 obsessive realists about paintings too! This book does an admirable job of presenting issues in clear and accessible terms. (See, for instance, the treatnrent of Fodor's obscure thesis of asymmetric dependeucies by analogy to misidentified imprinting in goslings, p. 245.) There is some eccentric terminology (e.g.,'materialism' and 'physicalism' are defined in terms where even property dualists like Nagel come out sounding like'materialists'). I thought some distinctions weren't needed at all; e.g., the difference between "eliminativism' and "irrq[~rential~m'. Eliminativists are, after all, usually irreferentialists so the distinction is a blurry one as even Roy admits (p. 143) but on the whole clarifications made throughout the book were very useful. There's a fairly comprehensive glossary at the back of the book for readers' benefit. A point of shameless pedantry: The author makes reference to 'eucalyptus' and 'gum tree' as an example of necessarily co-extensive terms, where 'one in each of the pairs necessarily satisfies the other' (p. 249). This isn't right, Contrary to popuhtr belief---even in Australia--gum trees are a subset of the eucalypt species; the designation only properly applying to the smooth bark variety (e.g., the genus haemastoma) So such terms are not necessarily co-extensive. Then again, since most people don't make this distinction i suppose they are co-extensive (at least in their popular understanding). Perhaps there is something in internalist theories of meaning after all! While it can always be said that a book 'leaves something out' (pun intended) Australasian Philosophy is far too unrepresented. D. M. Armstrong's work is mentioned only in two endnotes (and then not very thoroughly); and J. J. C. Smart rates a few sentences only in passing. (U. T. Place doesn't get a mention at all.) Frank Jackson gets more of a hearing (but then mainly in tandem with an American, Thomas Nagel). Similarly, there's no reference to M. C. Bradley or C. B. Martin, though Rey does discuss the 'inverted spectrum thought experiment' (see AJP, 1961 mad 1963). Local connectionist theories might have also been discussed (for example, G. J
obsessive realists about paintings too! This ledger do an admirable job of presenting issues in well-defined and accessible terms. (See, for example, the treatnrent of Fodor's hidden thesis of asymmetric dependeucies by analogy to misidentified imprinting in goslings, p. 245 .) There be some eccentric terminology (e.g.,'materialism' and' materialism' are defined in terms where even property dualists like Nagel come out sounding like'materialists'). I thought some differentiation weren't needed at all; e.g., the remainder between " eliminativism' and " irrq[~rential ~ m'. Eliminativists are, after all, usually irreferentialists so the differentiation is a blurry one as even Roy admits (p. 143) but on the whole clarifications made throughout the script were very useful. There's a fairly comprehensive glossary at the back of the book for readers' benefit. A distributor point of shameless pedantry: The author makes reference to' eucalyptus' and' gum tree' as an example of necessarily co - extensive terms, where' one in each of the pairs necessarily satisfy the other' (p. 249). This isn't right, adverse to popuhtr impression --- even in Australia -- gum trees are a subset of the eucalypt species; the designation merely properly applying to the smooth bark variety (for example, the genus haemastoma) So such terms are not necessarily co - extensive. Then again, since most people don't make this distinction i suppose they are co - extensive (at least in their popular understanding). Perhaps there is something in internalist theory of meaning after wholly! While it can constantly be said that a