a, 8). In fact, Duhem notes that representing by theories "unconnected with each other, or even by theories that contradict each other when they meet in a common domain" is a "transitory evil". Unity should be what physics should aim for. It might seem that in Duhem's writings, two tendencies are always fighting against each other: on one hand, his own project of proceeding to the strict logical examination of physical theories-"we shall in this book offer a simple logical analysis of the method by which physical science makes progress" (1906, 3); and, on the other hand, his desire to support some theories over others. In the first case, Duhem insists on the value of the physical theory as an economy of thought, as condensing a multitude of facts and laws. In the second case, the emphasis is put on the theory as a natural classification, reflecting the true order of the world. We shall argue that Duhem went beyond the positivist trend in French epistemology of science by bringing into it the thought that some kind of contact between theory and an underlying reality is necessary for taking a theoretical classification to be "a satisfactory representation" of experimental laws (1906, 298). His chief point, addressed to his fellow epistemologists, is that the ideal form of a scientific theory is achieved when a theory is a "natural classification" of experimental laws and that looking for this ideal form, even though it is a limiting condition, is reasonable and warranted (by the history of science). Its justification, however, exceeds the confines of the positivist method they (and he himself) were prone to follow. All this was thrown into sharp relief after Abel Rey published a sympathetic but critical essay of Duhem's views in 1904 and Duhem replied in 1905. But it was already there in Duhem's very early writings on the epistemology of science. Let us go into this matter in some more detail. Already in 1893, Duhem assumed the idea of "the best classification" of experimental laws as this classification which would follow from a "detailed metaphysical knowledge of the essence of material things" (1893a, 37). This is because this kind of classification would map the order (viz., relations) there is (are) among things in the world, where this order would "result from their nature itself". He's careful to add that even if this knowledge were available, the physicist would still have the right to adopt another theory, "to connect physical laws in a different order, to
a, 8). In fact, Duhem notes that representing by theories " unconnected with each early, or even by theory that contradict each other when they touch in a coarse domain " is a " transitory evil ". integrity should be what physics should aim for. It might look that in Duhem's writings, two tendencies are constantly fighting against each other: on one handwriting, his own undertaking of proceeding to the strict coherent examination of physical theories-"we shall in this record offer a simple logical psychoanalysis of the method by which physical skill makes advancement " (1906, 3); and, on the other hand, his desire to support some theories over others. In the first case, Duhem insist on the value of the physical theory as an economy of thought, as condensing a multitude of facts and laws. In the second case, the emphasis is put on the theory as a natural classification, reflecting the true order of the world. We shall argue that Duhem go beyond the positivist trend in French epistemology of science by lend into it the opinion that some kind of contact between theory and an underlying world is necessary for taking a theoretical categorization to be " a satisfactory representation " of experimental laws (1906, 298). His chief point, address to his fellow epistemologists, is that the ideal form of a scientific theory is achieved when a theory is a " natural classification " of experimental laws and that looking for this ideal form, even though it is a limiting circumstance, is reasonable and guarantee (by the history of skill). Its justification, however, surpass the confines of the positivist method they (and he himself) were prone to follow. All this was thrown into shrill relief after Abel Rey published a sympathetic but critical essay of Duhem's views in 1904 and Duhem replied in 1905. But it was already there in Duhem's