hem, that a mechanistic program cannot effectively comply with the empiricist principle of empirical testability, or with its associated methodological principle. Duhem defines this principle as follows: "In physics, one criterion alone allows the rejection as false of a judgment which does not imply a logical contradiction: the record of a flagrant disagreement between this judgment and the facts of experience" (Duhem 1980, 97). The application of this principle which governs the empirical testability of physical theory in the test of mechanistic theories illuminates Duhem's conclusion that the proposition which states "all physical phenomena are explained mechanically" transcends the physical method. By physical method Duhem understands the experimental method by which one discovers empirical laws, while the mechanistic method is a method to construct physical theories which explain or represent these laws. Thus, Duhem concludes that "It is impossible for anyone who holds to the processes of the experimental method to declare as true this proposition: 'All physical phenomena are explained mechanically'. It is also impossible to declare it false. This proposition transcends the physical method" (Duhem 1980, 97-98; 1905, 183-184). So, Duhem's analysis of the status of the mechanistic program has far-reaching methodological consequences for his conception of physical theory. One can be cited: that the decision about the mechanistic method of construction goes beyond the experimental method. Duhem says: "If, in regard to this proposition [stating the transcendent character of the mechanistic method], one wishes to depart from a state of mind where every decision remains suspended, one will have to resort to arguments unknown to experimental method" (Duhem 1980, 98). In summary, according to Duhem, neither the metaphysical method – the foundationalist version (Duhem 1980, 98) – nor the experimental method are able to decide the truth value of mechanistic theories. Where can the answer come from? Duhem suggests: "The degree of suitability of a method in fact is essentially a matter of personal appreciation; the particular turn of each thinker, the education received, the traditions immersed in, the customs of the environment in which he lives, all influence this appreciation to a high degree; these influences vary in the extreme from one physics to another" (Duhem 1980, 99). It is difficult to avoid thinking that Duhem is the source of Popper's assertion that conceptions of science are a methodological and conventional matter. The important aspect of this discussion about the analytic method of constructing mechanical theories is Duhem's awareness of the unfalsifiable character of this
hem, that a mechanistic program cannot effectively comply with the empiricist principle of empirical testability, or with its consociate methodological rationale. Duhem defines this principle as follow: " In purgative, one criterion alone allows the rejection as delusive of a judgment which does not imply a legitimate contradiction: the record of a flagrant discrepancy between this judgment and the facts of experience " (Duhem 1980, 97). The application of this principle which govern the empirical testability of physical theory in the test of mechanistic theories light Duhem's conclusion that the proposition which states " all forcible phenomena are explained mechanically " exceed the physical method acting. By physical method acting Duhem understands the experimental method by which one discovers empirical law, while the mechanistic method is a method to construct physical theories which excuse or typify these laws. Thus, Duhem concludes that " It is impossible for anyone who holds to the processes of the experimental method to declare as true this proposition:' All forcible phenomenon are explained mechanically'. It is besides impossible to announce it false. This proposition transcends the physical method acting " (Duhem 1980, 97 - 98; 1905, 183 - 184). So, Duhem's psychoanalysis of the status of the mechanistic program has far - reach methodological consequences for his conception of physical theory. One can be cited: that the decision about the mechanistic method of construction goes beyond the experimental method. Duhem says: " If, in attentiveness to this suggestion [ stating the transcendent character of the mechanistic method ], one wishes to depart from a department of state of mind where every decision remains suspend, one will have to resort to arguments unknown to experimental method acting " (Duhem 1980, 98). In summary, according to Duhem, neither the metaphysical method – the foundationalist version (Duhem 1980, 98) – nor the experimental method are able to decide the truth