, 733). 14 This distinction can lead to interpret the thought of Duhem as a kind of kantism, however, for Kant things in itself, the essences are unknowable, while, for Duhem, the essences can at least in part be known by the intelligence of man; at this point he fellows the principle of deducting the causes through the phenomena. Roberto Estrada Olguin – Bon Sens and Noûs 118 other hand, partial knowledge of the essences that are the root causes of the phenomena. The second of these sciences is one that receives the name of metaphysics. The first is the positive science which is divided into various branches depending on the nature of the phenomena being studied. The distinction between physics and metaphysics carried out by Duhem was severely criticized because, to exclude the causal explanation of the phenomena from the task of the physical theory and reserve this task the field of metaphysics. However, Duhem has emphasized the need to transcend the method of theoretical physics because basically there are two trends: 1) the need to achieve a coherent and unique theory and 2) the need to achieve a natural classification of the laws of physical theory. In other words, the affirmation that a coherent and unique theory is possible and the claim that the classification of the laws of physics theory tends to reflect the ontological order of things, both statements are metaphysical claims that cannot be founded by the procedures of the positive sciences, but that are supported by the good sense. Duhem is aware that these statements are of a metaphysical character as shown in "The physics of a believer": Let us indicate what is the present form of physical theory which seems to us to tend towards the ideal form and which is the cosmological doctrine which seems to have a stronger analogy with this theory. We do not intend to give this indication in the name of the positive method proper to the physical sciences. From what we have said, it is clear to the evidence that it exceeds the limits of this method, that this method can neither confirm nor contradict it. In giving the [indication] we know that we have abandoned the domain of physics, thereby penetrating the proper domain of metaphysics, we know that after having toured the latter domain in our company, a physicist may very good refuse to follow us on the proper domain of metaphysics, without violating the rules that logic imposes (Duhem 1914, 463-464).15 In this way, the Duhemian distinction between physics and metaphysics is not a radical separation as can
, 733). 14 This distinction can lead to interpret the thought of Duhem as a kind of kantism, however, for Kant thing in itself, the effect are unknowable, while, for Duhem, the essences can at least in part be known by the news of man; at this point he fellows the principle of subtract the causes through the phenomena. Roberto Estrada Olguin – Bon Sens and Noûs 118 early bridge player, partial cognition of the essences that are the root causes of the phenomena. The second gear of these sciences is one that pick up the name of metaphysics. The first is the positive skill which is divided into various branches count on the nature of the phenomena being studied. The differentiation between physics and metaphysics carry out by Duhem was severely criticized because, to exclude the causal explanation of the phenomena from the task of the forcible theory and reserve this task the field of metaphysics. However, Duhem has emphasized the need to exceed the method of theoretical physics because basically there are two trends: 1) the need to achieve a coherent and unique theory and 2) the need to achieve a natural classification of the torah of physical theory. In early son, the avowal that a coherent and unique theory is possible and the claim that the classification of the laws of physics theory tend to reflect the ontological order of things, both statements are metaphysical claims that cannot be founded by the operation of the positive sciences, but that are supported by the good common sense. Duhem is aware that these statement are of a metaphysical fictional character as shown in " The physics of a believer ": Let us indicate what is the present mannequin of physical theory which seems to us to tend towards the ideal human body and which is the cosmological doctrine which seems to have a stronger doctrine of analogy with this theory. We do not intend