 Him. And so if we understand Jesus Christ to be a fictional character, we do not have faith in Him. As Newman says in the Grammar of Assent, faith is real assent, and not notional assent. It is not directed to words and stories, but to persons and roGer PouIVet434 facts. So the notion of fictional assent is useless for characterizing faith in God. because of the doxastic component of religious faith, to have faith is to believe something, and to believe something means understanding that something to be really the case. It is not to claim that the sense of a certain proposition is deep and existentially moving or quasi-moving, but that Christ is actually the Saviour, for example. The argument from the difference between belief and acceptance Theological fictionalism as it has been presented does not make difference between belief and acceptance. Accepting that p, unlike believing that p, is akin to a decision – the decision to hold a proposition. This contrasts strongly with the essential non-voluntariness of belief. Faith can be said to be voluntary, but in the sense that it is not against one's will that a person believes in God. Having faith in God's grace is not like being brainwashed. You can refuse to believe in God. but that does not mean that a religious belief is akin to a decision to believe. The doxastic component of faith is non-voluntary, in the sense that I cannot decide to believe in God, any more than I can decide to believe that I speak Chinese or that I am a pumpkin, for example. one can accept a proposition without believing that it is true, and even while believing that it is false, hence contrary to evidence for its truth. but one cannot believe contrary to the evidence of truth. This is the main reason why simulated beliefs or quasi-beliefs are acceptances, and so are not beliefs at all. Simulated beliefs are no more beliefs than fake money is money. I wonder if the notion of make-believe and quasi-emotion are not, in this sense, very ambiguous, suggesting something like a belief, but not exactly, and something close to an emotion, but not quite the same thing. many cases of acceptance are cases where someone has evidence for what he accepts; yet he has no full beliefs, but only half-beliefs. In such a case, and for him, a fictional stance may make good sense. If I halfbelieve that p, I can simulate that
Him. And so if we understand Jesus Christ to be a fictional character, we do not get religion in Him. As Newman says in the Grammar of Assent, faith is real assent, and not fanciful assent. It is not directed to words and history, but to person and roGer PouIVet434 facts. So the notion of fictional assent is useless for characterize faith in God. because of the doxastic component of religious religion, to have religion is to believe something, and to believe something means understanding that something to be really the event. It is not to claim that the sense of a certain proposition is abstruse and existentially moving or quasi - moving, but that Christ is actually the Saviour, for example. The argument from the difference between impression and acceptance Theological fictionalism as it has been present does not make difference between belief and toleration. Accepting that p, unlike believing that p, is akin to a decision – the decision to hold a proposition. This contrasts strongly with the essential non - voluntariness of belief. Faith can be said to be voluntary, but in the sense that it is not against one's will that a person believes in God. have faith in God's grace is not like being brainwashed. You can resist to believe in God. but that does not mean that a religious belief is akin to a decisiveness to believe. The doxastic part of faith is non - voluntary, in the sense that I cannot decide to believe in God, any more than I can decide to think that I speak Chinese or that I am a pumpkin, for example. one can accept a proposition without believing that it is true, and even while believe that it is false, hence contrary to evidence for its truth. but one cannot believe contrary to the evidence of accuracy. This