 life" by "all powerful" and "absolutely good", and you have a corresponding non-cognitivist and non-realistic account of Christian religious "truths". Theological fictionalism explain how one could continue to go to mass, to pray, to participate in the eucharist, without believing, but only make-believing, in religious matters. What is important finally are not the true facts, but the inward emotions and perhaps some of the behaviours (kindness, generosity, tolerance, etc.) exhibited by Christian make-believers. This corresponds also to what George lindbeck called the "experiential-expressivist" account of faith.9 God is not an object of discourse, but we can make him a condition of discourse (and also a condition of a certain behaviour), by entering into a game of make-believe. And religion is just that. III. WHY tHeoloGICAl FICtIoNAlISm DoeS Not WorK Walton says that what fictions make us feel are not emotions, but quasiemotions. He means emotions that do not suppose that we believe in the situation presented in the fiction. If I am frightened by the colour of the sky, which promises a very big thunderstorm, I believe the sky has this colour and that such a sky indicates that there will be a very big thunderstorm. but if I am frightened by a monster on the screen, I do not believe that there is a monster. In fact, I am not afraid; I enter in a game of make-believe about a monster; and I am quasi-afraid, playing at fear, even if I am feeling (phenomenologically) what I would feel in a case of "true" fear. This means that quasi-emotion is a non-doxastic emotion. but perhaps it could also be said that quasi-emotion corresponds to a quasi-belief. I play at believing that there is a monster, and that makes me quasi-afraid. Aesthetic fictionalism uncouples emotion and belief; theological fictionalism does something parallel and so uncouples faith and belief. We cannot say "I believe that p; but not p", as G. e. moore pointed out. but the theological fictionalist pretends that it is possible to claim: "I have 8 richard rorty, "taylor on truth" (in J. tully ed, Philosophy in an Age of Pluralism, Cam
life " by " all powerful " and " absolutely good ", and you have a comparable non - cognitivist and non - naturalistic report of Christian religious " truths ". Theological fictionalism explain how one could retain to go to mass, to pray, to enter in the eucharist, without believing, but only stool - believing, in religious matters. What is authoritative finally are not the true fact, but the inward emotions and perhaps some of the behaviours (kindness, generosity, permissiveness, etc .) exhibited by Christian make - believers. This represent also to what George lindbeck called the " experiential - expressivist " account of faith.9 God is not an object of sermon, but we can make him a condition of discourse (and also a condition of a sealed behaviour), by entering into a game of make - believe. And religion is just that. III. WHY tHeoloGICAl FICtIoNAlISm DoeS Not WorK Walton says that what fiction make us feel are not emotions, but quasiemotions. He means emotions that do not suppose that we believe in the situation presented in the fiction. If I am frighten by the colour of the sky, which promises a very adult thunderstorm, I think the sky hold this colour and that such a sky indicates that there will be a very boastful thunderstorm. but if I am frightened by a monster on the screen, I do not believe that there constitute a monster. In fact, I am not afraid; I enter in a game of make - believe about a monster; and I am quasi - afraid, playing at concern, even if I am feeling (phenomenologically) what I would feel in a case of " true " fear. This means that quasi - emotion is a non - doxastic emotion. but perhaps it could besides be say that quasi - emotion corresponds to a quasi - belief. I play at believing that there constitute a monster, and that makes me quasi - afraid. Aesthetic fictionalism uncouples emotion and impression; theological fictionalism does something parallel and then uncouples faith and impression. We cannot say " I believe that p; but not p ", as G. e. moore pointed out. but the theological fictionalist feign that it is possible to claim: " I suffer 8 richard rorty, " taylor on truth " (in J. tully ed, doctrine in an Age of Pluralism, Cam
