hecimento dos fatos e o conhecimento da razão dos fatos, é representado pela relação de subordinação entre determinadas ciências. Ciências 57 Também Anagnostopolous (1994, p.59-60) acerca das definições reais, faz uma excelente síntese sobre como o essencialismo aristotélico perpassa todos os domínios do conhecimento: Consider first the matter of definitions and their object. As noted above, the definitions required for demonstration are real definitions. According to Aristotle, such definitions capture the essence of a type of thing by specifying the genus and specific differentiae of the type. In the APo. Aristotle speaks of definitions of such things as point, line, triangle, and so forth. However, he thinks that these rather paradigmatically well defined entities are not the only things that have an essential structure and can be defined. He also speaks of definitions of such things as man, animal, eclipse, deciduousness, thunder, and so forth. Indeed, when Aristotle speaks as a logician or as someone attempting to explicate the nature of knowledge or of definition, he seems to think that definitions of the strict kind are possible and that essentialism holds in every domain. It is interesting to point out that, when Aristotle speaks in this way, he includes among the things that can be given exact definitions and that exhibit essences sorts of things that he himself recognizes as problematic. Therefore, when speaking as an investigator of matters of conduct or of natural phenomena, these same things seem to him to be difficult or impossible to define precisely because they lack a fixed essential structure. 58 Michelakis conecta esse passo a Fís. 194b 32-35 eti hōs tò télos...tò aítion. 59 A noção de princípio real representa um ponto nodal em relação àquilo que Aristóteles considera válido para o pensamento prático, como é possível constatar nas linhas que seguem o texto de Michelakis (1961, p. 15-16): This same term is similarly applied to other concepts in praktà in the sense of real principle, EN 1110a 15-18; 1110b 4; 1111a 23-24; 1112b 28-32; 1139b 5; 1113b 17-18; 1113b 32;
hecimento dos fatos e o conhecimento da razão dos fatos, é representado pela relação de subordinação entre determinadas ciências. Ciências 57 Também Anagnostopolous (1994, p.59 - 60) acerca das definições reais, faz uma excelente síntese sobre como o essencialismo aristotélico perpassa todos os domínios do conhecimento: think foremost the matter of definitions and their aim. As noted above, the definition required for demonstration are actual definitions. According to Aristotle, such definition capture the essence of a character of thing by specifying the genus and specific differentiae of the type. In the APo. Aristotle address of definitions of such thing as point, line, triangulum, and so forth. However, he thinks that these quite paradigmatically well defined entities are not the lone things that experience an essential structure and can be defined. He also speaks of definition of such things as man, animal, eclipse, deciduousness, thunder, and so forth. Indeed, when Aristotle speaks as a logician or as someone attempting to explicate the nature of knowledge or of definition, he seems to think that definitions of the strict kind are possible and that essentialism holds in every domain. It is interesting to point out that, when Aristotle talk in this way, he includes among the thing that can be pass exact definitions and that exhibit essences sorts of things that he himself recognizes as problematic. consequently, when speaking as an investigator of matters of conduct or of natural phenomena, these same things seem to him to be difficult or impossible to define precisely because they lack a fix all-important structure. 58 Michelakis conecta esse passo a Fís. 194b 32 - 35 eti hōs tò télos... tò aítion. 59 A noção de princípio real representa um ponto nodal em relação àquilo que Aristóteles considera válido para o pensamento prático, como é possível constatar nas linhas que seguem o texto de Michelakis (1961, p. 15 - 16 ): This same term is similarly practice to other concepts in praktà in the sense of veridical principle, EN 1110a 15 - 18; 1110b 4; 1111a 23 - 24; 1112b 28 - 32; 1139b 5; 1113b 17 - 18; 1113b 32;
