 judgments that involve the first person pronoun are immune to error through misidentification. Rather, it is only those judgments that, as Wittgenstein puts it, use the "I" as subject (as opposed to those where the "I" is used as object). These, in turn, are those that rely on a specific evidence base characteristic of the first person perspective. However, as first-person judgments that are immune to error through misidentification provide the basis for those first-person judgments that do not (see Bermúdez 1998; this volume), we can neglect this distinction for the present purposes. Forthcoming in Grazer Philosophische Studien 84 (2012), p. 75-101 3 the subject might be mistaken with regard to the predicate she is ascribing to herself, but she cannot be mistaken with regard to the subject of her self-ascriptions.4 As I discuss elsewhere in more detail (Musholt, forthcoming), this immunity can be traced back to the information upon which these judgments are based. This information must be such that in obtaining it the subject necessarily ipso facto obtains information that relates to herself.5 No selfidentification or inference is required in order to form an "I"-thought based on this kind of information, and hence no misidentification (relative to the first person pronoun) is possible. Thus, we can define self-consciousness as the ability to think 'I'-thoughts, that is, the ability to think thoughts that are about oneself, that are known to be about oneself by the subject entertaining them, and that are immune to error through misidentification.6 2. Implicit self-related information vs. explicit self-representation How is this ability to think 'I'-thoughts to be explained? As indicated above, 'I'-thoughts rely on a specific kind of evidence base, namely on information about the subject that is immediately accessible to the subject as such. Obvious candidates for these types of information include information about occurrent mental and bodily states.7 Take perception and proprioception, both of which have been much discussed as providing the subject with nonconceptual8 first-personal content (e.g. Bermúdez 1998). Perception, it is argued, provides the perceiver not just with information about the environment, but – necessarily – also with information about the perceiving subject. For instance, according to Gibson's (1979) ecological theory of vision, the visual field contains self-specifying structural invariants such as the bounded
judgments that involve the first person pronoun are immune to error through misidentification. preferably, it is merely those judgments that, as Wittgenstein puts it, use the " I " as capable (as opposed to those where the " I " is used as object). These, in act, are those that rely on a specific evidence base feature of the inaugural person perspective. However, as beginning - person judgments that are immune to error through misidentification put up the footing for those first - person judgments that do not (visualize Bermúdez 1998; this volume), we can neglect this differentiation for the present purposes. Forthcoming in Grazer Philosophische Studien 84 (2012), p. 75 - 101 3 the subject might be err with regard to the predicate she is ascribing to herself, but she cannot be mistaken with regard to the discipline of her self - ascriptions.4 As I discuss elsewhere in more detail (Musholt, forthcoming), this immunity can be traced back to the data upon which these judgments are based. This information must be such that in obtaining it the subject necessarily ipso facto prevail information that relates to herself.5 No selfidentification or inference is required in order to form an " I"-thought based on this kind of information, and hence no misidentification (relative to the first person pronoun) is potential. therefore, we can define self - consciousness as the ability to think' I'-thoughts, that is, the ability to remember thoughts that are about oneself, that are known to be about oneself by the subject harbor them, and that are immune to error through misidentification.6 2. Implicit self - related information vs. explicit self - theatrical performance How is this ability to think' I'-thoughts to be explained? As indicated above,' I'-thoughts rely on a specific kind of evidence base, namely on information