 my reading of Rawls, believe that whatever they are equipped to do to take part in their system of social cooperation is worth doing. grounds for the mattering interpretation We can reject the merit interpretation of Rawlsian self-respect fairly swiftly. There is plenty of textual evidence, which I consider below, that implies that the merit view is not what Rawls has in mind. More importantly, though, if this were what Rawls has in mind, his view of self-respect would conflict with his view of conceptions of the good. Because Rawls thinks that every citizen should have self-respect, he would be committed, on the merit interpretation, to the idea that every citizen should have as part of his conception of the good the idea that persons' contributions can be assessed on an objective scale of merit. He would not be committed to a particular view of which contributions have merit-he would not be, that is, committed to a particular standard of merit. But he would be committed to the notion that all persons should have an objectivist view about the merit of various types of human activities. In the language of the later Rawls, we can say that Rawls would be committed to the idea that a reasonable comprehensive doctrine as such must contain the view that the various sorts of contributions people make to a scheme of social cooperation can be ranked on a scale of merit. But Rawls clearly does not restrict reasonable comprehensive doctrines in this way (1993: 58–66). He counts among the reasonable comprehensive doctrines those that deny the existence of an objective standard for assessing the merit of various human activities. So, we have a fairly strong reason to conclude that Rawls does not see self-respect as a secure conviction in the merit of our contributions to a scheme of social cooperation. That leaves us with the good-for-oneself and the mattering interpretations of Rawlsian self-respect. Before outlining my argument for the 10 There may be, in rare cases, adult members of society who have virtually nothing to offer to a scheme of social cooperation. To encourage them to have self-respect, then, would be to encourage them to have a false belief. This problem is set aside by Rawls's conception of the citizen as a fully cooperating member of society. OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 2/11/2012, SPi Rawlsian Self-Respect 245 mattering interpretation, I must make a distinction between two types of circumstances that Rawls thinks sustain citizens' self-respect.
my reading of Rawls, believe that whatever they are equipped to do to subscribe character in their system of social cooperation is worth doing. yard for the mattering interpretation We can rule out the deservingness interpretation of Rawlsian self - respect fairly swiftly. There is plenty of textual evidence, which I regard below, that implies that the deservingness view is not what Rawls has in mind. More importantly, though, if this were what Rawls has in mind, his view of self - respect would conflict with his position of conceptions of the good. Because Rawls thinks that every citizen should consume self - respect, he would be committed, on the merit interpretation, to the mind that every citizen should have as part of his conception of the good the idea that persons' contribution can be assessed on an objective scale of merit. He would not be committed to a particular scene of which contribution have merit - he would not be, that is, committed to a particular standard of merit. But he would be invest to the impression that all persons should have an objectivist view about the deservingness of diverse type of human activities. In the language of the later Rawls, we can say that Rawls would be committed to the idea that a reasonable comprehensive doctrine as such must control the view that the various sorts of contributions people make to a system of social cooperation can be ranked on a scale of merit. But Rawls clearly does not qualify reasonable comprehensive doctrine in this way (1993: 58–66). He counts among the reasonable comprehensive doctrines those that deny the existence of an objective criterion for assessing the merit of various human activities. So, we have a fairly strong reason to reason that Rawls does not see self - respect as a secure conviction in the merit of our contributions to a dodge of social cooperation. That leaves us with the full - for - oneself and the mattering interpretations of Rawlsian self - deference. Before outlining my argumentation for the 10 There may be, in rare cases, adult members of society who have virtually nothing to propose to a scheme of social cooperation. To encourage them to have self - respect, then, would be to encourage them to have a false belief. This problem is put aside by Rawls's conception of the citizen as a in full cooperating member of company. OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 2/11/2012, SPi Rawlsian Self - Respect 245 mattering interpretation, I must stool a distinction between two types of circumstances that Rawls thinks sustain citizen' self - respect.
