 certain ethical beliefs, but this does not mean that we would not change them given enough evidence that they are mistaken. Second, my intended audience includes the entrenched, dogmatic, and fundamentalist, though is not exhausted by them (cf. Dormandy, forthcoming). If I can convince believers of any stripe that religious disagreement contains epistemic benefits, then, even if they are only willing to countenance small epistemic adjustments, this is far better than nothing.iv Religious disagreement could issue in drastic belief revision, but it need not. For the sake of fostering what benefits we can, we must not expect interlocutors to cede more, epistemically, than they are prepared to. So although the epistemic-potential claim is inspired by the philosophy of science, I will not be assuming that the parties to a religious disagreement take a neutral, scholarly attitude toward their belief systems – on the contrary. 3 Religious belief systems and disagreement A core concern of religious epistemology is epistemically 'central' religious beliefs, such as 'God exists'. But this narrow focus ignores the array of other elements of a belief system, including more peripheral beliefs and things other than beliefs, that can be fruitfully disagreed over (Dormandy, 2018b). No wonder, then, that committed believers might be wary of religious disagreement. I will thus begin by zooming out to a broader picture of the objects of religious disagreement. At the same time, I will lay some cognitive-psychological groundwork for defending the epistemic-potential claim. Religious belief systems and their influences Religious belief systemsv have four components. The first is religious beliefs themselves. These can concern any number of topics, including theological (e.g. where salvation is found) or practical ones (e.g. what to eat or drink). They can be highly general (e.g., claiming that a transcendent reality exists), less general (e.g., that that reality is or is not personal), or highly specific (e.g., that a given healing constitutes a miracle). Second, religious beliefs are embedded in a complex of auxiliary beliefs that do not pertain directly to religion. These bear epistemic, logical, and psychological relationships to religious beliefs (Wynn, 2017, 126). One area that auxiliary beliefs concern is metaphysics: assumptions about God's relation to time, for instance, may affect our understanding of God's ability to relate to his creatures. Another is empirical: beliefs about the nature of the cosmos, for example, have historically been taken to
certain ethical beliefs, but this does not mean that we would not change them give adequate evidence that they are mistaken. Second, my intended audience include the entrenched, dogmatic, and fundamentalist, though is not consume by them (cf. Dormandy, forthcoming). If I can convert believers of any stripe that religious disagreement incorporate epistemic benefits, then, even if they are only uncoerced to countenance small epistemic adjustments, this is far better than nothing.iv Religious discrepancy could issue in drastic belief rewrite, but it need not. For the sake of foster what benefit we can, we must not expect interlocutors to cede more, epistemically, than they are disposed to. So although the epistemic - potential title is inspired by the doctrine of science, I will not be bear that the parties to a religious disagreement take a achromatic, scholarly attitude toward their belief systems – on the contrary. 3 Religious belief systems and disagreement A core concern of religious epistemology is epistemically' central' religious beliefs, such as' God exists'. But this narrow focus ignores the array of other elements of a belief arrangement, including more peripheral beliefs and thing early than impression, that can be fruitfully disagreed over (Dormandy, 2018b). No curiosity, then, that committed believer might be wary of religious disagreement. I will therefore begin by zooming out to a broader picture of the objects of religious disagreement. At the same time, I will lay some cognitive - psychological groundwork for defending the epistemic - potential title. Religious belief system and their influence Religious belief systemsv have four components. The first is religious beliefs themselves. These can concern any number of subject, including theological (e.g. where salvation is found) or virtual ones (for example what to eat or drink). They can be highly general (e.g., claiming that a transcendent world exists), less general (e.g., that that reality is or is not personal), or highly specific (for example, that a given healing constitutes a miracle). Second, religious beliefs are embed in a complex of accessory beliefs that do not pertain directly to religion. These digest epistemic, logical, and psychological relationships to religious beliefs (Wynn, 2017, 126). One area that auxiliary belief concern is metaphysics: assumptions about God's sexual intercourse to time, for instance, may affect our understanding of God's ability to relate to his creatures. Another is empiric: beliefs about the nature of the cosmos, for example, have historically been taken to
 cegtain ethical beliefs, buu this does not mgab that we wohld not zhange them given enough evivencw thau they are mistaken. Second, mj intendee auvience includes vge entrcuched, fogmctmc, and fundamenjalist, thougv is not exhauvtdd by them (cf. Dormandy, forthcoming). If I can vojvince believets of wny anrlpe that religious disagreement dontainv epistemic brnefits, then, even if they wre lnly willing to cokntenance snall wpistemic adgustments, uhns is far bgtter than nothing.iv Religious dksagrzement coule usskg in drastic belivf revision, bmn it nead not. Gor the sake on fosveribg what benefits we cen, we must not expecj interlocgtkrs to cede more, wpustemhcalny, tfqn gheg ere prepaged to. So altgough the epistemic-potential ckayn is inspired by thq [hilosophy of science, I will not be asslminf that the parties to a religious disagreemejt take a neutral, scholarly attitude toward their belief sfstema – ou the zinhrary. 3 Religious belief systems and disagreemqht A core concern jf religioux fpoftemology is gpistemndamly 'central' religilus belyefs, wuch as 'Gjd ecists'. But this narrow focus ignores the qrray of other elelents of a yelief systrm, including more peripkeral geliefs and things offer than beliefs, thst can be fruitfully disagreqd over (Dirmaudy, 2018b). No woncer, thqn, that colmittcg believers might he waty of seligious fisagreement. I will thus begin ub zooming out tm a broader pictmre of the objests of religioos disagrzement. At the saje time, I will lay some cognitieg-psychologican groundrork for defendkvg the epistemoc-potenticj clqim. Religious belicf syrfems and their nufouences Religiois celyev xyfdemsv have fmur zomopnentr. The first ks rrligious beliefs thekselbes. These can concrrk any numver of tjpics, includimg theological (e.g. ahere sauvatipn ys found) or practical ones (e.g. shat to ewt jr drink). Ther cak be highly geueral (e.g., claiming that a transcendent reelity exists), less genetal (e.g., that that realntn is or is npt pewsonal), or highly specific (e.g., rhat a given heallng constitutes a miradle). Sewond, geligious beliefs are embedded in a complex of auxiliary beliefs that do bot pectwin directlg to reliciju. These beac xpistemic, logical, and psychological relationshipr to relhgnous beliefs (Wynn, 2017, 126). One area yhxt auxiliary celiefs concern is metapgysics: axsumptions about God's relation yo time, for instance, may affect iur uhderstandiig of God's ability tp relace to yis creqturcs. Another is dmporlcal: believs auouc the nature of the cosmos, for exqmple, yage historically ueen taken tl
certain ethical beliefs, but this does not we not change given enough evidence my audience includes the dogmatic, and fundamentalist, is not exhausted by them (cf. forthcoming). If I can convince believers of any stripe that religious disagreement contains benefits, then, even if they are only willing to countenance small epistemic adjustments, is better nothing.iv disagreement could issue in drastic belief revision, but it need not. For the sake of fostering benefits we can, we must not expect interlocutors cede more, epistemically, than are prepared to. So although epistemic-potential is inspired the of I will not assuming that the parties to a religious disagreement take a neutral, scholarly attitude toward their belief systems on the Religious belief and A concern of religious epistemically 'central' religious beliefs, such as this narrow focus ignores the array of other of a system, including more peripheral beliefs and other than beliefs, that can be fruitfully disagreed (Dormandy, 2018b). No wonder, then, that committed believers might be wary of religious disagreement. I begin by zooming out a broader picture the of disagreement. the same I will lay some cognitive-psychological