 basic assumptions of the naïve view, so well and good; but we do not base our understanding on that view. It is an effect, not a cause of knowledge. What matters for us here in phenomenology, to begin with, is what is cognized, irrespective of how it came to be cognized. Because the 'how' is ultimately just another 'what.' For instance, the common thesis that the visual phenomena appearing before me here and now are the end products of a process of some kind involving physical eyes, constitute in this context an attempt at explanation. Taken as a given ab initio, it constitutes Naïve Realism. But to say this does not exclude the truth of the thesis as a final conclusion. Note that we say 'naïve,' not so as to intimidate eventual dissenters into following suit, but because there is an unquestioning acceptance, an unawareness of the issues involved, to correct. In our example, the main issue is (simply put) that, just as each act of seeing something requires validation, so the vision of the eyes themselves is itself open to doubt. It is not because our perceptions are occasionally wrong that they need evaluation, but because a lot of what we regard as perceptual is more precisely (at least in part) conceptual. Phenomenology is the intelligent organization of appearances into knowledge. By 'knowledge' is meant loosely, to start with, our opinions and impressions. If these are well organized, they gain the status of knowledge in a strict sense, or 'true' knowledge. If they remain scattered and confused, they are classed as mere opinions and impressions, or 'false' knowledge. Among the basic methodological principles of phenomenology, we may cite the following: (a) Attention to all appearances in all their details. Awareness that they change and accumulate. (b) Constructing a theoretical model that takes all appearances into consideration, and does not simply ignore them nor (worse still) contradict them. (c) The order of things in knowledge proposed by that model must be coherent, as an inappropriate sequence of events can hide or lead to contradictions. (d) Such an epistemological model is necessarily flexible, open to revision, depending on its adaptation to the current mass of data and insights. (e) It is not an axiom, but is acknowledged to be an ongoing hypothetical construct, to be 'proved' inductively by virtue of its adherence to the aforesaid reasonable principles (which may of course be viewed as themselves part
basic assumptions of the naïve view, so well and good; but we do not establish our reason on that view. It is an effect, not a cause of cognition. What matters for us here in phenomenology, to begin with, is what is cognized, regardless of how it fall to be cognized. Because the' how' is ultimately merely another' what.' For instance, the common dissertation that the visual phenomena appearing before me here and now are the goal products of a process of some kind involving physical eyes, appoint in this context an attempt at explanation. Taken as a given ab initio, it establish Naïve Realism. But to say this does not exclude the truth of the thesis as a concluding conclusion. notice that we say' naïve,' not so as to intimidate eventual dissenters into following courtship, but because there is an unquestioning acceptance, an unawareness of the issues involved, to discipline. In our exercise, the main issue is (simply put) that, just as each act of seeing something requires validation, so the sight of the eyes themselves is itself open to doubt. It is not because our perception are occasionally amiss that they need evaluation, but because a lot of what we regard as perceptual is more precisely (at least in part) conceptual. Phenomenology is the intelligent organization of appearances into cognition. By' knowledge' is meant loosely, to start with, our opinions and impressions. If these are well organized, they gain the status of knowledge in a strict sense, or' genuine' knowledge. If they stay scattered and confused, they are classed as mere opinions and impression, or' false' knowledge. Among the basic methodological principles of phenomenology, we may reference the following: (a) Attention to all appearances in all their details. Awareness that they deepen and accumulate. (b) reconstruct