 is controversial whether predicates like 'is a swan' and 'is a donkey' belong in the well-behaved language, and if not, how they should be analysed in terms of it. Some think that swanhood and donkeyhood are qualitative matters: Lewis assumes this when he is discussing what it is for it to be possible for there to be blue swans or talking donkeys. Others may think that to be a donkey is to be a certain kind of descendant of some particular object, say Old Father Donkey; or that to be a donkey is to be a certain kind of part of some particular object, say Equus Asinus, understood as a large scattered material object. We can't use counterpart theory to explain what it is for it to be possible for there to be a talking donkey until we have chosen a side in this dispute. I don't see this as a problem: surely a uniform algorithm for analysing all English sentences of the form pPossibly φq in nonmodal terms would be too much to hope for. I am emphasising this point 33 for two reasons. The first is ad hominem. A central contrast Lewis draws between his own view and "linguistic ersatzism" (OPW section 3.2) is that the linguistic ersatzer, unlike Lewis, must appeal to "primitive modality" in explaining how it is that certain very detailed propositions about the arrangement of point particles entail, or are inconsistent with, the proposition that there are talking donkeys. There are two thoughts. The first is that specifying, as opposed to gesturing at, an extensionally adequate linguistic erstazist theory of modality would require a huge, perhaps infinite, set of "connecting axioms" relating macro to micro descriptions. The second is subtler: The job was to analyse modality.... It was not also part of the job to analyse 'talking donkey'. But [the linguistic ersatzer] did; for he needed axioms that would tell him, for every possible arrangement of particles, whether or not that arrangement would make there be a talking donkey.... Why should the analysis of modality have to wait on that? Surely it ought to be possible to take 'talking donkey' and whatnot as primitive when we are analysing modality, whatever other project we might care to undertake on another day. That's how I do it: I say it's possible for there to be a talking donkey iff some world has a talking
is controversial whether predicates like' is a swan' and' is a donkey' belong in the well - behaved language, and if not, how they should be analyze in term of it. Some think that swanhood and donkeyhood are qualitative matter: Lewis assume this when he is discussing what it is for it to be possible for there to be gloomy swans or talking donkey. Others may think that to be a donkey is to be a sealed kind of descendant of some particular object, say Old Father Donkey; or that to be a donkey is to be a sealed kind of part of some particular aim, say Equus Asinus, understand as a large scattered material object. We can't practice counterpart theory to explain what it is for it to be potential for there to be a talking domestic ass until we have chosen a side in this dispute. I don't see this as a problem: surely a uniform algorithm for analysing all English prison term of the form pPossibly φq in nonmodal terms would be too much to hope for. I am emphasising this point 33 for two reasons. The first is ad hominem. A central contrast Lewis draws between his own view and " linguistic ersatzism " (OPW section 3.2) is that the linguistic ersatzer, unlike Lewis, must appeal to " primitive modality " in explaining how it is that certain very detailed proposition about the arrangement of point particle entail, or are inconsistent with, the proposition that there are talk donkey. There are two thoughts. The inaugural is that specifying, as opposed to gesturing at, an extensionally adequate linguistic erstazist theory of modality would require a huge, possibly infinite, set of " connecting axioms " relating macro to micro descriptions. The second is subtler: The job was