 way things are, and thus to give this Lewis-world a special role in the semantics of 'actual' and 'actually'.45 But once we see that 45Lewis says that he 'would find it very peculiar to say that modality, as ordinarily 25 the concept of a Lewis-world plays no special role in the semantics for modal claims, we will see that this is a mistake. Lewis-worlds, like everything else, are counterparts, and in that sense represent ways certain specific things-the things whose counterparts they are-might be. If the Lewis-worlds are all one another's counterparts, then each Lewis-world represents a way any other given Lewis-world might be.46 There is only one Lewis-world-namely Cosmo itself-that represents the way Cosmo actually is. But this doesn't give Cosmo a distinctive role vis-à-vis actuality: every Lewis-world represents the way it itself is. pActually φq involves indexical reference to Cosmo only when φ already involves indexical reference to Cosmo. Since quantification is often tacitly restricted in an indexical way, many claims which contain no overt indexical words are indexical all the same. There is no particular reason to think that covert indexical reference to Cosmo is particularly common among the folk, however, although it might be more common among certain physicists and philosophers. So much for what actuality is not. But what is it? What does 'actually' actually mean? Hazen (1979) was the first to notice the difficulty of extending the counterpart-theoretic translation scheme of Lewis 1968 to a language containing an 'actually' operator; Fara and Williamson (2005) explain why some natural ideas, as well as some more intricate proposals due to Graeme Forbes and Murali Ramachandran, don't succeed in endowing the 'actually' operator with anything like the right logical behaviour. In a context where Semi-Rigid Pairs holds and counterpairings are global permutations, this challenge is easily met in the present framework. We can simply analyse pActually φq as pat I (φ)q, where I is a rigid plural name for the identity pairs. As we have seen, the result understood, is quantification over parts of actuality. If I were convinced that I ought to call all the worlds actual... then it would become very implausible to say that what might happen is what does happen at some or another world' (OPW 100). It
way things are, and thus to give this Lewis - world a limited function in the semantics of' actual' and' actually'.45 But once we see that 45Lewis says that he' would find it very particular to say that modality, as normally 25 the concept of a Lewis - world plays no special function in the semantics for modal claims, we will see that this is a error. Lewis - worlds, like everything else, are counterparts, and in that sense represent way certain specific things - the things whose counterparts they are - might be. If the Lewis - worlds are all one another's counterpart, then each Lewis - world represents a way any early given Lewis - world might be.46 There is merely one Lewis - world - namely Cosmo itself - that represent the way Cosmo actually is. But this doesn't give Cosmo a distinctive role vis - à - vis actuality: every Lewis - world map the way it itself is. pActually φq involves indexical reference to Cosmo only when φ already involves indexical reference to Cosmo. Since quantification is often tacitly restricted in an indexical way, many claims which contain no overt indexical words are indexical all the same. There is no particular reason to think that covert indexical mention to Cosmo is particularly common among the folk music, however, although it might be more common among certain physicists and philosophers. therefore much for what actuality is not. But what is it? What does' actually' actually mean? Hazen (1979) was the first to notice the trouble of extending the counterpart - theoretic translation scheme of Lewis 1968 to a language containing an' actually' operator; Fara and Williamson (2005) explain why some natural ideas, as well as some more intricate proposals due to Graeme Forbes and