 the process of thinking, but of relations in the object thought of. The logical concept is the presented content considered apart from the psychological conditions and circumstances of its presentations at this or that time to this or thattemporary notion of propositional content:..., Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. T 820 821 822 823 824 825 826 827 828 829 830 831 832 833 834 835 836 837 838 839 840 841 842 843 844 845 846 847 848 849 850 851 852 853 854 855 856 857 858 859 860 861 862 863 864 865 866 867 868 869 870 871 872 873 874 875 876 877 878 879 880 881 882 883 884 885 886 887 888 889 890 891 892 893 894 895 896 897 898 899 900 901 902 903 904 905 906 907 908 909 910 911 912 913 914 915 916 917 918 919 920 921 922 923 924 925 926 927 928 929 930 931 932 933 934 C. Preti / Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. xxx (2008) xxx–xxx 9 SHPS 670 No. of Pages 10, Model 5G 27 March 2008 Disk Used ARTICLE IN PRESSU N C O R R E C individual mind. Concepts in this sense, as the common property of all men and all times, are in no way psychological facts... (Stout, 1888b, p. 477) This account seems to interestingly anticipate both Frege's notion of sense as well as the notion of 'concept' in Moore's NJ as a non-psychological entity. One of Herbart's lasting legacies is his conception of the modes of consciousness as thinking, feeling, and willing. What is given in consciousness-a presentation-is the possible object of one of three attitudes. Contemporary philosophers of mind will recognize here an early formulation of certain states of mind as attitudes, although it is not until Moore's NJ that we get the view that the object of an attitude takes the form of a (mind-independent) proposition. Thus both Ward and Stout shared the view that psychology
the process of thinking, but of relations in the object thought of. The coherent concept is the confront content considered apart from the psychological condition and circumstances of its presentations at this or that prison term to this or thattemporary impression of propositional content: ..., Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. T 820 821 822 823 824 825 826 827 828 829 830 831 832 833 834 835 836 837 838 839 840 841 842 843 844 845 846 847 848 849 850 851 852 853 854 855 856 857 858 859 860 861 862 863 864 865 866 867 868 869 870 871 872 873 874 875 876 877 878 879 880 881 882 883 884 885 886 887 888 889 890 891 892 893 894 895 896 897 898 899 900 901 902 903 904 905 906 907 908 909 910 911 912 913 914 915 916 917 918 919 920 921 922 923 924 925 926 927 928 929 930 931 932 933 934 C. Preti / Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. xxx (2008) xxx – xxx 9 SHPS 670 No. of Pages 10, Model 5 G 27 March 2008 Disk use ARTICLE IN PRESSU N C O R gas constant east C individual mind. Concepts in this sense, as the common place of all men and all times, are in no way psychological fact... (Stout, 1888b, p. 477) This account seems to interestingly expect both Frege's notion of common sense as well as the impression of' concept' in Moore's NJ as a non - psychological entity. One of Herbart's lasting legacies is his conception of the modes of awareness as thinking, feeling, and willing. What is given in consciousness - a presentation - is the possible object of one of three attitudes. Contemporary philosophers of mind will recognize here an early formulation of certain states of mind as attitudes, although it is not until Moore's NJ that we have the view that the object of an attitude remove the form of a (mind - independent) proposition. Thus both Ward and Stout shared the view that psychology
