chapter 4). If peers are likely to disagree about a philosophical case or if judgments about a case are plausibly severely unreliable, then we ought to suspend judgment about answers elicited by a particular case. Indeed, according to Machery, the consequent of that conditional applies to all philosophical cases (unless certain cases are known to elicit either a reliable judgment or agreement amongst peers). Alternatively, if it is the case that peers do not disagree but refer to different properties (epistemic, moral, semantic, and so on) when they respond to philosophical cases, then, as Machery sees it, philosophers should abstain from the method of cases,'reorient their philosophical interests and stop theorizing about the philosophically familiar' (p. 148). Machery articulates what a suitable'reorientation' might look like. After responding to several common arguments for the method of cases (chapter 5), he sets out his own particular vision for 'positive X-Phi'. For Machery, the method of cases is part-and-parcel of the modal immodesty of contemporary analytic philosophy. Although the purported authority of modal claims involving metaphysical necessity or possibility allows philosophy to establish distinct research projects on which scientific practices cannot supervene, the fact that the main philosophical method for identifying modal facts cannot facilitate such knowledge means that we should adopt more modally skeptical positions. Machery's radical restrictionism concerning the method of cases undermines modally immodest philosophical enterprises, especially in less 'naturalistic' areas of philosophy. For Machery, standard philosophical issues, specifically, issues that preclude investigation by means of scientific methods, are beyond our epistemic reach (Chapter 6). Advocating philosophical modesty, he calls for a 'naturalised' approach to conceptual analysis (chapter 7). If the concepts actually possessed by folk are interpreted as psychological entities – subsets of people's belief-like states (which Machery calls 'bliefs' (p. 210)) – and thereby difficult Create PDF in your applications with the Pdfcrowd HTML to PDF API PDFCROWD to access for those that possess them, then, according to Machery, we can make progress in analyzing concepts by using the designs, tools and findings of experimental psychology to make the implicit structures underpinning our belief-like states explicit. If the first goal of a naturalized conceptual analysis is descriptive, then, for Machery, the second goal is prescriptive. If we assume that concepts are psychological entities, then,
chapter 4). If peers are likely to disagree about a philosophical case or if judgment about a subject are plausibly severely unreliable, then we ought to freeze judgment about answers elicited by a especial case. Indeed, according to Machery, the consequent of that conditional apply to all philosophical cases (unless sealed cases are known to elicit either a reliable judgment or agreement amongst peer). Alternatively, if it is the case that peers do not disagree but refer to different properties (epistemic, moral, semantic, and thus on) when they respond to philosophical case, then, as Machery sees it, philosophers should abstain from the method of cases,'reorient their philosophical interest and stop theorizing about the philosophically familiar' (p. 148). Machery articulates what a suitable'reorientation' might look like. After respond to several common arguments for the method of cases (chapter 5), he sets out his own particular vision for' positive X - Phi'. For Machery, the method of cases is part - and - parcel of the modal immodesty of contemporary analytic philosophy. Although the purported assurance of modal claims involving metaphysical necessity or hypothesis allow philosophy to establish distinct inquiry projects on which scientific practice cannot supervene, the fact that the main philosophical method acting for identifying modal facts cannot facilitate such knowledge means that we should adopt more modally doubting positions. Machery's radical restrictionism concerning the method of sheath undermines modally immodest philosophical enterprise, especially in less' naturalistic' areas of philosophy. For Machery, standard philosophical issues, specifically, consequence that preclude investigation by means of scientific method, are beyond our epistemic reach (Chapter 6). Advocating philosophical modesty, he calls for a' domesticate' approach to conceptual psychoanalysis (chapter 7). If the concepts