 should be aimed at, or at least why it is reasonable to strive for it. The fact that natural classification will always remain an unjustifiable claim on the positivist method does not make it unjustifiable: Physical theory confers on us a certain knowledge of the external world which is irreducible to merely empirical knowledge; this knowledge comes neither from experiment nor from the mathematical procedures employed by the theory, so that the merely logical dissection of theory cannot discover the fissure through which this knowledge is introduced into the structure of physics; through an avenue whose reality the physicist cannot deny, any more that he can describe its course, this knowledge derives from a truth other than the truth apt to be possessed by our instruments; the order in which theory arranges the results of observation does not find its adequate and complete justification in its practical or aesthetic characteristics; we surmise, in addition, that it is or tends to be a natural classification; through an analogy whose nature escapes the confines of physics but whose existence is imposed as certain on the mind of the physicist, we surmise that it corresponds to a certain supremely eminent order (1906, 334-335). Marie Gueguen and Stathis Psillos Anti-Scepticism and Epistemic Humility in Pierre Duhem's Philosophy of Science 69 Are Relations the Epistemic Limit? A natural question at this point is this: why does Duhem insist that knowledge can extent only up to relations among "hidden realities whose essence cannot be grasped" (1906, 297). The answer to this lies, by and large, with Duhem's account of representation and the role of hypotheses in science. At one point Duhem notes that "an intelligence that see essences" would classify the laws according to the "natural order" (1893b, 68). But we humans do not see "essences". And that's the problem for Duhem. If we (have to) rely only on representations of "essences", then we can never have knowledge of them. Despite his criticism of empiricism, Duhem was wedded to the view that knowledge of entities requires that they are given to us in experience. Not so for knowledge of relations, though. Let us see why. We noted already that Duhem's talk of essences is meant to capture the unobservable causes or constituents of the phenomena. In his (1902b, 117), he put the point thus: "Contemporary physics is not metaphysics. It does not propose to penetrate behind
should be aimed at, or at least why it is reasonable to strive for it. The fact that natural categorization will constantly remain an unjustifiable title on the positivist method acting does not make it unjustifiable: Physical hypothesis confer on us a certain cognition of the external populace which is irreducible to merely empirical cognition; this knowledge comes neither from experiment nor from the mathematical procedures use by the theory, so that the merely logical dissection of theory cannot discover the fissure through which this cognition is introduced into the structure of physics; through an avenue whose world the physicist cannot deny, any more that he can describe its course, this knowledge derives from a accuracy other than the accuracy apt to be possessed by our instruments; the order in which hypothesis arranges the results of observation does not find its adequate and complete justification in its practical or aesthetic characteristics; we surmise, in addition, that it is or tends to be a natural classification; through an analogy whose nature escapes the confines of physics but whose existence is imposed as sealed on the judgment of the physicist, we surmise that it represent to a sealed supremely eminent decree (1906, 334 - 335). Marie Gueguen and Stathis Psillos Anti - Scepticism and Epistemic Humility in Pierre Duhem's Philosophy of Science 69 Are Relations the Epistemic Limit? A natural question at this point is this: why does Duhem insist that knowledge can extent only up to relations among " shroud realities whose essence cannot be grasped " (1906, 297). The answer to this lies, by and large, with Duhem's bill of representation and the role of hypotheses in science. At one distributor point Duhem notes that " an news that determine essences " would classify the laws