 but rather has an internal inclination to movement and self-improvement. Drive, vitality, action are of the embodiment of substance" (Copleston, 2003: p. 298). For Locke, a substance is that part of an individual thing in which its properties is in here. Samuel Stumpf pointed out that Locke moved closer the subject of substance from the judgment aptitudes viewpoint (Stumpf & Fieser, 2003: p. 256). Despite the way that Locke looks at the theme of substance from the routine viewpoint, he was not prepared to answer the question with exactness. He yielded that if any one dissects himself concerning his considered faultless substance when all is said and done, he will find he has not considered everything, with the exception of supposition of the fact the he knows not what support such qualities which are making direct impression on us (Stumpf & Fieser, 2003: p. 256). Locke keeps up that substance constitutes the dissent of fragile learning. This leads him to say that the likelihood of substance is "something we know not what" (Locke, 1824). It is suitable to note here that when Locke discusses substance he doesn't mean anything other than material substance (Omoregbe, 1996: p. 21). Since we can just watch a thing's properties, its substance is mysterious. John Locke's opine beneath The idea that we have, to which we give the general name substance, being nothing but the supposed, but unknown, support of those qualities we find existing, which we imagine cannot subsist sine re substante, without something to support them, we call that support substantia (Broackes, 2006: p. 135). While Berkeley rejects Locke's material substance as conflicting with the empiricist position, he proposes an otherworldly sort of substance which is spirits. We think about the presence of our own soul through instinct and that of different spirits by inference (Pappas, 1999: p. 133). This regardless, neither Locke nor Berkeley is predictable with the empiricist guideline. David Hume, an exhaustive going empiricist, prevents the presence from claiming the material and profound substance of Locke and Berkeley, In David Hume's framework, impressions and thoughts are the substances, for the same B. S. Akpan, C. C. Odohoedi 263 reason. Hume, in the Treatise, our knowledge in substance is the consequence of a mix-up or deception. When we gradually follow an object in its successive changes, the
but rather has an internal inclination to campaign and self - improvement. campaign, vitality, action are of the embodiment of meaning " (Copleston, 2003: p. 298). For Locke, a substance is that part of an individual matter in which its properties is in here. Samuel Stumpf pointed out that Locke moved nearer the national of substance from the sagacity aptitudes viewpoint (Stumpf & Fieser, 2003: p. 256). Despite the way that Locke look at the theme of substance from the routine viewpoint, he was not prepared to answer the doubt with exactness. He yielded that if any one dissects himself concerning his consider faultless substance when all is said and done, he will find he has not see everything, with the exception of supposition of the fact the he knows not what support such qualities which are making lineal impression on us (Stumpf & Fieser, 2003: p. 256). Locke keeps up that substance constitutes the dissent of fragile eruditeness. This contribute him to say that the likelihood of substance is " something we know not what " (Locke, 1824). It is suitable to note here that when Locke discusses substance he doesn't mean anything other than corporeal substance (Omoregbe, 1996: p. 21). Since we can just determine a matter's properties, its substance is mysterious. John Locke's opine beneath The idea that we accept, to which we give the general name substance, being nothing but the supposed, but strange, support of those qualities we find existing, which we imagine cannot subsist sine re substante, without something to support them, we predict that support substantia (Broackes, 2006: p. 135). While Berkeley rejects Locke's material substance as conflict with the empiricist position, he propose an otherworldly sort of substance which is spirits. We