 performs. Vivek is prone to wishful seeing. He wants and expects people to enjoy his performance, and when he looks at the sea of faces, approval is all he sees. Unbeknownst to him, Vivek's vanity --‐ like imperceptible tinted sunglasses --‐ affects his visual experience of the faces in the crowd. To arrive at a belief that's congruent with his vanity, Vivek has no need to jump to conclusions. He can just believe his eyes. When he believes his eyes, he takes himself to have gained evidence (or perhaps a more generic form of rational support) for his belief that people like his performances. And so he strengthens his belief. Were it not for the presumption that experiences have no rational standing, we might suspect that when Vivek's vanity affects his experience, his experience is ill--‐founded, for the same reason as a vanity--‐induced belief would be: because it's an extension of the ill--‐founded exaggeration beneath Vivek's vanity. If Vivek's vanity left his experience untouched, but made him infer, from the looks on their neutral and displeased faces, that the people he sees are pleased, we wouldn't hesitate to consider his belief ill--‐founded. If Vivek's wishful seeing could have the same epistemic effects on his perceptual experience as his wishful thinking has on his belief, then presumably the other routes to ill--‐founded belief besides wishful thinking also have epistemic parallels for experience. The question whether perceptual experiences redound on the subject's rational standing has direct application to self--‐defense law. Here we have another reason why the question matters. Self--‐defense laws mitigate sanctions against some forms of physical aggression. In US law, for an act of self--‐defense to justify aggression, the defender has to believe that he or she is in immanent danger, and 3 Discussions of the boundary include Davidson (1982) and more recently A. Smith (2005). Even many who reject Davidson's idea that perceptions can't justify beliefs (only beliefs can) agree with him that perception has no rational standing of its own. Where the boundaries are around what Davidson calls the 'house of reason' arises in discussions of how implicit biases as measured by the Implicit Association Task. On the issue of how implicit biases may redound on the moral or rational standing go the subjects, see many of the papers in Brownstein and Saul (2016). 4 I argue that
performs. Vivek is prone to wishful seeing. He wants and expect citizenry to enjoy his performance, and when he looks at the ocean of faces, approval is all he sees. unbeknown to him, Vivek's conceit --‐ like imperceptible tinted sunglasses --‐ affects his visual experience of the boldness in the crowd. To arrive at a belief that's congruent with his vanity, Vivek take no need to jump to conclusions. He can just believe his eyes. When he believe his eyes, he takes himself to have gained evidence (or possibly a more generic form of rational documentation) for his belief that citizenry like his performances. And so he strengthens his belief. Were it not for the presumption that experience have no rational standing, we might suspect that when Vivek's vanity affects his experience, his experience is ill--‐founded, for the same reason as a vanity--‐induced belief would be: because it's an extension of the ill--‐founded exaggeration beneath Vivek's vanity. If Vivek's vanity left his experience untouched, but made him infer, from the looks on their neutral and displeased grimace, that the people he sees are pleased, we wouldn't hesitate to think his impression ill--‐founded. If Vivek's wishful seeing could have the same epistemic effects on his perceptual experience as his wishful thinking has on his belief, then presumably the other path to ill--‐founded belief besides wishful thinking also have epistemic parallels for experience. The question whether perceptual experience redound on the subject's rational standing has direct lotion to self--‐defense law. Here we get another rationality why the question matters. Self--‐defense laws extenuate sanctions against some forms of physical aggression. In US law, for an act of self--‐defense to justify aggression, the defender has to believe that he or she is in immanent danger, and 3 Discussions of the limit include Davidson (1982) and more recently A. Smith (2005). Even many who reject Davidson's idea that perceptions can't justify belief (only belief can) agree with him that percept has no intellectual standing of its own. Where the boundaries are around what Davidson calls the' house of cause' arises in discussion of how implicit biases as measured by the Implicit Association Task. On the issue of how implicit biases may redound on the moral or rational standing go the subjects, see many of the papers in Brownstein and Saul (2016). 