 focus on parts and their arrangement, what is essential becomes invisible. Despite my differences with Swinburne, I believe that he and I share certain desiderata in our theories about human persons: (a) A human person is not identical to her body at any time. (b) A human person can survive a complete change of body. (c) Not all truths about persons are truths about bodies. (d) The property of being a person entails the instantiation of mental properties – at least a rudimentary first-person perspective. (e) The persistence of persons is primitive (as the Simple Theory of Personal Identity over time implies). V. CONCLUSION Mind, Brain and Free Will is a closely argued comprehensive work on major themes of Swinburne's. I have discussed only a few aspects of Swinburne's views bearing on substance dualism. In the belief that we can (and should) reject the dichotomy that Swinburne began his book with – that human beings are either'merely complicated machines or souls interacting with bodies' – I offered an alternative that I believe achieves much of what substance dualists want. 15SWINBURNE ON SUBSTANCE DUALISM REFERENCES Baker, Lynne Rudder. 1995. Explaining Attitudes: A Practical Approach to the Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) – 2000. Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) – 2007a. 'Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective', in How Successful Is Naturalism?, ed. Georg Gasser, (Frankfurt: Ontos-Verlag) pp. 203–227 – 2007b. 'Persons and the Metaphysics of Resurrection', Religious Studies, 43 (3): 333–348 – 2009. 'Nonreductive Materialism', in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind, ed. Brian P. McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann, and Sven Walter (Oxford: Clarendon Press), pp. 109-127 – 2012. 'Personal Identity: A Not-So-Simple Simple View', in Personal Identity: Complex or Simple?, ed. Matthias Stephan and Georg Gasser (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 179-191 – 2013. Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective (New York: Oxford University Press) Merricks, Trenton. 1998. 'There Are No Criteria of Identity over Time', Nous, 32 (1): 106–124 Perry, John
focus on parts and their arrangement, what is essential become inconspicuous. Despite my differences with Swinburne, I believe that he and I partake certain desideratum in our theories about human persons: (a) A human person is not identical to her torso at any time. (b) A human person can survive a accomplished change of body. (vitamin c) Not all truths about persons are truths about bodies. (d) The property of being a person entails the instantiation of genial properties – at least a rudimentary first - person position. (e) The persistence of persons is primitive (as the Simple Theory of Personal Identity over time implies). V. CONCLUSION Mind, Brain and Free Will is a close argued comprehensive oeuvre on major themes of Swinburne's. I have discussed only a few aspect of Swinburne's views bearing on substance dualism. In the belief that we can (and should) reject the dichotomy that Swinburne begin his book with – that human beings are either'merely complicated machines or souls interacting with bodies' – I offered an alternative that I believe achieves much of what kernel dualists want. 15SWINBURNE ON SUBSTANCE DUALISM reference Baker, Lynne Rudder. 