putationally; the debate is only a matter what kind of functionalism is best. And, for Rey, what is required is a classical model in which cognition is understood as computations over representations stored in something like a language of thought. However, Rey is perhaps unique among functionalists in thinking that no current computational theory of mind on offer is quite up to doing the job. The book has twelve chapters including a brief introduction. The introduction sets out differences between explanation, ontology, and ordinary talk, explains the overall cognitive science enterprise, and gives a useful chapter smnmary. Chapter 1 outlines the three main metaphysical approaches: reductionism, dualism, and eliminativism, as well as explaining some important key terms: propositional attitudes, qualitative states, intentionality/intensionality, types/tokens, and reference. It also outlines his 'ground rules' (p. 6) which a good theory of mind should follow, a eharacterisation which guides later discussion--'The need for fairness', 'The need for non-tendentious evidence', and the value of constitutive definitions and analysis in relation to philosophical and empirical research. Chapter 2 concentrates on the 'temptations' of dualism and looks at it number of mental phenomena which seem to corroborate the dualists' case: the nature of rationality, privacy, free-will, the non-spatial and intentional character of thoughts, and the essentially mental and subjective character of experience. The nature of physicalist reduction, identity, and the Leibniz law argmnents are clearly explained, as well as the relevance of 'explanatory gaps' to the dualists' case. Chapter 3 develops philosophical arguments against dualism frmn an eliminativist perspective. Causal gap arguments and problems associated with the normativity of mental ascriptions are introduced in this connection. The usual objections against eliminativism are then presented: transcendental argmnents, introspective arguments (such as those appealing to first-person sensory states), and finally arguments which appeal to'standardised regularities' in mental aptitude tests (results from SAT and GRE tests are given as examples). The overall argument against the eliminativist is that the systematic responses humans make in such tests require that mental state ascriptions have some explanatory mad predictive value (thus, the 'psycho' part of 'psycho-functionalism'). Chapter 4 looks at empirical issues associated with the eliminativist stance. Radical behaviourism (RB) is chosen as
putationally; the debate is only a matter what kind of functionalism is best. And, for Rey, what is command is a authoritative model in which cognition is understood as calculation over representation stored in something like a language of idea. However, Rey is perhaps unique among functionalist in think that no current computational theory of thinker on offer is quite up to doing the problem. The koran has twelve chapter including a brief presentation. The introduction sets out differences between explanation, ontology, and average talk, explains the overall cognitive skill enterprise, and gives a utilitarian chapter smnmary. Chapter 1 outlines the three main metaphysical approaches: reductionism, dualism, and eliminativism, as well as explaining some important cardinal terms: propositional attitudes, qualitative states, intentionality / intensionality, types / tokens, and reference. It besides sketch his' ground rules' (p. 6) which a good theory of mind should follow, a eharacterisation which guides later discussion--'The need for paleness',' The need for non - tendentious evidence', and the value of constitutive definition and psychoanalysis in relation back to philosophical and empirical research. Chapter 2 concentrates on the' temptations' of dualism and looks at it number of genial phenomena which seem to corroborate the dualists' case: the nature of rationality, privacy, free - will, the non - spatial and intentional character of thoughts, and the essentially mental and immanent character of experience. The nature of physicalist decrease, identity, and the Leibniz law argmnents are clearly explained, as well as the relevance of' explanatory gaps' to the dualists' shell. Chapter 3 develops philosophical arguments against dualism frmn an eliminativist position. Causal gap controversy and problems associated with the normativity of genial ascriptions are introduced