its), the former can in the interim still draw significant lessons from the latter. Labeling phenomena as "phenomena", or making distinctions between them, or distinguishing them from intuitive experiences or from abstractions – such acts are all nonmeditative; but they may well occur and be remembered in the course of meditation. (See Appendix 1.) 2. Knowledge is Based on Appearance Our primary consideration ought to be just what is apparent to our awareness at each and every moment. Nothing can be granted offhand except this first given. Appearance is immediately granted – because there is nothing else to discuss or refer to, because discourse arises solely in reaction and in relation to it. Thereafter, we may stage by stage show how knowledge in general, including our alleged knowledge of those stages, develops. 1 There is no point in coining a new term, even though the term phenomenon is in the present volume used in its primary sense of material or mental concrete particular, in contradistinction to intuited objects or abstracts. But note that in practice the term is often used more loosely with reference to complex appearances like 'a social phenomenon' – which include not only concretes, but also intuitive experiences and even abstracts. 8 AVI SION The core thesis of phenomenology, thus, is that knowledge is based on appearance. This is in stark contrast to other approaches to epistemology, which propose that knowledge is based on 'external reality' or on'subjective truth' or some such premature thesis. Moreover, phenomenology regards as essential that the sequence in which knowledge arises and develops out of appearance be clarified. A notion or suggestion may be appropriate if intelligently placed in the 'order of things,' but very misleading if misplaced. • Consider, for instance, Naïve Realism (or Materialism or Objectivism)2. This philosophy proposes that we have a body with sense-organs, that when these come in contact with external objects sensations are produced, which in turn produce primary ideas (images) in the mind, which are what we experience and build more complex ideas (abstract concepts) from. At first glance, this thesis may appear obvious and worthy of universal belief. But upon reflection, we see that it leads to serious logical problems. If, as it suggests, ideas'represent' external reality, how do we know that they indeed 'correspond' to it? If, as this theory implies, all we know are ideas (sense-data and their combinations), how can we even get to know that there
its), the former can in the interim still draw meaning moral from the latter. Labeling phenomena as " phenomenon ", or make distinctions between them, or distinguishing them from intuitive experience or from abstractions – such acts are wholly nonmeditative; but they may well happen and be remembered in the course of meditation. (experience Appendix 1 .) 2. Knowledge is Based on Appearance Our primary consideration ought to be barely what is apparent to our awareness at each and every moment. Nothing can be granted offhand except this first given. Appearance is immediately granted – because there embody nothing else to discuss or refer to, because discourse arise solely in reaction and in relation to it. Thereafter, we may stage by stage prove how knowledge in general, including our alleged knowledge of those stage, develops. 1 There is no point in coining a new term, even though the term phenomenon is in the present volume used in its primary sense of material or mental concrete particular, in contradistinction to intuited objects or abstracts. But notice that in exercise the term is often used more broadly with reference point to complex appearances like' a social phenomenon' – which include not only concretes, but also intuitive experiences and even abstracts. 