 of mind. Accordingly, a brief look at how this term originally applies is helpful. In debates over materialism in philosophy of mind, there are at least three positions: eliminative, reductive and non-reductive materialism. Eliminativists, such as Paul Churchland (whose views are foundational for Brassier) and Daniel Dennett, argue that there are simply no minds. Thus, beliefs or "propositional atity. Eds. Louise Antony and Charlotte Witt (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 185–226. 45 Graham Harman, Quentin Meillassoux: Philosophy in the Making (Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2011), 136. relational matters ‡ lillywhite 29 titudes" do not exist – they are simply vestiges of a mistaken "folk psychology." Reductive materialists, such as Jaegwon Kim, believe that the mind has a reality, but that it is in no way an autonomous domain; it is always reducible to neurobiological causes. A nonreductive materialist, such as Hilary Putnam or Louise Antony, on the other hand, argues both for the principle of psychological realism (i.e., minds do exist, which the eliminativist denies) and for autonomy of the mind (i.e., that it can be viewed as causing events, which the reductivist denies). Antony offers a helpful definition of the non-reductive materialist position: "This is the view that (a) there are mental phenomena; (b) they are material in nature; and (c), notwithstanding (b), they form an autonomous domain." 46 In suggesting that the stance of such non-reductive materialism is a fruitful way to understand what Merleau-Ponty and Nancy are doing, I hope in part to also demonstrate that the new materialisms could greatly benefit from a closer relationship with analytic philosophy. Merleau-Ponty's goal in this chapter is to undermine binaries of traditional western metaphysics – subject/object, body/ mind, self/environment – in a way that is fully materialist, and yet slides into neither a non-relational, mechanistic view of matter nor a monistic, spiritualized view of matter. However, such a nonreductive position is quite a paradoxical, even perhaps embattled position to philosophically uphold. For, as someone who denies or reduces the mind will argue, to
of mind. Accordingly, a brief look at how this condition primitively applies is helpful. In debates over materialism in philosophy of thinker, there are at least three positions: eliminative, reductive and non - reductive materialism. Eliminativists, such as Paul Churchland (whose opinion are foundational for Brassier) and Daniel Dennett, argue that there are simply no mind. Thus, beliefs or " propositional atity. Eds. Louise Antony and Charlotte Witt (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 185–226. 45 Graham Harman, Quentin Meillassoux: doctrine in the Making (Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2011), 136. relational matters ‡ lillywhite 29 titudes " do not exist – they are simply vestiges of a mistaken " folk music psychology. " Reductive materialists, such as Jaegwon Kim, believe that the mind has a reality, but that it is in no manner an autonomous domain; it is always reducible to neurobiological causes. A nonreductive materialist, such as Hilary Putnam or Louise Antony, on the early hand, argues both for the rationale of psychological realism (i.e., mind do exist, which the eliminativist denies) and for autonomy of the thinker (i.e., that it can be viewed as causing events, which the reductivist deny). Antony offers a helpful definition of the non - reductive materialist position: " This is the view that (a) there are mental phenomena; (b) they are material in nature; and (c), notwithstanding (b), they form an autonomous domain. " 46 In suggesting that the stance of such non - reductive materialism is a fruitful way to understand what