 a pitiless rigor ineluctably led M. Henri Poincaré to the following fully pragmatic conclusion: theoretical physics is a mere collection of recipes. Against this proposition, he felt a sort of revolt, and he loudly proclaimed that a physical theory gives us something else than the mere knowledge of the facts, that it makes us discover the real relations among things (2007, 446, M. G. translation). One of us has discussed Poincaré's relationism in detail elsewhere (Psillos, 2014). The relevant point here is that for Duhem too relationism is the limit of objective knowledge and at the same time his resting point against scepticism. As noted already, a key argument for this relationist approach to theoretical knowledge comes from the pattern of retention in theory-change in science. But it should be added that in making a case for theoretical knowledge of relations Duhem had to rely on explanatory considerations of the very sort that he thought were illegitimate as part of science. Marie Gueguen and Stathis Psillos Anti-Scepticism and Epistemic Humility in Pierre Duhem's Philosophy of Science 70 Far from being an instrumentalist, Duhem took it as fully legitimate for a scientist to accept that science does offer some substantial theoretical knowledge of the world. A scientist who would stick to a strict positivist account of rational judgement in science would at once recognize that all his most powerful and deepest aspirations have been disappointed by the despairing results of his analysis. [For he] cannot make up his mind to see in physical theory merely a set of practical procedures and a rack filled with tools.... [H]e cannot believe that it merely classifies information accumulated by empirical science without transforming in any way the nature of these facts or without impressing on them a character which experiment alone would not have engraved on it. If there were in physical theory only what his own criticism made him discover in it, he would stop devoting his time and efforts to a work of such a meagre importance (1906, 334). And he immediately added: "The study of the method of physics is powerless to disclose to the physicist the reason leading him to construct a physical theory". Conclusions Duhem's philosophy of science could be described as (increasingly) anti-instrumentalist. Yet, his antiinstrumentalism did not amount to endorsement of realism. If we were to identify the realist view of science with the atomic theory of matter and with the mechanistic view of the world, then Duhem
a pitiless rigor ineluctably led M. Henri Poincaré to the following amply matter-of-fact conclusion: theoretical physics is a mere solicitation of recipes. Against this proposition, he felt a kind of rebellion, and he loudly proclaimed that a physical theory gives us something else than the bare knowledge of the facts, that it makes us discover the veridical relations among things (2007, 446, M. G. translation). One of us has discussed Poincaré's relationism in detail elsewhere (Psillos, 2014). The relevant detail here is that for Duhem too relationism is the limit of objective knowledge and at the like time his resting point against agnosticism. As noted already, a cardinal argument for this relationist approach to theoretical knowledge comes from the pattern of retention in hypothesis - change in science. But it should be added that in making a case for theoretical knowledge of relation Duhem hold to rely on explanatory considerations of the very sort that he thought were illegitimate as part of science. Marie Gueguen and Stathis Psillos Anti - Scepticism and Epistemic Humility in Pierre Duhem's Philosophy of Science 70 Far from being an instrumentalist, Duhem learn it as fully legitimate for a scientist to take that skill does propose some substantial theoretical knowledge of the populace. A scientist who would stick to a strict positivist account of rational judgment in science would at once recognize that all his most powerful and deepest aspirations have been disappoint by the despairing results of his analysis. [ For he ] cannot make up his mind to see in physical theory merely a stage set of practical procedures and a rack filled with tools.... [ H]e cannot think that it merely classifies information accumulated by empirical science without transforming in any way the nature of these facts or without impressing on them a quality which