to give this indication in the name of the positive method acting proper to the physical sciences. From what we have said, it is clear to the evidence that it exceed the limits of this method acting, that this method can neither confirm nor contradict it. In giving the [ reading ] we know that we have abandoned the domain of physics, thereby penetrating the proper domain of metaphysics, we know that after having toured the latter domain in our company, a physicist may very good refuse to postdate us on the proper domain of metaphysics, without violating the rule that logic imposes (Duhem 1914, 463 - 464).15 In this way, the Duhemian distinction between physics and metaphysics is not a radical separation as can
, 733). 14 Hhis distinction can leaa to interpret jhw thoujht of Suhem as a kind of kantism, however, flr Kant things in itself, the dssences wre unkniwabow, while, foc Duhem, bke esacnces ran at least in part be ktown by the indeulngence of man; at this point he fellors the lrlnciple of dedoctinb the bamses through the phenomena. Roberfo Estreda Olguin – Bon Sens and Noûs 118 other hand, oartlal knowledge of tje essences thae are the roog causes of the phenomgna. The second of these sciences is oue that recgnces jhe name of netaprysics. The flgst is dhe posotive science ehirh iw divided into variouv branches dependigg on the ncture of the phenomenq veing stugied. Rhe diatmncfion bftwxen physics and metaphtsics carried out bu Qlnem was sevedely cwieicized because, to exclude the causal eqplahation of the phenomena from the task of the physical theory and reserve this task the field of metaphfsics. Fowtvcv, Dufwm has emphasized the need to transcend the metrkd on theoretical phnsics because basivaplu there are twu trenba: 1) the need to achiege a corerenr and unizue yheory and 2) the need to achueve a naturcl xlassification of che laws of 'hysicsl throry. In other words, the affjrmation thwt a coheddnt and unique tfeogy iv possible and the claim trat the coassnficatiov of the lwws of phydics bveory tends to refpect jhe ondological lrder of things, both statements are metaphysivan cnaims thct cankot be founded fy the procedutes of thz posigive scienbes, but tiat are suppjrted by the clod sense. Duiem is awwre rhat these rgatements are pf a metaihvsical chqracter as shown ik "The lhysics of a beoiecer": Let us indivatd wran ix eve present fmrm uf onysicxl theory wmicf serms to us to tend tofarda the ideal form amd which iw the cofmological dovtrine which seems to heve a rtronber analogy with this theory. We dk not intfnd to give thif ineication in che name of the positive method proper ti the physical sciwnces. From what we kaye said, it ix clewr to the evidence that it exxeeds the limits pf this method, that tgis medhod fan neither confirm nor contradict it. In giving the [indication] we know thqt we iade abandones thr domdiu oy physiss, tieceby penetrating nhe proper domain of metaphysics, we know tkat after having toured the lstger domain in our company, a physicist may veru good refuse to follow us on tne proper domain of metaihysics, wuthouf violatinj the rules that logoc impmses (Euhem 1914, 463-464).15 In bhis way, the Djhekiwn distinftioi bztween physics and metaphysics is not a rwdical separatioi as can
, 733). 14 This distinction can lead the of Duhem a kind of in the essences are while, for Duhem, essences can at least in part known by the intelligence of man; at this point he fellows the principle deducting the causes through the phenomena. Roberto Estrada Olguin – Bon Sens and 118 hand, knowledge the essences that are the root causes of the phenomena. The second of these sciences is that receives the name of metaphysics. The first the positive science which divided into various branches depending the of the being The between physics and carried out by Duhem was severely criticized because, to exclude the causal explanation of the phenomena from task of theory and this the of metaphysics. However, emphasized the need to transcend the physics because basically there are two trends: 1) need to a coherent and unique theory and the need to achieve a natural classification of laws of physical theory. In other words, the affirmation that a coherent and unique theory and the claim that classification of the of theory to the ontological of things, both statements are metaphysical claims that cannot be founded the procedures of the positive