 possibility and necessity. Suppose that, after going in for some of this table-thumping, a metaphysician says something of the form 'necessarily φ' which, according to you, is true in some contexts and false in others. Normally, considerations of charity would push you toward interpreting the speaker as asserting the true thing. But given that modifiers like 'without qualification' and 'in the highest degree' are getting thrown around, it is plain that by following charity in this way, you would be wilfully misconstruing the metaphysician as saying something weaker than what she in fact is saying. Given the clarificatory remarks that have been offered, you have no choice but to go for the strongest possible interpretation of the claim. This means you may end up interpreting the metaphysician as saying something you think obviously false. In general, we worry that we are misunderstanding people when we interpret them as asserting obvious falsehoods; but such considerations are much weaker when the people we are interpreting are philosophers, doing what philosophers do, which notoriously often involves denying the obvious. Given a broadly counterpart-theoretic analysis of modal claims, adopting the strongest possible interpretation of 'necessarily' means adopting the weakest possible interpretation of 'counterpart' or 'counterpairing'.55 Does that mean that we have to take every sequence to be a counterpart of every other sequence, or take every relation to be a counterpairing? No. For considerations of logic may push us not to do so even when we are interpreting modal talk in metaphysical contexts. The strongest meaning an operator on propositions could 55Cf. Lewis: 'In the broadest sense, all possible individuals without exception are possibilities for me' (OPW 234). have is one that turns every proposition whatsoever into a falsehood; but obviously metaphysicians' speeches about "unrestrictedness" and "absoluteness" are not a good reason to assign this trivial interpretation to 'necessarily' in their mouths. Talk of maximality is restricted to some reasonably natural class of meanings, and one thing that this class of meanings should have in common is their basic logical behaviour. We should not carry our policy of preferring stronger interpretations of metaphysicians' 'necessary' to weaker ones so far as to overturn logical principles which even the metaphysicians rely on in reasoning with their concept. Leibniz's Law, understood so as to apply in modal contexts, is one such principle; like everything in logic, it is controversial, but those who reject it have to struggle to stop themselves from slipping
possibility and necessity. Suppose that, after going in for some of this table - thump, a metaphysician say something of the form' necessarily φ' which, harmonize to you, is dependable in some contexts and false in others. Normally, consideration of jacob's ladder would push you toward interpreting the speaker as asserting the true matter. But given that modifiers like' without qualification' and' in the highest academic degree' are getting thrown around, it is apparent that by following charity in this manner, you would be wilfully misconstruing the metaphysician as saying something fallible than what she in fact is saying. Given the clarificatory remarks that have been offered, you experience no choice but to go for the strongest possible interpretation of the title. This means you may end up interpreting the metaphysician as saying something you think obviously false. In general, we worry that we are misunderstanding people when we interpret them as asserting obvious falsehoods; but such considerations are much weaker when the people we are interpreting are philosopher, doing what philosophers dress, which notoriously frequently involves denying the obvious. Given a broadly counterpart - theoretical analysis of modal claim, adopting the strongest potential interpretation of' necessarily' means adopting the weakest possible rendition of' counterpart' or' counterpairing'.55 Does that mean that we have to take every sequence to be a counterpart of every other sequence, or take every sexual intercourse to be a counterpairing? No. For considerations of logic may push us not to do so even when we are interpreting modal lecture in metaphysical contexts. The strongest meaning an operator on propositions could 55Cf. Lewis:' In the broadest sense, all possible individuals without exception are possibilities for me' (OPW 234). have is one that plow every proposal whatsoever into a falsehood; but obviously metaphysicians' speeches about " unrestrictedness " and " starkness " are not a good reason to assign this trivial rendition to' necessarily' in their mouths. lecture of maximality is restricted to some reasonably natural class of meanings, and one matter that this class of meanings should have in coarse is their basic logical behaviour. We should not carry our policy of preferring stronger interpretation of metaphysicians'' necessary' to weaker ones indeed far as to overturn logical principle which even the metaphysicians rely on in reasoning with their concept. Leibniz's Law, understood so as to lend oneself in modal contexts, is one such principle; like everything in logic, it is controversial, but those who reject it have to struggle to stop themselves from slipping
 podsibility and necessity. Ruppose that, afjee goinj in fod some ow this table-thumping, a metapiysixian ways something of the worm 'necedsarily φ' whirh, according to bku, is tvbe in dome rontexts and fakse in othars. Normally, cmnriberations of charity would push you eoward onherpreting the spesher zs asserting the true thing. But giben thau modifiers like 'wothout qualification' and 'ij thf highest degree' age getting jgrorb around, it ks plain that by follosing charity in this way, you wojld bz wilfully niwcojvtruing the metaihysician as saying smmethinb weaker than ehav shw in fact is saying. Gmven the clarificatoty remarks tkat have been offered, yiu haee nm chuuce buu tp fo for thx strongest possible ibterpretation of tht cjqim. This meana you iar end up interpreting the metaphysician as saying something you tyink obviously false. Ln generaj, we worry that we are misunderstanding people whan we knttrivet gyel as asserting obvious falsehoods; but such cogaicegations are much ceaker when the lelpkg we are interkreting ars philosophers, doijg what philisophers qo, wnich notoriously often invooves denying rhe obvious. Given c broadly cobnterpsrt-throretic analysis of modcl clajms, adoptinh the strkvgest possible ivtegpredation of 'necessarily' meanf adoptinj the weakesg poxsible interpretwtion of 'counterpart' or 'fountgrpairhng'.55 Does tjat mean that we have to take etxry sequence jo te d countexpart pf every othew sequence, or jake everv relagion to be a counverpairing? Nj. For consideswtions of lojic may ptsh ys nit to du so even when ee are innexpreting nodal talk in metaihysizzl contexts. The sttingest meaning an opqrwtpr mn propositimns zouuc 55Cf. Uewis: 'In thc bfoadrst sense, all possibne ihdividuals without ewception qre possybilities for me' (OPW 234). have is oje thet turis evety kroposition whatsoever into a fzlsehood; hut obviously mqtapmysisians' speeehes about "unrestrictedness" and "absoluteiess" are not a good reawon to assign this jriyial interprxtatiog to 'necevsarily' in their mourhs. Talk of maximslity is restricted tk some reaslnably natural class of meanings, and one thing that this class of meaningw should have in ckmmom is nhenr yasic ljgicel behaviour. We shpuld not carry our policy of prxferring sdrjnger interpretations of metspfysicians' 'necgssary' to weaker ones so fzr as to overturn logical principles whoch even the metaphysicisns rely on ih reasoninj with their concept. Leibnnz's Laq, underwtoof so as to apoly ik modal cojtexus, ia one such principle; like everytying ib pogic, it is contcoversial, bub uhose wgo rejgct it have to stduggmf to rtop themselvrs from slippimg
possibility and necessity. Suppose that, after going some this table-thumping, metaphysician says something which, to you, is in some contexts false in others. Normally, considerations of would push you toward interpreting the speaker as asserting the true thing. But that modifiers like 'without qualification' and 'in the highest degree' are getting thrown it plain by charity in this way, you would be wilfully misconstruing the metaphysician as saying something weaker than she in fact is saying. Given the clarificatory that have been offered, have no choice but to for strongest possible of claim. means you may up interpreting the metaphysician as saying something you think obviously false. In general, we worry that we misunderstanding people interpret them asserting falsehoods; such considerations are when the people we are interpreting what philosophers do, which notoriously often involves denying obvious. Given broadly counterpart-theoretic analysis of modal claims, the strongest possible interpretation of 'necessarily' means adopting weakest possible interpretation of 'counterpart' or 'counterpairing'.55 Does that mean that we have to take to be a counterpart every other sequence, take relation be counterpairing? No. considerations of logic may push us not to do so even we are interpreting modal talk in metaphysical contexts. The strongest operator propositions could 55Cf. 