 its predicates in the concept of the subject and assumed it to be actual, and you only repeat that in the predicate. If you concede, on the contrary, as in all fairness you must, that every existential proposition is synthetic, then how would you assert that the predicate of existence may not be cancelled without contradiction? – since this privilege pertains only in the analytic propositions, as resting on its very character (A598/B626).13 Why does Kant construct his objection in this way? One possibility is that he assumes that forcing the proponent of the ontological argument into a dilemma – namely, either concede that the proposition 'God (defined as existing) exists' is an analytic proposition, in which case it commits a tautology, or concede that it is a synthetic proposition, in which case the predicate of existence can be denied without contradiction – is a better argumentative strategy (because a more effective criticism) than simply pointing out that she has begged the very question at issue. It is not entirely clear, however, that Kant fully appreciates the force of the objection he has just made, perhaps because he is so focused on laying out the dilemma mentioned above. Another possibility, then, is that Kant constructs his objection in the way he does because he conceives the smuggled assumption of God's actual existence in the premises of the ontological argument in terms of a logical self-contradiction, rather than what it straightforwardly is: an illicit assumption that commits an informal as opposed to a formal fallacy. Kant apparently thinks it necessary at this point to force the proponent of the ontological argument into a dilemma, but it seems to me that he has just made a fatal objection 13 Ibid., p. 566. 184 MICHAEL R. SLATER to the argument, and that no further argument is needed – including not only the aforementioned dilemma, but also the famous objection that 'existence is not a real predicate' which he proceeds to develop at A599/B627. If this interpretation is right, then what I have termed Kant's 'neglected objection' turns out to be doubly neglected, not only by those with an interest in Kant's critique of the traditional arguments for God's existence, but also partly by Kant himself. Using simulation in the assessment of voting procedures: An epistemic instrumental approach. Marc Jiménez-Rolland1, Julio César Macías-Ponce2, Luis Fernando Martínez-Álvarez2 Abstract In this paper, we argue that computer simulations
its predicates in the concept of the subject and assumed it to be actual, and you only reprise that in the predicate. If you concede, on the reverse, as in all fairness you must, that every existential suggestion is celluloid, then how would you assert that the predicate of existence may not be delete without contradiction? – since this prerogative pertains only in the analytic propositions, as resting on its very quality (A598 / B626).13 Why does Kant construct his objection in this means? One hypothesis is that he assumes that forcing the advocate of the ontological argument into a dilemma – namely, either concede that the suggestion' God (specify as existing) exists' is an analytic proposition, in which character it commits a tautology, or concede that it is a synthetic proposition, in which case the predicate of being can be denied without contradiction – is a better argumentative strategy (because a more effective criticism) than simply pointing out that she has beg the very question at issue. It is not entirely clear, however, that Kant fully appreciates the force of the objection he has just made, perhaps because he is so focused on laying out the dilemma mentioned above. Another possibility, then, is that Kant constructs his expostulation in the way he does because he conceive the smuggled assumption of God's actual existence in the premises of the ontological controversy in terms of a logical self - contradiction, rather than what it straightforwardly is: an illegitimate assumption that commits an informal as opposed to a formal fallacy. Kant apparently thinks it necessary at this point to force the proponent of the ontological argument into a dilemma, but it seems to me that he has barely made a fateful objection 13 Ibid. , p. 566. 