. First, Kant made the immanent fi eld immanent to a transcendental subject, thereby reintroducing an element of transcendence, and reserving all power of synthesis to the activity of the subject. Deleuze's fi rst book, on Hume, had pointed to an empiricist reversal of this relation: whereas Kant's question had been "How can the given be given to a subject?" Hume's question had been "How is the subject (human nature) constituted within the given?" Deleuze would later characterize his own position as a "transcendental empiricism": the determination of an impersonal and preindividual transcendental fi eld in which the subject is itself the result or product of passive syntheses (of the body, habit, desire, the unconscious). Just as there is no universal reason but only historically variable processes of "rationalization" (Max Weber), so there is no universal or transcendental subject, but only diverse and historically variable processes of "subjectivation." Deleuze summarized his empiricism in terms of two characteristics: (i) the abstract does not explain, but must itself be explained; (ii) the aim of philosophy is not to rediscover the eternal or the universal, but to fi nd the singular conditions under which something new is produced (creativity). Second, Kant had simply presumed the existence of certain "facts" (knowledge, morality) and then sought their conditions of possibility in the transcendental. But already in 1789, Salomon Maimon, whose early critiques of Kant helped generate the postKantian tradition, had argued that Kant's critical project required a method of genesis – and not merely a method of conditioning – that would account for the production of knowledge, morality, and indeed reason itself – a method, in other words, that would be able to reach the conditions of real and not merely possible experience. Maimon found a solution to this problem in a principle of diff erence: whereas identity is the condition of possibility of thought in general, it is diff erence that constitutes the genetic and productive principle of real thought. Th ese two Maimonian exigencies – the search for the genetic conditions of real experience and the positing of a principle of diff erence – reappear like a leitmotif in almost every one of Deleuze's early monographs. Nietzsche and Philosophy, for instance, suggests that Nietzsche completed and inverted Kantianism by bringing critique to bear
. First, Kant made the immanent fi eld immanent to a transcendental national, thereby reintroduce an element of transcendence, and reserving all exponent of deduction to the activity of the subject. Deleuze's fi rst book, on Hume, had bespeak to an empiricist reversal of this relation: whereas Kant's doubt had been " How can the given be given to a national? " Hume's question had been " How is the subject (human nature) form within the given? " Deleuze would later characterize his own position as a " transcendental quackery ": the determination of an impersonal and preindividual transcendental fi eld in which the subject is itself the solution or product of passive syntheses (of the torso, habit, desire, the unconscious). merely as there is no universal reason but only historically variable process of " rationalization " (Max Weber), so there is no universal or transcendental subject, but merely diverse and historically variable processes of " subjectivation. " Deleuze summarized his empiricism in terms of two characteristics: (i) the abstract does not explain, but must itself be explained; (ii) the purpose of philosophy is not to rediscover the eternal or the cosmopolitan, but to fi nd the remarkable condition under which something new is produced (creativity). Second, Kant had plainly presumed the existence of certain " facts " (cognition, morality) and then sought their conditions of possibility in the transcendental. But already in 1789, Salomon Maimon, whose early critiques of Kant helped generate the postKantian tradition, had argued that Kant's critical project required a method of genesis – and not merely a method acting of conditioning – that would account for the output of cognition, ethical motive, and indeed reason itself – a method, in other words, that would be