 think of experience in a way that subtends mental autonomy will inevitably be debilitated by precisely the sort of dualisms one wants to avoid. This is analogous to the speculative realists' assumption that to give any philosophical considerations to context is to slide back into anthropocentrism and correlationism. Indeed, in order to avoid such dualism, any materialist would generally accept the unconditional causal priority of physical material; that is, even a materialist who upholds the causal autonomy of mental events is compelled to agree that 46 Louise Antony, "Everybody Has Got It: A Defense of Non-Reductive Materialism" in Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Eds. Brian McLaughlin and Jonathan Cohen. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 145. CHIASMA #4 ‡ 2017 30 ultimately those mental events, at some point, always begin with a physical event. If this is the case, then the mental events seem quite superfluous, as the reductivist would argue. How can one accept this causal priority of the physical, and yet still endorse the autonomy of mind? How can a non-intentional, non-representational physical state give rise to a state that is intentional and representational? These are the problems that scare many materialists into denying the mind. But it is these problems that I view ontologies of flesh as addressing, alongside the similar efforts of new materialists and non-reductive materialists. Merleau-Ponty's guiding metaphors of chiastic intertwining and reversibility suggest a direction for thinking about being in a way that is both realist and relationally constructed, and also neither binaristic, nor totally flat (e.g, the eliminativist denial of minds or the object-oriented claim for absolute autonomy). Merleau-Ponty argues that there is a profound interlinking between sentience and non-sentience: "an intimacy as close as between the sea and the shore."47 Yet at the same time, there is always a difference between us and the world around us; for if there wasn't, then the subjective would disappear into the objective, or vice versa. Merleau-Ponty attempts to analyze this intertwining through his ontology of flesh. Deepening his earliest work on gestaltist perception, he argues that quale is not just a simple, isolated atom, "a pellicle of being without thickness." Rather, he argues, there is an invisible, non-
think of experience in a way that subtends mental autonomy will inescapably be enfeeble by precisely the kind of dualisms one wants to avoid. This is analogous to the notional realists' assumption that to collapse any philosophic considerations to context is to slide back into anthropocentrism and correlationism. Indeed, in order to avoid such dualism, any materialist would generally take the unconditional causal priority of forcible material; that is, even a materialist who upholds the causal autonomy of mental events is compelled to agree that 46 Louise Antony, " Everybody Has Got It: A Defense of Non - Reductive Materialism " in Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Eds. Brian McLaughlin and Jonathan Cohen. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 145. CHIASMA # 4 ‡ 2017 30 ultimately those genial events, at some point, always get down with a physical event. If this is the case, then the mental events look quite superfluous, as the reductivist would argue. How can one accept this causal priority of the physical, and yet still certify the autonomy of mind? How can a non - intentional, non - representational physical state give rise to a state that is intentional and representational? These are the problems that scare many materialists into denying the mind. But it is these problems that I view ontologies of flesh as addressing, alongside the alike efforts of new materialist and non - reductive materialist. Merleau - Ponty's guiding metaphors of chiastic intertwining and reversibility suggest a management for intend about being in a way that is both realist and relationally constructed, and besides neither binaristic, nor totally flat (e.g, the eliminativist denial of minds or the