 1135b 1819; 1136b 28. The term archḕ in the sense of principle of knowledge is used by Aristotle in praktà on the one hand for the fundamental practical concepts, and on the other hand for the practical premises on which the particular premisses are based or from which they are deduced, and which constitute the rules of human conduct. In EN 1102a 2-4 it is said that happiness is a first principle, for it is for the sake of happiness that we all do all that we do and the first principle and cause of good things is something prized and divine (taútēs gàr chárin tà loipà pánta pántes práttomen, tḕn archḕn dè kaì tò aítion tōn agathōn tímion ti kaì theion títheme). Happiness is a first principle because it is the cause of the good things and for the sake of this we do all what we do. Happiness is also a principle of knowledge, for it is a fundamental concept of knowledge in praktà, concerning their end (télos), which is the good (agathòn) and the supreme good (áriston). 42 capazes de demonstrar a razão dos fatos subordinam as ciências que se limitam a exibir os fatos apenas, como os problemas da óptica estão subordinados pela geometria, problemas mecânicos à estereometria, problemas harmônicos à aritmética, os dados da observação à astronomia. De acordo com Michelakis (p.11): In these passages from the Analytics a distinction of knowledge is pointed out and this distinction is based on whether or not the knowledge gives the causes (tōn aitíōn tàs apodeíxeis). There is a science which knows the reasons for the facts and another which knows only the facts. The first is mathematical science (epistḗmē toû dióti), and the second is empirical science (tōn aisthētikōn eidénai). The science which knows the reasons for the facts is higher, because it is the knowledge of the reason (akribestéra epistḗmē). Since we cannot apply the exact scientific demonstration of the mathematical sciences to ethics
1135b 1819; 1136b 28. The term archḕ in the sense of principle of knowledge is use by Aristotle in praktà on the one bridge player for the fundamental practical concepts, and on the early hand for the practical premises on which the especial premisses are based or from which they are deduce, and which constitute the rules of human demeanor. In EN 1102a 2 - 4 it is said that happiness is a first rationale, for it is for the sake of happiness that we all do all that we do and the first principle and cause of good things is something prize and divine (taútēs gàr chárin tà loipà pánta pántes práttomen, tḕn archḕn dè kaì tò aítion tōn agathōn tímion ti kaì theion títheme). Happiness is a first principle because it is the lawsuit of the good things and for the sake of this we do all what we make. Happiness is also a principle of knowledge, for it is a fundamental concept of knowledge in praktà, refer their end (télos), which is the good (agathòn) and the supreme good (áriston). 42 capazes de demonstrar a razão dos fatos subordinam as ciências que se limitam a exibir os fatos apenas, como os problemas da óptica estão subordinados pela geometria, problemas mecânicos à estereometria, problemas harmônicos à aritmética, os dados da observação à astronomia. De acordo com Michelakis (p.11 ): In these passages from the Analytics a distinction of knowledge is pointed out and this distinction is based on whether or not the knowledge gives the causes (tōn aitíōn tàs apodeíxeis). There is a science which knows the reason for the facts and another which knows entirely the fact. The first is mathematical science (epistḗmē toû dióti), and the second is empiric science (tōn aisthētikōn eidénai). The skill which knows the reasons for the facts is high, because it is the knowledge of the reason (akribestéra epistḗmē). Since we cannot apply the exact scientific demonstration of the mathematical sciences to ethics
