 dependent on its context, such that a phenomenon is always multiply realizable depending on the particular, functional situation at hand. This successfully taps into the fundamental outsidedness, extension and exposure – or even soulfulness – of matter that speculative realism fails to adequately account for in its theories of absolute inner autonomy.66 Contrary to the anti-correlationist notion that relationality always slides into a phenomenalist denial of materiality, a radically externalist account is predicated on the finding that relation matters if we are to have successful materialism. Moreover, such an account helps avoid certain pitfalls of the new materialist "return 66 This externalism attends to the growing empirical proof of the brain's plasticity. Catherine Malabou's in Before Tomorrow is particularly promising for providing a neuroscientific backdrop for the non-reductivism I am suggesting. This work shows that mental states are not linked in any straightforward or exhaustively determinable way to the neural "firings" of specific regions of the brain. Rather, there is a plasticity or alterability between the regions of the brain that cause a given state of being (i.e., being is multiply realizable), supporting the idea that there is, in fact, a radical, hermeneutic indeterminacy, or at least context-dependency of matter's inter-involvements. relational matters ‡ lillywhite 39 to objects," and thus perhaps points the way to the "special kind" of materialist realism that combines external constructedness with a sense of the real liveliness of matter. Here, the world possesses and touches us, and thus seems to exhibit some of the activeness that Bennett, Latour and the speculative realists want to develop. However, this activeness is not biologically reducible to any genetic inherency in the matter itself. Instead, material activeness evolves out of a radical relationality with other matter that, even if "sentient," always knows its equal non-sentience and objectness, rendering any rigid sentient/non-sentient binary untenable. Such a new materialist, non-reductive, externalist ontology is indeed richly amenable to political implications gleaned from social constructionism, notwithstanding the speculative realist's rejection of such a project. EUROPEAN JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 6/2 (SUMMER 2014), PP. 5-15 SWINBURNE ON SUBSTANCE DUALISM LYNNE RUDDER BAKER University
dependent on its context, such that a phenomenon is always multiply realizable depending on the especial, running situation at hand. This successfully tap into the cardinal outsidedness, extension and exposure – or even soulfulness – of topic that notional realism fails to adequately account for in its theories of absolute inside autonomy.66 Contrary to the anti - correlationist notion that relationality always slides into a phenomenalist abnegation of materiality, a radically externalist account is predicated on the finding that relation matters if we are to suffer successful materialism. Moreover, such an account helps avoid sealed pitfalls of the new materialist " reelect 66 This externalism attend to the growing empirical proof of the brain's plasticity. Catherine Malabou's in Before Tomorrow is peculiarly promising for providing a neuroscientific backdrop for the non - reductivism I am suggesting. This work shows that genial state are not linked in any straightforward or exhaustively determinable way to the neural " firings " of specific regions of the brain. Rather, there embody a plasticity or alterability between the regions of the genius that induce a give state of being (i.e., being is multiply realizable), corroborate the idea that there is, in fact, a radical, hermeneutic indeterminacy, or at least context - colony of matter's inter - involvements. relational matters ‡ lillywhite 39 to objects, " and thus perhaps point the way to the " special kind " of materialist realism that combines external constructedness with a common sense of the real liveliness of topic. Here, the world possesses and touches us, and thus seems to exhibit some of the action that Bennett, Latour and the speculative realists want to develop. However, this activeness is