 is false, since nor swans are blue. Nevertheless, (8′) is true: what they say is not false at Cosmo-Prime. At Cosmo-Prime, it is they who are right and we who are wrong. This further claim is supposed to help us overcome our initial inclination to endorse (8). Views that deploy the ideology of "relative truth" in this way have recently been quite popular in many domains: defenders include MacFarlane (2005, 2007), Lasersohn (2005), Richard (2008), Kölbel (2002), and many others. Another example should convey the general pattern. A Relativist about 'tasty' who, unlike me, dislikes Marmite will think (i) that Marmite is tasty for me and not tasty for him; (ii) that the proposition that Marmite is tasty is true for me and false for him; (iii) that Marmite is not tasty, and the proposition that Marmite is tasty is false; (iv) that I believe the false proposition that Marmite is tasty, and assert it when I say 'Marmite is tasty'; but (v) my believing and asserting this false proposition involves "no fault", in some strong sense that goes beyond the idea that I am fully justified in my belief.19 The view about contingency-inducing quantification that we are considering works in a similar way. People in other Lewis-worlds who are looking at blue swans will frequently come to believe and assert the false proposition that somer swans are blue. However, since this proposition is true for them, in believing and asserting it they are conducting themselves "correctly"; their having these false 19See Cappelen and Hawthorne 2009, chapter 1. beliefs involves "no fault"; they are achieving the "goals" of belief and assertion; etc. Even for words like 'tasty', the Relativist programme strikes me as extremely problematic. According to the Relativist, I ought to think that the things that are tasty for me are tasty, and the propositions that are true for me are true, whereas the propositions that are true for other people are often false; if they believe these propositions, as they ought, they will getting things wrong. This seems to describe a state of extraordinary intellectual hubris: why should I be so confident that I am the special person truth for whom coincides with truth? The further claim that everyone else ought to regard themselves as special in the
is false, since nor swans are blue. Nevertheless, (8′) is genuine: what they suppose is not false at Cosmo - Prime. At Cosmo - Prime, it is they who are right and we who are wrong. This further call is supposed to help us get the better of our initial inclination to endorse (8). horizon that deploy the ideology of " relative accuracy " in this way have recently been quite popular in many domains: defenders admit MacFarlane (2005, 2007), Lasersohn (2005), Richard (2008), Kölbel (2002), and many others. Another example should convey the cosmopolitan pattern. A Relativist about' tasty' who, unlike me, dislike Marmite will intend (i) that Marmite is tasty for me and not tasty for him; (ii) that the proposition that Marmite is tasty is true for me and fake for him; (iii) that Marmite is not tasty, and the proposition that Marmite is tasty is false; (iv) that I think the false proposal that Marmite is tasty, and assert it when I read' Marmite is tasty'; but (v) my believing and asserting this false proposition involve " no fault ", in some strong sense that goes beyond the idea that I am fully justified in my belief.19 The view about contingency - inducing quantification that we are considering works in a similar way. People in other Lewis - worlds who are look at blue swans will frequently do to think and insist the false proposition that some swans are blue. However, since this proposition is true for them, in believe and asserting it they are conducting themselves " correctly "; their having these false 19See Cappelen and Hawthorne 2009, chapter 1. impression involves " no fault "; they are achieving the " goals " of impression and assertion; etc. Even for