 Regard for Reason / Synopsis / pg. 4 of 5 quality education, intellectual humility (including some deference to experts), and various methods that combat cognitive biases (e.g. overconfidence and confirmation bias). 6. Beyond Self-Interest Abstract: This chapter introduces the long-standing idea that inappropriate motives, such as selfinterest, can militate against something like virtue. Some have tried to show that we are universally egoistic by appeal to empirical research, from evolutionary theory to the neuroscience of learning. However, these efforts fail and instead decades of experiments in social psychology provide powerful evidence that we are capable of genuine altruism. We can be motivated ultimately by a concern for others for their own sake, especially when empathizing with them. The psychological evidence, moreover, cannot be dismissed as showing that empathy blurs the distinction between self and other, making helping behavior truly egoistic or even non-altruistic. 7. The Motivational Power of Moral Beliefs Abstract: Even if we can rise above self-interest, we may just be slaves of our passions. The dominant Humean tradition has desire reining supreme when it comes to motivation generally and moral motivation in particular. But the motivational power of reason, via moral beliefs, has been understated. Appealing to empirical work primarily in social and developmental psychology, I show that moral beliefs play a prominent role in motivation, even in the difficult case of temptation. Experiments show that often when we succumb, it is due in part to a change in moral (or normative) belief. Rationalization, perhaps paradoxically, reveals a deep regard for reason-to act in ways we can justify to ourselves and to others. The result is that we are very often morally motivated. Even when behaving badly, actions that often seem motivated by selfinterest are actually ultimately driven by a concern to do what's right. This addresses a second form of egoistic pessimism but also sets up a challenge to the Humean theory addressed in the next chapter. 8. Freeing Reason from Desire Abstract: The previous chapter showed that our beliefs about which actions we ought to perform frequently have an effect on what we do. But Humean theories-holding that all motivation has its source in desire-insist on connecting such beliefs with an antecedent motive. I argue that we can allow normative beliefs a more independent role. First, I show that the Humean theory rules out some of the ways we ordinarily explain actions. This shifts the burden of proof onto Humeans to
Regard for Reason / Synopsis / pg. 4 of 5 quality education, intellectual humility (including some complaisance to expert), and versatile methods that battle cognitive biases (for example overconfidence and confirmation diagonal). 6. Beyond Self - Interest Abstract: This chapter introduces the long - standing idea that inappropriate motivation, such as selfinterest, can militate against something like virtue. Some have tried to express that we are universally egoistic by appeal to empirical inquiry, from evolutionary theory to the neuroscience of learning. However, these efforts fail and instead decades of experiments in social psychology provide knock-down evidence that we are capable of genuine altruism. We can be motivated ultimately by a business for others for their own sake, especially when empathizing with them. The psychological evidence, furthermore, cannot be dismissed as show that empathy blurs the distinction between self and other, making helping demeanor truly egoistic or even non - altruistic. 7. The Motivational Power of Moral Beliefs Abstract: Even if we can rise above self - interest, we may just be slaves of our passions. The prevailing Humean custom hold desire reining supreme when it comes to motivation generally and moral motivation in particular. But the motivational power of reason, via moral beliefs, has been understated. appeal to empirical work chiefly in social and developmental psychology, I picture that moral impression play a prominent function in motivation, even in the difficult case of temptation. Experiments usher that often when we succumb, it is due in part to a change in moral (or normative) impression. Rationalization, perhaps paradoxically, reveals a deep regard for reason - to act in direction we can apologize to ourselves and to others. The result is that we are very often morally motivated. Even when behaving ill, actions that often seem motivate by selfinterest are actually ultimately driven by a business to do what's right. This addresses a second form of egoistic pessimism but also sets up a challenge to the Humean hypothesis addressed in the next chapter. 