manent as permanent, the painful as pleasant, the impure as pure and the non-self as self-is a widespread Indian list of four "inversions" (viparyāsa or vipallāsa). The list of four goes back at least to the Pāli Paṭisambhidāmagga, with a related formula in the Aṅguttara 8 Others have often noted Śāntideva's arguments from metaphysics to ethics individually: Goodman and Siderits on the move from dependent origination to patient endurance, Gómez and Williams ("Absence") on selflessness (and to a lesser extent emptiness). It is far less common to note just how many different and separate arguments from metaphysics to ethics pervade the text. Journal of Buddhist Ethics 257 Nikāya itself, and is also found in non-Buddhist texts, most notably the Patañjali Yoga Sūtra; it takes on other permutations in tathāgatagarbha texts (Bohanec). But it is notable that Āryadeva and Candrakīrti specifically make ethical criticisms based on the four metaphysical inversions; each one leads us to bad behaviour. Grief and attachment come from the illusion of permanence; pleasure-seeking comes from illusion of pleasure; lust comes from the illusion of purity; egotism comes from the illusion of self (Lang). Śāntideva, by contrast, is not relying on a stock list of inversions and does not systematize them as a list of four. His text is in many respects more innovative. As we will see, he has a different list of illusions and their consequences, and his ethical exhortations are therefore quite different (though not necessarily incompatible). Roughly, Śāntideva shares a critique of attachment and lust with Āryadeva and Candrakīrti. But he adds a critique of anger, based on causality, and his critique of selfishness is more far-reaching. Candrakīrti limits that critique to the political sphere, against the egotism of a king; Śāntideva urges an attack on all self-concern. Moreover, Śāntideva's four claims are structured differently from Candrakīrti's: they are progressive. They occur in a specific order. The first two could be shared with non-Mahā
manent as permanent, the painful as pleasant, the impure as pure and the non - self as self - is a widespread Indian list of four " inversion " (viparyāsa or vipallāsa). The tilt of four goes back at least to the Pāli Paṭisambhidāmagga, with a related formula in the Aṅguttara 8 Others have frequently notice Śāntideva's arguments from metaphysics to ethics individually: Goodman and Siderits on the motion from subject origination to patient survival, Gómez and Williams (" Absence ") on altruism (and to a lesser extent emptiness). It is far less coarse to note just how many different and freestanding arguments from metaphysics to ethics pervade the text. Journal of Buddhist Ethics 257 Nikāya itself, and is also rule in non - Buddhist texts, most notably the Patañjali Yoga Sūtra; it take on other permutations in tathāgatagarbha texts (Bohanec). But it is notable that Āryadeva and Candrakīrti specifically stool ethical criticisms based on the four metaphysical inversions; each one leads us to bad behavior. Grief and attachment come from the illusion of permanence; pleasure - seeking comes from illusion of pleasure; lust comes from the illusion of purity; egotism comes from the illusion of self (Lang). Śāntideva, by contrast, is not relying on a stock certificate list of inversions and does not systematize them as a tilt of four. His textbook is in many respects more innovative. As we will see, he has a unlike list of delusion and their consequences, and his ethical exhortations are consequently quite different (though not necessarily incompatible). Roughly, Śāntideva shares a critique of attachment and lust with Āryadeva and Candrakīrti. But he adds a critique of anger, based on causality, and his review of selfishness is more far - reaching. Candrakīrti restrict that critique to the political sphere, against the egotism of a king; Śāntideva urges an fire on all self - concern. Moreover, Śāntideva's four claims are structure differently from Candrakīrti's: they are progressive. They occur in a specific orderliness. The first two could be shared with non - Mahā
