, and by talking often with people who are firmly convinced of the grim consequences. Beliefs may be indirectly adjustable by orienting oneself to the factors that shape belief. The phenomenon of perceptual learning suggests that if habituation can apply to perceptual experience as well. Suppose that one is used to using eye and hair color to distinguish faces from one another, and one then moves to a place where everyone has the same eye color and hair color. One might then try to focus on features of faces that vary, such as the distances between their eyes, or between eyes and nose, or nose and mouth, to code individual differences. By engineering one's own course of perceptual learning, one could come to have different experiences of other people's faces. By controlling one's attention, one can habituate to having other experiences. So if adjusting by habituation is diagnostic of epistemic evaluability, then once again, experiences satisfy it. belief to begin with. (For discussion of whether delusions are beliefs, see Currie and Ravenscroft (2002). 13 See B. Pascal, Pensées Section III Translation by W. F. Trotter. Siegel/Epistemic Charge 9 So far, I have rejected what strike me as the two most powerful kinds of reasons to think that experiences can have a rational standing: experiences are passive, and experiences are not rationally adjustable. Several varieties of passivity and unadjustability pertain to beliefs as well. This continuity could naturally lead someone to wonder: what might ground the rational standing of belief, and could that factor also ground the rational standing of experience? A natural idea is that what grounds the rational standing of both states is their role in the mind. Perhaps there is no further feature of belief, or of routes to belief, that explains why beliefs can be evaluated as epistemically better or worse. Instead, it is their role as states that contribute to our outlook on the world. The outlook may be unstable or temporary, or it may be better characterized by incremental states (such as credences) than binary ones. Parts of the outlook will be odds with others, and not all parts will have equal weight in the subject's considered view. But any part of the complete outlook will belong to a perspective on how things are in the world. Experiences that we disown or disbelieve might not belong to our considered outlook, but they are part of the complete outlook. Belonging to an outlook plausibly anchors appraisals of other mental states, such as fears and desires. For
, and by talking often with people who are firmly convinced of the dour consequence. Beliefs may be indirectly adjustable by orienting oneself to the factors that form belief. The phenomenon of perceptual learning indicate that if addiction can apply to perceptual experience as well. Suppose that one is used to using center and hair color to distinguish faces from one another, and one then move to a place where everyone has the same eye color and hair's-breadth color. One might then try to focus on feature of faces that vary, such as the distances between their eyes, or between eye and nose, or nose and mouth, to code individual differences. By engineering one's own path of perceptual learning, one could come to have different experiences of other people's faces. By controlling one's attention, one can habituate to having other experiences. So if adjusting by habituation is diagnostic of epistemic evaluability, then once again, experience satisfy it. belief to get down with. (For discussion of whether delusion are impression, see Currie and Ravenscroft (2002). 13 See B. Pascal, Pensées Section III Translation by W. F. Trotter. Siegel / Epistemic Charge 9 So far, I have rule out what strike me as the two most powerful kinds of reason to think that experiences can have a rational standing: experiences are passive, and experience are not rationally adjustable. Several varieties of passivity and unadjustability pertain to beliefs as well. This continuity could naturally head someone to wonder: what might grind the rational standing of belief, and could that factor besides ground the rational standing of experience? A natural idea is that what grounds the rational standing of both states is their role in the mind. possibly there is no further feature of belief, or of routes to belief, that explain why beliefs can be measure as epistemically better or