 Frank overlaps several Lewis-worlds. Since 'overlaps several Lewis-worlds' is a qualitative predicate, this possibility claim is singly de re. So according to Analysis B, it is equivalent to the claim that some counterpart of Frank overlaps several Lewis-worlds. If we thought that only parts of Lewis-worlds could be counterparts, we would have to maintain, absurdly, that Frank overlaps several Lewis-worlds despite the fact that it is not possible for it to do so. We are still free to maintain, if we wish, that only parts of Lewisworlds are counterparts of other parts of Lewis-worlds. But even this 21We can even allow φ(t) to contain propositional attitude ascriptions: if we take the name 'Hesperus' to be a referential term and hence an admissible substituend for 't', 'Possibly someone believes that Hesperus is bright ↔df ∃x(x C Hesperus ∧ someone believes that x is bright)' is a legitimate instance of Analysis B. Note that this is logically equivalent to the analysis of 'Possibly ∃y(y = Hesperus and someone believes that y is bright)'. Some theories about the behaviour of names in attitude ascriptions deny that 'Someone believes that Hesperus is bright' is logically equivalent to '∃y(y = Hesperus and someone believes that y is bright)'; I count proponents of these theories as denying that 'Hesperus' is a referential singular term, in the sense relevant to what counts as a substitution instance of Analysis B. Most of these proponents will also deny that 'Hesperus' is purely qualitative; in that case, they will not be able to use Analysis B as an analysis of possibility claims involving 'Hesperus'. Nevertheless, they might endorse it as an analysis of possibility and necessity claims in which 'Hesperus' occurs only outside the scope of attitude verbs, while leaving the task of analysing modal sentences that embed attitude ascriptions for another occasion. seems unduly restrictive. Bigelow and Pargetter (1987) and Bricker (2001) consider Lewis-worlds which consist of two large lobes of spacetime, connected by a narrow and temporary wormhole. It seems perfectly consistent to suppose that if things had been a little different at earlier times, the wormhole wouldn't have formed at all, so that the thing that
Frank overlaps several Lewis - worlds. Since' overlaps several Lewis - world' is a qualitative predicate, this hypothesis claim is singly de re. therefore accord to Analysis B, it is equivalent to the claim that some counterpart of Frank overlaps respective Lewis - worlds. If we thought that only part of Lewis - worlds could be counterparts, we would get to maintain, absurdly, that Frank overlaps several Lewis - worlds despite the fact that it is not possible for it to do thus. We are still free to maintain, if we wish, that alone parts of Lewisworlds are counterparts of other parts of Lewis - universe. But even this 21We can even allow φ(t) to contain propositional attitude ascriptions: if we take the name' Hesperus' to be a referential condition and hence an admissible substituend for' t',' Possibly someone believes that Hesperus is bright ↔df ∃x(x C Hesperus ∧ someone believes that x is bright)' is a legitimate instance of Analysis B. Note that this is logically equivalent to the analysis of' Possibly ∃y(y = Hesperus and someone believes that y is bright)'. Some theories about the behaviour of names in attitude ascriptions deny that' Someone believe that Hesperus is bright' is logically equivalent to' ∃y(y = Hesperus and someone believes that y is undimmed)'; I consider advocate of these theories as denying that' Hesperus' is a referential singular term, in the sense relevant to what counts as a substitution instance of Analysis B. Most of these proponents will besides deny that' Hesperus' is purely qualitative; in that case, they will not be able to use Analysis B as an analysis of possibility claims involving' Hesperus'. Nevertheless, they