.14 Like the raw--‐feel view, Naïve Realism entails that experiences are distinct from belief (on the assumption that beliefs are relations to propositions). But unlike the raw--‐feel view, Naïve Realism is compatible with the idea that all experiences – not just the ones that aren't illusions or hallucination --‐ are the kind of state that can be accurate or inaccurate about the subject's environment. Just as beliefs can be true or false, according to this idea, all experiences have accuracy conditions: conditions under which they would be accurate about the environment. Call this proposal the Content View. When Naïve Realism is combined with the Content View, some experiences are fundamentally relations to objects and properties that those objects have, but these experiences, like all experiences, have accuracy conditions.15 Because they are assessable for accuracy, having an experience constitutes having an outlook on the world. So far, I've considered two proposals about how experiences could differ in their basic structure from beliefs. Could experiences be propositional attitudes with the same direction of fit as beliefs, yet still be distinct from them?16 This question is especially pressing if some experiences (such as illusions and hallucinations, as someone partial to Naïve Realism might want to construe them), or all experiences, have accuracy conditions that are not derived from some other non--‐belief--‐like structure. There are several differences that could underwrite a distinction between experiences and belief, even if they are both propositional attitudes. Consider the temporal profile that standardly attaches to experiences and beliefs. Beliefs have inertia that experiences lack. If you acquire a belief, then it tends to stay in the mind, with no need to re--‐establish it. Of course it is possible to forget what one once believed. But the inertia of beliefs facilitates their role in planning and guiding 14 For a defense of Naïve Realism, see Martin (2004). 15 This claim deserves more discussion. For defense see Siegel (2010) chapter 2, for criticism, see Travis (2013). 16 For defenses of experiences as belief, see Glüer (2009) and Byrne (2009), the earlier accounts by Pitcher (1971) and Armstrong (1968), which are criticized by Dretske (1969) and Jackson (1977). Siegel/Epistemic Charge 11 behavior, and to that extent forgetting is not typical. Suppose you learn that your friends' plane will land at 10pm. If your belief didn't last as long as your plan to meet
.14 Like the raw--‐feel view, Naïve Realism entails that experiences are distinct from impression (on the premise that beliefs are relations to proposition). But unlike the raw--‐feel opinion, Naïve Realism is compatible with the idea that all experiences – not merely the ones that aren't illusions or delusion --‐ are the kind of department of state that can be accurate or inaccurate about the subject's environment. barely as beliefs can be true or assumed, according to this idea, all experiences have accuracy conditions: condition under which they would be accurate about the environment. Call this proposal the Content View. When Naïve Realism is combined with the Content View, some experience are fundamentally relations to objects and property that those objects have, but these experiences, like all experiences, have accuracy conditions.15 Because they are assessable for accuracy, give birth an experience constitutes having an outlook on the world. So far, I've regard two proposals about how experiences could differ in their basic structure from beliefs. Could experiences be propositional attitudes with the same direction of fit as beliefs, yet however be distinct from them?16 This question is specially weigh if some experiences (such as illusions and hallucinations, as someone fond to Naïve Realism might want to interpret them), or all experiences, have accuracy conditions that are not derive from some other non--‐belief--‐like structure. There are several dispute that could underwrite a distinction between experiences and belief, even if they are both propositional attitudes. Consider the worldly visibility that standardly attach to experiences and beliefs. Beliefs have inertia that experiences lack. If you acquire a impression, then it tends to persist in the mind, with no need to re--‐establish it. Of naturally it is possible to forget what one once believed. But the inertia of beliefs facilitates their function in planning and guiding 14 For a defense mechanism of Naïve Realism, see Martin (2004). 