 occult qualities, which Duhem says 'explains nothing'. But in the third instance, 'to explain' refers to the explanation of all properties by clear principles. This double use of 'explanation' seems to suggest that Duhem may well allow an explanation that does not rely on any hidden causes, but aims at the kind of unification Newton offers by his laws. However, in the subsequent paragraph he seems to equate this sense of 'explanation' with geometric representation (représentation géométrique). Thanks to an anonymous reader for bringing this subtle point to our attention. Marie Gueguen and Stathis Psillos Anti-Scepticism and Epistemic Humility in Pierre Duhem's Philosophy of Science 61 the inheritance of all the valuable possessions of the old theory, whereas the explanatory part falls out in order to give way to another explanation. Thus, by virtue of a continuous tradition, each theory passes on to the one that follows it a share of the natural classification it was able to construct, as in certain ancient games each runner handed on the lighted torch to the courier ahead of him, and this continuous tradition assures a perpetuity of life and progress for science. This continuity of tradition is not visible to the superficial observer due to the constant breaking-out of explanations which arise only to be quelled. The metaphor of a relay in which the lighted torch is passed on from one runner to the next is very vivid. It highlights Duhem's belief in continuity; in the existence of a pattern of retention in the history of science. But the retention is limited to the representative parts of theories; the explanatory parts are supposed to have been abandoned and replaced by new explanations. For Duhem, the lighted torch of science is representation and not explanation. His favorite example was the theory of light-refraction. In Descartes's own work, the representative part was entirely subsumed under one law: the Snell-Descartes law, which asserts the constancy of the ratio between the sine of the angle of incidence and the sine of the angle of refraction of a light ray. This law is still accepted and can nowadays be found in any optics textbook. However, this representation of the phenomena of refraction was accompanied by an explanation of this phenomenon, where light was analyzed as being caused by a "pressure engendered by the rapid motion of incandescent bodies within a "subtle" matter penetrating all bodies" (1906, 33). This
occult qualities, which Duhem says' explains nothing'. But in the third case,' to explain' refer to the explanation of all properties by clear principles. This bivalent use of' explanation' seems to suggest that Duhem may well give up an explanation that does not rely on any hidden cause, but aims at the kind of unification Newton propose by his laws. However, in the subsequent paragraph he seems to equal this common sense of' explanation' with geometric representation (représentation géométrique). Thanks to an anonymous reader for bring this subtle point to our care. Marie Gueguen and Stathis Psillos Anti - Scepticism and Epistemic Humility in Pierre Duhem's Philosophy of Science 61 the inheritance of all the valuable possessions of the old theory, whereas the explanatory function falls out in order to afford way to another explanation. therefore, by virtue of a continuous custom, each theory passes on to the one that follows it a share of the lifelike classification it was able to construct, as in certain ancient games each runner handed on the lighted torch to the courier ahead of him, and this continuous tradition assures a perpetuity of life and progress for science. This continuity of tradition is not visible to the superficial observer due to the constant breakage - out of explanation which arise entirely to be squelch. The metaphor of a relay in which the lighted torch is passed on from one stolon to the next is very vivid. It highlights Duhem's belief in continuity; in the being of a pattern of retention in the history of science. But the retention is limited to the representative parts of hypothesis; the explanatory parts are supposed to have been abandoned and replaced by newfangled explanations. For Duhem, the fall torch of science is representation and not explanation. His favorite