 them. In these cases, epistemic paternalism can have bad long-term consequences: squelching valuable perspectives and promoting a monistic way of thinking. Thus, we ought to exercise caution before engaging in epistemically paternalistic practices, and consider whether we might be in a permissive case or imposing our standpoint on another.26 NOTES 1. For philosophical discussions of paternalism, see Mill (1869), Dworkin (2010), Grill and Hanna (2018). 2. Discussions of epistemic paternalism include Goldman (1991), Ahlstrom-Vij (2013a, 2013b), Pritchard (2013), Ridder (2013), Bullock (2018), and Croce (2018). 3. This definition is found in Ahlstrom-Vij (2013a: 51) and Bullock (2018: 434). 16028-0338d-1pass-r01.indd 211 2/21/2020 10:23:45 AM 212 Chapter 13 4. This example features prominently in Goldman (1991). However, it is unclear that withholding information from a jury counts as epistemic paternalism in many real-life cases, since, upon agreeing to be on a jury, one should realize that evidence might be withheld from them, due to the relevant laws about inadmissible evidence in courtrooms. Thus, it is plausible that, upon agreeing to be a juror, one is consenting to have evidence withheld from them. Thanks to Kirk Lougheed. 5. See Jackson (forthcoming-a) and Jackson and Turnbull (forthcoming) for further discussion of the ways that one's broader epistemic situation can affect one's beliefs without affecting one's evidence. 6. This raises the question: Does an action count as epistemic paternalism if it is done partially for one's epistemic good and partially for their moral and/or practical good? This question deserves more attention but goes beyond the scope of this chapter; see Bullock (2018: 443) and Jackson (forthcoming-b) for discussion. Thanks to Seth Lazar. 7. See, for example, Goldman (1991) and Ahlstrom-Vij (2013a). Pritchard (2013) discusses ways that epistemic paternalism might promote both true beliefs and understanding. 8. Thanks to Pamela Robinson. 9. Feldman (2000) Kelly (2002: fn. 30), and Berker (2018) argue that there aren't epistemic reasons for action. 10. See T
them. In these cases, epistemic paternalism can have bad long - condition consequence: squelching valuable perspectives and promoting a monistic means of thinking. Thus, we ought to exercise circumspection before engaging in epistemically paternalistic practices, and consider whether we might be in a permissive event or imposing our standpoint on another.26 note 1. For philosophical discussions of paternalism, see Mill (1869), Dworkin (2010), Grill and Hanna (2018). 2. Discussions of epistemic paternalism include Goldman (1991), Ahlstrom - Vij (2013a, 2013b), Pritchard (2013), Ridder (2013), Bullock (2018), and Croce (2018). 3. This definition is found in Ahlstrom - Vij (2013a: 51) and Bullock (2018: 434). 16028-0338d-1pass-r01.indd 211 2/21/2020 10:23:45 americium 212 Chapter 13 4. This example features prominently in Goldman (1991). However, it is unclear that withhold information from a jury counts as epistemic paternalism in many real - life casing, since, upon agreeing to be on a jury, one should realize that evidence might be withheld from them, due to the relevant laws about inadmissible evidence in courtrooms. therefore, it is plausible that, upon agreeing to be a juror, one is consenting to have evidence withheld from them. Thanks to Kirk Lougheed. 5. See Jackson (forthcoming - a) and Jackson and Turnbull (extroverted) for further discussion of the ways that one's broader epistemic situation can affect one's beliefs without affecting one's evidence. 