bad. Instead, it is their function as states that contribute to our lookout on the worldly concern. The outlook may be unstable or temporary, or it may be better characterized by incremental states (such as credences) than binary ones. Parts of the mentality will be odds with others, and not all parts will have adequate weight in the subject's considered view. But any part of the complete outlook will belong to to a perspective on how things are in the world. Experiences that we disown or disbelieve might not belong to our considered outlook, but they are character of the accomplished outlook. Belonging to an outlook plausibly anchors appraisals of early mental states, such as fears and desires. For
, anf by talking often with keople who are fitmoy continced kf the gfim consequences. Beliefs may bw indurectly adjustable by urienting oneself to uhe factors that shape belief. Tgc pheuonenon of percektual learnitg suggests thdt iy habituation can apply to perceptuaj experoejce as well. Sukpose ehat one is used to using eye and hair color uo distinguish facrs from one another, and onf thfn moves to a placf where evetgonq has the samd eye colog and hair dolor. One might then try to focjs on features if fafgs that vary, such as the distances bedween tneir eyes, or bctweei eyws and nose, or nose aid mouth, to code indyvidual dhfyerences. By engineeribg one's own coufwe uf kerrepfual lfariing, one cohld come to have different exptriqbces of other peoplq's faces. By controlling one's attention, ont can habituate to having otyer experiences. So if adjustind by habituation is diagnostic of epistemic evaludbilivy, thtn once qgwin, experiences satisfy it. belief to begin wieg. (Gog discussion of wmether delusions ate brjiefs, see Curtie and Rabenscroft (2002). 13 See B. Oascal, Kensées Section YII Yranslation by W. F. Trotter. Wiegel/Episteiuc Charge 9 So far, N have rejecced whst sttike me as the two most powsrful kinds of reasohr to think that dxpvrietces can have a rational seanding: eeperiznces ard paxsive, wnd experifnces are not rationally adjudtdble. Severwl varieties of passivity and uiedjustability partdin to bzliefs as well. This continuity coold naturclly ldad someonv to wondxr: what mighe ground the swtional stanving of bqlied, ane could ghat factor alxo ground the ratiobal standing of exierievde? A natural idzc us that what grpunas ehv retionwn standing ox bogh ryates is their riue im the mind. Perhaps tvere is no further feayuve of beluef, or os routes to brlief, that explaind why beuiefs cag be evaluated as epistemicallg better lr rorse. Insteaq, it is their roke as states that contribute to our outoook on the world. Rhe outlook may be onsuable or tempprary, or it maf be better characteeized by incremenual states (such as credsnces) dhan hinary ones. Parts of the outlook will be odds with others, and not all parrs will have equal weibht it che subjest's roisidered view. But any part of the complete outlouk will tejong to a perspective on how tfings are in jhe world. Experiences that we disoen or disbelieve might not belomg to our considered outkook, but they are part uf the complete ouylook. Yelongung to qn omtlook plausibuy snghors apprwisaks of other mental states, such as dears qnf desires. For
, and by talking often with people firmly of the consequences. Beliefs may oneself the factors that belief. The phenomenon perceptual learning suggests that if habituation apply to perceptual experience as well. Suppose that one is used to using and hair color to distinguish faces from one another, and one then moves a where has same eye color and hair color. One might then try to focus on features of faces vary, such as the distances between their eyes, between eyes and nose, nose and mouth, to code differences. engineering one's course perceptual one could come have different experiences of other people's faces. By controlling one's attention, one can habituate to having other So if habituation is of evaluability, once again, experiences belief to begin with. (For discussion are beliefs, see Currie and Ravenscroft (2002). 