 representation, depending on which of the three constituents of the propositional attitude is represented explicitly. We can distinguish between: (1) explicit content but implicit attitude and implicit holder of the attitude; (2) explicit content and attitude but implicit holder of attitude; (3) explicit content, attitude and holder of attitude.11 Their idea is that in the first instance it is the proposition that is represented, whereas the attitude results from the functional role of that representation. For example, a desire has a different functional role in my cognitive architecture than a belief, a fear or a wish. But the propositional attitude itself can also be explicitly represented as in when I am aware of the fact that I am currently entertaining a belief as opposed to a wish, imagination or worry. The attitude can then also be explicitly ascribed to myself (or, as it were, to another subject), thus making the holder of the attitude explicit.12 So say I am at this moment seeing a red lamp on my desk. In order to consciously access the content of this visual experience (so that I can report on the lamp, for instance), I must explicitly represent the red lamp. But I need not explicitly represent the fact that this is a visual perception, or that it is me who has this experience. However, in order for me to be aware of the fact that I am entertaining a visual representation, the information that was previously implicit in the functional role that my representation played must be represented explicitly. And the same holds for the fact that it is me (rather than someone else) who is seeing the lamp. This fact is implicit in the fact that I do indeed have the experience, but it must be made explicit for me to consciously access it (such that I can then form an 'I'thought). Now, on my view, proponents of theories of nonconceptual content are correct in pointing out the fact that perception is always perception from a specific egocentric perspective and hence necessarily self-related.13 They are also correct in pointing out that proprioception delivers the 11 Moreover, propositional contents contain different components, such as individuals, properties, predication relations between the former and the latter, as well as temporal context and factuality vs. fiction, each of which can also be either implicitly or explicitly represented. 12 Note that, as we are concerned here with nonconceptual as well as conceptual representations, in the following, I will sometimes choose the more neutral term "intentional attitude", rather than "propositional attitude". In contrast to the
representation, depending on which of the three constituents of the propositional attitude is represent explicitly. We can identify between: (1) explicit content but implicit attitude and implicit holder of the position; (2) explicit content and attitude but implicit holder of position; (3) denotative content, attitude and holder of attitude.11 Their idea is that in the first instance it is the proposal that is represented, whereas the attitude leave from the running role of that representation. For case, a desire has a different running role in my cognitive architecture than a belief, a concern or a wish. But the propositional attitude itself can also be explicitly represented as in when I am aware of the fact that I am presently entertaining a impression as opposed to a wish, imagination or worry. The position can then also be explicitly ascribed to myself (or, as it were, to another subject), thus making the holder of the attitude explicit.12 So say I am at this moment seeing a red lamp on my desk. In order to consciously access the content of this visual experience (so that I can report on the lamp, for instance), I must explicitly represent the red lamp. But I need not explicitly typify the fact that this is a visual perception, or that it is me who have this experience. However, in decree for me to be aware of the fact that I am entertaining a visual representation, the information that was previously implicit in the functional role that my theatrical performance played must be represented explicitly. And the same holds for the fact that it is me (rather than someone else) who is seeing the lamp. This fact is implicit in the fact that I do indeed have the experience, but it must be made explicit for me to consciously access it (such that I can then form an' I'thought). Now, on my view, proponents of theory of nonconceptual content are right in point out the fact that perception is always perception from a specific egoistic perspective and hence necessarily self - related.13 They are also correct in pointing out that proprioception delivers the 11 Moreover, propositional contents check different part, such as individuals, properties, postulation relations between the former and the latter, as well as temporal context and factuality vs. fabrication, each of which can also be either implicitly or explicitly represented. 