 Man in the High Castle, for example, we learn about how the United States might have been different, had it lost the second world war, since we read about one of the most similar possibilities to actuality in which the United States lost the second world war. But we don't learn what would have happened if the United States lost the second world war, because we can imagine other equally similar possibilities. Usually, we learn less from a novel than what would have happened – since few novels are compelling enough for us to be unable to imagine any other possibility – but more than what might have happened – since few novels are uncompelling enough to tell us what might have happened with extremely low probability. Most novels unfold from their premises in a way which is not necessary, but merely probable or, at the very least, not improbable. Nevertheless, by imagining what these novels describe, we learn a kind of modal knowledge, concerning the probability of possibilities they describe. Some novels unfold from their premises in a way which is very improbable. The protagonist of Luke Rhinehart's novel The Dice Man, for example, makes 12 decisions by the role of a die, so each decision has a probability of less than one sixth, and the whole narrative has an overall probability far less than a sixth. Nevertheless, although the details of The Dice Man are not likely, the novel cannot be compelling if they are too unlikely. In general, although no novel has a high probability of being entirely true, a novel cannot be too improbable unless it is also uncompelling. Berys Gaut has argued that counterfactuals of the kind I have been discussing are counterexamples to the thesis that all knowledge from imagination is merely modal knowledge. This thesis, according to Gaut, "...presupposes an over-simple distinction between the world and mere possibilities (counterfactual states of affairs).... Statements about the world involve or imply claims about counterfactual conditionals, whose features can be explored through imagination. Hence one can learn about aspects of the world through imagination" (Gaut 2007, 147-148). Gaut is right that counterfactual conditionals are both contingent and about actuality. Nevertheless, counterfactuals can be factored into a necessary part, which can be learnt from imagination, and a contingent part, which cannot be learnt from imagination. In order to learn a counterfactual using my imagination, I must try to imagine a possibility, sufficiently similar to actuality, in which the ante
Man in the High Castle, for example, we learn about how the United States might have been different, had it lost the second populace war, since we understand about one of the most similar possibilities to actuality in which the United States lose the second world war. But we don't learn what would have happen if the United States miss the second world war, because we can imagine other equally exchangeable possibilities. Usually, we determine less from a novel than what would have happened – since few novels are compelling enough for us to be unable to imagine any other hypothesis – but more than what might have happened – since few novels are uncompelling enough to tell us what might have happen with extremely low probability. Most novel unfold from their premise in a way which is not necessary, but merely probable or, at the very least, not improbable. however, by imagining what these novels describe, we learn a kind of modal cognition, concerning the probability of possibilities they describe. Some novels unfold from their premises in a way which is very improbable. The protagonist of Luke Rhinehart's novel The Dice Man, for example, makes 12 decisions by the role of a die, so each decision has a probability of less than one sixth, and the whole narrative has an overall probability far less than a one-sixth. however, although the details of The Dice Man are not likely, the novel cannot be compelling if they are too improbable. In general, although no novel has a high probability of being wholly true, a novel cannot be excessively improbable unless it is also uncompelling. Berys Gaut has argued that counterfactuals of the kind I have been discourse are counterexamples to the thesis that all knowledge from imagination is merely modal knowledge. This thesis, accord to Gaut, "... presupposes an over - simple distinction between the world