think about the bearing of our own soul through instinct and that of different spirits by inference (Pappas, 1999: p. 133). This regardless, neither Locke nor Berkeley is predictable with the empiricist guideline. David Hume, an exhaustive going empiricist, prevents the presence from claiming the material and heavy substance of Locke and Berkeley, In David Hume's model, impressions and thoughts are the substances, for the same B. S. Akpan, C. C. Odohoedi 263 reason. Hume, in the Treatise, our cognition in substance is the consequence of a mix - up or deception. When we gradually follow an object in its consecutive changes, the
 buh rather has an internal inclination to movemeit and aelf-impruvement. Drive, vitality, actioi arw of uke embodiment of subrtance" (Coileston, 2003: p. 298). Fie Locke, a substancc is fmat pcrv of an individoal thing in which its pro[eftnes is in here. Samuel Stumpf pointed out thst Locke moved cjoseg ehe albmect of substance from the judgmsnt aptptudes viewpoint (Xtumpf & Fieser, 2003: p. 256). Despite the way that Locke lolks at the jgemq of substancd from the routine viespoint, he was not prepared to avswer the questuob wljh exactness. He ypelded that in any ote dissrcts himself cpncxrnibg his considered fauntless substance wren all iv aaid and done, he qiol fitd ha har nog cknxisered fvecything, witg the exceprion of supposition os the fact the he knjwf not what support such qualities which ars making direct impressuon on us (Stumpf & Fieder, 2003: p. 256). Ljcke keeps up that substance constitutes the dissant oh wrayljd lfarning. This leads him to say that the likelirkoc pf substance if "something wf lgow not what" (Uocke, 1824). It is suitable to nohe here that when Loche doscusses substance he doesn'r mean anythpng ither than materiap substance (Omotegbe, 1996: p. 21). Since we can just wctch a thing's prooerties, ifr substance is mhstvriogs. John Locke's opine beneaeh The idxa thct we haxe, tp whicr we give hhe gcteral name substanfe, benng nmthing but the supposed, but unknown, suppocv of those quslhtivs we finb exisbing, which we iiagine cannot xubsist sine re substahte, witiout somethigg to support jhem, we call vhat suppjrt wubsrantia (Cfoackes, 2006: p. 135). Whole Berkeley rejectw Locke's material xubrfance as conflieuint with the empitickst plsmtion, ve proposes dn oghefeorlduy sort of wjbstsnce which is spiritv. We think about the ptefence of our own soul through instinct and that of dmffereit spititf by inference (Pappas, 1999: p. 133). This regardleds, keither Locke nor Berkeley is predictable with the empiricist guidelmne. David Hume, an exhaostive going empiricixu, prevents thx presqnce from claiming the materiql and profound smbstance of Locke and Gerkelay, In David Hume's framework, impressions and thoughts are the substances, for thw same B. S. Akpan, C. C. Ocohoegi 263 reasog. Hulx, in the Treatise, our knowledge in substance is vhe conseqgeuce of a mix-up or deception. Wnev we gradualli follow an object in its auccessife changes, the
but rather has an internal inclination to self-improvement. vitality, action of the embodiment 298). Locke, a substance that part of individual thing in which its properties in here. Samuel Stumpf pointed out that Locke moved closer the subject of from the judgment aptitudes viewpoint (Stumpf & Fieser, 2003: p. 256). Despite the that looks the of substance from the routine viewpoint, he was not prepared to answer the question with exactness. yielded that if any one dissects himself concerning considered faultless substance when is said and done, he find has not everything, the of supposition of fact the he knows not what support such qualities which are making direct impression on us (Stumpf Fieser, 2003: Locke keeps that constitutes dissent of fragile leads him to say that the is "something we know not what" (Locke, 1824). is suitable note here that when Locke discusses he doesn't mean anything other than material substance 1996: p. 21). Since we can just watch a thing's properties, its substance is mysterious. opine beneath The idea we have, to we the name being nothing the supposed, but unknown, support of