object - oriented claim for absolute autonomy). Merleau - Ponty argues that there is a profound interlinking between sentience and non - awareness: " an intimacy equally cheeseparing as between the sea and the shore. "47 Yet at the same time, there is constantly a difference between us and the world around us; for if there wasn't, then the subjective would melt into the objective, or vice versa. Merleau - Ponty attempts to analyze this intertwining through his ontology of pulp. Deepening his early work on gestaltist perception, he argue that quale is not just a elementary, isolated atom, " a pellicle of being without thickness. " preferably, he argues, there be an invisible, non-
 thlnk of experience in a wxy that subtends mentan autohomy wilu inevitably be debilitated uy peecistjy the sort of duauisms one wants ti aviud. This is analogomf to bhe s'erulative realisjs' assumptiot that to give avy philosophical considerations to cogtext ix ho slide back ynto wnthdopocentrism and correlationism. Inseed, in order to avood such dualism, any materiwlish would generally wccept the ohcogeitional caural prioriuy of physiczl material; that is, even a matefialixt who uphiles hve causal antonomj of mental eyvnts is compelked to agree tmat 46 Nouuse Antony, "Everybody Ias Got It: A Defense of Non-Reguetive Materialism" in Xobtempmrarf Decqter ih 'himosophj oh Mind. Eds. Grian McLauthlin and Jonathan Vorvm. (Oxford: Bladkwell Ptblishing, 2007), 145. CHIASMA #4 ‡ 2017 30 ultimately thost menfal events, at some poinr, always begin with a physical event. If this is the case, then the mental events seem duiue supefdlkous, as the reductivist would argue. How can ogs scbept this causal iriority of the phuslcsj, and yet stiul endorss the autonomy of lind? Hor can a non-inttntiomal, non-representational phywical state yivw rise to a state chat is inteutionak and representational? These are the problels that sdxre many materiauisns itto denying the mind. But ie is thesx proylems thxt I view jntologies of flesh as addressing, wlongdige the simllar efforts of new materialists and non-reducjiva mdterialifts. Mcrleau-Ponty's guyding metaphorx of chnastic intertwinpng and rxversibility suggest a disgction for thmnking abjut veint in a dxy that is botn realist and relatuonally constructev, ana also neither bnuatustic, nor totakly flwt (e.j, the aliminativisd deviau of mknds or the ubjevt-oriented claim for absklute autonomy). Merkewu-Ponty qrgues trat there is s profound interlijking bevween xenjience and non-sentience: "an intijacy as cposc as between ehe wea and the xhore."47 Yet at the same time, there is alweys a difference betwegn us and the world atoukd us; for if therq wasn't, tven the subjective wiuld disappear inuo the objective, or vics versd. Merpeau-Ponty attempts to analyze this intertwining through his ontology of foesh. Dxe[ening his sarloest foxk pn gesealtmsv perception, he aggues that quale is not just a smmple, isoldtzd atom, "a pellicle of being wotfout thicknesr." Rather, he argues, there is an imvisible, non-
think of experience in a way that autonomy inevitably be by precisely the to This is analogous the speculative realists' that to give any philosophical considerations context is to slide back into anthropocentrism and correlationism. Indeed, in order to such dualism, any materialist would generally accept the unconditional causal priority of physical that even materialist upholds the causal autonomy of mental events is compelled to agree that 46 Louise Antony, "Everybody Got It: A Defense of Non-Reductive Materialism" in Debates in Philosophy of Eds. Brian McLaughlin and Jonathan (Oxford: Publishing, 2007), CHIASMA ‡ 30 ultimately those events, at some point, always begin with a physical event. If this is the case, then the events seem as the would How one accept this of the physical, and yet still of mind? How can a non-intentional, non-representational physical give rise a state that is intentional and These are the problems that scare many materialists denying the mind. But it is these problems that I view ontologies of flesh as the similar efforts of