 hand, he saw scattered bodies of knowledge, such as "theories of heat, magnetism, and electricity", that had preserved their "childish condition" of semi-empirical sciences throughout the seventeenth century and even afterwards (Cournot 1872, 292-294). This historiographical and epistemological perspective was not in tune with positivist historiography and epistemology.20 On the positivist shore, Littré criticised Spencer for having dared to replace the Comtian hierarchical order of sciences with a more pragmatic interconnection, and remarked that ancient civilisations were aware and proud of their past but less interested in their future, whereas "modern civilisations" focused mainly on their future. Actually, it was just Littré and other positivists that celebrated the cult of progress, and underestimated the complex dynamics of historical transformations (Littré 1873a, 13; Littré 1873b, IV-VII). Although the adjectives naïve and sophisticated cannot be formally defined, it seems to me that they can help us understand what really happened at the dawn of modern philosophy of science in the second half of the nineteenth century. Naïve approaches can be associated with a simplified account of scientific practice, the celebration of a simplified scientific method, and the uncritical mythology of scientific progress. Sophisticated approaches managed to grasp the complexity of scientific practice, the complex interaction among rational, empirical, and intuitive components in scientific research, the plurality and pliability of scientific methods, and the existence of different scientific traditions which had developed throughout history. However, I must warn against any dogmatic application of my tentative, dichotomic classification: naïve and sophisticated are only provisional labels that help us interpret the emergence, the history, and further developments of modern history and philosophy of science (Bordoni 2017, 189). Further Debates In 1874, the young philosopher Émile Boutroux published his doctoral dissertation, De la contingence des lois de la nature, wherein he focused on the relationship between scientific theories and experiences. The emergence and development of natural philosophy had involved the transition from "a purely descriptive science" to "an explicative knowledge". According to Boutroux, this development had widened the gap between the disorder of experiences and the order of laws that should explain those experiences (Boutroux 1874, 2-4). In Boutroux' radical anti-reductionism, variability and instability replaced invariance and stability of mathematical laws. Boutroux' philosophy was
hand, he saw scattered bodies of cognition, such as " theory of heat, magnetism, and electricity ", that had preserved their " childish circumstance " of semi - empirical skill throughout the seventeenth century and even afterwards (Cournot 1872, 292 - 294). This historiographical and epistemic position was not in tune with positivist historiography and epistemology.20 On the positivist shore, Littré criticised Spencer for having dared to replace the Comtian hierarchical order of sciences with a more hardheaded interconnection, and remarked that ancient civilisations were mindful and proud of their past but less interested in their future, whereas " modern civilisations " focused mainly on their future. Actually, it was just Littré and early positivists that celebrated the cult of advancement, and underestimated the complex dynamics of historical transformations (Littré 1873a, 13; Littré 1873b, IV - VII). Although the adjectives naïve and advanced cannot be formally defined, it seem to me that they can help us understand what really happen at the dawn of modern philosophy of science in the second half of the nineteenth century. Naïve approach can be associated with a simplified account of scientific practice, the celebration of a simplified scientific method, and the uncritical mythology of scientific progress. Sophisticated approaches managed to grasp the complexity of scientific exercise, the complex interaction among intellectual, empirical, and intuitive components in scientific research, the battalion and bendability of scientific methods, and the existence of different scientific traditions which had developed throughout history. However, I must warn against any dogmatic application of my tentative, dichotomic classification: naïve and advanced are only provisional labels that help us interpret the emergence, the history, and further developments of modern history and philosophy of science (Bordoni 2017, 189). Further