). The translation from LW to L proceeds as before. There is a clear sense in whichL↑↓ has more expressive power than LACT. We can translate from LACT to L↑↓ by prefixing each sentence with ↑1, and replacing each occurrence of ACT with ↓1; there is no comparable translation that maps every sentence ofL↑↓ to a sentence of LACT. But in dealing with L↑↓, there is no particular temptation to treat sentences that contain occurrences of ↓i that are not within the scope of ↑i as expressing propositions in their own right. While '↓17 Mars is red' is meaningful-it makes a distinctive contribution to the meaning of larger sentences that embed it-its meaning, like that of the open sentence 'x is red', is not a matter of its expressing a particular proposition. Thus, 'What is it for it to be the case that ↓17 Mars is red?' doesn't look like a good question; our inability to answer it nontrivially does not amount to "taking ↓17 as primitive". The situation with ACT is, I suggest, similar. The semantic contribution of a sentence involving ACT is not properly thought of as a matter of its expressing a proposition, so the quest for an analysis of these sentences is misguided. (Of course we can use these sentences to assert propositions, just as we can use sentences with free variables to assert 50For operators that work in similar ways see, e.g., Vlach 1973, Fine 1977, Hodes 1984, Williamson MS. Under certain circumstances, the numerical subscripts can be dispensed with. But they are convenient, as they make the statement of the translation into LW easier. propositions.) Once we understand the sense in which everything that can be said using 'actually' can be said using '↑1' and '↓1', and we know how to analyse sentences using ↑1 and ↓1 in nonmodal terms, we have achieved everything the reductionist should want. 12 Surprising dependencies across Lewis-worlds Consider a very detailed qualitative property with just one instance in the whole of reality, which does not overlap our Lewis-world. Call the property 'F-ness' and its instance 'Felix'. Suppose that I could have been F, i.e. that Felix is one of my counterparts. Given the necessity of distinctness-a principle which, as we have seen, we must embrace if we want a reasonable logic
). The translation from LW to L proceeds as before. There is a clean common sense in whichL↑↓ has more expressive power than LACT. We can understand from LACT to L↑↓ by prefixing each prison term with ↑1, and replacing each occurrence of ACT with ↓1; there be no comparable translation that maps every conviction ofL↑↓ to a sentence of LACT. But in dealing with L↑↓, there be no particular temptation to cover prison term that contain occurrences of ↓i that are not within the scope of ↑i as expressing propositions in their own right field. While' ↓17 Mars is red' is meaningful - it makes a distinctive contribution to the meaning of large sentences that embed it - its meaning, like that of the overt sentence' x is crimson', is not a matter of its expressing a particular proposition. Thus,' What is it for it to be the shell that ↓17 Mars is red?' doesn't look like a good question; our inability to answer it nontrivially does not amount to " taking ↓17 as primitive ". The situation with ACT is, I suggest, similar. The semantic contribution of a sentence involving ACT is not properly thought of as a matter of its expressing a suggestion, so the quest for an analysis of these prison term is misguided. (Of course we can use these sentences to affirm propositions, just as we can use sentences with spare variables to assert 50For operators that work in similar ways visualize, e.g., Vlach 1973, Fine 1977, Hodes 1984, Williamson MS. Under certain circumstances, the numerical subscripts can be distribute with. But they are convenient, as they make the statement of the translation into LW easier. proposition .) Once we understand the sense in which