 to go from here? To map a way forward, we propose to see von Fintel's semantics as breaking into three assumptions that jointly entail it. Begin with a basic assumption of the best-worlds semantics, one that's shared by all of the other belief-set-based semantics, and one that we will pre7Letw′ <S wmean thatw′ is better thanw according to S's preferences: bestS(Γ) = {w ∈ Γ | ¬∃w′ ∈ Γ:w′ <S w}. 8Wemake an innocuous simplification here: following Heim (1992), von Fintel (1999) actually uses not BelS as his domain but rather a certain superset of it, Bel ∗ S, which screens off S's beliefs grounded in her own intentions: Bel∗S = {w |w is compatible with what S believes will happen no matter how she chooses to act}. As discussed in footnote 6, this is in order to account for a certain species of FWAs in which the agent intends to make it the case that the desired proposition holds. But since not all FWAs are of this species, the problem of FWAs persists, as of course does the problem of CFWAs. 9We're assuming that BelS, and therefore bestS(BelS), is non-empty. If BelS is instead empty, then counterfactual want ascriptions are vacuously true: all of the best worlds in BelS (there are none!) are vacuously p worlds. 10The details of this presuppositional component differ by theorist. See e.g. Heim 1992: 198 or von Fintel 1999:117. 11This is not to say that all (C)FWAs are impeccable, and indeed we speculate that competition from the explicitly counterfactual 'wish' and the explicitly factual 'be glad (that)' may render (C)FWAs weakly dispreferred under some conditions. See section 9. 4 serve. The assumption is that 'want' ascriptions are evaluated against some domain of worlds, D, and the agent's preferences are among the worlds in D. (5) Form of a semantics for 'want'JS wants pK = 1 iff S prefers the p worlds in D to the ¬p worlds in D. This form requires us to fill in two elements: what it is for S to prefer p to ¬p in D, and what
to go from here? To map a way forward, we propose to visualize von Fintel's semantics as break in into three assumptions that jointly entail it. Begin with a basic presumption of the best - worlds semantics, one that's share by all of the early belief - set - based semantics, and one that we will pre7Letw′ < S wmean thatw′ is better thanw according to S's preference: bestS(Γ) = { w ∈ Γ | ¬∃w′ ∈ Γ: w′ < S w }. 8Wemake an innocuous reduction here: following Heim (1992), von Fintel (1999) actually uses not BelS as his domain but rather a certain superset of it, Bel ∗ S, which screens off S's beliefs ground in her own intentions: Bel∗S = { w |w is compatible with what S believes will happen no matter how she choose to act }. As discussed in footnote 6, this is in order to report for a certain coinage of FWAs in which the agent intends to make it the case that the hope proposition holds. But since not all FWAs are of this species, the problem of FWAs persists, as of course suffice the problem of CFWAs. 9We're assuming that BelS, and therefore bestS(BelS), is non - empty. If BelS is instead empty, then counterfactual want ascriptions are vacuously true: all of the best worlds in BelS (there are none !) are vacuously phosphorus universe. 10The details of this presuppositional part disagree by theorist. See e.g. Heim 1992: 198 or von Fintel 1999:117. 11This is not to say that all (C)FWAs are impeccable, and indeed we chew over that competition from the explicitly counterfactual' regard' and the explicitly factual' be glad (that)' may render (C)FWAs weakly dispreferred under some condition. See section 9. 4 serve. The assumption is that' want' ascriptions are evaluated against some domain of worlds, D, and the agent's preferences are among the worldly concern in D. (5) Form of a semantics for' want'JS want pK = 1 iff S prefers the p worlds in D to the ¬p worlds in D. This form command us to fill in two elements: what it is for S to prefer phosphorus to ¬p in D, and what
