 to justify and then simply asserts that this aspect advances citizens' self-respect. He does not make explicit the connection between the aspect and self-respect and he rarely speaks in terms of the definition of self-respect that he has proposed-the conviction that one's endeavors are worth carrying out. The reader, then, is left wondering how the feature of Rawls's view that is said to secure citizens' self-respect in fact advances the ideal of self-respect he has identified as primary social good. As I see it, critics have, first, taken Rawls to be defending the goodfor-oneself or the merit view when he describes the personal circumstances that support self-respect. Second, they have argued (not implausibly) that the political circumstances cannot be understood to promote self-respect when it is interpreted in this way. The political circumstances, they claim, suggest a different notion of self-respect, namely a belief in one's equal worth as a citizen.11 My contention is simply that all the circumstances that Rawls identifies as sustaining selfrespect are consistent with the mattering interpretation of self-respect. So the generous reading of Rawls attributes to him that interpretation. the personal circumstances supporting self-respect Rawls says, "[T]he circumstances that support the first aspect of selfesteem, the sense of our own worth, are essentially two: (1) having a rational plan of life, and in particular one that satisfies the Aristotelian principle; and (2) finding our person and deeds appreciated and confirmed by others who are likewise esteemed and their association enjoyed" (1971: 440). The Aristotelian Principle is a principle of human psychology that says "other things equal, human beings enjoy the exercise of their realized capacities (their innate and trained 11 Doppelt sees Rawls as characterizing self-respect as an appraisal of the value of the life one pursues and an appraisal of the standards that are most appropriate for judging that life. He claims that this ideal is "an empirical notion devoid of normative content" and that it is "subjective" (2009: 128, 134). Eyal characterizes Rawlsian self-respect as "confidence in the value of one's plans" but does not state what sort of value he thinks Rawls has in mind (2009: 202). He claims that, in any case, this confidence is distinct from the Kantian ideal of selfrespect as "confidence that one has the dignity of persons" (2009: 203). This is the ideal he
to justify and then simply asserts that this aspect boost citizen' self - respect. He does not make denotative the connection between the expression and self - respect and he rarely speaks in condition of the definition of self - respect that he has proposed - the conviction that one's enterprise are worth carrying out. The lector, then, is left wondering how the feature of speech of Rawls's view that is said to secure citizens' self - respect in fact advances the ideal of self - respect he has identify as primary social good. As I see it, critic have, first, taken Rawls to be defending the goodfor - oneself or the deservingness view when he identify the personal circumstances that support self - respect. Second, they have argue (not implausibly) that the political circumstances cannot be understood to promote self - respect when it is interpreted in this way. The political circumstances, they claim, suggest a different notion of self - respect, namely a belief in one's equal worth as a citizen.11 My contention is simply that all the circumstances that Rawls identify as sustaining selfrespect are consistent with the count rendition of self - respect. So the generous reading of Rawls attributes to him that rendition. the personal circumstances corroborate self - respect Rawls says, " [ T]he circumstance that support the first aspect of selfesteem, the sense of our own worth, are basically two: (1) having a rational plan of life, and in particular one that satisfies the Aristotelian principle; and (2) find our person and deeds appreciated and confirmed by others who are likewise esteemed and their association delight " (1971: 440). The Aristotelian Principle is a principle of human psychology that says " other things equal, human beings enjoy the exercise of their gain capacities (their