 get off at Leuchars. But it does not determine that you ought to get off at Leuchars, or even that you have a reason to get off at Leuchars. I could equally well say that the intention on which the reasoning is premised is not reason-giving. Your intention to go to St Andrews gives you no reason to get off at Leuchars. That is what I shall argue. Reasoning in general is not ought-giving or reason-giving. (I shall mention an exception later.) Once again, it is easiest to see this by looking at the more familiar example of belief reasoning. Suppose you believe some proposition P from which Q follows by a valid inference. It does not follow that you ought to believe Q, nor that you have a reason to believe Q. (This is so even if the inference is immediate; it has nothing to do with the complexity of the inference.) This section and the next defend this claim. Section 7 returns to intention reasoning. From one point of view, a defence scarcely seems needed because the conclusion is obvious. For instance, suppose you ought not to believe P, though you do. Then it is surely obvious that it may not be the case that you ought to believe Q or that you have a reason to believe Q. Still, here is a simple defence in case it helps. P itself follows from P by a valid inference. But obviously, from the fact that you believe P it cannot follow that you ought to believe P, or have a reason to believe P. Beliefs do not automatically justify themselves. So it cannot be a general principle that if you believe P you ought to believe its consequences, or that you have a reason to do so. However, I need to respond to a plausible contrary thought: if you believe P, then surely in some sense or other that gives you a reason to believe its consequence Q, when Q is different from P itself. No doubt, we would not say believing P gives you a reason to believe P itself, because you do not need a reason for that; you already believe it. But if you are going to believe a consequence of P that is distinct from P, you do need a reason for that, and surely believing P gives you one, in some sense or other. Perhaps this thought does not apply to every consequence of P that is distinct from P. For instance, suppose you believe the earth is flat. Perhaps this gives you no reason to believe that either the earth is flat or the moon is made
get off at Leuchars. But it does not determine that you ought to get off at Leuchars, or even that you have a rationality to make off at Leuchars. I could equally well say that the intention on which the reasoning is precede is not reason - giving. Your intention to travel to St Andrews gives you no reason to get off at Leuchars. That is what I shall argue. Reasoning in general is not ought - giving or cause - giving. (I shall mention an exception later .) Once again, it is easy to see this by looking at the more familiar example of belief reasoning. Suppose you think some proposition P from which Q follows by a valid inference. It does not comply that you ought to believe Q, nor that you have a rationality to believe Q. (This is thus even if the inference is immediate; it has nothing to do with the complexity of the inference .) This section and the next defend this title. Section 7 returns to intention reasoning. From one point of view, a defence scarcely seems needed because the conclusion is obvious. For instance, suppose you ought not to believe P, though you do. Then it is surely obvious that it may not be the case that you ought to believe Q or that you suffer a reason to believe Q. even, here is a childlike defence in case it helps. phosphorus itself follows from phosphorus by a valid inference. But obviously, from the fact that you believe P it cannot follow that you ought to think P, or have a reason to believe P. Beliefs do not automatically justify themselves. then it cannot be a general principle that if you believe P you ought to think its consequences, or that you get a rationality to do so. However, I need to react to a plausible contrary thought: if you believe phosphorus, then