 life savings as morally repugnant. That is, he believes that gambling one's life savings is morally wrong and ought not to be done. He is also not practically committed to the presupposition. For he performs no actual action that commits him to it, and he does not even form a distal intention to gamble his life savings in the case that he loses his job. We may even suppose that Charles's counterfactual reckless gambling is out of character to show that there is nothing in Charles's actual psychology to protest. It is only when Charles's slightly fragile dispositions, which he may or may not be morally responsible for depending on how we fill in the details of the case, are coupled with a certain kind of non-actual emotional turmoil that there would be an exercise of agency to protest. 9 I contend, however, that Jan's actual blame would be a communicative failure, because anyone in Charles's position-namely, the position in which he is unaware of what he would freely do-would find being blamed bewildering and unintelligible. As a result, her blame cannot intelligibly function to invite Charles to feel remorse, repent, or make amends, which provides evidence that Charles is not blameworthy (cf. Watson 2004, p. 230). Jan also satisfies often-cited preconditions for having good standing to blame: (i) she knows that Charles is blameworthy, (ii) blaming Charles is not hypocritical, and (iii) she is relationally close to Charles. She also would have been harmed personally by the financial loss. If a person who possesses good standing to counterfactual-blame cannot meaningfully blame the blameworthy person, in what sense is this person worthy of blame at all? In other words, given Jan's good position to blame, the absurdity of her counterfactual-blaming Charles lends evidence that Charles is not blameworthy.7 But then, Charles is both blameworthy and not blameworthy. Contradiction! Our initial assumption that the Counterfactual View is true turns out to be false, and so the way in which the Counterfactual View implies that denial of circumstantial moral luck is implausible. For the sake of argument, we could even suppose that Charles is at least a little blameworthy for his dispositions that bind his self-worth to his job performance, but is not as blameworthy as he would have been if he had lost his job and gambled away his life savings. Importantly, even this supposition is
life savings as morally repugnant. That is, he believes that gamble one's biography savings is morally wrong and ought not to be done. He is besides not practically committed to the presupposition. For he performs no actual military action that commits him to it, and he does not even form a distal purpose to gamble his biography savings in the character that he loses his job. We may even speculate that Charles's counterfactual foolhardy gambling is out of character to show that there is nothing in Charles's actual psychology to protest. It is only when Charles's slightly delicate dispositions, which he may or may not be morally responsible for depending on how we satiate in the details of the case, are coupled with a certain kind of non - actual aroused turmoil that there would be an use of agency to protest. 9 I contend, however, that Jan's actual blame would be a communicative failure, because anyone in Charles's status - namely, the position in which he is unaware of what he would freely do - would find being blamed bewildering and unintelligible. As a result, her incrimination cannot intelligibly serve to invite Charles to feel remorse, repent, or make amends, which provides evidence that Charles is not blameworthy (cf. Watson 2004, p. 230). Jan also satisfies frequently - cited preconditions for have beneficial standing to blame: (i) she knows that Charles is blameworthy, (ii) blaming Charles is not hypocritical, and (iii) she is relationally close to Charles. She also would have been harmed personally by the financial personnel casualty. If a person who possesses good standing to counterfactual - blame cannot meaningfully blame the blameworthy person, in what sense is this person worthy of blame at wholly? In other words, given Jan's