 reiterated an opinion that was widely shared or at least known by many Italian scholars. Quite opportunistically, Croce came to the same conclusions on the troubles of nineteenth-century science as many other European scholars, but the details of such conclusions were foreign to his personality. Particularly, the absence of Duhem's name in Croce's writings is a sign of his superficial relationship with epistemological works. Gentile was even less interested in epistemology than Croce. In his famous controversy with mathematician Federigo Enriques, Gentile refrained from an epistemological discussion, shifting his focus from the "critique of science" to Enriques' "scientific philosophy", identified as the "Naturalism" that is typical of all science-based philosophies. Even in his systematic works Gentile traced the critique of sciences back to the critique of a vaguely outlined single type of philosophy, which, in his view, encompassed all the science-based philosophical varieties. Unlike Croce, Gentile could not criticize sciences and separate them from philosophy by attributing them a mere practical value, as in his philosophy a clear distinction between theory and praxis is impossible: like philosophy, science has a cognitive value, too. The difference between science and philosophy lies in the lack of universality of the object in science. In fact, every science is particular and refers to a limited object. Hence its need to presume the object of its investigation and to see reality as nature, made of elements that can be studied separately. So, Dogmatism and Naturalism are the two distinctive characters of every science, and Gentile finds them after a very generic analysis that has no relation whatsoever with epistemological critique. On the contrary, the immediate conclusion that Gentile draws from his investigation appears to be in contrast with what was emerging in epistemology at the time. As epistemological critique was often labelled as an allied of "idealistic reaction" at the beginning of the century, Gentile established a strong and steady relation between science and Materialism. He speaks of a "logically necessary tendency of science in all times towards the mechanical philosophy and Materialism" (Gentile 1924, 198) and maintains that "science as philosophy has always stood up against philosophy, which, overcoming the mechanical philosophy, Empiricism and Dogmatism, has tried to turn into a universal idea of the world in its metaphysical reality". He also theorises the incompatibility between being a scientist and being an idealist: "Scientists, because of the very spirit of
reiterated an opinion that was widely shared or at least know by many Italian scholar. Quite opportunistically, Croce came to the same conclusions on the fuss of nineteenth - century science as many early European scholars, but the details of such conclusions were alien to his personality. Particularly, the absence of Duhem's name in Croce's writings is a polarity of his superficial relationship with epistemological work. Gentile was even less interested in epistemology than Croce. In his famous controversy with mathematician Federigo Enriques, Gentile refrained from an epistemological discussion, shifting his focus from the " review of science " to Enriques' " scientific philosophy ", identified as the " Naturalism " that is distinctive of all science - based doctrine. Even in his systematic plant Gentile traced the critique of sciences back to the critique of a vaguely outlined individual type of philosophy, which, in his view, encompassed all the science - based philosophical varieties. Unlike Croce, Gentile could not criticize sciences and separate them from philosophy by attributing them a mere practical value, as in his philosophy a clear differentiation between theory and praxis is impossible: like philosophy, skill have a cognitive value, besides. The difference between science and doctrine lies in the lack of universality of the aim in science. In fact, every science is particular and refer to a limited object. Hence its need to presume the object of its investigation and to see reality as nature, made of elements that can be study individually. therefore, Dogmatism and Naturalism are the two distinctive characters of every science, and Gentile line up them after a very generic analysis that has no relation whatsoever with epistemic critique. On the reverse, the immediate conclusion that Gentile draws from his investigation appears to be in line with what was emerging in epistemology at the time. As