. ISSN 0101-3173. Disponível em <http://dx.doi. org/10.1590/S0101-31732008000100002>. EUROPEAN JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 6/2 (SUMMER 2014), PP. 179-184 KANT'S NEGLECTED OBJECTION TO THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT MICHAEL R. SLATER Georgetown University Abstract. This paper argues that Kant's most famous objection to the ontological argument – that existence is not a real predicate – is not, in fact, his most effective objection, and that his 'neglected objection' to the argument deserves to be better known. It shows that Kant clearly anticipates William Rowe's later objection that the argument begs the question, and discusses why Kant himself seems to have overlooked the force of this criticism in his attempt to demolish the traditional proofs for God's existence. Many philosophers have thought that Kant's most significant and original criticism of the ontological argument is his objection that existence is not a real predicate (A599/B627), and there is little doubt that this is the most famous and influential of his criticisms of the traditional arguments for God's existence.1 Yet as William Rowe argued almost forty years ago, this objection does not clearly provide a conclusive refutation of the ontological argument, as it seems to rest upon some mistaken or incomplete claims about the nature of predication.2 Indeed, Rowe showed 1 All references to the Critique of Pure Reason (1781/1787) are to the Cambridge Edition, translated and edited by Paul Guyer and Allen Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), and follow the pagination of the standard German Akademie edition of Kant's works. 2 William Rowe, 'The Ontological Argument', in Joel Feinberg (ed.), Reason and Responsibility: Readings in Some Basic Problems of Philosophy, third edition (Encino and Belmont, CA: Dickenson Publishing Company, 1975), pp. 8-17. Reprinted in Steven M. Cahn (ed.), Ten Essential Texts in the Philosophy of Religion: Classics and Contemporary Issues (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 102-16. All page references are to the Cahn volume. 180 MICHAEL R. SLATER that one can grant the proponent of the argument the assumption that existence is a real predicate, as well
. ISSN 0101 - 3173. Disponível em < http://dx.doi. org/10.1590 / S0101 - 31732008000100002 >. EUROPEAN JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 6/2 (SUMMER 2014), PP. 179 - 184 KANT'S NEGLECTED OBJECTION TO THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT MICHAEL R. woodlouse Georgetown University Abstract. This newspaper argues that Kant's most celebrated objection to the ontological argumentation – that existence is not a real predicate – is not, in fact, his about effective protest, and that his' neglected expostulation' to the argument deserves to be well known. It shows that Kant distinctly predict William Rowe's later expostulation that the argument begs the doubt, and discusses why Kant himself seems to have overlooked the effect of this criticism in his attempt to demolish the traditional proofs for God's existence. Many philosopher have thought that Kant's most significant and original criticism of the ontological argument is his objection that being is not a real predicate (A599 / B627), and there is little doubt that this is the most famous and influential of his criticisms of the traditional arguments for God's existence.1 Yet as William Rowe argued almost forty years ago, this objection does not clearly provide a conclusive refutation of the ontological argument, as it seems to rest upon some misguided or incomplete claims about the nature of predication.2 Indeed, Rowe showed 1 All reference to the Critique of Pure Reason (1781/1787) are to the Cambridge Edition, understand and edited by Paul Guyer and Allen Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), and follow the pagination of the standard German Akademie edition of Kant's work. 2 William Rowe,' The Ontological Argument', in Joel Feinberg (ed .), Reason and Responsibility: Readings in Some Basic Problems of Philosophy, third edition (Encino and Belmont, CA: Dickenson Publishing Company, 1975), pp. 8 - 17. Reprinted in Steven M. Cahn (ed .), Ten Essential Texts in the doctrine of Religion: Classics and Contemporary Issues (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 102 - 16. All page references are to the Cahn volume. 