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 of_states of_affairs. Cambridge: Cambridge University_Press. Armstrong,_D._(2004). Truth_and_truthmakers. Cambridge: Cambridge_University Press. Austin,_J. L. (1950). 'Truth'._Aristotelian Society Supplement,_24,_111–129. (Reprinted in Philosophical papers, by J. O. Urmson & G. J. Warnock, Ed.,_Clarendon_Press, Oxford)._Austin,_J._L. (1961). Unfair to facts._In J. O. Urmson &_G. J._Warnock (Eds.), Philosophical papers (pp. 102–222). Oxford: Clarendon_Press._Barwise, J., &_Perry, J. (1981). Semantic innocence and uncompromising situations. Midwest_Studies in Philosophy, 6(1), 387–404. Carlson,_G. (1977a). A_unified_analysis_of the English bare_plural. Linguistics and Philosophy, 1, 413–_457. Carlson, G. (1977b). Amount relatives._Language, 53, 520–542. Chomsky, N. (1965). Aspects_of the theory of syntax. Cambridge,_MA: MIT Press. Chomsky, N._(1981). Lectures_on government and binding. Dordrecht:_Foris. Ciardelli, I.,_Roloefsen, F.,_& Theiler, N._(2017). Composing alternatives. Linguistics and Philosophy,_40, 1–36. Cinque,_G. (2015). Three phenomena discriminating between_"raising"_and "matching" relative_clauses._Semantics–Syntax_Interface, 2(1),_1–27. Fine, K._(1982)._First-order modal_theories_III: Facts. Synthese, 53, 43–112. Fine,_K._(2012). Counterfactuals without possible worlds. Journal of_Philosophy, 109(3), 221–246. Fine,_K._(2014). Truthmaker semantics for_intuitionistic logic. Journal of Philosophical_Logic, 43(2–3), 549–577. Fine, K. (2017)._Truthmaker semantics._In B._Hale, C. Wright, & A. Miller (Eds.), A companion to the_philosophy of language (Vol. 2, pp._556–577). Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. Fine,_K. (2018a)._Compliance_and command I._Review_of Symbolic_Logic 11(4), 609