 Fair and Following | doi 10.1163/17455243-46810054 journal of moral philosophy (2016) 1-8 <UN> There are, of course, cases in which one does conventionally signal consent by accepting benefits. In these cases, consent is a fine explanation of the duties that arise.18 But the existence of such cases is of no help to Zhu, for two reasons. First, acceptance is not always a sign of consent, and when it is not there are still sometimes clear duties to follow the rules. For Zhu to avoid this problem, he would have to show that acceptance always signifies consent in the relevant cases, or that there are some other grounds for the duty in these cases besides fair play. But the public transport case is one clear example in which acceptance is not a sign of consent, benefits are accepted, and fair play is a strong candidate explanation for the relevant duty.19 Second, even if consent can explain our intuition that a person is under a duty in some case, that duty could have multiple grounds. One could be bound to fulfill the duty both because one agreed to do so, and as a matter of fair play. To see how this is possible, take a case involving another kind of special duty. Suppose that my mother is sick. I have an associative duty to her to provide for her care. But suppose further that I once promised my father that I would take care of my mother should the need arise. There is no good reason of simplicity to declare one of these grounds invalid. In fact, in this case the multiple grounds illuminate the fact that I owe the relevant action to different people for different reasons. The same could be true of some private variant of the public transit case. I may offer my consent to follow the rules of the bus (pay my fare, no eating or smoking, etc.) to the bus company and also owe the same thing to my fellow passengers as a matter of fair play. Fair play sometimes offers a better explanation than does consent for a duty to follow the rules. The public transit case is a representative example. Thus, the theoretical utility of fair play cannot be so easily replaced. And even if it could, fair play might still be an additional grounds for a particular duty to cooperate. he had in fact consented. I may do something which is not itself an act of consent, but which nonetheless binds me as if I had consented." Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations, 89. 18 The serving conventions at some restaurants are one example
Fair and Following | doi 10.1163/17455243 - 46810054 journal of moral philosophy (2016) 1 - 8 < UN > There be, of path, cases in which one does conventionally signal consent by accepting benefit. In these cases, consent is a fine explanation of the duty that arise.18 But the existence of such cases is of no aid to Zhu, for two reasons. First, toleration is not always a sign of consent, and when it is not there constitute still sometimes clear duties to follow the rules. For Zhu to debar this problem, he would have to show that toleration always signifies consent in the relevant cases, or that there be some other grounds for the duty in these cases besides fair play. But the public transportation case is one clear example in which acceptance is not a sign of consent, benefit are accepted, and fair play is a strong candidate explanation for the relevant duty.19 Second, even if consent can explain our intuition that a person is under a duty in some case, that duty could have multiple grounds. One could be bound to carry through the duty both because one agreed to do indeed, and as a topic of honest play. To see how this is potential, take a shell involving another kind of special duty. presuppose that my mother is sick. I have an associative duty to her to provide for her care. But suppose further that I once promise my father that I would take care of my mother should the need rebel. There is no dear reason of simplicity to declare one of these grounds invalid. In fact, in this case the multiple footing illuminate the fact that I owe the relevant action to different citizenry for different reasons. The same could be true of some secret variant of the public transportation system case. I may offer my consent to keep up the rules of the bus topology (pay my menu, no eating or smoking, etc .) to the bus ship's company and also owe the same matter to my fellow passengers as a matter of fair play. Fair play sometimes offers a better explanation than does consent for a duty to follow the rules. The public transit event is a representative example. Thus, the theoretical utility program of fair play cannot be so easily replaced. And even if it could, fair play might even be an additional grounds for a particular duty to cooperate. he had in fact consented. I may do something which is not itself an act of consent, but which however binds me as if I had consented. " Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations, 89. 18 The serve conventions at some restaurants are one example
 Falr and Following | doi 10.1163/17455243-46810054 juurnal of moral philosmphy (2016) 1-8 <UN> Therd are, of course, cases in whirh obe dotf conventionally skgnal condent by qccekting benefits. In these cases, ckksent ms a fine explakation of tve duties that afide.18 But the existence of such cases ys of np jelp to Zhu, fot two weaskns. First, acceptance is not always a sign of consent, amd when it is not there arf stlll sometimes cleag duties to foljiw the rules. For Zhu to avoid this problem, he would have to show ghat ccceptance qlqayd signifies ronsenn in the releysnt caves, or yhat there are soke ither grounds for the duty in these casgs besides fcir play. But the publuc tranvpord carw ir ohe cmear edam'le in whicg acceptancw is not a sign of vogwent, benefits are ascqpted, and fair play is a strong candidaue exllanation for the relevqnt duty.19 Second, even lf consene can explain our intuition that a person is undes a dnth iu some xade, that duty could have multiple grounds. One skukd be bound to fmlfill the duty boyh brsause one agrged to bk ao, and as a matter of fait play. To see hjw tnis is possible, take a case involving auotyer kind of speciap duty. Suppuse jhat mu mother is sick. I have an zssociative duty to gdr to provide fof hvr cdre. But suppose further thwt I once prokised mh fajher thwt I would take care of my mother dhoulb the need arisf. There is no good reason of simplicity to devldre one of chese nrounds invalid. In fact, in thns case che muutiple grolnds illukinate the sact that I ofg the relevanv action eo duffeeent peuole for differrnt reasouf. Thw same could be trme of aome private vaxnabt of the publiv tfanfin cese. I kay offer my conreng to fullow the rmler of the bus (pay my fare, no sating or smoking, rtg.) to the vus compwny and also pwe the same thing to mb felluw paxseggers as a matter of fair play. Fair plaj sjmetimes offqrs q better expkanation than does consent for a duty ti follow the rules. The public transit gase is a re'reseneative exdmple. Thus, the theorwtical utility of fair play cannot be ao eashly rfplaced. And even if it could, fair play might still be an additional grounes for a particulad duyy to cjpperatq. he iad in fact consemted. I may do something which ir not itvejf an act of consent, but whivh nonetheless cinds me as if I had conaented." Sommons, Moral Principles and Polotical Obligations, 89. 18 The serving convsntions at some restaurants sre onz example
Fair and Following | doi 10.1163/17455243-46810054 journal philosophy 1-8 <UN> are, of course, conventionally consent by accepting In these cases, is a fine explanation of the that arise.18 But the existence of such cases is of no help to for two reasons. First, acceptance is not always a sign of consent, and it not are sometimes clear duties to follow the rules. For Zhu to avoid this problem, he would have show that acceptance always signifies consent in the cases, or that there some other grounds for the in cases besides play. the transport case is clear example in which acceptance is not a sign of consent, benefits are accepted, and fair play a strong for the duty.19 even consent can explain that a person is under a case, that duty could have multiple grounds. One be bound fulfill the duty both because one to do so, and as a matter of play. To see how this is possible, take a case involving another kind of special that my mother is I have an duty her provide her care. suppose further that I once promised my father that I would care of my mother should the need arise. There is reason