 the main target. Against this, evidence from latent and passive learning, spontaneous alteration, and behavioural improvisatima are presented from the psychological and ethological literature. (Evidence is drawn mainly from the behaviour of rats in mazes--stock examples usually raised in support of RB.) Most of this material is well-known; but it is refreshing to see it so well-argued and with useful diagrams. Alongside this data, evidence from transformational grammar is presented, demonstrating that language learning assumes innate capacities and processes which can't be admitted on the terms of the RB account. Chapter 5 develops 'pre-fnnctionalist' mentalist alternatives in response to the failure of eliminativist approaches. 'Pre-functionalist' views include analytical behaviourism-and what the author calls 'introspectivism' and 'irreferentialism'. The former comprise views which assume that the meaning of mental terms and concepts 'is provided by the introspectible mental item to which it refers' (p. 136). Incorporated under this are the strange bedfellows of Locke and Searle; against them are the views of Wittgenstein and Kripke on internal states, explanations, and rule following. 'Irreferentialism' is presented as the view that'mental terms don't r~JOr but serve some other linguistic function' (p. 140). The views of Ryle, Smart, Quine, Harman, among others, are discussed here. Chapter 6 develops common themes endorsed by a variety of functionalist accounts. The discussion ranges over Turiug machines and binary coding (one of the clearest discussions of this around); and also Church's thesis, Ramsification, and multiple realizability (somewhat less clear). A number of other issues are raised including levels of functional explanation, prosthetic replacement of machine parts, and Quine's ontology/ideology distinction. Chapter 7 deals with the differences among functionalist approaches. A number of such approaches are treated: folk functionalism, a priori and psycho-functionalism, input/output vs. anchored functionalism; holistic vs. homuncular functionalism, teleo-functionalism, and something Rey calls'superficiafism', which he attributes to the view of Dennett. Toward the end of this chapter Rey introduces his'modest mentalism' which incorporates the central features of a generalised functionalism (intentional states which are prompted by and represent distal phenomena) while keeping some of the features of our mental
the main target. Against this, evidence from latent and passive learning, spontaneous change, and behavioral improvisatima are presented from the psychological and ethological literature. (Evidence is drawn chiefly from the behaviour of informer in mazes -- breed example usually raise in support of RB .) Most of this material is well - know; but it is refreshing to see it so well - argued and with useful diagrams. Alongside this datum, evidence from transformational grammar is presented, demonstrating that language eruditeness assumes innate capacities and processes which can't be admitted on the terms of the RB history. Chapter 5 develops' pre - fnnctionalist' mentalist alternatives in response to the failure of eliminativist approaches.' Pre - functionalist' view include analytical behaviourism - and what the author calls' introspectivism' and' irreferentialism'. The erstwhile comprise views which assume that the meaning of mental terms and concepts' is provided by the introspectible mental item to which it refers' (p. 136). Incorporated under this are the foreign bedfellow of Locke and Searle; against them are the views of Wittgenstein and Kripke on inner states, explanations, and rule following.' Irreferentialism' is give as the view that'mental terms don't r ~ JOr but serve some other linguistic affair' (p. 140). The views of Ryle, Smart, Quine, Harman, among others, are discussed here. Chapter 6 develops common themes endorsed by a diverseness of functionalist accounts. The discussion ranges over Turiug machines and binary coding (one of the clear discussions of this about); and also Church's thesis, Ramsification, and multiple realizability (somewhat less clear). A number of early issues are raised including levels of functional explanation, prosthetic replacement of machine parts, and Quine's ontology / ideology eminence. Chapter 7 deals with the dispute among functionalist approaches. A act of such approaches are treat: folk functionalism, a priori and psychotic - functionalism, input / output vs. anchored functionalism; holistic vs. homuncular functionalism, teleo - functionalism, and something Rey calls'superficiafism', which he impute to the view of Dennett. Toward the end of this chapter Rey introduce his'modest mentalism' which incorporates the central features of a generalised functionalism (intentional states which are prompted by and represent distal phenomena) while keeping some of the features of our genial
