 no bootstrapping. One intention gives rise to another by means of reasoning, but no reasons are involved. There is only the relation of rational requirement, which is given us by the correctness of the reasoning. There is something normative about the process, but the normativity attaches to the reasoning and not to the intention that emerges from it. When we acquire beliefs or intentions by reasoning, we may hope we ought to have them or have reason to have them, but we cannot be sure of it. It is often thought that, to justify our beliefs and intentions, we must give reasons for them. But we cannot do that, and it is the wrong idea of justification. The correct way to justify beliefs and intentions is to cite the reasoning that led to them, with its premises. If you are asked to give reasons for your beliefs and intentions, you should interpret this as a request to cite your reasoning. 8. Summary Like all reasoning, practical reasoning is a process that takes you from some of your existing mental states to a new mental state. Theoretical reasoning concludes in a belief; practical reasoning in an intention. If a piece of reasoning is correct, it concludes in a state that is rationally required by the states it is derived from. But it does not follow that you ought to be in the concluding state, or have a reason to be in it, even if you are in the states it is derived from. This paper considered only one sort of practical reasoning: instrumental reasoning. If you intend an end, from this intention together with an appropriate belief, instrumental reasoning leads you to intend some means to the end. The simplest cases of instrumental reasoning are where you believe a particular means is necessary to the end. In those cases, the correctness of the reasoning is ensured by the logical validity of its content. References Åqvist, Lennart: 1984, 'Deontic logic', in D. Gabbay and F. Guenthner (eds), Handbook of Philosophical Logic, Volume II, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, pp. 605–714. Bratman, Michael E.: 1987, Intentions, Plans and Practical Reason, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Broome, John: 1998, 'Practical reasoning', typescript. Hume, David: 1978, A Treatise of Human Nature, eds L. A. Selby-Bigge and P. H. Nidditch, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Kant, Immanuel: 1948, Groundwork of the Metaphysic
no bootstrapping. One intention gives rise to another by means of reasoning, but no reason are imply. There is only the relation of intellectual requirement, which is given us by the correctness of the reasoning. There is something prescriptive about the summons, but the normativity attaches to the reasoning and not to the purpose that emerge from it. When we acquire impression or intentions by reasoning, we may hope we ought to get them or have reason to have them, but we cannot be sure of it. It is often thought that, to apologize our beliefs and intentions, we must give rationality for them. But we cannot do that, and it is the wrong idea of justification. The correct manner to justify beliefs and intentions is to cite the reasoning that led to them, with its premise. If you are asked to give reasons for your beliefs and intentions, you should interpret this as a request to summon your reasoning. 8. Summary Like all reasoning, practical reasoning is a process that takes you from some of your existing mental states to a new mental state. Theoretical reasoning concludes in a impression; hardheaded reasoning in an intention. If a man of reasoning is correct, it concludes in a state that is rationally required by the country it is derived from. But it does not follow that you ought to be in the concluding state, or accept a reason to be in it, even if you are in the states it is derived from. This paper considered only one kind of practical reasoning: instrumental reasoning. If you intend an end, from this intention together with an appropriate belief, implemental reasoning head you to intend some means to the end. The simple cases of instrumental reasoning are where you believe a especial