 salience of chance rises and therefore knowledge attributions are undermined. Handling Case 6 14 this way allows us to say that knowledge is closed under known entailment. Taking a page from the book of standards contextualists, we may note that there is no single context relative to which a) S knows that her friend will meet her for lunch, b) S knows that her friend will meet her for lunch only if he loses the lottery, and c) S does not know that her friend will lose the lottery. If the context does not make chance salient, then relative to that context S can know that her friend will meet her for lunch. But if the context does make chance salient, then relative to that context S knows neither that her friend will meet her for lunch nor that he will lose the lottery.xxii Now consider another case. Case 7. S is visiting from another culture and knows nothing about lotteries. However, over a long period of time S observes many people exchanging dollar bills for small slips of paper, which they invariably discard after a brief examination. On the basis of excellent inductive reasoning, S concludes that the next person in line will soon discard his slip of paper. And in fact S's belief is true.xxiii This case threatens a counterintuitive result: that relative to S's context, S knows that the next person in line will discard his ticket. Put another way, if S were to express a knowledge claim, then, relative to S's own context of attribution, his claim would be true. This result threatens because S understands nothing about the workings of lotteries. And therefore, it seems, chance could not be a salient factor in S's context. However, this way of interpreting the case assumes that salience is a psychological phenomenon-that salience is a function of where someone's attention is, or how he is thinking about things. This is admittedly one meaning of the term, but it is not the one that we want here. On the contrary, I have argued that salience is a function of a) what is in fact normal or abnormal in the case, and b) what interests and purposes are in fact operative in the context of attribution. Therefore, whether something is salient relative to a context of attribution, in the sense intended here, is not a question about how anyone is thinking. What we are looking for is not psychological salience but explanatory salience. The way to identify what is salient in this sense is to ask where a correct explanation would have
salience of chance rises and therefore knowledge attribution are sabotage. Handling Case 6 14 this way allows us to allege that knowledge is closed under know entailment. Taking a page from the record of standards contextualists, we may note that there be no single context relative to which a) S know that her friend will meet her for lunch, b) S knows that her friend will meet her for lunch only if he fall back the lottery, and c) S does not know that her friend will lose the lottery. If the context does not hold chance salient, then relative to that context S can know that her ally will meet her for lunch. But if the context does make chance salient, then relative to that context S knows neither that her supporter will meet her for lunch nor that he will lose the lottery.xxii Now consider another case. Case 7. S is visiting from another culture and knows nothing about lotteries. However, over a long period of time S observes many people exchanging dollar bills for minor slips of paper, which they constantly discard after a abbreviated examination. On the basis of excellent inductive reasoning, S concludes that the next person in lineage will soon discard his slip of paper. And in fact S's belief is true.xxiii This case threaten a counterintuitive result: that relative to S's context, S knows that the next person in line will discard his ticket. invest another way, if S were to express a knowledge claim, then, proportional to S's own context of attribution, his claim would be on-key. This resultant role threatens because S understands nothing about the workings of lotteries. And consequently, it seems, chance could not be a salient factor in S's context. However, this way of interpreting the case assumes that salience is a psychological phenomenon - that salience is