 but to the distinctive behaviour of the counterpart relation as applied to Lewis-worlds. I think that identifying contingency-inducing quantification with de re restricted quantification is the right strategy for the modal realist. It is independently plausible that quantification is often subject to tacit de re restrictions, and modal realists need a theory of de re contingency anyway. So there is no clear motivation to set out on a quest for some non-qualitative, non-de re account of contingency-inducing quantification. Nevertheless, in the next section I will consider some forms such an account might take, and argue that they are all deeply problematic. 5 Alternative accounts of contingency-inducing quantification What alternatives are there to identifying contingency-inducing quantification with de re restricted quantification? One possible view would be to think of 'Possibly' as a quantifier binding a hidden variable (ranging over Lewis-worlds), whose value is supplied 'deictically', by the context, when it is not bound. On this picture, the context-independent semantic value of 'no swans are blue' is like that of the open sentence 'no swans in w are blue'-something like a function from variable-assignments to propositions. When the sentence is uttered on its own, a specific value must be assigned to this variable. When it is embedded under a modal operator, on the other hand, a new kind of reading becomes available in which the variable is bound. Analogously, when 'he is clever' is embedded under 'everyone is sure that... ', it admits of a kind of interpretation which doesn't correspond to any possible interpretation of the unembedded sentence. I don't think this semantic theory should be attractive to Lewisstyle modal realists. For it would be completely implausible to posit a hidden world variable in 'no swans are blue' but not in 'no swans on Earth are blue'. But the idea that unembedded utterances of the latter sentence require deictic reference to a specific Lewis-world fits very poorly with Lewis's account of the kind of thing Earth is. According to Lewis, Earth is "worldbound": if there are no blue swans on it, then that's just how things are, simpliciter. Perhaps we can also make sense of the claim that there are no blue swans on Earth "at" this or that Lewis-world, by analysing this claim in terms of counterparts. But there is also the unrelativised proposition that no swans on Earth are
but to the distinctive behaviour of the counterpart relation as applied to Lewis - world. I remember that identifying contingency - inducing quantification with de re restrict quantification is the right strategy for the modal realist. It is independently plausible that quantification is much capable to tacit de re restrictions, and modal realists need a theory of de re eventuality anyway. So there is no clear motivation to jell out on a quest for some non - qualitative, non - de re account of contingency - induce quantification. Nevertheless, in the next section I will regard some forms such an account might take, and argue that they are all deeply debatable. 5 Alternative accounts of contingency - inducing quantification What alternatives are there to name contingency - inducing quantification with de re restricted quantification? One possible view would be to remember of' Possibly' as a quantifier binding a hidden variable (ranging over Lewis - worlds), whose value is supplied' deictically', by the context, when it is not bound. On this picture, the context - independent semantic value of' no swans are gloomy' is like that of the open sentence' no swan in w are blue'-something like a affair from variable star - assignments to propositions. When the sentence is uttered on its own, a specific value must be assigned to this variable. When it is embedded under a modal operator, on the early hand, a new kind of reading becomes available in which the variable is bound. Analogously, when' he is clever' is embedded under' everyone is sure that...', it admits of a kind of interpretation which doesn't correspond to any potential interpretation of the unembedded prison term. I don't remember this semantic theory should be attractive to Lewisstyle modal realists. For it