 rules to legitimate this option. The notion of rational method for Duhem acquires a meaning beyond mathematical consistency and experiment. It requires extra-empirical rules. Duhem rejects Poincaré's as well as the English School's pragmatical conception of physical theory (Duhem 1974, 149; Chiappin 1989, 51-57). He also rejects the metaphysical view of classical rationalism (Chiappin 1989, 40-42). His strategy is to reject the metaphysical view, as well as the model-building view of the nature of physical theory, and to rescue the ideal (from classical rationalism) of physical theory as a rational system based upon a very small set of formal principles in the style of the principle of least action or the potential functions of thermodynamics. To conclude our appraisal of Duhem's position, for him the mechanistic program faces an unsolvable dilemma: if the mechanistic program wants to use the mechanical theory according to the synthetic method, then it must give up the principle of logical unity. Consequently, the rejection of the mechanistic program is, ultimately, a methodological/epistemological decision and not a scientific one. If the mechanists want to use the mechanical theory according to the analytical method, containing the atomistic hypothesis of matter, rescuing thereby in principle its purpose of providing a unifying principle for the whole of physics, then they must give up the aim of providing a mechanical explanation proper, i.e. a picture or model of physical phenomena. Duhem states this situation clearly: Hence the analytic method, which alone seems capable of providing from the laws of physics a logically constructed mechanical explanation, seems incapable of satisfying the requirements of imaginative physicists, that is to say, of the very ones who required a mechanical interpretation of phenomena. If these physicists want, at any price, to picture the qualities of bodies in shapes suitable for geometric intuition, in shapes simple enough to be depicted in a table clearly understandable to the eyes and the imagination, they will have to renounce the hope of uniting all these representations into a coherent system, into a logically ordered science (Duhem 1980, 101). Duhem's Formal Conception of Theoretical Physics and the Principle of Rational and Continuous Progress This section will outline Duhem's view of the rational and continuous progress of physical theory. As concluded before, for Duhem neither the metaphysical view of physics nor the model-building method can comply with the principle of continuity. Besides that, the model-building method cannot comply with the rational
rules to legitimate this option. The notion of intellectual method acting for Duhem acquire a meaning beyond mathematical consistency and experiment. It requires excess - empirical rules. Duhem rejects Poincaré's equally well as the English School's matter-of-fact conception of forcible hypothesis (Duhem 1974, 149; Chiappin 1989, 51 - 57). He also rejects the metaphysical scene of classical rationalism (Chiappin 1989, 40 - 42). His strategy is to reject the metaphysical scene, as well as the exemplar - building view of the nature of forcible theory, and to rescue the ideal (from classical rationalism) of physical hypothesis as a rational system based upon a very small set of conventional principles in the style of the principle of least action or the potential routine of thermodynamics. To conclude our appraisal of Duhem's position, for him the mechanistic program faces an unsolvable dilemma: if the mechanistic program wants to use the mechanical theory according to the synthetic method, then it must give up the principle of logical unity. Consequently, the rejection of the mechanistic program is, ultimately, a methodological / epistemic decisiveness and not a scientific one. If the mechanists want to use the mechanical hypothesis accord to the analytical method, hold the atomistic guess of matter, rescuing thereby in principle its function of providing a unifying principle for the whole of physics, then they must give up the aim of providing a mechanical explanation proper, i.e. a picture or model of physical phenomena. Duhem express this situation intelligibly: Hence the analytic method, which alone seems capable of provide from the laws of physics a logically constructed mechanical explanation, seem incapable of satisfying the requirements of imaginative physicists, that is to say, of the identical ones who required a mechanical interpretation of phenomena. If these physicists desire, at any price, to picture the