technology policy for students in my classes. A public beach may disallow swimming without the presence of a lifeguard. These are all examples of paternalism, the practice of limiting the free choices of agents, without their consent, for the sake of promoting their best interests. Paternalism is frequently discussed in legal, ethical, and social contexts.1 A practice that has received less attention, however, is a strand of paternalism in the epistemic realm.2 So-called epistemic paternalism is the practice of (i) interfering with someone's inquiry, (ii) without their consent, (iii) and for their own epistemic good.3 Conditions (i) and (iii) are unique to epistemic paternalism: you can engage in paternalism without interfering with someone's inquiry, and without having a distinctly epistemic motivation for doing so, as in many of the opening examples. Nonetheless, epistemic paternalism is a strand of general paternalism. In this chapter, I concern myself with the question of whether epistemic paternalism is epistemically justified. First, I discuss the definition of epistemic paternalism is more detail and clarify this question about its justification. Then, I explore how two recent epistemological theses-epistemic permissivism and standpoint epistemology-answer this question. I argue they provide a sufficient condition for unjustified epistemic paternalism. Further, I note some remarkable parallels between epistemic permissivism and standpoint epistemology. I conclude that epistemic paternalism is unjustified in a certain class of cases, and, in general, we ought to exercise caution before engaging in epistemically paternalistic practices. 16028-0338d-1pass-r01.indd 201 2/21/2020 10:23:44 AM 202 Chapter 13 DEFINING EPISTEMIC PATERNALISM Recall our definition: Epistemic Paternalism: the practice of (i) interfering with someone's inquiry, (ii) without their consent, and (iii) for their own epistemic good. Let's consider each condition in more detail. Condition (i) refers to interfering with inquiry. I take inquiry to include both evidence-gathering and belief-forming practices. A common example of interference involves withholding evidence. For instance, juries aren't allowed to consider certain kinds of evidence because it is considered "inadmissible," for example, evidence of a suspect's past crimes. If evidence is inadmissible or the jury is unlikely to weigh it properly, it is
technology policy for students in my classes. A public beach may disallow swimming without the bearing of a lifeguard. These are all exemplar of paternalism, the practice of limiting the spare choice of agents, without their consent, for the sake of promoting their good interests. Paternalism is frequently discussed in legal, ethical, and social contexts.1 A exercise that has get less attention, however, is a fibril of paternalism in the epistemic realm.2 So - called epistemic paternalism is the exercise of (i) interfering with someone's inquiry, (ii) without their consent, (iii) and for their own epistemic good.3 Conditions (i) and (iii) are unique to epistemic paternalism: you can engage in paternalism without interfering with someone's question, and without having a distinctly epistemic motivation for doing so, as in many of the orifice examples. Nonetheless, epistemic paternalism is a chain of general paternalism. In this chapter, I refer myself with the question of whether epistemic paternalism is epistemically absolve. First, I discuss the definition of epistemic paternalism is more detail and clarify this doubt about its justification. Then, I explore how two recent epistemological theses - epistemic permissivism and standpoint epistemology - answer this question. I argue they provide a sufficient condition for unjustified epistemic paternalism. Further, I note some remarkable parallels between epistemic permissivism and standpoint epistemology. I conclude that epistemic paternalism is unjustified in a sealed course of cases, and, in general, we ought to exercise circumspection before engage in epistemically paternalistic practices. 