' is generally used in contrast to 'de re', the obvious answer is that the relevant restrictions are those that involve some de re component. For example, one might utter the sentence 'there are no blue swans' and thereby express what one could equally well have expressed more explicitly by saying 'there are no blue swans on Earth'. If we have a theory of the meaning of 'It is contingent whether there are blue swans on Earth' that explains how it can be true, we can adapt this theory to explain how 'It is contingent whether there are blue swans' can be true, on the relevant restricted reading. Lewis's counterpart theory is such a theory. According to it, for it to be 5 contingent whether there are blue swans on Earth is for there to be blue swans on some but not all of Earth's counterparts. It will be convenient to have a name for the Lewis-world of which we are part: call it 'Cosmo'. One thing we could mean by saying 'there are no blue swans' is that there are no blue swans in Cosmo. On the approach I am proposing, this is just another case of quantification with a de re restriction. There is no reason to think that ordinary people often restrict their quantifiers in this particular way: typically, when quantifiers are restricted at all, the restriction will be something much stronger. Be that as it may, when quantifiers restricted to things in Cosmo occur within the scope of modal operators, our analysis of the result will take the same form as it would for any other de re restriction. If our analysis of 'It is possible that some swans on Earth are blue' is 'Some swans on some counterpart of Earth are blue', our analysis of 'It is possible that some swans in Cosmo are blue' must be 'Some swans in some counterpart of Cosmo are blue'; this is also our analysis of 'It is possible that some swans are blue' on the reading where the quantifier is restricted to things in Cosmo. We might think that necessarily, the counterparts of Cosmo are all and only the Lewisworlds; if so, we will recover (1), since we will regard'some swans in some counterpart of Cosmo are blue' as equivalent to 'there is a Lewis-world such that some swans in it are blue'. But this will be due not to some special role played by the concept of a Lewis-world in the analysis of possibility claims in general,
' is generally used in contrast to' de rhenium', the obvious solution is that the relevant restrictions are those that involve some de re part. For example, one might talk the sentence' there are no gloomy swans' and thereby express what one could evenly well have carry more explicitly by saying' there be no blue swans on Earth'. If we get a theory of the meaning of' It is contingent whether there are blue swans on Earth' that explains how it can be true, we can adjust this theory to explain how' It is contingent whether there are blasphemous swans' can be true, on the relevant restricted interpretation. Lewis's counterpart theory is such a hypothesis. According to it, for it to be 5 contingent whether there exist blue swans on Earth is for there to be blue swan on some but not all of Earth's counterparts. It will be convenient to have a name for the Lewis - world of which we are part: call it' Cosmo'. One matter we could entail by saying' there are no blue swans' is that there are no blue swans in Cosmo. On the approach I am proposing, this is merely another case of quantification with a de re limitation. There be no cause to think that ordinary citizenry often restrict their quantifiers in this particular direction: typically, when quantifiers are restricted at all, the restriction will be something much stronger. Be that as it may, when quantifier restricted to things in Cosmo occur within the scope of modal operator, our psychoanalysis of the resultant role will take the same form as it would for any other de re limitation. If our analysis of' It is possible that some swans on Earth are blue' is' Some swans on some counterpart of Earth are blue', our analysis of' It is possible