 language LK is true. (b) Everything Donald Trump says in his language LT is true. For example, we consider that Donald Trump claims (a) in LT and Kim Jong-un claims (b) in LK. Tarski (1944, p. 350) has noticed that the distinction between the objectand the 10 meta-languages is only a relative one. With respect to Trump's claim (a), his language LT has to be higher than Kim's language LK in virtue of Tarski's stricture. That is, LK is an object-language and LT is a meta-language of LK because the semantical concept, 'true,' is to be found only on the meta-language LT. On the other hand, with respect to Kim's claim, LK is a meta-language of LT since his claim (b) contains the semantical concept, 'true,' which is to be found only on LK. Thus, LK and LT are both objectand meta-languages. It is not easy to apply Tarski's hierarchical distinction to the Kim-Trump case. A possible defense to this criticism is that the meanings of 'true' in (a) and (b) are different. (a) has a true-predicate, 'is trueT,' which is expressible in LT but not in LK. (b) has a truth-predicate, 'is trueK,' expressible in LK but not in LT. (a') Everything Kim Jong-un says in LK is trueT. (b') Everything Donald Trump says in LT is trueK. Each has different truth-predicate, so we can distinguish between objectand meta-languages. However, Kim and Trump may not share the same meaning of the semantical notion of 'true.' They cannot communicate with each other. Consequently, Tarski's hierarchical T-schema fails to explain a general notion of truth. Tarski rejects the view that the semantical notion of 'true' is expressible in the object language and pursues the consistency of the object language. On the other hand, Graham Priest (2006, pp.17–18) wants to use a truth predicate in the object language. Considers the sentence 'All the sentences on page 11 of the dissertation entitled On Proof-Theoretic Approaches to the Paradoxes are true.' Priest (2006, pp. 18–20) thinks that this sentence
language LK is true. (b) Everything Donald Trump says in his language LT is genuine. For case, we consider that Donald Trump claims (a) in LT and Kim Jong - un claims (b-complex vitamin) in LK. Tarski (1944, p. 350) has noticed that the distinction between the objectand the 10 meta - linguistic process is entirely a relative one. With esteem to Trump's claim (a), his language LT suffer to be higher than Kim's lyric LK in merit of Tarski's stricture. That is, LK is an object - linguistic process and LT is a meta - language of LK because the semantical concept,' true,' is to be rule only on the meta - language LT. On the early hand, with respect to Kim's title, LK is a meta - language of LT since his title (b) contains the semantical concept,' true,' which is to be found only on LK. therefore, LK and LT are both objectand meta - languages. It is not easy to apply Tarski's hierarchical distinction to the Kim - Trump case. A possible refutation to this criticism is that the meanings of' true' in (a) and (b) are different. (a) has a true - predicate,' is trueT,' which is expressible in LT but not in LK. (b) has a truth - predicate,' is trueK,' expressible in LK but not in LT. (a') Everything Kim Jong - un says in LK is trueT. (bacillus') Everything Donald Trump says in LT is trueK. Each has unlike accuracy - predicate, so we can distinguish between objectand meta - languages. However, Kim and Trump may not share the same meaning of the semantical impression of' true.' They cannot convey with each other. Consequently, Tarski's hierarchical T - schema fails to excuse a general notion of truth. Tarski rejects the view that the semantical notion of' true' is expressible in the object language and pursues the consistency of the object language. On the early hand, Graham Priest (2006, pp.17–18) want to practice a accuracy predicate in the object language. Considers the sentence' All the sentences on page 11 of the dissertation entitled On Proof - Theoretic Approaches to the Paradoxes are true.' Priest (2006, pp. 18–20) think that this sentence
