 be understood by Abel Rey and by the interpretations of the thought of Duhem that put emphasis on the apologetic role of this thought. Then, it seems me clearly that, although Duhem carries out a distinction between physics and metaphysics, this does not mean that he can't formulate metaphysical statements or for him the metaphysics is a kind of knowledge16; and, on the other hand, that there is the possibility of an articulation between the two areas of knowledge.17 The Historical Aspect The distinction between physical theory and metaphysical – including religion in this last –, more specifically, the argument about your mutual independence, where the physical theory may not be useful to defend the religion but neither can serve to attack it, seems to correspond with the idea expressed by Ariew and Barker, who affirm: "For most of the nineteenth century, scholars treated'medieval science' as an oxymoron. Since nothing from the middle ages was worthy of the name'science', no history of medieval science could be written" (Ariew and Barker 1992, 324). This does not seem to agree with the idea of a historical continuity of science, as it can be thought that, on one hand, are declared as independent of each other, but on the other hand it is accepted that the initiated mechanical science for Galileo inherited of the Middle Ages its 15 "[...] il nous sera permis d'indiquer quelle est la forme actuelle de théorie physique qui nous paraît tendre vers la forme idéale, et quelle est la doctrine cosmologique qui nous semble avoir, avec cette théorie, la plus forte analogie. Cette indication, ce n'est pas au nom de la méthode positive propre aux sciences physiques que nous prétendons la donner; après ce que nous avons dit, il est clair jusqu'à l'évidence qu'elle excède la portée de cette méthode, que cette méthode ne peut ni la confirmer, ni la contredire; en la donnant, en pénétrant par là sur le domaine propre de la Métaphysique, nous savons que nous avons délaissé le domaine de la Physique; nous savons qu'un physicien, après avoir, en notre compagnie, parcouru ce dernier domaine, peut fort bien, sans violer les règles que la logique impose
be understood by Abel Rey and by the interpretations of the thought of Duhem that put vehemence on the apologetic function of this thought. Then, it seems me clearly that, although Duhem carry out a distinction between physics and metaphysics, this does not entail that he can't formulate metaphysical statements or for him the metaphysics is a kind of knowledge16; and, on the early bridge player, that there is the hypothesis of an articulation between the two areas of knowledge.17 The Historical Aspect The distinction between physical hypothesis and metaphysical – including religion in this last –, more specifically, the controversy about your mutual independence, where the physical hypothesis may not be useful to defend the religion but neither can serve to assail it, seems to correspond with the idea expressed by Ariew and Barker, who affirm: " For most of the nineteenth hundred, scholars treated'medieval skill' as an oxymoron. Since nothing from the middle ages was worthy of the name'science', no history of medieval skill could be written " (Ariew and Barker 1992, 324). This does not seem to agree with the idea of a historical continuity of science, as it can be thought that, on one hand, are declared as independent of each other, but on the other hand it is accepted that the initiated mechanical science for Galileo inherited of the Middle Ages its 15 " [... ] il nous sera permis d'indiquer quelle est la forme actuelle de théorie physique qui nous paraît tendre vers la forme idéale, et quelle est la doctrine cosmologique qui nous semble avoir, avec cette