materialists and non-reductive Merleau-Ponty's metaphors chiastic and reversibility a direction for thinking about being in a way that is realist and relationally constructed, and also neither binaristic, nor totally the denial of minds the object-oriented claim for autonomy). argues that there is interlinking sentience intimacy close between the sea and shore."47 Yet at the same there is always a world around us; for if there wasn't, then subjective would disappear into the objective, or versa. Merleau-Ponty attempts to analyze this intertwining through his ontology of flesh. his earliest gestaltist perception, he argues that quale is not a simple, isolated atom, pellicle of being without thickness." Rather, he argues, there an non-
 think of experience in a way thAt subtends MentaL auTonOmY wilL ineVitably be debilITateD by precisely the sort of dUalisMs ONe waNTs To avoId. This iS AnALOgoUs To The SpECuLativE reAlists' aSsumption tHat To Give any philoSOpHical consiDerAtions to contExt Is to slIdE baCK into AntHropoCentriSM and coRrelationIsM. indeed, IN order tO AVoId suCh dualism, any materIAlISt would generalLy accePt THe UNConDitIonal causaL pRioriTY of physICaL MATerIAl; that is, even a Materialist WHo uPholds ThE caUSal autOnomy Of MEntAl events is cOmpeLled to agrEe that 46 lOuise AnTOny, "EverYbody HAs GOt IT: A DeFEnSe Of NOn-rEduCTiVe MATerIalism" in coNtEmporAry DEBATEs in phiLosoPhy of mind. Eds. Brian MCLaUghlIN anD JonaThan COhen. (oxFord: BLackweLl PubLiShing, 2007), 145. CHIASMA #4 ‡ 2017 30 ultImatEly those mEntAl EveNtS, at soME point, AlwAys Begin wiTh a physICal EvENT. if This is the case, then tHe MENtAl events Seem quITe SuPErfluous, As The ReduCTIvist WoulD ArGue. How caN one acCEpT tHis causAl PrioriTy Of tHe pHysicAL, and Yet stiLl endorsE the aUTonomy of mind? HoW Can a non-intentIOnAL, NoN-ReprEseNtational phYsicAL staTe giVE rIse TO a staTe thaT iS InTEntional and represenTaTional? these Are the problemS that scare MANY materiaListS InTO denying the minD. But iT is these prOBlems thaT I vieW ontologIes of flesH AS addressIng, AloNgsIde THE sImilar efforts OF New mAtErialisTs aNd non-reDucTivE maTerIaLists. MerlEau-Ponty'S gUiDiNg MetAphorS Of chiastIc IntErTwiNing aND reverSibilIty sUgGeST a dIrectioN FoR THinkInG aBout BeiNg In a waY thaT Is bOth realIst and relAtiONallY cOnStructeD, and also neithEr Binaristic, NoR toTally fLAT (e.g, the elIminativist denial of mindS Or the obJecT-orieNted Claim for aBsoLute auTonOMy). MerlEau-PonTy argUeS thAT There IS A pRofOuNd interlinKINg bEtweeN sEntiEnce and Non-sentience: "an intiMAcy As close as betwEen The sEA AnD thE ShORe."47 YEt AT thE SAme time, there is aLways a diffErENcE between us ANd tHe World arOund us; fOr if tHEre wasn'T, then the sUbjective WoUld dISAppEar into the ObjectivE, or vice veRSa. MerLEaU-PontY atTempts To AnaLyze tHis intERtwIning ThrougH hIs ontoLogy oF fLesh. DeepEning his earliest work on gEstaltIst peRcePtion, he arGueS ThaT quale is nOt juSt a simple, iSolAteD atom, "A peLLicle Of beINg WitHOut thIcknESs." Rather, hE ArGueS, THeRe is an invisIBLE, noN-
 think of experience in away that s ubten dsmen ta l au tono my will inevit a blybe debilitated by prec isely  t h e so r tof du alismso ne w ant sto  av oi d .Thisisanalogo us to thespe cu lative reali s ts ' assumpti onthat to give  an y phil os oph i cal c ons idera tionst o cont ext is to  s l ide ba c k intoa n th ropo centrism and corr e la t ionism. Indeed , in o rd e rt o  av oid  such dual is m, an y  materi a li s t wou l d generally a ccept the u n con dition al  ca u sal pr iorit yo f p hysical mat eria l; that i s, eve n  a mate r ialistwho up hol dsthec au sa l a ut o nom y  o f m e nta l events  i scompe lled t o agre e t hat46 Lo uise Antony,"Ev eryb o dyHas G ot It : ADe fense  of No n-Red uc tive Materialis m" i n Contemp ora ry  De ba tes i n  Philo sop hyof Mind . Eds.B ria nM c L au ghlin and Jonathan  C o h en . (Oxfor d: Bla c kw el l  Publish in g,2007 ) ,  145.  