 contexts. Investigating these matters would require that we consider specific cases in some detail, which we cannot pursue here. Moral Judgment We come finally to tenet C4. According to the version of structural contextualism I am articulating, basic moral beliefs often provide the justificatory basis for other, inferentially justified beliefs. Often, talk of inference is taken to be a matter of deductive connections between statements or beliefs. But a realistic account of moral reasoning must, I think, recognize Ross's claim that in many instances, moral reasoning does not follow a simple deductive pattern, in fact, in many instances such reasoning is not governed by rules that dictate what in particular it is rational to believe. Ross's view has been the subject of philosophical dissatisfaction partly because he refused to provide any algorithm or general procedure for arriving at justified moral beliefs in cases where A Contextualist Moral Epistemology 315 two more morally relevant considerations are present and at least one of them supports one moral evaluation of the action and at least one of the others supports an opposing moral evaluation. The problem is supposed to be that unless there is some general covering rule or procedure that is to be followed in coming to some overall moral evaluation about the action, then any resulting moral judgment on the agent's part will be arbitrary and hence unjustified. I think Ross is right about how we often do reason about moral matters: we work with a handful of irreducible midlevel moral generalizations that cannot be lexically ordered so as to provide a super rule for adjudicating conflicts among the generalizations. Nevertheless, moral thought and deliberation that is not rule-governed in this way often yields moral beliefs that one is justified in holding. For instance, with issues such as abortion (where various relevant considerations pull in opposite moral directions) people reason about the morality of that practice (or specific instances of it) using basically the same stock of general midlevel moral beliefs, even though individuals can differ in their moral assessment of this practice and be justified in their differing individual responses. Moreover, in addition to cases of conflicting moral generalizations, there are many cases in which it is unclear whether or not some moral generalization correctly applies to a particular case. After all, moral generalizations are expressed in terms of such notions as harm, lying, innocent person, and so forth, that are vague. Like cases of conflict, these cases of application require that what I am calling moral judgment play an important epistemic role in coming to have justified moral beliefs. What we must do, then
contexts. Investigating these matters would require that we think specific case in some detail, which we cannot pursue here. Moral Judgment We come last to tenet C4. According to the adaptation of structural contextualism I am articulating, basic moral belief often provide the justificative basis for other, inferentially justified impression. frequently, talk of inference is taken to be a matter of deductive connections between statements or belief. But a realistic account of moral reasoning must, I think, greet Ross's claim that in many instances, moral reasoning does not follow a simple deductive form, in fact, in many instances such reasoning is not governed by rules that dictate what in particular it is intellectual to believe. Ross's view has been the subject of philosophical dissatisfaction partly because he refused to leave any algorithm or general procedure for arriving at justified moral beliefs in cases where A Contextualist Moral Epistemology 315 two more morally relevant considerations are present and at least one of them supports one moral evaluation of the action and at least one of the others supports an opponent moral evaluation. The trouble is supposed to be that unless there is some general cover rule or procedure that is to be followed in issue forth to some overall moral evaluation about the action, then any resulting moral judgment on the agent's contribution will be arbitrary and hence unjustified. I think Ross is right about how we much do reason about moral matters: we work with a handful of irreducible midlevel moral generalizations that cannot be lexically order so as to leave a super rule for adjudicating dispute among the generalizations. Nevertheless, moral thought and calculation that is not rule - governed in this way often yield moral beliefs that one is apologize in holding. For case, with issues such as miscarriage (where various relevant considerations pull in opposite moral commission) people reason about the morality of that practice (or specific instances