that some swans in Cosmo are blasphemous' must be' Some swans in some counterpart of Cosmo are blue'; this is besides our analysis of' It is possible that some swans are blue' on the interpretation where the quantifier is restricted to thing in Cosmo. We might think that necessarily, the counterparts of Cosmo are all and only the Lewisworlds; if indeed, we will recover (1), since we will regard'some swans in some counterpart of Cosmo are blue' as equivalent to' there is a Lewis - world such that some swans in it are blue'. But this will be due not to some particular role played by the concept of a Lewis - worldly concern in the analysis of possibility claim in general,
' is generally used in contrxst to 'de re', thg ibviouv answsr is thxt the relevant restrictions aee thise that involve some ae re comionent. Foe exemple, one might nfter thc senfcnce 'chxre are no blue swans' and thereby exprevs wkat one could equally well have exprqssed mprf explicitly bi saypnd 'thsge are no blue swans on Earth'. Ir we hane a theory of thr meaning of 'It is contingfnt ahether there are hlue swans in Eweth' that expuains how pc can be troe, we can adapt this theory to ebplaiu how 'It is cintltgent whethxr thege are blue swans' can be trur, on the relevsnt rewtricted reading. Lewiv's counterpart thejry is suwh a theory. Accordibg to ij, for it gi bd 5 doitihgent ahevher there zre blue swqns on Earth is for trvte to be blus swanf jn some but not all of Earth's counterpagts. Jt will be convenient ti have a name for the Lewis-worjd of which we are part: call it 'Cosmo'. One thing wa couma mtak ct daying 'there are no blue swans' is that there wde np blue swans ik Cosmo. On the apptowcn I am proposivg, this ia just another casf of quwntifucation wyth s de re restriction. There iw no reason no tyink that ordinary people oftzn resjrict yheir quantifiers in thns parficular way: typicallg, when quantifierr age rastricted at all, the restryction wiol bz somethkng kuch seronger. Be that as it may, when quajtifigrs revtricted tl things in Cosmo occur within vie scope of mpddl mperatorf, our analysis of ehe result wilk take che saoe form as it wound for any jther de re radtriction. If our anajysiw of 'It is oussible that spme swans on Earth qre blue' is 'Some sxans kn some counter'cru if Earth are bkue', ouw wnelysif of 'It is povsibue gnat sume swans ik Cusmo are blue' must be 'Soke ssans in some countrriart of Cismo are blue'; this is also our analysis of 'Iv is pussibke jhat some swans are blue' on the reading aheve the quantisier is restrictzd to things in Cosmo. We might think thav necessarily, the counjerparts of Cosmo are sll and onlb the Jewisworlgs; if so, we will reciver (1), since we wikl regard'some swans ih some counherpart of Cosmo are blue' as equivalent to 'there is a Lewis-world such thar some swans in it are blue'. Bbt chis wijl bx vue not to some siecial role played by the concepv of a Lewhs-corld in the analysis of possobklity claims kn general,
' is generally used in contrast to the answer is the relevant restrictions de component. For example, might utter the 'there are no blue swans' and express what one could equally well have expressed more explicitly by saying 'there no blue swans on Earth'. If we have a theory of the meaning 'It contingent there blue swans on Earth' that explains how it can be true, we can adapt this theory explain how 'It is contingent whether there are swans' can be true, the relevant restricted reading. Lewis's theory such a According it, it to be contingent whether there are blue swans on Earth is for there to be blue swans on some not all counterparts. It be to a name for of which we are part: call thing we could mean by saying 'there are blue swans' that there are no blue swans Cosmo. On the approach I am proposing, this just another case of quantification with a de re restriction. There is no reason to ordinary people often restrict quantifiers in this way: when are at all, restriction will be something much stronger. Be that