 of evidence that suggests that he did not. In OPW §1.2, we are told that 'possibly there are blue swans iff, for some world W, at W there are blue swans', where 'at W' 'works mainly by restricting the domains of quantifiers in its scope, in much the same way that the restricting modifier "in Australia" does' 4 (OPW 5). This suggests that 'at W' can apply restrictions even when it is applied to a sentence that doesn't come with its own restriction, so that 'at W, Qu Fs are Gs' means the same as 'Qu Fs which are in W are Gs'. If so, 'At some Lewis-world W, no swans are blue', and hence also 'Possibly no swans are blue', will be true even when the quantifier is read unrestrictedly.10 On the other hand, Lewis shows no signs of endorsing any of the puzzling claims that-as we saw in section 1-follow from analyses like (1) and (2) when all the quantifiers are taken as unrestricted.11 And there are several passages in which Lewis directly addresses the modal status of claims built up from unrestricted quantification and qualitative predicates, which suggest that such claims are necessary when true. Here is one example: Our contingent knowledge that there are donkeys at our world requires causal acquaintance with the donkeys, or at least with what produces them. Our necessary knowledge that there are donkeys at some worlds-even talking donkeys, donkeys with dragons as worldmates, and what have 10There is a complication: 'I do not suppose that [restrictive modifiers] must restrict all quantifiers in their scope, without exception. "In Australia, there is a yacht faster than any other" would mean less than it does if the modifier restricted both quantifiers rather than just the first.... [A] lot is left up to the pragmatic rule that what is said should be interpreted so as to be sensible' (OPW 6). This suggests that sentences involving restricting modifiers, including modal operators, have a range of readings, which differ as regards which quantifiers get restricted. If so, then 'In W there are many Lewis-worlds' and 'Possibly there are many Lewis-worlds' have readings on which they are both equivalent to 'There are many Lewis-worlds', as well as readings on which they are trivially false. It is easy to
of evidence that suggests that he did not. In OPW § 1.2, we are told that' possibly there are aristocratic swans iff, for some populace W, at W there are blue swans', where' at W'' whole shebang mainly by restricting the world of quantifier in its scope, in a lot the like way that the restricting changer " in Australia " does' 4 (OPW 5). This suggests that' at W' can enforce restriction even when it is applied to a sentence that doesn't come with its own restriction, so that' at W, Qu Fs are Gs' means the like as' Qu Fs which are in W are Gs'. If so,' At some Lewis - world W, no swans are blasphemous', and hence also' Possibly no swan are blue', will be dependable even when the quantifier is read unrestrictedly.10 On the early hand, Lewis shows no signs of endorsing any of the puzzle claims that - as we saw in section 1 - follow from analyses like (1) and (2) when all the quantifiers are accept as unrestricted.11 And there are several passages in which Lewis directly addresses the modal status of claims built up from unrestricted quantification and qualitative predicates, which propose that such claims are necessary when true. Here is one exercise: Our contingent cognition that there be donkeys at our world command causal acquaintance with the donkeys, or at least with what produces them. Our necessary knowledge that there are donkey at some worlds - even talking donkeys, donkeys with dragons as worldmates, and what have 10There is a complication:' I do not speculate that [ restrictive modifiers ] must restrict all quantifiers in their scope, without exception. " In Australia, there be a yacht quicker than any early " would think of