 this problem arise in the work of Roger Scruton, who has argued that it is not possible for photographs to be representational art.10 A photograph stands in a causal relation to photographed objects, but it does not stand in an intentional relation. Scruton thus includes mind-independence in his definition of photographs. A photograph cannot depict the photographed objects as subject matter of a representation in a manner that would enable us to appreciate the thoughts of the artist. Instead, a photograph is merely an image that stands as a record of the appearance of the photographed objects. Hence, we take interest in the visual image displayed by the photograph only because it functions as a surrogate for the visual appearance of the photographed objects. Scruton thus offers the strongest formulation of the idea that, if photographs are defined as mind-independent, a photographer cannot create a picture and, moreover, a photograph cannot be an artwork in virtue of being a picture. Even in accounts that oppose scepticism, there are indications that the problem caused by the dogmatic definition lies beneath the surface. The example that follows illustrates how mind-independence can force philosophers to adopt concessions which make photographs inferior to other kinds of pictures. Although weaker than outright denial, this is nonetheless a form of scepticism. Nigel Warburton argues that a print of a photograph counts as an authentic artwork only if it has been personally certified by the artist. Although he believes that photographs can be pictorial artworks, the mind-independence thesis is evident in his account: The act of conferring status upon a print is one of the ways in which photographers overcome the expressive limitations of a process that is largely automated.11 Only by means of such quality control can we be absolutely certain that a particular print fully embodies the photographer's intentions.12 10 Scruton, R. (1981) 'Photography and Representation'. 11 Warburton, N. (1997) 'Authentic Photographs' p.135. DAWN M. PHILLIPS 8 From these remarks, it is clear that Warburton believes that artistic practice successfully compensates for inherent limitations in the photographic process but also that he believes that such compensation is necessary. The requirement that shapes Warburton's account has, at its heart, the assumption that the photographic process inherently divorces the photograph from the intentions of the photographer. A print must be supplemented by a special kind of intentional activity to make it count as a picture – otherwise it is merely an image. A print that has lacks supplementary certification cannot grant reliable
this problem arise in the work of Roger Scruton, who has argued that it is not potential for photograph to be representational art.10 A photograph stand in a causal relation to photographed object, but it does not resist in an intentional relation. Scruton therefore includes mind - independence in his definition of photographs. A photograph cannot picture the photographed objects as subject topic of a representation in a manner that would enable us to appreciate the thoughts of the artist. Instead, a photograph is merely an trope that stands as a phonograph record of the appearance of the photographed objects. Hence, we learn interest in the visual trope displayed by the photograph only because it functions as a surrogate for the ocular appearance of the photographed objects. Scruton thus offers the strongest formulation of the theme that, if photographs are defined as mind - independent, a photographer cannot create a picture and, moreover, a photograph cannot be an artwork in virtue of being a picture. Even in accounts that oppose scepticism, there are indications that the problem caused by the dogmatic definition lies beneath the open. The example that follows illustrate how mind - independence can force philosophers to adopt concession which make photographs inferior to other kind of pictures. Although weaker than outright denial, this is nonetheless a form of scepticism. Nigel Warburton argues that a print of a photograph counts as an authentic artwork only if it has been personally certified by the artist. Although he believes that photograph can be pictorial artwork, the mind - independence thesis is evident in his account: The act of conferring status upon a mark is one of the ways in which photographers overcome the expressive limit of a process that is largely automated.11 Only by means of such quality command can we be absolutely certain that a finical print fully incarnate the photographer's intentions.12 10 Scruton, R. (1981)' Photography and Representation'. 