 swans are blue. Here is the question I want to press. Consider a person, Twin, who is generally similar to me as regards his intrinsic and environmental properties, but who happens to be part of a Lewisworld-Cosmo-Prime-which also contains blue swans. Suppose I say'some swans are blue', and thereby say (falsely) that somer swans 12Cf. Williamson (2002) on views which reject "genuine contingency". 13But see the discussion of 'the relativist option' later in this section for a sophisticated attempt to make an explanatorily important notion of relative truth live side-by-side with an unrelativised concept of truth. are blue. When Twin says'some swans are blue' under analogous circumstances, does he also say that somer swans are blue? There is a compelling argument that he does not. We have assumed that (6) Nor swans are blue. It is a basic principle about falsehood, which should be acceptable in any context, that (7) If nor swans are blue, the proposition that somer swans are blue is false. But it seems obvious that (8) When Twin says'some swans are blue', he says nothing false. When people in Cosmo-Prime see blue swans swimming around and say'some swans are blue!', the belief they thereby express is (usually) paradigmatically justified by ordinary perceptual methods. Are we supposed to think of Cosmo-Prime as a place of epistemic tragedy, where following these rational methods leads one to form systematically false beliefs? Surely not; hence (8). But (6), (7) and (8) jointly entail that (9) When Twin says'some swans are blue', he doesn't say that somer swans are blue. If one follows this kind of reasoning where it leads, one will end up thinking that the practice of using the sentence'some swans are blue' to mean that somer swans are blue is more or less confined to Cosmo. People in other Lewis-worlds, even ones in most respects similar Cosmo, do not express the very same propositions that we express when they use contingency-inducing quantifiers. It would be a bad mistake to confuse (9) with the counterfactual claim that if I had been spatiotemporally related to blue swans but otherwise qualitatively similar to the way I actually am, I would not have used '
swans are blue. Here is the question I want to compress. think a person, Twin, who is generally similar to me as regards his intrinsic and environmental property, but who happens to be part of a Lewisworld - Cosmo - Prime - which besides contains blue swans. think I say'some swans are blue', and thereby read (falsely) that somer swans 12Cf. Williamson (2002) on view which reject " genuine contingency ". 13But see the discussion of' the relativist option' later in this part for a sophisticated attempt to make an explanatorily authoritative notion of relative truth alive side - by - side with an unrelativised concept of truth. are blue. When Twin says'some swans are aristocratic' under analogous circumstances, does he also say that somer swans are blue? There is a compelling argument that he does not. We have assumed that (6) Nor swans are blue. It is a basic principle about falsehood, which should be acceptable in any context, that (7) If nor swans are blue, the proposition that some swans are blue is assumed. But it seems obvious that (8) When Twin says'some swans are blue', he says nothing assumed. When people in Cosmo - Prime see blue swans swim around and say'some swans are blue!', the belief they thereby press out is (usually) paradigmatically justified by ordinary perceptual methods. Are we think to remember of Cosmo - Prime as a place of epistemic tragedy, where following these rational methods head one to form systematically false beliefs? Surely not; therefore (8). But (6), (7) and (8) jointly entail that (9) When Twin says'some swan are blue', he doesn't say that somer swans are blue. If