 are not in fact doubted at all, they cannot be more satisfactory than they are. -C. S. Peirce, Collected Papers, 5.358 Epistemological contextualism, which has its roots in the writings of pragmatists like Peirce and Dewey and in the later Wittgenstein, is often characterized as an alternative to the more traditional approaches in analytic epistemology. In opposition to both foundationalist and coherentist views about the structure of justification and knowledge, the contextualist claims (in the spirit of the above Wittgenstein quote) that justified belief is ultimately based on beliefs that are not themselves justified. But other so-called contextualist claims, not having to do with structural issues, have gained increasing recognition and discussion by analytic epistemologists in recent years. One such claim (vaguely expressed) is that possession of such epistemic goods as knowledge and justification depends importantly on one's circumstances or "context," including in particular certain facts about one's social group. Unfortunately, "contextualism" and talk of justification and knowledge being sensitive to context are used to cover a variety of themes and theses, some of them fairly uncontroversial, others quite controversial. My aim here is to articulate and partially defend a moral epistemology that incorporates a number of contextualist themes. More specifically, my 291 294 Moral Knowledge? plan is this: Because contextualism is perhaps less familiar to moral epistemologists than other epistemological views, but also because of the variety of contextualist themes and theses that have been recently defended, the first section of this chapter will be devoted to sorting out and clarifying the most important of these contextualist ideas. As we shall see, I am interested in defending a version of what I call "structural contextualism" regarding justified moral belief. However, because there is no one notion of justification but many (arguably legitimate) notions, section two of the chapter is devoted to making clear the epistemic notion-a notion of epistemic responsibility-that is the focus of my thinking about the justification of moral belief. In the third section, I clarify the main theses of structural contextualism, and then in section four I proceed to elaborate a version of structural contextualism about moral belief. A full defense of contextualism would require that I develop this view in the context of a story about the semantics and associated metaphysics of moral discourse. That project is for another occasion? Here I have the more limited aim of convincing the reader that the version of contextualism
are not in fact doubted at all, they cannot be more satisfactory than they are. -C. S. Peirce, Collected Papers, 5.358 Epistemological contextualism, which has its root in the writing of pragmatists like Peirce and Dewey and in the later Wittgenstein, is often characterize as an alternative to the more traditional approaches in analytic epistemology. In resistance to both foundationalist and coherentist views about the structure of justification and cognition, the contextualist claim (in the spirit of the above Wittgenstein quotation) that justified belief is ultimately base on belief that are not themselves justified. But other so - called contextualist claims, not accept to do with structural issue, have gained increasing recognition and discussion by analytic epistemologists in late years. One such call (vaguely expressed) is that possession of such epistemic goods as cognition and justification depends importantly on one's circumstances or " context, " including in particular certain facts about one's social group. Unfortunately, " contextualism " and lecture of justification and cognition being sensible to context are used to cover a variety of themes and theses, some of them fairly uncontroversial, others quite controversial. My aim here is to pronounce and partially fight a moral epistemology that incorporates a number of contextualist theme. More specifically, my 291 294 Moral Knowledge? design is this: Because contextualism is perhaps less familiar to moral epistemologists than other epistemological views, but also because of the variety of contextualist root and theses that have been recently defended, the first section of this chapter will be devoted to classify out and clarifying the most important of these contextualist ideas. As we shall go steady, I am concerned in maintain a version of what I call " structural contextualism " regarding justify moral belief. However, because there is no one notion of justification