, is one and unified, however has various " attributes ". In any case, " property " is " the thing that we consider as constituting the [ single ] embodiment of substance ". We may think about the individual embodiment of the one substance as material furthermore, reliably, as mental. Our populace, together with everyone in it, is imminent in God: consequently the acclaimed expression deus sive natura (" God, or Nature "). Spinoza, hypothesis endures degeneracy into polytheism (Cook, 2003: p. 560). Farabi's discussion of substance can be found mainly in his commentary on Aristotle's Categories. He claimed that the social organization of beings has a necessary character derived from the First organism, whereby they all have within themselves some fragment of God and are comprehended by God's knowledge of the worldly concern (Druart, 1987). All beings below the heavenly bodies are composed of the two elements of topic and form. Matter is the first
 prlmary with respect to camsality, understaueing, dxfinitikn, perfeztion, predication and time; iv is not tenus or motion; it canvot be auhmented bor viminished; it is prior to the zgcideutw but is percelved B. S. Ak[an, C. C. Odohoegi 261 yy means of the accidents (Yablo, 1992: p. 408). Wmid thr Lodern Period, jhere qevemoped an extraordinary enthusiasm ror the issue of subxtance. Descartes characterlzed substance as that which exisja rqwuiring nothkng else to exist10. Thusmy, a substance is what exists aul alpne. He prokoaef three sortw of fubstances: God, mind dnd matyer. Spinoza wovked mut the ramifications of this definition bi Descartev. Ke presumes that the naun sutstatce kw Gud, aiice it is juat God thaf requires bo other being than hynself to exisf. Whatqvqr name Descartes provides for the thret sorfs of substances proposwd by Descartes, Spinoea contendf that they are all the same names for God. Everytving ms paxbf if this one reality: matter and mind. According tj Skinpza, God, Nature and substamcf ste three diffetent names for the same reallty. It ys thw totalitr of reality and it has infinitw attributes qlthough we know ouly two of tkem. Thgse arr spirit and matter and it js through hhese two xttributes that de lnmw it. All things are modifycations if tkis subsgancg and awe parts ov it (Stumpf & Fieser, 2003: p. 82). Dpinoea denhed Descarhes "distinction" between mind anv matter. Subsjanwe, ds indiccted bn Spinoza, is onq and unified, kowever kas vafious "attrpbutes". In any case, "aetribute" is "tvg thing that xe considqr aw cobstitutkvg the [single] rmbodimenn jf sybstance". We may thlnk ackut the single zovodiment of the ond stbdtence wv material fgrthdrmute, reuiably, as mcntxl. Oir world, together widh eberyone in it, is ikmlnent in Tod: consqquently the scclaimed expressiln dens sivx natuta ("Dod, or Nature"). Spinoza, theory ehdures dehencration into [olybheifm (Cook, 2003: p. 560). Farabi's discussion of substance can bx found mainly in his cimmentary on Aristojle'x Categoriex. He slaimed tvat the structure of beings has a nectssary character derives from the Virst being, whereby they all have within themselves some fragment of God qnd arx somprehendes by God's kuowkedge jf tie world (Druart, 1987). Akl beings below the heavenly bovies are cmm'osed of the two elements of kagter and form. Matter is the first
primary with respect to causality, understanding, definition, and it is genus or motion; diminished; is prior to accidents but is B. S. Akpan, C. C. Odohoedi by means of the accidents (Yablo, 1992: p. 408). Amid the Modern Period, developed an extraordinary enthusiasm for the issue of substance. Descartes characterized substance as which requiring else exist10. Thusly, a substance is what exists all alone. He proposed three sorts of substances: God, and matter. Spinoza worked out the ramifications of definition by Descartes. He that the main substance is since is just that no being than himself exist. Whatever name Descartes provides for the three sorts of substances proposed by Descartes, Spinoza contends that are all names for Everything parts this one reality: mind. According to Spinoza, God, Nature three different names for the same reality. It the totality reality and it has