. We can imagine that the bag's getting hung up is extremely unlikely because everything would have to go just right for that to occur, including the trajectory of the bag, its contents, the distribution of its weight, etc. iv See Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981). v Here is another counterexample to Nozick's account, due to Jonathan Vogel: "Suppose two policemen confront a mugger, who is standing some distance away with a drawn gun. One of the officers, a rookie, attempts to disarm the mugger by shooting a bullet down the barrel of the mugger's gun. (I assume that the chances of doing this are virtually nil.) Imagine that the rookie's veteran partner knows what the rookie is trying to do. The veteran sees him fire, but is screened from seeing the result. Aware that his partner is trying something that is all but impossible, the veteran thinks (correctly as it turns out) [that the] rookie missed." From "Tracking, Closure, and Deductive Knowledge," in Steven Luper-Foy, ed., The Possibility of Knowledge (Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1987). vi See Ernest Sosa, "Skepticism and Contextualism"; "How Must Knowledge be Modally Related to What is Known," Philosophical Topics 26 (1999): 373-384; and "How to Defeat Opposition to Moore," Philosophical Perspectives 13 (1999): 141-155. vii Here I am assuming that there is a close world in which the bag gets hung up in the chute. If that seems wrong, we can invoke Vogel's rookie cop example from note 5. There it seems uncontroversial that there is a close world where the rookie's bullet enters the mugger's barrel. viii "How Must Knowledge be Modally Related to What is Known?", p. 383, note 7. ix Knowledge in Perspective, p. 278. x "How to Be a Fallibilist," pp. 106-7. xi My claim is not that standards contextualism cannot explain the lottery case in principle. Rather, I restrict myself to the weaker claim that Cohen's contextualism does not in fact explain it. What are the prospects for other versions of standards contextualism? The trick, of course, is for the standards contextualist to explain why S does not have knowledge in the lottery case,
. We can imagine that the bag's getting hung up is highly improbable because everything would have to go barely mighty for that to occur, including the trajectory of the base, its contents, the distribution of its weight, etc. iv attend Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981). v Here is another counterexample to Nozick's account, due to Jonathan Vogel: " Suppose two policeman confront a mugger, who is standing some distance away with a drawn gun. One of the policeman, a rookie, attempts to disarm the mugger by shooting a bullet down the barrel of the mugger's gun. (I bear that the chances of doing this are virtually nil .) think that the rookie's veteran partner sleep together what the cub is trying to do. The veteran sees him fire, but is screened from seeing the resultant role. Aware that his partner is trying something that is all but impossible, the veteran thinks (correctly as it turns out) [ that the ] rookie missed. " From " Tracking, Closure, and Deductive Knowledge, " in Steven Luper - Foy, ed. , The Possibility of Knowledge (Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1987). vi See Ernest Sosa, " Skepticism and Contextualism "; " How Must Knowledge be Modally Related to What is Known, " Philosophical Topics 26 (1999 ): 373 - 384; and " How to Defeat Opposition to Moore, " Philosophical Perspectives 13 (1999 ): 141 - 155. vii Here I am assuming that there is a close world in which the bag gets hung up in the parachute. If that look wrong, we can appeal Vogel's cub cop exercise from note 5. There it seems uncontroversial that there constitute a close world where the rookie's bullet accede the mugger's barrel. viii " How Must Knowledge be Modally Related to What is Known? ", p. 383, note 7. ix Knowledge in Perspective, p. 278. x " How to Be a Fallibilist, " pp. 106 - 7. xi My claim is not that standards contextualism cannot excuse the lottery case in principle. Rather, I restrict myself to the weaker claim that Cohen's contextualism does not in fact explain it. What are the prognosis for other versions of standards contextualism? The trick, of course, is for the standard contextualist to explain why S does not have knowledge in the lottery case,
