 referent of a token may be derived from the fundamental notion of a person referring: a token of an expression refers to x iff the person using that token is thereby referring to x. For our purposes, it does not matter which notion one thinks of as fundamental. What matters is that this line of thought may lead one to say that there is no such thing as, or that there is something wrong with the idea of, reference in the absence of a token, and, in particular, that there is no such thing as a referent of an expression type. Suppose that one holds such a view. Then, plausibly, we would get the result that "pail" and "bucket" have different meanings, just like "I" and "je" above: Character Function for "pail": The meaning of "pail" is the function from each token of "pail" to the property of being a pail/bucket. Character Function for "bucket": The meaning of "bucket" is the function from each token of 7 "bucket" to the property of being a pail/bucket. The last part of these is unproblematic, assuming, as I would, that the property of being a bucket is the same as the property of being a pail; or one may instead forgo talk of properties, and talk about the class of pails in that world, etc. The problem comes from the fact that the two functions have distinct domains, namely the class of "pail"-tokens and the class of "bucket"-tokens. I take it that this result is unacceptable: it would entail that there are no synonyms among expressions for whom referents are only assigned to tokens. Under this guise, the puzzle threatens a particular kind of semantic theory, rather than prototypical token-reflexive expressions like "I" and "je", namely a theory that thinks of reference as requiring a token, and thus of meaning as ascribing referents only to tokens.10 The second way one may run into trouble with the puzzle is if one thinks for some other reason that (C) above is true, i.e. that there are token-reflexive expressions. Such a semanticist would find coherent and unproblematic the notion of meanings that assign referents to expression types. But they may think that some expressions simply have a different kind of meaning, which only assigns a referent to tokens. My favorite example are demonstratives. Suppose, as I think, that a
referent of a token may be derived from the fundamental notion of a person refer: a keepsake of an expression refers to x iff the person use that keepsake is thereby referring to x. For our purposes, it does not matter which impression one think of as cardinal. What count is that this line of thought may head one to say that there is no such thing as, or that there is something wrong with the idea of, mention in the absence of a token, and, in particular, that there is no such matter as a referent of an expression type. think that one holds such a position. Then, plausibly, we would get the result that " pail " and " bucket " have different meaning, just like " I " and " je " above: Character Function for " pail ": The meaning of " pail " is the function from each token of " pail " to the property of being a pail / bucket. Character Function for " bucket ": The meaning of " bucket " is the function from each token of 7 " bucket " to the property of being a pail / bucket. The last part of these is unproblematic, assuming, as I would, that the property of being a bucket is the like as the place of being a pail; or one may instead forgo lecture of place, and talk about the class of pails in that world, etc. The problem comes from the fact that the two functions have discrete domains, namely the class of " pail"-tokens and the class of " bucket"-tokens. I take it that this result is unacceptable: it would fee-tail that there are no synonyms among expressions for whom referents are only assigned to tokens. Under this guise, the puzzle endanger a particular kind of semantic theory, rather than prototypical token - automatic expressions like " I " and " je ", namely a theory that thinks of reference as requiring a token, and thus of meaning as ascribing referents only to tokens.10 The second room one may run into worry with the puzzle is if one thinks for some other rationality that (C) above is truthful, i.e. that there are nominal - reflexive expressions. Such a semanticist would recover coherent and unproblematic the notion of meanings that assign referent to expression types. But they may intend that some expressions simply have a different kind of meaning, which only delegate a referent to tokens. My favorite exercise are demonstratives. Suppose, as I intend, that a
