 blue, which we can (and presumably do) express when we say 'no swans on Earth are blue'. The un-Lewisian kind of "modal realism" that postulates hidden world variables all over the place, even in atomic sentences, is certainly a serious alternative to the kind of modal realism I am trying to develop. This view is the modal analogue of the familiar B-theory of time. Just as B-theorists hold that propositions aren't the sorts of things that can be true temporarily, so this view holds that proposi6 tions aren't the sorts of things that can be true contingently.12 A full investigation of this view is beyond the scope of this paper. But let me briefly indicate my reasons for suspecting that it will fall into incoherence. There is pressure to treat modal operators and propositional attitude verbs like 'believe' and 'assert' as broadly analogous-in particular, to regard the attitude verbs as variable binders if one regards modal operators as such. For one thing, we have sentences like 'It is both necessary, and universally believed, that no bachelors are married', which seem to require a uniform treatment for the two kinds of construction. But the treatment of attitude verbs as variable-binders seems to me to be incoherent. For if there is such a thing as believing or asserting that no swans on Earth are blue, as opposed to believing asserting that at w no swans on Earth are blue for some specific w, then surely this is something ordinary English speakers sometimes do when they sincerely and literally utter 'no swans on Earth are blue'. And in that case, it is just not true that asserting this sentence requires deictically assigning a value to a free variable. Neither is it true that this sentence can only be evaluated for truth relative to a variableassignment (or a world). For if there is such a thing as believing that there are no swans on Earth simpliciter, there must also be such a thing as believing that 'there are no swans on Earth' is true simpliciter, i.e. evaluating it as true simpliciter. So the central point of the analogy with 'he is clever' breaks down.13 Let us assume, then, that the distinctive contingency-inducing form of restriction (which we continue to indicate with the subscript r) can attach even to unembedded uses of quantifiers. For the sake of a concrete example, suppose that nor swans are blue, even though someu
blue, which we can (and presumably do) express when we say' no swans on Earth are aristocratic'. The un - Lewisian kind of " modal platonism " that postulates hidden world variable all over the place, even in nuclear sentences, is certainly a serious option to the kind of modal platonism I am trying to build up. This view is the modal analogue of the familiar boron - theory of time. Just as B - theorists hold that proposition aren't the sorts of things that can be true temporarily, so this scene holds that proposi6 tions aren't the sorts of things that can be true contingently.12 A entire investigation of this view is beyond the scope of this paper. But let me concisely indicate my reasons for suspecting that it will fall into incoherence. There is pressure to treat modal hustler and propositional position verbs like' believe' and' assert' as broadly analogous - in particular, to regard the attitude verbs as variable binder if one see modal operators as such. For one thing, we receive prison term like' It is both necessary, and universally believed, that no bachelors are married', which look to require a uniform treatment for the two kinds of structure. But the treatment of attitude verbs as variable - binders seems to me to be incoherent. For if there is such a thing as believing or asserting that no swans on Earth are blue, as opposed to think assert that at w no swans on Earth are blue for some specific w, then surely this is something ordinary English speakers sometimes serve when they sincerely and literally utter' no swans on Earth are blue'. And in that subject, it is just not true that asserting this sentence want deictically assigning a value to a detached variable. Neither is it true that this conviction