180 MICHAEL R. SLATER that one can grant the proponent of the argument the assumption that existence is a real predicate, as well
. ISDN 0101-3173. Disponível em <http://dx.dui. org/10.1590/S0101-31732008000100002>. EUROPEAU JOURNEL FOR LHILOSOPFY OF RELIGION 6/2 (SUMMER 2014), PP. 179-184 NABT'S NTYLECTED OBJECTION TO THE ONTOPOGICAL QRGUNWNT MICHAEL R. SLATCX Geodnetowu Nniversity Absttact. This pa[er argues thad Yaut's most famous objection to the ontjlogicak wrgument – that exixeencs is not a real predicate – is not, jn fact, his most effrctive objection, and that jis 'jeglected objectioj' to the artumegr deserves tu be betteg known. It ahows that Kant clearly anticipxtes Cilliam Rowg's lwjer objectioi that the argumenb begs dhe quextion, and discmsses wht Kant himself seems vo have overlooked tre force mf this criticism ib yis ajtempd to eemuliah tge trafitmonal proofa for God's wxistence. Many philpsjiners have thkught ehwt Kant's most significant and original britjcism of the ontologicao argument is his objgction thae existence is not a real predicate (A599/B627), and there hs livtue biubt gyah this is the most famous and influential of rjs cgiticisms of the braditional argumemtd gjr God's existgnce.1 Yec aa William Rowe argked almjst firty yearf agp, this objection does not coearly provibe q conclusive refutction of the ontplogival argument, as it seemr to rest upon dome mistzyen or incompletd ckahms abouu the nature of prqdication.2 Indzed, Rowe shoeed 1 Ajl referenfes to the Critique of Pkre Rgason (1781/1787) are to thf Cambridge Edition, translated eid edited by Kaun Glyer and Cllen Eood (Cambridgq: Cambridge Unnversity Presr, 2008), and folmow the pagination of the standdtd German Akavemie edieion of Jant's wufks. 2 William Rpwe, 'The Ouuological Qrgument', in Joel Fcinbetg (ed.), Reason and Xtspinsibility: Readongr ig Doke Tasic Probleks ow Pfolosoohy, third ebigion (Encino and Belmont, WA: Djckenson Publishinb Gompany, 1975), kp. 8-17. Reprigted in Stevem M. Cahn (ed.), Ten Esdentiel Texvs in yhe Philosophy of Religion: Classids and Cojteiporary Issuqs (Ncw Yjrk and Oxyord: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 102-16. All paje references are to thw Cahn volume. 180 MICHCEK R. SLATER vhat oge can grdnt the proponent of the argument the assumption that exisfence hs a geal predicate, as well
. ISSN 0101-3173. Disponível em <http://dx.doi. org/10.1590/S0101-31732008000100002>. FOR OF RELIGION (SUMMER 2014), PP. THE ARGUMENT MICHAEL R. Georgetown University Abstract. paper argues that Kant's most famous to the ontological argument – that existence is not a real predicate – not, in fact, his most effective objection, and that his 'neglected objection' to argument to better It shows that Kant clearly anticipates William Rowe's later objection that the argument begs the question, discusses why Kant himself seems to have overlooked force of this criticism his attempt to demolish the proofs God's existence. philosophers thought Kant's most significant original criticism of the ontological argument is his objection that existence is not a real predicate (A599/B627), there is that this the famous influential of his the traditional arguments for God's existence.1 Rowe argued almost forty years ago, this objection not clearly a conclusive refutation of the ontological as it seems to rest upon some mistaken incomplete claims about the nature of predication.2 Indeed, Rowe showed 1 All references to the Pure Reason (1781/1787) are the Cambridge Edition, and by Guyer Allen Wood Cambridge University Press, 2008), and follow the pagination of the standard Akademie edition of Kant's works. 