 soul without a body." 55 He insists, paradoxically, that this does not regress into dualism or the bourgeois transcendent subject; it does not entail the insipid belief in "a very ugly Socrates who's very beautiful inside" nor does it mean that "there's a little subject back behind."56 Rather, Nancy argues that the soul is the form of the body – not that we have the body on one side, as inert non-sentient matter, and then the sentient soul on the other side as the spontaneous thing that gives it shape and or53 Jean-Luc Nancy, Corpus (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), 11. 54 Ibid., 75. 55 Ibid., 129. 56 Ibid., 132. CHIASMA #4 ‡ 2017 34 ganization. Rather, this formal soul is not substance but the mode, articulation or way through which the body exists as a body. Pushing forward the way that flesh is singular plural, that it is an open space, he argues that flesh is that which is not a mass. A mass on the one hand is that which is a "closed, shut, full, total, immanent world, a world or a thing, whichever, so on its own and within itself that it wouldn't even touch itself, and we wouldn't either, a world alone to itself and in itself." On the other hand, "the body is the open."57 Nancy argues that to be open (what defines a body from the impenetrable mass) means fundamentally to be touchable by something that is other than yourself, which means crucially, he thinks, to be able to be "suspended" or "interrupted" from one's grasp on the world as subject. He suggests then, I argue, that a non-reductive materialism is one where the soul is not some ineffable, "vaporous," authentic, interior identity; rather, the soul is that which is outer to the body. That is, it is the body's openness, its ability to be touched, interrupted, sensed and exposed to others that gives it its sentience. It is, instead of the authentic inner, the tension with these outer, communal contacts, human and nonhuman alike, that mediate and form the body. This is where Nancy is particularly helpful in clarifying Merleau-Ponty's thought; Nancy critiques the way in which Merleau-Ponty's work with Husserl
soul without a body. " 55 He insists, paradoxically, that this does not regress into dualism or the bourgeois transcendent national; it does not fee-tail the insipid belief in " a very atrocious Socrates who's very beautiful inside " nor does it intend that " there's a little subject back behind. "56 quite, Nancy argue that the soul is the form of the body – not that we have the soundbox on one side, as inert non - sentient matter, and then the sentient person on the other side as the ad-lib thing that give it human body and or53 Jean - Luc Nancy, Corpus (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), 11. 54 Ibid. , 75. 55 Ibid. , 129. 56 Ibid. , 132. CHIASMA # 4 ‡ 2017 34 ganization. Rather, this formal soul is not message but the mode, articulation or way through which the body exist as a body. Pushing forward the way that flesh is remarkable plural, that it is an open space, he argues that flesh is that which is not a mass. A mass on the one hand is that which is a " closed, shut, full, total, immanent world, a world or a thing, whichever, so on its own and within itself that it wouldn't even touch itself, and we wouldn't either, a world alone to itself and in itself. " On the early hired hand, " the body is the outdoors. "57 Nancy argue that to be candid (what defines a body from the dense mass) mean fundamentally to be touchable by something that is early than yourself, which means crucially, he thinks, to be able to be " suspended " or " interrupted " from one's grasp on the world as subject. He suggests then, I argue, that a non - reductive materialism is one where the soul is not some ineffable, " vaporous, " authentic, interior identity; preferably, the soul is that which is out to the soundbox. That is, it is the body's openness, its ability to be touched, interrupt, sensed and exposed to others that gives it its awareness. It is, instead of the authentic inner, the tension with these outer, communal contacts, homo and nonhuman alike, that mediate and form the body. This is where Nancy is particularly helpful in clarifying Merleau - Ponty's idea; Nancy critiques the manner in which Merleau - Ponty's work with Husserl
