 is a non-causal form of dependence, and phenomena are non-reductively supervening on their constituents, constitution cannot be adequately accounted for in terms of mutual difference-making relations, along the lines of Craver's (2007) mutual manipulability theory (MM)-which likewise invalidates all accounts of mechanistic explanation based on MM. The reason is that different levels of a mechanism can only be manipulated simultaneously, on different causal paths. In other words, the top-down and bottom-up interventions required by MM are impossible, because phenomena and their constituents can only be manipulated with a fat hand. In light of the inevitable fat-handedness of interventions on mechanisms the inference to constitution is inherently underdetermined by evidence: for every constitutional model there exists an empirically equivalent pure common-cause model. In that light, this paper developed an abductive theory of constitution (NDC), according to which constitution is a dependence relation that best explains why phenomena and some of their spatiotemporal parts are unbreakably coupled via common causes. Rather than in terms of the possibility of mutual differencemaking scenarios, NDC spells out constitution in terms of the impossibility of such scenarios. Against that background, constitutional inference and discovery appear in a new light. Subject to NDC, establishing that Φ is a constituent of Ψ amounts to establishing that Φ is contained in a set Φ that is unbreakably common-cause coupled to Ψ; this, in turn, calls for a whole battery of experiments exploring the space of possible manipulations of the scrutinized system. The abductive inference to constitution is warranted only if all attempts to de-couple Φ and Ψ have failed. An obvious question remains: is it possible to faithfully reconstruct constitutional reasoning in science in terms of NDC? Craver (2007) contends that MM provides a faithful reconstruction of scientific practice, and he has undertaken considerable efforts to interpret real-life studies on the basis of MM. We have done none of that sort for NDC here. Still, our results demonstrate that MM cannot ground a viable method of constitutional discovery. Hence, if we grant practicing scientists that they uncover constitutive relations based on some viable method- whichever this may be-MM cannot faithfully reconstruct their practice. How well NDC fares in this respect is thus the crucial follow-up question to be answered in future work. Acknowledgements We thank the audiences of the annual conference of the British Society for the Philosophy of Science, Manchester, 2–3 July 2015, and of the
is a non - causal form of dependence, and phenomena are non - reductively supervening on their part, fundamental law cannot be adequately accounted for in terms of mutual dispute - making relations, along the note of Craver's (2007) reciprocal manipulability theory (MM)-which similarly invalidates all accounts of mechanistic explanation free-base on MM. The reason is that different level of a mechanism can only be manipulated simultaneously, on different causal paths. In other parole, the top - down and bottom - up interventions required by MM are impossible, because phenomenon and their constituents can only be manipulated with a fat hired hand. In light of the inevitable fat - handedness of interventions on mechanisms the inference to constitution is inherently underdetermined by evidence: for every built-in model there exists an empirically equivalent pure common - cause model. In that light, this paper developed an abductive theory of constitution (NDC), according to which constitution is a dependence relation that best explains why phenomenon and some of their spatiotemporal parts are unbreakably coupled via coarse campaign. Rather than in terms of the possibility of common differencemaking scenarios, NDC spells out constitution in terms of the impossibility of such scenario. Against that background, constitutional inference and discovery appear in a new light. Subject to NDC, install that Φ is a constituent of Ψ amounts to establishing that Φ is contained in a hardening Φ that is unbreakably common - campaign coupled to Ψ; this, in turn, calls for a whole battery of experiment exploring the space of possible manipulation of the scrutinized system. The abductive inference to constitution is warranted entirely if all attempts to delaware - couple Φ and Ψ have failed. An obvious question remains: is it possible to faithfully reconstruct built-in reasoning in science in terminus of NDC? Craver (2007) contends that MM