 and determinations of the masses, motions, sizes and forces. Why does Duhem see the unfalsifiability of the mechanistic method as a problem and why is it a source for his criticism? Is not this approach a legitimate heuristic approach as defended by Poincaré? Duhem does not think that the aim of theoretical physics is to promote the discovery of new laws. Such is the task of experimental physics. Duhem's Critical Analysis of Mechanicism and his Defense of a Formal Conception of Theoretical Physics José R. N. Chiappin – Cássio Costa Laranjeiras 48 Duhem pursues a rational explanation of the evolution of theoretical physics. From this viewpoint, he evaluates the methodological characteristics of the analytic approach to mechanistic theories. He does not think that hypotheses and methods that construct unfalsifiable physical theories make scientific growth rational and continuous. For him, rationality is controllability, and continuity means that the new theory encompasses everything already accounted for. Duhem's method of constructing physical theory with his rules for the formation of physical concepts establishes that the introduction of concepts in physics must be controlled by measurable conditions, and that mechanical models are to be expelled from physical theories. As we have seen, these systems of hidden masses in motion are totally indeterminate and arbitrary, since nothing limits the nature and number of these masses in motion; this makes mechanical theories unfalsifiable (Duhem 1980, 78-79). Consequently, physical theories constructed by a mechanistic method, according to Hertz's and Lagrange's mechanics, are not subject to the control of empirical facts. This means that the application of the empiricist principle of the testability of physical theory is made meaningless by the mechanistic method of constructing physical theory. For Duhem, a rational method of constructing physical theory (Chiappin 1989, 282-310) must optimize the empirical testability of physical theories. Therefore, from Duhem's viewpoint, the ongoing polemic between Lagrange's formulation of classical mechanics, which takes force as a primitive concept representing a real cause, and Hertz's formulation, which rejects force as a primitive concept, does not make any difference with respect to his criticism of the mechanistic method. For him, both formulations generate unfalsifiable physical theories (Duhem 1980, 97; 1905, 183). Hence, the analytic approach and the atomistic hypothesis can always provide compatibility between a mechanical theory and facts making it unfalsifiable (Duhem 1905, 182). This thesis, the compatibility between mechanical program and facts, means, for Du
and determinations of the masses, motions, sizes and force. Why does Duhem examine the unfalsifiability of the mechanistic method as a problem and why is it a source for his criticism? Is not this approach path a legitimate heuristic approach as fight by Poincaré? Duhem does not intend that the aim of theoretical purgative is to advertise the discovery of new laws. Such is the job of experimental physics. Duhem's Critical Analysis of Mechanicism and his Defense of a Formal Conception of Theoretical Physics José R. N. Chiappin – Cássio Costa Laranjeiras 48 Duhem pursues a rational explanation of the development of theoretical physics. From this viewpoint, he measure the methodological characteristics of the analytic approach to mechanistic theory. He does not think that hypotheses and methods that reconstruct unfalsifiable physical theories make scientific growth intellectual and continuous. For him, rationality is controllability, and continuity means that the modern theory encompasses everything already accounted for. Duhem's method acting of constructing physical theory with his rules for the formation of physical concept establish that the introduction of concepts in physics must be controlled by measurable conditions, and that mechanical models are to be expelled from physical theories. As we have watch, these systems of hidden masses in apparent motion are totally indeterminate and arbitrary, since nothing limits the nature and number of these multitude in motion; this makes mechanical theories unfalsifiable (Duhem 1980, 78 - 79). Consequently, physical theory constructed by a mechanistic method, according to Hertz's and Lagrange's mechanics, are not subject to the control of empiric facts. This means that the application of the empiricist principle of the testability of physical theory is made meaningless by the mechanistic method acting of construct physical theory. For Duhem, a rational method of constructing physical theory (Chiappin 1989, 282 - 310) must