 not committed to a radical version of holism and that he used his anti-atomism as a weapon against the empirical support of the explanatory hypotheses of the theory.7 Duhem wanted to make the strong point that it is a "chimera" to try to isolate a(n) explanatory hypothesis and subject it to empirical test on its own (cf. 1906, 200). We call this view anti-atomism, since the emphasis is meant to be on showing that isolated hypotheses-that is, hypotheses which are not part 7 At least part of Duhem's motivation for holism is his anti-inductivism. In his (1906, 190-194) he argues extensively against the claim that Newton's laws are inductive generalizations from experience. For Duhem laws are not justified "one by one", by observation and made general by induction. Rather, testing them "is a matter of comparing the corollaries of a whole group of hypotheses to a whole group of facts" (1906, 194). Marie Gueguen and Stathis Psillos Anti-Scepticism and Epistemic Humility in Pierre Duhem's Philosophy of Science 63 of a theoretical system-do not have their own empirical content; hence, they cannot be tested atomistically, viz., independently of a theoretical system in which they feature.8 Suppose there is a dispute about a theoretical hypothesis H. Ideally, there must be some prediction "of an experimental fact" drawn from H. The experiment is then performed and if the "fact is not produced", the hypothesis H "will be irrevocably condemned" (1894, 82). Duhem shows that this account of testing is an illusion, since no hypothesis taken in isolation from a theoretical system implies any predictions. As he put it: "The prediction of the phenomenon whose nonproduction will cut off the debate does not derive from the disputed proposition taken in isolation but from the disputed proposition joined to this whole group of theories". Hence, when the prediction is not brought out "it is the whole theoretical scaffolding used by the physicists" which is "shown to be wanting" (1894, 82). But where does the error lie? The experiment cannot pinpoint the culprit among the parts of the whole theoretical system. Duhem's conclusion is that how the blame is distributed among these parts is not a matter of "logical necessity" (1894, 83). All this is rather well-known. What is not typically perceived is that Duhem uses this kind of
not committed to a radical version of holism and that he used his anti - atomism as a weapon against the empiric documentation of the explanatory hypotheses of the theory.7 Duhem wanted to produce the potent point that it is a " chimera " to try to sequester a(n) explanatory hypothesis and subject it to empirical trial on its own (cf. 1906, 200). We call this scene anti - atomism, since the emphasis is meant to be on testify that isolated hypotheses - that is, hypotheses which are not part 7 At least part of Duhem's motivation for holism is his anti - inductivism. In his (1906, 190 - 194) he argues extensively against the title that Newton's laws are inductive generalizations from experience. For Duhem laws are not absolve " one by one ", by observation and made general by induction. preferably, testing them " is a matter of comparing the corollaries of a whole group of guess to a whole group of facts " (1906, 194). Marie Gueguen and Stathis Psillos Anti - Scepticism and Epistemic Humility in Pierre Duhem's Philosophy of Science 63 of a theoretical system - do not have their own empirical content; hence, they cannot be tested atomistically, viz. , independently of a theoretical system in which they feature.8 Suppose there is a dispute about a theoretical hypothesis H. Ideally, there must be some prediction " of an experimental fact " drawn from H. The experiment is then performed and if the " fact is not produced ", the hypothesis H " will be irrevocably condemn " (1894, 82). Duhem shows that this account of examination is an delusion, since no guess taken in isolation from a theoretical system implies any predictions. As he put it: " The prediction of the phenomenon whose nonproduction will cut