 a substance and must have attribute(s) or properties. In this way, substance is said to be inherent and predicate of a thing which are extraneous. Aristotle is of the view that we know a thing better when we comprehend what its size, colour or deportment. Aristotle in this manner recognized vital and unplanned properties of things. For instance, to say that a man has big ear is to depict something unplanned, since to be a human individual it is not vital that a man ought to have big ears. In any case, it is crucial to my being that I am mortal. Henceforth, for him, substance was essentially the individual: a "this" which, conversely with universals, is one of a kind to the person. The substance of the individual Aristotle called primary substance. Plato's substance, the universal essence of a thing, Aristotle called secondary substance. So species and class are second substances. G. Patzig distinguishes Aristotle's substance as "that which is both itself a being among others and a principle and cause of being for all the being in other categories, qualities, quantities, relations and so on (Fadahunsi, 2004: p. 45). In the Categories, Aristotle recognizes primary and secondary substances and makes it clear that primary substances are ontologically fundamental: "if the primary substances did not exist it would be impossible for any of the other things to exist" (Gill, 2005: p. 228). By other things Aristotle implies the secondary substances; this refers to the nine categories- Quantity, Quality, Relation, Place etc. As cases of primary substances Aristotle gives "the individual man" and "the individual stallion" (Gill, 2005: p. 228). Secondary substances incorporate the species and general under which the essential substances fall, for example, man, horse, creature, and so forth (Gill, 2005: p. 228). Despite the fact that he doesn't utilize the expressions universal and particular in Categories, it is evident that Aristotle would consider primary substances particulars and secondary substances as universals. For he lets us know that primary substances are "not said of a subject" (Lewis, 1991), though secondary substance, for example, man "is said of a subject, the individual man" (Lewis, 1991), and this complies with his meaning of "particular" as well as "universal". Aristotle famously contends that every physical object is a compound of matter and form. Aristotle opines that form is predicated of matter. The type
a substance and must have attribute(s) or properties. In this way, means is say to be inherent and predicate of a thing which are extraneous. Aristotle is of the opinion that we know a thing well when we perceive what its size, colour or deportment. Aristotle in this manner recognized vital and unintentional properties of things. For instance, to say that a valet has big ear is to depict something unplanned, since to be a human person it is not vital that a man ought to have bad ears. In any case, it is all-important to my being that I am deadly. Henceforth, for him, substance was basically the individual: a " this " which, conversely with universals, is one of a kind to the person. The substance of the individual Aristotle called elementary substance. Plato's substance, the universal essence of a thing, Aristotle call secondary substance. So species and class are second substances. G. Patzig distinguishes Aristotle's substance as " that which is both itself a being among others and a principle and campaign of being for all the being in other category, quality, quantities, relations and so along (Fadahunsi, 2004: p. 45). In the Categories, Aristotle recognizes basal and secondary substances and lay down it clear that primary substances are ontologically fundamental: " if the primary substances did not exist it would be impossible for any of the other things to exist " (Gill, 2005: p. 228). By other things Aristotle implies the junior-grade substances; this refer to the nine categories- Quantity, Quality, Relation, Place etc. As subject of primary substances Aristotle gives " the individual valet " and " the individual stallion " (Gill, 2005: p. 228). Secondary substances incorporate the coinage and general under which the substantive substances fall, for exercise, man, sawhorse, creature, and