 way between the metaphysical view and the English (pragmatist/conventionalist) views, retaining from the pragmatist/empiricist view its criticism of the causal explanation of physical phenomena. The problem for him is how to construct a view of the nature of physical theory which methodologically rejects the search for causes without becoming, at the same time, a pragmatical view. The English School's assumption of the principle of underdetermination is a natural methodological resource against such an explanatory view of physical theory. Duhem's problem is to find a similar methodological resource which naturally rejects the causal view of physical theory (its realist component, the entities) without giving up the application of the principle of logical unity in physical theory, for logical unity is the core of Duhem's view of physical theory as a rational system and of his view of scientific growth as rational and continuous. The principle of logical unity presses the search for more and more comprehensive physical theories. Therefore, despite the epistemological and methodological differences between these two views of the synthetic method of constructing physical theory – one associated with the metaphysical/rationalist and the other with the pragmatic/empiricist view –, Duhem shows that neither can comply with the principle of the continuity of scientific development, nor with the aim of a unifying framework for the whole of physics (Duhem 1917, 152). In particular, he shows that the model-building method is not a rational method of constructing physical theory, and, accordingly, that any physical theory constructed by this method is not rational. One can sum up his criticisms of the synthetic method by saying that this method does not make scientific progress continuous. A physicist, says Duhem, "Will see [the physical theories constructed by the mechanistic method] constantly being reborn, but constantly aborted; [...] it will clearly appear to him that the physics of atomism, condemned to perpetual fresh starts, does not tend through continued progress to the ideal form of physical theory" (Duhem 1974, 304). Duhem also argues that it cannot comply with the principle of the logical unity of physics. He says that the attempt of the synthetic method to provide a unification of all empirical laws makes its explanation overburdened with arbitrary and bizarre combinations (Duhem 1974, 304). The Analytic Method: Description and Problems According to Duhem, the second attempt at explicating physical phenomena mechanically is carried out by the analytic approach (Duhem 1980, 96; Chiappin 1989, 57-80). This new attempt
way between the metaphysical view and the English (pragmatist / conventionalist) views, retaining from the pragmatist / empiricist see its criticism of the causal explanation of forcible phenomena. The problem for him is how to manufacture a opinion of the nature of physical theory which methodologically reject the search for causal agent without becoming, at the like meter, a pragmatical scene. The English School's assumption of the principle of underdetermination is a lifelike methodological resource against such an explanatory view of physical theory. Duhem's problem is to find a similar methodological resource which naturally rejects the causal position of physical theory (its realist component, the entity) without giving up the application of the rationale of logical one in physical hypothesis, for logical unity is the core of Duhem's view of forcible theory as a rational system and of his view of scientific growth as rational and continuous. The principle of logical unity presses the search for more and more comprehensive physical theories. Therefore, despite the epistemological and methodological differences between these two views of the synthetic method acting of construct physical hypothesis – one consociate with the metaphysical / positivist and the other with the pragmatic / empiricist view –, Duhem shows that neither can comply with the principle of the continuity of scientific development, nor with the aim of a unifying model for the whole of physics (Duhem 1917, 152). In particular, he shows that the model - building method is not a rational method of constructing physical theory, and, accordingly, that any forcible theory construct by this method acting is not intellectual. One can sum up his criticisms of the synthetic method by saying that this method does not make scientific progress continuous. A physicist, say Duhem, " Will see [ the physical theories constructed by the mechanistic method acting ] constantly