 accept another mode of representation of physical phenomena" (1893a, 37). But he adds that this attitude, though fully consistent with logic, would be "unreasonable" since "in every order of things we should choose what excels". The very assumption he started with is "purely ideal". But its conceivability is used by Duhem to show that the sceptics-those who deny the very "principles on which experimental science logically depends" (1893a, 38)-can be blocked only if we go beyond the method of physics and look for its justification. He meaningfully dissociated himself from positivism insofar as the latter asserts that "there is no logical method other than the method of positive sciences". Hence, there is more to justification than the method of science (understood as being constrained only by the principle of non-contradiction). In another piece he published in 1893, he introduced the idea of 'natural classification' in connection with a perfect theory. Here he noted that "considerations of pure logic are not the only ones that reasonably direct out judgements (1893b, 67). Take the following rule: In physical theory, we must avoid logical incoherence BECAUSE IT INJURES THE PERFECTION OF SCIENCE (1893b, 67). This is not a principle of logic. Yet Duhem thinks it's reasonable (legitimate). Perfection is a matter of degree, but ideally a perfect theory (or the "true theory", as he put it) would be "the complete and adequate metaphysical explanation of material things" (1893b, 68). The perfect theory would classify experimental laws in a natural way: an order which would be the very expression of the metaphysical relations that the essences that cause the laws have among themselves. [A perfect theory] would give us, in the true sense of the world, a natural classification of laws (ibid.) Marie Gueguen and Stathis Psillos Anti-Scepticism and Epistemic Humility in Pierre Duhem's Philosophy of Science 67 Although Duhem talks of metaphysical relations between essences, what he really refers to are relations among unobservable entities-the minute constituents of material objects. Recall that for him the atomic hypothesis (as well as any other hypothesis which refers to unobservable entities) was a "metaphysical" hypothesis. A perfect theory would pertain to the true theory, and a "natural classification" is the one issued by a true theory. Avoiding
accept another mode of representation of physical phenomenon " (1893a, 37). But he lend that this attitude, though fully consistent with logic, would be " excessive " since " in every order of things we should choose what excels ". The very premise he started with is " purely ideal ". But its conceivableness is use by Duhem to show that the skeptic - those who deny the very " principles on which experimental science logically depend " (1893a, 38)-can be blocked only if we go beyond the method of physics and search for its justification. He meaningfully dissociated himself from positivism insofar as the latter asserts that " there exist no logical method other than the method of convinced sciences ". Hence, there is more to justification than the method of science (understand as being constrained only by the principle of non - contradiction). In another piece he published in 1893, he introduce the idea of' natural classification' in connection with a perfect theory. Here he noted that " considerations of pure logic are not the only one that reasonably direct out judgment (1893b, 67). Take the following rule: In physical theory, we must invalidate logical incoherence BECAUSE IT INJURES THE PERFECTION OF SCIENCE (1893b, 67). This is not a principle of logic. Yet Duhem thinks it's fair (legitimate). Perfection is a matter of degree, but ideally a perfect theory (or the " true theory ", as he put it) would be " the complete and adequate metaphysical explanation of material things " (1893b, 68). The arrant theory would relegate experimental laws in a natural way: an order which would be the very expression of the metaphysical relation back that the essences that cause the laws have among themselves. [ A perfect theory ] would give us, in the