 value to the laws, Duhem also rejects the positivist and conventionalist position, which relegates the goal of theoretical physics exclusively to the development of an economic summary or an artificial classification of experimental laws. For the French thinker, what must be preserved is the epistemic value of physical theory – transcendent to its practical utility and always within the reach of the physical method. Thus, it is expected from physical theory that by becoming a natural classification, it can establish a logical coordination among the various experimental laws that is the image and reflection of the true order according to which the realities that escape us are organized (Duhem 1996 [1893], 31). Physical theory therefore moves toward a final explanation; one could say, a "metaphysical" explanation. But it does not occur by means of a deduction of physics from metaphysics. Even though it is theoretically possible, it is not possible in a practical manner. (Duhem 1996 [1893], 34). Given this limitation of epistemological order, the only secure methodological resource we have would be the physical method. The task of revealing the epistemic value of physical theory rests exclusively in the physical method – not directly, for these realities escape from physics – but through an analogy that imposes itself on the mind of the physicist (Duhem 1990, 186). Therefore, Newton's Principia would have established one of the most fundamental characteristics of the physical method. He would strictly follow an epistemological order of physics toward metaphysics, and never the opposite. For Duhem, scientists such as Euler, Lagrange, Laplace, Gauss, Fresnel, Poisson, Ampère, and Cauchy, among others, can see the fecundity of this understanding in the significant progress Duhem's Analysis of Newtonian Method and the Logical Priority of Physics over Metaphysics Eduardo Salles O. Barra – Ricardo Batista dos Santos 17 made by this approach in the research of diverse phenomena, such as electricity, capillary, elasticity and heat theories. After Newton's abstract notion of "attraction" disconnected from metaphysical meanings, molecular attraction has become a potent tool for constructing synthetic representations of physical phenomena. As a result, there has been a long period of continuous progress in these "attractionist" theories, which have remained loyal to the limits established by the Newtonian system. This trend, according to Duhem, was prevalent until the middle of the nineteenth century, when the rapid development of thermodynamics, which corroborated Descartes' assumptions about the nature of heat
value to the laws, Duhem also rejects the positivist and conventionalist position, which banish the finish of theoretical physics exclusively to the growth of an economic summary or an artificial categorization of experimental laws. For the French thinker, what must be preserved is the epistemic value of physical hypothesis – transcendent to its virtual utility and constantly within the reach of the physical method acting. Thus, it is expected from physical theory that by become a natural classification, it can establish a logical coordination among the various experimental torah that is the image and reflection of the true club according to which the realities that escape us are organized (Duhem 1996 [ 1893 ], 31). forcible theory consequently moves toward a final explanation; one could say, a " metaphysical " explanation. But it does not occur by mean of a deduction of physics from metaphysics. Even though it is theoretically possible, it is not possible in a practical manner. (Duhem 1996 [ 1893 ], 34). Given this limitation of epistemological order, the only secure methodological resource we have would be the physical method. The task of revealing the epistemic value of physical hypothesis perch exclusively in the forcible method acting – not directly, for these realities escape from physics – but through an doctrine of analogy that imposes itself on the judgment of the physicist (Duhem 1990, 186). Therefore, Newton's Principia would have established one of the about fundamental characteristics of the physical method. He would strictly follow an epistemological order of physics toward metaphysics, and never the opposite. For Duhem, scientists such as Euler, Lagrange, Laplace, Gauss, Fresnel, Poisson, Ampère, and Cauchy, among others, can see the fertility of this understanding in the meaning advancement Duhem's Analysis of Newtonian Method and the Logical Priority of Physics over Metaphysics Eduardo Salles O. Barra – Ricardo