a function of where someone's care is, or how he is thinking about things. This is admittedly one meaning of the term, but it is not the one that we want here. On the reverse, I have argued that salience is a function of a) what is in fact normal or abnormal in the case, and b) what interests and purpose are in fact operative in the context of attribution. consequently, whether something is salient relative to a context of attribution, in the sense mean here, is not a question about how anyone is think. What we are looking for is not psychological salience but explanatory salience. The way to identify what is salient in this sense is to ask where a correct explanation would have
 sapience of chance rises akd therefore knocoedge ettribufions ard undermined. Handling Case 6 14 tyis wqy allows us to say thxt knowlefge is coosev under known envzilment. Takinf a pcgx from the book of standasds contextualhsgs, we may note that there is no singlq contect relative to wrich w) S inows that her friend will meet hed for llnch, b) S knows thst her friend will meet heg fog lunch only if he loses the oottqey, and c) S dues not know that her rriend will lose the lottery. If the eontext doew bot kake chance salivnt, then relabpve to dhat comtext S can knpw vhat her friend will meet her for lunch. But if the cmncext does make chance sqlienj, thet reuqtixe uo vhaf contfxt S knows nsither that her friend will mett rvt for lunch hor thwt he will lose the lottery.xxii Now consiger another case. Case 7. S iw visiting from anothgr culture and knows nothing about lotteries. However, over a long oernid of rile S observes many people exchanging dollar bymlx nor small slips jf paper, whocj yrey invariabli discaxs zfter a brief examlnation. On tye basis jf eccellent inductive reasonint, S concludef that the next perdon in line wilk soom discard his slip of pcper. Ahd in fact D's belief ks true.xxiii Thir cssa threattvs a counterintuieive resuot: tkat relagive to S's context, S knows that the next perdon iu lina will disfard his ticket. Put another way, if S were to gxpsesv a knowjedge claim, then, rqlative to S's pwn concext ow attributpon, his cnaim would fe true. This sgsult threateis becausq S yndeestands vothing about yhe workiuys of lotreries. And therefove, it aeems, chance cobue not be a salirnt fastlr ig S's context. Vowexer, yhis day of intevprdtinb the case assumes tvat aalience is a psycnojogical khenomenog-that saliencr is a function of wherx someune's sttgntion is, or how he is thinking about thlngf. This is adiittcdly one meaniug of the term, but it is not the one thav we want here. On the cintrary, I have argugd uhat salience is a function of a) what is in facr normal or abnorkal in the case, and b) what hnterfsts and purposes are in fact operative in the context of attribution. Theeefore, whether somsthimg is scliznt relwtivx vo a context of antribution, in the sense intended here, is njt a question about how anyome is thinking. Dhat we are looking for js not pxychological salience but explamatory salience. The way bo identidy whzt is salixnt in this sense is to asn wheee a coerecb explanation doukd have
salience of chance rises and therefore knowledge undermined. Case 6 this way allows is under known entailment. a page from book of standards contextualists, we may that there is no single context relative to which a) S knows that friend will meet her for lunch, b) S knows that her friend will her lunch if loses the lottery, and c) S does not know that her friend will lose the lottery. the context does not make chance salient, then to that context S know that her friend will her lunch. But the does chance salient, then to that context S knows neither that her friend will meet her for lunch nor that he lose the consider another Case S visiting from another knows nothing about lotteries. However, over of time S observes many people exchanging dollar for small of paper, which they invariably discard a brief examination. On the basis of excellent reasoning, S concludes that the next person in line will soon discard his slip of in fact S's belief true.xxiii This case a result: relative S's context, knows that the next person in line will discard his ticket. another way, if S were to express a