, 1997, xv + 362, US$54.95 (cloth)/US$24.95 (paper). This is a book that should be on every philosopher's shelf. A very readable introductory textbook to contemporary debates in the philosophy of mind, it is well-positioned to service its intended audience of upper-level undergraduates and graduate students 'in the analytic tradition'. In addition to his intended audience, the author 'piously hopes' that his book 'will be accessible to anyone with an interest in the issues' (p. xiii). This is unlikely to be borne out, however, for the book is far too big and, in places, too technical for the general reader. (In tenaas of sophistication it stands about midway between Churchland's very short and accessible Matter and Consciousness and the professional readers edited by W. Lycan and D. M. Rosenthal.) However, while the author's book doesn't do the job of reaching beyond its target audience, it does much else besides. The book is about contemporary philosophy of mind, yet Rey employs a broadly Cartesian classical framework to house his'mentalist' approach. He takes seriously 'what many philosophers have thought to be the misconceived problems of the philosophy of mind since Descartes: e.g., what is the nature of a mental state? How could matter have mental properties? How could the properties be causal'?' (p. xiii). However, Rey's position naturally shares far more with the contemporary work of L A. Fodor than Descartes. The book defends a computational/representational theory of thought (CRTT) augmented by a computational/representational theory of qualitative states (CRTQ). The overall bias is p.sycho-functionalist: i.e., that an adequate functionalist understanding of mental phenomena will only emerge from a (future) empirical psychology along the lines of what a classical computational account provides. (CRTT and CRTQ are'species' of this more general psychofunctionalism.) The hesitancy to endorse any of the present computational theories of mind on 342 Reviews offer--neither connectionism (process or vehicle types) nor holistic, homuncular or input/output functionalism--shares more with Nagel's (1986) equally cautious remarks about the poverty of present-day theories of mind than the author might care to admit. Even so, Rey is no 'new lnysterian': the mind is to be explained eom
, 1997, xv + 362, US$ 54.95 (cloth)/US$24.95 (paper). This is a book that should be on every philosopher's shelf. A very readable basic textbook to contemporaneous debate in the philosophy of judgment, it is well - put to service its intended consultation of upper - horizontal surface undergraduates and graduate student' in the analytic tradition'. In addition to his mean audience, the author' devoutly hopes' that his book' will be accessible to anyone with an interest in the issues' (p. xiii). This is unlikely to be borne out, however, for the book is far excessively big and, in places, too technical for the cosmopolitan reader. (In tenaas of sophistication it stand about midway between Churchland's very unretentive and accessible Matter and Consciousness and the professional reviewer edited by W. Lycan and D. M. Rosenthal .) However, while the author's book doesn't serve the job of reaching beyond its target audience, it does much else besides. The book is about contemporary philosophy of mind, yet Rey employs a broadly Cartesian classical framework to house his'mentalist' approach. He takes seriously' what many philosophers have thought to be the misconstrue problem of the philosophy of thinker since Descartes: for example, what is the nature of a genial state? How could matter have mental properties? How could the properties be causal'?' (p. xiii). However, Rey's position naturally shares far more with the contemporaneous work of L A. Fodor than Descartes. The book defends a computational / representational theory of thought (CRTT) augmented by a computational / representational theory of qualitative states (CRTQ). The overall bias is p.sycho - functionalist: i.e., that an adequate functionalist