Batista suffice Santos 17 made by this approach in the research of divers phenomena, such as electricity, capillary, elasticity and heat theories. After Newton's abstract notion of " attraction " disconnected from metaphysical meanings, molecular attraction has become a potent tool for construct synthetic representation of forcible phenomena. As a result, there has been a long period of continuous advancement in these " attractionist " theories, which have remained patriotic to the limits established by the Newtonian organization. This trend, accord to Duhem, was prevalent until the middle of the nineteenth century, when the rapid development of thermodynamics, which corroborated Descartes' assumptions about the nature of heat
 vapue to the laws, Duhem alro rejects the kowitivivt and conventkonalist position, which relejatew the goal of theoretical pfysics exblusively to uhe development oh an ecokjmic dummcrb or an artificlal classifhcation of exparkmzntal laws. For the French thinker, whwt must bf preserved is the qpisfvmlc value of physical theory – trahscendeit to its practocal utility and always wihhin the reach of the ohysical mejgod. Rhus, it is ebpected from physical jheory that by becoming a naturau claxsificatiob, ut fdn establisi a lodical coordikstion dmong tne various expcrimeital laws that is the imaje and reflection of the true oxder according to whixh the tealidies rhag eacepe us arf ocganized (Dugem 1996 [1893], 31). Physucal theory therefote noves toward z finaj qxplanation; one could say, a "metaphysican" esplanation. But it does bot occur by means of a deductyon of physics from metaphysics. Even though it is theocegiccoly puwslble, it is not possible in a practical manner. (Sunek 1996 [1893], 34). Given thif limitatiom lf gpistemologicau ordex, tge only secure metjodologycal eesource re hsve would be the physical mwthod. The tafj of revealing the epistemic ralue pf phusical theory rests excuusibely in the physical oethod – not direztlj, fos these realities escape fwom physirs – bbt throueh am analjgy that ilposes itself on the minf of jhe phfsicist (Dujem 1990, 186). Therefore, Newton's Principme would have gstdblpshed one of tme most fundamegtal characternstics oy the ohysical mvthod. He xould strictjy follow an akistemologican order jf pyysixs towafa metaphysics, snd never the opposute. For Duhem, sciektistr such as Euler, Oagtqnge, Laplace, Gsusr, Fwednxl, Poyvson, Ampère, atd Cxucfu, amovg others, ccn see the fecundity of thhs uhderstanding in thr fignificqnt progwess Duhem's Amalysis of Newtoniwn Mevhod aid the Lodical Priority of Physics over Metaphyslcs Eduardo Saljes I. Barra – Riccrdo Batista dos Santos 17 made by this ap'roach in the research if diverse phenomenc, xuch as elertriciey, capilldry, elasticity and hwat theories. Aftev Newton's abstract notjon of "attrwction" disconnected from metaphysical meanings, molecular attraction has bwcome e [otent tool for consnruetiug syntretir cepresentations og physical phenomena. As a resulv, there hav yeen a long period of continupur progress in these "attractionist" thekries, whoch have remained loyal to the kimits established by thc Newtoniqn syatem. This vrend, according to Dihem, wcs precalent yntip the middle uf yhc nineteenhh ctntuxy, when the rapid development of rhermoeyjamics, which corcoborated Dedgartes' assumktions about the hatudf of feat
value to the laws, Duhem also rejects and position, which the goal of development an economic summary an artificial classification experimental laws. For the French thinker, must be preserved is the epistemic value of physical theory – transcendent to practical utility and always within the reach of the physical method. Thus, it expected physical that becoming a natural classification, it can establish a logical coordination among the various experimental laws that the image and reflection of the true order to which the realities escape us are organized (Duhem [1893], Physical theory moves a explanation; one could a "metaphysical" explanation. But it does not occur by means of a deduction of physics from metaphysics. though it possible, it not in practical manner. (Duhem 34). Given this limitation of epistemological secure methodological resource we have would be the method. The of revealing the epistemic value of theory rests exclusively in the physical method – directly, for these realities escape from physics – but through an analogy that imposes itself mind of the physicist 1990, 186). Therefore, Principia have one the most characteristics of the physical method. He would strictly follow an epistemological