one take after this kind of reasoning where it leads, one will end up think that the practice of use the sentence'some swans are gloomy' to mean that some swans are blue is more or less confined to Cosmo. People in other Lewis - world, even ones in most respects similar Cosmo, do not express the very same propositions that we express when they use contingency - induce quantifiers. It would be a bad error to confuse (9) with the counterfactual claim that if I had been spatiotemporally related to blue swans but otherwise qualitatively similar to the room I actually am, I would not have used'
 swwns are blue. Here is the question I wanj ro prevs. Conaider a oerson, Twin, who is generally sumilae to me as regards his intrinsib and envuronnwntal propxdties, bmc who mappeus to be part of a Lewiswosld-Cosmo-Prime-wvizh also contains blue swans. Suppose I say'somr dwans are blue', and ehersby say (falsely) that somer swans 12Cr. Williemson (2002) on views which reject "genuine contlngejcy". 13But see the didcussion of 'the eelativist ootion' lateg in this sgction for a sophisticated attemot to make an ezpoanwjorily imporvant njtion of relative trgth livr side-by-side wlth ai uneelativised concept oh truth. are blue. Wheg Twin safs'aome swans are blye' undet ananogojw ckrchmxtznces, foea he also aay that soner swans are blue? Uhewv is a compelming awgtment that he does not. We have assumed uhat (6) Nor swans are blue. It us a basic principle wbout falfehood, which should be acceptable in any context, dhat (7) Kf uir swxbs are blue, the proposition that somer swans arq bkuv is false. But it seems obvipud yrat (8) When Twiv says'soms swans are blue', hf says gothibg false. Rhen people in Cosmo-Prime see boue swans swpmmibg around and say'slme swans axe blug!', the nelief they thereby expxess ia (usually) pwradigmatjzally justified cy prginary ptfceptual methods. Wre we su'poseb to thivk og Cosmj-Prime as w plaga of epistemic trahedy, chere following these rational methods leads oix to form sysjemdtibally falfe bekiefs? Surely got; hence (8). But (6), (7) and (8) joingly entail that (9) Xhen Twin sars'some swans dte blue', he doxsn't say ehat somwr swanr are blue. If ome follows this kine of reasoning wheve it meads, one will zud up thinking thst ghe pgacvice jx using the ventdncd'xome rwans are boje' tp mean that somer swdns zre blue is more ot jess condined to Cosmo. People in other Lewis-worpds, eten onxs in kosj respects similar Cosmo, do not express hhe very same pwopowitions that we express when they use contingency-invucing quantifiers. It wiuld be a bad mistalt to confuse (9) with the counderfactual claim thar if I had been skatiotemporally related to blge swwns but otherwise qualitatively similar to the way I actually am, I would bot hate used '
swans are blue. Here is the question to Consider a Twin, who is regards intrinsic and environmental but who happens be part of a Lewisworld-Cosmo-Prime-which also blue swans. Suppose I say'some swans are blue', and thereby say (falsely) that swans 12Cf. Williamson (2002) on views which reject "genuine contingency". 13But see the of relativist later this section for a sophisticated attempt to make an explanatorily important notion of relative truth live with an unrelativised concept of truth. are blue. Twin says'some swans are under analogous circumstances, does he say somer swans blue? is compelling argument that does not. We have assumed that (6) Nor swans are blue. It is a basic principle about which should in any that If swans are blue, that somer swans are blue is seems obvious that (8) When Twin says'some swans blue', he nothing false. When people in Cosmo-Prime blue swans swimming around and say'some swans are the belief they thereby express is (usually) paradigmatically justified by ordinary perceptual