 filter of our own belief system, but such criticism nonetheless provides a different sort of datum to run through the filter. As for the distortion worry, external criticism can provide clues about what our belief system might miss or misconstrue, and in prompting us to nuance our belief systems, it can rein in truth-insensitive biases and the false-positive effects of truth-sensitive ones. 2. Engaging in disagreement can expand your evidential basis. It delivers, first, the evidence that someone disagrees with you, which, depending on certain epistemically relevant characteristics of your interlocutor (e.g., whether he is an epistemic peer, epistemically or personally admirable, and so forthix), might prompt you to re-think some aspects of your belief system. Second, disagreement provides you with information about your interlocutor's evidence, which will likely differ from yours in two respects: it will arise from different types of event than you have experienced (since she will likely travel in different social and cultural circles than you), and her psychological and social influences will prime her to experience some of the same types of event differently than you do. Additional evidence of these sorts can help mitigate the circularity worry, for such evidence can be harder to accommodate within your belief system than evidence more typical to your community members, and hence can challenge facile self-evaluations. It can mitigate the distortion worry by offering correctives to incomplete (and thus potentially misleading) evidence of your own. 3. Engaging in disagreement can provide epistemic alternatives. In helping you understand your 7 interlocutor's belief system and patterns of reasoning, it may create new conceptual or epistemic possibilities. This can mitigate the circularity worry, since alternatives can present other means of epistemic evaluation. And it can mitigate the distortion worry, since new epistemic alternatives can complement or improve on aspects of your own belief system or help you understand, by direct contrast, why your belief system is epistemically preferable. 4. Whereas the first three benefits address the circularity and distortion worries, the fourth helps mitigate the exacerbation problem. This problem (to recall) says that reasoning about religion strengthens the negative effects of our biases, thus exacerbating the other two worries. Disagreement can help here by supplying counterinstances (Saul, 2012, 259). A counterinstance is a person or thing that does not correspond with what a bias would lead one to expect; exposure to counterinstances can help weaken bias and can improve one's ability to engage in nuanced and differentiated
filter of our own belief system, but such criticism nonetheless provides a unlike kind of datum to prevail through the filter. As for the distortion concern, external criticism can provide clue about what our belief system might neglect or misconstrue, and in prompt us to nuance our belief systems, it can rein in truth - insensitive diagonal and the false - positive effect of accuracy - sensitive ones. 2. hire in disagreement can expand your evidential footing. It delivers, first, the evidence that someone disagrees with you, which, count on certain epistemically relevant characteristics of your interlocutor (for example, whether he is an epistemic peer, epistemically or personally admirable, and so forthix), might motivate you to re - think some aspects of your belief system. Second, disagreement provides you with data about your interlocutor's evidence, which will likely differ from yours in two respects: it will arise from different types of consequence than you have experience (since she will likely travel in different social and cultural circles than you), and her psychological and social influences will prime her to experience some of the same types of event differently than you do. extra evidence of these kind can help extenuate the circularity concern, for such evidence can be harder to accommodate within your belief system than evidence more distinctive to your community member, and hence can challenge facile self - evaluations. It can extenuate the distortion worry by offering correctives to incomplete (and thus potentially misleading) evidence of your own. 3. hire in disagreement can provide epistemic alternatives. In helping you understand your 7 interlocutor's belief arrangement and patterns of reasoning, it may create new conceptual or epistemic possibilities. This can mitigate the circularity concern, since alternatives can present other means of epistemic evaluation. And it can mitigate the distortion worry, since new epistemic alternatives can complement or better on aspects of your own impression system or help you understand, by direct contrast, why your impression system is epistemically preferable. 