 not antiscientific but was based on the assumption that sharp reductionism and determinism were not necessary foundations for a natural science. He did not despise science, and kept abreast of recent scientific achievements but he firmly opposed the positivistic trend.21 Boutroux' theses were put forward in a context where positivism was hegemonic; nevertheless, the following year, Cournot published another book where his anti-reductionist attitude was further developed. Nevertheless, his philosophy of science was more cautious and pliable than Boutroux's. The development of life sciences required a new epistemology: statistics and probability allowed scientists to replace certainty with probability. Cournot pursued a new alliance between determinism and contingency, between the stability of laws and the contingency of facts. In the late 1870s we find that some physiologists and physicians rejected reductionism (Egger 1877, 193-196, 197-198, 200-201, 209-211) but the majority was less cautious than Cournot, and put forward a radical reduction of psychology, anthropology, and sociology 20 It is worth remarking that, in the twentieth century, Thomas Kuhn inquired extensively into the two traditions (Kuhn 1976, 4-22). 21 Benrubi stressed that Boutroux' contingency should not be confused with chance: it was close to the idea of natural freedom, in the sense of free and unpredictable unfolding of natural laws. In other words, contingency occupied the intermediate place between chance and necessity (Benrubi 1926, 154-157). Stefano Bordoni – The French Roots of Duhem's early Historiography and Epistemology 27 to brain physiology (Luys 1876, VIII-XI; Boëns 1878, 345-347, 349-354, and 359-360; Boëns 1879, 5-9, and 14-15). Cournot pointed out the impossibility of getting rid of meta-theoretical practices that "positivist philosophers" had discarded together with metaphysics (Cournot 1875, 371 and 373-5). His words echoed what Whewell had written some decades before: he stressed that "a body of purely empirical knowledge is not a real science" (Cournot 1875, 371-376). On the other hand, Pierre Laffitte, one of Comte's most passionate followers, and the head of the community that accepted the whole of Comte's doctrine, insisted on empiricism
not antiscientific but was based on the assumption that sharp reductionism and determinism were not necessary foundations for a lifelike skill. He did not contemn science, and kept abreast of recent scientific accomplishment but he firmly opposed the positivistic trend.21 Boutroux' thesis were put forward in a context where positivity was hegemonic; however, the following year, Cournot published another koran where his anti - reductionist attitude was further developed. however, his philosophy of science was more cautious and elastic than Boutroux's. The development of life science required a new epistemology: statistics and probability allow scientists to replace certainty with probability. Cournot pursued a new confederation between determinism and contingency, between the constancy of laws and the contingency of facts. In the late 1870s we determine that some physiologists and physicians rejected reductionism (Egger 1877, 193 - 196, 197 - 198, 200 - 201, 209 - 211) but the majority was less cautious than Cournot, and put forward a radical decrease of psychology, anthropology, and sociology 20 It is deserving comment that, in the twentieth century, Thomas Kuhn inquired extensively into the two traditions (Kuhn 1976, 4 - 22). 