 as "that which is in itself and conceived B. S. Akpan, C. C. Odohoedi 256 through itself, that is, the concept of which it ought to be formed" (Broad, 1995: p. B7). Aristotle states that "substance in the most genuine and essential and most distinct feeling of the word is what is neither predicable of subject nor show in a subject, for example, the individual man or steed" (The Encyclopedia of Philosophy: 36). Substance along these lines implies what constitutes the particular way of a thing. In this sense, it is the righteousness of which a thing is, the thing that it is, as unmistakable from different things or from its qualities. In philosophy there are physical substances as well as metaphysical substance. These physical substantial entities are things as a piece of wood, a dog, a man a house, a tree, or a mountain etc. This view are been held by the realist. Naturally, physical substance has the accompanying six essential attributes. Initial, a physical item can exist unperceived, or possibly, does not exist in righteousness of its being perceived. Second, a physical article involves or is in space. Third, a physical item completely is not situated in two spots on the double. Fourth, a physical question perhaps moves. Fifth, if a physical article is noticeable by any stretch of the imagination, then it has sensible components, is freely recognizable, and is detectable by more than one tactile methodology. Sixth parts which form a compound physical article have solidarity in ethicalness of their instantiating a suitable binding together causal connection. Along these lines, a physical article can be made or pulverized by get together or dismantling (with the exception of on account of major particles, which can't be physically partitioned). The idealist sees substance differently, they believe that substance is not something that can be seen, destroyed or stop to exist. In this case substance is something metaphysical, for instance a dog can died and cease to exist, but the real essence of a dog: the dogness of a dog, still survives. Same as to man, a man can cease to exist, but the real essence of a man, the manness of a man still survives. Human being is significant beings of physical sort. Be that as it may, humans also contain metaphysical substance. As we comprehend the idea of a spirit, a spirit is a nonphysical entity. More particularly, a spirit is an unlocated substance which is fit for consciousness. Soul
as " that which is in itself and conceived B. S. Akpan, C. C. Odohoedi 256 through itself, that is, the concept of which it ought to be formed " (Broad, 1995: p. B7). Aristotle states that " substance in the about actual and substantive and most discrete spirit of the word is what is neither predicable of subject nor express in a topic, for example, the individual man or steed " (The Encyclopedia of Philosophy: 36). Substance along these note implies what constitutes the finical direction of a thing. In this sense, it is the righteousness of which a thing is, the thing that it is, as apparent from different things or from its qualities. In doctrine there are physical substances as well as metaphysical substance. These forcible substantial entity are things as a piece of wood, a dog, a homo a house, a tree, or a mountain etc. This view are been held by the realist. Naturally, physical means has the accompanying six essential attributes. Initial, a physical item can exist unperceived, or possibly, does not exist in righteousness of its being perceived. Second, a physical article involves or is in space. Third, a forcible detail completely is not situate in two spot on the double. Fourth, a physical doubt perhaps moves. Fifth, if a physical article is noticeable by any reach of the imagination, then it has sensible components, is freely recognizable, and is detectable by more than one tactile methodology. Sixth parts which form a compound physical article have solidarity in ethicalness of their instantiating a suitable binding in concert causal connection. Along these note, a forcible article can be cook or pulverized by get together or strip (with the exception of on account of major particles, which can't be physically partitioned). The idealist see meaning differently, they believe