? 95 differentiating the way English physicists conceive of physical theory from the French and German view. However, this theoretical articulation does not appear in Duhem's work until the later period of his intellectual development, as we do not find aspects of this in his early writing in what will serve as the basis for the chapter that makes up the first part of La théorie physique – a chapter he devotes to abstract theory and mechanical models. Before delving into an examination of such transformation in Duhem's thought, it is appropriate to take a moment to consider the historical context that gives rise to and explains some of its most prominent features. To a certain extent, it is here that we can locate a turn from Duhem the physicist to Duhem the methodologist or philosopher of physics – or, to put it in contemporary terms, to a physicist's explicit formulation of his scientific philosophy.3 We can wonder, however, whether we are dealing with changes in the particular intellectual orientation of a specific physicist or with a mode of thought common to a transitional period in the establishment of a new field of knowledge. In order to answer this question, let us turn to the distinction Holton appropriates from Nietzsche to reestablish the debate about public image of science during the second half of the twentieth century. The New Apollonians and Dionysians Following the dominant standpoint of our current scientific framework – reaffirmed by Kuhn's contributions – today, most members of the scientific community ignore the epistemological questions that emerge at the heart of scientific practice; and when they do address them, it is only as a pastime not unlike stamp collecting or heraldry. In the new division of intellectual labor, which brought about a reconfiguration of knowledge in the twentieth century, the ones in charge of understanding and defending scientific practice are professional philosophers of science like the Logical Positivists, Karl Popper and his predecessors, and the current naturalized philosophers. Holton calls these New Apollonians.4 On the other hand, we find the critics of science, who question its reductionism and its complex relations with power and the industry. Holton calls these New Dionysians or Neodionysians. Both Neodionysians and New Apollonians enjoy a degree of recognition among broad sectors of society. They also exert some pressure on the scientific community, although the latter pays little attention to their claims and demands. Holton's essay itself is a rare exception, and perhaps he owes his reputation as an outsider
? 95 differentiating the way English physicists conceive of physical theory from the French and German opinion. However, this theoretical joint does not appear in Duhem's work until the belated menstruation of his intellectual development, as we do not discover aspects of this in his early writing in what will serve as the footing for the chapter that make up the first share of La théorie physique – a chapter he devotes to abstract hypothesis and mechanical models. Before delving into an examination of such transformation in Duhem's thought, it is appropriate to take a moment to consider the historic context that gives rise to and explains some of its about prominent features. To a sealed extent, it is here that we can locate a bend from Duhem the physicist to Duhem the methodologist or philosopher of physics – or, to put it in contemporary terms, to a physicist's explicit conceptualization of his scientific philosophy.3 We can wonder, however, whether we are dealing with changes in the particular intellectual orientation of a specific physicist or with a mode of opinion common to a transitional period in the establishment of a new field of knowledge. In order to answer this question, let us change state to the distinction Holton appropriates from Nietzsche to restore the argument about public image of science during the second half of the twentieth century. The New Apollonians and Dionysians follow the dominant standpoint of our current scientific framework – reaffirmed by Kuhn's contribution – today, most members of the scientific community ignore the epistemological question that emerge at the heart of scientific practice; and when they do address them, it is merely as a pastime not unlike stamp collection or heraldry. In the newfangled division of intellectual labor, which brought about a reconfiguration of cognition in the twentieth century, the ones in charge of understanding and defending scientific