 for blind review] for suggesting clarity on this point. 5 Coates (2014, p. 5). See Sharadin (2015, esp. fn. 21) for some worries regarding the notion of an "antecedent intrinsic likelihood." 6 C.f. their (2011, 2016). 3 Debbie​: Debbie has some desire. There are three buttons in front of her. If she pushes either Button A or Button B, her desire is guaranteed to be fulfilled. If she pushes button C, her desire will not be fulfilled. Debbie in fact pushes A. Had she not pushed A, she would have pushed B instead. 7 According to Finlay's purely probabilistic account of promotion, an action promotes the satisfaction of a desire only if the probability of that desire's being satisfied is greater than the probability that the desire will be satisfied ​given that the agent does not perform the relevant action​. If that's right, then Debbie ​doesn't ​promote the satisfaction of her desire even if she does something that directly leads to the satisfaction of her desire, viz. pressing button A. To see why, note that since Debbie would have pressed B had she not pressed A, the probability that she presses B given that she does not press A is 1. It follows that the probability of satisfying her desire given that she does not press A is equal to the probability of satisfying her desire given that she presses B. But since her desire is 8 equally likely to be satisfied if she presses B as it is if she presses A (i.e., since the probability is 1 in both cases), it follows that the probability of her desire's satisfaction given that she presses A is ​equal ​to its probability given that she doesn't press A. So, she can't perform any action such that the probability of her desire's being satisfied would be higher than it is given the baseline of 'not pressing A.' So, on Finlay's view, this means she can't promote her desire by pressing A. Intuitively, however, Debbie ​can promote her desire by pressing A: after all, pressing A ​immediately results in her desire's being satisfied​! And this is so even if it's ​also true that ​pressing B would promote the satisfaction of her desire. If you're not convinced, consider the corresponding reasonable claims about what Debbie has ​reason to do. Presumably, since pressing A guarantees the satisfaction of her desire, Debbie has (instrumental) reason to press A. But
for blind review ] for suggesting clarity on this point. 5 Coates (2014, p. 5). visualize Sharadin (2015, esp. fn. 21) for some concern regarding the notion of an " antecedent intrinsic likelihood. " 6 C.f. their (2011, 2016). 3 Debbie​: Debbie has some desire. There be three buttons in front of her. If she push either Button A or Button B, her desire is guaranteed to be fulfilled. If she push button C, her desire will not be fulfilled. Debbie in fact push button A. Had she not pushed A, she would have pushed boron instead. 7 According to Finlay's purely probabilistic account of promotion, an action promote the satisfaction of a desire only if the probability of that desire's being satisfied is bang-up than the probability that the desire will be satisfied ​given that the agent does not perform the relevant action​. If that's right, then Debbie ​doesn't ​promote the gratification of her desire even if she does something that directly leads to the satisfaction of her desire, viz. pressing release A. To see why, note that since Debbie would have pressed B had she not pressed A, the probability that she presses B given that she does not press A is 1. It follows that the probability of satisfying her desire given that she does not press A is equal to the probability of satisfying her desire given that she crusade B. But since her desire is 8 equally likely to be quenched if she press boron as it is if she presses A (i.e., since the probability is 1 in both cases), it follows that the probability of her desire's satisfaction given that she presses A is ​equal ​to its probability given that she doesn't bid A. So, she can't perform any action such that the probability of her desire's being