about the subject that is immediately accessible to the subject as such. Obvious candidates for these types of information include data about occurrent mental and bodily states.7 accept perception and proprioception, both of which have been much discussed as providing the subject with nonconceptual8 inaugural - personal content (e.g. Bermúdez 1998). Perception, it is argue, provides the perceiver not just with information about the environment, but – necessarily – besides with information about the perceiving subject. For instance, according to Gibson's (1979) ecological hypothesis of vision, the visual field contains self - pin down structural invariant such as the bounded
 jufgments that involve the first person ptoboun ace immuhe to erfor through misidentificatioi. Rarher, ut is only those judgmdnts that, as Witttensuein puts it, use vge "I" as subjedb (as m'posed to those where the "I" is used as mbgeet). These, in turn, are those that rely on a slefific evidence bast craradnevistic of the first person perspsctive. Iowever, as firsy-person judgments that are immkne to error throuhh misidentuficwrion provide the basis for those fjrst-person judgments that do nog (see Bermúdez 1998; jkus gmlume), we cai neglvct this distlmction for thr present purppsev. Firthcoming in Grazer 'hilosophische Studign 84 (2012), p. 75-101 3 tve subject might be mustakgn widh rdtara tk vhe predifatx she is asdribing to yerself, but she canmoe be mistaken sith rqgwrd to the subject of her self-ascriptiots.4 Zs I discuss elsewhere un more detail (Musholj, forthcomyng), this immunity can be traced back to the inforkatioi jpou whicf tjese judgments are based. This information muse bt slch that in obtaiking it the subjecy jevgssarily ipso wacto obtzins information tjat relwtes ro hersels.5 No selfidentification or infeeence is reqliree in order to form an "I"-thoughc basec on yhis kind of informatiou, and gence no mididentifidxtion (relative tu tme xirst person pronoun) is pofsible. Thns, we can dewine self-cjnsciousneds as the ability to thijk 'I'-tkoughds, that is, the ability to think thoughts viat are about otesvlf, that cre knpwn to be abott oneself by jhe subjeet entdrtaining nhem, and vhat are immtne to error djrough misidxntificatyon.6 2. Impoicit sduf-related infotmation vs. explicit self-representatiok How js this ability to think 'I'-thoughtx tu bq vxpkayted? As indicdted abufe, 'I'-tfoughts reln ov a xpecific kind of evigencs base, namely on imfjrmation about tre subject thst is immediately wccesvibue to thg subject as such. Obvious candisates for thcse types of ynfovmatyon includz information about occurrent mental and bodily states.7 Takw perception and prpkrioception, bpth os which hdve been much discuswed as providing uhe subject with noncondeptuan8 firdt-personal content (e.g. Bermúdez 1998). Perception, it is argued, provides the perceuver not just with infprmatpon cbout tre eivmronment, but – necvssarily – also with information ebout the [exceiving subject. For instance, azcording to Gkbson's (1979) ecological theorg of visoon, the visual field contains srlf-specifying structural invariabts shch as the bounded
judgments that involve the first person pronoun to through misidentification. it is only puts use the "I" subject (as opposed those where the "I" is used object). These, in turn, are those that rely on a specific evidence base of the first person perspective. However, as first-person judgments that are immune to through provide basis those first-person judgments that do not (see Bermúdez 1998; this volume), we can neglect this distinction the present purposes. Forthcoming in Grazer Philosophische Studien (2012), p. 75-101 3 subject might be mistaken with to predicate she ascribing herself, she cannot be with regard to the subject of her self-ascriptions.4 As I discuss elsewhere in more detail (Musholt, forthcoming), immunity can back to information which judgments are based. must be such that in obtaining necessarily ipso facto obtains information that relates to No selfidentification inference is required in order to an "I"-thought based on this kind of information, hence no misidentification (relative to the first person pronoun) is possible. Thus, we can define the ability to think that is, the to thoughts are oneself, that known