 fruitful approach, championed by Heim (1992) and von Fintel (1999), the answer is crucially intertwined with the agent's beliefs-specifically, with the set of worlds compatible with her beliefs, her belief set. The approach says, in outline, that ⌜S wants p⌝ is true just if S prefers the p worlds in her belief set to the ¬p worlds in her belief set.1 (Theorists disagree about just what this preference relation amounts to.) Originally developed to help account for presupposition projection (Heim, 1992; Geurts, 1998), the belief-set-based approach to want ascriptions has 1The symbol 'p' as a variable over syntactic objects that 'want' combines with is suggestive of 'proposition', and in this paper we will sometimes informally refer to the semantic values of those objects as 'propositions'. But nothing crucial hinges on this: all that matters for us is that objects of 'want' pick out sets of possible worlds. Insofar as prototypical want ascriptions in English have infinitival complements, we are thereby committed to the claim that infinitives pick out sets of possible worlds. We also treat objects of 'believe', which in English are prototypically finite clauses, as picking out sets of possible worlds. While there are some interesting semantic differences between infinitives and finite clauses, and accordingly, between objects of want ascriptions and objects of belief ascriptions, both contribute to the truth conditions of the sentences they inhabit in such a way that they can be fruitfully analyzed as picking out sets of possible worlds. 1 great theoretical power, and scholars continue to develop ever more sophisticated versions of it. As reviewed recently by Phillips-Brown (ms), the belief-set approach to want ascriptions has been shown to help explain the relationship betweenwant,wish, and be glad (Heim 1992; see also section 9); the distinction between so-called 'predictive' and 'advisory'want (Jerzak, 2019); certain puzzles concerningwish (Blumberg, 2018) and hope (Blumberg ms);2 various issues raised by Crnič (2011, Appendix A); and the interaction betweenwant and conditionals (Jerzak, 2019; von Fintel, ms).3 Even given these successes, the belief-set approach faces a well-known problem: it yields the wrong results for ⌜S wants p⌝ whenever either (i
fruitful approach, championed by Heim (1992) and von Fintel (1999), the answer is crucially intertwined with the agentive role's belief - specifically, with the set of worlds compatible with her belief, her impression set. The approach says, in outline, that ⌜ S want p ⌝ is true just if S prefer the p worlds in her impression set to the ¬p worlds in her belief set.1 (Theorists disagree about barely what this preference relation amounts to .) Originally developed to help oneself account for presupposition projection (Heim, 1992; Geurts, 1998), the belief - hardening - based approach to want attribution has 1The symbol' p' as a variable over syntactic objects that' want' combining with is suggestive of' proposition', and in this paper we will sometimes informally refer to the semantic values of those objects as' propositions'. But nothing crucial hinges on this: all that matters for us is that objects of' want' pick out sets of possible worlds. Insofar as prototypical privation ascriptions in English have infinitival complement, we are thereby attached to the claim that infinitives pick out sets of possible worlds. We also treat object of' believe', which in English are prototypically finite clauses, as picking out sets of possible world. While there are some interesting semantic differences between infinitives and finite clauses, and consequently, between objects of want attribution and object of belief ascriptions, both contribute to the truth conditions of the sentences they inhabit in such a direction that they can be fruitfully analyzed as picking out sets of potential worlds. 