simplicity to declare of these grounds invalid. fact, this case the multiple the that relevant to people for different reasons. same could be true of private variant of the offer my consent to follow the rules of bus (pay my fare, no eating or etc.) to the bus company and also owe the same thing to fellow passengers matter of fair play. Fair play sometimes offers better explanation than does for a duty to follow the rules. The public case a representative Thus, the theoretical of fair play be so easily even if could, play an additional grounds for a particular to he had in fact consented. may which is not itself an act of consent, but which nonetheless binds me as if consented." Simmons, Moral Principles Political 89. 18 The serving conventions at some restaurants are one example
 Fair and Following | doi 10.1163/17455243-46810054 journaL of moral phIlosoPhy (2016) 1-8 <uN> THeRe arE, of cOurse, cases in whICh onE does conventionally sigNal coNsENt by ACcEptinG benefiTS. IN THesE cAsEs, cOnSEnT is a fIne ExplanaTion of the dUtiEs That arise.18 But THe Existence oF suCh cases is of nO heLp to ZhU, fOr tWO reasOns. first, AcceptANce is nOt always a SiGN of conSEnt, and wHEN iT is nOt there are still soMEtIMes clear duties To follOw THe RULes. for zhu to avoid ThIs proBLem, he woULd HAVE to SHow that acceptAnce always sIGniFies coNsEnt IN the reLevanT cASes, Or that there Are sOme other gRounds FOr the duTY in thesE cases BesIdeS faiR PlAy. but ThE PubLIc TraNSpoRt case is OnE cLear eXampLE IN WhicH acCeptAnce iS not a sign of coNseNt, beNEfiTs are AccepTed, aNd Fair pLay is a StronG cAndidate explanaTion For the relEvaNt DutY.19 SEcond, EVen if cOnsEnt Can explAin our iNTuiTiON THaT a person is under a duTy IN SoMe case, thAt duty COuLd HAve multiPlE grOundS. oNe couLd be BOuNd to fulfIll the DUtY bOth becaUsE one agReEd tO do So, and AS a maTter of Fair play. to see HOw this is possibLE, take a case invOLvING aNOtheR kiNd of special Duty. sUppoSe thAT mY moTHer is Sick. I HaVE aN Associative duty to heR tO proviDe for Her care. But supPose furtheR THAt I once pRomiSEd MY father that I woUld taKe care of my MOther shoUld thE need ariSe. There is NO Good reasOn oF siMplIciTY To Declare one of tHESe grOuNds invaLid. in fact, iN thIs cAse The MuLtiple groUnds illuMiNaTe ThE faCt thaT i owe the rElEvaNt ActIon to DIffereNt peoPle fOr DiFFerEnt reasONs. tHE samE cOuLd be TruE oF some PrivATe vAriant oF the publiC trANsit CaSe. i may offEr my consent to FoLlow the rulEs Of tHe bus (pAY My fare, no Eating or smoking, etc.) to the BUs compaNy aNd alsO owe The same thIng To my feLloW PassenGers as A mattEr Of fAIR play. fAIr PlaY sOmetimes ofFERs a BetteR eXplaNation tHan does consent for a DUty To follow the ruLes. the pUBLiC trANsIT caSe IS a rEPResentative examPle. Thus, the ThEOrEtical utilITy oF fAir play Cannot bE so eaSIly replAced. And evEn if it couLd, Fair PLAy mIght still bE an additIonal grouNDs for A PaRticuLar Duty to CoOpeRate. hE had in FAct ConseNted. I mAy Do someThing WhIch is not Itself an act of consent, but Which nOnethEleSs binds me As iF i haD consenteD." SimMons, Moral PRinCipLes anD PoLIticaL OblIGaTioNS, 89. 18 The sErviNG conventiONs At sOME rEstaurants aRE ONe eXamplE
 Fair and Following | doi10.1163/17 45524 3-4 681 00 54 j ourn al of moral ph i loso phy (2016) 1-8 <UN> Th ere a re ,  ofc ou rse,cases i n  w h i chon edoe sc on venti ona lly sig nal consen t b yaccepting be n ef its. In th ese  cases, cons ent  is afi nee xplan ati on of  the d u ties t hat arise .1 8  But t h e exist e n ce  ofsuch cases is ofn oh elp to Zhu, fo r twore a so n s . F irs t, accepta nc e isn ot alwa y sa s ign of consent, a nd when iti s n ot the re  ar e  still  some ti m esclear dutie s to  follow t he rul e s. ForZ hu to a void t his  pr oble m ,he  wo ul d  ha v etos how  that ac ce pt ancealwa y s s igni fie s co nsent  in the relev ant  cas e s,or th at th erear e som e othe r gro un ds for the duty  inthese cas esbe sid es  fair play.But  th e publi c trans p ort  c a s e  i s one clear exampl ei n  w hich acc eptanc e  i sn ot a sig nofcons e n t, be nefi t sare acce pted,a nd  f air pla yis a s tr ong  ca ndida t e ex planat ion forthe r e levant duty.19 Second, eveni fc o ns e nt c anexplain our  int u itio n th a ta p e rsonis un de r  a duty in some case,th at dut y cou ld have multi ple ground s . One coul d be bo u nd to fulfillthe d uty both b e cause on e agr eed to d o so, and a s a matt eroffai r p l a y.  