example was the hypothesis of light - refraction. In Descartes's own work, the representative part was entirely subsumed under one law: the Snell - Descartes law, which asserts the constancy of the proportion between the sine of the angle of incidence and the sine of the angle of refraction of a light ray. This jurisprudence is still accept and can nowadays be found in any eye textbook. However, this representation of the phenomena of deflection was accompanied by an explanation of this phenomenon, where light was analyzed as being caused by a " pressure beget by the rapid motion of incandescent bodies within a " subtle " matter penetrating all bodies " (1906, 33). This
 ocfult qualities, which Duhtm says 'explains uithing'. But ih the thkrd instance, 'to explain' refecs ti the explanation of all pruperties hy clear priiciples. This douume use of 'expmwnatnoi' seems to sugggst that Duham may well alnod cn explanation that does not rely on any hicdfn causes, but wims wt tgv jind of unification Newton ofrers by his laws. Howrver, in the subsequent parwgraoh he seems to equwte this sebse jd 'explanatiov' with geometric repreaentation (représentation géométriqje). Thcnks to an qninylmus reader hor brpnging this smntle pmint to our attention. Macie Tueguen and Stathis Pvillos Anti-Scepticysm and E[iatemic Humility ib Pierrg Duham's Oyilusokhy or Sciejce 61 the inheditance of qll the valuable poxsqwsions of the old trejry, whereas the explanatory part falls mut in order to give way ti another explanation. Thus, by dirtue of a continuous tradition, each theory passas on go uhc ube that follows it a share of the natural classyrivanion it was able bo construct, as in cfrywin ancient gxmes ecdh runner handed on hhe ligrted rorch to uhe cpurier ahead of him, and thiw continuous rradition assures c perpetuity of kife snd progress for sciencz. This continuity of tradifkon is not visibue no tve superficial observer duq to the ronstcnt breaying-put of explanatilns wmhch arise only to he quglled. Dhe metaphlr of a relay in which the lighvxd torch is pssved on from one vunner to the nqxt is very virid. It hnghligfts Duhem's belief in continuyty; in the exhdtence of a 'attern os rerentuon in gfe history of xcience. Blt the retention is limibed tu the representacnvt parts of theoroes; thq vxpkagdtory parts dre rupopsed go have beek acandpned and replaced by new explanations. For Cumem, the lughted tjrch of scienve is representatiln anv not xxplanstijn. His favorite example was ths theory lf jight-refractyon. Ln Dgscartes's ocn work, the representative part was enticely subsumed under ong law: the Snell-Descarjes law, which essertf the convtancy of the ratio vetween the sine pf the angle of incidsnce atd thf sine of the angle of refraction of a light ray. This law is still acceptwd and can nowadaya be foung nn cny optycs veetbook. However, thps representation of the phenomeia of refrdccion was accompanied by an exllxnation of thks phenomenon, where lighf was anslyzed as being caused by a "prexsure engendered by the vapid motuon or incandesrent bodies within a "subtlz" mattwr penerratlng all bodies" (1906, 33). Yhls
occult qualities, which Duhem says 'explains nothing'. the instance, 'to refers to the clear This double use 'explanation' seems to that Duhem may well allow an that does not rely on any hidden causes, but aims at the kind unification Newton offers by his laws. However, in the subsequent paragraph he seems equate sense 'explanation' geometric representation (représentation géométrique). Thanks to an anonymous reader for bringing this subtle point to our Marie Gueguen and Stathis Psillos Anti-Scepticism and Epistemic in Pierre Duhem's Philosophy Science 61 the inheritance of the possessions of old whereas explanatory part falls in order to give way to another explanation. Thus, by virtue of a continuous tradition, each theory on to that follows a of natural classification it to construct, as in certain ancient handed on the lighted torch to the courier of him, this continuous tradition assures a perpetuity life and progress for science. This continuity of is not visible to the superficial observer due to the constant breaking-out of explanations which to be quelled. The of a relay which lighted is on from runner to the next is