's famous example of the hands as "self-touching" tends to refer back to interiority. Nancy suggests that this image of flesh as an open fold means the way it always first has being on the outside. This is what Nancy means to do by provocatively deploying the word soul as a way to further his thesis of exscription: the body is always first outside itself, exscribed and touched as an object in relation to others, before it can consequently constitute an interiority. Nancy then gives us a definition of the soul that is diametrically opposed to traditional ones. He insists that we do not have an "interior" soul; rather, Nancy argues that we always begin with an "exteriority" in order to have any sensation of self at all. The soul is literally the body's extension, its "being outside," its "ex-istence," its "articulation" in relation to other bodies that it touches and that touch it. 57 Ibid., 123. relational matters ‡ lillywhite 35 This Nancyan ontology of flesh has considerable political implications. Nancy suggests that if we give ourselves soulless, non-touchable bodies (as eliminativists and reductivists claim), then we lose the necessity of a given body's existence; the haecceity or thisness of the body's soulful exscription. If we instead eliminate soul, we get mass, the body's opposite: "Where there's a mass of bodies, there's no more body, and where there's a mass of bodies, there's a mass grave."58 However, poststructural ideology critique has dogmatically avoided such ontologies of flesh. As a result, putting ontologies of flesh into dialogue with Foucaultian and Deleuzean political theory, for example, has been regrettably undertheorized. The major innovation of Nancy is to synthesize the way a fully material, real flesh relates to these issues. Recent work has, however, tried to recuperate a sense of political relevance to Merleau-Ponty's work that may be helpful in understanding the politics of flesh so central to Nancy's thinking. Diane Coole for example, points out that both Foucault and Deleuze inherited from Merleau-Ponty the conception of the subject as a fold or as hollow. Similarly, William Connolly puts Merleau-Ponty's work on perception into dialogue with Foucault to suggest that together they give
's famous example of the hands as " self - touching " tend to denote back to interiority. Nancy suggests that this image of flesh as an assailable fold means the room it constantly first has being on the outside. This is what Nancy mean to do by provocatively deploying the son soul as a way to promote his dissertation of exscription: the body is always foremost outside itself, exscribed and touched as an aim in sexual intercourse to others, before it can consequently constitute an interiority. Nancy then gives us a definition of the soul that is diametrically pit to traditional ones. He insists that we do not have an " interior " person; rather, Nancy argue that we always begin with an " exteriority " in order to have any sense of self at all. The soul is literally the body's extension, its " being outside, " its " ex - istence, " its " joint " in sexual intercourse to other bodies that it touches and that touch it. 57 Ibid. , 123. relational matters ‡ lillywhite 35 This Nancyan ontology of flesh has considerable political implications. Nancy suggests that if we move over ourselves soulless, non - touchable bodies (as eliminativists and reductivists claim), then we suffer the necessity of a pass body's existence; the haecceity or thisness of the body's soulful exscription. If we instead eliminate soul, we get aggregate, the body's opposite: " Where there's a mass of bodies, there's no more body, and where there's a mass of bodies, there's a mass grave. "58 However, poststructural ideology critique has dogmatically avoided such ontology of flesh. As a consequence, putting ontologies of flesh into dialogue with Foucaultian and Deleuzean political theory, for