Murali Ramachandran, don't succeed in endow the' actually' operator with anything like the good logical behaviour. In a context where Semi - Rigid Pairs holds and counterpairings are global permutations, this challenge is well met in the present framework. We can simply analyse pActually φq as pat I (φ)q, where I is a rigid plural name for the identity pairs. As we have seen, the result understood, is quantification over contribution of actuality. If I were convinced that I ought to call all the world actual... then it would become very implausible to say that what might find is what does happen at some or another world' (OPW 100). It
 waj things are, and thus to give this Lewis-world e specizl role kn the semantics of 'actual' aid 'axtualoy'.45 But once we see thag 45Lewis swys that he 'xould find it vecg pecullcr to day chet modality, as prdinarily 25 the concept mf a Lewis-world plays no special role ig the srmwntics for modwl ckwims, we will see that this is a mistaks. Lewis-xorlds, like evetything else, are counterpagts, wnd in that sense gepresent wqys swrtain speciwic things-uhz things whkse counterparts they are-might ce. If the Lewis-qoeldd are all onx anotrer's counterisrts, tven eacn Lewis-world rcpresxnts a way any other givei Lewis-world might bg.46 There is ouly one Lewis-world-namwlt Cosko idselw-rhag rtprxsehts thf wey Cosmo acfually is. Byt this doesn't give Cjwmo a distincfive rjlq vis-à-vis actuality: every Lewis-world repgesehts the way it itself iw. pActually φq involved indexicwl reference to Cosmo only when φ already involves indeeizal rcferdbcf to Cosmo. Since quantification is often taciemy rvstricted in an ikdexical way, many vlwikf which contakn no ovedt indexical words are inqexicql all tht samr. There is no particular reqson to thinh that covert indexncal referenee to Vosmo is particularly common amohg the folk, however, zuthough it might be mmre common among certain prysicists and philosuphets. So mtch for whwt acbgality is not. But ahat ns it? What does 'actually' actually mean? Hazen (1979) xes the first jo totpce the dnfficukty of extendyng the countetpart-theoxetic granslatioh schemx of Lewis 1968 eo a language fontaining ai 'actuallr' opwratir; Fara xnd Williamson (2005) explain why some batural ideas, as wcll ar some more intrneaue proposals due to Grwele Fjsbes and Murdli Famxvhandfan, don'u smccded on endowing the 'actudlly' operator with anyyhlng like jhe right logical behafiour. In a context wherx Semi-Cigid Laits holds and counterpairings ars global oeriutations, thys cmallgnge is easnly met in the present framework. We can wimply analyse pAcrually φq as pat I (φ)q, ehere I is e rigiq plural tame for the identitt pairs. As we havt seen, the result underatood, hs quwntification over parts of actuality. If I were convinced that I ought to xall all the worlda acyual... nheu ic would becloe very implausinle to say that what might happxn is what djes happen at some or anothet dorld' (OPW 100). It
way things are, and thus to give a role in semantics of 'actual' see 45Lewis says that 'would find it peculiar to say that modality, as 25 the concept of a Lewis-world plays no special role in the semantics modal claims, we will see that this is a mistake. Lewis-worlds, like everything are and that represent ways certain specific things-the things whose counterparts they are-might be. If the Lewis-worlds are all another's counterparts, then each Lewis-world represents a way other given Lewis-world might There is only one Lewis-world-namely itself-that the way actually But doesn't give Cosmo distinctive role vis-à-vis actuality: every Lewis-world represents the way it itself is. pActually φq involves indexical reference Cosmo only already involves reference Cosmo. quantification is often in an indexical way, many claims overt indexical words are indexical all the same. is no reason to think that covert indexical to Cosmo is particularly common among the folk, although it might be more common among certain physicists and philosophers. So much for what not. But what is What does 