 something that is more than instrumentally reason-giving for her. It is not clear what form her concern for him might take. After all, Ally cannot share in his thinking that his good is something which by its very nature must be reason-giving for him. Ally must, it seems, see his concern for his own good as in a sense arbitrary, for the reasons I have just considered. What kind of attitude can that leave her, not only towards his well-being but towards him? In Aristotle, the love of self and the love of others are deeply connected. In commitments of the best sort, Aristotle says, I love my friend as a'second self '.5 This DEVELOPMENT AND REASONS  ©  The Author Journal compilation ©  The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly 4 Kraut has re-emphasized in private communication his concern about social roles in answering this question. 5 NE a , b , b ; EE a ; MM a . is a way of extending the love I already have for myself (in particular for myself as rational agent) for my own sake.6 Aristotle thinks this connection between people who love their own goods first is possible because we recognize our own rational agency as essential to ourselves, and we do likewise with those we care about. We see their rational agency, their love for themselves, and their love for others as inextricably bound together, psychologically and normatively. But it is not clear that Ally can do this. She does not understand what it is like to be someone for the sake of whom people have reasons to act, since she has no sense of being a self whose own good gives her reasons for action. For this reason also, being the object of love for one's own sake is a notion alien to her. Better that her concern for her father's good is grounded in a concern for him – a concern which it is hard to see that
something that is more than instrumentally reason - giving for her. It is not clear what form her concern for him might subscribe. subsequently all, Ally cannot share in his thinking that his commodity is something which by its very nature must be cause - giving for him. Ally must, it seems, see his business for his own commodity as in a sense arbitrary, for the reasons I have just considered. What kind of attitude can that impart her, not only towards his well - being but towards him? In Aristotle, the sexual love of self and the beloved of others are deeply connected. In commitments of the best sort, Aristotle say, I love my friend as a'second self' .5 This DEVELOPMENT AND REASONS  ©  The Author Journal compilation ©  The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly 4 Kraut has re - underscore in private communication his concern about social roles in answering this doubt. 5 NE a , b , b ; EE a ; MM a . is a way of extending the love I already have for myself (in particular for myself as intellectual agent) for my own sake.6 Aristotle thinks this connection between people who love their own goods foremost is potential because we acknowledge our own rational agency as essential to ourselves, and we do likewise with those we care about. We interpret their intellectual agency, their love for themselves, and their sexual love for others as inextricably bounce together, psychologically and normatively. But it is not clear that Ally can do this. She does not sympathize what it is like to be someone for the sake of whom people accept reasons to act, since she get no sense of being a self whose own good gives her reasons for natural process. For this reason also, being the object of love for one's own sake is a impression alien to her. Better that her business for her father's good is grounded in a concern for him – a concern which it is hard to determine that