means is necessary to the end. In those cases, the correctness of the reasoning is ensured by the coherent validity of its content. References Åqvist, Lennart: 1984,' Deontic logic', in D. Gabbay and F. Guenthner (eds), Handbook of Philosophical Logic, Volume II, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, pp. 605–714. Bratman, Michael E.: 1987, Intentions, plan and Practical Reason, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Broome, John: 1998,' Practical reasoning', typescript. Hume, David: 1978, A Treatise of Human Nature, eds L. A. Selby - Bigge and P. H. Nidditch, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Kant, Immanuel: 1948, Groundwork of the Metaphysic
 no bootstrapping. One intenuion gives rise to anothxr by msans of feasoning, but no reasons are ibvolvtb. There is only the felation lf ratiobal cequirement, whici is givcu us gn the rorrectness of jhe reasoninc. There is somatfiug normative about the process, but tre normstlvity attaches to uhe reaaoning and not to the intention thzt emerjes from it. Whem we acquire beliefs or inhentlons by reasoning, ae may hope we jyght to have them or have reason tk have them, but we cannot be sufe of it. It is ifren jhought that, to jlstify our beliefs ang intenyions, we must nive ceasins for them. But we cennot do that, and it is the wsoug idea of justificatuob. The corsect qay to jnstjfy bepiehs and intehtions is ti cite the reasoninb eyat led to thsm, witr yts premises. If you are asked to give rtasona for your beliefs and untentions, you should interpree this as a request to cite your reasoning. 8. Summasy Liid aol fwadoning, practical reasoning is a process that ezkts jou from some of nour existing mentsl sywtes to a new mental sfate. Theoretical rfasonind conxludes in a brlief; practical reasoning ib an intentijb. If a piece of recsoning is currevt, it concludes in a state tkat is rationally required cy the states it is darived from. But it does noe follow vhat vou oughg to be in the conclkding state, or have a rewson jo be hn it, even if you are in the states it is derived from. Jhiv pdper confidercd only one sore of practical reasonnng: inrtrumental reasonmng. If you igtend an end, xtom this inteition togqthee wirh an aooropriate belirf, instrumental reawoning leads you tp ivfend some means to the end. The sikpldst cwsxs of hnstrumental rearonkmg ard where you celirve a particular meats ia necessary to the ekd. In thowe cases, the correctnrss of the reasonijg is enrured by the logical validity of its ckntent. Revercnces Åqvist, Lqnnavt: 1984, 'Qeontic loyic', in D. Gabbay and F. Guenthner (eds), Handuook of Philosophical Ligic, Volume II, D. Rendtl, Dordrecht, 'p. 605–714. Brwtman, Micvael E.: 1987, Intentions, Poans and Practicak Reason, Harvard Univsrsity Presd, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Broome, John: 1998, 'Practical reasoning', typescript. Humw, Daviv: 1978, A Treatise of Numan Nctuxe, eds J. A. Dxlby-Bigge and P. H. Nidditch, Oxford University Prers, Oxforg. Hant, Immanuel: 1948, Groundwork of tfe Metaphysic
no bootstrapping. One intention gives rise to means reasoning, but reasons are involved. of requirement, which is us by the of the reasoning. There is something about the process, but the normativity attaches to the reasoning and not to intention that emerges from it. When we acquire beliefs or intentions by reasoning, may we to them or have reason to have them, but we cannot be sure of it. It is thought that, to justify our beliefs and intentions, must give reasons for But we cannot do that, it the wrong of The way to justify and intentions is to cite the reasoning that led to them, with its premises. If you are to give your beliefs intentions, should this as a cite your reasoning. 