ytmicznych okazał się nieuzasadniony. Celem niniejszego artykułu jest ukazanie innych kryteriów typologicznego opisu języków pod względem rytmu (tu na przykładzie języków polskiego i niemieckiego), który ma duże znaczenie w dziedzinie językoznawstwa kontrastywnego oraz nauczania języków obcych. Bayesian Confirmation: A Means With No End Peter Brössel Franz Huber Department of Philosophy Department of Philosophy Ruhr-University Bochum University of Toronto Germany Canada peter.broessel@rub.de franz.huber@utoronto.ca Penultimate version: please cite the paper that is forthcoming in the BJPS! – Franz Huber, 01/01/2014 Abstract Any theory of confirmation must answer the following question: what is the purpose of its conception of confirmation for scientific inquiry? In this paper we argue that no Bayesian conception of confirmation can be used for its primary intended purpose, which we take to be saying how worthy of belief various hypotheses are. Then we consider a different use Bayesian confirmation might be put to, namely to determine the epistemic value of experimental outcomes, and thus to decide which experiments to carry out. Interestingly Bayesian confirmation theorists rule out that confirmation be used for this purpose. We conclude that Bayesian confirmation is a means with no end. 1 Contents 1 Introduction 2 2 Bayesian Confirmation Theory 4 3 Bayesian Confirmation and Belief 5 4 Confirmation and the Value of Experiments 12 5 Conclusion 16 1 Introduction Any theory of confirmation must answer the following question: what is the purpose of its conception of confirmation for scientific inquiry, broadly construed? In this paper we argue that no Bayesian conception of confirmation can be used for guiding or prescribing epistemic states, or for guiding or prescribing experimental actions. First we argue that no Bayesian conception of confirmation can be used for its primary intended purpose, which we take to be saying how worthy of belief certain hypotheses are. Then we consider a different use confirmation might be put to, namely to determine the epistemic value of experimental outcomes, and thus to decide which experiments to carry out. Interestingly, however, Bayesian confirmation theorists rule out that confirmation be used for this purpose. We conclude that there is no need to supplement the
ytmicznych okazał się nieuzasadniony. Celem niniejszego artykułu jest ukazanie innych kryteriów typologicznego opisu języków pod względem rytmu (tu na przykładzie języków polskiego i niemieckiego), który ma duże znaczenie w dziedzinie językoznawstwa kontrastywnego oraz nauczania języków obcych. Bayesian Confirmation: A Means With No End Peter Brössel Franz Huber Department of Philosophy Department of Philosophy Ruhr - University Bochum University of Toronto Germany Canada peter.broessel@rub.de franz.huber@utoronto.ca Penultimate version: please cite the newspaper that is extroverted in the BJPS! – Franz Huber, 01/01/2014 Abstract Any theory of confirmation must answer the following motion: what is the purpose of its conception of ratification for scientific inquiry? In this paper we argue that no Bayesian conception of ratification can be use for its primary mean purpose, which we take to be suppose how worthy of belief various hypotheses are. Then we consider a different function Bayesian confirmation might be put to, namely to determine the epistemic value of experimental consequence, and thus to decide which experiments to carry out. Interestingly Bayesian confirmation theorist rule out that ratification be used for this purpose. We conclude that Bayesian confirmation is a mean with no end. 1 Contents 1 Introduction 2 2 Bayesian Confirmation Theory 4 3 Bayesian Confirmation and Belief 5 4 Confirmation and the Value of Experiments 12 5 Conclusion 16 1 Introduction Any theory of confirmation must answer the following question: what is the purpose of its conception of confirmation for scientific inquiry, broadly construed? In this paper we argue that no Bayesian conception of ratification can be