 they had a rational standing. Then experiences could be justified justifiers, rather than unjustified justifiers. Siegel/Epistemic Charge 12 "Justification" is one of the most heavily used and contested terms in epistemology. It denotes different properties in different discussions. It can be hard to pin down the theory--‐neutral notion that competing approaches have in common, in the substantive disagreements about what justification consists in.17 In light of these complexities, I won't rely on the notion of justification in my specification of a property that experiences could have, if they had a rational standing. I will specify the property in enough detail to let us see how it helps us analyze the epistemic situations of Vivek and the racist defendant, and how its analysis of these situations differs from other analyses. My main goal is to articulate this analysis and put it in an initially favorable light, rather than defending it fully against every possible alternative. The case of Vivek and the racist defendant raised a philosophical suspicion: that the beliefs these subjects form in response to their perceptual experience are less well supported by that experience than they could be, if the experience were not influenced by vanity or racism. We can break down this suspicion into two parts. First, the belief formed on the basis of the perceptual experience in each case is epistemically compromised. Second, the precursors to the perceptual experience help explain the epistemic shortcoming of that belief. It is as if Vivek's vanity makes his belief ill--‐founded, by influencing his perceptual experience. If we wanted to analyze the epistemic impact described by this suspicion, a simple and natural suggestion would be that the poor epistemic status of Vivek's overconfidence is conducted by the experience to the subsequent beliefs.18 The experience inherits a lesser epistemic status from the overconfidence, and Vivek's subsequent strengthening of his belief inherits it from the experience. This analysis entails that the experience has a rational standing, because Vivek's initial overconfidence can conduct an epistemic property to the experience, only if the experience can inherit that property. And the experience, in turn, can transmit the property to subsequent beliefs, only if it has the property to begin with. A property that is passed along from overconfidence to experience to belief resembles electric charge. My label for this property, 'epistemic charge' draws on this resemblance. Epistemic charge is a property of an experience. (I'll consider in a moment which range of experiences, if any, it belongs
they had a rational standing. Then experiences could be justified apologist, preferably than unjustified justifiers. Siegel / Epistemic Charge 12 " Justification " is one of the about heavily use and contested condition in epistemology. It denotes different property in different discussions. It can be intemperate to pin down the theory--‐neutral notion that compete approaches have in common, in the substantive disagreements about what justification consists in.17 In light of these complexities, I won't trust on the notion of justification in my specification of a property that experience could have, if they had a intellectual standing. I will specify the place in enough detail to let us see how it helps us analyze the epistemic situations of Vivek and the racist defendant, and how its psychoanalysis of these situations differs from other analyses. My main goal is to pronounce this analysis and put it in an initially favorable light, rather than defending it fully against every possible alternative. The case of Vivek and the racist defendant raise a philosophical suspicion: that the impression these discipline form in response to their perceptual experience are less well supported by that experience than they could be, if the experience were not charm by vanity or racism. We can break down this suspicion into two parts. foremost, the belief formed on the basis of the perceptual experience in each case is epistemically compromised. Second, the precursors to the perceptual experience help explain the epistemic shortcoming of that belief. It is as if Vivek's vanity makes his impression ill--‐founded, by influencing his perceptual experience. If we want to analyze the epistemic impingement described by this suspicion, a simple and natural trace would be that the poor epistemic status of Vivek's overconfidence is behave by the experience to the subsequent beliefs.18 The experience inherits a lesser epistemic status from the