 by Varela, Thompson and Rosch, has always laid great emphasis on organism/environment interactions as the proper framework for studying cognition. Minds have to be understood as ―enacted‖ by situationally embedded living organisms. By proposing this approach to minds, enactivists have explicitly opposed themselves to cognitivists, who take representation as their central posit (Varela, Thompson & Rosch 1991). Thus, it is claimed that cognition is, rather than representation of the world, ―the enactment of a world and a mind on the basis of a history of the variety of actions that a being in the world performs‖ (Varela, Thompson & Rosch 1991: 9; see also Thompson 2007). True to the enactivist motto that ―a path is laid down in walking,‖ the role of internally stored rules and representations in accounting for cognition is thus replaced by an embodied history of interactions. By taking up this position, enactivism reveals itself as committed to a strong notion of embodiment. Such a concept has to be distinguished from other senses of embodiment. One way to use ―embodiment‖ is to emphasize the role of the particular properties of the body in shaping our cognitive capacities. Thus, to give a rather trite example, it could be argued that having ten fingers lies at the basis of the decimal system, so that even mathematics has a basis in the body. Such a use of the notion of embodiment is in no way incompatible with a traditional cognitive science approach, in which computations and internal representations are assigned a key role for explaining our cognitive capacities. In particular, one could conceive of the specifics of the body as constraining the form or content of our representations or computations. In the sense of ―embodied‖ at stake here, ―embodied‖ is used in contrast with ―representational,‖ such that saying that some capacity is embodied is to deny that it involves internal representations. One could argue, for example, that people embody the rules of their native language, in the sense that the rules are manifest, and only manifest in their utterances, or other practical dealings with language. The structure of language then is implicit in the 2 practices; it is spread out in time, not represented anywhere. Of course, one could not embody rules without having a body engaged in the relevant, rule manifesting, activities, but the emphasis here lies not on the specifics of that body, but on what could be called the primacy of embodiment over representation.
by Varela, Thompson and Rosch, has always laid great emphasis on organism / environment interaction as the proper model for studying cognition. Minds get to be understand as ―enacted‖ by situationally embedded living organism. By nominate this approach to mind, enactivists have explicitly opposed themselves to cognitivists, who take theatrical performance as their central posit (Varela, Thompson & Rosch 1991). Thus, it is claimed that cognition is, preferably than representation of the world, ―the enactment of a world and a mind on the footing of a history of the variety of actions that a being in the earth performs‖ (Varela, Thompson & Rosch 1991: 9; see also Thompson 2007). truthful to the enactivist motto that ―a path is put down in walking,‖ the role of internally stored rules and representations in accounting for cognition is therefore replaced by an embodied history of interactions. By taking up this position, enactivism reveals itself as entrust to a hard notion of embodiment. Such a concept has to be distinguished from other senses of embodiment. One direction to practice ―embodiment‖ is to stress the role of the finical place of the body in shaping our cognitive capacities. therefore, to give a preferably trite example, it could be argue that having ten fingers lies at the basis of the decimal system, so that even mathematics has a footing in the body. Such a use of the notion of embodiment is in no way incompatible with a traditional cognitive science access, in which computations and internal representations are assigned a key function for explaining our cognitive capacities. In particular, one could gestate of the specifics of the body as constraining the form or subject of our representations or calculation. In the sense of ―embodied‖ at stake here, ―embodied‖ is use in contrast with ―representational,‖ such that say that some capacity is incarnate is to deny that it imply internal representations. One could argue, for exercise, that people incarnate the rules of their native language, in the sense that the principle are manifest, and only manifest in their utterances, or other hardheaded dealings with language. The social organization of language then is implicit in the 2 practices; it is spread out in time, not represented anywhere. Of course, one could not embody rule without having a body engaged in the relevant, rule manifesting, activities, but the emphasis here lie not on the particular of that torso, but on what could be called the primacy of embodiment over representation.
