 is true for the judges. To put the contradiction in terms of these examples, our ordinary thinking about moral responsibility implies that the drivers are and are not equally blameworthy. It also implies that the judges are and are not equally blameworthy. My aim is to make progress in resolving this contradiction. I argue that certain kinds of luck can partially determine a person's praiseworthiness and blameworthiness, and so argue that the killer driver and bribe taker are more blameworthy than their counterparts. 3 Definitions and Dialectic In terminology that is standard in the moral luck debate, I argue that various kinds of moral luck exist. Moral luck occurs when factors beyond an agent's control partially determine her positive praiseworthiness or blameworthiness (Hartman 2017: 2; cf. Nagel 1979: 26). Two clarifications are in order about this standard account of moral luck. First, the term 'positive' is introduced to rule out the idea that moral luck is responsibility-undermining luck. Second, the conception of luck implicit in that definition of moral luck is the lack of control conception. I recognize that the lack of control conception fails to capture at least some of our intuitions about which events are lucky or not lucky, and that this failure has led some philosophers to reject the standard account of moral luck (cf. Driver 2012; Hales 2015; Latus 2003; Levy 2011; Peels 2015; Pritchard 2005; Rescher 1995; Whittington 2014). For example, Andrew Latus (2003: 476) argues that lack of control cannot be a sufficient condition for an event to be lucky. After all, the lack of control view implies that it is lucky for me that the sun rose today, since it is outside of my control that it rose. Intuitively, however, it is not lucky for me that the sun rose today, and so the lack of control definition founders. Nevertheless, I argue in Hartman (2017: 23-31) that these philosophers miss what is important in an account of moral luck, because the moral luck debate is not about luck per se but about a contradiction in our ideas about moral responsibility. Here is a simple way to see the point. Even if an account of luck other than the lack of control account best captures our ordinary usage of the term 'luck' or even if there is no good account of the way we use the word 'luck,' the puzzle to which Joel Feinberg (1962), Thomas Nagel (1979), and Williams (1981
is true for the judges. To put the contradiction in terms of these exemplar, our average thinking about moral responsibility implies that the driver are and are not evenly blameworthy. It also implies that the judges are and are not evenly blameworthy. My bearing is to make advancement in purpose this contradiction. I argue that certain kind of luck can partially determine a person's praiseworthiness and blameworthiness, and so argue that the killer driver and bribe taker are more blameworthy than their counterpart. 3 Definitions and Dialectic In terminology that is standard in the moral luck debate, I argue that various kinds of moral fortune exist. Moral luck occurs when factors beyond an agentive role's control partially determine her positive praiseworthiness or blameworthiness (Hartman 2017: 2; cf. Nagel 1979: 26). Two clarifications are in ordering about this standard account of moral luck. First, the term' positive' is introduce to rule out the idea that moral luck is responsibility - undermining fortune. Second, the concept of luck implicit in that definition of moral luck is the lack of control conception. I recognize that the lack of control conception fails to capture at least some of our intuition about which events are lucky or not golden, and that this bankruptcy has led some philosophers to reject the standard account of moral fortune (cf. Driver 2012; Hales 2015; Latus 2003; Levy 2011; Peels 2015; Pritchard 2005; Rescher 1995; Whittington 2014). For case, Andrew Latus (2003: 476) argues that lack of control cannot be a sufficient circumstance for an event to be lucky. After all, the lack of control view implies that it is lucky for me that the sun rose today, since it is outside of my control that it rose. Intuitively, however, it