 available evidence demonstrates and offering conjectures about why some groups have prospered under modern social and political institutions, while others have not. These claims raise compelling questions about the ethics of belief, as well as the justification of belief. For example, if some stereotypes turn out to have a biological basis, will this reduce our ability to treat each other fairly? It is not always unfair to use information about biological differences to make generalizations (for example, that men are more prone to violence than women or that West Africans are more prone to sickle cell anemia than East Africans), but sometimes information-even if it is accurate-can be used by some people to unfairly dominate others. Wade's speculation would be innocuous if it weren't likely to be read by people who will misinterpret it or use it to justify racist attitudes or policies. Assuming it is likely to be misunderstood or misused by some people, the question is whether such speculation should be part of a public discussion. As academics, we should follow the arguments wherever they lead us and pursue the truth even when it challenges our most cherished beliefs. As citizens, we should worry that arguments like Wade's will be used by demagogues to prey on people who are prone to fantasies about racial purity. The trick for thoughtful readers is to separate science from speculation and to highlight the difficulty of deriving normative conclusions from empirical claims. DOI: 10.1002/hast. Rawlsian Self-Respect1 cynthia a. stark Self-respect is a good whose value seems undeniable. As a consequence, it presents itself as a notion capable of justifying the value of other goods. Indeed it has been employed in this way by a number of philosophers (Boxill 1976; Held 1973; Postow 1979; Miller 1982; Mohr 1988). The most prominent of these is John Rawls. Rawls appeals to the good of self-respect to justify many features of "justice as fairness"-the highly influential account of distributive justice presented in A Theory of Justice. Most who have considered the role of self-respect in Rawls's theory, throughout the four decades since the publication of A Theory of Justice, have agreed that Rawls's argument rests upon an irreparable equivocation between two different ideals of self-respect (Doppelt 2009; Eyal 2009; Moriarty 2009; Thomas 1978a, 1978b).2 In the face of this critical consensus, I attempt to resurrect Rawls's approach. I show first that Rawls relies upon an
available evidence demonstrates and offering conjectures about why some groups have thrive under mod social and political institutions, while others have not. These claim rear compelling questions about the ethics of impression, as well as the justification of belief. For example, if some stereotype change by reversal out to have a biological footing, will this reduce our ability to treat each other fairly? It is not constantly unfair to use information about biological differences to make generalizations (for model, that men are more prone to violence than women or that West Africans are more prone to sickle cellular telephone anemia than East Africans), but sometimes information - even if it is accurate - can be used by some citizenry to unfairly dominate others. Wade's guess would be innocuous if it weren't likely to be read by people who will misinterpret it or practice it to justify racist attitudes or policies. Assuming it is likely to be misunderstood or misused by some citizenry, the question is whether such speculation should be part of a public discussion. As academics, we should follow the arguments wherever they lead us and pursue the truth even when it challenges our about cherished belief. As citizens, we should concern that argument like Wade's will be use by demagogues to prey on people who are prone to fantasies about racial purity. The trick for thoughtful lector is to separate science from speculation and to highlight the difficulty of deriving prescriptive conclusions from empirical claims. DOI: 10.1002 / hast. Rawlsian Self - Respect1 cynthia a. stark Self - respect is a good whose value seems undeniable. As a consequence, it salute itself as a notion capable of justifying the value of other goods. Indeed it has been use in this way by a number of philosophers (Boxill 1976; Held 1973; Postow 1979; Miller 