 them at the airport shortly after 10pm, then you'd have to revisit the plan. And if the world changes in a way that makes the belief false – for instance, if the plane is delayed – that fact alone normally tells us next to nothing about whether the belief will change. Analogous observations apply to occurrent judgment. If you occurrently judge that your friend's plane will land at 10pm, even when the judgment ends, the content is typically retained. In contrast, experiences lack the psychological inertia that characterizes beliefs. Whether your experience persists typically depends on whether you remain in contact with the relevant part of the environment. If you see a skyscraper ahead, and then turn so that it is no longer in view, your skyscraper--‐experience comes to an end, but your belief about where the skyscraper is located will typically persist. Fading into the past extinguishes the experience, but not the belief. These considerations suggest that if experience were a form of belief, then experiential beliefs would be short--‐lived, and the reason for their short lives would differ from the reasons for losing other beliefs. Experiences don't die from forgetting, or from the subject's responses to counter--‐evidence. A proponent of assimilating experiences to beliefs could respond that beliefs simply vary in the range of temporal profiles they can have – experiential beliefs have one profile, and non--‐experiential beliefs have another. But the substantive point would remain that experiences have a distinctive temporal profile, and one that precludes it from playing a central role of belief. And the more differences one finds between experiences and non–experiential belief, the less dialectical power an assimilation of experience to belief would have. For instance, if beliefs admit of a range of temporal profiles, perhaps they admit of a range of epistemic profiles as well. Given the diversity of beliefs that the proponent of the experience--‐as--‐belief thesis has to accommodate, they seem poorly positioned to claim that experiences share the epistemic profile of belief, on the grounds that experiences are beliefs. So there are good reasons to think that experiences aren't beliefs, and they apply to wide range of theories of the underlying structure of experiences. 3. Epistemic Charge So far, I've discussed whether experiences can have a rational standing, without looking closely at what epistemic property they would have, if they did. As a first stab, we could say that experiences would be able to be justified if
them at the airport shortly after 10 pm, then you'd have to revisit the plan. And if the populace transfer in a way that make the impression false – for instance, if the plane is delay – that fact alone normally tells us next to nothing about whether the impression will transfer. Analogous observations give to occurrent judgment. If you occurrently judge that your acquaintance's airplane will land at 10 pm, even when the opinion ends, the content is typically retain. In contrast, experiences lack the psychological inactiveness that characterizes beliefs. Whether your experience persists typically depend on whether you remain in liaison with the relevant part of the environment. If you learn a skyscraper ahead, and then turn so that it is no longer in view, your skyscraper--‐experience comes to an goal, but your belief about where the skyscraper is located will typically persist. Fading into the past extinguishes the experience, but not the belief. These considerations suggest that if experience were a form of belief, then experiential beliefs would be short--‐lived, and the reason for their short lives would differ from the reasons for losing early belief. Experiences don't fail from forget, or from the national's responses to counter--‐evidence. A proponent of assimilating experiences to beliefs could respond that beliefs plainly vary in the range of temporal profiles they can have – experiential beliefs get one profile, and non--‐experiential beliefs have another. But the substantive point would remain that experience have a distinctive temporal profile, and one that precludes it from play a central role of impression. And the more differences one detect between experiences and non – experiential belief, the less dialectic power an assimilation of experience to belief would have. For instance, if belief admit of a scope of temporal profile, perhaps they accommodate of a range of epistemic profiles as well. Given the diversity of impression that the proponent of the experience--‐as--‐belief thesis has to accommodate, they seem poorly positioned to claim that experiences share the epistemic visibility of belief, on the grounds that experience are beliefs. So there are good reasons to think that experiences aren't impression, and they apply to wide range of theories of the underlying structure of experience. 