 thf main target. Against thls, evidence from latent and pzssive ldarning, spontaneous alteratiln, and vehavioural improvisatkma are pgesented drom rhe psychological and etgllogncel literature. (Eyidence is grawn mainly fsoo che behaviour of rats in mazes--stock qxamplex ksually raised in xtppodn if RB.) Most of this material ia well-kiown; but it is tefreshing to see it so wepl-arhued and with usefkl diagrams. Alogtside this dxta, evidenbz from tranaformational grammar is presentdd, dekonstratint rhah language lxarnind assumes inkste ca[acitiex and processex wiich can't be admitted on vhe terms of the RB wccount. Cva'ter 5 develops 'pre-fnnxtuonalhst' kentxoisg amtxrnztives in response fo the failyre of eliminativisu a[itoaches. 'Pre-fhnctiogajist' views include analytical behaviourpsm-ahd what the author callw 'introspectivism' and 'irreferegtialism'. The former comprise views which assume tvat tie mecklng ud lental terms and concepts 'is provided by the yhttoxpectible mentcl item to which ih tgfers' (p. 136). Incorkorated unser this are the shrange fedfeolows of Jockr and Searle; against them aee the views if Wittgenstein anb Kripke on nnternsl ststes, explanations, and rble fomlowing. 'Irrfferentiamksm' is presented as tve view ufat'mental terms djn't r~JOr uut szrve somd otner ligguistic fknction' (p. 140). The views of Gyle, Dmdrt, Quine, Jarman, among others, are discussxv here. Chaptet 6 gevvlops comion tmemes endorsed fy a variety oy functijnalirt accounta. The dmscussion ragges over Turhog machines aid binary codung (ine of gfe clearest dixcussions of this aeound); and also Chuvch's jhssis, Ramsificatnub, and multiple teauizwbplivy (soiawhat less cnear). A vimber of othtx iwrues are raised includinc lebels of functional ewplanatiob, prosthqtic replacemrnt of machine parus, and Qumne's omtojogy/ideology distinction. Chaptsr 7 deals wibh the differqncew among funccionalist approaches. A number of such ap'roaches are treated: fook functionalism, a kripri and psyrho-funstionalisk, input/output vs. ancyored functionalixm; holistic vs. homunchlar fgnctilnalism, teleo-functionalism, and something Rey calls'superficiafism', which he attriuuees to the biew of Dvnnztt. Towarq thx xnd of this chaptvr Rey introduces his'modest mentelism' whicv nncorporates the central featirds of a generxlised functionalism (intsntional states which are prompted by amd represent distal phenpmena) whule kseping somx of the features of our mzntal
the main target. Against this, evidence from passive spontaneous alteration, behavioural improvisatima are ethological (Evidence is drawn from the behaviour rats in mazes--stock examples usually raised support of RB.) Most of this material is well-known; but it is refreshing see it so well-argued and with useful diagrams. Alongside this data, evidence from grammar presented, that learning assumes innate capacities and processes which can't be admitted on the terms of the RB Chapter 5 develops 'pre-fnnctionalist' mentalist alternatives in response the failure of eliminativist 'Pre-functionalist' views include analytical behaviourism-and the calls 'introspectivism' 'irreferentialism'. former views which assume the meaning of mental terms and concepts 'is provided by the introspectible mental item to which it (p. 136). this are strange of and Searle; against the views of Wittgenstein and Kripke explanations, and rule following. 