 the Moral Luck and Asymmetry Views. And since I have provided the Parallelism Argument as an argument that does not bottom out in standard proMoral Luck View intuitions, no adequate reply to the Parallelism Argument can appeal merely to the basic intuition that motivates the Asymmetry View. Are there other arguments for the supervenience principle? Perhaps there are, but it is not obvious to me what they might be. So, I leave the proponent of the Asymmetry View with a challenge to provide the argument. As it stands, however, we have good analogical evidence for extant resultant moral luck. Error Theory for the Luck-Free Intuition Suppose that we have before us a good cumulative case for the Moral Luck View-that is, for the claim that resultant, circumstantial, and constitutive moral luck exist and are everywhere. In that case, why is there a contradiction in our ordinary thinking about moral responsibility in the first place? Why do we mistakenly intuit that the drivers are equally blameworthy and that the judges are equally blameworthy? Let us refer to intuitions such as the drivers are equally blameworthy and the judges are equally blameworthy as the luck-free intuition. A good explanation for the widespread but 16 errant luck-free intuition would reinforce the plausibility of the Moral Luck View. In the this section, I offer such an explanation. There are two broad ways to explain the prevalence of the luck-free intuition. On the one hand, one might attempt to explain it in a way that eliminates its moral value. For example, one might attribute the ubiquity of that intuition to the operation of a widespread cognitive bias. Let us refer to this kind of explanation as an elimination error theory. On the other hand, one might attempt to explain the luck-free intuition in a way that preserves a kernel of moral truth. For example, one might discover something insightful about the luck-free intuition and integrate it into moral evaluation. Call this kind of explanation an integration error theory. Offering an integration error theory for a widely shared moral intuition is better than supplying an elimination error theory for two reasons. First, integration explanations are more charitable; they attribute at least a kernel of truth to the errant intuition. Second, widely shared moral intuitions very often provide at least some insight into morality. For these reasons, I maintain that we can satisfactorily explain the luck-free intuition with an elimination error theory only if no integration error theory can plausibly do so. There are at least three
the Moral Luck and Asymmetry Views. And since I have provided the Parallelism Argument as an argument that does not bottom out in standard proMoral Luck View intuitions, no adequate answer to the Parallelism Argument can attract merely to the basic intuition that motivates the Asymmetry View. Are there other argument for the supervenience rationale? Perhaps there are, but it is not obvious to me what they might be. So, I forget the proponent of the Asymmetry View with a challenge to provide the controversy. As it stands, however, we have adept analogical evidence for extant resultant moral luck. erroneousness hypothesis for the Luck - Free Intuition Suppose that we have before us a beneficial cumulative case for the Moral Luck View - that is, for the title that resultant, circumstantial, and constitutive moral luck exist and are everywhere. In that character, why is there a contradiction in our ordinary thinking about moral responsibility in the first place? Why do we mistakenly intuit that the driver are equally blameworthy and that the judges are equally blameworthy? Let us refer to intuition such as the drivers are equally blameworthy and the judges are equally blameworthy as the luck - free intuition. A good explanation for the widespread but 16 errant luck - free intuition would reinforce the plausibility of the Moral Luck View. In the this section, I offer such an explanation. There are two broad ways to explain the prevalence of the fortune - complimentary intuition. On the one hand, one might undertake to excuse it in a room that eliminates its moral value. For example, one might impute the ubiquity of that intuition to the operation of a widespread cognitive bias. Let us denote to this kind of explanation as an elimination error theory. On the other hand, one might attempt to explain the fortune - free intuition in a way that preserves a kernel of moral truth. For example, one might discover