 unambiguous notion of self-respect, though he sometimes is unclear as to whether this notion has merely instrumental or also intrinsic value. I show second that Rawls's main objective in arguing that justice as fairness supports citizens' self-respect is not, as many have thought, to show that his principles support citizens' self-respect generally, but to show that his principles counter the effects of the market on lower class citizens' sense of worth. This discussion 1 I owe thanks to Jeffrey Moriarty and the participants in the Second Annual Arizona Workshop in Normative Ethics, especially Ernesto Garcia, Thomas Hurka, and Elijah Millgram, for their feedback on this paper. I am also grateful to two anonymous referees for their helpful comments. 2 See also, Deigh 1983; Labukt 2009; Lane 1982; McKinnon 2003; and Yanal 1987. Distinctions among different types of self-respect that have bearing upon the supposed equivocation contained in Rawls's account are discussed in Darwall 1977; Dillon 1992; Hudson 1980; Massey 1983; Middleton 2006; and Sachs 1981. OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 2/11/2012, SPi establishes that Rawls, in the end, sees self-respect primarily as an intrinsic good. I proceed as follows. First I outline the equivocation objection. Second I argue that that Rawls's view of self-respect should be interpreted as the belief that the activities that make up one's contribution to a scheme of social cooperation matter. Third I establish that this interpretation is consistent with all of Rawls's arguments justifying justice as fairness by appeal to self-respect. Finally, I show that these arguments are primarily designed to demonstrate that justice as fairness upholds the self-respect of lower class citizens in spite of their diminished class position. the argument and the standard critique Rawls's argument that his principles of justice preserve citizens' selfrespect has the following structure. First, Rawls claims that selfrespect-the secure conviction that one's plan of life is worth carrying out-is what he calls a "primary social good." It is, along with wealth, liberties, and opportunities, a necessary all-purpose means for citizens (as moral persons) to achieve their ends. He maintains, second, that because self-respect has this special role, the provision of self-respect is a matter of justice. Indeed, political arrangements can be judged just or unjust in part on the basis of whether those arrangements sustain selfrespect. Third,
unambiguous notion of self - respect, though he sometimes is unclear as to whether this impression has merely implemental or besides intrinsic value. I show second that Rawls's main objective in argue that justice as fairness confirm citizens' self - respect is not, as many have think, to show that his principles subscribe citizens' self - respect broadly, but to usher that his principles counter the effects of the market on lower course citizens' sense of worth. This discussion 1 I owe thanks to Jeffrey Moriarty and the participants in the Second Annual Arizona Workshop in Normative Ethics, specially Ernesto Garcia, Thomas Hurka, and Elijah Millgram, for their feedback on this paper. I am also grateful to two anonymous referee for their helpful comments. 2 understand also, Deigh 1983; Labukt 2009; Lane 1982; McKinnon 2003; and Yanal 1987. Distinctions among different types of self - respect that have give birth upon the supposed equivocation contained in Rawls's account are discussed in Darwall 1977; Dillon 1992; Hudson 1980; Massey 1983; Middleton 2006; and Sachs 1981. OUP adjust PROOF – FINAL, 2/11/2012, SPi establishes that Rawls, in the end, sees self - respect primarily as an intrinsic good. I proceed as follows. First I outline the equivocation expostulation. Second I argue that that Rawls's view of self - respect should be interpret as the impression that the activities that make up one's contribution to a scheme of social cooperation matter. Third I establish that this interpretation is consistent with all of Rawls's arguments justify justice as fairness by appeal to self - respect. last, I show that these arguments are primarily designed to attest that justice as paleness upholds the self - respect of lower class citizens in malice of their diminished class position. the controversy and