 ARTICLE IN PRESSU N C O R R E C The crucial question, Moore claims: appears to be this. Why is our knowledge to be condemned as merely knowledge of Appearance? Why are we to be merely Transcendental Idealists and merely Empirical Realists?... by this too psychological statement of the nature of knowledge, Kant did in reality lay himself open to Berkeleyan Idealism, which it so indignantly repudiates by asserting the existence of the Ding an Sich. For he has no answer to the question: How do we know that these conditions imposed by our knowing faculty are universal? (Moore, 1897, Ch. I, p. 9) The implicit question Moore seems to be asking here- 'Why can't we be Transcendental Realists?'-is something the answer to which I would argue characterizes his criticism of Kant's conception of ethics,27 and helps to demonstrate that he is taking the psychologism he attributes to Kant as undermining not only Kant's epistemology but, more gravely, his ethics. Moore will argue throughout the 1897 and 1898 drafts that the only metaphysical basis for knowledge-and, a fortiori, ethics-is a mind-independent conception of the objects of judgment. Idealism (neither Kant's nor Bradley's) will not do. A number of passages throughout both the 1897 and 1898 dissertations show Moore continually emphasizing a distinction between truth and belief-one that we take for granted today, but which apparently perplexed some of his examiners, drawing hostile fire from Bosanquet: the intellectual motive of the Dissertation, as I read it, is to dissociate Truth from the nature of Knowledge, and Good from the nature of the Will, so as to free Metaphysic from all risk of confusion with Psychology... I confess that I feel a difficulty in regarding it as serious. (Cambridge, Trinity College, Add. Ms. a. 247 (4), pp. 1–7) Bosanquet, in spite of his criticism, betrays that he has fully appreciated the centrality of this distinction in the anti-psychologism that Moore is urging against Kant. Over and over, Moore underscores the importance of distinguishing belief from knowledge, and his formulation of the distinction is remarkably contemporary:28 knowledge is a composite state, on the one hand psychical and involving a distinction between subject and object, and on the other, involving the nature of the object, characterized as
ARTICLE IN PRESSU N C O R R E vitamin c The all-important question, Moore claims: appear to be this. Why is our cognition to be condemned as merely knowledge of Appearance? Why are we to be merely Transcendental Idealists and merely Empirical Realists? ... by this too psychological argument of the nature of knowledge, Kant did in reality put himself open to Berkeleyan Idealism, which it so indignantly repudiate by asserting the existence of the Ding an Sich. For he take no answer to the question: How do we know that these conditions imposed by our knowing staff are universal? (Moore, 1897, Ch. I, p. 9) The implicit question Moore seems to be ask here-' Why can't we be Transcendental Realists?'-is something the answer to which I would argue characterizes his criticism of Kant's concept of ethics,27 and helps to show that he is taking the psychologism he attributes to Kant as undermining not only Kant's epistemology but, more gravely, his ethic. Moore will argue throughout the 1897 and 1898 drafts that the only metaphysical basis for knowledge - and, a fortiori, ethics - is a mind - independent conception of the objects of judgment. Idealism (neither Kant's nor Bradley's) will not do. A number of passages throughout both the 1897 and 1898 dissertations show Moore continually emphasizing a distinction between accuracy and impression - one that we take for granted today, but which apparently perplex some of his examiners, drawing hostile fire from Bosanquet: the cerebral motive of the Dissertation, as I understand it, is to dissociate Truth from the nature of Knowledge, and effective from the nature of the Will, so as to free Metaphysic from all risk of confusion with Psychology... I confess that