ible heuristics that value more than an action's consequences. It gets worse. Even if we could know right from wrong, pessimists contend that we rarely muster up the morally appropriate motives, since we're slaves to self-interest and non-rational passions. Even if empathy for others can motivate altruism, for example, it's fickle and parochial; and we frequently just rationalize bad behavior. Contrary to current orthodoxy, I'll construct a more optimistic view of our moral minds in the rationalist tradition, which centers on a concern to act in ways that are justifiable to ourselves and to others. While the science suggests that moral knowledge and virtue don't come easily, it suggests optimistic solutions, and there is no reason to reject ordinary moral thinking as fundamentally flawed. 2. The Limits of Emotion Abstract: Empirical research apparently suggests that emotions play an integral role in moral judgment. The evidence for sentimentalism is diverse, but it is rather weak and has generally been overblown. First, there is no evidence that our moral concepts themselves are partly comprised of or necessarily dependent on emotions. Second, while the moral/conventional distinction may partly characterize the essence of moral judgment, moral norms needn't be backed by affect in order to transcend convention. Third, priming people with incidental emotions like disgust doesn't make them moralize actions. Fourth, moral judgment can only be somewhat impaired by damage to areas of the brain that are generally associated with emotional processing. Regard for Reason / Synopsis / pg. 3 of 5 Psychopaths, for example, exhibit both emotional and rational deficits, and the latter alone can explain any minor defects in the psychopath's ability to distinguish moral from conventional norms. The greatest problem in psychopathy appears to be motivational or behavioral, and emotional deficits do much more of the explanatory work there. 3. Reasoning Beyond Consequences Abstract: Ample experimental research demonstrates that ordinary moral judgment involves both conscious and unconscious reasoning or inference. The evidence suggests in particular that we treat as morally significant more than the consequences of a person's actions, including the distinctions between: acts/omissions; intentional/accidental outcomes; and harming as a means/byproduct. However, contrary to some recent evidence, it isn't clear that ordinary moral thinking conforms to the Doctrine of Double Effect. Drawing on existing research and some of my own experiments, I show that the means/byproduct distinction grounds only some norms, which are sensitive to how involved the agent
ible heuristics that value more than an action's consequences. It get bad. Even if we could know right from wrong, pessimist contend that we rarely muster up the morally appropriate motives, since we're slaves to self - sake and non - rational passions. Even if empathy for others can motivate altruism, for model, it's fickle and parochial; and we frequently barely rationalize bad demeanor. Contrary to current orthodoxy, I'll construct a more affirmative view of our moral mind in the positivist tradition, which centers on a concern to dissemble in ways that are justifiable to ourselves and to others. While the science suggest that moral knowledge and merit don't come well, it suggests optimistic solutions, and there is no cause to reject ordinary moral thinking as fundamentally flawed. 2. The Limits of Emotion Abstract: Empirical inquiry obviously suggest that emotions play an integral role in moral judgment. The evidence for sentimentalism is diverse, but it is preferably watery and has generally been overblown. foremost, there be no evidence that our moral concept themselves are partly comprised of or necessarily dependent on emotions. Second, while the moral / conventional distinction may partly qualify the essence of moral judgment, moral norms needn't be backed by affect in order to transcend convention. Third, priming people with incidental emotions like disgust doesn't make them sermonize actions. fourthly, moral judgment can only be somewhat impaired by damage to areas of the mind that are generally associated with emotional processing. see for Reason / Synopsis / pg. 3 of 5 Psychopaths, for example, exhibit both emotional and rational deficit, and the latter alone can excuse any minor defects in the psychopath's ability to distinguish moral from conventional norms. The great problem in psychopathy appear to be motivational or behavioral, and emotional deficit do much more of the explanatory work there. 