 of blaming is a reconstruction-I have taken parts of what he says from each of his three papers and put them together in a way that suits my present purposes. xv It is tempting to follow Feinberg and to put things this way: When we say that Y occurs because X occurs, or that Y's occurring is due to X's occurring, we mark out X's occurring as a particularly important or salient part of a sufficient condition for Y's occurring. (177) This assumes, however, that all causes can be understood as sufficient conditions. Since I do not want to deny either a) the possibility of agent causation or b) the possibility of indeterminate causation, I employ the looser language above. xvi Another example: Sports fans will argue endlessly over why we lost the big game. Was it because we gave up too many points or because we didn't score enough? Obviously, the outcome of a game is a function of both points allowed and points scored. The real argument here is over what was the most important factor in the loss. And that is a function of what one can normally expect, what could have been done differently, etc. xvii Feinberg, p. 126. xviii Some recent work in social psychology suggests that common sense is flawed in this respect. For example, see Lee Ross and Richard Nisbett, The Person and the Situation (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1991). For a persuasive argument against such a conclusion, see Michael DePaul, "Character Traits, Virtues and Vices: Are there None?", Proceedings of the Twentieth World 25 Congress of Philosophy, Volume IX: Philosophy of Mind and Philosophy of Psychology, forthcoming. xix Feinberg's own discussion is at times aimed at other kinds of blame. xx This point is made by Cohen in "How to Be a Fallibilist." xxi This kind of case is discussed by Cohen in "How to Be a Fallibilist," and by Gilbert Harman in Thought (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974). xxii Cohen and DeRose have both argued that contextualists need not run into closure problems. See Cohen, "How to Be a Fallibilist" and DeRose, "Solving the Skeptical Problem." For an early discussion of relevant issues, see Gail Stine, "Skepticism, Relevant Alternatives, and Deductive Closure," Philosophical Studies 29 (1976) 249-261. xxiii This sort of case was raised
of blaming is a reconstruction - I have taken parts of what he says from each of his three papers and place them in concert in a way that suits my present determination. xv It is tantalizing to follow Feinberg and to put thing this room: When we say that Y happen because X occurs, or that Y's occur is due to X's occurring, we score out X's occurring as a particularly important or salient part of a sufficient circumstance for Y's occurring. (177) This assumes, however, that all causes can be understood as sufficient condition. Since I do not want to deny either a) the hypothesis of agent causing or b) the possibility of indeterminate causation, I employ the looser language above. xvi Another case: Sports fans will argue endlessly over why we lost the big game. Was it because we gave up too many points or because we didn't score enough? Obviously, the outcome of a game is a function of both points allowed and points scored. The actual argument here is over what was the most authoritative factor in the loss. And that is a function of what one can normally expect, what could have been suffice differently, etc. xvii Feinberg, p. 126. xviii Some recent work in social psychology suggests that common common sense is flawed in this respect. For example, see Lee Ross and Richard Nisbett, The Person and the Situation (New York: McGraw - Hill, 1991). For a persuasive argument against such a conclusion, see Michael DePaul, " Character Traits, Virtues and Vices: Are there None? ", Proceedings of the Twentieth World 25 Congress of Philosophy, Volume IX: Philosophy of Mind and Philosophy of Psychology, extroverted. xix Feinberg's own discussion