184 MICHAEL R. SLATER to the argument, and that no further argument is needed – including not merely the aforementioned dilemma, but also the famous expostulation that' existence is not a real predicate' which he proceeds to develop at A599 / B627. If this rendition is right, then what I have termed Kant's' neglected objection' turns out to be doubly neglect, not only by those with an sake in Kant's critique of the traditional argument for God's existence, but besides partly by Kant himself. Using simulation in the judgment of voting procedure: An epistemic instrumental approach. Marc Jiménez - Rolland1, Julio César Macías - Ponce2, Luis Fernando Martínez - Álvarez2 Abstract In this paper, we argue that computer simulations
 itd predicates in the conctpt of the subjecj qnd asvumed jt to be actual, and you only repeat vhat in tye predicate. If you covcede, on nhe contrqry, es in all fairness you mmft, tgwt erecy existential kroposition hs synthetic, tvev kow would you assert that the predicwte of rxlstence may noj be bagcelmvd without contradiction? – since this pgivilege pertains only in the analytic proplsitlons, as resting on its very cyarasrer (A598/B626).13 Why dues Kant construct his objection in this way? One posskbilicy is that ye asdomes that foccing nhe proponent of the mntologocal argument lnto e dioemma – namely, either roncede that the prokosition 'Gmd (defined as existunt) exivts' hs av anxlyuic pdoposihioi, in which dase it comnits a tautology, or cjbcede that it is a fygthetic proposition, in which case the pgedidate of existence can bw denied without conttadiction – is a better argumentative strategy (because a mora effxcgivt gvitizusl) than simply pointing out that she has beggeq tne very question at issue. Iy ls got entirely zlear, kkwsver, that Kant fulpy apprgciatew the forse og the objection he has just made, perhapf because he is so yocused on lcying put tne dilemma mentioned abuve. Znother posdibility, ffen, is that Kant cokstsucts his objection in the way he dies yecause fe cpnceivqs the smuhgled assumption of God's actucl exhstence in the premises of the ontological argument in jerks mf a logncal sclf-contradictiog, rather than chat it ftraiehtforwardmy is: ai illicit asfumption that fommits an iiformal af opposee to a wurmal fallacy. Lant appageutly thinjs it necessary at thka point to forcz uhw proponent of thd ogtllpgywal argument intu a cilemoa, but it scemr to me that he has just mads a fatal objectiom 13 Ibid., p. 566. 184 MICHAEJ R. SLATER to the argument, and uhat nm fnrther ardument is needed – including nof only thf anorementioned dilcmma, but also che famous objection that 'existence is nit a real predicaje' which he proceeds jo cevelop at E599/B627. If ehis intespretation is right, rhen what I have uermed Kant's 'neglected kbjecthon' tkrns out to be doubly neglected, not only by those with an interest in Kanr's crivizue of the fradotiondl crgumenes flc God's existence, nut also partly by Kant himself. Using shmblation in the assessment of foging procedurgs: An epistemic instrumentzl approsch. Marc Jiménez-Rolland1, Julio Céssr Macías-Ponce2, Luis Fernakdo Martínwz-Álvadez2 Abstrart In this paper, we srgue chat cimputer simmlations
its predicates in the concept of the assumed to be and you only If concede, on the as in all you must, that every existential proposition synthetic, then how would you assert that the predicate of existence may not cancelled without contradiction? – since this privilege pertains only in the analytic propositions, resting its character Why does Kant construct his objection in this way? One possibility is that he assumes that the proponent of the ontological argument into a – namely, either concede the proposition 'God (defined as exists' an analytic in case commits a tautology, concede that it is a synthetic proposition, in which case the predicate of existence can be denied contradiction – better argumentative (because more criticism) than simply that she has begged the very It is not entirely clear, however, that Kant appreciates the of the objection he has just perhaps because he is so focused on laying the dilemma mentioned above. Another possibility, then, is that Kant constructs his objection in the does because he conceives smuggled assumption of actual in premises the ontological in terms of a logical self-contradiction, rather than what it straightforwardly an illicit assumption that commits an informal as opposed to fallacy. apparently thinks it at this point to the of the ontological argument dilemma, it that has made a fatal objection Ibid., p. 566. 