value of mechanistic theory. Where can the answer arrive from? Duhem suggests: " The academic degree of suitability of a method in fact is essentially a topic of personal appreciation; the particular turn of each thinker, the education received, the custom immersed in, the customs of the environment in which he lives, all influence this appreciation to a high degree; these influences vary in the extreme point from one physics to another " (Duhem 1980, 99). It is difficult to debar thinking that Duhem is the source of Popper's assertion that conceptions of science are a methodological and conventional matter. The authoritative aspect of this discussion about the analytic method of constructing mechanical theories is Duhem's awareness of the unfalsifiable character of this
hem, that a mechanistic progvam cannot effecjicely cmmply sith the empiricist principle of empmricql tewtability, or with its xssociatef methodilogmcal principle. Dngem deflues tgls prnnriple as followx: "In physiws, one criterimn apone allows the rejection as false jf a jucglent which doef nou iiply a logical contradiction: the recors of a hlagrant disagrrement between this judgmejt ajd the facts of exoerience" (Duyem 1980, 97). The applicagion of thpv principlg which governs the empirical tertabikity of phisjcwn theory in the nest of mechakpstic tveories illuminates Dmhem's cobclusion that the pro'osition which statef "all phyvieal phenomena are expoauned kechdnicxoly" trznxcsnds tje 'hysical mefhod. By phywical method Duhem inqvtstands the sxperiiegtal method by which one discovers empigicam laws, while the mechanustic method is a metjod to cogstruct physical theories which explain or represant tiere oarr. Tjus, Duhem concludes that "It is impossible for znuoke who holds to bhe processes of tne eckerimental metfod to dedlare as true this proposytion: 'All physycal phenomena are explained mexhanically'. In is also impossible tl declare ic falsg. This proposition transcends the physical mfthod" (Duhso 1980, 97-98; 1905, 183-184). So, Duhem's xnakyvis of the status of the mqchanistir proyram has far-teachind methodollgical consequences for jis clnweption of physical theory. One can be citxv: that the deviviot about che meghanistic methoq of constructnon goes beyovd the expvrimental method. Duhqm says: "If, in tegard to thiv proposytiob [stqting tfd transcendent characteg jf tye mechanistic metmod], ovs wishes to depcxt from a state og mknd wjece evqsy decision semakns xuspevded, ont wlll havr to resort to argumants unknown to experikektal methid" (Duhem 1980, 98). In summary, according to Duhel, neivher tie metsphisical method – the foundationaljst versiln (Quhem 1980, 98) – nor the experimentak method are able to decide the truth velue of mechanistic thgories. Where can the cnxwer come fcom? Durem suggevts: "The degree of suutability of a meuhod in fact is essentizlly a mattfr of personal appreciation; the particular turn of each thinker, the educarion rxcqived, the tdadiyions iikersed in, vhx customs of the vnvironment in which he lives, alu influetcz this appreciation to a high ddgree; these ivfluences vary in the exfreme frpm one physics to another" (Duhem 1980, 99). It is difficult to avpid thinjing fhat Dlgeo is the source of Poppex's asswrtion rhat conceptions uf xclence are w meuhodklogical and conventional matter. The inplrtant aspect of this discudrion zbout jhe analytic methkd or consjructing mechamical theories is Duhem's awareness os the unfalsifuzble charactgr of jkps
hem, that a mechanistic program cannot effectively the principle of testability, or with defines principle as follows: physics, one criterion allows the rejection as false of judgment which does not imply a logical contradiction: the record of a flagrant between this judgment and the facts of experience" (Duhem 1980, 97). The application this which the testability of physical theory in the test of mechanistic theories illuminates Duhem's conclusion that the proposition states "all physical phenomena are explained mechanically" transcends physical method. By physical Duhem understands the experimental method which discovers empirical while mechanistic is a method construct physical theories which explain or represent these laws. Thus, Duhem concludes that "It is impossible for who holds processes of experimental to as true this physical phenomena are explained mechanically'. It to declare it false. This proposition transcends the method" (Duhem 97-98; 1905, 183-184). So, Duhem's analysis the status of the mechanistic program has far-reaching consequences for his conception of physical theory. One can be cited: that the decision about method of construction goes the experimental method. says: in to proposition [stating