optimize the empiric testability of physical hypothesis. Therefore, from Duhem's viewpoint, the ongoing polemicist between Lagrange's formulation of classical mechanics, which takes force as a crude concept representing a actual cause, and Hertz's conceptualization, which rejects force as a crude concept, does not make any difference with regard to his criticism of the mechanistic method. For him, both formulation generate unfalsifiable forcible theories (Duhem 1980, 97; 1905, 183). Hence, the analytic approach and the atomistic hypothesis can constantly supply compatibility between a mechanical theory and facts make it unfalsifiable (Duhem 1905, 182). This thesis, the compatibility between mechanical program and fact, means, for Du
 anf determinations of the oasses, motions, sizes aid forcss. Why dues Duhem see the unfalsifiauiliry of the mechanistic methoa as a prlblem ane whb is it a source for his critidlsm? Iv not this apprpach a leghtimate heurisdiz cpproach as defended by Poincaré? Duhei does moh think that tre apm of fheoretical physics is to promote fhe disbovery of new lawx. Such is the task of expegimejtal physics. Duhem'd Critical Qnalrwis of Mechavicism and his Defense of a Formal Conception of Theofeticcl Physics Howé R. T. Chiappin – Cássij Costa Larakkeiras 48 Duhem pursues a ratlonal explanation of the evolntion of theoretical physics. Xrkm this viewpoint, hw evanuatas tfw mdthkdplkgical cheracteristids of the abalytic approach to mqbnanistic thekries. Re does not think that hypotheses and metvoda that construct unfalsufiable physical theoties make fcientific growth rational and continuous. For him, ratikvalnbn is xojtrollability, and continuity means that the nqs uhepry encompassef everythinb wltgady accounted for. Dbgej's method of constgucting physucal theowy woth his rules for the formarion of physpcal concepts establiskes that the inttoductoon of concepts in physncs muat be contrllled by jdasurable conditkonx, dnd that mechanical models are to bx expzlled frum pnysicaj theories. As wc have seen, these sjstemd mf hidden lasses in motion are totally invxterminate anc drbptrary, siuce nobhing limits thq nature and nomber of chese oasses in jotion; vhis makes mqchanical themties unfalsifmable (Duhqm 1980, 78-79). Conwequentuh, physical thepries constructed bt a mechanistic mebhod, xdcording to Herce's qnd Lagrange's mrchxniss, ace noe subject to dhe zongtol ow empirical wactx. This means that tha apllication of the ekplricist ptinciple jf the testabolity of physical uheory is made mewningless by the mechanistic msthod of fonftructing phrsicql theory. Fox Duhem, a rational method of constructinj physical theory (Chiakpin 1989, 282-310) must optimize jhe empirical vestabylity of [hysical theories. Thwrefore, from Duhek's viewpoint, the ongojng ponemic between Lagrange's formulation of classical mechanics, which takes force aw a prmmytive concelt rrpresvntnng a reaj cansx, and Hertz's formllation, which rejects force as a primitiee concept, does not make any dofwerence with tespect to his criticism or the mevhanistic method. For him, both fprmulations generate unfslsifiaboe phgsical theuries (Duhem 1980, 97; 1905, 183). Hemce, thz analttic approagh and the atooisyig hypothesls cen clways provide compatibility betwwen a nefhanical theory end facts manlng it unfalfifiable (Duhem 1905, 182). Thia thesks, the compatobility betweem mechanical program agd facts, means, ror Du
and determinations of the masses, motions, sizes Why Duhem see unfalsifiability of the and is it a for his criticism? not this approach a legitimate heuristic as defended by Poincaré? Duhem does not think that the aim of theoretical is to promote the discovery of new laws. Such is the task of physics. Critical of and his Defense of a Formal Conception of Theoretical Physics José R. N. Chiappin – Cássio Laranjeiras 48 Duhem pursues a rational explanation of evolution of theoretical physics. this viewpoint, he evaluates the characteristics the analytic to theories. does not think hypotheses and methods that construct unfalsifiable physical theories make scientific growth rational and continuous. For him, rationality controllability, and that the theory everything accounted for. Duhem's constructing physical theory with his rules of physical concepts establishes that the introduction of in physics be controlled by measurable conditions, and mechanical models are to be expelled from physical As we have seen, these systems of hidden masses in motion are totally indeterminate and nothing limits the nature number of these in this mechanical unfalsifiable (Duhem 78-79). Consequently, physical theories constructed by a mechanistic method, according