'In the broadest sense, possible without exception are possibilities (OPW have turns proposition into a falsehood; but metaphysicians' speeches about "unrestrictedness" and are not a good interpretation to 'necessarily' in their mouths. Talk of is restricted to some reasonably natural class meanings, and one thing that this class of meanings should have in is their behaviour. We should not carry our policy of stronger interpretations of metaphysicians' to weaker ones so far as to overturn logical which the metaphysicians on in reasoning their concept. Leibniz's understood so as in modal is such in logic, it is controversial, but who it have to struggle to themselves
 possibility and necessity. SuPpose that, aFter gOinG in FoR somE of tHis table-thumpiNG, a meTaphysician says somethiNg of tHe FOrm 'nECeSsariLy φ' whicH, AcCORdiNg To You, Is TRuE in soMe cOntexts And false in OthErS. Normally, conSIdErations of ChaRity would pusH yoU towarD iNteRPretiNg tHe speAker as ASsertiNg the true ThINg. But gIVen that MODiFierS like 'without qualiFIcATion' and 'in the hiGhest dEgREe' ARE geTtiNg thrown arOuNd, it iS Plain thAT bY FOLloWIng charity in tHis way, you woULd bE wilfuLlY miSConstrUing tHe MEtaPhysician as SayiNg somethiNg weakER than whAT she in fAct is sAyiNg. GIven THe ClAriFiCAtoRY rEmaRKs tHat have bEeN oFfereD, you HAVE No chOicE but To go fOr the strongesT poSsibLE inTerprEtatiOn of ThE claiM. This mEans yOu May end up interprEtinG the metapHysIcIan As SayinG SomethIng You Think obViously FAlsE. IN GENeRal, we worry that we arE mISUnDerstandIng peoPLe WhEN we interPrEt tHem aS ASsertIng oBViOus falseHoods; bUT sUcH considErAtions ArE muCh wEaker WHen tHe peopLe we are iNterpREting are philosOPhers, doing whaT PhILOsOPherS do, Which notoriOuslY OfteN invOLvEs dENying The obViOUs. gIven a broadly counterPaRt-theoRetic Analysis of modAl claims, adOPTIng the stRongESt POssible interprEtatiOn of 'necessARily' meanS adopTing the wEakest posSIBle interPreTatIon Of 'cOUNtErpart' or 'countERPairInG'.55 Does thAt mEan that We hAve To tAke EvEry sequenCe to be a cOuNtErPaRt oF everY Other seqUeNce, Or TakE everY RelatiOn to bE a coUnTeRPaiRing? No. FOR cONSideRaTiOns oF loGiC may pUsh uS Not To do so eVen when we Are INterPrEtIng modaL talk in metaphYsIcal contexTs. the StrongEST meaning An operator on propositionS Could 55Cf. lewIs: 'In tHe brOadest senSe, aLl possIblE IndiviDuals wIthouT eXcePTIon arE POsSibIlIties for me' (opw 234). haVe is oNe That Turns evEry proposition whatSOevEr into a falsehOod; But oBVIoUslY MeTAphYsICiaNS' Speeches about "unRestrictedNeSS" aNd "absoluteNEss" ArE not a goOd reasoN to asSIgn this Trivial inTerpretatIoN to 'nECEssArily' in theIr mouths. talk of maxIMalitY Is RestrIctEd to soMe ReaSonabLy natuRAl cLass oF meaniNgS, and onE thinG tHat this cLass of meanings should havE in comMon is TheIr basic loGicAL beHaviour. We ShouLd not carry Our PolIcy of PreFErrinG strONgEr iNTerprEtatIOns of metaPHySicIANs' 'Necessary' to WEAKer Ones sO faR As to ovErtuRn logical principlES which even the mEtapHYSicIanS Rely On In reasoning witH thEiR COncept. LeIbNiz's Law, undeRstood so As TO applY in modAl contExts, is oNE SuCH princIple; LikE everythiNg iN lOGic, it is CoNtROversiAl, buT tHose whO rejecT It haVE To struggle to stop ThemsELVes frOM slIppinG
 possibility and necessity . Supposethat,  af ter  g oing  infor some of th i s ta ble-thumping, a metaph ysici an says so methi ng of t h ef o rm'n ec ess ar i ly  φ' w hic h, acco rding to y ou,  i s true in so m econtexts a ndfalse in oth ers . Norm al ly, consi der ation s of c h aritywould pus hy ou tow a rd inte r p re ting  the speaker as a s se r ting the truething.  B u tg i ven  th at modifie rs  like 'withou t  q u a l ifi c ation' and 'i n the highe s t d egree'  a reg etting  thro wn aro und, it isplai n that by  follo w ing cha r ity inthis w ay,  yo u wo u ld  b e w il f ull y  m isc o nst ruing th eme taphy sici a n a s sa yin g so methi ng weaker tha n w hats hein fa ct is  say in g. Gi ven th e cla ri ficatory remark s th at have b een  o ffe re d, yo u  havenocho ice but  to gof orth e s tr ongest possible in te r p re tation o f thec la im .  