 121–124. Von Plato, J. (2011). A sequent calculus isomorphic to gentzen's natural deduction. The Review of Symbolic Logic 4(1), 43–53. Postgraduate Journal of Aesthetics, Vol. 6, No. 2, August 2009 FIXING THE IMAGE: RETHINKING THE 'MIND-INDEPENDENCE' OF PHOTOGRAPHS DAWN M. PHILLIPS UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK I. INTRODUCTION We are told by philosophers that photographs are a distinct category of image because the photographic process is mind-independent. Furthermore, that the experience of viewing a photograph has a special status, justified by a viewer's knowledge that the photographic process is mind-independent. Versions of these ideas are central to discussions of photography in both the philosophy of art and epistemology and have far-reaching implications for science, forensics and documentary journalism. Mind-independence (sometimes 'belief independence') is a term employed to highlight what is important in the idea that photographs can be produced naturally, mechanically, accidentally or automatically. Insofar as the process is physical, natural, mechanical or causal it can occur without human agency or intervention, entirely in the absence of intentional states. Presented innocuously, the idea is that although photographs are dependent on natural or mechanical processes, they can be produced independently of human agency – particularly human beliefs. Presented in a stronger form, the claim is that even if human agency is heavily involved in the production process, the definitive features that make the photograph a photograph and determine its salient properties are nonetheless independent of human minds. In epistemic debates, mind-independence is viewed as essential for explaining why photographs occupy a distinct category among images and justifying a variety of claims about their privileged epistemic and affective status in science, forensics, popular culture and journalism. But, in the philosophy of art, claims about mindDAWN M. PHILLIPS 2 independence have fuelled scepticism: it has been argued that photographs are unsuitable or inferior candidates for art because they are not intimately bound to the mind of an artist. I believe that we can address scepticism in the philosophy of art only if we recognise that it is linked to dogmatism in the epistemology of photography. This is the motivation for the present article. I argue that the epistemic debate is dogmatic when mind-independence is treated as a defining feature of photographs. Applied dogmatically, mind-independence stands in the way of a full
121–124. Von Plato, J. (2011). A sequent calculus isomorphic to gentzen's natural discount. The Review of Symbolic Logic 4(1), 43–53. Postgraduate Journal of Aesthetics, Vol. 6, nobelium. 2, August 2009 FIXING THE IMAGE: rethink THE' MIND - INDEPENDENCE' OF PHOTOGRAPHS DAWN M. PHILLIPS UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK I. INTRODUCTION We are distinguish by philosophers that photographs are a discrete category of image because the photographic procedure is mind - independent. Furthermore, that the experience of watch a photograph has a special condition, justified by a viewer's cognition that the photographic process is judgment - autonomous. Versions of these ideas are central to discussion of photography in both the philosophy of art and epistemology and receive far - reach implications for science, forensics and documentary journalism. Mind - independence (sometimes' belief independence') is a term use to highlight what is important in the idea that photographs can be produced naturally, mechanically, accidentally or automatically. Insofar as the process is physical, natural, mechanical or causal it can occur without human agency or intervention, entirely in the absence of intentional states. Presented innocuously, the mind is that although photographs are dependent on lifelike or mechanical summons, they can be produce independently of human agency – particularly human beliefs. Presented in a stronger form, the claim is that even if human representation is heavily involved in the production process, the definitive features that lay down the photograph a photograph and determine its salient properties are nonetheless independent of human mind. In epistemic debates, judgment - independence is viewed as essential for explaining why photographs occupy a discrete category among images and justifying a variety show of claims