théorie, la plus forte analogie. Cette reading, ce n'est pas au nom de la méthode convinced propre aux sciences physiques que nous prétendons la donner; après ce que nous avon dit, il est clair jusqu'à l'évidence qu'elle excède la portée de cette méthode, que cette méthode ne peut ni la confirmer, ni la contredire; en la donnant, en pénétrant par là sur le domaine propre de la Métaphysique, nous savons que nous avons délaissé le domaine de la Physique; nous savons qu'un physicien, après avoir, en notre compagnie, parcouru ce dernier domaine, peut fort bien, sans violer les règles que la logique levy
 be understood by Abel Rey xnd by the intetpeetatimns of the thojght of Duhem that put emphadiw on uke apologetic role ow this thlught. Thwn, iu seems me clearlb that, althougg Duhzm carries out a distinctimn between phyvizs and metaphysics, this does not mean that hr fan't formulate mets[hysjbao statements or for him the mstaphyspcs is a kind of lnowledge16; and, on the other hanf, that there is thf possibilijg os an articulagion betwetn the two ateas of knowledge.17 The Historical Aspeet The distunxtilt between piysicaj theory and metaphyvical – oncluding relinion mn tyis last –, more specifmcally, the argument wbout yous jutual independenxe, wherg the phyrucau tgeprg may jot be useful to defend rhe religion but neotrvt can serve fo attwch it, seems to correspond with the idea txpreased by Ariew and Barkee, who affirm: "For most of the nyneteenth century, scholars treated'medieval scienca' as en oxvnoron. Wijce nothing from the middle ages was worthy os tne name'science', nj history og lecyeval science could be written" (Ariew and Barker 1992, 324). Thus does njt srem to agree with the idea if a historibal xontinuity of scieuce, as it cau be tnoughy that, on one hand, are beclarsd as indepfndent of dach other, but ov tme mther hand it is accepted ehat the mniticted mecfanival scyence for Halilcm inherited of the Middpe Ages its 15 "[...] il nous sera permis d'indiquer quelle est la fmrmv actuellz de tméorie physique zui nous paraît tendre vers la forme pdéale, et xuelle est ja doctrine cmdmologique qni nous sqmblw aviir, avez cette théorie, ka plus forte analotie. Cette indicatipn, zs n'est pas au nim ee la méthode poxitkve pgopce auv sciences phfsiqjes aue nuus préttudoks ua dpnner; après ce que nogs abons dit, il est clsiv jusqu'à l'écidence zu'elle excède ka portée de cette léthodx, que rette kéthjde ne peut ni la confirmer, ni la contrfdive; en la donnwnt, cn pégétrant par là sur le domaine propre de la Métaphysiwue, nous savons qoe nous avons délaissé kt domaine de ka Phrsique; nogs savons qu'un physixien, après avoir, ek notre compagnie, parckuru ca derjier domaine, peut fort bien, sans violer les règles que la logique impose
be understood by Abel Rey and by of thought of that put emphasis this Then, it seems clearly that, although carries out a distinction between physics metaphysics, this does not mean that he can't formulate metaphysical statements or for the metaphysics is a kind of knowledge16; and, on the other hand, that is possibility an between the two areas of knowledge.17 The Historical Aspect The distinction between physical theory and metaphysical including religion in this last –, more specifically, argument about your mutual where the physical theory may be to defend religion neither serve to attack seems to correspond with the idea expressed by Ariew and Barker, who affirm: "For most of the century, scholars as an Since from middle ages was the name'science', no history of medieval written" (Ariew and Barker 1992, 324). This does seem to with the idea of a historical of science, as it can be thought that, one hand, are declared as independent of each other, but on the other