 "relational"	metaphysics	is	the	lesson	that	"justice"	and	"rights"	are	necessarily relational,	even	though	human	rights	are	inviolable:	while	"rights"	depend	on	"justice" and	are	thus	relational,	it	remains	the	case	that	every	act	of	injustice	against	a	human being	as	such	(i.e.,	every	violation	of	a	human	right)	is	always	wrong	or	intrinsically evil	(thus	human	rights	as	such	are	inviolable).	Contrary	to	many	contemporary perspectives,	then,	Benedict	(2007c,	345)	teaches	that	it	is	possible	to	affirm	the inviolability	of	human	rights,	yet	without	affirming	that	human	autonomy	is	absolute	or non-relational.	There	is	no	doubt	that	human	freedom	is	a	genuine	good,	but	it	can	be the	genuine	good	that	it	is,	only	within	the	context	of	an	ordered	"network	of	other goods."	Accordingly,	the	"criterion	of	real	right-right	entitled	to	call	itself	true	right, which	accords	with	freedom-can,	therefore,	only	be	the	good	of	the	whole	.	.	." (Benedict	2007c,	349). CONCLUSION As	we	have	seen,	Benedict	XVI's	"natural	law"	environmental	vision	includes	his endorsement	of	three	metaphysical	premises	involving:	a)	the	convertibility	of	being and	goodness;	b)	the	convertibility	of	being	and	order;	and	c)	the	uniquely	intellectual nature	of	the	human	being.	It	is	because	of	these	three	theoretical	commitments	that Benedict
" relational " 	 metaphysics 	 is 	 the 	 lesson 	 that 	 " justice " 	 and 	 " rights " 	 are 	 necessarily relational, 	 even 	 though 	 human 	 right field 	 are 	 impregnable: 	 while 	 " rights " 	 depend 	 on 	 " justice " and 	 are 	 therefore 	 relational, 	 it 	 remains 	 the 	 case 	 that 	 every 	 act 	 of 	 injustice 	 against 	 a 	 human being 	 equally 	 such 	 (i.e., 	 every 	 rape 	 of 	 a 	 human 	 right) 	 is 	 constantly 	 wrong 	 or 	 intrinsically evil 	 (therefore 	 human 	 rights 	 as 	 such 	 are 	 inviolable). 	 Contrary 	 to 	 many 	 contemporary perspectives, 	 then, 	 Benedict 	 (2007c, 	 345) 	 teach 	 that 	 it 	 is 	 possible 	 to 	 affirm 	 the inviolability 	 of 	 human 	 rights, 	 yet 	 without 	 affirming 	 that 	 human 	 autonomy 	 is 	 absolute 	 or non - relational. 	 There 	 is 	 no 	 doubt 	 that 	 human 	 exemption 	 is 	 a 	 genuine 	 good, 	 but 	 it 	 can 	 be the 	 genuine 	 commodity 	 that 	 it 	 is, 	 only 	 within 	 the 	 context 	 of 	 an 	 ordered 	 " network 	 of 	 other goods. " 	 consequently, 	 the 	 " criterion 	 of 	 substantial 	 right - right 	 entitled 	 to 	 shout 	 itself 	 true 	 right, which 	 accords 	 with 	 freedom - can, 	 therefore, 	 merely 	 be 	 the 	 good 	 of 	 the 	 whole 	. 	. 	. " (Benedict 	 2007c, 	 349). CONCLUSION As 	 we 	 have 	 seen, 	 Benedict 	 XVI's 	 " natural 	 law " 	 environmental 	 vision 	 includes 	 his endorsement 	 of 	 three 	 metaphysical 	 premises 	 involving: 	 a) 	 the 	 convertibility 	 of 	 being and 	 good; 	 b) 	 the 	 convertibility 	 of 	 being 	 and 	 order; 	 and 	 c) 	 the 	 uniquely 	 intellectual nature 	 of 	 the 	 homo 	 being. 	 It 	 is 	 because 	 of 	 these 	 three 	 theoretical 	 commitment 	 that Benedict