4 I argue that
 pegforms. Vivek is prone to wishful seeing. He wanvs and sxpects oeople to enjoy his performaice, qnd wyen he looks at the sex of faced, approvql iw all he sexa. Unbekkjwnsf to kin, Vivek's vaniti --‐ like impesceptible tintad sbnglasses --‐ affects his visual experiqnce of tje faces in thg croeq. To arrive at a belief that's congruenf with iis vanity, Vivel has no need to jump to clnclksions. He can just believe hiw eyqw. When he beuieves his eyes, he takgs himself to have gained evidenze (or perhaps a mire ceneric forn of gational support) for vis beloef that peoplc likx hiw performances. And so he strengthens hif belief. Fexe it not for the prewunptiot thdt ebperkendex gave nl retional stahding, we mitht suspect that whtn Dpfek's vanity zffectf ris experience, his experience is ill--‐foutdes, for the same reason aw a vanity--‐induced bellef would be: because it's an extension of the ill--‐founded exdggeretkon bcneagy Givek's vanity. If Vivek's vanity left his experysnve untouched, but made him imffr, srom the lookr on tksid neutral and disppeased saces, that the peolle he sees are pleased, we qouldn't hesinate to consider his bzlief ill--‐fouuded. Ig Vivrk's wishful seeing coulb have the same eoistemic swfects on his pefceituan experitvce as his wishfuj thinkinj has on his beloef, thqn presumahly tma other routes to lll--‐foonded telief besldes wishful thinking also have epistemic parslnelv for ex'erienge. The question whether percektual expzriencds redound on the subject's rwtional standhjg has direcv applicaeion to welf--‐defdvse law. Here wr have another reasin why the questiok matjeds. Self--‐defense oaww mitigate sancyiovs wgwiist sjke forms of [hyskcau aggrdssion. In UW law, for an act of self--‐dafenae to justify aggrrsfion, the defendew has to belirve that he or she is ii immaient dsnggr, and 3 Discussions of the bounsary inclkde Davidson (1982) agd mire recently A. Smith (2005). Even many who reject Davidson'w idea that percektions can't justify bglitfs (only belixfs cag) agree whth him that perceptuon has no rationsl standing of its owh. Whera the boundaries are around what Davidson calls the 'house of reason' arises in eiscussions of how impkicit bnaszs as mqasucev by the Implicit Association Task. On the issue uf how ikpjicit biases may redound on yhd moral or rajional standing go the subnects, ser many of the papers in Brownstrin and Saul (2016). 4 I argue tmat
performs. Vivek is prone to wishful seeing. and people to his performance, and sea faces, approval is he sees. Unbeknownst him, Vivek's vanity --‐ like imperceptible sunglasses --‐ affects his visual experience of the faces in the crowd. To at a belief that's congruent with his vanity, Vivek has no need to to He just his eyes. When he believes his eyes, he takes himself to have gained evidence (or perhaps more generic form of rational support) for his that people like his And so he strengthens his Were not for presumption experiences no rational standing, might suspect that when Vivek's vanity affects his experience, his experience is ill--‐founded, for the same reason a vanity--‐induced be: because an of ill--‐founded exaggeration beneath If Vivek's vanity left his experience him infer, from the looks on their neutral displeased faces, the people he sees are pleased, wouldn't hesitate to consider his belief ill--‐founded. If wishful seeing could have the same epistemic effects on his perceptual experience as his wishful on his belief, then the other routes ill--‐founded besides thinking have epistemic for experience. The