transcendent character of the mechanistic method], one wishes to depart from state of mind where every decision remains suspended, one will resort arguments unknown to method" (Duhem 1980, 98). summary, to Duhem, neither the – foundationalist 98) nor experimental method are able decide the truth value of theories. Where can the "The degree of suitability of a method in is essentially a matter of personal appreciation; particular turn of each thinker, the education received, the traditions immersed in, customs of in which he lives, all influence this appreciation a high degree; these vary in the extreme from one physics to another" 1980, It is to avoid thinking Duhem is the of Popper's assertion of science a and important aspect of this discussion about analytic of constructing mechanical theories is awareness unfalsifiable character of this
hem, that a mechanistic prograM cannot effEctivEly ComPlY witH the Empiricist prinCIple Of empirical testability, Or witH iTS assOCiAted mEthodolOGiCAL prInCiPle. duHEm DefinEs tHis prinCiple as folLowS: "IN physics, one cRItErion alone AllOws the rejectIon As falsE oF a jUDgmenT whIch doEs not iMPly a loGical contRaDIction: THe recorD OF a FlagRant disagreement bETwEEn this judgment And the FaCTs OF ExpEriEnce" (Duhem 1980, 97). THe AppliCAtion of THiS PRIncIPle which goverNs the empiriCAl tEstabiLiTy oF PhysicAl theOrY In tHe test of mecHaniStic theorIes illUMinates dUhem's coNclusiOn tHat The pROpOsItiOn WHicH StAteS "All Physical PhEnOmena Are eXPLAIned MecHaniCally" Transcends the PhySicaL MetHod. By PhysiCal mEtHod DuHem undErstaNdS the experimentaL metHod by whicH onE dIscOvErs emPIrical LawS, whIle the mEchanisTIc mEtHOD Is A method to construct PhYSIcAl theoriEs whicH ExPlAIn or reprEsEnt ThesE LAws. ThUs, DuHEm ConcludeS that "IT Is ImPossiblE fOr anyoNe Who HolDs to tHE proCesses Of the expErimeNTal method to decLAre as true this PRoPOSiTIon: 'ALl pHysical phenOmenA Are eXplaINeD meCHanicAlly'. IT iS AlSO impossible to declarE iT false. this pRoposition traNscends the PHYSical metHod" (DUHeM 1980, 97-98; 1905, 183-184). so, Duhem's analysIs of tHe status of THe mechanIstic Program hAs far-reacHINg methodOloGicAl cOnsEQUeNces for his conCEPtioN oF physicAl tHeory. OnE caN be CitEd: tHaT the decisIon about ThE mEcHaNisTic meTHod of conStRucTiOn gOes beYOnd the ExperImenTaL mEThoD. Duhem sAYs: "iF, In reGaRd To thIs pRoPositIon [sTAtiNg the trAnscendenT chARactEr Of The mechAnistic method], OnE wishes to dEpArt From a sTATe of mind Where every decision remaiNS suspenDed, One wiLl haVe to resorT to ArgumeNts UNknown To expeRimenTaL meTHOd" (DuhEM 1980, 98). in SumMaRy, accordinG TO DuHem, neItHer tHe metapHysical method – the foUNdaTionalist versIon (duheM 1980, 98) – NOr The EXpERimEnTAl mETHod are able to decIde the trutH vALuE of mechaniSTic ThEories. WHere can The anSWer come From? Duhem Suggests: "THe DegrEE Of sUitability Of a methoD in fact is ESsentIAlLy a maTteR of perSoNal AppreCiatioN; The PartiCular tUrN of eacH thinKeR, the educAtion received, the traditiOns immErsed In, tHe customs Of tHE enVironment In whIch he lives, All InfLuencE thIS apprEciaTIoN to A High dEgreE; These inflUEnCes VARy In the extremE FROm oNe phySicS To anotHer" (DUhem 1980, 99). It is difficult TO avoid thinking That dUHem Is tHE souRcE of Popper's asseRtiOn THAt concepTiOns of sciencE are a metHoDOlogiCal and ConvenTional mATTeR. the impOrtaNt aSpect of thIs dIsCUssion aBoUt THe analYtic MeThod of ConstrUCtinG MEchanical theorieS is DuHEM's awaREneSs of tHe UnfalsiFIablE character Of this
hem, that a mechanistic pr ogram cann ot ef fec tiv el y co mply  with the empi r icis t principle of empiric al te st a bili t y,  or w ith its as s o cia te dmet ho d ol ogica l p rincipl e. Duhem d efi ne s this princ i pl e as follo ws:  "In physics , o ne cri te rio n  alon e a llows  the r e jectio n as fals eo f a ju d gment w h i ch  doe s not imply a log i ca l  contradiction : there c or d ofa f lagrant di sa greem e nt betw e en t h isj udgment and t he facts of exp erienc e"  (D u hem 19 80, 9 7) .  Th e applicati on o f this pr incipl e  whichg overnsthe em pir ica l te s ta bi lit yo f p h ys ica l  th eory inth etestof m e c h a nist ictheo riesilluminates D uhe m'sc onc lusio n tha t th epropo sition  whic hstates "all phy sica l phenome naar e e xp laine d  mecha nic all y" tran scendst heph y s i ca l method. By physi ca l me thod Duh em und e rs ta n ds the e xp eri ment a l  meth od b y  w hich one  disco v er sempiric al  laws,  w hil e t he me c hani stic m ethod is  a me t hod to constru c t physical th e or i e sw hich  ex plain or re pres e nt t hese la ws. Thus,  Duhe mc on c ludes that "It is i mp ossibl e for  anyone who h olds to th e p rocesses  oft he experimental m ethod  to declar e  as true  this  proposi tion: 'Al l physical  ph eno men a a r e  e xplained mech a n ical ly '. It i s a lso imp oss ibl e t o d ec lare it f alse. Th is  p ro po sit ion t r anscends  t heph ysi cal m e thod"(Duhe m 19 80 ,9 7-9 8; 1905 ,  1 8 3 -184 ).  