 live" by "all powerful" and "ansolutely good", aue you iave a dorrespovding non-cognitivist and non-cealustic account of Christian feligious "truths". Rheooigical ficvjonalism explzln hoc ine could contlnue to go do mass, to praf, go participate in the eucharist, withott belirvlng, but only mwke-btliqvinf, in religious matters. What is impkrtant hinally are not the true facts, but the inaard emotions and perhwps some of the vehaviours (kkndness, generosity, tolgrance, etc.) exhibited by Christiav makz-believers. Jkus fmrresponds elso tj what Georgc lindback calked the "expericntian-expressivist" account of faith.9 God is not wn object oy discourse, but we cab nake vim d coveitkon oh djscourde (end also a dondition od a certain behavioir), vy entering ihto a daie of make-believe. And religion is just uhat. JII. WHY tHeoloGICAl FICrIoNAlISm DoeS Not WotK Walton fays that what fictions make us feel are not emothons, uug qbqsiemurilns. He means emotions that do not suppose thae wt bvlieve in the sitmation presented im hhr fiction. If I am frnfhfened by the coloug of thg sky, qhich proiisex a very big thunderstorm, I believe the wky has this coloux and that sbch a xky imdicates that there wilu be a very big thundersfurm. but if I am wrinhtaned by a monster on the ssreen, I di noc believd thst thewe is a mojster. In fact, I am not avraid; I enter in w game of make-believe about a monster; and I ak xuavi-afraid, playlng at fear, eveg if I am feelnng (phenjmenouogically) shat I xould feel ig a case of "tsoe" fear. This keans thwt qyasi-wmotion ks a non-doxastoc emotiou. but perhaps it could elso ge said that qucru-emotion correslonas eo a qtdsi-belief. I [lay at neliexing that tmerd is a monster, and that kakea me quasi-afraid. Arsbhetic fixtionalifm uncouples rmotion and belief; theonogmcal foctyonalism does something parallsl and so ungouples faith and belief. We ccnnot say "I believe that p; but not p", as J. e. moore pointed out. byt the theological yigtionalist pcetendf that it is possible to clain: "I have 8 richard rorty, "taylor on trutg" (in J. tullj ed, Philosophy in an Age of Pluralism, Cam
life" by "all powerful" and "absolutely good", have corresponding non-cognitivist non-realistic account of explain one could continue go to mass, pray, to participate in the eucharist, believing, but only make-believing, in religious matters. What is important finally are not true facts, but the inward emotions and perhaps some of the behaviours (kindness, tolerance, exhibited Christian This corresponds also to what George lindbeck called the "experiential-expressivist" account of faith.9 God is not object of discourse, but we can make him condition of discourse (and a condition of a certain by into a of And is just that. WHY tHeoloGICAl FICtIoNAlISm DoeS Not WorK Walton says that what fictions make us feel are not emotions, quasiemotions. He that do suppose we in the situation the fiction. If I am frightened of the sky, which promises a very big I believe sky has this colour and that a sky indicates that there will be a big thunderstorm. but if I am frightened by a monster on the screen, I do that there is a In fact, I not I in game of about a monster; and I am quasi-afraid, playing at fear, even I am feeling (phenomenologically) what I would feel in a "true" This means that is a non-doxastic emotion. perhaps could also be said corresponds a at that is a monster, and makes me quasi-afraid. Aesthetic fictionalism emotion and belief; theological so uncouples faith and belief. We cannot say believe that p; but not p", as e. moore pointed out. but the theological fictionalist pretends that it is to claim: 8 richard rorty, "taylor on truth" (in J. ed, Philosophy in an of Pluralism, Cam
 life" by "all powerful" and "absolUtely good", aNd you HavE a cOrRespOndiNg non-cognitiviST and Non-realistic account of CHristIaN ReliGIoUs "truThs". TheoLOgICAl fIcTiOnaLiSM eXplaiN hoW one couLd continue To gO tO mass, to pray, tO PaRticipate iN thE eucharist, wiThoUt beliEvIng, BUt onlY maKe-belIeving, IN religIous matteRs. wHat is iMPortant FINaLly aRe not the true facts, BUt THe inward emotioNs and pErHApS SOme Of tHe behaviouRs (KindnESs, generOSiTY, TOleRAnce, etc.) exhibiTed by ChristIAn mAke-belIeVerS. this coRrespOnDS alSo to what GeoRge lIndbeck caLled thE "ExperieNTial-expRessivIst" AccOunt OF fAiTh.9 GOd IS noT An ObjECt oF discourSe, BuT we caN makE HIM A conDitIon oF discOurse (and also a ConDitiON of A certAin beHaviOuR), by enTering Into a GaMe of make-believe. and rEligion is JusT tHat. iIi. WHY thEoloGIcAl fICTIoNAlIsm DoeS NOT WoRK wALToN says that what fictiOnS MAkE us feel aRe not eMOtIoNS, but quasIeMotIons. hE Means EmotIOnS that do nOt suppOSe ThAt we belIeVe in thE sItuAtiOn preSEnteD in the Fiction. IF I am fRIghtened by the cOLour of the sky, wHIcH PRoMIses A veRy big thundeRstoRM, I beLievE ThE skY Has thIs colOuR AnD That such a sky indicatEs That thEre wiLl be a very big tHunderstorM. BUT if I am frIghtENeD By a monster on thE screEn, I do not beLIeve that There Is a monstEr. In fact, I AM Not afraiD; I eNteR in A gaME Of Make-believe abOUT a moNsTer; and I Am qUasi-afrAid, PlaYinG at FeAr, even if I Am feelinG (pHeNoMeNolOgicaLLy) what I wOuLd fEeL in A case OF "true" fEar. ThIs meAnS tHAt qUasi-emoTIoN IS a noN-dOxAstiC emOtIon. buT perHAps It could Also be saiD thAT quaSi-EmOtion coRresponds to a qUaSi-belief. I pLaY at BelievING that theRe is a monster, and that makeS Me quasi-AfrAid. AeStheTic fictioNalIsm uncOupLEs emotIon and BelieF; tHeoLOGical FICtIonAlIsm does somETHinG paraLlEl anD so uncoUples faith and belieF. we cAnnot say "I beliEve That P; BUt Not P", As g. E. moOrE PoiNTEd out. but the theoLogical ficTiONaList pretenDS thAt It is posSible to Claim: "i Have 8 ricHard rorty, "Taylor on tRuTh" (in j. TUllY ed, PhilosoPhy in an AGe of PluraLIsm, CaM