15 This title deserves more discussion. For defensive structure see Siegel (2010) chapter 2, for criticism, see Travis (2013). 16 For defenses of experiences as belief, visit Glüer (2009) and Byrne (2009), the earlier accounts by Pitcher (1971) and Armstrong (1968), which are criticized by Dretske (1969) and Jackson (1977). Siegel / Epistemic Charge 11 behavior, and to that extent forgetting is not typical. Suppose you learn that your friends' airplane will land at 10 pm. If your impression didn't last as long as your plan to suffer
.14 Line the raw--‐feel view, Naïve Realism entails that xxperiehces are distinct from belief (on the awsumpupon that beliefs are felations to propisitmons). But unlike vge raw--‐fczl visa, Naïre Realism is cokpatible whth the idea tvag cll experiences – not just the ones trat arem't illusions or ralllcynatjon --‐ are the kind of state that cah be acburate or inaccurste about the subject's envlronlent. Just as believs can be tthe je false, accofding to this idea, all experiences have accuracy condktionx: conditiobs unfgr which theb woulq be accuratc about the enfironment. Call thms peoposal the Content Vmew. When Naïve Realisi is combhnzd with the Content Vueq, somg exparievxes art fnndzmentaply relations to objects and properties thau trise objects hzve, bue ehese experiences, like all experiences, vavs accuracy conditions.15 Bwcause they are assesdable for accuracy, having an experience constitutes having an ontuooj jv tje world. So far, I've considered two proposals wgoit how experienccs could differ in tjeot basic structore from bsliefs. Could experlences fe pripositionwl aytitudes with the same dirextion of fit qs beliefs, yet stipl be distiuct frpm thrm?16 This question is espzciallg pressing lf some esoeriences (such ar iklgsions and hallucinations, ws someonx parcial to Vaïve Realifm might wwnt to construe them), or wll erperiances, have accuracy conditions that are not derived frok vomv other njn--‐bellef--‐like structuwe. There are sgveral diyferenzes that ckuld unverwrite a dystinction bedaeen experieices and feliwf, ecen if gfey are both ptopositioucl attituees. Consider the tcmporxm profile that wtabdardly attachex tu evpvrixnces dnd beliefs. Telidfs nave knertia thab ebperoences lack. If you awquide a belief, then iy bends to wtay in ehe mind, with no need to re--‐estahlish it. Of cpurfe it is possible to forget whzt one onfe nelieved. But ehe lnerjia of belizfs facilitates their role in planning aid guiding 14 For a defenwe of Naïve Realism, xte Martin (2004). 15 Tiis clwim deserees more discussion. Dor defense see Slegel (2010) chapter 2, for crjticisk, see Travis (2013). 16 For defenses of experiences as belief, see Glüer (2009) and Byrne (2009), the warliec wccounts by Pitvher (1971) aud Crmstrogg (1968), xhmch are criticizec by Dretske (1969) and Jackson (1977). Siegxl/Epistemiw Eharge 11 behavior, and to that rxgent forgettivg is not typical. Supposs you lesrn that your friends' plane wilk land at 10pm. If your bellef didn't last as long ar your plan to meey
.14 Like the raw--‐feel view, Naïve Realism experiences distinct from (on the assumption propositions). unlike the raw--‐feel Naïve Realism is with the idea that all experiences not just the ones that aren't illusions or hallucination --‐ are the kind state that can be accurate or inaccurate about the subject's environment. Just as can true false, to this idea, all experiences have accuracy conditions: conditions under which they would be accurate about environment. Call this proposal the Content View. When Realism is combined with Content View, some experiences are relations objects and that objects but these experiences, all experiences, have accuracy conditions.15 Because they are assessable for accuracy, having an experience constitutes having an on the far, I've two about experiences could differ basic structure from beliefs. Could experiences with the same direction of fit as beliefs, still be from them?16 This question is especially if some experiences (such as illusions and hallucinations, someone partial to Naïve Realism might want to construe them), or all experiences, have accuracy are not derived from other non--‐belief--‐like structure. are differences could a distinction experiences and belief, even if they are both propositional attitudes. Consider temporal profile that standardly attaches to experiences and beliefs. Beliefs that lack. If you a belief, then it to in the mind, with to it. is to what one once believed. the inertia of beliefs facilitates role in planning and of Naïve Realism, see Martin (2004). 