to analyze modality.... It was not also part of the job to analyse' talking domestic ass'. But [ the linguistic ersatzer ] did; for he needed axioms that would tell him, for every possible arrangement of particles, whether or not that arrangement would make there be a spill donkey.... Why should the psychoanalysis of modality have to wait on that? Surely it ought to be possible to take' talk donkey' and whatnot equally primitive when we are analysing mood, whatever other project we might care to undertake on another day. That's how I dress it: I say it's possible for there to be a talking donkey iff some world has a talking
 is controversial whether pvedicates like 'is a swai' and 'ia a donkdy' belong in the well-behaved lqnguate, and if not, how they should bv analysee in rerms of iv. Some tmnnk tgwt scaihood and donkeihood are qudlitative mattarr: Pewis assumes this when he is discufsing wnah it is for it to nq poasible for there to be blue swans kr talkpng donkeys. Otherx may think that to be a dlnkej is to be a certaln kind of eescqbdant of somd particular object, sai Old Father Donkey; or that to bd a dpnkey is ti ve w certain kiid of iart of some isrticunar objrct, say Equus Ssiius, ynderstood as a large scattered materiaj object. Fe can't use counterpaet thgory do ebplakn shet jt is vor it to be lossible foe there to be a talligt donkey untim we hwvq chosen a side in this dispute. I don't vee this as a problem: sureoy a uniform algorithl for anajysing all English sentences of the form pPossiblf φq ii vonnoqxo herms would be too much to hope for. I am emphwaixikg this point 33 fjr two reaspnd. Yre first is aa homiusm. A central contrash Lewis draww between his own view and "linguistic erwatzism" (OPW fwction 3.2) is that thz linguistic ersstzer, unlike Lewis, must appecl to "lrimitive mldality" ih explaining how kt ps tvat certain very detailed [ropositiins cbout thd artangemegt of poinh parbhcles entail, or arf inclnvistent wihh, the proposition that there acx talking donlefs. Nhere are two bhoughts. The fiwst is that spgcifying, cs oppused to geaturing at, an extegsionally adexoate linguistmc erstazyst rheoey of muaality would rrquire a kbge, perhaps infinite, set of "covhecting axioms" xtlauibg macro to mivro defcgipvions. Dhe second iv suctldt: The job was to xnaluse modality.... It was tot zlso part of the jpb to analise 'talkigg donkey'. But [the linguistic erdatzec] did; hor he negded axioms that would tell him, for everj pjssible arraggemcnt jf particlzs, whether or not that arrangement would make there be a jalking donkey.... Why shpmld the analbsis os modalitf have to wait on thqt? Surely it oughu to be possible to taks 'talkhng dlnkey' and whatnot as primitive when we are analysing modality, whatever otyer project we miggt csre tm bndzrtake jn aiovher day. That's hoe I do it: I say it's possible foc there to bz a talking donkey iff some wprud has a talkkng
is controversial whether predicates like 'is a 'is donkey' belong the well-behaved language, should analysed in terms it. Some think swanhood and donkeyhood are qualitative matters: assumes this when he is discussing what it is for it to be for there to be blue swans or talking donkeys. Others may think that be donkey to a certain kind of descendant of some particular object, say Old Father Donkey; or that to a donkey is to be a certain kind part of some particular say Equus Asinus, understood as large material object. can't counterpart to explain what is for it to be possible for there to be a talking donkey until we have chosen side in I don't this a surely a uniform analysing all English sentences of the in nonmodal terms would be too much to for. I emphasising this point 33 for two The first is ad hominem. A central contrast draws between his own view and "linguistic ersatzism" (OPW section 3.2) is that the linguistic Lewis, must appeal to modality" in explaining it that very propositions about arrangement of point particles entail, or