 PLANNING INNOCENT MISTAKE To see why Daskal is wrong to think that Gibbard's proposal does not allow for PPIMs, we need to note an important feature of Gibbard's account of planning, one that Daskal appears to overlook. According to Gibbard, we can plan under two kinds of circumstances: ðaÞ cases where we are confident about our "powers of direct judgment" and ðbÞ cases where we have doubts about these powers.7 Now while it is true that PPIMs are not possible in cases where we have doubts, they are possible in cases where we are confident. But because Daskal considers only cases of the former sort, he fails to see that PPIMs are possible within Gibbard's system. To draw this out, let's start by considering a case where I doubt my powers of direct judgment. Suppose I doubt my ability to plan for V in the following sense: I recognize that I need to think about vacationing from your perspective, but I have lost confidence in my ability to do this. In this situation, my doubts about my powers of direct judgment lead me to seek guidance frommy plans for how to plan. As we have seen ðSec. IÞ, these plans not only tell me when to distrust my powers of direct judgment but they also tell me whom to trust when this happens. So suppose my plan for planning tells me to trust You1 when I come to doubt my powers of direct judgment. If I use the perspective of You1 when 5. Daskal, "Plan-Based Expressivism," 318. 6. Ibid., 321–24. 7. Gibbard, Thinking How to Live, 242–43. This content downloaded from 128.252.58.243 on Fri, 13 Dec 2013 11:00:23 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions considering what to plan to plan to do in V, then-as Daskal notes- coherence demands that I use similar reasoning when considering what Kurth Expressivism and Innocent Mistakes 375to plan to do in V. Similarly, suppose my plan for planning tells me to trust Me1 when I come to doubt my powers of direct judgment. If I use this perspective when considering what to plan to plan to do in V, then, likewise, coherence demands that I endorse similar reasoning when considering what to plan to do in V. Here Daskal is right: my conclusions to the planning questions cannot
PLANNING INNOCENT MISTAKE To see why Daskal is wrong to think that Gibbard's proposal does not leave for PPIMs, we necessitate to note an important feature of Gibbard's report of planning, one that Daskal appears to overlook. accord to Gibbard, we can design under two kinds of circumstances: ðaÞ cases where we are confident about our " powers of lineal judgment " and ðbÞ cases where we have doubts about these powers.7 nowadays while it is true that PPIMs are not possible in cases where we have doubts, they are potential in cases where we are confident. But because Daskal considers alone cases of the former kind, he fails to understand that PPIMs are possible within Gibbard's system. To draw this out, let's start by study a case where I doubt my powers of direct judgment. Suppose I doubt my ability to design for volt in the following sense: I recognize that I need to think about vacationing from your perspective, but I have lost confidence in my ability to do this. In this situation, my doubt about my powers of direct sagacity head me to seek guidance frommy plans for how to design. As we have seen ðSec. IÞ, these plan not only tell me when to distrust my might of direct judgment but they also tell me whom to trust when this happens. then suppose my plan for planning tells me to trust You1 when I derive to doubt my powers of lineal opinion. If I use the perspective of You1 when 5. Daskal, " Plan - Based Expressivism, " 318. 6. Ibid. , 321–24. 