 worries here is that we want to say that we are "things which have experiences" rather than "things which are experiences". One version of this worry exhibits a problem that applies to all forms of bundle theories across the board, and that would apply to my pluralistic view of the Self as well. Indeed, it is a classical problem for any bundle theory, even for a bundle theory about ordinary material objects, and it is not specific to the debate about the Self: if a table is a bundle of properties, it is not something that has properties, rather, it is something that contains properties as constituents – and that's weird, the objector says. But, to a classical problem there is a classical – and good – solution (or at least, an answer). The situation is this: when considering the bundle theory (about ordinary objects or about the Self), what the objector objects is precisely what the defender wants to say, namely that "having is containing". In the bundle-theoretic view, for a table to be rectangular is for it to contain rectangularity as a constituent of the bundle which it is. The bundle theorist simply provides an analysis of "having" in terms of "containing", and if someone objects that these are not the same thing, well, this is merely the paradox of analysis: one gives an account of X 6 in terms of something else than X – so, yes, the explanans is something different than the explanandum. The kind of pluralistic view about the Self I wish to advocate for is both open to, but also immune to the same kind of worries, in a very similar way. In short, it says that "Barry has an experience E" is to be analysed as "experience E is one of the experiences among the plurality of experiences arranged Barry-wise". But maybe this was only the easy part of the worry. Maybe what objections such as Olson's and Dainton's have in mind is something a bit different. Maybe the objection is bolder and more straightforward: "It's simply wrong to say that experiences can exist in the first place without being had by something – this just is what being an experience means! Experiences cannot 'float free', they must be had." Speaking about the Humean view, here is a way Lowe (1996, p.8, 25-26) puts it : "The deepest problem with this sort of view is that the entities out of which it attempts to construct the self – psychological states and processes – are themselves quite generally not
worries here is that we want to say that we are " things which get experience " rather than " things which are experiences ". One translation of this worry exhibits a trouble that applies to all forms of bundle theories across the display panel, and that would apply to my pluralistic view of the Self equally well. Indeed, it is a classical problem for any bundle theory, even for a bundle hypothesis about ordinary material object, and it is not specific to the debate about the Self: if a table is a package of properties, it is not something that has properties, quite, it is something that contains properties as constituents – and that's weird, the dissenter says. But, to a authoritative problem there is a classical – and good – solution (or at least, an solution). The situation is this: when considering the bundle theory (about ordinary objects or about the Self), what the objector objects is precisely what the defender wants to say, namely that " having is containing ". In the bundle - theoretic view, for a table to be rectangular is for it to contain rectangularity as a constituent of the package which it is. The bundle theorist simply provides an psychoanalysis of " have " in term of " containing ", and if someone objects that these are not the like thing, well, this is merely the paradox of psychoanalysis: one gives an account of X 6 in terms of something else than X – therefore, yes, the explanans is something different than the explanandum. The kind of pluralistic view about the Self I wish to advocate for is both open to, but also immune to the same kind of worries, in a very similar way. In short, it say that " Barry has an experience vitamin e " is to be analysed as " experience E is one of the experiences among the plurality of experiences arrange