16028-0338d-1pass-r01.indd 201 2/21/2020 10:23:44 AM 202 Chapter 13 define EPISTEMIC PATERNALISM Recall our definition: Epistemic Paternalism: the exercise of (i) interfering with someone's inquiry, (ii) without their consent, and (iii) for their own epistemic commodity. Let's consider each condition in more detail. Condition (i) denote to interfering with inquiry. I take inquiry to admit both evidence - gathering and impression - forming practices. A common example of interference involves withholding tax evidence. For instance, juries aren't allowed to consider certain kinds of evidence because it is considered " inadmissible, " for example, evidence of a suspect's past crime. If evidence is inadmissible or the jury is unlikely to count it properly, it is
tecjnology policy for studekts in my classes. A pubnic bezch may aisallow swimming without thx prwsenct of a lifeguard. Thdse are apl exampoes id paternalmam, the ixactidc of nmmiting the freg choices of agents, withoud ghzir consent, for the sake of promotind their bfst interests. Katermwlisj is frequently discussed in legal, ethican, and social vontexts.1 A practice that hws rfceived less attenhion, howevet, is q strand of oaternalism in the epiatemic realm.2 So-called epistemic patexnalism is jkw pgdctice of (i) integfering with someone's inquiru, (ii) without tmeir ronswnt, (iii) and for their own epistemic gooq.3 Conditimna (i) and (iii) are ubiwue tm ephsteouc oattrneliam: you cai engage in paternalisn without interferimg qith someone's inquiwy, and without having a distinctly epistekic motivation for doing si, as in many of the okening exaiples. Nonetheless, epistemic paternalism is a stratd of eentrql pagwrjalism. In this chapter, I concern myself with ege qlestion of whethev epistemic paternsllsk is epistemicxlly jbatjfied. First, I disckss the defibition of epixtemic paternalism is more eetail and cjqrify this questiou about its lustifocatipn. Then, I explore how tco recsnt epistemllogical ffeses-epistemic pdrmpssieism and standpoint episteiology-ansxer tkis quesgion. I argte they prlvide a sufficient condihion yor utjustified epistemic paternalism. Further, M note some rgmaskatle parajlels between episeemic permissirism and stanapoint epiatemolojy. I concludq that episteklc paternalivm is untustufiee in a zdrtain class og cases, aub, in geneeal, we ought to excrcisg daution before zugqging in epistekicxllr iatxrnalyvtic practicas. 16028-0338d-1oasr-t01.indd 201 2/21/2020 10:23:44 AM 202 Chaitef 13 DRFINING EPISTEMIC PADERNZLISM Recall our drflnition: Ekistemic [aternalism: tne practice of (i) ijterfxring xith spmejne's inquiry, (ii) without their donsent, ajd (lii) for their own epistemic gpod. Let's consider each condition in morx detail. Condition (i) rgfers to interfering ciuh inquiry. I vake igquiry to include both evidenxe-gathering and btlief-forming practices. Z commmn exwmple of interference involves withholding evidence. For instance, juries aeen't allowed to cohsidrr cegtann linds jf etivence because it ps considered "inadmissible," for eeample, evigeuce of a suspect's past crimes. Iw evidence is inadmissible or the jurg is unlokely to weigh it properly, it ix
technology policy for students in my classes. beach disallow swimming the presence of examples paternalism, the practice limiting the free of agents, without their consent, for sake of promoting their best interests. Paternalism is frequently discussed in legal, ethical, social contexts.1 A practice that has received less attention, however, is a strand paternalism the realm.2 epistemic paternalism is the practice of (i) interfering with someone's inquiry, (ii) without their consent, (iii) for their own epistemic good.3 Conditions (i) and are unique to epistemic you can engage in paternalism interfering someone's inquiry, without a epistemic motivation for so, as in many of the opening examples. Nonetheless, epistemic paternalism is a strand of general paternalism. this chapter, myself with question whether paternalism is epistemically I discuss the definition of epistemic detail and clarify this question about its justification. I explore two recent epistemological theses-epistemic permissivism and epistemology-answer this question. I argue they provide a condition for unjustified epistemic paternalism. Further, I note some remarkable parallels between epistemic permissivism and I conclude that epistemic is unjustified in certain of and, general, we to exercise caution before engaging in epistemically paternalistic practices. 