 as a contingent, though natural, response to problems arising in a particular scientific context and under a particular understanding of the history of science in that context. It concludes that the history of science provides little support for interesting theses about the present or future state of science. Keywords: Pierre Duhem; historical induction; scientific realism; antirealism; natural classification; energetics Received: 30 March 2017. Reviewed: 13 May 2017. Accepted: 30 May 2017. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.24117/2526-2270.2017.i2.07 _____________________________________________________________________________ Introduction Debates between scientific realists and antirealists have persisted in the philosophy of science literature of the past half century following the demise of logical positivism. Realists view scientific theories as largely faithful representations of reality; antirealists do not. On the realist image of science, scientific theories reveal the reality that underlies and causally explains the phenomena. On the antirealist image, in contrast, scientific theories are representational fictions constructed by human beings to solve problems that seem pressing at a particular time, to save the phenomena, etc.3 A good deal of the dialectic between the two 1 I thank two anonymous referees whose comments significantly improved this paper. I also thank both the National Science Foundation for a grant (NSF SES-0726051) and the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee for a sabbatical award that supported this and other research on Duhem. 2 Professor of Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. Address: Department of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, PO Box 413, Milwaukee, WI 53201. Email: mnliston@uwm.edu 3 Thus drawn, the distinction between realist and antirealist images of science is broad-brush and generic. The variety of specific proposals is large: for example, there is realism/antirealism about the existence of unobservables and about the truth of fundamental laws; there is selective realism about the causes of phenomena and about structures; there are disputes about the intelligibility and/or point of the debates. Here I focus only on the debates insofar as they rely Michael Liston – Duhem: Images of Science, Historical Continuity, and the First Crisis in Physics 74 relies on meta-level inductions on the history of science. Realists apply an optimistic induction on the history of science. They see it as the continuous, progressive evolution
as a contingent, though natural, response to problems arising in a especial scientific context and under a especial understanding of the history of science in that context. It concludes that the history of skill provides little support for interesting thesis about the present or future state of science. Keywords: Pierre Duhem; historic induction; scientific realism; antirealism; lifelike classification; energetics Received: 30 March 2017. Reviewed: 13 May 2017. Accepted: 30 May 2017. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.24117/2526-2270.2017.i2.07 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Introduction Debates between scientific realist and antirealists have persisted in the philosophy of science literature of the past half century following the death of logical positivism. Realists watch scientific theories as largely faithful representation of world; antirealists do not. On the realist image of science, scientific theories reveal the reality that underlie and causally explains the phenomena. On the antirealist image, in contrast, scientific theories are representational fictions constructed by human beings to solve problems that seem pressing at a particular time, to save the phenomena, etc.3 A good bargain of the dialectic between the two 1 I thank two anonymous referees whose comments importantly better this newspaper. I also thank both the National Science Foundation for a grant (NSF SES-0726051) and the University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee for a sabbatical prize that supported this and early research on Duhem. 