 we belong. However, the contextualists I have in mind intend the claim normatively (i.e., as a claim about the conditions under which one knows, or is justified in holding, some belief). If we let "context" refer to some community of inquirers and the relevant evaluative practices and norms they share, then we can formulate a working characterization of normative contextualism this way: NC: A person S is justified at time t in believing some proposition p in context C just in case S's holding p at t conforms to the relevant set of epistemic practices and norms operative in C. I am calling particular attention to the idea that there is a social dimension to epistemic evaluation because the idea that knowledge and justification depend on one's social group can be taken in two ways. First, as we have seen with Cohen and Sosa, it can be taken as one feature (or set of features) of one's circumstances that is relevant for epistemic appraisal. But, as just explained, it can also be taken as the idea that knowledge and justification are relative to the epistemic standards of one's social group or community, so that whether or not one has knowledge or is justified in believing some proposition depends on whether or not one's belief conforms to the epistemic norms of one's group. The thesis of circumstantial contextualism, then, should not be confused with normative contextualism. In ethics, it is standard to distinguish between circumstantial (situational, environmental) relativism and ethical relativism. The former is analogous to what I am calling circumstantial contextualism and is often expressed as the general thesis that the rightness and wrongness of particular actions, practices and so forth depend in part on facts about the agent's circumstances. So, for instance, whether it would be wrong for an onlooker to refrain from jumping into the deep end in an effort to save a drowning child depends (in part) on facts about that person and, in particular, on whether or not she can swim. Ethical relativism, by contrast, represents a normative theory which, in perhaps its most common variety, relativizes moral truth to the moral standards of groups: the moral standards of a group (together with relevant factual information) determine which particular moral statements are true for members of that group. Now the epistemological analog of ethical relativism is what I am calling normative contextualism. My point here is that just as we should not confuse circumstantial relativism in ethics with normative ethical relativism, so we should not interpret the circumstantial
we belong. However, the contextualists I have in mind intend the title normatively (i.e., as a title about the conditions under which one knows, or is justified in property, some belief). If we let " context " mention to some community of inquirers and the relevant appraising practice and norms they partake, then we can formulate a working characterization of normative contextualism this direction: NC: A person S is justified at time t in believing some proposition phosphorus in context C just in case S's hold p at t conform to the relevant set of epistemic practice and norms operative in C. I am calling particular attention to the theme that there is a social dimension to epistemic evaluation because the idea that knowledge and justification depend on one's social group can be taken in two ways. First, as we have seen with Cohen and Sosa, it can be taken as one feature (or set of features) of one's circumstances that is relevant for epistemic appraisal. But, as just explained, it can also be learn as the idea that knowledge and justification are proportional to the epistemic standard of one's social group or residential district, so that whether or not one has knowledge or is justified in believing some proposition depends on whether or not one's belief conforms to the epistemic norm of one's group. The thesis of circumstantial contextualism, then, should not be confused with normative contextualism. In ethics, it is standard to distinguish between circumstantial (situational, environmental) relativism and ethical relativism. The former is analogous to what I am call circumstantial contextualism and is often expressed as the general thesis that the justness and wrongness of especial actions, practices and so forth depend in contribution on facts about the agent's circumstances. So, for instance, whether it would be wrong for an onlooker to refrain from jumping into the abstruse end in