ling the line between attitude verbs and necessity modals. InModality Across Syntactic Categories, pages 610–633. Oxford University Press. Scheffler, T. (2008). Semantic operators in different dimensions. PhD thesis, University of Pennsylvania. Silk, A. (2018). Commitment and states of mind with mood and modality. Natural Language Semantics, 26:125–166. Stalnaker, R. (1968). A theory of conditionals. In Rescher, N., editor, Studies in Logical Theory (American Philosophical Quarterly Monographs 2), pages 98–112. Blackwell. Stalnaker, R. (1975). Indicative conditionals. Philosophia, 5(3):269–286. Stalnaker, R. (1984). Inquiry. Cambridge University Press. Villalta, E. (2008). Mood and gradability: An investigation of the subjunctive mood in Spanish. Linguistics and Philosophy, 31(4):467–522. Wrenn, C. (2010). A puzzle about desire. Erkenntnis, 73(2):185–209. ACCEPTING MORAL LUCK1 by Robert J. Hartman Forthcoming in The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck Edited by Ian M. Church and Robert J. Hartman Abstract: I argue for the view that certain kinds of luck in results, circumstances, and constitutive properties can partially determine an agent's praiseworthiness and blameworthiness. To make this view clearer, consider some examples. Two agents drive recklessly, and one but not the other kills a pedestrian. Two corrupt judges would freely take a bribe if one were offered. But only one judge is offered a bribe, and so only one judge takes a bribe. Put in terms of these examples, I argue that the killer driver and bribe taker are more blameworthy than their counterparts. I offer three arguments for that view, and, in doing so, I exemplify a general way to advance the debate. First, I argue against an account of moral responsibility that implies that the judges are equally blameworthy. Second, I argue that the killer driver is more blameworthy than the merely reckless driver. Third, I present an alternative sense in which the agents in each case pair are morally on par. Introduction One way to frame the problem of moral luck is as a skeptical argument that rules out our being morally responsible agents. That is,
ling the line between attitude verbs and necessity modals. InModality Across Syntactic Categories, page 610–633. Oxford University Press. Scheffler, T. (2008). Semantic operator in different dimensions. PhD dissertation, University of Pennsylvania. Silk, A. (2018). Commitment and states of mind with temper and modality. Natural Language Semantics, 26:125–166. Stalnaker, R. (1968). A theory of conditionals. In Rescher, N., editor program, Studies in Logical Theory (American Philosophical Quarterly Monographs 2), foliate 98–112. Blackwell. Stalnaker, R. (1975). Indicative conditionals. Philosophia, 5(3):269–286. Stalnaker, R. (1984). Inquiry. Cambridge University Press. Villalta, E. (2008). climate and gradability: An investigation of the subjunctive mood in Spanish. Linguistics and Philosophy, 31(4):467–522. Wrenn, C. (2010). A puzzle about desire. Erkenntnis, 73(2):185–209. accept MORAL LUCK1 by Robert J. Hartman Forthcoming in The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck Edited by Ian M. Church and Robert J. Hartman Abstract: I argue for the view that certain kinds of luck in results, circumstances, and constituent properties can partially determine an agent's praiseworthiness and blameworthiness. To cause this view clearer, view some examples. Two agent drive recklessly, and one but not the other kills a pedestrian. Two corrupt judges would freely lease a bribe if one were offered. But only one judge is offered a bribe, and so merely one judge takes a bribe. Put in terms of these examples, I argue that the killer driver and bribe taker are more blameworthy than their counterparts. I offer three arguments for that view, and, in act so, I exemplify a general room to gain the debate. First, I argue against an account of moral duty that implies that the judges are equally blameworthy. Second, I argue that the killer driver is more blameworthy than the merely foolhardy driver. Third, I present an alternative sense in which the agents in each case pair are morally on equality. Introduction One way to frame the problem of moral luck is as a skeptical argument that rule out our being morally responsible agents. That is,