understanding of mental phenomena will merely emerge from a (future) empiric psychology along the line of what a classical computational account provides. (CRTT and CRTQ are'species' of this more cosmopolitan psychofunctionalism .) The hesitancy to endorse any of the present computational theories of mind on 342 Reviews offer -- neither connectionism (process or vehicle types) nor holistic, homuncular or input / output signal functionalism -- shares more with Nagel's (1986) evenly cautious remarks about the poverty of present - day theories of mind than the author might wish to admit. Even thus, Rey is no' new lnysterian': the thinker is to be explained eom
, 1997, xg + 362, US$54.95 (cloth)/US$24.95 (paper). Thir is a book thaj whould be on every pfilosopher's shelf. A very reavablw inteoductory textbook to zontemporwry debares mn the philosophb of mind, it ia weln-'ositioned to sgrvice its ittended audienwe oy upper-level undergraduates and gradtate stidfnts 'in the anwlytpc trasptlon'. In addition to his intended zudienct, the author 'piousky hopes' that his book 'wilp be accessible to anylne with an intqeest in the kssues' (p. xpni). This is onlikely to be borne out, however, for che book is fqr hmo big and, mn plabes, too technlbal for the gemeral reader. (Ik teneas if sophistication it vtands about midwai between Whbrchland's very short qne accgssibne Mxrtef ahd Cknscioksnxss and the professionql readers edited bu R. Lycan and D. J. Rosegtral.) However, while the author's book doest't so the job of reaching veyond its target audlence, it qoes much else besides. The book is about contemposary 'hklowoihy ud lind, yet Rey employs a broadly Cartesian clasfjcsl framework to mouse his'mentalist' aoptjach. He takes seriobalg 'what many philoslphers rave rhought tj be the misconceived problems if the philofiphy of mind since Descartes: z.g., whaj is tne nature of a mental scate? Hkw could mahter have oental propertier? Hpw could the properties be cwusal'?' (p. xmii). Hpwever, Fey's posityon naturaply smdres far more with the eontekporary wogk of L A. Fodor than Descartes. Vie book defencs a bomputatijnal/rcpresentational theory of thooght (CRTT) augmdnted by a computetional/reprefentational tvgory of qualivative stwtes (CRTW). The oxdrall bias is l.sycho-funbtnonalist: u.e., that an adequatc funzfionalist underwtabding of mental phdnoieja wynl only emerce ffom s (futjre) empiriccl psyvhology along the lites kf what a classicak gomputatiinal accjunt provides. (CRTT and CRTQ are'dpecixs' of vhis mpre general psychofunctionalism.) Tge hesitajcy to endorse wny if the preseut computational theories of mind on 342 Retiews offer--neither connwctionism (process ot vthicle types) ior hojistic, hokuncular or input/output functionalism--xhares more with Nagem's (1986) eqgally cautious remarks about the poverty of present-day theories of mind than tye autiow might cars to admin. Eren so, Rer is io 'new lnysterian': the mind is to be explained eoo
, 1997, xv + 362, US$54.95 (cloth)/US$24.95 is book that be on every introductory to contemporary debates the philosophy of it is well-positioned to service its audience of upper-level undergraduates and graduate students 'in the analytic tradition'. In addition his intended audience, the author 'piously hopes' that his book 'will be accessible anyone an in issues' (p. xiii). This is unlikely to be borne out, however, for the book is far big and, in places, too technical for the reader. (In tenaas of it stands about midway between very and accessible and and professional readers edited W. Lycan and D. M. Rosenthal.) However, while the author's book doesn't do the job of reaching its target does much besides. book about contemporary philosophy yet Rey employs a broadly Cartesian house his'mentalist' approach. He takes seriously 'what many have thought be the misconceived problems of the of mind since Descartes: e.g., what is the of a mental state? How could matter have mental properties? How could the properties be xiii). However, Rey's position shares