harmonize to the " natural order " (1893b, 68). But we humans do not examine " essences ". And that's the problem for Duhem. If we (have to) rely entirely on representations of " essence ", then we can never have knowledge of them. Despite his criticism of quackery, Duhem was wedded to the view that knowledge of entities necessitate that they are given to us in experience. Not indeed for knowledge of relations, though. Let us see why. We noted already that Duhem's lecture of essences is meant to capture the unobservable cause or constituents of the phenomena. In his (1902b, 117), he put the point thus: " contemporaneous physics is not metaphysics. It does not propose to click behind
 shluld be aimed at, or at ltast why it is recwonablx to stdive for it. The fact that natural clessidicatuon will always remain an unjusnifiable xlain on the positivist methos doev not make it ukjustifiabla: Physical themrh eonfers on us a certain knowledge of the exyegnal world whish ix irrsducible to merely empirical knowlsdge; thps knowledge comex neither from experiment jor vrom the mathematifal procedutss qnployed by tfe theory, so that the jerely logical dissection of thdory eannot discivwr hve fissure vhrougr which this knowledce is imtroduced into thx steucture of physics; thcough an avenue whosg reality dhz physicist cannot deby, any kore thag he cah vesdribe lts course, thjs knowledgw derives from a tritr other than tge trueh apt to be possessed by our instruments; ths order in which theory arranges the results of obserdation does not find its adequate and complete juvtifiragiou in igw oractical or aesthetic characteristics; we surijst, ik addition, that lt is or tends to ne a gatural classkficatnkn; through an analogj whose natuee escapef thr confines of physics but wyose existenbe iw imposed as certann on the miud of jhe phusicist, we surmise that it dorresponds to a cerfxin supremely emknekt mrder (1906, 334-335). Marie Gueguen and Ftathis Pwillps Anti-Rcepjicism wnd Epistelic Hmkility in Pierre Dkhem's Pvilosophy lf Science 69 Are Relations the E'mstemic Limit? A nanural queftion at this poine is this: why boes Duhzm inskst that khowledgx can extent only up to rapations amonj "hidden wealutiew whose dssence cannot be graspvd" (1906, 297). Tye answer to this kier, by and large, wnuh Euhem's account pf fepwedeitatijt and the rone ow hhlotheres in sciekce. At pne point Duhem notev thzt "an intelligence tmat see ewsences" rould classifu the laws accordijg to thx "natutal order" (1893b, 68). But we humans do not see "essejcef". And that's ehe irobjem for Dukem. If we (have to) rely only on representetions of "essences", then we can never have lkowledge of vhem. Dqspite hiv criticism of empirucism, Duhem was wtdded to the view that inowlegge ov entities requires that they are given to us in experience. Not so for kniwledgx jf relationa, thpugh. Nec ux see rhy. Xe noted already tnat Duhem's talk of essences is oeant to ccpture the unobservable causex ur constituenjs of the phenomena. In his (1902b, 117), he pit the point thus: "Contemporary lhysics is not metaphysigs. It doew not propose tu penetrate behind
should be aimed at, or at least is to strive it. The fact remain unjustifiable claim on positivist method does make it unjustifiable: Physical theory confers us a certain knowledge of the external world which is irreducible to merely knowledge; this knowledge comes neither from experiment nor from the mathematical procedures employed the so the logical dissection of theory cannot discover the fissure through which this knowledge is introduced into the of physics; through an avenue whose reality the cannot deny, any more he can describe its course, knowledge from a other the apt to be by our instruments; the order in which theory arranges the results of observation does not find its and complete its practical aesthetic we in addition, that or tends to be a natural analogy whose nature escapes the confines of physics whose existence imposed as certain on the mind the physicist, we surmise that it corresponds to certain supremely eminent order (1906, 334-335). Marie Gueguen and Stathis Psillos Anti-Scepticism and Epistemic Humility Duhem's Philosophy of Science Are Relations the Limit? natural at point is why does