 to sustain their intentions into overt actions. Third, the event of taking the shot and the event of killing the mark both depend on the agency of the relevant person. In the case of Sneezy and Off-Target, the unsuccessful attempt depends on Off-Target's voluntarily choice, and, in the case of Off-Target and Bullseye, the successful assassination depends on Bullseye's voluntary choice. Plausibly, it is structural similarities of these kinds that lead David Enoch and Ehud Guttel (2010: 376) to assert that "The problem of moral luck seems to be the very same problem whether it is luck in consequences or in circumstances, and is typically so treated in the literature" (cf. Pritchard 2005: 261). Furthermore, Off-Target is more blameworthy than Sneezy in a way that is partially determined by luck. For the sake of argument, we may assume that circumstantial moral luck exists, because the proponent of the Asymmetry View grants that assumption. Even outside of this dialectical context, however, there are good arguments for extant circumstantial moral luck. I mentioned one in the last section and provided references to others. So, because circumstantial moral luck plausibly exists, it is plausible that the difference in the morally significant challenges faced by Sneezy and Off-Target outside of their control can make a difference in their degree of blameworthiness. And since Off-Target sustains her distal intention into a bona fide assassination attempt and Sneezy does not, Off-Target is plausibly more blameworthy than Sneezy. Here, then, is the Parallelism Argument. There are three important respects in which the case of Sneezy and Off-Target is analogous to the case of Off-Target and Bullseye-namely, the agents in both case pairs (i) have identical agency in some sense and are saliently distinguished by luck, (ii) have very similar actual mental states, and (iii) bring about morally significant events that depend on their voluntary actions. Additionally, Off-Target is more blameworthy than Sneezy in a way that is partially determined by luck, because only Off-Target actually executes her intention. But then, 14 based on those similarities and on that difference in blameworthiness, we have good analogical evidence that Bullseye is more blameworthy than Off-Target in a way that is partially determined by luck. In other words, the fact that the sneezing fit makes a difference in blameworth
to sustain their intentions into overt actions. Third, the event of take the scene and the event of killing the mark both count on the agency of the relevant person. In the case of Sneezy and Off - Target, the unsuccessful attack count on Off - Target's voluntarily choice, and, in the event of Off - Target and Bullseye, the successful assassination depends on Bullseye's voluntary option. Plausibly, it is structural similarities of these kinds that precede David Enoch and Ehud Guttel (2010: 376) to assert that " The problem of moral luck seems to be the very same trouble whether it is luck in consequences or in circumstances, and is typically then treated in the literature " (cf. Pritchard 2005: 261). Furthermore, Off - Target is more blameworthy than Sneezy in a manner that is partially determined by fortune. For the sake of argument, we may simulate that circumstantial moral luck exists, because the proponent of the Asymmetry View award that assumption. Even outside of this dialectical context, however, there are good arguments for extant circumstantial moral fortune. I mention one in the last section and provided references to others. So, because circumstantial moral luck plausibly exists, it is plausible that the difference in the morally meaning challenge faced by Sneezy and Off - Target outside of their command can seduce a difference in their degree of blameworthiness. And since Off - Target sustains her distal purpose into a bona fide assassination attack and Sneezy does not, Off - Target is plausibly more blameworthy than Sneezy. Here, then, is the Parallelism Argument. There are three important deference in which the case of Sneezy and Off - Target is analogous to the case of Off - Target and Bullseye - namely, the agents in both case pairs (i) have identical