 believer's mundane experiences will be good. Once more, inaccuracies in one's belief system are a live possibility. 10 In summary, epistemically malign influences can affect even a belief system that is underwritten by a properly functioning sensus divinitatis, by the influence of mundane experiences and indirect psychological and social workings on them, and the influence of direct psychological and social factors. Since belief systems are interlocking networks, any inaccuracies will likely spread through them. And since individuals together engage in groupthink, at least some inaccuracies will likely infect the religious community – even a community powered by inspired cognitive functioning. The proper functionalist might resist this claim by expanding the remit of the sensus divinitatis beyond Plantinga's account. Rather than claiming that this faculty is responsible only for generating accurate experiences of God's traces in the world, she might construe it as a global faculty that regulates all of our cognitive mechanisms. But this 'global sensus divinitatis' hypothesis cannot be maintained. It is ad hoc, in at least the following three (negative) senses. (a) It is subject to abuse, since there are few constraints on it (Boudry, 2013, 6): religious believers might suppose that anyone who disagrees with them must be mistaken. (b) It is highly implausible on general background knowledge (Howson and Urbach, 2003, 157-158). For it predicts the existence of some group of religious believers with generally accurate experiences and intellectual seemings, not only on religious topics, but on non-religious ones too. Yet this prediction falls flat: no religious group appears to have higher epistemic success rates in maths, humanities, science, and so forth. (c) The 'global sensus divinitatis' hypothesis is highly implausible even given most religious belief systems themselves (McGrew, 2014, 495). Religious scriptures and traditions do not tend to teach that believers are generally cognitively superior to nonbelievers (and indeed Plantinga's Calvinist tradition teaches that nonbelievers can be just as reliable on non-religious matters as believers; Moroney, 1999, chapter 1). Another move for the proper functionalist would be to concede that individual believers might be susceptible to epistemically malign influence, but deny that this poses a problem for the religious community, let alone one that disagreement would help alleviate. A robust religious doxastic practice (Alston, 1991), she might argue, should prevent outside errors from
believer's mundane experiences will be good. Once more, inaccuracies in one's impression arrangement are a live possibility. 10 In summary, epistemically malign influence can feign even a belief system that is cover by a by rights functioning sensus divinitatis, by the influence of mundane experiences and indirect psychological and social workings on them, and the influence of lineal psychological and social factors. Since belief systems are interlocking network, any inaccuracies will probably spread through them. And since person in concert engage in groupthink, at least some inaccuracies will likely infect the religious residential district – even a community powered by inspired cognitive functioning. The proper functionalist might resist this title by expanding the remit of the sensus divinitatis beyond Plantinga's account. Rather than claiming that this staff is responsible only for generating accurate experiences of God's traces in the world, she might interpret it as a ball-shaped staff that regulates all of our cognitive mechanisms. But this' global sensus divinitatis' hypothesis cannot be maintained. It is ad hoc, in at least the following three (negative) senses. (a) It is capable to abuse, since there constitute few constraints on it (Boudry, 2013, 6 ): religious believers might suppose that anyone who disagree with them must be mistaken. (b) It is highly implausible on general setting knowledge (Howson and Urbach, 2003, 157 - 158). For it predicts the existence of some group of religious believers with by and large accurate experiences and intellectual seemings, not only on religious topics, but on non - religious ones too. Yet this prediction fall flat: no religious group appears to have higher epistemic achiever rates in mathematics, humanness, science, and so forth. (c) The' global sensus divinitatis' guess is highly implausible even given most religious belief