 three things about the following thesis. Epistemic Charge thesis: Some experiences are epistemically charged. To assess this thesis, further explanation is needed on three fronts: Scope: What is the scope of epistemic charge among experiences? Ground: In virtue of what do experiences have any epistemic charge at all? Modulation: What kinds of factors can modulate the epistemic charge of an epistemically charged experience? The scope question asks whether all perceptual experiences have epistemic charge. Is having epistemic charge exceptional or standard? The ground question asks what features of charged experiences, or what facts about experiences, explain why they are epistemically charged at all, as opposed to having no epistemic charge. The ground question bears directly on the scope question. The scope of epistemic charge will depend on the distribution across experiences of the factors that ground its epistemic charge. For instance, if the factors are exclusively contingent features of experience – such as resulting from projected overconfidence --‐ then only the experiences with those features will be charged, and these experiences may occur only occasionally. At the other extreme, if the grounding factors are constitutive of experience, then all experiences will be epistemically charged. The modulation question assumes that experiences can be epistemically charged, and asks what kinds of factors can increase or decrease its charge, or flip its valence from positive to negative. Taken together, the ground and the modulation questions ask for an account of which features give an experience the specific epistemic charge that it has. We have already met a possible answer to the modulation question: inference can modulate epistemic charge. If experiences can be epistemically charged, this opens the possibility that at least some of the routes 21 In Siegel (2011) and (2013) I argue that it would indeed be epistemically problematic for Vivek to strengthen (even further) his confidence that audiences like him in response to his vanity--‐generated experience. For discussion, see McGrath (2013), Huemer (2013), Fumerton (2013), Tucker (2014), Jackson (2011), and Zeimbekis, ed. (2015) Siegel/Epistemic Charge 16 to experience that psychologists call 'inferences' belong in the class of inferences that establish epistemic dependence of conclusions on their inferential inputs. In the rest of the paper, I sketch what strike me as the most plausible and powerful potential answer to the scope and ground questions. The sketch lets us see more clearly how the Epistemic Charge thesis could be developed, what it entails, and what
three things about the following thesis. Epistemic Charge dissertation: Some experience are epistemically charged. To assess this dissertation, further explanation is needed on three presence: Scope: What is the scope of epistemic commission among experiences? Ground: In merit of what do experience have any epistemic charge at wholly? Modulation: What kinds of factors can modulate the epistemic bang of an epistemically charged experience? The oscilloscope question asks whether all perceptual experience have epistemic charge. Is having epistemic bang exceptional or standard? The ground question asks what feature of charged experiences, or what facts about experiences, explain why they are epistemically charged at wholly, as opposed to having no epistemic charge. The ground question bears immediately on the setting question. The scope of epistemic charge will depend on the distribution across experiences of the factors that ground its epistemic charge. For instance, if the factor are exclusively contingent features of experience – such as result from projected overconfidence --‐ then only the experiences with those feature will be charge, and these experiences may occur merely occasionally. At the other extreme, if the grounding factors are constitutive of experience, then all experiences will be epistemically agitate. The modulation question assumes that experiences can be epistemically charge, and asks what kind of gene can increase or decrease its charge, or flip its valence from positive to negative. take together, the ground and the modulation question ask for an account of which features give an experience the specific epistemic bang that it has. We have already meet a possible solution to the modulation question: inference can modulate epistemic charge. If experience can be epistemically charged, this open the possibility that at least some of the routes 21 In Siegel (2011) and (2013) I argue that it would indeed be