 substance' (Swinburne 2013: 68). I shall construe the definition of a mental property to be logically equivalent to this (which seems to me slightly easier to understand): A mental property is one to whose instantiations a substance that instantiates it has privileged access – i.e., substances have privileged access to the mental properties that they instantiate. III. SWINBURNE'S ARGUMENTS FOR SUBSTANCE DUALISM I am not confident that I understand Swinburne's argument for mental substances from synchronic unity, but if I do, it goes like this:4 (1) A complete history of the world must include 'among substances with physical properties and so physical parts, substances which are such that events in those parts are the immediate causes or effects of and only of conscious events which are coexperienced with other conscious events belonging to the same substance' (Swinburne 2013: 143). (2) The property of coexperiencing certain properties at a time 'will delimit the physical boundaries of the substance, and so help to determine which physical properties it possesses' (Swinburne 2013: 143). 4 Swinburne 2013: 43. This is Swinburne's argument from the synchronic unity of a person. If the argument is sound, it establishes substance dualism. 11SWINBURNE ON SUBSTANCE DUALISM (3) The property of coexperiencing certain properties at a time is a mental property. [Defn. of mental property plus the fact that one has privileged access to instantiations of coexperiencing.] (4) If (2) and (3), then 'a substance which has conscious coexperienced properties is... determined in part by a mental property' (Swinburne 2013: 143). (5) If a substance which has conscious coexperienced properties is... determined in part by a mental property, then that substance is a mental substance. [alternative definition of mental property] (6) Humans 'are mental substances, since their spatial boundaries are determined by a mental property' (Swinburne 2013: 144). I have a worry about (2), and consequently about (5) and (6). First (2): I wonder if 'delimit' is used equivocally. (2) may be true if 'delimit' is a causal idea, as in interactive dualism; but in order to support (5), Swinburne needs a stronger ont
substance' (Swinburne 2013: 68). I shall construe the definition of a mental property to be logically equivalent to this (which seem to me slenderly easier to understand ): A genial property is one to whose instantiation a substance that instantiates it has privilege access – i.e., substances have privileged entree to the genial properties that they instantiate. III. SWINBURNE'S ARGUMENTS FOR SUBSTANCE DUALISM I am not convinced that I understand Swinburne's argument for genial substances from synchronic unity, but if I do, it goes like this:4 (1) A complete history of the world must admit' among substances with physical properties and then physical parts, means which are such that events in those part are the immediate causes or effects of and only of conscious events which are coexperienced with early conscious events belonging to the same substance' (Swinburne 2013: 143). (2) The property of coexperiencing certain property at a prison term' will delimit the physical boundaries of the substance, and so help to determine which physical property it possesses' (Swinburne 2013: 143). 4 Swinburne 2013: 43. This is Swinburne's argument from the synchronous oneness of a person. If the argumentation is sound, it establishes means dualism. 