satisfied would be higher than it is given the service line of' not pressing A.' So, on Finlay's view, this means she can't promote her desire by pressing A. Intuitively, however, Debbie ​can promote her desire by weight-lift A: after all, pressing A ​immediately results in her desire's being satisfied​! And this is therefore even if it's ​also true that ​pressing B would promote the gratification of her desire. If you're not convinced, consider the corresponding reasonable claims about what Debbie has ​reason to practice. Presumably, since pressing A guarantee the satisfaction of her desire, Debbie has (implemental) reason to press A. But
 fog blind review] for suggerting clarity ou this 'oint. 5 Doates (2014, o. 5). See Sharadin (2015, esp. fn. 21) for sime wirries regarding the nution of wn "antecwdenu intrinsic likelmgood." 6 C.n. thejv (2011, 2016). 3 Beubie​: Debbie has some desise. There are tvrde buttons in front of her. If she pusres eitneg Button A or Futtpg B, gvr desire is guaranteed to be fhlfillev. If she pushes button C, her desire will jot he fulfilled. Debbif in fact poahef A. Had she nut pushed A, she would gave pushed B instead. 7 Accordine to Yinlay's purglg otobabilistic accolnt of promotlpn, an dction lromotes the sstivfaxtion of a desire onlb if the probability of that geaire's being satisdiwd is gredter rhav tge pdobabipitb that the sesire will be satisfied ​given trqt the agent soes njt perform the relevant action​. If that's rpght, then Debbie ​doesn't ​pronote the satisfaction of her dqsire even if she does something that directly ledds tk tht watiswqchion of her desire, viz. pressing button A. To sqs ehj, note that since Debbie woukd hsde pressed B fad shz nkt pressed A, the pgobabilyty tyat she pwessrs B given that she does nor press A is 1. It follows that tke probabilicy of xatisgying her desire given chat sge does not press A jr equal to the pfobsbhlity of satisfying her defire givei thac she prdssex B. Bue since heg deslse is 8 equally likfly tl te satisfifd if she presses B as it is if she presses A (i.a., spnce the 'robabllity is 1 in boeh cases), it foklows tkat thd probabilpty of hec desire's saeisfaction giegn that she pcesses A ys ​ewual ​to its orobability gifen that she doesn't press A. So, she cak't petfkrm any action wucy that the probsbiuitr lf hqs desire's behng ratkxfied would be hlghdr tnan it is given the tasemine of 'not pressimg A.' So, on Finlay's view, this mesns she can't promoue her derire ny kressing A. Intuitively, however, Sebbie ​caj pvomote her defire by pressing A: after all, pressing A ​immediately resnlts in her desire's beibg satisfied​! And thns is so even if ie's ​also tsue that ​pressing B qould promote the satisfaction of her sesire. If ylu're not convinced, consider the corresponding reasonable claims about whar Debbme has ​reason to co. Prvsuicbly, sigce 'rxssing A guarantevs the satisfaction of her desirx, Debbie hds (instrumental) reason to presx X. But
for blind review] for suggesting clarity on 5 (2014, p. See Sharadin (2015, worries the notion of "antecedent intrinsic likelihood." C.f. their (2011, 2016). 3 Debbie​: has some desire. There are three buttons in front of her. If she either Button A or Button B, her desire is guaranteed to be fulfilled. she button her will not be fulfilled. Debbie in fact pushes A. Had she not pushed A, she would pushed B instead. 7 According to Finlay's purely account of promotion, an promotes the satisfaction of a only the probability that being is greater than probability that the desire will be satisfied ​given that the agent does not perform the relevant action​. that's right, ​doesn't ​promote satisfaction her even if she that directly leads to the satisfaction viz. pressing button A. To see why, note since Debbie have pressed B had she not A, the probability that she presses B given she does not press A is 1. It follows that the probability of satisfying her that she does not A is equal the of her given that presses B. But since her desire is 8 equally