inducing quantifiers. This is straightforwardly explained by the hypothesis that contingencyinducing quantification is de re restricted quantification. I grant that other explanations are conceivable. One could, for instance, propose that vim comes in a multitude of different flavours: our contingency-inducing quantifiers are restricted to things with our flavour of vim, while Twin's contingency-inducting quantifiers are restricted to things with his different flavour of vim. But what is the point? Given the strength of the independent reasons for regarding de re restricted quantification as pervasive, the postulation of a mysterious new realm of properties that are neither qualitative nor de re just in order to provide an additional source of contingency in quantified claims is utterly ill-motivated. 6 Counterpart theory: the singly de re When φ is a closed sentence containing no de re elements at all, either overt or covert, the modal realist should claim that for it to be possible or necessary that φ is just for it to be the case that φ. What if φ does contain referential singular terms (including free variables)? Let us begin by considering how the analysis should work when there just 20Ironically, one of MacFarlane's favourite ways of defending Relativism in other domains is to appeal to something very like the view I have just been criticising: 'Consider Jane (who inhabits this world, the actual world) and June, her counterpart in another possible world. Jane asserts that Mars has two moons, and June denies this very proposition. Do they disagree? Not in any real way.' (MacFarlane 2007: p. 10) one such term has occurrences in φ. Lewis 1968 is a good place to start. Although that paper deals in translations between formal languages rather than analyses stated in English, there is an obvious way to read off from the translation a schematic analysis whose instances are sentences of (logician's) English: Possibly φ(t)↔df Analysis A ∃w∃v(w is a Lewis-world ∧ v is in w ∧ v C t ∧ φw(v)). Necessarily φ(t)↔df ∀w∀v((w is a Lewis-world ∧ v is in w ∧ v C t)→ φw(v)). Here 'φ(t)' is to be replaced with a sentence in which t is the only free variable or directly referential term and everything else is qualitative; φ(v) is the result
inducing quantifiers. This is straightforwardly explained by the guess that contingencyinducing quantification is de re restrict quantification. I grant that other explanation are conceivable. One could, for example, propose that vim comes in a battalion of different flavours: our contingency - induce quantifiers are restricted to thing with our flavour of vim, while Twin's eventuality - inducting quantifiers are restricted to things with his different flavour of vim. But what is the detail? Given the strength of the independent rationality for regarding de re restricted quantification as pervasive, the postulation of a cryptic new kingdom of properties that are neither qualitative nor de re just in order to put up an additional source of contingency in quantified claims is absolutely ill - motivate. 6 Counterpart hypothesis: the singly de re When φ is a closed sentence containing no de re elements at all, either overt or covert, the modal realist should claim that for it to be possible or necessary that φ is barely for it to be the event that φ. What if φ does contain referential singular term (include free variables)? Let us get down by considering how the psychoanalysis should work when there just 20Ironically, one of MacFarlane's favourite way of defending Relativism in other domains is to appeal to something very like the view I have just been criticising:' Consider Jane (who inhabits this world, the actual world) and June, her counterpart in another potential world. Jane insist that Mars have two moons, and June denies this very suggestion. Do they disagree? Not in any real way.' (MacFarlane 2007: p. 10) one such term take occurrence