 can provide valuable insights into the performance of voting methods on different collective decision problems. This could improve institutional design, even when there is no general theoretical result to support the optimality of a voting method. To support our claim, we first describe a decision problem that has not received much theoretical attention in the literature. We outline different voting methods to address that collective decision problem. Under certain criteria of assessment akin to extensions of the Condorcet Jury Theorem, we run simulations for the methods using MATLAB, in order to compare their performance under various conditions. We consider and respond to concerns about the use of simulations in the assessment of voting procedures for policymaking. Keywords Voting methods, equation-based simulation, instrumental qualities, social policymaking, epistemic democracy 1 Introduction Not all collective decision problems are born equal. They vary according to the number of participants that must make the decision (ranging from a pair to a full nation); they also differ regarding what must be chosen (for instance, it may be an only option, a ranking, or even a grade over several options); there is also variation on the views that count to make a choice (only those of some or the views of all the participants) and on how much they count (for instance, some views may be weighted or all might be counted equally). Nowadays, there is no shortage of decision problems that involve the participation and acquiescence of very large groups, expecting to meet certain political ideals. Different procedures can be used to make a collective decision by means of a voting method. In order to fit the ideals of our democratic societies, voting methods should incorporate the views of every member of the group to yield collective outcomes, by means of a specific aggregation function. Aiming to achieve. 1 Centro de Estudios sobre la Educación, El Colegio de Morelos, México. 2 Departamento de Matemáticas y Física, Centro de Ciencias Básicas, Universidad Autónoma de Aguascalientes, México. Corresponding author: Marc Jiménez-Rolland, El Colegio de Morelos, Av. Morelos Sur 154, Las Palmas, 62050, Cuernavaca, Morelos, México. Email: marc.jimenez@elcolegiodemorelos.edu.mx certain goals, some of these methods can provide clear advantages over others, at least under certain conditions. Those goals may include procedural qualities such as inclusiveness, equality, and fairness
can provide valuable insights into the performance of voting method on unlike collective decision trouble. This could better institutional design, even when there is no cosmopolitan theoretical result to support the optimality of a voting method acting. To confirm our claim, we foremost describe a decision problem that has not received much theoretical care in the literature. We outline different vote methods to cover that corporate decision problem. Under certain criteria of judgment akin to extensions of the Condorcet Jury Theorem, we run simulations for the methods use MATLAB, in order to compare their performance under various conditions. We consider and react to concerns about the use of simulations in the assessment of voting procedures for policymaking. Keywords Voting methods, equation - based simulation, instrumental qualities, social policymaking, epistemic democracy 1 Introduction Not all collective decision problems are wear equal. They vary accord to the numeral of participants that must make the decision (range from a pair to a full nation); they also disagree regarding what must be chosen (for instance, it may be an only option, a ranking, or even a grade over several options); there is also variation on the views that consider to make a option (merely those of some or the views of all the participants) and on how much they count (for instance, some view may be weighted or all might be counted equally). Nowadays, there be no shortage of decision problems that involve the engagement and acquiescence of very large groups, expecting to meet sealed political ideals. Different procedures can be used to reach a collective decisiveness by means of a voting method. In club to fit the ideal of our democratic societies, voting methods should incorporate the views of every member of the group to yield collective outcomes, by mean of a specific aggregation function. target to achieve. 1 Centro de Estudios sobre la Educación, El Colegio de Morelos, México. 2 Departamento de Matemáticas y Física, Centro de Ciencias Básicas, Universidad Autónoma de Aguascalientes, México. Corresponding author: Marc Jiménez - Rolland, El Colegio de Morelos, Av. Morelos Sur 154, Las Palmas, 62050, Cuernavaca, Morelos, México. Email: marc.jimenez@elcolegiodemorelos.edu.mx certain goals, some of these methods can provide absolved advantages over others, at least under certain conditions. Those goals may include procedural quality such as inclusiveness, equality, and paleness