password like' tasty', the Relativist program strikes me as extremely problematic. According to the Relativist, I ought to remember that the things that are tasty for me are tasty, and the propositions that are true for me are genuine, whereas the propositions that are true for other people are much false; if they think these propositions, as they ought, they will getting things wrong. This seems to report a state of extraordinary intellectual hubris: why should I be thus confident that I am the limited person truth for whom coincides with accuracy? The further claim that everyone else ought to regard themselves as special in the
 is false, since nor swans ave blue. Nevertheless, (8′) iv true: what thdy say is not false at Cosmo-'rimw. At Xosmo-Prime, it is they dho are rpght and qe wio are wrong. This furthev clajl is wupposed to hekp us overwome our initidl iuclination to endorse (8). Views that de[loy thr ldeology of "rejatine trufh" in this way have recently been suite pmpular in manu domains: defenders includf MafFarlane (2005, 2007), Lasersojn (2005), Richard (2008), Kölfwl (2002), and many others. Another examplg should convey the general pattdrn. A Relativisj zblot 'tasty' who, unlihe me, dislikcx Marmhte wilk think (i) that Macmitw is tasty for me and not tasty for him; (ii) that dhz proposition that Maemute iv tavty kw tfue fpr me anf felse for hij; (iii) that Narmite is not tastu, wbd the proposjtion ehwt Marmite is tasty is false; (iv) that I teljeve the false proposituon that Marmite is twsty, and wssert it when I say 'Marmite is tasty'; but (v) my benieviig anb assefrijg this false proposition involves "no fault", ig spmv strong sense thct goes beyond tne icga that I am folly justiried in my belief.19 Hhe vier aboyt contindencu-inducing quantification thqt we are cousieering works in a dimilar way. Peokle in other Lewis-worlds who cre lokking at blke swans skll frequently cume tm believt and assert the fwlse propisitnon that somgr swanf are blue. Howeyar, since this proplsitiln is true flr them, in believing and assertmig it they arg cmndlcting thzmselvcs "correctly"; thqir having thexe falsz 19See Zappelen ahd Hawtiorne 2009, chaptqr 1. beliefs itgolves "no fanlt"; they wre qchiwving tfd "goals" of beloef and assertion; erc. Even for words kikg 'fasty', the Relatnriwt programme sttikds ie ax qftremely protlemxtiz. Accofding to thc Rdlatovist, I ought to thitk tgat the things thay wre tasti for me wre tasty, and the propositions uhat ace trux for ke wre true, whereas the propositikns that wre true for otrer ieopje are oftzn false; if they believe these propositiins, as they ought, rhey will getting tkikgs wrong. Thms seeis to deswribe a state of exteaordinary intelltctual hubris: why shouls I be so clnfident that I am the special person truth for whom coincides with truth? The fnreher claim fhat everjonz ekse oudht vo regard themselvvs as special in the
is false, since nor swans are blue. is what they is not false is who are right we who are This further claim is supposed to us overcome our initial inclination to endorse (8). Views that deploy the ideology "relative truth" in this way have recently been quite popular in many domains: include (2005, Lasersohn Richard (2008), Kölbel (2002), and many others. Another example should convey the general pattern. A Relativist 'tasty' who, unlike me, dislikes Marmite will think that Marmite is tasty me and not tasty for (ii) the proposition Marmite tasty true for me false for him; (iii) that Marmite is not tasty, and the proposition that Marmite is tasty is (iv) that the false that is and assert it say 'Marmite is tasty'; but (v) asserting this false proposition involves "no fault", in strong sense goes beyond the idea that I fully justified in my belief.19 The view about quantification that we are considering works in a similar way. People in other Lewis-worlds who at blue swans will come to believe assert false that swans are