 as an attempt to "strip the reality of the appearances covering it like a veil, in order to see the bare reality itself" (1906, 7), the physicist aiming to explain "the appearances" has to accept that there is some distinct'reality' behind them and that the task of science is to reveal it. Outside such a framework, as Duhem puts it, "the search for a physical explanation could not be conceived" (1906, 9). Thus, the success of an explanation can only be assessed on the prior adoption of a given metaphysics. To explain is therefore to step outside of physics, and to subordinate a physical theory to a metaphysics that alone can deliver the standards of evaluation of a successful explanation. For Duhem, not only does this way of proceeding misrepresent the aim and object of physical theories, but it also ruins the possibility for an autonomous physics. Notably, he blames Descartes for having breached "the barrier between physics and metaphysics" (1893a, 44). The Cartesian project to reconstruct the whole edifice of knowledge on secure and indubitable principles implies that physics rests on hypotheses not obtained through scientific methods and as such not belonging to science, but to metaphysics. But his criticism of Descartes bears as much on his extreme hypothetico-deductivism as on his use of mechanical hypotheses. Instead of merely translating into mathematical symbols the physical concepts appearing in experimental laws, the Cartesian physicist adds constraints on the choice of properties and admits no simple property other than motion, size, shape. Duhem argues that the imposition of these conditions on the physical theory will result in an extraordinary complexity: The (...) inconvenience of such a method is that in restricting the number of elements that may be used in constructing the representation of a group of laws, physicists are left with no other resource than to complicate the combinations they make with these elements in order to respond to all of the demands of experimentation (1892a, 13). Disentangling the two Parts of the Theory Explanations should be banned from ideal physical theories, according to Duhem. In fact, he found energetics, qua a rival of atomism, to be as close to this ideal as possible. Far from looking for the "revelation of the true nature of matter", energetics was taken to operate by general principles (like the principle of conservation of energy) under which experimental laws are subsumed. These principles, as Duhem put it, were "pure postulates
as an attempt to " strip the reality of the appearances cover it like a humeral veil, in order to see the bare world itself " (1906, 7), the physicist aiming to explain " the appearances " have to accept that there is some distinct'reality' behind them and that the task of science is to reveal it. Outside such a model, as Duhem puts it, " the search for a physical explanation could not be conceived " (1906, 9). Thus, the achiever of an explanation can only be assessed on the anterior adoption of a give metaphysics. To excuse is therefore to step outside of physics, and to subordinate a forcible theory to a metaphysics that alone can deliver the standards of evaluation of a successful explanation. For Duhem, not only make this way of proceeding misrepresent the aim and object of physical theory, but it also ruins the possibility for an autonomous physics. Notably, he blames Descartes for having breached " the barrier between physics and metaphysics " (1893a, 44). The Cartesian project to reconstruct the whole edifice of knowledge on secure and indubitable principles implies that physics remainder on hypotheses not obtained through scientific method acting and as such not belong to science, but to metaphysics. But his criticism of Descartes bears as a lot on his extreme hypothetico - deductivism as on his use of mechanical guess. Instead of merely translating into numerical symbols the physical concepts appearing in experimental laws, the Cartesian physicist adds constraints on the choice of properties and admits no simple property early than motion, size, supreme headquarters allied powers europe. Duhem argue that the imposition of these conditions on the physical theory will result in an extraordinary complexity: The (...) troublesomeness of such a method is that in restricting the number of elements that may be used in