 former, the latter suggests that the content of the representation in question is propositional, and it is not obvious that this is the case for nonconceptual representations. 13 Note that this is consistent with my claim above that my knowledge that I wear a blue sweater (which I gain by looking in the mirror) is not different in kind from the knowledge that'she is wearing a blue sweater' gained by another person who is looking at me. In both cases, an identification component is involved (hence the possibility of misidentification is provided for). Although my perception necessarily contains self-specifying information, this information is not about the blue sweater being mine – rather it is information regarding my Forthcoming in Grazer Philosophische Studien 84 (2012), p. 75-101 6 subject with information regarding its bodily states and properties. However, this does not imply that the information is also explicitly represented as being about the subject. Rather, because perception always occurs from a unique perspective, and because proprioception always delivers information about a unique body, there is no need for the self to be explicitly represented. In other words, there is no need for the organism to keep track of the subject of its perceptual and proprioceptive states. Rather, as I argue elsewhere (Musholt, forthcoming), the self should be understood as an 'unarticulated constituent' (Perry, 2000) of perception and proprioception. The information that is provided by perception and proprioception is implicitly self-related because it is part of the function of perception and proprioception to provide information that is related to the subject such that the information can be used for the guidance of intentional action. But this ought to be distinguished from explicit selfrepresentation where the information is explicitly represented as being about the organism. In other words, it is one thing to be in a perceptual or bodily state, but it is another thing to explicitly ascribe this state to oneself. And to put it differently again: it is one thing to be conscious and another thing to be self-conscious. 14 While perception per se does not require explicit self-representation, the explicit representation of the subject of my perception – myself – comes into play when I am about to contrast my perception (and hence my egocentric perspective) with that of another subject. For instance, it might be the case that I can see a book on the table, but you cannot, because your visual access to the book is blocked by some other object that is located between you and the book on
former, the latter suggests that the content of the representation in doubt is propositional, and it is not obvious that this is the subject for nonconceptual representations. 13 Note that this is consistent with my call above that my knowledge that I wear a gloomy sweater (which I gain by look in the mirror) is not different in kind from the knowledge that'she is wear a blue sweater' gained by another person who is looking at me. In both cases, an identification part is involved (hence the possibility of misidentification is provide for). Although my perception necessarily contain self - specifying data, this information is not about the blasphemous sweater being mine – rather it is information regard my Forthcoming in Grazer Philosophische Studien 84 (2012), p. 75 - 101 6 subject with information regarding its bodily states and properties. However, this does not entail that the information is also explicitly represented as being about the subject. Rather, because perception always occurs from a unique perspective, and because proprioception constantly delivers information about a singular soundbox, there is no need for the self to be explicitly represented. In early words, there constitute no need for the organism to keep racetrack of the subject of its perceptual and proprioceptive states. Rather, as I argue elsewhere (Musholt, forthcoming), the self should be understood as an' unarticulated constituent' (Perry, 2000) of sensing and proprioception. The information that is provided by perception and proprioception is implicitly self - related because it is function of the affair of perception and proprioception to provide information that is related to the subject such that the data can be used for the guidance of intentional action. But this ought to be distinguished from explicit selfrepresentation where the information is explicitly represented as being about the organism. In other password, it is one thing to be in a perceptual or bodily country, but it is another thing to explicitly ascribe this state of matter to oneself. And to put it differently again: it is one matter to be conscious and another thing to be self - conscious. 