knowledge claim, to own context of his claim would be This threatens because S understands the of it chance not be a salient in S's context. However, this of interpreting the case psychological phenomenon-that salience is a function of where attention is, or how he is thinking things. This is admittedly one meaning of the term, but it is the one want here. On the contrary, I have argued salience is a function a) what is in fact normal or abnormal in case, b) what and purposes are fact operative in context of attribution. something is relative a in the sense intended here, is a about how anyone is thinking. we for is not psychological salience but explanatory salience. The way to identify what is salient sense is to ask a explanation would have
 salience of chance rises and tHerefore knOwledGe aTtrIbUtioNs arE undermined. HanDLing case 6 14 this way allows us to sAy thaT kNOwleDGe Is cloSed undeR KnOWN enTaIlMenT. TAKiNg a paGe fRom the bOok of standArdS cOntextualistS, We May note thaT thEre is no singlE coNtext rElAtiVE to whIch A) S knoWs that HEr frieNd will meeT hER for luNCh, b) S knoWS ThAt heR friend will meet heR FoR Lunch only if he lOses thE lOTtERY, anD c) S Does not knoW tHat heR Friend wILl LOSE thE Lottery. If the cOntext does nOT maKe chanCe SalIEnt, theN relaTiVE to That context s can Know that hEr frieND will meET her for Lunch. BUt iF thE conTExT dOes MaKE chANcE saLIenT, then relAtIvE to thAt coNTEXT S knOws NeitHer thAt her friend wiLl mEet hER foR luncH nor tHat hE wIll loSe the lOtterY.xXii Now consider aNothEr case. CasE 7. S iS vIsiTiNg froM AnotheR cuLtuRe and knOws nothINg aBoUT LOtTeries. However, over a LoNG PeRiod of tiMe S obsERvEs MAny peoplE eXchAngiNG DollaR bilLS fOr small sLips of PApEr, Which thEy InvariAbLy dIscArd afTEr a bRief exAminatioN. On thE Basis of excelleNT inductive reaSOnING, S COnclUdeS that the nexT perSOn in Line WIlL soON discArd hiS sLIp OF paper. And in fact S's beLiEf is trUe.xxiIi This case thrEatens a couNTERintuitiVe reSUlT: That relative to s's conText, S knows THat the neXt perSon in linE will discARD his tickEt. PUt aNotHer WAY, iF S were to expreSS A knoWlEdge claIm, tHen, relaTivE to s's oWn cOnText of attRibution, HiS cLaIm WouLd be tRUe. This reSuLt tHrEatEns beCAuse S uNdersTandS nOtHIng About thE WoRKIngs Of LoTterIes. anD therEforE, It sEems, chaNce could nOt bE A salIeNt Factor iN S's context. HowEvEr, this way oF iNteRpretiNG The case aSsumes that salience is a psYChologiCal PhenoMenoN-that saliEncE is a fuNctIOn of whEre somEone's AtTenTIOn is, oR HOw He iS tHinking aboUT ThiNgs. ThIs Is adMittedlY one meaning of the teRM, buT it is not the onE thAt we WANt HerE. on THe cOnTRarY, i Have argued that sAlience is a FuNCtIon of a) what IS in FaCt normaL or abnoRmal iN The case, And b) what iNterests aNd PurpOSEs aRe in fact opErative iN the conteXT of atTRiButioN. ThEreforE, wHetHer soMethinG Is sAlienT relatIvE to a coNtext Of AttributIon, in the sense intended heRe, is noT a queStiOn about hoW anYOne Is thinkinG. WhaT we are lookIng For Is not PsyCHologIcal SAlIenCE but eXplaNAtory saliENcE. ThE WAy To identify wHAT Is sAlienT in THis senSe is To ask where a correcT Explanation wouLd haVE
 salience of chance risesand theref ore k now led ge  att ribu tions are unde r mine d. Handling Case 6 14thiswa y  all o ws  us t o say t h at k now le dg e i sc lo sed u nde r known  entailmen t.Ta king a pagef ro m the book  of  standards c ont extual is ts, we ma y n ote t hat th e re isno single  c o ntextr elative t owhic h a) S knows that he r  friend will m eet he rf or l unc h,b) S knows  t hat h e r frien d  w i l l  me e t her for lun ch only ifh e l oses t he  lo t tery,and c )S  do es not know  tha t her fri end wi l l loset he lott ery. I f t hecont e xt  d oes  n o t m a ke  ch a nce  salient ,th en re lati v e t o th atcont ext S  can know tha t h er f r ien d wil l mee t he rfor l unch.But i fthe context doe s ma ke chance  sa li ent ,thenr elativ e t o t hat con text Sk now sn e i th er that her friend  w i l lmeet her  for l u nc hn or thathe  wi ll l o s e the  lot t er y.xxii N ow con s id er  anothe rcase.Ca se7.S isv isit ing fr om anoth er cu l ture and knows nothing about lo t t er i es.How ever, overa lo n g pe riod of  ti m e S o bserv es ma n y people exchanging  d ollarbills  for small sl ips of pap e r ,  which t heyi nv a riably discard  afte r a briefe xaminati on. O n the ba sis of ex c e llent in duc tiv e r eas o n in g, S conclude s that  t he next  pe rson in  li newil l s oo n discard  his sli pof  p ap er.  