 A R A L D S E N as described in the fiction. Possibilism even gives us a basis for explaining how it is possible to learn from fiction – not only facts about the actual world related in the fiction, but about morality or the human condition. Of course, I will not have space to discuss all these features in detail here. But even the apparent ease with which possibilism can accommodate the intuitive data is some evidence in its favor. There are, however, important questions I will set aside here; I mention some of them in Section 2. In Section 3 I sketch a possibilist model of fiction and explain how it accommodates i) creativity and ii) the distinction between fictional and counterfactual talk. In Section 4 I sketch and defend a promising theory of truth-in-fiction. 2. Referring to Holmes There are several issues I do not have room to discuss. I merely note some of them here: 1) To provide a theory of truth for fiction it is natural to assume that we need possible worlds to be fairly metaphysically robust. To what extent we are committed to modal realism is a question I leave open. 2) I will assume that names are directly referential. A commitment to direct reference sits uncomfortably with a counterpart theory of modality, which appears to require some form of descriptivism (see Sullivan 2005, for discussion). A counterfactual claim about Aristotle must, on a direct reference view, be a claim about Aristotle, and not his potentially descriptively indistinguishable counterparts (on pain of a change in semantic content). To determine whether 'Aristotle could have failed to teach Alexander' is true, then, we don't search the space of worlds to discover one in which an identifiable Aristotle fails to teach Alexander. Rather, we consider what the case is with Aristotle, and evaluate the counterfactual claim by determining whether he is part of a world where he doesn't teach Alexander. On direct reference views, reference precedes the identification of relevant worlds. Accordingly, Aristotle must exist in multiple worlds, and the relevant worlds must contain the numerically same individual Aristotle. And since we want the semantic content of names in fiction to be of the same type as ordinary names, 'Holmes' should be directly referential as well. As a consequence, we reject counterpart theories of modality in our T H E T R U T H A B O U T S H E R L O C K H O L M E S 343 model of fiction. Possibilism is not wedded to a
A R A L D S E N as described in the fabrication. Possibilism even render us a basis for explaining how it is potential to learn from fabrication – not only facts about the actual worldly concern relate in the fiction, but about ethical motive or the human circumstance. Of course, I will not have quad to discuss all these features in contingent here. But even the apparent ease with which possibilism can accommodate the intuitive datum is some evidence in its favor. There constitute, however, significant questions I will set aside here; I note some of them in Section 2. In Section 3 I sketch a possibilist exemplar of fiction and excuse how it accommodates one) creativity and ii) the distinction between fictional and counterfactual talk. In Section 4 I sketch and champion a promising theory of truth - in - fiction. 2. Referring to Holmes There constitute several issues I do not have room to discuss. I merely note some of them here: 1) To provide a theory of truth for fiction it is natural to bear that we need possible world to be reasonably metaphysically full-bodied. To what extent we are committed to modal realism is a question I leave open. 2) I will assume that names are directly referential. A committedness to direct reference sits uncomfortably with a counterpart theory of modality, which appears to require some form of descriptivism (see Sullivan 2005, for discussion). A counterfactual claim about Aristotle must, on a direct reference opinion, be a title about Aristotle, and not his potentially descriptively indistinguishable counterparts (on pain of a change in semantic content). To settle whether' Aristotle could have failed to teach Alexander' is true, then, we don't search the quad of worlds to discover one in which an identifiable Aristotle fails to teach Alexander. Rather, we regard what the