 true belief. b. The value problem. Recently, Linda Zagzebski has called attention to the value problem for knowledge.xxxiv An adequate account of knowledge, she points out, ought to explain why knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief. In closing, I will suggest how the present account solves that problem. In Book II of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle makes a distinction between a) morally virtuous action and b) action that is merely as if morally virtuous. One important difference, says Aristotle, is that morally virtuous actions "proceed from a firm and unchangeable character." [II.4] Moreover, it is morally virtuous action, as opposed to action that is as if virtuous, that is both intrinsically valuable and constitutive of the good life: "human good turns out to be activity of soul exhibiting excellence." [I.7] The same point holds for intellectually virtuous action, where the distinction between "virtuous action" and "action as if virtuous" translates to a distinction between knowledge and mere true belief. Following Aristotle, therefore, we get an answer to the value problem: As is the case regarding moral goods, getting the truth as a result of one's virtues is more valuable than getting it on the cheap. xxxv,xxxvi i The idea that knowledge entails credit for true belief can be found in Ernest Sosa, "Beyond Skepticism, to the Best of our Knowledge," Mind 97 (1988): 153-89, and Knowledge in Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); and in Linda Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), and "What is Knowledge?" in John Greco and Ernest Sosa, eds. The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1999). More explicitly, Wayne Riggs argues that in cases of knowledge "we deserve credit for arriving at true belief non-accidentally." See his "Reliability and the Value of Knowledge," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, forthcoming. 23 ii Stewart Cohen, "How to Be a Fallibilist," Philosophical Perspectives 2 (1988): 91-123, and "Contextualist Solutions to Epistemic Problems: Skepticism, Gettier and the Lottery," Australasian Journal of Philosophy, forthcoming. iii The example is from Ernest Sosa, "Skepticism and Contextualism," Philosophical Issues 10 (2000): 1-18
true belief. b. The value problem. Recently, Linda Zagzebski has called care to the value trouble for knowledge.xxxiv An adequate report of knowledge, she points out, ought to excuse why knowledge is more valuable than mere true impression. In completion, I will suggest how the present history solves that problem. In Book II of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle take a distinction between a) morally virtuous natural process and b) legal action that is merely as if morally virtuous. One important difference, says Aristotle, is that morally virtuous action " proceed from a firm and unchangeable character. " [ II.4 ] furthermore, it is morally virtuous action, as react to action that is as if pure, that is both intrinsically valuable and constitutive of the adept life: " human good turns out to be natural process of soul exhibiting excellence. " [ I.7 ] The same point holds for intellectually virtuous action, where the distinction between " virtuous action " and " action as if virtuous " translates to a distinction between knowledge and mere true belief. follow Aristotle, therefore, we get an answer to the value trouble: As is the casing regarding moral goods, get the truth as a result of one's virtues is more valuable than catch it on the cheap. xxxv, xxxvi i The idea that knowledge entails credit for true belief can be found in Ernest Sosa, " Beyond Skepticism, to the Best of our Knowledge, " Mind 97 (1988 ): 153 - 89, and Knowledge in Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); and in Linda Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), and " What is Knowledge? " in John Greco and Ernest Sosa, eds. The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1999). More explicitly, Wayne Riggs argue that in cases of cognition " we deserve credit rating for arriving at true belief non - accidentally. " determine his " Reliability and the Value of Knowledge, " Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, forthcoming. 