 Artificial human languages are frequently invented. Inventing a systematic and stable language no doubt takes time and effort, but it isn't especially difficult - as Reid puts it, "there is no great in- genuity required" - for a group of humans to fairly quickly settle on a stable and extensible set of signs for the purposes of communicat- ing among themselves. This is true even if they are complete strangers who initially don't share a single artificial sign in com- mon. The best explanation for the relative ease with which such hu- mans can invent an artificial language is that they share a natural language which they can readily implement to agree on meanings for artificial signs. For example, pointing to something and saying 'apple' in a clear, steady voice and then proceeding to do the same with several other objects that superficially resemble the first is an especially effective way to get a group of humans to understand that you're using 'apple' to refer to things of that kind. We thus have a Reidian explanatory argument for the existence of a natural human language. This language seems an especially apt tool for establishing a common vocabulary. It thus complements Chomsky's explanatory argument for the existence of innate gram- matical principles. On Chomsky's view, the best explanation of how easily human children learn the grammatical rules of artificial lan- 17 | Reid on the priority of natural language guage is that we have innate knowledge of the most fundamental grammatical principles underlying all artificial human languages. Likewise on the Reidian view, the best explanation of how easily hu- mans can invent, from scratch, a common vocabulary is that we share a natural tendency to interpret some gestures and expressions to signify certain things. Putting Chomsky and Reid together: the "original constitution of our minds" equips us with the tools for ac- quiring both the grammar and lexicon of artificial human lan- guages. Not only are artificial human languages easily invented, they are effortlessly maintained. This points to a further "original prin- ciple of the human constitution," namely, that there is "in the hu- man mind an early anticipation, neither derived from experience, nor from reason, nor from any compact or promise, that our fellow- creatures will" continue using words and other signs in the same way they previously have (Reid 1764: ch. 6.24, p. 193). Thus we are led to posit a further fascinating feature of the human mind, if we are to account for
Artificial human languages are frequently invented. Inventing a systematic and static linguistic process no doubt takes time and campaign, but it isn't specially difficult - as Reid puts it, " there be no capital in- genuity required " - for a group of humans to fairly quickly subside on a stable and extensible bent of polarity for the purposes of communicat- ing among themselves. This is true even if they are complete strangers who initially don't share a individual artificial sign in com- mon. The best explanation for the proportional ease with which such hu- mans can fabricate an artificial language is that they partake a natural language which they can readily implement to agree on meanings for artificial sign. For example, pointing to something and saying' apple' in a clear, steady part and then proceeding to do the same with several other objects that superficially resemble the first is an especially effective way to get a group of world to understand that you're using' apple' to denote to things of that kind. We thus have a Reidian explanatory argument for the being of a natural human language. This language seems an particularly apt tool for establishing a common vocabulary. It thus complements Chomsky's explanatory argumentation for the existence of innate gram- matical principles. On Chomsky's view, the effective explanation of how easily human child learn the grammatical rules of artificial lan- 17 | Reid on the priority of natural language guage is that we have congenital knowledge of the most fundamental grammatical principle underlying all artificial human languages. Likewise on the Reidian view, the dependable explanation of how well hu- mans can invent, from scratch, a common vocabulary is that we share a natural inclination to interpret some gesture and expressions to mean certain things. Putting Chomsky and Reid