 q, this justification need not come from a source distinct from experience. So epistemically charged experiences can immediately justify beliefs, and those beliefs, together with the experiences that immediately justify them, could in principle form a foundation for knowledge. In addition to asking whether self--‐charged experiences could provide immediate justification (they can), we can also ask whether they have to provide immediate justification. Here, the answer is No. If the minimal unit needed to provide justification includes more than the just an epistemically charged experience, then even a positively charged experience will not be able to provide immediate justification. Siegel/Epistemic Charge 20 The Phenomenal Ground Argument develops the idea that epistemic charge is grounded in the fact that experience belongs to one's outlook on the world. One might ask whether highly inattentive experiences contribute to one's outlook in a way that grounds epistemic charge.24 The phenomenal ground approach could be refined by excluding highly inattentive experiences. But since most experiences fall outside the category of highly inattentive ones, even this adjustment would make the scope of epistemic charge far--‐reaching. Epistemically charged experiences would still be standard rather than exceptional. The phenomenal ground idea could be developed either in a way that takes the foundation to include beliefs that self--‐ascribe experiences, or in a way that takes the foundation to include beliefs about the external world. If experiences are positively self--‐charged in having the self--‐reflexive content "I am having this experience", then the foundation can include self--‐ascriptions of experiences. If experiences lack self--‐ reflexive contents, and their only presentational phenomenology is reflected in external--‐world contents, then the foundation can include beliefs about the external world. The important point is that from the fact that all perceptual experiences are epistemically charged by their presentational phenomenal character, it does not follow that foundationalism is false, or that it is true, or that experiences cannot provide immediate justification or that they can. These positions can only emerge from further commitments, beyond the commitment that all experiences are positively epistemically charged by virtue of their presentational phenomenal character. Inference: Ground vs. Modulator I've been discussing the hypothesis that the presentational phenomenal character gives experience an epistemic charge. This hypothesis develops the idea that experiences are epistemically charged because they belong to one's outlook on the world. According to a different way to develop this idea, experiences have a rational standing exactly when they result from the kinds of inference
q, this justification need not come from a source distinct from experience. So epistemically charge experience can immediately justify beliefs, and those beliefs, in concert with the experiences that immediately justify them, could in principle form a basis for knowledge. In addition to ask whether self--‐charged experiences could provide contiguous justification (they can), we can also ask whether they have to provide contiguous justification. Here, the answer is No. If the minimal unit of measurement needed to provide justification include more than the just an epistemically charged experience, then even a positively charged experience will not be able to leave immediate justification. Siegel / Epistemic Charge 20 The Phenomenal Ground Argument develops the idea that epistemic care is grounded in the fact that experience belongs to one's outlook on the world. One might ask whether highly inattentive experience contribute to one's outlook in a way that grounds epistemic charge.24 The phenomenal ground approach could be refined by excluding highly inattentive experiences. But since most experiences fall outside the category of highly inattentive ones, even this adjustment would make the scope of epistemic charge far--‐reaching. Epistemically charge experiences would still be standard quite than exceeding. The phenomenal ground idea could be developed either in a direction that takes the foundation to include beliefs that self--‐ascribe experience, or in a way that takes the foundation to include beliefs about the external world. If experience are positively self--‐charged in having the self--‐reflexive content " I am having this experience ", then the foundation can admit self--‐ascriptions of experiences. If experience lack self--‐ reflexive contents, and their only presentational phenomenology is reflected in external--‐world subject, then the foundation can include beliefs about the external populace. The important point is that from the fact that all perceptual experiences are epistemically charged by their presentational phenomenal quality, it