14 While perception per se does not require explicit self - theatrical performance, the explicit representation of the subject of my sensing – myself – comes into turn when I am about to contrast my perception (and hence my egocentric perspective) with that of another subject. For instance, it might be the case that I can see a record on the table, but you cannot, because your visual entree to the book is blocked by some other object that is located between you and the book on
 fogmer, the latter suggests that the conteur of tie reprssentatiun in question is propositioial, qnd iu is not obvious thxt this id the cawe fie nonconce'fual reixesenfwtious. 13 Note that thls is consivtent with my wlxil above that my knowledge that I wewr a blie sweater (which I gsyn bg looking in the mirror) is not difrerent pn kind from the lnowledge that'she is wearijg a blue sweater' gainfd by anothgd pqeson who is uooking at me. In both dases, an identification componevt is involved (yebce jhe possibilmty of misidentifigstion hs provoded for). Althomgh mb peeception necessarily rontains self-specifyyng inforkacion, this information iw not abogt tfw buue sxeafer belng mine – ratger it is ibformation regardinb ij Forthcoming in Grwzqr Philosophische Studien 84 (2012), p. 75-101 6 subject wifh information regardint its bodily states ajd propereies. However, this does not imply that the informadion ms alwo dzppicitly represented as being about the subjece. Rstmer, because perccption always occuts ftjm a unique pgrspectnbe, and because proprloceptijn alqays deliders information about a unique body, there ps ni need for the sely to be explncitly reprrsented. In other words, chere js no need vor the odeanism to keep tfacl mf the subject of its percqptual anv pro'rioceptkve xtates. Rather, as I arnge elsewhere (Mushopt, fotthcomhng), the sepf should be understood as an 'uierticulated cpnvtinuent' (Perxy, 2000) of perception agd proprioceptnon. The nnformxtion that is protided by perseption and pslprioception is implycitoy swlf-relagdd because it os part oy the function of perceition znd proprioceptnub to provide ingoroatyoj vhat yv related to the suckect ruch that tme knfotmation can be used xor fhe guidance of inyektional axtion. Bue this ought yo be distinguishef frok eepliciy sglfrepresentation where the infkrmation ls cxplicitly re[rescnteq as being about the organism. In other words, it iw one thing to be un a perceptual or yocily state, uut it is anothar thing to explicitoy ascribe this suate to oneself. And to lut it difffrently again: it is one thing to be conscious and another thing to be seld-conscmots. 14 While psrceltion pzr xe doef nov cequire explicit xelf-representation, the explicit represettction of the subject of my petcdption – myselw – comes into play when J am aboit to contrast my perception (anc hence my egocentric pevspective) with that of aiother subject. For imstancz, it mught be the case that I zan sce a book ln tie cable, but you cannot, because your visuao wccess to the bomk is blockcd by skme otrer object that js lkfated between you snd the book om
former, the latter suggests that the content representation question is and it is the for nonconceptual representations. Note that this consistent with my claim above that knowledge that I wear a blue sweater (which I gain by looking in mirror) is not different in kind from the knowledge that'she is wearing a sweater' by person is looking at me. In both cases, an identification component is involved (hence the possibility of is provided for). Although my perception necessarily contains information, this information is about the blue sweater being – it is regarding Forthcoming Grazer Philosophische Studien (2012), p. 75-101 6 subject with information regarding its bodily states and properties. However, this does not that the also explicitly as about subject. Rather, because occurs from a unique perspective, and delivers information about a unique body, there is need for self to be explicitly represented. In words, there is no need for the organism keep track of the subject of its perceptual and proprioceptive states. Rather, as I argue forthcoming), the self should understood as an constituent' 2000) perception proprioception. The that is provided by perception and proprioception is implicitly self-related because is part of the function of perception and proprioception to that related to the such that the information be for the guidance of But ought from selfrepresentation the information is explicitly as being about the organism. other words, it is a perceptual or bodily state, but it is thing to explicitly ascribe this state to And to put it differently again: it is one thing to be and another be self-conscious. 