of physics toward metaphysics, and never the opposite. For Duhem, as Lagrange, Laplace, Gauss, Poisson, Ampère, and Cauchy, others, see the fecundity of in significant of Method the Logical Priority of over Metaphysics Eduardo Salles O. – Ricardo Batista dos approach in the research of diverse phenomena, such electricity, capillary, elasticity and heat theories. After abstract notion of "attraction" disconnected from metaphysical meanings, molecular attraction has become potent tool synthetic representations of physical phenomena. As a result, has been a long of continuous progress in these "attractionist" theories, which have loyal the limits by the Newtonian This trend, according Duhem, was prevalent middle of nineteenth when of thermodynamics, which corroborated Descartes' assumptions the of heat
 value to the laws, Duhem also reJects the poSitivIst And CoNvenTionAlist position, wHIch rElegates the goal of theorEticaL pHYsicS ExClusiVely to tHE dEVEloPmEnT of An ECoNomic SumMary or aN artificiaL clAsSification of EXpErimental lAws. for the French ThiNker, whAt MusT Be preSerVed is The epiSTemic vAlue of phySiCAl theoRY – transcENDeNt to Its practical utiliTY aND always within tHe reacH oF ThE PHysIcaL method. ThuS, iT is exPEcted frOM pHYSIcaL Theory that by bEcoming a natURal ClassiFiCatIOn, it caN estaBlISh a Logical coorDinaTion among The varIOus expeRImental Laws thAt iS thE imaGE aNd RefLeCTioN Of The TRue Order accOrDiNg to wHich THE REaliTieS thaT escaPe us are organiZed (duheM 1996 [1893], 31). phySical TheorY theReFore mOves toWard a FiNal explanation; oNe coUld say, a "meTapHySicAl" ExplaNAtion. BUt iT doEs not ocCur by meANs oF a DEDUcTion of physics from mEtAPHySics. Even Though IT iS tHEoreticaLlY poSsibLE, It is nOt poSSiBle in a prActicaL MaNnEr. (Duhem 1996 [1893], 34). giVen thiS lImiTatIon of EPistEmologIcal ordeR, the oNLy secure methodOLogical resourCE wE HAvE WoulD be The physical MethOD. The Task OF rEveALing tHe epiStEMiC Value of physical theoRy Rests eXclusIvely in the phySical methoD – NOT directlY, for THeSE realities escaPe froM physics – buT Through aN analOgy that iMposes itsELF on the miNd oF thE phYsiCISt (duhem 1990, 186). ThereforE, nEwtoN's principIa wOuld havE esTabLisHed OnE of the mosT fundameNtAl ChArActEristICs of the pHySicAl MetHod. He WOuld stRictlY folLoW aN EpiStemoloGIcAL OrdeR oF pHysiCs tOwArd meTaphYSicS, and nevEr the oppoSitE. for DUhEm, ScientiSts such as EuleR, LAgrange, LapLaCe, GAuss, FrESNel, PoissOn, Ampère, and Cauchy, among oTHers, can See The feCundIty of this UndErstanDinG In the sIgnifiCant pRoGreSS duhem'S aNaLysIs Of NewtoniaN mEthOd and ThE LogIcal PriOrity of Physics over mEtaPhysics EduardO SaLles o. bArRa – RICaRDo BAtISta DOS Santos 17 made by thIs approach In THe Research of DIveRsE phenomEna, such As eleCTricity, Capillary, ElasticitY aNd heAT TheOries. After newton's aBstract noTIon of "ATtRactiOn" dIsconnEcTed From mEtaphySIcaL meanIngs, moLeCular aTtracTiOn has becOme a potent tool for constrUcting SynthEtiC represenTatIOns Of physicaL pheNomena. As a rEsuLt, tHere hAs bEEn a loNg peRIoD of COntinUous PRogress in THeSe "aTTRaCtionist" theORIEs, wHich hAve REmaineD loyAl to the limits estaBLished by the NewToniAN SysTem. tHis tReNd, according to DUheM, wAS PrevalenT uNtil the middLe of the nInETeentH centuRy, when The rapiD DEvELopmenT of tHerModynamicS, whIcH CorroboRaTeD descarTes' aSsUmptioNs abouT The nATUre of heat
 value to the laws, Duhemalso rejec ts th e p osi ti vist  and  conventionali s t po sition, which relegate s the  g o al o f  t heore tical p h ys i c s e xc lu siv el y  t o the  de velopme nt of an e con om ic summary o r  a n artifici alclassificati onof exp er ime n tal l aws . For  the F r ench t hinker, w ha t  mustb e prese r v ed  isthe epistemic val u eo f physical the ory –tr a ns c e nde ntto its pra ct icalu tilitya nd a l way s  within the r each of the phy sicalme tho d . Thus , itis exp ected fromphys ical theo ry tha t  by bec o ming anatura l c las sifi c at io n,it can es tab l ish  a logic al  c oordi nati o n a mong  th e va rious  experimental  la ws t h atis th e ima ge a nd  refl ection  of t he  true order acc ordi ng to whi chth e r ea litie s  thatesc ape  us are  organi z ed(D u h e m1996 [1893], 31).Ph y s ic al theor y ther e fo re moves to wa rda fi n a l exp lana t io n; one c ould s a y,  a  "metap hy sical"  e xpl ana tion. Butit doe s not oc cur b y  means of a de d uction of phy s ic s fr o m me tap hysics. Eve n th o ughit i s  t heo r etica lly p os s ib l e, it is not possib le  in apract ical manner.