ivity, this opens up the possibility of reconciling the fact-value divorce that has made ethics so problematic since the Modem period. Consider emotivism, the notion that moral values are merely an expression of affective preferences that have no cognitive status. A phenomenology of values would, I think, call into question the idea that my objections to torture, for example, are nothing more than personal preferences (and what could I say about those whose preferences support torture?). And is the objection to fraud in scientific research nothing more than a preference? Consider also moral egoism, which in my view amounts to an oxymoron. In effect it says that the right thing to do is whatever an individual wants to do-when it is this very condition of individuals pursuing any and every desire that generates normative thinking in the first place. Individual subjectivity, then, is somewhat incoherent as an ethical reference, and it certainly seems to lack any sense of a "call" (what would it mean to say that I am obligated to follow my desires?). Utilitarianism is somewhat of an improvement in asking individuals to adjust 13See, e.g., Werner Marx, Is There a Measure on Earth? ch. 2. ETHICS AND FINITUDE 409 their actions to the general well-being of the community. But the community in this case is simply an aggregate of individual subjectivities, which does not therefore supercede the assumption that the good is nothing more than an internal affection having no external claim. Moreover, the criterion of collectivity contains the danger of majoritarian tyranny that has often plagued this theory, and the emphasis on instrumental reason seems to leave no room for the dignity of persons. The one modern approach that most satisfies the need for an ethical call is the kind of de ontological theory inspired by Kant. Here the subject is the rational subject that discovers universal ethical principles solely through the exercise of reason by way of the categorical imperative, principles that are completely independent of personal or collective inclinations and empirical conditions, and that should command our thinking in the same way that other rational truths claim the mind's assent. But we can notice in Kant's detached, abstract route to universal consistency something analogous to metaphysical subjectivism, as critiqued by Heidegger, particularly technicity's totalistic oblivion of Being and finite dwelling. The strict segregation of the good from personal concerns and from the contingencies of experience makes possible a kind of tyrannical formalism that becomes blind to the actual conditions of existence and thereby not only inapplicable but dangerously
ivity, this opens up the possibility of reconciling the fact - value divorce that has made ethic therefore problematic since the Modem period. Consider emotivism, the impression that moral values are merely an expression of affective preference that have no cognitive status. A phenomenology of value would, I think, call into motion the idea that my objections to agony, for case, are nothing more than personal preferences (and what could I say about those whose preferences support torture ?). And is the expostulation to fraud in scientific research nothing more than a preference? Consider besides moral egoism, which in my view amounts to an oxymoron. In consequence it says that the correct thing to do is whatever an individual wants to do - when it is this identical condition of individuals pursuing any and every desire that generates normative thinking in the first plaza. Individual subjectivity, then, is somewhat incoherent as an ethical reference, and it certainly seems to lack any sense of a " call " (what would it mean to say that I am obligated to keep up my desires ?). Utilitarianism is somewhat of an improvement in ask individuals to adjust 13See, e.g., Werner Marx, Is There a Measure on Earth? ch. 2. ETHICS AND FINITUDE 409 their action to the general well - being of the community. But the community in this shell is simply an aggregate of individual subjectivities, which does not therefore supercede the assumption that the commodity is nothing more than an internal affection having no external claim. Moreover, the criterion of collectivity contains the danger of majoritarian dictatorship that has often plagued this theory, and the emphasis on instrumental rationality seems to leave no room for the dignity of persons. The one mod approach that most satisfies the need for an ethical call is the kind of de ontological hypothesis inspired by Kant. Here the subject is the rational subject that discovers cosmopolitan ethical principles solely through the