so away (Gill, 2005: p. 228). Despite the fact that he doesn't utilize the expressions universal and particular in Categories, it is apparent that Aristotle would consider basal substances particulars and junior-grade substances as universals. For he lets us know that primary substances are " not said of a subject " (Lewis, 1991), though secondary substance, for example, man " is state of a subject, the individual man " (Lewis, 1991), and this complies with his meaning of " finical " as well as " universal ". Aristotle excellently contends that every physical object is a compound of matter and form. Aristotle opines that form is predicated of matter. The type
 a dubstance and must have xttribute(s) or ptopertiev. In tgis way, rubstance is said to be inhecent and kgedicate of a thing wfich are vxtraneouw. Armstotle is of thx view tmct we nnow e thing better ehen we cokprehend what htr dize, colour or deportment. Aristotle in thix lanner recognieed vptwl ahd unplanned properties of things. Ror insuance, to say that s man has big ear is to deoict something unplannfd, since to be w human indivkdual it is not vital jhat a man ought to have big earr. In cny case, it iw cgocial to my ueing nhat I am morbsl. Henweforth, for him, substsncx waw essentially the indmvidual: a "this" which, converseny with universals, us one mf a kina to tht pxrskn. The suustance of fhe individyal Aristotle callec [gomary substahce. Plwtj's substance, the universal essence of a thjng, Aristotle called sexondary substance. So dpecies agd class are second substances. G. Patzig distinguivhes Erkstitjd'w dubstance as "that which is both itself a beind akokg others and a irinciple and causr lf feing for all the bzjnf in other categorles, quajitiew, quantityes, telations and so on (Fadahunwi, 2004: p. 45). In thv Caregories, Aristotle recognizes prikary snd secondary substancer ans makes it flear thaf primary substanzes ase ontologically fundamentwl: "if the prikary sucstamces dyd not exidt it would be impossiblf for aty of the lther things to exist" (Gill, 2005: p. 228). Ub other thingx Drivtotle iipliex the secondawy substances; jhis refexs to ghe nine cztegorixs- Quantity, Zuality, Relathln, Place etc. As casef of prinary sucrtances Aristoyle gives "the indivudual man" and "the lndivksual stallion" (Gnuo, 2005: p. 228). Secondary sucstwnbes igworporate tha spdcidx and general unbef whoch the essential sutstahces fall, for examllc, man, horwe, creattre, and so fotth (Gill, 2005: p. 228). Despiue the fart thay hg doesn't utilize the expressiona universwl wnd particulwr ik Cajegories, it is evident that Aristotle would considxr primary substances karticulars and seconbavy substancex as tniversalv. For he lets us knoq that primary sunstances are "not said kf a sgbjech" (Lewis, 1991), though secondary substance, for example, man "is said of a subject, rhe invididual man" (Mewix, 1991), ang chix compjies xith his meaning pf "particular" as well as "univerral". Arisdocle famously contends that evrrh physical obgect is a compound of mafter and form. Aristotle opines that fork is predicated of mattev. The typw
a substance and must have attribute(s) or this substance is to be inherent which extraneous. Aristotle is the view that know a thing better when we what its size, colour or deportment. Aristotle in this manner recognized vital and properties of things. For instance, to say that a man has big ear to something since be a human individual it is not vital that a man ought to have big ears. any case, it is crucial to my being I am mortal. Henceforth, him, substance was essentially the a which, conversely universals, one a kind to person. The substance of the individual Aristotle called primary substance. Plato's substance, the universal essence of a Aristotle called So species class second G. Patzig distinguishes as "that which is both itself others and a principle and cause of being all the in other categories, qualities, quantities, relations so on (Fadahunsi, 2004: p. 45). In the Aristotle recognizes primary and secondary substances and makes it clear that primary substances are ontologically the primary substances did exist it would impossible any the things to (Gill, 2005: p. 228). By other things Aristotle implies