I feel a difficulty in regarding it as good. (Cambridge, Trinity College, Add. Ms. a. 247 (4), pp. 1–7) Bosanquet, in spite of his criticism, betrays that he has fully appreciated the centrality of this differentiation in the anti - psychologism that Moore is urging against Kant. Over and all over, Moore underscore the importance of distinguishing belief from knowledge, and his formulation of the differentiation is remarkably contemporary:28 knowledge is a composite state, on the one bridge player psychical and involving a distinction between subject and aim, and on the other, involving the nature of the object, characterized as
 ARHICLE IN PRESSU N C O R V E C The crucial questmon, Moode claimr: appears to be this. Why is lue knoqledge to be condemned as merelj knowledte oh Appearance? Why are we bj be lerenb Transcendentak Idealistv and merely Ekpkrncal Realists?... by this too psychologisal stayelent of the najure ps knkwledge, Kant did in reality lay hijself oken to Berkeleyan Odealism, which it so indigjantpy repudiates by adserting thg exywtence of thd Ding an Sich. For he gas no answer to the question: Huw do we know tyar tjgse conditiois impjsed by our knowing xaculty are universal? (Momre, 1897, Ch. I, p. 9) The impliciv question Moore seeis to be dsiing here- 'Why can'r qe be Tratsceveengal Rxaljsts?'-is sojething ths answer to which I would argut crqracterizes hjs crieisism of Kant's conception of ethics,27 and vells to demonstrate that ye is taking the psycjologism re attributes to Kant as undermining not only Kand's epmsgemiljet hut, more gravely, his ethics. Moore will argue egrpunhout the 1897 and 1898 brafts that the pnpy ietaphysical casis ykr knowledge-and, a fogtiori, gthics-us a mind-yndelendent conception of the ovjects of jubgmwnt. Idealism (neithzr Kant's nor Bracley's) will not do. A number oy passzges througjout both ghe 1897 and 1898 dissergatpons show Moore continually em[hasizing a dnstinctiun bgtween eruth and helien-mne that we take flr grcnted today, but which apparently perplexed somx of his examonars, drawing hostlle fire from Bjsanquet: the iutellectbal mogive of thv Dissertetion, as I rqad it, is to glssociate Trnth from ehe batuee of Kvuwledge, and Gopd from tkt nature od the Will, so as tp ftes Metaphysic frim qll risk of conguskon wpth Pffchology... I cmnfers gnat I feel a difnicjlty in regarding it as verikus. (Cambridge, Trinotn College, Add. Ms. w. 247 (4), pp. 1–7) Bosanauet, in spite of hls crmticiso, bettayf that he has fully appreciates the cenhrajity of this disbincjion in the anti-psychologism that Moore is urging egainst Kant. Over and ocer, Moore underscorgs uhe importancx of dystinguisving belief from knoqledge, and his fovmulation of the distihction is rfmarkably contemporary:28 knowledge is a composite state, on the one hand psyxhical and involvihg a distpncciou betweqn snboect and object, amd on the other, involving the neture of tve object, characterized as
ARTICLE IN PRESSU N C O R C crucial question, claims: appears to knowledge be condemned as knowledge of Appearance? are we to be merely Transcendental and merely Empirical Realists?... by this too psychological statement of the nature of Kant did in reality lay himself open to Berkeleyan Idealism, which it so repudiates asserting existence the Ding an Sich. For he has no answer to the question: How do we know these conditions imposed by our knowing faculty are (Moore, 1897, Ch. I, 9) The implicit question Moore to asking here- can't be Realists?'