exercise of reason by manner of the categorical imperative mood, principles that are completely independent of personal or corporate inclinations and empirical conditions, and that should command our thinking in the same way that other rational truths claim the mind's assent. But we cannotice in Kant's detached, abstract path to universal consistency something analogous to metaphysical subjectivism, as critiqued by Heidegger, peculiarly technicity's totalistic oblivion of Being and finite dwelling. The strict segregation of the good from personal concerns and from the contingencies of experience makes potential a kind of tyrannical formalism that becomes blind to the actual conditions of existence and thereby not only inapplicable but dangerously
ivihy, this opens up the posribility of reconcilinj the fzct-value divorce that has made ethicd wo priblematic since the Moaem periof. Considwr enitivism, thx notion that jlral talues are mereky an exprassion of affewtkvz preferences that have no cognitive status. A phenomenology of najues would, I think, call into question fhe idee that my objecyions to torture, for examppe, age nothing more thwn personal preswrences (and dhat could I say about those whose preferences supporg torcure?). And is tye ltjection to frauq in scientinpc resedrch noyhing more thak a pcefeeence? Consider also mmral egoism, which yn my vief cmounts to an oxymorob. Un efxect it rqys thzt tge rigjt vhing to do is whatevee an individual wanus ei do-when it ia this vqry condition of individuals pursuing aty znd every desire that gwnerates normative thlnking in the first place. Individual subjectivity, then, is vomewiag iugjfwrfnt as an ethical reference, and it certainly fseks to lack any scnse of a "call" (whay aoijd it mean to say tkzt I am obligated to follow my dwsires?). Utylitsrianism is somewhat of an umprovement pn awking individuals co adjust 13Sez, e.g., Wgrner Karx, Is There a Measure on Sarth? ch. 2. EHHICS AND WINITUDE 409 their xctpons to the general well-being jf the conmunnty. But ghe vommunyty in thid casc is simply an aggrfgate ox individuwl subjectivities, which does nov therefore sopescege the afsumpbion that the gjod is nothing more tkan an internal zffectimn having nj external cldlm. Moreover, vhe critewion of xollectkxity contains yhe dangeg jf mqjoritarian tyrannn thaj gas often plaguzb uhus theory, and yhe em[hwsms on hnstrumental rearon xeems to leave ni rook for the dignity of peraons. The one moderm wpproach that moft satisfies yhe need for an etjical caul is thg kind of de ontological theory inspired by Kant. Here tre smbjest is the xational subject that discovers universao ethical principlws solely through tke exercise oh reasjn by way of the categorical umperative, princikles that are completelg inde[endejt of personal or collective inclinations and empirical conditions, and thqt shonlq command ohr tninkitg nn the fame xay that other ranional truths claim the mind's asrent. But wz can notice in Kant's detachec, xbstract routg to universal consistency somethimg analogous to metaphysical sunjectivism, as critiqued ny Heidegter, pzrticularlb technicity's totalixtic oyliviob of Beung wnd finite dwdllonn. The strift stgreyation of the good from personal xoncerbs and from the coitingencies ln expetience mwkes possible a iind lf tytannical formakism that becokes blind to the actlal conditions of vxistence and thergyj not only inepplicable bgt dangerously
ivity, this opens up the possibility of fact-value that has ethics so problematic emotivism, notion that moral are merely an of affective preferences that have no status. A phenomenology of values would, I think, call into question the idea my objections to torture, for example, are nothing more than personal preferences (and could say those preferences support torture?). And is the objection to fraud in scientific research nothing more than a Consider also moral egoism, which in my view to an oxymoron. In it says that the right to is whatever individual to it is this condition of individuals pursuing any and every desire that generates normative thinking in the first place. Individual then, is as an reference, it seems to lack of a "call" (what would it that I am obligated to follow my desires?). is somewhat an improvement in asking individuals to 13See, e.g., Werner Marx, Is There a Measure Earth? ch. 2. ETHICS AND FINITUDE 409 their actions to the general well-being of the the community in this is simply an of subjectivities, does therefore supercede assumption that the good is nothing more than an internal affection no external claim. Moreover, the criterion of collectivity contains the majoritarian that has often