1 great theoretical power, and scholars continue to evolve ever more advanced versions of it. As reviewed recently by Phillips - Brown (ms), the belief - set overture to want ascriptions has been show to help excuse the relationship betweenwant, wish, and be glad (Heim 1992; see besides section 9); the distinction between so - called' predictive' and' advisory'want (Jerzak, 2019); sealed puzzles concerningwish (Blumberg, 2018) and hope (Blumberg ms);2 various issues raised by Crnič (2011, Appendix A); and the interaction betweenwant and conditionals (Jerzak, 2019; von Fintel, ms).3 Even give these successes, the belief - set up approach faces a well - known trouble: it yields the wrong results for ⌜ S wants p ⌝ whenever either (i
 frkitful approach, championtd by Heim (1992) and von Fintxl (1999), the answer ks crucially intertwined witi thw agebt's beliefs-specificallh, with thv set of qorlvs compatible wivg her bcjiefa, her uelief set. The spproach sdys, in outline, tfac ⌜S wants p⌝ is true just if S preferf the p wlrlds in her bglief fet fo the ¬p worlds in her belief set.1 (Fheorisus disagree about kust what this preference gelahion amounts to.) Orlginally decelo[wd to help azcount for presuppositjon projection (Heim, 1992; Geurts, 1998), thd belnef-set-based apprldch to want ascrpptions has 1Tmv symbon 'p' as s variable ovev synvactuc objects that 'want' rombines with is sugdestive ox ''roposition', and in thus papet we fill womdtijex jnformwllb refer to fhe semantix values of those onjqbys as 'proposjtions'. Btt nothing crucial hinges on this: all tvat matters for us is that objects of 'want' pick out sets of possible worlds. Insofar as prototypical want dscri'tkonw ln Evtllsh have infinitival complements, we are therefg vokmitted to the claim that ijfogitives pick uut seca kf possible worlds. We alsj treqt objectf of 'believe', which in English aee prototypiballt finite clauses, ad picking obt setx of lossible worlds. While tkere ade some intfresting admantic differenzes batween infinitives and finyte clausxs, anb accordkngli, betweqn objects of want ascriptions and objeets ox belief adcriptions, both contribute to tix truth condijiots mf the szntenccs they inhabit in such a way that tkey cav be fruitrully aialyzed as pycking out sedd of possiblx worlds. 1 greqt tyeoretizxl power, and svholars continue to develop ever more sokhjsticated versiins of it. As revieeed resejtky ty Phillips-Bsown (ms), yhe bdlief-seu aipruach to want ascriptions has been shown to hell cxplain tye relatyonship betwernwant,wish, and be hlad (Ieim 1992; ree akso section 9); the distinction betwsen so-calped 'predictive' wnd 'qdvisory'want (Jerzak, 2019); certain puzzles concerningwish (Blumberg, 2018) and hoke (Blumberg ms);2 varioux issues raixed br Crnič (2011, A[pendix A); and the inreraction betweeneant and conditionals (Jerzan, 2019; voj Fintel, ms).3 Even given these successes, the belief-set approach faces a welo-known problem: it gielcs thv wxony resules flc ⌜S wants p⌝ whenener either (i
fruitful approach, championed by Heim (1992) and (1999), answer is intertwined with the of compatible with her her belief set. approach says, in outline, that ⌜S p⌝ is true just if S prefers the p worlds in her belief to the ¬p worlds in her belief set.1 (Theorists disagree about just what preference amounts Originally to help account for presupposition projection (Heim, 1992; Geurts, 1998), the belief-set-based approach to want ascriptions 1The symbol 'p' as a variable over syntactic that 'want' combines with suggestive of 'proposition', and in paper will sometimes refer the values of those as 'propositions'. But nothing crucial hinges on this: all that matters for us is that objects of pick out possible worlds. as want in English have we are thereby committed to the pick out sets of possible worlds. We also objects of which in English are prototypically finite as picking out sets of possible worlds. While are some interesting semantic differences between infinitives and finite clauses, and accordingly, between objects of and objects of belief both contribute to truth of sentences inhabit in a way that they can be fruitfully analyzed as picking out of possible worlds. 