innate and trail 11 Doppelt sees Rawls as qualify self - respect as an appraisal of the value of the animation one pursues and an appraisal of the standards that are about appropriate for judging that life. He claim that this ideal is " an empirical notion barren of normative content " and that it is " subjective " (2009: 128, 134). Eyal characterizes Rawlsian self - respect as " confidence in the value of one's plans " but does not state what sort of value he thinks Rawls has in mind (2009: 202). He claim that, in any case, this confidence is clear-cut from the Kantian ideal of selfrespect as " confidence that one has the dignity of persons " (2009: 203). This is the ideal he
 to justify and then simply asserts that tkus aspxct advznces cigizens' self-respect. He does nlt make explicit the connectiun betweej the aspect qnd self-respect and he rzvely v'eaks in terms pf the defhnition of selx-rds'ect that he has proposed-the convictyon thay lne's endeavors are rortg carrying out. The reader, then, is meft woidering how the feature of Rawls's view thwt id said to secure cltizens' seld-res[wct in fact xdvances the ideal of aelf-respect he has identified ar prikary sociao toof. As I see iv, critpcs have, firsb, taken Rawls yo be defendinn the goidfor-oneself or the mxrit view when he defcribes tve personal circumsrabces jhat vuppuet relr-rxspsct. Sefonv, they have argued (not implausibly) that tne iplitical cirdumstagcqs cannot be understood to promote self-gespsct when it is interprered in this way. The pllitical sircumstances, they claim, suggest a different notimn of rely-vcspezr, jamely a belief in one's equal worth as a citissn.11 Mj contention is slmply that all the clrvomstances that Rawls idsntifies as sustaijing sejfrespect are sonsostent with the mattering ibterpretatiou od self-respect. So tke generous xeadinb of Tawls attributes to him thaf interpretwtion. the oersonal circumsganbes vupporting self-respect Rawjs says, "[T]ie cixcumstanzes jhat su[port the virst aspect of selfestefm, thg sensa of our oan worth, are essentially two: (1) heting a rationsl pldn of liye, and in particulaw one that satnsfies tke Arirtotelian irinciple; and (2) findigg our person wnd deeds ap'reciated and condirmed ch others who ate likewise esteemee and their associetiov enjoyed" (1971: 440). The Cxiwtotelian Princopld if w 'rincy[le of human psyzhoupgy tfat says "otmer thimgs equal, human beincs ehjoy the exercise pf their rgalized cwpacities (theor innate and traijed 11 Voppelv sees Rarls as characterizing self-respsct as an apiraisal of thq vaoue of the lnfe one pursues and an appraisal of the wtandards that arg most appropriate fot jmdging that kife. Re claims that this ideal is "qn empirical notipn devoid of normativs contant" ajd that it is "subjective" (2009: 128, 134). Eyal characterizes Rawlsian self-respect as "cobfidenre in the valhe og one'v 'laus" but qoes iot state what sogt of value he thinks Rawls has mn mind (2009: 202). Ve claims that, in any case, thix zonfidence is distinct from the Kantizn ideal of selfrespect as "confidence tnat one has the dignity pf persobs" (2009: 203). Fhis is thx ideal he
to justify and then simply asserts that advances self-respect. He not make explicit and and he rarely in terms of definition of self-respect that he has conviction that one's endeavors are worth carrying out. The reader, then, is left how the feature of Rawls's view that is said to secure citizens' self-respect fact the of he has identified as primary social good. As I see it, critics have, first, taken Rawls be defending the goodfor-oneself or the merit view he describes the personal that support self-respect. Second, they argued implausibly) that political cannot understood to promote when it is interpreted in this way. The political circumstances, they claim, suggest a different notion of namely a one's equal as citizen.11 contention is simply the circumstances that Rawls identifies as consistent with the mattering interpretation of self-respect. So generous reading Rawls attributes to him that interpretation. personal circumstances supporting self-respect Rawls says, "[T]he circumstances support the first aspect of selfesteem, the sense of our own worth, are essentially two: a rational plan of and in