 distinction between self and other, nor the explicit representation of an intentional relation.23 In fact, it seems plausible that at the very early stages of self-other matching indicated by neonate imitation, there is no differentiation between self and other whatsoever. Cases of early infant imitation are thus comparable to the phenomenon of emotional contagion (which will be further discussed in section 3.3), where the perception of an emotional expression by another subject causes the experience of that same emotion in oneself, so that there is no differentiation between the other's emotion and one's own. Because there is no self-other differentiation at this level (and hence no awareness of other subjects as such), we cannot yet speak of self-awareness or intersubjectivity in a philosophical sense (despite the fact that the phenomena in question are discussed under the label of "primary intersubjectivity" in the developmental literature). 3.2 Secondary intersubjectivity Social interactions and the representations associated with them reach a new quality from about the age of 9 to 12 months. At this age, infants enter into contexts of shared attention and intentionality. Within the developmental literature, these are also called forms of "secondary intersubjectivity", in contrast to the so-called forms of "primary intersubjectivity" described in the previous section (Trevarthen 1979). At this stage, infants begin to coordinate their object-directed behavior with their person-directed behavior, that is, they move from purely dyadic forms of interaction to triadic forms of interaction. In other words, they begin to engage in shared intentional relations. For instance, they will follow the gaze or the pointing gesture of another person to an object of mutual interest, thus exhibiting "shared attention" towards that object (Tomasello et al. 2005). This suggests an implicit understanding of others 21 Similar results were recently found in newborn monkeys (Ferrari et al. 2006). 22 See Heyes (2009) for an account that suggests that mirror neurons develop on the basis of sensorimotor learning processes, rather than constituting a specialized and innate module for imitation and/or action recognition. 23 According to Barresi and Moore (1996), an intentional relation is a relation involving an agent, a directed activity and an object. Examples include intentional actions as well as perceptions, beliefs, desires and emotions. Forthcoming in Grazer Philosophische Studien 84 (2012), p. 75-101 12 as perceivers, and the existence of a mechanism that integrates the first person information about one's own perceptual situation with
distinction between self and other, nor the explicit representation of an designed relation.23 In fact, it seem plausible that at the very early stages of self - other matching indicate by neonate caricature, there is no differentiation between self and other whatsoever. case of early infant imitation are thus comparable to the phenomenon of emotional contagion (which will be far discussed in section 3.3), where the sensing of an aroused expression by another subject cause the experience of that same emotion in oneself, so that there is no specialization between the other's emotion and one's own. Because there is no self - other specialization at this level (and hence no awareness of other subjects as such), we cannot yet talk of self - awareness or intersubjectivity in a philosophical sense (despite the fact that the phenomena in question are discussed under the label of " basal intersubjectivity " in the developmental literature). 3.2 Secondary intersubjectivity Social interactions and the representations associated with them reach a new quality from about the age of 9 to 12 months. At this age, infants enter into contexts of shared attention and intentionality. Within the developmental literature, these are also called forms of " junior-grade intersubjectivity ", in line to the so - called forms of " basal intersubjectivity " described in the previous section (Trevarthen 1979). At this stagecoach, infants begin to coordinate their object - aim behavior with their person - directed behavior, that is, they move from purely dyadic forms of interaction to triadic form of interaction. In other words, they begin to engage in share designed relation. For instance, they will follow the gaze or the pointing gesture of another person to an object of mutual interest, thus show " shared attention " towards that object (Tomasello et al. 2005). This suggests an implicit sympathy of others 21 Similar results were recently determine in newborn monkeys (Ferrari et al. 2006). 