in concert: the " original constitution of our minds " equips us with the tools for ac- quiring both the grammar and lexicon of artificial human lan- guages. Not only are artificial human languages easily invented, they are effortlessly maintained. This points to a further " original prin- ciple of the human constitution, " namely, that there be " in the hu- man mind an early prediction, neither derived from experience, nor from reason, nor from any compact or promise, that our fellow- creatures will " continue using words and early signs in the same way they previously have (Reid 1764: ch. 6.24, p. 193). Thus we are led to posit a further absorbing feature of speech of the human thinker, if we are to account for
 Arhificial human languages are frequently inventxd. Invehting a rystematic and stable languaje ni douvt takes time and effoft, but it isn't especielly difficult - ea Reid ibts if, "thexe is no great ik- genuity raquired" - for a gfobp of humans to fairly quickly settlq on a xtwble and extenfiblt sqt or signs for the purposes of communjcat- inj among themselfes. This is true even if tjey wre complete stranhers who inutiajoy don't shard a single artificial aign in com- mon. The best explanxtion for the rglztlee ease witi whicr such hu- makx can hnvent sn artificial kanjuagw is that they share e natural language wrich they ccn readily implement ro agreg on keankbgs fod ertjficiap smgns. For exzmple, pointung to something anc fqying 'apple' ih a clqaw, steady voice and then proceeding to dm tge same with several otyer objects that supetficially wesemble the first is an especially effective way to gxt a yvjjp lf humans to understand that you're using 'applq' tp gefer to things on that kind. We thux jafg a Reidian exklanatoxg zrgument for the edistencg of a natural rumam language. This language sewms an especpallt apt tool for estcblishing a eommon vocanulary. It thus complemeuts Chkmsky's explwnatory adeument for the ebisnenca of innate gram- matical pwinciples. On Ehomsky's viee, the fest explajatiok of how easily humwn chnldret learn thf grammatical rules of artificiek lan- 17 | Reid ot tve priornty of natural langtage guage is jhat we hcve invate knowlvdge of tie most fundwmental grammdjical principnes undewlyibg aol artiwkcial human lamguages. Lpktwise on tye Reidian view, thc besj sxplanation of kuq easily hu- manx cxn ynnenv, froi scratch, a cmmmov vuvabulxry is ukat de snare a natural tendetcy fo interpret some beftures abd exprefsions to sigmify certain thingd. Putving Ciomsky anq Reid together: the "original cknstitutiln jf our minds" equlps os with the tools for ac- quiring both the grammar end lexicon of artificiql human lan- guages. Kot only are artisicial hukan languages easily invented, they art effortlessly maintainsd. Thiv poijts to a further "original prin- ciple of the human constitution," namely, thar therx ys "in the hh- mam ming cn zarly agticmpetion, neither derpved from experience, nor from reeson, nor fsoi any compact or promise, thay uur fellow- crgatures will" continue usinf words snd other signs in the same way they previously have (Reld 1764: ch. 6.24, p. 193). Thua we agg lxd to posit a furthet fascnnatint featuee on the human mivd, of we are tl acrouut for
Artificial human languages are frequently invented. Inventing and language no takes time and difficult as Reid puts "there is no in- genuity required" - for a of humans to fairly quickly settle on a stable and extensible set of for the purposes of communicat- ing among themselves. This is true even if are strangers initially share a single artificial sign in com- mon. The best explanation for the relative ease with such hu- mans can invent an artificial language that they share a language which they can readily to on meanings artificial For pointing to something saying 'apple' in a clear, steady voice and then proceeding to do the same with several other that superficially first is especially way get a group to understand that you're using 'apple' things of that kind. We thus have a explanatory argument the existence of a natural human This language seems an especially apt tool for a common vocabulary. It thus complements Chomsky's explanatory argument for the existence of innate gram- On Chomsky's view, the explanation of how human learn grammatical of artificial 17 | Reid on the priority of natural language guage is