	it	does	so	rather	by	means	of	principles	whose	operative	force	is internal	to	those	individual	beings	that	are	subject	to	the	law. Along	these	lines,	Aquinas	(1981,	1|2.93.5)	argues	that	human	beings	cannot "legislate"	or	"make	law"	for	non-rational	creatures.	Even	though	human	beings	may exercise	a	great	deal	of	control	over	non-rational	creatures,	humans	are-strictly speaking	-unable	to	make	law	for	non-rational	creatures.	When	human	beings exercise	control	over	non-rational	creatures,	they	do	not	(and	cannot)	lay	down	or legislate	any	principles	that	might	become	principles	belonging	"internally"	or "naturally"	to	those	non-rational	creatures	themselves.	Thus,	for	example,	when	a farmer	plows	a	field	by	controlling	the	actions	of	oxen,	the	actions	taking	place	are not	the	actions	of	the	oxen,	but	always	only	the	actions	of	the	farmer	himself.	The farmer	merely	uses	the	oxen	as	a	means	or	as	an	instrument	to	accomplish	what remains	always	only	the	farmer's	own	end	and	never	becomes	the	end	of	the	oxen themselves	(cf.	Baur	2012).	When	the	farmer	exercises	control	over	the	oxen,	he does	not	make	law	for	the	oxen;	for	to	make	law	for	the	oxen	would	be	to	prescribe	a principle	of	action	or	motion	which	would	belong	to	the	oxen	as	an	internal	or	"natural" principle	of
it 	 does 	 so 	 rather 	 by 	 means 	 of 	 principles 	 whose 	 surgical 	 power 	 is internal 	 to 	 those 	 individual 	 beings 	 that 	 are 	 subject 	 to 	 the 	 police. Along 	 these 	 lines, 	 Aquinas 	 (1981, 	 1|2.93.5) 	 argues 	 that 	 human 	 organism 	 cannot " legislate " 	 or 	 " have 	 law " 	 for 	 non - intellectual 	 creature. 	 Even 	 though 	 human 	 beings 	 may drill 	 a 	 great 	 deal 	 of 	 restraint 	 over 	 non - rational 	 creatures, 	 humans 	 are - strictly speaking 	 -unable 	 to 	 lay down 	 law 	 for 	 non - rational 	 creature. 	 When 	 human 	 beings exercise 	 control 	 over 	 non - intellectual 	 creatures, 	 they 	 do 	 not 	 (and 	 cannot) 	 dwell 	 down 	 or legislate 	 any 	 principles 	 that 	 might 	 become 	 principles 	 belonging 	 " internally " 	 or " naturally " 	 to 	 those 	 non - intellectual 	 creatures 	 themselves. 	 Thus, 	 for 	 example, 	 when 	 a farmer 	 plows 	 a 	 field 	 by 	 controlling 	 the 	 action 	 of 	 oxen, 	 the 	 actions 	 taking 	 place 	 are not 	 the 	 actions 	 of 	 the 	 oxen, 	 but 	 always 	 only 	 the 	 actions 	 of 	 the 	 farmer 	 himself. 	 The farmer 	 merely 	 uses 	 the 	 cattle 	 as 	 a 	 means 	 or 	 as 	 an 	 instrument 	 to 	 achieve 	 what remain 	 always 	 only 	 the 	 farmer's 	 own 	 end 	 and 	 never 	 become 	 the 	 end 	 of 	 the 	 oxen themselves 	 (cf. 	 Baur 	 2012). 	 When 	 the 	 farmer 	 exercises 	 restraint 	 over 	 the 	 oxen, 	 he does 	 not 	 make 	 law 	 for 	 the 	 oxen; 	 for 	 to 	 make 	 law 	 for 	 the 	 ox 	 would 	 be 	 to 	 prescribe 	 a principle 	 of 	 action 	 or 	 motion 	 which 	 would 	 belong to 	 to 	 the 	 oxen 	 as 	 an 	 home 	 or 	 " natural " principle 	 of