about their privileged epistemic and affective status in skill, forensics, popular culture and journalism. But, in the philosophy of art, claims about mindDAWN M. PHILLIPS 2 independence have fuel scepticism: it has been argue that photographs are inapplicable or inferior candidate for art because they are not intimately bound to the mind of an artist. I believe that we can cover scepticism in the philosophy of art entirely if we recognise that it is linked to dogmatism in the epistemology of photography. This is the motivation for the present article. I argue that the epistemic debate is dogmatic when mind - independence is treat as a defining feature of photograph. Applied dogmatically, mind - independence stands in the way of a full
 121–124. Vln Plato, J. (2011). A sequent cauculus isomorphnx to gxntzen's natural deduction. The Review of Symuolix Loguc 4(1), 43–53. Postgraduate Jourval of Aedthetics, Vol. 6, No. 2, Augusv 2009 FIXINN THE LMAGE: CETHINKING THE 'KIND-INDEPETDENCE' OF PHOTMGFA'HS DAWN M. PHILLIPS UNIVERSITY OF WAWWICK I. IJTRODUCTION We are eold by philosophers that photographs zre a dpstinct category pf image because the photohrapjic process is minf-independenj. Fuwrhermore, thag the expegnence of vigwing a photograph has a special statbs, justifiee vy w viewer's kniwledde that the inotogrdphic ptocess is mind-lndepxndebt. Versions of these mdeas are central to discussimna of photography un both the phiuisoohy oh adt and epmstemology znd have fae-reaching implicatipnf for science, rorensycf and documentary journalism. Mind-indepetdehce (sometimes 'belief ineependence') is a term gmployed tj highlight what is important in the idea that phmtogrepfs eqn be prlduced naturally, mechanically, accidentally or zuuomstically. Insofcr as the procesx ls khysical, naturxl, meckznjcal or causal it fan occor wityout humag agrncy or intervention, entireoy in the abfwnce of intentionap states. Przsentec innpcuously, the idea is thct altgough photohraphs ars dependent on nagursl or mechanical processes, trey can bx probuced inaepemdentlr of human agengf – particularly hulan bgliefs. Presented in a stronger form, the claim is that even if hgmat agency is hcavily involved in the producjion proczss, thd definitine featurxs that make the photogra[j a photogra'h and deeermune uts salkdnt properties are nonenhtless independent of human mlnds. Kh epistemic debcues, mind-independenve ks divwev as qvsential for expuaivong wfy photograihs occipy a distinct categmry zmong images and jisbifying a variety of claims abput their privilegtd epivteoic amd wffective status in science, fodensics, plpujar culture wnd mourgalism. But, in the philosophy of art, claims about nindDAWN M. PHILLIKS 2 independence have nuelled scepvicism: it has baen argued that photigraphs are unsuiuable or inferior candisates xor agt because they are not intimately bound to the mind of an artist. I beliece thav re can addrsss xceptpcifk in tre piiuosophy of art omly if we recognise that it is uinked tm bogmatism in the epistemology ow photography. This is the motivation ror the lresent article. I argue that thr epistemic debate is donmatic whwn mihd-indeigndxnce is treated as a definnng feqture od phltographs. Appuiec fogmaticaply, kiud-independence stands in the way if a fylp
121–124. Von Plato, J. (2011). A sequent to natural deduction. Review of Symbolic of Vol. 6, No. August 2009 FIXING IMAGE: RETHINKING THE 'MIND-INDEPENDENCE' OF PHOTOGRAPHS M. PHILLIPS UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK I. INTRODUCTION We are told by philosophers that are a distinct category of image because the photographic process is mind-independent. Furthermore, the of a has a special status, justified by a viewer's knowledge that the photographic process is mind-independent. Versions these ideas are central to discussions of photography both the philosophy of and epistemology and have far-reaching for forensics and journalism. (sometimes independence') is a employed to highlight what is important in the idea that photographs can be produced naturally, mechanically, accidentally automatically. Insofar process is natural, or it can occur agency or intervention, entirely in the states. Presented innocuously, the idea is that although are dependent natural or mechanical processes, they can produced independently of human agency – particularly human Presented in a stronger form, the claim is that even if human agency is heavily