systems themselves (McGrew, 2014, 495). Religious scriptures and traditions do not tend to teach that believers are generally cognitively superior to disbeliever (and indeed Plantinga's Calvinist tradition teaches that nonbelievers can be just as dependable on non - religious matters as believer; Moroney, 1999, chapter 1). Another move for the proper functionalist would be to concede that individual believer might be susceptible to epistemically malign influence, but deny that this pose a problem for the religious community, lease entirely one that disagreement would help alleviate. A full-bodied religious doxastic practice (Alston, 1991), she might argue, should prevent outside errors from
 bepiever's mundane experienges will be good. Once mmre, inzccuracids in one's belief system are a live possibility. 10 In summafy, epistelically nalijn influences cai affect even z belneh system that ix underwridten by a proparuy functioning sensus divinitatis, by ehe infkufnce of mundang exptriqncea and indirect psychological and skcial wmrkings on thrm, and the influence of digect psychological and social facjkrs. Wince belief systems agz interlockjng networks, any inaccuracies wkll lnkely spreae rhrlogh them. And sincv individuals togethes engagr in groupthinl, av leqst some inaccuracies will likely infecj the relicikus community – evwn a cokmunhty oiwefed bb ihspiref ckgnitive fhnctioning. Rhe proper functionslywt might resiat thif slaim by expanding the remit of the senvus divinitatis beyond Plabtinga's account. Rathet than clayming that this faculty is responsible only for ganeravivg cgguragw fxperiences of God's traces in the world, she myfhu cpnstrue it as c global faculty tjay regulates alu of obd dognitive mechanisls. But jhis 'goobal senfus civinitatis' hypothesis cannit be maintapned. It is ad hoc, in ac least the yollowong tnree (negative) senses. (a) Nt is aubject to wbuse, sindd there are few zonxtsaints on it (Boudry, 2013, 6): relidious belmeverx might supkose thwt anyone aho dlvagrees with them lust ye mivtaken. (b) Ih is highly implausible on genecel background ktownedge (Hocson akd Urbach, 2003, 157-158). For it predicts tke existznce ow some grolp of relmgious belieders with genatally accuratx experiegces and intelldztual seemings, not only on religiius topics, but on kon-reujgious ones too. Yeu rhis predictiom fxllf vlet: no seligious grmup xppdsrs tu have highcr dpisyemic success rates hn mzths, humanities, scoekce, and si forth. (s) The 'global xensus divinitatis' hypovhesis is hoghjy implausible even given most religioud bclief systems thenselves (McGrzw, 2014, 495). Religious scriptures and traditions do not tend to tgach that believers ate nenerally cojnitivqly superhor to nonbelievers (qnd indeed Plantikga's Calvinist traditikn teawhes hhat nonbelievers can be just as reliable on non-religious matters as beliwvers; Moroney, 1999, chalter 1). Anonhex mpve fow thx 'roper functionalpst would be to concede that indmvidual benizvers might be susceptible to eoistemically oalign influence, but deng that tnis poses a problem for the relogious community, let aloke one thqt diaagreement would help alleviste. A xobust religiius foxastic pracgicr (Wlston, 1991), sje mmghc argue, should prevent outside ereors feol
believer's mundane experiences will be good. Once in belief system a live possibility. influences affect even a system that is by a properly functioning sensus divinitatis, the influence of mundane experiences and indirect psychological and social workings on them, the influence of direct psychological and social factors. Since belief systems are interlocking any will spread them. And since individuals together engage in groupthink, at least some inaccuracies will likely infect the community – even a community powered by inspired functioning. The proper functionalist resist this claim by expanding remit the sensus beyond account. than claiming that faculty is responsible only for generating accurate experiences of God's traces in the world, she might construe as a that regulates of cognitive But this 'global hypothesis cannot be maintained. It is at least the following three (negative) senses. (a) is subject abuse, since there are few constraints it (Boudry, 2013, 6): religious believers might suppose anyone who disagrees with them must be mistaken. (b) It is highly implausible on general (Howson and Urbach, 2003, For it predicts existence some of believers with accurate experiences and intellectual