 Sosa voices this idea when he says: "[W]hen [perceptual] experiences help explain the rational standing of some other state or action, they do not thereby problematize their own rational standing. Being so passive, they have no such standing".2 The kind of rational standing Sosa is describing goes beyond harboring power to justify other beliefs, and it goes beyond having the power to transmit justification to a belief from another source. To say that a mental state has a rational standing in Sosa's sense is to say that by itself, being in the mental state redounds on the rationality of the subject of the experience. It enters the calculus that determines how rational or how irrational the subject is. In this respect it is comparable to the property a belief can have of being justified, in the sense of having been formed epistemically well or badly. If you want to know what determines how rational or irrational a subject is overall, you have to take account of how well--‐formed or ill--‐ formed her beliefs are. The idea that perceptual experiences have no rational standing is entailed by the thesis that experiences are unjustified justifiers. Proponents of that thesis don't mean that the experiences are anti--‐justified, or that they have some other negative epistemic status. They mean that experiences are off the grid of epistemic appraisability. The grid supports beliefs, but not experiences. Experiences have no rational standing. Why does it matter whether a person's experiences can reflect their rational standing? If experiences could have a rational standing, then we'd have to re--‐think the boundary between the a--‐rational aspects of the mind, and the aspects that 1 Perceptual experiences characterize the way things appear to you in perception or hallucination. Psychologists who posit perceptual inference include Alhazen (1989/ca 1030), Helmholtz (1867/1910), Rock (1975). For discussion see Hatfield (2002). 2 Sosa (2007), p. 46. Sosa ultimately disowns this picture. Siegel/Epistemic Charge 2 determine our rational standing. That boundary, or one part of it, has often been taken to divide perception from belief.3 Is there any reason to suspect that experiences have a rational standing? Perhaps the strongest philosophical suspicions come from certain cases of cognitive penetration of perceptual experience – a type of influence on it by psychological precursors.4 Consider Vivek, a vain performer, who projects his self--‐conception onto the audience when he
Sosa voices this idea when he says: " [ W]hen [ perceptual ] experiences avail excuse the rational standing of some other department of state or natural process, they do not thereby problematize their own rational standing. Being so passive, they hold no such standing".2 The kind of rational standing Sosa is describe goes beyond harboring might to justify other impression, and it go beyond having the power to transmit justification to a belief from another source. To state that a mental state has a intellectual standing in Sosa's sense is to say that by itself, being in the genial state redounds on the rationality of the topic of the experience. It enters the tartar that determines how rational or how irrational the subject is. In this respect it is comparable to the place a belief can have of being justified, in the sense of having been formed epistemically well or badly. If you want to know what determines how rational or irrational a subject is overall, you have to take account of how well--‐formed or ill--‐ formed her beliefs are. The idea that perceptual experience have no rational standing is entailed by the dissertation that experience are undue justifiers. Proponents of that thesis don't mean that the experiences are anti--‐justified, or that they have some other negative epistemic condition. They mean that experiences are off the grid of epistemic appraisability. The grid supports beliefs, but not experiences. Experiences have no rational standing. Why does it matter whether a person's experiences can chew over their rational standing? If experience could have a rational standing, then we'd have to re--‐think the boundary between the a--‐rational aspects of the judgment, and the aspects that 1 Perceptual experiences characterize the direction things appear to you in perception or hallucination. psychologist who posit perceptual inference include Alhazen (1989 / ca 1030), Helmholtz (1867/1910), Rock (1975). For discussion see Hatfield (2002). 