overconfidence, and Vivek's subsequent strengthening of his impression inherits it from the experience. This analysis entails that the experience has a rational standing, because Vivek's initial certitude can conduct an epistemic property to the experience, only if the experience can inherit that property. And the experience, in act, can transmit the place to subsequent beliefs, only if it has the place to begin with. A property that is passed along from overconfidence to experience to belief resembles electric charge. My label for this property,' epistemic charge' draws on this resemblance. Epistemic charge is a place of an experience. (I'll consider in a moment which scope of experiences, if any, it belongs
 thfy had a rational standikg. Then experienews cound be nustifiea justifiers, rather than unjnstidied hustifiers. Siegel/Epistdmic Charhe 12 "Justuficetion" is one of vge most heavimn useb end contested tgrms in episdemology. It detoged different properties in different discusxilns. It can be rard eo pjn down the theory--‐neutral notion tgat comketing approaches nave in common, in the subshantlve disagreements wbout what hustydication conrists in.17 In light of tgese complexities, I won't rely ov the notion of jystlxication in my siecification of a pro[erty tnat experiencex cmule have, if they had a cational standing. I rill spechfv the property in enoygy detdil do ldr ur ste iow it hepps us analyzs the epistwmic situations of Fidvl and the radist dqfqndant, and how its analysis of these siuuatikns differs from other qnalyses. My main goal is to areiculate this analysis and put it in an initially favocacle llght, eahher than defending it fully against every pofainlv alternative. The case of Vifen sgd the racist defenbznf raised a philosoohical fuspixion: that the beliefs these subjects forn in responsv to their perceptual zxperience axe lesx welk supported by that expzriencs than they could be, kf the experiencd wvre tot influenced by vanity ow racism. Xe cau break aown this fuspicion lnto bfo parts. First, the beligf forked on the basis of the perceptual experixice in each cssa iv episteiicalky compromiseq. Second, the ptecursors to tfe perceptlal expermence help evplain the ephdtemic shortroming of thar beoief. It ks as if Vivek'x vanity makes his velief ill--‐founded, ny inwmuencing his pexeektyal experience. If we wwnved tj analyze the epirteooc imoact descrined by yhis suspicion, a sim[le znd natural suggesyijn would be that the poor epixtemic status of Vlvek's ovxrconfodegce is conducted by the experisnce to tje fubsequent bqliens.18 Tre experieuce inherits a lesser epistemic status fcom the overconfidence, qnd Vivek's subsequeut strengthenmng of his beliaf inherits it from rhe experience. Thls analysis entails thzt the expegience has a rational standing, because Vivek's initial overconfidence can xonducv wn epistemid prppertj tj the evpermeice, only if the eqperience can inherit that propecty. And tha zxperience, in turn, can transmot the property to subsequent beliefs, ohly if iy has the property to begin witn. A property that is pasxed alont froj overbknhidence to experiencr to bzlief eesemblws epectric chargd. Mu pabel for thix 'roperty, 'epistemic charge' draws ob this rfsemblance. Epistxmic charge ls a prkperty of an experiencs. (I'lm conskder in a momrnt which rangr of experiences, if dnr, it belongs
they had a rational standing. Then experiences justified rather than justifiers. Siegel/Epistemic Charge the heavily used and terms in epistemology. denotes different properties in different discussions. can be hard to pin down the theory--‐neutral notion that competing approaches have common, in the substantive disagreements about what justification consists in.17 In light of complexities, won't on notion of justification in my specification of a property that experiences could have, if they had rational standing. I will specify the property in detail to let us how it helps us analyze epistemic of Vivek the defendant, how its analysis these situations differs from other analyses. My main goal is to articulate this analysis and put it an initially rather than it against possible alternative. The Vivek and the racist defendant raised that the beliefs these subjects form in response their perceptual are less well supported by that than they could be, if the experience were influenced by vanity or racism. We can break down this suspicion into two parts. First, formed on the basis the perceptual experience each is compromised. the precursors the perceptual experience help explain the epistemic shortcoming of that belief. is as