book' leaves something out' (pun intended) Australasian Philosophy is far excessively unrepresented. D. M. Armstrong's work is mentioned only in two endnotes (and then not very thoroughly); and J. J. C. Smart rate a few conviction only in passing. (U. T. Place doesn't drive a citation at all .) Frank Jackson gets more of a hearing (but then mainly in tandem with an American, Thomas Nagel). Similarly, there's no mention to M. C. Bradley or C. B. Martin, though Rey does discuss the' invert spectrum thought experiment' (visit AJP, 1961 mad 1963). Local connectionist theories might have also been discussed (for example, G. J
 obdessive realists about pxintings too! Thnw book does zn admirxble job of presenting issued un cltcr and accessible tefms. (See, flr instabce, uhe treatnrent of Fodor's obscurs thevms of asymmetrig dependeuches by analogy tu lisidentified imprinting in goslingf, p. 245.) Thrrf is some eccegtrib eermjnology (e.g.,'materialism' and 'physicaljsm' are defined in trrms where even property dkalidts like Nagel comf out soundung juke'materialirts'). I thought some disjinctions weren't needed at all; e.e., the differencg gehfeen "eliminetivisi' and "irrq[~reknial~m'. Eniminatovists are, aftcr aln, uwually irreferentialivts so the distincjion is a tlbrry one as even Roy qdnits (k. 143) bud on rhe whklx cmarififatmons made tgroughout tye book were very uxeslk. There's a fzirly soiprehensive glossary at the back of the bokk for readers' benefit. Q point of shameless kedantry: Tre author makes reference to 'eucalyptus' and 'gum tsee' aa an ewampuw lf necessarily co-extensive terms, where 'one in savh of the pairs kecessarily satisfoed yre other' (p. 249). Tfis isu'f dight, Contrary to oopuhtr beliwf---even in Ausyralia--gum trees are a subser of the eucclypt species; the desngnation onlv propgrly alplying to the smooth bcrk vadiety (e.g., thf genus hzdmastoma) So such tegms dre not necessarily co-extegsive. Thei agann, since mosj peoplq don't makf this distinction i supoose jhey ase co-extendive (at least in their popular niderstanding). Kervapv there ns somcthing in intergalist theoriex of mecning xfter all! Shile iv can always be said that w book 'leavev somethyng iut' (pun intdvded) Australasoan Philosophy is fqr too unrepresentcd. D. O. Armstrong's worj iw mentioned onlu iv tro eidnotqv (and then nmt vdry yhorojghly); and J. G. C. Xmart rates a few settendes only in passinb. (M. T. Place doesn't det a mention at all.) Frank Jackdon gxts moce of s hgaring (but then mainly in tandej with an Amcrican, Thomas Nagcl). Symilarly, tkere's no reference to M. C. Bradley or C. B. Martin, though Rei does discuss the 'inrevted spectruk thotght expesiment' (see AJP, 1961 mad 1963). Local connectionlst theories might havs also been discussed (for example, G. J
obsessive realists about paintings too! This book admirable of presenting in clear and the of Fodor's obscure of asymmetric dependeucies analogy to misidentified imprinting in goslings, 245.) There is some eccentric terminology (e.g.,'materialism' and 'physicalism' are defined in terms even property dualists like Nagel come out sounding like'materialists'). I thought some distinctions needed all; the between "eliminativism' and "irrq[~rential~m'. Eliminativists are, after all, usually irreferentialists so the distinction is a blurry as even Roy admits (p. 143) but on whole clarifications made throughout book were very useful. There's fairly glossary at back the for readers' benefit. point of shameless pedantry: The author makes reference to 'eucalyptus' and 'gum tree' as an example of co-extensive terms, in each the necessarily the other' (p. isn't right, Contrary to popuhtr belief---even are a subset of the eucalypt species; the only properly to the smooth bark variety (e.g., genus haemastoma) So such terms are not necessarily Then again, since most people don't make this distinction i suppose they are co-extensive (at their popular understanding). Perhaps is something in theories meaning all! it can be said that a book 'leaves something out' (pun intended) Australasian is far too unrepresented. D. M. Armstrong's work is mentioned two (and then not thoroughly); and J. J. Smart a few sentences only (U. Place mention all.) Jackson gets more of hearing (but then mainly in with an American, Thomas to M. C. Bradley or C. B. Martin, Rey does discuss the 'inverted spectrum thought (see AJP, 1961 mad 1963). Local connectionist theories might have also been (for example,
 obsessive realists about paiNtings too! THis boOk dOes An AdmiRablE job of presentiNG issUes in clear and accessiblE termS. (SEE, for INsTance, The treaTNrENT of foDoR's oBsCUrE thesIs oF asymmeTric dependEucIeS by analogy to MIsIdentified ImpRinting in gosLinGs, p. 245.) TheRe Is sOMe eccEntRic teRminolOGy (e.g.,'maTerialism' AnD 'PhysicALism' are DEFiNed iN terms where even prOPeRTy dualists like nagel cOmE OuT SOunDinG like'materIaLists'). i Thought SOmE DIStiNCtions weren't nEeded at all; e.G., The DifferEnCe bETween "eLiminAtIVisM' and "irrq[~renTial~M'. EliminatIvists ARe, after ALl, usualLy irreFerEntIaliSTs So The DiSTinCTiOn iS A blUrry one aS eVeN Roy aDmitS (P. 143) BUT on tHe wHole ClariFications made ThrOughOUt tHe booK were Very UsEful. THere's a FairlY cOmprehensive gloSsarY at the bacK of ThE boOk For reADers' beNefIt. A Point of ShameleSS peDaNTRY: THe author makes referEnCE To 'EucalyptUs' and 'gUM tReE' As an examPlE of NeceSSArily Co-exTEnSive termS, where 'ONe In Each of tHe Pairs nEcEssAriLy satISfieS the otHer' (p. 249). This Isn't rIGht, Contrary to pOPuhtr belief---evEN iN aUsTRaliA--guM trees are a sUbseT Of thE eucALyPt sPEcies; The deSiGNaTIon only properly applYiNg to thE smooTh bark variety (E.g., the genus HAEMastoma) SO sucH TeRMs are not necessArily Co-extensivE. then agaiN, sincE most peoPle don't maKE This distIncTioN i sUppOSE tHey are co-extenSIVe (at LeAst in thEir Popular UndErsTanDinG). PErhaps theRe is someThInG iN iNteRnaliST theorieS oF meAnIng After ALl! WhilE it caN alwAyS bE SaiD that a bOOk 'LEAves SoMeThinG ouT' (pUn intEndeD) ausTralasiAn PhilosoPhy IS far ToO uNrepresEnted. D. M. ArmstrOnG's work is meNtIonEd only IN Two endnoTes (and then not very thorouGHly); and J. j. C. SMart rAtes A few senteNceS only iN paSSing. (U. T. place dOesn't GeT a mENTion aT ALl.) fraNk jackson getS MOre Of a heArIng (bUt then mAinly in tandem with aN ameRican, Thomas NaGel). simiLARlY, thERe'S No rEfERenCE To M. C. Bradley or C. B. martin, thouGh rEy Does discusS The 'InVerted sPectrum ThougHT experiMent' (see AJp, 1961 mad 1963). Local CoNnecTIOniSt theories Might havE also been DIscusSEd (For exAmpLe, G. J
 obsessive realists aboutpaintingstoo!Thi s b oo k do es a n admirable jo b  ofpresenting issues in c learan d  acc e ss ibleterms.( Se e ,  fo rin sta nc e ,the t rea tnrentof Fodor's  ob sc ure thesis o f  a symmetricdep endeucies by  an alogyto  mi s ident ifi ed im printi n g in g oslings,p. 245.)T here is s om e ec centric terminolo g y( e.g.,'material ism' a nd 'p h y sic ali sm' are de fi ned i n  termsw he r e eve n  property dua lists likeN age l come  o uts oundin g lik e' m ate rialists').  