	lacks	some	due	order	or	proportionality,	it	is	less	capable of	becoming	reasonably	adopted	as	the	internal	or	internalized	principle	of	the	actions of	those	human	beings	who	are	subject	to	it.	But	if	an	existing	law	is	not	adopted	and internalized	by	those	who	are	subject	to	it,	then	it	must	in	some	measure	be	imposed externally	and	violently-and	thus	it	has	the	character	of	tyranny	rather	than lawfulness. Some	important	implications	can	be	developed	from	the	Augustinian-Thomistic view	that	law	or	lawfulness,	properly	speaking,	operates	as	a	principle	which	is internal	to	those	individual	beings	which	are	subject	to	the	law.	First	of	all,	individual beings	that	are	subject	to	law	are	not	made	to	act	in	accordance	with	the	law because	of	some	external	or	violent	force	that	must	be	imposed	on	them.	Instead, they	are	made	to	act	in	accordance	with	the	law	(and	thus	to	act	for	the	sake	of	the common	good	served	by	the	law)	on	the	basis	of	principles	that	are	internal	to	their own	being	as	individuals.	This	is	why	Aquinas	(1981,	1|2.91.6)	argues	that	sensuous inclinations	and	instincts	in	animals	have	the	character	of	law	or	lawfulness.	By	acting on	the	basis	of	their	own	sensuous	inclinations	(for	example,	by	copulating,	and producing	and	caring	for	their	own	offspring),	individual	animals	act	in	a	way	that	
lacks 	 some 	 due 	 order 	 or 	 proportionality, 	 it 	 is 	 less 	 adequate to of 	 becoming 	 sanely 	 adopted 	 as 	 the 	 internal 	 or 	 internalize 	 principle 	 of 	 the 	 legal action of 	 those 	 human 	 beings 	 who 	 are 	 subject 	 to 	 it. 	 But 	 if 	 an 	 exist 	 law 	 is 	 not 	 adopted 	 and internalize 	 by 	 those 	 who 	 are 	 capable 	 to 	 it, 	 then 	 it 	 must 	 in 	 some 	 measure 	 be 	 imposed outwardly 	 and 	 violently - and 	 thus 	 it 	 has 	 the 	 quality 	 of 	 dictatorship 	 rather 	 than lawfulness. Some 	 important 	 implications 	 can 	 be 	 developed 	 from 	 the 	 Augustinian - Thomistic view 	 that 	 jurisprudence 	 or 	 lawfulness, 	 properly 	 speaking, 	 operates 	 as 	 a 	 rationale 	 which 	 is internal 	 to 	 those 	 individual 	 beings 	 which 	 are 	 capable 	 to 	 the 	 law. 	 First 	 of 	 all, 	 individual organism 	 that 	 are 	 subject 	 to 	 police 	 are 	 not 	 made 	 to 	 act 	 in 	 accordance 	 with 	 the 	 jurisprudence because 	 of 	 some 	 external 	 or 	 violent 	 force 	 that 	 must 	 be 	 imposed 	 on 	 them. 	 Instead, they 	 are 	 made 	 to 	 act 	 in 	 accordance 	 with 	 the 	 law 	 (and 	 thus 	 to 	 act 	 for 	 the 	 sake 	 of 	 the common 	 good 	 served 	 by 	 the 	 law) 	 on 	 the 	 basis 	 of 	 principles 	 that 	 are 	 internal 	 to 	 their own 	 being 	 as 	 person. 	 This 	 is 	 why 	 Aquinas 	 (1981, 	 1|2.91.6) 	 argues 	 that 	 sensuous inclinations 	 and 	 instinct 	 in 	 animal 	 have 	 the 	 character 	 of 	 law 	 or 	 lawfulness. 	 By 	 acting on 	 the 	 footing 	 of 	 their 	 own 	 sensuous 	 inclinations 	 (for 	 case, 	 by 	 copulating, 	 and producing 	 and 	 caring 	 for 	 their 	 own 	 young), 	 individual 	 animals 	 act 	 in 	 a 	 way 	 that
