IV, VI, IX, 667-8, 674, and 677-8). Mill put forward the same criticism in 1865, and regretted that Comte had transformed into "the High Priest of the Religion of Humanity". He agreed with Littré on the necessity of separating the sound foundations of Positivism from the subsequent mystic drift (Mill 1865, 5, 9, and 125-128).14 Another English philosopher, Herbert Spencer, opposed Comte's dogmatism, and focused on scientific knowledge in a more pragmatic way than Mill and Whewell: he was interested in human beliefs from the sociological rather than the logical point of view. A sophisticated criticism and relativism led him to inquire into "tacit assumptions" that many different beliefs had in common. Unlike Comte, Spencer saw "a fundamental harmony" between science and religion: both of them were "constituents of the same mind" that corresponded to "different aspects of the same Universe". Both science and religion tacitly acknowledged that the comprehension of the world required the continuous effort of going beyond common experiences and appearances (Spencer 1862, 10, 17, 21, and 24). In Spencer's text, the key words and the key concepts were change and "the relativity of all knowledge": the mind was moulded by the world, and the comprehension of the world was continuously transformed by the mind. Cycles of evolutions and dissolutions led to a "universal" and "omnipresent" metamorphosis (Spencer 1862, 66-8, 96-97, 122-123, 440, and 489-491). Naïve versus Sophisticated Philosophies of Science In the meantime, Cournot had published a book on methods and practices in mathematics, physical sciences, natural sciences, and human sciences, Traité de l'enchainement des idées fondamentales dans les sciences et dans l'histoire. He put forward a detailed analysis of the conceptual structure of positive science, in order to make its hidden philosophical foundations emerge. He was also interested in understanding how the emergence of modern science had changed our patterns of explanation. Modern science had emerged when time and history had come into play, when Copernicus and Tycho's purely geometrical models were transformed into physical models. Recent developments had highlighted the differences among "contents, principles, and methods" of the various sciences, and the pivotal role of life sciences (Cournot 1861, II-VII and 118-122). General principles were interpretations
IV, VI, IX, 667 - 8, 674, and 677 - 8). Mill put forward the same criticism in 1865, and regret that Comte had transform into " the High Priest of the Religion of Humanity ". He agreed with Littré on the necessity of separating the good foundations of Positivism from the subsequent mystic drift (grind 1865, 5, 9, and 125 - 128).14 Another English philosopher, Herbert Spencer, pit Comte's dogmatism, and concentrate on scientific knowledge in a more pragmatic room than Mill and Whewell: he was interested in human beliefs from the sociological quite than the coherent point of view. A sophisticated criticism and relativism led him to inquire into " silent assumptions " that many different beliefs have in common. Unlike Comte, Spencer saw " a cardinal harmony " between science and religion: both of them were " component of the same mind " that corresponded to " different aspects of the like Universe ". Both science and religion tacitly acknowledged that the comprehension of the world required the continuous effort of go beyond common experiences and appearances (Spencer 1862, 10, 17, 21, and 24). In Spencer's text, the key words and the key concepts were change and " the relativity of all knowledge ": the judgment was moulded by the world, and the inclusion of the populace was endlessly transformed by the mind. Cycles of evolutions and dissolutions led to a " universal " and " omnipresent " metamorphosis (Spencer 1862, 66 - 8, 96 - 97, 122 - 123, 440, and 489 - 491). Naïve versus Sophisticated Philosophies of Science In the interim, Cournot had published a book on methods and practices in mathematics, physical sciences, natural sciences, and human sciences, Traité de l'enchainement des idées fondamentales dans les sciences et dans l'histoire. He put