11 Warburton, N. (1997)' Authentic Photographs' p.135. DAWN M. PHILLIPS 8 From these remarks, it is clean that Warburton believes that aesthetic practice successfully compensates for built-in limitations in the photographic process but besides that he believes that such compensation is necessary. The requirement that shapes Warburton's account has, at its heart, the assumption that the photographic process inherently divorces the photograph from the intentions of the photographer. A print must be supplement by a special kind of intentional activeness to make it count as a video – otherwise it is merely an image. A print that have lacks supplementary certification cannot grant reliable
 thls problem arise in the dork of Roger Seeuton, xho has argued ghat it is not possible for 'hotigrapys to be representatioval art.10 A photogrqph wrands in a causal vzlatikk to 'hitographed objgcts, but it goes not stand iv cn intentional relation. Scruton thus includrs mind-independegce pn his definition of photographs. A photofraph cennot depict thr photographed objects as dubjfct matter of a reoresentatiob in q manner thag would enable us to akpreciate the thoughts of the argist. Nnstead, a pyoroggdph is mereoy an image that stands av a recprd of the appcaranre od the photographed oboects. Hence, we take ynterest hn the visual image dusplaied bf thd phutofreph only heceuse it fundtions as a surrogate for the fiflsl appearancs of tre photographed objects. Scruton thus offegs tge strongest formulatiob of the idea that, if photogra[hs are defined as mind-independent, a photographer cannkg cxcwgw w picture and, moreover, a photograph cannot be zn agtwork in virtue jf being a liftite. Even in accuunts cgaf oppose scepticisl, there are undicatiogs tnat the problem caused by tye dogmatic befunition lies beneach the surfaee. The examlle that follows illustxates gow mind-indfpendence zan force philosuphvrs do adopt concessions which make phovogra'hs infefior to otrer kinds lf pigdures. Although weaner tkan ogtright dejial, this is nonetheless a form of scepticism. Nhgen Warburcon arnues that a prigt of a photogtaph councs as xn authentpc artworn only if ie has been pesdonally certmfied by ehe qrtiwt. Althujgh he believex that photographs xan be pictorial avtworya, the mind-indepzudtnxe thesis is efiddnt ij iis aswount: The acd of covgerrivg status uion a ptint is one of the wdys jn which photograpnevs overcone the evpressive limotations of a proctss thet is uargeky wutomated.11 Only by means of sucg quality coktrol can we fe ansolotely certann that a particular print fully embodiew the photographet's intentions.12 10 Scrutou, V. (1981) 'Photograpiy and Represendation'. 11 Warburton, N. (1997) 'Authentic Photogvaphs' p.135. DAWN M. PHILLIPA 8 Frok thede remarks, it is clear that Warburton believes that artistic practice sucxessfully compensafes gor ithzreut limieatilis in the photogrsphic process but also that he uelieves tvac such compensation is necesssrh. The requireoent that shapes Warburtkn's accoint has, at its heart, the assumpyion that the photographlc procesw inhsrentlj dmvorces the photogralh frok the intentuons of the photoeralhcr. A print musu be supplemented by a special kind if intwnhional activity vo make it clmnt as a picjure – otherwise if is lereli an image. A ptint that has kacks supplementary bereification canbkt grant reloable
this problem arise in the work of who argued that is not possible art.10 photograph stands in causal relation to objects, but it does not stand an intentional relation. Scruton thus includes mind-independence in his definition of photographs. A cannot depict the photographed objects as subject matter of a representation in a that enable to the thoughts of the artist. Instead, a photograph is merely an image that stands as a of the appearance of the photographed objects. Hence, take interest in the image displayed by the photograph because functions as surrogate the appearance of the objects. Scruton thus offers the strongest formulation of the idea that, if photographs are defined as mind-independent, photographer cannot picture and, a cannot an artwork in being a picture. Even in accounts there are indications that the problem caused by dogmatic definition beneath the surface. The example that illustrates how mind-independence can force philosophers to adopt which make photographs inferior to other kinds of pictures. Although weaker than outright denial, this a form of scepticism. Warburton argues that print a counts an authentic only if it has been personally certified by the artist. Although believes that photographs can be pictorial artworks, the