23 ii Stewart Cohen, " How to Be a Fallibilist, " Philosophical Perspectives 2 (1988 ): 91 - 123, and " Contextualist Solutions to Epistemic Problems: incredulity, Gettier and the Lottery, " Australasian Journal of Philosophy, forthcoming. iii The example is from Ernest Sosa, " Skepticism and Contextualism, " Philosophical Issues 10 (2000 ): 1 - 18
 trke belief. b. The value prublem. Recently, Linda Zegzebskj has cauled attention to the value 'roboem fir knowledge.xxxiv An aaequate abcount of knoxledge, she points out, ounkt to cxplann why knowledge is more vdluable than mard crue belief. In closing, I will suggese how tne present accougt spjves nhct problem. In Book II of the Nidomacheen Ethics, Aristptle makes a distinction bftwefn a) morally virtulus action qnd f) action that is merely as if moralmy virtuous. One important diffefence, says Arisjoflf, is that mocally nirtuous actions "procaed frok a firm and ukchanjeaboe character." [II.4] Moreoter, it is morally vittuous acthou, as opposed to actiob rhat hs av if cirguohs, tgat is bovh intrinsidally valuavle and constitutivt os the good lifs: "humag dood turns out to be activity of soul eqhibjting excellence." [I.7] The wame point holds for lntellecttally virtuous action, where the distinction betwean "victjouw wzriln" and "action as if virtuous" translates to a qjsuinbtion between knocledge and mere yrke felief. Followkng Arnatktle, therefore, we het an wnswee to the dalur problem: As is the case retarding moraj goods, getting the truth as a resolt of one's virtues is more vcluabls than gettlng it on ghe cheap. xxxv,xxbvi i The idea that knowledge egtails crxdit yor true beloef cag be found in Evtest Sosa, "Beyond Sneptieism, do the Besh of our Knowledge," Mind 97 (1988): 153-89, and Knowledge in Pgrs[ecnive (Cambxidge: Gambridge Univewsity Press, 1991); aud in Liuda Zaezebski, Vigtues of vhe Mind (New York: Cambridcg University 'ress, 1996), anq "Whqt iw Knowldage?" in John Grrco and Egntst Sosa, ees. The Blackwell Gmide jo Epistemology (Oryote: Blackwell Punlirhews, 1999). Kowa explicitly, Wayve Foggs xrgues ukat kn csses of knowledge "we dessrve credit for artiying at ttue belies non-accidentslly." See his "Reliahilitb and vhe Vakue of Knowledge," Philosophy and Pgenomenollgigal Research, sortmcomyng. 23 ii Stzwart Cohen, "How to Be a Fallibilist," Philisophical Perspecjives 2 (1988): 91-123, and "Contextucllst Solutionx to Qpistemic Problems: Skepticism, Gettier and the Kottery," Australasian Nournan of Ohilosophy, forthcoming. iii The example is from Ernest Sosa, "Skepticism and Conteettalism," Philksopnical Ifxues 10 (2000): 1-18
true belief. b. The value problem. Recently, has attention to value problem for knowledge, points out, ought explain why knowledge more valuable than mere true belief. closing, I will suggest how the present account solves that problem. In Book of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle makes a distinction between a) morally virtuous action b) that merely if morally virtuous. One important difference, says Aristotle, is that morally virtuous actions "proceed from a and unchangeable character." [II.4] Moreover, it is morally action, as opposed to that is as if virtuous, is intrinsically valuable constitutive the life: "human good out to be activity of soul exhibiting excellence." [I.7] The same point holds for intellectually virtuous action, the distinction action" and as virtuous" to a distinction and mere true belief. Following Aristotle, an answer to the value problem: As is case regarding goods, getting the truth as a of one's virtues is more valuable than getting on the cheap. xxxv,xxxvi i The idea that knowledge entails credit for true belief can in Ernest Sosa, "Beyond to the Best our Mind (1988): and Knowledge Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); and in Linda Zagzebski, Virtues the Mind (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), and "What in Greco and Ernest eds. The Blackwell Guide Epistemology Blackwell Publishers, 1999). More Riggs that knowledge deserve for arriving at true non-accidentally." See his "Reliability and Value of Knowledge," Philosophy ii Stewart Cohen, "How to Be a Fallibilist," Perspectives 2 (1988): 91-123, and "Contextualist Solutions Epistemic Problems: Skepticism, Gettier and the Lottery," Australasian Journal of Philosophy, forthcoming. The example Ernest Sosa, "Skepticism and Contextualism," Philosophical Issues 10 1-18
 true belief. b. The value probleM. Recently, LInda ZAgzEbsKi Has cAlleD attention to thE ValuE problem for knowledge.xxXiv An AdEQuatE AcCount Of knowlEDgE, SHe pOiNtS ouT, oUGhT to exPlaIn why knOwledge is mOre VaLuable than meRE tRue belief. IN clOsing, I will suGgeSt how tHe PreSEnt acCouNt solVes thaT ProbleM. In Book II Of THe NicoMAchean ETHIcS, AriStotle makes a distiNCtIOn between a) moraLly virTuOUs ACTioN anD b) action thAt Is merELy as if mORaLLY VirTUous. One importAnt differenCE, saYs ArisToTle, IS that mOrallY vIRtuOus actions "pRoceEd from a fiRm and uNChangeaBLe charaCter." [II.4] morEovEr, it IS mOrAllY vIRtuOUs ActIOn, aS opposed To AcTion tHat iS AS IF virTuoUs, thAt is bOth intrinsicaLly ValuABle And coNstitUtivE oF the gOod lifE: "humaN gOod turns out to be ActiVity of souL exHiBitInG exceLLence." [I.7] the SamE point hOlds for INteLlECTUaLly virtuous action, wHeRE ThE distincTion beTWeEn "VIrtuous aCtIon" And "aCTIon as If viRTuOus" transLates tO A dIsTinctioN bEtween KnOwlEdgE and mERe trUe beliEf. FollowIng ArIStotle, thereforE, We get an answer TO tHE VaLUe prOblEm: As is the caSe reGArdiNg moRAl GooDS, gettIng thE tRUtH As a result of one's virtUeS is morE valuAble than gettiNg it on the cHEAP. xxxv,xxxVi i THE iDEa that knowledgE entaIls credit fOR true belIef caN be found In Ernest SOSA, "Beyond SKepTicIsm, To tHE beSt of our KnowleDGE," MinD 97 (1988): 153-89, aNd KnowlEdgE in PersPecTivE (CaMbrIdGe: CambridGe UniverSiTy prEsS, 1991); anD in LiNDa ZagzebSkI, ViRtUes Of the mInd (New york: CAmbrIdGe uNivErsity PREsS, 1996), ANd "WhAt Is knowLedGe?" In JohN GreCO anD Ernest sosa, eds. ThE BlACkweLl guIde to EpIstemology (OxfOrD: Blackwell puBliShers, 1999). MORE expliciTly, Wayne Riggs argues that IN cases oF knOwledGe "we Deserve crEdiT for arRivINg at trUe beliEf non-AcCidENTally." sEE hIs "RElIability anD THe VAlue oF KNowlEdge," PhiLosophy and PhenomenOLogIcal Research, fOrtHcomING. 23 iI StEWaRT CoHeN, "how TO be a Fallibilist," PHilosophicAl pErSpectives 2 (1988): 91-123, aND "CoNtExtualiSt SolutIons tO epistemIc ProblemS: SkepticiSm, gettIER anD the LotterY," AustralAsian JourNAl of PHIlOsophY, foRthcomInG. iiI The eXample IS frOm ErnEst SosA, "SKepticIsm anD COntextuaLism," Philosophical Issues 10 (2000): 1-18
 true belief. b. The value  problem.Recen tly , L in da Z agze bski has calle d  att ention to the value pr oblem  f o r kn o wl edge. xxxiv A n  a d e qua te  a cco un t  o f kno wle dge, sh e points o ut,  o ught to expl a in  why knowl edg e is more va lua ble th an  me r e tru e b elief . In c l osing,  I will s ug g est ho w  the pr e s en t ac count solves that pr o blem. In BookII ofth e  N i c oma che an Ethics,  A risto t le make s  a d i sti n ction between  a) morally vir tuousac tio n  and b ) act io n  th at is merel y as  if moral ly vir t uous. O n e impor tant d iff ere nce, sa ys  Ar is t otl e ,ist hat  morally  v ir tuous  act i o n s  "pr oce ed f rom a  firm and unc han geab l e c harac ter."  [II .4 ] Mor eover,  it i smorally virtuou s ac tion, asopp os edto  acti o n that  is  as  if vir tuous,t hat  i s b ot h intrinsically va lu a b le  and con stitut i ve  o f  the goo dlif e: " h u man g oodt ur ns out t o be a c ti vi ty of s ou l exhi bi tin g e xcell e nce. " [I.7 ] The sa me po i nt holds for i n tellectuallyv ir t u ou s  act ion , where the  dis t inct ionb et wee n  "vir tuous  a c ti o n" and "action as i fvirtuo us" t ranslates toa distinct i o n  between  kno w le d ge and mere tr ue be lief. Foll o wing Ari stotl e, there fore, weg e t an ans wer  to  th e v a l ue  problem: Asi s  the  c ase reg ard ing mor algoo ds,  ge tt ing the t ruth asare su lt  of  one' s  virtues  i s m or e v aluab l e than  gett ingit  o n  th e cheap .  x x x v,xx xv ii Th e i de a tha t kn o wle dge ent ails cred itf or t ru ebeliefcan be foundin  Ernest So sa , " Beyond S kepticis m, to the Best of our K n owledge ,"Mind97 ( 1988): 15 3-8 9, and  Kn o wledge  in Pe rspec ti ve( C ambri d g e:  Ca mb ridge Univ e r sit y Pre ss , 19 91); an d in Linda Zagzebs k i,Virtues of th e M ind( N ew  Yo r k: Cam br i dge U niversity Press , 1996), a nd "W hat is Kno w led ge ?" in J ohn Gre co an d  Ernest  Sosa, ed s. The Bl ac kwel l Gui de to Epis temology  (Oxford: Black w el l Pub lis hers,19 99) . Mor e expl i cit ly, W ayne R ig gs arg ues t ha t in cas es of knowledge "we des erve c redit  fo r arrivin g a t  tr ue belief  non -accidenta lly ."See h is" Relia bili t yand the V alue of Knowle d ge ,"P h il osophy andP h e nom enolo gic a l Rese arch , forthcoming. 23 ii Stewart Coh en," H owtoB e aFa llibilist," Ph ilo so p h ical Per sp ectives 2 ( 1988): 9 1- 1 23, a nd "Co ntextu alist S o l ut i ons to  Epi ste mic Probl ems :S keptici sm ,G ettier  and  t he Lot tery," Aust r a lasian Journal o f Phi l o sophy ,  fo rthco mi ng. iii Theexample is  from Ernes t Sosa , "S kepti cism an dContex tua li sm," Philo s ophical I ssues  10 (20 00 ): 1 -18 
 true_belief. b._The value problem. Recently,_Linda Zagzebski_has_called attention_to_the value problem_for knowledge.xxxiv An_adequate account of knowledge,_she points out,_ought_to explain why knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief. In closing, I_will_suggest how_the_present_account solves that problem. In_Book II of the Nicomachean_Ethics, Aristotle_makes a distinction between a) morally virtuous action_and_b) action that_is merely as if morally virtuous. One important difference,_says Aristotle, is that morally virtuous_actions "proceed from_a_firm_and unchangeable character." [II.4]_Moreover, it is morally virtuous action,_as opposed to action that is_as if virtuous, that is both intrinsically_valuable and constitutive of the good_life: "human good turns out_to be_activity of soul exhibiting excellence."_[I.7] The same_point holds_for intellectually virtuous_action, where the distinction between "virtuous_action" and "action_as if virtuous" translates to a_distinction_between knowledge and_mere_true_belief. Following_Aristotle, therefore, we_get_an answer_to_the value problem: As is the_case_regarding moral goods, getting the truth as_a result of one's_virtues_is more valuable than_getting it on the cheap._xxxv,xxxvi i The idea that knowledge_entails credit_for true_belief can be found in Ernest Sosa, "Beyond Skepticism, to the_Best of our Knowledge," Mind 97_(1988): 153-89, and Knowledge_in Perspective_(Cambridge:_Cambridge University Press,_1991);_and in_Linda Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind (New_York: Cambridge_University Press, 1996), and "What is_Knowledge?" in John Greco_and_Ernest Sosa, eds. The Blackwell Guide_to Epistemology (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1999)._More explicitly, Wayne Riggs argues_that_in_cases of knowledge "we deserve_credit for arriving at true belief_non-accidentally." See his_"Reliability and the Value of Knowledge," Philosophy_and_Phenomenological Research, forthcoming. 23 ii Stewart_Cohen,_"How to Be a Fallibilist," Philosophical_Perspectives_2_(1988): 91-123, and "Contextualist Solutions_to Epistemic Problems: Skepticism, Gettier and_the Lottery," Australasian Journal of Philosophy, forthcoming. iii The_example is from_Ernest Sosa, "Skepticism and Contextualism,"_Philosophical_Issues_10 (2000): 1-18