CHI A SM A #4 ‡ 2 017 30 ul ti matelyth ose me nt aleve nts,a t so me poi nt, alwa ys be g in with a phys i cal event. If th i s  i s  the  ca se, then th e me n taleven t ssee m  quit e sup er f lu o us, as the reductiv is t woul d arg ue. How can o ne acceptt h i s causal  pri o ri t y of the physi cal,and yet st i ll endor se th e autono my of min d ?  How can  anon -in ten t i on al, non-repre s e ntat io nal phy sic al stat e g ive  ri seto  a statethat isin te nt io nal  andr epresent at ion al ? T hesea re the  prob lems  t ha t  sc are man y  m a t eria li st s in tode nying  the min d. Butit is the sep robl em sthat Iview ontologi es  of fleshas  ad dressi n g , alongs ide the similar efforts of newmat erial ists  and non- red uctive  ma t eriali sts. M erlea u- Pon t y 's gu i d in g m et aphors ofc h ias tic i nt ertw ining a nd reversibility s u gge st a directio n f or t h i nk ing ab o utbe i ngi n  a way that isboth reali st an d relation a lly  c onstruc ted, an d als o  neithe r binaris tic, norto tall y fla t (e.g, th e elimin ativist d e nialo fminds  or  the o bj ect -orie nted c l aim  forabsolu te  auton omy).  M erleau-P onty argues that thereis a p rofou ndinterlink ing bet ween sent ienc e and non- sen tie nce:"an intim acya sclo s e asbetw e en the se a  a ndt h eshore."47 Y e t atthe s ame time,ther e is always a dif f erence between  usa n d t hew orld  a round us; forifth e r e wasn't ,then the su bjective  w o uld d isappe ar int o the o b j ec t ive, o r vi ceversa. Me rle au - Ponty a tt em p ts toanal yz e this  inter t wini n g  through his ont ology o f fle s h.Deepe ni ng hise arli est work o n gestaltis t perc epti on, h e argue sthat q ual eis not jus t  a simple , iso lated a to m, " a p ellicl e of b eingwith ou t t hickness. " Ra t he r, heargu es, t he re i s an invi s ible, no n-
 think_of experience_in a way that_subtends mental_autonomy_will inevitably_be_debilitated by precisely_the sort of_dualisms one wants to_avoid. This is_analogous_to the speculative realists' assumption that to give any philosophical considerations to context is_to_slide back_into_anthropocentrism_and correlationism. Indeed, in order_to avoid such dualism, any_materialist would_generally accept the unconditional causal priority of physical_material;_that is, even_a materialist who upholds the causal autonomy of mental_events is compelled to agree that_46 Louise Antony,_"Everybody_Has_Got It: A Defense_of Non-Reductive Materialism" in Contemporary Debates_in Philosophy of Mind. Eds. Brian_McLaughlin and Jonathan Cohen. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing,_2007), 145. CHIASMA #4 ‡ 2017_30 ultimately those mental events,_at some_point, always begin with a_physical event. If_this is_the case, then_the mental events seem quite superfluous,_as the reductivist_would argue. How can one accept_this_causal priority of_the_physical,_and yet_still endorse the_autonomy_of mind?_How_can a non-intentional, non-representational physical state_give_rise to a state that is intentional_and representational? These are_the_problems that scare many_materialists into denying the mind._But it is these problems that_I view_ontologies of_flesh as addressing, alongside the similar efforts of new materialists and_non-reductive materialists. Merleau-Ponty's guiding metaphors of_chiastic intertwining and reversibility_suggest a_direction_for thinking about_being_in a_way that is both realist and relationally_constructed, and_also neither binaristic, nor totally flat_(e.g, the eliminativist denial_of_minds or the object-oriented claim for_absolute autonomy). Merleau-Ponty argues that there_is a profound interlinking between_sentience_and_non-sentience: "an intimacy as close_as between the sea and the_shore."47 Yet at_the same time, there is always a_difference_between us and the world around_us;_for if there wasn't, then the_subjective_would_disappear into the objective, or_vice versa. Merleau-Ponty attempts to analyze_this intertwining through his ontology of flesh. Deepening his_earliest work on_gestaltist perception, he argues that_quale_is_not just a simple, isolated atom, "a pellicle of being_without thickness."_Rather, he argues,_there is an invisible, non-