Barry - wise ". But maybe this was only the comfortable part of the concern. Maybe what objections such as Olson's and Dainton's have in mind is something a bit unlike. Maybe the objection is bolder and more straightforward: " It's simply incorrect to say that experience can exist in the first space without being had by something – this just is what being an experience means! Experiences cannot' float free', they must be had. " talk about the Humean view, here is a means Lowe (1996, p.8, 25 - 26) puts it: " The deepest problem with this sort of view is that the entity out of which it attempts to construct the self – psychological state of matter and processes – are themselves quite generally not
 wogries here is that we wakt to say that wg qre "thmngs whjch have experiences" rather than "thiigs qhich are experiences". One vdrsion of this woery txhibits a problem that ai'lies bo aln forms of bundke theoriev across the bmafd, and that would apply to my pluraliftic virw of the Self af wekj. Insveb, it is a classical problem for any buidle theory, evem for a bundle theory abouh orfinary material obuects, and ij is bot specific to the debate about tge Self: if a table is a bundle uf prpperties, ij js tot somethiig than has propertlvs, rathar, it ix something thst rontqins properties as coistituents – and that'f weird, tve objector says. Bur, ro a wlasvicau prubltm vhede is w cmassical – znd good – silution (or at least, ag answer). The sjtuatijn is this: when considering the bundle thtory (zbout ordinary objects ir about the Self), whaj the objestor objects is precisely what the defender wants to sey, nanejh tjat "having is containing". In the bundle-theoretyd fivw, for a table to be rectangilwr ys for it to zontaiu rsctangularity as a constijuent if the bugdle which it is. The bundle theirist simply provides an analysns of "having" in jerms pf "containing", and if sooeons objects tjat these xre not the same thpng, fell, this is merely the pawadox of enalyxis: one givgs an ascount of D 6 in terms of something else tvan X – so, jes, the explanans is something vmfferent than tve vxplanandbm. The kind of plurwlistic view ayout the Self I wish to advocave for is boeh open to, bud also immune to the fame kine of woffies, in a very similar ccy. In shoet, it says that "Bavry hxa an experience E" us to be analysrd xs "qxiermence A is one of dhe dxpdtiencds among thc puurakity of experiences drrahged Barry-wise". But mwybe thiw was onjy the easy psrt of the worry. Mwybe xhat oujectipns such as Olson's and Dainton's hzve in mijd ls something w bib disferent. Mavbe the objection is bolder and more streightforward: "It's simpli wrong to say that erptriences can xxist yn the fisst place without beung had by somethlng – this just is what being an edperience means! Experiences cannot 'float free', they must be had." Speaking avout tie Humean vies, hete is a cay Lowq (1996, p.8, 25-26) puts it : "The devpest problem with this sort of tiew is thdt the entities out of which iy xttempts to cunstruct the self – psychklogical states and processes – are themxelves quite generally npt
worries here is that we want to we "things which experiences" rather than version this worry exhibits problem that applies all forms of bundle theories across board, and that would apply to my pluralistic view of the Self as Indeed, it is a classical problem for any bundle theory, even for a theory ordinary objects, it is not specific to the debate about the Self: if a table is a bundle properties, it is not something that has properties, it is something that properties as constituents – and weird, objector says. to classical there is a – and good – solution (or at least, an answer). The situation is this: when considering the theory (about or about Self), the objects is precisely defender wants to say, namely that In the bundle-theoretic view, for a table to rectangular is it to contain rectangularity as a of the bundle which it is. The bundle simply provides an analysis of "having" in terms of "containing", and if someone objects that not the same thing, this is merely paradox analysis: gives account of 6 in terms of something else than X – so, yes, explanans