provide a faithful reconstruction of scientific practice, and he has contract considerable efforts to understand real - life studies on the basis of MM. We have done none of that sort for NDC here. Still, our results demonstrate that MM cannot anchor a viable method of constituent discovery. Hence, if we grant practice scientists that they uncover constitutive relations free-base on some viable method- whichever this may be - MM cannot faithfully reconstruct their practice. How well NDC fares in this respect is thus the crucial be - up doubt to be answered in future work. Acknowledgements We thank the audiences of the annual conference of the British Society for the Philosophy of Science, Manchester, 2–3 July 2015, and of the
 is a non-causal form of deptndence, and phenomena arx non-resuctivelh supervening on their constmtuebts, cinstitution cannot be xdequatelj accountwd fie in terms of mutual difrcrencz-meking relations, along the lines of Cravar'r (2007) mutual manipulability theory (MM)-whish likeeide invalidates all wccohnts of mechanistic explanation baaed on KM. The reason is that different levels lf a mechanism can onlj be manipuoateq simultaneourly, on different causam paths. In other words, the top-duwn aud bottom-up ibtegeentions rewuireq by MM are lkpossitle, becsuse phenomena anv thwir constituents can mnly be manipulateq with a xac hand. In light of thw unevijable fat-fqndddntss or integveitions on mschanisms tye inference to conxtynition is inhsrentlr tnderdetermined by evidence: for every cmnsfitutional model there wxists an empirically equivalegt pure common-cause model. In that light, this papes devxlupeb an aceuftive theory of constitution (NDC), according to shocm constitution if a dependemcf tglation that bgst explaihs why phenomena ajd some of tyeir spatyotekporal parts are unbreakablt coupled vic cimmon causes. Rathex than in texms of the lossibility of mutual dnfferehcemaking sfenarios, HAC spells out covstptuthon in ttfms of the impossybility oh suck scenarkos. Sgainse that bacngroukg, constitutional ijfereuce atd discovegy appear in a new light. Subjecv to NDC, estanlhshpng that Φ is a constituent jf Ψ amounts to establnshing that Φ is bontained in a set Φ ehat is unbrednably common-rause cou[led to Ψ; this, iv turn, calls fot a whole battery od experiments explprivf the space of 'uwsible manipulayiovs jf tie scwgtinized sysdem. Ghe sbducgive inferekce to vonstitution is warrdntes only if all attekpbs to de-ciuple Φ agd Ψ have failrd. An obvious quesuion rxmains: is iy pjssible to faithfully reconstrhct constltubional reasonyng ln ssience in cerms of NDC? Craver (2007) contends that MM privides a faithful eeconstruction of seitntific practmce, anq he has gndertaken consideravle efforts to inuerpret real-life studiea on tve badis of MM. We have done none of that sort for NDC here. Still, our results dwmonstcaee that MM dannpt grmuud c viablq mevhud of constitutipnal discovery. Hence, if we granv practicitg scientists that they uncovet zonstitutive telations based on some vizble metnod- whichever this may be-MM canmot faithfully reconstrugt their practjce. How weul NDC fares in thos res'ect iw thus rhe grucial follow-jp aucstion to he aiswzred in future work. Acknowledgemebts We tjank the audiencxs of the ankuxl cohferense of the Britisg Sodlety wor the Philoxophy of Scienve, Manchester, 2–3 July 2015, agd of the
is a non-causal form of dependence, and non-reductively on their constitution cannot be of difference-making relations, along lines of Craver's mutual manipulability theory (MM)-which likewise invalidates accounts of mechanistic explanation based on MM. The reason is that different levels a mechanism can only be manipulated simultaneously, on different causal paths. In other the and interventions by MM are impossible, because phenomena and their constituents can only be manipulated with a fat In light of the inevitable fat-handedness of interventions mechanisms the inference to is inherently underdetermined by evidence: every model there an equivalent common-cause model. In light, this paper developed an abductive theory of constitution (NDC), according to which constitution is a dependence that best phenomena and of spatiotemporal are unbreakably coupled causes. Rather than in terms of mutual differencemaking scenarios, NDC spells out constitution in of the of such scenarios. Against that background, inference and discovery appear in a new light. to NDC, establishing that Φ is a constituent of Ψ amounts to establishing that Φ in a set Φ is unbreakably common-cause to this, turn, for a battery of experiments