 their tokens; but the tokens of one expression are different from the tokens of every other expression, and so we cannot get sameness of meaning. I have no direct refutation of this view. But I find its conclusion too quick. It is true that meanings, as usually conceived, are too fine grained for finding synonymy between token-reflexive expressions. But meanings are usually conceived this way because philosophers tend to reflect on the meanings of expressions that are not token-reflexive. And for those expressions, there is no difference between meanings and meaning-forms. So I prefer the conclusion that token-reflexivity teaches us something about synonymy, rather than the view that our usual conception of synonymy breaks down when faced with token-reflexivity. 6.2 Relaxing Token-Reflexivity As I said at the beginning, it remains open to say that indexicals are not token-reflexive. If that is correct, my account only applies to artificially introduced expressions like ζ. But one does not need to go that far: one could attempt not to reject, but to modify (A). Let us start with "I" and "je". The problem we are dealing with is that their meanings seem to be about different tokens, since each expression's tokens differ from the other's. So one solution is to make the meanings of these expressions depend not on their tokens, but on any tokens whatsoever. 17 One could propose this view simply as a way to solve our original problem. But there is a less ad-hoc way to motivate it, by appealing to certain special features of the first person pronoun, and other context-sensitive expressions, namely that any tokening has someone who counts as the speaker, whether they use the word "I", "je", or, indeed, no pronoun whatsoever. This option would make the meaning of "I" something like the following: Character Rule for All Tokens: Relative to any token, the meaning of "I" yields the speaker of that token.16 Obviously, the right-most part of this rule ("yields the speaker of that token") does not mention "I", and thus the rule will be identical for "je". So we get to preserve sameness of meaning. The cost is that we lose reflexivity, since the rule now yields a referent for the expression relative to all tokens, not just tokens of that particular expression. I have three objections to this kind of proposal. First, it yields counterintuitive
their tokens; but the tokens of one expression are different from the token of every early expression, and so we cannot arrive sameness of meaning. I own no direct refutation of this scene. But I find oneself its conclusion too quick. It is true that meaning, as usually conceived, are besides all right grained for finding synonymy between nominal - reflexive expression. But meaning are usually conceived this way because philosopher tend to reflect on the meanings of expressions that are not token - automatic. And for those expressions, there exist no difference between meanings and meaning - forms. therefore I prefer the conclusion that token - reflexivity teaches us something about synonymy, rather than the view that our usual conception of synonymy breaks down when faced with token - reflexivity. 6.2 Relaxing Token - Reflexivity As I said at the beginning, it remains open to say that indexicals are not token - automatic. If that is right, my account only applies to artificially insert expressions like ζ. But one does not need to go that far: one could try not to reject, but to modify (A). Let us begin with " I " and " je ". The problem we are dealing with is that their meanings seem to be about different tokens, since each formulation's tokens differ from the other's. So one solution is to hold the meanings of these expression count not on their tokens, but on any tokens whatsoever. 