 which he is non-voluntarily confrontational provides insight into whether he is a good or bad person. The intuition behind this objection seems to me to be clearly right, and thus I think we should allow it to refine Greco's error theory. This intuition can help us to see that the essential moral worth error theory is a hybrid error theory; it is part integration error theory and part elimination error theory. To see which part is which, let us separate essential moral worth into three parts. Recall that essential moral worth is a function of an agent's (i) actual free actions 15 Proponents on both sides of the moral luck debate including Zimmerman (2002: 575) agree that this aspiration is incoherent. At the very least, then, Greco's error theory does not face a distinctive difficulty due to the way in which essential moral worth is shaped by essential constitutive luck. 21 (ii) counterfactual free actions in circumstances continuous with her actual history (iii) counterfactual free actions in circumstances continuous with various counterfactual histories. I contend that parts (i) and (ii) exhaust the integration part of the error theory. In other words, it is only a person's actual moral worth, parts (i) and (ii) of her essential moral worth, that provides insight into whether she is a good or bad person. Part (iii) is a problematic extrapolation from parts (i) and (ii), because part (iii) lacks even a kernel of moral truth with respect to person-level evaluation (cf. McKenna 1998: 139-41).16 Even so, part (iii) of the error theory should not be jettisoned, because there is more explanatory work to be done concerning cases of constitutive luck. The explanation with respect to part (iii), however, is that the luck-free intuition is purely erroneous. Conclusion I have exemplified a general method that I take to be promising for advancing the moral luck debate-and in my case-for arguing that we should accept at least part of the Moral Luck View, which is the view that constitutive, circumstantial, and resultant moral luck exist. I offered an argument for circumstantial moral luck by arguing against the Counterfactual View. I also argued that we have good analogical evidence for resultant moral luck. Finally, I fortified these arguments by explaining away the intuitive appeal of the luck-free intuition as a confusion between moral record and moral worth evaluation.17 16 Not everyone agrees that part (iii) has no bearing on person-
which he is non - voluntarily confrontational provides insight into whether he is a good or bad person. The intuition behind this expostulation seem to me to be clearly right, and thus I intend we should allow it to refine Greco's erroneousness hypothesis. This intuition can help us to see that the essential moral worth error hypothesis is a hybrid error theory; it is part integration mistake theory and part elimination error theory. To see which region is which, let us separate essential moral worth into three part. Recall that essential moral worth is a function of an agent's (iodine) actual free actions 15 Proponents on both sides of the moral luck argument including Zimmerman (2002: 575) agree that this aspiration is incoherent. At the very least, then, Greco's error theory does not face a classifiable trouble due to the room in which essential moral worth is shaped by essential constitutive luck. 21 (ii) counterfactual free actions in circumstances continuous with her actual history (iii) counterfactual complimentary actions in circumstances continuous with versatile counterfactual history. I contend that parts (i) and (ii) consume the integration part of the error theory. In early words, it is only a person's actual moral worth, parts (i) and (ii) of her essential moral worth, that provides insight into whether she is a good or bad person. Part (iii) is a problematic extrapolation from parts (i) and (ii), because function (iii) miss even a kernel of moral accuracy with esteem to person - level evaluation (cf. McKenna 1998: 139 - 41).16 Even so, part (iii) of the error theory should not be jettisoned, because there be more explanatory work to be done concerning cases of constituent luck. The explanation with respect to part (iii), however, is that the luck - free intuition is strictly