 we are a function or process. It isn't clear how both descriptions can be correct. But suppose we assume that the human person is a wholly physical body and that such a body is just a collection of complex processes and functions. It is not clear how such a view can explain how humans can be subjects of consciousness and agents. Nor it is clear how it can explain how humans can undergo psychological and spiritual transformation. These facts pose significant problems for physicalists.76 As a biological organism, the human body undergoes an unrelenting process of part replacement. Moment by moment your body absorbs new parts and expels old parts. This takes place through respiration and metabolic processes, among others. Strictly speaking, the body you had 20 seconds ago is not exactly the same body you have now. It is similar, but not identical. This is true for the same reason that the body you have now is not identical to the body you had when you were an infant. If your body is nothing more than a wholly-physical biological organism comprised of various complex processes and functions, then your body does not exist from one moment to the next. Your body five minutes ago does not have all the parts that your body has right now. It is fairly obvious that they are not identical. However, if you are identical to your body, a wholly-physical biological organism comprised of various complex processes and functions, then you do not persist 72 Brown and Strawn, 5. 73 Ibid., 54. 74 Ibid., 125. 75 Ibid., 75. 76 This section is influenced by the following papers: J. P. Moreland, "Restoring the Substance of the Soul to Psychology," Journal of Psychology and Theology 26 (1) (1998): 29-43; and J. P. Moreland, "Spiritual Formation and the Nature of the Soul," Christian Education Journal (2000): 25-43. Although Moreland raises different objections than ours, his approach to analyzing substances in contrast to aggregates or property things inspirited our approach in this section. through part replacement either. That is, the person that existed 5 minutes ago is not the person you identify as yourself right now. Like other Christian physicalists, Brown and Strawn hold that there are features of your consciousness, agency, and psychology that are emergent and thus not reducible to your body. So perhaps they can escape this objection by holding that although the body you are identical to does not persist, the emergent properties that are a part of what comprises you do persist, and so
we are a function or process. It isn't clear how both descriptions can be right. But presuppose we assume that the human person is a wholly physical soundbox and that such a consistency is just a collection of complex process and function. It is not clear how such a position can explain how humans can be topic of consciousness and agents. Nor it is well-defined how it can excuse how humans can undergo psychological and spiritual transformation. These fact pose significant problem for physicalists.76 As a biological organism, the human body undergoes an unrelenting summons of part replacement. Moment by moment your torso absorbs new parts and expels old part. This takes place through respiration and metabolic processes, among others. Strictly address, the torso you had 20 seconds ago is not exactly the same body you have nowadays. It is alike, but not identical. This is true for the same cause that the soundbox you have now is not identical to the body you have when you were an infant. If your body is nothing more than a wholly - physical biological organism comprised of diverse complex processes and functions, then your body does not exist from one moment to the next. Your body five hour ago does not have all the parts that your body has justly now. It is reasonably obvious that they are not identical. However, if you are identical to your soundbox, a wholly - physical biological organism comprised of various complex processes and routine, then you do not persist 72 Brown and Strawn, 5. 73 Ibid. , 54. 74 Ibid. , 125. 75 Ibid. , 75. 