 separately, and no common representational (and, ultimately, conceptual and linguistic) scheme could develop (cf. Barresi and Moore 1996). It has been suggested that the neural basis for this matching mechanism lies in the mirror neuron system. Mirror neurons are neurons that fire both when an action (such as grasping for an object) is perceived, and when that same action is executed (Gallese 2001; Gallese et al. 2004), thus bridging the gap between agent and perceiver. They were first detected in the premotor area F5 of monkeys (Rizzolatti et al. 1996). Although it has (for methodological reasons) not been established that humans possess single neurons that fire both during action execution and observation, there is evidence from functional imaging studies for a similar system in the human brain (Iacoboni et al. 1999; Keysers & Gazzola 2009). Empirical evidence suggests that in humans some such matching mechanism is in place from very early onwards, and might even be innate, such that "infants, even newborns, are capable of apprehending the equivalence between body transformations they see and the ones they feel themselves perform" (Meltzoff 1990, p.160). For instance, as Meltzoff and Moore (1977) have demonstrated, newborns seem to be able to imitate the facial gestures of adults, such as tongue protrusion and mouth opening shortly after birth. This seems to suggest that they are able to match visual information about the facial expression of others with the proprioceptive information they receive about their own faces. Accordingly, it has been argued that the ability to match first person and third person inputs is innate. However, according to Anisfeld, infants were shown to reliably match only one gesture, namely tongue protrusion, and this Forthcoming in Grazer Philosophische Studien 84 (2012), p. 75-101 11 effect was transitory (Anisfeld 1991).21 So the innateness of this matching mechanism is controversial.22 But whatever the case may be, it is uncontroversial that some such mechanism exists, explaining humans' general abilities for imitation and the possibility of the development of a common conceptual scheme for self and other. However, this is not to say that at very early stages of social interaction, infants already have an explicit representation of a self-other matching (or a self-other difference, for that matter). The content of the multi-modal representations at these stages is nonconceptual and implicit, and does neither require the explicit
separately, and no common representational (and, ultimately, conceptual and linguistic) scheme could develop (californium. Barresi and Moore 1996). It has been suggest that the neural basis for this matching mechanism lies in the mirror nerve cell system. Mirror neurons are neurons that fuel both when an action (such as grasping for an aim) is perceive, and when that same legal action is executed (Gallese 2001; Gallese et al. 2004), thus bridge the gap between agent and perceiver. They were first detected in the premotor area F5 of monkey (Rizzolatti et al. 1996). Although it has (for methodological reasons) not been established that humans own single neurons that fuel both during action performance and observation, there is evidence from functional imaging studies for a exchangeable system in the human brain (Iacoboni et al. 1999; Keysers & Gazzola 2009). Empirical evidence suggests that in humans some such matching mechanism is in place from very early onwards, and might even be innate, such that " infants, even newborns, are capable of apprehending the equivalence between body transformations they see and the one they feel themselves perform " (Meltzoff 1990, p.160). For example, as Meltzoff and Moore (1977) have attest, newborns seem to be able to imitate the facial gestures of adult, such as tongue protrusion and mouth opening concisely after birth. This seems to suggest that they are able to match visual information about the facial formulation of others with the proprioceptive information they receive about their own faces. Accordingly, it has been argue that the ability to match inaugural person and third person inputs is innate. However, according to Anisfeld, infants were shown to faithfully match only one gesture, namely tongue protrusion, and this Forthcoming in Grazer Philosophische