case is with Aristotle, and measure the counterfactual claim by determining whether he is part of a world where he doesn't teach Alexander. On direct mention views, character precedes the recognition of relevant worlds. Accordingly, Aristotle must exist in multiple worlds, and the relevant worlds must contain the numerically like individual Aristotle. And since we want the semantic content of names in fabrication to be of the same type as ordinary names,' Holmes' should be immediately referential as well. As a consequence, we reject counterpart theories of modality in our thymine H E T R U T heat content A B O U T S H vitamin e radius liter O C K H O L M E S 343 model of fabrication. Possibilism is not wedded to a
 A G A L D S E N as describtd in the fiction. Possibmlism eben giver us a basis for explaining iow ut is possible to learn froo fiction – not onoy fects about the arfual wovjd rspateb mn the fiction, nut about mmrality or the hjmcn condition. Of course, I will not hade spacr ho discuss all thexq feznuves in detail here. But even the zpparenu ease with which lossibilism can accommodatf thf intuitive data id some evidghce un its favor. There are, however, impkrtant questions I will set asiae hexe; I mentiob womf of them in Sectpon 2. In Section 3 I skatch a lossibilist mocel of fiction and explain iow it accommodates y) creativhtv and ii) the distinctuob betfeen ficguonxl znv ckuntervacvual talk. Ih Section 4 U sketch and defend a itomising thekry of twuth-in-fiction. 2. Referring to Holmes Thert are several issues I do nor have room to discusd. I merelr note some of them here: 1) To provide a theory of druth wor flctiub lt is natural to assume that we need possible sotlcs to be fairln metaphysically rpbksy. To what extevt we cde committed to modap realifm is a questijn I leave open. 2) I will assume rhat names age durectly referentiap. A commitmznt to direvt reference sits uncomyortabmy with a clunterparf theory of modalkty, wvich apptxrs to require soie form oh deseriptivirm (sge Sullyvan 2005, for fiscussion). A counterfactkal cpahm about Agistotle must, on a direct referxice view, be a cnaik about Cristoble, and not his potentially dgscriptivzly inaistinguisgable cmunterparts (on pain of a fhange in sekantic cjntebt). Ti deterokne whether 'Arostotle could have dailed to teach Alcxandgr' is true, then, wz eon't search the spxce ov xorldf to discover one in ehich an identiflabue Atistotle fails to tedch Zlexander. Rather, wr gonsider qhat the case is with Aristotle, and evapuate thx counyersactual claim by determining wgether he is part of a wjrld where he dozsn't teach Alexander. On direct reference views, reference krecedes the identifieauion of relevent wowlds. Accosdingly, Aristotle muwt exist in multikle worlds, and the relebant wmrlds must contain the numerically same individual Aristotle. And since we want the sxmwntic conteht og namvs nn yiction to ue of the same typv as ordinary names, 'Holmes' shoulv be direcdlv referential as well. As a comsdquence, we regect counterpart theoriea of modslity in our T H E T R U T H A N O U T S H E R L O C K M O L M E S 343 mkdel of firtion. Possibilism is not wzdded ro a
A R A L D S E described the fiction. even gives us it possible to learn fiction – not facts about the actual world related the fiction, but about morality or the human condition. Of course, I will have space to discuss all these features in detail here. But even the ease which can the intuitive data is some evidence in its favor. There are, however, important questions I will aside here; I mention some of them in 2. In Section 3 sketch a possibilist model of and how it i) and the distinction between and counterfactual talk. In Section 4 I sketch and defend a promising theory of truth-in-fiction. 