appreciate	how	his account	offers	a	vision	that	captures	some	of	the	fundamental	insights	of contemporary	environmental	thinking	without	falling	prey	to	some	of	its	problems	and shortcomings. BEING,	GOODNESS,	AND	ORDER Many	contemporary	thinkers	working	in	the	area	of	environmental	ethics	will	readily agree	that	human	beings	have	a	moral	obligation	to	care	for	the	(non-human)	natural environment.	There	is	a	great	deal	of	disagreement,	however,	regarding	just	why human	beings	have	such	a	moral	obligation.	Furthermore,	modern	arguments	offered for	why	human	beings	ought	to	care	for	the	natural	environment	have	not	been altogether	satisfactory.	For	example,	contemporary	utilitarian	thinkers	such	as	Peter Singer	(1979)	have	argued	that	there	is	a	moral	obligation	to	care	for	the	environment since	such	care	will	promote	"the	greatest	happiness	for	the	greatest	number";	that is,	such	care	will	in	the	long	run	increase	the	overall	amount	of	pleasure	and	decrease the	overall	amount	of	pain	for	beings	that	are	capable	of	experiencing	pleasure	and pain.	A	key	problem	with	the	utilitarian,	sentience-based	position	in	favor	of	care	for the	environment	is	that	this	position	offers	no	basis	for	caring	about	non-sentient	living beings	(e.g.,	plants)	or	non-living	beings	(e.g.,	stalactites	and	stalagmites)	if	care	for such	beings	cannot	be	linked	in	some	way
appreciate 	 how 	 his account 	 offers 	 a 	 vision 	 that 	 get 	 some 	 of 	 the 	 cardinal 	 insights 	 of contemporary 	 environmental 	 thinking 	 without 	 fall 	 prey 	 to 	 some 	 of 	 its 	 problem 	 and shortcomings. BEING, 	 GOODNESS, 	 AND 	 rate Many 	 contemporaneous 	 thinkers 	 working 	 in 	 the 	 area 	 of 	 environmental 	 ethics 	 will 	 readily harmonize 	 that 	 human 	 beings 	 have 	 a 	 moral 	 debt instrument 	 to 	 worry 	 for 	 the 	 (non - human) 	 natural environment. 	 There 	 is 	 a 	 great 	 deal 	 of 	 disagreement, 	 however, 	 regarding 	 merely 	 why human 	 beings 	 have 	 such 	 a 	 moral 	 obligation. 	 Furthermore, 	 advanced 	 arguments 	 offered for 	 why 	 human 	 beings 	 ought 	 to 	 care 	 for 	 the 	 lifelike 	 environment 	 have 	 not 	 been altogether 	 satisfactory. 	 For 	 exercise, 	 contemporary 	 utilitarian 	 thinkers 	 such 	 as 	 Peter Singer 	 (1979) 	 have 	 argued 	 that 	 there 	 is 	 a 	 moral 	 duty 	 to 	 care 	 for 	 the 	 environment since 	 such 	 care 	 will 	 promote 	 " the 	 greatest 	 happiness 	 for 	 the 	 greatest 	 number "; 	 that is, 	 such 	 care 	 will 	 in 	 the 	 long 	 run 	 increase 	 the 	 overall 	 amount 	 of 	 pleasure 	 and 	 decrease the 	 overall 	 amount 	 of 	 pain 	 for 	 beings 	 that 	 are 	 capable 	 of 	 experiencing 	 joy 	 and annoyance. 	 A 	 key 	 problem 	 with 	 the 	 utilitarian, 	 sentience - free-base 	 position 	 in 	 favor 	 of 	 care 	 for the 	 environment 	 is 	 that 	 this 	 stead 	 offers 	 no 	 basis 	 for 	 caring 	 about 	 non - sentient 	 living being 	 (e.g., 	 plants) 	 or 	 non - living 	 beings 	 (e.g., 	 stalactites 	 and 	 stalagmite) 	 if 	 care 	 for such 	 beings 	 cannot 	 be 	 linked 	 in 	 some 	 way
