, I think, at least allow arbitrary fusions of appropriate parts of reality to be themselves appropriate.8 But any such 7This is the "T-preserving analysis" discussed by Parsons (2009). 8Bricker (2001) endorses something like (5) with 'appropriate' interpreted to mean 'fusion of Lewis-worlds', but he does not intend it as an analysis of possibility claims involving absolutely unrestricted quantifiers. I will discuss his theory of the relevant kind of restriction in section 4 below. 3 view still strikes me as pointless. If anything short of reality as a whole counts as "appropriate", we will no longer have an S5 modal logic, even for claims involving just unrestricted quantification and qualitative predicates. For example, if there is an appropriate part that lacks blue swans, then it is possible that nou swans be blue, and hence possible that it is not possible that someu swans be blue. Endorsing such a claim for the sake of being able to agree with ordinary people when they claim that it is possible that nou swans are blue seems like a bad trade. For the modal realist is already committed to rejecting many common-sense modal claims involving unrestricted quantification, e.g. the claim that it is possible that it is contingently the case that nou swans are blue. It would be perverse to jettison compelling logical principles just in order to slightly decrease the scope of this systematic disagreement. I conclude that the best option for the modal realist is to hold that 'Possibly, Qu Fs are Gs' is equivalent in every case to 'Qu Fs are Gs'. And if we say this, I can see no grounds for resisting the following obvious generalisation: whenever φ is a sentence built up from qualitative predicates, unrestricted quantifiers and truth-functional operators, pPossibly φq and pNecessarily φq are both equivalent to φ.9 One might attempt to avoid this conclusion by giving up the "plausible principle of compositionality" alluded to above, and denying that sentences of the form 'Possibly Q Fs are G' even admit readings on which the quantifier is unrestricted. The setup in 'Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic' (Lewis 1968) may suggest such a view. There, the project of reducing modality is cast as one of finding translations from one formal language, containing modal operators, into another, which lacks them. The latter is not just the modality-free fragment of
, I think, at least allow arbitrary fusions of appropriate parts of world to be themselves appropriate.8 But any such 7This is the " metric ton - preserving analysis " discourse by Parsons (2009). 8Bricker (2001) second something like (5) with' appropriate' interpreted to mean' coalition of Lewis - worlds', but he does not intend it as an analysis of hypothesis claim involving absolutely nonsensitive quantifiers. I will discuss his hypothesis of the relevant kind of restriction in section 4 below. 3 view still strikes me as pointless. If anything inadequate of reality as a whole counts as " appropriate ", we will no longer consume an S5 modal logic, even for claims involving just unrestricted quantification and qualitative predicate. For example, if there is an appropriate part that lacks blue swan, then it is possible that nou swans be blue, and hence possible that it is not potential that someu swan cost blue. Endorsing such a claim for the sake of being able to agree with ordinary people when they claim that it is potential that nou swans are aristocratic seems like a bad trade. For the modal realist is already commit to rejecting many common - sense modal claim involve unrestricted quantification, e.g. the title that it is possible that it is contingently the case that nou swans are blue. It would be perverse to jettison compelling logical rationale just in order to slightly decrease the scope of this taxonomic disagreement. I reason that the best option for the modal realist is to hold that' Possibly, Qu Fs are Gs' is equivalent in every case to' Qu Fs are Gs'. And if we say this, I can see no footing for resisting the following obvious generalisation: whenever φ is a conviction built up from qualitative predicates, unrestricted quantifiers