a theoretical model that takes all appearance into consideration, and does not merely ignore them nor (worse however) contradict them. (c) The decree of things in knowledge nominate by that model must be coherent, as an inappropriate succession of events can hide or lead to contradiction. (d) Such an epistemological model is necessarily flexible, open to rewrite, depending on its adaptation to the current mass of datum and insights. (e) It is not an axiom, but is acknowledged to be an ongoing conjectural construct, to be' proved' inductively by virtue of its adherence to the aforesaid reasonable principles (which may of course be viewed as themselves part
 badic assumptions of the nxïve view, so well and gmod; buf we do vot base our understanding oi thqt vitc. It is an effect, nog a cause of knowoedgt. What matters foc us herc in lmenomznilogy, to begin with, is wvat is cognizeg, krxespective of how it came to be cognyzed. Bevakse the 'how' is ultpmwtelg just another 'what.' For instance, tge commmn thesis thay the visual phenomena appfarijg before me here wnd now are the wnd products of a proctsv of some iind involving physical eyes, covstitbte in this cintfft an attem't at vxplanation. Taken as d given ab initio, it gonstmtutws Naïve Realism. But tm say this does noj exclude dhz truth of the thesis aw a fhnal conzouskon. Npts that we say 'naïve,' hot so as ti intimidate eventusl eissenters info foljoring suit, but because there is an unquevtikning acceptance, an unaqareness of the issued involveq, to correct. In our example, the main issue is (sim[ly pnt) thcb, gysh as each act of seeing something requires vajjdstpon, so the vision of the eyex hhriselves is itrelf o'sn to doubt. It is noh becaufe oue perceptyons are occasionally wrong thar they need vvalyation, but because a lot of wkat we regatd as perceptual is morz precjsely (at lewst in padg) conceptual. Phevomvnolmgy is the intelligent orgwnization of cppearanzes onto kgowledge. Bj 'knowledge' is meant loodely, jo stast with, oug opinions and impressions. If tixse are well prcanpzed, they gain the status os knowledge in a striet senre, or 'true' knowlevge. If they wemain scattesgd and confusxd, they awe coasswd as mdfe opinions anc impresspous, or 'falwe' knowledge. Among thg gasic methodoloyncql principles og pfenjmvnokodf, we may cita thd fuklowivg: (a) Atuzntlon to sll appearances in anl tgeir details. Awaremefs that jhey chande and accumukate. (b) Constructinh a tieoretmcal mpdej that takes all appearances ihto consiferwtion, and doqs nit simply iguore them nor (worse still) contradict then. (c) The order of jhings in knowledge ptoppsed by thav modej must be coherent, as an inappropriate sequenct of events can hide or lead do cojtradictions. (d) Such an epistemological model is necessarily flexible, open to retifion, dependjng pn itv cda'tation to vhx current mass of data and insights. (e) It is not en axiom, bgt is acknowledged to be an onbokng hypothetizal construct, to be 'provsd' inducyively by virtue of its adherenve to the aforesaid reaspnable peincilles (which may of course be fiewed as tyemselvws pwrt
basic assumptions of the naïve view, so good; we do base our understanding an not a cause knowledge. What matters us here in phenomenology, to begin is what is cognized, irrespective of how it came to be cognized. Because 'how' is ultimately just another 'what.' For instance, the common thesis that the phenomena before here now are the end products of a process of some kind involving physical eyes, constitute in context an attempt at explanation. Taken as a ab initio, it constitutes Realism. But to say this not the truth the as final conclusion. Note we say 'naïve,' not so as to intimidate eventual dissenters into following suit, but because there is unquestioning acceptance, of the involved, correct. our example, the is (simply put) that, just as seeing something requires validation, so the vision of eyes themselves itself open to doubt. It is because our perceptions are occasionally wrong that they evaluation, but because a lot of what we regard as perceptual is more precisely (at part) conceptual. Phenomenology is intelligent organization of into By is loosely, to with, our opinions and impressions. If these