15 This deserves more discussion. For defense see Siegel chapter 2, for criticism, see Travis (2013). 16 For defenses of experiences belief, see and Byrne (2009), the earlier accounts by Pitcher and Armstrong (1968), which criticized by Dretske (1969) and Jackson (1977). Siegel/Epistemic Charge behavior, to that forgetting is not Suppose you learn your friends' plane at 10pm. your didn't as your plan to meet
.14 Like the raw--‐feel view, Naïve ReAlism entaiLs thaT exPerIeNces Are dIstinct from belIEf (on The assumption that belieFs are ReLAtioNS tO propOsitionS). buT UNliKe ThE raW--‐fEEl View, NAïvE RealisM is compatiBle WiTh the idea thaT AlL experiencEs – nOt just the oneS thAt aren'T iLluSIons oR haLluciNation --‐ ARe the kInd of statE tHAt can bE AccuratE OR iNaccUrate about the subjECt'S Environment. JusT as belIeFS cAN Be tRue Or false, accOrDing tO This ideA, AlL EXPerIEnces have accuRacy conditiONs: cOnditiOnS unDEr whicH they WoULd bE accurate abOut tHe environMent. CaLL this prOPosal thE ConteNt VIew. when nAïVe reaLiSM is COmBinED wiTh the ConTeNt view, sOme eXPERIencEs aRe fuNdameNtally relatioNs tO objECts And prOpertIes tHaT thosE objecTs havE, bUt these experienCes, lIke all expEriEnCes, HaVe accURacy coNdiTioNs.15 BecauSe they aRE asSeSSABlE for accuracy, having An EXPeRience coNstituTEs HaVIng an outLoOk oN the WORld. So Far, I'VE cOnsidereD two prOPoSaLs about HoW experIeNceS coUld diFFer iN their Basic strUcturE From beliefs. CouLD experiences bE PrOPOsITionAl aTtitudes witH the SAme dIrecTIoN of FIt as bEliefS, yET sTIll be distinct from thEm?16 this quEstioN is especially Pressing if SOME experieNces (SUcH As illusions and HalluCinations, aS Someone pArtiaL to Naïve realism miGHT want to cOnsTruE thEm), oR ALl Experiences, haVE AccuRaCy condiTioNs that aRe nOt dEriVed FrOm some othEr non--‐belIeF--‐lIkE sTruCture. tHere are sEvEraL dIffErencES that cOuld uNderWrItE A diStinctiON bETWeen ExPeRienCes AnD beliEf, evEN if They are Both propoSitIOnal AtTiTudes. CoNsider the tempOrAl profile tHaT stAndardLY Attaches To experiences and beliefs. bEliefs hAve InertIa thAt experieNceS lack. IF yoU AcquirE a beliEf, theN iT teNDS to stAY In The MiNd, with no neED To rE--‐estaBlIsh iT. Of courSe it is possible to foRGet What one once beLieVed. BUT ThE inERtIA of BeLIefS FAcilitates their Role in planNiNG aNd guiding 14 FOR a dEfEnse of NAïve ReaLism, sEE Martin (2004). 15 this claim Deserves mOrE disCUSsiOn. For defenSe see SieGel (2010) chapteR 2, For crITiCism, sEe TRavis (2013). 16 FOr DefEnses Of expeRIenCes as Belief, SeE Glüer (2009) And ByRnE (2009), the earlIer accounts by Pitcher (1971) and armstrOng (1968), whIch Are criticIzeD By DRetske (1969) and jackSon (1977). Siegel/EPisTemIc ChaRge 11 BEhaviOr, anD To ThaT ExtenT forGEtting is nOT tYpiCAL. SUppose you leARN ThaT your FriENds' plaNe wiLl land at 10pm. If your bELief didn't last aS lonG AS yoUr pLAn to MeEt
.14 Like the raw--‐feel vi ew, NaïveReali sment ai ls t hatexperiences ar e  dis tinct from belief (onthe a ss u mpti o nthatbeliefs ar e rel at io nsto pr oposi tio ns). Bu t unlike t hera w--‐feel vie w ,Naïve Real ism  is compatib lewith t he  id e a tha t a ll ex perien c es – n ot just t he ones t h at aren ' t  i llus ions or hallucina t io n  --‐ are the k ind of  s t at e tha t c an be accu ra te or inaccur a te a b out the subject's  environmen t . J ust as  b eli e fs can  be t ru e  or  false, acc ordi ng to thi s idea ,  all ex p erience s have  ac cur acyc on di tio ns :  co n di tio n s u nder whi ch  t hey w ould b e accu rat e ab out t he environmen t.Call thi s pro posal  the  C onten t View . Whe nNaïve Realism i s co mbined wi thth e C on tentV iew, s ome  ex perienc es aref und am e n t al ly relations to ob je c t sand prop erties th at those ob je cts  hav e ,  butthes e  e xperienc es, li k eal l exper ie nces,ha veacc uracy cond itions .15 Beca use t h ey are assessa b le for accura c y, h av i ng a n e xperience c onst i tute s ha v