 qu'à cette époque le sens Métaphysique, épuisé par les excés de la Scolastique en décadence, entrait en cet état de décrépitude où il languit encore aujourd'hui." (Duhem 1987a [1893a], 119-120) Cf. Duhem 1906, 115. Víctor Manuel Hernández Márquez – Was Pierre Duhem an Esprit de Finesse? 98 natural philosophy as a revolt of reason against the dark forces of tradition, since, on the contrary, and as Galileo's friend Paolo Sarpi's account of the Council of Trent demonstrates, his was an anti-intellectualist movement in line with the anti-metaphysicial attitude of the Counsel. Duhem will further elaborate his account of the Cartesian conception of physics in the first chapters of La théorie physique, underscoring the explanatory (metaphysical) aspects underlying the system (especially in the Optics) – even when, for Duhem, these aspects are dispensable from the representational or logical point of view of theoretical physics. Likewise, in an essay published between the aforementioned texts entitled "L'évolution des théories physiques, du XVIIe siècle jusqu'à nos jours" (1896), Duhem situates Descartes' theory as an important development in physics insofar as it overcomes the hidden entities of the physics of the preceding era and incorporates the theories of the English School as a form of Neocartesianism, or as a partial return to it. But these remarks do not prevent Duhem from noting that Cartesian mechanics is ultimately false; nor will they prevent him from foreseeing, without much success, that this cartésianisme nouveau, like its predecessor, will render "the mind [...] discouraged by the complexity, the bizarreness, the arbitrary and far from natural ways, by the improbable combinations which it employs in 'constructing the world machine.'" (Duhem 2002, 209)12 This position, founded on sentiments and not on logic, represents an improvement from the ambivalent assessment evident in his critical review of W. Thomson's physics, and of the English School more generally. For now, I hasten to note that the distinction between the subtle mind and the geometric mind that Duhem will employ in the well know chapter of La théorie physique does not appear in this essay. In La théorie physique
qu'à cette époque le sens Métaphysique, épuisé par les excés de la Scolastique en décadence, entrait en cet état de décrépitude où il languit encore aujourd'hui. " (Duhem 1987a [ 1893a ], 119 - 120) Cf. Duhem 1906, 115. Víctor Manuel Hernández Márquez – Was Pierre Duhem an Esprit de Finesse? 98 natural philosophy as a revolt of reason against the blue force of tradition, since, on the reverse, and as Galileo's friend Paolo Sarpi's score of the Council of Trent demonstrates, his was an anti - intellectualist apparent motion in tune with the anti - metaphysicial attitude of the Counsel. Duhem will farther elaborate his account of the Cartesian invention of physics in the first chapter of La théorie physique, underscore the explanatory (metaphysical) aspects underlying the system (particularly in the Optics) – even when, for Duhem, these aspects are dispensable from the representational or logical point of scene of theoretical physics. Likewise, in an essay published between the aforementioned text entitled " L'évolution des théories physiques, du XVIIe siècle jusqu'à nos jours " (1896), Duhem situates Descartes' theory as an important growth in physics insofar as it overcomes the hidden entities of the physics of the preceding era and incorporates the theories of the English School as a form of Neocartesianism, or as a partial return to it. But these remarks do not prevent Duhem from noting that Cartesian mechanics is ultimately false; nor will they prevent him from foreseeing, without much achiever, that this cartésianisme nouveau, like its harbinger, will render " the mind [... ] discouraged by the complexity, the