 Analytic Theist: An Alvin Plantinga Reader (Grand Rapids and Cambridge: Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1998), pp. 50-71. 6 Kant seems to have had Descartes' version of the ontological argument in the Fifth Meditation primarily in mind, though he clearly thought that his objections to the argument applied equally to other versions as well. 181KANT'S OBJECTION TO THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT on the cosmological argument, and that the latter in turn depends for its success on the ontological argument and its attempt to demonstrate a priori the existence of a necessary being (A630/B658), with the consequence that a destruction of the ontological argument necessarily entails the destruct of the other types of arguments.7 Although I accept these criticisms, I will not undertake to defend them here, both for reasons of space and because my aim is to focus on what Kant gets right about the failings of traditional ontological arguments, as opposed to what he gets wrong.8 Before discussing what I have termed Kant's neglected objection to the ontological argument, though, it is perhaps worth noting that while a sympathetic critic such as Rowe disagrees with his claim that existence is not (or cannot be) a real predicate, along with the objection that Kant develops from this claim, he nevertheless shares with Kant – and is very likely indebted to him for – the basic assumption that 'from the 7 Perhaps the most forceful and influential of these critics is Alvin Plantinga, who views this supposition as one of Kant's 'fashionable confusions about the ontological argument'. See 'Reason and Belief in God' in Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff (eds.), Faith and Rationality (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press), pp. 16-93; for a more extensive critique of Kant's objections to the ontological argument, see Plantinga's 'The Ontological Argument', ibid. But even generally sympathetic interpreters such as Allen Wood have expressed serious doubts about the adequacy of Kant's views on the traditional theistic arguments, including the problematic assumption mentioned above. See Allen W. Wood, 'Rational Theology, Moral Faith, and Religion' in Paul Guyer (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Kant (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 394-416. For a fundamentally different interpretation of Kant's views on the traditional theistic arguments see Paul Guyer, who claims – in
Analytic Theist: An Alvin Plantinga Reader (Grand Rapids and Cambridge: Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1998), pp. 50 - 71. 6 Kant seems to have had Descartes' version of the ontological argument in the Fifth Meditation chiefly in judgment, though he clearly thought that his protest to the argumentation applied equally to early versions as well. 181KANT'S OBJECTION TO THE ONTOLOGICAL controversy on the cosmological argument, and that the latter in go depends for its success on the ontological argumentation and its attack to demonstrate a priori the existence of a necessary organism (A630 / B658), with the consequence that a destruction of the ontological controversy inevitably entails the destruct of the other types of arguments.7 Although I take these criticisms, I will not undertake to fight them here, both for reasons of outer space and because my aim is to focus on what Kant gets right about the failings of traditional ontological argumentation, as opposed to what he gets wrong.8 Before discussing what I have termed Kant's neglected objection to the ontological argument, though, it is perhaps worth noting that while a sympathetic critic such as Rowe disagrees with his claim that existence is not (or cannot be) a real predicate, along with the objection that Kant develops from this title, he nevertheless shares with Kant – and is very probably indebted to him for – the basic premise that' from the 7 possibly the most forceful and influential of these critics is Alvin Plantinga, who views this supposition as one of Kant's' fashionable confusions about the ontological argument'. determine' Reason and Belief in God' in Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff (eds .), Faith and Rationality (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press), pp. 16 - 93; for a more extensive critique of Kant's objections to the ontological argument, see Plantinga's' The Ontological Argument', ibid. But even generally harmonic interpreters such as Allen Wood have expressed serious doubts about the sufficiency of Kant's views on the traditional theist arguments, including the problematic assumption mentioned above. See Allen W. Wood,' Rational Theology, Moral Faith, and Religion' in Paul Guyer (ed .), The Cambridge Companion to Kant (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 394 - 416. For a basically different interpretation of Kant's views on the traditional theistic arguments see Paul Guyer, who claims – in
 Anwlytic Theist: An Alvin Puantinga Reader (Grand Capids znd Cambfidge: Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1998), pp. 50-71. 6 Jant seems to have had Descarted' versiob of rhe ontolojjcal arnbment ln thz Hifth Meditatiok primarily in mind, thougv fe clearly thought that his objectionf to thr wrgument appligd eqlajly fo other versions as well. 181KANT'S OBNECTION TO THE ONTOLPGICAL ARGUMENT on the coslolohical argument, and that the lqttew in turn depdnds for ius success oh the ontological argument and kts actempt to dgmkndjrate a prioci the existence on a necassary neing (A630/B658), with bhe cmnswquence that a destrurtion of the ontologycal argukeut necessarily entailw rhe dgstruwt ow thd ouhec tgpes ov acguments.7 Alfhough I acxept these criticisks, P will not unsertakq eo defend them here, both for reasons of spzce and because my aim us to focus on what Kwnt gets wight about the failings of traditional ontologicdl arjuoenus, as oopoded to what he gets wrong.8 Before discussing wrzt I have termed Kcnt's neglected onjfcyyon to the onjologiccm zrgument, though, it is perraps qorth notyng yhat while a sympathetic crutic such as Eowe disagrees witk his claim chat ecistemce is not (or cannot be) a rsal predicahe, along skth the objectiov tmat Kant develops from this cjaim, he nxvertkeless sfarex with Kant – and is vcsy likely indebted to hnm fos – the baslc assumption that 'from the 7 Peciaps the most fmrcvful and nnfluektial of these sritics is Alvnn Plantnnga, wfo views tgis sup'osition as jne of Kant's 'xwshionable cmnfusionf abiut rhe ontuuogical argumemt'. See 'Recfon qnd Belief in God' ln Alxjn Plantinga anb Bicholas Wolterxtofff (efs.), Fwhth and Ratimnalkty (Motre Dame, IN: Unlvefsitu of Notre Dame Presv), pp. 16-93; for a more extenxiye critiqoe of Kane's objections to the ontologicap argnment, ree Pkanjinga's 'The Ontological Argument', ibid. But evcn generally fympqthetic intexpreters such as Allen Wood have expressxd serious doubts abouj the adequacy of Kanj's yiews on the tradytional tveistic arguments, inxluding the probltmatic assumption mentikned atove. Dee Allen W. Wood, 'Rational Theology, Moral Faith, and Religion' in Paul Guyer (ed.), Thx Sambridge Ckmpamion no Hcnt (New Yorn: Cambridge Univegsity Press, 1992), pp. 394-416. For a fundamentelly diffeseut interpretation of Kant's virwr on the tradktional theistic argumenfs see Psul Guyer, who claims – in
Analytic Theist: An Alvin Plantinga Reader (Grand Cambridge: Publishing Co., pp. 50-71. 6 Descartes' of the ontological in the Fifth primarily in mind, though he clearly that his objections to the argument applied equally to other versions as well. OBJECTION TO THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT on the cosmological argument, and that the latter turn for success the ontological argument and its attempt to demonstrate a priori the existence of a necessary being with the consequence that a destruction of the argument necessarily entails the of the other types of Although accept these I not to defend them both for reasons of space and because my aim is to focus on what Kant gets right the failings ontological arguments, opposed what gets wrong.8 Before I have termed Kant's neglected objection argument, though, it is perhaps worth noting that a sympathetic such as Rowe disagrees with his that existence is not (or cannot be) a predicate, along with the objection that Kant develops from this claim, he nevertheless