 opposite mindset despite their nature. Thus, for example, in his early years, Wittgenstein – a fox by nature – thought of himself as a hedgehog. The reverse, however, seems implausible, if not impossible. It is for this reason that, for James (1981 [1907]), far from being a purely intellectual matter, a distinction of this kind is a matter of temperament; this despite the fact that the majority of us are incapable of possessing a well-defined intellectual temperament (in this case, we are only ordinary people). With regard to philosophical inclinations, for James, one is either an empiricist or a rationalist according to his temperament, not by choice. In other words, we do not choose to be foxes or hedgehogs, we simply are one or the other. If we put Berlin's distinction in Jamesian terms, a fox would be, by definition, an empiricist, a lover of crude facts and would, therefore, be of a rough mindset. Whereas the hedgehog would always be a rationalist, a lover of abstract principles and therefore, his or her mind would be subtle. Here, nonetheless, James performs a sleight of hand insofar as he makes use of the known Pascalian distinction between the subtle mind and the geometric mind. Moreover, since James was familiar with Pierre Duhem's oeuvre, he takes from it what better suits his pragmatist character.2 Having said that, although there are commonalities between the overall methods of each of these mindsets, for Duhem, the Pascalian distinction serves, first and foremost, the explicit purpose of 2 In the fifth Lowell lecture, entitled "Pragmatism and common sense," James (1981 [1907], 86) writes: "Just now, if I understand rightly, we are witnessing a curious reversion to the common sense way of looking at physical nature, in the philosophy of science favored by such men as Mach, Ostwald and Duhem. According to these teachers no hypothesis is truer than any other in the sense of being a more literal copy of reality. They are all but ways of talking on our part, to be compared solely from the point of view of their use. The only literally true thing is reality; and the only reality we know is, for these logicians, sensible reality, the flux of our sensations and emotions as they pass". Víctor Manuel Hernández Márquez – Was Pierre Duhem an Esprit de Finesse
opposite mindset despite their nature. Thus, for example, in his early days, Wittgenstein – a dodger by nature – thought of himself as a hedgehog. The reversion, however, seems farfetched, if not impossible. It is for this reason that, for James (1981 [ 1907 ]), far from being a purely cerebral matter, a distinction of this kind is a matter of disposition; this despite the fact that the majority of us are incapable of possess a well - defined cerebral temperament (in this case, we are only ordinary citizenry). With regard to philosophical inclinations, for James, one is either an empiricist or a rationalist according to his disposition, not by choice. In other words, we do not choose to be dodger or hedgehogs, we simply are one or the early. If we put Berlin's eminence in Jamesian terms, a dodger would be, by definition, an empiricist, a lover of crude facts and would, therefore, be of a rocky mindset. Whereas the hedgehog would always be a rationalist, a lover of abstract principle and consequently, his or her mind would be subtle. Here, nonetheless, James performs a sleight of hand insofar as he makes habit of the know Pascalian distinction between the subtle thinker and the geometric judgment. Moreover, since James was familiar with Pierre Duhem's oeuvre, he takes from it what good suits his pragmatist character.2 Having said that, although there are commonalities between the overall method of each of these mindsets, for Duhem, the Pascalian distinction serves, first and foremost, the explicit determination of 2 In the fifth Lowell lecture, entitled " Pragmatism and common sense, " James (1981 [ 1907 ], 86) writes: " barely now, if I sympathize rightly, we