and accuracy - functional operators, pPossibly φq and pNecessarily φq are both equivalent to φ.9 One might attempt to avoid this conclusion by contribute up the " plausible principle of compositionality " allude to above, and denying that sentences of the form' Possibly Q Fs are G' even admit reading on which the quantifier is unrestricted. The setup in' Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic' (Lewis 1968) may suggest such a view. There, the undertaking of reducing modality is cast as one of find translations from one formal language, containing modal operators, into another, which miss them. The latter is not just the modality - complimentary fragment of
, I hhink, at least allow arbltrary fusions oy appro'riate larts of reality to be themselves ap'ropeiate.8 But any such 7This is ghe "T-presvrving anqlysms" discussed by 'zrsons (2009). 8Bricksv (2001) enbocses something kike (5) with 'appropriate' ittdr'reted to mean 'fusion of Lewis-worlds', but he dles not intend it sf an analysis of possibility claims inbolving absolutely umrestricted quantifiers. I aill discuss his theorj of the reoevagr kind of rertriction pu section 4 gelow. 3 view still strikes me as poincless. If anicyinh short of rxality as a whole gpunts ds "apprppriate", we wilk nm linger have an S5 modal logic, even for clwims invonvnng just unrestricted qyantixicadion qnd quzlmtafive pgedmcates. For sxample, if rhere is an approproaev part that lzcks bjuq swans, then it is possible that nou swdns be blue, and hence possuble that it is not plssible trat someu swans be blue. Endorsing such a claim fos the rakt if bekbg able to agree with ordinary people when they dlsik that it is pjssible thay joi swans are bloe seems ljke a bad trade. Fog the mjdal eealist if alteady committed to rejectint many commou-sebse modal claims iuvolving unrzstricjed qusntification, e.g. the clanm thaf it is posdible thaf it is contingengly tve case ufat nou swans are blue. It xould be perxersg to jeetison comoellikc logical principlfs judt in order ho slightly decrease the scope of this systemsthc gisagreeient. L conclude that the best optipn for che moaal realisn is to hmld that 'Pofsibly, Qu Fs dte Gs' is equitalent in eveey cqse to 'Dj Fs are Gs'. Anc if we scv this, I xan see no grounds fot desisting the filliwing obvious grnefalyswtmon: wranever φ is a sengenzr buiut up from wjaliyative predicates, unsestdicted quantifiers akd truth-fonctional operators, pPpssibly φq and pNectssariny φd are bojh equivalent to φ.9 One might attsmpt to agoiq this concltsiok by giving up the "plausible principle of compositionelity" alluded to above, qnd denying that seuttnces of the horm 'Pjssibly Q Fs are G' even admit readings on whicm the quantifier is undestriwted. Hhe setup in 'Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic' (Lewis 1968) may sugtest sncr a view. Thsre, yhe pgojzct of requciig modality is casn as one of finding translations from ona yormal language, containing mocau operators, ivto another, which lacks fhem. The latter is not just the modalitu-free fragment of
, I think, at least allow arbitrary appropriate of reality be themselves appropriate.8 the analysis" discussed by (2009). 8Bricker (2001) something like (5) with 'appropriate' interpreted mean 'fusion of Lewis-worlds', but he does not intend it as an analysis possibility claims involving absolutely unrestricted quantifiers. I will discuss his theory of the kind restriction section below. 3 view still strikes me as pointless. If anything short of reality as a whole as "appropriate", we will no longer have an modal logic, even for involving just unrestricted quantification and predicates. example, if is appropriate that lacks blue then it is possible that nou swans be blue, and hence possible that it is not possible someu swans Endorsing such claim the of being able with ordinary people when they claim possible that nou swans are blue seems like bad trade. the modal realist is already committed rejecting many common-sense modal claims involving unrestricted quantification, the claim that it is possible that it is contingently the case that nou swans It would be perverse jettison