constructing the representation of a group of laws, physicists are leave with no other resource than to complicate the combination they make with these elements in ordering to respond to all of the demand of experimentation (1892a, 13). comb the two Parts of the Theory Explanations should be banned from ideal forcible theories, according to Duhem. In fact, he found energetics, qua a rival of atomism, to be equally close to this ideal as possible. Far from looking for the " revelation of the true nature of matter ", energetics was taken to operate by general principles (like the principle of conservation of energy) under which experimental torah are subsumed. These principles, as Duhem arrange it, were " pure postulates
 as an attempt to "strip the reality of the appearences ckvering kt like a veil, in order to sxe tye baee reality itself" (1906, 7), thd physicidt aimint to wxplain "thx appearances" gws tm accept that tmere is soma distinct'realhth' yehind them and that the task of sciqnce is tl reveal it. Oujside fuch a framework, as Duhem puts it, "the aearch hor a physical rxplanation could not be clncelved" (1906, 9). Thus, the sufcess of an expjqnation can unly be assessed on thg prior adoption of a given metaohysies. To explaun is jherefore to step outside of inysics, and to subordinate a phbsicql theory to a metaphbsics that alone can deliver dhz standards of evaluariin of a sgccerwfuu espkahation. Foc Duhem, not only does rhis way of proceedond misrepresent the aym and object of physical theories, but it alao ruins the possibilitt for an autonomous pjysics. Noeably, he blames Descartes for having breached "the barrmef bttqeen oyydics and metaphysics" (1893a, 44). The Cartesian project fo rvconstruct the whjle edifice ov lgowledge on sgcure aus jndubitable princioles imklies rhat physycs tests on hypotheses not obtqined througk sxientific methods cnd as such uot bekongimg to science, but to mecaphysjcs. But his criticisj of Descartes bexrs av much on his extreme hypoehetico-devuctirism as un hos use of mechanlcal mfpotheses. Instead lf metely tsanslating into mathematical symbols the 'iysical concekts apiearing iu expevimental laws, tre Cartesian pkysicist adds constrainns on the choice of [roperties ang admits no smmple pro[ertt otyer thav motion, size, snape. Duhem argues tyat the imposition of fhese conditionw ob the physical yheury wpll rqvult in an eftraurdkmary zomplexity: Bhe (...) invonvenience of such d mefhod is that in rextvicting tye numbew of elements that may be used ln coistrucving tne tepresentation of a group of lass, physiclstf are left wyth ko ojher resouree than to complicate the combinations tiey make with these elgments in order to rexkond to all oh the qemands ox experimentation (1892a, 13). Disentangling tht two Parts of the Theody Expnanatlons should be banned from ideal physical theories, according to Duhem. In dact, hx sound energsticx, qua a xival os atloism, to be as clpse to this ideal as possible. Fer from lomknng for the "revelation of the tfue nature of matter", energetics was tzken to pperate by general principles (loke the principle of conxervatiob of snergy) undxr which experimentak laws are wubsumee. Thcse principles, as Dmhem put ih, wece "'ure postulates
as an attempt to "strip the reality appearances it like veil, in order itself" 7), the physicist to explain "the has to accept that there is distinct'reality' behind them and that the task of science is to reveal it. such a framework, as Duhem puts it, "the search for a physical explanation not conceived" 9). the success of an explanation can only be assessed on the prior adoption of a given To explain is therefore to step outside of and to subordinate a theory to a metaphysics that can the standards evaluation a explanation. For Duhem, only does this way of proceeding misrepresent the aim and object of physical theories, but it also the possibility autonomous physics. he Descartes having breached "the physics and metaphysics" (1893a, 44). The reconstruct the whole edifice of knowledge on secure indubitable principles that physics rests on hypotheses not through scientific methods and as such not belonging science, but to metaphysics. But his criticism of Descartes bears as much on his extreme on his use of hypotheses. Instead of translating mathematical the concepts appearing experimental laws, the Cartesian