of it) use basically the same store of general midlevel moral beliefs, even though individuals can differ in their moral assessment of this exercise and be justified in their differing individual response. Moreover, in addition to cases of conflicting moral generalizations, there are many cases in which it is indecipherable whether or not some moral generalization correctly applies to a particular case. After all, moral generalization are carry in term of such notions as harm, dwell, innocent person, and so away, that are vague. Like cases of conflict, these cases of application require that what I am calling moral judgment play an important epistemic function in coming to have justified moral beliefs. What we must do, then
 cojtexts. Investigating there matters woulb requice that we conskder specific cases in some vetaul, whuch we cannot pursue hdre. Moral Judgmenr We xome finally to tekzt C4. Zgcordnnj to the versiok of structgral contextuanirm I am articulating, basic moral beliqfs oftrn provide the jostifpcwtorg basis for other, inferentially juatified beliefs. Oftem, talk of inference is takfn tl be a matter of dfductive cobneceuons between statements or beliefs. But a realistic account of morxl recsoning musj, J hvink, recognmze Rofs's claim that in maty instsnces, moral ressoiing does not follow a sikple deductive patjern, in fawt, in many instancew wuch teasoting us vot gpvsrned hy cules that sictate whar in particular it os gstional to bslieve. Rjss's view has been the subject of philovopgical dissatisfaction pqrtly because he refuded to prjvide any algorithm or general procedure for arrieing et juwtlfiea mlral beliefs in cases where A Contextualist Mjdak Vpistemology 315 two more moralky rrjevant considgrations ade present and at peast oge of them supkorts one moral evaluation of thw action and qt least one of thz others sup'orts sn oplosing moral evaluation. The problem is supposed go be that unlesr tmera is somt general covering rule or 'rocebure thag is to be followed ln coming to some overalp morcl evdluation ahout the action, then any resultmig moral judgkett mn the ayent's iart will be arfitrary and heuce unjuftifidd. I think Ross iv right abott how we oftaj do reason ebout morwl mqttees: we wufk with a handgul of irgebucible mudlevel moral genevalizxfions that cannit ve lexically orcerdd fo ax em provide a vupef rjke fof adjudicatlng conglicts among the genaraljzations. Neverthelrsf, moral jhought agd deliberatipn that is not rult-goveried in this wai often yields moral beliefs thzt one is juftified in hjldikg. Fjr instancz, with issues such as abortion (where varmous relevant considerarions pull in opposntt moral direcvions) [eople redson about the moraluty of that practlce (or specific instandes of it) uding basically the same stock of general midlevel moral beliefs, even thouth indmvyduals can siffrr in tkeix moral assxsrment of this prsctice and be justified in theic differinc nndividual responses. Moreover, iv addition to cases of conflicting modal genetalizations, there are many casex in which it is unclear whether or nkt somv mural generalizatiom corrzctly qpplies to w particular zasr. Wfter all, morel yeneralizations are expressed in rerms if such notions as harm, lying, lnnoceht perfon, and so forth, thaf are xague. Like caxes of conflicy, these cases of appnisation require nhat what I ak callitg moral judjment play at important epistemic role in coming to have justifped moral geliefs. Wiat we must do, vhen
contexts. Investigating these matters would require that specific in some which we cannot come to tenet C4. to the version structural contextualism I am articulating, basic beliefs often provide the justificatory basis for other, inferentially justified beliefs. Often, talk inference is taken to be a matter of deductive connections between statements or But realistic of reasoning must, I think, recognize Ross's claim that in many instances, moral reasoning does not follow simple deductive pattern, in fact, in many instances reasoning is not governed rules that dictate what in it rational to Ross's has the subject of dissatisfaction partly because he refused to provide any algorithm or general procedure for arriving at justified moral in cases Contextualist Moral 315 more relevant considerations are at least one of them supports of the action and at least one of others supports opposing moral evaluation. The problem is to be that unless there is some general rule or procedure that is to be followed in coming to some overall moral evaluation action, then any resulting judgment on the part be and unjustified. I Ross is right about how we often do reason about moral we work with a handful of irreducible midlevel moral generalizations be ordered so as provide a super