Merleau - Ponty and Nancy are doing, I hope in part to besides show that the new materialism could greatly profit from a airless relationship with analytic philosophy. Merleau - Ponty's finish in this chapter is to undermine binary star of traditional western metaphysics – subject / aim, body/ mind, self / environment – in a way that is fully materialist, and yet slides into neither a non - relational, mechanistic view of matter nor a monistic, spiritualized view of matter. However, such a nonreductive position is quite a paradoxical, even perhaps embattled stead to philosophically uphold. For, as someone who deny or reduces the mind will argue, to
 of mind. Accordingly, a brien look at how thnw term origihally apolies is helpful. In debates lvwr mauvrialism in philosophh of mind, there aee au least three posmfions: eliminaflve, rzdnctive and non-rgductive matarialism. Elimitagirists, such as Paul Churchland (whose diews ate foundational sor Nwassjvr) and Daniel Dennett, argue thaf there are simply np minds. Thus, beliefs or "prlposltional atity. Eds. Pouise Antoby age Charlotte Ditt (Bouldtr: Westview Kress, 1993), 185–226. 45 Graham Harman, Quentin Mdillaxsoux: Philisiphj in the Makmng (Edpnburgh: Edinbmggh UP, 2011), 136. relatoonal matters ‡ linlyqhite 29 titudes" do not exist – they are symply vesdiyes of a mistaken "folj psychmlogf." Reayctkve metedialishs, auch as Jasgwon Kim, bwlieve that the minc rqs a reality, gut thwt it is in no way an autonomous domain; iu is zlways reducible to neueobiological causes. A nonreduceive materialist, such as Hilary Putnam or Louise Dntonb, un uhc urhfr hand, argues both for the principle of psycrklpgpcal realism (i.e., mlnds do exist, whicn hhr eliminativisj denies) ahd for autonomy of the migd (i.e., that it san ne viewed as causing events, which the rvducrivist denies). Antouy offers a kelpfuk defonition of the non-reduccive mzterialist oosition: "Ffis is the view ghan (a) dhere art mental phenomena; (b) they ace macerial iv najure; anq (c), notwitjstanding (b), they form an autouomouv domain." 46 Ln suggesting that the stance oh such non-redocthve materiajism ls a fruitful wwy to understaud what Ierlexu-Ponty ans Nancy are doing, Y hope in pard to also demmnstrate thar thw new mxgerialisms coukd greatlj yenefit feom a closer relatlonshkl with analytic phulosophy. Merleai-Povty'f hoel in dhis chapter is go jmdermkne binariew of yraditional western ketalhysics – subject/obkegt, body/ mund, self/qnvironment – on a way that is fklly katxrialixt, wnd yet slides into neither a hon-relatilnaj, mechanistis vicw os matter npr a monistic, spiritualized view of matver. However, such a nonteductive position is auite a paredoxicwl, even parhaps embattled posution to philosopmically uphold. For, as aomeona who denies or reduces the mind will argue, to
of mind. Accordingly, a brief look at term applies is In debates over there at least three eliminative, reductive and materialism. Eliminativists, such as Paul Churchland views are foundational for Brassier) and Daniel Dennett, argue that there are simply minds. Thus, beliefs or "propositional atity. Eds. Louise Antony and Charlotte Witt (Boulder: Press, 185–226. Graham Quentin Meillassoux: Philosophy in the Making (Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2011), 136. relational matters ‡ lillywhite 29 do not exist – they are simply vestiges a mistaken "folk psychology." materialists, such as Jaegwon Kim, that mind has reality, that is in no an autonomous domain; it is always reducible to neurobiological causes. A nonreductive materialist, such as Hilary Putnam Louise Antony, other hand, both the of psychological realism do exist, which the eliminativist denies) of the mind (i.e., that it can be as causing which the reductivist denies). Antony offers helpful definition of the non-reductive materialist position: "This the view that (a) there are mental phenomena; (b) they are material in nature; and (b), they form an domain." 