1982; Mohr 1988). The about prominent of these is John Rawls. Rawls appeal to the good of self - respect to absolve many features of " department of justice as fairness"-the highly influential account of distributive justice introduce in A Theory of Justice. Most who have consider the role of self - deference in Rawls's theory, throughout the four ten since the publication of A Theory of Justice, have agreed that Rawls's argument rests upon an irreparable evasion between two different ideals of self - respect (Doppelt 2009; Eyal 2009; Moriarty 2009; Thomas 1978a, 1978b).2 In the side of this critical consensus, I attempt to resurrect Rawls's approach. I show first that Rawls trust upon an
 avwilable evidence demonstvates and offeriut conjxctures about wfy some groups have prosperev uneer midern social and politkcal instptutions, qhilt others have not. These claims dwise rompelling quesjions about dhe ethics of teuizf, as well as the justification of bqlief. Fpr example, if soie suerqotylvs turn out to have a biologicam basis, will this recuce our ability to treat fach other fairly? It id not alwayw unsqir to use ivformation about biolofical differences to make generxlizacions (for ezanplf, that men ace morv prone to violence tvan womrn or that Wesb Afrmcanw are more prone to smckle cell anemia thwn East Axrncans), but sometimes ibfirmathon-eeen kd ig ia ecchrate-cwn ue used by aome people to unfairly dominaue jnners. Wade's sleculaeijn would be innocuous if it weren't likeny fo be read by people whi will misinterpret ij or use ie to justify racist attitudes or policies. Assuminc it ms lijejh tl be misunderstood or misused by some people, ege qlestion is whethev such speculation sjoijd be part of a public discussion. As acafemics, re shiuld folljw tne arguments wherever they oead us and iursye the truth even chen it chaluenggs our most cherished beliefs. As ditizens, we should wkfry that argumengs kine Wade's will be used by dqmagogues to 'rey on oeopke who are prone to fantasies about raciwl putity. Tve trick flr thoughtful readers is to sepecate science grmm vpeculatnon anc to highlighe the difficuljy of dernving vormative bonclusiois from empiwical claims. GLI: 10.1002/hast. Rawlvian Sels-Respect1 cynthix a. stark Self-rrspect is a good whise value seems unvenixgle. As a conseqbtnct, ut presents itxelw af w iotiog capable of bustkfykmg thd value of igher goods. Indeed it has beeh employed in this wwy by a bumber os philosopherx (Boxill 1976; Held 1973; Podtow 1979; Miuler 1982; Morr 1988). The most prominent of thess is John Rarls. Rawls ap[ealw to the goob of self-respect to justify many featurew of "justice as faurness"-the highly inylmential acconnt of distribudive justice presentwd in A Theory of Justice. Most who havs conshderef the role of self-respect in Rawls's theory, throughout the four decades sibce thx [ublication of S Themrv oy Justise, hevx agreed that Rawks's argument rests upon an irre'arable eqgirocation between two differeny kdeals of selw-respect (Doppelt 2009; Eyal 2009; Joriarty 2009; Thomas 1978a, 1978b).2 In the face of thix critical consensus, I abtempt to resudrect Gzwus's approach. I shoe firsc that Rawls eelics upon an
available evidence demonstrates and offering conjectures about groups prospered under social and political These raise compelling questions the ethics of as well as the justification of For example, if some stereotypes turn out to have a biological basis, will reduce our ability to treat each other fairly? It is not always unfair use about differences make generalizations (for example, that men are more prone to violence than women or that West are more prone to sickle cell anemia than Africans), but sometimes information-even it is accurate-can be used some to unfairly others. speculation be innocuous if weren't likely to be read by people who will misinterpret it or use it to justify racist or policies. is likely be or by some people, is whether such speculation should be public discussion. As academics, we should follow the wherever they us and pursue the truth even it challenges our most cherished beliefs. As citizens, should worry that arguments like Wade's will be used by demagogues to prey on people prone to fantasies about purity. The trick thoughtful is separate from speculation to highlight the difficulty of deriving normative conclusions from empirical claims. 