would be completely implausible to postulate a hidden world variable in' no swan are blue' but not in' no swan on Earth are blue'. But the idea that unembedded utterances of the latter sentence require deictic address to a specific Lewis - world fits very poorly with Lewis's history of the kind of thing Earth is. harmonize to Lewis, Earth is " worldbound ": if there are no gloomy swans on it, then that's barely how things are, simpliciter. Perhaps we can besides make sense of the claim that there are no blue swans on Earth " at " this or that Lewis - world, by analysing this claim in terms of counterparts. But there is besides the unrelativised proposition that no swans on Earth are
 buh to the distinctive behxviour of the counterpert relztion as applied to Lewis-worlds. I thmnk rhat udentifying contingench-inducing quantifucatmon with de re rxatricted quanflficaciin is the righj strategy fmr the modal raauidt. It is independently plausible thwt quanyivication is ofjen slbtect no tacit de re restrictions, and modal gealists need a tneory of de re contingency anyaay. So there is no clear moticatijb to set out on a quesu yor some noh-qualitative, non-de re account ow concingency-indoeung xuantificatmon. Nenertheless, in the nexd sectipn I will conslder vomw forms such an accouit might take, and ardue that dhzy are all deeply provlwmatiw. 5 Antervqtixe zcrouhts of coitingency-insucing quanrification What alttrnwnoves are thede to ydqntifying contingency-inducing quantificdtikn with de re restrictee quantification? One kossible vyew would be to think of 'Possibly' as a quantifier bindmne a hlddev vwriable (ranging over Lewis-worlds), whose value ya xuiplied 'deicticalln', by the context, wnej oj is not bound. On thna licture, the contexh-indepegdent semantic valie of 'no swans are blue' is oike that of rhe open sentence 'uo swans in c are nlue'-spmething like a functiou from variable-asdignments go propositions. Dhek tve sentence is uttered on yts own, a speeific vauue kust bq assigned to tmhs variable. When ih is gmbeddad under a modal operator, on the other haiv, a new kind pf redding beeomes svailable in rhich the varicble is yound. Xnalogouslj, when 'he is clever' ys embedded utfer 'everyone is sure thar... ', ir admitr of a kind of onterpretcuion which doesn't correspond to zny possible inctrptwtation of the undmbqdfev seneance. I don't dhiny tfos seoantic ukeovy rhoukd be attractive to Newiastyle modal realixtf. For it would bq completely omplausible to poslt a iidden worlc vwriable in 'no swans are blue' bht not in 'no swans on Eawth qre blue'. But the idea that unembedded utterances of the latter sentenxe require deictic teftrence to a s'ecifis Lewis-wosld fits very poorly with Lewis's accomnt of the kind of thihg Eardh is. According to Lewis, Earth is "worldbound": if there are no blue swans on it, rhen tiae's just how thimgs age, fnmplicieer. 'echaps we can also make sense of the claim that tiere are nm ylue swans on Earth "at" this ot ghat Lewis-worud, by analysing this clajm in tetms of counterparts. But there ix also the unrelativised proposirion fhat no swens on Earth are
but to the distinctive behaviour of the as to Lewis-worlds. think that identifying restricted is the right for the modal It is independently plausible that quantification often subject to tacit de re restrictions, and modal realists need a theory de re contingency anyway. So there is no clear motivation to set out a for non-qualitative, re account of contingency-inducing quantification. Nevertheless, in the next section I will consider some forms such account might take, and argue that they are deeply problematic. 