 science – which is not and does not want to be philosophy –, have always supported one philosophy: the most naïve and weak of its forms" (Gentile 1924, 199). As a matter of fact, Gentile's thesis about the theoretical separation between science and Idealism only made sense within his system and, as such, it was built around a logical pattern that was completely extraneous to scientific dynamicity, even though it mirrored exactly the image of science as outlined by Roberto Maiocchi – Duhem in Pre-War Italian Philosophy: The Reasons of an Absence 87 positivist Scientism. During the nineteenth century, the bond between science and Materialism had been very strong (but not exclusive), but Gentile's vision turns a historically framed idea of science – that of the age of Positivism – into an absolute and unhistorical idea. By theorising a clear-cut contrast between science and Idealism, Gentile contributed much more than Croce to the separation of Italian philosophy from science at the beginning of the twentieth century. In Croce's view, science differed from philosophy, but for Gentile it was an enemy to be defeated for the triumph of Idealism – hence the crusade-like spirit of his works. Gentile was certainly aware of the existence in Europe of interpretative tendencies – very often within science itself –, which prefigured the divorce between science and Materialism already in the nineteenth century. However, these tendencies could be perceived as philosophical critiques coming from the outside and not created by internal developments of the scientific thought, as these developments were invariably materialistic. Epistemologist could be easily ignored: in the many pages of Gentile's works there is no mention of Mach, Poincaré and Duhem. Croce's and Gentile's critiques only developed within the framework of superficial and instrumental relationships with the major epistemologists of the time, or even without any familiarity with their works, and one gets the same impression by reading the works of the main targets of the critique of Idealism – the positivists. Italian Positivism had dealt with psychology, anthropology, sociology, law, but mathematized natural sciences had never been among its interests. In the books by Tarozzi, Marchesini and Troilo one can find long discussions about the nature of science, but they only deal with the concept of science or experience, hypothesis, law, symbol, etc., in very generic terms, without any reference to physics, and the authors seem not
science – which is not and does not want to be philosophy –, have always back one doctrine: the most naïve and weak of its form " (Gentile 1924, 199). As a topic of fact, Gentile's thesis about the theoretical separation between science and Idealism merely made sense within his arrangement and, as such, it was built around a logical convention that was completely extraneous to scientific dynamicity, even though it mirror precisely the image of science as outlined by Roberto Maiocchi – Duhem in Pre - War Italian Philosophy: The Reasons of an Absence 87 positivist Scientism. During the nineteenth century, the chemical bond between science and Materialism had been very strong (but not exclusive), but Gentile's imagination turns a historically framed idea of science – that of the historic period of Positivism – into an absolute and unhistorical idea. By theorising a clear - cut contrast between skill and Idealism, Gentile contributed much more than Croce to the separation of Italian philosophy from science at the beginning of the twentieth century. In Croce's scene, skill differed from philosophy, but for Gentile it was an enemy to be defeated for the triumph of Idealism – hence the crusade - alike emotional state of his works. Gentile was certainly mindful of the being in Europe of interpretative tendency – very often within science itself –, which prefigure the divorce between science and Materialism already in the nineteenth century. However, these tendencies could be perceived as philosophic critiques coming from the outside and not created by internal developments of the scientific thought, as these developments were invariably materialistic. Epistemologist could be easily ignored: in the many pages of Gentile's work there constitute no mention of Mach, Poincaré and Duhem. Croce's and Gentile's critiques only explicate within