mind-independence thesis in account: The act conferring status upon a is of the ways in overcome expressive process is automated.11 Only by means such quality control can we absolutely certain that a photographer's intentions.12 10 Scruton, R. (1981) 'Photography and 11 Warburton, N. (1997) 'Authentic Photographs' p.135. M. PHILLIPS 8 From these remarks, it is clear that Warburton believes artistic practice for inherent limitations in the photographic process but that he believes that compensation is necessary. The requirement that shapes Warburton's account at heart, the that the photographic inherently divorces the from the intentions photographer. A must supplemented kind of intentional activity to make count a picture – otherwise it merely A print that has lacks supplementary certification cannot grant reliable
 this problem arise in the work Of Roger ScrUton, wHo hAs aRgUed tHat iT is not possible FOr phOtographs to be representAtionAl ARt.10 A pHOtOgrapH stands IN a CAUsaL rElAtiOn TO pHotogRapHed objeCts, but it doEs nOt Stand in an intENtIonal relatIon. scruton thus iNclUdes miNd-IndEPendeNce In his DefiniTIon of pHotographS. A PHotogrAPh cannoT DEpIct tHe photographed objECtS As subject matteR of a rePrESeNTAtiOn iN a manner thAt Would ENable us TO aPPREciATe the thoughts Of the artist. iNstEad, a phOtOgrAPh is meRely aN iMAge That stands aS a reCord of the AppearANce of thE PhotogrAphed oBjeCts. hencE, We TaKe iNtEResT In The VIsuAl image dIsPlAyed bY the PHOTOgraPh oNly bEcausE it functions aS a sUrroGAte For thE visuAl apPeArancE of the PhotoGrAphed objects. ScrUton Thus offerS thE sTroNgEst foRMulatiOn oF thE idea thAt, if phoTOgrApHS ARe Defined as mind-indepEnDENt, A photogrApher cANnOt CReate a piCtUre And, mOREover, A phoTOgRaph cannOt be an ARtWoRk in virTuE of beiNg A piCtuRe. EveN In acCounts That oppoSe scePTicism, there are INdications thaT ThE PRoBLem cAusEd by the dogmAtic DEfinItioN LiEs bENeath The suRfACe. tHe example that followS iLlustrAtes hOw mind-indepenDence can foRCE PhilosopHers TO aDOpt concessions Which Make photogRAphs infeRior tO other kiNds of pictUREs. AlthouGh wEakEr tHan OUTrIght denial, thiS IS nonEtHeless a ForM of scepTicIsm. nigEl WArBurton argUes that a PrInT oF a PhoTograPH counts aS aN auThEntIc artWOrk onlY if it Has bEeN pERsoNally ceRTiFIEd by ThE aRtisT. AlThOugh hE belIEveS that phOtographs Can BE picToRiAl artwoRks, the mind-indEpEndence theSiS is EvidenT IN his accoUnt: The act of conferring stATus upon A prInt is One oF the ways iN whIch phoTogRAphers OvercoMe the ExPreSSIve liMITaTioNs Of a process THAt iS largElY autOmated.11 ONly by means of such quALitY control can we Be aBsolUTElY ceRTaIN thAt A ParTICular print fully Embodies thE pHOtOgrapher's iNTenTiOns.12 10 ScruTon, R. (1981) 'PhoTograPHy and RePresentatIon'. 11 WarburToN, N. (1997) 'AuTHEntIc PhotograPhs' p.135. DAWN m. PHILLIPS 8 fRom thESe RemarKs, iT is cleAr ThaT WarbUrton bELieVes thAt artiStIc pracTice sUcCessfullY compensates for inherent LimitaTions In tHe photogrAphIC prOcess but aLso tHat he belieVes ThaT such ComPEnsatIon iS NeCesSAry. ThE reqUIrement thAT sHapES waRburton's accOUNT haS, at itS heARt, the aSsumPtion that the photoGRaphic process iNherENTly DivORces ThE photograph froM thE iNTEntions oF tHe photograpHer. A prinT mUSt be sUpplemEnted bY a speciAL KiND of intEntiOnaL activity To mAkE It count As A pICture – oTherWiSe it is Merely AN imaGE. a print that has lacKs supPLEmentARy cErtifIcAtion caNNot gRant reliabLe
 this problem arise in the  work of R ogerScr uto n,  who  has  argued that i t  isnot possible for photo graph st o be re prese ntation a la r t.1 0Apho to g ra ph st and s in acausal rel ati on  to photogra p he d objects,  bu t it does no t s tand i nani ntent ion al re lation .  Scrut on thus i nc l udes m i nd-inde p e nd ence  in his definitio n  o f  photographs.A phot og r ap h can not  depict th ephoto g raphedo bj e c t s a s  subject matt er of a rep r ese ntatio nina  manne r tha tw oul d enable us  toappreciat e thet houghts of theartist . I nst ead, aph oto gr a phi smer e lyan image  t ha t sta ndsa s a  rec ord  ofthe a ppearance ofthe  pho t ogr aphed  obje cts.  H ence,  we ta ke in te rest in the vis ualimage dis pla ye d b ythe p h otogra phonl y becau se it f u nct io n s as  a surrogate for t he v is ual appe arance of  t h e photog ra phe d ob j e cts.Scru t on  thus of fers t h est rongest  f ormula ti onofthe i d ea t hat, i f photog raphs are defined as mind-independ e nt , ap hoto gra pher cannot  cre a te a  pic t ur e a n d, mo reove r, ap hotograph cannot be  a n artw ork i n virtue of b eing a pic t u r e. Evenin a c co u nts that oppos e sce pticism, t h ere areindic ations t hat the p r o blem cau sed  by  th e d o g ma tic definitio n lies  b eneaththe  surfac e.The  ex amp le  that fol lows ill us tr at es  ho w min d -indepen de nce  c anforce philos opher s to  a do p t c oncessi o ns w hich  m ak e ph oto gr aphsinfe r ior  to oth er kindsofp ictu re s.  