very early writings on the epistemology of science. Let us belong into this topic in some more detail. Already in 1893, Duhem assumed the idea of " the best classification " of experimental torah as this classification which would pursue from a " detailed metaphysical knowledge of the perfume of material things " (1893a, 37). This is because this kind of categorization would map the order (viz. , relations) there is (are) among things in the world, where this order would " result from their nature itself ". He's careful to add that even if this knowledge were available, the physicist would still have the right to assume another theory, " to connect forcible laws in a different order, to
a, 8). Ln fact, Duhem notes that representing bi rheorixs "uncohnected dith each other, or even by tieorues tyat contradict each otfer when nhey meet in e common domain" ma a "trakfitodn evin". Unity should ne what phyvics should aik wox. It might seem that in Duhem's writiggs, two tfndencies are wlwajs figgnikg against each other: on one hans, his oxn project of ptoceeding to the strict lohicap examination of pjysical theirief-"qe shall in ghis book offer a simpme logical analysis of the methud by which phywixal vcience makxs prodress" (1906, 3); and, on the odher hamd, his desire bo su'porr some theories over mthers. In the firsj case, Duham insists on the vqlye of the phyrucau tgeprg as aj eronomy of tgought, as cindensing a multituce if facts and maws. Ig ehe second case, the emphasis is put on uhe tgeory as a natural claswification, reflecting the true order of the world. We shall argue that Duhem wend beykvd uhc oisltivist trend in French epistemology of scienss ny bringing into it the thoigjt jhat some kind of coufadt between theory wnd an onderlting realyty os necessary for taking a tyeoretical cjqssification to be "a satisfaccory rgpresemtation" of experimental lawa (1906, 298). His chiff point, zadressed to his welkof epistemologists, is that ehe ideal fork of a rciemtific theory is achiceed when a theory ls a "uaturdl classiflcation" of experimental laws anv that lookinb xor this idzal fovm, even though yt is a limitiug condicion, ir reasonabme and xarranted (by the history mv science). Itv justifycatuon, yowever, dxceeds the comfines of the posituvist method they (end fs himself) were 'xobe to follow. Alk tfis wws trsown into shdrp felkrf afger Abel Ren pjblixhed a sympathetic bgt cditical essay of Dihcm's views in 1904 and Duhem repliec in 1905. But it was apreadb therx in Dihei's very early writings on the spistemollgy of science. Jet ms gj into thix matter in some more detail. Already in 1893, Duhem assumed thw idea of "the best elsssificatioi" of evperimentdl laws as this claswification which eould follow from a "dstaileg metwphysical knowledge of the essence of material things" (1893a, 37). This is because rhis kmnq of classiricayion fobld map tre ocdxr (viz., relations) nhere is (are) among things in the world, wvexe this order would "result frpm their nature itself". He's careful to asd that rven if this knowledge were avaolable, the physicist woukd still have the rpfhv to adopt another tneory, "co conbect phtsicwl laws in a aifgevent order, to
a, 8). In fact, Duhem notes that theories with each or even by when meet in a domain" is a evil". Unity should be what physics aim for. It might seem that in Duhem's writings, two tendencies are always against each other: on one hand, his own project of proceeding to the logical of theories-"we in this book offer a simple logical analysis of the method by which physical science makes (1906, 3); and, on the other hand, his to support some theories others. In the first case, insists the value the theory an economy of as condensing a multitude of facts and laws. In the second case, the emphasis is put on theory as classification, reflecting true of world. We shall Duhem went beyond the positivist trend of science by bringing into it the thought some kind contact between theory and an underlying is necessary for taking a theoretical classification to "a satisfactory representation" of experimental laws (1906, 298). His chief point, addressed to his fellow that the ideal form a scientific theory achieved a is "natural classification" experimental laws and that looking for this ideal form, even though is a limiting condition, is reasonable and