might endorse it as an analysis of possibility and necessity claim in which' Hesperus' happen only outside the scope of attitude verbs, while leaving the undertaking of analysing modal sentences that embed position ascriptions for another affair. seems unduly restrictive. Bigelow and Pargetter (1987) and Bricker (2001) consider Lewis - earth which consist of two big lobes of spacetime, connected by a narrow-minded and temporary wormhole. It look perfectly reproducible to suppose that if thing had been a little different at earlier times, the wormhole wouldn't have formed at wholly, so that the thing that
 Frwnk overlaps several Lewls-worlds. Since 'orwrlaps severzl Lewis-dorlds' is a qualitative predmcatw, thiw possibility claim is singly dv re. So axcorving to Analysis B, it is equivzpent vo the claim thst some cognterpart of Fsavk overlaps several Lewis-worlds. If we thoughy hhat only partf of Jewia-worlds could be counterparts, we wkuld hane to maintain, abxurdly, that Frank overlaps sevfral Lewis-worlds dfspite the dact rhat it is nut possiblt yor it to dk so. We are still free to maintxin, iy we wish, tyar ojny parts of Lewifworlds are gpunter[arts og other parts pf Newus-worlds. But even thiv 21We can even allor φ(t) to cottcin propositional attutyde avcri[tiovw: iw wt teke the nwme 'Hesperus' fo be a refwrential term and htncq an admissibls subseieuend for 't', 'Possibly someone believes tvat Hesperus is bright ↔df ∃z(x C Hesperus ∧ someong believes that x is bright)' is a legitimate instance of Ananysis C. Nitc thxr hhis is logically equivalent to the analysis jr 'Kosxibly ∃y(y = Hespcrus and someone brllefgs that y is btight)'. Some theories about thf behavyour if names yn aytitude ascriptions deny thqt 'Someone bvlieces that Hesperus ns bright' is logocallu equivalent to '∃y(y = Hes'erus znd someone believes ghat y is bright)'; I bound propontvts of these theowies as dxnyiny that 'Hdspetus' is w referentlal sltgular term, in the sensg releeant to whwt counts as a substitution insvence of Analyxiv B. Most of thesc proponents wijl also deny tkat 'Hespzrus' ir purely qlalitativx; in that cafe, they will tlt be able tm use Anwlysus B as an xvalysis of posxibility blcims invooving 'Hesperus'. Nevcrtheusss, they might zudirse it as an amalhsif lf pjvsibility ang nezesroty cuaims in whlch 'Heslerus' occurs only oudsids the scope of attotmde verbs, while lqaving the taxk of analysing mofal sxntencxs thay eibed attitude ascriptions for znother ofcafion. seems ugduln reftrictive. Yigelow and Pargetter (1987) and Bricker (2001) consmder Lewis-worlds which xonsist of two largg lpbes of sparetime, connecteg by a narrow and tenporary wormhole. Lt seems perfectly conaistend to duppose that if things had been a little different at earlier times, the wirmholx rouldn't havs fotmed dt cll, so ehat vhe thing that
Frank overlaps several Lewis-worlds. Since 'overlaps several a predicate, this claim is singly Analysis it is equivalent the claim that counterpart of Frank overlaps several Lewis-worlds. we thought that only parts of Lewis-worlds could be counterparts, we would have maintain, absurdly, that Frank overlaps several Lewis-worlds despite the fact that it is possible it do We are still free to maintain, if we wish, that only parts of Lewisworlds are counterparts other parts of Lewis-worlds. But even this 21We even allow φ(t) to propositional attitude ascriptions: if we the 'Hesperus' to a term hence an admissible for 't', 'Possibly someone believes that Hesperus is bright ↔df ∃x(x C Hesperus ∧ someone believes that is bright)' legitimate instance Analysis Note this is logically the analysis of 'Possibly ∃y(y = believes that y is bright)'. Some theories about behaviour of in attitude ascriptions deny that 'Someone that Hesperus is bright' is logically equivalent to = Hesperus and someone believes that y is bright)'; I count proponents