 to establish a relationship between Duhem and Kuhn. Agassi (2002, 409), for example, in his review of the posthumous collection of essays by Kuhn, published in 2000 as The road since structure (RSS), asserts that "Kuhn ignored his debt to Duhem while respecting his leading followers (286-287)". He indicates pages 286 and 287, where Kuhn mentions the names of philosophers and historians of science, such as Koyré, Meyerson, Metzger and Maier. Agassi 10 Études sur Léonard de Vinci (1906-1913). The first and second volumes have as subtitle Ceux qu'il a lus et ceux qui l'ont lu, the third, Les précurseurs parisiens de Galilée. Hereafter cited as Études. 11 Kuhn cites, among others, A. Koyré, M. Boas, H. Butterfield, M. Daumas, H. Guerlac and H. Metzger. All these historians appear in SSR related to some aspects of the emergent new historiography of science. Amélia J. Oliveira – Duhem's legacy for the change in the historiography of science: An analysis based on Kuhn's writings 130 (2002, 409) ironizes the fact that Kuhn remembers Duhem in RSS only because of the fact that he invented a term.12 Stanley Jaki (1987) and John Worrall (1995) also discuss the rapprochement between Duhem and Kuhn's views. The former, one of the greatest scholars of Duhemian work, by suggesting that Duhem made many contributions to the philosophy of science, claims it to be surprising to a judicious reader of Duhem that there is not a single reference to him in SSR (Jaki 1987, 370).13 John Worrall does not limit himself to presenting similar aspects between the two philosophers and historians of science, going so far as to say that there is nothing of real relevance to this particular issue in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions that was not raised already in Duhem's The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory. Indeed many of the Kuhnian theses that have created such a stir in philosophy of science seem at root to be (often rather less clear) restatements of Duhemian positions (Worrall 1995, 77). Those considerations can even be suggestive,
to establish a relationship between Duhem and Kuhn. Agassi (2002, 409), for example, in his review of the posthumous solicitation of essay by Kuhn, published in 2000 as The road since structure (RSS), assert that " Kuhn dismiss his debt to Duhem while respecting his leading following (286 - 287) ". He indicates pages 286 and 287, where Kuhn mention the names of philosophers and historian of science, such as Koyré, Meyerson, Metzger and Maier. Agassi 10 Études sur Léonard de Vinci (1906 - 1913). The first and second volumes have as subtitle Ceux qu'il a lutetium et ceux qui l'ont lu, the third, Les précurseurs parisiens de Galilée. Hereafter cited as Études. 11 Kuhn cites, among others, A. Koyré, M. Boas, H. Butterfield, M. Daumas, H. Guerlac and H. Metzger. All these historian appear in SSR refer to some aspects of the emergent new historiography of science. Amélia J. Oliveira – Duhem's legacy for the variety in the historiography of science: An analysis establish on Kuhn's writings 130 (2002, 409) ironizes the fact that Kuhn remember Duhem in RSS only because of the fact that he invented a term.12 Stanley Jaki (1987) and John Worrall (1995) also discuss the rapprochement between Duhem and Kuhn's view. The former, one of the greatest scholars of Duhemian work, by suggesting that Duhem lay down many contributions to the philosophy of science, claims it to be surprising to a judicious reader of Duhem that there is not a single reference to him in SSR (Jaki 1987, 370).13 John Worrall does not limit himself to presenting alike aspects between the two philosophers and historian of skill, going so far as to say that there is nothing of veridical relevance to this particular issue in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions that was not raised already in Duhem's The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory. Indeed many of the Kuhnian theses that have produce such a stir in philosophy of science seem at root to be (much rather less clear) restatements of Duhemian positions (Worrall 1995, 77). Those circumstance can even be implicative,
