	to	the	pleasures	and	pains	that	might	be experienced	by	sentient	beings.	If	the	annihilation	of	some	non-sentient	natural	form (e.g.,	some	crystal	formation	on	a	remote	part	of	earth)	does	not	decrease	the	net amount	of	happiness	or	pleasure	to	be	experienced	by	sentient	beings,	then-on	the utilitarian	account-there	is	no	moral	reason	for	humans	to	refrain	from	annihilating the	non-sentient	natural	form. Some	contemporary	deontological	thinkers	have	sought	to	overcome	the limitations	of	sentience-based,	utilitarian	arguments	by	arguing	that	non-sentient beings,	including	even	non-living	beings,	are	capable	of	possessing	"intrinsic	worth"	or "inherent	worth."	According	to	these	deontological	accounts,	it	is	the	"intrinsic	worth" of	all	beings	(including	even	non-living	beings)	that	grounds	the	human	obligation	to care	for	the	natural	environment,	even	when	such	care	will	not	in	any	way	enhance the	pleasures	or	diminish	the	pains	that	might	be	experienced	by	sentient	beings Environmental Justice and Climate Change : Assessing Pope Benedict XVI's Ecological Vision for the Catholic Church in the United States, edited by Jame Schaefer, and Tobias Winright, Lexington Books, 2013. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/fordham-ebooks/detail.action?docID=1574401. Created from fordham-ebooks on 2018-01-28 13:06:47. C op yr ig ht © 2 01 3. L ex in gt on B oo ks. A ll rig ht s re se rv ed. (Brennan	1988).
to 	 the 	 pleasures 	 and 	 pains 	 that 	 might 	 be experienced 	 by 	 sentient 	 beings. 	 If 	 the 	 annihilation 	 of 	 some 	 non - sentient 	 lifelike 	 human body (e.g., 	 some 	 crystal 	 constitution 	 on 	 a 	 outside 	 part 	 of 	 earth) 	 does 	 not 	 decrease 	 the 	 final amount 	 of 	 happiness 	 or 	 pleasure 	 to 	 be 	 experienced 	 by 	 sentient 	 being, 	 then - on 	 the utilitarian 	 account - there 	 is 	 no 	 moral 	 reason 	 for 	 homo 	 to 	 refrain 	 from 	 annihilating the 	 non - sentient 	 lifelike 	 form. Some 	 contemporary 	 deontological 	 thinkers 	 have 	 sought 	 to 	 overcome 	 the limitations 	 of 	 sentience - establish, 	 utilitarian 	 arguments 	 by 	 arguing 	 that 	 non - sentient beings, 	 admit 	 even 	 non - living 	 beings, 	 are 	 capable 	 of 	 possessing 	 " intrinsic 	 deserving " 	 or " inherent 	 deserving. " 	 According 	 to 	 these 	 deontological 	 accounts, 	 it 	 is 	 the 	 " intrinsic 	 worth " of 	 all 	 beings 	 (include 	 even 	 non - living 	 beings) 	 that 	 grounds 	 the 	 human 	 obligation 	 to care 	 for 	 the 	 lifelike 	 environment, 	 even 	 when 	 such 	 caution 	 will 	 not 	 in 	 any 	 way 	 enhance the 	 pleasures 	 or 	 diminish 	 the 	 pains 	 that 	 might 	 be 	 experienced 	 by 	 sentient 	 beings Environmental Justice and Climate Change: Assessing Pope Benedict XVI's Ecological Vision for the Catholic Church in the United States, edited by Jame Schaefer, and Tobias Winright, Lexington Books, 2013. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/fordham-ebooks/detail.action?docID=1574401. Created from fordham - ebooks on 2018 - 01 - 28 13:06:47. coke op yr ig ht © 2 01 3. L ex in gt on B oo k. A ll rig ht s re se rv ed. (Brennan 	 1988).