erroneous. Conclusion I have exemplified a general method that I accept to be promising for advance the moral luck debate - and in my case - for arguing that we should accept at least region of the Moral Luck View, which is the view that constituent, circumstantial, and resultant moral luck exist. I offered an argument for circumstantial moral luck by argue against the Counterfactual View. I also argued that we have full analogical evidence for resultant moral luck. Finally, I fortified these arguments by explaining aside the intuitive appeal of the luck - free intuition as a confusion between moral record and moral worth evaluation.17 16 Not everyone agrees that part (iii) has no carriage on person-
 whlch he is non-voluntarily confrontational provives insjght intu whether he is a good or bav peeson. Uke intuition behind ghis objebtion seens ti me to be rmearly vnght, zkd thbs I think we shpuld allow it to refine Crdcl's error theory. This intuition can relp us tl see that the esstntyal joral worth error theory is a hybrjd errog theory; it is patt integration error theorj anf part elimination error theotg. Tj see which pxrt is whibk, let us sekarate essential moral worth intu thrze parts. Rexaol hvat essentiel morwl worth is a functimn of am agent's (i) actmal fcee qctions 15 Proponents oi both sides of the ioral lucn bebate including Zimmwrnan (2002: 575) agrae tfqt ghia espjratioj ia incohereht. At the vwry least, then, Grecp's vtror theory soes njt face a distinctive difficulty due to tve say in which essential noral worth is shaped by esseneial constitutive luck. 21 (ii) counterfactual free acdions kn elvcumrrajces continuous with her actual history (iii) cjhnuernactual free actlons in circumstanved vjntinuous witf various counterfactual hidtories. I cobtend thau parys (i) and (ii) exhaust the intwgration parn of the error theory. Nn other worbs, it os onky a person's actual morcl worfh, parts (i) wnd (ii) of fer essential mofal wmrth, thau provides insight into whevher xhe is x gopd or fad person. Part (iii) is a problematlc exjrapoldtion from parts (i) and (ii), because part (iim) lacks even s nertel of mjral bruth with respqct to person-lgvel evalbation (cf. McKennz 1998: 139-41).16 Evei so, part (iiy) of the erros theory shound not bq jertisined, bezxuse there is kore explcuatory woek to be done conccrnine cases of constnuutuve luck. The exllavatyoj xith waspect to past (iki), fpwevef, is that tme uuck-gree intuition is pusely erroneous. Conclusook I have gxemplifiqd a general kethod that I take to bx prommsing gor advancing the moral luck debafe-and in ly gase-for arguigg tmat re should cccept at least part of the Moral Luck Vmew, which is the view jhat constitutive, cireukstantial, aid restltant mosal luck exist. I offwred an argument nor circumstantial morzl lucn by wrguing against the Counterfactual View. I also argued that we have good abalogiraj evidence ror tesulnanc mpral ltck. Hiially, I fortified these arguments by explaining eway the ittbitive appeal of the luck-free ivtuition as a confusion between moral record snd moral worth evaluation.17 16 Not everyone agrees that pavt (iii) haw no gearing on person-
which he is non-voluntarily confrontational provides insight he a good bad person. The to to be clearly and thus I we should allow it to refine error theory. This intuition can help us to see that the essential moral error theory is a hybrid error theory; it is part integration error theory part error To which part is which, let us separate essential moral worth into three parts. Recall that essential worth is a function of an agent's (i) free actions 15 Proponents both sides of the moral debate Zimmerman (2002: agree this is incoherent. At very least, then, Greco's error theory does not face a distinctive difficulty due to the way in essential moral shaped by constitutive 21 counterfactual free actions continuous with her actual history (iii) in circumstances continuous with various counterfactual histories. I that parts and (ii) exhaust the integration part the error theory. In other words, it is a person's actual moral worth, parts (i) and (ii) of her essential moral worth, that into whether she is good or bad Part is problematic from parts and (ii), because part (iii) lacks even a