 my reading of Rawls, believt that whatever tkwy are equipled to du to take part in their systxm od socual cooperation is worgh doing. hrounds dor uhe mattering intxdpretatljn Ws can ceject the merij interpretadion of Rawlsidn szlf-respect fairly swiftly. There is pjenty og hextual evidense, wnych J consider below, that implies that the megit view is not wnat Rawls has in mind. More implrtantly, though, if this were qhat Eawls has in mind, his nnew of self-tespect would conflict with his xiew pf conceptuobs lx the good. Uecausv Rawls thinks that eeery ciyizen should hsve seof-respect, he would be committed, on the ierit intar'retation, to the idea tyat eeery citkzen shkukd have ws 'art of his conception of the good the idta eyat persons' ckntribttyons can be assessed on an objective scdle of merit. He would not ve committed to a parjicular viqw of which contributions have merit-he would not te, thet is, cjonihted to a particular standard of merit. But he soilc be committed to the notooj yrat all persovs shobmd have an objectividt view abour the meryt og various types of human acrivities. In nhe oanguage of the lacer Rawls, we can say yhat Rawls would be comoittsd to the ifea that z reasonable compfehvnsiee doctrine as such must cjntain thx viec that tfe vsrious sorts of fontrltutions people makf to c schame of soclal cooperation can be ranked oi a scale of kesit. But Rawjs clcarly does not westrict reasouable coiprehdnsive docnrines in this way (1993: 58–66). He counts ammjg the reasoiable com[rehwnsice doctfknes those thay deny thv txistence if an objective stendatd for assessing cke merit of variois fumwn artiviehes. So, we haee a faktly sgrong rtcsok tu comclude that Rawls doas nkt see self-respect af a secute conviceion in the mrrit of our contrihutiois to e scheke jf social cooperation. That leabes us wihh bhe good-for-onqseln anq the mattzring interpretations of Rawlsian self-rewpect. Before outlibing my argument fot tme 10 There mab be, ig rare caves, adult members of society who have virtually nothing to offer to a scheme of social cooperation. To encourage them to have self-respect, then, qould ue to encourafe tnem tm kavz a falfe bxlmef. This problem ps set aside by Rawls's conceptioi of the chtnzen as a fully cooperating mrmcer of societi. OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINZL, 2/11/2012, SPi Tawlsian Self-Respect 245 mattering interpretation, I must mske a diwtincfion bvjwexn two types of circimstanees thqt Rawlw thlnks sustain cktiaeks' self-resoect.
my reading of Rawls, believe that whatever equipped do to part in their worth grounds for the interpretation We can the merit interpretation of Rawlsian self-respect swiftly. There is plenty of textual evidence, which I consider below, that implies the merit view is not what Rawls has in mind. More importantly, though, this what has mind, his view of self-respect would conflict with his view of conceptions of the good. Because thinks that every citizen should have self-respect, he be committed, on the interpretation, to the idea that citizen have as of conception the good the that persons' contributions can be assessed on an objective scale of merit. He would not be committed a particular which contributions merit-he not that is, committed particular standard of merit. But he to the notion that all persons should have objectivist view the merit of various types of activities. In the language of the later Rawls, can say that Rawls would be committed to the idea that a reasonable comprehensive doctrine must contain the view the various sorts contributions make a of social can be ranked on a scale of merit. But Rawls clearly not restrict reasonable comprehensive doctrines in this way (1993: 58–66). among reasonable comprehensive doctrines that deny the existence an standard for assessing the various activities. a strong to conclude that Rawls not see self-respect as a conviction in the merit scheme of social cooperation. That leaves us with good-for-oneself and the mattering interpretations of Rawlsian Before outlining my argument for the 10 There may be, in rare adult members who have virtually nothing to offer to a of social cooperation. To them to have self-respect, then, would be to encourage to a false This problem is aside by Rawls's of the citizen fully cooperating of OUP FINAL, 2/11/2012, SPi Rawlsian Self-Respect 245 interpretation, must make a distinction between types that Rawls thinks sustain citizens' self-respect.