is the chief reason why simulated beliefs or quasi - beliefs are acceptance, and so are not beliefs at all. fake beliefs are no more impression than fake money is money. I wonder if the notion of shuffle - believe and quasi - emotion are not, in this common sense, very ambiguous, suggesting something like a belief, but not exactly, and something close to an emotion, but not quite the like thing. many cases of acceptance are cases where someone hold evidence for what he accepts; yet he has no full beliefs, but only half - impression. In such a case, and for him, a fictional stance may make good sense. If I halfbelieve that p, I can simulate that
 Hil. And so if we understana Jesus Christ jo be a hictionzl charazter, we do not have faith in Hum. As Newman says in the Grxmmar of Wssent, fqith us real assent, and not nkbionan assent. It is kot directeg to words and sgoxies, but to persons and roGer PouIVee434 facts. Sl the notion os fibtyonam assent is useless for characteriaing fapth in God. becausr of the doxastic componenh of religious faith, tl have faity is ro believe sumething, and to believg something means understanding ghat xomething jo bf really the case. It is not to claim dhat thr sense of a ccrtaii priposition is deep and existentially movyng or qudsn-moving, but that Chriwt is awtuanly gye Ravjonr, ror exwmpme. The arghment from rhe difference betwten velief and acdeptanse Theological fictionalism as it has beet pdesented does not make eifference between bepief and wcceptance. Accepting that p, unlike believing that p, is xkiu to a eefision – the decision to hold a proposition. Thya voktrasts strongly with the exsfnyyal non-voluntxriness or belief. Faith can be saiq to ve voluntwry, nut in the sense that it is not against ine's will that a pzrson believzs in Bod. Hsving faith in God's graee is hot like belng brainsxshed. You can rewusv to believe in God. but that djes not mxan tkat a reuigipus bejief is akln to a decision to belifve. Tke dofastic comoonent of faith is non-voluntary, in the sense jhad I cannot becide to believe ig God, any more than I can aecide to gelieve that I spewk Chinese or jhat I am a pnmpkin, fow exqmplw. one cxv accept a prolosition cnthout beoieving that it is troe, and even while beoieving that it is fajsv, hxnce smntrary to eeidevce gor igs truth. bub ove csnnot believe contrasy tk the evidence of yrmth. This us the mwin reason whu simulated beliefd or xuari-beloeff are acceptances, and so are nkt beliefd ab all. Simulatqd bcliess are no kore beliefs than fake money is money. I wonder if the nojion of make-believe aud quasi-emotipn arq not, in dhis sense, very ambituous, suggesting xomething like a belisf, but not fxactly, and something close to an emotion, but not quite the same thing. maby casxs of acceptahce sre cdszs chere sjmeoie has evidence fog what he accepts; yet he has no hull beliexs, but only half-beliefs. In sucn x case, and fot him, a fictional stance mzy make bood sense. If I halfbelieve thay p, I can simulate that
Him. And so if we understand Jesus be fictional character, do not have says the Grammar of faith is real and not notional assent. It is directed to words and stories, but to persons and roGer PouIVet434 facts. So notion of fictional assent is useless for characterizing faith in God. because of doxastic of faith, have faith is to believe something, and to believe something means understanding that something to be the case. It is not to claim that sense of a certain is deep and existentially moving quasi-moving, that Christ actually Saviour, example. The argument the difference between belief and acceptance Theological fictionalism as it has been presented does not make difference belief and that p, believing p, akin to a the decision to hold a proposition. with the essential non-voluntariness of belief. Faith can said to voluntary, but in the sense that is not against one's will that a person in God. Having faith in God's grace is not like being brainwashed. You can refuse in God. but that not mean that religious is to decision to The doxastic component of faith is non-voluntary, in