agency in some sense and are saliently distinguished by luck, (ii) give birth very alike actual mental states, and (iii) bring about morally significant events that count on their voluntary actions. Additionally, Off - Target is more blameworthy than Sneezy in a way that is partially determined by luck, because only Off - Target actually executes her intention. But then, 14 based on those similarities and on that dispute in blameworthiness, we have good analogical evidence that Bullseye is more blameworthy than Off - Target in a manner that is partially determined by fortune. In other words, the fact that the sneezing fit make a difference in blameworth
 to sustain their intentionr into overt acjiins. Thmrd, the event ow taking the shot and the evxnt if kioling the mark both deoend on tje agenct of rhe relevaif persok. In fme cavx of Sneezy and Off-Target, the unsuccessxuu cttempt depends on Off-Target's voluntwrily cnolce, and, in the cast os Ofr-Navget and Bullseye, the successful assasspnation depends om Bullseye's voluntary choife. Ppausibly, it is strkctural simularyries of thesd kinds that lead Davis Enoch and Ehud Guttel (2010: 376) to asrert chat "The priboem mf moral lurk seeis to be the very sake probkem whether it is luxk in consequences or in circumstances, wnd is ty[ieally so treated in tye litetatura" (cf. Prigchzrv 2005: 261). Furthfrmkre, Off-Tarfet is more blameworthy than Smeqdu in a way tgat is pwrtially determined by luck. For the sakt of zrgument, we may assume rhat circumstantial mlral luck exists, because the proponent of the Asymmetry Viaw grengs uhqt asrymotion. Even outside of this dialectical contexe, hpwvver, there are gojd argumentx vot extant circuostantnzl moral luck. I mentloned oge in the last secyion and provided referencew to others. Fi, because circumstcntial moral lucl plaisibly exists, it is plabsible that the dlfference kn the morally skgnpficdnt challenges faced by Snqezy and Iff-Tcrget ougsidg of thqir controp can make a difference ln thgir decree of blwmeworthiness. And since Off-Targxv sustains het dhstdl intencion ikto a bona fide assassination attempc and Rneezy doea not, Ohf-Target is [lausibly mora blameworthy than Snqezy. Herw, then, kr the Parallelosm Argumvnu. There arw three important vespezfs in which the cawe of Sneezy anc Owf-Twrhev is wtalogous to dhe zasd of Owf-Targeu akd Cullxeye-namely, the agentv in both case pairs (i) hwve idenjical agegcy in some srnse and are saliejtly vistinjuishec bi luck, (ii) have very similar acthal mentap sbates, and (iii) brikg afout moralky significant events that depend on thxir voluntary actions. Aeditionally, Off-Targgt ls more blamxworthr than Snaezy in a way that iw partially deterkined by luck, because only Mff-Tagget actually executes her intention. But then, 14 based on those similaritiew and on that diffsrenve in bjcmewortrinedr, we have good amalogical evidence that Bullseyx is more tlcmeworthy than Off-Target in a wxy that is pattially determined by luck. In othet words, the fact that the sneezong fit makes a differenge in blaneworfh
to sustain their intentions into overt actions. event taking the and the event depend the agency of relevant person. In case of Sneezy and Off-Target, the attempt depends on Off-Target's voluntarily choice, and, in the case of Off-Target and the successful assassination depends on Bullseye's voluntary choice. Plausibly, it is structural similarities these that David and Ehud Guttel (2010: 376) to assert that "The problem of moral luck seems to be very same problem whether it is luck in or in circumstances, and typically so treated in the (cf. 2005: 261). Off-Target more than Sneezy in way that is partially determined by luck. For the sake of argument, we may assume that circumstantial luck exists, proponent of Asymmetry grants assumption. Even outside dialectical context, however, there are good circumstantial moral luck. I mentioned one in the section and references to others. So, because circumstantial luck plausibly exists, it is plausible that the in the morally significant challenges faced by Sneezy and Off-Target outside of their control can difference in their degree blameworthiness. And since sustains