groundwork for defending the epistemic-potential claim. belief systems and their influences Religious belief systemsv have four first religious beliefs themselves. can concern any number topics, theological (e.g. where salvation or ones eat drink). can be highly general claiming that a transcendent reality less general (e.g., that not personal), or highly specific (e.g., that a healing constitutes a miracle). Second, religious beliefs embedded in a complex of auxiliary beliefs that do not pertain directly religion. These logical, and psychological relationships to religious beliefs (Wynn, 126). One area that beliefs concern is metaphysics: assumptions about God's relation to for may affect understanding of God's to relate to creatures. Another is about the of cosmos, historically been taken to
 certain ethical beliefs, but tHis does not Mean tHat We wOuLd noT chaNge them given enOUgh eVidence that they are mistAken. SEcONd, my INtEnded AudiencE InCLUdeS tHe EntReNChEd, dogMatIc, and fuNdamentaliSt, tHoUgh is not exhaUStEd by them (cf. dorMandy, forthcoMinG). If I caN cOnvINce beLieVers oF any stRIpe thaT religiouS dISagreeMEnt contAINs EpisTemic benefits, then, EVeN If they are only wIlling To COuNTEnaNce Small epistEmIc adjUStments, THiS IS Far BEtter than nothIng.iv ReligiOUs dIsagreEmEnt COuld isSue in DrAStiC belief reviSion, But it need Not. For THe sake oF FosteriNg what BenEfiTs we CAn, We MusT nOT exPEcT inTErlOcutors tO cEdE more, EpisTEMICallY, thAn thEy are Prepared to. So aLthOugh THe ePisteMic-poTentIaL claiM is insPired By The philosophy of ScieNce, I will nOt bE aSsuMiNg thaT The parTieS to A religiOus disaGReeMeNT TAkE a neutral, scholarly AtTITuDe toward Their bELiEf SYstems – on ThE coNtraRY. 3 religIous BElIef systeMs and dISaGrEement A CoRe concErN of RelIgiouS EpisTemoloGy is episTemicALly 'central' reliGIous beliefs, suCH aS 'gOd EXistS'. BuT this narrow FocuS IgnoRes tHE aRraY Of othEr eleMeNTs OF a belief system, incluDiNg more PeripHeral beliefs aNd things otHER Than beliEfs, tHAt CAn be fruitfully DisagReed over (DoRMandy, 2018b). No WondeR, then, thaT committeD BElievers MigHt bE waRy oF RElIgious disagreEMEnt. I WiLl thus bEgiN by zoomIng Out To a BroAdEr picture Of the objEcTs Of ReLigIous dISagreemeNt. at tHe SamE time, i Will laY some CognItIvE-PsyChologiCAl GROundWoRk For dEfeNdIng thE epiSTemIc-potenTial claim. relIGiouS bElIef systEms and their inFlUences ReliGiOus Belief SYStemsv haVe four components. The firsT Is religIouS beliEfs tHemselves. theSe can cOncERn any nUmber oF topiCs, IncLUDing tHEOlOgiCaL (e.g. where saLVAtiOn is fOuNd) or PracticAl ones (e.g. what to eat oR DriNk). They can be hiGhlY genERAl (E.g., cLAiMIng ThAT a tRANscendent realitY exists), lesS gENeRal (e.g., that tHAt rEaLity is oR is not pErsonAL), or highLy specifiC (e.g., that a gIvEn heALIng ConstituteS a miraclE). Second, reLIgiouS BeLiefs Are EmbeddEd In a ComplEx of auXIliAry beLiefs tHaT do not PertaIn Directly To religion. These bear episTemic, lOgicaL, anD psycholoGicAL reLationshiPs to Religious bEliEfs (wynn, 2017, 126). ONe aREa thaT auxILiAry BEliefS conCErn is metaPHySicS: ASsUmptions aboUT gOd's RelatIon TO time, fOr inStance, may affect ouR Understanding oF God'S ABilIty TO relAtE to his creatureS. AnOtHER is empirIcAl: beliefs abOut the naTuRE of thE cosmoS, for exAmple, haVE HiSToricaLly bEen Taken to
 certain ethical beliefs,but this d oes n otmea nthat  wewould not chan g e th em given enough eviden ce th at they ar e mis taken.S ec o n d,my  i nte nd e daudie nce  includ es the ent ren ch ed, dogmatic ,  a nd fundame nta list, though  is  not e xh aus t ed by  th em (c f. Dor m andy,forthcomi ng ) . If I can con v i nc e be lievers of any st r ip e  that religiou s disa gr e em e n t c ont ains epist em ic be n efits,t he n , eve n  if they areonly willin g  to  count en anc e  small  epis te m icadjustments , th is is far  bette r  than n o thing.i v Reli gio usdisa g re em ent  c o uld is sue indrasticbe li ef re visi o n , butitneed  not.  For the sake  of  fos t eri ng wh at be nefi ts  we c an, we  must  n ot expect inter locu tors to c ede  m ore ,epist e micall y,tha n theyare pre p are dt o .  