 by Varela, Thompson and Rosgh, has always lane greav emphaais on ofganism/environment interactilnw as uke proper framework wor studypng cognirion. Ninds have to be ukberstkld av ―enacted‖ by sijuationally ambedded livinc uryanisms. By proposing this approach tj minds, ejactivists havg expkycitmj ipposed themselves to cognitibists, wio take represemtation as their central plsit (Varela, Thompson & Gosch 1991). Thus, it yw claimed thxt cognition is, rather than representation of the worud, ―thz enactment od a forld and a mind on the basis of a hhstory pf the variety of acrions that a being in the world performf‖ (Varela, Dhkmpson & Rosch 1991: 9; swe also Thokpsov 2007). Tfue tp fhe enwctmvist motto that ―a paty is laid down in wslhpmg,‖ the role kf intqrgally stored rules and representations pn adcounting for cognition is thus replaced by wn embodiqd history of interactions. By taking up this posidion, xnxctnylsm fwvfals itself as committed to a strong notion os ekbpdiment. Such a concept hax ho fe distinguisfed from kther senses of emhodimenj. One qay to ust ―embpdiment‖ is to emphasize the role of the particular propertnes of the budy on shsping our cognitive capccitiea. Thus, to glve a ratgdr trite example, it cmuld be argued that having ten fingxrs lnes at tfe bssis os the decilal snvtem, so that even latheladics has a basis in the body. Such a use oh the notion pf emtodiment is ik no way incompwtible with a jraditioncl cogvitive scivnce apprmach, in whish computatiotd and internel represqntarionw are arrigned a key rple for eqpjainung our cognitive gapackfies. In particuoar, one could concrivd os nhe s[acifics of tve budy ss covstraining bhe fork or content of our seprssentations or comlubations. Ib the segse of ―embodird‖ at stake here, ―elbodixd‖ is nsed im cjntrast with ―representational,‖ auch that saning that somq caiacijy is embodned is to deny that it involves internal representations. Obe could argue, for gxakple, that pxople qmbody tha rules of their natuve language, in tme sense that the rulea are kaniffst, and only manifest in their utterances, or other practical dealings wity langnade. The strudturr of naugucge theg is mmplicit in the 2 iractices; it is spread out in tioe, not rapxesented anywhere. Of course, ome could not emcody rules without havinf a body engaged in the relevant, rule msnifesting, activities, bub the empyasis here lies not on the specifocs of that body, byt ok what could bd cslped the pgimary kf embodiment over representatiob.
by Varela, Thompson and Rosch, has always emphasis organism/environment interactions the proper framework to understood as ―enacted‖ situationally embedded living By proposing this approach to minds, have explicitly opposed themselves to cognitivists, who take representation as their central posit Thompson & Rosch 1991). Thus, it is claimed that cognition is, rather than of world, enactment a world and a mind on the basis of a history of the variety of actions a being in the world performs‖ (Varela, Thompson Rosch 1991: 9; see Thompson 2007). True to the motto ―a path laid in the role of stored rules and representations in accounting for cognition is thus replaced by an embodied history of interactions. taking up enactivism reveals as to strong notion of a concept has to be distinguished of embodiment. One way to use ―embodiment‖ is emphasize the of the particular properties of the in shaping our cognitive capacities. Thus, to give rather trite example, it could be argued that having ten fingers lies at the basis decimal system, so that mathematics has a in body. a of the of embodiment is in no way incompatible with a traditional cognitive approach, in which computations and internal representations are assigned a for our cognitive capacities. particular, one could conceive the of the body as form content or In sense of ―embodied‖ at here, ―embodied‖ is used in with ―representational,‖ such that embodied is to deny that it involves internal One could argue, for example, that people the rules of their native language, in the sense that the rules manifest, and in their utterances, or other practical dealings with The structure of language is implicit in the 2 practices; it is spread in not represented Of course, one not embody rules having a body the relevant, manifesting, but lies not on the specifics of body, on what could be called primacy over representation.
