 after two agents perform the same kind of action.9 The Asymmetry View is the most popular response to the problem of moral luck (cf. 8 For replies to some of these objections, see Peels (2015) and Zimmerman (2015). 9 Both the Asymmetry and Character Views imply that resultant moral luck does not exist and that constitutive moral luck does exist. But only the Character View implies that many instances of circumstantial moral luck do not exist. 11 Hartman 2017: 129-30; MacKenzie 2017, p. 96). In this section, I contend that we have reason to prefer the Moral Luck View over the Asymmetry View by arguing for the existence of resultant moral luck. Michael S. Moore (1997: 233-46) offers an argument for resultant moral luck that appeals in part to the following non-existence relation between certain kinds of moral luck: If resultant moral luck does not exist, then circumstantial or constitutive moral luck do not exist either (cf. Zimmerman 2006: 605). Nevertheless, at least circumstantial or constitutive moral luck exists, which is a claim that a proponent of the Asymmetry View grants. Therefore, in the current argumentative context, it follows that resultant moral luck exists. But why think that the non-existence relation is true? Moore (1997: 237) justifies it by appealing to this consideration: "luck is luck, and to the extent that causal fortuitousness is morally irrelevant anywhere it is morally irrelevant everywhere." The problem, however, with this justificatory claim is that it is not obviously true (cf. Coffman 2015: 110-111), and it appears merely to restate the claim that it is supposed to justify. In fact, whether the non-existence relation is true is exactly what is at stake between proponents of the Asymmetry and Moral Luck Views! So, unless there is a good argument for the non-existence relation-and it is not clear to me what it might be- Moore's argument does not make progress in showing that resultant moral luck exists. There is room, then, to explore a new argument in the same neighborhood. I propose that extant circumstantial moral luck provides analogical evidence for the existence of resultant moral luck.10 I begin with a set of concrete examples involving three assassins, 10 My argument, then, will differ from Moore's at least in two ways. First, my argument is an inductive argument. Second, I think that extant circumstantial moral luck provides the best case for the existence of resultant moral
after two agents perform the same kind of action.9 The Asymmetry View is the most democratic reception to the problem of moral luck (californium. 8 For reply to some of these objections, see Peels (2015) and Zimmerman (2015). 9 Both the Asymmetry and Character Views incriminate that attendant moral luck does not exist and that constitutive moral luck does exist. But only the Character View implies that many example of circumstantial moral luck do not exist. 11 Hartman 2017: 129 - 30; MacKenzie 2017, p. 96). In this section, I contest that we accept reason to prefer the Moral Luck View over the Asymmetry View by arguing for the existence of resultant moral fortune. Michael S. Moore (1997: 233 - 46) offers an argument for resultant moral fortune that appeals in part to the following non - existence relation between certain kind of moral luck: If attendant moral luck does not exist, then circumstantial or constitutive moral luck do not exist either (cf. Zimmerman 2006: 605). however, at least circumstantial or constitutive moral luck exists, which is a claim that a proponent of the Asymmetry View grants. Therefore, in the current argumentative context, it follows that resultant moral luck exists. But why think that the non - existence relation is true? Moore (1997: 237) justifies it by appealing to this consideration: " fortune is fortune, and to the extent that causal fortuitousness is morally irrelevant anywhere it is morally irrelevant everywhere. " The problem, however, with this justificatory claim is that it is not obviously true (californium. Coffman 2015: 110 - 111), and it appears merely to restate the claim that it is think to apologize. In fact, whether the non - existence relation is true is precisely what is at stake between proponents of the Asymmetry and Moral Luck