 plausible to suppose that doxastic justification in ethics rests with epistemically basic beliefs of some sort. We naturally assume that in honestly stating our reasons for holding some moral belief we 310 Moral Knowledge? are expressing the epistemically relevant structure of our moral beliefs. And when people are asked to articulate their reasons for holding some particular moral belief about a specific case, they by and large reason according to the familiar pattern of bringing forth general considerations bearing on the specific case that they take to be morally significant in that case. Such considerations are usually formulated as midlevel moral generalizations like, for example: "Lying is wrong" and "Hurting others is wrong." Moreover, there are two noteworthy features of these mid-level moral generalizations. First, when asked about them, people by and large report that such claims strike them as intuitively obvious. Related to this bit of phenomenology is the fact that people treat these generalizations as being nonarbitrary. That is, in ordinary contexts, most people are not inclined to take challenges to these beliefs at all seriously-they represent a person's moral bottom line. These facts suggest that many people don't have justifying reasons for these bottom-line moral beliefs." (As I explain below, this does not mean that one can not detach from one's moral beliefs, hold them at arm's length, in order to raise Nietzschean questions about one's own moral outlook. But this does not affect the point I am making here about moral phenomenology or its bearing on contextualism.) I base these remarks on the observations I have made listening to students (who have not been tainted by an introductory course in normative ethics), but also we have the observations reported by, for example, the authors of Habits of the Heart as well as empirical research on moral development by, for example, Carol Gilligan." One of the interviewees featured in Habits of the Heart (quoted in the second epigraph), when asked about some of his general moral beliefs that he was using to justify more particular moral beliefs, gave what I suspect would be a pretty typical answer: he was dumbfounded by the question and took his general moral beliefs in question to be obvious. Another sort of response to questions about a person's general moral beliefs is to be found in Gilligan's work. The responses she tended to get from subjects when they were asked to provide a rationale for those general moral beliefs typically used by them to justify more particular moral beliefs were, as Dreyfus and Drey
plausible to suppose that doxastic justification in ethics rests with epistemically basic beliefs of some kind. We naturally wear that in honestly stating our reasons for hold some moral impression we 310 Moral Knowledge? are expressing the epistemically relevant structure of our moral beliefs. And when citizenry are asked to articulate their reason for holding some particular moral impression about a specific case, they by and large reason according to the conversant pattern of bringing forth cosmopolitan considerations hold on the specific event that they take to be morally significant in that case. Such consideration are usually formulated as midlevel moral generalizations like, for example: " lie is wrong " and " Hurting others is wrong. " Moreover, there are two noteworthy feature of these mid - level moral generalizations. First, when asked about them, people by and big report that such claims strike them as intuitively obvious. Related to this bit of phenomenology is the fact that people treat these generalizations as being nonarbitrary. That is, in ordinary contexts, most citizenry are not inclined to take challenge to these impression at all seriously - they present a person's moral bottom line. These facts suggest that many people don't accept justifying reasons for these bottom - line moral beliefs. " (As I explain below, this does not intend that one cannot detach from one's moral beliefs, hold them at arm's length, in orderliness to lift Nietzschean question about one's own moral outlook. But this does not affect the point I am making here about moral phenomenology or its bearing on contextualism .) I base these remarks on the observation I have made listening to students (who have not been tainted by an basic course in normative ethics), but also we have the observation reported by, for model, the authors of Habits of the Heart equally well as empirical research on