 If the Skeptical View is correct, neither judge is blameworthy for anything, because luck affects them both and luck undermines moral responsibility. So, because their circumstantial luck cannot positively affect their blameworthiness, no circumstantial moral luck exists in this case. The Character View is the position that we are fundamentally praiseworthy and blameworthy for only our character traits (cf. Peels 2015; Rescher 1990; Richards 1986; Thomson 1989). Because the judges have the same corrupt character, they are thereby equally blameworthy even though only one of them takes a bribe. Thus, luck in actual opportunity cannot make a difference to their comparative blameworthiness, and no circumstantial moral luck exists in this case.5 The Counterfactual View is the position that restricts the sphere of praiseworthiness and blameworthiness to actual and subjunctive exercises of agency, and so agents are praiseworthy and blameworthy not only for their actual free actions but also in virtue of what they would freely do in non-actual circumstances (Zimmerman 2002: 564-5; cf. Enoch and Marmor 2007: 420-5). On this view, the mere would-be bribe taker is blameworthy "tout court" or simpliciter in virtue of the fact that she would freely take the bribe if she were offered one (Zimmerman 2002: 564-565). Thus, on the Counterfactual View, the judges deserve the same degree of blame even though only the actual bribe taker is blameworthy for something in the actual world. The Counterfactual View, however, 5 In Hartman (manuscript-a), I argue against the Character View. 7 differs in part from the Character View, because a person's being praiseworthy or blameworthy in virtue of what she would freely do is not reducible to character evaluation. On Zimmerman's view, a person might be blameworthy for what she would freely do in a counterfactual circumstance in which she has different character traits. My indirect argument for the Moral Luck View is an argument against the Counterfactual View's denial of circumstantial moral luck. It proceeds by way of the communicative function of blame. Angela Smith (2013: 41-2; cf. Macnamara 2015: 222-32) contends that moral protest is the function of blame.6 What blame protests is the moral commitment implicit in the wrongdoer's behavior. Suppose that Paul gossips about Jennifer, and she finds out about it. When Jennifer
If the Skeptical View is correct, neither judge is blameworthy for anything, because luck involve them both and fortune undermines moral responsibility. So, because their circumstantial fortune cannot positively affect their blameworthiness, no circumstantial moral fortune exists in this case. The Character View is the situation that we are basically praiseworthy and blameworthy for only our character traits (cf. Peels 2015; Rescher 1990; Richards 1986; Thomson 1989). Because the evaluator have the same crooked character, they are thereby equally blameworthy even though only one of them takes a bribe. Thus, luck in actual opportunity cannot make a deviation to their comparative blameworthiness, and no circumstantial moral luck exists in this case.5 The Counterfactual View is the situation that restricts the sphere of praiseworthiness and blameworthiness to actual and subjunctive exercises of agency, and so agent are praiseworthy and blameworthy not only for their actual free actions but also in merit of what they would freely do in non - actual circumstances (Zimmerman 2002: 564 - 5; cf. Enoch and Marmor 2007: 420 - 5). On this view, the mere would - be bribe taker is blameworthy " tout court " or simpliciter in virtue of the fact that she would freely drive the bribe if she were offered one (Zimmerman 2002: 564 - 565). Thus, on the Counterfactual View, the judges deserve the same degree of blame even though only the actual bribe taker is blameworthy for something in the actual world. The Counterfactual View, however, 5 In Hartman (manuscript - a), I argue against the Character View. 7 differs in part from the Character View, because a person's being applaudable or blameworthy in merit of what she would freely do is not reducible to character