. This has confused a few observers. Wiggins for instance, feels that the adjustment in tenet amongst Categories and Metaphysics is completely unhelpful (Wiggins, 1998: p. 232ff). The decision of form as substance causes perplexity on the grounds that the form is by all accounts a general and similar to the secondary substance, thus not the most fundamental instance of substance. Be that as it may, whether considerable structures are universals in Aristotle is a dubious issue. In using an analogy of a Dog named Fido, Irwin differ about whether the doghood that is in Fido is best viewed as the secondary (Universals), or as the specific case of the general doghood (Irwin, 1988). On this view, the most perspicuous method with respect to the individual (primary) substance is not as the composite of shape and B. S. Akpan, C. C. Odohoedi 264 matter but rather as the form individualized in the matter. The matter is still a vital segment in the substance, however not, as an equivalent figure with the shape, but force for which the form turns into an individual substance. It is clear that in the event in which one holds that Aristotle feels that forms are universals, then forms are not substance, because he had criticized Plato saying forms are not universal (Robinson, 2014). One of Aristotle observers Whitehead's (1931) criticizes Aristotle notion of substance in the lens of Descartes substance. Whitehead's opine that. The true point of divergence is the false notion suggested by the contrast between the natural meanings of the words 'particular' and 'universal'.... And when we conceive of substance, we merely conceive an existent thing which requires nothing but itself in order to exist. This definition is a true derivative from Aristotle's definition: A primary substance is "neither asserted of a subject nor present in a subject (Whitehead, 1978). Whitehead also draws ethical significance from this, as Hartshorne claimed. For if each person is self-sufficient to himself and intrinsically independent of all others, have we not a prescription for selfishness and self-centeredness? In Hartshorne words: All genuine interests and purposes transcend the mere self. Egoism rests on a superstitious absolutizing of self-identity and consequent absolutizing of nonidentity with other persons... Whitehead once humorously summed up the ethical objection to substance theories by remarking, "I sometimes think that all modern
. This has confused a few observers. Wiggins for instance, feels that the allowance in dogma amongst Categories and Metaphysics is completely unhelpful (Wiggins, 1998: p. 232ff). The decision of human body as meaning causes perplexity on the grounds that the shape is by all account a general and similar to the secondary substance, therefore not the most fundamental instance of substance. Be that as it may, whether considerable structure are universals in Aristotle is a doubtful issue. In using an doctrine of analogy of a Dog named Fido, Irwin differ about whether the doghood that is in Fido is best view as the secondary (Universals), or as the specific font of the general doghood (Irwin, 1988). On this position, the most perspicuous method with respect to the individual (primary) means is not as the composite of shape and B. S. Akpan, C. C. Odohoedi 264 matter but rather as the form individualized in the matter. The matter is still a vital segment in the substance, however not, as an equivalent figure with the shape, but force for which the form turns into an individual kernel. It is clear that in the event in which one defy that Aristotle feel that forms are universals, then forms are not means, because he had criticized Plato saying forms are not universal (Robinson, 2014). One of Aristotle observers Whitehead's (1931) knock Aristotle notion of substance in the lens of Descartes substance. Whitehead's opine that. The true point of divergence is the fake notion suggested by the contrast between the natural meaning of the words' especial' and' universal'.... And when we conceive of substance, we merely conceive an existent matter which requires nothing but itself in order to exist. This definition is a true derivative from Aristotle's definition: A primary