8. Summary Like reasoning is a process that takes you from of your mental states to a new mental Theoretical reasoning concludes in a belief; practical reasoning an intention. If a piece of reasoning is correct, it concludes in a state that required by the states is derived from. it not that ought to in the concluding state, or have a reason to be in even if you are in the states it is derived paper only one sort practical reasoning: instrumental reasoning. you an end, from this with appropriate leads to some means to the The simplest cases of instrumental are where you believe to the end. In those cases, the correctness the reasoning is ensured by the logical of its content. References Åqvist, Lennart: 1984, 'Deontic logic', in D. Gabbay F. Guenthner of Philosophical Logic, Volume II, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 605–714. Bratman, Michael E.: Intentions, Plans and Practical Reason, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Broome, 1998, 'Practical typescript. Hume, David: A Treatise of Nature, eds L. and P. Nidditch, University Immanuel: 1948, Groundwork of the Metaphysic
 no bootstrapping. One intentiOn gives risE to anOthEr bY mEans Of reAsoning, but no reASons Are involved. There is only The reLaTIon oF RaTionaL requirEMeNT, WhiCh Is GivEn US bY the cOrrEctness Of the reasoNinG. THere is somethINg Normative aBouT the process, bUt tHe normAtIviTY attaCheS to thE reasoNIng and Not to the iNtENtion tHAt emergES FrOm it. when we acquire beliEFs OR intentions by rEasoniNg, WE mAY HopE we Ought to havE tHem or HAve reasON tO HAVe tHEm, but we cannot Be sure of it. IT Is oFten thOuGht THat, to jUstifY oUR beLiefs and intEntiOns, we must Give reASons for THem. But wE cannoT do ThaT, and IT iS tHe wRoNG idEA oF juSTifIcation. THe CoRrect Way tO JUSTify BelIefs And inTentions is to cIte The rEAsoNing tHat leD to tHeM, with Its preMises. if You are asked to giVe reAsons for yOur BeLieFs And inTEntionS, yoU shOuld intErpret tHIs aS a REQUeSt to cite your reasonInG. 8. sUmMary Like All reaSOnInG, PracticaL rEasOninG IS a proCess THaT takes yoU from sOMe Of Your exiStIng menTaL stAteS to a nEW menTal staTe. TheoreTical REasoning concluDEs in a belief; prACtICAl REasoNinG in an intentIon. IF A pieCe of REaSonINg is cOrrecT, iT CoNCludes in a state that iS rAtionaLly reQuired by the stAtes it is deRIVEd from. BuT it dOEs NOt follow that yoU oughT to be in the COncludinG statE, or have a Reason to bE IN it, even iF yoU arE in The STAtEs it is derived FROm. ThIs Paper coNsiDered onLy oNe sOrt Of pRaCtical reaSoning: inStRuMeNtAl rEasonINg. If you iNtEnd An End, From tHIs inteNtion TogeThEr WIth An approPRiATE belIeF, iNstrUmeNtAl reaSoniNG leAds you tO intend soMe mEAns tO tHe End. The sImplest cases oF iNstrumentaL rEasOning aRE Where you Believe a particular means IS necessAry To the End. IN those casEs, tHe corrEctNEss of tHe reasOning Is EnsUREd by tHE LoGicAl Validity of ITS coNtent. reFereNces ÅqvIst, Lennart: 1984, 'Deontic lOGic', In D. Gabbay and F. gueNthnER (EdS), HaNDbOOk oF PHIloSOPhical Logic, VoluMe II, D. ReideL, DORdRecht, pp. 605–714. BraTMan, miChael E.: 1987, INtentioNs, PlaNS and PraCtical ReaSon, HarvarD UNiveRSIty press, CambrIdge, MassAchusetts. bRoome, jOhN: 1998, 'PracTicAl reasOnIng', TypesCript. HUMe, DAvid: 1978, A treatiSe Of HumaN NatuRe, Eds L. A. SelBy-Bigge and P. H. Nidditch, OxfOrd UniVersiTy PRess, OxforD. KaNT, ImManuel: 1948, GroUndwOrk of the MeTapHysIc
 no bootstrapping. One int ention giv es ri setoan othe r by  means of reas o ning , but no reasons are i nvolv ed .  The r eis on ly ther el a t ion  o frat io n al  requ ire ment, w hich is gi ven  u s by the cor r ec tness of t hereasoning. T her e is s om eth i ng no rma tiveaboutt he pro cess, but  t h e norm a tivitya t ta ches  to the reasoning an d  not to the in tentio nt ha t eme rge s from it.  W hen w e  acquir e  b e l i efs or intentions  by reasoni n g,we may  h ope we oug ht to  h a vethem or hav e re ason to h ave th e m, butw e canno t be s ure  of  it. It  i s o ft e n t h ou ght tha t, to ju st if y our  bel i e f s  and  in tent ions,  we must give  re ason s  fo r the m. Bu t we  c annot  do th at, a nd  it is the wron g id ea of jus tif ic ati on . The correc t w ayto just ify bel i efs  a n d in tentions is to cit et h ereasonin g that le dt o them,wi thitsp r emise s. I f  y ou are a sked t o  g iv e reaso ns  for y ou r b eli efs a n d in tentio ns, youshoul d  interpret thi s  as a request to c it e  you r r easoning. 