surely in some sense or early that gives you a reason to believe its consequence Q, when Q is different from P itself. No doubt, we would not pronounce believing P contribute you a reason to think P itself, because you do not need a reason for that; you already believe it. But if you are proceed to believe a consequence of P that is distinct from P, you do need a cause for that, and surely believing P gives you one, in some sense or other. Perhaps this thought does not apply to every consequence of P that is discrete from P. For instance, suppose you think the earth is flat. Perhaps this gives you no reason to believe that either the earth is bland or the moon is made
 geh off at Leuchars. But it does not determine thet you kught to get off at Leuchars, or even tyat yiu have a reason to geg off at Peuchars. I ciyld equallb well say thaf the mntention on whlch the reavoning is premhsdd is not reason-giving. Your intention to go yo St Andrews gides jot no gecson to get off at Leuchars. Thaf is whet I shall argur. Reasoning in general is jot lught-giving or readon-giving. (I shajo mention an exception later.) Once zgain, it is easiest to see this by lpoking at jkw mlte familiar xxamplv of belief rcssoninc. Suppoxe you believe soke proposition P from whmch Q follows by a vwlid infeseuce. It does not folloq rhat iou ogght ro celjete S, nor hhav you have z reason to believe Q. (This is xo vfen if the ihferense is immediate; it has nothing to do with ths complexity of the infwrence.) This section ajd the nevt defend this claim. Section 7 returns to intentiot reaauniun. Weol one point of view, a defence scarcely seems gsecec because the gonclusion is obvipud. Gjr instance, soppose vku ought not to belifve P, trough you do. Tren ot is surely obvious that ir may not be rhe case that you lught to beuievg Q or that you have a reason to gelieve Q. Shill, here ks a simple defevce it case iu helps. P itself fjllows frim P by a vxlid inferqnce. But ohviously, from the fact tjat ylu believe P it cannot follow that you oughv to believe K, os hdve a recson tp believe P. Bqliefs do not cutomatieally gustify thvmselves. Vo it cannoe be a generan principle tiat if yot beoievw P you uught to beliefe its coufequwnces, or that you mave x reason to do si. Hiwever, I need tp rdspjnf vo a [nausible condrarh tfpught: if you bellevd P, yhen surely in some venss or other that gifef you a teason to believe its vonsequence Q, when Q is dihfereny ftom P itself. No doubt, we would hot say bflicving P gives you a reason to believe P itself, because you do not nexd a reason for that; yoy already believe ij. Bmt if you arx goind to beliave a consequence of P that is distingt from P, you do need z reasmn fog that, and surely believing P gives you one, in some sense or other. Perhapw this thought doea noy appny co everr coisxquence of P that is distinct from P. For instancx, suppose fob believe the earth is flat. Prrfaps this givgs you no reason to believs that eother the earth is flat or the koon is made
get off at Leuchars. But it does that ought to off at Leuchars, a to get off Leuchars. I could well say that the intention on the reasoning is premised is not reason-giving. Your intention to go to St gives you no reason to get off at Leuchars. That is what I argue. in is ought-giving or reason-giving. (I shall mention an exception later.) Once again, it is easiest to see by looking at the more familiar example of reasoning. Suppose you believe proposition P from which Q by valid inference. does follow you ought to Q, nor that you have a reason to believe Q. (This is so even if the inference immediate; it to do the of inference.) This section next defend this claim. Section 7 reasoning. From one point of view, a defence seems needed the conclusion is obvious. For instance, you ought not to believe P, though you Then it is surely obvious that it may not be the case that you ought Q or that you a reason to Q. here a defence in it helps. P itself follows from P by a valid inference. obviously, from the fact that you believe P it cannot you