 relationship between the methodology of the bon sens and the Aristotelian epagôgè through the problem of the infinite regress; and between the problem of infinite regress and the solution proposed by Pascal to this problem with "his doctrine of the heart". According to Martin, his doctrine leads precisely to the separation, at the same time methodological and thematic, Duhemian and Pascalian, of two areas that do not touch each other: the reason and the senses are two faculties that serve entirely different areas, in such a way that the natural reason may not be useful neither to defend nor to attack the faith. However, let's not forget that to Aristotle, the virtue which allows us to grasp the principles is the noûs through the procedure of the epagôgè which appears to be the solution proposed by the Greek philosopher the problem of the infinite regress. In sum, it is possible to establish a relationship between the bon sens and the noûs and "doctrine of the heart". We need to return to the thought of Aristotle to explain this possible relationship. Aisthesis and Noûs in Aristotle In the sixth book of the Nicomachean ethics we find the famous Aristotelian classification of the different kinds of virtues by which the knowledge is acquired: téchne, epistéme, phrónesis, sophía and noûs (Aristotle 1926, 1139: 15-20). Later, in this work, it is argued that only the noûs can capture the principles. Aristotle explains what should be understood by each of these capacities and concludes that the principles can only be captured by the noûs, although it is not very clear what the procedure by which the noûs captures the principles is. In the Posterior analytics Aristotle expresses: Since we learn either by induction [epagôgè] or by demonstration [apodeixis]. Now demonstration proceeds from universals and induction from particulars; but it is impossible to gain a view of universals except through induction [epagôgè] (since even what we call abstractions can only be grasped by induction [epagôgè], because, although they cannot exist in separation, some of them inhere in each class of objects, in so far as each class has a determined nature); and we cannot employ induction if we lack sense-perception, because it is sense-perception that apprehends particulars. It is impossible to gain scientific knowledge of them
relationship between the methodology of the bon sens and the Aristotelian epagôgè through the problem of the infinite regression; and between the trouble of countless regress and the solution proposed by Pascal to this problem with " his doctrine of the kernel ". According to Martin, his doctrine leads precisely to the legal separation, at the like time methodological and thematic, Duhemian and Pascalian, of two areas that do not touch each other: the reason and the common sense are two faculties that serve wholly different areas, in such a way that the natural reason may not be useful neither to defend nor to assail the faith. However, let's not forget that to Aristotle, the virtue which permit us to grasp the principles is the noûs through the operation of the epagôgè which appears to be the solution propose by the Greek philosopher the problem of the infinite regress. In sum, it is possible to install a relationship between the bon sens and the noûs and " doctrine of the heart ". We need to return to the thought of Aristotle to explain this possible relationship. Aisthesis and Noûs in Aristotle In the sixth book of the Nicomachean ethics we find the famous Aristotelian classification of the different kinds of virtues by which the cognition is get: téchne, epistéme, phrónesis, sophía and noûs (Aristotle 1926, 1139: 15 - 20). Later, in this oeuvre, it is argue that only the noûs can capture the principles. Aristotle excuse what should be understood by each of these capacities and concludes that the principles can merely be captured by the noûs, although it is not very clear what the procedure by which the noûs captures the principles is. In the Posterior analytics Aristotle expresses: Since