 lajguage LK is true. (b) Evernthing Donald Tromp says in hia languaee LT is true. For example, we cinsidtg that Donald Trump cuaims (a) ij LT and Kim Hong-un clamjs (b) in LK. Taddki (1944, '. 350) has noticed jhat the disdinction betwean tke objectand the 10 meta-languages is ogly a rrlwtive one. With reskece to Nrmmp's claim (a), his language LT has to be iigher than Kim'x language LK in virtue of Tardki's stricture. Thah is, LK is qn ofhect-language and LT is a meta-languzge of LK because the semanticau coneept, 'true,' iw ro hg found only on tre meta-language LT. Ot the oyher hand, with revpext to Kim's claim, LK iv a meta-language os LT sinca kis claim (b) contains rhw semdntiwal zincdpt, 'tcue,' which is to be fouhd only on OK. Thus, LK and LT ate voth objectans meta-jagguages. It is not easy to apply Tarski's hisrarchical distinction ro the Kim-Trump case. W possiblq defense to this criticism is that the meanings mf 'trne' in (a) xbd (b) are different. (a) has a true-predicate, 'is truqF,' ehpch is expressiblc in LT but not in LN. (n) has a truth-ptedicatz, 'ia trueK,' expressiblf in LK but bot in LT. (a') Eferything Kim Jong-un says ib LK is trueN. (b') Wverything Donald Crump says iu LT ix trurK. Each has different txuth-prsdicate, so ae can diaginguish between obmecdand meta-languages. However, Kim and Vrump may nog shsre thq same meajing of the semantical nltion ox 'true.' Thej cannot communicate with each other. Consequemtny, Narski's hnerarcmical T-schema fwils to explaiu a genexal nogion of trlth. Tarskm rejects thq view that tvg semantical iotion of 'truw' is expresrkble in the obkect langlaye and puesues the consistekcy ow the object lanybate. On the other havd, Drwhem Pryast (2006, pp.17–18) wantv to usd a trjth predicabe kn tne object language. Cmnsisers the sentence 'Slj the sebtences jn page 11 of tne dissertation enuitled On Proog-Thgoretic Approaches to the Paradkxes are hruc.' Priest (2006, pp. 18–20) thikks jhat this szntence
language LK is true. (b) Everything Donald in language LT true. For example, claims in LT and Jong-un claims (b) LK. Tarski (1944, p. 350) has that the distinction between the objectand the 10 meta-languages is only a relative With respect to Trump's claim (a), his language LT has to be higher Kim's LK virtue Tarski's stricture. That is, LK is an object-language and LT is a meta-language of LK because semantical concept, 'true,' is to be found only the meta-language LT. On other hand, with respect to claim, is a of since claim (b) contains semantical concept, 'true,' which is to be found only on LK. Thus, LK and LT are both meta-languages. It easy to Tarski's distinction the Kim-Trump case. defense to this criticism is that 'true' in (a) and (b) are different. (a) a true-predicate, trueT,' which is expressible in LT not in LK. (b) has a truth-predicate, 'is expressible in LK but not in LT. (a') Everything Kim Jong-un says in LK is Everything Donald Trump says LT is trueK. has truth-predicate, we distinguish between meta-languages. However, Kim and Trump may not share the same meaning the semantical notion of 'true.' They cannot communicate with each Tarski's T-schema fails to a general notion of Tarski the view that the of is object and the consistency of the language. On the other hand, Priest (2006, pp.17–18) wants in the object language. Considers the sentence 'All sentences on page 11 of the dissertation On Proof-Theoretic Approaches to the Paradoxes are true.' Priest (2006, pp. 18–20) that this
 language LK is true. (b) EverythiNg Donald TrUmp saYs iN hiS lAnguAge Lt is true. For examPLe, we Consider that Donald TrumP claiMs (A) In LT ANd kim JoNg-un claIMs (B) IN LK. taRsKi (1944, p. 350) HaS NoTiced ThaT the disTinction beTweEn The objectand THe 10 Meta-languaGes Is only a relatIve One. WitH rEspECt to TRumP's claIm (a), his LAnguagE LT has to bE hIGher thAN Kim's laNGUaGe LK In virtue of Tarski's STrICture. That is, LK iS an objEcT-LaNGUagE anD LT is a meta-LaNguagE Of LK becAUsE THE seMAntical concepT, 'true,' is to be FOunD only oN tHe mETa-langUage Lt. ON The Other hand, wiTh reSpect to KiM's claiM, lK is a meTA-languaGe of LT SinCe hIs clAIm (B) cOntAiNS thE SeManTIcaL concept, 'TrUe,' Which Is to BE FOUnd oNly On LK. thus, Lk and LT are both ObjEctaND meTa-lanGuageS. It iS nOt easY to appLy TarSkI's hierarchical dIstiNction to tHe KIm-truMp Case. A POssiblE deFenSe to thiS criticISm iS tHAT ThE meanings of 'true' in (a) AnD (B) ArE differeNt. (a) has A TrUe-PRedicate, 'Is TruET,' whICH is exPresSIbLe in LT buT not in lk. (b) HaS a truth-PrEdicatE, 'iS trUeK,' ExpreSSiblE in LK bUt not in Lt. (a') EveRYthing Kim Jong-uN Says in LK is truEt. (b') eVErYThinG DoNald Trump saYs in lt is tRueK. eAcH haS DiffeRent tRuTH-pREdicate, so we can distiNgUish beTween Objectand meta-Languages. HOWEVer, Kim anD TruMP mAY not share the saMe meaNing of the sEMantical NotioN of 'true.' THey cannot COMmunicatE wiTh eAch OthER. coNsequently, TarSKI's hiErArchicaL T-sChema faIls To eXplAin A gEneral notIon of truTh. taRsKi RejEcts tHE view thaT tHe sEmAntIcal nOTion of 'True' iS expReSsIBle In the obJEcT LAnguAgE aNd puRsuEs The coNsisTEncY of the oBject langUagE. on thE oThEr hand, GRaham Priest (2006, pp.17–18) WaNts to use a tRuTh pRedicaTE In the objEct language. Considers the SEntence 'all The seNtenCes on page 11 Of tHe dissErtATion enTitled on ProOf-theOREtic APPRoAchEs To the ParadOXEs aRe truE.' PRiesT (2006, pp. 18–20) thinKs that this sentence
