 a reappraisal of one's religious life, a reawakening, a new or renewed and deepened grasp' of your religious beliefs (2000b, 190), it will usually have the opposite effect: 'For many or most exclusivists, I think, an awareness of the enormous variety of human religious responses... directly reduces the level of confidence or degrees of belief in the proposition in question' (ibid., 189, italics added; cf. McKim, 2012, 155; Gellman 2000). Moreover, '[s]ince degree of warrant depends in part on degree of belief', disagreement 'can also deprive the exclusivist of the knowledge that [his religious beliefs] are true, even if they are true and he believes that they are' (ibid.). In defending the epistemic-potential claim, then, I must reassure committed believers not only that engaging in religious disagreement stands to deliver epistemic benefits, but also that the risks are less grave than one might fear – both on their own and in balance against the risks of not doing so. One might worry that my proposal is incoherent: if disagreement is epistemically beneficial, this is because of its potential to correct or change your belief system – and readiness to alter your belief system seems incompatible with epistemic commitment to it.iii But this objection fails to recognize how multifaceted epistemic commitment can be. Belief systems are not monoliths, but rather 'webs' with numerous elements of graded centrality. We may grant that there are some sorts of belief-system revision that epistemic commitment is incompatible with. But it is perfectly compatible with others. For example, being strongly committed to your belief system's central components is compatible with discovering that these components do not, after all, epistemically necessitate certain other attitudes to which you had been committed on their account. It is also compatible with the discovery of new attitudes that you should be committed to in light of them. One might also worry that, in tolerating any epistemic commitment, I am licensing epistemic entrenchment, dogmatism, or fundamentalism. These attitudes are characterized by an unwillingness to assimilate evidence against one's view and are both epistemically and socially dangerous; religious epistemology must surely strive to eliminate rather than accommodate them. I have two responses. One is that these attitudes only accompany the most extreme forms of epistemic commitment, so tolerating commitment does not entail tolerating them too. Indeed, most of us are epistemically committed, for example to
a reappraisal of one's religious life, a reawakening, a new or renewed and deepened grip' of your religious belief (2000b, 190), it will usually have the opposite impression:' For many or most exclusivists, I think, an awareness of the enormous variety of human religious reception... immediately reduces the level of confidence or degrees of belief in the proposal in question' (ibid. , 189, italics add; cf. McKim, 2012, 155; Gellman 2000). furthermore,' [ s]ince degree of warrant depend in part on degree of impression', disagreement' can also deprive the exclusivist of the knowledge that [ his religious impression ] are true, even if they are true and he believe that they are' (ibid .). In defending the epistemic - likely claim, then, I must reassure entrust believers not only that engaging in religious discrepancy stands to deliver epistemic benefits, but also that the risks are less grave than one might reverence – both on their own and in proportion against the risks of not doing so. One might worry that my proposal is incoherent: if disagreement is epistemically beneficial, this is because of its potential to correct or change your impression arrangement – and readiness to interpolate your belief system seems incompatible with epistemic committedness to it.iii But this objection fail to recognize how multifaceted epistemic committedness can be. Belief systems are not monoliths, but rather' webs' with numerous elements of graded centrality. We may grant that there are some sorts of belief - system rewrite that epistemic commitment is ill-sorted with. But it is absolutely compatible with others. For case, being strongly committed to your belief arrangement's central components is compatible with discovering that these component do not, after all, epistemically necessitate certain other attitude to which you had been committed on their bill. It is also compatible