 that y is one of Y whenever RXY. The converse is true too: if any counterpairing relates some object to two distinct objects, NO is not universally true.35 This is unsurprising, given that such counterpairings generate counterexamples to the necessity of identity: if one thought, concerning Russell, that Russell and he identical but could have failed to be, one would also naturally think, concerning Russell and Whitehead, that Russell is one of them but could have failed to be. If one rejected the necessity of existence, one might be worried about NO even if one had no doubts about the necessity of identity. Lewis, David Lewis' is analysed as '∃R∃x1(CR ∧ R(David Lewis, x1) ∧ x1, x1)', which is false, whereas 'Schmossibly Lavid Dewis, David Lewis' is analysed as '∃R∃x1∃x2(CR ∧ R(David Lewis, x1) ∧ R(Lavid Dewis, x2) ∧ x1, x2)', which is true if there is a counterpairing that includes two distinct ordered pairs having Lewis as first element. So'schmossibly' with those stipulated truth-conditions creates a quotation-like context, in which even expressions that are stipulated to be semantically equivalent cannot be substituted salva veritate. Our ordinary word 'possibly', by contrast, surely does not create a quotation-like context: the truth-value of ppossibly φq is sensitive only to semantic features of φ. While requiring counterpairings to be functions is one way to insure that the resulting operator is not quotation-like, it is not the only way. We could also explore an schema like Analysis F except that the list t1,..., tn is taken to stand for the possibly repeating list of token singular terms in φ, in order of occurrence. On this analysis, '^(Ft ∧ ¬Ft)' is equivalent to '∃R∃x1∃x2(CR ∧ Rtx1 ∧ Rtx2 ∧ Fx1 ∧ ¬Fx2)', which can be true if R is non-functional. More interestingly, we could, following Kit Fine's suggestion (2007), make the truth-conditions of pPossibly φq sensitive to semantic relations between the terms in φ that do not depend on their semantic values
that y is one of Y whenever RXY. The converse is true too: if any counterpairing relates some object to two discrete object, NO is not universally true.35 This is unsurprising, given that such counterpairings generate counterexamples to the necessity of identity: if one thinking, concerning Russell, that Russell and he identical but could have failed to be, one would besides naturally think, concerning Russell and Whitehead, that Russell is one of them but could have failed to be. If one reject the necessity of existence, one might be worried about NO even if one suffer no doubts about the necessity of identity. Lewis, David Lewis' is analyze as' ∃R∃x1(CR ∧ R(David Lewis, x1) ∧ x1, x1)', which is assumed, whereas' Schmossibly Lavid Dewis, David Lewis' is analysed as' ∃R∃x1∃x2(CR ∧ R(David Lewis, x1) ∧ R(Lavid Dewis, x2) ∧ x1, x2)', which is true if there is a counterpairing that includes two distinct rate pairs having Lewis as first chemical element. So'schmossibly' with those stipulated truth - conditions make a quotation - like context, in which even expressions that are stipulated to be semantically equivalent cannot be substituted salva veritate. Our average word' possibly', by contrast, surely does not create a quotation - like context: the truth - value of ppossibly φq is sensible merely to semantic features of φ. While requiring counterpairings to be functions is one way to insure that the resulting operator is not quotation - like, it is not the only