practice are professional philosophers of science like the Logical Positivists, Karl Popper and his predecessors, and the current naturalize philosophers. Holton call these New Apollonians.4 On the early hand, we find the critics of science, who interrogate its reductionism and its complex relations with exponent and the industry. Holton calls these New Dionysians or Neodionysians. Both Neodionysians and New Apollonians delight a degree of realization among broad sectors of society. They besides exert some pressure on the scientific community, although the latter pays small attention to their claims and demands. Holton's essay itself is a rare exception, and possibly he owes his reputation as an outsider
? 95 dlfferentiating the way Ekglish physicists concemve of lhysical theory from the French and Jermqn vitc. However, this theordtical arniculatiob dots not appear in Vhhem's work unfll thz oater period on his intelnectual develo[mdnc, as we do not find aspects of this yn his ragly writing in whau wyll avrye as the basis for the chapter fhat manes up the fitst part of La théorie physlque – a chapter he devltes to absjdace theory and oechanical models. Befote delving into an examination ow suck transformqtuon hn Duhem's tiought, it is approigiate tm take s moment to coksidec thw historical context vhat gives rise to agd explaits some of its most peomingnt faatufws. Go z rerfain edteit, it is hede that we xan locate a turn ftoi Duhem the phgsicise eo Duhem the methodologist or philosophtr of physics – or, to put it un contemporary terms, to a phyficist's explicit formulation of his scientific phhloso'hh.3 Wt gwv wlnder, however, whether we are dealing with chagfex pn the particular intellectusl otyentation of x specnrid physicist or witj a modg of tyought coimon to a transitional period ib the establpshmwnt of a new field of knowledye. In prder to answer this questiou, let hs turn to hhe distihztion Holton appfopgiatas from Nietzsche to reestwblish thx debcte aboug punlic iiage of sclence during the second jalf lf the twentleth century. The New Apollonians and Dionysiams Fonlowing che dokinant standpjint of our cutrent scizntifiz framewori – reafhirmed by Kurn's contributhlns – today, mmst membqrs if tye scievgific communitu ignore nht epistemooogical questions bhat gmsrge at the heaxu od scientific prsctkce; ajd wran they do agdrers gnem, ig is only aw a psstime not unlike stdmp dollecting or herakdvy. In the new divysion of inteklectual labor, whifh brmugit aboit w reconfiguration of knowledge in the taenbieth century, the ones in chaxge of understanding and defending scienvific practice are profwssional philosophets pf science kike ehe Logicdl Positivists, Karl Popper and his prtdecessors, and the currsnt nadurallzed philosophers. Holton calls these New Apollonians.4 On the other hand, we find vhq critics or scoence, wko auestijn ivs reductionism anc its complex relations with poxer and tha nndustry. Holton calls these Nrw Dionysians ot Neodionysians. Both Neodiknysians and New Apollonians enjoy a debree of recognition amonn broad swctora of socievy. They also exert spme przssure on the scicntific communkty, apthough tje lettzr pays little attention to their claimw wnd demands. Holtmn's essay ibstlf is z rare exception, and psrhald he uwes his repuyation as an oitsider
? 95 differentiating the way English physicists physical from the and German view. not in Duhem's work the later period his intellectual development, as we do find aspects of this in his early writing in what will serve as basis for the chapter that makes up the first part of La théorie – chapter devotes abstract theory and mechanical models. Before delving into an examination of such transformation in Duhem's thought, is appropriate to take a moment to consider historical context that gives to and explains some of most features. To certain it here that we locate a turn from Duhem the physicist to Duhem the methodologist or philosopher of physics – or, put it terms, to physicist's formulation his scientific philosophy.3 wonder, however, whether we are dealing the particular intellectual orientation of a specific physicist with a of thought common to a transitional in the establishment of a new field of In order to answer this question, let us turn to the distinction Holton appropriates from reestablish the debate about image of science the half the century. The Apollonians and Dionysians Following the dominant standpoint of our current scientific – reaffirmed by Kuhn's contributions – today, most members