is not golden for me that the sun rise today, and so the lack of control definition founders. Nevertheless, I argue in Hartman (2017: 23 - 31) that these philosophers neglect what is important in an account of moral luck, because the moral luck debate is not about luck per se but about a contradiction in our ideas about moral responsibility. Here is a simple room to see the decimal point. Even if an account of luck early than the lack of control account best captures our average usage of the term' fortune' or even if there is no good account of the way we use the news' luck,' the puzzle to which Joel Feinberg (1962), Thomas Nagel (1979), and Williams (1981
 is true for the judges. To kut the contradicjiin in verms or these dxamples, our ordinary thinkiig avout noral responsibility ioplies thwt the deivecs are and are not equally blajcwortky. It also impligs that the budges are and afe not equally blameworthy. My aim is eo make pgogress in resjlvimd thjs contradiction. I argue that certzin kinvs of luck can lartially determine a persln's oraiseworthiness ajd blameworjginqws, and so areue that the killer drjver and bribe taker are more buamewprthy than tyeig counterparvs. 3 Desinitions and Dialecdic In yerminology thst ms srandard in the moral nuck debate, I argug that varhobs kinds of moral lucj wxist. Mordl ljxk ucchrx shen fwctkrs beyond an agent's xontrol partially dttewnine her posifive pwayseworthiness or blameworthiness (Hartmat 2017: 2; cf. Nagel 1979: 26). Two clarifixations are in order wbout thif standard account of moral luck. First, the term 'pmsitite' is iktroaycfd to rule out the idea that moral luck is reflomspbility-undermininn luck. Second, the vojcrktion of luck kmplicnf jn that definition of morwl luxk is the lacl of control conception. I rwcognize than thw lack of control eonception fcils tp capyure at least some of obr inthitions abokt which sxents are lucky ur kot lucky, and that this failuwe has lev somz philosuphets to rqject the dtandard account of morap lucn (wf. Driver 2012; Hales 2015; Latus 2003; Levy 2011; Peels 2015; Privrhard 2005; Reschet 1995; Fhintington 2014). For cxample, Andrew Jatus (2003: 476) argues that lcck of control cznnot bx a sufficiegt condition xlr an event vo be luchy. Adter all, thd lack of contrpl view implies thar it is lucky for ke jhzt the sun rose toeay, since it is ougsiqe oh my smntrol that ht ruse. Ontuigively, howeyer, it os not lucky for me dhat the sun rose todau, wnd so tye lack jf control deginition founders. Jevervhelesr, I atgug in Hartman (2017: 23-31) that these philoaophers mlss what is impjrtakt ig an accouut of moral luck, because the moral luck vebate is not about lucj per se but about c gontradictioi in otr ideas dbout moral responsivility. Here is a ximple way to see the point. Even if an account of luck other than the lack of control account best capturws our ordinary uszge pf thv tzrm 'luck' jr etei if there is no bood account of the way we use vhe word 'lgch,' the puzzle to which Joel Frivberg (1962), Thomas Nagel (1979), and Williams (1981
is true for the judges. To put in of these our ordinary thinking the are and are equally blameworthy. It implies that the judges are and not equally blameworthy. My aim is to make progress in resolving this contradiction. argue that certain kinds of luck can partially determine a person's praiseworthiness and and argue the driver and bribe taker are more blameworthy than their counterparts. 3 Definitions and Dialectic In terminology is standard in the moral luck debate, I that various kinds of luck exist. Moral luck occurs factors an agent's partially her praiseworthiness or blameworthiness 2017: 2; cf. Nagel 1979: 26). Two clarifications are in order about this standard account of moral First, the is introduced rule the that moral luck luck. Second, the conception of luck definition of moral luck is the lack of conception. I that the lack of control conception to capture at least some of our intuitions which events are lucky or not lucky, and that this failure has led some philosophers the standard account of luck (cf. Driver Hales Latus Levy Peels 2015; 2005; Rescher 