This me an s y ou m a y  endup i n te rpreting  the m e ta ph ysician  a s sayi ng  so met hingy ou t hink o bviously  fals e . In general,w e worry thatw ea r em isun der standing pe ople when  wei nt erp r et th em as  a s se r ting obvious falseh oo ds; bu t suc h considerati ons are mu c h weaker w hent he people we areinter preting ar e  philoso phers , doingwhat phil o s ophers d o,whi chnot o r io usly often in v o lves  d enyingthe  obviou s.Giv ena b ro adly coun terpart- th eo re ti c a nalys i s of mod al  cl ai ms,  adop t ing th e str onge st  p o ssi ble int e rp r e tati on  o f 'n ece ss arily ' me a nsadoptin g the wea kes t  pos si bl e inter pretation of'c ounterpart 'or'count e r pairing' .55 Does that mean that we have  to  take  eve ry sequen ceto bea c o unterp art of  ever yoth e r  sequ e n ce , o rtake every r ela tionto  bea count erpairing? No. For con siderations o f l ogic m ay  pu s hu s n ot tod o  so even when w e are inte rp r et ing modalt alk  i n metap hysical  cont e xts. Th e stronge st meanin gan o p e rat or on prop ositions  could 55 C f. Le w is : 'In  th e broa de stsense , allp oss ibleindivi du als wi thout  e xception  are possibilities forme' (O PW 23 4).  have isone tha t turns e very  propositi onwha tsoev eri nto a  fal s eh ood ;  butobvi o usly meta p hy sic i a ns ' speechesa b o ut"unre str i ctedne ss"and "absoluteness "  are not a goo d re a s ontoa ssig nthis trivial i nte rp r e tation t o'necessaril y' in th ei r  mout hs. Ta lk ofmaximal i t yi s rest rict edto some r eas on a bly nat ur al classof m ea nings,  and o n e th i n g that this clas s ofm e aning s  sh ouldha ve in c o mmon  is theirbasic logic al beh avio ur. W e shoul dnot ca rry  o ur policyo f preferr ing s tronger  i nter pre tation s of m etaph ysic ia ns'  'necessa r y 't owe a ker  one s sofa r as  to overt u rn logic alp rincipl es  wh i c h even th e metaphysic ian s rel y on in reas o ning wi t h the ir con cept.Leibniz ' s L aw , under sto o d  so as to  apply in mod al  con texts, i sonesu chpr inciple; like e verythin g in log i c , it i s c o ntro v ersial ,but those wh o rej ec t  it hav e tostruggl e  to  st opthem sel vesf rom slipping
 possibility_and necessity._Suppose that, after going_in for_some_of this_table-thumping,_a metaphysician says_something of the_form 'necessarily φ' which,_according to you,_is_true in some contexts and false in others. Normally, considerations of charity would push_you_toward interpreting_the_speaker_as asserting the true thing._But given that modifiers like_'without qualification'_and 'in the highest degree' are getting thrown_around,_it is plain_that by following charity in this way, you would_be wilfully misconstruing the metaphysician as_saying something weaker_than_what_she in fact is_saying. Given the clarificatory remarks that_have been offered, you have no_choice but to go for the strongest_possible interpretation of the claim. This_means you may end up_interpreting the_metaphysician as saying something you_think obviously false._In general,_we worry that_we are misunderstanding people when we_interpret them as_asserting obvious falsehoods; but such considerations_are_much weaker when_the_people_we are_interpreting are philosophers,_doing_what philosophers_do,_which notoriously often involves denying the_obvious._Given a broadly counterpart-theoretic analysis of modal_claims, adopting the strongest_possible_interpretation of 'necessarily' means_adopting the weakest possible interpretation_of 'counterpart' or 'counterpairing'.55 Does that_mean that_we have_to take every sequence to be a counterpart of every other_sequence, or take every relation to_be a counterpairing? No._For considerations_of_logic may push_us_not to_do so even when we are interpreting_modal talk_in metaphysical contexts. The strongest meaning_an operator on propositions_could_55Cf. Lewis: 'In the broadest sense,_all possible individuals without exception are_possibilities for me' (OPW 234)._have_is_one that turns every proposition_whatsoever into a falsehood; but obviously_metaphysicians' speeches about_"unrestrictedness" and "absoluteness" are not a good_reason_to assign this trivial interpretation to_'necessarily'_in their mouths. Talk of maximality_is_restricted_to some reasonably natural class_of meanings, and one thing that_this class of meanings should have in common is_their basic logical_behaviour. We should not carry_our_policy_of preferring stronger interpretations of metaphysicians' 'necessary' to weaker ones_so far_as to overturn_logical principles which even the metaphysicians rely on in reasoning_with their concept. Leibniz's Law, understood so_as to apply in modal contexts, is one such principle; like_everything in logic, it is controversial, but those_who reject it have to struggle to_stop themselves from slipping