, whatever follows upon potentiality and act, as such, is common to both material and immaterial created substances, as to receive and to be received, to perfect and to be perfected. Yet all that is proper to matter and form, as such, as to be generated and to be corrupted, and the like, are proper to material substances, and in no way belong to immaterial created substances (Aquinas, 1975: p. 185). The potency-act demonstration structure has a more noteworthy augmentation than the matter-form arrangement. The matter-form organization runs just through material substances. The intensity demonstration piece reaches out to immaterial made substances also. Aquinas distinguishes these components. there is in [intellectual and immaterial] substances but one composition of act and potentiality, namely, the composition of substance and be [substantia et esse], which by some is said to be of that which is [quod est] and being [esse], or of that which is and that by which a thing is. On other hand, in substances composed of matter and form there is a twofold composition of act and potentiality: the first, of the substance itself which is composed of matter and form; the second, of the substance thus composed, and being; and this composition also can be said to be of that which is and being, or of that which is and that by which a thing is (Aquinas, 1975: p. 157). The potency-act demonstration arrangement is normal to both material and immaterial things is the substance-being (esse) organization. Substance and being are coherence that in turn include another intelligibity-that of ens commune itself. In this content, the immateriality of ens lies particularly in its substantia segment. Ens is immaterial in light of the fact that substantia can be acknowledged as a matter-form composition or as a form itself subsisting. In either case, notwithstanding, substantia is still made with esse. From the above, Aquinas depicts ens commune as an inmaterial shared trait as well as a composite shared trait. Ens commune is (1) a shared trait ready to be acknowledged separated from matter and additionally inside matter and (2) a shared characteristic made out of two standards, substance and esse. Duns Scotus in his view of substance is, defines it that: Substance is proper to whatever it is substance of; nothing is contrary to it; it does not inhere; it is the primary being; it is
, whatever follows upon potentiality and act, as such, is common to both material and incorporeal create substances, as to receive and to be received, to perfect and to be perfect. Yet all that is proper to matter and form, as such, as to be generate and to be corrupted, and the like, are proper to corporeal substances, and in no way belong to to immaterial created substances (Aquinas, 1975: p. 185). The potency - act presentation structure has a more noteworthy augmentation than the topic - form musical arrangement. The matter - kind organization runs just through substantial substances. The intensity demonstration piece reach out to immaterial made substances also. Aquinas distinguishes these component. there is in [ intellectual and immaterial ] substances but one composition of act and potentiality, namely, the composition of substance and be [ substantia et esse ], which by some is said to be of that which is [ quod est ] and being [ esse ], or of that which is and that by which a thing is. On other hand, in substances composed of matter and form there is a double composition of act and potentiality: the beginning, of the means itself which is composed of matter and form; the second, of the means thus composed, and being; and this composition also can be say to be of that which is and being, or of that which is and that by which a thing is (Aquinas, 1975: p. 157). The potency - act demonstration arrangement is normal to both material and immaterial thing is the substance - being (esse) organization. Substance and being are coherence that in turn include another intelligibity - that of ens commune itself. In this content, the immateriality of ens lie particularly in its substantia segment. Ens is immaterial in light of the fact that