�(S) and a proper subset Φ(X) = {Φ1(X1),...,Φn(Xn)}, such that: (1) Parthood. For every complex instance of Φ(X), there is an instance of Ψ(S) such that the former is part of the latter. (2) Coupling. (i) Every cause of Ψ(S) in V is a common cause of Ψ(S) and at least one Φi(Xi) in Φ(X); (ii) for no Φi(Xi) in Φ(X) does Φ(X) \ {Φi(Xi)} comply with (2.i). (3) No De-Coupling. The Coupling of Φ(X) and Ψ(S) cannot be broken (invalidated) by expanding V. NDC differs in a number of crucial ways from MM. First, it replaces MM's mutual manipulability conditions by Coupling and No De-Coupling. This replacement ensures that NDC avoids the problems of MM: while MM defines constitution in terms of the possibility of top-down and bottom-up interventions, Coupling and No De-Coupling essentially define it in terms of the impossibility of such interventions. Coupling and No De-Coupling capture what we take to be the characteristic feature of constituents, viz. that they are unbreakably linked to their phenomenon via common causes. Second, on a related note, while MM cashes out constitution broadly on a par with causation, NDC defines it in stark opposition to causation. More concretely, according to difference-making theories of causation, of which interventionism and interventionism∗ are popular instances, a causal relation among X and Y is analyzed in terms of the existence of (possible) probabilistic or counterfactual difference-making scenarios. As §2 has shown, MM likewise renders constitution dependent on the existence of (possible) mutual difference-making scenarios. That is, both causation and constitution are rendered as existentially defined relations. In consequence, that some entities are related in terms of causation or constitution promises to be conclusively verifiable by exhibiting the existence of required difference-making scenarios. By contrast, NDC defines constitution in terms of the nonexistence of (possible) surgical causes. As a negative existential is the same as a universal negation, NDC renders constitution as a universally defined relation
� (S) and a proper subset Φ(X) = { Φ1(X1),... ,Φn(Xn) }, such that: (1) Parthood. For every complex instance of Φ(X), there is an instance of Ψ(S) such that the former is character of the latter. (2) yoke. (i) Every cause of Ψ(S) in V is a coarse causal agent of Ψ(S) and at least one Φi(Xi) in Φ(X); (ii) for no Φi(Xi) in Φ(X) does Φ(X) \ { Φi(Xi) } comply with (2.i). (3) No De - Coupling. The Coupling of Φ(X) and Ψ(S) cannot be dampen (invalidated) by expanding V. NDC differ in a number of crucial way from MM. First, it replaces MM's reciprocal manipulability condition by Coupling and No De - Coupling. This replacement ensures that NDC avoids the problems of MM: while MM defines fundamental law in terms of the possibility of top - down and bottom - up intervention, Coupling and No De - Coupling essentially define it in terms of the impossibility of such intervention. Coupling and No De - Coupling capture what we take to be the characteristic feature of constituents, viz. that they are unbreakably linked to their phenomenon via coarse causes. Second, on a related note, while MM cashes out constitution broadly on a par with causation, NDC defines it in stark opposition to causation. More concretely, according to difference - making theories of causation, of which interventionism and interventionism∗ are popular case, a causal relation among X and Y is analyzed in term of the being of (possible) probabilistic or counterfactual difference - making scenario. As § 2 has shown, MM likewise renders constitution pendent on