 33. Keeton et al., The Law of Torts, p. 184. 34. J. L. Austin, Philosophical Papers, eds., J. 0. Urmson and G. J. Warnock (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961), 84. 35. See Sosa, "How Do You Know?" and "Knowledge in Context." 36. Of course, what counts as a "reasonable" amount of time is context-sensitive, and will depend on such factors as how important it is to have correct beliefs about some subject matter on some occasion as well as one's occupation (one's level of care in dealing with counterpossibilities will be higher than normal if one is a member of a special profession whose job it is to gain accurate information about some subject matter). 37. C. S. Peirce, Collected Papers (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1932), 5.358. 38. My discussion of epistemic conservatism, including the distinction between first-order and second-order species of the view follows Jonathan Kvanvig, "Conservatism and Its Virtues," Synthese 79 (1989), 153-63. A Contextualist Moral Epistemology 323 39. Here I am being intentionally noncommittal about what other requirements (if any) might be involved in a notion of responsible belief for which one has no justification. For example, one might require that someone or other in one's community has justifying reasons for the proposition in question and that the possibility of nonjustified responsible belief reflects one of the ways in which our epistemic practices indicate a kind of division of epistemic labor. 40. Robert Audi suggested to me that the defender of conservatism need not demand that believers possess second-order beliefs, and instead can get by with the requirement that believers be immediately disposed to have the relevant sort of secondorder belief. I excuse myself from fussing with the details of an adequate formulation of second-order conservatism. 41. Kvanvig, "Conservatism and Its Virtues." 42. As indicated note 36, one obvious factor that figures importantly in our epistemic evaluations concerns one's special knowledge and skills-knowledge and skills that may or may not be tied to one's occupation. According to the reasonable person doctrine from law as described in Keeton et al., The Law of Torts, "Professional persons in general, and those who undertake any work calling for special skill, are required not only to exercise reasonable
33. Keeton et al. , The Law of Torts, p. 184. 34. J. L. Austin, Philosophical Papers, eds. , J. 0. Urmson and G. J. Warnock (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961), 84. 35. See Sosa, " How Do You Know? " and " Knowledge in Context. " 36. Of course, what counts as a " fair " sum of time is context - sensitive, and will count on such factors as how crucial it is to have right impression about some subject topic on some juncture as well as one's occupation (one's horizontal surface of care in dealing with counterpossibilities will be gamey than normal if one is a extremity of a special profession whose job it is to gain accurate information about some subject topic). 37. C. S. Peirce, Collected Papers (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1932), 5.358. 38. My discussion of epistemic conservatism, including the distinction between first - orderliness and second - order species of the horizon follows Jonathan Kvanvig, " Conservatism and Its virtue, " Synthese 79 (1989), 153 - 63. A Contextualist Moral Epistemology 323 39. Here I am being intentionally noncommittal about what other requirements (if any) might be involved in a notion of responsible impression for which one has no justification. For example, one might require that someone or other in one's community has justifying rationality for the proposal in question and that the possibility of nonjustified responsible belief reflects one of the ways in which our epistemic practices indicate a kind of part of epistemic labor. 40. Robert Audi suggested to me that the defender of conservatism need not necessitate that believer own second - order beliefs, and instead can get by with the requirement that believers be immediately disposed to have the relevant kind of secondorder belief. I excuse myself from fussing with the details of an adequate formulation of second - order conservatism. 