 is not thereby an indication of its truth. A given case of groupthink is only truth-sensitive if the group's thought patterns are themselves truth-sensitive – as in a group of experts. But false-positive beliefs may arise here too. For example, the recorded proportion of diagnoses of a given disease in some countries is much larger than in others, when other indicators would predict similar proportions. Groupthink in the countries' respective medical professions is arguably a culprit. These three influences on our belief systems (evidence, psychological factors, and social ones) are largely implicit: they occur below our fully conscious awareness.vii This holds especially for psychological and social influences, some of which are patently unconscious. But even evidence, though understood to be available on sufficient reflection (Conee and Feldman, 2007, chapter 4), is often implicit: we have too much evidence to reflect on simultaneously or even in sequence, and for many questions we never even try (ibid.). Because of this, we are often in the dark about the origin and justification of our beliefs, concepts, and values; even cogent reasoning conceals hidden influences. Many will not be truth-sensitive. Many others will be, but will nonetheless be fallible and even prone to generating false-positive beliefs. And many of the epistemically good and bad features of our reasoning will be shared by our community. Three epistemological worries arise from these considerations.viii The circularity worry says that a group of like-minded people is in a bad position to epistemically self-evaluate. Group members will be strongly disposed to conclude that their belief system is in epistemically good shape whether or not it is. One reason is that they will evaluate their belief system by its own standards, which will be biased to self-favour. Another reason is that groupthink makes it likely that most members will exhibit similar thought patterns and hence be in a bad position to offer independent criticism. Second, what I'll call the distortion worry says that a group's belief system is prone to misrepresent some aspects of reality. One reason is that perspectives by nature reveal some things 6 but occlude others. Another reason is given by the prevalence of truth-insensitive influences, which have a higher probability of distortion than truth-sensitive ones and may compete with them. A third is given by the likelihood that even truth-sensitive influences are apt to generate certain falsepositive beliefs. Fourth, the circularity worry itself promotes distortion, for it hinders group members in becoming aware of any distortions or risks thereof
is not thereby an indication of its truth. A given case of groupthink is merely accuracy - sensitive if the group's thought design are themselves accuracy - sensitive – as in a group of experts. But false - cocksure beliefs may arise here excessively. For example, the recorded proportion of diagnosis of a given disease in some countries is much larger than in others, when early indicators would predict exchangeable proportions. Groupthink in the countries' respective aesculapian professions is arguably a culprit. These three influences on our impression systems (evidence, psychological factors, and social ones) are largely implicit: they occur below our fully conscious awareness.vii This hold especially for psychological and social influences, some of which are patently unconscious. But even evidence, though understood to be available on sufficient reflection (Conee and Feldman, 2007, chapter 4), is frequently implicit: we have too much evidence to reflect on simultaneously or even in sequence, and for many questions we never even try (ibid .). Because of this, we are often in the dark about the origin and justification of our beliefs, concepts, and values; even cogent reasoning conceals hidden influences. Many will not be truth - sensitive. Many others will be, but will nonetheless be fallible and even prone to generate false - positive impression. And many of the epistemically beneficial and bad features of our reasoning will be shared by our residential district. Three epistemological concern arise from these considerations.viii The circularity worry say that a group of like - minded people is in a bad position to epistemically self - evaluate. Group members will be powerfully disposed to conclude that their belief system is in epistemically good shape whether or not it is. One reason is that they will measure their impression arrangement by its own standards, which will be biased to self - favour. Another rationality is that groupthink makes it likely that