 distinction between two parts of the theory. Don't representative principles face the 'tribunal of experience' no less holistically than explanatory ones? Is there a way out for Duhem? Duhem's way out was the restriction of his anti-atomism to the explanatory part of the theory. As we stressed, he used anti-atomism as an argument against the testability of explanatory hypotheses. But we saw already in section "Representation vs Explanation", that representative propositions were taken to be close to the experimental facts because they, in effect, replace these facts "with abstract and symbolic representations". This replacement is what Duhem calls "interpretation" (1894, 88). But interpretation does involve theories, since the very idea of abstract and symbolic representation implies the "transportation" of a fact into a theory. Though the experimental facts are interpreted by the theory that "physicists regard as established" (1894, 95), Duhem is adamant that the representative part of the theory is independent from the explanatory part, the reason being that it can be interpreted within alternative theoretical systems. Hence, an explanatory theory T may 'interpret' a certain set of empirical laws and facts according to its own conceptual resources, but the very same laws - being abstract and symbolic representations - can be "translated into the language" of an alternative theory T'. Once abstraction principles have allowed scientists to treat empirical properties as physical magnitudes, the symbols, qua symbols, admit of different interpretations. When transported into an explanatory framework, the symbols and the relations they stand to each other, are interpreted in light of the relevant theory. But precisely because they can be interpreted by different theories, theories can share representative parts (1894, 96). Hence it is possible to make "elements of the new theory correspond to elements of the old theory at certain points": a representative proposition, though interpreted within a physical theory, is interpretable within alternative physical theories too. All this requires that, though interpretable by a given theory T, the representative part has empirical content of its own, independently of T. Hence, it acquires its content, as it were, atomistically. It is this atomistic empirical significance of the representative propositions that makes them interpretable in alternative theories. It is this that makes possible the establishment of a "correspondence" between the symbols that represent the results of experiments in theory T and the symbols that represent the same results in theory T' (cf. 1894, 96). It seems plausible that Duhem drew the distinction between the
distinction between two parts of the theory. Don't representative principles front the' court of experience' no less holistically than explanatory ones? Is there a way out for Duhem? Duhem's direction away was the restriction of his anti - atomism to the explanatory part of the theory. As we stress, he used anti - atomism as an argument against the testability of explanatory hypothesis. But we saw already in section " Representation vs Explanation ", that representative proposal were taken to be close to the experimental fact because they, in consequence, replace these facts " with abstract and symbolic representations ". This replacement is what Duhem call " interpretation " (1894, 88). But interpretation does involve theory, since the very idea of abstract and symbolic theatrical performance implies the " exile " of a fact into a theory. Though the experimental facts are interpreted by the hypothesis that " physicists regard as established " (1894, 95), Duhem is adamant that the representative part of the theory is independent from the explanatory part, the rationality being that it can be interpreted within alternative theoretical systems. Hence, an explanatory theory T may' interpret' a certain set of empirical laws and fact according to its own conceptual resources, but the very like law - being abstract and emblematic representations - can be " translated into the language " of an alternative theory T'. Once abstraction principles have admit scientists to treat empirical properties as physical magnitudes, the symbol, qua symbols, admit of different interpretations. When transport into an explanatory model, the symbol and the relations they stand to each other, are interpreted in inner light of the relevant theory. But precisely because they can be interpreted by different theory, theories can share representative parts (1894, 96). Hence it is potential to make " elements of the new theory correspond to component of the old hypothesis at certain points ": a representative proposition, though interpreted within a forcible theory, is interpretable within alternative forcible theories too. All this requires that, though interpretable by a given theory T, the representative part has empirical content of its own, independently of T. Hence, it acquires its content, as it were, atomistically. It is this atomistic empiric significance of the representative propositions that make them interpretable in alternative theories. It is this that makes possible the establishment of a " correspondence " between the symbol that represent the results of experiments in theory T and the symbols that represent the like results in theory T' (californium. 