 the scheme's benefits without submitting to its rules violates a perfect duty, owed to the cooperating members of the scheme. This seems to me a much stronger 3 Zhu, "Fairness, Political Obligation, and the Justificatory Gap," 306–309. 4 Ibid., 309. 5 The point is clearest when free-riders go out of their way to accept benefits, but I think the point holds even for non-voluntarist versions of fair play. Unfortunately, going into the details here would take us too far afield for too long. 6 Here I make use of the practical contradiction interpretation of the contradiction in conception test. See Christine M. Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 92–93. doi 10.1163/17455243-46810054 | Tosi journal of moral philosophy (2016) 1-8 <UN> 4 argument for the conclusion that non-cooperators wrongfully claim for themselves an extra liberty right.7 Another attractive feature of the argument from disrespect is that it avoids the following novel argument from Zhu against the actual consequences argument. If the point of the principle of fair play is to allocate to schemes the rights necessary to prevent their collapse, then schemes should have only a liberty right to coerce beneficiaries into providing the form of support the scheme needs, since that is the only right necessary to ensure the functioning of the scheme. The claim right to similar submission is dispensable.8 But the argument from disrespect does not call for the allocation of rights with an eye to the consequences of different possible allocations. Rather, the argument shows through non-consequentialist means that free-riding and free reciprocation both violate the claim rights of the other cooperators. The argument from disrespect is importantly different from the argument from actual consequences, as it holds that people must cooperate out of considerations of fair play whether the scheme actually depends on fair play cooperators or not. And the argument is not question-begging, as it represents the fundamental moral concern underlying the principle of fair play just as much as it does an explanation of the wrongness of claiming a liberty right to reciprocate freely. Thus, one cannot grant that fair play requires some form of reciprocity-as Zhu does-without also admitting that the form of that reciprocity must be submission to the rules. Fair play theorists have better resources for requiring cooperation than Zhu recognizes. But that may be of little import, as Zhu also charges that cases
the scheme's benefits without submitting to its rules violate a arrant duty, owed to the cooperating extremity of the system. This seems to me a much impregnable 3 Zhu, " Fairness, Political Obligation, and the Justificatory Gap, " 306–309. 4 Ibid. , 309. 5 The point is clearest when complimentary - riders go out of their room to accept benefits, but I intend the distributor point holds even for non - voluntarist versions of fair play. Unfortunately, going into the detail here would take us too far afield for too farseeing. 6 Here I make use of the practical contradiction interpretation of the contradiction in concept test. See Christine M. Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 92–93. doi 10.1163/17455243 - 46810054 | Tosi journal of moral philosophy (2016) 1 - 8 < UN > 4 controversy for the conclusion that non - cooperators wrongfully claim for themselves an extra liberty right.7 Another attractive feature of the argument from disrespect is that it avoids the following novel argument from Zhu against the actual consequences argument. If the point of the principle of fair play is to allocate to schemes the rights necessary to prevent their flop, then schemes should have entirely a familiarity right to coerce beneficiaries into providing the mannequin of support the scheme needs, since that is the only justly necessary to ensure the functioning of the scheme. The claim right to similar meekness is dispensable.8 But the argument from disrespect does not call for the allocation of rights with an eye to the consequences of unlike potential allocation. Rather, the argument shows through non - consequentialist mean that free - riding and free reciprocation both rape the claim rights of the other cooperators. The argumentation from disrespect is importantly different from the argumentation from actual consequences, as it holds that citizenry must cooperate out of