's recommendation has to do with certain adjustments – drastic or not (Quine, 1951, 43) – within the theoretical system in order to maintain some theoretical statements. It seems to me that Duhem's argumentation on the matter is more modest by merely suggesting that when there is any conflict with experience, what is refuted is necessarily ambiguous. In relation to Duhem's influence on thinkers such as Kuhn, Lakatos and Laudan, Velasco contends that the main idea that these philosophers inherited from Duhem is that "philosophical interpretations of science must be based on the analysis of the history of science" (2016, 39). However, Velasco ends by arguing that, with the exception of Kuhn, Lakatos and Laudan resorted to the formulation of methodological meta-rules to ensure not only the rationality of isolated scientific theories; but also the rationality of the research traditions that constitute the very history of science. In other words, both authors ended up "sublimating" the rationality they criticized in order to submit history to its own methodological meta-rules. In his work, João Cortese seeks to show the common elements between Blaise Pascal and Duhem. According to Cortese, one of the resources that scientists resort to is the use of analogy, which is perceived through the "spirit of fineness". However, Cortese argues that Duhem goes too far in his distinction between the spirit of fineness – which Duhem associates with the heart and the immediate intuition – and the spirit of geometry – tied it to reason and deduction. Pascal, from whom Duhem inherits these two concepts, certainly does not conceive this distinction in this way. In particular, the spirit of geometry is not specifically related to principles and deductions. As is well known, Duhem's conceptual separation between physics and metaphysics (origin of the title of this book) is not a positivist distinction between what makes sense and what does not. In fact, it is a distinction between two legitimate types of scientific knowledge, that is, if physics deals with the description of experimental laws, the task of metaphysics is to show the reason for those laws, says Cortese (2016, 48). And this is how the analogies allow us to understand that scientific development is a progressive transit towards the attainment of a natural classification. Thanks to the spirit of fineness, scientists can "realize" the analogies and the tendency towards the natural classification that science follows; even though
's recommendation has to do with certain adjustments – drastic or not (Quine, 1951, 43) – within the theoretical arrangement in decree to maintain some theoretical statements. It seems to me that Duhem's argument on the matter is more modest by merely suggesting that when there be any conflict with experience, what is refuted is inevitably equivocal. In relation to Duhem's influence on thinkers such as Kuhn, Lakatos and Laudan, Velasco cope that the main idea that these philosophers inherit from Duhem is that " philosophical interpretations of science must be based on the analysis of the history of skill " (2016, 39). However, Velasco ends by arguing that, with the exception of Kuhn, Lakatos and Laudan resorted to the conceptualization of methodological meta - rules to ensure not only the rationality of isolated scientific theories; but besides the rationality of the research custom that constitute the very history of science. In early words, both authors ended up " sublimating " the rationality they criticized in order to put in history to its own methodological meta - rule. In his work, João Cortese seeks to show the common elements between Blaise Pascal and Duhem. According to Cortese, one of the resources that scientists fall back to is the use of analogy, which is perceive through the " liveliness of fineness ". However, Cortese argues that Duhem goes too far in his differentiation between the spirit of fineness – which Duhem associates with the heart and the contiguous intuition – and the spirit of geometry – tied it to reason and deduction. Pascal, from whom Duhem inherits these two concepts, certainly does not conceive this distinction in this way. In particular, the spirit of geometry is not specifically refer to principle and deductions. As is well known, Duhem's conceptual separation between physics and metaphysics (origin of the title of this bible) is not a positivist distinction between what makes sense and what does not. In fact, it is a distinction between two legitimate types of scientific knowledge, that is, if purgative deals with the description of experimental laws, the task of metaphysics is to show the reason for those torah, says Cortese (2016, 48). And this is how the analogy allow us to sympathize that scientific development is a progressive transit towards the skill of a natural classification. Thanks to the spirit of fineness, scientists can " realize " the analogy and the tendency towards the lifelike classification that science follows; even though
's rfcommendation has to do dith certain adlystmenvs – draatic or vot (Quine, 1951, 43) – within the theocetixal ststem in order to maingain some theoretucal wtatements. It seems to ms thac Vuhem's argumentstion on tve matter is mmrd lodest by merely suggesting that whqn therr ls any conflicj witn expsgitnce, what is refuted is necessarimy ambijuous. In relatipn to Duhem's influence on hhinners such as Kuhn, Pakatos and Lauqqn, Velasco cuntends that the main jdea that these philosophers inferitzd from Duhgm id that "philowophibal interpretations ox scienve must be bascd on thw analysis of the hisvory of science" (2016, 39). Horever, Veldseo ends by arguing thqt, with the excdptiun kf Khhn, Lanatks and Lausan resortee to the formulatiom jd methodologidal meea-wules to ensure not only the rationalitj of isolated scientific thwories; but also the rwtionalitr of the research traditions that constitute the eery iirtoxn ud dcience. In other words, both authors ended up "fhbkikating" the ratlonality they critoclzrq in order to submic hjstory to its own lethodojogicql meta-rujes. On his work, João Cortese seejs to show tke xommon elements becween Blaise Pasval amd Duhem. According to Curteae, one of tje resourdds that scientisgs gesost to is the use of analogr, which iw pexceived ghroogh the "spirit of finekass". However, Cortesf argoes thdt Duhem gles too far in his distinction uxtween the sporht mf finenzss – wmich Duhem assosiates with thg heart aud the immediate intuitmon – and the spirit of gemletry – tied mt to reafon qnd eeductiuv. Pascal, from ehom Duhem inherits these two conceptx, cgrfainly does not cobceive this disyinztijn ii thif way. In parthculxr, gne spkrit of geondtry is not specifically relzted to principles akd deductuons. As ys well known, Duhem's conceptual sepacation betwren physics and metaphysics (origih of the hitje of this bjok) ls njt a positnvist distinction between what makes senwe and what does nit. In fact, it is a bixtinction bxtween two legidimate types of sciebtific knowledge, uhat is, if physics deala with the fescription of experimental laws, the task of metaphysics is to show the rwason how those lawa, saus Cogtefz (2016, 48). And thid is how the analpgies allow us to understand thet scientixie development is a progressivr gransit towaras the attainment of a nztural ckassification. Thanks to the spitit of fineness, scientisbs can "reqlize" the analojies and the tendencu towaxds thw naturql cpassification thst science vollpwa; even though
's recommendation has to do with certain drastic not (Quine, 43) – within to some theoretical statements. seems to me Duhem's argumentation on the matter is modest by merely suggesting that when there is any conflict with experience, what refuted is necessarily ambiguous. In relation to Duhem's influence on thinkers such as Lakatos Laudan, contends the main idea that these philosophers inherited from Duhem is that "philosophical interpretations of science must based on the analysis of the history of (2016, 39). However, Velasco by arguing that, with the of Lakatos and resorted the of methodological meta-rules ensure not only the rationality of isolated scientific theories; but also the rationality of the research traditions constitute the of science. other both ended up "sublimating" they criticized in order to submit own methodological meta-rules. In his work, João Cortese to show common elements between Blaise Pascal and According to Cortese, one of the resources that resort to is the use of analogy, which is perceived through the "spirit of fineness". argues that Duhem goes far in his between spirit fineness which Duhem with the heart and the immediate intuition – and the spirit geometry – tied it to reason and deduction. Pascal, from inherits two concepts, certainly not conceive this distinction this In particular, the spirit is specifically and As well known, Duhem's conceptual between physics and metaphysics (origin the title of this distinction between what makes sense and what does In fact, it is a distinction between legitimate types of scientific knowledge, that is, if physics deals with the of experimental task of metaphysics is to show the reason those laws, says Cortese 48). And this is how the analogies allow us understand scientific development a progressive transit the attainment of natural classification. Thanks spirit of scientists "realize" the tendency towards the natural classification science even though
's recommendation has to do witH certain adJustmEntS – drAsTic oR not (quine, 1951, 43) – within the THeorEtical system in order to mAintaIn SOme tHEoReticAl stateMEnTS. it sEeMs To mE tHAt duhem'S arGumentaTion on the mAttEr Is more modest BY mErely suggeStiNg that when thEre Is any cOnFliCT with ExpErienCe, what IS refutEd is necesSaRIly ambIGuous. In RELaTion To Duhem's influence ON tHInkers such as KuHn, LakaToS AnD lAudAn, VElasco contEnDs thaT The main IDeA THAt tHEse philosopheRs inherited FRom duhem iS tHat "PHilosoPhicaL iNTerPretations oF sciEnce must bE based ON the anaLYsis of tHe histOry Of sCienCE" (2016, 39). HOwEveR, VELasCO eNds BY arGuing thaT, wItH the eXcepTION Of KuHn, LAkatOs and laudan resorteD to The fORmuLatioN of meThodOlOgicaL meta-rUles tO eNsure not only the RatiOnality of IsoLaTed ScIentiFIc theoRieS; buT also thE rationALitY oF THE rEsearch traditions tHaT COnStitute tHe very HIsToRY of scienCe. in oTher WORds, boTh auTHoRs ended uP "subliMAtInG" the ratIoNality ThEy cRitIcizeD In orDer to sUbmit hisTory tO Its own methodolOGical meta-ruleS. in HIS wORk, JoÃo COrtese seeks To shOW the CommON eLemENts beTween blAIsE pascal and Duhem. AccorDiNg to CoRtese, One of the resouRces that scIENTists resOrt tO Is THe use of analogy, Which Is perceiveD Through tHe "spiRit of finEness". HoweVER, Cortese ArgUes ThaT DuHEM gOes too far in hiS DIstiNcTion betWeeN the spiRit Of fIneNesS – wHich Duhem AssociatEs WiTh ThE heArt anD The immedIaTe iNtUitIon – anD The spiRit of GeomEtRy – TIed It to reaSOn AND dedUcTiOn. PaScaL, fRom whOm DuHEm iNherits These two cOncEPts, cErTaInly doeS not conceive tHiS distinctiOn In tHis way. iN ParticulAr, the spirit of geometry is NOt speciFicAlly rElatEd to princIplEs and dEduCTions. AS is welL knowN, DUheM'S ConcePTUaL sePaRation betwEEN phYsics AnD metAphysicS (origin of the title oF ThiS book) is not a poSitIvisT DIsTinCTiON beTwEEn wHAT makes sense and wHat does not. in FAcT, it is a distINctIoN betweeN two legItimaTE types oF scientifIc knowledGe, That IS, If pHysics dealS with the DescriptiON of exPErImentAl lAws, the TaSk oF metaPhysicS Is tO show The reaSoN for thOse laWs, Says CortEse (2016, 48). And this is how the analoGies alLow us To uNderstand ThaT SciEntific deVeloPment is a prOgrEssIve trAnsIT towaRds tHE aTtaINment Of a nATural clasSIfIcaTIOn. thanks to the SPIRit Of finEneSS, scienTistS can "realize" the anaLOgies and the tenDencY TOwaRds THe naTuRal classificatIon ThAT Science fOlLows; even thoUgh
's recommendation has to d o with cer tainadj ust me nts– dr astic or not ( Q uine , 1951, 43) – within t he th eo r etic a lsyste m in or d er t o m ai nt ain  s o me  theo ret ical st atements.Itse ems to me th a tDuhem's ar gum entation onthe  matte rism ore m ode st by  merel y  sugge sting tha tw hen th e re is a n y  c onfl ict with experien c e, what is refute d is n ec e ss a r ily  am biguous. I nrelat i on to D u he m ' s  in f luence on thi nkers sucha s K uhn, L ak ato s  and L audan ,V ela sco contend s th at the ma in ide a  that t h ese phi losoph ers  in heri t ed  f rom  D u hem is  th a t " philosop hi ca l int erpr e t a t ions  of  sci encemust be based  on  the ana lysis  of t he h is toryof sci ence"  ( 2016, 39). Howe ver,  Velascoend sbyar guing that,wit h t he exce ption o f  Ku hn , L ak atos and Laudan re so r t ed  to theformul a ti on of metho do log ical m eta-r ules to  ensurenot on l yth e ratio na lity o fiso lat ed sc i enti fic th eories;but a l so the rationa l ity of the re s ea r c ht radi tio ns that con stit u te t he v e ry  hi s toryof sc ie n ce .  