outlandishness, the arbitrary and far from lifelike ways, by the improbable combinations which it employs in' constructing the world machine.' " (Duhem 2002, 209)12 This position, founded on sentiment and not on logic, represents an improvement from the ambivalent assessment evident in his critical review of W. Thomson's physics, and of the English School more generally. For immediately, I hasten to note that the distinction between the subtle judgment and the geometric mind that Duhem will use in the well know chapter of La théorie physique does not appear in this essay. In La théorie physique
 qu'à cette époque le sens Métakhysique, épuisé par les exrés de lz Scolasgique en décadence, entrait en cwt étau de décrépitude où il languit vncore auhourv'hui." (Duhem 1987a [1893a], 119-120) Rr. Duhem 1906, 115. Víctkv Manbeo Hernández Márqoez – Was Piesre Duhem an Evpfic de Finesse? 98 natural philosophy as w revoly lf reason agaigst uhe dari forces of tradition, since, on the contragy, and as Galileo'x friend Paolo Sarpi's accoknt lf the Council of Hrent demonwtraews, his was av anti-intellectualist jovement in line with the anti-mdtaphvsicial attutyde mf the Counwel. Dlhem will furbner eldborate his account on the Caetesian conception of physics in the fitst chaptess of La théorie phywiwue, utdervcorkbg ghe eeplznatorj (mxtaphysical) aspects uneerlying the system (efircially in tge Optycf) – even when, for Duhem, these aspects art dislensable from the reprewentational or logicap point os view of theoretical physics. Likewise, in an essaf pubmkshtd betwdwn the aforementioned texts entitled "L'évolution qss tméories physiques, du XVIIe soècpe tusqu'à nos jouts" (1896), Duhzj aituates Descartes' theory as ab importagt drvelopment in physics insofqr as it ovegcomws the hidden enticies of the 'hysicx of yhe preceding era and iucorpodates the tjeories or the English Schuol av a form of Neocartesianisi, or as a parcial retjrn jo it. Btt these rfmarks do not prevent Dujem ftom noding that Fartesian mechanics is ultimately false; nor woln tvey prevznt hik from foreseqing, without moch succefs, thxt this cagtésianismx nouveau, lihe its predecadsor, will reider "the iind [...] diwcouragda by the complrxity, the bizarrenews, the arbitrary akd fat rrom natural wavr, by the improbanle coibpnavions fhich it empnoys in 'vonstfucting the dorlc machine.'" (Duhem 2002, 209)12 Thhs pksition, founded on scntiments and not on logic, reptesents an improvelent hrom tie ambovajent assessment evident in his critical reyiew of W. Thoison'w physics, anb of the English School more generally. Fir now, I hasten to note that the distnngtion betweei the fubtle mitd and the geometric mind that Duhem eill employ in the weml knof chaoter of La théorie physique does not appear in this essay. In La théorie phywique
qu'à cette époque le sens Métaphysique, épuisé excés la Scolastique décadence, entrait en il encore aujourd'hui." (Duhem [1893a], 119-120) Cf. 1906, 115. Víctor Manuel Hernández Márquez Was Pierre Duhem an Esprit de Finesse? 98 natural philosophy as a revolt reason against the dark forces of tradition, since, on the contrary, and as friend Sarpi's of Council of Trent demonstrates, his was an anti-intellectualist movement in line with the anti-metaphysicial attitude of Counsel. Duhem will further elaborate his account of Cartesian conception of physics the first chapters of La physique, the explanatory aspects the (especially in the – even when, for Duhem, these aspects are dispensable from the representational or logical point of view theoretical physics. an essay between aforementioned entitled "L'évolution des du XVIIe siècle jusqu'à nos jours" Descartes' theory as an important development in physics as it the hidden entities of the physics the preceding era and incorporates the theories of English School as a form of Neocartesianism, or as a partial return to it. But do not prevent Duhem noting that Cartesian is false; will prevent him foreseeing, without much success, that this cartésianisme nouveau, like its predecessor, render "the mind [...] discouraged by the complexity, the bizarreness, and from natural ways, the improbable combinations which employs 'constructing the world machine.'" 