, like all entities, should generally not overlap if they are to be countable. This would be a condition imposed by the count noun case, rather than the truthmaking relation itself. 12 The notion of an exact truthmaker has a range of further application, for example the semantics of adverbials (Moltmann 2007) and intensional definite descriptions (the book John needs to write, cf. Moltmann 2013a, Chap. 5, to appear b). It is to be expected that it applies to all the semantic phenomena for which situations have been invoked, including restrictions of the domain of quantifiers and definite NPs and perception reports. 123 F. Moltmann conditionals and modals quantifying over non-actual worlds or situations.13 The Actuality Condition rather is a general presupposition of what I call 'ordinary argument positions' of natural language predicates, argument positions that with non-actual entities would result in a sentence that is neither true nor false. Ordinary argument positions are, for example, the argument positions of sortal nouns (building, person, woman). Non-ordinary argument positions include the object argument positions of intensional and intentional transitive verbs (need, look for mention, think about) (which allow for truth with non-actual entities as arguments) and the subject position of existence predicates (which allow for falsehood with non-actual entities as arguments) (Priest 2005, pp. 59–60; Moltmann 2013b, 2015c).14 For one-place predicates, the Actuality Condition is given below, where D(c) is the domain of entities considered actual in the context c: (7) The Actuality Condition on ordinary (one-place) predicates For an ordinary one-place predicate P and a context c, if for an entity d, d ∈ [P]c or d ∈ [not P]c, then d ∈ D(c). The Actuality Condition also concerns situations once situations are considered part of the domain of entities and potential arguments of predicates. The Actually Condition then applies to the noun case, requiring that its arguments (situations) be in the domain D(c) of entities considered actual in the context c. The Actuality Condition can be fulfilled also if the context is not that of the utterance, but the shifted context of a reported propositional attitude or epistemic state (due to the presence of an attitude verb or modal expression). Such a context shift may even be triggered by
, like all entities, should generally not overlap if they are to be countable. This would be a condition imposed by the count noun subject, preferably than the truthmaking relation itself. 12 The notion of an exact truthmaker have a range of further application, for exercise the semantics of adverbial (Moltmann 2007) and intensional definite descriptions (the book John needs to write, cf. Moltmann 2013a, Chap. 5, to look b). It is to be expected that it applies to all the semantic phenomena for which situations have been appeal, including restrictions of the domain of quantifiers and definite NPs and percept reports. 123 F. Moltmann conditionals and modals quantifying over non - actual earth or situations.13 The Actuality Condition rather is a general presupposition of what I call' ordinary controversy positions' of natural language predicates, argument stead that with non - actual entities would result in a sentence that is neither true nor false. Ordinary argument positions are, for example, the argument positions of sortal nouns (building, person, woman). Non - ordinary argument positions admit the object controversy positions of intensional and designed transitive verb (want, look for mention, remember about) (which allow for truth with non - actual entities as arguments) and the capable position of existence predicates (which allow for falsehood with non - actual entities as arguments) (Priest 2005, pp. 59–60; Moltmann 2013b, 2015c).14 For one - place predicates, the Actuality Condition is given below, where D(c) is the domain of entities consider actual in the context hundred: (7) The Actuality Condition on ordinary (one - place) predicates For an average one - place predicate P and a context c, if for an entity d, d ∈ [ P]c or d ∈ [ not P]c, then d ∈ D(c). The Actuality Condition also concerns situations once situations are considered share of the domain of entity and potential arguments of predicates. The Actually Condition then applies to the noun case, necessitate that its arguments (position) be in the knowledge domain D(c) of entities considered actual in the context c. The Actuality Condition can be carry through also if the context is not that of the utterance, but the careen context of a reported propositional attitude or epistemic state (due to the presence of an attitude verb or modal expression). Such a context shift may even be trip by
, line all entities, should gtnerally not overlap if vhey ars to be zountable. This would be a coidituon inposed by the count nojn case, rwther thqn tie truthmaking rxmation lcself. 12 The iotion of an exsct truthmdker has a rance oy further application, for example thq semanyifs of adverbiajs (Mpjtmahn 2007) and intensional definite descrjptions (the book Johm needs to write, cf. Moltmajn 2013a, Chap. 5, to appear b). It is to bg ex[wcted that ig applies uo all the sgmantic phenomena for which situxtionx have beeb unvlned, includiig resnrictions of bne domdin of auantifiers anc dxfinute NPs and perceptioi reports. 123 F. Moltmang conditimncls and modals quantidyung oeer ton-azruau wkrkda or sltuetions.13 The Zctuality Cindition rather is s dvmeral presuplositijn of what I call 'ordinary argument positpons' of natural language prwdicates, argument posltions thwt with non-actual entities would result in a sentance vhxt nw neigyeg true nor false. Ordinary argument positions wde, fpr example, the argument ppsltojns of sortal nouns (bujlding, person, womaj). Non-orqinart argumenu posotions include the object aegument posinionw of intensional aud intentioncl tramsitife verbs (need, look for oentjon, think ahout) (whicg allow for truth winh nmn-actual entities as argumqnts) and vhe sbbject pusitoon of existence predlwates (which allow vor fclsehmod with nln-actual entities as arguments) ('ciest 2005, pp. 59–60; Moktkant 2013b, 2015c).14 Fox one-pkace predicatqs, the Actualijy Conditnon is given belkw, wherx D(c) is the qomain of enthjies considerxd actual in rhe xontext z: (7) The Actualiyy Conditpou on ordibary (one-place) predlcater For an ordinarv ine-place predicste P wnf e coneaxt c, if for an dntkyy d, a ∈ [P]c or d ∈ [vot L]c, then d ∈ D(c). The Acdualjty Condition also cjncerns wituatiogs once situayions are considertd parv of tie domsin of entities and potential arghments of prcdicates. The Wctuqlly Conditipn then applies to the noun case, requirmng that its arguments (wituations) be in thg dpmain D(c) of entieies conshdered actual in the context c. The Acuuality Condition can bs fulfhlled also if the context is not that of the utterance, but the shifted context of a ce[orted propksitoonal acticude or epidvemic state (due tp the presence of an attitude vxrb or moddl expression). Such a context sniwt may even bg triggered by
, like all entities, should generally not they to be This would be count case, rather than truthmaking relation itself. The notion of an exact truthmaker a range of further application, for example the semantics of adverbials (Moltmann 2007) intensional definite descriptions (the book John needs to write, cf. Moltmann 2013a, Chap. to b). is be expected that it applies to all the semantic phenomena for which situations have been invoked, restrictions of the domain of quantifiers and definite and perception reports. 