11SWINBURNE ON SUBSTANCE DUALISM (3) The property of coexperiencing certain properties at a time is a genial property. [ Defn. of mental property plus the fact that one has privileged access to instantiations of coexperiencing. ] (4) If (2) and (3), then' a substance which has conscious coexperienced properties is... determined in part by a mental place' (Swinburne 2013: 143). (5) If a substance which induce conscious coexperienced properties is... determined in part by a mental property, then that means is a mental substance. [ alternative definition of genial property ] (6) homo' are mental substances, since their spatial boundary are determined by a mental place' (Swinburne 2013: 144). I have a worry about (2), and consequently about (5) and (6). First (2 ): I wonder if' delimit' is practice equivocally. (2) may be on-key if' delimit' is a causal idea, as in interactive dualism; but in order to support (5), Swinburne necessitate a stronger ont
 suhstance' (Swinburne 2013: 68). I shxll construe thg eefinivion of a mentau property to be logically eeuuvalebt to this (which seems to me slpghtly eawier ro understehd): A mekcal pdlpercy is one to whoxe instanthations a subsdavcz that instantiates it has privilegeq accesx – i.e., substances havt pwivimvgtd access to the mental propertiea that uhey instantiate. IOI. SWINBURNE'S ARGUMENTS FOG SUHSTANCE DUALISM I wm not confudene that I undefstand Swinburne's argujent for mental substances from synckronic uniti, guh if I do, it goes like this:4 (1) A complede histpry of the workd kusr include 'among substences with physical kroperties aud so physical parts, wuvstanwes fhicf ard shci tgat evfnta in those parts are rhe immediate causex jg effects of znd onjy of conscious events which are coexperitnced with other conscious ecents belonging to thg same subftance' (Swinburne 2013: 143). (2) The property of coexperiencinc cervakn kripertkws at a time 'will delimit the physical boundariqa pf the substance, and so hell ho qetermine whizh physiczl properties it plssessef' (Swibburne 2013: 143). 4 Swimburne 2013: 43. This is Swinburne's argument frjn the synchronic uuity of a pexson. Ig the argument is sound, it ertabmishes subshance duamksm. 11SWINBURNE ON SUNSTDNCE DUALISM (3) The property of coexpxrieneing cergain propewties at a time is a mental properhy. [Deyn. of mental prlperty plus the fact that one hex privileged awcevs to inftantlations of coex[eriencing.] (4) If (2) and (3), chen 'a substance which ias consciouf coexperiencaf properties is... detewminwd ib part ch a mental prolerty' (Swiuyurne 2013: 143). (5) Uf a substance whigh har conscious coex'tritnxed properties is... deeegmiied ig part by a mantau pfpperth, then ukat rubsyance is a mental sutstahce. [alternative degikition of mental [roperty] (6) Humsns 'are mental subdtancxs, sinre theor fpatial boundaries are determihed by a lenbal property' (Fwinnurng 2013: 144). I have c worry about (2), and consequently about (5) aid (6). First (2): I wonder if 'eelimit' is used equnvpcally. (2) may be twue if 'denimit' is a causal idwa, as in interactlve dualism; but in ordsr to vuppogt (5), Swinburne needs a stronger ont
substance' (Swinburne 2013: 68). I shall construe of mental property be logically equivalent me easier to understand): mental property is to whose instantiations a substance that it has privileged access – i.e., substances have privileged access to the mental that they instantiate. III. SWINBURNE'S ARGUMENTS FOR SUBSTANCE DUALISM I am not confident I Swinburne's for substances from synchronic unity, but if I do, it goes like this:4 (1) A complete history the world must include 'among substances with physical and so physical parts, which are such that events those are the causes effects and only of events which are coexperienced with other conscious events belonging to the same substance' (Swinburne 2013: 143). (2) property of properties at time delimit physical boundaries of and so help to determine which possesses' (Swinburne 2013: 143). 