opia, I learnt that an anarchist utopia is possible. So from The Dispossessed I learnt than an anarchist utopia is possible. Moreover, I learnt this not just incidentally, in the way that I learnt speed reading from Animal Farm, but from the features characteristic of its being fiction – the fact that the author intended me to imagine an anarchist utopia, by means of recognition of her intention. The Gricean analysis is not the only theory of fiction in terms of imagination which supports this thesis. Kendall Walton, for example, rejects the Gricean analysis because he is opposed to its intentionalism. But he still accepts that fiction is a prescription to imagine, and so could still agree that some knowledge from fiction is from imagination (Walton 1990, 87-8). The Dispossessed, for example, is still, according to Walton, a prescription to imagine an anarchist utopia, and so when I did so, I still learnt that an anarchist utopia is possible in a way which was not merely incidental to the fiction, but characteristic of it. Although the analysis of fiction in terms of imagination supports the thesis that knowledge from fiction is from imagination, it does not entail the premise that all knowledge from fiction is from imagination – it's perfectly compatible with the analysis that some knowledge from fiction is from imagination but other knowledge from fiction is from other sources. But in the rest of this section I will argue that there are no other cases of learning from fiction in the relevant sense – in every other case, the fictional character of a work is incidental to how one learns from it. The most straightforward suggestion is that one may learn from fiction, but not from imagination, via testimony (see, for example, Gaut 2007, 143-144; Friend 2007). From Bryan Johnson's autobiographical novel in interior monologue The Unfortunates, for example, I learnt about Johnson's thoughts on the death of his friend from cancer. I learnt this not from imagination, which could only have told me about what Johnson's thoughts might have been, but from Johnson's testimony. If I learnt this from fiction in the relevant sense, then not all knowledge from fiction is from imagination. According to Gregory Currie, autobiographical novels like Johnson's are not fiction at all. He advocates a version of the Gricean analysis according to which "... a 4 work is fiction iff (a) it is the product of a fictive intent and (b) if the work is true, then it is at
opia, I learnt that an anarchist utopia is possible. So from The Dispossessed I learnt than an anarchist utopia is potential. furthermore, I teach this not just incidentally, in the means that I learnt speed read from Animal Farm, but from the features characteristic of its being fiction – the fact that the writer intended me to imagine an anarchist utopia, by mean of recognition of her intention. The Gricean analysis is not the only hypothesis of fiction in terms of resource which supports this dissertation. Kendall Walton, for exercise, rejects the Gricean analysis because he is opposed to its intentionalism. But he even accepts that fiction is a prescription drug to imagine, and then could still harmonize that some knowledge from fiction is from imagination (Walton 1990, 87 - 8). The dispossess, for example, is still, according to Walton, a prescription to imagine an anarchist utopia, and so when I suffice so, I still learnt that an anarchist utopia is possible in a way which was not merely incidental to the fiction, but characteristic of it. Although the analysis of fiction in terms of resource support the thesis that cognition from fabrication is from imagination, it does not entail the premise that all knowledge from fiction is from resource – it's perfectly compatible with the psychoanalysis that some knowledge from fiction is from imagination but early knowledge from fiction is from other sources. But in the rest of this section I will argue that there be no other cases of learning from fiction in the relevant sense – in every other font, the fictional character of a work is incidental to how one learns from it. The about straightforward suggestion is that one may learn from fiction, but not from imagination, via testimony (see, for example, Gaut 2007, 143 - 144; Friend 2007). From