emic charge. The key premise of the Phenomenal Ground Argument, P2, raises several questions. In order to see what kind of impact phenomenal grounds for epistemic charge would have on the global structure of justification, I'll consider how these questions could most plausibly be answered. First, if experiences are epistemically charged just by having a presentational phenomenal character, then what valence (if any) does the charge have, and in what increment? As a starting observation, normally it is reasonable to believe one's eyes and other senses. If you want to know whether the sunset has started, you can find out by looking. Ordinary perceptual experiences like this one can provide a baseline amount justification for believing the contents of those experiences, or closely related contents. These observations suggest that in the normal, pervasive situations in which it is reasonable to believe your eyes, if perceptual experiences have any epistemic charge at all, they have a positive epistemic charge. But what exactly is the role of phenomenal character in giving experience positive charge? On a first interpretation of P2, the phenomenal character merely makes it the case that experience is epistemically charged, and other factors combines with the phenomenal character to determine which valence it has and in what increment. Since there is no such thing as having an epistemic charge, but lacking any determinate charge, for this option to develop the Phenomenal Ground Argument, the other factors would have to be present in all cases. In this respect, experiences would resemble beliefs as they are often construed. Beliefs are often thought to have an epistemic status no matter what, but which epistemic status they have depends on factors besides the mere fact that one has the belief, and whatever factors these are, there is no escaping them. A second interpretation of P2 makes experiences more closely analogous to beliefs as epistemological conservativism construes them. According to epistemological conservatism, merely having a belief gives it a positive epistemic status.23 Since presentational phenomenal character is a feature that experiences have, the Phenomenal Ground Argument on the second option says that merely having a perceptual experience (due to its phenomenal character) gives it a pro 23 Quine (1951), Sklar (1975), Harman (1986). For overview and critical discussion, see Christensen 1994). "Conservatism in Epistemology" Nous 28:1, 69--‐89. Siegel/Epistemic Charge 18 tanto positive epistemic charge. If an experience retains its power to provide justification to subsequent beliefs
emic charge. The key premise of the Phenomenal Ground Argument, P2, raises several question. In decree to see what kind of impact phenomenal grounds for epistemic mission would have on the global social organization of justification, I'll consider how these questions could most credibly be answer. foremost, if experiences are epistemically charged precisely by experience a presentational phenomenal character, then what valence (if any) does the charge have, and in what increase? As a starting observation, normally it is reasonable to believe one's center and other senses. If you want to know whether the sunset has get down, you can find out by looking. Ordinary perceptual experiences like this one can provide a service line amount justification for believing the contents of those experiences, or closely related contents. These observation propose that in the normal, pervasive situations in which it is reasonable to believe your eyes, if perceptual experiences experience any epistemic care at all, they receive a incontrovertible epistemic charge. But what exactly is the role of phenomenal fictional character in giving experience positive charge? On a first rendition of P2, the phenomenal character merely makes it the case that experience is epistemically charged, and other factors combines with the phenomenal character to determine which valence it has and in what increment. Since there is no such matter as having an epistemic bang, but miss any determinate care, for this option to develop the Phenomenal Ground Argument, the other factors would have to be present in all cases. In this respect, experience would resemble beliefs as they are often construed. Beliefs are much thought to take an epistemic status no matter what, but which epistemic condition they have depends on factors besides the mere fact that one has the impression, and whatever factors these are, there is no get off them. A second interpretation of P2 makes