of these theories that 'Hesperus' is a singular term, in sense to counts a substitution of Analysis B. Most of these proponents will also deny that is purely qualitative; in that case, they will not be use B as an of possibility claims involving Nevertheless, might endorse it as of and which occurs outside the scope of verbs, while leaving the task analysing modal sentences that occasion. seems unduly restrictive. Bigelow and Pargetter (1987) Bricker (2001) consider Lewis-worlds which consist of large lobes of spacetime, connected by a narrow and temporary wormhole. It perfectly consistent that if things had been a little different earlier times, the wormhole have formed at all, so that the thing that
 Frank overlaps several Lewis-Worlds. SincE 'overLapS seVeRal LEwis-Worlds' is a qualiTAtivE predicate, this possibilIty clAiM Is siNGlY de re. so accorDInG TO AnAlYsIs B, It IS eQuivaLenT to the cLaim that soMe cOuNterpart of FrANk Overlaps seVerAl Lewis-worldS. If We thouGhT thAT only ParTs of LEwis-woRLds couLd be countErPArts, we WOuld havE TO mAintAin, absurdly, that FrANk OVerlaps several lewis-wOrLDs DESpiTe tHe fact that It Is not POssible FOr IT TO do SO. We are still frEe to maintaiN, If wE wish, tHaT onLY parts Of LewIsWOrlDs are counteRparTs of other Parts oF lewis-woRLds. But eVen thiS 21We Can Even ALlOw Φ(t) tO cONtaIN pRopOSitIonal attItUdE ascrIptiONS: IF we tAke The nAme 'HeSperus' to be a reFerEntiAL teRm and Hence An adMiSsiblE substItuenD fOr 't', 'Possibly someOne bElieves thAt HEsPerUs Is briGHt ↔df ∃x(x c HeSpeRus ∧ someOne beliEVes ThAT X Is Bright)' is a legitimatE iNSTaNce of AnaLysis B. nOtE tHAt this is LoGicAlly EQUivalEnt tO ThE analysiS of 'PosSIbLy ∃Y(y = HespeRuS and soMeOne BelIeves THat y Is brigHt)'. Some thEorieS About the behaviOUr of names in atTItUDE aSCripTioNs deny that 'SOmeoNE belIeveS ThAt HESperuS is brIgHT' iS Logically equivalent To '∃Y(y = HespErus aNd someone beliEves that y iS BRIght)'; I couNt prOPoNEnts of these theOries As denying tHAt 'HesperUs' is a ReferentIal singulAR Term, in thE seNse RelEvaNT To What counts as a SUBstiTuTion insTanCe of AnaLysIs B. mosT of ThEse proponEnts will AlSo DeNy ThaT 'HespERus' is purElY quAlItaTive; iN That caSe, theY wilL nOt BE abLe to use aNaLYSis B As An AnalYsiS oF possIbilITy cLaims inVolving 'HeSpeRUs'. NeVeRtHeless, tHey might endorSe It as an analYsIs oF possiBILity and nEcessity claims in which 'HeSPerus' ocCurS only OutsIde the scoPe oF attitUde VErbs, whIle leaVing tHe TasK OF analYSInG moDaL sentences THAt eMbed aTtItudE ascripTions for another occASioN. seems unduly rEstRictIVE. BIgeLOw ANd PArGEttER (1987) And Bricker (2001) consiDer Lewis-woRlDS wHich consisT Of tWo Large loBes of spAcetiME, connecTed by a narRow and temPoRary WORmhOle. It seems PerfectlY consisteNT to suPPoSe thaT if Things HaD beEn a liTtle diFFerEnt at EarlieR tImes, thE wormHoLe wouldn'T have formed at all, so that tHe thinG that
 Frank overlaps several Le wis-worlds . Sin ce'ov er laps  sev eral Lewis-wor l ds'is a qualitative predi cate,  t h is p o ss ibili ty clai m  i s sin gl ydere .  S o acc ord ing toAnalysis B , i tis equivalen t  t o the clai m t hat some cou nte rpartof  Fr a nk ov erl aps s everal Lewis- worlds. I fw e thou g ht that o nl y pa rts of Lewis-worl d sc ould be counte rparts ,w ew o uld  ha ve to main ta in, a b surdly, th a t Fra n k overlaps se veral Lewis - wor lds de sp ite the fa ct th at itis not poss ible  for it t o do s o . We ar e  stillfree t o m ain tain ,  i fwewi s h,t ha t o n lyparts of  L ew iswor ldsa r e coun ter part s ofother parts o f L ewis - wor lds.But e venth is 21 We can  even  a llow φ(t) to co ntai n proposi tio na l a tt itude ascrip tio ns:  if wetake th e  na me ' H es perus' to be a ref er e n ti al termand he n ce  a n  admissi bl e s ubst i t uendfor' t' , 'Possi bly so m eo ne  believ es  thatHe spe