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 Hud_(1997). 'Brute_Facts.' Australasian Journal of_Philosophy 75:_77–82._Kagan, Shelly_and_Peter Vallentyne (1997)._'Infinite Value and_Finitely Additive Value Theory.'_Journal of Philosophy_94:_5–26. Kripke, Saul (1972). Naming and Necessity. Revised edition. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,_1980._Kölbel, Max_(2002)._Truth_without Objectivity. London: Routledge. Lasersohn,_Peter (2005). 'Context Dependence, Disagreement_and Predicates_of Personal Taste.' Linguistics and Philosophy 28(6): 643–_86._Lewis, David (1968)._'Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic.' Journal of Philosophy_65: 113–26. Reprinted in Lewis 1983:_26–46. - (1983)._Philosophical_Papers,_volume 1. Oxford: Oxford_University Press. - (1986). On the_Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Blackwell. -_(1992). 'Armstrong on Combinatorial Possibility.' Australasian Journal_of Philosophy 70: 211–224. Reprinted in_Lewis 1999: 196–214. - (1996)._'Maudlin and_Modal Mystery.' Australasian Journal of_Philosophy 74: 683–684._Reprinted in_Lewis 1999: 221–223._- (1999). Papers in Metaphysics and_Epistemology. Cambridge: Cambridge_University Press. - (2000). 'Causation as_Influence.'_Journal of Philosophy_97:_182–197._MacFarlane, John_(2005). 'Making Sense_of_Relative Truth.'_Proceedings_of the Aristotelian Society 105: 321–329._-_(2007). 'Relativism and Disagreement.' Philosophical Studies 132:_17–31. Parsons, Josh (2009)._'Against_Advanced Modalising.' Available online_at http://www.otago.ac.nz/philosophy/Staff/ JoshParsons/papers/against-advanced2.pdf. Richard, Mark_(2008). When Truth Gives Out. Oxford:_Oxford Univer36_sity Press._Shoemaker, Sydney (1998). 'Causal and Metaphysical Necessity.' Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79:_59–77. Sider, Theodore (2009). 'Beyond the_Humphrey Objection.' Available online_at http://tedsider.org/papers/counterpart__theory.pdf._Stanley, Jason and