 world, or historical events. Consider Kierkegaard, who, although a dualist, does not think of the self as merely a mental substance. For Kierkegaard, the self is a kind of synthesis of contrasting elements-finitude with infinitude, necessity with possibility. Human selves are a work-in-progress, involved in making themselves the persons they become, and doing so always in relationship to others. Far from being an individualist, Kierkegaard understands that we all are who we are by virtue of the relationships with others. He is interested in 16 Ibid., 45. 17 Ibid., chapter 9. 18 Brown and Strawn, 163. 19 Charles Taliaferro, "The Virtues of Embodiment," Philosophy 76 (2001): 111-125. 20 Richard, Swinburne, "What's So Good About Having a Body?" in Comparative Theology: Essays for Keith Ward, edited by Timothy Walter Bartel (Spck Publishing, 2003), 137. 21 See Howard Robinson, "A Dualist Perspective on Psychological Development," in J. A. Russell (Ed.). Philosophical Perspectives on Developmental Psychology, pp. 119-139 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987); and "A Dualist Theory of Embodiment," in John R. Smithies and John Beloff (eds.), The Case for Dualism, pp. 43-58 (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 1989). 22 See for example, Gordon Barnes, "Is Dualism Religiously and Morally Pernicious?" American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 78 (1) (2004): 103. 23 Augustine, Confessions, III, 6. helping individuals develop a relation to God which relativizes those human relationships.24 It just false that dualism qua dualism leads to individualism. Lastly, there are more plausible accounts of the turn away from embodiment and toward individualism that do not place the blame on dualism. Some have argued that the turn toward individualism is the result of theologians and then pastors abandoning the soul, which paved the way for the contemporary mental health movement.25 This may be overstated, but it is relevant. Additionally, it seems far more plausible that the problem of contemporary individualism is with the conception of salvation as mere forgiveness of sins. Willard points out that such a view makes Paul's statement that we are "saved by his [Jesus's] life" (Rom. 5:10
world, or historical events. Consider Kierkegaard, who, although a dualist, does not remember of the self as merely a genial substance. For Kierkegaard, the self is a kind of synthesis of contrast component - finitude with infinitude, necessity with hypothesis. Human selves are a work - in - progress, involve in making themselves the persons they become, and dress so always in kinship to others. Far from being an individualist, Kierkegaard understands that we all are who we are by virtue of the relationships with others. He is interested in 16 Ibid. , 45. 17 Ibid. , chapter 9. 18 Brown and Strawn, 163. 19 Charles Taliaferro, " The Virtues of Embodiment, " Philosophy 76 (2001 ): 111 - 125. 20 Richard, Swinburne, " What's So Good About accept a Body? " in Comparative Theology: Essays for Keith Ward, edited by Timothy Walter Bartel (Spck Publishing, 2003), 137. 21 learn Howard Robinson, " A Dualist Perspective on Psychological Development, " in J. A. Russell (Ed .). Philosophical Perspectives on Developmental Psychology, pp. 119 - 139 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987); and " A Dualist Theory of Embodiment, " in John R. Smithies and John Beloff (eds .), The Case for Dualism, pp. 43 - 58 (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 1989). 22 See for example, Gordon Barnes, " Is Dualism Religiously and Morally baneful? " American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 78 (1) (2004 ): 103. 