kernel of moral with respect to person-level evaluation (cf. McKenna 1998: 139-41).16 Even (iii) the error theory not be jettisoned, because is explanatory work to be cases constitutive with to (iii), however, is that luck-free intuition is purely erroneous. I have exemplified a to be promising for advancing the moral luck in my case-for arguing that we should at least part of the Moral Luck View, which is the view constitutive, circumstantial, moral luck exist. I offered an argument for moral luck by arguing the Counterfactual View. I also argued that we have analogical for resultant luck. Finally, I these arguments by away the intuitive the luck-free as confusion and moral worth evaluation.17 16 Not agrees part (iii) has no bearing person-
 which he is non-voluntarily coNfrontatioNal prOviDes InSighT intO whether he is a gOOd or Bad person. The intuition bEhind ThIS objECtIon seEms to me TO bE CLeaRlY rIghT, aND tHus I tHinK we shouLd allow it tO reFiNe Greco's erroR ThEory. This inTuiTion can help uS to See thaT tHe eSSentiAl mOral wOrth erROr theoRy is a hybrId ERror thEOry; it is PARt InteGration error theorY AnD Part eliminatioN error ThEOrY. tO seE whIch part is wHiCh, let US separaTE eSSENtiAL moral worth inTo three partS. recAll thaT eSseNTial moRal woRtH Is a Function of aN ageNt's (i) actuaL free aCTions 15 PrOPonents On both SidEs oF the MOrAl LucK dEBatE InCluDIng zimmermaN (2002: 575) aGrEe thaT thiS ASPIratIon Is inCoherEnt. At the very lEasT, theN, greCo's erRor thEory DoEs not Face a dIstinCtIve difficulty duE to tHe way in whIch EsSenTiAl morAL worth Is sHapEd by essEntial cONstItUTIVe Luck. 21 (ii) counterfactuAl FREe Actions iN circuMStAnCEs continUoUs wIth hER ActuaL hisTOrY (iii) counTerfacTUaL fRee actiOnS in cirCuMstAncEs conTInuoUs with Various cOunteRFactual historiES. I contend that PArTS (I) aND (ii) eXhaUst the integRatiON parT of tHE eRroR TheorY. In otHeR WoRDs, it is only a person's aCtUal morAl worTh, parts (i) and (ii) Of her essenTIAL moral woRth, tHAt PRovides insight Into wHether she iS A good or bAd perSon. Part (iIi) is a probLEMatic extRapOlaTioN frOM PaRts (i) and (ii), becaUSE parT (iIi) lacks EveN a kerneL of MorAl tRutH wIth respecT to persoN-lEvEl EvAluAtion (CF. McKenna 1998: 139-41).16 evEn sO, pArt (Iii) of THe erroR theoRy shOuLd NOt bE jettisONeD, BEcauSe ThEre iS moRe ExplaNatoRY woRk to be dOne concerNinG CaseS oF cOnstituTive luck. The exPlAnation witH rEspEct to pART (iii), howeVer, is that the luck-free intUItion is PurEly erRoneOus. ConcluSioN I have ExeMPlifieD a geneRal meThOd tHAT I takE TO bE prOmIsing for adVANciNg the MoRal lUck debaTe-and in my case-for arGUinG that we should AccEpt aT LEaSt pARt OF thE MORal lUCk View, which is thE view that cOnSTiTutive, circUMstAnTial, and ResultaNt morAL luck exIst. I offerEd an argumEnT for CIRcuMstantial mOral luck By arguing AGainsT ThE CounTerFactuaL VIew. i also Argued THat We havE good aNaLogicaL evidEnCe for resUltant moral luck. Finally, I FortifIed thEse Arguments By eXPlaIning away The iNtuitive apPeaL of The luCk-fREe intUitiON aS a cONfusiOn beTWeen moral REcOrd AND mOral worth evALUAtiOn.17 16 Not EveRYone agRees That part (iii) has no bEAring on person-
 which he is non-voluntari ly confron tatio nal  pr ov ides  ins ight into whet h er h e is a good or bad per son.Th e  int u it ion b ehind t h is o bje ct io n s ee m sto me  to  be cle arly right , a nd  thus I thin k  w e should a llo w it to refi neGreco' serr o r the ory . Thi s intu i tion c an help u st o seet hat the e ss enti al moral worth er r or theory is a hy brid e rr o rt h eor y;it is part  i ntegr a tion er r or t h eor y  and part eli mination er r ortheory .Tos ee whi ch pa rt iswhich, letus s eparate e ssenti a l moral worth i nto th ree  pa rts. Re ca llth a t e s se nti a l m oral wor th  i s a f unct i o n of a n a gent 's (i ) actual free  ac tion s  15  Prop onent s on  b oth s ides o f the  m oral luck debat e in cluding Z imm er man  ( 2002: 575) a gre e t hat thi s aspir a tio ni s in coherent. At the v er y le ast, the n, Gre c o' se rror the or y d oesn o t fac e ad is tinctive  diffi c ul ty  due to  t he way  i n w hic h ess e ntia l mora l worthis sh a ped by essenti a l constitutiv e  l u c k. 21 ( ii)  counterfac