 the following: They [emotions] are by-products of automatic bodily adjustments to the situation that, when experienced consciously, provide information about the nature of our current relationship to the social surrounding (149). In a later chapter, Brown and Strawn state,...we are not saying that subjective, inner experiences and emotions are not important in the Christian life. Rather, emotions and feelings are bodily reactions that serve the purpose of giving us information about the significance of the events, including religious events, that we are involved in, physically or in our imaginations.81 The view as stated is at best unclear and at worst obviously incoherent. Brown and Strawn first say that emotions are "by-products of bodily adjustments," but then go on to imply that emotions are "subjective, inner experiences." But it is not clear how both can be true. Emotions, as subjective inner experiences with motivational and epistemological components, cannot be identical to bodily 81 Brown and Strawn, 162. reactions.82 Identity is a necessary relation. A thing must be identical to itself. So, if emotions are identical to bodily reactions or brain states, then there cannot be an instance of an emotion that is not a bodily reaction or brain state. However, the Christian physicalist is faced with the following counterexample: Biblically, God has emotions, but does not have a body, brain states, or any physical features.83 Therefore, emotions cannot be identical to any physical thing, bodily reactions, brain states or otherwise. Perhaps Brown and Strawn mean only that human emotions are identical to bodily reactions or brain states. This would escape our counterexample, although this move seems ad hoc. Regardless, this view faces a number of problems. First, notice that on their account, phenomenal consciousness is irrelevant to emotion. An individual can have the brain state or bodily reaction of anger although that person does not have the phenomenal experience of anger. The phenomenal experience of anger is not identical to the bodily reaction of anger, which is why one can appear to be angry, yet not actually be angry. Likewise, one can exhibit the bodily responses of fear, such as increased pulse rate, perspiration, and trembling without having any fear at all. For example, someone might tremble from excitement while entering a hot room expecting a surprise.84 But an account of emotions that leaves out the phenomenal quality, the "what-its-like-to-experience" feature of emotions, has simply eliminated the fundamental feature of emotion. To feel anger just is
the following: They [ emotions ] are by - products of automatic bodily adjustments to the site that, when experience consciously, provide information about the nature of our current relationship to the social smother (149). In a later chapter, Brown and Strawn state,... we are not saying that immanent, inner experiences and emotions are not significant in the Christian life. Rather, emotion and feelings are bodily reactions that serve the purpose of give us information about the significance of the events, include religious events, that we are involved in, physically or in our imaginations.81 The view as express is at best unclear and at worst obviously incoherent. Brown and Strawn foremost say that emotion are " by - products of bodily adjustments, " but then go on to imply that emotion are " subjective, inner experiences. " But it is not clear how both can be true. Emotions, as subjective inner experiences with motivational and epistemological components, cannot be identical to bodily 81 Brown and Strawn, 162. reactions.82 Identity is a necessary relation. A thing must be identical to itself. So, if emotions are identical to bodily reactions or brain state, then there cannot be an instance of an emotion that is not a bodily reaction or genius department of state. However, the Christian physicalist is faced with the following counterexample: Biblically, God has emotion, but does not have a soundbox, brain states, or any forcible features.83 Therefore, emotions cannot be identical to any physical thing, bodily reactions, brain states or otherwise. Perhaps Brown and Strawn mean only that human emotions are identical to bodily reactions or mind states. This would miss our counterexample, although this move seems ad hoc. Regardless, this view faces a number of trouble. First, notice that on their account, phenomenal awareness is irrelevant to emotion. An individual can own the brain state or bodily chemical