However, since this proposition is true for them, in believing and it they are conducting themselves "correctly"; their having these false and 2009, chapter 1. involves "no fault"; they achieving "goals" of belief and Even words Relativist strikes as extremely problematic. According the Relativist, I ought to that the things that tasty, and the propositions that are true for are true, whereas the propositions that are for other people are often false; if they believe these propositions, as ought, they things wrong. This seems to describe a state extraordinary intellectual hubris: why I be so confident that I am the special truth whom coincides truth? The further that everyone else to regard themselves in the
 is false, since nor swans are blUe. NevertheLess, (8′) iS trUe: wHaT theY say Is not false at CoSMo-PrIme. At Cosmo-Prime, it is theY who aRe RIght ANd We who Are wronG. thIS FurThEr ClaIm IS sUpposEd tO help us Overcome ouR inItIal inclinatiON tO endorse (8). ViEws That deploy thE idEology Of "RelATive tRutH" in thIs way hAVe receNtly been qUiTE populAR in many DOMaIns: dEfenders include MaCfaRLane (2005, 2007), Lasersohn (2005), RIchard (2008), köLBeL (2002), ANd mAny Others. AnotHeR examPLe shoulD CoNVEY thE General patterN. A RelativisT AboUt 'tastY' wHo, uNLike me, DisliKeS marMite will thiNk (i) tHat MarmitE is tasTY for me aND not tasTy for hIm; (iI) thAt thE PrOpOsiTiON thAT MArmITe iS tasty is TrUe For me And fALSE For hIm; (iIi) thAt MarMite is not tastY, anD the PRopOsitiOn thaT MarMiTe is tAsty is False; (Iv) That I believe the FalsE propositIon ThAt MArMite iS Tasty, aNd aSseRt it wheN I say 'MaRMitE iS TAStY'; but (v) my believing anD aSSErTing this False pROpOsITion invoLvEs "nO fauLT", In somE strONg Sense thaT goes bEYoNd The idea ThAt I am fUlLy jUstIfied IN my bElief.19 THe view abOut coNTingency-induciNG quantificatiON tHAT wE Are cOnsIdering workS in a SImilAr waY. peOplE In othEr LewIs-WOrLDs who are looking at blUe Swans wIll frEquently come tO believe anD ASSert the fAlse PRoPOsition that somEr swaNs are blue. HOWever, sinCe thiS proposiTion is truE FOr them, in BelIevIng And ASSeRting it they arE COnduCtIng themSelVes "corrEctLy"; tHeiR haViNg these faLse 19See CaPpElEn AnD HaWthorNE 2009, chapter 1. BeLieFs InvOlves "NO fault"; They aRe acHiEvINg tHe "goals" OF bELIef aNd AsSertIon; EtC. Even For wORds Like 'tasTy', the RelaTivISt prOgRaMme striKes me as extremElY problematIc. accOrding TO The RelatIvist, I ought to think that tHE things ThaT are tAsty For me are tAstY, and thE prOPositiOns thaT are tRuE foR ME are tRUE, wHerEaS the proposITIonS that ArE truE for othEr people are often faLSe; iF they believe tHesE proPOSiTioNS, aS TheY oUGht, THEy will getting thIngs wrong. THiS SeEms to descrIBe a StAte of exTraordiNary iNTellectUal hubris: Why should i bE so cONFidEnt that I am The speciAl person tRUth foR WhOm coiNciDes witH tRutH? The fUrther CLaiM that EveryoNe Else ouGht to ReGard themSelves as special in the
 is false, since nor swans  are blue.  Neve rth ele ss , (8 ′) i s true: what t h ey s ay is not false at Cos mo-Pr im e . At Co smo-P rime, i t  i s the ywh o a re ri ght a ndwe whoare wrong.  Th is  further cla i mis suppose d t o help us ov erc ome ou rini t ial i ncl inati on toe ndorse  (8). Vie ws that d e ploy th e id eolo gy of "relative t r ut h " in this wayhave r ec e nt l y  be enquite popu la r inm any dom a in s : def e nders include  MacFarlane (20 05, 20 07 ),L aserso hn (2 00 5 ),Richard (20 08),  Kölbel ( 2002), and man y  others . Anot her  ex ampl e  s ho uld  c o nve y  t heg ene ral patt er n.  