 assumption that existence is (or can be) a real predicate, which Kant of course does not. This constitutes an advantage of Rowe's version of the objection, I think, but the basic objection itself is already anticipated in Kant's critique of the argument. Rowe's second objection, however, that the ontological argument begs the question, adds little if anything to Kant's prior objection in the First Critique. Although Kant does not specifically state that proponents of the argument are guilty of committing this informal fallacy, it is nevertheless clearly implied by his remarks. In response to the would-be proponent, he writes: 'You have already committed a contradiction when you have brought the concept of existence, under whatever disguised name, into the concept of a thing which you would think merely in terms of its possibility.' (A598/B626)12 What is highly interesting (and in some ways perplexing) about Kant's analysis of this defect in the argument, though, is that having identified this fallacious piece of reasoning he immediately proceeds to discuss how the proponent of the argument has committed a tautology, presumably on the assumption that that is the more serious problem facing the argument. The passage continues as follows: 9 William Rowe, 'The Ontological Argument', p. 108. 10 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 566. 11 Ibid., p. 568. 12 Ibid., p. 566. 183KANT'S OBJECTION TO THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT If one allows you to do that, then you have won the illusion of a victory, but in fact you have said nothing; for you have committed a mere tautology. I ask you: is the proposition, This or that thing (which I have conceded to you as possible, whatever it may be) exists – is this proposition, I say, an analytic or a synthetic proposition? If it is the former, then with existence you add nothing to your thought of the thing; but then either the thought that is in you must be the thing itself, or else you have presupposed an existence as belonging to possibility, and then inferred that existence on this pretext from its inner possibility, which is nothing but a miserable tautology. The word'reality', which sounds different from 'existence' in the concept of the predicate, does not settle it. For if you call all positing (leaving indeterminate what you posit)'reality', then you have already posited the thing with all
assumption that existence is (or can be) a real predicate, which Kant of course do not. This form an advantage of Rowe's version of the objection, I think, but the basic protest itself is already anticipated in Kant's critique of the argumentation. Rowe's second protest, however, that the ontological argument beg the question, adds short if anything to Kant's prior objection in the First Critique. Although Kant does not specifically submit that proponents of the argument are guilty of committing this informal fallacy, it is nevertheless intelligibly implied by his remarks. In response to the would - be advocate, he writes:' You have already committed a contradiction when you have lend the concept of universe, under whatever disguised name, into the concept of a matter which you would think merely in terms of its possibility.' (A598 / B626)12 What is highly interesting (and in some ways confusing) about Kant's analysis of this defect in the argument, though, is that having identified this fallacious piece of reasoning he immediately proceeds to discuss how the proponent of the argument has committed a tautology, presumably on the assumption that that is the more serious problem facing the argument. The passage cover as follows: 9 William Rowe,' The Ontological Argument', p. 108. 10 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 566. 11 Ibid. , p. 568. 12 Ibid. , p. 566. 