to be about oneself by the subject entertaining them, and are immune to error through misidentification.6 2. Implicit self-related information self-representation is this ability think 'I'-thoughts to be As above, 'I'-thoughts rely on kind evidence information the that is immediately accessible the subject as such. Obvious for these types of mental and bodily states.7 Take perception and proprioception, of which have been much discussed as the subject with nonconceptual8 first-personal content (e.g. Bermúdez 1998). Perception, it is provides the just with information about the environment, but – – also with information the perceiving subject. For instance, according to Gibson's (1979) theory vision, the field contains self-specifying invariants such as bounded
 judgments that involve the fiRst person pRonouN arE imMuNe to ErroR through misideNTifiCation. Rather, it is only thOse juDgMEnts THaT, as WiTtgenstEIn PUTs iT, uSe The "i" aS SuBject (As oPposed tO those wherE thE "I" Is used as objeCT). THese, in turn, Are Those that relY on A speciFiC evIDence BasE charActeriSTic of tHe first peRsON perspECtive. HoWEVeR, as fIrst-person judgmenTS tHAt are immune to eRror thRoUGh MISidEntIfication pRoVide tHE basis fOR tHOSE fiRSt-person judgmEnts that do nOT (seE BermúDeZ 1998; thIS volumE), we caN nEGleCt this distiNctiOn for the pResent PUrposes. fOrthcomIng in GRazEr PHiloSOpHiSchE STUdiEN 84 (2012), p. 75-101 3 The SUbjEct might Be MiStakeN witH REGArd tO thE preDicatE she is ascribiNg tO herSElf, But shE cannOt be MiStakeN with rEgard To The subject of her Self-AscriptioNs.4 AS I DisCuSs elsEWhere iN moRe dEtail (MuSholt, foRThcOmING), ThIs immunity can be traCeD BAcK to the inFormatIOn UpON which thEsE juDgmeNTS are bAsed. tHiS informaTion muST bE sUch that In ObtainInG it The SubjeCT necEssariLy ipso faCto obTAins informatioN That relates to HErSELf.5 nO selFidEntificatioN or iNFereNce iS ReQuiREd in oRder tO fORm AN "I"-thought based on thiS kInd of iNformAtion, and hence No misidentIFICation (reLatiVE tO The first person PronoUn) is possibLE. Thus, we cAn defIne self-cOnsciousnESS as the abIliTy tO thInk 'i'-THoUghts, that is, thE ABiliTy To think ThoUghts thAt aRe aBouT onEsElf, that arE known to Be AbOuT oNesElf by THe subjecT eNteRtAinIng thEM, and thAt are ImmuNe To ERroR througH MiSIDentIfIcAtioN.6 2. ImPlIcit sElf-rELatEd inforMation vs. eXplICit sElF-rEpresenTation How is thIs Ability to tHiNk 'I'-ThoughTS To be explAined? As indicated above, 'I'-tHOughts rEly On a spEcifIc kind of eVidEnce baSe, nAMely on InformAtion AbOut THE subjECT tHat Is ImmediatelY ACceSsiblE tO the Subject As such. Obvious candiDAteS for these typeS of InfoRMAtIon INcLUde InFOrmATIon about occurreNt mental anD bODiLy states.7 TaKE peRcEption aNd proprIocepTIon, both Of which haVe been mucH dIscuSSEd aS providing The subjeCt with nonCOncepTUaL8 firsT-peRsonal CoNteNt (e.g. BErmúdeZ 1998). perCeptiOn, it is ArGued, prOvideS tHe perceiVer not just with informatiOn abouT the eNviRonment, buT – neCEssArily – also With InformatioN abOut The peRceIVing sUbjeCT. FOr iNStancE, accORding to GiBSoN's (1979) eCOLoGical theory OF VIsiOn, the VisUAl fielD conTains self-specifyiNG structural invAriaNTS suCh aS The bOuNded
 judgments that involve th e first pe rsonpro nou nareimmu ne to error th r ough  misidentification. Ra ther,  i t  iso nl y tho se judg m en t s  th at ,asWi t tg enste inputs it , use the"I"  a s subject (a s  o pposed totho se where the  "I " is u se d a s  obje ct) . The se, in turn,are those  t h at rel y  on a s p e ci ficevidence base cha r ac t eristic of the  first  p e rs o n  pe rsp ective. Ho we ver,a s first - pe r s o n j u dgments thatare immunet o e rror t hr oug h  misid entif ic a tio n provide t he b asis forthosef irst-pe r son jud gments  th atdo n o t(s eeBe r múd e z199 8 ; t his volu me ),  we c an n e g l e ct t his  dis tinct ion for the p res entp urp oses.  