compelling logical just order slightly the scope this systematic disagreement. I conclude that the best option for the realist is to hold that 'Possibly, Qu Fs are Gs' in case to 'Qu are Gs'. And if say I can see no resisting following φ a built up from qualitative unrestricted quantifiers and truth-functional operators, φq and pNecessarily φq One might attempt to avoid this conclusion by up the "plausible principle of compositionality" alluded above, and denying that sentences of the form 'Possibly Q Fs are even admit which the quantifier is unrestricted. The setup in Theory and Quantified Modal (Lewis 1968) may suggest such a view. There, the of modality is as one of translations from one language, containing modal another, which them. latter the modality-free fragment of
, I think, at least allow arbitraRy fusions oF apprOprIatE pArts Of reAlity to be themsELves Appropriate.8 But any such 7THis is ThE "t-preSErVing aNalysis" DIsCUSseD bY PArsOnS (2009). 8brIcker (2001) EndOrses soMething likE (5) wiTh 'Appropriate' iNTeRpreted to mEan 'Fusion of LewiS-woRlds', buT hE doES not iNteNd it aS an anaLYsis of PossibiliTy CLaims iNVolving ABSoLuteLy unrestricted quaNTiFIers. I will discuSs his tHeORy OF The RelEvant kind oF rEstriCTion in sECtION 4 BelOW. 3 view still strIkes me as poiNTleSs. If anYtHinG Short oF realItY As a Whole counts As "apPropriate", We will NO longer HAve an S5 mOdal loGic, EveN for CLaImS inVoLVinG JuSt uNResTricted qUaNtIficaTion AND QUaliTatIve pRedicAtes. For examplE, if TherE Is aN apprOpriaTe paRt That lAcks blUe swaNs, Then it is possiblE thaT nou swans Be bLuE, anD hEnce pOSsible ThaT it Is not poSsible tHAt sOmEU SWaNs be blue. Endorsing sUcH A ClAim for thE sake oF BeInG Able to agReE wiTh orDINary pEoplE WhEn they clAim thaT It Is PossiblE tHat nou SwAns Are Blue sEEms lIke a baD trade. FoR the mODal realist is alREady committed TO rEJEcTIng mAny Common-sense ModaL ClaiMs inVOlVinG UnresTrictEd QUaNTification, e.g. the claiM tHat it iS possIble that it is cOntingentlY THE case thaT nou SWaNS are blue. It woulD be peRverse to jeTTison comPelliNg logicaL principlES Just in orDer To sLigHtlY DEcRease the scope OF This SyStematiC diSagreemEnt. i coNclUde ThAt the best Option foR tHe MoDaL reAlist IS to hold tHaT 'PoSsIblY, Qu Fs ARe Gs' is EquivAlenT iN eVEry Case to 'QU fs ARE Gs'. ANd If We saY thIs, i can sEe no GRouNds for rEsisting tHe fOLlowInG oBvious gEneralisation: WhEnever φ is a SeNteNce buiLT Up from quAlitative predicates, unreSTricted QuaNtifiErs aNd truth-fuNctIonal oPerATors, pPOssiblY φq anD pnecESSarilY ΦQ aRe bOtH equivalenT TO φ.9 ONe migHt AtteMpt to avOid this conclusion bY GivIng up the "plausIblE priNCIpLe oF CoMPosItIOnaLITy" alluded to abovE, and denyinG tHAt Sentences oF The FoRm 'PossiBly Q Fs aRe G' evEN admit rEadings on Which the qUaNtifIER is UnrestrictEd. The setUp in 'CountERpart tHeOry anD QuAntifiEd modAl LogIc' (LewiS 1968) May SuggeSt such A vIew. TheRe, the PrOject of rEducing modality is cast as One of fIndinG trAnslationS frOM onE formal laNguaGe, containiNg mOdaL operAtoRS, into AnotHEr, WhiCH lackS theM. the latter IS nOt jUST tHe modality-fREE FraGment Of
, I think, at least allowarbitraryfusio nsofap prop riat e parts of rea l ityto be themselves appro priat e. 8  But an y suc h 7This is t he"T -p res er v in g ana lys is" dis cussed byPar so ns (2009). 8 B ri cker (2001 ) e ndorses some thi ng lik e(5) with'ap propr iate'i nterpr eted to m ea n  'fusi o n of Le w i s- worl ds', but he doesn ot intend it as a n anal ys i so f  po ssi bility cla im s inv o lving a b so l u t ely unrestrictedquantifiers .  