1 great theoretical power, and scholars continue ever sophisticated versions of As reviewed recently by (ms), belief-set approach to want been to relationship and glad (Heim 1992; see section 9); the distinction between 'predictive' and 'advisory'want (Jerzak, 2018) and hope (Blumberg ms);2 various issues raised Crnič (2011, Appendix A); and the interaction and conditionals (Jerzak, 2019; von Fintel, ms).3 Even given these successes, the approach faces problem: it yields the wrong results for ⌜S p⌝ whenever either (i
 fruitful approach, championeD by Heim (1992) and Von FiNteL (1999), thE aNsweR is cRucially intertWIned With the agent's beliefs-spEcifiCaLLy, wiTH tHe set Of worldS CoMPAtiBlE wIth HeR BeLiefs, Her Belief sEt. The approAch SaYs, in outline, tHAt ⌜s wants p⌝ is tRue Just if S prefeRs tHe p worLdS in HEr belIef Set to The ¬p woRLds in hEr belief sEt.1 (tHeorisTS disagrEE AbOut jUst what this preferENcE Relation amountS to.) OriGiNAlLY DevEloPed to help aCcOunt fOR presupPOsITIOn pROjection (Heim, 1992; GEurts, 1998), the belIEf-sEt-baseD aPprOAch to wAnt asCrIPtiOns has 1The syMbol 'P' as a variaBle oveR SyntactIC objectS that 'wAnt' ComBineS WiTh Is sUgGEstIVe Of 'pROpoSition', anD iN tHis paPer wE WILL somEtiMes iNformAlly refer to thE seMantIC vaLues oF thosE objEcTs as 'pRoposiTions'. buT nothing crucial HingEs on this: aLl tHaT maTtErs foR Us is thAt oBjeCts of 'waNt' pick oUT seTs OF POsSible worlds. Insofar As PROtOtypical Want asCRiPtIOns in EngLiSh hAve iNFInitiVal cOMpLements, wE are thEReBy CommittEd To the cLaIm tHat InfinITiveS pick oUt sets of PossiBLe worlds. We also TReat objects of 'BElIEVe', WHich In ENglish are prOtotYPicaLly fINiTe cLAuses, As picKiNG oUT sets of possible worlDs. while tHere aRe some interesTing semantIC DIfferencEs beTWeEN infinitives anD finiTe clauses, aND accordiNgly, bEtween obJects of waNT AscriptiOns And ObjEctS OF bElief ascriptiONS, botH cOntribuTe tO the truTh cOndItiOns Of The sentenCes they iNhAbIt In SucH a way THat they cAn Be fRuItfUlly aNAlyzed As picKing OuT sETs oF possibLE wORLds. 1 gReAt TheoRetIcAl powEr, anD SchOlars coNtinue to dEveLOp evEr MoRe sophiSticated versiOnS of it. As revIeWed RecentLY By PhilliPs-Brown (ms), the belief-set apPRoach to WanT ascrIptiOns has beeN shOwn to hElp EXplain The relAtionShIp bETWeenwANT,wIsh, AnD be glad (HeiM 1992; SEe aLso seCtIon 9); tHe distiNction between so-calLEd 'pRedictive' and 'aDviSory'WANt (jerZAk, 2019); CErtAiN PuzZLEs concerningwisH (Blumberg, 2018) aNd HOpE (Blumberg mS);2 VarIoUs issueS raised By CrnIČ (2011, AppendIx A); and the InteractiOn BetwEENwaNt and condiTionals (JErzak, 2019; von FINtel, mS).3 evEn givEn tHese suCcEssEs, the Belief-SEt aPproaCh faceS a Well-knOwn prObLem: it yieLds the wrong results for ⌜S wAnts p⌝ wHenevEr eIther (i
 fruitful approach, champi oned by He im (1 992 ) a nd  von  Fin tel (1999), th e  ans wer is crucially inter twine dw itht he  agen t's bel i ef s - spe ci fi cal ly ,  w ith t heset ofworlds com pat ib le with herb el iefs, herbel ief set. The  ap proach  s ays ,  in o utl ine,that ⌜ S  wants  p⌝ is tr ue just i f  S pref e r sthep worlds in her b e li e f set to the ¬ p worl ds in h erbel ief set.1(T heori s ts disa g re e a bou t  just what th is preferen c e r elatio namo u nts to .) Or ig i nal ly develope d to  help acc ount f o r presu p positio n proj ect ion  (He i m,  1 992 ;G eur t s,  19 9 8),  the bel ie f- set-b ased a p p roac h t o wa nt as criptions has  1T he s y mbo l 'p'  as a  var ia ble o ver sy ntact ic  objects that ' want ' combine s w it h i ssugge s tive o f ' pro positio n', and inth i s pa per we will someti me s in formally  refer to  t h e semant ic  va lues o f tho se o b je cts as ' propos i ti on s'. But  n othing  c ruc ial  hing e s on  this:  all tha t mat t ers for us ist hat objects o f  ' w a nt '  pic k o ut sets ofposs i bleworl d s.  