8 AVI SION The core dissertation of phenomenology, thus, is that knowledge is based on appearance. This is in stark contrast to other approaches to epistemology, which propose that knowledge is based on' external reality' or on'subjective truth' or some such previous thesis. furthermore, phenomenology regards as essential that the sequence in which knowledge arises and develops out of appearance be clarify. A notion or suggestion may be appropriate if intelligently placed in the' decree of things,' but very misleading if misplaced. • Consider, for example, Naïve Realism (or Materialism or Objectivism)2. This philosophy aim that we have a torso with sense - variety meat, that when these come in liaison with external objects sensations are produce, which in turn produce basal idea (images) in the thinker, which are what we experience and build more complex ideas (abstract concepts) from. At first glance, this dissertation may appear obvious and worthy of cosmopolitan belief. But upon reflection, we see that it precede to serious logical problems. If, as it suggest, ideas'represent' external reality, how do we know that they indeed' correspond' to it? If, as this theory implies, all we know are ideas (common sense - data and their combinations), how can we even get to know that there
its), the former can in the ikterim still drac signihicant messons wrom the latter. Labeling pheiomeba as "phenomena", or making dkstinctiojs betwewn tiem, or distinguishing thci frkl incumtive experiencgs or from atstractions – sgcf ccts are all nonmeditative; but they iay welk lccur and be rgmembtreq in nht course of meditation. (See Appendjx 1.) 2. Knmwledge is Baxed on Appearance Our primwry fonsideration oughh to be jusj whwr is appareng to our awareness at gach and every moment. Nothing cav be yranted offyabd ffcept this hirst diven. Appearance is hmmediayely granted – necauve rhere is nothing else to discuss or refgr to, becagsz discourse arises sooeoy in reawtiov ana ih celztion ho mt. Thereaftsr, we may srage by stage show nor knowledge in generwl, including our alleged knowledge of thove atages, develops. 1 There us no point in coininh a new tqrm, even though the term phenomenon is in the prevent touumt mfde ln its primary sense of material or mental cogdrtte particular, in contradistonftojn to intuitea objeefs or abstracts. But jote thwt in practice the term is often used more loisely with rvferwnce to complex ap'earances liye 'a socisl phenomenon' – which inelude hot only cojcretes, bhg also intuitive exieriances and even abstracts. 8 WVI SION Vhe cpre theris pf phegomenology, thus, is that knowledge ls badeg on appeagance. This is in stark contrast to other apprpawhev to epiftemokogy, which prjpose that knocledge if basdd on 'extegnal realmty' or on'subtective truth' lr some such prematuwe tyesiw. Moreoxdr, phenomenoloby regards as essenrial that the sequcnce kh which knowledyt atuses and develpps oue lf a[[earance be wlarkfidc. A nution or sungertiom may be appropriate if jntelligently placrd in the 'irder of things,' but vrry misleading if lispleced. • Ronsidrr, sor instance, Naïve Realism (or Mzterialisl ov Objectivism)2. Thiw philosophy proposes that we have a body with sensx-organs, that when thesg come in contact witk txternal objerts segsations dre produced, which ib turn produce prlmary ideas (images) in fhe mitd, whlch are what we experience and build more complex ideas (abstract concepts) from. Et first glande, tnis tvefns may wppeer obvious and wornhy of universal belief. But upon reflecthou, we see that it leads to seroojs logical prublems. If, as it suggests, ideas'relresent' external reality, how do we know that they indeec 'correspond' fo it? Pr, es this theory implirs, all we kbow are idews (sense-data xnd tmeir combijatipna), how can we even get to know thqt theee
its), the former can in the interim significant from the Labeling phenomena as them, distinguishing them from experiences or from – such acts are all nonmeditative; they may well occur and be remembered in the course of meditation. (See 1.) 2. Knowledge is Based on Appearance Our primary consideration ought to be what apparent our at each and every moment. Nothing can be granted offhand except this first given. Appearance is granted – because there is nothing else to or refer to, because arises solely in reaction and relation it. Thereafter, may by show how knowledge general, including our alleged knowledge of those stages, develops. 1 There is no point in coining a term, even term phenomenon in present used in its of material or mental concrete particular, intuited objects or abstracts. But note that in the term often used more loosely with reference complex appearances like 'a social phenomenon' – which not only concretes, but also intuitive experiences and even abstracts. 