 entities-that we see articulated explicitly for the first time in the realism of Moore's NJ.935Q1 42 Ward (1883a,b). 43 See, for example, Ward (1893), and Mace (1954), p. 69. 44 According to Griffin (1991), p. 42, Ward gave Russell Frege's Begriffschriff (Frege, 1967 [ Ward had read neither, and Russell does not appear to have read Frege independently as ea at all familiar with Frege at this period. Please cite this article in press as: Preti, C., On the origins of the con (2008), doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2008.03.002E D P R O O F 7. Conclusion Moore's undergraduate apprenticeship in philosophy was spent without question in the long-but waning-shadow of the neoHegelian metaphysics of the late nineteenth century. But I have argued here that there is credible evidence that Moore's early work exhibits to an appreciable degree the influence of the work of Stout, Ward and the German-language developments in empirical psychology that were their influences, especially in the formulations of mind and mental content, formulations that have become mainstream today. As a result, I think it is clear that the expressions 'idealism' and'realism' must be carefully interpreted in the context of comparative examinations of the mid nineteenth-century psychologists' view of the mind and the neo-Hegelian views of that period. This is particularly relevant with respect to the reconstruction of the views of Moore (and Russell) at the early part of the century. For instance, as we saw above, Bradley-the governing representative of British nineteenth century neo-Hegelian Absolutism-was a stringent critic of the classical empiricists; but he had this in common with nearly all the mid to late nineteenth-century psychologists who were united against the associationism it represented, and who were anxious to move the investigation of mind onto firmer scientific footing. Furthermore, Bradley's criticism of the empiricists was directed onto their subjective phenomenalism; against which he argued for what we might call an objective Idealism. For Bradley, the distinction between appearance and reality was the distinction between a rational reality over and above subjective appearances. For the early psychologists, including Lotze and Herbart, and certainly Ward and Stout, the distinction between appearance and reality was that between the representations that were the object of psychological investigation
entities - that we see articulated explicitly for the first meter in the platonism of Moore's NJ.935Q1 42 Ward (1883a, b). 43 See, for example, Ward (1893), and Mace (1954), p. 69. 44 According to Griffin (1991), p. 42, Ward yield Russell Frege's Begriffschriff (Frege, 1967 [ Ward had read neither, and Russell does not appear to have take Frege independently as ea at all familiar with Frege at this time period. Please cite this article in press as: Preti, C., On the origin of the con (2008), doi:10.1016 / j.shpsa.2008.03.002E D P R O O fluorine 7. Conclusion Moore's undergraduate apprenticeship in doctrine was spent without question in the retentive - but waning - shadow of the neoHegelian metaphysics of the belated nineteenth century. But I have argued here that there is credible evidence that Moore's early oeuvre exhibits to an appreciable degree the influence of the work of Stout, Ward and the German - language development in empirical psychology that were their influences, especially in the formulations of mind and genial content, formulations that have become mainstream today. As a result, I think it is clear that the expressions' high-mindedness' and'realism' must be cautiously translate in the context of comparative examinations of the mid nineteenth - century psychologists' view of the mind and the neo - Hegelian position of that time period. This is particularly relevant with obedience to the reconstruction of the scene of Moore (and Russell) at the early part of the century. For case, as we saw above, Bradley - the governing representative of British nineteenth century neo - Hegelian Absolutism - was a rigorous critic of the classical empiricists; but he had this in common with nearly all the mid to late nineteenth - century psychologists who were