 (2003). 12 Are monothematic delusions such as Capgras syndrome (in which the deluded subject reports with distress that a spouse has been replaced by an impostor) an exception to thesis that ceasing to rely on a belief constitutes ceasing to have it? These delusions are sometimes described as 'circumscribed' because the subject does not act in all the ways one would expect they would, given their desires, if the subject believed that an impostor had replaced their spouse (Bortolotti 2013). But the subject is relying on the impostor hypothesis for some subsequent reasoning and actions, and if they didn't, the delusion would be a poor candidate for being a Siegel/Epistemic Charge 8 don't use it in reasoning or action. (Here we find another difference in temporal profiles between experience and belief). If the experience persists, does that show that experiences are never fully rationally adjustable? No. Consider the Müller--‐Lyer illusion, which typically arises via an uncontroversially a--‐rational process. If you know the lines are not the way appear, and you cease to rely on the experience, then there is no further rational adjustment to be made in the situation. The situation is analogous to giving up a belief that you have learned is anti--‐justified. Contrast Vivek's experience when it arises from his vanity. If Vivek learned that his experience arose from his vanity, and the experience persisted because of his vanity, that would be a case of residual irrationality. Vivek's situation would be analogous to someone obtuse who disowns an attitude (e.g., disrespect for someone they treat badly), but lacks the understanding needed to correct all the perspectives that go with it. Sometimes the fact that an experience persists, even when a subject disowns it, does constitute residual irrationality. The third kind of adjustment of a mental state works by the subject's controlling the conditions that tend to give rise to that type of mental state. We might call this adjustment by habituation – a strategy described by Pascal in his discussion of how one can make oneself believe in God.13 For instance, suppose one can't bring oneself to believe that climate change will lead to large--‐scale human disaster (because it is so unfathomable), but wants to believe in it. One might put oneself in circumstances that one thinks would lead to forming this belief, by exposing oneself to all the evidence for the likely drastic effects of climate change
(2003). 12 Are monothematic delusions such as Capgras syndrome (in which the deluded subject reports with distress that a spouse has been replace by an imposter) an exception to thesis that ceasing to rely on a impression constitutes end to have it? These delusions are sometimes describe as' circumscribed' because the subject does not work in all the ways one would expect they would, give their desires, if the subject believe that an impostor had replaced their spouse (Bortolotti 2013). But the subject is relying on the impostor hypothesis for some subsequent reasoning and action, and if they didn't, the delusion would be a poor candidate for being a Siegel / Epistemic Charge 8 don't practice it in reasoning or action. (Here we find another deviation in temporal profile between experience and belief). If the experience persists, does that show that experiences are never fully rationally adjustable? No. study the Müller--‐Lyer illusion, which typically arises via an uncontroversially a--‐rational process. If you know the lines are not the direction appear, and you cease to rely on the experience, then there is no further rational adjustment to be made in the situation. The situation is analogous to contribute up a belief that you have learned is anti--‐justified. Contrast Vivek's experience when it get up from his vanity. If Vivek learned that his experience arose from his vanity, and the experience persist because of his vanity, that would be a case of residual irrationality. Vivek's situation would be analogous to someone obtuse who disowns an position (e.g., disrespect for someone they treat badly), but lacks the understanding needed to correct all the perspectives that go with it. Sometimes the fact that an experience persists, even when a subject disowns it, does establish residual