1995. excuse Attitudes: A Practical Approach to the Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) – 2000. Persons and consistency: A Constitution View (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) – 2007a.' Naturalism and the First - Person Perspective', in How Successful Is Naturalism? , ed. Georg Gasser, (Frankfurt: Ontos - Verlag) pp. 203–227 – 2007b.' Persons and the Metaphysics of Resurrection', Religious Studies, 43 (3 ): 333–348 – 2009.' Nonreductive Materialism', in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind, ed. Brian P. McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann, and Sven Walter (Oxford: Clarendon Press), pp. 109 - 127 – 2012.' Personal Identity: A Not - So - Simple Simple View', in Personal Identity: Complex or Simple? , ed. Matthias Stephan and Georg Gasser (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 179 - 191 – 2013. Naturalism and the First - Person Perspective (New York: Oxford University Press) Merricks, Trenton. 1998.' There Are No Criteria of Identity over Time', Nous, 32 (1 ): 106–124 Perry, John
 fofus on parts and their avrangement, what nw esseitial bscomes ivvisible. Despite my differenres qith Wwinburne, I believe thxt he and I share ceruain desiderata ii our thcjriea abobt human persons: (a) A human person is not iaeutical to her body at any time. (b) A htman petsln can survive a cpiplefv ghange of body. (c) Not all truths zbout ptrsons are truths sbout bodies. (d) The propertj of being a person enhails the ibstagriation of mdntal proptrcies – at lezst a rudimentary first-person pdrspeetive. (e) The pwrslvtence of pxrsons is primitivc (as tha Simplr Theory of Pevsonan Ieentity over time impnies). V. CONCLUSION Iind, Brait cnd Free Will is a cliswly atgued comoeehdnsjvx wkrk on maoor themes kf Swinburnw's. I have discussed ogoy a few aspedts of Srinburne's views bearing on substance dudliam. In the belief that ww can (and should) rejeft the dishotomy that Swinburne began his book with – that vuman ceiunf qrf either'merely complicated machines or souls yhttrabting with bodies' – I offered aj sjternative thxt I bzmisve achieves much lf what subsrance duajistx want. 15SWINBURNE ON SUBSTANXE DUALISM RVFERWNCES Baker, Lynne Xudder. 1995. Explcining Attiyudes: A Practical Approcch to the Mind (Cwmbridge: Dxmbridge Universkty Psess) – 2000. Ptfsons and Bodies: W Constitntion View (Cxmbrodge: Cwmbridge Ujiversity Press) – 2007a. 'Naturwlism atd the Firdt-Person Perspective', in How Sucrxssful Is Natoranisk?, ed. Geoxg Gasxer, (Frankfurt: Ontos-Verlag) pk. 203–227 – 2007b. 'Perfons xnd the Menaphysics of Resurrestion', Religiogd Studies, 43 (3): 333–348 – 2009. 'Nonrequctuve Nateriauksm', in The Oxfprd Handbook of Phioosophy of Mind, ed. Brkzn P. McLaughlin, Anwgar Beckermann, ana Sdej Xaltew (Oxford: Clarandov Pfrss), po. 109-127 – 2012. 'Personcl Idemtity: A Not-So-Simple Vimpme View', in Personak Ldentity: Xomplex jr Simple?, ed. Katthias Stephan ajd Gemrg Gassrr (Sambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 179-191 – 2013. Naturalism wnd bhe Sirst-Persou Perspective (New York: Oxford University Press) Merricks, Ttenton. 1998. 'There Are No Erlteria of Idxntity over Tima', Nous, 32 (1): 106–124 Perry, John
focus on parts and their arrangement, what becomes Despite my with Swinburne, I share desiderata in our about human persons: A human person is not identical her body at any time. (b) A human person can survive a complete of body. (c) Not all truths about persons are truths about bodies. (d) property being person the instantiation of mental properties – at least a rudimentary first-person perspective. (e) The persistence of is primitive (as the Simple Theory of Personal over time implies). V. Mind, Brain and Free Will a argued comprehensive on themes Swinburne's. I have only a few aspects of Swinburne's views bearing on substance dualism. In the belief that we can should) reject that Swinburne his with that human beings complicated machines or souls interacting with offered an alternative that I believe achieves much what substance want. 15SWINBURNE ON SUBSTANCE DUALISM REFERENCES Lynne Rudder. 1995. Explaining Attitudes: A Practical Approach the Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) – 2000. Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View (Cambridge: Press) – 2007a. 'Naturalism the First-Person Perspective', How Is ed. Gasser, (Frankfurt: pp. 203–227 – 2007b. 'Persons and the Metaphysics of Resurrection', Religious 43 (3): 333–348 – 2009. 'Nonreductive Materialism', in The Oxford Philosophy Mind, ed. Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann, and Walter Clarendon Press), pp. 109-127 'Personal A in Identity: or Simple?, ed. Matthias and Georg Gasser (Cambridge: Cambridge Press), pp. 179-191 – Perspective (New York: Oxford University Press) Merricks, Trenton. 'There Are No Criteria of Identity over Nous, 32 (1): 106–124 Perry, John
 focus on parts and their arranGement, what Is essEntIal BeComeS invIsible. Despite mY DiffErences with Swinburne, I bElievE tHAt he ANd i sharE certaiN DeSIDerAtA iN ouR tHEoRies aBouT human pErsons: (a) A huMan PeRson is not ideNTiCal to her boDy aT any time. (b) A huMan Person CaN suRVive a ComPlete Change OF body. (c) not all truThS About pERsons arE TRuThs aBout bodies. (d) The proPErTY of being a persoN entaiLs THe INStaNtiAtion of menTaL propERties – at LEaST A RudIMentary first-pErson perspeCTivE. (e) The pErSisTEnce of PersoNs IS prImitive (as thE SimPle Theory Of PersONal IdenTIty over Time imPliEs). V. cONCluSiOn MiNd, bRaiN AnD FrEE WiLl is a cloSeLy ArgueD comPREHEnsiVe wOrk oN majoR themes of SwinBurNe's. I HAve DiscuSsed oNly a FeW aspeCts of SWinbuRnE's views bearing oN subStance duaLisM. IN thE bElief THat we cAn (aNd sHould) reJect the DIchOtOMY ThAt Swinburne began hiS bOOK wIth – that hUman beINgS aRE either'mErEly CompLICated MachINeS or souls InteraCTiNg With bodIeS' – I offeReD an AltErnatIVe thAt I belIeve achiEves mUCh of what substaNCe dualists wanT. 15sWinbUrnE ON sUBsTANCE DUALIsM REfeRENcES BAKeR, LyNNe RudDer. 1995. ExPlAInINg Attitudes: A PracticAl approaCh to tHe Mind (CambridGe: CambridgE uNIversity presS) – 2000. peRSons and Bodies: A constItution VieW (cambridgE: CambRidge UniVersity PrESS) – 2007a. 'NaturaLisM anD thE FiRST-PErson PerspectIVE', in HOw successFul is NaturAliSm?, eD. GeOrg gaSser, (FrankFurt: OntoS-VErLaG) pP. 203–227 – 2007b. 'PErsonS And the MeTaPhySiCs oF ResuRRectioN', ReliGiouS STuDIes, 43 (3): 333–348 – 2009. 'nonreduCTiVE mateRiAlIsm', iN ThE OXford handBOok Of PhiloSophy of MiNd, eD. briaN P. mclaughliN, Ansgar BeckerMaNn, and Sven WAlTer (oxford: cLArendon PRess), pp. 109-127 – 2012. 'Personal Identity: A nOt-So-SimPle simplE VieW', in PersonAl IDentitY: CoMPlex or simple?, Ed. MatThIas sTEphan AND GEorG GAsser (CambrIDGe: CAmbriDgE UniVersity press), pp. 179-191 – 2013. Naturalism aND thE First-Person PErsPectIVE (NEw YORk: oXfoRd uNivERSity Press) MerricKs, Trenton. 1998. 'THeRE ARe No CriterIA of idEntity oVer Time', nous, 32 (1): 106–124 PERry, John
 focus on parts and theirarrangemen t, wh atises sent ialbecomes invisi b le.Despite my differences  with  S w inbu r ne , I b elievet ha t hean dI s ha r ecerta indesider ata in our  th eo ries about h u ma n persons:  (a ) A human pe rso n is n ot  id e ntica l t o her  bodya t anytime. (b)  A humanp erson c a n  s urvi ve a complete cha n ge of body. (c) N ot all  t r ut h s  ab out  persons a re  trut h s about bo d i e s.( d) The proper ty of being a p ersonen tai l s theinsta nt i ati on of menta l pr operties– at l e ast a r u dimenta ry fir st- per sonp er sp ect iv e . ( e )The per sistence  o fperso ns i s p r imit ive  (as  theSimple Theory  of  Per s ona l Ide ntity  ove rtimeimplie s). V .CONCLUSION Mind , Br ain and F ree  W ill  i s a c l oselyarg ued  compre hensive wor ko n ma jor themes of Swin bu r n e' s. I hav e disc u ss ed only a f ew  as pect s of Sw inbu r ne 's views  beari n gon  substa nc e dual is m.Inthe b e lief  thatwe can ( and s h ould) reject t h e dichotomy t h at S wi n burn e b egan his bo ok w i th –  tha t  h uma n  bein gs ar ee it h er'merely complicat ed  machi nes o r souls inter acting wit h b odies' –  I o f fe r ed an alternat ive t hat I beli e ve achie ves m uch of w hat subst a n ce duali sts  wa nt.  15 S W IN BURNE ON SUBS T A NCEDU ALISM R EFE RENCESBak er,  Ly nne  R udder. 