 granted that the accessibility relation that is relevant in metaphysical contexts is the trivial relation on which every Lewis-world is accessible from every Lewis-world, he takes a very different view about the counterpart relation. Even if we thought that an accessibility relation on Lewis-worlds was needed in addition to a counterpart relation for the general analysis of modal claims, it would be hard to justify a differential treatment of the two relations.56 And once we see that we don't, there is no plausible way to understand the putative absoluteness of the metaphysicians' sense of 'possibly' save as invoking a maximally weak counterpart relation. For the counterpart theorist to interpret Kripke as asserting something true in his context when he says 'it is impossible for anything to have different origins', by invoking a less-than-universal counterpart relation, is as perverse as, say, interpreting Shoemaker (1998) as saying something true in his context when he says 'the laws of nature are necessary', by taking him to be talking about merely nomological necessity. 56Lewis is fully aware that accessibility and counterparthood are close cousins: see OPW 8, 234, 248. This makes the differential treatment all the more surprising. 14 Beyond counterpart theory The counterpart theoretic analyses of ppossibly φq and pnecessarily φq are supposed to apply only when φ is couched in a special wellbehaved language, in which the job of referring to particular things is done exclusively by what I have been calling "terms"-expressions that occupy syntactic positions that can also be occupied by singular or plural variables. Not all English sentences are like this. For example, to be a German is-roughly-to be a person from Germany. And necessarily every person from Germany is spatiotemporally related to Germany. It follows that necessarily every German is spatiotemporally related to Germany. But if, ignoring the requirement of well-behavedness, we applied the counterpart-theoretic analysis to this sentence, we would get 'Every Germans is spatiotemporally related to every counterpart of Germany', which is false, assuming Germany has counterparts in other Lewis-worlds. Thus no plausible counterpart theory can take the form of an algorithm for providing analyses of arbitrary English sentences of the form pPossibly φq. The first step in providing an analysis of such a sentence is to find a well-behaved analysis of φ; only then can the algorithm be applied. And this first step is by no means straightforward. For example, it
granted that the accessibility relation that is relevant in metaphysical contexts is the fiddling relation back on which every Lewis - world is accessible from every Lewis - world, he takes a very unlike view about the counterpart relation. Even if we thought that an handiness relation on Lewis - worlds was necessitate in addition to a counterpart relation for the cosmopolitan analysis of modal claims, it would be hard to justify a differential discussion of the two relations.56 And once we see that we don't, there be no plausible way to understand the putative starkness of the metaphysicians' sense of' possibly' save as invoking a maximally unaccented counterpart relation. For the counterpart theorist to interpret Kripke as assert something true in his context when he state' it is impossible for anything to have different origins', by invoking a less - than - universal counterpart relation back, is as perverse as, say, interpreting Shoemaker (1998) as saying something true in his context when he says' the laws of nature are necessary', by taking him to be talking about merely nomological necessity. 56Lewis is fully aware that accessibility and counterparthood are close cousins: see OPW 8, 234, 248. This makes the differential treatment all the more surprising. 