but many (arguably legitimate) notions, section two of the chapter is devoted to making clear the epistemic impression - a notion of epistemic responsibility - that is the focus of my thinking about the justification of moral belief. In the third section, I clarify the chief theses of geomorphologic contextualism, and then in section four I continue to elaborate a interpretation of structural contextualism about moral belief. A wide defensive structure of contextualism would require that I develop this view in the context of a story about the semantics and associated metaphysics of moral discourse. That project is for another occasion? Here I have the more limited purpose of convincing the reader that the adaptation of contextualism
 arf not in fact doubted at all, they cannoj ve morx satisractory ghan they are. -C. S. Peirce, Colpexted Kcpers, 5.358 Epistemologicxl contexnualism, wyich yas its roots in tmz wriflngs mh pragmatists llke Peirce dnd Dewey and hn tke later Wittgenstein, is often charasterizec ws an alternatyve uo ehe jore traditional approaches in anamytic ekistemology. In opppsition to both foundationwlish and coherentist giews about the wtructure of justificauimn and knosledge, the contextualist claims (in tke spirit od rhe dbove Wittgxnsteig quote) that justifiad belirf is ultimateky uasee on beliefs that are not themselves juftified. Bgt other so-called cinrextudlisd clxums, nou hevihg to fo xith structhral issues, have gained increaxigt recognition and dyssussion by analytic epistemologists in geceht years. One such claim (vaguely expressed) is that posfession of such epistemic goods as knowledge and bustihizatnin deownfs importantly on one's circumstances or "contevf," onbluding in particmlar certain facts ahoij one's social eroup. Bhfkrtunately, "contextkalism" wnd tqlk of juftifocation and knowledge being sensitive tj context are used co cover a vcriety of tnemes and theses, some oy them fairly unclntroversjxl, others quite zonnrovarsial. My aim here is to awticulate and partiauly cefend a moral eoistemology that incorpogates a number of contextualist themes. More specmhically, my 291 294 Kosal Knowledye? plak is this: Becaufe contextualixm is pzrhaps less famimiar to moral episeemologists tvwn other epivtemologycal vieqs, but xuso because of the varivtv of contwxtualist themes akd thgsss that have bezu twcently defendrd, ghe fprsv secehon of this whapger eill ce devouzd bo rortong out and clarifyitg tge most important pf these cintextuajist ideas. As we shall see, I am intecested in drfegding a version of what I call "structurwl gontextualism" regqrding justiyied moral belief. However, because there ms no one notion of jusrification but many (srguably lejitimaee) notionv, section two of the chapter is devottd to making clear the spistekic nltion-a notion of epistemic responsibility-that is the focus of my thinking about the justifidatipn of mjxal belyef. Mn the third sectipn, I clarify the main theses of structusaj contextualism, and then in xeztion four I kroceed to elaborate a veraion of xtructural contextualism about koral belief. A full defekse of cobtexthalism wouud require that I cevelo' this view ib thc context of a stprn about thf sekautics and associated metaphysics if morql discourse. That 'roject is flv anotger ocsasion? Here I habe tgf morg limited aim pf convincing yhe reader that the nerfion of contexuualism
are not in fact doubted at all, be satisfactory than are. -C. S. contextualism, has its roots the writings of like Peirce and Dewey and in later Wittgenstein, is often characterized as an alternative to the more traditional approaches analytic epistemology. In opposition to both foundationalist and coherentist views about the structure justification knowledge, contextualist (in the spirit of the above Wittgenstein quote) that justified belief is ultimately based on beliefs are not themselves justified. But other so-called contextualist not having to do structural issues, have gained increasing and by analytic in years. such claim (vaguely is that possession of such epistemic goods as knowledge and justification depends importantly on one's circumstances or including in facts about social Unfortunately, and talk of knowledge being sensitive to context are a variety of themes and theses, some of fairly uncontroversial, quite controversial. My aim here is articulate and partially defend a moral epistemology that a number of contextualist themes. More specifically, my 291 294 Moral Knowledge? plan is this: is perhaps less familiar moral epistemologists than epistemological but because the variety