13 B. Pascal, Section III Translation by W. F. Siegel/Epistemic Charge 9 So far, I have rejected strike me as the two most powerful kinds of reasons to think that experiences can rational standing: experiences are and experiences are rationally Several of and unadjustability to beliefs as well. This continuity could naturally lead someone to what might ground the rational standing of belief, and could also the rational standing experience? A natural idea that grounds the rational standing states their mind. there no further feature of or of routes to belief, explains why beliefs can or worse. Instead, it is their role as that contribute to our outlook on the The outlook may be unstable or temporary, or it may be better by incremental as credences) than binary ones. Parts of the will be odds with and not all parts will have equal weight in subject's view. But part of the outlook will belong a perspective on are in world. that disbelieve might not belong to our outlook, they are part of the outlook. an outlook plausibly anchors appraisals of other mental states, such as fears and desires. For
, and by talking often with peopLe who are fiRmly cOnvIncEd Of thE griM consequences. BELiefS may be indirectly adjustAble bY oRIentINg OneseLf to the FAcTORs tHaT sHapE bELiEf. The PheNomenon Of perceptuAl lEaRning suggestS ThAt if habituAtiOn can apply to PerCeptuaL eXpeRIence As wEll. SuPpose tHAt one iS used to usInG Eye and HAir coloR TO dIstiNguish faces from onE AnOTher, and one then Moves tO a PLaCE WheRe eVeryone has ThE same EYe color ANd HAIR coLOr. One might theN try to focus ON feAtures Of FacES that vAry, suCh AS thE distances bEtweEn their eyEs, or beTWeen eyeS And nose, Or nose And MouTh, to COdE iNdiViDUal DIfFerENceS. By enginEeRiNg one'S own COURSe of PerCeptUal leArning, one coulD coMe to HAve DiffeRent eXperIeNces oF other PeoplE's Faces. By controllIng oNe's attentIon, OnE caN hAbituATe to haVinG otHer expeRiences. sO if AdJUSTiNg by habituation is dIaGNOsTic of epiStemic EVaLuABility, thEn OncE agaIN, ExperIencES sAtisfy it. Belief TO bEgIn with. (FOr DiscusSiOn oF whEther DElusIons arE beliefs, See CuRRie and RavenscrOFt (2002). 13 See B. Pascal, PENsÉES SECtioN IIi TranslatioN by W. f. trotTer. SIEgEl/EPIstemIc ChaRgE 9 so FAr, I have rejected what StRike me As the Two most powerfUl kinds of rEASOns to thiNk thAT eXPeriences can haVe a raTional stanDIng: experIenceS are passIve, and expERIences arE noT raTioNalLY AdJustable. SeverAL VariEtIes of paSsiVity and UnaDjuStaBilItY pertain tO beliefs As WeLl. thIs cOntinUIty could NaTurAlLy lEad soMEone to WondeR: whaT mIgHT grOund the RAtIONal sTaNdIng oF beLiEf, and CoulD ThaT factor Also grounD thE RatiOnAl StandinG of experience? a nAtural idea Is ThaT what gROUnds the rAtional standing of both stATes is thEir Role iN the Mind. PerhaPs tHere is No fURther fEature Of belIeF, or OF RouteS TO bEliEf, That explaiNS Why BelieFs Can bE evaluaTed as epistemically BEttEr or worse. InstEad, It is THEiR roLE aS StaTeS ThaT COntribute to our oUtlook on thE wORlD. The outlooK May Be UnstablE or tempOrary, OR it may bE better chAracterizEd By inCREmeNtal states (Such as crEdences) thAN binaRY oNes. PaRts Of the oUtLooK will Be odds WIth OtherS, and noT aLl partS will HaVe equal wEight in the subject's consiDered vIew. BuT anY part of thE coMPleTe outlook Will Belong to a pErsPecTive oN hoW ThingS are IN tHe wORld. ExPeriENces that wE DiSowN OR dIsbelieve miGHT Not BelonG to OUr consIderEd outlook, but they aRE part of the compLete OUTloOk. BELongInG to an outlook plAusIbLY Anchors aPpRaisals of otHer mentaL sTAtes, sUch as fEars anD desireS. fOr
, and by talking often wit h people w ho ar e f irm ly  con vinc ed of the grim cons equences. Beliefs maybe in di r ectl y  a djust able by or i e nti ng  o nes el f  t o the  fa ctors t hat shapebel ie f. The pheno m en on of perc ept ual learning  su ggests  t hat if ha bit uatio n cana pply t o percept ua l  exper i ence as w el l. S uppose that one i s  u s ed to using ey e andha i rc o lor  to  distingui sh  face s  from o n ea n o the r , and one the n moves toa  pl ace wh er e e v eryone  hasth e  sa me eye colo r an d hair co lor. O n e might then tr y to f ocu s o n fe a tu re s o ff ace s  t hat var y, suchas  t he di stan c e s betw een  the ir ey es, or betwee n e yesa ndnose,  or n osean d mou th, to  code  i ndividual diffe renc es. By en gin ee rin gone's own co urs e o f perce ptual l e arn in g , on e could come to ha ve d if ferent e xperie n ce so f otherpe opl e'sf a ces.By c o nt rollingone'sa tt en tion, o ne  can h ab itu ate  to h a ving  other  experie nces. So if adjustin g  by habituati o ni s  d i agno sti c of episte mice valu abil i ty , t h en on ce ag ai n ,e xperiences satisfyit . beli ef to  begin with.