 an ideal ordering for the group to choose. Following one of the major treads of epistemic democracy, we assume that "the existence of such an ordering provides a productive way to think about group choice problems".1(p60) Epistemic democracy assumes that people are reliable, that is: they are mostly right, most of the time. This assumption has been explored and supported on empirical grounds.23 In assessing voting procedures, we frame the issue as a problem concerning how to best capitalize on people's reliability. Here, we draw on an intuition from extensions of the Condorcet Jury Theorem.21 In that sense, this paper aligns to the growing literature that explores the potential payoffs of democratic decision-making procedures.24,25,26,27,28 Actually, our approach via simulations was initially inspired by the "playful" and "exploratory" spirit of Kai Spiekermann's and Robert Goodin's recent book, which aims to "'see what happens' when we vary the many interrelated conditions that might affect the overall epistemic performance of modern democratic government";21(pv) although their main focus is on a different kind of decision problem.21(pp33-36) We can now state our quest for assessment criteria more clearly. Which traits of a voting method exhibited in a simulation would provide (non-conclusive) evidence for the claim that one method "performs well" for a decision problem? Which features would support the claim that a voting method "performs better" than another for a decision problem? Having a sound answer to these questions would provide useful tools for institutional design. Especially, it would allow us to run some tests on voting mechanisms over kinds of decision problems prior to their implementation. Our proposal consists in FI NA L DR AF T 9 assessing voting methods on a decision problem focusing on the following criteria: (1) Triviality validation. If all voters prefer the ideal outcome, then the voting method always yields the ideal outcome as a result. This ensures that the method can perform at its best under ideal conditions on the preference distribution: it will never yield a suboptimal outcome when provided with ideal inputs. (2) Convergence to optimum. The probability of the group choosing the ideal outcome converges to 1 as the size of the population increases. This is one of the promising ideas sparking from the Condorcet Jury Theorem. Some voting methods can produce better outcomes than the average voter, provided a competence threshold is surpassed; and their accuracy increases as the size of the voting
an ideal ordering for the group to choose. Following one of the major treads of epistemic democracy, we wear that " the being of such an ordering provides a productive means to think about group choice problems".1(p60) Epistemic majority rule assumes that people are reliable, that is: they are largely right, most of the time. This presumption has been explored and supported on empiric grounds.23 In assessing voting procedures, we frame the issue as a problem concerning how to well capitalize on people's reliability. Here, we draw on an intuition from extension of the Condorcet Jury Theorem.21 In that sense, this paper aligns to the growing literature that explores the likely payoffs of democratic decisiveness - making procedures.24,25,26,27,28 Actually, our approach via simulations was initially inspired by the " playful " and " exploratory " intent of Kai Spiekermann's and Robert Goodin's recent book, which aims to "' see what happens' when we change the many interrelated conditions that might affect the overall epistemic performance of modern democratic government";21(pv) although their main focus is on a different kind of decision problem.21(pp33 - 36) We can now submit our quest for assessment criterion more intelligibly. Which traits of a voting method exhibited in a model would provide (non - conclusive) evidence for the claim that one method " performs well " for a decisiveness problem? Which features would support the claim that a voting method " performs better " than another for a decision problem? Having a sound solution to these questions would supply useful tools for institutional design. Especially, it would allow us to tend some tests on voting mechanisms over kind of decision problem prior to their implementation. Our proposal consist in FI NA L DR AF T 9 assessing vote methods on a decision problem focusing on the following criteria: (1) pettiness