-scepticism should be moderated by epistemic humility: it should come to terms with the history of science and the fact that "it reminds [us] that the most attractive systems are only provisional representations, and not definitive explanations" (1906, 270).4 Understanding Duhem's philosophy of science requires a careful examination of his accounts of representation and explanation as well as of their relation. Duhem's account of science rests decisively on the claim that the explanatory parts and the representative parts of theories can be sharply distinguished. We shall argue that they cannot be. The repercussions of this failure for Duhem's account of science will then be explored. Here is the roadmap. Section "Representation vs Explanation" will discuss Duhem's account of representation, focusing on his novel use of abstraction principles to introduce physical magnitudes and his account of explanation, focusing on his anti-Cartesianism. Then, in section "Disentangling the two Parts of the Theory", we will examine Duhem's two arguments for the existence of a sharp distinction between the representative and the explanatory parts of the theory and we will show, summoning historical evidence available to Duhem himself, that this distinction is shaky and problematic. Section "Re-assessing Duhem's holism" will then offer a new reading of Duhem's anti-atomism (aka holism). In section "Natural Classification", we will offer the main argument for the unity of Duhem's thought in light of his views on natural classifications. Finally, in section "Are Relations the Epistemic Limit?" we shall briefly discuss some motivations of Duhem's relationism. 3 For a useful discussion see Needham (2011). 4 Fábio Leite (2017) offers a nice summary of the various interpretative accounts of Duhem's philosophy of science. For an account of Duhem as canvassing a middle way between realism and instrumentalism, see Psillos (1999, 3437). 5 This point has been emphasized by Maiocchi (1990, 398). 4 Our notion of "epistemic humility" must be distinguished from the notion discussed by Kidd in his (2011); and more generally, from its use in recent debates concerning whether Duhem was a virtue epistemologist. Kidd talks of "intellectual humility" as virtue and takes it to refer to some inherent limitation of "the scope of human mind", circumscribing "the proper acknowledgment of the cognitive capacities appropriate to human beings, and of the proper epistemic ambitions
-scepticism should be moderated by epistemic humility: it should come to terms with the history of science and the fact that " it remind [ us ] that the about attractive systems are only probationary representations, and not authoritative explanations " (1906, 270).4 Understanding Duhem's doctrine of science requires a careful examination of his bill of representation and explanation as well as of their relation back. Duhem's account of science rest decisively on the claim that the explanatory parts and the representative parts of theories can be sharply distinguish. We shall argue that they cannot be. The repercussions of this failure for Duhem's account of skill will then be explored. Here is the roadmap. Section " Representation vs Explanation " will discourse Duhem's account of theatrical performance, focusing on his fresh use of abstraction principles to introduce forcible magnitudes and his account of explanation, focusing on his anti - Cartesianism. Then, in section " Disentangling the two Parts of the Theory ", we will examine Duhem's two arguments for the existence of a sharp distinction between the representative and the explanatory parts of the theory and we will show, summoning historical evidence available to Duhem himself, that this distinction is rickety and problematic. Section " Re - assess Duhem's holism " will then extend a new reading of Duhem's anti - atomism (aka holism). In section " Natural Classification ", we will extend the main argument for the unity of Duhem's thought in inner light of his views on natural classifications. Finally, in section " Are Relations the Epistemic Limit? " we shall briefly hash out some motivations of Duhem's relationism. 3 For a useful discussion see Needham (2011). 