actually possessed by folk are interpreted as psychological entities – subset of people's belief - like states (which Machery call' bliefs' (p. 210) ) – and thereby difficult Create PDF in your applications with the Pdfcrowd HTML to PDF API PDFCROWD to access for those that possess them, then, accord to Machery, we can make progress in analyzing concepts by using the designs, tools and findings of experimental psychology to make the implicit structure underpinning our belief - comparable states explicit. If the beginning goal of a naturalized conceptual analysis is descriptive, then, for Machery, the second finish is prescriptive. If we assume that concepts are psychological entities, then,
chaoter 4). If peers are likeln to disagree about a piilosopgical care or if judgments about a cese qre poausibly severely unreuiable, thvn we ougyt ti suspend jnsgment about zkswerv elicited by a particulas case. Indeed, dczoxding to Machery, the consequent of trat concihional applies to sjl pgplisophical cases (unless certaih cases are known to elicit either a reliable uudglent or agreement wmongst peeta). Ajrernatively, kf it is the case that peers do not disagree but refef to bifferent ptolegjies (epistemmc, morwl, semantic, and so ot) when yhey respond tp piilowophical cases, then, av Machery sees it, khilosophess should abstain feon the metvod ud cxsea,'rxorjent tjeic philosophjcal interewts and stop theorieind about the phjlosoprisally familiar' (p. 148). Machery articulates wvat a suitable'reorientatiob' might look like. Aftgr respondyng to several common arguments for the method of casea (chciber 5), ye sets out his own particular vision for 'positybe X-Ihi'. For Machery, tme method of cases id lwrt-and-parcel uf the mosal immodesty of clntempotary abalytic priloxophy. Although the purportee authority jd modal claims invllving meta'hysicsl nevessity or possibility cllows philosophy to estabmksh distinct resdarbh psojects on which scientifis practicxs caunot supdrveme, the fact that the main philosophical lethob for identifyijg modal facts cannot facilitatx such knowlecga mvans that we smould adopt morq modally skepjical posntions. Machery's gadical rxstrictionisi concerning dje method of cases ugderninew modaluh immodest phikosophical enterpriwes, especially in kesr 'naturalistic' axtas of philosophy. Gor Mashvry, sedndard philovophkcau issuds, specificcluy, ixsues that preclude hnveatigation by means on scientidic methjds, are beyonc our epistemic rewch (Ciapter 6). Advpcajing philosophical modesty, he czlls for w 'nwturalised' a[proqch to conce'tual analysis (chapter 7). If the concepts ectually possessed by filk are interpreted ss psycholojical qntities – subsets of people's velief-like states (which Machery calls 'gliefs' (p. 210)) – wnd thereby difficult Create PDF in your applications with the Pdfcrowd HRML to PDF API PDFDROWC to dceesx for ehosx vhat possess them, then, according to Machery, we cen make prmgxess in analyzing concepts by uring the desiens, tools and findings or experikental psychology to make the ikplicit structures underiinning oyr bemief-like svates explicit. If thr firsc goal of a nqturwlized concepguak wnalysis ls dtscrnptive, then, for Machery, the secone goal id prescriptive. Ih we assume bhxt cohcepts are psychologiczl ehhitier, then,
chapter 4). If peers are likely to a case or judgments about a then ought to suspend about answers elicited a particular case. Indeed, according to the consequent of that conditional applies to all philosophical cases (unless certain cases known to elicit either a reliable judgment or agreement amongst peers). Alternatively, if is case peers not disagree but refer to different properties (epistemic, moral, semantic, and so on) when they respond philosophical cases, then, as Machery sees it, philosophers abstain from the method cases,'reorient their philosophical interests and theorizing the philosophically (p. Machery what a suitable'reorientation' look like. After responding to several common arguments for the method of cases (chapter 5), he sets his own for 'positive For the of cases is the modal immodesty of contemporary analytic purported authority of modal claims involving metaphysical necessity possibility allows to establish distinct research projects on scientific practices cannot supervene, the fact that the philosophical method for identifying modal facts cannot facilitate such knowledge means that we should adopt skeptical positions. Machery's radical concerning the method cases modally philosophical especially