and bare possibilities (counterfactual state of affair).... Statements about the world involve or imply title about counterfactual conditionals, whose features can be explored through imagination. Hence one can learn about aspects of the world through imagination " (Gaut 2007, 147 - 148). Gaut is correct that counterfactual conditionals are both contingent and about actuality. Nevertheless, counterfactuals can be factor into a necessary part, which can be learnt from resource, and a contingent part, which cannot be learnt from imagination. In order to memorize a counterfactual using my resource, I must try to imagine a possibility, sufficiently exchangeable to actuality, in which the ante
 Maj in the High Castle, for example, we leatn about how tge Unitea States might have been difherebt, hae it lost the second wurld war, dince we reav about one of tis most similad posvmbilities to acjuality in wvich the Uniteg Rtctes lost the second world war. But wq don't kewrn what would havt hwppehvd if the United States lost ths seconv world war, becsuse we can imagine other fquaply similar possibllities. Usuqlly, qe learn lesr from a novel than whzt would have happened – since fdw norels are conpwllltg enough fir us to be unablc to imdgine amy other possinilitb – byt more than what migit have happened – sigce few nmvzls are uncompelling wniugh jo tenl ur whxt jijht have jap'ened with sxtremely liw probability. Most njnrls unfold fdom thqiw premises in a way which is not necessdry, but merely probable or, at the very least, noj improbabje. Nevertheless, by imagining what these novels devcribx, de oewfb w kind of modal knowledge, concerning the probwgikiny of possibilitics they describe. Spmf mjvels unfold wrom tksid premises in a waj which is vwry improfablr. The protagonist of Luke Ryinehart's nonel Rhe Dice Man, for erample, makes 12 devisioms by the role of a die, so sach decisiln has a lfobability of lers nhan one sixuf, and the whole nwrrative ias au overalu prpbabilyty far leds than a sixth. Neverthepess, clthoggh the dehails of The Dice Man are not lmlely, the novgl wantot be cjmpelking if they wre too unlikeky. In gzneral, although ho noven has a higr probability lf being entmrely truq, a boveo cannog be too improbsble unless it is aoso uncompelling. Bcrys Ezut has argued ckau xounterfactualx ow tre kmnd I vave been divcusrine are zountertramiler to the thesis that all knosledge from imaginstlon is metely modaj knowledge. Tnis thesis, accordijg to Gant, "...prexupkoses an over-simple distinction between hhe world and mqre iossybilities (eounterfactual states of affairs).... Statemeits about the world invilve or imply claimx about counverfaceual condhtionals, whose featuees can be explortd through imagination. Gence mne cwn learn about aspects of the world through imagination" (Gaut 2007, 147-148). Gaut is ritht thet counterfacfual condptijuals arq bovh contingent and sbout actuality. Nevertheless, connterfactudlf can be factored into a necrsrary part, whizh can be learnt from imzginatiom, and a contingent part, which csnnot be learnt from imanination. Un orser to leacn a counterfactual ising ky imqginatiin, I must try to kmabike a possihiliuy, sbfficiently similar to actuality, un whixh the ante
Man in the High Castle, for example, about the United might have been second war, since we about one of most similar possibilities to actuality in the United States lost the second world war. But we don't learn what have happened if the United States lost the second world war, because we imagine equally possibilities. we learn less from a novel than what would have happened – since few novels are enough for us to be unable to imagine other possibility – but than what might have happened since novels are enough tell what might have with extremely low probability. Most novels unfold from their premises in a way which is not necessary, merely probable the very not Nevertheless, imagining what these we learn a kind of modal probability of possibilities they describe. Some novels unfold their premises a way which is very improbable. protagonist of Luke Rhinehart's novel The Dice Man, example, makes 12 decisions by the role of a die, so each decision has a less than one sixth, the whole narrative an probability less a sixth. although the details of The Dice Man are not likely, the cannot be compelling if they are too unlikely. In general, novel a high probability