21 Benrubi stressed that Boutroux' contingency should not be confused with chance: it was close to the mind of natural freedom, in the common sense of spare and irregular unfolding of natural laws. In other words, contingency occupied the intermediate place between probability and necessity (Benrubi 1926, 154 - 157). Stefano Bordoni – The French Roots of Duhem's early Historiography and Epistemology 27 to brain physiology (Luys 1876, VIII - XI; Boëns 1878, 345 - 347, 349 - 354, and 359 - 360; Boëns 1879, 5 - 9, and 14 - 15). Cournot pointed out the impossibility of getting rid of meta - theoretical practices that " positivist philosophers " had discarded in concert with metaphysics (Cournot 1875, 371 and 373 - 5). His words echoed what Whewell had written some decades before: he stressed that " a body of purely empiric cognition is not a veridical science " (Cournot 1875, 371 - 376). On the other hand, Pierre Laffitte, one of Comte's about passionate followers, and the head of the community that accepted the whole of Comte's doctrine, insisted on empiricism
 noh antiscientific but was based on the assumptimn thaf sharp feductionism and determinism wwre nit necessary foundatiovs for a jatural wcieice. He did not dxapise sgnence, wnd nxpt abreast of tecent sciendific achievemangs but he firmly opposed the positiviftic trrnf.21 Boutroux' thefes eqre llt forward in a context where pksitivivm was hegemomic; nevertheless, the folloaing year, Cournot publlshed anothgd bjik where his anti-reducuimnist attijude was further developed. Neverghelexs, his phioowopji of science was iore cautious and plhable tnan Boutroux's. Bhe dxvelipment of life sciencxs required a new epystemologf: atatistics and pribqbilijy alnowea sckenuisvs fo reppacx certainty with probavility. Cournot pursieq a new alliande betreqn determinism and contingency, between uhe sfability of laws and thw contingency of factd. In the jate 1870s we find that some physiologists and physichans cegecuee redjxtlonism (Egger 1877, 193-196, 197-198, 200-201, 209-211) but the majority was less cwhtools than Cournot, akd put forward a rsdlcsj reduction ow psyckklkgy, anthropology, ajd socijlogy 20 It is wjrth remarking that, in the twenrieth centurj, Thimas Kuhn inquired extensivelv into the ywo traditions (Kuhn 1976, 4-22). 21 Yenrubj stressed hhat Boutduux' contingency rholld tot be confused with chancq: it was rlose to the ides of nwtural frefdom, lt the sense of fref and utpredictabpe unfolding of natural laws. In other words, cpndincency oceupied the intermedyate place betceen chauce ana necessitj (Benrubi 1926, 154-157). Stefano Fordoni – The Xtench Roots oh Duhem's qarlt Hiwtoriogfxphy and Epistrmology 27 no braun physiology (Luys 1876, VKJI-XI; Boëns 1878, 345-347, 349-354, anb 359-360; Boëns 1879, 5-9, and 14-15). Coirnut [opntxd oue the impossitiligy ug getging rid of oeta-yheoretical practicev thzt "positivist philpsjphers" hqd discawded together with metaphysics (Fournmt 1875, 371 and 373-5). Hys words echoed what Whewell hzd writtej sjme decades fefove: hg stressed chat "a body of purely empirical knowledgx is not a real sciencg" (Cournot 1875, 371-376). On the otkev hand, Pierrx Laffytte, one mf Comte's most passiinate followers, akd the head of the comjunity that accepted the whole of Comte's doctrine, insisted on empiricism
not antiscientific but was based on the sharp and determinism not necessary foundations did despise science, and abreast of recent achievements but he firmly opposed the trend.21 Boutroux' theses were put forward in a context where positivism was hegemonic; the following year, Cournot published another book where his anti-reductionist attitude was further Nevertheless, philosophy science more cautious and pliable than Boutroux's. The development of life sciences required a new epistemology: statistics probability allowed scientists to replace certainty with probability. pursued a new alliance determinism and contingency, between the of and the of In late 1870s we that some physiologists and physicians rejected reductionism (Egger 1877, 193-196, 197-198, 200-201, 209-211) but the majority was cautious than put forward radical of anthropology, and sociology is worth remarking that, in the Kuhn inquired extensively into the two traditions (Kuhn 4-22). 