2 Professor of Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee. Address: Department of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee, PO Box 413, Milwaukee, WI 53201. Email: mnliston@uwm.edu 3 therefore drawn, the distinction between realist and antirealist images of science is broad - brush and generic. The variety of specific marriage proposal is large: for example, there is realism / antirealism about the being of unobservables and about the truth of cardinal law; there is selective realism about the causes of phenomena and about social organization; there are disputes about the intelligibility and/or point of the debates. Here I focus only on the debates insofar as they rely Michael Liston – Duhem: prototype of Science, Historical Continuity, and the First Crisis in Physics 74 relies on meta - level inductions on the history of science. Realists use an optimistic initiation on the history of science. They visit it as the continuous, progressive evolution
 as a contingent, though natmral, response to probleks ariaing in x particular scientific contxxt qnd ubder a particular undefstanding of the yistiey of scieide in tmct cohbext. Nt concludes thaj the historf of science psoxibes little support for interesting treses anokt the present or gtturs state of science. Keywords: Pierre Duhem; iistorical induvtion; scientific realism; ajtirfalism; natural cladsification; enewtetics Receixed: 30 March 2017. Reviewed: 13 Jay 2017. Accepted: 30 May 2017. DOI: http://dx.dui.org/10.24117/2526-2270.2017.n2.07 _____________________________________________________________________________ Introducjnin Fgbates betwexn scivntific realists and dntireakists have perxisved un the philosophy of vcience literature of the pdsc half century followunt the demhse ud lugidak lositigisj. Realists view scienrific theories as lsrdvky faithful depresqneations of reality; antirealists do not. Mn fhe realist image of scuence, scientific theoties reveaj the reality that underlies and causally explainv the oheuimena. In the antirealist image, in contrast, scientific fhtorpes are representctional fictions clnxjructed by humxn beiufs to solve problems that sgem prwssing at a psrticular time, to save the phenomena, etb.3 A tood deal of the dnalectic betceen tne twp 1 I thank two anonymour rererees whosf commenta significantly ioprpvad this kxper. I also thank both the Natnonal Sckencg Foundwtion for w grakd (NSF SES-0726051) and the Knivetsity mf Wisconsln-Milwaukee for a sabbatical awecd that suppotteg tvis and jther research on Quhem. 2 Professpr of Pkilosoohy at the Univervity of Wissonsin-Milwaukag. Address: Depertment os Phulosiphy, Unkxersity of Wisvonsin-Milccukee, PO Vox 413, Milwaukee, WI 53201. Emxjl: mnliston@uwm.ebb 3 Thus drawn, the dirtigcnioi betraen realist dnd xntktealirt imagtf iw scoence is broad-brush dnd feneric. The varietu jf specidic propjsals is largr: for example, thert is rxalism/entireslifm about the existence of unobaervables anq about the erutm of fundamentcl laws; there is selective realism about the causes of phgnomena and about stroctmres; there ace dis[utes abogt the intelligibiliry and/or point of the debates. Here I fkcus otly oj the debates insofar as they rely Michael Liston – Duhem: Images of Sciencw, Historical Contihuitu, and tke Yirst Cwisid in Physics 74 relpes on meta-level inductions on tie history oy science. Realists apply an oltkmistic inducjion on the history of scisnce. Theu see it as the continuous, progtessive evolution
as a contingent, though natural, response to in particular scientific and under a of in that context. concludes that the of science provides little support for theses about the present or future state of science. Keywords: Pierre Duhem; historical scientific realism; antirealism; natural classification; energetics Received: 30 March 2017. Reviewed: 13 May Accepted: May DOI: _____________________________________________________________________________ Introduction Debates between scientific realists and antirealists have persisted in the philosophy of science literature the past half century following the demise of positivism. Realists view scientific as largely faithful representations of antirealists not. On realist of scientific theories reveal reality that underlies and causally explains the phenomena. On the antirealist image, in contrast, scientific theories are fictions constructed beings to problems seem at a particular save the phenomena, etc.3 A good dialectic between the two 1 I thank two referees whose significantly improved this paper. I also both the National Science Foundation for a grant SES-0726051) and the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee for a sabbatical award that supported this and other Duhem. 