rus  is b r ight  ↔df ∃ x(x C He speru s  ∧ someone bel i eves that x i s  b r i gh t )' i s a  legitimate  ins t ance  ofA na lys i s B.Noteth a tt his is logically eq ui valent  to t he analysis o f 'Possibl y ∃ y(y = He sper u sa nd someone bel ieves  that y is bright)' . Som e theori es aboutt h e behavi our  of  na mes i nattitude ascr i p tion sdeny th at'Someon e b eli eve s t ha t Hesperu s is bri gh t'  i slog icall y  equival en t t o'∃y (y =H esperu s and  som eo ne bel ieves t h at y  isbr ig ht)' ; I  c ountprop o nen ts of t hese theo rie s  asde ny ing tha t 'Hesperus'is  a referen ti alsingul a r  term, i n the sense relevant to what co unt s asa su bstitutio n i nstanc e o f  Analy sis B.  Most  o f t h e se pr o p on ent swill alsod e nythat'H espe rus' is  purely qualitativ e ; i n that case,the y wi l l  n otb ea ble  t o  us e Analysis B as a n analysis  o f  p ossibility cla im s invol ving 'H esper u s'. Nev ertheless , they mi gh t en d o rse  it as ananalysis  of possi b ility an d nec ess ity cl ai msin wh ich 'H e spe rus'occurs  o nly ou tside  t he scope  of attitude verbs, whi le lea vingthe  task ofana l ysi ng modalsent ences that  em bed  atti tud e  ascr ipti o ns  fo r  anot hero ccasion.s ee msu n du ly restrict i v e . B igelo w a n d Parg ette r (1987) and Bric k er (2001) cons ider L ewi s-w o rlds  w hich consist o f t wo l arge lob es  of spaceti me, conn ec t ed by  a nar row an d tempo r a ry wormho le.Itseems per fec tl y  consis te nt to sup pose  t hat if  thing s  had b een a little dif feren t at ea r lie r tim es , the w o rmho le wouldn' t have form ed atall,  so t hat the  t hing t hat 
 Frank_overlaps several_Lewis-worlds. Since 'overlaps several_Lewis-worlds' is_a_qualitative predicate,_this_possibility claim is_singly de re._So according to Analysis_B, it is_equivalent_to the claim that some counterpart of Frank overlaps several Lewis-worlds. If we thought_that_only parts_of_Lewis-worlds_could be counterparts, we would_have to maintain, absurdly, that_Frank overlaps_several Lewis-worlds despite the fact that it is_not_possible for it_to do so. We are still free to maintain,_if we wish, that only parts_of Lewisworlds are_counterparts_of_other parts of Lewis-worlds._But even this 21We can even_allow φ(t) to contain propositional attitude_ascriptions: if we take the name 'Hesperus'_to be a referential term and_hence an admissible substituend for_'t', 'Possibly_someone believes that Hesperus is_bright ↔df ∃x(x_C Hesperus_∧ someone believes_that x is bright)' is a_legitimate instance of_Analysis B. Note that this is_logically_equivalent to the_analysis_of_'Possibly ∃y(y_= Hesperus and_someone_believes that_y_is bright)'. Some theories about the_behaviour_of names in attitude ascriptions deny that_'Someone believes that Hesperus_is_bright' is logically equivalent_to '∃y(y = Hesperus and_someone believes that y is bright)';_I count_proponents of_these theories as denying that 'Hesperus' is a referential singular term,_in the sense relevant to what_counts as a substitution_instance of_Analysis_B. Most of_these_proponents will_also deny that 'Hesperus' is purely qualitative;_in that_case, they will not be able_to use Analysis B_as_an analysis of possibility claims involving_'Hesperus'. Nevertheless, they might endorse it_as an analysis of possibility_and_necessity_claims in which 'Hesperus' occurs_only outside the scope of attitude_verbs, while leaving_the task of analysing modal sentences that_embed_attitude ascriptions for another occasion. seems_unduly_restrictive. Bigelow and Pargetter (1987) and_Bricker_(2001)_consider Lewis-worlds which consist of_two large lobes of spacetime, connected_by a narrow and temporary wormhole. It seems perfectly_consistent to suppose_that if things had been_a_little_different at earlier times, the wormhole wouldn't have formed at_all, so_that the thing_that