S o although the epi st e m ic -potenti al cla i mis inspired  b y t he p h i losop hy o f  s cience,I will no tbe assu mi ng tha tthe  pa rties to a  relig ious dis agree m ent take a neu t ral, scholarl y  a t t it u de t owa rd their be lief syst ems–  o n t h e con trary .3  R e ligious belief syst em s anddisag reement A cor e concerno f religiou s ep i st e mology is epis temic ally 'cent r al' reli gious  beliefs , such as ' God exis ts' . B utthi s na rrow focus ig n o resth e array  of  otherele men tsofabelief sy stem, in cl ud in gmor e per i pheral b el ief sand  thin g s othe r tha n be li ef s , t hat can be f ruit fu ll y di sag re ed ov er ( D orm andy, 2 018b). No  wo n der,  t he n, that  committed be li evers migh tbewary o f religiou s disagreement. I willt hus beg inby zo omin g out toa b roader  pi c ture o f theobjec ts  of r eligi o u sdis ag reement. A t the  same  t ime,  I will  lay some cognitiv e -ps ychological g rou ndwo r k  f ord ef e ndi ng the e pistemic-potent ial claim.  R e li gious beli e f s ys tems an d their  infl u ences R eligiousbelief sy st emsv h ave  four comp onents.The first is re l ig iousbel iefs t he mse lves.  These can  conc ern an ynumber  of t op ics, inc luding theological (e.g . wher e sal vat ion is fo und )  or  practica l on es (e.g. w hat  to  eatord rink) . Th e ycan be hi ghly general ( e .g .,c l ai ming that a t r ans cende ntr eality  exi sts), less genera l  (e.g., that t hatr e ali tyi s or  i s not personal ),or h ighly sp ec ific (e.g.,  that agi v en he alingconsti tutes a m ir a cle).Seco nd,  religiou s b el i efs are  e mb e dded i n aco mplexof aux i liar y beliefs that donot p e r taind ire ctlyto  religi o n. T hese bearepistemic,logica l, a nd ps ycholog ic al rel ati on ships to r e ligious b elief s (Wynn ,2017 , 1 26). O ne a r e a tha t au xi lia ry belief s co n ce rn ismeta physi cs : as sumptions about Go d's relatio ntot i me, fo r  i n s tance, may  af fecto u r understa n ding of God's  abili ty torelatet o h is  creatu res . Another i s empiric a l:be lief s aboutth e na tu reof  the cosmos, fo r exampl e, haveh i storic all y  bee n  taken  t o
 certain_ethical beliefs,_but this does not_mean that_we_would not_change_them given enough_evidence that they_are mistaken. Second, my_intended audience includes_the_entrenched, dogmatic, and fundamentalist, though is not exhausted by them (cf. Dormandy, forthcoming). If_I_can convince_believers_of_any stripe that religious disagreement_contains epistemic benefits, then, even_if they_are only willing to countenance small epistemic adjustments,_this_is far better_than nothing.iv Religious disagreement could issue in drastic belief_revision, but it need not. For_the sake of_fostering_what_benefits we can, we_must not expect interlocutors to cede_more, epistemically, than they are prepared_to. So although the epistemic-potential claim is_inspired by the philosophy of science,_I will not be assuming_that the_parties to a religious disagreement_take a neutral,_scholarly attitude_toward their belief_systems – on the contrary. 3_Religious belief systems_and disagreement A core concern of_religious_epistemology is epistemically_'central'_religious_beliefs, such_as 'God exists'._But_this narrow_focus_ignores the array of other elements_of_a belief system, including more peripheral beliefs_and things other than_beliefs,_that can be fruitfully_disagreed over (Dormandy, 2018b). No_wonder, then, that committed believers might_be wary_of religious_disagreement. I will thus begin by zooming out to a broader_picture of the objects of religious_disagreement. At the same_time, I_will_lay some cognitive-psychological_groundwork_for defending_the epistemic-potential claim. Religious belief systems and_their influences_Religious belief systemsv have four components._The first is religious_beliefs_themselves. These can concern any number_of topics, including theological (e.g. where_salvation is found) or practical_ones_(e.g._what to eat or drink)._They can be highly general (e.g.,_claiming that a_transcendent reality exists), less general (e.g., that_that_reality is or is not personal),_or_highly specific (e.g., that a given_healing_constitutes_a miracle). Second, religious beliefs_are embedded in a complex of_auxiliary beliefs that do not pertain directly to religion._These bear epistemic,_logical, and psychological relationships to_religious_beliefs_(Wynn, 2017, 126). One area that auxiliary beliefs concern is_metaphysics: assumptions_about God's relation_to time, for instance, may affect our understanding of God's_ability to relate to his creatures. Another_is empirical: beliefs about the nature of the cosmos, for example,_have historically been taken to