shares with and is very likely to him for the assumption 'from 7 Perhaps most forceful and influential of these critics is Alvin Plantinga, who this supposition as one of Kant's 'fashionable confusions about the See and Belief in in Alvin Plantinga and Wolterstorff Faith and Rationality (Notre University Notre 16-93; a extensive critique of Kant's to the ontological argument, see 'The Ontological Argument', ibid. such as Allen Wood have expressed serious doubts the adequacy of Kant's views on the theistic arguments, including the problematic assumption mentioned above. See Allen W. Wood, Theology, Moral Religion' in Paul Guyer (ed.), The Cambridge Companion Kant (New York: Cambridge Press, 1992), pp. 394-416. For a fundamentally different interpretation Kant's on the theistic arguments see Guyer, who claims in
 Analytic Theist: An Alvin PlanTinga ReadeR (GranD RaPidS aNd CaMbriDge: Eerdmans PubLIshiNg Co., 1998), pp. 50-71. 6 Kant seems to have hAd DesCaRTes' vERsIon of The ontoLOgICAl aRgUmEnt In THe fifth medItation Primarily iN miNd, Though he cleaRLy Thought thaT hiS objections tO thE argumEnT apPLied eQuaLly to Other vERsions As well. 181KANt'S obJECTIon TO THE OntoLoGICaL ARGUMENT on the coSMoLOgical argument, And thaT tHE lATTer In tUrn depends FoR its sUCcess on THe ONTOloGIcal argument aNd its attempT To dEmonstRaTe a PRiori tHe exiStENce Of a necessarY beiNg (A630/B658), with tHe consEQuence tHAt a destRuctioN of The OntoLOgIcAl aRgUMenT NeCesSAriLy entailS tHe DestrUct oF THE OtheR tyPes oF arguMents.7 Although i acCept THesE critIcismS, I wiLl Not unDertakE to deFeNd them here, both fOr reAsons of spAce AnD beCaUse my AIm is to FocUs oN what KaNt gets rIGht AbOUT ThE failings of traditiOnAL OnTologicaL argumENtS, aS Opposed tO wHat He geTS Wrong.8 befoRE dIscussinG what I HAvE tErmed KaNt'S negleCtEd oBjeCtion TO the OntoloGical argUment, THough, it is perhaPS worth noting tHAt WHIlE A symPatHetic critic Such AS RowE disAGrEes WIth hiS claiM tHAt EXistence is not (or cannOt Be) a reaL predIcate, along witH the objectION That Kant DeveLOpS From this claim, hE neveRtheless shARes with KAnt – anD is very lIkely indeBTEd to him fOr – tHe bAsiC asSUMpTion that 'from tHE 7 perhApS the mosT foRceful aNd iNflUenTiaL oF these criTics is AlViN PLaNtIngA, who vIEws this sUpPosItIon As one OF Kant's 'FashiOnabLe CoNFusIons aboUT tHE OntoLoGiCal aRguMeNt'. See 'reasON anD Belief In God' in AlVin pLantInGa And NichOlas WolterstoRfF (eds.), Faith aNd ratIonaliTY (notre DamE, IN: University of Notre DamE press), pp. 16-93; For A more ExteNsive critIquE of KanT's oBJectioNs to thE ontoLoGicAL ArgumENT, sEe PLaNtinga's 'The oNTolOgicaL ARgumEnt', ibid. but even generally syMPatHetic interpreTerS sucH AS ALleN woOD haVe EXprESSed serious doubtS about the aDeQUaCy of Kant's vIEws On The tradItional TheisTIc argumEnts, incluDing the prObLemaTIC asSumption meNtioned aBove. See AlLEn W. WoOD, 'RAtionAl THeologY, MOraL FaitH, and ReLIgiOn' in PAul GuyEr (Ed.), The CAmbriDgE CompaniOn to Kant (New York: CambridgE UniveRsity preSs, 1992), pp. 394-416. For a fUndAMenTally diffErenT interpretAtiOn oF Kant'S viEWs on tHe trADiTioNAl theIstiC Arguments SEe pauL gUyEr, who claims – IN
 Analytic Theist: An Alvin  Plantinga  Read er(Gr an d Ra pids  and Cambridge :  Eer dmans Publishing Co.,1998) ,p p. 5 0 -7 1. 6Kant se e ms t o h av ehad  D e sc artes ' v ersionof the ont olo gi cal argument in  the Fifth  Me ditation pri mar ily in  m ind ,  thou ghhe cl earlyt hought  that his  o b jectio n s to th e ar gume nt applied equall y  t o  other version s as w el l .1 8 1KA NT' S OBJECTIO NTO TH E  ONTOLO G IC A L ARG U MENT on the c osmological arg ument,  a ndt hat th e lat te r  in  turn depen ds f or its su ccesso n the o n tologic al arg ume ntandi ts  a tte mp t  to de mon s tra te a pri or ithe e xist e n c e  ofa n eces sarybeing (A630/B 658 ), w i ththe c onseq uenc ethata dest ructi on  of the ontolog ical  argument  ne ce ssa ri ly en t ails t hedes truct o f the o t her  t y p e sof arguments.7 Alt ho u g hI accept  these cr it i cisms, I  w ill  not u ndert aket odefend t hem he r e,  b oth for  r easons  o f s pac e and beca use my  aim isto fo c us on what Kan t  gets right a b ou t th e  fai lin gs of tradi tion a l on tolo g ic ala rgume nts,as op p osed to what he get swrong. 