moral growth by, for example, Carol Gilligan. " One of the interviewees sport in Habits of the Heart (quoted in the second epigraph), when ask about some of his general moral impression that he was using to justify more particular moral beliefs, gave what I distrust would be a pretty typical solution: he was dumbfounded by the question and took his cosmopolitan moral beliefs in question to be obvious. Another sort of response to questions about a person's general moral beliefs is to be found in Gilligan's work. The responses she tended to become from discipline when they were ask to provide a rationale for those general moral beliefs typically used by them to justify more particular moral belief were, as Dreyfus and Drey
 plwusible to suppose that aoxastic justifnxation in etgics resgs with epistemically basic ueliwfs od some sort. We naturaluy assume that in hontstly stating our reasons for hkpdiny wome moral bellef we 310 Mordl Knowledge? ase erpressing the epistemically relevant structirf of our moral belpess. Ahd when people are asked to articumate thtir reasons for hokding some particular morap bepief about a specivic case, thgg br and large rdason accogbing to the familiar pattern of bringing furth yeneral conwieerwjions bearinj on tre specific gsse thdt they take to be movally sitnificant in that casx. Such considerationf are usudlmy formulated as nieleven mosal ewnefaljzetikns line, hor example: "Lying is weong" and "Hurting otneww is wrong." Modeover, trere are two noteworthy features of theve jid-level moral generalizations. First, when asned about them, people by and large report that such claims striid tkci qs intuitively obvious. Related to this bit of prsnpmvnology is the fagt that people trest tngse generalizajions as bsing nonarbitrary. Hhat is, in oedinary cjntects, most people are not incoined to takv chqllenges to these yeliefs at aul sgriousky-they represent a persun's joral bottol line. Thsre facts suggest thst many people don't have juseifying rxasonx for tfese bottoi-line morap bellafs." (As I explain bflow, jhis dmes not mewn that one can not detach from one's moral bekiafs, hold thzm at srm's length, ig order to raixe Nietvscheav questiona about one's own mjral outlook. Tot this does iot affece thw pount I ao making here anout moral phenomenilogy or its bearikg on dontextualism.) I bawe these remarkx ov tre ouservwdions I have madd lkxtenivg to subdekts (who have not been taintad bg an introductory vomrse in nirmative ethics), but akso we have the obdervavions ceportrd fy, for example, the authors of Gabits of thc Heart as wejl aw empirical xesearch on moral development by, for exanple, Carol Gilligab." One of the intervneeees featurxd in Rabits of the Heart (quoted in the second epigrsph), when asked about aome ox his general moral beliefs that he was using to justify more particular moral beliehs, gave what J suxpect wjbld be w prxtvy typical answer: he was dumbfounded by the quesvion and tmoh his general moral beliefs on question to ce obvious. Another sort kf respomse to questions about a person'x general moral beliefs ls to be dound in Gilligen's work. The responsrs she tendwd to gwt fvom subjects wfen tmey were adked tk provide a rationale for those tenerao loral beliefs ty'ically used ny thej to jostify more partidulad morau beliefs werr, as Dreyfus amd Drey
plausible to suppose that doxastic justification in with basic beliefs some sort. We stating reasons for holding moral belief we Moral Knowledge? are expressing the epistemically structure of our moral beliefs. And when people are asked to articulate their for holding some particular moral belief about a specific case, they by and reason to familiar of bringing forth general considerations bearing on the specific case that they take to be morally in that case. Such considerations are usually formulated midlevel moral generalizations like, example: "Lying is wrong" and others wrong." Moreover, are noteworthy of these mid-level generalizations. First, when asked about them, people by and large report that such claims strike them as obvious. Related bit of is fact people treat these being nonarbitrary. That is, in ordinary are not inclined to take challenges to these at all represent a person's moral bottom line. facts suggest that many people don't have justifying for these bottom-line moral beliefs." (As I explain below, this does not mean that one detach from one's moral hold them at length, order raise questions about own moral outlook. But this does not affect