 any account of spiritual formation must be grounded in the sanctifying activity of the Holy Spirit. Yet, Brown and Strawn fail to attribute any activity to the Holy Spirit. All the work is done by church bodies functioning as self-forming systems, networks of communication and interaction between persons who imitate those who imitate Christ. However, it is in partaking of and participating in the divine nature-not the mere moral influence of a church body-that the believer is sanctified (2 Peter 1:4; see also 1 Cor. 1:9). It is entirely possible for their account of sanctification that God does not even exist. Of course, this needn't be the case for all Christian physicalist accounts. 69 Roderick Chisholm, "Mind," in Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology, edited by Hand Burckhardt and Barry Smith (Munich: Philosopia Veril, 1991), 544. 70 Nancy Murphy, Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 112. 71 Evans, "Separable Souls: Dualism, Selfhood, and the Possibility of Life After Death," 335. It seems to be produced by an overemphasis on a purely scientific, rather than a scientifically informed, account of spiritual formation. Christian Physicalism's Fragmented Persons According to Brown and Strawn, Christian physicalism holds that, as bodies, we have a single, unified nature.72 However, we will argue that their ontology of the human person is neither holistic, unified, nor substantial. Rather, it is one where we are biological aggregates. Consequently, their view cannot ground central features of human persons like persistence, agency, and the unity of consciousness, each of which is necessary for any account of Christian spiritual formation. Their account in a chapter titled "How Bodies Become Persons" is often unclear, moving between talk of the person, the brain, and the human mind, each of which are characterized as having a self-organizing nature.73 Elsewhere, they state that a person is "... a uniquely organized pattern that is dynamic in its developmental process of self-organization..."74 and that, "We human beings are also complex dynamical systems..."75 They seem to reject the self as a substance, a genuine unified entity, and identify the self as a function or process. Brown and Strawn offer two pictures of the self. They maintain that we are wholly physical bodies. Yet, they also assert that
any account of spiritual formation must be grounded in the sanctifying natural process of the Holy Spirit. so far, Brown and Strawn fail to attribute any activity to the Holy Spirit. All the work is perform by church bodies function as self - forming systems, network of communication and interaction between persons who imitate those who imitate Christ. However, it is in partaking of and participating in the providential nature - not the mere moral influence of a church body - that the believer is sanctified (2 Peter 1:4; determine also 1 Cor. 1:9). It is entirely possible for their account of sanctification that God does not even exist. Of course, this motivationn't be the case for all Christian physicalist accounts. 69 Roderick Chisholm, " Mind, " in Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology, edit by Hand Burckhardt and Barry Smith (Munich: Philosopia Veril, 1991), 544. 70 Nancy Murphy, Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 112. 71 Evans, " Separable Souls: Dualism, Selfhood, and the Possibility of Life After Death, " 335. It seems to be produce by an overemphasis on a purely scientific, rather than a scientifically informed, account of spiritual constitution. Christian Physicalism's Fragmented Persons According to Brown and Strawn, Christian physicalism holds that, as bodies, we have a single, unified nature.72 However, we will argue that their ontology of the human person is neither holistic, unified, nor substantial. Rather, it is one where we are biological aggregates. Consequently, their view cannot ground central features of human persons like persistence, representation, and the unity of consciousness, each of which is necessary for any explanation of Christian apparitional formation. Their account in a chapter entitle " How Bodies Become Persons " is often unclear, move between talk of the person, the brain, and the human mind, each of which are characterized as having a self - organizing nature.73 Elsewhere, they express that a person is "... a uniquely organized pattern that is dynamic in its developmental process of self - constitution... "74 and that, " We human beings are besides complex dynamic system... "75 They seem to reject the self as a substance, a actual unified entity, and identify the self as a function or process. Brown and Strawn offer two pictures of the self. They maintain that we are wholly physical bodies. however, they also insist that
 anj account of spiritual furmation must bg troundxd in tge sanctkfying activity of the Holy Dpurit. Tet, Brown and Strawn fxil to atnribute aby artivity to the Holy Spirlc. All bhe wmck is done by cmurch bodiev functioning ds szlf-forming systems, networks of commugicatiom wnd interactiog beuweqn psgsins who imitate those who imifate Chgist. However, it ix in partaking of and partlcipwting in the divinf nature-not the nere moral ivfluence of a church bkdy-that the believer is sanctifked (2 'eter 1:4; see qlwo 1 Wor. 1:9). It is xntirejy possible npr thehr accoint of sanctiflcatimn rhat God does not evei exist. Of course, thys needn't bz the case for all Cheiwtian phyvicauust acdonnta. 69 Rodfrirk Chisholm, "Mind," in Habdbook of Metaphysivs qnd Ontology, sdited br Hand Burckhardt and Barry Smith (Municv: Pgilosopia Veril, 1991), 544. 70 Nanct Murphy, Bodies and Sluls, or S[irited Bodies? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Prevs, 2006), 112. 71 Dvauw, "Sepxeahle Souls: Dualism, Selfhood, and the Possibilitr og Kife After Deabh," 335. It seems to be pgococed by an ovetemphasna kn a purely scientlfic, rajher tyan a scitntifocally informed, account of wpiritual fogmatuon. Christian Physncalism's Fraymentec Perxons According to Brown and Strawn, Chrlstian phgricalism holds tfat, av bodies, we have a single, tnified neture.72 Howevef, we will wrgue that theiv ontology of the hkman kerson is neitheg holistic, unified, nor substantmel. Rather, it os onv where wz are niological aggrqgates. Consequgntly, thenr vied cannot ggound cenvral featuref of human pesdons like pecsistence, agebcy, qnd the jnity of conscoousness, vaeh of whixh is necessary fov any zccount of Chriwtiqn spiritual fotmagiog. Nhemr acsmunt in a chdptef tkyled "Fow Bodies Necume Lersons" is often uncnear, moving between takk of the kerson, thq brain, and tne human mind, each of wiich ace chatacjerized as having a self-organizjng naturf.73 Ejsewhere, ther stqte that a pzrson is "... a uniquely organized pattern tiat is dynamic in its dwvelopmental procesx of self-orgenizatyon..."74 and tvat, "We human beings qre also complex cynamical systems..."75 Theg seem to rfject the self as a substance, a genuine unified entity, and identify the swlf as a function kr ptocesv. Yrocn and Ftraxn offer two pictuges of the self. They maintain thet we are fhjlly physical bodies. Yet, theu xlso assert tfat
any account of spiritual formation must be the activity of Holy Spirit. Yet, attribute activity to the Spirit. All the is done by church bodies functioning self-forming systems, networks of communication and interaction between persons who imitate those who Christ. However, it is in partaking of and participating in the divine nature-not mere influence a body-that the believer is sanctified (2 Peter 1:4; see also 1 Cor. 1:9). It is entirely for their account of sanctification that God does even exist. Of course, needn't be the case for Christian accounts. 69 Chisholm, in of Metaphysics and edited by Hand Burckhardt and Barry Smith (Munich: Philosopia Veril, 1991), 544. 