 and the extra-mental reality those representations were representations of. The account of Moore's influences that I have argued for here supports the view that what Dummett has called the 'extrusion of thought from the mind'-which he argues is a legacy of (1993, p. 25), and deeply influential on early analytic philosophy by way of Frege's discoveries in logic and philosophical logic-has a complex history. I think it is true that the extrusion of thought from the mind is deeply influential on the development of early analytic philosophy. But the anti-psychologism characteristic of Frege's logic was not known by Ward or by Russell in 1896, when Moore began his moral sciences Tripos preparation; and not known at all by Moore between 1896–1898.44 It is to do both Stout and Ward a historical and conceptual disservice not to emphasize that they themselves made prolific and substantive contributions to the issue of the extrusion of thought from the mind as scientifically minded psychologists-contributions that were far more accessible to Moore, and for which there is direct evidence of his exposure. In Moore's hands, I have argued, the extrusion of thought from the mind as represented in NJ rang the curtain down on nineteenth-century philosophy; and also on nineteenth-century mental science. NJ represents not only the inception of an entirely contemporary metaphysics of mind but also of an entirely different method in philosophy, whose transit through the first half of the twentieth century was further influenced in no small part by Moore's mature views. 8. Uncited references [Brentano, 1995, Ryle, 1970, Schilpp, 1944, Sully, 1878a, Sully, 1878b, Twardowski, 1997, Ward, 1887, Ward, 1899].1879]) when Russell was a Fellow (thus as early as 1895 or 1896). According to Griffin, rly as this (see Russell, 1903, p. xviii). There is no evidence, moreover, that Moore was temporary notion of propositional content:..., Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. 936 937 938 939 940 941 942 943 944 945 946 947 948 949 950 951 952 953 954 955 956 957 958 959 960 961 962 963 964 965 966 967 968 969 970 971 972 973 974 975 976 977 978 979 980 981 982
and the extra - mental reality those representations were representation of. The explanation of Moore's influences that I have argued for here supports the opinion that what Dummett has called the' extrusion of idea from the mind'-which he argues is a legacy of (1993, p. 25), and profoundly influential on early analytic doctrine by way of Frege's discoveries in logic and philosophic logic - has a complex history. I think it is true that the bulge of thought from the mind is deeply influential on the development of early analytic philosophy. But the anti - psychologism characteristic of Frege's logic was not known by Ward or by Russell in 1896, when Moore begin his moral sciences Tripos preparation; and not known at wholly by Moore between 1896–1898.44 It is to do both Stout and Ward a historical and conceptual disservice not to stress that they themselves made fecund and substantive contribution to the issue of the extrusion of thought from the judgment as scientifically minded psychologists - contributions that were far more accessible to Moore, and for which there is direct evidence of his exposure. In Moore's hands, I have argued, the extrusion of thought from the mind as represented in NJ rang the curtain down on nineteenth - century philosophy; and also on nineteenth - century genial skill. NJ represents not only the inception of an wholly contemporaneous metaphysics of mind but also of an entirely different method in philosophy, whose transit through the first one-half of the twentieth century was further influenced in no small part by Moore's mature views. 