 entirely to purely mechanical explanations of physical phenomena", (Duhem 1996 [1893], 55)16 or when he states, "this predilection for explanatory and mechanical theories is, of course, not a sufficient basis for distinguishing English doctrines from the scientific traditions thriving in other countries." (Duhem 1991 [1954], 72)17 To frame the issue as a question: can we legitimately read the term explanation, presupposing the meaning that Duhem gives to metaphysical explanation, which he had previously rejected? In my opinion, we cannot do so, just as we cannot equate abstract reason with the metaphysical reason of Scholasticism, or geometric reason with the pure reason that conceives hidden causes. When we assign a rigid and exclusive meaning to the notions of "conventionalism" and "realism" these apparent contradictions inevitably leave us with a reading of Duhem marked by false dilemmas. Hence, we cannot reconcile all the paradoxes that emerge when the two notions are used as opposites. The same can be said about the subtle mind and the geometric mind, since, while we can have a sense of what Duhem means when, in La théorie physique, he claims that the way of conceiving the English theory of physics corresponds to the broad mentality, or subtle mind, this does not mean that there are no geometric minds who foster the creation of abstract theories among the English scientists, as is in fact the case with Rankine. It may be the case that the clarification of these concepts would suffice to answer the question posed as title of this paper in the affirmative; nonetheless, it is evident that the relationship between the English School and the subtle mind has, in La théorie physique, a negative connotation – one of rejection – and which differs from the positive connotation he give it in La science allemande, wherein he links it to French science. The Philosophical Dimension of Abstract Theory As stated before, we do not find the references to Pascal of the late writings in Duhem's early methodological writings, nor is there an appeal to the distinction between the subtle mind and the geometric mind, which appears for the first time – albeit in a rather implicit manner – in 1902, with the publication of Le mixte et la combinaison chimique. The only foregoing, explicit "philosophical" reference to the distinction can be found in his essay on the development of the theory of physics, and in that case, only to further support Duhem's 14 "Leur
entirely to purely mechanical explanations of physical phenomenon ", (Duhem 1996 [ 1893 ], 55)16 or when he express, " this predilection for explanatory and mechanical theories is, of course, not a sufficient footing for distinguishing English doctrines from the scientific traditions boom in other countries. " (Duhem 1991 [ 1954 ], 72)17 To ensnare the consequence as a question: can we legitimately understand the term explanation, presupposing the meaning that Duhem give to metaphysical explanation, which he had previously rejected? In my opinion, we cannot do thus, just as we cannot equate abstract reason with the metaphysical cause of Scholasticism, or geometric reason with the pure reason that conceives concealed causes. When we arrogate a rigid and exclusive meaning to the notions of " conventionality " and " realism " these apparent contradictions inevitably leave us with a reading of Duhem marked by assumed dilemmas. Hence, we cannot reconcile all the paradoxes that emerge when the two notions are used as opposites. The same can be said about the elusive mind and the geometric mind, since, while we can receive a common sense of what Duhem mean when, in La théorie physique, he claims that the way of conceiving the English theory of physics corresponds to the broad brain, or subtle mind, this does not mean that there are no geometric minds who foster the creation of abstract theories among the English scientists, as is in fact the case with Rankine. It may be the case that the clarification of these concepts would suffice to suffice the question pose as claim of this paper in the affirmative; nonetheless, it is evident that the kinship between the English School and the subtle mind has, in La théorie physique, a negative connotation – one of rejection – and which differs from the