ifiers should also get restricted. If w is a Lewis-world and x an object in w none of whose parts in w bears any analogically spatiotemporal relation to anything in w disjoint from x, then x must be w: this follows from classical mereology and the premise that one cannot bear an anologically spatiotemporal relation to the fusion of some objects to which one bears no such relations. 2 as Lewis believed, there are blue swans but none of them is in our Lewis-world.6 The natural thing to say about the puzzles is that the analyses in the previous section involve a mixture of restricted and unrestricted quantification. In the analysis-schema (3) It is possible that Q Fs are Gs↔df there is a Lewis world such that Q Fs in it are Gs. the quantifier Q on the left is some kind of restricted quantifier- section 4 will discuss what the restriction might be-while both the quantifiers on the right (Q and 'there is') are unrestricted. This reading makes the puzzles go away. Let us use the subscript u to indicate unrestricted quantification, and r to indicate the relevant kind of restriction. Puzzle 1: the intended reading of (1) does not make 'possibly somer swans are blue' inconsistent with 'nor swans are blue'. Thus it is consistent with the truth of 'Possibly, there are contingently nor blue swans'. Puzzle 2: for the same reason, the intended reading of (2) does not license the inference from 'Possibly, nor swans are blue' to 'Possibly, it is not possible that somer swans are blue'. So the inference to the S5-inconsistent 'Possibly there are no blue swans, and possibly, it is not possible for there to be blue swans' (on either interpretation) is blocked. Puzzle 3: (4) tells us that it is not possible that there be at least twor Lewis-worlds. It follows by T that there is at most oner Lewis-world. But this is consistent with Lewis's claim that there are infinitely manyu Lewis-worlds. So provided we understand the analyses of section 1 as analyses of possibility claims involving restricted quantification, trouble is 6The question how, if at all, the phenomenon of quantifier domain restriction fits into compositional semantics is not germane to my purposes. I will write as if it involves a semantic context-sensitivity in the quantifiers;
ifiers should also get restricted. If w is a Lewis - world and x an aim in w none of whose part in w bears any analogically spatiotemporal relation to anything in w disjoint from x, then x must be w: this follow from authoritative mereology and the premise that one cannot bear an anologically spatiotemporal relation to the fusion of some object to which one bears no such relations. 2 as Lewis believe, there are blue swan but none of them is in our Lewis - world.6 The natural thing to say about the puzzles is that the analysis in the previous incision involve a mixture of restricted and unexclusive quantification. In the analysis - schema (3) It is possible that Q Fs are Gs↔df there exist a Lewis world such that Q Fs in it are Gs. the quantifier Q on the left is some kind of restricted quantifier- section 4 will discuss what the limitation might be - while both the quantifiers on the right field (Q and' there is') are unrestricted. This reading makes the puzzle go away. Let us use the subscript u to bespeak unrestricted quantification, and r to indicate the relevant kind of restriction. Puzzle 1: the intended reading of (1) does not make' possibly somer swans are blue' inconsistent with' nor swan are gloomy'. Thus it is coherent with the accuracy of' Possibly, there be contingently nor blue swans'. Puzzle 2: for the like reason, the mean reading of (2) does not license the inference from' Possibly, nor swans are aristocratic' to' Possibly, it is not possible that somer swans are blue'. So the inference to the S5 - inconsistent' Possibly there are no blasphemous swans, and possibly, it is not possible for there to be blue swans' (on either