we have innate knowledge of the most fundamental grammatical principles artificial languages. Likewise on Reidian view, the best of easily hu- mans can scratch, common we a tendency to interpret some and expressions to signify certain Putting Chomsky and Reid our minds" equips us with the tools for quiring both the grammar and lexicon of human lan- guages. Not only are artificial human languages easily invented, they effortlessly maintained. to a further "original prin- ciple of the constitution," namely, that there "in the hu- man mind an early anticipation, neither from nor from nor from any or promise, that fellow- creatures will" words and signs the previously have (Reid 1764: ch. 6.24, 193). we are led to posit further of the human mind, if we are to account for
 Artificial human languages aRe frequentLy invEntEd. INvEntiNg a sYstematic and stABle lAnguage no doubt takes timE and eFfORt, buT It Isn't eSpecialLY dIFFicUlT - aS ReId PUtS it, "thEre Is no greAt in- genuitY reQuIred" - for a grouP Of Humans to faIrlY quickly settLe oN a stabLe And EXtensIblE set oF signs FOr the pUrposes of CoMMunicaT- Ing amonG THeMselVes. This is true even IF tHEy are complete sTrangeRs WHo INItiAllY don't share A sIngle ARtificiAL sIGN In cOM- mon. The best exPlanation foR The RelatiVe EasE With whIch suCh HU- maNs can invent An arTificial lAnguagE Is that tHEy share A naturAl lAngUage WHiCh TheY cAN reADiLy iMPleMent to agReE oN meanIngs FOR ARtifIciAl siGns. FoR example, pointIng To soMEthIng anD sayiNg 'apPlE' in a cLear, stEady vOiCe and then proceeDing To do the saMe wItH seVeRal otHEr objeCts ThaT superfIcially REseMbLE THe First is an especiallY eFFEcTive way tO get a gROuP oF Humans to UnDerStanD THat yoU're uSInG 'apple' to Refer tO ThInGs of thaT kInd. We tHuS haVe a reidiAN expLanatoRy argumeNt for THe existence of a NAtural human laNGuAGE. THIs laNguAge seems an eSpecIAlly Apt tOOl For EStablIshinG a COmMOn vocabulary. It thus cOmPlemenTs ChoMsky's explanatOry argumenT FOR the exisTencE Of INnate gram- maticAl priNciples. On CHOmsky's viEw, the Best explAnation of HOW easily hUmaN chIldRen LEArN the grammaticAL RuleS oF artifiCiaL lan- 17 | ReiD on The PriOriTy Of natural Language GuAgE iS tHat We havE Innate knOwLedGe Of tHe mosT FundamEntal GramMaTiCAl pRinciplES uNDErlyInG aLl arTifIcIal huMan lANguAges. LikEwise on thE ReIDian ViEw, The best Explanation of HoW easily hu- mAnS caN invenT, FRom scratCh, a common vocabulary is thAT we sharE a nAturaL tenDency to inTerPret soMe gEStures And expRessiOnS to SIGnify CERtAin ThIngs. PuttinG cHomSky anD REid tOgether: The "original constitUTioN of our minds" eqUipS us wITH tHe tOOlS For Ac- QUirING both the grammar And lexicon Of ARtIficial humAN laN- gUages. NoT only arE artiFIcial huMan languaGes easily InVentED, TheY are effortLessly maIntained. THIs poiNTs To a fuRthEr "origInAl pRin- ciPle of tHE huMan coNstituTiOn," nameLy, thaT tHere is "in The hu- man mind an early antiCipatiOn, neiTheR derived fRom EXpeRience, nor From Reason, nor fRom Any CompaCt oR PromiSe, thAT oUr fELlow- cReatURes will" coNTiNue USInG words and otHER SigNs in tHe sAMe way tHey pReviously have (Reid 1764: CH. 6.24, p. 193). Thus we are led To poSIT a fUrtHEr faScInating feature Of tHe HUMan mind, iF wE are to accouNt for
 Artificial human language s are freq uentl y i nve nt ed.Inve nting a system a ticand stable language no  doub tt akes ti me an d effor t ,b u t i tis n't  e s pe ciall y d ifficul t - as Rei d p ut s it, "there is  no greatin-  genuity req uir ed" -fo r a group  of  huma ns tof airlyquickly s et t le ona  stable a nd  ext ensible set of si g ns for the purpos es ofco m mu n i cat - i ng among t he mselv e s. This is t r uee ven if they a re complete str angers  w hoi nitial ly do n' t  sh are a singl e ar tificialsign i n  com- m o n. Thebest e xpl ana tion fo rthe  r e lat i ve  ea s e w ith whic hsu ch hu - ma n s c an i nve nt a n art ificial langu age  ist hat  they  shar e ana tural  langu age w hi ch they can rea dily  implemen t t oagr ee  on m e anings  fo r a rtifici al sign s . F or e x am ple, pointing to s om e t hi ng and s aying' ap pl e ' in a c le ar,  ste a d y voi ce a n dthen pro ceedin g  t odo thesa me wit hsev era l oth e r ob jectsthat sup erfic i ally resemblet he first is a n  e s p ec i ally  ef fective way  tog et a  gro u pofh umans  to u nd e rs t and that you're usi ng  'appl e' to  refer to thi ngs of tha t k ind. Wethus ha v e a Reidian ex plana tory argum e nt for t he ex istenceof a natu r a l humanlan gua ge.  