2 Sosa (2007), p. 46. Sosa ultimately disowns this picture. Siegel / Epistemic Charge 2 specify our rational standing. That limit, or one part of it, has often been taken to divide sensing from belief.3 Is there any reason to suspect that experiences have a rational standing? possibly the strongest philosophical suspicions issue forth from certain cases of cognitive penetration of perceptual experience – a type of influence on it by psychological precursors.4 Consider Vivek, a vain performer, who projects his self--‐conception onto the hearing when he
 Soda voices this idea when he says: "[W]hen [pgrxeptuan] expediences felp explain the rational stendibg of some other state or aztion, thej do not rhertby problematize vgeir owk ratjlnal wtanding. Being so passiva, they have no sjck standing".2 The kind of rational stanqing Soxa is describing goex beyknd harboring power to justify othsr belitfs, and it goes beuond having the power to tganslit justification ho a belief froi another soufce. To say that a mentzl state has a rational standine in Xosa's sensg js jo say that uy itsvlf, being in bne mendal staye redounds on thx rarionality of the subjxct of the experiencg. It enterv che calculus that detwrnines how ratkinau od iow irratlonel the subjsct is. In tyis respect it is cpm[qrable to the propewtr a belief can have of being justified, pn tge sense of having been formed epistemically well or fadly. If you want to know what determines how rathonal ur nvvatiubap a subject is overall, you have to take accougf pf how well--‐formeb or ill--‐ formed neg ngliefs are. The idea cgaf perceptual experlences rave bo rationwl syanding is entailed by the rhesis that vxpeeiences are unjustnfied justifners. Ptoponemts of that thesis don't meah that the fxperiencsr are anti--‐justifked, os that they have some othew negativx epixtemic rtatos. They mean that expevhences are off the grid ox epistemif appraisability. The grid suppocvs beliefs, buj nmt vxperienczs. Expcriences have nj rational stauding. Whv does it matter whethec a person's qxperiences cdj reflect thxir ratiogal wtaneing? If dxperiences coild have c ratuonal standing, thek we'd gave to re--‐think tht voundary betwern ghe a--‐gatmonal dspects of tve mknd, snd tfe aspects bhag 1 Prrceptual experiencev chzracterize the way tmings appgar to yot in perceptipn or hallucinatioj. Psyrhologmsts wno kosit perceptual inference inclhde Alhazfn (1989/ga 1030), Helmholtz (1867/1910), Rogk (1975). Sor discusxion see Hatfield (2002). 2 Sosa (2007), p. 46. Sosa ultimetely disowns this picjure. Siegel/Epistemic Ehsrge 2 deterkine jur ratiotal standing. That boyndary, or one paru of it, has often been faken do digide perception from belief.3 Is there any reason to suspect that experiencws havx w rational atancing? Ierkapx the ftroigxst philosophical suspicions come from certain ceses of cocnntive penetration of perceptusl experience – x type of influence on if by psyvhological precursors.4 Consider Fivek, a vain performer, wmo projecrs hia self--‐bknreption onto the audoence chen hw
Sosa voices this idea when he says: experiences explain the standing of some do thereby problematize their rational standing. Being passive, they have no such standing".2 kind of rational standing Sosa is describing goes beyond harboring power to justify beliefs, and it goes beyond having the power to transmit justification to a from source. say a mental state has a rational standing in Sosa's sense is to say that by itself, in the mental state redounds on the rationality the subject of the It enters the calculus that how or how the is. this respect it comparable to the property a belief can have of being justified, in the sense of having been epistemically well If you to what how rational or subject is overall, you have to how well--‐formed or ill--‐ formed her beliefs are. idea that experiences have no rational standing is by the thesis that experiences are unjustified justifiers. of that thesis don't mean that the experiences are anti--‐justified, or that they have some epistemic status. They mean experiences are off grid epistemic The supports beliefs, not experiences. Experiences have no rational standing. Why does it matter a person's experiences can reflect their rational standing? If experiences a standing, then we'd to re--‐think the boundary the aspects of the mind, aspects 1 the things to you in perception hallucination. Psychologists who posit perceptual include Alhazen (1989/ca 1030), discussion see Hatfield (2002). 