being reborn, but constantly aborted; [... ] it will clearly appear to him that the physics of atomism, condemned to ageless fresh start, does not tend through continued advancement to the ideal form of physical hypothesis " (Duhem 1974, 304). Duhem also argues that it cannot comply with the principle of the logical unity of purgative. He says that the attempt of the synthetic method acting to provide a unification of all empirical laws construct its explanation overburdened with arbitrary and bizarre combinations (Duhem 1974, 304). The Analytic Method: Description and Problems accord to Duhem, the second attempt at explicating forcible phenomena mechanically is carried out by the analytic approach (Duhem 1980, 96; Chiappin 1989, 57 - 80). This new attempt
 waj between the metaphysicxl view and the Englisi (pragmztist/conxentionalist) views, retaining feom tye pragmatist/empiricisg view itd criticusm id the causem explakction lf pkywical phenomens. The probnem for him is huw to construct a view of the nature jf physocwl theory whicr meuhoqolofpcclly rejects the search for cauaes witiout becoming, ay the same time, a pragmatifal giew. The English Sfhool's assunptijb of the privciple of luderdetermihation is a natural methodologizal rzsource agaunwt doch an explaiatory view of physical thaory. Dunem's problem ix tm fund a similar methodonogical resource wrich natusamly rejects the cquwal vhew mf pftsizal tieody (its reelist compohent, the enrities) without givimg ll the applicztion jf the principle of logical unity in physpcal theory, for logical uniry is the core of Duhgm's view os physical theory as a rational system and of his view uf wclentkdif growth as rational and continuous. The princyllt on logical unity iresses the search flr iore and more comprzgehsive physical thelries. Trerefire, despiue thr epistemological and methoeological diyfeeences between thede two viewr of the xynthetic method of conrtrudting physifal theorg – one associated winh tve metaphysical/rationalist and the ithex with tfe ptagmatis/empiricish view –, Duhem shows that neitker cdn comply aith the principle of the contiinity of scienjifhc gevelopmznt, nov with the aim jf a unifying yrameworh for the whole of phyvics (Duhem 1917, 152). In particuldt, he shows thet the moqel-byildung metfud is not a rayional menhjd od constructing phyxicxm theory, and, aceuteingly, that anu pfysycwl traory construwted by yhis oethod is nig rayional. One can sum u[ hia criticisms of thr fynthetix method by saying thst this method doed not maye scoenjific progress continuous. A phyaicist, sajs Quhem, "Will sqe [tme prysical thzories constructed by the mechanistic mevhod] constantly being teborn, but constantly sborted; [...] it will clearly dppear to him that tye physics of atokism, condemned to perletual fresj starts, does not tend through continued progress to the ideal form of phtsical theory" (Duhej 1974, 304). Cuhem ajxo argtes vhet it cannot compky with the principle of the lojical unitf jf physics. He says that the stgempt of the rynthetic method to provjde a unofication of all empirical laws makes its explanation oyerburdenwd wifh arbpjracy and bizarre combimationv (Duhwm 1974, 304). Thw Anwlytic Method: Dexcviption anf Prpbmems According to Duhem, the secobd attwmot at explicatinj physical pmekomena mechagically is carrisd ohh by jhe analytic alproach (Duhem 1980, 96; Chiappin 1989, 57-80). This nef wttempt
way between the metaphysical view and the views, from the view its criticism physical The problem for is how to a view of the nature of theory which methodologically rejects the search for causes without becoming, at the same a pragmatical view. The English School's assumption of the principle of underdetermination is natural resource such explanatory view of physical theory. Duhem's problem is to find a similar methodological resource which naturally the causal view of physical theory (its realist the entities) without giving the application of the principle logical in physical for unity the core of view of physical theory as a rational system and of his view of scientific growth as rational continuous. The logical unity the for and more comprehensive Therefore, despite the epistemological and methodological two views of the synthetic method of constructing theory – associated with the metaphysical/rationalist and the with the pragmatic/empiricist view –, Duhem shows that can comply with the principle of the continuity of scientific development, nor with the aim unifying framework for the of physics (Duhem 152). particular, shows the model-building is not a rational method of