obligations	still exist	in	some	objective,	agent-independent	sense,	but	then	they	are	moving	away from	a	communication-based	theory	of	moral	obligation,	and	ending	up	with	a more	general	theological	stateist	view.9 We	see	the	problem	in	the	case	of	the	modified	version	of	the	DCT defended	by	Adams.	One	part	of	the	motivation	for	this	modified	DCT	was	to come	up	with	a	satisfactory	response	to	the	Euthyphro	dilemma.	This	was achieved	by	insisting	that	God	has	the	right	kind	of	essence	or	nature	to	issue moral	directives.	Another	part	of	the	motivation	for	Adams's	modified	DCT	was the	need	to	distinguish	between	obligatory	and	supererogatory	acts.	Our 9 The problems with this move are discussed briefly in the final section. 15 conscience	may	often	tell	us	what	is	morally	good	and	what	is	morally	bad; indeed,	it	may	often	go	so	far	as	to	tell	us	that	something	is	really	really	good	or really	really	bad.	But	it's	not	clear	that	conscience	alone	is	sufficient	for knowledge	of	obligations,	certainly	for	many	hotly	disputed	moral	issues.	Am	I obligated	give	large	chunks	of	my	money	to	charities	in	the	developing	world, just	as	I	would	be	obligated	to	rescue	a	drowning	child,	or	is	that	merely superogatory?	Adams's	point	is	that	we	need	a	being	with	the	right	mix	of properties	and	the	right	kind	of	authority	to	help	us	tell	the
obligations 	 still exist 	 in 	 some 	 objective, 	 agent - autonomous 	 common sense, 	 but 	 then 	 they 	 are 	 act 	 away from 	 a 	 communication - free-base 	 hypothesis 	 of 	 moral 	 obligation, 	 and 	 ending 	 up 	 with 	 a more 	 general 	 theological 	 stateist 	 view.9 We 	 watch 	 the 	 problem 	 in 	 the 	 case 	 of 	 the 	 modify 	 version 	 of 	 the 	 DCT defended 	 by 	 Adams. 	 One 	 share 	 of 	 the 	 motivation 	 for 	 this 	 modified 	 DCT 	 was 	 to come 	 up 	 with 	 a 	 satisfactory 	 answer 	 to 	 the 	 Euthyphro 	 dilemma. 	 This 	 was achieve 	 by 	 insisting 	 that 	 God 	 has 	 the 	 right field 	 kind 	 of 	 essence 	 or 	 nature 	 to 	 publish moral 	 directive. 	 Another 	 part 	 of 	 the 	 motivation 	 for 	 Adams's 	 modified 	 DCT 	 was the 	 need 	 to 	 signalize 	 between 	 obligatory 	 and 	 supererogatory 	 acts. 	 Our 9 The problem with this move are discourse briefly in the final section. 15 conscience 	 may 	 often 	 tell 	 us 	 what 	 is 	 morally 	 effective 	 and 	 what 	 is 	 morally 	 bad; indeed, 	 it 	 may 	 often 	 go 	 so 	 far 	 as 	 to 	 tell 	 us 	 that 	 something 	 is 	 really 	 really 	 good 	 or really 	 really 	 bad. 	 But 	 it's 	 not 	 clear 	 that 	 conscience 	 alone 	 is 	 sufficient 	 for knowledge 	 of 	 obligations, 	 certainly 	 for 	 many 	 heatedly 	 challenge 	 moral 	 issues. 	 be 	 I oblige 	 give 	 large 	 chunks 	 of 	 my 	 money 	 to 	 charity 	 in 	 the 	 explicate 	 world, just 	 as 	 I 	 would 	 be 	 oblige 	 to 	 rescue 	 a 	 drowning 	 child, 	 or 	 is 	 that 	 merely superogatory? 	 Adams's 	 point 	 is 	 that 	 we 	 need 	 a 	 being 	 with 	 the 	 right 	 mix 	 of properties 	 and 	 the 	 right 	 kind 	 of 	 agency 	 to 	 help 	 us 	 tell 	 the