 caj provide valuable insigmts into the peryirmancx of vofing metfods on different collective dwcisiin problems. This could improve pnstitutiinal eesign, evei when tmzre ia no yeieral theoreticsl result do support the ootnmality of a voting method. To suppore our ckalm, we first defcrinq a svclsion problem that has not receibed muci theoretical aytention in the literature. We lutline different goting methids ei address thxt collectpre decision problem. Under certain criteria of axsessment qkun hm extensionw of nhe Condorcet Jury Thaorem, wr run simulatipns foe the methods using METLAB, in order to coipare thehr performance undee carioos cotditkins. We cpnaider wnd respond tk concerns qbout the use of sikujqtions in the assesfmqnt of voting procedures for policymakitg. Ieywords Voting methods, equation-based simulajion, instrtmental qualities, social policymaking, epistemic damocrech 1 Nkbrodjxtlon Not all collective decision problems are fkrm vqual. They vary agcording to the nukbfr jf participanjs that muat make the decisiln (rangyng feom a paiw to a full nation); they also didfer regardiug qhat must be choseu (for instanee, it kay br an only option, a ranknng, or even a grafe over ssxeral options); thdre iv also variation on the viqws that rount to makd a vhoice (only thosf of some or the views ov all tve particioants) and on how much they counv (for instancg, smme views mcy be eeighted or ajl might be coonted equclly). Nuwadays, thvre is no shortage os decision prmhlems that iivolve thq paeticupation xnd acquiescenve of verj jargw groups, expecting to jeet certain pooitucal ideals. Difgerdnt pgocxduref can be used to oakd a coulectivt dccirion by means of a votinc mefhod. In order to fot the ideqls of otr democratic societies, voting lethovs shonld invorkorate the views of every membed of the hromp to yield cjllegtivg outcomes, yy means of a specific aggregation functmon. Aiming to achieve. 1 Xentro de Estudios xpbre la Eduración, Ql Colegim de Morelos, México. 2 Eepartamento de Mstemáticas y Física, Cenfro de Cienfias Básicas, Universidad Autónoma de Aguascalientes, México. Corresponding autyor: Macc Jiménez-Rollznd, Rl Coneyio de Mowelod, Av. Morelos Sur 154, Las Palmas, 62050, Cuernavaca, Morelos, México. Ekanl: marc.jimenez@elcolegiodemorekor.edu.mx certaiv goals, some of these mefhods cam provide clear advantages over others, at least under ccrtain cobditikns. Those joals may include prpcedurcl quaoities wuch as inclusivevesx, cquality, ajd feiruess
can provide valuable insights into the performance methods different collective problems. This could there no general theoretical to support the of a voting method. To support claim, we first describe a decision problem that has not received much theoretical in the literature. We outline different voting methods to address that collective decision Under criteria assessment to extensions of the Condorcet Jury Theorem, we run simulations for the methods using MATLAB, in to compare their performance under various conditions. We and respond to concerns the use of simulations in assessment voting procedures policymaking. Voting equation-based simulation, instrumental social policymaking, epistemic democracy 1 Introduction Not all collective decision problems are born equal. They vary according the number that must the (ranging a pair to nation); they also differ regarding what (for instance, it may be an only option, ranking, or a grade over several options); there also variation on the views that count to a choice (only those of some or the views of all the participants) and on they count (for instance, views may be or might counted Nowadays, there no shortage of decision problems that involve the participation and acquiescence very large groups, expecting to meet certain political ideals. Different be to make a decision by means of voting In order to fit of democratic should the of every member of group to yield collective outcomes, means of a specific 1 Centro de Estudios sobre la Educación, El de Morelos, México. 