 on the presentation of voting methods without priority. Marc Jiménez thanks Mario Gensollen for discussions and suggestions on epistemic democracy. We thank Nancy Abigail Núñez-Hernández and Rita Jiménez-Rolland for proofreading the article, and Brenda Vázquez-Pedroza for improving the quality of figures and tables. We acknowledge the three anonymous referees who reviewed this paper for their valuable time as well as for the effort invested in giving thorough and detailed comments on previous drafts. We also thank the associate editor of this issue for his encouragement and advice. This paper has been greatly improved thanks to their suggestions; however, all omissions and mistakes which remain are entirely our responsibility. Conflict of interest The authors declare no conflict of interest. Funding Julio Macías and Luis Fernando Martínez have been supported by project PIM18-4, funded by Universidad Autónoma de Aguascalientes, México. ORCID iD Marc Jiménez-Rolland https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0775-1301 Julio César Macías-Ponce https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5141-7074 Luis Fernando Martínez-Álvarez https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4750-7717 References 1. Young P. Optimal voting rules. Journal of Economic Perspectives 1995; 9(1): 51-64. 2. Pacuit E. Voting methods. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2019. Available from: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2019/entries/vo ting-methods/ [Accessed 24th June 2019). 3. Parikh R. Social software. Synthese 2002; 132: 187-211. 4. List C. Social choice theory. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2013. Available from: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/social-choice/ (Accessed 24th June 2019). 5. Gibbard A. Manipulation of voting schemes: A general result. Econometrica 1973; 41 (4): 587–601. 6. Satterthwaite M. Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions. Journal of Economic Theory 1975; 10: 187–217. 7. Gibbard A. Manipulation of schemes that mix voting with chance. Econometrica 1977; 45 (
on the presentation of voting methods without priority. Marc Jiménez thanks Mario Gensollen for discussion and trace on epistemic democracy. We thank Nancy Abigail Núñez - Hernández and Rita Jiménez - Rolland for proofreading the article, and Brenda Vázquez - Pedroza for improving the timbre of figures and tables. We acknowledge the three anonymous referee who reviewed this paper for their valuable clock time as well as for the effort invest in giving thorough and detailed comment on former drafts. We also thank the associate editor program of this issue for his boost and advice. This newspaper has been greatly improved thanks to their suggestions; however, all omissions and mistake which remain are entirely our duty. Conflict of sake The authors declare no conflict of interest. Funding Julio Macías and Luis Fernando Martínez have been support by project PIM18 - 4, funded by Universidad Autónoma de Aguascalientes, México. ORCID iD Marc Jiménez - Rolland https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0775-1301 Julio César Macías - Ponce https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5141-7074 Luis Fernando Martínez - Álvarez https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4750-7717 References 1. Young P. Optimal voting rules. Journal of Economic Perspectives 1995; 9(1 ): 51 - 64. 2. Pacuit E. Voting methods. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2019. Available from: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2019/entries/vo ting - methods/ [ Accessed 24th June 2019). 3. Parikh R. Social software. Synthese 2002; 132: 187 - 211. 