 doesn't exist even if people think they know that he does. The existence of God is an objective matter-either God's up there in the heavens or he isn't-and it doesn't depend on what we think or what we know. God's existence (or nonexistence) is the objective state of the world that we're trying to discover. The same applies to morality. One question is: Is there a single objective morality? That's a metaphysical question, a question about the nature of reality itself. Another question is: What can we know about this objective morality? That's an epistemological question, a question about what we can know. Just because you think there's a single objective morality doesn't mean you think you know everything, or even anything, about it. Of course, if you believe in a single objective morality then you've probably got some ideas about what you think it involves. But you needn't be very sure about this, and you certainly needn't think you can never be wrong. This is a view that philosophers call fallibilism: the view that our ideas and beliefs might be mistaken. You can be a fallibilist about all kinds of things. For instance, you could be a fallibilist about science: you could think that even our best scientific theories might be mistaken. (Nearly everyone, and 4 definitely all scientists, are fallibilists about science.) Similarly, you could be a fallibilist about morality: you could think that even our best moral theories might be mistaken. The crucial point is that being a fallibilist about morality needn't make you an anti-objectivist or a relativist. It's possible to think both that there's one true objective morality and that we're often mistaken about what it consists in. To be an objectivist about morality, you don't have to arrogantly assume that you know all the moral truths. In fact, it's pretty difficult to be a fallibilist about morality without being an objectivist. Suppose that I, an objectivist, say: 'I think that abortion is morally permissible; but I might be wrong'. What do I mean? What I mean is this: first, that there's an objective morality; second, that my best guess is that this objective morality tells us that abortion is morally permissible; and, third, that it might not-that for all I know it might, in fact, tell us that abortion is morally wrong. Now suppose that you, a moral relativist, say: '
doesn't exist even if people think they know that he does. The being of God is an objective topic - either God's up there in the heavens or he isn't - and it doesn't depend on what we remember or what we sleep together. God's existence (or nonexistence) is the objective state of the worldly concern that we're try to detect. The same applies to ethical motive. One question is: Is there a single objective morality? That's a metaphysical question, a doubt about the nature of reality itself. Another question is: What can we know about this objective morality? That's an epistemological doubt, a question about what we can know. Just because you intend there's a single objective morality doesn't mean you think you acknowledge everything, or even anything, about it. Of course, if you believe in a single objective morality then you've probably catch some ideas about what you think it involves. But you needn't be very sure about this, and you certainly needn't remember you can never be wrong. This is a view that philosophers call fallibilism: the view that our ideas and beliefs might be mistaken. You can be a fallibilist about all kinds of things. For case, you could be a fallibilist about science: you could think that even our dear scientific theory might be mistaken. (Nearly everyone, and 4 definitely all scientists, are fallibilists about science .) Similarly, you could be a fallibilist about morality: you could think that even our estimable moral theories might be mistaken. The crucial point is that being a fallibilist about ethical motive needn't make you an anti - objectivist or a relativist. It's possible to think both that there's one true objective morality and that we're often misguided about what it consists in. To be an objectivist about morality, you don't have to arrogantly assume that you know all the moral truth. In fact, it's pretty difficult to be a fallibilist about morality without being an objectivist. Suppose that I, an objectivist, say:' I think that abortion is morally permissible; but I might be wrong'. What do I intend? What I mean is this: first, that there's an objective ethical motive; second, that my best guess is that this objective morality tells us that abortion is morally permissible; and, third, that it might not - that for all I acknowledge it might, in fact, tell us that miscarriage is morally wrong. Now suppose that you, a moral relativist, read:'
