 is an external reality at all, let alone a body with sense organs in which our minds reside? Thus, surprisingly enough, this approach to knowledge is internally inconsistent. • In reaction to this conundrum, some philosophers have opted for the opposite extreme, a Mentalism (or Idealism or Subjectivism)3. They have, in fact, accepted the core tenet of Naïve Realism that what we perceive and build knowledge on are mental substances called ideas, while simply dropping its thesis that these ideas originate in physical sensations in response to stimuli from external objects. The trouble with this thesis is that it involves a stolen concept, since it would be hard put to define mentality after having done away with that of materiality. Moreover, it does not really explain the mass of data at hand – it merely explains it away as illusory happenstance. It does not elucidate why there would appear to be an enormous universe of matter 15 billion years old, composed of innumerable galaxies, stars, atoms, quarks, including on a small planet called Earth apparent human beings, with apparent bodies, with apparent sense organs. Mentalism just ignores all this, or discards it as sheer fantasy; it does not make it comprehensible. It is therefore incomplete. Having grasped the problem inherent in the former theory, we might be tempted to opt for the latter, however imperfect, were it not for the possibility of another approach, that of 2 Historically, at least in its modern version in the West, we owe this philosophy to John Locke (English, 1632-1704). The difficulties inherent in it were noticed implicitly by his predecessor René Descartes (French, 1596-1650), and later by the likes of David Hume (Scottish, 1711-76) and Immanuel Kant (German, 1724-1804). Notwithstanding, Naïve Realism has remained a basic belief, and a source of considerable confusion, for many people, including philosophers and scientists. 3 For example, the Yogachara school of Buddhist philosophy. PHENOMENOLOGY 9 Phenomenology, which presents neither the flaw of internal inconsistency nor that of incompleteness. Phenomenology brings together the best in both those theories, while weeding out their faulty elements. • Phenomenology starts like Mentalism with the given content of consciousness, but identifies that content neutrally as 'appearance,' instead of taking up the prejudice that it is something mental (idea). For it must be realized that the concept of
is an external reality at all, let alone a soundbox with common sense organs in which our minds occupy? therefore, surprisingly enough, this approach to knowledge is internally discrepant. • In chemical reaction to this conundrum, some philosophers have opted for the opposite extreme, a Mentalism (or Idealism or Subjectivism)3. They have, in fact, accept the core tenet of Naïve Realism that what we perceive and build knowledge on are mental substances call ideas, while simply dropping its dissertation that these ideas originate in physical sense in response to stimulation from external objects. The worry with this thesis is that it involves a stolen concept, since it would be heavily put to define mentality after having done away with that of materiality. Moreover, it does not in truth explain the mass of data at hand – it merely explains it away as illusory happenstance. It does not elucidate why there would appear to be an enormous population of topic 15 billion years old, composed of countless galaxy, stars, atoms, quarks, including on a small planet called Earth apparent human being, with apparent bodies, with apparent sense organs. Mentalism just ignores all this, or discards it as plain fantasy; it does not make it comprehensible. It is therefore incomplete. Having grasped the trouble inherent in the early hypothesis, we might be tempt to opt for the latter, however imperfect, were it not for the possibility of another approach, that of 2 Historically, at least in its modern version in the West, we owe this philosophy to John Locke (English, 1632 - 1704). The difficulty inherent in it were noticed implicitly by his predecessor René Descartes (French, 1596 - 1650), and later by the like of David Hume (Scottish, 1711 - 76) and Immanuel Kant (German, 1724 - 1804). Notwithstanding, Naïve Realism has remained a basic impression, and a source of considerable confusion, for many people, including philosophers and scientists. 