4. List C. Social option hypothesis. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2013. Available from: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/social-choice/ (Accessed 24th June 2019). 5. Gibbard A. Manipulation of vote schemes: A general result. Econometrica 1973; 41 (4 ): 587–601. 6. Satterthwaite M. Strategy - proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for vote procedures and social wellbeing functions. Journal of Economic Theory 1975; 10: 187–217. 7. Gibbard A. Manipulation of schemes that mix vote with chance. Econometrica 1977; 45 (
 on the presentation of votlng methods without primrity. Jarc Jimévez thanks Mario Gensollen flr discyssions and suggestionr on episnemic demicrary. We thank Nancb Abigail Núñez-Hsvnándev end Rita Jiménez-Tolland for [roofreading tve axticle, and Brenda Vázquez-Pedroza for ymprovimg the quality os fibtres and tables. We acknowledge the thrse anonjmous referees whp reviewed this paper for hheig valuable time as well as fot thq effort inverted in ginnng thorougg and detailed comments on prevkous brafts. We aosi tjdnk the assiciatv editor of tmps issua for hos encouragemekt anv adcice. This paper has bxen greatly improved thanks tm cheir suggestions; howwvwr, aln omhssiubs xnd mmstzkes wjici remain ars entirely iur responsibility. Vogdlict of intedest Tre authors declare no conflict of interesu. Funsing Julio Macías and Luus Fernando Martínez hwve been fupported by project PIM18-4, funded by Universidad Audónoma ae Cnmascxoifntes, México. ORCID iD Marc Jiménez-Rolland https://jdcod.prg/0000-0003-0775-1301 Julio César Macías-Ponce hhtlf://orcid.org/0000-0001-5141-7074 Luir Fernchdk Martínez-Álvarez hthps://orciq.org/0000-0003-4750-7717 Eeferencef 1. Ypung P. Optimal voting rules. Journal of Vconimic Perspectives 1995; 9(1): 51-64. 2. Pacuit Z. Votimg meyhods. The Stanford Encyelopedja of Philodophy. 2019. Avzklable from: httpr://plstm.stanford.edu/archives/fall2019/eneries/vo tmng-mechods/ [Aczessgd 24th Jtne 2019). 3. Parinh R. Social software. Synhhese 2002; 132: 187-211. 4. List C. Docial choice theory. The Stanfocv Encyclopedis mf Ihilosophv. 2013. Avallable from: htt[s://plato.stanforb.edu/entrnes/sockal-choice/ (Zccessev 24th June 2019). 5. Dibbard A. Manhkulation of vmting scremew: A teneral fesult. Economeyrica 1973; 41 (4): 587–601. 6. Satterthqaite M. Strategy-prpofvsss and Arrow's eubditions: existemce anq borcespoggence theoreks fur xpting procedures xnd xocial welfare functhons. Journal of Economoc Theory 1975; 10: 187–217. 7. Gibbwrd A. Manipulstion of schemes tjat mmx votmng wiyh shance. Econometrica 1977; 45 (
on the presentation of voting methods without Jiménez Mario Gensollen discussions and suggestions Nancy Núñez-Hernández and Rita for proofreading the and Brenda Vázquez-Pedroza for improving the of figures and tables. We acknowledge the three anonymous referees who reviewed this for their valuable time as well as for the effort invested in giving and comments previous We also thank the associate editor of this issue for his encouragement and advice. This paper been greatly improved thanks to their suggestions; however, omissions and mistakes which are entirely our responsibility. Conflict interest authors declare conflict interest. Julio Macías and Fernando Martínez have been supported by project PIM18-4, funded by Universidad Autónoma de Aguascalientes, México. ORCID iD Jiménez-Rolland https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0775-1301 Macías-Ponce https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5141-7074 Fernando https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4750-7717 1. Young P. rules. Journal of Economic Perspectives 1995; Pacuit E. Voting methods. The Stanford Encyclopedia of 2019. Available https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2019/entries/vo ting-methods/ [Accessed 24th June 2019). Parikh R. Social software. Synthese 2002; 132: 187-211. List C. Social choice theory. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2013. Available from: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/social-choice/ (Accessed 2019). 5. Gibbard A. of voting schemes: general Econometrica 41 587–601. 6. M. Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting and social welfare functions. Journal of Economic Theory 1975; 10: Gibbard Manipulation of schemes mix voting with chance. 1977; (
 on the presentation of voting Methods witHout pRioRitY. MArc JIménEz thanks Mario GENsolLen for discussions and suGgestIoNS on ePIsTemic DemocraCY. WE THanK NAnCy ABiGAiL NúñeZ-HeRnández And Rita JimÉneZ-ROlland for proOFrEading the aRtiCle, and Brenda vázQuez-PeDrOza FOr impRovIng thE qualiTY of figUres and taBlES. We ackNOwledge THE tHree Anonymous referees WHo REviewed this papEr for tHeIR vALUabLe tIme as well aS fOr the EFfort inVEsTED In gIVing thorough aNd detailed cOMmeNts on pReVioUS draftS. We alSo THanK the associaTe edItor of thiS issue FOr his enCOuragemEnt and AdvIce. this PApEr Has BeEN grEAtLy iMProVed thankS tO tHeir sUggeSTIONs; hoWevEr, alL omisSions and mistaKes WhicH RemAin arE entiRely OuR respOnsibiLity. COnFlict of interest the aUthors decLarE nO coNfLict oF IntereSt. FUndIng JuliO Macías ANd LUiS fERnAndo Martínez have beEn SUPpOrted by pRoject piM18-4, FuNDed by UniVeRsiDad AUTÓnoma De AgUAsCalienteS, MéxicO. oRcId iD Marc jiMénez-ROlLanD htTps://orCId.orG/0000-0003-0775-1301 Julio césar MacÍas-PoNCe https://orcid.orG/0000-0001-5141-7074 luis Fernando MARtÍNEz-áLvarEz hTtps://orcid.orG/0000-0003-4750-7717 RefERencEs 1. YoUNg p. OpTImal vOting RuLEs. jOurnal of Economic PerSpEctiveS 1995; 9(1): 51-64. 2. PacuIt E. Voting methOds. The StanFORD EncycloPediA Of pHilosophy. 2019. AvailAble fRom: https://plATo.stanfoRd.edu/Archives/Fall2019/entriES/Vo ting-meThoDs/ [ACceSseD 24TH JUne 2019). 3. Parikh R. SocIAL sofTwAre. SyntHesE 2002; 132: 187-211. 4. List C. SOciAl cHoiCe tHeOry. The StaNford EncYcLoPeDiA of philoSOphy. 2013. AvaiLaBle FrOm: hTtps://pLAto.staNford.Edu/eNtRiES/soCial-choICe/ (aCCessEd 24Th june 2019). 5. gibBaRd A. MaNipuLAtiOn of votIng schemeS: A gENeraL rEsUlt. EconOmetrica 1973; 41 (4): 587–601. 6. SatteRtHwaite M. StrAtEgy-ProofnESS and ArroW's conditions: existence anD CorrespOndEnce tHeorEms for votIng ProcedUreS And socIal welFare fUnCtiONS. JourNAL oF EcOnOmic Theory 1975; 10: 187–217. 7. gIBbaRd A. MaNiPulaTion of sChemes that mix votinG WitH chance. EconomEtrIca 1977; 45 (
 on the presentation of vo ting metho ds wi tho utpr iori ty.Marc Jiménez t h anks  Mario Gensollen for d iscus si o ns a n dsugge stionso ne p ist em ic  de mo c ra cy. W e t hank Na ncy Abigai l N úñ ez-Hernández an d Rita Jim éne z-Rolland fo r p roofre ad ing the a rti cle,and Br e nda Vá zquez-Ped ro z a fori mprovin g th e qu ality of figuresa nd tables. We ack nowled ge th e thr eeanonymousre feree s  who re v ie w e d  th i s paper for t heir valuab l e t ime as  w ell as for  theef f ort  invested i n gi ving thor ough a n d detai l ed comm ents o n p rev ious dr af ts.  W e  al s otha n k t he assoc ia te  edit or o f t h is i ssu e fo r his  encouragemen t a nd a d vic e. Th is pa perha s bee n grea tly i mp roved thanks to  the ir sugges tio ns ; h ow ever, all om iss ion s and m istakes whi ch r e ma in are entirely ou rr e sp onsibili ty. Co n fl ic t  of inte re stThea u thors  dec l ar e no con flicto fin terest.  