8. Freeing Reason from Desire Abstract: The previous chapter showed that our belief about which actions we ought to do frequently have an effect on what we do. But Humean theory - holding that all motivation has its reservoir in desire - insist on connecting such impression with an antecedent motive. I argue that we can allow normative beliefs a more independent role. First, I show that the Humean theory govern out some of the ways we ordinarily excuse actions. This shifts the burden of proof onto Humeans to
 Rehard for Reason / Synopsir / pg. 4 of 5 qualnry eduration, jntellecgual humility (including some dwferebce to experts), and varkous methlds that comuat cognitive bieaes (e.g. overcohnidenee and confirmatlon bias). 6. Bayond Self-Intesert Abstract: This chapter introduces tre long-xtwnding idea thwt imwpprkirlate motives, such as selfinteresf, can mplitate against spmething like virtue. Some jave tried to show thah we are unuverfqlly egoistiz by appeal to empiriczl research, from evolutionary tfeory to the neoxisclgnce of leariing. Hjwever, these efforts fail amd instead decsdev od experiments in sociel psychology providg powerful eridence that we are cqpqble mf ganuivw autrhixm. We caj bx motivated ultimately by a concern for ouheww for their osn sakq, qspecially when empathizing with them. Tve lsychological evidence, noreover, cannot be didmissed af showing that empathy blurs the distinction betwaen sxlw aue othde, laking helping behavior truly egoistic or eveg npn-sltruistic. 7. Thc Motivational Powrr og Moral Beliefr Abstxzcf: Even if we can rlse abode seof-interesu, we kay just be slaves of our pqssions. The bomunant Humean tradicion has desnre reoning supreme when it comes co motjvation genfrally ans moral motivatiov ik pdrticular. But the motivatijnal powec of xeason, vka mpral bqliefs, has been understated. Appeallng tl ampirical aork primarily in social and detxlopmental psichmlocy, I shoc that moral belieff play a promiuent rolz in mutivation, vven in tie difficult case of tempdwtion. Experikents shjw tyat iften wfdn we succumb, ot is due in part ti a change in morak (ot hormative) beliey. Tqtionalization, pefha[s peradovhcally, reveans a dedl regxrd for reawun-to act in ways we can bustjfy to ourselves amd to othets. The refult is that ee are very often loralny ootivsteq. Even when behaving badly, actjons that ofben seem motidatee by selfintzrest are actually ultimately driven by e concern to do what's tight. This addresses c xecond form of edoistic passimism but also sers up a challenge to the Humean theory addrevsed ln the next chapter. 8. Freeing Reason from Desire Abstract: The previous chapter siored that oud bekiefs ayouc which actmois we ought to pegform frequently have an effect un what fe do. But Humean theories-holdimg that all motkvation has its source ih desire-onsist on connecting such beliegs with an antecedent mobive. I artue tgat we can allow normative brliefs a moee independcnt role. First, I xhlw that tje Hnmecn theory rules out some of the wqys we ogdinarily explaii actions. Thls shifjs the borden of proof onfo Hhleans to
Regard for Reason / Synopsis / pg. 5 education, intellectual (including some deference that cognitive biases (e.g. and confirmation bias). Beyond Self-Interest Abstract: This chapter introduces long-standing idea that inappropriate motives, such as selfinterest, can militate against something like Some have tried to show that we are universally egoistic by appeal to research, evolutionary to neuroscience of learning. However, these efforts fail and instead decades of experiments in social psychology provide evidence that we are capable of genuine altruism. can be motivated ultimately a concern for others for own especially when with The evidence, moreover, cannot dismissed as showing that empathy blurs the distinction between self and other, making helping behavior truly egoistic even non-altruistic. Motivational Power Moral Abstract: if we can self-interest, we may just be slaves The dominant Humean tradition has desire reining supreme it comes motivation generally and moral motivation in But the motivational power of reason, via moral has been understated. Appealing to empirical work primarily in social and developmental psychology, I show beliefs play a prominent in motivation, even the case temptation. show that when we succumb, it is due in part to a change moral (or normative) belief. Rationalization, perhaps paradoxically, reveals a deep reason-to in ways we justify to ourselves and others. result is that we often motivated. badly, that seem motivated by selfinterest actually ultimately driven by a to do what's right. of egoistic pessimism but also sets up a to the Humean theory addressed in the chapter. 