 a mindindependent entity, a proposition. In the introduction to the 1897 dissertation Moore gives an account of the difference between what he calls Theoretical and Practical Philosophy, with a view to defending Ethics as a science, and not as, in classical philosophy, an Art: But though Art, as the actual doing of things in which sense alone the moulding of things can be its direct aim, may really be treated as so coordinate with knowing-the distinction being that between volition and cognition in psychology; when Art is treated as a'scientific discipline' its direct object becomes 'knowing' just as much as that of science. The object of Ethics, 'what ought to be', is certainly different from that of any science, but in as much as the direct aim of Ethics is to know this and not to do it, it becomes pure theory and is subordinate to the general conditions of knowledge. The non-naturalism that is a well known characteristic of Moore's later ethical views is evident in nascent form here-but there is27 'Transcendental Realism' might even be said characterize Moore's own conception of 28 A sampling of explicit passages, some of which also turn up in Moore 1898, can be fo 29 See, for instance, Mace (1954). 30 Consider, in this context, that Bradley and Ward differed quite pointedly on their con individual self and its objects (denying relations altogether), and Ward defending it (so mu 31 See, for instance, Hodgson (1876), p. 228, who takes it that the difference between ps aspect of states of consciousness'. Please cite this article in press as: Preti, C., On the origins of the con (2008), doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2008.03.002E D P R O O F something else evident as well. Moore confidently formulates his view in the language of empirical psychology (note for instance the distinction between 'volition and cognition'); and this language appears throughout the manuscripts. That Moore's critical assessment of Kant is informed by the psychology literature of the day cannot be better illustrated, I think, than in this passage: there is, in short, no reason for supposing that such a science as has been called 'Transcendental Psychology' in distinction from empirical psychology does exist; or for regarding 'Reason' as other than an object of empirical psychology. It is attempted to base the distinction by asserting that Transcendental Reason is a condition for the possibility of
a mindindependent entity, a proposition. In the introduction to the 1897 dissertation Moore gives an account of the remainder between what he call Theoretical and Practical Philosophy, with a view to defending Ethics as a science, and not as, in authoritative philosophy, an Art: But though Art, as the actual doing of thing in which sense alone the molding of things can be its direct bearing, may really be treated as then organize with knowing - the distinction being that between volition and cognition in psychology; when Art is treated as a'scientific discipline' its direct object become' knowing' just as much as that of skill. The object of Ethics,' what ought to be', is certainly unlike from that of any science, but in equally much as the direct aim of Ethics is to know this and not to do it, it becomes pure hypothesis and is subordinate to the general conditions of knowledge. The non - naturalism that is a well known characteristic of Moore's subsequently ethical views is evident in nascent form here - but there is27' Transcendental Realism' might even be said characterize Moore's own conception of 28 A sampling of explicit passages, some of which also change state up in Moore 1898, can be fo 29 See, for instance, Mace (1954). 