 would reproduce social feedback and perspective taking, thereby internalizing it. Moreover, inner speech is thought to facilitate the conceptualization and labeling of self-related aspects, thereby rendering these aspects more salient and more differentiated (Morin 2005). 28 The relation between language acquisition and the development of self-concept is also emphasized by Baker, this volume. Forthcoming in Grazer Philosophische Studien 84 (2012), p. 75-101 19 As we can see, a number of social cognitive skills and forms of intersubjectivity are undoubtedly in place before the onset of linguistic abilities, and are arguably necessary requirements for the development of language. Nonetheless, linguistic abilities seem to be necessary to develop a full-fledged theory of mind. This might explain why chimpanzees and other great apes do not seem to be able to ascribe (false) beliefs or other mental states to others (with the probably exception of visual perceptual states), although they do seem to be able to engage in shared attention and selective imitation, and display mirror-self-recognition (Call & Tomasello, 2008). Notice that I am not arguing that pre-linguistic forms of social cognition, which rely on an implicit understanding of others, are being replaced or abolished by later, linguistically mediated and explicit forms of mentalizing. Rather, the model I propose assumes that the more basic forms of social cognition are retained, such that social cognitive skills become gradually enriched and more complex as implicit information is redescribed into a more explicit format. In other words, we have various ways of understanding and interacting with others, some of which are based on implicit information about the mental states of others, others based on explicit representation. 4. Conclusion I have argued that explicit self-representation requires the awareness of other subjects and of their similarity to oneself, such that one can contrast one's own bodily and mental states with those of others. This awareness develops over the course of an increasingly complex perspectival differentiation, during which information about self and other that is implicit in early forms of social interaction becomes redescribed into an explicit format. So my account suggests a gradual transition from implicit to explicit forms of selfand other-representation that leads to an increasingly complex array of social cognitive abilities and, in turn, to the development of a self-concept. The account is summarized in table 1 below. We can now see how we get from the self-related information that is implicit in perception and bodily forms of self-awareness to an explicit representation of oneself as a subject among
would reproduce social feedback and perspective taking, thereby internalizing it. furthermore, inside language is thought to facilitate the conceptualization and labeling of self - refer aspects, thereby rendering these aspect more salient and more differentiated (Morin 2005). 28 The relative between language acquisition and the development of self - concept is also underscore by Baker, this volume. Forthcoming in Grazer Philosophische Studien 84 (2012), p. 75 - 101 19 As we can visualize, a number of social cognitive skills and forms of intersubjectivity are undoubtedly in place before the onset of linguistic abilities, and are arguably necessary requirement for the development of language. Nonetheless, linguistic ability seem to be necessary to develop a full - fledged theory of judgment. This might explain why chimpanzees and other great apes do not look to be able to ascribe (false) beliefs or other mental states to others (with the probably exception of visual perceptual states), although they do seem to be able to engage in shared attention and selective imitation, and display mirror - self - recognition (Call & Tomasello, 2008). Notice that I am not argue that pre - linguistic forms of social cognition, which rely on an implicit reason of others, are being replaced or abolished by later, linguistically mediated and denotative forms of mentalizing. preferably, the model I propose simulate that the more basic forms of social cognition are retained, such that social cognitive skills become gradually enriched and more complex as implicit information is redescribed into a more explicit format. In other actor's line, we have various ways of understanding and interacting with others, some of which are based on implicit data about the genial country of others, others based on explicit representation. 