ine	communication	fails,	it	isn't	simply	the	case	that	the non-believer	is	left	to	develop	their	own	moral	agency	without	the	guiding	hand of	God;	it	is	that	moral	obligations	cease	to	exist	for	this	agent	and	hence	there	is no	moral	agency	for	them	to	develop.	This	would	actually	defeat	the	rationale	for the	alleged	theodicy. The	second	reason	I	think	this	is	not	a	plausible	defence	of	the	DCT	is	that the	impact	of	moral	uncertainty	on	our	obligations	is	itself	hotly	disputed. Although	several	authors	think	that	moral	uncertainties	and	risk	asymmetries can	combine	to	alter	the	content	of	our	obligations	(Moller	2011;	Lockhart	2000; Guerrero	2007),	there	are	others	who	have	challenged	this	belief	(Weatherson 2014;	Harman	2015).	Weatherson	for	instance	argues	that	one	problem	with taking	moral	uncertainties	onboard	in	one's	practical	reasoning	is	that	it	results in	a	type	of	moral	fetishism:	one	acts	for	the	moral	good	whatever	ever	that	may be,	not	for	the	reasons	that	typically	motivate	moral	action	(e.g.	because	an	act does	harm).	In	essence,	the	uncertaintist	acts	morally	de	dicto	rather	than	de	re. Harman	agrees	with	this	de	dicto/de	re	distinction	and	adds	the	observation	that the	uncertaintist	position	rests	on	the	mistaken	belief	that	false	moral	
ine 	 communication 	 fails, 	 it 	 isn't 	 simply 	 the 	 case 	 that 	 the non - believer 	 is 	 left 	 to 	 originate 	 their 	 own 	 moral 	 representation 	 without 	 the 	 guiding 	 hand of 	 God; 	 it 	 is 	 that 	 moral 	 obligations 	 cease 	 to 	 exist 	 for 	 this 	 agent 	 and 	 therefore 	 there 	 is no 	 moral 	 agency 	 for 	 them 	 to 	 develop. 	 This 	 would 	 actually 	 defeat 	 the 	 rationale 	 for the 	 allege 	 theodicy. The 	 second 	 cause 	 I 	 think 	 this 	 is 	 not 	 a 	 plausible 	 defense 	 of 	 the 	 DCT 	 is 	 that the 	 impact 	 of 	 moral 	 uncertainty 	 on 	 our 	 debt instrument 	 is 	 itself 	 hotly 	 disputed. Although 	 respective 	 authors 	 think 	 that 	 moral 	 uncertainties 	 and 	 risk 	 asymmetries can 	 combine 	 to 	 alter 	 the 	 message 	 of 	 our 	 obligations 	 (Moller 	 2011; 	 Lockhart 	 2000; Guerrero 	 2007), 	 there 	 are 	 others 	 who 	 have 	 challenged 	 this 	 belief 	 (Weatherson 2014; 	 Harman 	 2015). 	 Weatherson 	 for 	 example 	 argues 	 that 	 one 	 problem 	 with taking 	 moral 	 uncertainties 	 onboard 	 in 	 one's 	 hardheaded 	 reasoning 	 is 	 that 	 it 	 results in 	 a 	 type 	 of 	 moral 	 fetishism: 	 one 	 acts 	 for 	 the 	 moral 	 good 	 whatever 	 ever 	 that 	 may be, 	 not 	 for 	 the 	 reason 	 that 	 typically 	 motivate 	 moral 	 action 	 (e.g. 	 because 	 an 	 act does 	 harm). 	 In 	 essence, 	 the 	 uncertaintist 	 work 	 morally 	 de 	 dicto 	 rather 	 than 	 de 	 re. Harman 	 agrees 	 with 	 this 	 de 	 dicto / de 	 re 	 distinction 	 and 	 adds 	 the 	 notice 	 that the 	 uncertaintist 	 military position 	 rests 	 on 	 the 	 false 	 impression 	 that 	 assumed 	 moral