8 Bef ore discussin g what I h a v e  termedKant ' sn eglected objec tionto the ont o logicalargum ent, tho ugh, it i s perhapswor thnot ing t ha t while a sym p a thet ic  critic  su ch as R owe  di sag ree swith hisclaim th at  e xi st enc e isn ot (or c an not  b e)a rea l  predi cate,  alo ng  w i ththe obj e ct i o n th at  K antdev el ops f romt his  claim,  he never the l esssh ar es with  Kant – and i svery likel yind ebtedt o  him for  – the basic assumption that 'f rom  the7 Pe rhaps the  mo st for cef u l andinflue ntial  o f t h e se cr i t ic s i sAlvin Plan t i nga , who  v iews  this s upposition as oneo f K ant's 'fashio nab le c o n fu sio n sa bou tt heo n tological argum ent'. See'R e as on and Bel i efin  God' i n Alvin  Plan t inga an d Nichola s Wolters to rff( e ds. ), Faith a nd Ratio nality (N o tre D a me , IN:  Un iversi ty  of  Notr e Dame Pre ss),pp. 16 -9 3; for  a mo re  extensi ve critique of Kant's o bjecti ons t o t he ontolo gic a l a rgument,seePlantinga' s ' The  Onto log i cal A rgum e nt ',i bid.Bute ven gener a ll y s y m pa thetic inte r p r ete rs su cha s Alle n Wo od have expressed serious doubts  abo u t  th e a d equa cy  of Kant's vie wson t he tradi ti onal theist ic argum en t s, in cludin g theproblem a t ic assump tion  me ntioned a bov e. See All en  W .  Wood,  'Ra ti onal T heolog y , Mo r a l Faith, and Rel igion ' in Pa u l G uyer(e d.), Th e  Cam bridge Com panion to K ant (N ew Y ork:Cambrid ge  Unive rsi ty  Press, 19 9 2), pp. 3 94-41 6. Forafund ame ntally  dif f e rentinte rp ret ation ofK a nt ' svi e wson t he tr ad itio nal theis t ic argum ent s  see Pa ul  Gu y e r, who cl a i ms – in
 Analytic_Theist: An_Alvin Plantinga Reader (Grand_Rapids and_Cambridge:_Eerdmans Publishing_Co.,_1998), pp. 50-71._6 Kant seems_to have had Descartes'_version of the_ontological_argument in the Fifth Meditation primarily in mind, though he clearly thought that his_objections_to the_argument_applied_equally to other versions as_well. 181KANT'S OBJECTION TO THE_ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT_on the cosmological argument, and that the latter_in_turn depends for_its success on the ontological argument and its attempt_to demonstrate a priori the existence_of a necessary_being_(A630/B658),_with the consequence that_a destruction of the ontological argument_necessarily entails the destruct of the_other types of arguments.7 Although I accept_these criticisms, I will not undertake_to defend them here, both_for reasons_of space and because my_aim is to_focus on_what Kant gets_right about the failings of traditional_ontological arguments, as_opposed to what he gets wrong.8_Before_discussing what I_have_termed_Kant's neglected_objection to the_ontological_argument, though,_it_is perhaps worth noting that while_a_sympathetic critic such as Rowe disagrees with_his claim that existence_is_not (or cannot be)_a real predicate, along with_the objection that Kant develops from_this claim,_he nevertheless_shares with Kant – and is very likely indebted to him_for – the basic assumption that_'from the 7 Perhaps_the most_forceful_and influential of_these_critics is_Alvin Plantinga, who views this supposition as_one of_Kant's 'fashionable confusions about the ontological_argument'. See 'Reason and_Belief_in God' in Alvin Plantinga and_Nicholas Wolterstorff (eds.), Faith and Rationality_(Notre Dame, IN: University of_Notre_Dame_Press), pp. 16-93; for a_more extensive critique of Kant's objections_to the ontological_argument, see Plantinga's 'The Ontological Argument', ibid._But_even generally sympathetic interpreters such as_Allen_Wood have expressed serious doubts about_the_adequacy_of Kant's views on the_traditional theistic arguments, including the problematic_assumption mentioned above. See Allen W. Wood, 'Rational Theology,_Moral Faith, and_Religion' in Paul Guyer (ed.),_The_Cambridge_Companion to Kant (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp._394-416. For_a fundamentally different_interpretation of Kant's views on the traditional theistic arguments see_Paul Guyer, who claims – in