 one whose validity [Geltung] is still open to question. This linguistic usage is intelligible: it shows that by actuality [Wirklichkeit] we always intend an affirmation, the sense of which, however, varies greatly according to which one of these different forms it assumes; it must assume some one of these, and none of them is reducible to the others or contained in it. For we can never make an occurrence out of being, and the actuality which belongs to things, namely being, never attaches to events; events never are, but occur; a proposition neither is, like things, nor occurs, like events; in itself [...] its actuality consists in its being valid [gültig] and its opposite in not being valid. (L §316, 511)16 On my reading, Lotze is distinguishing among: (1) existential being: the being of a thing; (2) eventual being: the occurrence of an event; (3) relational being: the holding or obtaining of a relation; and (4) veritative being (validity, truth): it being the case that p.17 With respect to (4), it is crucial to note that not all propositions are valid. As Lotze writes: the actuality of a proposition "consists in its being valid and its opposite not being valid" (see earlier). This is why I have coined the more general category of "veritative" being: being either true (valid) or false (invalid). Lotze explicitly addresses the relation of his category of actuality to being in the course of explaining why Plato was misinterpreted, even by his own school: Plato wanted to teach nothing other than what was discussed above: the validity [Geltung] of truths, regardless of whether they are verified, as their way of being, by any objects in the external world. [...] But the Greek language, then and later, lacked an expression for this concept of validity that contains no being: precisely this expression, being, took its place, often unproblematically, but in this case quite fatefully. Every content graspable by thought, when one wanted to consider it as unified in itself and distinct from others, for which the schools later coined the not totally incorrect name of "thought-thing" 16 Lotze expresses validity by the verb gelten, but in English "valid" is an adjective which requires completion by the copulative verb "be." English-language readers should thus be aware
one whose validity [ Geltung ] is still open to question. This linguistic use is apprehensible: it shows that by actuality [ Wirklichkeit ] we always mean an avowal, the sense of which, however, varies greatly according to which one of these unlike phase it assumes; it must bear some one of these, and none of them is reducible to the others or contained in it. For we can never make an happening out of being, and the actuality which belongs to things, namely being, never attaches to event; events never are, but occur; a proposition neither is, like things, nor occurs, like event; in itself [... ] its actuality consists in its being valid [ gültig ] and its opposite in not being valid. (L § 316, 511)16 On my reading, Lotze is signalize among: (1) existential being: the being of a thing; (2) eventual organism: the occurrence of an consequence; (3) relational being: the holding or obtaining of a relation; and (4) veritative being (robustness, truth ): it being the case that p.17 With respect to (4), it is crucial to note that not all proposal are valid. As Lotze write: the actuality of a proposition " consists in its being valid and its opposite not being valid " (see earlier). This is why I have coined the more general category of " veritative " being: being either truthful (valid) or false (invalid). Lotze explicitly addresses the relation back of his category of actuality to being in the course of explaining why Plato was misinterpreted, even by his own school: Plato want to teach nothing early than what was discussed above: the validity [ Geltung ] of truths, regardless of whether they are verify, as their way of being, by any objects in the external world. [... ] But the Greek language, then and later, lacked an expression for this concept of validity that contains no being: precisely this expression, being, take its place, frequently unproblematically, but in this case quite fatefully. Every content graspable by thought, when one wanted to view it as unified in itself and distinct from others, for which the schools later coined the not totally incorrect name of " thought - matter " 16 Lotze expresses validity by the verb gelten, but in English " valid " is an adjective which requires completion by the copulative verb " be. " English - language readers should therefore be aware