linh the line between attitmde verbs and neewssity modala. InModauity Across Syntactic Categocies, pagew 610–633. Oxford University Pfess. Schevfler, T. (2008). Sementic operators mh diffevznt djlensnois. PhD thesis, Ukiversity ox Pennsylvania. Skln, A. (2018). Commitment and states of mind rith mopd and modality. Gatugaj Lahguage Semantics, 26:125–166. Stalnaker, R. (1968). A tgeory oh conditionals. On Rescher, N., editor, Studied in Logical Theory (Amfrican Philisoprucal Quarteruy Monograkhv 2), pages 98–112. Glackwell. Stalnaker, R. (1975). Indicatixe couditionals. Kkulodmphia, 5(3):269–286. Staliaker, G. (1984). Inquiry. Cambridge Gniversoty Press. Villslte, E. (2008). Mood and gradability: An investigation jf the sutjbnctive mood in Spaniwh. Lingoistiws ave Pfilksppgy, 31(4):467–522. Wrfnn, C. (2010). A puzzme about dewire. Erkenntnis, 73(2):185–209. ACVE[NONG MORAL LUDK1 by Wofert J. Hartman Forthcoming in The Routltdge Gandbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck Edieed by Ian M. Church and Robert J. Hartman Abstract: I arjud fir gye view that certain kinds of luck in results, cydcimxtances, and cokstitutive propertoed vwn partially aetermnhe an agent's praisewlrthinefs ane blamewowthimess. To make this view cleaeer, consider wome examples. Two cgents drive recllessky, and one but not the uthed kills a pfdestrian. Gwo corrupt judgds eogld freely take a bribe if one were offzred. But onli one jtdge is ofvered a bribe, and so onlj one jgdge takes a bribe. Put in terms of these xeamples, I argoe dhan the kiljer dviver and bribe taker are morg blamewoxthy tfan their bounterpacts. I offer ehree argumendd for that vmew, and, ig doung wo, I exdoplify a genersl way to advance tye debate. First, I ergug zgainst an accobut of moral respomsicilytj tiat ii[lies that tve jjdgdx are equally blcmdworyhy. Second, I argue tvat fhe killer driver os more blqmeworthr than the metely reckless drivtr. Thicd, I pcesent an alternative sense in which ths agents ln cach case paiw arc motally on pax. Introduction One way to frame the proboem of moral luck us as a skeptical atgukent that rnles ott our behng morally responsivle agents. That ix,
ling the line between attitude verbs and InModality Syntactic Categories, 610–633. Oxford University operators different dimensions. PhD University of Pennsylvania. A. (2018). Commitment and states of with mood and modality. Natural Language Semantics, 26:125–166. Stalnaker, R. (1968). A theory conditionals. In Rescher, N., editor, Studies in Logical Theory (American Philosophical Quarterly Monographs pages Blackwell. R. Indicative conditionals. Philosophia, 5(3):269–286. Stalnaker, R. (1984). Inquiry. Cambridge University Press. Villalta, E. (2008). Mood and An investigation of the subjunctive mood in Spanish. and Philosophy, 31(4):467–522. Wrenn, (2010). A puzzle about desire. 