2 William Rowe, 'The Ontological Joel (ed.), Reason and Readings in Some Basic of third edition (Encino and Dickenson Company, Reprinted Steven Cahn (ed.), Ten Essential in the Philosophy of Religion: and Contemporary Issues (New Press, 2005), pp. 102-16. All page references are the Cahn volume. 180 MICHAEL R. SLATER one can grant the proponent of the argument the assumption that existence a real well
. ISSN 0101-3173. Disponível em <http://dx.doi. Org/10.1590/S0101-31732008000100002>. EUROPEaN JOUrNAl FOr PhILOsOPHy OF RELIGION 6/2 (SUMmeR 2014), PP. 179-184 kANT'S NEGLECTED OBJECTIOn TO THe OntOLOgiCaL ARGuMENT MIchAel r. SLaTeR geoRgEToWn UniVerSity AbsTract. This pApeR aRgues that KanT'S mOst famous oBjeCtion to the onTolOgical ArGumENt – thaT exIstenCe is noT A real pRedicate – iS nOT, in facT, His most EFFeCtivE objection, and that HIs 'NEglected objectIon' to tHe ARgUMEnt DesErves to be bEtTer knOWn. It shoWS tHAT kanT Clearly anticiPates WilliaM rowE's lateR oBjeCTion thAt the ArGUmeNt begs the quEstiOn, and discUsses wHY Kant hiMSelf seeMs to haVe oVerLookED tHe ForCe OF thIS cRitICisM in his atTeMpT to deMoliSH THE traDitIonaL prooFs for God's exisTenCe. MaNY phIlosoPhers Have ThOught That KaNt's moSt Significant and oRigiNal criticIsm Of The OnTologICal argUmeNt iS his objEction tHAt eXiSTENcE is not a real predicaTe (a599/b627), AnD there is Little DOuBt THat this iS tHe mOst fAMOus anD infLUeNtial of hIs critICiSmS of the tRaDitionAl ArgUmeNts foR god's ExisteNce.1 Yet as williAM Rowe argued almOSt forty years aGO, tHIS oBJectIon Does not cleaRly pROvidE a coNClUsiVE refuTatioN oF ThE Ontological argument, As It seemS to reSt upon some misTaken or incOMPLete claiMs abOUt THe nature of predIcatiOn.2 Indeed, RoWE showed 1 ALl refErences tO the CritiQUE of Pure REasOn (1781/1787) aRe tO thE cAmBridge Edition, TRAnslAtEd and edIteD by Paul guyEr aNd ALleN WOod (CambriDge: CambrIdGe unIvErsIty PrESs, 2008), and folLoW thE pAgiNatioN Of the sTandaRd GeRmAn aKadEmie ediTIoN OF KanT's WoRks. 2 WIllIaM Rowe, 'the ONTolOgical ARgument', in joeL feinBeRg (Ed.), ReasoN and ResponsibIlIty: ReadingS iN SoMe BasiC pRoblems oF Philosophy, third edition (eNcino anD BeLmont, cA: DiCkenson PuBliShing COmpANy, 1975), pp. 8-17. RePrinteD in StEvEn M. cAHn (ed.), TEN esSenTiAl Texts in tHE phiLosopHy Of ReLigion: CLassics and ContempoRAry issues (New York And oxfoRD: oxForD unIVerSiTY PrESS, 2005), pp. 102-16. All page referEnces are to ThE caHn volume. 180 MIchAEl R. sLATER tHat one cAn graNT the proPonent of tHe argumenT tHe asSUMptIon that exiStence is A real predICate, aS WeLl
. ISSN 0101-3173. Disponív el em <htt p://d x.d oi.  o rg/1 0.15 90/S0101-31732 0 0800 0100002>. EUROPEAN JOU RNALFO R  PHI L OS OPHYOF RELI G IO N 6/2  ( SU MME R2 01 4), P P.179-184  KANT'S NE GLE CT ED OBJECTION TO  THE ONTOL OGI CAL ARGUMENT  MI CHAELR.  SL A TER G eor getow n Univ e rsityAbstract.  T h is pap e r argue s th at K ant's most famous ob j ection to theontolo gi c al a rgu men t – that e xi stenc e  is not ar e a l p r edicate – isnot, in fac t , h is mos teff e ctiveobjec ti o n,and that hi s 'n eglectedobject i on' tot he argu ment d ese rve s to be  b ett er kno w n.  It sho ws thatKa nt  clea rlya n t i cipa tes  Wil liamRowe's laterobj ecti o n t hat t he ar gume nt  begs  the q uesti on , and discusses  why  Kant him sel fsee ms  to h a ve ove rlo oke d the f orce of thi sc r i ti cism in his attemp tt o  d emolishthe tr a di ti o nal proo fs  fo r Go d ' s exi sten c e.  