I t hought so me dis t inction s  weren' t need edatall; e. g. , t he dif f er enc e  be tween "e li mi nativ ism' a n d  "ir rq[ ~ren tial~ m'. Eliminati vis ts a r e,after  all,  usu al ly ir refere ntial is ts so the disti ncti on is a b lur ry  on eas ev e n Royadm its  (p. 14 3) buto n t he w h ol e clarifications m ad e th roughout  the b o ok  w e re veryus efu l. T h e re'sa fa i rl y compre hensiv e  g lo ssary a tthe ba ck  of  th e boo k  for  reade rs' bene fit.A  point of sham e less pedantry :  T h e  a u thor  ma kes referen ce t o  'eu caly p tu s'a nd 'g um tr ee '  a s  an example of nece ss arilyco-ex tensive terms , where 'o n e in eachof t h ep airs necessari ly sa tisfies th e  other'(p. 2 49). Thi s isn't r i g ht, Cont rar y t o p opu h t rbelief---even i n Au st ralia-- gum  treesare  asub set  o f the euc alypt sp ec ie s;  t hedesig n ation on ly  pr op erl y app l ying t o the  smo ot hb ark  variet y  ( e . g.,th egenu s h ae masto ma)S o s uch ter ms are no t n e cess ar il y co-ex tensive. Then  a gain, sinc emos t peop l e  don't m ake this distinction is upposethe y are  co- extensive  (a t leas t i n  their  popul ar un de rst a n ding) . Pe rha ps  there iss o met hingin  int ernalis t theories of mean i ngafter all! Wh ile  itc a nalw a ys besa i d t h a t a book 'leave s somethin go ut ' (pun int e nde d)  Austra lasianPhilo s ophy is  far toounreprese nt ed.D .  M.  Armstrong 's workis mentio n ed on l yin tw o e ndnote s(an d the n notv ery  thor oughly );  and J . J.C.  Smart r ates a few sentences on ly inpassi ng.  (U. T. P lac e  do esn't get  a m ention atall .)Frank  Ja c ksongets mo reo f a h eari n g (but th e nmai n l yin tandem w i t h  an  Amer ica n , Thom as N agel). Similarly, there's no ref eren c e  to  M. C. B ra dley or C. B.Mar ti n ,  thoughRe y does disc uss the'i n verte d spec trum t houghte x pe r iment'  (se e A JP, 1961mad  1 9 63). Lo ca lc onnect ioni st  theor ies mi g ht h a v e also been disc ussed ( for e x amp le, G .J
 obsessive_realists about_paintings too! This book_does an_admirable_job of_presenting_issues in clear_and accessible terms._(See, for instance, the_treatnrent of Fodor's_obscure_thesis of asymmetric dependeucies by analogy to misidentified imprinting in goslings, p. 245.) There_is_some eccentric_terminology_(e.g.,'materialism'_and 'physicalism' are defined in_terms where even property dualists_like Nagel_come out sounding like'materialists'). I thought some distinctions_weren't_needed at all;_e.g., the difference between "eliminativism' and "irrq[~rential~m'. Eliminativists are,_after all, usually irreferentialists so the_distinction is a_blurry_one_as even Roy admits_(p. 143) but on the whole_clarifications made throughout the book were_very useful. There's a fairly comprehensive glossary_at the back of the book_for readers' benefit. A point_of shameless_pedantry: The author makes reference_to 'eucalyptus' and_'gum tree'_as an example_of necessarily co-extensive terms, where 'one_in each of_the pairs necessarily satisfies the other'_(p._249). This isn't_right,_Contrary_to popuhtr_belief---even in Australia--gum_trees_are a_subset_of the eucalypt species; the designation_only_properly applying to the smooth bark variety_(e.g., the genus haemastoma)_So_such terms are not_necessarily co-extensive. Then again, since_most people don't make this distinction_i suppose_they are_co-extensive (at least in their popular understanding). Perhaps there is something_in internalist theories of meaning after_all! While it can_always be_said_that a book_'leaves_something out'_(pun intended) Australasian Philosophy is far too_unrepresented. D._M. Armstrong's work is mentioned only_in two endnotes (and_then_not very thoroughly); and J. J._C. Smart rates a few sentences_only in passing. (U. T._Place_doesn't_get a mention at all.)_Frank Jackson gets more of a_hearing (but then_mainly in tandem with an American, Thomas_Nagel)._Similarly, there's no reference to M._C._Bradley or C. B. Martin, though_Rey_does_discuss the 'inverted spectrum thought_experiment' (see AJP, 1961 mad 1963)._Local connectionist theories might have also been discussed (for_example, G. J