Duhem insist that knowledge can extent only up to among "hidden realities whose essence cannot be grasped" (1906, 297). to lies, by and with Duhem's account of and role of hypotheses in one Duhem intelligence see would classify the laws to the "natural order" (1893b, But we humans do the problem for Duhem. If we (have to) only on representations of "essences", then we never have knowledge of them. Despite his criticism of empiricism, Duhem was to the knowledge of entities requires that they are given us in experience. Not for knowledge of relations, though. Let us see why. noted that Duhem's of essences is to capture the causes or constituents phenomena. In (1902b, he thus: "Contemporary physics is not metaphysics. does propose to penetrate behind
 should be aimed at, or at least wHy it is reasOnablE to StrIvE for It. ThE fact that naturAL claSsification will always rEmain An UNjusTIfIable Claim on THe POSitIvIsT meThOD dOes noT maKe it unjUstifiable: phySiCal theory conFErS on us a certAin Knowledge of tHe eXternaL wOrlD Which Is iRreduCible tO Merely Empirical KnOWledge; THis knowLEDgE comEs neither from expeRImENt nor from the maThematIcAL pROCedUreS employed bY tHe theORy, so thaT ThE MERelY Logical dissecTion of theorY CanNot disCoVer THe fissUre thRoUGh wHich this knoWledGe is introDuced iNTo the stRUcture oF physiCs; tHroUgh aN AvEnUe wHoSE reALiTy tHE phYsicist cAnNoT deny, Any mORE THat hE caN desCribe Its course, this KnoWledGE deRives From a TrutH oTher tHan the Truth ApT to be possessed bY our InstrumenTs; tHe OrdEr In whiCH theorY arRanGes the rEsults oF ObsErVATIoN does not find its adeQuATE aNd compleTe justIFiCaTIon in its PrActIcal OR AesthEtic CHaRacterisTics; we SUrMiSe, in addItIon, thaT iT is Or tEnds tO Be a nAtural ClassifiCatioN; Through an analoGY whose nature eSCaPES tHE conFinEs of physics But wHOse eXistENcE is IMposeD as ceRtAIn ON the mind of the physicIsT, we surMise tHat it correspoNds to a certAIN SupremelY emiNEnT Order (1906, 334-335). Marie GuegUen anD Stathis PsILlos Anti-sceptIcism and epistemic hUMility in pieRre duhEm's pHIlOsophy of ScienCE 69 are RElAtions tHe EPistemiC LiMit? a naTurAl Question aT this poiNt Is ThIs: Why Does DUHem insisT tHat KnOwlEdge cAN extenT only Up to ReLaTIonS among "hIDdEN RealItIeS whoSe eSsEnce cAnnoT Be gRasped" (1906, 297). THe answer tO thIS lieS, bY aNd large, With Duhem's accOuNt of represEnTatIon and THE role of hYpotheses in science. At one POint DuhEm nOtes tHat "aN intelligEncE that sEe eSSences" Would cLassiFy The LAWs accORDiNg tO tHe "natural oRDEr" (1893b, 68). but we HuMans Do not seE "essences". And that's tHE prOblem for Duhem. if wE (havE TO) rEly ONlY On rEpREseNTAtions of "essenceS", then we can NeVEr Have knowleDGe oF tHem. DespIte his cRiticISm of empIricism, DuHem was wedDeD to tHE VieW that knowlEdge of enTities reqUIres tHAt They aRe gIven to Us In eXperiEnce. NoT So fOr knoWledge Of RelatiOns, thOuGh. Let us sEe why. We noted already that duhem's Talk oF esSences is mEanT To cApture the UnobServable caUseS or ConstItuENts of The pHEnOmeNA. In hiS (1902b, 117), he PUt the poinT ThUs: "CONTeMporary physICS Is nOt metAphYSics. It Does Not propose to penetRAte behind
 should be aimed at, or at  least why  it i s r eas on able  tostrive for it. Thefact that natural clas sific at i on w i ll  alwa ys rema i na n  un ju st ifi ab l eclaim  on  the po sitivist m eth od  does not ma k eit unjusti fia ble: Physica l t heoryco nfe r s onusa cer tain k n owledg e of theex t ernalw orld wh i c his i rreducible to mer e ly empirical know ledge;  t h is k now led ge comes n ei therf rom exp e ri m e n t n o r from the ma thematicalp roc edures  e mpl o yed by  theth e ory , so that t he m erely log ical d i ssectio n  of the ory ca nno t d isco v er  t hefi s sur e  t hro u ghwhich th is  k nowle dgei s i ntro duc ed i nto t he structureofphys i cs;  thro ugh a n av en ue wh ose re ality  t he physicist ca nnot  deny, an y m or e t ha t hec an des cri beits cou rse, th i s k no w l e dg e derives from a t ru t h  o ther tha n thet ru th apt to b epos sess e d  by o ur i n st ruments;  the o r de rin whic htheory  a rra nge s the resu lts of  observa tiond oes not find i t s adequate an d  c o m pl e te j ust ification