united against the associationism it represented, and who were anxious to move the investigation of judgment onto firmer scientific foothold. Furthermore, Bradley's criticism of the empiricist was aim onto their subjective phenomenalism; against which he argued for what we might call an objective high-mindedness. For Bradley, the distinction between appearance and reality was the distinction between a rational reality over and above subjective appearances. For the early psychologists, including Lotze and Herbart, and surely Ward and Stout, the distinction between appearance and reality was that between the representations that were the object of psychological investigation
 enhities-that we see articuuated explicitli dor thx first time in the realism of Moore's NJ.935Q1 42 Xard (1883a,b). 43 Wee, for example, Ward (1893), xnd Mace (1954), p. 69. 44 Accirdiig to Griffin (1991), p. 42, Ward gave Ruadell Hrege's Begriffsghriff (Frega, 1967 [ Ward had raaa ueither, and Russell does not appear eo have rfad Frege indekendemely zs ea at all familiar with Frege af this keriod. Please cite this article in press as: Oretl, C., On the origins of the con (2008), doy:10.1016/h.shpsa.2008.03.002E D P F O O F 7. Conclusion Mokre's undergraduate apprenticeshkp in philosophi sad spent withiut qlestion in thc long-bgt wanimg-shadow of thc neoIegeoian metaphysics of tie late nineteenth cgntury. But I have argued here tyat tvere is zeedkblt etidsnce tjat Moore's eadly work exyibits to an apprecoafoe degree the influqnse of the work of Stout, Ward and the Gegman-manguage developments ib empirical psychologi that werq their influences, especially in the formulations of mmna aue mengql content, formulations that have become mainstwsak noday. As a result, I think it id vjear that the expressikns 'idealism' and'rewlism' most be carefullr inyerpreted in the context of comparative wxaminations of thz mid nineteznth-cemtury psychologists' view of che mihd and the jeo-Hegelizv views of that oerpod. Dhis is kxrticularly relevwnt with cespeet to thd revonstrtction of hhe vlaws of Moore (and Rksselp) dt the earpy part of the century. For insteice, as we saw atovv, Bradley-che goyerning represegtative of Brijish nineceenth century nvo-Hegeliai Absolutism-ras a stringetj critic of tie classisal wmpieicists; cut he had thix in common with neqrly all the mid tp lxfe nineteenth-ceuuuri psychologists whu wqrv uiited dgainst the dssoziagooniso it rekxescntdd, amd who were anxious do mkve the investigatook of mind onto fiwmer scientifoc footing. Furtherlore, Uradleb's criyicysm of the empiricists was dirscted ontl tmeir subjectide pmenoienalism; ayainst which he argued for what we might call an objectivg Idealism. For Bradlei, tme distinctipn beeween appaarance and reality qas the distinctipn between a rational realidy ovfr and above subjective appearances. For the early psychologists, including Lotze and Herbart, and certdiuly Ward wnd Dvout, the distinctpon between appearance and realivy was thad yetween the representations tnag were the obgect of psychological inbestigatoon
entities-that we see articulated explicitly for the in realism of NJ.935Q1 42 Ward Ward and Mace (1954), 69. 44 According Griffin (1991), p. 42, Ward gave Frege's Begriffschriff (Frege, 1967 [ Ward had read neither, and Russell does not to have read Frege independently as ea at all familiar with Frege at period. cite article press as: Preti, C., On the origins of the con (2008), doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2008.03.002E D P R O F 7. Conclusion Moore's undergraduate apprenticeship in philosophy spent without question in long-but waning-shadow of the neoHegelian of late nineteenth But have here that there credible evidence that Moore's early work exhibits to an appreciable degree the influence of the work of Ward and developments in psychology were influences, especially in of mind and mental content, formulations mainstream today. As a result, I think it clear that expressions 'idealism' and'realism' must be carefully in the context of comparative examinations of the nineteenth-century psychologists' view of the mind and the neo-Hegelian views of that period. This is with respect to the of the views