the standard critique Rawls's argument that his principles of justice preserve citizen' selfrespect has the following structure. First, Rawls claims that selfrespect - the secure conviction that one's design of life is worth carrying out - is what he calls a " chief social good. " It is, along with wealth, liberty, and opportunities, a necessary all - purpose mean for citizens (as moral persons) to achieve their ends. He maintains, second, that because self - respect has this special role, the provision of self - respect is a matter of justice. Indeed, political agreement can be judged just or inequitable in part on the basis of whether those placement sustain selfrespect. Third,
 unwmbiguous notion of self-vespect, though hg wometikes is unclear as to whether this notion hes mwrely instrumental or also kntrinsic value. I shox second that Raxms's maik objsgtive mn arguing that justice av fairness sup[oftd citizens' self-respect is not, as magy have tjought, to show thau hys pdpngiples support citizens' self-respsct gentrally, but to show that his principles countfr tje effects of the larket on liwer xlass citizevs' sense of worth. This discussion 1 I owe thanks to Jewfrey Moriarty qne tjg participanvs in nhe Second Anklal Arisona Wotkshop in Normstite Erhics, especially Ernevto Garcia, Thomas Rurka, and Emijah Millgram, foe rheir feegbacy on thjs pzper. I am also gratsful to two anonymous referees fjg their helpfhl comiegts. 2 See also, Deigh 1983; Labukt 2009; Lane 1982; McKitnoh 2003; and Yanal 1987. Distinctiins among different tipes of sejf-respect that have bearing upon the supposed equhvocaviun eintaivwd in Rawls's account are discussed in Darwall 1977; Qjlkok 1992; Hudson 1980; Massen 1983; Middleton 2006; and Xafhx 1981. OUP CORRECTGD PROOY – RINAL, 2/11/2012, SPi establidhes thwt Raqls, in tht end, sees self-respect primarily as an intriusix good. I proceed ad follows. Fnrst I outlone the equivocation oblectioh. Second I wrgue thaf that Rawls's vied on salf-respect should be inter[reted as the belief thaj the astivities hhat make up one's contrihutiou to d scheme ov social cooperation matter. Thicv I establish tvat this incerprebation is consiftent with all of Rawjs's afguments jlstifying justice as fairness by dkpeal to self-cespect. Fynaloy, I show tfxt these argumrnts are irnmarily dwsigned to demonstvate jhzt justice as fcnrbess upholds thr sdlf-wedpxct os lower class citkzevx in rpite of thcir dimonished class positimn. tge argument and thr ftandard critiquq Rawls's argukent that his prinfiplev oh justoce preserve citizens' selfrespect has the voljowing struceure. First, Rawls claims that selfrespect-the secure convmction that one's plan od life is worth cartyikg out-is whav he cwlls a "prhmary social good." It is, along with weslth, liberties, and oplortunhties, a necessary all-purpose means for citizens (as moral persons) to achieve thwir envs. He maintaihs, srcond, tkat becaufe sxlh-respect has this special role, the provision of relf-respacc is a matter of justice. Inderd, political artangements can be judged jhst or umjust in part on the basis of wnether those arrangementx sustaib selrrespebj. Tiird,
unambiguous notion of self-respect, though he sometimes as whether this has merely instrumental show that Rawls's main in arguing that as fairness supports citizens' self-respect is as many have thought, to show that his principles support citizens' self-respect generally, to show that his principles counter the effects of the market on lower citizens' of This 1 I owe thanks to Jeffrey Moriarty and the participants in the Second Annual Arizona Workshop Normative Ethics, especially Ernesto Garcia, Thomas Hurka, and Millgram, for their feedback this paper. I am also to anonymous referees their comments. See also, Deigh Labukt 2009; Lane 1982; McKinnon 2003; and Yanal 1987. Distinctions among different types of self-respect that have upon the contained in account discussed Darwall 1977; Dillon 1980; Massey 1983; Middleton 2006; and CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 2/11/2012, SPi establishes that in the sees self-respect primarily as an intrinsic I proceed as follows. First I outline the objection. Second I argue that that Rawls's view of self-respect should be interpreted as the the activities that make one's contribution to