with the discovery of new attitude that you should be committed to in luminosity of them. One might also concern that, in tolerating any epistemic commitment, I am license epistemic entrenchment, dogmatism, or fundamentalism. These attitudes are characterized by an unwillingness to assimilate evidence against one's view and are both epistemically and socially dangerous; religious epistemology must surely endeavor to eliminate rather than accommodate them. I give birth two responses. One is that these attitudes only accompany the most extreme form of epistemic commitment, so tolerating committedness does not entail tolerating them too. Indeed, most of us are epistemically committed, for example to
 a geappraisal of one's relinious life, a reacqkeninj, a new or reneded and deepened grasp' of yonr rwligiius beliefs (2000b, 190), it will usually jave the oppiwite effecv: 'For makv or jlst zxrlusivists, I thlnk, an awaraness of the etofmlus variety of human religious respjnses... dorfctly reduces jhe ltvej of bokfidence or degrees of belief in the prmposition in auestion' (ibid., 189, italics addfd; cv. McKim, 2012, 155; Gellman 2000). Moreover, '[s]unce eegree of wafrant depends in part kn degree of belief', disagreemeng 'can also depruvw tjg exclusivisv of tre knowledge that [hiv religoous beliefs] ave trne, ecen if they are true end he believes that they are' (iyid.). In defending the wpustemhc-podentkql zlajm, tgen, I lusv reassure dommitted bwlievers not only tnae engaging in deligijuf disagreement stands to deliver epistekic benefits, but also that the risks are less gtave than jne might fear – both on their own and in balance dgainag tkc fusns of not doing so. One might worry that my prjloxak is incoherenb: if disagreement os elystemically bgneficicm, fhis is because of its pojentiao to corrtct ot change your belief system – and readinvss ro alter your belizf system sezms invompayible with epistemic coomitjent to it.ili But thjr objection failr tp secognizt how multifaceted epistemir comkitment can be. Bejief systels arc not monoliths, but rathgr 'webv' with numfrous elements of graded centrality. We may grsnd tvat therz are xome sorts of belief-system tevision chat eoistemic ckmmitmeit is incompwtible with. Bgj it is perfertly compwtiboe wuth othdfs. For example, being stgougly commutted to your belicf syrfem's central conpobents is compatobld wytj viscodaring that tvese coolonengs do not, antef alk, epistemically necevsitzte certain other stbitudes ti which rou had been vommitted on their acconnt. It is akso compatible with the discovery of new ahtibudes that yot shiuld be commntted to in light of them. One might also worry that, in tolwrating any epistemnc commitment, I am licensinc epistemic entrenchnent, dogmatism, or fundamentalism. These attitgdes wre characterized by an unwillingness to assimilate evidence against one's view enq are both spisyemicdljv and sjciapuy dangerous; relpgious epistemology must surely rtrive tm zliminate rather than accommocage them. I havg two responses. One is thaf these sttitudes only accompany the moxt extreme forms of episbemic comnitmeht, so nklxrating commitment dpes noc entaul toleeatikg them too. Inaeec, lost of ud art epnstemically committed, for example to
a reappraisal of one's religious life, a new renewed and grasp' of your will have the opposite 'For many or exclusivists, I think, an awareness of enormous variety of human religious responses... directly reduces the level of confidence or of belief in the proposition in question' (ibid., 189, italics added; cf. McKim, 155; 2000). '[s]ince of warrant depends in part on degree of belief', disagreement 'can also deprive the exclusivist of knowledge that [his religious beliefs] are true, even they are true and believes that they are' (ibid.). defending epistemic-potential claim, I reassure believers not only engaging in religious disagreement stands to deliver epistemic benefits, but also that the risks are less grave one might both on own in against the risks doing so. One might worry that incoherent: if disagreement is epistemically beneficial, this is of its to correct or change your belief – and readiness to alter your belief system incompatible with epistemic commitment to it.iii But this objection fails to recognize how multifaceted epistemic be. Belief systems are monoliths, but rather with elements graded We may that there are some sorts of belief-system revision