8. Uncited references [ Brentano, 1995, Ryle, 1970, Schilpp, 1944, Sully, 1878a, Sully, 1878b, Twardowski, 1997, Ward, 1887, Ward, 1899].1879 ]) when Russell was a Fellow (thus as early as 1895 or 1896). According to Griffin, rly as this (see Russell, 1903, p. xviii). There be no evidence, furthermore, that Moore was impermanent notion of propositional content: ..., Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. 936 937 938 939 940 941 942 943 944 945 946 947 948 949 950 951 952 953 954 955 956 957 958 959 960 961 962 963 964 965 966 967 968 969 970 971 972 973 974 975 976 977 978 979 980 981 982
 anf the extra-mental realitn those represenjarions xere relresentagions of. The account of Moorx's ibfluebces that I have arguea for herv supportw tht view that what Vhmmett mcs camped chx 'extrusion of jhought from the mind'-which hd crgues is a legacy of (1993, p. 25), and deeply influemtlal on early agalyuic phimosophy by way of Frege's discoveriss in lmgic and philpsophical logic-has a complfx hlstory. I think it ls true thaj thq extrusion ow thought from the mins is deeply influential on the aevelppment of gcely dnalytic phmlosopry. But the akni-psychmlogism characteristig of Hregw's logic was not knowi by Ward or by Russgll in 1896, whan Moore began his noeal swienwes Geipus kre'arztion; wnd not known at all by Noore between 1896–1898.44 It ix ei do both Stoht and Wwrd a historical and conceptual disservpce hot to emphasize that tyey themselves made ptolific anq substantive contributions to the issue of the eftrusmov oy thoueyt from the mind as scientifically minded psychjmobixts-contributioks that were far mprf sscessible to Ooore, chd for which there id direcj evidwnce of hys ecposure. In Moore's hands, I hqve argued, tke wxtrusion of thougkt from the oind as rrpresented in NJ rang tke curfain down oj nineteehgh-century philosuphj; ang also on nineteenth-centurr mental wcieuce. NJ rdprexents got only tje ingaption of an entirfly clndemporary letaphysics of mind but also of an entirely dofxervnt methob in pmilosophy, whose transit throuyh the fnrst hxlf of the twentixth century ras further itvluenced in io small [art by Noore's oxture views. 8. Umcited reytrences [Brwntano, 1995, Ryle, 1970, Schikpp, 1944, Sully, 1878a, Sully, 1878y, Uwqrdowski, 1997, Ward, 1887, Wxrd, 1899].1879]) ahxn Rufvell was a Fallod (tfis as early as 1895 if 1896). Avcording to Griffin, sly zs this (see Russelk, 1903, p. xviii). There if no evidence, moreover, that Mooge wav txmporaty gotion of propositional contenf:..., Stud. Hidt. Ihil. Sci. 936 937 938 939 940 941 942 943 944 945 946 947 948 949 950 951 952 953 954 955 956 957 958 959 960 961 962 963 964 965 966 967 968 969 970 971 972 973 974 975 976 977 978 979 980 981 982
and the extra-mental reality those representations were The of Moore's that I have view what Dummett has the 'extrusion of from the mind'-which he argues is legacy of (1993, p. 25), and deeply influential on early analytic philosophy by of Frege's discoveries in logic and philosophical logic-has a complex history. I think is that extrusion thought from the mind is deeply influential on the development of early analytic philosophy. But the characteristic of Frege's logic was not known by or by Russell in when Moore began his moral Tripos and not at by between 1896–1898.44 It to do both Stout and Ward a historical and conceptual disservice not to emphasize that they themselves prolific and to the of extrusion thought from the scientifically minded psychologists-contributions that were far Moore, and for which there is direct evidence his exposure. Moore's hands, I have argued, the of thought from the mind as represented in rang the curtain down on nineteenth-century philosophy; and also on nineteenth-century mental science. NJ represents the inception of an contemporary metaphysics of but of entirely method in whose transit through the first half of the twentieth century was influenced in no small part by Moore's mature views. 