 have had their source in the work of two of Moore's teachers, G. F. Stout and James Ward. What may be called an antipsychologism about psychology characterizes the work of these and other psychologists of the period. I argue that the anti-psychologism that is the main aim of Moore's early theory of judgment is an adaptation of this notion, which is significantly dissimilar from the notion defended by Bradley, traditionally thought to have been a key influence on Moore.  2008 Published by Elsevier Ltd.E C T When citing this paper, please use the full journal title Studies in History and Philosophy of Science49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60N C O R R1. Introduction The story of the rise of analytic philosophy in the early writings of Bertrand Russell (1872–1970) and G. E. Moore (1873–1958) has long emphasized the dominance of neo-Hegelian metaphysics in late nineteenth-century philosophy at Cambridge and Oxford.1 The conventional account of the shift in philosophical perspective and practice in the late 1890s often takes the form of Russell's own early description of a'rebellion',2 initiated by Moore and eagerly embraced by Russell himself. Both are held to have rejected the Idealist metaphysics they had absorbed from their teachers at Cambridge, and introduced concerns and methods that generallyElsevier Ltd. ard Bosanquet (1848–1923), and F.. 11–12; (1975), p. 61. ity Library; his 1897 and 1898 disse ry is cited as 'Add. 8330' or 'Add. 8 onsult Moore's dissertations (on pe Moore papers held there.., On the origins of the concharacterize analytic philosophy to this day.3 Later reconstructions of this period in philosophy have, in their turn, included detailed discussion of the considerable influence of Frege's work in mathematical and philosophical logic. In this paper, I will defend the position that the traditional picture of the rise of analytic philosophy is incomplete and, to some degree, erroneous. While Russell's idealist apprenticeship has been thoroughly and definitively examined by Griffin, and by Hylton,4 there is no similarly detailed analysis of the development of G. E. Moore's views between 1894–1904.5 A careful look at both published and unpublished material will show, I believe, that it is more likely that a significant influence on Moore's early writings,C. S. Schiller (18
have had their source in the work of two of Moore's teachers, G. F. Stout and James Ward. What may be call an antipsychologism about psychology qualify the work of these and other psychologists of the menstruation. I argue that the anti - psychologism that is the main aim of Moore's early hypothesis of judgment is an adaptation of this notion, which is significantly unalike from the notion defended by Bradley, traditionally think to have been a key influence on Moore.  2008 Published by Elsevier Ltd. einsteinium hundred T When citing this paper, please use the full diary title Studies in History and Philosophy of Science49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60N C oxygen R R1. Introduction The fib of the rise of analytic doctrine in the early writings of Bertrand Russell (1872–1970) and G. E. Moore (1873–1958) has long underscore the dominance of neo - Hegelian metaphysics in late nineteenth - century doctrine at Cambridge and Oxford.1 The conventional account of the shift in philosophical perspective and practice in the belated 1890s often takes the form of Russell's own early description of a'rebellion',2 initiated by Moore and eagerly embraced by Russell himself. Both are held to have rejected the Idealist metaphysics they had absorbed from their teachers at Cambridge, and precede concerns and methods that generallyElsevier Ltd. ard Bosanquet (1848–1923), and F.. 11–12; (1975), p. 61. ity Library; his 1897 and 1898 disse ry is summon as' Add. 8330' or' Add. 8 onsult Moore's dissertations (on pe Moore papers hold there.. , On the origins of the concharacterize analytic philosophy to this day.3 Later reconstruction of this period in philosophy have, in their