203, 212), and the Holy Spirit repairs those of some but not all (278). The committed believer may argue that the person with a properly functioning sensus divinitatis stands to gain nothing from religious disagreement. First, such a person does not need disagreement to reveal whether his belief system has absorbed malign epistemic influences from new contexts: the sensus divinitatis will prevent this from occurring to begin with. Second, he does not need disagreement to reveal new insights: the sensus divinitatis provides all the inspiration he 9 needs. To respond, let us look more closely at the cognitive profile of the believer with a properly functioning sensus divinitatis. We may divide his experiences into two (mutually exclusive) subsets. The first, which I'll call SD experiences, are those which his properly functioning sensus divinitatis helps bring about. These experiences purport mainly to represent religious aspects of reality and can include intellectual seemings. I take it that religious believers also have other experiences, without religious content or character, that arise from the usual sensory and intellectual mechanisms, and that these mechanisms do not need the help of a properly functioning sensus divinitatis to deliver accurate experiences. I will call this second subset mundane experiences. SD and mundane experiences provide experiential evidence, which is non-inferential, and on its basis beliefs, from which inferences can be drawn. With this picture in mind, let's return to the first of the proper functionalist's reasons for denying that religious disagreement can benefit believers whose sensus divinitatis functions properly: that the properly functioning sensus divinitatis keeps out epistemically malign influences. To assess this claim, let's consider each factor that might influence a belief system undergirded by a properly functioning sensus divinitatis. I'll start with evidence, focusing on experiential evidence, which I have just subdivided into SD and mundane experiences. As for SD experiences, we will grant the objector that, due to their origin in the sensus divinitatis, these exert an epistemically good influence. They provide non-inferential bases for many true religious beliefs and for at least some true auxiliary beliefs (e.g., about scriptural hermeneutics; Plantinga, 2000a, 203-204). Although Plantinga only discusses the way in which the properly functioning sensus divinitatis produces religious beliefs, we may grant the objector that this mechanism also promotes the formation of
203, 212), and the Holy Spirit repairs those of some but not all (278). The committed believer may argue that the person with a properly functioning sensus divinitatis stand to profit nothing from religious disagreement. First, such a person does not need discrepancy to reveal whether his belief system has absorb malign epistemic influences from new context: the sensus divinitatis will prevent this from occurring to begin with. Second, he does not want disagreement to reveal raw insight: the sensus divinitatis provides all the inspiration he 9 needs. To respond, let us search more closely at the cognitive profile of the believer with a properly officiate sensus divinitatis. We may divide his experiences into two (mutually exclusive) subset. The first, which I'll address SD experiences, are those which his properly officiate sensus divinitatis helps bring about. These experiences purport mainly to represent religious aspects of reality and can include intellectual seemings. I take it that religious believers also have other experiences, without religious content or character, that originate from the usual sensory and intellectual mechanism, and that these mechanism do not need the help of a properly functioning sensus divinitatis to deliver accurate experiences. I will call this second subset everyday experiences. SD and mundane experiences provide experiential evidence, which is non - inferential, and on its basis beliefs, from which inferences can be drawn. With this picture in mind, lease's return to the inaugural of the proper functionalist's reasons for denying that religious disagreement can benefit believers whose sensus divinitatis routine properly: that the properly functioning sensus divinitatis keep out epistemically malign influence. To assess this claim, get's consider each factor that might determine a belief arrangement undergirded by a by rights functioning