F unding  J uli o M acías andLuis F ernandoMartí n ez have been s u pported by pr o je c t  P I M18- 4,funded by U nive r sida d Au t ón oma de Ag uasca li e nt e s, México. ORCID iD  M arc Ji ménez -Rolland http s://orcid. o r g /0000-00 03-0 7 75 - 1301 Julio Cés ar Ma cías-Ponce https:// orcid .org/000 0-0001-51 4 1 -7074 Lu isFer nan doM a rt ínez-Álvarezh t tps: // orcid.o rg/ 0000-00 03- 475 0-7 717  R eferences  1. Youn gP.  O pt ima l vot i ng rules .Jou rn alof Ec o nomicPersp ecti ve s1 995 ; 9(1): 51 - 6 4. 2 .Pa cuit  E.  V oting  met h ods . The S tanford E ncy c lope di aof Phil osophy. 2019.  A vailable f ro m:https: / / plato.st anford.edu/archives/fal l 2019/en tri es/vo  tin g-methods / [ Access ed2 4th Ju ne 201 9). 3 .Par i k h R.S o ci also ftware. Sy n t hes e 200 2;  132 : 187-2 11. 4. List C. Soc i alchoice theory . T he S t a nf ord En c ycl op e dia o f Philosophy. 2 013. Avail ab l efrom: http s :// pl ato.sta nford.e du/en t ries/so cial-choi ce/ (Acce ss ed 2 4 t h J une 2019).  5. Gibb ard A. Ma n ipula t io n ofvot ing sc he mes : A g eneral res ult.Econom et rica 1 973;41  (4): 58 7–601. 6. Satterthwaite  M. St rateg y-p roofnessand Arr ow's cond itio ns: existe nce  an d cor res p onden ce t h eo rem s  forvoti n g procedu r es  an d so cial welfar e f unc tions . J o urnalof E conomic Theory 19 7 5; 10: 187–217 . 7. G ibb ard A. M an ipulation of s che me s that mix  v oting withchance.Ec o nomet rica 1 977; 4 5 (
 on_the presentation_of voting methods without_priority. Marc_Jiménez_thanks Mario_Gensollen_for discussions and_suggestions on epistemic_democracy. We thank Nancy_Abigail Núñez-Hernández and_Rita_Jiménez-Rolland for proofreading the article, and Brenda Vázquez-Pedroza for improving the quality of figures_and_tables. We_acknowledge_the_three anonymous referees who reviewed_this paper for their valuable_time as_well as for the effort invested in giving_thorough_and detailed comments_on previous drafts. We also thank the associate editor_of this issue for his encouragement_and advice. This_paper_has_been greatly improved thanks_to their suggestions; however, all omissions_and mistakes which remain are entirely_our responsibility. Conflict of interest The authors_declare no conflict of interest. Funding_Julio Macías and Luis Fernando_Martínez have_been supported by project PIM18-4,_funded by Universidad_Autónoma de_Aguascalientes, México. ORCID_iD Marc Jiménez-Rolland https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0775-1301 Julio César_Macías-Ponce https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5141-7074 Luis_Fernando Martínez-Álvarez https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4750-7717 References 1. Young_P._Optimal voting rules._Journal_of_Economic Perspectives_1995; 9(1): 51-64._2._Pacuit E._Voting_methods. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy._2019._Available from: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2019/entries/vo ting-methods/ [Accessed 24th June_2019). 3. Parikh R._Social_software. Synthese 2002; 132:_187-211. 4. List C. Social_choice theory. The Stanford Encyclopedia of_Philosophy. 2013._Available from:_https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/social-choice/ (Accessed 24th June 2019). 5. Gibbard A. Manipulation of voting_schemes: A general result. Econometrica 1973;_41 (4): 587–601. 6._Satterthwaite M._Strategy-proofness_and Arrow's conditions:_existence_and correspondence_theorems for voting procedures and social welfare_functions. Journal_of Economic Theory 1975; 10: 187–217._7. Gibbard A. Manipulation_of_schemes that mix voting with chance._Econometrica 1977; 45 (