 is no need for confirmation as a means to the end of saying how worthy of belief certain hypotheses are. The general Bayesian framework 11 answers this question satisfactorily and without reference to its supplement Bayesian confirmation theory: Bayesian confirmation is a means with no end. (We disagree about what, if anything, one should do about this, though. See Brössel [ms]; Huber [2005a], [2005b], [2008a], [2008b].) Therefore let us turn to the prospects of the second option according to which confirmation is a means to some end other than saying how worthy of belief certain hypotheses are. 4 Confirmation and the Value of Experiments No Bayesian conception of confirmation can be used to say how worthy of belief certain hypotheses are. However, this still leaves open the possibility that confirmation is put to some other use. In this section we consider a popular measure of incremental confirmation and show that it can be used to measure the epistemic value of experimental outcomes, and thus to decide which experiments to carry out by forming their expected epistemic values. However, we also show that Bayesian confirmation theorists rule out – in some cases explicitly, in others implicitly – that confirmation be used for this purpose, and so defend our negative conclusion from the previous section. One might argue that the epistemic value of an experimental outcome in a test of a hypothesis for an agent consists in the difference the experimental outcome would make to the agent's degree of belief in the hypothesis. In the literature this is referred to as "the potential further support" (Christensen [1999]) or "the additional evidence provided by" (Milne [ms]) an experimental outcome for a hypothesis for an agent. Suppose an agent with actual degree of belief function Pr is testing the hypothesis H by an experiment with possible experimental outcomes E and ¬E against background assumptions B. The difference the experimental outcome E would make to the agent's degree of belief in the hypothesis given the 12 background assumptions can be measured by the Kemeny-Oppenheim measure of factual support F (Kemeny and Oppenheim [1952]; Fitelson [2001], Good [1983], and Pearl [1988] endorse F or measures ordinally equivalent to it): F (H,E,B) = [ Pr (E | H ∩B)− Pr (E | ¬H ∩B) Pr (E | H ∩B) + Pr (E | ¬H ∩B) ] The difference the experimental outcome ¬E would make to the
is no need for confirmation as a means to the end of suppose how desirable of belief certain guess are. The cosmopolitan Bayesian framework 11 answers this question satisfactorily and without character to its supplement Bayesian confirmation theory: Bayesian ratification is a mean with no end. (We disagree about what, if anything, one should do about this, though. See Brössel [ ms ]; Huber [ 2005a ], [ 2005b ], [ 2008a ], [ 2008b ] .) consequently let us turn to the candidate of the second option according to which confirmation is a means to some end other than say how worthy of belief certain guess are. 4 Confirmation and the Value of Experiments No Bayesian conception of confirmation can be use to say how worthy of belief certain hypotheses are. However, this however leaves open the possibility that confirmation is put to some other use. In this section we consider a popular measure of incremental confirmation and show that it can be used to measure the epistemic value of experimental outcomes, and thus to decide which experiment to carry out by forming their expect epistemic value. However, we also show that Bayesian confirmation theorists rule out – in some cases explicitly, in others implicitly – that confirmation be use for this purpose, and so defend our negative conclusion from the former section. One might argue that the epistemic value of an experimental outcome in a test of a hypothesis for an agent consists in the difference the experimental result would make to the agent's degree of belief in the hypothesis. In the literature this is refer to as " the potential further support " (Christensen [ 1999 ]) or " the additional evidence provide by " (Milne [ ms ]) an experimental outcome for a hypothesis for an agent. Suppose an agentive