 D is. The belief-set-based view says that D is the belief set: (6) Belief-set domain D = BelS And we can read von Fintel as saying that S prefers the p worlds in D to the ¬p worlds in D just if all of the best worlds in D are p worlds, as ranked by S's preferences. Or, more formally: (7) Best-worlds preference within a domain S prefers the p worlds in D to ¬p worlds in D iff ∀w ∈ bestS(D): p(w) = 1. Together, (5), (6), and (7) entail von Fintel's semantics. Von Fintel's semantics must be rejected, and so one of these three views must be rejected. Certainly one could reject (5) and instead take a different approach to 'want'. Some have done so.12 We would like to know if the (C)FWA problem can be solved-and so the theoretical fruits of the belief-set-based approach enjoyed- while holding on to (5), and indeed we believe that it can be, as we'll argue in section 5. So: we must reject either either the Belief-set domain (i.e. (6)) or the Bestworlds preference within a domain (i.e. (7)). Not necessarily (7). While its adequacy is debated, rejecting it is not a solution to the problem of (C)FWAs. If we were to replace it with something else, like a Heimian notion of preference within a domain (see section 6), we'd be playing a game of whack-a-mole: the (C)FWA problem would pop up with its replacement. Out with (6), then-the domain for (C)FWAs is not the belief set. So what is it? In the next section we review and argue against Rubinstein's answer to this question; in sections 4–5 we develop our own. 12For example, the Content Specification version of the so-called Relational Analysis-an influential semantics in the philosophy literature (Fara, 2013)-quantifies over the agent's desires (rather than over some domain of worlds). Similarly, Condoravdi and Lauer (2016) quantifies over the agent's preferences. 5 3 Against Rubinstein's domain Rubinstein (2017) proposes a variant of Heim's (1992) semantics for want ascriptions, amended so as
D is. The belief - set - based opinion say that D is the belief set: (6) Belief - determine domain D = BelS And we can take von Fintel as saying that S prefers the phosphorus world in D to the ¬p worlds in D barely if all of the best worlds in D are phosphorus worlds, as ranked by S's preference. Or, more formally: (7) Best - worlds predilection within a domain S prefers the p world in D to ¬p worlds in D iff ∀w ∈ bestS(D ): p(w) = 1. Together, (5), (6), and (7) entail von Fintel's semantics. Von Fintel's semantics must be resist, and so one of these three position must be rejected. Certainly one could reject (5) and instead take a unlike approach to' want'. Some have done so.12 We would like to know if the (C)FWA problem can be clear - and so the theoretical fruits of the belief - set - based approach enjoyed- while holding on to (5), and indeed we believe that it can be, as we'll argue in section 5. So: we must refuse either either the Belief - set knowledge domain (i.e. (6) ) or the Bestworlds preference within a domain (i.e. (7) ). Not necessarily (7). While its adequacy is debate, rejecting it is not a solution to the problem of (C)FWAs. If we were to replace it with something else, like a Heimian notion of predilection within a domain (see section 6), we'd be playing a game of whack - a - mole: the (C)FWA problem would pop up with its replacement. Out with (6), then - the domain for (C)FWAs is not the impression set. indeed what is it? In the future section we review and argue against Rubinstein's answer to this question; in sections 4–5 we modernize our own. 12For example, the Content Specification version of the so - call Relational Analysis - an influential semantics in the philosophy literature (Fara, 2013)-quantifies over the agent's desires (rather than over some world of worlds). Similarly, Condoravdi and Lauer (2016) quantifies over the agent's preference. 5 3 Against Rubinstein's domain Rubinstein (2017) propose a variant of Heim's (1992) semantics for want attribution, amended indeed as
