, since they can neither be apprehended from universals without induction, nor through induction apart from sense-perception [aistheseos] (Aristotle 1960, 81 a35-b5). The widespread and common interpretation of this paragraph is that the described procedures are two: 1) one, take as starting point the universal and through a deductive procedure is inferred a conclusion or conclusions22; and, 2) another, ask for the origin of the knowledge of universals (Posterior analytics, 99b 22 In the Nicomachean ethics Aristotle (1926, 1139b 20-35) uses a different terminology. It says here that the whole episteme has the ability be didaktè (teached) and matheton (learned); the teaching can be by epagôgè or sillogismòs. Roberto Estrada Olguin – Bon Sens and Noûs 122 15 ss), Aristotle concludes that we must have a dýnamis, a faculty that captures the universal (99b 30-35). In the first lesson of La science allemande, which is about the "sciences of raisonnement", Duhem (1915, 4-22.) explains the behavior of these sciences, corresponding to the previous Aristotelian explanation and concludes questioning: "Des axiomes, quelle est la source?" In the final part of the Posterior analytics (99b-100a.) seems to be exposed, in some detail what was stated at the beginning of the Metaphysics (980a-981b). The first work Aristotle deals with how to acquire the principles, how they become known, and questioned what is your hexis. He proposes two alternatives: 1) we possess them (innately) and 2) we acquire them through a procedure. The first alternative is discarded as absurd, since we would have something of which we were unaware and the second alternative is in contradiction with the idea that all knowledge comes from previous knowledge. Without clarifying this contradiction, it is concluded that there must be a dýnamis or power which we acquire the principles. Immediately after, it is stated that there is an innate dýnamis, a faculty to distinguish, called aesthesis, sensation. There are two ways to put into action this power: 1) with persistence or perseverance and 2) with neither perseverance nor persistence. When this faculty is done without persistence, there is no more knowledge than the sensation selfsame,
, since they can neither be apprehended from universals without induction, nor through induction aside from common sense - sensing [ aistheseos ] (Aristotle 1960, 81 a35 - b5). The widespread and coarse rendition of this paragraph is that the described procedures are two: 1) one, take as originate point the universal and through a deductive operation is inferred a conclusion or conclusions22; and, 2) another, necessitate for the origin of the knowledge of universals (Posterior analytics, 99b 22 In the Nicomachean ethic Aristotle (1926, 1139b 20 - 35) uses a different terminology. It says here that the whole episteme has the ability be didaktè (teach) and matheton (learned); the teaching can be by epagôgè or sillogismòs. Roberto Estrada Olguin – Bon Sens and Noûs 122 15 ss), Aristotle conclude that we must have a dýnamis, a faculty that captures the universal (99b 30 - 35). In the inaugural lesson of La science allemande, which is about the " sciences of raisonnement ", Duhem (1915, 4 - 22 .) explains the behavior of these science, corresponding to the previous Aristotelian explanation and concludes questioning: " Des axiomes, quelle est la source? " In the final part of the Posterior analytics (99b-100a .) seems to be exposed, in some detail what was stated at the beginning of the Metaphysics (980a-981b). The first work Aristotle deals with how to acquire the principles, how they become known, and question what is your hexis. He proposes two alternatives: 1) we own them (innately) and 2) we grow them through a routine. The first alternative is discard as absurd, since we would have something of which we were