scheme social matter. I establish this interpretation is consistent with all of Rawls's arguments justifying justice fairness by appeal to self-respect. Finally, I show that these primarily to demonstrate that as fairness upholds the of class citizens in spite diminished position. the critique argument that his principles justice preserve citizens' selfrespect has following structure. First, Rawls that one's plan of life is worth carrying what he calls a "primary social good." is, along with wealth, liberties, and opportunities, a necessary all-purpose means for (as moral achieve their ends. He maintains, second, that because has this special role, provision of self-respect is a matter of justice. Indeed, arrangements be judged or unjust in on the basis whether those arrangements Third,
 unambiguous notion of self-reSpect, thougH he soMetImeS iS uncLear As to whether thiS NotiOn has merely instrumentaL or alSo INtriNSiC valuE. I show sECoND ThaT RAwLs's MaIN oBjectIve In arguiNg that justIce As Fairness suppORtS citizens' sElf-Respect is not, As mAny havE tHouGHt, to sHow That hIs prinCIples sUpport citIzENs' self-REspect gENErAlly, But to show that his pRInCIples counter thE effecTs OF tHE MarKet On lower claSs CitizENs' sense OF wORTH. ThIS discussion 1 I oWe thanks to JEFfrEy MoriArTy aND the paRticiPaNTs iN the Second ANnuaL Arizona WOrkshoP In NormaTIve EthiCs, espeCiaLly erneSTo gaRciA, THOmaS huRka, ANd ELijah MilLgRaM, for tHeir FEEDBack On tHis pAper. I Am also gratefuL to Two aNOnyMous rEfereEs foR tHeir hElpful CommeNtS. 2 See also, Deigh 1983; LaBukt 2009; lane 1982; McKinNon 2003; AnD YaNaL 1987. DistINctionS amOng DiffereNt types OF seLf-RESPeCt that have bearing uPoN THe Supposed EquivoCAtIoN ContaineD iN RaWls's ACCount Are dIScUssed in DArwall 1977; dIlLoN 1992; Hudson 1980; maSsey 1983; MiDdLetOn 2006; aNd SacHS 1981. OUP cORRECtED PROOF – fINAL, 2/11/2012, spi establishes tHAt Rawls, in the eND, sEES sELf-reSpeCt primarily As an INtriNsic GOoD. I pROceed As folLoWS. FIRst I outline the equivOcAtion oBjectIon. Second I argUe that that rAWLs's view oF selF-ReSPect should be inTerprEted as the bELief that The acTivities That make uP ONe's contrIbuTioN to A scHEMe Of social coopeRATion MaTter. ThiRd I EstabliSh tHat ThiS inTeRpretatioN is consiStEnT wItH alL of RaWLs's argumEnTs jUsTifYing jUStice aS fairNess By ApPEal To self-rESpECT. FinAlLy, i shoW thAt These ArguMEntS are priMarily desIgnED to dEmOnStrate tHat justice as fAiRness upholDs The Self-reSPEct of lowEr class citizens in spite oF Their diMinIshed ClasS position. The ArgumeNt aND the stAndard CritiQuE RaWLS's argUMEnT thAt His principLES of JustiCe PresErve citIzens' selfrespect haS The Following struCtuRe. FiRST, RAwlS ClAIms ThAT seLFRespect-the securE convictioN tHAt One's plan of LIfe Is Worth caRrying oUt-is wHAt he calLs a "primarY social goOd." it is, ALOng With wealth, LibertieS, and opporTUnitiES, a NecesSarY all-puRpOse Means For citIZenS (as moRal perSoNs) to acHieve ThEir ends. HE maintains, second, that becAuse seLf-resPecT has this sPecIAl rOle, the proVisiOn of self-reSpeCt iS a matTer OF justIce. INDeEd, pOLiticAl arRAngements CAn Be jUDGeD just or unjuST IN paRt on tHe bASis of wHethEr those arrangemenTS sustain selfreSpecT. tHirD,
 unambiguous notion of sel f-respect,  thou ghheso meti mesis unclear ast o wh ether this notion hasmerel yi nstr u me ntalor also in t r ins ic  v alu e. Ishowsec ond tha t Rawls'smai nobjective in ar guing that  ju stice as fai rne ss sup po rts citiz ens ' sel f-resp e ct isnot, as m an y  havet hought, t oshow  that his princip l es support citize ns' se lf - re s p ect  ge nerally, b ut  to s h ow that hi s p rin c iples counter  the effect s  of  the m ar ket on low er cl as s  ci tizens' sen se o f worth.This d i scussio n  1 I ow e than kstoJeff r ey  M ori ar t y a n dthe par ticipant sin  theSeco n d A nnua l A rizo na Wo rkshop in Nor mat iveE thi cs, e speci ally  E rnest o Garc ia, T ho mas Hurka, andElij ah Millgr am,  f orth eir f e edback  on  th is pape r. I am als og r a te ful to two anonymo us r ef erees fo r thei r  h el p ful comm en ts.  2 S e e  also , De i gh  1983; L abukt2 00 9;  Lane 1 98 2; McK in non  20 03; a n d Ya nal 19 87. Dist incti o ns among diffe r ent types ofs el f - re s pect  th at have bea ring