in this connection. The usual objections against eliminativism are then introduce: transcendental argmnents, introspective argument (such as those appealing to inaugural - person sensory department of state), and finally arguments which appeal to'standardised regularities' in mental aptitude trial (results from SAT and GRE test are given as examples). The overall argument against the eliminativist is that the systematic responses world make in such tests want that mental state attribution have some explanatory mad predictive value (thus, the' psychotic' part of' psycho - functionalism'). Chapter 4 looks at empirical issues associated with the eliminativist stance. Radical behaviorism (RB) is chosen as
putwtionally; the debate is unly a matter wkqt kinv of fuhctionalksm is best. And, for Rey, what iw reqyired is a classical mudel in wjich cogbitiib is understood as compufwtious over represenjations storad in somethinc uine a language of thought. However, Rer is pethwps unique amogg flnstiohalists in thinking that no currenf compuuational theory of mind on offer is quite up to foing the job. The hook has twgmve xhapters incuuding a bgnef introdudtion. The introduction sets out diffzrences betqewn ffplanation, intoljgy, and ordiksry tank, explsins the overakl rognutive science enterprmse, and gives a usefol chapter sjnmary. Chapter 1 oytoines the thrdw mxin mxtalhysicwl epproaches: deductionisn, dualism, and elimimaepfism, as well as ex[lwining some important key terms: proposiuionam attitudes, qualitative states, intentionaliti/intensionwlity, types/tokens, and reference. It also outlines vis 'gcojnd rmles' (p. 6) which a good theory of mind should follow, a qgatabterisation which guides latrr dofcussion--'The nged for fajrness', 'The need fog non-tegdentuous evidtnce', snd the value of constitutice definitious qnd analysis in repation to pkilosokhical and empirical research. Chalter 2 concejtrates oh the 'temptations' of dgalism and looks at it numfer of meital 'henomenx whoch seqm to corrlboraba the dualists' casf: the ndture of rwtionality, privacy, free-will, the non-spatial anc hntvntional eharacber of thoughts, and the essenjially meutal avd subjectpve chararter of expewience. The nadore of physicelist redtctiin, ieentity, xnd the Leibnia law argmnents are clearly explained, as sell as the relzrabce of 'explanatpry ga[s' tp eve dualists' wase. Chxlter 3 develokf ihiuosolhical arguments agahnst dualism frmn an ekiiinativiwt perspqctive. Causal gap arguments and probnemr asspciwted with the normativity of msntal ascgipbions are intwoduged yn this counection. The usual objections against elmminativism are then ptesented: transcendentcl argmnents, mntros[ective asguments (such as thowe appealing to flrst-person sensory stafes), ang finwlly arguments which appeal to'standardised regularities' in mental aptitudw tests (results frkm SST ang YRE tests are jiven as examples). The overall argument against tie eliminadirist is that the systematic rrsoonses humans make in such tests requjre that mental state ascriptions have xome explanatory mad precictive calue (thus, nge 'psycho' part of 'psucho-fuuctionqlism'). Cyaptcr 4 looks at eopitigal issues asspcnated with the eliminativist stanxe. Raducwl behaviourism (CB) is chosen xs
putationally; the debate is only a matter of is best. for Rey, what model which cognition is as computations over stored in something like a language thought. However, Rey is perhaps unique among functionalists in thinking that no current theory of mind on offer is quite up to doing the job. The has chapters a introduction. The introduction sets out differences between explanation, ontology, and ordinary talk, explains the overall cognitive enterprise, and gives a useful chapter smnmary. Chapter outlines the three main approaches: reductionism, dualism, and eliminativism, well explaining some key propositional qualitative states, intentionality/intensionality, and reference. It also outlines his 'ground rules' (p. 6) which a good theory of mind should a eharacterisation later discussion--'The for 'The for non-tendentious evidence', value of constitutive definitions and analysis philosophical and empirical research. Chapter 2 concentrates on 'temptations' of and looks at it number of phenomena which seem to corroborate the dualists' case: nature of rationality, privacy, free-will, the non-spatial and intentional character of thoughts, and the essentially subjective character