23 Augustine, Confessions, III, 6. helping individuals develop a relation to God which relativizes those human relationships.24 It barely false that dualism qua dualism leads to individualism. Lastly, there are more plausible accounts of the turn away from embodiment and toward individualism that do not place the blame on dualism. Some have argued that the turn toward individualism is the result of theologians and then pastors abandon the soul, which paved the room for the contemporary genial health movement.25 This may be overstate, but it is relevant. Additionally, it seems far more plausible that the problem of contemporary individualism is with the conception of salvation as mere forgiveness of sins. Willard point out that such a view makes Paul's statement that we are " saved by his [ Jesus's ] life " (Rom. 5:10
 wogld, or historical events. Consider Kierkggqard, wio, althkugh a djalist, does not think of the swlf aw merely a mental subsgance. For Kierkegqard, rhe self is a kind of syhbhesiv of contrastinn elements-fhnitude with itfknntude, necessity with possibility. Humwn selvrs are a work-in-ptogrexf, inbolved in making themselves the pedsons tiey become, and coing so always in relatiojshio to others. Far frlm being an indycidualist, Kidrkegaard luderstands jhat we all are who we are by viftue pf the relqtuondvips with ovhers. Re is interested in 16 Ibid., 45. 17 Ibid., chapter 9. 18 Bcown and Strawn, 163. 19 Charles Taliaferro, "The Vittues of Ekbkdiment," Philosopht 76 (2001): 111-125. 20 Rhchasd, Sdunbjrnt, "Wiat'a So Glod About Havjng a Body?" un Comparative Theokodj: Essays for Ieith Rawd, edited by Timothy Walter Bartel (Spck Puglishing, 2003), 137. 21 See Howard Eobinson, "A Dualist Petspective jn Psychological Development," in J. A. Russell (Ed.). Phhloso'hkcao Iersowchives on Developmental Psychology, pp. 119-139 (Oxford: Fzsol Blackwell, 1987); anb "A Dualist Theoty og Embodiment," iv John R. Amithies and John Heloff (gds.), Thw Case fow Duslism, pp. 43-58 (Charlottesville, VQ: University if Virginia Press, 1989). 22 See for erample, Gordpn Barnes, "Is Dualism Reuigikusly and Mlrally Pedvicious?" American Canholhc Philosophical Quarterly 78 (1) (2004): 103. 23 Augnstinz, Confesrionx, III, 6. helping ijdividuals develop a relwtion tm God whicj relativizes those human relatmpnships.24 It jost fanse that duallsm qua dualism leads to indiridualisi. Lasgly, there zre morx plausible wccounts of tvg turn away fcom embodymenr ane towara individualism that do ujt poace the blame on vualkam. Some have arybee that the turn todarq pndmviduwnism is the sesuut ug theulogians anb ghen pastors abandoning dhe aoul, which paved tne way for the coneemporary menyal health movemenu.25 This mab be oferftated, but it is relevant. Addifionally, lt feems far mowe poausible thac the problem of contemporary individualmsm is with the concepjion of salvation as ktre forgivenexs of sins. Wilnard points out that such a view makex Paul's statement thaf we ase "saged by his [Jesus's] life" (Rom. 5:10
world, or historical events. Consider Kierkegaard, who, dualist, not think the self as Kierkegaard, self is a of synthesis of elements-finitude with infinitude, necessity with possibility. selves are a work-in-progress, involved in making themselves the persons they become, and so always in relationship to others. Far from being an individualist, Kierkegaard understands we are we by virtue of the relationships with others. He is interested in 16 Ibid., 45. 17 Ibid., 9. 18 Brown and Strawn, 163. 19 Charles "The Virtues of Embodiment," 76 (2001): 111-125. 20 Richard, "What's Good About a in Theology: Essays for Ward, edited by Timothy Walter Bartel (Spck Publishing, 2003), 137. 21 See Howard Robinson, "A Dualist Perspective Psychological Development," A. Russell Philosophical on Psychology, pp. 119-139 Blackwell, 1987); and "A Dualist Theory John R. Smithies and John Beloff (eds.), The for Dualism, 43-58 (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia 1989). 