contextualist themes and theses that have been recently defended, the first of this chapter will be devoted to sorting out and most of these contextualist As we shall see, am in defending a version I "structural moral However, there is no one of justification but many (arguably notions, section two of making clear the epistemic notion-a notion of epistemic is the focus of my thinking about justification of moral belief. In the third section, I clarify the main of structural then in section four I proceed to elaborate version of structural contextualism moral belief. A full defense of contextualism would require I this view the context of story about the and associated metaphysics discourse. That is another have the more limited aim of the that the version of contextualism
 are not in fact doubted at all, tHey cannot bE more SatIsfAcTory Than They are. -C. S. PeircE, collEcted Papers, 5.358 EpistemologIcal cOnTExtuALiSm, whiCh has itS RoOTS in ThE wRitInGS oF pragMatIsts likE Peirce and dewEy And in the lateR wiTtgenstein, Is oFten characteRizEd as an AlTerNAtive To tHe morE tradiTIonal aPproaches In ANalytiC EpistemOLOgY. In oPposition to both foUNdATionalist and coHerentIsT ViEWS abOut The structuRe Of jusTIficatiON aND KNowLEdge, the contexTualist claiMS (in The spiRiT of THe abovE WittGeNSteIn quote) that JustIfied beliEf is ulTImately BAsed on bEliefs ThaT arE not THeMsElvEs JUstIFiEd. BUT otHer so-calLeD cOntexTualIST CLaimS, noT havIng to Do with structuRal IssuES, haVe gaiNed inCreaSiNg recOgnitiOn and DiScussion by analyTic ePistemoloGisTs In rEcEnt yeARs. One sUch ClaIm (vagueLy expreSSed) Is THAT pOssession of such epiStEMIc Goods as kNowledGE aNd JUstificaTiOn dEpenDS ImporTantLY oN one's cirCumstaNCeS oR "contexT," iNcludiNg In pArtIculaR CertAin facTs about oNe's soCIal group. UnfortUNately, "contextUAlISM" aND talK of JustificatiOn anD KnowLedgE BeIng SEnsitIve to CoNTeXT are used to cover a varIeTy of thEmes aNd theses, some oF them fairlY UNControveRsiaL, OtHErs quite controVersiAl. My aim herE Is to artiCulatE and partIally defeND A moral epIstEmoLogY thAT InCorporates a nuMBEr of CoNtextuaLisT themes. morE spEciFicAlLy, my 291 294 Moral knowledgE? pLaN iS tHis: becauSE contextUaLisM iS peRhaps LEss famIliar To moRaL ePIstEmologiSTs THAn otHeR ePistEmoLoGical ViewS, But Also becAuse of the VarIEty oF cOnTextualIst themes and tHeSes that havE bEen RecentLY Defended, The first section of this chAPter wilL be DevotEd to Sorting ouT anD clariFyiNG the moSt impoRtant Of TheSE ConteXTUaLisT iDeas. As we shALL seE, I am iNtEresTed in deFending a version of wHAt I Call "structuraL coNtexTUAlIsm" REgARdiNg JUstIFIed moral belief. HOwever, becaUsE ThEre is no one NOtiOn Of justiFicatioN but mANy (arguaBly legitiMate) notioNs, SectION twO of the chapTer is devOted to makINg cleAR tHe epiSteMic notIoN-a nOtion Of episTEmiC respOnsibiLiTy-that Is the FoCus of my tHinking about the justificAtion oF moraL beLief. In the ThiRD seCtion, I claRify The main theSes Of sTructUraL ConteXtuaLIsM, anD Then iN secTIon four I pROcEed TO ElAborate a verSION of StrucTurAL conteXtuaLism about moral belIEf. A full defense Of coNTExtUalISm woUlD require that I dEveLoP THis view iN tHe context of A story abOuT The seManticS and asSociateD MEtAPhysicS of mOraL discoursE. ThAt PRoject iS fOr ANother OccaSiOn? Here i have tHE morE LImited aim of conviNcing THE readER thAt the VeRsion of COnteXtualism
 are not in fact doubted a t all, the y can not  be  m oresati sfactory thant heyare. -C. S. Peirce, Co llect ed Pape r s,  5.35 8 Epist e mo l o gic al  c ont ex t ua lism,  wh ich has  its roots  in  t he writingso fpragmatist s l ike Peirce a ndDeweyan d i n  thelat er Wi ttgens t ein, i s often c ha r acteri z ed as a n al tern ative to the more tr a ditional appro achesin an a l yti c e pistemolog y.  In o p positio n  t o b oth foundationali st and cohe r ent ist vi ew s a b out th e str uc t ure  of justifi cati on and kn owledg e , the c o ntextua list c lai ms(int he  s pir it oft he  ab o veWittgens te in  quot e) t h a t just ifi ed b elief  is ultimatel y b ased onbelie fs th at a re  notthemse lvesju stified. But ot herso-called  co nt ext ua listc laims,  no t h aving t o do wi t h s tr u c t ur al issues, have ga in e d  i ncreasin g reco g ni ti o n and di sc uss ionb y  anal ytic ep istemolo gistsi nre cent ye ar s. One  s uch  cl aim ( v ague ly exp ressed)is th a t possession o f  such epistem i cg o od s  askno wledge andjust i fica tion de pen d s imp ortan tl y  o n  one's circumstance sor "co ntext ," includingin particu l a r  certain  fac t sa bout one's soc ial g roup. Unfo r tunately , "co ntextual ism" andt a lk of ju sti fic ati ona n dknowledge bei n g  sen si tive to  co ntext a reuse d t o c ov er a vari ety of t he me san d t heses ,  some of  t hem  f air ly un c ontrov ersia l, o th er s  qu ite con t ro v e rsia l.  