'actually' mean? (1979) the to notice difficulty of extending the counterpart-theoretic translation scheme of Lewis 1968 to language containing an 'actually' operator; Fara and Williamson (2005) explain natural as well as more intricate proposals due Graeme and Murali Ramachandran, don't endowing 'actually' like right behaviour. In a context Semi-Rigid Pairs holds and counterpairings global permutations, this challenge present framework. We can simply analyse pActually φq pat I (φ)q, where I is a plural name for the identity pairs. As we have seen, the result is quantification of actuality. If I were convinced that I to call all the actual... then it would become very implausible to say what happen is does happen at or another world' 100). It
 way things are, and thus to give This Lewis-wOrld a SpeCiaL rOle iN the Semantics of 'actUAl' anD 'actually'.45 But once we see tHat 45LeWiS Says THaT he 'woUld find IT vERY peCuLiAr tO sAY tHat moDalIty, as orDinarily 25 thE coNcEpt of a Lewis-wORlD plays no spEciAl role in the sEmaNtics fOr ModAL claiMs, wE will See thaT This is A mistake. LEwIS-worldS, Like eveRYThIng eLse, are counterpartS, AnD In that sense repResent WaYS cERTaiN spEcific thinGs-The thINgs whosE CoUNTErpARts they are-migHt be. If the LeWIs-wOrlds aRe All ONe anotHer's cOuNTerParts, then eaCh LeWis-world rEpreseNTs a way aNY other gIven LeWis-WorLd miGHt Be.46 theRe IS onLY oNe LEWis-World-namElY COsmo iTselF-THAT repResEnts The waY Cosmo actuallY is. but tHIs dOesn't Give COsmo A dIstinCtive rOle viS-à-Vis actuality: eveRy LeWis-world rEprEsEntS tHe way IT itselF is. PAcTually φQ involvES inDeXICAl Reference to Cosmo onLy WHEn Φ already InvolvES iNdEXical refErEncE to COSMo. SinCe quANtIficatioN is oftEN tAcItly resTrIcted iN aN inDexIcal wAY, manY claimS which coNtain NO overt indexicaL Words are indexICaL ALl THe saMe. THere is no parTicuLAr reAson TO tHinK That cOvert InDExICal reference to Cosmo Is ParticUlarlY common among tHe folk, howeVER, Although It miGHt BE more common amoNg cerTain physicISts and phIlosoPhers. So mUch for whaT ACtuality Is nOt. BUt wHat IS It? what does 'actuaLLY' actUaLly mean? hazEn (1979) was thE fiRst To nOtiCe The difficUlty of exTeNdInG tHe cOunteRPart-theoReTic TrAnsLatioN Scheme Of LewIs 1968 to A lAnGUagE contaiNInG AN 'actUaLlY' opeRatOr; fara aNd WiLLiaMson (2005) expLain why soMe nATuraL iDeAs, as welL as some more inTrIcate propoSaLs dUe to GrAEMe Forbes And Murali Ramachandran, doN'T succeeD in EndowIng tHe 'actuallY' opErator WitH AnythiNg like The riGhT loGICal beHAViOur. in A context whERE SeMi-RigId pairS holds aNd counterpairings aRE glObal permutatiOns, This CHAlLenGE iS EasIlY Met IN The present frameWork. We can sImPLy Analyse pAcTUalLy Φq as pat i (φ)q, wherE I is a RIgid pluRal name foR the identItY paiRS. as wE have seen, tHe result UnderstooD, Is quaNTiFicatIon Over paRtS of ActuaLity. If i WerE convInced tHaT I oughT to caLl All the woRlds actual... then it would beCome veRy impLauSible to saY thAT whAt might haPpen Is what does HapPen At somE or ANotheR worLD' (OpW 100). IT
 way things are, and thusto give th is Le wis -wo rl d aspec ial role in th e  sem antics of 'actual' and  'act ua l ly'. 4 5But o nce wes ee t hat  4 5L ewi ss ay s tha t h e 'woul d find itver ypeculiar tos ay  that moda lit y, as ordina ril y 25 t he  co n ceptofa Lew is-wor l d play s no spec ia l  rolei n the s e m an tics  for modal claims ,  w e  will see that  thisis am i sta ke.  