 D ls. The belief-set-based vitw says that D is the benief sst: (6) Belidf-set domain D = BelS And we ran eead con Fintel as saying tfat S prevers the p wields in D vk the ¬p worlda in B oust if all of jhe best wornds in D are p wurpds, as ranked by S's preferences. Or, iore fotmwlly: (7) Best-worlqs pgeserehbe within a domain S prefers ths p wornds in D to ¬p worlds in D iff ∀w ∈ bestS(D): p(w) = 1. Together, (5), (6), and (7) fntail von Dintqo's semantics. Von Fintel's semantics must be rejected, and so one of thesz three vieqs mudj be rejectev. Certwinly one comkd rejact (5) anc instead take a viffwrent approach to 'wanv'. Some have done so.12 Re would niie to know if the (C)DWA ptoblek cav be somvxd-ahd so hhe theoreticzl fruits od the belief-set-basec wilroach enjoysd- whije holding on to (5), and indeed we believe tvat it can be, as we'll arguw in section 5. So: we most reject either either the Belief-set domain (i.e. (6)) or the Bevtwormas krcnerevxe within a domain (i.e. (7)). Not necessarily (7). While iea sdvquacy is debated, rejecting ot ix not a solutiun to cge problem of (C)FWAs. Lf we wgre to replace yt woth something else, like a Hwimian notiou od preference withiu a domain (sze secjion 6), ee'd be playing a game oy whaci-a-mole: the (F)FWA probmdm would pop up ditm ids replacement. Out with (6), tren-the donain for (C)FDAs os not the believ set. So what is it? In tje nert sewtion we rfview and argue against Rubinstxmn's answer to tvis questiou; in scctions 4–5 we devqlop our own. 12Fpr exam'le, thd Content Apecifiration versijn of the so-cdpled Relatioial Analyfis-ab indluentixu semantics in the philosophy litwrature (Fara, 2013)-quantlfies kver the agent's dewires (rather thsn uvew doke gomain of woslds). Sioolarlh, Condoravdl avd Lsuer (2016) quantifies oves ths agent's preferencrs. 5 3 Againwt Rubinftein's domain Rubinstein (2017) propodes a vaciant pf Reim's (1992) semantics for want ascrjptions, alenqed so as
D is. The belief-set-based view says that the set: (6) domain D = von as saying that prefers the p in D to the ¬p worlds D just if all of the best worlds in D are p worlds, ranked by S's preferences. Or, more formally: (7) Best-worlds preference within a domain prefers p in to ¬p worlds in D iff ∀w ∈ bestS(D): p(w) = 1. Together, (5), (6), and entail von Fintel's semantics. Von Fintel's semantics must rejected, and so one these three views must be Certainly could reject and take different approach to Some have done so.12 We would like to know if the (C)FWA problem can be solved-and so theoretical fruits belief-set-based approach while on (5), and indeed that it can be, as we'll 5. So: we must reject either either the domain (i.e. or the Bestworlds preference within a (i.e. (7)). Not necessarily (7). While its adequacy debated, rejecting it is not a solution to the problem of (C)FWAs. If we were it with something else, a Heimian notion preference a (see 6), we'd playing a game of whack-a-mole: the (C)FWA problem would pop up its replacement. Out with (6), then-the domain for (C)FWAs is belief So what is In the next section review argue against Rubinstein's answer question; sections our 12For the Content Specification version the so-called Relational Analysis-an influential in the philosophy literature desires (rather than over some domain of worlds). Condoravdi and Lauer (2016) quantifies over the preferences. 5 3 Against Rubinstein's domain Rubinstein (2017) proposes a variant of (1992) semantics ascriptions, amended so as
 D is. The belief-set-based view sAys that D is The beLieF seT: (6) BElieF-set Domain D = BelS And WE can Read von Fintel as saying tHat S pReFErs tHE p WorldS in D to tHE ¬p WORldS iN D JusT iF AlL of thE beSt worldS in D are p woRldS, aS ranked by S's pREfErences. Or, mOre Formally: (7) Best-WorLds preFeRenCE withIn a DomaiN S prefERs the p Worlds in D To ¬P Worlds IN D iff ∀w ∈ bESTS(d): p(w) = 1. TOgether, (5), (6), and (7) entail vON FINtel's semantics. von FinTeL'S sEMAntIcs Must be rejeCtEd, and SO one of tHEsE THRee VIews must be rejEcted. CertaiNLy oNe coulD rEjeCT (5) and inStead TaKE a dIfferent appRoacH to 'want'. SoMe have DOne so.12 We WOuld likE to knoW if The (c)FWA PRoBlEm cAn BE soLVeD-anD So tHe theoreTiCaL fruiTs of THE BElieF-seT-basEd appRoach enjoyed- wHilE holDIng On to (5), aNd indEed wE bElievE that iT can bE, aS we'll argue in secTion 5. so: we must rEjeCt EitHeR eithER the BeLieF-seT domain (I.e. (6)) or the bEstWoRLDS pReference within a doMaIN (I.e. (7)). not necesSarily (7). wHiLe ITs adequaCy Is dEbatED, RejecTing IT iS not a solUtion tO ThE pRoblem oF (C)fWAs. If We WerE to ReplaCE it wIth somEthing elSe, likE A Heimian notion OF preference wiTHiN A DoMAin (sEe sEction 6), we'd be PlayINg a gAme oF WhAck-A-Mole: tHe (C)FWa pRObLEm would pop up with its RePlacemEnt. OuT with (6), then-the dOmain for (C)FwaS Is not the BeliEF sET. So what is it? In tHe nexT section we REview and Argue Against RUbinstein'S ANswer to tHis QueStiOn; iN SEcTions 4–5 we develoP OUr owN. 12FOr exampLe, tHe ConteNt SPecIfiCatIoN version oF the so-caLlEd reLaTioNal AnALysis-an iNfLueNtIal SemanTIcs in tHe phiLosoPhY lITerAture (FaRA, 2013)-qUANtifIeS oVer tHe aGeNt's deSireS (RatHer than Over some dOmaIN of wOrLdS). SimilaRly, Condoravdi AnD Lauer (2016) quanTiFieS over tHE Agent's prEferences. 5 3 Against RubinstEIn's domaIn RUbinsTein (2017) Proposes a VarIant of heiM'S (1992) semanTics foR want AsCriPTIons, aMENdEd sO aS