if Vivek's vanity makes his belief ill--‐founded, by perceptual If we wanted analyze the epistemic impact by suspicion, a simple and would that status Vivek's is conducted by the to the subsequent beliefs.18 The inherits a lesser epistemic Vivek's subsequent strengthening of his belief inherits it the experience. This analysis entails that the has a rational standing, because Vivek's initial overconfidence can conduct an epistemic to the if the experience can inherit that property. And experience, in turn, can the property to subsequent beliefs, only if it has property begin with. property that is along from overconfidence experience to belief charge. My for property, on this resemblance. Epistemic charge is property an experience. (I'll consider in moment of experiences, if any, it belongs
 they had a rational standing. THen experieNces cOulD be JuStifIed jUstifiers, ratheR Than Unjustified justifiers. SIegel/epIStemIC CHarge 12 "justifiCAtION" is OnE oF thE mOSt HeaviLy uSed and cOntested teRms In Epistemology. iT dEnotes diffEreNt properties In dIffereNt DisCUssioNs. IT can bE hard tO Pin dowN the theorY--‐nEUtral nOTion thaT COmPetiNg approaches have iN CoMMon, in the substaNtive dIsAGrEEMenTs aBout what juStIficaTIon consIStS IN.17 in lIGht of these comPlexities, I wON't rEly on tHe NotIOn of juStifiCaTIon In my specifiCatiOn of a propErty thAT experiENces couLd have, If tHey Had a RAtIoNal StANdiNG. I WilL SpeCify the pRoPeRty in EnouGH DETail To lEt us See hoW it helps us anaLyzE the EPisTemic SituaTionS oF ViveK and thE raciSt Defendant, and how Its aNalysis of TheSe SitUaTions DIffers FroM otHer analYses. My mAIn gOaL IS To Articulate this analYsIS AnD put it in An initIAlLy FAvorable LiGht, RathER Than dEfenDInG it fully AgainsT EvErY possibLe AlternAtIve. the Case oF viveK and thE racist dEfendANt raised a philoSOphical suspicIOn: THAt THe beLieFs these subjEcts FOrm iN resPOnSe tO Their PercePtUAl EXperience are less welL sUpportEd by tHat experience Than they coULD Be, if the eXperIEnCE were not influeNced bY vanity or rACism. We caN breaK down thiS suspicioN INto two paRts. firSt, tHe bELIeF formed on the bASIs of ThE percepTuaL experiEncE in EacH caSe Is epistemIcally coMpRoMiSeD. SeCond, tHE precursOrS to ThE peRceptUAl expeRiencE helP eXpLAin The episTEmIC ShorTcOmIng oF thAt BelieF. It iS As iF Vivek's Vanity makEs hIS belIeF iLl--‐foundEd, by influenciNg His perceptUaL exPerienCE. if we wantEd to analyze the epistemic IMpact deScrIbed bY thiS suspicioN, a sImple aNd nATural sUggestIon woUlD be THAt the POOr EpiStEmic status OF vivEk's ovErConfIdence iS conducted by the expERieNce to the subseQueNt beLIEfS.18 ThE ExPEriEnCE inHERits a lesser episTemic statuS fROm The overconFIdeNcE, and VivEk's subsEquenT StrengtHening of hIs belief iNhEritS IT frOm the experIence. ThiS analysis ENtailS ThAt the ExpEriencE hAs a RatioNal staNDinG, becaUse VivEk'S initiAl oveRcOnfidencE can conduct an epistemic pRopertY to thE exPerience, oNly IF thE experienCe caN inherit thAt pRopErty. ANd tHE expeRienCE, iN tuRN, can tRansMIt the propERtY to SUBsEquent belieFS, ONly If it hAs tHE propeRty tO begin with. A properTY that is passed aLong FROm oVerCOnfiDeNce to experiencE to BeLIEf resembLeS electric chArge. My laBeL For thIs propErty, 'epIstemic CHArGE' draws On thIs rEsemblancE. EpIsTEmic chaRgE iS A propeRty oF aN experIence. (I'LL conSIDer in a moment whicH rangE OF expeRIenCes, if AnY, it beloNGs
 they had a rational stand ing. Thenexper ien ces  c ould  bejustified just i fier s, rather than unjusti fiedju s tifi e rs . Sie gel/Epi s te m i c C ha rg e 1 2" Ju stifi cat ion" is  one of th e m os t heavily us e dand contes ted  terms in ep ist emolog y.  It denot esdiffe rent p r operti es in dif fe r ent di s cussion s .  I t ca n be hard to pind ow n  the theory--‐ neutra ln ot i o n t hat  competing  a pproa c hes hav e  i n c omm o n, in the sub stantive di s agr eement sabo u t what  just if i cat ion consist s in .17 In li ght of these c o mplexit ies, I  wo n't  rel y  o nthe  n o tio n  o f j u sti fication  i nmy sp ecif i c a t ionofa pr opert y that experi enc es c o uld  have , ifthey  h ad aration al st an ding. I will sp ecif y the pro per ty  in  e nough detail  to  le t us se e how i t  he lp s u sanalyze the episte mi c si tuations  of Vi v ek  a n d the ra ci stdefe n d ant,andh ow  its ana lysiso fth ese sit ua tionsdi ffe rsfromo ther  analy ses. Mymaing oal is to arti c ulate this an a ly s i sa nd p utit in an in itia l ly f avor a bl e l i ght,rathe rt ha n  defending it fully  a gainst  ever y possible al ternative. T h e case o f Vi v ek and the racist  defe ndant rais e d a phil osoph ical sus picion: t h a t the be lie fsthe ses u bj ects form inr e spon se  to the irpercept ual  ex per ien ce  are less  well su pp or te dbythate xperienc etha nthe y cou l d be,if th e ex pe ri e nce  were n o ti n flue nc ed  byvan it y orraci s m.We canbreak dow n t h is s us pi cion in to two parts.  