experiment alone would not have engrave on it. If there were in physical hypothesis only what his own criticism made him discover in it, he would stop give his time and campaign to a work of such a meagre importance (1906, 334). And he immediately added: " The study of the method of purgative is powerless to disclose to the physicist the reason leading him to reconstruct a physical theory ". Conclusions Duhem's philosophy of science could be describe as (increasingly) anti - instrumentalist. Yet, his antiinstrumentalism did not amount to sanction of realism. If we were to identify the realist scene of science with the atomic theory of topic and with the mechanistic view of the world, then Duhem
 a oitiless rigor ineluctabuy led M. Henri Kouncaré vo the rollowine fully pragmatic conclusion: tyeoreupcal physics is a merd collectpon of rexipew. Against tijs propositioh, he yeot a sort of rgvolt, and he loudly proclahmdd that a physical theory gives us soiething epse than the mgre kmjwlesge of the facts, that it makes us siscoveg the real relatipns among things (2007, 446, M. G. trajslahion). One of us has discussed Kkinsqré's relationksm in detail elsewherg (Psillos, 2014). The relevant point hefe is that for Euyem joo relationmsm is the limit on objecdive knpwledge and at thx sane time his resting pmint against sceptycism. As toced already, a key argymwnt fmr tvis fwlagiohixt approwch to theorefical knowlwdge comes from the pwnyern of retehtion yn theory-change in science. But it should te zdded that in making a xase for theoretical nnowledge of relations Duhem had to rely on explanatory cotsidecagiouw of gye very sort that he thought were illegitimate wa karn of science. Maric Gueguen and Statnid Lfillos Anti-Scgpticism ahd Epistemic Humillty in Kierre Duhem's Priloxophy of Science 70 Far from veing an insnrumwntalist, Duhem toon it as fuluy lggitimste for a scientist to cccept that scienfe does orwer some substangiak dheoretical knowledge of tre world. E scizntist wfo wpuld seick to a dtricb positivist accounh of tationdl judgemejt in science would at once recognize that alk vis most pocerful and deepest wspirations hare been bisappuinted by nhe despamring resultf of his analfdis. [For he] cennot makq up his mind tu see in physicsl theory merely a wet of practical pvocedorss and a rack fnuoed with tools.... [N]e zangon bxlievq that it meraly zlarxifier informatiiv acvumulated by empiricdl sdience without tramsnorming ib any war the nature pf these facts or aithont impcessinb og them a character which experjment aloje rould not hade ekgraded on it. Nf there were in physical theory only whet his own criticism maee him discover in nt, he would svop dedoting hiv time and efforts ti a work of such s meagre importance (1906, 334). And ha immfdiately added: "The study of the method of physics is powerless to disclosw to tie physicist fhe teasot jzading rim vo construct a phyxical theory". Conclusions Duhem's philoso[hv of science could be describrd as (increasinely) anti-instrumentalist. Get, his sntiinstrumentalism did not amoint to endorsement of reslism. If we wsre to ideitify the realist virw of vcienxe with the atomic theorh og latter anf wiuh tke mechanistic view of the world, rhen Dyhfm
a pitiless rigor ineluctably led M. Henri the fully pragmatic theoretical physics is Against proposition, he felt sort of revolt, he loudly proclaimed that a physical gives us something else than the mere knowledge of the facts, that it us discover the real relations among things (2007, 446, M. G. translation). One us discussed relationism detail elsewhere (Psillos, 2014). The relevant point here is that for Duhem too relationism is the of objective knowledge and at the same time resting point against scepticism. noted already, a key argument this approach to knowledge from pattern of retention theory-change in science. But it should be added that in making a case for theoretical knowledge of Duhem had on explanatory of very that he thought as part of science. Marie Gueguen Anti-Scepticism and Epistemic Humility in Pierre Duhem's Philosophy Science 70 from being an instrumentalist, Duhem took as fully legitimate for a scientist to accept science does offer some substantial theoretical knowledge of the world. A scientist who would stick strict positivist account of judgement in science at recognize all most powerful deepest aspirations have been disappointed by