turn, included detailed discussion of the considerable influence of Frege's work in mathematical and philosophical logic. In this paper, I will defend the position that the traditional picture of the raise of analytic doctrine is incomplete and, to some academic degree, erroneous. While Russell's idealist apprenticeship has been thoroughly and definitively analyze by Griffin, and by Hylton,4 there is no similarly detailed analysis of the development of G. E. Moore's views between 1894–1904.5 A careful look at both published and unpublished material will picture, I believe, that it is more likely that a significant influence on Moore's early writings, C. S. Schiller (18
 hage had their source in tme work of two oy Moore'v teacgers, G. F. Stout and James Ward. What mey bw caloed an antipsychologiso about pdychologt cheracterizes the xkrk of bkese zkd otkec psychologists of the pesiod. I argue tvag che anti-psychologism that is the maig aim og Loore's early treorj jf jhdgment is an adaptation of this nktion, wiich is signifivantly dissimilar from the notlon defended by Brwdley, tradijjonwoly thought go have betn a key infmuence on Moore.  2008 Published by Dlsevner Ltd.E C J Shft citing thms papvr, please use the fuln journsl title Studics in Hiwtory and Philosophy mf Science49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60N C O S X1. Introduction The stirt of jhe rhse ud avalgtmc lhiloslphb in the eadly writingw of Bertrand Russekl (1872–1970) and G. E. Moors (1873–1958) has ljng emphasized the dominance of neo-Hegeniah metaphysics in late nuneteenth-century phillsophy at Cambridge and Oxford.1 The conventional account of the afifu lk phkoodophical perspective and practice in the late 1890a pfnen takes the fori of Russelk's oeg early descrkption of a'rebellion',2 initiahed by Ioore and eagewly rmbraced by Russell himself. Both are heje to have rejected the Idealirt mgtaphyxics they had absorbed yrom tgeir teachegs at Camgfidge, and introdjcec woncerns and methods that denerallyXlsevner Ltd. xrd Nosanqtet (1848–1923), and F.. 11–12; (1975), p. 61. ity Library; his 1897 ajd 1898 dnsse sy is citef as 'Add. 8330' or 'Add. 8 onsult Moore's dissertations (ot pv Moore pcpers meld there.., On tre origins of jhe conchcractefize analynic philovophy to thys day.3 Later sgconstructionv of thif peeiod in phiuusophy have, in their tugn, incouded detailed disgussiuh of the considzxavle influence og Ffegq's wprh in mathemathcal ana philusophical lieic. On this paper, I will defsnd the position tnab the traeitional picture of tne rise of analytif phinosuphy os yncomplete and, to some degree, srroneous. Whlle Russell's ydeaoist apprentnceship has been thoroughly and definititely examined by Griffib, and by Hylton,4 thete ls no similacly deeailed andlysis of the development of G. E. Moort's views between 1894–1904.5 A carsful lmok ah both published and unpublished material will show, I believe, that it is nore lmkqly that a aignoficatt nnfluense oi Ooore's early wrinings,C. S. Schiller (18
have had their source in the work of teachers, G. Stout and James an about psychology characterizes work of these other psychologists of the period. I that the anti-psychologism that is the main aim of Moore's early theory of is an adaptation of this notion, which is significantly dissimilar from the notion by traditionally to been a key influence on Moore.  2008 Published by Elsevier Ltd.E C T When citing paper, please use the full journal title Studies History and Philosophy of 50 51 52 53 54 56 58 59 C R Introduction The story the rise of analytic philosophy in the early writings of Bertrand Russell (1872–1970) and G. E. Moore has long dominance of metaphysics late philosophy at Cambridge The conventional account of the shift and practice in the late 1890s often takes form of own early description of a'rebellion',2 initiated Moore and eagerly embraced by Russell himself. Both held to have rejected the Idealist metaphysics they had absorbed from their teachers at Cambridge, concerns and methods that Ltd. ard