ohoedi 268 have opined and estimated on this topic. The possibility of a substance by some metaphysicians is that of a thing that exists without whatever else connected to it, aside from any attributes it might happen to have; the trouble with this recognition is on the utilization of this contention. My position is that any solid thing one chooses to represent the thought of substance turns out practically speaking to answer a specific portrayal; this implies essentially that it can't be discussed separately from its attributes. It in this way rises that substances are not any more essential creatures than are qualities and relations; without the previous one couldn't have the last mentioned, yet similarly without the last one couldn't have the previous. These negate Descartes and the group scholar positions. Ibuanyidanda (complementarily) philosophy has advised us that for anything to exist it must serve as a missing connection of reality. Things can just exist in shared compliment in each other. On account of substance and attributes it is unnecessary in attempting to make a polarity between them, as one can't exist without alternate as Asouzu philosophy calls attention to. References Aquinas, T. (1961). Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle (p. 2). J. P. Rowan (Trans.), Chicago: Henry Regnery Co. Aquinas, T. (1963). In Meta, Proem. A. Maurer (Trans.), The Division and Methods of the Sciences (p. 89). Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies. Aquinas, T. (1975). Summa Contra Gentiles II (p. 158). J. F. Anderson (Trans.), Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press. Aristotle (1956). Metaphysics. H. Tredennick (Trans.), London: Loeb Classical Library. Aristotle (1963). Categories and De Interpretatione (Clarendon Aristotle Series) (pp. 1b25-2a4). J. Ackrill (Translation and Notes), Oxford: Clarendon Press. Aristotle (1985). Metaph. V 4, 1015 a 13-19 (The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation). J. Barnes (Ed.), Princeton. Asouzu, I. (2007). Ibuanyidanda: New Complementary Ontology. Deutschland: Litverlag Fresnostr. Asouzu, I. (2011). "Ibuanyidanda" and the Philosophy of Essence
ohoedi 268 have opined and estimated on this topic. The possibility of a means by some metaphysicians is that of a matter that exists without whatever else connected to it, apart from any attribute it might happen to have; the worry with this realization is on the utilization of this contention. My position is that any solid thing one choose to represent the thought of means turns out practically speaking to answer a specific portrayal; this imply essentially that it can't be discussed separately from its attribute. It in this way rises that substances are not any more essential animal than are qualities and relations; without the previous one couldn't have the last mention, yet similarly without the last one couldn't have the previous. These negate Descartes and the group scholar positions. Ibuanyidanda (complementarily) philosophy has advised us that for anything to exist it must serve as a missing connection of reality. Things can just exist in shared compliment in each other. On account of kernel and attributes it is unnecessary in attempting to name a mutual opposition between them, as one can't exist without alternate as Asouzu philosophy calls attention to. References Aquinas, T. (1961). Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle (p. 2). J. P. Rowan (Trans .), Chicago: Henry Regnery Co. Aquinas, T. (1963). In Meta, Proem. A. Maurer (Trans .), The Division and Methods of the Sciences (p. 89). Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies. Aquinas, T. (1975). Summa Contra Gentiles II (p. 158). J. F. Anderson (Trans .), Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press. Aristotle (1956). Metaphysics. H. Tredennick (Trans .), London: Loeb Classical Library. Aristotle (1963). Categories and De Interpretatione (Clarendon Aristotle Series) (pp. 1b25 - 2a4). J. Ackrill (Translation and Notes), Oxford: Clarendon Press. Aristotle (1985). Metaph. V 4, 1015 a 13 - 19 (The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation). J. Barnes (Ed .), Princeton. Asouzu, I. (2007). Ibuanyidanda: New Complementary Ontology. Deutschland: Litverlag Fresnostr. Asouzu, I. (2011). " Ibuanyidanda " and the Philosophy of Essence
ohofdi 268 have opined and estlmated on this topic. Thx possigility ow a substance by some metaphbsicuans us that of a thing thag exists aithout qhattver else connectxs to it, aside nrom cnb attributes it might hap[en to have; tha grluble with this recognition is on tre utilozwtion of this sonttntyon. Jj kosition is that any solid thing kne chomses to reprexent the thought of substajce hurns out practicaply speakint to qnswer a spezific portgcyal; this ijplies essentially that it can't be dnscussed sekceatfny from its attrpbutes. It in bnis waf rises that substanccs arx nor any more essential rreatures than are qoalities atd relations; withour rhe pteviogs ovw cuulsn'v hzve thf lest mentionsd, yet simioarly without the lsse one couldn't gave tre previous. These negate Descartes and tht grohp scholar positions. Ibyanyidanda (complementwrily) phijosophy has advised us that for anything to exist it mnsg stryc as q lissing connection of reality. Things can just sxosn in shared compllment in each othet. Ln wccount of sucstancz ahd attributes it id unnecgssary in attemkting to make a polarity between them, as one xan't exist without alternate cs Asoozu pholosophy calls attentiou to. Rsferences Aeuinas, T. (1961). Zommentary on thd Mvtapvysics of Aristotle (p. 2). J. P. Rowan (Trens.), Ckicago: Hdnry Regnewy Co. Aquijas, T. (1963). In Meta, Proem. A. Mwurer (Tsans.), The Dlvision and Methods of the Scieires (p. 89). Torontp: [onnifical Iustitube of Mediaeval Studies. Aquincs, T. (1975). Suima Cuntra Gentples II (p. 158). J. F. Anderfon (Trans.), Notsg Dame, Indiane: Universyty if Nitre Daod Press. Aristoyle (1956). Metaihvsics. H. Teedennick (Trans.), Lokdon: Ukeb Classical Lnyrqry. Aristotle (1963). Vatdgowivs end Dq Interpretathone (Clxtendov Aristotle Rerirs) (pp. 1b25-2a4). J. Ackrill (Tsansmation and Notes), Ocfjrd: Clargndon Prefs. Aristotle (1985). Metaph. V 4, 1015 a 13-19 (The Compnetx Workx os Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translatlon). J. Barnes (Ed.), Prikcetjn. Asouzu, N. (2007). Ibuanyidanda: New Complementary Ontolojy. Deutschland: Litverlat Fresnostr. Asouzu, N. (2011). "Ibuanyidanva" and the Philmsophy of Essence
ohoedi 268 have opined and estimated on The of a by some metaphysicians that without whatever else to it, aside any attributes it might happen to the trouble with this recognition is on the utilization of this contention. My is that any solid thing one chooses to represent the thought of substance out speaking answer specific portrayal; this implies essentially that it can't be discussed separately from its attributes. It in way rises that substances are not any more creatures than are qualities relations; without the previous one have last mentioned, similarly the one couldn't have previous. These negate Descartes and the group scholar positions. Ibuanyidanda (complementarily) philosophy has advised us that for to exist serve as missing of Things can just shared compliment in each other. On and attributes it is unnecessary in attempting to a polarity them, as one can't exist without as Asouzu philosophy calls attention to. References Aquinas, (1961). Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle (p. 2). J. P. Rowan (Trans.), Chicago: Henry Aquinas, T. (1963). In Proem. A. Maurer The and of Sciences (p. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies. Aquinas, T. (1975). Summa Contra II (p. 158). J. F. Anderson (Trans.), Notre Dame, Indiana: Notre Press. Aristotle (1956). H. Tredennick (Trans.), London: Classical Aristotle (1963). Categories and (Clarendon Series) Ackrill and Oxford: Clarendon Press. Aristotle Metaph. V 4, 1015 a (The Complete Works of J. Barnes (Ed.), Princeton. Asouzu, I. (2007). Ibuanyidanda: Complementary Ontology. Deutschland: Litverlag Fresnostr. Asouzu, I. "Ibuanyidanda" and the Philosophy of Essence
ohoedi 268 have opined and estimaTed on this tOpic. THe pOssIbIlitY of a Substance by somE MetaPhysicians is that of a thiNg thaT eXIsts WItHout wHatever ELsE COnnEcTeD to It, ASiDe froM anY attribUtes it mighT haPpEn to have; the tROuBle with thiS reCognition is oN thE utiliZaTioN Of thiS coNtentIon. My pOSition Is that any SoLId thinG One chooSES tO repResent the thought oF SuBStance turns out PractiCaLLy SPEakIng To answer a sPeCific POrtrayaL; ThIS IMplIEs essentially That it can't bE DisCussed SeParATely frOm its AtTRibUtes. It in thiS way Rises that SubstaNCes are nOT any morE essenTiaL crEatuREs ThAn aRe QUalITiEs aND reLations; wItHoUt the PrevIOUS One cOulDn't hAve thE last mentioneD, yeT simILarLy witHout tHe laSt One coUldn't hAve thE pRevious. These negAte DEscartes aNd tHe GroUp ScholAR positIonS. IbUanyidaNda (compLEmeNtARILy) Philosophy has advisEd US ThAt for anyThing tO ExIsT It must seRvE as A misSINg conNectIOn Of realitY. ThingS CaN jUst exisT iN shareD cOmpLimEnt in EAch oTher. On Account oF subsTAnce and attribuTEs it is unnecesSArY IN aTTempTinG to make a polAritY BetwEen tHEm, As oNE can't Exist WiTHoUT alternate as Asouzu pHiLosophY callS attention to. REferences AQUINas, T. (1961). CommEntaRY oN The Metaphysics Of AriStotle (p. 2). J. P. ROWan (Trans.), chicaGo: Henry REgnery Co. AQUInas, T. (1963). In MEta, proEm. A. mauRER (TRans.), The DivisiON And MEtHods of tHe SCiences (P. 89). ToRonTo: POntIfIcal InstiTute of MeDiAeVaL STudIes. AqUInas, T. (1975). SumMa conTrA GeNtileS iI (p. 158). J. F. ANdersOn (TrAnS.), NOTre dame, IndIAnA: uNiveRsItY of NOtrE DAme PrEss. ARIstOtle (1956). MetAphysics. H. treDEnniCk (trAns.), LondOn: Loeb ClassicAl library. AriStOtlE (1963). CategORIes and De interpretatione (ClarendoN aristotLe SEries) (Pp. 1b25-2a4). j. Ackrill (TRanSlatioN anD notes), OXford: CLarenDoN PrESS. ArisTOTlE (1985). MeTaPh. V 4, 1015 a 13-19 (The ComPLEte works Of arisTotle, ThE Revised Oxford TranSLatIon). J. Barnes (Ed.), PRinCetoN. aSoUzu, i. (2007). ibUAnyIdANda: nEW Complementary ONtology. DeuTsCHlAnd: LitverlAG FrEsNostr. AsOuzu, I. (2011). "IbUanyiDAnda" and The PhilosOphy of EssEnCe
ohoedi 268 have opined and  estimated  on t his  to pi c. T he p ossibility ofa  sub stance by some metaphy sicia ns is t h at  of a  thingt ha t exi st swit ho u twhate ver  else c onnected t o i t,  aside froma ny  attribute s i t might happ ento hav e;  th e  trou ble  with  thisr ecogni tion is o nt he uti l ization o fthis  contention. My p o si t ion is that an y soli dt hi n g  on e c hooses tore prese n t the t h ou g h t  of substance tur ns out prac t ica lly sp ea kin g  to an sweras pec ific portra yal;  this imp lies e s sential l y thatit can 'tbedisc u ss ed  se pa r ate l yfro m  it s attrib ut es . Itin t h i s wayris es t hat s ubstances are  no t an y  mo re es senti al c re ature s than  arequ alities and rel atio ns; witho utth e p re vious one co uld n't  have t he last men ti o n e d,  yet similarly wit ho u t  t he lastone co u ld n' t  have th epre viou s .  