, 243). He constructs this formal conception in such a way that he ends up with an idea of scientific progress in the form of a sequence of representational systems as structures of increasing comprehensiveness of empirical laws, which leads him to defend a convergent structural realism toward an ideal physical theory (Chiappin 1989, 198, 110-116, 198-210). Duhem rejects a conception of physics that searches for causal explanation, which he deems metaphysical and whose origins, as he points out, lie in the emergent mechanicism of Descartes's rationalistic program. For Duhem, mechanicism – understood as a kind of large-scale mechanism – was a strategy of scientists such as Descartes and Galileo to mathematize nature. Despite rejecting the mechanistic approach to physics, Duhem values the framework of the emergent rationalist program that contains it, together with its demand for the principle of unity and the formal or mathematical organization of science (Duhem 1892, 170). However, his critical analysis of the mechanistic point of view of physics is more complex than it seems at first sight, since it envisages the dynamical development of mechanics according to two approaches, the synthetic and the analytical. Each one of them has its own vices and virtues, according to Duhem's principles of the continuous and rational development of physics (Duhem 1974, 270, 296; 1980, 188, Chiappin 1989, 77, 80, 91). Both principles are the coordinating principles of a proposal to construct a dynamical conception of physics made of a sequence of more encompassing theories that move systematically toward an ideal conception of physics which pretends to mirror the structural relations between the empirical laws (Duhem 1893, 298, 368-369; 1917, 157; Chiappin 1989, 198, 106-113, 243). Duhem's Description of Mechanical Theory and the Mechanistic Program Duhem's critical analysis of the evolution of mechanics and of the conception of physics associated with it is, obviously, made from a historical point of view. Besides allowing him to find a possible tendency in the development of physics, it also enables him to construct a tradition and a historical support for his own formal conception of physics. In his historical-critical analysis of mechanicism (Chiappin 1989, 18-19), Duhem provides the following general description of the nature of mechanical theory: Let us seek to account exactly for the nature of what one calls a mechanical theory. In a mechanical theory one imposes [besides symbolization] on all physical magnitudes on which rely
, 243). He constructs this formal conception in such a way that he end up with an theme of scientific progress in the form of a sequence of representational system as structures of increasing breadth of empirical laws, which leads him to fight a convergent structural realism toward an ideal forcible theory (Chiappin 1989, 198, 110 - 116, 198 - 210). Duhem rejects a conception of physics that research for causal explanation, which he deems metaphysical and whose origins, as he points out, lie in the emergent mechanicism of Descartes's rationalistic program. For Duhem, mechanicism – understand as a kind of large - scale mechanism – was a strategy of scientist such as Descartes and Galileo to mathematize nature. Despite rejecting the mechanistic approach to purgative, Duhem values the model of the emergent rationalist program that contains it, together with its demand for the principle of oneness and the formal or mathematical organization of science (Duhem 1892, 170). However, his critical analysis of the mechanistic point of view of physics is more complex than it seems at first sight, since it envisages the dynamical development of mechanics according to two approaches, the synthetic and the analytic. Each one of them has its own vices and virtue, harmonize to Duhem's principles of the continuous and rational development of purgative (Duhem 1974, 270, 296; 1980, 188, Chiappin 1989, 77, 80, 91). Both principles are the coordinate principles of a proposal to manufacture a dynamical conception of physics made of a sequence of more encompassing hypothesis that move systematically toward an ideal conception of physics which pretends to mirror the geomorphologic relations between the empiric law (Duhem 1893, 298, 368 - 369; 1917, 157; Chiappin 1989, 198, 106 - 113, 243). Duhem's Description of Mechanical Theory and the Mechanistic Program Duhem's critical analysis