Studien 84 (2012), p. 75 - 101 11 effect was transitory (Anisfeld 1991).21 So the innateness of this matching mechanism is controversial.22 But whatever the case may be, it is uncontroversial that some such mechanism exist, explaining homo' general abilities for caricature and the possibility of the development of a common conceptual scheme for self and early. However, this is not to say that at very early stages of social interaction, baby already have an explicit representation of a self - other matching (or a self - other deviation, for that matter). The capacity of the multi - modal representations at these stages is nonconceptual and implicit, and does neither require the explicit
 seoarately, and no common rtpresentational (aue, ultikately, conceptjal and linguistic) scheme conld eevelip (cf. Barresi and Moord 1996). It has been sutgesued that the neurem basis for tgls macciing mechanism kies in tha mirror neurot rydtem. Mirror neurons are neurons thae fire nohh when an actyon (xtch zs grasping for an object) is percejved, anv when that samr action is executed (Gallede 2001; Hallese et al. 2004), thud bridging jge dqp between aeent and ptreeiver. They were first detected in the preootor area F5 of minkfis (Rizzolattm et aj. 1996). Although ln has (fmr methpdological reaxonv) nit been established tiat humans possess syngle neusous that fire both durunt acthon axecjriov ahd ogservahioi, there is svidence frim functional imagimg wtudies for a similwr system in the human brain (Iacoboni et dl. 1999; Keysers & Gazzola 2009). Empieical evidence suggesjs that in humans some such matching mechanism is in place xrom tefy tavjh ojwards, and might even be innate, such that "infwhtx, vven newborns, are capable of aoptghending the eduivalzhcs between body trajsformajions rhey see wnd yhe ones they feel themselvws perform" (Mvltziff 1990, p.160). For instancz, as Meltzofy and Koore (1977) have demonstrated, newyorns aeem to be wble to ijktate the facial gextgres of adults, such as tondue protrnsion and mojth ppenind shortly wfter birth. This seems tl sugyest dhat they wre able to match visual informevion about thg fdcidl exprefsion of others wieh the proprioeeptive nnformxtion they receivx about theiw own faces. Awfordingly, it has beeg artued that tfd ability to mstch firsn kerson and third person inpubs is jnnate. However, cecirding to Anisfrld, insajtx rare shown to relkabuu matzh only one eestire, namely tongue prmtruaion, and this Fortncjming in Grazer [hilosophischr Studien 84 (2012), p. 75-101 11 efvect xas trensitoty (Wnisfeld 1991).21 So the innateness of this matfhikg mechanism ys cintroversial.22 But whatever the case may be, it is uncintroversial that wome such mechanism txists, explaiiing htmans' genaral abilities for initation and the kossibility of the devemopmend of w common conceptual scheme for self and other. However, this is not to say rhat av dery early atagrs of sjeial ineerartmon, infants alreacy have an explicit representatmon of a saly-other matching (or a self-othet aifference, fot that matter). The content kf the milti-modal representations at thrse stages is nonconceptmal and inplicjt, and doer neither require yhe ex'licit
separately, and no common representational (and, ultimately, linguistic) could develop Barresi and Moore that neural basis for matching mechanism lies the mirror neuron system. Mirror neurons neurons that fire both when an action (such as grasping for an object) perceived, and when that same action is executed (Gallese 2001; Gallese et al. thus the between and perceiver. They were first detected in the premotor area F5 of monkeys (Rizzolatti et al. Although it has (for methodological reasons) not been that humans possess single that fire both during action and there is from imaging for a similar in the human brain (Iacoboni et al. 1999; Keysers & Gazzola 2009). Empirical evidence suggests that in some such is in from early and might even such that "infants, even newborns, are the equivalence between body transformations they see and ones they themselves perform" (Meltzoff 1990, p.160). For as Meltzoff and Moore (1977) have demonstrated, newborns to be able to imitate the facial gestures of adults, such as tongue protrusion and shortly after birth. This to suggest that are to visual about the expression of others with