3. Epistemic Charge therefore far, I've discourse whether experiences can have a rational standing, without looking closely at what epistemic property they would have, if they act. As a first stab, we could say that experience would be able to be justify if
 thfm at the airport shortln after 10pm, then ioy'd havx to rebisit thd plan. And if the world chanjes un a qay that makes the belkef false – for inwtanre, if the plane ma delaycb – thzb facc elone normally jells us nexd to nothing atojt whether the belief will change. Anajogous pbdervations appjy tp occhgrtnt judgment. If you occurrently jhdge thet your friend's plane will land at 10pm, evej whfn the judgment enfs, the contght yw typically fetained. In contrast, esperiences lack the psychologicxl inzrtia that xhqrafjerizes belixfs. Whvther your exivrience persisys typically dcpendv ob whether you remain mn contact with the televant pdrc of the environment. Uf you vee d skhwcrxped ehezd, and thxn turn so fhat it is bo longer in view, ypuw skyscraper--‐exleriense comes to an end, but your belief about fhede the skyscraper is loxated will typically kersist. Faqing into the past extinguishes the experience, bud not ghe bcliew. Tjese considerations suggest that if experiencq wtre a form of bellef, then experientoap ngliefs would bg short--‐livsd, and the reason vor theyr shirt lives woukd differ from the reasons dor losing onher beliefs. Experienczs don't die yrom fprgetying, or from the subjecc's reslonses to clunter--‐evisdnce. A proponent of avsimilating experiences to beliefs rould respona thst belyefs simplj varn in the range of tfmporcl prmfiles thej can have – experiential beliefs have one progine, dnd non--‐erperiektial beliefs hwve another. Buj the subftantkve point sould rxmain that evperiences haeg a distinctite temporwl peofioe, and uve that precluces it from playing a central role of beujef. And the morz eifferences one fivds bvtwxen ev[eriences ang nov–exorriengial belief, ghe kess dialectical powar ah assimilation of rxierience jo belief would have. Fpr instance, if bellefs edmit uf a tande of temporal profiles, perhapa they adlit of a range jf eiistgmic profilzs as well. Given the diversity of beliefw that the propongnt of the experience--‐cs--‐nelief thesix has to accomkodate, they seem pooely positioned to claim that experiencss shase thf epistemic profile of belief, on the grounds that experiences are beliefs. So thxrq are good deaspns tm chiuk that expxrmences aren't belivfs, and they apply to wide range of theosizs of the underlying structurr uf experiencer. 3. Epistemic Charge So fzr, I've doscussed whether experiences cam have a rational standikg, withour looiing closeuy at what epistemoc pro'erty rhey woyld mave, if they dkd. Ss a first dtab, wz could say that experiences woule be avlf to be justifiev if
them at the airport shortly after 10pm, have revisit the And if the that the belief false for instance, if plane is delayed – that fact normally tells us next to nothing about whether the belief will change. Analogous apply to occurrent judgment. If you occurrently judge that your friend's plane will at even the ends, the content is typically retained. In contrast, experiences lack the psychological inertia that characterizes beliefs. your experience persists typically depends on whether you in contact with the part of the environment. If see skyscraper ahead, then so it is no in view, your skyscraper--‐experience comes to an end, but your belief about where the skyscraper is located typically persist. the past the but the belief. These that if experience were a form experiential beliefs would be short--‐lived, and the reason their short would differ from the reasons for other beliefs. Experiences don't die from forgetting, or the subject's responses to counter--‐evidence. A proponent of assimilating experiences to beliefs could respond that vary in the range temporal profiles they have experiential have profile, and beliefs have another. But the substantive point would remain that experiences a distinctive temporal profile, and one that precludes it from central of belief. And more differences one finds experiences non–experiential belief, the less an of would For if beliefs admit of range of temporal profiles, perhaps admit of a range Given the diversity of beliefs that the proponent the experience--‐as--‐belief thesis has to accommodate, they poorly positioned to claim that experiences share the epistemic profile of belief, the grounds are beliefs. So there are good reasons to that experiences aren't beliefs, they apply to wide range of theories of the structure experiences. 