2. Referring Holmes There issues I not room discuss. I merely of them here: 1) To provide truth for fiction it is natural to assume we need worlds to be fairly metaphysically robust. what extent we are committed to modal realism a question I leave open. 2) I will assume that names are directly referential. A direct reference sits uncomfortably a counterpart theory modality, appears require form of (see Sullivan 2005, for discussion). A counterfactual claim about Aristotle must, a direct reference view, be a claim about Aristotle, and potentially indistinguishable counterparts (on of a change in content). determine whether 'Aristotle could to Alexander' we search space of worlds to one in which an identifiable fails to teach Alexander. case is with Aristotle, and evaluate the counterfactual by determining whether he is part of world where he doesn't teach Alexander. On direct reference views, reference precedes identification of Accordingly, Aristotle must exist in multiple worlds, and relevant worlds must contain numerically same individual Aristotle. And since we want the content names in to be of same type as names, 'Holmes' should referential as As consequence, theories of modality in our T E R U T H A O S H E R L O C K H O L M E S 343 fiction. Possibilism is not to
 A R A L D S E N as described in the fIction. PossIbiliSm eVen GiVes uS a baSis for explainiNG how It is possible to learn froM fictIoN – Not oNLy Facts About thE AcTUAl wOrLd RelAtED iN the fIctIon, but aBout moraliTy oR tHe human condiTIoN. Of course, I WilL not have spacE to DiscusS aLl tHEse feAtuRes in Detail HEre. But Even the apPaREnt easE With whiCH PoSsibIlism can accommodaTE tHE intuitive data Is some EvIDeNCE in Its Favor. There ArE, howeVEr, imporTAnT QUEstIOns I will set asIde here; I menTIon Some of ThEm iN sectioN 2. In SeCtIOn 3 I Sketch a possIbilIst model oF fictiON and expLAin how iT accomModAteS i) crEAtIvIty AnD Ii) tHE dIstINctIon betweEn FiCtionAl anD COUNterFacTual Talk. IN Section 4 I sketCh aNd deFEnd A promIsing TheoRy Of truTh-in-fiCtion. 2. reFerring to Holmes therE are severAl iSsUes i dO not hAVe room To dIscUss. I merEly note SOme Of THEM hEre: 1) To provide a theorY oF TRuTh for ficTion it IS nAtURal to assUmE thAt we NEEd posSiblE WoRlds to be Fairly MEtApHysicalLy Robust. to WhaT exTent wE Are cOmmittEd to modaL realISm is a question I LEave open. 2) I will ASsUME tHAt naMes Are directly RefeREntiAl. A cOMmItmENt to dIrect ReFErENce sits uncomfortablY wIth a coUnterPart theory of mOdality, whiCH APpears to RequIRe SOme form of descrIptivIsm (see SullIVan 2005, for diScussIon). A counTerfactuaL CLaim abouT ArIstOtlE muST, On A direct refereNCE vieW, bE a claim AboUt AristOtlE, anD noT hiS pOtentiallY descripTiVeLy InDisTinguIShable coUnTerPaRts (On paiN Of a chaNge in SemaNtIc COntEnt). To deTErMINe whEtHeR 'AriStoTlE coulD havE FaiLed to teAch AlexanDer' IS truE, tHeN, we don't Search the spacE oF worlds to dIsCovEr one iN WHich an idEntifiable Aristotle failS To teach aleXandeR. RatHer, we consIdeR what tHe cASe is wiTh ArisTotle, AnD evALUate tHE CoUntErFactual claIM By dEtermInIng wHether hE is part of a world wheRE he Doesn't teach AlExaNder. oN DiRecT ReFEreNcE VieWS, Reference precedEs the identIfICaTion of releVAnt WoRlds. AccOrdinglY, ArisTOtle musT exist in mUltiple woRlDs, anD THe rElevant worLds must cOntain the NUmeriCAlLy samE inDividuAl ariStotlE. And siNCe wE want The semAnTic conTent oF nAmes in fiCtion to be of the same type aS ordinAry naMes, 'holmes' shoUld BE diRectly refErenTial as well. as a ConSequeNce, WE rejeCt coUNtErpARt theOrieS Of modalitY In Our t h e T r U T H A B O U T S H e r l o C K h O L M E s 343 moDEl of fiCtioN. Possibilism is not WEdded to a
 A R A L D S E N as descri bed in the  fict ion . P os sibi lism  even gives us a ba sis for explaining how  it i sp ossi b le  to l earn fr o mf i cti on  –  no to nl y fac tsabout t he actualwor ld  related int he  fiction,but  about moral ity  or th ehum a n con dit ion.Of cou r se, Iwill notha v e spac e  to dis c u ss  all  these features i n  d e tail here. But  eventh e  a p p are ntease withwh ich p o ssibili s mc a n  ac c ommodate theintuitive d a tais som eevi d ence i n its  f a vor . There are , ho wever, im portan t  questi o ns I wi ll set  as ide  her e ;Imen ti o n s o me  of the m in Sec ti on  2. I n Se c t i o n 3I s ketc h a p ossibilist mo del  off ict ion a nd ex plai nhow i t acco mmoda te s i) creativity  and  ii) thedis ti nct io n bet w een fi cti ona l and c ounterf a ctu al t a lk . In Section 4 I s ke t c hand defe nd a p r om is i ng theor yoftrut h - in-fi ctio n .2. Refer ring t o  H ol mes The re  are s ev era l i ssues I do  not h ave room  to d i scuss. I merel y  note some of th e m  h e re:1)To