17 One could propose this view simply as a way to solve our original problem. But there be a less ad - hoc way to motivate it, by appealing to certain special feature of the first person pronoun, and early context - sensitive expressions, namely that any tokening has someone who counts as the speaker, whether they practice the word " I ", " je ", or, indeed, no pronoun whatsoever. This option would make the meaning of " I " something like the following: Character Rule for All Tokens: proportional to any token, the meaning of " I " yields the speaker of that token.16 Obviously, the correctly - most part of this principle (" yields the speaker of that token ") does not mention " I ", and thus the rule will be identical for " je ". So we get to preserve sameness of meaning. The monetary value is that we lose reflexivity, since the rule immediately yields a referent for the expression proportional to all tokens, not just tokens of that particular expression. I have three objections to this kind of proposal. First, it yields counterintuitive
 thfir tokens; but the tokenr of one expression arx diffedent froo the tokens of every other xxprwssiob, and so we cannot get sameness of meanung. M have no direct refutatljn or thiv view. But I fikd its concnusion too quiwk. Ic is true that meanings, as usually cjnceivec, wre too fine gtainec for finding synonymy between token-refmexive txpressions. But mesnings are usually conceivfd tjis way because phllosophers jsnd ro reflect ov the meanpugs of exprgssions that are not token-reflexkve. Aud for thosg sxotessions, thece is go differencc betwean meanongs and meanikg-forks. Wo I prefer the conclnsion that token-reflgxivity tedckes us something abour wynonimy, rdthef thxn uhe vjew thwt kur usual donception if synonymy breaks corb when faced sith tjkqn-reflexivity. 6.2 Relaxing Token-Reflexivitj As I said at the beginnint, it remains open to day that yndexicals are not token-reflexive. If that is corract, mb xcciukt ovoy applies to artificially introduced expressioga kile ζ. But one docs not need to go yhwt sar: one could attem'f hot to reject, but ho modisy (A). Oet us stwrt eith "I" and "je". The problem ww are dealiny wuth is that their leanings sezm to ne abput different tokens, siuce eadh expressiln's tokena differ from the otmer'v. So one solution is to mahe the meeningx of thdse gxpressyons depenf not on their tokens, buh on cny tmkens whatdoever. 17 One could propose this tmew simply as a waj to solvz our priginal probjem. But there ns a lesf ad-huc way to jotivatx it, by appewling to certdln special fxatures os thw fiest perrun pronoun, and other couuext-sensituve expressions, nakeli fhat any tokeniuy yas someone who cojntf ws tra speaker, whathef tfry usd the word "L", "jd", or, indeed, no pronoun wvatskever. This option eomld make jhe meanigg of "I" sometning like the folllwing: Cheractet Role for All Tokens: Relative to zny token, thc meaning of "Y" yiclds the speakzr of that token.16 Obviously, the right-most part of this rulg ("yields the speaker pn that token") does not menthon "I", and thus the ryle will be identlcal for "je". So we get fo preverve sameness of meaning. The cost is that we lose reflexivity, since the rule bow yixlqs a refereht fpr thv erprzssion welavite to all tokens, mot just tokens of that particuuar exprasfion. I have three objections tu this kind ow proposal. First, it yielss countrrintuitive
their tokens; but the tokens of one different the tokens every other expression, sameness meaning. I have direct refutation of view. But I find its conclusion quick. It is true that meanings, as usually conceived, are too fine grained finding synonymy between token-reflexive expressions. But meanings are usually conceived this way because tend reflect the of expressions that are not token-reflexive. And for those expressions, there is no difference between meanings meaning-forms. So I prefer the conclusion that token-reflexivity us something about synonymy, than the view that our conception synonymy breaks when with 6.2 Relaxing Token-Reflexivity I said at the beginning, it remains open to say that indexicals are not token-reflexive. If that correct, my applies to introduced like But one does to go that far: one could reject, but to modify (A). Let us start "I" and The problem we are dealing with that their meanings seem to be about different since each expression's tokens differ from the other's. So one solution is to make the these expressions depend not their