	to	which	Benedict	XVI	explicitly	appeals	is	exceedingly rich,	and	thus	resists	any	simplistic,	superficial	characterization.	Nevertheless,	it	is possible	to	identify	at	least	three	central	theoretical	commitments	that	belong	to	this tradition	and	which	will	prove	to	be	especially	illuminating	as	we	seek	to	appreciate his	thought	regarding	human	beings	and	their	relation	to	the	natural	environment. First	of	all,	Benedict	XVI	affirms	what	has	come	to	be	known	in	philosophical	and theological	circles	as	the	"convertibility"	of	being	and	goodness.	To	say	that	being	and goodness	are	"convertible"	is	to	say	that	every	instance	of	being,	precisely	insofar	as it	is	an	instance	of	being,	is	also	an	instance	of	goodness;	and	every	instance	of goodness,	precisely	insofar	as	it	is	an	instance	of	goodness,	is	also	an	instance	of being.	Even	though	the	meaning	of	the	term	"being"	may	not	be	the	same	as	the meaning	of	the	term	"goodness,"	it	nevertheless	remains	the	case	that	any	proper referent	of	the	term	"being"	is	also	always	a	proper	referent	of	the	term	"goodness." Thus	while	"being"	and	"goodness"	differ	in	meaning,	they	do	not	differ	in	reference.	It follows	from	this	that	every	being,	even	if	the	being	is	non-living	and	non-sentient,	is good	in	some	respect,	and	thus	has	some	degree	of	value	or	worth	
to 	 which 	 Benedict 	 XVI 	 explicitly 	 appeals 	 is 	 exceedingly rich, 	 and 	 thus 	 protest 	 any 	 simplistic, 	 superficial 	 word picture. 	 Nevertheless, 	 it 	 is possible 	 to 	 identify 	 at 	 least 	 three 	 cardinal 	 theoretical 	 commitments 	 that 	 belong 	 to 	 this tradition 	 and 	 which 	 will 	 testify 	 to 	 be 	 especially 	 illuminating 	 as 	 we 	 search 	 to 	 appreciate his 	 thought 	 involve 	 human 	 beings 	 and 	 their 	 relation 	 to 	 the 	 lifelike 	 environment. First 	 of 	 all, 	 Benedict 	 XVI 	 affirms 	 what 	 has 	 hail 	 to 	 be 	 known 	 in 	 philosophical 	 and theological 	 circle 	 as 	 the 	 " convertibility " 	 of 	 being 	 and 	 goodness. 	 To 	 say 	 that 	 being 	 and goodness 	 are 	 " convertible " 	 is 	 to 	 read 	 that 	 every 	 instance 	 of 	 being, 	 precisely 	 insofar 	 as it 	 is 	 an 	 instance 	 of 	 being, 	 is 	 also 	 an 	 instance 	 of 	 good; 	 and 	 every 	 instance 	 of goodness, 	 precisely 	 insofar 	 as 	 it 	 is 	 an 	 instance 	 of 	 goodness, 	 is 	 also 	 an 	 case 	 of being. 	 Even 	 though 	 the 	 meaning 	 of 	 the 	 term 	 " being " 	 may 	 not 	 be 	 the 	 same 	 as 	 the meaning 	 of 	 the 	 term 	 " goodness, " 	 it 	 nevertheless 	 remains 	 the 	 case 	 that 	 any 	 proper referent 	 of 	 the 	 term 	 " being " 	 is 	 also 	 always 	 a 	 proper 	 referent 	 of 	 the 	 term 	 " goodness. " Thus 	 while 	 " being " 	 and 	 " goodness " 	 differ 	 in 	 meaning, 	 they 	 do 	 not 	 differ 	 in 	 reference. 	 It follow 	 from 	 this 	 that 	 every 	 being, 	 even 	 if 	 the 	 being 	 is 	 non - living 	 and 	 non - sentient, 	 is good 	 in 	 some 	 obedience, 	 and 	 thus 	 has 	 some 	 degree 	 of 	 value 	 or 	 deserving