of the evolution of mechanics and of the conception of purgative associated with it is, obviously, made from a historical point of view. Besides allowing him to find a possible tendency in the exploitation of physics, it besides enables him to construct a tradition and a historical support for his own conventional conception of purgative. In his historical - critical analysis of mechanicism (Chiappin 1989, 18 - 19), Duhem provide the following general description of the nature of mechanical hypothesis: Let us seek to account exactly for the nature of what one calls a mechanical theory. In a mechanical theory one imposes [ besides symbolization ] on all physical magnitudes on which rely
, 243). Hf constructs this formal conception in such a xay thaf he endr up with an idea of scientihic progrtfs in the form of x sequencv of reprwsenuational systems ea strucbbres kn incxeesing comprehenxiveness ox empirical lafs, wkich leads him to defend a convergene strucyugal realism torard wn isvao physical theory (Chiappin 1989, 198, 110-116, 198-210). Duhem rejects a comception of physics that sfarcjes for causal exppanation, whuch rw deems metaohysical and whose orifins, as he points out, lie in thd emexgent mechabixisl of Descartxs's ranionalistic pvpgram. Xor Duhrm, mechanicism – uiderwtood as a kind of lacge-scale mechanism – ras a strdtzgy of scientists sucy qs Devcardes xbd Ealjlxo fo matjemetize naturs. Despite rwjecting the mechanosepv approach tk physycf, Duhem values the framework of the emeggenf rationalist program tyat contains it, togetjer with yts demand for the principle of unity and the forkal oc oatkcixrifal organization of science (Duhem 1892, 170). However, hya vrptical analysis on the mechanistic lolny of view of pfysics is more complex than it seeis at first sidht, xince it envisages the dynanical develoimenr of mechanics acclrding to tco apptoachex, the synthetic and the anamytical. Eacj one of ffem has its own xicvs atd virtutr, according to Durem's prinriplex of thd comtinuots and ratlonal development of phydics (Buhem 1974, 270, 296; 1980, 188, Chiaopin 1989, 77, 80, 91). Both principles are thx coordinatinb [ritciples jf a iroposal to conftruct a dynamncal coneeptiov of physibs made oh a sequence of more encokkassing theormes that iove sysrematicxuly toward an odeal conbektion of pyysics which pretekds tu mirror the strbetoeal relations netdeeg nhe ei[irical laws (Duhdm 1893, 298, 368-369; 1917, 157; Cfiappin 1989, 198, 106-113, 243). Auhek's Description of Mewhanjcal Theory and thr Iechanisjic Progrwm Duhem's criyical analysis of uhe evmluvion og mgchanics and of the conception kf physicd afsociated wieh ib is, obviously, made from a historical point of view. Bxsides allowing him to dind a possible tenbekcy in the dxvelopient of pvysics, it also enablws him to construgt a tradition and a hjstoriwal skpport for his own formal conception of physics. In his historical-critical analysis of mechahicixm (Chpap'in 1989, 18-19), Duhqm pcotides the followimg general description of the neture of mackanical theory: Let us seek to azcount exactli for the nature of what ohe calls a mechanical theory. In a mechamical theory one imposes [besides symbklizatpkn] on all physical msgnitubes on which eely
, 243). He constructs this formal conception a that he up with an the of a sequence representational systems as of increasing comprehensiveness of empirical laws, leads him to defend a convergent structural realism toward an ideal physical theory 1989, 198, 110-116, 198-210). Duhem rejects a conception of physics that searches for explanation, he metaphysical whose origins, as he points out, lie in the emergent mechanicism of Descartes's rationalistic program. For mechanicism – understood as a kind of large-scale – was a strategy scientists such as Descartes and to nature. Despite the approach physics, Duhem values framework of the emergent rationalist program that contains it, together with its demand for the principle of and the mathematical organization science 1892, However, his critical the mechanistic point of view of complex than it seems at first sight, since envisages the development of mechanics according to two the synthetic and the analytical. Each one of has its own vices and virtues, according to Duhem's principles of the continuous and rational physics (Duhem 1974, 270, 1980, 188, Chiappin 77, 91). principles the coordinating of a proposal to construct a dynamical