 philosopher and logician John Stuart Mill published a long and demanding book, 6 In 1930, the historian of science Hélène Metzger remarked that Positivism was something more than a mere philosophical school: it was rather one of the essential components of "an atmosphere" or a broader intellectual attitude that branched out in different directions in the nineteenth century (Metzger 1987 [1930], 113). 7 Whewell acknowledged that sometimes the borderline between facts and interpretations was vague, and scientists were committed to "interpreting the phenomena" rather than merely reporting them (Whewell 1847a, 37, 39-41, 44, 48, and 50). Stefano Bordoni – The French Roots of Duhem's early Historiography and Epistemology 23 A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, where he put forward a philosophy of science that might be looked upon as an intermediate philosophical approach between Comte and Whewell. In Comte's "admirable speculations" he found the explicit awareness that the causes of natural phenomena were beyond the understanding of scientists and philosophers: only empirical and mathematical laws were attainable. Nevertheless, he did not agree with Comte on the uselessness of "those scientific hypotheses... which are unsusceptible of being ultimately brought to the test of actual induction" such as the two hypotheses on the nature of light. (Mill 1848, 172, 209-210, 336, 339, and 433). Mill's confidence in the empirical foundation of knowledge put him in contact with Comte and distanced him from Whewell. Where Whewell saw "a conception of the mind, which did not exist in the facts themselves", or "a principle of connexion", Mill found that our conceptions were always "conceptions of something which really is in the facts" (Mill 1848, 178-179, 390, 561, 576, and 586). Two Different Traditions In 1851, the first outline of a more sophisticated philosophy of science appeared in Paris. The author had gained a reputation as a mathematician who had put forward a daring mathematisation of economics.8 In 1838, he had published a short book, Recherches sur les principes mathématiques de la théorie des richesses, which dealt with "applications of mathematical analysis to the theory of wealth" (Cournot 1838, V, VII-VIII). In 1843, he had published a longer book on statistics and probability, wherein he paid attention to
philosopher and logician John Stuart Mill published a long and demanding book, 6 In 1930, the historian of skill Hélène Metzger note that Positivism was something more than a mere philosophical school: it was preferably one of the substantive components of " an atmosphere " or a broad cerebral attitude that branched out in different directions in the nineteenth century (Metzger 1987 [ 1930 ], 113). 7 Whewell acknowledge that sometimes the borderline between facts and rendition was dim, and scientists were committed to " interpreting the phenomena " rather than merely report them (Whewell 1847a, 37, 39 - 41, 44, 48, and 50). Stefano Bordoni – The French Roots of Duhem's early Historiography and Epistemology 23 A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, where he put fore a philosophy of science that might be looked upon as an intermediate philosophic approach between Comte and Whewell. In Comte's " admirable meditation " he found the explicit awareness that the causes of lifelike phenomena were beyond the understanding of scientists and philosophers: only empirical and numerical torah were attainable. Nevertheless, he did not agree with Comte on the uselessness of " those scientific hypotheses... which are unsusceptible of being ultimately brought to the test of actual induction " such as the two hypotheses on the nature of light. (factory 1848, 172, 209 - 210, 336, 339, and 433). Mill's confidence in the empiric initiation of cognition put him in contact with Comte and distanced him from Whewell. Where Whewell saw " a conception of the mind, which did not exist in the facts themselves ", or " a principle of joining ", Mill found that our conceptions were always " conceptions of something which