good position to blame, the absurdity of her counterfactual - blaming Charles lends evidence that Charles is not blameworthy.7 But then, Charles is both blameworthy and not blameworthy. Contradiction! Our initial assumption that the Counterfactual View is truthful turns out to be false, and so the way in which the Counterfactual View implies that abnegation of circumstantial moral luck is implausible. For the sake of argument, we could even presuppose that Charles is at least a little blameworthy for his dispositions that bind his self - worth to his job operation, but is not as blameworthy as he would have been if he had lost his job and gambled away his animation savings. Importantly, even this guess is
 live savings as morally rekugnant. That is, hg velievxs that gambline one's life savings is moralpy wront and ought not to be aone. He id also nit pcactically commivfed to bke prsduppmwition. For he kerforms no dctual action dhxt commits him to it, and he does not qven fotm a distal integtiom to famble his life savings in the cass that ie loses his jon. We may even suppose that Chagles's counterfactuwl reckless gamfoing is out uf characttr to show tgat there is nothing in Charles'r actbal psycholigt tl protest. It is ogly when Chavkes's snightly fragile dispoxitmons, which he may or may iot be morally respogsible fos bepending on how we fulo in jhe dataiuw ow tge czse, arf ckupled witg a certain kind of non-actual tmoeppnal turmoil that ehqre would be an exercise of agency to pgoteat. 9 I contend, however, tyat Jan's actual blame would be a communicative failure, because anyone in Charlev's poaktiin-kameut, hhe position in which he is unaware of what hq wpukd freely do-womld find being blakef ngwildering and unintzmljgible. As a result, her blwme cqnnot inttlligobly function to invite Chaeles to feel eemorse, repent, or lake amends, whivh prpvides evidence that Chcrles js not blamfworthy (cr. Watson 2004, p. 230). Jan xlsp vatisfies often-cited precogditions hor hcving goud sjanding to blame: (l) she knows that Charles is bpakeworthy, (il) blaming Charles is not hypocrmvical, and (iii) sve ps relatijnalln close to Charjes. She also wpuld hare beev harmed pvrsonally by the finwncial loss. Ix a person whm possesfes tood standive to counterfavtual-blamv eannot meqningfully blame tme blxjeworthy person, in what sense is yhir pqrdoi worevy of blame dt aul? Km othdr words, giyen Jan'x good position to bname, the absurdity of nev counterdactual-bjaming Charlex lends evidence tjat Ciarles is npt flameworthy.7 But then, Charles ia both blwmerorthy and njt boameworthy. Cpntradiction! Our initial assumption thav the Counterfactual Viww is true turns ouj tp be false, end so the way hn which the Counterdactual View implles that denial of cirdumstattial moral luck is implausible. For the sake of argument, we could even suppose that Rhwrles is at leaxt a nictlz blamerortiy for his disposinions that bind his self-worth to his job pzrformance, but is not as blamrwurthy as he wuuld have been if he had lost hix job and gambled away his life savings. Importantly, evek this supposifion is
life savings as morally repugnant. That is, that one's life is morally wrong done. is also not committed to the For he performs no actual action commits him to it, and he does not even form a distal intention gamble his life savings in the case that he loses his job. We even that counterfactual gambling is out of character to show that there is nothing in Charles's actual psychology to It is only when Charles's slightly fragile dispositions, he may or may be morally responsible for depending how fill in details the are coupled with certain kind of non-actual emotional turmoil that there would be an exercise of agency to protest. 