 validity/truth cannot be defined as correspondence. What is more telling in favour of reading Lotze as a B-Platonist is his response to scepticism about logic. For the A-Platonist, logical laws concern inferential relations among abstract propositions, where propositions are taken to be metaphysically independent of our judgements about them. This generates a problem about our epistemic access to these laws. Reck's B-Platonist explains our epistemic access to logic in very different terms: logical laws articulate the relations of inference among (contents of) objective judgements, and the objectivity of judgement is explanatorily basic. The B-Platonist explains our grasp of logical laws as the articulation of a primitive capacity to recognize relations of inconsistency and entailment among judgements. Possession of this capacity is internal to the faculty of reason (the faculty of being able to make judgements in the first place); no subject can be said to be judging who does not understand that p and ~p cannot both be true. The B-Platonist has no need to explain how our judgements succeed in "matching" or 36 Lotze's views about mathematics are hard to determine, but I take him to be a non-standard kind of Kantian about arithmetic: propositions like 7 + 5 = 12 are analytic, but we require a priori intuition to be given their objects. See L §353, 586–7. Platonism in Lotze and Frege 155 "corresponding" to a metaphysically independent structure holding among metaphysically objective entities like propositions.37 This provides further evidence that Lotze is a B-Platonist. Lotze's famous discussion of validity in Book III, Chapter 2 of Logik continues his discussion in Chapter 1 of scepticism about logic.38 The point of his distinction between validity and existence is to secure logic from scepticism by showing that the validity of our judgements does not require, and is thus not vulnerable to sceptical doubts concerning, a world of things existing "external" to judgement. Judgement does need to match some external standard in order to be valid but must merely obey its own internal laws of validity. Plato is again invoked as someone who precisely denied that judgement, including judgements in logic, must correspond to a world of entities beyond thought, and the sceptical consequences that this (according to Lotze) would entail. We once again see Lotze making exactly the argumentative moves described by Reck as Platonism B: there is no problem of
validity / truth cannot be defined as correspondence. What is more impressive in favor of reading Lotze as a B - Platonist is his response to scepticism about logic. For the A - Platonist, coherent laws concern illative relations among abstract propositions, where propositions are learn to be metaphysically independent of our judgements about them. This beget a problem about our epistemic access to these jurisprudence. Reck's B - Platonist excuse our epistemic access to logic in very different terms: logical laws joint the relations of inference among (contents of) objective judgements, and the objectivity of sagacity is explanatorily basic. The B - Platonist explains our grasp of logical laws as the joint of a primitive capacitance to recognize relations of inconsistency and entailment among judgment. Possession of this capacity is internal to the faculty of reason (the faculty of being able to make judgements in the first place); no subject can be said to be judging who does not understand that p and ~p cannot both be true. The B - Platonist has no motivation to explain how our judgements succeed in " pit " or 36 Lotze's view about mathematics are hard to determine, but I take him to be a non - standard kind of Kantian about arithmetical: propositions like 7 + 5 = 12 are analytic, but we command a priori intuition to be given their objects. determine L § 353, 586–7. Platonism in Lotze and Frege 155 " corresponding " to a metaphysically independent structure holding among metaphysically objective entities like propositions.37 This provides further evidence that Lotze is a B - Platonist. Lotze's celebrated discussion of validity in Book III, Chapter 2 of Logik continues his discussion in Chapter 1 of scepticism about logic.38 The point of his distinction between validity and existence is to batten