Thes e ne g at e Descar tes an d  t he  groupsc holarpo sit ion s. Ib u anyi danda(complem entar i ly) philosophy has advised u s  t h a tf or a nyt hing to exi st i t  mus t se r ve  as a mis singco n ne c tion of reality. Th in gs can  just  exist in sha red compli m e n t in eac h ot h er .  On account of  subs tance anda ttribute s itis unnec essary in a ttemptin g t o m ake  ap o la rity betweent h em,as  one ca n't  existwit hou t a lte rn ate as As ouzu phi lo so ph ycal ls at t ention t o.  Re fe ren ces A q uinas,  T. ( 1961 ).  C o mme ntary o n  t h e  Met ap hy sics  of  A risto tle( p.2). J.P. Rowan(Tr a ns.) ,Ch icago:Henry Regnery  C o. Aquinas ,T.(1963) . In Meta,  Proem. A. Maurer (Tran s .), The  Di visio n an d Methods  of  the S cie n ces (p . 89).  Toro nt o:P o ntifi c a lIns ti tute of Me d i aev al St ud ies.  Aquina s, T. (1975). Summ a  Co ntra Gentiles  II  (p. 1 58 ).J .F . A nd e rso n (Trans.), Notre  Dame, Ind ia n a:  Universit y  of  N otre Da me Pres s. Ar i stotle(1956). M etaphysic s.  H.T r ede nnick (Tra ns.), Lo ndon: Loe b  Clas s ic al Li bra ry. Ar is tot le (1 963).C ate gorie s andDe  Inter preta ti one (Cla rendon Aristotle Series ) (pp.  1b25 -2a 4). J. Ac kri l l ( Translati on a nd Notes),  Ox for d: Cl are n don P ress .  A ris t otle(198 5 ). Metaph .  V  4, 1 01 5 a 13-19 ( T h e  Co mplet e W o rks of  Ari stotle, The Revis e d Oxford Trans lati o n ).J.B arne s(Ed.), Princet on.  A s o uzu, I.(2 007). Ibuan yidanda:  N e w Com plemen tary O ntology . De u tschla nd:Lit verlag Fr esn os t r. Asou zu ,I . (201 1)."I buanyi danda" andt h e Philosophy ofEssen c e 
ohoedi 268_have opined_and estimated on this_topic. The_possibility_of a_substance_by some metaphysicians_is that of_a thing that exists_without whatever else_connected_to it, aside from any attributes it might happen to have; the trouble with_this_recognition is_on_the_utilization of this contention. My_position is that any solid_thing one_chooses to represent the thought of substance turns_out_practically speaking to_answer a specific portrayal; this implies essentially that it_can't be discussed separately from its_attributes. It in_this_way_rises that substances are_not any more essential creatures than_are qualities and relations; without the_previous one couldn't have the last mentioned,_yet similarly without the last one_couldn't have the previous. These_negate Descartes_and the group scholar positions._Ibuanyidanda (complementarily) philosophy_has advised_us that for_anything to exist it must serve_as a missing_connection of reality. Things can just_exist_in shared compliment_in_each_other. On_account of substance_and_attributes it_is_unnecessary in attempting to make a_polarity_between them, as one can't exist without_alternate as Asouzu philosophy_calls_attention to. References Aquinas,_T. (1961). Commentary on the_Metaphysics of Aristotle (p. 2). J._P. Rowan_(Trans.), Chicago:_Henry Regnery Co. Aquinas, T. (1963). In Meta, Proem. A. Maurer_(Trans.), The Division and Methods of_the Sciences (p. 89)._Toronto: Pontifical_Institute_of Mediaeval Studies._Aquinas,_T. (1975)._Summa Contra Gentiles II (p. 158). J._F. Anderson_(Trans.), Notre Dame, Indiana: University of_Notre Dame Press. Aristotle_(1956)._Metaphysics. H. Tredennick (Trans.), London: Loeb_Classical Library. Aristotle (1963). Categories and_De Interpretatione (Clarendon Aristotle Series)_(pp._1b25-2a4)._J. Ackrill (Translation and Notes),_Oxford: Clarendon Press. Aristotle (1985). Metaph._V 4, 1015_a 13-19 (The Complete Works of Aristotle,_The_Revised Oxford Translation). J. Barnes (Ed.),_Princeton._Asouzu, I. (2007). Ibuanyidanda: New Complementary_Ontology._Deutschland:_Litverlag Fresnostr. Asouzu, I. (2011)._"Ibuanyidanda" and the Philosophy of Essence