something insightful about the luck - complimentary intuition and integrate it into moral evaluation. Call this kind of explanation an integration error theory. offer an integration error theory for a wide shared moral intuition is full than supplying an elimination error hypothesis for two reasons. First, integration explanations are more charitable; they attribute at least a kernel of accuracy to the errant intuition. Second, widely shared moral intuitions very often supply at least some insight into ethical motive. For these reasons, I maintain that we can satisfactorily explain the fortune - free intuition with an elimination error theory only if no integration error theory can plausibly do so. There are at least three
 thf Moral Luck and Asymmetvy Views. And sinew I hate provjded the Parallelism Argument as an ergunent ukat does not bottom uut in stwndard peoMocal Luck View invhitions, no adseuatz ceply to the Patallelism Arcument can appaau lerely to the basic intuition that iotivatrs the Asymmetry Viee. Are nhtre other arguments for the superbenienct principle? Perhapx there are, but it is not lbvilus to me what thej might be. Wo, I oeave the pruponent of the Asymmetty View with a challenge to provkde tke argument. Aw ih stands, howxver, wv have good akslogicdl evidrnce for extanb resnltabt moral luck. Error Tieory for the Luck-Frge Intuitimn Suppose that we yace bexore us x goud dukumative caae for the Moral Luck View-that is, for tht cjqim that resumtant, siwcumstantial, and constitutive moral lucn esist and are everywhere. In that case, why is jhere a cogtradiction in our ordinary thinking about moral sespoiskbioiby iv tje first place? Why do we mistakenly intuit thwf uhe drivers are ezually blamrwlryry and that tfe judyss are equally blameaorthy? Jet uw refer tj inyuitions such as the driverw are equallj blqmeworthy and the ludges are edualky blsmeworthy as the luck-frze inthition. A gold explanzgion for the widdspgead but 16 errant luck-free intuytion wouod rzinforce the plausybility of the Moral Luck View. In hhe tkis saction, I ovfer such an explanation. There ece two broad eafs no explaiu the irevalence of tre luck-free injuition. Ou the une hand, ohe mighv attempt to explain it it a way that xliminatef itw moeal valjd. For example, pne might attribute the ubiquity of tmat ivfuition to the ipetqtion of a widrspfeaq bogiitivq bias. Let us refdr gp thir kind of ewplxnatoon as an eliminatiot erdor theory. On the ptmer hand, ine mighe attempt to rxplain the luck-frte intnition in a wai that preserves a kernel of modal truth. Fov example, one migmt dyscover sokething insightful about the luck-free iituition and integrate ut into moral evaluctlon. Call thix kinq of expldnation an integratiin error theory. Onfering an integration error theogy for a widely shared moral intuition is better than supplying an eliminqtion xrwor theory ror ywo rvasjus. Firse, invejration explanatipns are more charitable; they atvribute at lzast a kernel of truth to the efrant intuitiun. Second, widely shared joral inyuitions very often provide at keast some insight into korality. For fhese ggasuns, I maintain thay we ccn satusfactoeily explain the uucl-fvee intuitlon xitk an elimination error theory onlt if ni lntegration erroc theory can klausibmy do fo. There are at measf threg
the Moral Luck and Asymmetry Views. And have the Parallelism as an argument in proMoral Luck View no adequate reply the Parallelism Argument can appeal merely the basic intuition that motivates the Asymmetry View. Are there other arguments for supervenience principle? Perhaps there are, but it is not obvious to me what might So, leave proponent of the Asymmetry View with a challenge to provide the argument. As it stands, however, have good analogical evidence for extant resultant moral Error Theory for the Intuition Suppose that we have us good cumulative for Moral View-that is, for claim that resultant, circumstantial, and constitutive moral luck exist and are everywhere. In that case, why is a contradiction ordinary thinking moral in first place? Why mistakenly intuit that the drivers are that the judges are equally blameworthy? Let us to intuitions as the drivers are equally blameworthy the judges are equally blameworthy as the luck-free A good explanation for the widespread but 16 errant luck-free intuition would reinforce the plausibility Moral Luck View. In this section, I such explanation. are broad ways explain the prevalence of the luck-free intuition. On the one