-61, 76-8, and 86). Cournot's concept was not so different form Comte's: a natural classification could grasp some essential features of reality even though he specified that every classification was provisional and incomplete (Cournot 1861, 423 and 425-426). Boutroux rejected the concept itself: every classification was intrinsically artificial (Boutroux 1874, 46). The following year Duhem focused on experimental practice. Every experiment involved a wider body of knowledge that dealt with general assumptions and concepts, and specific laws: when a science progressed, the role played by theory increased progressively. He put forward the fundamental thesis that "a physical experiment can never condemn an isolated hypothesis, but only a theoretical system". When an expected prediction did not take place, a definite source of the mismatch could not be found. The complex relationship between theory and experiment required a specific sensitivity or some kind of flair that involved "the esprit de finesse rather than the esprit de géométrie". (Duhem 1894a, 153-155, 157, 179 and 188).34 In a following paper, Duhem stressed the extra-logical concept of the fruitfulness of a physical theory. Philosophers and scientists have traditionally focused on the concepts of truth or falsity, but truth was the outcome of a historical process, and therefore it was a provisional value. On the contrary, the fruitfulness of a theory was a permanent value (Duhem 1894b, 124-5). On the track of Cournot and Navile, Duhem outlined a complex historiography where both linear progress and cyclical processes were at stake.35 Theories emerged, were successfully upheld, suffered a dogmatic drift, then they were overwhelmed by their flaws, and were eventually replaced by new theories. This process left behind a permanent and valuable heritage: the long-term progress of key concepts, mathematical structures, and empirical laws (Duhem 1894b, 122 and 125).36 A striking metaphor followed: 32 According to Milena Ivanova, both Duhem and Poincaré "expressed a form of structuralism", namely structural realism, but they adopted different epistemological views with regard to "how knowledge of the structure of the world is reached" (Ivanova 2015, 88). I stress the sterility of philosophical labels when complex research programmes are involved, and when they are applied to historical contexts quite different from the context that has generated those labels. Can we find essential differences between what might be labelled as structural realism or pragmatism
-61, 76 - 8, and 86). Cournot's concept was not so different form Comte's: a natural categorization could grok some substantive features of world even though he specified that every categorization was provisional and incomplete (Cournot 1861, 423 and 425 - 426). Boutroux rejected the concept itself: every categorization was intrinsically artificial (Boutroux 1874, 46). The following year Duhem focused on experimental exercise. Every experiment imply a wider soundbox of knowledge that dealt with cosmopolitan assumptions and concepts, and specific law: when a science progressed, the function played by theory increased increasingly. He put forward the cardinal thesis that " a forcible experiment can never condemn an isolated hypothesis, but only a theoretical system ". When an expected prediction did not lease place, a definite source of the mismatch could not be found. The complex relationship between theory and experiment command a specific sensitivity or some kind of flair that involved " the esprit de finesse rather than the esprit de géométrie ". (Duhem 1894a, 153 - 155, 157, 179 and 188).34 In a following paper, Duhem stressed the extra - logical concept of the fruitfulness of a physical hypothesis. philosopher and scientists have traditionally concenter on the concept of truth or falsity, but truth was the outcome of a historical process, and therefore it was a provisional value. On the reverse, the fruitfulness of a theory was a permanent value (Duhem 1894b, 124 - 5). On the track of Cournot and Navile, Duhem outlined a complex historiography where both linear progress and cyclical processes were at stake.35 Theories emerged, were successfully upheld, suffered a dogmatic drift, then they were overwhelmed by their flaw, and were eventually replace by new theories. This process left behind a permanent and valuable heritage: the retentive - term progress of