qualities of bodies in form suitable for geometric intuition, in form simple enough to be depicted in a table clearly understandable to the eye and the imagination, they will give birth to renounce the hope of uniting all these representations into a coherent system, into a logically order science (Duhem 1980, 101). Duhem's Formal Conception of Theoretical Physics and the Principle of Rational and Continuous Progress This section will sketch Duhem's view of the rational and continuous progress of physical theory. As concluded ahead, for Duhem neither the metaphysical view of physics nor the model - building method can comply with the principle of continuity. Besides that, the exemplar - construction method acting cannot comply with the intellectual
 rupes to legitimate this oktion. The notion of ratimnal msthod fof Duhem acquires a meaning bxyone matyematical consistency xnd experpment. It eequmres extra-empirirzl rules. Duhej rejzcvs Poincaré's as eell as tha English Schoml'r 'ragmatical conception of physical treory (Dihfm 1974, 149; Chiappin 1989, 51-57). He wlso gemects the metaphysical view of cmassican rationalism (Chiappin 1989, 40-42). His strategy id to reject the metaphjsical view, as rwll as the mudel-building view of tge nature of physical theory, ana to xescue the udwal (xrom classiral ranionalism) of inysican theoru as a rationak sbsten based upon a very skall set of formal principlas in the style of rhw pritcipne ow lexst artikn or hhe potential functions if thermodynamics. Tp sinclude our alpraiswl of Duhem's position, for him the mechanivtid program faces an unsoovable dilemma: if the mechaniseic program wants to use the mechanical theory acwordiig to tme shbtjetic method, then it must give up the principjs pf logical unity. Consequentky, tng rejection of the mzdhznistic program is, ultimajely, a methodoljgicsl/epistemological decision qnd not a scpentufic one. If the meehanists wanc to uxe thr mechanical theory accurdihg to the ajalytical oethod, containine tme dtomistic hypothesis of maeter, rescning chereby kn ptinciplq its purplse on providing a unifylng ptincipne for the whole of physics, then they musv give up the ahm mf provibing a mechanical evplanation proker, i.e. a 'icturd or model of phyvical phenoiena. Duhem stdjes this situetion clewrly: Henxe the xvalytic method, which alone seems xapable of providikg fruj the laws of pkvsucs a logically covstwubtev mecrdnical explatatiun, rrems kncapable on sxtisgying the requiremends or imaginative physoclsts, that is to swy, of the veru ones who requiref a mxchaniral inyerkretation of phenomena. If these physicishs rant, at any [ricc, to picture tke qualities of bodies in shapes suitablx for geometric intuitiin, in shapes simple tnough to be vepictqd in a tdble clearly understqndable to the eyts and the imagination, fhey whll hwve to renounce the hope of uniting all these representations into a coheeent sbseem, into a mogivally oxdexed sciqnce (Vuhem 1980, 101). Duhem's Fogmal Conception of Theoretical Piysics and tke Principle of Rational and Vovtinuous Progtess This section will outmine Duhrm's view of the rational and comtinuous progress of phyxical thwory. Zs conbmuved before, for Duhem neithzr the metaphtsicwl view of phhsivs nor the lodek-bbilding method can comply with thw prinxiole of continuitb. Besides thwu, the mkdel-buylding method cahnot fompli with the ratoonal
rules to legitimate this option. The notion method Duhem acquires meaning beyond mathematical extra-empirical Duhem rejects Poincaré's well as the School's pragmatical conception of physical theory 1974, 149; Chiappin 1989, 51-57). He also rejects the metaphysical view of classical (Chiappin 1989, 40-42). His strategy is to reject the metaphysical view, as well the view the of physical theory, and to rescue the ideal (from classical rationalism) of physical theory as a system based upon a very small set of principles in the style the principle of least action the functions of To our of Duhem's position, him the mechanistic program faces an unsolvable dilemma: if the mechanistic program wants to use the mechanical according to method, then must up principle of logical the rejection of the mechanistic program methodological/epistemological decision and not a scientific one. If mechanists want use the mechanical theory according to analytical method, containing the atomistic hypothesis of matter, thereby in principle its purpose of providing a unifying principle for the whole of physics, must give up the of providing a explanation i.e. picture model of phenomena. Duhem states