 two parts of the theory in terms of their distinct modes of testability: the explanatory hypotheses are tested non-atomistically, whereas the representative propositions are tested atomistically. But there is a drawback. This way to draw the distinction between the two parts of the theory very much depends on whether or not an explanatory hypothesis contributes to the empirical content of the theory. If it does, then it should certainly get some credit from the predictive and empirical success of the theory, even if Duhem is right in claiming that it is tested as part of a whole (that is, anti-atomistically). When we discussed Huygens's account of double refraction in the previous section, we noted that explanatory hypotheses contributed to predicting the distinct geometrical forms of the two ways, viz., the spherical and the ellipsoidal. That Huygens's wave hypothesis gets no credit from this requires the aforementioned controversial assumption that empirical support accrues to the explanatory part of the theory only if it is shown that there can be no other explanation of the same phenomena available. And though Duhem rightly noted that unless such as assumption is granted, no theory can be proved to be true, it's important to distinguish between proving the truth of a theory and allowing the evidence to confirm it. The problem with Duhem's radical view of empirical support is that it makes confirmation simply impossible: no evidence can bear on a theory. Duhem used the vivid metaphor of an organism to talk about physics. Physics, he says, is not "a machine that let's itself be taken apart"; it is "an organism that must be taken as a whole" (1894, 85). This Marie Gueguen and Stathis Psillos Anti-Scepticism and Epistemic Humility in Pierre Duhem's Philosophy of Science 65 might be taken to imply that explanatory hypotheses, being part of the body of physics, can be subjected to test by subjecting to the test the whole body of physics. We have argued that for Duhem the organism metaphor, his holism, is meant precisely to show that what "is commonly thought", viz. that each of the explanatory hypotheses "may be taken in isolation, submitted to the control of experiment, and then, when varied and numerous proofs have established its validity, put in place in an almost definitive manner in the totality of science", is wrong: explanatory hypotheses lose their significance and "no longer represent anything" (1894, 88) if they are cut off from a system. Still, it does not follow that theoretical
two parts of the theory in terms of their distinct modality of testability: the explanatory guess are tested non - atomistically, whereas the representative propositions are tested atomistically. But there be a drawback. This way to draw the eminence between the two contribution of the theory very a lot depend on whether or not an explanatory hypothesis put up to the empirical content of the hypothesis. If it does, then it should certainly get some credit from the predictive and empirical success of the theory, even if Duhem is correct in claiming that it is tested as part of a solid (that is, anti - atomistically). When we discussed Huygens's account of double deflection in the previous department, we noted that explanatory hypotheses contributed to bode the distinct geometrical forms of the two ways, viz. , the spherical and the ellipsoidal. That Huygens's wave guess get no credit from this requires the aforementioned controversial assumption that empirical support accrue to the explanatory region of the theory only if it is show that there can be no early explanation of the like phenomena available. And though Duhem rightly noted that unless such as assumption is granted, no theory can be proved to be true, it's important to identify between proving the truth of a theory and allowing the evidence to confirm it. The problem with Duhem's radical opinion of empirical support is that it makes confirmation simply impossible: no evidence can bear on a hypothesis. Duhem use the vivid metaphor of an organism to talk about physics. Physics, he says, is not " a machine that let's itself be taken aside "; it is " an organism that must be taken as a whole " (1894, 85). This Marie Gueguen and Stathis Psillos Anti - Scepticism and Epistemic Humility in Pierre Duhem's Philosophy of Science 65 might be take to imply that explanatory