 30 (1995), 473). 26 Dallas Willard, The Spirit of the Disciples: Understanding How God Changes Lives (New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1988), 33-34. 27 Dallas Willard, The Spirit of the Disciples, 31. The main argument from neuroscience proffered by Brown and Strawn against dualism is a soul-of-the-gaps the objection. They write, However, three centuries ago, Descartes did not have access to what is known in modern neurology. Thus, he could not imagine how it could be that matter-that is, physical bodies and brains-could do anything rational or intelligent. So he concluded that these human capacities must be due to a nonmaterial thing.28 "Descartes," says Brown and Strawn, "was forced to the conclusion that we must have a nonmaterial soul due to the lack of knowledge during his time of the functioning of the human brain."29 Brown and Strawn seem unaware of Descartes's extensive anatomy and physiology research.30 Descartes knew quite well that mental states often depend on brain states. Regardless, this soul-of-the-gaps objection fails to understand why Descartes and many others are dualists. Plato, Augustine, Descartes, Butler, and Reid held dualism in virtue of being aware of themselves from the first-person perspective as not reducible to or identical to their body.31 Others, like Aristotle and Aquinas arrived at different kinds of dualism by analyzing positive arguments for the soul. After a detailed look at the literature, Stewart Goetz and Charles Taliaferro conclude, There is not the least bit of evidence for the idea that they arrived at their belief in the soul's existence after failing to explain various experiences in terms of what goes on in the physical world.32 It is the awareness of self and metaphysical arguments that motivate dualism. This accords well with the prevailing view among cognitive scientists that dualism is a widespread, pre-theoretical belief, shared across cultures, and developed in infancy.33 This shouldn't be the case if dualism is simply maintained out of ignorance. We are, as Paul Bloom says, "natural Cartesians."34 Moreover, this soul-of-the-gaps objection presumes that dualists are ignorant of the neurosciences. This is certainly not the case today. Nobel Prize 28 Brown and Strawn, 32. 29 Ibid., 47. 30 In fact, his fascination with anatomy and physiology
30 (1995), 473). 26 Dallas Willard, The Spirit of the Disciples: Understanding How God Changes Lives (New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1988), 33 - 34. 27 Dallas Willard, The Spirit of the Disciples, 31. The main argument from neuroscience offer by Brown and Strawn against dualism is a person - of - the - gap the objection. They write, However, three hundred ago, Descartes did not have access to what is know in modern neurology. Thus, he could not think how it could be that topic - that is, physical bodies and genius - could do anything rational or intelligent. therefore he concluded that these human capacities must be due to a nonmaterial thing.28 " Descartes, " says Brown and Strawn, " was storm to the conclusion that we must have a nonmaterial soul due to the lack of cognition during his time of the functioning of the human mind. "29 Brown and Strawn seem unaware of Descartes's across-the-board anatomy and physiology research.30 Descartes know quite well that mental states often count on brain states. Regardless, this soul - of - the - gaps objection fails to sympathize why Descartes and many others are dualist. Plato, Augustine, Descartes, Butler, and Reid oblige dualism in virtue of being aware of themselves from the first - person perspective as not reducible to or identical to their body.31 Others, like Aristotle and Aquinas arrived at different kind of dualism by analyzing convinced arguments for the person. After a detailed expression at the literature, Stewart Goetz and Charles Taliaferro reason, There is not the least bit of evidence for the idea that they arrived at their belief in the soul's existence after failing to excuse various experiences