 may just be fictions. Theological instrumentalism says that discourse about God is purely fictional. but the predictive dimension is largely beside the point in theological instrumentalism, unless we have in mind predicting the behaviour of religious persons, which may be anticipated through knowing what they believe. Positivism. Theories, according to positivism, are either true or false (and so positivism differs from instrumentalism in this respect); but (in contrast with realism) theories have not to be taken at face value. Theological positivism says that discourse apparently about God is true, but what it describes, in symbolic language, are truths about our moral and psychological lives. What I call "theological fictionalism" le Poidevin calls "theological instrumentalism". I think that "theological fictionalism" is a better name, because the notion of fiction is central to explaining how this kind of view works. le Poidevin relies heavily upon Walton's theory of fiction as make-believe. According to Walton, just as a child make-believes that a group of chairs set in a line is a bus, or that, in chasing after a friend, he is chasing after a desperate criminal, armed to the teeth with a pop-gun and a water pistol, so we, in reading a novel, make-believe that it is reporting the truth. In doing so we, as it were, locate ourselves in the novel. We are there, witnessing the events. We may even assign ourselves a role, and imagine talking to the characters. It is our active participation in the fiction which explains why we become emotionally involved.3 le Poidevin adds: Walton's solution of the paradox that we can be emotionally involved in something we know to be false is that we play a game of make-believe in which the fiction becomes reality, and part of the game is to feel something akin to real emotions, though they are not the genuine article.4 3 Kendall l. Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe, p. 116. 4 robin le Poidevin, Arguing for Atheism, p. 117. roGer PouIVet430 Theological fictionalism is thus the thesis that to engage in religious practice is to engage in a game of make-believe: We make-believe that there is a God, by reciting, in the context of the game, a statement of belief. We listen to what make-believedly are accounts of the activities of God and his people, and
may just be fictions. Theological instrumentalism says that discourse about God is strictly fabricated. but the predictive proportion is largely beside the point in theological instrumentalism, unless we have in judgment bode the behaviour of religious persons, which may be predict through know what they believe. Positivism. Theories, according to positivity, are either true or false (and so positivism differ from instrumentalism in this respect); but (in contrast with realism) theories have not to be taken at expression value. Theological positivism says that discourse obviously about God is true, but what it describes, in emblematic language, are truth about our moral and psychological lives. What I call " theological fictionalism " le Poidevin calls " theological instrumentalism ". I think that " theological fictionalism " is a better name, because the impression of fiction is central to explaining how this kind of view works. le Poidevin relies heavy upon Walton's hypothesis of fabrication as make - believe. According to Walton, just as a child make - believes that a group of chairs dress in a channel is a bus, or that, in chasing after a supporter, he is chasing after a desperate criminal, armed to the teeth with a dad - gun and a water pistol, so we, in reading a novel, brand - believe that it is reporting the truth. In doing so we, as it were, locate ourselves in the novel. We are there, witness the events. We may even assign ourselves a role, and imagine talk to the character. It is our active engagement in the fiction which explains why we become emotionally involved.3 le Poidevin adds: Walton's solution of the paradox that we can be emotionally involved in something we know to be false is that we play a game of brand - believe in which the fiction becomes reality, and part of the plot is to feel something akin to real emotions, though they are not the genuine article.4 3 Kendall l. Walton, Mimesis as Make - Believe, p. 116. 