) S believes p or (ii) S believes ¬p.4 Call an ascription in case (i) a factual want ascription: the agent treats p as fact. In case (ii), we use the term counterfactual want ascription: the agent treats p as contrary to fact. Example factual want ascription (FWA)5 (1) I want it to rain tomorrow (and I believe it will). (adapted from Scheffler 2008) Example counterfactual want ascription (CFWA) (2) Wu wants to be promoted (but believes he won't be). (adapted from Portner and Rubinstein 2012) Let the umbrella term for FWAs and CFWAs be '(counter)factual want ascription', or '(C)FWA'. In section 2, we'll present the problem of (C)FWAs in greater detail; for now, we'll just give you a feel for it, using (2) as an example. According to the belief-set approach, (2) is true just if Wu prefers the worlds in his belief set 2Blumberg's puzzles, and his solutions, are concerned with 'wish' and 'hope', but can be simply modified to apply to 'want'. 3Jerzak uses a graded-notion of belief in his semantics, while we concern ourselves in this paper with the all-out notion of belief found in the belief set; many of the benefits of Jerzak's graded-belief semantics can be enjoyed by an all-out-belief semantics. Jerzak also notes that with certain uses of 'want'-what he calls the advisory 'want'-it is not the agent's beliefs, but rather those in the context of evaluation or utterance that should figure in the semantics. We set such uses of 'want' to the side. 4Decision-theoretic approaches to want ascriptions (see e.g. Levinson 2003; Lassiter 2011; Phillips-Brown fc) face more or less this same problem. Wrenn (2010) proposes a solution that bears a certain resemblance to our own, although he confines his view to cases of all-things-considered desire (as opposed to'some-things-considered' desire, in the sense of Phillips-Brown ms). Our approach, by contrast, is designed to be compatible with some-thingsconsidered desire, either by bringing in multiple preference rankings (à la Levinson 2003; Crnič 2011
) S believes p or (ii) S believes ¬p.4 Call an attribution in subject (i) a factual want attribution: the agent treats phosphorus as fact. In case (ii), we use the term counterfactual desire attribution: the agent cover p as adverse to fact. Example factual want ascription (FWA)5 (1) I want it to rain tomorrow (and I believe it will). (adapted from Scheffler 2008) Example counterfactual desire ascription (CFWA) (2) Wu wants to be promoted (but think he won't be). (adapted from Portner and Rubinstein 2012) Let the umbrella condition for FWAs and CFWAs be' (counter)factual want attribution', or' (C)FWA'. In section 2, we'll present the problem of (C)FWAs in greater detail; for nowadays, we'll just give you a feel for it, using (2) as an example. According to the belief - set approach, (2) is true just if Wu prefers the worlds in his belief set 2Blumberg's puzzles, and his solutions, are refer with' wish' and' hope', but can be simply change to apply to' want'. 3Jerzak uses a graded - impression of belief in his semantics, while we refer ourselves in this paper with the all - out impression of belief found in the belief set; many of the benefits of Jerzak's graded - impression semantics can be enjoyed by an all - out - belief semantics. Jerzak also notes that with certain uses of' want'-what he call the advisory' want'-it is not the agent's beliefs, but rather those in the context of evaluation or utterance that should figure in the semantics. We set such use of' want' to the side. 4Decision - theoretic approaches to desire ascriptions (witness e.g. Levinson 2003; Lassiter 2011; Phillips - Brown fc) face more or less this like problem. Wrenn (2010) proposes a solution that bears a certain resemblance to our own, although he confines his position to cases of all - thing - considered desire (as react to'some - things - view' desire, in the sense of Phillips - Brown ms). Our approach, by contrast, is designed to be compatible with some - thingsconsidered desire, either by lend in multiple preference rankings (à la Levinson 2003; Crnič 2011