12 bill that, as we are concerned here with nonconceptual as well as conceptual representation, in the following, I will sometimes choose the more neutral term " intentional attitude ", rather than " propositional attitude ". In contrast to the
 reoresentation, depending ok which of the tkeee coistituehts of tfe propositional attitude is rwprestuted explicitly. We cxn distinhuish berweei: (1) explicit contxht but liplidlt atcivude and impliclt holder ox the attitude; (2) dx'licit content and attitude but implycit hokdfr of attitude; (3) exklisit dontent, attitude and holder of attjtude.11 Tieir idea is thst in the first instance ih is the proposition tjat is reprgaenewd, whereas tfe attitudt xesults froj the functional role of that rdpreszntation. Fot sxwkple, a desice has a different functiotal rolr in my cognitlve acchirecture than a belief, a fear or a wish. Fut the pso'ositional attitude irswlf cdn anso cw ebpljcmtlg reprfseited as in shen I am aqare of the fact thst P am currentlg entewtwining a belief as opposed to a wish, imdgihation or worry. The attutude can then also bg explicitjy ascribed to myself (or, as it were, to another sutject), ghuw ixjijg the holder of the attitude explicit.12 So say J sm at this momenb seeing a red laml ln iy desk. In oraer to cohsciously access tje contgnt of this vistal rxperience (so that I can report on the jqmp, for instance), I must explieitly tepresrnt the red lamp. But I ueed nkt explicitpy repressvt the fact that thps iv a visual perception, or trat it is me cho has ghis experyence. Howeger, ik order for me to bf awate of dhe fact tjat I am entertaining a visual cxpresentation, tve pnformatijn thst was previotsly implicit nn the fbnctioval role tgat my cepresentatijn played musd be represenved explisitlt. Ane the sxoe holds for tne fact tkct it is ne (rather than somcone glae) who is seeiny uhw lamp. This favt ks ymilirit ig the fact thdt I do ondeea have uke cxpdriemce, but it must be mdde sxplicit for me to cjnsciousoy accesf it (such thay I can then form wn 'I'tiought). Now, pn iy view, proponents of theories of noncojceitual content are correct in 'ointing out the fact that perception is always perception from a specific egpgentric pers'ectivq and henwe necessarily self-rwlated.13 They are akso correct in pointihg out that proprioception delivers the 11 Moreover, propositional contents contain difderent components, auch as itdnvibuals, pwopectmes, predication rvlations between the former and vhe latter, af well as temporal context amd factuality vr. fiction, each of which dan also be either implicitly or explicotly represented. 12 Note tmat, as we are doncerned iere with nonconceptial as well as conxeptmal representagioms, in the fllloxiny, I will sometimes choose the morw neuteap term "intentionel attitude", vauher thzn "prokositional attituse". Ih conttast to the
representation, depending on which of the three the attitude is explicitly. We can but attitude and implicit of the attitude; explicit content and attitude but implicit of attitude; (3) explicit content, attitude and holder of attitude.11 Their idea is in the first instance it is the proposition that is represented, whereas the results the role that representation. For example, a desire has a different functional role in my cognitive architecture than belief, a fear or a wish. But the attitude itself can also explicitly represented as in when am of the that am entertaining a belief opposed to a wish, imagination or worry. The attitude can then also be explicitly ascribed to myself as it another subject), making holder the attitude explicit.12 I am at this moment seeing on my desk. In order to consciously access content of visual experience (so that I can on the lamp, for instance), I must explicitly the red lamp. But I need not explicitly represent the fact that this is a or that it is who has this However, order me be aware the fact that I am entertaining a visual representation, the information was previously implicit in the functional role that my representation be explicitly. And the holds for the fact it me (rather than someone is the is in fact that I do have the experience, but it be made explicit for (such that I can then form an 'I'thought). on my view, proponents of theories of content are correct in pointing out the fact that perception is always from a perspective and hence necessarily self-related.13 They are also in pointing out that delivers the 11 Moreover, propositional contents contain different components, as properties, predication between the former the latter, as as temporal context vs. fiction, of can implicitly or explicitly represented. 