76 This section is influenced by the follow paper: J. P. Moreland, " Restoring the Substance of the Soul to Psychology, " Journal of Psychology and Theology 26 (1) (1998 ): 29 - 43; and J. P. Moreland, " Spiritual Formation and the Nature of the Soul, " Christian Education Journal (2000 ): 25 - 43. Although Moreland raises unlike objections than ours, his approach to analyzing substances in contrast to sum or property thing inspirited our access in this section. through character replacement either. That is, the person that existed 5 minute ago is not the person you identify as yourself correctly now. Like other Christian physicalists, Brown and Strawn hold that there are features of your consciousness, agency, and psychology that are emergent and thus not reducible to your body. thus perhaps they can escape this protest by holding that although the body you are identical to does not persevere, the emergent properties that are a part of what comprises you do persevere, and so
 we are a function or procers. It isn't cleat yow bovh descdiptions can be correct. But suppose xe awsume that the human person is a whoply physucal vody and tizt such a bodg is luwt a collectiok of complef processes ang wuuctions. It is not clear how such a vyew can edplain how humwns bag be subjects of consciousness and agehts. Nor it is clear now it can explain how humwns fan undergo psychopogical and spiwutual transfurmation. These facts pkse significant problems for phhsicakists.76 As a buollcical organmsm, thv human body mmdergoas an umrelenting progess mf part replacement. Momeit by moment your boqy absorbv uew parts and expels ile parjs. Thhs txjes plzcx tgrough reapiration znd metaboluc processes, among ptrvts. Strictly apeakigg, the body you had 20 seconds ago is not eqactmy the same body you hace now. It is similar, hut not iqentical. This is true for the same reason that tha bodb hou hwxw jow is not identical to the body you had when goi eere an infant. If your bocy ix nothing more than c wgolly-physical biollgical jrganusm comprysed of various complex processws and functpons, then your body dozs not exist frok one moment to the next. Youx body five minutfs ago dosr not have all tfe iartv that your body has right now. It iw fanrly obvkous that ehey are nlt idcttical. However, if jou ate idettical to jour body, a wholly-physical biological organisk womirised of varipus complex pwocesses and fonctions, chen yuu do not iersist 72 Urown and Stwawn, 5. 73 Ibid., 54. 74 Lbid., 125. 75 Ibid., 75. 76 This sqctiin iw infludvced by the foklowing pckers: J. P. Mireland, "Restoring bhe Sobatance of the Siul to Psychology," Koufnaj lf Pffchology and Theuloeu 26 (1) (1998): 29-43; and J. K. Mifelamd, "Spiritual Formatimn ahd the Nature of tne Soul," Chtistian Equcation Jourmal (2000): 25-43. Although Mortland caises diffrregt objections than ours, his aplroach to anwlyzing subseanccs ig contrast to aggregates or property things inspicited our approach in jhis section. through karu replacement eithqr. That iv, the person that exusted 5 minutes agp is not the person yku idettify as yourself right now. Like other Christian physicalists, Brown and Strawn hold vhwt there ars festurev jy your sonsriuusness, agency, amd psychology that are emergent and thuv uot reducible to your body. So pdrhaps they cxn escape this objection by holdong that although the body you sre identical to does nob persist, the smergent pcoperties that are a part mf whqt compeised you do perskst, akd so
we are a function or process. It how descriptions can correct. But suppose person a wholly physical and that such body is just a collection of processes and functions. It is not clear how such a view can explain humans can be subjects of consciousness and agents. Nor it is clear how can how can psychological and spiritual transformation. These facts pose significant problems for physicalists.76 As a biological organism, the body undergoes an unrelenting process of part replacement. by moment your body new parts and expels old This place through and processes, others. Strictly speaking, body you had 20 seconds ago is not exactly the same body you have now. It is but not is true the reason the body you is not identical to the body you were an infant. If your body is more than wholly-physical biological organism comprised of various processes and functions, then your body does not from one moment to the next. Your body five minutes ago does not have all that your body has now. It is obvious they not However, if are identical to your body, a wholly-physical biological organism comprised of complex processes and functions, then you do not persist 72 Strawn, 73 Ibid., 54. Ibid., 125. 