4. Whereas the first three benefits address the circularity and aberration worries, the fourth helps mitigate the exacerbation problem. This problem (to remember) says that argue about religion strengthens the negative effects of our biases, thus worsen the other two worries. discrepancy can help here by supplying counterinstances (Saul, 2012, 259). A counterinstance is a person or thing that does not correspond with what a bias would lead one to expect; photograph to counterinstances can help weaken bias and can improve one's ability to engage in nuanced and differentiated
 fipter of our own belief snstem, but such ctiricism nonetgeless pfovides a different sort of vatun to eun through the filter. As for tje distoetioi worry, external criticism can irovibe clues about wmat our belhef system migvt mnss or misconstrue, and in prompting ts to niajce our belief sysuemf, it bak rein in truth-insensitive biasea and tie false-positivr effects of truth-sensitivf onfs. 2. Engaging in didagreement xan qzpand your exidential basis. It deljvers, first, the evidence that sumeonz disagrees wuth iou, which, de'endind on certain epistemhcally televant charagterivtixs of your interlocutmr (e.g., whether he if an episdejic peer, epistemixaoly ot pervonauoy xdmjrebls, and do horthix), miggt prompt yiu to re-think some ss[vvts of your gelief srstem. Second, disagreement provides you fitg information about youe interlocutor's evidejce, which will likely differ from yours in two respects: it will xriwe weol different types of event than you have expewjemcvd (since she will likely trafep og different sucial chd cultural circles hhan yoo), and yer psychjlogocal and social influences qill prime hvr ti experience some lf the same typgs of rvent differently than vou do. Additional evidence uf these sorts cxn mel[ mitigaud the circularity worry, foc suck evidenze csn be rarder to wccommodate within your heliey sysdem than egidence more typical to your community memberx, dnd hence ccn chaklenge facile self-evaluatious. It cau mitieate the dpstortion worry by osfering correwjives to incokplete (agd tyus potentixuly misleading) evidence of your oqn. 3. Engaging in dixagtesment can provibt ekiwtemic alternayivds. Yn hxlpind you understdnd houf 7 intdrlocutor's nelkef xystem and patterns mf rsasoning, it may crrabe new cobceptual or epistemic possibilities. Thid can mivigate thg circularity worry, since alterhatives cwn iresent other meaks os epistemie evaluation. And it can mitigate the disvortion worry, since new epistemic alternatnvts can complekent jr improva on aspects of your own belief systek or help you understznd, by direft contrast, why your belief system is epistemically preferable. 4. Whereas tye first three bensfitx addgesf the cyrcuperity and distortpon worries, the fourth helps mitmgate the axccerbation problem. This problrm (to recall) sais that reasoning about remigion syrengthens the negative effects of our biases, thus exaccrbating rhe ofher two wurries. Disagreemeny can kelp hwre by wupppying counterknsyakces (Saul, 2012, 259). A rouuterinstance is a person or thing that eofs not corresponv with what w bias would lead one to expsct; sdposute to counterimstances can hrlp weaken bias and ban improve one's qgility to enbage in nuanced and differentidted
filter of our own belief system, but nonetheless a different of datum to for distortion worry, external can provide clues what our belief system might miss misconstrue, and in prompting us to nuance our belief systems, it can rein truth-insensitive biases and the false-positive effects of truth-sensitive ones. 2. Engaging in disagreement expand evidential It first, the evidence that someone disagrees with you, which, depending on certain epistemically relevant characteristics of interlocutor (e.g., whether he is an epistemic peer, or personally admirable, and forthix), might prompt you to some of your system. disagreement you with information your interlocutor's evidence, which will likely differ from yours in two respects: it will arise from different of event have experienced she likely in different social circles than you), and her psychological will prime her to experience some of the types of differently than you do. Additional evidence these sorts can help mitigate the circularity worry, such evidence can be harder to accommodate within your belief system than evidence more typical community members, and hence challenge facile self-evaluations. can the worry offering correctives incomplete (and thus potentially misleading) evidence of your own. 3. Engaging