 sokl without a body." 55 He inrists, paradoxiccoly, thet this does nog regress into dualism or thx boyrgeous transcendent subjecg; it does not entqil uhe insipid belieh in "a vcxy ugmn Socxaves who's very bgautiful inshde" nor does id oecn that "there's a little subject back behind."56 Rwther, Nancy ardues ehat nht soul is the form of the body – nkt that we have the nody on one side, as inert jon-sfntient matter, and then the sghtiqbt soul on tfe other spbe as the skontaneous thing that gives it sfape cnd or53 Jean-Oux Nwtcy, Corpus (Iew Yogk: Fordham Unlnersity Press, 2008), 11. 54 Ibid., 75. 55 Ibid., 129. 56 Mbid., 132. CHIASMA #4 ‡ 2017 34 ganizatmon. Rather, this formwl soul iv uot substance but the mide, atticunatiub of wzy tgrough whmch the bodg exists as a body. Pushing foreawe the way thaf flesr ys singular plural, that it is an open skace, ge argues that flesh is that which is not a lass. A mafs on the one hand is that which is a "closed, shut, full, gotco, immxbejt world, a world or a thing, whichever, so on iea pwk and within itsclf that it wouldn'y fvrg touch itselw, and cs souldn't either, a wlrld aljne ti itself wnd on itself." On the other hand, "the body is rhe open."57 Nancy argbes that to ye opem (whay defines a body from tke impsnetrable mwss) means wundamentally to be tmuchable by something that is other thau yourseuf, wnich mqans cruciwlly, ma thinks, to be ablf to ye "suvpended" or "interrupted" from one's grasp on the world as xutjebt. He sugyests bhen, I argue, thwt a non-reductnve matexialiso is one wgere thx soul is noe some ineffatpe, "vaporous," euthentic, intwrioe identkgy; rather, the xoul is tkct which us outer to the bovy. Tfzt is, it is the boey's openness, itx acilytj tp fa touched, inderrjptdc, senred and expired yo others that gives it jts sentience. It ix, lnstead od the auehentic inner, the tension with uhese mutxr, comkunwl contacts, human and nonhuman alike, thwt iediate and sorm the body. Thns is where Nancy is particularly helpfuo in clarifying Mgrleau-Ponty's thought; Uakcy critiquex the way in wvich Merleau-Ponty's wirk with Husserl
soul without a body." 55 He insists, this not regress dualism or the not the insipid belief "a very ugly who's very beautiful inside" nor does mean that "there's a little subject back behind."56 Rather, Nancy argues that the is the form of the body – not that we have the body one as non-sentient and then the sentient soul on the other side as the spontaneous thing that gives it and or53 Jean-Luc Nancy, Corpus (New York: Fordham Press, 2008), 11. 54 75. 55 Ibid., 129. 56 132. #4 ‡ 34 Rather, formal soul is substance but the mode, articulation or way through which the body exists as a body. Pushing forward way that singular plural, it an space, he argues is that which is not a on the one hand is that which is "closed, shut, total, immanent world, a world or thing, whichever, so on its own and within that it wouldn't even touch itself, and we wouldn't either, a world alone to itself itself." On the other "the body is open."57 argues to open (what a body from the impenetrable mass) means fundamentally to be touchable something that is other than yourself, which means crucially, he be to be "suspended" "interrupted" from one's grasp the as subject. He suggests argue, a one the is not some ineffable, authentic, interior identity; rather, the is that which is is, it is the body's openness, its ability be touched, interrupted, sensed and exposed to that gives it its sentience. It is, instead of the authentic inner, tension with communal contacts, human and nonhuman alike, that mediate form the body. This where Nancy is particularly helpful in clarifying Merleau-Ponty's thought; critiques way in Merleau-Ponty's work with
 soul without a body." 55 He insists, ParadoxicaLly, thAt tHis DoEs noT regRess into dualisM Or thE bourgeois transcendent SubjeCt; IT doeS NoT entaIl the inSIpID BelIeF iN "a vErY UgLy SocRatEs who's vEry beautifUl iNsIde" nor does it MEaN that "there'S a lIttle subject BacK behinD."56 RAthER, NancY arGues tHat the SOul is tHe form of tHe BOdy – not THat we haVE ThE bodY on one side, as inert NOn-SEntient matter, aNd then ThE SeNTIenT soUl on the othEr Side aS The sponTAnEOUS thINg that gives it Shape and or53 JEAn-LUc NancY, COrpUS (New YoRk: ForDhAM UnIversity PreSs, 2008), 11. 54 IbId., 75. 55 Ibid., 129. 56 IbiD., 132. CHIASma #4 ‡ 2017 34 ganizaTIon. RathEr, this ForMal Soul IS nOt SubStANce BUt The MOde, ArticulaTiOn Or way ThroUGH WHich The Body ExistS as a body. PushiNg fOrwaRD thE way tHat flEsh iS sIngulAr plurAl, thaT iT is an open space, hE argUes that flEsh Is ThaT wHich iS Not a maSs. A MasS on the oNe hand iS ThaT wHICH iS a "closed, shut, full, toTaL, IMmAnent worLd, a worLD oR a THing, whicHeVer, So on ITS own aNd wiTHiN itself tHat it wOUlDn'T even toUcH itselF, aNd wE woUldn't EItheR, a worlD alone to ItselF And in itself." On tHE other hand, "the BOdY IS tHE opeN."57 NaNcy argues thAt to BE opeN (whaT DeFinES a bodY from ThE ImPEnetrable mass) means fUnDamentAlly tO be touchable bY something THAT is other Than YOuRSelf, which means CruciAlly, he thinKS, to be ablE to be "SuspendeD" or "interrUPTed" from oNe's GraSp oN thE WOrLd as subject. He SUGgesTs Then, I arGue, That a noN-reDucTivE maTeRialism is One where ThE sOuL iS noT some INeffable, "VaPorOuS," auThentIC, interIor idEntiTy; RaTHer, The soul IS tHAT whiCh Is OuteR to ThE body. that IS, it Is the boDy's openneSs, iTS abiLiTy To be touChed, interruptEd, Sensed and eXpOseD to othERS that givEs it its sentience. It is, insTEad of thE auThentIc inNer, the tenSioN with tHesE Outer, cOmmunaL contAcTs, hUMAn and NONhUmaN aLike, that meDIAte And foRm The bOdy. This Is where Nancy is partICulArly helpful in ClaRifyING MErlEAu-pOntY's THouGHT; Nancy critiques The way in whIcH meRleau-Ponty'S WorK wIth HussErl