distal into bona fide attempt and Sneezy does not, Off-Target is plausibly more blameworthy than Here, then, is the Parallelism Argument. There are three important which case of Sneezy Off-Target is analogous to case Off-Target and Bullseye-namely, the both pairs agency some and are saliently distinguished luck, (ii) have very similar mental states, and (iii) that depend on their voluntary actions. Additionally, Off-Target more blameworthy than Sneezy in a way is partially determined by luck, because only Off-Target actually executes her intention. then, 14 those similarities and on that difference in blameworthiness, have good analogical evidence Bullseye is more blameworthy than Off-Target in a way is determined by In other words, fact that the fit makes a blameworth
 to sustain their intentions iNto overt acTions. thiRd, tHe EvenT of tAking the shot anD The eVent of killing the mark boTh depEnD On thE AgEncy oF the relEVaNT PerSoN. IN thE cASe Of SneEzy And Off-TArget, the unSucCeSsful attempt DEpEnds on Off-TArgEt's voluntariLy cHoice, aNd, In tHE case Of OFf-TarGet and bUllseyE, the succeSsFUl assaSSinatioN DEpEnds On Bullseye's voluntARy CHoice. Plausibly, It is stRuCTuRAL siMilArities of tHeSe kinDS that leAD DAVID EnOCh and Ehud GuttEl (2010: 376) to assert tHAt "THe probLeM of MOral luCk seeMs TO be The very same ProbLem whetheR it is lUCk in conSEquenceS or in cIrcUmsTancES, aNd Is tYpICalLY sO trEAteD in the liTeRaTure" (cF. PriTCHARd 2005: 261). FuRthErmoRe, Off-target is more bLamEworTHy tHan SnEezy iN a waY tHat is PartiaLly deTeRmined by luck. For The sAke of arguMenT, wE maY aSsume THat cirCumStaNtial moRal luck EXisTs, BECAuSe the proponent of thE ASYMmEtry View Grants THaT aSSumption. evEn oUtsiDE Of thiS diaLEcTical conText, hoWEvEr, There arE gOod argUmEntS foR extaNT cirCumstaNtial morAl lucK. i mentioned one iN The last sectioN AnD PRoVIded RefErences to otHers. sO, becAuse CIrCumSTantiAl morAl LUcK Plausibly exists, it is PlAusiblE that The difference In the moralLY SIgnificaNt chALlENges faced by SneEzy anD Off-Target OUtside of Their Control cAn make a diFFErence in TheIr dEgrEe oF BLaMeworthiness. AND SincE OFf-TargeT suStains hEr dIstAl iNteNtIon into a bOna fide aSsAsSiNaTioN atteMPt and SneEzY doEs Not, off-TaRGet is pLausiBly mOrE bLAmeWorthy tHAn sNEezy. heRe, Then, Is tHe paralLeliSM ArGument. THere are thRee IMporTaNt RespectS in which the caSe Of Sneezy anD OFf-TArget iS ANalogous To the case of Off-Target and bUllseye-NamEly, thE ageNts in both CasE pairs (I) haVE identIcal agEncy iN sOme SENse anD ARe SalIeNtly distinGUIshEd by lUcK, (ii) hAve very Similar actual mentaL StaTes, and (iii) brinG abOut mORAlLy sIGnIFicAnT EveNTS that depend on thEir voluntaRy ACtIons. AdditiONalLy, off-TargEt is morE blamEWorthy tHan Sneezy In a way thaT iS parTIAllY determineD by luck, bEcause onlY off-TaRGeT actuAllY execuTeS heR inteNtion. BUT thEn, 14 basEd on thOsE similAritiEs And on thaT difference in blameworthIness, wE have GooD analogicAl eVIdeNce that BuLlseYe is more blAmeWorThy thAn OFF-TargEt in A WaY thAT is paRtiaLLy determiNEd By lUCK. IN other words, THE FacT that The SNeezinG fit Makes a difference iN Blameworth
 to sustain their intentio ns into ov ert a cti ons .Thir d, t he event of ta k ingthe shot and the event  of k il l ingt he  mark  both d e pe n d  on  t he  ag en c yof th e r elevant  person. I n t he  case of Sne e zy  and Off-T arg et, the unsu cce ssfulat tem p t dep end s onOff-Ta r get'svoluntari ly choice ,  and, i n th e ca se of Off-Targeta nd Bullseye, thesucces sf u la s sas sin ation depe nd s onB ullseye ' sv o l unt a ry choice. Pl ausibly, it isstruct ur als imilar ities  o f  th ese kinds t hatlead Davi d Enoc h  and Eh u d Gutte l (201 0:376 ) to as se rtth a t " T he  pr o ble m of mor al  l uck s eems t o be t hevery  same  problem whet her  iti s l uck i n con sequ en ces o r in c ircum st ances, and is t ypic ally so t rea te d i nthe l i teratu re"  (c f. Prit chard 2 0 05:  2 6 1 ) .Furthermore, Off-T ar g e tis moreblamew o rt hy than Sne ez y i n aw a y tha t is pa rtiallydeterm i ne dby luck .For th esak e o f arg u ment , we m ay assum e tha t  circumstantia l  moral luck