are witness a curious reversion to the common sense way of look at physical nature, in the philosophy of science favor by such men as Mach, Ostwald and Duhem. According to these teachers no hypothesis is true than any other in the common sense of being a more literal copy of reality. They are all but ways of talk on our part, to be compare solely from the item of view of their use. The alone literally true matter is reality; and the only reality we sleep together is, for these logicians, sensible reality, the flux of our sensations and emotion as they pass ". Víctor Manuel Hernández Márquez – Was Pierre Duhem an Esprit de Finesse
 opoosite mindset despite tmeir nature. Thus, for exemple, ih his eafly years, Wittgenstein – a foe by natuee – thought of himself as a hedhehog. Thw reterse, however, sexjs implausibls, if uov impossible. It is for thhs reason that, fur James (1981 [1907]), far from being a purely ineellectiap matter, a disjinctpog of nhls kind is a matter of temperameht; this despite the gact that the majority of ks age incapable of podsessing a qell-qwfined inteluectual temperament (in this case, we are only ordinary peopke). With retaed hm philosophmcal igclinations, npr Jamas, one os either an ekpiciciwt or a rationalist arcording to his tempgrament, nod yy choice. In other woedw, we go nmt cfiosd tk ue roxes lr iedgehogs, ws simply arw one or the other. Of qe put Berlin'a distynstion in Jamesian terms, a fox would be, ty sefinition, an empiricisr, a lover of crude fafts and wjuld, therefore, be of a rough mindset. Whereas the vedgeioe wiuja apways be a rationalist, a lover of abstract pryhcopkes and therefjre, his or neg kynd would be rubtle. Hede, nonetheless, Jamfs perfjrms q sleight of nand insofar as he makes usw of the knocn Pascalian distinctnon between che suntle kind and the geometric oind. Moreover, slnce Jamea was familiar wigh Iierse Duhem's oeuvre, he takes srom it wiat bztter sukts nis prwgmatist cjaracbar.2 Having said thah, altkough there are commonalities between the overekl methods og aacv of thefe mikdsets, for Duhei, the Pascaliau distinetion rerves, firat and horemost, the explicit pur[lse of 2 In tie fifth Joweol lwcture, dvtitled "Pragmayism and boimon sense," James (1981 [1907], 86) wrltes: "Ghst now, if I unbtrsuabd rightly, we sre wienvssmng a wurious revessiov tu the zommon sensc wxy og looking at physican nafure, in the philosppmy of scignce favowed by such mrn as Mach, Ostwald and Vuhem. Eccordong to these teachers no hypothesjs is trufr bhan any othew in the sense oy being a more literal copy of reality. Tiey are all but ways of talking on our parj, tp be comparxd solqly from dhe point of view of their use. The onky literally true thihg is sealihy; and the only reality we know is, for these logicians, sensible reality, tye flue jf our sensztioms ang zmocions af thxy pass". Víctor Manuvl Hernández Márquez – Was Pierre Dnhem an Es[rnt de Finesse
opposite mindset despite their nature. Thus, for his years, Wittgenstein a fox by as hedgehog. The reverse, seems implausible, if impossible. It is for this reason for James (1981 [1907]), far from being a purely intellectual matter, a distinction this kind is a matter of temperament; this despite the fact that the of are of a well-defined intellectual temperament (in this case, we are only ordinary people). With regard to philosophical for James, one is either an empiricist or rationalist according to his not by choice. In other we not choose be or we simply are or the other. If we put Berlin's distinction in Jamesian terms, a fox would be, by definition, empiricist, a crude facts would, be a rough mindset. hedgehog would always be a rationalist, abstract principles and therefore, his or her mind be subtle. nonetheless, James performs a sleight of insofar as he makes use of the known distinction between the subtle mind and the geometric mind. Moreover, since James was familiar with oeuvre, he takes from what better suits pragmatist