epistemically problematic for Vivek to strengthen (even further) his assurance that audiences like him in response to his vanity--‐generated experience. For discussion, see McGrath (2013), Huemer (2013), Fumerton (2013), Tucker (2014), Jackson (2011), and Zeimbekis, ed. (2015) Siegel / Epistemic mission 16 to experience that psychologists call' inferences' belong in the class of inference that establish epistemic dependence of conclusion on their inferential inputs. In the rest of the paper, I sketch what strike me as the most plausible and powerful likely answer to the scope and ground questions. The sketch lets us see more clearly how the Epistemic Charge dissertation could be developed, what it entails, and what
 thgee things about the foluowing thesis. Ekiwtemic Chargs thesis: Some experiences are epistelixally charged. To assess thir thesis, vurther wxplenation is needev on thrcz frohbs: Scm'e: What is the xcope of e[istemic charga xmlng experiences? Ground: In virtue of what dp fxperiences hade amr epjstemic charge at all? Modulation: Wgat kinvs of factors csn modulate the epistemic fharhe of an epistemicwlly chargee ex[wrience? The rcope quesuimn asks whgther all perceptual experiences have epistemic cyarhg. Is having xpisteiic charge ewbeptiondl or syandard? The grpunv quwstion asks what featnres of charged expetiences, or wkat facts about experuebces, gxplahn wft tfey ace spistelicelly charges at all, as opposed to having mo vlistemic chadge. Thq dround question bears directly on the sbope question. The scope of wpistemic charge will depend og the distribution across experiences of the factmrs tiag gxiund krs epistemic charge. For instance, if the factors zrt eqclusively continnent features of ecpfrognce – such as tesultiuf rrom projected ovegconfidgnce --‐ rhen only the experiences with those fearures will bv chqrged, and these ex'eriences mav occut only occasionally. At the otker exfreme, if thf groundihe factors are covstptuthve of experience, then all experienres wnll be eoistgmicallr charged. Hhe modulation question wssumgs thad experienfes can be epistemically chargev, and asks whst kitds of fcctors can increase or decrease ijs charge, or fuip its vamence fcom positive to negative. Dwken togethec, the grotnd qnd rhe modjuation questioms ask fog cn accounr of which featurex gkbe an experiencz uhw specific epixteoic cjacge trdt it has. We havd auteady met a kjswkble answer to the moduldtioh question: inferenve can modolate epiftemic charge. If experiences caj be xpisteoicalky sharged, this opens the possibimity that at least some jf tme rjutes 21 In Xiegel (2011) and (2013) I argue that it would indexd be epistemically provlematic for Vivek jo xtrengthen (xven ftrther) hiv confidence that aueiences like him ln response to his vanjty--‐genaratef experience. For discussion, see McGrath (2013), Huemer (2013), Fumerton (2013), Tucker (2014), Jacksob (2011), and Zeimbekis, es. (2015) Soegel/Vpifcemic Crargx 16 to experience tnat psychologists call 'inferencxs' belong hn the class of inferences thay dstablish epirtemic dependence of condlusions on their inferential inputs. In the rest of the paper, I sketch qhat atrike me es the most plausiblr and 'owerfyl potebtiap answer to tfe xclpe and ggounv qbestions. The sketch lets us see mire clwagly how the Episvemic Charge uhesis bould bg developed, what jt ehhails, and what
three things about the following thesis. Epistemic Some are epistemically To assess this on fronts: Scope: What the scope of charge among experiences? Ground: In virtue what do experiences have any epistemic charge at all? Modulation: What kinds of can modulate the epistemic charge of an epistemically charged experience? The scope question whether perceptual have charge. Is having epistemic charge exceptional or standard? The ground question asks what features of charged or what facts about experiences, explain why they epistemically charged at all, opposed to having no epistemic The question bears on scope The scope of charge will depend on the distribution across experiences of the factors that ground its epistemic charge. For if the exclusively contingent of – as resulting from --‐ then only the experiences with be charged, and these experiences may occur only At the extreme, if the grounding factors are of experience, then all experiences will be epistemically The modulation question assumes that experiences can be epistemically charged, and asks what kinds of increase or decrease its or flip its from to Taken the ground the modulation questions ask for an account of which features give experience the specific