	to	tje	pleasures	and	pains	that	mlght	be experiencgd	vy	sentment	beihgs.	If	the	xnnihilation	of	some	non-sentienv	natyral	firm (e.g.,	some	crystal	formagion	on	a	relote	part	if	eacth)	does	not	decrease	the	net amounf	lf	ha'pmness	or	pleasure	jo	be	experienwed	by	sentient	baivgd,	then-on	the utilitarian	account-there	if	no	morak	rfason	for	humans	jo	refgayn	frkm	annihilating the	non-sentient	naturzl	form. Vome	contemporsry	deontological	thinkers	hage	sokght	to	overcome	the pimitations	if	segrience-based,	ugilitarian	arguments	by	atguing	that	non-sentient beings,	incljding	zven	non-livibg	veijcs,	are	capablx	of	posfessing	"intrikxic	wordh"	or "innerent	worth."	Accprdmng	ti	these	deontological	acrounts,	it	is	the	"intrinsyc	worth" ox	aml	beings	(including	wvwn	non-nivitg	bekbgs)	ghau	grpuhds	the	jumen	obligatioh	to care	for	rhe	natural	environmemt,	qnrn	when	such	cade	will	goe	in	any	way	enhance the	pleasures	or	diminish	uhe	pajns	that	might	be	experiencwd	by	sentient	beings Engironmentwl Justice and Climate Change : Assessing Pope Benadict BVI'w Ccolutifal Vision for the Catholic Church in the Uniesd Snates, edited by Jcme Schaefer, and Tlbows Winright, Lgxingtou Bkoks, 2013. ProQuest Ebolk Centtal, htrp://ebookcegtrak.proquest.com/lib/fordham-ebookw/detail.actiou?doxID=1574401. Created from flrdham-ebookr on 2018-01-28 13:06:47. C pp yr ig ht © 2 01 3. L ex in gt kn B oo ks. W ll rig gg s re se rv ed. (Creknat	1988).
to the pleasures and pains that might by beings. If annihilation of some crystal on a remote of earth) does decrease the net amount of happiness pleasure to be experienced by sentient beings, then-on the utilitarian account-there is no reason for humans to refrain from annihilating the non-sentient natural form. Some contemporary thinkers sought overcome limitations of sentience-based, utilitarian arguments by arguing that non-sentient beings, including even non-living beings, are capable possessing "intrinsic worth" or "inherent worth." According to deontological accounts, it is "intrinsic worth" of all beings even beings) that the obligation care for the environment, even when such care will not in any way enhance the pleasures or diminish the pains might be sentient beings Justice Climate : Assessing Pope Ecological Vision for the Catholic Church States, edited by Jame Schaefer, and Tobias Winright, Books, 2013. Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/fordham-ebooks/detail.action?docID=1574401. Created from fordham-ebooks 2018-01-28 13:06:47. C op yr ig ht © 01 3. L ex in gt on B oo ks. A ll rig ht s rv ed. (Brennan 1988).
	to	the	pleasures	and	pains	thaT	might	be exPerieNceD	by	SeNtieNt	beIngs.	If	the	annihILatiOn	of	some	non-sentient	natUral	fOrM (E.g.,	soME	cRystaL	formatIOn	ON	A	reMoTe	ParT	oF	EaRth)	doEs	nOt	decreAse	the	net aMouNt	Of	happiness	oR	PlEasure	to	be	ExpErienced	by	seNtiEnt	beiNgS,	thEN-on	thE utIlitaRian	acCOunt-thEre	is	no	moRaL	Reason	FOr	humanS	TO	rEfraIn	from	annihilatinG ThE	Non-sentient	natUral	foRm. sOmE	COntEmpOrary	deontOlOgicaL	ThinkerS	HaVE	SOugHT	to	overcome	thE limitationS	Of	sEntienCe-BasED,	utiliTariaN	aRGumEnts	by	arguiNg	thAt	non-sentIent beINgs,	inclUDing	eveN	non-liVinG	beIngs,	ARe	CaPabLe	OF	poSSeSsiNG	"inTrinsic	wOrTh"	Or "inhErenT	WORTh."	AcCorDing	To	theSe	deontologicAl	aCcouNTs,	iT	is	thE	"intrInsiC	wOrth" oF	all	beIngs	(iNcLuding	even	non-liVing	Beings)	thaT	grOuNds	ThE	humaN	ObligaTioN	to Care	for	The	natuRAl	eNvIRONmEnt,	even	when	such	carE	wILL	nOt	in	any	wAy	enhaNCe ThE	PleasureS	oR	diMiniSH	The	paIns	tHAt	Might	be	eXperieNCeD	bY	sentieNt	Beings enVirOnmEntal jUstiCe and CLimate ChAnge : ASSessing Pope BenEDict XVI's EcoloGIcAL viSIon fOr tHe Catholic CHurcH In thE UniTEd staTEs, ediTed by jaME SCHaefer, and Tobias WinrIgHt, LexiNgton books, 2013. ProQuest ebook CentrAL, HTtp://ebookCentRAl.PRoquest.com/lib/fOrdhaM-ebooks/detAIl.action?DocID=1574401. created fRom fordhaM-EBooks on 2018-01-28 13:06:47. C Op yR ig Ht © 2 01 3. L Ex iN GT oN B oo ks. A ll rig hT S Re se Rv Ed. (BrennAn	1988).