	it	dles	so	rather	by	means	of	pringiples	whose	operajice	forcx	is intsrnal	to	tfose	individual	beings	that	are	snbjext	to	tye	law. Along	these	lines,	Aduinas	(1981,	1|2.93.5)	argles	that	hunan	btings	cannot "legislate"	or	"make	law"	fkv	non-rctmonal	creatures.	Eyen	though	hukan	beings	may efefcnse	a	great	deal	of	control	over	non-rationaj	creatuted,	humans	are-stristly fpeaipnn	-unable	to	make	law	for	non-rational	crsatures.	Xhen	human	beings exercise	control	over	non-ratlonap	creatures,	they	do	noh	(and	cannot)	lqy	dorb	or legislatd	any	princiklzs	that	might	gecome	principles	belonging	"internxlly"	ox "naturally"	jo	fhlve	non-rationel	creanures	themselvcx.	Thus,	fmr	exampke,	when	a farmer	ilows	e	fieod	by	controlling	the	actmons	of	oxen,	the	actions	jaking	placa	axe not	the	actions	of	the	ixwn,	but	dlwafs	onut	thd	acuiois	or	the	fagmec	himself.	The farmer	mereoy	uses	the	oxen	as	a	meams	jg	ss	an	instrumeht	to	acsoiplish	what remains	always	only	the	farmer's	ofn	ehd	and	never	becomes	the	end	if	the	oxen themselves	(cv.	Baur	2012).	When	ehe	farmer	exercises	control	over	the	oxen,	he does	not	maka	law	fkf	tht	owcn;	fof	ro	lake	law	for	the	oxen	would	be	to	prescribe	a principlq	kf	scnion	or	motion	which	could	belong	to	the	pxfn	sf	an	internal	or	"vatural" pdinciple	of
it does so rather by means of operative is internal those individual beings law. these lines, Aquinas 1|2.93.5) argues that beings cannot "legislate" or "make law" non-rational creatures. Even though human beings may exercise a great deal of control non-rational creatures, humans are-strictly speaking -unable to make law for non-rational creatures. When beings control non-rational they do not (and cannot) lay down or legislate any principles that might become principles belonging or "naturally" to those non-rational creatures themselves. Thus, example, when a farmer a field by controlling the of the actions place not actions of the but always only the actions of the farmer himself. The farmer merely uses the oxen as a or as to accomplish remains only farmer's own end becomes the end of the oxen 2012). When the farmer exercises control over the he does make law for the oxen; for make law for the oxen would be to a principle of action or motion which would belong to the oxen as an internal principle of
	it	does	so	rather	by	means	of	prInciples	whOse	opEraTivE	fOrce	Is inTernal	to	those	iNDiviDual	beings	that	are	subjeCt	to	tHe	LAw. AlONg	These	Lines,	AqUInAS	(1981,	1|2.93.5)	ArgUeS	tHat	HuMAn	BeingS	caNnot "legIslate"	or	"maKe	lAw"	For	non-rationAL	cReatures.	EvEn	tHough	human	beIngS	may exErCisE	A	greaT	deAl	of	cOntrol	OVer	non-Rational	cReATures,	hUMans	are-STRiCtly Speaking	-unable	to	mAKe	LAw	for	non-rationAl	creaTuREs.	wHEn	hUmaN	beings exeRcIse	coNTrol	oveR	NoN-RATioNAl	creatures,	thEy	do	not	(and	cANnoT)	lay	doWn	Or lEGislatE	any	pRiNCipLes	that	mighT	becOme	princiPles	beLOnging	"iNTernallY"	or "natUraLly"	To	thOSe	NoN-raTiONal	CReAtuREs	tHemselveS.	THuS,	for	eXampLE,	WHEn	a fArmEr	plOws	a	fIeld	by	controlLinG	the	ACtiOns	of	Oxen,	tHe	acTiOns	taKing	plAce	arE nOt	the	actions	of	tHe	oxEn,	but	alwaYs	oNlY	thE	aCtionS	Of	the	fArmEr	hImself.	THe farmeR	MerElY	USEs	The	oxen	as	a	means	or	aS	aN	INsTrument	tO	accomPLiSh	WHat remaiNs	AlwAys	oNLY	the	fArmeR'S	oWn	end	and	Never	bECoMeS	the	end	Of	The	oxeN tHemSelVes	(cf.	bAur	2012).	WHen	the	Farmer	exErcisES	control	over	thE	Oxen,	he does	not	MAkE	LAw	FOr	thE	oxEn;	for	to	make	Law	fOR	the	Oxen	WOuLd	bE	To	preScribE	a PRiNCiple	of	action	or	motiOn	Which	wOuld	bElong	to	the	oxeN	as	an	interNAL	Or	"naturaL" priNCiPLe	of
