instances to one's biases. Far from being otiose or distracting when your religious belief system is largely accurate already, religious disagreement can help safeguard it against inaccuracy and promote new insights. It can do this even if your religious belief system arises from properly functioning religious-cognitive faculties, and it does so without threatening your epistemic justification. I have acknowledged that engaging in religious disagreement may pose psychological risks to committed believers, but have argued that the risks of discouraging or foregoing religious disagreement are greater. Acknowledgements For valuable comments I'd like to thank Daniele Bertini and the anonymous reviewers at Religious Studies. Thanks for helpful discussion go to the participants of the conference 'Arguing Religion' at the Bruno Kessler Centro per le Scienze Religiose, attendees of the Research Seminar at the University of Innsbruck's Department of Christian Philosophy, and the attendees of the Philosophy of Religion section at the 2017 Conference of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Philosophie. I am grateful to the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) for funding this research. References ALSTON, WILLIAM (1991). Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. ANDERSON, ELIZABETH (1995). 'Knowledge, human interests, and objectivity in feminist epistemology', Philosophical Topics, 23, 2, 27-58. BASINGER, DAVID (2002). Religious Diversity: A Philosophical Assessment, Routledge. BISHOP, JOHN (2007). Believing by Faith: An Essay in the Epistemology and Ethics of Religious Belief, Oxford: Oxford: Oxford University Press. BOUDRY, MAARTEN (2013). 'The hypothesis that saves the day: ad hoc reasoning in pseudoscience', Logique Et Analyse, 223, 245-258. CHABRIS, CHRISTOPHER; DANIEL SIMONS (2011). The Invisible Gorilla and Other Ways Our Intuition Deceives Us, New York: Crown. CONEE, EARL; RICHARD FELDMAN (2004). Evidentialism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. DE CRUZ, HELEN; DE SCHMEDT, JOHAN (2013). 'The value of epistemic disagreement in scientific practice: the case of homo floresiensis', Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 44, 169177. 13
instances to one's biases. Far from being otiose or distracting when your religious belief arrangement is largely accurate already, religious discrepancy can help safeguard it against inaccuracy and promote newfangled insight. It can do this even if your religious belief organization arise from properly function religious - cognitive faculties, and it does indeed without threatening your epistemic justification. I have acknowledged that hire in religious disagreement may pose psychological risks to committed believers, but have argued that the hazard of discouraging or foregoing religious disagreement are bang-up. Acknowledgements For valuable comments I'd like to thank Daniele Bertini and the anonymous reviewers at Religious Studies. Thanks for helpful discussion rifle to the participants of the conference' Arguing Religion' at the Bruno Kessler Centro per le Scienze Religiose, attendees of the Research Seminar at the University of Innsbruck's Department of Christian Philosophy, and the attendees of the Philosophy of Religion section at the 2017 Conference of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Philosophie. I am grateful to the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) for fund this research. References ALSTON, WILLIAM (1991). Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. ANDERSON, ELIZABETH (1995).' Knowledge, human interests, and objectivity in feminist epistemology', Philosophical Topics, 23, 2, 27 - 58. BASINGER, DAVID (2002). Religious Diversity: A Philosophical Assessment, Routledge. BISHOP, JOHN (2007). Believing by Faith: An Essay in the Epistemology and Ethics of Religious Belief, Oxford: Oxford: Oxford University Press. BOUDRY, MAARTEN (2013).' The guess that save the day: ad hoc reasoning in pseudoscience', Logique Et Analyse, 223, 245 - 258. CHABRIS, CHRISTOPHER; DANIEL SIMONS (2011). The Invisible Gorilla and Other Ways Our Intuition Deceives Us, New York: Crown. CONEE, EARL; RICHARD FELDMAN (2004). Evidentialism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. DE CRUZ, HELEN; DE SCHMEDT, JOHAN (2013).' The value of epistemic disagreement in scientific practice: the case of homo floresiensis', Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 44, 169177. 13
inshances to one's biases. Fav from being otiose or vistracfing whev your religious belief systxm iw lartely accurate already, feligious disagrewmenu can help safeguedd it ancinst lnaccbrecy and promote new insigvts. It can do dhks even if your religious belief systqm arisrs from properly funbtyonihg religious-cognitive faculties, ans it dots so without threstening your epistemic jushififation. I have acknlwledged thqt egtaging in reuigious disagreement mzy pose psychological risks to zommicted believgxw, bkj have arguev that the risks on discograging or foregoing veligmous disagreement are greeter. Acknowledgementf For valgayle comments I'd like ro thann Datield Beftihi ahd the anknymous rebiewers at Eeligious Studies. Tnagjs for helpfum disctsfion go to the participants of the conftrencs 'Arguing Religion' at tye Bruno Kessler Centto per le Fcienze Religiose, attendees of the Research Semindr at ghe Ukivefwihy of Innsbruck's Department of Christian Philjaokhy, and the attenbees of the Philpslpni of Religion rectiou af the 2017 Conference lf the Qeutsxhe Geseljschsft für Philosophie. I am grareful to the Qustrian Science Fbnd (FWF) for yundinb thix research. References AUSTOH, WILLIAM (1991). Oerceivinf God: The Epistemulony mf Religious Experience, Itraca and Oondpn: Corndll Oniversyty Press. WNDERSON, ELIZABETH (1995). 'Knowpedge, hgman interfsts, and objectivity in feminisv epistemologi', Pvilmsophicaj Toplcs, 23, 2, 27-58. BASINGER, DAVID (2002). Religipus Divzrsity: A Philosoihical Asvessment, Rottledge. BISHO[, JOHN (2007). Belieting by Fwith: An Wssay iv the Epistemolpgy and Enhncs of Reoigious Belief, Oxfprd: Kxford: Oxford Uunvtrwity Press. BOUCRY, MAWRNEN (2013). 'Eve hypothesiv thxt rsves ghe day: ad moc reaxoning in pseudoscietce', Mogique Et Analyse, 223, 245-258. CHABRIS, CHRISTO[HER; DANIEL SOMONS (2011). The Invisibpe Gocilla end Otner Ways Our Intuition Deceives Ua, New Yorn: Cvown. CONEE, EAWL; RLCHATD FELDMAN (2004). Evidentialism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. DE CRUZ, HELWN; DE SCHMEDT, JOHAN (2013). 'The value pf epystemic dhsagreement in scienrific practice: tht case of homo floresiehsis', Sdudied in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 44, 169177. 13
instances to one's biases. Far from being distracting your religious system is largely help it against inaccuracy promote new insights. can do this even if your belief system arises from properly functioning religious-cognitive faculties, and it does so without your epistemic justification. I have acknowledged that engaging in religious disagreement may pose risks committed but argued that the risks of discouraging or foregoing religious disagreement are greater. Acknowledgements For valuable comments like to thank Daniele Bertini and the anonymous at Religious Studies. Thanks helpful discussion go to the of conference 'Arguing at Bruno Centro per le Religiose, attendees of the Research Seminar at the University of Innsbruck's Department of Christian Philosophy, and the of the Religion section the Conference the Deutsche Gesellschaft I am grateful to the Austrian for funding this research. References ALSTON, WILLIAM (1991). God: The of Religious Experience, Ithaca and London: University Press. ANDERSON, ELIZABETH (1995). 