in φ. Lewis 1968 is a good place to begin. Although that paper deal in translations between formal language rather than analysis stated in English, there be an obvious way to read off from the translation a schematic analysis whose example are sentences of (logician's) English: Possibly φ(t)↔df Analysis A ∃w∃v(w is a Lewis - world ∧ v is in w ∧ v C t ∧ φw(v) ). Necessarily φ(t)↔df ∀w∀v((w is a Lewis - world ∧ v is in w ∧ v C t)→ φw(v) ). Here' φ(t)' is to be replaced with a sentence in which thymine is the only free variable star or directly referential term and everything else is qualitative; φ(v) is the result
indkcing quantifiers. This ir straightforwatdoy expnained by the fypothesis that contingencyiiducung qyantification is de re restrictvd quantidicauion. I grant that other ew'lanaflons crx conceivable. Oke could, fos instance, pro[ore that vim comes in a multitude of dyffereny vlavours: our cjntimdencg-pnbucing quantifiers are restrictsd to tiings with our glavour of vim, while Twin's conhingency-inducting euantifiers are eestricted tu things wpch his diffgrent flavour of vim. But what is the 'oint? Given tye djrength of tie indvpendent reasons for segardimg de re restrlcted quqntification as pervavive, the postulatijn of a mfscerious new realm of priperthes dhat qre nejtier qualihatmve nor de de just in irder to provide an aqeitional sourde of sogtingency in quantified claims is utterny jll-motivated. 6 Counterpaet theory: the singly fe re Wheg φ is a closed sentence containing no de re elemetts av xll, elthef ogert or covert, the modal realist should claim fhst for it to be iossible or necesssrj yrat φ is just wor it to be the case that φ. What is φ dows contaig regerential singular terms (inxluding free cariables)? Let us bzgin by consnderinb how the analysis should woxk wheh there jush 20Ironicamuy, one of MacFaruanv's fdvourite ways of defending Relativiwm iu other aomaons is to appeal to something very like hhe vnew I have just been criticising: 'Consider Jane (who inhabits jhiv wmrld, the actusl world) and Tune, her countgrpart in anotfer possibme worlv. Jane asseres that Mars vws two moons, and Junq debies this vdfy proposition. Do they bnsagree? Nit in any real way.' (MazRarlane 2007: p. 10) one suxh term has occirrdncqs ii φ. Lerhs 1968 is a goog plxce yo stxrt. Althougm tfat laper deals in transnatikns between formal lwnguages rather ehan analyses stated in English, therx is ai obvipus way to read off from the tranalation a scmematic analyfis qhose instanees are sentences of (logician's) English: Pissibly φ(t)↔df Analysus A ∃w∃v(w is a Lewis-covld ∧ v is in w ∧ v C t ∧ φw(v)). Tecessarily φ(t)↔df ∀w∀v((w us a Lewis-world ∧ y is in w ∧ v C t)→ φw(v)). Hede 'φ(t)' iv to he replaced with a sentence in which t is the only free variable or direcrly rehewential terj anc evegytkiny else ys qnauitative; φ(v) is thv result
inducing quantifiers. This is straightforwardly explained by that quantification is re restricted quantification. are One could, for propose that vim in a multitude of different flavours: contingency-inducing quantifiers are restricted to things with our flavour of vim, while Twin's quantifiers are restricted to things with his different flavour of vim. But what the Given strength the independent reasons for regarding de re restricted quantification as pervasive, the postulation of a mysterious realm of properties that are neither qualitative nor re just in order provide an additional source of in claims is ill-motivated. Counterpart the singly de When φ is a closed sentence containing no de re elements at all, either overt or covert, modal realist that for to possible necessary that φ for it to be the case if φ does contain referential singular terms (including variables)? Let begin by considering how the analysis work when there just 20Ironically, one of MacFarlane's ways of defending Relativism in other domains is to appeal to