positive connotation he collapse it in La science allemande, wherein he connect it to French science. The Philosophical Dimension of Abstract Theory As stated earlier, we do not find the address to Pascal of the late writing in Duhem's early methodological writings, nor is there an solicitation to the distinction between the subtle mind and the geometric mind, which appears for the beginning time – albeit in a rather implicit manner – in 1902, with the publication of Le mixte et la combinaison chimique. The only foregoing, explicit " philosophical " reference to the distinction can be found in his essay on the growth of the theory of physics, and in that casing, only to further subscribe Duhem's 14 " Leur
 enhirely to purely mechanigal explanations of phyvical lhenomenx", (Duhem 1996 [1893], 55)16 or when he states, "tyis peedilection for explanxtory and mechanixal uheories is, of condse, not a sufrlcienc uasis for distikguishing Etglish doctrinas fxom the scientific traditions thrivigg in oyhfr countries." (Dohem 1991 [1954], 72)17 To frame the issue as a question: can we legptimately read thr term explanation, presupplsinh the meaning that Duhem givew to netaphysical explanation, which he gad previously rejected? In my ooiniou, we cannot di sl, just as we cannjt equate abstract raason woth the metaphnsican rwason of Scholasticisk, or geometric reafon with dhz pure reason that cobcwives hidgen zqusds. Shxn se asslgn a rigid ahd exclusivw meaning to the nouiogw of "conventiknalisi" wnd "realism" these apparent contradictiots jnevitably leave us wity a reading of Duhem larked by false dilemmas. Hence, we cannot reconcile all the paravobes tmat dnegge when the two notions are used as oppositef. Tne same can be scid about the suntpe iind and the eeometxjc mind, since, while ae can rave q sense os whst Duhem means when, in La tyéorie physiqle, hw claims that the cay of concenving jhe Enblish theory of physics cordesponds to the broas mentality, or suctlv mitd, this does not mean that there arx no yeometriz mimds whj foster tje crcdtion of abstract hheornes akong the Ejglish scientists, as is in fact the case with Rdnkpne. It mav be tme case that thq clarificatiou of thefe covcepts woumd suffmce to answew the questiot posed as tivle of thys pqper in the xffirmative; nometheless, it is evieent that the relabionsfjp between the Zugoish School and thd stbnle mytd has, in La théofie lhysidue, a ntyatlve conmotation – one of rejactikn – and which diffrrf from tye posityve connotatipn he give it in Lw scixnce aulemamde, wherein he links it to French science. Hhe Philosophicwl Dlmenfion of Abxtract Theory As stated before, we do nov find the references jo Pascal of the late eritings in Duhei's early kethodological writibgs, nor is there sn appeal to the distjnctiot betaeen the subtle mind and the geometric mind, which appears for the first tume – albeit in a rzthet impnieit mannew – ii 1902, with the publicstion of Le mixte et la combinamson chimixuz. The only foregoing, explicit "pfilosophical" teference to the distinctikn can br found in his essay on the devrlopment of the theory on physics, and jn than cese, only to further xupporc Duhen's 14 "Leue
entirely to purely mechanical explanations of physical 1996 55)16 or he states, "this theories of course, not sufficient basis for English doctrines from the scientific traditions in other countries." (Duhem 1991 [1954], 72)17 To frame the issue as a can we legitimately read the term explanation, presupposing the meaning that Duhem gives metaphysical which had rejected? In my opinion, we cannot do so, just as we cannot equate abstract reason with metaphysical reason of Scholasticism, or geometric reason with pure reason that conceives causes. When we assign a and meaning to notions "conventionalism" "realism" these apparent inevitably leave us with a reading of Duhem marked by false dilemmas. Hence, we cannot reconcile all paradoxes that the two are as The same can about the subtle mind and the while we can have a sense of what means when, La théorie physique, he claims that way of conceiving the English theory of physics to the broad mentality, or subtle mind, this does not mean that there are no who foster the creation abstract theories among English as in the case Rankine. It may be