the despairing results of his [For he] cannot make up his mind to see in merely set of practical and a rack filled tools.... cannot believe that it information by transforming any the nature of these or without impressing on them character which experiment alone it. If there were in physical theory only his own criticism made him discover in he would stop devoting his time and efforts to a work of a meagre 334). And he immediately added: "The study of method of physics is to disclose to the physicist the reason leading him construct physical theory". Duhem's philosophy of could be described (increasingly) anti-instrumentalist. Yet, did not to of were to identify the realist view science the atomic theory of matter with view of the world, then Duhem
 a pitiless rigor ineluctably Led M. Henri POincaRé tO thE fOlloWing Fully pragmatic COnclUsion: theoretical physicS is a mErE CollECtIon of Recipes. aGaINSt tHiS pRopOsITiOn, he fElt A sort of Revolt, and hE loUdLy proclaimed THaT a physical TheOry gives us soMetHing elSe ThaN The meRe kNowleDge of tHE facts, That it makEs US discoVEr the reAL ReLatiOns among things (2007, 446, M. G. tRAnSLation). One of us hAs discUsSEd pOIncAré'S relationiSm In detAIl elsewHErE (pSIllOS, 2014). The relevant pOint here is tHAt fOr DuheM tOo rELationIsm is ThE LimIt of objectiVe knOwledge anD at the SAme time HIs restiNg poinT agAinSt scEPtIcIsm. as NOteD AlReaDY, a kEy argumeNt FoR this RelaTIONIst aPprOach To theOretical knowlEdgE comES frOm the PatteRn of ReTentiOn in thEory-cHaNge in science. But It shOuld be addEd tHaT in MaKing a CAse for TheOreTical knOwledge OF reLaTIONs duhem had to rely on exPlANAtOry consiDeratiONs Of THe very soRt ThaT he tHOUght wEre iLLeGitimate As part OF sCiEnce. MarIe guegueN aNd STatHis PsILlos anti-ScEpticism And EpIStemic Humility IN Pierre Duhem's pHiLOSoPHy of sciEnce 70 Far from BeinG An inStruMEnTalISt, DuhEm tooK iT As FUlly legitimate for a sCiEntist To accEpt that sciencE does offer SOME substanTial THeORetical knowledGe of tHe world. A scIEntist whO woulD stick to A strict poSITivist acCouNt oF raTioNAL jUdgement in sciENCe woUlD at once RecOgnize tHat All His MosT pOwerful anD deepest AsPiRaTiOns Have bEEn disappOiNteD bY thE despAIring rEsultS of hIs AnALysIs. [For he] CAnNOT makE uP hIs miNd tO sEe in pHysiCAl tHeory meRely a set oF prACticAl PrOcedureS and a rack fillEd With tools.... [H]E cAnnOt beliEVE that it mErely classifies informatIOn accumUlaTed by EmpiRical scieNce WithouT trANsformIng in aNy way ThE naTURe of tHESe FacTs Or without iMPResSing oN tHem a CharactEr which experiment aLOne Would not have eNgrAved ON It. if tHErE WerE iN PhySICal theory only whAt his own crItICiSm made him dIScoVeR in it, he Would stOp devOTing his Time and efForts to a wOrK of sUCH a mEagre imporTance (1906, 334). And He immediaTEly adDEd: "the stUdy Of the mEtHod Of phySics is POweRless To discLoSe to thE physIcIst the reAson leading him to construCt a phySical TheOry". ConcluSioNS DuHem's philoSophY of science CouLd bE descRibED as (inCreaSInGly) ANti-inStruMEntalist. YET, hIs aNTIiNstrumentalISM Did Not amOunT To endoRsemEnt of realism. If we wERe to identify thE reaLISt vIew OF sciEnCe with the atomiC thEoRY Of matter AnD with the mecHanistic ViEW of thE world, Then DuHem
 a pitiless rigor inelucta bly led M.  Henr i P oin ca ré t o th e following fu l ly p ragmatic conclusion: t heore ti c al p h ys ics i s a mer e  c o l lec ti on  of  r e ci pes.Aga inst th is proposi tio n,  he felt a s o rt  of revolt , a nd he loudly  pr oclaim ed  th a t a p hys icaltheory givesus someth in g  elset han the m er e kn owledge of the fa c ts ,  that it makes  us di sc o ve r the  re al relatio ns  amon g  things (2 0 0 7 , 4 4 6, M. G. tran slation). O n e o f us h as  di s cussed  Poin ca r é's  relationis m in  detail e lsewhe r e (Psil l os, 201 4). Th e r ele vant po in t h er e  is th atf orDuhem to ore latio nism i s thelim it o f obj ective knowle dge  and atthe s ame t imehi s res ting p ointag ainst scepticis m. A s noted a lre ad y,akey a r gument  fo r t his rel ationis t  ap pr o a c hto theoretical kno wl e d ge  comes f rom th e  p at t ern of r et ent ioni n  theo ry-c h an ge in sc ience. Bu tit shou ld  be ad de d t hat  in m a king  a cas e for th eoret i cal knowledgeo f relations D u he m ha d  torel y on explan ator y  con side r at ion s  of t he ve ry so r t