physicist adds constraints on the choice of and admits no simple property other than motion, size, shape. that imposition of these on the physical theory result an extraordinary complexity: The of a in the of elements that may used in constructing the representation a group of laws, other resource than to complicate the combinations they with these elements in order to respond all of the demands of experimentation (1892a, 13). Disentangling the two Parts the Theory be banned from ideal physical theories, according to In fact, he found qua a rival of atomism, to be as close this as possible. from looking for "revelation of the nature of matter", taken to by principles of conservation of energy) under which laws subsumed. These principles, as Duhem it, postulates
 as an attempt to "strip the realIty of the apPearaNceS coVeRing It liKe a veil, in order TO see The bare reality itself" (1906, 7), thE physIcISt aiMInG to exPlain "thE ApPEAraNcEs" Has To ACcEpt thAt tHere is sOme distincT'reAlIty' behind theM AnD that the taSk oF science is to RevEal it. OUtSidE Such a FraMeworK, as DuhEM puts iT, "the searcH fOR a physICal explANAtIon cOuld not be conceiveD" (1906, 9). thUS, the success of aN explaNaTIoN CAn oNly Be assessed On The prIOr adoptIOn OF A GivEN metaphysics. TO explain is tHEreFore to StEp oUTside oF physIcS, And To subordinaTe a pHysical thEory to A MetaphySIcs that Alone cAn dEliVer tHE sTaNdaRdS Of eVAlUatIOn oF a succesSfUl ExplaNatiON. fOR DuhEm, nOt onLy doeS this way of proCeeDing MIsrEpresEnt thE aim AnD objeCt of phYsicaL tHeories, but it alsO ruiNs the possIbiLiTy fOr An autONomous PhySicS. NotablY, he blamES DeScARTEs For having breached "tHe BARrIer betweEn physICs AnD MetaphysIcS" (1893a, 44). THe CaRTEsian ProjECt To reconsTruct tHE wHoLe edifiCe Of knowLeDge On sEcure ANd inDubitaBle princIples IMplies that physICs rests on hypoTHeSES nOT obtAinEd through scIentIFic mEthoDS aNd aS Such nOt belOnGInG To science, but to metapHySics. BuT his cRiticism of DesCartes bearS AS Much on hiS extREmE Hypothetico-dedUctivIsm as on his USe of mechAnicaL hypotheSes. InsteaD OF merely tRanSlaTinG inTO MaThematical symBOLs thE pHysical ConCepts apPeaRinG in ExpErImental laWs, the CarTeSiAn PhYsiCist aDDs constrAiNts On The ChoicE Of propErtieS and AdMiTS no Simple pROpERTy otHeR tHan mOtiOn, Size, sHape. dUheM argues That the imPosITion Of ThEse condItions on the phYsIcal theory WiLl rEsult iN AN extraorDinary complexity: The (...) incoNVeniencE of Such a MethOd is that iN reStrictIng THe numbEr of elEmentS tHat MAY be usED In ConStRucting the REPreSentaTiOn of A group oF laws, physicists are LEft With no other reSouRce tHAN tO coMPlICatE tHE coMBInations they makE with these ElEMeNts in order TO reSpOnd to alL of the dEmandS Of experImentatioN (1892a, 13). DisentaNgLing THE twO Parts of thE Theory EXplanatioNS shouLD bE bannEd fRom ideAl PhySical TheoriES, acCordiNg to DuHeM. In facT, he foUnD energetIcs, qua a rival of atomism, to Be as clOse to ThiS ideal as pOssIBle. far from loOkinG for the "revElaTioN of thE trUE natuRe of MAtTer", ENergeTics WAs taken to OPeRatE BY gEneral princIPLEs (lIke thE prINciple Of coNservation of energY) Under which expeRimeNTAl lAws ARe suBsUmed. These princIplEs, AS duhem put It, Were "pure posTulates
 as an attempt to "strip t he reality  of t heapp ea ranc es c overing it lik e  a v eil, in order to see t he ba re real i ty  itse lf" (19 0 6, 7 ),th ephy si c is t aim ing  to exp lain "theapp ea rances" hast oaccept tha t t here is some  di stinct 'r eal i ty' b ehi nd th em and that t he task o fs cience is to r e v ea l it . Outside such af ra m ework, as Duhe m puts  i t ," t hesea rch for aph ysica l  explan a ti o n cou l d not be conc eived" (190 6 , 9 ). Thu s,  th e  succe ss of  a n  ex planation c an o nly be as sessed on thep rior ad option  of  agive n  m et aph ys i cs. To  ex p lai n is the re fo re to  ste p o u tsid e o f ph ysics , and to subo rdi nate a p hysic al th eory  t o a m etaphy sicsth at alone can de live r the sta nda rd s o fevalu a tion o f a  su ccessfu l expla n ati on . F or  Duhem, not only d oe s th is way o f proc e ed in g  misrepr es ent  the a im an d ob j ec t of phy sicalt he or ies, bu tit als orui nsthe p o ssib ilityfor an a utono m ous physics. N o tably, he bla m es D es c arte s f or having b reac h ed " theb ar rie r  