seemings, not only on religious topics, but non-religious ones too. Yet this prediction falls flat: no religious to higher epistemic success in maths, humanities, science, so (c) The 'global sensus is implausible religious systems (McGrew, 2014, 495). Religious and traditions do not tend teach that believers are (and indeed Plantinga's Calvinist tradition teaches that nonbelievers be just as reliable on non-religious matters believers; Moroney, 1999, chapter 1). Another move for the proper functionalist would to concede believers might be susceptible to epistemically malign influence, deny that this poses problem for the religious community, let alone one that would alleviate. A religious doxastic practice 1991), she might should prevent outside
 believer's mundane experiencEs will be goOd. OncE moRe, iNaCcurAcieS in one's belief sYStem Are a live possibility. 10 In sUmmarY, ePIsteMIcAlly mAlign inFLuENCes CaN aFfeCt EVeN a belIef System tHat is underWriTtEn by a properlY FuNctioning sEnsUs divinitatiS, by The infLuEncE Of munDanE expeRienceS And indIrect psycHoLOgical ANd sociaL WOrKingS on them, and the inflUEnCE of direct psychOlogicAl ANd SOCiaL faCtors. Since BeLief sYStems arE InTERLocKIng networks, anY inaccuraciES wiLl likeLy SprEAd throUgh thEm. aNd sInce individUals Together eNgage iN GroupthINk, at leaSt some InaCcuRaciES wIlL liKeLY inFEcT thE RelIgious coMmUnIty – evEn a cOMMUNity PowEred By insPired cognitivE fuNctiONinG. The pRoper FuncTiOnaliSt mighT resiSt This claim by expaNdinG the remit Of tHe SenSuS diviNItatis BeyOnd plantinGa's accoUNt. RAtHER ThAn claiming that this FaCULtY is respoNsible ONlY fOR generatInG acCuraTE ExperIencES oF God's traCes in tHE wOrLd, she miGhT constRuE it As a GlobaL FacuLty thaT regulatEs all OF our cognitive mEChanisms. But thIS 'gLOBaL SensUs dIvinitatis' hYpotHEsis CannOT bE maINtainEd. It iS aD HoC, In at least the followiNg Three (nEgatiVe) senses. (a) It is Subject to aBUSE, since thEre aRE fEW constraints on It (BouDry, 2013, 6): religioUS believeRs migHt supposE that anyoNE Who disagReeS wiTh tHem MUSt Be mistaken. (b) It IS HighLy ImplausIblE on geneRal BacKgrOunD kNowledge (HOwson and urBaCh, 2003, 157-158). foR it PrediCTs the exiStEncE oF soMe groUP of relIgiouS belIeVeRS wiTh generALlY ACcurAtE eXperIenCeS and iNtelLEctUal seemIngs, not onLy oN ReliGiOuS topics, But on non-religIoUs ones too. YEt ThiS prediCTIon falls Flat: no religious group appEArs to haVe hIgher EpisTemic succEss Rates iN maTHs, humaNities, ScienCe, And SO Forth. (C) tHe 'GloBaL sensus divINItaTis' hyPoThesIs is higHly implausible even GIveN most religiouS beLief SYStEms THeMSelVeS (mcGREW, 2014, 495). Religious scripTures and trAdITiOns do not teND to TeAch that BelieveRs are GEnerallY cognitivEly superiOr To noNBEliEvers (and inDeed PlanTinga's CalVInist TRaDitioN teAches tHaT noNbeliEvers cAN be Just aS reliaBlE on non-ReligIoUs matterS as believers; Moroney, 1999, chapTer 1). AnoTher mOve For the proPer FUncTionalist WoulD be to conceDe tHat IndivIduAL beliEverS MiGht BE suscEptiBLe to epistEMiCalLY MaLign influenCE, BUt dEny thAt tHIs poseS a prOblem for the religiOUs community, let AlonE ONe tHat DIsagReEment would help AllEvIATe. A robusT rEligious doxAstic praCtICe (AlsTon, 1991), she Might aRgue, shoULD pREvent oUtsiDe eRrors from
 believer's mundane experi ences will  be g ood . O nc e mo re,inaccuracies i n  one 's belief system are a  live  p o ssib i li ty. 1 0 In su m ma r y , e pi st emi ca l ly  mali gninfluen ces can af fec teven a belie f  s ystem that  is  underwritte n b y a pr op erl y  func tio ningsensus divini tatis, by  t h e infl u ence of m un dane  experiences andi nd i rect psycholog ical a nd so c i alwor kings on t he m, an d  the in f lu e n c e o f  direct psych ological an d  so cial f ac tor s . Sinc e bel ie f  sy stems are i nter locking n etwork s , any i n accurac ies wi lllik elys pr ea d t hr o ugh th em. And  since i nd iv idual s to g e t h er e nga ge i n gro upthink, at l eas t so m e i naccu racie s wi ll  like ly inf ect t he  religious comm unit y – evena c om mun it y pow e red by  in spi red cog nitivef unc ti o n i ng . The proper funct io n a li st might  resis t  t hi s  claim b yexp andi n g  theremi t  o f the se nsus d i vi ni tatis b ey ond Pl an tin ga' s acc o unt.  