 and cosmology. Roberto Estrada Olguin – Bon Sens and Noûs 117 directing: "In this work of successive retouch-ups which a first idea, necessarily risky and often false, ends up developing a fruitful hypothesis, the deductive method and intuition play one another their role; but here it is much more complex and more difficult define this role that in a science of reasoning" (Duhem 1915, 27). In this way, notions richer in content, but less accurate and less analyzed that the notions of the science of reasoning are produced for the joined role of deductive and intuition methods: the rules of logic are not effective enough to be able to reason about these notions, they must be supported by "a kind of sense of fairness which is one of the forms of good sense" (Duhem 1915, 28).11 The Philosophical Aspect First, in the criticism by Abel Rey, not of the physical but of the scientific philosophy of Duhem, he accuses him of doing metaphysics by taking as a starting point a determined notion of human knowledge. In fact, Rey said that Duhem has succumbed to the temptation of metaphysics, having on his head a preconceived idea of the value, of the limits and of the nature of science. Duhem responds, in "The physics of a believer", that his "physical system" by its origins and its consequences is positive. Of this to succumb to the common temptation, Rey may conclude that:12 Unless we limit science to nothing but the collection of empirical recipes – and even this pretension, isn't the result conscious of a metaphysical tendency? – at times the metaphysical problems are so close to the great scientific questions; the human spirit is so eager to prolong its curiosity by imagining new whys it is chimerical and abstract to want to put an insurmountable, and above all unsurpassed, gap between science and metaphysics. (Rey 1904, 733)13 Does Duhem put an insurmountable gap between science and metaphysics? It does not appear, but it distinguishes the science of metaphysics because it discusses their mutual independence and autonomy. But before arguing in favor of the negative answer to this question, let's ask: what is the basis on which the autonomy between science and metaphysics rests? The answer to this question is found in article "Physique et métaphysique" of 1893, which sets forth the following which supports the view of Abel Rey before mentioned: human beings do not
and cosmology. Roberto Estrada Olguin – Bon Sens and Noûs 117 directing: " In this work of successive retouch - ups which a first idea, inevitably hazardous and often false, end up evolve a fruitful hypothesis, the deductive method and intuition dally one another their role; but here it is much more complex and more unmanageable define this function that in a science of reasoning " (Duhem 1915, 27). In this room, notions richer in capacity, but less accurate and less analyze that the notions of the science of reasoning are produced for the joined role of deductive and intuition method: the rules of logic are not effective enough to be able to reason about these notions, they must be hold by " a kind of sense of fairness which is one of the forms of good common sense " (Duhem 1915, 28).11 The Philosophical Aspect First, in the criticism by Abel Rey, not of the physical but of the scientific doctrine of Duhem, he accuses him of doing metaphysics by taking as a starting degree a determined notion of human knowledge. In fact, Rey said that Duhem has succumbed to the enticement of metaphysics, hold on his head a preconceived idea of the value, of the limits and of the nature of science. Duhem responds, in " The physics of a believer ", that his " physical system " by its beginning and its consequences is positive. Of this to yield to the coarse enticement, Rey may conclude that:12 Unless we limit science to nothing but the collection of empirical recipes – and even this pretension, isn't the result conscious of a metaphysical inclination? – at times the metaphysical problems are so close to the great scientific questions; the human intent is so eager to prolong its curiosity by imagining new why s it is chimeric and abstract to want to arrange an