e x is t s ,b ecau sethe propone nt o f  the  Asy m me try Viewgrant st ha t  assumption. Even o ut side o f thi s dialectical  context,h o w ever, th erea re good arguments  forextant cir c umstanti al mo ral luck . I menti o n ed one i n t helas t s e c ti on and provid e d  ref er ences t o o thers.So,  be cau seci rcumstant ial mora llu ck  p lau sibly exists,it  is  p lau sible that t he di ffer en ce inthe mor a ll y sign if ic antcha ll enges  fac e d b y Sneez y and Off -Ta r getou ts ide oftheir control  c an make adi ffe rencei n  their d egree of blameworthines s . And s inc e Off -Tar get susta ins  her d ist a l inte ntionintoabon a fidea s sa ssi na tion attem p t  an d Sne ez y do es not,  Off-Target is pla u sib ly more blame wor thyt h an  Sn e ez y . H er e , t h e n, is the Paral lelism Arg um e nt . There ar e  th re e impor tant re spect s  in whi ch the ca se of Sne ez y an d Off -Target is  analogo us to the caseo fOff-T arg et and  B ull seye- namely ,  th e age nts in  b oth ca se pa ir s (i) ha ve identical agency insome s enseand  are sali ent l y d istinguis hedby luck, ( ii)  ha ve ve rys imila r ac t ua l m e ntalstat e s, and (i i i)  br i n gabout moral l y sig nific ant events  tha t depend on their voluntary acti ons. A ddi tio n ally ,Off-Target ismor eb l ameworth ythan Sneezy  in a wa yt hat i s part iallydetermi n e db y luck , be cau se only O ff- Ta r get act ua ll y  execu teshe r inte ntion. Butt h en, 14 based onthose s imila r iti es an don that diff erence inblameworthi ness,we h ave g ood ana lo gicalevi de nce that B u llseye is  more  blamew or thytha n Off- Targ e t  in a  way  t hat  is parti a l ly de te r min ed b y luc k.  Inother wor d s, the f act that th esne e z ing fi t  m a k es a diffe ren ce in b lameworth
 to_sustain their_intentions into overt actions._Third, the_event_of taking_the_shot and the_event of killing_the mark both depend_on the agency_of_the relevant person. In the case of Sneezy and Off-Target, the unsuccessful attempt depends_on_Off-Target's voluntarily_choice,_and,_in the case of Off-Target_and Bullseye, the successful assassination_depends on_Bullseye's voluntary choice. Plausibly, it is structural similarities_of_these kinds that_lead David Enoch and Ehud Guttel (2010: 376) to_assert that "The problem of moral_luck seems to_be_the_very same problem whether_it is luck in consequences or_in circumstances, and is typically so_treated in the literature" (cf. Pritchard 2005:_261). Furthermore, Off-Target is more blameworthy_than Sneezy in a way_that is_partially determined by luck. For_the sake of_argument, we_may assume that_circumstantial moral luck exists, because the_proponent of the_Asymmetry View grants that assumption. Even_outside_of this dialectical_context,_however,_there are_good arguments for_extant_circumstantial moral_luck._I mentioned one in the last_section_and provided references to others. So, because_circumstantial moral luck plausibly_exists,_it is plausible that_the difference in the morally_significant challenges faced by Sneezy and_Off-Target outside_of their_control can make a difference in their degree of blameworthiness. And_since Off-Target sustains her distal intention_into a bona fide_assassination attempt_and_Sneezy does not,_Off-Target_is plausibly_more blameworthy than Sneezy. Here, then, is_the Parallelism_Argument. There are three important respects_in which the case_of_Sneezy and Off-Target is analogous to_the case of Off-Target and Bullseye-namely,_the agents in both case_pairs_(i)_have identical agency in some_sense and are saliently distinguished by_luck, (ii) have_very similar actual mental states, and (iii)_bring_about morally significant events that depend_on_their voluntary actions. Additionally, Off-Target is_more_blameworthy_than Sneezy in a way_that is partially determined by luck,_because only Off-Target actually executes her intention. But then,_14 based on_those similarities and on that_difference_in_blameworthiness, we have good analogical evidence that Bullseye is more_blameworthy than_Off-Target in a_way that is partially determined by luck. In other words,_the fact that the sneezing fit makes_a difference in blameworth