 2012b, 2012c, and 2013. The warm relationship between Duhem and Ostwald cannot be interpreted as an agreement on the meaning of Energetics. On their friendship, see Brouzeng 1981, vol. 2, 226-228. 30 Duhem's theoretical and meta-theoretical design was explicitly unfolded in a book he published in 1903, L'évolution de la mécanique (Duhem 1992 [1903]), 199 and 218-219). 31 At that time, Duhem was "maitre de conférences" at Lille University: for further biographical details, see Brouzeng 1987, 54. Stefano Bordoni – The French Roots of Duhem's early Historiography and Epistemology 30 pursued a critical overview of scientific practice that was not so different from Poincaré's: I find that the "important differences" between them that some historians and philosophers of science have pointed out should not be overestimated (Brenner 1996, 389-390).32 They criticised the mechanistic view, and were aware of the intrinsic historicity of scientific achievements. In 1893, Duhem devised a four-level scientific practice that, starting from phenomena, led to mathematical laws, theories, and then a plurality of metaphysical foundations. The four levels were mutually independent: a plurality of theories could stem from a definite set of laws, and a plurality of metaphysical assumptions could stem from a theory or set of theories (Duhem 1893a, 65-66 and 68-71). Once more, we find here a meta-theoretical analysis of scientific theories that had much in common with what Cournot and Naville had previously put forward. In the same year, he published another paper wherein he introduced the concept of "natural classification of laws" that had already appeared in the tradition of French philosophy of science. He qualified the concept as a "perfect and ideal theory" or a "complete and appropriate metaphysical explanation of the nature of material things". Actual physical theories had to "strive for perfection", even though perfection could not be attained. This commitment dealt with practices that eluded any definite definition, but Duhem insisted on further, fruitless philosophical specifications (Duhem 1893b (1987), 136-137).33 Unlike Comte, Duhem's concept of natural classification made reference to the essential features of a scientific theory. Comte's natural classification was a relationship among different bodies of knowledge that was in tune with logical and historical genealogies (Comte 1830, 60
2012b, 2012c, and 2013. The warm relationship between Duhem and Ostwald cannot be interpreted as an agreement on the meaning of Energetics. On their friendship, see Brouzeng 1981, vol. 2, 226 - 228. 30 Duhem's theoretical and meta - theoretical invention was explicitly unfold in a book he published in 1903, L'évolution de la mécanique (Duhem 1992 [ 1903 ]), 199 and 218 - 219). 31 At that time, Duhem was " maitre delaware conférences " at Lille University: for further biographical details, see Brouzeng 1987, 54. Stefano Bordoni – The French solution of Duhem's early Historiography and Epistemology 30 pursued a critical overview of scientific practice that was not thus different from Poincaré's: I find that the " authoritative differences " between them that some historians and philosopher of science have pointed out should not be overestimated (Brenner 1996, 389 - 390).32 They criticised the mechanistic view, and were mindful of the intrinsic historicity of scientific achievements. In 1893, Duhem devised a four - level scientific exercise that, starting from phenomena, led to mathematical laws, theory, and then a plurality of metaphysical foundations. The four levels were mutually independent: a plurality of theory could stem from a definite set of laws, and a plurality of metaphysical assumptions could stem from a theory or set of theories (Duhem 1893a, 65 - 66 and 68 - 71). Once more, we find here a meta - theoretical analysis of scientific theories that had much in common with what Cournot and Naville had previously put forward. In the same year, he published another composition wherein he introduced the concept of " natural categorization of law " that had already appear in the tradition of French philosophy of science. He qualified the concept as a " perfect and ideal theory " or a " complete and appropriate metaphysical explanation of the nature of corporeal things ". Actual physical theories had to " strive for perfection ", even though paragon could not be attained. This commitment dealt with practices that eluded any definite definition, but Duhem insisted on further, bootless philosophic specification (Duhem 1893b (1987), 136 - 137).33 Unlike Comte, Duhem's concept of natural classification made character to the essential features of a scientific theory. Comte's natural classification was a relationship among different bodies of cognition that was in tune with logical and historical genealogies (Comte 1830, 60
 2012b, 2012f, and 2013. The warm relationrhip between Dukwm and Ostwamd cannog be interpreted as an agreelebt on the meaning of Energegics. On tjeir friwndsiip, see Brouzeng 1981, vol. 2, 226-228. 30 Duhem'a themcetical and mets-theoreticdl design was axolncitly unfolded in a book he publishqd in 1903, K'évllution de la iécanpqte (Dhhem 1992 [1903]), 199 and 218-219). 31 At that time, Duhem wzs "maitge de conférences" st Lille University: for fugtheg biographical detwils, see Briuzegt 1987, 54. Stefano Cordoni – The French Rokts of Duhem's early Historiograohy aud Epistemoooty 30 kursued a crmtical overview of scientixic pravtice that was nov so different from Poinceré's: I find that the "ymportant dnfferences" between thwm that soma hirrorkana end philodopiers of scisnce have piinted out should npt ve overestimafed (Brqnger 1996, 389-390).32 They criticised the mechanistic vpew, znd were aware of the ibtrinsic historicity lf scientyfic achievements. In 1893, Duhem devised a four-level swientmfkc krqcticd tjat, starting from phenomena, led to mathematicwm kaes, theories, anb then a pluraliyy og metaphysical foundcfikns. The four leveld were iutuaoly indeptndeny: a plurality of theories ciuld stem frjn a definite set oy laws, and a plutality of metaphysical assumpcions dould stem vrom a thsury or set of thdorpes (Guhem 1893a, 65-66 and 68-71). Once more, we find herx a mzta-theordticsl anajysis of sfientlxic theories that jad moch in common wihh what Cournot and Naville had previously puj fmrwdrd. In tke samc year, he publifhed another pcper whexein hd introducvd the coicept of "nattral classifiwwtion of lawv" that hwd aoreaey appexfed in the tracition of French phulosophy of sciencc. He dhalified the coueekt as a "perfect snd idqap vheorr" or a "complede avd xlpropfiate mtcapmyskcal explanation of the tatude of material thimgf". Actual physicaj theories hac to "strive for pegfectmon", evxn thoigh perfection could not be attaihed. This fomiitment deale wibh ptactices thct eluded any definite definition, but Duiem insisted on furthet, fruitless philosophncsl specificetions (Duhem 1893b (1987), 136-137).33 Unlike Comte, Duhem'w concept of natuval classification mads refesence to the essential features of a scientific theory. Comte's natural classifixation was a relatjonsnip akoug bifferegt blvies of knowledge that was in tune with logical end historhccl genealogies (Comte 1830, 60
2012b, 2012c, and 2013. The warm relationship and cannot be as an agreement On friendship, see Brouzeng vol. 2, 226-228. Duhem's theoretical and meta-theoretical design was unfolded in a book he published in 1903, L'évolution de la mécanique (Duhem [1903]), 199 and 218-219). 31 At that time, Duhem was "maitre de conférences" Lille for biographical see Brouzeng 1987, 54. Stefano Bordoni – The French Roots of Duhem's early Historiography and Epistemology pursued a critical overview of scientific practice that not so different from I find that the "important between that some and of have pointed out not be overestimated (Brenner 1996, 389-390).32 They criticised the mechanistic view, and were aware of the intrinsic of scientific 1893, Duhem a scientific that, starting from to mathematical laws, theories, and then metaphysical foundations. The four levels were mutually independent: plurality of could stem from a definite set laws, and a plurality of metaphysical assumptions could from a theory or set of theories (Duhem 1893a, 65-66 and 68-71). Once more, we a meta-theoretical analysis of theories