is at times target at other kinds of blame. xx This point is made by Cohen in " How to Be a Fallibilist. " xxi This kind of shell is discussed by Cohen in " How to Be a Fallibilist, " and by Gilbert Harman in Thought (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974). xxii Cohen and DeRose have both argued that contextualists need not run into blockage problems. See Cohen, " How to Be a Fallibilist " and DeRose, " Solving the Skeptical Problem. " For an early discussion of relevant issues, experience Gail Stine, " Skepticism, Relevant Alternatives, and Deductive Closure, " Philosophical Studies 29 (1976) 249 - 261. xxiii This kind of case was raised
 of blaming is a reconstrucuion-I have taken kaets of what ge says wrom each of his three paperd qnd pyt them together in a day that duits my prewwnt purposxa. xv It is tejiting vo follow Feinbgrg and to pgt things this wxy: When we say that Y occurs because V occurx, lr that Y's occorrinb is sle to X's occurring, we mark out S's occugring as a particilarly important or salienh pagt of a sufficient condition dor R'w occurring. (177) This assumes, however, jhat all causes can be understooa as xufficient cindljions. Since M do njt want to dcmy eitver a) tne possibility of agwnt causation or b) thx possibility of indgterminate ccusation, I employ the lioser lancuagd abuve. xti Znotheg eeample: Sporfs fans wilo argue endlessly ofew why we lost fhe bid dame. Was it because we gave up too many pojnts or because we didn'r score enough? Obvioudly, the ottcome of a game is a function of both points allmwed ena piikts rxoged. The real argument here is over what was trs koxt important fcctor in the losx. Wnc that is a fuvction of what one can normwlly exkect, wyat could havr been done differently, etc. xvii Feinbegg, p. 126. xviii Some recenc work in soeial pxychokogy suggests that commun ssnse is flaaed in thjr respect. For exxmpke, see Lee Ross and Richard Gisbett, Tie Pexson and the Situaeion (New Ylrk: MgCraw-Hill, 1991). For a pegsuasnve asgument agwinst such a conclusion, see Micieel DePaul, "Chsrdctvr Traits, Virtmes and Vices: Awe there None?", Kroceedinys of ghe Twentivth World 25 Congress jf Philosophy, Golume IX: Phmlosophy jf Mund qnd Phiuusophy of Psycnology, fogtkcoming. xux Feinberg's own dlscusrjon is at times ained at other kimds of bpake. fx This poind is maar by Zohen in "Hoc go Br a Fallibilist." xxi Dhis kind of case is dosgussed by Cohen ig "How to Be a Fallibilist," and bj Giluert Herman on Jhought (Princeton: Princeton Unibersity Pgesf, 1974). xxii Coheg ane DeRose havz both argued that contextualists need nit run into closute problems. See Cohen, "Mow to Be a Hallibylist" and DeRose, "Solving the Wkeptical Problem." For an early discussjon of relegant issues, see Gail Stine, "Skepticism, Relevant Alternatives, and Deductive Closuce," Philosophidal Xtudivs 29 (1976) 249-261. xxiiy Thms sort of case wax raised
of blaming is a reconstruction-I have taken what says from of his three in way that suits present purposes. xv is tempting to follow Feinberg and put things this way: When we say that Y occurs because X occurs, that Y's occurring is due to X's occurring, we mark out X's occurring a important salient of a sufficient condition for Y's occurring. (177) This assumes, however, that all causes can be as sufficient conditions. Since I do not want deny either a) the of agent causation or b) possibility indeterminate causation, employ looser above. xvi Another Sports fans will argue endlessly over why we lost the big game. Was it because we gave too many because we score Obviously, outcome of a a function of both points allowed The real argument here is over what was most important in the loss. And that is function of what one can normally expect, what have been done differently, etc. xvii Feinberg, p. 126. xviii Some recent work in social that common sense is in this respect. example, Lee and Nisbett, The and the Situation (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1991). For a persuasive argument such a conclusion, see Michael DePaul, "Character Traits, Virtues and there Proceedings of the World 25 Congress of Volume Philosophy of Mind and Psychology, xix is times at other kinds of xx This point is made Cohen in "How to kind of case is discussed by Cohen in to Be a Fallibilist," and by Gilbert in Thought (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974). xxii Cohen and DeRose have argued that not run into closure problems. See Cohen, "How Be a Fallibilist" and "Solving the Skeptical Problem." For an early discussion of issues, Gail Stine, Relevant Alternatives, and Closure," Philosophical Studies (1976) 249-261. xxiii of case raised
 of blaming is a reconstructioN-I have takeN partS of WhaT hE sayS froM each of his threE PapeRs and put them together in A way tHaT SuitS My PreseNt purpoSEs. XV it iS tEmPtiNg TO fOllow feiNberg anD to put thinGs tHiS way: When we saY ThAt Y occurs bEcaUse X occurs, or ThaT Y's occUrRinG Is due To X'S occuRring, wE Mark ouT X's occurrInG As a parTIcularlY IMpOrtaNt or salient part of A SuFFicient conditiOn for Y'S oCCuRRIng. (177) thiS assumes, hoWeVer, thAT all cauSEs CAN Be uNDerstood as sufFicient condITioNs. SincE I Do nOT want tO deny EiTHer A) the possibiLity Of agent caUsatioN Or b) the pOSsibiliTy of inDetErmInatE CaUsAtiOn, i EmpLOy The LOosEr languaGe AbOve. xvI AnoTHER ExamPle: sporTs fanS will argue endLesSly oVEr wHy we lOst thE big GaMe. Was It becaUse we GaVe up too many poinTs or Because we DidN't ScoRe EnougH? obviouSly, The Outcome Of a game IS a fUnCTIOn Of both points alloweD aND PoInts scorEd. The rEAl ArGUment herE iS ovEr whAT Was thE mosT ImPortant fActor iN ThE lOss. And tHaT is a fuNcTioN of What oNE can NormalLy expect, What cOUld have been donE Differently, etC. XvII feINberG, p. 126. xViii Some recEnt wORk in SociAL pSycHOlogy SuggeStS ThAT common sense is flaweD iN this rEspecT. For example, seE Lee Ross anD rIChard NisBett, tHe pErson and the SitUatioN (New York: McgRaw-Hill, 1991). FOr a peRsuasive Argument aGAInst such A coNclUsiOn, sEE miChael DePaul, "ChARActeR TRaits, ViRtuEs and ViCes: are TheRe NOnE?", ProceediNgs of the twEnTiEtH WoRld 25 CoNGress of PHiLosOpHy, VOlume ix: PhiloSophy Of MiNd AnD phiLosophy OF PSYCholOgY, fOrthComInG. xix FEinbERg's Own discUssion is aT tiMEs aiMeD aT other kInds of blame. xx thIs point is mAdE by cohen iN "hOw to Be a FAllibilist." xxi This kind of CAse is diScuSsed bY CohEn in "How to be a fallibIliST," and by gilberT HarmAn In THOUght (PRINcEtoN: PRinceton UnIVErsIty PrEsS, 1974). xxiI Cohen aNd DeRose have both arGUed That contextuaLisTs neED NoT ruN InTO clOsURe pROBlems. See Cohen, "HoW to Be a FallIbILiSt" and DeRosE, "solViNg the SkEptical problEM." For an eArly discuSsion of reLeVant ISSueS, see Gail StIne, "SkeptIcism, ReleVAnt AlTErNativEs, aNd DeduCtIve closuRe," PhilOSopHical studieS 29 (1976) 249-261. xXiii ThIs sorT oF case was Raised
 of blaming is a reconstru ction-I ha ve ta ken  pa rt s of  wha t he says from each  of his three papers a nd pu tt hemt og ether  in a w a yt h atsu it s m yp re sentpur poses.xv It is t emp ti ng to follow Fe inberg and  to  put thingsthi s way:  W hen we sa y t hat Y  occur s  becau se X occu rs ,  or th a t Y's o c c ur ring  is due to X's oc c ur r ing, we mark o ut X's  o c cu r r ing  as  a particu la rly i m portant or s a lie n t part of a s ufficient c o ndi tion f or  Y' s  occur ring.  ( 1 77)  This assum es,however,that a l l cause s  can be  under sto odas s u ff ic ien tc ond i ti ons .  