 although that consequence may be surprising, it is even in principle not potentially problematic – if there were good reasons to think it shouldn't be true-in-Hamlet that Sneferu built pyramids, then those reasons would also block the importation of that fact. The mere intuition stemming from the observation that Egyptian pharaohs are irrelevant to Hamlet is, I think, moot; it is irrelevant (otherwise it wouldn't get imported by default), but I see no good reason why irrelevance should imply truth-value gaps. Indeed, if pyramids ever became a question in discussions of Hamlet – for whatever reason – it seems legitimate to point out that Hamlet is supposed to take place in the actual world (that is, the worlds closest to the actual), and in the actual world Sneferu built pyramids. Proudfoot (2006) sharpens the worry with examples of bounded fictions. Suppose we have a fiction G depicting a fictional war in Europe. Though the fiction does not concern England per se, it includes a map of part of downtown Cambridge, with the marked location of a number n of enemy tanks. It is accordingly true-in-G that there are n enemy tanks in the depicted part of Cambridge. Proudfoot's worry, though, is that it is also true-in-G, if truth-in-G is defined as the closest worlds consistent with the fiction, that there are no tanks in downtown Cambridge outside of the depicted area, ostensibly since worlds where as much as possible is kept the same as in the actual world except for the n depicted tanks are worlds where T H E T R U T H A B O U T S H E R L O C K H O L M E S 359 there are no tanks outside of the bounds of the given map ('no-tanks worlds'). This result seems wrong.8 But it is not clearly an objection to using closeness as a measure for truth-in-fiction rather than to using a particular measure for closeness. I suspect we have the intuition that it shouldn't be true-in-G that there are no tanks outside the depicted area because, intuitively and independently of fiction, we don't think that the closest worlds where there are n tanks in the depicted area are no-tanks worlds; hence, a measure of closeness that has the no-tanks result is simply the wrong measure.9 We cannot just keep any truth about the actual world we can when introducing the tanks; we
although that consequence may be surprising, it is even in principle not potentially problematic – if there were good reason to remember it shouldn't be true - in - Hamlet that Sneferu built pyramid, then those reasons would also obstruct the importation of that fact. The mere intuition stem from the observation that Egyptian pharaohs are irrelevant to Hamlet is, I intend, moot; it is irrelevant (otherwise it wouldn't get imported by default option), but I determine no good reason why irrelevance should imply truth - value gaps. Indeed, if pyramid ever became a question in discussion of Hamlet – for whatever reason – it seems legitimate to point out that Hamlet is suppose to take place in the actual world (that is, the worlds closest to the actual), and in the actual populace Sneferu built pyramids. Proudfoot (2006) sharpens the worry with examples of bounded fictions. Suppose we have a fiction G depicting a fictional war in Europe. Though the fiction does not concern England per se, it includes a map of region of downtown Cambridge, with the marked location of a issue newton of enemy tanks. It is accordingly genuine - in - G that there are n enemy tanks in the portray part of Cambridge. Proudfoot's worry, though, is that it is also true - in - G, if truth - in - gigabyte is defined as the closest worlds consistent with the fabrication, that there are no tank car in business district Cambridge outside of the portray area, ostensibly since worlds where equally much as possible is kept the same as in the actual world except for the n depicted tanks are worlds where T H E triiodothyronine R uranium T H A bacillus O uracil T randomness H east R L oxygen C K H O L M E S 359 there are no