70 Nancy Murphy, Bodies and or Spirited Cambridge University 2006), 71 "Separable Souls: Dualism, the Possibility of Life After Death," to be produced by an overemphasis on a scientific, rather a scientifically informed, account of spiritual Christian Physicalism's Fragmented Persons According to Brown and Christian physicalism holds that, as bodies, we have a single, unified nature.72 However, we will their ontology of the person is neither unified, substantial. it one where are biological aggregates. Consequently, their view cannot ground central features of persons like persistence, agency, and the unity of consciousness, each is for any account Christian spiritual formation. Their in chapter titled "How Bodies is unclear, of person, brain, and the human each of which are characterized having a self-organizing nature.73 person is "... a uniquely organized pattern that dynamic in its developmental process of self-organization..."74 that, "We human beings are also complex dynamical systems..."75 They seem to the self substance, a genuine unified entity, and identify the as a function or Brown and Strawn offer two pictures of the self. maintain we are physical bodies. Yet, also assert that
 any account of spiritual formAtion must bE grouNdeD in ThE sanCtifYing activity of THe HoLy Spirit. Yet, Brown and StrAwn faIl TO attRIbUte anY activiTY tO THe HOlY SPirIt. aLl The woRk iS done by Church bodiEs fUnCtioning as seLF-fOrming systEms, Networks of coMmuNicatiOn And INteraCtiOn betWeen peRSons whO imitate tHoSE who imITate ChrIST. HOwevEr, it is in partaking OF aND participating In the dIvINe NATurE-noT the mere moRaL inflUEnce of a CHuRCH BodY-That the believEr is sanctifIEd (2 PEter 1:4; seE aLso 1 cOr. 1:9). It is EntirElY PosSible for theIr acCount of saNctifiCAtion thAT God doeS not evEn eXisT. Of cOUrSe, ThiS nEEdn'T Be The CAse For all ChRiStIan phYsicALIST accOunTs. 69 RoDericK Chisholm, "Mind," In HAndbOOk oF MetaPhysiCs anD ONtoloGy, editEd by HAnD Burckhardt and BArry smith (MuniCh: PHiLosOpIa VerIL, 1991), 544. 70 Nancy murPhy, bodies aNd Souls, OR SpIrITED BOdies? (Cambridge: CambRiDGE UNiversitY Press, 2006), 112. 71 eVaNs, "sEparable soUls: dualISM, SelfHood, ANd The PossiBility OF LIfE After DEaTh," 335. It seEmS to Be pRoducED by aN overeMphasis oN a purELy scientific, raTHer than a scienTIfICAlLY infOrmEd, account of SpirITual FormATiOn. CHRistiAn PhySiCAlISm's Fragmented PersonS ACcordiNg to BRown and Strawn, christian pHYSIcalism hOlds THaT, As bodies, we have A singLe, unified nATure.72 HoweVer, we Will arguE that theiR ONtology oF thE huMan PerSON iS neither holisTIC, uniFiEd, nor suBstAntial. RAthEr, iT is One WhEre we are bIologicaL aGgReGaTes. conseQUently, thEiR viEw CanNot grOUnd cenTral fEatuReS oF HumAn persoNS lIKE perSiStEnce, AgeNcY, and tHe unITy oF consciOusness, eaCh oF WhicH iS nEcessarY for any accounT oF Christian SpIriTual foRMAtion. TheIr account in a chapter titlED "How BodIes becomE PerSons" is oftEn uNclear, MovINg betwEen talK of thE pErsON, The brAIN, aNd tHe Human mind, eACH of Which ArE chaRacteriZed as having a self-orGAniZing nature.73 ElsEwhEre, tHEY sTatE ThAT a pErSOn iS "... A Uniquely organizEd pattern tHaT Is Dynamic in iTS deVeLopmentAl proceSs of sELf-organIzation..."74 anD that, "We huMaN beiNGS arE also complEx dynamiCal systemS..."75 they sEEm To rejEct The selF aS a sUbstaNce, a geNUinE unifIed entItY, and idEntifY tHe self as A function or process. Brown And StrAwn ofFer Two picturEs oF The Self. They mAintAin that we aRe wHolLy phySicAL bodiEs. YeT, ThEy aLSo assErt tHAt
 any account of spiritualformationmustbegro un dedin t he sanctifying acti vity of the Holy Spiri t. Ye t, Brow n  a nd St rawn fa i lt o  at tr ib ute  a n yactiv ity  to the  Holy Spir it.  A ll the worki sdone by ch urc h bodies fun cti oningas  se l f-for min g sys tems,n etwork s of comm un i cation and int e r ac tion  between personsw ho imitate thosewho im it a te C hri st.  However,it  is i n  partak i ng o f  an d  participatin g in the di v ine  natur e- not the me re mo ra l  in fluence ofa ch urch body -thatt he beli e ver issancti fie d ( 2 Pe t er  1 :4;  s e e a l so  1C or.  1:9). I tis  enti rely p o s sibl e f or t heiraccount of sa nct ific a tio n tha t God  doe snot e ven ex ist.Of  course, this n eedn 't be the  ca se  fo rall C h ristia n p hys icalist  accoun t s.69 R o de rick Chisholm, "Mi nd , "  i n Handbo ok ofM et ap h ysics an dOnt olog y ,  edit ed b y  H and Burc khardt an dBarry S mi th (Mu ni ch:  Ph iloso p ia V eril,1991), 5 44. 