use for guiding or prescribing epistemic department of state, or for guide or prescribing experimental actions. First we argue that no Bayesian invention of confirmation can be used for its primary intended function, which we take to be saying how worthy of belief certain hypotheses are. Then we think a different use confirmation might be put to, namely to determine the epistemic value of experimental outcomes, and therefore to decide which experiment to carry out. Interestingly, however, Bayesian confirmation theorists rule out that ratification be used for this purpose. We conclude that there is no need to supplement the
ytmlcznych okazał się nieuzasxdniony. Celem nnbiejszxgo artgkułu jesg ukazanie innych kryteriów tbpoligiczbego opisu języków pod wxględem rynmu (tu na przbkładzie języków polskiego l niejleckizgi), który ma duże enaczenie w gziedzinie języnoxncwstwa kontrastywnego oraz nauczania języków pbfych. Bayesian Sonfpriatikn: A Means With No End Peter Brössem Franz Huber Departkent of Philosophy Departmfnt lf Philosophy Ruhr-Kniversity Vochtn University of Toronto Germany Cahada peter.broessel@rub.de franz.hucer@utpronto.ca Pguyltlkate versioi: pleafe cite the isper tvat is gorthcoming in thx BJPS! – Franz Huber, 01/01/2014 Abstcact Any theory of cjnfirmatimn must answer the doolowitg qgestkin: dhau ix fhe pugpoae of its donception if confirmation for ssprntific inqujry? In tris paper we argue that no Bayesian conbeptjon of confirmation can be used for its primwry intenqed purpose, which we take to be saying how worthy of bxlkef vwfuoks hypotheses are. Then we consider a differene uxe Bayesian conflrmation might be luh yj, namely to dgterminz tge epistemic value of expgrimenral outcoies, snd thus to decide which experiments to xarry out. Interestnngly Bayesicn congirmayion theorists rule out thaf confirmatlon be ussa for this purpore. Ee concludt that Bayesian cogfirmatioi is c means dith no enq. 1 Contentd 1 Inbsoduction 2 2 Bayesiwn Coufirmdtion Theogy 4 3 Bayesian Confirmation and Uxlief 5 4 Confitmadiot and thz Valuc of Experimentf 12 5 Conclusion 16 1 Intrjductkon Any thvory of cmnfirmation must answer dje following questiog: whqt iw the pjfpose of its cpnception of confirnation for scientinic ivsuiry, broadly cinsuryed? In this paler we aggux thae no Bayesian conzepgoon ow confirmatlon can be used for guiding or lrescribing epistekig states, ir for gtiding or prexcribing experimenual acvions. Hirst ee wrgue that no Bayesian conceptjon of cojfivmation can bq uscd fjr its prikary intended purpose, which we take to ue saying how worthy of belief certain hyppuheses are. Thxn we sonsider d different use confurmation might be put to, namely to detsrmine the fpistemic value of experimental outcomes, and thus to decide which experimwnts to carry out. Jntetestitgjv, howevqr, Beyxsian confirmatiom theorists rule out that conficmation be ufed for this purpose. We conckuae that there is no need to supplemenf the
ytmicznych okazał się nieuzasadniony. Celem niniejszego artykułu innych typologicznego opisu pod względem rytmu i który ma duże w dziedzinie językoznawstwa oraz nauczania języków obcych. Bayesian Confirmation: Means With No End Peter Brössel Franz Huber Department of Philosophy Department of Ruhr-University Bochum University of Toronto Germany Canada peter.broessel@rub.de franz.huber@utoronto.ca Penultimate version: please cite paper is in BJPS! – Franz Huber, 01/01/2014 Abstract Any theory of confirmation must answer the following question: what the purpose of its conception of confirmation for inquiry? In this paper argue that no Bayesian conception confirmation be used its intended which we take be saying how worthy of belief various hypotheses are. Then we consider a different use Bayesian confirmation be put to determine epistemic of outcomes, and thus which experiments to carry out. Interestingly rule out that confirmation be used for this We conclude Bayesian confirmation is a means with end. 1 Contents 1 Introduction 2 2 Bayesian Theory 4 3 Bayesian Confirmation and Belief 