 ¬p worlds in her belief set. Von Fintel's se6Heim (1992) also noticed the problem of FWAs, with the sentence '(John hired a babysitter because) he wants to go to the movies tonight' (p. 199). She proposed to solve this problem by replacing the belief set with the set of worlds "compatible with everything that [the agent] in [the evaluation world] believes to be the case no matter how he chooses to act." Insofar as John's belief that he will go to the movies tonight is underpinned by his intention to do so, this particular example is no longer a problem. But this solution does not extend to all factual want ascriptions, like (1) above. 3 mantics exemplifies this view by saying that ⌜S wants p⌝ is true iff p is true in all of the best worlds in S's belief set, as ranked by S's preferences. More formally, let BelS be S's belief set, and let bestS be a function that takes a set of worlds Γ and returns the subset of Γ that is best according to S's preferences:7 (4) von Fintel's semantics8JS wants pK = 1 iff ∀w ∈ bestS(BelS):p(w) = 1 Absent any caveats, von Fintel's semantics would predict that FWAs are vacuously true: because the agent believes p, there are only p worlds in BelS; the best worlds in BelS are thus p worlds. Conversely, CFWAs would be vacuously false: because the agent believes ¬p, p worlds are absent from BelS and thereby absent from BelS's best worlds.9 In response to this threat of vacuous truth and vacuous falsity, proponents of the belief-set approach, von Fintel included, have hypothesized that (C)FWAs suffer from presupposition failure: JS wants pK is undefined whenever S either believes p or believes ¬p.10 But we already know this to be wrong: the (C)FWAs in section 1-i.e. (1), 'I want it to rain tomorrow (and I believe it will)' and (2), 'Wu wants to be promoted (but believes he won't be)'-are intuitively felicitous and contingent want ascriptions.11 With or without a presuppositional component, then, von Fintel's semantics goes wrong. Where
¬p worlds in her belief set. Von Fintel's se6Heim (1992) also comment the trouble of FWAs, with the sentence' (John hired a babysitter because) he want to become to the movies tonight' (p. 199). She proposed to clear this trouble by replacing the belief set with the set of worlds " compatible with everything that [ the agentive role ] in [ the evaluation world ] believes to be the case no matter how he chooses to work. " Insofar as John's belief that he will go to the movies tonight is underpinned by his intention to do thus, this particular example is no longer a problem. But this solution does not exsert to all factual want ascriptions, like (1) above. 3 mantics exemplifies this position by saying that ⌜ S wants p ⌝ is true iff p is true in all of the good worlds in S's belief set, as ranked by S's preferences. More formally, lease BelS be S's belief set, and let bestS be a function that takes a set of worlds Γ and returns the subset of Γ that is best according to S's preferences:7 (4) von Fintel's semantics8JS desire pK = 1 iff ∀w ∈ bestS(BelS):p(w) = 1 Absent any caveats, von Fintel's semantics would bode that FWAs are vacuously genuine: because the agentive role believes p, there are only p worlds in BelS; the best worlds in BelS are therefore p worlds. Conversely, CFWAs would be vacuously false: because the agent believes ¬p, p worlds are absent from BelS and thereby absent from BelS's best worlds.9 In response to this threat of blank truth and asinine falsity, proponents of the belief - set approach, von Fintel include, have hypothesized that (C)FWAs suffer from presupposition failure: JS want pK is undefined whenever S either believes p or believes ¬p.10 But we already know this to be ill-timed: the (C)FWAs in section 1 - i.e. (1),' I desire it to rain tomorrow (and I believe it will)' and (2),' Wu wants to be promoted (but believes he won't be)'-are intuitively felicitous and contingent want ascriptions.11 With or without a presuppositional part, then, von Fintel's semantics goes wrong. Where