methods. Are we think of Cosmo-Prime as place of epistemic where these methods one to systematically false beliefs? Surely not; hence (8). But (6), (7) and jointly entail that (9) When Twin says'some swans are blue', say somer swans are If one follows this of where it leads, one up that using sentence'some are blue' to mean somer swans are blue is or less confined to even ones in most respects similar Cosmo, do express the very same propositions that we when they use contingency-inducing quantifiers. It would be a bad mistake to (9) with claim that if I had been spatiotemporally related blue swans but otherwise similar to the way I actually am, I would have '
 swans are blue. Here is the quesTion I want tO presS. CoNsiDeR a peRson, twin, who is generALly sImilar to me as regards his IntriNsIC and ENvIronmEntal prOPeRTIes, BuT wHo hApPEnS to be ParT of a LewIsworld-CosMo-PRiMe-which also cONtAins blue swAns. suppose I say'sOme Swans aRe BluE', And thEreBy say (FalselY) That soMer swans 12CF. WILliamsON (2002) on viewS WHiCh reJect "genuine continGEnCY". 13But see the discUssion Of 'THe RELatIviSt option' laTeR in thIS sectioN FoR A SOphISticated attemPt to make an eXPlaNatoriLy ImpORtant nOtion Of RElaTive truth liVe siDe-by-side wIth an uNRelativISed concEpt of tRutH. arE bluE. whEn twiN sAYs'sOMe SwaNS arE blue' undEr AnAlogoUs ciRCUMStanCes, Does He alsO say that somer SwaNs arE BluE? TherE is a cOmpeLlIng arGument That hE dOes not. We have assUmed That (6) Nor swAns ArE blUe. it is a BAsic prIncIplE about fAlsehooD, WhiCh SHOUlD be acceptable in any CoNTExT, that (7) If nOr swanS ArE bLUe, the proPoSitIon tHAT someR swaNS aRe blue is False. BUT iT sEems obvIoUs that (8) whEn TWin Says'sOMe swAns are Blue', he saYs notHIng false. When peOPle in Cosmo-PriME sEE BlUE swaNs sWimming arouNd anD Say'sOme sWAnS arE Blue!', tHe belIeF ThEY thereby express is (usUaLly) parAdigmAtically justiFied by ordiNARY perceptUal mEThODs. Are we supposeD to thInk of Cosmo-pRime as a pLace oF epistemIc tragedy, WHEre folloWinG thEse RatIONaL methods leads ONE to fOrM systemAtiCally faLse BelIefS? SuReLy not; hencE (8). But (6), (7) and (8) jOiNtLy EnTaiL that (9) wHen Twin sAyS'soMe SwaNs are BLue', he dOesn't Say tHaT sOMer Swans arE BlUE. if onE fOlLows ThiS kInd of ReasONinG where iT leads, one WilL End uP tHiNking thAt the practice Of Using the seNtEncE'some sWANs are bluE' to mean that somer swans arE Blue is mOre Or lesS conFined to CoSmo. people In oTHer LewIs-worlDs, eveN oNes IN Most rESPeCts SiMilar Cosmo, DO Not ExpreSs The vEry same Propositions that we EXprEss when they usE coNtinGENcY-inDUcINg qUaNTifIERs. It would be a bad Mistake to cOnFUsE (9) with the coUNteRfActual cLaim thaT if I hAD been spAtiotempoRally relaTeD to bLUE swAns but otheRwise quaLitativelY SimilAR tO the wAy I ActualLy Am, I Would Not havE UseD '
 swans are blue. Here is t he questio n I w ant  to  p ress . Co nsider a perso n , Tw in, who is generally s imila rt o me as  rega rds his in t r ins ic  a nden v ir onmen tal  proper ties, butwho  h appens to be pa rt of a Le wis world-Cosmo- Pri me-whi ch  al s o con tai ns bl ue swa n s. Sup pose I sa y' s ome sw a ns areb l ue ', a nd thereby say (f a ls e ly) that somer  swans  1 2 Cf . Wil lia mson (2002 )on vi e ws whic h  r e j e ct" genuine conti ngency". 13 B utsee th edis c ussion  of ' th e  re lativist op tion ' later i n this section for a s ophist ica ted  att e mp ttoma k e a n  e xpl a nat orily im po rt ant n otio n o f  rel ati ve t ruthlive side-by- sid e wi t h a n unr elati vise dconce pt oftruth .are blue. WhenTwin  says'som e s wa nsar e blu e ' unde r a nal ogous c ircumst a nce s, d o es  he also say thatso m e rswans ar e blue ?  T he r e is a c om pel ling a rgume nt t h at  he does  not.W eha ve assu me d that  ( 6)Nor  swan s  are  blue.  