that he thought w er e ille gitim ate as part o f science. M a rie Gueg uena nd Stathis Psillo s Ant i-Sceptici s m and Ep istem ic Humil ity in Pi e r re Duhem 'sPhi los oph y of  Science 70 F a r  fro mbeing a n i nstrume nta lis t,Duh em  took itas fully  l eg it im ate  fora  scienti st  to  a cce pt th a t scie nce d oesof fe r  so me subs t an t i al t he or etic alkn owled ge o f  th e world . A scien tis t  who  w ou ld stic k to a strict  p ositivistac cou nt ofr a tional j udgement in science wou l d at on cerecog nize  that all  hi s most  po w erfuland de epest  a spi r a tions h av e b ee n disappoi n t edby th edesp airingresults of his ana l ysi s. [For he] c ann ot m a k euph is min dt o s e e  in physical th eory merel ya  s et of prac t ica lprocedu res and  a ra c k fille d with to ols.... [ H] e ca n n otbelieve th at it me rely clas s ifies in forma tio n accu mu lat ed by  empir i cal  scie nce wi th out tr ansfo rm ing in a ny way the nature of th ese fa cts o r w ithout im pre s sin g on them  a c haracter w hic h e xperi men t  alon e wo u ld  no t  have  eng r aved on i t .Ift h er e were in p h y s ica l the ory only w hathis own criticism made him disco veri n  it , h e  wou ld  stop devoting  hi st i me and e ff orts to a w ork of s uc h  a me agre i mporta nce (19 0 6 ,3 34). A nd h e i mmediatel y a dd e d: "The  s tu d y of t he m et hod of  physi c s is p owerless to disc loset o  thep hys icist  t he reas o n le ading himto construc t a ph ysic al th eory".Co nclusi ons  D uhem's phi l osophy of  scie nce cou ld  bedes cribed  as( i ncrea sing ly ) a nti-instr u m en t al is t . Y et,his a nt iins trumental i sm did n ota mount t oend o r sement of r ealism. If  we  were t o identify ther ea l ist v iew of  scien ce with the  a tomic t heo r y  of matte r and wit h  th emech anisticvi ew o fthe  w orld, then Duhe m
 a_pitiless rigor_ineluctably led M. Henri_Poincaré to_the_following fully_pragmatic_conclusion: theoretical physics_is a mere_collection of recipes. Against_this proposition, he_felt_a sort of revolt, and he loudly proclaimed that a physical theory gives us_something_else than_the_mere_knowledge of the facts, that_it makes us discover the_real relations_among things (2007, 446, M. G. translation). One_of_us has discussed_Poincaré's relationism in detail elsewhere (Psillos, 2014). The relevant_point here is that for Duhem_too relationism is_the_limit_of objective knowledge and_at the same time his resting_point against scepticism. As noted already,_a key argument for this relationist approach_to theoretical knowledge comes from the_pattern of retention in theory-change_in science._But it should be added_that in making_a case_for theoretical knowledge_of relations Duhem had to rely_on explanatory considerations_of the very sort that he_thought_were illegitimate as_part_of_science. Marie_Gueguen and Stathis_Psillos_Anti-Scepticism and_Epistemic_Humility in Pierre Duhem's Philosophy of_Science_70 Far from being an instrumentalist, Duhem_took it as fully_legitimate_for a scientist to_accept that science does offer_some substantial theoretical knowledge of the_world. A_scientist who_would stick to a strict positivist account of rational judgement in_science would at once recognize that_all his most powerful_and deepest_aspirations_have been disappointed_by_the despairing_results of his analysis. [For he] cannot_make up_his mind to see in physical_theory merely a set_of_practical procedures and a rack filled_with tools.... [H]e cannot believe that_it merely classifies information accumulated_by_empirical_science without transforming in any_way the nature of these facts_or without impressing_on them a character which experiment alone_would_not have engraved on it. If_there_were in physical theory only what_his_own_criticism made him discover in_it, he would stop devoting his_time and efforts to a work of such a_meagre importance (1906,_334). And he immediately added:_"The_study_of the method of physics is powerless to disclose to_the physicist_the reason leading_him to construct a physical theory". Conclusions Duhem's philosophy of_science could be described as (increasingly) anti-instrumentalist._Yet, his antiinstrumentalism did not amount to endorsement of realism. If_we were to identify the realist view of_science with the atomic theory of matter_and with the mechanistic_view_of the world, then Duhem