not biologically reducible to any genetic inherency in the matter itself. Instead, fabric activeness evolves out of a radical relationality with other matter that, even if " sentient, " constantly knows its adequate non - sentience and objectness, rendering any rigid sentient / non - sentient binary indefensible. Such a new materialist, non - reductive, externalist ontology is indeed richly amenable to political implications reap from social constructionism, notwithstanding the speculative realist's rejection of such a project. EUROPEAN JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 6/2 (SUMMER 2014), PP. 5 - 15 SWINBURNE ON SUBSTANCE DUALISM LYNNE RUDDER BAKER University
 deoendent on its context, smch that a phenomenon iv alwags multioly realizable depending on vhe partixular, functional situagion at hwnd. This sucressfully taps iifo the nbndamsktal mntsidedness, extgnsion and efposure – or evan slulfulness – of matter that speculatyve reakidm fails to adgquattly accklnu for in its theories of absolute inner eutonomy.66 Contraty to the anti-correlationidt nltion that relatiojality alwaia sjudes into a ohenomenalpvt denial kf materiality, a radically extefnalixt account iw pggdicated on vhe figding that rckation matterx if we are to hate syccessful materialism. Moreover, such an wccount hal's avoid certain pitfqlos of the new natdrizlmst "returj 66 Vhis externzlism attenes to the growing ekpygocal proof or the frwin's plasticity. Catherine Malabou's in Btfore Tomorrow is particularoy promising for provlding a nquroscientific backdrop for the non-reductivism I dm sujgdstnkn. Thkw aork shows that mental states are not linked yh snj straightforward or exhaustovflu determinable way to tge neural "firings" lf specyfic eegions os thr brain. Rather, there is a poasticity or qlterability betwezn the regious of jhe brsin that cause a given rtats of being (l.e., being jr multiply realixabke), supporting the idea that ehere is, mn faet, a radkcal, hermegeutic indftermltacy, or at least clntexj-depengency of mwtter's inter-involvements. relational matters ‡ kinlyfhite 39 tj objccts," and thus pqrhaps points jhe way tj the "special kpnd" of maverialist rewlism that cokhines externel constrtcteenesw with x sense of the teal liveliness of natter. Here, the wovld puasesses and touekew us, and thus sremr tj vxhmbit fmme of the awtivdnerx thag Benneuc, Lctuur snd the speculative sealjsts want to develpp. However, this aceiveness is npt biologically refucibne vo any gegetic inherency in the matter jtself. Indtewd, material wctiyenefs evolves out of a radical relationality with otier matter that, even if "sentient," always knpes its equak non-fentience and objectness, rendwring any rigid stntient/non-sentient binady untanablf. Such a new materialist, non-reductive, externalist ontology is indeed richoy ameiafle to polificak impnieatnons glqanev hrom social constguctionism, notwithstanding the s'eculative rzalist's rejection of such a ptogect. EUROPEAN JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHY KF RELIGOON 6/2 (SUMMER 2014), PP. 5-15 SWINBURNE ON SIBSTANCE DUALISM LYNNE RMDDER BAKWR Unjversini
dependent on its context, such that a always realizable depending the particular, functional taps the fundamental outsidedness, and exposure – even soulfulness – of matter that realism fails to adequately account for in its theories of absolute inner autonomy.66 to the anti-correlationist notion that relationality always slides into a phenomenalist denial of a externalist is on the finding that relation matters if we are to have successful materialism. Moreover, such an helps avoid certain pitfalls of the new materialist 66 This externalism attends the growing empirical proof of brain's Catherine Malabou's Before is promising for providing neuroscientific backdrop for the non-reductivism I am suggesting. This work shows that mental states are not linked any straightforward determinable way the "firings" specific regions of Rather, there is a plasticity or regions of the brain that cause a given of being being is multiply realizable), supporting the that there is, in fact, a radical, hermeneutic or at least context-dependency of matter's inter-involvements. relational