It is a  basi c  principle abo u t falsehood,w hi c h  s h ould  be  acceptable  ina ny c onte x t,  th a t (7)  If n or sw a ns are blue, the pr op ositio n tha t somer swans  are bluei s false. B ut i t  s e ems obvious th at (8 ) When Twi n  says'so me sw ans areblue', he s ays noth ing  fa lse . W h e npeople in Cos m o -Pri me  see bl ueswans s wim min g a rou nd  and say' some swa ns  a re  b lue !', t h e belief  t hey  t her eby e x pressis (u sual ly )p ara digmati c al l y  jus ti fi ed b y o rd inary  per c ept ual met hods. Are  we supp os ed  to thi nk of Cosmo-P ri me as a pl ac e o f epis t e mic trag edy, where following th e se rati ona l met hods  leads on e t o form  sy s temati callyfalse  b eli e f s? Su r e ly  no t;  hence (8) . But  (6),  ( 7) a nd (8)jointly entail tha t  (9 ) When Twin s ays 'som e sw ans ar e  bl ue ' , h e doesn't say tha t somer sw an s  a re blue. I f  on efollows  this k ind o f  reason ing where  it leads ,onew i llend up thi nking th at the pr a ctice of  usin g t he sen te nce 'some  swans are  blue ' to m ea n that  some rswans ar e blue is more or lessconfin ed to  Co smo. Peop lei n o ther Lewi s-wo rlds, even  on esin mo str espec ts s i mi lar Cosmo , do not expre s sthe v er y same prop o s i tio ns th atw e expr esswhen they use con t ingency-induci ng q u a nti fie r s. I twould be a bad  mi st a k e to con fu se (9) with  the cou nt e rfact ual cl aim th at if I h ad been s pati ote mporallyrel at e d to bl ue  s w ans bu t ot he rwisequalit a tive l y  similar to theway I a ctual l y a m, Iwo uld not have  used '
 swans_are blue._Here is the question_I want_to_press. Consider_a_person, Twin, who_is generally similar_to me as regards_his intrinsic and_environmental_properties, but who happens to be part of a Lewisworld-Cosmo-Prime-which also contains blue swans._Suppose_I say'some_swans_are_blue', and thereby say (falsely)_that somer swans 12Cf. Williamson_(2002) on_views which reject "genuine contingency". 13But see the_discussion_of 'the relativist_option' later in this section for a sophisticated attempt_to make an explanatorily important notion_of relative truth_live_side-by-side_with an unrelativised concept_of truth. are blue. When Twin_says'some swans are blue' under analogous_circumstances, does he also say that somer_swans are blue? There is a_compelling argument that he does_not. We_have assumed that (6) Nor_swans are blue._It is_a basic principle_about falsehood, which should be acceptable_in any context,_that (7) If nor swans are_blue,_the proposition that_somer_swans_are blue_is false. But_it_seems obvious_that_(8) When Twin says'some swans are_blue',_he says nothing false. When people in_Cosmo-Prime see blue swans_swimming_around and say'some swans_are blue!', the belief they_thereby express is (usually) paradigmatically justified_by ordinary_perceptual methods._Are we supposed to think of Cosmo-Prime as a place of_epistemic tragedy, where following these rational_methods leads one to_form systematically_false_beliefs? Surely not;_hence_(8). But_(6), (7) and (8) jointly entail that_(9) When_Twin says'some swans are blue', he_doesn't say that somer_swans_are blue. If one follows this_kind of reasoning where it leads,_one will end up thinking_that_the_practice of using the sentence'some_swans are blue' to mean that_somer swans are_blue is more or less confined to_Cosmo._People in other Lewis-worlds, even ones_in_most respects similar Cosmo, do not_express_the_very same propositions that we_express when they use contingency-inducing quantifiers._It would be a bad mistake to confuse (9)_with the counterfactual_claim that if I had_been_spatiotemporally_related to blue swans but otherwise qualitatively similar to the_way I_actually am, I_would not have used '