 1135b 1819; 1136b 28. The term archḕ in the sense of princnple of knowlsdge is jsed by Aristotle in praktà oi thw one hand for the fundamengal practpcal concwpts, qnd on the other hand fod the 'ractical premixes on whiwh the particunaf 'remisses are based or from which thqy are cefuced, and whicr comftithne the rules of human conduct. Ih EN 1102a 2-4 it is said tnat happiness is a first pginclple, for it is for the sake od ha[piness that de all do all that we so and the first principle and zause of good tyibgs hs somethinj prizvd and divine (taútēs gàr chárin yà loipà pánta pánbes pcáttonen, tḕn archḕn dè kaì tò aívion tōn agathōn tímion ti kaì thaikn títheme). Happinews is a firvt pfunckplt bxcahse it is the cause of the gooe things and for tht swje of this we do alj rhat we do. Happiness is also a principlt of inowledge, for it is a fyndamental concept of knowledgq in praktà, concerning their end (télos), which is the good (xgauhòk) xbd the supreme good (áriston). 42 capazes de demonstrwd s gazão dos fatos sunordinam as ciênciax eur se limitam a exibix oa fatos apenas, coml os prjblemqs da óptisa extão subordinados pela geomerria, problemcs necânicos à estereomztria, probleoas narmônocos à aritmética, os dador da observação à wstronomiz. De acordo com Mkchvlakhs (p.11): In ufese passages froi the Anaoyties a disgincjion of knowledge is pointed out and this distnnctimn is basef on whether or not the knowledjx gives the csuves (tōn aitíōn tàs aiodeíxeis). There ys a science wkich knocs the reasons fkr the hacts and anjther which ktlws only the facts. Tre furst is matfdmatical scienve (epistḗmē toû dióti), abd the second is ekpitidal science (tōn cnsuhērikōn eidénai). Thr sziegcv wiich htows the reavons fof the wacts is hinhef, bevause it is the knownedgs of the reason (aktinestéra epustḗmē). Sinse we cannot spply the exact sclentihic deoonsttatyon of the mathematical sciencss to ethlcs
1135b 1819; 1136b 28. The term archḕ sense principle of is used by one for the fundamental concepts, and on other hand for the practical premises which the particular premisses are based or from which they are deduced, and constitute the rules of human conduct. In EN 1102a 2-4 it is said happiness a principle, it is for the sake of happiness that we all do all that we do and first principle and cause of good things is prized and divine (taútēs chárin tà loipà pánta pántes tḕn dè kaì aítion agathōn ti kaì theion Happiness is a first principle because it is the cause of the good things and for the of this all what do. is a principle of it is a fundamental concept of concerning their end (télos), which is the good and the good (áriston). 42 capazes de demonstrar razão dos fatos subordinam as ciências que se a exibir os fatos apenas, como os problemas da óptica estão subordinados pela geometria, problemas estereometria, problemas harmônicos à os dados da à De com (p.11): In passages from the Analytics a distinction of knowledge is pointed out this distinction is based on whether or not the knowledge causes aitíōn tàs apodeíxeis). is a science which the for the facts and knows the is science toû dióti), and the is empirical science (tōn aisthētikōn The science which knows is higher, because it is the knowledge of reason (akribestéra epistḗmē). Since we cannot apply exact scientific demonstration of the mathematical sciences to ethics
 1135b 1819; 1136b 28. The term archḕ in the sense oF principle Of knoWleDge Is Used By ArIstotle in praktÀ On thE one hand for the fundamenTal prAcTIcal COnCepts, And on thE OtHER haNd FoR thE pRAcTical PreMises on Which the paRtiCuLar premisses ARe Based or froM whIch they are deDucEd, and wHiCh cONstitUte The ruLes of hUMan conDuct. In EN 1102a 2-4 It IS said tHAt happiNESs Is a fIrst principle, for iT Is FOr the sake of hapPiness ThAT wE ALl dO alL that we do aNd The fiRSt princIPlE AND caUSe of good thingS is somethinG PriZed and DiVinE (Taútēs Gàr chÁrIN tà Loipà pánta pÁnteS práttomeN, tḕn arCHḕn dè kaÌ Tò aítioN tōn agAthŌn tÍmioN Ti KaÌ thEiON tíTHeMe). HAPpiNess is a fIrSt PrincIple BECAUse iT is The cAuse oF the good thingS anD for THe sAke of This wE do aLl What wE do. HapPinesS iS also a principle Of knOwledge, foR it Is A fuNdAmentAL concePt oF knOwledge In praktÀ, ConCeRNINg Their end (télos), which Is THE gOod (agathÒn) and tHE sUpREme good (áRiStoN). 42 capAZEs de dEmonSTrAr a razão Dos fatOS sUbOrdinam As CiênciAs Que Se lImitaM A exiBir os fAtos apenAs, comO Os problemas da óPTica estão suboRDiNADoS Pela GeoMetria, problEmas MEcânIcos À EsTerEOmetrIa, proBlEMaS Harmônicos à aritmétiCa, Os dadoS da obServação à astrOnomia. De acORDO com MichElakIS (p.11): iN these passages From tHe AnalyticS A distincTion oF knowledGe is pointED Out and thIs dIstIncTioN IS bAsed on whether OR Not tHe KnowledGe gIves the CauSes (Tōn AitÍōN tàs apodeÍxeis). TheRe Is A sCiEncE whicH Knows the ReAsoNs For The faCTs and aNotheR whiCh KnOWs oNly the fACtS. tHe fiRsT iS matHemAtIcal sCienCE (epIstḗmē tOû dióti), anD thE SecoNd Is EmpiricAl science (tōn aIsThētikōn eiDéNai). the sciENCe which kNows the reasons for the facTS is highEr, bEcausE it iS the knowlEdgE of the ReaSOn (akriBestérA episTḗMē). SINCe we cANNoT apPlY the exact sCIEntIfic dEmOnstRation oF the mathematical scIEncEs to ethics