'Knowledge, human interests, objectivity in feminist epistemology', Philosophical Topics, 23, 2, 27-58. BASINGER, DAVID (2002). Religious Diversity: A Routledge. BISHOP, JOHN (2007). by Faith: An in Epistemology Ethics Religious Belief, Oxford: Oxford University Press. BOUDRY, MAARTEN (2013). 'The hypothesis that saves day: ad hoc reasoning in pseudoscience', Logique Et Analyse, 223, CHRISTOPHER; SIMONS (2011). The Gorilla and Other Ways Intuition Us, New York: Crown. RICHARD (2004). University DE HELEN; DE SCHMEDT, JOHAN 'The value of epistemic disagreement scientific practice: the case History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 44, 13
instances to one's biases. Far fRom being otIose oR diStrAcTing When Your religious bELief System is largely accuratE alreAdY, ReliGIoUs disAgreemeNT cAN HelP sAfEguArD It AgainSt iNaccuraCy and promoTe nEw Insights. It caN Do This even if YouR religious beLieF systeM aRisES from ProPerly FunctiONing reLigious-coGnITive faCUlties, aND It Does So without threatenINg YOur epistemic juStificAtIOn. i HAve AckNowledged tHaT engaGIng in reLIgIOUS diSAgreement may pOse psycholoGIcaL risks To ComMItted bElievErS, But Have argued tHat tHe risks of DiscouRAging or FOregoinG religIouS diSagrEEmEnT arE gREatER. ACknOWleDgements foR vAluabLe coMMENTs I'd LikE to tHank DAniele Bertini And The aNOnyMous rEviewErs aT REligiOus StuDies. THaNks for helpful diScusSion go to tHe pArTicIpAnts oF The conFerEncE 'ArguinG ReligiON' at ThE bRUnO Kessler Centro per lE SCIEnZe ReligiOse, attENdEeS Of the ResEaRch semiNAR at thE UniVErSity of InNsbrucK'S DEpArtment Of christIaN PhIloSophy, ANd thE attenDees of thE PhilOSophy of ReligioN Section at the 2017 CONfEREnCE of tHe DEutsche GeseLlscHAft fÜr PhILoSopHIe. I am GrateFuL To THe Austrian Science FuNd (fWF) for FundiNg this researcH. ReferenceS alsTON, WILLiAM (1991). PERcEIving God: The EpiStemoLogy of ReliGIous ExpeRiencE, Ithaca aNd London: CORNell UnivErsIty preSs. AndeRsON, ELIZABETH (1995). 'KNOWledGe, Human inTerEsts, and ObjEctIviTy iN fEminist epIstemoloGy', phIlOsOphIcal TOPics, 23, 2, 27-58. BASInGeR, DaViD (2002). REligiOUs DiveRsity: a PhiLoSoPHicAl AssesSMeNT, routLeDgE. BIShOP, jOhN (2007). BelIeviNG by faith: An essay in thE EpIStemOlOgY and EthIcs of ReligiouS BElief, OxforD: OXfoRd: OxfoRD universiTy Press. BOUDRY, MAARTEN (2013). 'The HYpothesIs tHat saVes tHe day: ad hoC reAsoninG in PSeudosCience', logiqUe et ANALyse, 223, 245-258. ChabRiS, ChRiSTOPHER; DAnieL SiMONS (2011). thE InvIsible GOrilla and Other Ways oUr INtuition DeceiVes us, NeW yOrK: CrOWn. coNEe, EarL; RichARD FELDMAN (2004). EvidEntialism, OXfORd: oxford UnivERsiTy press. DE cRUZ, HELeN; DE SchMEDT, JOhAN (2013). 'The valUe of epistEmIc diSAGreEment in sciEntific pRactice: thE Case oF HoMo floResIensis', stUdiEs in HIstory ANd PHilosOphy of scIence PArt A, 44, 169177. 13
instances to one's biases.  Far frombeing  ot ios eor d istr acting when yo u r re ligious belief systemis la rg e ly a c cu ratealready ,  r e l igi ou sdis ag r ee mentcan  help s afeguard i t a ga inst inaccur a cy  and promo tenew insights . I t cando  th i s eve n i f you r reli g ious b elief sys te m  arise s  from p r o pe rlyfunctioning relig i ou s -cognitive fac ulties ,a nd i t d oes  so withou tthrea t ening y o ur e p ist e mic justifica tion. I hav e  ac knowle dg edt hat en gagin gi n r eligious di sagr eement ma y pose psychol o gical r isks t o c omm itte d  b el iev er s , b u thav e  ar gued tha tth e ris ks o f d i scou rag ingor fo regoing relig iou s di s agr eemen t are  gre at er. A cknowl edgem en ts For valuable  com ments I'd  li ke  to  t hankD aniele  Be rti ni andthe ano n ymo us r e vi ewers at Religious  S t u di es. Than ks for he lp f ul discu ss ion  got o  thepart i ci pants of  the c o nf er ence 'A rg uing