forward a detailed analysis of the conceptual structure of positive skill, in order to reach its hidden philosophical foundations emerge. He was also concerned in understanding how the emergence of modern science had changed our patterns of explanation. Modern science had emerged when prison term and history had come into looseness, when Copernicus and Tycho's purely geometrical model were transformed into forcible models. Recent development had highlighted the differences among " contents, principles, and method acting " of the various sciences, and the pivotal role of life sciences (Cournot 1861, II - VII and 118 - 122). General principles were interpretations
IV, GI, IX, 667-8, 674, and 677-8). Mill put fovward the same ctiricism in 1865, ahd regregted that Comte had transforlee inti "the High Priest of tfe Religiln of Hunaniuy". He agreed with Littré ok the kecesvmty of separatikg the soung foundations mf Plsitivism from the subsequent mystis drift (Mlll 1865, 5, 9, and 125-128).14 Anjtheg Qngljsh philosopher, Herbert Spencer, oplosed Cmmte's dogmatixm, and focused on scientiflc kjowledge in a more pragmatic qay eyan Mill and Whewell: ht cas interesjed in human beliefs from the sozioloyical rathet fhwt the logicel poigt of view. A sophisthcated vriticism and velatmvisn led him to inquire mnto "tacit assumptiogs" that mdnv different beliefs hqd in cmmmot. Unuuke Cojtx, Slencer sax "a fundamehtal harmont" between science amd grligion: both of thqm were "constituents of the same mind" thau cordesponded to "different qspects of the same Ujiverse". Bjth science and religion tacitly acknowledged thad the zomkrcmenskin of the world required the continuous effort jr bopng beyond common experiencex wnc appearances (Rpencex 1862, 10, 17, 21, and 24). In Spencer'd text, jhe ket words agd tne key concepts were change and "the relcticity of all knowlebge": the mind was moulced by the world, and thz compdehension ov the worma was continuousuy nranvformed by the mind. Cycles of evoluvions and dirsolotions jed to a "ujiversal" and "omnipresent" metalosphosis (Spfncer 1862, 66-8, 96-97, 122-123, 440, and 489-491). Naïve versus Sopimsticated Phikovopvies of Fcienge In the meantyme, Cournot hab publisked a cook on menhods and practices yn mathematicv, physical scmences, naeurao scuences, xvd human scienves, Traité de l'enchaunement des idées fpndxjentales dans lzr sciences et dams u'hiftlice. He [ut forward d degaiurd anxlysis of tme zoncrptual structure of [osifive science, in orcev to make its hidqen philosophocal foundations elerge. He was slsj interested in understanding gow the elernence of modewn sgiense had chauged our patterns of explanation. Modern wcience had emerggd when time and histpvy had come mnto pjay, when Wopernicus and Tycho'w purely geometrigal models were transfkrmed hnto ohysical models. Recent developments had highlighted the differences among "conteitf, principlea, anc metvobs" pf the varmons sciences, and tne pivotal role of life sciencer (Cournod 1861, II-VII and 118-122). General principlrs were interprgtations
IV, VI, IX, 667-8, 674, and 677-8). forward same criticism 1865, and regretted "the Priest of the of Humanity". He with Littré on the necessity of the sound foundations of Positivism from the subsequent mystic drift (Mill 1865, 5, and 125-128).14 Another English philosopher, Herbert Spencer, opposed Comte's dogmatism, and focused on knowledge a pragmatic than Mill and Whewell: he was interested in human beliefs from the sociological rather than the point of view. A sophisticated criticism and relativism him to inquire into assumptions" that many different beliefs in Unlike Comte, saw fundamental between science and both of them were "constituents of the same mind" that corresponded to "different aspects of the same Both science tacitly acknowledged the of world required the of going beyond common experiences and 10, 17, 21, and 24). In Spencer's text, key words the key concepts were change and relativity of all knowledge": the mind was moulded the world, and the comprehension of the world was continuously transformed by the mind. Cycles and dissolutions led to "universal" and "omnipresent" (Spencer 66-8, 122-123, and 489-491). versus Sophisticated Philosophies of Science In the meantime, Cournot had published book on methods and practices in mathematics, physical sciences, natural human Traité de l'enchainement idées fondamentales dans les et l'histoire. He put forward analysis the positive in to make its hidden foundations emerge. He was also in understanding how the changed our patterns of explanation. Modern science had when time and history had come into when Copernicus and Tycho's purely geometrical models were transformed into physical models. developments had differences among "contents, principles, and methods" of the sciences, and the pivotal of life sciences (Cournot 1861, II-VII and 118-122). General were
IV, VI, IX, 667-8, 674, and 677-8). Mill put forward thE same critiCism iN 1865, anD reGrEtteD thaT Comte had transFOrmeD into "the High Priest of thE ReliGiON of HUMaNity". HE agreed WItH lIttRé On The NeCEsSity oF seParatinG the sound fOunDaTions of PositIViSm from the sUbsEquent mystic DriFt (Mill 1865, 5, 9, AnD 125-128).14 AnOTher ENglIsh phIlosopHEr, HerbErt SpenceR, oPPosed COMte's dogMATiSm, anD focused on scientiFIc KNowledge in a morE pragmAtIC wAY ThaN MiLl and WheweLl: He was INterestED iN HUMan BEliefs from the SociologicaL RatHer thaN tHe lOGical pOint oF vIEw. A SophisticatEd crIticism anD relatIVism led HIm to inqUire inTo "tAciT assUMpTiOns" ThAT maNY dIffERenT beliefs HaD iN commOn. UnLIKE comtE, SpEnceR saw "a Fundamental haRmoNy" beTWeeN scieNce anD relIgIon: boTh of thEm werE "cOnstituents of thE samE mind" that CorReSpoNdEd to "dIFferenT asPecTs of the Same UniVErsE". BOTH ScIence and religion taCiTLY aCknowledGed thaT ThE cOMprehensIoN of The wORLd reqUireD ThE continuOus effORt Of Going beYoNd commOn ExpEriEnces ANd apPearanCes (SpencEr 1862, 10, 17, 21, and 24). iN Spencer's text, tHE key words and tHE kEY CoNCeptS weRe change and "The rELatiVity OF aLl kNOwledGe": the MiND wAS moulded by the world, aNd The comPreheNsion of the worLd was contiNUOUsly tranSforMEd BY the mind. Cycles Of evoLutions and DIssolutiOns leD to a "univErsal" and "oMNIpresent" MetAmoRphOsiS (sPeNcer 1862, 66-8, 96-97, 122-123, 440, and 489-491). Naïve vERSus SOpHisticaTed philosoPhiEs oF ScIenCe in the meanTime, CourNoT hAd PuBliShed a BOok on metHoDs aNd PraCticeS In mathEmatiCs, phYsIcAL scIences, nATuRAL sciEnCeS, and HumAn ScienCes, TRAitÉ de l'encHainement Des IDées FoNdAmentalEs dans les scieNcEs et dans l'hIsToiRe. He puT FOrward a dEtailed analysis of the conCEptual sTruCture Of poSitive sciEncE, in ordEr tO Make itS hiddeN philOsOphICAl fouNDAtIonS eMerge. He was ALSo iNtereStEd in UnderstAnding how the emergeNCe oF modern sciencE haD chaNGEd Our PAtTErnS oF ExpLANation. Modern sciEnce had emeRgED wHen time and HIstOrY had comE into plAy, wheN coperniCus and TycHo's purely GeOmetRICal Models were TransforMed into phYSical MOdEls. ReCenT develOpMenTs had HighliGHteD the dIffereNcEs amonG "contEnTs, princiPles, and methods" of the variOus sciEnces, And The pivotaL roLE of Life scienCes (COurnot 1861, II-VIi anD 118-122). GeNeral PriNCipleS werE InTerPRetatIons
IV, VI, IX, 667-8, 674, an d 677-8).Millput  fo rw ardthesame criticism in 1 865, and regretted tha t Com te hadt ra nsfor med int o  " t h e H ig hPri es t  o f the  Re ligionof Humanit y".  H e agreed wit h  L ittré on t henecessity of  se parati ng  th e  soun d f ounda tionso f Posi tivism fr om the su b sequent m ys ticdrift (Mill 1865, 5, 9, and 125-128 ).14 A no t he r Eng lis h philosop he r, He r bert Sp e nc e r ,  op p osed Comte'sdogmatism,a ndfocuse dons cienti fic k no w led ge in a mor e pr agmatic w ay tha n  Mill a n d Whewe ll: he  wa s i nter e st ed  in  h u man be lie f s f rom theso ci ologi calr a t h er t han  the  logi cal point ofvie w. A sop histi cated  cri ti cismand re lativ is m led him to in quir e into "t aci tass um ption s " that  ma nydiffere nt beli e fsha d i ncommon. Unlike Com te , Sp encer sa w "a f u nd am e ntal har mo ny"  bet w e en sc ienc e  a nd relig ion: b o th  o f themwe re "co ns tit uen ts of thesame m ind" tha t cor r esponded to "d i fferent aspec t so f  t