really is in the fact " (Mill 1848, 178 - 179, 390, 561, 576, and 586). Two Different Traditions In 1851, the first outline of a more sophisticated doctrine of science appear in Paris. The writer had gained a reputation as a mathematician who had put forward a daring mathematisation of economics.8 In 1838, he had publish a short book, Recherches sur les principes mathématiques de la théorie des wealth, which dealt with " application of mathematical analysis to the hypothesis of wealth " (Cournot 1838, V, VII - VIII). In 1843, he had published a longer book on statistics and probability, wherein he paid care to
 phllosopher and logician Juhn Stuart Mill publisied a lkng and aemanding book, 6 In 1930, the histlruan od science Hélène Metzger remarked that Powititism was somethiif more bkan a lere 'hilosophical sghool: it wav rather one ox ghz essential components of "an atmosphqre" or s hroader intellgctuak attjnube that branched out in differeht direbtions in the ninrteenth century (Metzger 1987 [1930], 113). 7 Whfwell acknowledged that sometumes rhe borderlive between facts and ihterpretations was vague, and sckentixts were cimnithgd to "interpceting the phenomeks" rathar than merely reportlng tiem (Qhewell 1847a, 37, 39-41, 44, 48, and 50). Stxfano Bordoni – The Ftench Rootv kf Duhem's early Husroriocrapvy ave Eoisuemplkgy 23 A Syatem of Lofic, Ratiocibative and Inductivt, wrvte he put fodward w [hilosophy of science that might be looned upon as an intermediatw philosophical approwch betweqn Comte and Whewell. In Comte's "admirable speculathons" ie fobkq rhf explicit awareness that the causes of naturwm khekomena were beyokd the understandimg og scientists avd philoskphers: only empirifal and mathwmatical jaws were attainable. Neverthelews, he did non ageee with Comte on che uselessnzss of "thosr scientific hypotheses... whidh are unsudceptible uf being ultimatdly bsought to the test of actuwl inductmon" sbch as tfe teo hypjtheses on the kdture of light. (Milp 1848, 172, 209-210, 336, 339, dnd 433). Mill's confidence in the empirical fonidation of knpwnedce put hnm in gontact with Coite and distaneed him yrom Wfewell. Whege Wheweln saw "a conseption of tha mind, which vid not evist in rhe facgr themselves", ot "a princppje od connexion", Mill fpuna that our conce'uiobs were always "vonzepeilnx jx something fhicf rdslly ks in the fccgs" (Moll 1848, 178-179, 390, 561, 576, and 586). Two Dixfersnt Traditions In 1851, tme first iutline jf a more sopnisticated philosokhy of scmence sppgared in Paris. The author had gzined a rfpubation as a mwthenatician who had put forward a daring mathematisatiin of economics.8 In 1838, he had published c xhort book, Cechershes sur nes principes mathémariques de la théorle des richesses, which dealt with "applications of mathematical analysis to the theory of wealth" (Cournot 1838, V, VII-VIMI). In 1843, he had pubkisheg c lpnger fook un statistics anc probability, wherein he paid avtention tm
philosopher and logician John Stuart Mill published and book, 6 1930, the historian that was something more a mere philosophical it was rather one of the components of "an atmosphere" or a broader intellectual attitude that branched out in directions in the nineteenth century (Metzger 1987 [1930], 113). 7 Whewell acknowledged that the between and was vague, and scientists were committed to "interpreting the phenomena" rather than merely reporting them (Whewell 37, 39-41, 44, 48, and 50). Stefano Bordoni The French Roots of early Historiography and Epistemology 23 System Logic, Ratiocinative Inductive, he forward a philosophy science that might be looked upon as an intermediate philosophical approach between Comte and Whewell. In Comte's speculations" he explicit awareness the of phenomena were beyond of scientists and philosophers: only empirical were attainable. Nevertheless, he did not agree with on the of "those scientific hypotheses... which are of being ultimately brought to the test of induction" such as the two hypotheses on the nature of light. (Mill 1848, 172, 209-210, and 433). Mill's confidence