consideration of fair gambling whether the scheme actually depend on fair play collaborator or not. And the argument is not question - begging, as it represents the fundamental moral concern underlying the principle of fair play just as much as it make an explanation of the wrongness of claiming a autonomy right to reciprocate freely. Thus, one cannot grant that fair play requires some human body of reciprocity - as Zhu does - without also admitting that the form of that reciprocity must be submission to the rule. bonny play theorists have better resources for requiring cooperation than Zhu recognizes. But that may be of small import, as Zhu also charges that case
 thf scheme's benefits withomt submitting to its runes viklates a perfect duty, owed to the colpwratibg members of the scheoe. This svems to mw a nych strongxd 3 Zhu, "Ncirnead, Ponmtical Obligatipn, and the Justificatory Gxp," 306–309. 4 Ibid., 309. 5 The point is clearest wheg free-rodfrs go out of jheir ray fo accept benefits, but I think the point iolds even for mon-voluntarist versions of faig play. Unfortunatepy, going injk trw details hefe would take us too fzr afield for too long. 6 Here I oake bse of the kxqctlwal contradmction interpretatlpn of dhe conyradiction in gonce'tiob test. See Christine K. Korsgaard, Creatigg the Kitgbom of Ends (Cambridge: Cqmbrigge Gnivdesigy Krexs, 1996), 92–93. doi 10.1163/17455243-46810054 | Vosi journam of moral philosophy (2016) 1-8 <UN> 4 arbuivmt for the cknclusyog that non-cooperators wrongfully claim xor themselves an extra liverty right.7 Another ajtractive seature of the argument from disrespect is that id avomdr tkc wilpowing novel argument from Zhu against the acehak bonsequences arguient. If the plimj of the princkple oy fzir play is to alllcate tj schwmes the wighys necessary to prevent theur collapse, nhen schemes should hare only a liyerty tight yo coerce beneficiaries intk providing the form uf support the szheke needs, since that is the ogly right neczssary tu enxure tre functiojing of the scheme. The cpaim tight do similar submission is dispensable.8 But vie argument ftom divrespect does not call for the allocatiou of rigkts wigh an eye no the coisequences os different pmdsible allocetions. Raeher, the argumevg shows througn non-consvqbentialisr means that free-rlding znd free recipricauiin both violatr tfe slwik whghts of the othdr zpoperxtors. The avguoent from disrespect is hmpodtantly different grjm the atgument fwom actual comsequences, as it hllds vhat pxople kusj cooperate out of consideratiohs of faig pjay whether ehe wcheme actuakly depends on fair play cooperators or not. And the argumwnt is not question-yenging, as it cepresqnts the xundamental moral cobcern underlying uhe principle of fair pmay juvt as much as it does an explanation of the wrongness of claiming a liberty ritht to reciprocate frerly. Tvuf, one cwnnov jrant that fair pkay requires some form of recipcocity-as Zvu does-without also admitting yhxt the form ow that reciprocity must ge submixsion to the rules. Fair play throrists have better resomrces for requjring bko'eration than Zhu revognizzs. But that mqy bc of little imoory, ws Zhu aldo ciaryes that cases
the scheme's benefits without submitting to its a duty, owed the cooperating members to a much stronger Zhu, "Fairness, Political and the Justificatory Gap," 306–309. 4 309. 5 The point is clearest when free-riders go out of their way accept benefits, but I think the point holds even for non-voluntarist versions of play. going the here would take us too far afield for too long. 6 Here I make use of practical contradiction interpretation of the contradiction in conception See Christine M. Korsgaard, the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge: University 1996), 92–93. 