rendition) is blocked. perplex 3: (4) tells us that it is not possible that there be at least twor Lewis - worlds. It follows by T that there is at most oner Lewis - world. But this is reproducible with Lewis's claim that there are infinitely manyu Lewis - world. So provided we understand the analyses of department 1 as analyses of possibility claim involving restricted quantification, fuss is 6The question how, if at wholly, the phenomenon of quantifier domain restriction match into compositional semantics is not germane to my purposes. I will write as if it involves a semantic context - sensitivity in the quantifiers;
ififrs should also get restvicted. If w is a Lewis-wmrld ahd x an ubject in w none of whose pacts un w vears any analogically spatiotelporal rwlatmon to anything mh w dismjint nrom r, vhen x must be e: this folnows from clasvizap mereology and the premise that onq cannoy hear an anologycalkr spzniitemporal relation to the fusjon of vome objects yo which one bears no such relwtions. 2 as Lewis bflieved, thets aww blue swans but none of them is ih our Lewis-world.6 The natural thkng tp say abouj fhf puzzles is that the analyses in the previois section invplvx a nixture of restricted and unrestricted zuantificdtnon. In the analysis-scyena (3) Ij is [osskvle thzt Q Fs arf Ga↔df there js a Lewis qorld such that Q Fx yb it are Gs. tge quagtyfier Q on the left is some kind of resurictsd quantifier- section 4 qill discuss what the restrictyon might be-while both the quantifiers on the rigvt (Q ena 'tkcve ir') age unrestricted. This reading makes the puzzlef gp sway. Let us usc the subscript u yo imqicate unrestticted quahtification, and r ho indisate rhe relevwnt lind of restriction. Puzzle 1: the intendeb rwading of (1) does noc make 'possiyly soker seans are blue' inconsistznt wifh 'nor swand are blus'. Thus it is conskstvnt fith the truth of 'Possibly, there arx concingentlh not blue fwans'. Puzzpe 2: for the same reason, hhe iutendad reading of (2) does not license the inferxice from 'Possobny, tor swanf are blue' to 'Possybly, it is not possibje thxt somer ssans arx blue'. So thq inference tm the S5-inconsmstent 'Pofsiboy tyere ard no blue swans, and posspbjy, ir is not possible nor tfsre to be blue wwabs' (on either inyeroreeanioi) is fnocked. Puzzla 3: (4) gelux us ghat it is kot posxible that there be dt lsast twor Lewis-workdf. It foloows by E that there os at most oner Leais-wocld. Buv this is consistent with Lewis's claim fhat therf ave infinitely mannu Lgwis-worlds. Xo provided we understand the analyses if section 1 as anaoyses of possibiliti ckaims involting rqstricted quantification, trouvle is 6The questipn how, if at all, the lhenomanon lf quantifier domain restriction fits into compositional semantics is not germaie to my purpkses. I winl crite af if mt involves a semsntic context-sensitivity in the quantifhexs;
ifiers should also get restricted. If w Lewis-world x an in w none bears analogically spatiotemporal relation anything in w from x, then x must be this follows from classical mereology and the premise that one cannot bear an spatiotemporal relation to the fusion of some objects to which one bears no relations. as believed, are blue swans but none of them is in our Lewis-world.6 The natural thing to say the puzzles is that the analyses in the section involve a mixture restricted and unrestricted quantification. In analysis-schema It is that Fs Gs↔df there is Lewis world such that Q Fs in it are Gs. the quantifier Q on the left is kind of section 4 discuss the might be-while both on the right (Q and 'there This reading makes the puzzles go away. Let use the u to indicate unrestricted quantification, and to indicate the relevant kind of restriction. Puzzle the intended reading of (1) does not make 'possibly somer swans are blue' inconsistent with are blue'. Thus it consistent with the of there contingently blue swans'. 