can only be measure for truth proportional to a variableassignment (or a world). For if there is such a matter as believing that there are no swans on Earth simpliciter, there must also be such a thing as believe that' there are no swan on Earth' is true simpliciter, i.e. evaluating it as true simpliciter. So the cardinal point of the analogy with' he is clever' breaks down.13 permit us assume, then, that the distinctive contingency - inducing form of restriction (which we cover to indicate with the subscript r) can attach even to unembedded uses of quantifiers. For the sake of a concrete example, think that nor swan are blue, even though someu
 blke, which we can (and presmmably do) express when xe say 'ho swans on Earth are blue'. The un-Lewmsiab kine of "modal realism" thag postulanes hiddeb wocld variables all over tmz pladc, eveu mn atomic sentekces, is cerdainly a seriogs apternative to the kind of modal reajism I sm trying to devglop. Uhif visw is the modal analogue of the fajiliar U-theory of time. Just as B-theorists hold tjat oropositions aren't the sorts if trungs that cav be true uekporarily, ao this view holds that proposi6 tionx aren't thg aogjs of things that can be true contingantly.12 A full investigstimn if this view is beyonv the scope of this kaper. But nec me briefly indicate mt reavons for wusoecuinj tgat it wiml fall info incoherebce. There is pressute np treat modam operwtjrs and propositional attitude verbs line 'gelieve' and 'assert' as beoadly analogous-in patticular, tj regard the attitude verbs as variable binders ix one fegcvqr mldal operators as such. For one thing, we have fsnuenbes like 'It is bobh necessary, and umigetfally believea, that no bachelors are margied', whych swem to rezuirr a uniform treatment for tye two kinds if construction. Buc the treatmznt of attiyude verbs as variable-bnnders seems to mf to be ihzoherent. For if ghege iv such a thing as believind or assecting that nu swsns on Earth are blue, as opposed to belifving avserting tjat at w no swans on Earth are ukue for some s[ecpfic w, thzn surcly this is somqthing ordinari English speayers sometpmes do wien they sinserely and lidgrally utter 'io swans jn Eqrth are bljd'. And in that vase, it is just not true that assertikg thka sentence requnxew deictically axsienigg a vwnue to a frea vafiacke. Nekther is it grue that this sentence wan knly be evaluated gov truth rglative tj a variableaxsignment (or a worpd). Foc if tiere ix soch a thing as believing that tgere are jo fwans on Eareh slmplyciter, thexe must also be such a thing as believinj that 'there are no swabs on Earth' is true ximpliciter, i.e. edaluating it as true simplicirer. So the centrak point of the analogg with 'he id clever' breaks down.13 Let us assume, then, that the distinctive contingency-ibducinj sorm of resfricyion (fhnch we cogtinne to indicate witn the subscript r) can attach evxn to unemtebded uses of quantifiers. For yhd sake of a cuncrete example, suppose fhat nor swans are blue, even though somru
blue, which we can (and presumably do) we 'no swans Earth are blue'. realism" postulates hidden world all over the even in atomic sentences, is certainly serious alternative to the kind of modal realism I am trying to develop. view is the modal analogue of the familiar B-theory of time. Just as hold propositions the of things that can be true temporarily, so this view holds that proposi6 tions aren't the of things that can be true contingently.12 A investigation of this view beyond the scope of this But me briefly my for that it will into incoherence. There is pressure to treat modal operators and propositional attitude verbs like 'believe' and 'assert' broadly analogous-in regard the verbs variable if one regards as such. For one thing, we 'It is both necessary, and universally believed, that bachelors are which seem to require a uniform for the two kinds of construction. But the of attitude verbs as variable-binders seems to me to be incoherent. For if there is thing as believing or that no swans Earth blue, opposed believing asserting at w no swans on Earth are blue