FWAs. 6 (9) Variation 1 on Rubinstein's (2017) Domain for ⌜S wants p⌝ D ∩ BelS = ∅ D ∩ p = ∅ and D ∩ ¬p = ∅ (where D is contextually circumscribed) The second variation is to remove any reference whatsoever to BelS. This is suggested by Rubinstein herself: citing Heim's never-ending weekend sentence (see (3) above), Rubinstein says "one might...challenge the very assumption that beliefs semantically restrict desire statements at some level" (p. 119). That would give us (10), which requires merely that D be diverse with respect to p: (10) Variation 2 on Rubinstein's (2017) Domain for ⌜S wants p⌝ D ∩ p = ∅ and D ∩ ¬p = ∅ (where D is contextually circumscribed) In what follows, we will show that (9) goes wrong because the relationship between D and BelS is insufficiently constrained. Since (10) leaves that relationship even more unconstrained (in fact, completely unconstrained), it follows that (10) goes wrong too. We proceed by first elaborating on what Rubinstein says in prose about the relationship between D and BelS. Rubinstein suggests that in general, the relation between D and S's belief set "may be one of inclusion, such that the accessible worlds are a superset of the doxastic alternatives, arrived at by potentially suspending some of the subject's beliefs" (p. 118). This suggestion is quite similar to Heim's (1992) reaction to the problem of CFWAs; Heim says, "maybe for some reason not all the subject's beliefs are taken into account" (p. 200). We believe that there is something importantly right about this idea. Crucially, though, its ultimate success depends on whether we can answer the following question: what are the rules that govern which worlds D contains, beyond those in S's belief set? Stated differently: what are the rules that tell us which of S's beliefs to suspend in arriving at D? Is it really left entirely to context? The only guideline Rubinstein offers is in connection with one particular example she considers (an example from Heim 1992, 'I want to teach Tuesdays and Thursdays next semester'), where she says that the domain consists of "circumstantially accessible worlds in which I teach
FWAs. 6 (9) Variation 1 on Rubinstein's (2017) Domain for ⌜ S wants p ⌝ D ∩ BelS = ∅ vitamin d ∩ phosphorus = ∅ and D ∩ ¬p = ∅ (where D is contextually circumscribed) The second mutant is to take out any reference whatsoever to BelS. This is suggested by Rubinstein herself: quote Heim's never - end weekend sentence (attend (3) above), Rubinstein says " one might... challenge the very presumption that beliefs semantically restrict desire instruction at some horizontal surface " (p. 119). That would give us (10), which command merely that D be diverse with esteem to p: (10) Variation 2 on Rubinstein's (2017) Domain for ⌜ S wants phosphorus ⌝ D ∩ p = ∅ and D ∩ ¬p = ∅ (where D is contextually circumscribe) In what follows, we will prove that (9) goes wrong because the relationship between D and BelS is insufficiently constrained. Since (10) leaves that kinship even more unconstrained (in fact, completely unconstrained), it follows that (10) goes wrong too. We proceed by inaugural elaborating on what Rubinstein says in prose about the relationship between D and BelS. Rubinstein suggests that in general, the relation between D and S's belief set " may be one of inclusion, such that the accessible worlds are a superset of the doxastic alternatives, arrive at by potentially suspending some of the subject's impression " (p. 118). This trace is quite similar to Heim's (1992) reaction to the problem of CFWAs; Heim say, " maybe for some reason not all the subject's beliefs are accept into account " (p. 200). We believe that there is something importantly right about this idea. Crucially, though, its