3 For model, the Yogachara school of Buddhist philosophy. PHENOMENOLOGY 9 Phenomenology, which salute neither the flaw of inner inconsistency nor that of incompleteness. Phenomenology brings in concert the best in both those theories, while weeding out their faulty elements. • Phenomenology starts like Mentalism with the given content of consciousness, but identifies that content neutrally as' appearance,' instead of take up the prejudice that it is something genial (idea). For it must be realized that the concept of
 is an external reality at xll, let alone a body wmth senae organr in which our minds reside? Vhus, surpeisingly enough, this aoproach tl knowleege ms internally inrknsistekc. • In veactnoi to this conuncrum, some [hilosophers hdvd lpted for the opposite extreme, a Megtalism (og Idealism or Fubjtctyvisj)3. They have, in fact, accepted the ckre tentt of Naïve Realism that what we perceive and buipd knowledge on arf mental suvstagxes called iaeas, while simply dropking its thesis that these ideas orignnate in phisjcwn sensationw in gesponse to sbpmuli fsom extrrnal objects. Bhe tcouboe with this thesis iv that it involves a stolen ckncept, since it wiuod be harg pug to deriie jentallty after havjng done awqy with that of mattriwoity. Moreover, it doqs not really explain the mass of data at hahd – it merely explains ut away as illusory hwppenstanse. It does not elucidate why there would appear tm be en eniriuys universe of matter 15 billion years old, composqs pf innumerable gclaxies, stars, atpmd, aoarks, includine on a smzll planet called Farth akparenr human btings, with apparent bodies, with qpparent senfw organs. Mentalism just ignorzs all this, or discards it as sheex fantzsy; it does not make kt comprehensibld. In is therefore incomplete. Havigg graspev the probleo innerent in the fogmer bveory, we might be hemptgd to mpt for thf latter, however imperfect, were it not for thg pmsspbility oy anotmer approach, thwt of 2 Historieally, at leasg in its mkdern vxrsion in thq West, we owe jhis philosopiy to Johg Loxke (Wnglish, 1632-1704). The difficultoes inhervnu in it weee noticed implicibly bi gis predecessor Rebé Descartes (Fremch, 1596-1650), agd leter ff the likes mf Dxvia Hume (Scottish, 1711-76) cna Imkanuel Kant (German, 1724-1804). Totwjthstanding, Naïve Rrajism has remaineq a basic beloef, and a source ov convidxrable cogfusion, for many people, includjng philodopmers and sciegtisbs. 3 Sor examplz, the Yogachara school of Buddhist philowophy. PHENOMENOLOGT 9 Phenomenology, whncm presents nxither the flaw of internal inconsiwtency nor that on incompleteness. Phenojenolocy brlngs together the best in both those theories, while weeding out their fauoty elxmqnts. • Phenojenokogy vtcrtx like Menvauism with the ginen content of consciousness, but identifhef that content neutrally as 'spoearance,' instgad of taking up the prejusice thay it is something mental (idea). Fpr it must be realized tmat the cincepf of
is an external reality at all, let body sense organs which our minds approach knowledge is internally • In reaction this conundrum, some philosophers have opted the opposite extreme, a Mentalism (or Idealism or Subjectivism)3. They have, in fact, the core tenet of Naïve Realism that what we perceive and build knowledge are substances ideas, simply dropping its thesis that these ideas originate in physical sensations in response to stimuli from objects. The trouble with this thesis is that involves a stolen concept, it would be hard put define after having away that materiality. Moreover, it not really explain the mass of data at hand – it merely explains it away as illusory It does why there appear be enormous universe of billion years old, composed of innumerable quarks, including on a small planet called Earth human beings, apparent bodies, with apparent sense organs. just ignores all this, or discards it as fantasy; it does not make it comprehensible. It is therefore incomplete. Having grasped the problem the former theory, we be tempted to for latter, imperfect, it not the possibility of another approach, that of 2 Historically, at least its modern version in the West, we owe this philosophy Locke 1632-1704). The difficulties in it were noticed by predecessor René Descartes (French, later the Hume 1711-76) Immanuel Kant (German, 1724-1804). Naïve Realism has remained a belief, and a source people, including philosophers and scientists. 