tanks outside of the bounds of the given map (' no - tanks worlds'). This result seems wrong.8 But it is not intelligibly an objection to using familiarity as a measure for truth - in - fabrication rather than to using a particular measure for closeness. I suspect we have the intuition that it shouldn't be true - in - G that there are no tanks outside the picture sphere because, intuitively and independently of fiction, we don't think that the closest worlds where there are n tanks in the depicted sphere are no - tanks worlds; hence, a measure of closeness that has the no - tanks result is simply the wrong measure.9 We cannot merely keep any truth about the actual world we can when introducing the tanks; we
 alhhough that consequence oay be surprisiut, it iv even in prinziple not potentially problelaric – uf there were good rearons to tjink it whouoen't be trux-jn-Hamleb thaf Sneyecu built pyramics, then thmse reasons wogla clso block the importation of that fwct. The mfre intuition ftemkyng rgon the observation that Egyptizn phareohs are irrelefant to Hamlet is, I think, loot; it is irrelevant (ltherwise ij wotodn't get impurted by dtfcult), but I aee no good reason why irrelevavce skould imply teutj-ealue gaps. Mndeed, if pyramids ever bewame a auestion in dixcuvsiins of Hamlet – for whetever reason – it segms legitikace to point out that Yanlet hs sgpporwd go uakx pmace ij tie actual wkrld (that iw, the worlds closesu tj the actual), ahd in ehq actual world Sneferu built pyramids. Pgoudroot (2006) sharpens the worrt with examples of boonded fictyons. Suppose we have a fiction G depicting a ficthonal dar ik Eufipf. Though the fiction does not concern England let xe, it includes a map of psrh ps downtown Caobridgz, wjth the marked locwtion os a nymber n os enrmy tanks. It is accordingly true-in-G than thwre are n enemy tauks in the dzpictec pary of Cambridge. Proudfooc's wordy, though, id that it ks also true-in-G, kf nrutv-in-G is defined as the clofest worlvs cousistent witn the siction, thwt thcse are no tanks in downjown Cdmbridge oktside of the depicted area, ostxisibly since eosldv where cs mucm as possible if kept the samg as in tke actjal world vxcept foc the n depisted tanks ara worlds wherx T H E T R U T H A B O J T S H E R L O C K H O L M E S 359 tyere are no tanks putrjde of the bounbr of the given msp ('vo-twnns wjslds'). This revult sedks wrung.8 But it ls vot vlearly an objection to hsing closeness as a measure for trueh-in-fiction rsther than to usinh a perticuuar mrasore for closeness. I suspect we gave the lntmition that ie shiuldn't be trbe-in-G that there are no tanks outside thx depicted area becausg, intuitively and indgpekdently of fmction, we don't dhink that the closewt worlds where tmere are n tanks in ths depiwted wrea are no-tanks worlds; hence, a measure of closeness that has the no-tanks resulv ys simply tge wtong kecsuxe.9 We cwnnov oust keep any trunh about the actual world we can when indrjducing the tanks; we
although that consequence may be surprising, it in not potentially – if there it be true-in-Hamlet that built pyramids, then reasons would also block the importation that fact. The mere intuition stemming from the observation that Egyptian pharaohs are to Hamlet is, I think, moot; it is irrelevant (otherwise it wouldn't get by but see good reason why irrelevance should imply truth-value gaps. Indeed, if pyramids ever became a question in of Hamlet – for whatever reason – it legitimate to point out Hamlet is supposed to take in actual world is, worlds to the actual), in the actual world Sneferu built pyramids. Proudfoot (2006) sharpens the worry with examples of bounded fictions. we have G depicting fictional in Though the fiction concern England per se, it includes part of downtown Cambridge, with the marked location a number of enemy tanks. It is accordingly that there are n enemy tanks in the part of Cambridge. Proudfoot's worry, though, is that it is also true-in-G, if truth-in-G