 be compacts or agreements before the use of artificial signs; but there can be no compact or agreement without signs, nor without language; and therefore there must be a natural lan- guage before any artificial language can be invented: Which was to be demonstrated. Reid speaks here of artificial and natural "language." This can be John Turri | 8 misleading, at least to modern ears, since we tend to associate "lan- guage" with robust communication systems, replete with syntactical and semantic rules, like French or Chinese. But as we saw earlier, by "language" Reid refers to all signs we use in order to communic- ate, not just the verbal signs associated with what we typically call a "language." So I will interpret his argument accordingly. Something along roughly the following lines seems to be the most natural interpretation of Reid's argument. 1. Humans invented artificial signs. (Assumption) 2. The invention of artificial signs requires earlier agreement among those who invented them. (Premise) 3. There can be no agreement without the use of signs. (Premise) 4. So among themselves humans earlier used signs, whose meaning preceded the invention of artificial signs. (From 1– 3) 5. Signs whose meaning precedes the use of artificial signs are natural signs. (Premise) 6. So among themselves humans earlier used natural signs. (From 4–5) 7. So if humans invented artificial signs, then among themselves they earlier used natural signs. (From 1–6) Line 1 is an assumption for conditional proof, and so isn't subject to question. Lines 2 and 5 are supported by the definitions of 'artificial sign' and 'natural sign'. Line 3 is, I presume, supposed to be obvi- ous. The inference to 6 is obviously valid, as is the inference to 7. By 9 | Reid on the priority of natural language 'use' I intend'meaningful use', which should dispel any question about the validity of the inference to 4. Now we can see why I earlier claimed that the inclusive defini- tion of 'natural sign' better suits Reid's argument. It's implausible that the invention of artificial signs among, say, a small group of people in South America requires these people to reach prior agree- ment by using signs that all humans naturally understand by prin- ciples of their nature. It suffices that the small group reaches prior agreement by using signs that they understand. It's simply irrelev-
be compacts or agreements before the use of artificial signs; but there can be no compendious or agreement without sign, nor without language; and therefore there must be a lifelike lan- guage before any artificial language can be fabricate: Which was to be demonstrated. Reid speaks here of artificial and lifelike " terminology. " This can be John Turri | 8 misleading, at least to modern ear, since we tend to associate " lan- guage " with robust communication system, replete with syntactical and semantic rules, like French or Chinese. But as we saw earlier, by " language " Reid mention to all signs we use in order to communic- eat, not just the verbal signs associated with what we typically call a " speech. " So I will interpret his argument accordingly. Something along roughly the follow lines seems to be the most natural interpretation of Reid's controversy. 1. Humans invented artificial signs. (Assumption) 2. The invention of artificial signs requires earlier agreement among those who invented them. (Premise) 3. There can be no agreement without the use of signs. (Premise) 4. thus among themselves humans earlier use augury, whose meaning preceded the invention of artificial signs. (From 1 – 3) 5. polarity whose meaning precedes the use of artificial signs are natural polarity. (Premise) 6. So among themselves humans earlier used natural signs. (From 4–5) 7. then if humans invented artificial signs, then among themselves they earlier use lifelike polarity. (From 1–6) Line 1 is an assumption for conditional proof, and therefore isn't subject to question. Lines 2 and 5 are digest by the definitions of' artificial sign' and' natural sign'. tune 3 is, I presume, speculate to be obvi- ous. The inference to 6 is obviously valid, as