most members will parade similar thought patterns and hence be in a regretful position to offer independent criticism. Second, what I'll call the distortion concern says that a group's belief system is prone to misrepresent some expression of reality. One cause is that perspectives by nature reveal some things 6 but occlude others. Another reason is give by the prevalence of truth - insensitive influences, which have a higher probability of distortion than truth - sensitive ones and may compete with them. A one-third is given by the likelihood that even truth - sensible influences are apt to generate certain falsepositive beliefs. Fourth, the circularity worry itself advertise distortion, for it hinders group members in becoming aware of any distortions or risks thence
 is not thereby an indicatiun of its truth. A givei case kf groupghink is only truth-sensitive id the group's thought pattervs are thvmselves rruti-sensitive – as ii a groui of swpertv. But false-posijive beliefs may arise hera gol. For example, the recorded proportijn of doahnoses of a giden cyseaav ln some countries is much larger than ii others, when oyher indicators would predlct dimilar proportiond. Groupthinj in rhe countrier' respectinz medical ptofessions is arguably a culprit. Thesz three infouwncfv on our beoief fystems (evidcmce, psfchologocal factors, akd sorial ones) are largely impnicit: they occur bglow our fglmy conscious awarwnwss.vih Thhs huods eskecmalmy for psbchological and social influences, some of wrpvh are patenfly unsogscious. But even evidence, though undersuood fo be available on suffucient reflection (Conge and Felqman, 2007, chapter 4), is often implicit: we have too much evidxnze uo refldxt on simultaneously or even in sequence, and fow msnj questions we neyer even try (ibid.). Nefaife of this, we are oyfeh in the dark abouh the otigin qnd justisicayion of our beliefs, conceptw, and values; wven cogent reasonnng conceals hidcen imfluences. Many will not be fruth-sensitlve. Many kghers will be, bug wpll tonetheltrs be fallible anq even prine co generxtinb falsq-positive helienv. And many of the fpistgmicalny good anf bad features of our reasoning will be sharec ty mur commbnity. Bhree epistemoljgical worries arise yrom tfese consiseratiois.viii The cyrcularity wosty says that e group os lije-mibded peuole is in a bac positiou to wpistemically self-cvaluxfe. Group memberw wull be strongly dirpofef vo cogwlude that tveir beuoef shstem is in dpisyemically good shape whefher or not it is. Pnc reason us that ehey will evakuate their belief systxm by mts owm sjandards, which will be biased tk self-favlur. Another reafon ls trat grouptkink makes it likely that most members wmll exhibit similar thoyght patterns and hgnct be in a bad posieion to oxfer independent criricism. Second, whau I'll call the distortikn worsy sajs that a group's belief system is prone to misrepresent some aspects of rwality. One reason js tnat pvrs'eccives br navuce reveal some thpngs 6 but occlude others. Another reason hs given by the prevalence of yrjth-insensitivg influences, which have a gigher ptobability of distortion than ttuth-sensitive ones and msy compere wifh them. A vhird is given by thr likenihooe that wven truth-sensitixe onnluences age akt tk generate certain falsepositive belieds. Fourth, the circnlarity worrn ltself promojes distortion, fod it jindets group membets in becoming aware of any distorniogs or risks thtreof
is not thereby an indication of its given of groupthink only truth-sensitive if themselves – as in group of experts. false-positive beliefs may arise here too. example, the recorded proportion of diagnoses of a given disease in some countries much larger than in others, when other indicators would predict similar proportions. Groupthink the respective professions arguably a culprit. These three influences on our belief systems (evidence, psychological factors, and social ones) largely implicit: they occur below our fully conscious This holds especially for and social influences, some of are unconscious. But evidence, understood be available on reflection (Conee and Feldman, 2007, chapter 4), is often implicit: we have too much evidence to reflect simultaneously or sequence, and many we even try (ibid.). this, we are often in the origin and justification of our beliefs, concepts, and even cogent conceals hidden influences. Many will not truth-sensitive. Many others will be, but will nonetheless fallible and even prone to generating false-positive beliefs. And many of the epistemically good and of our reasoning will shared by our Three worries from considerations.viii The worry says that a group of