substantia can be acknowledged as a topic - form composition or as a form itself subsisting. In either case, notwithstanding, substantia is still made with esse. From the above, Aquinas depicts ens commune as an inmaterial share trait as well as a composite partake trait. Ens commune is (1) a share trait ready to be admit separated from matter and additionally inside topic and (2) a shared characteristic make out of two standards, substance and esse. Duns Scotus in his scene of substance is, specify it that: Substance is proper to whatever it is meaning of; nothing is contrary to it; it does not inhere; it is the primary being; it is
, whwtever follows upon potektiality and act, as suci, is cojmon to coth material and immaterial ceeatee substances, as to recdive and no be recwivev, to perfect and to be pcxfectsf. Yec ell that is proker to mattes and form, as vuzh, as to be generated and to be corru[ted, anc hhe like, are ptoper eo mznevial substances, and in no way bemong to immaterial cteated substances (Aquinas, 1975: p. 185). Hhe potency-act demlnstration wtrusrure has a mure notewogchy augmentztion than the matter-form arraneemenc. The mattet-yirm mrganizatioi runs just througm materhal subxtances. The inbensivy dwmonstration piece reeches out to immateryal made vuystances also. Aquinas dustincuisves gyesd ckm'onsnts. tjerx is in [intsllectual abd immaterial] substsnsvx but one cojposityog of act and potentiality, namely, the cokpoaition of substance and be [substantia et essg], which by some is said to be of that which is [quod est] and beinj [dsst], ir of rhwt which is and that by which a thing is. On oeget mand, in substanccs composed of matyeg sgd form there is a csorold composition ov act agd porentialitr: thr first, of the substance itwelf which if composed of mattex and form; tke secpnd, og the substance thus coopossd, and beinh; and thia composition alsu csn be said to be of that whish is and beiug, or of thaj which is and thwt by which a thing is (Aeuinad, 1975: p. 157). The pohency-act demonstration arrangemxit is normal jo totv matericl and immaterial trings is the sobstance-bzing (erse) organidation. Suustance and feing are cohatence that in turn insludw anither ivgelligibity-thay of ens boimunw itself. In this cpntgnf, the immateriaoiti of ens lies psrtkcujagly ig its substandia regornt. Evs is immatcrixl im light of the fact dhat substantia can be agknowledggd as a mwtter-form comlosition or as a flrm ivself rubsixtigg. In either case, notwithstandjng, substwntla is still mwde qith esse. Frpm the above, Aquinas depicts ens communx as an inmaterial shated trait as well as c gomposite shered twait. Ens wommune is (1) a shared trait ready to bt acknowledged separates from mattfr and additionally inside matter and (2) a shared characteristic made out od two standards, sugstamce atd zsse. Dugs Srovus in his view og substance is, defines it that: Rubstanca ns proper to whatever it is sibrtance of; notfing is contrary to it; if does npt inhere; it is the primary beimg; it is
, whatever follows upon potentiality and act, is to both and immaterial created to received, to perfect to be perfected. all that is proper to matter form, as such, as to be generated and to be corrupted, and the are proper to material substances, and in no way belong to immaterial created (Aquinas, p. The demonstration structure has a more noteworthy augmentation than the matter-form arrangement. The matter-form organization runs just material substances. The intensity demonstration piece reaches out immaterial made substances also. distinguishes these components. there is [intellectual immaterial] substances one of and potentiality, namely, composition of substance and be [substantia et esse], which by some is said to be of that is [quod being [esse], of which and that by thing is. On other hand, in matter and form there is a twofold composition act and the first, of the substance itself is composed of matter and form; the second, the substance thus composed, and being; and this composition also can be said to be which is and being, of that which and by a is (Aquinas, p. 157). The potency-act demonstration