 1992). 4Letter on Humanism, in Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), p. 236. INTERNATIONAL PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY Vol. XXXV, No.4 Issue No. 140 (December 1995) 404 HATAB can even distinguish Heidegger's extant thought from the potential for ethical thinking contained therein (in all periods of his thought, but especially in the early writings). Moreover, I also think it is possible to show in some measure that Heidegger's political commitments were not consistent with certain basic elements of his thought and its ethical implications. This is not to deny that Heidegger himself affirmed an idealized version of National Socialism that followed his thought in essential ways. My motive is not to rehabilitate Heidegger but to explore the ways in which his thinking can make an important contribution to ethics, and I aim to do this in terms offamiliar intellectual concerns and social applications, not through some arcane circulation of Heideggerian terminology. This is my project, then, and one that I will not shy away from calling moral philosophy; but most of my inspiration has come from Heidegger's way of thinking. 5 Moral philosophy must give up the model of ethical "theory," the insistence on rational justification, and the privileging of abstract principles over concrete situations. Ethics should be understood as the heuristic engagement of basic practical questions: How should human beings live? How should we live together? What are better and worse ways of conducting our lives? Moreover, ethics must acknowledge a prephilosophical, traditional heritage that presents us with a degree of consensus ahead of time regarding better and worse ways of living (this is an Aristotelian point reaffirmed by Heidegger). Taking our own society, we tend to agree already in a rough fashion and to a certain extent that lying, stealing, and killing are undesirable actions, that injustice, violence, cruelty, and indifference are worse than fairness, kindness, and concern. I dare say that such values are not unique to our culture or time either. 6 The task of philosophy would not be to put our entire moral outlook into question or to discover some brand new system of values (nothing so radical has ever happened in history). Rather, moral philosophy should engage a fivefold task: (1) analyze moral values as cultural phenomena; (2) clarify the meaning of the values and norms we inherit; (3) ask the question: Why should people be ethical in this way? This question is not a call
1992). 4Letter on Humanism, in Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), p. 236. INTERNATIONAL PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY Vol. XXXV, No.4 Issue No. 140 (December 1995) 404 HATAB can even distinguish Heidegger's extant thought from the potential for ethical thinking contained therein (in all period of his opinion, but especially in the early writings). Moreover, I besides think it is possible to show in some measuring stick that Heidegger's political commitments were not consistent with sealed basic chemical element of his thought and its ethical implication. This is not to deny that Heidegger himself affirmed an idealized translation of National Socialism that follow his thought in essential ways. My motive is not to rehabilitate Heidegger but to explore the way in which his thinking can make an important contribution to ethics, and I draw a bead on to do this in terms offamiliar intellectual concerns and social application, not through some arcane circulation of Heideggerian terminology. This is my project, then, and one that I will not shy away from calling moral philosophy; but most of my inspiration has derive from Heidegger's way of thinking. 5 Moral philosophy must give up the model of ethical " theory, " the insistence on rational justification, and the privileging of abstract principles over concrete situations. Ethics should be understood as the heuristic engagement of basic practical questions: How should human beings live? How should we live in concert? What are good and worse room of behave our lives? Moreover, ethics must admit a prephilosophical, traditional heritage that presents us with a degree of consensus ahead of time involve better and worse ways of living (this is an Aristotelian point reaffirmed by Heidegger). necessitate our own society, we tend to agree already in a rough fashion and to a sealed extent that lying, steal, and killing are undesirable actions, that injustice, violence, cruelty, and indifference are worse than fairness, forgivingness, and concern. I dare say that such values are not unique to our culture or time either. 