2 Professor of at the University Wisconsin-Milwaukee. Department Philosophy, of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, Box 413, Milwaukee, WI 53201. Email: mnliston@uwm.edu 3 Thus drawn, the between realist and antirealist images of science is broad-brush and variety specific proposals is for example, there is about existence of unobservables and truth fundamental selective about causes of phenomena and structures; there are disputes about intelligibility and/or point of only on the debates insofar as they rely Liston – Duhem: Images of Science, Historical and the First Crisis in Physics 74 relies on meta-level inductions on history of apply an optimistic induction on the history of They see it as continuous, progressive evolution
 as a contingent, though naturaL, response tO probLemS arIsIng iN a paRticular scientIFic cOntext and under a particuLar unDeRStanDInG of thE historY Of SCIenCe In ThaT cONtExt. It ConCludes tHat the histOry Of Science proviDEs Little suppOrt For interestiNg tHeses aBoUt tHE presEnt Or futUre staTE of sciEnce. KeywoRdS: pierre dUhem; hisTORiCal iNduction; scientifiC ReALism; antirealisM; naturAl CLaSSIfiCatIon; energetIcS ReceIVed: 30 MarcH 2017. reVIEWed: 13 mAy 2017. Accepted: 30 May 2017. dOI: http://dx.doI.Org/10.24117/2526-2270.2017.I2.07 _____________________________________________________________________________ IntroDuCtiON DebatEs betWeEN scIentific reaListS and antirEalistS Have perSIsted in The phiLosOphY of sCIeNcE liTeRAtuRE oF thE PasT half cenTuRy FolloWing THE DEmisE of LogiCal poSitivism. RealiSts View SCieNtifiC theoRies As LargeLy faitHful rEpResentations of rEaliTy; antireaLisTs Do nOt. on the REalist ImaGe oF sciencE, scientIFic ThEORIeS reveal the reality tHaT UNdErlies anD causaLLy ExPLains the PhEnoMena. oN The anTireALiSt image, iN contrASt, ScIentifiC tHeorieS aRe rEprEsentATionAl fictIons consTructED by human beings TO solve problemS ThAT SeEM preSsiNg at a particUlar TIme, tO savE ThE phENomenA, etc.3 A GoOD dEAl of the dialectic betWeEn the tWo 1 I thAnk two anonymoUs referees WHOSe commenTs siGNiFIcantly improveD this Paper. I also THank both The NaTional ScIence FounDATion for a GraNt (NsF SeS-0726051) aND ThE University of wISconSiN-MilwauKee For a sabBatIcaL awArd ThAt supportEd this anD oThEr ReSeaRch on dUhem. 2 ProfEsSor Of phiLosopHY at the univeRsitY oF WIScoNsin-MilWAuKEE. AddReSs: depaRtmEnT of PhIlosOPhy, universIty of WiscOnsIN-MilWaUkEe, PO Box 413, milwaukee, WI 53201. EmAiL: mnliston@uWm.Edu 3 thus drAWN, the distInction between realist anD AntireaLisT imagEs of Science is BroAd-brusH anD GeneriC. The vaRiety Of SpeCIFic prOPOsAls Is Large: for exAMPle, There Is RealIsm/antiRealism about the exiSTenCe of unobservaBleS and ABOuT thE TrUTh oF fUNdaMENtal laws; there is Selective rEaLIsM about the cAUseS oF phenomEna and aBout sTRuctureS; there are Disputes aBoUt thE INteLligibilitY and/or poInt of the dEBates. hErE I focUs oNly on tHe DebAtes iNsofar AS thEy relY MichaEl liston – duhem: imAges of ScIence, Historical ContinuiTy, and tHe FirSt CRisis in PhYsiCS 74 reLies on metA-levEl inductioNs oN thE histOry OF scieNce. REAlIstS Apply An opTImistic inDUcTioN ON tHe history of SCIEncE. They See IT as the ContInuous, progressive EVolution
 as a contingent, though n atural, re spons e t o p ro blem s ar ising in a par t icul ar scientific contextand u nd e r ap ar ticul ar unde r st a n din gof  th eh is toryofscience  in that c ont ex t. It conclu d es  that thehis tory of scie nce  provi de s l i ttlesup portfor in t eresti ng theses  a b out th e  presen t or  fut ure state of scie n ce .  Keywords: Pie rre Du he m ;h i sto ric al inducti on ; sci e ntificr ea l i s m;a ntirealism; n atural clas s ifi cation ;ene r getics  Rece iv e d:30 March 20 17.Reviewed:  13 Ma y  2017.A ccepted : 30 M ay201 7. D O I:  h ttp :/ / dx. d oi .or g /10 .24117/2 52 6- 2270. 2017 . i 2 . 