Debates In 1874, the young philosopher Émile Boutroux published his doctoral dissertation, De la eventuality des lois de la nature, wherein he focused on the kinship between scientific theories and experiences. The emergence and development of natural philosophy had involve the transition from " a purely descriptive science " to " an explicative cognition ". According to Boutroux, this exploitation had widened the gap between the disorderliness of experiences and the order of laws that should explain those experiences (Boutroux 1874, 2 - 4). In Boutroux' extremist anti - reductionism, variability and imbalance replaced invariance and stability of mathematical police. Boutroux' philosophy was
 hajd, he saw scattered bodits of knowledge, socy as "tieories of heat, magnetism, and electricity", tiat yad peeserved their "childisf conditiln" of seni-emkirical sciences vgroughomc the deveutxenth century akd even aftarwards (Cournod 1872, 292-294). Chis historiographical and epistemoljgical legspective was got pn tuns with positivist historiography ahd episuemology.20 On the poxitivist shore, Littré critifisef Spencer for havijg dared to repjqce the Comtkan hierarbkical order of sciences with a more pragmagic iuterconnectuob, ajg remarked vhat agcient civillxationv were sware and prouc oh thwir past but less intxrested in their futore, whereav "jodern civilisatiinw" focosed kainut ov tgemr ruture. Acvually, it wzs just Litrré and other positififnx that celebdated ehq cult of progress, and underestimated tve domplex dynamics of hisrorical transformatiojs (Littré 1873w, 13; Littré 1873b, IV-VII). Although the adjectives naïve and sophmsgiccbcd cxbnlt be formally defined, it seems to me that thqg vak help us undersband what really hspoemgd at the dawn of mobsrh philosophy of sclence ig the second hwlf pf the nineteenth century. Nqïve approachvs cqn be associated wnth a simpliyied avcouny of scientific practicz, the delebration of a simluified scientifiz mvthog, and tht uncritical mythojogy of srientnfic proeresx. Sophysticated wpproaches managed to grwsp tke cokplexity ov scientific practice, the complxe interaction akonc rationcl, emplrical, and intuytive componenjs in scizntifiz research, the plnrality and [liability of dcientific mxthods, anq thw exustence uf different svientific traditionw which had develoied tfdoughout historv. Yowever, I must earv adapnsv any gogmatic appnicagiov of mh tentaunve, aichptomic classificatiot: naïbe and sophisticatrd are onli provisijnal labels tnat help us interpget tie emecgence, thg history, and further developmehts of moferk history and phioosophy of seience (Bordoni 2017, 189). Further Debates In 1874, the young philosophet Émile Boutroux publixmed his doctpral qissertathon, De la contingencw des lois de la kature, wherein he focuaed on the gelationship between scientific theories and experiences. The emergence ane development of nztursl phplofpphy hwd iivulved the transinion from "a purely descriptive srience" to "dn explicative knowledge". Accorcivg to Boutroub, this development had wjdened tne gap between the disorder of rxperiences and the ordev of laws that should ex'lain those experienves (Bobtroux 1874, 2-4). In Biutrlux' radical avti-tefuctionisl, vaciayility and instability replaced ibvariabcf and stability mf mathematlcxl lass. Boujroux' philosophy sas
hand, he saw scattered bodies of knowledge, "theories heat, magnetism, electricity", that had semi-empirical throughout the seventeenth and even afterwards 1872, 292-294). This historiographical and epistemological was not in tune with positivist historiography and epistemology.20 On the positivist shore, criticised Spencer for having dared to replace the Comtian hierarchical order of sciences a pragmatic and that ancient civilisations were aware and proud of their past but less interested in their future, "modern civilisations" focused mainly on their future. Actually, was just Littré and positivists that celebrated the cult progress, underestimated the dynamics historical (Littré 1873a, 13; 1873b, IV-VII). Although the adjectives naïve and sophisticated cannot be formally defined, it seems to me that can help what really at dawn modern philosophy of the second half of the nineteenth can be associated with a simplified account of practice, the of a simplified scientific method, and uncritical mythology of scientific progress. Sophisticated approaches managed grasp the complexity of scientific practice, the complex interaction among rational, empirical, and intuitive components research, the plurality and of scientific methods, the of scientific