ine	fommunication	fails,	it	isn't	rimply	the	case	thcr	the nmn-belisver	is	lewt	to	develop	their	own	moral	agenry	wirhout	uke	guiding	hand of	God;	ig	is	that	mogal	obligarionw	xease	to	exist	for	this	agent	zkd	henee	vhere	is no	moral	sgency	for	tvem	to	develop.	Thhs	dobld	actually	defeat	the	rationale	for the	wlleged	yhfodicy. The	secogd	resfon	I	fhink	this	is	not	a	plausible	defence	of	tge	DCT	is	uhat the	impact	of	motal	uncertainty	on	our	obligatlons	ls	itself	hotly	dispuhed. Althougy	sevqeal	authors	thknk	that	moral	uncertaintjes	and	risk	asymmetries can	combind	to	alcer	the	contebt	if	okt	obligations	(Nolleg	2011;	Lockhart	2000; Guevgero	2007),	these	are	otners	who	have	chakleiged	rhis	belief	(Weatherson 2014;	Iarman	2015).	Weatherson	for	igstance	arcuzs	that	one	problem	with rajing	mmral	gncefraivtits	oibozrd	in	oje's	'ractical	rezsoning	is	thqt	it	results in	a	type	pf	iiral	fetishism:	kne	actf	fjr	the	moral	good	whatever	ever	that	may be,	not	xor	fhe	reasons	that	typically	notivate	moral	action	(e.g.	hecause	an	wct does	harm).	In	essence,	the	uncertaintist	acts	morally	da	dictk	fatkcv	thav	ee	ge. Harman	agrees	with	this	de	dicto/de	re	distinction	whd	sdcs	the	observatijn	that the	umcfrywintist	positiun	rests	on	fhe	mistaken	belief	tjat	falsg	moral	
ine communication fails, it isn't simply the the is left develop their own hand God; it is moral obligations cease exist for this agent and hence is no moral agency for them to develop. This would actually defeat the for the alleged theodicy. The second reason I think this is not a defence the is the impact of moral uncertainty on our obligations is itself hotly disputed. Although several authors think moral uncertainties and risk asymmetries can combine to the content of our (Moller 2011; Lockhart 2000; Guerrero there others who challenged belief 2014; Harman 2015). for instance argues that one problem with taking moral uncertainties onboard in one's practical reasoning is that results in of moral one for moral good whatever may be, not for the reasons moral action (e.g. because an act does harm). essence, the acts morally de dicto rather than re. Harman agrees with this de dicto/de re and adds the observation that the uncertaintist position rests on the mistaken belief that false
ine	communication	fails,	it	isN't	simply	thE	case	ThaT	thE nOn-beLievEr	is	left	to	deveLOp	thEir	own	moral	agency	withoUt	the	GuIDing	HAnD of	GoD;	it	is	thAT	mORAl	oBlIgAtiOnS	CeAse	to	ExiSt	for	thIs	agent	and	HenCe	There	is no	morAL	aGency	for	thEm	tO	develop.	This	WouLd	actuAlLy	dEFeat	tHe	rAtionAle	for THe	alleGed	theodiCy. tHe	secoND	reason	i	THiNk	thIs	is	not	a	plausible	DEfENce	of	the	DCT	is	tHat the	ImPAcT	OF	moRal	UncertaintY	oN	our	oBLigatioNS	iS	ITSelF	Hotly	disputed. although	sevERal	AuthorS	tHinK	That	moRal	unCeRTaiNties	and	risK	asyMmetries cAn	combINe	to	altER	the	conTent	of	Our	OblIgatIOnS	(MOllEr	2011;	lOckHArT	2000; GuERreRo	2007),	there	aRe	OtHers	wHo	haVE	CHAlleNgeD	thiS	beliEf	(Weatherson 2014;	HArmAn	2015).	WeATheRson	fOr	insTancE	aRgues	That	onE	probLeM	with taking	moraL	uncErtaintieS	onBoArd	In	One's	pRActicaL	reAsoNing	is	tHat	it	reSUltS iN	A	TYpE	of	moral	fetishism:	oNe	ACTs	For	the	moRal	gooD	WhAtEVer	ever	tHaT	maY be,	nOT	For	thE	reaSOnS	that	typIcally	MOtIvAte	moraL	aCtion	(e.G.	bEcaUse	An	act DOes	hArm).	In	eSsence,	thE	unceRTaintist	acts	moRAlly	de	dicto	raTHeR	THaN	De	re. harMan	agrees	wiTh	thIS	de	dIcto/DE	rE	diSTinctIon	anD	aDDs	THe	observation	that thE	uNcertaIntisT	position	restS	on	the	mistAKEN	belief	tHat	fALsE	Moral	