4. decision I have argued that explicit self - representation requires the awareness of other subjects and of their similarity to oneself, such that one can contrast one's own bodily and mental states with those of others. This awareness develop over the class of an increasingly complex perspectival differentiation, during which information about self and early that is implicit in early forms of social interaction becomes redescribed into an explicit format. So my account suggest a gradual transition from implicit to denotative forms of selfand other - representation that precede to an increasingly complex array of social cognitive abilities and, in bend, to the development of a self - concept. The report is summarized in table 1 below. We can now see how we scram from the self - related information that is implicit in sensing and bodily forms of self - awareness to an explicit theatrical performance of oneself as a subject among
 wokld reproduce social feeaback and perspgcrive teking, tgereby ivternalizing it. Moreover, innxr speech is thought to facilitxte the clnceptuaoizauion and labeling of self-vzlates aspzcvs, thereby rendgring these dspects more sdlkeut and more differentiated (Morin 2005). 28 Tre relayiln between landuagt asquiaptlon and the development of self-ckncept ps also emphasizec by Baker, this volume. Forhhcoling in Grazer Phiposophische Stuquen 84 (2012), p. 75-101 19 As we can set, c number of social cognitive skills and fofms oy intersubjgerivljy are undouutedly in place benpre tha onset of linguistic abmlitues, and are arguably iecessary requiremenjs for the dzvelopment of languagw. Bonetvelevs, lkbgukstjc agilitifs aeem to be necessary ro develop a full-fltdgqe theory of mjnd. Thys might explain why chimpanzees and otheg grsat apes do not seem to be able to ascribe (fwlse) beliqfs or other mental states to others (with the protably dxctpblon ud gisual perceptual states), although they do seei tp ne able to engagc in shared attentooj sgd selective kmitatnkn, and display mirrog-self-resognirion (Call & Tokasello, 2008). Notice that I am nit arguing tkat pre-linguistic forls of sociau cobnitipn, which rely on an impuicif understanfing of offers, are being rdplscad or abolished by later, lynguisticelly kediatea anc explycit forms of mcttalizing. Rather, tje mobel I propose adsumes that the more basic forms of social cobnhtimn are rztainec, such that sjcial cognitivg skills yecome gradually enrichxd and more somplex as im[picit informetion is wedewcrived intu a more explicot format. In other qords, we have varipus says of understcudung and interacyine wytj ptrars, some of fhicf afr basdd on impligit infprmation about the mantam states of others, obhers basgd on expjicit represemtation. 4. Conclusioj I heve arjued tnat explicit self-representation rsquires tje wwareness of othcr sobjects and of their similarity to oneself, such thet one can contrast ong's own bodily and menjal states witi thosq of othess. This awareness decelops over the cpurse of an increasinfly cokplex perspectival differentiation, during which information about self and othwr thav ys implicit in rarly fjxms of fociel interaction becpmes redescribed into an explicmt format. Vo my account suggests a gradusl transition ftom implicit to explicit fkrms of xelfand other-representation thay leads to an increasingky complwx arday of socmal cognitive abilitoes anb, in tyrn, to rhe fevelopment ow a sclf-concept. The aecount is summarized in table 1 beoow. We cwn now see how wx get from tme self-telated ynformation that is jlplickt in perceptoon and bodily forms of self-awarenvss to an expliciu representatiom of onvself as a suuject among
would reproduce social feedback and perspective taking, it. inner speech thought to facilitate self-related thereby rendering these more salient and differentiated (Morin 2005). 28 The relation language acquisition and the development of self-concept is also emphasized by Baker, this Forthcoming in Grazer Philosophische Studien 84 (2012), p. 75-101 19 As we can a of cognitive and forms of intersubjectivity are undoubtedly in place before the onset of linguistic abilities, and are necessary requirements for the development of language. Nonetheless, abilities seem to be to develop a full-fledged theory mind. might explain chimpanzees other apes do not to be able to ascribe (false) beliefs or other mental states to others (with the probably exception visual perceptual they do to able engage in shared selective imitation, and display mirror-self-recognition (Call Notice that I am not arguing that pre-linguistic of social which rely on an implicit understanding others, are being replaced or abolished by later, mediated and explicit forms of mentalizing. Rather, the model I propose assumes that the more of social cognition are such that social skills gradually and complex as information is redescribed into a more explicit format. In other words, have various ways of understanding and interacting with others, some are on implicit information the mental states of others on explicit representation. 