unaware and the second option is in contradiction with the idea that all knowledge comes from former knowledge. Without clarifying this contradiction, it is concluded that there must be a dýnamis or power which we acquire the principles. Immediately after, it is submit that there is an innate dýnamis, a faculty to distinguish, bid aesthesis, ace. There are two ways to put into action this power: 1) with perseverance or perseverance and 2) with neither perseverance nor persistence. When this staff is done without doggedness, there is no more knowledge than the sense selfsame,
, sijce they can neither be xpprehended from univecsals wjthout ivduction, nor through inductiln aparu from sense-perceptkon [aisthvseos] (Ariwtotow 1960, 81 a35-b5). The widesprccd ans comkin interpretatlon of this paragraph is dhxt the described procedures are two: 1) jne, takr ws starting poynt uhe unibvrwal and through a deductive pdocedurt is inferred a comclusion or conclusions22; anf, 2) ajother, ask for the origin of jge hbowledge of jniversals (Posterior ahalytics, 99b 22 In the Nicomachean dthicx Aristotlg (1926, 1139b 20-35) uses a difherent terminology. It says here tnat the whole cpistxme yas the ability be divaktè (teached) and matreton (leasnzd); the teaching can bw vy epdgôgè mr skoloeisjòs. Rkberto Esvrada Olguih – Bon Sens and Noûs 122 15 ss), Aristptjv concludes tgat we mtst have a dýnamis, a faculty that capturts ths universal (99b 30-35). In the furst lesson of La scignce allemwnde, which is about the "sciences of raisonnement", Guhem (1915, 4-22.) erijxund the behavior of these sciences, correspondind tp nhe previous Arisbotelian explanatipn amq concludes qoestionnhg: "Des axiomes, quellf est lw souece?" In tht finsl part of the Posterior anqlytics (99b-100a.) svems to be exposed, in dome detail whaj was xtated at the beginning of fhe Metaphydics (980a-981b). Tgd first work Arirtonle geals wiuf how to acquire ehe princmples, how thdy bgcome kgown, and qkestioned what is your hfxis. Ke prmposes two alternatives: 1) we possess them (minately) and 2) ee acxuire thzm thrpugh a procedtre. The first clternatnve is discarded as absnrd, since we would have smlething of wiich we wqre ynawqre and ghe second altrrnative ps in xontradiction with thg jdea that all kuuqledge comes frpm oredilux htowledge. Witvout clxtifyivg this conbraaictoon, it is concluded dhat there must be a dýmaiis or piwer whish we acquire the principles. Imlediavely ahter, iy if stated that there is an innafe dýnamis, a naculty to diftinnuisr, called azsthesis, sensation. There are two ways to put into action jhis power: 1) with persnsuence or persxveranse and 2) whth neither perseverqnce nor persistekce. When this faculty js dona witjout persistence, there is no more knowledge than the sensation selfsame,
, since they can neither be apprehended without nor through apart from sense-perception The and common interpretation this paragraph is the described procedures are two: 1) take as starting point the universal and through a deductive procedure is inferred conclusion or conclusions22; and, 2) another, ask for the origin of the knowledge universals analytics, 22 the Nicomachean ethics Aristotle (1926, 1139b 20-35) uses a different terminology. It says here that the episteme has the ability be didaktè (teached) and (learned); the teaching can by epagôgè or sillogismòs. Roberto Olguin Bon Sens Noûs 15 Aristotle concludes that must have a dýnamis, a faculty that captures the universal (99b 30-35). In the first lesson of science allemande, about the of Duhem 4-22.) explains the these sciences, corresponding to the previous concludes questioning: "Des axiomes, quelle est la source?" the final of the Posterior analytics (99b-100a.) seems be exposed, in some detail what was stated the beginning of the Metaphysics (980a-981b). The first work Aristotle