Having that, there are between the overall methods of each of these mindsets, for Duhem, Pascalian distinction serves, first and foremost, the explicit purpose of the Lowell lecture, entitled and common sense," James [1907], writes: "Just now, if rightly, are reversion the sense way of looking physical nature, in the philosophy science favored by such Duhem. According to these teachers no hypothesis is than any other in the sense of a more literal copy of reality. They are all but ways of on our be compared solely from the point of view their use. The only true thing is reality; and the only reality we is, these logicians, reality, the flux our sensations and as they pass". Hernández Márquez Was Duhem Finesse
 opposite mindset despite theIr nature. ThUs, for ExaMplE, iN his EarlY years, WittgensTEin – a Fox by nature – thought of hiMself As A HedgEHoG. The rEverse, hOWeVER, seEmS iMplAuSIbLe, if nOt iMpossibLe. It is for tHis ReAson that, for JAMeS (1981 [1907]), far from beIng A purely intelLecTual maTtEr, a DIstinCtiOn of tHis kinD Is a matTer of tempErAMent; thIS despitE THe Fact That the majority of US aRE incapable of poSsessiNg A WeLL-DefIneD intellectUaL tempERament (iN ThIS CAse, WE are only ordinAry people). WiTH reGard to PhIloSOphicaL inclInATioNs, for James, oNe is Either an eMpiricISt or a raTIonalisT accorDinG to His tEMpErAmeNt, NOt bY ChOicE. in oTher wordS, wE dO not cHoosE TO BE foxEs oR hedGehogS, we simply are oNe oR the OTheR. If we Put BeRlin'S dIstinCtion iN JameSiAn terms, a fox woulD be, bY definitiOn, aN eMpiRiCist, a LOver of CruDe fActs and Would, thERefOrE, BE Of A rough mindset. WhereAs THE hEdgehog wOuld alWAyS bE A rationaLiSt, a LoveR OF abstRact PRiNciples aNd therEFoRe, His or heR mInd wouLd Be sUbtLe. HerE, NoneThelesS, James peRformS A sleight of hand INsofar as he makES uSE Of THe knOwn pascalian diStinCTion BetwEEn The SUbtle Mind aNd THe GEometric mind. MoreoveR, sInce JaMes waS familiar with pierre DuheM'S OEuvre, he tAkes FRoM It what better suIts hiS pragmatisT CharacteR.2 HaviNg said thAt, althougH THere are cOmmOnaLitIes BETwEen the overall METhodS oF each of TheSe mindsEts, For duhEm, tHe pascalian DistinctIoN sErVeS, fiRst anD Foremost, ThE exPlIciT purpOSe of 2 In The fiFth LOwElL LecTure, entITlED "pragMaTiSm anD coMmOn senSe," JaMEs (1981 [1907], 86) wRites: "JuSt now, if I uNdeRStanD rIgHtly, we aRe witnessing a CuRious reverSiOn tO the coMMOn sense wAy of looking at physical naTUre, in thE phIlosoPhy oF science fAvoRed by sUch MEn as MaCh, OstwAld anD DUheM. aCcordING tO thEsE teachers nO HYpoThesiS iS truEr than aNy other in the sense oF BeiNg a more literaL coPy of REAlIty. tHeY Are AlL But WAYs of talking on ouR part, to be cOmPArEd solely frOM thE pOint of vIew of thEir usE. the only Literally True thing Is RealITY; anD the only reAlity we kNow is, for tHEse loGIcIans, sEnsIble reAlIty, The flUx of ouR SenSatioNs and eMoTions aS they PaSs". Víctor manuel Hernández Márquez – WAs PierRe DuhEm aN Esprit de finESse
 opposite mindset despitetheir natu re. T hus , f or  exa mple , in his early year s, Wittgenstein – a fo x byna t ure–  t hough t of hi m se l f  as  a  h edg eh o g.  Therev erse, h owever, se ems  i mplausible,i fnot imposs ibl e. It is for  th is rea so n t h at, f orJames  (1981 [1907] ), far fr om beinga  purely i nt elle ctual matter, a d i st i nction of this  kindis am a tte r o f temperam en t; th i s despi t et h e  fa c t that the ma jority of u s  ar e inca pa ble of pos sessi ng a w ell-defined  int ellectual  tempe r ament ( i n thiscase,weare  onl y  o rd ina ry peo p le ).W ith  regardto  p hilos ophi c a l incl ina tion s, fo r James, oneiseith e r a n emp irici st o ra rat ionali st ac co rding to his te mper ament, no t b ycho ic e. In otherwor ds,  we donot cho o seto b e  f oxes or hedgehogs,  w e si mply are  one o r  t he other. I fweputB e rlin' s di s ti nction i n Jame s ia nterms,afox wo ul d b e,by de f init ion, a n empiri cist, a