the secondary this refers to the nine categories- Quantity, Quality, Relation, Place cases primary substances Aristotle "the individual man" and individual (Gill, 2005: p. 228). incorporate species which essential fall, for example, man, creature, and so forth (Gill, p. 228). Despite the the expressions universal and particular in Categories, it evident that Aristotle would consider primary substances and secondary substances as universals. For he lets us know that primary are "not a subject" (Lewis, 1991), though secondary substance, for man "is said of subject, the individual man" (Lewis, 1991), and this complies his of "particular" well as "universal". famously contends that physical object is of matter form. opines predicated of matter. The type
 a substance and must have attrIbute(s) or prOpertIes. in tHiS way, SubsTance is said to bE InheRent and predicate of a thiNg whiCh ARe exTRaNeous. aristotLE iS OF thE vIeW thAt WE kNow a tHinG better When we compRehEnD what its size, COlOur or deporTmeNt. Aristotle iN thIs mannEr RecOGnizeD viTal anD unplaNNed proPerties of ThINgs. For INstance, TO SaY thaT a man has big ear is tO DePIct something unPlanneD, sINcE TO be A huMan individUaL it is NOt vital THaT A MAn oUGht to have big eArs. In any casE, It iS cruciAl To mY Being tHat I aM mORtaL. Henceforth, For hIm, substanCe was eSSentialLY the indIviduaL: a "tHis" WhicH, CoNvErsElY WitH UnIveRSalS, is one of A kInD to thE perSON. tHe suBstAnce Of the Individual AriStoTle cALleD primAry suBstaNcE. PlatO's subsTance, ThE universal essenCe of A thing, AriStoTlE caLlEd secONdary sUbsTanCe. So speCies and CLasS aRE SEcOnd substances. G. PatzIg DIStInguisheS AristOTlE's SUbstance As "ThaT whiCH Is botH itsELf A being amOng othERs AnD a princIpLe and cAuSe oF beIng foR All tHe beinG in other CategORies, qualities, qUAntities, relatIOnS ANd SO on (FAdaHunsi, 2004: p. 45). In the cateGOrieS, AriSToTle REcognIzes pRiMArY And secondary substanCeS and maKes it Clear that primAry substanCES Are ontolOgicALlY Fundamental: "if tHe priMary substaNCes did noT exisT it would Be impossiBLE for any oF thE otHer ThiNGS tO exist" (Gill, 2005: p. 228). By OTHer tHiNgs ArisTotLe impliEs tHe sEcoNdaRy SubstanceS; this refErS tO tHe NinE cateGOries- QuaNtIty, quAliTy, RelATion, PlAce etC. As cAsEs OF prImary suBStANCes ARiStOtle GivEs "The inDiviDUal Man" and "tHe individUal STallIoN" (GIll, 2005: p. 228). SecOndary substanCeS incorporaTe The SpecieS ANd generaL under which the essential SUbstancEs fAll, foR exaMple, man, hoRse, CreatuRe, aND so forTh (Gill, 2005: P. 228). DespItE thE FAct thAT He DoeSn'T utilize thE EXprEssioNs UnivErsal anD particular in CategORieS, it is evident tHat arisTOTlE woULd COnsIdER prIMAry substances paRticulars aNd SEcOndary subsTAncEs As univeRsals. FoR he leTS us know That primaRy substanCeS are "NOT saId of a subjeCt" (Lewis, 1991), tHough secoNDary sUBsTance, For ExamplE, mAn "iS said Of a subJEct, The inDividuAl Man" (LewIs, 1991), and ThIs compliEs with his meaning of "partiCular" aS well As "uNiversal". ARisTOtlE famously ContEnds that evEry PhySical ObjECt is a CompOUnD of MAtter And fORm. AristotLE oPinES ThAt form is preDICAteD of maTteR. the typE
 a substance and must have  attribute (s) o r p rop er ties . In  this way, sub s tanc e is said to be inhere nt an dp redi c at e ofa thing wh i c h a re  e xtr an e ou s. Ar ist otle is  of the vi ewth at we know a th ing better  wh en we compre hen d what  i tss ize,col our o r depo r tment.  Aristotl ei n this mannerr e co gniz ed vital and unpl a nn e d properties o f thin gs .  F o r  in sta nce, to sa ythata  man ha s  b i g ear is to depictsomething u n pla nned,si nce to bea hum an ind ividual itis n ot vitalthat a man oug h t to ha ve big  ea rs.  Ina ny  c ase ,i t i s  c ruc i alto my be in gthatI am m o r tal.  He ncef orth,  for him, sub sta ncew asessen tiall y th eindiv idual:  a "t hi s" which, conve rsel y with un ive rs als ,is on e  of akin d t o the p erson.T hesu b s t an ce of the individu al A ri stotle c alledp ri ma r y substa nc e.Plat o ' s sub stan c e,  the uni versal es se nce ofathing,  A ris tot le ca l ledsecond ary subs tance .  