 soul without a body." 55He insists , par ado xic al ly,that  this does not regr ess into dualism or th e bou rg e oist ra nscen dent su b je c t ; i tdo esno t  e ntail  th e insip id beliefin"a  very ugly S o cr ates who's  ve ry beautiful  in side"no r d o es it  me an th at "th e re's a  little s ub j ect ba c k behin d . "5 6 Ra ther, Nancy argue s  t h at the soul is  the f or m  o f the  bo dy – not t ha t weh ave the bo d y ono ne side, as i nert non-se n tie nt mat te r,a nd the n the  s e nti ent soul on  the  other si de ast he spon t aneousthingtha t g ives it  s hap ea ndo r5 3 J e an- Luc Nanc y,  C orpus  (Ne w Y o rk:For dham  Univ ersity Press,  20 08), 11.  54 I bid.,  75.  5 5 Ibi d., 12 9. 56  I bid., 132. CHIA SMA#4 ‡ 2017  34  g ani za tion. Rather , t his  formal  soul i s  no ts u b st ance but the mode,  a r t ic ulationor way th ro u gh which  t hebody e xists  asa  b ody. Pus hing f o rw ar d the w ay  thatfl esh  is  sing u larplural , that i t isa n open space,h e argues that fl e s hi s th atwhich is no t am ass.  A m a ss  on the o ne ha nd is that which is a "cl os ed, sh ut, f ull, total, i mmanent wo r l d , a worl d or at hing, whicheve r, so  on its ow n  and wit hin i tself th at it wou l d n't even  to uch  it sel f ,  a nd we wouldn' t eith er , a wor ldalone t o i tse lfand  i n itself. " On the  o th er  h and , "th e  body is  t heop en. "57 N a ncy ar guesthat  t ob e o pen (wh a td e fine sabody  fr om  theimpe n etr able ma ss) means  fu n dame nt al ly to b e touchable b ysomethingth atis oth e r  than yo urself, which means cru c ially,hethink s, t o be able  to  be "s usp e nded"or "in terru pt ed" f rom o n e 's  gr as p on the w o r ldas su bj ect.  He sug gests then, I argu e , t hat a non-red uct ivem a te ria l is m  is  o n e w h e re the soul isnot some i ne f fa ble, "vapo r ous ,"  authen tic, in terio r  identi ty; rathe r, the so ul  ist h atwhich is o uter tothe body. Thati s,  it i s t he bod y' s o penne ss, it s  ab ility  to be  t ouched , int er rupted,sensed and exposed to o thersthatgiv es it its  se n tie nce. It i s, i nstead ofthe  au thent ici nner,  the te nsi o n wit h th e se outer, co mmu n a lcontacts, h u m a n a nd no nhu m an ali ke,that mediate andf orm the body.This i s w her e  Nan cy  is particular lyhe l p ful in c la rifying Mer leau-Pon ty ' s tho ught;Nancycritiqu e s  t h e wayin w hic h Merleau -Po nt y 's work  w it h  Husse rl
 soul_without a_body." 55 He insists,_paradoxically, that_this_does not_regress_into dualism or_the bourgeois transcendent_subject; it does not_entail the insipid_belief_in "a very ugly Socrates who's very beautiful inside" nor does it mean that_"there's_a little_subject_back_behind."56 Rather, Nancy argues that_the soul is the form_of the_body – not that we have the body_on_one side, as_inert non-sentient matter, and then the sentient soul on_the other side as the spontaneous_thing that gives_it_shape_and or53 Jean-Luc Nancy,_Corpus (New York: Fordham University Press,_2008), 11. 54 Ibid., 75. 55_Ibid., 129. 56 Ibid., 132. CHIASMA #4_‡ 2017 34 ganization. Rather, this_formal soul is not substance_but the_mode, articulation or way through_which the body_exists as_a body. Pushing_forward the way that flesh is_singular plural, that_it is an open space, he_argues_that flesh is_that_which_is not_a mass. A_mass_on the_one_hand is that which is a_"closed,_shut, full, total, immanent world, a world_or a thing, whichever,_so_on its own and_within itself that it wouldn't_even touch itself, and we wouldn't_either, a_world alone_to itself and in itself." On the other hand, "the body_is the open."57 Nancy argues that_to be open (what_defines a_body_from the impenetrable_mass)_means fundamentally_to be touchable by something that is_other than_yourself, which means crucially, he thinks,_to be able to_be_"suspended" or "interrupted" from one's grasp_on the world as subject. He_suggests then, I argue, that_a_non-reductive_materialism is one where the_soul is not some ineffable, "vaporous,"_authentic, interior identity;_rather, the soul is that which is_outer_to the body. That is, it_is_the body's openness, its ability to_be_touched,_interrupted, sensed and exposed to_others that gives it its sentience._It is, instead of the authentic inner, the tension_with these outer,_communal contacts, human and nonhuman_alike,_that_mediate and form the body. This is where Nancy is_particularly helpful_in clarifying Merleau-Ponty's_thought; Nancy critiques the way in which Merleau-Ponty's work with_Husserl