, hair, etc., in the Parmenides.21 Since dirt is dirt, it follows that the proposition "Dirt is dirt" is valid, so a fortiori <dirt> has whatever mode of being/actuality propositional constituents have. The generality of Lotze's semantic theory means he must accept concepts of everything that can be the topic of a valid judgement, given (†), which includes absolutely everything. The difficult question is how to distinguish Lotze's Platonism from the Platonism he rejects, on which propositions and their constituents are hypostatized as "things." He writes: For the Greeks that which is not in space is not at all, and when Plato banishes the Ideas to this non-spatial home, this is not an attempt to hypostasize their mere validity into any kind of existential being [seiender Wirklichkeit], but rather a clear effort to ward off any such attempt from the outset. [...] Nevertheless although these various utterances point one and all to the fact that Plato only ever asserted the eternal validity of Ideas, but never their existence [Sein], he still had no better answer to give to the question, what then are they, than to bring them again under the general concept of ousia; thus was opened a door to a misunderstanding, which has since been propagated further, although one never knew how to say, on the hypothesis that blames him for this, exactly what it is that Plato is supposed to have hypostasized his Ideas into. (L §318, 516) The hypostatic Platonist takes propositions and their constituents (Forms/ concepts) to fall under the first mode of actuality/being: they exist as things, albeit as non-spatio-temporal things. This is informative as a characterization of hypostatic Platonism only to the extent that we understand the first mode of actuality/being: existence. But the trouble is that Lotze frequently characterizes this mode in terms of its causal efficacy and spatial location. Further, he explicitly associates it with the ontological category of things. Since the hypostatic Platonist clearly does not think that propositions and concepts are spatio-temporal or causally efficacious, we need a more general characterization of the existence– validity distinction. In other words, we need a more precise characterization of what it would mean to call proposition or concepts things. One tempting option would be to interpret Lotze's characterization of the first mode of actuality/being as existence in
, hair, etc. , in the Parmenides.21 Since dirt is dirt, it follows that the suggestion " Dirt is scandal " is valid, so a fortiori < dirt > has whatever mode of being / actuality propositional constituent have. The generality of Lotze's semantic hypothesis means he must accept concepts of everything that can be the subject of a valid judgment, given (†), which admit absolutely everything. The difficult question is how to signalize Lotze's Platonism from the Platonism he rule out, on which propositions and their constituents are hypostatized as " things. " He writes: For the Greeks that which is not in outer space is not at all, and when Plato banishes the Ideas to this non - spatial home, this is not an attack to hypostasize their mere validity into any kind of experiential being [ seiender Wirklichkeit ], but quite a clear feat to ward off any such attempt from the outset. [... ] however although these various utterances point one and all to the fact that Plato only ever asserted the eternal validity of Ideas, but never their existence [ Sein ], he still had no better answer to give to the question, what then are they, than to bring them again under the general concept of ousia; therefore was open a door to a mistake, which has since been propagate further, although one never knew how to say, on the guess that blames him for this, precisely what it is that Plato is supposed to have hypostasized his Ideas into. (L § 318, 516) The hypostatic Platonist takes proposition and their constituents (Forms/ concepts) to fall under the first modality of actuality / being: they exist as things, albeit as non - spatio - temporal things. This is informative as a word picture of hypostatic Platonism only to the extent that we sympathize the inaugural mode of actuality / being: existence. But the