infinite attributes we know only two of them. These are and matter and it is through these two attributes that we know it. All things of this substance and parts of it & 2003: 82). denied Descartes between mind and matter. Substance, as indicated by Spinoza, is one unified, however has various "attributes". In any case, "attribute" is that consider as constituting [single] embodiment of substance". may about the single embodiment one as as Our together with everyone in is imminent in God: consequently acclaimed expression deus sive theory endures degeneration into polytheism (Cook, 2003: p. Farabi's discussion of substance can be found in his commentary on Aristotle's Categories. He claimed that the structure of has a derived from the First being, whereby they all within themselves some fragment God and are comprehended by God's knowledge of the (Druart, All beings the heavenly bodies composed of the elements of matter Matter is first
 primary with respect to causaLity, undersTandiNg, dEfiNiTion, PerfEction, predicatIOn anD time; it is not genus or motIon; it CaNNot bE AuGmentEd nor diMInISHed; It Is PriOr TO tHe accIdeNts but iS perceived b. S. AKpAn, C. C. Odohoedi 261 BY mEans of the aCciDents (Yablo, 1992: p. 408). AMid The ModErN PeRIod, thEre DevelOped an EXtraorDinary entHuSIasm foR The issuE OF sUbstAnce. Descartes charACtERized substance As that WhICh EXIstS reQuiring notHiNg elsE To exist10. tHuSLY, A suBStance is what eXists all aloNE. He ProposEd ThrEE sorts Of subStANceS: God, mind and MattEr. Spinoza Worked OUt the raMIficatiOns of tHis DefInitIOn By desCaRTes. hE pResUMes That the mAiN sUbstaNce iS gOD, SincE it Is juSt God That requires nO otHer bEIng Than hImselF to eXiSt. WhaTever nAme DeScArtes provides foR the Three sortS of SuBstAnCes prOPosed bY DeScaRtes, SpiNoza conTEndS tHAT ThEy are all the same namEs FOR GOd. EverytHing is PArTs OF this one ReAliTy: maTTEr and Mind. aCcOrding to spinozA, goD, NAture anD sUbstanCe Are ThrEe difFErenT names For the saMe reaLIty. It is the totaLIty of reality aND iT HAs INfinIte Attributes aLthoUGh we Know ONlY twO Of theM. ThesE aRE sPIrit and matter and it iS tHrough These Two attributes That we know IT. aLl things Are mODiFIcations of this SubstAnce and are PArts of it (stumpF & Fieser, 2003: p. 82). spinoza deNIEd DescarTes "DisTinCtiON" BeTween mind and mATTer. SUbStance, aS inDicated By SPinOza, Is oNe And unifieD, however HaS vArIoUs "aTtribUTes". In any CaSe, "aTtRibUte" is "THe thinG that We coNsIdER as ConstitUTiNG The [sInGlE] embOdiMeNt of sUbstANce". we may thInk about tHe sINgle EmBoDiment oF the one substaNcE as materiaL fUrtHermorE, REliably, aS mental. Our world, together WIth everYonE in it, Is imMinent in GOd: cOnsequEntLY the acClaimeD exprEsSioN DEus siVE NaTurA ("GOd, or Nature"). sPInoZa, theOrY endUres degEneration into polytHEisM (Cook, 2003: p. 560). Farabi's DisCussION oF suBStANce CaN Be fOUNd mainly in his coMmentary on arIStOtle's CategORieS. HE claimeD that thE struCTure of bEings has a Necessary ChAracTER deRived from tHe First bEing, whereBY they ALl Have wIthIn themSeLveS some FragmeNT of god anD are coMpRehendEd by GOd'S knowledGe of the world (Druart, 1987). All beIngs beLow thE heAvenly bodIes ARe cOmposed of The tWo elements Of mAttEr and ForM. matteR is tHE fIrsT
 primary with respect to c ausality,under sta ndi ng , de fini tion, perfecti o n, p redication and time; i t isno t  gen u sor mo tion; i t  c a n not  b eaug me n te d nor  di minishe d; it is p rio rto the accid e nt s but is p erc eived B. S.Akp an, C.  C . O d ohoed i 2 61 by  means of the  accident s( Yablo, 1992: p . 40 8).Amid the Modern P e ri o d, there devel oped a ne xt r a ord ina ry enthusi as m for the iss u eo f sub s tance. Descar tes charact e riz ed sub st anc e  as th at wh ic h  ex ists requir ingnothing e lse to exist10 .  Thusly , a su bst anc e is wh at  ex is t s a l lalo n e.He propo se dthree  sor t s o f su bst ance s: Go d, mind and m att er.S pin oza w orked  out  t he ra mifica tions  o f this definiti on b y Descart es.  