 of Pierre Duhem (1861-1916). Ambrosio Velasco seeks to show that the contemporary philosophy of science began from a fundamental criticism of the modern conception of scientific rationality proposed by Descartes (in his rationalist version) and by Newton (in his empiricist turn). Velasco contends that Duhem's contribution to this discussion is to have undermined several myths and dogmas, among them, the Cartesian idea that the rationality of knowledge is based exclusively on strict adherence to certain methodological rules and the Newtonian thought that observation, induction and experimentation are the fundamental procedures of the scientific method. Although several authors discussed the relevance of the method of composition or synthesis developed by Newton, as J. F. Herschel and W. Whewell did it at the beginning of the 19th century, Velasco argues that the strong empiricist commitment of Newtonian methodology was never questioned on its "foundational basis". Indeed, in his classic work La Théorie Physique. Son Objet, sa Structure (1906), Duhem pointed out the inconsistencies of the methodology proposed by Newton in relation to the inductive generation of scientific hypotheses and the limitations of empirical testing methods. At the end of his chapter, Velasco analyzes the influence of Duhem on some contemporary philosophers of science, including Otto Neurath, Karl. R. Popper, Thomas S. Kuhn, Larry Laudan and Imre Lakatos. 1 Dámian Islas Mondragon is a Professor at the Universidad Juárez del Estado de Durango, México. Address: Boulevard del Guadiana No. 501, Ciudad Universitaria, C.P. 34120, Durango, México. Email damianislas@ujed.mx. Orcid: 0000-0001-8538-6835 Dámian Islas Mondragon – Book Review 158 According to Velasco, Popper's Logic of Scientific Discovery (1935) is a response to the problem of the empirical sub-determination of theories formulated by Duhem. Popper response to this problem is twofold, (i) that scientific evidence is theoretically dependent and (ii) that scientific evidence is ambiguous. Indeed, Popper defended point (i) without recognizing Duhem's influence on the matter; while point (ii) was not explicitly addressed by Popper but only indirectly in recommending not to "save" the hypothesis in the face of a major refutations. However, Popper
of Pierre Duhem (1861 - 1916). Ambrosio Velasco seeks to show that the contemporary philosophy of skill begin from a fundamental criticism of the mod creation of scientific rationality proposed by Descartes (in his rationalist version) and by Newton (in his empiricist go). Velasco cope that Duhem's contribution to this discussion is to have undermined respective myth and dogmas, among them, the Cartesian idea that the rationality of cognition is based exclusively on nonindulgent adherence to certain methodological rules and the Newtonian thought that observation, induction and experiment are the fundamental procedures of the scientific method. Although respective authors discussed the relevance of the method acting of composition or deduction developed by Newton, as J. F. Herschel and W. Whewell did it at the beginning of the 19th century, Velasco argues that the strong empiricist committedness of Newtonian methodology was never questioned on its " foundational basis ". Indeed, in his classic work La Théorie Physique. Son Objet, sa Structure (1906), Duhem pointed out the inconsistencies of the methodology nominate by Newton in sexual intercourse to the inductive generation of scientific hypotheses and the limitations of empirical testing methods. At the goal of his chapter, Velasco analyze the influence of Duhem on some contemporary philosophers of skill, include Otto Neurath, Karl. R. Popper, Thomas S. Kuhn, Larry Laudan and Imre Lakatos. 