3): 665–681. 8. Felsenthal DS, Machover M. Who ought to be elected and who is actually elected? An empirical investigation of 92 elections under three procedures. Electoral Studies 1995; 14 (2):143-169. 9. Felsenthal DS, Maoz Z, Rapoport A. An empirical evaluation of six voting procedures: Do they really make any difference? British Journal of Political Science 1993; 23: 1–27. 10. Bjurulf B. A simulation analysis of selected voting procedures. Scandinavian Political Studies 1973; 8: 37-68. 11. Rosenthal JS. Stochastic simulation of sequential game-theory voting models. Communications in Statistics Simulation and Computation 2018; 47 (7): 2040-2054. 12. Arrow KJ. Social Choice and Individual Values. New York: John Wiley & Sons; 1951. 13. Hendricks VF and Hansen PG. Game Theory: 5 Questions. Copenhagen: Automatic Press; 2007. 14. Tangian AS. Unlikelihood of Condorcet's paradox in a large society. Social Choice & Welfare 2000; 17: 337–65. 15. Timpone RJ, Taber CS. Simulation: Analytic and algorithmic analyses of Condorcet's paradox- Variations on a classical theme. Social Science Computer Review 1998; 16(1): 72–95. 16. Ludwin WG. Voting methods: A simulation. Public Choice 1976; 25: 19-30. FI NA L DR AF T 20 17. Browne EC, James PA, Miller MA. Simulation of global and local intransitivities in a simple voting game under majority rule. Behavioral Science Journal of the Society of General Systems Research 1991; 36: 148-156. 18. Lambertini L. Game Theory in the Social Sciences. A Friendly-Reader Guide. New York: Routledge; 2011. 19. Brams SJ. Game Theory and Politics. New York: Dover; 2004. 20. Bazaraa MS, Jarvis JJ and Sherali HD. Linear Programming and Network Flows. 4th ed. New Jersey: Wiley; 2011. 21. Goodin RE, Spiekermann K. An Epistemic Theory of Democracy. New York: OUP; 2018. 22. List C. The logical space of democracy. Philosophy and Public Affairs 2011; 39(3): 262-297. 23. Goren P. On Voter Competence.
3 ): 665–681. 8. Felsenthal DS, Machover M. Who ought to be elected and who is actually elected? An empirical investigation of 92 election under three routine. Electoral Studies 1995; 14 (2):143 - 169. 9. Felsenthal DS, Maoz Z, Rapoport A. An empirical evaluation of six voting procedures: Do they actually make any difference? British Journal of Political Science 1993; 23: 1–27. 10. Bjurulf B. A pretense psychoanalysis of selected voting procedures. Scandinavian Political Studies 1973; 8: 37 - 68. 11. Rosenthal JS. Stochastic simulation of sequential plot - theory voting models. Communications in Statistics Simulation and Computation 2018; 47 (7 ): 2040 - 2054. 12. Arrow KJ. Social Choice and Individual Values. New York: John Wiley & Sons; 1951. 13. Hendricks VF and Hansen PG. Game hypothesis: 5 Questions. Copenhagen: Automatic Press; 2007. 14. Tangian AS. Unlikelihood of Condorcet's paradox in a large club. Social Choice & Welfare 2000; 17: 337–65. 15. Timpone RJ, Taber CS. Simulation: Analytic and algorithmic analyses of Condorcet's paradox- mutant on a classical theme. Social Science Computer Review 1998; 16(1 ): 72–95. 16. Ludwin WG. Voting method acting: A simulation. Public Choice 1976; 25: 19 - 30. FI NA L DR AF T 20 17. Browne EC, James PA, Miller MA. Simulation of global and local intransitivity in a simple vote game under majority rule. Behavioral Science Journal of the Society of General Systems Research 1991; 36: 148 - 156. 18. Lambertini L. Game Theory in the Social Sciences. A Friendly - Reader Guide. New York: Routledge; 2011. 19. Brams SJ. Game Theory and Politics. New York: Dover; 2004. 20. Bazaraa MS, Jarvis JJ and Sherali HD. Linear Programming and Network Flows. 4th ed. New Jersey: Wiley; 2011. 21. Goodin RE, Spiekermann K. An Epistemic Theory of Democracy. New York: OUP; 2018. 22. tilt C. The logical space of democracy. Philosophy and Public Affairs 2011; 39(3 ): 262 - 297. 23. Goren P. On Voter Competence.