(For discu s s i on of wh ethe r  d e lusions are be liefs , see Curr i e and Ra vensc roft (20 02). 13 S e e  B. Pasc al,  Pe nsé esS e ct ion III Trans l a tion  b y W. F.  Tr otter.Sie gel /Ep ist em ic Charge  9 So fa r,  I  h av e r eject e d what s tr ike  m e a s the two mo st po werf ul  k i nds  of rea s on s to t hi nk  tha t e xp erien cesc anhave arationalsta n ding :ex perienc es are passiv e,  and exper ie nce s aren o t ration ally adjustable. Severa l  variet ies  of p assi vity anduna djusta bil i ty per tain t o bel ie fsa s  well . Th isco ntinuity c o u ldnatur al ly l ead som eone to wonder: wh a t m ight ground t herati o n al  st a nd i ngof bel i e f, and could th at factoral s oground the rat io nal sta nding o f exp e rience?  A natura l idea is  t hatw h atgrounds th e ration al standi n g ofb ot h sta tes  is th ei r r ole i n them ind . Per haps t he re isno fu rt her feat ure of belief, or of ro utes t o bel ief , that ex pla i nswhy belie fs c an be eval uat edas ep ist e mical ly b e tt ero r wor se.I nstead, i t  i s t h e ir  role as st a t e s t hat c ont r ibuteto o ur outlook on the world. The out look m aybeu nsta bl e or temporary , o ri t  may bebe tter charac terizedby incre mental  state s (such a sc redenc es)tha n binaryone s. Parts o fth e  outlo ok w il l be o dds wi t h ot h e rs, and not allparts w ill h a veequal  w eight i n  the  subject's  considered  view.  But  anypart of  t he com ple te  outlook w i ll belong  to a  perspe ct iveonhow th ings a re in  the  w orl d. Experi e n ce s  t ha t  we  dis own o rdisb elieve mi g ht not b elo n g to ou rcon s i deredo ut l o ok, but th eyare p a r t of the c o mple t eo utloo k. Bel onging  to ano utl oo k plaus ibl y anchors a ppraisals ofot hermental s ta tes,  s uch  a s fears and des ires. Fo r
, and_by talking_often with people who_are firmly_convinced_of the_grim_consequences. Beliefs may_be indirectly adjustable_by orienting oneself to_the factors that_shape_belief. The phenomenon of perceptual learning suggests that if habituation can apply to perceptual_experience_as well._Suppose_that_one is used to using_eye and hair color to_distinguish faces_from one another, and one then moves to_a_place where everyone_has the same eye color and hair color. One_might then try to focus on_features of faces_that_vary,_such as the distances_between their eyes, or between eyes_and nose, or nose and mouth,_to code individual differences. By engineering one's_own course of perceptual learning, one_could come to have different_experiences of_other people's faces. By controlling_one's attention, one_can habituate_to having other_experiences. So if adjusting by habituation_is diagnostic of_epistemic evaluability, then once again, experiences_satisfy_it. belief to_begin_with._(For discussion_of whether delusions_are_beliefs, see_Currie_and Ravenscroft (2002). 13 See B._Pascal,_Pensées Section III Translation by W. F._Trotter. Siegel/Epistemic Charge 9_So_far, I have rejected_what strike me as the_two most powerful kinds of reasons_to think_that experiences_can have a rational standing: experiences are passive, and experiences are_not rationally adjustable. Several varieties of_passivity and unadjustability pertain_to beliefs_as_well. This continuity_could_naturally lead_someone to wonder: what might ground the_rational standing_of belief, and could that factor_also ground the rational_standing_of experience? A natural idea is_that what grounds the rational standing_of both states is their_role_in_the mind. Perhaps there is_no further feature of belief, or_of routes to_belief, that explains why beliefs can be_evaluated_as epistemically better or worse. Instead,_it_is their role as states that_contribute_to_our outlook on the world._The outlook may be unstable or_temporary, or it may be better characterized by incremental_states (such as_credences) than binary ones. Parts_of_the_outlook will be odds with others, and not all parts_will have_equal weight in_the subject's considered view. But any part of the complete_outlook will belong to a perspective on_how things are in the world. Experiences that we disown or_disbelieve might not belong to our considered outlook,_but they are part of the complete_outlook. Belonging to an_outlook_plausibly anchors appraisals of other mental states,_such_as_fears_and desires. For