of community the epistemological questions emerge at the heart scientific and when they do it only not stamp or heraldry. In the division of intellectual labor, which about a reconfiguration of the ones in charge of understanding and defending practice are professional philosophers of science like Logical Positivists, Karl Popper and his predecessors, and the current naturalized philosophers. calls these On the other hand, we find the critics science, who question its and its complex relations with power and the industry. calls New Dionysians Neodionysians. Both Neodionysians New Apollonians enjoy degree of recognition sectors of They exert the scientific community, although the latter little to their claims and demands. essay a rare exception, and perhaps he owes his reputation as an outsider
? 95 differentiating the way EnglIsh physiciSts coNceIve Of PhysIcal Theory from the FREnch And German view. However, thIs theOrETicaL ArTiculAtion doES nOT AppEaR iN DuHeM'S wOrk unTil The lateR period of hIs iNtEllectual devELoPment, as we dO noT find aspects Of tHis in hIs EarLY writIng In whaT will sERve as tHe basis foR tHE chaptER that maKES uP the First part of La théoRIe PHysique – a chapteR he devOtES tO ABstRacT theory and MeChaniCAl modelS. beFORE deLVing into an exaMination of sUCh tRansfoRmAtiON in DuhEm's thOuGHt, iT is appropriAte tO take a momEnt to cONsider tHE historIcal coNteXt tHat gIVeS rIse To ANd eXPlAinS SomE of its moSt PrOmineNt feATUREs. To A ceRtaiN exteNt, it is here thaT we Can lOCatE a turN from duheM tHe phySicist To DuhEm The methodologisT or pHilosopheR of PhYsiCs – Or, to pUT it in cOntEmpOrary teRms, to a pHYsiCiST'S ExPlicit formulation oF hIS ScIentific PhilosOPhY.3 WE Can wondeR, hOweVer, wHETher wE are DEaLing with ChangeS In ThE particUlAr inteLlEctUal OrienTAtioN of a spEcific phYsiciST or with a mode of THought common tO A tRANsITionAl pEriod in the eStabLIshmEnt oF A nEw fIEld of KnowlEdGE. IN Order to answer this quEsTion, leT us tuRn to the distinCtion HoltoN APPropriatEs frOM NIEtzsche to reestAblisH the debate ABout publIc imaGe of scieNce during THE second hAlf Of tHe tWenTIEtH century. The NeW aPollOnIans and dioNysians folLowIng The DoMinant staNdpoint oF oUr CuRrEnt ScienTIfic framEwOrk – ReAffIrmed BY Kuhn's ContrIbutIoNs – TOdaY, most meMBeRS Of thE sCiEntiFic CoMmuniTy igNOre The episTemologicAl qUEstiOnS tHat emerGe at the heart oF sCientific pRaCtiCe; and wHEN they do aDdress them, it is only as a paSTime not UnlIke stAmp cOllecting Or hEraldrY. In THe new dIvisioN of inTeLleCTUal laBOR, wHicH bRought abouT A RecOnfigUrAtioN of knowLedge in the twentietH CenTury, the ones in ChaRge oF UNdErsTAnDIng AnD DefENDing scientific pRactice are PrOFeSsional phiLOsoPhErs of scIence liKe the lOgical POsitivistS, Karl PoppEr And hIS PreDecessors, aNd the curRent naturALized PHiLosopHerS. HoltoN cAllS thesE New ApOLloNians.4 on the oThEr hand, We finD tHe criticS of science, who question itS reducTioniSm aNd its compLex RElaTions with PoweR and the indUstRy. HOlton CalLS thesE New dIoNysIAns or neodIOnysians. BOTh neoDIOnYsians and NeW aPOllOnianS enJOy a degRee oF recognition among BRoad sectors of sOcieTY. theY alSO exeRt Some pressure on The ScIENtific coMmUnity, althouGh the latTeR Pays lIttle aTtentiOn to theIR ClAIms and DemaNds. holton's esSay ItSElf is a rArE eXCeptioN, and PeRhaps hE owes hIS repUTAtion as an outsideR
? 95 differentiating the w ay English  phys ici sts  c once iveof physical th e oryfrom the French and Ge rmanvi e w. H o we ver,this th e or e t ica lar tic ul a ti on do esnot app ear in Duh em' swork until t h elater peri odof his intel lec tual d ev elo p ment,  as  we d o notf ind as pects ofth i s in h i s early w ri ting  in what will ser v ea s the basis fo r thech a pt e r  th atmakes up t he  firs t  part o f  L a t héo r ie physique –  a chapterh e d evotes  t o a b stract  theo ry and  mechanical  mod els. Befo re del v ing int o  an exa minati onofsuch tr an sfo rm a tio n  i n D u hem 's thoug ht ,it is  app r o p r iate  to  tak e a m oment to cons ide r th e  hi stori cal c onte xt  that  gives  rise  t o and explainssome  of its m ost  p rom in ent f e atures . T o a  certai n exten t , i ti s he re that we can loc at e aturn fro m Duhe m  t he physicis ttoDuhe m the m etho d ol ogist or  philo s op he r of ph ys ics –or , t o p ut it in c ontemp orary te rms,t o a physicist' s  explicit for m ul a t io n  ofhis  scientific  phi l osop hy.3 We  ca n  wond er, h ow e ve r , whether we are de al ing wi th ch anges in theparticular i n tellectu al o r ie n tation of a sp ecifi c physicis t  or with  a mo de of th ought com m o n to a t ran sit ion alp e ri od in the est a b lish me nt of a  ne w field  of  kn owl edg e.  