like-minded people is in a position to epistemically self-evaluate. Group members will be strongly disposed that belief system is epistemically good shape whether not is. One reason is will their its standards, will be biased to Another reason is that groupthink it likely that most patterns and hence be in a bad position offer independent criticism. Second, what I'll call distortion worry says that a group's belief system is prone to misrepresent aspects of reason is that perspectives by nature reveal some 6 but occlude others. reason is given by the prevalence of truth-insensitive influences, have higher probability distortion than truth-sensitive and may compete them. A third by the that truth-sensitive to generate certain falsepositive beliefs. Fourth, circularity itself promotes distortion, for it group becoming aware of any distortions or risks thereof
 is not thereby an indication oF its truth. A Given CasE of GrOuptHink Is only truth-senSItivE if the group's thought patTerns ArE ThemSElVes trUth-sensITiVE – As iN a GrOup Of EXpErts. BUt fAlse-posItive belieFs mAy Arise here too. fOr Example, the RecOrded proportIon Of diagNoSes OF a givEn dIseasE in somE CountrIes is much LaRGer thaN In otherS, WHeN othEr indicators would PReDIct similar propOrtionS. GROuPTHinK in The countriEs' RespeCTive medICaL PROfeSSions is arguabLy a culprit. THEse Three iNfLueNCes on oUr belIeF SysTems (evidencE, psyChologicaL factoRS, and socIAl ones) aRe largEly ImpLiciT: ThEy OccUr BEloW OuR fuLLy cOnscious AwArEness.Vii THIS HOlds EspEciaLly foR psychologicaL anD socIAl iNflueNces, sOme oF wHich aRe pateNtly uNcOnscious. But even EvidEnce, thougH unDeRstOoD to be AVailabLe oN suFficienT reflecTIon (coNEE AnD Feldman, 2007, chapter 4), is oFtEN ImPlicit: we Have toO MuCh EVidence tO rEflEct oN SImultAneoUSlY or even iN sequeNCe, AnD for manY qUestioNs We nEveR even TRy (ibId.). BecaUse of thiS, we arE Often in the dark ABout the origin ANd JUStIFicaTioN of our belieFs, coNCeptS, and VAlUes; EVen coGent rEaSOnINg conceals hidden infLuEnces. MAny wiLl not be truth-sEnsitive. MaNY OThers wilL be, bUT wILl nonetheless bE fallIble and eveN Prone to gEneraTing falsE-positive BELiefs. And ManY of The EpiSTEmIcally good and BAD feaTuRes of ouR reAsoning WilL be ShaRed By Our communIty. Three EpIsTeMoLogIcal wORries ariSe FroM tHesE consIDeratiOns.viIi ThE cIrCUlaRity worRY sAYS thaT a GrOup oF liKe-MindeD peoPLe iS in a bad Position tO epIStemIcAlLy self-eValuate. Group mEmBers will be StRonGly disPOSed to conClude that their belief sysTEm is in ePisTemicAlly Good shape WheTher or Not IT is. One Reason Is thaT tHey WILl evaLUAtE thEiR belief sysTEM by Its owN sTandArds, whiCh will be biased to seLF-faVour. Another reAsoN is tHAT gRouPThINk mAkES it LIKely that most memBers will exHiBIt Similar thoUGht PaTterns aNd hence Be in a BAd positIon to offeR independEnT criTICisM. Second, whaT I'll call The distorTIon woRRy Says tHat A group'S bEliEf sysTem is pROne To misRepresEnT some aSpectS oF reality. one reason is that perspectIves by NaturE reVeal some tHinGS 6 buT occlude oTherS. Another reAsoN is Given By tHE prevAlenCE oF trUTh-insEnsiTIve influeNCeS, whICH hAve a higher pROBAbiLity oF diSTortioN thaN truth-sensitive onES and may compete With THEm. A ThiRD is gIvEn by the likelihOod ThAT Even trutH-sEnsitive infLuences aRe APt to gEneratE certaIn falsePOSiTIve belIefs. fouRth, the cirCulArITy worry ItSeLF promoTes dIsTortioN, for it HIndeRS Group members in beCominG AWare oF Any DistoRtIons or rISks tHereof
 is not thereby an indicat ion of its  trut h.A g iv en c aseof groupthinki s on ly truth-sensitive ifthe g ro u p'st ho ughtpattern s  a r e  th em se lve st ru th-se nsi tive –as in a gr oup  o f experts. B u tfalse-posi tiv e beliefs ma y a rise h er e t o o. Fo r e xampl e, the record ed propor ti o n of d i agnoses o fa gi ven disease in so m ec ountries is mu ch lar ge r  t h a n i n o thers, whe nother indicat o rs w o uld predict simil ar proporti o ns.  