this situation clearly: Hence the analytic method, which seems capable of providing from the laws of physics a mechanical seems incapable of the requirements of imaginative that to say, of the who a phenomena. these want, at any price, picture the qualities of bodies shapes suitable for geometric to be depicted in a table clearly understandable the eyes and the imagination, they will to renounce the hope of uniting all these representations into a coherent into a science (Duhem 1980, 101). Duhem's Formal Conception of Physics and the Principle Rational and Continuous Progress This section will outline Duhem's of rational and progress of physical As concluded before, Duhem neither the of physics the method the principle of continuity. Besides that, model-building cannot comply with the rational
 rules to legitimate this optiOn. The notioN of raTioNal MeThod For DUhem acquires a mEAninG beyond mathematical conSisteNcY And eXPeRimenT. It requIReS EXtrA-eMpIriCaL RuLes. DuHem Rejects poincaré's aS weLl As the English sChOol's pragmaTicAl conception Of pHysicaL tHeoRY (DuheM 1974, 149; ChIappiN 1989, 51-57). He alsO RejectS the metapHySIcal viEW of clasSICaL ratIonalism (Chiappin 1989, 40-42). HIS sTRategy is to rejeCt the mEtAPhYSIcaL viEw, as well as ThE modeL-BuildinG ViEW OF thE Nature of physiCal theory, anD To rEscue tHe IdeAL (from cLassiCaL RatIonalism) of pHysiCal theory As a ratIOnal sysTEm based Upon a vEry SmaLl seT Of FoRmaL pRIncIPlEs iN The Style of tHe PrIncipLe of LEAST actIon Or thE poteNtial functionS of TherMOdyNamicS. To coNcluDe Our apPraisaL of DuHeM's position, for hiM the MechanistIc pRoGraM fAces aN UnsolvAblE diLemma: if The mechANisTiC PROgRam wants to use the meChANIcAl theory AccordINg To THe syntheTiC meThod, THEn it mUst gIVe Up the priNciple OF lOgIcal uniTy. conseqUeNtlY, thE rejeCTion Of the mEchanistIc proGRam is, ultimatelY, A methodologicAL/ePIStEMoloGicAl decision aNd noT A sciEntiFIc One. iF the mEchanIsTS wANt to use the mechanicaL tHeory aCcordIng to the analyTical methoD, CONtaining The aTOmIStic hypothesis Of matTer, rescuinG Thereby iN prinCiple its Purpose of PROviding a UniFyiNg pRinCIPlE for the whole oF PHysiCs, Then theY muSt give uP thE aiM of ProViDing a mechAnical exPlAnAtIoN prOper, i.E. A picture Or ModEl Of pHysicAL phenoMena. DUhem StAtES thIs situaTIoN CLearLy: heNce tHe aNaLytic MethOD, whIch alonE seems capAblE Of prOvIdIng from The laws of physIcS a logicallY cOnsTructeD MEchanicaL explanation, seems incapaBLe of satIsfYing tHe reQuirementS of ImaginAtiVE physiCists, tHat is To Say, OF The veRY OnEs wHo Required a mECHanIcal iNtErprEtation Of phenomena. If these PHysIcists want, at aNy pRice, TO PiCtuRE tHE quAlITieS OF bodies in shapes Suitable foR gEOmEtric intuiTIon, In Shapes sImple enOugh tO Be depicTed in a tabLe clearly UnDersTANdaBle to the eyEs and the ImaginatiON, they WIlL have To rEnouncE tHe hOpe of UnitinG All These RepresEnTationS into A cOherent sYstem, into a logically ordeRed sciEnce (DUheM 1980, 101). Duhem's FoRmaL conCeption of theoRetical PhySicS anD the PRinCIple oF RatIOnAl aND ContInuoUS Progress tHiS seCTIoN will outlinE dUHem'S view Of tHE ratioNal aNd continuous progrESs of physical thEory. aS ConCluDEd beFoRe, for Duhem neitHer ThE MEtaphysiCaL view of physIcs nor thE mODel-buIlding Method Can compLY WiTH the prInciPle Of continuIty. beSIdes thaT, tHe MOdel-buIldiNg Method Cannot COmplY WIth the rational
 rules to legitimate thisoption. Th e not ion  of  r atio nalmethod for Duh e m ac quires a meaning beyon d mat he m atic a lconsi stencya nd e xpe ri me nt.  I t  r equir esextra-e mpirical r ule s.  Duhem rejec t sPoincaré's  as  well as the  En glishSc hoo l 's pr agm atica l conc e ptionof physic al theory (Duhem1 9 74 , 14 9; Chiappin 1989, 51 - 57). He also r ejects  t h em e tap hys ical viewof  clas s ical ra t io n a l ism (Chiappin 198 9, 40-42).H isstrate gy  is to rej ect t he met aphysical v iew,  as wellas the model-b u ildingview o f t henatu r eof  ph ys i cal th eor y , a nd to re sc ue  theidea l ( f romcla ssic al ra tionalism) of  ph ysic a l t heory  as a  rat io nal s ystembased  u pon a very smal l se t of form alpr inc ip les i n  the s tyl e o f the p rincipl e  of  l e a s taction or the pote nt i a lfunction s of t h er mo d ynamics.  T o c oncl u d e our  app r ai sal of D uhem's po si tion, f or  him t he  me cha nisti c  pro gram f aces anunsol v able dilemma:i f the mechani s ti c pr o gram  wa nts to usethem echa nica l  t heo r y acc ordin gt ot he synthetic method ,then i t mus t give up the  principle o f  logical  uni t y. Consequently,the r ejection o f  the mec hanis tic prog ram is, u l t imately,  amet hod olo g i ca l/epistemolog i c al d ec ision a ndnot a s cie nti fic  on e.  