 "repational"	metaphysics	is	the	uesson	that	"justiew"	and	"rijhts"	are	hecessarkly relational,	even	though	humai	rigyts	art	pnviolable:	while	"rights"	aepend	on	"jlstice" ane	are	uhus	relational,	it	rxjains	thc	ease	tgwt	evzrb	act	of	injustice	sgainst	a	hukan being	as	sucv	(i.d.,	erery	violation	of	a	human	right)	is	always	wrjng	or	inyrlnsically evil	(jhus	hlmwn	rifhts	as	such	are	inviolable).	Contrary	to	mzny	conttmporary perspectifes,	then,	Benedict	(2007c,	345)	teaches	thah	it	id	possible	to	affirm	tje inviolabulitr	if	human	rightr,	yet	withouu	ayfirming	thaj	human	autonomy	is	absolute	or non-reuatioual.	There	is	ni	diubh	jhat	human	frexdom	is	w	genuine	good,	nlt	it	can	te the	grnuine	good	that	lt	is,	oily	wuthin	the	context	of	an	orvered	"network	of	other doods."	Accosdnngly,	the	"criterion	of	reql	eight-tight	antigoed	go	czlk	ifself	tgue	cight, which	zccords	with	dreedom-can,	therefore,	pnjj	ne	the	good	of	tge	wholq	.	.	." (Fenedict	2007c,	349). CONCLUSION As	we	have	seen,	Benedibt	XVJ's	"natural	law"	environmentql	vision	includes	his ejdorsemene	of	three	metaphysical	premises	involving:	a)	the	convertitilitb	ow	benkn ana	toldness;	b)	the	convertibility	of	being	and	order;	and	c)	thq	hnoqlely	intellectual kature	of	the	human	beonh.	Iy	ys	because	of	thgse	threz	fhsoretical	commitmenhs	that Feneduct
"relational" metaphysics is the lesson that "justice" are relational, even human rights are "justice" are thus relational, remains the case every act of injustice against a being as such (i.e., every violation of a human right) is always wrong intrinsically evil (thus human rights as such are inviolable). Contrary to many contemporary then, (2007c, teaches it is possible to affirm the inviolability of human rights, yet without affirming that human autonomy absolute or non-relational. There is no doubt that freedom is a genuine but it can be the good it is, within context an ordered "network other goods." Accordingly, the "criterion of real right-right entitled to call itself true right, which accords with therefore, only good of whole . (Benedict 2007c, 349). we have seen, Benedict XVI's "natural includes his endorsement of three metaphysical premises involving: the convertibility being and goodness; b) the convertibility being and order; and c) the uniquely intellectual of the human being. It is because of these three theoretical commitments that Benedict
 "relational"	metaphysics	is	thE	lesson	thaT	"justIce"	And	"RiGhts"	Are	nEcessarily relaTIonaL,	even	though	human	rights	Are	inViOLablE:	WhIle	"riGhts"	depENd	ON	"JusTiCe" And	ArE	ThUs	relAtiOnal,	it	rEmains	the	cAse	ThAt	every	act	of	INjUstice	agaiNst	A	human being	aS	suCh	(i.e.,	evErY	viOLatioN	of	A	humaN	right)	IS	alwayS	wrong	or	iNtRInsicaLLy evil	(tHUS	hUman	Rights	as	such	are	inVIoLAble).	Contrary	to	Many	coNtEMpORAry PerSpectives,	tHeN,	BeneDIct	(2007c,	345)	teaCHeS	THAt	iT	Is	possible	to	aFfirm	the invIOlaBility	Of	HumAN	rightS,	yet	wItHOut	Affirming	thAt	huMan	autonoMy	is	abSOlute	or NOn-relatIonal.	THerE	is	No	doUBt	ThAt	hUmAN	frEEdOm	iS	A	geNuine	gooD,	bUt	It	can	Be thE	GENUine	GooD	thaT	it	is,	Only	within	the	ConText	OF	an	OrderEd	"netWork	Of	Other Goods."	ACcordInGly,	the	"criterion	Of	reAl	right-riGht	EnTitLeD	to	caLL	itselF	trUe	rIght, whiCh	accorDS	wiTh	FREEdOm-can,	therefore,	only	Be	THE	gOod	of	the	Whole	.	.	." (BENeDiCT	2007c,	349). CONCLUsIoN AS	we	hAVE	seen,	beneDIcT	XVI's	"natUral	laW"	EnViRonmentAl	Vision	InCluDes	His enDOrseMent	of	Three	metAphysICal	premises	invOLving:	a)	the	convERtIBIlITy	of	BeiNg and	goodneSs;	b)	tHE	conVertIBiLitY	Of	beiNg	and	OrDEr;	ANd	c)	the	uniquely	intelLeCtual nAture	Of	the	human	beiNg.	It	is	becaUSE	Of	these	tHree	THeORetical	commitmEnts	tHat BenedicT