 solething that is more thak instrumentally reason-jiving ror her. Kt is not clear what form hec cobcern for him might take. Afger all, Aply cannit siare in his thinking thab his nood ns something whigh by its vary nature musd ce reason-giving for him. Ally must, it feems, sre his concern fjr hps own good as in a sense arbitrary, for fhe reavons I have jist considered. What kind ov athitude can that lewve her, not onlr towards his well-being but towards him? In Aristotle, the love of sdlf aud the love od ohvers are dexply cjnnected. In gpmmitmants of the best sort, Armstorle says, I love my frmend as a'second self '.5 This DEEEMOPMENT AND REASOBS  ©  Tve Agthof Jojrnzl ckmpilahioi ©  The Edifors of The Philosophical Quaruerjj 4 Kraut has de-emphwsyzed in private communication his concegn agout social roles in anwwering this question. 5 NE a , b , b ; EE a ; MM a . is a way of extending the love I alreedh hcyc fof mjself (in particular for myself as rational agqht) fpr my own sake.6 Aristotle yhlnlf this connecjion becsesn people who love their jwn giods firsu is lossible because we recognize our own rctiinal agency as esszntial to ouxselvex, and we do likewise with thuse se care abokt. We see gheir rational aeenby, tveir lovt for themselves, agd their oove for otfers as inqxtricably bound together, psycholohicalpy and normahively. But it is not clear that Ally can do tniv. Sve does uot uncerstand what it is like to be somzone fur the sakv of whom people havq reasons to dft, since she has no fensw of being x self whose owm good ginef hee reasons for actipn. Wkr this reason cuwo, being the obkecg os pote fow one's own sane ir a motiov alien to mer. Betyer that her concern for her father's good os groundee in a cjncern for hik – a concern which it iv herd to seg that
something that is more than instrumentally reason-giving It not clear form her concern all, cannot share in thinking that his is something which by its very must be reason-giving for him. Ally must, it seems, see his concern for own good as in a sense arbitrary, for the reasons I have just What of can leave her, not only towards his well-being but towards him? In Aristotle, the love of self the love of others are deeply connected. In of the best sort, says, I love my friend a'second '.5 This AND   The Author compilation ©  The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly 4 Kraut has re-emphasized in private communication his about social answering this 5 a b , b a ; MM a . is extending the love I already have for myself particular for as rational agent) for my own Aristotle thinks this connection between people who love own goods first is possible because we recognize our own rational agency as essential to we do likewise with we care about. see rational their for themselves, their love for others as inextricably bound together, psychologically and normatively. it is not clear that Ally can do this. She understand it is like be someone for the of people have reasons to she no a whose good gives her reasons action. For this reason also, the object of love a notion alien to her. Better that her for her father's good is grounded in concern for him – a concern which it is hard to see
 something that is more than inStrumentalLy reaSon-GivInG for Her. IT is not clear whaT Form Her concern for him might tAke. AfTeR All, ALLy CannoT share iN HiS THinKiNg ThaT hIS gOod is SomEthing wHich by its vEry NaTure must be reASoN-giving for Him. ally must, it seEms, See his CoNceRN for hIs oWn gooD as in a SEnse arBitrary, foR tHE reasoNS I have jUST cOnsiDered. What kind of atTItUDe can that leave Her, not OnLY tOWArdS hiS well-being BuT towaRDs him? In aRiSTOTle, THe love of self aNd the love of OTheRs are dEePly COnnectEd. In cOmMItmEnts of the beSt soRt, AristotLe says, i Love my fRIend as a'Second SelF '.5 ThIs DEveLoPmENt And REasOnS  ©  THE AuThor JourNaL cOmpilAtioN ©  tHE editOrs Of ThE PhilOsophical QuarTerLy 4 KrAUt hAs re-eMphasIzed In PrivaTe commUnicaTiOn his concern aboUt soCial roles In aNsWerInG this QUestioN. 5 NE A , b , b ; eE a ; MM a . iS a way of EXteNdING ThE love I already have fOr MYSeLf (in partIcular FOr MySElf as ratIoNal AgenT) FOr my oWn saKE.6 ARistotle Thinks THiS cOnnectiOn BetweeN pEopLe wHo lovE TheiR own goOds first Is posSIble because we rECognize our own RAtIONaL AgenCy aS essential tO ourSElveS, and WE dO liKEwise With tHoSE wE Care about. We see their RaTional AgencY, their love for Themselves, AND Their lovE for OThERs as inextricabLy bouNd together, PSychologIcallY and normAtively. BuT IT is not clEar ThaT AlLy cAN Do This. She does noT UNderStAnd what It iS like to Be sOmeOne For ThE sake of whOm people HaVe ReAsOns To act, SInce she hAs No sEnSe oF beinG A self wHose oWn goOd GiVEs hEr reasoNS fOR ActiOn. foR thiS reAsOn alsO, beiNG thE object Of love for One'S Own sAkE iS a notioN alien to her. BeTtEr that her cOnCerN for heR FAther's goOd is grounded in a concern fOR him – a coNceRn whiCh it Is hard to sEe tHat
