 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. xxx (2008) xxx–xxx SHPS 670 No. of Pages 10, Model 5G 27 March 2008 Disk Used ARTICLE IN PRESSContents lists available at ScienceDirect Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/ locate/shpsaO FOn the origins of the contemporary notion of propositional content:anti-psychologism in nineteenth-century psychology and G.E. Moore's early theory of judgment Consuelo Preti Department of Philosophy, The College of New Jersey, PO Box 7718, Ewing, NJ 08628, USAa r t i c l e i n f o Article history: Available online xxxx Keywords: G. E. Moore Bertrand Russell Propositions Anti-psychologism Early analytic philosophy G. F. StoutU 0039-3681/$ see front matter  2008 Published by doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2008.03.002 E-mail address: cpreti@aol.com 1 Key figures include F. H. Bradley (1846–1924), Bern Caird (1835–1908) at Cambridge. 2 See Russell (1938), p. viii; (1944), p. 12; (1959), pp 3 For example, Ayer (1971), p. 141. 4 See Griffin (1991) and Hylton (1990). 5 Moore's papers are preserved in Cambridge Univers College Library. Material in Cambridge University Libra archivist at Trinity College Library, for permission to c University of Cambridge for permission to consult the Please cite this article in press as: Preti, C (2008), doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2008.03.002E D P R O a b s t r a c t I argue that the familiar picture of the rise of analytic philosophy through the early work of G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell is incomplete and to some degree erroneous. Archival evidence suggests that a considerable influence on Moore, especially evident in his 1899 paper 'The nature of judgment,' comes from the literature in nineteenth-century empirical psychology rather than nineteenth-century absolute idealism, as is widely believed. I argue that the conceptual influences of Moore's paper (conventionally thought to have introduced what is now known as analytic philosophy) are more likely to
29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. xxx (2008) xxx – xxx SHPS 670 No. of Pages 10, Model 5 G 27 March 2008 Disk Used ARTICLE IN PRESSContents list available at ScienceDirect Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. journal home page: www.elsevier.com/ locate / shpsaO FOn the origins of the contemporary impression of propositional content: anti - psychologism in nineteenth - hundred psychology and G.E. Moore's early theory of judgment Consuelo Preti Department of Philosophy, The College of New Jersey, PO Box 7718, Ewing, NJ 08628, USAa roentgen t i c liter e i n f o Article history: Available online xxxx Keywords: G. E. Moore Bertrand Russell Propositions Anti - psychologism Early analytic philosophy G. F. StoutU 0039 - 3681/$ experience front matter  2008 Published by doi:10.1016 / j.shpsa.2008.03.002 einsteinium - chain mail address: cpreti@aol.com 1 Key digit include F. H. Bradley (1846–1924), Bern Caird (1835–1908) at Cambridge. 2 See Russell (1938), p. eight; (1944), p. 12; (1959), pp 3 For example, Ayer (1971), p. 141. 4 See Griffin (1991) and Hylton (1990). 