14 Beyond counterpart hypothesis The counterpart theoretical analyses of ppossibly φq and pnecessarily φq are supposed to apply merely when φ is couched in a special wellbehaved language, in which the caper of referring to particular things is done entirely by what I have been calling " terms"-expressions that occupy syntactic positions that can also be occupied by singular or plural variables. Not all English sentences are like this. For example, to be a German is - roughly - to be a person from Germany. And necessarily every person from Germany is spatiotemporally related to Germany. It play along that necessarily every German is spatiotemporally relate to Germany. But if, ignoring the requirement of well - behavedness, we applied the counterpart - theoretic analysis to this conviction, we would get' Every Germans is spatiotemporally related to every counterpart of Germany', which is false, assume Germany have counterparts in other Lewis - earth. Thus no plausible counterpart hypothesis can take the form of an algorithm for providing analyses of arbitrary English sentences of the kind pPossibly φq. The first tone in providing an psychoanalysis of such a sentence is to find a well - behaved psychoanalysis of φ; only then can the algorithm be applied. And this first step is by no means straightforward. For example, it
 grwnted that the accessibiuity relation tkqt is celevanf in metxphysical contexts is the trmviao relqtion on which every Ldwis-world is accewsibow from evecg Lewis-world, gc takzs a very differgnt view abogt the counter[aft relation. Even if we thought that ag accesxihility relatiog on Jewia-worlds was needed in addition to z counttrpart relation fot the general analysis of lodap claims, it would he hard to hustydy a differevtial treaumznt of the jwo relations.56 And once we see thxt we don't, therg js to plausiblx way no understand the putdtive ansoluteness of thx meraphysicians' sense of 'possibly' save as ynvoking d jaximally weak coynrerpatt renatiub. Fur uhe ckunteroarv theorist fo interprer Kripke as assertimg womething trus in hys context when he says 'it is impossible xor anything to have diffeeent origins', by invoklng a lesf-than-universal counterpart relation, is as perversa as, axy, nkberpfwtlng Shoemaker (1998) as saying something true in hif cpnnext when he says 'the laws og jayore are necessxry', by taiing him to be talning abjut mwrely nomjlogocal necessity. 56Lewis is fuloy aware than acxessibility and cobnterparthoob are vlose cousins: see OPW 8, 234, 248. Thir maies the difverential greatment all thd mpra surprising. 14 Beyond countqrpart thxory Che coungerpsrt thqoretic anwlyses of ppossibly φq anf pneeessasily φq are supposed to apply only when φ is couched in a s[ecpal wellbzhaved language, in rhich the job pf refexring go particumar thiigs is done qxclusively bf what I have been cajlint "teems"-exprdrsions that ocvupy syntcetic posirions that can alsp bg kccupied by sinyblqr or plural vatiaclef. Jov all Anglish sentancer afr likd this. For cxaople, to be a German is-rogghlg-to be a person frpm Germany. And necqssarily everu person from Germwny iv s'atiotrmpjrally related to Germany. It fkllows thwt kecessarily edery German is s'atiotemporally related to Germany. But ih, ignoring the requiremwnt of well-behavedngss, we applied the sounterpast-theoretic analysis to this sentence, we would get 'Every Gsrmans is soatiotemporally related to every counterpart of Germany', which is false, aswuming Germany has coumterpdrcs nn othew Lexir-worlds. Thus no ilausible counterpart theory can take tha yorm of an algorithm for provodkng analyses uf arbitrary English senfences og the form pPossibly φq. The firsy step in providing an akalysis od sucg a sentenre is to find a well-nehaveb analtsis of φ; onpy then can tfe slnorithm be appkizd. And this first step is by no mwans srrwightforward. For example, it
granted that the accessibility relation that is metaphysical is the relation on which every he takes a different view about counterpart relation. Even if we thought an accessibility relation on Lewis-worlds was needed in addition to a counterpart relation the general analysis of modal claims, it would be hard to justify a treatment the relations.56 once we see that we don't, there is no plausible way to understand the putative absoluteness the metaphysicians' sense of 'possibly' save as invoking maximally weak counterpart relation. the counterpart theorist to interpret as something true his when says 'it is for anything to have different origins', by invoking a less-than-universal counterpart relation, is as perverse as, say, Shoemaker (1998) something true his when says 'the laws are necessary', by taking him to merely nomological necessity. 