 by Varela, Thompson and Rosch, hAs always laId greAt eMphAsIs on OrgaNism/environmenT InteRactions as the proper fraMeworK fOR stuDYiNg cogNition. MINdS HAve To Be UndErSToOd as ―eNacTed‖ by siTuationallY emBeDded living orGAnIsms. By propOsiNg this approaCh tO minds, EnActIVists HavE explIcitly OPposed ThemselveS tO CognitIVists, whO TAkE repResentation as theiR CeNTral posit (VarelA, ThompSoN & roSCH 1991). ThUs, iT is claimed ThAt cogNItion is, RAtHER ThaN RepresentatioN of the world, ―THe eNactmeNt Of a WOrld anD a minD oN The Basis of a hisTory Of the variEty of aCTions thAT a being In the wOrlD peRforMS‖ (VArEla, thOMpsON & ROscH 1991: 9; See Also ThomPsOn 2007). true tO the ENACTiviSt mOtto That ―a Path is laid dowN in WalkINg,‖ tHe rolE of inTernAlLy stoRed rulEs and RePresentations in AccoUnting for CogNiTioN iS thus REplaceD by An eMbodied History OF inTeRACTiOns. By taking up this pOsITIoN, enactivIsm revEAlS iTSelf as coMmIttEd to A STrong NotiON oF embodimEnt. SucH A cOnCept has To Be distInGuiSheD from OTher Senses Of embodiMent. ONE way to use ―embodIMent‖ is to emphaSIzE THe ROle oF thE particular PropERtieS of tHE bOdy IN shapIng ouR cOGnITive capacities. Thus, tO gIve a raTher tRite example, it Could be argUED That haviNg teN FiNGers lies at the bAsis oF the decimaL System, so That eVen matheMatics has A BAsis in thE boDy. SUch A usE OF tHe notion of embODImenT iS in no waY inCompatiBle WitH a tRadItIonal cognItive sciEnCe ApPrOacH, in whICh computAtIonS aNd iNternAL repreSentaTionS aRe ASsiGned a keY RoLE For eXpLaIninG ouR cOgnitIve cAPacIties. In ParticulaR, onE CoulD cOnCeive of The specifics oF tHe body as coNsTraIning tHE Form or coNtent of our representatioNS or compUtaTions. in thE sense of ―eMboDied‖ at StaKE here, ―eMbodieD‖ is usEd In cONTrast WITh ―RepReSentationaL,‖ SUch That sAyIng tHat some Capacity is embodied IS to Deny that it invOlvEs inTERnAl rEPrESenTaTIonS. oNe could argue, for Example, thaT pEOpLe embody thE RulEs Of their Native lAnguaGE, in the sEnse that tHe rules arE mAnifEST, anD only manifEst in theIr utteranCEs, or oTHeR pracTicAl dealInGs wIth laNguage. tHe sTructUre of lAnGuage tHen is ImPlicit in The 2 practices; it is spread oUt in tiMe, not RepResented aNywHEre. of course, oNe coUld not emboDy rUleS withOut HAving A bodY EnGagED in thE relEVant, rule mANiFesTINg, Activities, bUT THe eMphasIs hERe lies Not oN the specifics of thAT body, but on what CoulD BE caLleD The pRiMacy of embodimeNt oVeR REpresentAtIon.
 by Varela, Thompson and R osch, hasalway s l aid  g reat  emp hasis on organ i sm/e nvironment interaction s asth e  pro p er  fram ework f o rs t udy in gcog ni t io n. Mi nds  have t o be under sto od  as ―enacted ‖  b y situatio nal ly embeddedliv ing or ga nis m s. By  pr oposi ng thi s  appro ach to mi nd s , enac t ivistsh a ve  exp licitly opposed t h em s elves to cogni tivist s, wh o tak e r epresentat io n ast heir ce n tr a l pos i t (Varela, Th ompson & Ro s ch1991).  T hus ,  it is  clai me d  th at cognitio n is , ratherthan r e present a tion of  the w orl d,―the en ac tme nt ofa  w orl d  an d a mind  o nthe b asis o f a hi sto ry o f the  variety of a cti onst hat  a be ing i n th eworld  perfo rms‖(V arela, Thompson  & R osch 1991 : 9 ;see  a lso T h ompson  20 07) . Trueto thee nac ti v i s tmotto that ―a path  i s la id downin wal k in g, ‖  the rol eofinte r n allystor e drules an d repr e se nt ationsin  accou nt ing  fo r cog n itio n is t hus repl acedb y an embodiedh istory of int e ra c t io n s. B y t aking up th is p o siti on,e na cti v ism r eveal si ts e lf as committed toastrong  noti on of embodim ent. Sucha c oncept h as t o  b e  distinguished  from  other sen s es of em bodim ent. One  way to u s e  ―embodi men t‖istoe m ph asize the rol e of t he  partic ula r prope rti esofthe  b ody in sh aping ou rco gn it ive  capa c ities. T hu s,to  gi ve ar athertrite  exa mp le ,  it  couldb ea r gued  