4 robin le Poidevin, Arguing for Atheism, p. 117. roGer PouIVet430 Theological fictionalism is therefore the thesis that to engage in religious practice is to engage in a plot of make - believe: We make - think that there is a God, by reciting, in the context of the game, a statement of belief. We heed to what make - believedly are accounts of the activities of God and his multitude, and
 maj just be fictions. Theolugical instrumeuralism says fhat diszourse about God is purely fmctiinal. vut the predictive dimdnsion is largely besmde the point in theologleal ihdtrukxntalism, unless we have it mind predicthne che behaviour of religious persons, wrich mau he anticipated thrptgh inowing what they believe. Positiviam. Theogies, according to positivism, are either truf or false (and so posihivism diffgds seom instrumevtalism in this respecj); but (in contrast with realism) tfeorizs have not ti bf taken at fece vajue. Theologigsl poshtivism says that disgoursx apparently about God is true, but what it qescribes, iu symbolic language, aee trutvs atout iur modak znd psjchklogical ljves. What I call "theological foceppnalism" le Pkidevig salls "theological instrumentalism". I thitk fhat "theological fictiobalism" is a better nale, becausq the notion of fiction is central to explaining vow tiir knkq if view works. le Poidevin relies heavily upon Wwmtpn'x theory of figtion as make-beliefe. Avsording to Wauton, jbat as a child make-bepieves jhat a group of chaors set in a line is a bus, ir that, in ckasung after a friend, he is chasnng afjer a cesperate criminal, armeb to tge teeth wihh a pop-ghv and a water pirtok, vo we, in reading a novel, mwke-believx thac it is fepotting tre truth. Ij doikc so we, as it were, locaje ourvelves in hhe novel. We are there, witnessiij the events. Ee maj even asfign purselves a rjle, and imaging talking to tfe charactvrs. It is our active participatiot in the fictmon which expoainw why wd become emotiomally involved.3 le Piidevin adds: Waltok's souhtion of the paxcdix that we can ne dmoeilnelly ytvolved in smmetfine we kvow to be fclre ix that we play a gama of make-believe in whocm the ficjion becoies reality, amd part of the gamt is tm fxel soketring akin to real emotions, thohgh they wre not the gentine article.4 3 Keudall l. Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe, p. 116. 4 robin le Poidevib, Arguing for Atheixk, p. 117. roGer 'ouIVee430 Theologhcal fictionalism is thus the thesis uhat to engage in religjous psactife is to engage in a game of make-believe: We make-believe that there is a Gid, by cesiting, in tge cpntexn oy tke game, a svavement of belief. Ee listen to what make-believedlb are accogncs of the activities of God amd his people, avd
may just be fictions. Theological instrumentalism says about is purely but the predictive point theological instrumentalism, unless have in mind the behaviour of religious persons, which be anticipated through knowing what they believe. Positivism. Theories, according to positivism, are true or false (and so positivism differs from instrumentalism in this respect); but contrast realism) have to be taken at face value. Theological positivism says that discourse apparently about God is true, what it describes, in symbolic language, are truths our moral and psychological What I call "theological fictionalism" Poidevin "theological instrumentalism". think "theological is a better because the notion of fiction is central to explaining how this kind of view works. le Poidevin heavily upon of fiction make-believe. to just as a that a group of chairs set is a bus, or that, in chasing after friend, he chasing after a desperate criminal, armed the teeth with a pop-gun and a water so we, in reading a novel, make-believe that it is reporting the truth. In doing as it were, locate in the novel. are witnessing events. may even ourselves a role, and imagine talking to the characters. It is active participation in the fiction which explains why we become le adds: Walton's solution the paradox that we be involved in something we be is a of in which the fiction reality, and part of the is to feel something they are not the genuine article.4 3 Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe, p. 116. 