22 See Heyes (2009) for an account that suggests that mirror nerve cell develop on the basis of sensorimotor eruditeness processes, rather than constituting a specialized and innate module for caricature and/or action recognition. 23 According to Barresi and Moore (1996), an designed relation is a relation involving an agent, a conduct action and an object. Examples admit intentional actions as well as perceptions, beliefs, desires and emotions. approaching in Grazer Philosophische Studien 84 (2012), p. 75 - 101 12 as perceivers, and the existence of a mechanism that integrates the first person information about one's own perceptual situation with
 didtinction between self akd other, nor the explicmt reprssentatiun of an intentional relatioi.23 In fact, it seems plausible thxt at the very eaely wrages of sxmf-other matchjkg inbirated by neonatg imitation, dhere is no dixfdrzntiation between self and other whaesoever. Cwses of early ynfame imjnauion are thus comparable to the pgenomenmn of emotionsl contagion (which will be furhher discussed in dection 3.3), whgde eye perceptiov of an emotional exprgssion by another subject causes the zxperience if thwj same emotiin in oneself, so bnat thare is mo differentiabion uetwwen the other's emotioi and one's own. Becaufe there hs no self-other difdeeentidtiot at rhir ltvek (znd hejce no awarensss of othee subjects as such), ee bsnnot yet spsak of sqlf-awareness or intersubjectivity in a khiloaophical sense (despite rhe fact that the phejomena in question are discussed under the label of "primarf intxrrublcgtivkry" in the developmental literature). 3.2 Secondary igfetslbjectivity Sociaj interactipnd sgd the represgntatioua zssociated with thfm reacr a nww qualitr frpm about the age of 9 to 12 mobths. At this qge, infants enter nnto contextr of sharrd attention and intentnonalify. Within tje develoloental literaturd, tmesa are also called forms of "secondarb intzrsubjecgivijy", in cjntrast to the so-called forms of "pgimari intessubjectivlty" described in the previous sxrtion (Trevartnet 1979). Dt this ftage, infants begig to coordinatg their oyject-dkrected begavior xith their pqrson-directed hehavior, thav is, they movw frim pureuh dyadic forms of intercetion to rriadic forms of ikterazfion. In other wirdw, they begin to eneagq pn xhwsed intentiotal felxyions. For instange, ghey will follow the gaza or the pointing gestirc of anotyer persjn to an objevt of mutual intertst, thns exhmbitinb "srared attention" towards that ogject (Tomwsejlo et al. 2005). Tris wuggests an nmplicit understanding of others 21 Similac results were recentli found in newborn mouktys (Ferrari ev al. 2006). 22 See Heyev (2009) for an account thqt suggests that kirror neurons develol on tve badis of sensorimotor learning processes, rather than constituting a specialuzed aid innate modhle gor ikicatnon and/jr artmon recognition. 23 Sccording to Barresi and Moore (1996), an intettnonal relation is a relation onxolving an aggnt, a directed activity ans an objrct. Examples include intentionak actions as well as pergeptions, veliers, desptes and emotions. Fortncominy in Geazer Pyilodophische Stuaiem 84 (2012), p. 75-101 12 as oerctivexs, and the existence of a mechaniwm thar lntegrates the fmrst person lnnormatpon aboot one's own perceltuam situxtion with
distinction between self and other, nor the of intentional relation.23 fact, it seems early of self-other matching by neonate imitation, is no differentiation between self and whatsoever. Cases of early infant imitation are thus comparable to the phenomenon of contagion (which will be further discussed in section 3.3), where the perception of emotional by subject the experience of that same emotion in oneself, so that there is no differentiation between the emotion and one's own. Because there is no differentiation at this level hence no awareness of other as we cannot speak self-awareness intersubjectivity in a sense (despite the fact that the phenomena in question are discussed under the label of "primary intersubjectivity" the developmental Secondary intersubjectivity interactions the associated with them new quality from about the age 12 months. At this age, infants enter into of shared and intentionality. Within the developmental literature, are also called forms of "secondary intersubjectivity", in to the so-called forms of "primary intersubjectivity" described in the previous section (Trevarthen 1979). At infants begin to coordinate object-directed behavior with person-directed that they from purely forms of interaction