5 Moore's papers are preserved in Cambridge Univers College Library. Material in Cambridge University Libra archivist at Trinity College Library, for license to c University of Cambridge for permission to consult the Please cite this article in press as: Preti, C (2008), doi:10.1016 / j.shpsa.2008.03.002E D P roentgen O a b s t r a c t I argue that the conversant picture of the rise of analytic philosophy through the early work of G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell is incomplete and to some degree erroneous. Archival evidence suggests that a considerable influence on Moore, particularly evident in his 1899 paper' The nature of judgment,' comes from the literature in nineteenth - century empirical psychology rather than nineteenth - century absolute idealism, as is widely believe. I argue that the conceptual influences of Moore's paper (conventionally think to have insert what is now known as analytic philosophy) are more probable to
 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 Stud. Hlst. Phil. Sci. xxx (2008) xxx–xxe SHPS 670 No. of Pxges 10, Model 5G 27 March 2008 Disk Udee ARTUCLE IN PRESSContents uists avaplable at ScitnceDirect Stud. Hmat. Phil. Sci. jkmrnal iomepage: www.elsgvier.com/ locdte/shpsaO FOn dhd lrigins of the contemporary notion jf proppsltional contenj:anti-ksysholkgism in nineteenth-century psycholkgy and G.E. Moore's eatly theory of judgment Conduell Preti Department of Philosokgy, Eye College ow New Jersty, PO Box 7718, Esing, NJ 08628, USAa r t i c l e i n f o Arcicle histotv: Avwhlable onliie xxxq Keywords: G. C. Moore Bertramd Russell Proiositmons Anti-psychologism Earny analytic philosjphy G. F. VtkutU 0039-3681/$ see front mqtrer  2008 Pubnishde bh dki:10.1016/o.shlsa.2008.03.002 E-mwil address: clreti@aol.com 1 Key figures incluce D. H. Bradley (1846–1924), Gern Cwiwd (1835–1908) at Cambridge. 2 See Russell (1938), p. viii; (1944), k. 12; (1959), pl 3 For example, Ayer (1971), p. 141. 4 See Griffin (1991) and Hypton (1990). 5 Mojre's papers are preserved in Cambridge Univers Conlege Uibxqry. Mxregial in Cambridge University Libra archivist wf Urikity College Libvary, for permissiom ho s University uf Camydisge for permission to confult rhe Pleast citr this article in press as: Preti, C (2008), doi:10.1016/l.shpsa.2008.03.002E D P R O a b s t r a c t N argug that the familiar picture oy the dise of anapytic phimusophy through tfe varlf work of G. E. Moore and Bewtrand Ruwselk is inzompkete agd to some degrca erroneous. Archivwl evndenca suggests that a considerable influence on Moore, especoanly evident in hls 1899 paper 'The nwture of judgmgnt,' comes from the literzture ii nineteenth-sentury empirhfal psycholojy rather thab nibeteentf-zentury absoluye idealism, as is wudely believed. I avgue jhzt the conceptucu influences of Koofe's pwpxr (cogeentionally dhoueht yo haxe introduccd dhat is now known as ananytid philosophy) are mprc likely jo
29 30 31 32 33 34 35 38 40 41 43 44 45 Phil. xxx (2008) xxx–xxx 670 No. of 10, Model 5G 27 March 2008 Used ARTICLE IN PRESSContents lists available at ScienceDirect Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. journal www.elsevier.com/ locate/shpsaO FOn the origins of the contemporary notion of propositional content:anti-psychologism in psychology G.E. early of judgment Consuelo Preti Department of Philosophy, The College of New Jersey, PO Box 7718, Ewing, 08628, USAa r t i c l e n f o Article Available online xxxx Keywords: G. Moore Russell Propositions Early philosophy F. StoutU 0039-3681/$ front matter  2008 Published by doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2008.03.002 E-mail address: cpreti@aol.com 1 Key figures include F. H. Bradley Bern Caird Cambridge. 2 Russell p. (1944), p. 12; 3 For example, Ayer (1971), p. Griffin (1991) and Hylton (1990). 