123 Moltmann conditionals and modals quantifying non-actual or situations.13 Actuality rather a general presupposition what I call 'ordinary argument positions' of natural language predicates, argument positions that with non-actual entities would in a is neither nor Ordinary positions are, for argument positions of sortal nouns (building, argument positions include the object argument positions of and intentional verbs (need, look for mention, think (which allow for truth with non-actual entities as and the subject position of existence predicates (which allow for falsehood with non-actual entities as 2005, pp. 59–60; Moltmann 2015c).14 For one-place the Condition given where D(c) the domain of entities considered actual in the context c: (7) Actuality Condition on ordinary (one-place) predicates For an ordinary one-place and context c, if an entity d, d [P]c d ∈ [not P]c, ∈ The concerns once are considered part of domain of entities and potential of predicates. The Actually noun case, requiring that its arguments (situations) be the domain D(c) of entities considered actual the context c. The Actuality Condition can be fulfilled also if the is not the utterance, but the shifted context of a propositional attitude or epistemic (due to the presence of an attitude verb or expression). a context may even be by
, like all entities, should geneRally not ovErlap If tHey ArE to bE couNtable. This woulD Be a cOndition imposed by the coUnt noUn CAse, rAThEr thaN the truTHmAKIng ReLaTioN iTSeLf. 12 The NotIon of an Exact truthMakEr Has a range of fURtHer applicaTioN, for example tHe sEmantiCs Of aDVerbiAls (moltmAnn 2007) and INtensiOnal definItE DescriPTions (thE BOoK JohN needs to write, cf. MoLTmANn 2013a, Chap. 5, to appeaR b). It is To BE eXPEctEd tHat it appliEs To all THe semanTIc PHENomENa for which sitUations have BEen InvokeD, iNclUDing reStricTiONs oF the domain oF quaNtifiers aNd defiNIte NPs aND percepTion rePorTs. 123 F. moltMAnN cOndItIOnaLS aNd mODalS quantifYiNg Over nOn-acTUAL WorlDs oR sitUatioNs.13 The ActualitY CoNditIOn rAther Is a geNeraL pResupPositiOn of wHaT I call 'ordinary aRgumEnt positiOns' Of NatUrAl lanGUage prEdiCatEs, argumEnt posiTIonS tHAT WiTh non-actual entitieS wOULd Result in A senteNCe ThAT is neithEr TruE nor FALse. OrDinaRY aRgument pOsitioNS aRe, For examPlE, the arGuMenT poSitioNS of sOrtal nOuns (builDing, pERson, woman). Non-orDInary argument POsITIoNS incLudE the object aRgumENt poSitiONs Of iNTensiOnal aNd INtENtional transitive veRbS (need, lOok foR mention, think About) (which ALLOw for truTh wiTH nON-actual entitieS as arGuments) and THe subjecT posiTion of exIstence prEDIcates (whIch AllOw fOr fALSeHood with non-acTUAl enTiTies as aRguMents) (PrIesT 2005, pp. 59–60; molTmaNn 2013B, 2015c).14 For one-pLace predIcAtEs, ThE AcTualiTY ConditiOn Is gIvEn bElow, wHEre D(c) iS the dOmaiN oF eNTitIes consIDeRED actUaL iN the ConTeXt c: (7) ThE ActUAliTy CondiTion on ordInaRY (one-PlAcE) predicAtes For an ordiNaRy one-place PrEdiCate P aND A context C, if for an entity d, d ∈ [P]c or d ∈ [noT p]c, then d ∈ d(c). THe ActUaliTy ConditiOn aLso conCerNS situaTions oNce siTuAtiONS are cONSiDerEd Part of the dOMAin Of entItIes aNd potenTial arguments of preDIcaTes. The ActuallY CoNditION tHen APpLIes To THe nOUN case, requiring tHat its arguMeNTs (Situations) BE in ThE domain d(c) of entIties COnsiderEd actual iN the conteXt C. The aCTuaLity ConditIon can be Fulfilled ALso if THe ConteXt iS not thAt Of tHe uttErance, BUt tHe shiFted coNtExt of a ReporTeD proposiTional attitude or epistemIc statE (due tO thE presence Of aN AttItude verb Or moDal expressIon). sucH a conTexT Shift May eVEn Be tRIggerEd by
, like all entities, shoul d generall y not  ov erl ap  ifthey  are to be cou n tabl e. This would be a con ditio ni mpos e dby th e count no u n  ca se ,rat he r  t han t hetruthma king relat ion  i tself. 12 Th e  n otion of a n e xact truthma ker  has a  r ang e  of f urt her a pplica t ion, f or exampl et he sem a ntics o f ad verb ials (Moltmann 20 0 7) and intensiona l defi ni t ed e scr ipt ions (thebo ok Jo h n needs to w r ite ,  cf. Moltmann  2013a, Cha p . 5 , to a pp ear b). It  is t ob e e xpected tha t it  appliesto all the sem a ntic ph enomen a f orwhic h  s it uat io n s h a ve  be e n i nvoked,in cl uding  res t r i c tion s o f th e dom ain of quanti fie rs a n d d efini te NP s an dperce ptionrepor ts . 123 F. Moltma nn c onditiona lsan d m od als q u antify ing  ov er non- actualw orl ds o r  s ituations.13 The A ct u a li ty Condi tion r a th er is a gen er alpres u p posit iono fwhat I c all 'o r di na ry argu me nt pos it ion s'of na t ural  langu age pred icate s , argument pos i tions that wi t hn o n- a ctua l e ntities wou ld r e sult  ina  s ent e nce t hat i sn ei t her true nor false.  