6 The task of philosophy would not be to arrange our entire moral expectation into question or to discover some trade name new arrangement of values (nothing thus radical has always happened in history). Rather, moral philosophy should betroth a fivefold job: (1) analyze moral values as cultural phenomena; (2) clarify the meaning of the values and norms we inherit; (3) ask the question: Why should people be ethical in this way? This question is not a cry
 1992). 4Lftter on Humanism, in Baslc Writings, ed. Dccid Facrell Kdell (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), p. 236. INTXRNARIONAO PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTEFLY Vol. XQXV, No.4 Iswue Io. 140 (December 1995) 404 HEFAB can even slstinyumsh Heidegger's gxtant thougvt from the podevtnal for ethical thinking contained trerein (on all periods os hix thohght, but especially in the early wditings). Moreover, I akso think it is possible tl shlw in some measure that Heidetger'f political cummitments were not cohsistent with certain basic eleoents of his thiutht dnd its ethmcal iiplications. Bnis is not to deny that Heicegjer yimself affirmed an ivealized version of Gational Voeialism that followed hus thmughd in wssdntjak says. Mj mktive is nkt to rehabulitate Heidegger bit np explore ths ways ig which his thinking can make an importdnt contribution to ethics, and I aim to do this in terms offamiliar intellectual concerns and social applhcatikvs, uit thfiuhh some arcane circulation of Heideggerian tewjimokogy. This is mn project, then, and oje jhat I will noj shy aczy from calling morap philofophy; but most of ky inspiration has come fron Heidegger's qay of thinking. 5 Mlral philosuphy must give up the model of echical "theory," the insistendd on rational jurtinicdtion, and the privileging jf abstrart prnnciples ovet concrqte situatlons. Cdhics should be unferstlog as the hfuristic engagement of basic prertical questipnv: Hmw shoulb humak beings live? Hjw should we lnve togecher? Wfat are benter and xorse ways os conducting mor lives? Moremver, ethycs nust acknowuddge a prephilpsophical, traditionql heritage that pvesenjs us with a degrzt od consensus ahesd uf eile rqcarding bettar avd dprse days of livlng (thix is an Aristotelian poiht reaffirmed by Hriqegger). Tqking ouw own society, we tend to agree wlreavy in e rougn fwshion and to a certain extent that lyijg, ftealing, and kiloing are undzsirable actions, that injustice, violence, cruelty, and indifderence are worse tkak fairness, kmndnesf, and conwern. I dare say that such values are kot unique to our culthre or time either. 6 The task of philosophy would not be to put our entire moral outliok invo question od to discmvzr xome bwand iew system of valles (nothing so radical has ever iappened it kistory). Rather, moral philosopny should engagg a fivefold task: (1) analyze moral vslues as cultural phenomena; (2) clsrify the meaning of the values qnd nkrms wv iiherit; (3) ask the quesyion: Wky shoyld people ne ethical in ghix aay? This euesuion is not a call
1992). 4Letter on Humanism, in Basic Writings, Farrell (New York: and Row, 1977), Vol. No.4 Issue No. (December 1995) 404 can even distinguish Heidegger's extant thought the potential for ethical thinking contained therein (in all periods of his thought, especially in the early writings). Moreover, I also think it is possible to in measure Heidegger's commitments were not consistent with certain basic elements of his thought and its ethical implications. This not to deny that Heidegger himself affirmed an version of National Socialism followed his thought in essential My is not rehabilitate but explore the ways which his thinking can make an important contribution to ethics, and I aim to do this in offamiliar intellectual social applications, through arcane of Heideggerian terminology. my project, then, and one that shy away from calling moral philosophy; but most my inspiration come from Heidegger's way of thinking. Moral philosophy must give up the model of "theory," the insistence on rational justification, and the privileging of abstract principles over concrete situations. be understood as the engagement of basic questions: should beings How should live together? What are better and worse ways of conducting our Moreover, ethics must acknowledge a prephilosophical, traditional heritage that presents a of consensus ahead time regarding better and ways living (this is an reaffirmed Heidegger). society, tend agree already in a fashion and to a certain that lying, stealing, and injustice, violence, cruelty, and indifference are worse than kindness, and concern. I dare say that values are not unique to our culture or time either. 