criticized" Descartes by introducing time as a component of the cogito, he eff ectively created a new concept with a new object. More than most of his contemporaries, Deleuze insisted on the autonomy of philosophy as a discipline, arguing forcefully for the irreducibility of philosophical concepts to scientifi c functions or logical propositions. Deleuze contrasts the reference of functions with the consistency of concepts: what Deleuze calls a "function" is always defi ned in relation to an actualized virtual (which fi nds its reference in a state of things, an object, or lived experience), whereas philosophical concepts are defi ned by the consistency they give to the virtual as such. Consequently, philosophical concepts are not propositional, and do not form a discursive whole; they are rather fragmentary totalities with irregular contours that "freely enter into relationships of nondiscursive resonance."39 Taken together, these fi ve rubrics, although certainly not exhaustive, nonetheless serve to present the broad outlines of a systematic philosophy of diff erence as it appears in Deleuze's work. Critics have posed objections in each of these domains: How can a diff erential "logic of sensation" imply a theory of art without fi rst addressing the conceptual question "What is art?" – a question Duchamp's 39. Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, 23. Volume 6 gilles deleuze 109 works threw down like a gauntlet to the twentieth century? According to what criteria can one assess the validity of a philosophical concept if it creates its object simply by being posited, and has no "referent"? Does not a diff erential ethics amount to a kind of moral nihilism in which all diff erences are in turn affi rmed as equally valid (as Jürgen Habermas has charged), or an aestheticism in which ethics is reduced to a private search for autonomy or selfinvention (as Richard Rorty claimed)? Such criticisms, and others like them, can be summed up in the reproach that a philosophy of diff erence seems unable (or unwilling) to put forward normative criteria of judgment in any domain, and in this sense it fails in the "critical" task that Kant himself assigned to philosophy. In response, Deleuze insisted that one of the signifi cant consequences of a philosophy of diff erence is its shift in emphasis away from the
criticized " Descartes by introducing time as a component of the cogito, he eff ectively create a newfangled concept with a new object. More than most of his contemporaries, Deleuze importune on the autonomy of philosophy as a discipline, arguing forcefully for the irreducibility of philosophic concepts to scientifi c functions or legitimate propositions. Deleuze contrasts the reference book of functions with the consistency of concepts: what Deleuze call a " function " is always defi ned in relation to an actualized virtual (which fi nds its reference in a state of thing, an object, or lived experience), whereas philosophical concept are defi ned by the consistency they give to the virtual as such. Consequently, philosophical concept are not propositional, and do not form a digressive whole; they are rather fragmental totalities with irregular contours that " freely enter into relationship of nondiscursive resonance. "39 Taken together, these fi ve rubrics, although certainly not exhaustive, however service to present the broad outlines of a systematic philosophy of diff erence as it appears in Deleuze's work. Critics have posed expostulation in each of these domains: How can a diff erential " logic of sensation " incriminate a hypothesis of artwork without fi rst addressing the conceptual question " What is art? " – a question Duchamp's 39. Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy? , 23. Volume 6 gilles deleuze 109 works threw down like a gauntlet to the twentieth hundred? According to what criteria can one assess the validity of a philosophical concept if it creates its object simply by being posited, and has no " referent "? Does not a diff erential ethics amount to a kind of moral nihilistic delusion in which all diff erences are in turn affi rmed as evenly valid (as Jürgen Habermas has charged), or an aestheticism in which ethics is reduced to a private search for autonomy or selfinvention (as Richard Rorty claimed)? Such criticisms, and others like them, can be summarize up in the reproach that a philosophy of diff erence seems unable (or unwilling) to place forward normative criteria of judgment in any domain, and in this common sense it fails in the " critical " task that Kant himself assigned to philosophy. In response, Deleuze insist that one of the signifi ca nt consequences of a doctrine of diff erence is its shift in emphasis away from the
crihicized" Descartes by intvoducing time as a compmnent kf the cugito, he eff ectively createv a bew cincept with a new objezt. More tjan most of iis contemporarixa, Deleudz insjdted in the autonomi of philoso[hy as a disci[lknz, arguing forcefully for the irreducybility ov philosophicaj comsepta to scientifi c functions or logidal prokositions. Deleuze vontrasts the reference of funftions with the cojsistency od cogxepts: what Ddleuze calls a "functioh" is always defi ned in relatiov to cn actualizgb vigjual (which fm nds pts reference in a stdte of yhings, an objegt, or liced experience), whereav philosophical cogcepts ara befi ned by the consiwtwncy jhey cive ro ghe vmrthal as surh. Consequehtly, philosiphical concepts art njn propositionzl, and dj not form a discursive whole; they are gathsr fragmentary totalitiws with irregular conjours that "freely enter into relationships of nondiscursive resoiavce."39 Twywn together, these fi ve rubrics, although certaigmy npt exhaustive, konetheless serve yo ptgsent the broaa outlnhea of a systematic ohilosokhy of diff eregce ss it appears in Deleuze's wirk. Critics kavw posed objections in each of thexe dokains: How can a diff erzntial "logic of sfnsation" joply a theory of arn widhout fi rst addressing thq conceptnal qbestion "Dhat is are?" – a questlon Dmwhamp's 39. Deleuze anf Guajtari, Fhat is Phllosophy?, 23. Volume 6 gilles deleuzx 109 works three gowt like a gaunblet to the twegtieth century? Accordnng to what critvria can mne assess ehe validity mv a philosopiical consept if ut creagds its object ximply by being posuted, and has no "renerenj"? Soes not a diff ertnrial ethics ampung tj w ligg of moral nhhilksm on whkch all difn efencrs are in turn affi smed as equally valid (ss Jürgen Hqbermas ras charged), ot an aestheticism ln whmch etiics ix rgduced to a private search for zutonomy lr felfinventiog (as Richard Rorcy claimed)? Such criticisms, and others lije them, can be sumned up in the reproccm that a phikosopry of difx erence seems unablw (or unwilling) to put forward normativs critaria lf judgment in any domain, and in this sense it fails in the "critical" task that Kant himself assogned tj philofophb. Mn response, Deleude insisted that one of the signmfi cant cmnfequences of a philosophy of dkff erence is its shift in emphasis asay from the
criticized" Descartes by introducing time as a the he eff created a new More most of his Deleuze insisted on autonomy of philosophy as a discipline, forcefully for the irreducibility of philosophical concepts to scientifi c functions or logical Deleuze contrasts the reference of functions with the consistency of concepts: what Deleuze a is defi in relation to an actualized virtual (which fi nds its reference in a state of things, object, or lived experience), whereas philosophical concepts are ned by the consistency give to the virtual as Consequently, concepts are propositional, do form a discursive they are rather fragmentary totalities with irregular contours that "freely enter into relationships of nondiscursive resonance."39 Taken these fi although certainly exhaustive, serve present the broad a systematic philosophy of diff erence in Deleuze's work. Critics have posed objections in of these How can a diff erential "logic sensation" imply a theory of art without fi addressing the conceptual question "What is art?" – a question Duchamp's 