 my reading of Rawls, believe thAt whatever They aRe eQuiPpEd to Do to Take part in theiR SystEm of social cooperation iS wortH dOIng. gROuNds foR the matTErING inTeRpRetAtIOn we can RejEct the mErit interpRetAtIon of RawlsiaN SeLf-respect fAirLy swiftly. TheRe iS plentY oF teXTual eVidEnce, wHich I cONsider Below, that ImPLies thAT the merIT ViEw is Not what Rawls has in MInD. more importantlY, thougH, iF ThIS WerE whAt Rawls has In Mind, hIS view of SElF-RESpeCT would conflicT with his vieW Of cOnceptIoNs oF The gooD. BecaUsE rawLs thinks thaT eveRy citizen Should HAve self-REspect, hE would Be cOmmItteD, On ThE meRiT IntERpRetATioN, to the idEa ThAt eveRy ciTIZEN shoUld Have As parT of his conceptIon Of thE GooD the iDea thAt peRsOns' coNtribuTions CaN be assessed on an ObjeCtive scalE of MeRit. he Would NOt be coMmiTteD to a parTicular VIew Of WHICh Contributions have mErIT-He Would not Be, that IS, cOmMItted to a PaRtiCulaR STandaRd of MErIt. But he wOuld be COmMiTted to tHe Notion ThAt aLl pErsonS ShouLd have An objectIvist VIew about the merIT of various typES oF HUmAN actIviTies. In the laNguaGE of tHe laTEr rawLS, we caN say tHaT raWLs would be committed tO tHe idea That a Reasonable comPrehensive DOCTrine as sUch mUSt COntain the view tHat thE various soRTs of contRibutIons peopLe make to a SCHeme of soCiaL coOpeRatION cAn be ranked on a SCAle oF mErit. But rawLs clearLy dOes Not ResTrIct reasonAble compReHeNsIvE doCtrinES in this wAy (1993: 58–66). he cOuNts Among THe reasOnablE comPrEhENsiVe doctrINeS THose ThAt Deny The ExIstenCe of AN obJective Standard fOr aSSessInG tHe merit Of various humaN aCtivities. SO, wE haVe a faiRLY strong rEason to conclude that RawlS Does not See Self-rEspeCt as a secuRe cOnvictIon IN the meRit of oUr conTrIbuTIOns to A SChEme Of Social coopERAtiOn. ThaT lEaveS us with The good-for-oneself aND thE mattering intErpRetaTIOnS of rAwLSiaN sELf-rESPect. Before outliNing my arguMeNT fOr the 10 There MAy bE, iN rare caSes, adulT membERs of socIety who haVe virtualLy NothING to Offer to a scHeme of soCial coopeRAtion. tO eNcourAge Them to HaVe sElf-reSpect, tHEn, wOuld bE to encOuRage thEm to hAvE a false bElief. This problem is set asIde by RAwls's ConCeption of The CItiZen as a fulLy coOperating mEmbEr oF sociEty. ouP CORrECTed PrOOf – fINAL, 2/11/2012, sPi RAWlsian SelF-reSpeCT 245 MaTtering inteRPREtaTion, I MusT Make a dIstiNction between two tYPes of circumstaNces THAt RAwlS ThinKs Sustain citizenS' seLf-RESpect.
 my reading of Rawls, beli eve that w hatev erthe yareequi pped to do tot akepart in their system o f soc ia l  coo p er ation  is wor t hd o ing .gr oun ds fo r the  ma ttering  interpret ati on  We can reje c tthe meritint erpretationofRawlsi an  se l f-res pec t fai rly sw i ftly.There ispl e nty of textual e vi denc e, which I consid e rb elow, that imp lies t ha t  t h e  me rit  view is n ot  what Rawls h a si n min d . More import antly, thou g h,if thi swer e  whatRawls  h a s i n mind, his  vie w of self -respe c t would conflic t with  hi s v iewo fco nce pt i ons of  th e  go od. Beca us eRawls  thi n k s that  ev erycitiz en should hav e s elf- r esp ect,he wo uldbe  comm itted,  on t he  merit interpre tati on, to th e i de a t ha t eve r y citi zen  sh ould ha ve as p a rtof h i sconception of thego o d  t he ideathat p e rs on s ' contri bu tio ns c a n  be a sses s ed  on an o bjecti v esc ale ofme rit. H ewou ldnot b e  com mitted  to a pa rticu l ar view of whi c h contributio n sh a ve meri t-h e would not  be, that  is, co mmi t ted t o a p ar t ic u lar standard of mer it . Buthe wo uld be commit ted to the n o tion tha t al l  p e rsons should h ave a n objectiv i st viewabout  the mer it of var i o us types  of  hu man  ac t i vi ties. In thel a ngua ge  of the  la ter Raw ls,  we  ca n s ay  that Raw ls would  b eco mm itt ed to the idea  t hat  a  re asona b le com prehe nsiv edo c tri ne as s u ch m ustco nt ainthe  v iew t hatt hevarious  sorts of  co n trib ut io ns peop le make to asc heme of so ci alcooper a t ion canbe ranked on a scale of merit.But  Rawl s cl early doe s n ot res tri c t reas onable  comp re hen s i ve do c t ri nes  i n this way ( 199 3: 58 –6 6).He coun ts among the reaso n abl e comprehensi vedoct r i ne s t h os e  th at den y the existence o f an objec ti v estandard f o r a ss essingthe mer it of various  human ac tivities.  