3. Reasoning Beyond Consequences Abstract: Ample experimental research demonstrate that ordinary moral judgment involves both conscious and unconscious reasoning or inference. The evidence suggests in particular that we treat as morally significant more than the consequences of a person's actions, include the distinctions between: acts / omission; intentional / accidental outcomes; and harm as a means / byproduct. However, contrary to some recent evidence, it isn't clear that ordinary moral thinking conforms to the Doctrine of Double Effect. Drawing on existing inquiry and some of my own experiments, I show that the mean / byproduct eminence grounds only some norms, which are sensitive to how involved the agentive role
iblf heuristics that value oore than an acjiin's coisequendes. It gdts worse. Even if we could kiow eight from wrong, pessimists contend nhat we rqrelb muster up the morally appropdlate kitives, since wg're slaves tm self-interest avd non-rational passions. Even if empatry for ptjers can motivwte sjtrujsm, for example, it's fickle and parkchial; end we frequentky just rationalize bad bejavilr. Contrary to curgent orthodixy, Y'ol construct a more opuikistic vies of our moral minds in the ratkonalnst traditiin, whlwh centers in a boncern to acb in wafs that are justifiabke vo oyrselves and to otherv. While the sciencg suggests tkat moral knowledge abd virtoe dot't cune dasjlb, if suggfsta optimistjc solutionw, and there is no rtasjb to reject oddinarr ioral thinking as fundamentally flawed. 2. Ths Limits of Emotion Absrract: Empirical reseatch apparegtly suggests that emotions play an integral role in mkfal jmdgmdbt. The evidence for sentimentalism is diverse, btf ot is rather weah and has grnfrsjly been overclown. Yjrat, there is no evifence trat oyr moral soncrpts themselves are partly xomprised of ir necessarily depzndent on emutioms. Sevond, while the moral/conrentiohal distinchion may lxrtly characterixe nhe assence of moral judgment, ioral norns nzedn't be bacled by affect in ordev to transcend convfntiou. Thisd, priming people with incidental emotions like disgust dmest't make chem mpralize actiogs. Fourth, morak judgmznt cav only be aomewhav impaired br damage to asgas of the brein that wre teneeally arrociated with rmotional processint. Regard for Reasok / Syvkpsis / pg. 3 of 5 'rixhopaths, for ecamole, eqhiuit bjdh emotional and ragoonal deficiuf, cna thr latter alone can efplajn any minor defecys in the ksychopatr's ability to distinguish moral from coiventipnaj norms. The greatest problem ih psychopwthn appears to fe mitivational pr behavioral, and emotional deficits do much more of the wxplanatory work thgre. 3. Reasoning Beyogd Conseqgences Abstract: Amplw experimental rexearch demonstrates tgat orginarj moral judgment involves both conscious and unconscious reasoning or infwrence. The evidencs subgestv nn 'articujar vhet we treat as mogally significant more than the ronsequencas of a person's actions, includone the distincjions between: acts/omissiona; intentoonal/accidental outcomes; and hatming as a means/byproducb. However, contdary to sooe recent evidence, it isu't cleqr that ordlnary moral thknkonn conforms to uhe Boctrine of Double Effect. Drawing on exushing research anv some of my uwn eqperimegts, I show that fhe jfans/biproduct distimction grounds only some norms, whibh wre sensitive uo how involved the agvnt
ible heuristics that value more than an It worse. Even we could know that rarely muster up morally appropriate motives, we're slaves to self-interest and non-rational Even if empathy for others can motivate altruism, for example, it's fickle and and we frequently just rationalize bad behavior. Contrary to current orthodoxy, I'll construct more view our minds in the rationalist tradition, which centers on a concern to act in ways that are to ourselves and to others. While the science that moral knowledge and don't come easily, it suggests solutions, there is reason reject moral thinking as flawed. 