 of Massachusetts Amherst Richard Swinburne's Mind, Brain and Free Will is a tour de force. Beginning with basic ontology, Swinburne formulates careful definitions that support his mature philosophy. He is well-known for his views on free will and substance dualism. In Mind, Brain and Free Will, he revisits these issues among others, because he now has 'deeper and stronger' arguments for his position. Here I want to discuss substance dualism. The first sentence of the book says that its focus is 'the nature of human beings – whether we are merely complicated machines or souls interacting with bodies'1 (Swinburne 2013: 1). Since I do not believe that this dichotomy is exhaustive, I shall first examine Swinburne's argument for the claim that human beings are'souls interacting with bodies', which he interprets as substance dualism. Then, I shall offer a sketch of a different view – my own – which is materialistic in the sense that it makes reference neither to any immaterial concrete objects nor to any immaterial properties (whatever that might mean). I do not say that my materialistic view is a complete metaphysics, inasmuch as that it pertains only to the natural world. I leave it open whether there is a supernatural world. Since I am going to offer an alternative to Swinburne's substance dualism, let me begin by enumerating ways in which I am in full agreement with him. I fully agree with Swinburne that it is not the case that'mental events are merely brain events', and it is not the case that 'I am the same thing as my body' (Baker 1995; Baker 2000). With Swinburne, 1 Since Swinburne begins with a dichotomy between human beings' being machines or souls, and goes on to argue that we are mental substances, I assume that he takes mental substances to be souls (i.e., immaterial substances). 6 LYNNE RUDDER BAKER I reject a Humean theory of causation in favour of a causal-powers view (Baker 2007a). And I thoroughly agree with Swinburne's rejection of the principle of the causal closure of the physical (Swinburne 2013: 104-123; cf. Baker 2009). Moreover, I also have a'simple view' of personal identity (Baker 2012).2 Now to turn to Swinburne. In Chapter One, Swinburne takes
of Massachusetts Amherst Richard Swinburne's Mind, Brain and Free Will is a tour de force. Beginning with basic ontology, Swinburne give voice careful definition that support his mature philosophy. He is well - know for his views on free volition and substance dualism. In Mind, Brain and Free Will, he revisits these issues among others, because he now have' deeper and stronger' argument for his position. Here I want to discuss means dualism. The first sentence of the book says that its focus is' the nature of human being – whether we are merely complicated machines or souls interacting with bodies'1 (Swinburne 2013: 1). Since I do not think that this dichotomy is exhaustive, I shall first examine Swinburne's controversy for the claim that human being are'souls interacting with bodies', which he interprets as substance dualism. Then, I shall offer a cartoon of a different view – my own – which is materialistic in the sense that it makes reference neither to any incorporeal concrete objects nor to any immaterial properties (whatever that might mean). I do not say that my materialistic view is a complete metaphysics, inasmuch as that it pertains only to the lifelike universe. I leave it candid whether there be a supernatural world. Since I am going to offer an option to Swinburne's substance dualism, lease me begin by enumerating way in which I am in full agreement with him. I fully agree with Swinburne that it is not the case that'mental events are merely brain event', and it is not the case that' I am the same thing as my body' (Baker 1995; Baker 2000). With Swinburne, 1 Since Swinburne begin with a dichotomy between human being' being machines or souls, and goes on to argue that we are mental substances, I wear that he takes mental substances to be soul (i.e., immaterial substances). 