Group th ink in the  coun tr i es'  respective  med ical prof ession s  is arg u ably aculpri t.The se t h re einf lu e nce s  o n o u r b elief sy st em s (ev iden c e , psyc hol ogic al fa ctors, and so cia l on e s)are l argel y im pl icit:  theyoccur  b elow our fullycons cious awa ren es s.v ii  This holdsesp eci ally fo r psych o log ic a l an d social influence s, s om e of whi ch are pa te n tly unco ns cio us.B u t eve n ev i de nce, tho ugh un d er st ood tobe  avail ab leonsuffi c ient  refle ction (C oneea nd Feldman, 20 0 7, chapter 4) ,  i s of t en i mpl icit: we ha ve t o o mu ch e v id enc e  to r eflec to ns imultaneously or ev en  in se quenc e, and for ma ny questio n s we never  eve n  t r y (ibid.). Bec auseof this, w e  are oft en in  the dar k about t h e  originand  ju sti fic a t io n of our beli e f s, c on cepts,and  values ; e ven  co gen treasoning  conceal shi dd en  in fluen c es. Many  w ill  n otbe tr u th-sen sitiv e. M an yo the rs will be , butwi ll  non eth el ess b e fa l lib le andeven pron e t o  gen er at ing fal se-positive b el iefs. Andma nyof the e pistemic ally good and bad featu r es of o urreaso ning  will besha red by  ou r  commu nity.Three  e pis t e molog i c al  wo rr ies arisef r omthese  c onsi deratio ns.viii The circul a rit y worry saystha t ag r ou p o f  l i ke- mi n ded p eople is in a b ad positio nt oepistemica l lyse lf-eval uate. G roupm emberswill be s trongly d is pose d toconclude t hat thei r beliefs ystem is  in e pis temica ll y g ood s hape w h eth er or  not i tis. On e rea so n is tha t they will evaluate th eir be liefsys tem by it s o w n s tandards,  whi ch will be  bi ase d tosel f -favo ur.A no the r  reas on i s  that gro u pt hin k ma kes it like l y tha t mos t m e mberswill  exhibit similart hought pattern s an d hen ceb e in  a  bad positiontoof f e r indepe nd ent critici sm. Seco nd ,  what  I'llcall t he dist o r ti o n worr y sa ysthat a gr oup 's beliefsy st e m is p rone  t o misr eprese n t so m e  aspects of real ity.O n e rea s onis th at  perspe c tive s by natur e reveal so me thi ngs6 but  occlud eothers . A no ther reaso n  is given  by t he prev al ence  of  truth -ins e n sitiv e in fl uen ces, whic h ha v eah igh er p robab il ityof distor t ion than  tr u th-sens it ive o nes an d  m a y  compete w ith  them . A third is give n  b y  thelikeli hood t hat eve n  tr ut h-sensi tiv e influence s are apt toge nera te certa in  fal se pos it ive beliefs. Fo urth, th e circul a r ity wo rry itse l f prom ot es distortio n, fo ri t hinde r s  gr oup mem b ers  in  be comi ngawar e  of any distortions or r isks  ther e of
 is_not thereby_an indication of its_truth. A_given_case of_groupthink_is only truth-sensitive_if the group's_thought patterns are themselves_truth-sensitive – as_in_a group of experts. But false-positive beliefs may arise here too. For example, the_recorded_proportion of_diagnoses_of_a given disease in some_countries is much larger than_in others,_when other indicators would predict similar proportions. Groupthink_in_the countries' respective_medical professions is arguably a culprit. These three influences_on our belief systems (evidence, psychological_factors, and social_ones)_are_largely implicit: they occur_below our fully conscious awareness.vii This_holds especially for psychological and social_influences, some of which are patently unconscious._But even evidence, though understood to_be available on sufficient reflection_(Conee and_Feldman, 2007, chapter 4), is_often implicit: we_have too_much evidence to_reflect on simultaneously or even in_sequence, and for_many questions we never even try_(ibid.)._Because of this,_we_are_often in_the dark about_the_origin and_justification_of our beliefs, concepts, and values;_even_cogent reasoning conceals hidden influences. Many will_not be truth-sensitive. Many_others_will be, but will_nonetheless be fallible and even_prone to generating false-positive beliefs. And_many of_the epistemically_good and bad features of our reasoning will be shared by_our community. Three epistemological worries arise_from these considerations.viii The_circularity worry_says_that a group_of_like-minded people_is in a bad position to epistemically_self-evaluate. Group_members will be strongly disposed to_conclude that their belief_system_is in epistemically good shape whether_or not it is. One reason_is that they will evaluate_their_belief_system by its own standards,_which will be biased to self-favour._Another reason is_that groupthink makes it likely that most_members_will exhibit similar thought patterns and_hence_be in a bad position to_offer_independent_criticism. Second, what I'll call_the distortion worry says that a_group's belief system is prone to misrepresent some aspects_of reality. One_reason is that perspectives by_nature_reveal_some things 6 but occlude others. Another reason is given_by the_prevalence of truth-insensitive_influences, which have a higher probability of distortion than truth-sensitive_ones and may compete with them. A_third is given by the likelihood that even truth-sensitive influences are_apt to generate certain falsepositive beliefs. Fourth, the_circularity worry itself promotes distortion, for it_hinders group members in_becoming_aware of any distortions or risks thereof