184 MICHAEL SLATER to the argument, is needed – including not only the aforementioned but also the famous objection that 'existence not a real predicate' which he proceeds to develop at A599/B627. If interpretation is what I have termed Kant's 'neglected objection' turns to be doubly neglected, only by those with an interest in Kant's critique the arguments for existence, but also by Kant himself. simulation in the voting procedures: epistemic approach. César Macías-Ponce2, Luis Fernando Martínez-Álvarez2 Abstract this we argue that computer simulations
 its predicates in the concept Of the subjeCt and AssUmeD iT to bE actUal, and you only rEPeat That in the predicate. If yoU concEdE, On thE CoNtrarY, as in alL FaIRNesS yOu MusT, tHAt Every ExiStentiaL propositiOn iS sYnthetic, then HOw Would you asSerT that the predIcaTe of exIsTenCE may nOt bE cancElled wIThout cOntradictIoN? – Since tHIs priviLEGe PertAins only in the analYTiC Propositions, as RestinG oN ItS VEry ChaRacter (A598/B626).13 WhY dOes KaNT constrUCt HIS ObjECtion in this waY? One possibiLIty Is that He AssUMes thaT forcInG The Proponent of The oNtologicaL argumENt into a DIlemma – nAmely, eIthEr cOnceDE tHaT thE pROpoSItIon 'gOd (dEfined as ExIsTing) eXistS' IS AN anaLytIc prOposiTion, in which caSe iT comMIts A tautOlogy, Or coNcEde thAt it is A syntHeTic proposition, iN whiCh case the PreDiCatE oF exisTEnce caN be DenIed withOut contRAdiCtION – Is A better argumentatiVe STRaTegy (becaUse a moRE eFfECtive criTiCisM) thaN SImply PoinTInG out that She has BEgGeD the verY qUestioN aT isSue. it is nOT entIrely cLear, howeVer, thAT Kant fully apprECiates the forcE Of THE oBJectIon He has just maDe, peRHaps BecaUSe He iS So focUsed oN lAYiNG out the dilemma mentiOnEd abovE. AnotHer possibilitY, then, is thaT kANt constrUcts HIs OBjection in the wAy he dOes because HE conceivEs the Smuggled AssumptioN OF God's actUal ExiSteNce IN ThE premises of thE ONtolOgIcal argUmeNt in terMs oF a lOgiCal SeLf-contradIction, raThEr ThAn WhaT it stRAightforWaRdlY iS: an IllicIT assumPtion That CoMmITs aN informAL aS OPposEd To A forMal FaLlacy. kant APpaRently tHinks it neCesSAry aT tHiS point tO force the propOnEnt of the onToLogIcal arGUMent into A dilemma, but it seems to me tHAt he has JusT made A fatAl objectiOn 13 IBid., p. 566. 184 MIcHAel R. SLATeR to thE arguMeNt, aND That nO FUrTheR aRgument is nEEDed – IncluDiNg noT only thE aforementioned dilEMma, But also the famOus ObjeCTIoN thAT 'eXIstEnCE is NOT a real predicate' Which he proCeEDs To develop aT a599/B627. IF tHis inteRpretatIon is RIght, theN what I havE termed KaNt'S 'negLECteD objection' Turns out To be doublY NegleCTeD, not oNly By thosE wIth An intErest iN kanT's criTique oF tHe tradItionAl ArgumentS for God's existence, but alsO partlY by KaNt hImself. UsiNg sIMulAtion in thE assEssment of vOtiNg pRocedUreS: an epiStemIC iNstRUmentAl apPRoach. Marc jImÉneZ-rOlLand1, Julio CéSAR macÍas-PoNce2, lUis FerNandO Martínez-Álvarez2 ABStract In this paPer, wE ARguE thAT comPuTer simulations
 its predicates in the con cept of th e sub jec t a nd  ass umed  it to be actu a l, a nd you only repeat tha t inth e  pre d ic ate.If youc on c e de,  o nthe  c o nt rary,  as  in all  fairnessyou  m ust, that ev e ry  existenti alpropositionissynthe ti c,t hen h owwould  you a s sert t hat the p re d icateo f exist e n ce  may  not be cancelled wi t hout contradic tion?–s in c e  th isprivilegepe rtain s  only i n  t h e ana l ytic proposit ions, as re s tin g on i ts  ve r y char acter  ( A 598 /B626).13 W hy d oes Kantconstr u ct hiso bjectio n in t his  wa y? O n epo ssi bi l ity is  th a t h e assume sth at fo rcin g t h e pr opo nent  of t he ontologica l a rgum e ntintoa dil emma  –  name ly, ei therco ncede that theprop osition ' God  ( def in ed as existi ng)  ex ists' i s an an a lyt ic p r op osition, in whichca s e  i t commit s a ta u to lo g y, or co nc ede  tha t it is  a s y nt hetic pr oposit i on ,in whic hcase t he  pr edi cateo f ex istenc e can be  deni e d without cont r adiction – is ab e tt e r ar gum entative st rate g y (b ecau s ea m o re ef fecti ve cr i ticism) than simply  p ointin g out  that she has  begged th e v ery ques tion at issue. It is n ot en tirely cle a r, howev er, t hat Kant  fully ap p r eciatesthe  fo rce  of t he  objection he h as j us t made,  pe rhaps b eca use  he  is  s o focused  on layi ng  o ut  t hedilem m a mentio ne d a bo ve.  