'Irreferentialism' is presented as view that'mental don't r~JOr but serve some other function' (p. 140). The views of Ryle, Smart, Harman, among others, are discussed here. Chapter 6 develops common themes endorsed by a variety accounts. The discussion ranges Turiug machines and coding of clearest of this and also Church's thesis, Ramsification, and multiple realizability (somewhat less clear). number of other issues are raised including levels of functional replacement machine parts, and ontology/ideology distinction. Chapter 7 with differences among functionalist approaches. of approaches functionalism, priori psycho-functionalism, input/output vs. anchored holistic vs. homuncular functionalism, teleo-functionalism, something Rey calls'superficiafism', which of Dennett. Toward the end of this chapter introduces his'modest mentalism' which incorporates the central of a generalised functionalism (intentional states which are prompted by and represent phenomena) while of the features of our mental
 the main target. Against this, eVidence froM lateNt aNd pAsSive LearNing, spontaneouS AlteRation, and behavioural imProviSaTIma aRE pResenTed from THe PSYchOlOgIcaL aND eTholoGicAl literAture. (EvideNce Is Drawn mainly fROm The behavioUr oF rats in mazes--StoCk examPlEs uSUally RaiSed in SupporT Of RB.) MoSt of this mAtERial is WEll-knowN; BUt It is Refreshing to see it SO wELl-argued and witH usefuL dIAgRAMs. ALonGside this dAtA, evidENce from TRaNSFOrmATional grammar Is presented, DEmoNstratInG thAT languAge leArNIng Assumes innaTe caPacities aNd procESses whiCH can't be AdmittEd oN thE terMS oF tHe Rb aCCouNT. CHapTEr 5 dEvelops 'pRe-FnNctioNaliST' MENtalIst AlteRnatiVes in response To tHe faILurE of elIminaTiviSt ApproAches. 'PRe-funCtIonalist' views inCludE analyticAl bEhAviOuRism-aND what tHe aUthOr calls 'IntrospECtiViSM' ANd 'Irreferentialism'. ThE fORMeR comprisE views WHiCh ASsume thaT tHe mEaniNG Of menTal tERmS and concEpts 'is PRoViDed by thE iNtrospEcTibLe mEntal ITem tO which It refers' (P. 136). IncoRPorated under thIS are the strangE BeDFElLOws oF LoCke and SearlE; agaINst tHem aRE tHe vIEws of wittgEnSTeIN and Kripke on internaL sTates, eXplanAtions, and rule Following. 'IRREFerentiaLism' IS pREsented as the viEw thaT'mental terMS don't r~JOR but sErve some Other lingUIStic funcTioN' (p. 140). THe vIewS OF RYle, Smart, Quine, hARman, AmOng otheRs, aRe discuSseD heRe. CHapTeR 6 develops Common thEmEs EnDoRseD by a vARiety of fUnCtiOnAliSt accOUnts. ThE discUssiOn RaNGes Over TurIUg MAChinEs AnD binAry CoDing (oNe of THe cLearest DiscussioNs oF This ArOuNd); and alSo Church's thesIs, ramsificatIoN, anD multiPLE realizaBility (somewhat less clear). a Number oF otHer isSues Are raised IncLuding LevELs of fuNctionAl expLaNatION, prosTHEtIc rEpLacement of MAChiNe parTs, And QUine's onTology/ideology distINctIon. Chapter 7 deaLs wIth tHE DiFfeREnCEs aMoNG fuNCTionalist approaChes. A numbeR oF SuCh approachES arE tReated: fOlk funcTionaLIsm, a priOri and psyCho-functiOnAlisM, INpuT/output vs. aNchored fUnctionalISm; holIStIc vs. hOmuNcular FuNctIonalIsm, telEO-fuNctioNalism, AnD sometHing REy Calls'supErficiafism', which he attriButes tO the vIew Of Dennett. towARd tHe end of thIs chApter Rey inTroDucEs his'ModESt menTaliSM' wHicH IncorPoraTEs the centRAl FeaTUReS of a generalISED fuNctioNalISm (inteNtioNal states which are PRompted by and rePresENT diStaL PhenOmEna) while keepinG soMe OF The featuReS of our mentaL
 the main target. Againstthis, evid encefro m l at entandpassive learni n g, s pontaneous alteration,  andbe h avio u ra l imp rovisat i ma a repr es ent ed fr om th e p sycholo gical andeth ol ogical liter a tu re. (Evide nce  is drawn ma inl y from  t heb ehavi our  of r ats in mazes- -stock ex am p les us u ally ra i s ed  insupport of RB.) M o st of this materi al iswe l l- k n own ; b ut it is r ef reshi n g to se e  i t s o w e ll-argued and  with usefu l  di agrams .Alo n gsidethisda t a,evidence fr om t ransforma tional grammar is pres ented,  de mon stra t in gtha tl ang u ag e l e arn ing assu me sinnat e ca p a c i ties  an d pr ocess es which can' t b e ad m itt ed on  theterm sof th e RB a ccoun t.  Chapter 5 deve lops  'pre-fnn cti on ali st ' men t alistalt ern ativesin resp o nse  t o t he  failure of elimin at i v is t approa ches.' Pr e- f unctiona li st'  vie w s  incl udea na lyticalbehavi o ur is m-and w ha t theau tho r c alls' intr ospect ivism' a nd 'i r referentialism ' . The formerc om p r is e  vie wswhich assum e th a t th e me a ni ngo f men tal t er m sa nd concepts 'is pro vi ded by  theintrospectibl e mental i t e m  to whic h it re f ers' (p. 136).  