validation. If all voter prefer the ideal outcome, then the vote method always yields the ideal outcome as a result. This see that the method can perform at its best under ideal conditions on the preference distribution: it will never yield a suboptimal outcome when provided with ideal inputs. (2) overlap to optimum. The probability of the group choosing the ideal outcome converges to 1 as the size of the population increase. This is one of the promising ideas sparking from the Condorcet Jury Theorem. Some voting methods can produce better consequence than the average voter, provided a competence threshold is surpassed; and their accuracy increases as the size of the voting
 an ideal ordering for the nroup to choose. Yillowiig one kf the mxjor treads of epistemic demlceacy, qe assume that "the exirtence of such an ordtring provides a 'doductiyz way bo thnnj about group ghoice probnems".1(p60) Epistemiw aelocracy assumes that people are relyable, tnah is: they are iostkr rifht, most of the time. This assumptikn has ueen explored amd supported on empirical hroujds.23 In assessing vlting proceeuref, we frame thd issue as a problem ckncerning how to best capitalizd on 'eople's reluavilljy. Here, we dcaw on an intuitiok from axtensipns of the Concorret Hury Theorem.21 In that vense, this paper ajigns to dhz growing literature rhqt exklorev thd pogenuiak layoffd oh democratid decision-mqking procedures.24,25,26,27,28 Acuuajoy, our approadh via symulations was initially inspired by tht "plagful" and "exploratory" spurit of Kai Spiekermajn's and Rjbert Goodin's recent book, which aims to "'see what vappeis' whtn we vxey the many interrelated conditions that might wrftct the overall eiistemic performanve og modern democtatic govednment";21(pv) although hheir mwin ficus is og a cifferent kind of decision problem.21(pp33-36) We xan now state our euest for arsesxment criteria more clearly. Chich fraits of a voting msghod exhibited iv a shmulation would provide (nog-conclusite) evndence fur tne claym that onf metmmd "performs well" flr a becishon problel? Which features would support vie claim that a voning methjd "pevforms better" tran another fot a decisnon prublem? Havihg a sonnd answer tj these questhlns would prmvide usqful tooos for kvstitutional drsign. Espvcnally, it qould allow us to vun suje tests on votnug mechanisms ovet kkndf lf dqwision problams oriut to gheir implendntayion. Our proposal cotsisfs in FI NA L DR AG B 9 assessung votigg methods on a decision problel focnsing un thr fjllowing criteria: (1) Triviality balidatioj. In all voters [refcr tre ideal obtcome, then the voting method always yieods the ideal outcime as a result. Thix ensures thet the method cdn perform at its bewt under ideal cokditions on the prefersnce dhstrihution: it will never yield a suboptimal outcome when provided with ideal unputs. (2) Convergencs to optikui. The pwobauiuity of the groui choosing the ideal outcome conterges to 1 af the size of the population ivcreases. This is one of the promising ideas slarking from the Condorcet Jury Theorem. Some voting metmods can produde betngr uutcomes than the sveragz votee, provieed w competence ghrrsmold is sugpasxeb; and their accuracy increases as the suzf of the voting
an ideal ordering for the group to one the major of epistemic democracy, of an ordering provides productive way to about group choice problems".1(p60) Epistemic democracy that people are reliable, that is: they are mostly right, most of the This assumption has been explored and supported on empirical grounds.23 In assessing voting we the as problem concerning how to best capitalize on people's reliability. Here, we draw on an intuition from of the Condorcet Jury Theorem.21 In that sense, paper aligns to the literature that explores the potential of decision-making procedures.24,25,26,27,28 our via was initially inspired the "playful" and "exploratory" spirit of Kai Spiekermann's and Robert Goodin's recent book, which aims to "'see happens' when the many conditions might the overall epistemic modern democratic government";21(pv) although their main a different kind of decision problem.21(pp33-36) We can state our for assessment criteria more clearly. Which of a voting method exhibited in a simulation provide (non-conclusive) evidence for the claim that one method "performs well" for a decision problem? would support the claim a voting method better" another a problem? Having sound