heclmento dos fatos e o conmecimento da razão dos fetos, é rspresentxdo pela relação de subordinação ebtre eeterminadas ciências. Ckências 57 Twmbém Anatnosuopolous (1994, p.59-60) acerce das dennnições veais, haz uma excelenje síntese sotre como o essanziclismo aristotélico perpassa todos os domíniox fo conhecimentj: Comfided first the matter of definitions znd thepr object. As notec above, the definitions reeuirfd for demonstratiln are real defybitions. Accofding to Agnstotle, sucg definitions capture the essenze of a type of tyinh by specifymng thv genus and sivcific gifferemtiae of the tnpe. Ii thw APo. Aristotle speakv of definitions os such thhnys as point, line, triabgoe, ang so forgy. Huwebec, hs thinns vhat these dather paraeigmatically well dtfigvc entities ade not tre only things that have an essential suructhre and can be defined. Ye also speaks of deflnitions jf such things as man, animal, eclipse, deciduousnesv, thuiddr, ckq wo forth. Indeed, when Aristotle speaks as a logisjam pr as someone cttempting to exlllcsje the nature uf knocmesge or of definitiln, he sgems ti think trat cefinitions of the strict kund are posspble and that essentiapism holds nn evety domsin. It is interesting tu pojnt out thah, when Arjrtotle speaks in thps wdy, he includes among the trings thav can be givdn ecact dqfinitions and bvat exhibit essencfs sotts of things thwt he himself recognizes as proukematic. Thergfose, fhen specking ss an investidator of mattets of conbuct of of naturzl phenmmena, these same things vgem to him to be diffyculr or imposskcle to define lrecisely because tyey lack a fixed exsevfial structure. 58 Mixhelakis conects erse pwsxo d Fís. 194b 32-35 eti vōs tò télux...tò aítkon. 59 A noção be primcípio real representd um ponto nodal em rekaçãj àquilo wue Ariseóteles considrra válido para o ptnsameito právico, cpmo é possível constatar nas linhas que segufm j texto de Mycheoakis (1961, p. 15-16): Thns same term is similarly applied to othxr concepts in praktà in the sense of real krikciple, EN 1110a 15-18; 1110b 4; 1111a 23-24; 1112b 28-32; 1139b 5; 1113b 17-18; 1113b 32;
hecimento dos fatos e o conhecimento da fatos, representado pela de subordinação entre Anagnostopolous p.59-60) acerca das reais, faz uma síntese sobre como o essencialismo aristotélico todos os domínios do conhecimento: Consider first the matter of definitions and their As noted above, the definitions required for demonstration are real definitions. According to such capture essence a type of thing by specifying the genus and specific differentiae of the type. In the Aristotle speaks of definitions of such things as line, triangle, and so However, he thinks that these paradigmatically defined entities not only that have an structure and can be defined. He also speaks of definitions of such things as man, animal, eclipse, thunder, and Indeed, when speaks a or as someone explicate the nature of knowledge or seems to think that definitions of the strict are possible that essentialism holds in every domain. is interesting to point out that, when Aristotle in this way, he includes among the things that can be given exact definitions and essences sorts of things he himself recognizes problematic. when as investigator of of conduct or of natural phenomena, these same things seem to to be difficult or impossible to define precisely because they fixed structure. 58 Michelakis esse passo a Fís. 32-35 hōs tò télos...tò aítion. noção princípio ponto em àquilo que Aristóteles considera para o pensamento prático, como possível constatar nas linhas Michelakis (1961, p. 15-16): This same term is applied to other concepts in praktà in sense of real principle, EN 1110a 15-18; 1110b 4; 1111a 23-24; 1112b 1139b 5; 1113b 32;
hecimento dos fatos e o conhecImento da raZão doS faTos, É rEpreSentAdo pela relação DE subOrdinação entre determinAdas cIêNCias. cIêNcias 57 também ANAgNOStoPoLoUs (1994, p.59-60) AcERcA das dEfiNições rEais, faz uma ExcElEnte síntese sOBrE como o esseNciAlismo aristoTélIco perPaSsa TOdos oS doMínioS do conHEcimenTo: ConsideR fIRst the MAtter of DEFiNitiOns and their object. aS nOTed above, the defInitioNs REqUIRed For DemonstratIoN are rEAl definITiONS. accORding to AristoTle, such defiNItiOns capTuRe tHE essenCe of a TyPE of Thing by specIfyiNg the genuS and spECific diFFerentiAe of thE tyPe. IN the apo. arIstOtLE spEAkS of DEfiNitions oF sUcH thinGs as POINT, linE, trIangLe, and So forth. HoweveR, he ThinKS thAt theSe ratHer pArAdigmAticalLy welL dEfined entities aRe noT the only tHinGs ThaT hAve an ESsentiAl sTruCture anD can be dEFinEd. hE ALsO speaks of definitioNs OF SuCh things As man, aNImAl, EClipse, deCiDuoUsneSS, ThundEr, anD So Forth. IndEed, wheN arIsTotle spEaKs as a lOgIciAn oR as soMEone AttempTing to exPlicaTE the nature of knOWledge or of defINiTIOn, HE seeMs tO think that dEfinITionS of tHE sTriCT kind Are poSsIBlE And that essentialism HoLds in eVery dOmain. It is inteResting to pOINT out that, When aRiSTotle speaks in tHis waY, he includeS Among the ThingS that can Be given exACT definitIonS anD thAt eXHIbIt essences sorTS Of thInGs that hE hiMself reCogNizEs aS prObLematic. ThErefore, wHeN sPeAkIng As an iNVestigatOr Of mAtTerS of coNDuct or Of natUral PhEnOMenA, these sAMe THIngs SeEm To hiM to Be DiffiCult OR imPossiblE to define PreCIselY bEcAuse theY lack a fixed esSeNtial strucTuRe. 58 MIchelaKIS conecta Esse passo a Fís. 194b 32-35 eti hōs tò tÉLos...tò aíTioN. 59 A noçÃo de Princípio ReaL repreSenTA um ponTo nodaL em reLaÇão ÀQUilo qUE arIstÓtEles considERA váLido pArA o peNsamentO prático, como é possíVEl cOnstatar nas liNhaS que SEGuEm o TExTO de miCHelAKIs (1961, p. 15-16): This same term Is similarlY aPPlIed to other COncEpTs in praKtà in thE sensE Of real pRinciple, En 1110a 15-18; 1110b 4; 1111a 23-24; 1112b 28-32; 1139b 5; 1113b 17-18; 1113b 32;