 to go from here? To map a wxy forward, we ptopose tm see bon Fintdl's semantics as breaking invo tyree qssumptions that jointuy entail it. Begib wiuh a basic assumpvjon of bke beab-worlbs semantics, one that's shased by all of dhd lther belief-set-based semantics, and jne thay ae will pre7Letr′ <S eiean nhctw′ is better thanw according tk S's prtferences: bestS(Γ) = {w ∈ Γ | ¬∃w′ ∈ Γ:w′ <S w}. 8Wemake an innlcuoks simplification jere: followung Rwim (1992), von Fingel (1999) actually uses not BelS as his domain but rather x cercain supersgc of ht, Bel ∗ S, wiich sbreens off S's beliefs groundrd in her own lntenvionw: Bel∗S = {w |w is compatmble with what S belyeves wiln kappen no matter how whw chomses to xxt}. Xs sixchssed ln hootnote 6, tgis is in oeder to account for a brrtain speciss of SWWs in which the agent intends to make iu the case that the desired proposition holds. But since noe all FWAs are of this species, the problem of FWAv perakstw, wr ov course does the problem of CFWAs. 9We're assumyhg tmat BelS, and thevefore bestS(BelS), ix jom-gmpty. If BelS ks inscsas empty, then countfrfactuwl wabt ascripuions are vacuously true: all of rhe best worjes in BelS (there axe none!) are racuouxly p worlds. 10The details of chis pdesuppositilnal compkvent differ by tfeogist. See e.g. Heim 1992: 198 or von Fintql 1999:117. 11This ms noc to say thaj all (C)SWAs are ilpeccable, and indeed we dpecupade that colpetition from the explicitly counterfactual 'eivh' dnd the zxplicltly factual 'be glad (that)' may render (C)FWAr weakly dpspreferrxd under somq conditions. Vge section 9. 4 verve. Thq aswumprion is ghat 'want' ascroptions age evaouated against somc domxjn of worlds, D, cud the agent's pregerdncqs ace amjtg the worldv in D. (5) Gorm uf a semantlcs for 'want'JS wants pK = 1 ixf S prefers the p workdf in D ti the ¬p rorlds in D. Tnis form requires ks to fiul in twj elements: what it is for S to prefer p to ¬p in D, and rhat
to go from here? To map a we to see Fintel's semantics as jointly it. Begin with basic assumption of best-worlds semantics, one that's shared by of the other belief-set-based semantics, and one that we will pre7Letw′ <S wmean is better thanw according to S's preferences: bestS(Γ) = {w ∈ Γ | ∈ <S 8Wemake innocuous simplification here: following Heim (1992), von Fintel (1999) actually uses not BelS as his domain rather a certain superset of it, Bel ∗ which screens off S's grounded in her own intentions: = |w is with S will happen no how she chooses to act}. As discussed in footnote 6, this is in order to account for certain species in which agent to it the case desired proposition holds. But since not of this species, the problem of FWAs persists, of course the problem of CFWAs. 9We're assuming BelS, and therefore bestS(BelS), is non-empty. If BelS instead empty, then counterfactual want ascriptions are vacuously true: all of the best worlds in are none!) are vacuously worlds. 10The details this component by See e.g. 1992: 198 or von Fintel 1999:117. 11This is not to say all (C)FWAs are impeccable, and indeed we speculate that competition explicitly 'wish' and the factual 'be glad (that)' render weakly dispreferred under some section 4 is 'want' are evaluated against some of worlds, D, and the preferences are among the of a semantics for 'want'JS wants pK = iff S prefers the p worlds in to the ¬p worlds in D. This form requires us to fill two elements: is for S to prefer p to ¬p D, and what
 to go from here? To map a way forwArd, we propoSe to sEe vOn FInTel's SemaNtics as breakinG Into Three assumptions that joIntly EnTAil iT. beGin wiTh a basiC AsSUMptIoN oF thE bESt-WorldS seMantics, One that's shAreD bY all of the othER bElief-set-baSed Semantics, and One That we WiLl pRE7Letw′ <s wmEan thAtw′ is bETter thAnw accordInG To S's prEFerenceS: BEsTS(Γ) = {w ∈ γ | ¬∃w′ ∈ Γ:w′ <S w}. 8Wemake an innOCuOUs simplificatiOn here: FoLLoWINg HEim (1992), Von Fintel (1999) aCtUally USes not BELS AS HIs dOMain but rather A certain supERseT of it, BEl ∗ s, whICh screEns ofF S'S BelIefs groundeD in hEr own inteNtions: bEl∗S = {w |w is COmpatibLe with WhaT S bElieVEs WiLl hApPEn nO MaTteR How She choosEs To Act}. As DiscUSSED in fOotNote 6, This iS in order to accOunT for A CerTain sPecieS of FwAS in whIch the Agent InTends to make it thE casE that the dEsiReD prOpOsitiON holds. but SinCe not alL FWAs arE Of tHiS SPEcIes, the problem of FWAS pERSiSts, as of cOurse dOEs ThE Problem oF CfWAS. 9We'rE ASsumiNg thAT BElS, and thEreforE BeSts(BelS), is NoN-empty. if bels is InsteAD empTy, then CounterfActuaL Want ascriptionS Are vacuously tRUe: ALL oF The bEst Worlds in Bels (theRE are None!) ARe VacUOusly P worlDs. 10tHe DEtails of this presuppOsItionaL compOnent differ by Theorist. SeE E.G. heim 1992: 198 or voN FinTEl 1999:117. 11tHis is not to say tHat alL (C)FWAs are iMPeccable, And inDeed we spEculate thAT CompetitIon FroM thE exPLIcItly counterfaCTUal 'wIsH' and the ExpLicitly FacTuaL 'be GlaD (tHat)' may renDer (C)FWAs WeAkLy DiSprEferrED under soMe ConDiTioNs. See SEction 9. 4 Serve. the aSsUmPTioN is that 'WAnT' AScriPtIoNs arE evAlUated AgaiNSt sOme domaIn of worldS, D, aND the AgEnT's prefeRences are amonG tHe worlds in d. (5) FOrm Of a semANTics for 'wAnt'JS wants pK = 1 iff S prefers THe p worlDs iN D to tHe ¬p wOrlds in D. THis Form reQuiREs us to Fill in Two elEmEntS: WHat it IS FoR S tO pRefer p to ¬p iN d, And What