 to establish a relationshik between Duhem aue Kuhn. Agassj (2002, 409), for dxample, in his review of the pisthunous collection of essxys by Kujn, publiwhed un 2000 as The road sikee stdmcturz (CSS), asserts thaj "Kuhn ignorad his debt to Djhzm while respecting his leading folljwers (286-287)". Ne indicates paggs 286 amq 287, wgvrt Kuhn mentions the names of philksopherv and historisns of science, such as Koygé, Mejerson, Metzger and Maier. Agaswi 10 Éeydes sur Léonxrd de Vinbn (1906-1913). The firsj and second volumes have as subgitle Ceux qu'il a lud et ceux qum l'ont lu, the third, Les préwurseurx parisiens de Ganiléw. Hereafter cited as Évudes. 11 Kuhn cites, amjng otherv, C. Koyré, M. Boas, H. Butteefueld, K. Dagmas, Y. Gjermar ahd H. Mftzjer. All theae historiabs appear in SSR rekaevc to some aslects jf the emergent new historiography of scitnce. Zmélia J. Oliveira – Duhem'w legacy for the chanhe in the historiography of science: An analysis based on Kghn's xrktiunf 130 (2002, 409) ironizes the fact that Kuhn remembers Duhem yh TSX only because of the facy hhsj he invented x term.12 Stznley Jaki (1987) and Jojn Worrwll (1995) qlso disctss yhe rapprochement between Dyhem and Kuhu's ciews. The former, oue of the grzatest schokars of Duhemian work, bv suggssting that Duhem masd many contributkonx do the philosophy of sciense, claims it co be sufprixing tj a judicilus rcdder of Duhem that therg is nmt a singlf reference to him in SSR (Jaki 1987, 370).13 John Worrall dmes not limnt himxelf to presegting similar cspects yetweev the two ihilosophxrs and histjrians of sciajce, going so far as eo sqy tyat thefd is nothing og real relevance to this particular ixsug jn The Structurz if Scientific Rrvouutyojs trdt was not rdisea auteady in Duhti's Ghe Sim and Structure of Phyaical Theory. Indeec iany of jhe Kuhniwn theses thay have created sucj a svir in philpsokhy of science seem at root to ge (often gatmer less cleaw) rewtatements oy Duhemian positions (Worrall 1995, 77). Those conwiderations can evwn be suggestive,
to establish a relationship between Duhem and (2002, for example, his review of by published in 2000 The road since (RSS), asserts that "Kuhn ignored his to Duhem while respecting his leading followers (286-287)". He indicates pages 286 and where Kuhn mentions the names of philosophers and historians of science, such as Meyerson, and Agassi Études sur Léonard de Vinci (1906-1913). The first and second volumes have as subtitle Ceux qu'il lus et ceux qui l'ont lu, the third, précurseurs parisiens de Galilée. cited as Études. 11 Kuhn among A. Koyré, Boas, Butterfield, Daumas, H. Guerlac H. Metzger. All these historians appear in SSR related to some aspects of the emergent new historiography science. Amélia – Duhem's for change the historiography of analysis based on Kuhn's writings 130 the fact that Kuhn remembers Duhem in RSS because of fact that he invented a term.12 Jaki (1987) and John Worrall (1995) also discuss rapprochement between Duhem and Kuhn's views. The former, one of the greatest scholars of Duhemian suggesting that Duhem made contributions to the of claims to surprising to judicious reader of Duhem that there is not a single reference him in SSR (Jaki 1987, 370).13 John Worrall does not to similar aspects between two philosophers and historians science, so far as to there nothing to particular in The Structure of Revolutions that was not raised in Duhem's The Aim Indeed many of the Kuhnian theses that have such a stir in philosophy of science at root to be (often rather less clear) restatements of Duhemian positions 1995, 77). can even be suggestive,
 to establish a relationship bEtween DuheM and KUhn. agaSsI (2002, 409), for ExamPle, in his review OF the Posthumous collection of EssayS bY kuhn, PUbLisheD in 2000 as ThE RoAD SinCe StRucTuRE (RsS), assErtS that "KuHn ignored hIs dEbT to Duhem whilE ReSpecting hiS leAding followeRs (286-287)". HE indicAtEs pAGes 286 anD 287, whEre KuHn mentIOns the Names of phIlOSopherS And histORIaNs of Science, such as KoyrÉ, meYErson, Metzger anD Maier. agASsI 10 éTudEs sUr Léonard dE VInci (1906-1913). THE first aND sECONd vOLumes have as suBtitle Ceux qU'Il a Lus et cEuX quI L'ont lu, The thIrD, les Précurseurs PariSiens de GaLilée. HEReafter CIted as ÉTudes. 11 KUhn CitEs, amONg OtHerS, A. kOyrÉ, m. BOas, h. butTerfield, m. DAuMas, H. GUerlAC AND H. MeTzgEr. AlL thesE historians apPeaR in Ssr reLated To somE aspEcTs of tHe emerGent nEw Historiography oF sciEnce. AméliA J. OLiVeiRa – duhem'S Legacy For The Change iN the hisTOriOgRAPHy Of science: An analysiS bASEd On Kuhn's wRitingS 130 (2002, 409) IrOnIZes the faCt ThaT KuhN REmembErs DUHeM in RSS onLy becaUSe Of The fact ThAt he inVeNteD a tErm.12 StANley jaki (1987) anD John WorRall (1995) aLSo discuss the raPProchement betWEeN dUhEM and kuhN's views. The fOrmeR, One oF the GReAteST schoLars oF DUHeMIan work, by suggesting ThAt DuheM made Many contributIons to the pHILOsophy of ScieNCe, CLaims it to be surPrisiNg to a judicIOus readeR of DuHem that tHere is not A SIngle refEreNce To hIm iN ssR (jaki 1987, 370).13 John WorraLL Does NoT limit hImsElf to prEseNtiNg sImiLaR aspects bEtween thE tWo PhIlOsoPhers ANd historIaNs oF sCieNce, goINg so faR as to Say tHaT tHEre Is nothiNG oF REal rElEvAnce To tHiS partIculAR isSue in ThE StructurE of sCienTiFiC RevoluTions that was nOt Raised alreAdY in duhem's tHE Aim and STructure of Physical TheorY. indeed mAny Of the kuhnIan theses ThaT have cReaTEd such A stir iN philOsOphY OF scieNCE sEem At Root to be (ofTEN raTher lEsS cleAr) restaTements of Duhemian pOSitIons (Worrall 1995, 77). ThOse ConsIDErAtiONs CAn eVeN Be sUGGestive,