does not follow that foundationalism is fake, or that it is true, or that experiences cannot supply immediate justification or that they can. These position can only issue from further commitments, beyond the committedness that all experiences are positively epistemically charged by virtue of their presentational phenomenal quality. Inference: Ground vs. Modulator I've been discussing the guess that the presentational phenomenal character gives experience an epistemic mission. This hypothesis develops the idea that experiences are epistemically charged because they belong to to one's outlook on the world. harmonize to a different way to develop this idea, experiences have a rational standing precisely when they result from the kinds of inference
 q, hhis justification need kot come from a source vistincf from ebperience. So epistemically ciargwd exkvriences can immediatdly justivy belieds, aid those beliefs, togethev witg the xxperiences thaj immediatelf justify them, cuupd in principle form a foundation fjr knowkefge. In additiog to wskihg whether self--‐charged experiences could krovide immediate kustification (they can), we fan wlso ask whether tjey have to produde immediatd justification. Here, tge answer is No. If the minimal jnit ueeded to ptobifg justificatmon inbludes more tmsn the just am epistemicalln chacged experience, then even a positively charded experheuce will not be able ro provhde hmmeauatd jhsvifjcatioj. Smegel/Epistejic Charge 20 The Phenomenal Groinq Argument devslops ehq idea that epistemic charge is groundeg ih the fact that experiebce belongs to one's ootlook on ehe world. One might ask whether highly inattentiva expxrkenecf xojtribute to one's outlook in a way that groundf ekisnemic charge.24 The ihenomenal ground sporpwch could be tefined by excluding highly lnattenjive ezperiencef. Buy since most experiences faol outside tke xategory of highly inattentivz ones, even this adjustment would oake the scope lf epistejkc charge far--‐reazhikg. Apistemically charged expewiences wiuld still ce sjandard rather thwn exgaptional. The phenolenal gsound idea could be developed either in a way that takex dhe foundatnon to include beliqfs that self--‐axcribe zxperidnces, or ih a way that takes the foundatimj to include beliefs aboyt tye extefval world. If ecperiences are posirively self--‐charged in gaving the self--‐xtfltxuve content "I sm favynh vhis qfperience", than tfe wpundagion can ingluae srlf--‐ascriptions of ex[erisnces. If experiencrs lack seof--‐ reflevive contents, and their only prtsentavional phenpmegology is reflected in externam--‐world cojtekts, then the souneation can iuclude beliefs about the external world. Vhe important point is rhat from the fact jhau all perceptnal ex[eriences are epistemically cyarged by their pvesentational phenomenzl chasacteg, it does not follow that foundationalism is false, or that it is true, or rhat eepqriences cahnot provpde nmmediaee jnsvification or than they can. These positions can oily emerge fxom further commitments, beyonc ghe commitmenj that all experiences are positivrly epistemically charged by vittue of their presentatipnal phebomenzl chagzcver. Inference: Ground vs. Mobulatoe I've bwen fiscussing thd huplthesis tjat uhe 'resentational phenomenal charactwr givws experience an e'istemic chavgt. This gypothgsis develops the idez that experiences sre epistemicakly charged because nher belong to ont's outlook on tne wotod. According tp a differett way to develop this idea, experiences have a ratiknal stansing exagtly when they rexnlt from the kinds of innerense
q, this justification need not come from distinct experience. So charged experiences can beliefs, with the experiences immediately justify them, in principle form a foundation for In addition to asking whether self--‐charged experiences could provide immediate justification (they can), can also ask whether they have to provide immediate justification. Here, the answer No. the unit to provide justification includes more than the just an epistemically charged experience, then even a positively experience will not be able to provide immediate Siegel/Epistemic Charge 20 The Ground Argument develops the idea epistemic is grounded the that belongs to one's on the world. One might ask whether highly inattentive experiences contribute to one's outlook in a way grounds epistemic phenomenal ground could refined excluding highly inattentive since most experiences fall outside the inattentive ones, even this adjustment would make the of epistemic far--‐reaching. Epistemically charged experiences would still standard rather than exceptional. The phenomenal ground idea be developed either in a way that takes the foundation to include beliefs that self--‐ascribe in a way that the foundation to beliefs the world. experiences are self--‐charged in having the self--‐reflexive content "I am having this experience", the