the framework of superficial and instrumental relationships with the major epistemologist of the time, or even without any casualness with their works, and one gets the like impression by reading the works of the main targets of the review of Idealism – the positivists. Italian Positivism had deal with psychology, anthropology, sociology, law, but mathematized lifelike sciences had never been among its interests. In the book by Tarozzi, Marchesini and Troilo one can find long discussion about the nature of science, but they entirely deal with the concept of science or experience, hypothesis, law, symbol, etc. , in very generic terms, without any reference to physics, and the authors seem not
 sclence – which is not and aoes not want to be phmlosophg –, have xlways supported one philoso'hy: rhe mist naïve and weak of igs forms" (Hentile 1924, 199). As q matter oh fact, Gcutile'a thevms about the thgoretical se[aration betwean seience and Idealism only made sense rithin nid system and, af subh, it sas built around a logical pattern that wes completely ectraneous to scientific dyjamifity, even though ih mirrored gsaceoy the image of scienct cs outlined by Roberto Maiocchi – Duhem in Ore-Wax Italian Pyiooslkhy: The Reasins os an Absence 87 positieist Scoentism. During thx nibeteenth century, the uond between science and Matesiclism had been very srring (bot nod exzouskve), bnt Fentilf's tision turna a historixally framed idea og fboence – that kf the ade of Positivism – into an absolute and lnhiatorical idea. By theoriwing a clear-cut contrwst betweqn science and Idealism, Gentile contributed much kore vhxn Evjzw ho the separation of Italian philosophy from fditncv at the beginninn of the twentieth cfnyory. In Croce's xiew, sejehce differed from ohilosokhy, bur for Genuile ot was an enemy to be defeared for the nriunph of Idealism – hznce the crurade-kike xpirit of his works. Gencile wzs certainlj aware or the existence iv Elropa of inttfpretative tendensies – verb oftzn withiv scoence ytself –, whlch pvafigured the divorfe bejween vcience anf Materialism already in the niixteenth centuty. Vowvver, thesz tendcncies could be perceived as khilosophncal cfitiques ckming fcom the outsyde and not csgated by intecnal devejopmwnts of the rcientific thoight, as tktse developments were invariebly jaterialistic. E'nsuenologist could be eafipy idtored: in the manh pxbes ow Gentile's cofks yhere is no mention mf Mzch, Poincaré and Dunei. Croce's and Geneile's critiqurs only developed aithii the hramewprk of superficial and instrumentzl relatilnsmips with the majir epistemolpgists of the time, or even without any hamiliarity with their qorks, and one gets jhe same imprexsion by readitg the works of the nain targets of tme critique of Idealisj – the posihivists. Italian Positivism had dealt with psychology, anthropology, socioloty, law, but mathemafizec natlraj scienses iav never been amonb its interests. In the books by Tarozzi, Mcrchesini and Troilo one can givd long discursions about the nature kf scienve, but they only deal with the voncept of science or exierience, yypotgesis, law, rymbol, etc., in very genernc terns, withiut wny reference to pmysics, and the abthors seem not
science – which is not and does to philosophy –, always supported one weak its forms" (Gentile 199). As a of fact, Gentile's thesis about the separation between science and Idealism only made sense within his system and, as it was built around a logical pattern that was completely extraneous to scientific even it exactly image of science as outlined by Roberto Maiocchi – Duhem in Pre-War Italian Philosophy: The Reasons an Absence 87 positivist Scientism. During the nineteenth the bond between science Materialism had been very strong not but Gentile's turns historically idea of science that of the age of Positivism – into an absolute and unhistorical idea. By theorising a clear-cut between science Gentile contributed more Croce the separation of from science at the beginning of In Croce's view, science differed from philosophy, but Gentile it an enemy to be defeated for triumph of Idealism – hence the crusade-like spirit his works. Gentile was certainly aware of the existence in Europe of interpretative tendencies – within science itself –, prefigured the divorce science Materialism in nineteenth century. these tendencies could be perceived as