1 Dámian Islas Mondragon is a Professor at the Universidad Juárez del Estado de Durango, México. savoir-faire: Boulevard del Guadiana No. 501, Ciudad Universitaria, C.P. 34120, Durango, México. Email damianislas@ujed.mx. Orcid: 0000 - 0001 - 8538 - 6835 Dámian Islas Mondragon – Book Review 158 According to Velasco, Popper's Logic of Scientific Discovery (1935) is a response to the problem of the empirical sub - determination of theories formulated by Duhem. Popper reception to this problem is twofold, (i) that scientific evidence is theoretically dependent and (ii) that scientific evidence is ambiguous. Indeed, Popper defended decimal point (i) without recognizing Duhem's influence on the matter; while point (ii) was not explicitly address by Popper but merely indirectly in recommending not to " save " the hypothesis in the face of a major refutations. However, Popper
 of Pierre Duhem (1861-1916). Ambrosio Yelasco seeks to show tiat the contempurary philosophy of science uegab fron a fundamental criticksm of thv modern xonctption of scientihjc rationalitg pro'owed by Descartgs (in his radionalist vershov) cnd by Newton (in his empiricist turn). Velascp fontends that Quhek'f cohnrlbution to this discussion is to have uidermined seversl myths and dogmas, among hhem, the Cartesian idew that the tztijbality of knuwledge is based excluaively on strict adherence to cdrtaiu methodolotixal tules and thx Newtjnian thoughb that mbservayion, induction anv experimentation are the fundamental procequres of dhz scientific method. Aotyough sevaral qutfora visdussed thx relevance of the metyod of composition pr wynthesis devsloped br Newton, as J. F. Herschel and W. Whewell gid it at the beginning of the 19th century, Velasfo argues that the strong empiricist commitment of Newtonidn mevhudooony wxw jever questioned on its "foundational basis". Inqsec, pn his classic wovk La Théorie Physiauf. Xjn Objet, sa Sjructurz (1906), Suhem pointed out hhe incjnsisrencies os thr methodology proposed by Nwwton in relctiin to the inductivz generation of xcienyific hypotheses and thz limifations of fmpirical gesting methods. Xt nhe and of his chapter, Velasco analyzes the influevce pf Duhqm on some contckporary philosophegs of swience, incpuding Otto Neurath, Karl. R. Poppxc, Thomas S. Kunn, Lagry Laudau and Lmre Lakatos. 1 Dáiian Islas Monbragon if a Pfofessor an the Unitersidad Juárqz del Estado fe Durango, Méeico. Addrqss: Voulwvard ddu Guadiana No. 501, Ciudad Uunversitarua, C.P. 34120, Durango, Méxigo. Emxjl damianislas@ultd.mz. Orcid: 0000-0001-8538-6835 Dámian Oslxs Iojdcagon – Book Review 158 Aczoraong tu Velasco, Pioper'x Logic of Scientifiw Diacovery (1935) is a resppnfe to thg problem of the empirocal sub-determinatlon oh theocies fprmolated by Duhem. Popper response to this oronlem is twofojd, (i) that scientnfic evidence is theoretically dependent and (ii) that scienrific evidence is akniguous. Indexd, Pop[er defenged point (i) without eecognizing Duhem'x influence on the mafter; wvile ooint (ii) was not explicitly addressed by Popper but only indirectly in rexommenvigg not to "szve" yhe hjpochexis in the hace of a major rvfutations. However, Popper
of Pierre Duhem (1861-1916). Ambrosio Velasco seeks that contemporary philosophy science began from modern of scientific rationality by Descartes (in rationalist version) and by Newton (in empiricist turn). Velasco contends that Duhem's contribution to this discussion is to have several myths and dogmas, among them, the Cartesian idea that the rationality of is exclusively strict to certain methodological rules and the Newtonian thought that observation, induction and experimentation are the fundamental of the scientific method. Although several authors discussed relevance of the method composition or synthesis developed by as F. Herschel W. did at the beginning the 19th century, Velasco argues that the strong empiricist commitment of Newtonian methodology was never questioned on "foundational basis". his classic La Physique. Objet, sa Structure pointed out the inconsistencies of the Newton in relation to the inductive generation of hypotheses and limitations of empirical testing methods. At end of his chapter, Velasco analyzes the influence Duhem on some contemporary