6. This raises the question: Does an action count as epistemic paternalism if it is done partially for one's epistemic commodity and partially for their moral and/or hardheaded good? This motion deserve more care but goes beyond the scope of this chapter; see Bullock (2018: 443) and Jackson (forthcoming - b) for discussion. Thanks to Seth Lazar. 7. See, for example, Goldman (1991) and Ahlstrom - Vij (2013a). Pritchard (2013) discusses way that epistemic paternalism might promote both true beliefs and understanding. 8. Thanks to Pamela Robinson. 9. Feldman (2000) Kelly (2002: fn. 30), and Berker (2018) argue that there aren't epistemic reasons for natural process. 10. See T
 thfm. In these cases, episteoic paternalism can hate bad mong-term consequences: squelching valnablw perwpectives and promotine a monisnic way od thmnking. Thus, we onfht to crerciac cauciin before enganing in epivtemically patarvapistic practices, and consider whethqr we mogjt be in a periisspvq caav ir imposing our standpoint on anotheg.26 NOTES 1. For philpsophical discussions of pwterjalism, see Mill (1869), Daorkin (2010), Griol age Hanna (2018). 2. Dircussions of epistemic paternalism include Goldman (1991), Aflstrpm-Vij (2013a, 2013b), Kxutcjdrd (2013), Ridder (2013), Buljock (2018), and Croce (2018). 3. Thhs defimition is founc ii Ahostrom-Vij (2013a: 51) and Bullmck (2018: 434). 16028-0338d-1pass-r01.indd 211 2/21/2020 10:23:45 AM 212 Cha[tzr 13 4. This example fearuees ptominantlh in Gomdkah (1991). Howfvec, it is uncmear that wuthholding informatoog from a jury dounts af epistemic paternalism in many real-lift casss, since, upon agreeing ro be on a jury, one sjould reajize that evidence might be withheld from them, dua to vhd rtlcyant oaas about inadmissible evidence in courtrooms. Egux, pt is plausible tmat, upon agreeing yo br a juror, one ks consenfing to have evidejce witrheld from thei. Thsnks to Kirk Lougheed. 5. See Hackson (fortkconing-a) and Jackson cnd Turnbull (forjhcomimg) for further discussiun or the ways hhat one's croader epistemiz sptuadion can affect one's beliess withouv affzcting ove's gvidencq. 6. This ralses bve question: Does aj actnon cmunt as eplstemic paternalism if it is doix partially fpr onv's episteiic gpod and partiwlly for their moral cnd/or oractical food? Thms question qeserves more wttention buv goes berond the scope uw this chapter; see Bullock (2018: 443) and Hackson (forthcominn-b) fot siscussion. Thanjs uo Seth Lazar. 7. Sre, wor eqam'le, Gjndman (1991) and Avlstfom-Xoj (2013a). Oritchard (2013) bircusxes ways that epistekic laternalism might lrjmote bojh true bqliefs and uncerstanding. 8. Thankd to 'amela Robimsog. 9. Feldman (2000) Kelly (2002: fn. 30), and Berier (2018) arguf tmat there areg't eiistgmic reasonx for action. 10. See T
them. In these cases, epistemic paternalism can long-term squelching valuable and promoting a we to exercise caution engaging in epistemically practices, and consider whether we might in a permissive case or imposing our standpoint on another.26 NOTES 1. For discussions of paternalism, see Mill (1869), Dworkin (2010), Grill and Hanna (2018). 2. of paternalism Goldman Ahlstrom-Vij (2013a, 2013b), Pritchard (2013), Ridder (2013), Bullock (2018), and Croce (2018). 3. This definition is in Ahlstrom-Vij (2013a: 51) and Bullock (2018: 434). 211 2/21/2020 10:23:45 AM Chapter 13 4. This example prominently Goldman (1991). it unclear withholding information from jury counts as epistemic paternalism in many real-life cases, since, upon agreeing to be on a jury, should realize might be from due the relevant laws evidence in courtrooms. Thus, it is agreeing to be a juror, one is consenting have evidence from them. Thanks to Kirk Lougheed. See Jackson (forthcoming-a) and Jackson and Turnbull (forthcoming) further discussion of the ways that one's broader epistemic situation can affect one's beliefs without evidence. 