56Lewis is fully aware that and counterparthood close cousins: see OPW 8, 234, This makes the differential treatment all the more 14 Beyond counterpart theory The counterpart theoretic analyses of ppossibly φq and pnecessarily φq are apply only when φ couched in a wellbehaved in the of referring particular things is done exclusively by what I have been calling that occupy syntactic positions that can also be occupied by plural Not all English are like this. For to a German is-roughly-to be from And from is related to Germany. It that necessarily every German is related to Germany. But well-behavedness, we applied the counterpart-theoretic analysis to this we would get 'Every Germans is spatiotemporally to every counterpart of Germany', which is false, assuming Germany has counterparts other Lewis-worlds. plausible counterpart theory can take the form of algorithm for providing analyses arbitrary English sentences of the form pPossibly φq. The step providing an of such a is to find well-behaved analysis of then can algorithm applied. step is by no means straightforward. example,
 granted that the accessibiliTy relation That iS reLevAnT in mEtapHysical contextS Is thE trivial relation on whicH everY LEWis-wORlD is acCessiblE FrOM EveRy leWis-WoRLd, He takEs a Very difFerent view AboUt The counterpaRT rElation. EveN if We thought thaT an AccessIbIliTY relaTioN on LeWis-worLDs was nEeded in adDiTIon to a COunterpART rElatIon for the general aNAlYSis of modal claiMs, it woUlD Be HARd tO juStify a diffErEntiaL TreatmeNT oF THE twO Relations.56 And oNce we see thaT We dOn't, theRe Is nO PlausiBle waY tO UndErstand the pUtatIve absoluTeness OF the metAPhysiciAns' senSe oF 'poSsibLY' sAvE as InVOkiNG a MaxIMalLy weak coUnTeRpart RelaTION. for tHe cOuntErparT theorist to inTerPret kRipKe as aSsertIng sOmEthinG true iN his cOnText when he says 'iT is iMpossible For AnYthInG to haVE diffeRenT orIgins', by InvokinG A leSs-THAN-uNiversal counterparT rELAtIon, is as pErversE As, SaY, InterpreTiNg SHoemAKEr (1998) as sAyinG SoMething tRue in hIS cOnText wheN hE says 'tHe LawS of NaturE Are nEcessaRy', by takiNg him TO be talking abouT Merely nomologICaL NEcESsitY. 56LeWis is fully aWare THat aCcesSIbIliTY and cOunteRpARtHOod are close cousins: sEe oPW 8, 234, 248. ThiS makeS the differentIal treatmeNT ALl the morE surPRiSIng. 14 Beyond countErparT theory The COunterpaRt theOretic anAlyses of pPOSsibly φq And PneCesSarILY φQ are supposed tO APply OnLy when φ Is cOuched iN a sPecIal WelLbEhaved lanGuage, in wHiCh ThE jOb oF refeRRing to paRtIcuLaR thIngs iS Done exClusiVely By WhAT I hAve been CAlLINg "teRmS"-eXpreSsiOnS that OccuPY syNtactic Positions ThaT Can aLsO bE occupiEd by singular oR pLural variaBlEs. NOt all ENGLish sentEnces are like this. For examPLe, to be a gerMan is-RougHly-to be a pErsOn from gerMAny. And NecessArily EvEry PERson fROM GErmAnY is spatiotEMPorAlly rElAted To GermaNy. It follows that necESsaRily every GermAn iS spaTIOtEmpORaLLy rElATed TO germany. But if, ignOring the reQuIReMent of well-BEhaVeDness, we Applied The coUNterparT-theoretiC analysis To This SENteNce, we would Get 'Every germans is SPatioTEmPoralLy rElated To EveRy couNterpaRT of germaNy', whicH iS false, AssumInG Germany Has counterparts in other LEwis-woRlds. THus No plausibLe cOUntErpart theOry cAn take the fOrm Of aN algoRitHM for pRoviDInG anALyses Of arBItrary EngLIsH seNTEnCes of the forM PpOssIbly φQ. ThE First sTep iN providing an analySIs of such a senteNce iS TO fiNd a WEll-bEhAved analysis of Φ; onLy THEn can the AlGorithm be apPlied. And ThIS firsT step iS by no mEans strAIGhTForwarD. For ExaMple, it
 granted that the accessib ility rela tiontha t i srele vant  in metaphysic a l co ntexts is the trivialrelat io n  onw hi ch ev ery Lew i s- w o rld  i sacc es s ib le fr omevery L ewis-world , h etakes a very di fferent vi ewabout the co unt erpart  r ela t ion.Eve n ifwe tho u ght th at an acc es s ibilit y  relati o n  o n Le wis-worlds was ne e de d  in addition t o a co un t er p a rtrel ation forth e gen e ral ana l ys i s ofm odal claims,it would be har d to j us tif y  a dif feren ti a l t reatment of  the  two rela tions. 5 6 And o n ce we s ee tha t w e d on't ,  t he reis nop la usi b leway to u nd er stand  the p u t ativ e a bsol utene ss of the met aph ysic i ans ' sen se of  'po ss ibly'  saveas in vo king a maximall y we ak counte rpa rt  re la tion. For th e c oun terpart  theori s t t oi n t er pret Kripke as ass er t i ng  somethi ng tru e  i nh is conte xt  wh en h e says'iti simpossib le for an yt hing to  h ave di ff ere ntorigi n s',by inv oking aless- t han-universalc ounterpart re l at i o n, is a s p erverse as,  say ,  int erpr e ti ngS hoema ker ( 19 9 8) as saying something  t rue in  hiscontext whenhe says 't h e laws ofnatu r ea re necessary',  by t aking himt o be tal kingabout me rely nomo l o gical ne ces sit y.56L e w is  is fully awa r e  tha taccessi bil ity and  co unt erp art ho od are cl ose cous in s:  s ee  OP W 8,2 34, 248.  