	there are	deontic	facts,	which	concern	whether	or	not	particular	actions	are	obligatory, forbidden,	permissible,	supererogatory	(and	so	on).1	Although	it	is	possible	for	a DCT	to	be	structured	in	such	a	way	that	it	accounts	for	both	value-based	and deontic	facts,	this	is	not	now	the	norm.	The	main	reason	for	this	lies	in	the	classic Euthyphro	dilemma,	which	challenges	proponents	of	DCT	to	account	for	the necessity	of	certain	moral	values	or	duties	(e.g.	the	duty	to	refrain	from	torturing innocent	children	for	fun).	If	DCT	is	true,	and	if	God	is	free	to	command	anything, then	it	seems	like	the	duty	to	refrain	from	torturing	children	could	be	contingent. 1 Deontic logic is multivalent. According to some theories there are more than the four deontic statuses mentioned in the text, hence the 'and so on'. 3 That	does	not	sit	well	with	many	people's	foundational	moral	intuitions.2	Many DCTists	resolve	this	dilemma	by	appealing	to	God's	nature.	They	argue	that	God's nature	necessarily	exemplifies	or	insantiates	certain	properties	like lovingkindness	and	that	these	properties	in	turn	ensure	that	God	would	never command	something	terrible	like	the	torture	of	innocent	children.	This	approach is	most	closely	associated	with	the	work	of	Robert	Adams	(1999),	though	it	has been	defended	by	others	(e.g.	Alston	1991;	Quinn	2006). The	upshot	is	a	more	complex
there are 	 deontic 	 facts, 	 which 	 concern 	 whether 	 or 	 not 	 particular 	 military action 	 are 	 obligatory, forbidden, 	 permissible, 	 excess 	 (and 	 so 	 on).1 	 Although 	 it 	 is 	 possible 	 for 	 a DCT 	 to 	 be 	 structure 	 in 	 such 	 a 	 way 	 that 	 it 	 account 	 for 	 both 	 value - based 	 and deontic 	 facts, 	 this 	 is 	 not 	 nowadays 	 the 	 norm. 	 The 	 main 	 rationality 	 for 	 this 	 lies 	 in 	 the 	 classic Euthyphro 	 dilemma, 	 which 	 challenge 	 proponents 	 of 	 DCT 	 to 	 account 	 for 	 the necessity 	 of 	 sealed 	 moral 	 values 	 or 	 duties 	 (e.g. 	 the 	 duty 	 to 	 refrain 	 from 	 torturing innocent 	 children 	 for 	 playfulness). 	 If 	 DCT 	 is 	 true, 	 and 	 if 	 God 	 is 	 free 	 to 	 command 	 anything, then 	 it 	 appear 	 like 	 the 	 duty 	 to 	 refrain 	 from 	 torturing 	 child 	 could 	 be 	 contingent. 1 Deontic logic is multivalent. harmonize to some theories there are more than the four deontic statuses mentioned in the text, therefore the' and so on'. 3 That 	 does 	 not 	 sit 	 well 	 with 	 many 	 people's 	 foundational 	 moral 	 intuitions.2 	 Many DCTists 	 resolve 	 this 	 dilemma 	 by 	 appealing 	 to 	 God's 	 nature. 	 They 	 argue 	 that 	 God's nature 	 necessarily 	 exemplifies 	 or 	 insantiates 	 sealed 	 property 	 like lovingkindness 	 and 	 that 	 these 	 properties 	 in 	 turn 	 ensure 	 that 	 God 	 would 	 never command 	 something 	 terrible 	 like 	 the 	 torture 	 of 	 innocent 	 children. 	 This 	 approach is 	 most 	 close 	 associate 	 with 	 the 	 work 	 of 	 Robert 	 Adams 	 (1999), 	 though 	 it 	 has been 	 maintain 	 by 	 others 	 (e.g. 	 Alston 	 1991; 	 Quinn 	 2006). The 	 upshot 	 is 	 a 	 more 	 complex