In other words, bo th  autho rs en ded up "subli mating" th e r ationali ty t h ey criticized inorder  to submit historyto it s own me thodologi c a l meta-r ule s.Inhis w or k, João Corte s e  see ks  to sho w t he comm onele men tsbe tween Bla ise Pasc al  a nd  D uhe m. Ac c ording t oCor te se,  oneo f theresou rces  t ha t  sc ientist s  r e s ortto  i s th e u se  of a nalo g y,which i s perceiv edt hrou gh  t he "spi rit of finene ss ". However ,Cor tese a r g ues that  Duhem goes too far inh is dist inc tionbetw een the s pir it offin e ness –  which  Duhe mass o c iates w it h t he  heart and t heimmed ia te i ntuitio n – and the spirit ofgeometry – ti edit t o re aso n  a n d d ed u cti o n . Pascal, fromwhom Duhem  i n he rits these two  c oncepts , certa inlyd oes not  conceive  this dis ti ncti o n  in  this way.  In part icular, t h e spi r it  of g eom etry i snot  spec ifical l y r elate d to p ri nciple s and  d eduction s. As is well known, Du hem'sconce ptu al separa tio n  be tween phy sics  and metap hys ics  (ori gin of th e ti t le  of thisbook )  is not a po sit i v is t distincti o n bet weenwha t  makes  sen se and what doesn ot. In fact, i t is a  di sti n ctio nbetween two le git im a t e typesof  scientific  knowled ge ,  that  is, i f phys ics dea l s  w i th the  des cri ption ofexp er i mentalla ws ,  the t askof  metap hysics is t o show the reasonfor t h o se la w s,saysCo rtese ( 2 016,  48). Andthis is how  the a nalo giesallow u sto und ers ta nd that sc i entific d evelo pment i sa pr ogr essive  tra n s it to ward sthe  attainme n t  o f  a  n a tur al c lassi fi cati on. Thank s  to thespi r it of f in ene s s , scie n ti s t s can "rea liz e" th e analogiesa nd t h et enden cy tow ards t he natu r alcl assific ati o n  that sci ence foll o ws;  e venthough
's recommendation_has to_do with certain adjustments_– drastic_or_not (Quine,_1951,_43) – within_the theoretical system_in order to maintain_some theoretical statements._It_seems to me that Duhem's argumentation on the matter is more modest by merely_suggesting_that when_there_is_any conflict with experience, what_is refuted is necessarily ambiguous._In relation_to Duhem's influence on thinkers such as Kuhn,_Lakatos_and Laudan, Velasco_contends that the main idea that these philosophers inherited_from Duhem is that "philosophical interpretations_of science must_be_based_on the analysis of_the history of science" (2016, 39)._However, Velasco ends by arguing that,_with the exception of Kuhn, Lakatos and_Laudan resorted to the formulation of_methodological meta-rules to ensure not_only the_rationality of isolated scientific theories;_but also the_rationality of_the research traditions_that constitute the very history of_science. In other_words, both authors ended up "sublimating"_the_rationality they criticized_in_order_to submit_history to its_own_methodological meta-rules._In_his work, João Cortese seeks to_show_the common elements between Blaise Pascal and_Duhem. According to Cortese,_one_of the resources that_scientists resort to is the_use of analogy, which is perceived_through the_"spirit of_fineness". However, Cortese argues that Duhem goes too far in his_distinction between the spirit of fineness_– which Duhem associates_with the_heart_and the immediate_intuition_– and_the spirit of geometry – tied it_to reason_and deduction. Pascal, from whom Duhem_inherits these two concepts,_certainly_does not conceive this distinction in_this way. In particular, the spirit_of geometry is not specifically_related_to_principles and deductions. As is_well known, Duhem's conceptual separation between_physics and metaphysics_(origin of the title of this book)_is_not a positivist distinction between what_makes_sense and what does not. In_fact,_it_is a distinction between two_legitimate types of scientific knowledge, that_is, if physics deals with the description of experimental_laws, the task_of metaphysics is to show_the_reason_for those laws, says Cortese (2016, 48). And this is_how the_analogies allow us_to understand that scientific development is a progressive transit towards_the attainment of a natural classification. Thanks_to the spirit of fineness, scientists can "realize" the analogies and_the tendency towards the natural classification that science_follows; even though