matters ‡ lillywhite 39 to objects," and points the way to "special kind" of realism combines constructedness a sense the real liveliness of matter. Here, the world possesses and touches and thus seems to exhibit some of the activeness that and speculative realists want develop. However, this activeness not reducible to any genetic the itself. evolves of radical relationality with other that, even if "sentient," always its equal non-sentience and binary untenable. Such a new materialist, non-reductive, externalist is indeed richly amenable to political implications from social constructionism, notwithstanding the speculative realist's rejection of such a project. JOURNAL FOR RELIGION 6/2 (SUMMER 2014), PP. 5-15 SWINBURNE ON DUALISM LYNNE RUDDER BAKER
 dependent on its context, such That a phenoMenon Is aLwaYs MultIply Realizable depeNDing On the particular, functioNal siTuATion AT hAnd. ThIs succeSSfULLy tApS iNto ThE FuNdameNtaL outsidEdness, exteNsiOn And exposure – oR EvEn soulfulnEss – Of matter that SpeCulatiVe ReaLIsm faIls To adeQuatelY AccounT for in its ThEOries oF AbsolutE INnEr auTonomy.66 Contrary to tHE aNTi-correlationiSt notiOn THaT RElaTioNality alwaYs SlideS Into a phENoMENAliST denial of mateRiality, a radICalLy exteRnAliST accouNt is pReDIcaTed on the finDing That relatIon matTErs if we ARe to havE succeSsfUl mAterIAlIsM. MoReOVer, SUcH an ACcoUnt helps AvOiD certAin pITFALls oF thE new MaterIalist "return 66 THis ExteRNalIsm atTends To thE gRowinG empirIcal pRoOf of the brain's plAstiCity. CatheRinE MAlaBoU's in BEFore ToMorRow Is partiCularly PRomIsING FoR providing a neuroscIeNTIfIc backdrOp for tHE nOn-REductiviSm i am SuggESTing. THis wORk Shows thaT mentaL StAtEs are noT lInked iN aNy sTraIghtfORwarD or exhAustivelY deteRMinable way to thE Neural "firings" OF sPECiFIc reGioNs of the braiN. RatHEr, thEre iS A pLasTIcity Or altErABiLIty between the regionS oF the brAin thAt cause a given State of beiNG (I.E., being is MultIPlY Realizable), suppOrtinG the idea thAT there is, In facT, a radicaL, hermeneuTIC indeterMinAcy, Or aT leAST cOntext-dependeNCY of mAtTer's intEr-iNvolvemEntS. reLatIonAl Matters ‡ liLlywhite 39 To ObJeCtS," anD thus PErhaps poInTs tHe Way To the "SPecial Kind" oF matErIaLIst Realism THaT COmbiNeS eXterNal CoNstruCtedNEss With a seNse of the rEal LIvelInEsS of mattEr. Here, the worlD pOssesses anD tOucHes us, aND Thus seemS to exhibit some of the actiVEness thAt BEnnetT, LatOur and the SpeCulatiVe rEAlists Want to DevelOp. howEVEr, thiS ACtIveNeSs is not bioLOGicAlly rEdUcibLe to any Genetic inherency in THe mAtter itself. InSteAd, maTERiAl aCTiVEneSs EVolVES out of a radical rElationaliTy WItH other mattER thAt, Even if "sEntient," AlwayS Knows itS equal non-Sentience AnD objECTneSs, renderinG any rigiD sentient/NOn-senTIeNt binAry UntenaBlE. SuCh a neW materIAliSt, non-ReductIvE, exterNalisT oNtology iS indeed richly amenable to PolitiCal imPliCations glEanED frOm social cOnstRuctionism, NotWitHstanDinG The spEculATiVe rEAlist'S rejECtion of suCH a ProJECt. eUROPEAN JOUrnal FOr PHILoSOphY OF RElIGIoN 6/2 (SUMMER 2014), PP. 5-15 SWINBURne ON SUBSTANCE DUaLISm lyNNe RUddER BaKeR University
 dependent on its context,  such that  a ph eno men on  isalwa ys multiply re a liza ble depending on the p artic ul a r, f u nc tiona l situa t io n atha nd . T hi s  s ucces sfu lly tap s into the  fu nd amental outs i de dness, ext ens ion and expo sur e – or  e ven soulf uln ess –  of ma t ter th at specul at i ve rea l ism fai l s  t o ad equately accountf or in its theorie s of a bs o lu t e  in ner  autonomy. 66  Cont r ary tot he a n ti- c orrelationist  notion tha t  re lation al ity always  slid es int o a phenome nali st denial  of ma t erialit y , a rad ically  ex ter nali s tac cou nt isp re dic a ted  on thefi nd ing t hatr e l a tion  ma tter s ifwe are to hav e s ucce s sfu l mat erial ism.  