	thege are	deontic	facts,	which	cuncern	whether	or	uit	partmcular	adtions	ard	obligatory, forbidden,	permissmble,	wupertgogatory	(and	so	on).1	Althoueh	it	is	posdible	for	q DCU	to	be	structured	in	such	a	way	bkat	it	zgcouncs	hor	both	value-basgd	and deontiw	facts,	this	is	nod	nuw	che	norm.	The	main	reason	for	this	lies	in	the	slassic Ekthyphro	dilemmw,	whibh	shalmvnnes	proponents	of	DCT	to	account	for	ths necesvity	of	certain	koral	values	or	duties	(e.g.	the	duhy	to	gefrain	from	torturijg innocent	xhilqeen	for	fun).	If	DZT	is	true,	and	if	God	is	free	jo	command	anything, then	it	seems	likd	the	dbty	to	refraib	feom	hmrturing	chiodren	bould	be	continnvnt. 1 Demntic lpgic is multivsleit. Axcording to some theocies there are more jhan the fmux deontic statuses mebtuoned in dhe gwxt, hehcx tge 'and so on'. 3 That	dkes	not	sit	weol	with	many	people's	foinqqtional	moral	ihtuitijnf.2	Many DCTists	resolve	this	dilemma	by	appealpng	tk	God's	nature.	They	argue	thar	God's nature	necessaripy	exemplisies	or	insantiates	certain	properties	like lovingkindtess	aid	ghau	tmcse	pfipfrties	in	turn	ensure	that	God	would	never command	soistnikg	terrible	like	thc	torture	of	innocent	vhllcten.	This	approacf is	most	cmosely	associated	wihh	the	wotk	of	Rovert	Adams	(1999),	uhougn	it	has been	defended	by	others	(w.g.	Alston	1991;	Quinu	2006). Tye	upshot	is	a	more	com'lex
there are deontic facts, which concern whether particular are obligatory, permissible, supererogatory (and possible a DCT to structured in such way that it accounts for both and deontic facts, this is not now the norm. The main reason for lies in the classic Euthyphro dilemma, which challenges proponents of DCT to account the of moral or duties (e.g. the duty to refrain from torturing innocent children for fun). If DCT is and if God is free to command anything, it seems like the to refrain from torturing children be 1 Deontic is According some theories there more than the four deontic statuses mentioned in the text, hence the 'and so on'. 3 That not sit many people's moral Many resolve this dilemma to God's nature. They argue that exemplifies or insantiates certain properties like lovingkindness and these properties turn ensure that God would never something terrible like the torture of innocent children. approach is most closely associated with the work of Robert Adams (1999), though it has by others (e.g. Alston Quinn 2006). The is more
	there are	deontic	facts,	which	Concern	wheTher	oR	noT	paRtIculAr	acTions	are	obligaTOry, fOrbidden,	permissible,	supEreroGaTOry	(aND	sO	on).1	AlThough	iT	Is	POSsiBlE	fOr	a dCt	To	Be	strUctUred	in	sUch	a	way	thaT	it	AcCounts	for	botH	VaLue-based	anD deOntic	facts,	thIs	iS	not	noW	tHe	nORm.	The	MaiN	reasOn	for	tHIs	lies	In	the	clasSiC euthypHRo	dilemMA,	WhIch	cHallenges	proponenTS	oF	dCT	to	account	foR	the neCeSSiTY	Of	cErtAin	moral	vaLuEs	or	dUTies	(e.g.	tHE	dUTY	To	rEFrain	from	tortUring innoceNT	chIldren	FoR	fuN).	if	DCT	iS	true,	AnD	If	GOd	is	free	to	cOmmaNd	anythinG, then	iT	Seems	liKE	the	dutY	to	refRaiN	frOm	toRTuRiNg	cHiLDreN	CoUld	BE	coNtingent. 1 deOnTic loGic iS MULTivaLenT. AccOrdinG to some theoriEs tHere ARe mOre thAn the Four DeOntic StatusEs menTiOned in the text, heNce tHe 'and so on'. 3 thaT	dOes	NoT	sit	wELl	with	ManY	peOple's	foUndatioNAl	mOrAL	INtUitions.2	Many DCTists	ReSOLvE	this	dilEmma	by	APpEaLIng	to	God'S	nAtuRe.	ThEY	Argue	That	gOd'S nature	nEcessaRIlY	eXemplifIeS	or	insAnTiaTes	CertaIN	proPertieS	like lovIngkiNDness	and	that	thESe	properties	iN	TuRN	EnSUre	tHat	god	would	nevEr coMMand	SomeTHiNg	tERriblE	like	ThE	ToRTure	of	innocent	childReN.	This	aPproaCh is	most	closeLy	associatED	WIth	the	woRk	of	rObERt	Adams	(1999),	though	iT	has bEen	defendeD	By	others	(E.g.	AlsTon	1991;	Quinn	2006). the	upshot	IS	A	more	comPleX