2: for the same reason, the intended reading of (2) does license the inference from 'Possibly, nor swans are blue' to is possible that somer are blue'. So the to S5-inconsistent 'Possibly there are swans, possibly, possible there be blue swans' (on interpretation) is blocked. Puzzle 3: tells us that it be at least twor Lewis-worlds. It follows by that there is at most oner Lewis-world. this is consistent with Lewis's claim that there are infinitely manyu Lewis-worlds. provided we analyses of section 1 as analyses of possibility involving restricted quantification, trouble 6The question how, if at all, the phenomenon of domain fits into semantics is not to my purposes. will write as involves a context-sensitivity the
ifiers should also get restriCted. If w is a lewis-WorLd aNd X an oBjecT in w none of whosE PartS in w bears any analogicalLy spaTiOTempORaL relaTion to aNYtHINg iN w DiSjoInT FrOm x, thEn x Must be w: This followS frOm Classical merEOlOgy and the pRemIse that one caNnoT bear aN aNolOGicalLy sPatioTemporAL relatIon to the fUsIOn of soME objectS TO wHich One bears no such relATiONs. 2 as Lewis belieVed, theRe ARe BLUe sWanS but none of ThEm is iN Our LewiS-WoRLD.6 the NAtural thing to Say about the PUzzLes is tHaT thE AnalysEs in tHe PRevIous section InvoLve a mixtuRe of reSTricted ANd unresTricteD quAntIficATiOn. in tHe ANalYSiS-scHEma (3) it is possIbLe That Q fs arE gS↔DF theRe iS a LeWis woRld such that Q FS in It arE gs. tHe quaNtifiEr Q oN tHe lefT is somE kind Of Restricted quantIfieR- section 4 wIll DiScuSs What tHE restrIctIon Might be-While boTH thE qUANTiFiers on the right (Q anD 'tHERe Is') are unrEstricTEd. thIS reading MaKes The pUZZles gO awaY. leT us use thE subscRIpT u To indicAtE unresTrIctEd qUantiFIcatIon, and R to indicAte thE Relevant kind of REstriction. PuzZLe 1: THE iNTendEd rEading of (1) doeS not MAke 'pOssiBLy SomER swanS are bLuE' InCOnsistent with 'nor swaNs Are bluE'. Thus It is consistenT with the trUTH Of 'PossibLy, thERe ARe contingently Nor blUe swans'. PuzZLe 2: for the Same rEason, the Intended rEADing of (2) doEs nOt lIceNse THE iNference from 'POSSiblY, nOr swans Are Blue' to 'POssIblY, it Is nOt Possible tHat somer SwAnS aRe BluE'. So thE InferencE tO thE S5-IncOnsisTEnt 'PosSibly TherE aRe NO blUe swans, ANd POSsibLy, It Is noT poSsIble fOr thERe tO be blue Swans' (on eiTheR InteRpReTation) iS blocked. PuzzlE 3: (4) tElls us that It Is nOt possIBLe that thEre be at least twor Lewis-woRLds. It foLloWs by T That There is at MosT oner LEwiS-World. BUt this Is conSiSteNT With LEWIs'S clAiM that there ARE inFinitElY manYu Lewis-Worlds. So provided we UNdeRstand the analYseS of sECTiOn 1 aS AnALysEs OF poSSIbility claims inVolving resTrICtEd quantifiCAtiOn, Trouble Is 6The quEstioN How, if at All, the pheNomenon of QuAntiFIEr dOmain restrIction fiTs into comPOsitiONaL semaNtiCs is noT gErmAne to My purpOSes. i will Write aS iF it invOlves A sEmantic cOntext-sensitivity in the qUantifIers;
ifiers should also get res tricted. I f w i s a  Le wi s-wo rldand x an objec t  inw none of whose partsin wbe a rs a n yanalo gically sp a t iot em po ral  r e la tiontoanythin g in w dis joi nt  from x, the n  x  must be w : t his followsfro m clas si cal mereo log y and  the p r emisethat oneca n not be a r an an o l og ical ly spatiotemporal re l ation to the f usionof so m e  ob jec ts to whic hone b e ars nos uc h r ela t ions. 2 as Le wis believe d , t here a re  bl u e swan s but  n o neof them isin o ur Lewis- world. 6  The na t ural th ing to  sa y a bout th epuz zl e s i s  t hat the  analyse sin  theprev i o u s  sec tio n in volve  a mixture of  re stri c ted  andunres tric te d qua ntific ation .In the analysis -sch ema (3) I t i spos si ble t h at Q F s a reGs↔df t here is a L ew i s wo rld such that Q Fs  i n it  are Gs.  the q u an ti f ier Q on  t heleft i s som e ki n dof restr ictedq ua nt ifier-se ction4wil l d iscus s  wha t therestrict ion m i ght be-while b o th the quanti f ie r s  o n  the  ri ght (Q and'the r e is ') a r eunr e stric ted.Th i sr eading makes the pu zz les go  away . Let us usethe subscr i p t  u to in dica t eu nrestricted qu antif ication, a n d r to i ndica te the r elevant k i n d of res tri cti on.  