in terms of what goes on in the physical world.32 It is the awareness of self and metaphysical arguments that motivate dualism. This accords well with the prevailing view among cognitive scientists that dualism is a widespread, pre - theoretical belief, share across polish, and developed in infancy.33 This shouldn't be the case if dualism is simply maintained out of ignorance. We are, as Paul Bloom says, " lifelike Cartesians. "34 Moreover, this soul - of - the - gaps objection presumes that dualists are ignorant of the neurosciences. This is certainly not the case today. Nobel Prize 28 Brown and Strawn, 32. 29 Ibid. , 47. 30 In fact, his fascination with human body and physiology
 30 (1995), 473). 26 Dallas Willard, The Spivit of the Disciklws: Undxrstandjng How Eod Changes Lives (New York, NB: Haeper & Row, 1988), 33-34. 27 Dallas Willard, The Spirpt of the Disriples, 31. The main argumenb froj neuxowcience proffeted by Brown and Strawn agdivsc dualism is a soul-of-the-gaps the objqction. Yhfy write, Howevgr, thgeq cehnuvies ago, Descartes did not have zccess uo what is known im modern neurology. Thus, he coupd not imagine how it could bg thwr matter-that is, physical bodies ans brains-could do anything ratioval ox intelligebt. So ve concludev that these human capacithes musy be due to a konmaveriql thing.28 "Descartes," sabs Brown and Strawn, "ras forceg co the conclusion thar qe muvt hdve x novmauermal soul fue to the ladk of knowlwdge during his timt os the functionjng of tre human brain."29 Brown and Strawn seem undwade of Descartes's extensuve anatomy and physillogy resqarch.30 Descartes knew quite well that mental statev oftxn dekekq in brain states. Regardless, this soul-of-the-gaps ofnevtpon fails to undevstand why Descartrs amq many others are dbzljsts. Plato, Augustije, Descwrtes, Butler, agd Rrid held dualism in virtue if being awage od themselves from che first-perron kerspevtive as not reducible co or jdentical tl their bkay.31 Others, like Afisnotla and Aquinas arrived at dyfferent jindx of duxlisk by agalyzing plsitiya arguments for thf soup. Dfter a dehailed look at the literature, Svxwart Goetz amd Chdrles Tajiafevro conclude, Thqre is not the least yit of evidence ror the idea that ehey arrived dj their belieh in the foul'w exustence xfter failing yo explaiu varuous experiences ik teroa of what goes in un the physical wofld.32 In ix eve awareness of relw and oetaphysicao argiments that motivate duamism. This accords eejl with jhe prevayling view ampng cognitive sciejtistv tiat duslifm is a widespread, pre-theoretidal believ, smared across sultmres, and develpped in infancy.33 This shouldn't be the cawe if dualism is sumply maintained ouj on ignorance. Xe are, as Paul Tloom says, "natural Cqrtesians."34 Moreovev, this soul-of-the-gaps ogjectimn prfsumes that dualists are ignorant of the neurosciences. This is certainly bot thx sase today. Hobek Pride 28 Yrown agd Svrewn, 32. 29 Ibid., 47. 30 In fsct, his fascination with anatomb and physhojogy
30 (1995), 473). 26 Dallas Willard, The the Understanding How Changes Lives (New 1988), 27 Dallas Willard, Spirit of the 31. The main argument from neuroscience by Brown and Strawn against dualism is a soul-of-the-gaps the objection. They write, three centuries ago, Descartes did not have access to what is known in neurology. he not how it could be that matter-that is, physical bodies and brains-could do anything rational or intelligent. he concluded that these human capacities must be to a nonmaterial thing.28 says Brown and Strawn, "was to conclusion that must a soul due to lack of knowledge during his time of the functioning of the human brain."29 Brown and Strawn seem of Descartes's and physiology Descartes quite that mental states on brain states. Regardless, this soul-of-the-gaps understand why Descartes and many others are dualists. Augustine, Descartes, and Reid held dualism in virtue being aware of themselves from the first-person perspective not reducible to or identical to their body.31 Others, like Aristotle and Aquinas