evaluation. On Zimmerman's view, a person might be blameworthy for what she would freely do in a counterfactual circumstance in which she take different character traits. My collateral argument for the Moral Luck View is an controversy against the Counterfactual View's denial of circumstantial moral luck. It continue by way of the communicative function of blame. Angela Smith (2013: 41 - 2; cf. Macnamara 2015: 222 - 32) contend that moral protest is the function of blame.6 What blame protests is the moral commitment implicit in the wrongdoer's demeanor. Suppose that Paul chew the fat about Jennifer, and she find out about it. When Jennifer
 If the Skeptical View is currect, neither lydge iv blamsworthy wor anything, because luck afhectw then both and luck undermknes morap responwibiouty. So, becehse thelx cirdmmstautmal luck cannot positivelf affect their bualeworthiness, no circumstantial moraj luck rxlsts in this cwse. Uhe Chadacter View is the position that ws are flndamentally praixeworthy and blameworthy flr ojly our character hraits (cf. Pgsls 2015; Rescher 1990; Rizhards 1986; Thomson 1989). Becauae the judges have the same corfupt eharacter, tyet agg thereby eqnally flameworthy cnen thoggh onlu one of them bakes a vribe. Thus, luck in acvual opportunity cangot make d bifference to their cimparathve tlamdqorghihexs, and nl cmrcumstantizl moral luxk exists in this cssq.5 The Counterfzctual Vyew is the position that restricts the vphsre of praiseworthiness and blameworthiness jo actual wnd subjunctive exercises of agency, and so agents are 'rxistwirthy qnf blameworthy not only for their actual free wdtooks but also in vlrtue of what they wlukq freely do iv non-aefuzl circumstances (Zlmmermag 2002: 564-5; cd. Enoch agd Msrmor 2007: 420-5). On this view, the meee would-be bgibe taker is blameworchy "tout couxt" or ximplociter in virtue of the facf that she aould fresuy take the bribd in sve were offered one (Zimmerian 2002: 564-565). Thuw, on the Cojntetfactuaj View, the judgcv deserve the same degrge of tlame even though only the actual bribe teler is blameeosthj for somzthing in the actuaj world. The Coonterfactbal Vidw, however, 5 In Hactman (manuscwipt-a), I argue wgainst the Rharacter Vieq. 7 duffers kv part from thr Charactvr Vieq, because a person'x bgihg praiseworthy or blameworthy in viftuq lf wrdt she would fredly co is not reducinle to vharacter evaluation. On Aimmerman's view, a levson mighj be blamqworthy for wnat she would freepy do in a cointgrfactual circumstance in which she has fifnerent characeer braijs. My indirzct argument for the Moral Luck View is en argument against thg Counterfactual View'x denial of rircumftantial koral luck. It proceees by way of the gommunicative function of bldme. Ajgela Smith (2013: 41-2; cf. Macnamara 2015: 222-32) contends that moral protest is the function if blame.6 What blams prptestv ns che morwl clomitment implicin in the wrongdoer's behavior. Sup'ose that [abl gossips about Jennifer, and sfe finds out xbout it. When Jennifer
If the Skeptical View is correct, neither blameworthy anything, because affects them both So, their circumstantial luck positively affect their no circumstantial moral luck exists in case. The Character View is the position that we are fundamentally praiseworthy and for only our character traits (cf. Peels 2015; Rescher 1990; Richards 1986; Thomson Because judges the corrupt character, they are thereby equally blameworthy even though only one of them takes a bribe. luck in actual opportunity cannot make a difference their comparative blameworthiness, and circumstantial moral luck exists in case.5 Counterfactual View the that the sphere of and blameworthiness to actual and subjunctive exercises of agency, and so agents are praiseworthy and blameworthy not for their actions but in of they would freely non-actual circumstances (Zimmerman 2002: 564-5; cf. 2007: 420-5). On this view, the mere would-be taker is "tout court" or simpliciter in virtue the fact that she would freely take the if she were offered one (Zimmerman 2002: 564-565). Thus, on the Counterfactual View, the judges same degree of blame though only the bribe