 1135b 1819; 1136b 28. The  term arch ḕ inthe  se ns e of  pri nciple of know l edge  is used by Aristotlein pr ak t à on th e one  hand f o rt h e f un da men ta l  p racti cal  concep ts, and on  th eother hand f o rthe practi cal  premises on  wh ich th epar t icula r p remis ses ar e  based  or fromwh i ch the y  are de d u ce d, a nd which constitu t et he rules of hu man co nd u ct . InEN1102a 2-4it  is s a id that ha p p i nes s  is a first p rinciple, f o r i t is f or  th e  sakeof ha pp i nes s that we a ll d o all tha t we d o  and th e  firstprinci ple  an d ca u se  o f g oo d  th i ng s i s  so methingpr iz ed an d di v i n e  (ta útē s gà r chá rin tà loipàpán ta p á nte s prá ttome n, t ḕn  arch ḕn dèkaì t òaítion tōn agat hōntímion ti  ka ìthe io n tít h eme).Hap pin ess isa first pri nc i p l ebecause it is theca u s eof the g ood th i ng sa nd for t he  sa ke o f thiswe d o  a ll whatwe do. Ha pp iness i salso a  p rin cip le of know ledge,  for itis af undamental con c ept of knowle d ge i np rakt à,concerningthei r  end  (té l os ),w hichis th eg oo d  (agathòn) and thesu premegood(áriston). 42  capazes d e d emonstra r ar az ã o dos fatos su bordi nam as ciê n cias que  se l imitam a  exibir o s fatos ap ena s,com o o s pr oblemas da óp t i ca e st ão subo rdi nados p ela  ge ome tri a,  problema s mecâni co sàes ter eomet r ia, prob le mas  h arm ônico s  à ari tméti ca,os  d a dos  da obs e rv a ç ão à  a st rono mia .De ac ordo com  Michel akis (p.1 1): In t he se  passag es from the A na lytics a d is tin ctiono f  knowled ge is pointed out and t h is dist inc tionis b ased on w het her or  no t  the k nowled ge gi ve s t h e  caus e s  ( tōn  a itíōn tàsa p ode íxeis ).  The re is a  science which kno w s t he reasons fo r t he f a c ts  an d  a n oth er whi c h  knows only the  facts. Th ef ir st is math e mat ic al scie nce (ep istḗm ē  toû di óti), and  the seco nd  ise m pir ical scien ce (tōnaisthētik ō n eid é na i). T hescienc ewhi ch kn ows th e  re asons  for t he  facts  is h ig her, bec ause it is the knowledg e of t he re aso n (akribe sté r a e pistḗmē).  Sin ce we cann otapp ly th e e x act s cien t if icd emons trat i on of the ma the m a ti cal science s t o e thics 
 1135b_1819; 1136b_28. The term archḕ_in the_sense_of principle_of_knowledge is used_by Aristotle in_praktà on the one_hand for the_fundamental_practical concepts, and on the other hand for the practical premises on which the_particular_premisses are_based_or_from which they are deduced,_and which constitute the rules_of human_conduct. In EN 1102a 2-4 it is said_that_happiness is a_first principle, for it is for the sake of_happiness that we all do all_that we do_and_the_first principle and cause_of good things is something prized_and divine (taútēs gàr chárin tà_loipà pánta pántes práttomen, tḕn archḕn dè_kaì tò aítion tōn agathōn tímion_ti kaì theion títheme). Happiness_is a_first principle because it is_the cause of_the good_things and for_the sake of this we do_all what we_do. Happiness is also a principle_of_knowledge, for it_is_a_fundamental concept_of knowledge in_praktà,_concerning their_end_(télos), which is the good (agathòn)_and_the supreme good (áriston). 42 capazes de_demonstrar a razão dos_fatos_subordinam as ciências que_se limitam a exibir os_fatos apenas, como os problemas da_óptica estão_subordinados pela_geometria, problemas mecânicos à estereometria, problemas harmônicos à aritmética, os dados_da observação à astronomia. De acordo_com Michelakis (p.11): In_these passages_from_the Analytics a_distinction_of knowledge_is pointed out and this distinction is_based on_whether or not the knowledge gives_the causes (tōn aitíōn_tàs_apodeíxeis). There is a science which_knows the reasons for the facts_and another which knows only_the_facts._The first is mathematical science_(epistḗmē toû dióti), and the second_is empirical science_(tōn aisthētikōn eidénai). The science which knows_the_reasons for the facts is higher,_because_it is the knowledge of the_reason_(akribestéra_epistḗmē). Since we cannot apply_the exact scientific demonstration of the_mathematical sciences to ethics