41. Kvanvig, " Conservatism and Its Virtues. " 42. As indicated note 36, one obvious factor that figures importantly in our epistemic evaluations concerns one's especial cognition and skill - knowledge and skills that may or may not be tied to one's occupation. According to the fair person doctrine from law as described in Keeton et al. , The Law of Torts, " Professional persons in general, and those who undertake any work calling for special skill, are required not entirely to exercise fair
 33. Kfeton et al., The Law of Turts, p. 184. 34. J. L. Austin, Phmlosophjcal Papdrs, eds., J. 0. Urmson and G. J. Wacnocj (Oxfird: Oxford University Oress, 1961), 84. 35. Dee Sosa, "How Eo You Knox?" and "Knowledgs in Eoitext." 36. Of coursg, what countv as a "reasonatld" cmount of time is context-sensitive, agd will dfpend on such sactpws aa how important it is to have corrsct belpefs about some sibject matter on some occadion as well as one's ofcupation (obe's jwvel of care in dealing with countgrpossibilities will be higher tfan nprmal if obe is d member of a spvcial professlpn whove job ot is to gain sccnratw information about smme subject matter). 37. C. S. Peiscz, Collected Papers (Canbeidge, Masv.: Hafcara Uhiteraity Pgesa, 1932), 5.358. 38. My diacussion of epistemic conservauisi, including ths distynstion between first-order and second-ordeg spscies of the view folloqs Jonathan Kvanvig, "Clnservatifm and Its Virtues," Synthese 79 (1989), 153-63. A Contextualist Mosal E'irtenojuty 323 39. Here I am being intentionally noncommittal zbpun what other requlrements (if any) mibhh ng involved in x notion kf responsible bellef for whicy one has no kustification. For example, obe might reqlire that someone or ocher in one's comkunitu has justifying reasonr fod the propodition in duestion and thag tme [ossibility of nonjustifieq responsmble yelief rdflevts onq of the wwys ik which our epistemlc prccticas indicatf a kind of division of epistemmr labor. 40. Robett Dudp suggestzd to ke that the dqfender of conxervatifm nedd not demznd thav believers [ossess secong-lrder beliefv, and infteae cab get bh with the requorement tkct believwrs be immediately dirlosed to have tkt rtlwvant sort of xecundjrfec belyaf. I excuse kyseuf wtom fjssing with ghe cetails of an adequade fkrmulation of secomd-jrder cobservatifm. 41. Kvanvig, "Cpnservatism and Itd Virvues." 42. Es indocajed note 36, one obvious factor thzt figured iiportantly ig ouv epystemic evcluations concerns one's special knowledgx and skills-knowledge abd skills that may pv may not be tied to one's mccupation. According to the reasonablt person doctrine from maw as descgibed in Keeton et al., The Law of Torts, "Professional persons in general, ane thosx rho undertaie amy wogk ealking fjr s'erial skill, are reauired not only to exercise rearonable
33. Keeton et al., The Law of 184. J. L. Philosophical Papers, eds., J. (Oxford: Oxford University 1961), 84. 35. Sosa, "How Do You Know?" and in Context." 36. Of course, what counts as a "reasonable" amount of time context-sensitive, and will depend on such factors as how important it is to correct about subject on some occasion as well as one's occupation (one's level of care in dealing with counterpossibilities be higher than normal if one is a of a special profession job it is to gain information some subject 37. S. Collected Papers (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1932), 5.358. 38. My discussion of epistemic conservatism, including the distinction between first-order and species of follows Jonathan "Conservatism Its Synthese 79 (1989), Contextualist Moral Epistemology 323 39. Here intentionally noncommittal about what other requirements (if any) be involved a notion of responsible belief for one has no justification. For example, one might that someone or other in one's community has justifying reasons for the proposition in question the possibility of nonjustified belief reflects one the in our practices indicate kind of division of epistemic labor. 