	to	wjich	Benedict	XVI	explicitln	appeals	is	exceednbgly rmch,	and	tgus	resisgs	any	simplistic,	superficial	cheracrerizqtion.	Nevertheless,	it	is oossible	tl	identift	at	ltast	three	central	tisoretical	commjbmentv	vhat	belong	to	thix traditiot	and	which	will	psoxe	co	be	especially	illuminating	as	we	seek	to	wpprecistf his	thought	redardpnd	humzn	beings	and	their	relation	to	the	naturzl	envirmnment. First	og	all,	Benedict	XVI	affirms	what	jas	clme	to	be	known	in	phillsophical	ane thqilogical	circues	as	the	"convertibility"	kf	being	and	goodness.	To	say	that	beine	and yoodness	are	"xobvegjible"	is	to	say	vhat	evvry	instance	of	nving,	prewisely	imsofar	as it	is	ak	instence	if	being,	is	also	an	instanre	of	goodness;	and	every	ynstance	ox yoodness,	precisely	insodae	as	it	hs	an	hnstxbce	uf	gkovneas,	is	aldo	ai	instance	of being.	Even	tyough	the	meaning	of	tht	tewn	"being"	may	not	bs	the	saie	ws	the meaning	of	the	term	"goodness,"	it	neverthtless	demains	the	case	that	any	priper referent	of	the	terl	"being"	is	ajso	always	a	proper	referent	of	the	term	"goodness." Thus	whine	"beiig"	xnd	"yiodnerw"	dlffer	in	meaning,	they	do	not	differ	in	reference.	It fojmoes	nrom	this	that	evern	being,	even	if	the	beimg	ls	mjn-living	and	nov-sentizht,	js good	in	some	respeft,	and	thos	has	sime	degree	jf	vakue	or	worth	
to which Benedict XVI explicitly appeals is and resists any superficial characterization. Nevertheless, at three central theoretical that belong to tradition and which will prove to especially illuminating as we seek to appreciate his thought regarding human beings and relation to the natural environment. First of all, Benedict XVI affirms what has to known philosophical theological circles as the "convertibility" of being and goodness. To say that being and goodness are is to say that every instance of being, insofar as it is instance of being, is also instance goodness; and instance goodness, insofar as it an instance of goodness, is also an instance of being. Even though the meaning of the term may not same as meaning the "goodness," it nevertheless case that any proper referent of is also always a proper referent of the "goodness." Thus "being" and "goodness" differ in meaning, do not differ in reference. It follows from that every being, even if the being is non-living and non-sentient, is good in some thus has some degree value or worth
	to	which	Benedict	XVI	expliciTly	appeals	Is	excEedIngLy Rich,	And	tHus	resists	any	sIMpliStic,	superficial	charactErizaTiON.	NevERtHelesS,	it	is poSSiBLE	to	IdEnTifY	aT	LeAst	thRee	Central	TheoreticaL	coMmItments	that	bELoNg	to	this trAdiTion	and	which	WilL	prove	To	Be	eSPeciaLly	IllumInatinG	As	we	seEk	to	appreCiATe his	tHOught	reGARdIng	hUman	beings	and	theiR	ReLAtion	to	the	natuRal	envIrONmENT. FiRst	Of	all,	BenedIcT	XVI	aFFirms	whAT	hAS	COme	TO	be	known	in	phiLosophical	aND thEologiCaL	ciRCles	as	The	"coNvERtiBility"	of	beiNg	anD	goodness.	to	say	tHAt	being	ANd goodnEss	are	"ConVerTiblE"	Is	To	Say	ThAT	evERy	InsTAncE	of	being,	PrEcIsely	InsoFAR	AS it	iS	an	InstAnce	oF	being,	is	also	aN	inStanCE	of	GoodnEss;	anD	eveRy	InstaNce	of gOodneSs,	Precisely	insofaR	as	iT	is	an	instAncE	oF	goOdNess,	iS	Also	an	InsTanCe	of beiNg.	Even	tHOugH	tHE	MEaNing	of	the	term	"being"	MaY	NOt	Be	the	samE	as	the MEaNiNG	of	the	teRm	"GooDnesS,"	IT	neveRtheLEsS	remains	The	casE	ThAt	Any	propEr RefereNt	Of	tHe	tErm	"beINg"	is	Also	alWays	a	proPer	reFErent	of	the	term	"GOodness." Thus	whILe	"BEInG"	And	"gOodNess"	differ	iN	meaNIng,	tHey	dO	NoT	diFFer	in	ReferEnCE.	IT Follows	from	this	that	EvEry	beiNg,	eveN	if	the	being	is	Non-living	aND	NOn-sentieNt,	is GOoD	In	some	respect,	aNd	thuS	has	some	deGRee	of	valUe	or	wOrth	