5 4 Confirmation and the Value of Experiments Conclusion 16 1 Introduction theory of confirmation answer following what the purpose its conception of confirmation for scientific inquiry, broadly construed? In this we argue that no Bayesian conception of confirmation can be guiding prescribing epistemic states, for guiding or prescribing actions. we argue that no of can its intended which we take to saying how worthy of belief hypotheses are. Then we might be put to, namely to determine the value of experimental outcomes, and thus to which experiments to carry out. Interestingly, however, Bayesian confirmation theorists rule out confirmation be this purpose. We conclude that there is no to supplement the
ytmicznych okazał się nieuzaSadniony. CeLem niNieJszEgO artYkułU jest ukazanie iNNych Kryteriów typologicznegO opisU jĘZykóW PoD wzglĘdem rytMU (tU NA prZyKłAdzIe JĘzYków pOlsKiego i nIemieckiegO), ktÓrY ma duże znaczENiE w dziedzinIe jĘzykoznawstwA koNtrastYwNegO Oraz nAucZania JęzykóW Obcych. bayesian COnFIrmatiON: A Means wITh no EnD Peter Brössel FranZ huBEr Department of philosOpHY DEPArtMenT of PhilosoPhY Ruhr-uNiversiTY BOCHUm UNIversity of TorOnto Germany cAnaDa peteR.bRoeSSel@rub.De fraNz.HUbeR@utoronto.ca penuLtimate veRsion: pLEase citE The papeR that iS foRthComiNG iN tHe BjPs! – fraNZ HUbeR, 01/01/2014 absTract Any ThEoRy of cOnfiRMATIon mUst AnswEr the Following quesTioN: whaT Is tHe purPose oF its CoNceptIon of cOnfirMaTion for scientifIc inQuiry? In thIs pApEr wE aRgue tHAt no BaYesIan ConceptIon of coNFirMaTION cAn be used for its primArY INtEnded purPose, whICh We TAke to be sAyIng How wORThy of BeliEF vArious hyPothesES aRe. then we cOnSider a DiFfeRenT use BAYesiAn confIrmation Might BE put to, namely to DEtermine the epIStEMIc VAlue Of eXperimental OutcOMes, aNd thUS tO deCIde whIch exPeRImENts to carry out. IntereStIngly BAyesiAn confirmatioN theorists RULE out that ConfIRmATion be used for tHis puRpose. We conCLude that bayesIan confiRmation is A MEans with No eNd. 1 COntEntS 1 iNtRoduction 2 2 BayeSIAn CoNfIrmatioN ThEory 4 3 BayEsiAn COnfIrmAtIon and BelIef 5 4 ConfiRmAtIoN aNd tHe ValUE of ExperImEntS 12 5 COncLusioN 16 1 introdUctioN Any ThEoRY of ConfirmATiON Must AnSwEr thE foLlOwing QuesTIon: What is tHe purpose Of iTS conCePtIon of coNfirmation for ScIentific inQuIry, BroadlY COnstrued? in this paper we argue that nO bayesiaN coNceptIon oF confirmaTioN can be UseD For guiDing or PrescRiBinG EPisteMIC sTatEs, Or for guidiNG Or pRescrIbIng eXperimeNtal actions. First we ARguE that no BayesiAn cOncePTIoN of COnFIrmAtIOn cAN Be used for its priMary intendEd PUrPose, which wE TakE tO be sayiNg how woRthy oF Belief cErtain hypOtheses arE. THen wE COnsIder a diffeRent use cOnfirmatiON mighT Be Put to, NamEly to dEtErmIne thE epistEMic Value Of expeRiMental OutcoMeS, and thus To decide which experimentS to carRy out. intErestinglY, hoWEveR, Bayesian ConfIrmation thEorIstS rule Out THat coNfirMAtIon BE used For tHIs purpose. wE cOncLUDe That there is NO NEed To supPleMEnt the
ytmicznych okazał się nieu zasadniony . Cel emnin ie jsze go a rtykułu jest u k azan ie innych kryteriów ty polog ic z nego op isu j ęzykówp od w zgl ęd em  ry tm u  ( tu na  pr zykładz ie języków  po ls kiego i niem i ec kiego), kt óry  ma duże zna cze nie wdz ied z iniejęz ykozn awstwa kontra stywnegoor a z nauc z ania ję z y kó w ob cych. Bayesian Co n fi r mation: A Mean s With  N o  E n d  Pe ter  Brössel F ra nz Hu b er Depa r tm e n t  of Philosophy De partment of Phi losoph yRuh r -Unive rsity  B o chu m Universit y of  TorontoGerman y  Canada peter.b roesse l@r ub. de f r an z. hub er @ uto r on to. c a P enultima te  v ersio n: p l e a s e ci tethepaper  that is fort hco ming inthe B JPS!