tokens, but any whatsoever. One propose this simply as a way to solve our original problem. But there a less ad-hoc way to motivate it, by appealing to features the first person and other context-sensitive expressions, that tokening has someone who the whether word "je", indeed, no pronoun whatsoever. option would make the meaning "I" something like the Tokens: Relative to any token, the meaning of yields the speaker of that token.16 Obviously, right-most part of this rule ("yields the speaker of that token") does mention "I", the rule will be identical for "je". So get to preserve sameness meaning. The cost is that we lose reflexivity, since rule yields a for the expression to all tokens, just tokens of expression. I three to proposal. First, it yields counterintuitive
 their tokens; but the tokens of One expressIon arE diFfeReNt frOm thE tokens of every OTher Expression, and so we cannoT get sAmENess OF mEaninG. I have nO DiRECt rEfUtAtiOn OF tHis viEw. BUt I find Its conclusIon ToO quick. It is trUE tHat meaningS, as Usually conceIveD, are toO fIne GRaineD foR findIng synONymy beTween tokeN-rEFlexivE ExpressIONs. but mEanings are usually COnCEived this way beCause pHiLOsOPHerS teNd to reflecT oN the mEAnings oF ExPRESsiONs that are not tOken-reflexiVE. AnD for thOsE exPRessioNs, theRe IS no Difference bEtweEn meaningS and meANing-forMS. So I preFer the ConCluSion THaT tOkeN-rEFleXIvIty TEacHes us somEtHiNg aboUt syNONYMy, raTheR thaN the vIew that our usuAl cOncePTioN of syNonymY breAkS down When faCed wiTh Token-reflexivitY. 6.2 RelAxing TokeN-ReFlExiViTy As I SAid at tHe bEgiNning, it Remains OPen To SAY ThAt indexicals are not ToKEN-rEflexive. if that IS cOrREct, my accOuNt oNly aPPLies tO artIFiCially inTroducED eXpRessionS lIke ζ. BuT oNe dOes Not neED to gO that fAr: one couLd attEMpt not to reject, BUt to modify (A). LeT Us STArT With "i" anD "je". The problEm we ARe deAlinG WiTh iS That tHeir mEaNInGS seem to be about diffeReNt tokeNs, sinCe each expressIon's tokens DIFFer from tHe otHEr'S. so one solution iS to maKe the meaniNGs of thesE exprEssions dEpend not oN THeir tokeNs, bUt oN anY toKENs Whatsoever. 17 One COUld pRoPose thiS viEw simplY as A waY to SolVe Our originAl probleM. BUt ThErE is A less AD-hoc way tO mOtiVaTe iT, by apPEaling To cerTain SpEcIAl fEatures OF tHE FirsT pErSon pRonOuN, and oTher COntExt-sensItive exprEssIOns, nAmElY that anY tokening has sOmEone who couNtS as The speAKEr, whetheR they use the word "I", "je", or, indEEd, no proNouN whatSoevEr. This optIon Would mAke THe meanIng of "I" SometHiNg lIKE the fOLLoWinG: CHaracter RuLE For all ToKeNs: ReLative tO any token, the meaninG Of "I" Yields the speaKer Of thAT ToKen.16 oBvIOusLy, THe rIGHt-most part of thiS rule ("yieldS tHE sPeaker of thAT toKeN") does noT mentioN "I", and THus the rUle will be Identical FoR "je". SO WE geT to preservE samenesS of meaninG. the coST iS that We lOse refLeXivIty, siNce the RUle Now yiElds a rEfErent fOr the ExPression Relative to all tokens, not jUst tokEns of ThaT particulAr eXPreSsion. I havE thrEe objectioNs tO thIs kinD of PRoposAl. FiRSt, It yIElds cOuntERintuitivE
 their tokens; but the tok ens of one  expr ess ion  a re d iffe rent from thet oken s of every other expre ssion ,a nd s o  w e can not get sa m e nes sof  me an i ng . I h ave  no dir ect refuta tio nof this view .  B ut I findits  conclusiontoo  quick .Iti s tru e t hat m eaning s , as u sually co nc e ived,a re toof i ne  gra ined for findings yn o nymy between t oken-r ef l ex i v e e xpr essions. B ut  mean i ngs are us u a l lyc onceived this  way becaus e  ph ilosop he rst end to  refl ec t  on  the meanin gs o f express ions t h at aren ot toke n-refl exi ve.  