epistemic charge that it has. We have a answer to the question: inference can modulate charge. experiences can be epistemically opens possibility some the 21 In Siegel (2011) (2013) I argue that it indeed be epistemically problematic further) his confidence that audiences like him in to his vanity--‐generated experience. For discussion, see (2013), Huemer (2013), Fumerton (2013), Tucker (2014), Jackson (2011), and Zeimbekis, ed. Siegel/Epistemic Charge experience that psychologists call 'inferences' belong in the of inferences that establish dependence of conclusions on their inferential inputs. In the of paper, I what strike me the most plausible powerful potential answer scope and questions. sketch more clearly how the Epistemic Charge could developed, what it entails, and
 three things about the followIng thesis. EPisteMic chaRgE theSis: SOme experiences ARe epIstemically charged. To asSess tHiS ThesIS, fUrtheR explanATiON Is nEeDeD on ThREe FrontS: ScOpe: What Is the scope Of ePiStemic charge AMoNg experienCes? ground: In virtUe oF what dO eXpeRIenceS haVe any EpisteMIc charGe at all? MoDuLAtion: WHAt kinds OF FaCtorS can modulate the epIStEMic charge of an ePistemIcALlY CHarGed Experience? thE scopE QuestioN AsKS WHetHEr all perceptuAl experiencES haVe episTeMic CHarge. IS haviNg EPisTemic charge ExcePtional or StandaRD? The groUNd questIon askS whAt fEatuREs Of ChaRgED exPErIenCEs, oR what facTs AbOut exPeriENCES, expLaiN why They aRe epistemicalLy cHargED at All, as OpposEd to HaVing nO epistEmic cHaRge. The ground queStioN bears dirEctLy On tHe Scope QUestioN. ThE scOpe of epIstemic CHarGe WILL dEpend on the distribuTiON AcRoss expeRienceS Of ThE Factors tHaT grOund ITS episTemiC ChArge. For iNstancE, If ThE factorS aRe exclUsIveLy cOntinGEnt fEatureS of experIence – SUch as resulting FRom projected oVErCONfIDencE --‐ thEn only the exPeriENces With THoSe fEAtureS will Be CHaRGed, and these experienCeS may ocCur onLy occasionallY. At the otheR EXTreme, if tHe grOUnDIng factors are cOnstiTutive of exPErience, tHen alL experieNces will bE EPistemicAllY chArgEd. THE MoDulation questION assUmEs that eXpeRiences Can Be ePisTemIcAlly chargEd, and askS wHaT kInDs oF factORs can incReAse Or DecRease ITs charGe, or fLip iTs VaLEncE from poSItIVE to nEgAtIve. TAkeN tOgethEr, thE GroUnd and tHe modulatIon QUestIoNs Ask for aN account of whiCh Features giVe An eXperieNCE the specIfic epistemic charge that IT has. We hAve AlreaDy meT a possiblE anSwer to The MOdulatIon queStion: InFerENCe can MODuLatE ePistemic chARGe. IF expeRiEnceS can be ePistemically chargeD, ThiS opens the possIbiLity THAt At lEAsT SomE oF The ROUtes 21 In Siegel (2011) and (2013) i argue that It WOuLd indeed be EPisTeMically ProblemAtic fOR Vivek tO strengthEn (even furThEr) hiS COnfIdence that AudienceS like him iN RespoNSe To his VanIty--‐genErAteD expeRience. fOr dIscusSion, seE MCGrath (2013), huemeR (2013), FUmerton (2013), TUcker (2014), Jackson (2011), and ZeimbekiS, ed. (2015) SieGel/EpIstEmic ChargE 16 to EXpeRience thaT psyChologists CalL 'inFerenCes' BElong In thE ClAss OF infeRencES that estaBLiSh ePIStEmic dependeNCE Of cOncluSioNS on theIr inFerential inputs. In THe rest of the papEr, I sKETch WhaT StriKe Me as the most plaUsiBlE ANd powerfUl Potential anSwer to thE sCOpe anD grounD questIons. The SKEtCH lets uS see MorE clearly hOw tHe ePistemiC CHaRGe thesIs coUlD be devEloped, WHat iT ENtails, and what
 three things about the fo llowing th esis.  Ep ist em ic C harg e thesis: Some expe riences are epistemica lly c ha r ged. To  asse ss this th e s is,  f ur the re xp lanat ion  is nee ded on thr eefr onts: Scope: Wh at is thesco pe of episte mic  charg eamo n g exp eri ences ? Grou n d: Invirtue of  w h at doe xperien c e shave  any epistemic ch a rg e  at all? Modul ation:  W h at k ind s o f factorsca n mod u late th e  e p i s tem i c charge of a n epistemic a lly  charg ed  ex p erienc e? Th es cop e questionasks  whetherall pe r ceptual experie nces h ave  ep iste m ic  c har ge .  Is ha vin g  ep istemicch ar ge ex cept i o n a l or  st anda rd? T he ground que sti on a s kswhatfeatu resof  char ged ex perie nc es, or what fac ts a bout expe rie nc es,  e xplai n  why t hey  ar e epist emicall y  ch ar g e d  a t all, as opposedto h av ing no e pistem i cch a rge. The  g rou nd q u e stion  bea r sdirectly  on th e  s co pe ques ti on. Th esco peof ep i stem ic cha rge will  depe n d on the distr i bution across ex p e ri e nces  of  the factor s th a t gr ound it s e p istem ic ch ar g e. For instance, if th efactor s are  exclusivelycontingent f e atures o f ex p er i ence – such as  resu lting from projecte d ove rconfide nce --‐ t h e n only t heexp eri enc e s  w ith those fea t u reswi ll be c har ged, an d t hes e e xpe ri ences may  occur o nl yoc ca sio nally .  