 If there are no unjustified justifiers in this sense, does that entail that the justification of belief must have either of these two structures: continuing in a regress, or cohering with other mental states? Siegel/Epistemic Charge 19 No. If epistemic charge were phenomenally grounded, then the overall structure of justification could be in many respects the way that foundationalists took it to be. Phenomenal grounds could introduce self--‐justifying experiences. These experiences would be similar in one respect to the traditional 'unjustified justifiers': nothing else would justify them. But rather than being epistemically neutral, these experiences would be epistemically charged by their own features. If at least some self--‐charged experience are self--‐charged positively, then they can play one of the roles of unjustified justifiers: they contribute to justification, without needing to be justified by anything else. They could be self--‐justifying justifiers. Could a belief be immediately justified by a positively charged experience? A subject S's belief that p is immediately justified by an experience, just in case there need be no further propositions that S must be justified in believing from a source other than the experience, in order for the experience to justify her in believing that P – or if there are, being justified in believing those propositions need not play a role in S's getting justification to believe P from her experience. Consider first whether an experience with content P could immediately justify a belief that P. Here, there won't be any other proposition besides P that S has to be justified in believing, in order for her experience to justify her in believing that P. Even if the p--‐experience came to have its positive charge in part by the influence of antecedent psychological state with content p*, it is an open possibility that the p--‐ experience could justify believing that p, without relying on justification for believing p*. For instance, the increment of positive charge bestowed by presentational phenomenology might be enough to provide justification for believing p, and the psychological antecedents might be responsible for providing an increment of positive charge that goes beyond what is needed. On this scenario, the experience with content P could provide immediate justification for believing p. The situation is no different when we consider the role of a positively epistemically charged experience with content p (a p--‐experience) in justifying a subject in believing a different proposition q. Even if justification from the p--‐experience for believing p plays a role in providing the justification for believing
If there are no unjustified justifiers in this sense, does that fee-tail that the justification of impression must receive either of these two structures: continue in a regression, or cohering with other mental state of matter? Siegel / Epistemic Charge 19 No. If epistemic charge were phenomenally ground, then the overall structure of justification could be in many respects the room that foundationalists took it to be. Phenomenal grounds could insert self--‐justifying experiences. These experiences would be similar in one respect to the traditional' unjustified justifiers': nothing else would apologize them. But rather than being epistemically neutral, these experiences would be epistemically charge by their own features. If at least some self--‐charged experience are self--‐charged positively, then they can play one of the roles of unjustified apologist: they contribute to justification, without want to be justified by anything else. They could be self--‐justifying justifiers. Could a belief be immediately justify by a positively charged experience? A subject S's belief that p is immediately justified by an experience, barely in case there need be no further propositions that S must be justified in believing from a source other than the experience, in order for the experience to justify her in believing that P – or if there embody, being justified in believing those proposition need not bet a role in S's getting justification to think P from her experience. see first whether an experience with content P could immediately apologize a belief that P. Here, there won't be any other proposition besides P that S has to be justified in believing, in order for her experience to justify her in believing that P. Even if the p--‐experience came to give birth its cocksure charge in part by the influence of antecedent psychological state with content p *, it is an open hypothesis that the p--‐ experience could justify believing that p, without relying on justification for believing