 reverent of a token may be derived from tkw fundemental notion uf a person referring: a tokei of an ezpression refers to x kff the pvrson usibg tiat token is thecsby refcxring bo x. Yoc our purposes, lt does not matter which togiln one thinks of as fundamental. Whae mattets is that this jine jf tgought may lead one to say that thsre is io such thing ax, or that there is somethijg wgong with the idea of, referenxe ig the absence of a token, and, in parjicular, that there is no such thkng ax a referebt of dn expressiin tyie. Suppose that one hmlds suvh a view. Then, pleusivly, we would get the cesult that "pail" and "bucket" hdvz different meanings, huwt line "I" and "he" xbobe: Cgaractfr Hunction fod "pail": The neaning of "pail" is uhe dunction from each eohen of "pail" to the property of being a kail/bhcket. Character Functiob for "bucket": The meanlng of "busket" is the function from each token of 7 "bucket" tm the orokevby ow bfing a pail/bucket. The last part of these is uglrpbkematic, assumikg, as I would, that tje kroperty of bekng a yhciet is the same as the prjpertt of beind a lail; or one may instead forto talk of pgopeeties, and talk abobt the class of kails on that world, etc. The pxoblem comes from the fact ghat the two funztipnv have distinct domains, naiely the rlass of "paiu"-tokgns and the class of "bmwket"-tokens. I take lt thct thhs result ls unacceptable: it would entail that there arg nm sjnonyms aiong cxpressions for whom referentx are ouly asrigned to nokens. Unver this guife, the puzzle jhreatens a perticular kine of semantkz theory, rathet than prototypical token-reflexive exiresskkns like "I" and "lt", nqmely a theory yhag trijkx jx reference ds rdqukting x token, and ghus of meaning as ascriting referents only to tjkens.10 Thg second ray one may rin into trouble wiuh the puvzle ix is one thinks for some other rezson that (C) wbove is truq, i.e. that there cre token-reflexive expressions. Such a senanticist would fibd coherent and unptobkematic the notijn of meatings that assign rederents to expresxion types. But they mzy thitk thwt some expressions simply have a different kind of meaning, which only aswigns e weferent to tokrns. Mj fcvoxite exwmplx ere demonstrativex. Suppose, as I think, that a
referent of a token may be derived fundamental of a referring: a token x the person using token is thereby to x. For our purposes, it not matter which notion one thinks of as fundamental. What matters is that line of thought may lead one to say that there is no such as, that is wrong with the idea of, reference in the absence of a token, and, in particular, that is no such thing as a referent of expression type. Suppose that holds such a view. Then, we get the that and have different meanings, like "I" and "je" above: Character Function for "pail": The meaning of "pail" is the function from token of the property being pail/bucket. Function for "bucket": of "bucket" is the function from 7 "bucket" to the property of being a The last of these is unproblematic, assuming, as would, that the property of being a bucket the same as the property of being a pail; or one may instead forgo talk and talk about the of pails in world, The comes the fact the two functions have distinct domains, namely the class of "pail"-tokens the class of "bucket"-tokens. I take it that this result it entail that there no synonyms among expressions whom are only assigned to this the particular of theory, rather than prototypical expressions like "I" and "je", a theory that thinks token, and thus of meaning as ascribing referents to tokens.10 The second way one may into trouble with the puzzle is if one thinks for some other that (C) true, i.e. that there are token-reflexive expressions. Such semanticist would find coherent unproblematic the notion of meanings that assign referents to types. they may that some expressions have a different of meaning, which a referent tokens. favorite Suppose, as I think, that a
 referent of a token may be deriVed from the FundaMenTal NoTion Of a pErson referring: A TokeN of an expression refers tO x iff ThE PersON uSing tHat tokeN Is THEreBy ReFerRiNG tO x. For Our PurposeS, it does not MatTeR which notion ONe Thinks of as FunDamental. What MatTers is ThAt tHIs linE of ThougHt may lEAd one tO say that tHeRE is no sUCh thing AS, Or That There is something wROnG With the idea of, rEferenCe IN tHE AbsEncE of a token, aNd, In parTIcular, tHAt THERe iS No such thing as A referent of AN exPressiOn TypE. supposE that OnE HolDs such a view. then, Plausibly, We woulD Get the rESult thaT "pail" aNd "bUckEt" haVE dIfFerEnT MeaNInGs, jUSt lIke "I" and "jE" aBoVe: ChaRactER fUNctiOn fOr "paIl": The Meaning of "pail" Is tHe fuNCtiOn froM each TokeN oF "pail" To the pRoperTy Of being a pail/bucKet. CHaracter FUncTiOn fOr "BuckeT": the meaNinG of "Bucket" iS the funCTioN fROM EaCh token of 7 "bucket" to tHe PROpErty of beIng a paIL/bUcKEt. The lasT pArt Of thESE is unProbLEmAtic, assuMing, as i WoUlD, that thE pRopertY oF beIng A buckET is tHe same As the proPerty OF being a pail; or oNE may instead foRGo TALk OF proPerTies, and talk AbouT The cLass OF pAilS In thaT worlD, eTC. THE problem comes from thE fAct thaT the tWo functions haVe distinct DOMAins, nameLy thE ClASs of "pail"-tokens And thE class of "buCKet"-tokenS. I takE it that tHis result IS UnacceptAblE: it WouLd eNTAiL that there are NO SynoNyMs among ExpRessionS foR whOm rEfeReNts are onlY assigneD tO tOkEnS. UnDer thIS guise, thE pUzzLe ThrEatenS A partiCular Kind Of SeMAntIc theorY, RaTHEr thAn PrOtotYpiCaL tokeN-refLExiVe expreSsions likE "I" aND "je", nAmElY a theorY that thinks of ReFerence as rEqUirIng a toKEN, and thus Of meaning as ascribing refERents onLy tO tokeNs.10 ThE second waY onE may ruN inTO troubLe with The puZzLe iS IF one tHINkS foR sOme other reASOn tHat (C) aBoVe is True, i.e. tHat there are token-reFLexIve expressionS. SuCh a sEMAnTicISt WOulD fINd cOHErent and unproblEmatic the nOtIOn Of meanings THat AsSign refErents tO exprESsion tyPes. But theY may think ThAt soME ExpRessions siMply have A differenT Kind oF MeAning, WhiCh only AsSigNs a reFerent TO toKens. MY favorItE exampLe are DeMonstratIves. Suppose, as I think, that A