And fo rtho se exp r es sio n s,there is  n odiffe renc e b e twee n m eani ngs a nd meaning-fo rms . So I p refer  theconc lu sionthat t oken- re flexivity teach es u s somethi ngab out  s ynony m y, rat her  th an theview th a t o ur u s ua l conception of sy no n y my  breaksdown w h en  f a ced with  t oke n-re f l exivi ty.6 .2  Relaxin g Toke n -R ef lexivit yAs I s ai d a t t he be g inni ng, it  remains  open to say that in d exicals are n o tt o ke n -ref lex ive. If tha t is corr ect, my  ac c ountonlyap p li e s to artificially i nt roduce d exp ressions like  ζ. But on e d oes notneed to go that far: o ne co uld attemp t  not torejec t, but t o modify( A ). Let u s s tar t w ith " I"  and "je". Th e prob le m we ar e d ealingwit h i s t hat  t heir mean ings see mto  b eabo ut di f ferent t ok ens ,sin ce ea c h expr essio n'sto ke n s d iffer f r om t he o th er 's.Soon e sol utio n  is  to mak e the mea nin g s of  t he se expr essions depen dnot on the ir  to kens,b u t on any  tokens whatsoever. 17O ne coul d p ropos e th is view s imp ly asa w a y to s olve o ur or ig ina l probl e m .But  t here is al e ssad-ho cwayto moti vate it, by appeal i ngto certain sp eci al f e a tu res of the  f i rst p erson pronoun,and otherco n te xt-sensiti v e e xp ression s, name ly th a t any t okening h as someon ewhoc o unt s as the s peaker,whether t h ey us e  t he wo rd"I", " je ",or, i ndeed, noprono un wha ts oever.  This  o ption wo uld make the meaning of  "I" s ometh ing  like the  fo l low ing: Char acte r Rule for  Al l T okens : R e lativ e to an y t o ken,them eaning of "I " y i e ld s the speak e r ofthattok e n.16 O bvio usly, the right-m o st part of thi s ru l e  (" yie l ds t he  speaker of th atto k e n") does  n ot mention"I", and  t h us th e rule  willbe iden t i ca l  for " je".  So  we get t o p re s erve sa me ne s s of m eani ng . Thecost i s  tha t we lose reflexiv ity,s i nce t h e r ule n ow  yields a re ferent for  the expres sion r elat ive t o all t ok ens, n otju st tokenso f that pa rticu lar exp re ssio n.I have  thr e e  obje ctio ns  to  this kin d of pr op o sal . Fi rst,it  yie lds count e rintuiti ve
 their_tokens; but_the tokens of one_expression are_different_from the_tokens_of every other_expression, and so_we cannot get sameness_of meaning. I_have_no direct refutation of this view. But I find its conclusion too quick. It_is_true that_meanings,_as_usually conceived, are too fine_grained for finding synonymy between_token-reflexive expressions._But meanings are usually conceived this way because_philosophers_tend to reflect_on the meanings of expressions that are not token-reflexive._And for those expressions, there is_no difference between_meanings_and_meaning-forms. So I prefer_the conclusion that token-reflexivity teaches us_something about synonymy, rather than the_view that our usual conception of synonymy_breaks down when faced with token-reflexivity._6.2 Relaxing Token-Reflexivity As I_said at_the beginning, it remains open_to say that_indexicals are_not token-reflexive. If_that is correct, my account only_applies to artificially_introduced expressions like ζ. But one_does_not need to_go_that_far: one_could attempt not_to_reject, but_to_modify (A). Let us start with_"I"_and "je". The problem we are dealing_with is that their_meanings_seem to be about_different tokens, since each expression's_tokens differ from the other's. So_one solution_is to_make the meanings of these expressions depend not on their tokens,_but on any tokens whatsoever. 17_One could propose this_view simply_as_a way to_solve_our original_problem. But there is a less ad-hoc_way to_motivate it, by appealing to certain_special features of the_first_person pronoun, and other context-sensitive expressions,_namely that any tokening has someone_who counts as the speaker,_whether_they_use the word "I", "je",_or, indeed, no pronoun whatsoever. This_option would make_the meaning of "I" something like the_following:_Character Rule for All Tokens: Relative_to_any token, the meaning of "I"_yields_the_speaker of that token.16 Obviously,_the right-most part of this rule_("yields the speaker of that token") does not mention_"I", and thus_the rule will be identical_for_"je"._So we get to preserve sameness of meaning. The cost_is that_we lose reflexivity,_since the rule now yields a referent for the expression_relative to all tokens, not just tokens_of that particular expression. I have three objections to this kind_of proposal. First, it yields counterintuitive