something very like the have just been criticising: Jane (who inhabits world, actual and her counterpart another possible world. Jane asserts that Mars has two moons, and denies this very proposition. Do they disagree? Not in any (MacFarlane p. 10) one term has occurrences in Lewis is a good place Although paper between languages than analyses stated in there is an obvious way read off from the instances are sentences of (logician's) English: Possibly φ(t)↔df A ∃w∃v(w is a Lewis-world ∧ v in w ∧ v C t ∧ φw(v)). Necessarily φ(t)↔df ∀w∀v((w is Lewis-world ∧ in w ∧ v C t)→ φw(v)). Here is to be replaced a sentence in which t is the only free or referential term everything else is φ(v) is the
inducing quantifiers. This is StraightfoRwardLy eXplAiNed bY the Hypothesis that COntiNgencyinducing quantifiCatioN iS De re REsTrictEd quantIFiCATioN. I GrAnt ThAT oTher eXplAnationS are conceiVabLe. one could, for iNStAnce, proposE thAt vim comes in A muLtitudE oF diFFerenT flAvourS: our coNTingenCy-inducinG qUAntifiERs are reSTRiCted To things with our flAVoUR of vim, while TwiN's contInGEnCY-IndUctIng quantifIeRs are REstrictED tO THIngS With his differEnt flavour oF Vim. but whaT iS thE Point? GIven tHe STreNgth of the inDepeNdent reasOns for REgardinG De re resTricteD quAntIficATiOn As pErVAsiVE, tHe pOStuLation of A mYsTerioUs neW REALm of ProPertIes thAt are neither qUalItatIVe nOr de rE just In orDeR to prOvide aN addiTiOnal source of conTingEncy in quaNtiFiEd cLaIms is UTterly Ill-MotIvated. 6 COunterpARt tHeORY: ThE singly de re When φ is A cLOSeD sentencE contaINiNg NO de re eleMeNts At alL, EIther OverT Or Covert, thE modal REaLiSt shoulD cLaim thAt For It tO be poSSiblE or necEssary thAt φ is JUst for it to be thE Case that φ. What IF φ DOEs COntaIn rEferential sInguLAr teRms (iNClUdiNG free VariaBlES)? LET us begin by consideriNg How the AnalySis should work When there jUST 20ironicalLy, onE Of mAcFarlane's favoUrite Ways of defeNDing RelaTivisM in other Domains is TO Appeal to SomEthIng VerY LIkE the view I have JUSt beEn CriticiSinG: 'ConsidEr JAne (Who InhAbIts this woRld, the acTuAl WoRlD) anD June, HEr counteRpArt In AnoTher pOSsible World. jane AsSeRTs tHat Mars HAs TWO mooNs, AnD JunE deNiEs thiS verY ProPositioN. Do they diSagREe? NoT iN aNy real wAy.' (MacFarlane 2007: p. 10) OnE such term hAs OccUrrencES In φ. Lewis 1968 Is a good place to start. AlthOUgh that PapEr deaLs in TranslatiOns BetweeN foRMal lanGuages RatheR tHan ANAlyseS STaTed In english, theRE Is aN obviOuS way To read oFf from the translatiON a sChematic analySis WhosE INsTanCEs ARe sEnTEncES Of (logician's) EnglIsh: PossiblY φ(T)↔Df analysis A ∃w∃V(W is A LEwis-worLd ∧ v is in W ∧ v C t ∧ φW(V)). NecessArily φ(t)↔df ∀W∀v((w is a LewIs-WorlD ∧ V Is iN w ∧ v C t)→ φw(v)). HeRe 'φ(t)' is to Be replaceD With a SEnTence In wHich t iS tHe oNly frEe variABle Or dirEctly rEfErentiAl terM aNd everytHing else is qualitative; φ(v) Is the rEsult
inducing quantifiers. This  is straig htfor war dly  e xpla ined  by the hypoth e sisthat contingencyinduci ng qu an t ific a ti on is  de rer es t r ict ed  q uan ti f ic ation . I  grantthat other  ex pl anations are co nceivable.  On e could, for  in stance ,pro p ose t hat  vimcomesi n a mu ltitude o fd iffere n t flavo u r s:  our  contingency-indu c in g  quantifiers a re res tr i ct e d  to  th ings withou r fla v our ofv im , w hil e  Twin's conti ngency-indu c tin g quan ti fie r s arerestr ic t edto things w ithhis diffe rent f l avour o f  vim. B ut wha t i s t he p o in t?  Gi ve n  th e  s tre n gth  of thein de pende nt r e a s o ns f orrega rding  de re restri cte d qu a nti ficat ion a s pe rv asive , thepostu la tion of a myste riou s new rea lmof  pr op ertie s  thatare  ne ither q ualitat i veno r d ere just in order t op r ov ide an a dditio n al  s o urce ofco nti ngen c y  in q uant i fi ed claim s is u t te rl y ill-m ot ivated .6 C oun terpa r t th eory:the sing ly de re When φ is a closed senten c ec o nt a inin g n o de re ele ment s  atall, ei the r  over t orco v er t , the modal realist  s houldclaim  that for itto be poss i b l e or nec essa r yt hat φ is justfor i t to be th e  case th at φ.  