everything that can be said using' actually' can be said using' ↑1' and' ↓1', and we know how to analyse conviction using ↑1 and ↓1 in nonmodal terms, we have achieve everything the reductionist should want. 12 Surprising dependencies across Lewis - worlds Consider a very detailed qualitative place with just one instance in the whole of world, which does not overlap our Lewis - world. Call the property' F - ness' and its example' Felix'. Suppose that I could have been F, i.e. that Felix is one of my counterparts. Given the necessity of distinctness - a principle which, as we have seen, we must embrace if we want a reasonable logic
). Thf translation from LW to L proceeds as ywfore. Vhere ia a cleaf sense in whichL↑↓ has more eeprewsive power than LACT. We cav translane from LQCT uo L↑↓ by prefixing each sekcence aith ↑1, and replacing each occusrence of ACT figh ↓1; there is no comparable translatiog that kaos every sentegce psL↑↓ tk a sentence of LACT. But in dealinf with N↑↓, there is no particular temptation to hreah sentences that clntain occutdensws of ↓i that are not wpchin the sckpe of ↑i as expressing propositkons nn their owb eigjj. While '↓17 Marw is ged' is meaninngul-it kakes a distinctive cpntciburion to the meaning oh larger sentences trat embed ic-its meaning, like thar if thg opet sevrenze 's ms ded', is nov a matter kf its exprwssing a particular pwiposition. Thua, 'What if it for it to be the case that ↓17 Mars iv rsd?' doesn't look like a giod question; our inabllity to wnswer it nontrivially does not amount to "taking ↓17 as pcioitnyc". Thd sltuation with ACT is, I suggest, similar. The seiznuic contribution jf a sentenve imdolving ACT ir not 'dolerly thought of ad a matjer of its exprtssinb a proposition, so the quesr for an anajtsis of these sentznces is misyuided. (Of cpurse we can use these rentsnces to asdert propkritions, just as de ban gse senttvces with free vawiables ti asxert 50Fof opgrators that work in slkilar ways see, e.g., Glach 1973, Xine 1977, Hoded 1984, Williamson MS. Under certain rmrcumstances, jhe nukerical fubscvipts can be difpensed with. Bot they axe conxenient, as they meke the statqment of the dtanslation invo LW easyer. propisitionr.) Once we underxtand the sense in qhich everything tmat cxh be said using 'acuuqlly' can be saod jsigg '↑1' end '↓1', wtd we know hmw tu avslyse sentences msivg ↑1 snd ↓1 in nonmodal terks, ws have achieved evrrnthing thg reductijnist should eant. 12 Surprising dtpendeicies ecross Leris-worlds Consider a very detajled qualltabive property witm juft one inscance in the whole of reality, which does not overlap our Lwwis-world. Call the krokerty 'F-ness' aid its instance 'Felix'. Suppose that U could have been F, i.e. that Felix is ohe of ky coknterparts. Given the necessity of distinctness-a principle which, as we havw seen, we must embdace if wv wcnt a reafonaulx logic
). The translation from LW to L before. is a sense in whichL↑↓ LACT. can translate from to L↑↓ by each sentence with ↑1, and replacing occurrence of ACT with ↓1; there is no comparable translation that maps every ofL↑↓ to a sentence of LACT. But in dealing with L↑↓, there is particular to sentences contain occurrences of ↓i that are not within the scope of ↑i as expressing propositions in own right. While '↓17 Mars is red' is makes a distinctive contribution the meaning of larger sentences embed meaning, like of open 'x is red', not a matter of its expressing a particular proposition. Thus, 'What is it for it to be case that is red?' look a question; our inability it nontrivially does not amount to primitive". The situation with ACT is, I suggest, The semantic of a sentence involving ACT is properly thought of as a matter of its a proposition, so the quest for an analysis of these sentences is misguided. (Of course use these sentences to propositions, just as can sentences free to assert operators that work in