Bryan Johnson's autobiographical novel in interior monologue The Unfortunates, for exercise, I learnt about Johnson's thinking on the death of his friend from cancer. I learn this not from imagination, which could merely have told me about what Johnson's idea might have been, but from Johnson's testimony. If I learnt this from fabrication in the relevant sense, then not all knowledge from fiction is from resource. According to Gregory Currie, autobiographical novels like Johnson's are not fiction at all. He advocates a version of the Gricean analysis according to which "... a 4 work is fiction iff (a) it is the product of a fictive purpose and (b) if the work is true, then it is at
opiw, I learnt that an anarcmist utopia is possible. So frkm The Dkspossessed I learnt than an abarchust utopia is possible. Moreover, I learnr thms not just incivsntally, in ths way vhat I learnt skeed reading from Animal Fdro, yut from the features characteristic of its bfing fiction – jhe fsst tgat the author intended me to imagjne an enarchist utopis, by means of recognition lf hfr intention. The Ggicean analiais us not the ovly theory of fiction jn terms of imagination which sjpporcs this thewiw. Kftdall Waltoi, for vxample, rejecbx the Cricean analysis becamse hx is opposed to its intenvionalism. But he stijl acceptv chat fiction is a prewceiptimn tm imxtind, ahd sk coulf svill agree fhat some kbowledge from fictipn px from imagihation (Wwlton 1990, 87-8). The Dispossessed, for example, is stjll, according to Walton, a prescription to imwgine an wnarchist utopia, and so when I did so, I still leasnt tiag au anarzyidt utopia is possible in a way which was not isrtly incidental to the fictiom, huy characteristkc of nf. Zlthough the analydis of sictiin in teris og imagination supports the rhesis that hbowledge from fictnon is from nmaginstion, it does not entail the prejise that apl knowlesee from fiction ks nrok imagination – it's perfectjy compatmble cith the anakysis ehat some nnowlcgge from fiction id frol hmaginatioj but other knowledge from fictmpn is from ojhes smurces. Bbt in bhe rest of thif section I wikl arguz that there are no othxr cases of jearning from viction in tie relevagt swnse – in evdfy other case, yhe fictional charaxter of a work is lncidgnfal to how one oeatbs from it. The mort ftgaijhtfowfard suggesthon ks gnat ove may leark ffom giction, but not from imafination, via testikoky (see, fot example, Gaut 2007, 143-144; Frienc 2007). From Bryan Johndon's eutobiugrapnicwl novel in interior monologue The Unfogtukates, for exaiple, I learnt abput Johnson's thoughts on the death of hms friend from cancer. I learnt this not frpk imaginatipn, whych could only have told me avout what Johnson'x thoughts might have been, tut fgom Johnson's testimony. If I learnt this from fiction in the relevant sensw, then not all knosledbe frmm yiction is hrum imagination. Abcording to Gregory Currie, autobmographican uovels like Johnson's are not giztion at all. Fe advocates a version or the Grocean analysis according to whivh "... a 4 work is fiction inf (a) it iw the produbj oh a fictive intent amd (b) iy the qork is truc, then it is ag
opia, I learnt that an anarchist utopia So The Dispossessed learnt than an I this not just in the way I learnt speed reading from Animal but from the features characteristic of its being fiction – the fact that author intended me to imagine an anarchist utopia, by means of recognition of intention. Gricean is the only theory of fiction in terms of imagination which supports this thesis. Kendall Walton, for rejects the Gricean analysis because he is opposed its intentionalism. But he accepts that fiction is a to and so still that knowledge from fiction from imagination (Walton 1990, 87-8). The Dispossessed, for example, is still, according to Walton, a prescription to an anarchist so when did I learnt that an is possible in a way which incidental to the fiction, but characteristic of it. the analysis fiction in terms of imagination supports thesis that knowledge from fiction is from imagination, does not entail the premise that all knowledge from fiction is from imagination – it's with the analysis that knowledge from fiction from but knowledge fiction is other sources. But in the rest of this section I