10.1163/17455243-46810054 Tosi of moral philosophy 1-8 <UN> 4 argument for the conclusion that non-cooperators wrongfully claim for themselves an extra liberty right.7 attractive feature argument from is it the following novel Zhu against the actual consequences argument. of the principle of fair play is to to schemes rights necessary to prevent their collapse, schemes should have only a liberty right to beneficiaries into providing the form of support the scheme needs, since that is the only to ensure the functioning the scheme. The right similar is But the from disrespect does not call for the allocation of rights with eye to the consequences of different possible allocations. Rather, the through means that free-riding free reciprocation both violate claim of the other cooperators. from is the from consequences, as it holds people must cooperate out of of fair play whether fair play cooperators or not. And the argument not question-begging, as it represents the fundamental concern underlying the principle of fair play just as much as it an explanation wrongness of claiming a liberty right to reciprocate Thus, one cannot grant fair play requires some form of reciprocity-as Zhu does-without admitting the form that reciprocity must submission to the Fair play theorists resources for cooperation Zhu may be of little import, as also that cases
 the scheme's benefits without Submitting To its RulEs vIoLateS a peRfect duty, owed tO The cOoperating members of the SchemE. THIs seEMs To me a Much strONgER 3 zhu, "faIrNesS, POLiTical oblIgation, And the JustIfiCaTory Gap," 306–309. 4 Ibid., 309. 5 THE pOint is cleaResT when free-ridErs Go out oF tHeiR Way to AccEpt beNefits, BUt I thiNk the poinT hOLds eveN For non-vOLUnTariSt versions of fair pLAy. uNfortunately, goIng intO tHE dETAilS heRe would takE uS too fAR afield FOr TOO LonG. 6 here I make use oF the practicAL coNtradiCtIon INterprEtatiOn OF thE contradictIon iN conceptiOn test. sEe ChrisTIne M. KorSgaard, creAtiNg thE kiNgDom Of eNds (cAmBriDGe: CAmbridge unIvErsitY PreSS, 1996), 92–93. DOI 10.1163/17455243-46810054 | TosI joUrnaL of moRal philosophy (2016) 1-8 <uN> 4 aRgumENt fOr the ConclUsioN tHat noN-coopeRatorS wRongfully claim fOr thEmselves aN exTrA liBeRty riGHt.7 AnotHer AttRactive Feature OF thE aRGUMeNt from disrespect is ThAT It Avoids thE folloWInG nOVel argumEnT frOm ZhU AGainsT the ACtUal conseQuenceS ArGuMent. If tHe Point oF tHe pRinCiple OF faiR play iS to allocAte to SChemes the rightS Necessary to prEVeNT ThEIr coLlaPse, then scheMes sHOuld Have ONlY a lIBerty Right To COeRCe beneficiaries into PrOvidinG the fOrm of support tHe scheme neEDS, Since thaT is tHE oNLy right necessaRy to eNsure the fuNCtioning Of the Scheme. ThE claim rigHT To similaR suBmiSsiOn iS DIsPensable.8 But thE ARgumEnT from diSreSpect doEs nOt cAll For ThE allocatiOn of righTs WiTh An Eye To the COnsequenCeS of DiFfeRent pOSsible AllocAtioNs. raTHer, The arguMEnT SHows ThRoUgh nOn-cOnSequeNtiaLIst Means thAt free-ridIng ANd frEe ReCiprocaTion both violaTe The claim riGhTs oF the otHER cooperaTors. The argument from disrESpect is ImpOrtanTly dIfferent fRom The argUmeNT from aCtual cOnseqUeNceS, AS it hoLDS tHat PeOple must coOPEraTe out Of ConsIderatiOns of fair play whethER thE scheme actualLy dEpenDS On FaiR PlAY coOpERatORS or not. And the argUment is not QuEStIon-begging, AS it RePresentS the funDamenTAl moral Concern unDerlying tHe PrinCIPle Of fair play Just as muCh as it doeS An expLAnAtion Of tHe wronGnEss Of claIming a LIbeRty riGht to rEcIprocaTe freElY. Thus, one Cannot grant that fair play RequirEs somE foRm of recipRocITy-aS Zhu does-wIthoUt also admiTtiNg tHat thE foRM of thAt reCIpRocITy musT be sUBmission tO ThE ruLES. FAir play theoRISTs hAve beTteR ResourCes fOr requiring cooperATion than Zhu recOgniZES. BuT thAT may Be Of little import, As ZHu ALSo chargeS tHat cases
 the scheme's benefits wit hout submi tting  to  it srule s vi olates a perfe c t du ty, owed to the cooper ating  m e mber s  o f the  scheme .  T h i s s ee ms  to  m e  a  much  st ronger3 Zhu, "Fa irn es s, Political Ob ligation,and  the Justifi cat ory Ga p, " 3 0 6–309 . 4  Ibid ., 309 .  5 The  point is  c l earest when fr e e -r ider s go out of their wa y  to accept ben efits,  b u tI thi nkthe pointho lds e v en forn on - v o lun t arist version s of fair p l ay.  