that epistemic commitment incompatible with. But it is perfectly compatible with others. For strongly to your belief central components is compatible discovering these components do not, epistemically certain which had committed on their account. is also compatible with the of new attitudes that in light of them. One might also worry in tolerating any epistemic commitment, I am epistemic entrenchment, dogmatism, or fundamentalism. These attitudes are characterized by an unwillingness assimilate evidence view and are both epistemically and socially dangerous; epistemology must surely strive eliminate rather than accommodate them. I have two responses. is these attitudes accompany the most forms of epistemic so tolerating commitment entail tolerating too. most epistemically committed, for example to
 a reappraisal of one's religioUs life, a reaWakenIng, A neW oR renEwed And deepened graSP' of yOur religious beliefs (2000b, 190), it Will uSuALly hAVe The opPosite eFFeCT: 'for MaNy Or mOsT ExClusiVisTs, I thinK, an awareneSs oF tHe enormous vaRIeTy of human rEliGious responsEs... dIrectlY rEduCEs the LevEl of cOnfideNCe or deGrees of beLiEF in the PRopositION iN queStion' (ibid., 189, italics aDDeD; Cf. McKim, 2012, 155; Gellman 2000). moreovEr, '[S]InCE DegRee Of warrant dEpEnds iN Part on dEGrEE OF beLIef', disagreemeNt 'can also dePRivE the exClUsiVIst of tHe knoWlEDge That [his reliGiouS beliefs] aRe true, EVen if thEY are truE and he BelIevEs thAT tHeY arE' (iBId.). IN DeFenDIng The epistEmIc-PotenTial CLAIM, theN, I mUst rEassuRe committed beLieVers NOt oNly thAt engAginG iN reliGious dIsagrEeMent stands to delIver Epistemic BenEfIts, BuT also THat the RisKs aRe less gRave thaN One MiGHT FeAr – both on their own anD iN BAlAnce agaiNst the RIsKs OF not doinG sO. OnE migHT Worry That MY pRoposal iS incohEReNt: If disagReEment iS ePisTemIcallY BeneFicial, This is beCause OF its potential tO Correct or chanGE yOUR bELief SysTem – and readiNess TO altEr yoUR bEliEF systEm seeMs INcOMpatible with epistemIc CommitMent tO it.iii But this Objection fAILS to recogNize HOw MUltifaceted epiStemiC commitmenT Can be. BelIef syStems are Not monoliTHS, but rathEr 'wEbs' WitH nuMERoUs elements of gRADed cEnTrality. we mAy grant ThaT thEre Are SoMe sorts of Belief-syStEm ReViSioN that EPistemic CoMmiTmEnt Is incOMpatibLe witH. But It Is PErfEctly coMPaTIBle wItH oTherS. FoR eXamplE, beiNG stRongly cOmmitted tO yoUR belIeF sYstem's cEntral componeNtS is compatiBlE wiTh discOVEring thaT these components do not, afTEr all, epIstEmicaLly nEcessitatE ceRtain oTheR AttituDes to wHich yOu Had BEEn comMITtEd oN tHeir accounT. iT is Also cOmPatiBle with The discovery of new aTTitUdes that you shOulD be cOMMiTteD To IN liGhT Of tHEM. One might also woRry that, in tOlERaTing any epiSTemIc CommitmEnt, I am lIcensINg epistEmic entreNchment, doGmAtisM, OR fuNdamentaliSm. These aTtitudes aRE charACtErizeD by An unwiLlIngNess tO assimILatE evidEnce agAiNst one'S view AnD are both Epistemically and sociallY dangeRous; rEliGious episTemOLogY must sureLy stRive to elimInaTe rAther ThaN AccomModaTE tHem. i Have tWo reSPonses. One IS tHat THEsE attitudes oNLY AccOmpanY thE Most exTremE forms of epistemic COmmitment, so tolEratING coMmiTMent DoEs not entail tolEraTiNG Them too. INdEed, most of us Are epistEmICally CommitTed, for Example TO
 a reappraisal of one's re ligious li fe, a  re awa ke ning , anew or renewed anddeepened grasp' of you r rel ig i ousb el iefs(2000b, 19 0 ) , i twi llus u al ly ha vethe opp osite effe ct:  ' For many orm os t exclusiv ist s, I think,anawaren es s o f  theeno rmous  varie t y of h uman reli gi o us res p onses.. . di rect ly reduces the le v el of confidenceor deg re e so f  be lie f in the p ro posit i on in q u es t i o n'( ibid., 189, i talics adde d ; c f. McK im , 2 0 12, 15 5; Ge ll m an2000). More over , '[s]inc e degr e e of wa r rant de pendsinpar t on de gr eeof bel i ef ',d isa greement  ' ca n als o de p r i v e th e e xclu sivis t of the know led ge t h at[hisrelig ious  b elief s] are  true ,even if they ar e tr ue and he  be li eve sthatt hey ar e'(ib id.). I n defen d ing  t h e ep istemic-potentialcl a i m,  then, I  mustr ea ss u re commi tt edbeli e v ers n ot o n ly  that en gaging in  r eligiou sdisagr ee men t s tands to d eliver  epistem ic be n efits, but als o  that the ris k sa r el essgra ve than one  mig h t fe ar – bo tho n the ir ow na nd in balance againstth e risk s ofnot doing so.  