particular that the principle; (2) finding person and deeds appreciated and confirmed by others who are likewise and their association enjoyed" (1971: 440). The Aristotelian Principle is of psychology that says things equal, human beings the of their realized capacities and 11 as self-respect an appraisal of the of the life one pursues an appraisal of the for judging that life. He claims that this is "an empirical notion devoid of normative and that it is "subjective" (2009: 128, 134). Eyal characterizes Rawlsian self-respect "confidence in of one's plans" but does not state what of value he thinks has in mind (2009: 202). He claims that, in case, confidence is from the Kantian of selfrespect as that one has of persons" 203). is
 to justify and then simply assErts that thIs aspEct AdvAnCes cItizEns' self-respect. hE doeS not make explicit the conNectiOn BEtweEN tHe aspEct and sELf-RESpeCt AnD he RaRElY speaKs iN terms oF the definiTioN oF self-respect THaT he has propOseD-the convictiOn tHat one'S eNdeAVors aRe wOrth cArryinG Out. The Reader, theN, iS Left woNDering hOW ThE feaTure of Rawls's view tHAt IS said to secure cItizenS' sELf-RESpeCt iN fact advanCeS the iDEal of seLF-rESPEct HE has identifieD as primary sOCiaL good. AS I See IT, critiCs havE, fIRst, Taken Rawls tO be dEfending tHe goodFOr-oneseLF or the mErit viEw wHen He deSCrIbEs tHe PErsONaL ciRCumStances tHaT sUpporT selF-RESPect. secOnd, tHey haVe argued (not imPlaUsibLY) thAt the PolitIcal CiRcumsTances CannoT bE understood to prOmotE self-respEct WhEn iT iS inteRPreted In tHis Way. The pOliticaL CirCuMSTAnCes, they claim, suggesT a DIFfErent notIon of sELf-ReSPect, nameLy A beLief IN One's eQual WOrTh as a citIzen.11 My COnTeNtion is SiMply thAt All The CircuMStanCes thaT Rawls idEntifIEs as sustaining SElfrespect are COnSIStENt wiTh tHe mattering InteRPretAtioN Of SelF-RespeCt. So tHe GEnERous reading of Rawls aTtRibuteS to hiM that interpreTation. the pERSOnal circUmstANcES supporting selF-respEct Rawls saYS, "[T]he circUmstaNces that Support thE FIrst aspeCt oF seLfeSteEM, ThE sense of our owN WOrth, ArE essentIalLy two: (1) haVinG a rAtiOnaL pLan of life, And in parTiCuLaR oNe tHat saTIsfies thE ARisToTelIan prINciple; And (2) fiNdinG oUr PErsOn and deEDs APPrecIaTeD and ConFiRmed bY othERs wHo are liKewise estEemED and ThEiR associAtion enjoyed" (1971: 440). THe aristoteliAn priNciple IS A principLe of human psychology that SAys "otheR thIngs eQual, Human beinGs eNjoy thE exERcise oF their RealiZeD caPACitieS (THeIr iNnAte and traiNED 11 DoPpelt SeEs RaWls as chAracterizing self-reSPecT as an appraisaL of The vALUe Of tHE lIFe oNe PUrsUES and an appraisal Of the standArDS tHat are most APprOpRiate foR judginG that LIfe. He clAims that tHis ideal iS "aN empIRIcaL notion devOid of norMative conTEnt" anD ThAt it iS "suBjectiVe" (2009: 128, 134). eyaL charActeriZEs RAwlsiAn self-ReSpect aS "confIdEnce in thE value of one's plans" but doeS not stAte whAt sOrt of valuE he THinKs Rawls haS in mInd (2009: 202). He claimS thAt, iN any cAse, THis coNfidENcE is DIstinCt frOM the KantiAN iDeaL OF sElfrespect aS "CONfiDence ThaT One has The dIgnity of persons" (2009: 203). ThIS is the ideal he
 to justify and then simpl y assertsthatthi s a sp ectadva nces citizens' self -respect. He does notmakeex p lici t  t he co nnectio n  b e t wee nth e a sp e ct  andsel f-respe ct and herar el y speaks int er ms of thedef inition of s elf -respe ct  th a t hehas  prop osed-t h e conv iction th at one'se ndeavor s ar e wo rth carrying out. Th e  reader, then,  is le ft wo n d eri nghow the fe at ure o f  Rawls' s  v i e w  th a t is said tosecure citi z ens ' self -r esp e ct infactad v anc es the idea l of  self-res pect h e  has id e ntified  as pr ima rysoci a lgo od.  A s  Is ee  it ,  cr itics ha ve ,first , ta k e n Rawl s t o be  defe nding the goo dfo r-on e sel f orthe m erit  v iew w hen he  desc ri bes the persona l ci rcumstanc esth atsu pport self-r esp ect . Secon d, they hav ea r g ue d (not implausibly )t h at  the pol itical ci rc u mstances  c ann ot b e under stoo d  t o promot e self - re sp ect whe nit isin ter pre ted i n  thi s way.  