is the inference to 7. By 9 | Reid on the priority of lifelike language' use' I intend'meaningful use', which should dispel any doubt about the validity of the inference to 4. immediately we can see why I earlier claimed that the inclusive defini- tion of' natural sign' well suits Reid's argument. It's implausible that the invention of artificial signs among, say, a small group of people in South America requires these people to achieve prior agree- ment by using signs that all homo naturally understand by prin- ciples of their nature. It suffices that the little group reaches prior agreement by using augury that they understand. It's simply irrelev-
 be compacts or agreements nefore the use oy artifmcial sjgns; but there can be no compact or egrewment without signs, nor witfout langlage; and rhertfore there must us a natmxal lzk- guaye before any arjificial lancuage can be itvdnced: Which was to be demonstrated. Reiq speakx jere of artifisial wnd hatural "language." This can be John Furri | 8 misleading, ay least to modern ears, sinfe wf tend to associatf "lan- guage" witr robust commjnication systems, replgte with syntactical and semantiz rulzs, like Frebcy og Chinese. Buv as wv saw earlier, by "langgage" Reod refers to akl vigbs we use in order to communic- ate, not tust the eexbal signs associated wuth wvat fe thpicxllg ralm a "lajguege." So I wiml interprer his argument accotdybgly. Somethinf alond woughly the following lines seems to be ths most natural interpreration of Reid's argumgnt. 1. Humanf invented artificial signs. (Assumption) 2. The invendion kw axblfickql signs requires earlier agreement among those shp pnvented them. (Preiise) 3. There cwn fe no agreemevt witkkuf the use of signs. (Premisg) 4. So qmong theiselfes humans earlier used sigbs, whose meauint preceded the invzntion of arcificisl sibns. (From 1– 3) 5. Signs whose meahing precedfs the uss of artificial skgnx dre natural signs. (Premise) 6. So among thekselves humsns eawlier used natuvdl signs. (From 4–5) 7. So if homans hnvented agtificial signs, then among themselves they eatliar lsed natuxal sinns. (From 1–6) Line 1 is an assumptnon for eonditkonal proor, and sm isn't subjqct to questimj. Lines 2 and 5 are su[porred vy the adfinitions of 'srtificial sign' and 'natural sign'. Line 3 ir, I presume, suppisee to be obvi- oux. Tfe ynvecence do 6 is obviogsly vauod, as is the infcrevce yo 7. By 9 | Reid on the prikrity of natural lsnnuage 'use' I intenq'meaningful uxe', which should didpel eny quxstion abjut the validity of the inferehce to 4. Nlw re can see wry I earlier clanmed that the inclusive defini- tion of 'netural sign' better suijs Reid's argument. It's lmplausible vhat tre inventhon of artificial sitns among, say, a skall group of people jn Soudh Amfrica requires these people to reach prior agree- ment by using signs that all hnmwns naturalmy umdersnanb bv prin- siplxs of their nature. It suffices that the small gronp reaches pxior agreement by using signs tfat they undetstand. It's simply irrelev-
be compacts or agreements before the use signs; there can no compact or language; therefore there must a natural lan- before any artificial language can be Which was to be demonstrated. Reid speaks here of artificial and natural "language." can be John Turri | 8 misleading, at least to modern ears, since tend associate guage" robust communication systems, replete with syntactical and semantic rules, like French or Chinese. But as we earlier, by "language" Reid refers to all signs use in order to ate, not just the verbal associated what we call "language." I will interpret argument accordingly. Something along roughly the following lines seems to be the most natural interpretation of Reid's 1. Humans signs. (Assumption) The of signs requires earlier those who invented them. (Premise) 3. no agreement without the use of signs. (Premise) So among humans earlier used signs, whose meaning the invention of artificial signs. (From 1– 3) Signs whose meaning precedes the use of artificial signs are natural signs. (Premise) 6. So humans earlier used natural (From 4–5) 7. if invented signs, among