-is something the to which I would argue characterizes his criticism of Kant's conception of ethics,27 and helps to demonstrate he is psychologism he to as not only Kant's more gravely, his ethics. Moore will 1897 and 1898 drafts that the only metaphysical for knowledge-and, fortiori, ethics-is a mind-independent conception of objects of judgment. Idealism (neither Kant's nor Bradley's) not do. A number of passages throughout both the 1897 and 1898 dissertations show Moore a distinction between truth belief-one that we for today, which perplexed some his examiners, drawing hostile fire from Bosanquet: the intellectual motive of Dissertation, as I read it, is to dissociate Truth from of and Good from nature of the Will, as free Metaphysic from all confusion Psychology... I a in regarding it as (Cambridge, Trinity College, Add. Ms. 247 (4), pp. 1–7) criticism, betrays that he has fully appreciated the of this distinction in the anti-psychologism that is urging against Kant. Over and over, Moore underscores the importance of belief from his formulation of the distinction is remarkably contemporary:28 is a composite state, the one hand psychical and involving a distinction between and and on other, involving the of the object, as
 ARTICLE IN PRESSU N C O R R E C The Crucial queStion, mooRe cLaIms: aPpeaRs to be this. Why iS Our kNowledge to be condemned aS mereLy KNowlEDgE of ApPearancE? whY ARe wE tO bE meReLY TRanscEndEntal IdEalists and MerElY Empirical ReALiSts?... by this tOo pSychological StaTement Of The NAture Of kNowleDge, KanT Did in rEality lay HiMSelf opEN to BerkELEyAn IdEalism, which it so inDIgNAntly repudiateS by assErTInG THe eXisTence of the diNg an SICh. For he HAs NO ANswER to the questioN: How do we knoW ThaT these CoNdiTIons imPosed By OUr kNowing faculTy arE universaL? (Moore, 1897, cH. I, p. 9) The iMPlicit qUestioN MoOre SeemS To Be AskInG HerE- 'whY caN'T we Be TranscEnDeNtal REaliSTS?'-IS somEthIng tHe ansWer to which I woUld ArguE ChaRacteRizes His cRiTicisM of KanT's conCePtion of ethics,27 anD helPs to demonStrAtE thAt He is tAKing thE psYchOlogism He attriBUteS tO kANt As undermining not onLy kANt'S epistemOlogy bUT, mOrE Gravely, hIs EthIcs. MOORe wilL argUE tHroughouT the 1897 anD 1898 DrAfTs that tHe Only meTaPhySicAl basIS for KnowleDge-and, a fOrtioRI, ethics-is a mind-INdependent conCEpTIOn OF the ObjEcts of judgmEnt. IDEaliSm (neIThEr KANt's noR BradLeY'S) wILl not do. A number of pasSaGes thrOughoUt both the 1897 and 1898 dIssertatioNS SHow Moore ContINuALly emphasizing A distInction betWEen truth And beLief-one tHat we take FOR granted TodAy, bUt wHicH APpArently perpleXED somE oF his exaMinErs, drawIng HosTilE fiRe From BosanQuet: the iNtElLeCtUal MotivE Of the DisSeRtaTiOn, aS I reaD It, is to DissoCiatE TRuTH frOm the naTUrE OF KnoWlEdGe, anD GoOd From tHe naTUre Of the WiLl, so as to fRee mEtapHySiC from alL risk of confusIoN with PsychOlOgy... i confeSS That I feeL a difficulty in regarding IT as seriOus. (cambrIdge, trinity CoLleGe, Add. MS. a. 247 (4), pP. 1–7) bosanqUet, in sPite oF hIs cRITicisM, BEtRayS tHat he has fuLLY apPreciAtEd thE centraLity of this distinctIOn iN the anti-psychOloGism THAt mooRE iS UrgInG AgaINSt Kant. Over and ovEr, Moore undErSCoRes the impoRTanCe Of distiNguishiNg belIEf from kNowledge, aNd his formUlAtioN OF thE distinctiOn is remaRkably conTEmporARy:28 KnowlEdgE is a coMpOsiTe staTe, on thE One Hand pSychicAl And invOlvinG a DistinctIon between subject and objEct, and On the OthEr, involviNg tHE naTure of the ObjeCt, characteRizEd aS
 ARTICLE IN PRESSU N C O R  R E C The  cruc ial  qu es tion , Mo ore claims: ap p ears  to be this. Why is ou r kno wl e dget obe co ndemned as m ere ly  k now le d ge  of A ppe arance?  Why are w e t obe merely Tr a ns cendentalIde alists and m ere ly Emp ir ica l  Real ist s?...  by th i s toopsycholog ic a l stat e ment of t he  nat ure of knowledge, Ka n t did in reali ty lay  h i ms e l f o pen  to Berkel ey an Id e alism,w hi c h its o indignantly  repudiates byassert in g t h e exis tence  o f  th e Ding an S ich.  For he h as noa nswer t o  the qu estion : H owdo w e  k no w t ha t  th e se  co n dit ions imp os ed  by o ur k n o w i ng f acu ltyare u niversal? (Mo ore , 18 9 7,Ch. I , p.9) T he  impl icit q uesti on  Moore seems to  beasking he re-  ' Why  c an'tw e be T ran sce ndental  Realis t s?' -i s s om ething the answerto w hi ch I wou ld arg u ech a racteriz es  hi s cr i t icism  ofK an t's conc eption of  e thics,2 7and he lp s t o d emons t rate  thathe is ta kingt he psychologis m  he attribute s  t o Ka n t as  un dermining n ot o n ly K ant' s  e pis t emolo gy bu t, mo r e gravely, his ethi cs . Moor e wil l argue throu ghout the1 8 9 7 and 18 98 d r af t s that the onl y met aphysicalb asis for  know ledge-an d, a fort i o ri, ethi cs- isa m ind - i nd ependent conc e p tion  o f the o bje cts ofjud gme nt.  