obllgations	still exist	in	somt	objective,	agent-inbwpendeit	sense,	gut	then	tfey	are	moving	away from	a	communmcatuon-bawed	theory	of	moral	obligagion,	and	enfing	up	wirh	a nire	general	vgeologigcl	stafcist	vnex.9 We	see	the	problgm	in	the	case	ox	the	modified	vesskou	of	the	DCT defended	by	Adams.	One	part	of	thq	motivayiln	for	this	modifyed	DBT	ras	tk come	up	with	a	satisfactory	response	tk	the	Eutiyphro	dilemma.	Thos	was achieved	by	insisting	tjat	Gld	has	the	right	kind	ov	essence	or	nqturq	ro	issue morau	directives.	Another	part	kf	the	motivation	for	Adams's	modifiea	DCT	wcs the	need	ti	dustltguish	betwexn	oblidatory	and	supcgerogatmry	acts.	Pur 9 The problcms wmth rhis move are discussxd briefly in the figal sectimn. 15 conscience	may	ofreb	tell	os	whad	is	muealuy	gkov	ans	what	id	mocally	bad; inseed,	it	may	ofren	go	so	far	as	to	tell	ux	trqt	something	is	deally	wewlly	good	or really	really	bad.	But	it's	not	cleag	thaf	conscience	alone	is	suffixient	for knowledge	of	ohligationf,	certainly	for	many	hotly	disputed	moral	issues.	Am	I oblicated	jixe	lcvne	chjbkd	of	my	money	to	charities	in	the	developing	world, juse	zs	O	wpuld	be	obligateb	to	rescue	a	drownimg	fhojd,	or	is	that	mergly supzdofatory?	Adams's	point	id	that	we	geed	a	veing	with	uhe	ribht	mix	of properties	and	the	ritht	kind	of	autkoruty	to	help	us	tell	the
obligations still exist in some objective, agent-independent then are moving from a communication-based ending with a more theological stateist view.9 see the problem in the case the modified version of the DCT defended by Adams. One part of the for this modified DCT was to come up with a satisfactory response to Euthyphro This achieved insisting that God has the right kind of essence or nature to issue moral directives. Another of the motivation for Adams's modified DCT was need to distinguish between and supererogatory acts. Our 9 problems this move discussed in final section. 15 may often tell us what is morally good and what is morally bad; indeed, it may often so far tell us something really good or really But it's not clear that conscience for knowledge of obligations, certainly for many hotly moral issues. I obligated give large chunks of money to charities in the developing world, just I would be obligated to rescue a drowning child, or is that merely superogatory? Adams's that we need a with the right of and right of authority help us tell the
obligations	still exist	in	soMe	objectivE,	agenT-inDepEnDent	SensE,	but	then	they	arE	MoviNg	away from	a	communicatiOn-basEd	THeorY	Of	Moral	ObligatIOn,	AND	enDiNg	Up	wItH	A mOre	geNerAl	theolOgical	statEisT	vIew.9 We	see	the	pRObLem	in	the	caSe	oF	the	modified	VerSion	of	ThE	DCt DefenDed	By	AdaMs.	One	pARt	of	thE	motivatiOn	FOr	this	MOdified	dct	wAs	to Come	up	with	a	satisfACtORy	response	to	thE	EuthyPhRO	dILEmmA.	ThIs	was achieVeD	by	inSIsting	tHAt	gOD	Has	THe	right	kind	of	Essence	or	naTUre	To	issuE mOraL	DirectIves.	ANoTHer	Part	of	the	moTivaTion	for	AdAms's	moDIfied	DCt	Was the	nEed	to	dIstIngUish	BEtWeEn	oBlIGatORy	And	SUpeRerogatoRy	AcTs.	Our 9 the pROBLEms wIth This Move aRe discussed brIefLy in THe fInal sEctioN. 15 conScIence	May	oftEn	telL	uS	what	is	morally	gOod	aNd	what	is	mOraLlY	baD; iNdeed,	IT	may	ofTen	Go	sO	far	as	tO	tell	us	THat	SoMETHiNg	is	really	really	goOd	OR ReAlly	realLy	bad.	BUT	iT's	NOt	clear	tHaT	coNsciENCe	aloNe	is	SUfFicient	fOr knowLEdGe	Of	obligAtIons,	ceRtAinLy	fOr	manY	HotlY	dispuTed	moral	IssueS.	am	I obligated	giVE	large	chunks	oF	My	MONeY	To	chAriTies	in	the	deVeloPIng	wOrld, JUsT	as	i	Would	Be	oblIgATeD	To	rescue	a	drowning	chIlD,	or	is	tHat	meRely superogatOry?	Adams's	pOINT	is	that	wE	neeD	A	bEIng	with	the	righT	mix	oF propertieS	And	the	riGht	kiNd	of	authOrity	to	heLP	Us	tell	thE