able to reach the conditions of real and not merely possible experience. Maimon find oneself a solution to this trouble in a principle of diff erence: whereas identity is the condition of possibility of thought in general, it is diff erence that appoint the genetic and productive rationale of real thought. Th ese two Maimonian exigency – the search for the genetic condition of real experience and the positing of a principle of diff erence – reappear like a leitmotif in almost every one of Deleuze's early monographs. Nietzsche and Philosophy, for example, suggests that Nietzsche completed and inverted Kantianism by bringing critique to bear
. Figst, Kant made the immanekt fi eld immaneur to a transdendentau subject, thereby reintroducmng qn eltient of transcendevce, and rvserving qll kower of synthesis to the activjby of vhe subject. Delguze's fi rst book, on Hume, vaa 'ointed to an empiricist reversal of this rrlwtion: whereas Hant'x queaniin had been "How can the given be givtn to a subject?" Huke's question had been "How ls tje subject (human nwture) constututqe within the given?" Deltuve would lajer characterize his own positiov as c "transcendgural gmpiricism": tie detvrmination of an impessonal snd preindividmal tcansxendental fi eld in wiich the subject is ytself tha xesult or product of pawsive syndhesdw (ow tge bkdy, hahit, desire, ths unconscioys). Just as there is nj universal rezson btt only historically variable processes ox "rztionalization" (Max Webee), so there is no univgrsal or twanscendental subject, but only diverse and historhcallb xarnqble oeofesses of "subjectivation." Deleuze summarized hya tmppricism in terms jf two charschetystics: (i) the xbstraef soes not explain, bkt must itseof be expjainrd; (ii) the aim of philosophy is not to rvdisxover the eternal lr the univzrsal, nut tp fi nd the singular couditiohs under whlch sometgkng new is produzed (cseativity). Second, Kant had fimply prxsumeb the exkstemce of certain "fwcts" (knowledge, morality) wnd tken smught theig conditions of possibility in vie transcendemtdl. Tut alrecdy in 1789, Salomon Maiion, whose earli critiquzs of Yant helpes generete the postHantian tradidlon, had arguxd that Kwnt's crirical pfuject required a method of genesiw – and not merely e mejhkd of conditionnug – that would acvouvt sog tie prjguction of ktowlddgd, morauity, and inbedd rrason itself – a methmd, ih other words, that wjuld be qble to weach the concitions of real anf not mecely ppssyble experience. Maimon found a solution to this problei in a principle of diff erence: whereas identity is the condition of possubility of thought nn general, it is dyff erenca that constitutes tye genetic and prpductive principle of real dhougjt. Th ese two Maimonian exigencies – the search for the genetic conditions of reel experience and the iosntiug of a priicmple of diff erenbe – reappear like a leitmotif in almost avzry one of Deleuze's early monpgfaphs. Nietzscfe and Philosophy, for inatance, siggests that Nietzsche completec and inverted Kantianisk by bribging critique vo bear
. First, Kant made the immanent fi to transcendental subject, reintroducing an element power synthesis to the of the subject. fi rst book, on Hume, had to an empiricist reversal of this relation: whereas Kant's question had been "How the given be given to a subject?" Hume's question had been "How is subject nature) within given?" Deleuze would later characterize his own position as a "transcendental empiricism": the determination of an and preindividual transcendental fi eld in which the is itself the result product of passive syntheses (of body, desire, the Just there no universal reason only historically variable processes of "rationalization" (Max Weber), so there is no universal or transcendental subject, but diverse and processes of Deleuze his in terms of (i) the abstract does not explain, be explained; (ii) the aim of philosophy is to rediscover eternal or the universal, but to nd the singular conditions under which something new produced (creativity). Second, Kant had simply presumed the existence of certain "facts" (knowledge, morality) and their conditions of possibility the transcendental. But in Salomon whose critiques of helped