are well organized, they the status of knowledge in a strict sense, or 'true' they scattered and confused, are classed as mere and or 'false' knowledge. Among methodological of cite following: Attention to all appearances all their details. Awareness that change and accumulate. (b) takes all appearances into consideration, and does not ignore them nor (worse still) contradict them. The order of things in knowledge proposed by that model must be as an of events can hide or lead to contradictions. Such an epistemological model necessarily flexible, open to revision, depending on its adaptation the mass of and insights. (e) is not an but is acknowledged an ongoing construct, be virtue of its adherence to the reasonable (which may of course be as
 basic assumptions of the naïvE view, so welL and gOod; But We Do noT basE our understandINg on That view. It is an effect, noT a cauSe OF knoWLeDge. WhAt matteRS fOR Us hErE iN phEnOMeNologY, to Begin wiTh, is what is CogNiZed, irrespectIVe Of how it camE to Be cognized. BeCauSe the 'hOw' Is uLTimatEly Just aNother 'WHat.' For Instance, tHe COmmon tHEsis thaT THe VisuAl phenomena appearINg BEfore me here and Now are ThE EnD PRodUctS of a procesS oF some KInd invoLViNG PHysICal eyes, constiTute in this cONteXt an atTeMpt AT explaNatioN. TAKen As a given ab iNitiO, it constiTutes NAÏve RealISm. But to Say thiS doEs nOt exCLuDe The TrUTh oF ThE thESis As a final CoNcLusioN. NotE THAT we sAy 'nAïve,' Not so As to intimidatE evEntuAL diSsentErs inTo foLlOwing Suit, buT becaUsE there is an unqueStioNing accepTanCe, An uNaWarenESs of thE isSueS involvEd, to corREct. in OUR ExAmple, the main issue iS (sIMPlY put) that, Just as EAcH aCT of seeinG sOmeThinG REquirEs vaLIdAtion, so tHe visiON oF tHe eyes tHeMselveS iS itSelF open TO douBt. It is Not becauSe our PErceptions are oCCasionally wroNG tHAT tHEy neEd eValuation, buT becAUse a Lot oF WhAt wE RegarD as peRcEPtUAl is more precisely (at LeAst in pArt) coNceptual. PhenoMenology is THE IntelligEnt oRGaNIzation of appeaRanceS into knowlEDge. By 'knoWledgE' is meant Loosely, to STArt with, oUr oPinIonS anD IMpRessions. If theSE Are wElL organiZed, They gaiN thE stAtuS of KnOwledge in A strict sEnSe, Or 'TrUe' kNowleDGe. If they ReMaiN sCatTered ANd confUsed, tHey aRe ClASseD as mere OPiNIOns aNd ImPresSioNs, Or 'falSe' knOWleDge. AmonG the basic MetHOdolOgIcAl princIples of phenomEnOlogy, we may CiTe tHe follOWIng: (a) AtteNtion to all appearances in ALl their DetAils. AWareNess that tHey Change And ACcumulAte. (b) CoNstruCtIng A THeoreTICaL moDeL that takes ALL apPearaNcEs inTo consiDeration, and does not SImpLy ignore them nOr (wOrse STIlL) coNTrADicT tHEm. (c) tHE order of things iN knowledge PrOPoSed by that mODel MuSt be cohErent, as An inaPPropriaTe sequencE of events CaN hidE OR leAd to contraDictions. (D) Such an epIStemoLOgIcal mOdeL is necEsSarIly flExible, OPen To revIsion, dEpEnding On its AdAptation To the current mass of data aNd insiGhts. (e) it iS not an axiOm, bUT is AcknowledGed tO be an ongoiNg hYpoThetiCal COnstrUct, tO Be 'ProVEd' indUctiVEly by virtUE oF itS ADhErence to the AFOResAid reAsoNAble prInciPles (which may of couRSe be viewed as thEmseLVEs pArt
 basic assumptions of thenaïve view , sowel l a nd  goo d; b ut we do not b a se o ur understanding on th at vi ew .  Iti san ef fect, n o ta cau se  o f k no w le dge.Wha t matte rs for usher ein phenomeno l og y, to begi n w ith, is what  is  cogni ze d,i rresp ect ive o f howi t came  to be co gn i zed. B e cause t h e  ' how'  is ultimately ju s ta nother 'what.'  For i ns t an c e , t hecommon the si s tha t  the vi s ua l p hen o mena appearin g before me her e andno w a r e theend p ro d uct s of a proc essof some k ind in v olvingp hysical  eyes,  co nst itut e  i nthi sc ont e xt  an att empt atex pl anati on.T a k e n as  agive n abinitio, it co nst itut e s N aïveReali sm.Bu t tosay th is do es  not exclude th e tr uth of th e t he sis  a s a f i nal co ncl usi on. Not e thatw e s ay ' n aï ve,' not so as toin t i mi date eve ntuald is se n ters int ofol lowi n g  suit , bu t  b ecause t here i s  a nunquest io ning a cc ept anc e, an unaw arenes s of the  issu e s involved, to correct. In o u re x am p le,the  main issue  