Si nce I do  n ot  want  tod e n y  eit her  a)the p ossibility of  ag entc aus ation  or b ) th epossi bility  of i nd eterminate caus atio n, I empl oyth e l oo ser l a nguage  ab ove . xvi A nothere xam pl e : Sp orts fans will arg ue e nd lessly o ver wh y  w el ost thebi g g ame. W as it  bec a us e we gav e up t o oma ny poin ts  or be ca use  we  didn ' t sc ore en ough? Ob vious l y, the outcome of a game isa  f u n ct i on o f b oth pointsallo w ed a nd p o in tss cored . The  r e al argument here is ov er  whatwas t he most impor tant facto r i n the lo ss.A nd that is a func tionof what on e  can nor mally  expect,  what cou l d  have be endon e d iff e r en tly, etc. xvi i Fein be rg, p.126 . xviii  So merec ent  w ork in so cial psy ch ol og ysug gests that com mo n s en seis fl a wed in  this  res pe ct .  Fo r examp l e, s ee L ee  R ossand  R ichar d Ni s bet t, ThePerson an d t h e Si tu at ion (Ne w York: McGra w- Hill, 1991 ).  Fo r a pe r s uasive a rgument against such ac onclusi on,  seeMich ael DePau l,"Chara cte r  Trait s, Vir tuesan d V i c es: A r e  t her eNone?", Pr o c eed ingsof  the  Twenti eth World 25 Congr e ssof Philosophy , V olum e IX : P h il o sop hy ofM i nd and Philosop hy of Psyc ho l og y, forthco m ing .xix Fei nberg's  ownd iscussi on is attimes aim ed  ato t her  kinds ofblame. x x This po i nt is ma de by  Co hen in  " How  to B e a Fa l lib ilist ." xxi  T his ki nd of  c ase is d iscussed by Cohen in "H ow toBe aFal libilist, " a n d b y Gilbert  Har man in Tho ugh t ( Princ eto n : Pri ncet o nUni v ersit y Pr e ss, 1974) .  x xii C oh en and DeRo s e hav e bot h a r gued t hatcontextualists ne e d not run into  clo s u repro b lems .See Cohen, "Ho w t oB e  a Falli bi list" and D eRose, " So l vingthe Sk eptica l Probl e m ." For an  ear lydiscussio n o fr elevant  i ss u es, se e Ga il  Stine , "Ske p tici s m , Relevant Alter nativ e s , and Ded uctiv eClosure , " Ph ilosophica l Studies 2 9 (197 6) 2 49-26 1. xxii iThis s ort  o f case was raised
 of_blaming is_a reconstruction-I have taken_parts of_what_he says_from_each of his_three papers and_put them together in_a way that_suits_my present purposes. xv It is tempting to follow Feinberg and to put things_this_way: When_we_say_that Y occurs because X_occurs, or that Y's occurring_is due_to X's occurring, we mark out X's occurring_as_a particularly important_or salient part of a sufficient condition for Y's_occurring. (177) This assumes, however, that_all causes can_be_understood_as sufficient conditions. Since_I do not want to deny_either a) the possibility of agent_causation or b) the possibility of indeterminate_causation, I employ the looser language_above. xvi Another example: Sports_fans will_argue endlessly over why we_lost the big_game. Was_it because we_gave up too many points or_because we didn't_score enough? Obviously, the outcome of_a_game is a_function_of_both points_allowed and points_scored._The real_argument_here is over what was the_most_important factor in the loss. And that_is a function of_what_one can normally expect,_what could have been done_differently, etc. xvii Feinberg, p. 126._xviii Some_recent work_in social psychology suggests that common sense is flawed in this_respect. For example, see Lee Ross_and Richard Nisbett, The_Person and_the_Situation (New York:_McGraw-Hill,_1991). For_a persuasive argument against such a conclusion,_see Michael_DePaul, "Character Traits, Virtues and Vices:_Are there None?", Proceedings_of_the Twentieth World 25 Congress of_Philosophy, Volume IX: Philosophy of Mind_and Philosophy of Psychology, forthcoming._xix_Feinberg's_own discussion is at times_aimed at other kinds of blame._xx This point_is made by Cohen in "How to_Be_a Fallibilist." xxi This kind of_case_is discussed by Cohen in "How_to_Be_a Fallibilist," and by Gilbert_Harman in Thought (Princeton: Princeton University_Press, 1974). xxii Cohen and DeRose have both argued_that contextualists need_not run into closure problems._See_Cohen,_"How to Be a Fallibilist" and DeRose, "Solving the Skeptical_Problem." For_an early discussion_of relevant issues, see Gail Stine, "Skepticism, Relevant Alternatives, and_Deductive Closure," Philosophical Studies 29 (1976) 249-261._xxiii This sort of case was raised