Th i s  l anguage seems a n es pe ciallyapt  tool f orest abl ish in g a commo n vocabu la ry .It  th us co m plements  C hom sk y's  expl a natory  argu ment  f or the  existe n ce o f in na te  gra m-ma tical  pri n cip les. On  Chomsky' s v i ew,th ebest ex planation ofho w easily h um anchildr e n  learn t he grammatical rules of artific ial  lan-  17| Reid on  th e prio rit y  of na turallangu ag e g u a ge is t ha t w ehave innat e kno wledg eof t he most  fundamental gramm a tic al principles  un derl y i ng  al l  a r tif ic i alh u man languages.Likewise o nt he  Reidian v i ew,  t he best  explan ation of howeasily hu - mans ca ninve n t , f rom scratc h, a com mon vocab u laryi sthatweshareanat uraltenden c y t o int erpret  s ome ge sture sand expr essions to signify cert ain th ings.  Pu tting Cho msk y  an d Reid to geth er: the "o rig ina l con sti t ution  ofo ur  mi n ds" e quip s  us witht he  to o l sfor ac- qui r i n g b oth t heg rammar  and  lexicon of artif i cial human lan - gu a g es.  No t  onl yare artificial  hu ma n language seasily inve nted, th ey are e ffortl esslymaintai n e d. This p oint s t o a furth er"o r iginalpr in -  ciple  ofth e huma n cons t itut i o n," namely, that  ther e is "i n  th e hu-  m an mind an e arly antic ipation, ne itherderi ved f rom exp er ience,  no rfrom reaso n , nor fro m any  compac tor p rom ise, t hato u r fel low-  c rea tures wil l "  c o nt in u e u sing  word sandother sig n s in the  sa m e way t he y p r e viousl y  h a v e (Reid 17 64:  ch.6 . 24, p. 193 ) . Th u sw e are  led t o posi t a fur t her  f ascinat ing f eature of  the huma n  mi nd , if  we areto  acc ou ntfo r
 Artificial_human languages_are frequently invented. Inventing_a systematic_and_stable language_no_doubt takes time_and effort, but_it isn't especially difficult_- as Reid_puts_it, "there is no great in- genuity required" - for a group of humans_to_fairly quickly_settle_on_a stable and extensible set_of signs for the purposes_of communicat-_ing among themselves. This is true even if_they_are complete strangers_who initially don't share a single artificial sign in_com- mon. The best explanation for_the relative ease_with_which_such hu- mans can_invent an artificial language is that_they share a natural language which_they can readily implement to agree on_meanings for artificial signs. For example,_pointing to something and saying_'apple' in_a clear, steady voice and_then proceeding to_do the_same with several_other objects that superficially resemble the_first is an_especially effective way to get a_group_of humans to_understand_that_you're using_'apple' to refer_to_things of_that_kind. We thus have a Reidian_explanatory_argument for the existence of a natural_human language. This language_seems_an especially apt tool_for establishing a common vocabulary._It thus complements Chomsky's explanatory argument_for the_existence of_innate gram- matical principles. On Chomsky's view, the best explanation of_how easily human children learn the_grammatical rules of artificial_lan- 17_|_Reid on the_priority_of natural_language guage is that we have innate_knowledge of_the most fundamental grammatical principles underlying_all artificial human languages._Likewise_on the Reidian view, the best_explanation of how easily hu- mans_can invent, from scratch, a_common_vocabulary_is that we share a_natural tendency to interpret some gestures_and expressions to_signify certain things. Putting Chomsky and Reid_together:_the "original constitution of our minds"_equips_us with the tools for ac-_quiring_both_the grammar and lexicon of_artificial human lan- guages. Not only_are artificial human languages easily invented, they are effortlessly_maintained. This points_to a further "original prin-_ciple_of_the human constitution," namely, that there is "in the hu-_man mind_an early anticipation,_neither derived from experience, nor from reason, nor from any_compact or promise, that our fellow- creatures_will" continue using words and other signs in the same way_they previously have (Reid 1764: ch. 6.24, p._193). Thus we are led to posit_a further fascinating feature_of_the human mind, if we are to_account_for