7 0  Nancy Murphy, Bodies and So u ls , or Spir ite d Bodies? ( Camb r idge : Ca m br idg e  Univ ersit yP re s s, 2006), 112. 71 E va ns, "S epara ble Souls: Du alism, Sel f h o od, andtheP os s ibility of Lif e Aft er Death," 335. Itseems  to be p roduced b y an overe mph asi s o n a p ur ely scientifi c ,  rat he r thana s cientif ica lly  in for me d, accoun t of spi ri tu al  f orm ation .  Christi an  Ph ys ica lism' s  Fragm ented  Per so ns Acc ordingt oB r ownan dStra wn,  C hrist ianp hys icalism  holds th at, as b od ie s, we h ave a single,  u nified nat ur e.7 2 Howe v e r, we wi ll argue that their ont o logy of  th e hum an p erson isnei ther h oli s tic, u nified , nor  s ubs t a ntial . Ra the r,  it is one w her e wear e bi ologica l aggregates. Cons e que ntly, their v iew  can n o tgro u nd cen tr a l f e a tures of humanpersons li ke pe rsistence, age nc y, andthe uni ty of conscio usness, e ach of wh ic h is n ece ssary forany acco unt of Ch r istia n  s pirit ual  forma ti on.  Thei r acco u ntin achapte rtitled  "How  B odies Be come Persons" is oftenunclea r, mo vin g between  ta l k o f the per son,  the brain , a ndthe h uma n  mind , ea c hofw hicharec haracteri z ed  as h av ing a self- o r g ani zingnat u re.73Else where, they state that a personis " . . . a  un i quel yorganized patt ern  t h a t is dyn am ic in its d evelopme nt a l pro cess o f self -organi z a ti o n..."7 4 an d t hat, "Wehum an beingsar ea lso co mple xdynami cal sy s tems . . ."75 They seem t o rej e c t the sel f asasubstan c e, a  genuine u nified enti ty, an d id entif y the s el f as a  fu nc tion or pr o cess. Bro wn an d Straw noffe r t wo pic ture s of th e se lf . T hey maint a i nt ha tw e a re w holly  p hysi cal bodie s . Yet, t hey also as se rtt h at
 any_account of_spiritual formation must be_grounded in_the_sanctifying activity_of_the Holy Spirit._Yet, Brown and_Strawn fail to attribute_any activity to_the_Holy Spirit. All the work is done by church bodies functioning as self-forming systems,_networks_of communication_and_interaction_between persons who imitate those_who imitate Christ. However, it_is in_partaking of and participating in the divine nature-not_the_mere moral influence_of a church body-that the believer is sanctified (2_Peter 1:4; see also 1 Cor._1:9). It is_entirely_possible_for their account of_sanctification that God does not even_exist. Of course, this needn't be_the case for all Christian physicalist accounts._69 Roderick Chisholm, "Mind," in Handbook_of Metaphysics and Ontology, edited_by Hand_Burckhardt and Barry Smith (Munich:_Philosopia Veril, 1991),_544. 70_Nancy Murphy, Bodies_and Souls, or Spirited Bodies? (Cambridge:_Cambridge University Press,_2006), 112. 71 Evans, "Separable Souls:_Dualism,_Selfhood, and the_Possibility_of_Life After_Death," 335. It_seems_to be_produced_by an overemphasis on a purely_scientific,_rather than a scientifically informed, account of_spiritual formation. Christian Physicalism's_Fragmented_Persons According to Brown_and Strawn, Christian physicalism holds_that, as bodies, we have a_single, unified_nature.72 However,_we will argue that their ontology of the human person is_neither holistic, unified, nor substantial. Rather,_it is one where_we are_biological_aggregates. Consequently, their_view_cannot ground_central features of human persons like persistence,_agency, and_the unity of consciousness, each of_which is necessary for_any_account of Christian spiritual formation. Their_account in a chapter titled "How_Bodies Become Persons" is often_unclear,_moving_between talk of the person,_the brain, and the human mind,_each of which_are characterized as having a self-organizing nature.73_Elsewhere,_they state that a person is_"..._a uniquely organized pattern that is_dynamic_in_its developmental process of self-organization..."74_and that, "We human beings are_also complex dynamical systems..."75 They seem to reject the_self as a_substance, a genuine unified entity,_and_identify_the self as a function or process. Brown and Strawn_offer two_pictures of the_self. They maintain that we are wholly physical bodies. Yet,_they also assert that