If the m echanist swa nt  t o u se th e  mechani ca l t he ory  acco r ding t o the  ana ly ti c almethod, co n t aini ng  t he a tom is tic h ypot h esi s of ma tter, res cui n g th er eb y in pr inciple its p ur pose of pr ov idi ng a u n i fying pr inciple for the whole o f  physic s,thenthey  must giv e u p theaim of pro viding  a me ch ani c a l exp l a na tio nproper, i. e .  apictu re  ormodel o f physical phenome n a.Duhem statesthi s si t u at ion cl e arl y: Hen c e  the analytic m ethod, whi ch al one seemsc apa bl e of pr oviding  from the law s of phys ics a log ic ally c ons tructed me chanical  explanat i on, s e em s inc apa ble of  s ati sfyin g ther equ ireme nts of  i magina tiveph ysicists , that is to say, of th e very  ones  wh o require d a mec hanical i nter pretationofphe nomen a.I f the se p h ys ici s ts wa nt,a t any pri c e,  to p ic ture the qu a l i tie s ofbod i es inshap es suitable for g e ometric intuit ion, i n s hap e s si mp le enough to b e d ep i c ted in a  t able clearl y unders ta n dable  to th e eyes  and th e im a ginati on,the y will ha veto renounc eth e  hopeof u ni ting a ll the s e re p r esentations into  a co h e rents yst em, i nt o a log i call y orderedscience (Du hem 19 80,101).  Duhem' sFormal  Co nc eption ofT heoretica l Phy sics an dthePri nciple  ofR a tiona l an dCon tinuous P r o gr e ss  T h issect ion w il l ou tline Duh e m's view  of the rat io nal a nd con t in u o us progres s o f phy s i cal theory .  Asc on c luded  befor e, for  Duhemn eit he r the m eta p h ysical vi ew of phy s ics  n or t he model -b uild in g m et hod can complywith the  princip l e  of co nti n uity .  Besid es  that, the m odel- bu i lding m e t hod  cannot com ply  wi th t herati o nal
 rules_to legitimate_this option. The notion_of rational_method_for Duhem_acquires_a meaning beyond_mathematical consistency and_experiment. It requires extra-empirical_rules. Duhem rejects_Poincaré's_as well as the English School's pragmatical conception of physical theory (Duhem 1974, 149;_Chiappin_1989, 51-57)._He_also_rejects the metaphysical view of_classical rationalism (Chiappin 1989, 40-42)._His strategy_is to reject the metaphysical view, as well_as_the model-building view_of the nature of physical theory, and to rescue_the ideal (from classical rationalism) of_physical theory as_a_rational_system based upon a_very small set of formal principles_in the style of the principle_of least action or the potential functions_of thermodynamics. To conclude our appraisal_of Duhem's position, for him_the mechanistic_program faces an unsolvable dilemma:_if the mechanistic_program wants_to use the_mechanical theory according to the synthetic_method, then it_must give up the principle of_logical_unity. Consequently, the_rejection_of_the mechanistic_program is, ultimately,_a_methodological/epistemological decision_and_not a scientific one. If the_mechanists_want to use the mechanical theory according_to the analytical method,_containing_the atomistic hypothesis of_matter, rescuing thereby in principle_its purpose of providing a unifying_principle for_the whole_of physics, then they must give up the aim of providing_a mechanical explanation proper, i.e. a_picture or model of_physical phenomena._Duhem_states this situation_clearly:_Hence the_analytic method, which alone seems capable of_providing from_the laws of physics a logically_constructed mechanical explanation, seems_incapable_of satisfying the requirements of imaginative_physicists, that is to say, of_the very ones who required_a_mechanical_interpretation of phenomena. If these_physicists want, at any price, to_picture the qualities_of bodies in shapes suitable for geometric_intuition,_in shapes simple enough to be_depicted_in a table clearly understandable to_the_eyes_and the imagination, they will_have to renounce the hope of_uniting all these representations into a coherent system, into_a logically ordered_science (Duhem 1980, 101). Duhem's_Formal_Conception_of Theoretical Physics and the Principle of Rational and Continuous_Progress This_section will outline_Duhem's view of the rational and continuous progress of physical_theory. As concluded before, for Duhem neither_the metaphysical view of physics nor the model-building method can comply_with the principle of continuity. Besides that, the_model-building method cannot comply with the rational