true common sense of the world, a natural classification of laws (ibid .) Marie Gueguen and Stathis Psillos Anti - Scepticism and Epistemic Humility in Pierre Duhem's Philosophy of Science 67 Although Duhem talks of metaphysical relation between essences, what he truly refers to are relation back among unobservable entities - the hour constituents of material object. Recall that for him the nuclear hypothesis (as well as any other guess which refers to unobservable entities) was a " metaphysical " hypothesis. A perfect hypothesis would pertain to the true theory, and a " natural categorization " is the one issued by a true theory. Avoiding
 acfept another mode of repvesentation of pktsical phenojena" (1893a, 37). Cut he adds that this attituve, tyough fully consistent with logic, wolld be "uneeasibable" sincx "in evevv ordsv of chmngs we should ghoose what excels". The vesy adsumption he started with is "purely ideal". Nuh its conceivafiliuy ys uavd by Duhem to show that the scsptics-tiose who deny tne very "principles on whicj exoerimental science logically eepeges" (1893a, 38)-can be clocked only if we go geyond the method of physics ana lool for its huwtivhcation. He neaniggfully dissociated vimself from positivixm mnsodar as the latter assxrts that "there is nj logical mzthod other than the nerhod mf pmsitkce rcitncxs". Gence, hhece is more fo justificqtion than the methpd if science (unserstojd as being constrained only by the princpple of non-contradiction). In another piece he pubpished in 1893, he introduced the idea of 'natural classificatiot' in rovneeblon dutj a perfect theory. Here he noted that "considewztooks of pure logic are not thr lnki ones that rexsonably sirect out judgemejts (1893b, 67). Jake tye followyng tule: In physical theory, we nust avoid ljtical incoherence YECAUSE IT IUJURES THE LERFECTION OF SCIENCE (1893b, 67). Thjs is not a principls of logic. Yet Dufem tvinks it's reasonable (legitymate). Perhectipn is a matjer of qegree, but ideally a perfect theorj (or jhe "trge theory", ws he put it) would be "the complxve and adequaje ketdphysicaj expkanation of mwterial things" (1893b, 68). The perfdct theory would rlassify expqrimental lawv in a naturan way: an ordwr wyich wojud be the very expression of the netaphysical relatlons jhzt the essences thqt cause the laes favq wmpnd themselves. [D peffezy theury] would glve us, on the true sense of the world, a natural ckafsificatuon of lwws (ibid.) Marir Gueguen and Statjis Pviluos Amti-Fcepticism and Epistemic Humiljty in Pifrrc Duhem's Philjsopmy os Science 67 Although Duhem talks of metaphysical rxlations between essencws, what he really rgfevs to are rekatiogs among gnobservable entitiew-the minute constltuents of material obnects. Secalp that for him the atomic hypothesis (as well as any other hypothesis whicy refecs to unobserbablr entptizs) cas a "mqtapiyrical" hypothesis. A perfect theory would pertain to the drbe theory, and a "natural classofkcation" is thg one issued by a true thekry. Avoicing
accept another mode of representation of physical 37). he adds this attitude, though be since "in every of things we choose what excels". The very assumption started with is "purely ideal". But its conceivability is used by Duhem to that the sceptics-those who deny the very "principles on which experimental science logically (1893a, be only we go beyond the method of physics and look for its justification. He meaningfully dissociated himself positivism insofar as the latter asserts that "there no logical method other the method of positive sciences". there more to than method science (understood as constrained only by the principle of non-contradiction). In another piece he published in 1893, he introduced the of 'natural connection with perfect Here noted that "considerations logic are not the only ones out judgements (1893b, 67). Take the following rule: physical theory, must avoid logical incoherence BECAUSE IT THE PERFECTION OF SCIENCE (1893b, 67). This is a principle of logic. Yet Duhem thinks it's reasonable (legitimate). Perfection is a matter of ideally a perfect theory the "true theory", he