hand, might attempt to explain it in a way that eliminates value. example, one might the ubiquity of that to operation of a widespread Let refer of as elimination error theory. On other hand, one might attempt explain the luck-free intuition a kernel of moral truth. For example, one discover something insightful about the luck-free intuition integrate it into moral evaluation. Call this kind of explanation an integration theory. Offering error theory for a widely shared moral intuition better than supplying an error theory for two reasons. First, integration explanations are charitable; attribute at a kernel of to the errant Second, widely shared very often at some For these reasons, I maintain that can explain the luck-free intuition with elimination only if no integration error theory can plausibly do so. There are at least three
 the Moral Luck and Asymmetry VIews. And sinCe I haVe pRovIdEd thE ParAllelism ArgumeNT as aN argument that does not boTtom oUt IN staNDaRd promoral LuCK VIEW inTuItIonS, nO AdEquatE rePly to thE ParalleliSm ARgUment can appeAL mErely to the BasIc intuition tHat MotivaTeS thE asymmEtrY View. are theRE other Arguments FoR The supERvenienCE PrInciPle? Perhaps there arE, BuT It is not obvious To me whAt THeY MIghT be. so, I leave thE pRoponENt of the aSyMMETry vIew with a challEnge to proviDE thE argumEnT. As IT standS, howeVeR, We hAve good analOgicAl evidencE for exTAnt resuLTant morAl luck. errOr THeorY FoR tHe LUcK-freE inTuiTIon suppose tHaT wE have BefoRE US A gooD cuMulaTive cAse for the MoraL LuCk ViEW-thAt is, fOr the ClaiM tHat reSultanT, circUmStantial, and consTituTive moral LucK eXisT aNd are EVerywhEre. in tHat case, Why is thERe a CoNTRAdIction in our ordinarY tHINkIng about Moral rESpOnSIbility iN tHe fIrst PLAce? WhY do wE MiStakenly Intuit THaT tHe driveRs Are equAlLy bLamEwortHY and That thE judges aRe equALly blameworthy? lEt us refer to inTUiTIOnS Such As tHe drivers arE equALly bLameWOrThy ANd the JudgeS aRE eQUally blameworthy as tHe Luck-frEe intUition. A good exPlanation fOR THe widespRead BUt 16 ERrant luck-free iNtuitIon would reINforce thE plauSibility Of the MoraL lUck View. IN thE thIs sEctION, I Offer such an exPLAnatIoN. There aRe tWo broad WayS to ExpLaiN tHe prevaleNce of the LuCk-FrEe IntUitioN. on the one HaNd, oNe MigHt attEMpt to eXplaiN it iN a WaY ThaT eliminATeS ITs moRaL vAlue. for ExAmple, One mIGht AttribuTe the ubiqUitY Of thAt InTuition To the operatioN oF a widespreAd CogNitive BIAs. Let us rEfer to this kind of explanaTIon as an EliMinatIon eRror theorY. On The othEr hANd, one mIght atTempt To ExpLAIn the LUCk-FreE iNtuition in A WAy tHat prEsErveS a kerneL of moral truth. For exAMplE, one might discOveR somETHiNg iNSiGHtfUl ABouT THe luck-free intuiTion and intEgRAtE it into morAL evAlUation. CAll this Kind oF ExplanaTion an intEgration eRrOr thEORy. OFfering an iNtegratiOn error thEOry foR A wIdely ShaRed morAl IntUitioN is betTEr tHan suPplyinG aN elimiNatioN eRror theoRy for two reasons. First, intEgratiOn expLanAtions are MorE ChaRitable; thEy atTribute at lEasT a kErnel Of tRUth to The eRRaNt iNTuitiOn. SeCOnd, widely SHaRed MORaL intuitions VERY ofTen prOviDE at leaSt soMe insight into moraLIty. For these reaSons, i MAinTaiN That We Can satisfactorIly ExPLAin the luCk-Free intuitiOn with an ElIMinatIon errOr theoRy only iF NO iNTegratIon eRroR theory caN plAuSIbly do sO. THeRE are at LeasT tHree
 the Moral Luck and Asymme try Views.  Andsin ceIhave  pro vided the Para l leli sm Argument as an argu mentth a t do e snot b ottom o u ti n  st an da rdpr o Mo ral L uck  View i ntuitions,  no  a dequate repl y  t o the Para lle lism Argumen t c an app ea l m e relytothe b asic i n tuitio n that mo ti v ates t h e Asymm e t ry  Vie w. Are there othe r  a r guments for th e supe rv e ni e n cepri nciple? Pe rh aps t h ere are ,  b u t iti s not obvious  to me what the y migh tbe. So, Ileave  t h e p roponent of  the  Asymmetr y View with ac halleng e to p rov ide  the ar gu men t. Asi tsta n ds,  however ,we  have  goo d a n alog ica l ev idenc e for extantres ulta n t m oralluck.  Err or  Theo ry for  theLu ck-Free Intuiti on S uppose th atwe  ha ve  befo r e us a  go odcumulat ive cas e  fo rt h e  M oral Luck View-tha ti s ,for theclaimt ha tr esultant ,cir cums t a ntial , an d  c onstitut ive mo r al  l uck exi st  and a re  ev ery where .  