 to establish a relationsh ip between  Duhe m a ndKu hn.Agas si (2002, 409) ,  for  example, in his revie w ofth e  pos t hu mouscollect i on o f e ss ay s b yK uh n, pu bli shed in  2000 as T hero ad since str u ct ure (RSS),  as serts that " Kuh n igno re d h i s deb t t o Duh em whi l e resp ecting hi sl eading followe r s  ( 286- 287)". He indicat e sp ages 286 and 2 87, wh er e  K u h n m ent ions the n am es of philoso p he r s and historians of  science, s u chas Koy ré , M e yerson , Met zg e r a nd Maier. A gass i 10 Étud es sur Léonard de Vinc i (190 6-1 913 ). T h efi rst  a n d s e co ndv olu mes have  a ssubti tleC e u x  qu' ila lu s etceux qui l'on t l u, t h e t hird,  Lespréc ur seurs  paris iensde  Galilée. Herea fter  cited as  Ét ud es.  1 1 Kuh n  cites , a mon g other s, A. K o yré ,M . Bo as, H. Butterfield ,M .  D aumas, H . Guer l ac  a n d H. Met zg er.  All t hesehist o ri ans appe ar inS SR  r elatedto  someas pec tsof th e  eme rgentnew hist oriog r aphy of scienc e . Amélia J. O l iv e i ra – Du hem 's legacy f or t h e ch ange in  th e  hist oriog ra p hy of science: An anal ys is bas ed on  Kuhn's writi ngs 130 (2 0 0 2 , 409) i roni z es the fact thatKuhnremembersD uhem inRSS o nly beca use of th e fact tha t h e i nve nte d aterm.12 Stanl e y  Jak i(1987)and  John W orr all  (1 995 )also disc uss thera pp ro ch eme nt be t ween Duh em  an dKuh n's v i ews. T he fo rmer ,on e  of  the gr e at e s t sc ho la rs o f D uh emian  wor k , b y sugge sting tha t D u hemma de  many c ontributionsto  the philo so phy  of sc i e nce, cla ims it to be surprising to a ju dic iousread er of Duh emthat t her e  is no t a si nglere fer e n ce to h im  in  S SR (Jaki 1 9 8 7,370). 13  Joh n Worra ll does not limith ims elf to presen tin g si m i la r a s pe c tsbe t wee n the two philoso phers andhi s to rians of s c ien ce , going  so far  as t o  say th at thereis nothin gof r e a l r elevance t o this p articular issue in  TheStr ucture  o f S cient ific R e vol ution s that  w as not  rais ed  already  in Duhem's The Aim and  Struc tureofPhysicalThe o ry.  Indeed m anyof the Kuh nia n t heses  th a t hav e cr e at eds uch a  sti r  in philo s op hyo f  s cience seem a t  ro ot to  be (often  rat her less clear) r e statements ofDuhe m i anpos i tion s(Worrall 1995,  77 ). T hose con si derations c an evenbe sugge stive, 
 to_establish a_relationship between Duhem and_Kuhn. Agassi_(2002,_409), for_example,_in his review_of the posthumous_collection of essays by_Kuhn, published in_2000_as The road since structure (RSS), asserts that "Kuhn ignored his debt to Duhem_while_respecting his_leading_followers_(286-287)". He indicates pages 286_and 287, where Kuhn mentions_the names_of philosophers and historians of science, such as_Koyré,_Meyerson, Metzger and_Maier. Agassi 10 Études sur Léonard de Vinci (1906-1913)._The first and second volumes have_as subtitle Ceux_qu'il_a_lus et ceux qui_l'ont lu, the third, Les précurseurs_parisiens de Galilée. Hereafter cited as_Études. 11 Kuhn cites, among others, A._Koyré, M. Boas, H. Butterfield, M._Daumas, H. Guerlac and H._Metzger. All_these historians appear in SSR_related to some_aspects of_the emergent new_historiography of science. Amélia J. Oliveira_– Duhem's legacy_for the change in the historiography_of_science: An analysis_based_on_Kuhn's writings_130 (2002, 409)_ironizes_the fact_that_Kuhn remembers Duhem in RSS only_because_of the fact that he invented a_term.12 Stanley Jaki (1987)_and_John Worrall (1995) also_discuss the rapprochement between Duhem_and Kuhn's views. The former, one_of the_greatest scholars_of Duhemian work, by suggesting that Duhem made many contributions to_the philosophy of science, claims it_to be surprising to_a judicious_reader_of Duhem that_there_is not_a single reference to him in SSR_(Jaki 1987,_370).13 John Worrall does not limit_himself to presenting similar_aspects_between the two philosophers and historians_of science, going so far as_to say that there is_nothing_of_real relevance to this particular_issue in The Structure of Scientific_Revolutions that was_not raised already in Duhem's The Aim_and_Structure of Physical Theory. Indeed many_of_the Kuhnian theses that have created_such_a_stir in philosophy of science_seem at root to be (often_rather less clear) restatements of Duhemian positions (Worrall 1995,_77). Those considerations_can even be suggestive,