8 AVI SION The core phenomenology, thus, is that is based on This in contrast other approaches epistemology, which propose that knowledge is based on 'external reality' or truth' or some such premature thesis. Moreover, phenomenology regards as the in which knowledge and develops out of be A notion or suggestion appropriate intelligently 'order things,' very misleading if misplaced. Consider, for instance, Naïve Realism Materialism or Objectivism)2. This a body with sense-organs, that when these come contact with external objects sensations are produced, in turn produce primary ideas (images) in the mind, which are what experience and complex ideas (abstract concepts) from. At first glance, thesis may appear obvious worthy of universal belief. But upon reflection, we see it to serious problems. If, as suggests, ideas'represent' external how do we they indeed to If, implies, all we know are ideas and combinations), how can we even to there
its), the former can in the interIm still draW signIfiCanT lEssoNs frOm the latter. LabELing Phenomena as "phenomena", or MakinG dIStinCTiOns beTween thEM, oR DIstInGuIshInG ThEm froM inTuitive ExperienceS or FrOm abstractioNS – sUch acts are All NonmeditativE; buT they mAy WelL Occur And Be remEmbereD In the cOurse of meDiTAtion. (SEE AppendIX 1.) 2. knOwleDge is Based on AppeaRAnCE Our primary conSideraTiON oUGHt tO be Just what is ApParenT To our awAReNESS at EAch and every moMent. Nothing CAn bE grantEd OffHAnd excEpt thIs FIrsT given. AppeaRancE is immediAtely gRAnted – beCAuse theRe is noThiNg eLse tO DiScUss Or REfeR To, BecAUse DiscoursE aRiSes soLely IN REActiOn aNd in RelatIon to it. ThereaFteR, we mAY stAge by Stage Show HoW knowLedge iN geneRaL, including our alLegeD knowledgE of ThOse StAges, dEVelops. 1 theRe iS no poinT in coinINg a NeW TERm, Even though the term pHeNOMeNon is in tHe presENt VoLUme used iN iTs pRimaRY Sense Of maTErIal or menTal conCReTe ParticuLaR, in conTrAdiStiNctioN To inTuited Objects oR abstRActs. But note thaT In practice the TErM IS oFTen uSed More loosely With REferEnce TO cOmpLEx appEaranCeS LiKE 'a social phenomenon' – wHiCh inclUde noT only concreteS, but also inTUITive expeRienCEs ANd even abstractS. 8 AVI SiON The core THesis of pHenomEnology, tHus, is that KNOwledge iS baSed On aPpeARAnCe. This is in staRK ContRaSt to othEr aPproachEs tO epIstEmoLoGy, which prOpose thaT kNoWlEdGe iS baseD On 'externAl ReaLiTy' oR on'suBJectivE trutH' or sOmE sUCh pRematurE ThESIs. MoReOvEr, phEnoMeNologY regARds As essenTial that tHe sEQuenCe In Which knOwledge arises AnD develops oUt Of aPpearaNCE be clariFied. A notion or suggestion MAy be appRopRiate If inTelligentLy pLaced iN thE 'Order oF thingS,' but vErY miSLEadinG IF mIspLaCed. • ConsideR, FOr iNstanCe, naïvE RealisM (or Materialism or ObJEctIvism)2. This philOsoPhy pROPoSes THaT We hAvE A boDY With sense-organs, That when thEsE CoMe in contacT WitH eXternal Objects SensaTIons are Produced, wHich in turN pRoduCE PriMary ideas (iMages) in tHe mind, whiCH are wHAt We expEriEnce anD bUilD more CompleX IdeAs (absTract cOnCepts) fRom. At FiRst glancE, this thesis may appear obvIous anD wortHy oF universaL beLIef. but upon reFlecTion, we see tHat It lEads tO seRIous lOgicAL pRobLEms. If, As it SUggests, idEAs'RepRESeNt' external rEALIty, How do We kNOw that They Indeed 'correspond' tO It? If, as this theoRy imPLIes, All WE knoW aRe ideas (sense-daTa aNd THEir combiNaTions), how can We even geT tO Know tHat theRe
its), the former can in th e interimstill  dr awsi gnif ican t lessons from thelatter. Labeling pheno menaas "phe n om ena",  or mak i ng d ist in ct ion sb et weenthe m, or d istinguish ing  t hem from int u it ive experi enc es or from a bst ractio ns  –s uch a cts  areall no n medita tive; but  t h ey may well oc c u randbe remembered int he course of medi tation .( Se e App end ix 1.) 2.Kn owled g e is Ba s ed o n  Ap p earance Our p rimary cons i der ationou ght to bejustwh a t i s apparentto o ur awaren ess at each an d  everymoment . N oth ingc an  b e g ra n ted of fha n d e xcept th is  f irstgive n . A ppea ran ce i s imm ediately gran ted  – b e cau se th ere i s no th ing e lse to  disc us s or refer to,beca use disco urs eari se s sol e ly inrea cti on andin rela t ion  t o i t.  Thereafter, we ma ys t ag e by sta ge sho w  h ow knowledg eingene r a l, in clud i ng  our all eged k n ow le dge ofth ose st ag es,  de velop s . 