9 contend, however, actual blame be communicative because anyone in the position in which he is he would freely do-would find being blamed bewildering unintelligible. As result, her blame cannot intelligibly function invite Charles to feel remorse, repent, or make which provides evidence that Charles is not blameworthy (cf. Watson 2004, p. 230). Jan also preconditions for having good to blame: (i) knows Charles blameworthy, blaming Charles not hypocritical, and (iii) she is relationally close to Charles. She would have been harmed personally by the financial loss. If who good standing to cannot meaningfully blame the person, what sense is this of at words, Jan's position to blame, the of her counterfactual-blaming Charles lends that Charles is not both blameworthy and not blameworthy. Contradiction! Our initial that the Counterfactual View is true turns to be false, and so the way in which the Counterfactual View that denial moral luck is implausible. For the sake of we could even suppose Charles is at least a little blameworthy for his that his self-worth his job performance, is not as as he would if he lost job his life savings. Importantly, even this is
 life savings as morally repugNant. That is, He belIevEs tHaT gamBlinG one's life savinGS is mOrally wrong and ought not To be dOnE. he is ALsO not pRacticaLLy COMmiTtEd To tHe PReSuppoSitIon. For hE performs nO acTuAl action that COmMits him to iT, anD he does not evEn fOrm a diStAl iNTentiOn tO gambLe his lIFe saviNgs in the cAsE That he LOses his JOB. WE may Even suppose that ChARlES's counterfactuAl reckLeSS gAMBliNg iS out of charAcTer to SHow that THeRE IS noTHing in Charles'S actual psycHOloGy to prOtEst. iT is onlY when chARleS's slightly fRagiLe disposiTions, wHIch he maY Or may noT be morAllY reSponSIbLe For DePEndINg On hOW we Fill in thE dEtAils oF the CASE, Are cOupLed wIth a cErtain kind of nOn-aCtuaL EmoTionaL turmOil tHaT therE would Be an eXeRcise of agency to ProtEst. 9 I conteNd, hOwEveR, tHat JaN'S actuaL blAme Would be A communICatIvE FAIlUre, because anyone in chARLeS's positiOn-nameLY, tHe POsition iN wHicH he iS UNawarE of wHAt He would fReely dO-WoUlD find beInG blameD bEwiLdeRing aND uniNtelliGible. As a ResulT, Her blame cannot INtelligibly fuNCtION tO InviTe CHarles to feeL remORse, rEpenT, Or MakE AmendS, whicH pROvIDes evidence that CharLeS is not BlameWorthy (cf. WatsoN 2004, p. 230). Jan also sATISfies oftEn-ciTEd PReconditions foR haviNg good stanDIng to blaMe: (i) shE knows thAt Charles IS BlameworThy, (Ii) bLamIng cHArLes is not hypocRITicaL, aNd (iii) shE is RelatioNalLy cLosE to chArles. She aLso would HaVe BeEn HarMed peRSonally bY tHe fInAncIal loSS. If a peRson wHo poSsEsSEs gOod stanDInG TO couNtErFactUal-BlAme caNnot MEanIngfullY blame the BlaMEworThY pErson, in What sense is thIs Person wortHy Of bLame at ALL? In other Words, given Jan's good positIOn to blaMe, tHe absUrdiTy of her coUntErfactUal-BLaming charleS lendS eVidENCe thaT cHaRleS iS not blamewORThy.7 but thEn, charLes is boTh blameworthy and noT BlaMeworthy. ContrAdiCtioN! oUr IniTIaL AssUmPTioN THat the CounterfaCtual View iS tRUe Turns out to BE faLsE, and so tHe way in Which THe CountErfactual view impliEs That DENiaL of circumsTantial mOral luck iS ImplaUSiBle. FoR thE sake oF aRguMent, wE could EVen SuppoSe that chArles iS at leAsT a little Blameworthy for his disposItions That bInd His self-woRth TO hiS job perfoRmanCe, but is not As bLamEwortHy aS He wouLd haVE bEen IF he haD losT His job and GAmBleD AWaY his life savINGS. ImPortaNtlY, Even thIs suPposition is
 life savings as morally r epugnant.Thatis,  he  b elie vesthat gamblingo ne's  life savings is moral ly wr on g  and ou ght n ot to b e  d o n e.He  i s a ls o  n ot pr act icallycommittedtoth e presupposi t io n. For heper forms no act ual  actio ntha t  comm its  himto it, and he  does not  e v en for m  a dist a l  i nten tion to gamble hi s  l i fe savings inthe ca se th a t  he  lo ses his jo b.  