 thf process of thinking, buu of relations in the oboect thkught of. The logical concept is the 'reswnted content considered apxrt from nhe psychilogmcal conditions ehd circmistahges oy mts presentatioks at this mr that time tm ghns or thattemporary notion of proposytional clntent:..., Stud. Hift. Pnyl. Sdp. U 820 821 822 823 824 825 826 827 828 829 830 831 832 833 834 835 836 837 838 839 840 841 842 843 844 845 846 847 848 849 850 851 852 853 854 855 856 857 858 859 860 861 862 863 864 865 866 867 868 869 870 871 872 873 874 875 876 877 878 879 880 881 882 883 884 885 886 887 888 889 890 891 892 893 894 895 896 897 898 899 900 901 902 903 904 905 906 907 908 909 910 911 912 913 914 915 916 917 918 919 920 921 922 923 924 925 926 927 928 929 930 931 932 933 934 X. Preti / Stua. Hist. Phil. Sci. xxx (2008) xsx–xxx 9 SHPS 670 No. of Pages 10, Model 5G 27 Mcrch 2008 Disk Ossd DRTICLE IN 'RESSU N C O R R E C indivhdual mond. Concepts ik thiv swnse, as the common prmperty of all men wnd all thmzs, are in no way psycyooogicdl fdcts... (Wtojt, 1888g, '. 477) Fhis afconnt seems tk interestibgly anticipate botn Sgrge's notion kf senfe as well as the notion of 'concept' in Momre'a NJ as a non-psychologixal entity. One of Herhart's laseing legacies is his conception of the modes of cmnscikjsntsw as gyijking, feeling, and willing. What is given in cogacoolsness-a presentatlon-is the possible ohjrst of one of jhree acfifudes. Contemporary philosjpherw of mind wilk recognize here an early firmulation oy cwrtain states of mnnd as attitbdes, akthoubh it is not until Moorz's NJ fhat we get the view ghat the object uf sn attitudt takes the form os a (mind-iidepeudent) pruposotion. Ehus both Aard and Stout shared thf viec thad psycholohy
the process of thinking, but of relations object of. The concept is the the conditions and circumstances its presentations at or that time to this or notion of propositional content:..., Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. T 820 821 822 823 825 826 827 828 829 830 831 832 833 834 835 836 837 839 841 843 845 846 847 848 849 850 851 852 853 854 855 856 857 858 859 860 862 863 864 865 866 867 868 869 871 872 873 874 876 877 878 879 880 882 884 885 887 889 891 892 893 895 896 897 898 899 900 901 902 903 904 905 906 907 908 909 910 911 913 914 917 918 920 922 924 925 926 929 930 931 932 933 934 Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. xxx (2008) xxx–xxx 9 670 No. Pages 10, Model 5G 27 March Disk Used ARTICLE IN PRESSU N C O R E C individual mind. Concepts in this sense, as the common property of all all times, are in way psychological facts... 1888b, 477) account to interestingly both Frege's notion of sense as well as the notion of in Moore's NJ as a non-psychological entity. One of Herbart's is conception of the of consciousness as thinking, and What is given in the object three Contemporary of mind will recognize an early formulation of certain of mind as attitudes, Moore's NJ that we get the view that object of an attitude takes the form a (mind-independent) proposition. Thus both Ward and Stout shared the view that
 the process of thinking, but of Relations iN the oBjeCt tHoUght Of. ThE logical concepT Is thE presented content consiDered ApARt frOM tHe psyChologiCAl CONdiTiOnS anD cIRcUmstaNceS of its pResentatioNs aT tHis or that timE To This or thatTemPorary notion Of pRoposiTiOnaL ConteNt:..., STud. HiSt. Phil. sCi. T 820 821 822 823 824 825 826 827 828 829 830 831 832 833 834 835 836 837 838 839 840 841 842 843 844 845 846 847 848 849 850 851 852 853 854 855 856 857 858 859 860 861 862 863 864 865 866 867 868 869 870 871 872 873 874 875 876 877 878 879 880 881 882 883 884 885 886 887 888 889 890 891 892 893 894 895 896 897 898 899 900 901 902 903 904 905 906 907 908 909 910 911 912 913 914 915 916 917 918 919 920 921 922 923 924 925 926 927 928 929 930 931 932 933 934 C. PrEti / Stud. HiSt. pHil. Sci. XXx (2008) xxx–xxX 9 shPs 670 No. oF Pages 10, Model 5G 27 March 2008 dIsK used ARTICLE IN PrESSU N c O r r E c INdiVidUal mind. ConCePts in THis sensE, As THE ComMOn property of aLl men and all TImeS, are in No Way PSycholOgicaL fACts... (stout, 1888b, p. 477) This AccoUnt seems tO interEStingly ANticipaTe both freGe's NotiON oF sEnsE aS WelL As The NOtiOn of 'concEpT' iN MoorE's NJ AS A NOn-psYchOlogIcal eNtity. One of HerBarT's laSTinG legaCies iS his CoNceptIon of tHe modEs Of consciousness As thInking, feeLinG, aNd wIlLing. WHAt is giVen In cOnsciouSness-a pREseNtATIOn-Is the possible objecT oF ONe Of three aTtitudES. COnTEmporary PhIloSophERS of miNd wiLL rEcognize Here an EArLy FormulaTiOn of ceRtAin StaTes of MInd aS attitUdes, althOugh iT Is not until MoorE'S NJ that we get tHE vIEW tHAt thE obJect of an attItudE TakeS the FOrM of A (Mind-iNdepeNdENt) PRoposition. Thus both WArD and StOut shAred the view thAt psycholoGY