to and Lagrange's mechanics, are not subject to the control of This that the application the empiricist principle of testability physical theory is made the method theory. Duhem, rational method of constructing theory (Chiappin 1989, 282-310) must the empirical testability of viewpoint, the ongoing polemic between Lagrange's formulation of mechanics, which takes force as a primitive representing a real cause, and Hertz's formulation, which rejects force as a concept, does any difference with respect to his criticism of mechanistic method. For him, formulations generate unfalsifiable physical theories (Duhem 1980, 97; 1905, Hence, analytic approach the atomistic hypothesis always provide compatibility a mechanical theory making it (Duhem 182). compatibility between mechanical program and facts, for
 and determinations of the masSes, motions, Sizes And ForCeS. Why Does duhem see the unfALsifIability of the mechanistIc metHoD As a pRObLem anD why is iT A sOURce FoR hIs cRiTIcIsm? Is Not This appRoach a legiTimAtE heuristic apPRoAch as defenDed By Poincaré? DuHem Does noT tHinK That tHe aIm of tHeoretICal phySics is to pRoMOte the DIscoverY OF nEw laWs. Such is the task of EXpERimental physicS. Duhem'S CRItICAl ANalYsis of MechAnIcism ANd his DeFEnSE OF a FORmal ConceptioN of TheoretiCAl PHysics joSé R. n. chiappIn – CásSiO cosTa LaranjeirAs 48 DuHem pursueS a ratiONal explANation oF the evOluTioN of tHEoReTicAl PHysICs. froM ThiS viewpoiNt, He EvaluAtes THE MEthoDolOgicAl chaRacteristics oF thE anaLYtiC apprOach tO mecHaNistiC theorIes. He DoEs not think that hYpotHeses and mEthOdS thAt ConstRUct unfAlsIfiAble phySical thEOriEs MAKE sCientific growth ratIoNAL aNd continUous. FoR HiM, rATionalitY iS coNtroLLAbiliTy, anD CoNtinuity Means tHAt ThE new theOrY encomPaSseS evErythINg alReady aCcounted For. DuHEm's method of conSTructing physiCAl THEoRY witH hiS rules for thE forMAtioN of pHYsIcaL ConcePts esTaBLiSHes that the introductIoN of conCepts In physics must Be controllED BY measuraBle cONdITions, and that meChaniCal models aRE to be expElled From physIcal theorIES. As we havE seEn, tHesE sySTEmS of hidden massES In moTiOn are toTalLy indetErmInaTe aNd aRbItrary, sinCe nothinG lImItS tHe nAture ANd number Of TheSe MasSes in MOtion; tHis maKes mEcHaNIcaL theoriES uNFAlsiFiAbLe (DuHem 1980, 78-79). coNsequEntlY, PhySical thEories conStrUCted By A mEchanisTic method, accoRdIng to Hertz'S aNd LAgrangE'S MechanicS, are not subject to the contROl of empIriCal faCts. THis means tHat The appLicATion of The empIriciSt PriNCIple oF THe TesTaBility of phYSIcaL theoRy Is maDe meaniNgless by the mechaniSTic Method of constRucTing PHYsIcaL ThEOry. foR duhEM, A rational method Of construcTiNG pHysical theORy (CHiAppin 1989, 282-310) muSt optimIze thE EmpiricAl testabiLity of phySiCal tHEOriEs. ThereforE, from DuhEm's viewpoINt, the ONgOing pOleMic betWeEn LAgranGe's forMUlaTion oF classIcAl mechAnics, WhIch takes Force as a primitive concepT repreSentiNg a Real cause, And hErtZ's formulaTion, Which rejecTs fOrcE as a pRimITive cOncePT, dOes NOt makE any DIfference WItH reSPEcT to his critiCISM of The meChaNIstic mEthoD. For him, both formulATions generate uNfalSIFiaBle PHysiCaL theories (Duhem 1980, 97; 1905, 183). henCe, THE analytiC aPproach and tHe atomisTiC HypotHesis cAn alwaYs proviDE CoMPatibiLity BetWeen a mechAniCaL Theory aNd FaCTs makiNg it UnFalsifIable (DUHem 1905, 182). THIS thesis, the compatIbiliTY BetweEN meChaniCaL prograM And fActs, means, fOr Du
 and determinations of the  masses, m otion s,siz es  and  for ces. Why doesD uhem  see the unfalsifiabil ity o ft he m e ch anist ic meth o da s  apr ob lem  a n dwhy i s i t a sou rce for hi s c ri ticism? Is n o tthis appro ach  a legitimat e h eurist ic  ap p roach  as  defe nded b y  Poinc aré? Duhe md oes no t  thinkt h at  the  aim of theoretic a lp hysics is to p romote  t h ed i sco ver y of new l aw s. Su c h is th e  t a s k  of experimentalphysics. Du h em' s Crit ic alA nalysi s ofMe c han icism and h is D efense of  a For m al Conc e ption o f Theo ret ica l Ph y si cs  Jo sé R.N .Chi a ppi n – Cáss io  C ostaLara n j e i ras48Duhe m pur sues a ration alexpl a nat ion o f the  evo lu tionof the oreti ca l physics. From  thi s viewpoi nt,  h e e va luate s  the m eth odo logical  charac t eri st i c s  o f the analytic app ro a c hto mecha nistic th eo r ies. Hedo esnott h ink t hath yp othesesand me t ho ds  that c on struct  u nfa lsi fiabl e  phy sicaltheories  make scientific gro w th rational a n dc o nt i nuou s.For him, ra tion a lity  isc on tro l labil ity,an d  c o ntinuity means that  t he new  theo ry encompasse s everythi n g alreadyacco u nt e d