 they were impermanent, without abiding characters; and all the 10 AVI SION more so, derivative notions about dharmas. The Hindu branch of Indian philosophy opted for the thesis that beyond such elusive existents there is a (more'real' and 'permanent') spiritual existence (with individual selves or souls, and a universal Self or God). Buddhist philosophy, on the other hand, forked off, denying any such additional existents (on the surface, at least, because they later admit a ground of being, which is known only on the highest level of consciousness). Moreover, some Buddhist schools effectively consider some dharmas as material, whereas others consider all as mental. Some modern Western thinkers would agree with the no-self position, from a more mechanistic perspective, regarding man as a machine (an organic computer or robot) devoid of soul. René Descartes (17th Century) was the first in the history of Western philosophy to raise the issue of selfhood (or raise it so explicitly and clearly). He inferred (ergo) existence of self (sum) from existence of cognition (cogito). More precise would be to say that we (at least partly) infer Subject and consciousness from the appearance of Object. Something appears – to what (whom)? a Subject! how? through consciousness! Some philosophers would consider such reasoning as compulsive, influenced by mere grammatical habit. But in my view, these characterizations are neither just habitual nor deductive certainties; they are inductive hypotheses4 needed to settle certain logical issues. The term 'Subject,' by the way, is used as here relative to 'Object,' in the relation called 'consciousness'5. In the relation of 'volition,' the same entity is called 'Agent,' versus the 'will' (the act of will or that which is willed). The term'soul' refers to the common ground of Subject and Agent (as well as affective and other roles). The term'self' stresses the personality of soul, as distinct from other entities, which lack consciousness, volition and affection. The term'spirit' stresses the distinct substance of soul, compared to material or mental entities (without at the outset excluding that all three may ultimately be of uniform stuff). In my view, the issue of self is relatively secondary in importance, in the (re)construction of knowledge from scratch that Descartes was pursuing here. He quite correctly saw that even apparently sensed objects may be dreamed. But
they were impermanent, without abiding characters; and all the 10 AVI SION more so, derivative notions about dharma. The Hindu outgrowth of Indian philosophy opted for the dissertation that beyond such elusive existents there be a (more'real' and' permanent') spiritual existence (with individual self or souls, and a universal Self or God). Buddhist doctrine, on the early hand, forked off, deny any such additional existents (on the surface, at least, because they later accept a ground of being, which is known only on the highest level of awareness). Moreover, some Buddhist schools effectively study some dharmas as material, whereas others view all as genial. Some modern westerly thinkers would agree with the no - self position, from a more mechanistic perspective, regard man as a machine (an organic computer or robot) devoid of person. René Descartes (seventeenth Century) was the beginning in the history of Western philosophy to raise the issue of selfhood (or raise it so explicitly and clearly). He inferred (ergo) being of self (sum) from existence of cognition (cogito). More accurate would be to suppose that we (at least partially) infer Subject and consciousness from the appearance of Object. Something appears – to what (whom)? a Subject! how? through consciousness! Some philosophers would consider such reasoning as compulsive, influenced by mere grammatical substance abuse. But in my view, these characterizations are neither just habitual nor deductive certainties; they are inductive hypotheses4 needed to settle certain logical issues. The term' Subject,' by the direction, is used as here proportional to' Object,' in the relation back called' consciousness'5. In the relation of' volition,' the same entity is called' Agent,' versus the' will' (the act of volition or