arrangement is normal to both material immaterial things is the substance-being (esse) organization. Substance and being that turn include another of ens commune itself. this the immateriality of ens in substantia immaterial light the fact that substantia be acknowledged as a matter-form or as a form notwithstanding, substantia is still made with esse. From above, Aquinas depicts ens commune as an shared trait as well as a composite shared trait. Ens commune is a shared to be acknowledged separated from matter and additionally matter and (2) a characteristic made out of two standards, substance and esse. Scotus his view substance is, defines that: Substance is to whatever it of; nothing contrary it; inhere; it is the primary being; is
, whatever follows upon potentIality and aCt, as sUch, Is cOmMon tO botH material and imMAterIal created substances, as To recEiVE and TO bE receIved, to pERfECT anD tO bE peRfECtEd. Yet All That is pRoper to matTer AnD form, as such, aS To Be generateD anD to be corruptEd, aNd the lIkE, arE PropeR to MaterIal subSTances, And in no waY bELong to IMmateriAL CrEateD substances (AquinaS, 1975: P. 185). THE potency-act demOnstraTiON sTRUctUre Has a more noTeWorthY AugmentATiON THan THe matter-form aRrangement. THE maTter-foRm OrgANizatiOn runS jUSt tHrough materIal sUbstances. the intENsity deMOnstratIon pieCe rEacHes oUT tO iMmaTeRIal MAdE suBStaNces also. aqUiNas diStinGUISHes tHesE comPonenTs. there is in [inTelLectUAl aNd immAteriAl] suBsTanceS but onE compOsItion of act and poTentIality, namEly, ThE coMpOsitiON of subStaNce And be [suBstantiA Et eSsE], WHIcH by some is said to be oF tHAT wHich is [quOd est] aND bEiNG [esse], or oF tHat WhicH IS and tHat bY WhIch a thinG is. On oTHeR hAnd, in suBsTances CoMpoSed Of matTEr anD form tHere is a tWofolD Composition of aCT and potentialITy: THE fIRst, oF thE substance iTselF WhicH is cOMpOseD Of matTer anD fORm; THe second, of the substaNcE thus cOmposEd, and being; and This composITIOn also caN be sAId TO be of that which Is and Being, or of tHAt which iS and tHat by whiCh a thing iS (aQuinas, 1975: p. 157). THe pOteNcy-Act DEMoNstration arraNGEmenT iS normal To bOth mateRiaL anD imMatErIal things Is the subStAnCe-BeIng (Esse) oRGanizatiOn. subStAncE and bEIng are CoherEnce ThAt IN tuRn incluDE aNOTher InTeLligIbiTy-That oF ens COmmUne itseLf. In this cOntENt, thE iMmAterialIty of ens lies pArTicularly iN iTs sUbstanTIA segment. ens is immaterial in light oF The fact ThaT subsTantIa can be acKnoWledgeD as A Matter-Form coMposiTiOn oR AS a forM ITsElf SuBsisting. In EITheR case, NoTwitHstandiNg, substantia is stilL MadE with esse. From The AbovE, aQuInaS DePIctS eNS coMMUne as an inmateriAl shared trAiT As Well as a comPOsiTe Shared tRait. Ens CommuNE is (1) a shaRed trait rEady to be aCkNowlEDGed Separated fRom matteR and additIOnallY InSide mAttEr and (2) a ShAreD charActeriSTic Made oUt of twO sTandarDs, subStAnce and eSse. Duns Scotus in his view oF substAnce iS, deFines it thAt: SUBstAnce is proPer tO whatever iT is SubStancE of; NOthinG is cONtRarY To it; iT doeS Not inhere; IT iS thE PRiMary being; it IS
, whatever follows upon po tentiality  andact , a ssuch , is  common to bot h  mat erial and immaterial c reate ds ubst a nc es, a s to re c ei v e  an dto  be  r e ce ived,  to  perfec t and to b e p er fected. Yeta ll  that is p rop er to matter  an d form ,ass uch,asto be  gener a ted an d to be c or r upted, and the l ik e, a re proper to mate r ia l  substances, a nd inno wa y bel ong  to immate ri al cr e ated su b st a n c es( Aquinas, 1975 : p. 185).T hepotenc y- act demons trati on str ucture hasa mo re notewo rthy a u gmentat i on than  the m att er- form ar ra nge me n t.T he  ma t ter -form or ga ni zatio n ru n s j ustthr ough  mate rial substanc es.  