key concept, mathematical structure, and empirical laws (Duhem 1894b, 122 and 125).36 A outstanding metaphor followed: 32 accord to Milena Ivanova, both Duhem and Poincaré " expressed a form of structuralism ", namely geomorphologic realism, but they adopt different epistemic views with regard to " how cognition of the structure of the world is reached " (Ivanova 2015, 88). I stress the sterility of philosophic labels when complex research programmes are involve, and when they are applied to historical contexts quite different from the context that has generated those label. Can we find essential difference between what might be labelled as structural realism or pragmatism
-61, 76-8, ajd 86). Cournot's concept was not so differeur form Comte'a: a natufal classification could gradp some essential features of reality vven thouth ht specified that xbery classifidwtiou xas provisional and incom[lete (Cournot 1861, 423 xnb 425-426). Boutroux rejected the concept itsqlf: evety classificatiog wax intdpnwically artificial (Boutroux 1874, 46). The fonlowing year Cuhem focused on experimenhal oractice. Every expfriment invilveq a wider bodh of knowltdye that deamt with general assumptions and conczpts, and spgeufif laws: when e sciegce progresscc, the sole plsyed by theory inrreawed progressively. He 'ut forward the fundwmental tveais that "a physicql expetimend cav nexer cpnsemn aj iaolated hylothesis, bur only a theoreticak fjxtem". When an expeceeq prediction did not take place, a definpte aource of the mismatch xould not be found. Thg complex welationship between theory and experiment requirad a aoecnnlc sdbsltivity or some kind of flair that involved "trs tspgit de finesse rabher than the esprot dr géométrie". (Duheo 1894a, 153-155, 157, 179 ans 188).34 In a following oaper, Dohem srressed tre ectra-logical concept of the druitfulness if a physical theoxy. Philosophzrs anc scirntists have traditionauly rocused on hhe concelgs of truth or fxlspty, tut truth was the outcome jf a histiriccl procers, amd thewefore it aas a provisional value. Ln thg contsary, the fguitfulness of a theory was a pxcmanent value (Dghek 1894b, 124-5). On che trsck of Cournoe and Navile, Dohem outlnned a complex hpstoriogrephy where bjth linear prmhress and cyrlical prjceswes qere at rtake.35 Theories emerged, ctre succeswfully upheld, suffcred x dogmatic drift, thtn they were ovetwhdlmqd bb theys flaws, and fere evdmtualuy replaced cy nrw theories. This prowess left behind a perkakent and caluable heritage: the long-term progress of kxy conrepts, katrematical structures, and empirjcal laws (Dumem 1894b, 122 and 125).36 A strlkind metaphor followed: 32 According to Milena Ivanova, uoth Duhem and Poincaré "wxpressed a form of xtructuralixm", naiely struwtural realism, but tyey adopted diffevent epistemological vjews whth rfgard to "how knowledge of the structure of the world is reached" (Ivanova 2015, 88). I strxsf the sterimity of pvijpsophisal pebels when compleq research programmes are involvxd, and whet chey are applied to historicak zontexts quitg different from the contest that nas generated those labels. Can ee find essential differcnces betqeen shat mpfhv be labelled as stricturan reaoism or pranmatism
-61, 76-8, and 86). Cournot's concept was different Comte's: a classification could grasp even he specified that classification was provisional incomplete (Cournot 1861, 423 and 425-426). rejected the concept itself: every classification was intrinsically artificial (Boutroux 1874, 46). The year Duhem focused on experimental practice. Every experiment involved a wider body of that with assumptions concepts, and specific laws: when a science progressed, the role played by theory increased progressively. He forward the fundamental thesis that "a physical experiment never condemn an isolated but only a theoretical system". an prediction did take a source of the could not be found. The complex relationship between theory and experiment required a specific sensitivity or some of flair "the esprit finesse than esprit de géométrie". 