Andi n fact S 's  be li efis tr u e.xxii i Thi s ca se  t h rea tens ac ou n t erin tu it iveres ul t: th at r e lat ive toS's conte xt, S kn ow sthat th e next person  i n line wil ldis card h i s  ticket.  Put another way, if Sw ere toexp ressa kn owledge c lai m, the n,r elativ e to S 's ow ncon t e xt of a tt rib ut ion, his c l a imwould  b e tr ue. Thi s result threatens bec ause S unders tan ds n o t hi nga bo u t t he wor k i ngs of lotterie s. And the re f or e, it seem s , c ha nce cou ld notbe as alientfactor in  S's cont ex t. H o w eve r, this wa y of int erpreting the c a se  assu mes  thatsa lie nce i s a ps y cho logic al phe no menon- thatsa lience i s a function of where s omeone 's at ten tion is,orh owhe is thi nkin g about th ing s.Thisisa dmitt edly on e m e aning  oft he term,b ut  it i snot the one t h atwe wa nth ere. O n th e contrary, I hav e  argued that s alie n c e i s a func ti on of a) whatisin f act norm al  or abnorma l in the  c a se, a nd b)what i nterest s an d  purpo sesare  in factope ra t ive inth ec ontext  ofat tribut ion. T h eref o r e, whether somet hingi s  sali e ntrelat iv e to ac onte xt of attr ibution, in  the s ense  inte nded he re , is n otaquestion a b out how a nyone  is thi nk ing.  Wh at wearel o oking  for  i s n ot psycho l o gi c al  s a lie ncebut e xp lana tory sali e nce. The  wa y  to ide nt ify w hat is sa l i ent in thi s s ensei s  to ask wh e re a co r rectexplan ationwould h a ve
 salience_of chance_rises and therefore knowledge_attributions are_undermined._Handling Case_6_14 this way_allows us to_say that knowledge is_closed under known_entailment._Taking a page from the book of standards contextualists, we may note that there_is_no single_context_relative_to which a) S knows_that her friend will meet_her for_lunch, b) S knows that her friend will_meet_her for lunch_only if he loses the lottery, and c) S_does not know that her friend_will lose the_lottery._If_the context does not_make chance salient, then relative to_that context S can know that_her friend will meet her for lunch._But if the context does make_chance salient, then relative to_that context_S knows neither that her_friend will meet_her for_lunch nor that_he will lose the lottery.xxii Now_consider another case._Case 7. S is visiting from_another_culture and knows_nothing_about_lotteries. However,_over a long_period_of time_S_observes many people exchanging dollar bills_for_small slips of paper, which they invariably_discard after a brief_examination._On the basis of_excellent inductive reasoning, S concludes_that the next person in line_will soon_discard his_slip of paper. And in fact S's belief is true.xxiii This_case threatens a counterintuitive result: that_relative to S's context,_S knows_that_the next person_in_line will_discard his ticket. Put another way, if_S were_to express a knowledge claim, then,_relative to S's own_context_of attribution, his claim would be_true. This result threatens because S_understands nothing about the workings_of_lotteries._And therefore, it seems, chance_could not be a salient factor_in S's context._However, this way of interpreting the case_assumes_that salience is a psychological phenomenon-that_salience_is a function of where someone's_attention_is,_or how he is thinking_about things. This is admittedly one_meaning of the term, but it is not the_one that we_want here. On the contrary,_I_have_argued that salience is a function of a) what is_in fact_normal or abnormal_in the case, and b) what interests and purposes are_in fact operative in the context of_attribution. Therefore, whether something is salient relative to a context of_attribution, in the sense intended here, is not_a question about how anyone is thinking._What we are looking_for_is not psychological salience but explanatory salience._The_way_to_identify what is_salient in this_sense is to_ask where_a correct explanation_would have