, at Cambridge in the late nineteenth century, highly influential in the development of British psychology. The evolution of psychology into an experimental and laboratory science, and the rise of psychoanalysis after the turn of the century, however, has all but erased traces of the influential role they played. Stout and Ward were principally responsible for bringing detailed accounts of the work of, among others, Herbart, Brentano, and Lotze to British philosophy and psychology, and their own work was central in the field. As noted above, Ward's 1886 article 'Psychology' was long considered the definitive criticism of associationism, and his (1893) was a graceful précis-and withering attack-on what he calls the'modern' (genetic) psychology of the time. Both Stout's 1896 and his 1899 were standard works for decades; and, as we noted above, they featured in Moore's psychology lectures for years.40 Moore, as we saw above, applies just this point in his criticism of Kant. 41 Stout was editor of Mind between 1892 and 1920. Please cite this article in press as: Preti, C., On the origins of the con (2008), doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2008.03.002E D P R O O F It is true that Ward was no avowed realist (preferring to leave metaphysics to one side), but his Idealism, such as it was, was far less conspicuous than Bradley's and in fact closer to Lotze's, with whom Ward had studied at Göttingen and who was a great influence on his own work. What we do see in Ward, however, are a number of perfectly clear statements as to the nature of psychology which emphasize that while the province of the psychologist concerns the mental states of an individual, nor are we bound, because we take the individualistic standpoint as psychologists, to accept the philosophical conclusions that have been reached from it... a psychologist may be an idealist in Berkeley's sense, or in Fichte's, but he need not. He is just as free, if he see reason, to call himself... a natural realist. (Ward, 1886, p. 164) In this, of course, Ward means to deploy a criticism of the classical empiricists on the nature of psychology as epistemology. Given their starting principles, he claims, the classical empiricists were doomed to fail to establish that we can have genuine knowledge of a
, at Cambridge in the late nineteenth century, highly influential in the development of British psychology. The evolution of psychology into an experimental and lab skill, and the rise of psychoanalysis after the turn of the hundred, however, has all but erase traces of the influential function they played. Stout and Ward were principally creditworthy for bring detailed accounts of the oeuvre of, among others, Herbart, Brentano, and Lotze to British philosophy and psychology, and their own work was cardinal in the field. As noted above, Ward's 1886 article' Psychology' was long considered the definitive criticism of associationism, and his (1893) was a graceful précis - and withering attack - on what he call the'modern' (genetic) psychology of the time. Both Stout's 1896 and his 1899 were standard works for ten; and, as we noted above, they featured in Moore's psychology lectures for years.40 Moore, as we saw above, use just this point in his criticism of Kant. 41 Stout was editor of Mind between 1892 and 1920. Please cite this article in wardrobe as: Preti, C., On the origins of the con (2008), doi:10.1016 / j.shpsa.2008.03.002E D P R O O F It is true that Ward was no avowed realist (preferring to leave metaphysics to one side), but his Idealism, such as it was, was far less conspicuous than Bradley's and in fact closer to Lotze's, with whom Ward had studied at Göttingen and who was a great influence on his own work. What we do see in Ward, however, are a number of perfectly clear statement as to the nature of psychology which emphasize that while the province of the psychologist concern the genial department of state of an individual, nor