4 Fábio Leite (2017) offers a courteous summary of the various interpretative account of Duhem's doctrine of science. For an account of Duhem as canvassing a middle way between realism and instrumentalism, see Psillos (1999, 3437). 5 This point has been stress by Maiocchi (1990, 398). 4 Our notion of " epistemic humility " must be distinguished from the notion discussed by Kidd in his (2011); and more broadly, from its use in late debates concerning whether Duhem was a virtue epistemologist. Kidd talks of " intellectual humility " as merit and takes it to refer to some inherent limitation of " the oscilloscope of human mind ", circumscribing " the proper citation of the cognitive capacities appropriate to human organism, and of the proper epistemic ambitions
-sceoticism should be moderaued by epistemic kymilitb: it shkuld comd to terms with the history lf sciebce and the fact that "kt remindd [us] thar tht most attractive systems are ohpy pxotisional represgntations, ang not definitiee erplanations" (1906, 270).4 Understanding Duhem's prilosopny of science rezuirts w cadvfml examination of his accounts or repreventation and explanation as well as of thelr relation. Duhem's account of sciqbce rests dezisively on the claim jhat the explanatory parts and tfe re'resentativg lagjs of theorixs can be sharply distinguhshed. Wr shall argue bhat vhey cannot be. The repercnssions of this failore for Duvej's account of sciwnxe winl tven cw ebplkrxd. Gere id tie roadmap. Aection "Repeesentation vs Explsnwnoon" will disduss Dthqm's account of representation, focusing mn gis novel use of abstraxtion principles to ijtroduce [hysical magnitudes and his account of explanatiot, focnskng ok hir ajti-Cartesianism. Then, in section "Disentangling fht teo Parts of thc Theory", we will ecalimg Duhem's two atguments fkr the existence ov a shatp disrinction fetwren the representative and rhe explanatjey parts of the thzory and we cill snow, simmoning historical evibence zvailable tl Duhem hjoself, that this aisnincdion is shaky and problemaeic. Sectiin "Rz-assessivg Dohem's hjlism" will then offer a new readinh of Buhem'v anti-atomlsm (aka holism). In section "Naturek Classificajiot", wv will ofyer thc main argument for the unity of Duhzm's thuught in lpght of hms views on gatural classhvications. Fiially, in fectuon "Qre Relxgions the Episyemic Limpt?" we whall briefly discmss suje motivations if Euhem's relationosm. 3 Fjr a ufaful discusshon ree Meedhxm (2011). 4 Fábio Lcitd (2017) ogfers a nice summary of fhe various interptebative acxounts os Duhem's philpsophy of science. Vor ai acconnt of Durem as canvassing a middle way between geajism and inserumcntajism, see Pxillos (1999, 3437). 5 This point has been emphasizev by Maiocchi (1990, 398). 4 Our norion of "epistemic homikity" must bx distynguished from the notion disxussed by Kidd in his (2011); and more generamly, frmm itd use in recent debates concerning whether Duhem was a virtue epistemologust. Kivd talks of "ihtelkectudl kumilitr" as tirtue and takes pt to refer to some inherent limmtation of "tke scope of human mind", circumxcfibing "the pruper acknowledgment of tge cogniyive capacities appropriate to numan beings, and of the iroper epustemjc ambpjiois
-scepticism should be moderated by epistemic humility: come terms with history of science reminds that the most systems are only representations, and not definitive explanations" (1906, Understanding Duhem's philosophy of science requires a careful examination of his accounts of and explanation as well as of their relation. Duhem's account of science rests on claim the parts and the representative parts of theories can be sharply distinguished. We shall argue that they be. The repercussions of this failure for Duhem's of science will then explored. Here is the roadmap. "Representation Explanation" will Duhem's of focusing on his use of abstraction principles to introduce physical magnitudes and his account of explanation, focusing on his anti-Cartesianism. in section two Parts the we examine Duhem's two the existence of a sharp distinction and the explanatory parts of the theory and will show, historical evidence available to Duhem himself, this distinction is shaky and problematic. Section "Re-assessing holism" will then offer a new reading of Duhem's anti-atomism (aka holism). In section "Natural will offer the main for the unity Duhem's in of views on classifications. Finally, in section "Are Relations the Epistemic Limit?" we shall discuss some motivations of Duhem's relationism. 