 When he explains that self-respect is a primary social good, Rawls gives us what I will call the "personal circumstances" that support individuals' selfrespect. These include, first, the conformity of one's activities to the Aristotelian Principle and, second, the appreciation of one's activities by one's associates. When he explains why the tenets of justice as fairness secure citizens' self-respect, Rawls is identifying what I will call the "political circumstances" that support self-respect. There are three of these. The first is the duty of mutual respect, which Rawls thinks would be adopted by the parties in the original position along with his two principles of distributive justice. The two principles of distributive justice include, first, the equal liberty principle, which prescribes the equal distribution of the maximal degree of liberty compatible with its being distributed equally. The second allows inequalities of wealth provided that there is substantive equality of opportunity and that the inequalities maximally benefit the person with the least wealth. The second of these constraints on inequality is termed the "difference principle." The second political circumstance that supports citizens' self-respect, according to Rawls, is the difference principle and the third is the "lexical ordering" of his two principles, also known as the doctrine of the priority of liberty. This doctrine prohibits constraining liberty for the sake of increased wealth. In what follows, I examine Rawls's explanation of both the personal and political circumstances that sustain self-respect. I show that citizens' self-respect is supported by all of these circumstances when self-respect is understood as the mattering notion. However, citizens' self-respect is supported only by the personal circumstances, and perhaps by one of political circumstances, when self-respect is understood as the goodfor-oneself notion. It follows that if Rawls were offering the good-foroneself view in his account of self-respect as a primary social good, then he would indeed by offering an equivocal account of self-respect, as critics have maintained. Moreover, Rawls, to a certain degree, invites this objection because the passages explaining the political circumstances that secure selfrespect are often cryptic. Rawls is attempting in these passages to show that certain aspects of his view are justified by the fact that they OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 2/11/2012, SPi 246 Cynthia A. Stark promote self-respect. Yet, in each case, he briefly describes the aspect that he wishes
When he explains that self - respect is a primary social good, Rawls give us what I will visit the " personal circumstances " that support individuals' selfrespect. These admit, first, the conformity of one's activities to the Aristotelian Principle and, second, the taste of one's activities by one's associates. When he explain why the tenets of justice as comeliness secure citizens' self - obedience, Rawls is identifying what I will call the " political circumstances " that support self - respect. There are three of these. The inaugural is the duty of mutual respect, which Rawls thinks would be assume by the parties in the original position along with his two principles of distributive justice. The two principle of distributive justice include, first, the equal liberty rationale, which prescribes the equal distribution of the maximal degree of liberty compatible with its being distributed equally. The second admit inequalities of wealth provided that there is substantive equality of opportunity and that the inequalities maximally benefit the person with the least wealth. The second of these constraints on inequality is termed the " difference rationale. " The second political context that supports citizens' self - respect, harmonize to Rawls, is the difference principle and the third is the " lexical ordering " of his two principle, besides known as the doctrine of the priority of liberty. This doctrine forbid constraining liberty for the sake of increased wealth. In what follows, I examine Rawls's explanation of both the personal and political circumstances that nourish self - respect. I show that citizens' self - respect is supported by all of these circumstances when self - deference is understood as the mattering notion. However, citizens' self - respect is supported merely by the personal circumstances, and perhaps by one of political circumstances, when self - obedience is understood as the goodfor - oneself notion. It follows that if Rawls were offering the adept - foroneself view in his bill of self - respect as a primary social commodity, then he would indeed by offering an equivocal account of self - respect, as critics have uphold. Moreover, Rawls, to a sealed degree, invites this objection because the passages explaining the political fortune that secure selfrespect are much cryptic. Rawls is attempting in these passages to show that certain aspect of his view are justified by the fact that they OUP correct PROOF – FINAL, 2/11/2012, SPi 246 Cynthia A. Stark promote self - respect. however, in each case, he briefly describes the expression that he wishes
 Whfn he explains that self-vespect is a primary sorial gokd, Rawls gives us what I will call tie "pwrsonql circumstances" that rupport ijdividuaos' stlfrespect. These mhclude, nnrst, fme coufirmity of one's activitiev to the Aristmtdlnan Principle and, second, the appreciwtion og lne's activitief by jne's associates. When he explains why tge teneus of justice as fsirness secure citizens' sepf-redpect, Rawls is idejtifying whqt I qill call thd "political circumstandes" that support self-respect. Thdre axe three of tyesf. The first ms the duty of mutmsl res[ect, whoch Rawls thinls xoule be adopted by the perties in the originwl positimn along with his tqo prinwiplas ow dirtrjbntibe jushicx. The two pdinciples od distributive justocq include, firsf, the qqtal liberty principle, which prescribes uhe esual distribution of thw maximal degree of llberty coipatible with its being distributed equally. The sacond xlliwf unfqualities of wealth provided that there is stgsuannive equality of jpportunity ajd jhat the inequxlities mzximally benefit tje persjn wirh the lewst eealth. The second of these xonstraints jb inequality is texmed the "difyerencg prinviple." The second politieal cidcumstance hhat suppkfts citizens' selw-rexpact, according to Rawls, is ehe diffecence princiole snd thq third is the "lexical ordering" of his jwo prhnciples, apso known as the doctrine of thx priority of lhbegty. This boctrike prohibits cogstraining libgrty for che saye of incrvased weanth. In what follows, I exdline Rawls's xxplanatijn od borh the odrsonal and pokitical cpreumstancew that sustain seln-respgcf. I show that cnuiztnw' self-respect os rup[ogtev by wnl of these wircjmsgsnces when stjf-vesoect is understood as tha maftering notion. Howrvcr, citizebs' self-rqspect is suplorted only by the persmnau cirvumftances, and perhaps by one of lolitical civcumstances, wren welf-respect ns understood as the goodfor-oneself notiin. It follows thaj if Rawls were offernnn the good-foconesejf view it his account of seld-respect as a prikary social good, then he wogld ijdeed by offering an equivocal account of self-respect, as critics have maibtainev. Ioreover, Rasls, yo a bercaiu degreq, intives this objectiom because the passages explainiig the polhtncal circumstances that securr relfrespect ate often cryptic. Rawls is zttemptimg in these passages to show thst certain aspects of hix view aee juatified by the fact that theu OUP EORRECRED PROIF – NINAL, 2/11/2012, SPi 246 Cyvthoa A. Stark oromptz self-respect. Yet, in each case, he briefoy describes the avpect that me wishgs
When he explains that self-respect is a good, gives us I will call individuals' These include, first, conformity of one's to the Aristotelian Principle and, second, appreciation of one's activities by one's associates. When he explains why the tenets justice as fairness secure citizens' self-respect, Rawls is identifying what I will call "political that self-respect. are three of these. The first is the duty of mutual respect, which Rawls thinks would adopted by the parties in the original position with his two principles distributive justice. The two principles distributive include, first, equal principle, prescribes the equal of the maximal degree of liberty compatible with its being distributed equally. The second allows inequalities of provided that substantive equality opportunity that inequalities maximally benefit with the least wealth. The second on inequality is termed the "difference principle." The political circumstance supports citizens' self-respect, according to Rawls, the difference principle and the third is the ordering" of his two principles, also known as the doctrine of the priority of liberty. prohibits constraining liberty for sake of increased In follows, examine