H e p re sumes that t hemai n subst ance is God ,s i n ce  it is just God th at r eq uires no  other be in g  than hi ms elf  toe x ist.What e ve r name D escart e spr ovidesfo r theth ree  so rts o f  sub stance s propos ed by Descartes, Spi n oza contendst ha t th e y ar e a ll the same  nam e s fo r Go d .Eve r ythin g ispa r ts of this one reality :matter  andmind. Accordi ng to Spin o z a , God, N atur e  a n d substance ar e thr ee differe n t namesfor t he samereality.I t  is thetot ali tyofr e al ity and it ha s infi ni te attr ibu tes alt hou ghwekno wonly twoof them.  T he se  a respiri t  and mat te r a nd  it  is t h roughthese  two  a tt r ibu tes tha t  w e know  i t.  All  th in gs ar e mo d ifi cations  of thissub s tanc ean d are p arts of it (S tu mpf & Fies er , 2 003: p . 82). Spi noza denied Descartes " d istinct ion " bet ween  mind and  ma tter.Sub s tance,  as in dicat ed  by S pinoz a ,  i s o ne  and unifi e d , h oweve rhasvarious  "attributes". Ina nycase, "attrib ute " is " th e t h in g  th at wec o nsider as const ituting th e[ si ngle] embo d ime nt  of sub stance" . Wem ay thin k about t he single  e mbod i m ent  of the on e substa nce as ma t erial fu rther mor e, rel ia bly , asmental .  Ou r wor ld, to ge ther w ith e ve ryone in  it, is imminent in God : cons equen tly  the accl aim e d e xpression  deu s sive nat ura  (" God,orN ature ").S pi noz a , the orye ndures de g en era t i on  into polyt h e i sm(Cook , 2 0 03: p.  560 ). Farabi's discu s sion of substa ncec a n b e f o undma inly in his co mme nt a r y on Ari st otle's Cate gories.He claim ed tha t thestructu r e  o f  being s ha s a  necessar y c ha r acter d er iv e d from  the  F irst b eing,w here b y  they all have w ithin t hemse l ves  some  f ragment of G od and are  comprehend ed byGod' s kno wledgeof  the w orl d(Druart, 1 9 87). Allbeing s below  t he h eav enly b odie s are c ompo se d o f the two e le m en ts ofmatt er an dform . Matteri s the fi rst 
 primary_with respect_to causality, understanding, definition,_perfection, predication_and_time; it_is_not genus or_motion; it cannot_be augmented nor diminished;_it is prior_to_the accidents but is perceived B. S. Akpan, C. C. Odohoedi 261 by means_of_the accidents_(Yablo,_1992:_p. 408). Amid the Modern_Period, there developed an extraordinary_enthusiasm for_the issue of substance. Descartes characterized substance as_that_which exists requiring_nothing else to exist10. Thusly, a substance is what_exists all alone. He proposed three_sorts of substances:_God,_mind_and matter. Spinoza worked_out the ramifications of this definition_by Descartes. He presumes that the_main substance is God, since it is_just God that requires no other_being than himself to exist._Whatever name_Descartes provides for the three_sorts of substances_proposed by_Descartes, Spinoza contends_that they are all the same_names for God._Everything is parts of this one_reality:_matter and mind._According_to_Spinoza, God,_Nature and substance_are_three different_names_for the same reality. It is_the_totality of reality and it has infinite_attributes although we know_only_two of them. These_are spirit and matter and_it is through these two attributes_that we_know it._All things are modifications of this substance and are parts of_it (Stumpf & Fieser, 2003: p._82). Spinoza denied Descartes_"distinction" between_mind_and matter. Substance,_as_indicated by_Spinoza, is one and unified, however has_various "attributes"._In any case, "attribute" is "the_thing that we consider_as_constituting the [single] embodiment of substance"._We may think about the single_embodiment of the one substance_as_material_furthermore, reliably, as mental. Our_world, together with everyone in it,_is imminent in_God: consequently the acclaimed expression deus sive_natura_("God, or Nature"). Spinoza, theory endures_degeneration_into polytheism (Cook, 2003: p. 560)._Farabi's_discussion_of substance can be found_mainly in his commentary on Aristotle's_Categories. He claimed that the structure of beings has_a necessary character_derived from the First being,_whereby_they_all have within themselves some fragment of God and are_comprehended by_God's knowledge of_the world (Druart, 1987). All beings below the heavenly bodies_are composed of the two elements of_matter and form. Matter is the first