 inquiry, a mode followed by a rigorous procedure from "effects" to "causes", or from "phenomena" to theory. Both in his preface to the first edition of the Principia and in Roger Cotes's preface to the second edition, as well as in the acclaimed General Scholium, one can see the purpose of Newton in highlighting this new mode of inquiry by which his theory is constructed. In the first preface, he manifests the hope that "the principles set down here will shed some light on either this mode of philosophing or some truer one" (Newton 1999, 383). In the preface to the second edition, the editor Roger Cotes called Newton's method an "incomparably best way of philosophizing" (Newton 1999, 386). And in the General Scholium, Newton provides a brief description of this "incomparably best" method. It is worth transcribing this memorable passage: Duhem's Analysis of Newtonian Method and the Logical Priority of Physics over Metaphysics Eduardo Salles O. Barra – Ricardo Batista dos Santos 9 I have not as yet been able to deduce from phenomena the reason for this properties of gravity, and I do not feign hypothesis. For whatever is not deduced from phenomena must be called a hypothesis; and hypothesis, whether metaphysical or physical, or based on occult qualities, or mechanical, have no place in experimental philosophy. In this experimental philosophy, propositions are deduced from the phenomena and are made general by induction. The impenetrability, mobility, and impetus of bodies, and the laws of motion and the law of gravity have been found by this method. And it is enough that gravity really exists and acts according to the laws that we have set forth and is sufficient to explain all the motion of the heavenly bodies and of our sea. (Newton 1999, 943) The brand new method Newton used in the Principia could be summarized, prima facie, in the famous statement "I do not feigh hypothesis" (hypotheses non fingo), and in the comment that in this philosophy "propositions are deduced from the phenomena and are made general by induction". In fact, Newton established here an opposition between "feighning hypothesis" and "deducing propositions from phenomena". He points out that "whatever is not deduced from phenomena must be called a hypothesis". Feighning hypotheses and deducing from phenomena are two opposed approaches. The latter would characterize the new way of
inquiry, a mode followed by a rigorous procedure from " effect " to " campaign ", or from " phenomena " to theory. Both in his preface to the beginning edition of the Principia and in Roger Cotes's preface to the second version, as well as in the acclaimed General Scholium, one can see the purpose of Newton in foreground this new mode of question by which his theory is constructed. In the first preface, he manifest the hope that " the principles set down here will shed some light on either this manner of philosophing or some truer one " (Newton 1999, 383). In the preface to the second edition, the editor Roger Cotes call Newton's method an " incomparably best way of philosophizing " (Newton 1999, 386). And in the General Scholium, Newton supply a brief description of this " incomparably best " method. It is worth transcribing this memorable enactment: Duhem's Analysis of Newtonian Method and the Logical Priority of Physics over Metaphysics Eduardo Salles O. Barra – Ricardo Batista dos Santos 9 I have not as yet been able to deduce from phenomena the reason for this properties of gravity, and I do not feign hypothesis. For whatever is not deduced from phenomena must be called a hypothesis; and hypothesis, whether metaphysical or physical, or based on occult quality, or mechanical, have no place in experimental doctrine. In this experimental doctrine, propositions are deduced from the phenomena and are made cosmopolitan by induction. The impenetrability, mobility, and drift of bodies, and the laws of apparent motion and the law of gravity have been found by this method. And it is enough that gravity actually exists and acts according to the laws that we have dress forth and is sufficient to explain all the gesture of the heavenly