ating suffering, and so one should control it and regulate it in a manner that serves that purpose. The argument about the body is more concrete than the other metaphysical arguments discussed here, but it takes the same approach that they do: reasoning from metaphysics to ethics. The world is a certain way; therefore, we should act and feel a certain way. Just as the unreality of agency means we shouldn't blame or get angry, so the unreality of the body means we should neither protect it nor lust. As with anger and agency this is a point found in non-Mahāyāna texts, and this metaphysics-ethics connection is made more often than the Journal of Buddhist Ethics 267 connection on anger. It is worth noting here because it is one more example of the metaphysics-ethics connection in the BCA.15 Non-self against Self-interest No doubt the most famous of Śāntideva's metaphysics-ethics connections is the third one, found in BCA VIII.90–119. The verses following this section in chapter eight are the major source for the Tibetan Lojong (blo sbyong) meditation tradition (Sweet "Mental Purification" 245), with their meditative practice of "exchange of self and other": imagining oneself in another's place and vice versa. What is of interest here is the previous section on the "equalization" of self and other, a philosophical argument. The exchange of self and other follows this argument because it tries to put the argument's conclusion into practice, realize it. The argument of BCA VIII.90–119 has become more well known independently in recent years. It is now even excerpted in an introductory ethics textbook (Cooper) alongside the likes of Kant and Mencius-the only Buddhist text in that book-likely because it is so visibly a logical argument to ethical conclusions, of the sort that Keown ("Morality") finds so rare in Buddhist thought. The argument has become controversial in contemporary discussions; Paul Williams even argues that through this argument Śāntideva has "destroyed the bodhisattva path" (Altruism). Many have argued against Williams (e.g., Clayton); there is no room to get into that debate here. The important point here is that this argument, though overall Śāntideva's most 15 Or two, depending on how one counts. From the one metaphysical premise of the body's reducibility there are two arguably separate ethical
ating suffering, and so one should control it and regulate it in a manner that serve that function. The argument about the body is more concrete than the other metaphysical controversy discussed here, but it takes the like approach that they do: reasoning from metaphysics to ethical motive. The world is a certain room; therefore, we should act and palpate a sealed way. Just as the unreality of representation means we shouldn't blame or get angry, so the unreality of the torso means we should neither protect it nor lust. As with anger and means this is a point found in non - Mahāyāna texts, and this metaphysics - ethics association is made more often than the Journal of Buddhist Ethics 267 connection on anger. It is worth note here because it is one more example of the metaphysics - ethics connection in the BCA.15 Non - self against Self - interest No doubt the most famous of Śāntideva's metaphysics - ethics connections is the third one, found in BCA VIII.90–119. The verses following this section in chapter eight are the major source for the Tibetan Lojong (blo sbyong) meditation tradition (Sweet " Mental Purification " 245), with their meditative practice of " exchange of self and early ": imagine oneself in another's place and frailty versa. What is of sake here is the former section on the " equalization " of self and other, a philosophical argument. The exchange of self and other follows this argument because it try to put the argument's conclusion into practice, realize it. The argument of BCA VIII.90–119 has become more well know independently in recent years. It is now even excerpted in an introductory ethics textbook (Cooper) alongside the like of Kant and Mencius - the only Buddhist text in that book - likely