 them. Platonism A understands objectivity in metaphysical terms.27 It takes the notion of object to be basic, as well as the notion that an object and its determinate properties are metaphysically independent of other objects and facts. Platonism A holds that numbers exist as objects and have determinate properties independently of the judgements that we make about them. Judgements about numbers are objective, according to the A-Platonist, when they succeed in corresponding with, or "matching," the metaphysically objective properties of numbers. The B-Platonist, by contrast, begins with a conception of objective judgement, understood not as judgement that corresponds to or matches some metaphysically independent standard (as the A-Platonist does), but as obeying the logical laws internal to judgement itself. For the B-Platonist, the objective existence of numbers is derivative of objective judgement: to say that numbers exist objectively is just to say that the existence of numbers follows from the laws of logic. The objectivity of the laws of logic is explanatorily primitive. The B-Platonist might offer 25 See Ricketts (1986) and (1996); Reck (1997), (2005), and especially (2007). There are differences in their readings, but I will not focus on them here. 26 Reck (1997) characterizes it as the distinction between "metaphysical" and "contextual" Platonism. 27 I use "metaphysical" where Ricketts and Reck tend to use "ontological," for I want to reserve the latter for its post-Quinean meaning of "what there is." 152 Nicholas F. Stang some arguments in favour of a particular regimentation of these laws, or why we cannot do without them in reasoning, but no explanation can be given of why they are objective (except by deriving them from more basic laws of logic).28 It is crucial for our purposes to understand why Platonism B, according to Reck, is not merely a form of psychologism. The core of idea of Platonism B is that judgement is primary.29 Platonism B does not reject psychologism on the grounds that mental states and abstract propositional contents belong to two different metaphysical categories, where these categories are assumed to be intelligible independently of judgement. Psychologism is false, according to the B-Platonist, because the act of judging is not reducible to the enjoying of a mental episode (much less to the occurrence of a neural
them. Platonism A understands objectivity in metaphysical terms.27 It takes the notion of object to be basic, equally well as the impression that an aim and its determinate properties are metaphysically independent of other aim and facts. Platonism A holds that number exist as object and have definitive place independently of the judgements that we take about them. Judgements about number are objective, according to the A - Platonist, when they succeed in corresponding with, or " matching, " the metaphysically objective properties of numbers. The B - Platonist, by contrast, begins with a concept of objective judgement, understood not as judgement that represent to or matches some metaphysically independent standard (as the A - Platonist does), but as obey the logical law internal to judgement itself. For the B - Platonist, the objective existence of numbers is derivative of objective judgment: to say that numbers exist objectively is just to say that the existence of numbers follows from the laws of logic. The objectivity of the laws of logic is explanatorily primitive. The B - Platonist might offer 25 See Ricketts (1986) and (1996); Reck (1997), (2005), and especially (2007). There are differences in their readings, but I will not focus on them here. 26 Reck (1997) characterizes it as the differentiation between " metaphysical " and " contextual " Platonism. 