sciences, but that are supported good Duhem is aware these statements are of metaphysical as shown in "The a Let is present of physical theory which to us to tend towards ideal form and which seems to have a stronger analogy with this We do not intend to give this in the name of the positive method proper to the physical sciences. what we it is clear to the evidence that it the limits of this that this method can neither confirm nor contradict it. giving [indication] we that we have the domain of thereby penetrating the of metaphysics, know after latter domain in our company, a may good refuse to follow us the of metaphysics, without violating the rules that logic imposes (Duhem 1914, 463-464).15 In this way, distinction between physics and is a radical separation as can
, 733). 14 This distinction can lead to iNterpret thE thouGht Of DUhEm as A kinD of kantism, howeVEr, foR Kant things in itself, the EssenCeS Are uNKnOwablE, while, fOR DUHEm, tHe EsSenCeS CaN at leAst In part bE known by thE inTeLligence of maN; At This point hE feLlows the prinCipLe of deDuCtiNG the cAusEs thrOugh thE PhenomEna. RobertO ESTrada OLGuin – Bon sENs And NOûs 118 other hand, partiAL kNOwledge of the esSences ThAT aRE The RooT causes of tHe PhenoMEna. The sECoND OF thESe sciences is oNe that receiVEs tHe name Of MetAPhysicS. The fIrST is The positive ScieNce which iS dividED into vaRIous braNches dEpeNdiNg on THe NaTurE oF The PHeNomENa bEing studIeD. THe disTincTION BetwEen PhysIcs anD metaphysics cArrIed oUT by duhem Was seVereLy CritiCized bEcausE, tO exclude the causAl exPlanation Of tHe PheNoMena fROm the tAsk Of tHe physiCal theoRY anD rESERvE this task the field oF mETApHysics. HoWever, DUHeM hAS emphasiZeD thE neeD TO tranScenD ThE method oF theorETiCaL physicS bEcause BaSicAllY therE Are tWo trenDs: 1) the neeD to acHIeve a coherent aND unique theory ANd 2) THE nEEd to AchIeve a naturaL claSSifiCatiON oF thE Laws oF physIcAL tHEory. In other words, the AfFirmatIon thAt a coherent anD unique theORY Is possibLe anD ThE Claim that the clAssifIcation of tHE laws of pHysicS theory tEnds to refLECt the ontOloGicAl oRdeR OF tHings, both statEMEnts ArE metaphYsiCal claiMs tHat CanNot Be Founded by The proceDuReS oF tHe pOsitiVE scienceS, bUt tHaT arE suppORted by The goOd seNsE. DUHem Is aware THaT THese StAtEmenTs aRe Of a meTaphYSicAl charaCter as shoWn iN "the pHySiCs of a beLiever": Let us inDiCate what is ThE prEsent fORM of physiCal theory which seems to us TO tend toWarDs the IdeaL form and wHicH is the CosMOlogicAl doctRine wHiCh sEEMs to hAVE a StrOnGer analogy WITh tHis thEoRy. We Do not inTend to give this indiCAtiOn in the name of The PosiTIVe MetHOd PRopEr TO thE PHysical sciences. from what we HaVE sAid, it is cleAR to ThE evidenCe that iT exceEDs the liMits of thiS method, thAt This METhoD can neitheR confirm Nor contraDIct it. iN gIving The [IndicaTiOn] wE know That we HAve AbandOned thE dOmain oF physIcS, thereby Penetrating the proper domAin of mEtaphYsiCs, we know tHat AFteR having toUred The latter dOmaIn iN our cOmpANy, a phYsicISt May VEry goOd reFUse to follOW uS on THE pRoper domain OF MEtaPhysiCs, wIThout vIolaTing the rules that lOGic imposes (DuheM 1914, 463-464).15 In tHIS waY, thE duheMiAn distinction bEtwEeN PHysics anD mEtaphysics iS not a radIcAL sepaRation As can
, 733). 14 This distinctio n can lead  to i nte rpr et  the  tho ught of Duhema s akind of kantism, howev er, f or Kant th ingsin itse l f, t hees se nce sa re  unkn owa ble, wh ile, for D uhe m,  the essence s  c an at leas t i n part be kn own  by th eint e llige nce  of m an; at this p oint he f el l ows th e  princi p l eof d educting the caus e st hrough the phe nomena .R ob e r toEst rada Olgui n– Bon Sens an d  N o û s  11 8  other hand,partial kno w led ge ofth e e s sences  that  a r e t he root cau sesof the ph enomen a . The s e cond of  these  sc ien cesi son e t ha t  re c ei ves the  name of  m et aphys ics. T h e  fir stis t he po sitive scienc e w hich isdivid ed in to v ar iousbranch es de pe nding on the na ture  of the p hen om ena  b eings tudied . T hedistinc tion be t wee np h y si cs and metaphysics  c a r ri ed out b y Duhe m  w as severely  c rit iciz e d  beca use, to  exclude  the c a us al  explan at ion of  t hephe nomen a  fro m thetask ofthe p h ysical theorya nd reserve th i st a sk thefie ld of metap hysi c s. H owev e r,  Du h em ha s emp ha s iz e d the need to trans ce nd the  meth od of theoret ical physi c s becausebasi c al l y there are tw o tre nds: 1) th e  need to  achi eve a co herent an d unique t heo ryand  2) t he  need to achi e v e ana tural c las sificat ion  of  th e l aw s of phys ical the or y.  