case, has been regrettably undertheorized. The major innovation of Nancy is to synthesize the way a amply material, real flesh relates to these issue. Recent work has, however, tried to recuperate a sense of political relevance to Merleau - Ponty's employment that may be helpful in understanding the politics of human body so cardinal to Nancy's thinking. Diane Coole for example, points out that both Foucault and Deleuze inherited from Merleau - Ponty the invention of the discipline as a fold or equally hollow. Similarly, William Connolly puts Merleau - Ponty's work on perception into negotiation with Foucault to suggest that together they give
's fwmous example of the hanas as "self-touchnbg" tenvs to rsfer bacy to interiority. Nancy suggedtw thau this image of flerh as an lpen fole meens the way it always fivft hzd bennj on the outsidg. This is whdt Nancy means tu bo by provocatively deploying the wowd soul ad a way to furjher nys tgvsls of exscription: the body is alsays figst outside itselg, exscribed and touched as an lbject in relation to others, vefoww it can conrequently bmnstitute zn interiority. Nancy then gives us a definitiob if hve soul thav is dpametrically opposed do tradotional ones. Hc insmsts that we do not have en "interior" soul; ratrer, Nancy axgues that we always vetin whth dn "ebrerkorjtb" ih ordeg tk have any sensation if self at all. The xoto is literallg the foqy's extension, its "being outside," its "ex-ivtehce," its "articulation" in relation to other bofies that it touches and that touch it. 57 Ibid., 123. relational mdttera ‡ lnolywhkre 35 This Nancyan ontology of flesh has considerwglt pplitical impligations. Nancy suggrshs jhat if we givg ourselvea soulless, non-toucjable bjdies (as elimigatifists and reductivists clain), then we lofw the necessity of a given boby's exostenve; the haecceity or thirnesa of the bofy's soulfhu exscription. If we itstead eliminate soul, we gqt mass, tie boby's opporite: "Where there's a lass of bodies, there's no more bmdy, and whfre there's a mass of bodies, thecx's a mass grafe."58 Hofever, poftstrmctural ideologr critique has dogmatncally avoided slch ontolmgies of flqsh. As a resunj, putting ontmlogies jf foesh into dkxlogue with Foicaultian and Deleuzean political thepry, ror example, has betn regrettably umdefthqogizxd. Thq major innovdtiov ow Nanch is to synbherize the way a fully matariam, real flesh relatrs to thesg issues. Wecent work hss, however, tried tl recnperatx a semse of political relevance to Mermeau-Ponty'd wjrk that may be melpsul in undzrstanding the politics of flesh so centcal to Nancy's thinking. Eiane Coole for exakkle, points ouv that both Fouwault and Deleuze inyerited from Merltau-Ponty the conception of tha subuect as a fold or as hollow. Similarly, William Connolly puts Merleau-Ponty's work on perceptioh inyo didljyue witr Fonceult to suggest tnat together they give
's famous example of the hands as to back to Nancy suggests that an fold means the it always first being on the outside. This is Nancy means to do by provocatively deploying the word soul as a way further his thesis of exscription: the body is always first outside itself, exscribed touched an in to others, before it can consequently constitute an interiority. Nancy then gives us a definition of soul that is diametrically opposed to traditional ones. insists that we do have an "interior" soul; rather, argues we always with "exteriority" order to have sensation of self at all. The soul is literally the body's extension, its "being outside," its "ex-istence," "articulation" in other bodies it and touch it. 57 relational matters ‡ lillywhite 35 This flesh has considerable political implications. Nancy suggests that we give soulless, non-touchable bodies (as eliminativists and claim), then we lose the necessity of a body's existence; the haecceity or thisness of the body's soulful exscription. If we instead eliminate get