insuperable, and above all unexcelled, gap between science and metaphysics. (Rey 1904, 733)13 Does Duhem put an insurmountable gap between science and metaphysics? It does not appear, but it distinguishes the skill of metaphysics because it discusses their reciprocal independence and autonomy. But before arguing in favor of the minus answer to this motion, let's ask: what is the footing on which the autonomy between science and metaphysics rests? The answer to this question is find in article " Physique et métaphysique " of 1893, which sets forth the pursuit which supports the view of Abel Rey before mentioned: human organism do not
 anf cosmology. Roberto Estrxda Olguin – Bon Sens aid Noûs 117 directivg: "In this work of successivx rerouch-yps which a first idea, necessarply risky and iften falsx, ends ui devspopiug a fruitful hykothesis, the deductive metvoa cnd intuition play one another their role; bit here it is mush mpwe ckmplex and more difficult define tgis rolt that in a sciencr of reasoning" (Duhem 1915, 27). In hhis way, notions richeg in contenj, bue less accurage and less analyzed tgat the notions of the science uf recsoning are peodkwed for the joinvd role of deductive dnd intiition methods: thx ruoes of logic are not xffective enough to fe able tm xeason about these noriins, tvey kust ve rupkorved by "a ninv of sense kf fairness which is one of tht fjgks of good ssnse" (Dthqm 1915, 28).11 The Philosophical Aspect First, in uhe cditicism by Abel Rey, nor of the physical but of the ssientific philosophy of Duhem, he accuses him of dming jdtakhnfkxs by taking as a starting point a determined njfipn of human knowjedge. In favt, Rri said that Dufem has shccumbed to the telptatiog of netaphysiss, hsving on his head a preconcwived idea oy tye value, of the lilits and of the natute of science. Duhem res'onds, jn "The physlcs of a gdliever", that his "phjsicdl system" by its origins agd its coisequznces is posotive. Jf this to succmkb to the common tfmptajion, Ray may conflude that:12 Unless we limit scieire to nothing bgt nhe colleetion pf empirical wecipes – and eren this pretdnsion, isn'n the resnlt consciouf of a metaphfdical tendenry? – at tiies rhe netaphyrkcal problems sre so close to the great scientific auerfions; the human spurit is so eaget tu pwopoig itf curiosity bf imxgivong ndw whys it ls zhimrrical and abstract do wznt to put an insutmjuntable, and abode all unsurpsssed, gap between dcienre and metalhyfics. (Rey 1904, 733)13 Does Duhem put an ihsurmountwblc gap between scicnce and metapkysics? It does not appear, but it distingnishes the science of mwtaphysics because nt discusses vheir iutual ingependence and autonimy. But before arnuing in favor of the hegatiee andwer to this question, let's ask: what is the basis on which the autonomy berween science and jetalhysibs xescs? The wnswxr to this questiom is found in article "Physique xt métaphyshqbe" of 1893, which sets forth the fpluowing which rupports the view of Abem Rey begore mentioned: human beings do mot
and cosmology. Roberto Estrada Olguin – Bon Noûs directing: "In work of successive necessarily and often false, up developing a hypothesis, the deductive method and intuition one another their role; but here it is much more complex and more define this role that in a science of reasoning" (Duhem 1915, 27). In way, richer content, less accurate and less analyzed that the notions of the science of reasoning are produced for joined role of deductive and intuition methods: the of logic are not enough to be able to about notions, they be by kind of sense fairness which is one of the forms of good sense" (Duhem 1915, 28).11 The Philosophical Aspect First, the criticism Rey, not the but the scientific philosophy he accuses him of doing metaphysics a starting point a determined notion of human In fact, said that Duhem has succumbed to temptation of metaphysics, having on his head a idea of the value, of the limits and of the nature of science. Duhem responds, physics of a believer", his "physical system" its and consequences positive. Of to succumb to the common temptation, Rey may conclude that:12 Unless limit science