73(2):185–209. MORAL LUCK1 Robert Hartman in The Routledge of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck Edited by Ian M. Church and Robert J. Hartman Abstract: argue for that certain of in circumstances, and constitutive partially determine an agent's praiseworthiness and this view clearer, consider some examples. Two agents recklessly, and but not the other kills a Two corrupt judges would freely take a bribe one were offered. But only one judge is offered a bribe, and so only one a bribe. Put in of these examples, argue the driver bribe taker more blameworthy than their counterparts. I offer three arguments for that and, in doing so, I exemplify a general way to debate. I argue against account of moral responsibility implies the judges are equally I that is blameworthy the merely reckless driver. I present an alternative sense which the agents in on par. Introduction One way to frame the of moral luck is as a skeptical that rules out our being morally responsible agents. That is,
ling the line between attitudE verbs and nEcessIty ModAlS. InMOdalIty Across SyntaCTic CAtegories, pages 610–633. Oxford UnIversItY presS. scHefflEr, T. (2008). SemaNTiC OPerAtOrS in DiFFeRent dImeNsions. PHD thesis, UnIveRsIty of PennsylVAnIa. Silk, A. (2018). ComMitMent and stateS of Mind wiTh MooD And moDalIty. NaTural LANguage semantics, 26:125–166. stALnaker, r. (1968). a theory OF CoNditIonals. In Rescher, N., eDItOR, Studies in LogiCal TheOrY (amERIcaN PhIlosophicaL QUarteRLy MonogRApHS 2), PAgeS 98–112. blackwell. StalNaker, R. (1975). IndicATivE condiTiOnaLS. PhiloSophiA, 5(3):269–286. STAlnAker, R. (1984). InquirY. CamBridge UniVersitY press. ViLLalta, E. (2008). MOod and GraDabIlitY: an InVesTiGAtiON oF thE SubJunctive MoOd In SpaNish. lINGUistIcs And PHilosOphy, 31(4):467–522. Wrenn, C. (2010). A puZzlE aboUT deSire. ERkennTnis, 73(2):185–209. aCcEPTInG MORAl LUCK1 By robert J. Hartman FOrthComing in THe ROuTleDgE HandBOok of tHe PHilOsophy aNd PsychOLogY oF lUCk edited by Ian M. Church AnD rObErt J. HartMan AbsTRaCt: i Argue for ThE viEw thAT CertaIn kiNDs Of luck in ResultS, CiRcUmstancEs, And conStItuTivE propERtieS can paRtially dEtermINe an agent's praiSEworthiness anD BlAMEwORthiNesS. To make this View CLearEr, coNSiDer SOme exAmpleS. TWO aGEnts drive recklessly, AnD one buT not tHe other kills a Pedestrian. tWO Corrupt jUdgeS WoULd freely take a bRibe iF one were ofFEred. But oNly onE judge is Offered a bRIBe, and so oNly One JudGe tAKEs A bribe. Put in teRMS of tHeSe exampLes, i argue tHat The KilLer DrIver and brIbe taker ArE mOrE bLamEwortHY than theIr CouNtErpArts. I OFfer thRee arGumeNtS fOR thAt view, aND, iN DOing So, i eXempLifY a GenerAl waY To aDvance tHe debate. FIrsT, i argUe AgAinst an Account of moraL rEsponsibilItY thAt implIES that the Judges are equally blamewoRThy. SecoNd, I Argue That The killer DriVer is mOre BLamewoRthy thAn the MeRelY REckleSS DrIveR. THird, I preseNT An aLternAtIve sEnse in wHich the agents in eacH CasE pair are moralLy oN par. iNTrOduCTiON OnE wAY to FRAme the problem of Moral luck iS aS A sKeptical arGUmeNt That rulEs out ouR beinG Morally ResponsibLe agents. THaT is,
ling the line between atti tude verbs  andnec ess it y mo dals . InModality A c ross  Syntactic Categories,  page s6 10–6 3 3.  Oxfo rd Univ e rs i t y P re ss . S ch e ff ler,T.(2008).  Semanticope ra tors in diff e re nt dimensi ons . PhD thesis , U nivers it y o f  Penn syl vania . Silk ,  A. (2 018). Com mi t ment a n d state s of  min d with mood and m o da l ity. Natural L anguag eS em a n tic s,26:125–166 .Staln a ker, R. (1 9 6 8 ).A  theory of co nditionals. InResche r,  N. ,  edito r, St ud i esin LogicalTheo ry (Ameri can Ph i losophi c al Quar terlyMon ogr aphs 2) ,pag es 98– 1 12 . B l ack well. St al na ker,R. ( 1 9 7 5 ). I ndi cati ve co nditionals. P hil osop h ia,  5(3) :269– 286.  S talna ker, R . (19 84 ). Inquiry. Cam brid ge Univer sit yPre ss . Vil l alta,E.(20 08). Mo od andg rad ab i l i ty : An investigation  o f th e subjun ctivem oo di n Spanis h.  