What if  φ does c o n tain ref ere nti alsin g u la r terms (incl u d ingfr ee vari abl es)? Le t u s b egi n b yconsideri ng how t he  a na ly sis  shou l d work w he n t he rejust2 0Ironi cally , on eof Mac Farlane ' sf a vour it eways  of  d efend ingR ela tivismin otherdom a insis  t o appea l to somethin gvery liketh e v iew Ih a ve justbeen criticising: 'Cons i der Jan e ( who i nhab its thiswor ld, th e a c tual w orld)and J un e,h e r cou n t er par tin another p oss iblewo rld.  Jane a sserts that Mars h a s t wo moons, and  Ju ne d e n ie s t h is ver yp rop o s ition. Do theydisagree?No t  i n any real way .'  (MacFa rlane 2 007:p . 10) o ne such t erm has o cc urre n c esin φ. Lewi s 1968 i s a goodp lacet ostart . A lthoug htha t pap er dea l s i n tra nslati on s betw een f or mal lang uages rather than analy ses st atedinEnglish,the r e i s an obvi ousway to rea d o fffromthe trans lati o na s c hemat ic a n alysis wh o se  in s t an ces are sen t e n ces  of ( log i cian's ) En glish: Possibly φ ( t)↔df Analysis  A ∃ w ∃ v(w  is a Le wi s-world ∧ v is  in  w ∧  v C t ∧  φ w(v)). Nece ssarilyφ( t )↔df∀w∀v(( w is a  Lewis- w o rl d  ∧ v i s in  w∧ v C t)→  φw (v ) ). Here  ' φ( t )' isto b ereplac ed wit h  a s e n tence in which t  is t h e  only fre e var ia ble ord irec tly refere ntial termand ev eryt hingelse is  q ualita tiv e;  φ(v) is t h e result
inducing quantifiers._This is_straightforwardly explained by the_hypothesis that_contingencyinducing_quantification is_de_re restricted quantification._I grant that_other explanations are conceivable._One could, for_instance,_propose that vim comes in a multitude of different flavours: our contingency-inducing quantifiers are_restricted_to things_with_our_flavour of vim, while Twin's_contingency-inducting quantifiers are restricted to_things with_his different flavour of vim. But what is_the_point? Given the_strength of the independent reasons for regarding de re_restricted quantification as pervasive, the postulation_of a mysterious_new_realm_of properties that are_neither qualitative nor de re just_in order to provide an additional_source of contingency in quantified claims is_utterly ill-motivated. 6 Counterpart theory: the_singly de re When φ_is a_closed sentence containing no de_re elements at_all, either_overt or covert,_the modal realist should claim that_for it to_be possible or necessary that φ_is_just for it_to_be_the case_that φ. What_if_φ does_contain_referential singular terms (including free variables)?_Let_us begin by considering how the analysis_should work when there_just_20Ironically, one of MacFarlane's_favourite ways of defending Relativism_in other domains is to appeal_to something_very like_the view I have just been criticising: 'Consider Jane (who inhabits_this world, the actual world) and_June, her counterpart in_another possible_world._Jane asserts that_Mars_has two_moons, and June denies this very proposition._Do they_disagree? Not in any real way.'_(MacFarlane 2007: p. 10)_one_such term has occurrences in φ._Lewis 1968 is a good place_to start. Although that paper_deals_in_translations between formal languages rather_than analyses stated in English, there_is an obvious_way to read off from the translation_a_schematic analysis whose instances are sentences_of_(logician's) English: Possibly φ(t)↔df Analysis A_∃w∃v(w_is_a Lewis-world ∧ v is_in w ∧ v C t_∧ φw(v)). Necessarily φ(t)↔df ∀w∀v((w is a Lewis-world ∧_v is in_w ∧ v C t)→_φw(v))._Here_'φ(t)' is to be replaced with a sentence in which_t is_the only free_variable or directly referential term and everything else is qualitative;_φ(v) is the result