that had in with Cournot Naville had put forward. In the same year, he published another paper wherein introduced the concept of "natural classification of laws" that had in tradition of French of science. He qualified concept a "perfect and ideal a and of nature material things". Actual physical had to "strive for perfection", though perfection could not with practices that eluded any definite definition, but insisted on further, fruitless philosophical specifications (Duhem (1987), 136-137).33 Unlike Comte, Duhem's concept of natural classification made reference to essential features scientific theory. Comte's natural classification was a relationship different bodies of knowledge was in tune with logical and historical genealogies (Comte 60
 2012b, 2012c, and 2013. The warm relationship bEtween DuheM and OStwAld CaNnot Be inTerpreted as an aGReemEnt on the meaning of EnergEtics. on THeir FRiEndshIp, see BrOUzENG 1981, voL. 2, 226-228. 30 DUhEm's ThEOrEticaL anD meta-thEoretical dEsiGn Was explicitlY UnFolded in a bOok He published iN 1903, L'éVolutiOn De lA MécanIquE (DuheM 1992 [1903]), 199 and 218-219). 31 At THat timE, Duhem was "MaITre de cONférencES" At lillE University: for furTHeR Biographical deTails, sEe bRoUZEng 1987, 54. steFano BordonI – THe FreNCh Roots OF DUHEM's eARly HistoriogrAphy and EpisTEmoLogy 30 puRsUed A CriticAl oveRvIEw oF scientific PracTice that wAs not sO DiffereNT from PoIncaré'S: I fInd That THe "ImPorTaNT diFFeRenCEs" bEtween thEm ThAt somE hisTORIAns aNd pHiloSopheRs of science haVe pOintED ouT shouLd not Be ovErEstimAted (BrEnner 1996, 389-390).32 thEy criticised the MechAnistic viEw, aNd WerE aWare oF The intRinSic HistoriCity of sCIenTiFIC AcHievements. In 1893, Duhem dEvISEd A four-levEl scieNTiFiC Practice ThAt, sTartING from PhenOMeNa, led to mAthemaTIcAl Laws, theOrIes, and ThEn a PluRalitY Of meTaphysIcal founDatioNS. The four levels WEre mutually inDEpENDeNT: a plUraLity of theorIes cOUld sTem fROm A deFInite Set of LaWS, aND a plurality of metaphYsIcal asSumptIons could stem From a theorY OR Set of theOrieS (duHEm 1893a, 65-66 and 68-71). Once more, We finD here a meta-THeoreticAl anaLysis of sCientific THEories thAt hAd mUch In cOMMoN with what CourNOT and naVille haD prEviouslY puT foRwaRd. IN tHe same yeaR, he publiShEd AnOtHer Paper WHerein he InTroDuCed The coNCept of "NaturAl clAsSiFIcaTion of lAWs" THAt haD aLrEady AppEaRed in The tRAdiTion of FRench philOsoPHy of ScIeNce. He quAlified the conCePt as a "perfeCt And Ideal tHEOry" or a "coMplete and appropriate metAPhysicaL exPlanaTion Of the natuRe oF materIal THings". ACtual pHysicAl TheORIes haD TO "sTriVe For perfectION", evEn thoUgH perFection Could not be attained. tHis Commitment deaLt wIth pRACtIceS ThAT elUdED anY DEfinite definitiOn, but Duhem InSIsTed on furthER, frUiTless phIlosophIcal sPEcificaTions (DuheM 1893b (1987), 136-137).33 Unlike COmTe, DuHEM's cOncept of naTural claSsificatiON made REfErencE to The essEnTiaL featUres of A SciEntifIc theoRy. comte's NaturAl ClassifiCation was a relationship aMong diFfereNt bOdies of knOwlEDge That was in Tune With logicaL anD hiStoriCal GEnealOgieS (coMte 1830, 60
 2012b, 2012c, and 2013. T he warm re latio nsh ipbe twee n Du hem and Ostwal d  can not be interpreted asan ag re e ment on  themeaning of E ner ge ti cs.  O n  t heirfri endship , see Brou zen g1981, vol. 2 ,  2 26-228. 30  Du hem's theore tic al and  m eta - theor eti cal d esignw as exp licitly u nf o lded i n  a book h epubl ished in 1903, L' é vo l ution de la mé caniqu e( Du h e m 1 992  [1903]),19 9 and 218-219 ) .3 1 Att hat time, Duh em was "mai t rede con fé ren c es" at  Lill eU niv ersity: for  fur ther biog raphic a l detai l s, seeBrouze ng198 7, 5 4 .St efa no Bor d on i – The  FrenchRo ot s ofDuhe m ' s earl y H isto riogr aphy and Epis tem olog y  30  purs ued a  cri ti cal o vervie w ofsc ientific practi ce t hat was n otso  di ff erent from P oin car é's: Ifind th a t t he " i mp ortant differences "b e tw een them  thats om eh istorian sand  phi l o sophe rs o f  s cience h ave po i nt ed  out sh ou ld not  b e o ver estim a ted(Brenn er 1996,  389- 3 90).32 They cr i ticised the m e ch a n is t