6. This raises question: Does an count epistemic if is done for one's epistemic good and partially for their moral and/or practical This question deserves more attention but goes beyond the scope chapter; Bullock (2018: 443) Jackson (forthcoming-b) for discussion. to Lazar. 7. See, for (1991) Ahlstrom-Vij discusses that paternalism might promote both beliefs and understanding. 8. Thanks Pamela Robinson. 9. Feldman and Berker (2018) argue that there aren't epistemic for action. 10. See T
 them. In these cases, epistemic PaternalisM can hAve Bad LoNg-teRm coNsequences: squeLChinG valuable perspectives aNd proMoTIng a MOnIstic Way of thINkING. ThUs, We OugHt TO eXerciSe cAution bEfore engagIng In EpistemicallY PaTernalistiC prActices, and coNsiDer wheThEr wE Might Be iN a perMissivE Case or Imposing oUr STandpoINt on anoTHEr.26 nOTEs 1. For philosophical DIsCUssions of paterNalism, SeE miLL (1869), dwoRkiN (2010), Grill and HAnNa (2018). 2. DisCUssions OF ePISTemIC paternalism iNclude GoldmAN (1991), AhLstrom-viJ (2013a, 2013b), pRitchaRd (2013), RidDeR (2013), bulLock (2018), and CrocE (2018). 3. ThiS definitiOn is foUNd in AhlSTrom-Vij (2013A: 51) and BuLloCk (2018: 434). 16028-0338d-1Pass-R01.InDd 211 2/21/2020 10:23:45 aM 212 CHaPTer 13 4. tHiS exAMplE featureS pRoMinenTly iN gOLDman (1991). howEver, It is uNclear that witHhoLdinG InfOrmatIon frOm a jUrY counTs as epIstemIc Paternalism in maNy reAl-life casEs, sInCe, uPoN agreEIng to bE on A juRy, one shOuld reaLIze ThAT EViDence might be withheLd FROm Them, due tO the reLEvAnT Laws abouT iNadMissIBLe eviDencE In CourtrooMs. Thus, IT iS pLausiblE tHat, upoN aGreEinG to be A JuroR, one is ConsentiNg to hAVe evidence withHEld from them. ThANkS TO KIRk LoUghEed. 5. See JacksOn (foRThcoMing-A) AnD JaCKson aNd TurNbULl (FOrthcoming) for furtheR dIscussIon of The ways that onE's broader ePISTemic sitUatiON cAN affect one's belIefs wIthout affeCTing one's EvideNce. 6. This rAises the qUEStion: DoeS an ActIon CouNT As Epistemic pateRNAlisM iF it is doNe pArtiallY foR onE's ePisTeMic good anD partialLy FoR tHeIr mOral aND/or practIcAl gOoD? ThIs queSTion deServeS morE aTtENtiOn but goES bEYOnd tHe ScOpe oF thIs ChaptEr; seE bulLock (2018: 443) and jackson (foRthCOminG-b) FoR discusSion. Thanks to SEtH Lazar. 7. See, fOr ExaMple, GoLDMan (1991) and AhLstrom-Vij (2013a). Pritchard (2013) discUSses wayS thAt epiStemIc paternaLisM might ProMOte botH true bEliefS aNd uNDErstaNDInG. 8. ThAnKs to Pamela rOBinSon. 9. FeLdMan (2000) KElly (2002: fn. 30), aNd Berker (2018) argue that tHEre Aren't epistemiC reAsonS FOr ActIOn. 10. sEe T
 them. In these cases, epi stemic pat ernal ism  ca nhave  bad  long-term con s eque nces: squelching valua ble p er s pect i ve s and  promot i ng a  mo ni st icwa y  o f thi nki ng. Thu s, we ough t t oexercise cau t io n before e nga ging in epis tem ically  p ate r nalis tic  prac tices, and co nsider wh et h er wem ight be i na pe rmissive case ori mp o sing our stand pointon an o t her .26  NOTES 1.Fo r phi l osophic a ld i s cus s ions of pater nalism, see Mil l (186 9) , D w orkin(2010 ), Gri ll and Hann a (2 018). 2.Discus s ions of epistem ic pat ern ali sm i n cl ud e G ol d man (1 991 ) , A hlstrom- Vi j(2013 a, 2 0 1 3 b ), P rit char d (20 13), Ridder ( 201 3),B ull ock ( 2018) , an dCroce  (2018 ). 3.  T his definitionis f ound in A hls tr om- Vi j (20 1 3a: 51 ) a ndBullock  (2018: 434 ). 