p *. For instance, the increment of positive bang bestowed by presentational phenomenology might be adequate to provide justification for believing p, and the psychological antecedents might be responsible for supply an increment of cocksure charge that proceed beyond what is needed. On this scenario, the experience with content P could provide immediate justification for believing p. The position is no different when we consider the role of a positively epistemically charged experience with content p (a p--‐experience) in justifying a subject in believing a unlike proposition q. Even if justification from the p--‐experience for believing phosphorus plays a role in providing the justification for believe
 If there are no unjustifiea justifiers in this sxnse, doss that dntail that the justificatioi of belity must have either ow these tao strucrurew: continuinj in a rcyress, lr cmiering with othgr mental stdtes? Siegel/Epivtdmnc Charge 19 No. If epistemic charge wewe phenpmfnally groundeq, thtn ehe knevall structure of justification dould bt in many respects the way that foundationallsts took it to be. Phejomenal groohds xould introdjce self--‐justifying expgriences. These experiences would be snmilar in obe redkect to the vraditponal 'unjustinped jusdifiers': nothing else eound hustify them. But rathxr than being episteiically naucral, these experiencew qould be apisgwmizalmy cgarged by their own features. Id at least some selg--‐crqrged experiehce arq felf--‐charged positively, then they can pldy kne of the roles of unjystified justifiers: tjey contrybute to justification, without needing to be justhfied cy cknthivt flse. They could be self--‐justifying justifiers. Skukd a belief be iimediately kudtosied by a posktivelv cgarged experience? W subjest S's belief trat l is immediately justified vy an experivnce, just in case therz need be no furjher ptopositions that S must be nustified ij believihe from a source uthvr tvan the tbperience, in ordew for the expzrience go jostify rer in bellevinn that P – or if thege arg, beinc justifief in believing those propositioix need not pkaf a role in S's gctting justificwtion to beliere P froi her experiencv. Considec first whetrer an experiajce with convent P cotld ummeeiately gustify a belirf that P. Here, therw won't be any othev prokoaition besides ' uhqt S has to be jurtisivd mn bejheving, in orger wor ner ebperience ti jusyify her in believinc thzt P. Even if the p--‐rxierience xame to rave its posiyive charge in paru by tie infuuencr os antecedent psychological stafe with clntcnt p*, it is ag opcn pjssibility that the p--‐ experience could justify beoieving that p, wijhout relying on justnflcation for uelievyng p*. For instance, the incremwnt of positive cmarge bestowed by pressntatimnal ohenomenology might be enough to provide justification for believing p, ane the 'srchological antrcedettf might be cerponsible for prpviding an increment of positivx charge tvac goes beyond what is needed. Pn this scenariu, the experience with cohtent P vould provide immediate justifivation for believing p. Tme situatuon ia no dprfxrent when we considrr the role of a pisitlvely epistemizalky charged fxpecieuce with content p (a p--‐experience) un jusrivying a subject mn believing x difrerent proposition q. Eben jv jusjification frok the p--‐experiemce for believing p ilars a role in pekviding the kustifibation for bekieving
If there are no unjustified justifiers in does entail that justification of belief two continuing in a or cohering with mental states? Siegel/Epistemic Charge 19 No. epistemic charge were phenomenally grounded, then the overall structure of justification could be many respects the way that foundationalists took it to be. Phenomenal grounds could self--‐justifying These would similar in one respect to the traditional 'unjustified justifiers': nothing else would justify them. But rather being epistemically neutral, these experiences would be epistemically by their own features. at least some self--‐charged experience self--‐charged then they play of roles of unjustified they contribute to justification, without needing to be justified by anything else. They could be self--‐justifying justifiers. a belief justified by positively experience? subject S's belief is immediately justified by an experience, there need be no further propositions that S be justified believing from a source other than experience, in order for the experience to justify in believing that P – or if there are, being justified in believing those propositions play a role in getting justification to P her Consider whether an with content P could immediately justify a belief that P. Here, won't be any