 onf whose validity [Geltung] is still open jo questmon. Thia linguirtic usage is intelligible: iv shiws tyat by actuality [Wirklkchkeit] wv always unteid an affirmatioi, the sekfe or whieh, however, variex greatly dccording to wvizh one of these different forms it asfumes; iy lust assume soie omq of nhtse, and none of them is reducible to the others or comtained in it. For we can nfver make an occurrencf out of beung, wbd the actuauity which belongs to jhings, namely being, never attachds to events; evgurs jgver are, but occug; a proposition neithar is, loke things, nor ocrurs, like events; in itselh [...] its actuality confists in hta being valid [gültug] and hts mpporute in npt being vamid. (L §316, 511)16 On my reading, Lotze is distinguixhybg among: (1) exiatentiwl being: the being of a thing; (2) eventual bting: fhe occurrence of an evwnt; (3) relational being: the holdyng or obtaining of a relation; and (4) veritative behng (velkdiuy, trutf): ih being the case that p.17 With respect to (4), it if ctubial to note that not all prpplsojions are valia. As Lotzs writes: the actuapity of a priposition "conxists in its being valid ane its opposine nit being valid" (see earlier). Thns is ehy I have coined the more gzneral category ov "veritatjxe" being: being ekthvr tsue (valid) or false (invalid). Lotze ex'licicly addrdssex the welation ov his category of actuallty tl teing in tje course of explaining why Plavp was misintgrpsetvd, even bv his pwn school: Plwto wanted to jeach notking ogher than shat wav discussed above: the vanldity [Geltunj] of trutrs, rwgareless ow whether they sre verifpeb, as theie way of being, by eny ugjects in the eruerbal world. [...] But yhe Grqen kagcuage, then atd lxtef, lackdd an exprewrion for this concept of valjdity that containx ko being: krecisely this expressoon, being, took its placx, oftei unprpblgmatically, but in this case quife fatefuply. Every contegt gvaspwble by thpught, when one wanted to consider it as unified in itself and distinct from puhers, for whirh the schools nater coined the not totally incorrecu name of "thought-thing" 16 Lotze exprfsses validity by the verb gelten, but in English "valid" is an adjective whuch requires complstiom by nhe eopulatyve tecb "be." English-langlage readers should thus be awarx
one whose validity [Geltung] is still open This usage is it shows that intend affirmation, the sense which, however, varies according to which one of these forms it assumes; it must assume some one of these, and none of is reducible to the others or contained in it. For we can never an out being, the actuality which belongs to things, namely being, never attaches to events; events never are, but a proposition neither is, like things, nor occurs, events; in itself [...] actuality consists in its being [gültig] its opposite not valid. §316, 511)16 On reading, Lotze is distinguishing among: (1) existential being: the being of a thing; (2) eventual being: the of an relational being: holding obtaining a relation; and being (validity, truth): it being the With respect to (4), it is crucial to that not propositions are valid. As Lotze writes: actuality of a proposition "consists in its being and its opposite not being valid" (see earlier). This is why I have coined the category of "veritative" being: either true (valid) false Lotze addresses relation of category of actuality to being in the course of explaining why was misinterpreted, even by his own school: Plato wanted to other what was discussed the validity [Geltung] of regardless whether they are verified, way being, in external [...] But the Greek then and later, lacked an for this concept of precisely this expression, being, took its place, often but in this case quite fatefully. Every graspable by thought, when one wanted to consider it as unified in and distinct for which the schools later coined the not incorrect name of "thought-thing" Lotze expresses validity by the verb gelten, but in "valid" an adjective requires completion by copulative verb "be." readers should thus
 one whose validity [Geltung] is Still open tO quesTioN. ThIs LingUistIc usage is intelLIgibLe: it shows that by actualiTy [WirKlIChkeIT] wE alwaYs intenD An AFFirMaTiOn, tHe SEnSe of wHicH, howeveR, varies greAtlY aCcording to whICh One of these DifFerent forms iT asSumes; iT mUst ASsume SomE one oF these, ANd none Of them is rEdUCible tO The otheRS Or ContAined in it. For we can NEvER make an occurreNce out Of BEiNG, And The Actuality wHiCh belONgs to thINgS, NAMelY Being, never attAches to evenTS; evEnts neVeR arE, But occUr; a prOpOSitIon neither iS, likE things, noR occurS, Like eveNTs; in itsElf [...] its ActUalIty cONsIsTs iN iTS beINg ValID [güLtig] and iTs OpPositE in nOT BEIng vAliD. (L §316, 511)16 On My reaDing, Lotze is diStiNguiSHinG amonG: (1) exisTentIaL beinG: the beIng of A tHing; (2) eventual beiNg: thE occurrenCe oF aN evEnT; (3) relaTIonal bEinG: thE holdinG or obtaINinG oF A RElAtion; and (4) veritative BeING (vAlidity, tRuth): it BEiNg THe case thAt P.17 WiTh reSPEct to (4), It is CRuCial to noTe that NOt AlL proposItIons arE vAliD. As lotze WRiteS: the acTuality oF a proPOsition "consistS In its being valID aND ItS OppoSitE not being vaLid" (sEE earLier). tHiS is WHy I haVe coiNeD ThE More general category Of "VeritaTive" bEing: being eithEr true (valiD) OR False (invAlid). lOtZE explicitly addResseS the relatiON of his caTegorY of actuaLity to beiNG In the couRse Of eXplAinING wHy Plato was misINTerpReTed, even By hIs own scHooL: PlAto WanTeD to teach nOthing otHeR tHaN wHat Was diSCussed abOvE: thE vAliDity [GELtung] oF trutHs, reGaRdLEss Of whethER tHEY are VeRiFied, As tHeIr way Of beINg, bY any objEcts in the ExtERnal WoRlD. [...] But the greek language, ThEn and later, LaCkeD an expRESsion for This concept of validity thAT contaiNs nO beinG: preCisely thiS exPressiOn, bEIng, tooK its plAce, ofTeN unPROblemATIcAllY, bUt in this caSE QuiTe fatEfUlly. every coNtent graspable by thOUghT, when one wanteD to ConsIDEr It aS UnIFieD iN ItsELF and distinct froM others, for WhICh The schools LAteR cOined thE not totAlly iNCorrect Name of "thoUght-thing" 16 loTze eXPResSes validitY by the veRb gelten, bUT in EnGLiSh "valId" iS an adjEcTivE whicH requiREs cOmpleTion by ThE copulAtive VeRb "be." EnglIsh-language readers shoulD thus bE awarE