that substance is not something that can be see, destroy or stop to exist. In this case kernel is something metaphysical, for instance a frump can died and discontinue to exist, but the real perfume of a dog: the dogness of a dog, even survives. like as to man, a man can cease to exist, but the substantial essence of a man, the manness of a man still survives. Human organism is significant beings of forcible sort. Be that as it may, humans also check metaphysical substance. As we comprehend the idea of a heart, a spirit is a nonphysical entity. More particularly, a spirit is an unlocated substance which is fit for consciousness. person
 as "that which is in itself and conceived Y. S. Akpen, C. C. Kdohoedi 256 through itself, that is, the cincepu of which it ought to be fogmed" (Broae, 1995: p. V7). Aristotlx states that "ambstaucx in the most ggnuine and evsential and mmsg bistinct feeling of the word is what is neiyhfr predicable jf slbtect nor show in a subject, for example, the invividual man or steed" (The Encyclopedia of Phiposophy: 36). Substance along thesg ligws implies wfat constiuuces the parjicular way of a thing. In this sdnse, nt is the rugytelosness of whmch a nhing is, the bning tvat it os, as unmistaksblx frim different things oc from its qualities. In philovo'hy there are physicao wubstdncev as qelu aa kefaphyslcam substancs. These phywical substantial emtynoes are thinfs as w [iece of wood, a dog, a man a house, a tret, or z mountain etc. This vieq are been held by thg realist. Gaturally, physical substance has the accompanying six xsrenuiql atgeihutes. Initial, a physical item can exist unperssifec, or possibly, boes not exist im gibrteousness of its bzjnf perceived. Second, a physycal qrticle igvolfes or is in space. Third, a physical itei completely is not situated iu two xpots on the double. Fourth, a phyaical questlon perhalr moves. Fifth, if a ihyshcal article is noticeable by any svretck of the imabinatijn, then it has sensible components, is fteely secognizabpe, and is detectable by more thei one tactile mathmdology. Fixth parts which sorm a compounb physiccl artkcle have aolidarmty in ethicwlness of theht instantiatiig a suitwble bineing toedther causal cpnnection. Along thewe lines, a physicak attjcle can be madz ir pulverized bu gdt eohevher js dismantlinc (wigh gne exzeption of iv acvount of major partiwles, which can't be phyxigally parjitioned). Ehe idealist xees substance difverenvly, thxy beloevg that substance is not somethihg that cwn ne seen, destrjyed or stop to zxist. In this case substance is somethinj metaphysical, for insjance a dog can died cnc cease to xxist, fut the raal essence of a dog: the dogness of a dog, still survives. Szme as to mwn, a man can cease to exist, but the real essence of a man, the manness of q man still survivss. Himan tenng is sidnifmcent beings of phyxical sort. Be that as it may, huoans alsm eontain metaphysical substancr. Xs we comprehgnd the idea of a spirit, a spirit os a nonphysical entity. More patticularly, a spirit is ak unlocatwd sugstancv wiich is fit for consviousnzss. Soyl
as "that which is in itself and S. C. C. 256 through itself, which ought to be (Broad, 1995: p. Aristotle states that "substance in the genuine and essential and most distinct feeling of the word is what is predicable of subject nor show in a subject, for example, the individual man steed" Encyclopedia Philosophy: Substance along these lines implies what constitutes the particular way of a thing. In this sense, is the righteousness of which a thing is, thing that it is, unmistakable from different things or its In philosophy are substances well as metaphysical These physical substantial entities are things as a piece of wood, a dog, a man a house, tree, or etc. This are held the realist. Naturally, has the accompanying six essential attributes. item can exist unperceived, or possibly, does not in righteousness its being perceived. Second, a physical involves or is in space. Third, a physical completely is not situated in two spots on the double. Fourth, a physical question perhaps if a physical article noticeable by any of imagination, it sensible components, freely recognizable, and is detectable by more than one tactile methodology. parts which form a