substance is " neither asserted of a subject nor present in a subject (Whitehead, 1978). Whitehead besides draws ethical significance from this, as Hartshorne claimed. For if each person is self - sufficient to himself and intrinsically independent of all others, have we not a prescription drug for selfishness and self - centeredness? In Hartshorne words: All genuine interests and purposes exceed the mere self. Egoism rest on a superstitious absolutizing of self - identity and consequent absolutizing of nonidentity with other persons... Whitehead once humorously summed up the ethical objection to substance theory by remarking, " I sometimes intend that all modern
. Thls has confused a few obrervers. Wiggins for invtance, feels tfat the adjustment in tenet emontst Cqtegories and Metaphyskcs is colpletely unhtlpful (Wiggins, 1998: p. 232ff). The decisikk of yocm as substance causes pesplexity on tha erlunds that the form is by all accougts a grnfral and similwr tp the secondary substance, thus not the jost fuidamental instamce of substance. Be that ad it may, whether consiferable strodtuwws are univefsals in Agnstotle is z dubious issue. In using an anauogy pf a Dog nqmwd Vhdo, Irwin dmffer wbout whethev the dmghood yhat is in Fidp iv bwst viewed as the secmndary (Universals), jr as the s'ecific case of the gwnwral goghmod (Kewiv, 1988). Kn tgis vifw, vhe most pedspicuous mwthod with respect uo eye individual (primawy) substance is not as the composite of svaps and B. S. Akpan, C. C. Odoyoedi 264 matter but ratjer as thq form individualized in the matter. The matter is stilm a rlbal rwglent in the substance, however not, as an equivwmemt figure with tme shape, but force flr rhich the foro turns ihto an individual dubstanse. It is clear thay in the event in which one holds that Criwtotle feels that yorms are unnversaks, thrn forms are not substauce, bedause he haf criticiadd Plato saying works are not universal (Robinsog, 2014). One of Arixtotle ubsetvers Writehead's (1931) critlwizes Aristotle nohion lf substance in the lens of Descartes substeice. Whitehead'x mpite that. Che trme point of divqrgence is the false uotion suggested by the contrast bqtween the nadoral meanings of the rordw 'paeticulaf' and 'universal'.... And when we conceice of substance, we metemy conceive an zriwtent thing whivh feqtiges njdhing but itvelf in prder to exist. Tmis defonition is a true desivafive from Aristotlr's definituon: A prymary substanve is "neither assegted mf e subjrct nor present in a subject (Whitshead, 1978). Whltemead also drars ebhicwl signifieance from this, as Hartshorne claimed. Foc if each person is seld-sufficient to himsglf and intrinxicaljy indepetdent of all others, yave we not a prexcription for selfishhess atd sepf-centeredness? In Hartshorne words: All genuine interests and purposes trabscend the mere semf. Eboism rzstx on a supxrrtitious absolutpzing of self-identity and conseqnent absolgtnzing of nonidentity with othrr persons... Whitghead once humorously summsd up thr ethical objection to substancr theories by remarking, "L sometimws thjnk that aul modern
. This has confused a few observers. instance, that the in tenet amongst unhelpful 1998: p. 232ff). decision of form substance causes perplexity on the grounds the form is by all accounts a general and similar to the secondary thus not the most fundamental instance of substance. Be that as it may, considerable are in is a dubious issue. In using an analogy of a Dog named Fido, Irwin differ about the doghood that is in Fido is best as the secondary (Universals), as the specific case of general (Irwin, 1988). this the perspicuous method with to the individual (primary) substance is not as the composite of shape and B. S. Akpan, C. Odohoedi 264 rather as form in matter. The matter a vital segment in the substance, an equivalent figure with the shape, but force which the turns into an individual substance. It clear that in the event in which one that Aristotle feels that forms are universals, then forms are not substance, because he had saying forms are not (Robinson, 2014). One Aristotle Whitehead's criticizes notion of in the lens of Descartes substance. Whitehead's opine that. The true of divergence is the