very vivid. It highlights Duhem's belief continuity; in the existence of a pattern of retention in of But the retention limited to the representative of the explanatory parts are have abandoned new For the lighted torch of is representation and not explanation. favorite example was the own work, the representative part was entirely subsumed one law: the Snell-Descartes law, which asserts constancy of the ratio between the sine of the angle of incidence the sine angle of refraction of a light ray. This is still accepted and nowadays be found in any optics textbook. However, this of phenomena of was accompanied by explanation of this where light was being caused a engendered motion of incandescent bodies within a matter all bodies" (1906, 33). This
 occult qualities, which Duhem Says 'explaiNs notHinG'. BuT iN the ThirD instance, 'to expLAin' rEfers to the explanation oF all pRoPErtiES bY cleaR princiPLeS. tHis DoUbLe uSe OF 'eXplanAtiOn' seems To suggest tHat duHem may well alLOw An explanatIon That does not rEly On any hIdDen CAuses, But Aims aT the kiND of uniFication NEwTOn offeRS by his lAWS. HOwevEr, in the subsequent PArAGraph he seems to Equate ThIS sENSe oF 'exPlanation' wItH geomETric repREsENTAtiON (représentatiOn géométriqUE). ThAnks to An AnoNYmous rEader FoR BriNging this suBtle Point to ouR attenTIon. MariE gueguen And StaThiS PsIlloS anTi-scePtICisM AnD EpISteMic HumilItY iN PierRe DuHEM'S philOsoPhy oF ScieNce 61 the inheritAncE of aLL thE valuAble pOsseSsIons oF the olD theoRy, Whereas the explaNatoRy part falLs oUt In oRdEr to gIVe way tO anOthEr explaNation. THUs, bY vIRTUe Of a continuous tradiTiON, EaCh theory Passes ON tO tHE one that FoLloWs it A SHare oF the NAtUral clasSificaTIoN iT was ablE tO constRuCt, aS in CertaIN ancIent gaMes each rUnner HAnded on the lighTEd torch to the cOUrIER aHEad oF hiM, and this conTinuOUs trAditIOn AssURes a pErpetUiTY oF Life and progress for sCiEnce. ThIs conTinuity of tradItion is not VISIble to thE supERfICial observer duE to thE constant bREaking-ouT of exPlanatioNs which arISE only to bE quEllEd. THe mETApHor of a relay in WHIch tHe Lighted TorCh is pasSed On fRom One RuNner to the Next is veRy ViViD. IT hiGhligHTs Duhem's BeLieF iN coNtinuITy; in thE exisTencE oF a PAttErn of reTEnTIOn in ThE hIstoRy oF sCiencE. But THe rEtentioN is limiteD to THe rePrEsEntativE parts of theorIeS; the explanAtOry Parts aRE Supposed To have been abandoned and rEPlaced bY neW explAnatIons. For DuHem, The ligHteD Torch oF scienCe is rEpResENTatioN ANd Not ExPlanation. HIS FavOrite ExAmplE was the Theory of light-refraCTioN. In Descartes's Own Work, THE rEprESeNTatIvE ParT WAs entirely subsuMed under onE lAW: tHe Snell-DesCArtEs Law, whicH assertS the cONstancy Of the ratiO between tHe Sine OF The Angle of incIdence anD the sine oF The anGLe Of refRacTion of A lIghT ray. THis law IS stIll acCepted AnD can noWadayS bE found in Any optics textbook. HoweveR, this rEpresEntAtion of thE phENomEna of refrActiOn was accomPanIed By an eXplANatioN of tHIs PheNOmenoN, wheRE light was ANaLyzED As Being caused BY A "PreSsure EngENdered By thE rapid motion of incANdescent bodies WithIN A "suBtlE" MattEr Penetrating all BodIeS" (1906, 33). tHis
 occult qualities, which D uhem says'expl ain s n ot hing '. B ut in the thir d  ins tance, 'to explain' re fersto thee xp lanat ion ofa ll p rop er ti esby cl ear p rin ciples.  This doub leus e of 'explan a ti on' seemstosuggest that  Du hem ma ywel l  allo w a n exp lanati o n that  does not  r e ly ona ny hidd e n  c ause s, but aims at th e  k i nd of unificat ion Ne wt o no f fer s b y his laws .Howev e r, in t h es u b seq u ent paragraph  he seems t o  eq uate t hi s s e nse of  'exp la n ati on' with ge omet ric repre sentat i on (rep r ésentat ion gé omé tri que) .  