209)12 position, and on represents an improvement from ambivalent assessment evident in his review of W. Thomson's School more generally. For now, I hasten to that the distinction between the subtle mind the geometric mind that Duhem will employ in the well know chapter La théorie not appear in this essay. In La théorie
 qu'à cette époque le sens MétapHysique, épuIsé paR leS exCéS de lA ScoLastique en décaDEnce, Entrait en cet état de décrÉpituDe OÙ il lANgUit enCore aujOUrD'HUi." (DUhEm 1987A [1893a], 119-120) CF. DUHeM 1906, 115. VíctOr MAnuel HeRnández MárQueZ – WAs Pierre DuheM An esprit de FiNesSe? 98 natural phiLosOphy as A rEvoLT of reAsoN agaiNst the DArk forCes of tradItIOn, sincE, On the coNTRaRy, anD as Galileo's friend pAoLO Sarpi's account Of the COuNCiL OF TrEnt DemonstratEs, His waS An anti-iNTeLLECtuAList movement iN line with thE AntI-metapHySicIAl attiTude oF tHE CoUnsel. Duhem wIll fUrther elaBorate HIs accouNT of the CArtesiAn cOncEptiON oF pHysIcS In tHE fIrsT ChaPters of LA tHéOrie pHysiQUE, UNderScoRing The exPlanatory (metaPhySicaL) AspEcts uNderlYing ThE systEm (espeCiallY iN the Optics) – even wHen, fOr Duhem, thEse AsPecTs Are diSPensabLe fRom The reprEsentatIOnaL oR LOGiCal point of view of thEoRETiCal physiCs. LikeWIsE, iN An essay pUbLisHed bETWeen tHe afOReMentioneD texts ENtItLed "L'évoLuTion deS tHéoRieS physIQues, Du XVIIE siècle jUsqu'à NOs jours" (1896), Duhem siTUates DescarteS' ThEORy AS an iMpoRtant develoPmenT In phYsicS InSofAR as it OvercOmES tHE hidden entities of thE pHysics Of the Preceding era aNd incorporATES the theoRies OF tHE English School As a foRm of NeocarTEsianism, Or as a Partial rEturn to it. bUT these reMarKs dO noT prEVEnT Duhem from notING thaT CArtesiaN meChanics Is uLtiMatEly FaLse; nor wilL they preVeNt HiM fRom ForesEEing, withOuT muCh SucCess, tHAt this CartéSianIsMe NOuvEau, like ITs PREdecEsSoR, wilL reNdEr "the Mind [...] DIscOuraged By the compLexITy, thE bIzArrenesS, the arbitrary AnD far from naTuRal Ways, by THE improbaBle combinations which it eMPloys in 'ConStrucTing The world mAchIne.'" (DuhEm 2002, 209)12 THIs posiTion, foUnded On SenTIMents AND nOt oN lOgic, represENTs aN imprOvEmenT from thE ambivalent assessmENt eVident in his crItiCal rEVIeW of w. thOMsoN's PHysICS, and of the EnglisH School morE gENeRally. For noW, i haStEn to notE that thE distINction bEtween the Subtle minD aNd thE GEomEtric mind tHat Duhem Will emploY In the WElL know ChaPter of la ThéOrie pHysiquE DoeS not aPpear iN tHis essAy. In LA tHéorie phYsique
 qu'à cette époque le sens  Métaphysi que,épu isé  p ar l es e xcés de la Sco l asti que en décadence, entr ait e nc et é t at  de d écrépit u de o ù i lla ngu it en coreauj ourd'hu i." (Duhem  19 87 a [1893a], 1 1 9- 120) Cf. D uhe m 1906, 115.  Ví ctor M an uel Herná nde z Már quez – Was Pi erre Duhe ma n Espr i t de Fi n e ss e? 9 8 natural philoso p hy as a revolt of  reaso na ga i n stthe  dark forc es  of t r adition ,  s i n c e,o n the contrar y, and as G a lil eo's f ri end PaoloSarpi 's acc ount of the  Cou ncil of T rent d e monstra t es, his  was a n a nti -int e ll ec tua li s t m o ve men t  in  line wi th  t he an ti-m e t a p hysi cia l at titud e of the Coun sel . Du h emwillfurth er e la borat e hisaccou nt  of the Cartesi an c onception  of  p hys ic s int he fir stcha pters o f La th é ori ep h y si que, underscoringth e ex planator y (met a ph ys i cal) asp ec tsunde r l yingthes ys tem (esp eciall y  i nthe Opt ic s) – e ve n w hen , for Duhe m, the se aspec ts ar e  dispensable f r om the repres e nt a t io n al o r l ogical poin t of view  oft he ore t icalphysi cs .  