bodies and of our sea. (Newton 1999, 943) The brand new method acting Newton used in the Principia could be summarized, prima facie, in the famous statement " I do not feigh hypothesis " (hypotheses non fingo), and in the comment that in this philosophy " propositions are deduced from the phenomenon and are made cosmopolitan by induction ". In fact, Newton established here an opposition between " feighning hypothesis " and " deducing proposition from phenomena ". He sharpen out that " whatever is not deduced from phenomenon must be called a hypothesis ". Feighning hypotheses and deducing from phenomena are two opposed approach. The latter would characterize the new way of
 ineuiry, a mode followed by a rigorous proewdure hrom "efrects" to "causes", or from "phenomena" to tyeory. Both in his preface tu the firdt editiin oh the Principia ehd in Roger Ckbes's 'rxface to the segond editiot, as well as it ghz acclaimed General Scholium, one can see thr ourpose of Newjon im higglighting this new mode of inquiry by whibh his theory is vonstructed. In the first pgefafe, he manifests thf hope that "the principles sdt down hegz will shed some light on either this mode of pkilosophing oe slke truer onx" (Newtjn 1999, 383). In the igeface do the xecond edition, thx edutor Roger Cotes callxd Newton's method an "incompardbmy best way of phulisophhzinc" (Nedron 1999, 386). Znv ih the Henxral Scholihm, Newton peovides a brief desvryiyion of this "incom[awably best" method. It is worth transcribpng fhis memorable passage: Euhem's Analysis of Neatonian Mqthod and the Logical Priority of Physics over Medaphyakcs Eqjqrfo Salles O. Barra – Ricardo Batista dos Santos 9 I hsve not as yet been able yo drquce from phevomena ths reason for this oropertyes od gravity, and I do not feign hypothesis. Dor whatever us not deduced frol phenomena musj be cslled a hypothesis; and kypothssis, whetheg metaphyakcal or physical, or bdsed on occult qualities, ow mechaniral, hcve no puace in ex[erimental philosophy. In this expegimenjal phhlosophy, pgopositions are deduced from thx phenomena amd arv made geueral ny induction. Thq impenetrabilnty, mobijity, xnd impetua of bovies, and the laws of motimj and the lax of gravyty yave been fujnd by this meyhod. And pt is wnough that gravitn reaumy exists and aeus qccording to thr lxws tjav we rdve set fortv ana ir suffkcient uj cxpuain all the motion of tve hsavenly bodies and on our sea. (Newton 1999, 943) The brand nrw method Newton uded ii the 'rincilia could be summarized, prima facje, in the faious statemegt "I do not feigk hypothesis" (hypotheses non fingo), and in the comment that un this philosophy "krokositions are dedused from dhe phenomena and arw made general by induction". In fact, Neston evtabllshed here an opposition between "feighning hypothesis" and "deducing proposutions from phenomsna". Ne popntf out trat "xhetever is not dedlced from phenomena must be callxd a hypotvefis". Feighning hypotheses and ddducing from khenomena are two opposed zpproachrs. The latter would characterizr the new way of
inquiry, a mode followed by a rigorous "effects" "causes", or "phenomena" to theory. the edition of the and in Roger preface to the second edition, as as in the acclaimed General Scholium, one can see the purpose of Newton highlighting this new mode of inquiry by which his theory is constructed. In first he the that "the principles set down here will shed some light on either this mode of philosophing some truer one" (Newton 1999, 383). In the to the second edition, editor Roger Cotes called Newton's an best way philosophizing" 1999, And in the Scholium, Newton provides a brief description of this "incomparably best" method. It is worth transcribing this memorable Duhem's Analysis Method and Logical of over Metaphysics Eduardo Barra – Ricardo Batista dos Santos not as yet been able to deduce from the reason this properties of gravity, and I not feign hypothesis. For whatever is not deduced phenomena must be called a hypothesis; and hypothesis, whether metaphysical or physical, or based on or mechanical, have no in experimental philosophy. this philosophy, are from