we teach either by induction [ epagôgè ] or by demonstration [ apodeixis ]. Now demonstration return from universals and trigger from particular; but it is impossible to gain a view of universals except through induction [ epagôgè ] (since even what we bid abstractions can only be grasped by induction [ epagôgè ], because, although they cannot exist in separation, some of them inhere in each class of objects, in so far as each course has a determined nature); and we cannot employ induction if we lack common sense - perception, because it is sense - perception that apprehends particular. It is impossible to gain scientific cognition of them
 repationship between the mtthodology of the bon seis and fhe Arisgotelian epagôgè through the pcoblwm of the infinite regress; xnd betwevn the priblen of infinivs regress and bhe smoution proposec by Pascan to this probneo cith "his doctrine of the heart". Accorqing to Mwrtin, his docttine kqads irtcisely to the separation, at the aame tike methodologocal and thematic, Duhemian and Pascalian, of two wreas that eo njr touch each other: the reason and jhe senses are two faculties thag serre entirely duffftent areas, ii such a way that bne natgral resson may not bc usehul beither to defend nor to attack the faijh. However, lzt's not forget that ti Qristmtle, the cirgue wiicg alloas ns to grasp the principles is the noûs thrpudy the procedude of ehq epagôgè which appears to be the solutiot pdoposed by the Greek phulosopher the problem of the igfinite regress. In sum, it is possible to establisv a rxlxtiinffup between the bon sens and the noûs and "doctrinq og nhe heart". We need to return yo tng thought of Atistotlz tk explain this posdible rglatiobship. Aisuhesix and Noûs in Aristotle In tye sixth booh of the Nicomacheau ethics we yind tne fakous Aristotelian classnficatjon of the fifferent yinds of virtues by wvich the knowledge is acquyred: téchnx, epixtéme, phfónesos, sopría and noûs (Arisbmtle 1926, 1139: 15-20). Later, in tjis wlrn, it is arhued that only the noûs can captnce the princiklev. Agistotle zxplaiks what should fe understood yy each jf thdse capacinies and roncludes thwt the princi[pes can only be capttred by rhe noûs, xlthough it is not very clear whar the procedure by whkdh the noûs captbxew the principlex ir. Ig nhe Pjvterior analfticr Afostotue exprtfscs: Rincr we learn either by indhction [epagôgè] or by dcmonstratuon [apodqixis]. Now dempnstration proceedd frok uiiverssls and induction from particulara; but it ls lmpossible to gaik a diew of unnversals except through induction [epagôgè] (wince even what wg call abstractions ccn only be gresped fy inducthon [epagôgè], because, alrhough they cannou exist in separation, skme of them inhere in each class of objects, in so far as each class has a determined naturx); wnd we cannkt ekploy iuduetion is we uack sense-percepnion, because it is sense-perceptiun that dp'rehends particulars. It is imlorsible to gaiv scientific knowledge or them
relationship between the methodology of the bon the epagôgè through problem of the problem infinite regress and solution proposed by to this problem with "his doctrine the heart". According to Martin, his doctrine leads precisely to the separation, at same time methodological and thematic, Duhemian and Pascalian, of two areas that do touch other: reason the senses are two faculties that serve entirely different areas, in such a way that the reason may not be useful neither to defend to attack the faith. let's not forget that to the which allows to the is the noûs the procedure of the epagôgè which appears to be the solution proposed by the Greek philosopher the of the In sum, is to a relationship between sens and the noûs and "doctrine We need to return to the thought of to explain possible relationship. Aisthesis and Noûs in In the sixth book of the Nicomachean ethics find the famous Aristotelian classification of the different kinds of virtues by which the knowledge téchne, epistéme, phrónesis, sophía noûs (Aristotle 1926, 15-20). in work, is argued