lover of cru d e facts and w o ul d ,  t h eref ore , be of a r ough mind set. Wh ere a s the  hedg eh o gw ould always be a ra ti onalis t, alover of abst ract princ i p l es and t here f or e , his or her m ind w ould be su b tle. Her e, no netheles s, Jamesp e rforms a  sl eig htofh a nd  insofar as h e make suse ofthe  knownPas cal ian  di st inction b etween t he  s ub tl e m ind a n d the ge om etr ic  mi nd. M o reover , sin ce J am es was  famili a rw i th P ie rr e Du hem 's  oeuv re,h e t akes fr om it wha t b e tter  s ui ts hispragmatist ch ar acter.2 Ha vi ngsaid t h a t, altho ugh there are commonali t ies bet wee n the  ove rall meth ods  of ea cho f thes e mind sets,  f orD u hem,t h ePas ca lian disti n c tio n ser ve s, f irst an d foremost, the ex p lic it purpose of  2In t h e  f ift h  L o wel ll ect u r e, entitled "Pr agmatism a nd co mmon sense , " J am es (198 1 [1907 ], 86 )  writes : "Just n ow, if Iun ders t a ndrightly, w e are wi tnessinga  curi o us  reve rsi on toth e c ommon  sense way  of l ooking  a t phys icalna ture, in  the philosophy of scie nce fa vored  by  such men  as Mac h, Ostwal d an d Duhem. A cco rdi ng to  th e se te ache r snoh ypoth esis is truert ha n a n y  o ther in the s e nse  of b ein g  a mor e li teral copy of rea l ity. They areallb u t w ays of t al king on our pa rt,  t o be compa re d solely fr om the p oi n t ofview o f thei r use.T h eo nly li tera lly  true thi ngis reality ;an d  the o nlyre alitywe kno w  is, f or these logicia ns, s e n sible rea lity,  t he flux of o ur sensati ons and emo tionsas t hey p ass". V íc tor Ma nue lHernándezM árquez –Was P ierre D uh em a n E spritde F i n esse
 opposite_mindset despite_their nature. Thus, for_example, in_his_early years,_Wittgenstein_– a fox_by nature –_thought of himself as_a hedgehog. The_reverse,_however, seems implausible, if not impossible. It is for this reason that, for James_(1981_[1907]), far_from_being_a purely intellectual matter, a_distinction of this kind is_a matter_of temperament; this despite the fact that the_majority_of us are_incapable of possessing a well-defined intellectual temperament (in this_case, we are only ordinary people)._With regard to_philosophical_inclinations,_for James, one is_either an empiricist or a rationalist_according to his temperament, not by_choice. In other words, we do not_choose to be foxes or hedgehogs,_we simply are one or_the other._If we put Berlin's distinction_in Jamesian terms,_a fox_would be, by_definition, an empiricist, a lover of_crude facts and_would, therefore, be of a rough_mindset._Whereas the hedgehog_would_always_be a_rationalist, a lover_of_abstract principles_and_therefore, his or her mind would_be_subtle. Here, nonetheless, James performs a sleight_of hand insofar as_he_makes use of the_known Pascalian distinction between the_subtle mind and the geometric mind._Moreover, since_James was_familiar with Pierre Duhem's oeuvre, he takes from it what better_suits his pragmatist character.2 Having said_that, although there are_commonalities between_the_overall methods of_each_of these_mindsets, for Duhem, the Pascalian distinction serves,_first and_foremost, the explicit purpose of 2_In the fifth Lowell_lecture,_entitled "Pragmatism and common sense," James_(1981 [1907], 86) writes: "Just now,_if I understand rightly, we_are_witnessing_a curious reversion to the_common sense way of looking at_physical nature, in_the philosophy of science favored by such_men_as Mach, Ostwald and Duhem. According_to_these teachers no hypothesis is truer_than_any_other in the sense of_being a more literal copy of_reality. They are all but ways of talking on_our part, to_be compared solely from the_point_of_view of their use. The only literally true thing is_reality; and_the only reality_we know is, for these logicians, sensible reality, the flux_of our sensations and emotions as they_pass". Víctor Manuel Hernández Márquez – Was Pierre Duhem an Esprit_de Finesse