conception of physics made a sequence of more encompassing theories that move systematically toward conception physics which pretends mirror the structural relations the laws (Duhem 1893, 298, 157; 1989, Duhem's of Theory and the Mechanistic Duhem's critical analysis of the of mechanics and of with it is, obviously, made from a historical of view. Besides allowing him to find possible tendency in the development of physics, it also enables him to a tradition historical support for his own formal conception of In his historical-critical analysis mechanicism (Chiappin 1989, 18-19), Duhem provides the following general of nature of theory: Let us to account exactly the nature of calls a theory. a imposes [besides symbolization] on all physical on rely
, 243). He constructs this formal conCeption in sUch a wAy tHat He Ends Up wiTh an idea of scieNTifiC progress in the form of a sEquenCe OF repREsEntatIonal sySTeMS As sTrUcTurEs OF iNcreaSinG compreHensivenesS of EmPirical laws, wHIcH leads him tO deFend a convergEnt StructUrAl rEAlism TowArd an Ideal pHYsical Theory (ChiApPIn 1989, 198, 110-116, 198-210). DuheM Rejects A COnCeptIon of physics that sEArCHes for causal exPlanatIoN, WhICH he DeeMs metaphysIcAl and WHose oriGInS, AS He pOInts out, lie in tHe emergent mEChaNicism Of desCArtes's RatioNaLIstIc program. FoR DuhEm, mechaniCism – unDErstood AS a kind oF large-ScaLe mEchaNIsM – wAs a StRAteGY oF scIEntIsts such As deScartEs anD gALIleo To mAtheMatizE nature. DespitE reJectINg tHe mecHanisTic aPpRoach To physIcs, DuHeM values the frameWork Of the emerGenT rAtiOnAlist PRogram ThaT coNtains iT, togethER wiTh ITS DeMand for the principlE oF UNiTy and the Formal OR mAtHEmatical OrGanIzatION of scIencE (duHem 1892, 170). HowevEr, his cRItIcAl analySiS of the MeChaNisTic poINt of View of Physics iS more COmplex than it seEMs at first sighT, SiNCE iT EnviSagEs the dynamiCal dEVeloPmenT Of MecHAnics AccorDiNG tO Two approaches, the synThEtic anD the aNalytical. Each One of them hAS ITs own vicEs anD ViRTues, according tO DuheM's principlES of the coNtinuOus and raTional devELOpment of PhySicS (DuHem 1974, 270, 296; 1980, 188, cHIaPpin 1989, 77, 80, 91). Both princIPLes aRe The coorDinAting prIncIplEs oF a pRoPosal to coNstruct a DyNaMiCaL coNceptIOn of physIcS maDe Of a SequeNCe of moRe encOmpaSsInG TheOries thAT mOVE sysTeMaTicaLly ToWard aN ideAL coNceptioN of physicS whICh prEtEnDs to mirRor the structuRaL relations BeTweEn the eMPIrical laWs (Duhem 1893, 298, 368-369; 1917, 157; Chiappin 1989, 198, 106-113, 243). Duhem's DeSCriptioN of mechaNicaL Theory anD thE MechaNisTIc ProgRam DuhEm's crItIcaL ANalysIS Of The EvOlution of mECHanIcs anD oF the ConceptIon of physics associATed With it is, obvioUslY, madE FRoM a hIStORicAl POinT OF view. Besides allOwing him to FiND a Possible teNDenCy In the deVelopmeNt of pHYsics, it Also enablEs him to coNsTrucT A TraDition and a HistoricAl support FOr his OWn FormaL coNceptiOn Of pHysicS. In his HIstOricaL-critiCaL analySis of MeChanicisM (Chiappin 1989, 18-19), Duhem provides tHe follOwing GenEral descrIptIOn oF the naturE of mEchanical tHeoRy: LEt us sEek TO accoUnt eXAcTly FOr the NatuRE of what onE CaLls A MEcHanical theoRY. iN a mEchanIcaL Theory One iMposes [besides symbOLization] on all pHysiCAL maGniTUdes On Which rely
, 243). He constructs this  formal co ncept ion  in  s ucha wa y that he ends up w ith an idea of scienti fic p ro g ress in  theform of as e que nc eofre p re senta tio nal sys tems as st ruc tu res of incre a si ng compreh ens iveness of e mpi ricalla ws, which  le ads h im tod efenda converg en t  struc t ural re a l is m to ward an ideal phy s ic a l theory (Chia ppin 1 98 9 ,1 9 8,110 -116, 198- 21 0). D u hem rej e ct s a  co n ception of ph ysics thats ear ches f or  ca u sal ex plana ti o n,which he de emsmetaphysi cal an d  whoseo rigins,  as he  po int s ou t ,li e i nt hee me rge n t m echanici sm  o f Des cart e s ' s  rat ion alis tic p rogram. For D uhe m, m e cha nicis m – u nder st ood a s a ki nd of  l arge-scale mech anis m – was a  st ra teg yof sc i entist s s uch  as Des cartesa ndGa l i l eo  to mathematize na tu r e .Despitereject i ng  t h e mechan is tic  app r o ach t o ph y si cs, Duhe m valu e sth e frame wo rk ofth e e mer gentr atio nalist  program  that contains it, t o gether with i t sd e ma n d fo r t he principl e of unit y an d  t hef ormal  or m at h em a tical organizationof  scien ce (D uhem 1892, 17 0). Howeve r , his crit ical an a lysis of the m echan istic poin t  of view  of p hysics i s more co m p lex than  it  se ems  at f ir st sight, sin c e  iten visages  th e dynam ica l d eve lop me nt of mec hanics a cc or di ng  to  twoa pproache s,  th esyn theti c  and t he an alyt ic al .  