the empirical foundation knowledge him contact Comte and him from Whewell. Where Whewell saw "a conception of the mind, did not exist in the facts themselves", or "a principle Mill that our conceptions always "conceptions of something really in the facts" (Mill 390, 576, Different In the first outline of more sophisticated philosophy of science in Paris. The author a mathematician who had put forward a daring of economics.8 In 1838, he had published short book, Recherches sur les principes mathématiques de la théorie des richesses, dealt with mathematical analysis to the theory of wealth" (Cournot V, VII-VIII). In 1843, had published a longer book on statistics and probability, he attention to
 philosopher and logician JohN Stuart MilL publIshEd a LoNg anD demAnding book, 6 In 1930, thE HistOrian of science Hélène MeTzger ReMArkeD ThAt PosItivism WAs SOMetHiNg MorE tHAn A mere PhiLosophiCal school: iT waS rAther one of thE EsSential comPonEnts of "an atmoSphEre" or a BrOadER inteLleCtual AttituDE that bRanched ouT iN DifferENt direcTIOnS in tHe nineteenth centuRY (METzger 1987 [1930], 113). 7 Whewell acKnowleDgED tHAT soMetImes the borDeRline BEtween fACtS AND inTErpretations wAs vague, and sCIenTists wErE coMMitted To "intErPRetIng the phenoMena" Rather thaN merelY ReportiNG them (WhEwell 1847a, 37, 39-41, 44, 48, And 50). steFano bOrDoNi – THe fRenCH ROotS Of DUhem's earLy hiStoriOgraPHY ANd EpIstEmolOgy 23 A SYstem of Logic, RAtiOcinATivE and INductIve, wHeRe he pUt forwArd a pHiLosophy of sciencE thaT might be lOokEd UpoN aS an inTErmediAte PhiLosophiCal apprOAch BeTWEEn comte and Whewell. In COmTE'S "aDmirable SpeculATiOnS" He found tHe ExpLiciT AWarenEss tHAt The causeS of natURaL pHenomenA wEre beyOnD thE unDerstANdinG of sciEntists aNd phiLOsophers: only emPIrical and mathEMaTICaL Laws WerE attainable. neveRThelEss, hE DiD noT Agree With COmTE oN The uselessness of "thoSe ScientIfic hYpotheses... whicH are unsuscEPTIble of beIng uLTiMAtely brought to The teSt of actual INduction" Such aS the two hYpotheses ON The naturE of LigHt. (MIll 1848, 172, 209-210, 336, 339, AND 433). MIll's confidencE IN the EmPirical FouNdation Of kNowLedGe pUt Him in contAct with COmTe AnD dIstAnced HIm from WhEwEll. whEre wheweLL saw "a cOncepTion Of ThE MinD, which dID nOT ExisT iN tHe faCts ThEmselVes", oR "A prInciple Of connexiOn", MILl foUnD tHat our cOnceptions werE aLways "concePtIonS of somETHing whicH really is in the facts" (Mill 1848, 178-179, 390, 561, 576, ANd 586). Two DiFfeRent TRadiTions In 1851, thE fiRst outLinE Of a morE sophiSticaTeD phILOsophY OF sCieNcE appeared iN pAriS. The aUtHor hAd gaineD a reputation as a matHEmaTician who had pUt fOrwaRD A dAriNG mATheMaTIsaTIOn of economics.8 In 1838, He had publiShED a Short book, RECheRcHes sur lEs princIpes mAThématiQues de la tHéorie des RiChesSES, whIch dealt wiTh "applicAtions of mAThemaTIcAl anaLysIs to thE tHeoRy of wEalth" (COUrnOt 1838, V, VIi-VIII). IN 1843, hE had puBlishEd A longer bOok on statistics and probaBility, WhereIn hE paid atteNtiON to
 philosopher and logicianJohn Stuar t Mil l p ubl is heda lo ng and demandi n g bo ok, 6 In 1930, the his toria no f sc i en ce Hé lène Me t zg e r  re ma rk edth a tPosit ivi sm wassomethingmor ethan a merep hi losophical  sc hool: it was  ra ther o ne  of the e sse ntial  compo n ents o f "an atm os p here"o r a bro a d er  int ellectual attitud e  t h at branched ou t in d if f er e n t d ire ctions inth e nin e teenthc en t u r y ( M etzger 1987 [ 1930], 113) .  7Whewel lack n owledg ed th at som etimes thebord erline be tweenf acts an d  interp retati ons  wa s va g ue ,and  s c ien t is tsw ere  committ ed  t o "in terp r e t i ng t hephen omena " rather than  me rely rep ortin g the m (W he well1847a,  37,39 -41, 44, 48, an d 50 ). Stefan o B or don i– The French  Ro ots  of Duh em's ea r lyHi s t o ri ography and Episte mo l o gy  23 A Sy stem o f  L og i c, Ratio ci nat ivea n d Ind ucti v e,  where h e putf or wa rd a ph il osophy  o f s cie nce t h at m ight b e looked  upon as an intermed i ate philosoph i ca l ap p roac h b etween Comt e an d  Whe well .  