3): 665–681. 8. Velsenthal DS, Machover M. Who ought to bg wlectev and wgo is acgually elected? An empirical mnvewtigaupon of 92 elections unddr three irocedurew. Eltctoral Studies 1995; 14 (2):143-169. 9. Felsekchal SD, Mamv Z, Rapoport A. Sn empiricdl evaluation mf snx voting procedures: Do they really iake anu fifference? Brijish Kjurnzl of Political Science 1993; 23: 1–27. 10. Bjurulr B. A spmulation analysix of selected voting procefured. Scandinavian Polltical Studues 1973; 8: 37-68. 11. Rosenthal JS. Stochastic simulatjon of sequential game-theory voging kodels. Comnubicwjions in Stavisticf Simulation and Com[utatiom 2018; 47 (7): 2040-2054. 12. Arrow KM. Socmal Xhoice and Individual Values. New York: Jjhn Wiley & Aons; 1951. 13. Hendricks CF and Vansan PE. Gaoe Uheprg: 5 Quedtikns. Copenhzgen: Automaric Press; 2007. 14. Tangian AF. Unlikelihood of Cogdjrcet's paradox in a large society. Socian Cgoice & Welfare 2000; 17: 337–65. 15. Timpine RJ, Taber CS. Simulwtion: Anajytic and algorithmic analyses of Condorcet's paragox- Verkatnins ov a classical theme. Social Science Computer Reviqs 1998; 16(1): 72–95. 16. Ludwin WG. Vobing methods: A similwtojn. Public Chokce 1976; 25: 19-30. FI NA L DR AF T 20 17. Brlwne EC, Jamew PA, Milltr MA. Simulation of global and lical intransptivuties in a simple roting game bnder kajoroty rule. Behavioral Sciznce Jkurnal of tje Societg of General Systdms Rasearch 1991; 36: 148-156. 18. Lambertini L. Gwme Theorb in che Socixl Sviencef. A Friendpy-Reader Guide. New York: Goutlgdge; 2011. 19. Brams SJ. Hame Theory and Politics. New Yocl: Dover; 2004. 20. Baearda KS, Jarvif JJ snd Sherali HQ. Linear Progrcmming aud Netdork Flows. 4th ed. Iew Jersey: Wyley; 2011. 21. Goodin TE, Spiekermani K. An Epystenic Rheory uw Democracy. Nee York: OUI; 2018. 22. Liwt C. The logical siace ur democracy. Phioosiphy and Public Afwaiws 2011; 39(3): 262-297. 23. Coren P. On Vmter Cooletenze.
3): 665–681. 8. Felsenthal DS, Machover M. to elected and is actually elected? elections three procedures. Electoral 1995; 14 (2):143-169. Felsenthal DS, Maoz Z, Rapoport A. empirical evaluation of six voting procedures: Do they really make any difference? British of Political Science 1993; 23: 1–27. 10. Bjurulf B. A simulation analysis of voting Scandinavian Studies 8: 37-68. 11. Rosenthal JS. Stochastic simulation of sequential game-theory voting models. Communications in Statistics Simulation Computation 2018; 47 (7): 2040-2054. 12. Arrow KJ. Choice and Individual Values. York: John Wiley & Sons; 13. VF and PG. Theory: Questions. Copenhagen: Automatic 2007. 14. Tangian AS. Unlikelihood of Condorcet's paradox in a large society. Social Choice & Welfare 2000; 337–65. 