2 Sosa (2007), p. Sosa ultimately disowns this picture. Siegel/Epistemic Charge determine our rational standing. That boundary, or one part of it, has been taken perception from belief.3 Is there any reason to that experiences have a standing? Perhaps the strongest philosophical suspicions come from certain of penetration of experience – a of influence on by psychological precursors.4 a vain who his audience when he
 Sosa voices this idea when he sAys: "[W]hen [perCeptuAl] eXpeRiEnceS helP explain the ratIOnal Standing of some other staTe or aCtIOn, thEY dO not tHereby pRObLEMatIzE tHeiR oWN rAtionAl sTanding. being so pasSivE, tHey have no sucH StAnding".2 The kInd Of rational stAndIng SosA iS deSCribiNg gOes beYond haRBoring Power to juStIFy otheR Beliefs, AND iT goeS beyond having the pOWeR To transmit justIficatIoN To A BEliEf fRom another SoUrce. TO Say that A MeNTAL stATe has a rationaL standing in sOsa'S sense Is To sAY that bY itseLf, BEinG in the mentaL staTe redoundS on the RAtionalITy of the SubjecT of The ExpeRIeNcE. It EnTErs THe CalCUluS that detErMiNes hoW ratIONAL or hOw iRratIonal The subject is. IN thIs reSPecT it is CompaRablE tO the pRopertY a belIeF can have of being JustIfied, in thE seNsE of HaVing bEEn formEd ePisTemicalLy well oR BadLy. iF YOu Want to know what deteRmINEs How ratioNal or iRRaTiONal a subjEcT is OverALL, you hAve tO TaKe accounT of how WElL--‐fOrmed or IlL--‐ formeD hEr bEliEfs arE. the iDea thaT perceptUal exPEriences have no RAtional standiNG iS ENtAIled By tHe thesis thaT expERienCes aRE uNjuSTifieD justIfIErS. proponents of that theSiS don't mEan thAt the experienCes are anti--‐JUSTified, or That THeY Have some other nEgatiVe epistemiC Status. ThEy meaN that expEriences aRE Off the grId oF epIstEmiC APpRaisability. ThE GRid sUpPorts beLieFs, but noT exPerIenCes. exPeriences Have no raTiOnAl StAndIng. WhY Does it maTtEr wHeTheR a perSOn's expErienCes cAn ReFLecT their rATiONAl stAnDiNg? If ExpErIenceS couLD haVe a ratiOnal standIng, THen wE'd HaVe to re--‐tHink the boundaRy Between the A--‐rAtiOnal asPECts of the Mind, and the aspects that 1 PeRCeptual ExpErienCes cHaracteriZe tHe way tHinGS appeaR to you In perCePtiON Or halLUCiNatIoN. PsychologISTs wHo posIt PercEptual iNference include AlhAZen (1989/Ca 1030), Helmholtz (1867/1910), RoCk (1975). FOr diSCUsSioN SeE hatFiELd (2002). 2 SOSA (2007), p. 46. Sosa ultimatelY disowns thIs PIcTure. Siegel/ePisTeMic CharGe 2 deterMine oUR rationAl standinG. That bounDaRy, or ONE paRt of it, has oFten been Taken to diVIde peRCePtion FroM belieF.3 IS thEre anY reasoN To sUspecT that eXpEriencEs havE a Rational Standing? Perhaps the stronGest phIlosoPhiCal suspicIonS ComE from certAin cAses of cognItiVe pEnetrAtiON of peRcepTUaL exPErienCe – a tYPe of influENcE on IT By PsychologicAL PRecUrsorS.4 CoNSider VIvek, A vain performer, who PRojects his self--‐ConcEPTioN onTO the AuDience when he
 Sosa voices this idea whe n he says:  "[W] hen  [p er cept ual]  experiences h e lp e xplain the rational st andin go f so m eother  stateo ra c tio n,  t hey  d o  n ot th ere by prob lematize t hei rown rational st anding. Be ing  so passive,  th ey hav enos uch s tan ding" .2 The kind o f rationa ls tandin g  Sosa i s de scri bing goes beyondh ar b oring power to  justi fy ot h e r b eli efs, and i tgoesb eyond h a vi n g the power to tran smit justif i cat ion to  a  be l ief fr om an ot h ersource. Tosaythat a me ntal s t ate has a ratio nal st and ing  inS os a' s s en s e i s  t o s a y t hat by i ts el f, be ingi n t he m ent al s tateredounds on t herati o nal ity o f the  sub je ct of  the e xperi en ce. It enters t he c alculus t hat  d ete rm inesh ow rat ion alor howirratio n alth e s ub ject is. In this r es p e ct  it is c ompara b le  t o  the pro pe rty  a b e l ief c an h a ve  of bein g just i fi ed , in th esenseof  ha vin g bee n  for med ep istemica lly w e ll or badly. I f  you want tok no w wh a t de ter mines how r atio n al o r ir r at ion a l a s ubjec ti so verall, you have to  t ake ac count  of how well- -‐formed o r i ll--‐ fo rmed he r  beliefs are.The i dea that p e rceptual  expe rienceshave no r a t ional st and ing  is  en t a il ed by the the s i s th at  experi enc es areunj ust ifi edju stifiers.  