12 Note as are concerned here with nonconceptual well representations, in the following, I will sometimes choose the more neutral term "intentional attitude", rather attitude". In contrast to
 representation, depending on Which of the Three ConStiTuEnts Of thE propositional ATtitUde is represented explicItly. WE cAN disTInGuish Between: (1) EXpLICit CoNtEnt BuT ImPliciT atTitude aNd implicit HolDeR of the attituDE; (2) eXplicit conTenT and attitude But ImplicIt HolDEr of aTtiTude; (3) eXpliciT ContenT, attitude AnD Holder OF attituDE.11 thEir iDea is that in the firST iNStance it is the pRoposiTiON tHAT is RepResented, whErEas thE AttitudE ReSULTs fROm the functionAl role of thaT RepResentAtIon. fOr examPle, a dEsIRe hAs a differenT funCtional roLe in my COgnitivE ArchiteCture tHan A beLief, A FeAr Or a WiSH. BuT ThE prOPosItional aTtItUde itSelf CAN ALso bE exPlicItly rEpresented as iN whEn I aM AwaRe of tHe facT thaT I Am curRently EnterTaIning a belief as oPposEd to a wish, ImaGiNatIoN or woRRy. The aTtiTudE can theN also be EXplIcITLY aScribed to myself (or, aS iT WErE, to anothEr subjECt), ThUS making tHe HolDer oF THe attItudE ExPlicit.12 So Say I am AT tHiS moment SeEing a rEd LamP on My desK. in orDer to cOnsciousLy accESs the content of THis visual expeRIeNCE (sO That i caN report on thE lamP, For iNstaNCe), i muST explIcitlY rEPrESent the red lamp. But I nEeD not exPliciTly represent tHe fact that THIS is a visuAl peRCePTion, or that it is Me who Has this expERience. HoWever, In order fOr me to be aWARe of the fAct ThaT I aM enTERtAining a visual REPresEnTation, tHe iNformatIon ThaT waS prEvIously impLicit in tHe FuNcTiOnaL role THat my repReSenTaTioN playED must bE reprEsenTeD eXPliCitly. AnD ThE SAme hOlDs For tHe fAcT that It is ME (raTher thaN someone eLse) WHo is SeEiNg the laMp. This fact is iMpLicit in the FaCt tHat I do INDeed have The experience, but it must bE Made expLicIt for Me to ConsciousLy aCcess iT (suCH that I Can theN form An 'i'thOUGht). NoW, ON mY viEw, Proponents OF TheOries Of NoncOnceptuAl content are correcT In pOinting out the FacT thaT PErCepTIoN Is aLwAYs pERCeption from a speCific egoceNtRIc PerspectivE And HeNce neceSsarily Self-rELated.13 ThEy are also Correct in PoIntiNG Out That propriOception Delivers tHE 11 MoreOVeR, propOsiTional CoNteNts coNtain dIFfeRent cOmponeNtS, such aS indiViDuals, proPerties, predication relatIons beTween The Former and The LAttEr, as well aS temPoral conteXt aNd fActuaLitY Vs. ficTion, EAcH of WHich cAn alSO be either IMpLicITLy Or explicitlY REPreSenteD. 12 NoTE that, aS we aRe concerned here wiTH nonconceptual As weLL As cOncEPtuaL rEpresentations, In tHe FOLlowing, I WiLl sometimes Choose thE mORe neuTral teRm "inteNtional ATTiTUde", ratHer tHan "PropositiOnaL aTTitude". IN cOnTRast to The
 representation, depending  on whichof th e t hre econs titu ents of the pr o posi tional attitude is rep resen te d  exp l ic itly.  We can di s t ing ui sh  be tw e en : (1)  ex plicitcontent bu t i mp licit attitu d eand implic itholder of th e a ttitud e;  (2 )  expl ici t con tent a n d atti tude butim p licith older o f at titu de; (3) explicitc on t ent, attitudeand ho ld e ro f  at tit ude.11 The ir  idea is that in t h e f i rst instanceit is the p r opo sition  t hat is rep resen te d , w hereas theatti tude resu lts fr o m the f u nctiona l role  of  th at r e pr es ent at i on. Fo r e x amp le, a de si re  hasa di f f e r entfun ctio nal r ole in my cog nit ivea rch itect ure t hanabelie f, a f ear o ra wish. But the  pro positiona l a tt itu de  itse l f canals o b e expli citly r e pre se n t e das in when I am aw ar e of  the fac t that Iam currentl yent erta i n ing a  bel i ef  as oppo sed to awi sh, ima gi nation  o r w orr y. Th e  att itudecan then  also be explicitlya scribed to my s el f (o r , as  it  were, to a noth e r su bjec t ),  th u s mak ing t he ho l der of the attitude  e xplici t.12So say I am a t this mom e n t  seeinga re d  l a mp on my desk.  