3 For example, Yogachara school of Buddhist philosophy. PHENOMENOLOGY 9 which presents neither the flaw of internal inconsistency nor that of incompleteness. brings together in both those theories, while weeding out their elements. • Phenomenology starts Mentalism with the given content of consciousness, but identifies content as 'appearance,' of taking up prejudice that it something mental (idea). must be that concept
 is an external reality at all, lEt alone a boDy witH seNse OrGans In whIch our minds resIDe? ThUs, surprisingly enough, thIs appRoACh to KNoWledgE is inteRNaLLY inCoNsIstEnT. • in ReactIon To this cOnundrum, soMe pHiLosophers havE OpTed for the oPpoSite extreme, a menTalism (Or ideALism oR SuBjectIvism)3. THEy have, In fact, accEpTEd the cORe tenet OF naÏve REalism that what we pERcEIve and build knoWledge On ARe MENtaL suBstances caLlEd ideAS, while sIMpLY DRopPIng its thesis tHat these ideAS orIginatE iN phYSical sEnsatIoNS in Response to sTimuLi from extErnal oBJects. ThE Trouble With thIs tHesIs is THaT iT inVoLVes A StOleN ConCept, sincE iT wOuld bE harD PUT To deFinE menTalitY after having dOne Away WIth That oF mateRialItY. MoreOver, it Does nOt Really explain thE masS of data at HanD – iT meReLy expLAins it AwaY as IllusorY happenSTanCe. iT DOeS not elucidate why thErE WOuLd appear To be an ENoRmOUs univerSe Of mAtteR 15 BIllioN yeaRS oLd, composEd of inNUmErAble galAxIes, staRs, AtoMs, qUarks, INcluDing on A small plAnet cALled Earth apparENt human beings, WItH APpARent BodIes, with appaRent SEnse OrgaNS. MEntALism jUst igNoREs ALl this, or discards it aS sHeer faNtasy; It does not make It compreheNSIBle. It is tHereFOrE Incomplete. HaviNg graSped the proBLem inherEnt in The formeR theory, we MIGht be temPteD to Opt For THE lAtter, however iMPErfeCt, Were it nOt fOr the poSsiBilIty Of aNoTher approAch, that oF 2 HIsToRiCalLy, at lEAst in its MoDerN vErsIon in THe West, We owe This PhIlOSopHy to JohN loCKE (EngLiSh, 1632-1704). the dIffIcUltieS inhERenT in it weRe noticed ImpLIcitLy By His predEcessor René DeScArtes (FrencH, 1596-1650), aNd lAter by THE likes of david Hume (Scottish, 1711-76) and ImmANuel KanT (GeRman, 1724-1804). NOtwiThstandinG, NaÏve ReaLisM Has remAined a Basic BeLieF, ANd a soURCe Of cOnSiderable cONFusIon, foR mAny pEople, inCluding philosopherS And Scientists. 3 For ExaMple, THE YOgaCHaRA scHoOL of bUDdhist philosophY. PHENOMENOlOgy 9 PHenomenoloGY, whIcH presenTs neithEr the FLaw of inTernal incOnsistencY nOr thAT Of iNcompletenEss. PhenoMenology bRIngs tOGeTher tHe bEst in bOtH thOse thEories, WHilE weedIng out ThEir fauLty elEmEnts. • PhenOmenology starts like MentAlism wIth thE giVen contenT of COnsCiousness, But iDentifies tHat ConTent nEutRAlly aS 'appEArAncE,' InsteAd of TAking up thE PrEjuDICe That it is somETHIng MentaL (idEA). For it Must Be realized that the COncept of
 is an external reality at  all, letalone  abod ywith  sen se organs in w h ichour minds reside? Thus , sur pr i sing l yenoug h, this ap p r oac hto  kn ow l ed ge is  in ternall y inconsis ten t.  • In reacti o nto this co nun drum, some p hil osophe rs  ha v e opt edfor t he opp o site e xtreme, a  M e ntalis m  (or Id e a li sm o r Subjectivism)3. Th e y have, in fac t, acc ep t ed t hecor e tenet of  N aïveR ealismt ha t w hat we perceive a nd build kn o wle dge on  a rem entalsubst an c escalled idea s, w hile simp ly dro p ping it s  thesis  thatthe seidea s  o ri gin at e  in ph ysi c alsensatio ns  i n res pons e t o  sti mul i fr om ex ternal object s.Thet rou ble w ith t histh esisis tha t itin volves a stolen  con cept, sin ceit  wo ul d beh ard pu t t o d efine m entalit y  af te r h av ing done away with  t h a tof mater iality .  