less than it does if the modifier restricted both quantifier rather than just the first.... [ A ] fortune is left up to the pragmatic rule that what is said should be represent so as to be sensible' (OPW 6). This suggest that sentences involve restricting modifier, including modal operator, have a stove of readings, which differ as regards which quantifiers get restricted. If indeed, then' In W there are many Lewis - worlds' and' Possibly there are many Lewis - worlds' have readings on which they are both equivalent to' There are many Lewis - worlds', as well as reading on which they are trivially false. It is easy to
 of evidence that suggests uhat he did not. Iu OPW §1.2, xe are fold thag 'possibly there are blue swens uff, fir some world W, at W tfere are hlue swabs', wiere 'at W' 'works mainly bn resfvictiug the domains on quantifiess in its scopa, kn much the same way that the restriceing mocivier "in Austrajia" cjes' 4 (OPW 5). This suggests that 'at W' can zpply rtstrictions even wnen it is applied to a senhencf that doesn't come with its oqn rqwtriction, so that 'at W, Qu Fs are Ga' means the same as 'Qu Fs which are nn W are Gs'. Id sl, 'At some Lexis-worjd W, no swans are blge', and nence also 'Posxibny bo swans are blue', wiln be true even wheg the quattnfier is read unrestrucredly.10 On dhe urhef hznv, Lswis sjowa no signs of endorsibg any of the puzzlond claims that-aa we sww in section 1-follow from analyses like (1) dnd (2) when all the quantifiwrs are taken as unredtricted.11 Wnd there are several passages in which Lewis diractly xddxcfrws the modal status of claims built up from unrqattibted quantificatijn and qualotwtode predicates, which sufgest that such clwims arg necewsary wheg trie. Here is one example: Our xontingent kuowoedge that there axe donkeys ac our eorld requires causal acquaiutance with the dlnkeys, or xt least with whxt irodgces them. Our necessary knjwledge tiat tkere are donleys ae some worpds-evct talking donkeys, fonkeis witv dragons ws worldmates, and what have 10Thecx is a complivadiot: 'I do njt suipose that [restwictive modifigrs] must xestrizt all quahtifierv in their fcope, without gxception. "In Eustralia, theee iw a yacfg faster than sny other" would meab less than it doex iw the modifier rzruructed both quamtiwiews rether dhan just tha fifst.... [S] lot is lefu ui tu thr pragmatic rule thad whzt is said should ne interprgted so af to be sensinle' (OPW 6). This suggtsts tiat seitencex igvolving restricting modifiers, includinh mjdal operatows, hqve a range pf readings, which differ as regards whirh quantifiers get resjricted. If so, then 'In E there are many Lewis-wornds' and 'Possibly theee are many Lewis-eorlds' have readings kn whiwh thfy are both equivalent to 'There are many Lewis-worlds', as well as readings in whirh they are tdivislly xajxe. It ys eesb to
of evidence that suggests that he did OPW we are that 'possibly there some W, at W are blue swans', 'at W' 'works mainly by restricting domains of quantifiers in its scope, in much the same way that the modifier "in Australia" does' 4 (OPW 5). This suggests that 'at W' can restrictions when is to a sentence that doesn't come with its own restriction, so that 'at W, Qu Fs Gs' means the same as 'Qu Fs which in W are Gs'. so, 'At some Lewis-world W, swans blue', and also no are blue', will true even when the quantifier is read unrestrictedly.10 On the other hand, Lewis shows no signs of any of claims that-as saw section from analyses like (2) when all the quantifiers are And there are several passages in which Lewis addresses the status of claims built up from quantification and qualitative predicates, which suggest that such are necessary when true. Here is one example: Our contingent knowledge that there are donkeys world requires causal acquaintance the donkeys, or least what them. necessary knowledge there are donkeys at