warranted (by the science). justification, however, exceeds confines of the positivist they he himself) were prone All was relief Abel published a sympathetic but essay of Duhem's views in and Duhem replied in there in Duhem's very early writings on the of science. Let us go into this in some more detail. Already in 1893, Duhem assumed the idea of best classification" laws as this classification which would follow from "detailed metaphysical knowledge of essence of material things" (1893a, 37). This is because kind classification would the order (viz., there is (are) things in the this order "result their careful to add that even if knowledge available, the physicist would still the adopt another theory, "to connect physical laws in a different order, to
a, 8). In fact, Duhem notes that reprEsenting by TheorIes "UncOnNectEd wiTh each other, or eVEn by Theories that contradict Each oThER wheN ThEy meeT in a comMOn DOMaiN" iS a "TraNsIToRy eviL". UnIty shouLd be what phYsiCs Should aim for. iT mIght seem thAt iN Duhem's writiNgs, Two tenDeNciES are aLwaYs figHting aGAinst eAch other: oN oNE hand, hIS own proJECt Of prOceeding to the striCT lOGical examinatiOn of phYsICaL THeoRieS-"we shall in ThIs booK Offer a sIMpLE LOgiCAl analysis of tHe method by wHIch PhysicAl SciENce makEs proGrESs" (1906, 3); aNd, on the otheR hanD, his desirE to supPOrt some THeories Over otHerS. In The fIRsT cAse, duHEm iNSiSts ON thE value of ThE pHysicAl thEORY As an EcoNomy Of thoUght, as condensIng A mulTItuDe of fActs aNd laWs. in the Second Case, tHe Emphasis is put on The tHeory as a nAtuRaL clAsSificATion, reFleCtiNg the trUe order OF thE wORLD. WE shall argue that DuhEm WENt Beyond thE positIViSt TRend in FrEnCh ePistEMOlogy Of scIEnCe by brinGing inTO iT tHe thougHt That soMe KinD of ContaCT betWeen thEory and aN undeRLying reality is NEcessary for taKInG A ThEOretIcaL classificaTion TO be "a SatiSFaCtoRY reprEsentAtIOn" OF experimental laws (1906, 298). HiS cHief poInt, adDressed to his fEllow epistEMOLogists, iS thaT ThE Ideal form of a scIentiFic theory iS Achieved When a Theory is A "natural cLASsificatIon" Of eXpeRimENTaL laws and that lOOKing FoR this idEal Form, eveN thOugH it Is a LiMiting conDition, is ReAsOnAbLe aNd warRAnted (by tHe HisToRy oF scieNCe). Its jUstifIcatIoN, hOWevEr, exceeDS tHE ConfInEs Of thE poSiTivisT metHOd tHey (and hE himself) wEre PRone To FoLlow. All This was thrown InTo sharp relIeF afTer AbeL rEy publisHed a sympathetic but critiCAl essay Of DUhem's ViewS in 1904 and DuhEm rEplied In 1905. BUT it was AlreadY therE iN DuHEM's verY EArLy wRiTings on the EPIstEmoloGy Of scIence. LeT us go into this matteR In sOme more detail. alrEady IN 1893, duHem ASsUMed ThE IdeA OF "the best classifIcation" of eXpERiMental laws AS thIs ClassifIcation Which WOuld folLow from a "dEtailed meTaPhysICAl kNowledge of The essenCe of materIAl thiNGs" (1893A, 37). This Is bEcause ThIs kInd of ClassiFIcaTion wOuld maP tHe ordeR (viz., rElAtions) thEre is (are) among things in thE world, Where ThiS order wouLd "rESulT from theiR natUre itself". HE's cAreFul to Add THat evEn if THiS knOWledgE werE Available, THe PhySICiSt would stilL HAVe tHe rigHt tO Adopt aNothEr theory, "to connect PHysical laws in a DiffEREnt OrdER, to
a, 8). In fact, Duhem note s that rep resen tin g b ytheo ries  "unconnectedw itheach other, or even by  theo ri e s th a tcontr adict e a ch o the rwh enth e ymeetina commo n domain"isa"transitorye vi l". Unitysho uld be whatphy sics s ho uld aim f or.  It m ight s e em tha t in Duhe m' s  writi n gs, two t en denc ies are always fi g ht i ng against eac h othe r: on o nehan d, his own  p rojec t  of pro c ee d i n g t o  the strict l ogical exam i nat ion of  p hys i cal th eorie s- " weshall in th is b ook offer  a sim p le logi c al anal ysis o f t hemeth o dby  wh ic h  ph y si cal sci ence mak es  p rogre ss"( 1 9 0 6, 3 );and,  on t he other hand , h is d e sir e tosuppo rt s om e the oriesoverot hers. In the fi rstcase, Duh emin sis ts  on t h e valu e o f t he phys ical th e ory  a s a neconomy of thought ,a s  c ondensin g a mu l ti tu d e of fac ts  an d la w s . Inthes ec ond case , thee mp ha sis ispu t on t he  th eor y asa  nat ural c lassific ation ,  reflecting th e  true order o f  t h e  w o rld.  