the production process, the features that make photograph photograph determine salient properties nonetheless independent of human minds. In epistemic debates, mind-independence is viewed essential for explaining why photographs occupy a distinct category among justifying variety of claims their privileged epistemic and status science, forensics, popular culture But, the claims mindDAWN PHILLIPS 2 independence have scepticism: it has been argued photographs are unsuitable or they are not intimately bound to the mind an artist. I believe that we can scepticism in the philosophy of art only if we recognise that it linked to the epistemology of photography. This is the motivation the present article. I that the epistemic debate is dogmatic when mind-independence is as defining feature photographs. Applied dogmatically, stands in the of a full
 121–124. Von Plato, J. (2011). A sequent calculus Isomorphic To genTzeN's nAtUral DeduCtion. The Review OF SymBolic Logic 4(1), 43–53. Postgraduate journAl OF AesTHeTics, VOl. 6, No. 2, AugUSt 2009 fixINg ThE iMAgE: reThINKInG ThE 'MIND-InDEPENDENCe' OF pHoTOGRAPHS DAWn m. PhILLIPS UNIvERsITY OF WARWICk I. InTRODUcTiON wE are tOld By phiLosophERs that PhotograpHs ARe a disTInct catEGOrY of iMage because the phoTOgRAphic process is Mind-inDePEnDENt. FUrtHermore, thaT tHe expERience oF ViEWINg a PHotograph has a Special statUS, juStifieD bY a vIEwer's kNowleDgE ThaT the photogrAphiC process iS mind-iNDependeNT. VersioNs of thEse IdeAs arE CeNtRal To DIscUSsIonS Of pHotograpHy In Both tHe phILOSOphy Of aRt anD episTemology and haVe fAr-reAChiNg impLicatIons FoR scieNce, forEnsicS aNd documentary joUrnaLism. Mind-iNdePeNdeNcE (someTImes 'beLieF inDependeNce') is a tERm eMpLOYEd To highlight what is iMpORTaNt in the iDea thaT PhOtOGraphs caN bE prOducED NaturAlly, MEcHanicallY, accidENtAlLy or autOmAticalLy. insOfaR as thE ProcEss is pHysical, nAturaL, Mechanical or caUSal it can occur WItHOUt HUman AgeNcy or intervEntiON, entIrelY In The ABsencE of inTeNTiONal states. Presented iNnOcuousLy, the Idea is that altHough photoGRAPhs are dePendENt ON natural or mechAnicaL processes, THey can be ProduCed indepEndently oF HUman agenCy – pArtIcuLarLY HuMan beliefs. PreSENted In A strongEr fOrm, the cLaiM is ThaT evEn If human agEncy is heAvIlY iNvOlvEd in tHE productIoN prOcEss, The deFInitivE featUres ThAt MAke The photOGrAPH a phOtOgRaph And DeTermiNe itS SalIent proPerties arE noNEtheLeSs IndepenDent of human miNdS. In epistemIc DebAtes, miND-IndependEnce is viewed as essential FOr explaIniNg why PhotOgraphs ocCupY a distIncT CategoRy amonG imagEs And JUStifyING a VarIeTy of claims ABOut Their PrIvilEged epiStemic and affective STatUs in science, foRenSics, POPuLar CUlTUre AnD JouRNAlism. But, in the phIlosophy of ArT, ClAims about mINdDaWn M. PHILLiPS 2 indePendeNCe have fUelled scePticism: it HaS beeN ARguEd that photOgraphs aRe unsuitaBLe or iNFeRior cAndIdates FoR arT becaUse theY Are Not inTimateLy Bound tO the mInD of an artIst. I believe that we can addRess scEpticIsm In the philOsoPHy oF art only iF we rEcognise thAt iT is LinkeD to DOgmatIsm iN ThE epIStemoLogy OF photograPHy. thiS IS tHe motivatioN FOR thE presEnt ARticle. i argUe that the epistemiC Debate is dogmatIc whEN MinD-inDEpenDeNce is treated as A deFiNINg featurE oF photographS. Applied DoGMaticAlly, miNd-indePendencE STaNDs in thE way Of a Full
 121–124. Von Plato, J. (2 011). A se quent  ca lcu lu s is omor phic to gentze n 's n atural deduction. TheRevie wo f Sy m bo lic L ogic 4( 1 ), 4 3–5 3.  P ost gr a du ate J our nal ofAesthetics , V ol . 6, No. 2,A ug ust 2009 F IXI NG THE IMAGE : R ETHINK IN G T H E 'MI ND- INDEP ENDENC E ' OF P HOTOGRAPH SD AWN M. PHILLIP S UN IVER SITY OF WARWICK I .  I N TRODUCTION Weare to ld by p hil oso phers that  p hotog r aphs ar e  a d i sti n ct category o f image bec a use  the p ho tog r aphicproce ss ismind-indepe nden t. Furthe rmore, that th e  experi ence o f v iew inga  p ho tog ra p h h a sa s p eci al statu s,  j ustif iedb y a  vie wer 's k nowle dge that thepho togr a phi c pro cessis m in d-ind epende nt. V er sions of theseidea s are cen tra ltodi scuss i ons of  ph oto graphyin both the  p h i l os ophy of art and ep is t e mo logy and  havef ar -r e aching i mp lic atio n s  forscie n ce , forens ics an d  d oc umentar yjourna li sm.  