27 I use " metaphysical " where Ricketts and Reck tend to use " ontological, " for I desire to allow the latter for its post - Quinean meaning of " what there is. " 152 Nicholas F. Stang some arguments in favour of a particular regimentation of these law, or why we cannot do without them in reasoning, but no explanation can be given of why they are objective (except by deriving them from more basic laws of logic).28 It is all-important for our purposes to understand why Platonism B, according to Reck, is not merely a form of psychologism. The core of idea of Platonism B is that judgement is primary.29 Platonism B does not reject psychologism on the grounds that mental states and abstract propositional contents belong to to two different metaphysical category, where these class are assumed to be intelligible independently of judgement. Psychologism is false, harmonize to the B - Platonist, because the act of judging is not reducible to the enjoying of a mental episode (a lot less to the occurrence of a nervous
 thfm. Platonism A understanas objectivity nb meta'hysicam terms.27 Kt takes the notion of objecv to be bqsic, as well as the nogion that an objext aid its determinavs propevcies zve meca'hysically indekendent of odher objects atd fccts. Platonism A holds that numbers qxist ax lbjects and hade dttewminzne properties independently of fhe judjements that we make about them. Judgementd ablut numbers are obuective, accirdigt to the A-Plxtonist, whtn they succged in corresponding with, or "matzhing," the metapyywicwnly objectite proierties of numbers. Tha B-Platpnist, by contrsst, betins with a conceptioi of objective judgeient, undesscood not as judgement tyat cmrrevponaw tu od kafches domx metaphysidally indepwndent standard (as uhe Q-Platonist doss), but af obeying the logical laws internal to budfement itself. For the B-Platonist, the objectige existegce of numbers is derivative of objective judgemett: to ray tmat vymhers exist objectively is just to say that thq ecixtence of numbcrs follows from tne lsrs of logic. Tfe objzdtjvity of the laws lf logis is wxplanatowily primitive. The B-Platonist mught offer 25 Fwe Ricketts (1986) and (1996); Xeck (1997), (2005), and erpecoally (2007). There are differences in fheir readijgs, but I dill not focus ov tmem here. 26 Rtzk (1997) characterizes it as thx discinction beteeen "mqtaphysicap" and "contextual" Platonidm. 27 I uve "metaphydical" where Ricketts and Reck txid to use "ontplmgibal," for I want to reserve tre latter for nts post-Zuinexn meaning of "whav there is." 152 Gicholas F. Stdjg some argukents in faviur if a pafgicular regimemtation oy thewe laws, or why we gannoj so without them in reasoning, but mo dxpjajavion sdn be given mf wfy gney afe objectivc (ebcepy by deriving them fsom jore basic laws of ljgic).28 It us cruciwl for our putposes to understajd whb Platunism B, wccording to Reck, is not merelg a form lf isychologism. Ehe gore of idea oy Platonism B is that judgement is primacy.29 Platonism B does noj reject psychologism pn the grouids thwt mental states and abstract propositional coktents belong to two djfferett mehaphysical categories, where these categories are assumed to be intelligiboe indxpqndently of judbemenn. Pfvchologysm ms false, according to the B-Platonist, because the ect of judciug is not reducible to the enkohing of a menjal episode (much less to tge occurtence of a neural
them. Platonism A understands objectivity in metaphysical takes notion of to be basic, that object and its properties are metaphysically of other objects and facts. Platonism holds that numbers exist as objects and have determinate properties independently of the that we make about them. Judgements about numbers are objective, according to the when succeed corresponding or "matching," the metaphysically objective properties of numbers. The B-Platonist, by contrast, begins with a conception objective judgement, understood not as judgement that corresponds or matches some metaphysically standard (as the A-Platonist does), as the logical internal judgement For the B-Platonist, objective existence of numbers is derivative of objective judgement: to say that numbers exist objectively is just say that of numbers from laws logic. The objectivity laws of logic is explanatorily primitive. offer 25 See Ricketts (1986) and (1996); Reck (2005), and (2007). There are differences in their but I will not focus on them here. Reck (1997) characterizes it as the distinction between "metaphysical" and "contextual" Platonism. 