. We can imagine that the ban's getting hung op is exvremely unlikelh because everything would heve ro go just right for that tu occur, ijcluding the rrajectory of the ncg, ita conceits, the distribotion of its weight, etc. iv Sde Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanwtions (Valbridge, MA: Hardard Tnivsgslty Press, 1981). v Here is another couhterexakple to Nozicl's account, due to Jonathan Vogfl: "Suppose two pollcemen conftknt q mugger, who is standing some distznce away with a drawn gun. One uf thz officers, q eoonhe, attempts to dpsarm the mugnvr by svooting a bullet down thx baerel of the mugger's gnn. (I assume that the chances mf doing this are vurrualli nil.) Imaeune thzt tge roonie'a veteran lartner knoqs what the rookie os ntying to do. Fhe veeewan sees him fire, but is screened from veejng the result. Aware thqt his partner is trylng sometring that is all but impossible, the veteran thinkv (corceztlv as ig tkrns out) [that the] rookie missed." From "Tracking, Dlpslre, and Deductive Knowledge," on Sygven Luper-Foy, gd., The 'ksaibility of Knowlefge (Totjwa, Nww Jersey: Rowkan and Littlefield, 1987). vi See Ernest Sosa, "Wkepticism and Concextualism"; "Huw Most Knpwledge be Modally Relaced to What is Knlwn," Philoauphical Topics 26 (1999): 373-384; akd "Vow to Dtweat Opposition tj Moore," Piilospphical Perxpectides 13 (1999): 141-155. vii Here I am assuming that therg is a close worpd in which the bag gets hung u' in the chutg. Ix tvat seemf wrokg, we can invokq Vogel's rookig cop exaiple wrom note 5. There mt seems uncjntroversial djat there is a close worod wyere thd rookie's bulley enters nht mugger's varrel. viii "How Muxt Yhowledge be Modcuoy Related to Wnat is Kjoxn?", p. 383, tote 7. ix Knofledee km Perrpectivt, p. 278. x "Hpw to Be a Fallibilivt," pl. 106-7. xi My claim is mob that stqndards sontextualism cannot explain tht lottxry care in prynciple. Rather, I restrict mysemf to the wewker claim trat Goheg's contextbalism does not in fact explain it. What ere the prospects for orher versions of stcncards conteetualifm? The trhck, of course, is for the standards coktextualist to explain why S does not have knowledge in the lottery case,
. We can imagine that the bag's up extremely unlikely everything would have that occur, including the of the bag, contents, the distribution of its weight, iv See Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981). v is another counterexample to Nozick's account, due to Jonathan Vogel: "Suppose two policemen a who standing distance away with a drawn gun. One of the officers, a rookie, attempts to disarm the by shooting a bullet down the barrel of mugger's gun. (I assume the chances of doing this virtually Imagine that rookie's partner what the rookie trying to do. The veteran sees him fire, but is screened from seeing the result. Aware that partner is that is but the thinks (correctly as out) [that the] rookie missed." From Deductive Knowledge," in Steven Luper-Foy, ed., The Possibility Knowledge (Totowa, Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1987). vi Ernest Sosa, "Skepticism and Contextualism"; "How Must Knowledge Modally Related to What is Known," Philosophical Topics 26 (1999): 373-384; and "How to Defeat Moore," Philosophical Perspectives 13 141-155. vii Here am that is close world which the bag gets hung up in the chute. If that wrong, we can invoke Vogel's rookie cop example from note it uncontroversial that there a close world where rookie's enters the mugger's barrel. Must be What Known?", 383, note 7. ix in Perspective, p. 278. x to Be a Fallibilist," is not that standards contextualism cannot explain the case in principle. Rather, I restrict myself the weaker claim that Cohen's contextualism does not in fact explain it. are the other versions of standards contextualism? The trick, of is for the standards to explain why S does not have knowledge in lottery
. We can imagine that the bag's geTting hung uP is exTreMelY uNlikEly bEcause everythiNG wouLd have to go just right for That tO oCCur, iNClUding The trajECtORY of ThE bAg, iTs COnTents, The DistribUtion of its WeiGhT, etc. iv See RobERt nozick, PhilOsoPhical ExplanAtiOns (CamBrIdgE, mA: HarVarD UnivErsity pRess, 1981). v HEre is anotHeR CounteRExample TO noZick'S account, due to JonaTHaN vogel: "Suppose twO policEmEN cONFroNt a Mugger, who iS sTandiNG some diSTaNCE AwaY With a drawn gun. one of the offICerS, a rookIe, AttEMpts to DisarM tHE muGger by shootIng a Bullet dowN the baRRel of thE Mugger's Gun. (I asSumE thAt thE ChAnCes Of DOinG ThIs aRE viRtually nIl.) imAgine That THE ROokiE's vEterAn parTner knows what The RookIE is TryinG to do. the vEtEran sEes him Fire, bUt Is screened from sEeinG the resulT. AwArE thAt His paRTner is TryIng SomethiNg that iS All BuT IMPoSsible, the veteran thInKS (CoRrectly aS it turNS oUt) [THat the] roOkIe mIsseD." fRom "TrAckiNG, CLosure, anD DeducTIvE KNowledgE," iN SteveN LUpeR-FoY, ed., ThE possIbilitY of KnowlEdge (TOTowa, New Jersey: ROWman and LittleFIeLD, 1987). Vi sEe ErNesT Sosa, "SkeptiCism ANd CoNtexTUaLisM"; "how MuSt KnoWlEDgE Be Modally Related to WHaT is KnoWn," PhiLosophical TopIcs 26 (1999): 373-384; and "How tO dEFeat OppoSitiON tO moore," PhilosophIcal PErspectiveS 13 (1999): 141-155. Vii Here I Am assUming thaT there is a CLOse world In wHicH thE baG GEtS hung up in the cHUTe. If ThAt seems WroNg, we can InvOke vogEl's RoOkie cop exAmple froM nOtE 5. THeRe iT seemS UncontroVeRsiAl ThaT therE Is a cloSe worLd whErE tHE roOkie's buLLeT ENterS tHe MuggEr's BaRrel. vIii "HOW MuSt KnowlEdge be ModAllY relaTeD tO What is known?", p. 383, note 7. ix KNoWledge in PeRsPecTive, p. 278. x "hOW to Be a FaLlibilist," pp. 106-7. xi My claim is nOT that stAndArds cOnteXtualism cAnnOt explAin THe lottEry casE in prInCipLE. ratheR, i ReStrIcT myself to tHE WeaKer clAiM thaT Cohen's Contextualism does nOT in Fact explain it. whaT are THE pRosPEcTS foR oTHer VERsions of standarDs contextuAlISm? the trick, of COurSe, Is for thE standaRds coNTextualIst to explAin why S doEs Not hAVE knOwledge in tHe lotterY case,
. We can imagine that thebag's gett ing h ung  up  i s ex trem ely unlikely b e caus e everything would hav e togo just ri ght f or that to o ccu r,  i ncl ud i ng  thetra jectory  of the ba g,it s contents,t he  distribut ion  of its weig ht,  etc.iv  Se e  Robe rtNozic k, Phi l osophi cal Expla na t ions ( C ambridg e ,  M A: H arvard University Pr e ss, 1981). v H ere is  a n ot h e r c oun terexample  t o Noz i ck's ac c ou n t ,  du e  to JonathanVogel: "Sup p ose  two p ol ice m en con front  a mug ger, who is  sta nding som e dist a nce awa y  with a  drawn  gu n.Oneo fth e o ff i cer s ,a r o oki e, attem pt sto di sarm t h e  mug ger  byshoot ing a bulletdow n th e  ba rrelof th e mu gg er'sgun. ( I ass um e that the chan cesof doingthi sare  v irtua l ly nil .)Ima gine th at ther ook ie ' s ve teran partner know sw h at  the roo kie is tr yi n g to do.  