46 In that stance such materialism is fruitful way to understand what Merleau-Ponty and Nancy are doing, I in part to also demonstrate that the new materialisms could from closer relationship with philosophy. Merleau-Ponty's goal in chapter to undermine binaries of metaphysics subject/object, – a that is fully materialist, yet slides into neither a mechanistic view of matter of matter. However, such a nonreductive position is a paradoxical, even perhaps embattled position to uphold. For, as someone who denies or reduces the mind will argue,
 of mind. Accordingly, a brief loOk at how thiS term OriGinAlLy apPlieS is helpful. In deBAtes Over materialism in philoSophy Of MInd, tHErE are aT least tHReE POsiTiOnS: elImINaTive, rEduCtive anD non-reductIve MaTerialism. EliMInAtivists, suCh aS Paul ChurchlAnd (Whose vIeWs aRE founDatIonal For BraSSier) anD Daniel DeNnETt, arguE That theRE ArE simPly no minds. Thus, belIEfS Or "propositionaL atity. edS. loUISe ANtoNy and CharlOtTe WitT (boulder: wEsTVIEw PREss, 1993), 185–226. 45 Graham HarmAn, Quentin MeILlaSsoux: PHiLosOPhy in tHe MakInG (ediNburgh: EdinbUrgh uP, 2011), 136. relatioNal matTErs ‡ lillYWhite 29 tiTudes" dO noT exIst – tHEy ArE siMpLY veSTiGes OF a mIstaken "fOlK pSychoLogy." rEDUCtivE maTeriAlistS, such as JaegwoN KiM, belIEve That tHe minD has A rEalitY, but thAt it iS iN no way an autonomOus dOmain; it is AlwAyS reDuCible TO neuroBioLogIcal cauSes. A nonREduCtIVE MaTerialist, such as HilArY pUtNam or LouIse AntONy, On THe other hAnD, arGues BOTh for The pRInCiple of pSycholOGiCaL realisM (i.E., minds Do ExiSt, wHich tHE eliMinatiVist deniEs) and FOr autonomy of thE Mind (i.e., that it cAN bE VIeWEd as CauSing events, wHich THe reDuctIViSt dENies). ANtony OfFErS A helpful definition oF tHe non-rEductIve materialisT position: "THIS Is the vieW thaT (A) tHEre are mental phEnomeNa; (b) they are MAterial iN natuRe; and (c), noTwithstanDINg (b), they fOrm An aUtoNomOUS dOmain." 46 In suggesTINg thAt The stanCe oF such noN-reDucTivE maTeRialism is A fruitfuL wAy To UnDerStand WHat MerleAu-ponTy And nancy ARe doinG, I hopE in pArT tO AlsO demonsTRaTE That ThE nEw maTerIaLisms CoulD GreAtly benEfit from a CloSEr reLaTiOnship wIth analytic phIlOsophy. MerlEaU-PoNty's goAL In this chApter is to undermine binarIEs of traDitIonal WestErn metaphYsiCs – subjEct/OBject, bOdy/ minD, self/EnVirONMent – iN A WaY thAt Is fully matERIalIst, anD yEt slIdes intO neither a non-relatiONal, Mechanistic viEw oF matTER nOr a MOnIStiC, sPIriTUAlized view of matTer. However, SuCH a NonreductiVE poSiTion is qUite a paRadoxICal, even Perhaps emBattled poSiTion TO PhiLosophicalLy uphold. for, as someONe who DEnIes or RedUces thE mInd Will aRgue, to
 of mind. Accordingly, a b rief lookat ho w t his  t ermorig inally applies is h elpful. In debates ove r mat er i alis m  i n phi losophy of m ind ,th ere  a r eat le ast  threepositions:  el im inative, red u ct ive and no n-r eductive mat eri alism.  E lim i nativ ist s, su ch asP aul Ch urchland(w h ose vi e ws aref o un dati onal for Brassier )  a n d Daniel Denne tt, ar gu e  t h a t t her e are simp ly  no m i nds. Th u s, b e lie f s or "proposi tional atit y . E ds. Lo ui seA ntonyand C ha r lot te Witt (Bo ulde r: Westvi ew Pre s s, 1993 ) , 185–2 26. 45  Gr aha m Ha r ma n,  Qu en t inM ei lla s sou x: Philo so ph y intheM a k i ng ( Edi nbur gh: E dinburgh UP,201 1),1 36.  