foundation can include self--‐ascriptions of experiences. If experiences lack contents, their only presentational is reflected in external--‐world then foundation can include beliefs external The that the that all perceptual experiences epistemically charged by their presentational character, it does not or that it is true, or that experiences provide immediate justification or that they can. positions can only emerge from further commitments, beyond the commitment that all are positively by virtue of their presentational phenomenal character. Inference: vs. Modulator I've been the hypothesis that the presentational phenomenal character gives experience epistemic This hypothesis the idea that are epistemically charged they belong to on the According a develop this idea, experiences have a standing when they result from the of
 q, this justification need not Come from a sOurce DisTinCt From ExpeRience. So episteMIcalLy charged experiences caN immeDiATely JUsTify bEliefs, aND tHOSe bElIeFs, tOgEThEr witH thE experiEnces that iMmeDiAtely justify THeM, could in prIncIple form a fouNdaTion foR kNowLEdge. IN adDitioN to askINg whetHer self--‐chArGEd expeRIences cOULd ProvIde immediate justiFIcATion (they can), we cAn also AsK WhETHer TheY have to proViDe immEDiate juSTiFICAtiON. Here, the answeR is No. If the mINimAl unit NeEdeD To provIde juStIFicAtion includEs moRe than the Just an EPistemiCAlly chaRged exPerIenCe, thEN eVeN a pOsITivELy ChaRGed ExperienCe WiLl not Be abLE TO ProvIde ImmeDiate Justification. sieGel/EPIstEmic CHarge 20 the PHeNomenAl GrouNd ArgUmEnt develops the iDea tHat episteMic ChArgE iS grouNDed in tHe fAct That expErience BEloNgS TO OnE's outlook on the worlD. ONE MiGht ask whEther hIGhLy INattentiVe ExpErieNCEs conTribUTe To one's ouTlook iN A wAy That groUnDs episTeMic ChaRge.24 ThE PhenOmenal Ground apProacH Could be refined BY excluding higHLy INAtTEntiVe eXperiences. BUt siNCe moSt exPErIenCEs falL outsIdE ThE Category of highly inaTtEntive Ones, eVen this adjustMent would mAKE The scope Of epIStEMic charge far--‐reAchinG. EpistemicALly chargEd expEriences Would stilL BE standarD raTheR thAn eXCEpTional. The phenOMEnal GrOund ideA coUld be deVelOpeD eiTheR iN a way that Takes the FoUnDaTiOn tO inclUDe beliefS tHat SeLf--‐aScribE ExperiEnces, Or in A wAy THat Takes thE FoUNDatiOn To InclUde BeLiefs AbouT The ExternaL world. If eXpeRIencEs ArE positiVely self--‐chargEd In having thE sElf--‐ReflexIVE content "i am having this experience", THen the fOunDatioN can Include seLf--‐aScriptIonS Of expeRienceS. If exPeRieNCEs lacK SElF--‐ reFlExive conteNTS, anD theiR oNly pResentaTional phenomenologY Is rEflected in extErnAl--‐woRLD cOntENtS, TheN tHE foUNDation can includE beliefs abOuT ThE external wORld. thE importAnt poinT is thAT from thE fact that All percepTuAl exPERieNces are epiStemicalLy charged BY theiR PrEsentAtiOnal phEnOmeNal chAracteR, It dOes noT folloW tHat fouNdatiOnAlism is fAlse, or that it is true, or thaT experIenceS caNnot proviDe iMMedIate justiFicaTion or that TheY caN. ThesE poSItionS can ONlY emERge frOm fuRTher commiTMeNts, BEYoNd the commitMENT thAt all ExpERienceS are Positively epistemICally charged by VirtUE Of tHeiR PresEnTational phenomEnaL cHARacter. InFeRence: Ground Vs. ModulaToR i've beEn discUssing The hypoTHEsIS that tHe prEseNtational PheNoMEnal chaRaCtER gives ExpeRiEnce an EpisteMIc chARGe. This hypothesis DevelOPS the iDEa tHat exPeRiences ARe epIstemicallY charged becAuse thEy beLong tO one's ouTlOok on tHe wOrLd. AccordinG To a differEnt waY to deveLoP thiS idEa, expeRienCES have A ratIoNal Standing eXACtLY wHeN TheY resUlt frOm The kInds of infERence
 q, this justification nee d not come  from  asou rc e di stin ct from experi e nce.  So epistemically char ged e xp e rien c es  canimmedia t el y jus ti fy  be li e fs , and  th ose bel iefs, toge the rwith the exp e ri ences that  im mediately ju sti fy the m,  co u ld in  pr incip le for m  a fou ndation f or knowle d ge. Ina d di tion  to asking whethe r  s e lf--‐charged e xperie nc e sc o uld  pr ovide imme di ate j u stifica t io n ( the y  can), we can  also ask w h eth er the yhav e  to pr ovide  i m med iate justif icat ion. Here , thea nswer i s  No. If  the m ini mal  uni t  n ee ded  t o  pr o vi dej ust ificatio nin clude s mo r e t hanthe  jus t anepistemically  ch arge d  ex perie nce,then  e ven a  posit ively  c harged experien ce w ill not b e a bl e t oprovi d e imme dia tejustifi cation. Sie ge l / E pi stemic Charge 20 T he P he nomenalGround Ar gu m ent deve lo psthei d ea th at e p is temic ch arge i s  g ro unded i nthe fa ct  th atexper i ence  belon gs to on e's o u tlook on the w o rld. One migh t  a s k  w h ethe r h ighly inatt enti v e ex peri e nc esc ontri buteto on e 's outlook in a way  t hat gr ounds  epistemic ch arge.24 Th e p henomena l gr o un d  approach coul d berefined by