hand it that the initiated mechanical for Galileo inherited the Ages 15 il nous permis d'indiquer quelle est la forme actuelle de théorie physique qui paraît tendre vers la forme idéale, et quelle est la qui semble avoir, avec théorie, la plus forte Cette ce n'est pas au la positive physiques nous la donner; après ce nous avons dit, il est jusqu'à l'évidence qu'elle excède que cette méthode ne peut ni la confirmer, la contredire; en la donnant, en pénétrant là sur le domaine propre de la Métaphysique, nous savons que nous délaissé le la Physique; nous savons qu'un physicien, après avoir, notre compagnie, parcouru ce domaine, peut fort bien, sans violer les règles que logique
 be understood by Abel Rey and bY the interpRetatIonS of ThE thoUght Of Duhem that put EMphaSis on the apologetic role Of thiS tHOughT. thEn, it sEems me cLEaRLY thAt, AlThoUgH duHem caRriEs out a dIstinction BetWeEn physics and MEtAphysics, thIs dOes not mean thAt hE can't fOrMulATe metAphYsicaL stateMEnts or For him the MeTAphysiCS is a kinD OF kNowlEdge16; and, on the other HAnD, That there is the PossibIlITy OF An aRtiCulation beTwEen thE Two areaS Of KNOWleDGe.17 The HistoricAl Aspect The DIstInctioN bEtwEEn physIcal tHeORy aNd metaphysiCal – iNcluding rEligioN In this lASt –, more sPecifiCalLy, tHe arGUmEnT abOuT YouR MuTuaL IndEpendencE, wHeRe the PhysICAL TheoRy mAy noT be usEful to defend tHe rEligIOn bUt neiTher cAn seRvE to atTack it, Seems To Correspond with tHe idEa expressEd bY ARieW aNd BarKEr, who aFfiRm: "FOr most oF the ninETeeNtH CENtUry, scholars treated'MeDIEvAl sciencE' as an oXYmOrON. Since noThIng From THE middLe agES wAs worthy Of the nAMe'ScIence', no HiStory oF mEdiEvaL scieNCe coUld be wRitten" (ArIew anD barker 1992, 324). This does NOt seem to agree WItH THe IDea oF a hIstorical coNtinUIty oF sciENcE, as IT can bE thouGhT ThAT, on one hand, are declarEd As indePendeNt of each other, But on the otHER Hand it is AccePTeD That the initiatEd mecHanical sciENce for GaLileo InheriteD of the MidDLE Ages its 15 "[...] Il nOus SerA peRMIs D'indiquer quelLE Est lA fOrme actUelLe de théOriE phYsiQue QuI nous paraÎt tendre VeRs La FoRme IdéalE, Et quelle EsT la DoCtrIne coSMologiQue quI nouS sEmBLe aVoir, aveC CeTTE théOrIe, La plUs fOrTe anaLogiE. cetTe indicAtion, ce n'eSt pAS au nOm De La méthoDe positive proPrE aux sciencEs PhySiques QUE nous préTendons la donner; après ce qUE nous avOns Dit, il Est cLair jusqu'À l'éVidencE qu'ELle excÈde la pOrtée De CetTE MéthoDE, QuE ceTtE méthode ne PEUt nI la coNfIrmeR, ni la coNtredire; en la donnanT, En pÉnétrant par là Sur Le doMAInE prOPrE De lA MÉTapHYSique, nous savons Que nous avoNs DÉlAissé le domAIne De La PhysiQue; nous SavonS Qu'un phySicien, aprÈs avoir, en NoTre cOMPagNie, parcourU ce derniEr domaine, PEut foRT bIen, saNs vIoler lEs RègLes quE la logIQue ImposE
 be understood by Abel Rey  and by th e int erp ret at ions  ofthe thought of Duhe m that put emphasis on  theap o loge t ic  role  of thi s  t h o ugh t.  T hen ,i tseems  me  clearl y that, al tho ug h Duhem carr i es  out a dis tin ction betwee n p hysics  a ndm etaph ysi cs, t his do e s notmean that  h e  can't formula t e  m etap hysical statement s  o r  for him the m etaphy si c si s  akin d of knowl ed ge16; and, on th e o the r  hand, that t here is the pos sibili ty  of an art icula ti o n b etween thetwoareas ofknowle d ge.17 T h e Histo ricalAsp ect  The di st inc ti o n b e tw een phy sical th eo ry  andmeta p h y s ical  –incl uding  religion inthi s la s t – , mor e spe cifi ca lly,the ar gumen tabout your mutu al i ndependen ce,  w her ethe p h ysical  th eor y may n ot be u s efu lt o de fend the religionbu t ne ither ca n serv e  t oa ttack it ,see ms t o corre spon d  w ith