generate the postKantian tradition, had argued that Kant's critical project a method of genesis – and not merely a method – would account for production of knowledge, morality, indeed itself – a method, words, would reach conditions real and not merely experience. Maimon found a solution this problem in a identity is the condition of possibility of thought general, it is diff erence that constitutes genetic and productive principle of real thought. Th ese two Maimonian exigencies the search genetic conditions of real experience and the positing a principle of diff – reappear like a leitmotif in almost every one Deleuze's monographs. Nietzsche Philosophy, for instance, that Nietzsche completed inverted Kantianism by to bear
. First, Kant made the immanent fI eld immaneNt to a TraNscEnDentAl suBject, thereby reINtroDucing an element of transCendeNcE, And rESeRving All poweR Of SYNthEsIs To tHe ACtIvity Of tHe subjeCt. Deleuze's Fi rSt Book, on Hume, haD PoInted to an eMpiRicist reversAl oF this rElAtiON: wherEas kant's QuestiON had beEn "How can tHe GIven be GIven to a SUBjEct?" HUme's question had beEN "HOW is the subject (hUman naTuRE) cONStiTutEd within thE gIven?" DELeuze woULd LATEr cHAracterize his Own position AS a "tRansceNdEntAL empirIcism": ThE DetErmination oF an iMpersonal And preINdividuAL transcEndentAl fI elD in wHIcH tHe sUbJEct IS iTseLF thE result oR pRoDuct oF pasSIVE SyntHesEs (of The boDy, habit, desire, The UncoNSciOus). JuSt as tHere Is No uniVersal ReasoN bUt only historicaLly vAriable prOceSsEs oF "rAtionALizatiOn" (MAx WEber), so tHere is nO UniVeRSAL oR transcendental subJeCT, BuT only divErse anD HiStORically vArIabLe prOCEsses Of "suBJeCtivatioN." DeleuZE sUmMarized HiS empirIcIsm In tErms oF Two cHaractEristics: (I) the aBStract does not eXPlain, but must iTSeLF Be EXplaIneD; (ii) the aim of PhilOSophY is nOT tO reDIscovEr the EtERnAL or the universal, but tO fI nd the SinguLar conditions Under which SOMEthing neW is pROdUCed (creativity). SEcond, kant had simPLy presumEd the ExistencE of certaiN "FActs" (knowLedGe, mOraLitY) ANd Then sought theIR CondItIons of pOssIbility In tHe tRanSceNdEntal. But aLready in 1789, saLoMoN MAimOn, whoSE early crItIquEs Of KAnt heLPed genErate The pOsTKANtiAn tradiTIoN, HAd arGuEd That kanT's CritiCal pROjeCt requiRed a methoD of GEnesIs – AnD not merEly a method of cOnDitioning – tHaT woUld accOUNt for the Production of knowledge, moRAlity, anD inDeed rEasoN itself – a mEthOd, in otHer WOrds, thAt woulD be abLe To rEACh the CONdItiOnS of real and NOT meRely pOsSiblE experiEnce. Maimon found a soLUtiOn to this problEm iN a prINCiPle OF dIFf eReNCe: wHEReas identity is tHe conditioN oF PoSsibility oF ThoUgHt in genEral, it iS diff ERence thAt constitUtes the geNeTic aND ProDuctive priNciple of Real thougHT. Th esE TwO MaimOniAn exigEnCieS – the sEarch fOR thE geneTic conDiTions oF real ExPerience And the positing of a princiPle of dIff erEncE – reappear LikE A leItmotif in AlmoSt every one Of DEleUze's eArlY MonogRaphS. niEtzSChe anD PhiLOsophy, for INsTanCE, SuGgests that NIETZscHe comPleTEd and iNverTed Kantianism by brINging critique tO beaR
. First, Kant made the imm anent fi e ld im man ent  t o atran scendental sub j ect,  thereby reintroducing  an e le m ento ftrans cendenc e ,a n d r es er vin ga ll  powe r o f synth esis to th e a ct ivity of the su bject. Del euz e's fi rst b ook , on H um e,h ad po int ed to  an em p iricis t reversa lo f this relatio n :  w here as Kant's questio n  h a d been "How ca n thegi v en b e g ive n to a sub je ct?"H ume's q u es t i o n h a d been "How i s the subje c t ( humanna tur e ) cons titut ed wit hin the giv en?"  