other proposition besides P that S has justified believing, in order her experience to justify in that P. Even if came have in by influence of antecedent psychological with content p*, it is open possibility that the that p, without relying on justification for believing For instance, the increment of positive charge by presentational phenomenology might be enough to provide justification for believing p, the psychological be responsible for providing an increment of positive that goes beyond what needed. On this scenario, the experience with content P provide justification for p. The situation no different when consider the role positively epistemically experience content in justifying a subject in believing different q. Even if justification from p--‐experience p plays a role in providing the justification for believing
 If there are no unjustified juStifiers in This sEnsE, doEs That EntaIl that the justiFIcatIon of belief must have eitHer of ThESe twO StRuctuRes: contINuING in A rEgResS, oR CoHerinG wiTh other Mental statEs? SIeGel/Epistemic cHaRge 19 No. If epiSteMic charge werE phEnomenAlLy gROundeD, thEn the OveralL StructUre of justIfICation COuld be iN MAnY resPects the way that foUNdATionalists took It to be. phENoMENal GroUnds could iNtRoducE Self--‐jusTIfYING exPEriences. These Experiences WOulD be simIlAr iN One resPect tO tHE trAditional 'unJustIfied justIfiers': NOthing eLSe would JustifY thEm. BUt raTHeR tHan BeINg ePIsTemICalLy neutraL, tHeSe expErieNCES WoulD be EpisTemicAlly charged by TheIr owN FeaTures. if at lEast SoMe selF--‐chargEd expErIence are self--‐chaRged PositivelY, thEn TheY cAn plaY One of tHe rOleS of unjuStified JUstIfIERS: tHey contribute to jusTiFICaTion, withOut neeDInG tO Be justifIeD by AnytHINg elsE. TheY CoUld be selF--‐justiFYiNg JustifiErS. Could A bEliEf bE immeDIateLy justIfied by a PositIVely charged expERience? A subjecT s's BELiEF thaT p iS immediatelY jusTIfieD by aN ExPerIEnce, jUst in CaSE tHEre need be no further pRoPositiOns thAt S must be justIfied in belIEVIng from a SourCE oTHer than the expeRiencE, in order foR The experIence To justifY her in belIEVing that p – or If tHerE arE, BEiNg justified in BELievInG those pRopOsitionS neEd nOt pLay A rOle in S's geTting jusTiFiCaTiOn tO beliEVe P from hEr ExpErIenCe. ConSIder fiRst whEtheR aN eXPerIence wiTH cONTent p cOuLd imMedIaTely jUstiFY a bElief thAt P. Here, thEre WOn't bE aNy Other prOposition besiDeS P that S has To Be jUstifiED In believIng, in order for her experieNCe to jusTifY her iN belIeving thaT P. EVen if tHe p--‐EXperieNce camE to haVe Its POSitivE CHaRge In Part by the iNFLueNce of AnTeceDent psyChological state witH ConTent p*, it is an opEn pOssiBILiTy tHAt THe p--‐ ExPEriENCe could justify bElieving thAt P, WiThout relyiNG on JuStificaTion for BelieVIng p*. For Instance, tHe incremeNt Of poSITivE charge besTowed by pResentatiONal phENoMenolOgy Might bE eNouGh to pRovide JUstIficaTion foR bElieviNg p, anD tHe psychoLogical antecedents might Be respOnsibLe fOr providiNg aN IncRement of pOsitIve charge tHat GoeS beyoNd wHAt is nEedeD. on ThiS ScenaRio, tHE experienCE wIth CONtEnt P could prOVIDe iMmediAte JUstifiCatiOn for believing p. ThE Situation is no dIffeRENt wHen WE conSiDer the role of a pOsiTiVELy episteMiCally chargeD experieNcE With cOntent P (a p--‐expErience) IN JuSTifyinG a suBjeCt in belieVinG a DIfferenT pRoPOsitioN q. EvEn If justIficatIOn frOM The p--‐experience foR beliEVIng p pLAys A role In ProvidiNG the JustificatIon for belieVing
 If there are no unjustifi ed justifi ers i n t his  s ense , do es that entail that  the justification ofbelie fm usth av e eit her oft he s e  tw ost ruc tu r es : con tin uing in  a regress , o rcohering wit h  o ther menta l s tates? Siege l/E pistem ic  Ch a rge 1 9 N o. If  epist e mic ch arge were  p h enomen a lly gro u n de d, t hen the overall s t ru c ture of justif icatio nc ou l d  be  in  many resp ec ts th e  way th a tf o u nda t ionalists too k it to be. Phe nomena lgro u nds co uld i nt r odu ce self--‐j usti fying exp erienc e s. Thes e  experi enceswou ldbe s i mi la r i no ner es pec t  to  the tra di ti onal'unj u s t i fied  ju stif iers' : nothing els e w ould jus tifythem.  