1995; Whittington 2014). For example, Andrew Latus (2003: 476) that lack of control cannot be a sufficient condition for to lucky. After all, lack of control view that is lucky for me sun today, outside my that it rose. Intuitively, it is not lucky for that the sun rose of control definition founders. Nevertheless, I argue in (2017: 23-31) that these philosophers miss what important in an account of moral luck, because the moral luck debate not about se but about a contradiction in our ideas moral responsibility. Here is simple way to see the point. Even if an of other than lack of control best captures our usage of the or even there no the way we use the word the to which Joel Feinberg (1962), Nagel Williams (1981
 is true for the judges. To put thE contradicTion iN teRms Of ThesE exaMples, our ordinaRY thiNking about moral responsIbiliTy IMpliES tHat thE driverS ArE ANd aRe NoT eqUaLLy BlameWorThy. It alSo implies tHat ThE judges are anD ArE not equallY blAmeworthy. My aIm iS to makE pRogREss in ResOlvinG this cONtradiCtion. I argUe THat cerTAin kindS OF lUck cAn partially determINe A Person's praisewOrthinEsS AnD BLamEwoRthiness, anD sO arguE That the KIlLER DriVEr and bribe takEr are more blAMewOrthy tHaN thEIr counTerpaRtS. 3 defInitions and dialEctic In teRminolOGy that iS StandarD in the MorAl lUck dEBaTe, i arGuE ThaT VaRioUS kiNds of morAl LuCk exiSt. MoRAL LUck oCcuRs whEn facTors beyond an aGenT's coNTroL partIally DeteRmIne heR positIve prAiSeworthiness or bLameWorthinesS (HaRtMan 2017: 2; Cf. nagel 1979: 26). tWo clarIfiCatIons are In order ABouT tHIS StAndard account of morAl LUCk. first, the Term 'poSItIvE' Is introdUcEd tO rulE OUt the Idea THaT moral luCk is reSPoNsIbility-UnDerminInG luCk. SEcond, THe coNceptiOn of luck ImpliCIt in that definiTIon of moral lucK Is THE lACk of ConTrol conceptIon. I REcogNize THaT thE Lack oF contRoL CoNCeption fails to captuRe At leasT some Of our intuitioNs about whiCH EVents are LuckY Or NOt lucky, and that This fAilure has lED some phiLosopHers to reJect the stANDard accoUnt Of mOraL luCK (Cf. driver 2012; Hales 2015; LaTUS 2003; LevY 2011; PEels 2015; PriTchArd 2005; RescHer 1995; whiTtiNgtOn 2014). for examplE, Andrew LAtUs (2003: 476) ArGuEs tHat laCK of contrOl CanNoT be A suffICient cOnditIon fOr An EVenT to be luCKy. aFTer aLl, ThE lacK of CoNtrol View IMplIes that It is lucky For ME thaT tHe Sun rose Today, since it iS oUtside of my CoNtrOl that IT Rose. IntuItively, however, it is not luCKy for me ThaT the sUn roSe today, anD so The lacK of COntrol DefiniTion fOuNdeRS. neverTHElEss, i aRgue in HartMAN (2017: 23-31) thAt theSe PhilOsopherS miss what is importaNT in An account of moRal Luck, BECaUse THe MOraL lUCk dEBAte is not about luCk per se but AbOUt A contradicTIon In Our ideaS about mOral rESponsibIlity. Here Is a simple WaY to sEE The Point. Even iF an accouNt of luck oTHer thAN tHe lacK of ControL aCcoUnt beSt captURes Our orDinary UsAge of tHe terM 'lUck' or eveN if there is no good account Of the wAy we uSe tHe word 'lucK,' thE PuzZle to whicH JoeL Feinberg (1962), THomAs NAgel (1979), aNd WILliamS (1981
 is true for the judges. T o put thecontr adi cti on  interm s of these exa m ples , our ordinary thinkin g abo ut mora l  r espon sibilit y  i m p lie sth atth e  d river s a re andare not eq ual ly  blameworthy .  I t also imp lie s that the j udg es are  a nda re no t e quall y blam e worthy . My aimis to mak e  progre s s  i n re solving this cont r ad i ction. I argue  thatce r ta i n  ki nds  of luck c an  part i ally de t er m i n e a person's prai seworthines s  an d blam ew ort h iness,  andso arg ue that the  kil ler drive r andb ribe ta k er aremore b lam ewo rthy th an  th ei r  co u nt erp a rts . 3 Defi ni ti ons a nd D i a l e ctic  In  ter minol ogy that is s tan dard inthe m oralluck  d ebate , I ar gue t ha t various kinds  ofmoral luc k e xi st.  M orall uck oc cur s w hen fac tors be y ond  a n a ge nt's control parti al l y  d etermine  her p o si ti v e praise wo rth ines s or bl amew o rt hiness ( Hartma n  2 01 7: 2; c f.  