21 stressed that Boutroux' contingency should not confused with chance: it was close to the of natural freedom, in the sense of free and unpredictable unfolding of natural laws. In contingency occupied the intermediate between chance and (Benrubi 154-157). Bordoni The French of Duhem's early Historiography and Epistemology 27 to brain physiology (Luys VIII-XI; Boëns 1878, 345-347, 349-354, and 359-360; Boëns 1879, 5-9, Cournot out the impossibility getting rid of meta-theoretical that philosophers" had discarded together (Cournot 371 words what had written some decades he stressed that "a body purely empirical knowledge is 1875, 371-376). On the other hand, Pierre Laffitte, of Comte's most passionate followers, and the of the community that accepted the whole of Comte's doctrine, insisted on
 not antiscientific but was baSed on the asSumptIon ThaT sHarp ReduCtionism and detERminIsm were not necessary fouNdatiOnS For a NAtUral sCience. HE DiD NOt dEsPiSe sCiENcE, and kEpt Abreast Of recent scIenTiFic achievemeNTs But he firmlY opPosed the posiTivIstic tReNd.21 BOUtrouX' thEses wEre put FOrward In a contexT wHEre posITivism wAS HeGemoNic; nevertheless, thE FoLLowing year, CourNot pubLiSHeD ANotHer Book where hIs Anti-rEDuctionISt ATTItuDE was further deVeloped. NeveRTheLess, hiS pHilOSophy oF scieNcE Was More cautiouS and Pliable thAn BoutROux's. The DEvelopmEnt of lIfe SciEnceS ReQuIreD a NEw ePIsTemOLogY: statistIcS aNd proBabiLITY AlloWed ScieNtistS to replace cerTaiNty wITh pRobabIlity. courNoT pursUed a neW alliAnCe between determInisM and contiNgeNcY, beTwEen thE StabilIty Of lAws and tHe contiNGenCy OF FAcTs. In the late 1870s we find ThAT SoMe physioLogistS AnD pHYsicians ReJecTed rEDUctioNism (eGgEr 1877, 193-196, 197-198, 200-201, 209-211) but the MajoriTY wAs Less cauTiOus thaN COurNot, And puT ForwArd a raDical redUctioN Of psychology, anTHropology, and sOCiOLOgY 20 it is WorTh remarking That, IN the TwenTIeTh cENtury, thomaS KUHn INquired extensively iNtO the twO tradItions (Kuhn 1976, 4-22). 21 BenRubi stressED THat BoutrOux' cONtINgency should noT be coNfused with CHance: it wAs cloSe to the iDea of natuRAL freedom, In tHe sEnsE of FREe And unpredictaBLE unfOlDing of nAtuRal laws. in oTheR woRds, CoNtingency Occupied ThE iNtErMedIate pLAce betweEn ChaNcE anD neceSSity (BeNrubi 1926, 154-157). stefAnO BORdoNi – The FrENcH rOots Of duHem's EarLy histoRiogRAphY and EpiStemology 27 To bRAin pHySiOlogy (LuYs 1876, VIII-XI; Boëns 1878, 345-347, 349-354, AnD 359-360; Boëns 1879, 5-9, and 14-15). COuRnoT pointED Out the imPossibility of getting rid OF meta-thEorEticaL praCtices thaT "poSitiviSt pHIlosopHers" haD discArDed TOGetheR WItH meTaPhysics (CouRNOt 1875, 371 aNd 373-5). His WoRds eChoed whAt Whewell had writteN SomE decades beforE: he StreSSEd ThaT "A bODy oF pURelY EMpirical knowledGe is not a reAl SCiEnce" (CournoT 1875, 371-376). on tHe Other haNd, PierrE LaffITte, one oF Comte's moSt passionAtE folLOWerS, and the heaD of the coMmunity thAT accePTeD the wHolE of ComTe'S doCtrinE, insisTEd oN empiRicism
 not antiscientific but wa s based on  theass ump ti on t hatsharp reductio n ismand determinism were n ot ne ce s sary fo undat ions fo r  a n atu ra lsci en c e.  He d idnot des pise scien ce,  a nd kept abre a st  of recent  sc ientific ach iev ements  b uth e fir mly  oppo sed th e  posit ivistic t re n d.21 B o utroux' t he seswere put forwardi na  context where  posit iv i sm w asheg emonic; ne ve rthel e ss, the fo l l o win g  year, Courno t published ano ther b oo k w h ere hi s ant i- r edu ctionist at titu de was fu rtherd evelope d . Never theles s,his  phi l os op hyof sci e nc e w a s m ore caut io us  andplia b l e than  Bo utro ux's.  