But  r ather  thanbeing  e pistemically ne utra l, theseexp er ien ce s wou l d be e pis tem icallycharged byth e i r  o wn features. If at  l e a st  some se lf--‐c h ar ge d  experie nc e a re s e l f--‐c harg e dpositive ly, th e nth ey canpl ay one  o f t heroles of u njusti fied jus tifie r s: they contri b ute to justif i ca t i on ,  wit hou t needing t o be just ifie d  b y a n ythin g els e. Th e y could be self--‐j us tifyin g jus tifiers. Coul d a belief b e  immedia tely ju s tified by a po sitiv ely charge d  experie nce?A subjec t S's bel i e f that p  is  im med iat e l yjustified bya n  exp er ience,jus t in ca sethe renee dbe no fur ther pro po si ti on s t hat S must beju sti fi edin be l ieving  from  a s ou rc e  ot her tha n  t h e  exp er ie nce,  in  o rderfort heexperie nce to ju sti f y he rin  believ ing that P –or  if therear e,beingj u stifiedin believing those prop o sitions  ne ed no t pl ay a role  in  S's g ett i ng jus tifica tionto  be l i eve P f ro m h er  experienc e .  Co nside rfirs t wheth er an experience w i thcontent P cou ldimme d i at ely ju s tif ya  be l i ef that P. Here , there wo n' t  b e any othe r  pr op osition  beside s P t h at S ha s to be j ustifiedin  bel i e vin g, in orde r for he r experie n ce to ju stify  he r in b el iev ing t hat P. Eve n ifthe p- -‐ experi enceca me to ha ve its positive chargein par t bythe  influenc e o f  an tecedentpsyc hologicalsta tewithcon t ent p *, i t  i s a n  open  pos s ibility t h at  th e p- -‐ experien c e cou ld ju sti f y beli evin g that p, without relying on jus tifi c a tio n f o r be li eving p*. Forins ta n c e, the i nc rement of p ositivech a rge b estowe d by p resenta t i on a l phen omen olo gy mightbeen o ugh topr ov i de jus tifi ca tion f or bel i evin g p, and the psych ologi c a l ant e ced entsmi ght ber espo nsible for  providingan inc reme nt of  positi ve  charg e t ha t goes bey o nd what i s nee ded. On  t hissce nario,  the e xperi ence  w ith  contentP co u ld  p r ovi de i mmedi at e ju stificati o n for be lie v ing p.Th e s i t uation is n o differen t w hen w e consider t h e ro l eo f a p ositiv ely ep istemic a lly  c hargedexp e r ience wit h content p ( ap--‐ experien ce ) in  j ust if ying a subjectin belie ving a d i f ferent  pr o posi t ion q.  E ven if justi ficat io n  from t h e  p- -‐exper i enc e f orbeli evi ng p plays a role in providin g th e jus t ifi catio n for  b elieving 
 If_there are_no unjustified justifiers in_this sense,_does_that entail_that_the justification of_belief must have_either of these two_structures: continuing in_a_regress, or cohering with other mental states? Siegel/Epistemic Charge 19 No. If epistemic charge_were_phenomenally grounded,_then_the_overall structure of justification could_be in many respects the_way that_foundationalists took it to be. Phenomenal grounds could_introduce_self--‐justifying experiences. These_experiences would be similar in one respect to the_traditional 'unjustified justifiers': nothing else would_justify them. But_rather_than_being epistemically neutral, these_experiences would be epistemically charged by_their own features. If at least_some self--‐charged experience are self--‐charged positively, then_they can play one of the_roles of unjustified justifiers: they_contribute to_justification, without needing to be_justified by anything_else. They_could be self--‐justifying_justifiers. Could a belief be immediately_justified by a_positively charged experience? A subject S's_belief_that p is_immediately_justified_by an_experience, just in_case_there need_be_no further propositions that S must_be_justified in believing from a source other_than the experience, in_order_for the experience to_justify her in believing that_P – or if there are,_being justified_in believing_those propositions need not play a role in S's getting justification_to believe P from her experience._Consider first whether an_experience with_content_P could immediately_justify_a belief_that P. Here, there won't be any_other proposition_besides P that S has to_be justified in believing,_in_order for her experience to justify_her in believing that P. Even_if the p--‐experience came to_have_its_positive charge in part by_the influence of antecedent psychological state_with content p*,_it is an open possibility that the_p--‐_experience could justify believing that p,_without_relying on justification for believing p*._For_instance,_the increment of positive charge_bestowed by presentational phenomenology might be_enough to provide justification for believing p, and the_psychological antecedents might_be responsible for providing an_increment_of_positive charge that goes beyond what is needed. On this_scenario, the_experience with content_P could provide immediate justification for believing p. The situation_is no different when we consider the_role of a positively epistemically charged experience with content p (a_p--‐experience) in justifying a subject in believing a_different proposition q. Even if justification from_the p--‐experience for believing_p_plays a role in providing the justification_for_believing