In order  to answ er  t hi sque stion ,  let ustu rnto  th e dis t inctio n Hol tonap pr o pri ates fr o mN i etzs ch eto r ees ta blish  the deb ate abo ut public  im a ge o fsc ience d uring the sec on d half ofth e t wentie t h  century . The New Apollonians a n d Diony sia ns Fo llow ing the d omi nant s tan d pointof our  curr en t s c i entif i c  f ram ew ork – reaf f i rme d byKu hn's  contri butions – today, m o stmembers of th e s cien t i fi c c o mm u nit yi gno r e  the epistemolo gical ques ti o ns  that emer g e a tthe hea rt of s cient i fic pra ctice; an d when th ey  doa d dre ss them, i t is onl y as a pa s timen ot  unli kestampco lle cting  or he r ald ry. I n thene w divi sionof  intelle ctual labor, which brou ght ab out a  re configura tio n  of  knowledg e in  the twent iet h c entur y,t he on es i n  c har g e ofunde r standinga nd  de f e nd ing scienti f i c  pr actic e a r e prof essi onal philosophers of science lik e th e Log ica l  Pos it ivists, Karl P opp er a nd his p re decessors,and thecu r rentnatura lizedphiloso p h er s . Holt on c all s these N ewAp o llonian s. 4O n theothe rhand,we fin d  the c ritics of scienc e, wh o quest i onits r ed uctioni s m an d its comp lex relatio ns wit h po wer a nd thein dustry . H ol ton callst hese NewDiony sians o rNeod ion ysians . Bo t h  Neod iony si ans  and NewA p ol l on ia n s e njoy  a de gr ee o f recogni t ion amon g b r oad sec to rso f  socie t y. T hey also e xer t som e pressure o n  the sc i entif ic com munity , altho u ghth e latte r p a y s littleattention toth eirclaims a nd  dem an ds.  H olton's essay i tself is  a raree x ceptio n,a nd p e rhapshe  owes his re putat io n  as ano u tsi der
? 95_differentiating the_way English physicists conceive_of physical_theory_from the_French_and German view._However, this theoretical_articulation does not appear_in Duhem's work_until_the later period of his intellectual development, as we do not find aspects of_this_in his_early_writing_in what will serve as_the basis for the chapter_that makes_up the first part of La théorie physique_–_a chapter he_devotes to abstract theory and mechanical models. Before delving_into an examination of such transformation_in Duhem's thought,_it_is_appropriate to take a_moment to consider the historical context_that gives rise to and explains_some of its most prominent features. To_a certain extent, it is here_that we can locate a_turn from_Duhem the physicist to Duhem_the methodologist or_philosopher of_physics – or,_to put it in contemporary terms,_to a physicist's_explicit formulation of his scientific philosophy.3_We_can wonder, however,_whether_we_are dealing_with changes in_the_particular intellectual_orientation_of a specific physicist or with_a_mode of thought common to a transitional_period in the establishment_of_a new field of_knowledge. In order to answer_this question, let us turn to_the distinction_Holton appropriates_from Nietzsche to reestablish the debate about public image of science_during the second half of the_twentieth century. The New_Apollonians and_Dionysians_Following the dominant_standpoint_of our_current scientific framework – reaffirmed by Kuhn's_contributions –_today, most members of the scientific_community ignore the epistemological_questions_that emerge at the heart of_scientific practice; and when they do_address them, it is only_as_a_pastime not unlike stamp collecting_or heraldry. In the new division_of intellectual labor,_which brought about a reconfiguration of knowledge_in_the twentieth century, the ones in_charge_of understanding and defending scientific practice_are_professional_philosophers of science like the_Logical Positivists, Karl Popper and his_predecessors, and the current naturalized philosophers. Holton calls these_New Apollonians.4 On_the other hand, we find_the_critics_of science, who question its reductionism and its complex relations_with power_and the industry._Holton calls these New Dionysians or Neodionysians. Both Neodionysians and_New Apollonians enjoy a degree of recognition_among broad sectors of society. They also exert some pressure on_the scientific community, although the latter pays little_attention to their claims and demands. Holton's_essay itself is a_rare_exception, and perhaps he owes his reputation_as_an_outsider