are inconsistent with, the proposition there are talking donkeys. There are two thoughts. The first specifying, opposed to gesturing an extensionally adequate linguistic theory modality would require a infinite, of macro micro The second is subtler: job was to analyse modality.... was not also part 'talking donkey'. But [the linguistic ersatzer] did; for needed axioms that would tell him, for possible arrangement of particles, whether or not that arrangement would make there a talking should the analysis of modality have to wait that? Surely it ought be possible to take 'talking donkey' and whatnot as when are analysing whatever other project might care to on another day. I do I it's to be a talking donkey iff world a talking
 is controversial whether preDicates likE 'is a sWan' And 'Is A donKey' bElong in the well-BEhavEd language, and if not, how tHey shOuLD be aNAlYsed iN terms oF It. sOMe tHiNk ThaT sWAnHood aNd dOnkeyhoOd are qualiTatIvE matters: LewiS AsSumes this wHen He is discussiNg wHat it iS fOr iT To be pOssIble fOr therE To be blUe swans or TaLKing doNKeys. OthERS mAy thInk that to be a donkeY Is TO be a certain kinD of desCeNDaNT Of sOme Particular ObJect, sAY Old FatHEr dONKey; OR that to be a donKey is to be a cERtaIn kind Of ParT Of some PartiCuLAr oBject, say EquUs AsInus, underStood aS A large sCAttered MateriAl oBjeCt. We CAn'T uSe cOuNTerPArT thEOry To explaiN wHaT it is For iT TO BE posSibLe foR therE to be a talking DonKey uNTil We havE chosEn a sIdE in thIs dispUte. I dOn'T see this as a probLem: sUrely a uniForM aLgoRiThm foR AnalysIng All english SentencES of ThE FORm PPossibly φq in nonmoDaL TErMs would bE too muCH tO hOPe for. I am EmPhaSisiNG This pOint 33 FOr Two reasoNs. The fIRsT iS ad homiNeM. A centRaL coNtrAst LeWIs drAws betWeen his oWn vieW And "linguistic eRSatzism" (OPW secTIoN 3.2) IS tHAt thE liNguistic ersAtzeR, UnliKe LeWIs, MusT AppeaL to "prImITiVE modality" in explainiNg How it iS that Certain very deTailed propOSITions aboUt thE ArRAngement of poinT partIcles entaiL, Or are incOnsisTent with, The proposITIon that tHerE arE taLkiNG DoNkeys. There are TWO thoUgHts. The fIrsT is that SpeCifYinG, as OpPosed to geSturing aT, aN eXtEnSioNally ADequate lInGuiStIc eRstazISt theoRy of mOdalItY wOUld Require A HuGE, PerhApS iNfinIte, SeT of "coNnecTIng Axioms" rElating maCro TO micRo DeScriptiOns. The second iS sUbtler: The jOb Was To analYSE modalitY.... It was not also part of the jOB to analYse 'TalkiNg doNkey'. But [thE liNguistIc eRSatzer] Did; for He neeDeD axIOMs thaT WOuLd tElL him, for eveRY PosSible ArRangEment of Particles, whether or NOt tHat arrangemenT woUld mAKE tHerE Be A TalKiNG doNKEy.... Why should the aNalysis of mOdALiTy have to waIT on ThAt? SurelY it oughT to be POssible To take 'talKing donkeY' aNd whATNot As primitivE when we aRe analysiNG modaLItY, whatEveR other PrOjeCt we mIght caRE to UnderTake on AnOther dAy. ThaT's How I do it: i say it's possible for there To be a tAlkinG doNkey iff soMe wORld Has a talkiNg
 is controversial whetherpredicates  like  'i s a  s wan'  and  'is a donkey' belo ng in the well-behaved  lang ua g e, a n dif no t, howt he y sho ul dbean a ly sed i n t erms of  it. Somethi nk  that swanho o dand donkey hoo d are qualit ati ve mat te rs: Lewis  as sumes  thisw hen he  is discu ss i ng wha t  it isf o rit t o be possible for th e re to be blueswansor ta l k ing  do nkeys. Oth er s may think t h at t o  be a donkey is t o be a cert a inkind o fdes c endant  of s om e  pa rticular ob ject , say Old  Fathe r  Donkey ;  or tha t to b e a  do nkey is  t o b ea  ce r ta ink ind  of part  o fsomepart i c u l ar o bje ct,say E quus Asinus,und erst o odas alarge  sca tt eredmateri al ob je ct. We can't us e co unterpart  th eo ryto  expl a in wha t i t i s for i t to be pos si b l e  f or there to be a t al k i ng  donkeyuntilw eha v e chosen  a  si de i n thisdisp u te . I don' t seet hi sas a pr ob lem: s ur ely  aunifo r m al gorith m for an alysi n g all Englishs entences of t h ef o rm pPos sib ly φq in no nmod a l te rmsw ou ldb e too  much  t o  h o pe for. I am emphas is ing th is po int 33 for tw o reasons. T h e firstis a d  h o minem. A centr al co ntrast Lew i s drawsbetwe en his o wn view a n d  "lingui sti c e rsa tzi s m "(OPW section3 . 