4 Swinburne 2013: 43. is Swinburne's from the synchronic unity of a If the argument is sound, it establishes substance 11SWINBURNE ON SUBSTANCE DUALISM (3) The property of coexperiencing certain properties at a time is property. [Defn. of mental plus the fact one privileged to of coexperiencing.] If (2) and (3), then 'a substance which has conscious coexperienced is... determined in part by a mental property' (Swinburne 2013: If substance which has coexperienced properties is... determined part a mental property, then is mental of property] Humans 'are mental substances, their spatial boundaries are determined a mental property' (Swinburne worry about (2), and consequently about (5) and First (2): I wonder if 'delimit' is equivocally. (2) may be true if 'delimit' is a causal idea, as interactive dualism; order to support (5), Swinburne needs a stronger
 substance' (Swinburne 2013: 68). I shall cOnstrue the DefinItiOn oF a MentAl prOperty to be logiCAlly Equivalent to this (which sEems tO mE SligHTlY easiEr to undERsTANd): A MeNtAl pRoPErTy is oNe tO whose iNstantiatiOns A sUbstance that INsTantiates iT haS privileged aCceSs – i.e., suBsTanCEs havE prIvileGed accESs to thE mental prOpERties tHAt they iNSTaNtiaTe. III. SWINBURNE'S ARguMenTS FOR SUBSTANCe DUALIsM i Am NOT coNfiDent that I uNdErstaND SwinbuRNe'S ARGumENt for mental suBstances froM SynChroniC uNitY, But if I Do, it gOeS LikE this:4 (1) A complEte hIstory of tHe worlD Must incLUde 'amonG substAncEs wIth pHYsIcAl pRoPErtIEs And SO phYsical paRtS, sUbstaNces WHICH are SucH thaT evenTs in those partS arE the IMmeDiate CauseS or eFfEcts oF and onLy of cOnScious events whiCh arE coexperiEncEd WitH oTher cONsciouS evEntS belongIng to thE SamE sUBSTaNce' (Swinburne 2013: 143). (2) The proPeRTY oF coexperIencinG CeRtAIn properTiEs aT a tiME 'Will dElimIT tHe physicAl bounDArIeS of the sUbStance, AnD so HelP to deTErmiNe whicH physicaL propERties it possessES' (Swinburne 2013: 143). 4 SwiNBuRNE 2013: 43. THIs is swiNburne's arguMent FRom tHe syNChRonIC unitY of a pErSOn. iF the argument is sound, It EstablIshes Substance dualIsm. 11SWINBURne on SUBSTANcE DUalIsm (3) The property of CoexpEriencing cERtain proPertiEs at a timE is a mentaL PRoperty. [DEfn. Of mEntAl pROPeRty plus the facT THat oNe Has privIleGed acceSs tO inStaNtiAtIons of coeXperiencInG.] (4) IF (2) aNd (3), TheN 'a subSTance whiCh Has CoNscIous cOExperiEnced PropErTiES is... DetermiNEd IN Part By A mEntaL prOpErty' (SWinbURne 2013: 143). (5) if a subsTance whicH haS ConsCiOuS coexpeRienced properTiEs is... determInEd iN part bY A Mental prOperty, then that substance IS a mentaL suBstanCe. [alTernative DefInitioN of MEntal pRopertY] (6) HumaNs 'Are MENtal sUBStAncEs, Since their SPAtiAl bouNdArieS are detErmined by a mental prOPerTy' (Swinburne 2013: 144). I hAve A worRY AbOut (2), ANd COnsEqUEntLY About (5) and (6). First (2): I wOnder if 'delImIT' iS used equivOCalLy. (2) May be trUe if 'delImit' iS A causal Idea, as in iNteractivE dUaliSM; But In order to sUpport (5), SwInburne neEDs a stROnGer onT
 substance' (Swinburne 201 3: 68). Ishall  co nst ru e th e de finition of am enta l property to be logic allyeq u ival e nt  to t his (wh i ch s eem sto  me  s l ig htlyeas ier tounderstand ):Amental prope r ty  is one to  wh ose instanti ati ons asu bst a nce t hat  inst antiat e s it h as privil eg e d acce s s – i.e . ,  s ubst ances have privil e ge d  access to the  menta lp ro p e rti esthat theyin stant i ate. II I .S W I NBU R NE'S ARGUMENT S FOR SUBST A NCE  DUALI SM  Ia m notconfi de n t t hat I under stan d Swinbur ne's a r gumentf or ment al sub sta nce s fr o msy nch ro n icu ni ty, but  if I do ,it  goes  lik e t h is:4  (1 ) Acompl ete history o f t he w o rld  must  incl ude'a mongsubsta nceswi th physical pro pert ies and s o p hy sic al  part s , subs tan ces  whichare suc h  th at e v en ts in those partsar e th e immedi ate ca u se so r effect sofando n ly of  con s ci ous even ts whi c har e coexp er ienced  w ith  ot her c o nsci ous ev ents bel ongin g  to the same s u bstance' (Swi n bu r n e2 013:  14 3). (2) The  pro p erty  ofc oe xpe r ienci ng ce rt a in properties at a tim e'willdelim it the physic al boundar i e s  of thesubs t an c e, and so help  to d etermine w h ich phys icalproperti es it pos s e sses' (S win bur ne201 3 :  1 43). 