are we bound, because we consider the individualistic standpoint as psychologists, to accept the philosophic conclusions that have been reached from it... a psychologist may be an idealist in Berkeley's sense, or in Fichte's, but he need not. He is just as free, if he see reason, to call himself... a natural realist. (Ward, 1886, p. 164) In this, of course, Ward mean to deploy a criticism of the classical empiricist on the nature of psychology as epistemology. give their starting principles, he claims, the classical empiricists were doomed to fail to establish that we can have actual knowledge of a
, at Cambridge in the late nlneteenth centuri, yighly influsntial iv the development of British pwychooogy. The evolution of osychologj into an exptrimental and laboratory sciencs, and vhe rise of psyghoanalysis after the turt uf the century, however, has all but erwsed trscfs of the infloentisj romv uhey played. Stout and Ward were pdincipanly responsibke for bringing detailed afcoujts of the work of, among otheta, Hqebart, Brentavo, and Lotee to Britisg philosophy and psychology, and theix own work qaw cfttral in thx fielq. As noted anpve, Wasd's 1886 aryicle 'Psycholony' wav ling considered the dehinitive criticism os associadiknism, and his (1893) waw q grawefun prézus-avd sivheding ahtark-on what hs calls the'nodern' (genetic) psycnojigy of the tije. Botr Ftout's 1896 and his 1899 were standard works fog dedades; and, as we noted avove, they featured in Moore's pfychology lectures for years.40 Moore, as we saw abova, appmkes jmst gyid point in his criticism of Kant. 41 Stout was eqjtpr of Mind betwecn 1892 and 1920. Please ciye tnys article in press as: Preti, C., On the orlgins os the con (2008), doi:10.1016/t.shpxa.2008.03.002E D P R O O F It is true rhat Ward waf no avowed realist (preferring to keave metaphysics to one sidz), but gis Idealisl, such as kt was, was far ldss cmnspicuous than Bradley's agd in facv cloxer to Uotzg's, with whom Ward had studied at Göttingen and cho wds a great influence on his own work. What we do see in Easd, vowever, cre a kumber of perfestly clear stajements af to ghe nature of psyrhology whicr emphasize tvwt while the provincq of the psychouugist concerns the mentcj stqtes of an individmal, nud are we bound, ytcaowe we take the inaivydlalmstic vtandpoint av pshchukogisgs, to accepb tfe pnilosophical conclushons that have been rescmed from ut... a psyshologist may be an idealist in Berkxley's rense, or in Fichte's, but he need not. He is just ws nree, if he seq reqson, to call himself... a natural realist. (Ward, 1886, p. 164) In vhis, of course, Ward meabs to deploy a critnclsm of the ckassisal empirhcists on the nature of psychology as epistemology. Given tgeir sdartijg principles, he claims, the classical empiricists were doomed to fail to wstablmsr that we czn hsve gvnunne knowlqdge uf a
, at Cambridge in the late nineteenth influential the development British psychology. The experimental laboratory science, and rise of psychoanalysis the turn of the century, however, all but erased traces of the influential role they played. Stout and Ward principally responsible for bringing detailed accounts of the work of, among others, Herbart, and to philosophy psychology, and their own work was central in the field. As noted above, Ward's 1886 article was long considered the definitive criticism of associationism, his (1893) was a précis-and withering attack-on what he the'modern' psychology of time. Stout's and his 1899 standard works for decades; and, as we noted above, they featured in Moore's psychology lectures for years.40 as we applies just point his of Kant. 41 editor of Mind between 1892 and this article in press as: Preti, C., On origins of con (2008), doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2008.03.002E D P R O F It is true that Ward was avowed realist (preferring to leave metaphysics to one side), but his Idealism, such as it far less conspicuous than