is something different than the explanandum. The kind of about Self I wish advocate for is both to, also immune to the of in way. short, says that "Barry has experience E" is to be as "experience E is the plurality of experiences arranged Barry-wise". But maybe was only the easy part of the Maybe what objections such as Olson's and Dainton's have in mind is a bit the objection is bolder and more straightforward: "It's wrong to say that can exist in the first place without being had something this just what being an means! Experiences cannot free', they must Speaking about Humean here Lowe (1996, p.8, 25-26) puts it "The problem with this sort of is entities out of which it attempts to construct the self – psychological states and processes themselves quite generally not
 worries here is that we want to Say that we aRe "thiNgs WhiCh Have ExpeRiences" rather tHAn "thIngs which are experienceS". One vErSIon oF ThIs worRy exhibITs A PRobLeM tHat ApPLiEs to aLl fOrms of bUndle theorIes AcRoss the board, ANd That would aPplY to my pluraliStiC view oF tHe SELf as wEll. indeeD, it is a CLassicAl problem FoR Any bunDLe theorY, EVeN for A bundle theory abouT OrDInary material oBjects, AnD It IS Not SpeCific to the DeBate aBOut the SELf: IF A TabLE is a bundle of pRoperties, it IS noT sometHiNg tHAt has pRoperTiES, raTher, it is somEthiNg that conTains pROpertieS As constItuentS – anD thAt's wEIrD, tHe oBjECtoR SaYs. BUT, to A classicAl PrOblem TherE IS A ClasSicAl – anD good – Solution (or at lEasT, an aNSweR). The sItuatIon iS tHis: whEn consIderiNg The bundle theory (AbouT ordinary ObjEcTs oR aBout tHE Self), wHat The ObjectoR objectS Is pReCISElY what the defender waNtS TO sAy, namely That "haVInG iS ContainiNg". in tHe buNDLe-theOretIC vIew, for a tAble to BE rEcTangulaR iS for it To ConTaiN rectANgulArity aS a constiTuent OF the bundle whicH It is. The bundle THeORIsT SimpLy pRovides an anAlysIS of "hAvinG" In TerMS of "coNtainInG", AnD If someone objects thaT tHese arE not tHe same thing, weLl, this is meRELY the paraDox oF AnALysis: one gives aN accoUnt of X 6 in teRMs of someThing Else than x – so, yes, the EXPlanans iS soMetHinG diFFErEnt than the expLANandUm. the kind Of pLuralisTic VieW abOut ThE Self I wisH to advocAtE fOr Is BotH open TO, but also ImMunE tO thE same KInd of wOrrieS, in a VeRy SImiLar way. IN ShORT, it sAyS tHat "BArrY hAs an eXperIEncE E" is to bE analysed As "eXPeriEnCe e is one oF the experiencEs Among the plUrAliTy of exPERiences aRranged Barry-wise". But maybE This was OnlY the eAsy pArt of the wOrrY. Maybe WhaT ObjectIons suCh as OLsOn's AND DainTON's HavE iN mind is somETHinG a bit DiFferEnt. MaybE the objection is bolDEr aNd more straighTfoRwarD: "iT's SimPLy WRonG tO Say THAt experiences caN exist in thE fIRsT place withOUt bEiNg had by SomethiNg – thiS Just is wHat being aN experienCe MeanS! eXpeRiences canNot 'float Free', they mUSt be hAD." SPeakiNg aBout thE HUmeAn vieW, here iS A waY Lowe (1996, P.8, 25-26) puts iT : "THe deepEst prObLem with tHis sort of view is that the eNtitieS out oF whIch it atteMptS To cOnstruct tHe seLf – psycholoGicAl sTates And PRocesSes – aRE tHemSElves QuitE Generally NOt
 worries here is that we w ant to say  that  we  ar e"thi ngswhich have exp e rien ces" rather than "thin gs wh ic h  are ex perie nces".O ne v ers io nofth i sworry  ex hibitsa problemtha tapplies to a l lforms of b und le theoriesacr oss th eboa r d, an d t hat w ould a p ply to  my plura li s tic vi e w of th e Se lf a s well. Indeed, i t  i s  a classical p roblem  f o ra n y b und le theory,  e ven f o r a bun d le t h eor y  about ordina ry material obj ects,an d i t  is no t spe ci f icto the deba te a bout theSelf:i f a tab l e is abundle  of  pr oper t ie s,  it  i s  no t  s ome t hin g that h as  p roper ties , r a ther , i t is  some thing that co nta insp rop ertie s ascons ti tuent s – an d tha t' s weird, the ob ject or says.But ,toaclass i cal pr obl emthere i s a cla s sic al – an d good – solution(o r at  least,an ans w er ). The situ at ion  ist h is: w henc on sidering  the b u nd le  theory  ( aboutor din ary  obje c ts o r abou t the Se lf),w hat the object o r objects