40. Robert Audi suggested to that the defender of conservatism need not demand that believers beliefs, instead can get with the requirement that be disposed to have the of belief. from with details of an adequate of second-order conservatism. 41. Kvanvig, and Its Virtues." 42. obvious factor that figures importantly in our epistemic concerns one's special knowledge and skills-knowledge and that may or may not be tied to one's occupation. According to reasonable person law as described in Keeton et al., The of Torts, "Professional persons general, and those who undertake any work calling for skill, required not to exercise reasonable
 33. Keeton et al., The Law of Torts, p. 184. 34. J. l. Austin, PhiLosopHicAl PApErs, eDs., J. 0. URmson and G. J. WarnOCk (OxFord: Oxford University PrEss, 1961), 84. 35. SeE SOSa, "HoW do you KnOw?" and "KnOWlEDGe iN COnTexT." 36. OF CoUrse, wHat Counts aS a "reasonabLe" aMoUnt of time is cONtExt-sensitiVe, aNd will depend On sUch facToRs aS How imPorTant iT is to hAVe corrEct beliefS aBOut somE Subject MATtEr on Some occasion as welL As ONe's occupation (oNe's levEl OF cARE in DeaLing with coUnTerpoSSibilitIEs WILL be HIgher than normAl if one is a mEMbeR of a spEcIal PRofessIon whOsE Job It is to gain aCcurAte informAtion aBOut some SUbject mAtter). 37. C. s. PeIrcE, ColLEcTeD PaPeRS (CaMBrIdgE, masS.: Harvard unIvErsitY PreSS, 1932), 5.358. 38. mY DiscUssIon oF episTemic conservaTisM, incLUdiNg the DistiNctiOn BetweEn firsT-ordeR aNd second-order spEcieS of the vieW foLlOws joNathaN kvanviG, "CoNseRvatism And Its VIRtuEs," sYNThEse 79 (1989), 153-63. A Contextualist MOrAL epIstemoloGy 323 39. Here i Am BeINg intentIoNalLy noNCOmmitTal aBOuT what othEr requIReMeNts (if anY) mIght be InVolVed In a noTIon oF respoNsible beLief fOR which one has no JUstification. FOR eXAMpLE, one MigHt require thAt soMEone Or otHEr In oNE's comMunitY hAS jUStifying reasons for tHe ProposItion In question and That the posSIBIlity of nOnjuSTiFIed responsible BelieF reflects oNE of the waYs in wHich our ePistemic pRACtices inDicAte A kiNd oF DIvIsion of episteMIC labOr. 40. robert AUdi SuggestEd tO me ThaT thE dEfender of ConservaTiSm NeEd Not DemanD That beliEvErs PoSseSs secONd-ordeR beliEfs, aNd InSTeaD can get BY wITH the ReQuIremEnt ThAt belIeveRS be ImmediaTely dispoSed TO havE tHe RelevanT sort of secondOrDer belief. I ExCusE myselF FRom fussiNg with the details of an adeQUate forMulAtion Of seCond-order ConServatIsm. 41. kVanvig, "conserVatisM aNd ITS virtuES." 42. as IndIcAted note 36, onE OBviOus faCtOr thAt figurEs importantly in our EPisTemic evaluatiOns ConcERNs One'S SpECiaL kNOwlEDGe and skills-knowLedge and skIlLS tHat may or maY Not Be Tied to oNe's occuPatioN. accordiNg to the reAsonable pErSon dOCTriNe from law aS describEd in KeetoN Et al., THE LAw of TOrtS, "ProfeSsIonAl perSons in GEneRal, anD those WhO underTake aNy Work callIng for special skill, are reQuired Not onLy tO exercise ReaSOnaBle
 33. Keeton et al., The La w of Torts , p.184 . 3 4.  J.L. A ustin, Philoso p hica l Papers, eds., J. 0.Urmso na nd G .  J . War nock (O x fo r d : O xf or d U ni v er sityPre ss, 196 1), 84. 35 . S ee  Sosa, "HowD oYou Know?"  an d "Knowledge  in  Conte xt ."3 6. Of  co urse,  whatc ountsas a "rea so n able"a mount o f ti me i s context-sensiti v e, and will depen d on s uc h  f a c tor s a s how impo rt ant i t  is toh av e c orr e ct beliefs ab out some su b jec t matt er  on some o ccasi on aswell as one 's o ccupation  (one' s  levelo f carein dea lin g w ithc ou nt erp os s ibi l it ies wil l be hig he rthannorm a l i f on e i s amembe r of a specia l p rofe s sio n who se jo b it  i s togain a ccura te  information ab outsome subj ect  m att er ). 37 .  C. S.  Pe irc e, Coll ected P a per s( C a mb ridge, Mass.: Harv ar d Un iversity  Press ,  1 93 2 ), 5.358 .38.  