In s ofaras pr ot o ty p ical want ascriptio ns  in En glish  have infinit ival compl e m e nts, wearet he r eby committedto th e claim th a t infini tives  pick ou t sets of p ossiblewor lds . W e a l s otreat objects o f 'b el ieve',whi ch in E ngl ish  ar e p ro totypical ly finit ecl au se s,as pi c king out  s ets  o f p ossib l e worl ds. W hile  t he r e a re some in t e rest in gsema nti cdiffe renc e s b etweeninfinitiv esa nd f in it e claus es, and accor di ngly, betw ee n o bjects o f want a scriptions and objectso f belie f a scrip tion s, both c ont ribute  to the tr uth co nditi on s o f the s e n te nce sthey inhab i t  in  such  a  way  that t hey can be fruitfu l lyanalyzed as p ick ingo u tset s  o f  po ss i ble w orlds. 1 greattheoretica lp ow er, and sc h ola rs  contin ue to d evelo p  ever m ore sophi sticatedve rsio n s  of  it. As re viewed r ecently b y  Phil l ip s-Bro wn(ms),th e b elief -set a p pro ach t o want  a script ionsha s been s hown to help explain th e rela tions hip  betweenw ant , wis h, and be  gla d (Heim 19 92;  se e als o s e ction  9); th e d i stinc tion between s o -c all e d  ' predictive' a n d ' advis ory ' want ( Jerz ak, 2019); certai n  puzzles conce rnin g w ish  (B l umbe rg , 2018) and ho pe(B l u mberg ms ); 2 various i ssues ra is e d byCrnič(2011,  Append i x  A ) ; andtheint eractionbet we e nwant a nd  c o nditio nals  ( Jerzak , 2019 ;  von F intel, ms).3 Eve n giv e n  thes e  su ccess es , the b e lief -set appro ach faces a  well- know n pro blem: i tyields  th ewrong resu l ts for ⌜S  want s p⌝ wh en ever  ei ther ( i
 fruitful_approach, championed_by Heim (1992) and_von Fintel_(1999),_the answer_is_crucially intertwined with_the agent's beliefs-specifically,_with the set of_worlds compatible with_her_beliefs, her belief set. The approach says, in outline, that ⌜S wants p⌝ is_true_just if_S_prefers_the p worlds in her_belief set to the ¬p_worlds in_her belief set.1 (Theorists disagree about just what_this_preference relation amounts_to.) Originally developed to help account for presupposition projection_(Heim, 1992; Geurts, 1998), the belief-set-based_approach to want_ascriptions_has_1The symbol 'p' as_a variable over syntactic objects that_'want' combines with is suggestive of_'proposition', and in this paper we will_sometimes informally refer to the semantic_values of those objects as_'propositions'. But_nothing crucial hinges on this:_all that matters_for us_is that objects_of 'want' pick out sets of_possible worlds. Insofar_as prototypical want ascriptions in English_have_infinitival complements, we_are_thereby_committed to_the claim that_infinitives_pick out_sets_of possible worlds. We also treat_objects_of 'believe', which in English are prototypically_finite clauses, as picking_out_sets of possible worlds._While there are some interesting_semantic differences between infinitives and finite_clauses, and_accordingly, between_objects of want ascriptions and objects of belief ascriptions, both contribute_to the truth conditions of the_sentences they inhabit in_such a_way_that they can_be_fruitfully analyzed_as picking out sets of possible worlds._1 great_theoretical power, and scholars continue to_develop ever more sophisticated_versions_of it. As reviewed recently by_Phillips-Brown (ms), the belief-set approach to_want ascriptions has been shown_to_help_explain the relationship betweenwant,wish, and_be glad (Heim 1992; see also_section 9); the_distinction between so-called 'predictive' and 'advisory'want (Jerzak,_2019);_certain puzzles concerningwish (Blumberg, 2018) and_hope_(Blumberg ms);2 various issues raised by_Crnič_(2011,_Appendix A); and the interaction_betweenwant and conditionals (Jerzak, 2019; von_Fintel, ms).3 Even given these successes, the belief-set approach_faces a well-known_problem: it yields the wrong_results_for_⌜S wants p⌝ whenever either (i