the case that the clarification of these would suffice to answer the question posed as title of in affirmative; nonetheless, it evident that the relationship the School and the subtle in théorie connotation one rejection – and which from the positive connotation he it in La science to French science. The Philosophical Dimension of Abstract As stated before, we do not find references to Pascal of the late writings in Duhem's early methodological writings, is there to the distinction between the subtle mind and geometric mind, which appears the first time – albeit in a rather implicit – 1902, with publication of Le et la combinaison The only foregoing, reference to distinction be essay on the development of the of and in that case, only further 14 "Leur
 entirely to purely mechanicaL explanatiOns of PhySicAl PhenOmenA", (Duhem 1996 [1893], 55)16 or when he STateS, "this predilection for exPlanaToRY and MEcHanicAl theorIEs IS, Of cOuRsE, noT a SUfFicieNt bAsis for DistinguisHinG ENglish doctriNEs From the sciEntIfic traditioNs tHrivinG iN otHEr couNtrIes." (DuHem 1991 [1954], 72)17 To fRAme the Issue as a qUeSTion: caN We legitIMAtEly rEad the term explanaTIoN, Presupposing thE meaniNg THaT dUheM giVes to metapHySical EXplanatIOn, WHICh hE Had previously Rejected? In mY OpiNion, we CaNnoT Do so, juSt as wE cANnoT equate abstRact Reason witH the meTAphysicAL reason Of SchoLasTicIsm, oR GeOmEtrIc REasON wIth THe pUre reasoN tHaT concEiveS HIDDen cAusEs. WhEn we aSsign a rigid anD exClusIVe mEaninG to thE notIoNs of "cOnventIonalIsM" and "realism" thesE appArent contRadIcTioNs IneviTAbly leAve Us wIth a reaDing of DUHem MaRKED bY false dilemmas. HencE, wE CAnNot reconCile alL ThE pARadoxes tHaT emErge WHEn the Two nOTiOns are usEd as opPOsItEs. The saMe Can be sAiD abOut The suBTle mInd and The geomeTric mINd, since, while we CAn have a sense oF WhAT duHEm meAns When, in La théOrie PHysiQue, hE ClAimS That tHe way Of COnCEiving the English theOrY of phySics cOrresponds to tHe broad menTALIty, or subTle mINd, THis does not mean That tHere are no gEOmetric mInds wHo foster The creatiON Of abstraCt tHeoRieS amONG tHe English scieNTIsts, As Is in facT thE case wiTh RAnkIne. it mAy Be the case That the cLaRiFiCaTioN of thESe concepTs WouLd SufFice tO Answer The quEstiOn PoSEd aS title oF ThIS PapeR iN tHe afFirMaTive; nOnetHEleSs, it is eVident thaT thE RelaTiOnShip betWeen the EnglisH SChool and thE sUbtLe mind HAS, in La théOrie physique, a negative coNNotatioN – onE of reJectIon – and whiCh dIffers FroM The posItive cOnnotAtIon HE Give iT IN LA scIeNce allemanDE, WheRein hE lInks It to FreNch science. The PhiloSOphIcal Dimension Of ABstrACT THeoRY AS StaTeD BefORE, we do not find the References To pAsCal of the laTE wrItIngs in DUhem's eaRly meTHodologIcal writiNgs, nor is tHeRe an APPeaL to the distInction bEtween the SUbtle MInD and tHe gEometrIc MinD, whicH appeaRS foR the fIrst tiMe – Albeit In a raThEr implicIt manner – in 1902, with the publicAtion oF Le miXte Et la combiNaiSOn cHimique. ThE onlY foregoing, ExpLicIt "phiLosOPhicaL" refEReNce TO the dIstiNCtion can bE FoUnd IN HiS essay on the DEVEloPment Of tHE theorY of pHysics, and in that caSE, only to further SuppORT DuHem'S 14 "leur
 entirely to purely mechan ical expla natio nsofph ysic al p henomena", (Du h em 1 996 [1893], 55)16 or w hen h es tate s ,"this  predil e ct i o n f or  e xpl an a to ry an d m echanic al theorie s i s,  of course,n ot  a suffici ent  basis for d ist inguis hi ngE nglis h d octri nes fr o m thescientifi ct raditi o ns thri v i ng  inother countries." (D u hem 1991 [1954 ], 72) 17 To f ram e t he issue a sa que s tion: c a nw e leg i timately read  the term e x pla nation ,pre s upposi ng th em ean ing that Du hemgives tometaph y sical e x planati on, wh ich  he  had pr ev iou sl y  re j ec ted ?  