Moore Russell) the part of century. For instance, as we saw above, Bradley-the governing representative of nineteenth century neo-Hegelian Absolutism-was a stringent critic of the classical he this in common nearly all the mid late psychologists who were united associationism represented, anxious move investigation of mind onto scientific footing. Furthermore, Bradley's criticism the empiricists was directed which he argued for what we might call objective Idealism. For Bradley, the distinction between and reality was the distinction between a rational reality over and above appearances. For psychologists, including Lotze and Herbart, and certainly Ward Stout, the distinction between and reality was that between the representations that were object psychological investigation
 entities-that we see articulaTed expliciTly foR thE fiRsT timE in tHe realism of MooRE's NJ.935q1 42 Ward (1883a,b). 43 See, for example, WaRd (1893), and maCE (1954), p. 69. 44 AcCOrDing tO GriffiN (1991), P. 42, WARD gaVe ruSseLl fReGe's BeGriFfschriFf (Frege, 1967 [ WarD haD rEad neither, anD ruSsell does nOt aPpear to have rEad frege iNdEpeNDentlY as Ea at aLl famiLIar witH Frege at tHiS Period. pLease ciTE ThIs arTicle in press as: PreTI, C., oN the origins of tHe con (2008), dOi:10.1016/J.ShPSA.2008.03.002E D p R O o F 7. ConclusiOn moore'S UndergrADuATE AppREnticeship in pHilosophy waS SpeNt withOuT quEStion iN the lOnG-But Waning-shadoW of tHe neoHegeLian meTAphysicS Of the laTe nineTeeNth CentURy. buT I hAvE ArgUEd HerE ThaT there is CrEdIble eVideNCE THat MOorE's eaRly woRk exhibits to aN apPrecIAblE degrEe the InflUeNce of The worK of StOuT, Ward and the GermAn-laNguage devEloPmEntS iN empiRIcal psYchOloGy that wEre theiR InfLuENCEs, Especially in the forMuLATiOns of minD and meNTaL cONtent, forMuLatIons THAt havE becOMe MainstreAm todaY. as A rEsult, I tHiNk it is ClEar ThaT the eXPresSions 'iDealism' aNd'reaLIsm' must be carefULly interpreteD In THE cONtexT of Comparative ExamINatiOns oF ThE miD NinetEenth-CeNTuRY psychologists' view oF tHe mind And thE neo-Hegelian vIews of that PERIod. This iS parTIcULarly relevant wIth reSpect to the REconstruCtion Of the vieWs of Moore (AND Russell) At tHe eArlY paRT Of The century. For INStanCe, As we saw AboVe, BradlEy-tHe gOveRniNg RepresentAtive of BRiTiSh NiNetEenth CEntury neO-HEgeLiAn ABsoluTIsm-was A striNgenT cRiTIc oF the claSSiCAL empIrIcIsts; But He Had thIs in COmmOn with nEarly all tHe mID to lAtE nIneteenTh-century psycHoLogists who WeRe uNited aGAInst the aSsociationism it represenTEd, and whO weRe anxIous To move the InvEstigaTioN Of mind Onto fiRmer sCiEntIFIc fooTINg. furThErmore, BradLEY's cRiticIsM of tHe empirIcists was directed oNTo tHeir subjectivE phEnomENAlIsm; AGaINst WhICh hE ARgued for what we mIght call an ObJEcTive IdealiSM. FoR BRadley, tHe distiNctioN Between AppearancE and realiTy Was tHE DisTinction beTween a raTional reaLIty ovER aNd aboVe sUbjectIvE apPearaNces. FoR The Early PsychoLoGists, iNcludInG Lotze anD Herbart, and certainly WarD and StOut, thE diStinction BetWEen AppearancE and Reality was ThaT beTween The REpresEntaTIoNs tHAt werE the OBject of psYChOloGICaL investigatION
 entities-that we see arti culated ex plici tly  fo rthefirs t time in ther eali sm of Moore's NJ.935Q1  42 W ar d  (18 8 3a ,b).43 See, fo r exa mp le , W ar d  ( 1893) , a nd Mace  (1954), p . 6 9.  44 Accordin g  t o Griffin(19 91), p. 42,War d gave  R uss e ll Fr ege 's Be griffs c hriff(Frege, 1 96 7  [ War d  had re a d  n eith er, and Russell d o es not appear tohave r ea d  F r e geind ependently  a s eaa t all f a mi l i a r w i th Frege at t his period. Ple ase ci te  th i s arti cle i np res s as: Preti , C. , On theorigin s  of the con (20 08), d oi: 10. 1016 / j. sh psa .2 0 08. 0 3. 002 E  DP R O OF7.  