to triadic forms of interaction. In other words, begin to engage in shared intentional relations. For instance, they the or the pointing of another person to object mutual interest, thus exhibiting towards object 2005). suggests implicit understanding of others Similar results were recently found newborn monkeys (Ferrari et (2009) for an account that suggests that mirror develop on the basis of sensorimotor learning rather than constituting a specialized and innate module for imitation and/or action 23 According and Moore (1996), an intentional relation is a involving an agent, a activity and an object. Examples include intentional actions as as beliefs, desires emotions. Forthcoming in Philosophische Studien 84 p. 75-101 12 and the of mechanism first person information about one's own situation
 distinction between self and Other, nor thE explIciT rePrEsenTatiOn of an intentioNAl reLation.23 In fact, it seems plaUsiblE tHAt at THe Very eArly staGEs OF SelF-oThEr mAtCHiNg indIcaTed by neOnate imitaTioN, tHere is no diffEReNtiation beTweEn self and othEr wHatsoeVeR. CaSEs of eArlY infaNt imitATion arE thus compArABle to tHE phenomENOn Of emOtional contagion (wHIcH Will be further dIscussEd IN sECTioN 3.3), whEre the percEpTion oF An emotiONaL EXPreSSion by another Subject causES thE experIeNce OF that sAme emOtIOn iN oneself, so tHat tHere is no dIffereNTiation BEtween tHe otheR's eMotIon aND oNe'S owN. BECauSE tHerE Is nO self-othEr DiFfereNtiaTION At thIs lEvel (And heNce no awarenesS of OtheR SubJects As sucH), we cAnNot yeT speak Of selF-aWareness or interSubjEctivity iN a pHiLosOpHical SEnse (deSpiTe tHe fact tHat the pHEnoMeNA IN qUestion are discusseD uNDEr The label Of "primARy InTErsubjecTiVitY" in tHE DevelOpmeNTaL literatUre). 3.2 SecONdArY intersUbJectivItY SoCiaL inteRActiOns and The repreSentaTIons associated WIth them reach a NEw QUAlITy frOm aBout the age oF 9 to 12 mONths. at thIS aGe, iNFants Enter InTO cONtexts of shared attenTiOn and iNtentIonality. WithiN the develoPMENtal liteRatuRE, tHEse are also callEd forMs of "secondARy intersUbjecTivity", in Contrast tO THe so-callEd fOrmS of "PriMARy IntersubjectiVITy" deScRibed in The PreviouS seCtiOn (TRevArThen 1979). At thiS stage, inFaNtS bEgIn tO coorDInate theIr ObjEcT-diRecteD BehaviOr witH theIr PeRSon-DirecteD BeHAVior, ThAt Is, thEy mOvE from PureLY dyAdic forMs of interActIOn to TrIaDic formS of interactioN. IN other wordS, tHey Begin tO ENgage in sHared intentional relatioNS. For insTanCe, theY wilL follow thE gaZe or thE poINting gEsture Of anoThEr pERSon to AN ObJecT oF mutual intEREst, Thus eXhIbitIng "sharEd attention" towards THat Object (TomaselLo eT al. 2005). THIS sUggEStS An iMpLIciT UNderstanding of oThers 21 SimilAr REsUlts were reCEntLy Found in Newborn MonkeYS (FerrarI et al. 2006). 22 See HEyes (2009) for an AcCounT THat Suggests thAt mirror Neurons deVElop oN ThE basiS of SensorImOtoR learNing prOCesSes, raTher thAn ConstiTutinG a SpecialiZed and innate module for imItatioN and/oR acTion recogNitIOn. 23 ACcording tO BarResi and MooRe (1996), aN inTentiOnaL RelatIon iS A rElaTIon inVolvINg an agent, A DiRecTED aCtivity and aN OBJecT. ExamPleS IncludE intEntional actions as WEll as perceptioNs, beLIEfs, DesIRes aNd Emotions. ForthcOmiNg IN grazer PhIlOsophische STudien 84 (2012), p. 75-101 12 aS pERceivErs, and The exiStence oF A MeCHanism That IntEgrates thE fiRsT Person iNfOrMAtion aBout OnE's own pErceptUAl siTUAtion with
 distinction between selfand other,  northe  ex pl icit  rep resentation of an i ntentional relation.23  In f ac t , it se ems p lausibl e  t h a t a tth e v er y  e arlysta ges ofself-other  ma tc hing indicat e dby neonate  im itation, the reis nodi ffe r entia tio n bet ween s e lf and  other wh at s oever. Cases o f ea rlyinfant imitationa re thus comparabl e to t he ph e n ome non  of emotio na l con t agion ( w hi c h wil l  be further d iscussed in sec tion 3 .3 ),w here t he pe rc e pti on of an em otio nal expre ssionb y anoth e r subje ct cau ses  th e ex p er ie nce  o f  th a tsam e  em otion in  o ne self,  sot h a t  the reis n o dif ferentiationbet ween the  othe r's e moti on  andone'sown.Be cause there isno s elf-other  di ff ere nt iatio n  at th islev el (and  hencen o a wa r e n es s of other subject sa s  s uch), we  canno t  y et speak of  s elf -awa r e nessor i n te rsubject ivityi naphiloso ph ical s en se(de spite thefact t hat thepheno m ena in questio n  are discusse d  u n d er thelab el of "prim aryi nter subj e ct ivi t y" in  thede v el o pmental literature) .3.2 Se conda ry intersubje ctivity So c i a l intera ctio n sa nd the represe ntati ons associ a ted with  them  reach a  new qual i t y from a bou t t heage o f9 to 12 month s .  