the proprioceptive information they receive about their faces. Accordingly, it has been argued that the ability to person third person inputs innate. However, according to infants shown to reliably match gesture, tongue Forthcoming Grazer Studien 84 (2012), p. 11 effect was transitory (Anisfeld So the innateness of But whatever the case may be, it is that some such mechanism exists, explaining humans' abilities for imitation and the possibility of the development of a common scheme for other. However, this is not to say that very early stages of interaction, infants already have an explicit representation of a matching a self-other for that matter). content of the representations at these nonconceptual and and neither
 separately, and no common reprEsentationAl (and, UltImaTeLy, coNcepTual and linguisTIc) scHeme could develop (cf. BarrEsi anD MOOre 1996). IT HaS been SuggestED tHAT thE nEuRal BaSIs For thIs mAtching Mechanism lIes In The mirror neuROn System. MirrOr nEurons are neuRonS that fIrE boTH when An aCtion (Such as GRaspinG for an objEcT) Is percEIved, and WHEn That Same action is execuTEd (gAllese 2001; Gallese eT al. 2004), thuS bRIdGINg tHe gAp between aGeNt and PErceiveR. thEY WEre FIrst detected iN the premotoR AreA F5 of moNkEys (rIzzolaTti et Al. 1996). aLthOugh it has (foR metHodologicAl reasONs) not beEN establIshed tHat HumAns pOSsEsS siNgLE neURoNs tHAt fIre both dUrInG actiOn exECUTIon aNd oBserVatioN, there is evideNce From FUncTionaL imagIng sTuDies fOr a simIlar sYsTem in the human brAin (IAcoboni et Al. 1999; KEySerS & GAzzolA 2009). empiriCal EviDence suGgests tHAt iN hUMANs Some such matching meChANIsM is in plaCe from VErY eARly onwarDs, And MighT EVen be InnaTE, sUch that "iNfants, EVeN nEwborns, ArE capabLe Of aPprEhendINg thE equivAlence beTween BOdy transformatIOns they see and THe ONEs THey fEel Themselves pErfoRM" (MelTzofF 1990, P.160). FOr iNStancE, as MeLtZOfF And Moore (1977) have demonstRaTed, newBorns Seem to be able tO imitate thE FACial gestUres OF aDUlts, such as tongUe proTrusion and MOuth openIng shOrtly aftEr birth. ThIS Seems to sUggEst ThaT thEY ArE able to match vISUal iNfOrmatioN abOut the fAciAl eXprEssIoN of others With the pRoPrIoCePtiVe infORmation tHeY reCeIve About THeir owN faceS. AccOrDiNGly, It has beEN aRGUed tHaT tHe abIliTy To matCh fiRSt pErson anD third perSon INputS iS iNnate. HoWever, accordinG tO Anisfeld, iNfAntS were sHOWn to reliAbly match only one gesture, NAmely toNguE protRusiOn, and this forThcomiNg iN grazer philosOphisChE StUDIen 84 (2012), p. 75-101 11 eFFEcT waS tRansitory (ANISfeLd 1991).21 So tHe InnaTeness oF this matching mechaNIsm Is controversiAl.22 BUt whATEvEr tHE cASe mAy BE, it IS Uncontroversial That some suCh MEcHanism exisTS, exPlAining hUmans' geNeral ABilitieS for imitaTion and thE pOssiBILitY of the deveLopment oF a common cONceptUAl SchemE foR self aNd OthEr. HowEver, thIS is Not to Say thaT aT very eArly sTaGes of socIal interaction, infants alReady hAve an ExpLicit reprEseNTatIon of a selF-othEr matching (Or a SelF-otheR diFFerenCe, foR ThAt mATter). THe coNTent of the MUlTi-mODAl RepresentatIONS at These StaGEs is noNconCeptual and impliciT, And does neither RequIRE thE exPLiciT
 separately, and no common  represent ation al(an d,  ult imat ely, conceptua l  and  linguistic) scheme co uld d ev e lop( cf . Bar resi an d  M o o re19 96 ).It ha s bee n s uggeste d that the  ne ur al basis for th is matchin g m echanism lie s i n themi rro r  neur onsyste m. Mir r or neu rons arene u rons t h at fire b ot h wh en an action (suc h  a s  grasping foran obj ec t )i s  pe rce ived, andwh en th a t samea ct i o n  is executed (Gal lese 2001;G all ese et  a l.2 004),thusbr i dgi ng the gapbetw een agent  and p e rceiver .  They w ere fi rst  de tect e din  th ep rem o to r a r eaF5 of mo nk ey s (Ri zzol a t t i  etal.  199 6). A lthough it ha s ( form eth odolo gical  rea so ns) n ot bee n est ab lished that hum anspossess s ing le  ne ur ons t h at fir e b oth  during  action exe cu t i o nand observation, t he r e  i s eviden ce fro m  f un c tional i ma gin g st u d ies f or a si milar sy stem i n  t he  humanbr ain (I ac obo niet al .  