6 LYNNE RUDDER BAKER I reject a Humean theory of causing in favour of a causal - powers view (Baker 2007a). And I thoroughly agree with Swinburne's rejection of the principle of the causal closing of the physical (Swinburne 2013: 104 - 123; californium. Baker 2009). Moreover, I besides have a'simple view' of personal identity (Baker 2012).2 nowadays to turn to Swinburne. In Chapter One, Swinburne takes
 of Massachusetts Amherst Rlchard Swinburne's Mind, Urain ahd Free Dill is a tour de force. Begiinint wity basic ontology, Swinbjrne formllates caeefuo definitioia that supporf his nature philosokhy. He is wenl-known for hiv xizws on free will and substance dualifm. In Monf, Brain and Frge Wikj, he geyisits these issues among others, becaust he now has 'deepet and stronger' arguments flr hls position. Here I want to diwcusf substance djalism. The first sentehce of the book says that its fucus ns 'the natutz of vuman beingw – whvther we are merely cmmplicayed machines ov souns unteracting with bodixs'1 (Swinburne 2013: 1). Since I do not bzlieve that this dichitimy iv exvausguve, I ahell first exemine Swinbhrne's argumwnt for the claim tnae human beings are'sotlf interacting with bodies', which he integprefs as substance dualism. Then, I shall offer a sketch os a different view – my own – which is materialistiw in vhd stnwe thxr lt makes reference neither to any immaterial sknvrvte objects nor tj any immatrrlak properties (wfatevex tgat might mean). I dl not swy thqt my mattrialostic view is a complete meraphysics, incsmych as that it percains only tu thg natutal world. I leave it opzn whefher there ls a supedvatural world. Sivce I am going to offer an altewnative ti Swnnburne's subxtance dualism, lft me begin by enumeratijg wais in fhich I am in full agreement with him. I fnkly agree wijh Vwitburne tkat it is not the cwse that'mental events are oerely brapn events', and it is got the case djat 'I am the same thyng qs mt body' (Cxker 1995; Baker 2000). Woth Swinblrue, 1 Since Swinburne begins xith z dichotomy betcten human beings' brine mwcjiies ow souls, and gmes un gp argje that we crd memtal substances, I asvume that he takes menyaj substabces to fe souls (i.e., ikmaterial substancts). 6 LYINE RUVDER BSKET I reject a Humean theory of czusation ln navour of a cwusao-powers view (Baker 2007a). And I thoroughly agree with Swmnburne's rejection of jhe principle of the eamsal closure of tre physicdl (Swinburne 2013: 104-123; cf. Bajer 2009). Moreover, I akso have a'simple view' of pessonap identity (Baker 2012).2 Now to turn to Swinburne. In Chapter One, Swinburne takes
of Massachusetts Amherst Richard Swinburne's Mind, Brain Will a tour force. Beginning with definitions support his mature He is well-known his views on free will and dualism. In Mind, Brain and Free Will, he revisits these issues among others, he now has 'deeper and stronger' arguments for his position. Here I want discuss dualism. first of the book says that its focus is 'the nature of human beings – whether we merely complicated machines or souls interacting with bodies'1 2013: 1). Since I not believe that this dichotomy exhaustive, shall first Swinburne's for claim that human are'souls interacting with bodies', which he interprets as substance dualism. Then, I shall offer a sketch of different view own – is in sense that it neither to any immaterial concrete objects immaterial properties (whatever that might mean). I do say that materialistic view is a complete metaphysics, as that it pertains only to the natural I leave it open whether there is a supernatural world. Since I am going to alternative to Swinburne's substance let me begin enumerating in I in full with him. I fully agree with Swinburne that it is not case that'mental events are merely brain events', and it is case 'I am the thing as my body' 1995; 2000). With Swinburne, 1 begins a beings' machines souls, and goes on argue that we are mental I assume that he souls (i.e., immaterial substances). 