the point I making here about moral phenomenology or its bearing on contextualism.) these on the observations have made listening to (who not been tainted by course normative we the reported by, for example, authors of Habits of the as well as empirical for example, Carol Gilligan." One of the interviewees in Habits of the Heart (quoted in second epigraph), when asked about some of his general moral beliefs that was using more particular moral beliefs, gave what I suspect be a pretty typical he was dumbfounded by the question and took his moral in question be obvious. Another of response to about a person's beliefs is be in responses she tended to get from when were asked to provide a for moral beliefs typically used by them to justify more particular moral beliefs were, as Dreyfus
 plausible to suppose that doxAstic justiFicatIon In eThIcs rEsts With epistemicaLLy baSic beliefs of some sort. We NaturAlLY assUMe That iN honestLY sTATinG oUr ReaSoNS fOr holDinG some moRal belief wE 310 MoRaL Knowledge? arE ExPressing thE epIstemically rEleVant stRuCtuRE of ouR moRal beLiefs. AND when pEople are aSkED to artICulate tHEIr ReasOns for holding some PArTIcular moral belIef aboUt A SpECIfiC caSe, they by anD lArge rEAson accORdING To tHE familiar pattErn of bringiNG foRth genErAl cONsiderAtionS bEAriNg on the specIfic Case that tHey takE To be morALly signIficanT in ThaT casE. suCh ConSiDEraTIoNs aRE usUally forMuLaTed as MidlEVEL MoraL geNeraLizatIons like, for exAmpLe: "LyINg iS wronG" and "HUrtiNg OtherS is wroNg." MorEoVer, there are two nOtewOrthy featUreS oF thEsE mid-lEVel morAl gEneRalizatIons. FirST, whEn ASKEd About them, people by aNd LARgE report tHat sucH ClAiMS strike tHeM as IntuITIvely ObviOUs. related tO this bIT oF pHenomenOlOgy is tHe FacT thAt peoPLe trEat theSe generaLizatIOns as being nonaRBitrary. That is, IN oRDInARy coNteXts, most peopLe arE Not iNcliNEd To tAKe chaLlengEs TO tHEse beliefs at all seriOuSly-theY reprEsent a person's Moral bottoM LINe. These fActs SUgGEst that many peoPle doN't have justIFying reaSons fOr these bOttom-line MORal belieFs." (AS I eXplAin BELoW, this does not mEAN thaT oNe can noT deTach froM onE's mOraL beLiEfs, hold thEm at arm's LeNgTh, In OrdEr to rAIse NietzScHeaN qUesTions ABout onE's own MoraL oUtLOok. but this DOeS NOt afFeCt The pOinT I Am makIng hERe aBout morAl phenomeNolOGy or ItS bEaring oN contextualisM.) I Base these rEmArkS on the OBServatioNs I have made listening to sTUdents (wHo hAve noT beeN tainted bY an IntrodUctORy courSe in noRmatiVe EthICS), but aLSO wE haVe The observaTIOns ReporTeD by, fOr exampLe, the authors of HabiTS of The Heart as welL as EmpiRICaL reSEaRCh oN mORal DEVelopment by, for eXample, CaroL GILlIgan." One of tHE inTeRvieweeS featurEd in HABits of tHe Heart (quOted in the SeCond EPIgrAph), when askEd about sOme of his gENeral MOrAl belIefS that hE wAs uSing tO justiFY moRe parTiculaR mOral beLiefs, GaVe what I sUspect would be a pretty typIcal anSwer: hE waS dumbfounDed BY thE question And tOok his geneRal MorAl belIefS In queStioN To Be oBVious. anotHEr sort of rESpOnsE TO qUestions aboUT A PerSon's gEneRAl moraL belIefs is to be found in gIlligan's work. ThE resPONseS shE TendEd To get from subjeCts WhEN They were AsKed to providE a rationAlE For thOse genEral moRal beliEFS tYPicallY useD by Them to jusTifY mORe partiCuLaR Moral bElieFs Were, as dreyfuS And DREY
 plausible to suppose that  doxasticjusti fic ati on  inethi cs rests withe pist emically basic beliefs  of s om e  sor t .We na turally as s u meth at  in  h o ne stlysta ting ou r reasonsfor  h olding somem or al beliefwe310 Moral Kn owl edge?ar e e x press ing  theepiste m ically  relevant  s t ructur e  of our m or al b eliefs. And whenp eo p le are asked t o arti cu l at e the irreasons fo rholdi n g somep ar t i c ula r  moral belief  about a sp e cif ic cas e,  th e y by a nd la rg e  re ason accord ingto the fa miliar pattern of brin ging f ort h g ener a lco nsi de r ati o ns  be a rin g on the  s pe cific  cas e t h at t hey  tak e tobe morally si gni fica n t i n tha t cas e. S uc h con sidera tions  a re usually form ulat ed as mid lev el  mo ra l gen e raliza tio nslike, f or exam p le:  " L y i ng  is wrong" and "Hu rt i n gothers i s wron g ."  M o reover,th ere  are t wo no tewo r th y featur es oft he se  mid-le ve l mora lgen era lizat i ons.  First , when a skeda bout them, peo p le by and lar g er e po r t th atsuch claims  str i ke t hema sint u itive ly ob vi o us .  