of experience. nature of physicalist identity, the law are clearly as well as the relevance of 'explanatory gaps' to the dualists' Chapter 3 develops philosophical arguments against dualism frmn an eliminativist gap and problems associated the normativity of mental are in this connection. The against are argmnents, arguments as those appealing to sensory states), and finally arguments appeal to'standardised regularities' in SAT and GRE tests are given as examples). overall argument against the eliminativist is that systematic responses humans make in such tests require that mental state ascriptions some explanatory value (thus, the 'psycho' part of 'psycho-functionalism'). Chapter looks at empirical issues with the eliminativist stance. Radical behaviourism (RB) is chosen
putationally; the debate is onLy a matter wHat kiNd oF fuNcTionAlisM is best. And, for REY, whaT is required is a classicaL modeL iN WhicH CoGnitiOn is undERsTOOd aS cOmPutAtIOnS over RepResentaTions storeD in SoMething like a LAnGuage of thoUghT. However, Rey iS peRhaps uNiQue AMong fUncTionaLists iN ThinkiNg that no cUrREnt comPUtationAL ThEory Of mind on offer is quITe UP to doing the job. the booK hAS tWELve ChaPters incluDiNg a brIEf introDUcTION. ThE Introduction sEts out diffeREncEs betwEeN exPLanatiOn, ontOlOGy, aNd ordinary tAlk, eXplains thE overaLL cognitIVe scienCe enteRprIse, And gIVeS a UseFuL ChaPTeR smNMarY. Chapter 1 OuTlInes tHe thREE MAin mEtaPhysIcal aPproaches: reduCtiOnisM, DuaLism, aNd eliMinaTiVism, aS well aS explAiNing some importaNt keY terms: proPosItIonAl AttitUDes, quaLitAtiVe stateS, intentIOnaLiTY/INtEnsionality, types/toKeNS, AnD referenCe. It alSO oUtLInes his 'gRoUnd RuleS' (P. 6) Which A gooD ThEory of miNd shouLD fOlLow, a ehaRaCterisAtIon WhiCh guiDEs laTer disCussion--'THe neeD For fairness', 'The NEed for non-tendENtIOUs EVideNce', And the value Of coNStitUtivE DeFinITions And anAlYSiS In relation to philosoPhIcal anD empiRical research. chapter 2 conCENTrates on The 'tEMpTAtions' of dualisM and lOoks at it nuMBer of menTal phEnomena wHich seem tO COrroboraTe tHe dUalIstS' CAsE: the nature of rATIonaLiTy, privaCy, fRee-will, The Non-SpaTiaL aNd intentiOnal charAcTeR oF tHouGhts, aND the esseNtIalLy MenTal anD SubjecTive cHaraCtEr OF exPeriencE. thE NAturE oF pHysiCalIsT reduCtioN, IdeNtity, anD the LeibnIz lAW argMnEnTs are clEarly explaineD, aS well as the ReLevAnce of 'EXPlanatorY gaps' to the dualists' case. CHApter 3 deVelOps phIlosOphical arGumEnts agAinST dualiSm frmn An eliMiNatIVIst peRSPeCtiVe. causal gap aRGUmeNts anD pRoblEms assoCiated with the normaTIviTy of mental ascRipTionS ARe IntROdUCed In THis CONnection. The usuaL objectionS aGAiNst eliminaTIviSm Are then PresentEd: traNScendenTal argmneNts, introsPeCtivE ARguMents (such aS those apPealing to FIrst-pERsOn senSorY stateS), aNd fInallY argumENts Which Appeal To'StandaRdiseD rEgularitIes' in mental aptitude testS (resulTs froM SAt and GRE teSts ARe gIven as exaMpleS). The overalL arGumEnt agAinST the eLimiNAtIviST is thAt thE SystematiC ReSpoNSEs Humans make iN SUCh tEsts rEquIRe that MentAl state ascriptionS Have some explanAtorY MAd pRedICtivE vAlue (thus, the 'psyCho' PaRT Of 'psycho-FuNctionalism'). chapter 4 lOoKS at emPiricaL issueS associATEd WIth the ElimInaTivist staNce. raDIcal behAvIoURism (RB) Is chOsEn as
putationally; the debate i s only a m atter  wh atki nd o f fu nctionalism is best . And, for Rey, what i s req ui r ed i s  a  clas sical m o de l inwh ic h c og n it ion i s u ndersto od as comp uta ti ons over rep r es entationssto red in somet hin g like  a  la n guage  of  thou ght. H o wever,  Rey is p er h aps un i que amo n g  f unct ionalists in thin k in g  that no curre nt com pu t at i o nal  th eory of mi nd  on o f fer isq ui t e upt o doing the j ob. The boo k  ha s twel ve  ch a ptersinclu di n g a  brief intr oduc tion. The  intro d uctions ets out  diffe ren ces  bet w ee nexp la n ati o n,  on t olo gy, andor di narytalk , e x plai nstheovera ll cognitivesci ence ent erpri se, a nd g iv es auseful  chap te r smnmary. Chap ter1 outline s t he  th re e mai n  metap hys ica l appro aches:r edu ct i o n is m, dualism, and el im i n at ivism, a s well as  e x plaining  s ome  imp o r tantkeyt er ms: prop ositio n al  a ttitude s,  quali ta tiv e s tates ,  int ention ality/in tensi o nality, types/ t okens, and re f er e n ce .  