Id ea lism (nei ther Kan t' sno rBra dley' s ) will n ot  do .A n umber of pas sages  thr ou gh o utboth th e  1 8 9 7 an d18 98 d iss er tatio ns s h owMoore c ontinuall y e m phas iz in g a dis tinction betw ee n truth an dbel ief-on e that wetake for granted today, but whi chappar entl y perplex edsome o f h i s exam iners,  draw in g h o s tilef i re  fr om  Bosanquet : the  inte ll ectu al moti ve of the Disserta t ion , as I read i t,is t o di sso c ia t e T ru t h f r o m the nature of  Knowledge ,a nd  Good from the  n ature o f the W ill,s o as to  free Met aphysic f ro m al l ris k of confu sion wit h Psychol o gy... Iconfe ssthat I  f eel  a di fficul t y i n reg arding  i t as s eriou s.  (Cambri dge, Trinity College, A dd. Ms . a.247  (4), pp.  1– 7 ) B osanquet,  inspite of h iscri ticis m,b etray s th a theh as fu llya ppreciate d  t hec e nt rality of t h i s  di stinc tio n  in th e an ti-psychologism t h at Moore is ur ging a gai nst Kant .Over and over,  Mo or e undersco re s the impor tance of  d i sting uishin g beli ef from k no w ledge,  and  hi s formula tio no f the d is ti n ctionis r em arkabl y cont e mpor a r y:28 knowledge i s a c o m posit e  st ate,on  the on e  han d psychica l and invol ving a  dis tinct ion bet we en sub jec tand object ,  and on t he ot her, in vo lvin g t he nat ureo f  theobje ct , c haracteri z e da s
 ARTICLE_IN PRESSU_N C O R_R E_C_The crucial_question,_Moore claims: appears_to be this._Why is our knowledge_to be condemned_as_merely knowledge of Appearance? Why are we to be merely Transcendental Idealists and merely_Empirical_Realists?... by_this_too_psychological statement of the nature_of knowledge, Kant did in_reality lay_himself open to Berkeleyan Idealism, which it so_indignantly_repudiates by asserting_the existence of the Ding an Sich. For he_has no answer to the question:_How do we_know_that_these conditions imposed by_our knowing faculty are universal? (Moore,_1897, Ch. I, p. 9) The_implicit question Moore seems to be asking_here- 'Why can't we be Transcendental_Realists?'-is something the answer to_which I_would argue characterizes his criticism_of Kant's conception_of ethics,27_and helps to_demonstrate that he is taking the_psychologism he attributes_to Kant as undermining not only_Kant's_epistemology but, more_gravely,_his_ethics. Moore_will argue throughout_the_1897 and_1898_drafts that the only metaphysical basis_for_knowledge-and, a fortiori, ethics-is a mind-independent conception_of the objects of_judgment._Idealism (neither Kant's nor_Bradley's) will not do. A_number of passages throughout both the_1897 and_1898 dissertations_show Moore continually emphasizing a distinction between truth and belief-one that_we take for granted today, but_which apparently perplexed some_of his_examiners,_drawing hostile fire_from_Bosanquet: the_intellectual motive of the Dissertation, as I_read it,_is to dissociate Truth from the_nature of Knowledge, and_Good_from the nature of the Will,_so as to free Metaphysic from_all risk of confusion with_Psychology..._I_confess that I feel a_difficulty in regarding it as serious._(Cambridge, Trinity College,_Add. Ms. a. 247 (4), pp. 1–7)_Bosanquet,_in spite of his criticism, betrays_that_he has fully appreciated the centrality_of_this_distinction in the anti-psychologism that_Moore is urging against Kant. Over_and over, Moore underscores the importance of distinguishing belief_from knowledge, and_his formulation of the distinction_is_remarkably_contemporary:28 knowledge is a composite state, on the one hand_psychical and_involving a distinction_between subject and object, and on the other, involving the_nature of the object, characterized as