this theory, and the on reason seems to leave for dignity one approach most satisfies the need an ethical call is the of de ontological theory subject is the rational subject that discovers universal principles solely through the exercise of reason way of the categorical imperative, principles that are completely independent of personal collective inclinations conditions, and that should command our thinking in same way that other truths claim the mind's assent. But we can notice Kant's abstract route universal consistency something to metaphysical subjectivism, critiqued by Heidegger, totalistic oblivion Being finite segregation of the good from personal and the contingencies of experience makes a tyrannical formalism that becomes blind to the actual conditions of existence and thereby not only dangerously
ivity, this opens up the possibIlity of recOncilIng The FaCt-vaLue dIvorce that has mADe etHics so problematic since The MoDeM PeriOD. COnsidEr emotiVIsM, THe nOtIoN thAt MOrAl valUes Are mereLy an expresSioN oF affective prEFeRences that HavE no cognitive StaTus. A phEnOmeNOlogy Of vAlues Would, I THink, caLl into queStIOn the iDEa that mY OBjEctiOns to torture, for exAMpLE, are nothing morE than pErSOnAL PreFerEnces (and whAt Could i Say abouT ThOSE WhoSE preferences sUpport tortuRE?). AnD is the ObJecTIon to fRaud iN sCIenTific researCh noThing more Than a pREferencE? consideR also mOraL egOism, WHiCh In mY vIEw aMOuNts TO an Oxymoron. in EfFect iT sayS THAT the RigHt thIng to Do is whatever aN inDiviDUal Wants To do-wHen iT iS this Very coNditiOn Of individuals puRsuiNg any and eVerY dEsiRe That gENerateS noRmaTive thiNking in THe fIrST PLaCe. Individual subjecTiVITy, Then, is soMewhat INcOhERent as an EtHicAl reFERence, And iT CeRtainly sEems to LAcK aNy sense Of A "call" (wHaT woUld It meaN To saY that I Am obligaTed to FOllow my desires?). uTilitarianism IS sOMEwHAt of An iMprovement iN askINg inDiviDUaLs tO AdjusT 13See, e.G., WERnER Marx, Is There a MeasurE oN Earth? Ch. 2. ETHiCS AND FINITUDe 409 their actiONS To the genEral WElL-Being of the commUnity. but the commUNity in thIs casE is simplY an aggregATE of indivIduAl sUbjEctIVItIes, which does nOT TherEfOre supeRceDe the asSumPtiOn tHat ThE good is noThing morE tHaN aN iNteRnal aFFection hAvIng No ExtErnal CLaim. MoReoveR, the CrItERioN of collECtIVIty cOnTaIns tHe dAnGer of MajoRItaRian tyrAnny that hAs oFTen pLaGuEd this tHeory, and the emPhAsis on instRuMenTal reaSON seems to Leave no room for the dignitY Of persoNs. THe one ModeRn approacH thAt most SatISfies tHe need For an EtHicAL Call iS THe KinD oF de ontologICAl tHeory InSpirEd by KanT. Here the subject is tHE raTional subject ThaT disCOVeRs uNIvERsaL eTHicAL Principles solelY through thE eXErCise of reasON by WaY of the cAtegoriCal imPErative, PrincipleS that are cOmPletELY inDependent oF personaL or collecTIve inCLiNatioNs aNd empiRiCal CondiTions, aND thAt shoUld comMaNd our tHinkiNg In the samE way that other rational trUths clAim thE miNd's assent. but WE caN notice in kant'S detached, aBstRacT routE to UNiverSal cONsIstENcy soMethINg analogoUS tO meTAPhYsical subjeCTIVisM, as crItiQUed by HEideGger, particularly tEChnicity's totalIstiC OBliVioN Of BeInG and finite dwelLinG. THE Strict seGrEgation of thE good froM pERsonaL conceRns and From the CONtINgenciEs of ExpErience maKes PoSSible a kInD oF TyrannIcal FoRmalisM that bEComeS BLind to the actual cOnditIONs of eXIstEnce aNd Thereby NOt onLy inapplicAble but dangErouslY
ivity, this opens up the p ossibility  of r eco nci li ng t he f act-value divo r ce t hat has made ethics so  prob le m atic si nce t he Mode m  p e r iod .Co nsi de r  e motiv ism , the n otion that  mo ra l values are me rely an ex pre ssion of aff ect ive pr ef ere n ces t hat  have  no co g nitive  status.Ap henome n ology o f va lues  would, I think,c al l  into question  the i de a  t h a t m y o bjectionsto  tort u re, for ex a m p le, are nothing m ore than pe r son al pre fe ren c es (an d wha tc oul d I say abo ut t hose whos e pref e rencess upporttortur e?) . A nd i s  t he  ob je c tio n  t o f r aud  in scie nt if ic re sear c h n othi ngmore  than  a preference ? C onsi d eralsomoral  ego is m, wh ich in  my v ie w amounts to an  oxy moron. In  ef fe ctit  says that t herig ht thin g to do iswh a t e ve r an individual wa nt s to  do-when  it is th is very con di tio n of i ndivi dual s  p ursuingany an d  e ve ry desi re  thatge ner ate s nor m ativ e thin king inthe f i rst place. Ind i vidual subjec t iv i t y, then , i s somewhatinco h eren t as an  et h icalrefer en c e, and it certainly se em s to l ack a ny sense of a  "call" (w h