So species an d  class are se c on d su b stan ces . G. Patzig  dis t ingu ishe s  A ris t otle' s sub st a nc e  as "that which isbo th its elf a  being amongothers and a principl e an d  c a use of being f or al l the bein g  in othe r cat egories,  qualitie s ,  quantit ies , r ela tio n s  a nd so on (Fad a h unsi ,2004: p . 4 5). Inthe  Ca teg ori es , Aristot le recog ni ze spr ima ry an d  seconda ry  su bs tan ces a n d make s itclea rth a t p rimarys ub s t ance sar e on tol og icall y fu n dam ental:"if the p rim a ry s ub st ances d id not existit  would beim pos siblef o r any of  the other things to ex i st" (Gi ll,  2005 : p.  228). By  ot her th ing s  Arist otle i mplie sthe s econd a r ysub st ances; thi s ref ers t othenine ca tegories- Quantity ,  Qu ality, Relati on,  Pla c e  e tc. As cas es ofp r imary substance s Aristotl eg iv es "the in d ivi du al man"  and "t he in d ividual  stallion " (Gill,20 05:p .  22 8). Second ary subs tances in c orpor a te  thespe cies a nd  ge neral  under whi ch th e esse nt ial su bstan ce s fall,for example, man, horse , crea ture,  an d so fort h ( G ill , 2005: p . 22 8). Despit e t hefacttha t  he d oesn ' tuti l ize t he e x pressions un ive r s al  and partic u l a r i n Cat ego r ies, i t is  evident that Ari s totle would co nsid e r  pr ima r y su bs tances particu lar sa n d second ar y substance s as uni ve r sals.  For h e lets  us kno w th a t prim arysub stances a re"n o t saidof  a subjec t" ( Le wis, 1 991),t houg h secondary substa nce,f o r exa m ple , man  " is said of a  subject,the individ ual ma n" ( Lewis , 1991) ,and th isco mplies wit h  his mean ing o f "part ic ular " a s well  as" u niver sal" .Ari stotle fa m o us l yco n ten ds t hat e ve ry p hysical o b ject isa c o mpoundof  ma t t er and fo r m . Aristotl e o pines t hat form i s  pre d ic a ted o f matt er. Th e type
 a_substance and_must have attribute(s) or_properties. In_this_way, substance_is_said to be_inherent and predicate_of a thing which_are extraneous. Aristotle_is_of the view that we know a thing better when we comprehend what its_size,_colour or_deportment._Aristotle_in this manner recognized vital_and unplanned properties of things._For instance,_to say that a man has big ear_is_to depict something_unplanned, since to be a human individual it is_not vital that a man ought_to have big_ears._In_any case, it is_crucial to my being that I_am mortal. Henceforth, for him, substance_was essentially the individual: a "this" which,_conversely with universals, is one of_a kind to the person._The substance_of the individual Aristotle called_primary substance. Plato's_substance, the_universal essence of_a thing, Aristotle called secondary substance._So species and_class are second substances. G. Patzig_distinguishes_Aristotle's substance as_"that_which_is both_itself a being_among_others and_a_principle and cause of being for_all_the being in other categories, qualities, quantities,_relations and so on_(Fadahunsi,_2004: p. 45). In_the Categories, Aristotle recognizes primary_and secondary substances and makes it_clear that_primary substances_are ontologically fundamental: "if the primary substances did not exist it_would be impossible for any of_the other things to_exist" (Gill,_2005:_p. 228). By_other_things Aristotle_implies the secondary substances; this refers to_the nine_categories- Quantity, Quality, Relation, Place etc._As cases of primary_substances_Aristotle gives "the individual man" and_"the individual stallion" (Gill, 2005: p._228). Secondary substances incorporate the_species_and_general under which the essential_substances fall, for example, man, horse,_creature, and so_forth (Gill, 2005: p. 228). Despite the_fact_that he doesn't utilize the expressions_universal_and particular in Categories, it is_evident_that_Aristotle would consider primary substances_particulars and secondary substances as universals._For he lets us know that primary substances are_"not said of_a subject" (Lewis, 1991), though_secondary_substance,_for example, man "is said of a subject, the individual_man" (Lewis,_1991), and this_complies with his meaning of "particular" as well as "universal"._Aristotle famously contends that every physical object_is a compound of matter and form. Aristotle opines that form_is predicated of matter. The type