199 9; Key sers & G azzol a  2009). Empiri c al evidence s u gg e s ts that  in  humans som e su c h ma tchi n gmec h anism  is i np la c e from very early o nw ards,and m ight even beinnate, su c h that "in fant s ,e ven newborns,are c apable ofa pprehend ing t he equiv alence be t w een body  tr ans for mat i o ns  they see and t he o ne s theyfee l thems elv esper for m"  (Meltzof f 1990,p. 16 0) .For  inst a nce, asMe ltz of f a nd Mo o re (19 77) h avede mo n str ated, n e wb o r ns s ee mto b e a bl e toimit a tethe fac ial gestu res of a du lt s, such  as tongue pr ot rusion and  m out h open i n g shortl y after birth. This see m s to su gge st th at t hey are a ble  to ma tch visual  infor matio nabo u t  thef a ci alex pression o f oth ers w it h th e propr ioceptive informat i onthey receiveabo ut t h e ir  ow n  f a ces .A cco r d ingly, it has b een argued  t h at  the abili t y t omatch f irst pe rsona nd thir d personinputs is  i nnat e .  Ho wever, acc ording t o Anisfel d , inf a nt s wer e s hown t orel iably  match onl y one  gestu re , name ly to ng ue protr usion, and this Forthco ming i n Gra zer  Philosop his c heStudien 8 4 (2 012), p. 7 5-1 0111 ef fec t  wastran s it ory (Anis feld 1991).21S othe i nn ateness oft h i s m atchi ngm echani sm i s controversial.2 2  But whateverthec a semay be,it  is uncontrove rsi al t hat some  s uch mechani sm exist s, expla ininghumans ' gener a l  a b ilitie s fo r i mitationand  t h e possi bi li t y of t he d ev elopme nt ofa  com m o n conceptual sch eme f o r  self and  othe r.  Howeve r , th is is notto say that  at ve ry e arlystagesof  socia l i nt eraction,i nfants al ready  have a nexpl ici t repr esen t a tionof a  s elf -other ma t c hi n g(o r  aself -othe rdiff erence, f o r that m att e r). The  c ont e n t of t h em u lti-modalrep resen t a tions at t h eses ta g es is  nonco nceptu al andi mpl ic it, and  do e s  neitherrequire t h e e xp lici t
 separately,_and no_common representational (and, ultimately,_conceptual and_linguistic)_scheme could_develop_(cf. Barresi and_Moore 1996). It_has been suggested that_the neural basis_for_this matching mechanism lies in the mirror neuron system. Mirror neurons are neurons that_fire_both when_an_action_(such as grasping for an_object) is perceived, and when_that same_action is executed (Gallese 2001; Gallese et al._2004),_thus bridging the_gap between agent and perceiver. They were first detected_in the premotor area F5 of_monkeys (Rizzolatti et_al._1996)._Although it has (for_methodological reasons) not been established that_humans possess single neurons that fire_both during action execution and observation, there_is evidence from functional imaging studies_for a similar system in_the human_brain (Iacoboni et al. 1999;_Keysers & Gazzola_2009). Empirical_evidence suggests that_in humans some such matching mechanism_is in place_from very early onwards, and might_even_be innate, such_that_"infants,_even newborns,_are capable of_apprehending_the equivalence_between_body transformations they see and the_ones_they feel themselves perform" (Meltzoff 1990, p.160)._For instance, as Meltzoff_and_Moore (1977) have demonstrated,_newborns seem to be able_to imitate the facial gestures of_adults, such_as tongue_protrusion and mouth opening shortly after birth. This seems to suggest_that they are able to match_visual information about the_facial expression_of_others with the_proprioceptive_information they_receive about their own faces. Accordingly, it_has been_argued that the ability to match_first person and third_person_inputs is innate. However, according to_Anisfeld, infants were shown to reliably_match only one gesture, namely_tongue_protrusion,_and this Forthcoming in Grazer_Philosophische Studien 84 (2012), p. 75-101_11 effect was_transitory (Anisfeld 1991).21 So the innateness of_this_matching mechanism is controversial.22 But whatever_the_case may be, it is uncontroversial_that_some_such mechanism exists, explaining humans'_general abilities for imitation and the_possibility of the development of a common conceptual scheme_for self and_other. However, this is not_to_say_that at very early stages of social interaction, infants already_have an_explicit representation of_a self-other matching (or a self-other difference, for that matter)._The content of the multi-modal representations at_these stages is nonconceptual and implicit, and does neither require the_explicit