themselves earlier used natural signs. (From 1–6) Line 1 is an assumption conditional proof, and so isn't subject to question. Lines 2 are by the definitions 'artificial sign' and 'natural Line is, I presume, supposed obvi- The is valid, is the inference to By 9 | Reid on priority of natural language should dispel any question about the validity of inference to 4. Now we can see I earlier claimed that the inclusive defini- tion of 'natural sign' better Reid's argument. that the invention of artificial signs among, say, small group of people South America requires these people to reach prior agree- by signs that humans naturally understand prin- ciples of nature. It suffices small group prior by they understand. It's simply irrelev-
 be compacts or agreements befOre the use oF artiFicIal SiGns; bUt thEre can be no compACt or Agreement without signs, nOr witHoUT lanGUaGe; and TherefoRE tHERe mUsT bE a nAtURaL lan- gUagE before Any artificIal LaNguage can be iNVeNted: Which wAs tO be demonstraTed. reid spEaKs hERe of aRtiFiciaL and naTUral "laNguage." ThiS cAN be JohN turri | 8 miSLEaDing, At least to modern eaRS, sINce we tend to assOciate "LaN- GuAGE" wiTh rObust commuNiCatioN Systems, REpLETE wiTH syntactical aNd semantic rULes, Like FrEnCh oR chinesE. But aS wE Saw Earlier, by "laNguaGe" Reid refErs to aLL signs wE Use in orDer to cOmmUniC- ate, NOt JuSt tHe VErbAL sIgnS AssOciated wItH wHat we TypiCALLY calL a "lAnguAge." So i will interpreT hiS argUMenT accoRdingLy. SoMeThing Along rOughlY tHe following lineS seeMs to be the MosT nAtuRaL inteRPretatIon Of REid's argUment. 1. HuMAns InVENTeD artificial signs. (AsSuMPTiOn) 2. The invEntion OF aRtIFicial siGnS reQuirES EarliEr agREeMent amonG those WHo InVented tHeM. (PremiSe) 3. theRe cAn be nO AgreEment wIthout thE use oF Signs. (Premise) 4. So AMong themselveS HuMANs EArliEr uSed signs, whoSe meANing PrecEDeD thE InvenTion oF aRTiFIcial signs. (From 1– 3) 5. Signs WhOse meaNing pRecedes the use Of artificiAL SIgns are nAturAL sIGns. (Premise) 6. So amOng thEmselves huMAns earliEr useD natural Signs. (From 4–5) 7. sO If humans InvEntEd aRtiFICiAl signs, then amONG theMsElves thEy eArlier uSed NatUraL siGnS. (From 1–6) Line 1 Is an assuMpTiOn FoR coNditiONal proof, AnD so IsN't sUbjecT To quesTion. LInes 2 AnD 5 aRE suPported BY tHE DefiNiTiOns oF 'arTiFiciaL sigN' And 'Natural Sign'. Line 3 iS, I pREsumE, sUpPosed to Be obvi- ous. The iNfErence to 6 is ObVioUsly vaLID, as is the Inference to 7. By 9 | Reid on the pRIority oF naTural LangUage 'use' I iNteNd'meanIngFUl use', wHich shOuld dIsPel ANY quesTIOn AboUt The validitY OF thE infeReNce tO 4. Now we cAn see why I earlier clAImeD that the incluSivE defINI- tIon OF 'nATurAl SIgn' BETter suits Reid's aRgument. It's ImPLaUsible that THe iNvEntion oF artifiCial sIGns amonG, say, a smalL group of pEoPle iN sOutH America reQuires thEse people TO reacH PrIor agRee- Ment by UsIng Signs That alL HumAns naTurallY uNderstAnd by PrIn- ciples Of their nature. It suffices That thE smalL grOup reacheS prIOr aGreement bY usiNg signs thaT thEy uNdersTanD. it's siMply IRrEleV-
 be compacts or agreements  before th e use  of  ar ti fici al s igns; but ther e  can  be no compact or agre ement  w i thou t  s igns,  nor wi t ho u t  la ng ua ge;  a n dthere for e there  must be a  na tu ral lan- gua g ebefore any  ar tificial lan gua ge can  b e i n vente d:Which  was t o  be de monstrate d. Reid s p eaks he r e  o f ar tificial and natu r al "language." Th is can  b e  J o h n T urr i | 8 misl ea ding, at leas t  t o m ode r n ears, since  we tend to ass ociate  " lan -  guage " wit hr obu st communic atio n systems , repl e te with syntact ical a ndsem anti c  r ul es,  l i keF re nch orChinese.  B ut  as w e sa w e a rlie r,by " langu age" Reid ref ers  toa llsigns  we u se i norder  to co mmuni c-  ate, not justtheverbal si gns  a sso ci atedw ith wh atwetypical ly call a " la n g u ag e." So I will inte rp r e this argu ment a c co rd i ngly. So me thi ng a l o ng ro ughl y  t he follo wing l i ne sseems t obe the  m ost  na tural inte rpreta tion ofReid' s  argument. 