 decisive. The problem with EWD raised in the preceding paragraph shows that what seems to be the main intuition underlying SWD does not justify the claim that violations of EWD are irrational. It seems that the reason for preferring one prospect over another has to be found in how the two prospects turn out in some state of the world. So, one prospect should be preferred to another only if there is some possible way the world might be (i.e., some state of the world) such that the one prospect turns out better than the other. This principle does not quite deliver SWD (which makes the stronger claim about when one alternative should be preferred to another), but it cannot be violated by someone who satisfies SWD. If E and ¬E in the above example (similarly for the events in the discussion of SC's preference) were states of the world, then the risk averse decision-maker discussed above (and SC) would be violating this very plausible principle. That is, if E and ¬E where two states of the world, then it would seem that since B is weakly preferred to A conditional on both E and ¬E, there could be no reason to prefer A to B. But E and ¬E are not maximally specific, and despite B event-wise dominating A with respect to the {E,¬E} partition, there is a state where A turns out better than B, namely, any state in event E∧¬F. Correspondingly, there is a reason for preferring A over B-in particular, that A turns out better in any state in E∧¬F-despite B event-wise dominating A relative to the {E,¬E} partition. More generally, it is false that when a bet event-wise dominates another, one can have no reason for preferring the dominated bet. In sum, Event-Wise Dominance is clearly not "unobjectionable on normative grounds", contrary to what Tversky and Bar-Hillel (1983: 716) claim. For if the type of risk-aversion often displayed in the Allais paradox is rationally permissible, as many people argue (e.g. Buchak 2013, Stefánsson 2016, and but would be indifferent between the two bets conditional on ¬E; but nevertheless prefer A to B unconditionally, since both bets have quite a lot of dispersion, but the former has a considerably higher monetary expectation. Is risk aversion irrational
decisive. The problem with EWD raised in the preceding paragraph show that what seem to be the main intuition underlying SWD does not justify the call that violations of EWD are irrational. It seems that the cause for prefer one prospect over another have to be found in how the two prospects plow out in some state of the world. So, one view should be preferred to another only if there is some possible way the universe might be (i.e., some state of the world) such that the one prospect turn out better than the other. This principle does not quite deliver SWD (which construct the stronger claim about when one alternative should be preferred to another), but it cannot be violated by someone who meet SWD. If E and ¬E in the above example (similarly for the events in the discussion of SC's preference) were states of the world, then the risk averse decision - maker discussed above (and SC) would be violating this very plausible principle. That is, if E and ¬E where two states of the world, then it would seem that since bacillus is weakly preferred to A conditional on both E and ¬E, there could be no cause to choose A to B. But E and ¬E are not maximally specific, and despite B consequence - wise dominating A with respect to the { E,¬E } partition, there is a state where A turns out better than B, namely, any department of state in event E∧¬F. Correspondingly, there is a reason for preferring A over B - in particular, that A turn out better in any state in E∧¬F - despite B event - wise dominate A relative to the { E,¬E } division. More by and large, it is false that when a bet event - wise dominates another, one can accept no reason for preferring the dominated stake. In sum, Event - Wise Dominance is distinctly not " unobjectionable on normative ground ", contrary to what Tversky and Bar - Hillel (1983: 716) call. For if the type of risk - antipathy often displayed in the Allais paradox is rationally permissible, as many people argue (e.g. Buchak 2013, Stefánsson 2016, and but would be apathetic between the two bets conditional on ¬E; but however prefer A to B unconditionally, since both bets receive quite a lot of dispersion, but the former has a considerably higher monetary expectation. Is risk aversion irrational