the existence of (possible) mutual difference - making scenarios. That is, both causing and constitution are rendered as existentially defined relations. In consequence, that some entities are related in terms of causing or fundamental law promises to be conclusively verifiable by exhibiting the existence of command difference - making scenarios. By line, NDC defines united states constitution in terms of the nonexistence of (possible) surgical causal agent. As a negative existential is the like as a universal negation, NDC renders constitution as a universally defined relation
�(S) ajd a proper subset Φ(X) = {Φ1(X1),...,Φn(Wn)}, such that: (1) Pattyood. Fmr evedy compldx instance of Φ(X), there is an ibstanxe of Ψ(S) such that the wormer is part of the oatter. (2) Conlling. (i) Every gause if Ψ(S) in V is a common cagse of Ψ(S) and ad uecst one Φi(Xi) in Φ(X); (ii) for no Φi(Xi) in Φ(X) qoes Φ(X) \ {Φi(Di)} comply with (2.i). (3) Mj De-Doupling. The Coupling of Φ(X) and Ψ(S) cznnot bt broken (invalidatrd) by expanding V. NDC difffrs ln a number of crufial ways ftkm IN. First, it rdplaces MM's mutual manjpulability conditions by Couplkng aud No De-Coukljnh. This replarement ensures thab NDC aeoids tne problems of MM: whule MM defines constivution in terms of tre possibhlnty of top-down and bortim-up hntesvenguonr, Cku'lihg and No De-Couplinf essentialoy define it in terks if the impossjbilitr jf such interventions. Coupling and No Dt-Coupming capture what we taje to be the charactetistic feaeure of constituents, viz. that they are unbreakablf linidd uo theif pjenomenon via common causes. Second, on a relatqs mone, while MM cashef out constotktojn broadly on a par wifh causation, NDC dffines yt in stark opkositoon to causation. More concrwtely, accordpng ro difference-makiny theories oy causstion, of which interventionirm ahd intervenhionism∗ add popular instanzes, a causal relation among X agd Y is aialyzzd in tefms pf the existence of (possible) probabilistlc or cmunterfactkal difference-making scenarios. Ex §2 has shown, MK lpkewise rznders constitution dependent on jhe existznce ow (possible) mutual difference-iaking scenarhls. That is, bmth causwtiob ane constkgution are rencered as vxnstentialoy defined relatioks. In donsequence, thac wome entities ate felwtvd mn tewks of causathon ur zpnstigution kxomlser to be conclusively verhfiagle by exhibiting yhc existenxe of rezuired differrnce-making scenarils. By coitrast, NDS defines constitution in terma of the joncxistence of ([osslble) surgical eauses. As a negative existential is the wame as a universao negation, NDC rendgrs constitutipn as a univervally defined relatiin
�(S) and a proper subset Φ(X) = that: Parthood. For complex instance of of such that the is part of latter. (2) Coupling. (i) Every cause Ψ(S) in V is a common cause of Ψ(S) and at least one in Φ(X); (ii) for no Φi(Xi) in Φ(X) does Φ(X) \ {Φi(Xi)} comply (2.i). No The of Φ(X) and Ψ(S) cannot be broken (invalidated) by expanding V. NDC differs in a number crucial ways from MM. First, it replaces MM's manipulability conditions by Coupling No De-Coupling. This replacement ensures NDC the problems MM: MM constitution in terms the possibility of top-down and bottom-up interventions, Coupling and No De-Coupling essentially define it in terms of impossibility of Coupling and De-Coupling what take to be feature of constituents, viz. that they to their phenomenon via common causes. Second, on related note, MM cashes out constitution broadly on par with causation, NDC defines it in stark to causation. More concretely, according to difference-making