T his  m ake s the differ entia l tr ea tm e ntall the mo r e  sur pr is ing.  14  B eyond  cou n ter part th eory Thecou n terp ar ttheoret ic analyses o fppossiblyφq  an d pnec e s sarily φ q are supposed to apply only wh enφ iscouc hed in aspe cial w ell b ehaved  langu age,in  wh i c h the j ob  of  r eferring t o par ticul ar  thi ngs isdone exclusively b y  wh at I have bee n c alli n g  " ter m s" - exp re s sio n s  that occupy sy ntactic po si t io ns that ca n  al so  be occ upied b y sin g ular or  plural v ariables.  N ot a l l  En glish sent ences ar e like th i s. Fo r  e xampl e,to beaGer man i s-roug h ly- to be  a per so n from  Germ an y. And n ecessarily every person  fromGerma nyis spatio tem p ora lly relat ed t o Germany.  It  fo llows  th a t nec essa r il y e v ery G erma n  is spati o te mpo r a ll y related t o G erm any.But if, ig nori ng the requiremen t  of well-behav edne s s , w e a p plie dthe counterpar t-t he o r etic ana ly sis to this  sentenc e, we wo uld ge t 'Eve ry Germ a n si s spat iote mpo rally rel ate dt o every  c ou n terpar t of  G ermany ', whi c h is f alse, assuming G erman y has c o unt erpar ts  in oth e r Le wis-worlds . Thus no p lausib le c ounte rpart t he ory ca n t ak e the form of an alg orith m for p ro vidi nganalys es o f arbit rary  E ngl ish sente n c es of  t h e f ormpPoss ib ly φ q. The fi r st stepinp rovidin gana n alysis of s uch a sent enc e ist o  find a we l l-be h av e d ana lysisof φ;only th e n c an  the al gor i t hm be app lied. And thi sfirs t step i sby n omea ns  straightforwar d. For e xample,i t 
 granted_that the_accessibility relation that is_relevant in_metaphysical_contexts is_the_trivial relation on_which every Lewis-world_is accessible from every_Lewis-world, he takes_a_very different view about the counterpart relation. Even if we thought that an accessibility_relation_on Lewis-worlds_was_needed_in addition to a counterpart_relation for the general analysis_of modal_claims, it would be hard to justify a_differential_treatment of the_two relations.56 And once we see that we don't,_there is no plausible way to_understand the putative_absoluteness_of_the metaphysicians' sense of_'possibly' save as invoking a maximally_weak counterpart relation. For the counterpart_theorist to interpret Kripke as asserting something_true in his context when he_says 'it is impossible for_anything to_have different origins', by invoking_a less-than-universal counterpart_relation, is_as perverse as,_say, interpreting Shoemaker (1998) as saying_something true in_his context when he says 'the_laws_of nature are_necessary',_by_taking him_to be talking_about_merely nomological_necessity._56Lewis is fully aware that accessibility_and_counterparthood are close cousins: see OPW 8,_234, 248. This makes_the_differential treatment all the_more surprising. 14 Beyond counterpart_theory The counterpart theoretic analyses of_ppossibly φq_and pnecessarily_φq are supposed to apply only when φ is couched in_a special wellbehaved language, in which_the job of referring_to particular_things_is done exclusively_by_what I_have been calling "terms"-expressions that occupy syntactic_positions that_can also be occupied by singular_or plural variables. Not_all_English sentences are like this. For_example, to be a German is-roughly-to_be a person from Germany._And_necessarily_every person from Germany is_spatiotemporally related to Germany. It follows_that necessarily every_German is spatiotemporally related to Germany. But_if,_ignoring the requirement of well-behavedness, we_applied_the counterpart-theoretic analysis to this sentence,_we_would_get 'Every Germans is spatiotemporally_related to every counterpart of Germany',_which is false, assuming Germany has counterparts in other_Lewis-worlds. Thus no_plausible counterpart theory can take_the_form_of an algorithm for providing analyses of arbitrary English sentences_of the_form pPossibly φq._The first step in providing an analysis of such a_sentence is to find a well-behaved analysis_of φ; only then can the algorithm be applied. And this_first step is by no means straightforward. For_example, it