30 Consider, in this context, that Bradley and Ward disagree quite pointedly on their con individual self and its object (denying relations altogether), and Ward maintain it (so mu 31 See, for instance, Hodgson (1876), p. 228, who takes it that the difference between ps aspect of country of consciousness'. Please cite this article in press as: Preti, C., On the origins of the con (2008), doi:10.1016 / j.shpsa.2008.03.002E D P R O O fluorine something else evident as well. Moore confidently formulates his view in the linguistic process of empirical psychology (notice for case the distinction between' volition and cognition'); and this language appears throughout the manuscripts. That Moore's critical appraisal of Kant is informed by the psychology literature of the day cannot be better illustrate, I think, than in this passage: there is, in short, no cause for supposing that such a science as has been call' Transcendental Psychology' in distinction from empiric psychology does exist; or for regarding' Reason' as other than an object of empirical psychology. It is try to base the eminence by asserting that Transcendental Reason is a condition for the possibility of
 a lindindependent entity, a proposition. In the invroductjon to tfe 1897 dissertation Moore gives ab acciunt of the difference between ahat he xallw Theoreticem and Pvccticzp Phnlisophy, with a yiew to defanding Ethics ds a science, and not as, in classical phylosophu, wn Art: But thoogh Agt, as fhe actual doing of things in whicg sense alone the moilding of things can be itd digect aim, may reallj be treatee as wo coordinatd with knowing-the distjnction being that between voligion cnd cognitiin in ksychology; wien Arn is treated as a'sciettific ciscipline' its dicect object becomes 'knowiig' just as much as trat of scheuce. The object of Ethucw, 'whaj ougvt tu be', is cxrtzinly fifherent from that of ant science, but in as mtbn as the dirsct aii jf Ethics is to know this and not to do it, it becomes pure theory and is subordinate tl the genqral conditions of knowledge. The non-naturalism thdt is x wtlo knodb fharacteristic of Moore's later ethical views ya tvicent in nascenb form here-but thete ix27 'Transcendentxl Realisj' might even be sald charwcteruze Moore'f owm conception of 28 A sampling of explicit passages, some of wkich also tuxn up on Mopre 1898, can be fo 29 See, for insfance, Mace (1954). 30 Consided, in this context, thst Bradley and Ward differed quite pomntedky on tfeir con igdividual delf and its objects (denjing telatimns altogehher), and Ward defending it (so mn 31 See, for inxtdncv, Hodgson (1876), p. 228, eho takes it ehat the diffetence betceen pr aspect or statev of conscijusness'. Pleasa cite this acticle in prews aw: Preti, Z., On the origims of the con (2008), doi:10.1016/j.whpsa.2008.03.002E D P R O O F soosthing else evibtnt as well. Moore vonwidqnnly fjsmulates his vied iv the uanguagt on eopirocal psychology (note for instance the distongtion betqeen 'volytion and cogmition'); and this lajguagx appeers thtoudhout the manuscripts. That Moode's critifal assessment jf Kqnt is inforked by the psychology literature of the day cannot be bejter illustrated, I thnnl, than in tiis pafsage: these is, in short, no reqson for supposinn that such a science zs has been called 'Transcendental Psychology' in distinction from empirical psychologt does exist; or fod rebarditg 'Xeason' ws ovhxr than an object of empirical psychology. It is ettempted do base the distinction by assrrging that Travscendental Reason is a donditiom for the possibility of
a mindindependent entity, a proposition. In the the dissertation Moore an account of calls and Practical Philosophy, a view to Ethics as a science, and not in classical philosophy, an Art: But though Art, as the actual doing of in which sense alone the moulding of things can be its direct aim, really treated so with knowing-the distinction being that between volition and cognition in psychology; when Art is treated as discipline' its direct object becomes 'knowing' just as as that of science. object of Ethics, 'what ought be', certainly different that any but in as as the direct aim of Ethics is to know this and not to do it, it becomes theory and to the conditions knowledge. non-naturalism that is known characteristic of Moore's later ethical in nascent form here-but there is27 'Transcendental Realism' even be characterize Moore's own conception of 28 sampling of explicit passages, some of which also up in Moore 1898, can be fo 29 See, for instance, Mace (1954). 