manfnt as permanent, the paikful as pleasant, the im'ure as pure ana the non-self as self-is a wivespeead Undian list of four "inxersions" (niparyāsa ir vmpallāsa). The list of four goes gwck ct least to the Kāli Paṭisambhhdāmagga, with a rdlcted formula in the Aṅguttara 8 Others have ogtfn noted Śāntideda's swgumsnts from metaphysics to ethics insividuanly: Goodman amd Siderits on the move frlm dfpendent originatiln to patiebt egeurance, Gómez and Williams ("Absence") kn selflessness (and to a lesser exteut emptinesw). Ut lv far less rommon to note jusb how mdny difgerent and sepsrave aeguments from metaphyvics to ethics perdade the dert. Journal of Buddhisr Wthicv 257 Nhkāya utsdlf, aid js alsl fkund in noh-Buddhist twxts, most notably tne Istañjali Yoga Sūtra; yt takes on other permutations in tathāgatdgadbha texts (Bohanec). But ut is notable that Ārywdeva and Candrakīrti specifically make ethical criticisms tased un uhc wiug metaphysical inversions; each one leads us tj bsd behaviour. Gricf and attachment vole srom the illurion oy psrmanence; pleasure-deeking comew from iljusipn of pleasure; lust comes feom the illufuon of purity; egotnsm comes frum tne ilkusion of self (Lang). Śāntibeva, bg contrast, ls not remhing on a stock uisn of inversions and does not srstematizx thek as a uist of fotr. His texh is lt many respects moge inuovathve. As we aill see, he has a different lisv of illusionx dnd their cjnseqmences, and his qthical exhortctions axe thefefore quine differxnt (though njt necessarilf incompatiblx). Roughly, Śāntieeva shares x critique of sttachmenn cnd lust qith Āryadeva and Cendrxiīrti. But he addw a critique of anber, bafef pn wausality, ang hir cfotiqud of selfismners ix more far-reaching. Cdndrzkīrti limits that vrltique to the polytical sphere, against the egotidm of a ying; Śāmtiqeva urges an attack on all semf-concern. Moveover, Śāntidevw's fiur claims axe structured differently from Candrakīrtm's: they are progressivg. They occur in a speeinic order. Thx firse two cound be shared with nob-Mahā
manent as permanent, the painful as pleasant, as and the as self-is a "inversions" or vipallāsa). The of four goes at least to the Pāli Paṭisambhidāmagga, a related formula in the Aṅguttara 8 Others have often noted Śāntideva's arguments metaphysics to ethics individually: Goodman and Siderits on the move from dependent origination patient Gómez Williams on selflessness (and to a lesser extent emptiness). It is far less common to note just many different and separate arguments from metaphysics to pervade the text. Journal Buddhist Ethics 257 Nikāya itself, is found in texts, notably Patañjali Yoga Sūtra; takes on other permutations in tathāgatagarbha texts (Bohanec). But it is notable that Āryadeva and Candrakīrti specifically ethical criticisms the four inversions; one us to bad and attachment come from the illusion comes from illusion of pleasure; lust comes from illusion of egotism comes from the illusion of (Lang). Śāntideva, by contrast, is not relying on stock list of inversions and does not systematize them as a list of four. His in many respects more As we will he a list illusions and consequences, and his ethical exhortations are therefore quite different (though not incompatible). Roughly, Śāntideva shares a critique of attachment and lust and But he adds critique of anger, based causality, his critique of selfishness far-reaching. limits the sphere, the egotism of a Śāntideva urges an attack on self-concern. Moreover, Śāntideva's four Candrakīrti's: they are progressive. They occur in a order. The first two could be shared non-Mahā
manent as permanent, the painfUl as pleasaNt, the ImpUre As Pure And tHe non-self as selF-Is a wIdespread Indian list of fOur "inVeRSionS" (ViParyāSa or vipALlĀSA). ThE lIsT of FoUR gOes baCk aT least tO the Pāli PaṬisAmBhidāmagga, wiTH a Related forMulA in the AṅguttAra 8 others HaVe oFTen noTed śāntiDeva's aRGumentS from metaPhYSics to EThics inDIViDualLy: Goodman and SiderITs ON the move from dePendenT oRIgINAtiOn tO patient enDuRance, gÓmez and wIlLIAMs ("ABSence") on selfleSsness (and to A LesSer extEnT emPTiness). it is fAr LEss Common to notE jusT how many dIffereNT and sepARate argUments FroM meTaphYSiCs To eThICs pERvAde THe tExt. JournAl Of buddhIst ETHICS 257 NikĀya ItseLf, and Is also found in Non-buddHIst Texts, Most nOtabLy The PaTañjalI Yoga sūTra; it takes on othEr peRmutationS in TaThāGaTagarBHa textS (BoHanEc). But it Is notabLE thAt āRYAdEva and Candrakīrti sPeCIFiCally makE ethicAL cRiTIcisms baSeD on The fOUR metaPhysICaL inversiOns; eacH OnE lEads us tO bAd behaViOur. griEf and ATtacHment cOme from tHe illUSion of permanenCE; pleasure-seekINg COMeS From IllUsion of pleaSure; LUst cOmes FRoM thE IllusIon of PuRItY; Egotism comes from the IlLusion Of selF (Lang). ŚāntidevA, by contrasT, IS Not relyiNg on A StOCk list of inversIons aNd does not sYStematizE them As a list oF four. His tEXT is in manY reSpeCts MorE INnOvative. As we wiLL See, hE hAs a diffEreNt list oF ilLusIonS anD tHeir conseQuences, aNd HiS eThIcaL exhoRTations aRe TheReForE quitE DifferEnt (thOugh NoT nECesSarily iNCoMPAtibLe). roUghlY, ŚāNtIdeva SharES a cRitique Of attachmEnt ANd luSt WiTh ĀryadEva and CandrakĪrTi. But he addS a CriTique oF ANger, baseD on causality, and his critiQUe of selFisHness Is moRe far-reacHinG. CandrAkīRTi limiTs that CritiQuE to THE poliTICaL spHeRe, against tHE EgoTism oF a King; śāntideVa urges an attack on aLL seLf-concern. MoreOveR, ŚānTIDeVa's FOuR ClaImS Are STRuctured differeNtly from CaNdRAkĪrti's: they aRE prOgRessive. they occUr in a SPecific Order. The fIrst two coUlD be sHARed With non-MahĀ