those qualities we find existing, we imagine cannot subsist sine re substante, without something to we that support substantia 2006: p. 135). While rejects material substance as conflicting empiricist he sort substance is spirits. We think the presence of our own through instinct and that (Pappas, 1999: p. 133). This regardless, neither Locke Berkeley is predictable with the empiricist guideline. Hume, an exhaustive going empiricist, prevents the presence from claiming the material profound substance and Berkeley, In David Hume's framework, impressions and are the substances, for same B. S. Akpan, C. C. Odohoedi 263 reason. in Treatise, our in substance is consequence of a or deception. When follow an in successive
 but rather has an internal incLination to MovemEnt And SeLf-imProvEment. Drive, vitaLIty, aCtion are of the embodimenT of suBsTAnce" (cOpLestoN, 2003: p. 298). For LoCKe, A SUbsTaNcE is ThAT pArt of An iNdividuAl thing in wHicH iTs properties IS iN here. SamueL StUmpf pointed oUt tHat LocKe MovED closEr tHe subJect of SUbstanCe from the JuDGment aPTitudes VIEwPoinT (Stumpf & Fieser, 2003: p. 256). DesPItE The way that LockE looks At THe THEme Of sUbstance frOm The roUTine vieWPoINT, He wAS not prepared tO answer the qUEstIon witH eXacTNess. He YieldEd THat If any one disSectS himself cOncernINg his coNSidered FaultlEss SubStanCE wHeN alL iS SaiD AnD doNE, he Will find He HaS not cOnsiDERED eveRytHing, With tHe exception of SupPosiTIon Of the Fact tHe he KnOws noT what sUpporT sUch qualities whiCh arE making diRecT iMprEsSion oN Us (StumPf & FIesEr, 2003: p. 256). LockE keeps uP ThaT sUBSTaNce constitutes the dIsSENt Of fragilE learnINg. thIS leads hiM tO saY thaT THe likElihOOd Of substaNce is "sOMeThIng we knOw Not whaT" (LOckE, 1824). It Is suiTAble To note Here that When LOCke discusses suBStance he doesn'T MeAN AnYThinG otHer than mateRial SUbstAnce (oMoRegBE, 1996: p. 21). SinCe we cAn JUsT Watch a thing's propertIeS, its suBstanCe is mysteriouS. John Locke'S OPIne beneaTh ThE IdEA that we have, to wHich wE give the geNEral name SubstAnce, beinG nothing bUT The suppoSed, But UnkNowN, SUpPort of those quALItieS wE find exIstIng, whicH we ImaGinE caNnOt subsist Sine re suBsTaNtE, wIthOut soMEthing to SuPpoRt TheM, we caLL that sUpporT subStAnTIa (BRoackes, 2006: P. 135). whILE BerKeLeY rejEctS LOcke's MateRIal SubstanCe as conflIctINg wiTh ThE empiriCist position, hE pRoposes an oThErwOrldly SORt of subsTance which is spirits. We thINk about The PreseNce oF our own soUl tHrough InsTInct anD that oF diffErEnt SPIrits BY InFerEnCe (Pappas, 1999: p. 133). THIS reGardlEsS, neiTher LocKe nor Berkeley is preDIctAble with the emPirIcisT GUiDelINe. dAviD HUMe, aN EXhaustive going eMpiricist, pReVEnTs the preseNCe fRoM claimiNg the maTeriaL And profOund substAnce of LocKe And BERKelEy, In David HUme's framEwork, imprESsionS AnD thouGhtS are thE sUbsTanceS, for thE SamE B. S. AkPan, C. C. ODoHoedi 263 rEason. huMe, in the TReatise, our knowledge in suBstancE is thE coNsequence Of a MIx-uP or deceptIon. WHen we graduAllY foLlow aN obJEct in Its sUCcEssIVe chaNges, THe
 but rather has an interna l inclinat ion t o m ove me nt a nd s elf-improvemen t . Dr ive, vitality, actionare o ft he e m bo dimen t of su b st a n ce"  ( Co ple st o n,  2003 : p . 298).  For Locke , a  s ubstance ist ha t part ofanindividual t hin g in w hi chi ts pr ope rties  is in here.Samuel St um p f poin t ed outt h at  Loc ke moved closer t h es ubject of subs tancefr o mt h e j udg ment aptit ud es vi e wpoint( St u m p f & Fieser, 2003:  p. 256). D e spi te the  w ayt hat Lo cke l oo k s a t the theme  ofsubstance  fromt he rout i ne view point,  he  wa s no t  p re par ed toa ns wer the  questio nwi th ex actn e s s .  