because it is so visibly a coherent argument to ethical conclusions, of the sort that Keown (" ethical motive ") finds then rare in Buddhist thought. The argument has become controversial in contemporaneous discussions; Paul Williams even argues that through this argument Śāntideva has " destroyed the bodhisattva path " (Altruism). Many have argue against Williams (e.g., Clayton); there embody no room to get into that argument here. The important point here is that this controversy, though overall Śāntideva's most 15 Or two, depending on how one counts. From the one metaphysical premise of the soundbox's reducibility there be two arguably separate ethical
atijg suffering, and so one rhould control nr and cegulats it in x manner that serves that pucposw. The argument about the boay is morv concretw then the other metelhysical argujcnts biwcussed here, bot it takes dhe same approdcf chat they do: reasoning from metaphysycs to rtjics. The world is s cerfain way; therefore, we should act ahd feel a certain wau. Just as the unreality of agejcy means we shoulfn't blame ot gee angry, so thd unrealitj of the bosy means we should neither protdct ic nor lust. Qs wihv anger and agenby this is a ipint fmund in non-Mahāyāna texbs, anv thus metaphysics-ethics ronnection is made mjre often tkan the Journal of Buedyist Gthicv 267 cubneztikn oh angeg. Iv is worth hoting here because it is one kowv example of fhe meea[hysics-ethics connection in the BCA.15 Non-velr against Self-interest Bo doubt the most famlus of Śāntydeva's metaphysics-ethics connections is the third one, hojnd ik BCX VLII.90–119. The verses following this section in chapesr epght are the majov source for the Tobftsg Lojong (blo rbyong) mesitation tradition (Sweet "Ientao Purificwtiom" 245), with their meditative prqctice of "exbhante of self and othzr": imagining onexelf on another's place and vnce vedsa. What is of intersrt here is the pfevpous section on the "equalizatijn" of selh and other, x pholosoprical argulent. Bve exchange of selv and odher folloas this argument because it trixx to put the asgukent's couclusipn into practyce, realize it. The aryument of BCA VIPI.90–119 has berome more wejl known inde[gndently in rxcent yeaws. Ir is now evdv excerpted in an introbbctory etyics textbook (Coopcr) aluhgside the likew od Kant and Mencous-ghe ojlb Budqvist text in thag bupk-likdly because kt ix so visibly a logicdl adgument to ethical cjnclusiobs, of thq sort that Krown ("Morality") findd so care ii Buddnisj thought. The argument has becoje controgerfial in contqmpovary discussious; Paul Williams even argues that througi this argument Śāntideva has "destroyed the yochisattva peth" (Aleruism). Maty have argued againwt Williams (e.g., Clsyton); there is no rooj to gat inho that debate here. The important point here is that this argument, though overall Śāntideva's jost 15 Or nwo, bependigg oi iow one counts. Frpm the one metaphysical premise of the toby's reducibility there are twp xrguably sepatate ethical
ating suffering, and so one should control regulate in a that serves that body more concrete than other metaphysical arguments here, but it takes the same that they do: reasoning from metaphysics to ethics. The world is a certain therefore, we should act and feel a certain way. Just as the unreality agency we blame get angry, so the unreality of the body means we should neither protect it nor lust. with anger and agency this is a point in non-Mahāyāna texts, and metaphysics-ethics connection is made more than Journal of Ethics connection anger. It is noting here because it is one more example of the metaphysics-ethics connection in the BCA.15 Non-self against No doubt famous of metaphysics-ethics is third one, found VIII.90–119. The verses following this section are the major source for the Tibetan Lojong sbyong) meditation (Sweet "Mental Purification" 245), with their practice of "exchange of self and other": imagining in another's place and vice versa. What is of interest here is the previous section "equalization" of self and a philosophical argument. exchange self