 Śāntideva's Ethics Therefore the aṇu does not exist" (IX.87). When we reduce things far enough, we are left only with their emptiness. This further decomposition of the body works quite differently from the previous one. Before, the body was divided into its bodily parts, which aroused disgust rather than lust. Now we have taken it further to straight emptiness, where disgust is not an issue. (The first level of reduction would fit comfortably in the Pāli Abhidhamma, but not this one.) So likewise for the deconstruction of the self. In chapter eight, the self had been replaced by free-floating suffering: one must prevent all suffering, not just what belongs to the self. But in chapter nine Śāntideva rejects the existence of even that suffering. He asks rhetorically at IX.88: "if suffering really exists, why does it not bother the cheerful?" So, the emptiness in this chapter supersedes the other three metaphysical claims. This is superseding in a Hegelian sense (Aufhebung, sublation): that is, transcending but including. It is the highest of the four claims, both truer and more pragmatically effective than the others, but the others retain their value at a lower level. Like the other claims, though, emptiness has clear and powerful ethical implications for Śāntideva. At the end of chapter nine, Śāntideva makes it clear that because things are empty, we should not be attached to them. Worldly goods are not worth the significance we usually give to them, the attachments we normally have. "When all things are empty in this way, what could be obtained or taken? Who could become honoured or humiliated, and by whom? From what could there be happiness or suffering? What could be liked or hated?" (IX.151-2). There is still no reason to feel anger or lust or self-interest, but these are now all subsumed as a part of feeling no attachment at all-which then passes Journal of Buddhist Ethics 277 into concern for those who haven't figured this out yet, the concern of the tenth and final chapter. So, this fourth and final argument from metaphysics to ethics supersedes the others, both metaphysically and ethically: everything (including agency, body, self and more) is empty, so don't get attached to any of it. In Śā
Śāntideva's Ethics Therefore the aṇu does not exist " (IX.87). When we reduce things far enough, we are left merely with their void. This further decomposition of the body works quite differently from the former one. Before, the body was divided into its bodily region, which aroused disgust rather than lecherousness. nowadays we have taken it far to straight emptiness, where disgust is not an exit. (The inaugural level of reduction would fit comfortably in the Pāli Abhidhamma, but not this one .) So similarly for the deconstruction of the self. In chapter eight, the self had been replaced by free - floating distress: one must prevent all suffering, not just what belongs to the self. But in chapter nine Śāntideva rejects the being of even that suffering. He asks rhetorically at IX.88: " if suffering really exists, why does it not trouble the cheerful? " So, the emptiness in this chapter supersedes the other three metaphysical claims. This is superseding in a Hegelian sense (Aufhebung, sublation ): that is, transcending but including. It is the highest of the four claims, both truer and more pragmatically effective than the others, but the others retain their value at a lower level. Like the other claims, though, emptiness has clear and knock-down ethical implications for Śāntideva. At the end of chapter nine, Śāntideva make it clean that because things are empty, we should not be attached to them. Worldly good are not worth the significance we usually give to them, the fastening we normally have. " When all things are empty in this way, what could be obtained or taken? Who could become honoured or humiliated, and by whom? From what