 "relational"	metaphysicsis	the	les son	t hat 	"j us tice "	an d	"rights"	are nece ssarily relational,	ev en	th ou g h	hu m an 	righ ts	arei nv i o lab le :whi le "r ights "	d epend	o n	"justice " a nd 	are	thus	re l at ional,	itrem ains	the	cas e	t hat	ev er y	a c t	ofinj ustic e	agai n st	a	h uman bein ga s	such (i.e.,e v er y	vi olation	of	a	huma n 	r i ght)	is	always 	wrong 	o r 	i n t rin sic ally evil(t hus	h u man	rig h ts a s 	su c h	are	inviola ble).	Contr a ryto	man ycon t empora ry pe rs p ect ives,	then, 	Ben edict	(20 07c,	3 4 5)	teac h es	that 	it	is 	po ssi blet oaf fir mt hei nv iol a bil ity	of	h um an 	righ ts,y e t with out 	aff irmin g	that	humanaut onom y 	is 	abso luteor n on -rela tional .	The re 	is	no	doubt	th at	h uman	free dom 	i s	a 	g enuin e 	good, 	bu t	i t	can	b e the	g e nui ne g o od 	that	it	is,	onlywi t h in 	the	con text	o f 	a no rdered	" ne two rk	o f other  goo d s. "	Accord ingly, th e"criter io n	of	r ea l	r igh t-rig h t	en titled 	to	call 	itse l f	true	right,w hich	accordsw it h fr e edom -ca n,	therefor e,	o n ly	b e	th e 	g ood of	th e	who le .. 	." (Benedict	2007c ,349).CONCL USION As	we	h ave	seen,B e n edict	XV I's" na t ural	law"	envi ronme ntal	visio n 	include s	his  endorse ment	of	t h r ee	metap hys ica l	p rem i s es 	involving:	a ) theco nvertib ili ty	of	b ein g a ndgoo dn ess;	b)	t he	conve rt ib il it y	o f	bei n g	and	or de r;an d	c )	the unique ly	in tell ec tu a l n ature	o f 	t h e 	hum an 	b eing .	I tis	be caus e 	of 	thesethree	the ore t ical 	c om mitment s	that Benedi ct 
 "relational"	metaphysics	is	the	lesson	that	"justice"	and	"rights"	are	necessarily_relational,	even	though	human	rights	are	inviolable:	while	"rights"	depend	on	"justice" and	are	thus	relational,	it	remains	the	case	that	every	act	of	injustice	against	a	human_being	as	such	(i.e.,	every	violation	of	a	human	right)	is	always	wrong	or	intrinsically evil	(thus	human	rights	as	such	are	inviolable).	Contrary	to	many	contemporary perspectives,	then,	Benedict	(2007c,	345)	teaches	that	it	is	possible	to	affirm	the inviolability	of	human	rights,	yet	without	affirming	that	human	autonomy	is	absolute	or_non-relational.	There	is	no	doubt	that	human	freedom	is	a	genuine	good,	but	it	can	be the	genuine	good	that	it	is,	only	within	the	context	of	an	ordered	"network	of	other_goods."	Accordingly,	the	"criterion	of	real	right-right	entitled	to	call	itself	true	right,_which	accords	with	freedom-can,	therefore,	only	be	the	good	of	the	whole	.	.	." (Benedict	2007c,	349)._CONCLUSION_As	we	have	seen,	Benedict	XVI's	"natural	law"	environmental	vision	includes	his endorsement	of	three	metaphysical	premises	involving:	a)	the	convertibility	of	being and	goodness;	b)	the	convertibility	of	being	and	order;	and	c)	the	uniquely	intellectual_nature	of	the	human	being.	It	is	because	of	these	three	theoretical	commitments	that Benedict