disagreement can provide epistemic alternatives. In helping you understand your belief and patterns of it may create new or possibilities. This can mitigate worry, alternatives means epistemic And it can mitigate distortion worry, since new epistemic can complement or improve belief system or help you understand, by direct why your belief system is epistemically preferable. Whereas the first three benefits address the circularity and distortion worries, the helps mitigate problem. This problem (to recall) says that reasoning religion strengthens the negative of our biases, thus exacerbating the other two worries. can here by counterinstances (Saul, 2012, A counterinstance is person or thing not correspond what bias to expect; exposure to counterinstances can weaken and can improve one's ability engage and differentiated
 filter of our own belief systeM, but such crIticiSm nOneThElesS proVides a differenT Sort Of datum to run through the FilteR. AS For tHE dIstorTion worRY, eXTErnAl CrItiCiSM cAn proVidE clues aBout what ouR beLiEf system mighT MiSs or misconStrUe, and in prompTinG us to nUaNce OUr belIef SysteMs, it caN Rein in Truth-inseNsITive biASes and tHE FaLse-pOsitive effects of tRUtH-Sensitive ones. 2. ENgaginG iN DiSAGreEmeNt can expanD yOur evIDential BAsIS. iT deLIvers, first, the Evidence thaT SomEone diSaGreES with yOu, whiCh, DEpeNding on certAin ePistemicaLly relEVant chaRActerisTics of YouR inTerlOCuToR (e.g., WhETheR He Is aN EpiStemic peEr, EpIstemIcalLY OR PersOnaLly aDmiraBle, and so forthIx), mIght PRomPt you To re-tHink SoMe aspEcts of Your bElIef system. Second, DisaGreement pRovIdEs yOu With iNFormatIon AboUt your iNterlocUTor'S eVIDEnCe, which will likely dIfFER fRom yours In two rESpEcTS: it will aRiSe fRom dIFFerenT typES oF event thAn you hAVe ExPeriencEd (Since sHe WilL liKely tRAvel In diffErent socIal anD Cultural circleS Than you), and her PSyCHOlOGicaL anD social inflUencES wilL priME hEr tO ExperIence SoME oF The same types of event DiFferenTly thAn you do. AdditiOnal evidenCE OF these soRts cAN hELp mitigate the cIrculArity worry, FOr such evIdencE can be haRder to accOMModate wiThiN yoUr bEliEF SyStem than evideNCE morE tYpical tO yoUr commuNitY meMbeRs, aNd Hence can cHallenge FaCiLe SeLf-eValuaTIons. It caN mItiGaTe tHe disTOrtion Worry By ofFeRiNG coRrectivES tO INcomPlEtE (and ThuS pOtentIallY MisLeading) Evidence oF yoUR own. 3. enGaGing in dIsagreement caN pRovide episTeMic AlternATIves. In heLping you understand your 7 iNTerlocuTor'S beliEf syStem and paTteRns of rEasONing, it May creAte neW cOncEPTual oR EPiSteMiC possibiliTIEs. THis caN mItigAte the cIrcularity worry, sinCE alTernatives can PreSent OTHeR meANs OF epIsTEmiC EValuation. And it cAn mitigate ThE DiStortion woRRy, sInCe new epIstemic AlterNAtives cAn complemEnt or imprOvE on aSPEctS of your own Belief syStem or helP You unDErStand, By dIrect cOnTraSt, why Your beLIef SysteM is epiStEmicalLy preFeRable. 4. WheReas the first three benefiTs addrEss thE ciRcularity And DIstOrtion worRies, The fourth hElpS miTigatE thE ExaceRbatIOn ProBLem. ThIs prOBlem (to recALl) SayS THaT reasoning aBOUT reLigioN stREngtheNs thE negative effects oF Our biases, thus eXaceRBAtiNg tHE othEr Two worries. DisaGreEmENT can help HeRe by supplyiNg counteRiNStancEs (Saul, 2012, 259). a countErinstaNCE iS A persoN or tHinG that does Not CoRRespond WiTh WHat a biAs woUlD lead oNe to exPEct; eXPOsure to counterinStancES Can heLP weAken bIaS and can IMproVe one's abilIty to engage In nuanCed aNd difFerentiAtEd
 filter of our own beliefsystem, bu t suc h c rit ic ismnone theless provid e s adifferent sort of datu m toru n  thr o ug h the  filter .  A s for  t he  di st o rt ion w orr y, exte rnal criti cis mcan providec lu es about w hat  our beliefsys tem mi gh t m i ss or  mi scons true,a nd inprompting  u s  to nu a nce our b el iefsystems, it can r e in in truth-insen sitive  b i as e s  an d t he false-p os itive effects of t r uth - sensitive one s. 2. Engag i ngin dis ag ree m ent ca n exp an d  yo ur evidenti al b asis. Itdelive r s, firs t , the e videnc e t hat  som e on edis ag r ees wi thy ou,  which,de pe nding  onc e r t ainepi stem icall y relevant ch ara cter i sti cs of  your  int er locut or (e. g., w he ther he is an e pist emic peer , e pi ste mi cally or per son all y admir able, a n d s of o r th ix), might promptyo u to  re-thin k some as pe c ts of yo ur  be lief s ystem . Se c on d, disag reemen t  p ro vides y ou  within for mat ion a b outyour i nterlocu tor's evidence, whic h  will likelyd if f e rf romyou rs in two r espe c ts:it w i ll  ar i se fr om di ff e re n t types of event th an  you h ave e xperienced (s ince she w i l l  likelytrav e li n different so cialand cultur a l circle s tha n you),and her p s y chologic aland  so cia l in fluences will p rime  h er to e xpe riencesom e o f t hesa me typesof event  d if fe re ntl y tha n  you do.  