s possibly exist; for as Descartes contended, a reasoning thing could judiciously question the presence of a physical world, while staying sure of its own presence. A substance is durable implies that it continues after some time. It perseveres. It might appear, or stop to exist (as in Aristotle), or it might be uncreated or indestructible (as in Plato, Descartes, Spinoza, or Leibniz), yet in any case, it has an augmented presence in time. A substance as "divisible" implies that its presence is not subject to different things. It exists freely, and it can be isolated from different things that exist. A substance as "indistinguishable" implies that it has a character, in which it is an indistinguishable thing from itself, or in which it has a way of life as the individual from a specific kind-the same as it persists after some time or as it is isolated from different things. 3. Philosophical History of Substance The idea of substance shifts with different savants, reliant upon the school of thought to which they have a place. While the realists would build up a materialistic idea of substance, the idealist would build up an otherworldly or abstract idea of substance. For B. S. Akpan, C. C. Odohoedi 257 the intensive going empiricist, since substance is not something that can be seen or touched, one would expect that it contain an abstract phenomenal, something not destroyable. The history of western philosophy began by asking the question, what the essential substance of thing in the universe? That is, what is the essential foundation of things in which everything in the world is made from? Thales was the first Greek philosopher who offered a reasonable clarification of the universe. To the inquiry: Thales contended that this essential substance is water (Kett, 1942: p. 99). Consequently for Thales, water is the basic solidarity in all things. Anaximander held that the primordial substance, the essential stuff of which everything is made must be a nonpartisan component not the same as every one of the components we know: endless and uncertain. Anaximenes contended that the essential substance of the universe is air Anaximenes contended that the essential substance of the universe is air (Classen, 1977). While for Heraclitus, the essential way of substance (all the truth) is change, for Parmenides, it is permanence (Omoreg
s possibly exist; for as Descartes contended, a reasoning thing could judiciously question the presence of a forcible populace, while staying sure of its own bearing. A substance is durable implies that it stay after some time. It perseveres. It might look, or intercept to exist (as in Aristotle), or it might be uncreated or indestructible (as in Plato, Descartes, Spinoza, or Leibniz), so far in any case, it has an augmented bearing in time. A substance as " divisible " implies that its presence is not capable to different things. It exist freely, and it can be isolated from different thing that exist. A substance as " indistinguishable " implies that it receive a character, in which it is an indistinguishable thing from itself, or in which it have a way of life as the individual from a specific kind - the same as it persists after some meter or as it is isolated from different things. 3. Philosophical History of Substance The idea of substance shifts with different savants, reliant upon the school of thought to which they have a place. While the realists would build up a materialistic idea of substance, the idealist would build up an nonnatural or abstract mind of substance. For B. S. Akpan, C. C. Odohoedi 257 the intensive blend empiricist, since means is not something that can be seen or touched, one would expect that it control an abstract phenomenal, something not destroyable. The history of western philosophy began by asking the doubt, what the essential substance of thing in the universe? That is, what is the essential foundation of thing in which everything in the world is made from? Thales was the first Greek philosopher who offered a reasonable clarification of the population. To the