Iwill d is cus s  his t heory  o f  th e relevantkind  of restr iction in sect i on 4 be low. 3  vi ewstil l  s tr ike sm e a s  p oin t les s. If an yt hi ng sh orto f r eali tyas a  whol e counts as " app ropr i ate ", we  will  nolo ngerhave a n S5mo dal logic, even  for  claims i nvo lv ing  j ust u n restri cte d q uantifi cationa ndqu a l i ta tive predicates. F or e xa mple, if  there is  a n  appropr ia tepart t hat l acks bl ue swans , then it  i s possi bl e that  n ouswa ns be blue , andhence po ssibl e  that it is no t  possible tha t  s o m eu swan s b e blue. End orsi n g su ch a cl aim for t he sa ke of being able to agree  w ith or dinar y people when  they clai m t hat it i s po s si b le that nou sw ans a re blue se e ms likea bad  trade.For the m o d al reali stisalr ead y co mmitted to re j e ctin gmany co mmo n-sense  mo dal  cl aim sinvolving  unrestr ic te dqu ant ifica t ion, e.g .the  c lai m tha t  it is  poss ible  t ha t  it  is con t in g e ntly  t he  cas e t ha t nou  swa n s a re blue . It woul d b e  per ve rs e to je ttison compel li ng logical  p rin ciples j ust in o rder to slightly decrea s e the s cop e ofthis  systemat icdisagr eem e nt. Iconclu de th at  th e besto p ti onfo r the moda l rea listis  tohold th at 'Possibly, Qu F s  ar e Gs' is equi val enti n  e ver y  c a seto 'Qu F s are Gs'. Andif we sayth i s,  I can see nogr ounds f or resi sting the fol lowing ob vious gen er alis a t ion : whenever  φ is asentenceb uiltu pfromqua litati ve  pr edica tes, u n res trict ed qua nt ifiers  andtr uth-func tional operators, pPoss ibly φ q and  pN ecessaril y φ q  ar e both eq uiva lent to φ. 9 O nemight  at t emptto a v oi d t h is co nclu s ion by gi v in g u p th e "plausibl e p rin ciple  of compos itio nality" alluded t o  above, and de nyin g tha t s e nten ce s of the form'Po ss i b ly Q Fsar e G' even a dmit rea di n gs on  which  the q uantifi e r  i s  unres tric ted . The set upin 'Counte rp ar t  Theor y an dQuanti fied M o dalL o gic' (Lewis 1968 ) may s ugges t  su ch avi ew. The r e, t he project  of reducin g moda lity  is c ast ason e of f ind in g translat i ons fromone f ormal l an guag e,contai ning m odaloper at ors , into an o t he r ,wh i chlack s the m.  The  latter i s  not jus t t h e modal it y-f r e e frag m en t of
, I_think, at_least allow arbitrary fusions_of appropriate_parts_of reality_to_be themselves appropriate.8_But any such_7This is the "T-preserving_analysis" discussed by_Parsons_(2009). 8Bricker (2001) endorses something like (5) with 'appropriate' interpreted to mean 'fusion of_Lewis-worlds',_but he_does_not_intend it as an analysis_of possibility claims involving absolutely_unrestricted quantifiers._I will discuss his theory of the relevant_kind_of restriction in_section 4 below. 3 view still strikes me as_pointless. If anything short of reality_as a whole_counts_as_"appropriate", we will no_longer have an S5 modal logic,_even for claims involving just unrestricted_quantification and qualitative predicates. For example, if_there is an appropriate part that_lacks blue swans, then it_is possible_that nou swans be blue,_and hence possible_that it_is not possible_that someu swans be blue. Endorsing_such a claim_for the sake of being able_to_agree with ordinary_people_when_they claim_that it is_possible_that nou_swans_are blue seems like a bad_trade._For the modal realist is already committed_to rejecting many common-sense_modal_claims involving unrestricted quantification,_e.g. the claim that it_is possible that it is contingently_the case_that nou_swans are blue. It would be perverse to jettison compelling logical_principles just in order to slightly_decrease the scope of_this systematic_disagreement._I conclude that_the_best option_for the modal realist is to hold_that 'Possibly,_Qu Fs are Gs' is equivalent_in every case to_'Qu_Fs are Gs'. And if we_say this, I can see no_grounds for resisting the following_obvious_generalisation:_whenever φ is a sentence_built up from qualitative predicates, unrestricted_quantifiers and truth-functional_operators, pPossibly φq and pNecessarily φq are_both_equivalent to φ.9 One might attempt_to_avoid this conclusion by giving up_the_"plausible_principle of compositionality" alluded to_above, and denying that sentences of_the form 'Possibly Q Fs are G' even admit_readings on which_the quantifier is unrestricted. The_setup_in_'Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic' (Lewis 1968) may suggest_such a_view. There, the_project of reducing modality is cast as one of finding_translations from one formal language, containing modal_operators, into another, which lacks them. The latter is not just_the modality-free fragment of