 light of Frege's quantificational theory of existence and characterize hypostatic Platonism as what I will call "ontological Platonism" (OP): there are propositions. 21 Parmenides 130c4–d9. Platonism in Lotze and Frege 149 On this reading, Lotze fails to be a hypostatic Platonist because he is not ontologically committed to propositions; they are not in his inventory of "what there is." Admittedly, much of Lotze's discussion of validity seems to "quantify over" propositions, though perhaps this apparent quantification can be paraphrased away. On this reading, Lotze's "object language" claims about propositions need to be read as "meta-level" claims about the logical grammar of various terms. For instance, it was confusing for Lotze to say that propositions are either true or false, timelessly and aperspectivally. This point would better have been stated as follows: "is true" cannot be supplemented by a reference to time, speaker, etc. This ontologically conservative Lotze could more perspicuously have expressed his core semantic doctrines by saying that you have not specified the content of the judgement that p unless you have specified it so fully that it is true or false that p timelessly, nonperspectivally, independently of position, and independently of whether any subject judges that p. If this is the correct reading of Lotze's non-hypostatic Platonism, it marks a clear difference between Lotze and the mature Frege, from roughly 1892 (the year "Über Sinn und Bedeutung" was published) onwards. Frege held that thoughts are the senses (Sinne) of complete sentences, but that in indirect discourse (e.g. in belief attributions), expressions refer (bedeuten) to the senses they express in direct discourse. For instance, consider these two sentences: 1 One can reach India directly by sailing due west from Spain. 2 Columbus believed that one can reach India directly by sailing due west from Spain.22 In (2), the sentence "One can reach India directly by sailing due west from Spain" refers to the sense it expresses in (1). Since it expresses a thought in (1), namely, the thought that one can reach India directly by sailing due west from Spain, in (2) it refers to that same thought. To get from the idea that thoughts can be the referents (Bedeutungen
light of Frege's quantificational theory of existence and characterize hypostatic Platonism as what I will visit " ontological Platonism " (OP ): there be propositions. 21 Parmenides 130c4 – d9. Platonism in Lotze and Frege 149 On this reading, Lotze fails to be a hypostatic Platonist because he is not ontologically attached to propositions; they are not in his inventory of " what there is. " true, much of Lotze's discussion of robustness seems to " quantify over " proposition, though perhaps this apparent quantification can be paraphrased aside. On this reading, Lotze's " object linguistic process " claims about propositions need to be read as " meta - level " claim about the logical grammar of various terms. For example, it was confusing for Lotze to say that propositions are either true or false, timelessly and aperspectivally. This detail would better have been stated as follows: " is true " cannot be supplemented by a citation to time, speaker, etc. This ontologically conservative Lotze could more perspicuously have expressed his effect semantic doctrines by saying that you have not specified the content of the judgement that p unless you have specified it so fully that it is true or delusive that p timelessly, nonperspectivally, independently of position, and independently of whether any capable judge that p. If this is the right reading of Lotze's non - hypostatic Platonism, it marks a clear difference between Lotze and the mature Frege, from roughly 1892 (the year " Über Sinn und Bedeutung " was published) ahead. Frege held that thoughts are the senses (Sinne) of complete sentences, but that in indirect discourse (e.g. in belief attributions), expressions refer (bedeuten) to the sense they carry in direct discourse. For instance, consider these two sentences: 1 One can strive India directly by sailing due west from Spain. 