some worlds-even talking donkeys, donkeys with dragons worldmates, and what have 10There is a complication: 'I do that modifiers] must restrict quantifiers in their scope, exception. Australia, there is a than other" than does the modifier restricted both rather than just the first.... lot is left up what is said should be interpreted so as be sensible' (OPW 6). This suggests that involving restricting modifiers, including modal operators, have a range of readings, which as regards get restricted. If so, then 'In W there many Lewis-worlds' and 'Possibly are many Lewis-worlds' have readings on which they are equivalent 'There are Lewis-worlds', as well readings on which are trivially false. easy to
 of evidence that suggests thaT he did not. IN OPW §1.2, wE arE toLd That 'PossIbly there are blUE swaNs iff, for some world W, at W tHere aRe BLue sWAnS', wherE 'at W' 'worKS mAINly By ReStrIcTInG the dOmaIns of quAntifiers iN itS sCope, in much thE SaMe way that tHe rEstricting moDifIer "in AUsTraLIa" doeS' 4 (OPw 5). This SuggesTS that 'aT W' can applY rEStrictIOns even WHEn It is Applied to a sentencE ThAT doesn't come witH its owN rEStRICtiOn, sO that 'at W, Qu fs Are Gs' MEans the SAmE AS 'qu FS Which are in W arE Gs'. If so, 'At soME LeWis-worLd w, no SWans arE blue', AnD HenCe also 'PossiBly nO swans are Blue', wiLL be true EVen when The quaNtiFieR is rEAd UnResTrICteDLy.10 on tHE otHer hand, LEwIs Shows No siGNS OF endOrsIng aNy of tHe puzzling claIms That-AS we Saw in SectiOn 1-foLlOw froM analySes liKe (1) And (2) when all the quAntiFiers are tAkeN aS unReStricTEd.11 And tHerE arE severaL passagES in WhICH leWis directly addressEs THE mOdal statUs of clAImS bUIlt up froM uNreStriCTEd quaNtifICaTion and qUalitaTIvE pRedicatEs, Which sUgGesT thAt sucH ClaiMs are nEcessary When tRUe. Here is one exaMPle: Our contingENt KNOwLEdge ThaT there are doNkeyS At ouR worLD rEquIRes caUsal aCqUAiNTance with the donkeys, Or At leasT with What produces tHem. Our neceSSARy knowleDge tHAt THere are donkeys At somE worlds-eveN Talking dOnkeyS, donkeys With dragoNS As worldmAteS, anD whAt hAVE 10THere is a compliCATion: 'i dO not supPosE that [reStrIctIve ModIfIers] must rEstrict aLl QuAnTiFieRs in tHEir scope, WiThoUt ExcEptioN. "in AustRalia, TherE iS a YAchT faster THaN ANy otHeR" wOuld MeaN lEss thAn it DOes If the moDifier resTriCTed bOtH qUantifiErs rather than JuSt the first.... [a] lOt iS left uP TO the pragMatic rule that what is said SHould be IntErpreTed sO as to be seNsiBle' (OPW 6). thiS SuggesTs that SenteNcEs iNVOlvinG REsTriCtIng modifieRS, IncLudinG mOdal OperatoRs, have a range of readINgs, Which differ as RegArds WHIcH quANtIFieRs GEt rESTricted. If so, then 'in W there arE mANy lewis-worldS' And 'poSsibly tHere are Many LEWis-worlDs' have reaDings on whIcH theY ARe bOth equivalEnt to 'TheRe are many lEwis-wORlDs', as wEll As readInGs oN whicH they aRE trIvialLy falsE. IT is easY to
 of evidence that suggests  that he d id no t.InOP W §1 .2,we are told th a t 'p ossibly there are blue  swan si ff,f or  some  worldW ,a t  Wth er e a re bl ue sw ans ', wher e 'at W' ' wor ks  mainly by r e st ricting th e d omains of qu ant ifiers  i n i t s sco pe,  in m uch th e  sameway thatth e  restr i cting m o d if ier"in Australia" do e s' 4 (OPW 5). Thi s sugg es t st h at'at  W' can ap pl y res t riction s  e v e n  wh e n it is appli ed to a sen t enc e that  d oes n 't com e wit hi tsown restric tion , so that  'at W ,  Qu Fsa re Gs'meansthe  sa me a s  ' Qu  Fs  w h ich ar e i n  Ware Gs'.  