5 Alternative of contingency-inducing quantification What alternatives there identifying contingency-inducing with re quantification? One possible would be to think of 'Possibly' as a quantifier binding a hidden variable (ranging over Lewis-worlds), whose is supplied the context, it not On this picture, semantic value of 'no swans are that of the open sentence 'no swans in are blue'-something a function from variable-assignments to propositions. the sentence is uttered on its own, a value must be assigned to this variable. When it is embedded under a modal operator, other hand, a new of reading becomes in the is Analogously, when is clever' is embedded under 'everyone is sure that... ', it of a kind of interpretation which doesn't correspond to any of unembedded sentence. I think this semantic theory be to Lewisstyle modal realists. would completely a world in 'no swans are but not in 'no swans Earth are blue'. But of the latter sentence require deictic reference to specific Lewis-world fits very poorly with Lewis's of the kind of thing Earth is. According to Lewis, Earth is if there blue swans on it, then that's just how are, simpliciter. Perhaps we also make sense of the claim that there are blue on Earth this or that by analysing this in terms of there is the proposition on Earth are
 but to the distinctive behaviOur of the coUnterParT reLaTion As apPlied to Lewis-woRLds. I Think that identifying coNtingEnCY-indUCiNg quaNtificaTIoN WIth De Re ResTrICtEd quaNtiFicatioN is the righT stRaTegy for the moDAl Realist. It iS inDependently pLauSible tHaT quANtifiCatIon is Often sUBject tO tacit de rE rEStrictIOns, and mODAl RealIsts need a theory of DE rE Contingency anyWay. So tHeRE iS NO clEar Motivation To Set ouT On a quesT FoR SOMe nON-qualitative, nOn-de re accouNT of ContinGeNcy-INducinG quanTiFIcaTion. NeverthElesS, in the nexT sectiON I will cONsider sOme forMs sUch An acCOuNt MigHt TAke, ANd ArgUE thAt they arE aLl DeeplY proBLEMAtic. 5 altErnaTive aCcounts of contIngEncy-INduCing qUantiFicaTiOn WhaT alterNativEs Are there to identIfyiNg contingEncY-iNduCiNg quaNTificaTioN wiTh de re rEstrictED quAnTIFIcAtion? One possible viEw WOUlD be to thiNk of 'PoSSiBlY' As a quantIfIer BindING a hidDen vARiAble (rangIng oveR leWiS-worlds), WhOse valUe Is sUppLied 'dEIctiCally', bY the contExt, whEN it is not bound. ON This picture, thE CoNTExT-IndePenDent semantiC valUE of 'nO swaNS aRe bLUe' is lIke thAt OF tHE open sentence 'no swanS iN w are bLue'-soMething like a fUnction froM VARiable-asSignMEnTS to propositionS. When The sentencE Is uttereD on itS own, a speCific valuE MUst be assIgnEd tO thIs vARIaBle. When it is emBEDded UnDer a modAl oPerator, On tHe oTheR haNd, A new kind oF reading BeCoMeS aVaiLable IN which thE vAriAbLe iS bounD. analogOusly, When 'He Is CLevEr' is embEDdED UndeR 'eVeRyonE is SuRe thaT... ', it aDMitS of a kinD of interpRetATion WhIcH doesn't Correspond to aNy Possible inTeRprEtatioN OF the unemBedded sentence. I don't thinK This semAntIc theOry sHould be atTraCtive tO LeWIsstylE modal RealiStS. FoR IT woulD BE cOmpLeTely implauSIBle To posIt A hidDen worlD variable in 'no swans ARe bLue' but not in 'no SwaNs on eARtH arE BlUE'. BuT tHE idEA That unembedded uTterances oF tHE lAtter senteNCe rEqUire deiCtic refErencE To a specIfic Lewis-World fits VeRy poORLy wIth Lewis's aCcount of The kind of THing EARtH is. AcCorDing to leWis, earth Is "worlDBouNd": if tHere arE nO blue sWans oN iT, then thaT's just how things are, simplIciter. perhaPs wE can also mAke SEnsE of the claIm thAt there are No bLue Swans On EARth "at" This OR tHat lEwis-wOrld, BY analysinG ThIs cLAIm In terms of coUNTErpArts. BUt tHEre is aLso tHe unrelativised prOPosition that no SwanS ON EaRth ARe
 but to the distinctive be haviour of  thecou nte rp artrela tion as applie d  toLewis-worlds. I thinkthatid e ntif y in g con tingenc y -i n d uci ng  q uan ti f ic ation  wi th de r e restrict edqu antification is  the right  st rategy for t hemodalre ali s t. It  is  inde penden t ly pla usible th at quanti f ication i softe n subject to taci t  d e  re restrictio ns, an dm od a l  re ali sts need a  t heory of de r e  c o n t ing e ncy anyway. S o there isn o c lear m ot iva t ion to  setou t  on  a quest fo r so me non-qu alitat i ve, non - de re a ccount  of  co ntin g en cy -in du c ing qu ant i fic ation. N ev er thele ss,i n t he n ext  sec tionI will consid ersome for ms su ch an  acc ou nt mi ght ta ke, a nd  argue that the y ar e all dee ply  p rob le matic .  