183KANT'S OBJECTION TO THE ONTOLOGICAL argumentation If one allow you to do that, then you have won the illusion of a victory, but in fact you have say nothing; for you have committed a mere tautology. I ask you: is the proposition, This or that matter (which I have conceded to you as possible, whatever it may be) exists – is this proposition, I say, an analytic or a synthetic proposition? If it is the former, then with existence you add nothing to your thought of the thing; but then either the opinion that is in you must be the thing itself, or else you have presuppose an existence as belonging to possibility, and then inferred that existence on this guise from its inner possibility, which is nothing but a miserable tautology. The word'reality', which sounds different from' existence' in the concept of the predicate, does not settle it. For if you call all positing (leave indeterminate what you posit)'reality', then you have already posited the matter with all
 asdumption that existence ls (or can be) a rgao predmcate, wgich Kang of course does not. This coistirutes an advantage of Rowe's version lf the ovjecuion, I think, but vge basig objsgtion mtself is alreacy anticipdted in Kant's wrktnque of the argument. Rowe's second obtection, hlwever, that thg ontpjogidal argument begs the question, adda littlt if anything to Ksnt's prior objection in thf Figst Critique. Althokgh Kant doga njr specificaluy state that proponenjs of the argument are guilty of commntting this ibfogkal fallacy, it if nevertheless clearny imploed by his remsrkv. Ib response to the wound-be proponent, he rrites: 'Yog kave already committee q conjradiwtiov whdn gon hzve brlugit the concspt of exisrence, under whatevet qpxguised name, into ehq concept of a thing which you would thpnk jerely in terms of its possibility.' (A598/B626)12 What id highly ynteresting (and in some ways perplexing) about Kand's anelhsiw jw tjis defect in the argument, though, is that havyhg icentified this fallacious plevg of reasoning he immedjately proceeds to discusf how the propjneny of the argument has commirted a tautojigy, presumably on che assumptiun tnat tnat is the more serious proglem facing the argujdnt. The passage zonninuas as follows: 9 William Rowq, 'The Ontilogncal Argjmenj', p. 108. 10 Kwnt, Critiqke of Pure Reason, p. 566. 11 Ibld., p. 568. 12 Hbid., p. 566. 183KAJT'S OBJECTION TO THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT If pna anlows yob to dp that, then yju have won thg illusiou of a victory, blt in facv you have swid nothing; fmt you have cokmitted w meee tqutologh. I ask you: is yhe proposition, Thiw or that thing (whlch I gave conceded ti yiu as possible, ehagevqr iv may te) exists – iv thks otoposktion, I say, xn amalytic or a synthethc pdoposition? If it ix bhe formet, then wieh existence uou add nothing to your thuught of the thing; but then either the thought hhab is in you mtst ne tre thing icself, or else you have presupposed an exmstence as belonging to possibility, and thgn lnferred thav exiseence on dhis pretext from itw inner possibiliuy, which is nothing but a misarablf tautology. The word'reality', which sounds different from 'existence' in the xoncepv jf the predjcatr, doev uot settlq it. Hor if you call akl positing (leaving indeterminave what yog 'osit)'reality', then you have altexdy posited tfe thing with all
assumption that existence is (or can be) predicate, Kant of does not. This version the objection, I but the basic itself is already anticipated in Kant's of the argument. Rowe's second objection, however, that the ontological argument begs the adds little if anything to Kant's prior objection in the First Critique. Although does specifically that of the argument are guilty of committing this informal fallacy, it is nevertheless clearly implied by remarks. In response to the would-be proponent, he 'You have already committed contradiction when you have brought concept existence, under disguised into concept of a which you would think merely in terms of its possibility.' (A598/B626)12 What is highly interesting (and in ways perplexing) analysis of defect the though, is that this fallacious piece of reasoning he discuss how the proponent of the argument has a tautology, on the assumption that that is more serious problem facing the argument. The passage as follows: 9 William Rowe, 'The Ontological Argument', p. 108. 10 Kant, Critique of Pure 566. 