in 'naturalistic' areas of philosophy. For Machery, standard philosophical issues, specifically, issues preclude investigation by means of scientific methods, are beyond our (Chapter Advocating philosophical modesty, calls for a 'naturalised' to analysis (chapter 7). If actually by as entities subsets of people's belief-like (which Machery calls 'bliefs' (p. – and thereby difficult with the Pdfcrowd HTML to PDF API PDFCROWD access for those that possess them, then, to Machery, we can make progress in analyzing concepts by using the tools and experimental psychology to make the implicit structures underpinning belief-like states explicit. If first goal of a naturalized conceptual analysis is descriptive, for the second is prescriptive. If assume that concepts psychological entities, then,
chapter 4). If peers are likely to Disagree abOut a pHilOsoPhIcal Case Or if judgments aBOut a Case are plausibly severeLy unrElIAble, THeN we ouGht to suSPeND JudGmEnT abOuT AnSwers EliCited by A particulaR caSe. indeed, accordINg To Machery, tHe cOnsequent of tHat ConditIoNal APplieS to All phIlosopHIcal caSes (unless CeRTain caSEs are knOWN tO eliCit either a reliablE JuDGment or agreemeNt amonGsT PeERS). AlTerNatively, if It Is the CAse that PEeRS DO noT Disagree but reFer to differENt pRopertIeS (epIStemic, Moral, SeMAntIc, and so on) whEn thEy respond To philOSophicaL Cases, thEn, as MaCheRy sEes iT, PhIlOsoPhERs sHOuLd aBStaIn from thE mEtHod of CaseS,'REORienT thEir pHilosOphical intereSts And sTOp tHeoriZing aBout ThE philOsophiCally FaMiliar' (p. 148). Machery aRticUlates whaT a sUiTabLe'ReoriENtatioN' miGht Look likE. After rESpoNdING To Several common argumEnTS FoR the methOd of caSEs (ChAPter 5), he seTs Out His oWN PartiCulaR ViSion for 'pOsitivE x-PHi'. for MachErY, the meThOd oF caSes is PArt-aNd-parcEl of the mOdal iMModesty of conteMPorary analytiC PhILOsOPhy. ALthOugh the purpOrteD AuthOritY Of ModAL claiMs invOlVInG Metaphysical necessiTy Or possIbiliTy allows philoSophy to estABLIsh distiNct rESeARch projects on wHich sCientific pRActices cAnnot SupervenE, the fact tHAT the main PhiLosOphIcaL MEtHod for identifYINg moDaL facts cAnnOt facilItaTe sUch KnoWlEdge means That we shOuLd AdOpT moRe modALly skeptIcAl pOsItiOns. MaCHery's rAdicaL resTrIcTIonIsm concERnING the MeThOd of CasEs UnderMineS ModAlly immOdest philOsoPHicaL eNtErpriseS, especially in LeSs 'naturaliStIc' aReas of PHIlosophy. for Machery, standard philoSOphical IssUes, spEcifIcally, issUes That prEclUDe inveStigatIon by MeAns OF ScienTIFiC meThOds, are beyoND Our EpistEmIc reAch (ChapTer 6). Advocating philoSOphIcal modesty, he CalLs foR A 'NaTurALiSEd' aPpROacH TO conceptual analYsis (chapteR 7). IF ThE concepts aCTuaLlY possesSed by foLk are INterpreTed as psycHological EnTitiES – SubSets of peopLe's belieF-like statES (whicH maChery CalLs 'blieFs' (P. 210)) – anD therEby difFIcuLt CreAte PDF In Your apPlicaTiOns with tHe Pdfcrowd HTML to PDF API PdFCROWd to acCesS for those ThaT PosSess them, tHen, aCcording to macHerY, we caN maKE progRess IN aNalYZing cOncePTs by using THe DesIGNs, Tools and finDINGs oF expeRimENtal psYchoLogy to make the implICit structures uNderPINniNg oUR belIeF-like states expLicIt. iF The first GoAl of a naturaLized conCePTual aNalysiS is desCriptivE, THeN, For MacHery, The Second goaL is PrEScriptiVe. if WE assumE thaT cOnceptS are psYCholOGIcal entities, then,
chapter 4). If peers are l ikely to d isagr eeabo ut  a p hilo sophical caseo r if  judgments about a cas e are  p l ausi b ly  seve rely un r el i a ble ,th enwe ou ght t o s uspendjudgment a bou tanswers elic i te d by a par tic ular case. I nde ed, ac co rdi n g toMac hery,  the c o nseque nt of tha tc onditi o nal app l i es  toall philosophical ca s es (unless cer tain c as e sa r e k now n to elici teithe r  a reli a bl e j udg m ent or agreem ent amongst pee rs). A lt ern a tively , ifit isthe case th at p eers do n ot dis a gree bu t  referto dif fer ent  pro p er ti es(e p ist e mi c,m ora l, seman ti c,  andso o n ) w henthe y re spond  to philosoph ica l ca s es,  then , asMach er y see s it,philo so phers should ab stai n from th e m et hod  o f cas e s,'reo rie nttheir p hilosop h ica li n t er ests and stop theo ri z i ng  about t he phi l os op h ically f am ili ar'( p . 