only the noûs can capture the principles. Aristotle explains what should understood by each of these capacities and concludes that the only captured by the although it is not clear the procedure by which captures principles Posterior Aristotle Since we learn either induction [epagôgè] or by demonstration Now demonstration proceeds from but it is impossible to gain a view universals except through induction [epagôgè] (since even we call abstractions can only be grasped by induction [epagôgè], because, although cannot exist some of them inhere in each class of in so far as class has a determined nature); and we cannot employ if lack sense-perception, it is sense-perception apprehends particulars. It impossible to gain of them
 relationship between the metHodology of The boN seNs aNd The ARistOtelian epagôgè THrouGh the problem of the infinIte reGrESs; anD BeTween The probLEm OF InfInItE reGrESs And thE soLution pRoposed by PAscAl To this probleM WiTh "his doctrIne Of the heart". AcCorDing to maRtiN, His doCtrIne leAds preCIsely tO the separAtIOn, at thE Same timE MEtHodoLogical and thematiC, duHEmian and PascalIan, of tWo AReAS ThaT do Not touch eaCh Other: THe reasoN AnD THE seNSes are two facuLties that seRVe eNtirelY dIffERent arEas, in SuCH a wAy that the naTuraL reason maY not be USeful neITher to dEfend nOr tO atTack THe FaIth. hoWEveR, LeT's nOT foRget that To arIstotLe, thE VIRTue wHicH allOws us To grasp the priNciPles IS thE noûs ThrouGh thE pRocedUre of tHe epaGôGè which appears tO be tHe solutioN prOpOseD bY the GREek phiLosOphEr the prOblem of THe iNfINITe Regress. In sum, it is poSsIBLe To establIsh a reLAtIoNShip betwEeN thE bon SENs and The nOÛs And "doctrIne of tHE hEaRt". We neeD tO returN tO thE thOught OF AriStotle To explaiN this POssible relatioNShip. Aisthesis ANd nOÛs IN AriStoTle In the sixTh boOK of tHe NiCOmAchEAn ethIcs we FiND tHE famous Aristotelian ClAssifiCatioN of the differeNt kinds of vIRTUes by whiCh thE KnOWledge is acquirEd: técHne, epistémE, PhrónesiS, sophÍa and noûS (AristotlE 1926, 1139: 15-20). lAter, in thIs wOrk, It iS arGUEd That only the noÛS Can cApTure the PriNciples. ariStoTle ExpLaIns what shOuld be unDeRsToOd By eAch of THese capaCiTieS aNd cOncluDEs that The prInciPlEs CAn oNly be caPTuRED by tHe NoÛs, alThoUgH it is Not vERy cLear whaT the proceDurE By whIcH tHe noûs cAptures the priNcIples is. In tHe posTerior ANAlytics ARistotle expresses: Since wE Learn eiTheR by inDuctIon [epagôgÈ] or By demoNstRAtion [aPodeixIs]. Now DeMonSTRatioN PRoCeeDs From univerSALs aNd indUcTion From parTiculars; but it is impOSsiBle to gain a vieW of UnivERSaLs eXCePT thRoUGh iNDUction [epagôgè] (siNce even whaT wE CaLl abstractIOns CaN only be Grasped By indUCtion [epAgôgè], becaUse, althouGh They CANnoT exist in seParation, Some of theM InherE In Each cLasS of objEcTs, iN so faR as eacH ClaSs has A deterMiNed natUre); anD wE cannot eMploy induction if we lack sEnse-peRceptIon, Because it Is sENse-PerceptioN thaT apprehendS paRtiCularS. It IS impoSsibLE tO gaIN scieNtifIC knowledgE Of TheM
 relationship between themethodolog y ofthe  bo nsens  and  the Aristotel i an e pagôgè through the pro blemof thei nf inite  regres s ;a n d b et we enth e  p roble m o f infin ite regres s a nd  the solutio n  p roposed by  Pa scal to this  pr oblemwi th" his d oct rineof the heart" . Accordi ng to Mar t in, his d oc trin e leads precisely to the separation , at t he sa m e  ti memethodolog ic al an d  themat i c, D u hem i an and Pascal ian, of two are as tha tdon ot tou ch ea ch oth er: the rea sonand the s ensesa re twof acultie s that  se rve  ent i re ly  di ff e ren t  a rea s , i n such a  w ay  that  the n a t ural  re ason  maynot be useful  ne ithe r  to  defe nd no r to  a ttack  the f aith.  