the and are made general by induction. The impenetrability, mobility, and impetus bodies, and the laws of motion and the law of been by this method. it is enough that really and acts according to that have is to all the motion of heavenly bodies and of our (Newton 1999, 943) The in the Principia could be summarized, prima facie, the famous statement "I do not feigh (hypotheses non fingo), and in the comment that in this philosophy "propositions deduced from and are made general by induction". In fact, established here an opposition "feighning hypothesis" and "deducing propositions from phenomena". He points that is not from phenomena must called a hypothesis". hypotheses and deducing are two approaches. latter new way of
 inquiry, a mode followed by a riGorous procEdure FroM "efFeCts" tO "cauSes", or from "phenoMEna" tO theory. Both in his prefacE to thE fIRst eDItIon of The PrinCIpIA And In roGer coTEs'S prefAce To the seCond editioN, as WeLl as in the accLAiMed General schOlium, one can sEe tHe purpOsE of nEwton In hIghliGhting THis new Mode of inqUiRY by whiCH his theORY iS conStructed. In the firsT PrEFace, he manifestS the hoPe THaT "THe pRinCiples set dOwN here WIll shed SOmE LIGht ON either this moDe of philosoPHinG or somE tRueR One" (NewTon 1999, 383). In ThE PreFace to the seCond Edition, thE editoR roger CoTEs calleD NewtoN's mEthOd an "INcOmParAbLY beST wAy oF PhiLosophizInG" (NEwton 1999, 386). and iN THE geneRal schoLium, NEwton provides A brIef dEScrIptioN of thIs "inCoMparaBly besT" methOd. it is worth transcRibiNg this memOraBlE paSsAge: DuHEm's AnaLysIs oF NewtonIan MethOD anD tHE lOgIcal Priority of PhysIcS OVeR MetaphySics EdUArDo sAlles O. BaRrA – RiCardO bAtistA dos sAnTos 9 I have Not as yET bEeN able to DeDuce frOm PheNomEna thE ReasOn for tHis propeRties OF gravity, and I do NOt feign hypothESiS. fOr WHateVer Is not deduceD froM PhenOmenA MuSt bE CalleD a hypOtHEsIS; and hypothesis, whethEr MetaphYsicaL or physical, or Based on occULT QualitieS, or mEChANical, have no plaCe in eXperimentaL PhilosopHy. In tHis experImental phILOsophy, prOpoSitIonS arE DEdUced from the phENOmenA aNd are maDe gEneral bY inDucTioN. ThE iMpenetrabIlity, mobIlItY, aNd ImpEtus oF Bodies, anD tHe lAwS of MotioN And the Law of GravItY hAVe bEen founD By THIs meThOd. and iT is EnOugh tHat gRAviTy reallY exists anD acTS accOrDiNg to the Laws that we havE sEt forth and Is SufFicienT TO explain All the motion of the heavenLY bodies And Of our Sea. (NEwton 1999, 943) The bRanD new meThoD newton Used in The PrInCipIA Could BE SuMmaRiZed, prima faCIE, in The faMoUs stAtement "i do not feigh hypotheSIs" (hYpotheses non fIngO), and IN ThE coMMeNT thAt IN thIS Philosophy "propoSitions are DeDUcEd from the pHEnoMeNa and arE made geNeral BY inductIon". In fact, newton estAbLishED HerE an oppositIon betweEn "feighniNG hypoTHeSis" anD "deDucing PrOpoSitioNs from PHenOmena". he poinTs Out thaT "whatEvEr is not dEduced from phenomena must Be callEd a hyPotHesis". FeigHniNG hyPotheses aNd deDucing from PheNomEna arE twO OpposEd apPRoAchES. The lAtteR Would charACtEriZE ThE new way of
 inquiry, a mode followedby a rigor ous p roc edu re  fro m "e ffects" to "ca u ses" , or from "phenomena"to th eo r y. B o th  in h is pref a ce t o t he  f irs te di tionofthe Pri ncipia and  in  R oger Cotes's pr eface to t hesecond editi on,  as we ll  as in th e a cclai med Ge n eral S cholium,on e  can s e e the p u r po se o f Newton in highl i gh t ing this new m ode of  i n qu i r y b y w hich his t he ory i s  constr u ct e d .  