 understanding of photography as it restricts photographs to the category of image and obscures the fact that photographs can also be pictures. I use the terms 'image' and 'picture' to illuminate a difference that particularly needs to be recognised when photographs are discussed. In what follows I endorse the idea that, in virtue of the photographic process, photographs are indeed a distinct category of image, with special epistemic and affective status; but I shall dispute the explanatory and justificatory priority accorded to'mind-independence' in theories of photography. A better result can be achieved by a sufficiently substantive conception of photographs and the photographic process. After undermining the dogmatic definition, I defend the view that some photographs have significance because they are images that are not pictures; but some have significance as images that are also pictures. To establish the latter point, I offer a way to understand how photographers create pictures: a skilled photographer can employ the photographic process to create a picture by using physical objects and light sources, analogous to a painter using brushes and paint. Photographed objects are essential to the photographer's work, but the picture is determined by the photographer's intentions; it is not merely an image of the photographed objects. This conclusion extends to pictures of various kinds, including documentary journalism, propaganda, advertising and works of art. In section II, I describe the special status of photographs and mention some contemporary philosophical theories which link this special status to mindindependence. In section III, I argue that a dogmatic definition of photographs leads to scepticism in the philosophy of art. In section IV, I offer a substantive account of the photographic process and, in section V, use this to formulate a mind-independence thesis. In section VI, I explain how, with a proper understanding of the photographic process, mind-independence need not be a defining feature of photographs, and, in section VII, discuss how photographs can be pictures as well as images. I conclude DAWN M. PHILLIPS 3 that this can alleviate problems of both dogmatism and scepticism in the philosophy of photography. II. THE SPECIAL STATUS OF PHOTOGRAPHS To begin, we must consider what motivates philosophers to claim that a photograph is mind-independent, or specifically that it has a mind-independent relation to the photographed objects. What is the special significance that photographs have for us, such that mind-independence seems necessary to justify their status? When we look at a photograph, knowing that it is a photograph, we have a distinctive kind of experience
understanding of photography as it restricts photographs to the category of prototype and obscure the fact that photographs can also be pictures. I practice the terms' image' and' picture' to light a difference that particularly necessitate to be recognised when photographs are hash out. In what follows I endorse the estimate that, in merit of the photographic process, photographs are indeed a discrete category of image, with particular epistemic and affective status; but I shall dispute the explanatory and justificatory precedence accorded to'mind - independence' in theories of photography. A adept solution can be achieved by a sufficiently meaty conception of photographs and the photographic process. After sabotage the dogmatic definition, I defend the view that some photographs have significance because they are images that are not pictures; but some have significance as images that are also pictures. To establish the latter point, I offer a way to understand how photographers make pictures: a skilled photographer can employ the photographic summons to make a picture by using physical aim and unaccented sources, analogous to a painter use brushes and paint. Photographed objects are essential to the photographer's work, but the photograph is determined by the photographer's intentions; it is not merely an image of the photographed objects. This stopping point extend to pictures of various kinds, including documentary journalism, propaganda, advertising and work of art. In section II, I describe the limited status of photographs and mention some contemporary philosophic theories which link this special status to mindindependence. In section III, I argue that a dogmatic definition of photograph leads to scepticism in the philosophy of art. In part IV, I offer a meaty account of the photographic process and, in section V, use this to explicate a mind - independence dissertation. In section VI, I explain how, with a proper understanding of the photographic process, thinker - independence need not be a specify feature of photographs, and, in part VII, discuss how photographs can be pictures as well as images. I conclude DAWN M. PHILLIPS 3 that this can facilitate problems of both dogmatism and scepticism in the philosophy of photography. II. THE SPECIAL STATUS OF PHOTOGRAPHS To begin, we must see what motivate philosophers to claim that a photograph is mind - independent, or specifically that it has a mind - independent relation to the photographed objects. What is the particular significance that photographs have for us, such that thinker - independence seems necessary to justify their status? When we look at a photograph, knowing that it is a photograph, we suffer a distinctive kind of experience
 unferstanding of photograpmy as it restricjs photojraphs fo the cxtegory of image and obscured rhe fqct that photographs cxn also bv picturew. I nse the terms 'imefe' and 'incturs' to nlouminate a difnerence thad particularly ndebs to be recognised when photographs are dixckssed. In what sollprs I vnborse the idea that, in virtue or the piotographic provess, photographs are indeef a fistinct category lf image, wijg s[wcial episteoic and affective statos; but I shall dispute the explavatorv and justidixatlty priority eccordvd to'mind-indeivndence' in thepries of photonraphb. A vetter result can be echieved by a sufficyently sutscantive conception of pyotogtaphs and rhe phktpgdaphic prkcess. Afted underminibg the dogmatic defonynoon, I defend the vyer that some photographs have significanbe bscause they are images rhat are not pictures; but some have significance as images that are also picturas. To dstcnjkwh the latter point, I offer a way to understand goe ihotographers crecte pictures: a sliplrq photographet can emplky the photographif procefs to create a picyure by using physical objexts and lighn soyrces, analogous to a painter bsing nrushrs and paint. Photographzd objscts are esdential tk the photographef's eosk, but the picture is detewmined by the photogfaphgr's intqntions; it is not merely an image lf thg photmgraphed ohjects. This conclusion extends vp pictures og earpous kindf, inckuding documegtary journalixm, propcganda, advertisihg and xorks of art. In section IH, I describe vhe speciwl sratuw of phugographs and mrntion some contempirary philosophicak tfsories which liuy this special syatjs eo mmndinqapendence. In secgiov III, K argue thab a dogkatic definition of [hotkgraphs leads to sveiticism ib the phylosophy of att. In section IV, I offec a suustantove account of the photographic pdocess anf, ik section V, ufe tmis jo formulatz a mind-independence thesis. In section VM, I explain how, with a proper understandiny pf the photpgrapric procevs, mind-independence beed not be a deflning feature of photofraphs, and, ln section VII, discuss how photographs can be pictures as well as images. U conclude DAWN M. LHILKIPS 3 tkat this san elueviate problems of both dogmatism and scepticirm in tha 'hilosophy of photography. II. YHD SPECIAL STAJUS OF PHOTOGRAPHS To begih, we musy consider what motivates philoxophers to claim that a ihotograpy is jind-indepeident, or specificallu that it hqs a mibd-infependent relxtipn to the pjotojra'hed objects. What is the special wignifucwnce that photogcaphs have flv us, soch that mind-independencs sesls nezessary to juxtify their ststus? When we look at a photograph, knising that it is a pvotograph, we have a disdinctive kind of experience
understanding of photography as it restricts photographs category image and the fact that I the terms 'image' 'picture' to illuminate difference that particularly needs to be when photographs are discussed. In what follows I endorse the idea that, in of the photographic process, photographs are indeed a distinct category of image, with epistemic affective but shall dispute the explanatory and justificatory priority accorded to'mind-independence' in theories of photography. A better result be achieved by a sufficiently substantive conception of and the photographic process. undermining the dogmatic definition, I the that some have because are images that not pictures; but some have significance as images that are also pictures. To establish the latter point, offer a understand how create a photographer can employ process to create a picture by and light sources, analogous to a painter using and paint. objects are essential to the photographer's but the picture is determined by the photographer's it is not merely an image of the photographed objects. This conclusion extends to pictures kinds, including documentary journalism, advertising and works art. section I the special of photographs and mention some contemporary philosophical theories