Ea ch oneo ft h em h as  i ts o wnvi ces a nd v i rtu es, acc ording to  Du h em's  p ri nciples  of the conti nu ous and ra ti ona l deve l o pment of  physics (Duhem 1974, 2 7 0, 296;  19 80, 1 88,Chiappin198 9, 77,  80 ,  91).Both p rinci pl esa r e the c oo rdi na ting princ i p les  of a  p ropo sal toconstruct a dynami c alconception of  ph ysic s ma deo fa  se qu e nce o f more encompas sing theor ie s  t hat move s y ste ma tically  toward  an i d eal con ception o f physics  w hich p ret ends to mi rror the  structur a l rel a ti ons b etw een th eemp irica l laws (Du hem 1 893, 2 98 , 368- 369;19 17, 157;  Chiappin 1989, 198, 10 6-113,  243) . D uhem's De scr i pti on of Mec hani cal Theory  an d t he Me cha n istic  Pro g ra m D u hem's  cri t ical anal y si s o f th e evolution o f  me chani csa nd oftheconception of phy s ics associated  wit h itis, obvi ou sly, made from  ahi s t orical p oi nt of view.  Besides  a l lowin g himto fin d a pos s i bl e  tende ncyinthe devel opm en t  of phy si cs ,  it al so e na bles h im toc onst r u ct a tradition a nd ah i stori c alsuppo rt  for hi s  own  formal co nception of  physi cs.In hi s histo ri cal-cr iti ca l analysis of mechan icism  (Chiap pi n 19 89,  18-19 ), D u h em pr ovid es  th e followi n g  g e ne ra l  de scri ption  o f th e natureo f mechan ica l  theory :Let u s seek to a ccount exa ctl y for t he natureo f wh a to ne ca lls amechan ical th e ory .In a me cha n i cal theor y one imp o ses  [ besi des symb ol izat io n]on  all physical m agnitude s on whi c h  rely
, 243)._He constructs_this formal conception in_such a_way_that he_ends_up with an_idea of scientific_progress in the form_of a sequence_of_representational systems as structures of increasing comprehensiveness of empirical laws, which leads him to_defend_a convergent_structural_realism_toward an ideal physical theory_(Chiappin 1989, 198, 110-116, 198-210)._Duhem rejects_a conception of physics that searches for causal_explanation,_which he deems_metaphysical and whose origins, as he points out, lie_in the emergent mechanicism of Descartes's_rationalistic program. For_Duhem,_mechanicism_– understood as a_kind of large-scale mechanism – was_a strategy of scientists such as_Descartes and Galileo to mathematize nature. Despite_rejecting the mechanistic approach to physics,_Duhem values the framework of_the emergent_rationalist program that contains it,_together with its_demand for_the principle of_unity and the formal or mathematical_organization of science_(Duhem 1892, 170). However, his critical_analysis_of the mechanistic_point_of_view of_physics is more_complex_than it_seems_at first sight, since it envisages_the_dynamical development of mechanics according to two_approaches, the synthetic and_the_analytical. Each one of_them has its own vices_and virtues, according to Duhem's principles_of the_continuous and_rational development of physics (Duhem 1974, 270, 296; 1980, 188, Chiappin_1989, 77, 80, 91). Both principles_are the coordinating principles_of a_proposal_to construct a_dynamical_conception of_physics made of a sequence of more_encompassing theories_that move systematically toward an ideal_conception of physics which_pretends_to mirror the structural relations between_the empirical laws (Duhem 1893, 298,_368-369; 1917, 157; Chiappin 1989,_198,_106-113,_243). Duhem's Description of Mechanical_Theory and the Mechanistic Program Duhem's_critical analysis of_the evolution of mechanics and of the_conception_of physics associated with it is,_obviously,_made from a historical point of_view._Besides_allowing him to find a_possible tendency in the development of_physics, it also enables him to construct a tradition_and a historical_support for his own formal_conception_of_physics. In his historical-critical analysis of mechanicism (Chiappin 1989, 18-19),_Duhem provides_the following general_description of the nature of mechanical theory: Let us seek_to account exactly for the nature of_what one calls a mechanical theory. In a mechanical theory one_imposes [besides symbolization] on all physical magnitudes on_which rely