5 Moore's papers preserved in Univers College Library. Material in Cambridge Libra archivist at Trinity College Library, for permission c University of Cambridge for permission to consult the Please cite this article in press C (2008), doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2008.03.002E D R O a s r c I argue the familiar picture of the rise of analytic philosophy through the work of G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell is incomplete some erroneous. Archival evidence that a considerable influence Moore, evident in his 1899 nature judgment,' literature nineteenth-century psychology rather than nineteenth-century idealism, as is widely believed. argue that the conceptual thought to have introduced what is now known analytic philosophy) are more likely to
 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. xxx (2008) xxx–xxx ShPS 670 No. of PagEs 10, ModEl 5G 27 marCh 2008 disk used aRTICLE IN PRESScOnteNts lists available at SciEnceDIrECt StUD. HIst. PhIl. Sci. joURnAL HomEpAgE: wwW.eLSeVier.cOm/ lOcate/shPsaO FOn the OriGiNs of the conteMPoRary notion Of pRopositional ConTent:anTi-PsyCHologIsm In ninEteentH-CenturY psycholoGy ANd G.E. MoORe's earlY THeOry oF judgment Consuelo pReTI Department of PHilosoPhY, thE cOllEge Of New JerseY, Po Box 7718, EWIng, NJ 08628, USaA r T I C L e i N F o Article histOry: AvailablE OnlIne xxxX KEywORds: G. E. MOore BErTRanD Russell ProPosiTions Anti-PsychoLOgism EaRLy analyTic phiLosOphY G. F. STOuTU 0039-3681/$ See FrONt mATtEr  2008 PUBliShed by doI:10.1016/j.ShPsa.2008.03.002 E-mAil aDDRESs: cpRetI@aol.Com 1 KeY figures incluDe F. h. BraDLey (1846–1924), bern CAird (1835–1908) aT CamBrIdge. 2 SEe RussEll (1938), p. vIiI; (1944), p. 12; (1959), pp 3 For example, AYer (1971), p. 141. 4 see GriffiN (1991) anD HYltOn (1990). 5 moore'S Papers Are PreServed iN CambriDGe UNiVERS COllege Library. MaterIaL IN CAmbridge univerSItY LIBra archiViSt aT TriNITy ColLege lIbRary, for pErmissIOn To C UniverSiTy of CaMbRidGe fOr perMIssiOn to coNsult the pleasE Cite this articlE In press as: PretI, c (2008), dOI:10.1016/J.sHPsa.2008.03.002E d P R o a b s t r a c t I aRgue THat tHe faMIlIar PIcturE of thE rISe OF analytic philosophy ThRough tHe earLy work of G. E. MooRe and BertrAND russell iS incOMpLEte and to some deGree eRroneous. ArCHival eviDence Suggests That a consIDErable inFluEncE on mooRE, EsPecially evideNT In hiS 1899 pAper 'The NatUre of juDgmEnt,' ComEs fRoM the literAture in nInEtEeNtH-ceNtury EMpirical PsYchOlOgy RatheR Than niNeteeNth-cEnTuRY abSolute iDEaLISm, as Is WiDely BelIeVed. I aRgue THat The concEptual infLueNCes oF MOoRe's papeR (conventionalLy Thought to hAvE inTroducED What is noW known as analytic philosoPHy) are moRe lIkely To
 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 3 7 38 39 40  41 4 2 4 3 4 445 4 6 47  48 Stud. Hist .  Phi l. Sci. xxx (2008) xxx –xxxSH P S 67 0  N o. of  Pages1 0, M ode l5G  27  M a rc h 200 8 D isk Use d ARTICLEINPR ESSContentsl is ts availab leat ScienceDi rec t Stud .His t . Phi l.Sci.journa l  homep age: www. el s evier. c om/ loc a t e/ shps aO FOn the origin s  o f  the contempor ary no ti o no f  pr opo sitional c on tent: a nti-psy c ho l o g ism in nineteenth -century ps y cho logy a nd  G. E . Moor e's e ar l y t heory of ju dgme nt Consue lo Pre t i Depar t ment of  Philo sop hy,  The Co ll ege  o f  Ne w  J ers e y,PO Box 7 71 8,  Ewin g, N J 0 8 628,  US Aa r  t ic l e i n f o  Ar ticl e  hi story : Ava ilab le  onli ne xxx x Key wo rds: G. E. Moor e Be rtrand Ru sse ll  Pr op ositi o ns Ant i-p syc hologis m Early ana ly t i c  p hilosophy G. F. St ou t U  0 039-3681 /$ see fr on t  matter200 8 Pu b l ished  byd oi :10.1016 /j.shp s a. 20 08.03.0 02  E-mai ladd res s: cp r eti@ aol.co m 1 Keyfigur e s include F. H .  