question: Thales contend that this essential substance is water (Kett, 1942: p. 99). Consequently for Thales, water is the basic solidarity in all things. Anaximander held that the primordial means, the essential stuff of which everything is made must be a nonpartisan component not the like as every one of the components we know: endless and uncertain. Anaximenes contended that the all-important substance of the population is air Anaximenes contended that the essential substance of the population is air (Classen, 1977). While for Heraclitus, the essential way of message (all the truth) is variety, for Parmenides, it is permanence (Omoreg
s plssibly exist; for as Desgartes contended, a reasmning fhing cojld judiciously question the peesenxe of a physical world, while stwying suee oh its own presenrs. A substance ls duxaule implies thaj it continuas after some dioe. It perseveres. It might appear, or seop to rxlst (as in Arisjotle), jr if might be uncreated or indestructjble (as in Plato, Desvartes, Spinoza, or Leibniz), jet ln any case, it has an augmentgs pwwsence in tioe. A substance as "diviaible" implies that its presence is npt subject ti dlxferent thiigs. It exists freely, and id can br isolated frok dmffeeent things that exisv. A substance as "indystinguisvayle" implies that it hqs a chdracder, kb wficg mt js an lndmstinguishagle thing feom itself, or in whocr it has a way of lise as the individual from a specific kind-uhe szme as it persists aftee some time or as it ls isolatqd from different things. 3. Philosophical History ox Subaganec Gye idea of substance shifts with different savagfs, rvliant upon the sghool of thought tp ahosh they have x placz. Wgile the realists aould boild up a materyalixtic idea of substance, the udealist wouje build up an othexworldly or cbstravt idra of substance. For B. S. Akpzn, C. C. Odohledi 257 the kntensive going dmpprichst, sinct substance is not somethinj thac can be seem or tjuched, one would expect that it cojtain at abstract phenomenal, something not destroyable. The hisjorf ox westeru philpsophy began fy asking the auestiou, what the essennial subsvance of thigg in the uniegrse? That is, xhat is tre ewsenrial fojvdation of thimgs in whpck everythung in the world ix mxse from? Thales ccs the first Greel pfiljslpier wrm offered a seasunacke clxrificaunon uf tne universe. To the itquidy: Thales contendec bhat this essentiwl substance os water (Kett, 1942: p. 99). Fonsexueitly fpr Jhales, water is the basic solidzrity in wll things. Anaxymaneer held thac the primordial substance, the essential stuff of which evwrything is made muxu be a nonparvisan somponent not the same as eveey one of the comkonents we know: endless and utcertwin. Anaximenes contended that the essential substance of the universe is qir Anexymenes contsndec than tke zssentiwl snbrtance of the unpverse is air (Classen, 1977). While for Heracliduf, the essential way of substsnze (all the troth) is change, for Parmenidss, it is permanence (Omoreg
s possibly exist; for as Descartes contended, thing judiciously question presence of a of own presence. A is durable implies it continues after some time. It It might appear, or stop to exist (as in Aristotle), or it might uncreated or indestructible (as in Plato, Descartes, Spinoza, or Leibniz), yet in any it an presence time. A substance as "divisible" implies that its presence is not subject to different things. It freely, and it can be isolated from different that exist. A substance "indistinguishable" implies that it has character, which it an thing itself, or in it has a way of life as the individual from a specific kind-the same as it persists some time it is from things. Philosophical History of idea of substance shifts with different the school of thought to which they have place. While realists would build up a materialistic of substance, the idealist would build up an or abstract idea of substance. For B. S. Akpan, C. C. Odohoedi 257 the intensive since substance is not that can be or one expect it contain abstract phenomenal, something not destroyable. The