Unfor tu nat e ly, go ing i nt o  th e details h erewould tak e us t o o far a f ield fo r toolon g.6 He r eImak eu seo fthe pra ctical c on tr adict ioni n t e rpre tat ionof th e contradicti onin c o nce ption  test . Se eChris tine M . Kor sg aard, CreatingtheKingdom o f E nd s ( Ca mbrid g e: Cam bri dge  Univer sity Pr e ss,  1 9 9 6 ),  92–93. doi 10.116 3/ 1 7 45 5243-468 10054|  T os i  journal  o f m oral p hilos ophy (2 016) 1-8  <UN>4  a rg ument f or  the c on clu sio n tha t  non -coope rators w rongf u lly claim fort hemselves ane xt r a  l i bert y r ight.7 Anot hera ttra ctiv e  f eat u re of  thear g um e nt from disrespectis  thatit av oids the foll owing nove l a rgumentfrom Zh u  against the a ctual  consequen c es argum ent.If the p oint of t h e  princip leoffai r p l a yis to allocat e to s ch emes th e r ights n ece ssa rytopr event the ir colla ps e,  t he n s cheme s  shouldha veon lya lib e rty ri ght t o co er ce ben eficiar i es i ntopr ov idin g t he  form  ofs upp ort the  scheme n eed s , si nc ethat is  the only rig ht  necessary  t o e nsuret h e functi oning of the scheme. Th e  claimrig ht to  sim ilar subm iss ion is  di s pensab le.8 B ut th earg u m ent f r o mdis re spect does n otcallfo r th e alloc ation of rights wi t h a n eye to thecon sequ e n ce s o f  d i ffe re n t p o s sible allocatio ns. Rather ,t he  arguments how sthrough  non-co nsequ e ntialis t means t hat free- ri ding a ndfree recip rocation  both vio l ate t h eclaim  ri ghts o fthe  othe r coop e rat ors.The ar gu ment f rom d is respectis importantly differen t from  thearg ument fro m a c tua l consequ ence s, as it h old s t hat p eop l e mus t co o pe rat e  outof c o nsiderati o ns  of f ai r play whet h e r  th e sch eme actual ly d epends on fair pl a y cooperatorsor n o t . A ndt he a rg ument is not q ues ti o n -begging ,as it repre sents th ef undam entalmoralconcern u nd e rlying  the  pr inciple o f f ai r  play j us ta s much  asit  doesan exp l anat i o n of the wrongne ss of c laimi n g a  libe rt y right to r eciprocate  freely. Th us, on e ca nnotgrant t ha t fair  pl ay  requiress ome formof re ciproci ty -asZhu  does- with o u t als o ad mi tti ng that t h e  f o rm  o f  th at r ecipr oc itymust be s u bmission  to the rul es . F a i r play th e o rists have  be tterr e sources fo r  req u ir i ng co operat ion th an Zhur eco gn izes. B utt h at may be  of littl e  im po rt,as Zhu a ls o ch ar ges  t hat cases
 the_scheme's benefits_without submitting to its_rules violates_a_perfect duty,_owed_to the cooperating_members of the_scheme. This seems to_me a much_stronger_3 Zhu, "Fairness, Political Obligation, and the Justificatory Gap," 306–309. 4 Ibid., 309. 5_The_point is_clearest_when_free-riders go out of their_way to accept benefits, but_I think_the point holds even for non-voluntarist versions of_fair_play. Unfortunately, going_into the details here would take us too far_afield for too long. 6 Here_I make use_of_the_practical contradiction interpretation of_the contradiction in conception test. See_Christine M. Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom_of Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996),_92–93. doi 10.1163/17455243-46810054 | Tosi journal_of moral philosophy (2016) 1-8_<UN> 4_argument for the conclusion that_non-cooperators wrongfully claim_for themselves_an extra liberty_right.7 Another attractive feature of the_argument from disrespect_is that it avoids the following_novel_argument from Zhu_against_the_actual consequences_argument. If the_point_of the_principle_of fair play is to allocate_to_schemes the rights necessary to prevent their_collapse, then schemes should_have_only a liberty right_to coerce beneficiaries into providing_the form of support the scheme_needs, since_that is_the only right necessary to ensure the functioning of the scheme._The claim right to similar submission_is dispensable.8 But the_argument from_disrespect_does not call_for_the allocation_of rights with an eye to the_consequences of_different possible allocations. Rather, the argument_shows through non-consequentialist means_that_free-riding and free reciprocation both violate_the claim rights of the other_cooperators. The argument from disrespect_is_importantly_different from the argument from_actual consequences, as it holds that_people must cooperate_out of considerations of fair play whether_the_scheme actually depends on fair play_cooperators_or not. And the argument is_not_question-begging,_as it represents the fundamental_moral concern underlying the principle of_fair play just as much as it does an_explanation of the_wrongness of claiming a liberty_right_to_reciprocate freely. Thus, one cannot grant that fair play requires_some form_of reciprocity-as Zhu_does-without also admitting that the form of that reciprocity must_be submission to the rules. Fair play_theorists have better resources for requiring cooperation than Zhu recognizes. But_that may be of little import, as Zhu_also charges that cases