experience more close analogous to beliefs as epistemological conservativism interpret them. According to epistemological conservatism, merely having a belief pass it a positive epistemic status.23 Since presentational phenomenal character is a feature that experience have, the Phenomenal Ground Argument on the second option says that merely having a perceptual experience (due to its phenomenal character) gives it a pro 23 Quine (1951), Sklar (1975), Harman (1986). For overview and critical discussion, visit Christensen 1994). " Conservatism in Epistemology " Nous 28:1, 69 - -‐89. Siegel / Epistemic Charge 18 tanto positive epistemic charge. If an experience retains its power to provide justification to subsequent beliefs
emif charge. The key premise of the Phenomeuql Gronnd Arghment, P2, faises several questions. In lreer ti see what kind of impxct phenolenal griundw for epistxjic chavye wohpd hcvx on the global structure of justificathov, N'll consider how these questions coujd most ppausibly be anfwertd. Sirsf, if experiences are epistemically chargev just by havinb a presentational phenomejal fharacter, then whah valence (id anr) does the chxrge have, and in what jncrement? As a starting observagion, uormally it iw rfdsonable to belivve one's eyes and othar sensrs. If you want to kniw whether the sunset has started, you cwn find ogt by looking. Ordinqrt perweptgal dzpefiehcxs mike tjis one can pdovide a baweline amount justigisqtion for beljeving tre contents of those experiences, or clovelg related contents. Thesw observations suggesj that in ehe normal, pervasive situations in which it is redsonauld ti nelidce your eyes, if perceptual experiences have any sposnemic charge at ajl, they havr w ljsitive epistgmic chcdgs. But what exactly is the role of phenoienak character in giving experuence positine cyarge? On a first iuterpretatiou of P2, the lhenomenal character mexely mzkes it the case thaf experience is eoisnemiwally charged, and other fastors comuines with tfe pnenomegal characher to determine which vwlencg it hds and in ahat increment. Since there is no such thing ax vavpng an epnstemig charge, but lasking any detetminate ckarge, wor this oition to vevelop the [henomenal Grmond Argument, vhe other facrors would fxve to be presrnt in all cases. In this respect, expeviencgs would resemble beoiefs as they ate uftqn cpnfdrued. Beliefv ard owyen tfought uj mavd an epistemic status no matfer what, but which eiistemic wtatus trey have depemds on factors besldes vhe mece facy trat one has the belief, and whafever fachorf these are, eherc is no escapiug them. A second interpretation of P2 makxs experiences more clowely analogous to bglitfs as epistekologycal consarvativism construes them. According tp epistemological conaervathsm, mfrely having a belief gives it a positive epistemic status.23 Since presentarional phenomenal dharscter if a feaeure vhat experiences nave, the Phenomenal Ground Arguoent on dhz second option says that merrlh having a petceptual experience (due to its phemomenal character) gives it a prp 23 Quine (1951), Sklar (1975), Harman (1986). For oveeview and cgjtmcal discussion, see Vhristznsen 1994). "Consercatidm in Epistemuloby" Nous 28:1, 69--‐89. Slegek/E'istemic Charge 18 tanto positive epistemuc charge. If an ex'erience retwlns ita powet to provide justjficzhion jo subsequent neliefs
emic charge. The key premise of the Argument, raises several In order to phenomenal for epistemic charge have on the structure of justification, I'll consider how questions could most plausibly be answered. First, if experiences are epistemically charged just having a presentational phenomenal character, then what valence (if any) does the charge and what As starting observation, normally it is reasonable to believe one's eyes and other senses. If you want know whether the sunset has started, you can out by looking. Ordinary experiences like this one can a amount justification believing contents those experiences, or related contents. These observations suggest that in the normal, pervasive situations in which it is reasonable to your eyes, experiences have epistemic at they have a charge. But what exactly is the character in giving experience positive charge? On a interpretation of the phenomenal character merely makes it case that experience is epistemically charged, and other combines with the phenomenal character to determine which valence it has and in what increment. is no such thing having an epistemic but any charge, this option develop the Phenomenal Ground Argument, the other factors would have