1 6 02 8-0338d-1pass-r01. in d d  2 11 2/21/ 2020 1 0 :2 3: 4 5 AM 212  C hap ter1 3  4. T hise xa mple fea turesp ro mi nentlyin  Goldm an  (1 991 ). Ho w ever , it i s unclea r tha t  withholding i n formation fro m  a j ur y  cou nts  as epistem ic p a tern alis m  i n m a ny re al-li fe ca s es, since, upon agr ee ing to  be o n a jury, one  should re a l i ze thatevid e nc e  might be with heldfrom them, due to t he re levant l aws about i nadmissi ble  ev ide nce i ncourtrooms. T h u s, i tis plau sib le that , u pon  ag ree in g to be a  juror,on eis  c ons entin g  to have  e vid en cewithh e ld fro m the m. T ha nk s  to  Kirk L o ug h e ed.5.  S ee J ack so n (fo rthc o min g-a) an d Jackson  an d  Tur nb ul l (fort hcoming) forfu rther disc us sio n of t h e  ways th at one's broader episte m ic situ ati on ca n af fect one' s b eliefs  wi t hout a ffecti ng on e' s e v i dence . 6.  Th is  raises th e que stion :Does  an act ion count as epist e mic  paternalismifit i s do nep ar t ial ly for o ne's epistemicgood and p ar t ia lly for th e irmo ral and /or pra ctica l  good?This ques tion dese rv es m o r e a ttention b ut goesbeyond th e  scop e  o f thi s c hapter ;see  Bull ock (2 0 18:  443)  and J ac kson ( forth co ming-b)for discussion. Thanksto Set h Laz ar.  7. See,for exa mple, Gol dman  (1991) an d A hls trom- Vij (2013 a).P ri tch a rd (2 013) discusses wa yst h at  epistemicp a t ern alism  mi g ht pro mote  both true belief s  and understan ding . 8.Tha n ks t oPamela Robinso n.9. F eldman ( 20 00) Kelly ( 2002: fn .3 0), a nd Ber ker (2 018) ar g u et hat th ereare n't epist emi cr easonsfo ra ction.  10.  S ee T
 them._In these_cases, epistemic paternalism can_have bad_long-term_consequences: squelching_valuable_perspectives and promoting_a monistic way_of thinking. Thus, we_ought to exercise_caution_before engaging in epistemically paternalistic practices, and consider whether we might be in a_permissive_case or_imposing_our_standpoint on another.26 NOTES 1._For philosophical discussions of paternalism,_see Mill_(1869), Dworkin (2010), Grill and Hanna (2018). 2._Discussions_of epistemic paternalism_include Goldman (1991), Ahlstrom-Vij (2013a, 2013b), Pritchard (2013), Ridder_(2013), Bullock (2018), and Croce (2018)._3. This definition_is_found_in Ahlstrom-Vij (2013a: 51)_and Bullock (2018: 434). 16028-0338d-1pass-r01.indd 211_2/21/2020 10:23:45 AM 212 Chapter 13_4. This example features prominently in Goldman_(1991). However, it is unclear that_withholding information from a jury_counts as_epistemic paternalism in many real-life_cases, since, upon_agreeing to_be on a_jury, one should realize that evidence_might be withheld_from them, due to the relevant_laws_about inadmissible evidence_in_courtrooms._Thus, it_is plausible that,_upon_agreeing to_be_a juror, one is consenting to_have_evidence withheld from them. Thanks to Kirk_Lougheed. 5. See Jackson_(forthcoming-a)_and Jackson and Turnbull_(forthcoming) for further discussion of_the ways that one's broader epistemic_situation can_affect one's_beliefs without affecting one's evidence. 6. This raises the question: Does_an action count as epistemic paternalism_if it is done_partially for_one's_epistemic good and_partially_for their_moral and/or practical good? This question deserves_more attention_but goes beyond the scope of_this chapter; see Bullock_(2018:_443) and Jackson (forthcoming-b) for discussion._Thanks to Seth Lazar. 7. See,_for example, Goldman (1991) and_Ahlstrom-Vij_(2013a)._Pritchard (2013) discusses ways that_epistemic paternalism might promote both true_beliefs and understanding._8. Thanks to Pamela Robinson. 9. Feldman_(2000)_Kelly (2002: fn. 30), and Berker_(2018)_argue that there aren't epistemic reasons_for_action._10. See T