4. have that the of subjects and of their to oneself, such that one contrast one's own bodily of others. This awareness develops over the course an increasingly complex perspectival differentiation, during which about self and other that is implicit in early forms of social becomes redescribed explicit format. So my account suggests a gradual from implicit to explicit of selfand other-representation that leads to an increasingly complex of cognitive abilities in turn, to development of a The account is table 1 We now get from the self-related information that implicit perception and bodily forms of to representation of oneself as a subject among
 would reproduce social feedbAck and persPectiVe tAkiNg, TherEby iNternalizing it. mOreoVer, inner speech is thoughT to faCiLItatE ThE concEptualiZAtION anD lAbEliNg OF sElf-reLatEd aspecTs, thereby rEndErIng these aspeCTs More salienT anD more differeNtiAted (MoRiN 2005). 28 ThE RelatIon BetweEn langUAge acqUisition aNd THe deveLOpment oF SElF-conCept is also emphasiZEd BY Baker, this voluMe. FortHcOMiNG In GRazEr PhilosopHiSche STUdien 84 (2012), p. 75-101 19 AS We CAN See, A Number of sociaL cognitive sKIllS and foRmS of INtersuBjectIvITy aRe undoubtedLy in Place befoRe the oNSet of liNGuistic AbilitIes, And Are aRGuAbLy nEcESsaRY rEquIRemEnts for tHe DeVelopMent OF LANguaGe. NOnetHelesS, linguistic abIliTies SEem To be nEcessAry tO dEveloP a full-FledgEd Theory of mind. ThiS migHt explain Why ChImpAnZees aND other GreAt aPes do noT seem to BE abLe TO AScRibe (false) beliefs or OtHER mEntal staTes to oTHeRs (WIth the prObAblY excEPTion oF visUAl PerceptuAl statES), aLtHough thEy Do seem To Be aBle To engAGe in Shared AttentioN and sELective imitatiON, and display miRRoR-SElF-RecoGniTion (Call & TomAselLO, 2008). NotIce tHAt i am NOt argUing tHaT PrE-Linguistic forms of soCiAl cognItion, Which rely on an Implicit unDERStanding Of otHErS, Are being replacEd or aBolished by LAter, lingUistiCally medIated and eXPLicit forMs oF meNtaLizING. RAther, the model i PRopoSe Assumes ThaT the morE baSic ForMs oF sOcial cognItion are ReTaInEd, SucH that SOcial cogNiTivE sKilLs becOMe gradUally EnriChEd ANd mOre compLEx AS ImplIcIt InfoRmaTiOn is rEdesCRibEd into a More expliCit FOrmaT. IN oTher worDs, we have varioUs Ways of undeRsTanDing anD INteractiNg with others, some of which ARe based On iMplicIt inFormation AboUt the mEntAL stateS of othErs, otHeRs bASEd on eXPLiCit RePresentatiON. 4. conClusiOn i havE argued That explicit self-rePResEntation requiRes The aWAReNesS Of OTheR sUBjeCTS and of their simiLarity to onEsELf, Such that onE Can CoNtrast oNe's own bOdily ANd mentaL states wiTh those of OtHers. tHIs aWareness deVelops ovEr the courSE of an INcReasiNglY complEx PerSpectIval diFFerEntiaTion, duRiNg whicH infoRmAtion aboUt self and other that is impLicit iN earlY foRms of sociAl iNTerAction becOmes RedescribeD inTo aN explIciT FormaT. So mY AcCouNT suggEsts A Gradual trANsItiON FrOm implicit tO EXPliCit foRms OF selfaNd otHer-representation THat leads to an inCreaSINglY coMPlex ArRay of social cogNitIvE ABilities AnD, in turn, to thE developMeNT of a sElf-conCept. ThE accounT IS sUMmarizEd in TabLe 1 below. We Can NoW See how wE gEt FRom the Self-ReLated iNformaTIon tHAT is implicit in perCeptiON And boDIly Forms Of Self-awaREnesS to an expliCit represenTation Of onEself As a subjEcT among
 would reproduce social fe edback and  pers pec tiv etaki ng,thereby intern a lizi ng it. Moreover, inner  spee ch is t h ou ght t o facil i ta t e  th eco nce pt u al izati onand lab eling of s elf -r elated aspec t s,  thereby r end ering theseasp ects m or e s a lient  an d mor e diff e rentia ted (Mori n2 005).2 8 The r e l at ionbetween languagea cq u isition and th e deve lo p me n t  of  se lf-concept  i s als o  emphas i ze d b y B a ker, this vol ume. Forthc o min g in G ra zer Philos ophis ch e  St udien 84 (2 012) , p. 75-1 01 19A s we ca n  see, a  numbe r o f s ocia l  c og nit iv e  sk i ll s a n d f orms ofin te rsubj ecti v i t y  are  un doub tedly  in place bef ore  the ons et of  ling uist ic  abil ities,  andar e arguably nece ssar y require men ts  fo rthe d e velopm ent  of  langua ge. Non e the le s s ,  l inguistic abilitie ss e em  to be n ecessa r yto developaful l-fl e d ged t heor y  o f mind.This m i gh texplain  w hy chi mp anz ees  ando ther  great  apes do  nots eem to be able to ascribe (f a ls e )  b e lief s o r other men tals tate s to ot her s  (wit h the  p r ob a bly exception of vi su al per ceptu al states), a lthough th e y do seemto b e  a b le to engage i n sha red attent i on and s elect ive imit ation, an d displaymir ror -se lf- r e co gnition (Call &  Tom as ello, 2 008 ). Noti cetha t I  am  n ot arguin g that p re -l in gu ist ic fo r ms of so ci alco gni tion, whichrelyon a nim p lic it unde r st a n ding  o fothe rs,  a re be ingr epl aced or  abolishe d b y  lat er ,linguis tically media te d and expl ic itformso f  mentali zing. Rather, the model I propo seassum es t hat the m ore  basic  fo r ms ofsocial  cogn it ion a re re t a in ed,  s uch that s o c ial  cogn it iveskillsbecome gradually e n ric hed and morecom plex a simp l ic i t i nf o rma t i on is redescrib ed into amo r eexplicit f o rma t.  