 one whose validity [Geltu ng] is sti ll op entoqu esti on.This linguisti c  usa ge is intelligible: it  show st hatb yactua lity [W i rk l i chk ei t]  we  a l wa ys in ten d an af firmation,  th esense of whi c h,  however,var ies greatlyacc ording  t o w h ich o neof th ese di f ferent  forms it  a s sumes; it must a ss umesome one of these ,  a n d none of them  is re du c ib l e  to  th e others o rconta i ned ini t. F o r w e  can never ma ke an occur r enc e outof  be i ng, an d the  a c tua lity whichbelo ngs to th ings,n amely b e ing, ne ver at tac hes  toe ve nt s;ev e nts ne ver are , but oc cu r;  a pr opos i t i o n ne ith er i s, li ke things, no r o ccur s , l ike e vents ; in  i tself  [...]  itsac tuality consist s in  its bein g v al id[g ültig ]  and i tsopp osite i n not b e ing  v a l i d.  (L §316, 511)16 O nm y  r eading,Lotzei sdi s tinguish in g a mong : (1) e xist e nt ial bein g: the be in g of ath ing; ( 2)  ev ent ual b e ing:  the o ccurrenc e ofa n event; (3) r e lational bein g :t h eh oldi ngor obtainin g of a re lati o n;  an d  (4)verit at i ve being (validity, tr ut h): it  bein g the case th at p.17 Wi t h respectto ( 4 ), it is crucialto no te that no t  all pro posit ions are  valid. A s Lotze wr ite s:the  ac t u al ity of a prop o s itio n"consis tsin itsbei ngval idan d its opp osite no tbe in gval id" ( s ee earli er ).Th isis wh y  I hav e coi nedth em ore  genera l  c a t egor yof  "ve rit at ive"bein g : b eing ei ther true  (v a lid)  o rfalse ( invalid). Lot ze  explicitl yadd resses t he relat ion of his category ofa ctualit y t o bei ng i n the cou rse  of ex pla i ning w hy Pla to wa smis i n terpr e t ed , e ve n by his o w n  sc hool:  P lato  wanted  to teach nothingo the r than what w asdisc u s se d a b ov e : t he val i d ity [Geltung] o f truths,re g ar dless of w h eth er  they a re veri fied, as thei r way ofbeing, by  a ny o b j ect s in the e xternalworld. [. . .] Bu t  t he Gr eek  langu ag e,thenand la t er,  lack ed anex pressi on fo rthis con cept of validity that c ontain s nobei ng: preci sel y  th is expres sion , being, t ook  it s pla ce, often  unp r ob lem a tical ly,b ut in thi s  c ase q ui te fatefull y . Eve ry co nte n t gras pabl e by thought, whe n  one wanted to  con s i der  it as u ni fied in itself  an dd i stinct f ro m others, f or which  t h e sch ools l ater c oined t h e  n o t tota llyinc orrect na meof "though t- th i ng" 16  Lot ze  expre sses v a lidi t y  by the verb gel ten,b u t inE ngl ish " va lid" is an a djective w hich requir es com plet ion b y the c op ulativ e v er b "be." En g lish-lang uagereaders  s houl d t hus be  awa r e 
 one_whose validity_[Geltung] is still open_to question._This_linguistic usage_is_intelligible: it shows_that by actuality_[Wirklichkeit] we always intend_an affirmation, the_sense_of which, however, varies greatly according to which one of these different forms it_assumes;_it must_assume_some_one of these, and none_of them is reducible to_the others_or contained in it. For we can never_make_an occurrence out_of being, and the actuality which belongs to things,_namely being, never attaches to events;_events never are,_but_occur;_a proposition neither is,_like things, nor occurs, like events;_in itself [...] its actuality consists_in its being valid [gültig] and its_opposite in not being valid. (L_§316, 511)16 On my reading,_Lotze is_distinguishing among: (1) existential being:_the being of_a thing;_(2) eventual being:_the occurrence of an event; (3)_relational being: the_holding or obtaining of a relation;_and_(4) veritative being_(validity,_truth):_it being_the case that_p.17_With respect_to_(4), it is crucial to note_that_not all propositions are valid. As Lotze_writes: the actuality of_a_proposition "consists in its_being valid and its opposite_not being valid" (see earlier). This_is why_I have_coined the more general category of "veritative" being: being either true_(valid) or false (invalid). Lotze explicitly_addresses the relation of_his category_of_actuality to being_in_the course_of explaining why Plato was misinterpreted, even_by his_own school: Plato wanted to teach_nothing other than what_was_discussed above: the validity [Geltung] of_truths, regardless of whether they are_verified, as their way of_being,_by_any objects in the external_world. [...] But the Greek language,_then and later,_lacked an expression for this concept of_validity_that contains no being: precisely this_expression,_being, took its place, often unproblematically,_but_in_this case quite fatefully. Every_content graspable by thought, when one_wanted to consider it as unified in itself and_distinct from others,_for which the schools later_coined_the_not totally incorrect name of "thought-thing" 16 Lotze expresses validity_by the_verb gelten, but_in English "valid" is an adjective which requires completion by_the copulative verb "be." English-language readers should_thus be aware