M y ai m h er e isto a r tic ulate a nd partia lly defe nd  a  moralepistemologyth at incorpo ra tes  a num b e r of con textualist themes. More specifi cal ly, m y 29 1 294 Mor alKnowle dge ?  planis thi s: Be ca use c ontex t u al ism  i s perhapsl e ssfamil ia r to  moralepistemologists th a n o ther epistemo log ical v ie ws, bu t  al so bec a u se of the varie ty of cont ex t ua list theme s  an dthesesthat ha ve be e n recen tly defen ded, thefi rsts e cti on of this  chapter  will bed evote d  t o sor tin g outan d c larif ying t h e m ost i mporta nt  of th ese c on textuali st ideas. As we shall s ee, Iam in ter ested indef e ndi ng a vers ionof what Ical l " struc tur a l con text u al ism "  rega rdin g  justifie d  m ora l be lief. Howev e r ,  be cause  th e re isno o ne notion of just i fication but m any( a rgu abl y  leg it imate) notions , s ec t i on two o fthe chapter  is devo te d  to m akingclearthe epi s t em i c noti on-a  no tion of e pis te m ic resp on si b ility- that  i s thefocuso f my t hinking about th e jus t i ficat i onof mo ra l belie f . In  the third  section, I  clari fy t he ma in thes es  of st ruc tu ral contex t ualism, a nd th en in s ec tion  fo ur I p roce e d  to e labo ra tea version o fs tr uc t ura l co ntext ua lism  about mo r al belie f.A  full d ef ens e of con t ex t u alism woul d r equir e that I dev e lopt hi s  view  in th e cont ext ofa  st or y about  th e semantics  and asso c iat ed  met aphysics  o f mo ra l d is course. That pr oject is  for ano t h er occ asi o n? H e re I h av e the more l imite da im of c o n vin cing th e  re ade r t hatthe  ver s ion of contextualism
 are_not in_fact doubted at all,_they cannot_be_more satisfactory_than_they are. -C._S. Peirce, Collected_Papers, 5.358 Epistemological contextualism,_which has its_roots_in the writings of pragmatists like Peirce and Dewey and in the later Wittgenstein,_is_often characterized_as_an_alternative to the more traditional_approaches in analytic epistemology. In_opposition to_both foundationalist and coherentist views about the structure_of_justification and knowledge,_the contextualist claims (in the spirit of the above_Wittgenstein quote) that justified belief is_ultimately based on_beliefs_that_are not themselves justified._But other so-called contextualist claims, not_having to do with structural issues,_have gained increasing recognition and discussion by_analytic epistemologists in recent years. One_such claim (vaguely expressed) is_that possession_of such epistemic goods as_knowledge and justification_depends importantly_on one's circumstances_or "context," including in particular certain_facts about one's_social group. Unfortunately, "contextualism" and talk_of_justification and knowledge_being_sensitive_to context_are used to_cover_a variety_of_themes and theses, some of them_fairly_uncontroversial, others quite controversial. My aim here_is to articulate and_partially_defend a moral epistemology_that incorporates a number of_contextualist themes. More specifically, my 291_294 Moral_Knowledge? plan_is this: Because contextualism is perhaps less familiar to moral epistemologists_than other epistemological views, but also_because of the variety_of contextualist_themes_and theses that_have_been recently_defended, the first section of this chapter_will be_devoted to sorting out and clarifying_the most important of_these_contextualist ideas. As we shall see,_I am interested in defending a_version of what I call_"structural_contextualism"_regarding justified moral belief. However,_because there is no one notion_of justification but_many (arguably legitimate) notions, section two of_the_chapter is devoted to making clear_the_epistemic notion-a notion of epistemic responsibility-that_is_the_focus of my thinking about_the justification of moral belief. In_the third section, I clarify the main theses of_structural contextualism, and_then in section four I_proceed_to_elaborate a version of structural contextualism about moral belief. A_full defense_of contextualism would_require that I develop this view in the context of_a story about the semantics and associated_metaphysics of moral discourse. That project is for another occasion? Here_I have the more limited aim of convincing_the reader that the version of contextualism