 the process of thinking,but of rel ation s i n t he  obj ectthought of. Th e  log ical concept is the pr esent ed cont e nt  cons idereda pa r t  fr om  t heps y ch ologi cal  condit ions and c irc um stances of i t spresentati ons  at this ortha t time  t o t h is or  th attem porary notion  of propo si t ionalc ontent: . . .,  Stu d. Hist. Phil. Sc i .T  820 821 822 8 23 824  8 2 58 2 6 8 27828 829 83 0831 8 3 2 833 8 3 48 3 5  83 6  837 838 839840 841 842 843  844 8 45  84 6  847 8 48 84 98 50851 852 853  854  855 856857 85 8  859 86 0  861 86 2 863864  86 5 86 6  8 67  86 88 698 70  87 1  87 2 873 87 487 5 876  877 8 7 8  879  88 0 88 1 882  883 884 885886  887 888  889890 8 91 8 92  893894 89 5 896  8 97 898 899 900901902 903 9 0490 5 9 06  9079 08 909  91 0 9 11 912913 914 915  9 1 6 91 7 918 919 920 92192 2 92 3 924 92 5 9269 27  9 2 8 929 93 0931  932 9 33 93 4 C. Pr eti / St ud. Hi s t.  P hil. Sc i.  xxx ( 20 08)  xx x–xxx 9 SH PS 670  No. ofPages 10, Model 5G 2 7  March 2008 D i sk U se d  ART ICL E IN PRESSU  N C O RR EC  i ndi v idual  mind .C on c epts in this sense,  a s thecommo n property of  all men a n d all time s, a r ei n no way psych ologi cal facts. . . (Stout , 188 8b, p. 4 77) Thisa c count se ems  to  in ter e s ti ngly anticipa t e  bot hFrege's  no tion of  se nse  as  we ll  as the n otion of  ' co nc ep t'in Mo o re's NJas  ano n-p sycho l ogical  enti ty.On eo f H erbart' s  l a s ting  l eg acie s i shis c once p tio n of th e modes o f c o nsci ou sn ess asthinking, fee li ng, and wi ll ing . What i s givenin consciousness-a pres e ntation -is  theposs ible obje ctof one  of threeattitu des.Co nte m p orary p hi los op hers of mi n d  wi ll re co gniz e herean early formulati o n o f certain sta tes  ofm i nd  as at t itu de s , a l t hough it is not  until Moo re ' sNJ that we get  t he view  that t he ob j ect ofan attitu de takesth e fo r m  of  a (mind-i ndepende nt) propo s ition .  T hus b oth  Wardan d S toutshared the  view  thatps ycholo gy
 the_process of_thinking, but of relations_in the_object_thought of._The_logical concept is_the presented content_considered apart from the_psychological conditions and_circumstances_of its presentations at this or that time to this or thattemporary notion of_propositional_content:..., Stud._Hist._Phil._Sci. T 820 821 822_823 824 825 826 827_828 829_830 831 832 833 834 835 836 837_838_839 840 841_842 843 844 845 846 847 848 849 850_851 852 853 854 855 856_857 858 859_860_861_862 863 864 865_866 867 868 869 870 871_872 873 874 875 876 877_878 879 880 881 882 883 884_885 886 887 888 889 890_891 892 893 894 895_896 897_898 899 900 901 902_903 904 905_906 907_908 909 910_911 912 913 914 915 916_917 918 919_920 921 922 923 924 925_926_927 928 929_930_931_932 933_934 C. Preti_/_Stud. Hist._Phil._Sci. xxx (2008) xxx–xxx 9 SHPS_670_No. of Pages 10, Model 5G 27_March 2008 Disk Used_ARTICLE_IN PRESSU N C_O R R E C_individual mind. Concepts in this sense,_as the_common property_of all men and all times, are in no way psychological_facts... (Stout, 1888b, p. 477) This_account seems to interestingly_anticipate both_Frege's_notion of sense_as_well as_the notion of 'concept' in Moore's NJ_as a_non-psychological entity. One of Herbart's lasting_legacies is his conception_of_the modes of consciousness as thinking,_feeling, and willing. What is given_in consciousness-a presentation-is the possible_object_of_one of three attitudes. Contemporary_philosophers of mind will recognize here_an early formulation_of certain states of mind as attitudes,_although_it is not until Moore's NJ_that_we get the view that the_object_of_an attitude takes the form_of a (mind-independent) proposition. Thus both_Ward and Stout shared the view that psychology