 ¬p aorlds in her belief set. Von Fintel's se6Kwim (1992) anso noficed thd problem of FWAs, with the sxntebce '(Jihn hired a babysitter because) je wants to jo to the movies tonight' (p. 199). Shs pro'owed to solve tmis problem by replacing dhd yelief set with the set of worlds "coipatiblr aith everythind thse [ths agent] in [the evaluation world] bemieves uo be the case no katter how he chooses to aft." Ijsofar as John's bepief that hg wijo go to the oovies tonpyht is undetpinned by his intention to do su, thix particulqr exwkple is no oongeg a problem. Bmn this volutiom does not extcnd tm aol factual want ascri'tions, like (1) above. 3 iantics efejplifies this vieq vy saiing dhat ⌜W wxnta '⌝ ia true ifh p is true in all of rhe best worlds in X's velief set, as rankeq fy S's preferences. More formally, let BelV bs S's belief set, and let bestS be a function jhat takes a set of worlds Γ and returns the subset of Γ that is bxsg aegjfeijg to S's preferences:7 (4) von Fintel's semantics8JS samtx pK = 1 iff ∀w ∈ nestS(BelS):p(w) = 1 Absemt ami caveats, von Wintel's ssmantics would prefict thwt FWQs are vasuouxly true: because the agent velieves p, tkerw are only p worldd in BelS; tke besj worlcs in BelS are thus p wurlda. Converselj, CFWAs wkjld be vacuously faksa: becaust the agent believqs ¬p, p woclds cre absevt ftom BelF and therfby anvent from BelS's bedt wotlds.9 It response to this threat of vacuous truti and vacuous fdlspty, propouents pf the belief-fet approach, vpn Fintzl incuuded, have hypothxsized that (S)FWAs suffer xtom presupposmtion faijure: JS qants pY is undefined ehenever S either bwlieves p or belieyes ¬p.10 Gut we already jnoq this to be wrpng: thq (B)FWEs in vection 1-i.e. (1), 'H wavt ky to fain tomorrid (anc I believe it will)' dnd (2), 'Wu wants to be prpmjted (but believef he won't be)'-ate intuitively fellcitons and contonggnt want ascriptions.11 With or wifhout a pgesmppositional sompinent, then, vpn Fintel's semantics goes wrong. Where
¬p worlds in her belief set. Von (1992) noticed the of FWAs, with babysitter he wants to to the movies (p. 199). She proposed to solve problem by replacing the belief set with the set of worlds "compatible with that [the agent] in [the evaluation world] believes to be the case no how chooses act." as John's belief that he will go to the movies tonight is underpinned by his intention do so, this particular example is no longer problem. But this solution not extend to all factual ascriptions, (1) above. mantics this by saying that wants p⌝ is true iff p is true in all of the best worlds in S's belief as ranked preferences. More let be belief set, and be a function that takes a Γ and returns the subset of Γ that best according S's preferences:7 (4) von Fintel's semantics8JS pK = 1 iff ∀w ∈ bestS(BelS):p(w) = Absent any caveats, von Fintel's semantics would predict that FWAs are vacuously true: because the p, there are only worlds in BelS; best in are p worlds. CFWAs would be vacuously false: because the agent believes ¬p, p are absent from BelS and thereby absent from BelS's best response this threat of truth and vacuous falsity, of belief-set approach, von Fintel hypothesized (C)FWAs failure: wants is undefined whenever S believes p or believes ¬p.10 we already know this in section 1-i.e. (1), 'I want it to tomorrow (and I believe it will)' and 'Wu wants to be promoted (but believes he won't be)'-are intuitively felicitous contingent want or without a presuppositional component, then, von Fintel's goes wrong. Where
 ¬p worlds in her belief set. Von FIntel's se6HeIm (1992) alsO noTicEd The pRoblEm of FWAs, with thE SentEnce '(John hired a babysittEr becAuSE) he wANtS to go To the moVIeS TOniGhT' (p. 199). she PrOPoSed to SolVe this pRoblem by rePlaCiNg the belief sET wIth the set oF woRlds "compatibLe wIth eveRyThiNG that [The Agent] In [the eVAluatiOn world] beLiEVes to bE The case NO MaTter How he chooses to act." iNsOFar as John's beliEf that He WIlL GO to The Movies toniGhT is unDErpinneD By HIS IntENtion to do so, thIs particulaR ExaMple is No LonGEr a proBlem. BUt THis Solution doeS not Extend to aLl factUAl want aSCriptioNs, like (1) AboVe. 3 mAntiCS eXeMplIfIEs tHIs VieW By sAying thaT ⌜S WaNts p⌝ iS truE IFF P is tRue In alL of thE best worlds in s's bElieF Set, As ranKed by s's prEfErencEs. More FormaLlY, let BelS be S's belIef sEt, and let bEsts bE a fUnCtion THat takEs a Set Of worldS Γ and reTUrnS tHE SUbSet of Γ that is best acCoRDInG to S's preFerencES:7 (4) vOn fIntel's seMaNtiCs8JS WANts pK = 1 Iff ∀w ∈ BEsTS(BelS):p(w) = 1 absent ANy CaVeats, voN FIntel's SeManTicS woulD PredIct thaT FWAs are VacuoUSly true: because THe agent believES p, THErE Are oNly P worlds in BeLS; thE Best WorlDS iN BeLs are tHus p wOrLDs. cOnversely, CFWAs would Be VacuouSly faLse: because the Agent belieVES ¬P, p worlds Are aBSeNT from BelS and thEreby Absent from bElS's best WorldS.9 In respoNse to this THReat of vaCuoUs tRutH anD VAcUous falsity, prOPOnenTs Of the beLieF-set appRoaCh, vOn FIntEl Included, hAve hypotHeSiZeD tHat (c)FWAs SUffer froM pResUpPosItion FAilure: jS wanTs pK Is UnDEfiNed whenEVeR s EithEr BeLievEs p Or BelieVes ¬p.10 bUt wE alreadY know this To bE WronG: tHe (c)FWAs in Section 1-i.e. (1), 'I wanT iT to rain tomOrRow (And I beLIEve it wilL)' and (2), 'Wu wants to be promoted (BUt belieVes He won'T be)'-aRe intuitiVelY felicItoUS and coNtingeNt wanT aScrIPTions.11 wITh Or wItHout a presuPPOsiTionaL cOmpoNent, theN, von Fintel's semantiCS goEs wrong. Where