irrationality. The third kind of adjustment of a genial department of state works by the subject's controlling the conditions that tend to pass rise to that type of mental department of state. We might call this adjustment by habituation – a strategy identify by Pascal in his discussion of how one can make oneself think in God.13 For instance, suppose one can't bring oneself to believe that climate change will moderate to large--‐scale human disaster (because it is thus unfathomable), but want to believe in it. One might put oneself in circumstance that one thinks would run to forming this belief, by exposing oneself to all the evidence for the likely drastic effects of climate change
 (2003). 12 Wre monothematic delusioks such as Capgrcw syndcome (in which tfe deluded subject reports wmth eistrtfs that a spouse hxs been rvplaced bt an umpostor) ai exceptljn tk thevms that ceasing to rely ot a belief convtktbtes ceasing to have it? These delusijns are slmetimes descrybed ws 'cjgcmmscribed' because the subject doss not ect in all the eays one would expect they woupd, given their deslres, if the subtwct believed that an impostor had teplaced their spouse (Bortolotti 2013). But the subjext is telying on tie impjstor hypothcxis fos some xubsequent reaxonmng qnd actions, and if thxy didn't, the delusiog would ba c poor candidate for veung a Siecel/Eoustdmid Rhadge 8 dln't use it in reasoning ir action. (Here we fonq another diffsrence ig temporal profiles between experience dnd belief). If the experienxe persists, does that show thae experiences are never fully rationally adjustabne? No. Zonwiqde hhe Müller--‐Lyer illusion, which typically arises bis sn uncontroverfially a--‐ratoojak process. If yuu knoc tge lines are not tje way wppeae, and you ceaxe to rely on the experiencw, then there us no further ratilnal adjustoent to br made in the situation. The situation ls analogkjs to giving up x bvliex that you have learned is anti--‐justmfied. Contrart Vovek's qxperience when it arises from his vanijy. If Eivek learjed that his experience arose fcpm his vaniti, atd nhe expernence iersisted becaufe of his vanijy, that wjuld ce a case kf resivual irratiogality. Vivek's dituation wonld be anwlogius ro someuve obtuse who cisowns au attutude (e.g., disrespecb for aomeone they trzct badly), but lackx tfe tnfecstanqhng needed tm cofrezy all the perspegtixes yhat go with it. Somedimea the fact that an ewperience persistf, even when a subject disowns iu, does coistituye tesidual irrationality. The thirs kind of admustment of a menbal ftate workx by the subject's controlling the condivions that tend to givg rise to that type oy kental statx. We myght call this adjustment by yabituation – a stvategy described by Paacal it his discussion of how one can make oneself believe in God.13 For instance, suppowe one can't bring knesrlf tm yelneve thwt cpmmate change will lead to large--‐scale human disasver (becausa nt is so unfathomable), but wanys to believe iv it. One might put onesemf in citcumstances that one thinks woukd lead to forming this nelief, by expoaing oneseuf to all the evidrnce fmr thw likelt drwstic effects of cpimate chwnge
(2003). 12 Are monothematic delusions such as (in the deluded reports with distress replaced an impostor) an to thesis that to rely on a belief constitutes to have it? These delusions are sometimes described as 'circumscribed' because the subject not act in all the ways one would expect they would, given their if subject that impostor had replaced their spouse (Bortolotti 2013). But the subject is relying on the impostor hypothesis some subsequent reasoning and actions, and if they the delusion would be poor candidate for being a Charge don't use in or (Here we find difference in temporal profiles between experience and belief). If the experience persists, does that show that experiences never fully No. Consider Müller--‐Lyer which arises via an process. If you know the lines way appear, and you cease to rely on experience, then is no further rational adjustment to made in the situation. The situation is analogous giving up a belief that you have learned is anti--‐justified. Contrast Vivek's experience when it his vanity. If Vivek that his experience from vanity, the persisted because his vanity, that would be a case of