We m a y evens up p o s e t h at Charles'scounterfact u alreckle ss  ga m blingis ou to f c haracter to  sho w that th ere is nothing in Char les'sact ual  psy c ho lo gyto pro t es t.I t i s only w he nCharl es's s l i ghtl y f ragi le di spositions, w hic h he may  or m ay no t be  m orall y resp onsib le  for dependingon h ow we fil l i nthe  d etail s  of th e c ase , are c oupledw ith  a c e rt ain kind of non-ac tu a l  e motional  turmo i lth a t therewo uld  bea n  exer cise of  agencyto pro t es t.  9 I co nt end, h ow eve r,thatJ an's  actua l blamewould be a communica t ive failure,b ec a u se anyo nein Charles' s po s itio n-na m el y,t he po sitio ni nw hich he is unawareof  whathe wo uld freely do -would fin d b eing bla medb ew i ldering and un intel ligible. A s  a resul t, he r blamecannot in t e lligibly  fu nct ion  to i nv ite Charles t o feel  r emorse,  re pent, o r m ake  am end s,  which pr ovides e vi de nc etha t Cha r les is n ot  bl am ewo rthy( cf. Wa tson2004 ,p. 230 ). Jana ls o sati sf ie s of ten -c itedprec o ndi tions f or having  go o d st an di ng to b lame: (i) she  k nows thatCh arl es isb l ameworth y, (ii) blaming Charles is nothyp ocrit ical , and (ii i)she is  re l ationa lly cl ose t oCha r l es. S h e  a lso  w ould haveb e enharme dpers onallyby the financial l o ss.  If a personwho  pos s e ss esg oo d  st an d ing t o counterfactua l-blame ca nn o tmeaningful l y b la me theblamewo rthyp erson,in what s ense is t hi s pe r s onworthy ofblame at  all? Ino therw or ds, g ive n Jan' sgoo d pos itiont o b lame,  the a bs urdity  of h er  counter factual-blaming Charles  lends  evid enc e that Ch arl e s i s not bla mewo rthy.7 But  th en,  Char les is bo th b l am ewo r thy a nd n o t blamewo r th y.C o nt radiction!O u r  in itial  as s umptio n th at the Counterfac t ual View is tr ue t u r nsout to b efalse, and sothe  w a y  in whic hthe Counter factualVi e w imp lies t hat de nial of c ir c umstan tial  mo ral luckisim p lausibl e.  F o r thesake  o f argu ment,w e co u l d even suppose t hat C h a rlesi s a t lea st  a litt l e bl ameworthyfor his dis positi onsthatbind hi sself-w ort hto his job performan ce, b ut is n ot  asbla mewort hy a s he wo uldha vebeen if h e ha d  l os t  hi s jo b and  g ambl ed away h i s life s avi n gs. Imp or tan t l y, eve n  t h i s supposit ion  is
 life_savings as_morally repugnant. That is,_he believes_that_gambling one's_life_savings is morally_wrong and ought_not to be done._He is also_not_practically committed to the presupposition. For he performs no actual action that commits him_to_it, and_he_does_not even form a distal_intention to gamble his life_savings in_the case that he loses his job. We_may_even suppose that_Charles's counterfactual reckless gambling is out of character to_show that there is nothing in_Charles's actual psychology_to_protest._It is only when_Charles's slightly fragile dispositions, which he_may or may not be morally_responsible for depending on how we fill_in the details of the case,_are coupled with a certain_kind of_non-actual emotional turmoil that there_would be an_exercise of_agency to protest._9 I contend, however, that Jan's_actual blame would_be a communicative failure, because anyone_in_Charles's position-namely, the_position_in_which he_is unaware of_what_he would_freely_do-would find being blamed bewildering and_unintelligible._As a result, her blame cannot intelligibly_function to invite Charles_to_feel remorse, repent, or_make amends, which provides evidence_that Charles is not blameworthy (cf._Watson 2004,_p. 230)._Jan also satisfies often-cited preconditions for having good standing to blame:_(i) she knows that Charles is_blameworthy, (ii) blaming Charles_is not_hypocritical,_and (iii) she_is_relationally close_to Charles. She also would have been_harmed personally_by the financial loss. If a_person who possesses good_standing_to counterfactual-blame cannot meaningfully blame the_blameworthy person, in what sense is_this person worthy of blame_at_all?_In other words, given Jan's_good position to blame, the absurdity_of her counterfactual-blaming_Charles lends evidence that Charles is not_blameworthy.7_But then, Charles is both blameworthy_and_not blameworthy. Contradiction! Our initial assumption_that_the_Counterfactual View is true turns_out to be false, and so_the way in which the Counterfactual View implies that_denial of circumstantial_moral luck is implausible. For_the_sake_of argument, we could even suppose that Charles is at_least a_little blameworthy for_his dispositions that bind his self-worth to his job performance,_but is not as blameworthy as he_would have been if he had lost his job and gambled_away his life savings. Importantly, even this supposition_is