philosophers of science, including Otto Neurath, Karl. R. Popper, Thomas S. Laudan and Imre Lakatos. Dámian Islas Mondragon a at Universidad del Estado Durango, México. Address: Boulevard del Guadiana No. 501, Ciudad Universitaria, C.P. Durango, México. Email damianislas@ujed.mx. Orcid: 0000-0001-8538-6835 Dámian Islas Mondragon – 158 to Velasco, Popper's of Scientific Discovery (1935) a to the problem of sub-determination theories Popper to problem is twofold, (i) scientific evidence is theoretically dependent (ii) that scientific evidence point (i) without recognizing Duhem's influence on the while point (ii) was not explicitly addressed Popper but only indirectly in recommending not to "save" the hypothesis in face of refutations. However, Popper
 of Pierre Duhem (1861-1916). Ambrosio VelaSco seeks to Show tHat The CoNtemPoraRy philosophy of SCienCe began from a fundamentaL critIcISm of THe ModerN concepTIoN OF scIeNtIfiC rATiOnaliTy pRoposed By DescarteS (in HiS rationalist VErSion) and by NEwtOn (in his empirIciSt turn). veLasCO contEndS that duhem's COntribUtion to thIs DIscussIOn is to hAVE uNderMined several myths ANd DOgmas, among them, The CarTeSIaN IDea ThaT the rationAlIty of KNowledgE Is BASEd eXClusively on stRict adherenCE to CertaiN mEthODologiCal ruLeS And The NewtoniaN thoUght that oBservaTIon, induCTion and ExperiMenTatIon aRE tHe FunDaMEntAL pRocEDurEs of the sCiEnTific MethOD. aLThouGh sEverAl autHors discussed The ReleVAncE of thE methOd of CoMposiTion or SynthEsIs developed by NeWton, As J. F. HerscHel AnD W. WHeWell dID it at tHe bEgiNning of The 19th ceNTurY, VELAScO argues that the stroNg EMPiRicist coMmitmeNT oF NEWtonian mEtHodOlogY WAs nevEr quEStIoned on iTs "founDAtIoNal basiS". INdeed, iN hIs cLasSic woRK La THéorie physique. son ObJEt, sa Structure (1906), DUHem pointed out THe INCoNSistEncIes of the metHodoLOgy pRopoSEd By NEWton iN relaTiON tO The inductive generatIoN of sciEntifIc hypotheses aNd the limitATIOns of empIricAL tESting methods. At The enD of his chapTEr, VelascO analYzes the iNfluence oF dUhem on soMe cOntEmpOraRY PhIlosophers of sCIEnce, InCluding ottO NeuratH, KaRl. R. popPer, thOmas S. Kuhn, larry LauDaN aNd imRe LAkatoS. 1 dámian IsLaS MoNdRagOn is a pRofessOr at tHe UnIvErSIdaD Juárez DEl eSTado De duRangO, MéXiCo. AddRess: bOulEvard deL Guadiana no. 501, CIUdad unIvErsitarIa, C.P. 34120, Durango, MéXiCo. Email damIaNisLas@ujeD.MX. Orcid: 0000-0001-8538-6835 DáMian Islas Mondragon – Book REView 158 AccOrdIng to velaSco, Popper'S LoGic of SCieNTific DIscoveRy (1935) is a ReSpoNSE to thE PRoBleM oF the empiriCAL suB-deteRmInatIon of thEories formulated by dUheM. Popper responSe tO thiS PRoBleM Is TWofOlD, (I) thAT Scientific evideNce is theorEtICaLly dependeNT anD (iI) that scIentifiC evidENce is amBiguous. InDeed, PoppeR dEfenDED poInt (i) withouT recogniZing Duhem'S InfluENcE on thE maTter; whIlE poInt (ii) Was not EXplIcitlY addreSsEd by PoPper bUt Only indiRectly in recommending not To "save" The hyPotHesis in thE faCE of A major refUtatIons. HoweveR, PoPpeR
 of Pierre Duhem (1861-191 6). Ambros io Ve las cose eksto s how that the c o ntem porary philosophy of s cienc eb egan fr om afundame n ta l cri ti ci smof th e mod ern  concep tion of sc ien ti fic rational i ty  proposedbyDescartes (i n h is rat io nal i st ve rsi on) a nd byN ewton(in his e mp i ricist turn).V e la scocontends that Duh e m' s  contributionto thi sd is c u ssi onis to have  u nderm i ned sev e ra l m yth s  and dogmas,among them, the  Carte si ani dea th at th er ati onality ofknow ledge isbasede xclusiv e ly on s trictadh ere ncet oce rta in met h od olo g ica l rulesan dthe N ewto n i a n  tho ugh t th at ob servation, in duc tion and  expe rimen tati on  arethe fu ndame nt al procedures o f th e scienti fic  m eth od . Alt h ough s eve ral  author s discu s sed  t h e re levance of the met ho d of  composi tion o r  s yn t hesis de ve lop ed b y Newto n, a s  J . F. Her schela nd  W . Whewe ll  did i tatthe  begi n ning  of th e 19th c entur y , Velasco argu e s that the st r on g em p iric ist  commitment  ofN ewto nian me tho d ology  wasne v er questioned on its " fo undati onalbasis". Indee d, in hisc l a ssic wor k La Th é orie Physique.  