 problematic it is to give full significance and coherence to an intuition that requires a scientific experience, which renews itself endlessly in light of multiple factors, but that, at the same time, pretends to attain – in advance – the truth itself about hypotheses that are accepted as highly arbitrary and subject to revision according to pragmatic criteria linked to the productivity of their consequences. On the other hand, it seems appropriate to suggest that this appeal to scientific experience foreshadows a key concept in physics' recent historiography, which Buchwald and Hong (2003, 180ff) have called unarticulated knowledge, refering to the implicit knowledge that makes possible the configuration of a theory but which also guides experimental practice in the laboratory.34 31 Notice sur les titres et travaux scientifiques de Pierre Duhem, written in May of 1913, but published posthumously, which deals with the supposed Newtonian method to arrive at principles by means of inductive reasoning, notes that according to Energetism: "The principles are laid down as pure postulates, arbitrary decrees of human reason; they are considered to have successfully fulfilled their role when they yield numerous consequences that conform to experimental laws." (Duhem 1987b, 334) Unfortunately, the English translation lacks the section devoted to his work as a physicist. 32 With regard to the first law of thermodynamics, he notes: "[...] it is a physical hypothesis [...]. It is for experience to verify its immediate and more distant consequences." (Duhem 2011 [1892-1894], 63) 33 "Plus complexe encore est le choix des hypothèses sur lesquelles reposera tout l'édifice d'une doctrine appartenant à la science expérimentale, d'une théorie de Mécanique ou de Physique. Ici, la matière qui doit fournir les principes, ce n'est plus l'expérience commune, celle que tout homme pratique spontanément dès qu'il est sorti de l'enfance; c'est l'expérience scientifique. Aux sciences mathématiques, l'expérience commune fournit des données autonomes, rigoureuses, définitives. Les données de l'expérience scientifique ne sont qu'approchées; le perfectionnement continuel des instruments les retouche et les modifie sans cesse, tandis
problematic it is to give full significance and coherence to an intuition that command a scientific experience, which regenerate itself endlessly in light of multiple factors, but that, at the like time, pretends to attain – in progress – the truth itself about hypotheses that are accept as highly arbitrary and subject to revision accord to pragmatic criteria connect to the productiveness of their consequences. On the other bridge player, it seems appropriate to suggest that this entreaty to scientific experience foreshadows a key concept in physics' late historiography, which Buchwald and Hong (2003, 180ff) have called unarticulated knowledge, consult to the implicit knowledge that construct possible the configuration of a theory but which also guides experimental exercise in the laboratory.34 31 Notice sur les titres et travaux scientifiques de Pierre Duhem, written in May of 1913, but published posthumously, which deals with the supposed Newtonian method to arrive at principle by mean of inductive reasoning, notes that according to Energetism: " The principles are laid down as pure postulates, arbitrary decrees of human rationality; they are consider to have successfully fulfilled their role when they give numerous consequence that conform to experimental laws. " (Duhem 1987b, 334) Unfortunately, the English translation miss the section devote to his work as a physicist. 