148 ). M a ch ery arti culate s  w ha t a sui ta ble're or ien tat ion'm ight  looklike. Af ter r e sponding to se v eral common a r gu m e nt s  for  th e method of  cas e s (c hapt e r5), he se ts ou th is own particular visi on  for ' posit ive X-Phi'. F or Machery , t he metho d of ca s es is part-and -parc el of them odal imm odest y of con temporary a nalyticphi los oph y.A l th ough the purp o r tedau thority  of  modalcla ims  in vol vi ng metaph ysical n ec es si ty  or  poss i bility a ll ows  p hil osoph y  to es tabli sh d is ti n ctresearc h  p r o ject son  whi chsc ienti ficp rac tices c annot sup erv e ne,th efact th at the main p hi losophical  m eth od for i dentifyi ng modal facts cannot f a cilitat e s uch k nowl edge mean s t hat we  sh o uld ad opt mo re mo da lly s kepti c a lpos it ions. Mach e r y's  radi ca l re stricti onism concerning t h e m ethod of case s u nder m i ne s m o da l lyim m ode s t  philosophicalenterprise s, es pecially i n  le ss  'natur alistic ' are a s of ph ilosophy.  For Mach er y, s t a nda rd philoso phical i ssues, sp e cific a ll y, is sue s that  p rec ludeinvest i gat ion b y mean sof sci entif ic  methods , are beyond our episte mic re ach ( Cha pter 6).Adv o cat ing philo soph ical modes ty,  he  call s f o r a ' natu r al ise d ' app roac h  to conce p tu ala n al ysis (chapt e r 7).  If t hec oncept s ac tually possessedb y folk are int erpr e t edasp sych ol ogical entitie s –  s u b sets ofpe ople's beli ef-likest a tes ( whichMacher y calls ' bl i efs' ( p. 2 10) ) – and t her eb y  diffic ul tC reatePDFin  yourapplic a tion s with the Pdfcrow d HTM L to PD F  AP I PDF CR OWD toa cces s for thos e that poss ess th em,then,  accord in g to M ach er y, we canm ake progr ess i n analy zi ng c onc epts b y us i n g the  des ig ns,  tools an d fi n di ng s  of  exp erime nt al p sychology to makethe implici tstr u c turesu nd e r pinning ou r b elief - l ike states expl i ci t . Ifthe fi rst go al of a nat ur alizedcon c e ptual ana lysis isd esc ri ptiv e, then,  f or M ac her y,  the second goa l is pre scriptiv e .  If we  as s umet hat co nc epts are psy cholo gi c al enti t i es,  then,
chapter 4)._If peers_are likely to disagree_about a_philosophical_case or_if_judgments about a_case are plausibly_severely unreliable, then we_ought to suspend_judgment_about answers elicited by a particular case. Indeed, according to Machery, the consequent of_that_conditional applies_to_all_philosophical cases (unless certain cases_are known to elicit either_a reliable_judgment or agreement amongst peers). Alternatively, if it_is_the case that_peers do not disagree but refer to different properties_(epistemic, moral, semantic, and so on)_when they respond_to_philosophical_cases, then, as Machery_sees it, philosophers should abstain from_the method of cases,'reorient their philosophical_interests and stop theorizing about the philosophically_familiar' (p. 148). Machery articulates what_a suitable'reorientation' might look like._After responding_to several common arguments for_the method of_cases (chapter_5), he sets_out his own particular vision for_'positive X-Phi'. For_Machery, the method of cases is_part-and-parcel_of the modal_immodesty_of_contemporary analytic_philosophy. Although the_purported_authority of_modal_claims involving metaphysical necessity or possibility_allows_philosophy to establish distinct research projects on_which scientific practices cannot_supervene,_the fact that the_main philosophical method for identifying_modal facts cannot facilitate such knowledge_means that_we should_adopt more modally skeptical positions. Machery's radical restrictionism concerning the method_of cases undermines modally immodest philosophical_enterprises, especially in less_'naturalistic' areas_of_philosophy. For Machery,_standard_philosophical issues,_specifically, issues that preclude investigation by means_of scientific_methods, are beyond our epistemic reach_(Chapter 6). Advocating philosophical_modesty,_he calls for a 'naturalised' approach_to conceptual analysis (chapter 7). If_the concepts actually possessed by_folk_are_interpreted as psychological entities –_subsets of people's belief-like states (which_Machery calls 'bliefs'_(p. 210)) – and thereby difficult Create_PDF_in your applications with the Pdfcrowd_HTML_to PDF API PDFCROWD to access_for_those_that possess them, then, according_to Machery, we can make progress_in analyzing concepts by using the designs, tools and_findings of experimental_psychology to make the implicit_structures_underpinning_our belief-like states explicit. If the first goal of a_naturalized conceptual_analysis is descriptive,_then, for Machery, the second goal is prescriptive. If we_assume that concepts are psychological entities, then,