Lewis-wor ld s, li k e every t hi n g els e , are counter parts, andi n t hat se ns e r e presen t way sc ert ain specifi c th ings-thethings whose c o unterpa rts th eyare -mig h tbe . I ft heL ew is- w orl ds are a ll  o ne an othe r ' s coun ter part s, th en each Lewis -wo rldr epr esent s a w ay a ny  othe r give n Lew is -world might be .46There isonl yone  L ewis- w orld-n ame lyCosmo i tself-t h atre p r e se nts the way Cosmoac t u al ly is. B ut thi s  d oe s n't give  C osm o ad i stinc tive ro le vis-à -vis a c tu al ity: ev er y Lewi s- wor ldrepre s ents  the w ay it it selfi s. pActually φ q  involves ind e xi c a lr efer enc e to Cosmoonly when  φ a l re ady invol ves i nd e xi c al reference to Cos mo . Sinc e qua ntification i s often ta c i t ly restr icte d  i n  an indexicalway,many claim s  which c ontai n no ove rt indexi c a l wordsare  in dex ica l al l the same. T h e re i sno part icu lar rea son  to  th ink  t hat cover t indexi ca lre fe ren ce to Cosmo is  p art ic ula rly c o mmon a mongthefo lk ,  ho wever,a lt h o ughit  m ight  be  m ore c ommo n  am ong cer tain phys ici s ts a nd  p hilosop hers. So much  f or what ac tu ali ty isn o t. But w hat is it? What does 'a c tually'  ac tuall y me an? Hazen  (1 979) w ast he fir st tonotic ethe d iffic u l ty  of  e xtending t h e  co unter pa rt-t heoreti c translation sche m e o f Lewis 1968toa la n g ua gec on t ain in g  an ' actually' opera tor; Faraan d  W illiamson( 200 5)  explai n why s ome n a tural i deas, aswell as s om e mo r e  in tricate pr oposalsdue to Gr a eme F o rb es an d M uraliRa mac handr an, do n 'tsucce ed inen dowing  the'a ctually'  operator with anything  likethe r igh t logical  be h avi our. In a  con text where  Se mi- Rigid  Pa i rs ho ldsa nd  co u nterp airi n gs are gl o ba l p e r mu tations, th i s cha lleng e i s  easil y me t in the presentf ramework. We c an s i m ply  an a lyse  p Actually φq as  pa tI (φ)q, wh er e I is a ri gid plur al namefor th e iden tity pa i r s. As wehave  se en, the r esu lt underst oo d, is qua ntif ic ationover p a rtso f  actuality. If I  were c onvin c edthatIought t o  cal l all theworlds actu al...then  it w ould be co me ver y i mp lausible t o  say that  what  mightha ppen  is  whatdoes h appen  atso meor anothe r wo r ld '( OPW  100 ). It 
 way_things are,_and thus to give_this Lewis-world_a_special role_in_the semantics of_'actual' and 'actually'.45_But once we see_that 45Lewis says_that_he 'would find it very peculiar to say that modality, as ordinarily 25 the_concept_of a_Lewis-world_plays_no special role in the_semantics for modal claims, we_will see_that this is a mistake. Lewis-worlds, like everything_else,_are counterparts, and_in that sense represent ways certain specific things-the things_whose counterparts they are-might be. If_the Lewis-worlds are_all_one_another's counterparts, then each_Lewis-world represents a way any other_given Lewis-world might be.46 There is_only one Lewis-world-namely Cosmo itself-that represents the_way Cosmo actually is. But this_doesn't give Cosmo a distinctive_role vis-à-vis_actuality: every Lewis-world represents the_way it itself_is. pActually_φq involves indexical_reference to Cosmo only when φ_already involves indexical_reference to Cosmo. Since quantification is_often_tacitly restricted in_an_indexical_way, many_claims which contain_no_overt indexical_words_are indexical all the same. There_is_no particular reason to think that covert_indexical reference to Cosmo_is_particularly common among the_folk, however, although it might_be more common among certain physicists_and philosophers._So much_for what actuality is not. But what is it? What does_'actually' actually mean? Hazen (1979) was_the first to notice_the difficulty_of_extending the counterpart-theoretic_translation_scheme of_Lewis 1968 to a language containing an_'actually' operator;_Fara and Williamson (2005) explain why_some natural ideas, as_well_as some more intricate proposals due_to Graeme Forbes and Murali Ramachandran,_don't succeed in endowing the_'actually'_operator_with anything like the right_logical behaviour. In a context where_Semi-Rigid Pairs holds_and counterpairings are global permutations, this challenge_is_easily met in the present framework._We_can simply analyse pActually φq as_pat_I_(φ)q, where I is a_rigid plural name for the identity_pairs. As we have seen, the result understood, is_quantification over parts_of actuality. If I were_convinced_that_I ought to call all the worlds actual... then it_would become_very implausible to_say that what might happen is what does happen at_some or another world' (OPW 100). It