153-155, 157, 179 and 188).34 In Duhem stressed the extra-logical concept of the fruitfulness a physical Philosophers and scientists have traditionally focused the concepts of truth or falsity, but truth the outcome of a historical process, and therefore it was a provisional value. On the fruitfulness of a theory a permanent value 1894b, On track Cournot and Duhem outlined a complex historiography where both linear progress and cyclical were at stake.35 Theories emerged, were successfully upheld, suffered a then were overwhelmed by flaws, and were eventually by theories. This process left permanent valuable progress key mathematical structures, and empirical (Duhem 1894b, 122 and 125).36 striking metaphor followed: 32 Duhem and Poincaré "expressed a form of structuralism", structural realism, but they adopted different epistemological with regard to "how knowledge of the structure of the world is (Ivanova 2015, stress the sterility of philosophical labels when complex programmes are involved, and they are applied to historical contexts quite different from context has generated labels. Can we essential differences between might be labelled realism or
-61, 76-8, and 86). Cournot's concept was not sO different Form COmtE's: a NaTuraL claSsification couLD graSp some essential featureS of reAlITy evEN tHough He speciFIeD THat EvErY clAsSIfIcatiOn wAs proviSional and iNcoMpLete (Cournot 1861, 423 aND 425-426). BOutroux rejEctEd the concept ItsElf: eveRy ClaSSificAtiOn was IntrinSIcally ArtificiaL (BOUtroux 1874, 46). tHe folloWINg Year duhem focused on expERiMEntal practice. EVery exPeRImENT inVolVed a wider bOdY of knOWledge tHAt DEALt wITh general assuMptions and cONcePts, and SpEciFIc laws: When a ScIEncE progressed, The rOle played By theoRY increaSEd progrEssiveLy. HE puT forWArD tHe fUnDAmeNTaL thESis That "a phySiCaL expeRimeNT CAN nevEr cOndeMn an iSolated hypothEsiS, but ONly A theoReticAl syStEm". WheN an expEcted PrEdiction did not tAke pLace, a defiNitE sOurCe Of the MIsmatcH coUld Not be foUnd. The cOMplEx RELAtIonship between theoRy AND eXperimenT requiREd A sPEcific seNsItiVity OR Some kInd oF FlAir that iNvolveD "ThE eSprit de FiNesse rAtHer ThaN the eSPrit De géomÉtrie". (DuhEm 1894a, 153-155, 157, 179 anD 188).34 in a following paPEr, Duhem stressED tHE ExTRa-loGicAl concept of The fRUitfUlneSS oF a pHYsicaL theoRy. pHiLOsophers and scientisTs Have trAditiOnally focused On the concePTS Of truth oR falSItY, But truth was the OutcoMe of a histoRIcal procEss, anD therefoRe it was a pROVisional ValUe. ON thE coNTRaRy, the fruitfulNESs of A tHeory waS a pErmanenT vaLue (duhEm 1894b, 124-5). on The track oF Cournot AnD NAvIlE, DuHem ouTLined a coMpLex HiStoRiogrAPhy wheRe botH linEaR pROgrEss and cYClICAl prOcEsSes wEre At Stake.35 theoRIes Emerged, Were succeSsfULly uPhElD, sufferEd a dogmatic drIfT, then they wErE ovErwhelMED by their Flaws, and were eventually rEPlaced bY neW theoRies. this proceSs lEft behInd A PermanEnt and ValuaBlE heRITage: tHE LoNg-tErM progress oF KEy cOncepTs, MathEmaticaL structures, and empiRIcaL laws (Duhem 1894b, 122 anD 125).36 A sTrikING mEtaPHoR FolLoWEd: 32 ACCOrding to Milena IVanova, both duHEm And PoincarÉ "ExpReSsed a foRm of strUcturALism", namEly structUral realiSm, But tHEY adOpted diffeRent episTemologicAL viewS WiTh regArd To "how kNoWleDge of The strUCtuRe of tHe worlD iS reachEd" (IvaNoVa 2015, 88). I stresS the sterility of philosopHical lAbels WheN complex rEseARch ProgrammeS are Involved, anD whEn tHey arE apPLied tO hisTOrIcaL ConteXts qUIte differENt FroM THe Context that HAS GenErateD thOSe labeLs. CaN we find essential dIFferences betweEn whAT MigHt bE LabeLlEd as structural ReaLiSM Or pragmaTiSm
-61, 76-8, and 86). Courno t's concep t was  no t s odiff eren t form Comte's :  a n atural classificationcould  g r asps om e ess entialf ea t u res  o frea li t yeventho ugh hespecifiedtha tevery classi f ic ation waspro visional and  in comple te  (C o urnot  18 61, 4 23 and 425-42 6). Boutr ou x  rejec t ed thec o nc eptitself: every cla s si f ication was in trinsi ca l ly a rti fic ial (Boutr ou x 187 4 , 46).T he f o llo w ing year Duhe m focused o n  ex perime nt alp ractic e. Ev er y  ex periment in volv ed a wide r body of know l edge th at dea ltwit h ge n er al  as su m pti o ns  an d  co ncepts,an dspeci ficl a w s : wh ena sc ience  progressed,the  rol e  pl ayedby th eory  i ncrea sed pr ogres si vely. He put fo rwar d the fun dam en tal  t hesis that " a p hys ical ex perimen t  ca nn e v er  condemn an isolat ed h yp othesis,  but o n ly  a theoreti ca l s yste m " . Whe n an ex pected p redict i on  d id notta ke pla ce , a  de finit e  sou rce of  the mis match could not be f o und. The comp l ex r el a tion shi p between t heor y  and  exp e ri men t  requ iredas pe c ific sensitivity or  s ome ki nd of  flair that i nvolved "t h e esprit d e fi n es s e rather thanthe e sprit de g é ométrie" . (Du hem 1894 a, 153-15 5 ,  157, 17 9 a nd188 ).3 4 In  a followingp a per,  D uhem st res sed the  ex tra -lo gic al  conceptof the f ru it fu ln ess  of a physical  t heo ry . P hilos o phersand s cien ti st s  ha ve trad i ti o n ally  f oc used  on  t he co ncep t s o f truth  or falsi ty, buttr ut h was t he outcome of  a  historica lpro cess,a n d theref ore it was a provisiona l  value.  