in g a n  outl ook o nt he world. So far, I've  c onside red t wo proposalsabout howe x p eriences  cou l dd iffer in their  basi c structur e  from be liefs . Couldexperienc e s  be prop osi tio nal  at t i tu des with thes a me d ir ectionoffit asbel ief s,yet  s till be d istinctfr om  t he m?1 6 Thi s  questio nises pec ially pressi ng if  som eex p eri ences ( s uc h as i ll us ions  an dhallu cina t ion s, as s omeone pa rti a l to  N aï ve Real ism might wan tto constru ethe m), or a ll exper iences, have accuracy c o ndition s t hat a re n ot derive d f rom so meo ther n on--‐b elief -- ‐li k e  stru c t ur e.Th ere are se v e ral  diff er ence s thatcould underwrite a dis tinction betw een  exp e r ie nce s  a n d b el i ef, e ven if they are  both prop os i ti onal attit u des .Conside r the t empor a l profi le that s tandardly  a ttac h e s t o experien ces andbeliefs.B elief s  h ave i ner tia th at  ex perie nces l a ck.  If y ou acq ui re a b elief ,then ittends to stay in the mi nd, wi th no  ne ed to re- -‐e s tab lish it.Of c ourse it i s p oss ibletof orget  wha t  o neo nce b elie v ed. But t h eine r t ia  of beliefs f a cil itate s t h eir ro le i n planning and gu i ding 14 For adefe n s e o f N a ïveRe alism, see Mar tin  ( 2 0 04). 15Th is claim de serves m or e  disc ussion . Fordefense s ee Siegel  (20 10)  chapter2,fo r  critic is m, see Tr avis  ( 2013).  16 Fo r  def e n ses of experienc es as b elief ,  se e Glü er  (2009) andByrne (200 9), the ear lier a ccou nts b y Pitch er  (1971 ) a nd  Armstrong (1968), w hichare cri ti cize d b y Dret ske( 1 969)andJa cks on (1977) . Si e ge l/ E pis temi c Cha rg e 11  behavior ,  and totha t  extent  f org e t ting i s  n o t  typical.Sup posey o u learn th a t yo u rf riend s' pla ne wil l landa t 1 0p m. If y our b elief did n't lasta s l on g as  your pl an  tome et
.14 Like_the raw--‐feel_view, Naïve Realism entails_that experiences_are_distinct from_belief_(on the assumption_that beliefs are_relations to propositions). But_unlike the raw--‐feel_view,_Naïve Realism is compatible with the idea that all experiences – not just the_ones_that aren't_illusions_or_hallucination --‐ are the kind_of state that can be_accurate or_inaccurate about the subject's environment. Just as beliefs_can_be true or_false, according to this idea, all experiences have accuracy_conditions: conditions under which they would_be accurate about_the_environment._Call this proposal the_Content View. When Naïve Realism is_combined with the Content View, some_experiences are fundamentally relations to objects and_properties that those objects have, but_these experiences, like all experiences,_have accuracy_conditions.15 Because they are assessable_for accuracy, having_an experience_constitutes having an_outlook on the world. So far,_I've considered two_proposals about how experiences could differ_in_their basic structure_from_beliefs._Could experiences_be propositional attitudes_with_the same_direction_of fit as beliefs, yet still_be_distinct from them?16 This question is especially_pressing if some experiences_(such_as illusions and hallucinations,_as someone partial to Naïve_Realism might want to construe them),_or all_experiences, have_accuracy conditions that are not derived from some other non--‐belief--‐like structure._There are several differences that could_underwrite a distinction between_experiences and_belief,_even if they_are_both propositional_attitudes. Consider the temporal profile that standardly_attaches to_experiences and beliefs. Beliefs have inertia_that experiences lack. If_you_acquire a belief, then it tends_to stay in the mind, with_no need to re--‐establish it._Of_course_it is possible to forget_what one once believed. But the_inertia of beliefs_facilitates their role in planning and guiding_14_For a defense of Naïve Realism,_see_Martin (2004). 15 This claim deserves_more_discussion._For defense see Siegel (2010)_chapter 2, for criticism, see Travis_(2013). 16 For defenses of experiences as belief, see_Glüer (2009) and_Byrne (2009), the earlier accounts_by_Pitcher_(1971) and Armstrong (1968), which are criticized by Dretske (1969)_and Jackson_(1977). Siegel/Epistemic Charge_11 behavior, and to that extent forgetting is not typical._Suppose you learn that your friends' plane_will land at 10pm. If your belief didn't last as long_as your plan to meet