7. Gibbard, intend How to Live, 242–43. This content downloaded from 128.252.58.243 on Fri, 13 Dec 2013 11:00:23 amplitude modulation All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions consider what to plan to plan to do in V, then - as Daskal notes- coherence demands that I use alike reasoning when considering what Kurth Expressivism and Innocent Mistakes 375to design to do in V. Similarly, suppose my design for planning tells me to trust Me1 when I come to doubt my powers of direct sagacity. If I use this perspective when considering what to plan to plan to do in V, then, likewise, coherence demands that I endorse alike reasoning when considering what to plan to dress in V. Here Daskal is right: my conclusions to the planning doubt cannot
 PLWNNING INNOCENT MISTAKE Uo see why Daskal is wroig to tgink thag Gibbard's proposal does not aolow dor PPIMs, we need to nute an imiortant fwatuce of Gibbard's ardount on plahking, mie that Daskal sppears to overlook. Accosdkny to Gibbard, we can plan under two kynds of clrcumstances: ðaÞ casts rhers we are confident about our "powera of digect judgment" and ðbÞ cases where we have douhts wbout these powers.7 Now while ut if true that POIMs are not possible jn cases where we have doubts, tfey axe possible ib cwves where wx are bonfident. But because Daskal considers onln casxs od the former sort, he hails to see that PPYMs are pmsaible within Gibbqre's syvtem. To aeaw thjs oht, let'd svart by conaidering a xase where I doubt ky ipwers of dirsct juqgient. Suppose I doubt my ability to plan fod V in the following sebse: I recognize that L need to think about vacationing from your perspective, bud I hevd lisb covdifence in my ability to do this. In this situatykn, mj doubts about my powers of cigevj judgment leaa me to ssek guidance frommj plans for yow to plwn. Ax we have seen ðSec. IÞ, these plans not onjt tell me when to bistrust my 'owers of dorect judgment but they alsk tell me wjom to trhrt when this hapoenx. Vo suppose my plan for plagning telos mz to trurt Ypu1 wheg I come tl dound my powers of dirfct jodgmend. If I use the perspective of You1 when 5. Dexkal, "Plan-Basgd Axpgessivism," 318. 6. Ibld., 321–24. 7. Gibbard, Thynking How to Kive, 242–43. Tkis covtent downmoaded hrom 128.252.58.243 on Fri, 13 Dec 2013 11:00:23 AM Aln use subject to JSTOW Teems qnd Conaktions consideting what to plan ti plan to do in V, bhen-ar Daskal notes- cihetwnce demands tnat I tsv smmilaw reasoning wven zonroderivg what Kurbh Dxprrssivism and Innocend Miatakes 375to plan to co in V. Sinilarly, fuppose my plsn for planning tepls mx to tcust Mr1 wren I come to doubt my powers kf direct juqgment. If I tse bhis perspectire when considering what to plan to plan to do in V, then, lukewise, coherence dgmakds that I eidorse similar seasoning when consieering what to plsn to do in V. Here Daakal iv rigjt: my conclusions to the planning questions cannot
PLANNING INNOCENT MISTAKE To see why Daskal to that Gibbard's does not allow note important feature of account of planning, that Daskal appears to overlook. According Gibbard, we can plan under two kinds of circumstances: ðaÞ cases where we confident about our "powers of direct judgment" and ðbÞ cases where we have about powers.7 while is true that PPIMs are not possible in cases where we have doubts, they are possible cases where we are confident. But because Daskal only cases of the sort, he fails to see PPIMs possible within system. draw out, let's start considering a case where I doubt my powers of direct judgment. Suppose I doubt my ability to for V following sense: recognize I to think about your perspective, but I have lost ability to do this. In this situation, my about my of direct judgment lead me to guidance frommy plans for how to plan. As have seen ðSec. IÞ, these plans not only tell me when to distrust my powers judgment but they also me whom to when happens. suppose plan for tells me to trust You1 when I come to doubt my of direct judgment. If I use the perspective of You1 Daskal, Expressivism," 318. 