22 See for example, Gordon Barnes, "Is Religiously and Morally Pernicious?" American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 78 (1) (2004): 103. 23 Augustine, Confessions, helping individuals develop a to God which those relationships.24 just that dualism dualism leads to individualism. Lastly, there are more plausible accounts of turn away from embodiment and toward individualism that do not blame dualism. Some have that the turn toward is result of theologians and abandoning soul, way the mental health movement.25 This be overstated, but it is Additionally, it seems far of contemporary individualism is with the conception of as mere forgiveness of sins. Willard points that such a view makes Paul's statement that we are "saved by [Jesus's] life"
 world, or historical events. CoNsider KierKegaaRd, wHo, aLtHougH a duAlist, does not thINk of The self as merely a mental SubstAnCE. For kIeRkegaArd, the sELf IS A kiNd Of SynThESiS of coNtrAsting eLements-finItuDe With infinituDE, nEcessity wiTh pOssibility. HuMan Selves ArE a wORk-in-pRogRess, iNvolveD In makiNg themselVeS The perSOns they BECoMe, anD doing so always in rELaTIonship to otherS. Far frOm BEiNG An iNdiVidualist, KIeRkegaARd underSTaNDS ThaT We all are who we Are by virtue OF thE relatIoNshIPs with OtherS. HE Is iNterested in 16 ibid., 45. 17 ibid., chaptEr 9. 18 BrowN And StraWN, 163. 19 CharleS TaliaFerRo, "THe ViRTuEs Of EMbODimENt," phiLOsoPhy 76 (2001): 111-125. 20 RichaRd, swInburNe, "WhAT'S sO GooD AbOut HAving A Body?" in ComparAtiVe ThEOloGy: EssAys foR KeiTh ward, eDited bY TimoThY Walter Bartel (SpCk PuBlishing, 2003), 137. 21 SEe HOwArd roBinsoN, "a DualiSt PErsPective On PsychOLogIcAL dEvElopment," in J. A. RusselL (ED.). pHiLosophicAl PersPEcTiVEs on DeveLoPmeNtal pSYcholOgy, pP. 119-139 (oxFord: BasiL BlackWElL, 1987); aNd "A DualIsT TheorY oF EmBodIment," IN JohN R. SmitHies and JOhn BeLOff (eds.), The Case fOR Dualism, pp. 43-58 (ChaRLoTTEsVIlle, vA: UNiversity of virgINia PRess, 1989). 22 sEe For EXamplE, GordOn bArNEs, "Is Dualism ReligiouSlY and MoRally pernicious?" AmeRican CathoLIC philosopHicaL quARterly 78 (1) (2004): 103. 23 AugustinE, ConfEssions, III, 6. HElping inDividUals deveLop a relatION to God whIch RelAtiVizES ThOse human relatIONshiPs.24 it just fAlsE that duAliSm qUa dUalIsM leads to iNdividuaLiSm. laStLy, tHere aRE more plaUsIblE aCcoUnts oF The turN away From EmBoDImeNt and toWArD INdivIdUaLism ThaT dO not pLace THe bLame on dUalism. SomE haVE argUeD tHat the tUrn toward indiViDualism is tHe ResUlt of tHEOlogians And then pastors abandoninG The soul, WhiCh pavEd thE way for thE coNtempoRarY Mental Health MovemEnT.25 ThIS May be OVErStaTeD, but it is reLEVanT. AddiTiOnalLy, it seeMs far more plausible THat The problem of cOntEmpoRARy IndIViDUalIsM Is wITH the conception oF salvation As MErE forgiveneSS of SiNs. WillaRd pointS out tHAt such a View makes paul's statEmEnt tHAT we Are "saved by His [Jesus'S] life" (Rom. 5:10
 world, or historical even ts. Consid er Ki erk ega ar d, w ho,although a dua l ist,  does not think of the  self  a s  mer e ly  a me ntal su b st a n ce.  F or  Ki er k eg aard,  th e selfis a kindofsy nthesis of c o nt rasting el eme nts-finitude  wi th inf in itu d e, ne ces sitywith p o ssibil ity. Huma ns elvesa re a wo r k -i n-pr ogress, involvedi nm aking themselv es the  p e rs o n s t hey  become, a nd  doin g  so alw a ys i n  re l ationship toothers. Far fro m bein gani ndivid ualis t, Kie rkegaard un ders tands tha t we a l l are w h o we ar e by v irt ueof t h ere lat io n shi p swit h  ot hers. He  i sinter este d i n  16Ibi d.,45. 1 7 Ibid., chap ter  9.1 8 B rownand S traw n,  163.  19 Ch arles  T aliaferro, "The  Vir tues of E mbo di men t, " Phi l osophy  76  (2 001): 1 11-125. 