a t  would i t me a nt o say that I a m obl igated tof ollow my  desi res?). U tilitaria n i sm is so mew hat  of  an i mp rovement in a s k ingin dividua lsto adju st13S ee,  e. g. , WernerMarx, Is  T he re  a  Me asure on Earth ?ch.  2 . E THICS AND FI NITUD E 40 9th e iractions to t he g en er al w ell -b eingof t h e c ommunit y. But th e c o mmun it yin this  case is simp ly  an aggreg at e o f indi v i dual sub jectivities, which does not the ref ore s uper cede theass umptio n t h at the  goodis no th ing m ore t h a nanin ternal aff e c tio n hav in g no  extern al claim. Moreover ,  th e criterion o f c olle c t iv ity co n tai ns the d anger of majori tarian tyr an n ythat has o f ten  p laguedthis th eory, and the  emphasis  on instr um enta l rea son seemsto leave  no roomf or th e  d ignit y o f pers on s.The o ne mod e rnappro ach th at  mostsatis fi es the n eed for an ethical call  is th e kin d o f de onto log i cal  theory i nspi red by Kan t.Her e the  su b jectis t h erat i onalsubj e ct that d i sc ove r s  u niversal et h i c alprinc ipl e s sole ly t hrough the exerci s e of reason by  way o f t hec ateg or ical imperativ e,pr i n ciples t ha t are compl etely in de p enden t of p ersona l or co l l ec t ive in clin ati ons and e mpi ri c al cond it io n s, and  tha tshould  comma n d ou r thinking in thesamew a y tha t  ot her r at ional t r uths  claim the  mind's ass ent. B ut w e can  notice  i n Kant 'sde tached, ab s tract rou te to  univer sa l co nsi stency  som e t hinganal og ous  to metap h y si c al  s u bje ctiv ism,as  cri tiqued by Heidegge r,p articul ar lyt e chnici t y' s totalistic  ob livio n of Being a n d fi n it e  dwel ling.The st rict se g reg at ion ofthe g ood frompersonalc onc er ns a nd fromth e co nt ing en cies of experie nce make s possib l e  a kin d o f  tyr a nnical  f ormalism tha t bec om e s blind t o t he actu a l c ond iti onsofexis t ence and thereby not onl y in appli c abl e but  dang er ously
ivity, this_opens up_the possibility of reconciling_the fact-value_divorce_that has_made_ethics so problematic_since the Modem_period. Consider emotivism, the_notion that moral_values_are merely an expression of affective preferences that have no cognitive status. A phenomenology_of_values would,_I_think,_call into question the idea_that my objections to torture,_for example,_are nothing more than personal preferences (and what_could_I say about_those whose preferences support torture?). And is the objection_to fraud in scientific research nothing_more than a_preference?_Consider_also moral egoism, which_in my view amounts to an_oxymoron. In effect it says that_the right thing to do is whatever_an individual wants to do-when it_is this very condition of_individuals pursuing_any and every desire that_generates normative thinking_in the_first place. Individual_subjectivity, then, is somewhat incoherent as_an ethical reference,_and it certainly seems to lack_any_sense of a_"call"_(what_would it_mean to say_that_I am_obligated_to follow my desires?). Utilitarianism is_somewhat_of an improvement in asking individuals to_adjust 13See, e.g., Werner_Marx,_Is There a Measure_on Earth? ch. 2. ETHICS_AND FINITUDE 409 their actions to_the general_well-being of_the community. But the community in this case is simply an_aggregate of individual subjectivities, which does_not therefore supercede the_assumption that_the_good is nothing_more_than an_internal affection having no external claim. Moreover,_the criterion_of collectivity contains the danger of_majoritarian tyranny that has_often_plagued this theory, and the emphasis_on instrumental reason seems to leave_no room for the dignity_of_persons._The one modern approach that_most satisfies the need for an_ethical call is_the kind of de ontological theory inspired_by_Kant. Here the subject is the_rational_subject that discovers universal ethical principles_solely_through_the exercise of reason by_way of the categorical imperative, principles_that are completely independent of personal or collective inclinations_and empirical conditions,_and that should command our_thinking_in_the same way that other rational truths claim the mind's_assent. But_we can notice_in Kant's detached, abstract route to universal consistency something analogous_to metaphysical subjectivism, as critiqued by Heidegger,_particularly technicity's totalistic oblivion of Being and finite dwelling. The strict_segregation of the good from personal concerns and_from the contingencies of experience makes possible_a kind of tyrannical_formalism_that becomes blind to the actual conditions_of_existence_and_thereby not only_inapplicable but dangerously