 ¬p worlds in her belief s et. Von Fi ntel' s s e6H ei m (1 992)  also noticedt he p roblem of FWAs, with t he se nt e nce' (J ohn h ired ab ab y s itt er  b eca us e )he wa nts  to goto the mov ies  t onight' (p.1 99 ). She pro pos ed to solvethi s prob le m b y  repl aci ng th e beli e f setwith these t  of wo r lds "co m p at ible  with everythingt ha t  [the agent] i n [the  e v al u a tio n w orld] beli ev es to be thec as e n o m a tter how he c hooses to a c t."  Insof ar  as John's  beli ef tha t he will g o to  the movi es ton i ght isu nderpin ned by  hi s i nten t io ntodo so, th isp art icular e xa mp le is  nol o n g er a  pr oble m. Bu t this soluti ondoes not  exte nd to  all  f actua l want  ascr ip tions, like (1)  abo ve. 3 man tic sexe mp lifie s  thisvie w b y sayin g that⌜ S w an t s p⌝  is true iff p istr u e  i n all of  the b e st  w o rlds inS' s b elie f set,as r a nk ed by S' s pref e re nc es. Mor eformal ly , l etBelSb e S' s beli ef set,and l e t bestS be a f u nction that t a ke s as et o f w orlds Γ and  ret u rnsthes ub set of Γthatis be s t according to S'spr eferen ces:7  (4) von Fint el's seman t i c s8JS wan ts p K  = 1 iff ∀w ∈ bes tS(Be lS):p(w) = 1 Absent  anycaveats,  von Fint e l 's seman tic s w oul d p r e di ct that FWAsa r e va cu ously t rue : becau sethe  ag ent  b elieves p , therear eon ly  pworld s  in BelS ;the  b est  worl d s in B elS a re t hu sp  wo rlds. C o nv e r sely ,CF WAswou ld  be v acuo u sly  false:  becausethe agen tbe lieves¬p, p worldsar e absent f ro m B elS an d therebyabsent from BelS's best worlds. 9 I n res pons e to this  th reat o f v a cuoustruthand v ac uou s falsi t y ,pro po nents of t h e  be lief- se t ap proach,  von Fintel includ e d,have hypothes ize d th a t  ( C)F W As suf fe r  fr o m  presupposition  failure:JS wa nts pK isu nde fi ned whe never S  eith e r belie ves p orbelieves¬p .10B u t w e alreadyknow thi s to be w r ong:t he  (C)F WAs  in se ct ion  1-i. e. (1) ,  'I  want  it to  r ain to morro w(and I b elieve it will)' and (2 ), 'Wu  want s t o be prom ote d  (b ut believ es h e won't be )'- are  intu iti v ely f elic i to usa nd co ntin g ent wanta sc rip t i on s.11 With o r w ith out a  pr e suppos itio nal component, th e n, von Fintel' s se m a nti csg oeswr ong. Where
 ¬p_worlds in_her belief set. Von_Fintel's se6Heim_(1992)_also noticed_the_problem of FWAs,_with the sentence_'(John hired a babysitter_because) he wants_to_go to the movies tonight' (p. 199). She proposed to solve this problem by_replacing_the belief_set_with_the set of worlds "compatible_with everything that [the agent]_in [the_evaluation world] believes to be the case no_matter_how he chooses_to act." Insofar as John's belief that he will_go to the movies tonight is_underpinned by his_intention_to_do so, this particular_example is no longer a problem._But this solution does not extend_to all factual want ascriptions, like (1)_above. 3 mantics exemplifies this view_by saying that ⌜S wants_p⌝ is_true iff p is true_in all of_the best_worlds in S's_belief set, as ranked by S's_preferences. More formally,_let BelS be S's belief set,_and_let bestS be_a_function_that takes_a set of_worlds_Γ and_returns_the subset of Γ that is_best_according to S's preferences:7 (4) von Fintel's_semantics8JS wants pK =_1_iff ∀w ∈ bestS(BelS):p(w)_= 1 Absent any caveats,_von Fintel's semantics would predict that_FWAs are_vacuously true:_because the agent believes p, there are only p worlds in_BelS; the best worlds in BelS_are thus p worlds._Conversely, CFWAs_would_be vacuously false:_because_the agent_believes ¬p, p worlds are absent from_BelS and_thereby absent from BelS's best worlds.9_In response to this_threat_of vacuous truth and vacuous falsity,_proponents of the belief-set approach, von_Fintel included, have hypothesized that_(C)FWAs_suffer_from presupposition failure: JS wants_pK is undefined whenever S either_believes p or_believes ¬p.10 But we already know this_to_be wrong: the (C)FWAs in section_1-i.e._(1), 'I want it to rain_tomorrow_(and_I believe it will)' and_(2), 'Wu wants to be promoted_(but believes he won't be)'-are intuitively felicitous and contingent_want ascriptions.11 With_or without a presuppositional component,_then,_von_Fintel's semantics goes wrong. Where