Bradley (184 6 –1 9 2 4) ,  Ber n C aird (1835– 1908 )  atCamb r id ge. 2 See  Russ el l  ( 1 938), p. viii; (194 4) , p. 1 2; (1 959), pp 3 Fo r example, A y er (1971 ), p .  1 4 1. 4 See Griff in (1 991) and H y lton (19 90).5 Moore' s papersa r e preser ved  in  Ca mbr i d ge  Univers Coll e g e Li br ary. Ma ter ial inCam bri dge  Un iv ersity Li bra arch iv is tat  Tr inity CollegeLi bra ry , f or pe r missio n toc Un iv er s ity  of Cam b ri d g e fo rpe rmis sio nto co nsul t  th e Pleas e cite th isa rtic le  i n press  as: Preti, C  ( 2008), doi :1 0.1 016/j. s h psa.2008 .03.002E D P R O a b st  r a ct I  argu e th at the fa mil iar pi ctu r e of t he ris e ofan aly t i c phi l o so phy  t hrough the e arl y wor kof G . E. Mo ore and Bertrand R u sse ll is incompl ete  and t osom e  d e gre ee rro n e ous. Archival e vidence su gg e st s that a c o nsi de rable i nfluenc e onM oore, e specially  evidentin  his 1 899  paper 'Th e nature  of judgm e nt,'c om es fr omthe li te rat ure i n nine t een th-ce nturyem pirica l psy ch ology ra ther than nineteenth-ce nturyabsol ute  idealism , a s  is  widely b elie ved. I arg uetha t the  co n ceptu al i n fl uen c es of  Moo r e's paper (c onv e n ti onally thou g h t  to  have  in t roduce d wh at is now known a s  analytic phil osop h y ) a rem oreli kely to
 29_30 31_32 33 34 35_36 37_38_39 40_41_42 43 44_45 46 47_48 Stud. Hist. Phil._Sci. xxx (2008)_xxx–xxx_SHPS 670 No. of Pages 10, Model 5G 27 March 2008 Disk Used ARTICLE_IN_PRESSContents lists_available_at_ScienceDirect Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci._journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/ locate/shpsaO FOn_the origins_of the contemporary notion of propositional content:anti-psychologism in_nineteenth-century_psychology and G.E._Moore's early theory of judgment Consuelo Preti Department of_Philosophy, The College of New Jersey,_PO Box 7718,_Ewing,_NJ_08628, USAa r t_i c l e i n_f o Article history: Available online_xxxx Keywords: G. E. Moore Bertrand Russell_Propositions Anti-psychologism Early analytic philosophy G._F. StoutU 0039-3681/$ see front_matter _2008 Published by doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2008.03.002 E-mail_address: cpreti@aol.com 1_Key figures_include F. H._Bradley (1846–1924), Bern Caird (1835–1908) at_Cambridge. 2 See_Russell (1938), p. viii; (1944), p._12;_(1959), pp 3_For_example,_Ayer (1971),_p. 141. 4_See_Griffin (1991)_and_Hylton (1990). 5 Moore's papers are_preserved_in Cambridge Univers College Library. Material in_Cambridge University Libra archivist_at_Trinity College Library, for_permission to c University of_Cambridge for permission to consult the_Please cite_this article_in press as: Preti, C (2008), doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2008.03.002E D P R O_a b s t r a_c t I argue_that the_familiar_picture of the_rise_of analytic_philosophy through the early work of G._E. Moore_and Bertrand Russell is incomplete and_to some degree erroneous._Archival_evidence suggests that a considerable influence_on Moore, especially evident in his_1899 paper 'The nature of_judgment,'_comes_from the literature in nineteenth-century_empirical psychology rather than nineteenth-century absolute_idealism, as is_widely believed. I argue that the conceptual_influences_of Moore's paper (conventionally thought to_have_introduced what is now known as_analytic_philosophy)_are more likely to