T hevete r a n see s hi m  f ire, but  is sc r ee ne d fromse eing t he  re sul t. Aw a re t hat hi s partne r ist rying somethin g  that is allb ut i mp o ssib le,  the vetera n th i nks(cor r ec tly as it  turn so ut )  [that the] rookiemi ssed."  From  "Tracking, C losure, an d D eductive  Kno w le d ge," in Steven  Lupe r-Foy, ed. ,  The Pos sibil ity of K nowledge( T otowa, N ewJer sey : R o w ma n and Littlef i e ld,19 87). vi  Se e Ernes t S osa , " Ske pt icism and  Context ua li sm ";  "H ow Mu s t Knowle dg e b eMod allyR elated  to W hatis  K n own ," Phil o so p h ical  T op ics26(1 999):  373 - 384 ; and " How to De fea t  Opp os it ion toMoore," Philo so phical Per sp ect ives 1 3 (1999):141-155. vii Here I ama ssuming  th at th ereis a clos e w orld i n w h ich th e baggetshu ngu p  in t h e  c hut e.  If that s e e mswrong ,we c an invo ke Vogel's rookiec opexample fromnot e 5. T he rei ts eem su nco n t roversial thatthere is a  c l os e world wh e reth e rooki e's bul let e n ters th e mugger' s barrel.  v iii" H owMust Knowl edge beModally R e lated to  What  is  Known ?" , p . 383 , note 7.ix Kn owledg ein Per spect iv e, p. 27 8. x "How to Be a Falli bilist ," pp . 1 06-7. xiMyc lai m is notthat  standards  co nte xtual ism canno t ex p la int he lo tter y  case inp ri nci p l e.  Rather, Ir e s tri ct my sel f  to th e we aker claim that C o hen's contextu alis m doe s n o t in  f act explain it . W ha t are thepr ospects for  other v er s ionsof sta ndards  contex t u al i sm? Th e tr ick , of cour se,  i s  for th est a ndards  con te xtuali st toe xpla i n  why S does nothavek n owled g e i n the  l otteryc ase, 
. We_can imagine_that the bag's getting_hung up_is_extremely unlikely_because_everything would have_to go just_right for that to_occur, including the_trajectory_of the bag, its contents, the distribution of its weight, etc. iv See Robert_Nozick,_Philosophical Explanations_(Cambridge,_MA:_Harvard University Press, 1981). v_Here is another counterexample to_Nozick's account,_due to Jonathan Vogel: "Suppose two policemen confront_a_mugger, who is_standing some distance away with a drawn gun. One_of the officers, a rookie, attempts_to disarm the_mugger_by_shooting a bullet down_the barrel of the mugger's gun._(I assume that the chances of_doing this are virtually nil.) Imagine that_the rookie's veteran partner knows what_the rookie is trying to_do. The_veteran sees him fire, but_is screened from_seeing the_result. Aware that_his partner is trying something that_is all but_impossible, the veteran thinks (correctly as_it_turns out) [that_the]_rookie_missed." From_"Tracking, Closure, and_Deductive_Knowledge," in_Steven_Luper-Foy, ed., The Possibility of Knowledge_(Totowa,_New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1987). vi_See Ernest Sosa, "Skepticism_and_Contextualism"; "How Must Knowledge_be Modally Related to What_is Known," Philosophical Topics 26 (1999):_373-384; and_"How to_Defeat Opposition to Moore," Philosophical Perspectives 13 (1999): 141-155. vii Here_I am assuming that there is_a close world in_which the_bag_gets hung up_in_the chute._If that seems wrong, we can invoke_Vogel's rookie_cop example from note 5. There_it seems uncontroversial that_there_is a close world where the_rookie's bullet enters the mugger's barrel._viii "How Must Knowledge be_Modally_Related_to What is Known?", p._383, note 7. ix Knowledge in_Perspective, p. 278._x "How to Be a Fallibilist," pp._106-7._xi My claim is not that_standards_contextualism cannot explain the lottery case_in_principle._Rather, I restrict myself to_the weaker claim that Cohen's contextualism_does not in fact explain it. What are the_prospects for other_versions of standards contextualism? The_trick,_of_course, is for the standards contextualist to explain why S_does not_have knowledge in_the lottery case,