Bosanquet and 11–12; p. ity Library; 1897 and 1898 disse ry is cited as 'Add. 8330' or 8 onsult Moore's dissertations (on pe Moore papers held there.., origins the concharacterize analytic to this day.3 Later of period in philosophy have, turn, detailed considerable of work in mathematical and logic. In this paper, I defend the position that rise of analytic philosophy is incomplete and, to degree, erroneous. While Russell's idealist apprenticeship has thoroughly and definitively examined by Griffin, and by Hylton,4 there is no detailed analysis development of G. E. Moore's views between 1894–1904.5 careful look at both and unpublished material will show, I believe, that it more that a influence on Moore's writings,C. S. Schiller
 have had their source in the woRk of two of MOore's TeaCheRs, g. F. StOut aNd James Ward. WhaT May bE called an antipsychologIsm abOuT PsycHOlOgy chAracterIZeS THe wOrK oF thEsE AnD otheR psYchologIsts of the pEriOd. i argue that thE AnTi-psycholoGisM that is the maIn aIm of MoOrE's eARly thEorY of juDgment IS an adaPtation of ThIS notioN, Which is SIGnIficAntly dissimilar frOM tHE notion defendeD by BraDlEY, tRADitIonAlly thoughT tO have BEen a key INfLUENce ON Moore.  2008 PublishEd by ElsevieR ltd.e C T WheN cItiNG this pAper, pLeASe uSe the full joUrnaL title StuDies in hIstory aND PhilosOphy of sciEncE49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60N C O r r1. INtRodUcTIon tHe StoRY of The rise oF aNaLytic PhilOSOPHy in The EarlY writIngs of BertranD RuSselL (1872–1970) And g. E. MooRe (1873–1958) has Long EmPhasiZed the DominAnCe of neo-Hegelian MetaPhysics in LatE nIneTeEnth-cENtury pHilOsoPhy at CaMbridge ANd OXfORD.1 thE conventional accouNt OF ThE shift in PhilosOPhIcAL perspecTiVe aNd prACTice iN the LAtE 1890s often tAkes thE FoRm Of RusseLl'S own eaRlY deScrIptioN Of a'rEbelliOn',2 initiaTed by mOore and eagerly EMbraced by RussELl HIMsELf. BoTh aRe held to havE rejECted The IDEaLisT MetapHysicS tHEy HAd absorbed from their TeAchers At CamBridge, and intrOduced concERNS and methOds tHAt GEnerallyElseviEr Ltd. Ard BosanquET (1848–1923), and F.. 11–12; (1975), p. 61. itY LibrAry; his 1897 anD 1898 disse ry iS CIted as 'AdD. 8330' or 'add. 8 OnsUlt mOOrE's dissertatioNS (On pe moOre papeRs hEld therE.., On The OriGinS oF the conchAracteriZe AnAlYtIc pHilosOPhy to thiS dAy.3 LAtEr rEconsTRuctioNs of tHis pErIoD In pHilosopHY hAVE, in tHeIr Turn, IncLuDed deTailED diScussioN of the conSidERablE iNfLuence oF Frege's work in MaThematical AnD phIlosopHICal logic. in this paper, I will defend tHE positiOn tHat thE traDitional pIctUre of tHe rISe of anAlytic PhiloSoPhy IS IncomPLEtE anD, tO some degreE, ERroNeous. whIle RUssell's Idealist apprenticeSHip Has been thorouGhlY and DEFiNitIVeLY exAmINed BY griffin, and by HylTon,4 there is No SImIlarly detaILed AnAlysis oF the devElopmENt of G. E. MOore's viewS between 1894–1904.5 A CaRefuL LOok At both publIshed and UnpublishED mateRIaL will ShoW, I beliEvE, thAt it iS more lIKelY that A signiFiCant inFluenCe On Moore's Early writings,C. S. Schiller (18
 have had their source inthe work o f two  of  Mo or e'steac hers, G. F. St o ut a nd James Ward. What ma y beca l leda nantip sycholo g is m abo ut  p syc ho l og y cha rac terizes  the workofth ese and othe r  p sychologis tsof the perio d.I argu etha t  theant i-psy cholog i sm tha t is thema i n aimo f Moore ' s  e arly  theory of judgme n ti s an adaptatio n of t hi s  n o t ion , w hich is si gn ifica n tly dis s im i l a r f r om the notion  defended b y  Br adley,  t rad i tional ly th ou g htto have bee n akey influ ence o n  Moore.  2008Publis hed  by  Els e vi er  Lt d. E  CT  W hen cit ing this  p ap er, p leas e u s e th e f ulljourn al title Stud ies  inH ist ory a nd Ph ilos op hy of  Scien ce4950  51 52 53 54 55  5657 58 5960N  C  ORR1. I n troduc tio n T he stor y of th e  ri se o f  a nalytic philosophy  i n th e earlywritin g sof Bertrand  R uss ell( 1 872–1 970) an d G. E.Moore( 18 73 –1958)ha s long  e mph asi zed t h e do minanc e of neo -Hege l ian metaphysic s  in late nine t ee n t h- c entu ryphilosophyat C a mbri dgea nd  Ox f ord.1  Theco n ve n tional account of t he  shift  in p hilosophicalperspectiv e a nd pract icei nt he late 1890soften  takes the form ofRusse ll's own  early de s c riptionofa'r ebe lli o n ', 2 initiated b y Moor eand eag erl y embra ced  by  Ru sse ll  himself.  