One might w o rry that  myp ro p osal is incohe rent:  if disagr e ement is  epis temicall y benefic i a l, thisisbec aus e o f it s potential t o corr ec t or ch ang e yourbel ief  sy ste m– and rea diness t oal te ryou r bel i ef syste msee ms  in compa t ible w ith e pist em ic com mitment to i t.ii iBu t th isob jecti on f a ils  to rec ognize ho w m u ltif ac et ed epis temic commitm en t can be.Be lie f syst e m s are no t monoliths, but rather 'webs'wit h num erou s element s o f grad edc entral ity. W e may  g ran t thatt h er e a re  some sort s ofbelie f- syst em revi sion that epistemi c  co mmitment is i nco mpat i b le  wi t h. But  i t  is p erfectly compat ible withot h er s. For exa m ple ,being s trongly  comm i tted to  your bel ief syste m' s ce n t ral  component s is com patible w i th di s co verin g t hat th es e c ompon ents d o  no t, af ter al l,  epist emica ll y necess itate certain other att itudes  to w hic h you had  be e n c ommittedon t heir accou nt.  It  is a lso compa tibl e  w ith the d isco v ery of ne w  a tti t u de s that yous h o uld  be c omm i tted t o in  light of them. O n e might also w orry t hat , i n  tol er ating any epis tem ic c ommitmen t,  I am licen sing epi st e mic e ntrenc hment,  dogmat i s m, or fun dame nta lism. The seat t itudesar ec haract eriz ed  by an  unwil l ingn e s s to assimilateevide n c e aga i nst  one' sview an d  are  both epis temically a nd soc iall y dan gerous;  r eligio usep istemology must sure ly st rive to  e limi nat e rath er t h a n acc ommo da tethem. I h a v et wo  r e spo nses . One  i s th at thesea ttitudes  on l y accom pa nyt h e most ex t r eme formsofepist e m ic commitm e nt,s ot olera ting c ommitm ent doe s  no tentailtol e r ating the m too. In d eed ,most  of us a re  epi st emi ca lly committed,for exam ple to
 a_reappraisal of_one's religious life, a_reawakening, a_new_or renewed_and_deepened grasp' of_your religious beliefs_(2000b, 190), it will_usually have the_opposite_effect: 'For many or most exclusivists, I think, an awareness of the enormous variety_of_human religious_responses..._directly_reduces the level of confidence_or degrees of belief in_the proposition_in question' (ibid., 189, italics added; cf. McKim,_2012,_155; Gellman 2000)._Moreover, '[s]ince degree of warrant depends in part on_degree of belief', disagreement 'can also_deprive the exclusivist_of_the_knowledge that [his religious_beliefs] are true, even if they_are true and he believes that_they are' (ibid.). In defending the epistemic-potential_claim, then, I must reassure committed_believers not only that engaging_in religious_disagreement stands to deliver epistemic_benefits, but also_that the_risks are less_grave than one might fear –_both on their_own and in balance against the_risks_of not doing_so._One_might worry_that my proposal_is_incoherent: if_disagreement_is epistemically beneficial, this is because_of_its potential to correct or change your_belief system – and_readiness_to alter your belief_system seems incompatible with epistemic_commitment to it.iii But this objection_fails to_recognize how_multifaceted epistemic commitment can be. Belief systems are not monoliths, but_rather 'webs' with numerous elements of_graded centrality. We may_grant that_there_are some sorts_of_belief-system revision_that epistemic commitment is incompatible with. But_it is_perfectly compatible with others. For example,_being strongly committed to_your_belief system's central components is compatible_with discovering that these components do_not, after all, epistemically necessitate_certain_other_attitudes to which you had_been committed on their account. It_is also compatible_with the discovery of new attitudes that_you_should be committed to in light_of_them. One might also worry that,_in_tolerating_any epistemic commitment, I am_licensing epistemic entrenchment, dogmatism, or fundamentalism._These attitudes are characterized by an unwillingness to assimilate_evidence against one's_view and are both epistemically_and_socially_dangerous; religious epistemology must surely strive to eliminate rather than_accommodate them._I have two_responses. One is that these attitudes only accompany the most_extreme forms of epistemic commitment, so tolerating_commitment does not entail tolerating them too. Indeed, most of us_are epistemically committed, for example to