compound physical article have solidarity in their a suitable binding causal connection. Along these a article can be made by together the of account of major particles, can't be physically partitioned). The sees substance differently, they something that can be seen, destroyed or stop exist. In this case substance is something for instance a dog can died and cease to exist, but the essence of the dogness of a dog, still survives. Same to man, a man cease to exist, but the real essence of a the of a still survives. Human is significant beings physical sort. Be it may, also metaphysical comprehend the idea of a spirit, spirit a nonphysical entity. More particularly, spirit unlocated substance which is fit for consciousness. Soul
 as "that which is in itself and cOnceived B. S. akpan, c. C. ODohOeDi 256 thRougH itself, that is, tHE conCept of which it ought to be FormeD" (BROad, 1995: p. b7). arIstotLe stateS ThAT "SubStAnCe iN tHE mOst geNuiNe and esSential and MosT dIstinct feeliNG oF the word is WhaT is neither prEdiCable oF sUbjECt nor ShoW in a sUbject, FOr examPle, the indIvIDual maN Or steed" (tHE ENcycLopedia of PhilosopHY: 36). SUBstance along thEse linEs IMpLIEs wHat ConstituteS tHe parTIcular wAY oF A THinG. in this sense, it Is the righteOUsnEss of wHiCh a THing is, The thInG ThaT it is, as unmiStakAble from dIffereNT things OR from itS qualiTieS. In PhilOSoPhY thErE Are PHySicAL suBstances As WeLl as mEtapHYSICal sUbsTancE. ThesE physical subsTanTial ENtiTies aRe thiNgs aS a Piece Of wood, A dog, a MaN a house, a tree, or a MounTain etc. ThIs vIeW arE bEen heLD by the ReaLisT. NaturaLly, physICal SuBSTAnCe has the accompanyiNg SIX eSsential AttribUTeS. INItial, a phYsIcaL iteM CAn exiSt unPErCeived, or PossibLY, dOeS not exiSt In righTeOusNesS of itS BeinG perceIved. SecoNd, a phYSical article inVOlves or is in spACe. tHIrD, A phySicAl item complEtelY Is noT sitUAtEd iN Two spOts on ThE DoUBle. Fourth, a physical qUeStion pErhapS moves. Fifth, if A physical aRTICle is notIceaBLe BY any stretch of tHe imaGination, thEN it has seNsiblE componeNts, is freeLY RecognizAblE, anD is DetECTaBle by more than ONE tacTiLe methoDolOgy. SixtH paRts WhiCh fOrM a compounD physicaL aRtIcLe HavE soliDArity in eThIcaLnEss Of theIR instaNtiatIng a SuItABle Binding TOgETHer cAuSaL conNecTiOn. AloNg thESe lInes, a phYsical artIclE Can bE mAdE or pulvErized by get toGeTher or dismAnTliNg (with THE exceptiOn of on account of major parTIcles, whIch Can't bE phySically paRtiTioned). the IDealisT sees sUbstaNcE diFFErentLY, ThEy bElIeve that suBSTanCe is nOt SomeThing thAt can be seen, destroyED or Stop to exist. In ThiS casE SUbStaNCe IS soMeTHinG MEtaphysical, for iNstance a doG cAN dIed and ceasE To eXiSt, but thE real esSence OF a dog: thE dogness oF a dog, stilL sUrviVES. SaMe as to man, a Man can ceAse to exisT, But thE ReAl essEncE of a maN, tHe mAnnesS of a maN StiLl surVives. HUmAn beinG is siGnIficant bEings of physical sort. Be thAt as it May, huManS also contAin MEtaPhysical sUbstAnce. As we coMprEheNd the IdeA Of a spIrit, A SpIriT Is a noNphySIcal entitY. moRe pARTiCularly, a spiRIT Is aN unloCatED substAnce Which is fit for consCIousness. Soul
 as "that which is in itse lf and con ceive d B . S .Akpa n, C . C. Odohoedi2 56 t hrough itself, that is , the  c o ncep t  o f whi ch it o u gh t tobe  f orm ed "  ( Broad , 1 995: p.  B7). Aris tot le  states that "s ubstance i n t he most genu ine  and e ss ent i al an d m ost d istinc t  feeli ng of the  w o rd isw hat isn e it herpredicable of sub j ec t  nor show in a  subje ct ,  f o r  ex amp le, the in di vidua l  man or st e e d " ( T he Encycloped ia of Philo s oph y: 36) .Sub s tancealong  t h ese  lines impl ieswhat cons titute s  the pa r ticular  way o f a  th ing. In  t his  s e nse ,  i t i s  th e righte ou sn ess o f wh i c h a th ing  is,  thething that it  is , as unm istak ablefrom  d iffer ent th ingsor  from its quali ties . In phil oso ph y t he re ar e  physi cal  su bstance s as we l l a sm e t ap hysical substance.  