– Fr an z Hub er, 01 /01/2 01 4 Abstract Anytheo ry of con fir ma tio nmusta nswerthe  fo llowing  questi o n:wh a t is  the purpose of it sc o nc eption o f conf i rm at i on for s ci ent ific i nquir y? I n  t his pape r we a r gu ethat no  B ayesia ncon cep tiono f co nfirma tion can  be u s ed for its pri m ary intendedp ur p o se ,  whi chwe take tobe s a ying  how wo rth y  of b elief  v a ri o us hypotheses are.Th en weconsi der a differe nt use Bay e s i an confi rmat i on might be put t o, na mely to de t ermine t he ep istemicvalue ofe x periment alout com es, a nd  thus to deci d e  whi ch  experi men ts to c arr y o ut.  In te restingly  Bayesia nco nf ir mat ion t h eoristsru leou t t hat c o nfirma tionbe u se df orthis pu r po s e . We  c on clud e t ha t Bay esia n  co nfirmat ion is amea n s wi th  n o end.1 Contents 1In troduction  2  2Bayesi a n  Confirm ation Theory 4 3 Bayesi a n Confi rma tionandBelief 54 C onfirm ati o n andthe Va lue o fExp e r iment s 12  5Co nclusion 1 6 1 I ntrod uc tion  Any th eory of confirmati o n m ust answer th e f ollo w i ng  qu e st i on:  w h ati s  the purpose of  its conce pt i on  of confir m ati on  for sc ientifi c inq u iry, br oadly con strued? I nthis p ape r we argue  that no  Bayesian conce p ti on of  co nfirma ti oncan b e used for  guid ing or  p rescri bingep istemicstates, or for guidingor pre scrib ing  experime nta l  ac tions. Fi rstwe argue t hat  no  Baye sia n  conc epti o nofc onfir mati o n can beu se d f o r  i ts primaryi n t end ed pu rpo s e, whi ch w e take to be sayi n g how worthy o f be l i efcer t ainhy potheses are.The nw e  conside ra different  use con fi r matio n migh t be p ut to,n a me l y to d eter min e the epi ste mi c  valueof  e x perime ntal  o utcome s, and thus t o decide which e xperi m e nts t o  ca rry o ut . Inter e stin gly, howev er, Bayesia n conf irma tiontheoris ts  ruleout  t hat confir m ation beusedfor thi spurp ose . We c oncl u d e tha t th er e i s no need t os up pl e men t th e
ytmicznych okazał_się nieuzasadniony._Celem niniejszego artykułu jest_ukazanie innych_kryteriów_typologicznego opisu_języków_pod względem rytmu_(tu na przykładzie_języków polskiego i niemieckiego),_który ma duże_znaczenie_w dziedzinie językoznawstwa kontrastywnego oraz nauczania języków obcych. Bayesian Confirmation: A Means With No_End_Peter Brössel_Franz_Huber_Department of Philosophy Department of_Philosophy Ruhr-University Bochum University of_Toronto Germany_Canada peter.broessel@rub.de franz.huber@utoronto.ca Penultimate version: please cite the_paper_that is forthcoming_in the BJPS! – Franz Huber, 01/01/2014 Abstract Any_theory of confirmation must answer the_following question: what_is_the_purpose of its conception_of confirmation for scientific inquiry? In_this paper we argue that no_Bayesian conception of confirmation can be used_for its primary intended purpose, which_we take to be saying_how worthy_of belief various hypotheses are._Then we consider_a different_use Bayesian confirmation_might be put to, namely to_determine the epistemic_value of experimental outcomes, and thus_to_decide which experiments_to_carry_out. Interestingly_Bayesian confirmation theorists_rule_out that_confirmation_be used for this purpose. We_conclude_that Bayesian confirmation is a means with_no end. 1 Contents_1_Introduction 2 2 Bayesian_Confirmation Theory 4 3 Bayesian_Confirmation and Belief 5 4 Confirmation_and the_Value of_Experiments 12 5 Conclusion 16 1 Introduction Any theory of confirmation_must answer the following question: what_is the purpose of_its conception_of_confirmation for scientific_inquiry,_broadly construed?_In this paper we argue that no_Bayesian conception_of confirmation can be used for_guiding or prescribing epistemic_states,_or for guiding or prescribing experimental_actions. First we argue that no_Bayesian conception of confirmation can_be_used_for its primary intended purpose,_which we take to be saying_how worthy of_belief certain hypotheses are. Then we consider_a_different use confirmation might be put_to,_namely to determine the epistemic value_of_experimental_outcomes, and thus to decide_which experiments to carry out. Interestingly,_however, Bayesian confirmation theorists rule out that confirmation be_used for this_purpose. We conclude that there_is_no_need to supplement the