question whether perceptual experiences redound on the subject's standing has direct application to self--‐defense law. Here we have why question matters. Self--‐defense mitigate sanctions against some of aggression. In US law, act self--‐defense the has believe that he or is in immanent danger, and Discussions of the boundary recently A. Smith (2005). Even many who reject idea that perceptions can't justify beliefs (only can) agree with him that perception has no rational standing of its Where the around what Davidson calls the 'house of reason' in discussions of how biases as measured by the Implicit Association Task. On issue how implicit may redound on moral or rational go the subjects, of the in and I argue that
 performs. Vivek is prone to wisHful seeing. he wanTs aNd eXpEcts PeopLe to enjoy his peRFormAnce, and when he looks at thE sea oF fACes, aPPrOval iS all he sEEs. uNBekNoWnSt tO hIM, VIvek's VanIty --‐ like ImperceptiBle TiNted sunglassES --‐ aFfects his vIsuAl experience Of tHe faceS iN thE Crowd. to aRrive At a belIEf that'S congruenT wITh his vANity, VivEK HaS no nEed to jump to concluSIoNS. He can just beliEve his EyES. WHEN he BelIeves his eyEs, He takES himselF To HAVE gaINed evidence (or Perhaps a morE GenEric foRm Of rATional SuppoRt) FOr hIs belief thaT peoPle like hiS perfoRMances. AND so he stRengthEns His BeliEF. WErE it NoT For THe PreSUmpTion that ExPeRiencEs haVE NO RatiOnaL staNding, We might suspecT thAt whEN ViVek's vAnity AffeCtS his eXperieNce, hiS eXperience is ill--‐fOundEd, for the sAme ReAsoN aS a vanITy--‐induCed BelIef woulD be: becaUSe iT's AN EXtEnsion of the ill--‐founDeD EXaGgeratioN beneaTH VIvEK's vanity. if vivEk's vANIty leFt hiS ExPerience UntoucHEd, BuT made hiM iNfer, frOm The LooKs on tHEir nEutral And displEased FAces, that the peoPLe he sees are plEAsED, We WOuldN't hEsitate to coNsidER his BeliEF iLl--‐fOUnded. if VivEk'S WiSHful seeing could have ThE same ePisteMic effects on hIs perceptuAL EXperiencE as hIS wIShful thinking hAs on hIs belief, thEN presumaBly thE other roUtes to ill--‐FOUnded belIef BesIdeS wiSHFuL thinking also HAVe epIsTemic paRalLels for ExpEriEncE. ThE qUestion whEther perCePtUaL eXpeRiencES redound On The SuBjeCt's raTIonal sTandiNg haS dIrECt aPplicatIOn TO Self--‐DeFeNse lAw. HErE we haVe anOTheR reason Why the queStiON matTeRs. self--‐defEnse laws mitigAtE sanctions AgAinSt some FORms of phySical aggression. In US law, fOR an act oF seLf--‐defEnse To justify AggRessioN, thE DefendEr has tO beliEvE thAT He or sHE Is In iMmAnent dangeR, ANd 3 DIscusSiOns oF the bouNdary include DavidsON (1982) anD more recently a. SmIth (2005). EVEN mAny WHo REjeCt dAviDSOn's idea that percEptions can'T jUStIfy beliefs (ONly BeLiefs caN) agree wIth hiM That perCeption haS no rationAl StanDINg oF its own. WheRe the bouNdaries arE ArounD WhAt DavIdsOn callS tHe 'hOuse oF reasoN' AriSes in DiscusSiOns of hOw impLiCit biaseS as measured by the ImpliciT AssocIatioN TaSk. On the isSue OF hoW implicit BiasEs may redouNd oN thE moraL or RAtionAl stANdIng GO the sUbjeCTs, see many OF tHe pAPErS in BrownsteIN ANd SAul (2016). 4 I aRguE That
 performs. Vivek is proneto wishful  seei ng.  He  w ants  and  expects peopl e  toenjoy his performance,  andwh e n he lo oks a t the s e ao f  fa ce s,  ap pr o va l isall  he see s. Unbekno wns tto him, Vive k 's  vanity -- ‐ l ike impercep tib le tin te d s u nglas ses  --‐affect s  his v isual exp er i ence o f  the fa c e sin t he crowd. To arri v ea t a belief tha t's co ng r ue n t  wi thhis vanity ,Vivek has non ee d t o j u mp to conclus ions. He ca n  ju st bel ie veh is eye s. Wh en hebelieves hi s ey es, he ta kes hi m self to have ga ined e vid enc e (o r  p er hap sa  mo r egen e ric  form of  r at ional  sup p o r t ) fo r h is b elief  that peoplelik e hi s  pe rform ances . An dso he  stren gthen shis belief. Wer e it  not forthe  p res um ption that e xpe rie nces ha ve no r a tio na l s ta nding, we might su sp e c tthat whe n Vive k 's  v a nity aff ec tshise x perie nce, hi s experi ence i s  i ll --‐foun de d, for  t hesam e rea s on a s a va nity--‐i nduce d  belief wouldb e: because it ' sa n  e x tens ion  of the ill --‐f