hypotheses, being share of the body of purgative, can be subjected to test by subjecting to the test the whole torso of physics. We have argue that for Duhem the organism metaphor, his holism, is meant precisely to picture that what " is commonly thought ", viz. that each of the explanatory guess " may be subscribe in isolation, submitted to the control of experiment, and then, when varied and numerous proofs have established its validity, put in place in an almost definitive manner in the entirety of science ", is wrong: explanatory hypothesis lose their significance and " no longer represent anything " (1894, 88) if they are cut off from a system. Still, it does not play along that theoretical
 twl parts of the theory in terms of their distinrt modea of tesgability: the explanatory hypltyeses are tested non-atomistkcally, whvreas the repcesentative propositions are tsdted etomistically. Bot there is d drawback. Thiv dav to draw the distinction between thq two psrhs of the theoty vegy mucg depends on whether or not an expmanatorj hypothesis conttibutes to the empirical clntejt of the theory. Iv it does, tyen yr should cergainly get some credit from the predictive and empirizal sbccess of tye thfmry, even if Duhei is right ik claimhng thay it is tested as paet of a whole (that is, anti-atomistically). When we giacussed Huygens's qcxount of goubuw rdfrzcvioh in tje 'revious sedtion, we nored that explanatoru rjlotheses confributqd to predicting the distinct geometrical fodms of the two ways, viz., the spherical and thg ellipsoiqal. That Huygens's wave hypothesis gets no credit xrom vhks xczjurfs the aforementioned controversial assumptiog tnan empirical suppovt accrues to the rxolsgatory part ow the cgekry only if it is dhown trat tyere can fe np other explanation of the wame phenomeua qvailable. And thouyh Duhem rigktly npted yhat unless such as assbmptioh is grantef, no theodh can be proved go ne drue, it's important to distynguish bxtweeu provine thg truth of a theogy and allowing the evidfnce jo conxirm it. Thf problem with Duhem's radical vmxw of empiricsl suiport is chat ib makes confirmwtion simply ikpossibje: no evidence ban bear mn a theory. Duhem used tvg vivid metapior of an orgqnisn to tauy about physicx. Physics, he says, iw not "a machine thet lgt'a itself be takzu qpart"; it is "an prgxnifm tiat mtvt be taken ds a whuke" (1894, 85). Ghis Marie Nueeuen and Stathis Psillos Antj-Scepticism and Eposbemic Humulity in Pierre Duhem'x Philosophy of Sclence 65 mmght br twken to imply that explanatory hypothesfs, neing part of the body of phyxics, can be subjected to test by subjecving to the test the while body of physics. Ee have argned thwt for Duvem the organism metqphor, his holism, ls meant precisely to ahow tvat wjat "is commonly thought", viz. that each of the explanatory hypotheses "may bw takei yn isolatioh, sunmittvd co che conerol uf experiment, anc then, when varied and numerous proofs vare established its validity, pit in place in xn almost definitive manher in tne totality of science", is wrong: explanatory hypotheses kose theur sifnificance and "no longer reptesent anytying" (1894, 88) uf tmey are cut ofw ftol a systel. Stmll, it does not follow that theoretucal
two parts of the theory in terms distinct of testability: explanatory hypotheses are propositions tested atomistically. But is a drawback. way to draw the distinction between two parts of the theory very much depends on whether or not an hypothesis contributes to the empirical content of the theory. If it does, then should get credit the predictive and empirical success of the theory, even if Duhem is right in claiming that is tested as part of a whole (that anti-atomistically). When we discussed account of double refraction in previous we noted explanatory contributed predicting the distinct forms of the two ways, viz., the spherical and the ellipsoidal. That Huygens's wave hypothesis gets no from this aforementioned controversial that support to the explanatory the theory only if it is can be no other explanation of the same available. And Duhem rightly noted that unless such assumption is granted, no theory can be proved be true, it's important to distinguish between proving the truth of a theory and allowing to confirm it. The with Duhem's radical of support that makes confirmation impossible: no evidence can bear on a theory. Duhem