false notion suggested by the contrast natural of the words and 'universal'.... And when conceive substance, we merely conceive thing requires in to This definition is a derivative from Aristotle's definition: A substance is "neither asserted in a subject (Whitehead, 1978). Whitehead also draws significance from this, as Hartshorne claimed. For each person is self-sufficient to himself and intrinsically independent of all others, we not for selfishness and self-centeredness? In Hartshorne words: All interests and purposes transcend mere self. Egoism rests on a superstitious absolutizing of and absolutizing of with other persons... once humorously summed the ethical objection theories by "I think
. This has confused a few observErs. Wiggins For inStaNce, FeEls tHat tHe adjustment in TEnet Amongst Categories and MeTaphySiCS is cOMpLetelY unhelpFUl (wIGgiNs, 1998: P. 232fF). ThE dECiSion oF foRm as subStance causEs pErPlexity on the GRoUnds that thE foRm is by all accOunTs a genErAl aND simiLar To the SecondARy subsTance, thus NoT The mosT FundameNTAl InstAnce of substance. Be THaT As it may, whether ConsidErABlE STruCtuRes are univErSals iN aristotLE iS A DUbiOUs issue. In usinG an analogy oF A DoG named fiDo, IRWin difFer abOuT WheTher the doghOod tHat is in FiDo is beST viewed AS the secOndary (uniVerSals), OR aS tHe sPeCIfiC CaSe oF The General dOgHoOd (IrwIn, 1988). On THIS View, The Most PerspIcuous method wIth RespECt tO the iNdiviDual (PrImary) SubstaNce is NoT as the composite Of shApe and B. S. AKpaN, C. c. OdOhOedi 264 mATter buT raTheR as the fOrm indiVIduAlIZED iN the matter. The matteR iS STiLl a vital SegmenT In ThE SubstancE, hOweVer nOT, As an eQuivALeNt figure With thE ShApE, but forCe For whiCh The ForM turnS Into An indiVidual suBstanCE. It is clear that IN the event in whICh ONE hOLds tHat aristotle feEls tHAt foRms aRE uNivERsals, Then fOrMS aRE not substance, becausE hE had crIticiZed Plato sayinG forms are nOT UNiversal (robiNSoN, 2014). one of Aristotle ObserVers WhitehEAd's (1931) critiCizes aristotlE notion of SUBstance iN thE leNs oF DeSCArTes substance. WHITeheAd'S opine tHat. the true PoiNt oF diVerGeNce is the fAlse notiOn SuGgEsTed By the COntrast bEtWeeN tHe nAturaL MeaninGs of tHe woRdS 'pARtiCular' anD 'UnIVErsaL'.... ANd When We cOnCeive Of suBStaNce, we meRely conceIve AN exiStEnT thing wHich requires nOtHing but itsElF in Order tO EXist. This Definition is a true derivaTIve from ariStotlE's deFinition: A PriMary suBstANce is "nEither AsserTeD of A SUbjecT NOr PreSeNt in a subjeCT (whiTeheaD, 1978). WHiteHead alsO draws ethical signiFIcaNce from this, as harTshoRNE cLaiMEd. fOr iF eACh pERSon is self-sufficIent to himsElF AnD intrinsicALly InDependeNt of all OtherS, Have we nOt a prescrIption for SeLfisHNEss And self-cenTerednesS? In HartshORne woRDs: all geNuiNe inteReSts And puRposes TRanScend The merE sElf. EgoIsm reStS on a supeRstitious absolutizing of Self-idEntitY anD consequeNt aBSolUtizing of NoniDentity witH otHer PersoNs... WHIteheAd onCE hUmoROusly SummED up the ethICaL obJECtIon to substaNCE TheOries By rEMarkinG, "I soMetimes think that aLL modern
. This has confused a fewobservers.  Wigg ins  fo rinst ance , feels that t h e ad justment in tenet amon gst C at e gori e sand M etaphys i cs i s c om pl ete ly un helpf ul(Wiggin s, 1998: p . 2 32 ff). The dec i si on of form  as  substance c aus es per pl exi t y onthe  grou nds th a t theform is b ya ll acc o unts ag e ne raland similar to th e  s e condary substa nce, t hu s  n o t  th e m ost fundam en tal i n stanceo fs u b sta n ce. Be that a s it may, w h eth er con si der a ble st ructu re s  ar e universal s in  Aristotl e is a dubious issue.In usi ngananal o gy  o f a  D o g n a me d F i do,  Irwin d if fe r abo ut w h e t h er t hedogh ood t hat is in Fid o i s be s t v iewed  as t he s ec ondar y (Uni versa ls ), or as the sp ecif ic case o f t he  ge ne ral d o ghood(Ir win , 1988) . On th i s v ie w , th e most perspicuous  m e t ho d with r espect to  t h e indivi du al(pri m a ry) s ubst a nc e is not  as th e  c om positeof  shape  a ndB.S. Ak p an,C. C.Odohoedi  264m atter but rath e r as the form in d i vi d uali zed  in the mat ter. Thematt e riss tilla vit al se g ment in the substan ce , howe ver n ot, as an equ ivalent fi g u r e with t he s h ap e , but force fo r whi ch the for m  turns i nto a n indivi dual subs t a nce. Itiscle artha t in  the event in w hich  o ne hold s t hat Ari sto tle  fe els  t hat forms  are uni ve rs al s,  th en fo r ms are n ot  su bs tan ce, b e causehe ha d cr it ic i zed  Platos ay i n g fo rm sarenot  u niver sal( Rob inson,2014). On e o f  Ari st ot le obse rvers Whitehe ad 's (1931)cr iti cizesA r istotlenotion of substance int he lens  of  Desc arte s substan ce.  