to nothing but the collection of empirical recipes even pretension, isn't the conscious of a metaphysical – times the metaphysical problems close the the spirit so eager to prolong curiosity by imagining new whys is chimerical and abstract insurmountable, and above all unsurpassed, gap between science metaphysics. (Rey 1904, 733)13 Does Duhem put insurmountable gap between science and metaphysics? It does not appear, but it the science because it discusses their mutual independence and autonomy. before arguing in favor the negative answer to this question, let's ask: what the on which autonomy between science metaphysics rests? The to this question in article et of forth the following which supports the of Rey before mentioned: human beings not
 and cosmology. Roberto EstradA Olguin – Bon sens aNd NOûs 117 DiRectIng: "IN this work of sucCEssiVe retouch-ups which a firsT idea, NeCEssaRIlY riskY and oftEN fALSe, eNdS uP deVeLOpIng a fRuiTful hypOthesis, the DedUcTive method anD InTuition plaY onE another theiR roLe; but hErE it IS much MorE compLex and MOre difFicult defInE This roLE that in A SCiEnce Of reasoning" (Duhem 1915, 27). IN ThIS way, notions ricHer in cOnTEnT, BUt lEss Accurate anD lEss anALyzed thAT tHE NOtiONs of the sciencE of reasoninG Are ProducEd For THe joinEd rolE oF DedUctive and inTuitIon methodS: the ruLEs of logIC are not EffectIve EnoUgh tO Be AbLe tO rEAsoN AbOut THesE notions, ThEy Must bE supPORTEd by "A kiNd of Sense Of fairness whiCh iS one OF thE formS of goOd seNsE" (DuheM 1915, 28).11 The PhIlosoPhIcal Aspect First, In thE criticisM by abEl REy, Not of THe physIcaL buT of the sCientifIC phIlOSOPhY of Duhem, he accuses hIm OF DoIng metapHysics BY tAkINg as a staRtIng PoinT A DeterMineD NoTion of huMan knoWLeDgE. In fact, reY said tHaT DuHem Has suCCumbEd to thE temptatIon of MEtaphysics, haviNG on his head a prECoNCEiVEd idEa oF the value, of The lIMits And oF ThE naTUre of ScienCe. dUhEM responds, in "The physiCs Of a belIever", That his "physicAl system" by ITS Origins aNd itS CoNSequences is posItive. of this to suCCumb to thE commOn temptaTion, Rey maY COnclude tHat:12 unlEss We lIMIt Science to nothING but ThE collecTioN of empiRicAl rEciPes – AnD even this PretensiOn, IsN't ThE reSult cONscious oF a MetApHysIcal tENdency? – At timEs thE mEtAPhySical prOBlEMS are So ClOse tO thE gReat sCienTIfiC questiOns; the humAn sPIrit Is So Eager to Prolong its curIoSity by imagInIng New whyS IT is chimeRical and abstract to want tO Put an inSurMountAble, And above aLl uNsurpaSseD, Gap betWeen scIence AnD meTAPhysiCS. (reY 1904, 733)13 DoEs duhem put an INSurMountAbLe gaP betweeN science and metaphySIcs? it does not appeAr, bUt it DIStIngUIsHEs tHe SCieNCE of metaphysics bEcause it diScUSsEs their mutUAl iNdEpendenCe and auTonomY. but befoRe arguing In favor of ThE negATIve Answer to thIs questiOn, let's ask: WHat is THe Basis On wHich thE aUtoNomy bEtween SCieNce anD metapHySics reSts? ThE aNswer to tHis question is found in artIcle "PhYsiquE et MétaphysiQue" OF 1893, whIch sets foRth tHe followinG whIch SuppoRts THe vieW of ABEl rey BEfore MentIOned: human BEiNgs DO NoT
 and cosmology. Roberto Es trada Olgu in –Bon  Se ns  and  Noû s 117 directin g : "I n this work of success ive r et o uch- u ps  whic h a fir s ti d ea,  n ec ess ar i ly  risk y a nd ofte n false, e nds  u p developing afruitful h ypo thesis, theded uctive  m eth o d and  in tuiti on pla y  one a nother th ei r  role; but her e it  ismuch more complex an d  more difficul t defi ne th i s  ro lethat in asc ience of reas o ni n g "  (D u hem 1915, 27) . In this w a y,notion sric h er inconte nt ,  bu t less accu rate  and less  analy z ed that the not ions o f t hescie n ce  o f r ea s oni n gare pro duced fo rth e joi nedr o l e  ofded ucti ve an d intuition m eth ods: the  rule s oflogi care n ot eff ectiv eenough to be ab le t o reasonabo ut  th es e not i ons, t hey  mu st be s upporte d  by  " a k in d of sense of fair ne s s  w hich isone of th ef orms ofgo odsens e "  (Duh em 1 9 15 , 28).11  The P h il os ophical  A spectFi rst , i n the crit icismby AbelRey,n ot of the phys i cal but of th e  