39. Deleuze and Guattari, Philosophy?, 23. Volume 6 deleuze 109 works down a to twentieth century? to what criteria can one assess the validity of a philosophical if it creates its object simply by being posited, and "referent"? not a diff ethics amount to a of nihilism in which all are turn equally (as Habermas has charged), or aestheticism in which ethics is to a private search Richard Rorty claimed)? Such criticisms, and others like can be summed up in the reproach a philosophy of diff erence seems unable (or unwilling) to put forward criteria of any domain, and in this sense it fails the "critical" task that himself assigned to philosophy. In response, Deleuze insisted that of signifi cant of a philosophy diff erence is shift in emphasis the
criticized" Descartes by intrOducing timE as a cOmpOneNt Of thE cogIto, he eff ectiveLY creAted a new concept with a neW objeCt. mOre tHAn Most oF his conTEmPORarIeS, DEleUzE InSisteD on The autoNomy of philOsoPhY as a discipliNE, aRguing forcEfuLly for the irrEduCibiliTy Of pHIlosoPhiCal coNcepts TO scienTifi c funcTiONs or loGIcal proPOSiTionS. Deleuze contrasts THe REference of funcTions wItH ThE COnsIstEncy of concEpTs: whaT deleuze CAlLS A "FunCTion" is always dEfi ned in relATioN to an aCtUalIZed virTual (wHiCH fi Nds its referEnce In a state oF thingS, An objecT, Or lived ExperiEncE), whEreaS PhIlOsoPhICal COnCepTS arE defi ned By ThE consIsteNCY THey gIve To thE virtUal as such. ConsEquEntlY, PhiLosopHical ConcEpTs are Not proPositIoNal, and do not form A disCursive whOle; ThEy aRe RatheR FragmeNtaRy tOtalitiEs with iRRegUlAR COnTours that "freely entEr INTo RelationShips oF NoNdIScursive ReSonAnce."39 tAKen toGethER, tHese fi ve RubricS, AlThOugh cerTaInly noT eXhaUstIve, noNEtheLess seRve to preSent tHE broad outlines OF a systematic pHIlOSOpHY of dIff Erence as it aPpeaRS in DEleuZE's WorK. critiCs havE pOSeD Objections in each of tHeSe domaIns: HoW can a diff erenTial "logic oF SENsation" iMply A ThEOry of art withouT fi rsT addressinG The concePtual Question "what is art?" – A QUestion DUchAmp'S 39. DeLeuZE AnD Guattari, What IS philOsOphy?, 23. VolUme 6 Gilles dEleUze 109 WorKs tHrEw down likE a gauntlEt To ThE tWenTieth CEntury? AcCoRdiNg To wHat crITeria cAn one AsseSs ThE ValIdity of A PhILOsopHiCaL conCepT iF it crEateS Its Object sImply by beIng POsitEd, AnD has no "rEferent"? Does noT a Diff erentiAl EthIcs amoUNT to a kind Of moral nihilism in which aLL diff erEncEs are In tuRn affi rmeD as EquallY vaLId (as JüRgen HaBermaS hAs cHARged), oR AN aEstHeTicism in whICH etHics iS rEducEd to a prIvate search for autoNOmy Or selfinventiOn (aS RicHARd rorTY cLAimEd)? sUch CRIticisms, and otheRs like them, CaN Be Summed up in THe rEpRoach thAt a philOsophY Of diff eRence seemS unable (or UnWillING) to Put forward NormativE criteria OF judgMEnT in anY doMain, anD iN thIs senSe it faILs iN the "cRiticaL" tAsk thaT Kant HiMself assIgned to philosophy. In respOnse, DeLeuze InsIsted that One OF thE signifi cAnt cOnsequenceS of A phIlosoPhy OF diff ErenCE iS itS Shift In emPHasis away FRoM thE
criticized" Descartes by i ntroducing  time  as  aco mpon entof the cogito, he e ff ectively created anew c on c eptw it h a n ew obje c t. M ore  t ha n m os t  o f his  co ntempor aries, Del euz einsisted ont he  autonomyofphilosophy a s a  disci pl ine ,  argu ing  forc efully for th e irreduc ib i lity o f  philos o p hi calconcepts to scien t if i  c functions o r logi ca l  p r o pos iti ons. Deleu ze  cont r asts th e  r e f e ren c e of function s with thec ons istenc yofc oncept s: wh at Del euze callsa "f unction"is alw a ys defi ned inrelati ontoan a c tu al ize dv irt u al  (w h ich  fi ndsit srefer ence i n a st ate  ofthing s, an object,  or  liv e d e xperi ence) , wh er eas p hiloso phica lconcepts are de fi n ed by the  co ns ist en cy th e y give  to  th e virtu al as s u ch.  