ultimate success depends on whether we can answer the following question: what are the rules that govern which worlds D hold, beyond those in S's impression hardening? Stated differently: what are the rules that tell us which of S's beliefs to freeze in arriving at D? Is it really left entirely to context? The only guideline Rubinstein offers is in connection with one particular exercise she considers (an exemplar from Heim 1992,' I want to teach Tuesdays and Thursdays next semester'), where she say that the domain dwell of " circumstantially accessible populace in which I teach
FWAd. 6 (9) Variation 1 on Rubinsuein's (2017) Domain for ⌜S wantv p⌝ D ∩ BelS = ∅ A ∩ p = ∅ and D ∩ ¬p = ∅ (where D is cintexulally circumscribed) Tfe second variatiin iw to remove any refcxence ahatviever to BelS. Jhis is suggasted by Rubinvtdiu herself: citing Heim's never-ending wqekend xejtence (see (3) abjve), Gufinsfvik says "one might...challenge the vedy assukption that brliefs semantically restrift dfsire statements ah some leveo" (p. 119). Rhat would gkve us (10), whpeh requires merely that D be diverse with fespeet to p: (10) Vatnqtilt 2 on Rubinwtein'f (2017) Domain fov ⌜S wands p⌝ D ∩ p = ∅ and D ∩ ¬p = ∅ (wiere D is contextually ciccumscribed) In what sollows, wa cill show that (9) goes qring bgcausa thd reuatjoishjp betaeei D and BelA is insuffuciently constrainec. Fpmce (10) leaves fhat rqlwtionship even more unconstrained (in fabt, ckmpletely unconstrained), it follows that (10) goed wrong tjo. We proceed by first elaborating on what Rubinsdein axys ik pruwe about the relationship between D and BelS. Rufjnxtvin suggests that in general, tje telation betwegn D anb S'a belief set "may bf one os incousion, sush tnat the accessible worlds aee a supersen of the doxastic altexnatives, arrnved aj by pptentially suspending sume kf the subjfct's belisws" (p. 118). This suggertipn is quitt similar to Heim's (1992) reactioi to che probuem pf CFWWs; Heim sajs, "mante for some reason not cll tve subject'd beliefs are taken into accounv" (p. 200). We beliefe thdt there is spmething impowtantly right cbout thns idex. Cruciallj, though, mts ultimate success depetfs on whethec we can wnswwr tye folluding question: ehat are nht rules thqt govern which wovlds A contains, beyonb uhise in S's belirf ret? Snatxd disxerently: whad ard tfr rulds that telo us ehich of S's beliefs do shspend in arriving ab D? Is it really jeft entirely to context? The onpy gumdelinx Rubimstgin offers is in connection witg one parhicmlar example fhe gonsyders (an erample from Heim 1992, 'I want to teach Tuesdabs and Thursdays next swmester'), where she scyx that the vomain consists of "circumstantially accessible worldx in which I teach
FWAs. 6 (9) Variation 1 on Rubinstein's for wants p⌝ ∩ BelS = ∅ D ∩ ¬p ∅ (where D contextually circumscribed) The second variation is remove any reference whatsoever to BelS. This is suggested by Rubinstein herself: citing never-ending weekend sentence (see (3) above), Rubinstein says "one might...challenge the very assumption beliefs restrict statements some level" (p. 119). That would give us (10), which requires merely that D be diverse respect to p: (10) Variation 2 on Rubinstein's Domain for ⌜S wants D ∩ p = ∅ D ¬p = (where is circumscribed) In what we will show that (9) goes wrong because the relationship between D and BelS is insufficiently constrained. (10) leaves even more (in completely it follows that wrong too. We proceed by first Rubinstein says in prose about the relationship between and BelS. suggests that in general, the relation D and S's belief set "may be one inclusion, such that the accessible worlds are a superset of the doxastic alternatives, arrived at suspending some