to believe P, have a reason to P. do not automatically justify it be that you P you ought to its consequences, or that you a reason to do respond to a plausible contrary thought: if you P, then surely in some sense or that gives you a reason to believe its consequence Q, when Q different from No doubt, we would not say believing P you a reason to P itself, because you do not need a reason that; already believe But if you going to believe consequence of P distinct from you need that, and surely believing P gives one, some sense or other. Perhaps thought apply to every consequence of P that is distinct from P. For instance, suppose you earth is flat. Perhaps gives no reason to believe that either the earth is flat or the made
 get off at Leuchars. But it does Not determiNe thaT yoU ouGhT to gEt ofF at Leuchars, or eVEn thAt you have a reason to get oFf at LEuCHars. i CoUld eqUally weLL sAY ThaT tHe IntEnTIoN on whIch The reasOning is preMisEd Is not reason-gIViNg. Your inteNtiOn to go to St AnDreWs giveS yOu nO ReasoN to Get ofF at LeuCHars. ThAt is what I ShALl arguE. reasoniNG In GeneRal is not ought-giviNG oR Reason-giving. (I sHall meNtIOn AN ExcEptIon later.) OnCe Again, IT is easiESt TO SEe tHIs by looking at The more famiLIar ExamplE oF beLIef reaSoninG. SUPpoSe you believE somE propositIon P frOM which Q FOllows bY a valiD inFerEnce. iT dOeS noT fOLloW ThAt yOU ouGht to belIeVe q, nor tHat yOU HAVe a rEasOn to BelieVe Q. (This is so evEn iF the INfeRence Is immEdiaTe; It has NothinG to do WiTh the complexity Of thE inferencE.) ThIs SecTiOn and THe next DefEnd This claIm. SectiON 7 reTuRNS To Intention reasoning. frOM OnE point of View, a dEFeNcE Scarcely SeEms NeedED BecauSe thE CoNclusion Is obviOUs. foR instanCe, SupposE yOu oUghT not tO BeliEve P, thOugh you dO. Then IT is surely obvioUS that it may not BE tHE CaSE thaT yoU ought to belIeve q Or thAt yoU HaVe a REason To belIeVE Q. sTill, here is a simple deFeNce in cAse it Helps. P itself fOllows from p BY A valid inFereNCe. bUt obviously, froM the fAct that you BElieve P iT cannOt follow That you ouGHT to belieVe P, Or hAve A reASOn To believe P. BelIEFs do NoT automaTicAlly jusTifY thEmsElvEs. so it cannoT be a geneRaL pRiNcIplE that IF you beliEvE P yOu OugHt to bELieve iTs conSequEnCeS, Or tHat you hAVe A REasoN tO dO so. HOweVeR, I neeD to rESpoNd to a plAusible coNtrARy thOuGhT: if you bElieve P, then suReLy in some seNsE or Other tHAT gives yoU a reason to believe its conSEquence q, whEn Q is DiffErent from p itSelf. No DouBT, we wouLd not sAy belIeVinG p Gives YOU a ReaSoN to believe p ITseLf, becAuSe yoU do not nEed a reason for that; yOU alReady believe iT. BuT if yOU ArE goINg TO beLiEVe a CONsequence of P thaT is distincT fROm p, you do need A ReaSoN for thaT, and surEly beLIeving P Gives you oNe, in some sEnSe or OTHer. perhaps thiS thought Does not apPLy to eVErY consEquEnce of p tHat Is disTinct fROm P. for inStance, SuPpose yOu belIeVe the earTh is flat. Perhaps this giveS you no ReasoN to Believe thAt eITheR the earth Is flAt or the mooN is MadE
 get off at Leuchars. Butit does no t det erm ine  t hatyouought to get o f f at  Leuchars, or even tha t you  h a ve a re asonto geto ff a t L eu ch ars .I  c ouldequ ally we ll say tha t t he  intention o n  w hich the r eas oning is pre mis ed isno t r e ason- giv ing.Your i n tentio n to go t oS t Andr e ws give s yo u no  reason to get of f  a t  Leuchars. Tha t is w ha t  I s hal l a rgue. Reas on ing i n  genera l  i s n oto ught-giving o r reason-gi v ing . (I s ha llm ention  an e xc e pti on later.)Once  again, i t is e a siest t o  see th is byloo kin g at th emor ef ami l ia r e x amp le of be li ef  reas onin g . S uppo seyoubelie ve some propo sit ionP  fr om wh ich Q  fol lo ws by  a val id in fe rence. It doesnotfollow th atyo u o ug ht to believ e Q , n or that  you ha v e a  r e a s on  to believe Q. (Th is i sso evenif the in fe r ence isim med iate ; it ha s no t hi ng to do  witht he  c omplexi ty  of th einf ere nce.) This  secti on and t he ne x t defend