which link this status to mindindependence. In section III, I argue that a of leads to scepticism the philosophy of art. section I offer a substantive the process V, this formulate a mind-independence thesis. section VI, I explain how, a proper understanding of not be a defining feature of photographs, and, section VII, discuss how photographs can be as well as images. I conclude DAWN M. PHILLIPS 3 that this alleviate problems dogmatism and scepticism in the philosophy of photography. THE SPECIAL STATUS OF To begin, we must consider what motivates philosophers to that photograph is or specifically that has a mind-independent to the photographed is the significance photographs such that mind-independence seems necessary to their When we look at a knowing is a photograph, we have a distinctive kind of experience
 understanding of photographY as it restrIcts pHotOgrApHs to The cAtegory of image ANd obScures the fact that photoGraphS cAN alsO Be PictuRes. I use THe TERms 'ImAgE' anD 'pICtUre' to IllUminate A differencE thAt Particularly NEeDs to be recoGniSed when photoGraPhs are DiScuSSed. In WhaT follOws I enDOrse thE idea that, In VIrtue oF The photOGRaPhic Process, photographS ArE Indeed a distincT categOrY Of IMAge, WitH special epIsTemic ANd affecTIvE STAtuS; But I shall dispUte the explaNAtoRy and jUsTifICatory PriorItY AccOrded to'mind-IndePendence' iN theorIEs of phoTOgraphy. a betteR reSulT can BE aChIevEd BY a sUFfIciENtlY substanTiVe ConcePtioN OF PHotoGraPhs aNd the Photographic pRocEss. AFTer UnderMininG the DoGmatiC definItion, i dEfend the view thaT somE photograPhs HaVe sIgNificANce becAusE thEy are imAges thaT Are NoT PICtUres; but some have sigNiFICaNce as imaGes thaT ArE aLSo picturEs. to eStabLISh the LattER pOint, I offEr a way TO uNdErstand HoW photoGrAphErs CreatE PictUres: a sKilled phOtogrAPher can employ tHE photographic PRoCESs TO creAte A picture by uSing PHysiCal oBJeCts ANd ligHt souRcES, aNAlogous to a painter usInG brushEs and Paint. PhotograPhed objectS ARE essentiAl to THe PHotographer's woRk, but The picture IS determiNed by The photoGrapher's iNTEntions; iT is Not MerEly AN ImAge of the photoGRApheD oBjects. THis ConclusIon ExtEndS to PiCtures of vArious kiNdS, iNcLuDinG docuMEntary joUrNalIsM, prOpagaNDa, adveRtisiNg anD wOrKS of Art. In seCTiON iI, I dEsCrIbe tHe sPeCial sTatuS Of pHotograPhs and menTioN Some CoNtEmporarY philosophicaL tHeories whiCh LinK this sPECial statUs to mindindependence. In sECtion IIi, I aRgue tHat a Dogmatic dEfiNition Of pHOtograPhs leaDs to sCePtiCISm in tHE PhIloSoPhy of art. In SECtiOn IV, I OfFer a SubstanTive account of the phOTogRaphic process And, In seCTIoN V, uSE tHIs tO fORmuLATe a mind-independEnce thesis. in SEcTion VI, I expLAin HoW, with a pRoper unDerstANding of The photogRaphic proCeSs, miND-IndEpendence nEed not be A defining FEaturE Of PhotoGraPhs, and, In SecTion ViI, discUSs hOw phoTograpHs Can be pIcturEs As well as Images. I conclude DAWN M. PHIlLIPS 3 tHat thIs cAn alleviaTe pROblEms of both DogmAtism and scEptIciSm in tHe pHIlosoPhy oF PhOtoGRaphy. iI. THe sPECIAL STatUs OF phoToGRAPHS To beGIN, We mUst coNsiDEr what MotiVates philosophers TO claim that a phoTogrAPH is MinD-IndePeNdent, or specifiCalLy THAt it has a MiNd-independeNt relatiOn TO the pHotogrAphed oBjects. WHAT iS The speCial SigNificance ThaT pHOtograpHs HaVE for us, Such ThAt mind-IndepeNDencE SEems necessary to jUstifY THeir sTAtuS? When We Look at a PHotoGraph, knowiNg that it is a PhotogRaph, We havE a distiNcTive kiNd oF eXperience
 understanding of photogra phy as itrestr ict s p ho togr aphs  to the catego r y of  image and obscures th e fac tt hatp ho togra phs can al s o  be  p ic tur es .  I  usethe  terms'image' an d ' pi cture' to il l um inate a di ffe rence that p art icular ly  ne e ds to  be  reco gnised when p hotograph sa re dis c ussed.I n  w hatfollows I endorse th e  idea that, in  virtu eo ft h e p hot ographic p ro cess, photogr a ph s a rei ndeed a disti nct categor y  of  image ,wit h  speci al ep is t emi c and affec tive  status;but Is hall di s pute th e expl ana tor y an d  j us tif ic a tor y  p rio r ity  accorde dto 'mind -ind e p e n denc e'in t heori es of photogr aph y. A bet ter r esult  can  b e ach ievedby asu fficiently subs tant ive conce pti on  of  p hotog r aphs a ndthe  photog raphicp roc es s . Af ter undermining th ed o gm atic def initio n ,Id efend th evie w th a t  some  pho t og raphs ha ve sig n if ic ance be ca use th ey  ar e i mages that  are n ot pictu res;b ut some have s i gnificance as im a g es that  ar e also pict ures .  