At theot her  e xtr eme,i f thegroun ding  f ac t ors  are co n st i t utiv eof  exp eri en ce, t hena llexperie nces will  be epis te mi cally c harged. The m od ulation qu es tio n assu m e s that e xperiences can be epist e mically  ch arged , an d asks wh atkindsoff actors  can i ncrea se  or d ecrea s e  i tsch arge, or f l i p i ts va le ncefrom po sitive to negative .  Ta ken together,  th e gr o u nd  an d  t h e m od u lat i o n questions ask  for an ac co u nt  of whichf eat ur es give  an exp erien c e the s pecific e pistemicch arge t hat  it has. W e have a lready me t  a po s si ble a nsw er toth e m odula tion q u est ion:infere nc e canmodul at e episte mic charge. If experien ces ca n beepi stemicall y c h arg ed, thisopen s the poss ibi lit y tha t a t  leas t so m eoft he ro utes 21 In Sie g el  (2 0 1 1)  and (2013) I arg ue th ati t woul d in deed be epistemic a lly problemati c fo r Viv ekt o st re ngthen (even f urt he r )  his con fi dence thataudience sl ike h im inrespon se to h i s  v a nity-- ‐gen era ted exper ien ce .  For di sc us s ion, s ee M cG rath ( 2013), Huem e r  (2013), Fumerto n (20 1 3 ), Tu c ker  (201 4) , Jacks o n (2 011), andZeimbekis,ed. (2 015)  Sieg el/Epis te mic Ch arg e16 to expe r ience tha t psy chologi st s ca ll'infer ence s '  belo ng i nthe  class of i nf e re nc e s t hatestab li sh e pistemicd ependenc e o f  conclu si ons o n thei r  i n f erential i npu ts. I n the rest o f  the pa p er, I  sketc h what  strike meas  the mo stp l ausible a nd powerf u l p ot enti al answe rto t he  sc op e and ground qu estions.  The ske t c h lets  us seem ore cl ea rly how theEpist em i c Charg e the sis cou l d b e d eve lope d,what it entails, and what
 three_things about_the following thesis. Epistemic_Charge thesis:_Some_experiences are_epistemically_charged. To assess_this thesis, further_explanation is needed on_three fronts: Scope:_What_is the scope of epistemic charge among experiences? Ground: In virtue of what do_experiences_have any_epistemic_charge_at all? Modulation: What kinds_of factors can modulate the_epistemic charge_of an epistemically charged experience? The scope question_asks_whether all perceptual_experiences have epistemic charge. Is having epistemic charge exceptional_or standard? The ground question asks_what features of_charged_experiences,_or what facts about_experiences, explain why they are epistemically_charged at all, as opposed to_having no epistemic charge. The ground question_bears directly on the scope question._The scope of epistemic charge_will depend_on the distribution across experiences_of the factors_that ground_its epistemic charge._For instance, if the factors are_exclusively contingent features_of experience – such as resulting_from_projected overconfidence --‐_then_only_the experiences_with those features_will_be charged,_and_these experiences may occur only occasionally._At_the other extreme, if the grounding factors_are constitutive of experience,_then_all experiences will be_epistemically charged. The modulation question_assumes that experiences can be epistemically_charged, and_asks what_kinds of factors can increase or decrease its charge, or flip_its valence from positive to negative._Taken together, the ground_and the_modulation_questions ask for_an_account of_which features give an experience the specific_epistemic charge_that it has. We have already_met a possible answer_to_the modulation question: inference can modulate_epistemic charge. If experiences can be_epistemically charged, this opens the_possibility_that_at least some of the_routes 21 In Siegel (2011) and_(2013) I argue_that it would indeed be epistemically problematic_for_Vivek to strengthen (even further) his_confidence_that audiences like him in response_to_his_vanity--‐generated experience. For discussion, see_McGrath (2013), Huemer (2013), Fumerton (2013),_Tucker (2014), Jackson (2011), and Zeimbekis, ed. (2015) Siegel/Epistemic_Charge 16 to_experience that psychologists call 'inferences'_belong_in_the class of inferences that establish epistemic dependence of conclusions_on their_inferential inputs. In_the rest of the paper, I sketch what strike me_as the most plausible and powerful potential_answer to the scope and ground questions. The sketch lets us_see more clearly how the Epistemic Charge thesis_could be developed, what it entails, and_what