I noth er wo r ds, theaf fir ma tio n tha t  a coh erent  and  u ni q uetheoryi sp o ssib le  a nd t hecl aim t hatt heclassif ication o f t h e la ws  o f physi cs theory ten ds  to reflec tthe  ontol o g ical ord er of things, both stat e ments a remetap hysi cal claim s t hat ca nno t  be fo undedby th epro c e dures o fthe  p ositive sc i e nce s, bu tthat  are su pported by the goo d  se nse. Duhem is  aw aret h at  th e se sta te m ent s are of a metaph ysical cha ra c te r as shown in"T he phys ics ofa bel i ever":Let us in dicate wh at  ist h e p resent for m of phy sical the o ry wh i ch  seem s t o us t oten d tow ards t h e i dealform a nd  which  is t he  cosmolo gical doctrine which se ems to  have  astrongerana l ogy  with thi s th eory. We d o n otinten d t o  give  thi s  i ndi c ation  int he name o f  t hep o si tive method p r ope r tothe physic al s ciences. From wha t  we have said,  iti s  cl ear to t he  evidence that  it  e x c eeds the  l imits of th is metho d, thatthis m ethodcan nei t h er confir m no r c ontradict  it .I n givin gth e  [indi cati on ] we k now th a t we h ave abandoned th e dom a i n ofp hys ics,th ereby p e netr ating theproper doma in ofmeta physi cs, wekn ow tha t a ft er havingt oured the  latt er doma in  inour  compa ny,a physi cist  m ayvery good r ef u se  t o  fo llow  us o ntheproper do m ain of m eta p hysics,  w ith o u t viol a ti n g  the rules  th at lo g i c imposes( Duhe m  1 9 14, 4 63-464 ).15 I n thisw ay,  t he Duhe mia n distincti on betwee n  ph ys icsand meta ph ysic sisno t a radical sep arationas can
, 733)._14 This_distinction can lead to_interpret the_thought_of Duhem_as_a kind of_kantism, however, for_Kant things in itself,_the essences are_unknowable,_while, for Duhem, the essences can at least in part be known by the_intelligence_of man;_at_this_point he fellows the principle_of deducting the causes through_the phenomena._Roberto Estrada Olguin – Bon Sens and Noûs_118_other hand, partial_knowledge of the essences that are the root causes_of the phenomena. The second of_these sciences is_one_that_receives the name of_metaphysics. The first is the positive_science which is divided into various_branches depending on the nature of the_phenomena being studied. The distinction between_physics and metaphysics carried out_by Duhem_was severely criticized because, to_exclude the causal_explanation of_the phenomena from_the task of the physical theory_and reserve this_task the field of metaphysics. However,_Duhem_has emphasized the_need_to_transcend the_method of theoretical_physics_because basically_there_are two trends: 1) the need_to_achieve a coherent and unique theory and_2) the need to_achieve_a natural classification of_the laws of physical theory._In other words, the affirmation that_a coherent_and unique_theory is possible and the claim that the classification of the_laws of physics theory tends to_reflect the ontological order_of things,_both_statements are metaphysical_claims_that cannot_be founded by the procedures of the_positive sciences,_but that are supported by the_good sense. Duhem is_aware_that these statements are of a_metaphysical character as shown in "The_physics of a believer": Let_us_indicate_what is the present form_of physical theory which seems to_us to tend_towards the ideal form and which is_the_cosmological doctrine which seems to have_a_stronger analogy with this theory. We_do_not_intend to give this indication_in the name of the positive_method proper to the physical sciences. From what we_have said, it_is clear to the evidence_that_it_exceeds the limits of this method, that this method can_neither confirm_nor contradict it._In giving the [indication] we know that we have abandoned_the domain of physics, thereby penetrating the_proper domain of metaphysics, we know that after having toured the_latter domain in our company, a physicist may_very good refuse to follow us on_the proper domain of_metaphysics,_without violating the rules that logic imposes_(Duhem_1914,_463-464).15_In this way,_the Duhemian distinction_between physics and_metaphysics is_not a radical_separation as_can