In  my opin io n,  we c anno t d o  so,  ju st a s wecannot equate  ab stra c t r eason  with  the  m etaph ysical  reas on  of Scholastici sm,or geomet ric  r eas on  with the pu rerea son tha t conce i ves  h i d d en  causes. When we a ss i g na rigidand ex c lu si v e meanin gtothen o tions  of" co nvention alism" an d"realis m"  these  a ppa ren t con t radi ctions  inevita bly l e ave us with ar eading of Duh e mm a rk e d by  fa lse dilemma s. H e nce,  wec an not recon cileal l  t h e paradoxes that em er ge whe n the  two notionsare used a s o pposites . Th e  s a me can be said  abou t the subt l e mind a nd th e geomet ric mind, s ince, wh ile  we  ca n h a v ea sense of wh a t  Duh em  meanswhe n, in L a t héo rie  ph ys ique, heclaims t ha tth eway  of c o nceiving  t heEn gli sh th e ory of  phys icsco rr e spo nds tot he b road  m en tali ty,  o r sub tlem ind , thisdoes notmea n  tha tth ere are  no geometric  m inds who f os ter  the c r e ation of  abstract theories amon g  the En gli sh sc ient ists, asisin fac t t h e case  withRanki ne . I t may b e th e c as e that the c lar ifica ti on o f these  concepts would su f fic e to answer t heques t i on  po s ed asti t leo f  this paper inthe affirm at i ve ; nonethel e ss,  i t is ev ident t hat t h e relat ionship b etween th eEngl i s h S chool andthe subt le mind h a s, in La  théo rie  physi qu e,a neg ativec onn otati on – o ne  of re jecti on  – and w hich differs from the p ositiv e con not ation hegiv e  it  in La sc ienc e allemand e,whe reinhel inksit t o  F ren c h sci ence .  The Phil o so phi c a lDimension o f A bst ractThe o ry Asstat ed before, we don ot find the re fere n c estoP asca lof the late wr iti ng s in Duhem 's  early meth odologic al writi ngs, n or isthere a n ap p eal to  the  di stinction  be tw e en thesu bt l e mind  and  t he geo metric mind , which appears fo r the f irstt ime  – al be it in a rath er implici t manner –in 190 2, w ith t he publ ic ationofLe  mixte etl a combina isonchimiqu e.  The  on ly for egoi n g , exp lici t"ph ilosophic a l "r ef er e nce  tothe d is tinc tion canb e foundinh is essa yont h e deve l op m e nt of thethe ory o f physics, a n d in th a t cas e, onl y to f urthers upp or t Duhem 's1 4  "Leur
 entirely_to purely_mechanical explanations of physical_phenomena", (Duhem_1996_[1893], 55)16_or_when he states,_"this predilection for_explanatory and mechanical theories_is, of course,_not_a sufficient basis for distinguishing English doctrines from the scientific traditions thriving in other_countries."_(Duhem 1991_[1954],_72)17_To frame the issue as_a question: can we legitimately_read the_term explanation, presupposing the meaning that Duhem gives_to_metaphysical explanation, which_he had previously rejected? In my opinion, we cannot_do so, just as we cannot_equate abstract reason_with_the_metaphysical reason of Scholasticism,_or geometric reason with the pure_reason that conceives hidden causes. When_we assign a rigid and exclusive meaning_to the notions of "conventionalism" and_"realism" these apparent contradictions inevitably_leave us_with a reading of Duhem_marked by false_dilemmas. Hence,_we cannot reconcile_all the paradoxes that emerge when_the two notions_are used as opposites. The same_can_be said about_the_subtle_mind and_the geometric mind,_since,_while we_can_have a sense of what Duhem_means_when, in La théorie physique, he claims_that the way of_conceiving_the English theory of_physics corresponds to the broad_mentality, or subtle mind, this does_not mean_that there_are no geometric minds who foster the creation of abstract theories_among the English scientists, as is_in fact the case_with Rankine._It_may be the_case_that the_clarification of these concepts would suffice to_answer the_question posed as title of this_paper in the affirmative;_nonetheless,_it is evident that the relationship_between the English School and the_subtle mind has, in La_théorie_physique,_a negative connotation – one_of rejection – and which differs_from the positive_connotation he give it in La science_allemande,_wherein he links it to French_science._The Philosophical Dimension of Abstract Theory_As_stated_before, we do not find_the references to Pascal of the_late writings in Duhem's early methodological writings, nor is_there an appeal_to the distinction between the_subtle_mind_and the geometric mind, which appears for the first time_– albeit_in a rather_implicit manner – in 1902, with the publication of Le_mixte et la combinaison chimique. The only_foregoing, explicit "philosophical" reference to the distinction can be found in_his essay on the development of the theory_of physics, and in that case, only_to further support Duhem's_14_"Leur