 referent of a token may b e derivedfromthe  fu nd amen talnotion of a pe r sonreferring: a token ofan ex pr e ssio n  r efers  to x i f ft h e p er so n u si n gthattok en is t hereby ref err in g to x. Foro ur  purposes,  it  does not ma tte r whic hnot i on on e t hinks  of as fundam ental. Wh at matter s  is tha t th is l ine of thought ma y  l e ad one to saythat t he r ei s  no  su ch thing a s,  or t h at ther e  i s s ome t hing wrong wi th the idea of,  refer en cei n theabsen ce ofa token, an d, i n particu lar, t h at ther e  is nosuch t hin g a s ar ef er ent  o f  an ex pre s sio n type.Su pp ose t hato n e hold s s ucha vie w. Then, plau sib ly,w e w ouldget t he r es ult t hat "p ail"an d "bucket" have  dif ferent me ani ng s,ju st li k e "I"and  "j e" abov e: Char a cte rF u n ct ion for "pail": Th em e an ing of " pail"i sth e  functio nfro m ea c h  toke n of "p ail" tothe pr o pe rt y of be in g a pa il /bu cke t. Ch a ract er Fun ction fo r "bu c ket": The mean i ng of "bucket "  i s th e  fun cti on from eac h to k en o f 7" bu cke t " tothe p ro p er t y of being a pail/b uc ket. T he la st part of th ese is unp r o b lematic,  ass u mi n g, as I would,  that  the prope r ty of be ing a  bucketis the sa m e  as thepro per tyofb e in g a pail; oro n e ma yinstead  fo rgo tal k o f p rop ert ie s, and ta lk about  t he  c la ssof pa i ls in th at  wo rl d,etc.T he pro blemcome sfr o m t he fact th a t  the  t wo  fun cti on s hav e di s tin ct doma ins, name lyt he c la ss  of "pa il"-tokens an dthe classof  "b ucket" - t okens. I  take it that this resu l t is un acc eptab le:it wouldent ail th att here a re nosynon ym s a m o ng ex p r es sio ns  for whomr e fer entsar e on ly assi gned to tokens. Un d erthis guise, t hepuzz l e  t hre a te n s a  p a rti c u lar kind of sem antic theo ry ,  r ather than pro to typical  token- refle x ive exp ressionslike "I"an d "j e " , n amely a th eory tha t thinkso f ref e re nce a s r equiri ng  atoken , andt hus  of m eaning  a s ascr ibing  r eferents  only to tokens.10 Thesecond  wayone  may runint o  tr ouble wit h th e puzzle i s i f o ne th ink s  forsome ot her reaso n th a t (C) abo v eist r ue , i.e. that t h ere  aretok e n-refl exiv e expressions. Su c h a semanticis t wo u l d f ind cohe re nt and unprobl ema ti c the noti on  of meaning s that a ss i gn re ferent s to e xpressi o n  t y pes. B ut t hey  may thin k t ha t  some e xp re s sionssimp ly  havea diff e rent k ind of meaning,which o nly a s sig ns are ferentt o to kens. My f avorite exa mple a re d emons trative s.  Suppo se,  a s I think, that a
 referent_of a_token may be derived_from the_fundamental_notion of_a_person referring: a_token of an_expression refers to x_iff the person_using_that token is thereby referring to x. For our purposes, it does not matter_which_notion one_thinks_of_as fundamental. What matters is_that this line of thought_may lead_one to say that there is no such_thing_as, or that_there is something wrong with the idea of, reference_in the absence of a token,_and, in particular,_that_there_is no such thing_as a referent of an expression_type. Suppose that one holds such_a view. Then, plausibly, we would get_the result that "pail" and "bucket"_have different meanings, just like_"I" and_"je" above: Character Function for_"pail": The meaning_of "pail"_is the function_from each token of "pail" to_the property of_being a pail/bucket. Character Function for_"bucket":_The meaning of_"bucket"_is_the function_from each token_of_7 "bucket"_to_the property of being a pail/bucket._The_last part of these is unproblematic, assuming,_as I would, that_the_property of being a_bucket is the same as_the property of being a pail;_or one_may instead_forgo talk of properties, and talk about the class of pails_in that world, etc. The problem_comes from the fact_that the_two_functions have distinct_domains,_namely the_class of "pail"-tokens and the class of_"bucket"-tokens. I_take it that this result is_unacceptable: it would entail_that_there are no synonyms among expressions_for whom referents are only assigned_to tokens. Under this guise,_the_puzzle_threatens a particular kind of_semantic theory, rather than prototypical token-reflexive_expressions like "I"_and "je", namely a theory that thinks_of_reference as requiring a token, and_thus_of meaning as ascribing referents only_to_tokens.10_The second way one may_run into trouble with the puzzle_is if one thinks for some other reason that_(C) above is_true, i.e. that there are_token-reflexive_expressions._Such a semanticist would find coherent and unproblematic the notion_of meanings_that assign referents_to expression types. But they may think that some expressions_simply have a different kind of meaning,_which only assigns a referent to tokens. My favorite example are_demonstratives. Suppose, as I think, that a