could there be happiness or distress? What could be liked or hated? " (IX.151 - 2). There is still no rationality to feel wrath or lecherousness or self - sake, but these are now all subsumed as a part of feel no attachment at all - which then passes Journal of Buddhist Ethics 277 into business for those who haven't figured this out even, the concern of the tenth and final chapter. indeed, this fourth and final argumentation from metaphysics to ethics supersedes the others, both metaphysically and ethically: everything (include agency, torso, self and more) is empty, so don't get impound to any of it. In Śā
 Śāntldeva's Ethics Therefore uhe aṇu does not erust" (IX.87). When se reducd things far enough, we are lxft inly qith their emptiness. Tfis furthvr decompisitmon of the body xkrks qulce dirnerenclb from the prevlous one. Bexore, the body far bivided into its bodily parts, which wroused dlsgust rather jhan ktst. How we have taken it further to stdaight tmptiness, where dixgust is not an issue. (The virsh level of reductiln would fij coidortably in ghe Pāli Abhidhamma, but not this one.) So likewise for tfe deeonstructiob if hve self. In rhapteg eight, the sckf had been rrplaced by frec-floaving suffering: one must pcevent all suffering, not just wkat belongs to the seof. But hn cvaptde nkne Śānvidsva reuecvs the exisfence of evwn that suffering. Ht afjs rhetoricalmy at YX.88: "if suffering really exists, why does it nof bother the cheerful?" Si, the emptiness in thls chaptew supersedes the other three metaphysical claims. Dhis ms sukevfdeijg in a Hegelian sense (Aufhebung, sublation): thwf os, transcending nut including. It ix hhr highest of tfe foux cmaims, both truer ajd more pragnatically effrctive than the others, but rhe others rvtaib their value at a lower leveu. Lile thr other claims, though, eoptihess has clfar and pkderful ethical ioplpcathons for Śāntideva. At the enq of chapver nnne, Śāntiddva kakes yt clear tjat bcwause things are elpty, ce shmuld not bf attached to them. Worldly goods are not wortn dhe signifieance ee usually gide to them, the attachients we normalmy have. "When all trings are empdi in this way, what cotld ve ovtained ur taken? Who cpuld become honouree or humiliated, anv by shom? From what euood there be halpivesf lr stxfering? What couud cr likdd or hated?" (KX.151-2). Tnere is still no reavon fo feel anger or lisb or self-unterest, but these arr now all subsumed as a pact of geejing no attachment at all-which then pasdes Journal of Fuddmist Ethics 277 iuto concern for those who haven't figured this out yet, the xoncern of the tentk snd final ciapter. So, this xourth and final argyment from metaphnsics to ethics superssdes tve otjers, both metaphysically and ethically: everything (including agency, body, swlf anv iore) is empfy, sp don'n gzt cttacheq to eny of it. In Śā
Śāntideva's Ethics Therefore the aṇu does not When reduce things enough, we are This decomposition of the works quite differently the previous one. Before, the body divided into its bodily parts, which aroused disgust rather than lust. Now we taken it further to straight emptiness, where disgust is not an issue. (The level reduction fit in the Pāli Abhidhamma, but not this one.) So likewise for the deconstruction of the self. chapter eight, the self had been replaced by suffering: one must prevent suffering, not just what belongs the But in nine rejects existence of even suffering. He asks rhetorically at IX.88: "if suffering really exists, why does it not bother the cheerful?" the emptiness chapter supersedes other metaphysical This is superseding Hegelian sense (Aufhebung, sublation): that is, It is the highest of the four claims, truer and pragmatically effective than the others, but others retain their value at a lower level. the other claims, though, emptiness has clear and powerful ethical implications for Śāntideva. At the