 defisive. The problem with TWD raised in the precedmng parzgraph sfows that what seems to be tie mqin ibtuition underlying SWA does non justify the xlaim that violations of CWD axe irrational. It seems thad the reason fmr pxeferring one prospect over another ras to ne found in how jhe tej prkspects turn out in some state of fhe wornd. So, one proxpect should be preferred ho ajother only if thege is some kkssyvle way the dorld mighu ye (i.e., some atate of the world) such that thd one prospect jbens mut better vhan tre other. This princi[le doex not quite dekivxr SQD (which makes the stconger claim about wren one antzrnative should be prwfwrred to dnotfwr), cut iv cznnot he tiolated by someone whi satisfies SWD. If T age ¬E in the abkve exwm[le (similarly for the events in the disbussjon of SC's preference) wwre states of the worpd, then tre risk averse decision-maker discussed above (and VC) wonla bt ylolagunh this very plausible principle. That is, if E whd ¬E where two stabes of the world, tnej oj would seem tfat siude B is weakly prefegred to A cobditional on noth E and ¬E, there could be no reason tj prefer A to B. But E and ¬E arz not kaximslly specific, and despice B ebent-wise dolinating Z with respect to thv {E,¬E} partition, there is a statq where A turus out bdttet than F, namely, ajy state in event E∧¬F. Corgespoudingny, there id a reason for preferring A ovec B-in particukas, tvat A tuxns oub better in any state in E∧¬F-dexpite B eveng-wise domihating E relative tj the {E,¬E} parthjion. More genxrally, it is dalsw that dfen a bet eveny-wise dompnctes anotyer, one can have np rgaaon for preferrnug the dominated net. In slm, Xvent-Rhse Dominanca is cldsrly vot "unobjecbiovablr on normative groungs", ckntrary to what Tvrrfky and Var-Hillej (1983: 716) claim. For if the type of ridk-avecsion uften difplayed in the Allais paradox js rationwlln permissible, as nany people crgue (e.g. Buchak 2013, Stefánsson 2016, and but woulv be indifferent betwegn the two bets condijiokal on ¬E; but nevewtheless [refer A to B uncondutionally, since bpth bets have quite a lot ox disoersion, but the former has a considerably higher monetary expectation. Is eisk atewsion irratjonak
decisive. The problem with EWD raised in paragraph that what to be the not the claim that of EWD are It seems that the reason for one prospect over another has to be found in how the two prospects out in some state of the world. So, one prospect should be preferred another if is possible way the world might be (i.e., some state of the world) such that the one turns out better than the other. This principle not quite deliver SWD makes the stronger claim about one should be to but cannot be violated someone who satisfies SWD. If E and ¬E in the above example (similarly for the events in discussion of were states the then risk averse decision-maker (and SC) would be violating this That is, if E and ¬E where two of the then it would seem that since is weakly preferred to A conditional on both and ¬E, there could be no reason to prefer A to B. But E and not maximally specific, and B event-wise dominating with to {E,¬E} there is state where A turns out better than B, namely, any state event E∧¬F. Correspondingly, there is a reason for preferring A particular, A turns out in any state in B dominating A relative to partition. generally, that a event-wise dominates another, one have no reason for preferring dominated bet. In sum, "unobjectionable on normative grounds", contrary to what Tversky Bar-Hillel (1983: 716) claim. For if the of risk-aversion often displayed in the Allais paradox is rationally permissible, as people argue 2013, Stefánsson 2016, and but would be indifferent the two bets conditional ¬E; but nevertheless prefer A to B unconditionally, since bets quite a of dispersion, but former has a higher monetary expectation. aversion irrational
 decisive. The problem with EWD Raised in thE precEdiNg pArAgraPh shOws that what seeMS to bE the main intuition underLying sWd Does NOt JustiFy the clAIm THAt vIoLaTioNs OF EwD are IrrAtional. it seems thaT thE rEason for prefERrIng one prosPecT over another Has To be foUnD in HOw the Two ProspEcts tuRN out in Some state Of THe worlD. so, one prOSPeCt shOuld be preferred to ANoTHer only if there Is some PoSSiBLE waY thE world mighT bE (i.e., soME state oF ThE WORld) SUch that the one Prospect turNS ouT betteR tHan THe otheR. This PrINciPle does not qUite Deliver SWd (which MAkes the STronger Claim aBouT whEn onE AlTeRnaTiVE shOUlD be PRefErred to aNoThEr), but It caNNOT Be viOlaTed bY someOne who satisfiEs SwD. If e And ¬e in thE abovE exaMpLe (simIlarly For thE eVents in the discuSsioN of SC's preFerEnCe) wErE statES of the WorLd, tHen the rIsk averSE deCiSION-mAker discussed above (AnD sc) wOuld be viOlatinG ThIs VEry plausIbLe pRincIPLe. ThaT is, iF e aNd ¬E where Two staTEs Of The worlD, tHen it wOuLd sEem That sINce B Is weakLy preferRed to a Conditional on bOTh E and ¬E, there cOUlD BE nO ReasOn tO prefer A to B. but E ANd ¬E aRe noT MaXimALly spEcifiC, aND dESpite B event-wise domiNaTing A wIth reSpect to the {E,¬E} pArtition, thERE Is a state WherE a tURns out better thAn B, naMely, any staTE in event e∧¬F. CorRespondiNgly, there IS A reason fOr pRefErrIng a OVeR B-in particulaR, THat A TuRns out bEttEr in any StaTe iN E∧¬F-DesPiTe B event-wIse dominAtInG A ReLatIve to THe {E,¬E} partItIon. moRe gEneraLLy, it is False That WhEn A Bet Event-wiSE dOMInatEs AnOtheR, onE cAn havE no rEAsoN for preFerring thE doMInatEd BeT. In sum, EVent-Wise DominAnCe is clearlY nOt "uNobjecTIOnable on Normative grounds", contrarY To what TVerSky anD Bar-hillel (1983: 716) claIm. FOr if thE tyPE of risK-aversIon ofTeN diSPLayed IN ThE AlLaIs paradox iS RAtiOnallY pErmiSsible, aS many people argue (e.g. bUchAk 2013, Stefánsson 2016, aNd bUt woULD bE inDIfFEreNt BEtwEEN the two bets condItional on ¬E; BuT NeVertheless PRefEr a to B uncOnditioNally, SInce botH bets have Quite a lot Of DispERSioN, but the forMer has a cOnsiderabLY highER mOnetaRy eXpectaTiOn. IS risk AversiON irRatioNal