for some specific then surely this is something ordinary English speakers sometimes do sincerely literally utter 'no on Earth are blue'. in case, it is just that this assigning value a free variable. Neither it true that this sentence only be evaluated for (or a world). For if there is such thing as believing that there are no on Earth simpliciter, there must also be such a thing as believing 'there are on Earth' is true simpliciter, i.e. evaluating it true simpliciter. So the point of the analogy with 'he is clever' breaks Let assume, then, the distinctive contingency-inducing of restriction (which continue to indicate subscript r) attach to quantifiers. For the sake of a example, that nor swans are blue, though
 blue, which we can (and presumabLy do) expresS when We sAy 'nO sWans On EaRth are blue'. The uN-lewiSian kind of "modal realism" That pOsTUlatES hIdden World vaRIaBLEs aLl OvEr tHe PLaCe, eveN in Atomic sEntences, is CerTaInly a serious ALtErnative to The Kind of modal rEalIsm I am TrYinG To devEloP. This View is THe modaL analogue Of THe famiLIar B-theORY oF timE. Just as B-theorists HOlD That propositioNs aren'T tHE sORTs oF thIngs that caN bE true TEmporarILy, SO THis VIew holds that pRoposi6 tions ARen'T the soRtS of THings tHat caN bE TruE contingentLy.12 A fUll investIgatioN Of this vIEw is beyOnd the ScoPe oF thiS PaPeR. BuT lET me BRiEflY IndIcate my rEaSoNs for SuspECTINg thAt iT wilL fall Into incoherenCe. THere IS prEssurE to trEat mOdAl opeRators And prOpOsitional attituDe veRbs like 'beLieVe' And 'AsSert' aS BroadlY anAloGous-in pArticulAR, to ReGARD tHe attitude verbs as vArIABlE binders If one rEGaRdS Modal opeRaTorS as sUCH. For oNe thINg, We have seNtenceS LiKe 'it is botH nEcessaRy, And UniVersaLLy beLieved, That no baCheloRS are married', whiCH seem to requirE A uNIFoRM treAtmEnt for the twO kinDS of cOnstRUcTioN. but thE treaTmENt OF attitude verbs as varIaBle-binDers sEems to me to be iNcoherent. FOR IF there is Such A ThINg as believing oR asseRting that nO Swans on EArth aRe blue, as Opposed to BELieving aSseRtiNg tHat AT W nO swans on Earth ARE bluE fOr some sPecIfic w, thEn sUreLy tHis Is Something Ordinary enGlIsH sPeaKers sOMetimes dO wHen ThEy sIncerELy and lIteraLly uTtEr 'NO swAns on EaRTh ARE bluE'. ANd In thAt cAsE, it is Just NOt tRue that Asserting ThiS SentEnCe RequireS deictically aSsIgning a valUe To a Free vaRIAble. NeitHer is it true that this sentENce can oNly Be evaLuatEd for trutH reLative To a VAriablEassigNment (Or A woRLD). For iF THeRe iS sUch a thing aS BEliEving ThAt thEre are nO swans on Earth simplICitEr, there must alSo bE sucH A ThIng AS bELieViNG thAT 'There are no swans On Earth' is tRuE SiMpliciter, i.E. EvaLuAting it As true sImpliCIter. So tHe central Point of thE aNaloGY WitH 'he is cleveR' breaks dOwn.13 Let us aSSume, tHEn, That tHe dIstincTiVe cOntinGency-iNDucIng foRm of reStRictioN (whicH wE continuE to indicate with the subscRipt r) cAn attAch Even to uneMbeDDed Uses of quaNtifIers. For the SakE of A concRetE ExampLe, suPPoSe tHAt nor SwanS Are blue, evEN tHouGH SoMeu
 blue, which we can (and p resumablydo) e xpr ess  w henwe s ay 'no swans o n  Ear th are blue'. The un-L ewisi an kind of  "mod al real i sm " tha tpo stu la t es  hidd enworld v ariables a llov er the place ,  e ven in ato mic  sentences,iscertai nl y a serio usalter native to the  kind ofmo d al rea l ism I a m tr ying  to develop. This vi e w is the modal  analo gu e  o f the  fa miliar B-t he ory o f  time.J us t a s B - theorists hol d that prop o sit ions a re n't the so rts o ft hin gs that can  betrue temp oraril y , so th i s viewholdstha t p ropo s i6  t ion sa ren ' tthe sor ts of th in gs  that  can b e true  co ntin gentl y.12 A full i nve stig a tio n ofthisview  i s bey ond th e sco pe  of this paper.  But  let me b rie fl y i nd icate my rea son s f or susp ectingt hat  i t w il l fall into incohe re n c e.  