Inthat c ase, why  is t h ere a contradi c tion in our o r di n a ry thin kin g about mor al r e spon sibi l it y i n  thefirst  p l ac e ? Why do we mistake nl y intu it th at the driver s are equa l l y  blamewo rthy an d  that the judg es ar e equallyb lamewort hy? L et us re fer to in t u itions s uch  as  th e d r i ve rs are equall y blam ew orthy a ndthe jud ges  ar e e qua ll y blamewo rthy asth elu ck -fr ee in t uition.Agoo dexp lanat i on for  thewide sp re a d b ut 16 e r ra n t  luc k- fr ee i ntu it ion w ould rei nforcethe plaus ibi l ityof  t he Mora l Luck View.In  the thisse cti on, Io f fer such  an explanation. Therea re twobro ad wa ys t o explain  th e prev ale n ce ofthe lu ck-fr ee  in t u ition . On  th eone hand,o n e m ightat temp t to ex plain it in a wayt hat  eliminates i tsmora l va lue .  F o r e xa m ple , one might attri bute the u bi q ui ty of that int ui tion to  the op erati o n of awidesprea d cogniti ve  bia s .  Le t us refer  to this  kind ofe xplan a ti on as  an  elimi na tio n err or the o ry.  On t he oth er  hand,  onemi ght atte mpt to explain the luck -freeintui tio n in a wa y t h atpreserves  a k ernel of m ora l t ruth.  Fo r  exam ple, on e m i ght d isco v er someth i ng  in s i gh tful aboutt h e  lu ck-fr eei ntuiti on a nd integrate it i n to moral evalu atio n .  Ca llt hiski nd of explanat ion  a n integrat io n error the ory. Off er i ng an  integ ration  errort h eo r y fora wi del y sharedmor al intuiti on  i s  bette r th an  suppl ying a n  eli m i nation error the ory f o r  twor eas ons.Fi rst, in t egra tion expla nations are  morechar itabl e; they  a ttribu teat  least a k e rnel of t ruthto theer rant  in tuitio n. S e c ond,wide ly  sh ared mora l in t ui ti o nsvery  ofte nprov ide at le a st someins i ght int omor a l ity. F o rt h ese reason s,I mai n t ain that w e  can sa t isfac torily  expla in thel uck -f ree int uit i o n with an  eliminat i oner rortheory o nl y if  n o i nt egration errortheory c an plaus i b ly doso. Ther e  are a tleast three
 the_Moral Luck_and Asymmetry Views. And_since I_have_provided the_Parallelism_Argument as an_argument that does_not bottom out in_standard proMoral Luck_View_intuitions, no adequate reply to the Parallelism Argument can appeal merely to the basic_intuition_that motivates_the_Asymmetry_View. Are there other arguments_for the supervenience principle? Perhaps_there are,_but it is not obvious to me what_they_might be. So,_I leave the proponent of the Asymmetry View with_a challenge to provide the argument._As it stands,_however,_we_have good analogical evidence_for extant resultant moral luck. Error_Theory for the Luck-Free Intuition Suppose_that we have before us a good_cumulative case for the Moral Luck_View-that is, for the claim_that resultant,_circumstantial, and constitutive moral luck_exist and are_everywhere. In_that case, why_is there a contradiction in our_ordinary thinking about_moral responsibility in the first place?_Why_do we mistakenly_intuit_that_the drivers_are equally blameworthy_and_that the_judges_are equally blameworthy? Let us refer_to_intuitions such as the drivers are equally_blameworthy and the judges_are_equally blameworthy as the_luck-free intuition. A good explanation_for the widespread but 16 errant_luck-free intuition_would reinforce_the plausibility of the Moral Luck View. In the this section,_I offer such an explanation. There_are two broad ways_to explain_the_prevalence of the_luck-free_intuition. On_the one hand, one might attempt to_explain it_in a way that eliminates its_moral value. For example,_one_might attribute the ubiquity of that_intuition to the operation of a_widespread cognitive bias. Let us_refer_to_this kind of explanation as_an elimination error theory. On the_other hand, one_might attempt to explain the luck-free intuition_in_a way that preserves a kernel_of_moral truth. For example, one might_discover_something_insightful about the luck-free intuition_and integrate it into moral evaluation._Call this kind of explanation an integration error theory._Offering an integration_error theory for a widely_shared_moral_intuition is better than supplying an elimination error theory for_two reasons._First, integration explanations_are more charitable; they attribute at least a kernel of_truth to the errant intuition. Second, widely_shared moral intuitions very often provide at least some insight into_morality. For these reasons, I maintain that we_can satisfactorily explain the luck-free intuition with_an elimination error theory_only_if no integration error theory can plausibly_do_so._There_are at least_three