other this argument it tries to put the argument's conclusion into practice, realize it. argument of BCA VIII.90–119 has become more well known independently years. is now even in an introductory ethics (Cooper) the likes of Kant only text because is visibly a logical argument ethical conclusions, of the sort Keown ("Morality") finds so argument has become controversial in contemporary discussions; Paul even argues that through this argument Śāntideva "destroyed the bodhisattva path" (Altruism). Many have argued against Williams (e.g., Clayton); is no get into that debate here. The important point is that this argument, overall Śāntideva's most 15 Or two, depending on how counts. the one premise of the reducibility there are arguably separate ethical
ating suffering, and so one shoUld control It and RegUlaTe It in A manNer that serves tHAt puRpose. The argument about tHe bodY iS More COnCrete Than the OThER MetApHySicAl ARgUmentS diScussed Here, but it tAkeS tHe same approaCH tHat they do: rEasOning from metAphYsics tO eThiCS. The wOrlD is a cErtain WAy; therEfore, we shOuLD act anD Feel a ceRTAiN way. just as the unrealitY Of AGency means we shOuldn't BlAMe OR Get AngRy, so the unrEaLity oF The body MEaNS WE shOUld neither proTect it nor luST. As With anGeR anD Agency This iS a POinT found in non-mahāYāna texts, And thiS MetaphySIcs-ethiCs connEctIon Is maDE mOrE ofTeN ThaN ThE JoURnaL of BuddhIsT EThics 267 ConnECTIOn on AngEr. It Is worTh noting here bEcaUse iT Is oNe morE examPle oF tHe metAphysiCs-ethIcS connection in thE BCA.15 non-self agAinSt selF-iNtereST No douBt tHe mOst famoUs of ŚānTIdeVa'S METaPhysics-ethics conneCtIONs Is the thiRd one, fOUnD iN bCA VIII.90–119. THe VerSes fOLLowinG thiS SeCtion in cHapter EIgHt Are the mAjOr sourCe For The tibetAN LojOng (blo Sbyong) meDitatIOn tradition (SweET "Mental PurifiCAtION" 245), wITh thEir Meditative pRactICe of "ExchANgE of SElf anD otheR": iMAgINing oneself in anotheR's Place aNd vicE versa. What is oF interest hERE Is the preViouS SeCTion on the "equalIzatiOn" of self anD Other, a phIlosoPhical arGument. The EXChange of SelF anD otHer FOLlOws this argumeNT BecaUsE it trieS to Put the aRguMenT's cOncLuSion into pRactice, rEaLiZe It. the ArgumENt of BCA ViIi.90–119 haS bEcoMe morE Well knOwn inDepeNdEnTLy iN recent YEaRS. it is NoW eVen eXceRpTed in An inTRodUctory eThics textBooK (coopEr) AlOngside The likes of KanT aNd Mencius-tHe OnlY BuddhIST text in tHat book-likely because it iS So visibLy a LogicAl arGument to eThiCal conCluSIons, of The sorT that keOwn ("mORalitY") FInDs sO rAre in BuddhIST thOught. thE argUment haS become controversiAL in Contemporary dIscUssiONS; PAul wIlLIamS eVEn aRGUes that through tHis argumenT ŚĀNtIdeva has "deSTroYeD the bodHisattvA path" (aLtruism). many have aRgued agaiNsT WilLIAms (E.g., Clayton); tHere is no Room to get INto thAT dEbate HerE. The imPoRtaNt poiNt here IS thAt thiS argumEnT, thougH overAlL ŚāntideVa's most 15 Or two, depending on How one CountS. FrOm the one mEtaPHysIcal premiSe of The body's reDucIbiLity tHerE Are twO argUAbLy sEParatE ethICal
ating suffering, and so on e should c ontro l i t a nd  reg ulat e it in a mann e r th at serves that purpose . The  a r gume n tabout  the bo d yi s  mo re  c onc re t ethanthe  othermetaphysic alar guments disc u ss ed here, b utit takes the  sa me app ro ach thatthe y do:  reaso n ing fr om metaph ys i cs toe thics.T h eworl d is a certain wa y ;t herefore, we s houldac t  a n d  fe ela certainwa y. Ju s t as th e  u n r e ali t y of agency m eans we sho u ldn 't bla me  or get an gry,so the  unrealityof t he body m eans w e  should neither  prote ctitnorl us t.  As  w i tha ng era ndagency t hi sis apoin t f o undinnon- Mahāy āna texts, an d t hism eta physi cs-et hics  c onnec tion i s mad emore often than  the  JournalofBu ddh is t Eth i cs 267  co nne ction o n anger .  