t ha t ha vin gten f inge r s l ies atthe basis  of thede ci mal sys tem, so thatev en mathema ti cshas ab a sis in t he body. Such a use oft he noti onof em bodi ment is i n n o wayinc o mpatib le wit h a t ra dit i o nal c o g ni tiv escience ap p r oac h, in  w hich  comput ations and interna l  re presentations  ar e as s i gn eda  k e y r ol e  fo r explaining ourcognitiveca p ac ities. Inp art ic ular, o ne coul d con c eive of  the spec ifics ofth e bo d y  as  constrain ing theform or c o ntent of  ourrep resent at ion s orcomput a tio ns. I n these nse of  ―emb od ied‖ atstake here, ―embodied‖is use d incon trast wit h ― r epr esentatio nal, ‖ such tha t s ayi ng th ats ome c apac i ty  is embod iedi s to deny th ati t  i nvolves int e r n alrepre sen t ations . On e could argue, fo r  example, that  peo p l e e mbo d y th erules of their  na ti v e  languag e,  in the sen se thatth e  rule s aremanife st, and o nl y  manif estintheir utt era nc e s, or o th er practi calde alings  withl angu a g e. The structure  of l a n guage the n isim pliciti n th e 2 practi ces; it isspread  out  in t ime, no trepres ent ed  anywhere. Of course , one  couldno t em bod y rule s wi t h out h avin ga b ody engag e d  i n  t he rel evan t, ru le  man ifesting, activiti es, but the  e mph a s is her e  l i e s not on t hespeci f i cs of that body ,  b u t onwhat c ould b e calle d  th eprimacy  of e mbodiment  over rep r ese nt atio n.
 by_Varela, Thompson_and Rosch, has always_laid great_emphasis_on organism/environment_interactions_as the proper_framework for studying_cognition. Minds have to_be understood as_―enacted‖_by situationally embedded living organisms. By proposing this approach to minds, enactivists have explicitly_opposed_themselves to_cognitivists,_who_take representation as their central_posit (Varela, Thompson & Rosch_1991). Thus,_it is claimed that cognition is, rather than_representation_of the world,_―the enactment of a world and a mind on_the basis of a history of_the variety of_actions_that_a being in the_world performs‖ (Varela, Thompson & Rosch_1991: 9; see also Thompson 2007)._True to the enactivist motto that ―a_path is laid down in walking,‖_the role of internally stored_rules and_representations in accounting for cognition_is thus replaced_by an_embodied history of_interactions. By taking up this position,_enactivism reveals itself_as committed to a strong notion_of_embodiment. Such a_concept_has_to be_distinguished from other_senses_of embodiment._One_way to use ―embodiment‖ is to_emphasize_the role of the particular properties of_the body in shaping_our_cognitive capacities. Thus, to_give a rather trite example,_it could be argued that having_ten fingers_lies at_the basis of the decimal system, so that even mathematics has_a basis in the body. Such_a use of the_notion of_embodiment_is in no_way_incompatible with_a traditional cognitive science approach, in which_computations and_internal representations are assigned a key_role for explaining our_cognitive_capacities. In particular, one could conceive_of the specifics of the body_as constraining the form or_content_of_our representations or computations. In_the sense of ―embodied‖ at stake_here, ―embodied‖ is_used in contrast with ―representational,‖ such that_saying_that some capacity is embodied is_to_deny that it involves internal representations._One_could_argue, for example, that people_embody the rules of their native_language, in the sense that the rules are manifest,_and only manifest_in their utterances, or other_practical_dealings_with language. The structure of language then is implicit in_the 2_practices; it is_spread out in time, not represented anywhere. Of course, one_could not embody rules without having a_body engaged in the relevant, rule manifesting, activities, but the emphasis_here lies not on the specifics of that_body, but on what could be called_the primacy of embodiment_over_representation.