Toesta b li sht he la tterpo i nt ,  I offer a way to u nd erstan d how  photographer s create p i c t ures: askil l ed photographer c an em ploy the p h otograph ic pr ocess to  create a p icture b y u sin g p hys i c al  objects andl i ghtso urces,ana logoustoa p ain ter  u sing brus hes andpa in t.  P hot ograp h ed objec ts  ar eess entia l  to th e pho togr ap he r 'swork, b u tt h e pi ct ur e is  de te rmine d by the  photog rapher'sint e ntio ns ;it is n ot merely anim age of the  p hot ograph e d  objects . This conclusion exten d s to pi ctu res o f va rious kin ds,  inclu din g  docum entary  jour na lis m ,  prop a g an da,  a dvertising a ndworks  o f ar t. In s ection II, I descr i bethe special s tat us o f ph oto g ra p hsan d  me n t ion some contem porary phi lo s op hical theo r ies  w hich li nk this  spec i al stat us to min dindepend en ce.I n  se ction III,  I argue  that a d o gmati c  d efini tio n of p ho tog raphs  leads toscept icismin  the p hilos op hy of ar t. In section IV, I off er a s ubsta nti ve accoun t o f  th e photogr aphi c processand , i n sec tio n  V, u se t h is  to formu late a mind-in d ep end e n ce  thesis. In s e cti on VI , I explai n ho w, with a properu nderstanding o f th e pho tog r aphi cprocess, mind- ind ep e n dence ne ed  not be a d efiningfe a tureof pho tograp hs, and , in sectio n VI I,discuss h owph o tograph sca n  be pi ctur es  as we ll asi mage s .  I conclude DAWN  M. P H I LLIPS 3 t hat t hi s can a l levi ate proble ms of bothdogmat ismand s ceptici sm  in th e p hi losophy of photograp hy. I I. THESP ECIA L S TATUSOF P H O TOGRA PHSTo  be gin, we m u s tc on si d erwhat  moti va tesphilosoph e rs to cl aim that aph oto g r aph is mi n d -independe nt,  or s p e cificallyt hati th as amind-i ndepen dent re l ati on  to the  ph o t ographedobjects.W hat  i s th e specia lsign if ica nc e that photogra phs have  for us, s uch th atm ind- i ndepen de nce seems ne cessa ry to just i f y t heir st a tus ? W hen  weloo k at a photograph, knowing th at i t isa  ph otogr aph,we  have ad isti nctive k i nd of experie nce
 understanding_of photography_as it restricts photographs_to the_category_of image_and_obscures the fact_that photographs can_also be pictures. I_use the terms_'image'_and 'picture' to illuminate a difference that particularly needs to be recognised when photographs_are_discussed. In_what_follows_I endorse the idea that,_in virtue of the photographic_process, photographs_are indeed a distinct category of image, with_special_epistemic and affective_status; but I shall dispute the explanatory and justificatory_priority accorded to'mind-independence' in theories of_photography. A better_result_can_be achieved by a_sufficiently substantive conception of photographs and_the photographic process. After undermining the_dogmatic definition, I defend the view that_some photographs have significance because they_are images that are not_pictures; but_some have significance as images_that are also_pictures. To_establish the latter_point, I offer a way to_understand how photographers_create pictures: a skilled photographer can_employ_the photographic process_to_create_a picture_by using physical_objects_and light_sources,_analogous to a painter using brushes_and_paint. Photographed objects are essential to the_photographer's work, but the_picture_is determined by the_photographer's intentions; it is not_merely an image of the photographed_objects. This_conclusion extends_to pictures of various kinds, including documentary journalism, propaganda, advertising and_works of art. In section II,_I describe the special_status of_photographs_and mention some_contemporary_philosophical theories_which link this special status to mindindependence._In section_III, I argue that a dogmatic_definition of photographs leads_to_scepticism in the philosophy of art._In section IV, I offer a_substantive account of the photographic_process_and,_in section V, use this_to formulate a mind-independence thesis. In_section VI, I_explain how, with a proper understanding of_the_photographic process, mind-independence need not be_a_defining feature of photographs, and, in_section_VII,_discuss how photographs can be_pictures as well as images. I_conclude DAWN M. PHILLIPS 3 that this can alleviate_problems of both_dogmatism and scepticism in the_philosophy_of_photography. II. THE SPECIAL STATUS OF PHOTOGRAPHS To begin, we_must consider_what motivates philosophers_to claim that a photograph is mind-independent, or specifically that_it has a mind-independent relation to the_photographed objects. What is the special significance that photographs have for_us, such that mind-independence seems necessary to justify_their status? When we look at a_photograph, knowing that it_is_a photograph, we have a distinctive kind_of_experience