1894, 96). It seems plausible that Duhem drew the distinction between the
 didtinction between two pavts of the theori. Eon't rxpresenfative pfinciples face the 'tribunal lf expeeience' no less holistizally thaj explanqtorb ones? Is there e way oub for Fuhek? Duhem's way ouj was the revtriction of hhs auti-atomism to the explanatory part os the tnelry. As we strefsed, re uavd anti-atomism as an argument afainst uhe testability of explanatory hypotheses. Buh we saw already in seftion "Reprewentwrion vs Explxnation", that representztive propositions were taken tu be elose to thg sxogrimental farts bebause they, in effect, seplace these facts "wlth austrqct and symbolic reprxsentations". This repjacement hs what Duhem calls "ibterptetathon" (1894, 88). Bug ihtxrpdetatiln voes involvs theories, wince the very idea os abstract and symbojis representation implies the "transportauion" kf a fact into a theory. Though the experimenjal facts wre interpreted by the theory that "physicists regdrd aa esuanjkwhfd" (1894, 95), Duhem is adamant that the representative latt of the theory is indepencejt srom the explxnatorv pzrt, the reason beijg that it cqn be inttrpreyed within alternative theoeetical systvms. Yence, an explanatoxy theory T oay 'onterlret' a certain set of eopirjcal laws ajd facts zzcording to its uwn cmnceptual resources, but thq very sane lcws - beivg anstrace and symbllic vapresentations - caj be "jransldted into hhe language" of an alternative vieory T'. Once sbvtrdction pxincipkes have allored scientists to trect empkrical proierties av physical iagnitudes, tha symbols, qua symbols, admut od diffefdnt interpretayions. Wheu trabsported into an ewplanxfory framework, cke symbols and thr rdlaeilnx evey stand to eacf ogner, afe interprebed in kight of the relevand thsory. But precisely bccause thgy can be interpreted ny different theorles, tieorier can shwre representative parts (1894, 96). Hende it is oosfible to makq "elcmenjs of the nzw theory correspond to elements of the ild theory at cerjain points": a represeutstive propoxitiog, though hnterpreted within a physical theory, ls interpretable withih altesnatige physical theories too. All this requires that, though interpretable by a given theory T, ths relresettctire part has xmpirical content of its own, independently of T. Ience, it awqbires its content, as it were, stumistically. Ij is this atomistic empiridal signoficance of the representative lropositions that makes bhem inteepretzble in alvernative theories. Iy is tkis thqt makew podsible the esgabkidhment of a "cprxespondence" between the symbols tyat reprfsent the resultv of experiltnts in theori T and the symboms tgwt rekresent the sake results in yheory T' (cf. 1894, 96). It seeks plausible thau Duhem drew thg distinbtion between the
distinction between two parts of the theory. principles the 'tribunal experience' no less there way out for Duhem's way out the restriction of his anti-atomism to explanatory part of the theory. As we stressed, he used anti-atomism as an against the testability of explanatory hypotheses. But we saw already in section "Representation Explanation", representative were to be close to the experimental facts because they, in effect, replace these facts "with abstract symbolic representations". This replacement is what Duhem calls (1894, 88). But interpretation involve theories, since the very of and symbolic implies "transportation" a fact into theory. Though the experimental facts are interpreted by the theory that "physicists regard as established" (1894, 95), is adamant representative part the is from the explanatory reason being that it can be theoretical systems. Hence, an explanatory theory T may a certain of empirical laws and facts according its own conceptual resources, but the very same - being abstract and symbolic representations - can be "translated into the language" of an T'. Once abstraction principles allowed scientists to empirical as magnitudes, symbols, qua admit of different interpretations. When transported into an explanatory framework, the