far more the work L Fodor than The book defends a computational/representational theory of thought (CRTT) augmented by computational/representational theory of qualitative states (CRTQ). The overall bias is that adequate functionalist understanding mental phenomena will only from (future) empirical psychology along of a provides. and are'species' of this more psychofunctionalism.) The hesitancy to endorse of the present computational Reviews offer--neither connectionism (process or vehicle types) nor homuncular or input/output functionalism--shares more with Nagel's equally cautious remarks about the poverty of present-day theories of mind than author might admit. Even so, Rey is no 'new lnysterian': mind is to be eom
, 1997, xv + 362, US$54.95 (cloth)/US$24.95 (paper). This is a boOk that shouLd be oN evEry PhIlosOpheR's shelf. A very reADablE introductory textbook tO contEmPOrarY DeBates In the phILoSOPhy Of MiNd, iT iS WeLl-posItiOned to sErvice its iNteNdEd audience of UPpEr-level undErgRaduates and gRadUate stUdEntS 'In the AnaLytic TraditIOn'. In adDition to hIs INtendeD AudiencE, THe AuthOr 'piously hopes' thaT HiS Book 'will be acceSsible To ANyONE wiTh aN interest iN tHe issUEs' (p. xiii). tHiS IS UnlIKely to be borne Out, however, fOR thE book iS fAr tOO big anD, in plAcES, toO technical fOr thE general rEader. (IN Tenaas oF SophistIcatioN it StaNds aBOuT mIdwAy BEtwEEn chuRChlAnd's very ShOrT and aCcesSIBLE MatTer And COnsciOusness and the ProFessIOnaL readErs edIted By w. LycaN and D. M. rosenThAl.) However, while tHe auThor's book DoeSn'T do ThE job oF ReachiNg bEyoNd its taRget audIEncE, iT DOEs Much else besides. The BoOK Is About conTemporARy PhILosophy oF mInd, Yet REY EmploYs a bROaDly CarteSian clASsIcAl frameWoRk to hoUsE hiS'meNtaliST' appRoach. HE takes seRiousLY 'what many philoSOphers have thoUGhT TO bE The mIscOnceived proBlemS Of thE phiLOsOphY Of minD sincE DEScARtes: e.g., what is the natuRe Of a menTal stAte? How could maTter have meNTAL propertIes? HOW cOUld the propertiEs be cAusal'?' (p. xiii). hOwever, ReY's posItion natUrally shaRES far more WitH thE coNteMPOrAry work of L A. FoDOR thaN DEscarteS. ThE book deFenDs a ComPutAtIonal/reprEsentatiOnAl ThEoRy oF thouGHt (CRTT) auGmEntEd By a CompuTAtionaL/reprEsenTaTiONal Theory oF QuALItatIvE sTateS (CRtQ). the ovEralL BiaS is p.sycHo-functioNalISt: i.e., ThAt An adequAte functionalIsT understanDiNg oF mentaL PHenomena Will only emerge from a (futuRE) empiriCal PsychOlogY along the LinEs of whAt a CLassicAl compUtatiOnAl aCCOunt pROViDes. (cRtT and CRTQ aRE'SpeCies' oF tHis mOre geneRal psychofunctionaLIsm.) the hesitancy tO enDorsE ANy Of tHE pREseNt COmpUTAtional theories Of mind on 342 ReViEWs Offer--neithER coNnEctioniSm (proceSs or vEHicle tyPes) nor holIstic, homuNcUlar OR InpUt/output fuNctionalIsm--shares MOre wiTH NAgel's (1986) EquAlly caUtIouS remaRks aboUT thE poveRty of pReSent-daY theoRiEs of mind Than the author might care tO admit. even sO, ReY is no 'new lNysTEriAn': the mind Is to Be explaineD eoM
, 1997, xv + 362, US$54.95  (cloth)/U S$24. 95(pa pe r).This  is a book tha t  sho uld be on every philos opher 's shel f .A ver y reada b le i ntr od uc tor yt ex tbook  to  contem porary deb ate sin the philo s op hy of mind , i t is well-po sit ionedto  se r viceits  inte nded a u dience  of upper -l e vel un d ergradu a t es  and  graduate student s  ' i n the analytic  tradi ti o n' . Inadd ition to h is  inte n ded aud i en c e ,  th e  author 'piou sly hopes't hat  his b oo k ' w ill be  acce ss i ble  to anyonewith  an inter est in the iss u es' (p.  xiii) . T his  isu nl ik ely  t o  be bo rne out , howeve r,  f or th e bo o k i s fa r t oo b ig an d, in places,  to o te c hni cal f or th e ge ne ral r eader.  (Inte naas of sophist icat ion it st and sabo ut  midw a y betw een  Ch urchlan d's ver y  sh or t a nd  accessible Matter  a n d  C onscious ness a n dth e  profess io nal  rea d e rs ed ited by  W. Lyca n andD .M.  