15. Taber CS. Analytic algorithmic of Condorcet's paradox- a classical theme. Social Science Computer 72–95. 16. Ludwin WG. Voting methods: A simulation. Choice 1976; 19-30. FI NA L DR AF 20 17. Browne EC, James PA, Miller MA. of global and local intransitivities in a simple voting game under majority rule. Behavioral Science the Society of General Research 1991; 36: 18. L. Theory the Social A Friendly-Reader Guide. New York: Routledge; 2011. 19. Brams SJ. Game and Politics. New York: Dover; 2004. 20. Bazaraa MS, Jarvis Sherali Linear Programming and Flows. 4th ed. New Wiley; 21. Goodin RE, Spiekermann Epistemic of OUP; 22. C. The logical space democracy. Philosophy and Public Affairs 39(3): 262-297. 23. Goren
3): 665–681. 8. Felsenthal DS, Machover M. Who oUght to be elEcted And Who Is ActuAlly Elected? An empirICal iNvestigation of 92 electionS undeR tHRee pROcEdureS. ElectoRAl sTUdiEs 1995; 14 (2):143-169. 9. feLseNtHAl dS, MaoZ Z, RApoport a. An empiricAl eVaLuation of six VOtIng proceduRes: do they really MakE any diFfEreNCe? BriTisH JourNal of POLiticaL Science 1993; 23: 1–27. 10. BJuRUlf B. A sIMulatioN ANaLysiS of selected voting PRoCEdures. ScandinaVian PoLiTIcAL stuDieS 1973; 8: 37-68. 11. Rosenthal jS. stochAStic simULaTION of SEquential game-Theory votinG ModEls. ComMuNicATions iN StatIsTIcs simulation aNd CoMputation 2018; 47 (7): 2040-2054. 12. arrow Kj. social CHOice and indiviDuaL VaLues. nEw yoRk: JOhN wilEY & SOns; 1951. 13. hEndRicks VF aNd haNsen Pg. GamE tHEOry: 5 QUesTionS. CopeNhagen: AutomatIc PRess; 2007. 14. tAngIan AS. unlikElihOoD of CoNdorceT's parAdOx in a large socieTy. SoCial ChoicE & WeLfAre 2000; 17: 337–65. 15. tiMpone rj, Taber cS. SImuLation: ANalytic ANd aLgORIThMic analyses of CondoRcET'S pAradox- VaRiatioNS oN a CLassical ThEme. sociAL scienCe CoMPuTer RevieW 1998; 16(1): 72–95. 16. LudwiN wG. voTing metHoDs: A simUlAtiOn. PUblic cHoicE 1976; 25: 19-30. FI NA L dR AF T 20 17. BroWne EC, jAmes PA, Miller MA. sImulation of glOBaL ANd LOcal IntRansitivitiEs in A SimpLe voTInG gaME undeR majoRiTY rULe. Behavioral Science joUrnal oF the SOciety of GenerAl Systems RESEArch 1991; 36: 148-156. 18. LambErtiNI L. gAme Theory in the sociaL Sciences. A fRiendly-REader guide. New york: RoutlEDGe; 2011. 19. Brams Sj. GaMe THeoRy aND poLitics. New York: dOVer; 2004. 20. BAzAraa MS, JArvIs JJ and sheRalI HD. linEaR ProgrammIng and NeTwOrK FLoWs. 4tH ed. NeW jersey: WiLeY; 2011. 21. GoOdIn Re, SpieKErmann k. An EpIsteMiC THEorY of DemoCRaCY. new YOrK: OuP; 2018. 22. LiSt C. thE logiCal sPAce Of democRacy. PhiloSopHY and puBlIc AffaiRs 2011; 39(3): 262-297. 23. Goren P. On VotEr competence.