epistemological critique was often label as an allied of " ideal reaction " at the beginning of the hundred, Gentile established a strong and steady relation back between skill and Materialism. He speaks of a " logically necessary tendency of science in all meter towards the mechanical philosophy and Materialism " (Gentile 1924, 198) and maintains that " science as philosophy has always stand up against philosophy, which, overcoming the mechanical doctrine, Empiricism and Dogmatism, has tried to turn into a universal idea of the world in its metaphysical reality ". He also speculate the incompatibility between being a scientist and being an idealist: " Scientists, because of the very spirit of
 relterated an opinion that was widely shatee or av least known bh many Italian scholars. Quitx opportubistically, Croce came go the sale conclysiois on the troublxa of nikzteenfm-centbrb science as maky other Eusopean scholarv, cuc the details of such conclusions wewe foreogj to his persogaliuy. [artjbuoarly, the absence of Duhem's nzme in Broce's writings ix a sign of his superficiap repationship with eplstemologicql wjeks. Gentile das even ltsv interestgd in epistemology than Croce. In his yamous conttobegvy with matiematibian Federigo Enriquev, Gentike refrained fvom ai epustemological discussmon, shifting his focos from tha "eritique of science" ti Wnriqoes' "swiengufiz pgikoaophy", ldeitified as fhe "Naturalusm" that is typical os all science-bzsed prijosophies. Even in his systematic works Cenfile traced the critiquw of sciences back to the crityque of a vaguely outlined single type of philoso[hy, wiizh, nk fus view, encompassed all the science-based philosjlhocsl varieties. Uklike Croce, Gentilr foijd not critickze scnsndes and separate tjem froi phioosophy br atyributing them a mere practucal value, af in his philosophy a clear dirtinvtion between theory and praris is impossible: like phimusophy, science hxs s wognitivt value, too. The disference uetwezn scienze amd phijosophy lifs in the lack of univerdaliti of tve object ln science. In fact, every sciencx is particulsr ang refers to a limited objest. Hence its nged to przsume ghe object of its investigatyon and to sea reality as iature, maqe od elwments gfat can be stucied sepagauely. So, Dotmatism and Naturakiso are the two diwtibctive charactets uf qvvry sshence, and Gettild fkmds tfem afttx a xery generic analysis thdt hzs no relation whaysjever wijh episteiological criyique. On the contrwry, tie immxdiate cogclusion that Gentile draws frkm his ingesbigation appewrs bo bg in contraxt with what was emerging in epistemolojy at the time. As episjemological critique cax often labxlled ws an allhed of "idealistic reqction" at the beglnning of the century, Fentila estwblished a strong and steady relation between science and Materialism. He wpeaks of a "logicamly mecesvaxy cendencr of rcience in all tpmes towards the mechanical philusophy atd Materialism" (Gentile 1924, 198) and msivtains that "szience as philosophy has always xtood up against philosophy, whivh, overcoming the mechanlcal philisophg, Empigjcmsm and Dogmatism, hax trieb to tyrn inti a mniversal idea of tme world ij itx jetaphysical reality". He also theirises tje incompatibilivy between bcikg a sbientisj and being an idsaliah: "Scigntists, becausr of the very xpirit of
reiterated an opinion that was widely shared least by many scholars. Quite opportunistically, conclusions the troubles of science as many European scholars, but the details of conclusions were foreign to his personality. Particularly, the absence of Duhem's name in writings is a sign of his superficial relationship with epistemological works. Gentile was less in than In his famous controversy with mathematician Federigo Enriques, Gentile refrained from an epistemological discussion, shifting his from the "critique of science" to Enriques' "scientific identified as the "Naturalism" is typical of all science-based Even his systematic Gentile the of sciences back the critique of a vaguely outlined single type of philosophy, which, in his view, encompassed all the philosophical varieties. Gentile could criticize and them from philosophy them a mere practical value, as a clear distinction between theory and praxis is like philosophy, has a cognitive value, too. The between science and philosophy lies in the lack universality of the object in science. In fact, every science is particular and refers to object. Hence its need presume the object its and see as nature, of elements that can be studied separately. So, Dogmatism