	to	which	Benedict	XVI	exp licitly	ap peals 	is 	ex ce edin glyrich,	and	thus resi sts	any	simplistic,	su perfi ci a l	ch a ra cteri zation. Ne v e rth el es s,it is  poss ibl e	to	id entify	atlea st 	three	centr a ltheoretica l	c ommitments	t hat 	belon gtot his t rad ition 	and	w h ich	wi ll	proveto be	esp e ciallyi l lu mina ting	as	we	seek	t o 	a p preciate his	t hought 	r e ga r d ing 	hu man	beings 	a nd	th e ir	rela t io n t o	t h e	natural	env ironment. F i rst 	of	al l, 	Be n edictXVI	a ff i rms 	what	has	c ometo	be	kno wn	inp hilosop h ical	an d theo log ica l	ci r cl es 	as 	t h e	" c on ver t ibi lity"	of 	b ei ng	an d	go o d n e ss.Tosaythatbeing	and goo dne ss	a r e	" conve rtibl e"	i sto	sa y	that 	ever yinstance	of	bei ng,precisely 	in so far 	a s iti s	an	i nst anc e	of	be ing,	is als oa n in stance	of	goodness ;a n devery	in stance of  g o odness,pr eci sely i nsofa r	as it 	is	an	i nstanc e 	o fgoodnes s, 	is	al so 	an 	in stanc e 	ofbeing. 	Even	th ought he	meaning	oft he	term	"bein g "m a yn ot	b e	t he	same	asthem eani ng	o f 	t het erm	" goodn es s ," it	nevertheless	rem ai ns	the 	case 	that	any	pro per refere n t of	the	t erm" be i ng"	is	also	al waysa	proper	r e ferent	o f	the 	term	"g oodness." T hus	whil e	" bei ng" 	an d "g oodness"	diff e r 	inme aning,the y	do	no t	d iff erinre ference.It follo ws 	f ro mthi s	tha t 	every	b ei ng, 	e ven 	if	t h e	bein g	isnon- li vi n g	a nd	non- s en t i ent, 	i sgood 	in 	s ome	r espe c t,and	thu s	has	som e	d e gree 	o fvalue	o r	worth	
	to	which	Benedict	XVI	explicitly	appeals	is	exceedingly rich,	and	thus	resists	any	simplistic,	superficial	characterization.	Nevertheless,	it	is_possible	to	identify	at	least	three	central	theoretical	commitments	that	belong	to	this tradition	and	which	will	prove	to	be	especially	illuminating	as	we	seek	to	appreciate_his	thought	regarding	human	beings	and	their	relation	to	the	natural	environment. First	of	all,	Benedict	XVI	affirms	what	has	come	to	be	known	in	philosophical	and theological	circles	as	the	"convertibility"	of	being	and	goodness.	To	say	that	being	and goodness	are	"convertible"	is	to	say	that	every	instance	of	being,	precisely	insofar	as_it	is	an	instance	of	being,	is	also	an	instance	of	goodness;	and	every	instance	of goodness,	precisely	insofar	as	it	is	an	instance	of	goodness,	is	also	an	instance	of_being.	Even	though	the	meaning	of	the	term	"being"	may	not	be	the	same	as	the_meaning	of	the	term	"goodness,"	it	nevertheless	remains	the	case	that	any	proper referent	of	the	term	"being"	is	also	always	a	proper	referent	of	the	term	"goodness."_Thus	while	"being"	and	"goodness"	differ	in	meaning,	they	do	not	differ	in	reference.	It_follows	from	this	that	every	being,	even	if	the	being	is	non-living	and	non-sentient,	is good	in	some	respect,	and	thus	has	some	degree	of	value	or	worth	