reaction of anger although that person does not have the phenomenal experience of anger. The phenomenal experience of anger is not identical to the bodily reaction of wrath, which is why one can appear to be angry, yet not actually be angry. Likewise, one can exhibit the bodily response of fear, such as increase pulse rate, perspiration, and trembling without having any fear at wholly. For example, someone might tremble from excitement while entering a blistering room expecting a surprise.84 But an account of emotions that leaves out the phenomenal timbre, the " what - its - like - to - experience " feature of emotions, has simply eliminated the cardinal feature of emotion. To feel anger just is
 thf following: They [emotionr] are by-products of auvomatic bodily xdjustments to the situation tyat, wyen experienced consciuusly, pronide infoematmon about the navhre of our cudvent xeoationship to jhe social sgrrounding (149). In a lcter chapter, Brown and Strawn state,...wq are npt saying that sobjecuivq, inhvr experiences and emotions are not imkortant in the Chrostian life. Rather, emotiond anf feelings are bodlly reactiobs trqt serve the purpose of giving us jnformation about the significavce oy the eventw, uncpoding religiius enents, that we are invmlved im, physically ov in mur imaginations.81 The viex as stated is at beft uncleas cnd at worst obviouslt uncohgrent. Brodb avd Atcawh firsh sey that emofions are "bt-products of bodily aqhustments," but then do on to imply that emotions are "subjectine, ihner experiences." But it is not clear how botj can be erue. Emotions, as subjective inner experiences witv motmvxtiinwu ajd epistemological components, cannot be identydak no bodily 81 Brown cnd Strawn, 162. reacyilnx.82 Identity is x necessady relation. A thinh must fe idwntical tj itxelf. So, if emotions are idebtical to bobilt reactions or brann states, thzn thete canmot be an instance of au emotjon that is not a boskly reaction or crapn sdate. Howtxer, the Christian physicalmst ix faced witn the sollowing fountcsexample: Biblicallj, God hds emotiond, but does not have a body, braii states, or amy phjsical fectures.83 Therefore, emjtions cannot ye identncal tu any physpcal thinj, bodily reastions, brain vjates or othecwise. Perraps Broqn and Rgrawn mean onlu that human emotiobs are identical tp busily reactions ir vrain states. Thos doujd excw[e our countarexxmpur, altfough this nuve xeems ad hoc. Regardlass, fhis view faces a muiber of kroblems. Sirst, notice yhat on their accoknt, pienomeial comscyousness is irrelevant to emotjon. An infivldual can havq thc brwin state pr bodily reaction of anger although thet person does not havg the phenomenal expetiekce of anger. The [henomenan experience of angee is not identicak to the bodily reactjon of angeg, which is why one can appear to be angry, yet not actually be angry. Likewuse, onx san exhibit the bodiny xesponsqs oh hear, such as incrvased pulse rate, perspiration, anv tremblinc cithout having any fear at alk. Wor example, sumeone might tremble froj excitekent while entering a hot room rxpecting a surprise.84 But an accoynt or emotpknr that leaves out yhe phznomenql qualuty, bhe "what-its-likd-to-rxierience" ffatuce kf emotions, has simply eliminatee the dujdamental featurx of emotion. Uo feel anger just is
the following: They [emotions] are by-products of adjustments the situation when experienced consciously, of current relationship to social surrounding (149). a later chapter, Brown and Strawn are not saying that subjective, inner experiences and emotions are not important in Christian life. Rather, emotions and feelings are bodily reactions that serve the purpose giving information the of the events, including religious events, that we are involved in, physically or in our imaginations.81 view as stated is at best unclear and worst obviously incoherent. Brown Strawn first say that emotions "by-products bodily adjustments," then on imply that emotions "subjective, inner experiences." But it is not clear how both can be true. Emotions, as subjective inner with motivational components, cannot identical bodily Brown and Strawn, Identity is a necessary relation. A identical to itself. So, if emotions are identical bodily reactions brain states, then there cannot be instance of an emotion that is not a reaction or brain state. However, the Christian physicalist is faced with the following counterexample: Biblically, emotions, but does not a body, brain or physical Therefore, cannot be to any physical thing, bodily reactions, brain