11 Ibid., p. 12 Ibid., p. 183KANT'S TO ONTOLOGICAL If one you to do that, then you have won the illusion of victory, but in fact you have said nothing; for you a tautology. I ask is the proposition, This that (which I have conceded as whatever exists is proposition, I say, an or a synthetic proposition? If is the former, then to your thought of the thing; but then the thought that is in you must the thing itself, or else you have presupposed an existence as belonging possibility, and that existence on this pretext from its inner which is nothing but miserable tautology. The word'reality', which sounds different from 'existence' the of the does not settle For if you all positing (leaving you posit)'reality', you already with all
 assumption that existence is (Or can be) a reAl preDicAte, WhIch KAnt oF course does not. tHis cOnstitutes an advantage oF Rowe'S vERsioN Of The obJection, i ThINK, buT tHe BasIc OBjEctioN itSelf is aLready antiCipAtEd in Kant's criTIqUe of the argUmeNt. Rowe's seconD obJectioN, hOweVEr, thaT thE ontoLogicaL ArgumeNt begs the QuEStion, aDDs littlE IF aNythIng to Kant's prior obJEcTIon in the First CRitiquE. ALThOUGh KAnt Does not speCiFicalLY state tHAt PROPonENts of the argumEnt are guiltY Of cOmmittInG thIS inforMal faLlACy, iT is nevertheLess Clearly imPlied bY His remaRKs. In resPonse tO thE woUld-bE PrOpOneNt, HE wrITeS: 'YoU HavE already CoMmItted A conTRADIctiOn wHen yOu havE brought the coNcePt of EXisTence, Under WhatEvEr disGuised Name, iNtO the concept of a tHing Which you wOulD tHinK mErely IN terms Of iTs pOssibilIty.' (A598/B626)12 WhAT is HiGHLY iNteresting (and in somE wAYS pErplexinG) about kAnT's ANalysis oF tHis DefeCT In the ArguMEnT, though, iS that hAViNg IdentifIeD this fAlLacIouS piecE Of reAsoninG he immedIatelY Proceeds to discUSs how the propoNEnT OF tHE argUmeNt has commitTed a TAutoLogy, PReSumABly on The asSuMPtIOn that that is the more SeRious pRobleM facing the argUment. The paSSAGe continUes aS FoLLows: 9 William RowE, 'The ONtological aRgument', p. 108. 10 kant, CRitique oF Pure ReasON, P. 566. 11 Ibid., p. 568. 12 IbId., p. 566. 183kANt'S ObJEctiOn TO THE ONTOLOGicaL ARgUmENT If oNe aLlows yoU to Do tHat, TheN yOu have won The illusIoN oF a ViCtoRy, but IN fact you HaVe sAiD noThing; FOr you hAve coMmitTeD a MEre TautoloGY. I ASK you: Is ThE proPosItIon, ThIs or THat Thing (whIch I have cOncEDed tO yOu As possiBle, whatever it MaY be) exists – iS tHis ProposITIon, I say, aN analytic or a synthetic prOPositioN? If It is tHe foRmer, then wIth ExisteNce YOu add nOthing To youR tHouGHT of thE THiNg; bUt Then either THE thOught ThAt is In you muSt be the thing itself, OR elSe you have presUppOsed AN ExIstENcE As bElONgiNG To possibility, anD then inferReD ThAt existencE On tHiS pretexT from itS inneR PossibiLity, which Is nothing BuT a miSERabLe tautologY. The word'Reality', whICh souNDs DiffeRenT from 'eXiSteNce' in The conCEpt Of the PredicAtE, does nOt setTlE it. For if You call all positing (leaviNg indeTermiNatE what you pOsiT)'ReaLity', then yOu haVe already pOsiTed The thIng WIth alL
 assumption that existence  is (or ca n be)  area lpred icat e, which Kanto f co urse does not. This co nstit ut e s an ad vanta ge of R o we ' s  ve rs io n o ft he  obje cti on, I t hink, butthe  b asic objecti o nitself isalr eady anticip ate d in K an t's criti que  of t he arg u ment.Rowe's se co n d obje c tion, h o w ev er,that the ontologi c al argument begsthe qu es t io n ,  ad dslittle ifan ythin g  to Kan t 's p r ior objection inthe First C r iti que. A lt hou g h Kant  does  n o t s pecifically  sta te that p ropone n ts of t h e argum ent ar e g uil ty o f  c om mit ti n g t h is  in f orm al falla cy ,it is  nev e r t h eles s c lear ly im plied by hisrem arks .  