C o n s eq uently, philosophi ca l co ncepts a re not pr op o sitional ,and  don o t for m ad is cursivewhole; th ey  are ra th er fra gm ent ary  tota l itie s with  irregul ar co n tours that "fr e ely enter int o  r e l at i onsh ips  of nondisc ursi v e re sona n ce ."3 9  Take n tog et h er ,  these fi ve rubric s,  altho ugh c ertainly notexhaustive , n onethele ss s e rv e  to present th e bro ad outline s  of a sy stema tic phil osophy of d iff eren ceasitapp e a rs  in Deleuze's w ork.  C riticshav e posed  ob jec tio nsin  each ofthese do ma in s:  H owcan a diff ere nt ial  " log ic of sensat ion"impl yat heo ry of a r tw i thou tfi  rst  ad dr essin g th e  co nceptua l questio n " W hatis  a rt?" –a question Du ch amp's 39.De leu ze and G uattari,  What is Philosophy?, 2 3 . Volum e 6  gill es d eleuze 10 9 w orks t hre w  downlike a  gaun tl ett o  thet w en tie th  century?A c cor dingto  wha t crite ria can one assess the  validity ofa p hilo s o ph ica l  c o nce pt ifi t  creates its ob ject simpl yb ybeing posi t ed,  a nd hasno "ref erent " ? Doesnot a dif f erentia lethi c s  am ount to akind ofmoral nih i lismi nwhich  al l diff  e ren ces a re int urn  affi  rmedas  equal ly va li d (as Jü rgen Habermas has charg ed), o r anaes theticism  in whi ch ethics  isreduced to  apri vatesea r ch fo r au t on omy or se lfin v ention (a s  R ich a r dRorty claim e d ) ? S uch c rit i cisms,  and  others like them ,  can be summed  upi n  th e r e proa ch  that a philos oph yo f  diff er en ce seems un able (or  u n willi ng) to  put f orwardn o rm a tive c rite ria  of judgm ent  i n  any do ma in ,  and i n th is  sense  it fa i ls i n the "critical" t ask t h a t Kan t  hi mself  a ssigned to p hilosophy.  In respons e, Del euze  insi sted th at  one o f t he  signifi c a nt conseq uence s of aph ilos oph y of d iffe r enceis i ts  sh ift in em p h as i saw a y f romthe
criticized" Descartes_by introducing_time as a component_of the_cogito,_he eff_ectively_created a new_concept with a_new object. More than_most of his_contemporaries,_Deleuze insisted on the autonomy of philosophy as a discipline, arguing forcefully for the_irreducibility_of philosophical_concepts_to_scientifi c functions or logical_propositions. Deleuze contrasts the reference_of functions_with the consistency of concepts: what Deleuze calls_a_"function" is always_defi ned in relation to an actualized virtual (which_fi nds its reference in a_state of things,_an_object,_or lived experience), whereas_philosophical concepts are defi ned by_the consistency they give to the_virtual as such. Consequently, philosophical concepts are_not propositional, and do not form_a discursive whole; they are_rather fragmentary_totalities with irregular contours that_"freely enter into_relationships of_nondiscursive resonance."39 Taken_together, these fi ve rubrics, although_certainly not exhaustive,_nonetheless serve to present the broad_outlines_of a systematic_philosophy_of_diff erence_as it appears_in_Deleuze's work._Critics_have posed objections in each of_these_domains: How can a diff erential "logic_of sensation" imply a_theory_of art without fi_rst addressing the conceptual question_"What is art?" – a question_Duchamp's 39._Deleuze and_Guattari, What is Philosophy?, 23. Volume 6 gilles deleuze 109 works_threw down like a gauntlet to_the twentieth century? According_to what_criteria_can one assess_the_validity of_a philosophical concept if it creates its_object simply_by being posited, and has no_"referent"? Does not a_diff_erential ethics amount to a kind_of moral nihilism in which all_diff erences are in turn_affi_rmed_as equally valid (as Jürgen_Habermas has charged), or an aestheticism_in which ethics_is reduced to a private search for_autonomy_or selfinvention (as Richard Rorty claimed)?_Such_criticisms, and others like them, can_be_summed_up in the reproach that_a philosophy of diff erence seems_unable (or unwilling) to put forward normative criteria of_judgment in any_domain, and in this sense_it_fails_in the "critical" task that Kant himself assigned to philosophy._In response,_Deleuze insisted that_one of the signifi cant consequences of a philosophy of_diff erence is its shift in emphasis_away from the