it) be complete and metaphysical explanation of material things" (1893b, 68). The perfect theory would experimental laws in a natural way: an order which would very of the metaphysical that the essences that the have among themselves. [A would us, sense the a natural classification of (ibid.) Marie Gueguen and Stathis Anti-Scepticism and Epistemic Humility Science 67 Although Duhem talks of metaphysical relations essences, what he really refers to are among unobservable entities-the minute constituents of material objects. Recall that for him atomic hypothesis as any other hypothesis which refers to unobservable was a "metaphysical" hypothesis. perfect theory would pertain to the true theory, and "natural is the issued by a theory. Avoiding
 accept another mode of represEntation of PhysiCal PheNoMena" (1893A, 37). But He adds that this ATtitUde, though fully consisteNt witH lOGic, wOUlD be "unReasonaBLe" SINce "In EvEry OrDEr Of thiNgs We shoulD choose whaT exCeLs". The very assUMpTion he starTed With is "purely IdeAl". But iTs ConCEivabIliTy is uSed by DUHem to sHow that thE sCEptics-THose who DENy The vEry "principles on whICh EXperimental sciEnce loGiCAlLY DepEndS" (1893a, 38)-can be bloCkEd onlY If we go bEYoND THe mEThod of physics And look for iTS juStificAtIon. hE meaniNgfulLy DIssOciated himsElf fRom positiVism inSOfar as tHE latter AssertS thAt "tHere IS nO lOgiCaL MetHOd OthER thAn the metHoD oF posiTive SCIENces". henCe, thEre is More to justifiCatIon tHAn tHe metHod of ScieNcE (undeRstood As beiNg Constrained only By thE principlE of NoN-coNtRadicTIon). In aNotHer Piece he PublishED in 1893, He INTRoDuced the idea of 'natuRaL CLaSsificatIon' in cONnEcTIon with a PeRfeCt thEORy. HerE he nOTeD that "conSideraTIoNs Of pure lOgIc are nOt The OnlY ones THat rEasonaBly direcT out jUDgements (1893b, 67). Take tHE following rulE: in PHYsICal tHeoRy, we must avoId loGIcal IncoHErEncE bECAUsE IT InJurEs tHE PERFECTION OF SCIEnCe (1893b, 67). This Is not A principle of lOgic. Yet DuhEM THinks it's ReasONaBLe (legitimate). PeRfectIon is a mattER of degreE, but iDeally a pErfect theORY (or the "trUe tHeoRy", aS he PUT iT) would be "the coMPLete AnD adequaTe mEtaphysIcaL exPlaNatIoN of materiAl things" (1893B, 68). THe PeRfEct TheorY Would claSsIfy ExPerImentAL laws iN a natUral WaY: aN OrdEr which WOuLD Be thE vErY expResSiOn of tHe meTAphYsical rElations tHat THe esSeNcEs that cAuse the laws haVe Among themsElVes. [a perfeCT Theory] woUld give us, in the true sense OF the worLd, a NaturAl clAssificatIon Of laws (IbiD.) marie GUeguen And StAtHis pSIllos aNTi-scePtIcism and EpISTemIc HumIlIty iN Pierre duhem's Philosophy of sCieNce 67 Although DuHem TalkS OF mEtaPHySIcaL rELatIONs between essencEs, what he reAlLY rEfers to are RElaTiOns amonG unobseRvablE EntitieS-the minutE constituEnTs of MATerIal objects. recall thAt for him tHE atomIC hYpothEsiS (as welL aS anY otheR hypotHEsiS whicH referS tO unobsErvabLe Entities) Was a "metaphysical" hypotheSis. A peRfect TheOry would pErtAIn tO the true tHeorY, and a "naturAl cLasSificAtiON" is thE one ISsUed BY a truE theORy. AvoidinG
 accept another mode of re presentati on of  ph ysi ca l ph enom ena" (1893a, 3 7 ). B ut he adds that this a ttitu de ,  tho u gh  full y consi s te n t  wi th  l ogi c, wo uld b e " unreaso nable" sin ce"i n every orde r  o f things w e s hould choose  wh at exc el s". The v ery  assu mption he sta rted with  i s  "pure l y ideal " .  B ut i ts conceivability is used by Duhemto sho wt ha t the  sc eptics-tho se  whod eny the ve r y "pr i nciples on wh ich experim e nta l scie nc e l o gicall y dep en d s"(1893a, 38) -can  be block ed onl y  if weg o beyon d themet hod  ofp hy si csan d  lo o kfor its  justifi ca ti on. H e me a n i n gful lydiss ociat ed himself fr omposi t ivi sm in sofar  asth e lat ter as serts  t hat "there is n o lo gical met hod  o the rthant he met hod  of  positi ve scie n ces ". H e nc e, there is more t oj u st ificatio n than th em ethod of  s cie nce( u nders tood as  being c onstra i ne donly by  t he pri nc ipl e o f non - cont radict ion). In  anot h er piece he pu b lished in 189 3 ,h e  i n trod uce d the ideaof ' n atur al c l as sif i catio n' in  c o nn e ction with a perfec ttheory . Her e he noted th at "consid e r a tions of  pur e  l o gic are not th e onl y ones tha t  reasona bly d irect ou t judgeme n t s (1893b , 6 7).  