is( simp ly p u t)  th a t, ju st as  e a ch act of seeing somet hi ng req uires  validation,so the vis i o n  of theeyes th e mselves is its elf o pen to dou b t. It is  notbecauseour perce p t ions are  oc cas ion all y wr ong that they n eedev aluatio n,but bec aus e a  lo t o fwhat we r egard as  p er ce pt ual  is m o re preci se ly(a t l easti n part ) con cept ua l. Phe nomenol o gy i s th ein tell ige nt  orga niza t ion  of app earancesint o  kno wl ed ge. By'knowledge' i smeant loos el y,to sta r t  with, o ur opinions and impress i ons. If  th ese a re w ell organ ize d, the y g a in the  statu s ofkn owl e d ge in a  s tri ct  sense, or ' tru e' kn ow ledg e. If t hey remain scatter e d a nd confused,the y ar e cl ass e da s m er e  op i n ions and impres sions, or'f a ls e' knowled g e.Am ong the  basicmetho d ologica l princip les of ph en omen o l ogy , we may c ite thefollowing :  (a)A tt entio n t o allap pea rance s in a l l t heirdetail s.  Aware nessth at theychange and accumulate.(b) Co nstru cti ng a theo ret i cal  model th at t akes all a ppe ara ncesint o  cons ider a ti on, and d oesn ot simply ig nor e th em nor (wor s e sti ll) c ont r adictthem . (c) The order o f  things in kno wled g e  pr opo s ed b ythat model mus t b ec o herent,as  an inappro priate s eq u enceof eve nts ca n hideo r  l e ad tocont rad ictions.(d)  S u ch an e pi st e mologi calmo del is  neces s aril y flexible, open t o rev i s ion,d epe nding  o n its a d apta tion to th e current m ass of  dat a and  insigh ts . (e)Itis  not an ax i om, but i s ack nowledg ed  tobean ong oing h ypoth etic al  co nstruct,t o  b e  ' pr o ved ' in ducti ve ly b y virtueo f its ad her e nce toth e a f o resaid re a s onable pri nci ples( w hich may o f  cou r se be vi ewed a s them selvesp art 
 basic_assumptions of_the naïve view, so_well and_good;_but we_do_not base our_understanding on that_view. It is an_effect, not a_cause_of knowledge. What matters for us here in phenomenology, to begin with, is what_is_cognized, irrespective_of_how_it came to be cognized._Because the 'how' is ultimately_just another_'what.' For instance, the common thesis that the_visual_phenomena appearing before_me here and now are the end products of_a process of some kind involving_physical eyes, constitute_in_this_context an attempt at_explanation. Taken as a given ab_initio, it constitutes Naïve Realism. But_to say this does not exclude the_truth of the thesis as a_final conclusion. Note that we_say 'naïve,'_not so as to intimidate_eventual dissenters into_following suit,_but because there_is an unquestioning acceptance, an unawareness_of the issues_involved, to correct. In our example,_the_main issue is_(simply_put)_that, just_as each act_of_seeing something_requires_validation, so the vision of the_eyes_themselves is itself open to doubt. It_is not because our_perceptions_are occasionally wrong that_they need evaluation, but because_a lot of what we regard_as perceptual_is more_precisely (at least in part) conceptual. Phenomenology is the intelligent organization_of appearances into knowledge. By 'knowledge'_is meant loosely, to_start with,_our_opinions and impressions._If_these are_well organized, they gain the status of_knowledge in_a strict sense, or 'true' knowledge._If they remain scattered_and_confused, they are classed as mere_opinions and impressions, or 'false' knowledge._Among the basic methodological principles_of_phenomenology,_we may cite the following:_(a) Attention to all appearances in_all their details._Awareness that they change and accumulate. (b)_Constructing_a theoretical model that takes all_appearances_into consideration, and does not simply_ignore_them_nor (worse still) contradict them._(c) The order of things in_knowledge proposed by that model must be coherent, as_an inappropriate sequence_of events can hide or_lead_to_contradictions. (d) Such an epistemological model is necessarily flexible, open_to revision,_depending on its_adaptation to the current mass of data and insights. (e)_It is not an axiom, but is_acknowledged to be an ongoing hypothetical construct, to be 'proved' inductively_by virtue of its adherence to the aforesaid_reasonable principles (which may of course be_viewed as themselves part