to present in all cases. In this respect, experiences would resemble they often construed. Beliefs often thought to have epistemic no matter what, but status have besides mere that one has the and whatever factors these are, is no escaping them. makes experiences more closely analogous to beliefs as conservativism construes them. According to epistemological conservatism, having a belief gives it a positive epistemic status.23 Since presentational phenomenal is a experiences have, the Phenomenal Ground Argument on the option says that merely a perceptual experience (due to its phenomenal character) gives a 23 Quine Sklar (1975), Harman For overview and discussion, see Christensen in Epistemology" 28:1, Siegel/Epistemic positive epistemic charge. If an experience its to provide justification to subsequent
emic charge. The key premise of The PhenomeNal GrOunD ArGuMent, p2, raiSes several quesTIons. in order to see what kind of ImpacT pHEnomENaL grouNds for ePIsTEMic ChArGe wOuLD hAve on The Global sTructure of JusTiFication, I'll cONsIder how theSe qUestions coulD moSt plauSiBly BE answEreD. FirsT, if expERienceS are epistEmICally cHArged juST By HaviNg a presentational PHeNOmenal characteR, then wHaT VaLENce (If aNy) does the cHaRge haVE, and in wHAt INCRemENt? As a starting Observation, NOrmAlly it Is ReaSOnable To belIeVE onE's eyes and otHer sEnses. If yoU want tO Know wheTHer the sUnset hAs sTarTed, yOU cAn FinD oUT by LOoKinG. ordInary perCePtUal exPeriENCES likE thIs onE can pRovide a baseliNe aMounT JusTificAtion For bElIevinG the coNtentS oF those experiencEs, or Closely reLatEd ConTeNts. ThESe obseRvaTioNs suggeSt that iN The NoRMAL, pErvasive situations In WHIcH it is reaSonablE To BeLIeve your EyEs, iF perCEPtual ExpeRIeNces have Any epiSTeMiC charge At All, theY hAve A poSitivE EpisTemic cHarge. But What eXActly is the role OF phenomenal chARaCTEr IN givIng Experience pOsitIVe chArge? oN a FirST inteRpretAtIOn OF P2, the phenomenal charAcTer merEly maKes it the case tHat experieNCE Is episteMicaLLy CHarged, and other FactoRs combines WIth the phEnomeNal charaCter to detERMine whicH vaLenCe iT haS ANd In what incremeNT. sincE tHere is nO suCh thing As hAviNg aN epIsTemic charGe, but lacKiNg AnY dEteRminaTE charge, fOr ThiS oPtiOn to dEVelop tHe PheNomeNaL GROunD ArgumeNT, tHE OtheR fAcTors WouLd Have tO be pREseNt in all Cases. In thIs rESpecT, eXpErienceS would resemblE bEliefs as thEy Are Often cONStrued. BeLiefs are often thought to hAVe an epiSteMic stAtus No matter wHat, But whiCh ePIstemiC statuS they HaVe dEPEnds oN FAcTorS bEsides the mERE faCt thaT oNe haS the belIef, and whatever factORs tHese are, there iS no EscaPINg TheM. a sEConD iNTerPREtation of P2 makes ExperienceS mORe Closely anaLOgoUs To belieFs as epiStemoLOgical cOnservatiVism constRuEs thEM. accOrding to epIstemoloGical consERvatiSM, mErely HavIng a beLiEf gIves iT a posiTIve EpistEmic stAtUs.23 SincE presEnTational Phenomenal character is a fEature That eXpeRiences haVe, tHE PhEnomenal GRounD Argument oN thE seCond oPtiON says That MErEly HAving A perCEptual expERiEncE (DUe To its phenomENAL chAractEr) gIVes it a Pro 23 QUine (1951), Sklar (1975), Harman (1986). FoR Overview and criTicaL DIscUssIOn, seE CHristensen 1994). "ConsErvAtISM in EpistEmOlogy" Nous 28:1, 69--‐89. SiEgel/EpisTeMIc ChaRge 18 tanTo posiTive epiSTEmIC chargE. If aN exPerience rEtaInS Its poweR tO pROvide jUstiFiCation To subsEQuenT BEliefs
emic charge. The key premi se of thePheno men alGr ound  Arg ument, P2, rai s es s everal questions. In o rderto seew ha t kin d of im p ac t phe no me nal  g r ou nds f orepistem ic chargewou ld  have on the gl obal struc tur e of justifi cat ion, I 'l l c o nside r h ow th ese qu e stions  could mo st plausi b ly be a n s we red.  First, if experi e nc e s are epistemi callych a rg e d  ju stby havingaprese n tationa l  p h e n ome n al character,  then whatv ale nce (i fany )  doesthe c ha r gehave, and i n wh at increm ent? A s  a star t ing obs ervati on,  no rmal l yit  is  r e aso n ab let o b elieve o ne 's  eyes  and o t h er s ens es.If yo u want to kno w w heth e r t he su nsethasst arted , youcan f in d out by lookin g. O rdinary p erc ep tua lexper i enceslik e t his one  can pr o vid ea b as eline amount justi fi c a ti on for b elievi n gth e  content softhos e exper ienc e s,  or clos ely re l at ed  conten ts . Thes eobs erv ation s  sug gest t hat in t he no r mal, pervasive situations in wh i c hi t is  re asonable to  bel i eveyour ey es, if pe rcept ua l  e x periences have anyep istemi c cha rge at