3. Charge So far, discussed whether experiences have a rational looking closely what property if they did. As a first we say that experiences would be to if
 them at the airport shortly afTer 10pm, then yOu'd haVe tO reViSit tHe plAn. And if the worlD ChanGes in a way that makes the bElief FaLSe – foR InStancE, if the pLAnE IS deLaYeD – thAt FAcT alonE noRmally tElls us next To nOtHing about wheTHeR the belief WilL change. AnaloGouS obserVaTioNS applY to OccurRent juDGment. IF you occurReNTly judGE that yoUR FrIend'S plane will land at 10pM, EvEN when the judgmeNt ends, ThE CoNTEnt Is tYpically reTaIned. IN ContrasT, ExPERIenCEs lack the psycHological inERtiA that cHaRacTErizes BelieFs. wHetHer your expeRienCe persistS typicALly depeNDs on wheTher yoU reMaiN in cONtAcT wiTh THe rELeVanT ParT of the enViRoNment. if yoU SEE A skyScrAper Ahead, And then turn so ThaT it iS No lOnger In vieW, youR sKyscrAper--‐exPerieNcE comes to an end, buT youR belief abOut WhEre ThE skysCRaper iS loCatEd will tYpicallY PerSiST. fAdIng into the past extiNgUIShEs the expEriencE, BuT nOT the beliEf. theSe coNSIderaTionS SuGgest thaT if expERiEnCe were a FoRm of beLiEf, tHen ExperIEntiAl beliEfs would Be shoRT--‐lived, and the reASon for their shORt LIVeS WoulD diFfer from the ReasONs foR losINg OthER beliEfs. ExPeRIeNCes don't die from forgeTtIng, or fRom thE subject's respOnses to couNTER--‐evidencE. A prOPoNEnt of assimilatIng exPeriences tO Beliefs cOuld rEspond thAt beliefs SIMply vary In tHe rAngE of TEMpOral profiles tHEY can HaVe – experIenTial belIefS haVe oNe pRoFile, and noN--‐experieNtIaL bElIefS have ANother. BuT tHe sUbStaNtive POint woUld reMain ThAt EXpeRiences HAvE A DistInCtIve tEmpOrAl proFile, ANd oNe that pRecludes iT frOM plaYiNg A centraL role of belief. anD the more diFfEreNces onE FInds betwEen experiences and non–expERientiaL beLief, tHe leSs dialectIcaL power An aSSimilaTion of ExperIeNce TO BelieF WOuLd hAvE. For instanCE, If bEliefS aDmit Of a rangE of temporal profileS, PerHaps they admit Of a RangE OF ePisTEmIC prOfILes AS Well. Given the divErsity of beLiEFs That the proPOneNt Of the exPeriencE--‐as--‐beLIef thesIs has to acCommodate, ThEy seEM PooRly positioNed to claIm that expERiencES sHare tHe ePistemIc ProFile oF belieF, On tHe groUnds thAt ExperiEnces ArE beliefs. so there are good reasons to Think tHat exPerIences areN't bELieFs, and they ApplY to wide ranGe oF thEorieS of THe undErlyINg StrUCture Of exPEriences. 3. EPIsTemIC chArge So far, I'vE DIScuSsed wHetHEr expeRienCes can have a rationAL standing, withoUt loOKIng CloSEly aT wHat epistemic prOpeRtY THey would HaVe, if they did. as a first StAB, we coUld say That exPeriencES WoULd be abLe to Be jUstified iF
 them at the airport short ly after 1 0pm,the n y ou 'd h aveto revisit the plan . And if the world cha ngesin a wa y  t hat m akes th e  b e l ief  f al se–f or  inst anc e, if t he plane i s d el ayed – thatf ac t alone no rma lly tells us  ne xt tono thi n g abo utwheth er the belief  will cha ng e . Anal o gous ob s e rv atio ns apply to occur r en t  judgment. Ifyou oc cu r re n t lyjud ge that yo ur  frie n d's pla n ew i l l l a nd at 10pm, e ven when th e  ju dgment  e nds ,  the c onten ti s t ypically re tain ed. In co ntrast ,  experi e nces la ck the  ps ych olog i ca line rt i a t h at  ch a rac terizesbe li efs.Whet h e r your  ex peri encepersists typi cal ly d e pen ds on  whet heryo u rem ain in  cont ac t with the rele vant  part ofthe  e nvi ro nment .  If yo u s eea skysc raper a h ead ,a n d  t hen turn so that i ti s  n o longer  in vi e w,  y o ur skysc ra per --‐e x p erien ce c o me s to anend, b u tyo ur beli ef  about  w her e t he sk y scra per is  located  will typically pers i st. Fading in t ot h ep astext inguishes t he e x peri ence ,  b utn ot th e bel ie f .T hese considerations  s uggest  that  if experienc e were a f o r m  of beli ef,t he n  experientialbelie fs would b e  short-- ‐live d, and t he reason f or their  sh ort  li ves w ou ld differ fro m there asons f orlosingoth erbel ief s.  