Li ngui s t ics a nd P h il osophy,31(4): 4 67 –5 22. Wre nn , C. ( 20 10) . A  puzz l e ab out de sire. Er kennt n is, 73(2):185– 2 09. ACCEPTING MO R A LL UCK1  by  Robert J.Hart m an F orth c om ing in Th e Rou tl e dg e  Handbook of the Ph il osophy  andPsychology of  Luck Edit e d by Ian M . Ch u rc h  and Robert J.  Hart man Abstra c t: I arg ue fo r the vi ew that c e r tain kin dsofluc k i n re sults, circum s t ance s,  and co nst itutive  pr ope rti esca n partial ly deter mi ne  a nage nt'sp raisewor th ine ss  an d bla m eworth iness . To  m ak e  th is view cl e a rer,  c on side r s om e exa mple s . T wo agen ts driverec k less ly ,and one  but not theot her killsaped estria n .  Two cor rupt judges would freel y  take a  br ibe i f on e were of fer ed. Bu t o n ly one  judge  is o ff ere d a bri b e ,and  s o only one j udg e tak es  a b ribe. P ut in terms of the s e e xamples, I ar gue  tha t th e k i ll e r d ri v era n d bribe taker a re more bl am e wo rthy thant hei rcounter parts.I off e r three  argument s for tha tview , and , in doing  so, I e xemplifya  gene r al  waytoadvanc ethe  deba te. Fi r st,  I ar gue ag ai nst an  acco un t of mor al responsibility thatimplie s tha t t he judges  ar e  eq ually bla mewo rthy. Seco nd,  Iargue  th a t the  kil l er  dr i ver i s mo r e blamewo r th y t h a nthe merelyr e c kle ss dr ive r . Thir d, I  present an alter n ative sense in  whi c h  th e a g ents  i n each case pa irar e morallyon  par. Intro ductionOn e  wayto fra me the  proble m of moralluck  is  as a ske pti ca l  argume nt  t h at rul es o ut  our b eing m o rall y responsible agen ts. T h a t is, 
ling the_line between_attitude verbs and necessity_modals. InModality_Across_Syntactic Categories,_pages_610–633. Oxford University_Press. Scheffler, T._(2008). Semantic operators in_different dimensions. PhD_thesis,_University of Pennsylvania. Silk, A. (2018). Commitment and states of mind with mood and_modality._Natural Language_Semantics,_26:125–166._Stalnaker, R. (1968). A theory_of conditionals. In Rescher, N.,_editor, Studies_in Logical Theory (American Philosophical Quarterly Monographs 2),_pages_98–112. Blackwell. Stalnaker,_R. (1975). Indicative conditionals. Philosophia, 5(3):269–286. Stalnaker, R. (1984)._Inquiry. Cambridge University Press. Villalta, E._(2008). Mood and_gradability:_An_investigation of the subjunctive_mood in Spanish. Linguistics and Philosophy,_31(4):467–522. Wrenn, C. (2010). A puzzle_about desire. Erkenntnis, 73(2):185–209. ACCEPTING MORAL LUCK1_by Robert J. Hartman Forthcoming in_The Routledge Handbook of the_Philosophy and_Psychology of Luck Edited by_Ian M. Church_and Robert_J. Hartman Abstract:_I argue for the view that_certain kinds of_luck in results, circumstances, and constitutive_properties_can partially determine_an_agent's_praiseworthiness and_blameworthiness. To make_this_view clearer,_consider_some examples. Two agents drive recklessly,_and_one but not the other kills a_pedestrian. Two corrupt judges_would_freely take a bribe_if one were offered. But_only one judge is offered a_bribe, and_so only_one judge takes a bribe. Put in terms of these examples,_I argue that the killer driver_and bribe taker are_more blameworthy_than_their counterparts. I_offer_three arguments_for that view, and, in doing so,_I exemplify_a general way to advance the_debate. First, I argue_against_an account of moral responsibility that_implies that the judges are equally_blameworthy. Second, I argue that_the_killer_driver is more blameworthy than_the merely reckless driver. Third, I_present an alternative_sense in which the agents in each_case_pair are morally on par. Introduction_One_way to frame the problem of_moral_luck_is as a skeptical argument_that rules out our being morally_responsible agents. That is,