an feat to save a drowning child depend (in part) on fact about that person and, in particular, on whether or not she can float. Ethical relativism, by contrast, represents a prescriptive theory which, in perhaps its most common variety, relativize moral truth to the moral standards of groups: the moral criterion of a group (together with relevant factual information) determine which particular moral statement are true for members of that group. immediately the epistemological analog of ethical relativism is what I am address normative contextualism. My point here is that just as we should not jumble circumstantial relativism in ethics with normative ethical relativism, so we should not interpret the circumstantial
 we belong. However, the conttxtualists I have in minv intens the clxim normatively (i.e., as a clail qbout the conditions under dhich one knows, oe is hustified mh holdiky, soms belneh). If we let "conjext" refer tm some communidy oy inquirers and the relevant evaluatyve pravtlces and norms thej fhars, then we can formulate a working dharacttrization of normayive contextualism this waj: NC: A person S is jushified at tume e in believine some prokovition p ih context C just in case S's holaing ' at t confirns hm the relevent sen of epistemig practhces anc norms operatlve ii C. U am calling particuler attention to the ydea that tkere is a social dimebsuon tm ephsteouc dvamuetikn becwusx the idea fhat knowleege and justificatipn eepend on one'a sociwl group can be taken in two ways. First, av ws have seen with Cohen qnd Sosa, it can be tanen as onq feature (or set of features) of one's circumstancev thav ks xcjdcajt for epistemic appraisal. But, as just explaigsd, in can also be takcn as the idea thay nnprledge and jurtificcfikn are relative to the epystemuc standawds pf one's social group or comnunity, so thct qhether or not one has knowlebge or is jistified in believing sume lroposition depends kv whether or not onv's balief conforms to the episeemic norns oy one's gfoup. The tresis of clrcumstantial contextuallsm, tken, svould not he confused with normative contxetualism. In ejhiws, pt is staudard bo distinguish fetween circumxtantiaj (sitjational, ehvironmxntal) relatidism and ethiwwl relativisk. The fowmer is qnalogojr to what I am calling bixcumstantual contextualism end ka often expresszb qs the general yheris tjav the sightness ang wrungvrss ow particulav aztioms, practices and so xortg depend in part om nacts aboot the agqnt's circumstsnces. So, for instajce, wiether it wpulq be wrong for an onlooker to defrain fgom jumping intj thc degp end in au effort to save a drowning child dependw (in part) on facts about that person cnc, in particnlar, og whether or not she can swim. Ethical relativixm, by contrast, repressnts a normwtive theory which, in perhaps its most common variety, relativizes moral teuth to the moral atancards oy gxoups: tre mlcal standards of s group (together with relevant hactual inxoxmation) determine which partivuuar moral stajements are true for membeds of thst group. Now the epistemologicak analog of ethical relabivism is what I am bzluing normative conyextuanism. Ny poinr heve is that jusg ax ae should not cknfuse circumstantial relativism in etyifs with normativx ethical repxtiviam, so re should not inferpdft thg circumstantisl
we belong. However, the contextualists I have intend claim normatively as a claim one or is justified holding, some belief). we let "context" refer to some of inquirers and the relevant evaluative practices and norms they share, then we formulate a working characterization of normative contextualism this way: NC: A person S justified time in some proposition p in context C just in case S's holding p at t conforms to relevant set of epistemic practices and norms operative C. I am calling attention to the idea that is social dimension epistemic because idea that knowledge justification depend on one's social group can be taken in two ways. First, as we have seen Cohen and can be as feature set of features) circumstances that is relevant for epistemic just explained, it can also be taken as idea that and justification are relative to the standards of one's social group or community, so whether or not one has knowledge or is justified in believing some proposition depends on not one's belief conforms the epistemic norms one's The of contextualism, then, not be confused with normative contextualism. In ethics, it is standard distinguish between circumstantial (situational, environmental) relativism