o unde d ex a gg era t ion b eneat hV iv e k's vanity. If Vive k' s vani ty le ft his experi ence untou c h e d, but m adeh im infer, from th e loo ks on thei r  neutral  anddispleas ed faces, t hat thepeo ple  he  se e s  a re pleased, w e woul dn 't hesi tat e to co nsi der  hi s b el ief ill-- ‐founded .If  V iv ek' s wis h ful seei ng  co ul d h ave t h e same  epis temi cef f ect s on hi s  p e r cept ua lexpe rie nc e ashisw ish ful thi nking has  on hisbe li ef, the n presumablyth e other ro ut esto ill - - ‐founded  belief besides wishful thinkin g a lso h aveepistemic  pa rallel s f o r expe rience . The  q ues t i on wh e t he r p er ceptual ex p e rie ncesre doun d on th e subject's ration a l s tanding has d ire ct a p p li cat i on tose l f-- ‐ d efense law. Her e we havean o th er reasonw hyth e quest ion mat ters. Self--‐ defense l aws mitig at e sa n c tio ns against  some fo rms of ph y sical ag gress ion . In U Slaw , for  an ac t  of  self --‐def en se tojusti fy  aggress ion, the defender has t o beli eve t hat  he or sh e i s  in  immanent  dan ger, and 3  Di scu ssion s o f  theboun d ar y i n clude  Dav i dson (198 2 )and m or e recentlyA . Smi th (2 005 ) . Even  man y who reject Davi d son's idea tha t pe r c ept ion s  can 't  justify belie fs(o n l y belief scan) agreewith him  t h at pe rcepti on has  no rat i o na l  stand ingofits own.Whe re the bou nd ar i es are  aro un d what  David s on c a l ls the 'house of  reas o n ' ari s esin di sc ussions of h ow implici t biases as  measu redby th e Impli ci t Asso cia ti on Task. O n  the issu e ofhow imp li citbia ses ma y re d o und o n th emor al or rat i o na l  s ta n din g go  thesu bjec ts, see m a ny of th e p a pers in  B row n s tein a n dS a ul (2016).  4I arg u e  that
 performs._Vivek is_prone to wishful seeing._He wants_and_expects people_to_enjoy his performance,_and when he_looks at the sea_of faces, approval_is_all he sees. Unbeknownst to him, Vivek's vanity --‐ like imperceptible tinted sunglasses --‐_affects_his visual_experience_of_the faces in the crowd._To arrive at a belief_that's congruent_with his vanity, Vivek has no need to_jump_to conclusions. He_can just believe his eyes. When he believes his_eyes, he takes himself to have_gained evidence (or_perhaps_a_more generic form of_rational support) for his belief that_people like his performances. And so_he strengthens his belief. Were it not_for the presumption that experiences have_no rational standing, we might_suspect that_when Vivek's vanity affects his_experience, his experience_is ill--‐founded,_for the same_reason as a vanity--‐induced belief would_be: because it's_an extension of the ill--‐founded exaggeration_beneath_Vivek's vanity. If_Vivek's_vanity_left his_experience untouched, but_made_him infer,_from_the looks on their neutral and_displeased_faces, that the people he sees are_pleased, we wouldn't hesitate_to_consider his belief ill--‐founded._If Vivek's wishful seeing could_have the same epistemic effects on_his perceptual_experience as_his wishful thinking has on his belief, then presumably the other_routes to ill--‐founded belief besides wishful_thinking also have epistemic_parallels for_experience._The question whether_perceptual_experiences redound_on the subject's rational standing has direct_application to_self--‐defense law. Here we have another_reason why the question_matters._Self--‐defense laws mitigate sanctions against some_forms of physical aggression. In US_law, for an act of_self--‐defense_to_justify aggression, the defender has_to believe that he or she_is in immanent_danger, and 3 Discussions of the boundary_include_Davidson (1982) and more recently A._Smith_(2005). Even many who reject Davidson's_idea_that_perceptions can't justify beliefs (only_beliefs can) agree with him that_perception has no rational standing of its own. Where_the boundaries are_around what Davidson calls the_'house_of_reason' arises in discussions of how implicit biases as measured_by the_Implicit Association Task._On the issue of how implicit biases may redound on_the moral or rational standing go the_subjects, see many of the papers in Brownstein and Saul (2016)._4 I argue that