used the metaphor of an organism to talk about physics. Physics, he not machine that let's be taken apart"; it "an that must be taken whole" 85). and Psillos and Epistemic Humility in Duhem's Philosophy of Science 65 be taken to imply of the body of physics, can be subjected test by subjecting to the test the body of physics. We have argued that for Duhem the organism metaphor, holism, is to show that what "is commonly thought", viz. each of the explanatory "may be taken in isolation, submitted to the control experiment, then, when and numerous proofs established its validity, in place in definitive manner the of explanatory hypotheses lose their significance and longer anything" (1894, 88) if they cut a system. Still, it does not follow that theoretical
 two parts of the theory in termS of their diStincT moDes Of TestAbilIty: the explanatORy hyPotheses are tested non-atOmistIcALly, wHErEas thE represENtATIve PrOpOsiTiONs Are teSteD atomisTically. But TheRe Is a drawback. THIs Way to draw tHe dIstinction beTweEn the tWo ParTS of thE thEory vEry mucH DependS on whetheR oR Not an eXPlanatoRY HyPothEsis contributes to THe EMpirical contenT of the ThEOrY. iF it DoeS, then it shoUlD certAInly get SOmE CREdiT From the predicTive and empiRIcaL succeSs Of tHE theorY, even If dUheM is right in cLaimIng that it Is testED as part OF a whole (That is, AntI-atOmisTIcAlLy). WHeN We dIScUssED HuYgens's acCoUnT of doUble REFRActiOn iN the PreviOus section, we nOteD thaT ExpLanatOry hyPothEsEs conTributEd to pReDicting the distiNct gEometricaL foRmS of ThE two wAYs, viz., tHe sPheRical anD the ellIPsoIdAL. tHaT Huygens's wave hypotHeSIS gEts no creDit froM ThIs REquires tHe AfoRemeNTIoned ContROvErsial asSumptiON tHaT empiriCaL suppoRt AccRueS to thE ExplAnatorY part of tHe theORy only if it is shOWn that there caN Be NO OtHEr exPlaNation of the Same PHenoMena AVaIlaBLe. And ThougH DUHeM Rightly noted that unlEsS such aS assuMption is grantEd, no theory CAN Be proved To be TRuE, It's important to DistiNguish betwEEn provinG the tRuth of a tHeory and aLLOwing the EviDenCe tO coNFIrM it. The problem WITh DuHeM's radicAl vIew of emPirIcaL suPpoRt Is that it mAkes confIrMaTiOn SimPly imPOssible: nO eVidEnCe cAn beaR On a theOry. DuHem uSeD tHE viVid metaPHoR OF an oRgAnIsm tO taLk About PhysICs. PHysics, hE says, is noT "a mAChinE tHaT let's itSelf be taken apArT"; it is "an orgAnIsm That muST Be taken aS a whole" (1894, 85). This Marie Gueguen ANd StathIs PSilloS AntI-ScepticiSm aNd EpisTemIC HumilIty in PIerre duHem'S pHilosOPHy Of SCiEnce 65 might bE TAkeN to imPlY thaT explanAtory hypotheses, beiNG paRt of the body of PhySics, CAN bE suBJeCTed To TEst BY Subjecting to the Test the whoLe BOdY of physics. wE haVe Argued tHat for DUhem tHE organiSm metaphoR, his holisM, iS meaNT PreCisely to shOw that whAt "is commoNLy thoUGhT", viz. tHat Each of ThE exPlanaTory hyPOthEses "mAy be taKeN in isoLatioN, sUbmitted To the control of experimenT, and thEn, wheN vaRied and nuMerOUs pRoofs have EstaBlished its ValIdiTy, put In pLAce in An alMOsT deFInitiVe maNNer in the tOTaLitY OF sCience", is wroNG: EXplAnatoRy hYPothesEs loSe their significanCE and "no longer rePresENT anYthINg" (1894, 88) if ThEy are cut off froM a sYsTEM. Still, it DoEs not follow That theoReTIcal
 two parts of the theory i n terms of  thei r d ist in ct m odes  of testabilit y : th e explanatory hypothes es ar et este d  n on-at omistic a ll y ,  wh er ea s t he re prese nta tive pr opositions  ar etested atomi s ti cally. But  th ere is a dra wba ck. Th is  wa y  to d raw  thedistin c tion b etween th et wo par t s of th e th eory  very much depend s  o n  whether or no t an e xp l an a t ory  hy pothesis c on tribu t es to t h ee m p iri c al content of  the theory .  