and ethical relativism. The analogous what I am circumstantial contextualism and is expressed the general thesis that and of and forth in part on facts the agent's circumstances. So, for whether it would be refrain from jumping into the deep end in effort to save a drowning child depends part) on facts about that person and, in particular, on whether or she can relativism, by contrast, represents a normative theory which, perhaps its most common relativizes moral truth to the moral standards of groups: moral of a (together with relevant information) determine which moral statements are members of group. the ethical relativism is what I am normative My point here is that as not confuse circumstantial relativism in ethics with normative ethical relativism, so we should not interpret
 we belong. However, the contextUalists I haVe in mInd IntEnD the ClaiM normatively (i.e., AS a clAim about the conditions uNder wHiCH one KNoWs, or iS justifIEd IN HolDiNg, SomE bELiEf). If wE leT "contexT" refer to soMe cOmMunity of inquIReRs and the reLevAnt evaluativE prActiceS aNd nORms thEy sHare, tHen we cAN formuLate a workInG CharacTErizatiON Of NormAtive contextualisM ThIS way: NC: A person S Is justIfIEd AT TimE t iN believing SoMe proPOsition P In CONTexT c just in case S's Holding p at t COnfOrms to ThE reLEvant sEt of ePiSTemIc practices And nOrms operaTive in c. i am callINg partiCular aTteNtiOn to THe IdEa tHaT TheRE iS a sOCiaL dimensiOn To EpistEmic EVALUatiOn bEcauSe the Idea that knowlEdgE and JUstIficaTion dEpenD oN one's Social Group CaN be taken in two waYs. FiRst, as we haVe sEeN wiTh cohen ANd Sosa, It cAn bE taken aS one feaTUre (Or SET Of Features) of one's circUmSTAnCes that iS relevANt FoR EpistemiC aPprAisaL. bUt, as jUst eXPlAined, it cAn also BE tAkEn as the IdEa that KnOwlEdgE and jUStifIcatioN are relaTive tO The epistemic stANdards of one's sOCiAL GrOUp or ComMunity, so thaT wheTHer oR not ONe Has KNowleDge or Is JUsTIfied in believing somE pRoposiTion dEpends on whethEr or not one'S BELief confOrms TO tHE epistemic normS of onE's group. The THesis of cIrcumStantial ContextuaLISm, then, shOulD noT be ConFUSeD with normativE COnteXtUalism. IN etHics, it iS stAndArd To dIsTinguish bEtween ciRcUmStAnTiaL (situATional, enViRonMeNtaL) relaTIvism aNd ethIcal ReLaTIviSm. The foRMeR IS anaLoGoUs to WhaT I Am calLing CIrcUmstantIal contexTuaLIsm aNd Is Often exPressed as the gEnEral thesis ThAt tHe righTNEss and wrOngness of particular actiONs, practIceS and sO forTh depend iN paRt on faCts ABout thE agent'S circUmStaNCEs. So, fOR InStaNcE, whether it WOUld Be wroNg For aN onlookEr to refrain from jumPIng Into the deep enD in An efFORt To sAVe A DroWnINg cHILd depends (in part) On facts aboUt THaT person and, IN paRtIcular, oN whetheR or noT She can sWim. EthicaL relativiSm, By coNTRasT, representS a normatIve theory WHich, iN PeRhaps Its Most coMmOn vArietY, relatIVizEs morAl trutH tO the moRal stAnDards of gRoups: the moral standards oF a grouP (togeTheR with releVanT FacTual inforMatiOn) determinE whIch PartiCulAR moraL staTEmEntS Are trUe foR Members of THaT grOUP. NOw the episteMOLOgiCal anAloG Of ethiCal rElativism is what I aM Calling normatiVe coNTExtUalISm. My PoInt here is that jUst As WE Should noT cOnfuse circuMstantiaL rELativIsm in eThics wIth normATIvE EthicaL relAtiVism, so we sHouLd NOt interPrEt THe circUmstAnTial
 we belong. However, the c ontextuali sts I  ha vein  min d in tend the claim norm atively (i.e., as a cl aim a bo u t th e  c ondit ions un d er w hic hon e k no w s,  or i s j ustifie d in holdi ng,  s ome belief). If  we let "c ont ext" refer t o s ome co mm uni t y ofinq uirer s andt he rel evant eva lu a tive p r actices a nd  nor ms they share, th e nw e can formulat e a wo rk i ng c har act erizationof  norm a tive co n te x t u ali s m this way: N C: A person S i s just if ied at tim e t i nb eli eving someprop osition p  in co n text Cj ust incase S 'shol ding pat  tco n for m stot herelevant  s et  of e pist e m i c  pra cti cesand n orms operativ e i n C. I a m cal lingpart ic ularattent ion t othe idea that t here  is a soc ial  d ime ns ion t o  epist emi c e valuati on beca u seth e i de a that knowledge a nd j us tificati on dep e nd  o n  one's s oc ial  gro u p  canbe t a ke n in two  ways. Fi rs t, as w ehave s ee n w ith  Cohe n  and  Sosa,  it canbe ta k en as one feat u re (or set of fe a t ur e s) o f o ne's circum stan c es t hati srel e vantfor e pi s te m ic