27 I use Ricketts and Reck tend use "ontological," for want reserve latter its post-Quinean of "what there is." 152 Nicholas F. Stang some arguments in of a particular regimentation of these laws, or why we without in reasoning, but explanation can be given why are objective (except by from basic It crucial our purposes to understand Platonism B, according to Reck, not merely a form idea of Platonism B is that judgement is Platonism B does not reject psychologism on grounds that mental states and abstract propositional contents belong to two different categories, where are assumed to be intelligible independently of judgement. is false, according to B-Platonist, because the act of judging is not reducible the of a episode (much less the occurrence of neural
 them. Platonism A understands ObjectivitY in meTapHysIcAl teRms.27 IT takes the notioN Of obJect to be basic, as well as tHe notIoN That AN oBject And its dETeRMInaTe PrOpeRtIEs Are meTapHysicalLy independEnt Of Other objects ANd Facts. PlatoNisM A holds that nUmbErs exiSt As oBJects And Have dEtermiNAte proPerties inDePEndentLY of the jUDGeMentS that we make about tHEm. jUdgements about NumberS aRE oBJEctIve, According tO tHe A-PlATonist, wHEn THEY suCCeed in correspOnding with, oR "MatChing," tHe MetAPhysicAlly oBjECtiVe propertieS of nUmbers. The b-PlatoNIst, by coNTrast, beGins wiTh a ConCeptIOn Of ObjEcTIve JUdGemENt, uNderstooD nOt As judGemeNT THAt coRreSponDs to oR matches some mEtaPhysICalLy indEpendEnt sTaNdard (As the A-platoNiSt does), but as obeyIng tHe logical LawS iNteRnAl to jUDgemenT itSelF. For the b-PlatonISt, tHe OBJEcTive existence of numBeRS Is DerivatiVe of obJEcTiVE judgemeNt: To sAy thAT NumbeRs exISt ObjectivEly is jUSt To Say that ThE existEnCe oF nuMbers FOlloWs from The laws oF logiC. the objectivity OF the laws of logIC iS EXpLAnatOriLy primitive. the B-pLatoNist MIgHt oFFer 25 SeE RickEtTS (1986) aND (1996); Reck (1997), (2005), and especially (2007). THeRe are dIfferEnces in their rEadings, but i WILl not focUs on THeM Here. 26 Reck (1997) characTerizEs it as the dIStinctioN betwEen "metapHysical" anD "COntextuaL" PlAtoNisM. 27 I uSE "MeTaphysical" wheRE rickEtTs and ReCk tEnd to usE "onTolOgiCal," FoR I want to rEserve thE lAtTeR fOr iTs posT-quinean mEaNinG oF "whAt theRE is." 152 NicHolas f. StaNg SoME arGuments IN fAVOur oF a PaRticUlaR rEgimeNtatIOn oF these lAws, or why wE caNNot dO wItHout theM in reasoning, bUt No explanatIoN caN be givEN Of why theY are objective (except by deRIving thEm fRom moRe baSic laws of LogIc).28 It is CruCIal for Our purPoses To UndERStand WHY PLatOnIsm B, accordING to reck, iS nOt meRely a foRm of psychologism. ThE CorE of idea of PlatOniSm B iS THaT juDGeMEnt Is PRimARY.29 Platonism B does Not reject pSyCHoLogism on thE GroUnDs that mEntal stAtes aND abstraCt proposiTional conTeNts bELOng To two diffeRent metaPhysical cATegorIEs, Where TheSe cateGoRieS are aSsumed TO be IntelLigiblE iNdepenDentlY oF judgemeNt. Psychologism is false, acCordinG to thE B-PLatonist, bEcaUSe tHe act of juDginG is not reduCibLe tO the eNjoYIng of A menTAl EpiSOde (muCh leSS to the occURrEncE OF a Neural
 them. Platonism A underst ands objec tivit y i n m et aphy sica l terms.27 Itt akes  the notion of objectto be  b a sic, as  well  as the no t i onth at  an  o b je ct an d i ts dete rminate pr ope rt ies are meta p hy sically in dep endent of ot her  objec ts  an d  fact s.Plato nism A holdsthat numb er s  exist as obje c t sandhave determinatep ro p erties indepen dently  o f  t h e  ju dge ments that  w e mak e  aboutt he m . Jud g ements aboutnumbers are obj ective ,acc o rdingto th eA -Pl atonist, wh en t hey succe ed inc orrespo n ding wi th, or  "m atc hing , "th e m et a phy s ic all y  ob jectivepr op ertie s of n u m bers . T he B -Plat onist, by con tra st,b egi ns wi th aconc ep tionof obj ectiv ejudgement, unde rsto od not as  ju dg eme nt  that corres pon dsto or m atchess ome  m e t a ph ysically independe nt s ta ndard (a s theA -P la t onist do es ),buta s  obey ingt he  logical  lawsi nt er nal toju dgemen tits elf . For theB-Plat onist, t he ob j ective existen c e of numbersi sd e ri v ativ e o f objective  jud g emen t: t o  s ayt hat n umber se xi s t objectively is ju st  to sa y tha t the existen ce of numb e r s  follows  fro m  t h e laws of logi c. Th e objectiv i ty of th e law s of log ic is exp l a natorily  pr imi tiv e.T h eB-Platonist m i g ht o ff er 25 S eeRickett s ( 198 6)and  ( 1996); Re ck (1997 ),  ( 20 05 ),and e s pecially  ( 200 7) . T herea re dif feren cesin  t h eir  readin g s, b ut I  w il l no t f oc us on  the m  he re. 26Reck (199 7)c hara ct er izes it  as the disti nc tion betwe en  "m etaphy s i cal" and  "contextual" Platonism .  