explanation of the personal and political circumstances that sustain self-respect. I show that self-respect is supported by all of these circumstances when self-respect as mattering notion. However, self-respect is supported only the circumstances, and perhaps by political when as goodfor-oneself It follows that if were offering the good-foroneself view his account of self-respect then he would indeed by offering an equivocal of self-respect, as critics have maintained. Moreover, to a certain degree, invites this objection because the passages explaining the circumstances that are often cryptic. Rawls is attempting in these to show that certain of his view are justified by the fact that OUP PROOF – 2/11/2012, SPi 246 A. Stark promote Yet, in each briefly describes aspect he
 When he explains that self-resPect is a priMary sOciAl gOoD, RawLs giVes us what I will CAll tHe "personal circumstanceS" that SuPPort INdIviduAls' selfREsPECt. THeSe IncLuDE, fIrst, tHe cOnformiTy of one's acTivItIes to the ArisTOtElian PrincIplE and, second, thE apPreciaTiOn oF One's aCtiVitieS by one'S AssociAtes. When hE eXPlains WHy the teNETs Of juStice as fairness seCUrE Citizens' self-reSpect, RAwLS iS IDenTifYing what I wIlL call THe "politICaL CIRcuMStances" that suPport self-reSPecT. There ArE thREe of thEse. ThE fIRst Is the duty of MutuAl respect, Which RAWls thinKS would bE adoptEd bY thE parTIeS iN thE oRIgiNAl PosITioN along wiTh HiS two pRincIPLES of dIstRibuTive jUstice. The two pRinCiplES of DistrIbutiVe juStIce inClude, fIrst, tHe Equal liberty priNcipLe, which prEscRiBes ThE equaL DistriButIon Of the maXimal deGRee Of LIBErTy compatible with itS bEINg DistribuTed equALlY. THE second aLlOws IneqUALitieS of wEAlTh providEd that THeRe Is substAnTive eqUaLitY of OpporTUnitY and thAt the ineQualiTIes maximally beNEfit the person WItH THe LEast WeaLth. The seconD of tHEse cOnstRAiNts ON ineqUalitY iS TeRMed the "difference priNcIple." ThE secoNd political ciRcumstance THAT supportS citIZeNS' self-respect, acCordiNg to Rawls, iS The diffeRence PrinciplE and the thIRD is the "leXicAl oRdeRinG" OF hIs two principlES, Also KnOwn as thE doCtrine oF thE prIorIty Of Liberty. ThIs doctriNe PrOhIbIts ConstRAining liBeRty FoR thE sake OF increAsed wEaltH. IN wHAt fOllows, I EXaMINe RaWlS's ExplAnaTiOn of bOth tHE peRsonal aNd politicAl cIRcumStAnCes that Sustain self-reSpEct. I show thAt CitIzens' sELF-respect Is supported by all of these CIrcumstAncEs wheN selF-respect iS unDerstoOd aS The matTering NotioN. HOweVER, citiZENs' SelF-rEspect is suPPOrtEd onlY bY the PersonaL circumstances, and pERhaPs by one of poliTicAl ciRCUmStaNCeS, WheN sELf-rESPect is understooD as the goodFoR-OnEself notioN. it fOlLows thaT if RawlS were OFfering The good-foRoneself vIeW in hIS AccOunt of self-Respect aS a primary SOcial GOoD, then He wOuld inDeEd bY offeRing an EQuiVocal AccounT oF self-rEspecT, aS critics Have maintained. Moreover, RAwls, to A certAin Degree, invIteS ThiS objectioN becAuse the pasSagEs eXplaiNinG The poLitiCAl CirCUmstaNces THat secure SElFreSPEcT are often crYPTIc. RAwls iS atTEmptinG in tHese passages to shoW That certain aspEcts OF His VieW Are jUsTified by the facT thAt THEy OUP CORrEcTED PROOF – FInAL, 2/11/2012, SPi 246 CyNtHIa A. StArk proMote seLf-respeCT. yeT, In each Case, He bRiefly desCriBeS The aspeCt ThAT he wisHes
 When he explains that sel f-respectis apri mar ysoci al g ood, Rawls giv e s us  what I will call the"pers on a l ci r cu mstan ces" th a ts u ppo rt  i ndi vi d ua ls' s elf respect . These in clu de , first, the co nformity o f o ne's activit ies  to th eAri s totel ian  Prin ciplea nd, se cond, the  a p precia t ion ofo n e' s ac tivities by one's as s ociates. Whenhe exp la i ns w hythe  tenets of  j ustic e  as fai r ne s s sec u re citizens'self-respec t , R awls i side n tifyin g wha tI  wi ll call the  "po litical c ircums t ances"t hat sup port s elf -re spec t .Th ere  a r e t h re e o f  th ese. The  f ir st is  the d u t y of  mu tual  resp ect, which Ra wls  thi n kswould  be a dopt ed  by t he par tiesin  the original p osit ion along  wi th  hi stwo p r incipl esofdistrib utive j u sti ce . T he  two principles of  d i s tr ibutivejustic e  i nc l ude, fir st , t he e q u al li bert y  p rinciple , whic h  p re scribes  t he equ al  di str ibuti o n of  the m aximal d egree of liberty com p atible with i t sb e in g  dis tri buted equal ly.T he s econ d  a llo w s ine quali ti e so f wealth provided t ha t ther e issubstantive e quality of o p portunit y an d  t h at the inequal ities  maximally benefitthe p erson wi th the le a s t wealth . T hesec ond o fthese constra i n ts o ninequal ity  is ter med  th e " dif fe rence pri nciple."  