30 Consider, context, that Bradley and differed quite pointedly their individual and objects (denying altogether), and Ward defending it (so mu 31 See, for instance, (1876), p. 228, who takes it that the difference between of of consciousness'. Please this article in press Preti, On the origins of (2008), D O something evident as well. Moore formulates his view in the of empirical psychology (note 'volition and cognition'); and this language appears throughout manuscripts. That Moore's critical assessment of Kant informed by the psychology literature of the day cannot be better illustrated, think, than passage: there is, in short, no reason for that such a science has been called 'Transcendental Psychology' in distinction from empirical does or for 'Reason' as other an object of psychology. It is base the by that a condition for the possibility of
 a mindindependent entity, a prOposition. IN the iNtrOduCtIon tO the 1897 Dissertation MoORe giVes an account of the diffeRence BeTWeen WHaT he caLls TheoREtICAl aNd prActIcAL PHilosOphY, with a vIew to defenDinG EThics as a scieNCe, And not as, in ClaSsical philosOphY, an Art: buT thOUgh ArT, as The acTual doINg of thIngs in whiCh SEnse alONe the moULDiNg of Things can be its dirECt AIm, may really be tReated As SO cOORdiNatE with knowiNg-The diSTinctioN BeING ThaT Between volitiOn and cognitIOn iN psychOlOgy; WHen Art Is treAtED as A'scientific DiscIpline' its Direct OBject beCOmes 'knoWing' juSt aS muCh as THaT oF scIeNCe. THE oBjeCT of ethics, 'whAt OuGht to Be', is CERTAinlY diFferEnt frOm that of any scIenCe, buT In aS much As the DireCt Aim of ethics Is to kNoW this and not to do It, it Becomes puRe tHeOry AnD is suBOrdinaTe tO thE generaL conditIOns Of KNOWlEdge. The non-naturaliSm THAt Is a well kNown chARaCtERistic of moOre'S latER EthicAl viEWs Is evidenT in nasCEnT fOrm here-BuT there Is27 'traNscEndenTAl ReAlism' mIght even Be saiD Characterize MoORe's own conceptIOn OF 28 a sAMpliNg oF explicit paSsagES, somE of wHIcH alSO turn Up in MOoRE 1898, cAN be fo 29 See, for instance, maCe (1954). 30 ConsIder, iN this context, tHat Bradley AND ward diffEred QUiTE pointedly on thEir coN individuaL Self and iTs objEcts (denyIng relatiONS altogetHer), And warD deFENdIng it (so mu 31 See, fOR InstAnCe, HodgsOn (1876), p. 228, Who takeS it ThaT thE diFfErence betWeen ps asPeCt Of StAteS of coNSciousneSs'. pleAsE ciTe thiS ArticlE in prEss aS: PReTI, C., ON the oriGInS OF the CoN (2008), dOi:10.1016/j.sHpsA.2008.03.002E d P R O O f somEThiNg else eVident as wEll. mOore CoNfIdently Formulates his ViEw in the lanGuAge Of empiRICal psychOlogy (note for instance the DIstinctIon BetweEn 'voLition and CogNition'); And THis lanGuage aPpearS tHroUGHout tHE MaNusCrIpts. That MoORE's cRiticAl AsseSsment oF Kant is informed by tHE psYchology literAtuRe of THE dAy cANnOT be BeTTer ILLustrated, I think, Than in this PaSSaGe: there is, iN ShoRt, No reasoN for supPosinG That sucH a science As has been CaLled 'tRAnsCendental PSychologY' in distinCTion fROm EmpirIcaL psychOlOgy Does eXist; or FOr rEgardIng 'ReaSoN' as othEr thaN aN object oF empirical psychology. It iS attemPted tO baSe the distIncTIon By assertiNg thAt TranscenDenTal reasoN is A CondiTion FOr The POssibIlitY Of
 a mindindependent entity,  a proposi tion.  In  th eintr oduc tion to the 18 9 7 di ssertation Moore gives  an a cc o unto fthe d ifferen c eb e twe en  w hat  h e  c allsThe oretica l and Prac tic al  Philosophy, wi th a viewtodefending Et hic s as a  s cie n ce, a ndnot a s, inc lassic al philos op h y, anA rt: But t ho ughArt, as the actua l  d o ing of thingsin whi ch se n s e a lon e the moul di ng of thingsc an b e  it s  direct aim,may reallyb e t reated  a s s o  coord inate  w i thknowing-the  dis tinctionbeingt hat bet w een vol itionand  co gnit i on  i n p sy c hol o gy ; w h enArt is t re at ed as  a's c i e n tifi c d isci pline ' its directobj ectb eco mes ' knowi ng'ju st as  muchas th at  of science. Th e ob ject of E thi cs , ' wh at ou g ht tobe' , i s certa inly di f fer en t f ro m that of any scie nc e ,  b ut in as  mucha sth e  directai m o f Et h i cs is  tok no w this a nd not to  d o it, i tbecome spur e t heory andis sub ordinate  to t h e general cond i tions of know l ed g e .T he n on- naturalismthat is a  wel l  k now n  char acter is t ic of Moore's later et hi cal vi ews i s evident innascent fo r m here-but  the r ei s27 'Transcend ental  Realism'm ight eve n besaid cha racterize M oore's o wncon cep tio n of  28 A samplin g of e xp licit p ass ages, s ome  of  wh ich  a lso turnup in Mo or e18 98 , c an be fo 29 Se e,  fo rins tance ,  Mace(1954 ). 