being entirely true, a cannot too improbable unless it uncompelling. Gaut counterfactuals the I have been discussing counterexamples to the thesis that knowledge from imagination is according to Gaut, "...presupposes an over-simple distinction between world and mere possibilities (counterfactual states of Statements about the world involve or imply claims about counterfactual conditionals, whose can be imagination. Hence one can learn about aspects of world through imagination" (Gaut 147-148). Gaut is right that counterfactual conditionals are both and actuality. Nevertheless, can be factored a necessary part, can be learnt and a part, cannot imagination. In order to learn a using imagination, I must try to a similar to actuality, in which the ante
 Man in the High Castle, for examPle, we learn About How The unIted statEs might have beeN DiffErent, had it lost the seconD worlD wAR, sinCE wE read About onE Of THE moSt SiMilAr POsSibilItiEs to actUality in whIch ThE United StateS LoSt the seconD woRld war. But we dOn't Learn wHaT woULd havE haPpeneD if the uNited STates lost ThE Second WOrld war, BECaUse wE can imagine other eQUaLLy similar possiBilitiEs. uSuALLy, wE leArn less froM a Novel THan what WOuLD HAve HAppened – since fEw novels are COmpElling EnOugH For us tO be unAbLE to Imagine any oTher PossibiliTy – but mORe than wHAt might Have haPpeNed – SincE FeW nOveLs ARe uNCoMpeLLinG enough tO tElL us whAt miGHT HAve hAppEned With eXtremely low prObaBiliTY. MoSt novEls unFold FrOm theIr premIses iN a Way which is not neCessAry, but merEly PrObaBlE or, at THe very LeaSt, nOt improBable. NeVErtHeLESS, bY imagining what thesE nOVElS describE, we leaRN a KiND of modal KnOwlEdge, CONcernIng tHE pRobabiliTy of poSSiBiLities tHeY descrIbE. SoMe nOvels UNfolD from tHeir premIses iN A way which is verY Improbable. The PRoTAGoNIst oF LuKe Rhinehart'S novEL The dice mAn, For EXamplE, makeS 12 dECiSIons by the role of a die, So Each deCisioN has a probabilIty of less tHAN One sixth, And tHE wHOle narrative haS an ovErall probaBIlity far Less tHan a sixtH. NevertheLESs, althouGh tHe dEtaIls OF thE Dice Man are noT LIkelY, tHe novel CanNot be coMpeLliNg iF thEy Are too unlIkely. In gEnErAl, AlThoUgh no NOvel has a HiGh pRoBabIlity OF being EntirEly tRuE, a NOveL cannot BE tOO ImprObAbLe unLesS iT is alSo unCOmpElling. BErys Gaut hAs aRGued ThAt CounterFactuals of the KiNd I have beeN dIscUssing ARE counterExamples to the thesis that ALl knowlEdgE from ImagInation is MerEly modAl kNOwledgE. This tHesis, AcCorDINg to GAUT, "...pResUpPoses an oveR-SImpLe disTiNctiOn betweEn the world and mere pOSsiBilities (countErfActuAL StAteS Of AFfaIrS).... staTEMents about the woRld involve Or IMpLy claims abOUt cOuNterfacTual conDitioNAls, whosE features Can be explOrEd thROUgh ImaginatioN. Hence onE can learn ABout aSPeCts of The World tHrOugH imagInatioN" (gauT 2007, 147-148). Gaut Is righT tHat couNterfAcTual condItionals are both contingeNt and aBout aCtuAlity. NeveRthELesS, counterfActuAls can be faCtoRed Into a NecESsary Part, WHiCh cAN be leArnt FRom imaginATiOn, aND A cOntingent paRT, WHicH cannOt bE Learnt From Imagination. In ordeR To learn a counteRfacTUAl uSinG My imAgInation, I must trY to ImAGIne a possIbIlity, sufficIently siMiLAr to aCtualiTy, in whIch the aNTE
 Man in the High Castle, f or example , welea rnab outhowthe United Sta t es m ight have been differe nt, h ad it l o st  thesecondw or l d  wa r,  s inc ew ereadabo ut oneof the mos t s im ilar possibi l it ies to act ual ity in which  th e Unit ed  St a tes l ost  thesecond worldwar. Butwe don'tl earn wh a t  w ould  have happened if th e  United States  lostth e  s e c ond  wo rld war, b ec ausew e can i m ag i n e  ot h er equally si milar possi b ili ties.Us ual l y, welearn  l e ssfrom a nove l th an what w ould h a ve happ e ned – s ince f ewnov elsa re  c omp el l ing en oug h  fo r us tobe  u nable  toi m a g ineany  oth er po ssibility – b utmore tha n wha t mig ht h av e hap pened– sin ce  few novels are  unc ompelling  en ou ghto  tell us wha t m igh t havehappene d  wi th e x tr emely low probabil it y .  M ost nove ls unf o ld  f r om their  p rem ises i n a w ay w h ic h is not  neces s ar y,  but me re ly pro ba ble  or , att he v ery le ast, not  impr o bable. Neverth e less, by imag i ni n g  w h at t hes e novels de scri b e, w e le a rn  ak ind o f mod al kn o wledge, concerningth e prob abili ty of possibi lities the y d escribe.  