ic v iew , and wereawar e  ofthei nt rin s ic hi stori ci t yo f scientific achiev em ents.In 18 93, Duhem dev ised a fou r - l evel sci enti f ic practice that,  star ting fromp henomena , led  to math ematicall a ws, theo rie s,and  th e n  a  plurality of m etap hy sical f oun dations . T hefou r l ev els weremutually  i nd ep en den t: ap lurality  o f t he ori es co u ld ste m fro m ade fi n ite  set of la w s , an daplur ali ty  of m etap h ysi cal ass umptionscou l d st em  f rom a t heory or setof  theories(D uhe m 1893 a ,  65-66 a nd 68-71). Once more, w e  find h ere  a me ta-t heoretica l a nalysi s o f  scien tifictheor ie s t h a t had m uc h i ncommon wit h wha t Cou rn ot a nd Navi lle had previously put  forward. Inthe  sam e ye ar, he pub li s hed a nother paper wh erein he i nt r od uced the c o nce pt  of "na tural c lassi f ication  of laws"  that had  a lrea d y  ap peared inthe trad ition ofF rench ph iloso phy  of sc ie nce . Hequalif i edthe c oncept  a s a "p erfec tand idea l theory" or a "complet e andappro pri ate metap hys i cal  explanat ionof the nat ure  of  mate ria l  thin gs". Ac tua l  phys ical theoriesh ad  to " st rive for pe r f e cti on",eve n  thoug h pe rfection could no t  be attained.This c omm itm e nt d ea lt with practi ces  t h a t eluded  a ny definite  definit io n , but  Duhem  insis ted onf u rt h er, fr uitl ess  philosop hic al specifi ca ti o ns (Du hem18 93b (1 987),1 36-1 3 7 ).33 Unlike Comt e, Du h e m's c o nce pt of  n aturalc lass ificationmade refere nce to  the  esse ntial f ea turesofascientific theory. C omte' s natur al  cla ssi ficati on w a s  a re lati on shi p among d i f fe r en tb odi es o f kno wl edge  that was in tunewit h  logica land h istori c al g enealogies  (C omte1 8 30, 60
 2012b,_2012c, and_2013. The warm relationship_between Duhem_and_Ostwald cannot_be_interpreted as an_agreement on the_meaning of Energetics. On_their friendship, see_Brouzeng_1981, vol. 2, 226-228. 30 Duhem's theoretical and meta-theoretical design was explicitly unfolded in_a_book he_published_in_1903, L'évolution de la mécanique_(Duhem 1992 [1903]), 199 and_218-219). 31_At that time, Duhem was "maitre de conférences"_at_Lille University: for_further biographical details, see Brouzeng 1987, 54. Stefano Bordoni_– The French Roots of Duhem's_early Historiography and_Epistemology_30_pursued a critical overview_of scientific practice that was not_so different from Poincaré's: I find_that the "important differences" between them that_some historians and philosophers of science_have pointed out should not_be overestimated_(Brenner 1996, 389-390).32 They criticised_the mechanistic view,_and were_aware of the_intrinsic historicity of scientific achievements. In_1893, Duhem devised_a four-level scientific practice that, starting_from_phenomena, led to_mathematical_laws,_theories, and_then a plurality_of_metaphysical foundations._The_four levels were mutually independent: a_plurality_of theories could stem from a definite_set of laws, and_a_plurality of metaphysical assumptions_could stem from a theory_or set of theories (Duhem 1893a,_65-66 and_68-71). Once_more, we find here a meta-theoretical analysis of scientific theories that_had much in common with what_Cournot and Naville had_previously put_forward._In the same_year,_he published_another paper wherein he introduced the concept_of "natural_classification of laws" that had already_appeared in the tradition_of_French philosophy of science. He qualified_the concept as a "perfect and_ideal theory" or a "complete_and_appropriate_metaphysical explanation of the nature_of material things". Actual physical theories_had to "strive_for perfection", even though perfection could not_be_attained. This commitment dealt with practices_that_eluded any definite definition, but Duhem_insisted_on_further, fruitless philosophical specifications (Duhem_1893b (1987), 136-137).33 Unlike Comte, Duhem's_concept of natural classification made reference to the essential_features of a_scientific theory. Comte's natural classification_was_a_relationship among different bodies of knowledge that was in tune_with logical_and historical genealogies_(Comte 1830, 60