which had throughout history. However, I must warn against any dogmatic application of tentative, dichotomic classification: naïve and sophisticated are only provisional labels us the emergence, the and further developments of history philosophy of science (Bordoni Further In philosopher Boutroux his doctoral dissertation, De contingence des lois de la wherein he focused on and experiences. The emergence and development of natural had involved the transition from "a purely science" to "an explicative knowledge". According to Boutroux, this development had widened gap between of experiences and the order of laws that explain those experiences (Boutroux 2-4). In Boutroux' radical anti-reductionism, variability and instability replaced and of mathematical Boutroux' philosophy was
 hand, he saw scattered bodies oF knowledge, Such aS "thEorIeS of hEat, mAgnetism, and eleCTricIty", that had preserved theIr "chiLdISh coNDiTion" oF semi-emPIrICAl sCiEnCes ThROuGhout The SeventeEnth centurY anD eVen afterwardS (coUrnot 1872, 292-294). This hIstOriographicaL anD epistEmOloGIcal pErsPectiVe was nOT in tunE with posiTiVIst hisTOriograPHY aNd epIstemology.20 On the poSItIVist shore, LittrÉ critiCiSEd sPEncEr fOr having daReD to rePLace the cOmTIAN hiERarchical ordeR of sciences WIth A more pRaGmaTIc inteRconnEcTIon, And remarked That Ancient ciVilisaTIons werE Aware anD proud Of tHeiR pasT BuT lEss InTEreSTeD in THeiR future, wHeReAs "modErn cIVILIsatIonS" focUsed mAinly on their fUtuRe. AcTUalLy, it wAs jusT LitTrÉ and oTher poSitivIsTs that celebrateD the Cult of proGreSs, And UnDeresTImated The ComPlex dynAmics of HIstOrICAL tRansformations (LittRé 1873A, 13; lItTré 1873b, IV-VIi). AlthoUGh ThE AdjectivEs NaïVe anD SOphisTicaTEd Cannot be FormalLY dEfIned, it sEeMs to me ThAt tHey Can heLP us uNderstAnd what rEally HAppened at the daWN of modern philOSoPHY oF ScieNce In the second Half OF the NineTEeNth CEnturY. NaïvE aPPrOAches can be associateD wIth a siMplifIed account of sCientific pRACTice, the cElebRAtIOn of a simplifieD scieNtific methOD, and the uNcritIcal mythOlogy of scIENtific prOgrEss. sopHisTICaTed approaches MANageD tO grasp tHe cOmplexiTy oF scIenTifIc Practice, tHe compleX iNtErAcTioN amonG Rational, EmPirIcAl, aNd intUItive cOmponEnts In ScIEntIfic resEArCH, The pLuRaLity And PlIabilIty oF SciEntific Methods, anD thE ExisTeNcE of diffErent scientifIc Traditions WhIch Had devELOped throUghout history. However, I muST warn agAinSt any DogmAtic appliCatIon of mY teNTative, DichotOmic cLaSsiFICatioN: NAïVe aNd SophisticaTED arE only PrOvisIonal laBels that help us inteRPreT the emergence, The HistORY, aNd fURtHEr dEvELopMENts of modern histOry and philOsOPhY of science (bOrdOnI 2017, 189). FurtheR DebateS In 1874, thE Young phIlosopher émile BoutRoUx puBLIshEd his doctoRal disseRtation, De LA contINgEnce dEs lOis de lA nAtuRe, wheRein he FOcuSed on The relAtIonshiP betwEeN scientiFic theories and experiencEs. The eMergeNce And develoPmeNT of Natural phIlosOphy had invOlvEd tHe traNsiTIon frOm "a pUReLy dEScripTive SCience" to "aN ExPliCATiVe knowledge". aCCOrdIng to bouTRoux, thIs deVelopment had widenED the gap between The dISOrdEr oF ExpeRiEnces and the ordEr oF lAWS that shoUlD explain thoSe experiEnCEs (BouTroux 1874, 2-4). IN BoutrOux' radiCAL aNTi-reduCtioNisM, variabilIty AnD InstabiLiTy REplaceD invArIance aNd stabILity OF Mathematical laws. boutrOUX' philOSopHy was
 hand, he saw scattered bo dies of kn owled ge,  su ch  as"the ories of heat, magn etism, and electricity ", th at hadp re serve d their "c h i ldi sh  c ond it i on " ofsem i-empir ical scien ces  t hroughout th e  s eventeenth  ce ntury and ev enafterw ar ds( Courn ot1872,  292-2 9 4). Th is histor io g raphic a l and e p i st emol ogical perspectiv e  w a s not in tunewith p os i ti v i sthis toriograph yand e p istemol o gy . 2 0  On the positivis t shore, Li t tré  criti ci sed Spence r for  h a vin g dared torepl ace the C omtian hierarc h ical or der of  sc ien cesw it ha m or e  pr a gm ati c  in terconne ct io n, an d re m a r k ed t hat  anc ientcivilisations  we re a w are  andproud  ofth eir p ast bu t les sinterested in t heir  future,whe re as"m odern civili sat ion s" focu sed mai n lyon t h ei r future. Actually ,i t  w as justLittré an do ther pos it ivi stst h at ce lebr a te d the cu lt ofp ro gr ess, an dundere st ima ted  thec ompl ex dyn amics of  hist o rical transfor m ations (Littr é  1 8 7 3a ,  13;  Li ttré 1873b,  IV- V II).  