chapter nine, Śāntideva makes clear that because are we not attached to Worldly goods are not worth the significance we usually give to the attachments we normally have. "When all things are empty way, could be obtained taken? Who could become or and by whom? From there happiness could liked hated?" (IX.151-2). There is no reason to feel anger lust or self-interest, but as a part of feeling no attachment at then passes Journal of Buddhist Ethics 277 concern for those who haven't figured this out yet, the concern of tenth and So, this fourth and final argument from metaphysics ethics supersedes the others, metaphysically and ethically: everything (including agency, body, self and is so don't attached to any it. In Śā
 Śāntideva's Ethics Therefore The aṇu does Not exIst" (iX.87). WHeN we rEducE things far enouGH, we aRe left only with their empTinesS. THIs fuRThEr decOmpositIOn OF The BoDy WorKs QUiTe difFerEntly frOm the previOus OnE. Before, the boDY wAs divided iNto Its bodily parTs, wHich arOuSed DIsgusT raTher tHan lusT. now we hAve taken iT fURther tO StraighT EMpTineSs, where disgust is nOT aN Issue. (The first lEvel of ReDUcTIOn wOulD fit comforTaBly in THe Pāli ABHiDHAMma, BUt not this one.) SO likewise foR The DeconsTrUctIOn of thE self. in CHapTer eight, the Self Had been rePlaced BY free-flOAting suFferinG: onE muSt prEVeNt All SuFFerINg, Not JUst What beloNgS tO the sElf. BUT IN ChapTer Nine śāntiDeva rejects thE exIsteNCe oF even That sUffeRiNg. He aSks rheToricAlLy at IX.88: "if sufferiNg reAlly existS, whY dOes It Not boTHer the CheErfUl?" So, the EmptineSS in ThIS CHaPter supersedes the oThER ThRee metapHysicaL ClAiMS. This is sUpErsEdinG IN a HegEliaN SeNse (AufheBung, suBLaTiOn): that iS, tRansceNdIng But IncluDIng. IT is the Highest oF the fOUr claims, both trUEr and more pragMAtICAlLY effEctIve than the oTherS, But tHe otHErS reTAin thEir vaLuE At A Lower level. Like the otHeR claimS, thouGh, emptiness haS clear and pOWERful ethiCal iMPlICations for ŚāntIdeva. at the end of CHapter niNe, ŚānTideva maKes it cleaR THat becauSe tHinGs aRe eMPTy, We should not be ATTachEd To them. WOrlDly goodS arE noT woRth ThE significAnce we usUaLlY gIvE to Them, tHE attachmEnTs wE nOrmAlly hAVe. "When All thIngs ArE eMPty In this wAY, wHAT couLd Be ObtaIneD oR takeN? Who COulD become Honoured oR huMIliaTeD, aNd by whoM? From what coulD tHere be happInEss Or suffERIng? What cOuld be liked or hated?" (IX.151-2). TheRE is stilL no ReasoN to fEel anger oR luSt or seLf-iNTerest, But theSe are NoW alL SUbsumED As A paRt Of feeling nO ATtaChmenT aT all-Which thEn passes Journal of BUDdhIst Ethics 277 into ConCern FOR tHosE WhO HavEn'T FigUREd this out yet, the Concern of tHe TEnTh and final CHapTeR. So, this Fourth aNd finAL argumeNt from metAphysics tO eThicS SUpeRsedes the oThers, botH metaphysICally ANd EthicAllY: everyThIng (IncluDing agENcy, Body, sElf and MoRe) is emPty, so DoN't get attAched to any of it. In Śā
 Śāntideva's Ethics Theref ore the aṇ u doe s n otex ist"  (IX .87). When wer educ e things far enough, w e are  l e ft o n ly  with  theire mp t i nes s.  T his  f u rt her d eco mpositi on of thebod yworks quited if ferently f rom  the previou s o ne. Be fo re, the b ody  wasdivide d  intoits bodil yp arts,w hich ar o u se d di sgust rather than lu s t. Now we have  taken  i t  f u r the r t o straight  e mptin e ss, whe r ed i s gus t  is not an is sue. (The f i rst  level  o f r e ductio n wou ld fit  comfortabl y in  the Pāli  Abhid h amma, b u t not t his on e.)  So  lik e wi se  fo rt hed ec ons t ruc tion ofth eself.  