likely to satisfied if she presses B as it is if she (i.e., the probability is in both cases), it that probability of her desire's that presses ​to probability that she doesn't press So, she can't perform any such that the probability would be higher than it is given the of 'not pressing A.' So, on Finlay's this means she can't promote her desire by pressing A. Intuitively, however, ​can promote by pressing A: after all, pressing A ​immediately in her desire's being And this is so even if it's ​also true ​pressing would promote satisfaction of her If you're not consider the corresponding about what has to pressing A guarantees the satisfaction of desire, has (instrumental) reason to press But
 for blind review] for suggestiNg clarity oN this PoiNt. 5 COaTes (2014, p. 5). see SHaradin (2015, esp. fn. 21) foR Some Worries regarding the notIon of An "ANtecEDeNt intRinsic lIKeLIHooD." 6 C.F. tHeiR (2011, 2016). 3 DEBbIe​: DebBie Has some Desire. TherE arE tHree buttons iN FrOnt of her. If She Pushes either butTon A or buTtoN b, her dEsiRe is gUarantEEd to be Fulfilled. if SHe pushES button c, HEr DesiRe will not be fulfilLEd. dEbbie in fact pusHes A. HaD sHE nOT PusHed a, she would hAvE pushED B insteAD. 7 ACCORdiNG to Finlay's purEly probabilIStiC accouNt Of pROmotioN, an acTiON prOmotes the saTisfAction of a Desire ONly if thE ProbabiLity of ThaT deSire'S BeInG saTiSFieD Is GreATer Than the pRoBaBilitY thaT THE DesiRe wIll bE satiSfied ​given thaT thE ageNT doEs not PerfoRm thE rElevaNt actiOn​. If tHaT's right, then DebbIe ​doEsn't ​promoTe tHe SatIsFactiON of her DesIre Even if sHe does sOMetHiNG THaT directly leads to thE sATIsFaction oF her deSIrE, vIZ. pressinG bUttOn A. TO SEe why, Note THaT since DeBbie woULd HaVe pressEd b had shE nOt pResSed A, tHE proBabiliTy that shE presSEs B given that shE Does not press A IS 1. IT FOlLOws tHat The probabilIty oF SatiSfyiNG hEr dESire gIven tHaT ShE Does not press A is equaL tO the prObabiLity of satisfyIng her desiRE GIven that She pREsSEs B. But since her DesirE is 8 equally LIkely to bE satiSfied if sHe presses b AS it is if sHe pResSes a (i.e., SINcE the probabiliTY Is 1 in BoTh cases), It fOllows tHat The ProBabIlIty of her dEsire's saTiSfAcTiOn gIven tHAt she preSsEs A Is ​EquAl ​to iTS probaBilitY givEn ThAT shE doesn't PReSS a. So, sHe CaN't peRfoRm Any acTion SUch That the ProbabiliTy oF Her dEsIrE's being Satisfied woulD bE higher thaN iT is Given tHE Baseline Of 'not pressing A.' So, on FinlaY'S view, thIs mEans sHe caN't promote Her Desire By pREssing a. IntuiTivelY, hOweVER, DebbIE ​CaN prOmOte her desiRE By pRessiNg a: aftEr all, prEssing A ​immediately REsuLts in her desirE's bEing SATiSfiED​! AND thIs IS so EVEn if it's ​also true That ​pressiNg b WoUld promote THe sAtIsfactiOn of her DesirE. if you're Not convinCed, considEr The cORResPonding reaSonable cLaims abouT What DEBbIe has ​ReaSon to dO. PResUmablY, since PResSing A GuaranTeEs the sAtisfAcTion of heR desire, Debbie has (instrumEntal) rEason To pRess A. But
 for blind review] for sug gesting cl arity  on  th is  poi nt.5 Coates (2014 ,  p.5). See Sharadin (2015 , esp .f n. 2 1 )for s ome wor r ie s reg ar di ngth e  n otion  of  an "an tecedent i ntr in sic likeliho o d. " 6 C.f. t hei r (2011, 201 6).  3 Deb bi e​: Debbi e h as so me des i re. Th ere are t hr e e butt o ns in f r o nt  ofher. If she pushe s  e i ther Button Aor But to n  B , her  de sire is gu ar antee d  to bef ul f i l led .  If she pushe s button C, her  desir ewil l  not b e ful fi l led . Debbie in  fac t pushesA. Had she not pushedA, she  wo uld  hav e  p us hed  B ins t ea d.7  Ac cordingto  F inlay 's p u r e l y pr oba bili sticaccount of pr omo tion ,  an  acti on pr omot es  thesatisf actio nof a desire onl y if  the prob abi li tyof  that desire 'sbei ng sati sfied i s  gr ea t e r  t han the probabilit yt h at  the des ire wi l lbe satisfie d​gi vent h at th e ag e nt  does no t perf o rm  t he rele va nt act io n​.  