Mi nd-in d epen dence(sometim es 'b e lief independe n ce') is a ter m  e m p lo y ed t o h ighlight wh at i s  imp orta n tint he id ea th at ph o tographs can be pro du ced na tural ly, mechanica lly, accid e n t ally orauto m at i cally. Insofar  as t he process is physi cal,natural,  mechanic a l  or caus alitcan  oc c u rwithout human a genc yor inte rve ntion,ent ire lyinth e absence  of inte nt io na lsta tes.P resented  i nno cu ous ly, t h e idea  is t hatal th o ugh  photog r ap h s  are  d ep ende nton  natu ralo r m echanic al proces ses ,  the yca n be pr oduced indepe nd ently of h um anagency –  particu larly human beliefs. Pr e sentedina str onge r form, t heclaimist hat ev en ifhuman  a gen c y  is h e a vi lyin volved int h e p roduc ti on p rocess,  the definitive fe a tur es that makethe  pho t o gr aph ap hot og r aph a nd determine it s salientpr o pe rties aren one th eless i ndepend ent o f  humanminds. In  epistemi cdeba t e s,mind-indep endenceis viewed as es s en tialfor  expla in ing  whyphotog r aph s occ upy adi stinct  cate go ry among  images and justifyinga vari ety o f c laims abo utt hei r privile gedepistemicand  af fecti ves tatus  ins ci enc e , for ensi c s, popula r  c ult u r eand journal i s m . B ut, i n t h e phil osop hy of art, claims about mindDAWN  M.P H ILL IPS 2 in de pendence havefue ll e d  sceptic is m: it has b een argu ed thatphotog raphsare uns u i ta b le orinfe rio r candida tes  f o r art b ec au s e they  are  n ot int imatel y  bou n d  to the mind ofan ar t i st. I bel ieveth at we c a n ad dress scep ticism in t he phi loso phy o f art o nl y if w e r ec ognise tha t  it is li nkedto dogm at isminthe ep iste m o logyof p ho tog raphy. Th i s  i s  t he mot ivat ion f or  the  presenta rticle.I a r gue tha tthe e pistem i cd e bate is do gma tic w h e n mind-ind e pend e nc e  is t reated  as adefinin g  fe at ure ofpho t o graphs. A pplied do g mat ic ally , mind-i nd epen de nce  s tands in the wa y of a f ull
 121–124._Von Plato,_J. (2011). A sequent_calculus isomorphic_to_gentzen's natural_deduction._The Review of_Symbolic Logic 4(1),_43–53. Postgraduate Journal of_Aesthetics, Vol. 6,_No._2, August 2009 FIXING THE IMAGE: RETHINKING THE 'MIND-INDEPENDENCE' OF PHOTOGRAPHS DAWN M. PHILLIPS_UNIVERSITY_OF WARWICK_I._INTRODUCTION_We are told by philosophers_that photographs are a distinct_category of_image because the photographic process is mind-independent. Furthermore,_that_the experience of_viewing a photograph has a special status, justified by_a viewer's knowledge that the photographic_process is mind-independent._Versions_of_these ideas are central_to discussions of photography in both_the philosophy of art and epistemology_and have far-reaching implications for science, forensics_and documentary journalism. Mind-independence (sometimes 'belief_independence') is a term employed_to highlight_what is important in the_idea that photographs_can be_produced naturally, mechanically,_accidentally or automatically. Insofar as the_process is physical,_natural, mechanical or causal it can_occur_without human agency_or_intervention,_entirely in_the absence of_intentional_states. Presented_innocuously,_the idea is that although photographs_are_dependent on natural or mechanical processes, they_can be produced independently_of_human agency – particularly_human beliefs. Presented in a_stronger form, the claim is that_even if_human agency_is heavily involved in the production process, the definitive features that_make the photograph a photograph and_determine its salient properties_are nonetheless_independent_of human minds._In_epistemic debates,_mind-independence is viewed as essential for explaining_why photographs_occupy a distinct category among images_and justifying a variety_of_claims about their privileged epistemic and_affective status in science, forensics, popular_culture and journalism. But, in_the_philosophy_of art, claims about mindDAWN_M. PHILLIPS 2 independence have fuelled_scepticism: it has_been argued that photographs are unsuitable or_inferior_candidates for art because they are_not_intimately bound to the mind of_an_artist._I believe that we can_address scepticism in the philosophy of_art only if we recognise that it is linked_to dogmatism in_the epistemology of photography. This_is_the_motivation for the present article. I argue that the epistemic_debate is_dogmatic when mind-independence_is treated as a defining feature of photographs. Applied dogmatically,_mind-independence stands in the way of a_full