Heyie lded  that  if any one d iss ects him selfconce rnin ghis c onside red f au ltless substanc e wh en all is  sa id  an ddone, he wil l f ind  he has  not co n sid er e d ev erything, with the  e x c ep tion ofsuppos i ti on of the f ac t t he h e knows  not wh at suppo rt suc h  q ua litieswh ich ar emak ing  dire c t im pressi on on us  (Stu m pf & Fieser, 2 0 03: p. 256).L oc k e  k e epsupthat substa ncec onst itut e sthe disse nt of  f r ag i le learning. This l ea ds him  to s ay that the l ikelihoodo f substanc e is "s o mething we kno w not  what" (Lo c ke, 1824 ). It  is suit able to n o t e here t hat  wh enLoc k e  d iscusses subs t a ncehe  doesn' t m ean any thi ngoth erth an materi al subst an ce  ( Om ore gbe,1 996: p.21 ).Si nce  we c a n just  watc h ath in g 'spropert i es , itssu bs tanc e i smyste riou s . J ohn Loc ke's opin e b e neat hTh e ideathat we have,  t o which we  g ive  the g e n eral nam e substance, being noth i ng butthe  supp osed , but unk now n, sup por t  of th ose qu aliti es  we f ind e x i st ing ,which we i m a gin e can no t su bsist s ine re substante,w ith out something  to  sup p o rt  th e m, weca l l t h a t support subst antia (Bro ac k es , 2006: p. 135 ).  WhileBerkele y rej e cts Loc ke's mate rial subs ta ncea s  co nflictingwith the  empirici s t pos i ti on, h e p ropose sanother worldl y  so rt of  subst an ce whi ch is  s pirits.We think about the pres ence o f our  ow n soul th rou g h i nstinct a nd t hat of dif fer ent  spir its by in fere n ce  (P a ppas,  199 9 : p. 133) .  T his r eg ardless, ne i t h erLocke  no r  Berke leyis predictable wi t h the empirici st g u i del ine .  Dav id  Hume, an exha ust iv e going em pi ricist, pre vents th ep resen ce fro m clai ming th e ma t erialandpro found sub sta nc e  of Loc ke  a n d Berk eley ,In Dav id Hum e 's f r a mework, impressi ons a n d  thou g hts  areth e subst a nces , for thesame B. S.Akpan,  C.C. Od ohoedi26 3 reas on.  H ume, in th e  Treatise , our  knowle dg e in  su bstanc e is t he co nseq ue nce  of a mix - u po rde c ept ion.  When  w e gr adually f o llow anobj e ct in i ts  su c c essive ch a n ges, the
 but_rather has_an internal inclination to_movement and_self-improvement._Drive, vitality,_action_are of the_embodiment of substance"_(Copleston, 2003: p. 298)._For Locke, a_substance_is that part of an individual thing in which its properties is in here._Samuel_Stumpf pointed_out_that_Locke moved closer the subject_of substance from the judgment_aptitudes viewpoint_(Stumpf & Fieser, 2003: p. 256). Despite the_way_that Locke looks_at the theme of substance from the routine viewpoint,_he was not prepared to answer_the question with_exactness._He_yielded that if any_one dissects himself concerning his considered_faultless substance when all is said_and done, he will find he has_not considered everything, with the exception_of supposition of the fact_the he_knows not what support such_qualities which are_making direct_impression on us_(Stumpf & Fieser, 2003: p. 256)._Locke keeps up_that substance constitutes the dissent of_fragile_learning. This leads_him_to_say that_the likelihood of_substance_is "something_we_know not what" (Locke, 1824). It_is_suitable to note here that when Locke_discusses substance he doesn't_mean_anything other than material_substance (Omoregbe, 1996: p. 21)._Since we can just watch a_thing's properties,_its substance_is mysterious. John Locke's opine beneath The idea that we have,_to which we give the general_name substance, being nothing_but the_supposed,_but unknown, support_of_those qualities_we find existing, which we imagine cannot_subsist sine_re substante, without something to support_them, we call that_support_substantia (Broackes, 2006: p. 135). While_Berkeley rejects Locke's material substance as_conflicting with the empiricist position,_he_proposes_an otherworldly sort of substance_which is spirits. We think about_the presence of_our own soul through instinct and that_of_different spirits by inference (Pappas, 1999:_p._133). This regardless, neither Locke nor_Berkeley_is_predictable with the empiricist guideline._David Hume, an exhaustive going empiricist,_prevents the presence from claiming the material and profound_substance of Locke_and Berkeley, In David Hume's_framework,_impressions_and thoughts are the substances, for the same B. S._Akpan, C._C. Odohoedi 263_reason. Hume, in the Treatise, our knowledge in substance is_the consequence of a mix-up or deception._When we gradually follow an object in its successive changes, the