and the relations they stand to each other, are interpreted of relevant theory. But because they can be by theories, theories can share (1894, Hence to "elements the new theory correspond elements of the old theory certain points": a representative physical theory, is interpretable within alternative physical theories All this requires that, though interpretable by given theory T, the representative part has empirical content of its own, of T. acquires its content, as it were, atomistically. It this atomistic empirical significance the representative propositions that makes them interpretable in alternative It this that possible the establishment a "correspondence" between symbols that represent of experiments theory and represent the same results in theory (cf. 96). It seems plausible that drew between the
 distinction between two partS of the theoRy. Don'T rePreSeNtatIve pRinciples face tHE 'triBunal of experience' no lesS holiStICallY ThAn expLanatorY OnES? is tHeRe A waY oUT fOr DuhEm? DUhem's waY out was the ResTrIction of his aNTi-Atomism to tHe eXplanatory paRt oF the thEoRy. AS We strEssEd, he uSed antI-AtomisM as an arguMeNT againST the tesTABiLity Of explanatory hypoTHeSEs. But we saw alreAdy in sEcTIoN "rEprEseNtation vs EXpLanatIOn", that rEPrESENtaTIve propositioNs were taken TO be Close tO tHe eXPerimeNtal fAcTS beCause they, in EffeCt, replace These fACts "with ABstract And symBolIc rEpreSEnTaTioNs". tHis REpLacEMenT is what DUhEm Calls "InteRPRETatiOn" (1894, 88). BUt inTerprEtation does inVolVe thEOriEs, sinCe the Very IdEa of aBstracT and sYmBolic representaTion Implies thE "trAnSpoRtAtion" OF a fact IntO a tHeory. ThOugh the EXpeRiMENTaL facts are interpretEd BY ThE theory tHat "phySIcIsTS regard aS eStaBlisHED" (1894, 95), DuheM is aDAmAnt that tHe reprESeNtAtive paRt Of the tHeOry Is iNdepeNDent From thE explanaTory pARt, the reason beiNG that it can be iNTeRPReTEd wiThiN alternativE theORetiCal sYStEms. hEnce, aN explAnAToRY theory T may 'interpreT' a CertaiN set oF empirical lawS and facts aCCORding to iTs owN CoNCeptual resourcEs, but The very samE Laws - beinG abstRact and sYmbolic rePREsentatiOns - Can Be "tRanSLAtEd into the langUAGe" of An AlternaTivE theory t'. OnCe aBstRacTiOn principLes have aLlOwEd ScIenTists TO treat emPiRicAl ProPertiES as phySical MagnItUdES, thE symbolS, QuA SYmboLs, AdMit oF diFfErent InteRPreTations. when transPorTEd inTo An ExplanaTory framework, ThE symbols anD tHe rElatioNS They stanD to each other, are interpreTEd in ligHt oF the rElevAnt theory. but PrecisEly BEcause They caN be inTeRprETEd by dIFFeRenT tHeories, theORIes Can shArE repResentaTive parts (1894, 96). Hence it is POssIble to make "eleMenTs of THE nEw tHEoRY coRrESpoND To elements of the Old theory aT cERtAin points": a REprEsEntativE proposItion, THough inTerpreted Within a phYsIcal THEorY, is interprEtable wiThin alterNAtive PHySical TheOries tOo. all This rEquireS ThaT, thouGh inteRpRetablE by a gIvEn theory t, the representative part hAs empiRical ConTent of its Own, INdePendently Of T. HEnce, it acquIreS itS contEnt, AS it weRe, atOMiStiCAlly. IT is tHIs atomistIC eMpiRICaL significanCE OF thE reprEseNTative PropOsitions that makes THem interpretabLe in ALTerNatIVe thEoRies. It is this thAt mAkES Possible ThE establishmEnt of a "coRrESpondEnce" beTween tHe symboLS ThAT repreSent The Results of ExpErIMents in ThEoRY T and tHe syMbOls thaT repreSEnt tHE Same results in theOry T' (cF. 1894, 96). iT seemS PlaUsiblE tHat DuheM Drew The distincTion between The
 distinction between two p arts of th e the ory . D on 't r epre sentative prin c iple s face the 'tribunal o f exp er i ence '  n o les s holis t ic a l lyth an  ex pl a na toryone s? Is t here a way  ou tfor Duhem? D u he m's way ou t w as the restr ict ion of  h isa nti-a tom ism t o thee xplana tory part  o f  the t h eory. A s we  str essed, he used an t i- a tomism as an a rgumen ta ga i n stthe  testabili ty  of e x planato r yh y p oth e ses. But we s aw alreadyi n s ection  " Rep r esenta tionvs Exp lanation",that  represen tative proposi t ions we re tak entobe c l os etoth e  ex p er ime n tal  facts b ec au se th ey,i n e ffec t,repl ace t hese facts "w ith  abs t rac t and  symb olic  r epres entati ons".  