sensus divinitatis. I'll start with evidence, concenter on experiential evidence, which I have just subdivided into south dakota and mundane experiences. As for SD experiences, we will grant the objector that, due to their origin in the sensus divinitatis, these exert an epistemically good influence. They provide non - inferential bases for many truthful religious beliefs and for at least some true accessory beliefs (e.g., about scriptural hermeneutics; Plantinga, 2000a, 203 - 204). Although Plantinga only discusses the way in which the properly officiate sensus divinitatis produces religious beliefs, we may grant the objector that this mechanism also promotes the formation of
203, 212), ajd the Holy Spirit repaivs those of some but nov all (278). Fhe commktted believer may argue thav thw perwon with a properly fuvctioning sensus eiviiitatis stands to gain nothing nrom xeoigious disagrgement. First, such a person dued not need disagreement to reveal wrether nid belief systei hax abskgbtd malign epistemic influences frkm new bontexts: the sensis divinitatis will prevenh thls from occurring ho begin wijg. Sqxond, he does not need disagreement to reveal new insights: the senrus dnvinitatis kxivifgs all the iispiranion he 9 needs. To res[ond, ley us look more clmseoy at the cognitive pcofile of the believgr with a [rkperly functionint wensuv dieinigqtir. Wt mey sivide hia experiendes into twi (mutually exclusivt) stvsets. The firat, whish I'll call SD experiences, are those whicv hjs properly functioning sensus divinitatis hglps bring about. These experiences purport mainly to represant rxlkgiiuf qsoects of reality and can include intellectual aetmikgs. I take it thct religious beloegetf also have ojher ex'srjences, without rellgious sontebt or chawactrr, that arise from the usuao sensory anb ibtellectual mechannsms, and thac thesg mechsnisms do not need the kelp or a properlj functiohkng sensus divinktanis do delivtf accurate experiqnces. I wmll ccll this secpnd sufset mundaje exiariences. SD and mujdane efperiences provide experiential evidence, xiich is non-ingesennial, and jn itx basis beliess, from which nnferenczs can be drawn. Sith thms picture ig mind, let's rajurn to the fmrst of tre peopee functkunalist's reasoms for deuving that religious disagrecment dan benefit belntvetw whose sensus dixinytwtms fugwtions propesly: ghag the oroperly fukctkonimg sensus divinitativ kesps out epistemicakln malign unfluencqs. To assess yhis claim, let's cojsidec each factpr jhat might influence a belief sgstem undfrglrded by a prjperoy functioniug sensus divinitatis. I'll start with evivence, focusing on expetiential evidence, whieh I have jusv subdyvided indo SD and mundane experiences. As for XD experiences, we wilm grand the objector that, due to their origin in the sensus divinitatis, these exert qn epistemically gkod onfluvncz. Tkey prodide ion-inferential baxes for many true religious belmefs and fmr at least some true auxiliaru celiefs (e.g., abuut scriptural hermeneutjcs; Planyinga, 2000a, 203-204). Although Plantinga onlu discusses the way in wmich the propedly functiuning sensus divinotatis prodyces reoigilus beliefs, wd msy grant thf oboeccor that this mechanism also promites tye formation of
203, 212), and the Holy Spirit repairs some not all The committed believer with properly functioning sensus stands to gain from religious disagreement. First, such a does not need disagreement to reveal whether his belief system has absorbed malign influences from new contexts: the sensus divinitatis will prevent this from occurring to with. he not disagreement to reveal new insights: the sensus divinitatis provides all the inspiration he 9 needs. To let us look more closely at the cognitive of the believer with properly functioning sensus divinitatis. We divide experiences into (mutually subsets. first, which I'll SD experiences, are those which his properly functioning sensus divinitatis helps bring about. These experiences purport mainly represent religious reality and include seemings. take it that also have other experiences, without religious that arise from the usual sensory and intellectual and that mechanisms do not need the help a properly functioning sensus divinitatis to deliver accurate I will call this second subset mundane experiences. SD and mundane experiences provide experiential evidence, non-inferential, and on its beliefs, from which can drawn. this in mind, return to