and Naturalism the two distinctive characters of every science, and Gentile finds a generic analysis that no relation whatsoever with critique. the contrary, the immediate Gentile from to in with what was emerging epistemology at the time. As critique was often labelled reaction" at the beginning of the century, Gentile a strong and steady relation between science Materialism. He speaks of a "logically necessary tendency of science in all towards the and Materialism" (Gentile 1924, 198) and maintains that as philosophy has always up against philosophy, which, overcoming the mechanical philosophy, Empiricism Dogmatism, tried to into a universal of the world its metaphysical reality". theorises the between a an idealist: "Scientists, because of the spirit
 reiterated an opinion that waS widely shaRed or At lEasT kNown By maNy Italian scholARs. QuIte opportunistically, CrOce caMe TO the SAmE concLusions ON tHE TroUbLeS of NiNEtEenth-CenTury sciEnce as many OthEr european schoLArS, but the detAilS of such conclUsiOns werE fOreIGn to hIs pErsonAlity. PARticulArly, the abSeNCe of DuHEm's name IN crOce's Writings is a sign of HIs SUperficial relaTionshIp WItH EPisTemOlogical woRkS. GentILe was evEN lESS IntERested in epistEmology than cRocE. In his FaMouS ControVersy WiTH maThematician fedeRigo EnriqUes, GenTIle refrAIned froM an epiSteMolOgicAL dIsCusSiON, shIFtIng HIs fOcus from ThE "cRitiqUe of SCIENce" tO EnRiquEs' "sciEntific philosOphY", ideNTifIed as The "NaTuraLiSm" thaT is typIcal oF aLl science-based pHiloSophies. EvEn iN hIs sYsTematIC works genTilE traced The critIQue Of SCIEnCes back to the critiqUe OF A vAguely ouTlined SInGlE Type of phIlOsoPhy, wHICh, in hIs viEW, eNcompassEd all tHE sCiEnce-basEd PhilosOpHicAl vArietIEs. UnLike CrOce, GentiLe couLD not criticize sCIences and sepaRAtE THeM From PhiLosophy by atTribUTing Them A MeRe pRActicAl valUe, AS iN His philosophy a clear DiStinctIon beTween theory anD praxis is iMPOSsible: liKe phILoSOphy, science has A cognItive value, TOo. The difFerenCe betweeN science aND PhilosopHy lIes In tHe lACK oF universality OF The oBjEct in scIenCe. In facT, evEry SciEncE iS particulAr and refErS tO a LiMitEd objECt. Hence iTs NeeD tO prEsume THe objeCt of iTs inVeStIGatIon and tO SeE REaliTy As NatuRe, mAdE of elEmenTS thAt can be Studied seParATely. so, doGmatism And Naturalism ArE the two disTiNctIve chaRACters of eVery science, and Gentile fiNDs them aFteR a verY genEric analySis That haS no RElatioN whatsOever WiTh ePIStemoLOGiCal CrItique. On thE COntRary, tHe ImmeDiate coNclusion that GentilE DraWs from his inveStiGatiON ApPeaRS tO Be iN cONtrAST with what was emeRging in epiStEMoLogy at the tIMe. AS ePistemoLogical CritiQUe was ofTen labellEd as an allIeD of "iDEAliStic reactiOn" at the bEginning oF The ceNTuRy, GenTilE estabLiSheD a strOng and STeaDy relAtion bEtWeen scIence AnD MateriaLism. He speaks of a "logicallY necesSary tEndEncy of sciEncE In aLl times toWardS the mechanIcaL phIlosoPhy ANd MatEriaLIsM" (GeNTile 1924, 198) aNd maINtains thaT "ScIenCE As Philosophy hAS ALwaYs stoOd uP AgainsT phiLosophy, which, overcOMing the mechaniCal pHILosOphY, empiRiCism and DogmatiSm, hAs TRIed to turN iNto a universAl idea of ThE World In its mEtaphySical reALItY". he also TheoRisEs the incoMpaTiBIlity beTwEeN Being a ScieNtIst and Being aN IdeaLISt: "Scientists, becaUse of THE very SPirIt of
 reiterated an opinion tha t was wide ly sh are d o rat l east  known by many Ital ian scholars. Quite op portu ni s tica l ly , Cro ce came to t hesa me  co nc l us ionsonthe tro ubles of n ine te enth-century sc ience as m any  other Europ ean  schol ar s,b ut th e d etail s of s u ch con clusionswe r e fore i gn to h i s  p erso nality. Particula r ly ,  the absence o f Duhe m' s  n a m e i n C roce's wri ti ngs i s  a sign of h i s s u perficial rel ationship w i thepiste mo log i cal wo rks.Ge n til e was evenless  interest ed ine pistemo l ogy tha n Croc e.Inhisf am ou s c on t rov e rs y w i thmathemat ic ia n Fed erig o E n riqu es,  Gen tilerefrained fro m a n ep i ste molog icaldisc us sion,  shift ing h is  focus from the  "cr itique of  sc ie nce "to En r iques'  "s cie ntificphiloso p hy" ,i d e nt ified as the "Natu ra l i sm " that i s typi c al  o f  all sci en ce- base d philo soph i es . Even i n hiss ys te matic w or ks Gen ti letra ced t h e cr itique  of scie ncesb ack to the cri t ique of a vag u el y ou t line d s ingle typeof p h ilos ophy ,  w hic h , inhis v ie w ,e ncompassed all thesc ience- based  philosophica l varietie s . Unlike C roce ,  G e ntile could no t cri ticize sci e nces and  sepa rate the m from ph i l osophy b y a ttr ibu tin g th em a mere pra c t ical  v alue, a s i n his p hil oso phy  acl ear disti nction b et we en  t heo ry an d  praxisis  im po ssi ble:l ike ph iloso phy,  s ci e nce  has ac og n i tive  v al ue,too .The d iffe r enc e betwe en scienc e a n d ph il os ophy li es in the lac kof univers al ity  of th e object i n science. In fact, eve r y scien ceis pa rtic ular andref ers to  al imited  objec t. He nc e i t s  need t opre su me the obj e c t o f its  i nves tigatio n and to see reali t y a s nature, mad e o f el e m en tst ha t  ca nb e s t u died separately . So, Dogm at i sm  and Natur a lis mare the  two di stinc t ive cha racters o f every s ci ence , and  Gentile f inds the m after a veryg en ericana lysisth athas n o rela t ion  what soever  w ith ep istem ol ogical c ritique. On the contrar y, the  imme dia te conclu sio n  th at Gentil e dr aws from h isinv estig ati o n app ears to  be in co ntra s t with wh a twas e me rging in ep i s t emo logyatt he tim e. A s epistemological critique was o ften l abe lle d  asan  allied of "id eal is t i c reacti on " at the be ginningof the c entury , Gent ile est a b li s hed astro ngand stead y r el a tion be tw ee n  scien ce a nd  Mater ialism .  Hes p eaks of a "logic allyn e cessa r y t enden cy  of sci e ncein all tim es towardsthe me chan icalphiloso ph y andMat er ialism" (G e ntile 192 4, 19 8) andma inta ins  that"sci e n ce as  phi lo sop hy has al w a ys st oo d  up  aga instph ilos ophy, whi c h, overc omi n g the m ec han i c al phi l os o p hy, Empiri cis m and D ogmatism,h as t r ie d  to t urn in to a u niversa l  id ea  of the  wo r l d in itsmetaphysi c alre alit y". He a ls o th eo ris es  the incompatib ility be tween be i n g a sc ien t ista nd bei ng  an idealist : "Sc ie n tists,b e cau se of t h e v ery  sp irit  of 
 reiterated_an opinion_that was widely shared_or at_least_known by_many_Italian scholars. Quite_opportunistically, Croce came_to the same conclusions_on the troubles_of_nineteenth-century science as many other European scholars, but the details of such conclusions were_foreign_to his_personality._Particularly,_the absence of Duhem's name_in Croce's writings is a_sign of_his superficial relationship with epistemological works. Gentile was_even_less interested in_epistemology than Croce. In his famous controversy with mathematician_Federigo Enriques, Gentile refrained from an_epistemological discussion, shifting_his_focus_from the "critique of_science" to Enriques' "scientific philosophy", identified_as the "Naturalism" that is typical_of all science-based philosophies. Even in his_systematic works Gentile traced the critique_of sciences back to the_critique of_a vaguely outlined single type_of philosophy, which,_in his_view, encompassed all_the science-based philosophical varieties. Unlike Croce,_Gentile could not_criticize sciences and separate them from_philosophy_by attributing them_a_mere_practical value,_as in his_philosophy_a clear_distinction_between theory and praxis is impossible:_like_philosophy, science has a cognitive value, too._The difference between science_and_philosophy lies in the_lack of universality of the_object in science. In fact, every_science is_particular and_refers to a limited object. Hence its need to presume the_object of its investigation and to_see reality as nature,_made of_elements_that can be_studied_separately. So,_Dogmatism and Naturalism are the two distinctive_characters of_every science, and Gentile finds them_after a very generic_analysis_that has no relation whatsoever with_epistemological critique. On the contrary, the_immediate conclusion that Gentile draws_from_his_investigation appears to be in_contrast with what was emerging in_epistemology at the_time. As epistemological critique was often labelled_as_an allied of "idealistic reaction" at_the_beginning of the century, Gentile established_a_strong_and steady relation between science_and Materialism. He speaks of a_"logically necessary tendency of science in all times towards_the mechanical philosophy_and Materialism" (Gentile 1924, 198)_and_maintains_that "science as philosophy has always stood up against philosophy,_which, overcoming_the mechanical philosophy,_Empiricism and Dogmatism, has tried to turn into a universal_idea of the world in its metaphysical_reality". He also theorises the incompatibility between being a scientist and_being an idealist: "Scientists, because of the very_spirit of