2 Columbus believe that one can reach India directly by sailing due west from Spain.22 In (2), the prison term " One can reach India immediately by sailing due west from Spain " refers to the sense it expresses in (1). Since it express a thought in (1), namely, the idea that one can reach India immediately by sailing due west from Spain, in (2) it refers to that like thought. To get from the idea that thoughts can be the referents (Bedeutungen
 lihht of Frege's quantificauional theory of gxustencx and cgaracterkze hypostatic Platonism as xhat I wiol call "ontological Plxtonism" (OI): there aee pcopositions. 21 Parmenides 130g4–b9. Plaflnisk in Lotze and Nrege 149 On tvis reading, Lodzd yails to be a hypostatic Platonist bqcause ne is not ontolodicakjy ckmmitted to propositions; they are hot in iis inventory og "what there is." Admittedly, mucj of Lotze's discusdion of valuditr seems to "quxntify oveg" propositikns, though perhaps this appareng quautification cqn hg paraphrasev away. On this reading, Lotse's "objrct language" ckaiks qbout propositions nexd to be read as "metw-level" cldijs about the logixao grakmar of xqriuus txrma. For lnsvance, it waa confusing for Lotze to say tnae propositions are eytrer true or false, timelessly and apersptctivzlly. This point would bwtter have been statef as folljws: "is true" cannot be supplemented by a reference to tmmd, skeqker, drc. This ontologically conservative Lotze could ikrt pvrspicuously have expressed nid vjre semantic aoctriuss by saying that yok have got specified uhe cpntent of the judgement thar p unless yjy have specified ic so fully tkat it is ttue or false that p timzlesslg, nonperspeftivally, jvdependently of oosptiot, and independently of wheeher any wubjzct judgds tnat p. Yf this is the gmrrect reading of Potze'd ton-hypostahic Platonism, it marks a clear vmfference beteean Notze anb the kature Frege, srom roughly 1892 (jhe year "Üyer Sivn und Bedvutung" wav published) onwards. Frega held that tioughts awe tye swnses (Skvne) of completr sentencvs, but that in indirect viscuhrse (e.g. in belizy qttributions), exlrersijnd cefer (tedeuten) to dhe renrrs thdy exprtfs kn dorect discourse. For hnstznce, consider thesr bwo sentebces: 1 Onq can reach Imdia directly by swilinj due xest ftom Spain. 2 Columbus believed that one can geagh India direstly by sailing bue west from Spain.22 In (2), the sentence "One can reach India durectly by sailing but west from S'ain" rqfers to dhe sense it expressws in (1). Since it ewpresses a thought in (1), namelf, the thought that one can reach India directly by sailing due west from Spain, in (2) iv wefers to tgat xame nhobghc. To gee frlo the idea that nhoughts can be the referents (Beveutungen
light of Frege's quantificational theory of existence hypostatic as what will call "ontological 21 130c4–d9. Platonism in and Frege 149 this reading, Lotze fails to be hypostatic Platonist because he is not ontologically committed to propositions; they are not his inventory of "what there is." Admittedly, much of Lotze's discussion of validity to over" though this apparent quantification can be paraphrased away. On this reading, Lotze's "object language" claims about propositions to be read as "meta-level" claims about the grammar of various terms. instance, it was confusing for to that propositions either or timelessly and aperspectivally. point would better have been stated as follows: "is true" cannot be supplemented by a reference to speaker, etc. conservative Lotze more have his core semantic saying that you have not specified the judgement that p unless you have specified so fully it is true or false that timelessly, nonperspectivally, independently of position, and independently of any subject judges that p. If this is the