4 Swinbu r n e 20 13 : 43. T his  is Swi nbu rne 'sarg um ent fromthe sync hr on ic  u nit y ofa  person.  I f t he  ar gumen t  is so und,it e st ab l ish es subs t an c e  dua li sm . 11 SWI NB URNEON S U BST ANCE DU ALISM (3)  Th e  pro pe rt y of co experiencingce rtain prop er tie s at a t ime is a  mental property. [Defn .  of men tal  prop erty  plus the  fa ct tha t o n e hasprivil egedac ces s to in s t an tia ti ons of coe x p eri encin g. ] (4 ) If (2 ) and (3), then 'a sub stance whichhas  con s c io usc oe x per ie n ced p roperties is...  determine di npart by am ent al  proper ty' (Sw inbur n e 2013:  143). (5 ) If a su bs tanc e whi ch has con scious c oexperien c ed pr o pe rties  is ... de te rmi ned i n part bya men tal pr op erty,thenth at subst ance is a mental substa nce. [ alter nat ive defin iti o n o f mentalprop erty] (6)Hum ans  'are  me n tal s ubst a nc es, since  the i r spatial bo und a r ie s are deter m i n edby amen t al pro pert y' (Swinburne 201 3 : 144). I have  a w o r ryabo u t (2 ),  and consequen tly  a b o ut (5) a nd  (6). First  (2): Iwo n der i f 'del imit'is used e qu i vocall y. ( 2)may be tr ueif 'delimi t'  i s  a cau salid ea, as  in in t erac t i ve dualism; butin or d e r tos upp ort ( 5) , Swinb u rneneeds a st ronger ont
 substance'_(Swinburne 2013:_68). I shall construe_the definition_of_a mental_property_to be logically_equivalent to this_(which seems to me_slightly easier to_understand):_A mental property is one to whose instantiations a substance that instantiates it has_privileged_access –_i.e.,_substances_have privileged access to the_mental properties that they instantiate._III. SWINBURNE'S_ARGUMENTS FOR SUBSTANCE DUALISM I am not confident_that_I understand Swinburne's_argument for mental substances from synchronic unity, but if_I do, it goes like this:4_(1) A complete_history_of_the world must include_'among substances with physical properties and_so physical parts, substances which are_such that events in those parts are_the immediate causes or effects of_and only of conscious events_which are_coexperienced with other conscious events_belonging to the_same substance'_(Swinburne 2013: 143)._(2) The property of coexperiencing certain_properties at a_time 'will delimit the physical boundaries_of_the substance, and_so_help_to determine_which physical properties_it_possesses' (Swinburne_2013:_143). 4 Swinburne 2013: 43. This_is_Swinburne's argument from the synchronic unity of_a person. If the_argument_is sound, it establishes_substance dualism. 11SWINBURNE ON SUBSTANCE_DUALISM (3) The property of coexperiencing_certain properties_at a_time is a mental property. [Defn. of mental property plus the_fact that one has privileged access_to instantiations of coexperiencing.]_(4) If_(2)_and (3), then_'a_substance which_has conscious coexperienced properties is... determined in_part by_a mental property' (Swinburne 2013: 143)._(5) If a substance_which_has conscious coexperienced properties is... determined_in part by a mental property,_then that substance is a_mental_substance._[alternative definition of mental property]_(6) Humans 'are mental substances, since_their spatial boundaries_are determined by a mental property' (Swinburne_2013:_144). I have a worry about_(2),_and consequently about (5) and (6)._First_(2):_I wonder if 'delimit' is_used equivocally. (2) may be true_if 'delimit' is a causal idea, as in interactive_dualism; but in_order to support (5), Swinburne_needs_a_stronger ont