In the first pre face, he ma n ife sts th ehop e  that"thepr i nci ples set do wn h ere willshed s o me ligh t  on eit her th ismod e of ph il oso ph i ngo rsom e  tr uer one"  ( Ne wton1999 , 3 8 3).Intheprefa ce to the sec ond  edi t ion , the  edit or R og er Co tes ca lledNe wton's method a n "i ncomparab lybe stwa y ofp hiloso phi zin g" (New ton 199 9 , 3 86 ) . An d in the General S ch o l iu m, Newto n prov i de sa  brief d es cri ptio n of th is " i nc omparabl y best "  m et hod. It  i s wort htra nsc ribin g  thi s memo rable pa ssage :  Duhem's Analy s is of Newtoni a nM e th o d an d t he LogicalPrio r ityof P h ys ics overMetap hy s ic s  Eduardo Salles O.Ba rra –Ricar do Batista do s Santos 9 I have not  asy et been able to d educe  from phen o mena the  reas on for t his prope r t ies of g rav ity , a ndI do  not feign hy p o thes is . For w hat ever is  no t d edu ced  f rom pheno mena mus tbe  c al led  a hy p othesis;  a ndhy pot hesis ,  wheth er me taph ys ic a l o r physi c al , or b as ed  onocc ul t qua liti e s,or mech anical, h ave no p la ce  in exp erimental phi lo sophy. Inth isexperi m e ntal phi losophy, propositions a r e deduc edfromthephenomena  an d aremad e  gener al byinduc ti on. T he im p e ne tra bi lity, mobi l i ty,  andim petu s of bo dies, and the laws ofmotion and th e l aw o f gr avi t yh ave  b e enf o und by this met hod. And i ti senough tha t  gr av ity rea lly exi sts a n d actsaccording  to the l aw s th a t  we  have setforth an d is suff i cient to  expl ain  all t he  mo tionof the hea venly  bodie sand of  ourse a. (Newt on 1999, 943) The brand  new m ethod  Ne wton used  in the  Principi a co uld be sum mar ize d, pr ima facie , in th e f a mousstat e ment "I d o  n otf e ig h hypothesi s " (hy pothe ses non fi ngo) , and in the comm e nt that in thi s ph i l oso phy "pro po sitions are de duc ed f rom theph enomena and  are mad eg enera l by i nducti on". In f ac t , Newt on e sta blished h ere  a n  opposi ti on betwee n "f ei ghning  hypot h esis " and "deducing pr oposi t i ons f r ompheno me na". He poin ts out tha t "whatever  is no t de duced  from p he nomena  mu st  be called a hypothe sis".  Feighn in g hy pot hesesandd e ducin g fr om  ph enomena a r e  t w oop p ose d ap proac he s. T he latter would ch ara c terizeth e n e w  way o f 
 inquiry,_a mode_followed by a rigorous_procedure from_"effects"_to "causes",_or_from "phenomena" to_theory. Both in_his preface to the_first edition of_the_Principia and in Roger Cotes's preface to the second edition, as well as in_the_acclaimed General_Scholium,_one_can see the purpose of_Newton in highlighting this new_mode of_inquiry by which his theory is constructed. In_the_first preface, he_manifests the hope that "the principles set down here_will shed some light on either_this mode of_philosophing_or_some truer one" (Newton_1999, 383). In the preface to_the second edition, the editor Roger_Cotes called Newton's method an "incomparably best_way of philosophizing" (Newton 1999, 386)._And in the General Scholium,_Newton provides_a brief description of this_"incomparably best" method._It is_worth transcribing this_memorable passage: Duhem's Analysis of Newtonian_Method and the_Logical Priority of Physics over Metaphysics_Eduardo_Salles O. Barra_–_Ricardo_Batista dos_Santos 9 I_have_not as_yet_been able to deduce from phenomena_the_reason for this properties of gravity, and_I do not feign_hypothesis._For whatever is not_deduced from phenomena must be_called a hypothesis; and hypothesis, whether_metaphysical or_physical, or_based on occult qualities, or mechanical, have no place in experimental_philosophy. In this experimental philosophy, propositions_are deduced from the_phenomena and_are_made general by_induction._The impenetrability,_mobility, and impetus of bodies, and the_laws of_motion and the law of gravity_have been found by_this_method. And it is enough that_gravity really exists and acts according_to the laws that we_have_set_forth and is sufficient to_explain all the motion of the_heavenly bodies and_of our sea. (Newton 1999, 943) The_brand_new method Newton used in the_Principia_could be summarized, prima facie, in_the_famous_statement "I do not feigh_hypothesis" (hypotheses non fingo), and in_the comment that in this philosophy "propositions are deduced_from the phenomena_and are made general by_induction"._In_fact, Newton established here an opposition between "feighning hypothesis" and_"deducing propositions_from phenomena". He_points out that "whatever is not deduced from phenomena must_be called a hypothesis". Feighning hypotheses and_deducing from phenomena are two opposed approaches. The latter would characterize_the new way of