correct reading of Lotze's non-hypostatic Platonism, a clear difference between and the mature from 1892 year Sinn und was published) onwards. Frege held that thoughts are the senses (Sinne) complete sentences, but that in indirect discourse (e.g. in belief refer to the senses express in direct discourse. instance, these two sentences: 1 reach directly west Spain. Columbus believed that one reach India directly by sailing west from Spain.22 In reach India directly by sailing due west from refers to the sense it expresses in Since it expresses a thought in (1), namely, the thought that one reach India sailing due west from Spain, in (2) it to that same thought. get from the idea that thoughts can be the (Bedeutungen
 light of Frege's quantificatiOnal theory Of exiSteNce AnD chaRactErize hypostatiC platOnism as what I will call "onTologIcAL PlaTOnIsm" (OP): There arE PrOPOsiTiOnS. 21 PaRmENiDes 130c4–d9. plaTonism iN Lotze and FRegE 149 ON this reading, lOtZe fails to bE a hYpostatic PlaTonIst becAuSe hE Is not OntOlogiCally cOMmitteD to proposItIOns; theY Are not iN HIs InveNtory of "what there iS." adMIttedly, much of LOtze's dIsCUsSIOn oF vaLidity seemS tO "quanTIfy over" PRoPOSItiONs, though perhaPs this apparENt qUantifIcAtiON can be ParapHrASed Away. On this rEadiNg, Lotze's "oBject lANguage" cLAims aboUt propOsiTioNs neED tO bE reAd AS "meTA-lEveL" ClaIms about ThE lOgicaL graMMAR Of vaRioUs teRms. FoR instance, it waS coNfusINg fOr LotZe to sAy thAt PropoSitionS are eItHer true or false, tImelEssly and aPerSpEctIvAlly. THIs poinT woUld Better hAve been STatEd AS FOlLows: "is true" cannot be SuPPLeMented by A referENcE tO Time, speaKeR, etC. ThiS ONtoloGicaLLy ConservaTive LoTZe CoUld more PeRspicuOuSly HavE exprESsed His corE semantiC doctRInes by saying thAT you have not spECiFIEd THe coNteNt of the judgEmenT That P unlESs You HAve spEcifiEd IT sO Fully that it is true or FaLse thaT p timElessly, nonperSpectivallY, INDependenTly oF PoSItion, and indepeNdentLy of whetheR Any subjeCt judGes that p. if this is tHE Correct rEadIng Of LOtzE'S NoN-hypostatic PlATOnisM, iT marks a CleAr diffeRenCe bEtwEen loTze and the Mature FrEgE, fRoM rOugHly 1892 (thE Year "Über siNn uNd bedEutunG" Was pubLisheD) onwArDs. fRegE held thAT tHOUghtS aRe The sEnsEs (sinne) Of coMPleTe senteNces, but thAt iN IndiReCt DiscourSe (e.g. in belief aTtRibutions), eXpResSions rEFEr (bedeutEn) to the senses they expresS In direcT diScourSe. FoR instance, ConSider tHesE Two senTences: 1 one caN rEacH iNdia dIREcTly By Sailing due WESt fRom SpAiN. 2 ColUmbus beLieved that one can reACh INdia directly bY saIlinG DUe WesT FrOM SpAiN.22 in (2), tHE Sentence "One can rEach India dIrECtLy by sailinG Due WeSt from SPain" refErs to THe sense It expressEs in (1). Since It ExprESSes A thought in (1), Namely, thE thought tHAt one CAn Reach indIa direCtLy bY sailIng due WEst From SPain, in (2) It Refers To thaT sAme thougHt. To get from the idea that tHoughtS can bE thE referentS (BeDEutUngen
 light of Frege's quantifi cational t heory  of  ex is tenc e an d characterize hypo static Platonism as wh at Iwi l l ca l l"onto logical Pl a t oni sm "(OP ): th ere a reproposi tions. 21Par me nides 130c4– d 9.  Platonism  in  Lotze and F reg e 149On  th i s rea din g, Lo tze fa i ls tobe a hypo st a tic Pl a tonistb e ca usehe is not ontolog i ca l ly committed t o prop os i ti o n s;the y are notin  hisi nventor y  o f " wha t  there is." A dmittedly,m uch  of Lo tz e's discus sionof val idity seems  to"quantify  over" proposi t ions, t houghper hap s th i sap par en t  qu a nt ifi c ati on can b epa raphr ased a w a y. O n t hisreadi ng, Lotze's " obj ectl ang uage"  clai ms a bo ut pr oposit ionsne ed to be read a s "m eta-level " c la ims  a boutt he log ica l g rammarof vari o uste r m s .For instance, it w as c on fusing f or Lot z eto say that  p rop osit i o ns ar e ei t he r true o r fals e ,ti melessl yand ap er spe cti vally .  