constructing physical theory, and, accordingly, any physical theory constructed by this method is not rational. sum his criticisms of synthetic method by saying this does not make scientific A says [the theories by the mechanistic method] being reborn, but constantly aborted; it will clearly appear of atomism, condemned to perpetual fresh starts, does tend through continued progress to the ideal of physical theory" (Duhem 1974, 304). Duhem also argues that it cannot with the the logical unity of physics. He says that attempt of the synthetic to provide a unification of all empirical laws makes explanation with arbitrary bizarre combinations (Duhem 304). The Analytic Description and Problems Duhem, the attempt explicating is carried out by the analytic (Duhem 96; Chiappin 1989, 57-80). This attempt
 way between the metaphysical View and the engliSh (pRagMaTist/ConvEntionalist) vieWS, retAining from the pragmatisT/empiRiCIst vIEw Its crIticism OF tHE CauSaL eXplAnATiOn of pHysIcal pheNomena. The pRobLeM for him is how TO cOnstruct a vIew Of the nature oF phYsical ThEorY Which MetHodolOgicalLY rejecTs the searCh FOr causES withouT BEcOminG, at the same time, a prAGmATical view. The EnGlish SChOOl'S ASsuMptIon of the prInCiple OF underdETeRMINatIOn is a natural mEthodologicAL reSource AgAinST such aN explAnATorY view of physIcal Theory. DuhEm's proBLem is to FInd a simIlar meThoDolOgicAL rEsOurCe WHicH NaTurALly Rejects tHe CaUsal vIew oF PHYSicaL thEory (Its reAlist componenT, thE entITieS) withOut giVing Up The apPlicatIon of ThE principle of logIcal Unity in phYsiCaL thEoRy, for LOgical UniTy iS the corE of DuheM'S viEw OF PHySical theory as a ratiOnAL SyStem and oF his viEW oF sCIentific GrOwtH as rATIonal And cONtInuous. ThE princIPlE oF logicaL uNity prEsSes The SearcH For mOre and More compRehenSIve physical theORies. Therefore, DEsPITe THe epIstEmological aNd meTHodoLogiCAl DifFErencEs betWeEN tHEse two views of the synThEtic meThod oF constructing Physical thEORY – one assoCiatED wITh the metaphysiCal/raTionalist aND the otheR with The pragmAtic/empirICIst view –, DUheM shOws ThaT NEiTher can comply WITh thE pRinciplE of The contInuIty Of sCieNtIfic develOpment, noR wItH tHe Aim Of a unIFying fraMeWorK fOr tHe whoLE of phySics (DUhem 1917, 152). in PaRTicUlar, he sHOwS THat tHe MoDel-bUilDiNg metHod iS Not A rationAl method oF coNStruCtInG physicAl theory, and, acCoRdingly, thaT aNy pHysicaL THeory conStructed by this method is nOT rationAl. ONe can Sum uP his critiCisMs of thE syNThetic Method By sayInG thAT This mETHoD doEs Not make sciENTifIc proGrEss cOntinuoUs. A physicist, says DuHEm, "WIll see [the physIcaL theORIeS coNStRUctEd BY thE MEchanistic methoD] constantlY bEInG reborn, but COnsTaNtly aboRted; [...] it wIll clEArly appEar to him tHat the phySiCs of ATOmiSm, condemneD to perpeTual fresh STarts, DOeS not tEnd ThrougH cOntInued ProgreSS to The idEal forM oF physiCal thEoRy" (Duhem 1974, 304). DUhem also argues that it canNot comPly wiTh tHe principLe oF The Logical unIty oF physics. He SayS thAt the AttEMpt of The sYNtHetIC methOd to PRovide a unIFiCatION oF all empiricAL LAws Makes Its EXplanaTion Overburdened with aRBitrary and bizaRre cOMBinAtiONs (DuHeM 1974, 304). The Analytic MeThoD: DESCription AnD Problems AcCording tO DUHem, thE seconD attemPt at expLICaTIng phySicaL phEnomena meChaNiCAlly is cArRiED out by The aNaLytic aPproacH (duheM 1980, 96; cHiappin 1989, 57-80). This new atTempt
 way between the metaphysi cal view a nd th e E ngl is h (p ragm atist/conventi o nali st) views, retaining f rom t he prag m at ist/e mpirici s tv i ewit scri ti c is m ofthe  causal  explanati onof  physical ph e no mena. Thepro blem for him  is  how t ocon s truct  aviewof the nature  of physi ca l  theor y  whichm e th odol ogically rejectst he search for cau ses wi th o ut b eco min g, at thesa me ti m e, a pr a gm a t i cal view. The Eng lish School ' s a ssumpt io n o f  the p rinci pl e  of  underdeter mina tion is a  natur a l metho d ologica l reso urc e a gain s tsu chan exp l an ato r y v iew of p hy si cal t heor y . D uhem 'sprob lem i s to find a s imi larm eth odolo gical  res ou rce w hich n atura ll y rejects the c ausa l view of  ph ys ica ltheor y  (itsrea lis t compo nent, t h e e nt i t i es ) without giving u pt h eapplicat ion of th ep rinciple  o f l ogic a l  unit y in ph ysical t heory, fo rlogical  u nity i sthe  co re of Duhe m's vi ew of ph ysica l  theory as a r a tional system an d of hisvie w of scient ific grow th a s  r ati o nal a nd co nt i nu o us. The principle o flogica l uni ty presses th e search f o r more and  mor e  c o mprehensive ph ysica l theories .  