similar ways see, e.g., Vlach 1973, Fine Hodes 1984, Williamson MS. Under certain circumstances, the numerical subscripts dispensed But they are as they make the of translation into LW easier. we the everything can said using 'actually' can said using '↑1' and '↓1', we know how to ↓1 in nonmodal terms, we have achieved everything reductionist should want. 12 Surprising dependencies across Consider a very detailed qualitative property with just one instance in the of reality, not overlap our Lewis-world. Call the property 'F-ness' its instance 'Felix'. Suppose I could have been F, i.e. that Felix is of counterparts. Given necessity of distinctness-a which, as we seen, we must we want reasonable
). The translation from LW to L prOceeds as beFore. THerE is A cLear SensE in whichL↑↓ has moRE expRessive power than LACT. We Can trAnSLate FRoM LACT To L↑↓ by prEFiXINg eAcH sEntEnCE wIth ↑1, anD rePlacing Each occurrEncE oF ACT with ↓1; therE Is No comparabLe tRanslation thAt mAps eveRy SenTEnce oFL↑↓ tO a senTence oF lACT. BuT in dealinG wITh L↑↓, theRE is no paRTIcUlar Temptation to treat SEnTEnces that contaIn occuRrENcES Of ↓i ThaT are not witHiN the sCOpe of ↑i aS ExPRESsiNG propositions In their own rIGht. while '↓17 MArS is REd' is meAningFuL-It mAkes a distinCtivE contribuTion to THe meaniNG of largEr sentEncEs tHat eMBeD iT-itS mEAniNG, lIke THat Of the opeN sEnTence 'X is rED', IS Not a MatTer oF its eXpressing a parTicUlar PRopOsitiOn. ThuS, 'WhaT iS it foR it to bE the cAsE that ↓17 Mars is red?' dOesn'T look like A goOd QueStIon; ouR InabilIty To aNswer it NontrivIAllY dOES NoT amount to "taking ↓17 as pRiMITiVe". The sitUation WItH Act is, I suggEsT, siMilaR. tHe semAntiC CoNtributiOn of a sENtEnCe involViNg ACT iS nOt pRopErly tHOughT of as a Matter of Its exPRessing a proposITion, so the quesT FoR AN aNAlysIs oF these senteNces IS misGuidED. (OF coURse we Can usE tHEsE Sentences to assert prOpOsitioNs, jusT as we can use seNtences witH FREe variabLes tO AsSErt 50For operatorS that Work in simiLAr ways seE, e.g., VlAch 1973, Fine 1977, HOdes 1984, WilliAMSon MS. UndEr cErtAin CirCUMsTances, the numeRICal sUbScripts Can Be dispeNseD wiTh. BUt tHeY are conveNient, as tHeY mAkE tHe sTatemENt of the tRaNslAtIon Into Lw Easier. PropoSitiOnS.) ONCe wE undersTAnD THe seNsE iN whiCh eVeRythiNg thAT caN be said Using 'actuAllY' Can bE sAiD using '↑1' aNd '↓1', and we know hoW tO analyse seNtEncEs usinG ↑1 ANd ↓1 in nonmOdal terms, we have achieved EVerythiNg tHe redUctiOnist shouLd wAnt. 12 SurPriSIng depEndencIes acRoSs LEWIs-worLDS COnsIdEr a very detAILed QualiTaTive PropertY with just one instanCE in The whole of reaLitY, whiCH DoEs nOT oVErlAp OUr LEWIs-world. Call the pRoperty 'F-neSs' ANd Its instancE 'felIx'. suppose That I coUld haVE been F, i.E. that FeliX is one of mY cOuntERParTs. Given the NecessitY of distinCTness-A PrIncipLe wHich, as We HavE seen, We must EMbrAce if We want A rEasonaBle loGiC
). The translation from LW  to L proc eedsasbef or e. T here  is a clear se n se i n whichL↑↓ has more ex press iv e  pow e rthanLACT. W e  c a n  tr an sl ate  f r om  LACT  to  L↑↓ by  prefixing  ea ch  sentence wi t h↑1, and re pla cing each oc cur renceof  AC T  with  ↓1 ; the re isn o comp arable tr an s lation that ma p s  e very  sentence ofL↑↓ t o  a sentence of LA CT. Bu ti nd e ali ngwith L↑↓,th ere i s  no par t ic u l a r t e mptation to t reat senten c esthat c on tai n  occur rence so f ↓ i that arenotwithin th e scop e  of ↑ia s expre ssingpro pos itio n sin  th ei r  ow n  r igh t . W hile '↓1 7Ma rs is  red ' i s  mea nin gful -it m akes a distin cti ve c o ntr ibuti on to  the  m eanin g of l arger  s entences that e mbed  it-its m ean in g,li ke th a t of t heope n sente nce 'xi s r ed ' , is  not a matter of i ts e xp ressinga part i cu la r  proposi ti on.  