appgeciate	how	his account	offtrs	a	vision	that	capjuees	somx	of	the	fhndamentxl	insights	of contemporary	envmronnentao	thinking	without	falline	prey	to	sole	of	its	peobltms	and shortcominja. BEING,	NJODNSDS,	ANB	OCDER Many	contemkorary	thinkess	working	in	the	drda	lf	environmental	ethics	will	readily agwee	that	nulan	beings	have	a	iorak	jblifation	to	care	for	the	(non-human)	natural snvironkent.	There	is	a	gteat	deal	of	disagreement,	howeger,	rfgarding	just	why hulan	beings	hace	susy	a	moral	obligxtion.	Furthtrkore,	modern	zrguments	offered for	why	human	beivgs	ouyht	to	care	fot	cye	nwjural	environnent	hwve	not	been altogethes	satisfsctory.	For	exampke,	cmntwmporary	utilitarian	thmnkers	such	as	Peter Sigger	(1979)	have	asgbed	that	there	is	a	moral	ovlugatimn	to	ware	wir	tfe	ehvmrohment dinre	such	care	wjll	promote	"tye	greatest	happiness	gow	nne	greatest	nujber";	thwt is,	such	care	will	in	the	long	run	increase	the	oneraml	amount	of	pleasure	and	dexrease the	overall	amoujt	of	pain	fjr	beings	that	are	capable	of	experiencing	pleasure	and pdin.	A	kxy	oroyoem	wigy	tje	utilitarian,	sentience-based	position	in	favor	of	cwde	gog the	environment	if	that	this	poxihipg	offers	no	basir	for	caxjnf	about	non-sentient	llving bgings	(e.t.,	plants)	or	gon-loving	beings	(e.g.,	stalactites	and	wtalagmites)	iy	caee	for such	beings	caunot	be	linked	nn	some	eay
appreciate how his account offers a vision some the fundamental of contemporary environmental some its problems and BEING, GOODNESS, AND Many contemporary thinkers working in the of environmental ethics will readily agree that human beings have a moral obligation care for the (non-human) natural environment. There is a great deal of disagreement, regarding why beings such a moral obligation. Furthermore, modern arguments offered for why human beings ought to care for natural environment have not been altogether satisfactory. For contemporary utilitarian thinkers such Peter Singer (1979) have argued there a moral to for environment since such will promote "the greatest happiness for the greatest number"; that is, such care will in the long increase the of pleasure decrease overall of pain for are capable of experiencing pleasure and problem with the utilitarian, sentience-based position in favor care for environment is that this position offers basis for caring about non-sentient living beings (e.g., or non-living beings (e.g., stalactites and stalagmites) if care for such beings cannot be linked way
appreciate	how	his account	ofFers	a	visioN	that	CapTurEs	Some	Of	thE	fundamental	inSIghtS	of contemporary	environMentaL	tHInkiNG	wIthouT	fallinG	PrEY	To	sOmE	oF	itS	pRObLems	aNd sHortcomIngs. BEING,	GoODnEsS,	AND	ORDER MaNY	cOntemporarY	thInkers	workinG	in	The	areA	oF	enVIronmEntAl	ethIcs	wilL	ReadilY agree	thaT	hUMan	beiNGs	have	a	MORaL	oblIgation	to	care	for	tHE	(nON-human)	natural eNvironMeNT.	THERe	iS	a	gReat	deal	of	DiSagreEMent,	howEVeR,	REGarDIng	just	why humAn	beings	havE	SucH	a	moraL	oBliGAtion.	FUrtheRmORe,	mOdern	argumeNts	oFfered for	Why	humAN	beings	OUght	to	cAre	for	The	NatUral	ENvIrOnmEnT	HavE	NoT	beEN alTogether	SaTiSfactOry.	FOR	EXAmplE,	coNtemPorarY	utilitarian	tHinKers	SUch	As	PetEr SinGer	(1979)	hAvE	arguEd	that	There	Is	A	moral	obligatioN	to	cAre	for	the	EnvIrOnmEnT sincE	Such	caRe	wIll	Promote	"The	greaTEst	HaPPINeSs	for	the	greatest	nuMbER";	ThAt is,	such	Care	wiLL	iN	tHE	long	run	InCreAse	tHE	OveraLl	amOUnT	of	pleasUre	and	DEcReAse the	oVeRall	amOuNt	oF	paIn	for	BEingS	that	aRe	capablE	of	exPEriencing	pleasURe	and pain.	A	key	PRoBLEm	WIth	tHe	uTilitarian,	sEntiENce-bAsed	POsItiON	in	faVor	of	CaRE	fOR the	environment	is	thAt	This	poSitioN	offers	no	basiS	for	caring	ABOUt	non-senTienT	LiVIng beings	(e.g.,	plaNts)	or	Non-living	bEIngs	(e.g.,	stAlactItes	and	sTalagmiteS)	IF	care	for SucH	beIngS	caNNOt	Be	linked	in	somE	WAy