To see how t h i s is  p ossible , t ake a c ase  in vol vin ganother k ind of s pe ci al  d uty . Sup p ose that  m y m ot her  is s i ck. Ihavean a ss oc i ati ve duty to h er t opr ovid e f or  hercare .  Bu t suppo se furthe r t h at I  o nc e promi sed my father  t hat I woul dtak e care o f my mot her should the need ari s e. Ther e i s nogood  reason o f s implic ity to dec lare o ne of  t hes e groun d s  i nva li d. In fact , inthisca se t he mult iple grounds illum i nat e the fact th atI ow e th e r e le v ant  a c tio n to different pe ople for d if f er ent reason s . T he  same c ould be  true of some  privatevariant o fthep u bli c transitcase. Imay offer my co n se nt to  fo llow t he  ru les o f theb us(paymy far e,  no ea tingor  smoking , etc.) to the bus comp any an d als o o we the sa met hin g to my f ello w passenge rsasa mat ter of fa ir p l ay . F a ir pl ay s o metimes o f fe rsa be tter explan a t i onthandoe s  conse nt f or a duty to foll o w the rules. T he p u b lic  tr a nsit  c ase is a repre sen ta t i ve examp le . Thus, the  theoret ic a l uti lity o f fair  play c a n no t  be so  eas ily  replaced . A nd even if  i tc ould,fair  p lay mi ght st i ll b e an additional gr ounds f or ap art icula rduty to coop erate. hehad in fact  conse nted . I m ay do s om ething  wh ic h is not i t self an a ct of  consen t,  but  wh ich no neth e l ess b inds  m e a s if I ha d co n se nt e d."  Sim mons,  M oral  Principl e s and Po lit i cal Obl ig ati o n s, 89. 18 T he serving  co nvent i o ns at some rest a ur a nts a re one  examp le
 Fair_and Following_| doi 10.1163/17455243-46810054 journal_of moral_philosophy_(2016) 1-8_<UN>_There are, of_course, cases in_which one does conventionally_signal consent by_accepting_benefits. In these cases, consent is a fine explanation of the duties that arise.18_But_the existence_of_such_cases is of no help_to Zhu, for two reasons._First, acceptance_is not always a sign of consent, and_when_it is not_there are still sometimes clear duties to follow the_rules. For Zhu to avoid this_problem, he would_have_to_show that acceptance always_signifies consent in the relevant cases,_or that there are some other_grounds for the duty in these cases_besides fair play. But the public_transport case is one clear_example in_which acceptance is not a_sign of consent,_benefits are_accepted, and fair_play is a strong candidate explanation_for the relevant_duty.19 Second, even if consent can_explain_our intuition that_a_person_is under_a duty in_some_case, that_duty_could have multiple grounds. One could_be_bound to fulfill the duty both because_one agreed to do_so,_and as a matter_of fair play. To see_how this is possible, take a_case involving_another kind_of special duty. Suppose that my mother is sick. I have_an associative duty to her to_provide for her care._But suppose_further_that I once_promised_my father_that I would take care of my_mother should_the need arise. There is no_good reason of simplicity_to_declare one of these grounds invalid._In fact, in this case the_multiple grounds illuminate the fact_that_I_owe the relevant action to_different people for different reasons. The_same could be_true of some private variant of the_public_transit case. I may offer my_consent_to follow the rules of the_bus_(pay_my fare, no eating or_smoking, etc.) to the bus company_and also owe the same thing to my fellow_passengers as a_matter of fair play. Fair_play_sometimes_offers a better explanation than does consent for a duty_to follow_the rules. The_public transit case is a representative example. Thus, the theoretical_utility of fair play cannot be so_easily replaced. And even if it could, fair play might still_be an additional grounds for a particular duty_to cooperate. he had in fact consented._I may do something_which_is not itself an act of consent,_but_which_nonetheless_binds me as_if I had_consented." Simmons, Moral_Principles and_Political Obligations, 89._18 The_serving conventions at_some_restaurants are one example