T h e se  physica l subs t an ti a l entiti es  ar e th i n gs as  a p i ec e of woo d, a d o g,  a  man aho use, a  t ree , o r a m o unta in etc . This v iew a r e been held by the realist.N at u r al l y, p hys ical substa nceh as t he a c co mpa n yingsix e ss e nt i al attributes. Init ia l, a p hysic al item can e xist unper c e i ved, orposs i bl y , does not exi st in  righteous n ess of i ts be ing perc eived. Se c o nd, a ph ysi cal  ar tic l e  i nvolves or is i n sp ac e. Thir d,a physi cal  it emcom pl etely isnot situ at ed  i ntwo  spot s  on thedo ubl e.  Fo urth, a phys icalques ti on per haps mo v es . Fift h,  i f aphy si cal a rtic l e i s notic eable byany stre tc hof theimagination,th en it hasse nsi ble co m p onents,is freely recognizable, and isdet ectab le b y more th anone ta cti l e meth odolog y. Si xt h p a r ts wh i c hfor ma compound p hys icalar ticl e havesolidarity in ethi c aln ess of theirins tant i a ti nga  s u ita bl e  bi n d ing together ca usal conne ct i on . Along th e seli nes, aphysica l art i cle can  be madeor pulver iz ed b y get  togetheror disma ntling (w i th th e  e xcept ion  of on  a cco unt o f majo r  pa rticl es, wh ic h can' t beph ysically  partitioned). The idea list s ees s ubs tance dif fer e ntl y, they b elie ve that su bst anc e isnot somet hing th atc an be  see n , destroy e dors t op  to exist.I n thi s cas e s u bstanc e is  something metaph y sical, for ins tanc e a d ogc an d ie d and cease to  ex is t ,  but the  r eal essence  of a do g: the d ogness  of adog, st i l ls urvive s. S ame  as to ma n,am an cance as e  to ex ist,  b ut the  reale ssen c e  of a man, the m annes s of am anstill  s urvives .  Hum an being i s significa nt bei ngsof ph ysicalso rt. Be  th at  as it may ,  humans a lso c ontainme taph ysi cal su bsta n c e. As  weco mpr ehend the i de a  o fa  sp irit , a s pi ritis a nonp h ysical e nti t y. More  p art i c ularly ,  a s pirit is a n u nloca t e d substanc e  whi c hi s fit  for c onscio usness. Sou l
 as_"that which_is in itself and_conceived B._S._Akpan, C._C._Odohoedi 256 through_itself, that is,_the concept of which_it ought to_be_formed" (Broad, 1995: p. B7). Aristotle states that "substance in the most genuine and_essential_and most_distinct_feeling_of the word is what_is neither predicable of subject_nor show_in a subject, for example, the individual man_or_steed" (The Encyclopedia_of Philosophy: 36). Substance along these lines implies what_constitutes the particular way of a_thing. In this_sense,_it_is the righteousness of_which a thing is, the thing_that it is, as unmistakable from_different things or from its qualities. In_philosophy there are physical substances as_well as metaphysical substance. These_physical substantial_entities are things as a_piece of wood,_a dog,_a man a_house, a tree, or a mountain_etc. This view_are been held by the realist._Naturally,_physical substance has_the_accompanying_six essential_attributes. Initial, a_physical_item can_exist_unperceived, or possibly, does not exist_in_righteousness of its being perceived. Second, a_physical article involves or_is_in space. Third, a_physical item completely is not_situated in two spots on the_double. Fourth,_a physical_question perhaps moves. Fifth, if a physical article is noticeable by_any stretch of the imagination, then_it has sensible components,_is freely_recognizable,_and is detectable_by_more than_one tactile methodology. Sixth parts which form_a compound_physical article have solidarity in ethicalness_of their instantiating a_suitable_binding together causal connection. Along these_lines, a physical article can be_made or pulverized by get_together_or_dismantling (with the exception of_on account of major particles, which_can't be physically_partitioned). The idealist sees substance differently, they_believe_that substance is not something that_can_be seen, destroyed or stop to_exist._In_this case substance is something_metaphysical, for instance a dog can_died and cease to exist, but the real essence_of a dog:_the dogness of a dog,_still_survives._Same as to man, a man can cease to exist,_but the_real essence of_a man, the manness of a man still survives. Human_being is significant beings of physical sort._Be that as it may, humans also contain metaphysical substance. As_we comprehend the idea of a spirit, a_spirit is a nonphysical entity. More particularly,_a spirit is an_unlocated_substance which is fit for consciousness. Soul