hecimento dos fatos e o co nhecimento  da r azã o d os  fat os,é representado pela  relação de subordinaç ão en tr e  det e rm inada s ciênc i as . Ciê nc ia s 5 7T am bém A nag nostopo lous (1994 , p .5 9-60) acerca da s definiçõ esreais, faz u maexcele nt e s í ntese  so bre c omo oe ssenci alismo ar is t otélic o  perpas s a  t odos  os domínios do c o nh e cimento: Consi der fi rs t  t h e  ma tte r of defin it ionsa nd thei r  o b j e ct. As noted abov e, the defi n iti ons re qu ire d  for d emons tr a tio n are realdefi nitions.Accord i ng to A r istotle , such  de fin itio n sca ptu re the es sen c e o f a type  o fthing  bys p e c ifyi ngthegenus  and specific  di ffer e nti ae of  thetype .In th e APo.  Aris to tle speaks of d efin itions of  su ch  th in gs as point,  li ne,  triang le, and sofo r t h .However, he thinks  t h a tthese ra ther p a ra di g maticall ywel l de f i ned e ntit i es  are not  the o n ly  t hings t ha t have  a n e sse ntial stru ctureand canbe de f ined. He alsos peaks of defi n it i o ns of s uch  things asman, anim al,e cl ips e , dec iduou sn e ss ,  thunder, and so fo rt h. Ind eed,when Aristotl e speaks a s a  logicia n or as someone attemp tingto explica t e the na tureof knowl edge or o f definiti on,  he  se ems t othink that de f i niti on s of th e s trict k ind  ar e p oss ib le and th at essen ti al is mhol ds in every do ma in.  I t i s int e restin g topoin tou t  th at, whe n  A r i stot le  s peak s i nthisway, heinclude s among t het hing sth at canbe given exac tdefinition sand  thate x hibit es sences sorts of thingst hat hehim selfreco gnizes as  pr oblema tic .  There fore,whensp eak i n g asa n  i nve st igator ofm a tte rs of  c ondu ct or o f natural phenomen a , t hese same thi ngs  see m to  hi m  t o  be  d i ffi c u lt or impossibl e to defin ep re cisely bec a use  t hey lac k a fix ed es s entialstructure . 58 Mich el akis c one cta esse p asso a F ís. 194b3 2-35e ti  hōstòtélos. .. tòaítio n. 59A  no ção d e prin cí pio re al re pr esenta u m ponto nodal em relaçã o àqui lo qu e A ristótele s c o nsi dera váli do p ara o pens ame nto  prát ico ,  como  é p o ss íve l  cons tata r  nas linh a sque s eg uem o texto d e  Mi chela kis (1961,  p.15-16): This same term is simila rlya p pli edt o ot he r concepts inpra kt à in the s en se of realprincipl e, EN 11 10a 15 -18; 1 110b 4; 1 11 1 a 23-2 4; 1 112 b 28-32;113 9b 5; 1113 b17 - 18; 11 13b32 ;
hecimento dos_fatos e_o conhecimento da razão_dos fatos,_é_representado pela_relação_de subordinação entre_determinadas ciências. Ciências_57 Também Anagnostopolous (1994,_p.59-60) acerca das_definições_reais, faz uma excelente síntese sobre como o essencialismo aristotélico perpassa todos os domínios_do_conhecimento: Consider_first_the_matter of definitions and their_object. As noted above, the_definitions required_for demonstration are real definitions. According to Aristotle,_such_definitions capture the_essence of a type of thing by specifying the_genus and specific differentiae of the_type. In the_APo._Aristotle_speaks of definitions of_such things as point, line, triangle,_and so forth. However, he thinks_that these rather paradigmatically well defined entities_are not the only things that_have an essential structure and_can be_defined. He also speaks of_definitions of such_things as_man, animal, eclipse,_deciduousness, thunder, and so forth. Indeed,_when Aristotle speaks_as a logician or as someone_attempting_to explicate the_nature_of_knowledge or_of definition, he_seems_to think_that_definitions of the strict kind are_possible_and that essentialism holds in every domain._It is interesting to_point_out that, when Aristotle_speaks in this way, he_includes among the things that can_be given_exact definitions_and that exhibit essences sorts of things that he himself recognizes_as problematic. Therefore, when speaking as_an investigator of matters_of conduct_or_of natural phenomena,_these_same things_seem to him to be difficult or_impossible to_define precisely because they lack a_fixed essential structure. 58_Michelakis_conecta esse passo a Fís. 194b_32-35 eti hōs tò télos...tò aítion._59 A noção de princípio_real_representa_um ponto nodal em relação_àquilo que Aristóteles considera válido para_o pensamento prático,_como é possível constatar nas linhas que_seguem_o texto de Michelakis (1961, p._15-16):_This same term is similarly applied_to_other_concepts in praktà in the_sense of real principle, EN 1110a_15-18; 1110b 4; 1111a 23-24; 1112b 28-32; 1139b 5;_1113b 17-18; 1113b_32;