of the beliefs" (p. 118). suggestion quite to (1992) reaction the problem of CFWAs; Heim says, "maybe for some reason not the subject's beliefs are taken into account" (p. 200). We there something importantly right this idea. Crucially, though, ultimate depends on whether we the question: rules govern worlds D contains, beyond in S's belief set? Stated what are the rules S's beliefs to suspend in arriving at D? it really left entirely to context? The guideline Rubinstein offers is in connection with one particular example she considers example from 'I want to teach Tuesdays and Thursdays next where she says that domain consists of "circumstantially accessible worlds in which I
FWAs. 6 (9) Variation 1 on Rubinstein'S (2017) Domain for ⌜s wantS p⌝ D ∩ bels = ∅ D ∩ P = ∅ and d ∩ ¬p = ∅ (whEre D is contextuALly cIrcumscribed) The second vAriatIoN Is to REmOve anY refereNCe WHAtsOeVeR to beLs. THis is SugGested bY RubinsteiN heRsElf: citing HeiM'S nEver-ending WeeKend sentence (See (3) Above), RUbInsTEin saYs "oNe migHt...chalLEnge thE very assuMpTIon thaT Beliefs SEMaNticAlly restrict desirE StATements at some lEvel" (p. 119). THaT WoULD giVe uS (10), which requIrEs merELy that D BE dIVERse WIth respect to p: (10) variation 2 on rUbiNstein'S (2017) DOmaIN for ⌜S wAnts p⌝ d ∩ p = ∅ ANd D ∩ ¬P = ∅ (where D is coNtexTually cirCumscrIBed) In whAT followS, we wilL shOw tHat (9) gOEs WrOng BeCAusE ThE reLAtiOnship beTwEeN D and belS IS INSuffIciEntlY consTrained. Since (10) lEavEs thAT reLatioNship Even MoRe uncOnstraIned (iN fAct, completely unConsTrained), it FolLoWs tHaT (10) goes WRong toO. We ProCeed by fIrst elaBOraTiNG ON wHat Rubinstein says iN pROSe About the RelatiONsHiP Between D AnD BeLS. RuBINsteiN sugGEsTs that in GeneraL, ThE rElation BeTween D AnD S's BelIef seT "May bE one of InclusioN, such THat the accessibLE worlds are a suPErSET oF The dOxaStic alternaTiveS, ArriVed aT By PotENtialLy susPeNDiNG some of the subject's bElIefs" (p. 118). THis suGgestion is quiTe similar tO hEIm's (1992) reactIon tO ThE Problem of CFWAs; heim sAys, "maybe foR Some reasOn not All the suBject's belIEFs are takEn iNto AccOunT" (P. 200). we Believe that thERE is sOmEthing iMpoRtantly RigHt aBouT thIs Idea. CruciAlly, thouGh, ItS uLtImaTe sucCEss depenDs On wHeTheR we caN Answer The foLlowInG qUEstIon: what ARe THE rulEs ThAt goVerN wHich wOrldS d coNtains, bEyond thosE in s'S belIeF sEt? StateD differently: wHaT are the rulEs ThaT tell uS WHich of S's Beliefs to suspend in arrivINg at D? Is It rEally Left Entirely tO coNtext? THe oNLy guidEline RUbinsTeIn oFFErs is IN CoNneCtIon with one PARtiCular ExAmplE she conSiders (an example froM heiM 1992, 'I want to teach tueSdayS ANd thuRSdAYs nExT SemESTer'), where she says That the domAiN CoNsists of "ciRCumStAntiallY accessIble wORlds in wHich I teacH
FWAs. 6 (9) Variation 1 on  Rubinstei n's ( 201 7)Do main  for  ⌜S wants p⌝ D ∩ Be lS = ∅ D ∩ p = ∅ and D  ∩ ¬p  = ∅ (w h er e D i s conte x tu a l lyci rc ums cr i be d) Th e s econd v ariation i s t oremove any r e fe rence what soe ver to BelS.  Th is issu gge s ted b y R ubins tein h e rself:  citing H ei m 's nev e r-endin g we eken d sentence (see ( 3 )a bove), Rubinst ein sa ys "o n e  mi ght ...challen ge  thev ery ass u mp t i o n t h at beliefs se manticallyr est rict d es ire statem entsat som e level" (p . 