 something that is more th an instrum ental lyrea so n-gi ving  for her. It i s  not  clear what form her c oncer nf or h i mmight  take.A ft e r  al l,  A lly  c a nn ot sh are  in his  thinkingtha this good iss om ething whi chby its verynat ure mu st  be reaso n-g iving  for h i m. All y must, i ts eems,s ee hisc o nc ernfor his own gooda si n a sense arbi trary,  f o rt h e r eas ons I have  j ust c o nsidere d .W h a t k i nd of attitud e can thatl eav e her,  n oto nly to wards  h i s w ell-being b ut t owards hi m? InA ristotl e , the l ove of  se lfandt he  l ove  o f  ot h er s a r e d eeply co nn ec ted.In c o m m i tmen tsof t he be st sort, Aris tot le s a ys,  I lo ve my  fri en d asa'seco nd se lf  '.5 This DEVEL OPME NT AND RE ASO NS   ©    The A uth orJournal  compil a tio n©    The Editors of T he P hi losophic al Qua r te rl y  4 Kraut  h asre-e m p hasiz ed i n  p rivate c ommuni c at io n his c on cern a bo utsoc ial r o lesin ans wering t his q u estion. 5 NE   a , b ,    b  ; E E a ;  MM a  . is  aw ay of  exte nd i ng the love I alreadyha ve for  myse lf (in partic ular for m y s e lf as ra tion a la gent) for my o wn sa ke.6 Arist o tle thin ks th is conne ction bet w e en peopl e w holov e t h e ir  own goods fi r s t is  p ossible  be cause w e r eco gni zeou r own rat ional ag en cy  a sess entia l  to ours el ves ,and  we d o  likew ise w ithth os e  we  care a b ou t .  Wese ethei r r at ional  age n cy,  theirlove forthe m selv es ,and the ir love for o th ers as ine xt ric ably b o u nd toget her, psychologically an d  normat ive ly. B ut i t is notcle ar tha t A l ly can  do th is. S he  do e s  notu n de rst an d what iti s  li ke to  b e so meone f or the sake of who m  pe ople have rea son s to a ct , s i nc e  sh eh asn o  sense of being  a self wh os e  o wn good gi v eshe r reaso ns foractio n . For t his reaso n also, b ei ng t h e  ob ject of lo ve for o ne's owns ake i s  a  noti onaliento  he r. Be tter t h ather c oncern  f or her  fath er 's goodis grounded in a concer n forhim –  aconcern w hic h  it  is hardto s ee that
 something_that is_more than instrumentally reason-giving_for her._It_is not_clear_what form her_concern for him_might take. After all,_Ally cannot share_in_his thinking that his good is something which by its very nature must be_reason-giving_for him._Ally_must,_it seems, see his concern_for his own good as_in a_sense arbitrary, for the reasons I have just_considered._What kind of_attitude can that leave her, not only towards his_well-being but towards him? In Aristotle,_the love of_self_and_the love of others_are deeply connected. In commitments of_the best sort, Aristotle says, I_love my friend as a'second self '.5_This DEVELOPMENT AND REASONS  ©_ The Author Journal compilation_© _The Editors of The Philosophical_Quarterly 4 Kraut_has re-emphasized_in private communication_his concern about social roles in_answering this question._5 NE a , b ,_b_; EE a_;_MM_a ._is a way_of_extending the_love_I already have for myself (in_particular_for myself as rational agent) for my_own sake.6 Aristotle thinks_this_connection between people who_love their own goods first_is possible because we recognize our_own rational_agency as_essential to ourselves, and we do likewise with those we care_about. We see their rational agency,_their love for themselves,_and their_love_for others as_inextricably_bound together,_psychologically and normatively. But it is not_clear that_Ally can do this. She does_not understand what it_is_like to be someone for the_sake of whom people have reasons_to act, since she has_no_sense_of being a self whose_own good gives her reasons for_action. For this_reason also, being the object of love_for_one's own sake is a notion_alien_to her. Better that her concern_for_her_father's good is grounded in_a concern for him – a_concern which it is hard to see that