We  shall argu e th a t Du hemw en t b e yondthe p os i ti v ist trend in French  e pistem ology  of science b y bringing i n to it th e th o ug h t that some ki nd of  contact b e tween th eoryand an u nderlying r eality i s n ece ssa ryf o rtaking a theo r e tica lclassif ica tion to  be  "a  sa tis fa ctory rep resentat io n"  o fexp erime n tal laws  ( 190 6,  29 8). H i s chie f poi nt,ad dr e sse d to hi s  f e l lowep is temo log is ts, i s th a t t he idea l form of  as cien ti fi c theor y is achieved  w hen a theo ry  is  a "na t u ral clas sification" of experime n tal law s a nd th at l ooking fo r t his id eal form,even t hough  i t i s a lim i t in g c on dition, is r eas onabl eandwarrant ed (by the history ofscience). Its  ju stif i c at ion ,  h o wev er ,  ex c e eds the confine s of the p os i ti vist metho d  th ey  (and h e himse lf) w e re pron e to foll ow. All t hi s wa s thr own into s harp rel ief after AbelR ey  publ ish ed a s ym pat hetic  but c r iti cal e ssay o fDuhem' s vie ws  in 1904  and Duhem replied in 1 905. B ut it  wa s already  th e rein Duhem' s ve ry early w rit ing s onthe epist emol o gy  of scien ce.L et us goi nt o t h i smatter in s o m e  mo re de tai l . Alre adyin 1893, Duhem as s umed the ideaof " t h e b est clas si fication" of e xpe ri m e ntal law sas this cla ssificat io n  whic h woul d foll ow from a  " d etaile d me tap hysical k now le d ge of t he  e s senceof m at erialthings "  (18 9 3 a, 37). This isbecau s e  this kin d ofcl assific a tion  would map  the order(viz.,  rel ation s) ther eis (ar e)am ong things in the wo rld,where t hi s or der  would  "re s u lt fr om t he irnature it s e lf " .He ' s c aref ul to  a dd t hat eveni f this k now l edge we re  av a i lable, th e physicistwou ld st i l l have the righ t  t o  adop t anot her th eory, " t o c on nect ph ysi c a l laws in  a differ e ntor der,  to
a, 8)._In fact,_Duhem notes that representing_by theories_"unconnected_with each_other,_or even by_theories that contradict_each other when they_meet in a_common_domain" is a "transitory evil". Unity should be what physics should aim for. It_might_seem that_in_Duhem's_writings, two tendencies are always_fighting against each other: on_one hand,_his own project of proceeding to the strict_logical_examination of physical_theories-"we shall in this book offer a simple logical_analysis of the method by which_physical science makes_progress"_(1906,_3); and, on the_other hand, his desire to support_some theories over others. In the_first case, Duhem insists on the value_of the physical theory as an_economy of thought, as condensing_a multitude_of facts and laws. In_the second case,_the emphasis_is put on_the theory as a natural classification,_reflecting the true_order of the world. We shall_argue_that Duhem went_beyond_the_positivist trend_in French epistemology_of_science by_bringing_into it the thought that some_kind_of contact between theory and an underlying_reality is necessary for_taking_a theoretical classification to_be "a satisfactory representation" of_experimental laws (1906, 298). His chief_point, addressed_to his_fellow epistemologists, is that the ideal form of a scientific theory_is achieved when a theory is_a "natural classification" of_experimental laws_and_that looking for_this_ideal form,_even though it is a limiting condition,_is reasonable_and warranted (by the history of_science). Its justification, however,_exceeds_the confines of the positivist method_they (and he himself) were prone_to follow. All this was_thrown_into_sharp relief after Abel Rey_published a sympathetic but critical essay_of Duhem's views_in 1904 and Duhem replied in 1905._But_it was already there in Duhem's_very_early writings on the epistemology of_science._Let_us go into this matter_in some more detail. Already in_1893, Duhem assumed the idea of "the best classification"_of experimental laws_as this classification which would_follow_from_a "detailed metaphysical knowledge of the essence of material things"_(1893a, 37)._This is because_this kind of classification would map the order (viz., relations)_there is (are) among things in the_world, where this order would "result from their nature itself". He's_careful to add that even if this knowledge_were available, the physicist would still have_the right to adopt_another_theory, "to connect physical laws in a_different_order,_to