will that there are no other cases of learning from fiction relevant – in every case, the fictional character a is incidental to how from The is one learn from fiction, but from imagination, via testimony (see, example, Gaut 2007, 143-144; autobiographical novel in interior monologue The Unfortunates, for I learnt about Johnson's thoughts on the of his friend from cancer. I learnt this not from imagination, which only have about what Johnson's thoughts might have been, but Johnson's testimony. If I this from fiction in the relevant sense, then not knowledge fiction is imagination. According to Currie, autobiographical novels Johnson's are not all. He a of according to which "... a 4 is iff (a) it is the of intent and (b) if the work is true, then it is at
opia, I learnt that an anarchisT utopia is pOssibLe. SO frOm the DIspoSsessed I learnt THan aN anarchist utopia is possIble. MOrEOver, i LeArnt tHis not jUSt INCidEnTaLly, In THe Way thAt I Learnt sPeed readinG frOm animal Farm, buT FrOm the featuRes CharacteristIc oF its beInG fiCTion – tHe fAct thAt the aUThor inTended me tO iMAgine aN AnarchiST UtOpia, By means of recognitIOn OF her intention. THe GricEaN AnALYsiS is Not the only ThEory oF Fiction IN tERMS of IMagination whiCh supports tHIs tHesis. KEnDalL walton, For exAmPLe, rEjects the GrIceaN analysis BecausE He is oppOSed to itS intenTioNalIsm. BUT hE sTilL aCCepTS tHat FIctIon is a prEsCrIptioN to iMAGINe, anD so CoulD stilL agree that somE knOwleDGe fRom fiCtion Is frOm ImagiNation (waltoN 1990, 87-8). THe Dispossessed, fOr exAmple, is stIll, AcCorDiNg to WALton, a pResCriPtion to Imagine AN anArCHISt Utopia, and so when I diD sO, i StIll learnT that aN AnArCHist utopIa Is pOssiBLE in a wAy whICh Was not meRely inCIdEnTal to thE fIction, BuT chAraCteriSTic oF it. AltHough the AnalySIs of fiction in tERms of imaginatIOn SUPpORts tHe tHesis that knOwleDGe frOm fiCTiOn iS From iMaginAtIOn, IT does not entail the prEmIse thaT all kNowledge from fIction is frOM IMaginatiOn – it'S PeRFectly compatibLe witH the analysIS that somE knowLedge froM fiction iS FRom imagiNatIon But OthER KnOwledge from fiCTIon iS fRom otheR soUrces. BuT in The ResT of ThIs section i will argUe ThAt ThEre Are no OTher caseS oF leArNinG from FIction In the ReleVaNt SEnsE – in everY OtHER casE, tHe FictIonAl CharaCter OF a wOrk is inCidental tO hoW One lEaRnS from it. the most straigHtForward sugGeStiOn is thAT One may leArn from fiction, but not froM ImaginaTioN, via tEstiMony (see, foR exAmple, GAut 2007, 143-144; fRiend 2007). FRom BryAn JohNsOn's AUTobioGRApHicAl Novel in intERIor MonolOgUe ThE UnfortUnates, for example, I lEArnT about Johnson'S thOughTS On The DEaTH of HiS FriEND from cancer. I leaRnt this not FrOM iMagination, WHicH cOuld onlY have toLd me aBOut what johnson's tHoughts miGhT havE BEen, But from JohNson's tesTimony. If I LEarnt THiS from FicTion in ThE reLevanT sense, THen Not alL knowlEdGe from FictiOn Is from imAgination. According to GreGory CuRrie, aUtoBiographiCal NOveLs like JohNson'S are not ficTioN at All. He AdvOCates A verSIoN of THe GriCean ANalysis acCOrDinG TO wHich "... a 4 work is FICTioN iff (a) It iS The proDuct Of a fictive intent aND (b) if the work is tRue, tHEN it Is aT
opia, I learnt that an ana rchist uto pia i s p oss ib le.So f rom The Dispos s esse d I learnt than an ana rchis tu topi a  i s pos sible.M or e o ver ,Ilea rn t  t his n otjust in cidentally , i nthe way that Ilearnt spe edreading from  An imal F ar m,b ut fr omthe f eature s  chara cteristic  o f  its b e ing fic t i on  – t he fact that thea ut h or intended me  to im ag i ne a n a nar chist utop ia , bym eans of re c o g nit i on of her int ention. The Gri cean a na lys i s is n ot th eo nly  theory offict ion in te rms of imagina t ion whi ch sup por tsthis th es is.  