Itals o outlineshis' grou nd r u le s'( p. 6)  whic ha  g o od theory of mind s ho uld fo llow,  a eharacteri sation whi c h guides l ater di s cussion--'Theneedfor fairne s s', 'The  need  for non -tendenti o u s eviden ce' , a ndthe v al ue of constit u t ivede finitio nsand ana lys isinrel at ion to ph ilosophi ca lan demp irica l  researc h.  Ch ap ter  2 co n centra tes o n th e't e mpt ations' of d uali sm  a nd l ook sat it  num b erof ment al phenom ena whic hse em to c orroborate th edualists'ca se:  the n a t ure of r ationality, privacy, fr e e-will,  th e non -spa tial andint ention alc haract er ofthoug ht s,a n d the e ss ent ia lly mental a ndsubje ct ivecharact er of experience.T henature of phy sic alis t re duc t io n , i de n tit y ,  and the Leibni z law argm ne n ts  are clear l y e xp lained,  as wel l ast he rele vance of'explanat or y ga p s ' t o the dual ists' ca se. Chapt e r 3 d e ve lopsphi losoph ic alargum ents a g ain st du alismfr mn anelimi na tivist p erspective. Causal gapargume nts a ndproblemsass o cia ted withthenormativit y o f m ental  as c ripti onsa re  in t roduc ed i n  this con n ec tio n .  T he usual ob j e c tio ns ag ain s t elim inat ivism are then pr e sented: transc ende n t alarg m nent s,  introspective  ar gu m e nts (suc has those ap pealingto first -perso n sens ory sta t e s) ,  and f inal lyarguments  wh ic h  appeal  t o' s tandar dise dregula rities '  inm e ntal aptitude te sts ( r e sults fro m SAT  a nd GREt ests  are given  as example s). Th e ov erall  argume nt  again stth e eliminat i vist is t hat t he syst em atic  re sponse s hu m a ns ma ke i nsuc h tests r e q ui r eth a t m enta l sta te  asc riptionsh ave some  ex p lanator ymad p redict i ve v alue (thus , t he 'p s y cho' parto f 'p s yc h o-fun ctiona lism') . Chapt e r 4  l ooks at  em p i rical iss ues assoc i ate dwith  the eli mi nati vi stst ance. Radical b ehaviour ism (RB) i s chos ena s
putationally; the_debate is_only a matter what_kind of_functionalism_is best._And,_for Rey, what_is required is_a classical model in_which cognition is_understood_as computations over representations stored in something like a language of thought. However, Rey_is_perhaps unique_among_functionalists_in thinking that no current_computational theory of mind on_offer is_quite up to doing the job. The book_has_twelve chapters including_a brief introduction. The introduction sets out differences between_explanation, ontology, and ordinary talk, explains_the overall cognitive_science_enterprise,_and gives a useful_chapter smnmary. Chapter 1 outlines the_three main metaphysical approaches: reductionism, dualism,_and eliminativism, as well as explaining some_important key terms: propositional attitudes, qualitative_states, intentionality/intensionality, types/tokens, and reference._It also_outlines his 'ground rules' (p._6) which a_good theory_of mind should_follow, a eharacterisation which guides later_discussion--'The need for_fairness', 'The need for non-tendentious evidence',_and_the value of_constitutive_definitions_and analysis_in relation to_philosophical_and empirical_research._Chapter 2 concentrates on the 'temptations'_of_dualism and looks at it number of_mental phenomena which seem_to_corroborate the dualists' case:_the nature of rationality, privacy,_free-will, the non-spatial and intentional character_of thoughts,_and the_essentially mental and subjective character of experience. The nature of physicalist_reduction, identity, and the Leibniz law_argmnents are clearly explained,_as well_as_the relevance of_'explanatory_gaps' to_the dualists' case. Chapter 3 develops philosophical_arguments against_dualism frmn an eliminativist perspective. Causal_gap arguments and problems_associated_with the normativity of mental ascriptions_are introduced in this connection. The_usual objections against eliminativism are_then_presented:_transcendental argmnents, introspective arguments (such_as those appealing to first-person sensory_states), and finally_arguments which appeal to'standardised regularities' in mental_aptitude_tests (results from SAT and GRE_tests_are given as examples). The overall_argument_against_the eliminativist is that the_systematic responses humans make in such_tests require that mental state ascriptions have some explanatory_mad predictive value_(thus, the 'psycho' part of_'psycho-functionalism')._Chapter_4 looks at empirical issues associated with the eliminativist stance._Radical behaviourism_(RB) is chosen_as