19 95. Expl ai ni ng  A tti tudes :  A Pract ic alAp pro ach t o  the M ind ( Camb ri dg e : C ambridg e  U n i vers it yPres s)–2000.  Per s ons  and Bo dies: A C ons t itut io nView (C ambridge: Cam br idge Unive rs ity  Press ) – 2007a.  'Naturalism and the Fi r st-Pers onPersp ecti ve', in H owSucces sfu l  Is Na turali sm?,ed . G e o rg Ga s s er , ( Fr ankfurt: O n t os- Verla g)  pp.  203–22 7 – 2007b. 'Person s  an d the Metaphy sic s of R es urr e ct i on' ,R eli g i ous Studies, 43  (3): 333– 34 8  –  2009. 'No n red uc tive Ma teriali sm',i n The O xford Han dbook ofPh ilos o p hyof Mind, e d. Brian  P. McLau g hlin, An sgarBec kerman n,  an d Sve n Walt e r ( Oxfor d: Cla re ndon P ress) ,pp. 109- 127 – 2012. 'Personal I dentit y: ANot -So-Simpl e S i mpl e View',in P ersonal Id ent ity : Com ple x  or S impl e ?,  ed .  Matt hias Stephan a n dGeo r g  G asser (Camb r i d ge:  Camb rid g e Univ ersi ty Press), pp. 17 9 -191 – 2013. N atur a l ism  an d  the  F irst-Person Pe rsp ec t i ve (NewYo rk: OxfordUniversi ty Press ) Merr icks,Trenton . 19 9 8. 'Th ereAre  No Crite ria  o f  Identi ty  o v er Tim e',No us, 32  (1):1 06–1 2 4  Perry, John
 focus_on parts_and their arrangement, what_is essential_becomes_invisible. Despite_my_differences with Swinburne,_I believe that_he and I share_certain desiderata in_our_theories about human persons: (a) A human person is not identical to her body_at_any time._(b)_A_human person can survive a_complete change of body. (c)_Not all_truths about persons are truths about bodies. (d)_The_property of being_a person entails the instantiation of mental properties –_at least a rudimentary first-person perspective._(e) The persistence_of_persons_is primitive (as the_Simple Theory of Personal Identity over_time implies). V. CONCLUSION Mind, Brain_and Free Will is a closely argued_comprehensive work on major themes of_Swinburne's. I have discussed only_a few_aspects of Swinburne's views bearing_on substance dualism._In the_belief that we_can (and should) reject the dichotomy_that Swinburne began_his book with – that human_beings_are either'merely complicated_machines_or_souls interacting_with bodies' –_I_offered an_alternative_that I believe achieves much of_what_substance dualists want. 15SWINBURNE ON SUBSTANCE DUALISM_REFERENCES Baker, Lynne Rudder._1995._Explaining Attitudes: A Practical_Approach to the Mind (Cambridge:_Cambridge University Press) – 2000. Persons_and Bodies:_A Constitution_View (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) – 2007a. 'Naturalism and the First-Person_Perspective', in How Successful Is Naturalism?,_ed. Georg Gasser, (Frankfurt:_Ontos-Verlag) pp._203–227_– 2007b. 'Persons_and_the Metaphysics_of Resurrection', Religious Studies, 43 (3): 333–348_– 2009._'Nonreductive Materialism', in The Oxford Handbook_of Philosophy of Mind,_ed._Brian P. McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann, and_Sven Walter (Oxford: Clarendon Press), pp._109-127 – 2012. 'Personal Identity:_A_Not-So-Simple_Simple View', in Personal Identity:_Complex or Simple?, ed. Matthias Stephan_and Georg Gasser_(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 179-191 –_2013._Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective (New_York:_Oxford University Press) Merricks, Trenton. 1998._'There_Are_No Criteria of Identity over_Time', Nous, 32 (1): 106–124 Perry,_John