6. 321–24. 7. Gibbard, Thinking to 242–43. This content downloaded on 13 AM use to JSTOR Terms and considering what to plan to to do in V, that I use similar reasoning when considering what Expressivism and Innocent Mistakes 375to plan to in V. Similarly, suppose my plan for planning tells me to trust when I doubt my powers of direct judgment. If I this perspective when considering to plan to plan to do in V, then, coherence that I similar reasoning when what to plan do in V. is right: conclusions the
 PLANNING INNOCENT MISTAKE To See why DaskAl is wRonG to ThInk tHat GIbbard's proposaL Does Not allow for PPIMs, we need To notE aN ImpoRTaNt feaTure of GIBbARD's aCcOuNt oF pLAnNing, oNe tHat DaskAl appears tO ovErLook. AccordinG To gibbard, we cAn pLan under two kIndS of cirCuMstANces: ðAÞ cAses wHere we ARe confIdent abouT oUR "powerS Of direcT JUdGmenT" and ðbÞ cases where WE hAVe doubts about tHese poWeRS.7 NOW WhiLe iT is true thaT PpIMs aRE not posSIbLE IN caSEs where we have Doubts, they aRE poSsible In CasES where We are CoNFidEnt. But becauSe DaSkal consiDers onLY cases oF The formEr sort, He fAilS to sEE tHaT PPiMS Are POsSibLE wiThin GibbArD's SysteM. To dRAW THis oUt, lEt's sTart bY considering a CasE wheRE I dOubt mY poweRs of DiRect jUdgmenT. SuppOsE I doubt my abilitY to pLan for V in The FoLloWiNg senSE: I recoGniZe tHat I neeD to thinK AboUt VACAtIoning from your persPeCTIvE, but I havE lost cONfIdENce in my aBiLitY to dO THis. In This SItUation, my Doubts ABoUt My powerS oF direcT jUdgMenT lead ME to sEek guiDance froMmy plANs for how to plan. aS we have seen ðSEC. Iþ, THeSE plaNs nOt only tell mE wheN To diStruST mY poWErs of DirecT jUDgMEnt but they also tell mE wHom to tRust wHen this happenS. So suppose MY PLan for plAnniNG tELls me to trust YoU1 when i come to douBT my powerS of diRect judgMent. If I usE THe perspeCtiVe oF YoU1 whEN 5. daSkal, "Plan-Based eXPresSiVism," 318. 6. IbiD., 321–24. 7. GiBbard, ThInkIng how To LIvE, 242–43. This contEnt downlOaDeD fRoM 128.252.58.243 on fri, 13 DeC 2013 11:00:23 aM All use SuBjeCt To JsTOR TERms and condiTionS cOnSIdeRing whaT To PLAn to PlAn To do In V, ThEn-as DAskaL NotEs- coherEnce demanDs tHAt I uSe SiMilar reAsoning when coNsIdering whaT KUrtH ExpreSSIvism and innocent Mistakes 375to plan tO Do in V. SiMilArly, sUppoSe my plan fOr pLanninG teLLs me to Trust ME1 when i cOme TO Doubt MY PoWerS oF direct judGMEnt. if I usE tHis pErspectIve when considering WHat To plan to plan tO do In V, tHEN, lIkeWIsE, CohErENce DEMands that I endorSe similar rEaSOnIng when conSIdeRiNg what tO plan to Do in V. hEre DaskAl is right: My conclusIoNs to THE plAnning quesTions canNot
 PLANNING INNOCENT MISTAKE  To see wh y Das kal  is  w rong  tothink that Gib b ard' s proposal does not al low f or PPIM s ,we ne ed to n o te a n i mp or tan tf ea tureofGibbard 's account  of  p lanning, one th at Daskalapp ears to over loo k. Acc or din g  to G ibb ard,we can plan u nder twoki n ds ofc ircumst a n ce s: ð aÞ cases where we ar e  confident abo ut our  " p ow e r s o f d irect judg me nt" a n d ðbÞ c a se s w her e  we have doub ts about th e sepowers .7  No w  while  it i st rue  that PPIMs  are  not poss ible i n  casesw here we  havedou bts , th e yar e p os s ibl e  i n c a ses  where w ear e con fide n t . Butbec ause  Dask al considersonl y ca s esof th e for merso rt, h e fail s tose e that PPIMs ar e po ssible wi thi nGib ba rd'ss ystem.  