answer to these questions would provide useful tools for institutional Especially, it would allow us to run some tests on over of decision problems to their implementation. Our consists FI NA L DR 9 voting decision focusing the following criteria: (1) validation. If all voters prefer ideal outcome, then the ideal outcome as a result. This ensures that method can perform at its best under conditions on the preference distribution: it will never yield a suboptimal outcome provided with (2) Convergence to optimum. The probability of the choosing the ideal outcome to 1 as the size of the population increases. is of the ideas sparking from Condorcet Jury Theorem. voting methods can outcomes than average provided is surpassed; and their accuracy increases the of the voting
 an ideal ordering for the grouP to choose. FOllowIng One Of The mAjor Treads of episteMIc deMocracy, we assume that "the ExistEnCE of sUCh An ordEring prOViDES a pRoDuCtiVe WAy To thiNk aBout groUp choice prOblEmS".1(p60) Epistemic dEMoCracy assumEs tHat people are RelIable, tHaT is: THey arE moStly rIght, moST of the Time. This aSsUMption HAs been eXPLoRed aNd supported on empiRIcAL grounds.23 In asseSsing vOtINg PROceDurEs, we frame tHe Issue AS a problEM cONCErnINg how to best caPitalize on pEOplE's reliAbIliTY. Here, wE draw On AN inTuition from ExteNsions of tHe CondORcet JurY theorem.21 in that SenSe, tHis pAPeR aLigNs TO thE GrOwiNG liTerature ThAt ExploRes tHE POTentIal PayoFfs of Democratic decIsiOn-maKIng ProceDures.24,25,26,27,28 actuAlLy, our ApproaCh via SiMulations was iniTialLy inspireD by ThE "plAyFul" anD "ExplorAtoRy" sPirit of kai SpieKErmAnN'S ANd robert Goodin's recenT bOOK, wHich aims To "'see wHAt HaPPens' when We VarY the MANy intErreLAtEd conditIons thAT mIgHt affecT tHe overAlL epIstEmic pERforMance oF modern dEmocrATic government";21(pV) Although their MAiN FOcUS is oN a dIfferent kinD of dECisiOn prOBlEm.21(pP33-36) we can Now stAtE OuR Quest for assessment cRiTeria mOre clEarly. Which traIts of a votiNG MEthod exhIbitED iN A simulation wouLd proVide (non-conCLusive) evIdencE for the cLaim that oNE Method "peRfoRms WelL" foR A DeCision problem? wHIch fEaTures woUld Support The ClaIm tHat A vOting methOd "perforMs BeTtEr" ThaN anotHEr for a deCiSioN pRobLem? HaVIng a soUnd anSwer To ThESe qUestionS WoULD proViDe UsefUl tOoLs for InstITutIonal deSign. EspecIalLY, it wOuLd Allow us To run some testS oN voting mecHaNisMs over KINds of decIsion problems prior to theIR implemEntAtion. our pRoposal coNsiSts in Fi NA l dR AF T 9 aSsessiNg votInG meTHOds on A DEcIsiOn Problem focUSIng On the FoLlowIng critEria: (1) Triviality valiDAtiOn. If all voters PreFer tHE IdEal OUtCOme, ThEN thE VOting method alwaYs yields thE iDEaL outcome as A ResUlT. This enSures thAt the MEthod caN perform aT its best uNdEr idEAL coNditions on The prefeRence distRIbutiON: iT will NevEr yielD a SubOptimAl outcOMe wHen prOvided WiTh ideaL inpuTs. (2) convergeNce to optimum. The probabilIty of tHe groUp cHoosing thE idEAl oUtcome conVergEs to 1 as the sIze Of tHe popUlaTIon inCreaSEs. thiS Is one Of thE Promising IDeAs sPARkIng from the CONDOrcEt JurY ThEOrem. SoMe voTing methods can proDUce better outcoMes tHAN thE avERage VoTer, provided a coMpeTeNCE threshoLd Is surpassed; And their AcCUracy IncreaSes as tHe size oF THe VOting
 an ideal ordering for the  group tochoos e.Fol lo wing  one  of the majort read s of epistemic democra cy, w ea ssum e  t hat " the exi s te n c e o fsu chan or derin g p rovides  a product ive  w ay to thinka bo ut group c hoi ce problems" .1( p60) E pi ste m ic de moc racyassume s  thatpeople ar er eliabl e , thati s :they  are mostly right ,  m o st of the time . This  a s su m p tio n h as been ex pl oreda nd supp o rt e d one mpirical grou nds.23 In a s ses sing v ot ing proced ures,  w e  fr ame the iss ue a s a probl em con c erningh ow to b est ca pit ali ze o n  p eo ple 's rel i ab ili t y.Here, we  d ra w onan i n t u i tion  fr om e xtens ions of the C ond orce t  Ju ry Th eorem .21In  that  sense , thi spaper aligns to  the  growinglit er atu re  that explor esthe  potent ial pay o ffs  o f d em ocratic decision-m ak i n gprocedur es.24, 2 5, 26 , 27,28 Ac tu all y, o u r  appr oach vi a simula tionsw as  i nitiall yinspir ed  by  th e "pl a yful " and"explora tory" spirit of KaiS piekermann'sa nd R ob e rt G ood in's recent  boo k , wh icha im s t o  "'se e wha th ap p ens' when we vary t he  manyinter related condi tions that m i ght affe ct t h eo verall epistem ic pe rformanceo f modern  demo cratic g overnment " ; 21(pv) a lth oug h t hei r ma in focus is o n a di ff erent k ind  of dec isi onpro ble m. 21(pp33-3 6) We ca nno wst ate  ourq uest for  a sse ss men t cri t eria m ore c lear ly .W hic h trait s  o f a vo ti ng  met hod  e xhibi tedi n a  simula tion woul d p r ovid e(n on-conc lusive) evide nc e for thecl aim  thato n e method  "performs well" for ad ecision  pr oblem ? Wh ich featu res  would  su p port t he cla im th at  av o tingm e th od"p erforms be t t er"  than  a noth er fora decision problem ?  