trouble is that Lotze frequently characterizes this mood in terms of its causal efficacy and spatial location. Further, he explicitly consociate it with the ontological category of things. Since the hypostatic Platonist clearly does not think that proposal and concepts are spatio - worldly or causally efficacious, we need a more general characterization of the existence – cogency distinction. In early words, we need a more accurate characterization of what it would mean to call proposition or concepts things. One tantalizing option would be to interpret Lotze's characterization of the first mode of actuality / being as existence in
, halr, etc., in the Parmenides.21 Since dirt is burt, it folloss that ghe proposition "Dirt is dirt" iw valud, so a fortiori <dirt> fas whatener mode if bting/actuality pro'ksitional conabitueutw have. The gengrality of Lmtze's semantic tfelry means he must accept concepts os everyyhlng that can bg the eopid of a valid judgement, given (†), whicg incluves absolutely rverything. The difficult qkestlon is how to distlnguish Lotes's [oatonism froo the Platonism he rejgcts, on which propositions and tfeir eonstituentw qre vypostatizev as "trings." He wribvs: For dhe Grerks that which is nor in space is not at ell, and when Plato bwnishes tve Ideas to this nob-spatian hoke, tfus ks hov ah attelpt to hypostzsize their mere validity into agj kind of exiatentiwl being [seiender Wirklichkeit], but rather a dlear effort to ward ofd any such attempt frlm the oueset. [...] Nevertheless although these various utteranwes pkknt oke ave wll to the fact that Plato only ever asserted fht enernal validity on Ideas, but never yhfit existence [Sekn], he stiml had no better ajswer tj givw to the zuesyion, what then are they, thab to bring tkem again under the gzneral conce't of pusia; thus was opened a door to z misundershanding, wgkch has since bedn iropdgated further, although onq never kiew hpw to sxy, om the rypothesis that blames him for thid, exaetly fhat it is that Plato is supposed to have hypostasized niv Igeas intj. (L §318, 516) The hypostatyc Platonist tckes pro'ositiuns and thvir constmtuents (Formf/ concepts) to vall under tie first iode of qctualigh/being: they exost as thpnys, albeit as non-spatio-tempoval tfjngs. This is inyutnative as a chsraztewidatmon os hypostatic [latunirk onlh to tht ewtevt tnat we understand tha fidst mode of actualotn/being: exustence. Fut the troubke is that Lotze fgequeitly ciaractrriees this mode in terms of its czusal efflcagy and spatiaj logatijn. Further, he explicitly associates it with the oitological category of rhings. Since the hykosuatic Platonixt clqarly doev not think that propositions and congepts are spatio-temporzl or wausaply efficacious, we need a more general characterization of the existence– calidivy distinctioh. In otheg wjxds, we geed e more precise chsracterization of what it would mean to ccll proposition or concepts tnivgs. One temptkng option would be to ihterpret Lotze's characterization of the first mode of actuality/neing as wxistsnce in
, hair, etc., in the Parmenides.21 Since dirt, follows that proposition "Dirt is fortiori has whatever mode being/actuality propositional constituents The generality of Lotze's semantic theory he must accept concepts of everything that can be the topic of a judgement, given (†), which includes absolutely everything. The difficult question is how to Lotze's from Platonism rejects, on which propositions and their constituents are hypostatized as "things." He writes: For the Greeks which is not in space is not at and when Plato banishes Ideas to this non-spatial home, is an attempt hypostasize mere into any kind existential being [seiender Wirklichkeit], but rather a clear effort to ward off any such attempt from the [...] Nevertheless various utterances one all the fact that ever asserted the eternal validity of their existence [Sein], he still had no better to give the question, what then are they, to bring them again under the general concept ousia; thus was opened a door to a misunderstanding, which has since been propagated further, never knew how to on the hypothesis blames for exactly it is Plato is supposed to have hypostasized his Ideas into. (L §318, The hypostatic Platonist takes propositions and their constituents (Forms/ concepts) under first mode of they exist as things, as things. This is informative characterization hypostatic the that understand the first mode actuality/being: existence. But the trouble that Lotze frequently characterizes its causal efficacy and spatial location. Further, he associates it with the ontological category of Since the hypostatic Platonist clearly does not think that propositions and concepts spatio-temporal or we need a more general characterization of the validity distinction. In other we need a more precise characterization of what it mean call proposition concepts things. One option would be interpret Lotze's characterization first mode actuality/being existence
, hair, etc., in the Parmenides.21 SinCe dirt is diRt, it fOllOws ThAt thE proPosition "Dirt is DIrt" iS valid, so a fortiori <dirt> hAs whaTeVEr moDE oF beinG/actualITy PROpoSiTiOnaL cONsTitueNts Have. The Generality Of LOtZe's semantic tHEoRy means he mUst Accept concepTs oF everyThIng THat caN be The toPic of a VAlid juDgement, giVeN (†), Which iNCludes aBSOlUtelY everything. The difFIcULt question is hoW to disTiNGuISH LoTze'S Platonism FrOm the pLatonisM He REJEctS, On which proposItions and thEIr cOnstitUeNts ARe hypoStatiZeD As "tHings." He writEs: FoR the GreekS that wHIch is noT In space Is not aT alL, anD wheN plAtO baNiSHes THe ideAS to This non-sPaTiAl homE, thiS IS NOt an AttEmpt To hypOstasize their MerE valIDitY into Any kiNd of ExIstenTial beIng [seIeNder WirklichkeiT], but Rather a clEar EfForT tO ward OFf any sUch AttEmpt froM the outSEt. [...] NEvERTHeLess although these vArIOUs UtterancEs poinT OnE aND all to thE fAct That pLAto onLy evER aSserted tHe eterNAl VaLidity oF IDeas, buT nEveR thEir exIStenCe [Sein], He still hAd no bETter answer to giVE to the questioN, WhAT ThEN are TheY, than to brinG theM AgaiN undER tHe gENeral ConcePt OF oUSia; thus was opened a doOr To a misUnderStanding, which Has since beEN PRopagateD furTHeR, Although one nevEr kneW how to say, oN The hypotHesis That blamEs him for tHIS, exactly WhaT it Is tHat pLAtO is supposed to HAVe hyPoStasizeD hiS Ideas iNto. (l §318, 516) ThE hyPosTaTic PlatonIst takes PrOpOsItIonS and tHEir constItUenTs (forMs/ conCEpts) to Fall uNder ThE fIRst Mode of aCTuALIty/bEiNg: They ExiSt As thiNgs, aLBeiT as non-sPatio-tempOraL ThinGs. thIs is infOrmative as a chArActerizatiOn Of hYpostaTIC PlatoniSm only to the extent that we UNderstaNd tHe firSt moDe of actuaLitY/being: ExiSTence. BUt the tRoublE iS thAT lotze FREqUenTlY characterIZEs tHis moDe In teRms of itS causal efficacy and SPatIal location. FuRthEr, he EXPlIciTLy ASsoCiATes IT With the ontologiCal categorY oF ThIngs. Since tHE hyPoStatic PLatonisT cleaRLy does nOt think thAt proposiTiOns aND ConCepts are spAtio-tempOral or cauSAlly eFFiCacioUs, wE need a MoRe gEneraL charaCTerIzatiOn of thE eXistenCe– valIdIty distiNction. In other words, we neeD a more PreciSe cHaracteriZatIOn oF what it woUld mEan to call pRopOsiTion oR coNCepts ThinGS. ONe tEMptinG optIOn would be TO iNteRPReT Lotze's charACTEriZatioN of THe firsT modE of actuality/being AS existence in
, hair, etc., in the Parme nides.21 S incedir t i sdirt , it  follows thatt he p roposition "Dirt is di rt" i sv alid ,  s o a f ortiori <d i r t>ha swha te v er  mode  of  being/ actualitypro po sitional con s ti tuents hav e.The generali tyof Lot ze 'ss emant ictheor y mean s  he mu st accept  c o ncepts of ever y t hi ng t hat can be the to p ic of a valid jud gement ,g iv e n  († ),which incl ud es ab s olutely ev e r y thi n g. The diffic ult questio n  is  how t odis t inguis h Lot ze ' s P latonism fr om t he Platon ism he rejects ,  on whi ch pro pos iti onsa nd  t hei rc ons t it uen t s a re hypos ta ti zed a s "t h i n g s."Hewrit es: F or the Greeks  th at w h ich  is n ot in  spa ce  is n ot atall,an d when Plato ba nish es the Id eas  t o t hi s non - spatia l h ome , thisis nota n a tt e m p tto hypostasize the ir m er e validi ty int o  a ny kind ofex ist enti a l  bein g [s e ie nder Wir klichk e it ],  but ra th er a c le areff ort t o  war d offany such  atte m pt from the ou t set. [...] Ne v er t h el e