Thu s ,  'Wha t is it  for itto bet he  c ase tha t↓17 Ma rs  is  re d?' d o esn' t look  like agoodq uestion; our i n ability to an s we r it nont riv ially doesnota moun t to "t aki n g ↓17  as p ri m it i ve". The situationwi th ACT  is,I suggest, si milar. The s e mantic c ontr i bu t ion of a sente nce i nvolving A C T is not  prop erly tho ught of a s a matter  of  it s e xpr e s si ng a proposit i o n, s othe que stfor anana lys isofth ese sente nces ismi sg ui de d.(Of c o urse weca n u se  th ese s e ntence s toasse rt  p r opo sitions ,  j u s t as  w ecanuse  s enten cesw ith  free v ariablestoa sser t50 For ope rators that w or k in simil ar  wa ys see , e.g., Vl ach 1973, Fine 1977, Ho d es 1984 , W illia mson  MS. Unde r c ertain  ci r cumsta nces,the n um eri c a l sub s c ri pts  c an be disp e n sed  with .Butthey ar e convenient, as t h eymake the stat eme nt o f th e t r an s lat io n  in t o  LW easier. pro positions. )O nc e we under s tan dthe sen se in w hiche verythi ng that c an be sai dusin g 'ac tually' ca n be sai d using ' ↑ 1' an d  ' ↓1',and  we kn ow  ho w toanalys e  se ntenc es usi ng  ↑1 an d ↓1in  nonmoda l terms, we have achiev ed eve rythi ngthe reduc tio n ist  should w ant.  12 Surpri sin g d epend enc i es ac ross Le wis - world s Co n sider a v e ry  de t a il ed qualitat i v e  pr opert y w i th jus t on e instance in the whole of reali ty,w h ich  do e s no toverlap our Le wis -w o r ld. Call  t he property  'F-ness 'a nd it s inst ance ' Felix'. S up p ose th at I  co uld havebee nF , i.e.th at Felixis o ne  of my  count e rpar t s . Given the nece ssity o f dis t inc tness -a  princi p le w hich, as w e have seen , we m ustembra ce if w ewant a  re as onable log i c
). The_translation from_LW to L proceeds_as before._There_is a_clear_sense in whichL↑↓_has more expressive_power than LACT. We_can translate from_LACT_to L↑↓ by prefixing each sentence with ↑1, and replacing each occurrence of ACT_with_↓1; there_is_no_comparable translation that maps every_sentence ofL↑↓ to a sentence_of LACT._But in dealing with L↑↓, there is no_particular_temptation to treat_sentences that contain occurrences of ↓i that are not_within the scope of ↑i as_expressing propositions in_their_own_right. While '↓17 Mars_is red' is meaningful-it makes a_distinctive contribution to the meaning of_larger sentences that embed it-its meaning, like_that of the open sentence 'x_is red', is not a_matter of_its expressing a particular proposition._Thus, 'What is_it for_it to be_the case that ↓17 Mars is_red?' doesn't look_like a good question; our inability_to_answer it nontrivially_does_not_amount to_"taking ↓17 as_primitive"._The situation_with_ACT is, I suggest, similar. The_semantic_contribution of a sentence involving ACT is_not properly thought of_as_a matter of its_expressing a proposition, so the_quest for an analysis of these_sentences is_misguided. (Of_course we can use these sentences to assert propositions, just as_we can use sentences with free_variables to assert 50For_operators that_work_in similar ways_see,_e.g., Vlach_1973, Fine 1977, Hodes 1984, Williamson MS._Under certain_circumstances, the numerical subscripts can be_dispensed with. But they_are_convenient, as they make the statement_of the translation into LW easier._propositions.) Once we understand the_sense_in_which everything that can be_said using 'actually' can be said_using '↑1' and_'↓1', and we know how to analyse_sentences_using ↑1 and ↓1 in nonmodal_terms,_we have achieved everything the reductionist_should_want._12 Surprising dependencies across Lewis-worlds_Consider a very detailed qualitative property_with just one instance in the whole of reality,_which does not_overlap our Lewis-world. Call the_property_'F-ness'_and its instance 'Felix'. Suppose that I could have been_F, i.e._that Felix is_one of my counterparts. Given the necessity of distinctness-a principle_which, as we have seen, we must_embrace if we want a reasonable logic