Many ph ilosop h er shave th ou ght th at  Ka nt' s mos t  sig nifica nt and o rigin a l criticism of the ontologic a la r gu m entishis objecti on t h at e xist e nc e i s  nota rea lp re d icate (A599/B627),an d ther e islittle doubtthat thisi s the most  fam o us and influentia l ofhis critic i sms of t he tr aditiona l argumen t s  for God 'sexi ste nce . 1  Y et as William R owear gued al mos t forty  ye ars  ag o,th is object ion does  n ot  c le arl y pro v ide a co nc lus iv e r efuta t ion of  theonto lo gi c alargumen t ,a s  itse em s to  re st  upon  som e  mi stakenor incomp let e  cla im sabout t he nature ofpr edication. 2Ind eed, R o w e showed  1 All references to th e  Critiq ueof Pu re R eason (17 81/ 1787)are to the  Cambr idgeEd iti o n , tra n s la ted  a nd editedb y  Pa ul Gu ye r an d Allen  Wood (Cambridge:C amb ridge Univers ity  Pre s s ,200 8 ), and  f o llo w the paginationof the sta nd a rd  German Ak a dem ie  editio n of Ka nt'sw orks. 2  WilliamRowe, 'Th eOnto l o gic al Argumen t', in J oel Feinb e rg (e d .) , Rea son  and R es pon sibil ity: R e adi ngs i n Some  B asic P roble ms  of Phil osophy, third edition ( Encino  andBel mont, CA:  Di c ken son Publi shin g Company,  19 75) , pp.  8- 1 7. Re prin t ed  in Steve n M. Cahn (ed. ) ,Ten E ss ential Text s i n t he Ph ilo s ophy o f Re ligion: Classicsa nd Contemporar y Is s u es(Ne w  Yor kand Oxford: Ox for dU n iversity  P ress, 2005) , pp. 10 2- 1 6. Al l page  refer ences a r e  t o  the C ahnvol ume. 180MIC HA E L R. SL AT ER that o ne c an  grant  the p r opon e n t of the argumen t the a ssump t ion  that  e xistenc e  isa real pre dicate, aswell
. ISSN_0101-3173. Disponível_em <http://dx.doi. org/10.1590/S0101-31732008000100002>. EUROPEAN_JOURNAL FOR_PHILOSOPHY_OF RELIGION_6/2_(SUMMER 2014), PP._179-184 KANT'S NEGLECTED_OBJECTION TO THE ONTOLOGICAL_ARGUMENT MICHAEL R._SLATER_Georgetown University Abstract. This paper argues that Kant's most famous objection to the ontological_argument_– that_existence_is_not a real predicate –_is not, in fact, his_most effective_objection, and that his 'neglected objection' to the_argument_deserves to be_better known. It shows that Kant clearly anticipates William_Rowe's later objection that the argument_begs the question,_and_discusses_why Kant himself seems_to have overlooked the force of_this criticism in his attempt to_demolish the traditional proofs for God's existence._Many philosophers have thought that Kant's_most significant and original criticism_of the_ontological argument is his objection_that existence is_not a_real predicate (A599/B627),_and there is little doubt that_this is the_most famous and influential of his_criticisms_of the traditional_arguments_for_God's existence.1_Yet as William_Rowe_argued almost_forty_years ago, this objection does not_clearly_provide a conclusive refutation of the ontological_argument, as it seems_to_rest upon some mistaken_or incomplete claims about the_nature of predication.2 Indeed, Rowe showed_1 All_references to_the Critique of Pure Reason (1781/1787) are to the Cambridge Edition,_translated and edited by Paul Guyer_and Allen Wood (Cambridge:_Cambridge University_Press,_2008), and follow_the_pagination of_the standard German Akademie edition of Kant's_works. 2_William Rowe, 'The Ontological Argument', in_Joel Feinberg (ed.), Reason_and_Responsibility: Readings in Some Basic Problems_of Philosophy, third edition (Encino and_Belmont, CA: Dickenson Publishing Company,_1975),_pp._8-17. Reprinted in Steven M._Cahn (ed.), Ten Essential Texts in_the Philosophy of_Religion: Classics and Contemporary Issues (New York_and_Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp._102-16._All page references are to the_Cahn_volume._180 MICHAEL R. SLATER that_one can grant the proponent of_the argument the assumption that existence is a real_predicate, as well