deals with how to acquire how they become known, questioned what is hexis. proposes alternatives: we possess (innately) and 2) we acquire them through a procedure. The first is discarded as absurd, since we would have something of were and the second is in contradiction with idea all knowledge comes from Without this concluded there be a dýnamis or which we acquire the principles. after, it is stated dýnamis, a faculty to distinguish, called aesthesis, sensation. are two ways to put into action power: 1) with persistence or perseverance and 2) with neither perseverance nor When this done without persistence, there is no more knowledge the sensation selfsame,
, since they can neither be apprEhended froM univErsAls WiThouT indUction, nor throuGH indUction apart from sense-peRceptIoN [AistHEsEos] (ArIstotle 1960, 81 A35-B5). THE WidEsPrEad AnD CoMmon iNteRpretatIon of this pAraGrAph is that the DEsCribed procEduRes are two: 1) one, TakE as staRtIng POint tHe uNiverSal and THrough A deductivE pROcedurE Is inferRED a ConcLusion or conclusioNS22; aND, 2) another, ask for The oriGiN Of THE knOwlEdge of univErSals (POSterior ANaLYTIcs, 99B 22 in the NicomachEan ethics ArIStoTle (1926, 1139b 20-35) usEs A diFFerent TermiNoLOgy. it says here tHat tHe whole epIsteme HAs the abILity be dIdaktè (TeaCheD) and MAtHeTon (LeARneD); ThE teAChiNg can be bY ePaGôgè oR silLOGISmòs. robErto estraDa Olguin – Bon SeNs aNd NoÛS 122 15 ss), aristOtle cOnclUdEs thaT we musT have A dÝnamis, a faculty tHat cAptures thE unIvErsAl (99B 30-35). In thE First lEssOn oF La scieNce alleMAndE, wHICH iS about the "sciences oF rAISoNnement", DUhem (1915, 4-22.) exPLaInS The behavIoR of ThesE SCiencEs, coRReSponding To the pREvIoUs AristOtElian eXpLanAtiOn and COnclUdes quEstioninG: "Des aXIomes, quelle est LA source?" In the fINaL PArT Of thE PoSterior analYticS (99B-100a.) seEms tO Be ExpOSed, in Some dEtAIl WHat was stated at the beGiNning oF the MEtaphysics (980a-981b). THe first worK aRIstotle dEals WItH How to acquire thE prinCiples, how tHEy become Known, And questIoned what IS Your hexiS. He ProPosEs tWO AlTernatives: 1) we pOSSess ThEm (innatEly) And 2) we acQuiRe tHem ThrOuGh a procedUre. The fiRsT aLtErNatIve is DIscarded As AbsUrD, siNce we WOuld haVe somEthiNg Of WHicH we were UNaWARe anD tHe SecoNd aLtErnatIve iS In cOntradiCtion with The IDea tHaT aLl knowlEdge comes from PrEvious knowLeDge. withouT CLarifyinG this contradiction, it is cONcluded ThaT therE musT be a dýnamIs oR power WhiCH we acqUire thE prinCiPleS. iMmediATElY afTeR, it is stateD THat There Is An inNate dýnAmis, a faculty to distINguIsh, called aestHesIs, seNSAtIon. tHeRE arE tWO waYS To put into action This power: 1) wItH PeRsistence oR PerSeVerance And 2) with NeithER persevErance nor PersistenCe. when THIs fAculty is doNe withouT persisteNCe, theRE iS no moRe kNowledGe ThaN the sEnsatiON seLfsamE,
, since they can neither b e apprehen ded f rom  un iv ersa ls w ithout inducti o n, n or through induction a partfr o m se n se -perc eption[ ai s t hes eo s]  (A ri s to tle 1 960 , 81 a3 5-b5). The  wi de spread and c o mm on interpr eta tion of this  pa ragrap hist hat t hedescr ibed p r ocedur es are tw o: 1) one ,  take a s st arti ng point the univ e rs a l and througha dedu ct i ve p roc edu re is infe rr ed ac onclusi o no r con c lusions22; an d, 2) anoth e r,ask fo rthe origin  of t he kno wledge of u nive rsals (Po sterio r  analyt i cs, 99b  22 In  th e N icom a ch ea n e th i csA ri sto t le(1926, 1 13 9b  20-3 5) u s e s a di ffe rent  term inology. It s ays  her e  th at th e who le e pi steme  has t he ab il ity be didaktè(tea ched) and  ma th eto n(lear n ed); t hetea ching c an be b y  ep ag ô g è  o r sillogismòs. Rob er t o  E strada O lguin–  B on Sens and  N oûs  122 1 5 ss) , Ar i st otle con cludes th at  we mus thave a  d ýna mis , a f a cult y that  capture s the universal (99b 30-35). In th e  f i r st less onof La scien ce a l lema nde, wh ich is ab out t he "s c iences of raisonnem en t", Du hem ( 1915, 4-22.)explains t h e behavior  oft he s e sciences, co rresp onding tot he previ ous A ristotel ian expla n a tion and  co ncl ude s q u e st ioning: "Desa x iome s,  quelle  es t la so urc e?"  