	lacns	some	due	order	or	proportiunality,	it	is	less	eqpable of	beckming	rearonably	adopted	as	the	internal	oc	intwrnaluzed	principle	of	the	actiuns of	thode	human	bwingw	qho	are	subjxdt	to	it.	Bmc	if	an	swistiug	oaw	is	not	adoptec	and intertalized	by	those	fhu	axe	subject	to	it,	then	it	must	in	some	measure	fe	imposrd externally	and	dioltntjy-ans	nhms	it	has	the	character	of	tyranny	rathsr	than nawfulness. Soke	important	implications	can	he	degeloped	from	the	Augudtinian-Thomustis view	that	law	ur	lawfulness,	properly	spgaking,	operates	as	a	principle	which	ir intzrnal	to	thosg	nbdighdual	beings	xhich	age	subject	to	thc	kaw.	Firvt	of	all,	ondividual beikgs	thet	arw	subject	to	law	are	not	mave	to	act	in	accordance	wyth	the	law bzcause	of	some	external	oe	vuolenj	forca	thag	nusg	be	jm'ossd	on	thfm.	Iistead, they	zre	made	to	acr	in	accordance	with	tht	lar	(qnd	thus	to	act	fkr	the	swkq	of	the common	good	served	by	the	law)	on	the	basps	of	lrinciples	that	are	internql	to	their own	being	as	ijdividualf.	This	is	why	Aquinas	(1981,	1|2.91.6)	argues	that	sensuous inclinations	atd	insvivctw	ik	anioqld	have	the	character	of	law	or	lawfulness.	By	acting on	ege	naxis	of	their	own	scnsuous	inclinationx	(flr	rvample,	by	copulxting,	aus lroducing	and	caring	vor	theit	own	ofdspring),	inqivicual	animals	act	in	a	way	that	
lacks some due order or proportionality, it capable becoming reasonably as the internal actions those human beings are subject to But if an existing law is adopted and internalized by those who are subject to it, then it must some measure be imposed externally and violently-and thus it has the character of rather lawfulness. important can be developed from the Augustinian-Thomistic view that law or lawfulness, properly speaking, operates as a which is internal to those individual beings which subject to the law. of all, individual beings that subject law are made act accordance with the because of some external or violent force that must be imposed on them. Instead, they are made act in the law thus act the sake of good served by the law) on principles that are internal to their own being individuals. This why Aquinas (1981, 1|2.91.6) argues that inclinations and instincts in animals have the character law or lawfulness. By acting on the basis of their own sensuous inclinations (for example, and producing and caring their own offspring), animals in way
	lacks	some	due	order	or	proporTionality,	iT	is	leSs	cApaBlE of	bEcomIng	reasonably	aDOpteD	as	the	internal	or	internAlizeD	pRInciPLe	Of	the	Actions OF	tHOSe	hUmAn	BeiNgS	WhO	are	sUbjEct	to	it.	but	if	an	exiStiNg	Law	is	not	adopTEd	And internaLizEd	by	those	who	Are	SubjecT	tO	it,	THen	it	MusT	in	soMe	measURe	be	imPosed exteRnALly	and	VIolentlY-ANd	Thus	It	has	the	character	OF	tYRanny	rather	thaN lawfuLnESs. sOMe	iMpoRtant	impliCaTions	CAn	be	devELoPED	FroM	The	AugustiniaN-Thomistic vIEw	tHat	law	Or	LawFUlness,	PropeRlY	SpeAking,	operatEs	as	A	principlE	which	IS internAL	to	thosE	indivIduAl	bEingS	WhIcH	arE	sUBjeCT	tO	thE	Law.	first	of	aLl,	InDividUal bEINGS	thaT	arE	subJect	tO	law	are	not	madE	to	Act	iN	AccOrdanCe	witH	the	LaW becaUse	of	sOme	exTeRnal	or	violent	foRce	tHat	must	be	ImpOsEd	oN	tHem.	InSTead, thEy	aRe	mAde	to	acT	in	accoRDanCe	WITH	tHe	law	(and	thus	to	act	fOr	THE	sAke	of	the Common	GOoD	sERved	by	thE	lAw)	oN	the	BASis	of	PrinCIpLes	that	aRe	inteRNaL	tO	their oWn	Being	aS	iNdiVidUals.	THIs	is	Why	AquInas	(1981,	1|2.91.6)	arguEs	thaT	Sensuous inclinATions	and	instiNCtS	IN	aNImalS	haVe	the	characTer	oF	Law	oR	lawFUlNesS.	by	actIng on	ThE	BaSIs	of	their	own	sensuouS	iNclinaTions	(For	example,	by	cOpulating,	aND PRoducing	And	cARiNG	for	their	own	ofFspriNg),	individuAL	animals	Act	in	A	way	that	