mass, the body's "Where there's a of there's more and where a mass of bodies, there's a mass grave."58 However, poststructural ideology has dogmatically avoided such ontologies of flesh. As a result, of into dialogue with and Deleuzean political theory, example, been regrettably undertheorized. The of is way fully real flesh relates to issues. Recent work has, however, to recuperate a sense work that may be helpful in understanding the of flesh so central to Nancy's thinking. Coole for example, points out that both Foucault and Deleuze inherited from the conception subject as a fold or as hollow. Similarly, Connolly puts Merleau-Ponty's work perception into dialogue with Foucault to suggest that together give
's famous example of the hands aS "self-touchIng" teNds To rEfEr baCk to Interiority. NanCY sugGests that this image of flEsh as An OPen fOLd Means The way iT AlWAYs fIrSt Has BeINg On the OutSide. ThiS is what NanCy mEaNs to do by provOCaTively deplOyiNg the word souL as A way to FuRthER his tHesIs of eXscripTIon: the Body is alwAyS First oUTside itSELf, ExscRibed and touched as AN oBJect in relation To otheRs, BEfORE it Can ConsequentLy ConstITute an iNTeRIORitY. nancy then giveS us a definitIOn oF the soUl ThaT Is diamEtricAlLY opPosed to tradItioNal ones. He InsistS That we dO Not have An "inteRioR" soUl; raTHeR, NAncY aRGueS ThAt wE AlwAys begin WiTh An "extErioRITY" In orDer To haVe any Sensation of seLf aT all. tHe sOul is LiterAlly ThE body'S extenSion, iTs "Being outside," its "Ex-isTence," its "aRtiCuLatIoN" in reLAtion tO otHer Bodies tHat it toUCheS aND THaT touch it. 57 Ibid., 123. relatiOnAL MaTters ‡ lilLywhitE 35 thIs nAncyan onToLogY of fLESh has ConsIDeRable polItical IMpLiCations. naNcy sugGeSts ThaT if we GIve oUrselvEs soulleSs, non-TOuchable bodies (AS eliminativisTS aND ReDUctiVisTs claim), then We loSE the NeceSSiTy oF A giveN body'S eXIsTEnce; the haecceity or tHiSness oF the bOdy's soulful exScription. IF WE Instead eLimiNAtE Soul, we get mass, tHe bodY's opposite: "wHere therE's a maSs of bodiEs, there's nO MOre body, aNd wHerE thEre'S A MaSs of bodies, theRE'S a maSs Grave."58 HoWevEr, postsTruCtuRal IdeOlOgy critiqUe has dogMaTiCaLlY avOided SUch ontolOgIes Of FleSh. As a REsult, pUttinG ontOlOgIEs oF flesh iNTo DIAlogUe WiTh FoUcaUlTian aNd DeLEuzEan poliTical theoRy, fOR exaMpLe, Has been Regrettably unDeRtheorized. thE maJor innOVAtion of NAncy is to synthesize the waY A fully mAteRial, rEal fLesh relatEs tO these IssUEs. ReceNt work Has, hoWeVer, TRIed to RECuPerAtE a sense of pOLItiCal reLeVancE to MerlEau-Ponty's work that mAY be Helpful in undeRstAndiNG ThE poLItICs oF fLEsh SO Central to Nancy's Thinking. DiAnE coOle for examPLe, pOiNts out tHat both foucaULt and DeLeuze inheRited from meRleaU-pOntY the concepTion of thE subject aS A fold OR aS hollOw. SImilarLy, wilLiam COnnollY PutS MerlEau-PonTy'S work oN percEpTion into Dialogue with Foucault to sUggest That tOgeTher they gIve
's famous example of the h ands as "s elf-t ouc hin g"  ten ds t o refer back t o  int eriority. Nancy sugges ts th at this im age o f flesh as a n o pe nfol dm ea ns th e w ay it a lways firs t h as  being on th e  o utside. Th isis what Nanc y m eans t odob y pro voc ative ly dep l oyingthe wordso u l as a way tof u rt herhis thesis of exs c ri p tion: the body  is al wa y sf i rst  ou tside itse lf , exs c ribed a n dt o u che d  as an object  in relatio n  to  other s,  be f ore it  canco n seq uently cons titu te an int eriori t y. Nanc y  then g ives u s a  de fini t io nofth e  so u ltha t  is  diametr ic al ly op pose d t o  tra dit iona l one s. He insists  th at w e  do  nothavean " in terio r" sou l; ra th er, Nancy argue s th at we alw ays  b egi nwitha n "ext eri ori ty" inorder t o  ha ve a n ysensation of selfat a ll . The so ul isl it er a lly thebo dy' s ex t e nsion , it s  " being ou tside, "  i ts  "ex-is te nce,"it s " art icula t ion"  in re lation t o oth e r bodies thati t touches and th a t  t o uchit.  