T he  s ec ond  poli t ical cir cu mst an cethats upport s cit izen s'  s e lf- respect ,  a c c ordi ng  t o Ra wls ,is th e di f fer ence pr inciple a ndt he t hi rd  is the  "lexical ord er ing" of hi stwo  princ i p les, als o known as the doctrine of thepri ority  ofliberty.Thi s doct rin e  prohi bits c onstr ai nin g liber t y  f orth e sake ofi n cre asedwe alth . In wh at follows, I exam i neRawls's expla nat iono f  b oth th e  pe rs o nal a nd political ci rcumstance st ha t sustains elf -r espect.  I show  that citizen s' self-r espect is  s uppo r t edby all ofthese ci rcumstanc e s whe n  s elf-r esp ect is  u nde rstoo d as t h e m atter ing no ti on. Ho wever ,citizens ' self-respect is suppo rted o nly b y t he person alc irc umstances , an d perhapsbyone  of p oli t icalcirc u ms tan c es, w hens elf-respe c tisu n de rstood as t h e goo dfor- one s elf no tion . It follows that if Rawls wereoffe r i ngthe good -f oroneself view  in  h i s  account  o f self-resp ect as a  p r imary  socia l good , thenh e  w o uld in deed  by  offering  an  e q uivocal  a cc o unt of  sel f- respec t, asc riti c s  have maintained . Mor e o ver,R awl s, to  a  certai n  deg ree, invit es this obj ection  bec ausethe pas sa ges ex pla in ing the po l itical ci rcums tancesth at s ecu re sel fres p e ct ar e of te n c ryptic. R a w ls is  a t tem ptin g inth esepassagest o show t hat certain  a spe c t s of h i sv i ew are jus tif ied b y the fact t h at t h ey OUP C ORRECT ED PRO OF – FI N AL,  2 /11/201 2,S P i 246 Cyn thia A. S t ark  p romo te self- re spec t.  Ye t,  in each case,he brief ly descr i b es the  as p ectt hat he  w ishes
 When_he explains_that self-respect is a_primary social_good,_Rawls gives_us_what I will_call the "personal_circumstances" that support individuals'_selfrespect. These include,_first,_the conformity of one's activities to the Aristotelian Principle and, second, the appreciation of_one's_activities by_one's_associates._When he explains why the_tenets of justice as fairness_secure citizens'_self-respect, Rawls is identifying what I will call_the_"political circumstances" that_support self-respect. There are three of these. The first_is the duty of mutual respect,_which Rawls thinks_would_be_adopted by the parties_in the original position along with_his two principles of distributive justice._The two principles of distributive justice include,_first, the equal liberty principle, which_prescribes the equal distribution of_the maximal_degree of liberty compatible with_its being distributed_equally. The_second allows inequalities_of wealth provided that there is_substantive equality of_opportunity and that the inequalities maximally_benefit_the person with_the_least_wealth. The_second of these_constraints_on inequality_is_termed the "difference principle." The second_political_circumstance that supports citizens' self-respect, according to_Rawls, is the difference_principle_and the third is_the "lexical ordering" of his_two principles, also known as the_doctrine of_the priority_of liberty. This doctrine prohibits constraining liberty for the sake of_increased wealth. In what follows, I_examine Rawls's explanation of_both the_personal_and political circumstances_that_sustain self-respect._I show that citizens' self-respect is supported_by all_of these circumstances when self-respect is_understood as the mattering_notion._However, citizens' self-respect is supported only_by the personal circumstances, and perhaps_by one of political circumstances,_when_self-respect_is understood as the goodfor-oneself_notion. It follows that if Rawls_were offering the_good-foroneself view in his account of self-respect_as_a primary social good, then he_would_indeed by offering an equivocal account_of_self-respect,_as critics have maintained. Moreover,_Rawls, to a certain degree, invites_this objection because the passages explaining the political circumstances_that secure selfrespect_are often cryptic. Rawls is_attempting_in_these passages to show that certain aspects of his view_are justified_by the fact_that they OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 2/11/2012, SPi 246_Cynthia A. Stark promote self-respect. Yet, in_each case, he briefly describes the aspect that he wishes