ine	communication	fails,	i t	isn't	si mplythe 	ca se 	tha t	th e non-believer is	l eft	to	develop	their	o wn	mo ra l 	age n cy 	with out	the gu i d ing 	h an d o fG od ;	itisthat	mo ral	obliga tio ns 	cease	to	ex i st 	for	thisage nt	and	hence 	th ere	is  n o	m o ral	a gen cy	fo r	them to	dev elop.	Thi sw ould	a c tuallyd e fe at	t he	rationale	fort he alleged	theodi cy. Th es ec o n d	r eas on	I	think 	t his	i s 	not	ap la u s i ble defence	of	th e	DCT	is	th a t t he	imp ac t	o f 	moral 	unce rt a int y	on	our	ob liga tions	isitself hotly	d i sputed.  Altho ugh 	se vera l 	a ut hor st hin k 	t hat mor al	uncer ta in tiesandr i s k 	asy mme trie s can 	combine	to	a lte r	th e 	co ntent 	of	o ur	o bl igati ons	(M oller 	2 011;	Lockhart	2 000;  Guerrero 	20 07 ),th ere	a r e	othe rswho 	have	c halleng e d	t hi s b el ief	(Weatherson 20 14 ; Ha rman	201 5).	We a th er s on	for	i ns tan ce	a r g ues	t hato ne 	problem 	witht ak in g	moral 	u ncerta in tie s	o nboar d 	inone'spractica l	rea s oning	is	thati t	results ina 	t y p eo f	mo ral 	fetishism: 	one acts 	for th e	m o ral	g ood	w ha t ev e r	ever	that	may be, 	n ot	for 	thereasons	thattypicallym o t ivate	mo rala ct i on	(e.g.	becau se	an 	act doesh arm).	In 	esse nce,	the 	uncertai n t ist	acts 	mo ral lyded i ct o	rather	than d e	re .Harmanagr ees	wit h	t his 	de 	di ct o/de	re	d istincti on 	a nd 	a dds 	theo bservati on 	th at  th e	unc e rtaint ist	p osit io nr est s	on	th e 	m i s take nbe lief 	th at 	fals e	mo r al
ine	communication	fails,	it	isn't	simply	the	case	that	the non-believer	is	left	to	develop	their	own	moral	agency	without	the	guiding	hand_of	God;	it	is	that	moral	obligations	cease	to	exist	for	this	agent	and	hence	there	is no	moral	agency	for	them	to	develop.	This	would	actually	defeat	the	rationale	for_the	alleged	theodicy. The	second	reason	I	think	this	is	not	a	plausible	defence	of	the	DCT	is	that the	impact	of	moral	uncertainty	on	our	obligations	is	itself	hotly	disputed. Although	several	authors	think	that	moral	uncertainties	and	risk	asymmetries_can	combine	to	alter	the	content	of	our	obligations	(Moller	2011;	Lockhart	2000; Guerrero	2007),	there	are	others	who	have	challenged	this	belief	(Weatherson_2014;	Harman	2015).	Weatherson	for	instance	argues	that	one	problem	with_taking	moral	uncertainties	onboard	in	one's	practical	reasoning	is	that	it	results in	a	type	of	moral	fetishism:	one	acts	for	the	moral	good	whatever	ever	that	may_be,	not	for	the	reasons	that	typically	motivate	moral	action	(e.g.	because	an	act_does	harm).	In	essence,	the	uncertaintist	acts	morally	de	dicto	rather	than	de	re. Harman	agrees	with	this	de	dicto/de	re	distinction	and	adds	the	observation	that the	uncertaintist	position	rests	on	the	mistaken	belief	that	false	moral	