H owever, let's n ot f orget tha t t oAri st otle, the vi rtu e w hich al lows us togr a s p  t he principles is t he n oû s throug h thep ro ce d ure of t he  ep agôg è which  app e ar s to bethe so l ut io n propo se d by t he  Gr eek  phil o soph er the  problem  of t h e infinite reg r ess. In sum,i ti s  p o ssib leto establis h ar elat ions h ip  be t weenthe b on se n s and the noûs and"d octrin e ofthe heart". W e need tor e t urn to t he t h ou g ht of Aristotl e toexplain th i s possib le re lationsh ip. Aisth e s is and N oûs  in  Ar ist o t le  In the sixth b ookof  the Ni com acheaneth ics  we  fi nd  the famo us Arist ot el ia ncla ssifi c ation of  t hedi ffe rentk inds o f vir tues  b yw hic h the k n ow l e dgeis  a cqui red :téchn e, e p ist éme, ph rónesis,sop h ía a nd  n oûs (Ar istotle 1926,  1 139: 15-20 ).  La ter, i n this wor k, it is argued that on l y the n oûs  cancapt ure the p rin ciples . A r istotl e expl ainswh ats h ouldb e  u nde rs tood by ea c h  of  thes ecapa citiesand concludes that the  principles c anonly b ecap t ur e d b yt hen o ûs, although it  is not ve ry cl ear what t h e p ro cedureby whic h the noûs ca ptures th e princip le s is . Inthe Poster ior anal ytics Ari s totle ex press es:  Since  w e l earneither byinduc tion [ ep agôgè]  or b ydemonstr ation [apodeixis]. Nowdemons trati onproceedsfro m  un iversalsandinductionfro m p artic ula r s; bu t it is  im p ossib le t o  gain a v i ew  of u ni versals exc e p t  th rough  in d uction  [ep agôgè] (since eve n  what we callabst r a cti ons canon ly be graspedbyin d u ction [e pa gôgè], beca use, alt ho u gh th ey can not ex ist ins e pa r ation,  som e o f them in her ei n eachcl as s  of ob ject s,  in so  far a s  eac h class has a dete rmine d natur e );and w ecannote mplo y inductio n if we lac k sens e-pe rcept ion, be ca use it  is  s ense-perce p tion that  appr ehendspa rtic ula rs. It  isi m possi bleto  ga in scient i f ic kn ow l edg e of  them 
 relationship_between the_methodology of the bon_sens and_the_Aristotelian epagôgè_through_the problem of_the infinite regress;_and between the problem_of infinite regress_and_the solution proposed by Pascal to this problem with "his doctrine of the heart"._According_to Martin,_his_doctrine_leads precisely to the separation,_at the same time methodological_and thematic,_Duhemian and Pascalian, of two areas that do_not_touch each other:_the reason and the senses are two faculties that_serve entirely different areas, in such_a way that_the_natural_reason may not be_useful neither to defend nor to_attack the faith. However, let's not_forget that to Aristotle, the virtue which_allows us to grasp the principles_is the noûs through the_procedure of_the epagôgè which appears to_be the solution_proposed by_the Greek philosopher_the problem of the infinite regress._In sum, it_is possible to establish a relationship_between_the bon sens_and_the_noûs and_"doctrine of the_heart"._We need_to_return to the thought of Aristotle_to_explain this possible relationship. Aisthesis and Noûs_in Aristotle In the_sixth_book of the Nicomachean_ethics we find the famous_Aristotelian classification of the different kinds_of virtues_by which_the knowledge is acquired: téchne, epistéme, phrónesis, sophía and noûs (Aristotle_1926, 1139: 15-20). Later, in this_work, it is argued_that only_the_noûs can capture_the_principles. Aristotle_explains what should be understood by each_of these_capacities and concludes that the principles_can only be captured_by_the noûs, although it is not_very clear what the procedure by_which the noûs captures the_principles_is._In the Posterior analytics Aristotle_expresses: Since we learn either by_induction [epagôgè] or_by demonstration [apodeixis]. Now demonstration proceeds from_universals_and induction from particulars; but it_is_impossible to gain a view of_universals_except_through induction [epagôgè] (since even_what we call abstractions can only_be grasped by induction [epagôgè], because, although they cannot_exist in separation,_some of them inhere in_each_class_of objects, in so far as each class has a_determined nature);_and we cannot_employ induction if we lack sense-perception, because it is sense-perception_that apprehends particulars. It is impossible to_gain scientific knowledge of them