s c i en t ific  ph ilosophy of  Duh e m, h e ac c us esh im of  doin gm et a physics by taking a sa star tingpoint a deter mined noti o n of human  kno w le d ge. In fact, R ey sa id that Du h em has s uccum bed to t he tempta t i on of me tap hys ics , h a v in g on his head a  pre co nceived  id ea of t heval ue,  of  t he limits  and ofth ena tu reof sc i ence. Du he m r es pon ds, i n  "Thephysi cs o fab eli ever",t ha t his"p hy sica l s ys tem"by i t s o riginsand its c ons e quen ce sis posi tive. Of this  t o succumbto  th e comm o n  temptat ion, Rey may conclude t h at:12 U nle ss we  lim it scienc e t o noth ing but th e coll ectio nofe m piric a l  r eci pe s – and ev e n  th is pr et ensi on, isn 't the result cons c iou s of a metaph ysi calt e nd enc y ?–  at  t i mes t he metaphysical  problemsar e  s o close to the  g reat sc ientifi c que s tions;the human  spirit i sso e a g erto prolong  its cur iosity by imagi n in g new  wh ys itis  ch imeri cal an d  ab strac t to w an t to p ut an  i nsurmoun table, and above all un surpas sed,gap  betweensci e nce  and meta phys ics. (Rey190 4,733)1 3 D o es Du hemp ut  an insur moun t able gapb et wee n sc ience and m e t a phy sics?  It does n ot a ppear, but it dis t inguishes thescie n c e o f m e taph ys ics because it  di sc u s ses thei rmutual inde pendence  a n d aut onomy.  But b efore a r g ui n g in f avor  of  the nega tiv ea nswer t oth i s ques tion ,let'sask: w h at i s the basis on whi ch th e auton o mybetwe en  scienc e  and  metaphysi cs rests? T he ans werto th is ques ti on isfou nd  in articl e  "Physiqu e etmétaphy si que"  of  1893,  whi c h  sets  for th  th e followi n g  w h ic hs upp orts  thevi ew o f Abel Re y  beforemen t ioned:hu man b eingsd on o t
 and_cosmology. Roberto_Estrada Olguin – Bon_Sens and_Noûs_117 directing:_"In_this work of_successive retouch-ups which_a first idea, necessarily_risky and often_false,_ends up developing a fruitful hypothesis, the deductive method and intuition play one another_their_role; but_here_it_is much more complex and_more difficult define this role_that in_a science of reasoning" (Duhem 1915, 27). In_this_way, notions richer_in content, but less accurate and less analyzed that_the notions of the science of_reasoning are produced_for_the_joined role of deductive_and intuition methods: the rules of_logic are not effective enough to_be able to reason about these notions,_they must be supported by "a_kind of sense of fairness_which is_one of the forms of_good sense" (Duhem_1915, 28).11_The Philosophical Aspect_First, in the criticism by Abel_Rey, not of_the physical but of the scientific_philosophy_of Duhem, he_accuses_him_of doing_metaphysics by taking_as_a starting_point_a determined notion of human knowledge._In_fact, Rey said that Duhem has succumbed_to the temptation of_metaphysics,_having on his head_a preconceived idea of the_value, of the limits and of_the nature_of science._Duhem responds, in "The physics of a believer", that his "physical_system" by its origins and its_consequences is positive. Of_this to_succumb_to the common_temptation,_Rey may_conclude that:12 Unless we limit science to_nothing but_the collection of empirical recipes –_and even this pretension,_isn't_the result conscious of a metaphysical_tendency? – at times the metaphysical_problems are so close to_the_great_scientific questions; the human spirit_is so eager to prolong its_curiosity by imagining_new whys it is chimerical and abstract_to_want to put an insurmountable, and_above_all unsurpassed, gap between science and_metaphysics._(Rey_1904, 733)13 Does Duhem put_an insurmountable gap between science and_metaphysics? It does not appear, but it distinguishes the_science of metaphysics_because it discusses their mutual_independence_and_autonomy. But before arguing in favor of the negative answer_to this_question, let's ask:_what is the basis on which the autonomy between science_and metaphysics rests? The answer to this_question is found in article "Physique et métaphysique" of 1893, which_sets forth the following which supports the view_of Abel Rey before mentioned: human beings_do not