 he argues that the arrangements proposed by justice as fairness indeed secure citizens' self-respect.3 He concludes that those arrangements are, to that extent, just. Rawls's critics claim that this argument breaks down because the attitude Rawls identifies as a primary social good, and hence as necessary for agents to achieve their ends, is not the same attitude as the one he shows his principles to promote.4 The former attitude consists in believing one's conception of the good to have value; the latter consists in recognizing one's equal standing as a citizen. So, Rawls has not shown 3 For a discussion of the ways in which Rawls's two principles of distributive justice support citizens' self-respect see Cohen 1989. 4 Though there are subtle differences in meaning between such terms as "support," "promote," "secure," "advance," and the like, for stylistic reasons, I use these interchangeably when discussing Rawls's idea that social arrangements and principles of justice can contribute to or detract from citizens' self-respect. OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 2/11/2012, SPi Rawlsian Self-Respect 239 that his principles ensure that citizens have the sense of worth they need to pursue their ends. Furthermore, the argument goes, this problem cannot be fixed because the attitude said to be supported by justice as fairness is not plausibly counted a primary social good: one need not recognize one's equal civil status in order to pursue one's ends. And, the attitude Rawls identifies as a primary social good is not plausibly supported by his principles of justice. While the equal distribution of liberty, for example, might help citizens recognize their equal civil status, it will not likely cause them to believe their conceptions of the good to be valuable. rawls's account of our sense of worth In A Theory of Justice, Rawls defines self-respect (or self-esteem-he uses the terms interchangeably) as follows: "First," he says, "... [I]t includes a person's sense of his own value, his secure conviction that his conception of the good, his plan of life, is worth carrying out. And second, selfrespect implies a confidence in one's ability, so far as it is within one's power, to fulfill one's intentions" (1971: 440). Later, in Political Liberalism, Rawls characterizes self-respect5 thusly: "Self-respect is rooted in our self-confidence as a fully cooper
he argues that the arrangements proposed by justice as paleness indeed guarantee citizens' self - respect.3 He concludes that those arrangements are, to that extent, precisely. Rawls's critics claim that this argument dampen down because the attitude Rawls identifies as a chief social good, and hence as necessary for agent to achieve their ends, is not the same position as the one he shows his principles to promote.4 The former attitude consists in believing one's conception of the commodity to have value; the latter consists in recognizing one's equal standing as a citizen. then, Rawls has not shown 3 For a discussion of the ways in which Rawls's two principle of distributive justice documentation citizens' self - respect see Cohen 1989. 4 Though there are subtle deviation in meaning between such terms as " support, " " promote, " " secure, " " advance, " and the alike, for stylistic reasons, I use these interchangeably when discussing Rawls's idea that social arrangements and principles of justice can contribute to or detract from citizens' self - esteem. OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 2/11/2012, SPi Rawlsian Self - Respect 239 that his principles see that citizen receive the sense of worth they necessitate to pursue their ends. Furthermore, the argument goes, this trouble cannot be fixed because the attitude said to be supported by justice as fairness is not plausibly counted a primary social good: one need not recognize one's equal civil condition in order to quest for one's end. And, the attitude Rawls identifies as a primary social commodity is not plausibly supported by his principles of justice. While the equal distribution of liberty, for example, might help citizens greet their equal civil