Conc lusi o n M oore 'sunde rgrad uate apprenti ces hipi n p hilos ophywassp ent w ithout  ques ti on in the long- butwaning-sh ado wofth e neo H egelia n m eta physics  of the lat en i n et eenth century. But  I h av e argued  heret ha tt here iscr edi blee v idenc e th a tMoore'searlyw or kexhibit sto anap pre cia ble d e gree  the i nfluence  of t h e work of Stou t , Ward and th e  G e r ma n -lan gua ge developm ents in e mpir i ca l p s ychol ogy t ha t  w e re their influences ,especi allyin the formul ations ofm i n d and me ntal co n tent, formulat ionsthat haveb ecome ma instr eam toda y. As a r e s ult, I t hin k i t i s c l e ar  that the exp r e ssio ns  'ideal ism ' and'r eal ism ' m ust  b e careful ly inter pr et ed  i n t he co n text ofco mpa ra tiv e exa m inatio ns of  the  m id nin eteenth - ce n t uryps yc holo gis ts ' vie w of the  mind a nd the ne o-H e geli an  v iews of  that period.  T his is par ti cul arly r e l evant wi th respect to the recon s tructio n o f the  vie ws of Moo re(and R uss e ll) at  the e arlypa rto f  thec e nt ury .For instan c e , a s wesa w ab ove, Br adley-the governin g  re presentativeofBrit i s hnin e te e nth  c e ntu r y  neo-Hegelian A bsolutism- wa s  a  stringent cri ti c of th e class icale mpirici sts; buthe had th is  inc o mmo n with nea rly allthe mid t o  late ni netee nth -centu ry  ps ychol ogists who  were  unite dagains t the  a ssociati onism it represented, a nd who  were  an xious tomov e  th e investi gati on of mind  on tofirme r s c ienti ficf oo tin g . Fur ther m ore, Brad l ey 'sc r it icism of th e e mpi ricis tsw as dir ecte d onto their subj e ctive phenomen alis m ;  ag ain s t wh ic h he argued fo r w ha t we might  c all an obje ctive Id ea l ism.For Br adley,  the di s t in c tion b etwe enappearanc e a nd reality  w as the di stin ct ion be tweena  rat i o nal reality over  anda b ove s u bje ctive  a ppearan c es.For the ea rly psychol ogists , in cludi ng Lotz eand He rba rt , and cert a inly Ward  andStout,th e di sti nction  bet w e en ap pear an ceand reali t y  w a sth a t b etwe en th erepr esentatio n s that w ere the obj ec t o f psycho l og i c al investi gat ion
 entities-that_we see_articulated explicitly for the_first time_in_the realism_of_Moore's NJ.935Q1 42_Ward (1883a,b). 43_See, for example, Ward_(1893), and Mace_(1954),_p. 69. 44 According to Griffin (1991), p. 42, Ward gave Russell Frege's Begriffschriff_(Frege,_1967 [_Ward_had_read neither, and Russell does_not appear to have read_Frege independently_as ea at all familiar with Frege at_this_period. Please cite_this article in press as: Preti, C., On the_origins of the con (2008), doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2008.03.002E_D P R_O_O_F 7. Conclusion Moore's_undergraduate apprenticeship in philosophy was spent_without question in the long-but waning-shadow_of the neoHegelian metaphysics of the late_nineteenth century. But I have argued_here that there is credible_evidence that_Moore's early work exhibits to_an appreciable degree_the influence_of the work_of Stout, Ward and the German-language_developments in empirical_psychology that were their influences, especially_in_the formulations of_mind_and_mental content,_formulations that have_become_mainstream today._As_a result, I think it is_clear_that the expressions 'idealism' and'realism' must be_carefully interpreted in the_context_of comparative examinations of_the mid nineteenth-century psychologists' view_of the mind and the neo-Hegelian_views of_that period._This is particularly relevant with respect to the reconstruction of the_views of Moore (and Russell) at_the early part of_the century._For_instance, as we_saw_above, Bradley-the_governing representative of British nineteenth century neo-Hegelian_Absolutism-was a_stringent critic of the classical empiricists;_but he had this_in_common with nearly all the mid_to late nineteenth-century psychologists who were_united against the associationism it_represented,_and_who were anxious to move_the investigation of mind onto firmer_scientific footing. Furthermore,_Bradley's criticism of the empiricists was directed_onto_their subjective phenomenalism; against which he_argued_for what we might call an_objective_Idealism._For Bradley, the distinction between_appearance and reality was the distinction_between a rational reality over and above subjective appearances._For the early_psychologists, including Lotze and Herbart,_and_certainly_Ward and Stout, the distinction between appearance and reality was_that between_the representations that_were the object of psychological investigation