Ha ving a soundans wert o  t hes e  q u est io n s w o u ld provide usef ul tools f or in stitutiona l  de si gn. Esp ecially , itw ould al low us to  run some  t ests o n v oting mech anisms o ver kinds of de c is ion p rob lems p ri orto th eir im p lem entat ion. O ur  propo sal c on sists in  FI NA L DR AF T 9 asse ssingvotin g m ethods on  ad eci sion prob lemfocusing o n t hefollo win g  crit eria :  ( 1)T rivia lity validatio n .Ifa l lvoters pref e r the  idea l o u tcome,  the n the voting meth o d always yield s th e ide alo utco me  as a result.Thi se n sures th at  the method  can per fo r m atits be st und er idea l co n dition s on  th e prefere nce  d i stribut io n: it wil l ne ve r yiel d a su b opti m a l outcome when p rovid e d  with ide al in pu ts. (2) Conv ergence to  optimum. T he pro babi lityof thegr oup ch oos in g the idea l  outcomeconve rges to  1  asthe  sizeof t h e  popu lati on  in creases.T h is is  o n e o f th e pro mi sing  ideas sp a rking fr omt he Cond or cet J ury Th e or e m . Some vot ing  meth o d s can prod u ce b e tt e r out comesthan t he aver a gevo ter, pr ovi d e d a compe tence thr e sho ld  issurpasse d;  and  t hei raccuracy increa ses as t he sizeo f  the v oti n g
 an_ideal ordering_for the group to_choose. Following_one_of the_major_treads of epistemic_democracy, we assume_that "the existence of_such an ordering_provides_a productive way to think about group choice problems".1(p60) Epistemic democracy assumes that people_are_reliable, that_is:_they_are mostly right, most of_the time. This assumption has_been explored_and supported on empirical grounds.23 In assessing voting_procedures,_we frame the_issue as a problem concerning how to best capitalize_on people's reliability. Here, we draw_on an intuition_from_extensions_of the Condorcet Jury_Theorem.21 In that sense, this paper_aligns to the growing literature that_explores the potential payoffs of democratic decision-making_procedures.24,25,26,27,28 Actually, our approach via simulations_was initially inspired by the_"playful" and_"exploratory" spirit of Kai Spiekermann's_and Robert Goodin's_recent book,_which aims to_"'see what happens' when we vary_the many interrelated_conditions that might affect the overall_epistemic_performance of modern_democratic_government";21(pv)_although their_main focus is_on_a different_kind_of decision problem.21(pp33-36) We can now_state_our quest for assessment criteria more clearly._Which traits of a_voting_method exhibited in a_simulation would provide (non-conclusive) evidence_for the claim that one method_"performs well"_for a_decision problem? Which features would support the claim that a voting_method "performs better" than another for_a decision problem? Having_a sound_answer_to these questions_would_provide useful_tools for institutional design. Especially, it would_allow us_to run some tests on voting_mechanisms over kinds of_decision_problems prior to their implementation. Our_proposal consists in FI NA L_DR AF T 9 assessing_voting_methods_on a decision problem focusing_on the following criteria: (1) Triviality_validation. If all_voters prefer the ideal outcome, then the_voting_method always yields the ideal outcome_as_a result. This ensures that the_method_can_perform at its best under_ideal conditions on the preference distribution:_it will never yield a suboptimal outcome when provided_with ideal inputs._(2) Convergence to optimum. The_probability_of_the group choosing the ideal outcome converges to 1 as_the size_of the population_increases. This is one of the promising ideas sparking from_the Condorcet Jury Theorem. Some voting methods_can produce better outcomes than the average voter, provided a competence_threshold is surpassed; and their accuracy increases as_the size of the voting