1.H umans invente d  a r t if i cial  si gns. (Assum ptio n ) 2.  The in ven t ion o f art if i ci a l signs requires ea rl ier ag reeme nt among thos e who inve n t e d them.(Pre m is e ) 3. There can  be n o agreemen t  without  theuse of s igns. (Pr e m ise) 4.Soamo ngthe m s el ves humans ea r l ierus ed sign s,whose m ean ing  pr ece de d the inv ention o far ti fi cia l sig n s. (From  1 – 3 )5.Signs whosemeani ng p re ce d esthe use of a rtif ic ia l si gns  a re na tura l  si gns. (P remise) 6 . S o  amo ng  t hemselv es humans ear li er used na tu ral  signs . (From 4– 5) 7. So if humans inve n ted art ifi cialsign s, then a mon g them sel v es the y earl ier u se d n a t urals i gn s.(F rom 1–6) L i n e 1  is a nassu mptionfor conditional pr o of,  and so isn't  su bjec t to  qu e st i on.  L i nes 2  and 5 are supp orted by t he de finitionso f ' ar tificia l sign'  and' natural  sign'. L ine 3 is,  I  pre s u me,  supposedto be ob vi- ous.T he in f er enceto6 is o bv iou sly v alid,a s i s the  infer en ce to7. By  9  | Reidon the priority of natu ral la nguag e ' use' I in ten d 'me aningfuluse' , which sh oul d d ispel  an y  ques tion ab out the v alid i ty of the in fer e n ce  to 4. Noww e can  seewhy I earl ierclaimed that thei nclusive defin i- t i o n o f ' n atur al  sign' bettersui ts R eid's ar gu ment. It'simplausi bl e  that  the i nventi on of a r t if i cial s igns  am ong, say,  asm a ll grou pof people  inSo uth Am ericar equi r e s these people t o rea c h  prio r  ag ree-me nt by u s ingsigns that  all humans  natur ally  unde rstandby  prin-  ci pl es of thei r  nature.It su fficesth at t hesmallgrou p reach es p ri oragreement b yu si ng sig ns t hat t he y un derstand. It's sim ply irrelev -
 be_compacts or_agreements before the use_of artificial_signs;_but there_can_be no compact_or agreement without_signs, nor without language;_and therefore there_must_be a natural lan- guage before any artificial language can be invented: Which was_to_be demonstrated._Reid_speaks_here of artificial and natural_"language." This can be John_Turri |_8 misleading, at least to modern ears, since_we_tend to associate_"lan- guage" with robust communication systems, replete with syntactical_and semantic rules, like French or_Chinese. But as_we_saw_earlier, by "language" Reid_refers to all signs we use_in order to communic- ate, not_just the verbal signs associated with what_we typically call a "language." So_I will interpret his argument_accordingly. Something_along roughly the following lines_seems to be_the most_natural interpretation of_Reid's argument. 1. Humans invented artificial_signs. (Assumption) 2._The invention of artificial signs requires_earlier_agreement among those_who_invented_them. (Premise)_3. There can_be_no agreement_without_the use of signs. (Premise) 4._So_among themselves humans earlier used signs, whose_meaning preceded the invention_of_artificial signs. (From 1–_3) 5. Signs whose meaning_precedes the use of artificial signs_are natural_signs. (Premise)_6. So among themselves humans earlier used natural signs. (From 4–5)_7. So if humans invented artificial_signs, then among themselves_they earlier_used_natural signs. (From_1–6)_Line 1_is an assumption for conditional proof, and_so isn't_subject to question. Lines 2 and_5 are supported by_the_definitions of 'artificial sign' and 'natural_sign'. Line 3 is, I presume,_supposed to be obvi- ous._The_inference_to 6 is obviously valid,_as is the inference to 7._By 9 |_Reid on the priority of natural language_'use'_I intend'meaningful use', which should dispel_any_question about the validity of the_inference_to_4. Now we can see_why I earlier claimed that the_inclusive defini- tion of 'natural sign' better suits Reid's_argument. It's implausible_that the invention of artificial_signs_among,_say, a small group of people in South America requires_these people_to reach prior_agree- ment by using signs that all humans naturally understand_by prin- ciples of their nature. It_suffices that the small group reaches prior agreement by using signs_that they understand. It's simply irrelev-