2 Departamento de Matemáticas Física, Centro de Ciencias Básicas, Universidad Autónoma de Aguascalientes, México. Corresponding author: Jiménez-Rolland, El Morelos, Av. Morelos Sur 154, Las Palmas, 62050, Morelos, México. Email: marc.jimenez@elcolegiodemorelos.edu.mx goals, some of these methods can provide clear advantages others, least under conditions. Those goals include procedural qualities as inclusiveness, equality,
 can provide valuable insightS into the peRformAncE of VoTing MethOds on different COlleCtive decision problems. THis coUlD ImprOVe InstiTutionaL DeSIGn, eVeN wHen ThERe Is no gEneRal theoRetical resUlt To Support the opTImAlity of a voTinG method. To supPorT our clAiM, we FIrst dEscRibe a DecisiON problEm that has NoT ReceivED much thEOReTicaL attention in the liTErATure. We outline dIffereNt VOtING meThoDs to addresS tHat coLLective DEcISIOn pROblem. Under cerTain criteriA Of aSsessmEnT akIN to extEnsioNs OF thE Condorcet JUry THeorem, we rUn simuLAtions fOR the metHods usIng mATlAB, iN OrDeR to CoMParE ThEir PErfOrmance uNdEr VarioUs coNDITIons. we cOnsiDer anD respond to conCerNs abOUt tHe use Of simUlatIoNs in tHe asseSsmenT oF voting procedurEs foR policymaKinG. KEywOrDs VotINg methOds, EquAtion-baSed simuLAtiOn, INSTrUmental qualities, soCiAL PoLicymakiNg, episTEmIc DEmocracy 1 inTroDuctION Not aLl coLLeCtive decIsion pRObLeMs are boRn Equal. THeY vaRy aCcordINg to The numBer of parTicipANts that must makE The decision (raNGiNG FrOM a paIr tO a full natioN); theY Also DiffER rEgaRDing wHat muSt BE cHOsen (for instance, it maY bE an onlY optiOn, a ranking, or eVen a grade oVER Several oPtioNS); tHEre is also variaTion oN the views tHAt count tO make A choice (oNly those oF SOme or the VieWs oF alL thE PArTicipants) and oN HOw muCh They couNt (fOr instaNce, SomE viEws MaY be weightEd or all mIgHt Be CoUntEd equALly). NowadAyS, thErE is No shoRTage of DecisIon pRoBlEMs tHat invoLVe THE parTiCiPatiOn aNd AcquiEsceNCe oF very laRge groups, ExpECtinG tO mEet certAin political iDeAls. DiffereNt ProCedureS CAn be used To make a collective decisiON by meanS of A votiNg meThod. In ordEr tO fit thE idEAls of oUr demoCratiC sOciETIes, voTINg MetHoDs should inCORpoRate tHe ViewS of everY member of the group tO YieLd collective oUtcOmes, BY MeAns OF a SPecIfIC agGREgation function. aiming to acHiEVe. 1 centro de EsTUdiOs Sobre la educaciÓn, El COLegio de morelos, MéXico. 2 DeparTaMentO DE MaTemáticas y física, CeNtro de CieNCias BÁSiCas, UnIveRsidad auTónOma de aguascALieNtes, MÉxico. COrResponDing aUtHor: Marc JIménez-Rolland, El Colegio dE MorelOs, Av. MOreLos Sur 154, Las palMAs, 62050, CUernavaca, moreLos, México. EMaiL: maRc.jimEneZ@ElcolEgioDEmOreLOs.edu.Mx ceRTain goals, SOmE of THEsE methods can PROVidE cleaR adVAntageS oveR others, at least undER certain conditIons. tHOse GoaLS may InClude proceduraL quAlITIes such aS iNclusivenesS, equalitY, aND fairNess
 can provide valuable insi ghts intothe p erf orm an ce o f vo ting methods o n  dif ferent collective deci sionpr o blem s .Thiscould i m pr o v e i ns ti tut io n al  desi gn,  even w hen thereisno  general the o re tical resu ltto support t heoptima li tyo f a v oti ng me thod.T o supp ort our c la i m, wef irst de s c ri be a  decision problem th a t has not rece ived m uc h  t h e ore tic al attenti on  in t h e liter a tu r e .  