condition, it will not likely cause them to believe their conceptions of the good to be valuable. rawls's history of our sense of worth In A hypothesis of Justice, Rawls defines self - respect (or self - admiration - he uses the terms interchangeably) as trace: " First, " he say, "... [ I]t includes a person's sense of his own value, his secure conviction that his conception of the good, his plan of life, is worth carry out. And second, selfrespect implies a assurance in one's ability, so far as it is within one's power, to fulfill one's intention " (1971: 440). Later, in Political Liberalism, Rawls characterizes self - respect5 thusly: " Self - respect is rooted in our self - confidence as a fully cooper
 he argues that the arrangeoents proposed yt justmce as rairness indeed secure citizens' self-cespwct.3 Ht concludes that thuse arranhements qre, uo that extent, just. Rawls's critjgs clcin that this arnument breans down becausa ghz attitude Rawls identifies as a priiary soviwl good, and hegce sf nedvswary for agents to achieve thsir endv, is not the xame attitude as the one hf shlws his principles to promote.4 The dormer attitjde consisus in believjng one's conception of the good to hcve value; tye lahjer consists in rvcognizing onc'x equan standong as a citizcn. So, Raqls has not shown 3 Foc a discussion of thg ways in fhnch Rawls's two principlws of disdribjrivd jhsvics supplrt citizens' aelf-respect see Cohen 1989. 4 Though trvte are subtls diffqrqnces in meaning between such terms as "vuplort," "promote," "secure," "advqnce," and the like, for stylistis reasons, I use these interchangeably when discusving Cadls'w ldea rhwt social arrangements and principles of justyde csn contribute bo or detract from cltoeens' self-respezt. OUP CODRECTED PROOF – FINWL, 2/11/2012, SPi Rawlwian Self-Wesprct 239 that his principles enwure that cinizebs have the sense lf worth thzy neec to lursue their ends. Furthzrmore, the argumejt goes, tgks problem cannog bv fifed because the attitude swid to be sup'orted bh juxtice ws fairnesd is kmt plausibly countfd a krimarf social glod: one need not recognize one's equal civil sjatgs pn order co purxue one's ends. And, the attitode Rawls idengifies as z primacy social gojd is not plagdibly supporved by hif prunciples of gustice. While yhe equal distributuon of liberty, for exxjple, might help ciuizens recognize thdir eeuel cidhl status, it wilu nuy likdly cause tmem to nelieve their concepdiona of the good to br yaluable. tawls's acsount of our xense of worth In W Themry of Jistyce, Rawls defines self-respect (kr self-esheei-he uses the terns interchanyeably) as follows: "First," he says, "... [I]t inclndes a person's sense of his own value, his xtcure convictmon thwt his cotception of the good, his plan of life, is worth carrying ouf. And veconf, selfrespect implies a confidence in one's ability, so far as it is within one's 'orer, to fulfjll pne's pntzntnons" (1971: 440). Jatec, mn Political Libegalism, Rawls characterizes self-rxspect5 thuvlv: "Self-respect is rooted in out relf-confidencg as a fully cooper
he argues that the arrangements proposed by fairness secure citizens' He concludes that extent, Rawls's critics claim this argument breaks because the attitude Rawls identifies as primary social good, and hence as necessary for agents to achieve their ends, not the same attitude as the one he shows his principles to promote.4 former consists believing conception of the good to have value; the latter consists in recognizing one's equal standing as citizen. So, Rawls has not shown 3 For discussion of the ways which Rawls's two principles of justice citizens' self-respect Cohen 4 there are subtle in meaning between such terms as "support," "promote," "secure," "advance," and the like, for stylistic reasons, I these interchangeably Rawls's idea social and of justice can or detract from citizens' self-respect. OUP FINAL, 2/11/2012, SPi Rawlsian Self-Respect 239 that his ensure that have the sense of worth they to pursue their ends. Furthermore, the argument goes, problem cannot be fixed because the attitude said to be supported by justice as fairness plausibly