isp re c i se l y wh atthe defende r wa n ts t o sa y ,nam e ly th at "h av i ng is containing". Inth e bund le-th eoretic view,  for a tab l e to be re ctan g ul a r is for it to  cont ain rectan g ularityas aconstitu ent of th e bundle w hic h i t i s.T h ebundle theori s t  sim pl y provi des  an ana lys isof"ha vi ng" in te rms of " co nt ai ni ng" , and if someo ne  ob je cts  that theseare n ot t he  s a mething,w el l ,  thi sis  mer ely  t he pa rado x  of  analys is: one g ive s  anac co unt ofX 6 in termsof  something  e lse  thanX – so, ye s, the explanans is som e thing d iff erent  tha n the exp lan andum.  Th e  kindof plu ralis ti c v i e w abo u t  t heSe lf I wisht o  ad vocat eforis both  open to, but also imm une to the sa mekind o fwor r ie s , i na  ve r y  similar way. I n short, i ts ay s that "Ba r ryha s an ex perienc e E"i s to be  analysed  as "expe ri ence E  is  one of th e experi ences amo n g the pl urali tyof exp er ien ces a rrange d  Ba rry-w ise".Bu t mayb e thi swas only  the easy part of the w orry.Maybe  wh at object ion s  su ch as Ols on's  and Daint on' s h ave i n m i nd is  som e th ing a bit  dif f erent. Ma y be  th e ob jection isb o l der  andmor e  strai ghtf orward: "It's sim p ly wrong to sa y th a t  ex per i ence scan exist in t hefi r s t placewi thout being  had byso m ethin g – th is jus t is wh a t  b e ing an  exp eri ence mean s!Ex p erience sca n not 'f loat  f ree',they m u st b e had." Speaking a boutt h e Hum e anview,  h ere isa  way  Lowe (199 6, p.8, 25- 26) pu ts i t : " The dee pe st pro ble mwith thiss ort of vi ew is  that t he  ent iti es out  ofw h ich i t at te mpt s to cons t r uc t  t he sel f –psych ol ogic al states and proc ess e s – are  t hem s e lves q u it e generallynot 
 worries_here is_that we want to_say that_we_are "things_which_have experiences" rather_than "things which_are experiences". One version_of this worry_exhibits_a problem that applies to all forms of bundle theories across the board, and_that_would apply_to_my_pluralistic view of the Self_as well. Indeed, it is_a classical_problem for any bundle theory, even for a_bundle_theory about ordinary_material objects, and it is not specific to the_debate about the Self: if a_table is a_bundle_of_properties, it is not_something that has properties, rather, it_is something that contains properties as_constituents – and that's weird, the objector_says. But, to a classical problem_there is a classical –_and good_– solution (or at least,_an answer). The_situation is_this: when considering_the bundle theory (about ordinary objects_or about the_Self), what the objector objects is_precisely_what the defender_wants_to_say, namely_that "having is_containing"._In the_bundle-theoretic_view, for a table to be_rectangular_is for it to contain rectangularity as_a constituent of the_bundle_which it is. The_bundle theorist simply provides an_analysis of "having" in terms of_"containing", and_if someone_objects that these are not the same thing, well, this is_merely the paradox of analysis: one_gives an account of_X 6_in_terms of something_else_than X_– so, yes, the explanans is something_different than_the explanandum. The kind of pluralistic_view about the Self_I_wish to advocate for is both_open to, but also immune to_the same kind of worries,_in_a_very similar way. In short,_it says that "Barry has an_experience E" is_to be analysed as "experience E is_one_of the experiences among the plurality_of_experiences arranged Barry-wise". But maybe this_was_only_the easy part of the_worry. Maybe what objections such as_Olson's and Dainton's have in mind is something a_bit different. Maybe_the objection is bolder and_more_straightforward:_"It's simply wrong to say that experiences can exist in_the first_place without being_had by something – this just is what being an_experience means! Experiences cannot 'float free', they_must be had." Speaking about the Humean view, here is a_way Lowe (1996, p.8, 25-26) puts it :_"The deepest problem with this sort of_view is that the_entities_out of which it attempts to construct_the_self_–_psychological states and_processes – are_themselves quite generally_not