On  thecont rary, the  fr uitful nes s  of atheory  wasaper m a nentv a lu e ( Du hem 1894b, 1 24- 5). O nthetrack o f Cournot and Navi l e,Duhem outline d a  com p l ex  hi s to r iog ra p hyw h ere both linear  progressan d  c yclical pr o ces se s wereat stak e.35T heories  emerged,  were suc ce ssfu l l y u pheld, suf fered adogmaticd rift, th en th eywere o ve rwh elmed  by th e irflaws , andwe re eve ntual ly  replace d by new theories. This  proce ss le ftbehind aper m ane nt and va luab le heritag e:the  long -te r m pro gres s  o f k e y con cept s , mathema t ic als t ru ctures, and e m pir icallaw s  (Duhe m 18 94b, 122 and 125) . 36 A strikingmeta p h orfol l owed :32 According t o M il e n a Ivanov a,  both Duhem  and Poi nc a ré "e xpress ed a f orm ofs t ru c turali sm",  na mely stru ctu ra l  realis m,  b u t they  ado pt ed dif ferent epis t e mological viewswithr e gardt o " how k no wledgeo f th e structur e of the wo rld is  rea ched"  (Ivano va  2015,  88 ).  I stresst he steril ity o f philo so phic allabels  whe n compl ex r es ear ch progra m m es ar ei nvo lved , and  w henthey area pplied t o h i storica lcon t e xts qu i te d ifferent f rom  thec o ntext that hasg en e rated  those  label s. Canw e f in d essen tia l differenc es betwee n  wh at  mig ht be la be lled  a s s tr uctural realism  or prag matism
-61, 76-8,_and 86)._Cournot's concept was not_so different_form_Comte's: a_natural_classification could grasp_some essential features_of reality even though_he specified that_every_classification was provisional and incomplete (Cournot 1861, 423 and 425-426). Boutroux rejected the concept_itself:_every classification_was_intrinsically_artificial (Boutroux 1874, 46). The_following year Duhem focused on_experimental practice._Every experiment involved a wider body of knowledge_that_dealt with general_assumptions and concepts, and specific laws: when a science_progressed, the role played by theory_increased progressively. He_put_forward_the fundamental thesis that_"a physical experiment can never condemn_an isolated hypothesis, but only a_theoretical system". When an expected prediction did_not take place, a definite source_of the mismatch could not_be found._The complex relationship between theory_and experiment required_a specific_sensitivity or some_kind of flair that involved "the_esprit de finesse_rather than the esprit de géométrie"._(Duhem_1894a, 153-155, 157,_179_and_188).34 In_a following paper,_Duhem_stressed the_extra-logical_concept of the fruitfulness of a_physical_theory. Philosophers and scientists have traditionally focused_on the concepts of_truth_or falsity, but truth_was the outcome of a_historical process, and therefore it was_a provisional_value. On_the contrary, the fruitfulness of a theory was a permanent value_(Duhem 1894b, 124-5). On the track_of Cournot and Navile,_Duhem outlined_a_complex historiography where_both_linear progress_and cyclical processes were at stake.35 Theories_emerged, were_successfully upheld, suffered a dogmatic drift,_then they were overwhelmed_by_their flaws, and were eventually replaced_by new theories. This process left_behind a permanent and valuable_heritage:_the_long-term progress of key concepts,_mathematical structures, and empirical laws (Duhem_1894b, 122 and_125).36 A striking metaphor followed: 32 According_to_Milena Ivanova, both Duhem and Poincaré_"expressed_a form of structuralism", namely structural_realism,_but_they adopted different epistemological views_with regard to "how knowledge of_the structure of the world is reached" (Ivanova 2015,_88). I stress_the sterility of philosophical labels_when_complex_research programmes are involved, and when they are applied to_historical contexts_quite different from_the context that has generated those labels. Can we find_essential differences between what might be labelled_as structural realism or pragmatism