Propone nt sof  t hat  thes i s don'tme anth atthe e x perien ces a re a nt i- - ‐ju stified ,  o r that  t he y ha veso me ot hern ega tive ep istemic s tat u s. T he ymean th at experience sare off th egri d of e p i stemic a ppraisability. The grid support s b elief s, b ut not ex per iences . E x perien ces ha ve no  r ati o n al st a n di ng.  W hy does it m att er wh et hera perso n's experiences ca n  re flect their r ati onal s ta ndi n g? Ifex p eri e n ces could havea rational  s t an ding, then we' dhave to  re--‐t hinkt he boun dary betw een the a -- ‐rat i o nal  aspects o f the mi nd, and t h e asp e ct s tha t 1  Perce pt ual  expe rience s  ch aract erizeth e waything sappear t o you in perception orhalluc inati on.  Psycholo gis t s w ho positperc eptual inf ere nce  incl ude Alhaz en ( 1 98 9/c a  1030 ), H e lmholtz ( 1 86 7/1 9 1 0) , Rock (197 5 ) .  Fo r dis cus s ion se e Ha tfield (2002). 2S osa (2007), p.  46. S osa  ul t imat el y disowns this  pi ct u r e. Siege l/ Epistemic C harge 2de t ermin e ourration al stan d i ng .  Thatboun dar y, or one  pa rt of it,ha so ften b eenta ken to  divid e  per c e ption from belie f.3 I s there any  reas on  to sus p ectthat exper iences have  a rat iona l sta nding?Pe rhapsthe  s trongest p h ilosophic al su spicion scome  fr om cer tain c asesof c og nit ive penet r a ti o nof per cept ual e xp erie nce – a t y pe of in flu e nce onit  by p sychol o gi c a l precurso rs. 4 Con s i der Vivek, a va i np erfor mer, w ho pro jects h i s s el f--‐con cep t i on onto t he audien c e w he n he 
 Sosa_voices this_idea when he says:_"[W]hen [perceptual]_experiences_help explain_the_rational standing of_some other state_or action, they do_not thereby problematize_their_own rational standing. Being so passive, they have no such standing".2 The kind of_rational_standing Sosa_is_describing_goes beyond harboring power to_justify other beliefs, and it_goes beyond_having the power to transmit justification to a_belief_from another source._To say that a mental state has a rational_standing in Sosa's sense is to_say that by_itself,_being_in the mental state_redounds on the rationality of the_subject of the experience. It enters_the calculus that determines how rational or_how irrational the subject is. In_this respect it is comparable_to the_property a belief can have_of being justified,_in the_sense of having_been formed epistemically well or badly._If you want_to know what determines how rational_or_irrational a subject_is_overall,_you have_to take account_of_how well--‐formed_or_ill--‐ formed her beliefs are. The_idea_that perceptual experiences have no rational standing_is entailed by the_thesis_that experiences are unjustified_justifiers. Proponents of that thesis_don't mean that the experiences are_anti--‐justified, or_that they_have some other negative epistemic status. They mean that experiences are_off the grid of epistemic appraisability._The grid supports beliefs,_but not_experiences._Experiences have no_rational_standing. Why_does it matter whether a person's experiences_can reflect_their rational standing? If experiences could_have a rational standing,_then_we'd have to re--‐think the boundary_between the a--‐rational aspects of the_mind, and the aspects that_1_Perceptual_experiences characterize the way things_appear to you in perception or_hallucination. Psychologists who_posit perceptual inference include Alhazen (1989/ca 1030),_Helmholtz_(1867/1910), Rock (1975). For discussion see_Hatfield_(2002). 2 Sosa (2007), p. 46._Sosa_ultimately_disowns this picture. Siegel/Epistemic Charge_2 determine our rational standing. That_boundary, or one part of it, has often been_taken to divide_perception from belief.3 Is there_any_reason_to suspect that experiences have a rational standing? Perhaps the_strongest philosophical_suspicions come from_certain cases of cognitive penetration of perceptual experience – a_type of influence on it by psychological_precursors.4 Consider Vivek, a vain performer, who projects his self--‐conception onto_the audience when he