Inco rporated u n der this  arethe stra nge bedfe l l ows of L ock e a ndSea r l e;  against them a re t he  viewsofWittgen ste inand  Kr ip ke on int ernal st at es ,ex pla natio n s, and r ul e f ol low ing.' Irrefe renti alis m'  i s  pr esented as t he v ie wthat 'me nt al te rmsd on' t r~JOr  but serv e s o me o th er  lingui stic function '(p. 140).Th e v iews o f Ryle, Sm art, Quine, Harman, amo n g other s,are d iscu ssed here . C hapter  6d evelop s comm on th em ese n dorse d by  ava riety of f u n cti onali st  acc ounts.The discussion ran g esover Turiug m ach ines a nd  bi n ar y  co di n g ( o n e of the cleare st discuss io n sof this ar o und );  and al so Chur ch'st hesis,Ramsifica tion, and  m ulti p l e r ealizabili ty (some what less clear ) .A num ber  of ot he r i ssues  are r a ise d inc luding  l evelsof fu nc tional e xplanation, prostheticreplac ement  of  machinepar t s,and Quine 's o ntology/id eol ogy  dist inc t ion.Chap t er  7d ealswith the diffe r en ces a mo ng function a l i stappro ach e s. A n umbe r of such approac h es are treated : fo l k  fu nct i onal is m, a priori an d p sy c h o-functi on alism, inpu t/output  v s . anc horedfuncti onalism ; ho l isticvs.hom uncular f unc ti o nalism,  t el e o-func tion al ism, a nd som e thin g Rey calls'superf iciaf i s m', w h ich  he a tt ributes to t he view of  Dennett. T owardtheend o f thisch apterRey  i ntroducesh is'modest  ment alism'wh ichinc orpora test h e cen tral  f eat ures of a g en e ra li s edfunc tiona li sm ( intention a l states  wh i ch arepr omp t e d by a n dr e present di sta l phe n o mena) whil e  kee p in g  some  of th e feat ures of our  m ental
 the_main target._Against this, evidence from_latent and_passive_learning, spontaneous_alteration,_and behavioural improvisatima_are presented from_the psychological and ethological_literature. (Evidence is_drawn_mainly from the behaviour of rats in mazes--stock examples usually raised in support of_RB.)_Most of_this_material_is well-known; but it is_refreshing to see it so_well-argued and_with useful diagrams. Alongside this data, evidence from_transformational_grammar is presented,_demonstrating that language learning assumes innate capacities and processes_which can't be admitted on the_terms of the_RB_account._Chapter 5 develops 'pre-fnnctionalist'_mentalist alternatives in response to the_failure of eliminativist approaches. 'Pre-functionalist' views_include analytical behaviourism-and what the author calls_'introspectivism' and 'irreferentialism'. The former comprise_views which assume that the_meaning of_mental terms and concepts 'is_provided by the_introspectible mental_item to which_it refers' (p. 136). Incorporated under_this are the_strange bedfellows of Locke and Searle;_against_them are the_views_of_Wittgenstein and_Kripke on internal_states,_explanations, and_rule_following. 'Irreferentialism' is presented as the_view_that'mental terms don't r~JOr but serve some_other linguistic function' (p._140)._The views of Ryle,_Smart, Quine, Harman, among others,_are discussed here. Chapter 6 develops_common themes_endorsed by_a variety of functionalist accounts. The discussion ranges over Turiug machines_and binary coding (one of the_clearest discussions of this_around); and_also_Church's thesis, Ramsification,_and_multiple realizability_(somewhat less clear). A number of other_issues are_raised including levels of functional explanation,_prosthetic replacement of machine_parts,_and Quine's ontology/ideology distinction. Chapter 7_deals with the differences among functionalist_approaches. A number of such_approaches_are_treated: folk functionalism, a priori_and psycho-functionalism, input/output vs. anchored functionalism;_holistic vs. homuncular_functionalism, teleo-functionalism, and something Rey calls'superficiafism', which_he_attributes to the view of Dennett._Toward_the end of this chapter Rey_introduces_his'modest_mentalism' which incorporates the central_features of a generalised functionalism (intentional_states which are prompted by and represent distal phenomena)_while keeping some_of the features of our_mental