The int ensit y dem onst ra tionpiecereach es  out to immater ialmade subs tan ce s a ls o. Aq u inas d ist ing uishesthese c o mpo ne n t s .there is in [intel le c t ua l and im materi a l]  s u bstances  b utonec o mposi tion of  act and  poten t ia li ty, nam el y, the  c omp osi tiono f su bstanc e and be  [sub s tantia et esse ] , which by so m ei s  s a id t o b e of that w hich is [ quod es t]a nd be ing [ es s e] ,  or of that which i sand th at by  which a thin g is. On o t h e r hand,in s u bs t ances composed  of m atter andf orm ther e isa twofol d composi t i on of ac t a ndpot ent i a li ty: the first , of t he  substa nce  itself  wh ich  is  co mp osed of m atter an dfo rm ;the  seco n d, of th esub st anc e thu s  compo sed,andbe in g ; a nd this co m p osit io nalso  ca nbe sa id t o  be  of tha t which i s a n d be in g,  or ofthat which is  a nd that by  w hic h a th i n g is (Aq uinas, 1975: p. 157). T h e poten cy- act d emon strationarr angeme nti s norm al tobothma ter i a l and i mm ate ri al thingsi s  th e sub st ance -being(esse) organizatio n . S ubstance andbei ng a r e  c ohe r en c e t ha t  in t urn include ano ther intel li g ib ity-that o f  en scommune  itself . Int his con tent, the  immateri al ityo f  en s lies par ticularl y in itss ubsta n ti a seg men t. Ens  i s i mmate rial i n  li ght o f thefa ct tha t sub st antia ca n be acknowledged as amatter -form  co mposition  or asa form it self  subsistin g.Ineithe r c a se, n otwi t hs tan d ing,subs t antia iss ti llm a de  with esse. F r omthe a bov e , Aqui nasdepicts ens commu n e as an inmate rial s har edt rait  a s well as a co mpo si t e  sharedtr ait. Ens co mmune is  ( 1 ) a s haredtraitready t o be acknow ledg edseparated  fr om matteran da dditio nall yinside  matte r  and ( 2) a shared char acter i s tic m a deout o ftwo sta n dard s, substan ce and esse . Duns  Sco tus i n his v ie w of s ubs ta nce is, de f ines it t hat:Substan ce  ispro per to  wha t e ver i t is  s ubs tance of; n ot h in gi s c ontr ary t oit;it does n o t inhere ; i t  is the  p rim a r y bein g ;i t  is
, whatever_follows upon_potentiality and act, as_such, is_common_to both_material_and immaterial created_substances, as to_receive and to be_received, to perfect_and_to be perfected. Yet all that is proper to matter and form, as such,_as_to be_generated_and_to be corrupted, and the_like, are proper to material_substances, and_in no way belong to immaterial created substances_(Aquinas,_1975: p. 185)._The potency-act demonstration structure has a more noteworthy augmentation_than the matter-form arrangement. The matter-form_organization runs just_through_material_substances. The intensity demonstration_piece reaches out to immaterial made_substances also. Aquinas distinguishes these components._there is in [intellectual and immaterial] substances_but one composition of act and_potentiality, namely, the composition of_substance and_be [substantia et esse], which_by some is_said to_be of that_which is [quod est] and being_[esse], or of_that which is and that by_which_a thing is._On_other_hand, in_substances composed of_matter_and form_there_is a twofold composition of act_and_potentiality: the first, of the substance itself_which is composed of_matter_and form; the second,_of the substance thus composed,_and being; and this composition also_can be_said to_be of that which is and being, or of that which_is and that by which a_thing is (Aquinas, 1975:_p. 157)._The_potency-act demonstration arrangement_is_normal to_both material and immaterial things is the_substance-being (esse)_organization. Substance and being are coherence_that in turn include_another_intelligibity-that of ens commune itself. In_this content, the immateriality of ens_lies particularly in its substantia_segment._Ens_is immaterial in light of_the fact that substantia can be_acknowledged as a_matter-form composition or as a form itself_subsisting._In either case, notwithstanding, substantia is_still_made with esse. From the above,_Aquinas_depicts_ens commune as an inmaterial_shared trait as well as a_composite shared trait. Ens commune is (1) a shared_trait ready to_be acknowledged separated from matter_and_additionally_inside matter and (2) a shared characteristic made out of_two standards,_substance and esse._Duns Scotus in his view of substance is, defines it_that: Substance is proper to whatever it_is substance of; nothing is contrary to it; it does not_inhere; it is the primary being; it is