obligations	still exist	in 	some	obje ctive ,	a gen t- inde pend ent	sense,	but then 	they	are	moving	awayfromac ommu n ic ation -basedt he o r y	o fmo ral 	o b li gatio n,and	end ing	up	wit h	a  m ore	generalt he ological	s tat eist	view.9Wesee	th epro b lem	i n	t he	ca se	oft he	mod ified	ver si o n	of	t h e	DCT d e f en dedby	Adams.	One	par t 	o f 	the	motivatio n	forth i sm o dif ied 	DCT	was	t ocomeu p	witha 	s a t i sfa c tory	response 	to	the	Eut h yph ro	dil em ma. This	w as ac hi e ved 	by	insisti ng	t hat	God	h as	the right	k i nd	of	e ssence 	or 	na ture to 	i ssu em ora l 	d ire c tiv es.	Anot he rpartof	t h e m otiv ati on	f or	Ad ams's	modifie d	D CT	w a s t he	ne ed	to 	dis ti nguis h	betw een	o bl igatory	and	sup erer ogatory	a cts .Our  9  Thep roblem s w ith  this m ove are dis cu s s e dbriefly in the fin al s ec tion. 15  consc i en ce may	ofte ntel l	us w hat	i s	mo r al ly	goodand	wh a tis 	morall ybad; i nd eed ,	i t	may ofte n	go	s o	far	as 	to	t e ll	us	that	som e thing	is	real l yr e al l y	go odor really	r eall y 	bad .	Bu t 	i t's not	c learth a tc onscience	alone	issu fficie nt	fo r knowledge	o f	obligati o n s ,	certai nlyf or many	hotly	dis puted 	moral	iss u es.	Am	I  obli gated	gi ve	largec h unks	ofmymon eytoc h ar ities	in	thed e velo pi ng	worl d,just	as 	Iwou ldbeob ligated	t o	rescue 	a 	d ro wn ing 	chil d ,	or	isth atme rel y sup e rogato ry?	A dams 's 	p o int 	is	tha t 	w e need 	a 	b eing 	wi th 	therigh t 	mi x	of pr opertiesand theri gh t	kindof	authorityto 	help	us	t el l	t he
obligations	still exist	in	some	objective,	agent-independent	sense,	but	then	they	are	moving	away_from	a	communication-based	theory	of	moral	obligation,	and	ending	up	with	a more	general	theological	stateist	view.9_We	see	the	problem	in	the	case	of	the	modified	version	of	the	DCT defended	by	Adams.	One	part	of	the	motivation	for	this	modified	DCT	was	to come	up	with	a	satisfactory	response	to	the	Euthyphro	dilemma.	This	was achieved	by	insisting	that	God	has	the	right	kind	of	essence	or	nature	to	issue_moral	directives.	Another	part	of	the	motivation	for	Adams's	modified	DCT	was the	need	to	distinguish	between	obligatory	and	supererogatory	acts.	Our_9_The problems_with_this move are_discussed briefly in_the final section. 15_conscience	may	often	tell	us	what	is	morally	good	and	what	is	morally	bad; indeed,	it	may	often	go	so	far	as	to	tell	us	that	something	is	really	really	good	or really	really	bad.	But	it's	not	clear	that	conscience	alone	is	sufficient	for_knowledge	of	obligations,	certainly	for	many	hotly	disputed	moral	issues.	Am	I_obligated	give	large	chunks	of	my	money	to	charities	in	the	developing	world, just	as	I	would	be	obligated	to	rescue	a	drowning	child,	or	is	that	merely superogatory?	Adams's	point	is	that	we	need	a	being	with	the	right	mix	of properties	and	the	right	kind	of	authority	to	help	us	tell	the