In  resp onseto t he  woul d-be p ropon en t, he writes: ' Youhave alre ady  c omm it ted a contra dic tio n whenyou hav e  br ou g h t  t he concept of exis te n c e,  under w hateve r  d is g uised na me , i ntot h e con cept of  a thing  which yo uwould t hi nk mer el y i n t ermso f it s poss ibility. ' (A5 9 8/B626)12 What is highly int e re s t in g  (an d i n some ways  per p lexi ng)a bo utK ant's  anal ys i so f this defect in th eargume nt, t hough, is tha t having i d e n tified t hisf al l acious piece o f rea soning hei mmediate ly pr oceeds t o discuss h ow the p rop one ntoft h eargument hasc o mmit te d a tau tol ogy, pr esu mab lyonth e assumpt ion that  t ha tis  th e mor e  serious  p rob le m f acing the ar gumen t. T he  p a ssa ge cont i nu e s  asfo ll ows:  9Wi lliam  Row e , ' The Ont ologicalArg u ment ',  p . 108.10 Kant, Crit iq ue of Pure  R eas on, p. 5 66. 11 I bid., p. 568. 12 Ibid., p. 566.  18 3KANT 'S O BJECTIONTOTHE ON TOL O GICALARGUME NT If  o nea l lowsy o utodo  that, the n you  have  w on t he illu sion of a victory, but  in fact youhav e sa i d  n oth i ng ;  fo ry ouh a ve committed amere tauto lo g y.  I ask you :  is  t he prop osition , Thi s  or tha t thing ( which I h av e co n c ede d to you a s possib le, whate v er it ma y be)  ex ists –  i s t his p roposi t ion , I s ay, an  a nalyti c orasyntheti c proposition? If it is  the f ormer , t hen withexi s ten ce you ad d no thing to y our  th ought  of the t hing ;  b utt hen e ithe r  the thou g ht  th a t  i s in you mu s t bethe t hin g  itsel f, o r else you have p r esupposed an e xist e n ceasb elon gi ng to possibil ity ,a n d then i nf erred thatexistenc eo n thi s pret ext fr om itsi n ne r  possi bili ty,  which is  no th i ng butami s erable  tau to logy.The wo r d're a l ity', which soun ds di f f erent fro m 'ex is tence'i n th e conceptof the pred icate,  doe s not  settle  i t. For  if  y ou call al l  positing  (lea ving in de term ina te wha t yo u posit )'re al ity ', then y o u  h a ve  a l rea dy p osite dthething wit h  all
 assumption_that existence_is (or can be)_a real_predicate,_which Kant_of_course does not._This constitutes an_advantage of Rowe's version_of the objection,_I_think, but the basic objection itself is already anticipated in Kant's critique of the_argument._Rowe's second_objection,_however,_that the ontological argument begs_the question, adds little if_anything to_Kant's prior objection in the First Critique. Although_Kant_does not specifically_state that proponents of the argument are guilty of_committing this informal fallacy, it is_nevertheless clearly implied_by_his_remarks. In response to_the would-be proponent, he writes: 'You_have already committed a contradiction when_you have brought the concept of existence,_under whatever disguised name, into the_concept of a thing which_you would_think merely in terms of_its possibility.' (A598/B626)12_What is_highly interesting (and_in some ways perplexing) about Kant's_analysis of this_defect in the argument, though, is_that_having identified this_fallacious_piece_of reasoning_he immediately proceeds_to_discuss how_the_proponent of the argument has committed_a_tautology, presumably on the assumption that that_is the more serious_problem_facing the argument. The_passage continues as follows: 9_William Rowe, 'The Ontological Argument', p._108. 10_Kant, Critique_of Pure Reason, p. 566. 11 Ibid., p. 568. 12 Ibid.,_p. 566. 183KANT'S OBJECTION TO THE_ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT If one_allows you_to_do that, then_you_have won_the illusion of a victory, but in_fact you_have said nothing; for you have_committed a mere tautology._I_ask you: is the proposition, This_or that thing (which I have_conceded to you as possible,_whatever_it_may be) exists – is_this proposition, I say, an analytic_or a synthetic_proposition? If it is the former, then_with_existence you add nothing to your_thought_of the thing; but then either_the_thought_that is in you must_be the thing itself, or else_you have presupposed an existence as belonging to possibility,_and then inferred_that existence on this pretext_from_its_inner possibility, which is nothing but a miserable tautology. The_word'reality', which_sounds different from_'existence' in the concept of the predicate, does not settle_it. For if you call all positing_(leaving indeterminate what you posit)'reality', then you have already posited the_thing with all