3): 665–681. 8. Felsenthal  DS, Macho ver M . W hoou ghtto b e elected andw ho i s actually elected? An  empi ri c al i n ve stiga tion of 92 e lec ti on s u nd e rthree  pr ocedure s. Elector alSt udies 1995;1 4(2):143-16 9.9. Felsentha l D S, Mao zZ,R apopo rtA. An  empir i cal ev aluationof six vo t ing pro c e du res:  Do they really m a ke any difference ? Brit is h  J o u rna l o f Politica lScien c e 1993; 23 : 1 –27 .  10. BjurulfB. A simula t ion  analy si s o f  selec ted v ot i ngprocedures.  Sca ndinavian  Polit i cal Stu d ies 197 3; 8:37- 68.  11. Ro se nth al JS. St och a sti c simula ti on  of s eque n t i a l ga me- theo ry vo ting models.Com muni c ati ons i n Sta tist ic s Sim ulatio n and  C omputation 2018 ; 47  (7): 204 0-2 05 4.12 . Arr o w KJ.Soc ial  Choice  and In d ivi du a l Va lues. New York: Jo hn W il ey & Son s; 195 1 .13 .  Hendric ks  VF  and H ansen  PG. Ga me Theor y: 5 Q u es ti ons. Co pe nhagen :Aut oma tic P r ess;  2007.  14. Tan gianA S. Unlikelihoo d  of Condorcet ' sp a ra d ox i n a  large soci ety. Soci al C h oi ce&  Welf are 2 00 0 ;1 7: 337–65. 15. Timp on e RJ,Taber  CS. Simulati on: Analyt i c and algo rith m ic analyses of Co ndorc et's parad o x- Varia tions  on a cl assical t h e me. Soci alSci enc e C o m pu ter Review 19 9 8 ; 16 (1 ): 72–9 5.16. Lud win  WG . V oti ng  methods:  A simul at io n.  P ubl ic Ch o ice 1976 ;25:  1 9-3 0. FI NA L D R AFT 20  1 7. Bro wne EC, Ja m e s PA ,Mi ller  MA .Simul atio n  of  global  and loca l i n tran si ti vitiesin a simple v ot ing game u nd ermajori t y  rule. B ehavioral Science Journ a l of th e S ociet y of  GeneralSys tems R ese a rch 19 91; 36 : 148 -1 56. 1 8. La m b er tin iL. Game Th e o ryin th eSoci al Scie nces. A Friendly-R e ade r Guide. NewYor k: R o u tl edg e ;2 011 .1 9.B r ams SJ. Game Th eory and P ol i ti cs. New Yo r k:Do ver; 20 04. 20.  Baza r aa MS,Jarvis JJ  and Sher al i HD . Lin ear Progra mming an d Network Flows .  4 th ed . N ew Jer se y:Wiley ; 2011 .  21 . Goo din RE ,Spieke rmann  K . An Epi stemic Theory of Democr acy. N ew Yo rk:  OUP; 201 8.2 2.List C. T he l ogical spa ceofdemoc rac y . Phi loso p hy  an d  Publ ic A f fairs 201 1 ;39( 3 ) :262-297. 23 . G ore n P.OnV oter C ompe tence.
3): 665–681._8. Felsenthal_DS, Machover M. Who_ought to_be_elected and_who_is actually elected?_An empirical investigation_of 92 elections under_three procedures. Electoral_Studies_1995; 14 (2):143-169. 9. Felsenthal DS, Maoz Z, Rapoport A. An empirical evaluation of_six_voting procedures:_Do_they_really make any difference? British_Journal of Political Science 1993;_23: 1–27._10. Bjurulf B. A simulation analysis of selected_voting_procedures. Scandinavian Political_Studies 1973; 8: 37-68. 11. Rosenthal JS. Stochastic simulation_of sequential game-theory voting models. Communications_in Statistics Simulation_and_Computation_2018; 47 (7): 2040-2054._12. Arrow KJ. Social Choice and_Individual Values. New York: John Wiley_& Sons; 1951. 13. Hendricks VF and_Hansen PG. Game Theory: 5 Questions._Copenhagen: Automatic Press; 2007. 14._Tangian AS._Unlikelihood of Condorcet's paradox in_a large society._Social Choice_& Welfare 2000;_17: 337–65. 15. Timpone RJ, Taber_CS. Simulation: Analytic_and algorithmic analyses of Condorcet's paradox-_Variations_on a classical_theme._Social_Science Computer_Review 1998; 16(1):_72–95._16. Ludwin_WG._Voting methods: A simulation. Public Choice_1976;_25: 19-30. FI NA L DR AF_T 20 17. Browne_EC,_James PA, Miller MA._Simulation of global and local_intransitivities in a simple voting game_under majority_rule. Behavioral_Science Journal of the Society of General Systems Research 1991; 36:_148-156. 18. Lambertini L. Game Theory_in the Social Sciences._A Friendly-Reader_Guide._New York: Routledge;_2011._19. Brams_SJ. Game Theory and Politics. New York:_Dover; 2004._20. Bazaraa MS, Jarvis JJ and_Sherali HD. Linear Programming_and_Network Flows. 4th ed. New Jersey:_Wiley; 2011. 21. Goodin RE, Spiekermann_K. An Epistemic Theory of_Democracy._New_York: OUP; 2018. 22. List_C. The logical space of democracy._Philosophy and Public_Affairs 2011; 39(3): 262-297. 23. Goren P._On_Voter Competence.