3 For a useful Needham 4 Fábio Leite offers a nice summary the interpretative accounts of Duhem's science. an as a way between realism and see Psillos (1999, 3437). 5 point has been emphasized Our notion of "epistemic humility" must be distinguished the notion discussed by Kidd in his and more generally, from its use in recent debates concerning whether Duhem a virtue talks of "intellectual humility" as virtue and takes to refer to some limitation of "the scope of human mind", circumscribing "the acknowledgment the cognitive appropriate to human and of the epistemic ambitions
-scepticism should be moderatEd by episteMic huMilIty: It ShouLd coMe to terms with tHE hisTory of science and the facT that "It REminDS [uS] that The most ATtRACtiVe SySteMs ARe Only pRovIsional RepresentaTioNs, And not definiTIvE explanatiOns" (1906, 270).4 understandinG DuHem's phIlOsoPHy of sCieNce reQuires A CarefuL examinatIoN Of his aCCounts oF REpReseNtation and explanaTIoN As well as of theiR relatIoN. duHEM's aCcoUnt of scienCe Rests DEcisiveLY oN THE clAIm that the explAnatory partS And The repReSenTAtive pArts oF tHEorIes can be shaRply DistinguiShed. We SHall argUE that thEy cannOt bE. ThE repERcUsSioNs OF thIS fAilURe fOr Duhem's AcCoUnt of ScieNCE WIll tHen Be exPloreD. Here is the roaDmaP. SecTIon "repreSentaTion Vs explaNation" Will dIsCuss Duhem's accouNt of RepresentAtiOn, FocUsIng on HIs noveL usE of AbstracTion priNCipLeS TO InTroduce physical magNiTUDeS and his aCcount OF eXpLAnation, fOcUsiNg on HIS anti-cartESiAnism. TheN, in secTIoN "DIsentanGlIng the TwO PaRts Of the tHeorY", we wilL examine duhem'S Two arguments foR The existence oF A sHARp DIstiNctIon between tHe rePReseNtatIVe And THe expLanatOrY PaRTs of the theory and we wIlL show, sUmmonIng historical Evidence avAILAble to DuHem hIMsELf, that this distInctiOn is shaky aND problemAtic. SEction "Re-Assessing dUHem's holiSm" wIll TheN ofFER a New reading of DUHEm's aNtI-atomisM (akA holism). in sEctIon "natUrAl ClassifIcation", wE wIlL oFfEr tHe maiN Argument FoR thE uNitY of DuHEm's thoUght iN ligHt Of HIs vIews on nATuRAL claSsIfIcatIonS. FInallY, in sECtiOn "Are ReLations thE EpIStemIc liMit?" we shAll briefly disCuSs some motiVaTioNs of DuHEM's relatiOnism. 3 For a useful discussiON see NeeDhaM (2011). 4 FábiO LeiTe (2017) offers a NicE summaRy oF The varIous inTerprEtAtiVE AccouNTS oF DuHeM's philosopHY Of sCiencE. FOr an Account Of Duhem as canvassinG A miDdle way betweeN reAlisM ANd InsTRuMEntAlISm, sEE psillos (1999, 3437). 5 This poinT has been emPhASiZed by MaiocCHi (1990, 398). 4 OUr Notion oF "episteMic huMIlity" muSt be distiNguished fRoM the NOTioN discussed By Kidd in His (2011); and morE GenerALlY, from Its Use in rEcEnt DebatEs concERniNg wheTher DuHeM was a vIrtue EpIstemoloGist. Kidd talks of "intellecTual huMilitY" as Virtue and TakES it To refer to Some Inherent liMitAtiOn of "tHe sCOpe of HumaN MiNd", cIRcumsCribINg "the propER aCknOWLeDgment of the COGNitIve caPacITies apPropRiate to human beingS, And of the proper EpisTEMic AmbITionS
-scepticism should be mode rated by e piste mic  hu mi lity : it  should come t o  ter ms with the history of  scie nc e  and th e fac t that" it r emi nd s[us ]t ha t the  mo st attr active sys tem sare only pro v is ional repr ese ntations, an d n ot def in iti v e exp lan ation s" (19 0 6, 270 ).4 Under st a ndingD uhem'sp h il osop hy of science req u ir e s a careful ex aminat io n  o f his  ac counts ofre prese n tationa nd e x pla n ation as well  as of thei r  re lation .Duh e m's ac count  o f  sc ience rests  dec isively o n thec laim th a t the e xplana tor y p arts an dthe  r e pre s en tat i veparts of  t he ories  can b e shar ply  dis tingu ished. We sha llargu e  th at th ey ca nnot  b e. Th e repe rcuss io ns of this fail urefor Duhem 'sac cou nt  of s c iencewil l t hen beexplore d . H er e i sthe roadmap. Secti on " Re presenta tion v s  E xp l anation"  w ill  dis c u ss Du hem' s  a ccount o f repr e se nt ation,fo cusing  o n h isnovel useof abs traction  prin c iples to intro d uce physicalm ag n i tu d es a ndhis account  ofe xpla nati o n,  fo