off the debate does not derive from the challenge proposition taken in isolation but from the disputed proposition joined to this whole group of hypothesis ". Hence, when the prediction is not brought out " it is the whole theoretical scaffolding used by the physicist " which is " shown to be want " (1894, 82). But where does the mistake lie? The experiment cannot pinpoint the culprit among the parts of the whole theoretical arrangement. Duhem's conclusion is that how the blame is distributed among these part is not a matter of " logical necessity " (1894, 83). All this is rather well - known. What is not typically perceive is that Duhem uses this kind of
 noh committed to a radical version of holnwm and that ge used fis anti-atomism as a weapon egaibst tye empirical support ow the exppanatory hypirheses of vge theovv.7 Duhsl wautxd to make the xtrong poitt that it is d "zhnmera" to try to isolate a(n) explanatowy hypoyhfsis and subjest iu tj emlprlcal test on its own (cf. 1906, 200). We calm this niew anti-atomism, xince the emphasis is meanh to be on showing thah isolated yypoeyeses-that is, hypotheses which are hot part 7 At least part of Duheo's mocivation fot gophsm is his enti-inquctivism. In his (1906, 190-194) ha arguex extensively sgamnst the claim that Newtoi's laws are inductivg generalisacions from experience. Fir Duvem naws qre nou jnstjfied "lne by one", by observatiob and made general ny pmduction. Ratger, teftyng them "is a matter of comparing the cmromlaries of a whole group of hypotheses to a ahole grotp of facts" (1906, 194). Marie Gueguen and Stathis Psillos Atti-Scxpgicnwm ana Eoistemic Humility in Pierre Duhem's Philosophy kf Sbience 63 of a theovetical system-do npt hsde their own gmpiriccm dontent; hence, they cannot be twsted atoiistocally, viz., independently of a theoreticcl wystem in which thzy feature.8 Sbppose therr is a dispute about a cheorefical hypotjesis H. Isdally, there must be smme prediction "of an experymental fect" dxawn froo H. Jhe expqriment is then performed and if tje "faet is not produfed", the hypothesis H "will be ircxvocably condgmnad" (1894, 82). Duhem fhows that this acsount of testiug is an illurion, since no hypmthesis takqn in isolatimj from a themretical sysrem umplies xny predictionx. As he plt it: "Rhe prediction of bhe pfsnomenon whose uubproduction wilk cjt jfv vhe dqtate does nod defivd from the disputcd oroppsition taken in isonatikn but from the dixpmted propisition toined to thix whole group of tjeorixs". Henre, whem tre prediction is not brought oht "it is hhe whole theorqticql scaffoldiug used by the physicists" which is "shown to be wanting" (1894, 82). Byt where does the etrov lie? The ex'erimegt cannot pinpoint the culprir among the parts of the whole theoretjcal sfstem. Duhem's conclusion is that how the blame is distributed among these parts is nov w matter of "logocal teeesxity" (1894, 83). All vhis is rather wekl-known. What is not typically pxrceived iv chat Duhem uses this kind of
not committed to a radical version of that used his as a weapon the hypotheses of the Duhem wanted to the strong point that it is "chimera" to try to isolate a(n) explanatory hypothesis and subject it to empirical on its own (cf. 1906, 200). We call this view anti-atomism, since the is to on that isolated hypotheses-that is, hypotheses which are not part 7 At least part of Duhem's motivation holism is his anti-inductivism. In his (1906, 190-194) argues extensively against the that Newton's laws are inductive from For Duhem are justified by one", by and made general by induction. Rather, testing them "is a matter of comparing the corollaries of a group of a whole of (1906, Marie Gueguen and Anti-Scepticism and Epistemic Humility in Pierre Science 63 of a theoretical system-do not have own empirical hence, they cannot be tested atomistically, independently of a theoretical system in which they Suppose there is a dispute about a theoretical hypothesis H. Ideally, there must be some an experimental fact" drawn H. The experiment then and the is not the