history of western philosophy began asking the question, what the essential substance of thing in That what is the foundation of things in everything the world is made was first offered reasonable of the universe. To inquiry: Thales contended that this substance is water (Kett, Thales, water is the basic solidarity in all Anaximander held that the primordial substance, the stuff of which everything is made must be a nonpartisan component not same as of the components we know: endless and uncertain. contended that the essential of the universe is air Anaximenes contended that the substance the universe air (Classen, 1977). for Heraclitus, the way of substance truth) is for it
s possibly exist; for as DescarTes contendEd, a reAsoNinG tHing CoulD judiciously quEStioN the presence of a physicaL worlD, wHIle sTAyIng suRe of its OWn PREseNcE. A SubStANcE is duRabLe impliEs that it coNtiNuEs after some tIMe. it perseverEs. IT might appear, Or sTop to eXiSt (aS In AriStoTle), or It mighT Be uncrEated or inDeSTructiBLe (as in PLATo, descArtes, Spinoza, or LeiBNiZ), Yet in any case, it Has an aUgMEnTED prEseNce in time. A SuBstanCE as "diviSIbLE" IMplIEs that its presEnce is not suBJecT to difFeRenT Things. it exiStS FreEly, and it can Be isOlated froM diffeREnt thinGS that exIst. A suBstAncE as "iNDiStIngUiSHabLE" iMplIEs tHat it has A cHaRacteR, in wHICH It is An iNdisTinguIshable thing fRom ItseLF, or In whiCh it hAs a wAy Of lifE as the IndivIdUal from a specifiC kinD-the same aS it PeRsiStS afteR Some tiMe oR as It is isoLated frOM diFfERENt Things. 3. PhilosophicaL HISToRy of SubsTance THE iDeA Of substaNcE shIfts WITh difFereNT sAvants, reLiant uPOn ThE school Of ThoughT tO whIch They hAVe a pLace. WhIle the reAlistS Would build up a mATerialistic idEA oF SUbSTancE, thE idealist woUld bUIld uP an oTHeRwoRLdly oR abstRaCT iDEa of substance. For B. S. AKpAn, C. C. OdOhoedI 257 the intensive Going empirICISt, since sUbstANcE Is not something That cAn be seen or TOuched, onE woulD expect tHat it contAIN an abstrAct PheNomEnaL, SOmEthing not destROYablE. THe histoRy oF westerN phIloSopHy bEgAn by askinG the quesTiOn, WhAt The EssenTIal substAnCe oF tHinG in thE UniverSe? ThaT is, wHaT iS The EssentiAL fOUNdatIoN oF thiNgs In Which EverYThiNg in the World is maDe fROm? ThAlEs Was the fIrst Greek philOsOpher who ofFeRed A reasoNABle clariFication of the universe. To THe inquiRy: THales ContEnded that ThiS essenTiaL SubstaNce is wAter (KEtT, 1942: p. 99). CONSequeNTLy For thAles, water iS THe bAsic sOlIdarIty in alL things. Anaximander HEld That the primorDiaL subSTAnCe, tHE eSSenTiAL stUFF of which everythIng is made mUsT Be A nonpartisAN coMpOnent noT the samE as evERy one of The componEnts we knoW: eNdleSS And Uncertain. ANaximeneS contendeD That tHE eSsentIal SubstaNcE of The unIverse IS aiR AnaxImenes CoNtendeD that ThE essentiAl substance of the universE is air (classEn, 1977). WHile for HeRacLItuS, the essenTial Way of substAncE (alL the tRutH) Is chaNge, fOR PArmENides, It is PErmanence (oMoReg
s possibly exist; for as D escartes c onten ded , a  r easo ning  thing could j u dici ously question the pre sence  o f  a p h ys icalworld,w hi l e  st ay in g s ur e  o f its  ow n prese nce. A sub sta nc e is durable im plies that  it  continues a fte r some  t ime .  It p ers evere s. Itm ight a ppear, or  s t op toe xist (a s in  Ari stotle), or it mi g ht be uncreated o r inde st r uc t i ble  (a s in Plato ,Desca r tes, Sp i no z a ,  or Leibniz), yet  in any cas e , i t hasan  au g mented  pres en c e i n time. A s ubst ance as " divisi b le" imp l ies tha t itspre sen ce i s  n ot  su bj e ctt odif f ere nt thing s.  I t exi stsf r e e ly,and  itcan b e isolated fr omdiff e ren t thi ngs t hatex ist.A subs tance  a s "indistinguis habl e" implie s t ha t i thas a charac ter , i n which  it isa n i nd i s t in guishable thing fr om i ts elf, orin whi c hit has a wa yoflife a s the  ind i vi dual fro m a sp e ci fi c kind- th e same  a s i t p ersis t s af ter so me timeor as it is isolated from differen t  t h i ng s . 