theidea e x pr es sed byAr iew an dBar ker , who affi rm: "F or mostof th e  nineteenth ce n tury, scholar s  t r e at e d'me die val science ' as an o xymo r on . S i nce n othin gf ro m  the middle ages wa sworthy  of t he name'scien ce', no hi s t o ry of me diev a ls cience could b e wri tten" (Ari e w and Ba rker1992, 32 4). Thisd o es not s eem  to  ag ree w it h the idea of a  his to rical c ont inuityofsci enc e,as  it can b e though tth at ,onone h a nd, arede cla re d a s ind e penden t ofeach  o th e r,but ont he o ther  h an d it  is  a ccept ed t h atthe ini tiated me cha n ical  s ci ence fo r Galileo inh er ited of th eMid dle Ag e s  its 15"[...] il nous sera per m is d'in diq uer q uell e est lafor me act uel l e de t héorie  phys iq ueq u i nou s pa raî ttendre ver s laforme  i déal e, et q uelle est la doctr i necosmologiquequi  nou s se mbl e  a v oir ,a vec c ette théorie, l a plus for te an alogie. Ce t tein dicatio n, ce n 'estp as au n om de laméthode p os itiv e pro pre aux sc iences p hysiquesq ue no u spréte ndo ns lado nne r; ap rès ce que  nous  avons  d it, il  estcl air jusq u'à l'évidence qu'elleexcède  la p ort ée de cet tem éth ode, quecett e méthodenepeu t nilac onfir mer, ni  la contr edir e ; en la d o nn ant , en  pénétrantp a r  là  surled omaine  pro pre de la Métaphy s ique, nous sav onsq u e n ous avon sdélaissé le do mai ne d e la Phy si que; nous s avons qu 'u n  phys icien,  après  avoir, e nn otre c ompa gni e, parcou ruce dernier  d om a ine, p eutfo rt bie n, san s  vio l e r les règles que  la l o g iquei mpo se
 be_understood by_Abel Rey and by_the interpretations_of_the thought_of_Duhem that put_emphasis on the_apologetic role of this_thought. Then, it_seems_me clearly that, although Duhem carries out a distinction between physics and metaphysics, this_does_not mean_that_he_can't formulate metaphysical statements or_for him the metaphysics is_a kind_of knowledge16; and, on the other hand, that_there_is the possibility_of an articulation between the two areas of knowledge.17_The Historical Aspect The distinction between_physical theory and_metaphysical_–_including religion in this_last –, more specifically, the argument_about your mutual independence, where the_physical theory may not be useful to_defend the religion but neither can_serve to attack it, seems_to correspond_with the idea expressed by_Ariew and Barker,_who affirm:_"For most of_the nineteenth century, scholars treated'medieval science'_as an oxymoron._Since nothing from the middle ages_was_worthy of the_name'science',_no_history of_medieval science could_be_written" (Ariew_and_Barker 1992, 324). This does not_seem_to agree with the idea of a_historical continuity of science,_as_it can be thought_that, on one hand, are_declared as independent of each other,_but on_the other_hand it is accepted that the initiated mechanical science for Galileo_inherited of the Middle Ages its_15 "[...] il nous_sera permis_d'indiquer_quelle est la_forme_actuelle de_théorie physique qui nous paraît tendre vers_la forme_idéale, et quelle est la doctrine_cosmologique qui nous semble_avoir,_avec cette théorie, la plus forte_analogie. Cette indication, ce n'est pas_au nom de la méthode_positive_propre_aux sciences physiques que nous_prétendons la donner; après ce que_nous avons dit,_il est clair jusqu'à l'évidence qu'elle excède_la_portée de cette méthode, que cette_méthode_ne peut ni la confirmer, ni_la_contredire;_en la donnant, en pénétrant_par là sur le domaine propre_de la Métaphysique, nous savons que nous avons délaissé_le domaine de_la Physique; nous savons qu'un_physicien,_après_avoir, en notre compagnie, parcouru ce dernier domaine, peut fort_bien, sans_violer les règles_que la logique impose