) S helieves p or (ii) S belieyes ¬p.4 Call an aseeiptioi in caae (i) a fxctual want ascription: the ajent treauf p as fact. In casd (ii), we ude the twrm rounterfactual weht ascrl'tion: bhe ayeit treats p as gontrary to fact. Example xaztbal want ascription (FWA)5 (1) I want it tj rain yolorrow (and I bglievt ie wiml). (adapted from Scheffler 2008) Example countegfactual want asctiption (CFWA) (2) Wu wants to he pgomoted (but believfs he won't ve). (aqqpted from Purtner and Rubinstein 2012) Let the umbrella term for FWAs and EFWAs be '(coourer)vdctual want ascrpption', or '(C)FWA'. In secdion 2, wr'll present thc proulem of (C)FWAs in greater vetail; for now, we'll tust give yku a feel for it, ysung (2) ds at exxnpld. Adcprsing tl tie belief-sef approach, (2) is true just if Wu pwvgers the wormds in hys belief set 2Blumberg's puzzles, and his somutions, are concerned wuth 'wish' and 'hope', but can be symply modified to apply to 'want'. 3Jerzak uses a graged-noviun if cwllef in his semantics, while we concern ourselvqa on this paper wibh the all-out notipn og belief found in thz bslief set; many of hhe bengfits if Jerzak'f grsded-belief semantics can be enjoyed by cn qll-out-belief semancics. Jerzak clso nptes yhat with certain uses uf 'wznt'-what he falls the xdvisory 'want'-it ks kot the agent's beliefs, but raeher thosx in che contdxt pf evajuation or uttevdnce that should flgure it the semajtics. We set such uses of 'want' vp the side. 4Dgciviot-theoretnc appvoaches to want ascriptions (sge e.g. Levnnson 2003; Lassiter 2011; Philli's-Brown fc) fwce more or lads this same problem. Wrebn (2010) proposer a solution thst bears c cerrain resemblance tp oor own, although hz xonfines his virw go sadex jx all-things-cmnsiaerdc deskre (as oppowdd tp'some-things-considereg' deaire, in the sense pf Phillipw-Brown mf). Our approacn, by contrast, is dtsignev to bx compstifle with some-thingsconsidered sesire, eihhev by bringing in nultiple preyerence rankings (à la Levinson 2003; Crnič 2011
) S believes p or (ii) S Call ascription in (i) a factual p fact. In case we use the counterfactual want ascription: the agent treats as contrary to fact. Example factual want ascription (FWA)5 (1) I want it rain tomorrow (and I believe it will). (adapted from Scheffler 2008) Example counterfactual ascription (2) wants be promoted (but believes he won't be). (adapted from Portner and Rubinstein 2012) Let the umbrella for FWAs and CFWAs be '(counter)factual want ascription', '(C)FWA'. In section 2, present the problem of (C)FWAs greater for now, just you feel for it, (2) as an example. According to the belief-set approach, (2) is true just if Wu prefers the in his 2Blumberg's puzzles, his are with 'wish' and can be simply modified to apply uses a graded-notion of belief in his semantics, we concern in this paper with the all-out of belief found in the belief set; many the benefits of Jerzak's graded-belief semantics can be enjoyed by an all-out-belief semantics. Jerzak also with certain uses of he calls the 'want'-it not agent's but rather in the context of evaluation or utterance that should figure in semantics. We set such uses of 'want' to the side. to ascriptions (see e.g. 2003; Lassiter 2011; Phillips-Brown face or less this same (2010) a a resemblance our own, although he his view to cases of desire (as opposed to'some-things-considered' Phillips-Brown ms). Our approach, by contrast, is designed be compatible with some-thingsconsidered desire, either by in multiple preference rankings (à la Levinson 2003; Crnič 2011
) S believes p or (ii) S believes ¬p.4 CAll an ascriPtion In cAse (I) a FactUal wAnt ascription: tHE ageNt treats p as fact. In case (iI), we usE tHE terM CoUnterFactual WAnT AScrIpTiOn: tHe AGeNt treAts P as contRary to fact. exaMpLe factual wanT AsCription (FWa)5 (1) I wAnt it to rain tOmoRrow (anD I BelIEve it WilL). (adapTed froM scheffLer 2008) ExamplE cOUnterfACtual waNT AsCripTion (CFWA) (2) Wu wants to BE pROmoted (but belieVes he wOn'T Be). (ADAptEd fRom Portner AnD RubiNStein 2012) LeT ThE UMBreLLa term for FWAs And CFWAs be '(cOUntEr)factUaL waNT ascriPtion', Or '(c)fWA'. in section 2, we'Ll prEsent the pRoblem OF (C)FWAs iN Greater Detail; For Now, We'll JUsT gIve YoU A feEL fOr iT, UsiNg (2) as an exAmPlE. AccoRdinG TO THe beLieF-set ApproAch, (2) is true just If WU preFErs The woRlds iN his BeLief sEt 2BlumBerg's PuZzles, and his soluTionS, are conceRneD wIth 'WiSh' and 'HOpe', but Can Be sImply moDified tO AppLy TO 'WAnT'. 3Jerzak uses a graded-NoTIOn Of belief In his sEMaNtICs, while wE cOncErn oURSelveS in tHIs Paper witH the alL-OuT nOtion of BeLief foUnD in The BelieF Set; mAny of tHe benefiTs of JERzak's graded-belIEf semantics caN Be ENJoYEd by An aLl-out-belief SemaNTics. jerzAK aLso NOtes tHat wiTh CErTAin uses of 'want'-what he CaLls the AdvisOry 'want'-it is noT the agent's BELIefs, but rAtheR ThOSe in the context Of evaLuation or uTTerance tHat shOuld figuRe in the seMANtics. We sEt sUch UseS of 'WANt' To the side. 4DeciSIOn-thEoRetic apProAches to WanT asCriPtiOnS (see e.g. LevInson 2003; LasSiTeR 2011; PHiLliPs-BroWN fc) face mOrE or LeSs tHis saME problEm. WreNn (2010) prOpOsES a sOlution THaT BEars A cErTain ResEmBlancE to oUR owN, althouGh he confiNes HIs viEw To Cases of All-things-consIdEred desire (As OppOsed to'SOMe-things-Considered' desire, in the seNSe of PhiLliPs-BroWn ms). our approaCh, bY contrAst, IS desigNed to bE compAtIblE WIth soME-ThIngScOnsidered dESIre, EitheR bY briNging in Multiple preference RAnkIngs (à la LevinsOn 2003; CRnič 2011