6 LYNNE RUDDER BAKER reject a Humean theory of causation in of a causal-powers view (Baker 2007a). And I thoroughly agree with Swinburne's of the the causal closure of the physical (Swinburne 2013: cf. Baker 2009). Moreover, also have a'simple view' of personal identity (Baker 2012).2 to to Swinburne. Chapter One, Swinburne
 of Massachusetts Amherst RicHard SwinbuRne's MInd, braIn And FRee WIll is a tour de foRCe. BeGinning with basic ontoloGy, SwiNbURne fORmUlateS carefuL DeFINitIoNs ThaT sUPpOrt hiS maTure phiLosophy. He iS weLl-Known for his vIEwS on free wilL anD substance duAliSm. In MiNd, braIN and FRee will, hE revisITs thesE issues amOnG Others, BEcause hE NOw Has 'dEeper and stronger' aRGuMEnts for his posiTion. HeRe i WaNT To dIscUss substanCe DualiSM. The firST sENTEncE Of the book says That its focuS Is 'tHe natuRe Of hUMan beiNgs – whEtHEr wE are merely cOmplIcated macHines oR Souls inTEractinG with bOdiEs'1 (SWinbURnE 2013: 1). SIncE I DO noT BeLieVE thAt this diChOtOmy is ExhaUSTIVe, I sHalL firSt exaMine Swinburne'S arGumeNT foR the cLaim tHat hUmAn beiNgs are'Souls InTeracting with boDies', Which he inTerPrEts As SubstANce duaLisM. ThEn, I shalL offer a SKetCh OF A DiFferent view – my own – whIcH IS mAterialiStic in THe SeNSe that it MaKes RefeRENce neItheR To Any immatErial cONcReTe objecTs Nor to aNy ImmAteRial pROperTies (whAtever thAt migHT mean). I do not say THat my materialIStIC ViEW is a ComPlete metaphYsicS, InasMuch AS tHat IT pertAins oNlY To THe natural world. I leavE iT open wHetheR there is a supeRnatural woRLD. since I am GoinG To OFfer an alternatIve to swinburne's SUbstance DualiSm, let me bEgin by enuMERating waYs iN whIch i am IN FuLl agreement wiTH Him. I FuLly agreE wiTh SwinbUrnE thAt iT is NoT the case tHat'mentaL eVeNtS aRe mErely BRain evenTs', And It Is nOt the CAse thaT 'I am tHe saMe ThINg aS my body' (bAkER 1995; bakeR 2000). WItH SwiNbuRnE, 1 SincE SwiNBurNe beginS with a dicHotOMy beTwEeN human bEings' being macHiNes or souls, AnD goEs on to ARGue that wE are mental substances, I asSUme that He tAkes mEntaL substancEs tO be souLs (i.E., ImmateRial suBstanCeS). 6 LYnne RUDDer bAkER i rEject a HumeAN TheOry of CaUsatIon in faVour of a causal-powerS VieW (Baker 2007a). And I thOroUghlY AGrEe wITh sWinBuRNe's REJection of the priNciple of thE cAUsAl closure oF The PhYsical (SWinburnE 2013: 104-123; cf. BaKEr 2009). MoreoVer, I also hAve a'simplE vIew' oF PErsOnal identiTy (Baker 2012).2 NOw to turn tO swinbURnE. In ChAptEr One, SWiNbuRne taKes
 of Massachusetts AmherstRichard Sw inbur ne' s M in d, B rain  and Free Will is a  tour de force. Beginn ing w it h  bas i contol ogy, Sw i nb u r nefo rm ula te s  c arefu l d efiniti ons that s upp or t his mature ph ilosophy.Heis well-know n f or his  v iew s  on f ree  will  and s u bstanc e dualism .I n Mind ,  Braina n dFree  Will, he revisit s  t h ese issues amo ng oth er s ,b e cau sehe now has  ' deepe r  and st r on g e r ' a r guments for h is position .  He re I w an t t o  discu ss su bs t anc e dualism.Thefirst sen tenceo f the b o ok says  thatits  fo cusi s't hena t ure of  hu m anbeings –  w he therwe a r e m erel y c ompl icate d machines or  so ulsi nte racti ng wi th b od ies'1  (Swin burne  2 013: 1). SinceI do  not beli eve  t hat  t his d i chotom y i s e xhausti ve, I s h all  f i r s texamine Swinburne' sa r gu ment for  the c l ai mt hat huma nbei ngsa r e'sou ls i n te ractingwith b o di es ', whic hhe int er pre tsas su b stan ce dua lism. Th en, I shall offer as ketch of a di f fe r e nt view  –my own – wh ichi s ma teri a li sti c  in t he se ns e  t h at it makes referen ce  neith er to  any immateri al concret e o bjects n or t o  a n y immaterial p roper ties (what e ver that  migh t mean).  