S o, w e hav e a fairly  strongreason to concl u de  that  Ra wls do es  no t see  self- r esp ect a s a se cu re con victi on  in themerit of our contributi ons to  a sc hem e of soci alc oop eration.That  leaves us  wi ththe g ood - for-o nese l fand the m atte r ing inter p re tat i o ns  of Rawlsia n s elf -resp ect .  Befor e ou tlining my argume n t for the 10 T here m aybe, in r ar e cases, adult  me mb e r s of soc ie ty who have  virtual ly nothi ng toofferto a sc h e me of soc ialcoo peration.  To  e n courage  t he m  to ha ve s el f-resp ect, t h en,w o uld be to encour age t h e m toh ave  a fa ls e belie f . Th is problem  is set asi de byRawl s's c oncepti on  of th e c it izen as af ully coop erati ng memb er  ofsoc iety.OUPC O RRECT ED P RO OF– FINAL,2 / 11 / 20 12 ,  SP i Ra wlsia nSelf -Respect2 45 matte rin g  interp re tat i o n, I m u st m ake a dist inc tionb e tween twot ypes of circu mstanc es tha t Rawls thi nk s susta inc i tizens' s elf-respe c t.
 my_reading of_Rawls, believe that whatever_they are_equipped_to do_to_take part in_their system of_social cooperation is worth_doing. grounds for_the_mattering interpretation We can reject the merit interpretation of Rawlsian self-respect fairly swiftly. There_is_plenty of_textual_evidence,_which I consider below, that_implies that the merit view_is not_what Rawls has in mind. More importantly, though,_if_this were what_Rawls has in mind, his view of self-respect would_conflict with his view of conceptions_of the good._Because_Rawls_thinks that every citizen_should have self-respect, he would be_committed, on the merit interpretation, to_the idea that every citizen should have_as part of his conception of_the good the idea that_persons' contributions_can be assessed on an_objective scale of_merit. He_would not be_committed to a particular view of_which contributions have_merit-he would not be, that is,_committed_to a particular_standard_of_merit. But_he would be_committed_to the_notion_that all persons should have an_objectivist_view about the merit of various types_of human activities. In_the_language of the later_Rawls, we can say that_Rawls would be committed to the_idea that_a reasonable_comprehensive doctrine as such must contain the view that the various_sorts of contributions people make to_a scheme of social_cooperation can_be_ranked on a_scale_of merit._But Rawls clearly does not restrict reasonable_comprehensive doctrines_in this way (1993: 58–66). He_counts among the reasonable_comprehensive_doctrines those that deny the existence_of an objective standard for assessing_the merit of various human_activities._So,_we have a fairly strong_reason to conclude that Rawls does_not see self-respect_as a secure conviction in the merit_of_our contributions to a scheme of_social_cooperation. That leaves us with the_good-for-oneself_and_the mattering interpretations of Rawlsian_self-respect. Before outlining my argument for_the 10 There may be, in rare cases, adult_members of society_who have virtually nothing to_offer_to_a scheme of social cooperation. To encourage them to have_self-respect, then,_would be to_encourage them to have a false belief. This problem is_set aside by Rawls's conception of the_citizen as a fully cooperating member of society. OUP CORRECTED PROOF_– FINAL, 2/11/2012, SPi Rawlsian Self-Respect 245 mattering_interpretation, I must make a distinction between_two types of circumstances_that_Rawls thinks sustain citizens' self-respect.