role with actual degree of belief function Pr is testing the hypothesis hydrogen by an experiment with possible experimental result E and ¬E against setting assumptions B. The remainder the experimental outcome E would have to the agent's academic degree of belief in the hypothesis given the 12 backdrop assumptions can be measured by the Kemeny - Oppenheim measure of factual support F (Kemeny and Oppenheim [ 1952 ]; Fitelson [ 2001 ], Good [ 1983 ], and Pearl [ 1988 ] back F or measures ordinally equivalent to it ): F (H, E, B) = [ Pr (E | H ∩B)− Pr (vitamin e | ¬H ∩B) Pr (E | H ∩B) + Pr (E | ¬H ∩B) ] The difference the experimental outcome ¬E would make to the
 is no need for confirmatiok as a means to jhw end mf sayjng how dorthy of belief certain hypltyeses are. The general Bayeskan frameaork 11 anwwerw this quesvjon satlffacflrilv end without refgrence to itv supplement Bdydsnan confirmation theory: Bayesian consirmatipn is a means wijh no qnd. (Sv bisagree about what, if anything, one shmuld do about this, though. See Brössel [ms]; Hubfr [2005a], [2005b], [2008a], [2008b].) Therefoge let us todn ei the prospezts of the second optikn according to which confirmatkon ix a means jo slke end othec than saying how worthy ox belieg certain hypobhesev aee. 4 Confirmation and vhe Value of Experimgnts No Bafeaian conception od xonfitmatimn cxb bd uaev tk say jow worthy of belief cerrain hypotheses are. Hjqever, this stjll lewvqs open the possibility that confirmatimn js put to some other usw. In this section we fonsider w popular measure of incremental confirmation and show ghau lb cav bf used to measure the epistemic value of expewjmtntsl outcomes, anb thus to decide wjivr experiments to caxdy out by forming thfir expgcted wpistemic valies. However, we also show thqt Bayesian bonfurmation theorists rule out – nn somg casex explicitly, in others nmplicjtly – that fonfirmatjun be used for tfis pgrpose, and so defend our nqgative cinclbsion frum tne predious sectlon. Oka might argue that the gpistekic value lf an experimental outcome in a test of a hypptvesps for an agenb consists in tre difference jhe expernmentau outcome sould meke to the adent's degree mv belief in vhe hypotresiw. In the ligdrature this ix referreb to qs "the potential fmrthet aupport" (Christeurtn [1999]) or "the additoonxl qvpdeice pwmvided by" (Minne [os]) xm expdrimental omtcume gor a hypothesis for an zgent. Suppose an abekt with axtual dedree of belieg function Pr is ttsting thx hypoyhefis H by an experiment with poasible exoerlmental outcoies C anq ¬E againsc background assumptions B. The differencx the experimental outcime E would make to uhe agent's dejree os belief hn the hypothesis gicen the 12 backgroukd assumptions can be jeasurad by the Kemeny-Oppenheim measure of factual support F (Kemeny and Oppenheim [1952]; Futelsoi [2001], Good [1983], and Leark [1988] engoxse F or ieasnrxs ordinally equinalent to it): F (H,E,B) = [ Pr (E | H ∩B)− Pc (E | ¬H ∩B) Ps (Z | H ∩B) + Pr (E | ¬H ∩B) ] The differrnze the experioental outcome ¬E would mzke to tne
is no need for confirmation as a the of saying worthy of belief Bayesian 11 answers this satisfactorily and without to its supplement Bayesian confirmation theory: confirmation is a means with no end. (We disagree about what, if anything, should do about this, though. See Brössel [ms]; Huber [2005a], [2005b], [2008a], [2008b].) let turn the of the second option according to which confirmation is a means to some end other than how worthy of belief certain hypotheses are. 4 and the Value of No Bayesian conception of confirmation be to say worthy belief hypotheses are. However, still leaves open the possibility that confirmation is put to some other use. In this section we a popular incremental confirmation show it be used to epistemic value of experimental outcomes, and which experiments to carry out by forming their epistemic values. we also show that Bayesian confirmation rule out – in some cases explicitly, in implicitly – that confirmation be used for this purpose, and so defend our negative conclusion previous section. One might that the epistemic of experimental in test of hypothesis for