 to go from here? To map a  way forwa rd, w e p rop os e to  see  von Fintel'ss eman tics as breaking intothree  a s sump t io ns th at join t ly e nta il  i t.Be g in  with  abasic a ssumptionofth e best-world s  s emantics,one  that's shar edby all  o f t h e oth erbelie f-set- b ased s emantics,  a n d onet hat wew i ll  pre 7Letw′ <S wmean t h at w ′ is better th anw ac co r di n g  to  S' s preferen ce s: be s tS(Γ) = {w ∈ Γ | ¬∃w′ ∈ Γ:w′ < S w}. 8Wema k e a n inno cu ous simpli ficat io n  he re: followi ng H eim (1992 ), von Fintel( 1999) a ctuall y u ses  not Be lS  as  h i s d o ma inb utrather a  c er tainsupe r s e t  ofit,  Bel  ∗ S,  which screen s o ff S ' s b elief s gro unde din he r owninten ti ons: Bel∗S = {w  |wis compat ibl ewit hwhatS  belie ves  wi ll happ en no m a tte rh o w  s he chooses to act} .A s  d iscussed  in fo o tn ot e  6, this  i s i n or d e r toacco u nt  for a c ertain sp ec ies ofFW As inwh ich  th e age n t in tendsto makeit th e  case that the desired propo s it i o nh olds . B ut since no t al l  FWA s ar e  o f t h is sp ecies ,t he problem of FWAs per si sts, a s ofcourse does t he problem o f  CFWAs.9We' r ea ssuming that B elS,and theref o re bestS (BelS ), is no n-empty.I f  BelS is  in ste ademp t y ,then counterf a c tual  w ant asc rip tions a revac uou sly  t rue: allof the b es two rl dsin Be l S (there  a reno ne! ) are vacuou sly p  wor ld s. 10T he deta i ls o f th is  p resu ppo si tiona l co m pon ent dif fer by th eor i st.Se ee.g. He im 1992: 198or  von Finte l199 9:117. 1 1This is  not to say that all (C ) FWAs ar e i mpecc able , and ind eed  we sp ecu l ate th at com petit io n f r o m the e xp lic it ly counter f a ctu al 'w is h' a nd theexplicitly factual 'be  glad (that)'  ma y re n d er  (C ) FW A s w ea k lyd i spreferred unde r some con di t io ns. See se c tio n9. 4 se rve. Th e ass u mptionis that ' want' asc ri ptio n s  ar e evaluate d agains t some do m ain o f  w orlds , D , andth e a gent' s pref e ren ces a re amo ng  the w orlds  i n D. (5)  Form of a semantics fo r 'wan t'JSwan ts pK = 1  if f  Sprefers t he p  worlds in  Dtothe ¬ p w o rldsin D .  T his formrequ i res us to fi lli n  t wo elements : w hat  it i s f o r S to  pre fer p to ¬p in D, and what
 to_go from_here? To map a_way forward,_we_propose to_see_von Fintel's semantics_as breaking into_three assumptions that jointly_entail it. Begin_with_a basic assumption of the best-worlds semantics, one that's shared by all of the_other_belief-set-based semantics,_and_one_that we will pre7Letw′ <S_wmean thatw′ is better thanw_according to_S's preferences: bestS(Γ) = {w ∈ Γ |_¬∃w′_∈ Γ:w′ <S_w}. 8Wemake an innocuous simplification here: following Heim (1992),_von Fintel (1999) actually uses not_BelS as his_domain_but_rather a certain superset_of it, Bel ∗ S, which_screens off S's beliefs grounded in_her own intentions: Bel∗S = {w |w_is compatible with what S believes_will happen no matter how_she chooses_to act}. As discussed in_footnote 6, this_is in_order to account_for a certain species of FWAs_in which the_agent intends to make it the_case_that the desired_proposition_holds._But since_not all FWAs_are_of this_species,_the problem of FWAs persists, as_of_course does the problem of CFWAs. 9We're_assuming that BelS, and_therefore_bestS(BelS), is non-empty. If_BelS is instead empty, then_counterfactual want ascriptions are vacuously true:_all of_the best_worlds in BelS (there are none!) are vacuously p worlds. 10The_details of this presuppositional component differ_by theorist. See e.g._Heim 1992:_198_or von Fintel_1999:117._11This is_not to say that all (C)FWAs are_impeccable, and_indeed we speculate that competition from_the explicitly counterfactual 'wish'_and_the explicitly factual 'be glad (that)'_may render (C)FWAs weakly dispreferred under_some conditions. See section 9._4_serve._The assumption is that 'want'_ascriptions are evaluated against some domain_of worlds, D,_and the agent's preferences are among the_worlds_in D. (5) Form of a_semantics_for 'want'JS wants pK = 1_iff_S_prefers the p worlds in_D to the ¬p worlds in_D. This form requires us to fill in two_elements: what it_is for S to prefer_p_to_¬p in D, and what