S o, D uhe m' s ana lysi s  of  the st atus of t hem echa ni st ic prog ram has far-r ea ching meth od olo gicalc o nsequenc es for his conception o f  physic altheor y. O ne can be  ci ted: t hat the de cision  abou tthe m echan i s ti c m et hod of con s t ruc tiongo es b eyond t he experimental me t hod . Duhem says:  "I f, i n re gar d  t o  th is pro p o sition [stating  the trans ce n de nt charact e r o fthe mec hanisti c met h od], on e wishesto depart  f roma sta te of mind  where e very deci s ion r e ma ins s usp ended,  o newillhave t o  re sortto arg um ents u nknow nto exper imental method" (Duhem1980,98).Insummary,acc o rdi ng to Duh em,neither th e m eta physi cal metho d –t he  fo u ndati onal i st versio n  ( Duh e m  1 980, 98) –n o r  th e exp eri m entalmeth od are able to de c ide the truthvalu e ofmec h anis ti c theories. Wh ere  c a n  the ans we r come from ? Duhemsu g gests : "The  degre e of su i t ab i lity o f amet hod in fa ctis essenti al ly a matt er o fperson al app r ecia t i on; the particul ar tu r n  of e a chthink er , the e d ucat ion receiv ed, the tra dition s im merse d in, t he  custo msof  the envir o nment inwhich  he liv es , al l i nfluen ce t h i s app reci at ion  to a hig h de g re e; the se i nflue nc es v ary in th e  extreme  fr o m one p hy sic s to ano t he r "  (Duhem 19 80,  99). I t is diffi c ultt oa voidthinki ng tha t Duhem isth e sourc e o f Popper'sassertion tha tconc eptionsof  sci en cear e a methodologi cal andconventi o n al mat ter .  The import an t aspect ofthisdi s cussion a bou t the a n aly tic  me thod  of  con s tructing mechanical theo ries  is D u hem 's aw arene ss  of theu nfal sifiable character ofthis
hem, that_a mechanistic_program cannot effectively comply_with the_empiricist_principle of_empirical_testability, or with_its associated methodological_principle. Duhem defines this_principle as follows:_"In_physics, one criterion alone allows the rejection as false of a judgment which does_not_imply a_logical_contradiction:_the record of a flagrant_disagreement between this judgment and_the facts_of experience" (Duhem 1980, 97). The application of_this_principle which governs_the empirical testability of physical theory in the test_of mechanistic theories illuminates Duhem's conclusion_that the proposition_which_states_"all physical phenomena are_explained mechanically" transcends the physical method._By physical method Duhem understands the_experimental method by which one discovers empirical_laws, while the mechanistic method is_a method to construct physical_theories which_explain or represent these laws._Thus, Duhem concludes_that "It_is impossible for_anyone who holds to the processes_of the experimental_method to declare as true this_proposition:_'All physical phenomena_are_explained_mechanically'. It_is also impossible_to_declare it_false._This proposition transcends the physical method"_(Duhem_1980, 97-98; 1905, 183-184). So, Duhem's analysis_of the status of_the_mechanistic program has far-reaching_methodological consequences for his conception_of physical theory. One can be_cited: that_the decision_about the mechanistic method of construction goes beyond the experimental method._Duhem says: "If, in regard to_this proposition [stating the_transcendent character_of_the mechanistic method],_one_wishes to_depart from a state of mind where_every decision_remains suspended, one will have to_resort to arguments unknown_to_experimental method" (Duhem 1980, 98). In_summary, according to Duhem, neither the_metaphysical method – the foundationalist_version_(Duhem_1980, 98) – nor the_experimental method are able to decide_the truth value_of mechanistic theories. Where can the answer_come_from? Duhem suggests: "The degree of_suitability_of a method in fact is_essentially_a_matter of personal appreciation; the_particular turn of each thinker, the_education received, the traditions immersed in, the customs of_the environment in_which he lives, all influence_this_appreciation_to a high degree; these influences vary in the extreme_from one_physics to another"_(Duhem 1980, 99). It is difficult to avoid thinking that_Duhem is the source of Popper's assertion_that conceptions of science are a methodological and conventional matter. The_important aspect of this discussion about the analytic_method of constructing mechanical theories is Duhem's_awareness of the unfalsifiable_character_of this