57 Ibid.,123. rela tion a lmat t ers ‡  lill yw h it e  35 This Nancyan on to logy o f fle sh has consid erable pol i t i cal impl icat i on s . Nancy sugges ts th at if we g i ve ourse lvessoulless , non-tou c h able bod ies  (a s e lim i n at ivists and re d u ctiv is ts clai m),  then w e l ose  th e n ec essity of  a given  b od y' sexi stenc e ; the ha ec cei ty  or  this n ess of  thebody 's  s o ulf ul exsc r ip t i on.If  w e in ste ad  elim inat e  so ul, weget mass,  th e  bod y' sopposit e: "Where the re 's a massof  bo dies,t h ere's no  more body, and where t h ere's a  ma ss of  bod ies, ther e's  a mas s g r ave."5 8 Howe ver,po sts t r uctur a l  i deo lo gy critiqu e has  dogm at ical ly avoi ded such ontologie s  of  flesh. As ares ult, p ut tin g  o n tol og i eso f  flesh into dia logue with  F o uc aultian an d  De le uzean p olitica l the o ry, for  example,  has been  r egre t t abl y underthe orized.The major innov a ti on of  Na ncy is  t o s ynthe size t h e w ay afullyma terial , rea lflesh re lates to these issues.Recent  work  ha s, howeve r,t rie d to recu pera te a sense  of  po litic alr eleva ncet oMer l eau-P onty ' s work th a tmay b ehelpful inu n d ers tandi ngt he pol itic s of flesh so cen t ral to Nancy's  thi n k ing . D i aneCo ole for exampl e,po i n ts out t ha t both Fouc ault and  D e leuze  inher ited f rom Mer l e au - Pontythecon ception o f t he subject  a sa  foldor a shollow . Simi l arly , William Connolly  puts M erlea u -Po nty's  w ork onp erce ption into  dialogue w ith Fo ucau lt to  sugges tthat t oge th er they gi v e
's famous_example of_the hands as "self-touching"_tends to_refer_back to_interiority._Nancy suggests that_this image of_flesh as an open_fold means the_way_it always first has being on the outside. This is what Nancy means to_do_by provocatively_deploying_the_word soul as a way_to further his thesis of_exscription: the_body is always first outside itself, exscribed and_touched_as an object_in relation to others, before it can consequently constitute_an interiority. Nancy then gives us_a definition of_the_soul_that is diametrically opposed_to traditional ones. He insists that_we do not have an "interior"_soul; rather, Nancy argues that we always_begin with an "exteriority" in order_to have any sensation of_self at_all. The soul is literally_the body's extension,_its "being_outside," its "ex-istence,"_its "articulation" in relation to other_bodies that it_touches and that touch it. 57_Ibid.,_123. relational matters_‡_lillywhite_35 This_Nancyan ontology of_flesh_has considerable_political_implications. Nancy suggests that if we_give_ourselves soulless, non-touchable bodies (as eliminativists and_reductivists claim), then we_lose_the necessity of a_given body's existence; the haecceity_or thisness of the body's soulful_exscription. If_we instead_eliminate soul, we get mass, the body's opposite: "Where there's a_mass of bodies, there's no more_body, and where there's_a mass_of_bodies, there's a_mass_grave."58 However,_poststructural ideology critique has dogmatically avoided such_ontologies of_flesh. As a result, putting ontologies_of flesh into dialogue_with_Foucaultian and Deleuzean political theory, for_example, has been regrettably undertheorized. The_major innovation of Nancy is_to_synthesize_the way a fully material,_real flesh relates to these issues._Recent work has,_however, tried to recuperate a sense of_political_relevance to Merleau-Ponty's work that may_be_helpful in understanding the politics of_flesh_so_central to Nancy's thinking. Diane_Coole for example, points out that_both Foucault and Deleuze inherited from Merleau-Ponty the conception_of the subject_as a fold or as_hollow._Similarly,_William Connolly puts Merleau-Ponty's work on perception into dialogue with_Foucault to_suggest that together_they give