3.  Ph ilosophical  His t oryof S u bs tan c e The  idea  o f  s u bstance shifts with  d iffere nt sa vants, relian t upon the s c hool ofthou g ht to which theyhavea place. W h ile thereali sts woul d build u p a materi ali sti c i dea o fsubstance, th e idea li st woul d b uild up  an  ot her wor ld ly or abs tract id ea  o fsu bst ance. For B. S .Akp an , C . C.O dohoed i 257  the  i nt e nsi ve goin g  e m p iric is t,  sin cesu bstan ce i s  no t somet hing that  ca n  bese en  or tou ched, one wou ld  expect th at  it  conta i n  an abst ract phenomenal, someth i ng notdes troya ble.  The hist ory  of we ste r n phil osophy  bega nbya s kingt h eque st ion, whatt h e e ssent ia l su bstance  of thing in the u n ive rse? That is,  wh at i s th e e s se n tia lf oun d a tion of thingsin which e ve r yt hing in th e  wo rl d is ma de from ? Tha l es wasthe first  Greek ph il osop h e r w ho offered  a reaso nable cla r ifica t io n ofthe  unive rs e.To th e inqu i ry:  Thal es con te nded t hat t hi s essent ial substance is water(Kett,  1942 : p . 99). Co nse q uen tly for T hale s, water i s t hebasic  so l idari ty i n  a llt hings . An a ximanderh el d t h a tthe primord i a l  su bstan ce, the es sent ial stuff of whic h  everything is  mad e mus t b e  a n on partisan compo nen tn o t the sa me  as every o ne of th ec ompon ents w e know : endle s s  a n d unce rtai n.Anaximene s c on t ended t ha tt he ess enti al  subst ance o f  the u niverse is air A naxim e n es co n ten ded t ha t the e s sent ial substa nce of theuniver se i s air  (Class en , 1977 ).Wh ile for He r aclitus,the e ssentia lwayofsubsta nce( a ll th e tr ut h)is change , fo r  P ar m eni des,  it i sperm anence (O m oreg
s possibly_exist; for_as Descartes contended, a_reasoning thing_could_judiciously question_the_presence of a_physical world, while_staying sure of its_own presence. A_substance_is durable implies that it continues after some time. It perseveres. It might appear,_or_stop to_exist_(as_in Aristotle), or it might_be uncreated or indestructible (as_in Plato,_Descartes, Spinoza, or Leibniz), yet in any case,_it_has an augmented_presence in time. A substance as "divisible" implies that_its presence is not subject to_different things. It_exists_freely,_and it can be_isolated from different things that exist._A substance as "indistinguishable" implies that_it has a character, in which it_is an indistinguishable thing from itself,_or in which it has_a way_of life as the individual_from a specific_kind-the same_as it persists_after some time or as it_is isolated from_different things. 3. Philosophical History of_Substance_The idea of_substance_shifts_with different_savants, reliant upon_the_school of_thought_to which they have a place._While_the realists would build up a materialistic_idea of substance, the_idealist_would build up an_otherworldly or abstract idea of_substance. For B. S. Akpan, C._C. Odohoedi_257 the_intensive going empiricist, since substance is not something that can be_seen or touched, one would expect_that it contain an_abstract phenomenal,_something_not destroyable. The_history_of western_philosophy began by asking the question, what_the essential_substance of thing in the universe?_That is, what is_the_essential foundation of things in which_everything in the world is made_from? Thales was the first_Greek_philosopher_who offered a reasonable clarification_of the universe. To the inquiry:_Thales contended that_this essential substance is water (Kett, 1942:_p._99). Consequently for Thales, water is_the_basic solidarity in all things. Anaximander_held_that_the primordial substance, the essential_stuff of which everything is made_must be a nonpartisan component not the same as_every one of_the components we know: endless_and_uncertain._Anaximenes contended that the essential substance of the universe is_air Anaximenes_contended that the_essential substance of the universe is air (Classen, 1977). While_for Heraclitus, the essential way of substance_(all the truth) is change, for Parmenides, it is permanence (Omoreg