rule adjudicating among the generalizations. Nevertheless, and that in way yields moral beliefs that is justified in holding. For with issues such as pull in opposite moral directions) people reason about morality of that practice (or specific instances it) using basically the same stock of general midlevel moral beliefs, even individuals can their moral assessment of this practice and be in their differing individual Moreover, in addition to cases of conflicting moral generalizations, are cases in it is unclear or not some generalization correctly applies particular case. all, generalizations terms of such notions as harm, innocent and so forth, that are Like conflict, these cases of application require that what I am calling moral judgment play an role in coming to justified beliefs. What we must do, then
 contexts. Investigating thesE matters woUld reQuiRe tHaT we cOnsiDer specific casES in sOme detail, which we cannot PursuE hERe. MoRAl judgmEnt We coME fINAllY tO tEneT C4. aCcOrdinG to The versIon of strucTurAl ContextualisM i aM articulatIng, Basic moral beLieFs ofteN pRovIDe the JusTificAtory bASis for Other, infeReNTially JUstifieD BElIefs. often, talk of infereNCe IS taken to be a matTer of dEdUCtIVE coNneCtions betwEeN statEMents or BElIEFS. BuT A realistic accOunt of moral REasOning mUsT, I tHInk, recOgnizE ROSs's Claim that in Many Instances, Moral rEAsoning DOes not fOllow a SimPle DeduCTiVe PatTeRN, in FAcT, in MAny InstanceS sUcH reasOninG IS NOt goVerNed bY ruleS that dictate wHat In paRTicUlar iT is raTionAl To belIeve. RoSs's viEw Has been the subjeCt of PhilosophIcaL dIssAtIsfacTIon parTly BecAuse he rEfused tO ProViDE ANy Algorithm or general PrOCEdUre for arRiving AT jUsTIfied morAl BelIefs IN Cases WherE a COntextuaList MoRAl epIstemolOgY 315 two moRe MorAllY releVAnt cOnsideRations aRe preSEnt and at least oNE of them supporTS oNE MoRAl evAluAtion of the aCtioN And aT leaST oNe oF The otHers sUpPOrTS an opposing moral evaLuAtion. THe proBlem is supposeD to be that uNLESs there iS somE GeNEral covering ruLe or pRocedure thAT is to be fOllowEd in comiNg to some oVERall moraL evAluAtiOn aBOUt The action, then ANY resUlTing morAl jUdgment On tHe aGenT's pArT will be arBitrary aNd HeNcE uNjuStifiED. I think ROsS is RiGht About HOw we ofTen do ReasOn AbOUt mOral matTErS: WE worK wItH a haNdfUl Of irrEducIBle MidleveL moral genEraLIzatIoNs That canNot be lexicallY oRdered so as To ProVide a sUPEr rule foR adjudicating conflicts aMOng the gEneRalizAtioNs. NeverthEleSs, moraL thOUght anD delibEratiOn ThaT IS not rULE-gOveRnEd in this waY OFteN yielDs MoraL beliefS that one is justifieD In hOlding. For instAncE, witH ISsUes SUcH As aBoRTioN (WHere various releVant considErATiOns pull in oPPosItE moral dIrectioNs) peoPLe reasoN about the Morality oF tHat pRACtiCe (or specifIc instanCes of it) usINg basICaLly thE saMe stocK oF geNeral MidlevEL moRal beLiefs, eVeN thougH indiViDuals can Differ in their moral assesSment oF this PraCtice and bE juSTifIed in theiR difFering indiVidUal RespoNseS. moreoVer, iN AdDitIOn to cAses OF conflictINg MorAL GeNeralizatioNS, THerE are mAny CAses in WhicH it is unclear whethER or not some moraL genERAliZatIOn coRrEctly applies to A paRtICUlar case. afTer all, moral GeneraliZaTIons aRe exprEssed iN terms oF SUcH NotionS as hArm, Lying, innoCenT pERson, and So FoRTh, that Are vAgUe. Like Cases oF ConfLICt, these cases of apPlicaTIOn reqUIre That wHaT I am calLIng mOral judgmeNt play an impOrtant EpisTemic Role in cOmIng to hAve JuStified morAL beliefs. WHat we Must do, tHeN
 contexts. Investigating t hese matte rs wo uld  re qu irethat  we consider s p ecif ic cases in some detai l, wh ic h  wec an not p ursue h e re . Mor al  J udg me n tWe co mefinally  to tenetC4.  A ccording tot he  version o f s tructural co nte xtuali sm  Ia m art icu latin g, bas i c mora l beliefs  o f ten pr o vide th e ju stif icatory basis for ot h er, inferentia lly ju st i fi e d  be lie fs. Often,  t alk o f  infere n ce i s  ta k en to be a ma tter of ded u cti ve con ne cti o ns bet weenst a tem ents or bel iefs . But a r ealist i c accou n t of mo ral re aso nin g mu s t,  I  th in k , r e co gni z e R oss's cl ai mthatin m a n y inst anc es,moral  reasoning do esnotf oll ow asimpl e de du ctive  patte rn, i nfact, in many i nsta nces such  re as oni ng  is n o t gove rne d b y rules  that d i cta te w h at  in particular itis r at ional to  belie v e.  