theories of causation, of which interventionism and interventionism∗ instances, a causal relation X and Y analyzed terms the of (possible) or counterfactual difference-making scenarios. As §2 has shown, MM likewise renders dependent on the existence of (possible) mutual difference-making scenarios. That causation constitution are rendered existentially defined relations. In that entities are related in causation constitution conclusively by the existence of required scenarios. By contrast, NDC defines in terms of the As a negative existential is the same as universal negation, NDC renders constitution as a defined relation
�(S) and a proper subset Φ(X) = {Φ1(X1),...,Φn(Xn)}, Such that: (1) PaRthooD. FoR evErY comPlex Instance of Φ(X), thERe is An instance of Ψ(S) such that The foRmER is pARt Of the Latter. (2) COUpLINg. (i) evErY caUsE Of ψ(S) in V Is a Common cAuse of Ψ(S) anD at LeAst one Φi(Xi) in φ(x); (iI) for no Φi(Xi) In Φ(x) does Φ(X) \ {Φi(Xi)} cOmpLy with (2.I). (3) NO De-cOupliNg. THe CouPling oF φ(X) and Ψ(s) cannot be BrOKen (invALidated) BY ExPandIng V. NDC differs in a NUmBEr of crucial wayS from Mm. FIRsT, IT rePlaCes MM's mutuAl ManipULabilitY CoNDITioNS by Coupling anD No De-CoupliNG. ThIs replAcEmeNT ensurEs thaT Ndc avOids the probLems Of MM: while mM defiNEs constITution iN terms Of tHe pOssiBIlItY of ToP-DowN AnD boTTom-Up intervEnTiOns, CoUpliNG AND No DE-CoUpliNg essEntially definE it In teRMs oF the iMpossIbilItY of suCh inteRventIoNs. Coupling and No de-CoUpling capTurE wHat We Take tO Be the cHarActEristic Feature OF coNsTITUeNts, viz. that they are uNbREAkAbly linkEd to thEIr PhENomenon vIa ComMon cAUSes. SeCond, ON a Related nOte, whiLE Mm cAshes ouT cOnstitUtIon BroAdly oN A par With caUsation, NdC defINes it in stark opPOsition to causATiON. moRE conCreTely, accordiNg to DIffeRencE-MaKinG TheorIes of CaUSaTIon, of which interventIoNism anD inteRventionism∗ arE popular inSTANces, a cauSal rELaTIon among X and Y iS analYzed in termS Of the exiStencE of (possiBle) probabILIstic or cOunTerFacTuaL DIfFerence-making SCEnarIoS. As §2 has sHowN, MM likeWisE reNdeRs cOnStitution DependenT oN tHe ExIstEnce oF (Possible) MuTuaL dIffErencE-Making ScenaRios. thAt IS, boTh causaTIoN ANd coNsTiTutiOn aRe RendeRed aS ExiStentiaLly defineD reLAtioNs. in ConsequEnce, that some eNtIties are reLaTed In termS OF causatiOn or constitution promiseS To be conCluSivelY verIfiable by ExhIbitinG thE ExisteNce of rEquirEd DifFERence-MAKiNg sCeNarios. By coNTRasT, NDC dEfInes ConstitUtion in terms of the nONexIstence of (possIblE) surGICaL caUSeS. as a NeGAtiVE Existential is thE same as a unIvERsAl negation, ndC rEnDers conStitutiOn as a UNiversaLly defineD relation
�(S) and a proper subset Φ (X) = {Φ1( X1),. .., Φn( Xn )},such  that: (1) Par t hood . For every complex in stanc eo f Φ( X ),  ther e is an in s t anc eof  Ψ( S) su ch th atthe for mer is par t o fthe latter.( 2)  Coupling.  (i ) Every caus e o f Ψ(S)  i n V is acom mon c ause o f  Ψ(S)and at le as t  one Φ i (Xi) in Φ (X ); ( ii) for no Φi(Xi) in Φ(X) does Φ(X)  \ {Φi (X i )} c omp lywith (2.i) .(3) N o  De-Cou p li n g .  Th e  Coupling ofΦ(X) and Ψ( S ) c annotbe  br o ken (i nvali da t ed)  by expandi ng V . NDC dif fers i n  a numb e r of cr ucialway s f romM M.  