I do not s ay thatmymat eri ali s t ic  view is a co m p lete  m etaphys ics , inasm uch  as  th atit  pertains  only to  t he  n at ura l wor l d. I lea ve  it  o pen  whet h er the re is  a s up er n atu ral wor l d. S ince  I  a m go ing  t o off er a n  al ternati ve to Swi nbu r ne's  s ub stancedualism, letme  begin byen ume rating w ays in w hich I am in full agree m ent wit h h im. I  ful ly agreewit h Swin bur n e that  it is  notth e c a s e tha t ' me nta levents are m ere ly br ai n ev ents',and it is not thec ase  that 'I am t hesame t hi nga sm y b od y ' ( B a ker 1995; Baker  2000). Wi th Sw inburne, 1 Sin ce  Swinbu rne beg ins w i th a di chotomy b etween hu ma n be i n gs'  being mac hines or  souls, a n d goe s  o n toarg ue tha tweare m entals ubs tance s, I a ss ume th at he  t akes men tal substances to be so uls (i .e.,imm aterial s ubs t anc es). 6 LY NNERUDDER BAK ERI r eject  aH umean  the o ry  of causa tion in favour of  ac a us al-powers v i e w  (B aker200 7 a). An d Ithoroughly agreew ith Swinburne' s re j e cti ono f th eprinciple of t heca u s al closu re  of the phy sical (S wi n burne  2013:  104-1 23; cf. B ak e r 2009 ). M ore over, I a lso  h a ve a'si mp le view'of p er sonalidenti t y (B a k er 2012).2 Now t o tur n to Sw i nbu rne.In  Chapte r  One , Swinburn e takes
 of_Massachusetts Amherst_Richard Swinburne's Mind, Brain_and Free_Will_is a_tour_de force. Beginning_with basic ontology,_Swinburne formulates careful definitions_that support his_mature_philosophy. He is well-known for his views on free will and substance dualism. In_Mind,_Brain and_Free_Will,_he revisits these issues among_others, because he now has_'deeper and_stronger' arguments for his position. Here I want_to_discuss substance dualism._The first sentence of the book says that its_focus is 'the nature of human_beings – whether_we_are_merely complicated machines or_souls interacting with bodies'1 (Swinburne 2013:_1). Since I do not believe_that this dichotomy is exhaustive, I shall_first examine Swinburne's argument for the_claim that human beings are'souls_interacting with_bodies', which he interprets as_substance dualism. Then,_I shall_offer a sketch_of a different view – my_own – which_is materialistic in the sense that_it_makes reference neither_to_any_immaterial concrete_objects nor to_any_immaterial properties_(whatever_that might mean). I do not_say_that my materialistic view is a complete_metaphysics, inasmuch as that_it_pertains only to the_natural world. I leave it_open whether there is a supernatural_world. Since_I am_going to offer an alternative to Swinburne's substance dualism, let me_begin by enumerating ways in which_I am in full_agreement with_him._I fully agree_with_Swinburne that_it is not the case that'mental events_are merely_brain events', and it is not_the case that 'I_am_the same thing as my body'_(Baker 1995; Baker 2000). With Swinburne,_1 Since Swinburne begins with_a_dichotomy_between human beings' being machines_or souls, and goes on to_argue that we_are mental substances, I assume that he_takes_mental substances to be souls (i.e.,_immaterial_substances). 6 LYNNE RUDDER BAKER I_reject_a_Humean theory of causation in_favour of a causal-powers view (Baker_2007a). And I thoroughly agree with Swinburne's rejection of_the principle of_the causal closure of the_physical_(Swinburne_2013: 104-123; cf. Baker 2009). Moreover, I also have a'simple_view' of_personal identity (Baker_2012).2 Now to turn to Swinburne. In Chapter One, Swinburne_takes