the first of the proper functionalist's reasons for denying religious disagreement can benefit believers whose sensus divinitatis functions properly: properly sensus divinitatis keeps epistemically malign influences. To this let's consider each factor influence belief a functioning divinitatis. I'll start with focusing on experiential evidence, which have just subdivided into for SD experiences, we will grant the objector due to their origin in the sensus these exert an epistemically good influence. They provide non-inferential bases for many religious beliefs at least some true auxiliary beliefs (e.g., about hermeneutics; Plantinga, 2000a, 203-204). Plantinga only discusses the way in which the properly sensus produces religious we may grant objector that this also promotes the
203, 212), and the Holy Spirit repairs thOse of some bUt not All (278). the CoMmitTed bEliever may arguE That The person with a properly FunctIoNIng sENsUs divInitatiS StANDs tO gAiN noThINg From rEliGious diSagreement. firSt, Such a person dOEs Not need disAgrEement to reveAl wHether HiS beLIef sySteM has aBsorbeD Malign Epistemic InFLuenceS From new CONtExts: The sensus divinitaTIs WIll prevent this From ocCuRRiNG To bEgiN with. SeconD, hE does NOt need dISaGREEmeNT to reveal new iNsights: the sENsuS divinItAtiS ProvidEs all ThE InsPiration he 9 nEeds. to respond, Let us lOOk more cLOsely at The cogNitIve ProfILe Of The BeLIevER wIth A ProPerly funCtIoNing sEnsuS DIVInitAtiS. We mAy divIde his experieNceS intO Two (MutuaLly exClusIvE) subsEts. The First, WhIch I'll call SD expErieNces, are thOse WhIch HiS propERly funCtiOniNg sensuS diviniTAtiS hELPS bRing about. These expeRiENCeS purport Mainly TO rEpREsent relIgIouS aspECTs of rEaliTY aNd can incLude inTElLeCtual seEmIngs. I tAkE it ThaT reliGIous BelievErs also hAve otHEr experiences, wIThout religiouS CoNTEnT Or chAraCter, that ariSe frOM the UsuaL SeNsoRY and iNtellEcTUaL Mechanisms, and that thEsE mechaNisms Do not need the hElp of a propERLY functioNing SEnSUs divinitatis tO deliVer accuratE ExperienCes. I wIll call tHis second SUBset mundAne ExpEriEncES. sD And mundane expERIencEs Provide ExpErientiAl eVidEncE, whIcH is non-infErential, AnD oN iTs BasIs belIEfs, from wHiCh iNfEreNces cAN be draWn. WitH thiS pIcTUre In mind, lET's RETurn To ThE firSt oF tHe proPer fUNctIonalisT's reasons For DEnyiNg ThAt religIous disagreemEnT can benefiT bEliEvers wHOSe sensus Divinitatis functions proPErly: thaT thE propErly FunctioniNg sEnsus dIviNItatis Keeps oUt epiStEmiCALly maLIGn InfLuEnces. To assESS thIs claIm, Let's ConsideR each factor that migHT inFluence a belieF syStem UNDeRgiRDeD By a PrOPerLY Functioning sensUs divinitaTiS. i'lL start with EVidEnCe, focusIng on exPerieNTial eviDence, whicH I have jusT sUbdiVIDed Into SD and mUndane exPeriences. aS for Sd ExPerieNceS, we wilL gRanT the oBjectoR ThaT, due tO their OrIgin in The seNsUs diviniTatis, these exert an episteMicallY good InfLuence. TheY prOVidE non-inferEntiAl bases for ManY trUe relIgiOUs belIefs ANd For AT leasT somE True auxilIArY beLIEfS (e.g., about scrIPTUraL hermEneUTics; PlAntiNga, 2000a, 203-204). Although PlantINga only discussEs thE WAy iN whICh thE pRoperly functioNinG sENSus divinItAtis produceS religioUs BEliefS, we may Grant tHe objecTOR tHAt this MechAniSm also proMotEs THe formaTiOn OF
203, 212), and the Holy Sp irit repai rs th ose  of  s omebutnot all (278). Thecommitted believer may  argu et hatt he  pers on with ap r ope rl yfun ct i on ing s ens us divi nitatis st and sto gain noth i ng  from reli gio us disagreem ent . Firs t,  su c h a p ers on do es not need d isagreeme nt to rev e al whet h e rhisbelief system has ab s orbed malign e pistem ic in f l uen ces  from newco ntext s : the s e ns u s div i nitatis willprevent thi s  fr om occ ur rin g  to be gin w it h . S econd, he d oesnot needdisagr e ement t o  reveal  new i nsi ght s: t h ese nsu sd ivi n it ati s  pr ovides a ll  t he in spir a t i o n he  9need s. To  respond, let  us  loo k  mo re cl osely  atth e cog nitive  prof il e of the believ er w ith a pro per ly  fu nc tioni n g sens usdiv initati s. We m a y d iv i d e  h is experiences int ot w o(mutuall y excl u si ve )  subsets .The  fir s t , whi ch I ' ll  call SD  exper i en ce s, areth ose wh ic h h isprope r ly f unctio ning sen sus d i vinitatis help s  bring about. Th e s ee xper ien ces purport  mai n ly t o re p re sen t  reli gious  a s pe c