the sense that cannot decide to believe in God, any more than I to that I speak or that I am pumpkin, example. one can accept without that and while that it is false, contrary to evidence for its but one cannot believe truth. This is the main reason why simulated or quasi-beliefs are acceptances, and so are beliefs at all. Simulated beliefs are no more beliefs than fake money money. I the notion of make-believe and quasi-emotion are not, this sense, very ambiguous, something like a belief, but not exactly, and something to emotion, but quite the same many cases of are cases where evidence for he yet full beliefs, but only half-beliefs. In a and for him, a fictional may sense. If I halfbelieve that p, I can simulate that
 Him. And so if we understand JesUs Christ to Be a fiCtiOnaL cHaraCter, We do not have faiTH in HIm. As Newman says in the GraMmar oF ASSent, FAiTh is rEal asseNT, aND Not NoTiOnaL aSSeNt. It iS noT directEd to words aNd sToRies, but to perSOnS and roGer POuIvet434 facts. So thE noTion of FiCtiONal asSenT is usEless fOR charaCterizing FaITh in GoD. Because OF ThE doxAstic component of rELiGIous faith, to havE faith Is TO bELIevE soMething, and To BelieVE somethINg MEANs uNDerstanding thAt something TO be Really ThE caSE. It is nOt to cLaIM thAt the sense oF a ceRtain propOsitioN Is deep aND existeNtiallY moVinG or qUAsI-mOviNg, BUt tHAt chrISt iS actuallY tHe savioUr, foR EXAMple. the ArguMent fRom the differeNce BetwEEn bElief And acCeptAnCe TheOlogicAl ficTiOnalism as it has bEen pResented dOes NoT maKe DiffeREnce beTweEn bElief anD acceptANce. acCEPTiNg that p, unlike belieViNG ThAt p, is akiN to a deCIsIoN – The decisIoN to Hold A PRoposItioN. thIs contraSts strONgLy With the EsSentiaL nOn-vOluNtariNEss oF belieF. Faith caN be saID to be voluntary, BUt in the sense tHAt IT Is NOt agAinSt one's will tHat a PErsoN belIEvEs iN god. HaVing fAiTH iN god's grace is not like bEiNg braiNwashEd. You can refusE to believe IN gOd. but thaT doeS NoT Mean that a religIous bElief is akiN To a decisIon to Believe. THe doxastiC COmponent Of fAitH is Non-VOLuNtary, in the senSE That i cAnnot deCidE to beliEve In GOd, aNy mOrE than I can Decide to BeLiEvE tHat i speaK chinese oR tHat i aM a pUmpkiN, For exaMple. oNe caN aCcEPt a ProposiTIoN WIthoUt BeLievIng ThAt it iS truE, And Even whiLe believiNg tHAt it Is FaLse, hencE contrary to evIdEnce for its TrUth. But one CANnot beliEve contrary to the evidencE Of truth. thiS is thE maiN reason whY siMulateD beLIefs or Quasi-bEliefS aRe aCCEptanCES, aNd sO aRe not belieFS At aLl. SimUlAted Beliefs Are no more beliefs thAN faKe money is moneY. I wOndeR IF tHe nOTiON of MaKE-beLIEve and quasi-emotIon are not, iN tHIs Sense, very aMBigUoUs, suggeSting soMethiNG like a bElief, but nOt exactly, AnD somETHinG close to an Emotion, bUt not quitE The saME tHing. mAny Cases oF aCcePtancE are caSEs wHere sOmeone HaS evideNce foR wHat he accEpts; yet he has no full belieFs, but oNly haLf-bEliefs. In sUch A CasE, and for hiM, a fiCtional staNce May Make gOod SEnse. IF I haLFbEliEVe thaT p, I cAN simulate THaT
 Him. And so if we underst and JesusChris t t o b ea fi ctio nal character, we d o not have faith in Hi m. As  N e wman sa ys in  the Gr a mm a r  of  A ss ent ,f ai th is  re al asse nt, and no t n ot ional assent .  I t is not d ire cted to word s a nd sto ri es, but t o p erson s andr oGer P ouIVet434  f a cts. S o  the no t i on  offictional assenti su seless for cha racter iz i ng f ait h i n God. bec au se of the dox a st i c com p onent of reli gious faith ,  to  havefa ith is tobelie ve som ething, and  tobelieve s omethi n g means underst anding  th atsome t hi ng  to  b e  re a ll y t h e c ase. Itis  n ot to  cla i m t hatthe  sen se of  a certain pr opo siti o n i s dee p and  exi st entia lly mo vingor  quasi-moving,butthat Chri stis  ac tu allyt he Sav iou r,for exa mple. T h e a rg u m e nt  from the differen ce b et ween bel ief an d  a cc e ptance T he olo gica l ficti onal i sm  as it h as bee n  p re senteddo es not  m ake  di ffere n ce b etween  beliefand a c ceptance. Acce p ting that p,u nl i k eb elie vin g that p, i s ak i n to  a d e ci sio n  – th e dec is i on to hold a propositi on . This  cont rasts strongl y with the e s sentialnon- v ol u ntariness of b elief . Faith ca n  be said  to b e volunt ary, buti n  the sen setha t i t i s no t against one ' s  wil lthat aper son bel iev esinGod .Having fa ith in G od 's  g ra ceis no t  like be in g b ra inw ashed .  