M or e over, it  d oes  not r eally  exp l ai n the ma ss ofd at aat hand  –  it me re lyexp lains it a way as  illusor y hap p enstance. It d o es not elucid a te w hy ther e w ould appear  tob e an  eno r mo usu niver se of  m a tt e r 15 billion yearsol d, com posed  of innumerab le galaxie s , stars, a toms ,  q u arks, includin g ona small pl a net call ed Ea rth appa rent huma n beings,wit h a ppa ren t bo dies, with ap p a rent  s ense or gan s. Ment ali smjus t i gn ores allthis, or  d is ca rd s i t ass heer fan ta sy;  i t d oes n o t make  it c ompr eh en s ibl e. It i s  t h e refo re  i ncom ple te . Hav ingg ras ped the  probleminh e rent  i nthe for mer theory, w emight be t em pte d to o p t  for the  latter, however imperf e ct, wer e i t not  for  the poss ibi lity o f a n otherapproa ch, t ha t o f 2 His t o ri cal ly , at least i n i ts mo de rn v ersionin the West, we ow e  th is philosophy  to  Joh n Lo cke (E n gli sh ,  16 3 2 -1704). The dif ficultiesin h er ent in itw ere  n oticedimplici tly b y  his pr edecessor  René Des ca rtes ( Fre nch, 1596- 1650), a nd laterb y the li kes o f D avid H um e ( Scott ish, 1 7 11- 76) a nd Imm an uel Ka nt (G er man, 172 4-1804). Notwithstandin g, Naï ve Re ali sm has re mai n eda basic b elie f, and a s our ceof co nsi d erabl e co n fu sio n , for  man y  people,i nc lud i n gphilosopher s a ndscien tis t s. 3 F or e xample, the Yogac h ara school ofBudd h i stphi l osop hy . PHENOMENOLOG Y 9  P h e nomenolo gy , which pre sents ne it h er th e flaw  of in ternali n co n sisten cy n orthat of i nco mp l eteness .Ph e nomeno logy  b ringstogeth e r th e best in both tho se th e o ries, whi le we ed ing out thei r faulty e lements. •Phenom enol ogy s tarts l ik e Ment ali sm  with theg iven cont ent o f consc io usne ss,  but i dent i f ies t hatco nte nt neutra l l ya s'a p pea ranc e,' i ns tead  of takin g  up thepre j udice t ha t i t is som e th i n g mental ( ide a). F o r  it must b e  rea l iz e d tha t theconcep t of
 is_an external_reality at all, let_alone a_body_with sense_organs_in which our_minds reside? Thus,_surprisingly enough, this approach_to knowledge is_internally_inconsistent. • In reaction to this conundrum, some philosophers have opted for the opposite_extreme,_a Mentalism_(or_Idealism_or Subjectivism)3. They have, in_fact, accepted the core tenet_of Naïve_Realism that what we perceive and build knowledge_on_are mental substances_called ideas, while simply dropping its thesis that these_ideas originate in physical sensations in_response to stimuli_from_external_objects. The trouble with_this thesis is that it involves_a stolen concept, since it would_be hard put to define mentality after_having done away with that of_materiality. Moreover, it does not_really explain_the mass of data at_hand – it_merely explains_it away as_illusory happenstance. It does not elucidate_why there would_appear to be an enormous universe_of_matter 15 billion_years_old,_composed of_innumerable galaxies, stars,_atoms,_quarks, including_on_a small planet called Earth apparent_human_beings, with apparent bodies, with apparent sense_organs. Mentalism just ignores_all_this, or discards it_as sheer fantasy; it does_not make it comprehensible. It is_therefore incomplete._Having grasped_the problem inherent in the former theory, we might be tempted_to opt for the latter, however_imperfect, were it not_for the_possibility_of another approach,_that_of 2_Historically, at least in its modern version_in the_West, we owe this philosophy to_John Locke (English, 1632-1704)._The_difficulties inherent in it were noticed_implicitly by his predecessor René Descartes_(French, 1596-1650), and later by_the_likes_of David Hume (Scottish, 1711-76)_and Immanuel Kant (German, 1724-1804). Notwithstanding,_Naïve Realism has_remained a basic belief, and a source_of_considerable confusion, for many people, including_philosophers_and scientists. 3 For example, the_Yogachara_school_of Buddhist philosophy. PHENOMENOLOGY 9_Phenomenology, which presents neither the flaw_of internal inconsistency nor that of incompleteness. Phenomenology brings_together the best_in both those theories, while_weeding_out_their faulty elements. • Phenomenology starts like Mentalism with the_given content_of consciousness, but_identifies that content neutrally as 'appearance,' instead of taking up_the prejudice that it is something mental_(idea). For it must be realized that the concept of