Rosent ha l.) Ho we ver , w hilet he a uthor' s book d oesn' t  do the job of reaching beyo n di t st arge t a udience, it  doe s  muc h el s ebes i des.The b oo k  i s  about contemporary  p hiloso phy o f mind, yet R ey employs a broadlyCart e si a n classical fr amewo rk to hous e  his'men talis t' appro ach. He t a k es serio usl y ' wha t m a n yphilosophersh a ve t ho ught to  be  the mi sco nce ive d p ro blems ofthe phil os op hy  o f m ind s i nce Desc ar tes :e.g ., wh a t is t he na ture  o fa  me ntal st a te ? Howco ul d ma tte rhavement a l p roperti es? How c oul d  the  p ro perties  be causal'?'  ( p. xiii).Ho wev er, Re y ' s positi on naturally shares far more wi ththe c onte mporary w ork  of LA.F odor t han De scart es . T h e  book d ef end sa computat i o nal /repr es enta tionaltheory of thought( CRT T) augmentedbya co m p ut ati o na l /re pr e sen t a tional theory o f qualitat iv e  s tates (CRT Q ).Th e overa ll bias  is p . sycho-f unctional ist: i.e. ,that a n a dequate fu nctional ist under s tandi n gof me nta l phen om ena  will  onlye mer ge fr om a ( fu ture)empir ic al psych ology along the lines o f what  a cl ass ical comp uta t ion al accoun t pr ovides. (C RTT  an d CRT Q a r e'spe cies '  o f t h is mo re g e neral psy c ho fun c t io nalism.) Th e h esi tancy  to endors e an y of the presentc omputational t heor i e s o f m i nd o n342 Reviews of fer -- n e ither co nn ectionism ( processor vehic le typ es) no r holis t i c, homunc ular  or  input/ou tpu tf unction al is m --shar es m or e with  Nagel ' s (1 9 8 6) equally cauti ous r e m arksa bou t the  p overtyo f pr esent-daytheories of  mindthan  theauthormi ght ca reto  admit. Ev e n so, Rey  is n o 'newln yste ria n': th e mi n d  is t o be  e xpl ained eom 
, 1997,_xv +_362, US$54.95 (cloth)/US$24.95 (paper)._This is_a_book that_should_be on every_philosopher's shelf. A_very readable introductory textbook_to contemporary debates_in_the philosophy of mind, it is well-positioned to service its intended audience of upper-level_undergraduates_and graduate_students_'in_the analytic tradition'. In addition_to his intended audience, the_author 'piously_hopes' that his book 'will be accessible to_anyone_with an interest_in the issues' (p. xiii). This is unlikely to_be borne out, however, for the_book is far_too_big_and, in places, too_technical for the general reader. (In_tenaas of sophistication it stands about_midway between Churchland's very short and accessible_Matter and Consciousness and the professional_readers edited by W. Lycan_and D._M. Rosenthal.) However, while the_author's book doesn't_do the_job of reaching_beyond its target audience, it does_much else besides._The book is about contemporary philosophy_of_mind, yet Rey_employs_a_broadly Cartesian_classical framework to_house_his'mentalist' approach._He_takes seriously 'what many philosophers have_thought_to be the misconceived problems of the_philosophy of mind since_Descartes:_e.g., what is the_nature of a mental state?_How could matter have mental properties?_How could_the properties_be causal'?' (p. xiii). However, Rey's position naturally shares far more_with the contemporary work of L_A. Fodor than Descartes._The book_defends_a computational/representational theory_of_thought (CRTT)_augmented by a computational/representational theory of qualitative_states (CRTQ)._The overall bias is p.sycho-functionalist: i.e.,_that an adequate functionalist_understanding_of mental phenomena will only emerge_from a (future) empirical psychology along_the lines of what a_classical_computational_account provides. (CRTT and CRTQ_are'species' of this more general psychofunctionalism.)_The hesitancy to_endorse any of the present computational theories_of_mind on 342 Reviews offer--neither connectionism_(process_or vehicle types) nor holistic, homuncular_or_input/output_functionalism--shares more with Nagel's (1986)_equally cautious remarks about the poverty_of present-day theories of mind than the author might_care to admit._Even so, Rey is no_'new_lnysterian':_the mind is to be explained eom