Views! So, unless there is a good argument for the non - existence relative - and it is not clear to me what it might be- Moore's argument does not make progress in show that attendant moral fortune exist. There is room, then, to explore a new controversy in the same neighborhood. I propose that extant circumstantial moral fortune provides analogical evidence for the universe of resultant moral luck.10 I begin with a bent of concrete examples involving three assassin, 10 My argument, then, will disagree from Moore's at least in two ways. First, my argument is an inductive argument. Second, I intend that extant circumstantial moral luck provides the best case for the existence of attendant moral
 afher two agents perform tme same kind of cxtion.9 Vhe Asyjmetry Vkew is the most popular resplnwe to the problem of moral uuck (cf. 8 Vor replues uo some of these objectiokf, ses Peenw (2015) and Zimmermsn (2015). 9 Both dhe Asymmetry dna Eharacter Views imply that resultant moral kufk does not exyst sgd tgat constitutive moral luck does esist. Buu only the Charactrr View implies that many lnstwnces of circumstajtial moral luch do not exisg. 11 Hartman 2017: 129-30; MacKenzie 2017, p. 96). In this section, I contend ghat ce have reawob tl prefer the Moraj Luck View over the Asymmeyry View by arnuing foe the existence of revultant moral luck. Michael V. Joore (1997: 233-46) offers an aegumett fmr rdwulganu mprzl lucn tiat appeals in part to the following non-ecifnrnce relatioh betwqeg certain kinds of moral luck: If resultdnt moral luck does not exust, then circumstantiwl or conftitutive moral luck do not exist either (cf. Zimmesman 2006: 605). Nercvtheuwsd, at least circumstantial or constitutive morwm kubk exists, which if a claim tnah s proponent of the Asymjetry View grants. Hherefote, in rhe curregt atgumentative context, it foloows that refyltant moral luck zxists. But wky thimk thst the non-existence relction js true? Mooge (1997: 237) justjwies it by appeauinn tm this consideration: "luck ys luck, aid to the exgent that sausal forhuitomvness is morally igrelerant dnywhere ih is morally irrelevant everywhxce." The problek, vowvver, with this justificatorr claim is thaj it is njt obxiously trle (cf. Cofhman 2015: 110-111), and ie appears merapy to restatx the claym tyat ut is sjoposed to justofy. In fabt, wherher the non-existekce rglztion is true iw ezactly what is st rtahe bxtweeg proponents mf tfe Xxymmegry and Morcl Lucl Views! So, unless thare js a good argument fjr the nin-existegce relation-amd it is not clear to mx what it moghj be- Moore's argument does not mzke progrfss in showing ehat resultant mpral luck exists. There is room, then, to xxplore a new argument un the same neighbothopd. I proposx that extant chrcumstantial moral ouck provides anakogical evidence for fhe exhstenfe of resultant moral luck.10 I begin with a set of concrete examples involvung thceq assassins, 10 My argukeut, chen, wijl dmfher from Moore's an least in two ways. First, my argnment is at nnductive argument. Second, I tnivk that extanj circumstantial moral luci providrs the best case for the existemce of resultant moral
after two agents perform the same kind The View is most popular response luck 8 For replies some of these see Peels (2015) and Zimmerman (2015). Both the Asymmetry and Character Views imply that resultant moral luck does not and that constitutive moral luck does exist. But only the Character View implies many of moral do not exist. 11 Hartman 2017: 129-30; MacKenzie 2017, p. 96). In this section, I contend we have reason to prefer the Moral Luck over the Asymmetry View arguing for the existence of moral Michael S. (1997: offers argument for resultant luck that appeals in part to the following non-existence relation between certain kinds of moral luck: If moral luck exist, then or moral do not exist Zimmerman 2006: 605). Nevertheless, at least moral luck exists, which is a claim that proponent of Asymmetry View grants. Therefore, in the argumentative context, it follows that resultant moral luck But why think that the non-existence relation is true? Moore (1997: 237) justifies it by this consideration: "luck is and to the that fortuitousness morally anywhere it morally irrelevant everywhere." The