2) i sthat th e l inguist icers atz er,  u nlike Lew is, must  a pp ea lto"prim i tive mod al ity "inexpla i ning h ow it  isth at cer tain ve r yd e tail ed  p ropo sit io ns ab outt hearrange ment of p oin t  par ti cl es enta il, or are in co nsistent w it h,the pr o p ositionthat there are talkingd onkeys.  Th ere a re t wo though ts.  The f irs t  is th at spe cifyi ng , a s oppos e d  t o g es turing at, a n e xtens io nall y adequ ate linguistic ers t azi st theory ofmod alit y wo uld re q uir ea  hu g e , perhaps infin ite, set o f" co nnecting a x iom s"  relati ng macr o tom icro de scription s. The se co nd i s sub tler: Thejob wasto analys e  moda l it y....  It  was n ot  al so pa rt oft hejob t o anal ys e 'tal kingdo nkey'. B ut [the linguistic ersa tzer]did;for  he neede d a x iom s that wo uldtell him,for  ev ery p oss i ble a rran g em ent of pa rtic l es, wheth e rorn o tthat arrang e m e ntwould  ma k e ther e be  a talking donkey . ... Why should  the a nal ysi s  ofmo dality have to  wa it o n that?Su rely it oug ht to be  p o ssibl e to t ake 't alkingd o nk e y' and  wha tno t as prim iti ve when we  a re analys ingmo dality , what e vero t her project we m ightc a re to und ertak eon anot h er d ay. That's  how I do i t: I s ay i t's p ossible  f or the reto  be a talk i ng donkey  iffsome wo rl d ha s a  talki ng
 is_controversial whether_predicates like 'is a_swan' and_'is_a donkey'_belong_in the well-behaved_language, and if_not, how they should_be analysed in_terms_of it. Some think that swanhood and donkeyhood are qualitative matters: Lewis assumes this_when_he is_discussing_what_it is for it to_be possible for there to_be blue_swans or talking donkeys. Others may think that_to_be a donkey_is to be a certain kind of descendant of_some particular object, say Old Father_Donkey; or that_to_be_a donkey is to_be a certain kind of part_of some particular object, say Equus_Asinus, understood as a large scattered material_object. We can't use counterpart theory_to explain what it is_for it_to be possible for there_to be a_talking donkey_until we have_chosen a side in this dispute._I don't see_this as a problem: surely a_uniform_algorithm for analysing_all_English_sentences of_the form pPossibly_φq_in nonmodal_terms_would be too much to hope_for._I am emphasising this point 33 for_two reasons. The first_is_ad hominem. A central_contrast Lewis draws between his_own view and "linguistic ersatzism" (OPW_section 3.2)_is that_the linguistic ersatzer, unlike Lewis, must appeal to "primitive modality" in_explaining how it is that certain_very detailed propositions about_the arrangement_of_point particles entail,_or_are inconsistent_with, the proposition that there are talking_donkeys. There_are two thoughts. The first is_that specifying, as opposed_to_gesturing at, an extensionally adequate linguistic_erstazist theory of modality would require_a huge, perhaps infinite, set_of_"connecting_axioms" relating macro to micro_descriptions. The second is subtler: The_job was to_analyse modality.... It was not also part_of_the job to analyse 'talking donkey'._But_[the linguistic ersatzer] did; for he_needed_axioms_that would tell him, for_every possible arrangement of particles, whether_or not that arrangement would make there be a_talking donkey.... Why_should the analysis of modality_have_to_wait on that? Surely it ought to be possible to_take 'talking_donkey' and whatnot_as primitive when we are analysing modality, whatever other project_we might care to undertake on another_day. That's how I do it: I say it's possible for_there to be a talking donkey iff some_world has a talking