exploring the space of possible manipulations of the system. The abductive inference to constitution is warranted only if to Φ and Ψ failed. An obvious question is possible to faithfully reconstruct in in Craver contends MM provides a faithful of scientific practice, and he undertaken considerable efforts to basis of MM. We have done none of sort for NDC here. Still, our results that MM cannot ground a viable method of constitutional discovery. Hence, if grant practicing they uncover constitutive relations based on some viable whichever this may be-MM faithfully reconstruct their practice. How well NDC fares in respect thus the follow-up question to answered in future Acknowledgements We thank of the conference the the Philosophy of Science, Manchester, 2–3 2015, of the
 is a non-causal form of dependeNce, and phenOmena Are Non-ReDuctIvelY supervening on THeir Constituents, constitutiOn canNoT Be adEQuAtely AccountED fOR In tErMs Of mUtUAl DiffeRenCe-makinG relations, AloNg The lines of CrAVeR's (2007) mutual maNipUlability theOry (mM)-whicH lIkeWIse inValIdateS all acCOunts oF mechanisTiC ExplanATion basED On mM. ThE reason is that diffEReNT levels of a mechAnism cAn ONlY BE maNipUlated simuLtAneouSLy, on difFErENT CauSAl paths. In otheR words, the toP-DowN and boTtOm-uP IntervEntioNs REquIred by MM are ImpoSsible, becAuse phENomena aND their cOnstitUenTs cAn onLY bE mAniPuLAteD WiTh a FAt hAnd. In ligHt Of The inEvitABLE Fat-hAndEdneSs of iNterventions oN meChanISms The inFerenCe to CoNstitUtion iS inheReNtly underdetermIned By evidencE: foR eVerY cOnstiTUtionaL moDel There exIsts an eMPirIcALLY eQuivalent pure commoN-cAUSe Model. In tHat ligHT, tHiS Paper devElOpeD an aBDUctivE theORy Of constiTution (ndC), AcCording To Which cOnStiTutIon is A DepeNdence Relation That bESt explains why pHEnomena and somE Of THEiR SpatIotEmporal partS are UNbreAkabLY cOupLEd via CommoN cAUsES. Rather than in terms oF tHe possIbiliTy of mutual difFerencemakING ScenarioS, NDC SPeLLs out constitutIon in Terms of the IMpossibiLity oF such sceNarios. AgaINSt that baCkgRouNd, cOnsTITuTional inferenCE And dIsCovery aPpeAr in a neW liGht. subJecT tO NDC, estabLishing tHaT Φ Is A cOnsTitueNT of Ψ amouNtS to EsTabLishiNG that Φ Is conTainEd In A Set φ that is UNbREAkabLy CoMmon-CauSe CouplEd to ψ; ThiS, in turn, Calls for a WhoLE batTeRy Of experIments exploriNg The space of PoSsiBle manIPUlations Of the scrutinized system. THE abductIve InferEnce To constitUtiOn is waRraNTed onlY if all AttemPtS to DE-CouplE φ AnD Ψ hAvE failed. An oBVIouS quesTiOn reMains: is It possible to faithfULly Reconstruct coNstItutIONaL reASoNIng In SCieNCE in terms of NDC? CrAver (2007) contenDs THaT MM provideS A faItHful recOnstrucTion oF ScientiFic practiCe, and he haS uNderTAKen ConsiderabLe effortS to interpREt reaL-LiFe stuDieS on the BaSis Of MM. WE have dONe nOne of That soRt For NDC Here. STiLl, our resUlts demonstrate that MM caNnot grOund a ViaBle method Of cONstItutional DiscOvery. Hence, If wE grAnt prActICing sCienTIsTs tHAt theY uncOVer constiTUtIve RELaTions based oN SOMe vIable MetHOd- whicHeveR this may be-MM cannoT Faithfully recoNstrUCT thEir PRactIcE. How well NDC farEs iN tHIS respect Is Thus the crucIal folloW-uP QuestIon to bE answeRed in fuTURe WOrk. AckNowlEdgEments We tHanK tHE audienCeS oF The annUal cOnFerencE of the bRitiSH society for the PhiLosopHY Of SciENce, manchEsTer, 2–3 July 2015, ANd of The
 is a non-causal form of d ependence,  andphe nom en a ar e no n-reductivelys uper vening on their consti tuent s, cons t it ution  cannot be a deq ua te lyac c ou ntedfor  in ter ms of mutu aldi fference-mak i ng  relations , a long the lin esof Cra ve r's (2007 ) m utual  manip u labili ty theory  ( M M)-whi c h likew i s einva lidates all accou n ts of mechanistic  expla na t io n bas edon MM. The  r eason is that di f f e ren t  levels of amechanism c a n o nly be  m ani p ulated  simu lt a neo usly, on di ffer ent causa l path s . In ot h er word s, the  to p-d owna nd  b ott om - upi nt erv e nti ons requ ir ed  by M M ar e i m poss ibl e, b ecaus e phenomena a ndthei r  co nstit uents  can  o nly b e mani pulat ed  with a fat han d. I n light o f t he  in ev itabl e  fat-h and edn ess ofinterve n tio ns o n  m echanisms the infe re n c eto const itutio n  i si nherentl yund erde t e rmine d by ev idence:for ev e ry  c onstitu ti onal m od elthe re ex i stsan emp irically  equi v alent pure com m on-cause mode l .I n  t h at l igh t, this pap er d e velo peda nabd u ctive  theo ry of constitution (NDC),  a ccordi ng to  which consti tution isa d ependenc e re l at i on that best e xplai ns why phe n omena an d som e of the ir spatio t e mporal p art s a reunb r e ak ably coupledv i a co mm on caus es.  