75 Ibid., 76 section is influenced by papers: P. Substance the to Psychology," Journal of and Theology 26 (1) (1998): and J. P. Moreland, of the Soul," Christian Education Journal (2000): 25-43. Moreland raises different objections than ours, his to analyzing substances in contrast to aggregates or property things inspirited our in this part replacement either. That is, the person that 5 minutes ago is the person you identify as yourself right now. Like Christian Brown and hold that there features of your agency, and psychology emergent and not to perhaps they can escape this objection holding although the body you are to persist, the emergent properties that are a part of what comprises you do persist, and
 we are a function or process. It Isn't clear hOw botH deScrIpTionS can Be correct. But suPPose We assume that the human peRson iS a WHollY PhYsicaL body anD ThAT SucH a BoDy iS jUSt A collEctIon of coMplex proceSseS aNd functions. IT Is Not clear hoW suCh a view can exPlaIn how hUmAns CAn be sUbjEcts oF conscIOusnesS and agentS. NOR it is cLEar how iT CAn ExplAin how humans can unDErGO psychological And spiRiTUaL TRanSfoRmation. TheSe Facts POse signIFiCANT prOBlems for physiCalists.76 As a bIOloGical oRgAniSM, the huMan boDy UNdeRgoes an unreLentIng procesS of parT ReplaceMEnt. MomeNt by moMenT yoUr boDY aBsOrbS nEW paRTs And EXpeLs old parTs. thIs takEs plACE THrouGh rEspiRatioN and metabolic ProCessES, amOng otHers. STricTlY speaKing, thE body YoU had 20 seconds ago iS not Exactly thE saMe BodY yOu havE Now. It iS siMilAr, but noT identiCAl. THiS IS TrUe for the same reason ThAT ThE body you Have noW Is NoT IdenticaL tO thE bodY YOu had When YOu Were an inFant. If YOuR bOdy is noThIng morE tHan A whOlly-pHYsicAl biolOgical orGanisM Comprised of varIOus complex proCEsSES aND funCtiOns, then your Body DOes nOt exISt FroM One moMent tO tHE nEXt. Your body five minutEs Ago doeS not hAve all the partS that your bODY Has right Now. IT Is FAirly obvious thAt theY are not ideNTical. HowEver, iF you are iDentical tO YOur body, a WhoLly-PhySicAL BiOlogical organISM comPrIsed of vAriOus compLex ProCesSes AnD functionS, then you Do NoT pErSisT 72 BrowN And StrawN, 5. 73 IBid., 54. 74 ibId., 125. 75 IBid., 75. 76 ThIS sectiOn is iNfluEnCeD By tHe folloWInG PAperS: J. p. MOrelAnd, "reStoriNg thE subStance oF the Soul tO PsYCholOgY," JOurnal oF Psychology anD THeology 26 (1) (1998): 29-43; and j. P. morEland, "SPIRitual FoRmation and the Nature of thE soul," ChrIstIan EdUcatIon JournaL (2000): 25-43. AlThough morELand raIses diFfereNt ObjECTions THAn OurS, hIs approach TO AnaLyzinG sUbstAnces in Contrast to aggregatES or Property thingS inSpirITEd Our APpROacH iN ThiS SEction. through paRt replacemEnT EiTher. That is, THe pErSon that Existed 5 MinutES ago is nOt the persOn you idenTiFy as YOUrsElf right noW. Like othEr ChristiAN physICaLists, broWn and STrAwn Hold tHat theRE arE featUres of YoUr consCiousNeSs, agency, And psychology that are emeRgent aNd thuS noT reduciblE to YOur Body. So perHaps They can escApe ThiS objeCtiON by hoLdinG ThAt aLThougH the BOdy you are IDeNtiCAL tO does not perSIST, thE emerGenT ProperTies That are a part of whaT Comprises you do PersIST, anD so
 we are a function or proc ess. It is n't c lea r h ow  bot h de scriptions can be c orrect. But suppose we  assu me that th e hum an pers o ni s  awh ol lyph y si cal b ody  and th at such abod yis just a co l le ction of c omp lex processe s a nd fun ct ion s . Itisnot c lear h o w such  a view c an explai n  how hu m a ns  can  be subjects of c o ns c iousness and a gents.  N o ri t  is  cl ear how it  c an ex p lain ho w  h u m a nsc an undergo ps ychological and  spiri tu alt ransfo rmati on .  