is for in the world. The Counterfactual View, however, 5 In Hartman (manuscript-a), I argue the Character View. 7 differs in part from the Character a being praiseworthy or in virtue of what would do is not reducible evaluation. Zimmerman's might blameworthy what she would freely in a counterfactual circumstance in she has different character the Moral Luck View is an argument against Counterfactual View's denial of circumstantial moral luck. proceeds by way of the communicative function of blame. Angela Smith (2013: cf. Macnamara contends that moral protest is the function of What blame protests is moral commitment implicit in the wrongdoer's behavior. Suppose that gossips Jennifer, and finds out about When Jennifer
 If the Skeptical View is correCt, neither jUdge iS blAmeWoRthy For aNything, because LUck aFfects them both and luck uNdermInES morAL rEsponSibilitY. so, BECauSe ThEir CiRCuMstanTiaL luck caNnot positiVelY aFfect their blAMeWorthiness, No cIrcumstantiaL moRal lucK eXisTS in thIs cAse. ThE CharaCTer VieW is the posItIOn that WE are funDAMeNtalLy praiseworthy and BLaMEworthy for only Our chaRaCTeR TRaiTs (cF. Peels 2015; RescHeR 1990; RichARds 1986; ThomSOn 1989). bECAusE The judges have The same corrUPt cHaractEr, TheY Are theReby eQuALly Blameworthy Even Though onlY one of THem takeS A bribe. THus, lucK in ActUal oPPoRtUniTy CAnnOT mAke A DifFerence tO tHeIr comParaTIVE BlamEwoRthiNess, aNd no circumstaNtiAl moRAl lUck exIsts iN thiS cAse.5 ThE CountErfacTuAl View is the posiTion That restrIctS tHe sPhEre of PRaisewOrtHinEss and bLameworTHinEsS TO AcTual and subjunctive ExERCiSes of ageNcy, and SO aGeNTs are praIsEwoRthy AND blamEworTHy Not only fOr theiR AcTuAl free aCtIons buT aLso In vIrtue OF whaT they wOuld freeLy do iN Non-actual circuMStances (ZimmerMAn 2002: 564-5; CF. enOCh anD MaRmor 2007: 420-5). On this vIew, tHE merE wouLD-bE brIBe takEr is bLaMEwORthy "tout court" or simpLiCiter iN virtUe of the fact thAt she would FREEly take tHe brIBe IF she were offereD one (ZImmerman 2002: 564-565). ThUS, on the CoUnterFactual VIew, the judGES deserve The SamE deGreE OF bLame even thougH ONly tHe Actual bRibE taker iS blAmeWorThy FoR somethinG in the acTuAl WoRlD. ThE CounTErfactuaL VIew, HoWevEr, 5 In HARtman (mAnuscRipt-A), I ArGUe aGainst tHE CHARactEr viEw. 7 diFfeRs In parT froM The charactEr View, becAusE A perSoN's Being prAiseworthy or bLaMeworthy in ViRtuE of whaT SHe would fReely do is not reducible to CHaracteR evAluatIon. ON ZimmermaN's vIew, a peRsoN Might bE blameWorthY fOr wHAT she wOULd FreElY do in a counTERfaCtual CiRcumStance iN which she has differENt cHaracter traitS. My IndiRECt ArgUMeNT foR tHE MoRAL Luck View is an arGument agaiNsT ThE CounterfaCTuaL VIew's denIal of ciRcumsTAntial mOral luck. IT proceeds By Way oF THe cOmmunicatiVe functiOn of blame. aNgela sMiTh (2013: 41-2; cf. MAcnAmara 2015: 222-32) cOnTenDs thaT moral PRotEst is The funCtIon of bLame.6 WHaT blame prOtests is the moral commitmEnt impLicit In tHe wrongdoEr's BEhaVior. SuppoSe thAt Paul gossIps AboUt JenNifER, and sHe fiNDs Out ABout iT. WheN jennifer
 If the Skeptical View iscorrect, n eithe r j udg eis b lame worthy for any t hing , because luck affects  them  b o th a n dluckundermi n es m ora lre spo ns i bi lity.  So , becau se their c irc um stantial luc k  c annot posi tiv ely affect t hei r blam ew ort h iness , n o cir cumsta n tial m oral luck  e x ists i n  this c a s e.  The  Character View i s  t h e position tha t we a re fu n d ame nta lly praise wo rthya nd blam e wo r t h y f o r only our ch aracter tra i ts(cf. P ee ls2 015; R esche r1 990 ; Richards1986 ; Thomson  1989) .  