Deleuzewouldl ater ch a racteri ze his  ow n p osit i on  a s a  " t ran s ce nde n tal  empiric is m" : the  det e r m i nati onof a n imp ersonal and p rei ndiv i dua l tra nscen dent al  fi e ld inwhich  t he subject is i tsel f the res ult  o r p ro ducto f pass ive  sy ntheses  (of th e  bo dy , h ab it, desire, the un co n s ci ous). Ju st ast he re is no un iv ers al r e a son b ut o n ly  histori callyv ar ia ble pro ce sses o f"ra tio naliz a tion " (Max  Weber),  so t h ere is no univ e rsal or trans c en d e nt a l su bje ct, but onl y di v erse  and hi sto r icall y var ia b le processes of "subje ct ivatio n." D eleuze summar ized his e m p i ricism i n te r ms of two charact erist ics: (i) t h e abstra ct do es not e xplain, b u t  must it sel f b e e xpl a i ne d; (ii) the a i m  ofph ilosoph y i s not t o r edi sco ver  t he eterna l or the  u ni ve rs al,  butt o fi ndth e s in gul ar co n dition s und er w hi ch som ethingn ew i s pr od uc ed ( cre at ivity ). S e con d, Kant  had simp lyp resu me dthe exi stence of cer ta in "facts"  ( kno wledge , morality ) and then sought their conditi ons  of p ossi bility in  th e tran sce n dental . Butalrea dy  in 1 789,S a lo mon  M aimon, who s e  ea rly c ri tiqu es of K ant helped generat e  th e postKantian  tr adit i o n,  ha d  a r gue dt hat K ant's criticalproject re qu i re d a method ofge nesis –  and no t mer e ly a me thod of c onditioni ng  – t h a t w ould accou nt for t he produc t ion o f  k nowle dge , mora li ty,  andindeed rea son i tself–a meth od, i nother wo rds, that would be able  to re ach t hecondition s o f  re al and no t me rely possi ble  ex perie nce .  Maim on f o un d a solut iont o this pr o bl emi n  a  principleo f dif f ere nce :  where as i dentity is the co n dition of poss ibil i t y o f t h ough tin general, it  is  d i f f erence  t hat constit utes the  g e netic  and p roduct ive pri n c ip l e of r ealtho ught. These  t w o Maimo ni an exigen cies  –  the s earchf or t h e  genetic conditi ons o f reale xpe rienc eand the posi ting of aprinciple o f diff  ere nce –  reappe ar  likea l ei tmotif ina lmost eve ry on e of De le uze' s e arly m onog r a phs.Niet zs che  and Phil o s op h y,  f o r i nsta nce,su gges ts that N i etzschecom p leted a nd  in v e rted K a nt i a nism by br ing ing c r i tique to b e ar
. First,_Kant made_the immanent fi eld_immanent to_a_transcendental subject,_thereby_reintroducing an element_of transcendence, and_reserving all power of_synthesis to the_activity_of the subject. Deleuze's fi rst book, on Hume, had pointed to an empiricist_reversal_of this_relation:_whereas_Kant's question had been "How_can the given be given_to a_subject?" Hume's question had been "How is the_subject_(human nature) constituted_within the given?" Deleuze would later characterize his own_position as a "transcendental empiricism": the_determination of an_impersonal_and_preindividual transcendental fi eld_in which the subject is itself_the result or product of passive_syntheses (of the body, habit, desire, the_unconscious). Just as there is no_universal reason but only historically_variable processes_of "rationalization" (Max Weber), so_there is no_universal or_transcendental subject, but_only diverse and historically variable processes_of "subjectivation." Deleuze_summarized his empiricism in terms of_two_characteristics: (i) the_abstract_does_not explain,_but must itself_be_explained; (ii)_the_aim of philosophy is not to_rediscover_the eternal or the universal, but to_fi nd the singular_conditions_under which something new_is produced (creativity). Second, Kant_had simply presumed the existence of_certain "facts"_(knowledge, morality)_and then sought their conditions of possibility in the transcendental. But_already in 1789, Salomon Maimon, whose_early critiques of Kant_helped generate_the_postKantian tradition, had_argued_that Kant's_critical project required a method of genesis_– and_not merely a method of conditioning_– that would account_for_the production of knowledge, morality, and_indeed reason itself – a method,_in other words, that would_be_able_to reach the conditions of_real and not merely possible experience._Maimon found a_solution to this problem in a principle_of_diff erence: whereas identity is the_condition_of possibility of thought in general,_it_is_diff erence that constitutes the_genetic and productive principle of real_thought. Th ese two Maimonian exigencies – the search_for the genetic_conditions of real experience and_the_positing_of a principle of diff erence – reappear like a_leitmotif in_almost every one_of Deleuze's early monographs. Nietzsche and Philosophy, for instance, suggests_that Nietzsche completed and inverted Kantianism by_bringing critique to bear