8. Freeing Reason from Desire Abstract: The previous chapter showed that beliefs about we ought to perform frequently have an effect what we do. But theories-holding that all motivation has its source in desire-insist connecting beliefs with antecedent motive. I that we can normative beliefs a role. First, show the out some of the ways we explain This shifts the burden of onto
 Regard for Reason / Synopsis / pg. 4 Of 5 quality eDucatIon, IntElLectUal hUmility (includiNG somE deference to experts), and VarioUs MEthoDS tHat coMbat cogNItIVE biAsEs (E.g. oVeRCoNfideNce And confIrmation biAs). 6. BEyOnd Self-InterESt abstract: ThIs cHapter introdUceS the loNg-StaNDing iDea That iNapproPRiate mOtives, sucH aS SelfinTErest, caN MIlItatE against something LIkE Virtue. Some have Tried tO sHOw THAt wE arE universalLy EgoisTIc by appEAl TO EMpiRIcal research, fRom evolutioNAry Theory To The NEuroscIence Of LEarNing. However, ThesE efforts fAil and INstead dECades of ExperiMenTs iN socIAl PsYchOlOGy pROvIde POweRful evidEnCe That wE are CAPABle oF geNuinE altrUism. We can be moTivAted ULtiMatelY by a cOnceRn For otHers foR theiR oWn sake, especiallY wheN empathizIng WiTh tHeM. The pSYcholoGicAl eVidence, MoreoveR, CanNoT BE DiSmissed as showing thAt EMPaThy blurs The disTInCtIOn betweeN sElf And oTHEr, makIng hELpIng behavIor truLY eGoIstic or EvEn non-aLtRuiStiC. 7. The MOTivaTional power of MOral BELiefs Abstract: EVEn if we can rise ABoVE SeLF-intEreSt, we may just Be slAVes oF our PAsSioNS. The dOminaNt hUmEAn tradition has desirE rEining SupreMe when it comes To motivatiON GEnerally And mORaL Motivation in paRticuLar. But the mOTivationAl powEr of reasOn, via moraL BEliefs, haS beEn uNdeRstATEd. appealing to emPIRicaL wOrk primAriLy in socIal And DevEloPmEntal psycHology, I sHoW tHaT mOraL beliEFs play a pRoMinEnT roLe in mOTivatiOn, eveN in tHe DiFFicUlt case OF tEMPtatIoN. EXperImeNtS show That OFteN when we Succumb, it Is dUE in pArT tO a changE in moral (or norMaTive) belief. raTioNalizaTIOn, perhapS paradoxically, reveals a dEEp regarD foR reasOn-to Act in ways We cAn justIfy TO ourseLves anD to otHeRs. THE ResulT IS tHat We Are very oftEN MorAlly mOtIvatEd. Even wHen behaving badly, acTIonS that often seeM moTivaTED bY seLFiNTerEsT Are ACTually ultimatelY driven by a CoNCeRn to do what'S RigHt. this addResses a SeconD Form of eGoistic peSsimism buT aLso sETS up A challenge To the HumEan theory ADdresSEd In the NexT chaptEr. 8. freEing REason fROm DEsire abstraCt: the preVious ChApter shoWed that our beliefs about wHich acTions We oUght to perForM FreQuently haVe an Effect on whAt wE do. but HuMeaN TheorIes-hOLdIng THat alL motIVation has ITs SouRCE iN desire-insiST ON coNnectIng SUch belIefs With an antecedent mOTive. I argue that We caN ALloW noRMatiVe Beliefs a more inDepEnDENt role. FiRsT, I show that tHe Humean ThEOry ruLes out Some of The ways WE OrDInarilY expLaiN actions. THis ShIFts the bUrDeN Of prooF ontO HUmeans To
 Regard for Reason / Synop sis / pg.4 of5 q ual it y ed ucat ion, intellect u al h umility (including som e def er e ncet oexper ts), an d  v a r iou sme tho ds th at co mba t cogni tive biase s ( e. g. overconfi d en ce and con fir mation bias) . 6 . Beyo nd  Se l f-Int ere st Ab stract :  Thischapter i nt r oduces the lon g - st andi ng idea that inap p ro p riate motives,  suchas se l f int ere st, can mi li tatea gainsts om e t h ing like virtue.Some have t r ied  to sh ow  th a t we a re un iv e rsa lly egoisti c by  appeal t o empi r ical re s earch,from e vol uti onar y  t he ory  t o  th e  n eur o sci ence ofle ar ning.  How e v e r , th ese  eff ortsfail and inst ead  dec a des  of e xperi ment sin so cial p sycho lo gy provide powe rful  evidence  th at  we  a re ca p able o f g enu ine alt ruism.W e c an b e  m otivated ultimatel yb y  a  concern  for o t he rs for thei rown  sak e ,  espe cial l ywhen emp athizi n gwi th them .The ps yc hol ogi cal e v iden ce, mo reover,canno t  be dismisseda s showing tha t  e m p at h y bl urs  the distin ctio n  bet ween se lfa nd ot her,ma k in g  helping behavior t ru ly ego istic  or even non- altruistic . 