as it may, quantifiers restricted to things in Cosmo occur within the scope operators, analysis of the will take the same as would for any other restriction. our is that swans on Earth are is 'Some swans on some of Earth are blue', possible that some swans in Cosmo are blue' be 'Some swans in some counterpart of are blue'; this is also our analysis of 'It is possible that swans are the reading where the quantifier is restricted to in Cosmo. We might that necessarily, the counterparts of Cosmo are all and the if so, will recover (1), we will regard'some in some counterpart are blue' equivalent 'there such that some swans in it blue'. this will be due not some played by the concept of a Lewis-world in the analysis of possibility claims in general,
' is generally used in contrast To 'de re', the oBviouS anSweR iS thaT the Relevant restriCTionS are those that involve soMe de rE cOMponENt. for exAmple, onE MiGHT utTeR tHe sEnTEnCe 'theRe aRe no bluE swans' and tHerEbY express what ONe Could equalLy wEll have expreSseD more eXpLicITly by SayIng 'thEre are NO blue sWans on EarTh'. iF we havE A theory OF ThE meaNing of 'It is contingENt WHether there are Blue swAnS On eARth' ThaT explains hOw It can BE true, we CAn ADAPt tHIs theory to expLain how 'It is COntIngent WhEthER there Are blUe SWanS' can be true, oN the Relevant rEstricTEd readiNG. Lewis's CounteRpaRt tHeorY Is SuCh a ThEOry. aCcOrdINg tO it, for it To Be 5 ContiNgenT WHETher TheRe arE blue Swans on Earth iS foR theRE to Be bluE swanS on sOmE but nOt all oF EartH's Counterparts. It wIll bE convenieNt tO hAve A nAme foR The LewIs-wOrlD of whicH we are pARt: cAlL IT 'coSmo'. One thing we could MeAN By Saying 'thEre are NO bLuE Swans' is tHaT thEre aRE No bluE swaNS iN Cosmo. On The appROaCh i am propOsIng, thiS iS juSt aNotheR Case Of quanTificatiOn witH A de re restrictiON. There is no reaSOn TO ThINk thAt oRdinary peopLe ofTEn reStriCT tHeiR QuantIfierS iN ThIS particular way: typicAlLy, when QuantIfiers are restRicted at alL, THE restricTion WIlL Be something mucH stroNger. Be that AS it may, whEn quaNtifiers RestricteD TO things iN CoSmo OccUr wITHiN the scope of moDAL opeRaTors, our AnaLysis of The ResUlt WilL tAke the samE form as iT wOuLd FoR anY otheR De re restRiCtiOn. if oUr anaLYsis of 'it is pOssiBlE tHAt sOme swanS On eARth aRe BlUe' is 'somE sWans oN somE CouNterparT of Earth aRe bLUe', ouR aNaLysis of 'it is possible tHaT some swans In cosMo are bLUE' must be 'SOme swans in some counterpaRT of CosmO arE blue'; This Is also our AnaLysis oF 'It IS possiBle thaT some SwAns ARE blue' ON ThE reAdIng where thE QUanTifieR iS resTricted To things in Cosmo. We mIGht Think that neceSsaRily, THE cOunTErPArtS oF cosMO Are all and only thE LewisworlDs; IF sO, we will recOVer (1), SiNce we wiLl regarD'some SWans in sOme counteRpart of CoSmO are BLUe' aS equivalenT to 'there Is a Lewis-wORld suCH tHat soMe sWans in It Are Blue'. BUt this WIll Be due Not to sOmE speciAl rolE pLayed by tHe concept of a Lewis-world iN the anAlysiS of PossibiliTy cLAimS in generaL,
' is generally used in con trast to ' de re ',the  o bvio us a nswer is thatt he r elevant restrictions a re th os e  tha t  i nvolv e somed er e  co mp on ent .F or  exam ple , one m ight utter  th esentence 'th e re  are no bl ueswans' and t her eby ex pr ess whatone  coul d equa l ly wel l have ex pr e ssed m o re expl i c it ly b y saying 'there a r en o blue swans o n Eart h' .  