ts of reality and c an  inclu de in tellectual se emings. It a k e it tha t re l ig i ous believersalsohave other experien ces,withoutreligious c ontent o r c har act er, t ha t arise fromt h e us ua l senso ryand int ell ect ual  me ch anisms, a nd thatth es eme cha nisms do not n ee d t he  he lp of a prop erlyfunc ti on i ngsensusd iv i n itat is  t o de liv er  accu rate exp erience s. I will  ca l l th is  s econd s ubset mundane  e xperiences .SDand mu n d ane expe riences provide experie n tial ev ide nce,whic h is non- inf erenti al, and on  its b asisbe lie f s , fro m wh ich  i nferencesc a n b e dra wn . Wi th this  picture in mind,l et' s return to t hefirs t of  th e  p r ope rf unc t i onalist's reaso ns for den yi n gthat relig i ous  d isagree ment ca n ben e fit bel ievers wh ose sensu sdivi n i tat is functio ns prope rly: that the p r op erlyfun ctioni ng  se nsusdivini t ati s kee ps out  e pistem icall ymalign i nfluences. To assess th is cla im, l et' s conside r e a chfactor th at m ight influ enc e a  beli efs ystem  und e rg ird e d bya pr o perly fun c ti oni n g  s ensus divin i t a tis . I'l l s t art wi th e vidence, focusing on experientia l ev i d enc e,w hich  I  have just sub div id e d  into SD  a nd mundaneexperien ce s . Asfor SD  exper iences, w ew ill gr antthe  objector  th at ,  due to  t he i r orig in i nthe se nsus d i vini t a tis, these exert  an e p i stemi c all y goo dinfluen c e. T hey provid e non-infer ential  bas es fo r manytr ue rel igi ou s beliefsa nd for at  leas t sometr ue a uxi liarybeli e f s (e. g.,ab out  scriptur a l  h e rm en e uti cs;Plant in ga,2000a, 20 3 -204). A lth o ugh Pla nt ing a only d i sc u s ses the wa y i n whi c h  the prope r ly f u nc t ionin g sens us div initati s  pr od uces re lig i o us belief s, we may gra nt  the  objecto rthat  t his  m echanism also p romotesthe form a t ion of 
203, 212),_and the_Holy Spirit repairs those_of some_but_not all_(278)._The committed believer_may argue that_the person with a_properly functioning sensus_divinitatis_stands to gain nothing from religious disagreement. First, such a person does not need_disagreement_to reveal_whether_his_belief system has absorbed malign_epistemic influences from new contexts:_the sensus_divinitatis will prevent this from occurring to begin_with._Second, he does_not need disagreement to reveal new insights: the sensus_divinitatis provides all the inspiration he_9 needs. To_respond,_let_us look more closely_at the cognitive profile of the_believer with a properly functioning sensus_divinitatis. We may divide his experiences into_two (mutually exclusive) subsets. The first,_which I'll call SD experiences,_are those_which his properly functioning sensus_divinitatis helps bring_about. These_experiences purport mainly_to represent religious aspects of reality_and can include_intellectual seemings. I take it that_religious_believers also have_other_experiences,_without religious_content or character,_that_arise from_the_usual sensory and intellectual mechanisms, and_that_these mechanisms do not need the help_of a properly functioning_sensus_divinitatis to deliver accurate_experiences. I will call this_second subset mundane experiences. SD and_mundane experiences_provide experiential_evidence, which is non-inferential, and on its basis beliefs, from which_inferences can be drawn. With this_picture in mind, let's_return to_the_first of the_proper_functionalist's reasons_for denying that religious disagreement can benefit_believers whose_sensus divinitatis functions properly: that the_properly functioning sensus divinitatis_keeps_out epistemically malign influences. To assess_this claim, let's consider each factor_that might influence a belief_system_undergirded_by a properly functioning sensus_divinitatis. I'll start with evidence, focusing_on experiential evidence,_which I have just subdivided into SD_and_mundane experiences. As for SD experiences,_we_will grant the objector that, due_to_their_origin in the sensus divinitatis,_these exert an epistemically good influence._They provide non-inferential bases for many true religious beliefs_and for at_least some true auxiliary beliefs_(e.g.,_about_scriptural hermeneutics; Plantinga, 2000a, 203-204). Although Plantinga only discusses the_way in_which the properly_functioning sensus divinitatis produces religious beliefs, we may grant the_objector that this mechanism also promotes the_formation of