Experien ces don' tdi efr omforge t ting, or  f rom  t hesubje c t's re spons es t oco u nte r--‐evi d en c e . Apr op onen t o fassim ilat i ngexperie nces to b eli e fs c ou ld  respon d that belief ssimply var yinthe ra n g e of tem poral profiles they can have –exp erien tial  beliefshav e onepro f ile, a nd non --‐ex pe rie n t ial b e l ie fsha ve another . But  thesu bsta ntive p oint would remaint hat  experienceshav e ad i st inc t iv e  te mp o ral p rofile, and one  that prec lu d es  it from p l ayi ng  a cent ral rol e ofb elief.And the m ore diffe re nces o nefinds betw een expe riences a n d non – ex perie nti al bel ie f,the l ess di a lec tical  power  a n assi milat io n of exp erience to belief would  have.  Forins tance, if  be l ief s admit o f arange of t emp ora l pro fil e s, pe rhap s  t hey admit  ofa  range of ep ist e m ic  profiles a s w ell . Giv ent he div ersi ty of beliefs tha t  the proponent  oft h e e xpe r ienc e- -‐as--‐beliefthe si s has to a cc ommodate, t hey seem  p o orlypositi oned t o claim t ha t  exper ienc esshare the  ep is t emic pr of il e  of be lief ,on the  groun d s th a t  experiences are  beli e f s. So the re ar egood re a sons  to thinkthat experi encesaren 't be liefs,an d they  ap pl y to wider ange of t heori es of t he  und erl ying s truc t u re of  exp er ien ces. 3. E p i st e mi cC har ge S o far ,I've  discusse d  whether  ex p erience scan h ave ar at i o nal standi ng,  with o u t lookingc lose l ya t wha t epis temicpropert y  th ey  wouldhav e ,  if theydid. As a fir st  sta b, we co ul d sa ytha texperiences wou ld be ab le to be j ustifi edi f
 them_at the_airport shortly after 10pm,_then you'd_have_to revisit_the_plan. And if_the world changes_in a way that_makes the belief_false_– for instance, if the plane is delayed – that fact alone normally tells_us_next to_nothing_about_whether the belief will change._Analogous observations apply to occurrent_judgment. If_you occurrently judge that your friend's plane will_land_at 10pm, even_when the judgment ends, the content is typically retained._In contrast, experiences lack the psychological_inertia that characterizes_beliefs._Whether_your experience persists typically_depends on whether you remain in_contact with the relevant part of_the environment. If you see a skyscraper_ahead, and then turn so that_it is no longer in_view, your_skyscraper--‐experience comes to an end,_but your belief_about where_the skyscraper is_located will typically persist. Fading into_the past extinguishes_the experience, but not the belief._These_considerations suggest that_if_experience_were a_form of belief,_then_experiential beliefs_would_be short--‐lived, and the reason for_their_short lives would differ from the reasons_for losing other beliefs._Experiences_don't die from forgetting,_or from the subject's responses_to counter--‐evidence. A proponent of assimilating_experiences to_beliefs could_respond that beliefs simply vary in the range of temporal profiles_they can have – experiential beliefs_have one profile, and_non--‐experiential beliefs_have_another. But the_substantive_point would_remain that experiences have a distinctive temporal_profile, and_one that precludes it from playing_a central role of_belief._And the more differences one finds_between experiences and non–experiential belief, the_less dialectical power an assimilation_of_experience_to belief would have. For_instance, if beliefs admit of a_range of temporal_profiles, perhaps they admit of a range_of_epistemic profiles as well. Given the_diversity_of beliefs that the proponent of_the_experience--‐as--‐belief_thesis has to accommodate, they_seem poorly positioned to claim that_experiences share the epistemic profile of belief, on the_grounds that experiences_are beliefs. So there are_good_reasons_to think that experiences aren't beliefs, and they apply to_wide range_of theories of_the underlying structure of experiences. 3. Epistemic Charge So far,_I've discussed whether experiences can have a_rational standing, without looking closely at what epistemic property they would_have, if they did. As a first stab,_we could say that experiences would be_able to be justified_if