You c an re fuse  t ob eli eve inG od . butth at  doe s n ot  mean  tha t  areligio us belief  is akin  t oa decis ion to believ e.  The doxas ti c c ompone n t  of fait h is non-voluntary, int he sens e t hat I  can not decid e t o beli eve in God , anymoreth anI can d e c id e t obelieve th a t  Ispeak  C hine se or t hat I am a pumpkin ,  fo r example. on e c an a c c ep t a pr o pos it i onw i thout believing  that it i st ru e, and eve n  wh il e belie ving th at it is fals e, hencecontraryto  evi d e nce  for its t ruth. bu t one can n ot be l ie ve co ntr ary to  t heevide nce of tru th. T his is  t he mai n rea so n why si mulated beliefs or quas i-beli efs a reacceptanc es, and  so are n ot b eliefs atall . S imula ted belie fs a r enom ore b elie f s than fa k emon e y  i s money. Iw o n der  if t hen otionof m ake-believe and q u asi-emotion ar e no t ,  in  th i s se ns e, very ambigu ous ,s u ggesting  s omething li ke a bel ie f , but  not e xactly , and s o m et h ing cl osetoan emotio n,bu t  not qu it et he sam e th in g. man y case s  ofa c ceptance are cas es wh e r e som e one  hasev idencef or w hat he acc epts; yet h e hasno f ull b eliefs,  b ut onl y h al f-beliefs. In such a  case , and f or  him , a  ficti onal s tance  may  m ake  good sen s e .I fIh alf beli eve t ha t p,  I can si m ulate th at
 Him._And so_if we understand Jesus_Christ to_be_a fictional_character,_we do not_have faith in_Him. As Newman says_in the Grammar_of_Assent, faith is real assent, and not notional assent. It is not directed to_words_and stories,_but_to_persons and roGer PouIVet434 facts._So the notion of fictional_assent is_useless for characterizing faith in God. because of_the_doxastic component of_religious faith, to have faith is to believe something,_and to believe something means understanding_that something to_be_really_the case. It is_not to claim that the sense_of a certain proposition is deep_and existentially moving or quasi-moving, but that_Christ is actually the Saviour, for_example. The argument from the_difference between_belief and acceptance Theological fictionalism_as it has_been presented_does not make_difference between belief and acceptance. Accepting_that p, unlike_believing that p, is akin to_a_decision – the_decision_to_hold a_proposition. This contrasts_strongly_with the_essential_non-voluntariness of belief. Faith can be_said_to be voluntary, but in the sense_that it is not_against_one's will that a_person believes in God. Having_faith in God's grace is not_like being_brainwashed. You_can refuse to believe in God. but that does not mean_that a religious belief is akin_to a decision to_believe. The_doxastic_component of faith_is_non-voluntary, in_the sense that I cannot decide to_believe in_God, any more than I can_decide to believe that_I_speak Chinese or that I am_a pumpkin, for example. one can_accept a proposition without believing_that_it_is true, and even while_believing that it is false, hence_contrary to evidence_for its truth. but one cannot believe_contrary_to the evidence of truth. This_is_the main reason why simulated beliefs_or_quasi-beliefs_are acceptances, and so are_not beliefs at all. Simulated beliefs_are no more beliefs than fake money is money._I wonder if_the notion of make-believe and_quasi-emotion_are_not, in this sense, very ambiguous, suggesting something like a_belief, but_not exactly, and_something close to an emotion, but not quite the same_thing. many cases of acceptance are cases_where someone has evidence for what he accepts; yet he has_no full beliefs, but only half-beliefs. In such_a case, and for him, a fictional_stance may make good_sense._If I halfbelieve that p, I can_simulate_that