32 With regard to the inaugural law of thermodynamics, he notes: " [... ] it is a physical hypothesis [... ]. It is for experience to verify its immediate and more aloof consequences. " (Duhem 2011 [ 1892 - 1894 ], 63) 33 " Plus complexe encore est le choix des hypothèses sur lesquelles reposera tout l'édifice d'une doctrine appartenant à la science expérimentale, d'une théorie de Mécanique ou de Physique. Ici, la matière qui doit fournir les principes, ce n'est plus l'expérience commune, celle que tout homme pratique spontanément dès qu'il est sorti de l'enfance; c'est l'expérience scientifique. Aux sciences mathématiques, l'expérience commune fournit des données autonomes, rigoureuses, définitives. Les données de l'expérience scientifique ne sont qu'approchées; le perfectionnement continuel des instruments les retouche et les modifie sans cesse, tandis
 prlblematic it is to give null significancg qnd coierence to an ivtuition that requires a scixntidic ezperience, which renews itself ejdlessly in ought of multiple factors, nut tkav, at the same tlme, pretendv to attain – it xdrance – the truth itself about hypothqses thst are accepted ws hpgrly zgbltrary and subject to revision adcordinj to pragmatic vriteria linked to the profuctlvity of their condequences. Ob thq other hand, kt seems akpxopriate to suggest that this appeal to sckentiyic experiebcw flteshadows a jey cjncept in phnxics' racent hostoriography, ehirh Bychwald and Hong (2003, 180ff) iave called unarticujated knoflzdge, refering to the umplicij knofledew tfat mekea posslblx the confifuration of a theory but which ajwo guides expsrimeneaj practice in the laboratory.34 31 Notice sug lea titres et travaux sciwntifiques de Pierre Fuhem, wrieten in May of 1913, but published posthumously, which geals ditk the rypoosed Newtonian method to arrive at principlef bu keans of inducbive reasoning, notrs tnwt according jo Enerystjsm: "The principles are layd doqn as purt posyulates, arbitrary decrees od human reasjb; they are considexed to have ruccgssfulky fulfilled their role wheh they yielf numeroua consequences thxt bonfmrm to experimental laws." (Dthem 1987b, 334) Uifortbnately, ghe Gnglish translatiln lagns the section devlted jo his work as a physicist. 32 With regard to the hmrst law of tnesmogynamics, he nptes: "[...] it is a physical hypojhesis [...]. Ic is fur experiehce to terify its iimediate and klre distant ronsequenses." (Euhen 2011 [1892-1894], 63) 33 "Pujs complexe envore est le choix dws hypothèses sur lcsqueumes reposera tobu l'éeifice d'une docyrive wpiarvenane à la science expéfimdmtale, d'une théoric dd Mécsnique ou de Physiqua. Icj, la matière qui doot fournir les prigcipes, ce n'esy plus l'expérience fommuie, celue qur tjut homme pratique spontanément dès qu'il fst sorti de l'egfange; c'gst l'expérieuce scientifique. Aux sciences mathématiquxs, l'expérience commune fiurnit des données aotokomes, rigourxuses, qéfinitivev. Les données de l'expéeience scientifiqme ne sont qu'approchées; le pesfectlonnement continuel des instruments les retouche et les modifie sans cessw, tandms
problematic it is to give full significance to intuition that a scientific experience, light multiple factors, but at the same pretends to attain – in advance the truth itself about hypotheses that are accepted as highly arbitrary and subject revision according to pragmatic criteria linked to the productivity of their consequences. On other it appropriate suggest that this appeal to scientific experience foreshadows a key concept in physics' recent historiography, which and Hong (2003, 180ff) have called unarticulated knowledge, to the implicit knowledge makes possible the configuration of theory which also experimental in laboratory.34 31 Notice les titres et travaux scientifiques de Pierre Duhem, written in May of 1913, but published posthumously, which with the method to at by of inductive reasoning, according to Energetism: "The principles are pure postulates, arbitrary decrees of human reason; they considered to successfully fulfilled their role when they numerous consequences that conform to experimental laws." (Duhem 334) Unfortunately, the English translation lacks the section devoted to his work as a physicist. regard to the first of thermodynamics, he "[...] is physical [...]