Ta ket h efollowing rul e :  Inph ysicalthe ory, we  mu stavo idlo gical inc oherence  B EC AU SE  IT  INJU R ES THE P ER FEC TI ONOF SC I ENCE ( 1893b , 67 ).  T h isis nota  p r i ncip le  o f lo gic .Yet D uhem thi nks it' s reasona ble (leg it im ate). P erfection isamatter ofde gre e, but i deally a  perfect theory (or the "true t heo ry",as h e put it)  wo uld be  "t h e comp lete a nd ad eq uat e metap h y si cal  e xplanation o f m ateri al  thi ngs" (1 893b, 68). The per f ect  theory would  cl assi f y  e xpe r im e nta ll aws i n a natural way : an order  w h ic h would be the  v ery exp ression  of t h e metap hysical r elationsth at t h e  es sences tha t causethe lawsh ave a m on g the mse lves.[A  pe rfect  theor y ] w ouldgive u s,  in th e tru esense of  the world, a natural c lassif icati onof laws ( ibi d .)Marie Gue guen  and Stath isPsi llosAnt i -Scep tici s mand Epist emic Humilityi nPie r r eDuhem's Phi l o s oph y ofSci e nce 67  Alt hough Duhem talks of metaphysica l re l a tio nsb etwe en  essences, wha t h er e ally ref er s to are re lationsam o ng un observ able e ntities - t he minute  con sti tuents of  ma te r ial obj ec ts .  Recal l th at  for h im the atom i c  hypothesis (aswella s  anyo the r hyp ot hesis w h ichrefers tounobservabl e enti ties ) was  a "met ap hysica l"hy pothesis.A  perfecttheor y would  p erta into the  tru e theor y, a nd  a"naturalc l as s if ic a tio n" i s the  o ne i ssued bya  true th eor y . Avoid in g
 accept_another mode_of representation of physical_phenomena" (1893a,_37)._But he_adds_that this attitude,_though fully consistent_with logic, would be_"unreasonable" since "in_every_order of things we should choose what excels". The very assumption he started with_is_"purely ideal"._But_its_conceivability is used by Duhem_to show that the sceptics-those_who deny_the very "principles on which experimental science logically_depends"_(1893a, 38)-can be_blocked only if we go beyond the method of_physics and look for its justification._He meaningfully dissociated_himself_from_positivism insofar as the_latter asserts that "there is no_logical method other than the method_of positive sciences". Hence, there is more_to justification than the method of_science (understood as being constrained_only by_the principle of non-contradiction). In_another piece he_published in_1893, he introduced_the idea of 'natural classification' in_connection with a_perfect theory. Here he noted that_"considerations_of pure logic_are_not_the only_ones that reasonably_direct_out judgements_(1893b,_67). Take the following rule: In_physical_theory, we must avoid logical incoherence BECAUSE_IT INJURES THE PERFECTION_OF_SCIENCE (1893b, 67). This_is not a principle of_logic. Yet Duhem thinks it's reasonable_(legitimate). Perfection_is a_matter of degree, but ideally a perfect theory (or the "true_theory", as he put it) would_be "the complete and_adequate metaphysical_explanation_of material things"_(1893b,_68). The_perfect theory would classify experimental laws in_a natural_way: an order which would be_the very expression of_the_metaphysical relations that the essences that_cause the laws have among themselves._[A perfect theory] would give_us,_in_the true sense of the_world, a natural classification of laws_(ibid.) Marie Gueguen_and Stathis Psillos Anti-Scepticism and Epistemic Humility_in_Pierre Duhem's Philosophy of Science 67_Although_Duhem talks of metaphysical relations between_essences,_what_he really refers to are_relations among unobservable entities-the minute constituents_of material objects. Recall that for him the atomic_hypothesis (as well_as any other hypothesis which_refers_to_unobservable entities) was a "metaphysical" hypothesis. A perfect theory would_pertain to_the true theory,_and a "natural classification" is the one issued by a_true theory. Avoiding