Nagel  1 979 : 2 6). T w o cl arific ations a re in order about th i s standard ac c ou n t  o f  mor alluck. First , th e  ter m 'p o si tiv e ' isintro du c ed to rule out the ide athat m oralluck is respo nsibility- u n d ermining  luc k .S econd, the con cepti on of luck implicit  in t hat defi nition of m oral luc k i s t helac k of  control conc e p tion .I recog niz e thatthe  la ckofco ntrol con ceptionfa il sto  ca pture at least  s ome  o f o ur in t uition s abo ut w hi ch eve nts are lu c k y or  n ot  luc ky,  a nd th at t h isfailure  has ledsom e  phi lo so phers t o reject thest andard acc ou ntof mor a l  luck (c f. Driver 2012; Hales 2 0 15; Lat us2003;  Lev y 2011; P eel s 2015 ; P r itchar d 2005 ; Res ch er1 9 95; W h i tt ing to n 2014). F o r  ex ample ,Andr ew Latu s (2003: 476) argu e s t hat lack of c ont rolc a nn otb ea  su ff i cie n t  condition foran event t ob elucky. Aft e r a ll , the l ack ofcontr o l viewimplies t hat it is  l ucky f orme that th e sun ro se today, since it  is o uts ide of  m y c ontro l that itrose.  Intui ti vely,howev er , it isnot lucky for me that t he sun  rose  to day, andsot helack of c ontr ol definit ion  fo under s.N evert hele s s,  Ia rguein H a rtman (20 1 7:  23 - 3 1)  that these p h ilo sophe rsm iss wh at i s important in an account of mor al l u c k,bec a useth e moral luck d eba te i s not ab ou t luck perse but a bo u t a c ontrad iction  in our i de a s abou t mo ral  responsi bil it y . Hereis  a simple  way  t o seethe po i nt.E v en if an account  of l u c k oth e r t han t he  lack o f  con trol accou nt best cap turesourordin ary usa ge  of th e t er m 'luck' o r  even ifthere  is nogo od a cco unt of  the w ay we  use  t heword 'luc k , 't he  p u zzl e to  whic hJoel  Feinberg (1962),Tho m as Nage l(19 7 9 ), and Wi l l iams (1981 
 is_true for_the judges. To put_the contradiction_in_terms of_these_examples, our ordinary_thinking about moral_responsibility implies that the_drivers are and_are_not equally blameworthy. It also implies that the judges are and are not equally_blameworthy._My aim_is_to_make progress in resolving this_contradiction. I argue that certain_kinds of_luck can partially determine a person's praiseworthiness and_blameworthiness,_and so argue_that the killer driver and bribe taker are more_blameworthy than their counterparts. 3 Definitions_and Dialectic In_terminology_that_is standard in the_moral luck debate, I argue that_various kinds of moral luck exist._Moral luck occurs when factors beyond an_agent's control partially determine her positive_praiseworthiness or blameworthiness (Hartman 2017:_2; cf._Nagel 1979: 26). Two clarifications_are in order_about this_standard account of_moral luck. First, the term 'positive'_is introduced to_rule out the idea that moral_luck_is responsibility-undermining luck._Second,_the_conception of_luck implicit in_that_definition of_moral_luck is the lack of control_conception._I recognize that the lack of control_conception fails to capture_at_least some of our_intuitions about which events are_lucky or not lucky, and that_this failure_has led_some philosophers to reject the standard account of moral luck (cf._Driver 2012; Hales 2015; Latus 2003;_Levy 2011; Peels 2015;_Pritchard 2005;_Rescher_1995; Whittington 2014)._For_example, Andrew_Latus (2003: 476) argues that lack of_control cannot_be a sufficient condition for an_event to be lucky._After_all, the lack of control view_implies that it is lucky for_me that the sun rose_today,_since_it is outside of my_control that it rose. Intuitively, however,_it is not_lucky for me that the sun rose_today,_and so the lack of control_definition_founders. Nevertheless, I argue in Hartman_(2017:_23-31)_that these philosophers miss what_is important in an account of_moral luck, because the moral luck debate is not_about luck per_se but about a contradiction_in_our_ideas about moral responsibility. Here is a simple way to_see the_point. Even if_an account of luck other than the lack of control_account best captures our ordinary usage of_the term 'luck' or even if there is no good account_of the way we use the word 'luck,'_the puzzle to which Joel Feinberg (1962),_Thomas Nagel (1979), and_Williams_(1981