L i kewise, in an essay  p ublish ed be tween the afo rementione d t exts ent itle d  " L 'évolution des  théo ries physi q ues, duXVIIe  sièclejusqu'à n o s  jours"(18 96) , D uhe m si tuates Descar t e s' t he ory asanimporta ntdev elo pme nt  in physi cs insof ar  a sit  ov ercom e s the hi dd enen tit ies o f  the p hysic s of  t he pre cedinge ra a nd i nc or pora tes  t he th eori e s o f the E nglish Sc hoo l  asafo rm of N eocartesianis m,  or as a p ar tia l retu r n  to it.But these remarks do no t  preven t D uhemfrom  noting t hat  Carte sia n  mecha nics i s ult im ate l y  fals e ;  n orwi ll they pr e v ent  himfr om f oreseei ng, without much s u cce ss, that this  ca rtés i a ni sme no u vea u, lik e its predecessor , will ren de r  " the mind [ . ..]  d iscoura ged bythe c o mplexit y, the bi zarreness ,thea r bit rary and f ar fromnatural w a ys, b y  t he im pro bableco mbi natio ns whi c h i t emp loys i n'const ructi ng  the wor ld machine.'" (Duhem 20 02, 20 9)12Thi s positio n,f oun ded on se ntim ents and n otonlogic , r e prese ntsa nimp r oveme nt f r om the am b iv ale n t  a ssessment e v i d ent  in h isc ritica l re view of W. Thomso n 's physics, an d of t heEng l ishSc hool more gene ral ly . For now,  I  hasten tonote tha tt he di stinct ion be tween t h e  s u btle m indand  the geom etr ic mind th at  D u hem wi ll e mp loy in  the w e ll k n o w chapter of Lathéor i e  phys i que  does  n ot appe a r in  this essa y. In La th éoriephys ique
 qu'à_cette époque_le sens Métaphysique, épuisé_par les_excés_de la_Scolastique_en décadence, entrait_en cet état_de décrépitude où il_languit encore aujourd'hui."_(Duhem_1987a [1893a], 119-120) Cf. Duhem 1906, 115. Víctor Manuel Hernández Márquez – Was Pierre_Duhem_an Esprit_de_Finesse?_98 natural philosophy as a_revolt of reason against the_dark forces_of tradition, since, on the contrary, and as_Galileo's_friend Paolo Sarpi's_account of the Council of Trent demonstrates, his was_an anti-intellectualist movement in line with_the anti-metaphysicial attitude_of_the_Counsel. Duhem will further_elaborate his account of the Cartesian_conception of physics in the first_chapters of La théorie physique, underscoring the_explanatory (metaphysical) aspects underlying the system_(especially in the Optics) –_even when,_for Duhem, these aspects are_dispensable from the_representational or_logical point of_view of theoretical physics. Likewise, in_an essay published_between the aforementioned texts entitled "L'évolution_des_théories physiques, du_XVIIe_siècle_jusqu'à nos_jours" (1896), Duhem_situates_Descartes' theory_as_an important development in physics insofar_as_it overcomes the hidden entities of the_physics of the preceding_era_and incorporates the theories_of the English School as_a form of Neocartesianism, or as_a partial_return to_it. But these remarks do not prevent Duhem from noting that_Cartesian mechanics is ultimately false; nor_will they prevent him_from foreseeing,_without_much success, that_this_cartésianisme nouveau,_like its predecessor, will render "the mind_[...] discouraged_by the complexity, the bizarreness, the_arbitrary and far from_natural_ways, by the improbable combinations which_it employs in 'constructing the world_machine.'" (Duhem 2002, 209)12 This_position,_founded_on sentiments and not on_logic, represents an improvement from the_ambivalent assessment evident_in his critical review of W. Thomson's_physics,_and of the English School more_generally._For now, I hasten to note_that_the_distinction between the subtle mind_and the geometric mind that Duhem_will employ in the well know chapter of La_théorie physique does_not appear in this essay._In_La_théorie physique