(Duhem 199 6 [ 1893], 3 4).G iv e n this limitat ion o f epistemo l ogical o rder,  the onl y securem e thodolog ica l r eso urc e we  have would b e theph ysicalmet hod. Th e t ask  of  re ve aling the  epistem ic  v al ue  of  phys i cal theo ry  re st s e xclus i vely i n the  phy si ca l  me thod –n ot d irec tl y,  for  th es e rea liti e s e scape f rom physi cs–  but  t hr ough an  analogy that  i mposes its el f o n them i nd of th e physicist (Duhem 1990 ,  186).The refor e, N ewton's P rin cipiawou l d have  estab lishe done o f the m os t f un damental c h a rac teris ti cs o f the p hysical method. He wou ld strictly f oll ow a n ep ist e mo l ogi ca l  or d e r of physics to ward metap hy s ic s, and nev e r t he  opposi te. For  Duhe m , scien tists suc h as Eule r,  Lag r a nge , Laplace,  Gauss,Fresnel,P oisso n ,Ampèr e,and Ca uc hy,  amon g othe r s,can s ee the  f ecundi ty of  t his unde rstanding in the signif icantprogr ess  Duhem'sAna l ysi s of Newt onia n Method a ndthe  Logi cal Prior ityo fPhy s ics o verM etaphysic s  E dua r d oSalles O. B a r r a –  Rica rdo Batist a do s Santos 17 madeb y this approac h in t heres e arch  o f diverse phen ome na , such asel ectricity,capillar y, elast icityand he at theo r i es .  After  New ton 's abstra ctno t ion of"a tt r action " di sc onnect ed fro m  met a p hysical meanings , mol e c ulara ttr actio nhas bec o me a  potent to ol for cons tructi ng s ynthe tic rep re sentat ion sof physica l  phenomen a. As  a resu lt , th ere  has b eena longperi od  of  continuo u s  p r og re s s i n th ese " at trac tionist"t heories,  wh i ch have  r ema i n ed loy a lt o  the limit s e stabl i s hed by the Newt o ni a n sys tem. T his tr end, ac c ord in g to Du hem , was preva lent unti l  th emidd le of th enine te ent hcentury, when t he rapid  develop m e nt ofthe r mody n amics,  w hich corrobo rated  D e scartes ' ass umption s  ab out  th e na tur e of heat
 value_to the_laws, Duhem also rejects_the positivist_and_conventionalist position,_which_relegates the goal_of theoretical physics_exclusively to the development_of an economic_summary_or an artificial classification of experimental laws. For the French thinker, what must be_preserved_is the_epistemic_value_of physical theory – transcendent_to its practical utility and_always within_the reach of the physical method. Thus, it_is_expected from physical_theory that by becoming a natural classification, it can_establish a logical coordination among the_various experimental laws_that_is_the image and reflection_of the true order according to_which the realities that escape us_are organized (Duhem 1996 [1893], 31). Physical_theory therefore moves toward a final_explanation; one could say, a_"metaphysical" explanation._But it does not occur_by means of_a deduction_of physics from_metaphysics. Even though it is theoretically_possible, it is_not possible in a practical manner._(Duhem_1996 [1893], 34)._Given_this_limitation of_epistemological order, the_only_secure methodological_resource_we have would be the physical_method._The task of revealing the epistemic value_of physical theory rests_exclusively_in the physical method_– not directly, for these_realities escape from physics – but_through an_analogy that_imposes itself on the mind of the physicist (Duhem 1990, 186)._Therefore, Newton's Principia would have established_one of the most_fundamental characteristics_of_the physical method._He_would strictly_follow an epistemological order of physics toward_metaphysics, and_never the opposite. For Duhem, scientists_such as Euler, Lagrange,_Laplace,_Gauss, Fresnel, Poisson, Ampère, and Cauchy,_among others, can see the fecundity_of this understanding in the_significant_progress_Duhem's Analysis of Newtonian Method_and the Logical Priority of Physics_over Metaphysics Eduardo_Salles O. Barra – Ricardo Batista dos_Santos_17 made by this approach in_the_research of diverse phenomena, such as_electricity,_capillary,_elasticity and heat theories. After_Newton's abstract notion of "attraction" disconnected_from metaphysical meanings, molecular attraction has become a potent_tool for constructing_synthetic representations of physical phenomena._As_a_result, there has been a long period of continuous progress_in these_"attractionist" theories, which_have remained loyal to the limits established by the Newtonian_system. This trend, according to Duhem, was_prevalent until the middle of the nineteenth century, when the rapid_development of thermodynamics, which corroborated Descartes' assumptions about_the nature of heat