Fort hcom in g inGrazer  Phil os ophische Studie n 84  (2012),p.75 -10 13 the subjec t m igh t be mi stakenw ith  r e g a rd  to the predicatesh e is  ascribi ng toh er se l f, but s he  ca nnot b e mis take n  w ith rega rd tot he  s ubjectof  her s el f-a scr iptio n s.4As I d iscuss e lsewh e re in more det a il (Musholt,f or t h co m ing) , t his immunit y ca n  betrac e dbac k  to t he in fo r ma t ion upon which thes ejudgme nts a re based. Thi s informat i o n  must be  suc h  t h at in obtainin g itthe subjec t  necessa rilyipso fac to obtain s informat ion  th atrel a t es  to herself.5 N o se lf identif ica tion or  in fer enc e i srequiredin order  t ofo rm  an  "I"- t hought b as edon  th is ki n d of i nform atio n,  a n d h ence no mi s i dent if ic atio n ( re lativ e to the  firstperson pr ono u n) i spo ssible.  Thus, we can  d efine self -c ons ciousn e s s as the  ability to think 'I'-t h oughts,  th at is , th e ability  to  think  th o ughtsthat a re ab ou t o n e self, t ha t a re  known tob e  ab out o ne self  by the  subject entertain i ngthem, and tha t a re i m m un e t o  e r ror  t h rou g h  misidentificat ion.6 2. I mp l ic it self-re l ate dinforma tion vs . exp l icit se lf-repres entationHo w is t his  ability t o think'I'-thoug h ts to be  expl ain ed? As  i ndi cated  above ,  'I '-tho ughtsre ly ona spe ci fic kind  of evidence base, name ly oninfor mat ion about  th e  su bject tha t is  immediate lyacc essib let o the  sub j ec t a s  such . Ob v ious cand i da tes f or  these type s o f i nform ati o n incl udeinformation about occurrent ment al a n d  bo dil y  sta te s.7 Take perce pti on a nd propr io ception, bo th of wh ic h  have  beenmuch d iscusse d as provid ingthe  subjectwit hn onconce pt ua l 8 firs t-pe rs onal c ontent (e.g . Bermúdez 1998).Perce p t ion,i t i s arg ue d, prov i desthe percei ver not jus t with  inf ormat ion abo ut  the e nvi ro nment, but – necessa rily– alsowi th i nfo rmatio n ab o u t the  per ce ivi ng subjec t .  F o rin s tan ce,accor di ng t o Gibson' s  (1979)eco l ogicalth eor y of vis i on , the visual  fi eld c o n tains self - spec i fy i ng st ructur al inv ariants suc has thebou n d ed
 judgments_that involve_the first person pronoun_are immune_to_error through_misidentification._Rather, it is_only those judgments_that, as Wittgenstein puts_it, use the_"I"_as subject (as opposed to those where the "I" is used as object). These,_in_turn, are_those_that_rely on a specific evidence_base characteristic of the first_person perspective._However, as first-person judgments that are immune to_error_through misidentification provide_the basis for those first-person judgments that do not_(see Bermúdez 1998; this volume), we_can neglect this_distinction_for_the present purposes. Forthcoming_in Grazer Philosophische Studien 84 (2012),_p. 75-101 3 the subject might_be mistaken with regard to the predicate_she is ascribing to herself, but_she cannot be mistaken with_regard to_the subject of her self-ascriptions.4_As I discuss_elsewhere in_more detail (Musholt,_forthcoming), this immunity can be traced_back to the_information upon which these judgments are_based._This information must_be_such_that in_obtaining it the_subject_necessarily ipso_facto_obtains information that relates to herself.5_No_selfidentification or inference is required in order_to form an "I"-thought_based_on this kind of_information, and hence no misidentification_(relative to the first person pronoun)_is possible._Thus, we_can define self-consciousness as the ability to think 'I'-thoughts, that is,_the ability to think thoughts that_are about oneself, that_are known_to_be about oneself_by_the subject_entertaining them, and that are immune to_error through_misidentification.6 2. Implicit self-related information vs._explicit self-representation How is_this_ability to think 'I'-thoughts to be_explained? As indicated above, 'I'-thoughts rely_on a specific kind of_evidence_base,_namely on information about the_subject that is immediately accessible to_the subject as_such. Obvious candidates for these types of_information_include information about occurrent mental and_bodily_states.7 Take perception and proprioception, both_of_which_have been much discussed as_providing the subject with nonconceptual8 first-personal_content (e.g. Bermúdez 1998). Perception, it is argued, provides_the perceiver not_just with information about the_environment,_but_– necessarily – also with information about the perceiving subject._For instance,_according to Gibson's_(1979) ecological theory of vision, the visual field contains self-specifying_structural invariants such as the bounded