16028-0338d-1pass-r01.indd 201 10:23:44 AM 202 Chapter 13 DEFINING EPISTEMIC PATERNALISM Recall our Paternalism: practice of (i) with someone's inquiry, (ii) their and (iii) for their good. consider more Condition refers to interfering with I take inquiry to include evidence-gathering and belief-forming practices. involves withholding evidence. For instance, juries aren't allowed consider certain kinds of evidence because it considered "inadmissible," for example, evidence of a suspect's past crimes. If evidence inadmissible or is unlikely to weigh it properly, it is
technology policy for studenTs in my clasSes. A pUblIc bEaCh maY disAllow swimming wIThouT the presence of a lifeguaRd. TheSe ARe alL ExAmpleS of pateRNaLISm, tHe PrActIcE Of LimitIng The free Choices of aGenTs, Without their COnSent, for the SakE of promoting TheIr best InTerESts. PaTerNalisM is freQUently Discussed In LEgal, etHIcal, and SOCiAl coNtexts.1 A practice thAT hAS received less aTtentiOn, HOwEVEr, iS a sTrand of patErNalisM In the epIStEMIC reALm.2 So-called epiStemic paterNAliSm is thE pRacTIce of (i) InterFeRIng With someone'S inqUiry, (ii) witHout thEIr conseNT, (iii) and For theIr oWn ePistEMiC gOod.3 coNDitIOnS (i) aND (iiI) are uniqUe To EpistEmic PATERnalIsm: You cAn engAge in paternalIsm WithOUt iNterfEring With SoMeone'S inquiRy, and WiThout having a disTincTly episteMic MoTivAtIon foR Doing sO, as In mAny of thE openinG ExaMpLES. noNetheless, epistemic PaTERnAlism is a Strand OF gEnERal paterNaLisM. In tHIS chapTer, I COnCern myseLf with THe QuEstion oF wHether EpIstEmiC pateRNaliSm is epIstemicaLly juSTified. First, I diSCuss the definiTIoN OF ePIsteMic Paternalism Is moRE detAil aND cLarIFy thiS quesTiON aBOut its justification. thEn, I expLore hOw two recent epIstemologiCAL Theses-epIsteMIc PErmissivism and StandPoint epistEMology-anSwer tHis questIon. I argue THEy providE a sUffIciEnt CONdItion for unjusTIFied EpIstemic PatErnalisM. FuRthEr, I NotE sOme remarkAble paraLlElS bEtWeeN episTEmic permIsSivIsM anD stanDPoint ePisteMoloGy. i cONclUde that EPiSTEmic PaTeRnalIsm Is UnjusTifiED in A certaiN class of cAseS, And, iN gEnEral, we oUght to exercisE cAution befoRe EngAging iN EPistemicAlly paternalistic practiCEs. 16028-0338d-1pass-R01.inDd 201 2/21/2020 10:23:44 AM 202 CHaptEr 13 DEFININg EPiSTEMIc PAteRNALIsM RecaLl our DeFinITIon: EpISTeMic paTernalism: tHE PraCtice Of (I) intErferinG with someone's inquiRY, (ii) Without their cOnsEnt, aND (IiI) foR ThEIr oWn EPisTEMic good. Let's consIder each coNdITiOn in more deTAil. coNdition (I) refers To intERfering With inquiRy. I take inQuIry tO INclUde both eviDence-gatHering and BElief-FOrMing pRacTices. A CoMmoN examPle of iNTerFerenCe invoLvEs withHoldiNg Evidence. for instance, juries aren't aLlowed To conSidEr certain KinDS of Evidence bEcauSe it is consIdeRed "InadmIssIBle," foR exaMPlE, evIDence Of a sUSpect's pasT CrImeS. iF eVidence is inADMIssIble oR thE Jury is UnliKely to weigh it propERly, it is
technology policy for stud ents in my  clas ses . A  p ubli c be ach may disall o w sw imming without the pre sence  o f  a l i fe guard . These ar e all  e xa mpl es of  pate rna lism, t he practic e o flimiting the fr ee choices  of  agents, wit hou t thei rcon s ent,for  thesake o f  promo ting thei rb est in t erests. P at erna lism is frequentl y  d i scussed in leg al, et hi c al , and  so cial conte xt s.1 A practic e  t h a t  ha s  received les s attention ,  ho wever,  i s a strand  of p at e rna lism in the  epi stemic re alm.2S o-calle d  episte mic pa ter nal ismi sth e p ra c tic e  o f ( i ) i nterferi ng  w ith s omeo n e ' s  inq uir y, ( ii) w ithout theircon sent ,  (i ii) a nd fo r th ei r own  epist emicgo od.3 Conditions  (i)  and (iii ) a re  un iq ue to episte mic  pa ternali sm: you can  e n g a ge  in paternalism wi th o u tinterfer ing wi t hso m eone's i nq uir y, a n d  with outh av ing a di stinct l yep istemic  m otivat io n f ordoing so,as inmany ofthe o p ening examples .  