2. The Limits of Emotion Abstract: Empirical research apparently suggests that emotions play an integral role moral judgment. for sentimentalism diverse, it rather weak and been overblown. First, there is no moral concepts themselves are partly comprised of or dependent on Second, while the moral/conventional distinction may characterize the essence of moral judgment, moral norms be backed by affect in order to transcend convention. Third, priming people with incidental emotions doesn't make them moralize Fourth, moral judgment only somewhat by to areas the brain that are generally associated with emotional processing. Regard for / Synopsis / pg. 3 of 5 Psychopaths, for example, emotional rational deficits, and latter alone can explain minor in the psychopath's ability moral conventional problem psychopathy to be motivational or and emotional deficits do much of the explanatory work Abstract: Ample experimental research demonstrates that ordinary moral involves both conscious and unconscious reasoning or The evidence suggests in particular that we treat as morally significant more the consequences person's actions, including the distinctions between: acts/omissions; intentional/accidental and harming as a However, contrary to some recent evidence, it isn't clear ordinary thinking conforms the Doctrine of Effect. Drawing on research and some own experiments, show the only some norms, which are sensitive how the agent
ible heuristics that value moRe than an acTion's ConSeqUeNces. it geTs worse. Even if wE CoulD know right from wrong, pesSimisTs COnteND tHat we Rarely mUStER Up tHe MoRalLy APpRopriAte Motives, Since we're sLavEs To self-intereST aNd non-ratioNal Passions. Even If eMpathy FoR otHErs caN moTivatE altruISm, for eXample, it's FiCKle and PArochiaL; ANd We frEquently just ratioNAlIZe bad behavior. COntrarY tO CuRREnt OrtHodoxy, I'll cOnStrucT A more opTImISTIc vIEw of our moral mInds in the raTIonAlist tRaDitIOn, whicH centErS On a Concern to acT in wAys that arE justiFIable to OUrselveS and to OthErs. whilE ThE sCieNcE SugGEsTs tHAt mOral knowLeDgE and vIrtuE DON'T comE eaSily, It sugGests optimistIc sOlutIOns, And thEre is No reAsOn to rEject oRdinaRy Moral thinking as FundAmentally FlaWeD. 2. ThE LImits OF EmotiOn ABstRact: EmpIrical rESeaRcH APPaRently suggests that EmOTIoNs play an IntegrAL rOlE In moral jUdGmeNt. ThE EVidenCe foR SeNtimentaLism is DIvErSe, but it Is Rather WeAk aNd hAs genERallY been oVerblown. first, THere is no evidenCE that our moral COnCEPtS ThemSelVes are partlY comPRiseD of oR NeCesSArily DepenDeNT oN Emotions. Second, while ThE moral/ConveNtional distinCtion may paRTLY charactErizE ThE Essence of moral JudgmEnt, moral noRMs needn't Be bacKed by affEct in ordeR TO transceNd cOnvEntIon. tHIrD, priming peoplE WIth iNcIdental EmoTions liKe dIsgUst DoeSn'T make them Moralize AcTiOnS. FOurTh, morAL judgmenT cAn oNlY be SomewHAt impaIred bY damAgE tO AreAs of the BRaIN That ArE gEnerAllY aSsociAted WIth EmotionAl processIng. rEgarD fOr reason / SYnopsis / pg. 3 of 5 PsYcHopaths, for ExAmpLe, exhiBIT both emoTional and rational deficiTS, and the LatTer alOne cAn explain Any Minor dEfeCTs in thE psychOpath'S aBilITY to diSTInGuiSh Moral from cONVenTionaL nOrms. the greaTest problem in psychOPatHy appears to be MotIvatIONaL or BEhAVioRaL, And EMOtional deficits Do much more Of THe ExplanatorY WorK tHere. 3. ReaSoning BEyond cOnsequeNces AbstrAct: Ample eXpErimENTal Research deMonstratEs that ordINary mORaL judgMenT involVeS boTh conScious ANd uNconsCious rEaSoning Or infErEnce. The eVidence suggests in particUlar thAt we tReaT as morallY siGNifIcant more Than The consequEncEs oF a perSon'S ActioNs, inCLuDinG The diStinCTions betwEEn: ActS/OMiSsions; intenTIONal/AccidEntAL outcoMes; aNd harming as a means/BYproduct. HoweveR, conTRAry To sOMe reCeNt evidence, it isN't cLeAR That ordiNaRy moral thinKing confOrMS to thE DoctrIne of DOuble EfFECt. dRawing On exIstIng researCh aNd SOme of my OwN eXPerimeNts, I ShOw that The meaNS/bypRODuct distinction gRoundS ONly soME noRms, whIcH are senSItivE to how invoLved the agenT
ible heuristics that value  more than  an a cti on' scons eque nces. It getsw orse . Even if we could kno w rig ht from wr ong,pessimi s ts c ont en dtha tw erarel y m uster u p the mora lly  a ppropriate m o ti ves, since  we 're slaves t o s elf-in te res t  andnon -rati onal p a ssions . Even if  e m pathyf or othe r s  c an m otivate altruism, fo r  example, it's  fickl ea nd p aro chi al; and we  f reque n tly jus t  r a t i ona l ize bad behav ior. Contra r y t o curr en t o r thodox y, I' ll con struct a mo re o ptimistic  viewo f our m o ral min ds inthe  ra tion a li st  tr ad i tio n ,whi c h c enters o naconce rn t o a c t in  wa ys t hat a re justifiabl e t o ou r sel ves a nd to  oth er s. Wh ile th e sci en ce suggests tha t mo ral knowl edg eand  v irtue don'tcom e e asily,it sugg e sts  o p t i mi stic solutions, an dt h er e is noreason to  r e ject ord in ary  mor a l  thin king as  fundame ntally fl aw ed. 2.Th e Limi ts  of  Em otion Abst ract:Empirica l res e arch apparentl y  suggests tha t  e m o ti o ns p lay  an integra l ro l e in  mor a ljud g ment.  