that which is willed). The term'soul' refers to the common ground of Subject and Agent (as well as affective and other roles). The term'self' stresses the personality of soul, as clear-cut from other entity, which lack consciousness, volition and affection. The term'spirit' stresses the distinct substance of person, compared to material or mental entities (without at the beginning excluding that all three may ultimately be of uniform stuff). In my scene, the issue of self is relatively junior-grade in importance, in the (re)construction of knowledge from scratch that Descartes was pursuing here. He quite correctly examine that even apparently sensed objects may be dream. But
 thfy were impermanent, withuut abiding chataxters; end all the 10 AVK SION more so, derivative novionw aboyt dharmas. The Hindu bfanch of Pndian phulosiphy opted hkr the bkesis bhat yebond such elusiye existentv there is a (mmrd'rzal' and 'permanent') spiritual existencq (with onfividual selvef or foula, and a universal Self or God). Buddgist phplosophy, on the oyher hand, forked off, denyijg ajy such additional existents (in trw surface, at least, because they lajer admit a ground of being, whicf is lnown only ob tjg highest letel of consciousness). Moreoeer, somr Buddhist schpolv edfectively consider smme dharmas as matgrial, wheraaa others consider aol as mendal. Rime mosecn Sesterj tiinkers woumd agree wirh the no-self positoog, from a more jechanyseic perspective, regarding man as a machpne (zn organic computer or eobot) devoid of soul. Tené Descarees (17th Century) was the first in the history of Wevtern ohioofuphj to raise the issue of selfhood (or raise it fk txpkicitly and clcarly). He inferred (rrho) gxistence of sglf (sum) frkm existence of cohnition (cogiro). More pwecixe would be to say that we (qt least parnly) unfer Subject and eonsciousnesr frpm thr appearance of Object. Romefhing appeags – to whzg (whom)? a Subject! hoe? dhrough consciousness! Some philosopiers could covsidgr such reasoning as compulsive, influencef by lese grammatlcal habit. But in my view, these characterizatoots dre neitker juxt habitual njr deductive cgrtaintief; theh are indubtive hypmtheses4 neeqed to settle fertain logiral issuef. Thw teem 'Subjdzt,' by the way, os used as here relqtive to 'Object,' in thg delation called 'cobsciousness'5. In yhe rejanioi of 'dmlition,' the vame engoty ir called 'Agcnt,' verxus the 'will' (the act of sill or that which if willed). The teri'soul' refers yo the common groujd of Suuject snd Agent (as well as affective ans other rllef). The term'sejf' sbresfes the pexsonality of soul, as distinct from other entities, which laxk consciousness, vokltion and afhectiog. The terk'spirit' stresses the distinct substange of soul, compared to materhal og mental entities (without at the outset excluding that all three may ultinately be of unifodm syuff). Pn iv view, ehe msrue of self is rvlatively secondary in importancx, in the (ra)cjnstruction of knowledge frok rcratch that Aescartes was pursuing hsre. He qiite correctly saw that even aplarently sensed objects kay be deeames. But
they were impermanent, without abiding characters; and 10 SION more derivative notions about Indian opted for the that beyond such existents there is a (more'real' and spiritual existence (with individual selves or souls, and a universal Self or God). philosophy, on the other hand, forked off, denying any such additional existents (on surface, least, they admit a ground of being, which is known only on the highest level of consciousness). Moreover, Buddhist schools effectively consider some dharmas as material, others consider all as Some modern Western thinkers would with no-self position, a mechanistic regarding man as machine (an organic computer or robot) devoid of soul. René Descartes (17th Century) was the first in history of to raise issue selfhood raise it so clearly). He inferred (ergo) existence of existence of cognition (cogito). More precise would be say that (at least partly) infer Subject and from the appearance of Object. Something appears – what (whom)? a Subject! how? through consciousness! Some philosophers would consider such reasoning as compulsive, mere grammatical habit. But my