In o rder to co n sciously  acce ss the c ontent of t his visu alexp eri enc e (s o that I canr e port  o n the l amp , for i nst anc e),  Imu st explic itly rep re se nt  t hered l a mp. ButInee dnot  expl i citlyrepre sent  t he fac t thatt hi s is a  v is ualper ce ption , or tha t it is  me who h ast hisex pe rience.  However, inor der for me  t o b e awar e of the f act that I am entertain i ng a vi sua l rep rese ntation,the  infor mat i on tha t wasprevi ou sly i mplic i t  i n t he  functiona l rol e tha tmy r epresen tation played must berepresented e xpl icit l y .And th e  sa me hol d s  for the fact t hat it isme (r ather than som eo ne else ) who i s see i ng thelamp. Thi s fact is  i mpli c i t i n the fact  that Ido indeed havet he  expe rie nce, b ut  it  must  be ma d e e xplic it for  m e to c onsci ou sly acce ss it (such that I canthen f orm a n ' I'thought ).N ow,  on my vi ew,proponents  of  th eorie s o f  nonc once p tu alc onten t ar e  correcti npoi n t in g out the f a c t  th at pe rce p tion i s al ways perception f r om a specificegoc e n tri c p e rspe ct ive and hencenec es s a rily sel f- related.13They are  a l so co rrectin poi nting o u t  t h at pro prio cep tion deli ver st he 11 M or eo v er, pr opos it ionalconten t s co n t ain different co mpone n t s, su c h a s ind iv iduals, prop erties, pr edication r elatio ns b etwee n the f or mer an d t he  latter, a s  well astempo ral con te xt a ndfactua lity v s. fi ctio n,  ea ch of whi c h  c a nal s o b e ei therim plic itly or e x plicitly  re p resente d.  12 N ote th a t, a s we are c onc erned h ere with n o ncon c ep t ual a s well  as co nceptua l  re pr esentat ion s ,  in the f ollowing, I w il l so metimesch oose  t hemo re neutral term  "intent ional at t i tude",  ra t hert han "p ro positional a ttitu de " . In co n t ras t to th e 
 representation,_depending on_which of the three_constituents of_the_propositional attitude_is_represented explicitly. We_can distinguish between:_(1) explicit content but_implicit attitude and_implicit_holder of the attitude; (2) explicit content and attitude but implicit holder of attitude;_(3)_explicit content,_attitude_and_holder of attitude.11 Their idea_is that in the first_instance it_is the proposition that is represented, whereas the_attitude_results from the_functional role of that representation. For example, a desire_has a different functional role in_my cognitive architecture_than_a_belief, a fear or_a wish. But the propositional attitude_itself can also be explicitly represented_as in when I am aware of_the fact that I am currently_entertaining a belief as opposed_to a_wish, imagination or worry. The_attitude can then_also be_explicitly ascribed to_myself (or, as it were, to_another subject), thus_making the holder of the attitude_explicit.12_So say I_am_at_this moment_seeing a red_lamp_on my_desk._In order to consciously access the_content_of this visual experience (so that I_can report on the_lamp,_for instance), I must_explicitly represent the red lamp._But I need not explicitly represent_the fact_that this_is a visual perception, or that it is me who has_this experience. However, in order for_me to be aware_of the_fact_that I am_entertaining_a visual_representation, the information that was previously implicit_in the_functional role that my representation played_must be represented explicitly._And_the same holds for the fact_that it is me (rather than_someone else) who is seeing_the_lamp._This fact is implicit in_the fact that I do indeed_have the experience,_but it must be made explicit for_me_to consciously access it (such that_I_can then form an 'I'thought). Now,_on_my_view, proponents of theories of_nonconceptual content are correct in pointing_out the fact that perception is always perception from_a specific egocentric_perspective and hence necessarily self-related.13_They_are_also correct in pointing out that proprioception delivers the 11_Moreover, propositional_contents contain different_components, such as individuals, properties, predication relations between the former_and the latter, as well as temporal_context and factuality vs. fiction, each of which can also be_either implicitly or explicitly represented. 12 Note that,_as we are concerned here with nonconceptual_as well as conceptual_representations,_in the following, I will sometimes choose_the_more_neutral_term "intentional attitude",_rather than "propositional_attitude". In contrast_to the