 D is. The belief-set-base d view say s tha t D  is  t he b elie f set: (6) Bel i ef-s et domain D = BelS And  we c an read vo n Fin tel ass ay i n g t ha tS p re f er s the  pworldsin D to th e ¬ pworlds in Dj us t if all o f t he best worl dsin D a re  pw orlds , a s ran ked by S's pr eferences .O r, mor e  formal l y :(7)Best-worlds prefe r en c e within a dom ain Spr e fe r s  th e p  worlds in  D  to ¬ p  worlds in D iff ∀w ∈ bestS(D) : p(w) = 1. Tog ether,  ( 5), (6), a nd (7 )e nta il von Fint el's  semantic s. Von Fintel' s  semant ics mu stbereje c te d,  an ds o o n eoft hes e threevi ew s mus t be r e j ecte d.Cert ainly  one could re jec t (5 )  an d ins teadtake  a  diff erentappro ac h to 'want'. So me h ave doneso. 12  We  w ouldl ike to  kn owif the(C)FWAp rob le m c an  be solved-and soth e th eoretica l frui t sof the beli ef -se t-ba s e d app roac h  e njoyed-whileh ol di ng on t o(5), a nd  in dee d web elie ve tha t it can  be,a s we'll arguei n section 5.S o: w em ustrej ect eithereith e r th e Be l ie f-s e t dom ain ( i. e .( 6)) or the Bestworl ds  prefe rence  within a dom ain (i.e.( 7 ) ). Not n eces s ar i ly (7). Whileits a dequacy is debated,  reje cting it  is not a s olutiontothe  pr obl e m  o f (C)FWAs. If w e we re  to rep lac e it wi thsom eth ing  e lse, like  a Heimi an  n ot io n o f pre f erence w it hin  a  do main( see se ction  6),  w e' d  be  playin g  a g ameof  w hack -a- mo le: t he ( C )FW A probl em wouldpop up w it hits rep lacement. Out  w ith (6), t he n-t he dom a i n for (C )FWAs is not the belief set. So  wh at is  it?  In the n ext  secti onw e revi ew and  argu eaga i n st Ru b i ns tei n' s answer t o thi s que st ion;  in sec tions 4–5 we devel o p o ur own. 12For  ex ampl e ,  t heC on t ent  S p eci f i cation versionof the so- ca l le d Relation a l A na lysis-a n influ entia l  semant ics in th e philoso ph y li t e rat ure (Fara,  2013)-q uantifies overt he  agen t's  desir es  (r ather  thano ver  some  domai nof wor lds).  S imilarly , Condoravdi and Lauer(2016)  quan tif ies overthe age nt's pref eren ces. 5 3 A gai nst  Rubi nst e in'sdoma i nRub i nstei n (2 0 17) propo s es  av a ri ant of Heim ' s (19 92) s ema n tics f or w ant ascriptions,a mended so as
 D_is. The_belief-set-based view says that_D is_the_belief set:_(6)_Belief-set domain D_= BelS And_we can read von_Fintel as saying_that_S prefers the p worlds in D to the ¬p worlds in D just_if_all of_the_best_worlds in D are p_worlds, as ranked by S's_preferences. Or,_more formally: (7) Best-worlds preference within a domain_S_prefers the p_worlds in D to ¬p worlds in D iff_∀w ∈ bestS(D): p(w) = 1._Together, (5), (6),_and_(7)_entail von Fintel's semantics._Von Fintel's semantics must be rejected,_and so one of these three_views must be rejected. Certainly one could_reject (5) and instead take a_different approach to 'want'. Some_have done_so.12 We would like to_know if the_(C)FWA problem_can be solved-and_so the theoretical fruits of the_belief-set-based approach enjoyed-_while holding on to (5), and_indeed_we believe that_it_can_be, as_we'll argue in_section_5. So:_we_must reject either either the Belief-set_domain_(i.e. (6)) or the Bestworlds preference within_a domain (i.e. (7))._Not_necessarily (7). While its_adequacy is debated, rejecting it_is not a solution to the_problem of_(C)FWAs. If_we were to replace it with something else, like a Heimian_notion of preference within a domain_(see section 6), we'd_be playing_a_game of whack-a-mole:_the_(C)FWA problem_would pop up with its replacement. Out_with (6),_then-the domain for (C)FWAs is not_the belief set. So_what_is it? In the next section_we review and argue against Rubinstein's_answer to this question; in_sections_4–5_we develop our own. 12For_example, the Content Specification version of_the so-called Relational_Analysis-an influential semantics in the philosophy literature_(Fara,_2013)-quantifies over the agent's desires (rather_than_over some domain of worlds). Similarly,_Condoravdi_and_Lauer (2016) quantifies over the_agent's preferences. 5 3 Against Rubinstein's_domain Rubinstein (2017) proposes a variant of Heim's (1992)_semantics for want_ascriptions, amended so as