3 0Co n sid er, int hi s cont ex t,  tha t B ra dleyandW ard  differ ed quitepoi n tedl yon  theircon individua lself and i ts  ob jects( d enying r elations altogether), a n d Warddef endin g it  (so mu 3 1 S ee, fo r i n stance , Hodg son ( 18 76) , p. 22 8 ,  w hota kes it tha t the  diff er ence  betwee n ps aspect of sta t esof consciousn ess '. P l e as e c i te thi sa rti c l e in press as:Preti, C.,  O n  t he origins ofth e con ( 2008),doi:1 0 .1016/j .shpsa.20 08.03.002 ED PR O O  F somethi ng elseevident a s  well .  M oorecon fident ly  fo rmula tes hi s  vi ew in  the l an guageof em pi rical ps ychology (note for inst ance t he di sti nction be twe e n ' volitionandcognition' );and  this  la n guage  app e ar s t h rough outt he manusc r ip ts. T ha t Moore's c r i t ica l ass ess m ent of  Kan t is informed byt he psychologylite r a tur e o f  the  d ay cannot be b ett er i llustrat ed , I think,than inth i s pas sage:thereis, ins h or t , no r easo n f or suppos ing  t h at such  a  s c ienceas h as  beencalled 'Tra n s cendental Psycho logy' i n dis t inc tionfr om empi r ical  psycholog y does exis t; orforregar ding 'R ea son' a s o th er than an object of  empi rical p sy chol ogy . It i s at t e mpted  toba sethe disti n c ti o nby ass erti ng th at  Tra nscendent a l Reason  is a condi ti onf o r thep os s i bility of
 a_mindindependent entity,_a proposition. In the_introduction to_the_1897 dissertation_Moore_gives an account_of the difference_between what he calls_Theoretical and Practical_Philosophy,_with a view to defending Ethics as a science, and not as, in classical_philosophy,_an Art:_But_though_Art, as the actual doing_of things in which sense_alone the_moulding of things can be its direct aim,_may_really be treated_as so coordinate with knowing-the distinction being that between_volition and cognition in psychology; when_Art is treated_as_a'scientific_discipline' its direct object_becomes 'knowing' just as much as_that of science. The object of_Ethics, 'what ought to be', is certainly_different from that of any science,_but in as much as_the direct_aim of Ethics is to_know this and_not to_do it, it_becomes pure theory and is subordinate_to the general_conditions of knowledge. The non-naturalism that_is_a well known_characteristic_of_Moore's later_ethical views is_evident_in nascent_form_here-but there is27 'Transcendental Realism' might_even_be said characterize Moore's own conception of_28 A sampling of_explicit_passages, some of which_also turn up in Moore_1898, can be fo 29 See,_for instance,_Mace (1954)._30 Consider, in this context, that Bradley and Ward differed quite_pointedly on their con individual self_and its objects (denying_relations altogether),_and_Ward defending it_(so_mu 31_See, for instance, Hodgson (1876), p. 228,_who takes_it that the difference between ps_aspect of states of_consciousness'._Please cite this article in press_as: Preti, C., On the origins_of the con (2008), doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2008.03.002E_D_P_R O O F something_else evident as well. Moore confidently_formulates his view_in the language of empirical psychology (note_for_instance the distinction between 'volition and_cognition');_and this language appears throughout the_manuscripts._That_Moore's critical assessment of Kant_is informed by the psychology literature_of the day cannot be better illustrated, I think,_than in this_passage: there is, in short,_no_reason_for supposing that such a science as has been called_'Transcendental Psychology'_in distinction from_empirical psychology does exist; or for regarding 'Reason' as other_than an object of empirical psychology. It_is attempted to base the distinction by asserting that Transcendental Reason_is a condition for the possibility of