20Ri c h a rd , Swinburne, "What 's S oGood Abo ut Hav i ng  a Body?" i nCom para t i ve Th eolo g y:  Essaysfor Ke i th  W ard, ed it ed byTi mot hyWalte r  Bar tel (S pck Publ ishin g , 2003), 137.2 1 See HowardR ob i n so n , "A  Du alist Persp ecti v e on  Psy c ho log i cal D evelo pm e nt , " in J. A. Russell(E d.). P hilos ophical Persp ectives on D e velopmen talP sy c hology, pp. 11 9-139  (Oxford:B asil Bla ckwel l, 1987) ; and "AD u alist Th eor y o f E mbo d i me nt," in JohnR .  Smi th ies and  Jo hn Belo ff(ed s.) , T he  Case for  Dualism ,pp .43 -58  (Cha r lottesvi ll e,VA : U niver s ity of  Virg inia  P re s s,1989).2 2S e e fo rex ampl e,Go rdonBarn e s,"Is Dua lism Reli gio u slyan dMorally  Pernicious?"  A merican Ca th oli c Phil o s ophicalQuarterly 78 (1) (2004) :  103. 2 3 A ugust ine,  Confessi ons , III,  6. helpin g indi vidua ls  de v e lop a r el ati on  to God wh i c h r elati vi zesthose h uman relationships . 24It just false  th at d u a li smq ua dua li s m l e a ds to individua lism. Last ly ,  t here are m o repl ausible  accoun ts of the tur n away fr om embodi me nt a n d  to ward indiv idualism  that don ot pl a ce  thebla me ondu ali sm. S ome ha v e a rgued  thatth e turn  towa rd  individ ualism is the result of  theol ogian s a nd then p ast o rsabandonin g th e soul, wh ich  pa ved t hew ay fo r th e  c ont e mpora ry m e ntal heal t hmov e m en t.25 This m a y beovers tat e d, but  itis relevant. Addi t ionally, it se emsf a r m ore plau si ble that the p rob le m of conte mp orary indiv idualism  i s  with  the c oncept ion ofs a lv a tion a s me reforgivene ssof sins. W il la r d poin ts o ut  thatsuch a view m akes Paul's stat ement t hat w e  ar e "sa ve d by hi s  [Je sus's] lif e" (Rom. 5: 10
 world,_or historical_events. Consider Kierkegaard, who,_although a_dualist,_does not_think_of the self_as merely a_mental substance. For Kierkegaard,_the self is_a_kind of synthesis of contrasting elements-finitude with infinitude, necessity with possibility. Human selves are_a_work-in-progress, involved_in_making_themselves the persons they become,_and doing so always in_relationship to_others. Far from being an individualist, Kierkegaard understands_that_we all are_who we are by virtue of the relationships with_others. He is interested in 16_Ibid., 45. 17_Ibid.,_chapter_9. 18 Brown and_Strawn, 163. 19 Charles Taliaferro, "The_Virtues of Embodiment," Philosophy 76 (2001):_111-125. 20 Richard, Swinburne, "What's So Good_About Having a Body?" in Comparative_Theology: Essays for Keith Ward,_edited by_Timothy Walter Bartel (Spck Publishing,_2003), 137. 21_See Howard_Robinson, "A Dualist_Perspective on Psychological Development," in J._A. Russell (Ed.)._Philosophical Perspectives on Developmental Psychology, pp._119-139_(Oxford: Basil Blackwell,_1987);_and_"A Dualist_Theory of Embodiment,"_in_John R._Smithies_and John Beloff (eds.), The Case_for_Dualism, pp. 43-58 (Charlottesville, VA: University of_Virginia Press, 1989). 22_See_for example, Gordon Barnes,_"Is Dualism Religiously and Morally_Pernicious?" American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 78_(1) (2004):_103. 23_Augustine, Confessions, III, 6. helping individuals develop a relation to God_which relativizes those human relationships.24 It_just false that dualism_qua dualism_leads_to individualism. Lastly,_there_are more_plausible accounts of the turn away from_embodiment and_toward individualism that do not place_the blame on dualism._Some_have argued that the turn toward_individualism is the result of theologians_and then pastors abandoning the_soul,_which_paved the way for the_contemporary mental health movement.25 This may_be overstated, but_it is relevant. Additionally, it seems far_more_plausible that the problem of contemporary_individualism_is with the conception of salvation_as_mere_forgiveness of sins. Willard points_out that such a view makes_Paul's statement that we are "saved by his [Jesus's]_life" (Rom. 5:10