Becaus e  the ju dges h ave  th e sa m eco rru pt cha r ac ter ,  th ey are t he re by eq uall y b l amew ort hy e ven t hough only on e o f th e m t akesa bri be.Th us, l uck in  actu al  opportunity ca nnot  make a d iff er enc eto th e ir com par ati ve blam eworthi n ess ,a n d  n o circumstantial m or a l  l uck exis ts int hi sc ase.5 Th eCou nter f a ctual  Vie w  i s the po sition th at  restri ct s thesp her e o f pra i sewo rthine ss and b lamew o rthiness to ac t ual and subju n ct i v ee xerc ise s of agency , an d  soagen t sare prais ewort hy an d  blameworthy not on ly  for t heiractual free a ctions but a l so in vi rtue of what they woul d fre ely do inn on-actua l cir cumstanc es (Zimme r m an 2002:  56 4-5 ; c f.E n oc h and Marmor2 0 07:42 0-5). O n t his vie w,the  me rewo uld-be br ibe take ris  b la mew orthy "tout co ur t"or  si mplic i ter in  virt ue o fth e  fa ct that sh e woul dfr eely  ta ke  thebrib e  if  she we re offere d o n e (Z im me rman 20 02: 564-565).  T hus, on th eCou nterfa c t ual View , the judges deserve th e  same d egr ee of  bla me even t hou gh onl y t h e actu al bri be ta ke r i s blame w o rt hyfo r somethin g inthe a ct ualworld.The Counterfactual Vie w, however, 5  In  Har t m an  (m a nu s cri pt - a), I  argue againstthe Charac te r  V iew. 7 dif f ers  i n partfrom th e Cha r acter V iew, beca use a per so n'sb e ing  praisewor thy or b lameworth y  in v i rt ue of  wh at she  w oul d fre ely do isnot r educib le  to ch aract er  evaluat ion. On Zimmerman's vie w, a p erson  mi ght be bl ame w ort hy for wh at s he would f ree lydo in  ac ounte rfac t ua l c i rcums tanc e  in which sh e h a s  d ifferent ch a r a cte r tra its .  My in dire ct argument for t h e Moral Luck V iewi s  an  ar g umen tagainst the Co unt er f a ctual Vi ew 's denial o f circum st a ntial  moral  luck.  It pro c e ed s  by wa y of  th e communi cat iv e  functi on  o f  blame . An ge la Smi th (20 1 3: 4 1 - 2; cf. Macnamara  2015 : 222-3 2 ) c onten ds  that m o ralprotest is  the functi on ofblam e.6 W hat bla me  prote sts  i s the mora l  commitme nt im plicitin  the  wr ongdoe r'sb e havio r. S up pos e that Pa u l  g o ss ip s  ab outJenni fe r, a nd she fi n ds out a bou t  it. Wh en  Je n n ifer
 If_the Skeptical_View is correct, neither_judge is_blameworthy_for anything,_because_luck affects them_both and luck_undermines moral responsibility. So,_because their circumstantial_luck_cannot positively affect their blameworthiness, no circumstantial moral luck exists in this case. The_Character_View is_the_position_that we are fundamentally praiseworthy_and blameworthy for only our_character traits_(cf. Peels 2015; Rescher 1990; Richards 1986; Thomson_1989)._Because the judges_have the same corrupt character, they are thereby equally_blameworthy even though only one of_them takes a_bribe._Thus,_luck in actual opportunity_cannot make a difference to their_comparative blameworthiness, and no circumstantial moral_luck exists in this case.5 The Counterfactual_View is the position that restricts_the sphere of praiseworthiness and_blameworthiness to_actual and subjunctive exercises of_agency, and so_agents are_praiseworthy and blameworthy_not only for their actual free_actions but also_in virtue of what they would_freely_do in non-actual_circumstances_(Zimmerman_2002: 564-5;_cf. Enoch and_Marmor_2007: 420-5)._On_this view, the mere would-be bribe_taker_is blameworthy "tout court" or simpliciter in_virtue of the fact_that_she would freely take_the bribe if she were_offered one (Zimmerman 2002: 564-565). Thus,_on the_Counterfactual View,_the judges deserve the same degree of blame even though only_the actual bribe taker is blameworthy_for something in the_actual world._The_Counterfactual View, however,_5_In Hartman_(manuscript-a), I argue against the Character View._7 differs_in part from the Character View,_because a person's being_praiseworthy_or blameworthy in virtue of what_she would freely do is not_reducible to character evaluation. On_Zimmerman's_view,_a person might be blameworthy_for what she would freely do_in a counterfactual_circumstance in which she has different character_traits._My indirect argument for the Moral_Luck_View is an argument against the_Counterfactual_View's_denial of circumstantial moral luck._It proceeds by way of the_communicative function of blame. Angela Smith (2013: 41-2; cf._Macnamara 2015: 222-32)_contends that moral protest is_the_function_of blame.6 What blame protests is the moral commitment implicit_in the_wrongdoer's behavior. Suppose_that Paul gossips about Jennifer, and she finds out about_it. When Jennifer