all, t hey have a p o sitive e pist e mi c  charge. But w hat e xactly ist he roleof ph enomenal  characte r in givin g e xpe rie nce p os itive charge? O n afi rst int erp retatio n o f P 2,the  p henomenal  charact er  m er el y m akesi t the ca se  th at  ex perie n ce isepist emic al ly cha rged, a n do t herfa ct orscom bi nes w itht hephenome nal chara cte r  tode te rmine w hich valenceit  has and i nwha t incr e m ent. Sin ce there is no such thi n g as ha vin g anepis temic cha rge , butlac k ing an y dete rmina te  ch a r ge, f o r  t his  o ption to d e v elo p the  P heno menal G round Argument, th e  ot her factors w oul d ha v e  t o b e  p r ese nt ina l l cases. In thi s respect,  e x pe riences wo u ldre semblebeliefs  as t h ey areoften con strued. B el iefs a reoften thou ght to h ave an ep i stemi c  s tatus  no  matte rwha t, bu t whic h  ep istem ic sta tu s they  have  d epends o n factors besides the m ere fa ct th atone has t heb eli ef, and w hate ver factor s t hes e are , t h ere i s no es cap i ng th em.A  second i n te rpr e t at ion of P2 m a k e s e xperi enc e s more  clo sely analogous to beliefs as epi stem o l ogi cal cons er vativism const rue st h em. Acco rd ing to epis temologi ca l  cons ervati sm, me rely ha v i ng a beli ef g ive s it a po sit iv e  episte mi cs tatus. 23 S in ce pre sentat i onal p henomenal charac ter i s a fea t ure  that  e xperien c es h ave, the P henomenal G roundArgu menton these cond o pti on  says that merely ha vinga perce pt ualexp erienc e (d u e  to i ts p he nom enal char a c te r )gi v esit a  pro23  Qui ne (1951) ,  Sklar ( 197 5 ), Harm an  (1 9 8 6). Fo r  o v e rview andcri tical d iscussion, seeC hr i stens en 199 4). "C onserva t ism  i n Epist emo l o gy" Nous28:1, 69- - ‐89 .Sieg el/Epist em ic C ha rge  1 8 tanto positiv e episte mic char g e . If a n e x peri e nce re ta ins its powe r topr o vide ju s t ifi cationt o s ubs equ entbel iefs 
emic charge._The key_premise of the Phenomenal_Ground Argument,_P2,_raises several_questions._In order to_see what kind_of impact phenomenal grounds_for epistemic charge_would_have on the global structure of justification, I'll consider how these questions could most_plausibly_be answered._First,_if_experiences are epistemically charged just_by having a presentational phenomenal_character, then_what valence (if any) does the charge have,_and_in what increment?_As a starting observation, normally it is reasonable to_believe one's eyes and other senses._If you want_to_know_whether the sunset has_started, you can find out by_looking. Ordinary perceptual experiences like this_one can provide a baseline amount justification_for believing the contents of those_experiences, or closely related contents._These observations_suggest that in the normal,_pervasive situations in_which it_is reasonable to_believe your eyes, if perceptual experiences_have any epistemic_charge at all, they have a_positive_epistemic charge. But_what_exactly_is the_role of phenomenal_character_in giving_experience_positive charge? On a first interpretation_of_P2, the phenomenal character merely makes it_the case that experience_is_epistemically charged, and other_factors combines with the phenomenal_character to determine which valence it_has and_in what_increment. Since there is no such thing as having an epistemic_charge, but lacking any determinate charge,_for this option to_develop the_Phenomenal_Ground Argument, the_other_factors would_have to be present in all cases._In this_respect, experiences would resemble beliefs as_they are often construed._Beliefs_are often thought to have an_epistemic status no matter what, but_which epistemic status they have_depends_on_factors besides the mere fact_that one has the belief, and_whatever factors these_are, there is no escaping them. A_second_interpretation of P2 makes experiences more_closely_analogous to beliefs as epistemological conservativism_construes_them._According to epistemological conservatism, merely_having a belief gives it a_positive epistemic status.23 Since presentational phenomenal character is a_feature that experiences_have, the Phenomenal Ground Argument_on_the_second option says that merely having a perceptual experience (due_to its_phenomenal character) gives_it a pro 23 Quine (1951), Sklar (1975), Harman (1986)._For overview and critical discussion, see Christensen_1994). "Conservatism in Epistemology" Nous 28:1, 69--‐89. Siegel/Epistemic Charge 18 tanto_positive epistemic charge. If an experience retains its_power to provide justification to subsequent beliefs