There i s pres s ur et o treatmo dal  ope r a torsandp ro position al att i tu de  verbsli ke 'be li eve ' a nd 'a s sert ' as b roadly a nalog o us-in particul a r, to regardt he a tt i tude  ve rbs as vari able bind ersi fone regar ds mo da l  o p erators as such. Fo rone th ing,we have sente nces like' I t  is both  nec e ss a ry, and univer sally  believed, that nobache lors are  married' , which se emtoreq uir e auniform treat m e nt f or  the tw o k inds of  co nst ruc tio n.  But thetreatmen tof  a tt itu de ve r bs as va ri abl e- bin derss eems t o meto b ein c ohe rent. F o ri f  the re  i s su chathing  asb eli eving o r asserti ngt hatno  s wans on  Earth are bl ue , as oppos ed  to  belie v i ng asser ting that at w no swans on Eart h a re bl ue f or some s pec ific w , t h en sur ely th is is  s ome t h ing o r d in ary  E nglish spe a k ers  some ti mesdo when  they sincerely an d  li terally utter  'n o sw a n sonE ar t h a re blu e ' . And in that c ase, it is  j u st  not truet hat  a ssertin g thissente n ce requ ires deic tically a ss igni n g  avalue to a  free va riable. N e ither is  it t rue  thatth issente nce ca n  on ly be  evalu at ed for  trut hrelative  to a variableassignmen t (ora wor ld) . For ifthe r e i s such athin g as belie vin g t hat t her e  areno s w an s o n  Eart h si m pliciter, th ere m us t also be s u c h  athing  as believ ingthat 'there are n o  swans on Eart h' i s tru e s i mpli ci ter, i.e. eval uat in g it as tr ue  simplicite r. So th ec entra l poin t of t he anal o g yw ith 'h e is  cl ever' bre aks  d o wn.13 L et  u s  assum e, t he n, tha t thed isti n c tive contingency -indu c i ng fo r m o f res tr iction( whic h we conti nue to indi cate w iththe s ubscrip tr) can  at ta ch even to unembedde d use s of qu an tifi ers . Forthes a ke of  a c on cre te exampl e ,  s u pp os e  th at n or sw an s ar e blue, e v en thoug h s o meu
 blue,_which we_can (and presumably do)_express when_we_say 'no_swans_on Earth are_blue'. The un-Lewisian_kind of "modal realism"_that postulates hidden_world_variables all over the place, even in atomic sentences, is certainly a serious alternative_to_the kind_of_modal_realism I am trying to_develop. This view is the_modal analogue_of the familiar B-theory of time. Just as_B-theorists_hold that propositions_aren't the sorts of things that can be true_temporarily, so this view holds that_proposi6 tions aren't_the_sorts_of things that can_be true contingently.12 A full investigation_of this view is beyond the_scope of this paper. But let me_briefly indicate my reasons for suspecting_that it will fall into_incoherence. There_is pressure to treat modal_operators and propositional_attitude verbs_like 'believe' and_'assert' as broadly analogous-in particular, to_regard the attitude_verbs as variable binders if one_regards_modal operators as_such._For_one thing,_we have sentences_like_'It is_both_necessary, and universally believed, that no_bachelors_are married', which seem to require a_uniform treatment for the_two_kinds of construction. But_the treatment of attitude verbs_as variable-binders seems to me to_be incoherent._For if_there is such a thing as believing or asserting that no_swans on Earth are blue, as_opposed to believing asserting_that at_w_no swans on_Earth_are blue_for some specific w, then surely this_is something_ordinary English speakers sometimes do when_they sincerely and literally_utter_'no swans on Earth are blue'._And in that case, it is_just not true that asserting_this_sentence_requires deictically assigning a value_to a free variable. Neither is_it true that_this sentence can only be evaluated for_truth_relative to a variableassignment (or a_world)._For if there is such a_thing_as_believing that there are no_swans on Earth simpliciter, there must_also be such a thing as believing that 'there_are no swans_on Earth' is true simpliciter,_i.e._evaluating_it as true simpliciter. So the central point of the_analogy with_'he is clever'_breaks down.13 Let us assume, then, that the distinctive contingency-inducing_form of restriction (which we continue to_indicate with the subscript r) can attach even to unembedded uses_of quantifiers. For the sake of a concrete_example, suppose that nor swans are blue,_even though someu