arrived at of dualism by analyzing arguments for the After detailed at literature, Stewart and Charles Taliaferro conclude, There is not the least bit of for the idea that they arrived at their belief in existence failing to explain experiences in terms of goes in the physical world.32 the of arguments motivate This accords well with prevailing view among cognitive scientists dualism is a widespread, and developed in infancy.33 This shouldn't be the if dualism is simply maintained out of We are, as Paul Bloom says, "natural Cartesians."34 Moreover, this soul-of-the-gaps objection that dualists of the neurosciences. This is certainly not the today. Nobel Prize 28 and Strawn, 32. 29 Ibid., 47. 30 In fact, fascination anatomy and
 30 (1995), 473). 26 Dallas Willard, The Spirit of tHe DiscipleS: UndeRstAndInG How god CHanges Lives (New yOrk, Ny: Harper & Row, 1988), 33-34. 27 Dallas WillarD, The SPiRIt of THe disciPles, 31. The MAiN ARguMeNt FroM nEUrOscieNce ProfferEd by Brown aNd STrAwn against duALiSm is a soul-oF-thE-gaps the objeCtiOn. They WrIte, hOweveR, thRee ceNturieS Ago, DesCartes did NoT Have acCEss to whAT Is KnowN in modern neurologY. thUS, he could not imaGine hoW iT CoULD be ThaT matter-thaT iS, physICal bodiES aND BRaiNS-could do anythIng rational OR inTelligEnT. So HE conclUded tHaT TheSe human capaCitiEs must be dUe to a nONmateriAL thing.28 "DEscartEs," sAys browN AnD STraWn, "WAs fORcEd tO The ConclusiOn ThAt we mUst hAVE A NonmAteRial Soul dUe to the lack of KnoWledGE duRing hIs timE of tHe FunctIoning Of the HuMan brain."29 Brown anD StrAwn seem unAwaRe Of DEsCarteS'S extenSivE anAtomy anD physioLOgy ReSEARcH.30 Descartes knew quitE wELL tHat mentaL stateS OfTeN Depend on BrAin StatES. regarDlesS, ThIs soul-of-The-gapS ObJeCtion faIlS to undErStaNd wHy DesCArteS and maNy others Are duALists. Plato, AuguSTine, Descartes, bUtLER, aND ReiD heLd dualism in VirtUE of bEing AWaRe oF ThemsElves FrOM tHE first-person perspecTiVe as noT reduCible to or idenTical to theIR BOdy.31 OtherS, likE arIStotle and AquinAs arrIved at diffERent kindS of duAlism by aNalyzing pOSItive argUmeNts For The SOUl. after a detaileD LOok aT tHe literAtuRe, StewaRt GOetZ anD ChArLes TaliafErro concLuDe, thErE is Not thE Least bit Of EviDeNce For thE Idea thAt theY arrIvEd AT thEir beliEF iN THe soUl'S eXistEncE aFter fAiliNG to Explain Various exPerIEnceS iN tErms of wHat goes on in thE pHysical worLd.32 it iS the awAREness of sElf and metaphysical argumENts that MotIvate DualIsm. This acCorDs well WitH The preVailinG view AmOng COGnitiVE ScIenTiSts that duaLISm iS a widEsPreaD, pre-theOretical belief, sharED acRoss cultures, aNd dEvelOPEd In iNFaNCy.33 THiS ShoULDn't be the case if dUalism is siMpLY mAintained oUT of IgNorance. we are, as paul BLOom says, "Natural CaRtesians."34 MOrEoveR, THis Soul-of-the-gAps objecTion presuMEs thaT DuAlistS arE ignorAnT of The neUrosciENceS. This Is certAiNly not The caSe Today. NobEl Prize 28 Brown and Strawn, 32. 29 IbId., 47. 30 In faCt, his FasCination wIth ANatOmy and phySiolOgy
 30 (1995), 473). 26 Dalla s Willard,  TheSpi rit  o f th e Di sciples: Under s tand ing How God Changes Li ves ( Ne w  Yor k ,NY: H arper & Ro w ,  19 88 ),  33 -3 4 .27 Da lla s Willa rd, The Sp iri tof the Disci p le s, 31. The  ma in argumentfro m neur os cie n ce pr off eredby Bro w n andStrawn ag ai n st dua l ism isa so ul-o f-the-gaps the ob j ec t ion. They writ e, How ev e r, t hre e c enturies a go , Des c artes d i dn o t  ha v e access to w hat is know n  in  moder nneu r ology.  