T ha nks  t o  an an ony m ous  readerfo rbring ingt h i s  sub tle  poi nt to  our attentio n.Mari e  Gu eguen  andStat hi s Psi llos A nti-S ce pticism and Epi stem ic Humili tyin  Pi er re Du h em's P hil oso phy ofScience 61th e i nh eritance of all th ev a lu able pos sessio n sof the oldth eor y, w h e reasthee xp lanatory  partf al ls  out in  o rder t ogiv e w ay to anot her ex planatio n. Th u s, by virtue o f  a continuous tr a d it i on,eac h theory pa sses on t o th e  o net hat f ollow si ta  share of the natur al  class ifica tion it was a ble to con s t r uct, asin c e rt a in ancient gam es ea ch runnerh anded on  thelightedtorch tot h e courie r a hea d o f h i m ,and this cont i n uous  t raditio n a ssuresa p erp etu ity  o f life an d progre ss  f or  s cie nce.T his cont in uit yoftradi t ion is  notvisi bl et o t he supe r fi c i al o bs er verdue  t o the  con s tan t break ing-out o f e x plan at io ns whic h arise onlyto  be quelle d.  Th e meta p h or of arelay in which the ligh t ed torc h i s pas sedon from o nerunner  to the ne xt isveryvi vid . It hi g h li ght sDuhem's be l i efin co nt inui ty; inthe existence of a pat tern of reten tio n in t he  hi s to r y o fs cie n c e. But the rete ntion is l im i te d to the r e pre se ntative  partsof th e ories;the expla natory pa rt s ar e sup posed to h ave been  abandone d  andr ep laced  by  new e xp lan ation s. For Duh em, t he lig ht ed tor ch of  s cience i s representation and no t expl anati on.  His favo rit e  ex ample was  the  theory of  li ght -refr act i on. I n De s ca rte s 's ow n wo r k, the re p re sen t a ti ve part was e n tir ely s ubs u med un derone law: the Snel l -Descartes law , wh i c h a sse r ts t he  constancy ofthe  r a t io betwe en  the sine o f the an gl e  of i nciden ce and  the si n e  o f  the a ngle  of  refracti onof a light  r ay .  Thislawis  still  accep t ed a n d  can nowadays be  foun d in an y  op ticste xtbook. Howe ver, thisrepresentat ion of  the  phen omena o frefrac tio nwas accomp a nied by a n exp lanatio nof t his  pheno meno n ,  wher e li gh t w as analyz e d  a s  b ei n g c ause d bya"pre ssure eng e ndered b y t h e rapid  m oti o n  of in c an d e scent bodi eswithi n a "subtle" matt e rp enetr atingall bo dies" ( 1 906 ,33). Th is
 occult_qualities, which_Duhem says 'explains nothing'._But in_the_third instance,_'to_explain' refers to_the explanation of_all properties by clear_principles. This double_use_of 'explanation' seems to suggest that Duhem may well allow an explanation that does_not_rely on_any_hidden_causes, but aims at the_kind of unification Newton offers_by his_laws. However, in the subsequent paragraph he seems_to_equate this sense_of 'explanation' with geometric representation (représentation géométrique). Thanks to_an anonymous reader for bringing this_subtle point to_our_attention._Marie Gueguen and Stathis_Psillos Anti-Scepticism and Epistemic Humility in_Pierre Duhem's Philosophy of Science 61_the inheritance of all the valuable possessions_of the old theory, whereas the_explanatory part falls out in_order to_give way to another explanation._Thus, by virtue_of a_continuous tradition, each_theory passes on to the one_that follows it_a share of the natural classification_it_was able to_construct,_as_in certain_ancient games each_runner_handed on_the_lighted torch to the courier ahead_of_him, and this continuous tradition assures a_perpetuity of life and_progress_for science. This continuity_of tradition is not visible_to the superficial observer due to_the constant_breaking-out of_explanations which arise only to be quelled. The metaphor of a_relay in which the lighted torch_is passed on from_one runner_to_the next is_very_vivid. It_highlights Duhem's belief in continuity; in the_existence of_a pattern of retention in the_history of science. But_the_retention is limited to the representative_parts of theories; the explanatory parts_are supposed to have been_abandoned_and_replaced by new explanations. For_Duhem, the lighted torch of science_is representation and_not explanation. His favorite example was the_theory_of light-refraction. In Descartes's own work,_the_representative part was entirely subsumed under_one_law:_the Snell-Descartes law, which asserts_the constancy of the ratio between_the sine of the angle of incidence and the_sine of the_angle of refraction of a_light_ray._This law is still accepted and can nowadays be found_in any_optics textbook. However,_this representation of the phenomena of refraction was accompanied by_an explanation of this phenomenon, where light_was analyzed as being caused by a "pressure engendered by the_rapid motion of incandescent bodies within a "subtle"_matter penetrating all bodies" (1906, 33). This