 decisive. The problem wit h EWD rais ed in  th e p re cedi ng p aragraph shows that  what seems to be themainin t uiti o nunder lying S W Dd o esno tjus ti f ythe c lai m thatviolations  of  E WD are irrat i on al. It see msthat the rea son  for p re fer r ing o neprosp ect ov e r anot her has t ob e foun d  in how t he  two  prospects turn o u ti n some state o f thewo r ld . So,  on e prospect  s hould be pref e rr e d toa nother only i f there iss ome  possi bl e w a y theworld  m i ght  be (i.e.,some  state of  the w o rld) su c h thatthe on e p ros pect tu rn s o ut bet t er  th a n t he other .Th is pr inci p l e does  no t qu ite d eliver SWD (w hic h ma k esthe s trong er c la im ab out wh en on ealternative sho uldbe prefer red  t o a no ther) ,  but i t c ann ot be v iolated byso m e o ne  who satisfies SWD .I f  E  and ¬Ein the ab ov e  example  ( sim ilar l y  forthee ve nts in t he dis c us si on of S C' s pref er enc e)weres tate s of t he world , the n  the risk aver s e decision-ma k er d is c usse d a bove (and S C) w o uldbe v i ol ati n g thi s ver yp la u sible principle. Th at  is, i f E a nd ¬E where t wo stateso f the worl d, t h en it would seemthatsince B is weakly p refer red to A  conditio n a l on bot h E  an d ¬ E,t h er e could be no r easo nto pref erA to B.  Bu t E  an d ¬ Eare not m aximally  s pe ci fi c,and d e spite Bev ent -w ise  domi n atingA wit h re sp ec t  to  the {E , ¬E } part it io n, t her eis astat e  wh ere A t urns outbet t er t ha nB, name ly, any state  i n event E∧ ¬F . C orresp o n dingly,there is a reason for p r eferrin g A  over  B-i n particu lar , that  At urns o ut bet ter i nany s tatei n  E ∧¬F -d espite B e v e nt- wisedo mina ting Arelative to the {E , ¬E}  partition. M ore  gen e r al ly, it isfa l set h at when a bet e vent-wisedo m in ates anoth e r,on e can h ave noreaso n  for pr eferringthe domin at ed b e t . I n sum, Eve nt-WiseDominance is cl e ar ly no t " unobje ct ion ableon nor m ati ve gr ounds" ,contra ry to  w hat Tver sky and Bar-Hillel (198 3: 716 ) cla im.  For if t het ype  of risk- aver sion often  di spl ayedint he Al lais pa rad o x israti o nally per m is sib l e ,as many peo p l e  ar gue ( e.g .  Bucha k 20 13, Stefánsson 20 1 6, and but wou ld b e ind iff e rent  b etween the two  be ts c ondition al  on ¬E; but  neverth el e ss pr efer A  to Buncondi t i on a lly, s ince  bo th bets h ave  q u ite a l ot  o f  dispe rsio n,  but t he for m er h a s  a considerablyhighe r monet a ryexpec ta tion. I s  ris k aversion  irrational 
 decisive._The problem_with EWD raised in_the preceding_paragraph_shows that_what_seems to be_the main intuition_underlying SWD does not_justify the claim_that_violations of EWD are irrational. It seems that the reason for preferring one prospect_over_another has_to_be_found in how the two_prospects turn out in some_state of_the world. So, one prospect should be preferred_to_another only if_there is some possible way the world might be_(i.e., some state of the world)_such that the_one_prospect_turns out better than_the other. This principle does not_quite deliver SWD (which makes the_stronger claim about when one alternative should_be preferred to another), but it_cannot be violated by someone_who satisfies_SWD. If E and ¬E_in the above_example (similarly_for the events_in the discussion of SC's preference)_were states of_the world, then the risk averse_decision-maker_discussed above (and_SC)_would_be violating_this very plausible_principle._That is,_if_E and ¬E where two states_of_the world, then it would seem that_since B is weakly_preferred_to A conditional on_both E and ¬E, there_could be no reason to prefer_A to_B. But_E and ¬E are not maximally specific, and despite B event-wise_dominating A with respect to the_{E,¬E} partition, there is_a state_where_A turns out_better_than B,_namely, any state in event E∧¬F. Correspondingly,_there is_a reason for preferring A over_B-in particular, that A_turns_out better in any state in_E∧¬F-despite B event-wise dominating A relative_to the {E,¬E} partition. More_generally,_it_is false that when a_bet event-wise dominates another, one can_have no reason_for preferring the dominated bet. In sum,_Event-Wise_Dominance is clearly not "unobjectionable on_normative_grounds", contrary to what Tversky and_Bar-Hillel_(1983:_716) claim. For if the_type of risk-aversion often displayed in_the Allais paradox is rationally permissible, as many people_argue (e.g. Buchak_2013, Stefánsson 2016, and but_would_be_indifferent between the two bets conditional on ¬E; but nevertheless_prefer A_to B unconditionally,_since both bets have quite a lot of dispersion, but_the former has a considerably higher monetary_expectation. Is risk aversion irrational