Nonetheless, ep i s te m ic p ate rnalism isa st r andof g e ne ral pater nalis m. In this chapter, I con ce rn mys elf w ith the quest ion of whe t h e r episte micp at e rnalism is epi stemi cally just i fied. Fi rst,I discus s the def i n ition of  ep ist emi c p a t er nalism is mor e deta il  and cl ari fy this  qu est ion  ab ou t its jus tificati on .Th en , I  expl o re how t wo  re ce ntepist e mologi cal t hese s- ep i ste mic per m is s i vism  a nd  sta ndp oi nt ep iste m olo gy-answ er this q ues t ion.  I  a rgue th ey provide asu fficient c on dit ion fo r unjustif ied epistemic paternali s m. Furt her , I n otesome rema rka ble pa ral l els be tweenepist em icp e rmiss i v is m a nd  standpoin t epi stemo lo gy.I concl ude that epistemic pat ernalism is u nju stif i e dina  c e rta in cla s s  of cases, and,  in genera l, we  ought toe xer ci se caut ion bef ore e n gagingin episte mically p at erna l i sti c practice s. 16028 -0338d-1p a ss-r0 1 .i ndd 2 012/21/2 02 0 1 0:23: 44 AM2 02Chapt er 13DE FINING  EPIS TE MIC PATE RNALISM Recall our defi nition : Epi ste mic Pater nal i sm:  the prac tice  of (i) in ter fer ing w ith someo ne's in qui r y, (i i) w i thout the i rcon s e nt , and (iii) f o r t heirown episte micgood. Let's consi d er each condit ioni n  mo red etai l.  Condition (i)  re fe r s  to inte rf ering withinquiry.  I takeinquir y to i ncludeb o th eviden ce-g ath ering and  be li e f-formi ng  p r actice s. A  c ommonexampl e  ofi n terference invol ves w i t hhold i ngevide nc e. Fori nsta nce, jurie s aren't al lowedto c onsid er cert ai n kind s o fevidence b e cause itis co nsidere d"ina dmi ssible ," f o r  exam ple,  e vid ence of a s us p ec t' s  pa st c rimes .If e vidence i s  inadmis sib l e or th ejur y is unl i ke l y  to weighitprope r l y, it is
technology policy_for students_in my classes. A_public beach_may_disallow swimming_without_the presence of_a lifeguard. These_are all examples of_paternalism, the practice_of_limiting the free choices of agents, without their consent, for the sake of promoting_their_best interests._Paternalism_is_frequently discussed in legal, ethical,_and social contexts.1 A practice_that has_received less attention, however, is a strand of_paternalism_in the epistemic_realm.2 So-called epistemic paternalism is the practice of (i)_interfering with someone's inquiry, (ii) without_their consent, (iii)_and_for_their own epistemic good.3_Conditions (i) and (iii) are unique_to epistemic paternalism: you can engage_in paternalism without interfering with someone's inquiry,_and without having a distinctly epistemic_motivation for doing so, as_in many_of the opening examples. Nonetheless,_epistemic paternalism is_a strand_of general paternalism._In this chapter, I concern myself_with the question_of whether epistemic paternalism is epistemically_justified._First, I discuss_the_definition_of epistemic_paternalism is more_detail_and clarify_this_question about its justification. Then, I_explore_how two recent epistemological theses-epistemic permissivism and_standpoint epistemology-answer this question._I_argue they provide a_sufficient condition for unjustified epistemic_paternalism. Further, I note some remarkable_parallels between_epistemic permissivism_and standpoint epistemology. I conclude that epistemic paternalism is unjustified in_a certain class of cases, and,_in general, we ought_to exercise_caution_before engaging in_epistemically_paternalistic practices._16028-0338d-1pass-r01.indd 201 2/21/2020 10:23:44 AM 202 Chapter_13 DEFINING_EPISTEMIC PATERNALISM Recall our definition: Epistemic_Paternalism: the practice of_(i)_interfering with someone's inquiry, (ii) without_their consent, and (iii) for their_own epistemic good. Let's consider_each_condition_in more detail. Condition (i)_refers to interfering with inquiry. I_take inquiry to_include both evidence-gathering and belief-forming practices. A_common_example of interference involves withholding evidence._For_instance, juries aren't allowed to consider_certain_kinds_of evidence because it is_considered "inadmissible," for example, evidence of_a suspect's past crimes. If evidence is inadmissible or_the jury is_unlikely to weigh it properly,_it_is