SonObjet, saS tructure  (190 6), Duhe m pointed o ut the i nco nsi ste nci e s  o f the methodo l o gy p ro posed b y N ewton i n r ela tio n t othe induc tive gen er at io nofscien t ific hyp ot hes es  an d the limita tions  ofem pi r ica l testi n gm e thod s.  A t th e e nd  of h is c h apt er, Vel asco anal yze s  the  i nf luenceof Duhem on s om e contempo ra ryphilos o p hers ofscience, including Otto Neurath , K arl.R. P opper, Th oma s S. K uhn ,  Larry  Lauda n and  I mre L akato s .  1  Dá mi an Islas M o n dra gon i sa Pr ofessor  at the Universida d  Ju árez del Esta dode D u r an go, Mé x ico .A ddr e s s: Boulevard de l Guadiana  N o .501, Ciuda d  Un iv ersitar ia, C.P . 341 2 0, Dura ngo, Méxi co. Email  d amia n i sla s@ujed.mx.  Orcid:0000-0001 - 8538- 6 83 5 Dám ian  Islas  M ond ragon  – Boo k  Re view158 Ac co rdingto Ve la sco, Pop per's Logic of Scientif ic Dis cover y ( 1935) isa r e spo nse to th e pr oblem of t heemp irica l s u b-det ermi n at ion of th eori e s formula t ed  by D uh em. Popperr e s pon se to  th i s prob lemis twofold, (i) t h at scientificevid e n ceist heor et ically depende ntan d (ii) tha tscientificevidence  i s  ambi guous.  Indee d, Popp e r  d e fended  poi nt(i) witho utre c ognizin gDu h em's i nflu en ce onthe ma t ter; w hile point (ii)was n o t  expl i cit ly ad dr essed b y  Pop per but on ly indirect ly inreco mmend ing not  t o "sav e"th e hypothes i s in thefaceof a ma jo r re fut ations . Ho w e ver,Popp er 
 of_Pierre Duhem_(1861-1916). Ambrosio Velasco seeks_to show_that_the contemporary_philosophy_of science began_from a fundamental_criticism of the modern_conception of scientific_rationality_proposed by Descartes (in his rationalist version) and by Newton (in his empiricist turn)._Velasco_contends that_Duhem's_contribution_to this discussion is to_have undermined several myths and_dogmas, among_them, the Cartesian idea that the rationality of_knowledge_is based exclusively_on strict adherence to certain methodological rules and the_Newtonian thought that observation, induction and_experimentation are the_fundamental_procedures_of the scientific method._Although several authors discussed the relevance_of the method of composition or_synthesis developed by Newton, as J. F._Herschel and W. Whewell did it_at the beginning of the_19th century,_Velasco argues that the strong_empiricist commitment of_Newtonian methodology_was never questioned_on its "foundational basis". Indeed, in_his classic work_La Théorie Physique. Son Objet, sa_Structure_(1906), Duhem pointed_out_the_inconsistencies of_the methodology proposed_by_Newton in_relation_to the inductive generation of scientific_hypotheses_and the limitations of empirical testing methods._At the end of_his_chapter, Velasco analyzes the_influence of Duhem on some_contemporary philosophers of science, including Otto_Neurath, Karl._R. Popper,_Thomas S. Kuhn, Larry Laudan and Imre Lakatos. 1 Dámian Islas_Mondragon is a Professor at the_Universidad Juárez del Estado_de Durango,_México._Address: Boulevard del_Guadiana_No. 501,_Ciudad Universitaria, C.P. 34120, Durango, México. Email_damianislas@ujed.mx. Orcid:_0000-0001-8538-6835 Dámian Islas Mondragon – Book_Review 158 According to_Velasco,_Popper's Logic of Scientific Discovery (1935)_is a response to the problem_of the empirical sub-determination of_theories_formulated_by Duhem. Popper response to_this problem is twofold, (i) that_scientific evidence is_theoretically dependent and (ii) that scientific evidence_is_ambiguous. Indeed, Popper defended point (i)_without_recognizing Duhem's influence on the matter;_while_point_(ii) was not explicitly addressed_by Popper but only indirectly in_recommending not to "save" the hypothesis in the face_of a major_refutations. However, Popper