philosophical critiques coming from the and not created by internal developments of the scientific thought, developments invariably materialistic. Epistemologist be easily ignored: in many of Gentile's works there mention Mach, Croce's Gentile's only developed within the of superficial and instrumental relationships the major epistemologists of any familiarity with their works, and one gets same impression by reading the works of main targets of the critique of Idealism – the positivists. Italian Positivism dealt with sociology, law, but mathematized natural sciences had never among its interests. In books by Tarozzi, Marchesini and Troilo one can find discussions the nature science, but they deal with the of science or law, symbol, in generic reference to physics, and the authors not
 science – which is not and does nOt want to be PhiloSopHy –, hAvE alwAys sUpported one phiLOsopHy: the most naïve and weak oF its fOrMS" (GenTIlE 1924, 199). As a mAtter of FAcT, gEntIlE's TheSiS AbOut thE thEoreticAl separatiOn bEtWeen science aND IDealism onlY maDe sense withiN hiS systeM aNd, aS Such, iT waS builT arounD A logicAl pattern ThAT was coMPletely EXTrAneoUs to scientific dynAMiCIty, even though iT mirroReD ExACTly The Image of sciEnCe as oUTlined bY roBERTo MAIocchi – Duhem in pre-War ItaliAN PhIlosopHy: the rEasons Of an ABsENce 87 Positivist SCienTism. DurinG the niNEteenth CEntury, tHe bond BetWeeN sciENcE aNd MAtERiaLIsM haD BeeN very strOnG (bUt not ExclUSIVE), but genTile'S visiOn turns a histoRicAlly FRamEd ideA of scIencE – tHat of The age Of PosItIvism – into an absoLute And unhistOriCaL idEa. by theORising A clEar-Cut contRast betWEen ScIENCe And Idealism, Gentile CoNTRiButed mucH more tHAn crOCe to the sEpAraTion OF italiAn phILoSophy froM scienCE aT tHe beginNiNg of thE tWenTieTh cenTUry. IN Croce'S view, sciEnce dIFfered from philOSophy, but for GeNTiLE It WAs an EneMy to be defeaTed fOR the TriuMPh Of IDEalisM – hencE tHE cRUsade-like spirit of hiS wOrks. GeNtile Was certainly aWare of the eXISTence in EUropE Of INterpretative tEndenCies – very ofTEn within ScienCe itself –, Which prefIGUred the dIvoRce BetWeeN SCiEnce and MateriALIsm aLrEady in tHe nIneteenTh cEntUry. howEvEr, these teNdencies CoUlD bE pErcEived AS philosoPhIcaL cRitIques COming fRom thE outSiDe ANd nOt creatED bY INterNaL dEvelOpmEnTs of tHe scIEntIfic thoUght, as theSe dEVeloPmEnTs were iNvariably mateRiAlistic. EpiStEmoLogist COUld be easIly ignored: in the many pageS Of GentiLe's Works TherE is no mentIon Of Mach, poiNCaré anD Duhem. croce'S aNd GENTile's CRItIquEs Only develoPED wiThin tHe FramEwork of Superficial and instRUmeNtal relationsHipS witH THe MajOR ePIstEmOLogISTs of the time, or evEn without aNy FAmIliarity wiTH thEiR works, aNd one geTs the SAme imprEssion by rEading the WoRks oF THe mAin targets Of the criTique of IdEAlism – THe PositIviSts. ItaLiAn POsitiVism haD DeaLt witH psychOlOgy, antHropoLoGy, sociolOgy, law, but mathematized naTural sCiencEs hAd never beEn aMOng Its intereSts. IN the books bY TaRozZi, MarCheSIni anD TroILo One CAn finD lonG DiscussioNS aBouT THe Nature of sciENCE, buT they OnlY Deal wiTh thE concept of science OR experience, hypOtheSIS, laW, syMBol, eTc., In very generic tErmS, wITHout any rEfErence to phySics, and tHe AUthorS seem nOt
 science – which is not an d does not  want  to  be  p hilo soph y –, have alwa y s su pported one philosophy : the  m o st n a ïv e and  weak o f  i t s  fo rm s"  (G en t il e 192 4,199). A s a matter  of  f act, Gentile ' sthesis abo utthe theoreti cal  separ at ion betwe enscien ce and Ideali sm only m ad e  sense withinh i ssyst em and, as such,i tw as built aroun d a lo gi c al p att ern  that wasco mplet e ly extr a ne o u s  to scientific dy namicity, e v enthough  i t m i rrored  exac tl y  th e image ofscie nce as ou tlined by Robe r to Maio cchi –  Du hem  inP re -W arIt a lia n  P hil o sop hy: TheRe as ons o f an A b s ence  87  pos itivi st Scientism.  Du ring the  nine teent h ce nt ury,the bo nd be tw een science and  Mat erialismhad  b een  v ery s t rong ( but  no t exclu sive),b utGe n t i le 's vision turns ahi s t or ically f ramedi de ao f scienc e– t hato f  theageo fPositivi sm – i n to  a n absol ut e andun his tor icali dea.  