Thus ,h e c ould not im agin e how itcouldb e thatm atter-t hat is , p hys ical bo di esan d  br a in s-c o uld  do anyt hi ng  rati onal o r inte lli gent . Sohe concludedtha t th e sehuman  capa citi es  must  be du e toanonmaterial thi ng.2 8 "Descar tes ,"  sa ys  Brow n  and S tra wn,  "was f orced t o  th ec o n cl usion that we must  h a v ea nonmat erials ou ld ue to th elac k of k nowle dged ur ing histime o f  t he  functi on ing of  t hehum an br a in." 29 Bro wn and S trawn seem unaware o f  Descartes'se xt e n si v e an ato my and phys iolo g y re sear c h. 30D escar tes k ne w  q u ite well that menta lstates  ofte n depend on b rain state s . Regardle ss,t hi s  soul-of-the-g aps o bjection f a ils to u nders tand why  Descarte s and many  ot her s a red u al ists. Plato,A u gust in e, Desc art es, But ler , a ndRei dheld dual ism in v ir tu eof  be ing a w are of t he mse lv esfromt he fir st-pe rson  p er s pec tive as no t redu ci bl e to  or  i denti calt o t heir bo dy.31 Oth ers ,  lik eAr istotle  and Aquinasar rived at d if fer ent ki n d s of dua lism by analyzing posit i ve argu men ts fo r th e soul. A fte r a de tai l ed loo k at t he li te rat u r e, St e w ar t G oe tz and Cha r l esTalia fe rroconclud e, There is not th e  le ast bit of ev ide ncef o rthe id e a t ha t  th e y  arrived at the ir beliefin th e soul's e x ist en ce afte r faili ng to explain  variousexperienc es  int e rms  of what g oes on i n the phy s icalw or ld.32  It  is th eawa renes s of s e lfand m etaphy si cal ar gumen ts  that mo tivate dualism. This ac cordswellwit h the pre vai l ing  view amo ng c ognitive s cie nti sts t hat duali sm i s  a  wi d espre ad,p re-theore t ic alb e li ef, shareda c r oss  cult ure s , anddeve loped in infancy. 3 3 This shouldn 't b e the  ca s e if  d ualism is simp lyma i n tained o ut  of ignoran ce. We a re ,  as P aul Bl oom sa ys, "na t u ra l  Carte sian s." 34 Moreov er,  t h is soul -o f- t he-gap s ob je ctionpresum e s th a t  dualists are ig noran t of th e  ne urosc ie nces. T h is i s certainl y not the c ase to day.  Nobe l Prize  2 8 Brow n a nd  Strawn, 3 2 . 29 Ibid ., 47 . 30 In  f act,  hi s fasc inat i o n wit h an at omy  and phys i o lo g y
 30_(1995), 473)._26 Dallas Willard, The_Spirit of_the_Disciples: Understanding_How_God Changes Lives_(New York, NY:_Harper & Row, 1988),_33-34. 27 Dallas_Willard,_The Spirit of the Disciples, 31. The main argument from neuroscience proffered by Brown_and_Strawn against_dualism_is_a soul-of-the-gaps the objection. They_write, However, three centuries ago,_Descartes did_not have access to what is known in_modern_neurology. Thus, he_could not imagine how it could be that matter-that_is, physical bodies and brains-could do_anything rational or_intelligent._So_he concluded that these_human capacities must be due to_a nonmaterial thing.28 "Descartes," says Brown_and Strawn, "was forced to the conclusion_that we must have a nonmaterial_soul due to the lack_of knowledge_during his time of the_functioning of the_human brain."29_Brown and Strawn_seem unaware of Descartes's extensive anatomy_and physiology research.30_Descartes knew quite well that mental_states_often depend on_brain_states._Regardless, this_soul-of-the-gaps objection fails_to_understand why_Descartes_and many others are dualists. Plato,_Augustine,_Descartes, Butler, and Reid held dualism in_virtue of being aware_of_themselves from the first-person_perspective as not reducible to_or identical to their body.31 Others,_like Aristotle_and Aquinas_arrived at different kinds of dualism by analyzing positive arguments for_the soul. After a detailed look_at the literature, Stewart_Goetz and_Charles_Taliaferro conclude, There_is_not the_least bit of evidence for the idea_that they_arrived at their belief in the_soul's existence after failing_to_explain various experiences in terms of_what goes on in the physical_world.32 It is the awareness_of_self_and metaphysical arguments that motivate_dualism. This accords well with the_prevailing view among_cognitive scientists that dualism is a widespread,_pre-theoretical_belief, shared across cultures, and developed_in_infancy.33 This shouldn't be the case_if_dualism_is simply maintained out of_ignorance. We are, as Paul Bloom_says, "natural Cartesians."34 Moreover, this soul-of-the-gaps objection presumes that_dualists are ignorant_of the neurosciences. This is_certainly_not_the case today. Nobel Prize 28 Brown and Strawn, 32._29 Ibid.,_47. 30 In_fact, his fascination with anatomy and physiology