7 . The Mo tiva t io n al Power of Mo ral B eliefs Abs t ract: Ev en if  we canrise abov e self-int ere st,  we  ma y ju st be slaveso f  our  p assions . T he domi nan t H ume antr adition h as desir ere in in g s uprem e  when it  c ome stomotiv a tion g enera llyan dm ora l motiv a ti o n  inpa rt icul ar.  B ut th e mo t iva tionalpower ofrea s on,vi amoral b eliefs, has b ee n understa te d.Appeal i n g to emp irical work primarily i n  social  an d dev elop mental ps ych ology,  Is how th at mor al be li efs p lay a p ro min en t role inm o tiv ation ,even  in the  difficult case of tem ptation. Expe rim ents s ho w t h at oft en whe n we succumb, itis due inpa r tto a chang e  in  m oral (o r norma tive) belief.  Rational ization,pe rhap s par adoxically , reveal s a deepr egard fo r rea son -to ac tinwayswe can jus tifyto our se lves a nd to  o thers. T he result is that we ar e very  ofte n m orally mo tiv a ted . Even wh en b ehaving ba dly , a ction s t h at of tens ee m m o tivat ed b y  selfinte r es t a r e  a ctually ult i m a tel y dri ven by a c once rn to do what's r i ght. This addr esse s a s eco n d fo rm  of egoistic p ess im i s m but al so  sets up achalleng et o the  Humea n theo ry addr e s se d  in th e ne xtchapter.8.Fr e eing Re as on from D esir eAbstra ct: Th e  pre v i ous chapter show ed th a t  ourb eli efs a bo ut whic h  act ions we ou ght to perf orm fr eque ntlyhave an  e ffectonwh at we do.B ut Humean  theo ries-ho ld ingtha t allmoti v a tionhasit s s ource ind e si r e- in s ist  onconne ct ingsuch beli e fs withana ntecede nt  mo t i ve. Ia rg u e  that we c anallow n ormative b e lief s  a moreindepe ndentrole. F i rst ,I showtha t the Humea n theoryr ule soutsome ofth e wa ys  we  o rdinarily expla in actio ns. This s hiftsthe burd e n of p ro of onto Hume ans t o
 Regard_for Reason_/ Synopsis / pg._4 of_5_quality education,_intellectual_humility (including some_deference to experts),_and various methods that_combat cognitive biases_(e.g._overconfidence and confirmation bias). 6. Beyond Self-Interest Abstract: This chapter introduces the long-standing idea_that_inappropriate motives,_such_as_selfinterest, can militate against something_like virtue. Some have tried_to show_that we are universally egoistic by appeal to_empirical_research, from evolutionary_theory to the neuroscience of learning. However, these efforts_fail and instead decades of experiments_in social psychology_provide_powerful_evidence that we are_capable of genuine altruism. We can_be motivated ultimately by a concern_for others for their own sake, especially_when empathizing with them. The psychological_evidence, moreover, cannot be dismissed_as showing_that empathy blurs the distinction_between self and_other, making_helping behavior truly_egoistic or even non-altruistic. 7. The_Motivational Power of_Moral Beliefs Abstract: Even if we_can_rise above self-interest,_we_may_just be_slaves of our_passions._The dominant_Humean_tradition has desire reining supreme when_it_comes to motivation generally and moral motivation_in particular. But the_motivational_power of reason, via_moral beliefs, has been understated._Appealing to empirical work primarily in_social and_developmental psychology,_I show that moral beliefs play a prominent role in motivation,_even in the difficult case of_temptation. Experiments show that_often when_we_succumb, it is_due_in part_to a change in moral (or normative)_belief. Rationalization,_perhaps paradoxically, reveals a deep regard_for reason-to act in_ways_we can justify to ourselves and_to others. The result is that_we are very often morally_motivated._Even_when behaving badly, actions that_often seem motivated by selfinterest are_actually ultimately driven_by a concern to do what's right._This_addresses a second form of egoistic_pessimism_but also sets up a challenge_to_the_Humean theory addressed in the_next chapter. 8. Freeing Reason from_Desire Abstract: The previous chapter showed that our beliefs_about which actions_we ought to perform frequently_have_an_effect on what we do. But Humean theories-holding that all_motivation has_its source in_desire-insist on connecting such beliefs with an antecedent motive. I_argue that we can allow normative beliefs_a more independent role. First, I show that the Humean theory_rules out some of the ways we ordinarily_explain actions. This shifts the burden of_proof onto Humeans to