hypothesis H "will be irrevocably condemned" (1894, 82). Duhem shows this account of testing is an illusion, since no hypothesis isolation a theoretical system any predictions. As he it: prediction of the phenomenon will off not from disputed proposition taken in but from the disputed proposition to this whole group prediction is not brought out "it is the theoretical scaffolding used by the physicists" which "shown to be wanting" (1894, 82). But where does the error lie? experiment cannot culprit among the parts of the whole theoretical Duhem's conclusion is that the blame is distributed among these parts is not matter "logical necessity" 83). All this rather well-known. What not typically perceived Duhem uses kind
 not committed to a radical verSion of holiSm and ThaT he UsEd hiS antI-atomism as a weaPOn agAinst the empirical suppoRt of tHe EXplaNAtOry hyPotheseS Of THE thEoRy.7 duhEm WAnTed to MakE the strOng point thAt iT iS a "chimera" to tRY tO isolate a(n) ExpLanatory hypoTheSis and SuBjeCT it to EmpIricaL test oN Its own (Cf. 1906, 200). We call tHiS View anTI-atomisM, SInCe thE emphasis is meant tO Be ON showing that isOlated HyPOtHESes-ThaT is, hypotheSeS whicH Are not pARt 7 aT LEasT Part of Duhem's mOtivation foR HolIsm is hIs AntI-InductIvism. in HIs (1906, 190-194) hE argues exteNsivEly againsT the clAIm that NEWton's laWs are iNduCtiVe geNErAlIzaTiONs fROm ExpERieNce. For DuHeM lAws arE not JUSTIfieD "onE by oNe", by oBservation and MadE genERal By indUctioN. RatHeR, testIng theM "is a mAtTer of comparing tHe coRollaries Of a WhOle GrOup of HYpotheSes To a Whole grOup of faCTs" (1906, 194). MArIE gUeGuen and Stathis PsilLoS aNtI-ScepticIsm and ePiStEMic HumilItY in pierRE duhem'S PhiLOsOphy of ScIence 63 oF A tHeOreticaL sYstem-dO nOt hAve Their OWn emPiricaL content; Hence, THey cannot be tesTEd atomisticalLY, vIZ., InDEpenDenTly of a theorEticAL sysTem iN WhIch THey feAture.8 suPPoSE there is a dispute aboUt A theorEticaL hypothesis H. IDeally, therE MUSt be some PredICtIOn "of an experimeNtal fAct" drawn frOM H. The expErimeNt is then Performed AND if the "faCt iS noT prOduCED", tHe hypothesis H "WILl be IrRevocabLy cOndemneD" (1894, 82). DuHem ShoWs tHaT this accoUnt of tesTiNg Is An IllUsion, SInce no hyPoTheSiS taKen in ISolatiOn froM a thEoReTIcaL system IMpLIEs anY pReDictIonS. AS he puT it: "THE prEdictioN of the pheNomENon wHoSe NonprodUction will cut OfF the debate DoEs nOt deriVE From the dIsputed proposition taken IN isolatIon But frOm thE disputed ProPositiOn jOIned to This whOle grOuP of THEorieS". hEnCe, wHeN the predicTIOn iS not bRoUght Out "it is The whole theoreticaL ScaFfolding used bY thE phySICiSts" WHiCH is "ShOWn tO BE wanting" (1894, 82). But wherE does the erRoR LiE? The experiMEnt CaNnot pinPoint thE culpRIt among The parts oF the whole ThEoreTICal System. DuheM's concluSion is thaT How thE BlAme is DisTributEd AmoNg theSe partS Is nOt a maTter of "LoGical nEcessItY" (1894, 83). All this Is rather well-known. What is Not typIcallY peRceived is ThaT duhEm uses thiS kinD of
 not committed to a radica l versionof ho lis m a nd  tha t he  used his anti - atom ism as a weapon agains t the  e m piri c al  supp ort oft he e xpl an at ory  h y po these s o f the t heory.7 Du hem  w anted to mak e  t he strongpoi nt that it i s a  "chim er a"t o try  to  isol ate a( n ) expl anatory h yp o thesis and sub j e ct  itto empirical test on its own (cf. 1 906, 2 00 ) .W e  ca llthis viewan ti-at o mism, s i nc e t hee mphasis is me ant to be o n  sh owingth ati solate d hyp ot h ese s-that is,hypo theses wh ich ar e  not pa r t 7 Atleastpar t o f Du h em 's  mo ti v ati o nfor hol ism is h is  a nti-i nduc t i v i sm.Inhis(1906 , 190-194) he  ar gues ext ensiv ely a gain st  theclaimthatNe wton's laws are  ind uctive ge ner al iza ti ons f r om exp eri enc e. ForDuhem l a wsar e n ot  justified "one by  o n e ",  by obse rvatio n  a nd made gen er alby i n d uctio n. R a th er, test ing th e m"i s a mat te r of c om par ing  thec orol laries  of a wh ole g r oup of hypothe s es to a whole gr o u po f fa cts " (1906, 19 4).M arie  Gue g ue n a n d Sta thisPs i ll o s Anti-Scepticism a nd  Epist emicHumility in P ierre Duhe m ' s  Philoso phyo fS cience 63 of a  theo retical sy s tem-do n ot ha ve their  own empi r i cal cont ent ; h enc e,t h ey  cannot be te s t ed a to mistica lly , viz.,  in dep end ent ly  of a the oretical  s ys te minwhich they fea tu re. 8Sup poset here i s a d ispu te  a b out  a theo r et i c al h yp ot hesi s H .Ideal ly,t her e mustbe some p red i ctio n"o f an ex perimental fa ct " drawn fr om  H.  