counted a primary good: one need recognize equal status order to one's ends. And, the attitude Rawls identifies as a primary social is not plausibly supported by his principles of justice. While distribution liberty, for example, help citizens recognize their civil it will not likely to their good be rawls's account of our of worth In A Theory Justice, Rawls defines self-respect interchangeably) as follows: "First," he says, "... [I]t a person's sense of his own value, secure conviction that his conception of the good, his plan of life, worth carrying second, selfrespect implies a confidence in one's ability, far as it is one's power, to fulfill one's intentions" (1971: 440). Later, Political Rawls characterizes thusly: "Self-respect is in our self-confidence a fully cooper
 he argues that the arrangemenTs proposed By jusTicE as FaIrneSs inDeed secure citiZEns' sElf-respect.3 He concludes tHat thOsE ArraNGeMents Are, to thAT eXTEnt, JuSt. rawLs'S CrItics ClaIm that tHis argumenT brEaKs down becausE ThE attitude RAwlS identifies aS a pRimary SoCiaL Good, aNd hEnce aS necesSAry for Agents to aChIEve theIR ends, is NOT tHe saMe attitude as the onE He SHows his principLes to pRoMOtE.4 tHe fOrmEr attitude CoNsistS In belieVInG ONE's cONception of the Good to have vALue; The latTeR coNSists iN recoGnIZinG one's equal sTandIng as a citIzen. So, rAwls has NOt shown 3 for a diScuSsiOn of THe WaYs iN wHIch rAwLs's TWo pRincipleS oF dIstriButiVE JUSticE suPporT citiZens' self-respeCt sEe CoHEn 1989. 4 THough There Are sUbTle diFferenCes in MeAning between sucH terMs as "suppoRt," "pRoMotE," "sEcure," "ADvance," And The Like, for StylistIC reAsONS, i uSe these interchangeAbLY WhEn discusSing RaWLs'S iDEa that soCiAl aRranGEMents And pRInCiples of JusticE CaN cOntribuTe To or deTrAct FroM citiZEns' sElf-resPect. OUP CoRRECteD PROOF – FINAL, 2/11/2012, SPI rawlsian Self-RESpECT 239 tHAt hiS prInciples ensUre tHAt ciTizeNS hAve THe senSe of wOrTH tHEy need to pursue their EnDs. FurtHermoRe, the argument Goes, this prOBLEm cannot Be fiXEd BEcause the attitUde saId to be suppORted by juStice As fairneSs is not plAUSibly couNteD a pRimAry SOCiAl good: one need NOT recOgNize one'S eqUal civiL stAtuS in OrdEr To pursue oNe's ends. ANd, ThE aTtItuDe RawLS identifIeS as A pRimAry soCIal gooD is noT plaUsIbLY suPported BY hIS PrinCiPlEs of JusTiCe. WhiLe thE EquAl distrIbution of LibERty, fOr ExAmple, miGht help citizeNs Recognize tHeIr eQual ciVIL status, iT will not likely cause them TO believE thEir coNcepTions of thE goOd to be ValUAble. raWls's acCount Of Our SENse of WORtH In a THeory of JusTICe, RAwls dEfInes Self-resPect (or self-esteem-he USes The terms interChaNgeaBLY) aS foLLoWS: "FiRsT," He sAYS, "... [I]t includes a perSon's sense oF hIS oWn value, his SEcuRe ConvictIon that His coNCeption Of the good, His plan of LiFe, is WORth Carrying ouT. And secoNd, selfresPEct imPLiEs a coNfiDence iN oNe's AbiliTy, so faR As iT is wiThin onE's Power, tO fulfIlL one's intEntions" (1971: 440). Later, in Political liberaLism, RAwlS characteRizES seLf-respect5 ThusLy: "Self-respEct Is rOoted In oUR self-ConfIDeNce AS a fulLy coOPer
 he argues that the arrang ements pro posed  by  ju st iceas f airness indeed secu re citizens' self-resp ect.3  H e  con c lu des t hat tho s ea r ran ge me nts  a r e,  to t hat  extent , just. Ra wls 's  critics cla i mthat thisarg ument breaks  do wn bec au set he at tit ude R awls i d entifi es as a p ri m ary so c ial goo d ,  a nd h ence as necessary fo r  agents to ach ieve t he i re n ds,  is  not the s am e att i tude as th e o neh e shows his p rinciples t o  pr omote. 4The former  atti tu d e c onsists inbeli eving one 's con c eptiono f the g ood to  ha vevalu e ;th e l at t erc on sis t s i n recogn iz in g one 's e q u a l  sta ndi ng a s a c itizen. So, R awl s ha s  no t sho wn 3Foradiscu ssionof th eways in which R awls 's two pr inc ip les  o f dis t ributi vejus tice su pport c i tiz en s ' se lf-respect see Coh en 1 98 9. 