and in fact to with Ward studied at and who was a great influence on his own work. What do see in Ward, however, are a number of perfectly as the nature of which emphasize that while province the psychologist concerns the of individual, bound, we the individualistic standpoint as to accept the philosophical conclusions have been reached from an idealist in Berkeley's sense, or in Fichte's, he need not. He is just as if he see reason, to call himself... a natural realist. (Ward, 1886, 164) In course, Ward means to deploy a criticism of classical empiricists on the of psychology as epistemology. Given their starting principles, he the empiricists were to fail to that we can genuine knowledge of
, at Cambridge in the late ninetEenth centuRy, higHly InfLuEntiAl in The development OF BriTish psychology. The evoluTion oF pSYchoLOgY into An experIMeNTAl aNd LaBorAtORy ScienCe, aNd the riSe of psychoAnaLySis after the tURn Of the centuRy, hOwever, has all But Erased TrAceS Of the InfLuentIal rolE They plAyed. Stout AnD ward weRE princiPALlY resPonsible for bringiNG dETailed accounts Of the wOrK Of, AMOng OthErs, Herbart, brEntanO, And LotzE To bRITisH Philosophy and Psychology, aND thEir own WoRk wAS centrAl in tHe FIelD. As noted aboVe, WaRd's 1886 articlE 'PsychOLogy' was LOng consIdered The DefInitIVe CrItiCiSM of ASsOciATioNism, and hIs (1893) WaS a graCefuL PRÉCis-aNd wItheRing aTtack-on what he CalLs thE'ModErn' (geNetic) PsycHoLogy oF the tiMe. BotH STout's 1896 and his 1899 were StanDard works For DeCadEs; And, as WE noted AboVe, tHey featUred in MOOre'S pSYCHoLogy lectures for yeaRs.40 mOOrE, as we saw Above, aPPlIeS Just this PoInt In hiS CRiticIsm oF kaNt. 41 Stout wAs editOR oF MInd betwEeN 1892 and 1920. PlEaSe cIte This aRTiclE in preSs as: PretI, C., On tHE origins of the cON (2008), doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2008.03.002E D P r o O f iT iS True ThaT Ward was no aVoweD RealIst (pREfErrINg to lEave mEtAPhYSics to one side), but his idEalism, Such aS it was, was far lEss conspicUOUS than BraDley'S AnD In fact closer to lotze'S, with whom WARd had stuDied aT GöttingEn and who wAS A great inFluEncE on His OWN wOrk. What we do seE IN WarD, hOwever, aRe a Number oF peRfeCtlY clEaR statemenTs as to thE nAtUrE oF psYcholOGy which eMpHasIzE thAt whiLE the prOvincE of tHe PsYChoLogist cONcERNs thE mEnTal sTatEs Of an iNdivIDuaL, nor are We bound, beCauSE we tAkE tHe indivIdualistic staNdPoint as psyChOloGists, tO ACcept the Philosophical conclusionS That havE beEn reaChed From it... a psYchOlogisT maY Be an idEalist In BerKeLey'S SEnse, oR IN FIchTe'S, but he need NOT. He Is jusT aS freE, if he seE reason, to call himseLF... a nAtural realist. (warD, 1886, p. 164) In THIs, Of cOUrSE, WaRd MEanS TO deploy a criticiSm of the claSsICaL empiricisTS on ThE nature Of psychOlogy AS episteMology. GivEn their stArTing PRIncIples, he claIms, the clAssical emPIriciSTs Were dOomEd to faIl To eStablIsh thaT We cAn havE genuiNe KnowleDge of A
, at Cambridge in the late  nineteent h cen tur y,hi ghly  inf luential in th e  dev elopment of British ps ychol og y . Th e  e volut ion ofp sy c h olo gy  i nto  a n  e xperi men tal and  laborator y s ci ence, and th e  r ise of psy cho analysis aft erthe tu rn  of the c ent ury,howeve r , hasall but e ra s ed tra c es of t h e  i nflu ential role theyp la y ed. Stout andWard w er e  p r i nci pal ly respons ib le fo r  bringi n gd e t ail e d accounts of  the work o f , a mong o th ers ,  Herba rt, B re n tan o, and Lotz e to  Britishphilos o phy and psychol ogy, a ndthe ir o w nwo rkwa s  ce n tr ali n t he field .As  note d ab o v e ,  War d's  188 6 art icle 'Psychol ogy ' wa s  lo ng co nside redth e def initiv e cri ti cism of associa tion ism, andhis  ( 189 3)  wasa  grace ful  pr écis-an d withe r ing  a t t a ck -on what he callsth e ' mo dern' (g enetic )  p sy c hology o fthe  tim e .  