8 . Su m mary  Lik e  a llr eason ing,pr a ct i cal reasoning is apr ocessthattakes you fro m some ofy o u r existi ng m e nt a l states to anew m ental stat e . Theore tical  reasoni ng conclu d e s in a b eli ef;  pr act i c al  reasoning in a n in te ntion.Ifa piece  of  re aso nin gis correc t, it co nc lu de sina sta t e that i srat io nal ly re q uiredby th e st at es itis deri v ed f rom.  B ut  itdoe snot f ollo w  th at youought tobei n th eco ncludin g state, or h av e a reason  t o b e in i t ,  even if  you are in the statesi t is de riv ed fr om.This pape r c onside red only o ne sor t ofpr act i c al re a s on ing :instrument a l  re asoni ng . If  you in tend an end, fromt his  intention to get herw i th  an ap p rop ri a teb e lief, instrumen tal reason in g  l eads you t o  in te nd some  meansto th e  end. T he simple st casesof  ins t r ume ntal reaso ning are  where yo u  beli e ve  a pa rti cularme ans  is n ecessa r y t o the  end.In  those  case s,  the cor rectness of the reasoni ng isensur edby the lo gic a l v alidity o f it s content.  Re fer ences  Åq v ist,Lenn a rt : 1 9 84, ' Deon t ic logic' ,  i n D . Ga bbay and F. G u ent hner(ed s ), Han dboo k of Philosophica l  Logic, Volume  II, D . R eid e l, D or drecht, pp. 60 5–7 14 . Bratman,  M ichael E.:1987, In te n tions , Plan s andPractic a l  R e ason,Harv ard  Universi tyPr e ss, Cam br id g e, Mas sach us etts.Broome ,  Joh n :  1998, 'Practica l rea s o ning' ,  ty pescr ip t. Hume ,  Dav id: 1978,A Treatiseof Hum an N ature , eds L .A. Sel by- Bi gge and P. H. Niddit ch, O xford U ni vers ity  Press , Ox f o rd. K ant,  I mma nuel: 194 8 ,  G r ou nd w ork  ofthe M et aphy sic
 no_bootstrapping. One_intention gives rise to_another by_means_of reasoning,_but_no reasons are_involved. There is_only the relation of_rational requirement, which_is_given us by the correctness of the reasoning. There is something normative about the_process,_but the_normativity_attaches_to the reasoning and not_to the intention that emerges_from it._When we acquire beliefs or intentions by reasoning,_we_may hope we_ought to have them or have reason to have_them, but we cannot be sure_of it. It_is_often_thought that, to justify_our beliefs and intentions, we must_give reasons for them. But we_cannot do that, and it is the_wrong idea of justification. The correct_way to justify beliefs and_intentions is_to cite the reasoning that_led to them,_with its_premises. If you_are asked to give reasons for_your beliefs and_intentions, you should interpret this as_a_request to cite_your_reasoning._8. Summary_Like all reasoning,_practical_reasoning is_a_process that takes you from some_of_your existing mental states to a new_mental state. Theoretical reasoning_concludes_in a belief; practical_reasoning in an intention. If_a piece of reasoning is correct,_it concludes_in a_state that is rationally required by the states it is derived_from. But it does not follow_that you ought to_be in_the_concluding state, or_have_a reason_to be in it, even if you_are in_the states it is derived from._This paper considered only_one_sort of practical reasoning: instrumental reasoning._If you intend an end, from_this intention together with an_appropriate_belief,_instrumental reasoning leads you to_intend some means to the end._The simplest cases_of instrumental reasoning are where you believe_a_particular means is necessary to the_end._In those cases, the correctness of_the_reasoning_is ensured by the logical_validity of its content. References Åqvist,_Lennart: 1984, 'Deontic logic', in D. Gabbay and F._Guenthner (eds), Handbook_of Philosophical Logic, Volume II,_D._Reidel,_Dordrecht, pp. 605–714. Bratman, Michael E.: 1987, Intentions, Plans and_Practical Reason,_Harvard University Press,_Cambridge, Massachusetts. Broome, John: 1998, 'Practical reasoning', typescript. Hume, David:_1978, A Treatise of Human Nature, eds_L. A. Selby-Bigge and P. H. Nidditch, Oxford University Press, Oxford._Kant, Immanuel: 1948, Groundwork of the Metaphysic