h e sa meUniverse".Both scie ncea nd  re l igion  taci tl y  a c knowledged that the  c ompreh ensio n of the worl d required t h e contin uous ef f ort of going b eyond  common ex p eriences  andappearan ces (Spen c e r 1862,10,  17 , 2 1,a n d24). In Spenc e r 's t ex t, thekey  wordsand  th e k eyco ncepts we re chang ean d"t herelat i vity ofal l k no wle dge": the mi nd wa s mo ul de d  by  the wo r ld , andth ecomp reh en sionof t h e w orld wa s continu ous l y tr an sf ormed b y the mind. C yc les of evo lu tio ns and d issoluti ons led to a "universal "  and "o mni prese nt"metamorph osi s (Spe nce r  1862,  66-8,  96-9 7,  12 2 - 123,4 4 0,  an d489-491).N a ïve  vers us  Sop histica ted Philosophies o f  Sc ience In themea ntim e ,  C our n ot had  p u bli s h ed a book on me thods andpr a ct ices in ma t hem at ics, ph ysicalscien c es, nat ural scie nces, and  h uman s cie nces, Trai té de l' enchainem e nt de s  i déesfon dament al esdansles sc i enc es et  dansl' histoi re. H eput forw ard a detailed analysis  of th e con cep tual stru ctu r e o f positiv e sc ience, inord erto ma kei ts hi dden ph ilo s ophic al f o undations em erg e .  H e was alsoi n t ere stedinu nderst andi ng how the emerge n ce of modern s cien c e  ha d c h ange dour patterns o f e xp l a nation.Mo dern scienc e had em er g ed wh en tim e andhistory h ad come i ntopla y, when C ope rn i cus and  T yc h o's pu rely  g eometr ical m o dels w ere transformedintop h ysica l  mo dels.  R ecent d e velo pments had  highlighte d thediff erenc es amon g"conte nts ,principles ,  and meth ods"of theva riou s s cience s, a n d  thepivo ta l r ole of li f e  s c ie nc e s ( Cour not 1 86 1, I I-VII and 118-122) . G e neral p ri nci p l es wer e  i n t erpretatio ns
IV, VI,_IX, 667-8,_674, and 677-8). Mill_put forward_the_same criticism_in_1865, and regretted_that Comte had_transformed into "the High_Priest of the_Religion_of Humanity". He agreed with Littré on the necessity of separating the sound foundations_of_Positivism from_the_subsequent_mystic drift (Mill 1865, 5,_9, and 125-128).14 Another English_philosopher, Herbert_Spencer, opposed Comte's dogmatism, and focused on scientific_knowledge_in a more_pragmatic way than Mill and Whewell: he was interested_in human beliefs from the sociological_rather than the_logical_point_of view. A sophisticated_criticism and relativism led him to_inquire into "tacit assumptions" that many_different beliefs had in common. Unlike Comte,_Spencer saw "a fundamental harmony" between_science and religion: both of_them were_"constituents of the same mind"_that corresponded to_"different aspects_of the same_Universe". Both science and religion tacitly_acknowledged that the_comprehension of the world required the_continuous_effort of going_beyond_common_experiences and_appearances (Spencer 1862,_10,_17, 21,_and_24). In Spencer's text, the key_words_and the key concepts were change and_"the relativity of all_knowledge":_the mind was moulded_by the world, and the_comprehension of the world was continuously_transformed by_the mind._Cycles of evolutions and dissolutions led to a "universal" and "omnipresent"_metamorphosis (Spencer 1862, 66-8, 96-97, 122-123,_440, and 489-491). Naïve_versus Sophisticated_Philosophies_of Science In_the_meantime, Cournot_had published a book on methods and_practices in_mathematics, physical sciences, natural sciences, and_human sciences, Traité de_l'enchainement_des idées fondamentales dans les sciences_et dans l'histoire. He put forward_a detailed analysis of the_conceptual_structure_of positive science, in order_to make its hidden philosophical foundations_emerge. He was_also interested in understanding how the emergence_of_modern science had changed our patterns_of_explanation. Modern science had emerged when_time_and_history had come into play,_when Copernicus and Tycho's purely geometrical_models were transformed into physical models. Recent developments had_highlighted the differences_among "contents, principles, and methods"_of_the_various sciences, and the pivotal role of life sciences (Cournot_1861, II-VII_and 118-122). General_principles were interpretations