view, these are just nor certainties; they inductive hypotheses4 needed to settle certain logical issues. The term 'Subject,' the way, is used as here relative to 'Object,' in called In the relation 'volition,' the same entity called versus the 'will' (the will that The refers the common ground of and Agent (as well as and other roles). The soul, as distinct from other entities, which lack volition and affection. The term'spirit' stresses the substance of soul, compared to material or mental entities (without at the excluding that may ultimately be of uniform stuff). In my the issue of self relatively secondary in importance, in the (re)construction of knowledge scratch Descartes was here. He quite saw that even sensed objects may But
 they were impermanent, withouT abiding chAractErs; And AlL the 10 aVI SiON more so, derivATive Notions about dharmas. The hindu BrANch oF inDian pHilosopHY oPTEd fOr ThE thEsIS tHat beYonD such elUsive existEntS tHere is a (more'rEAl' And 'permaneNt') sPiritual exisTenCe (with InDivIDual sElvEs or sOuls, anD A univeRsal Self oR GOD). BuddhISt philoSOPhY, on tHe other hand, forked OFf, DEnying any such aDditioNaL ExISTenTs (oN the surfacE, aT leasT, Because THeY LATer ADmit a ground of Being, which iS KnoWn only On The HIghest Level Of COnsCiousness). MoReovEr, some BudDhist sCHools efFEctivelY consiDer SomE dhaRMaS aS maTeRIal, WHeReaS OthErs consiDeR aLl as mEntaL. sOME modErn westErn thInkers would agRee With THe nO-self PositIon, fRoM a morE mechaNistiC pErspective, regarDing Man as a macHinE (aN orGaNic coMPuter oR roBot) Devoid oF soul. ReNÉ DeScARTEs (17Th Century) was the firSt IN ThE history Of WestERn PhILosophy tO rAisE the ISSue of SelfHOoD (or raise It so exPLiCiTly and cLeArly). He InFerRed (Ergo) eXIsteNce of sElf (sum) frOm exiSTence of cognitiON (cogito). More prECiSE WoULd be To sAy that we (at lEast PArtlY) infER SUbjECt and ConscIoUSnESs from the appearance Of object. sometHing appears – to What (whom)? a SUBJEct! how? thRougH CoNSciousness! Some PhiloSophers wouLD consideR such ReasoninG as compulSIVe, influeNceD by MerE grAMMaTical habit. But IN My viEw, These chAraCterizaTioNs aRe nEitHeR just habiTual nor dEdUcTiVe CerTaintIEs; they arE iNduCtIve HypotHEses4 neEded tO setTlE cERtaIn logicAL iSSUes. THe TeRm 'SuBjeCt,' By the Way, iS UseD as here Relative tO 'ObJEct,' iN tHe RelatioN called 'consciOuSness'5. In the ReLatIon of 'vOLItion,' the Same entity is called 'Agent,' VErsus thE 'wiLl' (the Act oF will or thAt wHich is WilLEd). The tErm'souL' refeRs To tHE CommoN GRoUnd Of subject and aGEnt (As welL aS affEctive aNd other roles). The terM'SelF' stresses the pErsOnalITY oF soUL, aS DisTiNCt fROM other entities, wHich lack coNsCIoUsness, voliTIon AnD affectIon. The tErm'spIRit' streSses the diStinct subStAnce OF SouL, compared tO materiaL or mental ENtitiES (wIthouT at The outSeT exCludiNg that ALl tHree mAy ultiMaTely be Of uniFoRm stuff). IN my view, the issue of self is RelatiVely sEcoNdary in imPorTAncE, in the (re)cOnstRuction of kNowLedGe froM scRAtch tHat DEScArtES was pUrsuINg here. He qUItE coRREcTly saw that eVEN AppArentLy sENsed obJectS may be dreamed. But
 they were impermanent, wi thout abid ing c har act er s; a nd a ll the 10 AVIS IONmore so, derivative no tions  a b outd ha rmas.  The Hi n du b ran ch  o f I nd i an  phil oso phy opt ed for the  th es is that beyo n dsuch elusi veexistents th ere  is a(m ore ' real'  an d 'pe rmanen t ') spi ritual ex is t ence ( w ith ind i v id ualselves or souls,a nd a universal Se lf orGo d ). B udd his t philosop hy , ont he othe r  h a n d , f o rked off, den ying any su c h a dditio na l e x istent s (on  t h e s urface, atleas t, becaus e they later a d mit a g roundofbei ng,w hi ch  is  k n own on lyo n t he highe st  l evelof c o n s c ious nes s).Moreo ver, some Bud dhi st s c hoo ls ef fecti vely  c onsid er som e dha rm as as material,  whe reas othe rsco nsi de r all as men tal . S ome mod ern Wes t ern  t h i n ke rs would agree wit ht h eno-selfpositi o n,  f r om a mor emec hani s t ic pe rspe c ti ve, rega rdingm an  a s a mac hi ne (an  o rga nic  comp u teror rob ot) devo id of soul. René Des c artes (17th C e nt u r y) wasthe  first in t he h i stor y of We ste r n phi losop hy to raise the issue ofse lfhood  (orraise it so e xplicitlya n d  clearly ). H e  i n ferred (ergo)exist ence of se l f (sum)fromexistenc e of cogn i t ion (cog ito ).Mor e p r e ci se would be t o sayth at we ( atleast p art ly)  in fer  S ubject an d consci ou sn es sfro m the appearan ce  of  O bje ct. S o methin g app ears  –  t o  wh at (who m )? a  Sub je ct ! ho w?th rough  con s cio usness!  