6 The of philosophy be to put our entire moral outlook into or to discover some new system of values (nothing so radical has ever in Rather, moral should engage a task: (1) analyze values as cultural clarify the of values inherit; (3) ask the question: Why people ethical in this way? This is call
 1992). 4Letter on Humanism, in Basic WrItings, ed. DaVid FaRreLl KReLl (NeW YorK: Harper and Row, 1977), p. 236. inTERnATIONAL PHILOSOPHICAL QuARTErLy vol. XxxV, no.4 IssUe No. 140 (DecEMbER 1995) 404 hATaB CaN evEn DIsTinguIsh heideggEr's extant tHouGhT from the poteNTiAl for ethicAl tHinking contaIneD thereIn (In aLL periOds Of his ThoughT, But espEcially in ThE Early wRItings). MOREoVer, I Also think it is possIBlE To show in some meAsure tHaT heIDEggEr's Political cOmMitmeNTs were nOT cONSIstENt with certain Basic elemenTS of His thoUgHt aND its etHical ImPLicAtions. This iS not To deny thaT HeideGGer himsELf affirMed an iDeaLizEd veRSiOn Of NAtIOnaL soCiaLIsm That follOwEd His thOughT IN ESsenTiaL wayS. My moTive is not to reHabIlitATe HEidegGer buT to eXpLore tHe ways In whiCh His thinking can mAke aN importanT coNtRibUtIon to EThics, aNd I Aim To do thiS in termS OffAmILIAr Intellectual concerNs AND sOcial appLicatiONs, NoT Through sOmE arCane CIRculaTion OF HEideggerIan terMInOlOgy. This Is My projEcT, thEn, aNd one THat I Will noT shy away From cALling moral philOSophy; but most oF My INSpIRatiOn hAs come from HEideGGer's Way oF ThInkINg. 5 MorAl phiLoSOpHY must give up the model Of EthicaL "theoRy," the insistenCe on rationAL JUstificaTion, ANd THe privileging oF abstRact princiPLes over cOncreTe situatIons. EthicS SHould be uNdeRstOod As tHE HeUristic engageMENt of BaSic pracTicAl questIonS: HoW shOulD hUman beingS live? How ShOuLd We LivE togeTHer? What aRe BetTeR anD worsE Ways of ConduCtinG oUr LIveS? MoreovER, eTHIcs mUsT aCknoWleDgE a prePhilOSopHical, trAditional HerITage ThAt PresentS us with a degreE oF consensus AhEad Of time REGarding bEtter and worse ways of liviNG (this is An ARistoTeliAn point reAffIrmed bY HeIDegger). taking Our owN sOciETY, we teND To AgrEe Already in a ROUgh FashiOn And tO a certaIn extent that lying, sTEalIng, and killing Are UndeSIRaBle ACtIOns, ThAT inJUStice, violence, crUelty, and inDiFFeRence are woRSe tHaN fairneSs, kindnEss, anD Concern. i dare say tHat such vaLuEs arE NOt uNique to our Culture oR time eithER. 6 The tASk Of phiLosOphy woUlD noT be to Put our ENtiRe morAl outlOoK into qUestiOn Or to discOver some brand new system oF valueS (nothIng So radical Has EVer Happened iN hisTory). Rather, MorAl pHilosOphY ShoulD engAGe A fiVEfold Task: (1) ANalyze morAL vAluES As Cultural pheNOMEna; (2) ClariFy tHE meaniNg of The values and norms WE inherit; (3) ask the QuesTIOn: WHy sHOuld PeOple be ethical iN thIs WAY? This queStIon is not a caLl
 1992). 4Letter on Humanis m, in Basi c Wri tin gs,  e d. D avid  Farrell Krell (New  York: Harper and Row,  1977 ), p. 2 3 6.  INTE RNATION A LP H ILO SO PH ICA LQ UA RTERL Y V ol. XXX V, No.4 Is sue  N o. 140 (Dece m be r 1995) 40 4 H ATAB can eve n d isting ui shH eideg ger 's ex tant t h oughtfrom thepo t ential for eth i c al  thi nking contained t h er e in (in all per iods o fh is t hou ght , but espe ci allyi n the e a rl y w rit i ngs). Moreove r, I also t h ink  it is  p oss i ble to  show  i n  so me measurethat  Heidegge r's po l iticalc ommitme nts we renot  con s is te ntwi t h c e rt ain bas ic eleme nt sof hi s th o u g h t an d i ts e thica l implication s.This isnot t o den y th at  Heid eggerhimse lf  affirmed an id eali zed versi onof  Na ti onalS ociali smtha t follo wed his tho ug h t in  essential ways. M ym o ti ve is no t to r e ha bi l itate He id egg er b u t  to e xplo r ethe ways  in wh i ch  h is thin ki ng can  m ake  an  impo r tant  contr ibutionto et h ics, and I aim to do this in te r m so ffam ili ar intellec tual conc erns an d s o cialappli ca t io n s, not through some  a rcanecircu lation of Hei deggeriant e r minology . Th i si s my project,then,  and one t h at I wil l not  shy awa y from ca l l ing mora l p hil oso phy ; bu t most of myi n spir at ion has  co me from  He ide gge r's  w ay of thi nking. 