11 9). Thatwouldg ive us( 10), wh ich re qui res  mer e ly  t hat  D bed iv ers e  wi th respe ct  t o p:(10) V a r iati on2 on  Rubi nstein's (201 7)Doma i n f or ⌜S  want s p⌝  D  ∩ p= ∅ an d D ∩  ¬ p = ∅ (where Dis c ontextual lyci rcu ms cribe d ) In w hat  fo llows,we will sho wt h a t(9) goes wrong bec au s e  t he relat ionshi p  b et w een D an dBel S is i nsuff icie n tl y constr ained. Si nc e (10)le aves t ha t r ela tions h ip e ven mo re uncon strai n ed (in fact, c o mpletely unco n st r a in e d),itfollows tha t (1 0 ) go es w r on g t o o. We  proc ee d  b y  first elaboratingon  whatRubin stein says in  prose abo u t the rela tion s hi p  between D and  BelS . Rubinste i n sugges ts th at in ge neral, th e relation  be twe enD a n d  S 's belief set " maybe  one of  in clusion , s uch  th atth e accessi ble worl ds  a re  a  su perse t  of thedo xas ti c a ltern a tives,  arri vedat  b y  po tential l ys u spen di ng  som e o fthe s ubje c t's  belief s" (p. 11 8). This  s ug gestion  is quite sim il ar to Heim 's  (1 992) r e a ction to  the problem of CFWAs;H eim say s,"mayb e fo r some re aso n notall the su bject' s bel ie fsa r e tak e n  i nto  a ccount" (p . 200 ). We  b elie ve that  there is somethin g  im portantly rig htabou t th isi de a . C ru c ial l y , though, its u ltimate su cc e ss  depends o n  wh et her wecan ans wer t h e follo wing ques tion: wha taret h e r ules thatgovern w hich worl d s D c o nt ains,  be yond t ho sein S' s beli e f s et? S tateddi fferen tly:wh at are t he rules that tell us w hich o f S's  be liefs tosus p end  in arriv ingat D? Is i t r eal ly le fte ntire ly t o  c ont e xt? T he o n ly guidel i ne  Ru b i ns tein offers i s  in  conn ect i on wit h on e particular exam p le she conside rs ( a n  ex amp l e fr om  Heim 1992, 'I  wa nt t o teachTu esdays andThursday sn ext s emeste r'), w here sh e sa y s that  the  do main cons ist so f "circ um st a ntiall y ac ce ssible  world s  inw h ich I teach
FWAs. 6_(9) Variation_1 on Rubinstein's (2017)_Domain for_⌜S_wants p⌝_D_∩ BelS =_∅ D ∩_p = ∅ and_D ∩ ¬p_=_∅ (where D is contextually circumscribed) The second variation is to remove any reference_whatsoever_to BelS._This_is_suggested by Rubinstein herself: citing_Heim's never-ending weekend sentence (see_(3) above),_Rubinstein says "one might...challenge the very assumption that_beliefs_semantically restrict desire_statements at some level" (p. 119). That would give_us (10), which requires merely that_D be diverse_with_respect_to p: (10) Variation_2 on Rubinstein's (2017) Domain for_⌜S wants p⌝ D ∩ p_= ∅ and D ∩ ¬p =_∅ (where D is contextually circumscribed)_In what follows, we will_show that_(9) goes wrong because the_relationship between D_and BelS_is insufficiently constrained._Since (10) leaves that relationship even_more unconstrained (in_fact, completely unconstrained), it follows that_(10)_goes wrong too._We_proceed_by first_elaborating on what_Rubinstein_says in_prose_about the relationship between D and_BelS._Rubinstein suggests that in general, the relation_between D and S's_belief_set "may be one_of inclusion, such that the_accessible worlds are a superset of_the doxastic_alternatives, arrived_at by potentially suspending some of the subject's beliefs" (p. 118)._This suggestion is quite similar to_Heim's (1992) reaction to_the problem_of_CFWAs; Heim says,_"maybe_for some_reason not all the subject's beliefs are_taken into_account" (p. 200). We believe that_there is something importantly_right_about this idea. Crucially, though, its_ultimate success depends on whether we_can answer the following question:_what_are_the rules that govern which_worlds D contains, beyond those in_S's belief set?_Stated differently: what are the rules that_tell_us which of S's beliefs to_suspend_in arriving at D? Is it_really_left_entirely to context? The only_guideline Rubinstein offers is in connection_with one particular example she considers (an example from_Heim 1992, 'I_want to teach Tuesdays and_Thursdays_next_semester'), where she says that the domain consists of "circumstantially_accessible worlds_in which I_teach