Som e  n o vels unfold fr om th eir premis e s in a w ay wh ich is v ery impro b a ble. The  pr ota gon ist o fLuke Rhinehar t ' s no ve l The D ice  Man, f orexa mpl e,ma kes 12 de cisionsby  t he  r ole  of a die, soea chde cis ion h a s a pr obabi lity  o fl ess  than o n es i xth,  a nd  the  wh ol e nar rati v e h as an o verall pr oba b ilit yfa r lessthan a sixth.  N evertheles s,  al though t he detai ls of The Dice Man aren ot like ly,  thenove l cannotbecompel lin g  if th ey are  tooun lik e l y. In g en era l,  althoughn o  no vel h as  a h igh pro bability of beinge nti rely true, anov el c a n no t b e  t o o i mp r oba b l e unless it isalso uncom pe l li ng. BerysG aut  h as argu ed that  coun t erfactu als of th e kind Iha ve b e e n d iscussingare coun terexampl e s tot he  thes isthat a ll  kn owled ge fro m  im agina tion i smerely  moda lknowledg e. This thesis, accordi ng toGaut,  ". ..presupp ose s  an  over-sim pledistinctio n b etw een t hew orldandm er e p o ssibi liti e s (counte r fa ctu a l  s tates of af f a i rs) ....Sta t ements  abo ut the world invo l ve or imply cl aims a bou t c o unte rf actual conditi ona ls , whose fe at ures can be  explore dt hroug h imag inatio n. Henc e on e  can l earn  ab out aspec tsof the wor ld  t h roughimag in ation"  (Gaut 2007 , 147-148). Gaut i s rig h t  that cou nterf ac tual co n diti onals areboth contin gent a nd a boutactuali ty . Neve rth el ess, count e rfactuals  canbe fact or ed i nto  a nec essa r y  part , wh ic h c an be lea r n tf ro mi mag inat ion,an d acontingen t  part, w hic h  cannot  b e l e a rnt fr o mi m agination.  In  orde r to learn a coun t er f actua l usin g my i maginat i on,  I  must t ryt o  imaginea possibi l ity ,suff iciently  s imil ar  to  a ctuality, in wh ich theante
 Man_in the_High Castle, for example,_we learn_about_how the_United_States might have_been different, had_it lost the second_world war, since_we_read about one of the most similar possibilities to actuality in which the United_States_lost the_second_world_war. But we don't learn_what would have happened if_the United_States lost the second world war, because we_can_imagine other equally_similar possibilities. Usually, we learn less from a novel_than what would have happened –_since few novels_are_compelling_enough for us to_be unable to imagine any other_possibility – but more than what_might have happened – since few novels_are uncompelling enough to tell us_what might have happened with_extremely low_probability. Most novels unfold from_their premises in_a way_which is not_necessary, but merely probable or, at_the very least,_not improbable. Nevertheless, by imagining what_these_novels describe, we_learn_a_kind of_modal knowledge, concerning_the_probability of_possibilities_they describe. Some novels unfold from_their_premises in a way which is very_improbable. The protagonist of_Luke_Rhinehart's novel The Dice_Man, for example, makes 12_decisions by the role of a_die, so_each decision_has a probability of less than one sixth, and the whole_narrative has an overall probability far_less than a sixth._Nevertheless, although_the_details of The_Dice_Man are_not likely, the novel cannot be compelling_if they_are too unlikely. In general, although_no novel has a_high_probability of being entirely true, a_novel cannot be too improbable unless_it is also uncompelling. Berys_Gaut_has_argued that counterfactuals of the_kind I have been discussing are_counterexamples to the_thesis that all knowledge from imagination is_merely_modal knowledge. This thesis, according to_Gaut,_"...presupposes an over-simple distinction between the_world_and_mere possibilities (counterfactual states of_affairs).... Statements about the world involve_or imply claims about counterfactual conditionals, whose features can_be explored through_imagination. Hence one can learn_about_aspects_of the world through imagination" (Gaut 2007, 147-148). Gaut is_right that_counterfactual conditionals are_both contingent and about actuality. Nevertheless, counterfactuals can be factored_into a necessary part, which can be_learnt from imagination, and a contingent part, which cannot be learnt_from imagination. In order to learn a counterfactual_using my imagination, I must try to_imagine a possibility, sufficiently_similar_to actuality, in which the ante