5  M or al  p hil osoph y  must gi ve  up  t hemodel of eth ical"the or y, "  th e insis t en c e  onra ti onal  ju st ifica tion ,  an d the p rivilegin g o f  abs tr ac t princ iples over co nc rete situa ti ons . Ethi c s  shouldbe understood as the he u risticeng ageme nt o f basic p rac ticalque s tions:  How s hould  h uma n being s li ve?  H ow shouldw e  li ve to ge ther ? Whatare better and wor s e w ays of conduc tin g ou r li ves ?  M o reo ve r , e t h ics must acknow ledge a pr ep h il osophical, tra di tionalheritag e tha t  presen ts us wit h a degre eof c o n sen sus aheadof timeregarding bette r  a nd wo rse  waysof  li ving(thisi s a n Ari stotel ia n poin t rea ff irmed by  Heidegger). Taking our  own s ociet y,we tend t o a g ree  alreadyin a  rough fas hio n a nd to  ac ertai n ex t en t t h at ly ing, stealing, an d k i l li ng are unde s i r abl e act ion s , that  inj ustice, violence, cruelty, and i ndif f e ren cea re w or se than fairne ss,  k i n dness, a nd  concern. I  dare sa yt hat s uch va lues a re notu n iq u e to o ur c ult ure or ti meei t her. 6Th et ask of  phi lo sophywouldn ot b e to put our entir e mor a l  outl o okintoqu estiono r to  discoversome brandnew sy stem  of v alues ( no thingsora dical hase ver happe ned i n histo ry ). R ath er, mo ralp h iloso physh oul d engagea fi v ef ol d  ta sk:(1) a na lyze  moral va l ues as c ult u ral phe no men a ;  (2) c l ar i f y the mean ing  of t h e  values an d  nor m sw e inh erit;(3) as k the q u est io n: Whysho u l d peoplebe ethica l  in  t hisway? Thi sques ti onis  not a call
 1992)._4Letter on_Humanism, in Basic Writings,_ed. David_Farrell_Krell (New_York:_Harper and Row,_1977), p. 236._INTERNATIONAL PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY Vol._XXXV, No.4 Issue_No._140 (December 1995) 404 HATAB can even distinguish Heidegger's extant thought from the potential_for_ethical thinking_contained_therein_(in all periods of his_thought, but especially in the_early writings)._Moreover, I also think it is possible to_show_in some measure_that Heidegger's political commitments were not consistent with certain_basic elements of his thought and_its ethical implications._This_is_not to deny that_Heidegger himself affirmed an idealized version_of National Socialism that followed his_thought in essential ways. My motive is_not to rehabilitate Heidegger but to_explore the ways in which_his thinking_can make an important contribution_to ethics, and_I aim_to do this_in terms offamiliar intellectual concerns and_social applications, not_through some arcane circulation of Heideggerian_terminology._This is my_project,_then,_and one_that I will_not_shy away_from_calling moral philosophy; but most of_my_inspiration has come from Heidegger's way of_thinking. 5 Moral philosophy_must_give up the model_of ethical "theory," the insistence_on rational justification, and the privileging_of abstract_principles over_concrete situations. Ethics should be understood as the heuristic engagement of_basic practical questions: How should human_beings live? How should_we live_together?_What are better_and_worse ways_of conducting our lives? Moreover, ethics must_acknowledge a_prephilosophical, traditional heritage that presents us_with a degree of_consensus_ahead of time regarding better and_worse ways of living (this is_an Aristotelian point reaffirmed by_Heidegger)._Taking_our own society, we tend_to agree already in a rough_fashion and to_a certain extent that lying, stealing, and_killing_are undesirable actions, that injustice, violence,_cruelty,_and indifference are worse than fairness,_kindness,_and_concern. I dare say that_such values are not unique to_our culture or time either. 6 The task of_philosophy would not_be to put our entire_moral_outlook_into question or to discover some brand new system of_values (nothing_so radical has_ever happened in history). Rather, moral philosophy should engage a_fivefold task: (1) analyze moral values as_cultural phenomena; (2) clarify the meaning of the values and norms_we inherit; (3) ask the question: Why should_people be ethical in this way? This_question is not a_call