8. [Brentano, Ryle, 1970, Schilpp, Sully, 1878a, Sully, 1878b, 1997, 1887, Ward, 1899].1879]) when a (thus 1895 1896). to Griffin, rly as (see Russell, 1903, p. xviii). is no evidence, moreover, of propositional content:..., Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. 936 938 939 940 941 942 943 944 946 947 948 949 950 951 952 953 954 955 956 957 959 960 963 964 965 966 967 968 969 970 972 973 974 975 977 978 979 980 981 982
 and the extra-mental reality tHose represEntatIonS weRe ReprEsenTations of. The acCOunt Of Moore's influences that i have ArGUed fOR hEre suPports tHE vIEW thAt WhAt DUmMEtT has cAllEd the 'exTrusion of tHouGhT from the mind'-WHiCh he argues Is a Legacy of (1993, p. 25), and DeePly infLuEntIAl on eArlY analYtic phILosophY by way of FReGE's discOVeries iN LOgIc anD philosophical logIC-hAS a complex histoRy. I thiNk IT iS TRue ThaT the extrusIoN of thOUght froM ThE MINd iS Deeply influenTial on the deVEloPment oF eArlY AnalytIc phiLoSOphY. But the anti-PsycHologism cHaractERistic oF frege's lOgic waS noT knOwn bY waRd Or bY RUSseLL iN 1896, whEN MoOre began HiS mOral sCienCES tRipoS prEparAtion; And not known at All By MoORe bEtweeN 1896–1898.44 It is To do BoTh StoUt and WArd a hIsTorical and concePtuaL disserviCe nOt To eMpHasizE That thEy tHemSelves mAde prolIFic AnD SUBsTantive contributioNs TO ThE issue of The extRUsIoN Of thoughT fRom The mIND as scIentIFiCally minDed psyCHoLoGists-coNtRibutiOnS thAt wEre faR More AccessIble to MoOre, anD For which there iS Direct evidencE Of HIS eXPosuRe. IN Moore's handS, I haVE argUed, tHE eXtrUSion oF thouGhT FrOM the mind as representEd In NJ raNg the Curtain down on Nineteenth-CENTury philOsopHY; aND also on nineteeNth-ceNtury mentaL Science. Nj reprEsents noT only the iNCEption of An eNtiRelY coNTEmPorary metaphySICs of MiNd but alSo oF an entiRelY diFfeRenT mEthod in phIlosophy, WhOsE tRaNsiT throUGh the firSt HalF oF thE twenTIeth ceNtury Was fUrThER inFluenceD In NO SmalL pArT by MOorE's MaturE vieWS. 8. UnCited reFerences [BRenTAno, 1995, RYlE, 1970, SChilpp, 1944, SUlly, 1878a, Sully, 1878b, TwArDowski, 1997, Ward, 1887, waRd, 1899].1879]) wHen RusSELl was a FeLlow (thus as early as 1895 or 1896). AccoRDing to GRifFin, rlY as tHis (see RusSelL, 1903, p. xviiI). ThERe is no EvidenCe, morEoVer, THAt MooRE WaS teMpOrary notioN OF prOposiTiOnal Content:..., stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. 936 937 938 939 940 941 942 943 944 945 946 947 948 949 950 951 952 953 954 955 956 957 958 959 960 961 962 963 964 965 966 967 968 969 970 971 972 973 974 975 976 977 978 979 980 981 982
 and the extra-mental real ity thoserepre sen tat io ns w ererepresentation s  of.  The account of Moore' s inf lu e nces th at Ihave ar g ue d for  h er e s up p or ts th e v iew tha t what Dum met thas called t h e'extrusion  of  thought fro m t he min d' -wh i ch he  ar guesis a l e gacy o f (1993,p. 25), a n d deepl y in flue ntial on early an a ly t ic philosophyby way  o f  F r e ge' s d iscoveries  i n log i c and p h il o s o phi c al logic-hasa complex h i sto ry. Ith ink it istrueth a t t he extrusio n of  thoughtfrom t h e mindi s deepl y infl uen tia l on th edev el o pme n tofe arl y analyt ic  p hilos ophy . B u t th e a nti- psych ologism chara cte rist i c o f Fre ge'slogi cwas n ot kno wn by  W ard or by Russe ll i n 1896, w hen  M oor ebegan his mo ral  sc iencesTriposp rep ar a t i on ; and not known at  a l l  b y Moorebetwee n  1 89 6 –1898.44  I t i s to d o bot h St o ut  and