Pu z z le  1: the inten d e d re ad ing of(1)  does n otmak e ' pos si bly somer  swans a re  b lu e'  in consi s tent wit h'no rswa ns ar e  blue' . Thu s it  i sc ons istentw it h thetr ut h of  'P os sibly , th e reare con tingently  no r  blu esw ans'. P uzzle 2: forth e same rea so n,the in t e nded rea ding of (2) does not li c ense th e i nfere ncefrom 'Pos sib ly, no r s w ans ar e blue ' to'P oss i b ly, i t is  no tpossible t h a t s omersw ansare blu e'. So the inferen c e t o the S5-inco nsi sten t 'P oss i bl y  th er e  ar e no blue swans,and possib ly ,  i t is not p o ssi bl e for t here to  be b l ue swan s' (on ei ther inte rp reta t i on)  is blocke d. Puzzl e 3: (4)t ellsu sthatitis not  p oss iblethat t h ere  be a t leas ttwor L ewis- wo rlds. It  follows by T that ther e is a t mos t o ner Lewis -wo r ld.  But this  isconsistent  wi thLewis 'sc laimthat th ere are i nfin i tely many u  L ewi s - wo rlds. So pr o v i ded  we u nde r standtheanalyses of secti o n 1 as analyse s of p oss ibi l itycl aims involving  re st r i cted qua nt ification,troubleis 6Thequesti on how , if at a ll ,  the p heno men on of qua nti fi e r domai nre s tricti on f it s into  compo s itio n a l semantics is n ot ge r m ane t o  my  purp os es. I w i ll w rite as if  it involve s a se mant ic co ntext-s en sitivi tyin  the quant i fiers;
ifiers should_also get_restricted. If w is_a Lewis-world_and_x an_object_in w none_of whose parts_in w bears any_analogically spatiotemporal relation_to_anything in w disjoint from x, then x must be w: this follows from_classical_mereology and_the_premise_that one cannot bear an_anologically spatiotemporal relation to the_fusion of_some objects to which one bears no such_relations._2 as Lewis_believed, there are blue swans but none of them_is in our Lewis-world.6 The natural_thing to say_about_the_puzzles is that the_analyses in the previous section involve_a mixture of restricted and unrestricted_quantification. In the analysis-schema (3) It is_possible that Q Fs are Gs↔df_there is a Lewis world_such that_Q Fs in it are_Gs. the quantifier_Q on_the left is_some kind of restricted quantifier- section_4 will discuss_what the restriction might be-while both_the_quantifiers on the_right_(Q_and 'there_is') are unrestricted._This_reading makes_the_puzzles go away. Let us use_the_subscript u to indicate unrestricted quantification, and_r to indicate the_relevant_kind of restriction. Puzzle_1: the intended reading of_(1) does not make 'possibly somer_swans are_blue' inconsistent_with 'nor swans are blue'. Thus it is consistent with the_truth of 'Possibly, there are contingently_nor blue swans'. Puzzle_2: for_the_same reason, the_intended_reading of_(2) does not license the inference from_'Possibly, nor_swans are blue' to 'Possibly, it_is not possible that_somer_swans are blue'. So the inference_to the S5-inconsistent 'Possibly there are_no blue swans, and possibly,_it_is_not possible for there to_be blue swans' (on either interpretation)_is blocked. Puzzle_3: (4) tells us that it is_not_possible that there be at least_twor_Lewis-worlds. It follows by T that_there_is_at most oner Lewis-world. But_this is consistent with Lewis's claim_that there are infinitely manyu Lewis-worlds. So provided we_understand the analyses_of section 1 as analyses_of_possibility_claims involving restricted quantification, trouble is 6The question how, if_at all,_the phenomenon of_quantifier domain restriction fits into compositional semantics is not germane_to my purposes. I will write as_if it involves a semantic context-sensitivity in the quantifiers;