4 le Poidevin, Arguing for Atheism, p. 117. roGer PouIVet430 Theological fictionalism is the thesis engage in religious practice is to engage in game of make-believe: We that there is a God, by reciting, in the of game, a of belief. We to what make-believedly accounts of the God and people,
 may just be fictions. TheologiCal instrumEntalIsm SayS tHat dIscoUrse about God is PUrelY fictional. but the predicTive dImENsioN Is LargeLy besidE ThE POinT iN tHeoLoGIcAl insTruMentaliSm, unless we HavE iN mind predictINg The behavioUr oF religious peRsoNs, whicH mAy bE AnticIpaTed thRough kNOwing wHat they beLiEVe. PosiTIvism. ThEORiEs, acCording to positiviSM, aRE either true or fAlse (anD sO PoSITivIsm Differs froM iNstruMEntalisM In THIS reSPect); but (in contRast with reaLIsm) TheoriEs HavE Not to bE takeN aT FacE value. TheolOgicAl positivIsm sayS That disCOurse apParentLy aBouT God IS tRuE, buT wHAt iT DeScrIBes, In symbolIc LaNguagE, are TRUTHs abOut Our mOral aNd psychologicAl lIves. wHat i call "TheolOgicAl FictiOnalisM" le PoIdEvin calls "theoloGicaL instrumeNtaLiSm". I ThInk thAT "theolOgiCal FictionAlism" is A BetTeR NAMe, Because the notion of FiCTIoN is centrAl to exPLaInINg how thiS kInd Of viEW Works. Le PoIDeVin relieS heaviLY uPoN Walton'S tHeory oF fIctIon As makE-BeliEve. AccOrding to waltoN, Just as a child maKE-believes that A GrOUP oF ChaiRs sEt in a line is A bus, OR thaT, in cHAsIng AFter a FrienD, hE Is CHasing after a desperaTe CriminAl, armEd to the teeth wIth a pop-gun AND A water piStol, SO wE, In reading a noveL, make-Believe thaT It is repoRting The truth. in doing so WE, As it were, LocAte OurSelVES iN the novel. We arE THere, WiTnessinG thE events. we mAy eVen AssIgN ourselveS a role, anD iMaGiNe TalKing tO The charaCtErs. it Is oUr actIVe partIcipaTion In ThE FicTion whiCH eXPLainS wHy We beComE eMotioNallY InvOlved.3 le poidevin aDds: wAltoN's SoLution oF the paradox thAt We can be emoTiOnaLly invOLVed in somEthing we know to be false is THat we plAy a Game oF makE-believe iN whIch the FicTIon becOmes reAlity, AnD paRT Of the GAMe Is tO fEel somethiNG AkiN to reAl EmotIons, thoUgh they are not the geNUinE article.4 3 KendaLl l. waltON, miMesIS aS makE-BELieVE, P. 116. 4 robin le PoideviN, Arguing foR ATHeIsm, p. 117. roGer POUIVEt430 theologIcal ficTionaLIsm is thUs the thesIs that to eNgAge iN REliGious practIce is to eNgage in a gAMe of mAKe-BelieVe: WE make-bElIevE that There iS A GoD, by reCiting, In The conText oF tHe game, a sTatement of belief. We listeN to whaT make-BelIevedly arE acCOunTs of the acTiviTies of God aNd hIs pEople, And
 may just be fictions. The ological i nstru men tal is m sa ys t hat discoursea bout  God is purely fiction al. b ut thep re dicti ve dime n si o n  is  l ar gel yb es ide t hepoint i n theologi cal  i nstrumentali s m,  unless we  ha ve in mind p red icting  t heb ehavi our  of r eligio u s pers ons, whic hm ay bea nticipa t e dthro ugh knowing whatt he y  believe. Posi tivism .T he o r ies , a ccording t oposit i vism, a r ee i t her true or false  (and so po s iti vism d if fer s  frominstr um e nta lism in thi s re spect); b ut (in contras t  with r ealism ) t heo ries ha ve  no tt o b e  t ake n  at  face va lu e.  Theo logi c a l posi tiv ismsaysthat discours e a ppar e ntl y abo ut Go d is  t rue,but wh at it  d escribes, in sy mbol ic langua ge,  a retr uthsa bout o urmor al andpsychol o gic al l i ve s. What I call "th eo l o gi cal fict ionali s m"  l e  Poidevi ncal ls " t h eolog ical in strument alism" .  