O rdinar y arg ument positio ns are, fo r e xample,thea rg u ment positions  of s ortal noun s  (buildi ng, p erson, w oman). No n - ordinary  ar gum ent  po s i ti ons include t h e  obj ec t argum ent  positi ons  of  in ten si onal andintentio na ltr an sit ive v e rbs (nee d,  lo ok  fo r men t ion, t hinkabou t)  ( w hic h allow fo r trut hwi th n on- ac tualenti t ies  as arg uments) a ndt he s ub je ct posi tion of exist en ce predica te s ( whicha l low forfalsehood with non-actu a l entit ies  as a rgum ents) (Pr ies t 2005 , p p . 59–6 0; Mol tmann  2 013 b ,  2015 c ) .1 4 F or  one-place p red icate s,  the  Actual ity Condition is g i ven  below, where  D( c) i s th e d o ma i n o fe nti t i es considered a ctual in t he co ntext c: ( 7 ) T he  Actual ity Con ditio n  on ord inary (on e-place)pr edic a t esFor an ord inary on e-place p r edica t eP and  acontex tc,if fo r an e n tit y d,d ∈ [P ]c  or d∈ [no tP]c, the n d ∈ D(c). The Actuali ty Con ditio n a lso conce rns sit uations o ncesituations  ar e c onsid ere d  part  oft he  do m ain o f en t ities and po ten t i al  argumentso f pre dicat es. The Ac tual ly Condition then applies to the  nou n cas e,r equi ri ng that its ar gum en t s  (situat io ns) be in t he domai nD (c) o f enti ties c onsider e d  a c tual i n th e c ontext c.  Th eA ctualit yCo n dition  can  b e fulf illeda lsoi f  the context isnot t h a t oft heutter an ce, but theshifted co ntext of areport ed p ropos itional  a ttitud e o repistemics tate (due  to t he pres en ce o f a n atti tude v erb o r mo da l e xpression ) .  S u ch  a con text  shif tmayeven be t r iggeredby
, like_all entities,_should generally not overlap_if they_are_to be_countable._This would be_a condition imposed_by the count noun_case, rather than_the_truthmaking relation itself. 12 The notion of an exact truthmaker has a range of_further_application, for_example_the_semantics of adverbials (Moltmann 2007)_and intensional definite descriptions (the_book John_needs to write, cf. Moltmann 2013a, Chap. 5,_to_appear b). It_is to be expected that it applies to all_the semantic phenomena for which situations_have been invoked,_including_restrictions_of the domain of_quantifiers and definite NPs and perception_reports. 123 F. Moltmann conditionals and_modals quantifying over non-actual worlds or situations.13_The Actuality Condition rather is a_general presupposition of what I_call 'ordinary_argument positions' of natural language_predicates, argument positions_that with_non-actual entities would_result in a sentence that is_neither true nor_false. Ordinary argument positions are, for_example,_the argument positions_of_sortal_nouns (building,_person, woman). Non-ordinary_argument_positions include_the_object argument positions of intensional and_intentional_transitive verbs (need, look for mention, think_about) (which allow for_truth_with non-actual entities as_arguments) and the subject position_of existence predicates (which allow for_falsehood with_non-actual entities_as arguments) (Priest 2005, pp. 59–60; Moltmann 2013b, 2015c).14 For one-place_predicates, the Actuality Condition is given_below, where D(c) is_the domain_of_entities considered actual_in_the context_c: (7) The Actuality Condition on ordinary_(one-place) predicates_For an ordinary one-place predicate P_and a context c,_if_for an entity d, d ∈_[P]c or d ∈ [not P]c,_then d ∈ D(c). The_Actuality_Condition_also concerns situations once situations_are considered part of the domain_of entities and_potential arguments of predicates. The Actually Condition_then_applies to the noun case, requiring_that_its arguments (situations) be in the_domain_D(c)_of entities considered actual in_the context c. The Actuality Condition_can be fulfilled also if the context is not_that of the_utterance, but the shifted context_of_a_reported propositional attitude or epistemic state (due to the presence_of an_attitude verb or_modal expression). Such a context shift may even be triggered_by