thisc laim. Section 7r e tu r ns t o i ntention re ason i ng.From on e p o int o f vie w, ad efence scarcely see ms  neede d bec ause the conc lusion iso b v ious. Fo r in s ta n ce, suppose yo u oug ht not tob elieve P , tho ugh youdo. Theni t  is sure lyobv iou s t h a tit may not be t he c as e thatyou  oughttobel iev e Q  o r that yo u have a  r ea so ntobelie v e Q. Sti ll , h er e i s a s i mple d efenc e in  c as e  it  helps. Pi t self  f ol lows  fr om  P by  a v a lid  infere nce. Butobv i ousl y,  f rom the  fact that yo ubelieve Pit  ca nnot f o l low that  you ought to believe P ,  or hav e a  reas on t o believe  P.  Belie fsd o notautoma tical ly  ju s t ify t h e ms elv es . So it ca n n otbe age nera l princ iple that if you b e lie ve P you ough t t o be l i ev e i t sc ons eq u enc e s , or that you h ave a reas on to  do so. Ho w eve r,  I need  to res pondt o a pla usible co ntrary th ou ght: i f y ou believe  P, then  surely i n  some se nse o r o ther t ha t g ivesyou ar eas on to  belie ve  its c onseq ue nce Q, w hen Q is different from  P its elf.Nodoubt, we  wo u ldnot say b elie ving P giv esyou  a re aso n  to b elie v eP i t self,  bec a use you d o  n otn e ed  a reason f o r tha t; yo u a l readybeli eve it. But if yo u  are going tobeli e v e a  co n sequ en ce of P that i s d is t i nct from  P , you do ne ed a rea so n  forthat,and su rely be l i ev i ng P g ives  yo u one, in  so me sense o rot h er. Pe rhap sthis t hought does n ot apply to ever y con s e quenc e  of  P th at  is dis t inct  from P. F or instance , supp oseyou b elieveth e eart h i sflat. Perh a ps this g ivesyou nore ason  to  belie ve t h a t eit herth e e arth is f l a to rth e  mo on i s mad e
 get_off at_Leuchars. But it does_not determine_that_you ought_to_get off at_Leuchars, or even_that you have a_reason to get_off_at Leuchars. I could equally well say that the intention on which the reasoning_is_premised is_not_reason-giving._Your intention to go to_St Andrews gives you no_reason to_get off at Leuchars. That is what I_shall_argue. Reasoning in_general is not ought-giving or reason-giving. (I shall mention_an exception later.) Once again, it_is easiest to_see_this_by looking at the_more familiar example of belief reasoning._Suppose you believe some proposition P_from which Q follows by a valid_inference. It does not follow that_you ought to believe Q,_nor that_you have a reason to_believe Q. (This_is so_even if the_inference is immediate; it has nothing_to do with_the complexity of the inference.) This_section_and the next_defend_this_claim. Section_7 returns to_intention_reasoning. From_one_point of view, a defence scarcely_seems_needed because the conclusion is obvious. For_instance, suppose you ought_not_to believe P, though_you do. Then it is_surely obvious that it may not_be the_case that_you ought to believe Q or that you have a reason_to believe Q. Still, here is_a simple defence in_case it_helps._P itself follows_from_P by_a valid inference. But obviously, from the_fact that_you believe P it cannot follow_that you ought to_believe_P, or have a reason to_believe P. Beliefs do not automatically_justify themselves. So it cannot_be_a_general principle that if you_believe P you ought to believe_its consequences, or_that you have a reason to do_so._However, I need to respond to_a_plausible contrary thought: if you believe_P,_then_surely in some sense or_other that gives you a reason_to believe its consequence Q, when Q is different_from P itself._No doubt, we would not_say_believing_P gives you a reason to believe P itself, because_you do_not need a_reason for that; you already believe it. But if you_are going to believe a consequence of_P that is distinct from P, you do need a reason_for that, and surely believing P gives you_one, in some sense or other. Perhaps_this thought does not_apply_to every consequence of P that is_distinct_from_P._For instance, suppose_you believe the_earth is flat._Perhaps this_gives you no_reason to_believe that either_the_earth is flat or the moon is made