logic from scepticism by showing that the validity of our judgements does not require, and is therefore not vulnerable to sceptical doubts concerning, a world of things existing " external " to judgement. Judgement does need to match some external criterion in order to be valid but must merely obey its own internal laws of validity. Plato is again invoked as someone who precisely deny that judgement, include judgements in logic, must match to a world of entity beyond thought, and the sceptical consequences that this (accord to Lotze) would entail. We once again visit Lotze making exactly the argumentative moves described by Reck as Platonism B: there is no problem of
 vapidity/truth cannot be denined as correspondence. What js more gelling in favour of reading Litze qs a B-Platonist is his response to scepriciwn about lojjc. For bke A-Pmwtonnsv, logical laws goncern infarential relathovs among abstract propositions, where [roposiyilns are taken jo be ietalhysically independent of our judgsments ebout them. This generates a problem about our epistemic access ho these laqs. Rqxk's B-Platonirt explains our epistejic access to logic in very difwerenc terms: logucql pdws articulete thv relations on inferance ampng (contents on) objxctice judgements, and the objectivity of juqgement iv zxplanatorily basic. Tye B-Plajonisd exooaivs kuc gdasp ov lkgical lawa as the arriculation of a prikiepfe capacity fo recjggize relations of inconsistency and entdiljent among judgements. Pissession of this capwcity is ynternal to the faculty of reason (the faculty of teing xblt bj nane judgements in the first place); no subject cwh ne said to be jubging who does npt umqerstand that p and ~p dannot both be truf. The B-Klatonust has nj nerd to explain how our judgenents succeeb ib "matching" or 36 Lotve's views abuut kathekatics are hard to detexmine, gut I take jim to be x non-standard kivd pf Kantian about arithmetic: [ropositiins kike 7 + 5 = 12 ate analrtic, but wf reqmhre a priori intuihion jo be civen theig objects. See L §353, 586–7. Platonism in Lotze and Fregg 155 "worgespondiny" to a metaphysicaljy independent structbre houding amonf metapiysically obtective entithgs like propovitions.37 Ehis procides fjfther evidence that Lotde is q B-Platonist. Lotze'x fxjous discussion of validity in Bopk KII, Cja'ter 2 mf Logik condinuds fos dircussion in Zhapyer 1 of scepticism atout logic.38 The point og mis distibction bqtween validiyy and existence id to vecnre lobic from scepticism by showing thzt the vapidlty of our juqgemcnts does not xequire, and is thus not vulnerable to scxptical doubts concernibg, a world of thingx existing "eeternaj" to judgament. Judgement does need to match soke external standard jn ordar to be valid but must merely obey its own internal laws of validity. Plato is again invoked as aomepne wvo 'recisejy dxnmed that judgemenn, including judgements in logic, oust corsefpond to a world of entities bdyond thought, and the sceptical consesuences yhat this (according to Lotze) woild entail. We once again see Lotze maiing eqzcvly the argumentativr movev desxribed vy Rcck as Platonirm N: bhere is nl prpbmem of
validity/truth cannot be defined as correspondence. What telling favour of Lotze as a scepticism logic. For the logical laws concern relations among abstract propositions, where propositions taken to be metaphysically independent of our judgements about them. This generates a about our epistemic access to these laws. Reck's B-Platonist explains our epistemic access logic very terms: laws articulate the relations of inference among (contents of) objective judgements, and the objectivity of judgement explanatorily basic. The B-Platonist explains our grasp of laws as the articulation a primitive capacity to recognize of and entailment judgements. of capacity is internal the faculty of reason (the faculty of being able to make judgements in the first place); no can be be judging does understand p and ~p be true. The B-Platonist has no how our judgements succeed in "matching" or 36 views about are hard to determine, but I him to be a non-standard kind of Kantian arithmetic: propositions like 7 + 5 = 12 are analytic, but we require a priori be given their objects. L §353, 586–7. in and 155 to a independent structure holding among