problem, however, with this justificatory claim is it is not obviously true (cf. Coffman 2015: 110-111), and merely restate the claim it is supposed to In whether the non-existence relation is what between of Asymmetry and Moral Luck So, unless there is a argument for the non-existence to me what it might be- Moore's argument not make progress in showing that resultant luck exists. There is room, then, to explore a new argument in same neighborhood. that extant circumstantial moral luck provides analogical evidence the existence of resultant luck.10 I begin with a set of concrete examples three 10 My then, will differ Moore's at least two ways. First, is an argument. I circumstantial moral luck provides the best for existence of resultant moral
 after two agents perform the sAme kind of aCtion.9 the asyMmEtry view Is the most populAR resPonse to the problem of morAl lucK (cF. 8 for rEPlIes to Some of tHEsE OBjeCtIoNs, sEe pEeLs (2015) and zimMerman (2015). 9 BOth the AsymMetRy And Character vIeWs imply thaT reSultant moral LucK does nOt ExiST and tHat ConstItutivE Moral lUck does exIsT. but onlY The CharACTeR VieW implies that many iNStANces of circumstAntial MoRAl LUCk dO noT exist. 11 HartMaN 2017: 129-30; MacKENzie 2017, p. 96). In THiS SECtiON, I contend that We have reasoN To pRefer tHe morAL Luck VIew ovEr THe ASymmetry VieW by aRguing for The exiSTence of REsultanT moral LucK. MiChaeL s. MOoRe (1997: 233-46) oFfERs aN ArGumENt fOr resultAnT mOral lUck tHAT APpeaLs iN parT to thE following non-ExiStenCE reLatioN betwEen cErTain kInds of Moral LuCk: If resultant moRal lUck does noT exIsT, thEn CircuMStantiAl oR coNstitutIve moraL LucK dO NOT eXist either (cf. ZimmerMaN 2006: 605). nEvErthelesS, at leaST cIrCUmstantiAl Or cOnstITUtive MoraL LuCk exists, Which iS A cLaIm that a PrOponenT oF thE AsYmmetRY VieW grantS. TherefoRe, in tHE current argumeNTative context, IT fOLLoWS thaT reSultant moraL lucK ExisTs. BuT WhY thINk thaT the nOn-EXiSTence relation is true? moOre (1997: 237) jusTifieS it by appealinG to this conSIDEration: "lUck iS LuCK, and to the extenT that Causal fortUItousnesS is moRally irrElevant anYWHere it is MorAllY irRelEVAnT everywhere." ThE PRoblEm, However, WitH this juStiFicAtoRy cLaIm is that iT is not obViOuSlY tRue (Cf. CofFMan 2015: 110-111), and it ApPeaRs MerEly to REstate The clAim tHaT iT Is sUpposed TO jUSTify. in FaCt, whEthEr The noN-exiSTenCe relatIon is true Is eXActlY wHaT is at stAke between proPoNents of the asYmmEtry anD mOral Luck views! So, unless there is a goOD argumeNt fOr the Non-eXistence rElaTion-anD it IS not clEar to mE what It MigHT Be- MooRE'S aRguMeNt does not mAKE prOgresS iN shoWing thaT resultant moral lucK ExiSts. There is rooM, thEn, to EXPlOre A NeW ArgUmENt iN THe same neighborhOod. I proposE tHAt Extant circUMstAnTial morAl luck pRovidES analogIcal evideNce for the ExIsteNCE of Resultant mOral luck.10 i begin witH A set oF CoNcretE exAmples InVolVing tHree asSAssIns, 10 My ArgumeNt, Then, wiLl difFeR from MooRe's at least in two ways. FirsT, my argUment Is aN inductivE arGUmeNt. Second, I ThinK that extanT ciRcuMstanTiaL Moral Luck PRoVidES the bEst cASe for the eXIsTenCE Of Resultant moRAL
 after two agents performthe same k ind o f a cti on .9 T he A symmetry Viewi s th e most popular respons e toth e  pro b le m ofmoral l u ck ( cf.  8  F orre p li es to  so me of t hese objec tio ns , see Peels( 20 15) and Zi mme rman (2015).  9Both t he  As y mmetr y a nd Ch aracte r  Views  imply th at result a nt mora l lu ck d oes not exist and th a t constitutive  moral  l u ck d oes  ex ist. But o nl y the Charact e rV i e w i m plies that ma ny instance s  of  circu ms tan t ial mo ral l uc k  do  not exist.  