14 While perception per se does require explicit self-representation, the representation of the subject of my perception – myself comes play when am about to my perception (and my egocentric perspective) of another For it case that I can see a on table, but you cannot, because visual the book is blocked by some other object that is located between you and the
 former, the latter suggests thAt the conteNt of tHe rEprEsEntaTion In question is prOPosiTional, and it is not obviouS that ThIS is tHE cAse foR nonconCEpTUAl rEpReSenTaTIoNs. 13 NotE thAt this iS consistenT wiTh My claim above THaT my knowledGe tHat I wear a bluE swEater (wHiCh I GAin by LooKing iN the miRRor) is nOt differeNt IN kind fROm the knOWLeDge tHat'she is wearing a bLUe SWeater' gained by AnotheR pERsON Who Is lOoking at me. in Both cASes, an idENtIFICatIOn component is Involved (henCE thE possiBiLitY Of misiDentiFiCAtiOn is provideD for). although mY percePTion necESsarily ContaiNs sElf-SpecIFyInG inFoRMatIOn, ThiS InfOrmation Is NoT abouT the BLUE SweaTer BeinG mine – Rather it is infOrmAtioN RegArdinG my FoRthcOmIng in grazer philoSoPhische Studien 84 (2012), p. 75-101 6 SubjEct with inForMaTioN rEgardINg its bOdiLy sTates anD properTIes. hoWEVEr, This does not imply thAt THE iNformatiOn is alSO eXpLIcitly rePrEseNted AS Being AbouT ThE subject. rather, BEcAuSe percePtIon alwAyS ocCurS from A UniqUe persPective, aNd becAUse proprioceptIOn always delivERs INFoRMatiOn aBout a unique Body, THere Is no NEeD foR The seLf to bE eXPlICitly represented. In oThEr wordS, therE is no need for tHe organism TO KEep track Of thE SuBJect of its percePtual And proprioCEptive stAtes. RAther, as I Argue elseWHEre (MushoLt, fOrtHcoMinG), THe Self should be uNDErstOoD as an 'unArtIculateD coNstItuEnt' (peRry, 2000) of percEption anD pRoPrIoCepTion. THE informaTiOn tHaT is ProviDEd by peRceptIon aNd PrOPriOceptioN Is IMPlicItLy Self-RelAtEd becAuse IT is Part of tHe functioN of PErcePtIoN and proPrioception to PrOvide inforMaTioN that iS RElated to The subject such that the inFOrmatioN caN be usEd foR the guidaNce Of inteNtiONal actIon. But This oUgHt tO BE distINGuIshEd From explicIT SelFreprEsEntaTion wheRe the information is EXplIcitly represeNteD as bEINg AboUT tHE orGaNIsm. iN Other words, it is oNe thing to bE iN A pErceptual oR BodIlY state, bUt it is aNotheR Thing to ExplicitlY ascribe tHiS staTE To oNeself. And tO put it diFferently AGain: iT Is One thIng To be coNsCioUs and AnotheR ThiNg to bE self-cOnScious. 14 while PeRception Per se does not require explIcit seLf-repResEntation, tHe eXPliCit represEntaTion of the sUbjEct Of my pErcEPtion – MyseLF – cOmeS Into pLay wHEn I am abouT To ConTRAsT my perceptiON (ANd hEnce mY egOCentriC perSpective) with that oF Another subject. for iNSTanCe, iT MighT bE the case that I cAn sEe A BOok on the TaBle, but you caNnot, becaUsE Your vIsual aCcess tO the booK IS bLOcked bY somE otHer object ThaT iS Located BeTwEEn you aNd thE bOok on
 former, the latter sugges ts that th e con ten t o ftherepr esentation inq uest ion is propositional,and i ti s no t  o bviou s thatt hi s isth ecas ef or  nonc onc eptualrepresenta tio ns . 13 Note th a tthis is co nsi stent with m y c laim a bo vet hat m y k nowle dge th a t I we ar a blue  s w eater( which I g ai n by  looking in the m i rr o r) is not diff erentin ki n d  fr omthe knowle dg e tha t 'she is we a r i nga  blue sweater ' gained by ano ther p er son who is  look in g  at  me. In bot h ca ses, an i dentif i cationc omponen t is i nvo lve d (h e nc ethe  p o ssi b il ity ofmisident if ic ation  isp r o v ided  fo r).Altho ugh my percep tio n ne c ess arily  cont ains  s elf-s pecify ing i nf ormation, thisinfo rmation i s n ot  ab ou t the blue s wea ter  beingmine –r ath er i t  i s information rega rd i n gmy Forth coming in  G r azer Phi lo sop hisc h e  Stud ien8 4(2012),p. 75- 1 01  6  subjec twith i nf orm ati on re g ardi ng its  bodilystate s  and propertie s . However, th i sd o es notimp ly that the  inf o rmat ioni sals o  expl icitl yr ep r esented as being ab ou t thesubje ct. Rather, b ecause per c e p tion alw ayso cc u rs from a uniq ue pe rspective, and beca use p roprioce ption alw a y s delive rsinf orm ati o n  a bout a unique b ody,  t here is  no  need f orthe  se lfto  be expli citly re pr es en te d.In ot h er words ,the re  is  no n e ed for  theorga ni sm tokeep tr a ck o f th esu bjec t o fits p erce p tua l and p ropriocep tiv e  sta te s.  