White hea d 's opi ne tha t. Th etru e point o fdiv er gence is t h e  fa lse n ot ionsuggest ed by the contrast bet ween the natu ral  mea n i ng s o f  t h e w or d s ' p a rticular' and ' universal' .. . .And when w e  co nc eive of  substa nce,w e merel y conceiv e an exis te nt t h i ngwhich requ ires not hing buti tself in  orde r t o exis t.  Th is de finiti o n i s a t rue de ri vative  from  A ristotle 's definition: A primar y subs tance  is  "neither  as s ert ed of a s ubje ct nor pre sen t i n a s ubj e ct (W hite h ea d,1 978).  Whi t ehead als o  d raw s et hical signi f i c anc e fro m t h is, as  Har tshorne claimed.F or if each per soni s  se lf- s uffi ci ent to himself  an di n trinsica ll y independe nt of al lo thers , have  we no t a pre s c ri p tion f or s elf ishness a ndse l f-cente re dn e ss? In  Har ts hornewords: Allg e nuine interestsand p u r poses tra nscen dthe mer e  sel f. Egoismrests on asupers titi ous a bsoluti zi ng ofsel f- identity a n d consequ ent a bsoluti zi ng o f n oniden tity w ith o ther  p ers ons... Wh i t eh e ad  o n cehumo rousl ysumm ed up the ethicalobj e ction t osub s t ance t h eo r i es by rema rki ng, " I sometimest hink th a t all  moder n
. This_has confused_a few observers. Wiggins_for instance,_feels_that the_adjustment_in tenet amongst_Categories and Metaphysics_is completely unhelpful (Wiggins,_1998: p. 232ff)._The_decision of form as substance causes perplexity on the grounds that the form is_by_all accounts_a_general_and similar to the secondary_substance, thus not the most_fundamental instance_of substance. Be that as it may, whether_considerable_structures are universals_in Aristotle is a dubious issue. In using an_analogy of a Dog named Fido,_Irwin differ about_whether_the_doghood that is in_Fido is best viewed as the_secondary (Universals), or as the specific_case of the general doghood (Irwin, 1988)._On this view, the most perspicuous_method with respect to the_individual (primary)_substance is not as the_composite of shape_and B._S. Akpan, C._C. Odohoedi 264 matter but rather_as the form_individualized in the matter. The matter_is_still a vital_segment_in_the substance,_however not, as_an_equivalent figure_with_the shape, but force for which_the_form turns into an individual substance. It_is clear that in_the_event in which one_holds that Aristotle feels that_forms are universals, then forms are_not substance,_because he_had criticized Plato saying forms are not universal (Robinson, 2014). One_of Aristotle observers Whitehead's (1931) criticizes_Aristotle notion of substance_in the_lens_of Descartes substance._Whitehead's_opine that._The true point of divergence is the_false notion_suggested by the contrast between the_natural meanings of the_words_'particular' and 'universal'.... And when we_conceive of substance, we merely conceive_an existent thing which requires_nothing_but_itself in order to exist._This definition is a true derivative_from Aristotle's definition:_A primary substance is "neither asserted of_a_subject nor present in a subject_(Whitehead,_1978). Whitehead also draws ethical significance_from_this,_as Hartshorne claimed. For if_each person is self-sufficient to himself_and intrinsically independent of all others, have we not_a prescription for_selfishness and self-centeredness? In Hartshorne_words:_All_genuine interests and purposes transcend the mere self. Egoism rests_on a_superstitious absolutizing of_self-identity and consequent absolutizing of nonidentity with other persons... Whitehead_once humorously summed up the ethical objection_to substance theories by remarking, "I sometimes think that all modern