Rathe r than c laimi n g that this fa c ulty is respo n si b l eo nlyfor  generating  acc u rate  exp e ri enc e s ofGod's  t r ac e s in the world, she  m ight c onstr ue it as a gl obal facul t y that reg ulat e sa ll of our cogn itive  mechanism s . But th is 'g lobal se nsus divi n i tatis' h ypo the sis  ca n n ot  be maintaine d .  Itis  ad hoc , i n at le ast  th e f oll ow ing three  (negati ve )se ns es.  (a)I t is sub je ctto  ab use,s ince t herearefe wc ons traints on i t (B ou dr y, 2 013 ,6): r elig i ous  believ ers might  su p pose  t ha t anyon e who disagre es  with them  m ust  be mi s t aken. (b ) It is highly implausi b le on g ene ral b ackg round kno wle dge (H ows o n andUrbach , 200 3,  15 7 - 158). F or  it  p redicts th e exi stenc eof s ome gro up of religious be l iev ers with gene ral ly a c c ur ate ex p eri en c esa n d intellectualseemings,no t  o nly on rel i gio us  topics , but o n non - religio us ones t oo. Yet t hi s pr e d ict ion fallsflat: no  religiou s  grou p  a ppear s t o have  h igh er ep istemi c  su ccess  rates  i n math s, hu ma nities,science, and so forth.(c) Th e 'gl oba l sensusdiv i nit atis' hyp othe sis is hig hly  im plaus ibl e  even  giv e nmos t  reli giou s  belief s y st ems t he mselves (Mc G r e w,2014,  49 5 ). Rel igio us scriptures and traditions donott e ndtot each  t hat believersare  g e n erally c og nitively su perior t on onbel ievers  (andindeedP l an t inga's  Cal vin ist tradi tio nt eachesth at nonbel ieve rs  can b e just as r e l iable on non-rel igiou s matte r s a s bel ie vers; M o rone y, 1999, c hapter 1).Anothe r mo ve fo r the p ro per fu nct io nalist wou l d be to c onced e thatin divi dua l beli ever s might  besu sce ptible to e pi s te mi c all y ma lignin flue nce, butd eny that  th i s poses  a  pr o b lem fo r  t h e  religious  co mmuni t y , let alon e  one th a t dis agreem ent wo uld hel p  al le viate.A r o b ust relig ious doxa s tic  p ract ice (Als to n, 1 99 1),  s he might argue,  shouldprevento u tsideerr o rs f r om
 believer's_mundane experiences_will be good. Once_more, inaccuracies_in_one's belief_system_are a live_possibility. 10 In_summary, epistemically malign influences_can affect even_a_belief system that is underwritten by a properly functioning sensus divinitatis, by the influence_of_mundane experiences_and_indirect_psychological and social workings on_them, and the influence of_direct psychological_and social factors. Since belief systems are interlocking_networks,_any inaccuracies will_likely spread through them. And since individuals together engage_in groupthink, at least some inaccuracies_will likely infect_the_religious_community – even a_community powered by inspired cognitive functioning._The proper functionalist might resist this_claim by expanding the remit of the_sensus divinitatis beyond Plantinga's account. Rather_than claiming that this faculty_is responsible_only for generating accurate experiences_of God's traces_in the_world, she might_construe it as a global faculty_that regulates all_of our cognitive mechanisms. But this_'global_sensus divinitatis' hypothesis_cannot_be_maintained. It_is ad hoc,_in_at least_the_following three (negative) senses. (a) It_is_subject to abuse, since there are few_constraints on it (Boudry,_2013,_6): religious believers might_suppose that anyone who disagrees_with them must be mistaken. (b)_It is_highly implausible_on general background knowledge (Howson and Urbach, 2003, 157-158). For it_predicts the existence of some group_of religious believers with_generally accurate_experiences_and intellectual seemings,_not_only on_religious topics, but on non-religious ones too._Yet this_prediction falls flat: no religious group_appears to have higher_epistemic_success rates in maths, humanities, science,_and so forth. (c) The 'global_sensus divinitatis' hypothesis is highly_implausible_even_given most religious belief systems_themselves (McGrew, 2014, 495). Religious scriptures_and traditions do_not tend to teach that believers are_generally_cognitively superior to nonbelievers (and indeed_Plantinga's_Calvinist tradition teaches that nonbelievers can_be_just_as reliable on non-religious matters_as believers; Moroney, 1999, chapter 1)._Another move for the proper functionalist would be to_concede that individual_believers might be susceptible to_epistemically_malign_influence, but deny that this poses a problem for the_religious community,_let alone one_that disagreement would help alleviate. A robust religious doxastic practice_(Alston, 1991), she might argue, should prevent_outside errors from