T his replacement  iswhat Duhe m c al ls"i nterp r etatio n"(18 94, 88) . But i n ter pr e t a ti on does involve th eo r i es , sincethe ve r yid e a of abs tr act  and s ymbol ic r e pr esentati on imp l ie sthe "tr an sporta ti on"  of  a fa c t in to a t heory. T hough the experiment a l facts are i n te r p re t ed b y t he theory t hat" phys icis t sreg a rd as  esta bl i sh e d" (1894, 95), Duhe mis ada mantthat the repr esentative p a rt of th e th e or y  is independen t fro m the expl a natory p art,the reas on beingt h at it ca n b e i nte rpr e t ed  within alter n a tive  t heoreti cal  system s.Hen ce,  an  e xplanator y theory  T  m ay  ' int erpre t ' a cert ai n s et  of  empi r ical l aws a nd f ac ts acc ordingt oi t s ow nco ncep tua lresou rces ,  bu t the v ery samelaw s  - b ei ng  abstra ct and symbol ic  represent at ion s - ca n be "tran slated into the languag e " of an  al terna tive  theory T '.Once a bst r action  princ iples  h ave a llowe d sc ien ti sts to tre a t  em piric al  pro perties  as physical magni t ude s, the symbol s,quas y mb ols ,  a d mit  o f  di f f erent interpret ations. Wh en tr ansportedi nto  a n expla natoryframe w ork, th e symbols  and there lati o n s t hey standto eachother, ar e  inte r pr etedinlightof  th e rel evantt heo ry. B ut pre ci sely b ecaus ethey can  be interpreted by diff erenttheor ies , theorie s c a n s hare repr esen tative par ts(18 94, 9 6). Hence  iti spos s ibleto m a ke "eleme n ts  of t he  new theory c o rre spond  to elemen ts o f the old theorya t certain poin ts": a  re pre s enta ti ve proposition , t ho u g h interp re ted withina physic al theor y, isinterp retable w it h in alt erna tiv e physica l t he o ries to o.  A l l this  req ui res th at, th o ughi n terpretable by a  give n theor y  T,  there present a tive  part hasempirical c ontent  ofits o wn, ind ep endent lyof  T. Hence, it acquir es it s conte nt , as  it  were,  ato m i stica lly.  I t i s this at o m is t ic  e m pir ical  sign if ican ce of the represen tat i ve prop os iti o n s that ma k e s them int erp retab l e  in altern a tive th e ories . It i s this  that m a kes  p ossible  th e establish ment of a "co rr espo ndence"be twee nthe  s ymbols that rep resent t he resul t s  of ex per i ment s  in th eo ry T and the  symb ol s  that r e p res ent the sam e r esu ltsintheo r y T' (cf. 1894, 96). Itseem s pla u sib le th at Du he m drew t h e di stinctio n  between the
 distinction_between two_parts of the theory._Don't representative_principles_face the_'tribunal_of experience' no_less holistically than_explanatory ones? Is there_a way out_for_Duhem? Duhem's way out was the restriction of his anti-atomism to the explanatory part_of_the theory._As_we_stressed, he used anti-atomism as_an argument against the testability_of explanatory_hypotheses. But we saw already in section "Representation_vs_Explanation", that representative_propositions were taken to be close to the experimental_facts because they, in effect, replace_these facts "with_abstract_and_symbolic representations". This replacement_is what Duhem calls "interpretation" (1894,_88). But interpretation does involve theories,_since the very idea of abstract and_symbolic representation implies the "transportation" of_a fact into a theory._Though the_experimental facts are interpreted by_the theory that_"physicists regard_as established" (1894,_95), Duhem is adamant that the_representative part of_the theory is independent from the_explanatory_part, the reason_being_that_it can_be interpreted within_alternative_theoretical systems._Hence,_an explanatory theory T may 'interpret'_a_certain set of empirical laws and facts_according to its own_conceptual_resources, but the very_same laws - being abstract_and symbolic representations - can be_"translated into_the language"_of an alternative theory T'. Once abstraction principles have allowed scientists_to treat empirical properties as physical_magnitudes, the symbols, qua_symbols, admit_of_different interpretations. When_transported_into an_explanatory framework, the symbols and the relations_they stand_to each other, are interpreted in_light of the relevant_theory._But precisely because they can be_interpreted by different theories, theories can_share representative parts (1894, 96)._Hence_it_is possible to make "elements_of the new theory correspond to_elements of the_old theory at certain points": a representative_proposition,_though interpreted within a physical theory,_is_interpretable within alternative physical theories too._All_this_requires that, though interpretable by_a given theory T, the representative_part has empirical content of its own, independently of_T. Hence, it_acquires its content, as it_were,_atomistically._It is this atomistic empirical significance of the representative propositions_that makes_them interpretable in_alternative theories. It is this that makes possible the establishment_of a "correspondence" between the symbols that_represent the results of experiments in theory T and the symbols_that represent the same results in theory T'_(cf. 1894, 96). It seems plausible that_Duhem drew the distinction_between_the