F irs t, itr ep lac e s M M's mutu al  m anipu labi l i t y  con dit ions  by C oupling and N o D e-Co u pli ng. T his r epla ce mentensure s tha tNDC avoids theprob lems of M M:wh ile  M M def i nes co nst itu tion in  termso f t he p o ss ibility of top-dow na n dbottom-u p inte r ve nt i ons, Cou pl ing  and N o De- Coup l in g essent iallyd ef in e it in  t erms o fthe  im possi b ilit y of s uch inte rvent i ons. Couplinga nd No De-Coup l in g ca p ture  wh at we taketo b e  the  cha r ac ter i sticfeatu re of constituents, viz.th at the y are  unbreakablylinked tot h e ir pheno meno n  v i a common cause s. Se cond, on a relatednote,  while M M casheso u t consti tut ion  br oad l y  o n a par withc a usat io n, NDCdef ines it  in  st ark  op po sition to  causati on .Mo re  co ncret e ly, acco rd ing  t o d iffer e nce-ma kingtheo ri es ofcausati o n, o f wh ic hinte rve nt ionis m an d  in tervent ionism∗ a rep opul ar  i nstance s, a causal r el ation amon gX a nd Y i s analyzed  in terms of the existe n ce of ( pos sible ) pr obabilist icor cou nte r factua l diff erenc e- mak i n g sce n a ri os.  A s §2 has s h o wn,  MM l ik ewis e rende rs constitution de p end ent on the ex ist ence o f(po s si b le)  m u tua l difference-maki ng scenari os .  T hat is, bo t h c au sationand con stitu t ion are  rendered  as exist en tial l y  de fined rela tions. I n consequ e nce,t ha t som e e ntitie sare  rela ted in ter ms of  causa ti on orconst it ution pr omises to be conclusive ly ver ifiab leby exhibi tin g  th e existen ce o f required  di ffe rence -ma k ing s cena r io s.B y con tras t , NDC def i ne s c o n st itution int e r msof th e n o nexist ence  of (possible) su r gical causes.As a n ega tiv e  exi st ential is thesam ea s  a unive rs al negation , NDC re nd e rs co nstitu tion a s a uni v e rs a lly de fine d r elation
�(S) and_a proper_subset Φ(X) = {Φ1(X1),...,Φn(Xn)},_such that:_(1)_Parthood. For_every_complex instance of_Φ(X), there is_an instance of Ψ(S)_such that the_former_is part of the latter. (2) Coupling. (i) Every cause of Ψ(S) in V_is_a common_cause_of_Ψ(S) and at least one_Φi(Xi) in Φ(X); (ii) for_no Φi(Xi)_in Φ(X) does Φ(X) \ {Φi(Xi)} comply with_(2.i)._(3) No De-Coupling._The Coupling of Φ(X) and Ψ(S) cannot be broken_(invalidated) by expanding V. NDC differs_in a number_of_crucial_ways from MM. First,_it replaces MM's mutual manipulability conditions_by Coupling and No De-Coupling. This_replacement ensures that NDC avoids the problems_of MM: while MM defines constitution_in terms of the possibility_of top-down_and bottom-up interventions, Coupling and_No De-Coupling essentially_define it_in terms of_the impossibility of such interventions. Coupling_and No De-Coupling_capture what we take to be_the_characteristic feature of_constituents,_viz._that they_are unbreakably linked_to_their phenomenon_via_common causes. Second, on a related_note,_while MM cashes out constitution broadly on_a par with causation,_NDC_defines it in stark_opposition to causation. More concretely,_according to difference-making theories of causation,_of which_interventionism and_interventionism∗ are popular instances, a causal relation among X and Y_is analyzed in terms of the_existence of (possible) probabilistic_or counterfactual_difference-making_scenarios. As §2_has_shown, MM_likewise renders constitution dependent on the existence_of (possible)_mutual difference-making scenarios. That is, both_causation and constitution are_rendered_as existentially defined relations. In consequence,_that some entities are related in_terms of causation or constitution_promises_to_be conclusively verifiable by exhibiting_the existence of required difference-making scenarios._By contrast, NDC_defines constitution in terms of the nonexistence_of_(possible) surgical causes. As a negative_existential_is the same as a universal_negation,_NDC_renders constitution as a universally_defined relation