Both ar ehe ld  t o h ave r e jected t he  Id ea lis t met a physic s the y ha dab s orb ed from th e i r te ac he rs a t C am bridg e, a n d i ntroduc ed concer nsa nd m et ho ds that  generallyEls ev ier Ltd. a rd  Bo sanque t (1848–19 23), and F.. 11–12; (19 7 5), p.61.  ityLibr ary; his189 7 and189 8  disse  ry is  cite das' A dd. 8 3 3 0'  or  ' Add. 8 ons u l t M oore' sdiss ertatio ns (on pe Moore pa p ers  held there.. , O n th e or igi n so f t he con c h aracterize anal ytic philo so p hy  to this d a y.3  L ater re constru ction s  of thi s periodin philos op hy h a v e,in their t urn, inc luded det a iledd is cussi onof the  c ons idera ble in f lue nce o f Freg e' s work  in m at hematica l and philosophical log ic. In  this  pa per, I wi lld efe nd the po siti on that th e t rad ition alp ictur e of th e r i se of  ana l ytic phil o so phy i sincompletea n d , t o som e d e gree,erro neous. While Russ e ll's idealistappr e n tic esh i p ha sbeen thoroughl y a nd d efinitiv el y examinedby Griff in ,  andby Hyl ton,4there i s no simila rlydet ailed ana lys is of thede ve l opment  ofG.  E. Mo ore'sv iews b etween 1894–1904 .5 Ac a reful loo k atbo th publ i shed  and unpub lished mate rial w illshow,  I beli ev e, tha t i tis more li k ely thata sig nifican tinfl uen ce onMoor e ' s ear ly w ri tin gs,C. S.S c hi l le r( 18
 have_had their_source in the work_of two_of_Moore's teachers,_G._F. Stout and_James Ward. What_may be called an_antipsychologism about psychology_characterizes_the work of these and other psychologists of the period. I argue that the_anti-psychologism_that is_the_main_aim of Moore's early theory_of judgment is an adaptation_of this_notion, which is significantly dissimilar from the notion_defended_by Bradley, traditionally_thought to have been a key influence on Moore._ 2008 Published by Elsevier Ltd.E_C T When_citing_this_paper, please use the_full journal title Studies in History_and Philosophy of Science49 50 51_52 53 54 55 56 57 58_59 60N C O R R1._Introduction The story of the_rise of_analytic philosophy in the early_writings of Bertrand_Russell (1872–1970)_and G. E._Moore (1873–1958) has long emphasized the_dominance of neo-Hegelian_metaphysics in late nineteenth-century philosophy at_Cambridge_and Oxford.1 The_conventional_account_of the_shift in philosophical_perspective_and practice_in_the late 1890s often takes the_form_of Russell's own early description of a'rebellion',2_initiated by Moore and_eagerly_embraced by Russell himself._Both are held to have_rejected the Idealist metaphysics they had_absorbed from_their teachers_at Cambridge, and introduced concerns and methods that generallyElsevier Ltd. ard_Bosanquet (1848–1923), and F.. 11–12; (1975),_p. 61. ity Library;_his 1897_and_1898 disse ry_is_cited as_'Add. 8330' or 'Add. 8 onsult Moore's_dissertations (on_pe Moore papers held there.., On_the origins of the_concharacterize_analytic philosophy to this day.3 Later_reconstructions of this period in philosophy_have, in their turn, included_detailed_discussion_of the considerable influence of_Frege's work in mathematical and philosophical_logic. In this_paper, I will defend the position that_the_traditional picture of the rise of_analytic_philosophy is incomplete and, to some_degree,_erroneous._While Russell's idealist apprenticeship has_been thoroughly and definitively examined by_Griffin, and by Hylton,4 there is no similarly detailed_analysis of the_development of G. E. Moore's_views_between_1894–1904.5 A careful look at both published and unpublished material_will show,_I believe, that_it is more likely that a significant influence on Moore's_early writings,C. S. Schiller (18