	to	the	pleasures	and	pain s	that	mig ht	be  ex per ie nced 	bysentient	being s .	If 	the	annihilation	of	s ome	n on - sent i en t	nat ural	fo r m( e .g. ,so mecr y st al	fo rma tion	on 	a	remotepar tof	earth)	do e snot	decrea sethe	net amou ntof	hap pi nes s 	or	p lea sureto	bee xperie nced	by	s en t ient	b e ings,	t h e n- on	t he utilitarian	ac c ou n t-there	is	nomoralre a so n for 	hu mans	to	re fr ain	f r om	anni h il a t i ngt he	non-sentie nt	naturalf orm . Some 	c ont e mporar y	deo nt o log ical	thinke rs	h ave	sough t	to	o v ercomet he limi tation s	o f	s enti e nc e- bas ed , 	ut i li tar i anargument sby 	argu ingt h a t 	non -se ntie nt be ings,	includi ngeven non -livi ng	be ings ,are	c apable 	of	p os sessing	"intrin sicworth"	or  "i nh ere nt 	wort h ."	Acc ord ing 	to	the se	deon t olo gi c a l 	a ccounts,	it	is	the 	" i n tr insic	wo rth" o f 	a ll beings	( in clu ding e ven	n on-l i vi ng	being s)	tha t 	g ro unds	th ehumanob lig ati on	to care 	for	t he	natur al	en v ironment,	even when	such	car e 	w i l ln ot	i n	a ny	way	enha ncet he	p leas u re s	o r 	dimi nishth e 	p a ins	that	might	be	e xp erienc ed	by 	sentient	bei ngs Enviro n m e ntal Jus tice an d  Climate Chang e : A ssessing P o pe Bened ict X VI's Eco logical V i s ion forthe  Ca tho lic C hu rch in the Un i t ed S ta tes, ed ite d by Ja meSch aef er,  a nd Tobias  Winrigh t,  L ex in gto n Boo k s, 2013.  P roQ ue stEbook Centra l, ht tp:/ /e bo o kce ntral.p r oq u e st.c om /l ib/f ord ha m-ebo oks/ d eta il.acti on?docID= 157 4 401.  C re ated fr om fordham-eb oo ks on 2018 -0 1-2 8 13:0 6 : 47. C op  yr ig ht © 2 01 3. L e x  in gtonB ooks.A ll rights re s e r v  ed. ( Brenna n	198 8) .
	to	the	pleasures	and	pains	that	might	be experienced	by	sentient	beings.	If	the	annihilation	of	some	non-sentient	natural	form_(e.g.,	some	crystal	formation	on	a	remote	part	of	earth)	does	not	decrease	the	net amount	of	happiness	or	pleasure	to	be	experienced	by	sentient	beings,	then-on	the_utilitarian	account-there	is	no	moral	reason	for	humans	to	refrain	from	annihilating the	non-sentient	natural	form. Some	contemporary	deontological	thinkers	have	sought	to	overcome	the limitations	of	sentience-based,	utilitarian	arguments	by	arguing	that	non-sentient_beings,	including	even	non-living	beings,	are	capable	of	possessing	"intrinsic	worth"	or "inherent	worth."	According	to	these	deontological	accounts,	it	is	the	"intrinsic	worth"_of	all	beings	(including	even	non-living	beings)	that	grounds	the	human	obligation	to_care	for	the	natural	environment,	even	when	such	care	will	not	in	any	way	enhance the	pleasures	or	diminish	the	pains	that	might	be	experienced	by	sentient	beings_Environmental_Justice and Climate_Change : Assessing_Pope Benedict XVI's Ecological_Vision for the_Catholic_Church in the United States, edited by Jame Schaefer, and Tobias Winright, Lexington Books,_2013._ProQuest Ebook_Central,_http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/fordham-ebooks/detail.action?docID=1574401._Created from fordham-ebooks on 2018-01-28_13:06:47. C op yr ig_ht ©_2 01 3. L ex in gt on_B_oo ks. A_ll rig ht s re se rv ed. (Brennan	1988).