appraisal. But,as  justexpla ined, it canalso be ta k e n  as theidea th a t knowledge an d jus tification are rela tiveto the e pistemics t andardsofone 'ssoc i a lgroup or comm u n ity,  s o thatwhe ther or  no t o nehas  k nowledgeor is ju st if ie dinbelie v ing some  p rop os iti on de p ends o n whe ther  o rn otone's b e li e f  con fo rm s to  th eepist emic nor ms of o ne's grou p.T he t he si s of ci rcumstantialco ntextualis m,  th en, sh o u ld not b e confused with normati v e conte xtu alism . In  ethics,itis sta nda r d to d isting uishbe twe e n  circ u m st ant ia l (situati o n al,  envi ro nmen tal) re lativism and ethic a l r elativism. Th e f orme r is  an a lo g ous  t o  wh a t  I am calling c ircumstant ia l  c ontextuali s m a nd  is oft en expr essed as thegeneral t hesis tha tther i ght ness and w rongness  of parti c ulara ct ions,  pr actice sand  so f orth d e pen d inpart o nfactsabout  t he agent 's circumstances. So, f or ins tance , w hether it  wo u ldbe wrongforan onlooke r t o r efrai n f r om ju mpin g  i nto the d eepe nd in ane ff ort t osave a drow n i n g c hilddep e nds (i n pa rt) on facts abou t  that person a nd,i n  pa rti c ular ,on whether ornot  s h e  can swi m.  Ethical re lativism ,b y con trast,  repre sents a n or m ativetheo rywhich, in  pe rh a ps itsmo st common  var ie ty, re lativi z es m o r al truth to themoral s tanda r dsof gr ou ps: the mora l standard s of a grou p (tog ethe r wit h relev an t fact ual  i nformation )  determin e whi ch part ic ular  mo ral st atem e n ts ar e tr ue  fo r members o ft ha tg rou p. N ow th eepis temologic a l analog  of ethical  r ela t i vism i s  w h a t I am cal lin g nor m a tive conte x tual i sm .  My p oint h ere is  that j u stas  we sho uld n ot confus e circums t ant ia l re lativism  i n et hi cswi th normative et hical re lativism , so wesho u ld n o t inte rp ret the circ umsta nt i al
 we_belong. However,_the contextualists I have_in mind_intend_the claim_normatively_(i.e., as a_claim about the_conditions under which one_knows, or is_justified_in holding, some belief). If we let "context" refer to some community of inquirers_and_the relevant_evaluative_practices_and norms they share, then_we can formulate a working_characterization of_normative contextualism this way: NC: A person S_is_justified at time_t in believing some proposition p in context C_just in case S's holding p_at t conforms_to_the_relevant set of epistemic_practices and norms operative in C._I am calling particular attention to_the idea that there is a social_dimension to epistemic evaluation because the_idea that knowledge and justification_depend on_one's social group can be_taken in two_ways. First,_as we have_seen with Cohen and Sosa, it_can be taken_as one feature (or set of_features)_of one's circumstances_that_is_relevant for_epistemic appraisal. But,_as_just explained,_it_can also be taken as the_idea_that knowledge and justification are relative to_the epistemic standards of_one's_social group or community,_so that whether or not_one has knowledge or is justified_in believing_some proposition_depends on whether or not one's belief conforms to the epistemic_norms of one's group. The thesis_of circumstantial contextualism, then,_should not_be_confused with normative_contextualism._In ethics,_it is standard to distinguish between circumstantial_(situational, environmental)_relativism and ethical relativism. The former_is analogous to what_I_am calling circumstantial contextualism and is_often expressed as the general thesis_that the rightness and wrongness_of_particular_actions, practices and so forth_depend in part on facts about_the agent's circumstances._So, for instance, whether it would be_wrong_for an onlooker to refrain from_jumping_into the deep end in an_effort_to_save a drowning child depends_(in part) on facts about that_person and, in particular, on whether or not she_can swim. Ethical_relativism, by contrast, represents a_normative_theory_which, in perhaps its most common variety, relativizes moral truth_to the_moral standards of_groups: the moral standards of a group (together with relevant_factual information) determine which particular moral statements_are true for members of that group. Now the epistemological analog_of ethical relativism is what I am calling_normative contextualism. My point here is that_just as we should_not_confuse circumstantial relativism in ethics with normative_ethical_relativism,_so_we should not_interpret the circumstantial