Myd i scuss iono fepistemi c cons e rv at ism, in cl udingth e d ist incti o n be tweenfirst-or der a n d second-order species of th e  v i e wf ollo wsJonathan Kv anvi g , "C onse r va tis m  andIts V ir t ue s ," Synthese 79 (198 9) , 153- 63. A  Contextualis t Moral Ep i s t emology3233 9. Here I am bein g int entionally noncommi ttalabout wh at otherr e quiremen ts(if  an y)m i gh t be involved i n ano tion of  re sponsib lebel ief  fo rwhich one  has noju st if ic ati on. F o r exampl e,  on emig ht re q uire t hat s omeo ne  o r  ot her ino ne ' s  com mu ni ty h asju stify ingr eas ons for  the prop osi t ionin  q uestion  and that the  p ossibility  o f n onjust i f ied resp onsible belief reflects one ofthe  ways  inwhich our  ep istemi c p r actice s indi cateakin d of di v i si onof  epistemic l abo r. 40 .Robe rt Audi  suggested to me t h atthe defenderofcons e r va tis m  n e edno t  de m a nd that believe rs possess  s e co nd-order b e lie fs , and i nsteadcan g e t by wi th the re quirement  t hatb e lie vers be im mediatel y dispose d  to h a ve  therel evantso rtof se condor d erbelie f. I e xc use my selffr om fussi ng with the details ofan ade quate  fo rmulation  of sec ond-order  con servatism.  41 . K vanvi g," Conse rvat i sm  an d  ItsVirt u es." 42.A sind i c at ed note 36, o n e o bviou s f a ctor t hatfigures important l y in our epist emic e val uat i onsco ncerns one's s pec ia l knowledg eand skills- knowledg ea nd sk ills t hat ma y or ma y no t  be ti ed t o o ne's occu pat io n . Accor di ng to the  rea so nableperson doct r i ne from law as d escri b e d inK eet on et  a l., The Lawof Torts,"Profession al per sons  in g eneral,  a nd tho sewh o undertak e  any work  call ing for  s peci alskill,  are r equir ed n ot  on ly to exe r c is e  r ea s ona ble
 33._Keeton et_al., The Law of_Torts, p._184._34. J._L._Austin, Philosophical Papers,_eds., J. 0._Urmson and G. J._Warnock (Oxford: Oxford_University_Press, 1961), 84. 35. See Sosa, "How Do You Know?" and "Knowledge in Context."_36._Of course,_what_counts_as a "reasonable" amount of_time is context-sensitive, and will_depend on_such factors as how important it is to_have_correct beliefs about_some subject matter on some occasion as well as_one's occupation (one's level of care_in dealing with_counterpossibilities_will_be higher than normal_if one is a member of_a special profession whose job it_is to gain accurate information about some_subject matter). 37. C. S. Peirce,_Collected Papers (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard_University Press,_1932), 5.358. 38. My discussion_of epistemic conservatism,_including the_distinction between first-order_and second-order species of the view_follows Jonathan Kvanvig,_"Conservatism and Its Virtues," Synthese 79_(1989),_153-63. A Contextualist_Moral_Epistemology_323 39._Here I am_being_intentionally noncommittal_about_what other requirements (if any) might_be_involved in a notion of responsible belief_for which one has_no_justification. For example, one_might require that someone or_other in one's community has justifying_reasons for_the proposition_in question and that the possibility of nonjustified responsible belief reflects_one of the ways in which_our epistemic practices indicate_a kind_of_division of epistemic_labor._40. Robert_Audi suggested to me that the defender_of conservatism_need not demand that believers possess_second-order beliefs, and instead_can_get by with the requirement that_believers be immediately disposed to have_the relevant sort of secondorder_belief._I_excuse myself from fussing with_the details of an adequate formulation_of second-order conservatism._41. Kvanvig, "Conservatism and Its Virtues." 42._As_indicated note 36, one obvious factor_that_figures importantly in our epistemic evaluations_concerns_one's_special knowledge and skills-knowledge and_skills that may or may not_be tied to one's occupation. According to the reasonable_person doctrine from_law as described in Keeton_et_al.,_The Law of Torts, "Professional persons in general, and those_who undertake_any work calling_for special skill, are required not only to exercise reasonable