Inc h a p tereig ht,the s elf had beenrep lace d  by  free -floa ting  s uffer ing: o ne mu st  prevent all su ffer ing, notjus twha tbelon g s to t hesel f. Butin chap t erni n e Śā ntideva rejects th ee x is tence of  event ha ts uffering .Heasks r hetor ical l yat IX.88 : "ifs uf fe ring re al ly exi st s,why  does it n ot bot her thecheer f ul?" So, the e m ptiness in th i sc h ap t er s upe rsedes theothe r  thr ee m e ta phy s icalclaim s. Th i s is superseding in  a  Hegel ian s ense (Aufhebu ng, sublat i o n ): thatis,t ra n scending but i nclud ing. It is the high est o f the fo ur claims , both tru erand  mo rep r ag matically eff e c tive  t han the  ot hers, b utthe  ot her sretain th eir valu eat  a  l owe r lev e l. Liketh e o th erclaim s , thou gh, e mpti ne ss has  cleara nd p ower fu lethi cal  i mplic atio n s f or Śānt ideva. At  th e  end  o fchapter  nine, Śāntid ev a makes it  c lea r that b ecause t hings are empty, we sho u ld notbeattac hedto them.Wor ldly g ood s  are n ot wor th th esig n i fican c e  w e u su ally givet o  th em, t he  att achment s we normally have .  "W hen all thing s a re e m p ty  in th i s w ay ,  wh a t  could be obtai ned or tak en ?  W ho could b e com ehonoure d or hu milia t ed, and  by whom?  From wha tcoul d the re be happ iness or  sufferin g ? Wha t  c ouldbelikedor  ha ted?"  (IX.1 5 1-2 ). Th ere is  s till n o rea so n to fee l anger or lust or self -inter est,but  these ar e n o w a ll subsum ed a s a part o f f eel ing n o a t tachm enta tall - which  the n  passes J o ur nal o fBuddhist Et h i c s 2 77 in toc oncern  for  those who haven' t  figured thisouty e t,the conc er n of the tenth  an df i nal chap te r. So, this  fourthan d  fina l argu ment f rom met a p hy s ics to  eth ics  supersed esth e  others ,bo t h meta phys ic ally a nd eth i call y :  everything (inc ludin g agenc y , b ody,se lf andm ore)  is empty,  so don't g et att ache d toany ofit . In Ś ā
 Śāntideva's_Ethics Therefore_the aṇu does not_exist" (IX.87)._When_we reduce_things_far enough, we_are left only_with their emptiness. This_further decomposition of_the_body works quite differently from the previous one. Before, the body was divided into_its_bodily parts,_which_aroused_disgust rather than lust. Now_we have taken it further_to straight_emptiness, where disgust is not an issue. (The_first_level of reduction_would fit comfortably in the Pāli Abhidhamma, but not_this one.) So likewise for the_deconstruction of the_self._In_chapter eight, the self_had been replaced by free-floating suffering:_one must prevent all suffering, not_just what belongs to the self. But_in chapter nine Śāntideva rejects the_existence of even that suffering._He asks_rhetorically at IX.88: "if suffering_really exists, why_does it_not bother the_cheerful?" So, the emptiness in this_chapter supersedes the_other three metaphysical claims. This is_superseding_in a Hegelian_sense_(Aufhebung,_sublation): that_is, transcending but_including._It is_the_highest of the four claims, both_truer_and more pragmatically effective than the others,_but the others retain_their_value at a lower_level. Like the other claims,_though, emptiness has clear and powerful_ethical implications_for Śāntideva._At the end of chapter nine, Śāntideva makes it clear that_because things are empty, we should_not be attached to_them. Worldly_goods_are not worth_the_significance we_usually give to them, the attachments we_normally have._"When all things are empty in_this way, what could_be_obtained or taken? Who could become_honoured or humiliated, and by whom?_From what could there be_happiness_or_suffering? What could be liked_or hated?" (IX.151-2). There is still_no reason to_feel anger or lust or self-interest, but_these_are now all subsumed as a_part_of feeling no attachment at all-which_then_passes_Journal of Buddhist Ethics 277_into concern for those who haven't_figured this out yet, the concern of the tenth_and final chapter._So, this fourth and final_argument_from_metaphysics to ethics supersedes the others, both metaphysically and ethically:_everything (including_agency, body, self_and more) is empty, so don't get attached to any_of it. In Śā