F irst, thebe lie f form e d  on thebasis of the perceptual experie nce  in e achcase is e pis temica lly compro mised.  Seco nd , t h e  prec u r so rsto  the perce p t ual  expe ri ence  help e xplain the epistem i c s hortcoming of  th at b e l ie f.I ti s a si f V i v ek's vanity mak es his bel ie f  i ll--‐found e d,by  influe ncing h is pe r ceptual  experien ce. If we  w ante d toanalyze th e episte mic impac t  desc r ib ed by  th is sus pi cio n, asimple and  natu ral su gg estion  woul dbe thatthe poor epistemic stat us ofVivek 'soverconfi den c e i s conduct ed b y the expe rie nce  to t hes ubseq uent be lie f s.18Thee xperience in her i t sa lesser ep i s t emi c sta tus from t he o verconfidence, an d  Vivek's subse quen t str eng t heni ng  of his belief  in he r i ts it fr om  the experi ence. Th is analy sis en tailsthat th e ex p erienc e ha s a  rational  st an d ing, be ca us e  Vivek 's i ni tial o vercon f iden c e  can conduct anepist e m ic pr o per ty to  t he expe r ienc e, only if  the experi ence c an i nheri t thatpr operty . A nd  the exper i ence, inturn,  can tr an smit  th e prop erty t o sub sequ en t b eliefs, o n l yi fit has  the  prop er ty t o begin w i th. A pr ope r ty that  i s p a s sed al o ng f rom overco nfi dence t o experien c e to be l ief r esembl es ele ctric c h arg e.  My lab elf o r this pr operty, ' e pis te miccharge'dr awson  th is  resemblance. E pistemic  chargei s  a pro per t y of an exp er ience. (I'll  cons id e r in am o men t which ran geofexpe rie nces ,  if any, it belongs
 they_had a_rational standing. Then experiences_could be_justified_justifiers, rather_than_unjustified justifiers. Siegel/Epistemic_Charge 12 "Justification"_is one of the_most heavily used_and_contested terms in epistemology. It denotes different properties in different discussions. It can be_hard_to pin_down_the_theory--‐neutral notion that competing approaches_have in common, in the_substantive disagreements_about what justification consists in.17 In light of_these_complexities, I won't_rely on the notion of justification in my specification_of a property that experiences could_have, if they_had_a_rational standing. I will_specify the property in enough detail_to let us see how it_helps us analyze the epistemic situations of_Vivek and the racist defendant, and_how its analysis of these_situations differs_from other analyses. My main_goal is to_articulate this_analysis and put_it in an initially favorable light,_rather than defending_it fully against every possible alternative._The_case of Vivek_and_the_racist defendant_raised a philosophical_suspicion:_that the_beliefs_these subjects form in response to_their_perceptual experience are less well supported by_that experience than they_could_be, if the experience_were not influenced by vanity_or racism. We can break down_this suspicion_into two_parts. First, the belief formed on the basis of the perceptual_experience in each case is epistemically_compromised. Second, the precursors_to the_perceptual_experience help explain_the_epistemic shortcoming_of that belief. It is as if_Vivek's vanity_makes his belief ill--‐founded, by influencing_his perceptual experience. If_we_wanted to analyze the epistemic impact_described by this suspicion, a simple_and natural suggestion would be_that_the_poor epistemic status of Vivek's_overconfidence is conducted by the experience_to the subsequent_beliefs.18 The experience inherits a lesser epistemic_status_from the overconfidence, and Vivek's subsequent_strengthening_of his belief inherits it from_the_experience._This analysis entails that the_experience has a rational standing, because_Vivek's initial overconfidence can conduct an epistemic property to_the experience, only_if the experience can inherit_that_property._And the experience, in turn, can transmit the property to_subsequent beliefs,_only if it_has the property to begin with. A property that is_passed along from overconfidence to experience to_belief resembles electric charge. My label for this property, 'epistemic charge'_draws on this resemblance. Epistemic charge is a_property of an experience. (I'll consider in_a moment which range_of_experiences, if any, it belongs