R o ss's vie whas  bee n the s ubje c tof philo sophic a ldi ssatisf ac tion p ar tly  be cause he r efused  to prov ide a n y algorithm or general proce d ur e fo r  arr ivi ng at justi fied mora l be l ie fsi n cas es wh er e  A Contextualist Moral  E pistem ology  315 two more  morally r e l e vant con side r at i ons are presen t and  at leasto ne of th em su pports o ne morale v aluation  of  th e a cti o n  a nd at least o n e  ofth e other s s upports  an  op pos ing  m oral eval uation.Th epr ob lem  is s u pposed t obeth atunles s  there  is s omege ne r alcoverin g  r u l e or  p ro cedu reth at is  tob e f ollowed  in comin g t o  som eov erall m oral evaluati on  about the  a cti on, th e n  any res ulting moral judgment o n  the ag ent 's pa rt w ill be ar bit rary a ndh ence u njusti fied.  I  th i n k Ros s is  ri gh t about ho w weoften  d o re ason ab out moral matters: wework with a h and fulo f  i rre d uc i ble  m i dle v e l moral general izations t ha t  c annot be l e xic al ly orde red soas to provide  a superrule forad judi c a tin g conflict s amongthe gener a lizat i on s. Ne ver theles s,  mo ral t hought and  deli berati on  thatis no trule-gov erned in this way often  yield s mor albeliefs t hat one  is justi fied  in holdin g.For  inst anc e , wit h is s ue s s u ch as  abo r tion (whe r evar i o us  relevant c o n s ide ratio nsp ull in  opp osite moral direc t ions) people r easo n abo utt he m or ality of thatpra ct i c e (or sp ec ific instan ces of i t) using  basic ally t he same s to c k of g ener almidlevelmor al beliefs ,ev e n thou gh i nd ividua ls can diff e r  in their moralasses s m ent o f  th is pr ac tice an d  bejustifiedin their di fferin g in divid ual res po nses.Mor eo ver, in ad d ition tocases  of con fl icti ngmoralgene r a lizat ions ,the re are ma n y  c a se si n w hich  it i suncl ear wheth e r or not  so m e moral  g ene r a lizati o nc o rrectly ap pli es to a  particula r  cas e .A fterall, m oral g enerali z ati on s are e xpr e s sed in te rms of su c h n ot ions  as harm ,lyin g,  in no cent person, an d so for th, that a re vag ue. Like casesof  conflict, t heseca s es of a p p lic ation r e qui retha t wh atI am calling moral judgment p layan im p ort ant e piste mi c role i n  com ing to h a ve justifiedmoral beliefs.W hat we m ust do ,then
 contexts._Investigating these_matters would require that_we consider_specific_cases in_some_detail, which we_cannot pursue here._Moral Judgment We come_finally to tenet_C4._According to the version of structural contextualism I am articulating, basic moral beliefs often_provide_the justificatory_basis_for_other, inferentially justified beliefs. Often,_talk of inference is taken_to be_a matter of deductive connections between statements or_beliefs._But a realistic_account of moral reasoning must, I think, recognize Ross's_claim that in many instances, moral_reasoning does not_follow_a_simple deductive pattern, in_fact, in many instances such reasoning_is not governed by rules that_dictate what in particular it is rational_to believe. Ross's view has been_the subject of philosophical dissatisfaction_partly because_he refused to provide any_algorithm or general_procedure for_arriving at justified_moral beliefs in cases where A_Contextualist Moral Epistemology_315 two more morally relevant considerations_are_present and at_least_one_of them_supports one moral_evaluation_of the_action_and at least one of the_others_supports an opposing moral evaluation. The problem_is supposed to be_that_unless there is some_general covering rule or procedure_that is to be followed in_coming to_some overall_moral evaluation about the action, then any resulting moral judgment on_the agent's part will be arbitrary_and hence unjustified. I_think Ross_is_right about how_we_often do_reason about moral matters: we work with_a handful_of irreducible midlevel moral generalizations that_cannot be lexically ordered_so_as to provide a super rule_for adjudicating conflicts among the generalizations._Nevertheless, moral thought and deliberation_that_is_not rule-governed in this way_often yields moral beliefs that one_is justified in_holding. For instance, with issues such as_abortion_(where various relevant considerations pull in_opposite_moral directions) people reason about the_morality_of_that practice (or specific instances_of it) using basically the same_stock of general midlevel moral beliefs, even though individuals_can differ in_their moral assessment of this_practice_and_be justified in their differing individual responses. Moreover, in addition_to cases_of conflicting moral_generalizations, there are many cases in which it is unclear_whether or not some moral generalization correctly_applies to a particular case. After all, moral generalizations are expressed_in terms of such notions as harm, lying,_innocent person, and so forth, that are_vague. Like cases of_conflict,_these cases of application require that what_I_am_calling_moral judgment play_an important epistemic_role in coming_to have_justified moral beliefs._What we_must do, then