ss a lth ough thesevari o us u tter a nc esp ointone a nd al l  to the fact that P la to onl y eve r asserted th e eternalv a l idity of  Ide a s, but never thei r exi stence [Se i n], he s tillhad no b etter ans w e r to giv e t o t heque s t io n, what thena r e th ey , thantobring t hem  ag ain  un de r the gen eral con ce pt  o fous ia; t h us was o pe ned  a  do or to a misu nders tand in g, whi ch hass in c e  bee npr opag ate dfurth er,a lth ough on e never k new howto  s ay, onthe hypothesi sthat blame shim  for t h i s, exact ly what it is that Plat o  is sup pos ed to  hav e hyposta siz ed his  Id e as int o. (L§318,  5 16) T he hy p o st ati cPlatonistt a kes  prop os itio ns andtheir constituents (Fo rms/ concepts ) t o fa l l  u nde r  t h e f ir s t m o d e of actuality/ being: the ye xi st as thin g s,al beit as  non-sp atio- t emporal  things.This is i nf orma t i veas a chara cterizat ion of hy p ostat i cPlato nis m only  t o t he ex tent t h atwe un dersta nd  the f irstmo de of ac tuality/being: existenc e. But  thetro uble is t hat Lot ze freque ntly  character ize s t his m ode in te rmso fits causa l ef f icacy and sp ati a l  l ocation. Fu r t h er,  he e xpl i citlyasso ciates it with th e  ontological c ateg o r y o f t h ings .Since the hypo sta ti c Platonis tclearly doe s not th in k  that  propo sition s and c o n ce p ts are  spa tio -temporal  or  c a usallyef fi c acious , we  n eed amore g e nera l characterization  of t h e  exis t enc e– va li dity di s tinc tion. In o ther words,  we ne ed a  more  precis echarac ter iz ation of w h at it wou ld me an to c al l pr opo sition  orc o ncept s th in gs.  One temp t i ng op ti o n w ould  be t ointe rpret Lot z e's char act e rizatio noft h e firs t  m o d e of actua lit y/bei n g  as existe n ce i n 
, hair,_etc., in_the Parmenides.21 Since dirt_is dirt,_it_follows that_the_proposition "Dirt is_dirt" is valid,_so a fortiori <dirt>_has whatever mode_of_being/actuality propositional constituents have. The generality of Lotze's semantic theory means he must accept_concepts_of everything_that_can_be the topic of a_valid judgement, given (†), which_includes absolutely_everything. The difficult question is how to distinguish_Lotze's_Platonism from the_Platonism he rejects, on which propositions and their constituents_are hypostatized as "things." He writes:_For the Greeks_that_which_is not in space_is not at all, and when_Plato banishes the Ideas to this_non-spatial home, this is not an attempt_to hypostasize their mere validity into_any kind of existential being_[seiender Wirklichkeit],_but rather a clear effort_to ward off_any such_attempt from the_outset. [...] Nevertheless although these various_utterances point one_and all to the fact that_Plato_only ever asserted_the_eternal_validity of_Ideas, but never_their_existence [Sein],_he_still had no better answer to_give_to the question, what then are they,_than to bring them_again_under the general concept_of ousia; thus was opened_a door to a misunderstanding, which_has since_been propagated_further, although one never knew how to say, on the hypothesis_that blames him for this, exactly_what it is that_Plato is_supposed_to have hypostasized_his_Ideas into._(L §318, 516) The hypostatic Platonist takes_propositions and_their constituents (Forms/ concepts) to fall_under the first mode_of_actuality/being: they exist as things, albeit_as non-spatio-temporal things. This is informative_as a characterization of hypostatic_Platonism_only_to the extent that we_understand the first mode of actuality/being:_existence. But the_trouble is that Lotze frequently characterizes this_mode_in terms of its causal efficacy_and_spatial location. Further, he explicitly associates_it_with_the ontological category of things._Since the hypostatic Platonist clearly does_not think that propositions and concepts are spatio-temporal or_causally efficacious, we_need a more general characterization_of_the_existence– validity distinction. In other words, we need a more_precise characterization_of what it_would mean to call proposition or concepts things. One tempting_option would be to interpret Lotze's characterization_of the first mode of actuality/being as existence in