. It for experience to verify its immediate and more distant consequences." (Duhem [1892-1894], 63) 33 "Plus complexe encore est le choix des lesquelles tout l'édifice d'une appartenant à la science d'une de Mécanique ou de la qui principes, n'est l'expérience commune, celle que homme pratique spontanément dès qu'il sorti de l'enfance; c'est l'expérience commune fournit des données autonomes, rigoureuses, définitives. données de l'expérience scientifique ne sont qu'approchées; perfectionnement continuel des instruments les retouche et les modifie sans cesse, tandis
 problematic it is to give full SignificanCe and CohEreNcE to aN intUition that requIRes a Scientific experience, whIch reNeWS itsELf EndleSsly in lIGhT OF muLtIpLe fAcTOrS, but tHat, At the saMe time, pretEndS tO attain – in advANcE – the truth iTseLf about hypotHesEs that ArE acCEpted As hIghly ArbitrARy and sUbject to rEvISion acCOrding tO PRaGmatIc criteria linked tO ThE Productivity of Their cOnSEqUENceS. On The other haNd, It seeMS appropRIaTE TO suGGest that this aPpeal to scieNTifIc expeRiEncE ForeshAdows A kEY coNcept in physIcs' rEcent histOriogrAPhy, whicH buchwalD and HoNg (2003, 180fF) haVe caLLeD uNarTiCUlaTEd KnoWLedGe, referiNg To The imPlicIT KNOwleDge That Makes Possible the coNfiGuraTIon Of a thEory bUt whIcH also Guides ExperImEntal practice in The lAboratory.34 31 notIcE suR lEs titREs et trAvaUx sCientifIques de pIerRe dUHEm, Written in May of 1913, but pUbLIShEd posthuMously, WHiCh DEals with ThE suPposED newtoNian MEtHod to arrIve at pRInCiPles by mEaNs of inDuCtiVe rEasonINg, noTes thaT accordiNg to ENErgetism: "The priNCiples are laid DOwN AS pURe poStuLates, arbitrAry dECreeS of hUMaN reASon; thEy are CoNSiDEred to have successfuLlY fulfiLled tHeir role when tHey yield nuMEROus conseQuenCEs THat conform to exPerimEntal laws." (DUHem 1987b, 334) UnfoRtunaTely, the ENglish traNSLation laCks The SecTioN DEvOted to his work AS A phySiCist. 32 WitH reGard to tHe fIrsT laW of ThErmodynamIcs, he notEs: "[...] It Is A pHysIcal hYPothesis [...]. it Is fOr ExpErienCE to verIfy itS immEdIaTE anD more diSTaNT ConsEqUeNces." (duhEm 2011 [1892-1894], 63) 33 "plus cOmplEXe eNcore esT le choix dEs hYPothÈsEs Sur lesqUelles reposerA tOut l'édificE d'Une DoctriNE AppartenAnt à la science expérimentALe, d'une tHéoRie de mécaNique ou de phySique. ICi, lA MatièrE qui doIt fouRnIr lES PrincIPEs, Ce n'EsT plus l'expéRIEncE commUnE, celLe que toUt homme pratique spoNTanÉment dès qu'il eSt sOrti DE L'eNfaNCe; C'Est L'eXPérIENce scientifique. aux scienceS mAThÉmatiques, l'EXpéRiEnce comMune fouRnit dES donnéeS autonomeS, rigoureuSeS, défINItiVes. Les donnÉes de l'exPérience sCIentiFIqUe ne sOnt Qu'apprOcHéeS; le peRfectiONneMent cOntinuEl Des insTrumeNtS les retoUche et les modifie sans cesSe, tandIs
 problematic it is to give  full sign ifica nce  an dcohe renc e to an intuit i on t hat requires a scienti fic e xp e rien c e,  whic h renew s  i t s elf  e nd les sl y  i n lig htof mult iple facto rs,  b ut that, att he  same time , p retends to a tta in – i nadv a nce –  th e tru th its e lf abo ut hypoth es e s that are acc e p te d as  highly arbitrary an d  subject to re vision  a c co r d ing  to  pragmatic  c riter i a linke d  t o t hep roductivity o f their con s equ ences.  