I  t hink th at  "theo lo gic alficti o nali sm" is  a bette r nam e , because then otion of fict i on i sc entr alto explaini ng h o w th is k i nd  of viewworks .l eP oidevin relies heav il y upon  Walt on's theory o f fictiona s make-bel ieve .  A c cording to Wal ton,just as ac hild mak e-bel ieves th at a grou p of chair s s etina l i n eis a bus, ort h at,in  chasin g a fter afri end , h e i schasing a fter a d es pe ra te  cr imina l , armedto  th etee th wi t h a po p-gun  and  a  w a ter  pistol ,  s o we,in  r eadi nganovel , ma k e-b elievethat it i s r e port in gthe tru th. In doingso  we, as it  w ere , loca t e  ourselv es in the novel. We are there,wit nessi ng t he events . W e mayeve n  assig n ours elves  a  ro l e , and i ma gin etalking to t hechara ct ers.  It isour active partici p ati on in the fic tio n wh i c hexp l ai n s w hy web e come emotionall y involved .3 le  Poidevina dds :Walton' s solut ion o f  the pa radox tha t we canbe  emo t i ona lly involv ed in so mething w e  know to  be f als e is t ha t w e pla y a ga m e o f mak e-beli ev e in w hichth e fictio n becomes reality, andpart o f the  ga me is tofee l  so mething a kinto real em oti ons , tho ugh theyaren ot  th e  genu inea rticle.43  K end a l ll. Walton,M i m esi s asMak e -Belie ve,p. 116. 4 robin l e  Poidevin, Arg uing f orAth e ism,  p . 117. roGer P ouI Ve t 4 30 Theol og ical fictio nalism i st hus t he the sis th at to e n g ag e  in re ligi ous  practice  is  t o  engage  i na  gameof m ak e-beli eve: W e  mak e - believe that the re is a  God, byrecit in g, in t h e co ntext of t he game, astatem entof be lief. W elisten  to  w hat make-b e lievedlyare a ccounts  o f th e a ctivit ieso f  Godandhi s p eople, an d 
 may_just be_fictions. Theological instrumentalism says_that discourse_about_God is_purely_fictional. but the_predictive dimension is_largely beside the point_in theological instrumentalism,_unless_we have in mind predicting the behaviour of religious persons, which may be anticipated_through_knowing what_they_believe._Positivism. Theories, according to positivism,_are either true or false_(and so_positivism differs from instrumentalism in this respect); but_(in_contrast with realism)_theories have not to be taken at face value._Theological positivism says that discourse apparently_about God is_true,_but_what it describes, in_symbolic language, are truths about our_moral and psychological lives. What I_call "theological fictionalism" le Poidevin calls "theological_instrumentalism". I think that "theological fictionalism"_is a better name, because_the notion_of fiction is central to_explaining how this_kind of_view works. le_Poidevin relies heavily upon Walton's theory_of fiction as_make-believe. According to Walton, just as_a_child make-believes that_a_group_of chairs_set in a_line_is a_bus,_or that, in chasing after a_friend,_he is chasing after a desperate criminal,_armed to the teeth_with_a pop-gun and a_water pistol, so we, in_reading a novel, make-believe that it_is reporting_the truth._In doing so we, as it were, locate ourselves in the_novel. We are there, witnessing the_events. We may even_assign ourselves_a_role, and imagine_talking_to the_characters. It is our active participation in_the fiction_which explains why we become emotionally_involved.3 le Poidevin adds:_Walton's_solution of the paradox that we_can be emotionally involved in something_we know to be false_is_that_we play a game of_make-believe in which the fiction becomes_reality, and part_of the game is to feel something_akin_to real emotions, though they are_not_the genuine article.4 3 Kendall l._Walton,_Mimesis_as Make-Believe, p. 116. 4_robin le Poidevin, Arguing for Atheism,_p. 117. roGer PouIVet430 Theological fictionalism is thus the_thesis that to_engage in religious practice is_to_engage_in a game of make-believe: We make-believe that there is_a God,_by reciting, in_the context of the game, a statement of belief. We_listen to what make-believedly are accounts of_the activities of God and his people, and