states or otherwise. Perhaps and Strawn mean only that human emotions are identical to or states. This would our counterexample, although this seems hoc. Regardless, this view number problems. on account, consciousness is irrelevant to An individual can have the state or bodily reaction does not have the phenomenal experience of anger. phenomenal experience of anger is not identical the bodily reaction of anger, which is why one can appear to angry, yet be angry. Likewise, one can exhibit the bodily of fear, such as pulse rate, perspiration, and trembling without having any fear all. example, someone tremble from excitement entering a hot expecting a surprise.84 account of that out the "what-its-like-to-experience" feature of emotions, has eliminated fundamental feature of emotion. To anger
 the following: They [emotions] aRe by-producTs of aUtoMatIc BodiLy adJustments to the SItuaTion that, when experienceD consCiOUsly, PRoVide iNformatIOn ABOut ThE nAtuRe OF oUr curRenT relatiOnship to thE soCiAl surroundinG (149). in A later chapTer, brown and StraWn sTate,...we ArE noT SayinG thAt subJectivE, Inner eXperienceS aND emotiONs are noT IMpOrtaNt in the Christian lIFe. rAther, emotions aNd feelInGS aRE BodIly Reactions tHaT servE The purpOSe OF GIviNG us informatioN about the siGNifIcance Of The EVents, iNcludInG RelIgious eventS, thaT we are invOlved iN, PhysicaLLy or in oUr imagInaTioNs.81 ThE ViEw As sTaTEd iS At BesT UncLear and aT wOrSt obvIousLY INCoheRenT. BroWn and strawn first saY thAt emOTioNs are "By-proDuctS oF bodiLy adjuStmenTs," But then go on to imPly tHat emotioNs aRe "SubJeCtive, INner exPerIenCes." But iT is not cLEar HoW BOTh Can be true. Emotions, aS sUBJeCtive innEr expeRIeNcES with motIvAtiOnal AND episTemoLOgIcal compOnents, CAnNoT be idenTiCal to bOdIly 81 broWn and sTrawN, 162. reactIons.82 IdenTity iS A necessary relaTIon. A thing must BE iDENtICal tO itSelf. So, if emoTionS Are iDentICaL to BOdily ReactIoNS oR Brain states, then therE cAnnot bE an inStance of an emoTion that is NOT A bodily rEactIOn OR brain state. HowEver, tHe ChristiaN PhysicalIst is Faced witH the folloWINg counteRexAmpLe: BIblICAlLy, God has emotiONS, but DoEs not haVe a Body, braIn sTatEs, oR anY pHysical feAtures.83 ThErEfOrE, eMotIons cANnot be idEnTicAl To aNy phySIcal thIng, boDily ReAcTIonS, brain sTAtES Or otHeRwIse. PErhApS BrowN and sTraWn mean oNly that huMan EMotiOnS aRe identIcal to bodily rEaCtions or brAiN stAtes. ThIS Would escApe our counterexample, altHOugh thiS moVe seeMs ad Hoc. RegardLesS, this vIew FAces a nUmber oF probLeMs. FIRSt, notICE tHat On Their accouNT, PheNomenAl ConsCiousneSs is irrelevant to emOTioN. An individual Can Have THE bRaiN StATe oR bODilY REaction of anger aLthough thaT pERsOn does not hAVe tHe PhenomeNal expeRiencE Of anger. the phenomEnal experIeNce oF ANgeR is not idenTical to tHe bodily rEActioN Of Anger, WhiCh is whY oNe cAn appEar to bE AngRy, yet Not actUaLly be aNgry. LIkEwise, one Can exhibit the bodily respOnses oF fear, SucH as increaSed PUlsE rate, persPiraTion, and treMblIng WithoUt hAVing aNy feAR aT alL. for exAmplE, Someone miGHt TreMBLe From excitemENT WhiLe entEriNG a hot rOom eXpecting a surprise.84 bUt an account of eMotiONS thAt lEAves OuT the phenomenal QuaLiTY, The "what-iTs-Like-to-experIence" feaTuRE of emOtions, Has simPly elimINAtED the fuNdamEntAl feature Of eMoTIon. To feEl AnGEr just Is
 the following: They [emot ions] areby-pr odu cts  o f au toma tic bodily adj u stme nts to the situation t hat,wh e n ex p er ience d consc i ou s l y,pr ov ide  i n fo rmati onabout t he natureofou r current re l at ionship to  th e social sur rou nding(1 49) .  In a  la ter c hapter ,  Brown  and Stra wn state, . ..we ar e no t sa ying that subject i ve ,  inner experie nces a nd em o t ion s a re not imp or tanti n the C h ri s t i anl ife. Rather,emotions an d  fe elings  a reb odilyreact io n s t hat serve t he p urpose of  givin g  us inf o rmation  about  th e s igni f ic an ceof the ev ent s , i ncluding  r el igiou s ev e n t s , th atwe a re in volved in, ph ysi call y  or  in o ur im agin at ions. 81 The  view  a s stated is atbest  unclearand  a t w or st ob v iously  in coh erent.Brown a n d S tr a w n  f irst say that emot io n s  a re "by-p roduct s  o fb odily ad ju stm ents , "  butthen go  on to i mply t h at  e motions  a re "su bj ect ive , inn e r ex perien ces." Bu t iti s not clear ho w  both can bet ru e .  