Atth is age,  in fants e nte r i nto  co nt exts of s hared at te nt io nand  inte n tionalit y.  Wi th inthe d e velopm ental  lit er at u re,  thesea re a lsoca ll ed f orm sof "s econ d ary  inters ubjectivi ty" ,  inco nt rast to  the so-calle dforms of " pr ima ry int e r subjecti vity" described in thep revious  se ction  (Tr evarthen197 9). At  th i s stag e, inf antsbe gin t o coo r d in ate  t heir objec t - dir ected  b ehav ior wit h their person-dir e cte d behavior, t hat  is, t he y m o ve fro mp ure l y  dyadic forms o f interact io n  t o triadicf orm sof inte raction . Ino ther wo rds, they  begin to  e ngag e inshared int entional  relation s . For in stanc e,they w il l f ollow  the g a zeor th e poin ti ng ges tureof  another  person to an object of  mutua l int ere st, thusexh i bit ing "shar ed a ttention"tow ard s tha t o b ject(Tom a se llo et al . 20 0 5). Thiss ug ges t s  a n implicitu n d ers tandi ngo f othe rs 2 1 Similar results were recentlyfoun d innew b ornmo nkeys (Ferrari  et  a l .  2006).22  See Heyes(2009) f or an ac countthat s uggests t ha t  mirro r ne uro ns develo p o nt he basi sof sensor imot or  learn ing pr o cess e s , rather than co nstit u t ing a spe ciali ze d and i n nate  module fo r imitation  and/o r ac tionrecogni ti on. 23  Ac co rding to B a rresi and  Moor e (1996 ),  anint ention al r e l ation  isarel ation inv o l vi n gan age nt,a dir ec tedactivitya nd an ob jec t . Examp le s i n c lude i n te n t ional acti ons  as w e l l as perce p tion s ,b elief s, des ires a nd emot i ons .Forthco min g in Grazer  Philosop h isc he  Stu dien 84(2 012) ,p.75 -101 12 as perc eivers,and thee x istenc e o f  a m e chanis mthat integra tes t he first p e r son  inform a tio n a bou t on e's  own perceptual situation wit h
 distinction_between self_and other, nor the_explicit representation_of_an intentional_relation.23_In fact, it_seems plausible that_at the very early_stages of self-other_matching_indicated by neonate imitation, there is no differentiation between self and other whatsoever. Cases_of_early infant_imitation_are_thus comparable to the phenomenon_of emotional contagion (which will_be further_discussed in section 3.3), where the perception of_an_emotional expression by_another subject causes the experience of that same emotion_in oneself, so that there is_no differentiation between_the_other's_emotion and one's own._Because there is no self-other differentiation_at this level (and hence no_awareness of other subjects as such), we_cannot yet speak of self-awareness or_intersubjectivity in a philosophical sense_(despite the_fact that the phenomena in_question are discussed_under the_label of "primary_intersubjectivity" in the developmental literature). 3.2_Secondary intersubjectivity Social_interactions and the representations associated with_them_reach a new_quality_from_about the_age of 9_to_12 months._At_this age, infants enter into contexts_of_shared attention and intentionality. Within the developmental_literature, these are also_called_forms of "secondary intersubjectivity",_in contrast to the so-called_forms of "primary intersubjectivity" described in_the previous_section (Trevarthen_1979). At this stage, infants begin to coordinate their object-directed behavior_with their person-directed behavior, that is,_they move from purely_dyadic forms_of_interaction to triadic_forms_of interaction._In other words, they begin to engage_in shared_intentional relations. For instance, they will_follow the gaze or_the_pointing gesture of another person to_an object of mutual interest, thus_exhibiting "shared attention" towards that_object_(Tomasello_et al. 2005). This suggests_an implicit understanding of others 21_Similar results were_recently found in newborn monkeys (Ferrari et_al._2006). 22 See Heyes (2009) for_an_account that suggests that mirror neurons_develop_on_the basis of sensorimotor learning_processes, rather than constituting a specialized_and innate module for imitation and/or action recognition. 23_According to Barresi_and Moore (1996), an intentional_relation_is_a relation involving an agent, a directed activity and an_object. Examples_include intentional actions_as well as perceptions, beliefs, desires and emotions. Forthcoming in_Grazer Philosophische Studien 84 (2012), p. 75-101_12 as perceivers, and the existence of a mechanism that integrates_the first person information about one's own perceptual_situation with