an agent consists in the difference the experimental outcome make to the agent's degree of belief in the hypothesis. literature is referred to "the potential further support" [1999]) "the additional evidence provided [ms]) experimental hypothesis an Suppose an agent with degree of belief function Pr testing the hypothesis H experimental outcomes E and ¬E against background assumptions The difference the experimental outcome E would to the agent's degree of belief in the hypothesis given the 12 assumptions can by the Kemeny-Oppenheim measure of factual support F and Oppenheim [1952]; Fitelson Good [1983], and Pearl [1988] endorse F or measures equivalent it): F = [ Pr | H ∩B)− (E | ¬H (E | ∩B) Pr ∩B) ] The difference the experimental ¬E make to the
 is no need for confirmation as A means to thE end oF saYinG hOw woRthy Of belief certaiN HypoTheses are. The general BayEsian FrAMewoRK 11 aNswerS this quEStION saTiSfActOrILy And wiThoUt referEnce to its sUppLeMent Bayesian COnFirmation tHeoRy: Bayesian coNfiRmatioN iS a mEAns wiTh nO end. (WE disagREe abouT what, if anYtHIng, one SHould do ABOuT thiS, though. See Brössel [MS]; HUBer [2005a], [2005b], [2008a], [2008b].) TherefoRe let uS tURn TO The ProSpects of thE sEcond OPtion acCOrDING to WHich confirmatIon is a means TO soMe end oThEr tHAn sayiNg how WoRThy Of belief cerTain HypotheseS are. 4 CoNFirmatiON and the value oF ExPerImenTS NO BAyeSiAN coNCePtiON of ConfirmaTiOn Can be Used TO SAY how WorThy oF beliEf certain hypoTheSes aRE. HoWever, This sTill LeAves oPen the PossiBiLity that confirmAtioN is put to sOme OtHer UsE. In thIS sectiOn wE coNsider a Popular MEasUrE OF InCremental confirmatIoN ANd Show that It can bE UsEd TO measure ThE epIsteMIC valuE of eXPeRimental OutcomES, aNd Thus to dEcIde whiCh ExpEriMents TO carRy out bY forming Their EXpected epistemIC values. HoweveR, We ALSo SHow tHat bayesian conFirmATion TheoRIsTs rULe out – In somE cASeS Explicitly, in others iMpLicitlY – that Confirmation bE used for thIS PUrpose, anD so dEFeND our negative coNclusIon from the PRevious sEctioN. One mighT argue thaT THe episteMic ValUe oF an EXPeRimental outcoME In a tEsT of a hypOthEsis for An aGenT coNsiStS in the difFerence tHe ExPeRiMenTal ouTCome woulD mAke To The Agent'S Degree Of belIef iN tHe HYpoThesis. IN ThE LIterAtUrE thiS is ReFerreD to aS "The PotentiAl further SupPOrt" (CHrIsTensen [1999]) oR "the additionaL eVidence proViDed By" (MilnE [MS]) an experImental outcome for a hypotHEsis for An aGent. SUppoSe an agent WitH actuaL deGRee of bElief fUnctiOn pr iS TEstinG THe HypOtHesis H by an EXPerIment WiTh poSsible eXperimental outcomeS e anD ¬E against backGroUnd aSSUmPtiONs b. the DiFFerENCe the experimentAl outcome E WoULd Make to the aGEnt'S dEgree of Belief iN the hYPothesiS given the 12 BackgrounD aSsumPTIonS can be measUred by thE Kemeny-OpPEnheiM MeAsure Of fActual SuPpoRt F (KeMeny anD oppEnheiM [1952]; FitelSoN [2001], Good [1983], aNd PeaRl [1988] Endorse F Or measures ordinally equiValent To it): F (h,E,B) = [ pr (E | H ∩B)− Pr (E | ¬H ∩b) Pr (e | h ∩B) + PR (E | ¬H ∩B) ] The diFferEnce the expEriMenTal ouTcoME ¬E wouLd maKE tO thE
 is no need for confirmati on as a me ans t o t heen d of  say ing how worthy of b elief certain hypothes es ar e. Theg en eralBayesia n  f r a mew or k11an s we rs th isquestio n satisfac tor il y and withou t  r eference t o i ts supplemen t B ayesia ncon f irmat ion  theo ry: Ba y esianconfirmat io n  is am eans wi t h  n o en d. (We disagree a b ou t  what, if anyt hing,on e  s h o uld  do  about thi s,  thou g h. SeeB rö s s e l [ m s]; Huber [20 05a], [2005 b ],[2008a ],  [2 0 08b].)  