I fso, ' At s o m e Lewi s-w orld  W, n o swans are b lue ', a n d h encealso'Pos si bly n o swan s are  b lue', will be t rueeven when  th equa nt ifier is rea d u nre stricte dly.10O n t he o t he r hand, Lewis show sn o  s igns ofendors i ng  a n y of the  p uzz ling c laims  tha t -a s we saw  in se c ti on  1-foll ow  froman aly ses  like (1)and (2 ) when a ll th e  quantifiers a r e taken as un r es t r ic t ed.1 1 A nd there ar e se v eral  pas s ag esi n whi ch Le wi s  d i rectly addresses th emodalstatu s of claims b uilt up fr o m unrestri cted qu a ntification an d qua litative p r edicates , whi ch sugge st that s u c h claims  ar e n ece ssa r y  w hen true. Her e is o ne  exampl e:Our con tin gen t k now le dge thatthere ar edo nk ey s a t our world re qu ire scau sal a c quaint ancewith  t he don keys, o r  a t leas twi th w hat  p roduc es t h em.  Our ne cessary k now l edge  t ha t there  are donkeysat  some worl ds -ev en tal k i ng donke ys, donkeys with dragon s  as wor ldm ates,  and  what hav e 1 0There  is a comp licati on: ' Idon o t sup p o se  th at  [restrict i v e m odifi er s] m ust res trict all quantifi e rsin their scop e,with o u texc e pt i on.  " I n A u s tralia, there i s a yachtfa s te r than any oth er " would  mean l ess t h an it d oes if th e modifie rrest r i cte d both qua ntifiers  rather t h an ju s tthe f irs t....[A ] l ot is  leftu p t o the  pragm at ic rul e tha twhat issaid should be interpre ted so  as t o b e sensibl e'( OPW  6). This  sug gests that  se nte ncesinv o lving  res t ri cti n g mod ifie r s, includ i ng  mo d a loperators,h a v e a  rang e o f  readi ngs,  which differ asr egards which q uant i f ier s g e t re st ricted. If so,  th en ' In W the re  are many L ewis-wor ld s ' and  'Poss ibly t here ar e ma n y Lewi s-wo rld s' have r ead in g s on wh ic ht hey ar e bo th  equiv alentt o 'T h e re are many Lewi s-wor l d s', a s  we ll as  r eadings on w hich theyare trivial ly fal se.It is  easy t o
 of_evidence that_suggests that he did_not. In_OPW_§1.2, we_are_told that 'possibly_there are blue_swans iff, for some_world W, at_W_there are blue swans', where 'at W' 'works mainly by restricting the domains of_quantifiers_in its_scope,_in_much the same way that_the restricting modifier "in Australia"_does' 4_(OPW 5). This suggests that 'at W' can_apply_restrictions even when_it is applied to a sentence that doesn't come_with its own restriction, so that_'at W, Qu_Fs_are_Gs' means the same_as 'Qu Fs which are in_W are Gs'. If so, 'At_some Lewis-world W, no swans are blue',_and hence also 'Possibly no swans_are blue', will be true_even when_the quantifier is read unrestrictedly.10_On the other_hand, Lewis_shows no signs_of endorsing any of the puzzling_claims that-as we_saw in section 1-follow from analyses_like_(1) and (2)_when_all_the quantifiers_are taken as_unrestricted.11_And there_are_several passages in which Lewis directly_addresses_the modal status of claims built up_from unrestricted quantification and_qualitative_predicates, which suggest that_such claims are necessary when_true. Here is one example: Our_contingent knowledge_that there_are donkeys at our world requires causal acquaintance with the donkeys,_or at least with what produces_them. Our necessary knowledge_that there_are_donkeys at some_worlds-even_talking donkeys,_donkeys with dragons as worldmates, and what_have 10There_is a complication: 'I do not_suppose that [restrictive modifiers]_must_restrict all quantifiers in their scope,_without exception. "In Australia, there is_a yacht faster than any_other"_would_mean less than it does_if the modifier restricted both quantifiers_rather than just_the first.... [A] lot is left up_to_the pragmatic rule that what is_said_should be interpreted so as to_be_sensible'_(OPW 6). This suggests that_sentences involving restricting modifiers, including modal_operators, have a range of readings, which differ as_regards which quantifiers_get restricted. If so, then_'In_W_there are many Lewis-worlds' and 'Possibly there are many Lewis-worlds'_have readings_on which they_are both equivalent to 'There are many Lewis-worlds', as well_as readings on which they are trivially_false. It is easy to