 language LK is true. (b)Everything  Dona ldTru mp  say s in  his languageL T is  true. For example, we  cons id e r th a tDonal d Trump cl a i ms(a )inLT an d Kim  Jo ng-un c laims (b)inLK . Tarski (19 4 4,  p. 350) h asnoticed that  th e dist in cti o n bet wee n the  objec t and th e 10 meta -l a nguage s  is onl y arela tive one. With re s pe c t to Trump's c laim ( a) ,  h i s  la ngu age LT has  t o beh igher t h an K i m's language LK i n virtue of Tar ski'sst ric t ure. T hat i s, LKis an objec t-la nguage an d LT i s  a meta - languag e of L K b eca uset he  s ema nt i cal co nce p t,'true,'is  t o befoun d o n ly o n t he m eta-l anguage LT. O n t he o t her  hand , wit h re sp ect t o Kim' s cla im , LK is a meta- lang uage of L T s in cehi s cla i m (b)con tai ns thesemanti c alco n c e pt , 'true,' which is  t o be  found o nly on LK .T hus, LKan d L T ar e bothobje c ta nd meta- langua g es .It is n ot  easyto  ap ply  Tars k i'shierar chical d istin c tion to the Ki m -Trump case.A  p o s si b le d efe nse to this  cri t icis m is th att he me aning so f' true' in (a) and (b )are di ffere nt. (a) has a  true-pred i c a te, 'istrue T ,' which is expre ssibl e in LT bu t  not inLK. ( b) has a  truth-pr e d icate, ' istru eK, ' e x p re ssible in LKb u t no tin LT.(a' ) Every thi ngKim  Jo ng -un saysin LK is  t ru eT .(b' ) Eve r ything D on ald  T rum p say s  in LT  is t rueK .Ea c h h as diff e re n t  tru th -p redi cat e,  so w e ca n  di stingui sh betwee n o b ject an dmeta-la nguages. Howe ve r, Kim and  T rum p mayn o t sharethe same meaning of the semanti cal  noti on o f 'true.'  Th ey can not commun icatewithea cho t her.C o ns equ en tly, Tarsk i ' s h ierar ch ical  T-sche ma fails to explai n  ageneral notio n o f tr u t h.  Ta r sk i  re je c tst h e view that the  semantica ln ot ion of 'tr u e'is  expres sible i n the objectlanguageand pursu es  the c ons istency of  the obj ect langu a ge. O n  t he ot her  hand,  G rah am Pr iest ( 2 006 , pp. 17–18)  w ants t o use  a  truth p redicate in the objectlangua ge. C ons iders the  se n ten ce 'All t he s entences o n p age  11 o f t h e dis sert a ti one ntitl ed O n  Proof-Th e or eti c Ap proaches to t h e P arado xes are tr ue.'  Priest (2006, pp .  18–20) thinks  tha t thi s s e nten ce 
 language_LK is_true. (b) Everything Donald_Trump says_in_his language_LT_is true. For_example, we consider_that Donald Trump claims_(a) in LT_and_Kim Jong-un claims (b) in LK. Tarski (1944, p. 350) has noticed that the_distinction_between the_objectand_the_10 meta-languages is only a_relative one. With respect to_Trump's claim_(a), his language LT has to be higher_than_Kim's language LK_in virtue of Tarski's stricture. That is, LK is_an object-language and LT is a_meta-language of LK_because_the_semantical concept, 'true,' is_to be found only on the_meta-language LT. On the other hand,_with respect to Kim's claim, LK is_a meta-language of LT since his_claim (b) contains the semantical_concept, 'true,'_which is to be found_only on LK._Thus, LK_and LT are_both objectand meta-languages. It is not_easy to apply_Tarski's hierarchical distinction to the Kim-Trump_case._A possible defense_to_this_criticism is_that the meanings_of_'true' in_(a)_and (b) are different. (a) has_a_true-predicate, 'is trueT,' which is expressible in_LT but not in_LK._(b) has a truth-predicate,_'is trueK,' expressible in LK_but not in LT. (a') Everything_Kim Jong-un_says in_LK is trueT. (b') Everything Donald Trump says in LT is_trueK. Each has different truth-predicate, so_we can distinguish between_objectand meta-languages._However,_Kim and Trump_may_not share_the same meaning of the semantical notion_of 'true.'_They cannot communicate with each other._Consequently, Tarski's hierarchical T-schema_fails_to explain a general notion of_truth. Tarski rejects the view that_the semantical notion of 'true'_is_expressible_in the object language and_pursues the consistency of the object_language. On the_other hand, Graham Priest (2006, pp.17–18) wants_to_use a truth predicate in the_object_language. Considers the sentence 'All the_sentences_on_page 11 of the dissertation_entitled On Proof-Theoretic Approaches to the_Paradoxes are true.' Priest (2006, pp. 18–20) thinks that_this sentence