providea th e oryof t r ut h f o r fic tionit is natural to assume t ha t we n eed p ossible world s to be fa i r l y metaph ysic a ll y  robust. To wh at ex tent we ar e  committ ed to  modal r ealism is a  questio n I  le ave  op e n .2) I will ass u m e th at  namesare  direct lyref ere nti al . A commi tment to  d ir ec tref erenc e  sits un co mfo rt abl y wit h  a cou nterp artth eo r y o f modal i ty , whic hap pear s t orequi re s o meform of  descript ivi s m (s ee  S ullivan  2005, for di sc ussion). A  c oun terfac t u al claim  about Aristotle must,o n a dir ect  refe renc e view, b e a  claim  ab o ut Ari stotle , and  n oth i s pot e n ti all ydescriptiv e l y i ndist in guis hable c ounterparts (on pa i n o f a change in  se mant i c  c ont e nt ) . T od ete r m ine whether 'Ar istotle co ul d  h ave failed tote ach Ale xander'  is t r ue, the n, we don 't search  t he s p a ceof worldsto disco ver one i n  whic h  a n ide nti fiable  A ris totle  fails toteach  Alexa nd er. Ra ther,  w e consid er what the case is wit h Aris totle , a nd evalua tet hecounterfa ctua l claim by  de ter minin g w h ether  hei spar t  of a  wor l d where h e  d oes n ' tteach Alexa n d e r.On di rec t  refer ence  views, reference precedes the i dent i f ica tio n  ofre levant worlds.  Ac co r d ingly, A ri stotle must  exist i nm ultip le wor lds, a nd ther e le v ant wo rlds  mu st contai n t he numeric al ly same i ndiv id ual Ar istotl e . An d since we want th e sem a n tic c o nte nt of  n ames in fict ion to beof the same  typeas o rdina ry name s,  'Holm es'  s hould be d i rectly re feren tial as  w ell.  As  a con sequ e n ce, w e re je ctcounterpa r t  t h eo ri e s o f mo dalit yin o ur T H ET  R U T H  AB  O U TSH E R  L O C KH O L M E S343  mode l of fiction .  Pos s ib i lismis not  wedde d to a
 A_R A_L D S E_N as_described_in the_fiction._Possibilism even gives_us a basis_for explaining how it_is possible to_learn_from fiction – not only facts about the actual world related in the fiction,_but_about morality_or_the_human condition. Of course, I_will not have space to_discuss all_these features in detail here. But even the_apparent_ease with which_possibilism can accommodate the intuitive data is some evidence_in its favor. There are, however,_important questions I_will_set_aside here; I mention_some of them in Section 2._In Section 3 I sketch a_possibilist model of fiction and explain how_it accommodates i) creativity and ii)_the distinction between fictional and_counterfactual talk._In Section 4 I sketch_and defend a_promising theory_of truth-in-fiction. 2._Referring to Holmes There are several_issues I do_not have room to discuss. I_merely_note some of_them_here:_1) To_provide a theory_of_truth for_fiction_it is natural to assume that_we_need possible worlds to be fairly metaphysically_robust. To what extent_we_are committed to modal_realism is a question I_leave open. 2) I will assume_that names_are directly_referential. A commitment to direct reference sits uncomfortably with a counterpart_theory of modality, which appears to_require some form of_descriptivism (see_Sullivan_2005, for discussion)._A_counterfactual claim_about Aristotle must, on a direct reference_view, be_a claim about Aristotle, and not_his potentially descriptively indistinguishable_counterparts_(on pain of a change in_semantic content). To determine whether 'Aristotle_could have failed to teach_Alexander'_is_true, then, we don't search_the space of worlds to discover_one in which_an identifiable Aristotle fails to teach Alexander._Rather,_we consider what the case is_with_Aristotle, and evaluate the counterfactual claim_by_determining_whether he is part of_a world where he doesn't teach_Alexander. On direct reference views, reference precedes the identification_of relevant worlds._Accordingly, Aristotle must exist in_multiple_worlds,_and the relevant worlds must contain the numerically same individual_Aristotle. And_since we want_the semantic content of names in fiction to be of_the same type as ordinary names, 'Holmes'_should be directly referential as well. As a consequence, we reject_counterpart theories of modality in our T H_E T R U T H A_B O U T_S_H E R L O C K_H_O_L_M E S_343 model of_fiction. Possibilism is_not wedded_to a