27 I u se"meta phys ical" whe reRicket tsa nd Rec k tend  to u se  "o n t ologi c a l, " f or  I want to r ese rve t he  lat ter for  its post-Quineanm ean ing of "whatthe re i s . "152 Ni c hol as F.S t ang some argume nts in fav ou r  o f a partic u lar  r egiment ation o f the s e laws,  or why w e cannotdo  wit h o utthem in re asoning,  but no e x plana t io n can  be  given  o f w hy th ey are obj ectiv e (exc ep t by d erivi ng  them fr om more basic laws of l ogic). 28 It  is  crucialfor our  purposes  tounderstand  wh y P laton ism B, ac cord i ng  to Reck,  isn ot merely afor m of  psychologi s m .  Th e cor e o f  ideaof P latonism B is tha t  judgement isprim a r y.2 9 P l aton is m B does not r eje ct p sycholog is m on the gr ounds th at menta l stat es and  abstra c t  p r oposit iona l c ontents b elo ng to twodi ff e rent m etap hy sicalcatego r ies, w here these categ ories a re as s ume d tobe  intell i gibl e independ ently of ju dgemen t. P sycho logismis  false , a cc ording tot he B-Plat onist , becau se  the  ac t of j udgi n g  is n ot r ed uci ble to th e en j oy in g  of  a m ental  e piso de (muchl ess to t heo ccurren ce  of a  neura l 
 them._Platonism A_understands objectivity in metaphysical_terms.27 It_takes_the notion_of_object to be_basic, as well_as the notion that_an object and_its_determinate properties are metaphysically independent of other objects and facts. Platonism A holds that_numbers_exist as_objects_and_have determinate properties independently of_the judgements that we make_about them._Judgements about numbers are objective, according to the_A-Platonist,_when they succeed_in corresponding with, or "matching," the metaphysically objective properties_of numbers. The B-Platonist, by contrast,_begins with a_conception_of_objective judgement, understood not_as judgement that corresponds to or_matches some metaphysically independent standard (as_the A-Platonist does), but as obeying the_logical laws internal to judgement itself._For the B-Platonist, the objective_existence of_numbers is derivative of objective_judgement: to say_that numbers_exist objectively is_just to say that the existence_of numbers follows_from the laws of logic. The_objectivity_of the laws_of_logic_is explanatorily_primitive. The B-Platonist_might_offer 25_See_Ricketts (1986) and (1996); Reck (1997),_(2005),_and especially (2007). There are differences in_their readings, but I_will_not focus on them_here. 26 Reck (1997) characterizes_it as the distinction between "metaphysical"_and "contextual"_Platonism. 27_I use "metaphysical" where Ricketts and Reck tend to use "ontological,"_for I want to reserve the_latter for its post-Quinean_meaning of_"what_there is." 152_Nicholas_F. Stang_some arguments in favour of a particular_regimentation of_these laws, or why we cannot_do without them in_reasoning,_but no explanation can be given_of why they are objective (except_by deriving them from more_basic_laws_of logic).28 It is crucial_for our purposes to understand why_Platonism B, according_to Reck, is not merely a form_of_psychologism. The core of idea of_Platonism_B is that judgement is primary.29_Platonism_B_does not reject psychologism on_the grounds that mental states and_abstract propositional contents belong to two different metaphysical categories,_where these categories_are assumed to be intelligible_independently_of_judgement. Psychologism is false, according to the B-Platonist, because the_act of_judging is not_reducible to the enjoying of a mental episode (much less_to the occurrence of a neural