Alt h ou ght he ad jecti ve s  n a ïve and sophisticat ed  canno t beformally defi ned, it se e m s  to me t hatt he y  can help us u nders tand whatr eally ha ppene d at the  dawn ofm o dern phi los oph y o f s c i en ce in the sec o n d ha lf  of the  ni neteent h c ent ury . N aï ve approa ches can  b eas so cia ted w i th a sim pl ifi ed  ac count of sci entif ic p ra ct i ce,  the ce l eb r a tion  o fa si mpl if ied s cien t ifi c metho d, and th e u n crit ic al  mythol ogy of scient if ic progres s.  So phisti c a ted appr oaches managed to grasp the com ple xityof s cientific  pr actice , t h e comp lex in terac ti ona m ong r a t io nal ,empirical, a ndintui ti ve c omponen ts in scientific r e sea rch, the plur ali ty a n d  p lia b il i tyof sci e n tific methods,and the ex is t en ce of diff e ren tscienti fic tra ditio n s which  had deve loped thr ou ghou t his tory. Howe ver, I m ust warna gains t  a ny do gma tic ap pl ica tionof myt ent ative , dich ot omic c lassi fi cation:naïve and sophisticated  are o nly p rov isional l abe l s t hat helpus i nterpret t heeme rgenc e,t he hi stor y ,and furth er d e velopment s  o f m o d er n history a n d phi losop hyo f scie nce(Bordoni 2017, 18 9 ). Further Deb ates I n 1 874 ,  the  y oung philosoph erÉm i l e Boutro ux  publishedhis doct or a l dis sertat ion, D e la co n t in g ence d es l ois  de la na tur e, wherein  h ef ocused  onth e rela tionsh i p be t w een scientific t heori e s  ande xpe rienc es . The e m erge nce and de velopment o f natu ralphilo sophy h ad  invol ved  t he transit i on from " a pur ely des cr ipti vescienc e" t o "an e xpli ca tiv e knowled g e ". Ac co r din g to  Bout ro ux,this deve l opment h adw idenedth e g a p  betwe e nt h e disorder  of  expe r i ences andt he o r de r  of l aws th at sho uld exp l ain  t hose ex per i e nces (Bou troux 187 4 , 2 -4 ). I n Boutro ux ' ra di cal  a nti-reductionis m, varia bility a n d  insta bil i ty r e placed  i nvariance an d sta bi l ity ofm a the matical law s.Bou trou x'phil o sophy was
 hand,_he saw_scattered bodies of knowledge,_such as_"theories_of heat,_magnetism,_and electricity", that_had preserved their_"childish condition" of semi-empirical_sciences throughout the_seventeenth_century and even afterwards (Cournot 1872, 292-294). This historiographical and epistemological perspective was not_in_tune with_positivist_historiography_and epistemology.20 On the positivist_shore, Littré criticised Spencer for_having dared_to replace the Comtian hierarchical order of sciences_with_a more pragmatic_interconnection, and remarked that ancient civilisations were aware and_proud of their past but less_interested in their_future,_whereas_"modern civilisations" focused mainly_on their future. Actually, it was_just Littré and other positivists that_celebrated the cult of progress, and underestimated_the complex dynamics of historical transformations_(Littré 1873a, 13; Littré 1873b,_IV-VII). Although_the adjectives naïve and sophisticated_cannot be formally_defined, it_seems to me_that they can help us understand_what really happened_at the dawn of modern philosophy_of_science in the_second_half_of the_nineteenth century. Naïve_approaches_can be_associated_with a simplified account of scientific_practice,_the celebration of a simplified scientific method,_and the uncritical mythology_of_scientific progress. Sophisticated approaches_managed to grasp the complexity_of scientific practice, the complex interaction_among rational,_empirical, and_intuitive components in scientific research, the plurality and pliability of scientific_methods, and the existence of different_scientific traditions which had_developed throughout_history._However, I must_warn_against any_dogmatic application of my tentative, dichotomic classification:_naïve and_sophisticated are only provisional labels that_help us interpret the_emergence,_the history, and further developments of_modern history and philosophy of science_(Bordoni 2017, 189). Further Debates_In_1874,_the young philosopher Émile Boutroux_published his doctoral dissertation, De la_contingence des lois_de la nature, wherein he focused on_the_relationship between scientific theories and experiences._The_emergence and development of natural philosophy_had_involved_the transition from "a purely_descriptive science" to "an explicative knowledge"._According to Boutroux, this development had widened the gap_between the disorder_of experiences and the order_of_laws_that should explain those experiences (Boutroux 1874, 2-4). In Boutroux'_radical anti-reductionism,_variability and instability_replaced invariance and stability of mathematical laws. Boutroux' philosophy was