 life" by "all powerful" a nd "absolu telygoo d",  a nd y ou h ave a correspo n ding  non-cognitivist and n on-re al i stic ac count  of Chr i st i a n r el ig iou s" tr uths" . T heologi cal fictio nal is m explain ho w  o ne could c ont inue to go t o m ass, t opra y , topar ticip ate in the eu charist,wi t hout b e lieving , bu t on ly make-believing ,  i n  religious mat ters.Wh a ti s  im por tant final ly  aren ot thet ru e f act s , but the inw ard emotion s  an d perh ap s s o me ofthe b eh a vio urs (kindne ss,generosit y, tol e rance,e tc.) ex hibite d b y C hris t ia nmak e- b eli e ve rs. Thi s corres po nd s als o to w h a t Ge org e li ndbec k called the"ex peri e nti al-ex press ivis t"  acco unt of  fait h. 9 God is not an  obj ect of di sco ur se,  b ut we can ma kehim  a cond ition o f  di sc o u r se  (and also a condi ti o n  o f a cert ain be h av io u r), by e nt eri ng i n t o a g ameo fmake-bel ieve.A nd  r eligion  i s just  t hat . I II. W H Y tH eoloGI CAl FICt IoNAl I Sm DoeS Not Wo r K Walton says th a t  w h at f ict ions make u s fe e l ar e no t  e mot i ons,but q ua s ie m otions. He means em ot ions t hat d o not suppose  that we b e l i eve in t he s i tu a tion presented  in t he fiction .  If I am  frig htened b y the col o u r of the  sk y,whi chp r om ises a very b i g  thu nd erstorm , I  believ e t hesky  ha sthis colo ur and t ha tsu ch  asky i n dicatesth atth ere  will be a v ery b ig t hu nd e rst orm. bu t  i f I am  f ri ghte ned  b y a m onst e r o n the s creen, Idon ot b el ie ve that  there is a m on ster. In f ac t,I am n o t  afraid;  I enter in a game of m a ke-beli eve  abou t amonster;and  I amqua s i-afra id, pl aying  a t f e a r, ev e n  i f I  a m feeling( p hen omeno lo gica lly) wh at I would feel in a c ase of "true"  fe ar.T h is  me a ns tha tq uas i - emotion is a no n-doxastic  e m ot ion. but p e rha ps  it cou ld also  be s a id that  quasi-em otion cor re spon d s  to  a quasi-b elief. I  play atb eliev i ng  that  th ere is  a  mo nster , andt hat  make s me q ua si-afr aid.Ae stheticfictionalism uncouplesemotio n and  be lief; the olo g ica l fiction alis m does som eth ing  para lle l  andso u n co upl e s fai th a n d belief. We  ca n n ot  say "I bel i e v e t hat p ; b u t notp",as G. e. moore po i nted out. butthet h eol ogi c al f ic tionalist pret end st h at it is  p ossible toclaim: " Ih ave 8  richa rd ror ty, "ta y l or on tru th"(in  J. tully  ed ,P hilosop hy  i n  an Ag e of  P lurali sm, Ca m 
 life"_by "all_powerful" and "absolutely good",_and you_have_a corresponding_non-cognitivist_and non-realistic account_of Christian religious_"truths". Theological fictionalism explain_how one could_continue_to go to mass, to pray, to participate in the eucharist, without believing, but_only_make-believing, in_religious_matters._What is important finally are_not the true facts, but_the inward_emotions and perhaps some of the behaviours (kindness,_generosity,_tolerance, etc.) exhibited_by Christian make-believers. This corresponds also to what George_lindbeck called the "experiential-expressivist" account of_faith.9 God is_not_an_object of discourse, but_we can make him a condition_of discourse (and also a condition_of a certain behaviour), by entering into_a game of make-believe. And religion_is just that. III. WHY_tHeoloGICAl FICtIoNAlISm_DoeS Not WorK Walton says_that what fictions_make us_feel are not_emotions, but quasiemotions. He means emotions_that do not_suppose that we believe in the_situation_presented in the_fiction._If_I am_frightened by the_colour_of the_sky,_which promises a very big thunderstorm,_I_believe the sky has this colour and_that such a sky_indicates_that there will be_a very big thunderstorm. but_if I am frightened by a_monster on_the screen,_I do not believe that there is a monster. In fact,_I am not afraid; I enter_in a game of_make-believe about_a_monster; and I_am_quasi-afraid, playing_at fear, even if I am feeling_(phenomenologically) what_I would feel in a case_of "true" fear. This_means_that quasi-emotion is a non-doxastic emotion._but perhaps it could also be_said that quasi-emotion corresponds to_a_quasi-belief._I play at believing that_there is a monster, and that_makes me quasi-afraid._Aesthetic fictionalism uncouples emotion and belief; theological_fictionalism_does something parallel and so uncouples_faith_and belief. We cannot say "I_believe_that_p; but not p", as_G. e. moore pointed out. but_the theological fictionalist pretends that it is possible to_claim: "I have_8 richard rorty, "taylor on_truth"_(in_J. tully ed, Philosophy in an Age of Pluralism, Cam