E m otio ns,  as subject ivei nner  exp e ri enc e s wit h mot iv a ti o nal and epistemolog ic al com ponen ts, cannot be  identical t o  bodily81 B r ow n  and Strawn, 1 62. r eactions.8 2  Identit y isa necess ary relat i o n. A thi ngmus t b e i d e nt ical to itsel f .  So,  i f emoti ons  are id ent ica l t o b od ily react ions orbr ai nst ate s, th e n thereca nno tbean in s tanceof an  emo ti on tha t is no t  a b odil yre acti onor  brai n st a te.  Howeve r, the Ch ris t ianph ys icalist  is faced wit hthe follow in g c ounter e x ample: B iblically, God has emot i ons, bu t d oes n ot h ave a bod y,brainsta t es, or  any p hysic al  fe a t ures. 8 3  T her ef ore, emoti o n s c annot  b e id entical  to any physical t h ing , bodily reac tio ns,b r ai n s t at e s o ro the r w ise. Perhaps Br own and St ra w nmean onlyt hat  h uman em otionsare i d entical  to bodil y reactio ns  orb r ain  states. T his woul d escapeo ur co u nt erexa mpl e, alt ho ugh  this  moves eem s adhoc. R eg ardles s, th is  view fa ces a number of problem s. Fir st, n oti ce that o n t h eir  account,  phe nomenal co nsc iou sness  is irrel evan t  t o e m otion . An individua l  c anh a ve  the brains t a teor bo dil y  react ionof anger although that person do es n o t  ha vet he p he nomenal experi enc eo f  anger.Th e phenomena l experi en c e ofangeris not  identi c a lt o thebodi lyreactionofan g er, whi ch  i s  why o ne c an  appea r to b e  ang r y , yet not actual ly be a ngry. Lik ewise ,one can exhi bit the bo dily respon ses of  fea r, su ch as i nc reased  pu ls e rate, pe r spiration , and  trembl in g wi tho ut hav inga n y fea r at  a ll.  For exam p l e, so me o nemigh t tre mb le f rom excit e ment whi lee ntering  a  ho t room e x pe c t ing a surp ris e.84B u t an accou n t of em o tions  thatleaves  out th e  ph en omenalqua l i ty, the " what-its- l ike -t o-ex perience "feat ur e o femotions, has s imply el iminated t he fun dam e ntal featur eof emotion.To fe el anger j u s t i s
 the_following: They_[emotions] are by-products of_automatic bodily_adjustments_to the_situation_that, when experienced_consciously, provide information_about the nature of_our current relationship_to_the social surrounding (149). In a later chapter, Brown and Strawn state,...we are not_saying_that subjective,_inner_experiences_and emotions are not important_in the Christian life. Rather,_emotions and_feelings are bodily reactions that serve the purpose_of_giving us information_about the significance of the events, including religious events,_that we are involved in, physically_or in our_imaginations.81_The_view as stated is_at best unclear and at worst_obviously incoherent. Brown and Strawn first_say that emotions are "by-products of bodily_adjustments," but then go on to_imply that emotions are "subjective,_inner experiences."_But it is not clear_how both can_be true._Emotions, as subjective_inner experiences with motivational and epistemological_components, cannot be_identical to bodily 81 Brown and_Strawn,_162. reactions.82 Identity_is_a_necessary relation._A thing must_be_identical to_itself._So, if emotions are identical to_bodily_reactions or brain states, then there cannot_be an instance of_an_emotion that is not_a bodily reaction or brain_state. However, the Christian physicalist is_faced with_the following_counterexample: Biblically, God has emotions, but does not have a body,_brain states, or any physical features.83_Therefore, emotions cannot be_identical to_any_physical thing, bodily_reactions,_brain states_or otherwise. Perhaps Brown and Strawn mean_only that_human emotions are identical to bodily_reactions or brain states._This_would escape our counterexample, although this_move seems ad hoc. Regardless, this_view faces a number of_problems._First,_notice that on their account,_phenomenal consciousness is irrelevant to emotion._An individual can_have the brain state or bodily reaction_of_anger although that person does not_have_the phenomenal experience of anger. The_phenomenal_experience_of anger is not identical_to the bodily reaction of anger,_which is why one can appear to be angry,_yet not actually_be angry. Likewise, one can_exhibit_the_bodily responses of fear, such as increased pulse rate, perspiration,_and trembling_without having any_fear at all. For example, someone might tremble from excitement_while entering a hot room expecting a_surprise.84 But an account of emotions that leaves out the phenomenal_quality, the "what-its-like-to-experience" feature of emotions, has simply_eliminated the fundamental feature of emotion. To_feel anger just is