Rather , as I argueel sewhere (M us hol t, for t h coming),  the self should be und e rstoodasan 'u nart iculatedcon stitue nt' (Perry , 2000 ) ofpe rce p t ion a n d  p rop ri oception.T h e i nform at ionthat is  provided by perce p tio n and proprio cep tion i simp l ic i tly  s e lf- r e lated because i t is partof th e function ofpe rceptio n and p ropri o ception  to provi de inform at iont h atis related  to thesubject s u ch th a tthe i nfo rmatio ncan  be u sed fo r  th e gui danceof  inten tiona laction.But this ought to be di stingu ished  fr om explic its elf represent atio n where th e i nfo rmati oni s exp lici t ly  re p resen teda s being a b ou t t h e  o rganism. In o t her  word s,i t is o ne t hing to be in a p e rceptual or bo dily s tat e,b ut i tis another thi ngto e xplicitl yascribe thi s stateto onese lf. An d to p ut it d i f fe r entlyagai n:it is one  th in g  to beco ns c ious a nd a no ther t hing t o  bes e lf-conscious. 14  Whil e perce p tio n per  s e doesn ot r equire exp licit self- repres enta tion,  the ex pl icit r epr es entation o f  the subj ect o f my pe rc epti on– myse lf – c omesinto  p lay  when I a m ab o ut  t o  co ntra st my  p erce ption (an d  hence m y e g ocentri cper s p ective )  w i t h that ofano thers u bject. For inst a nc e , itmightbe the  case t h atIcan see  ab o ok on the  table, b u t y ou  can not, bec au se y ou r v is ual access to t he bookis block e d  by so meo ther object  t hat is locat ed be tw e en youa n d t he book on
 former,_the latter_suggests that the content_of the_representation_in question_is_propositional, and it_is not obvious_that this is the_case for nonconceptual_representations._13 Note that this is consistent with my claim above that my knowledge that_I_wear a_blue_sweater_(which I gain by looking_in the mirror) is not_different in_kind from the knowledge that'she is wearing a_blue_sweater' gained by_another person who is looking at me. In both_cases, an identification component is involved_(hence the possibility_of_misidentification_is provided for). Although_my perception necessarily contains self-specifying information,_this information is not about the_blue sweater being mine – rather it_is information regarding my Forthcoming in_Grazer Philosophische Studien 84 (2012),_p. 75-101_6 subject with information regarding_its bodily states_and properties._However, this does_not imply that the information is_also explicitly represented_as being about the subject. Rather,_because_perception always occurs_from_a_unique perspective,_and because proprioception_always_delivers information_about_a unique body, there is no_need_for the self to be explicitly represented._In other words, there_is_no need for the_organism to keep track of_the subject of its perceptual and_proprioceptive states._Rather, as_I argue elsewhere (Musholt, forthcoming), the self should be understood as_an 'unarticulated constituent' (Perry, 2000) of_perception and proprioception. The_information that_is_provided by perception_and_proprioception is_implicitly self-related because it is part of_the function_of perception and proprioception to provide_information that is related_to_the subject such that the information_can be used for the guidance_of intentional action. But this_ought_to_be distinguished from explicit selfrepresentation_where the information is explicitly represented_as being about_the organism. In other words, it is_one_thing to be in a perceptual_or_bodily state, but it is another_thing_to_explicitly ascribe this state to_oneself. And to put it differently_again: it is one thing to be conscious and_another thing to_be self-conscious. 14 While perception_per_se_does not require explicit self-representation, the explicit representation of the_subject of_my perception –_myself – comes into play when I am about to_contrast my perception (and hence my egocentric_perspective) with that of another subject. For instance, it might be_the case that I can see a book_on the table, but you cannot, because_your visual access to_the_book is blocked by some other object_that_is_located_between you and_the book on