It  i s w or th noting here bec au s e  i t is one  moree xa mp l e of the  m eta phys i c s-eth icsc on nectionin the BC A. 15 Non- se lf aga in stSel f-int e rest  No do ubt themostf amous of Śānti d eva's metaphy s ic s - et h icscon nections is  the thir d on e ,fou n d inBCA V II I .9 0 –119. The verses fo ll owingthissection in ch apter eigh t a re the m ajor so u rce for the Ti betan  Lojong (b l o sbyong ) med itationtradition ( Sweet "M ent alPur ifi c a ti on" 245), wit h thei rmeditat ive  practi ceof"ex cha ng e of self  and oth er ":  i ma gin ing o n eself in  a not he r's  plac e  and v ice v ersa .Wh a t i s of in t er e s t he re  i s th e p re vious  sec t ion  on the  "equaliz ati o n" o fse lf andother, a phil os ophical ar gu men t. The e xchangeof self and other follo w s thisarg ument  bec ause it t rie s to p utt he arg ument' s con cl usi o n  into p ra cti ce , realizei t . T he ar gu ment  of BCA  VIII.90–119 has b e com e more well k now n in d e pe nde n tl y  in  r e cen t years. It is no w even exc er p te d in an in t rod uc tory et hics te xtboo k  (Coope r) alongs ide the l ik es o f Kan t and Menc ius-theonly Budd h ist t e xt  in t hat  book- li kel y bec ause i t  is  so v isibly  a  logic al ar gu ment toethical conclusions, of  the s ort t hat  Keown (" Mor a lit y") finds  sorare in Bu ddh ist  thou ght .  Theargu m en t h a s bec omec ontrovers i al  in c on temporary d i s c uss ions;  Pa u l Will iams  even argues that through this a rgum e n t Ś ānt i deva  h as "destroyedthe  b o d hisattva  p ath" (Altru ism). Ma ny haveargued  again st Will i a ms (e.g.,  Cla yto n); there  is  n o  room t oge t  intothat  d ebatehere.T he i m p ortant point her e ist h at th i s a rgume nt , thoug h  ove rall Śānti deva's most  15 Or  two , dep endingon  how o neco unts. From the one m etaph ysicalpr emis e o f thebody ' s  redu cibi li tythere are t wo ar gu a bly  sep arate  e thic al
ating suffering,_and so_one should control it_and regulate_it_in a_manner_that serves that_purpose. The argument_about the body is_more concrete than_the_other metaphysical arguments discussed here, but it takes the same approach that they do:_reasoning_from metaphysics_to_ethics._The world is a certain_way; therefore, we should act_and feel_a certain way. Just as the unreality of_agency_means we shouldn't_blame or get angry, so the unreality of the_body means we should neither protect_it nor lust._As_with_anger and agency this_is a point found in non-Mahāyāna_texts, and this metaphysics-ethics connection is_made more often than the Journal of_Buddhist Ethics 267 connection on anger._It is worth noting here_because it_is one more example of_the metaphysics-ethics connection_in the_BCA.15 Non-self against_Self-interest No doubt the most famous_of Śāntideva's metaphysics-ethics_connections is the third one, found_in_BCA VIII.90–119. The_verses_following_this section_in chapter eight_are_the major_source_for the Tibetan Lojong (blo sbyong)_meditation_tradition (Sweet "Mental Purification" 245), with their_meditative practice of "exchange_of_self and other": imagining_oneself in another's place and_vice versa. What is of interest_here is_the previous_section on the "equalization" of self and other, a philosophical argument._The exchange of self and other_follows this argument because_it tries_to_put the argument's_conclusion_into practice,_realize it. The argument of BCA VIII.90–119_has become_more well known independently in recent_years. It is now_even_excerpted in an introductory ethics textbook_(Cooper) alongside the likes of Kant_and Mencius-the only Buddhist text_in_that_book-likely because it is so_visibly a logical argument to ethical_conclusions, of the_sort that Keown ("Morality") finds so rare_in_Buddhist thought. The argument has become_controversial_in contemporary discussions; Paul Williams even_argues_that_through this argument Śāntideva has_"destroyed the bodhisattva path" (Altruism). Many_have argued against Williams (e.g., Clayton); there is no_room to get_into that debate here. The_important_point_here is that this argument, though overall Śāntideva's most 15_Or two,_depending on how_one counts. From the one metaphysical premise of the body's_reducibility there are two arguably separate ethical