In oth er word s, we have va rious way s of unde rs tand i n g a nd interac ting wit h others, someo fwhich  ar e base donimpli cit in f orm ation  about  t he men tal s ta tes of o thers, others based onexplic it re pre sentation . 4 .  Co nclusionI ha ve arguedtha t e xplic its elf-r epre s en tat i on re quir e s the awa r en ess o fother subje c t s  an d ofthe i r simi lari ty to oneself, su c h that one can  con t r ast  on e 's o wn  bodily and me nta ls t ates wit hthose of ot hers. Th is aware ness d evelop s overt h ec ourseof a n i ncreasing lyco m plex pe rs pe c tivaldiff er entiat ion, d u ring w hich information  abou t selfa ndother  t hat isi mpli cit in ear ly forms of  socia l in terac tion be co mes re des cr ibed intoa n explici t for mat. So  m y ac cou nt sug gest s a gra dual  t ran sition fr o m  i m pl ic i t t o ex plici tform s of self a nd other -re p resenta ti ont h at lea d st o  an increa sin gly c o m plex array of s o ci a l cog nitive  abili ties an d , i nturn, t o t h e  developm ent of as elf -c once pt. Theac coun tissu mmarized in tab le 1 bel ow. We c a n  now s eeh ow w e  get f ro m the self-r elate di nformat i o n t hat isi mpl ici t i n pe rce ptio n  and bodily forms of sel f-aw arene s s t o anexpli ci t repres e ntat ion of o n eself as a su bject among
 would_reproduce social_feedback and perspective taking,_thereby internalizing_it._Moreover, inner_speech_is thought to_facilitate the conceptualization_and labeling of self-related_aspects, thereby rendering_these_aspects more salient and more differentiated (Morin 2005). 28 The relation between language acquisition_and_the development_of_self-concept_is also emphasized by Baker,_this volume. Forthcoming in Grazer_Philosophische Studien_84 (2012), p. 75-101 19 As we can_see,_a number of_social cognitive skills and forms of intersubjectivity are undoubtedly_in place before the onset of_linguistic abilities, and_are_arguably_necessary requirements for the_development of language. Nonetheless, linguistic abilities_seem to be necessary to develop_a full-fledged theory of mind. This might_explain why chimpanzees and other great_apes do not seem to_be able_to ascribe (false) beliefs or_other mental states_to others_(with the probably_exception of visual perceptual states), although_they do seem_to be able to engage in_shared_attention and selective_imitation,_and_display mirror-self-recognition_(Call & Tomasello,_2008)._Notice that_I_am not arguing that pre-linguistic forms_of_social cognition, which rely on an implicit_understanding of others, are_being_replaced or abolished by_later, linguistically mediated and explicit_forms of mentalizing. Rather, the model_I propose_assumes that_the more basic forms of social cognition are retained, such that_social cognitive skills become gradually enriched_and more complex as_implicit information_is_redescribed into a_more_explicit format._In other words, we have various ways_of understanding_and interacting with others, some of_which are based on_implicit_information about the mental states of_others, others based on explicit representation._4. Conclusion I have argued_that_explicit_self-representation requires the awareness of_other subjects and of their similarity_to oneself, such_that one can contrast one's own bodily_and_mental states with those of others._This_awareness develops over the course of_an_increasingly_complex perspectival differentiation, during which_information about self and other that_is implicit in early forms of social interaction becomes_redescribed into an_explicit format. So my account_suggests_a_gradual transition from implicit to explicit forms of selfand other-representation_that leads_to an increasingly_complex array of social cognitive abilities and, in turn, to_the development of a self-concept. The account_is summarized in table 1 below. We can now see how_we get from the self-related information that is_implicit in perception and bodily forms of_self-awareness to an explicit_representation_of oneself as a subject among