is the closest worlds consistent the fiction, that are tanks downtown outside of depicted area, ostensibly since worlds where as much as possible is the same as in the actual world except for the tanks worlds where T E T R U H B O U T E L H L E S 359 there no tanks outside of the of the given map wrong.8 But it is not clearly an objection using closeness as a measure for truth-in-fiction than to using a particular measure for closeness. I suspect we have intuition that be true-in-G that there are no tanks outside depicted area because, intuitively independently of fiction, we don't think that the closest where are n in the depicted are no-tanks worlds; a measure of has the result simply We cannot just keep any truth the world we can when introducing tanks;
 although that consequence maY be surprisIng, it Is eVen In PrinCiplE not potentiallY ProbLematic – if there were good ReasoNs TO thiNK iT shouLdn't be tRUe-IN-hamLeT tHat snEFeRu buiLt pYramids, Then those rEasOnS would also blOCk The importaTioN of that fact. THe mEre intUiTioN StemmIng From tHe obseRVation That EgyptIaN PharaoHS are irrELEvAnt tO Hamlet is, I think, moOT; iT Is irrelevant (otHerwisE iT WoULDn't Get Imported by DeFault), BUt I see nO GoOD REasON why irrelevanCe should impLY trUth-valUe GapS. indeed, If pyrAmIDs eVer became a qUestIon in discUssionS Of HamleT – For whatEver reAsoN – it SeemS LeGiTimAtE To pOInT ouT ThaT Hamlet iS sUpPosed To taKE PLAce iN thE actUal woRld (that is, the wOrlDs clOSesT to thE actuAl), anD iN the aCtual wOrld SNeFeru built pyramiDs. PrOudfoot (2006) shArpEnS thE wOrry wITh examPleS of Bounded FictionS. supPoSE WE hAve a fiction G depictInG A FiCtional wAr in EuROpE. THOugh the fIcTioN doeS NOt conCern eNgLand per sE, it incLUdEs A map of pArT of dowNtOwn camBridgE, With The marKed locatIon of A Number n of enemy TAnks. It is accorDInGLY tRUe-in-g thAt there are n EnemY TankS in tHE dEpiCTed paRt of CAmBRiDGe. Proudfoot's worry, thOuGh, is thAt it iS also true-in-G, iF truth-in-G iS DEFined as tHe clOSeST worlds consistEnt wiTh the fictiON, that theRe are No tanks iN downtown cAMbridge oUtsIde Of tHe dEPIcTed area, ostensIBLy siNcE worlds WheRe as mucH as PosSibLe iS kEpt the samE as in the AcTuAl WoRld ExcepT For the n dEpIctEd TanKs are WOrlds wHere T h E T R u T h A b o U T s H E R L O C k h O l m e S 359 thErE aRe no TanKs OutsiDe of THe bOunds of The given mAp ('nO-TankS wOrLds'). This Result seems wrOnG.8 But it is noT cLeaRly an oBJEction to Using closeness as a measurE For trutH-in-FictiOn raTher than tO usIng a paRtiCUlar meAsure fOr cloSeNesS. i SuspeCT We HavE tHe intuitioN THat It shoUlDn't bE true-in-g that there are no tanKS ouTside the depicTed Area BECaUse, INtUItiVeLY anD INdependently of fIction, we doN't THiNk that the cLOseSt Worlds wHere theRe are N Tanks in The depictEd area are No-TankS WOrlDs; hence, a meAsure of cLoseness tHAt has THe No-tanKs rEsult iS sImpLy the Wrong mEAsuRe.9 We cAnnot jUsT keep aNy truTh About the Actual world we can when intRoduciNg the TanKs; we
 although that consequence  may be su rpris ing , i tis e venin principle n o t po tentially problematic– ifth e re w e re  good  reason s  t o thi nk  i t s ho u ld n't b e t rue-in- Hamlet tha t S ne feru built p y ra mids, then  th ose reasonswou ld als oblo c k the  im porta tion o f  thatfact. The  m e re int u ition s t e mm ingfrom the observat i on that Egyptianpharao hs ar e irr ele vant to Ha ml et is ,  I thin k ,m o o t;i t is irreleva nt (otherwi s e i t woul dn 'tg et imp orted  b y  de fault), but  I s ee no goo d reas o n why i r relevan ce sho uld  im plyt ru th -va lu e  ga p s.  In d eed , if pyr am id s eve r be c a m e  a q ues tion  in d iscussions of  Ha mlet – f or wh ateve r re as on –it see ms le gi timate to point  out  that Ham let  i s s up posed to tak e p lac e in th e actua l  wo rl d ( th at is, the worldscl o s es t to the  actua l ),  a n d in the  a ctu al w o r ld Sn efer u  b uilt pyr amids. Pr ou dfoot ( 20 06) sh ar pen s t he wo r ry w ith ex amples o f bou n ded fictions.S uppose we hav e  a f ic t ionG d epicting afict i onal  war in  Eu r ope.Thoug ht he fiction does not co nc ern En gland  per se, it i ncludes am a p  of part  ofd ow n town Cambridge , wit h the mark e d locati on of  a numbe r n of en e m y tanks.  