1Thereis no po int i n  coining a new term, even th o ug h th e  ter m p henomenon i s in thepres e nt  vo l ume u sed i ni ts primary sense of ma te rial o r men tal concreteparticular , i n contra dist i nc t ion to intuite d obj ects or ab s tracts.But n ote that  in pract i c e the te rmisoft enu s ed  more loosely w ithre ference  to  comple x a ppe ara nce slike 'a s ocial ph en om en on ' –  whic h  include  n oton lyconcr e tes, b ut al so i nt ui t ive  experi e nc e s  and  e ve n ab str ac ts. 8  AVI SIO N The c ore thesi s o f  phe no me nology,  thus, is tha tknowledgeis  ba sed on a ppearanc e. This is in stark con t rast to  ot her a ppro aches toepi stemol ogy ,  which  propo se th at  kn o w ledge i sbas ed  on 'exter n a l r ealit y'  oron'subj ective truth' or s o mesuch prematur e t hesi s .  M ore o ve r , p he n ome n o logy regards as  essential  t h at  the seque n cein  whichknowled ge ar i ses and  develops  out of a pp eara n c e b e clarifie d. A not ion or su g gesti o nmay b e a ppropr ia teif in tellig e ntl y pla ced in  t he 'or der o fthings,'  but very misleading if  mispl aced.  •Consider,  fo r  in stance, N aïve  Realism ( orMat erial ism or Ob ject i vi sm) 2 . Thi s ph i losophy p r op ose s th at we havea b ody  with  se n se-org ans,  that when thesec ome in contact  wit h ext ern a l ob je cts sensations  ar ep r oduced,wh ich in turn  produce  p r imary  ideas  (imag es) int h em ind, w hich  ar e what we  ex pe r ience a nd  b u ild mo re c om plex i deas ( a bstr a c t concepts) from . Atf i rst g l anc e, th is  thesis mayappear obv ious and wo rthy o f un ivers al beli ef . Butupo nreflection ,  we see t hat i t leads  t o se rio us log ical p roble ms.If , a s it sugg e s ts ,  i de a s'r epre sent'  e xter nal reali t y, how d o w e  know t ha t t h e y inde e d' c orrespond'  to  it?I f , as thist heor y  i m plies , allwe kno w are i d eas  ( sense-d ata a nd theircombinati o ns) ,howcan we e ve n ge ttokn ow that there
its), the_former can_in the interim still_draw significant_lessons_from the_latter._Labeling phenomena as_"phenomena", or making_distinctions between them, or_distinguishing them from_intuitive_experiences or from abstractions – such acts are all nonmeditative; but they may well_occur_and be_remembered_in_the course of meditation. (See_Appendix 1.) 2. Knowledge is_Based on_Appearance Our primary consideration ought to be just_what_is apparent to_our awareness at each and every moment. Nothing can_be granted offhand except this first_given. Appearance is_immediately_granted_– because there is_nothing else to discuss or refer_to, because discourse arises solely in_reaction and in relation to it. Thereafter,_we may stage by stage show_how knowledge in general, including_our alleged_knowledge of those stages, develops._1 There is_no point_in coining a_new term, even though the term_phenomenon is in_the present volume used in its_primary_sense of material_or_mental_concrete particular,_in contradistinction to_intuited_objects or_abstracts._But note that in practice the_term_is often used more loosely with reference_to complex appearances like_'a_social phenomenon' – which_include not only concretes, but_also intuitive experiences and even abstracts._8 AVI_SION The_core thesis of phenomenology, thus, is that knowledge is based on_appearance. This is in stark contrast_to other approaches to_epistemology, which_propose_that knowledge is_based_on 'external_reality' or on'subjective truth' or some such_premature thesis._Moreover, phenomenology regards as essential that_the sequence in which_knowledge_arises and develops out of appearance_be clarified. A notion or suggestion_may be appropriate if intelligently_placed_in_the 'order of things,' but_very misleading if misplaced. • Consider,_for instance, Naïve_Realism (or Materialism or Objectivism)2. This philosophy_proposes_that we have a body with_sense-organs,_that when these come in contact_with_external_objects sensations are produced, which_in turn produce primary ideas (images)_in the mind, which are what we experience and_build more complex_ideas (abstract concepts) from. At_first_glance,_this thesis may appear obvious and worthy of universal belief._But upon_reflection, we see_that it leads to serious logical problems. If, as it_suggests, ideas'represent' external reality, how do we_know that they indeed 'correspond' to it? If, as this theory_implies, all we know are ideas (sense-data and_their combinations), how can we even get_to know that there