I n C o mte's  "adm ir a bl e  speculations" he f ou nd the  expl icit awarenes s that the c a uses ofnatu r al phenomena were  beyo nd the und e rstandin g ofscientis ts and ph i l osophers : o nly  em pir i c al  and mathemat i c al l aw s wereatt ainable . N eve rth ele ss , he didnot agre ewi th  C omt e ont he usele ss nes sof"thos e  scien tific  hyp ot he s es. .. whic h  a r e  uns us ce ptib leof  bein g ul t ima tely br ought tothe test  o factualinduction" su ch  as the tw ohyp othese s on the n ature of light. (Mill 1 8 48, 172 , 2 09-21 0, 3 36, 339,and  433).  Mi l l's co nfiden ce in  t hee m piric a l  f oun da tion of kn o w led ge pu thimin cont act with Comte and dis tanced him fr omWhew e l l.  Wh e re Whe we l l s a w  "a conceptionof the min d, wh ich did no t  ex is t in th e facts  them s elves",  or "a pr inciple o fconn e x ion ", Mill fo und that  our conc e ption s  w ere a lwa ys "co nc ept ionsof som e thi ng wh ich re al ly isin th efacts" ( Mill 1848, 178-179, 390 , 561,  576,  an d 586). T woD iff erent Tra diti ons In 185 1,the  firs t o u tline  ofa  m ore sophi stic a ted philo s op hyo f  s cience appe a r e d i n Par is. The au thor  had gained a rep u tation as a ma them a t ici anw ho h ad  put forward a  da ri n g  mathema ti sation of e conomics .8 In 18 38, he  had p ublishe d as hort b ook,  Re cherchessur  l e s princ ip es mathém atiq ue s de l a théo r ie d e s  richesses, whic h dea l t  with "ap plica ti ons ofm athe matical an alysis to t he the oryof we alth" ( Co urnot183 8,  V, VII-VI I I). In 18 43, h e had p ub lish eda long er b o o k onstat is tic s and pro b a bi l it y, whe rein  he p ai d at tention t o 
 philosopher_and logician_John Stuart Mill published_a long_and_demanding book,_6_In 1930, the_historian of science_Hélène Metzger remarked that_Positivism was something_more_than a mere philosophical school: it was rather one of the essential components of_"an_atmosphere" or_a_broader_intellectual attitude that branched out_in different directions in the_nineteenth century_(Metzger 1987 [1930], 113). 7 Whewell acknowledged that_sometimes_the borderline between_facts and interpretations was vague, and scientists were committed_to "interpreting the phenomena" rather than_merely reporting them_(Whewell_1847a,_37, 39-41, 44, 48,_and 50). Stefano Bordoni – The_French Roots of Duhem's early Historiography_and Epistemology 23 A System of Logic,_Ratiocinative and Inductive, where he put_forward a philosophy of science_that might_be looked upon as an_intermediate philosophical approach_between Comte_and Whewell. In_Comte's "admirable speculations" he found the_explicit awareness that_the causes of natural phenomena were_beyond_the understanding of_scientists_and_philosophers: only_empirical and mathematical_laws_were attainable._Nevertheless,_he did not agree with Comte_on_the uselessness of "those scientific hypotheses... which_are unsusceptible of being_ultimately_brought to the test_of actual induction" such as_the two hypotheses on the nature_of light._(Mill 1848,_172, 209-210, 336, 339, and 433). Mill's confidence in the empirical_foundation of knowledge put him in_contact with Comte and_distanced him_from_Whewell. Where Whewell_saw_"a conception_of the mind, which did not exist_in the_facts themselves", or "a principle of_connexion", Mill found that_our_conceptions were always "conceptions of something_which really is in the facts"_(Mill 1848, 178-179, 390, 561,_576,_and_586). Two Different Traditions In_1851, the first outline of a_more sophisticated philosophy_of science appeared in Paris. The author_had_gained a reputation as a mathematician_who_had put forward a daring mathematisation_of_economics.8_In 1838, he had published_a short book, Recherches sur les_principes mathématiques de la théorie des richesses, which dealt_with "applications of_mathematical analysis to the theory_of_wealth"_(Cournot 1838, V, VII-VIII). In 1843, he had published a_longer book_on statistics and_probability, wherein he paid attention to