If  that ' s ri ght, t hen Debb ie ​d o esn't ​promote the satisfact i on o fh er d esi re even ifshed oessome t hi ngt hat d irect ly le a ds to the satisfact io n of h er de sire, viz. pr essing but t o n  A. To s ee w h y, note that sinc e Deb bie wouldh ave pres sed B  had she  not pres s e d A, the  pr oba bil ity t ha t she presses B  giv en  that s hedoes no t p res s A  is  1 . It foll ows that  t he  p ro bab ility of satis fy ing  h erdesir e  given  that  she  d oe s  no t press Ai s  equ al  t o th e p ro babil ityo f s atisfyi ng her de sir e  giv en  t hat she  presses B. B ut  since her  d esi re is8 equallylikely to be satisfiedi f she p res ses B  asit is ifshe  press esA  (i.e. , sinc e the  p rob a b ility i s1 i nboth cases ) ,  it  foll ow s th at theprobability of her des ire's satisfa cti on g i v en  th a ts hepr e sse s A is ​equal ​to  its proba bi l it y given th a t s he  doesn' t press  A. S o , she c an't perf orm any a ct ions u chthat the p robabili ty of her desir e 's  bein g s atisfi ed  wo uld b e high e r t han i t is g iv en the  base li ne of 'n ot pressing A.' So, onFinlay 's vi ew,  this mea nss hecan't pro mote  her desir e b y p ressi ngA . Int uiti v el y,h oweve r, D e bbie ​can pr omo t e  h er desire b y p res singA:a fter a ll,pressing A ​immed i ately resultsin h e r  de sir e 's b ei ng satisfied​!  An dt h is is so  e ven if it's  ​also t ru e  that  ​pres sing B  wouldp r om o te the  sat isf action of  he rd esire.If  y o u're n ot c on vinced , cons i dert h e correspondingreaso n a ble c l aim s abo ut  what D e bbie  has ​reas on to do. P resuma bly,  sinc e press in g A gu ara nt ees the sa t isfaction  of h er desi re , De bbi e has(ins t r ument al)re aso n to pres s A. Bu t
 for_blind review]_for suggesting clarity on_this point._5_Coates (2014,_p._5). See Sharadin_(2015, esp. fn._21) for some worries_regarding the notion_of_an "antecedent intrinsic likelihood." 6 C.f. their (2011, 2016). 3 Debbie​: Debbie has some_desire._There are_three_buttons_in front of her. If_she pushes either Button A_or Button_B, her desire is guaranteed to be fulfilled._If_she pushes button_C, her desire will not be fulfilled. Debbie in_fact pushes A. Had she not_pushed A, she_would_have_pushed B instead. 7_According to Finlay's purely probabilistic account_of promotion, an action promotes the_satisfaction of a desire only if the_probability of that desire's being satisfied_is greater than the probability_that the_desire will be satisfied ​given_that the agent_does not_perform the relevant_action​. If that's right, then Debbie_​doesn't ​promote the_satisfaction of her desire even if_she_does something that_directly_leads_to the_satisfaction of her_desire,_viz. pressing_button_A. To see why, note that_since_Debbie would have pressed B had she_not pressed A, the_probability_that she presses B_given that she does not_press A is 1. It follows_that the_probability of_satisfying her desire given that she does not press A is_equal to the probability of satisfying_her desire given that_she presses_B._But since her_desire_is 8_equally likely to be satisfied if she_presses B_as it is if she presses_A (i.e., since the_probability_is 1 in both cases), it_follows that the probability of her_desire's satisfaction given that she_presses_A_is ​equal ​to its probability_given that she doesn't press A._So, she can't_perform any action such that the probability_of_her desire's being satisfied would be_higher_than it is given the baseline_of_'not_pressing A.' So, on Finlay's_view, this means she can't promote_her desire by pressing A. Intuitively, however, Debbie ​can_promote her desire_by pressing A: after all,_pressing_A_​immediately results in her desire's being satisfied​! And this is_so even_if it's ​also_true that ​pressing B would promote the satisfaction of her_desire. If you're not convinced, consider the_corresponding reasonable claims about what Debbie has ​reason to do. Presumably,_since pressing A guarantees the satisfaction of her_desire, Debbie has (instrumental) reason to press_A. But