for. Duhem's  meth od of cons t ructingphysi cal theo ry with h i s  rules f orthe  fo rma t i on  of physicalc o ncep ts  establ ish es that  th e i ntr odu ct ion of co ncepts i nph ys ic s m ust b e  control le d b ymea surab l e cond ition s, a nd  t h atmechani c al m odel sar e to  be  e xpell ed f r omphysica l theorie s.A s we  h av e seen,  these system sof hiddenma sse s in m o t ion aretotally indeterminate a n d arbit rar y, si ncenothing l imi ts the  na t ure an d numb er of  t hes e masse s in  mo ti on; this m a k esmecha ni caltheorie s unfalsifiable (D u hem  1980, 78-79) . C onse q u en tly ,  p h ysi ca l  th e o ries constructe d by a mec ha n is tic method ,  ac co rding t o Hertz 's an d  Lagran ge's mech anics, ar enots u bje ct to thecontrolof empiri c al fa c ts . Thi s m eans t ha t t he ap plicat i onof th e empi ri cist p rinci pl e of the  testability of physica l theo ry is  ma de meanin gle s s b y the mec hani stic metho d o f c onstr uct i ng ph ysic a lthe o ry. F or D u hem, a ra t io nal m et hod of cons t r u cti ng ph ysi c al the ory(Chiappin 1989, 2 8 2-310) must op timi z e  th e e m piri ca l testabilityofph y s ical the or ies. Theref ore, fro mD uhem' s view point,  the on g o in g  polem ic b etw een Lagra nge 's formula ti on of cla ssic al  mecha nics,w hich t akes force as aprimi t i ve co n cep t rep re senting a re al cause,and Hertz's  formu lati on, w hich re je cts fo rce  a s a primit i ve concep t, do es notma ke a nydiffer ence w ith r espe ct  to  his crit i c is m  o ft hemech anist ic  met hod. Forh im, both  fo r mulatio ns  ge n e rate u n fa l s ifiable ph ysi cal t h e ories (Duh e m 19 8 0, 97; 1 905, 1 83). H ence, t h e a na lytic a ppr o a ch and th e atomist i c h yp othe sis canal ways  p rov id e compatibility  between  a mecha n i cal th eor y  and factsma king it unfa lsifi ab l e (Duhe m 190 5, 182) .  Th isthe sis,  th e co m patibility between mecha nica l pro g ram  andfacts ,means, f o r Du 
 and_determinations of_the masses, motions, sizes_and forces._Why_does Duhem_see_the unfalsifiability of_the mechanistic method_as a problem and_why is it_a_source for his criticism? Is not this approach a legitimate heuristic approach as defended_by_Poincaré? Duhem_does_not_think that the aim of_theoretical physics is to promote_the discovery_of new laws. Such is the task of_experimental_physics. Duhem's Critical_Analysis of Mechanicism and his Defense of a Formal_Conception of Theoretical Physics José R._N. Chiappin –_Cássio_Costa_Laranjeiras 48 Duhem pursues_a rational explanation of the evolution_of theoretical physics. From this viewpoint,_he evaluates the methodological characteristics of the_analytic approach to mechanistic theories. He_does not think that hypotheses_and methods_that construct unfalsifiable physical theories_make scientific growth_rational and_continuous. For him,_rationality is controllability, and continuity means_that the new_theory encompasses everything already accounted for._Duhem's_method of constructing_physical_theory_with his_rules for the_formation_of physical_concepts_establishes that the introduction of concepts_in_physics must be controlled by measurable conditions,_and that mechanical models_are_to be expelled from_physical theories. As we have_seen, these systems of hidden masses_in motion_are totally_indeterminate and arbitrary, since nothing limits the nature and number of_these masses in motion; this makes_mechanical theories unfalsifiable (Duhem_1980, 78-79)._Consequently,_physical theories constructed_by_a mechanistic_method, according to Hertz's and Lagrange's mechanics,_are not_subject to the control of empirical_facts. This means that_the_application of the empiricist principle of_the testability of physical theory is_made meaningless by the mechanistic_method_of_constructing physical theory. For Duhem,_a rational method of constructing physical_theory (Chiappin 1989,_282-310) must optimize the empirical testability of_physical_theories. Therefore, from Duhem's viewpoint, the_ongoing_polemic between Lagrange's formulation of classical_mechanics,_which_takes force as a primitive_concept representing a real cause, and_Hertz's formulation, which rejects force as a primitive concept,_does not make_any difference with respect to_his_criticism_of the mechanistic method. For him, both formulations generate unfalsifiable_physical theories_(Duhem 1980, 97;_1905, 183). Hence, the analytic approach and the atomistic hypothesis_can always provide compatibility between a mechanical_theory and facts making it unfalsifiable (Duhem 1905, 182). This thesis,_the compatibility between mechanical program and facts, means,_for Du