A Re lati v i s t  abo ut'tas ty' w ho, unlike me , d isli k esMarmi te wi ll t hi nk (i ) that  Marm it e is tasty forme a nd not ta sty  f orhi m; (i i ) that  th e p roposit ion tha t  Ma rm i t e  i s tasty is true fo rm e  a nd false  for h i m;  ( i ii) that  M arm itei s  nottast y ,and thepropos i ti on  that M ar mite i stas tyis fa l se;(iv) t hat I be lieve the false prop o sition that M a rm i t ei s ta sty , and asser t it when  I s a y'Ma r miteis ta st y '; but (v) my believin gand as serti ng this false  propositi o n involves  "no fa u lt", in some s trong  sense tha t  goes be yondthe idea  that I a m fully ju sti fie d i n m y be lief.19 The v i e w ab ou t conti nge ncy-ind uci ngqua nti fi cation th at we ar eco ns id eri ng wo r ks in asi mil ar  wa y. Pe o ple in  othe r Le wi s- w orl ds whoa re l ooki ng  a t bl uesw ans w illf req uentlycome to b eli e ve a nd  a ssert t he false prop os ition that  s ome r swan s are blue . However, since this p r opositi onis tr ue f or them,inbeliev ing and as sertin g itth eya r e con d u ct ing  t hemselves" c orr ectly ";  the ir havi ng these false 19S e e C appelen and H awt horn e 20 09, ch a pte r1 . b e l iefs involves " no fault";  t h ey  are achie v ing  t he "goa ls" ofbelie f  and as sertion;etc. Even  f or w o r dslike 'tast y', theRelativis t  prog r am me st rik es meas  ex treme ly pro b lem atic.  Accor di ng tothe R el ativist,  I ought to think thatthe th ingstha t are tas tyf orme are ta sty,  and the p rop osi tions  th a t are  tru e  f orm e are  tru e , whereas th e p r o po sitions tha t a retruefor otherpeop le are often fals e ; if they beli evet h ese  pr o posi ti ons, as they o ugh t, t hey will  g etting thin gs wrong .T his s eems t o desc ribe as t at e  of ex trao rdi nary inte lle ct u al hubr is :w hy sho uldIbe soconfid e nt t h a t I am the speci al pe r s on tr u thfor w ho m coinc i deswith truth ? The furth er cla im t hat e veryone  e lse ou ght  t o regard t h emselvesas sp ecial i nthe
 is_false, since_nor swans are blue._Nevertheless, (8′)_is_true: what_they_say is not_false at Cosmo-Prime._At Cosmo-Prime, it is_they who are_right_and we who are wrong. This further claim is supposed to help us overcome_our_initial inclination_to_endorse_(8). Views that deploy the_ideology of "relative truth" in_this way_have recently been quite popular in many domains:_defenders_include MacFarlane (2005,_2007), Lasersohn (2005), Richard (2008), Kölbel (2002), and many_others. Another example should convey the_general pattern. A_Relativist_about_'tasty' who, unlike me,_dislikes Marmite will think (i) that_Marmite is tasty for me and_not tasty for him; (ii) that the_proposition that Marmite is tasty is_true for me and false_for him;_(iii) that Marmite is not_tasty, and the_proposition that_Marmite is tasty_is false; (iv) that I believe_the false proposition_that Marmite is tasty, and assert_it_when I say_'Marmite_is_tasty'; but_(v) my believing_and_asserting this_false_proposition involves "no fault", in some_strong_sense that goes beyond the idea that_I am fully justified_in_my belief.19 The view_about contingency-inducing quantification that we_are considering works in a similar_way. People_in other_Lewis-worlds who are looking at blue swans will frequently come to_believe and assert the false proposition_that somer swans are_blue. However,_since_this proposition is_true_for them,_in believing and asserting it they are_conducting themselves_"correctly"; their having these false 19See_Cappelen and Hawthorne 2009,_chapter_1. beliefs involves "no fault"; they_are achieving the "goals" of belief_and assertion; etc. Even for_words_like_'tasty', the Relativist programme strikes_me as extremely problematic. According to_the Relativist, I_ought to think that the things that_are_tasty for me are tasty, and_the_propositions that are true for me_are_true,_whereas the propositions that are_true for other people are often_false; if they believe these propositions, as they ought,_they will getting_things wrong. This seems to_describe_a_state of extraordinary intellectual hubris: why should I be so_confident that_I am the_special person truth for whom coincides with truth? The further_claim that everyone else ought to regard_themselves as special in the