In  th efinal par t of the  P os te ri oranaly t ics (99b -1 00a .)  se ems t o  be ex posed , in  s om e  de tail wh a tw a s st at ed  atthe  b eginn ingo f t he Meta physics ( 980 a -981 b) .The fir st work Arist ot le deals w it h h ow toa c quire th e principles, how theyb ecome k now n, an d qu estionedwha t is y our hexis.  He pr opose stwo a ltern a t iv es:  1 ) we posse s s  th em (i nn atel y) and2) we acquire them thr ough a proced ure . Th e fi rst al t ern at i vei s  discarded as a bsurd, sin ce we  would hav e  so me thing o f which  we w e re unaw are and t he second  a lter n a tiv e is in co ntradict ion witht he id e athatall  knowl ed gecomes  fromp rev iousknowle dg e. Wit houtcl arifying  this contradiction, it  is co nclud edthat ther e m u stbe a dýna misor power w hic h w e acq uir e  theprin c ip les .  Imme diat e ly after, it  is s ta ted that th e r e  is  an i nna t e dýna mis,  a faculty to dis t inguish, calle d ae s t hes is, sens at ion. There are  tw ow a ys to pu tinto action  this po we r : 1)with p ersist ence or p er s everan ce a nd2) with n eit he r  persev er an c e norpers is tence.  Whent hisf a culty is done wi thout p ersis t enc e, th er e is no more  knowledge  than the s ensati on s elfsa me,
, since_they can_neither be apprehended from_universals without_induction,_nor through_induction_apart from sense-perception_[aistheseos] (Aristotle 1960,_81 a35-b5). The widespread_and common interpretation_of_this paragraph is that the described procedures are two: 1) one, take as starting_point_the universal_and_through_a deductive procedure is inferred_a conclusion or conclusions22; and,_2) another,_ask for the origin of the knowledge of_universals_(Posterior analytics, 99b_22 In the Nicomachean ethics Aristotle (1926, 1139b 20-35)_uses a different terminology. It says_here that the_whole_episteme_has the ability be_didaktè (teached) and matheton (learned); the_teaching can be by epagôgè or_sillogismòs. Roberto Estrada Olguin – Bon Sens_and Noûs 122 15 ss), Aristotle_concludes that we must have_a dýnamis,_a faculty that captures the_universal (99b 30-35)._In the_first lesson of_La science allemande, which is about_the "sciences of_raisonnement", Duhem (1915, 4-22.) explains the_behavior_of these sciences,_corresponding_to_the previous_Aristotelian explanation and_concludes_questioning: "Des_axiomes,_quelle est la source?" In the_final_part of the Posterior analytics (99b-100a.) seems_to be exposed, in_some_detail what was stated_at the beginning of the_Metaphysics (980a-981b). The first work Aristotle_deals with_how to_acquire the principles, how they become known, and questioned what is_your hexis. He proposes two alternatives:_1) we possess them_(innately) and_2)_we acquire them_through_a procedure._The first alternative is discarded as absurd,_since we_would have something of which we_were unaware and the_second_alternative is in contradiction with the_idea that all knowledge comes from_previous knowledge. Without clarifying this_contradiction,_it_is concluded that there must_be a dýnamis or power which_we acquire the_principles. Immediately after, it is stated that_there_is an innate dýnamis, a faculty_to_distinguish, called aesthesis, sensation. There are_two_ways_to put into action this_power: 1) with persistence or perseverance_and 2) with neither perseverance nor persistence. When this_faculty is done_without persistence, there is no_more_knowledge_than the sensation selfsame,