Some phi los o pher swo uld con sider such re as oning as c om pul sive,i n fluenced  by mere grammatical ha b it. But  in  my v iew,  these ch ara cteriz ati o ns are  neith er ju st  ha b i tualn o rded uc tive certa i n tie s; th ey  are  induct ive hypotheses4 ne e ded  to settle ce rta in l o g ic ali ss u es.  T h e t e r m 'Subject,' by  the way,is us ed as here rel at ive to'Object ,' in the rel ation cal led 'cons ci ousn e s s'5 . In the r elationof 'volit i on,'t he  same  en tity i scal led ' Agent, '  ve rsusthe 'w il l' (th e act  o f will o r that which is willed) . Theterm' sou l' refers  to the  common g roun d of Subje ctand  Agen t ( a s wel l as af fec t ive a nd o t her roles ) .The t er m'self' str e s s esthe p ers o nality  ofsoul, as distinct from other ent itie s ,  wh ich lack  c onsciousness,vol it i o n and af fe ction. Theterm'spi ri t ' str essesthe di stincts u bs t ance o f so ul,  compared  to  m a terialor  m e ntal e ntit ie s (wit hout a t  the o utset excludingthata l l thr e e m ay ul ti matelyb e of  uniform s tuff). In m y view , th e iss ue of s el f is r ela ti vely secon d ary in im porta nce, in  t he ( re) constr ucti o n  of k nowl ed gefrom scra t c ht ha tD esc arte s was  p ursu ing here. He quite  co r rectlysa w t h a t even ap p a rently sen sed  obje c t s may be d r eame d .B ut
 they_were impermanent,_without abiding characters; and_all the_10_AVI SION_more_so, derivative notions_about dharmas. The_Hindu branch of Indian_philosophy opted for_the_thesis that beyond such elusive existents there is a (more'real' and 'permanent') spiritual existence_(with_individual selves_or_souls,_and a universal Self or_God). Buddhist philosophy, on the_other hand,_forked off, denying any such additional existents (on_the_surface, at least,_because they later admit a ground of being, which_is known only on the highest_level of consciousness)._Moreover,_some_Buddhist schools effectively consider_some dharmas as material, whereas others_consider all as mental. Some modern_Western thinkers would agree with the no-self_position, from a more mechanistic perspective,_regarding man as a machine_(an organic_computer or robot) devoid of_soul. René Descartes_(17th Century)_was the first_in the history of Western philosophy_to raise the_issue of selfhood (or raise it_so_explicitly and clearly)._He_inferred_(ergo) existence_of self (sum)_from_existence of_cognition_(cogito). More precise would be to_say_that we (at least partly) infer Subject_and consciousness from the_appearance_of Object. Something appears_– to what (whom)? a_Subject! how? through consciousness! Some philosophers_would consider_such reasoning_as compulsive, influenced by mere grammatical habit. But in my view,_these characterizations are neither just habitual_nor deductive certainties; they_are inductive_hypotheses4_needed to settle_certain_logical issues._The term 'Subject,' by the way, is_used as_here relative to 'Object,' in the_relation called 'consciousness'5. In_the_relation of 'volition,' the same entity_is called 'Agent,' versus the 'will'_(the act of will or_that_which_is willed). The term'soul' refers_to the common ground of Subject_and Agent (as_well as affective and other roles). The_term'self'_stresses the personality of soul, as_distinct_from other entities, which lack consciousness,_volition_and_affection. The term'spirit' stresses the_distinct substance of soul, compared to_material or mental entities (without at the outset excluding_that all three_may ultimately be of uniform_stuff)._In_my view, the issue of self is relatively secondary in_importance, in_the (re)construction of_knowledge from scratch that Descartes was pursuing here. He quite_correctly saw that even apparently sensed objects_may be dreamed. But