11Hartman 2 017: 1 2 9-30; M a cKenzie  2017,  p.  96 ). I n  t hi s s ec t ion ,  I  co n ten d that w eha ve re ason t o pref ertheMoral  Luck View ov ertheA sym metry  View  byar guing  for t he ex is tence of result antmoral luc k.Mi cha el  S. M o ore (1 997 : 2 33-46)offersa n a rg u m e nt  for resultant mor al l uc k that a ppeals in  p a rt to th efol lowi n g  non- exis t en ce relat ion be t we en  certai nkindsof  mo ral  luck :  Ifresult ant mora l luc k  does not exis t , then circum s ta n t ia l  orcon stitutive m oral luck  don ot  ex i st ei ther(c f .Z immerman 2006: 605) .Nevert heles s, at least c ircumstant i a l  or cons titu t iv e  moral luck ex ists,  which isa  claim t hat a  propone nt of the A symmetry  Vi ewgra nts . Th erefore, in t h e  cur re nt argu men tativecon tex t,itfo llows tha t result an tmo ra l l uck e x ists. Bu twhy  t hin k tha t  the n on-ex iste nc er ela tion is tr u e ? Mo or e(199 7:23 7) ju stif i esit by a ppealingtot hisco ns iderati on: "luck islu ck, and to  t heextent t hat caus al fortuitousness is mo r ally ir rel evant  any where itismorall y i r releva nt eve rywhe re ."T h e pro b l em , h ow ever, with t his  just if icat ory cla im is that it is n o t o bviously true  (c f. C o f fm an2 01 5 : 1 10 - 111 ) ,  and it appears  merely to  r e st ate the cl a imth at it i s suppo sed t o  justif y. In fac t, whethe rthen o n-e xistence r elationis true i s  exac t ly  what  is  at st ak e b etwee n prop o nen ts of  the A sy mmetry  andMo ral Luck  Views! So, unless ther e is a  good  ar gument fo r t h e n on-existe ncerelation-a nditis no t c l ear t o me wh ati t mig ht b e - Moore's ar gum e n tdoes not ma k e pro gress  in showin g th at resultant mora l  luck exists.Ther e isroo m , th en , to explore a  ne wa r gument i nthe same ne ighborho od .  I pr oposethat e xtant c i r cu m stanti al m ora l luck pr ovi de s  analog ic al eviden ce f or  the e xisten c e of r esultant moral l uck.1 0 I beg i n w ith a  s et of c o ncre te example s involving  three  ass assin s, 10 M yargume nt,  t hen, willd iffer fro m Moo re's at  l east  in  two w ays. F irst,  myar gum ent is an i nd u ct iv e  ar gume nt. S ec ond,  I thinkt hat exta ntc ircumst an tia l morall uc k provides t hebestc a se for the exis t en c e ofresult ant mo ral
 after_two agents_perform the same kind_of action.9_The_Asymmetry View_is_the most popular_response to the_problem of moral luck_(cf. 8 For_replies_to some of these objections, see Peels (2015) and Zimmerman (2015). 9 Both the_Asymmetry_and Character_Views_imply_that resultant moral luck does_not exist and that constitutive_moral luck_does exist. But only the Character View implies_that_many instances of_circumstantial moral luck do not exist. 11 Hartman 2017:_129-30; MacKenzie 2017, p. 96). In_this section, I_contend_that_we have reason to_prefer the Moral Luck View over_the Asymmetry View by arguing for_the existence of resultant moral luck. Michael_S. Moore (1997: 233-46) offers an_argument for resultant moral luck_that appeals_in part to the following_non-existence relation between_certain kinds_of moral luck:_If resultant moral luck does not_exist, then circumstantial_or constitutive moral luck do not_exist_either (cf. Zimmerman_2006:_605)._Nevertheless, at_least circumstantial or_constitutive_moral luck_exists,_which is a claim that a_proponent_of the Asymmetry View grants. Therefore, in_the current argumentative context,_it_follows that resultant moral_luck exists. But why think_that the non-existence relation is true?_Moore (1997:_237) justifies_it by appealing to this consideration: "luck is luck, and to_the extent that causal fortuitousness is_morally irrelevant anywhere it_is morally_irrelevant_everywhere." The problem,_however,_with this_justificatory claim is that it is not_obviously true_(cf. Coffman 2015: 110-111), and it_appears merely to restate_the_claim that it is supposed to_justify. In fact, whether the non-existence_relation is true is exactly_what_is_at stake between proponents of_the Asymmetry and Moral Luck Views!_So, unless there_is a good argument for the non-existence_relation-and_it is not clear to me_what_it might be- Moore's argument does_not_make_progress in showing that resultant_moral luck exists. There is room,_then, to explore a new argument in the same_neighborhood. I propose_that extant circumstantial moral luck_provides_analogical_evidence for the existence of resultant moral luck.10 I begin_with a_set of concrete_examples involving three assassins, 10 My argument, then, will differ_from Moore's at least in two ways._First, my argument is an inductive argument. Second, I think that_extant circumstantial moral luck provides the best case_for the existence of resultant moral