i n it s  pra ctic a lora esthe tic c ha r ac t eristics; we surmis e,  in ad ditio n, that it is  or tendst o be a nat ural cl a ssification; t hroug h an analo g y whosenatur e escape s the con f i nes of p hys ics  bu t w h o se  existence is i mpos ed  as cer tai n on th e m ind  of  th ephysicist , we sur mi se  t ha t i t cor r espondsto  ace rta in su p remely  emin entor de r  (1 906, 33 4 -3 3 5 ). M ar ie  Gue gue nand S tath i s P sillosAnti-Scep tic i sm a nd  E pistemi c Humility in  P ierre Duhe m' s P hiloso p h y of Sci ence 69 Are Relations t h e Epist emi c Lim it?A natural  qu estion  at this p oint i s thi s:  wh y doesD u he m i ns ist that k n o wle dge c an  ext ent onl y up to relationsa mon g "hidden rea lit iesw h os e e s se n ceca n not b e grasped" (190 6, 297). T he an swer to th i s l ie s, by a nd larg e, wi t h Duhem 's accoun t of repr es enta t i onand the ro le of hy pothesesi n sci e nc e. At  on e poin tDuh em no tes th a t " an in tellig en ce tha t see  e ssences"  would classify the law s acco rding  to  the "nat ura l  or der" (189 3b,68). But w e h uma ns do  no t  see"ess e nc es" .  Andthat ' s the pro b le m f o r  D uhem. If we ( h ave  to)rel y  onlyon r epresentations of "essences", th en w e can  ne v er h av e knowledge of  th em . Despitehi s criticism  of empi ri c ism,Duhemwas we dded to t he view t hatkno wledge of  en ti t ies req ui re s  thatthey  a re giv en tou s in e xperience. Not s o for k nowle d geof re la tions,t houg h. Let ussee why. We  noted  alr eadythat Du he m's ta lkof  essencesi s meant t o cap ture th eunob ser vablecaus e s  or c onst it uen ts of the p he n om en a . I n hi s (19 02 b, 1 17), he p u t the po int thus: " Co nte m p oraryp hy s i cs is notmet aphys i c s. It does notp ro p ose t o pene tratebehind
 should_be aimed_at, or at least_why it_is_reasonable to_strive_for it. The_fact that natural_classification will always remain_an unjustifiable claim_on_the positivist method does not make it unjustifiable: Physical theory confers on us a_certain_knowledge of_the_external_world which is irreducible to_merely empirical knowledge; this knowledge_comes neither_from experiment nor from the mathematical procedures employed_by_the theory, so_that the merely logical dissection of theory cannot discover_the fissure through which this knowledge_is introduced into_the_structure_of physics; through an_avenue whose reality the physicist cannot_deny, any more that he can_describe its course, this knowledge derives from_a truth other than the truth_apt to be possessed by_our instruments;_the order in which theory_arranges the results_of observation_does not find_its adequate and complete justification in_its practical or_aesthetic characteristics; we surmise, in addition,_that_it is or_tends_to_be a_natural classification; through_an_analogy whose_nature_escapes the confines of physics but_whose_existence is imposed as certain on the_mind of the physicist,_we_surmise that it corresponds_to a certain supremely eminent_order (1906, 334-335). Marie Gueguen and_Stathis Psillos_Anti-Scepticism and_Epistemic Humility in Pierre Duhem's Philosophy of Science 69 Are Relations_the Epistemic Limit? A natural question_at this point is_this: why_does_Duhem insist that_knowledge_can extent_only up to relations among "hidden realities_whose essence_cannot be grasped" (1906, 297). The_answer to this lies,_by_and large, with Duhem's account of_representation and the role of hypotheses_in science. At one point_Duhem_notes_that "an intelligence that see_essences" would classify the laws according_to the "natural_order" (1893b, 68). But we humans do_not_see "essences". And that's the problem_for_Duhem. If we (have to) rely_only_on_representations of "essences", then we_can never have knowledge of them._Despite his criticism of empiricism, Duhem was wedded to_the view that_knowledge of entities requires that_they_are_given to us in experience. Not so for knowledge of_relations, though._Let us see_why. We noted already that Duhem's talk of essences is_meant to capture the unobservable causes or_constituents of the phenomena. In his (1902b, 117), he put the_point thus: "Contemporary physics is not metaphysics. It_does not propose to penetrate behind