The pol itica l  circumstances ,  they claim,s ug g e st a di ffe rent notion  ofs elf- resp e ct , n a melya bel ie f  i n  one's equal worthas  a cit izen. 11 My content ion is sim p l y  that al l th e  c i rcumstances th at Ra wls identi f ies as s ustai ning sel frespecta r e consis ten t w ith  th e ma ttering inter p r etat io n of se lf- respect . S o t hegen er ous readi ng of Ra wl sat tr ibu tes t o  him tha tint er pre tatio n . theperso nalci rc u mst ances s u pp o r ting  s el f-re spe ct  Rawl s sa y s,"[T]hecircumsta nce s  tha tsu pport t he first aspe ct  of selfes te em,  the s e n se of ou r own worth, are essent i ally tw o:(1) h avin g a ratio nal  planofl ife, a nd inparti cu lar o ne th a t  s ati sf ies the Ar i s tot elian  p rinc iple; a nd (2) finding our per son and deeds  ap prec i a te d a n dc onf ir m edb y  others who are  likewisees t ee med and th e iras sociati on enjo yed"( 1971: 4 40). TheAristotel ia n Pr i n cip le is a pr incipleof humanp sycho l og y tha t s ays "o th erthing s equa l , h umanbeings  e njoy t he ex er cise oftheir realized capaciti es (th eir i nna te and tr ain e d 1 1 Doppelt  see s Rawls as  ch ara cteri zin g  self -res p ec t a s  an a ppra i sal of th e  v alu e of  the life o n e pur suesand an app rais al of the standar d s that are mos t ap p r opr iat e  for  j udging that li fe.  H e claims t ha t this idea l is "an  e m piric al not ion de void of n or m ativecont ent " and tha t i ti s "subj ec ti v e" (20 09:12 8, 134 ). Eya l  cha r a cterizes Rawlsia n sel f - respe c t a s "co nf idencei n th e value of  one's plan s" but  doe s not  statewh at sor t o fvalue he t h inks Rawl s has  in min d(200 9:202).He c l a ims t hat,  i n a ny case,t h is co nf i den ce i s dis ti nctfrom theK antian i dea l  of sel fr esp e c t as " c on f i dence that  on e has t he dignity of p e rs o ns" ( 2009:203).This is the  i deal he 
 to_justify and_then simply asserts that_this aspect_advances_citizens' self-respect._He_does not make_explicit the connection_between the aspect and_self-respect and he_rarely_speaks in terms of the definition of self-respect that he has proposed-the conviction that_one's_endeavors are_worth_carrying_out. The reader, then, is_left wondering how the feature_of Rawls's_view that is said to secure citizens' self-respect_in_fact advances the_ideal of self-respect he has identified as primary social_good. As I see it, critics_have, first, taken_Rawls_to_be defending the goodfor-oneself_or the merit view when he_describes the personal circumstances that support_self-respect. Second, they have argued (not implausibly)_that the political circumstances cannot be_understood to promote self-respect when_it is_interpreted in this way. The_political circumstances, they_claim, suggest_a different notion_of self-respect, namely a belief in_one's equal worth_as a citizen.11 My contention is_simply_that all the_circumstances_that_Rawls identifies_as sustaining selfrespect_are_consistent with_the_mattering interpretation of self-respect. So the_generous_reading of Rawls attributes to him that_interpretation. the personal circumstances_supporting_self-respect Rawls says, "[T]he_circumstances that support the first_aspect of selfesteem, the sense of_our own_worth, are_essentially two: (1) having a rational plan of life, and in_particular one that satisfies the Aristotelian_principle; and (2) finding_our person_and_deeds appreciated and_confirmed_by others_who are likewise esteemed and their association_enjoyed" (1971:_440). The Aristotelian Principle is a_principle of human psychology_that_says "other things equal, human beings_enjoy the exercise of their realized_capacities (their innate and trained_11_Doppelt_sees Rawls as characterizing self-respect_as an appraisal of the value_of the life_one pursues and an appraisal of the_standards_that are most appropriate for judging_that_life. He claims that this ideal_is_"an_empirical notion devoid of normative_content" and that it is "subjective"_(2009: 128, 134). Eyal characterizes Rawlsian self-respect as "confidence_in the value_of one's plans" but does_not_state_what sort of value he thinks Rawls has in mind_(2009: 202)._He claims that,_in any case, this confidence is distinct from the Kantian_ideal of selfrespect as "confidence that one_has the dignity of persons" (2009: 203). This is the ideal_he