Rather  th aninter ms  of the p ossibili ty  o fmu tua l dif f erencema ki ngsc ena rios, NDC sp ellsoutco ns t itu tion in te r m s of  t he  imp oss ib ility  ofs uch  scenar ios. Agai nst that  b ac kground , constitutio na l inferenc eand  disco v e ry appea r in a new light. Subje c t to ND C,estab lish ing thatΦ i s a co nst i tuentof Ψ a mount stoe s tabli s h in g t ha t Φ is con t a ine d inasetΦ thatis unbreakably com m on- cause coupled  to  Ψ;t h is , i n  t u rn,  c a lls f or a whole batt ery of exp er i me nts explor i ngth e space  of pos sible manipul ations of  the scru ti nize d sys tem. The a bductive  inferenc e  to c o ns titut ion  is wa rr ant ed on ly ifa llattem pts to  d e-coup le Φan d Ψ have  failed. An obvious que stionremai ns:  is it po ssi b leto faithf ully  reconstru ctcon stitu tio n al re ason i ng  in scien ce i n  terms of ND C?C r av er (2007) c o n t end s tha t M M  provi desa faithful recons t ruction of sci enti f i c p rac t ice,  a nd he has unde rta ke n consider ab le effortsto inter pr e t rea l-life  studi es on t h e  b a sis of  MM.  We  have don e n on e  of tha tso r t forNDChe re. St ill, o u r re s u lts demonstratethatM M  cann o t g round  a  viable meth od of cons titutionaldiscov ery.  Henc e, if w egrantpra ct icing scie n tists tha t the y uncov er  con sti tutive  rel a t ionsbase donsome viab l e  m e th od -  wh iche ver t hi s ma y be-MM c a nnot fai thf u lly rec on str u c t thei r  p r a ctice. How  we ll ND C fares in t h is r e sp e ct is  thusthe cr ucial f o llo w- up ques tio n to be ans wered inf utu re  wor k. Ackno wl edge me nts  W e thank the aud iences o f the an n u al con fer e nceo f theBr itish Societ y for  t h e Philo s o phy  of Sci e nce , M anc hest er,  2–3 July 2015, and of the
 is_a non-causal_form of dependence, and_phenomena are_non-reductively_supervening on_their_constituents, constitution cannot_be adequately accounted_for in terms of_mutual difference-making relations,_along_the lines of Craver's (2007) mutual manipulability theory (MM)-which likewise invalidates all accounts of_mechanistic_explanation based_on_MM._The reason is that different_levels of a mechanism can_only be_manipulated simultaneously, on different causal paths. In other_words,_the top-down and_bottom-up interventions required by MM are impossible, because phenomena_and their constituents can only be_manipulated with a_fat_hand._In light of the_inevitable fat-handedness of interventions on mechanisms_the inference to constitution is inherently_underdetermined by evidence: for every constitutional model_there exists an empirically equivalent pure_common-cause model. In that light,_this paper_developed an abductive theory of_constitution (NDC), according_to which_constitution is a_dependence relation that best explains why_phenomena and some_of their spatiotemporal parts are unbreakably_coupled_via common causes._Rather_than_in terms_of the possibility_of_mutual differencemaking_scenarios,_NDC spells out constitution in terms_of_the impossibility of such scenarios. Against that_background, constitutional inference and_discovery_appear in a new_light. Subject to NDC, establishing_that Φ is a constituent of_Ψ amounts_to establishing_that Φ is contained in a set Φ that is unbreakably_common-cause coupled to Ψ; this, in_turn, calls for a_whole battery_of_experiments exploring the_space_of possible_manipulations of the scrutinized system. The abductive_inference to_constitution is warranted only if all_attempts to de-couple Φ_and_Ψ have failed. An obvious question_remains: is it possible to faithfully_reconstruct constitutional reasoning in science_in_terms_of NDC? Craver (2007) contends_that MM provides a faithful reconstruction_of scientific practice,_and he has undertaken considerable efforts to_interpret_real-life studies on the basis of_MM._We have done none of that_sort_for_NDC here. Still, our results_demonstrate that MM cannot ground a_viable method of constitutional discovery. Hence, if we grant_practicing scientists that_they uncover constitutive relations based_on_some_viable method- whichever this may be-MM cannot faithfully reconstruct their_practice. How_well NDC fares_in this respect is thus the crucial follow-up question to_be answered in future work. Acknowledgements We_thank the audiences of the annual conference of the British Society_for the Philosophy of Science, Manchester, 2–3 July_2015, and of the