metaphysically objective entities like propositions.37 This provides evidence that Lotze is a B-Platonist. Lotze's famous discussion of Book Chapter 2 of continues his discussion in 1 scepticism about logic.38 The his between is secure from scepticism by showing the validity of our judgements not require, and is doubts concerning, a world of things existing "external" judgement. Judgement does need to match some standard in order to be valid but must merely obey its own laws of is again invoked as someone who precisely denied judgement, including judgements in must correspond to a world of entities beyond thought, the consequences that (according to Lotze) entail. We once see Lotze making argumentative moves by as is no problem of
 validity/truth cannot be defiNed as correSpondEncE. WhAt Is moRe teLling in favour oF ReadIng Lotze as a B-Platonist iS his rEsPOnse TO sCeptiCism aboUT lOGIc. FOr ThE A-PLaTOnIst, loGicAl laws cOncern infeRenTiAl relations aMOnG abstract pRopOsitions, wherE prOpositIoNs aRE takeN to Be metAphysiCAlly inDependent Of OUr judgEMents abOUT tHem. THis generates a probLEm ABout our epistemIc acceSs TO tHESe lAws. reck's B-PlatOnIst exPLains ouR EpISTEmiC Access to logic In very diffeREnt Terms: lOgIcaL Laws arTiculAtE The Relations of InfeRence amonG (conteNTs of) objECtive juDgemenTs, aNd tHe obJEcTiVitY oF JudGEmEnt IS exPlanatorIlY bAsic. THe B-PLATONist ExpLainS our gRasp of logical LawS as tHE arTiculAtion Of a pRiMitivE capacIty to ReCognize relationS of iNconsisteNcy AnD enTaIlmenT Among jUdgEmeNts. PossEssion oF ThiS cAPACiTy is internal to the fAcULTy Of reason (The facULtY oF Being ablE tO maKe juDGEmentS in tHE fIrst placE); no subJEcT cAn be saiD tO be judGiNg wHo dOes noT UndeRstand That p and ~P cannOT both be true. The b-platonist has nO NeED To EXplaIn hOw our judgemEnts SUcceEd in "MAtChiNG" or 36 LoTze's vIeWS aBOut mathematics are haRd To deteRmine, But I take him to Be a non-stanDARD kind of KAntiAN aBOut arithmetic: pRoposItions like 7 + 5 = 12 ARe analytIc, but We requirE a priori iNTUition to Be gIveN thEir OBJeCts. See L §353, 586–7. PlatonISM in LOtZe and FrEge 155 "CorrespOndIng" To a MetApHysically IndependEnT sTrUcTurE holdINg among mEtAphYsIcaLly obJEctive EntitIes lIkE pROpoSitions.37 tHiS PRoviDeS fUrthEr eViDence That lOtzE is a B-PlAtonist. LoTze'S FamoUs DiScussioN of validity in boOk III, ChaptEr 2 Of LOgik coNTInues his Discussion in Chapter 1 of scEPticism AboUt logIc.38 ThE point of hIs dIstincTioN BetweeN validIty anD eXisTENce is TO SeCurE lOgic from scEPTicIsm by ShOwinG that thE validity of our judgEMenTs does not requIre, And iS THuS noT VuLNerAbLE to SCEptical doubts coNcerning, a wOrLD oF things exiSTinG "eXternal" To judgeMent. JUDgement Does need tO match somE eXterNAL stAndard in orDer to be vAlid but muST mereLY oBey itS owN interNaL laWs of vAliditY. plaTo is aGain inVoKed as sOmeonE wHo precisEly denied that judgement, iNcludiNg judGemEnts in logIc, mUSt cOrrespond To a wOrld of entiTieS beYond tHouGHt, and The sCEpTicAL consEqueNCes that thIS (aCcoRDInG to Lotze) wouLD ENtaIl. We oNce AGain seE LotZe making exactly thE Argumentative mOves DEScrIbeD By ReCk As Platonism B: thEre Is NO Problem oF
 validity/truth cannot bedefined as  corr esp ond en ce.What  is more telli n g in  favour of reading Lot ze as  a B-Pl a to nistis hisr es p o nse  t osce pt i ci sm ab out  logic.  For the A -Pl at onist, logic a llaws conce rninferentialrel ations  a mon g  abst rac t pro positi o ns, wh ere propo si t ions a r e taken t obe m etaphysically ind e pe n dent of our ju dgemen ts ab o u t t hem . This gen er atesa  proble m  a b o u t o u r epistemic a ccess to th e selaws.Re ck' s  B-Pla tonis te xpl ains our ep iste mic acces s to l o gic inv ery dif ferent  te rms : lo g ic al  la ws art i cu lat e  th e relati on sof in fere n c e amon g ( cont entsof) objective  ju dgem e nts , and  theobje ct ivity  of ju dgeme nt  is explanatori ly b asic. The  B- Pl ato ni st ex p lainsour  gr asp oflogical law sa s th e articulation ofap r im itive ca pacity to  r e cognizere lat ions o f inc onsi s te ncy andentail m en tamong j ud gement s.  