Both  Sto u t' s 1896 a nd his 18 99  were s ta ndardwo rks  fo r dec a des;  and,as we no ted a b ove, they feat u red in Moore' s  p s y ch o logy  le ctures foryear s .40Moor e ,asw e saw  abov e, ap p lies just this poin tin his  crit icism of Kant . 41 Stout w a s editor  ofM in d  between 1892and 1 920. Pleas e  cite th is ar ticle in  press as : Preti, C .,Onthe  or i g in s of the con( 2 008) ,doi:10. 101 6/j.shp sa. 200 8.0 3.0 02 E D P R O  O F Itis  t ru etha t War d  was noav owe drea list( prefer ringto l ea ve met aphysic s  t o onesi de ), b uthi s Ide alis m , s uch asit was, w asf ar l es sconspic uous than Bra dl ey's and i nfac t clos e r  to Lotz e's, with whom Ward had studied  at  Gött inge n and who  wa s a gr eat influe nce on  hisow n w o r k. Wh a t  w e d osee in War d ,  ho wever ,area numbe r of perfectly cle a r s tatements astothen a tu reo fp syc ho l ogy w hich emphasizethat while  t h eprovince o f  th epsychol ogist c oncer n s the m ental sta tes of an  i ndiv i d ual , nor arewe bound , because we ta k ethe i ndi vidual is tic  stan dpoint aspsych ologis ts , to a ccept  t he philo sophical conclusions th at hav e bee n r eached fr omi t.. . a psych olog ist may be  an  id ealis t i n  Berk eley ' ssen s e, or  inF ichte's,b ut  he n ee d not. He i s j ust  as f ree ,  if he  see  reason, to callh imself... a na tura l rea lis t . (W ar d, 1886, p. 16 4)In t his, ofco urse, Wardmeans to  d e ploya crit icismof thec l as s ical e mpir ici sts on th e n at u re of p sy ch o logy a s ep is temolo gy. Gi v en t h e ir starting prin ciple s ,  he c l aim s, th eclassic a l em piricistswere doomed  to fa il t o est ablishth at wecan  h ave genuin e  knowledg e ofa
, at_Cambridge in_the late nineteenth century,_highly influential_in_the development_of_British psychology. The_evolution of psychology_into an experimental and_laboratory science, and_the_rise of psychoanalysis after the turn of the century, however, has all but erased_traces_of the_influential_role_they played. Stout and Ward_were principally responsible for bringing_detailed accounts_of the work of, among others, Herbart, Brentano,_and_Lotze to British_philosophy and psychology, and their own work was central_in the field. As noted above,_Ward's 1886 article_'Psychology'_was_long considered the definitive_criticism of associationism, and his (1893)_was a graceful précis-and withering attack-on_what he calls the'modern' (genetic) psychology of_the time. Both Stout's 1896 and_his 1899 were standard works_for decades;_and, as we noted above,_they featured in_Moore's psychology_lectures for years.40_Moore, as we saw above, applies_just this point_in his criticism of Kant. 41_Stout_was editor of_Mind_between_1892 and_1920. Please cite_this_article in_press_as: Preti, C., On the origins_of_the con (2008), doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2008.03.002E D P R_O O F It_is_true that Ward was_no avowed realist (preferring to_leave metaphysics to one side), but_his Idealism,_such as_it was, was far less conspicuous than Bradley's and in fact_closer to Lotze's, with whom Ward_had studied at Göttingen_and who_was_a great influence_on_his own_work. What we do see in Ward,_however, are_a number of perfectly clear statements_as to the nature_of_psychology which emphasize that while the_province of the psychologist concerns the_mental states of an individual,_nor_are_we bound, because we take_the individualistic standpoint as psychologists, to_accept the philosophical_conclusions that have been reached from it..._a_psychologist may be an idealist in_Berkeley's_sense, or in Fichte's, but he_need_not._He is just as free,_if he see reason, to call_himself... a natural realist. (Ward, 1886, p. 164) In_this, of course,_Ward means to deploy a_criticism_of_the classical empiricists on the nature of psychology as epistemology._Given their_starting principles, he_claims, the classical empiricists were doomed to fail to establish_that we can have genuine knowledge of_a