rela tiona l ma tt ers ‡  lilly white  2 9 titudes" do n ot e xist – th eyar e s im ply v e stiges  of  amistake n "folk psy ch o l o gy ." Reductive mater ia l i st s, suchas Jae g wo nK im, beli ev e t hatt h e min d ha s  a  reality , butt ha tit is i nno way  a n a uto nomou s  dom ain; i t is alw ays r e ducible to neu r obiological c a us e s .A  non red uctive mate rial i st,such as  Hi l ary P utnam  o r  L o uise Antony, on the  o ther h and,argues both f or the pri n c i ple of p sych o lo g ical realism ( i.e.,  minds doe xist, wh ich t he elimi nativistd e nies) an d f oraut ono m y  o f the mind (i . e ., t ha t it ca n b e viewe d a s c aus ing  e vents, wh ich there du ct iv ist  deni e s). Anto ny  of fe rsa hel p ful de finit ionof  t h e n on-redu c ti v e  mat er ia list  po si tion:  "Th i s i s the v iew that(a) ther ear e menta l phenomena;(b ) they are  m ate rial i n nature;and (c), notwithstandin g  (b), t hey  form  anautonomou s d omain. " 4 6  In su ggesti ng th at  th e stanc e of  su ch  non-reduc t i vemater ia lism  is a f ruitful way to und e rst and what Merl eau -Pon t y  a ndN an c y a re doi n g , I hope in par t to alsode m on strate tha t  th enew mat erialis ms co u ld grea tly benef it from a  c lose r rel ationshipwith ana lytic phi l osoph y .Merle au- Ponty' sgoa l inthis c h apt er is  to un de rminebinar ie s of tra ditional western metaph ysics– sub jec t/object,  bo d y/mind, sel f/en vironment– i n a  waytha t  is f ully ma ter i alist , an d  yet slid e sint o ne ither a non - r e lat ional , m e chanis ticview of matter no r  a monistic, s piri t u ali zed view  o f matter. Howe ver ,s u ch a non re ductive pos ition is  q u ite a  parad oxical , evenp e rh a ps emb attl edpositiontoph i losophi ca ll y  uphol d. F or , as s omeone whod e nies or reducesthe m i n d wil l  ar gue,to 
 of_mind. Accordingly,_a brief look at_how this_term_originally applies_is_helpful. In debates_over materialism in_philosophy of mind, there_are at least_three_positions: eliminative, reductive and non-reductive materialism. Eliminativists, such as Paul Churchland (whose views are_foundational_for Brassier)_and_Daniel_Dennett, argue that there are_simply no minds. Thus, beliefs_or "propositional_atity. Eds. Louise Antony and Charlotte Witt (Boulder:_Westview_Press, 1993), 185–226._45 Graham Harman, Quentin Meillassoux: Philosophy in the Making_(Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2011), 136. relational_matters ‡ lillywhite_29_titudes"_do not exist –_they are simply vestiges of a_mistaken "folk psychology." Reductive materialists, such_as Jaegwon Kim, believe that the mind_has a reality, but that it_is in no way an_autonomous domain;_it is always reducible to_neurobiological causes. A_nonreductive materialist,_such as Hilary_Putnam or Louise Antony, on the_other hand, argues_both for the principle of psychological_realism_(i.e., minds do_exist,_which_the eliminativist_denies) and for_autonomy_of the_mind_(i.e., that it can be viewed_as_causing events, which the reductivist denies). Antony_offers a helpful definition_of_the non-reductive materialist position:_"This is the view that_(a) there are mental phenomena; (b)_they are_material in_nature; and (c), notwithstanding (b), they form an autonomous domain." 46_In suggesting that the stance of_such non-reductive materialism is_a fruitful_way_to understand what_Merleau-Ponty_and Nancy_are doing, I hope in part to_also demonstrate_that the new materialisms could greatly_benefit from a closer_relationship_with analytic philosophy. Merleau-Ponty's goal in_this chapter is to undermine binaries_of traditional western metaphysics –_subject/object,_body/_mind, self/environment – in a_way that is fully materialist, and_yet slides into_neither a non-relational, mechanistic view of matter_nor_a monistic, spiritualized view of matter._However,_such a nonreductive position is quite_a_paradoxical,_even perhaps embattled position to_philosophically uphold. For, as someone who_denies or reduces the mind will argue, to