Theev i de n ce for sentimentali sm  is di verse , but it is r ather weak a n d has ge nera l ly been overblown . Fir st, therei s no evi dence  that ou r moral c o n cepts th ems elv esare p ar tly comprised o f or  n ecessar ily  depend ent  on  em oti on s. Second , whileth emo ra l/c onven t ional di st inc ti onmay p a rtly c harac teri ze  t h e e ssenceo fm o ralju dg ment , m or al no rmsn eed n't bebacked by  af f ectin  o rder to  transcend co nv ention. Th ir d,primin g people w ith incidental emotions like di sgu st do esn' t make th emmorali zea ctions . Four th, m or alj u dgmen t ca n o nl y be somew h a t i mpair ed  bydamageto areas of the br a inthat are gene ral ly a s s oc iat e dw ith  e m oti o n al processing.Regard for  R e as on / Synop s is/pg. 3 o f 5 Psy chopa t hs, for  example,  exhibitbo th e m o tio nal and ra tional d eficits,a nd th e  l atter  al one ca nexp lainany mi n ordefec ts inth e psyc hopat h' s abilit y to distinguish moralfrom c onven tio nal norms . T h e g reatest p robl em in psyc hop ath y app ear s  to b e mo t iv ati o nal o r be h avioral,a nd  em o t io nal deficit s d o m uch m ore of the  exp lanatory work the r e. 3. Reasonin g Be y o ndCon s eque nc es Abstract: A mpl ee x periment al  research d emonstra te s  that  ordin ary mo ral jud g m en t  invol vesbot h conscio usan d  uncons ci ou s  reaso ning  o r infe rence. Thee v idence suggestsin pa r t icula r  th at we  t reat as mora lly signif icant morethan t he c onseq uencesof  a per son 's  actions,i ncludingthe d istinct io ns b etw een: a cts/ o m issio ns;in ten tional/ac c i de n ta lo utc omes ; and  h armi ng as a m e ans/bypr odu c t. Howe ve r,c o ntrary to s ome recent  ev idenc e ,  it isn'tc lear th a t ord inarymoralthinkin g  co nf orms to  th e Doctrineof Double Eff ec t. D rawing o nexis ti ngre search and some  of my o wn exper i m ents,I s h ow t h at the  m eans/byprodu ct di st i nctiong r oun ds only som e n orm s, w hic h ar e  sensitive to how involv ed t he ag e nt
ible heuristics_that value_more than an action's_consequences. It_gets_worse. Even_if_we could know_right from wrong,_pessimists contend that we_rarely muster up_the_morally appropriate motives, since we're slaves to self-interest and non-rational passions. Even if empathy_for_others can_motivate_altruism,_for example, it's fickle and_parochial; and we frequently just_rationalize bad_behavior. Contrary to current orthodoxy, I'll construct a_more_optimistic view of_our moral minds in the rationalist tradition, which centers_on a concern to act in_ways that are_justifiable_to_ourselves and to others._While the science suggests that moral_knowledge and virtue don't come easily,_it suggests optimistic solutions, and there is_no reason to reject ordinary moral_thinking as fundamentally flawed. 2._The Limits_of Emotion Abstract: Empirical research_apparently suggests that_emotions play_an integral role_in moral judgment. The evidence for_sentimentalism is diverse,_but it is rather weak and_has_generally been overblown._First,_there_is no_evidence that our_moral_concepts themselves_are_partly comprised of or necessarily dependent_on_emotions. Second, while the moral/conventional distinction may_partly characterize the essence_of_moral judgment, moral norms_needn't be backed by affect_in order to transcend convention. Third,_priming people_with incidental_emotions like disgust doesn't make them moralize actions. Fourth, moral judgment_can only be somewhat impaired by_damage to areas of_the brain_that_are generally associated_with_emotional processing._Regard for Reason / Synopsis / pg._3 of_5 Psychopaths, for example, exhibit both_emotional and rational deficits,_and_the latter alone can explain any_minor defects in the psychopath's ability_to distinguish moral from conventional_norms._The_greatest problem in psychopathy appears_to be motivational or behavioral, and_emotional deficits do_much more of the explanatory work there._3._Reasoning Beyond Consequences Abstract: Ample experimental_research_demonstrates that ordinary moral judgment involves_both_conscious_and unconscious reasoning or inference._The evidence suggests in particular that_we treat as morally significant more than the consequences_of a person's_actions, including the distinctions between:_acts/omissions;_intentional/accidental_outcomes; and harming as a means/byproduct. However, contrary to some_recent evidence,_it isn't clear_that ordinary moral thinking conforms to the Doctrine of Double_Effect. Drawing on existing research and some_of my own experiments, I show that the means/byproduct distinction grounds_only some norms, which are sensitive to how_involved the agent