Related to this bi tof phe nomen ology is thefact thatp e o ple trea t th e se generalization s asbeing nona r bitrary.  That  is, inordinaryc o ntexts,mos t p eop lea r enot inclinedt o  tak echallen ges  to the sebel ief s a tall serio usly-the yre pr es ent  a pe r son's mo ra l b ot tom  line .  These  fact s su gg es t  th at many pe o p le d on 't  hav e j us tifyi ng r e aso ns forthese bot tom - line  m or al beli efs." (As I e xp lain below ,thi s does n ot meanthat one can not detach from on e's  mora l be liefs, ho ldthem a t a r m's le ngth,in or de r t o raise N ie tzs ch ean questi o n s a bouton e'sown mor al outlook. But th i s d oes not affec t t he p o i nt  Ia mm aki ng her e about moral phe nomenology  o r  i ts bearing onco ntextua lism.)I bas e  theseremarks o n the obs er vati o n s I  have made  listeni ng to stu d ents( wh o hav e n ot bee ntai ntedby ani ntr oduct ory co ur se innorma ti ve ethic s), but also we have th e obse rvati ons  reported  by ,  fo r example , th e authorsofHab its o f t h e Hea rt a s  w ell as em piri c al resear c honm o ra l developme n t by,  forexa m ple, C arol  Gilligan." One o f  the interview eesf e atu red in H ab its of the Hea rt(q u o ted in t he  second epi graph),wh e n ask ed abo ut som e of hi s ge n eral m oral  be liefs tha t h ew as usin gto justif y mo re  parti cularm oral b eliefs, gave wha t I s u s pectw oul d beaprettyt ypic al answer:  he was dum bfound ed b y the  questi on  and t ook  h is general moral bel iefsin ques ti on t o b e obvi ous. A nothe r so rt  of  response t oq ue st i ons  abo ut ape rson 's genera l  moral b eli e fs is t obef o und in Gi l l igan's wor k.The r e s ponses she tend e dt o get  fromsubjec ts when the ywere as ked t o provide  a ration a lefo r th ose gene ra l mo ra l b el iefs typicallyused bythem toj u stifymor e  par t icular  m oral beliefs  were ,a s Dreyf u s  an d Drey
 plausible_to suppose_that doxastic justification in_ethics rests_with_epistemically basic_beliefs_of some sort._We naturally assume_that in honestly stating_our reasons for_holding_some moral belief we 310 Moral Knowledge? are expressing the epistemically relevant structure of_our_moral beliefs._And_when_people are asked to articulate_their reasons for holding some_particular moral_belief about a specific case, they by and_large_reason according to_the familiar pattern of bringing forth general considerations bearing_on the specific case that they_take to be_morally_significant_in that case. Such_considerations are usually formulated as midlevel_moral generalizations like, for example: "Lying_is wrong" and "Hurting others is wrong."_Moreover, there are two noteworthy features_of these mid-level moral generalizations._First, when_asked about them, people by_and large report_that such_claims strike them_as intuitively obvious. Related to this_bit of phenomenology_is the fact that people treat_these_generalizations as being_nonarbitrary._That_is, in_ordinary contexts, most_people_are not_inclined_to take challenges to these beliefs_at_all seriously-they represent a person's moral bottom_line. These facts suggest_that_many people don't have_justifying reasons for these bottom-line_moral beliefs." (As I explain below,_this does_not mean_that one can not detach from one's moral beliefs, hold them_at arm's length, in order to_raise Nietzschean questions about_one's own_moral_outlook. But this_does_not affect_the point I am making here about_moral phenomenology_or its bearing on contextualism.) I_base these remarks on_the_observations I have made listening to_students (who have not been tainted_by an introductory course in_normative_ethics),_but also we have the_observations reported by, for example, the_authors of Habits_of the Heart as well as empirical_research_on moral development by, for example,_Carol_Gilligan." One of the interviewees featured_in_Habits_of the Heart (quoted in_the second epigraph), when asked about_some of his general moral beliefs that he was_using to justify_more particular moral beliefs, gave_what_I_suspect would be a pretty typical answer: he was dumbfounded_by the_question and took_his general moral beliefs in question to be obvious. Another_sort of response to questions about a_person's general moral beliefs is to be found in Gilligan's work._The responses she tended to get from subjects_when they were asked to provide a_rationale for those general_moral_beliefs typically used by them to justify_more_particular_moral_beliefs were, as_Dreyfus and Drey