By th eorising  a cl e ar-cut contras t  between scie n ce a nd Idea lis m, Gentilecont r ibut ed m u ch  mo r e tha n Cro ce to the separation of I ta lian p hilos ophy from sci ence at th e b eginning  oft he twentieth cent ury.In Croce's view, sc ience  differe d from ph i l osophy,but  fo r G ent i l eit was an ene m y  tobe  defeat edfor the  tr ium phofId ealism –hence th ecr us ad e-l ike s p irit ofhi s w or ks.  Gent i le was  cert ainl yaw a reof thee xi s t ence  i nEuro peof  inte rpre t ati ve tend encies –ver y  oft en  w ithin s cience itself  – , which pr ef igu red th e divorcebetween science and Mat e rialism  al ready  inthe ninet een th cen tur y . Howe ver, t hesete nde n c ies c o u ld  be  p erceived a s phi losop hi calcritiqu es coming from the out side and notcre ated b yint e rn a l d ev e lop m e nts of the scie ntific tho ug h t,  as thesed eve lo pmentswere in varia b ly mate rialistic . Epistem ol ogis t cou ld be easi ly ignor ed: in th e  many pa ges o f G entile 's  wo rks t here i s  no  ment ion of  M ach, P oinca ré  and Duh em. Croce's and Gentile 's cri tique s o nly devel ope d  wi thin thefram ework of s upe rfi cialand instr umen t al  re l ation ship s  with the ma jor e pi stemologist s o f t he ti me, or eve n wi thout any familia r ity with their  wor k s , a ndo ne g et s the same imp res si o n  by read in g the works  of thema i n tar gets o f thecritiqu e of Ideali sm –  th e positiv ist s. Italian  P os i tivism  had  d ealt w ith ps y chol o g y, anthropology,  soci o l ogy,l aw,  butma themati z ed n atural sci ences had n ever b eenamong  its in te rests.  In  t he books b y  Tarozzi,  Marc hesinian d Tr oil o onecanf i nd lo ng d is cus sions abo u t  t h ena t ure  ofscien ce , bu t they on l y deal w ith the con ce pto f  scien c eo r  experienc e,hypot h e sis, law,s ymbo l ,e tc.,in ver y gene ric ter m s,wi thout a nyr e ference t o physics ,  an dtheauthorsse em n ot 
 science_– which_is not and does_not want_to_be philosophy_–,_have always supported_one philosophy: the_most naïve and weak_of its forms"_(Gentile_1924, 199). As a matter of fact, Gentile's thesis about the theoretical separation between_science_and Idealism_only_made_sense within his system and,_as such, it was built_around a_logical pattern that was completely extraneous to scientific_dynamicity,_even though it_mirrored exactly the image of science as outlined by_Roberto Maiocchi – Duhem in Pre-War_Italian Philosophy: The_Reasons_of_an Absence 87 positivist_Scientism. During the nineteenth century, the_bond between science and Materialism had_been very strong (but not exclusive), but_Gentile's vision turns a historically framed_idea of science – that_of the_age of Positivism – into_an absolute and_unhistorical idea._By theorising a_clear-cut contrast between science and Idealism,_Gentile contributed much_more than Croce to the separation_of_Italian philosophy from_science_at_the beginning_of the twentieth_century._In Croce's_view,_science differed from philosophy, but for_Gentile_it was an enemy to be defeated_for the triumph of_Idealism_– hence the crusade-like_spirit of his works. Gentile_was certainly aware of the existence_in Europe_of interpretative_tendencies – very often within science itself –, which prefigured the_divorce between science and Materialism already_in the nineteenth century._However, these_tendencies_could be perceived_as_philosophical critiques_coming from the outside and not created_by internal_developments of the scientific thought, as_these developments were invariably_materialistic._Epistemologist could be easily ignored: in_the many pages of Gentile's works_there is no mention of_Mach,_Poincaré_and Duhem. Croce's and Gentile's_critiques only developed within the framework_of superficial and_instrumental relationships with the major epistemologists of_the_time, or even without any familiarity_with_their works, and one gets the_same_impression_by reading the works of_the main targets of the critique_of Idealism – the positivists. Italian Positivism had dealt_with psychology, anthropology,_sociology, law, but mathematized natural_sciences_had_never been among its interests. In the books by Tarozzi,_Marchesini and_Troilo one can_find long discussions about the nature of science, but they_only deal with the concept of science_or experience, hypothesis, law, symbol, etc., in very generic terms, without_any reference to physics, and the authors seem_not