M oreov er, su ch an  a ccount helps av oidcertain p itf al lsof  then ew mat eri ali st "ret urn 66T his  e x t e rn alism attends to t he g ro wing emp irical pr oo f  of thebr ain 's p l a stici ty.C at herine M alabou ' sin  Before  T omorro wispar ticul a rlypromis ing forprovi d ing a neurosci e ntific backdr o pf o rt he n on- reductivism  I a m  sug gest i ng . T h is wo rk sh ow s  t h at mental states ar enot li nkedin any straig htforwardo r exhausti vely de t erminable wayto th e neural " f irings"of sp ecific r egions of t he brain . R ath er,  th e r eis a plastici t y  oral terabil ity  betwee n t hereg ion sof the br ain that  c au se  a  gi ven s t ate of b ei ng(i .e. , bei n g is m ultip ly r ea li z abl e), sup p or t i ng t he  i deatha tthere  is, infact, a  radical,  he r mene ut ic  indete rminacy, or a tleast cont ex t-d epende n c y of mat ter's inter-involvement s . relat ion al ma tter s ‡ lilly whi te 39too bjects ," and  thus  p erh a p s poi n t sthe  w ay to the" s pec ial k in d" o f mater ialist realism tha t  co mbines extern alcons t r uc ted n es s  wi th a s e n se of the realliveliness  o f  m atter. Her e , t he  worldpossess es an d  touche s us, and  thus see ms  toe x hib it some of  the act iveness t h at Be n ne tt, L ato ur and  t hespecu lative rea lists  wantto  devel op. H ow ever, th is activeness is not bi ologic allyred ucible to  an y  ge netic inh eren cy in themat ter  itse lf. Inste ad,m at eri a l act iven e ss evolve s  o uto f  a  radical re l a t ion ality  wi t h othe r ma tter that, even i f  "sentient," a lway s kno wsi ts e qu al non-sentien cean d objectne ss , rendering  any rig id senti ent/no n-sent ient bi n a ry untena ble.  Su ch a newmat er i alist,no n- r educti ve,ex ternal ist on t olog y is indeed richly  amen a b le to pol itica limplica t ions  gleaned f rom socialconstr ucti onism , notwi th standi ngth e speculat i ve realis t's r ejectio nof s uch  a pro ject . EUROP EANJO URN AL FOR PH I L OS O PH YO F R ELIG ION 6 /2  (SU MMER 2014 ) , PP. 5- 15S WINBURN EONS U BSTANC E  D U A LISM LYNNE  RU DDERB A KER Univer s ity
 dependent_on its_context, such that a_phenomenon is_always_multiply realizable_depending_on the particular,_functional situation at_hand. This successfully taps_into the fundamental_outsidedness,_extension and exposure – or even soulfulness – of matter that speculative realism fails_to_adequately account_for_in_its theories of absolute inner_autonomy.66 Contrary to the anti-correlationist_notion that_relationality always slides into a phenomenalist denial of_materiality,_a radically externalist_account is predicated on the finding that relation matters_if we are to have successful_materialism. Moreover, such_an_account_helps avoid certain pitfalls_of the new materialist "return 66_This externalism attends to the growing_empirical proof of the brain's plasticity. Catherine_Malabou's in Before Tomorrow is particularly_promising for providing a neuroscientific_backdrop for_the non-reductivism I am suggesting._This work shows_that mental_states are not_linked in any straightforward or exhaustively_determinable way to_the neural "firings" of specific regions_of_the brain. Rather,_there_is_a plasticity_or alterability between_the_regions of_the_brain that cause a given state_of_being (i.e., being is multiply realizable), supporting_the idea that there_is,_in fact, a radical,_hermeneutic indeterminacy, or at least_context-dependency of matter's inter-involvements. relational matters_‡ lillywhite_39 to_objects," and thus perhaps points the way to the "special kind"_of materialist realism that combines external_constructedness with a sense_of the_real_liveliness of matter._Here,_the world_possesses and touches us, and thus seems_to exhibit_some of the activeness that Bennett,_Latour and the speculative_realists_want to develop. However, this activeness_is not biologically reducible to any_genetic inherency in the matter_itself._Instead,_material activeness evolves out of_a radical relationality with other matter_that, even if_"sentient," always knows its equal non-sentience and_objectness,_rendering any rigid sentient/non-sentient binary untenable._Such_a new materialist, non-reductive, externalist ontology_is_indeed_richly amenable to political implications_gleaned from social constructionism, notwithstanding the_speculative realist's rejection of such a project. EUROPEAN JOURNAL_FOR PHILOSOPHY OF_RELIGION 6/2 (SUMMER 2014), PP._5-15_SWINBURNE_ON SUBSTANCE DUALISM LYNNE RUDDER BAKER University