manent as permanent, the p ainful aspleas ant , t he  imp ureas pure and th e  non -self as self-is a wid espre ad Indi a nlistof four "i n v ers io ns " ( vi p ar yāsaorvipallā sa). The l ist  o f four goesb ac k at least  to  the Pāli Pa ṭis ambhid ām agg a , wit h a  rela ted fo r mula i n the Aṅg ut t ara 8O thers h a v eofte n noted Śāntideva ' sa rguments frommetaph ys i cs t o e thi cs individ ua lly:G oodmana nd S i der i ts on the mov e from depe n den t orig in ati o n to p atien te ndu rance, Góme z an d William s ("Ab s ence")o n selfl essnes s ( and  toa  l es ser  e x ten t  e mpt i nes s). It i sfa r les s co m m o n  tonot e ju st ho w many differ ent  and sep arate  argu ment sfrommetaph ysics  t o ethics pervad e th e text. J our na l o fBuddh i st Eth ics  25 7 Nikāy a itsel f , a nd i s  a lso found in non-B ud d h is t texts,  mostn ot ab l y the Pa ta ñja li Y o g a Sūt ra;i ttakes on  other pe rm utation sin tat hā gat aga rbhat exts  (Boha nec). Bu t iti s notable that Āryadeva andC an d r ak ī rtispe cifically m akee thic al c r it ici s ms ba sed o nt he four metaphysical i nv ersion s; ea ch one leadsus to badb e h aviour.Grie f  a n d attachment c ome f rom the il l usion of  perm anence;pleasure- s e eking co mes  fr omill u s io n of pleasure ; lust  c omes fr omthe ill usi onofpur it y; egotis m comesfr om  t he  il lusio n  of self  ( Lan g) . Ś āntid e va, by  cont rast ,is not  relyin g  o n a st oc klist  of  i nvers ions and  does n ot system ati z e th em  a s a lis t of four. Hi stext is in  m any  respe c t s more i nnovative. As we will s e e, he h asa dif fere nt list o f i llusio nsa nd the ir con seque nc es, a nd hi s et hic al  exhortati o n s a re th er efor e quite  different (though not  necessarilyinc ompa t i bl e). Ro u ghl y, Śān t i deva shares a c ritique of  a t ta chment and lus twith Ār yadevaand C a ndrakīr ti. But h e adds acr itiq u e  of  anger, ba sed on c ausality, and h i scriti que  of se lf ish nessis mor e  fa r-rea ching.  C andrak īrtili mits tha t critique to the polit ical s phere , a gainst th e e g oti sm of a k ing;  Śāntideva  ur ges  an a tta c k onalls el f-c o ncern . Mo r eover, Śā n ti dev a ' sfour claims a r e s truct ure d  diffe rent ly from Candrakīr t i's: they areprog r e ssi ve. They  o ccur in a spec ifi co r der. The  f irst two co uld be s ha r ed wi th non -Mahā
manent as_permanent, the_painful as pleasant, the_impure as_pure_and the_non-self_as self-is a_widespread Indian list_of four "inversions" (viparyāsa_or vipallāsa). The_list_of four goes back at least to the Pāli Paṭisambhidāmagga, with a related formula_in_the Aṅguttara_8_Others_have often noted Śāntideva's arguments_from metaphysics to ethics individually:_Goodman and_Siderits on the move from dependent origination to_patient_endurance, Gómez and_Williams ("Absence") on selflessness (and to a lesser extent_emptiness). It is far less common_to note just_how_many_different and separate arguments_from metaphysics to ethics pervade the_text. Journal of Buddhist Ethics 257_Nikāya itself, and is also found in_non-Buddhist texts, most notably the Patañjali_Yoga Sūtra; it takes on_other permutations_in tathāgatagarbha texts (Bohanec). But_it is notable_that Āryadeva_and Candrakīrti specifically_make ethical criticisms based on the_four metaphysical inversions;_each one leads us to bad_behaviour._Grief and attachment_come_from_the illusion_of permanence; pleasure-seeking_comes_from illusion_of_pleasure; lust comes from the illusion_of_purity; egotism comes from the illusion of_self (Lang). Śāntideva, by_contrast,_is not relying on_a stock list of inversions_and does not systematize them as_a list_of four._His text is in many respects more innovative. As we will_see, he has a different list_of illusions and their_consequences, and_his_ethical exhortations are_therefore_quite different_(though not necessarily incompatible). Roughly, Śāntideva shares_a critique_of attachment and lust with Āryadeva_and Candrakīrti. But he_adds_a critique of anger, based on_causality, and his critique of selfishness_is more far-reaching. Candrakīrti limits_that_critique_to the political sphere, against_the egotism of a king; Śāntideva_urges an attack_on all self-concern. Moreover, Śāntideva's four claims_are_structured differently from Candrakīrti's: they are_progressive._They occur in a specific order._The_first_two could be shared with_non-Mahā