betw een p hy s ic s  and metaphysics" ( 18 93a, 4 4). T he Cartesianproject to r e construc t th e  w h ole edifice of  know ledge on s e cure and  indu bitableprinciple s impliestha t p hys ics r es ts on hypothe s e s no tobtaine d t hroughsci ent ifi c m et hods andas suchno tbe lo ngi ng to science,  b utto  me taphy s ics. B ut hi s cr it ic i smof Desc a rt e s  bea rs  a s mu chon  hisextr e mehypothe tico-dedu cti v ismas  o n his u se of mechani ca l hypothes es . I nstead o f merely  translating into mathe m aticalsym bolsthephysicalcon ceptsapp e aringin exp erime nt all a ws, t h e  C art es ian physic i s t a dds c on stra ints on  the choice of pro p ert ies and admit s n o si m p le  pr o pe r tyot h ert h an motion, size , shape. D uh e margues tha t  th eimposit ion ofthese conditi ons on th e physica ltheo r y  wi ll resultin an ex traordina r y com p le xity:  Th e (... )inc onven ienceo f s uch a  metho dis tha t inre strictin g the number of element s that  maybeused in c ons t ruc ting therepr esentation  of  agroup  of laws,  phy s ic ist s  areleft with no o t he r r e s ou rce than to c o mpl icate  th e  combi nati ons they make wit h  these element s in o rde r t o  res po nd to all of t hede m a nds of e xp erimentatio n (1892a ,1 3). D isenta ngling  the tw o Pa r ts oftheThe ory Expla nat io n s shoul dbe banned  fro midealphysic a l th e o ries, accordingto Du h e m. In fac t, he  f ound en e rget ics, qua a  rival of a tomism , to  be a s close  t o this  id ea l as possi b le. Far f rom l ookingfo r th e " revela tion o f the  tru enat ure of ma t t er " ,en e rge tics  wasta kento operat e  by gene ral princip le s ( l i ke the pr i n ciple of c ons ervat i o n of energ y ) un d er which  exper imenta l lawsa resu bsumed.  Th e s e princip les, as D u hem  p ut i t, were"p urepo stu la tes
 as_an attempt_to "strip the reality_of the_appearances_covering it_like_a veil, in_order to see_the bare reality itself"_(1906, 7), the_physicist_aiming to explain "the appearances" has to accept that there is some distinct'reality' behind_them_and that_the_task_of science is to reveal_it. Outside such a framework,_as Duhem_puts it, "the search for a physical explanation_could_not be conceived"_(1906, 9). Thus, the success of an explanation can_only be assessed on the prior_adoption of a_given_metaphysics._To explain is therefore_to step outside of physics, and_to subordinate a physical theory to_a metaphysics that alone can deliver the_standards of evaluation of a successful_explanation. For Duhem, not only_does this_way of proceeding misrepresent the_aim and object_of physical_theories, but it_also ruins the possibility for an_autonomous physics. Notably,_he blames Descartes for having breached_"the_barrier between physics_and_metaphysics"_(1893a, 44)._The Cartesian project_to_reconstruct the_whole_edifice of knowledge on secure and_indubitable_principles implies that physics rests on hypotheses_not obtained through scientific_methods_and as such not_belonging to science, but to_metaphysics. But his criticism of Descartes_bears as_much on_his extreme hypothetico-deductivism as on his use of mechanical hypotheses. Instead_of merely translating into mathematical symbols_the physical concepts appearing_in experimental_laws,_the Cartesian physicist_adds_constraints on_the choice of properties and admits no_simple property_other than motion, size, shape. Duhem_argues that the imposition_of_these conditions on the physical theory_will result in an extraordinary complexity:_The (...) inconvenience of such_a_method_is that in restricting the_number of elements that may be_used in constructing_the representation of a group of laws,_physicists_are left with no other resource_than_to complicate the combinations they make_with_these_elements in order to respond_to all of the demands of_experimentation (1892a, 13). Disentangling the two Parts of the_Theory Explanations should_be banned from ideal physical_theories,_according_to Duhem. In fact, he found energetics, qua a rival_of atomism,_to be as_close to this ideal as possible. Far from looking for_the "revelation of the true nature of_matter", energetics was taken to operate by general principles (like the_principle of conservation of energy) under which experimental_laws are subsumed. These principles, as Duhem_put it, were "pure_postulates