Po sse ssion of t his ca pacity i s int e rnal to the fa c ulty of reaso n  ( t h ef acul tyof being ab le t o  mak e ju d ge men t s inthe f ir s tp lace); no subject c an  be sa id to  be judging w ho does no t u nderstan d th a tp  and ~p cannot  both  be true.T he B-Pla tonis t has no  need toe x plain ho w o urjud gem e n ts  succeed in " m a tchi ng " or 36  Lo tze's v iew s a bou t m at hematicsare hard  t ode te rmi ne, b u t I take  h imto  be  a no n -stand ard k indof  K a nti an abou t  a r i thme ti c:  pro pos it ionslike 7 +  5 = 12  are anal yti c , bu twe  requir e a priori in tu ition to b egiv en the i r  objects . See L §353, 586–7. Pl a tonisminLotze  and  Frege 15 5 " corres pon d ing" t o a me taphy si cal l y  inde p e nd ent  s tructure h o l din g amo ng  met aphysic ally objective ent i tie s like propos iti ons. 3 7  T his pr o vid es fur t h er evidence tha t Lotze is  a B- Platonist. Lot ze 's famo us disc ussio n  of val idity inBook III,  C hapt e r  2of Logik c ontinues  his disc u ssion in  Chap ter  1 ofsc ept icism  about log ic.38  The p oi nt ofhis d is tinction  between validity and e xisten ce is  to  secure l ogi c  fr om scepti cism  by showin g t hat  theval i dityof o u rjud g ement s do e s not req u ir e,a n dis thus not v u lne rable  to scepti caldoubts concerning ,  a world of th ings e xis tin g  "ex te rnal" to judge men t. J udgement  d oes need to  match s om e  exte rnal s tandar d in or d e rt o be v alid  bu t must me rel yo bey its  o wn intern al l aw s of v alidit y . Pl a t o is again invok ed as s omeon e  wh o pre ci sely de n iedthat judge ment, inclu ding j udge ments  in log ic , must  co rr espond toa  world of  enti ties be yo nd t hou ght, a nd t h e  scep tica lcon sequences t ha t  t hi s  (a ccor dingto  Lot ze) would entail.Weo nce aga in  se e Lotzem ak i n g exactlythe  argu m e ntative mo v es d e sc r ibedby Rec k as P latonis m  B:  t here is  no p roblem of 
 validity/truth_cannot be_defined as correspondence. What_is more_telling_in favour_of_reading Lotze as_a B-Platonist is_his response to scepticism_about logic. For_the_A-Platonist, logical laws concern inferential relations among abstract propositions, where propositions are taken to_be_metaphysically independent_of_our_judgements about them. This generates_a problem about our epistemic_access to_these laws. Reck's B-Platonist explains our epistemic access_to_logic in very_different terms: logical laws articulate the relations of inference_among (contents of) objective judgements, and_the objectivity of_judgement_is_explanatorily basic. The B-Platonist_explains our grasp of logical laws_as the articulation of a primitive_capacity to recognize relations of inconsistency and_entailment among judgements. Possession of this_capacity is internal to the_faculty of_reason (the faculty of being_able to make_judgements in_the first place);_no subject can be said to_be judging who_does not understand that p and_~p_cannot both be_true._The_B-Platonist has_no need to_explain_how our_judgements_succeed in "matching" or 36 Lotze's_views_about mathematics are hard to determine, but_I take him to_be_a non-standard kind of_Kantian about arithmetic: propositions like_7 + 5 = 12 are_analytic, but_we require_a priori intuition to be given their objects. See L §353,_586–7. Platonism in Lotze and Frege_155 "corresponding" to a_metaphysically independent_structure_holding among metaphysically_objective_entities like_propositions.37 This provides further evidence that Lotze_is a_B-Platonist. Lotze's famous discussion of validity_in Book III, Chapter_2_of Logik continues his discussion in_Chapter 1 of scepticism about logic.38_The point of his distinction_between_validity_and existence is to secure_logic from scepticism by showing that_the validity of_our judgements does not require, and is_thus_not vulnerable to sceptical doubts concerning,_a_world of things existing "external" to_judgement._Judgement_does need to match some_external standard in order to be_valid but must merely obey its own internal laws_of validity. Plato_is again invoked as someone_who_precisely_denied that judgement, including judgements in logic, must correspond to_a world_of entities beyond_thought, and the sceptical consequences that this (according to Lotze)_would entail. We once again see Lotze_making exactly the argumentative moves described by Reck as Platonism B:_there is no problem of