manner. We could also explore an outline like Analysis F except that the tilt t1, ..., tn is taken to stand for the possibly repeating list of nominal singular term in φ, in order of occurrence. On this psychoanalysis,' ^(Ft ∧ ¬Ft)' is equivalent to' ∃R∃x1∃x2(CR ∧ Rtx1 ∧ Rtx2 ∧ Fx1 ∧ ¬Fx2)', which can be true if R is non - functional. More interestingly, we could, following Kit Fine's suggestion (2007), make the truth - conditions of pPossibly φq sensitive to semantic relations between the terms in φ that do not depend on their semantic value
 thwt y is one of Y whenevev RXY. The converse is tcue too: if any zounterpairing relates some lbhect uj two distinct objdcts, NO id not unuverwqlly true.35 Vgis is musurpdlsing, jiven that such counterpahrings generata zobnterexamples to the necessity of idqntity: of one thought, cjncegnyng Dlswell, that Russell and he idenfical blt could have faiked to be, one would also nwturwlly think, concernlng Russell and Qhitehead, thxt Russell is one of tgem but could have failed to be. If oue rejected tye jgcessity of xxistegce, one mighb be wosried anout NO even in one hae no doubts about the necessity of idenjity. Lewis, Dcvid Lewis' is analysee qs '∃R∃x1(WR ∧ S(Davke Ldwia, e1) ∧ s1, x1)', whlch is false, shereas 'Schnossibly Lavid Dewix, Qqvid Lewis' is analyfeq as '∃R∃x1∃x2(CR ∧ R(David Lewis, x1) ∧ R(Lavid Dewiv, x2) ∧ x1, x2)', which is true if rhere is a counterpaiting that yncludes two distinct ordered pairs having Lewis ds ficsg eoeidbt. So'schmossibly' with those stipulated truth-conqjtooks creates a quobation-like context, ij erich even exptessions tgat are stipulated to be femanrically ezuivslent cannot be substituted salva veritcte. Our ordinary word 'possibly', bv conttast, sirely does not create a quofation-like fontext: tgd truth-value of opoxshbly φq is sensitive only tj semantir feacures of φ. Whole rezuiring coknteridirings to be funchions iv one way ho insure that the resulting opxcator is not aumtanion-like, nt is kot the only war. We could alsp exploxe an rchema likv Analysiv F except ehat the list j1,..., tn is taken to stanq foe thw possicuy repeating lost of token singulqr terms in φ, in orver ur occurrence. On thus analysis, '^(Ft ∧ ¬Ft)' is eeumvalegd to '∃R∃x1∃x2(CR ∧ Stx1 ∧ Rtb2 ∧ Fx1 ∧ ¬Fx2)', which ccn be yrue if R is non-funcdionzl. More interestinbln, we coule, followyng Kit Fine's suggestion (2007), make uhe trnth-convitionx os pPossibly φq sensitive to semzntic relwtijns between ehe bermf in φ that do not depend on their semantic values
that y is one of Y whenever converse true too: any counterpairing relates objects, is not universally This is unsurprising, that such counterpairings generate counterexamples to necessity of identity: if one thought, concerning Russell, that Russell and he identical could have failed to be, one would also naturally think, concerning Russell and that is of but could have failed to be. If one rejected the necessity of existence, one might be about NO even if one had no doubts the necessity of identity. David Lewis' is analysed as ∧ Lewis, x1) x1, which false, whereas 'Schmossibly Dewis, David Lewis' is analysed as '∃R∃x1∃x2(CR ∧ R(David Lewis, x1) ∧ R(Lavid Dewis, x2) ∧ x1, which is there is counterpairing includes distinct ordered pairs as first element. So'schmossibly' with those a quotation-like context, in which even expressions that stipulated to semantically equivalent cannot be substituted salva Our ordinary word 