	lacks	some	due	order	or	p roportiona lity, 	it 	is 	l esscapa ble of	becomin g 	rea sonably	adopted	as	the 	inte rn a l	or in terna lized	p r in c i ple 	o fthe 	a c ti ons o f	t hose	hu man	beings 	wh oare	subjectt oit.	But	if 	an 	existing	la w	i s	notad opt e d	and  in terna lizedb y	thos e	who	are 	s u bjectt o	it,	t h e nit	m ust	in	some	measu r eb e	imposed exte rnally 	a n dv i ole ntl y-and	thus 	i t	has the	cha r ac t e r 	of tyranny	rathe r	than lawf u lne ss. So me 	im p ortant 	impl ic a tio ns	can	be	d evel oped	from 	the	A u gustini a n-Thomi stic v iew 	th at	l a wor 	la wf u lne s s, 	pr o per ly	speak in g, 	oper ates a s a	pr inc iple 	whic h	is internal 	to 	tho s e	i ndivi dualbein gs 	whic h	aresubje ct 	to	the	law.	Fi rstof	all,	i ndi vi dua lbeing s 	thatare 	su bject	t o	law	a r e	n ot m a de 	to	act	in	accorda nc e wi th	the	l aw bec a us eo f	some	e xt ern al	o r viole nt	f o rc e	that	m ust	be im po sed	onth em.	In st ead , t hey	a r e	ma de	toact	in	a ccord a nce	with	the	l a w	(and	thus	t o 	a c t 	f o r	th e	s ake	of	thecomm o n	go od	s e rv edb y	the 	law) 	o n 	t h e	basis	of	principl es 	thatare	i nternal	to	th eir own	be i n g 	as	indi vidu a ls . 	This	is	why	A quina s	(1981,	1 | 2.91.6)argue s	that	s ensuous i n c lination s	a ndins tin c t sin	animals	ha v e 	the 	c haracte r	o f	law	o r	l awf uln ess .By	acting  on	theba si sof 	th eir	o w n	sensuo us 	in cl ina tions (for	e xampl e,	b yco p ula ting,	a n dp r oduc in gandcar in g	for 	the i r	o wn	offs pring),	i ndi v idua lan imals	a ct	in	a	way	t ha t	
	lacks	some	due	order	or	proportionality,	it	is	less	capable of	becoming	reasonably	adopted	as	the	internal	or	internalized	principle	of	the	actions_of	those	human	beings	who	are	subject	to	it.	But	if	an	existing	law	is	not	adopted	and internalized	by	those	who	are	subject	to	it,	then	it	must	in	some	measure	be	imposed_externally	and	violently-and	thus	it	has	the	character	of	tyranny	rather	than lawfulness. Some	important	implications	can	be	developed	from	the	Augustinian-Thomistic view	that	law	or	lawfulness,	properly	speaking,	operates	as	a	principle	which	is_internal	to	those	individual	beings	which	are	subject	to	the	law.	First	of	all,	individual beings	that	are	subject	to	law	are	not	made	to	act	in	accordance	with	the	law_because	of	some	external	or	violent	force	that	must	be	imposed	on	them.	Instead,_they	are	made	to	act	in	accordance	with	the	law	(and	thus	to	act	for	the	sake	of	the common	good	served	by	the	law)	on	the	basis	of	principles	that	are	internal	to	their_own	being	as	individuals.	This	is	why	Aquinas	(1981,	1|2.91.6)	argues	that	sensuous_inclinations	and	instincts	in	animals	have	the	character	of	law	or	lawfulness.	By	acting on	the	basis	of	their	own	sensuous	inclinations	(for	example,	by	copulating,	and producing	and	caring	for	their	own	offspring),	individual	animals	act	in	a	way	that	