c using  on h is an t i-Cartesianism. The n,  in se ction  "Disentangli ng the two P a rts of t he T h eo r y", we will ex amine  Duhem's t w o argume nts f or the e xistenceo f  a sharp  di sti nct ion b et ween the repr e s enta ti ve andthe  explan ato rypar tsof  the theo ry and w ewi ll  s how , sum m oning hi st ori ca l e viden c e avai lable  toDu he m  hi mself,t ha t this  d is tinc tio nis sh akya ndproblem atic. Sec tio n  "Re -a ss essingDuhem's holis m"  will then  o ffe r a ne w readingof Duhem's anti-atomism (aka ho lis m). I n se ction "Na tur al Cla ssi f icatio n", we  will  o ffe r the m a i narg um ent for th e uni ty of  D uhem 's thou ght in light of hi s  vi ews on natura l c lass i f ic ati o ns .  Fi na l ly, i n section "AreRelationsth e  E pistemic L i mit ?"  we sha ll brie fly d i scuss s ome motiv ations of  D uhem ' s  re lationism.  3 For a  useful d i scuss i on  seeNee dham ( 20 11) . 4 F ábio L e ite  (201 7) off er s a ni ce su mm ary of t he various interpretati ve acc ounts  of  Duhem'sphi l oso phy of sc ienc e. For anacc oun t ofDuh e m ascanv a ss ing a mid dlew ay betwee n  r eal i s mand instrum e n t ali sm, s eeP sillos  (19 99, 3437). 5 This point has been  emp h a siz edb y Ma io cchi (1990, 39 8).  4 O ur notio nof "epistem ic humil it y " mus t be d isting uishedf r om the no tion  di scussed b y K id d  in his  ( 20 1 1); an d mo re  gener ally,f romi t s use in recentdebat e s  conc e rni ng wh et her Duh e m wa s a virtue  epistemolo gist.Kidd  talk s of "i nt ellect ual  h umility" a s  virtue a nd ta kes itto  ref erto som e in h e rentlimi ta tio n of "the s co p eof hum an m ind",  c ircu mscribing "the pro per acknowl ed gme n t  of th e  c o g nitive cap aci tiesa p propriatet o hu m an being s, and  of th e prope r  ep is temic a mbi t i ons
-scepticism should_be moderated_by epistemic humility: it_should come_to_terms with_the_history of science_and the fact_that "it reminds [us]_that the most_attractive_systems are only provisional representations, and not definitive explanations" (1906, 270).4 Understanding Duhem's philosophy_of_science requires_a_careful_examination of his accounts of_representation and explanation as well_as of_their relation. Duhem's account of science rests decisively_on_the claim that_the explanatory parts and the representative parts of theories_can be sharply distinguished. We shall_argue that they_cannot_be._The repercussions of this_failure for Duhem's account of science_will then be explored. Here is_the roadmap. Section "Representation vs Explanation" will_discuss Duhem's account of representation, focusing_on his novel use of_abstraction principles_to introduce physical magnitudes and_his account of_explanation, focusing_on his anti-Cartesianism._Then, in section "Disentangling the two_Parts of the_Theory", we will examine Duhem's two_arguments_for the existence_of_a_sharp distinction_between the representative_and_the explanatory_parts_of the theory and we will_show,_summoning historical evidence available to Duhem himself,_that this distinction is_shaky_and problematic. Section "Re-assessing_Duhem's holism" will then offer_a new reading of Duhem's anti-atomism_(aka holism)._In section_"Natural Classification", we will offer the main argument for the unity_of Duhem's thought in light of_his views on natural_classifications. Finally,_in_section "Are Relations_the_Epistemic Limit?"_we shall briefly discuss some motivations of_Duhem's relationism._3 For a useful discussion see_Needham (2011). 4 Fábio_Leite_(2017) offers a nice summary of_the various interpretative accounts of Duhem's_philosophy of science. For an_account_of_Duhem as canvassing a middle_way between realism and instrumentalism, see_Psillos (1999, 3437)._5 This point has been emphasized by_Maiocchi_(1990, 398). 4 Our notion of_"epistemic_humility" must be distinguished from the_notion_discussed_by Kidd in his (2011);_and more generally, from its use_in recent debates concerning whether Duhem was a virtue_epistemologist. Kidd talks_of "intellectual humility" as virtue_and_takes_it to refer to some inherent limitation of "the scope_of human_mind", circumscribing "the_proper acknowledgment of the cognitive capacities appropriate to human beings,_and of the proper epistemic ambitions