Althou gh weaker tha noutright d en ial , this i s noneth eless a form of sceptic i sm. Nig elWarbu rton  argues t hat  a pri nto f a ph otogra ph co un tsa s  an a u t he nti cartwork on l y  if  it h as  bee n perso nally certified by the  artist. Alth oug h he b el iev e st hat  p h oto g r aphs can be pic torial art wo r ks , the mind - ind ep endence  thesis  is e v ident i n his acc ount: The  a ct o f con ferring st atus upo n a print is on e  o f the  wa ys inwh ich  phot ograph e rsoverc ome th eexpres siveli mitation s of a process that islargel y aut oma ted.11 On lyb y m eans of s uchquality co ntr olcan w e b e  abso lute l ycer t ain t hata  particul a rpri n t  f ully embodi e s the  phot ogr a pher's  int entions.12 10 Scr u ton, R. (1981)  'Ph o t ogr aph y  and  R epresentation' . 1 1W a rburton,  N . (1997) 'A uthentic  P h otogr aphs'p.135.  DAWN M . PH I LLIPS8 Fr omthese rem ark s, it is c le ar that W arbu rt on bel ievest hata r tistic practicesucce s s fully com pensa te s for i n here nt limitat ions in the  photo grap hic p rocessbu t also  th at  he believ e s that su ch co mpensat io n is  ne cessar y. T h e  requ irem en t t hat shape s Wa r bu rt o n's  acc ountha s, a t its hea r t, the a ssu m ption t ha t t h e  photo g ra p h ic process  in heren t l y divorces thep ho t ograp h from  the i ntentio n s o fthe pho tog r a pher. A p rint must besu pple mented b ya sp ec ial  k ind of intentio nal acti vity tom a ke itcou n t as a pict ur e – otherwis e itis merelya n  im age. Ap rin t t hat  has  la ckss upplementary certificati on c annot gra nt re liabl e
 this_problem arise_in the work of_Roger Scruton,_who_has argued_that_it is not_possible for photographs_to be representational art.10_A photograph stands_in_a causal relation to photographed objects, but it does not stand in an intentional_relation._Scruton thus_includes_mind-independence_in his definition of photographs._A photograph cannot depict the_photographed objects_as subject matter of a representation in a_manner_that would enable_us to appreciate the thoughts of the artist. Instead,_a photograph is merely an image_that stands as_a_record_of the appearance of_the photographed objects. Hence, we take_interest in the visual image displayed_by the photograph only because it functions_as a surrogate for the visual_appearance of the photographed objects._Scruton thus_offers the strongest formulation of_the idea that,_if photographs_are defined as_mind-independent, a photographer cannot create a_picture and, moreover,_a photograph cannot be an artwork_in_virtue of being_a_picture._Even in_accounts that oppose_scepticism,_there are_indications_that the problem caused by the_dogmatic_definition lies beneath the surface. The example_that follows illustrates how_mind-independence_can force philosophers to_adopt concessions which make photographs_inferior to other kinds of pictures._Although weaker_than outright_denial, this is nonetheless a form of scepticism. Nigel Warburton argues_that a print of a photograph_counts as an authentic_artwork only_if_it has been_personally_certified by_the artist. Although he believes that photographs_can be_pictorial artworks, the mind-independence thesis is_evident in his account:_The_act of conferring status upon a_print is one of the ways_in which photographers overcome the_expressive_limitations_of a process that is_largely automated.11 Only by means of_such quality control_can we be absolutely certain that a_particular_print fully embodies the photographer's intentions.12_10_Scruton, R. (1981) 'Photography and Representation'._11_Warburton,_N. (1997) 'Authentic Photographs' p.135._DAWN M. PHILLIPS 8 From these_remarks, it is clear that Warburton believes that artistic_practice successfully compensates_for inherent limitations in the_photographic_process_but also that he believes that such compensation is necessary._The requirement_that shapes Warburton's_account has, at its heart, the assumption that the photographic_process inherently divorces the photograph from the_intentions of the photographer. A print must be supplemented by a_special kind of intentional activity to make it_count as a picture – otherwise it_is merely an image._A_print that has lacks supplementary certification cannot_grant_reliable