upon  the su ppo s ed eq uivoc at i on contained in Rawls' saccoun t are  discussed in  Darwall 1 9 7 7 ; Dillon  199 2 ;H udson 1980; Ma ssey1983; Midd l eton 200 6; an d Sachs1981. OUP C ORRECTED  PR OOF  –FIN A L ,2/11/2012, SP i esta bl ishes t hat  Rawls,  in  th e e nd,  s ees self- respectpr im ar il y a s ani ntrinsic  g ood .I p rocee d  as fo llows . Fi rs tI  ou tline t h ee q uivo ca ti on o bje ct ion.Seco n d I  arguethat that  Ra w ls's  v ie w of se lf-respect sh ou ld be inte rp ret ed ast h e belief  that the activities th a t makeupone's  con tribution  to  a sch eme of soc ial co opera ti onm a tter. T hi rdIestablisht h atthisin terp retatio n is consistent wi t h a ll of Rawls's  ar gume n t sjus t if y ing  j u sti c e  as fairness by  appeal to  s e lf -respect.F ina ll y, I sh ow that  thes e  argume nts are p rimarilyde sign e d  to  demonstra te thatjustice a s  fair n es s uph old s these lf- respe ct ofl owe r cla ss cit iz ens in  spit eof their  diminished class posit ion. t he ar gum ent and t hes tan dard crit ique  Rawls's a rgu men t tha t h i s pri ncip l es  of justi ce p r eserve ci t iz ens ' se lfrespect h a s the  foll owi n g stru ctur e. First, Rawls c l aims that self resp e c t-t hes ecur econviction tha t o ne ' s  plan of  l ife is wort h carryi ng out-i s what  he ca lls a " p r im a ry soc ialgoo d." It is , a lo n g withwe al t h, lib erti es , andopport u niti e s , a necessary al l-pur p o se me a nsfor c it izens ( a s mo ral person s) to achie ve the ir e nds.He main ta ins, s eco nd , that bec a use self- respe ct hasth is s pec ial ro le,t h e pro visi on  of  self-res p e ct is  a mat terof ju st ice.  Indeed,p olitical  ar r angemen ts  ca n be jud g ed j ust or unj ust  in p a r t on the b a siso fw hethe r thos e arra ngement s  su st ain sel fre s p ect. Thir d,
 unambiguous_notion of_self-respect, though he sometimes_is unclear_as_to whether_this_notion has merely_instrumental or also_intrinsic value. I show_second that Rawls's_main_objective in arguing that justice as fairness supports citizens' self-respect is not, as many_have_thought, to_show_that_his principles support citizens' self-respect_generally, but to show that_his principles_counter the effects of the market on lower_class_citizens' sense of_worth. This discussion 1 I owe thanks to Jeffrey_Moriarty and the participants in the_Second Annual Arizona_Workshop_in_Normative Ethics, especially Ernesto_Garcia, Thomas Hurka, and Elijah Millgram,_for their feedback on this paper._I am also grateful to two anonymous_referees for their helpful comments. 2_See also, Deigh 1983; Labukt_2009; Lane_1982; McKinnon 2003; and Yanal_1987. Distinctions among_different types_of self-respect that_have bearing upon the supposed equivocation_contained in Rawls's_account are discussed in Darwall 1977;_Dillon_1992; Hudson 1980;_Massey_1983;_Middleton 2006;_and Sachs 1981._OUP_CORRECTED PROOF_–_FINAL, 2/11/2012, SPi establishes that Rawls,_in_the end, sees self-respect primarily as an_intrinsic good. I proceed_as_follows. First I outline_the equivocation objection. Second I_argue that that Rawls's view of_self-respect should_be interpreted_as the belief that the activities that make up one's contribution_to a scheme of social cooperation_matter. Third I establish_that this_interpretation_is consistent with_all_of Rawls's_arguments justifying justice as fairness by appeal_to self-respect._Finally, I show that these arguments_are primarily designed to_demonstrate_that justice as fairness upholds the_self-respect of lower class citizens in_spite of their diminished class_position._the_argument and the standard critique_Rawls's argument that his principles of_justice preserve citizens'_selfrespect has the following structure. First, Rawls_claims_that selfrespect-the secure conviction that one's_plan_of life is worth carrying out-is_what_he_calls a "primary social good."_It is, along with wealth, liberties,_and opportunities, a necessary all-purpose means for citizens (as_moral persons) to_achieve their ends. He maintains,_second,_that_because self-respect has this special role, the provision of self-respect_is a_matter of justice._Indeed, political arrangements can be judged just or unjust in_part on the basis of whether those_arrangements sustain selfrespect. Third,