4 Tho ugh th e re  a r e subtle  d iff eren c e s inmean i ng  between  sucht er ms  as "su pp ort,""p rom ote ," "s e cure ," "ad vance,"and t h e like, for st y listic reason s ,I us e  the seinterchange ably when  dis c us sin g  Rawl s's i de a  t h at social arrangeme nt s andprinc iples of just ice can co n t r ibute to  ord et r act from citiz ens'self-respe c t. OUP C ORREC TED PROO F – FINAL , 2/11/201 2,SPi  Ra wls i a nSelf-Respect2 3 9 th at  his pr inc iples e nsu retha t c it izens hav e the se ns eof  w ort h the y  need to  p urs ue  th eir e n ds. Fu rther more ,th e  ar gumentg oe s ,  thi spr oble m c an not b e fi x edbecause  the atti tud e  sai dto  be sup ported by jus ti ce as fair ne ssis not p lausibly  counted a primary soci a l good:  on e nee d no t recogni zeone'sequ a l civi l stat us in  o rde r to pu r s ue  on e' s ends. An d ,  th e att it udeRawls i dentifies as a pri m ary  social goodisnotp l au sib l ys upp or t edb y  his principles  of justic e. Wh ile the eq u aldi stribut ion ofliber t y, forexample,might hel pciti z e nsrecognizetheir eq ual civil statu s ,it wi llnot li ke lycause  themt o b eliev e thei rconcep tions  o f the go od to be valuable. rawl s's ac count  of  our sens e o f  wo rth In ATheo ry of Just ice , R awlsdef i nes s elf- r es pec t  (orself - esteem-he us est h eterms inter c h a nge ably)  as follow s: " First," he says," ... [I]t inclu desa per son ' s se ns e of his own v alu e, h is secur econvictionthat his  c o ncept ion of  the g ood, hi s pl a n of l ife,  is  worth ca rry in g  out. A nd  s e cond,self re spectimplie s  a c o n fidence in one's  abil i t y, so far  as i tis with i n on e's power,  to fulfill  one's  int entio ns" (19 71 : 440) . L at er, in Pol i tical Lib erali sm, Raw ls  cha rac terize s se l f -resp ect5  t hus ly: "Self - r es p ec ti s r oote d inou r se lf-confid e nce as a  fu l ly coop er 
 he_argues that_the arrangements proposed by_justice as_fairness_indeed secure_citizens'_self-respect.3 He concludes_that those arrangements_are, to that extent,_just. Rawls's critics_claim_that this argument breaks down because the attitude Rawls identifies as a primary social_good,_and hence_as_necessary_for agents to achieve their_ends, is not the same_attitude as_the one he shows his principles to promote.4_The_former attitude consists_in believing one's conception of the good to have_value; the latter consists in recognizing_one's equal standing_as_a_citizen. So, Rawls has_not shown 3 For a discussion_of the ways in which Rawls's_two principles of distributive justice support citizens'_self-respect see Cohen 1989. 4 Though_there are subtle differences in_meaning between_such terms as "support," "promote,"_"secure," "advance," and_the like,_for stylistic reasons,_I use these interchangeably when discussing_Rawls's idea that_social arrangements and principles of justice_can_contribute to or_detract_from_citizens' self-respect._OUP CORRECTED PROOF_–_FINAL, 2/11/2012,_SPi_Rawlsian Self-Respect 239 that his principles_ensure_that citizens have the sense of worth_they need to pursue_their_ends. Furthermore, the argument_goes, this problem cannot be_fixed because the attitude said to_be supported_by justice_as fairness is not plausibly counted a primary social good: one_need not recognize one's equal civil_status in order to_pursue one's_ends._And, the attitude_Rawls_identifies as_a primary social good is not plausibly_supported by_his principles of justice. While the_equal distribution of liberty,_for_example, might help citizens recognize their_equal civil status, it will not_likely cause them to believe_their_conceptions_of the good to be_valuable. rawls's account of our sense_of worth In_A Theory of Justice, Rawls defines self-respect_(or_self-esteem-he uses the terms interchangeably) as_follows:_"First," he says, "... [I]t includes_a_person's_sense of his own value,_his secure conviction that his conception_of the good, his plan of life, is worth_carrying out. And_second, selfrespect implies a confidence_in_one's_ability, so far as it is within one's power, to_fulfill one's_intentions" (1971: 440)._Later, in Political Liberalism, Rawls characterizes self-respect5 thusly: "Self-respect is_rooted in our self-confidence as a fully_cooper