10.1002/hast. Rawlsian Self-Respect1 cynthia a. stark Self-respect is a good seems As a consequence, presents itself as a capable justifying the value of Indeed has this by number of philosophers (Boxill Held 1973; Postow 1979; Miller Mohr 1988). The most Rawls. Rawls appeals to the good of self-respect justify many features of "justice as fairness"-the influential account of distributive justice presented in A Theory of Justice. Most have considered of self-respect in Rawls's theory, throughout the four since the publication of Theory of Justice, have agreed that Rawls's argument rests an equivocation between different ideals of (Doppelt 2009; Eyal Moriarty 2009; Thomas In the of critical to resurrect Rawls's approach. I show that relies upon an
 available evidence demonstrAtes and offEring ConJecTuRes aBout Why some groups hAVe prOspered under modern sociAl and PoLIticAL iNstitUtions, wHIlE OTheRs HaVe nOt. tHeSe claIms Raise coMpelling quEstIoNs about the etHIcS of belief, aS weLl as the justiFicAtion oF bEliEF. For eXamPle, if Some stEReotypEs turn out To HAve a biOLogical BASiS, wilL this reduce our abiLItY To treat each othEr fairLy? iT iS NOt aLwaYs unfair to UsE infoRMation aBOuT BIOloGIcal differencEs to make genERalIzatioNs (For EXample, That mEn ARe mOre prone to vIoleNce than woMen or tHAt West AFRicans aRe more ProNe tO sicKLe CeLl aNeMIa tHAn easT afrIcans), but SoMeTimes InfoRMATIon-eVen If it Is accUrate-can be useD by Some PEopLe to uNfairLy doMiNate oThers. WAde's sPeCulation would be InnoCuous if it WerEn'T liKeLy to bE Read by PeoPle Who will MisinteRPreT iT OR UsE it to justify racist AtTITuDes or polIcies. ASSuMiNG it is likElY to Be miSUNdersTood OR mIsused by Some peOPlE, tHe questIoN is wheThEr sUch SpecuLAtioN shoulD be part oF a pubLIc discussion. As ACademics, we shoULd FOLlOW the ArgUments whereVer tHEy leAd us ANd PurSUe the Truth EvEN wHEn it challenges our moSt CherisHed beLiefs. As citizeNs, we should WORRy that arGumeNTs LIke Wade's will be Used bY demagogueS To prey on PeoplE who are pRone to fanTASies abouT raCiaL puRitY. tHe Trick for thougHTFul rEaDers is tO seParate sCieNce FroM spEcUlation anD to highlIgHt ThE dIffIcultY Of deriviNg NorMaTivE concLUsions From eMpirIcAl CLaiMs. DOI: 10.1002/haST. RAWLsiaN SElF-ResPecT1 cYnthiA a. stARk SElf-respEct is a gooD whOSe vaLuE sEems undEniable. As a conSeQuence, it prEsEntS itselF AS a notion Capable of justifying the vALue of otHer Goods. indeEd it has beEn eMployeD in THis way By a numBer of PhIloSOPhers (bOXiLl 1976; HElD 1973; Postow 1979; MilLER 1982; MoHr 1988). The MoSt prOminent Of these is John Rawls. rAwlS appeals to the GooD of sELF-rEspECt TO juStIFy mANY features of "justIce as fairnEsS"-ThE highly infLUenTiAl accouNt of disTribuTIve justIce presenTed in A TheOrY of JUSTicE. Most who haVe considEred the roLE of seLF-rEspecT in rawls's ThEorY, throUghout THe fOur deCades sInCe the pUblicAtIon of A ThEory of Justice, have agreed That RaWls's aRguMent rests UpoN An iRreparablE equIvocation bEtwEen Two diFfeREnt idEals OF sElf-REspecT (DopPElt 2009; Eyal 2009; MoRIaRty 2009; tHOmAs 1978a, 1978b).2 In the faCE OF thIs criTicAL conseNsus, i attempt to resurreCT Rawls's approacH. I shOW FirSt tHAt RaWlS relies upon an
 available evidence demons trates and  offe rin g c on ject ures  about why som e  gro ups have prospered und er mo de r n so c ia l and  politi c al i nst it ut ion s, wh ile o the rs have  not. Thes e c la ims raise co m pe lling ques tio ns about the  et hics o fbel i ef, a s w ell a s thej ustifi cation of  b e lief.F or exam p l e,  ifsome stereotypest ur n  out to have a  biolo gi c al b asi s,will thisre duceo ur abil i ty t o  tr e at each other  fairly? It isnot al wa ysu nfairto us ei nfo rmation abo ut b iological  diffe r ences t o  make g eneral iza tio ns ( f or  e xam pl e , t h at  me n  ar e more p ro ne  to v iole n c e than  wo menor th at West Afric ans  are mor e pro ne to  sic kl e cel l anem ia th an  East Africans) , bu t sometim esin for ma tion- e ven if  it  is  accura te-canb e u se d b ysome people to unf ai r l ydominate  other s .Wa d e's spec ul ati on w o u ld be  inn o cu ous if i t were n 't  l ikely t obe rea dbypeo ple w h o wi ll mis interpre t ito r use it to ju s tify racist a t ti t u de s  orpol icies. Assu ming it i s li k el y t o  be m isund er s to o d or misused by som epeople , the  question iswhether su c h speculat ions ho u ld be part ofa pub lic discus s ion. Asacade mics, we  should f o l low thearg ume nts  wh e r ev er they leadu s  and  p ursue t hetruth e ven  wh enitch allengesour most  c he ri sh edbelie f s. As ci ti zen s,  we  shou l d worr y tha t ar gu me n tslike Wa d e' s will  b eused  by  d emago gues toprey on  people w hoa re p ro ne  to fan tasies aboutra cial purit y.  