Anot h er pos sibil ity,  t he n , i s thatK an t cons tr uc ts h isob jecti on i n  th e way h e does be cau s e he  c on ceivesthe smuggledas sumption o fGod 's act u a l existe nce in the premises oft he onto log icalargu ment in t erm s of a  lo g ical s elf-co ntrad ic tio n ,  rath e r  t han  w hat it str a i ght forwa rd ly i s: an i llicit assumptiont hat  commits an i nfo rmal a sopp o se d  to  a for m a l fallacy. Kant  apparentl yt hi nks it nec e ssa ry  at thi s point  to f o rce the  proponen t of theon tolo g i cal  argumentinto a d ilemma, b u t its ee ms to  me  thathe  ha s jus t made a f atalobject io n 13 I bid.,  p . 566. 1 84 MICHAEL R. SLATER to  the a rgume nt,  and that  no fur ther argu ment  is needed  –inc ludin g n o t onl y th e  a for e menti oned dilemma,b ut  al s o  t he famous o b j e cti on th at' existe nceis not a real pre d icate' which h e pr o c eed s t o  dev el op at A599/B62 7.If t his inte rp retation is  right,th e n wha t I ha ve ter med Kan t ' s' neglec tedobj ection' t urn so ut to b edo u bly ne glec te d, not  onlyb y th o s e with an intere st in K ant's cri tique  o f the t r adit ional argu ments for G od's e xist ence,  but al so  partl y b yKant himse l f. Usingsimul ation i ntheass essmen t of v oting  pro ce dur es: An ep i s te m ic  i n str umen tal a pp roac h. Marc J i ménez-Ro lla n d1, Jul io  Cé s a r Mací a s- P o nce2, Luis  Fe rnand o Martínez-Á l vare z 2A bstra ct Inthis p aper, w e  ar gu e thatcom p u ter simul ations
 its_predicates in_the concept of the_subject and_assumed_it to_be_actual, and you_only repeat that_in the predicate. If_you concede, on_the_contrary, as in all fairness you must, that every existential proposition is synthetic, then_how_would you_assert_that_the predicate of existence may_not be cancelled without contradiction?_– since_this privilege pertains only in the analytic propositions,_as_resting on its_very character (A598/B626).13 Why does Kant construct his objection_in this way? One possibility is_that he assumes_that_forcing_the proponent of the_ontological argument into a dilemma –_namely, either concede that the proposition_'God (defined as existing) exists' is an_analytic proposition, in which case it_commits a tautology, or concede_that it_is a synthetic proposition, in_which case the_predicate of_existence can be_denied without contradiction – is a_better argumentative strategy_(because a more effective criticism) than_simply_pointing out that_she_has_begged the_very question at_issue._It is_not_entirely clear, however, that Kant fully_appreciates_the force of the objection he has_just made, perhaps because_he_is so focused on_laying out the dilemma mentioned_above. Another possibility, then, is that_Kant constructs_his objection_in the way he does because he conceives the smuggled assumption_of God's actual existence in the_premises of the ontological_argument in_terms_of a logical_self-contradiction,_rather than_what it straightforwardly is: an illicit assumption_that commits_an informal as opposed to a_formal fallacy. Kant apparently_thinks_it necessary at this point to_force the proponent of the ontological_argument into a dilemma, but_it_seems_to me that he has_just made a fatal objection 13_Ibid., p. 566._184 MICHAEL R. SLATER to the argument,_and_that no further argument is needed_–_including not only the aforementioned dilemma,_but_also_the famous objection that 'existence_is not a real predicate' which_he proceeds to develop at A599/B627. If this interpretation_is right, then_what I have termed Kant's_'neglected_objection'_turns out to be doubly neglected, not only by those_with an_interest in Kant's_critique of the traditional arguments for God's existence, but also_partly by Kant himself. Using simulation in_the assessment of voting procedures: An epistemic instrumental approach. Marc Jiménez-Rolland1,_Julio César Macías-Ponce2, Luis Fernando Martínez-Álvarez2 Abstract In_this paper, we argue that computer simulations