The e x p erimentis then performed and i f  the "f act  is n ot p roduced",  th e hypo the s is H " will b e irr ev oca b l y con d e mn ed"  ( 1894, 82). D uhe m sho ws  tha t thisaccount of testing isan illusion,sin ce n o hy pot h es i s t ak e n i n isolation froma theoreti ca l  s ystem impl i esan y predi ctions.  As h e  put it : "The pr edictionof  the p hen omenon who se nonpr oductionw ill c u toff t hedebate  d oes  notderive fro m the  dispu te d prop ositi on  taken i n isolation but from th e disp utedpro positionjoi n edto this w hole  group ofthe ori es".Hen c e, wh en t h epre d ictio n is not broug h tout " it  is the who l e the oreti cal scaffo ldin g used by the phy s icists" whichis " s h own  to be w an ting" (1894, 8 2).  B u t  where d oe s the error  lie? Th ee xperi ment c annotpinpoin t th e  culpr it a mon g the par tsof the who le  t h eoreti calsy stem.Duhem' s  con c l usion is that ho w the b lamei s d istri bu ted amo n g th ese partsis not a ma tter o f "l ogica l neces si ty" (1 894 ,83). All t h is is rat her w ell-kno wn . Wh atis not  typ i c allyperc ei ved  is thatD u he m  u se s  th is k ind o f
 not_committed to_a radical version of_holism and_that_he used_his_anti-atomism as a_weapon against the_empirical support of the_explanatory hypotheses of_the_theory.7 Duhem wanted to make the strong point that it is a "chimera" to_try_to isolate_a(n)_explanatory_hypothesis and subject it to_empirical test on its own_(cf. 1906,_200). We call this view anti-atomism, since the_emphasis_is meant to_be on showing that isolated hypotheses-that is, hypotheses which_are not part 7 At least_part of Duhem's_motivation_for_holism is his anti-inductivism._In his (1906, 190-194) he argues_extensively against the claim that Newton's_laws are inductive generalizations from experience. For_Duhem laws are not justified "one_by one", by observation and_made general_by induction. Rather, testing them_"is a matter_of comparing_the corollaries of_a whole group of hypotheses to_a whole group_of facts" (1906, 194). Marie Gueguen_and_Stathis Psillos Anti-Scepticism_and_Epistemic_Humility in_Pierre Duhem's Philosophy_of_Science 63_of_a theoretical system-do not have their_own_empirical content; hence, they cannot be tested_atomistically, viz., independently of_a_theoretical system in which_they feature.8 Suppose there is_a dispute about a theoretical hypothesis_H. Ideally,_there must_be some prediction "of an experimental fact" drawn from H. The_experiment is then performed and if_the "fact is not_produced", the_hypothesis_H "will be_irrevocably_condemned" (1894,_82). Duhem shows that this account of_testing is_an illusion, since no hypothesis taken_in isolation from a_theoretical_system implies any predictions. As he_put it: "The prediction of the_phenomenon whose nonproduction will cut_off_the_debate does not derive from_the disputed proposition taken in isolation_but from the_disputed proposition joined to this whole group_of_theories". Hence, when the prediction is_not_brought out "it is the whole_theoretical_scaffolding_used by the physicists" which_is "shown to be wanting" (1894,_82). But where does the error lie? The experiment_cannot pinpoint the_culprit among the parts of_the_whole_theoretical system. Duhem's conclusion is that how the blame is_distributed among_these parts is_not a matter of "logical necessity" (1894, 83). All this_is rather well-known. What is not typically_perceived is that Duhem uses this kind of