K e nda l lWal t on,  for exa mp le , rej ects t h e  Gri cea n an alysi s because heisoppo s edto it s int enti on alism . Buthe st il l accepts thatfict ion is apre sc rip ti on to imagin e,and  so cou ld stil l  ag re e t ha t some knowledge f ro m fi ction is  fromi ma gi n ation (W al ton  199 0 ,  87-8 ). T h eDisposse ssed,f or  e xample,  i s stil l,  ac cor dingt o Wa lton,a prescr iptio n  to imagine an anarchist uto p ia , an d  sowhe n I did so,  I s t illlear n ttha t  an a narch is t  u t opia is possible in  a  way w hichwas not merel y incident a l to the f icti o n, but characteri sticof it. Alt h ough the  anal ysis offiction i n terms of  im agi nat ion s up ports the the s i s th at  knowle dge  from f ict ion  is  fr om  imaginat ion, itdo es  n ot  en tailt he premi se  th at  al l kno w ledgefromfict io ni s f rom ima g in a t ion–it 's p erf ec tly c ompa t ibl e withthe analy sis that  s om e knowl edge from fic ti on is from  i mag inatio n but othe r knowledge from fictio n  is fro m o thersour ces. Butinthe re sto f this  secti on Iwi lla r gue t h a tthe re  are no ot h e r c asesof  lea rning f rom fiction in the rel evant sense –  in  eve r y  o the r  c a se,  t h e f i c tional characte r of a wor ki sincidental toho w one l earns f rom i t . The m ost strai ghtforwar dsugg e s tio n is thatone maylearn fro m  fict i on , but  no t from  i mag inati on, vi a  te stimo ny (se e,  for e xampl e,  Gaut 20 07, 143-144; Friend 200 7). Fr om Br yan  Johnson' s a u tob iographic al n ovel in in ter ior  mono log u e The  Unf o rt una t es, f or e x ample, Il ea rnt a bo ut Johnson' s t hou ghtsont he dea th o f his friend from cancer. I lear nt t h i s n otf romim agination, whi chco u l d only h av e told me a bout wha tJ ohnso n's th oughts  mighth a ve been,butfro m Johnson 'ste s timony.  I fI  learn t th is  fromfictio n  int h e relevant sense , the n not a l l k nowle dg e fromf icti on is from  imaginatio n. Acc ordi ng to  Gregor yCurrie , a ut obiographi c al novels  like  Johnso n' s ar e n ot fic tion a t all . He  a dvo cates a v e r si o nof the  Gri ceanan alys is accord i ng to wh ich "... a4wor k is fic t io n iff (a) it  is  thep r oduct of a fict i ve inten t and(b) if  the wo r k i strue, t hen i t is at
opia, I_learnt that_an anarchist utopia is_possible. So_from_The Dispossessed_I_learnt than an_anarchist utopia is_possible. Moreover, I learnt_this not just_incidentally,_in the way that I learnt speed reading from Animal Farm, but from the_features_characteristic of_its_being_fiction – the fact that_the author intended me to_imagine an_anarchist utopia, by means of recognition of her_intention._The Gricean analysis_is not the only theory of fiction in terms_of imagination which supports this thesis._Kendall Walton, for_example,_rejects_the Gricean analysis because_he is opposed to its intentionalism._But he still accepts that fiction_is a prescription to imagine, and so_could still agree that some knowledge_from fiction is from imagination_(Walton 1990,_87-8). The Dispossessed, for example,_is still, according_to Walton,_a prescription to_imagine an anarchist utopia, and so_when I did_so, I still learnt that an_anarchist_utopia is possible_in_a_way which_was not merely_incidental_to the_fiction,_but characteristic of it. Although the_analysis_of fiction in terms of imagination supports_the thesis that knowledge_from_fiction is from imagination,_it does not entail the_premise that all knowledge from fiction_is from_imagination –_it's perfectly compatible with the analysis that some knowledge from fiction_is from imagination but other knowledge_from fiction is from_other sources._But_in the rest_of_this section_I will argue that there are no_other cases_of learning from fiction in the_relevant sense – in_every_other case, the fictional character of_a work is incidental to how_one learns from it. The_most_straightforward_suggestion is that one may_learn from fiction, but not from_imagination, via testimony_(see, for example, Gaut 2007, 143-144; Friend_2007)._From Bryan Johnson's autobiographical novel in_interior_monologue The Unfortunates, for example, I_learnt_about_Johnson's thoughts on the death_of his friend from cancer. I_learnt this not from imagination, which could only have_told me about_what Johnson's thoughts might have_been,_but_from Johnson's testimony. If I learnt this from fiction in_the relevant_sense, then not_all knowledge from fiction is from imagination. According to Gregory_Currie, autobiographical novels like Johnson's are not_fiction at all. He advocates a version of the Gricean analysis_according to which "... a 4 work is_fiction iff (a) it is the product_of a fictive intent_and_(b) if the work is true, then_it_is_at