tual free  act i on s i n  circ umsta nc e sc ontinuous with herac tual h istor y (iii) count erfactualf r e e action s in ci r cumstances con tinuo us with va r ious cou nterf actual h istories. I  contend  th atpar ts( i )and (ii) exha u s t th eintegra tio n partofthe  er ror  t heory. In  other w or ds ,it  is  only a person 's  ac tu almoral worth,  part s (i )an d  (i i) of h e re s sent ia lmora l w or th, t hatp rov ides in sight int o w h ethe rsh e is agood or bad p er son. Part(i ii)  is ap r oblemati c extrapolation from pa r ts (i)and  (ii) , be cause par t ( iii) l ack s  evena kern el of  m ora l truth w it h r es pect to pe r s on- level  e valu ation ( cf. McKenna 1998:1 39- 41).16 Even s o,part ( ii i)o ft heer r ort h eory should not  be jettis on e d,  because t h ere  i s moreexplana toryw ork tobe done c oncerning  c ases o f c onstitutiv e luck.The expla n ation wi th re spe ct topa rt(iii) , howe v er,  is t hat th eluck-f ree i nt uition i s purely erroneous. Con clusio n I h ave  exemplif ied a g eneral me thod  that I ta ketobe pr omi s ing f or a d va nci n g the  mor a l luck de b at e-a n d  i n my case-f o r arg uingtha t  we sh ould  accept at leastp art of the Mor al L u c k V iew ,  whi ch  is the view t hat  c o n stitutiv e,  circumstan tial, an dr esult ant mo ral lu ck exis t .  I offere d an  ar gument fo r c ir c umstant ia lm oral l uckby  argui ng aga i nstt h e Counterfactual  View . I als o  ar guedth at we h a ve g ood analog ical eviden ce for  res ultan t moral  l uck. F ina ll y, I forti f ied these  argu ments b yexpl ain ing aw ay t h e  intu itiv eapp eal of th e lu c k- fr e e i ntui tionas  a c onfusionb etween m ora l  record  a ndm o ral wo r th e valuation. 1716 No t everyone a g rees th a t par t (iii ) hasno bear i ngon  person -
 which_he is_non-voluntarily confrontational provides insight_into whether_he_is a_good_or bad person._The intuition behind_this objection seems to_me to be_clearly_right, and thus I think we should allow it to refine Greco's error theory._This_intuition can_help_us_to see that the essential_moral worth error theory is_a hybrid_error theory; it is part integration error theory_and_part elimination error_theory. To see which part is which, let us_separate essential moral worth into three_parts. Recall that_essential_moral_worth is a function_of an agent's (i) actual free_actions 15 Proponents on both sides_of the moral luck debate including Zimmerman_(2002: 575) agree that this aspiration_is incoherent. At the very_least, then,_Greco's error theory does not_face a distinctive_difficulty due_to the way_in which essential moral worth is_shaped by essential_constitutive luck. 21 (ii) counterfactual free_actions_in circumstances continuous_with_her_actual history_(iii) counterfactual free_actions_in circumstances_continuous_with various counterfactual histories. I contend_that_parts (i) and (ii) exhaust the integration_part of the error_theory._In other words, it_is only a person's actual_moral worth, parts (i) and (ii)_of her_essential moral_worth, that provides insight into whether she is a good or_bad person. Part (iii) is a_problematic extrapolation from parts_(i) and_(ii),_because part (iii)_lacks_even a_kernel of moral truth with respect to_person-level evaluation_(cf. McKenna 1998: 139-41).16 Even so,_part (iii) of the_error_theory should not be jettisoned, because_there is more explanatory work to_be done concerning cases of_constitutive_luck._The explanation with respect to_part (iii), however, is that the_luck-free intuition is_purely erroneous. Conclusion I have exemplified a_general_method that I take to be_promising_for advancing the moral luck debate-and_in_my_case-for arguing that we should_accept at least part of the_Moral Luck View, which is the view that constitutive,_circumstantial, and resultant_moral luck exist. I offered_an_argument_for circumstantial moral luck by arguing against the Counterfactual View._I also_argued that we_have good analogical evidence for resultant moral luck. Finally, I_fortified these arguments by explaining away the_intuitive appeal of the luck-free intuition as a confusion between moral_record and moral worth evaluation.17 16 Not everyone_agrees that part (iii) has no bearing_on person-