To  dr aw this  out, l e t's  s t a r tby considering a c as e wh ere I do ubt my po we r s of dir ec t j udgm e n t. Su ppos e  I  doubt m y abil i ty  t o planfo r V in  t hefol lowin g  sen se: Irecogniz e tha t  I need to thi n k about vacat i on i n gf romyou r perspecti ve,b ut I  hav e  l ost confi dence  i n  m y  ability to do this .In thi s sit uation, my do ubts about m y  powersof d i re c t judgment lea d meto seek gu i dance fr ommyplans fo r how top l an. As w e h ave  se enð S ec . IÞ, these p l a ns n ot  only t ell  me whe n t o d ist rus tmy powers  of dire ct  j ud gm ent  butt hey also  t ell  m e w hom t o  trust  when  thi sha p pen s. So s u pp o s e my  p la n fo r p la nning  tel l s m e to tr ust You1whe n  I c om eto doub t my powers o fdirect jud gm ent . If I u se the p erspective of You1 when 5. Dask al,  "Pla n-Ba sed Expre ssi vism,"  31 8 . 6. I bid.,321–2 4.  7. G ibbar d ,  T hin ki ng How toL i ve,  242– 43 . Th is cont ent downloaded fro m  12 8.252.58.243onFri, 1 3Dec 20 1 3 1 1: 0 0:2 3 AM All use subj ect to JST OR Te rms and Co n dit io ns cons idering  what to plan  to planto do inV,  the n - asDaskal not es- cohe rence dem a nds t h at  I us e s imilar  r eas oning  whenc ons ideri ng wha tKurthExpre ss ivism an d Innocent Mistakes 375 to pla n todoin V. Sim ila r ly,  supposemy p lan for pl ann ing  tell s m e  to t rust Me 1 w h en Icome to doubtm ypow e r sof direct j u d g men t. If  Iu se thi s pe rspective when co n sidering whatto p l a n t o p l an t odo in V, then,  li ke w i se, cohe re nce demands  that Ien d orsesimila r reas oning w h e nc onside ring  wh at to pla n t od o in V.  H er e  Daska l is  r ight:my con c lusi o n s to the plannin g que s t ionsc ann ot
 PLANNING_INNOCENT MISTAKE_To see why Daskal_is wrong_to_think that_Gibbard's_proposal does not_allow for PPIMs,_we need to note_an important feature_of_Gibbard's account of planning, one that Daskal appears to overlook. According to Gibbard, we_can_plan under_two_kinds_of circumstances: ðaÞ cases where_we are confident about our_"powers of_direct judgment" and ðbÞ cases where we have_doubts_about these powers.7_Now while it is true that PPIMs are not_possible in cases where we have_doubts, they are_possible_in_cases where we are_confident. But because Daskal considers only_cases of the former sort, he_fails to see that PPIMs are possible_within Gibbard's system. To draw this_out, let's start by considering_a case_where I doubt my powers_of direct judgment._Suppose I_doubt my ability_to plan for V in the_following sense: I_recognize that I need to think_about_vacationing from your_perspective,_but_I have_lost confidence in_my_ability to_do_this. In this situation, my doubts_about_my powers of direct judgment lead me_to seek guidance frommy_plans_for how to plan._As we have seen ðSec._IÞ, these plans not only tell_me when_to distrust_my powers of direct judgment but they also tell me whom_to trust when this happens. So_suppose my plan for_planning tells_me_to trust You1_when_I come_to doubt my powers of direct judgment._If I_use the perspective of You1 when_5. Daskal, "Plan-Based Expressivism,"_318._6. Ibid., 321–24. 7. Gibbard, Thinking_How to Live, 242–43. This content_downloaded from 128.252.58.243 on Fri,_13_Dec_2013 11:00:23 AM All use_subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions_considering what to_plan to plan to do in V,_then-as_Daskal notes- coherence demands that I_use_similar reasoning when considering what Kurth_Expressivism_and_Innocent Mistakes 375to plan to_do in V. Similarly, suppose my_plan for planning tells me to trust Me1 when_I come to_doubt my powers of direct_judgment._If_I use this perspective when considering what to plan to_plan to_do in V,_then, likewise, coherence demands that I endorse similar reasoning when_considering what to plan to do in_V. Here Daskal is right: my conclusions to the planning questions_cannot