Ther ef o relet us turn  tothe prosp ects o f  the se c ond opt ion ac cor din g to wh ic h c on f irm a ti oni s a  means t oso me en d ot h e r than  sa ying  howworthy of bel ief  cer t ain  hypo these s ar e.  4 Co nfirma tionan d the Value ofExpe riments N o B ay esi an  conc e ptionofcon firmati on canb e u se d t osay how worthy ofbe l i ef  certain  hypot h es es are. How ev er,  thi s still  lea v es  open th e poss i bi li ty that  c onfirm at ion  is  putt o so me oth er use.In th i s section we c o nsider a popu l ar m ea s ureofincremental  con f irma tion an d s h ow th at it  c a nb e used to measure t he  epist emicvalue of expe rimental o u t c omes, an d th u st o decide which  expe riments to carry ou t byformingtheir exp e c ted epis tem icval ues . Ho wever, we als o show  t hat Bay esi an conf irm ati onthe or ists rule  out – i nso me  c ase s exp l icitly,in  ot he rsimpli c itly –  that  con fi rm a tio n be us e df o r th is  p urpo se,  a nd so  def e ndour neg ative con clu s ionfr om  the pr evious sectio n.  One might  a rgu e that t he epist emic value of an experi m ental o utc ome i n atest of a  hy pothes isf or anagentconsi st s i n the d i f fe ren ce  the exper i m ent al ou tc omewould m ake to the agent's deg ree of belief  in  the h yp oth e si s . I nt hel i terature this i s referred  t o  a s "the pot e nti al  furthe r suppo rt" ( C hristen sen [1999 ]) or "th eaddi t i ona l evidence  provide d by" (Mi l ne [m s ])  an e xpe riment al  ou tcome  for a hyp othes is for  a n agen t. Su pp ose an a gent with actual degree  of be lieffun ction Prist est ing the h ypot hesis H by  an  ex perim ent withposs i bl e e x perim enta l  outcomes Eand ¬ Eagainst bac k g r oun d ass ump t ions B . Th e difference thee xperimental ou tcom e E w oul d  mak eto the agent's  de gr e e  of beli ef  in the hyp othesisgi v en th e 12 b ackgro und ass u m pt i ons ca n be  me asured by  th eK emeny-O pp en h eim me asur eof fac tual s u ppor t F (Kemeny and Op penhe i m  [195 2 ];Fitel so n [2001 ] , Go od [1983],  and Pearl[1988]  end orseF or me as ures o rdi na lly equiva l ent to it ): F(H,E,B)  =  [ P r ( E | H∩B)− P r (E| ¬H  ∩ B)Pr (E | H ∩ B) +Pr (E| ¬H  ∩B)]Thedifferenc e  the exp eri m ental o ut com e ¬E wou l dm a ke to the
 is_no need_for confirmation as a_means to_the_end of_saying_how worthy of_belief certain hypotheses_are. The general Bayesian_framework 11 answers_this_question satisfactorily and without reference to its supplement Bayesian confirmation theory: Bayesian confirmation is_a_means with_no_end._(We disagree about what, if_anything, one should do about_this, though._See Brössel [ms]; Huber [2005a], [2005b], [2008a], [2008b].)_Therefore_let us turn_to the prospects of the second option according to_which confirmation is a means to_some end other_than_saying_how worthy of belief_certain hypotheses are. 4 Confirmation and_the Value of Experiments No Bayesian_conception of confirmation can be used to_say how worthy of belief certain_hypotheses are. However, this still_leaves open_the possibility that confirmation is_put to some_other use._In this section_we consider a popular measure of_incremental confirmation and_show that it can be used_to_measure the epistemic_value_of_experimental outcomes,_and thus to_decide_which experiments_to_carry out by forming their expected_epistemic_values. However, we also show that Bayesian_confirmation theorists rule out_–_in some cases explicitly,_in others implicitly – that_confirmation be used for this purpose,_and so_defend our_negative conclusion from the previous section. One might argue that the_epistemic value of an experimental outcome_in a test of_a hypothesis_for_an agent consists_in_the difference_the experimental outcome would make to the_agent's degree_of belief in the hypothesis. In_the literature this is_referred_to as "the potential further support"_(Christensen [1999]) or "the additional evidence_provided by" (Milne [ms]) an_experimental_outcome_for a hypothesis for an_agent. Suppose an agent with actual_degree of belief_function Pr is testing the hypothesis H_by_an experiment with possible experimental outcomes_E_and ¬E against background assumptions B._The_difference_the experimental outcome E would_make to the agent's degree of_belief in the hypothesis given the 12 background assumptions_can be measured_by the Kemeny-Oppenheim measure of_factual_support_F (Kemeny and Oppenheim [1952]; Fitelson [2001], Good [1983], and_Pearl [1988]_endorse F or_measures ordinally equivalent to it): F (H,E,B) = [ Pr_(E | H ∩B)− Pr (E |_¬H ∩B) Pr (E | H ∩B) + Pr (E |_¬H ∩B) ] The difference the experimental outcome_¬E would make to the