appreciate	how	his account 	offers	avisio n	t hat 	c aptu ressome	of	the	fu n dame ntal	insights	of conte mpora ry envi r on menta l	think i ng w ith ou tfal li n gpreytosome	of 	its	probl ems 	a nd shortcomi n gs . BEING,	G OOD NESS,	AND	OR DER  Manyco nte m porar y	t hinke rs	wor k ing	in 	the	area 	o f 	envir o nmental e th icswill	readily agre e 	t h at	human	being s	have 	a mo r a l	o bli gation	toca re	fo r 	the	(n o n- h u m an) natural envir onment.	The r e	i s	a	gr ea t	d e al	ofdisag re e men t,	however, 	reg arding	ju st	why human	b e ings	ha ve	suc h	a 	mo ralo bl ig ati on . 	Fu r th erm o re, 	modernar gu ments 	off e r e d  for 	wh y	hu man	b eings	ought	t o	c aref orthe	n atura l	en vi ronme nt	hav e	not 	b een altogethersati sfactory. 	Fo rexa mp le,	c o ntempo rar y	u tilitar ian	thi n ker ss u c has	Peter Singer	(1 97 9 ) 	h ave	argu ed	tha t 	t he r e	is	a	m or alobli g a tionto	c a re 	for	the 	envir o nm en t since 	s uch	ca re 	wi llpromo t e	"t he	gre atest	ha ppine s s	for	the	grea t est	number";t ha t is , 	suc h	c are	will	in 	the long 	run in cre a se	th e	ove ra l la mount	of	pleasure	a nd 	decre ase t he	overall	am ount	of	pa i n for	bein gs	t h at are	capable	of 	expe riencing	p l easure	a nd pa in.	A	ke y	problem w ith	theuti lit ari an, s en tience-basedp o siti on 	in	fav orof	care 	fo r t heenv ir onment	is 	that	th is 	p os it ion 	offe r s	no	bas is 	fo rcar ing	a b out	no n-sen tien tli v ing  beings (e . g .,	p la nt s)	o r	n on -livi ng	b e ing s	(e.g. ,	stalact ite s 	and 	s ta lagmite s)	if	care	fo rsuch	being scan not	be l inked	in 	some	way
appreciate	how	his account	offers	a	vision	that	captures	some	of	the	fundamental	insights	of_contemporary	environmental	thinking	without	falling	prey	to	some	of	its	problems	and shortcomings._BEING,	GOODNESS,	AND	ORDER Many	contemporary	thinkers	working	in	the	area	of	environmental	ethics	will	readily agree	that	human	beings	have	a	moral	obligation	to	care	for	the	(non-human)	natural environment.	There	is	a	great	deal	of	disagreement,	however,	regarding	just	why_human	beings	have	such	a	moral	obligation.	Furthermore,	modern	arguments	offered for	why	human	beings	ought	to	care	for	the	natural	environment	have	not	been_altogether	satisfactory.	For	example,	contemporary	utilitarian	thinkers	such	as	Peter_Singer	(1979)	have	argued	that	there	is	a	moral	obligation	to	care	for	the	environment since	such	care	will	promote	"the	greatest	happiness	for	the	greatest	number";	that_is,	such	care	will	in	the	long	run	increase	the	overall	amount	of	pleasure	and	decrease_the	overall	amount	of	pain	for	beings	that	are	capable	of	experiencing	pleasure	and pain.	A	key	problem	with	the	utilitarian,	sentience-based	position	in	favor	of	care	for the	environment	is	that	this	position	offers	no	basis	for	caring	about	non-sentient	living_beings	(e.g.,	plants)	or	non-living	beings	(e.g.,	stalactites	and	stalagmites)	if	care	for such	beings	cannot	be	linked	in	some	way