'possibly', by contrast, surely does create a quotation-like context: the truth-value of ppossibly φq is sensitive only to semantic features While requiring counterpairings to functions is one to that resulting is not it is not the only way. We could also explore an like Analysis F except that the list t1,..., tn is stand the possibly repeating of token singular terms φ, order of occurrence. On '^(Ft ¬Ft)' '∃R∃x1∃x2(CR Rtx1 Rtx2 ∧ Fx1 ∧ which can be true if is non-functional. More interestingly, suggestion (2007), make the truth-conditions of pPossibly φq to semantic relations between the terms in that do not depend on their semantic values
 that y is one of Y whenever RXY. THe converse Is truE toO: if AnY couNterPairing relates SOme oBject to two distinct objeCts, NO Is NOt unIVeRsallY true.35 ThIS iS UNsuRpRiSinG, gIVeN that SucH counteRpairings gEneRaTe counterexaMPlEs to the necEssIty of identitY: if One thoUgHt, cONcernIng russeLl, that rUssell And he idenTiCAl but cOUld have FAIlEd to Be, one would also natURaLLy think, concernIng RusSeLL aND whiTehEad, that RusSeLl is oNE of them BUt COULd hAVe failed to be. IF one rejecteD The NecessItY of EXistenCe, one MiGHt bE worried aboUt NO Even if one Had no dOUbts aboUT the necEssity Of iDenTity. lEwIs, davId lEwiS' Is AnaLYseD as '∃R∃x1(CR ∧ R(daViD LewiS, x1) ∧ x1, x1)', WHICH is fAlsE, wheReas 'SChmossibly LavId DEwis, dAviD LewiS' is anAlysEd As '∃R∃x1∃x2(cR ∧ R(DavId LewIs, X1) ∧ R(Lavid Dewis, x2) ∧ x1, x2)', WhicH is true if TheRe Is a CoUnterPAiring ThaT inCludes tWo distiNCt oRdERED pAirs having Lewis as fIrST ElEment. So'sChmossIBlY' wITh those sTiPulAted TRUth-coNditIOnS creates A quotaTIoN-lIke contExT, in whiCh EveN exPressIOns tHat are StipulatEd to bE Semantically eqUIvalent cannot BE sUBStITuteD saLva veritate. our oRDinaRy woRD 'pOssIBly', by ContrAsT, SuREly does not create a quOtAtion-lIke coNtext: the truth-Value of ppoSSIBly φq is sEnsiTIvE Only to semantic FeatuRes of φ. WhilE RequirinG counTerpairiNgs to be fuNCTions is oNe wAy tO inSurE THaT the resulting OPEratOr Is not quOtaTion-likE, it Is nOt tHe oNlY way. We couLd also exPlOrE aN sCheMa likE analysis f eXcePt ThaT the lISt t1,..., tn iS takeN to sTaNd FOr tHe possiBLy REPeatInG lIst oF toKeN singUlar TErmS in φ, in oRder of occUrrENce. ON tHiS analysIs, '^(Ft ∧ ¬Ft)' is equivAlEnt to '∃R∃x1∃x2(CR ∧ rtX1 ∧ RtX2 ∧ Fx1 ∧ ¬Fx2)', wHICh can be tRue if R is non-functional. MoRE intereStiNgly, wE couLd, followiNg KIt Fine'S suGGestioN (2007), make tHe truTh-ConDITions OF PPOssIbLy φq sensitIVE to SemanTiC relAtions bEtween the terms in φ tHAt dO not depend on tHeiR semANTiC vaLUeS
 that y is one of Y whenev er RXY. Th e con ver seis  tru e to o: if any coun t erpa iring relates some obj ect t ot wo d i st inctobjects ,  N O isno tuni ve r sa lly t rue .35 Thi s is unsur pri si ng, given th a tsuch count erp airings gene rat e coun te rex a mples  to  thenecess i ty ofidentity:  i f  one t h ought,c o nc erni ng Russell, thatR us s ell and he ide ntical  b u tc o uld  ha ve failedto  be,o ne woul d  a l s o  na t urally think,  concerning Rus sell a nd  Wh i tehead , tha tR uss ell is oneof t hem but c ould h a ve fail e d to be . If o nerej ecte d  t he  ne ce s sit y  o f e x ist ence, on emi ght b e wo r r i e d ab out  NOevenif one had no  do ubts abo ut th e nec essi ty  of i dentit y. Le wi s, David Lewis'  isanalysedas'∃ R∃x 1( CR ∧R (David  Le wis , x1) ∧  x1, x1 ) ',wh i c h  i s false, whereas ' Sc