 dofsn't exist even if peoplt think they know that hx does. Fhe exisgence of God is an objective mqtter-tpther God's up there iv the heanens or hw isi't-and it doesn't vspend ok whaf we chmnk or what we lnow. God's axistence (or nmndxnstence) is the objective state of thq world tjat we're tryind to qiscknev. The same applies to morality. Ohe quesuion is: Is there a single objective morality? Thah's a metaphysical euestion, a wueseuon about thd nature of reality itaelf. Another question is: What cxn we know abouj fhlv objective morajity? That's ak epistamologival question, a quxstiin about what we can nnow. Just because iou think dhzre's a single objectice moranity doerb't oeah bou think yon know evergthing, or ecen anything, about ot. If course, if gou bejiqve in a single objective morality then yoh've probably got some ieeas about what you tjink it igvolves. But you needn't be very sure about this, ang you zerualkly vwefn't think you can never be wrong. This is a viqs uhan philosophers cajl fallibilosl: yre view that uur idzzs and beliefs might be misjaken. Tou can bt a fsllibilist about all kinds if things. Fog inwtance, you could bz a fallibilnst abput svience: you could think chat eben our besh scientirkc theories mighg bv mivtaken. (Ntxrly everyone, and 4 definitxly akl scievtisjs, are sallibilishs about science.) Similarpy, yoo coulg be a falpibilist about morality: you could think that gvet olr best mjral bheories might fe mistaken. Thg crucial poing is that geing a fallibilise about moralhjy needn't makx you an wnti-ibjextivist ur a relativisy. It's possible to tyink both that theve's ovs true objectivz norality and thst de'rq lfven myvtaken about whag ig consksts in. To ne xn onjectivist about mordlitg, you don't have to avrogantly assume ehat you know all the moral truuhs. In fart, it's prgtty difficult to be a fallibiljst about movality withoue belng wn objectirist. Suppose that I, an objectivist, say: 'I think that abortiin is morally permixxible; but I mighe be wronc'. What do I mean? Whar I mean is this: nirst, that there's an ogjectiee mogality; second, that my best guess is that this objective morality tells us that ebjrtion is mkralky pegmifxible; wnd, vhmrd, that it might not-that for all I know it mighv, in fact, dejl us that abortion is moralky wrong. Now sukpose that you, a moral relztivist, xay: '
doesn't exist even if people think they he The existence God is an in heavens or he it doesn't depend what we think or what we God's existence (or nonexistence) is the objective state of the world that we're to discover. The same applies to morality. One question is: Is there a objective That's metaphysical a question about the nature of reality itself. Another question is: What can we know about objective morality? That's an epistemological question, a question what we can know. because you think there's a objective doesn't mean think know or even anything, it. Of course, if you believe in a single objective morality then you've probably got some ideas what you involves. But needn't very about this, and needn't think you can never be a view that philosophers call fallibilism: the view our ideas beliefs might be mistaken. You can a fallibilist about all kinds of things. For you could be a fallibilist about science: you could think that even our best scientific be mistaken. (Nearly everyone, 4 definitely all are about Similarly, could be fallibilist about morality: you could think that even our best moral might be mistaken. The crucial point is that being a morality make you an or a relativist. It's to both that there's one morality that about it in. To be an about morality, you don't have arrogantly assume that you In fact, it's pretty difficult to be a about morality without being an objectivist. Suppose I, an objectivist, say: 'I think that abortion is morally permissible; but might be do I mean? What I mean is this: that there's an objective second, that my best guess is that this objective tells that abortion morally permissible; and, that it might for all I might, in tell that wrong. Now suppose that you, a relativist, '
 doesn't exist even if people thInk they knoW that He dOes. thE exiStenCe of God is an objECtivE matter-either God's up theRe in tHe HEaveNS oR he isN't-and it DOeSN'T dePeNd On wHaT We Think Or wHat we knOw. God's exisTenCe (Or nonexistenCE) iS the objectIve State of the woRld That we'Re TryINg to dIscOver. THe same APplies To moralitY. ONE questIOn is: Is tHERe A sinGle objective moralITy? tHat's a metaphysiCal queStIOn, A QUesTioN about the nAtUre of REality iTSeLF. aNotHEr question is: WHat can we knoW AboUt this ObJecTIve morAlity? thAT's aN epistemoloGicaL question, A questIOn about WHat we caN know. JUst BecAuse YOu ThInk ThERe's A SiNglE ObjEctive moRaLiTy doeSn't mEAN YOu thInk You kNow evErything, or eveN anYthiNG, abOut it. of couRse, iF yOu belIeve in A singLe Objective moraliTy thEn you've prObaBlY goT sOme idEAs abouT whAt yOu think It involVEs. BUt YOU NeEdn't be very sure abouT tHIS, aNd you cerTainly NEeDn'T Think you CaN neVer bE WRong. THis iS A vIew that pHilosoPHeRs Call falLiBilism: ThE viEw tHat ouR IdeaS and beLiefs migHt be mIStaken. You can be A Fallibilist abOUt ALL kINds oF thIngs. For instAnce, YOu coUld bE A fAllIBilisT abouT sCIeNCe: you could think that EvEn our bEst scIentific theorIes might be MISTaken. (NeaRly eVErYOne, and 4 definiteLy all Scientists, ARe fallibIlistS about scIence.) SimiLARly, you coUld Be a FalLibILIsT about moralitY: YOu coUlD think tHat Even our BesT moRal TheOrIes might bE mistakeN. THe CrUcIal Point IS that beiNg A faLlIbiList aBOut morAlity NeedN't MaKE yoU an anti-OBjECTiviSt Or A relAtiViSt. It's PossIBle To think Both that tHerE'S one TrUe ObjectiVe morality and ThAt we're ofteN mIstAken abOUT what it cOnsists in. To be an objectivISt about MorAlity, You dOn't have to ArrOgantlY asSUme thaT you knOw all ThE moRAL trutHS. in FacT, iT's pretty diFFIcuLt to bE a FallIbilist About morality withoUT beIng an objectivIst. suppOSE tHat i, An OBjeCtIVisT, SAy: 'I think that aboRtion is morAlLY pErmissible; BUt I MiGht be wrOng'. What Do I meAN? What I mEan is this: First, that ThEre's AN ObjEctive moraLity; secoNd, that my bESt gueSS iS that ThiS objecTiVe mOraliTy tellS Us tHat abOrtion Is MorallY permIsSible; and, Third, that it might not-that For all i know It mIght, in facT, teLL us That abortIon iS morally wrOng. now SuppoSe tHAt you, A morAL rElaTIvist, Say: '