excludin g hig hly inat tentive e x p eriences . B utsin cem o st  experiencesf a ll o ut side th e c ategory  of  hi ghl y i na ttentiveones, ev en  t hi sadj ustme n t wouldma keth e s copeo f epis temic  cha rg ef ar- -‐reach i ng . Epis te mi call y c ha rgedexpe r ien ces wou ld stillbes tand ar dratherthan exceptio na l. The phe no men al gro u n d idea c ould be developed eithe r  in a w aythattake s the fou nda tion t o i n cludebelief s tha tsel f - -‐asc r i be  ex pe riences, o r ina way  t hattakes t he foundation to i n clu de beliefs ab out  the e xt ern a lw orl d. Ife x periences are p ositivelyse l f- -‐chargedi n h av ing the  self-- ‐refl e xive co ntent "Iam having  t hise x per ience", th en the f oundation can i n cl ude s elf --‐asc ri pti ons o f expe r ien ces.If exp er iences  lack  s elf--‐ r eflexive contents, andtheironlypre sentation alp hen omenology  isreflectedinext ernal --‐ w orldcont e nt s,t hen t he f o undationc an  in c l ud e beliefs a b o u t t he ex ter n al wor ld.The important poi n t is that from  the f act  th a t al lperceptual exp eri en c e s are ep is temically c harged b yt heirpresen tation al phen o m en a l char acte r,it does n otfo l low tha tfo u ndatio nali sm  is fa lse, o r  tha t it is true, or t hat e x p erien c escanno tprovide imme diate just ification o r that  the y can . These  p ositio nsca n only eme r ge from f urthe r commi tm ents , b eyondthec o mmitm entth atall exper i e nc e sar e  po siti velyep iste mically c h arged by  vi r tue ofth eir p resent a ti o n al phenome nal  char a c ter. Infer e nce: Gr o und v s. Mod ulator  I've b e endi scussin g t h e  hypothes is that t h e p re sent ationalph enom en alch aracter gives e xperienc e an epi s t emic c har g e. T h is hyp ot hesis develo ps th ei dea tha t exp erience s  ar e e pis temi cal ly c h arged because they belon g to  one' s  ou tlook  on t he  world.A ccor ding toa  different wa y to develop th i s i d ea,exp e ri en ces havea r a tiona l st and ingexa ctly w hent heyr es ultfrom t he k in ds  of infer en ce
 q,_this justification_need not come from_a source_distinct_from experience._So_epistemically charged experiences_can immediately justify_beliefs, and those beliefs,_together with the_experiences_that immediately justify them, could in principle form a foundation for knowledge. In addition_to_asking whether_self--‐charged_experiences_could provide immediate justification (they_can), we can also ask_whether they_have to provide immediate justification. Here, the answer_is_No. If the_minimal unit needed to provide justification includes more than_the just an epistemically charged experience,_then even a_positively_charged_experience will not be_able to provide immediate justification. Siegel/Epistemic_Charge 20 The Phenomenal Ground Argument_develops the idea that epistemic charge is_grounded in the fact that experience_belongs to one's outlook on_the world._One might ask whether highly_inattentive experiences contribute_to one's_outlook in a_way that grounds epistemic charge.24 The_phenomenal ground approach_could be refined by excluding highly_inattentive_experiences. But since_most_experiences_fall outside_the category of_highly_inattentive ones,_even_this adjustment would make the scope_of_epistemic charge far--‐reaching. Epistemically charged experiences would_still be standard rather_than_exceptional. The phenomenal ground_idea could be developed either_in a way that takes the_foundation to_include beliefs_that self--‐ascribe experiences, or in a way that takes the foundation_to include beliefs about the external_world. If experiences are_positively self--‐charged_in_having the self--‐reflexive_content_"I am_having this experience", then the foundation can_include self--‐ascriptions_of experiences. If experiences lack self--‐_reflexive contents, and their_only_presentational phenomenology is reflected in external--‐world_contents, then the foundation can include_beliefs about the external world._The_important_point is that from the_fact that all perceptual experiences are_epistemically charged by_their presentational phenomenal character, it does not_follow_that foundationalism is false, or that_it_is true, or that experiences cannot_provide_immediate_justification or that they can._These positions can only emerge from_further commitments, beyond the commitment that all experiences are_positively epistemically charged_by virtue of their presentational_phenomenal_character._Inference: Ground vs. Modulator I've been discussing the hypothesis that_the presentational_phenomenal character gives_experience an epistemic charge. This hypothesis develops the idea that_experiences are epistemically charged because they belong_to one's outlook on the world. According to a different way_to develop this idea, experiences have a rational_standing exactly when they result from the_kinds of inference