07 _ ___ ____ _____ _____________ ___ ____ _ ___ _____ _____ ____ __ _____ ______ _____ __ ______ Introduc tion  Debatesbet we ensc ienti f ic rea lis tsand ant irealis t s h av e p er sisted in the phil os o p hy  of scie nce li t er at u re of th epas t ha l f  cent uryf ol lowing t he dem i se  o f logic al  posit iv ism . R ealis t s vi ew sci entifictheor i es as largelyf aithful repre s en t a ti o ns o f r eality; ant irea l ists  don ot . O n  thereali st im a ge of science, scie nt ific t heori es reveal the  reality t h a t  underli es a n dc ausally explai ns th e phenomen a . On the  anti realistimage, in c ontrast,  sc ien tif ict h eo ries are repr e s enta ti onal fi cti ons con str uct edbyhu man being s to sol ve  p ro bl ems  that seem pre ss ing  a t a  part i culartime,  tosa ve the  phenom e na , etc. 3Agood  de al  of t he d i ale ctic be tween the  tw o  1 I  t ha nk twoanonymous ref er ees whoseco mme nts si g n ificantl y improved this paper.I  also t han k bot h th e Nationa l S cience  Fo u ndatio n fora gra nt  (N S F  SES- 0 7 26 051 )and the Un i v ers ity o fWisc onsin-M ilwaukee for a sab b ati cal award tha t s uppo r t ed  th i sa ndot h err e search on Duhem . 2 Profes so r  o f Philosop h y a tthe Uni versity  of W i sconsin -Milwauke e. Addres s:  Dep a r tme nt of Phil osophy,Universit y  of W i sc onsin -Mi lwauke e,  PO  Box413, M i lwa ukee,  WI 53 20 1. Ema il: m nl iston@uw m.edu 3 Thus drawn, the  disti nctio n b etween re ali s t a nd antire alis t images o f s cie nce i s b r oad-b rush an d g e neric . Th e  varietyo fspe c i fi c proposals i s  la rge:for exampl e, t here is realism/a n tirealism abou t th e exi ste n ce o funobservablesand  a b o ut the t ru th of funda mental l aw s ; the re isselect ive rea l i sm aboutthecau ses of ph eno me n a and a bo ut struct ures ;thereare di s pute s about the intell igibi l i ty an d /or  poin tof thed ebat es. Here I  focus only  on th e de bates  insofa ras the y r el y MichaelL iston – D uhem:  Images  o f Sc ien ce, Hi stor i c al Co ntin ui ty,  and theF i rs t  C ri s isin P hysic s74 r elies onm eta-leve l i n duction sont h e hist o ry o f science.  Re alist s apply an o p timi s ti c  indu ctionon the  histor y  of  s cience.  Th e y  see it a s the con t inu ou s, p rogressi ve  evo lu tio n
 as_a contingent,_though natural, response to_problems arising_in_a particular_scientific_context and under_a particular understanding_of the history of_science in that_context._It concludes that the history of science provides little support for interesting theses about_the_present or_future_state_of science. Keywords: Pierre Duhem;_historical induction; scientific realism; antirealism;_natural classification;_energetics Received: 30 March 2017. Reviewed: 13 May_2017._Accepted: 30 May_2017. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.24117/2526-2270.2017.i2.07 _____________________________________________________________________________ Introduction Debates between scientific realists_and antirealists have persisted in the_philosophy of science_literature_of_the past half century_following the demise of logical positivism._Realists view scientific theories as largely_faithful representations of reality; antirealists do not._On the realist image of science,_scientific theories reveal the reality_that underlies_and causally explains the phenomena._On the antirealist_image, in_contrast, scientific theories_are representational fictions constructed by human_beings to solve_problems that seem pressing at a_particular_time, to save_the_phenomena,_etc.3 A_good deal of_the_dialectic between_the_two 1 I thank two anonymous_referees_whose comments significantly improved this paper. I_also thank both the_National_Science Foundation for a_grant (NSF SES-0726051) and the_University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee for a sabbatical_award that_supported this_and other research on Duhem. 2 Professor of Philosophy at the_University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. Address: Department of_Philosophy, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee,_PO Box_413,_Milwaukee, WI 53201._Email:_mnliston@uwm.edu 3_Thus drawn, the distinction between realist and_antirealist images_of science is broad-brush and generic._The variety of specific_proposals_is large: for example, there is_realism/antirealism about the existence of unobservables_and about the truth of_fundamental_laws;_there is selective realism about_the causes of phenomena and about_structures; there are_disputes about the intelligibility and/or point of_the_debates. Here I focus only on_the_debates insofar as they rely Michael_Liston_–_Duhem: Images of Science, Historical_Continuity, and the First Crisis in_Physics 74 relies on meta-level inductions on the history_of science. Realists_apply an optimistic induction on_the_history_of science. They see it as the continuous, progressive evolution