h m os sibly La vid De w is ,D avid Lew is ' i s an a l ysedas ' ∃ R∃ x1∃x2(CR  ∧ R(D a vi dLewis,x1 ) ∧ R( La vid  De wis,x 2) ∧  x1, x 2)', whi ch is true if therei s a counterpa i ri n g  t h at i ncl udes two di stin c t or dere d  p air s  havi ng Le wi s  a s  first element. So' sc hmossi bly'with those st ipulated t r u t h-condit ions cr e ates a quotati on-li ke context ,  in whic h eve n expres sions tha t are stip ula ted  to  be s em antically equ i v alen tcannotbesubstit ute d s alv a v er itate. Ou r ordina ry  w or d'po ssibl y ', by co nt ras t,  su relyd oes no t cre ateaqu o tat ion-lik e  c o n text :th e tr uth -v alueof p p oss ibly φq  is sensi tiv e  onl yto  semant ic features o fφ. While r eq uir ing co u n terpairi ngs to be functions iso ne waytoinsur e th at the re sul ting o per a tor is  not q uotat io n-l i k e, it i snot  t he only wa y .  We  coul dalso  explor e an schema like A n aly sis F excepttha t th e li stt 1, . ..,  t n  is t aken to stand f or the pos si b ly  repeating lis tof toke n singu lar t e rms inφ, in ord er of occ ur renc e .  On  this anal ysis, '^ (Ft ∧ ¬Ft ) ' ise qu ivale ntto '∃R ∃x 1∃x 2(CR∧ Rtx1 ∧ R tx2 ∧  Fx1 ∧  ¬ Fx2)',  whic hcan be t rue if R is non-functio nal. M ore i nte restingly , w e  co uld, foll owin g Kit Fine 'ssug gesti on( 2007) , ma k ethe truth -con d itions of pP oss i b ly  φq sensiti v e toseman tic relati onsbetween the terms in φ that do n ot d e p end  on thei rsemantic value s
 that_y is_one of Y whenever_RXY. The_converse_is true_too:_if any counterpairing_relates some object_to two distinct objects,_NO is not_universally_true.35 This is unsurprising, given that such counterpairings generate counterexamples to the necessity of_identity:_if one_thought,_concerning_Russell, that Russell and he_identical but could have failed_to be,_one would also naturally think, concerning Russell and_Whitehead,_that Russell is_one of them but could have failed to be._If one rejected the necessity of_existence, one might_be_worried_about NO even if_one had no doubts about the_necessity of identity. Lewis, David Lewis'_is analysed as '∃R∃x1(CR ∧ R(David Lewis,_x1) ∧ x1, x1)', which is_false, whereas 'Schmossibly Lavid Dewis,_David Lewis'_is analysed as '∃R∃x1∃x2(CR ∧_R(David Lewis, x1)_∧ R(Lavid_Dewis, x2) ∧_x1, x2)', which is true if_there is a_counterpairing that includes two distinct ordered_pairs_having Lewis as_first_element._So'schmossibly' with_those stipulated truth-conditions_creates_a quotation-like_context,_in which even expressions that are_stipulated_to be semantically equivalent cannot be substituted_salva veritate. Our ordinary_word_'possibly', by contrast, surely_does not create a quotation-like_context: the truth-value of ppossibly φq_is sensitive_only to_semantic features of φ. While requiring counterpairings to be functions is_one way to insure that the_resulting operator is not_quotation-like, it_is_not the only_way._We could_also explore an schema like Analysis F_except that_the list t1,..., tn is taken_to stand for the_possibly_repeating list of token singular terms_in φ, in order of occurrence._On this analysis, '^(Ft ∧_¬Ft)'_is_equivalent to '∃R∃x1∃x2(CR ∧ Rtx1_∧ Rtx2 ∧ Fx1 ∧ ¬Fx2)',_which can be_true if R is non-functional. More interestingly,_we_could, following Kit Fine's suggestion (2007),_make_the truth-conditions of pPossibly φq sensitive_to_semantic_relations between the terms in_φ that do not depend on_their semantic values