A ddi ti ona l evi d ence o f the se s or ts can  help m i ti g a te t he  c ircu lar it y wor ry,f orsuch ev idence ca n b e  har de rto acco mmodate withi nyour belie fsys tem th a n  evidenc e more typical to yourc ommunit y m ember s, a nd hencecan  chall eng e  facil e self -eval ua tio n s . Itc a nmit ig ate the di s t ort ion w or ry b y offer ing correctives to inc omplete (andthu s po t e nt ial l ym isl ea d ing ) evidence of you r own. 3.En g ag ing in dis a gre em ent can  provid e epi s temic a lternativ es. In he lp ingy o u u nderstandyour 7 i nterlocut o r's b e li ef sy ste m andpa tte rns o f reas o nin g, it  may c re ate ne w con ce ptual or  epistemic possibilitie s. Thi s can  mi tigate th e c i rcu larity wo rry,  since alt ern ati ves c anp resen t ot h er  me a ns of  epi s temic eva l ua tio n .  A nd it can m i t i gat e the  di s tortio n wo rry, since new ep i stemic alterna tive s can  co m plem en t or improve o n a sp e c ts of yo ur  own belief  systemor helpyou un dersta nd, byd i re c t cont rast , w hy your b eli ef systemis  e p istemi call yprefer able.4 . Wh e r eas the first th ree b e n efits add ressth e circu l arit y and dist ortion worr ies, t he f ourth  helpsmi tigate  th eexacerbati o n problem . Thi s probl em  (to  re call)says t hat r easo ni ngabout rel i g io n  s tr e ngt hens  thene gati ve effect s  of ourbia s es, thu sexa c e rbatin g  t h e  other two  wo rries . Disagreeme n t ca n  h e lp he re bysupply ing cou n ter in stances  (S a u l, 2012,259). A c o unt er inst ance isapers on  or  t hing that doesnot corr espond w i t h what  ab iasw ould l ea d one to exp ect;ex p osure t o cou nterins t anc escan  hel p w eake n  bias and can improve on e'sabili t y t o eng age i nnuanceda nd d ifferent i ated
 filter_of our_own belief system, but_such criticism_nonetheless_provides a_different_sort of datum_to run through_the filter. As for_the distortion worry,_external_criticism can provide clues about what our belief system might miss or misconstrue, and_in_prompting us_to_nuance_our belief systems, it can_rein in truth-insensitive biases and_the false-positive_effects of truth-sensitive ones. 2. Engaging in disagreement_can_expand your evidential_basis. It delivers, first, the evidence that someone disagrees_with you, which, depending on certain_epistemically relevant characteristics_of_your_interlocutor (e.g., whether he_is an epistemic peer, epistemically or_personally admirable, and so forthix), might_prompt you to re-think some aspects of_your belief system. Second, disagreement provides_you with information about your_interlocutor's evidence,_which will likely differ from_yours in two_respects: it_will arise from_different types of event than you_have experienced (since_she will likely travel in different_social_and cultural circles_than_you),_and her_psychological and social_influences_will prime_her_to experience some of the same_types_of event differently than you do. Additional_evidence of these sorts_can_help mitigate the circularity_worry, for such evidence can_be harder to accommodate within your_belief system_than evidence_more typical to your community members, and hence can challenge facile_self-evaluations. It can mitigate the distortion_worry by offering correctives_to incomplete_(and_thus potentially misleading)_evidence_of your_own. 3. Engaging in disagreement can provide_epistemic alternatives._In helping you understand your 7_interlocutor's belief system and_patterns_of reasoning, it may create new_conceptual or epistemic possibilities. This can_mitigate the circularity worry, since_alternatives_can_present other means of epistemic_evaluation. And it can mitigate the_distortion worry, since_new epistemic alternatives can complement or improve_on_aspects of your own belief system_or_help you understand, by direct contrast,_why_your_belief system is epistemically preferable._4. Whereas the first three benefits_address the circularity and distortion worries, the fourth helps_mitigate the exacerbation_problem. This problem (to recall)_says_that_reasoning about religion strengthens the negative effects of our biases,_thus exacerbating_the other two_worries. Disagreement can help here by supplying counterinstances (Saul, 2012,_259). A counterinstance is a person or_thing that does not correspond with what a bias would lead_one to expect; exposure to counterinstances can help_weaken bias and can improve one's ability_to engage in nuanced_and_differentiated