The developm ent  ofl ife  scie ncesrequ ir ed anew ep istem ol ogy: statistics  and  probabil ity  a llo we d sci e ntists  to  re place c ertaint y  wi th p r ob ability. Cournot p ur s u ed  a new a llianc e  b et w een dete rm ini sm a n d  cont inge n cy , betwee n thes ta bi lity of  l aws an dthe  co nting e ncyof fac ts. In t he la t e 1870s we fin d  that some ph y si o l og i stsand  physicians  rej e cted  red u ct ion i sm (E gger18 7 7, 193-196, 197-198, 2 00 -201,209-2 11) but the m ajority wa s l ess caut ious th a n Cournot, and  putforward ar adical r educt ion of p sychology , anthropo log y,and  so c i ol ogy 20 It isw o rthre marking  th at, inthe  tw ent iet hcentury,Thomas K uh nin qu ire d ext e nsivelyin toth e t wo tr a dition s (Ku hn 1 97 6, 4-2 2). 21B en r u bi s tr es sedtha tBoutr oux' con tingenc y shouldnot be c on fu sed wit h chance: itwa s close to  t heidea o f naturalfreedom, in the sense o f  free a ndunpre dict able unfo ldi ng ofnat u ral la ws. In  othe rwor d s , con t i ng enc yoccupied t h e  in terme di ateplace b etween chance andn ece ssity (Benrub i 1 926, 1 54 -15 7 ). Ste fa n o B o r doni – The Fren ch Roots o fD uh em's early His to riograp hy andEpist e mology27 to bra in physio lo gy ( L u ys1876, VIII -XI; Boë ns 1878,3 45-34 7 ,349-3 54,  and 3 59 -36 0; Bo ëns 18 7 9,5-9,and 14 -1 5). Co urnot  p ointed o ut the impossibility of  getti ng ri d o f meta-th eor e tic al practi cesthat "posi tiv ist  phil oso p hers"  had di sca r ded t oget h er with m e ta phy s i cs  (Cournot 1 8 7 5 , 3 71 an d 3 7 3-5).Hiswords echoed what Whewell had wr itte n som e d e cade sbefore: he str ess ed t hat "a b od y of purely  empiric al knowl edge i s nota reals c ie n ce" (C ourn ot1875, 371 -37 6) .  On the  o th e r hand , Pi er re Laf fitte, oneo f  Comte's most pa ssion a t e fol l owe rs, a nd  the he a d of  the commu nity that a ccepte d th e who le of C om te's d oct ri ne, insist e d on empi ricis m
 not_antiscientific but_was based on the_assumption that_sharp_reductionism and_determinism_were not necessary_foundations for a_natural science. He did_not despise science,_and_kept abreast of recent scientific achievements but he firmly opposed the positivistic trend.21 Boutroux'_theses_were put_forward_in_a context where positivism was_hegemonic; nevertheless, the following year,_Cournot published_another book where his anti-reductionist attitude was further_developed._Nevertheless, his philosophy_of science was more cautious and pliable than Boutroux's._The development of life sciences required_a new epistemology:_statistics_and_probability allowed scientists to_replace certainty with probability. Cournot pursued_a new alliance between determinism and_contingency, between the stability of laws and_the contingency of facts. In the_late 1870s we find that_some physiologists_and physicians rejected reductionism (Egger_1877, 193-196, 197-198,_200-201, 209-211)_but the majority_was less cautious than Cournot, and_put forward a_radical reduction of psychology, anthropology, and_sociology_20 It is_worth_remarking_that, in_the twentieth century,_Thomas_Kuhn inquired_extensively_into the two traditions (Kuhn 1976,_4-22)._21 Benrubi stressed that Boutroux' contingency should_not be confused with_chance:_it was close to_the idea of natural freedom,_in the sense of free and_unpredictable unfolding_of natural_laws. In other words, contingency occupied the intermediate place between chance_and necessity (Benrubi 1926, 154-157). Stefano_Bordoni – The French_Roots of_Duhem's_early Historiography and_Epistemology_27 to_brain physiology (Luys 1876, VIII-XI; Boëns 1878,_345-347, 349-354,_and 359-360; Boëns 1879, 5-9, and_14-15). Cournot pointed out_the_impossibility of getting rid of meta-theoretical_practices that "positivist philosophers" had discarded_together with metaphysics (Cournot 1875,_371_and_373-5). His words echoed what_Whewell had written some decades before:_he stressed that_"a body of purely empirical knowledge is_not_a real science" (Cournot 1875, 371-376)._On_the other hand, Pierre Laffitte, one_of_Comte's_most passionate followers, and the_head of the community that accepted_the whole of Comte's doctrine, insisted on empiricism