 doesn't exist even if peo ple thinktheykno w t ha t he  doe s. The existen c e of  God is an objective m atter -e i ther Go d's u p there in t hehe av ens  o r  h e isn 't- and itdoesn't de pen don what we t h in k or whatweknow. God'sexi stence  ( orn onexi ste nce)is the object ive state  o f  the w o rld tha t we 'retrying to discove r .T he same applie s to m or a li t y . O nequestion i s:  Is t h ere a s i ng l e obj e ctive moralit y? That's a met aphysi ca l q u estion , a q ue s tio n about the  nat ure of re alityi tself.A notherquesti onis:  Wha t  c an  we  k n owa bo utt his  objecti ve  m orali ty?T h a t 's a n e pist emolo gical questio n,a qu e sti on ab out w hatwe  canknow.Justbe cause you think  the re's a si ngl eobj ec tivem oralit y d oes n't mea n you t h ink  y o u kn ow everything, orev e n  a nything,  about it .O f course ,ifyoub e lieve  ina  s ingle ob jectiv e  m or ality t he n you' ve  pr oba bly g o t so me ide as about  what you think it i n volves. But y o un e ed n 't b e v ery sure ab outt his,  and yo u c e rtain ly ne ed n 't think you can never  b e wron g. Th is is a viewthat philo s o p hers cal l fa l li b ilism: the vie w tha t our idea s  and bel iefsmight be  mistaken . You canbea f all ibi l i st  about all ki n d s of  t hings.For  instan ce,  yo u c oul dbe a fall ibilistab ou tsc ien ce: y o u couldth ink  t hat  even our be st sc ient if ic the ories m i gh t be m is ta ken.  (N ea rly e very o ne,  and 4definitel y a l l sc ie nt ists, a re fallibilis ts  about sci en ce. ) Simi l a rly, you  could be a fallibilist about m ora lity:  you  could th ink  thateve n  our b est mo ral t he ori e s  migh t be  mi st aken. Thec r uci al po in t is  that b eing a fallibilist abo ut morality n eed n'tm a ke  yo u  a n  an ti - obj e c tivist or a rel ativist. I t' s  p ossible to thi nk  both t hat the re'so ne true  objectiv e moralit yandt h atwe're ofte n mistak en aboutw hat i t  c onsis tsin. To  b e a n obj ectivi s t a boutmorali ty , youdon't  h ave to a rrogantly assume that y ou kno w all  th e moral t rut h s.In fact,it's  pretty di ffi cul t tobea  fall ibil i st  ab o ut mo rali t y without be ing a nobjectivist . S upp ose t hat I, anobje ctivist, say: 'It hink that abor tion i s m ora l ly p er missible; butI m ig h t  be wron g' . What do I  mean? W ha t  I me an isthis:first,t h at there' s an  ob jective m ora li t y; seco nd ,t hat my  bes tguessis tha t  thi s objective morali ty te l l s ust hat  abor ti on is m o rall y permissi ble; and, t hird,that  it m ight no t- that f oral l I know i t  might, i n fac t, tell  u s th ataborti on i s moral ly w ro ng.  Now supp o s et ha ty ou,  a m oralre lati vist, say :  '
 doesn't_exist even_if people think they_know that_he_does. The_existence_of God is_an objective matter-either_God's up there in_the heavens or_he_isn't-and it doesn't depend on what we think or what we know. God's existence_(or_nonexistence) is_the_objective_state of the world that_we're trying to discover. The_same applies_to morality. One question is: Is there a_single_objective morality? That's_a metaphysical question, a question about the nature of_reality itself. Another question is: What_can we know_about_this_objective morality? That's an_epistemological question, a question about what_we can know. Just because you_think there's a single objective morality doesn't_mean you think you know everything,_or even anything, about it._Of course,_if you believe in a_single objective morality_then you've_probably got some_ideas about what you think it_involves. But you_needn't be very sure about this,_and_you certainly needn't_think_you_can never_be wrong. This_is_a view_that_philosophers call fallibilism: the view that_our_ideas and beliefs might be mistaken. You_can be a fallibilist_about_all kinds of things._For instance, you could be_a fallibilist about science: you could_think that_even our_best scientific theories might be mistaken. (Nearly everyone, and 4 definitely_all scientists, are fallibilists about science.)_Similarly, you could be_a fallibilist_about_morality: you could_think_that even_our best moral theories might be mistaken._The crucial_point is that being a fallibilist_about morality needn't make_you_an anti-objectivist or a relativist. It's_possible to think both that there's_one true objective morality and_that_we're_often mistaken about what it_consists in. To be an objectivist_about morality, you_don't have to arrogantly assume that you_know_all the moral truths. In fact,_it's_pretty difficult to be a fallibilist_about_morality_without being an objectivist. Suppose_that I, an objectivist, say: 'I_think that abortion is morally permissible; but I might_be wrong'. What_do I mean? What I_mean_is_this: first, that there's an objective morality; second, that my_best guess_is that this_objective morality tells us that abortion is morally permissible; and,_third, that it might not-that for all_I know it might, in fact, tell us that abortion is_morally wrong. Now suppose that you, a moral_relativist, say: '