O n t h e othe r han d, itseems appro pria te to sug gest t h at this appealto sci ent ifi c ex p er ie nce  f o res h ad ows a k ey conce pt  i n phy sics ' r e cent  hi stor iogra phy, which Bu chw alda ndHong(2003 , 18 0f f) ha ve cal led u na rticulated know ledg e, referi ngto  th eimpli c it kno wle dge  that m akes po s sib le t h econfiguration of a  t h e or y but wh ich al s ogu i des expe ri men talp r actic e in th e labora tory.3 4  3 1Noticesu r lesti tre s e t tra v auxscient ifiquesde Pi e rre Duhem, wri t ten in May of 19 1 3 ,b ut p ubl ished posth umou s ly,whic h  d eal s  with  thesu p po s ed Newtonian method  t o arri ve at  principles b y means of i n ductivereas o ni n g, notes thataccor ding to En e rgetism:  "The  princip les are l a i d down a s p ure  po stu l a te s, arbitraryd e cree sof huma n r eason;the y a recon si dered tohave suc ce ss fu ll y f ulfil l ed their  r ole  w hen  they yieldnumer ousco ns e que nces th a tc o nfor mto  exp eri me ntallaws . " ( Duhem 1 987b, 334 ) U n fort un at ely, th e English tra ns lation lac ks  th e sect i o n devote d to his work as a phys i cist. 3 2 W ith r egar d to thefir st law  of thermo dynami cs, h enot e s : "[. . . ]itis  a physica l hyp othes is  [.. .]. Itis for experiencet o v erify its imm edi atea n dmor e  d i sta nt con s e quences." (Duhe m 2011 [18 92 - 18 94], 63) 3 3  "P lu s compl exe enc ore e s t le ch oix des h ypothèses  s ur l e s que lles repos era tout  l'édific e  d'un e  d octri neappart en ant  à la  scien c e e xpéri mental e,  d'une  théo ri e de Méc anique ou de Physique.Ici, l a mat ièr e qui doi t f o urn ir les pr inci pes, ce n' est  pl us l' exp é rienc e co m mu ne, celle  que tout homm e  p rat i q ue  spontanéme n t dès  qu'i l e s t sort i de  l'enfance; c'est l'expérience s cien t i fiq ue. Auxsc iences mathéma tiq ue s ,  l'expér ie nce commune  fournit  d e s don nées a utonom es, rig o u re u ses, d éfin iti ves. Lesdon né e s de l' ex pé r iencescie nt ifique  ne so n t qu ' a pprochées; le pe rfect i o nneme n t c ontin ue l des i n stru ments lesretouche et  les m odif ie sa ns cess e,  tandi s
 problematic_it is_to give full significance_and coherence_to_an intuition_that_requires a scientific_experience, which renews_itself endlessly in light_of multiple factors,_but_that, at the same time, pretends to attain – in advance – the truth_itself_about hypotheses_that_are_accepted as highly arbitrary and_subject to revision according to_pragmatic criteria_linked to the productivity of their consequences. On_the_other hand, it_seems appropriate to suggest that this appeal to scientific_experience foreshadows a key concept in_physics' recent historiography,_which_Buchwald_and Hong (2003, 180ff)_have called unarticulated knowledge, refering to_the implicit knowledge that makes possible_the configuration of a theory but which_also guides experimental practice in the_laboratory.34 31 Notice sur les_titres et_travaux scientifiques de Pierre Duhem,_written in May_of 1913,_but published posthumously,_which deals with the supposed Newtonian_method to arrive_at principles by means of inductive_reasoning,_notes that according_to_Energetism:_"The principles_are laid down_as_pure postulates,_arbitrary_decrees of human reason; they are_considered_to have successfully fulfilled their role when_they yield numerous consequences_that_conform to experimental laws."_(Duhem 1987b, 334) Unfortunately, the_English translation lacks the section devoted_to his_work as_a physicist. 32 With regard to the first law of thermodynamics,_he notes: "[...] it is a_physical hypothesis [...]. It_is for_experience_to verify its_immediate_and more_distant consequences." (Duhem 2011 [1892-1894], 63) 33_"Plus complexe_encore est le choix des hypothèses_sur lesquelles reposera tout_l'édifice_d'une doctrine appartenant à la science_expérimentale, d'une théorie de Mécanique ou_de Physique. Ici, la matière_qui_doit_fournir les principes, ce n'est_plus l'expérience commune, celle que tout_homme pratique spontanément_dès qu'il est sorti de l'enfance; c'est_l'expérience_scientifique. Aux sciences mathématiques, l'expérience commune_fournit_des données autonomes, rigoureuses, définitives. Les_données_de_l'expérience scientifique ne sont qu'approchées;_le perfectionnement continuel des instruments les_retouche et les modifie sans cesse, tandis