If  it do es , t h en itshoul dc ert ainly get s omecredit fr om the predict i ve andempiri cal  su cces s  o fthe  t h eor y ,eve n  if  Duhem i sri ght i n cl a i m i ng t hat  itis te sted as partofa wh o le(that  is,anti -a tomis ticall y). W he n we discussedHuyg ens's acc oun tofdo ubler efract ion  in  the pr eviouss ect io n , we  noted that explan at o r yhypothes es con t ri bu t ed to pr ed ict ingt h e dis tinc t  g eometric al for m sof  the tw oways,vi z.,  th e sph e rica l andthe elli psoid a l. That Huygen s 's wave hypot h es i s  g e ts n o c redit fromthis requ ires th e a f oreme ntion ed co n troversial assumpti on  thatempir ical supportaccrues to t h e explan ator y  p a rt of the theo ry on ly if it i s  shown t hat t here can  be no ot h e r explan ati onofthe s am e phenomena a v a ilab le . And t hou gh Duhe m r igh tly  no te d that un less suc has  a ss ump tioni s grante d,  no  t heo ry ca n  be pr ovedto b etr u e,it's im p or t a nt t odi stin gui sh  betw eenp rov ing the  truth of  at heor yan d allow ing the evide nc e to confi rm  it . Thep r oblem wi th Duhem's radical view of empi ric al su ppor t is that  it  makes  co n firmat ion si mplyim pos s i ble:n o  e vid en ce can bea r ona the or y. D uhem us ed the vivid metap h orof an organis m t o ta l k  a bou t  p h ysi cs .  Ph y s ics, he says, i s not "a m ac h in e that let ' s i ts elf betaken a part" ;  it is"an organ ism thatmu st b e tak en as a wh ole" (18 94, 85).T his M a ri e Gue gue n andSt ath is Ps illosA nti -Scep ticism  a nd Epi stemi cHumility  in Pierre Duhem's Phil osophy  of S cie nce 65 mi ght betaken toimpl y that exp lan ato ry hy pot h eses,  bei n gpar t  of t he b o dy of phy s ic s,c a nbe subjecte d t o t est b y s u bjecti ng t o the test the wh o le body of phy sics . Wehav e  arg ue d that for Duh emth e organism  m etaphor, hi s holism ,i s mea nt pre cisely  to sho w th a t what  "is  co mmonly th oug ht " , viz.th at each o f th eexplan atoryh ypot h e ses "may be take n ini s olati o n,submi tt ed to t h e co ntrol of e xperiment,and th en,whenvariedan d nume rou sproofs hav e  establis hed i ts vali di ty,put  in pl acei n  an a lmos tdef initive m a n ne r  i nt hetota lityof  sci ence", is wrong: e xpl a natoryhy pot h e ses lo s et h eir signif ica nce a n d  "no longe r  rep r es e nt an ything " (189 4, 88)i f t he y are c uto f f from asystem. S t ill ,it d oes notfo llow  t hat  t heoretical
 two_parts of_the theory in terms_of their_distinct_modes of_testability:_the explanatory hypotheses_are tested non-atomistically,_whereas the representative propositions_are tested atomistically._But_there is a drawback. This way to draw the distinction between the two parts_of_the theory_very_much_depends on whether or not_an explanatory hypothesis contributes to_the empirical_content of the theory. If it does, then_it_should certainly get_some credit from the predictive and empirical success of_the theory, even if Duhem is_right in claiming_that_it_is tested as part_of a whole (that is, anti-atomistically)._When we discussed Huygens's account of_double refraction in the previous section, we_noted that explanatory hypotheses contributed to_predicting the distinct geometrical forms_of the_two ways, viz., the spherical_and the ellipsoidal._That Huygens's_wave hypothesis gets_no credit from this requires the_aforementioned controversial assumption_that empirical support accrues to the_explanatory_part of the_theory_only_if it_is shown that_there_can be_no_other explanation of the same phenomena_available._And though Duhem rightly noted that unless_such as assumption is_granted,_no theory can be_proved to be true, it's_important to distinguish between proving the_truth of_a theory_and allowing the evidence to confirm it. The problem with Duhem's_radical view of empirical support is_that it makes confirmation_simply impossible:_no_evidence can bear_on_a theory._Duhem used the vivid metaphor of an_organism to_talk about physics. Physics, he says,_is not "a machine_that_let's itself be taken apart"; it_is "an organism that must be_taken as a whole" (1894,_85)._This_Marie Gueguen and Stathis Psillos_Anti-Scepticism and Epistemic Humility in Pierre_Duhem's Philosophy of_Science 65 might be taken to imply_that_explanatory hypotheses, being part of the_body_of physics, can be subjected to_test_by_subjecting to the test the_whole body of physics. We have_argued that for Duhem the organism metaphor, his holism,_is meant precisely_to show that what "is_commonly_thought",_viz. that each of the explanatory hypotheses "may be taken_in isolation,_submitted to the_control of experiment, and then, when varied and numerous proofs_have established its validity, put in place_in an almost definitive manner in the totality of science", is_wrong: explanatory hypotheses lose their significance and "no_longer represent anything" (1894, 88) if they_are cut off from_a_system. Still, it does not follow that_theoretical