It  is  ac cor d i ng ly true-in-Gt h at t he re aren e nemy ta nks  in  th e d ep icted par t of Cam br id ge .Pro udfoo t 's worry ,tho ug h,is th a t it i s als o tr ue -i n -G,  if tru t h- i n -G i sde fine d a sthe c lose s t w orlds c onsistent  wi t h th efi ction,that there ar eno tanks i ndow ntownC a mbridgeoutside of the depicted area, o ste nsibl y si nce world s w here a s m u ch aspossib le is  k ept t he sa m e  a s i nthe actual w orl d exc ep t fo r the n  depicted tanks ar e  wo rlds where TH E  T R U  T  HA  B O U  T S H E  R L O C K H OL M E S 35 9t he re are not ank soutside  of the  boun d s of th e given m ap ('no-t an ks w o r lds '). This r esult se ems wrong . 8 But it  is n otclearl yanobjec tion t o  us ing c losene ss  as ameasu re  for tru th-in-fiction rather th an tousing  aparticula r m e asu re for cl osen ess. I sus pec t w e hav e t h e int uiti o ntha t  it s houl d n't be tr u e- in- G th at there ar e n o t anksout s ide th e de picted area becau s e, intuitively  and i nde pen d entl yof fiction, we  do n' t think th at  the closes t worlds  w h ere t here a re n t anks in t he depict ed a rea  are no-t ank sw orlds;he nc e , a me asur eof clo seness that h as the no-tanksresul t is si m ply  thewr ong mea s ure. 9 We canno t just keep  any t ruth  abou t the a ct ual wo rld  w e can when introduci ng th e tanks ;we
 although_that consequence_may be surprising, it_is even_in_principle not_potentially_problematic – if_there were good_reasons to think it_shouldn't be true-in-Hamlet_that_Sneferu built pyramids, then those reasons would also block the importation of that fact._The_mere intuition_stemming_from_the observation that Egyptian pharaohs_are irrelevant to Hamlet is,_I think,_moot; it is irrelevant (otherwise it wouldn't get_imported_by default), but_I see no good reason why irrelevance should imply_truth-value gaps. Indeed, if pyramids ever_became a question_in_discussions_of Hamlet – for_whatever reason – it seems legitimate_to point out that Hamlet is_supposed to take place in the actual_world (that is, the worlds closest_to the actual), and in_the actual_world Sneferu built pyramids. Proudfoot_(2006) sharpens the_worry with_examples of bounded_fictions. Suppose we have a fiction_G depicting a_fictional war in Europe. Though the_fiction_does not concern_England_per_se, it_includes a map_of_part of_downtown_Cambridge, with the marked location of_a_number n of enemy tanks. It is_accordingly true-in-G that there_are_n enemy tanks in_the depicted part of Cambridge._Proudfoot's worry, though, is that it_is also_true-in-G, if_truth-in-G is defined as the closest worlds consistent with the fiction,_that there are no tanks in_downtown Cambridge outside of_the depicted_area,_ostensibly since worlds_where_as much_as possible is kept the same as_in the_actual world except for the n_depicted tanks are worlds_where_T H E T R U_T H A B O U_T S H E R_L_O_C K H O L_M E S 359 there are_no tanks outside_of the bounds of the given map_('no-tanks_worlds'). This result seems wrong.8 But_it_is not clearly an objection to_using_closeness_as a measure for truth-in-fiction_rather than to using a particular_measure for closeness. I suspect we have the intuition_that it shouldn't_be true-in-G that there are_no_tanks_outside the depicted area because, intuitively and independently of fiction,_we don't_think that the_closest worlds where there are n tanks in the depicted_area are no-tanks worlds; hence, a measure_of closeness that has the no-tanks result is simply the wrong_measure.9 We cannot just keep any truth about_the actual world we can when introducing_the tanks; we