I f wehav e a theory  o f the meaning of ' I t i s  contingent w hether ther e  ar e blue  s wan s  on Ea rth'th a t e xplains how  itcan be tr ue, we can ada p t thistheory  to  ex plai n  h ow  'I ti s c o nt ing e ntwhetherth er e are  blu e s w ans'  ca n be  true , on the rele van t re s tri ctedreadi ng.Le wis's  count erpar ttheory is sucha th eory. Acc ord in g t oit, f o r it t o b e 5  contin gent wh e the rt h e re  are blue swans on  E a r th  is fortheret obe blue swa ns  on  som e but n ot a l lof Earth 's cou n te rp arts. I twill b econ ven ientt o ha ve a n ame forthe L e wis-world of w h ich we are pa r t: c al l  it'Co smo'. One t hing we c ould me anb y say ing ' th e re are no blue swans'is  thatthere  are no blueswans in C o s m o. On th e ap p ro a ch I am propos ing,this is ju s t anothe r cas e of qua ntificati o n  with adereres tri c t io n. There is n o reas on  to thi nkthat or din ary  pe opl eoften res trict th ei rqu an tif iersi n this p ar tic ul arway:t ypical ly, w henqu an t ifi ers are re s t rict ed  a t al l,th e res tric t ion  will b e somethi ngm uchst ro nger. B e that as itma y, when qu an tif iers r e s trictedto things in Cosmo occu r  within  th e sco pe o f modal o per ators,  ou r  analy sis of  there sul t willt a ke  th esame forma s  it  woul dforany oth er de re restricti o n.If our analys isof ' I t  i s p o ss i ble  t h ats o me swans on Ear th are blu e' is  'Some swa n s o nsome co unterpa rt of Earth a re blue',  our anal ys is o f 'It  is possib le thatsome swan s  in C o sm o are  bl ue' mu st  be  'Som e swan s  in  some  count er part o f Cos mo  are blu e'; this is also our an alysis  of ' Itis possib let hat  some swa ns a re blue' o n t hereadi ngw heretheq ua nti f ier i s re s tricted t o  t hin g s  i n Cosmo. We m i ght  thin k t h at nec essa rily, the counter p arts of Cosmoarea l l a ndo nlyth e Lewisworlds;  if  s o ,  we will  r ecover (1),  since w ew ill r egard' some s wans in s om e  count erpa rtof Cosmoare  b l ue' aseq ui v alentto ' th ere is  a Lew i s-wo r l d such that some  swan s in it are  blue '.  But th i s wi ll be duenot to some  speci al r ole p layed b ythe co nce pt  of a Lewi s -world in  theanalysi sof p oss ibilit y cl a i ms in  gen er al, 
' is_generally used_in contrast to 'de_re', the_obvious_answer is_that_the relevant restrictions_are those that_involve some de re_component. For example,_one_might utter the sentence 'there are no blue swans' and thereby express what one_could_equally well_have_expressed_more explicitly by saying 'there_are no blue swans on_Earth'. If_we have a theory of the meaning of_'It_is contingent whether_there are blue swans on Earth' that explains how_it can be true, we can_adapt this theory_to_explain_how 'It is contingent_whether there are blue swans' can_be true, on the relevant restricted_reading. Lewis's counterpart theory is such a_theory. According to it, for it_to be 5 contingent whether_there are_blue swans on Earth is_for there to_be blue_swans on some_but not all of Earth's counterparts._It will be_convenient to have a name for_the_Lewis-world of which_we_are_part: call_it 'Cosmo'. One_thing_we could_mean_by saying 'there are no blue_swans'_is that there are no blue swans_in Cosmo. On the_approach_I am proposing, this_is just another case of_quantification with a de re restriction._There is_no reason_to think that ordinary people often restrict their quantifiers in this_particular way: typically, when quantifiers are_restricted at all, the_restriction will_be_something much stronger._Be_that as_it may, when quantifiers restricted to things_in Cosmo_occur within the scope of modal_operators, our analysis of_the_result will take the same form_as it would for any other_de re restriction. If our_analysis_of_'It is possible that some_swans on Earth are blue' is_'Some swans on_some counterpart of Earth are blue', our_analysis_of 'It is possible that some_swans_in Cosmo are blue' must be_'Some_swans_in some counterpart of Cosmo_are blue'; this is also our_analysis of 'It is possible that some swans are_blue' on the_reading where the quantifier is_restricted_to_things in Cosmo. We might think that necessarily, the counterparts_of Cosmo_are all and_only the Lewisworlds; if so, we will recover (1), since_we will regard'some swans in some counterpart_of Cosmo are blue' as equivalent to 'there is a Lewis-world_such that some swans in it are blue'._But this will be due not to_some special role played_by_the concept of a Lewis-world in the_analysis_of_possibility_claims in general,