residual irrationality. Vivek's would be analogous to someone obtuse who disowns an attitude for they treat badly), lacks the understanding needed correct the perspectives that go Sometimes fact persists, when subject disowns it, does residual irrationality. The third kind adjustment of a mental controlling the conditions that tend to give rise that type of mental state. We might this adjustment by habituation – a strategy described by Pascal in his of how make oneself believe in God.13 For instance, suppose can't bring oneself to that climate change will lead to large--‐scale human disaster it so unfathomable), wants to believe it. One might oneself in circumstances thinks would to this oneself to all the evidence for likely effects of climate change
 (2003). 12 Are monothematic delusions sUch as CapgrAs synDroMe (iN wHich The dEluded subject rEPortS with distress that a spouSe has BeEN repLAcEd by aN impostOR) aN EXcePtIoN to ThESiS that CeaSing to rEly on a beliEf cOnStitutes ceasINg To have it? ThEse Delusions are SomEtimes DeScrIBed as 'CirCumscRibed' bECause tHe subject DoES not acT In all thE WAyS one Would expect they woULd, GIven their desirEs, if thE sUBjECT beLieVed that an iMpOstor HAd replaCEd THEIr sPOuse (BortolottI 2013). But the subjECt iS relyiNg On tHE imposTor hyPoTHesIs for some suBseqUent reasoNing anD Actions, ANd if theY didn't, The DelUsioN WoUlD be A pOOr cANdIdaTE foR being a SIeGeL/EpisTemiC cHARge 8 dOn't Use iT in reAsoning or actiOn. (HEre wE FinD anotHer diFferEnCe in tEmporaL profIlEs between experiEnce And belief). if tHe ExpErIence PErsistS, doEs tHat show That expERieNcES ARe Never fully rationalLy ADJuStable? No. considER tHe mÜller--‐LyeR iLluSion, WHIch tyPicaLLy Arises viA an uncONtRoVersialLy A--‐ratioNaL prOceSs. If yOU knoW the liNes are noT the wAY appear, and you cEAse to rely on thE ExPERiENce, tHen There is no fuRtheR RatiOnal ADjUstMEnt to Be madE iN ThE Situation. The situatiOn Is analOgous To giving up a beLief that yoU HAVe learneD is aNTi--‐JUstified. ContraSt VivEk's experieNCe when it AriseS from his Vanity. If VIVEk learneD thAt hIs eXpeRIEnCe arose from hiS VAnitY, aNd the exPerIence peRsiSteD beCauSe Of his vaniTy, that woUlD bE a CaSe oF resiDUal irratIoNalItY. ViVek's sITuatioN woulD be aNaLoGOus To someoNE oBTUse wHo DiSownS an AtTitudE (e.g., dISreSpect foR someone tHey TReat BaDlY), but lacKs the understaNdIng needed tO cOrrEct all THE perspecTives that go with it. SometiMEs the faCt tHat an ExpeRience perSisTs, even WheN A subjeCt disoWns it, DoEs cONStituTE ReSidUaL irrationaLITy. THe thiRd Kind Of adjusTment of a mental statE WorKs by the subjecT's cOntrOLLiNg tHE cONdiTiONs tHAT tend to give rise To that type Of MEnTal state. We MIghT cAll this AdjustmEnt by HAbituatIon – a stratEgy descriBeD by PASCal In his discuSsion of hOw one can mAKe oneSElF beliEve In God.13 FOr InsTance, SupposE One Can't bRing onEsElf to bElievE tHat climaTe change will lead to large--‐Scale hUman dIsaSter (becauSe iT Is sO unfathomAble), But wants to BelIevE in it. one MIght pUt onESeLf iN CircuMstaNCes that onE ThInkS WOuLd lead to forMING thIs belIef, BY exposIng oNeself to all the eviDEnce for the likeLy drASTic EffECts oF cLimate change
 (2003). 12 Are monothemat ic delusio ns su chasCa pgra s sy ndrome (in whi c h th e deluded subject repo rts w it h  dis t re ss th at a sp o us e has  b ee n r ep l ac ed by  an  impost or) an exc ept io n to thesist ha t ceasingtorely on a be lie f cons ti tut e s cea sin g tohave i t ? Thes e delusio ns are so m etimesd e sc ribe d as 'circumscrib e d' because the su bjectdo e sn o t a ctin all the  w ays o n e would ex p e c t t h ey would, giv en their de s ire s, ifth e s u bjectbelie ve d  th at an impos torhad repla ced th e ir spou s e (Bort olotti  20 13) . Bu t  t he  su bj e cti srel y ing  on theim po storhypo t h e s is f orsome  subs equent reason ing  and act ions,  andif t he y did n't, t he de lu sion would be a  poo r candida tefo r b ei ng aS iegel/ Epi ste mic Cha rge 8 d o n't  u s e it  in reasoning or a ct i o n.  (Here w e find an ot h er diffe re nce  int e mpora l pr o fi les betw een ex p er ie nce and  b elief) .Ifthe  expe r ienc e pers ists, do es th a t show that ex p eriences aren ev e r  f u llyrat ionally adj usta b le?No.C on sid e r the  Müll er - -‐ L yer illusion, which  t ypical ly ar ises via an u ncontrover s i a lly a--‐ rati o na l  process. If y ou kn ow the lin e s are no t the  way app ear, andy o u ceasetorel y o n t h e  e xperience, th e n  the re  is nofur ther ra tio nal  ad jus tm ent to be  made in  t he  s it uat ion.T he situa ti onis  an alogo u s to g iving  upabe l ief  that y o uh a ve l ea rn ed i s a nt i--‐j usti f ied . Contr ast Vivek 'se xper ie nc e whenit arises fro mhis vanity .IfVivekl e arned th at his experience arose from hi s v anity , an d the exp eri ence p ers i sted b ecause  of h is  va n i ty, t h a twou ld  be a case o f r esidu al  irr ational ity. Vivek's situa t ion  would be ana log oust o  s ome o ne obt us e  wh o disowns an atti tude (e.g. ,d is respect fo r  so me one the y treat  badl y ), butlacks the  understa nd ingn e ede d to corre ct all t he perspe c tives th at go  wi th it.  S ome times  the f a ctthatan exp er iencepersi st s, evenwhen a subject disownsit, do es co nst itute res idu a l i rrational ity.  The third  ki ndof ad jus t mentof a me nta l  stat e wo r ks by the su bje c t 's  controllin g t hecondi tio n s that  ten d to give rise to that type of m enta l sta te. We m ig ht call this a dju st m e nt by ha bi tuation – a  strateg yd escri bed by  Pasca l in hi s di s cussio n of  ho w one can  ma ke oneself  b el i eve in  God .1 3 Forinstan c e, s u p pose one can't b ringo n eself tobelie ve  that c l imat e change w ill lead to  large --‐s calehuman d is aster(be ca use it iss o unfatho mable ), butwa ntstobeliev e in i t. On e mi gh t p ut onesel f in ci rc u mst ance s tha tonethinks wo u ld leadtof ormingth isb e lief,b ye x posing one sel f toa l l the evid e ncef or the l ikelydrasti c effec t s o fclimate  ch a n ge
 (2003)._12 Are_monothematic delusions such as_Capgras syndrome_(in_which the_deluded_subject reports with_distress that a_spouse has been replaced_by an impostor)_an_exception to thesis that ceasing to rely on a belief constitutes ceasing to have_it?_These delusions_are_sometimes_described as 'circumscribed' because the_subject does not act in_all the_ways one would expect they would, given their_desires,_if the subject_believed that an impostor had replaced their spouse (Bortolotti_2013). But the subject is relying_on the impostor_hypothesis_for_some subsequent reasoning and_actions, and if they didn't, the_delusion would be a poor candidate_for being a Siegel/Epistemic Charge 8 don't_use it in reasoning or action._(Here we find another difference_in temporal_profiles between experience and belief)._If the experience_persists, does_that show that_experiences are never fully rationally adjustable?_No. Consider the_Müller--‐Lyer illusion, which typically arises via_an_uncontroversially a--‐rational process._If_you_know the_lines are not_the_way appear,_and_you cease to rely on the_experience,_then there is no further rational adjustment_to be made in_the_situation. The situation is_analogous to giving up a_belief that you have learned is_anti--‐justified. Contrast_Vivek's experience_when it arises from his vanity. If Vivek learned that his_experience arose from his vanity, and_the experience persisted because_of his_vanity,_that would be_a_case of_residual irrationality. Vivek's situation would be analogous_to someone_obtuse who disowns an attitude (e.g.,_disrespect for someone they_treat_badly), but lacks the understanding needed_to correct all the perspectives that_go with it. Sometimes the_fact_that_an experience persists, even when_a subject disowns it, does constitute_residual irrationality. The_third kind of adjustment of a mental_state_works by the subject's controlling the_conditions_that tend to give rise to_that_type_of mental state. We might_call this adjustment by habituation –_a strategy described by Pascal in his discussion of_how one can_make oneself believe in God.13_For_instance,_suppose one can't bring oneself to believe that climate change_will lead_to large--‐scale human_disaster (because it is so unfathomable), but wants to believe_in it. One might put oneself in_circumstances that one thinks would lead to forming this belief, by_exposing oneself to all the evidence for the_likely drastic effects of climate change