We outline diffe rent voting met hods t oadd r ess th at co ll e cti ve decision  pro blem. Und er cer t ain cri t eria of  asses sme ntakin to  e xte ns i ons of  th e  Co ndorcetJu ry  Theo rem, w e runsim ulat ionsfor the metho dsusin g  MA TLAB,  in o rder  t o com pare t heirpe rformance under  var ious cond iti on s.We  cons i der an d r esp ond toconcern s  ab ou t t he  use of simulation si n  t he asses smento fvo t ing proc ed ure s fo r polic ymak i ng . Keywor ds Vot i ng  m ethods,  e quatio n- bas edsimul a tion , inst rumental  qual i ties, social p o licymaking, e p is t e mi c  dem ocr acy 1 Intro duct i on N ot a l lcol l ectiv e dec is i on problems are born e qu al. Th ey va ry accordingto the num b e r  of part icip a nt s  that must mak e the  decision( rangingfroma pair t o a fulln a tion); t hey  al sodif f e rregarding wha t must  b e chose n ( for ins tan ce,  it  ma ybe an onl y option ,ara nk ing , ore ven a gr ad e o ve r s evera l  optio ns);ther eis als o varia t io n on t he  v iews  th at  coun t to mak e a cho ice (only  th o se o fso me or t he views of a ll  the parti ci pan ts) an d on how m uch they count (for ins t ance, s ome  view s ma y be weig hte d or a llm ight b e coun ted e qu all y ) . Now a d ay s,th ere is nos h ort age o fdeci sion pr oblems that involv e  th e participati onanda c qu ies c en c e o fv ery l arge groups, ex pecting to  m e et  certain p o lit ic al idea ls. Dif feren t  proced ures canbe used t omake a  co llective d ecisionby meanso f a v o ti ng me tho d. Inor der  to f it the ide als o f ourde mocrat ic so ci eties, v oting methods should in corpor ate t heviews ofeve r y m ember ofthegroup to y iel d c ollec tiv e  outc omes ,  b y m e ans o f as pecific a g gr ega t i on  function.A i m ing  to a chi e ve. 1Cent ro de Estudios so b re la Educació n, E l Col egi o  deMo relos, México.  2De p a rtamento  d e Matemátic as y Fís ic a , Cen tro de  Cienc ias Bás i c as ,  Unive rsid adAutónomadeAg u ascalie nt es ,  Méxic o. C or respon ding a u thor : Marc Jiménez-Rol land, E l Col e gio  de M or elos, A v . Mo relos Sur154, Las Pa lmas,6205 0, Cu ernavac a,  Morel os,  M éxico. Ema i l: marc.j imene z@elcol eg iode mor elos.e du.m x certa in g oa ls,  some oft h es e  m et h ods  can  prov id e cl ear advan t ages ove r o t hers, a tlea s t  under ce r t ain condit ion s. Th o s e goals ma y  inc l ud e  proc edural  quali ties su c h a sinclusi ven e s s, equali ty, and f a irn es s
 can_provide valuable_insights into the performance_of voting_methods_on different_collective_decision problems. This_could improve institutional_design, even when there_is no general_theoretical_result to support the optimality of a voting method. To support our claim, we_first_describe a_decision_problem_that has not received much_theoretical attention in the literature._We outline_different voting methods to address that collective decision_problem._Under certain criteria_of assessment akin to extensions of the Condorcet Jury_Theorem, we run simulations for the_methods using MATLAB,_in_order_to compare their performance_under various conditions. We consider and_respond to concerns about the use_of simulations in the assessment of voting_procedures for policymaking. Keywords Voting methods,_equation-based simulation, instrumental qualities, social_policymaking, epistemic_democracy 1 Introduction Not all_collective decision problems_are born_equal. They vary_according to the number of participants_that must make_the decision (ranging from a pair_to_a full nation);_they_also_differ regarding_what must be_chosen_(for instance,_it_may be an only option, a_ranking,_or even a grade over several options);_there is also variation_on_the views that count_to make a choice (only_those of some or the views_of all_the participants)_and on how much they count (for instance, some views may_be weighted or all might be_counted equally). Nowadays, there_is no_shortage_of decision problems_that_involve the_participation and acquiescence of very large groups,_expecting to_meet certain political ideals. Different procedures_can be used to_make_a collective decision by means of_a voting method. In order to_fit the ideals of our_democratic_societies,_voting methods should incorporate the_views of every member of the_group to yield_collective outcomes, by means of a specific_aggregation_function. Aiming to achieve. 1 Centro_de_Estudios sobre la Educación, El Colegio_de_Morelos,_México. 2 Departamento de Matemáticas_y Física, Centro de Ciencias Básicas,_Universidad Autónoma de Aguascalientes, México. Corresponding author: Marc Jiménez-Rolland,_El Colegio de_Morelos, Av. Morelos Sur 154,_Las_Palmas,_62050, Cuernavaca, Morelos, México. Email: marc.jimenez@elcolegiodemorelos.edu.mx certain goals, some of_these methods_can provide clear_advantages over others, at least under certain conditions. Those goals_may include procedural qualities such as inclusiveness,_equality, and fairness