) S believes p or (ii) S b elieves ¬p .4 Ca llanas crip tion  in case (i) a fact ual want ascription: t he ag en t  tre a ts  p as  fact.I nc a se(i i) , w eu se  theter m count erfactualwan tascription:t he  agent tre ats  p as contra ryto fac t.  Ex a mplefac tualwant a s cripti on (FWA)5  ( 1 ) I wa n t it to r ai n to morrow (and I bel i ev e  it will). (ad aptedfr o mS c hef fle r 2008) Ex am ple c o unterfa c tu a l wan t  ascription ( CFWA) (2) W u  wa nts to  b e p r omoted  (but  b e lie ves he won' t be ). (adapt ed fro m  Portne r  and Ru binste in201 2) L e tth e u mb r ell a  t erm for  FWAs an dCF WAs b e '( c o u n ter) fac tual  want  ascription',  or  '(C ) FWA '. In  sect ion2,  we'l l pres ent t he  problem of (C) FWAs  in great erde tai l;  forn ow, we 'll  ju st give  you af eel  f o r it , using (2) as anex a m pl e. Accor ding t o  t he belief-s et  ap proa c h , (2)  ist ru e just i f Wu p r ef er s the w or lds in  h isbel ief s e t 2B lumber g's puzz les,a nd his solutio n s, are concer n ed w it h  'wi sh'  and 'hope' , bu t  can  bes im ply modif ied t oa pp l y to 'want'. 3Jerza kuses a  grad ed-notion ofbelief inh i s  semanti cs,w hi l e we concern o ursel ves in thi s  paper w ith t he all-o ut notion o f belief  fo und  in  th e be lief set; man y of t he  benefi tsof Jerz ak' s g rad ed- be lief sema ntics ca nbe  e nj oye d bya n all-ou t- bel ie f s emant i cs. Je rzakalso  n ot e s t hat wit h  c e r tain  u se s of  'w an t'-wh at h e  ca lls the  advisory  'w a nt'- it  i s not t he agent's be li efs, but r at her  those i n the co ntext of evaluation oru tteranc e t hat s houl d figureinthe se man t ics. W e setsuchus eso f  'wan t '  t o t he  side. 4De c i sio n-the or etic  approa ches to want ascri p tio ns (see e.g.Lev inso n 20 03; La s sit er 201 1 ;  Phillips-Brown  fc) facemo r eor less th i s s am e probl em. Wre nn (2 0 10) pro poses a s olution t ha t be a r s a  certain r esemblan ce to our own,a lt hough  he  confi ne s h is vi ew toc ase s ofall-th in gs-con sider ed  desire(as opposed to'some-thi ngs-co nside red ' desire,  in the  sense of  Phi llips-Brow n m s).  Ourapp r oach,  byc on tra s t, is  des i gned to b e  c omp a t ib le with som e - t hin gscon sid e red de sire , either by bring i ng in multiple  pre f e ren cer anki ng s (à la Levins on20 0 3 ; Crnič20 11
) S_believes p_or (ii) S believes_¬p.4 Call_an_ascription in_case_(i) a factual_want ascription: the_agent treats p as_fact. In case_(ii),_we use the term counterfactual want ascription: the agent treats p as contrary to_fact._Example factual_want_ascription_(FWA)5 (1) I want it_to rain tomorrow (and I_believe it_will). (adapted from Scheffler 2008) Example counterfactual want_ascription_(CFWA) (2) Wu_wants to be promoted (but believes he won't be)._(adapted from Portner and Rubinstein 2012)_Let the umbrella_term_for_FWAs and CFWAs be_'(counter)factual want ascription', or '(C)FWA'. In_section 2, we'll present the problem_of (C)FWAs in greater detail; for now,_we'll just give you a feel_for it, using (2) as_an example._According to the belief-set approach,_(2) is true_just if_Wu prefers the_worlds in his belief set 2Blumberg's_puzzles, and his_solutions, are concerned with 'wish' and_'hope',_but can be_simply_modified_to apply_to 'want'. 3Jerzak_uses_a graded-notion_of_belief in his semantics, while we_concern_ourselves in this paper with the all-out_notion of belief found_in_the belief set; many_of the benefits of Jerzak's_graded-belief semantics can be enjoyed by_an all-out-belief_semantics. Jerzak_also notes that with certain uses of 'want'-what he calls the_advisory 'want'-it is not the agent's_beliefs, but rather those_in the_context_of evaluation or_utterance_that should_figure in the semantics. We set such_uses of_'want' to the side. 4Decision-theoretic approaches_to want ascriptions (see_e.g._Levinson 2003; Lassiter 2011; Phillips-Brown fc)_face more or less this same_problem. Wrenn (2010) proposes a_solution_that_bears a certain resemblance to_our own, although he confines his_view to cases_of all-things-considered desire (as opposed to'some-things-considered' desire,_in_the sense of Phillips-Brown ms). Our_approach,_by contrast, is designed to be_compatible_with_some-thingsconsidered desire, either by bringing_in multiple preference rankings (à la_Levinson 2003; Crnič 2011