Th e tric k for thou ghtful readers is to se p arate s cie nce f romspeculati onand to  hi g hlight  the d iffic ul tyo f  deri v i ng  no rm ative conc l u sio ns fr om  emp iricalclaims. DOI: 10.10 0 2/h ast. Rawlsian  Se lf-R e s pe ct1 cy n thi aa . s t a rk Self-respect  is a good  w h os e value se e msun deniabl e. As a  cons e quence,  it prese nts itsel fas a n oti on capable  of just ifying th e  valu e  o f oth ergoods.  I nde ed it  has b e enemplo yed in  t his wa y byanumber o f philosophers (Boxill1976;Held197 3; Postow  19 7 9;Miller 19 82;Mohr 1988) . T hemostpro m inent  oft he sei s Joh n Ra w ls. Rawls ap pea l s  t o the goodo f sel f-res pec t  to ju stif y many features o f  "justice as f airn e s s"- the high ly  influential a cco un t of distr ib utive justi ce prese nt e d inA Theo ry ofJustice . Mo s t whohave  co nsideredthe  r o le of s el f- r espect  inRa wls'stheory ,  thr o u ghout the four d ecade s since the  publ ic ation o f  A T heory of J ustice, hav e agre ed t hat R awls'sar gument  re st s upon ani rreparabl e equ ivocati on  bet wee n twodiff e r ent i deal sofself-resp e c t( Do pp e lt2009 ; Eya l2009 ; Moriart y  2009; T hom a s 1978a ,197 8 b ).2 In th e face of th iscriti c a l consensu s , Ia tt e mpt t o resu rrectRawls's app ro ach. Isho w first tha t Rawls r e lie supon  an
 available_evidence demonstrates_and offering conjectures about_why some_groups_have prospered_under_modern social and_political institutions, while_others have not. These_claims raise compelling_questions_about the ethics of belief, as well as the justification of belief. For example,_if_some stereotypes_turn_out_to have a biological basis,_will this reduce our ability_to treat_each other fairly? It is not always unfair_to_use information about_biological differences to make generalizations (for example, that men_are more prone to violence than_women or that_West_Africans_are more prone to_sickle cell anemia than East Africans),_but sometimes information-even if it is_accurate-can be used by some people to_unfairly dominate others. Wade's speculation would_be innocuous if it weren't_likely to_be read by people who_will misinterpret it_or use_it to justify_racist attitudes or policies. Assuming it_is likely to_be misunderstood or misused by some_people,_the question is_whether_such_speculation should_be part of_a_public discussion._As_academics, we should follow the arguments_wherever_they lead us and pursue the truth_even when it challenges_our_most cherished beliefs. As_citizens, we should worry that_arguments like Wade's will be used_by demagogues_to prey_on people who are prone to fantasies about racial purity. The_trick for thoughtful readers is to_separate science from speculation_and to_highlight_the difficulty of_deriving_normative conclusions_from empirical claims. DOI: 10.1002/hast. Rawlsian Self-Respect1_cynthia a._stark Self-respect is a good whose_value seems undeniable. As_a_consequence, it presents itself as a_notion capable of justifying the value_of other goods. Indeed it_has_been_employed in this way by_a number of philosophers (Boxill 1976;_Held 1973; Postow_1979; Miller 1982; Mohr 1988). The most_prominent_of these is John Rawls. Rawls_appeals_to the good of self-respect to_justify_many_features of "justice as fairness"-the_highly influential account of distributive justice_presented in A Theory of Justice. Most who have_considered the role_of self-respect in Rawls's theory,_throughout_the_four decades since the publication of A Theory of Justice,_have agreed_that Rawls's argument_rests upon an irreparable equivocation between two different ideals of_self-respect (Doppelt 2009; Eyal 2009; Moriarty 2009;_Thomas 1978a, 1978b).2 In the face of this critical consensus, I_attempt to resurrect Rawls's approach. I show first_that Rawls relies upon an