War d a hi s to ri cal and  c oncept ua l d iss ervic e  not  to em phasizethatt hey themselves made prolific an d su b stan tiv e contribut ions to t he i s su e o f  theextru si o no f thought from themi nd asscien tifically min ded psycho l o g ists-con trib u ti o ns that were f ar mo re accessi b le to Mo ore,and forwhich the r e  is dire ctevi den ceo f  h is exposure.I n  Moo re 's hand s,I havearg ued , t heex trusion o f though tfr om  t heminda s repres en ted  i n N J ran g  the c urtai n do wn  o n  ni neteent h -c e n tury  p hi loso phy ;and a lsoo n n ineteen th-centur y m e ntal  s ci ence. N J representsno t only the  i nce ptiono f  an enti rely contemporary metap h ysics o f m ind b ut a lso of an  en tirely  di f ferent  metho d inph ilo s o phy,w h os e t ra nsit throu g h  th e fir st  hal f of th e twentieth centur y  wa s further inf lue nced i nnos ma l l p ar t  by M oore's mature v iews. 8. U nc i te d referenc e s [ Br entano,  1995,Ryle, 1970, S chilpp, 1 944, Sull y,  187 8 a , S ully, 1878 b, Tward owski, 19 9 7, Wa r d,  1887 , W ard, 1 89 9]. 1879] ) when Rus sellwas aFe llow ( thusas  early a s 1895 or 1896). Accord ing to  Grif fin , rly asthi s  (s ee Russel l, 1 903, p. xv iii ).There  is no ev iden c e,  mo r eover , th a t Moore w a stem p o ra ry notion o f p rop ositi ona l  conte nt:. .., Stud. Hist. P h il. Sci. 936 9 37 9 3 8  93 9 9 4 0 94 1942 943 944 94 5 9 46 9 47 948 9 49  950 951 95 2 953 95 49 55 95 6 957958 95 9 960 9 6 1  9 6 2 963964965  966 967968  9 6 9 970 9 71  9 7 2 97397497 5 976977 97 8  979 9 80 981 982
 and_the extra-mental_reality those representations were_representations of._The_account of_Moore's_influences that I_have argued for_here supports the view_that what Dummett_has_called the 'extrusion of thought from the mind'-which he argues is a legacy of_(1993,_p. 25),_and_deeply_influential on early analytic philosophy_by way of Frege's discoveries_in logic_and philosophical logic-has a complex history. I think_it_is true that_the extrusion of thought from the mind is deeply_influential on the development of early_analytic philosophy. But_the_anti-psychologism_characteristic of Frege's logic_was not known by Ward or_by Russell in 1896, when Moore_began his moral sciences Tripos preparation; and_not known at all by Moore_between 1896–1898.44 It is to_do both_Stout and Ward a historical_and conceptual disservice_not to_emphasize that they_themselves made prolific and substantive contributions_to the issue_of the extrusion of thought from_the_mind as scientifically_minded_psychologists-contributions_that were_far more accessible_to_Moore, and_for_which there is direct evidence of_his_exposure. In Moore's hands, I have argued,_the extrusion of thought_from_the mind as represented_in NJ rang the curtain_down on nineteenth-century philosophy; and also_on nineteenth-century_mental science._NJ represents not only the inception of an entirely contemporary metaphysics_of mind but also of an_entirely different method in_philosophy, whose_transit_through the first_half_of the_twentieth century was further influenced in no_small part_by Moore's mature views. 8. Uncited_references [Brentano, 1995, Ryle,_1970,_Schilpp, 1944, Sully, 1878a, Sully, 1878b,_Twardowski, 1997, Ward, 1887, Ward, 1899].1879])_when Russell was a Fellow_(thus_as_early as 1895 or 1896)._According to Griffin, rly as this_(see Russell, 1903,_p. xviii). There is no evidence, moreover,_that_Moore was temporary notion of propositional_content:...,_Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. 936 937_938_939_940 941 942 943 944_945 946 947 948 949 950_951 952 953 954 955 956 957 958 959_960 961 962_963 964 965 966 967_968_969_970 971 972 973 974 975 976 977 978 979_980 981_982