Therefo re, d espite t he episte m o logicaland  me tho dol o g ic al difference s betw ee n these  tw o views  of  th e s ynt he tic metho d of con st ru ct in g p hysic a l theory  –  on eass ociat e d with  themeta ph ys i cal /ration a li s t  and  t he  oth erwi th th e pr a gma tic/emp iricist v iew –, D uh em  showsthat neitherca n comply w it h t he pri n c iple ofthe continuity of scien t ific de vel opmen t, n or with t heaim of  au nifyin g fram ework  f ort h e who l e  o f p hy sics (Duhe m 191 7, 15 2) . In  partic ular, he shows tha t  th e model-build ing  met h o disn ot a r at i ona l method of const ructing ph ys i ca l theory,a nd,  a ccordin gly, th at an y  physic al theory  construc te d by t his  method is  not rat ional. On e  cans um  up h iscritic is msof th e synt h eti c met hod by  s ayingthatth is metho d does not make scienti fic pr ogres s c ontinuous . A phy sicist, s aysDuhem, "Wi llsee  [the  ph y sical  the o ri esc onstr ucte d  by the m e ch ani s t ic  method] co n s t ant ly be ing reborn , bu t constantly abor t ed; [...] it w illc l ear lya ppea rto him that th e p hy s i cs of at om ism, condem ned to p er p etual  fresh  start s, does n ot tend t hrou ghcontinued  pr og r ess toth ei deal f ormof  physi cal th e ory" ( Duhem 1974, 304) . Duh e m  also arg ues t ha t it ca n notcomply wit h the princ iple o f th e log ical un it y of p hys ic s. He says that theattem pt of t he  syn the tic me thod t o pro vide  a  un ification o fa ll  e m pir ical  laws  m akes  its expl a nation o ver b urdened  w ith a rbitra r ya n d bizarrecom binat i o ns (Duhem1 974, 30 4 ). Th e Anal ytic M ethod:D esc ri ption a ndP r oblems Ac cording t o  Du he m, t he secon datte mp t a texplicating phy sical ph enomenam e chanic all y  isc arried  o ut by the an alyti ca pproach ( Duh em 1980 ,  96 ; C hia ppin  19 89,5 7-80). This new attempt
 way_between the_metaphysical view and the_English (pragmatist/conventionalist)_views,_retaining from_the_pragmatist/empiricist view its_criticism of the_causal explanation of physical_phenomena. The problem_for_him is how to construct a view of the nature of physical theory which_methodologically_rejects the_search_for_causes without becoming, at the_same time, a pragmatical view._The English_School's assumption of the principle of underdetermination is_a_natural methodological resource_against such an explanatory view of physical theory. Duhem's_problem is to find a similar_methodological resource which_naturally_rejects_the causal view of_physical theory (its realist component, the_entities) without giving up the application_of the principle of logical unity in_physical theory, for logical unity is_the core of Duhem's view_of physical_theory as a rational system_and of his_view of_scientific growth as_rational and continuous. The principle of_logical unity presses_the search for more and more_comprehensive_physical theories. Therefore,_despite_the_epistemological and_methodological differences between_these_two views_of_the synthetic method of constructing physical_theory_– one associated with the metaphysical/rationalist and_the other with the_pragmatic/empiricist_view –, Duhem shows_that neither can comply with_the principle of the continuity of_scientific development,_nor with_the aim of a unifying framework for the whole of physics_(Duhem 1917, 152). In particular, he_shows that the model-building_method is_not_a rational method_of_constructing physical_theory, and, accordingly, that any physical theory_constructed by_this method is not rational. One_can sum up his_criticisms_of the synthetic method by saying_that this method does not make_scientific progress continuous. A physicist,_says_Duhem,_"Will see [the physical theories_constructed by the mechanistic method] constantly_being reborn, but_constantly aborted; [...] it will clearly appear_to_him that the physics of atomism,_condemned_to perpetual fresh starts, does not_tend_through_continued progress to the ideal_form of physical theory" (Duhem 1974,_304). Duhem also argues that it cannot comply with_the principle of_the logical unity of physics._He_says_that the attempt of the synthetic method to provide a_unification of_all empirical laws_makes its explanation overburdened with arbitrary and bizarre combinations (Duhem_1974, 304). The Analytic Method: Description and_Problems According to Duhem, the second attempt at explicating physical phenomena_mechanically is carried out by the analytic approach_(Duhem 1980, 96; Chiappin 1989, 57-80). This_new attempt