Thi s poin t wouldbette r  have been sta t ed as follows :  " i s  t r ue"can not be supp leme n tedby a re fer e nce t o tim e, sp e aker, etc. This ont ol ogical ly co nservative Lo tze couldm o r e perspi cuou s ly have expressed  hiscore seman t ic doctr inesby sayin g that yo u have not  sp eci fie d t h e  c ontent of the j udge me nt that  punlessyou  ha vespe ci fied it s o fullyth at  i tistrueo r falseth atptim eless l y, non persp ecti va ll y , i ndepend e nt l y  ofpo si tion , a nd  inde pend e ntl y of wh ether any  su b ject  j ud ges tha t p. If thisis  the corre ct  re adingo f  Lotze's  non-hypostatic Platoni s m, it m ark s a c lear  differen cebetwee n L o tze an d thematur eFre g e , fro m ro ugh ly  1892 (the y ear  "Übe rSinn  und Be deutung" was publi s hed ) onwards. Fr ege  hel d th att ho u ght sa ret h e senses (Sinne ) of compl et e  s entences,b utth at in i ndirect  disc o urse (e .g. in be lief attr ib utio n s ),expression s refer(bedeuten )  to t h esense s t hey ex pr ess  in d irectd isc ourse . Forin stance , con si der thes e two sentences: 1 Onecan re ach I ndi a directl y b y  sa iling due  wes t from Spa in.  2Colum bus belie vedt ha t o n e can  rea c h India d i re ctl y by  sailing du e w est  from  Sp a in.22In ( 2), the sentence" One can reachIndi a dir ect l y by  s ailing due wes t f ro m Spain" r ef ers to thesense it  e x press es in(1). S ince it e xp r essesa th oug ht in (1) , n am e ly, the  t ho u ght th at o ne  can r each I n diad i rectly by sailin g due w est f r omSpain ,in (2)i t re fers to th at same tho ught.To g et fr om theid ea tha t t ho ughts canb e the ref erent s (Bede ut unge n
 light_of Frege's_quantificational theory of existence_and characterize_hypostatic_Platonism as_what_I will call_"ontological Platonism" (OP):_there are propositions. 21_Parmenides 130c4–d9. Platonism_in_Lotze and Frege 149 On this reading, Lotze fails to be a hypostatic Platonist_because_he is_not_ontologically_committed to propositions; they are_not in his inventory of_"what there_is." Admittedly, much of Lotze's discussion of validity_seems_to "quantify over"_propositions, though perhaps this apparent quantification can be paraphrased_away. On this reading, Lotze's "object_language" claims about_propositions_need_to be read as_"meta-level" claims about the logical grammar_of various terms. For instance, it_was confusing for Lotze to say that_propositions are either true or false,_timelessly and aperspectivally. This point_would better_have been stated as follows:_"is true" cannot_be supplemented_by a reference_to time, speaker, etc. This ontologically_conservative Lotze could_more perspicuously have expressed his core_semantic_doctrines by saying_that_you_have not_specified the content_of_the judgement_that_p unless you have specified it_so_fully that it is true or false_that p timelessly, nonperspectivally,_independently_of position, and independently_of whether any subject judges_that p. If this is the_correct reading_of Lotze's_non-hypostatic Platonism, it marks a clear difference between Lotze and the_mature Frege, from roughly 1892 (the_year "Über Sinn und_Bedeutung" was_published)_onwards. Frege held_that_thoughts are_the senses (Sinne) of complete sentences, but_that in_indirect discourse (e.g. in belief attributions),_expressions refer (bedeuten) to_the_senses they express in direct discourse._For instance, consider these two sentences:_1 One can reach India_directly_by_sailing due west from Spain._2 Columbus believed that one can_reach India directly_by sailing due west from Spain.22 In_(2),_the sentence "One can reach India_directly_by sailing due west from Spain"_refers_to_the sense it expresses in_(1). Since it expresses a thought_in (1), namely, the thought that one can reach_India directly by_sailing due west from Spain,_in_(2)_it refers to that same thought. To get from the_idea that_thoughts can be_the referents (Bedeutungen