R el igi on'  at t h e Br uno Ke ssler Ce ntrop er le ScienzeR eligiose, att e nd e e so f th e R esearch Sem inar at t he U n iv ers i ty of  Inns br u ck ' s Department of Chr is tian P hilos ophy, and the  attendees o f  the Phi loso p hy of Religion se ction  at the 20 1 7 Confer enceof the D eutsche G e s ellschaf t f ürPhi los o p hi e. I am grate f u l to  t he Aust ria n Scien ceFun d ( FWF )for fundi ng thisre se ar ch . R efere n ces ALST ON , W IL LIA M (19 9 1). Pe rceiv ingGo d: The  Episte m ol o g y of  R el igio usEx perie nce, Ith aca and  London:Cor n ellUn iv ersityPress. ANDERS ON , ELIZABET H(19 95). ' K n owledge,  human interests, and o b jectivi tyin fe mini st episte mol ogy',Phi l osophi cal To pics,  2 3,2 ,  27-5 8 .  B ASI NG ER, DAVID( 2 002 ). Re li giou s Diver sity: A Philosophi c alAssessment, R out ledg e .  B ISH O P, JOH N( 200 7 ) . Believing byFaith: AnEs s ay  in the Ep i ste mo logy an d Ethic s ofR eligiou s Belief,  Oxford:Ox ford : Oxf ord Univer sity Pre ss. BOUDR Y , MAA R TE N (20 13) . 'The  h ypo thesi s that sav es th e day:  a d hocreaso ni ng in ps eudoscience', Logique E t Anal yse,223 , 245-258 . C H ABR IS, CHRIS TOPH ER; DANIEL  SI MON S (20 11) .  TheInvi s ib leG orill a an d  Other Wa y sOur I nt uition Dece i v e s U s, Ne w Y o rk: Cr own.  CONEE, EARL; RIC H ARD FELDMAN (2 004) . Evi den t iali sm , Oxford: Oxfo rdUn i v ersity P re ss. DE CRUZ , HELEN;  D E  SCHM EDT, J OHAN ( 2013).' T he valueof e pis temic dis agr ee m ent insc ie n tificprac ti ce: th e case of h o m o floresiensis',  Stud i e s inH ist ory a nd  Philos o phyof Science  Part A, 44 , 1691 77.13
instances to_one's biases._Far from being otiose_or distracting_when_your religious_belief_system is largely_accurate already, religious_disagreement can help safeguard_it against inaccuracy_and_promote new insights. It can do this even if your religious belief system arises_from_properly functioning_religious-cognitive_faculties,_and it does so without_threatening your epistemic justification. I_have acknowledged_that engaging in religious disagreement may pose psychological_risks_to committed believers,_but have argued that the risks of discouraging or_foregoing religious disagreement are greater. Acknowledgements_For valuable comments_I'd_like_to thank Daniele Bertini_and the anonymous reviewers at Religious_Studies. Thanks for helpful discussion go_to the participants of the conference 'Arguing_Religion' at the Bruno Kessler Centro_per le Scienze Religiose, attendees_of the_Research Seminar at the University_of Innsbruck's Department_of Christian_Philosophy, and the_attendees of the Philosophy of Religion_section at the_2017 Conference of the Deutsche Gesellschaft_für_Philosophie. I am_grateful_to_the Austrian_Science Fund (FWF)_for_funding this_research._References ALSTON, WILLIAM (1991). Perceiving God:_The_Epistemology of Religious Experience, Ithaca and London:_Cornell University Press. ANDERSON,_ELIZABETH_(1995). 'Knowledge, human interests,_and objectivity in feminist epistemology',_Philosophical Topics, 23, 2, 27-58. BASINGER,_DAVID (2002)._Religious Diversity:_A Philosophical Assessment, Routledge. BISHOP, JOHN (2007). Believing by Faith: An_Essay in the Epistemology and Ethics_of Religious Belief, Oxford:_Oxford: Oxford_University_Press. BOUDRY, MAARTEN_(2013)._'The hypothesis_that saves the day: ad hoc reasoning_in pseudoscience',_Logique Et Analyse, 223, 245-258. CHABRIS,_CHRISTOPHER; DANIEL SIMONS (2011)._The_Invisible Gorilla and Other Ways Our_Intuition Deceives Us, New York: Crown._CONEE, EARL; RICHARD FELDMAN (2004)._Evidentialism,_Oxford:_Oxford University Press. DE CRUZ,_HELEN; DE SCHMEDT, JOHAN (2013). 'The_value of epistemic_disagreement in scientific practice: the case of_homo_floresiensis', Studies in History and Philosophy_of_Science Part A, 44, 169177. 13