	there are	deontic	facts,which	conc ern	w het her 	o r	no t	pa rticular	actio n s	ar e	obligatory, forbidde n,	pe rm i ssib l e, 	supe rerogat o ry ( and 	s oon) .1 Al thoug h	i t	is	po ssible	for 	aDC T	to	be	stru c tu red	in	suc h	a 	way	that	it 	ac counts 	f orb oth	v alu e-bas ed	and deonti c	facts,th i s	is	n o t	now	t h e 	n orm. 	The	main	reasonf or this	lies	in	t he	cla ss i cE u thy phr o	dilemma, 	w hichc halleng e sp r o pon e nts	of	DCT	to 	account	fo r 	th e nece ss ity of	cer tainmo r alvalues	or	d utie s	(e.g.	t he	dut y 	to	ref r ain	fro m	tort uri nginno c en tchi ld r enf or 	fu n ).If	DCT	i str ue,	a nd	i f G o d	is 	fr ee	t o	com mand	anything , t heni t	s eemslikethedu ty	to 	refra in	fr om 	torturing	chil dren 	could	be 	co nt ing en t. 1D eontic  lo gic  is mul tivalen t . A cc o r d in g to some theories  t h e re  are mor e than th ef our deon ti c s tatu s e s men tion e din the t ext, h e nc ethe 'an dso on' .3 T hat 	does notsit	we ll	withmanyp eople's	founda t ional	moral	i n tu i t io n s.2Man y DCTists	r esol v e	th is	d i le mma by	ap peali ng to God's	nature.	Theyar gue	th at	Go d's nature	ne cessarilye x e mplifies 	ori ns a ntiates	certai n	pro perties	li k e loving kindn ess	andthat	thes e properti esintur n	e n s ur e	that	God	wo u l d	ne ve r comma ndsomethi ngter rib leli ke	the	to rture	of 	i nn oc en t	c hildr e n.	Thisap pro ac h i s	mos t 	close ly	as soci at ed wit h	the	w o rk o f	Ro be rt 	Ada ms(1 999), 	tho u ghit	hasbeen	defe nde d 	byot he rs	(e.g .	Alston	1991 ;Quinn	2006 ).  Th e	upsh o t 	is	a	mo re	complex
	there are	deontic	facts,	which	concern	whether	or	not	particular	actions	are	obligatory,_forbidden,	permissible,	supererogatory	(and	so	on).1	Although	it	is	possible	for	a DCT	to	be	structured	in	such	a	way	that	it	accounts	for	both	value-based	and_deontic	facts,	this	is	not	now	the	norm.	The	main	reason	for	this	lies	in	the	classic Euthyphro	dilemma,	which	challenges	proponents	of	DCT	to	account	for	the necessity	of	certain	moral	values	or	duties	(e.g.	the	duty	to	refrain	from	torturing innocent	children	for	fun).	If	DCT	is	true,	and	if	God	is	free	to	command	anything,_then	it	seems	like	the	duty	to	refrain	from	torturing	children	could	be	contingent. 1_Deontic_logic is_multivalent._According to some_theories there are_more than the four_deontic statuses mentioned_in_the text, hence the 'and so on'. 3 That	does	not	sit	well	with	many	people's	foundational	moral	intuitions.2	Many DCTists	resolve	this	dilemma	by	appealing	to	God's	nature.	They	argue	that	God's nature	necessarily	exemplifies	or	insantiates	certain	properties	like lovingkindness	and	that	these	properties	in	turn	ensure	that	God	would	never command	something	terrible	like	the	torture	of	innocent	children.	This	approach is	most	closely	associated	with	the	work	of	Robert	Adams	(1999),	though	it	has_been	defended	by	others	(e.g.	Alston	1991;	Quinn	2006)._The	upshot	is	a	more	complex