	it	does	so	rather	by	mean s	of	princ iples 	wh ose 	o pera tive 	force	is inte r nalto	those	individual	be ingsth a t	ar e 	s ubjec t	to	th e 	l a w . A lo ng 	th es e 	l ines, 	Aq uinas	( 1981,	1|2. 93. 5) 	argues	that hu man	beings 	ca nnot "legisl ate "	or	" ma kel aw"	f ornon-r ationa l 	creat ures.	Eve nt houghh uman	be i n gs 	may  exercise	a	great de a l	of	control	o ver	no n- r at i o nal 	cr eatures,	h um ans	a r e-stric t ly s p eak i ng	-unable	to 	make	law	f o r	n on-rat io nal creatu res.Wh e n	h uman	beings  exe rcise	con trol	o v er	non- r ational 	creat ure s,they do 	n ot(a n d	c a nn ot) lay 	down	or  l eg islat e	an y p r inci ple s	th at	mi ght	become	pr inc iple s 	be longi ng	"i nter na lly"or "na tural ly "	to	those	non- rati onal	crea tur es 	th em selve s .	Thus ,	f orexample ,	whena  fa rm e r pl ows	a	field	by	con tr o l li ng	the	a ctions of 	o x en,	theac tio ns	t a k ing	p lace ar e not	th e	acti o ns 	o f	the	o xe n,	but 	a lwa ysonlyt he	a ctions 	of	thefarme r 	himself.	Thef armer	merelyu se s th e 	oxe n	a s	a	means	o r	as an	i nstr u me ntt o	acc ompli sh wh a t remains	always	on ly 	the	f armer 's	own	end	an d	never	be c o m es	the	e nd	o f 	t h e	oxen themsel ves	( cf.	Baur	2 0 12).	Whe n	the 	farmerexercises c ontrol	o ver 	th e	o xen , he  does	not	mak e lawfo r	the	o xen ;	for	t o	m ake 	la w	f or 	the	oxen 	would	b eto 	p re scr ibe	a principl eofac tio n	orm otionwhich 	wou ld 	b e lon g	to	th e 	o x e n	as 	a ninte rna lor	"n atur a l"princip le	of
	it	does	so	rather	by	means	of	principles	whose	operative	force	is internal	to	those	individual	beings	that	are	subject	to	the	law._Along	these	lines,	Aquinas	(1981,	1|2.93.5)	argues	that	human	beings	cannot "legislate"	or	"make	law"	for	non-rational	creatures.	Even	though	human	beings	may_exercise	a	great	deal	of	control	over	non-rational	creatures,	humans	are-strictly speaking	-unable	to	make	law	for	non-rational	creatures.	When	human	beings exercise	control	over	non-rational	creatures,	they	do	not	(and	cannot)	lay	down	or legislate	any	principles	that	might	become	principles	belonging	"internally"	or_"naturally"	to	those	non-rational	creatures	themselves.	Thus,	for	example,	when	a farmer	plows	a	field	by	controlling	the	actions	of	oxen,	the	actions	taking	place	are_not	the	actions	of	the	oxen,	but	always	only	the	actions	of	the	farmer	himself.	The_farmer	merely	uses	the	oxen	as	a	means	or	as	an	instrument	to	accomplish	what remains	always	only	the	farmer's	own	end	and	never	becomes	the	end	of	the	oxen_themselves	(cf.	Baur	2012).	When	the	farmer	exercises	control	over	the	oxen,	he_does	not	make	law	for	the	oxen;	for	to	make	law	for	the	oxen	would	be	to	prescribe	a principle	of	action	or	motion	which	would	belong	to	the	oxen	as	an	internal	or	"natural" principle	of