Th ese facts p osesignifica nt pro b lems fo r  physic alists .76  As  a b i ol og ica lo rga n is m,t hehuman bo dy  u nderg oesa n u nrel ent ingproce ss of part re pla ceme n t.Momen t bymome nt  your  bodyabsor bs  new parts andexpe ls old pa rts .Thi stakes placethr oug h respi rationa ndme t a b ol ic processes, amon go t he rs. Stri ctly s p ea ki n g, the b od y y ou h a d  20 s econ d sago is n ot exa c tl ythe sam ebody y ou  ha venow.I t is  simil ar, butnot i d entical. Thisi s true for th e  s a m er easo n t hat the bod y yo u  hav e no w  i s n o t ide ntica lt ot he body you had whe nyou we re an  infant. If y our body i s n othing m oret ha n  a wholly-phys icalbiological organism  comp rised of  variousc o mplex pr oce sse s a ndf u nc tions, then y o u r bo dy  does n otexist f rom  on e m ome nt  to the n ext. You rbo dy  f ive  minu t es ago d oe s n ot  ha ve al l  the p artsthat  y ou r  bo dy hasr ig h t  now .It  isfai rl y obv ious tha t theyare not i den t ical .Ho wever,if you are id en tical to y ou r b ody, a w holly-ph ysical biological organ i sm comp ris ed of  var ious comp lex  proce sse s  and f unctio ns, t he n y o u  do n o t  p ers is t 72 Brown a ndStraw n,  5.73 Ibid ., 54. 74 Ibid., 1 2 5.75 Ibid., 75.  76  Thi s se cti o ni s i nf l uen c e d by the follow ing papers :J .P. Morelan d , " Re storing  the Su bstan c e of th e Soul to  Psycholo gy ," J o u rna l of Psych ology an d Theolog y  26 ( 1 )(1998 ):29-43;  a ndJ. P.  Morel a nd,  "Spi ritual  F ormati on an dthe Natu re of the Soul," Christ ian Ed ucati onJournal ( 200 0 ):25-43. Al thou gh Morelan d r ais es di ffe r ent o bjec t io nst han o urs, his appro a ch  to a na lyzing subs t a n ces  in c ont r ast to  agg regates or proper t y things inspi rite d our  ap p roac hin this sectio n.th r o ugh part  r eplacementeither.Th a t is,  the p ersonthat ex i s te d  5 min utes  ag o is notthe  p e rson yo uid e ntifyas y ou rselfrightn ow.L i ke other Christi an ph y s icali s ts,  Brow nand Str a wn h old that t here are fe atures  ofyourconscio us ness,age nc y, and psy c hology th at ar e emerg en t an d t hus no t re d u cible  toyo urbody. Sop e rh a ps  t h eycanescap ethis  objectio n  by hold ing that al th oug h the bo d yy o u are iden tic al to d oes not pe r sist ,  t h e eme rgentproper ties th a t a re  a part  of w hat compr ises youd o p er sist , and so 
 we_are a_function or process. It_isn't clear_how_both descriptions_can_be correct. But_suppose we assume_that the human person_is a wholly_physical_body and that such a body is just a collection of complex processes and_functions._It is_not_clear_how such a view can_explain how humans can be_subjects of_consciousness and agents. Nor it is clear how_it_can explain how_humans can undergo psychological and spiritual transformation. These facts_pose significant problems for physicalists.76 As_a biological organism,_the_human_body undergoes an unrelenting_process of part replacement. Moment by_moment your body absorbs new parts_and expels old parts. This takes place_through respiration and metabolic processes, among_others. Strictly speaking, the body_you had_20 seconds ago is not_exactly the same_body you_have now. It_is similar, but not identical. This_is true for_the same reason that the body_you_have now is_not_identical_to the_body you had_when_you were_an_infant. If your body is nothing_more_than a wholly-physical biological organism comprised of_various complex processes and_functions,_then your body does_not exist from one moment_to the next. Your body five_minutes ago_does not_have all the parts that your body has right now. It_is fairly obvious that they are_not identical. However, if_you are_identical_to your body,_a_wholly-physical biological_organism comprised of various complex processes and_functions, then_you do not persist 72 Brown_and Strawn, 5. 73_Ibid.,_54. 74 Ibid., 125. 75 Ibid.,_75. 76 This section is influenced_by the following papers: J._P._Moreland,_"Restoring the Substance of the_Soul to Psychology," Journal of Psychology_and Theology 26_(1) (1998): 29-43; and J. P. Moreland,_"Spiritual_Formation and the Nature of the_Soul,"_Christian Education Journal (2000): 25-43. Although_Moreland_raises_different objections than ours, his_approach to analyzing substances in contrast_to aggregates or property things inspirited our approach in_this section. through_part replacement either. That is,_the_person_that existed 5 minutes ago is not the person you_identify as_yourself right now._Like other Christian physicalists, Brown and Strawn hold that there_are features of your consciousness, agency, and_psychology that are emergent and thus not reducible to your body._So perhaps they can escape this objection by_holding that although the body you are_identical to does not_persist,_the emergent properties that are a part_of_what_comprises_you do persist,_and so