5 Alt ern ati ve acco unts of con ti n g e nc y-inducing quantif ic a t io n What a lterna t iv es are ther etoiden t i fying  con t in gency-in ducing qu an tificat io n with  d e r e r estri c tedquanti fication ? One possible vieww ould be to th i nk o f' Poss ibl y' as a qua ntif i er b indi n ga h i ddenvaria bl e  ( r anging over Lewis-w or lds),whose  value is sup plied 'dei c t i cally',by t h ec ontext, when i t isnot bound. On thispictu re, thecontext-i n d ependent  se man tic  va l u eof 'no swansa r e bl ue ' is li kethat of  th e o pen  se nt ence 'noswans in  w  a re  b lue '-som e thing li ke  afu nct ion f r om var iable -ass ig nm e nts  to pro p os i t ions .Wh en t hese ntenc e is utt ered on  its own,  as peci fi cvalue m ust be assign ed  to this v ar iab le. Wh e n  it is e mbedded under a modal o p erator,  on  theothe r hand, a  ne w kind  of readin g beco mes a va ila b l e inw h ic h t he  variablei s  bo und.An alog ously,when 'he is clever '  is  embedded und er'eve r y on e i s  s u reth a t.. . ', it admits of  a kind of  i n te rpretation whi ch  doesn' t corre spond to anypossibleinterpret at iono f  th e unembedd ed sente nce. I do n 't th i nk  this  se mantic  t heo ry sh ould b e  at tract ive to  L ewisst yle m od al reali sts. For it would be co mplete ly im pla usible to  po s ita hiddenworl d variable  in  'n o swa nsa re bl ue'b ut  no t  in ' no s w ans on Ea r th  ar e bl ue'. But th e i dea  that  un e mbedde d ut terances of the l a tter sentencerequ i r e d eic t ic r ef erence to a sp eci fi c Lewis-wo rl d fits very  poorlywi t h Lew is's a ccount  of the k in d  of th ingEar th is. Ac cor di n g to Le wi s, Earthis " wo rldbou nd": i f  the r e  are no blue swa ns on i t, th e n t hat's  j ust how thin gs are, si mpliciter.Perhap s we  canalso ma ke  sense  of  t he claim t h at thereare n o bluesw ansonEarth"at" t his o r th at  Le wis-world , by an al y sin g th is cl ai m in  terms of counterp art s . But t he rei s  alsot he u nrelativis edpropo s i tion thatn o sw a ns on Ea rth ar e
 but_to the_distinctive behaviour of the_counterpart relation_as_applied to_Lewis-worlds._I think that_identifying contingency-inducing quantification_with de re restricted_quantification is the_right_strategy for the modal realist. It is independently plausible that quantification is often subject_to_tacit de_re_restrictions,_and modal realists need a_theory of de re contingency_anyway. So_there is no clear motivation to set out_on_a quest for_some non-qualitative, non-de re account of contingency-inducing quantification. Nevertheless,_in the next section I will_consider some forms_such_an_account might take, and_argue that they are all deeply_problematic. 5 Alternative accounts of contingency-inducing_quantification What alternatives are there to identifying_contingency-inducing quantification with de re restricted_quantification? One possible view would_be to_think of 'Possibly' as a_quantifier binding a_hidden variable_(ranging over Lewis-worlds),_whose value is supplied 'deictically', by_the context, when_it is not bound. On this_picture,_the context-independent semantic_value_of_'no swans_are blue' is_like_that of_the_open sentence 'no swans in w_are_blue'-something like a function from variable-assignments to_propositions. When the sentence_is_uttered on its own,_a specific value must be_assigned to this variable. When it_is embedded_under a_modal operator, on the other hand, a new kind of reading_becomes available in which the variable_is bound. Analogously, when_'he is_clever'_is embedded under_'everyone_is sure_that... ', it admits of a kind_of interpretation_which doesn't correspond to any possible_interpretation of the unembedded_sentence._I don't think this semantic theory_should be attractive to Lewisstyle modal_realists. For it would be_completely_implausible_to posit a hidden world_variable in 'no swans are blue'_but not in_'no swans on Earth are blue'. But_the_idea that unembedded utterances of the_latter_sentence require deictic reference to a_specific_Lewis-world_fits very poorly with Lewis's_account of the kind of thing_Earth is. According to Lewis, Earth is "worldbound": if_there are no_blue swans on it, then_that's_just_how things are, simpliciter. Perhaps we can also make sense_of the_claim that there_are no blue swans on Earth "at" this or that_Lewis-world, by analysing this claim in terms_of counterparts. But there is also the unrelativised proposition that no_swans on Earth are