 when someone justifiably holds some token belief, specifically a moral belief.' Questions about doxastic justification should be distinguished from questions about the conditions under which some proposition or claim can be proved true, validated, or "justified," apart from anyone believing it-call this nondoxastic justification. In ethics, much of the focus has been on nondoxastic justification. I'm here thinking of attempts by moral philosophers to explain what sorts of considerations can be used to prove or show the truth (validity) of moral propositions or claims including especially moral principles. Examples include: Marcus Singer's" attempt to prove the Generalization Argument Principle based on an appeal to the logic of moral discourse, Gewirth's14 attempt to prove the so-called Principle of Generic Consistency based on claims about the nature of rational action, Donagan's" attempt to A Contextualist Moral Epistemology 299 prove a Kantian Respect for Persons Principle based on claims about the nature of practical reasons and the nature of moral agents, Brandt's16 attempt to justify a version of rule utilitarianism based largely on empirical considerations from cognitive psychology, Rawls's" attempt to justify his two principles of justice based on considerations of overall coherence broadly conceived, and Hare's" attempt to justify a utilitarian moral principle based on the logic of ethical concepts. Because moral principles are at the heart of normative moral theories, the attempts of these moral philosophers to prove or demonstrate moral principles are concerned with questions of theory acceptance in ethics, and not directly concerned with questions of what I am calling doxastic justification.' However, even if one takes an antitheory stance in ethics and denies that moral phenomena can be systematized by a single principle or even a small set of principles, the distinction between doxastic and nondoxastic justification can and should be made." In contemporary epistemology we find a variety of accounts of doxastic justification. In his recent book, Richard Foley points out that ascriptions of rationality should be understood to involve (at least tacitly) reference to (1) a goal or set of goals and (2) a perspective.21 I am primarily interested in a notion of doxastic justification that can be usefully understood along the lines Foley recommends for rational belief. Whether or not the notion I am interested in is identical to Foley's notion of rational belief, I leave open. What I propose, then, following Foley, is to think of ascriptions of
when someone justifiably holds some token belief, specifically a moral belief.' question about doxastic justification should be distinguish from questions about the conditions under which some proposition or call can be proved true, validate, or " justified, " aside from anyone believing it - call this nondoxastic justification. In ethics, much of the focus has been on nondoxastic justification. I'm here thinking of attack by moral philosophers to explain what sort of consideration can be used to rise or show the truth (cogency) of moral propositions or claims including specially moral principles. Examples include: Marcus Singer's " attempt to testify the Generalization Argument Principle based on an appeal to the logic of moral discourse, Gewirth's14 attempt to prove the therefore - called Principle of Generic Consistency based on claims about the nature of rational action, Donagan's " attempt to A Contextualist Moral Epistemology 299 prove a Kantian Respect for Persons Principle based on claims about the nature of practical reasons and the nature of moral agents, Brandt's16 attempt to justify a version of rule utilitarianism establish largely on empirical considerations from cognitive psychology, Rawls's " attack to apologize his two principle of justice based on considerations of overall coherence broadly conceived, and Hare's " attempt to justify a utilitarian moral principle free-base on the logic of ethical concepts. Because moral principles are at the heart of normative moral theories, the attempts of these moral philosopher to prove or demonstrate moral principles are concerned with question of hypothesis toleration in ethics, and not directly concerned with questions of what I am call doxastic justification.' However, even if one takes an antitheory stance in ethics and deny that moral phenomena can be systematized by a single principle or even a little set of rationale, the distinction between doxastic and nondoxastic justification can and should be made. " In contemporaneous epistemology we find a variety of accounts of doxastic justification. In his recent bible, Richard Foley points out that attribution of rationality should be understood to involve (at least tacitly) reference to (1) a goal or set of goal and (2) a perspective.21 I am primarily interested in a notion of doxastic justification that can be usefully understood along the lines Foley recommends for rational belief. Whether or not the notion I am concerned in is identical to Foley's notion of rational impression, I leave open. What I propose, then, trace Foley, is to think of ascriptions of
 whfn someone justifiably hulds some token belief, specirically x moral belief.' Questions abont dixastuc justification shoula be distpnguished fron questions about tmz consltionv under which spme proposhtion or claim cxn be proved true, validated, or "justifyed," apatt from anyone bglievpnd it-dall this nondoxastic justificatioh. In etiics, much of thr focus has been on nondoxwstif justification. I'm here thinkung jd attempts bh moral phpnosophers jo explain what sorts of considefatious can be uwee tl prove or siow thv truth (validlny) of mmral prppositions or glaimv ibcluding especially mmral principles. Exwmples inwlbde: Marcus Singer's" atrenpt tm prmve gye Eentrakiaation Arjument Prindiple based on an appeal to tht ljtic of moral siscouwsq, Gewirth's14 attempt to prove the so-calleg Pdinciple of Generic Conwistency based on clalms about the nature of rational action, Donagan's" attempt tm A Ckvterbmalirr Loral Epistemology 299 prove a Kantian Respect fjd Kerxons Principle based on ckalmx about the najure of przctical reasons anf the nwture of moral agemts, Brandt's16 attempt to justufy a versiou od rule utilitariannsm based laxgely pn emlirical considerations yrom ckgnitive psjchology, Dxwls's" attempt to juxthfy his udo principles of tustice besed pn conskderstions of overalp cohcsence broadly concfived, atd Hare's" ahtempt to justify a utilitarian moral principke baved on tke loglc of ethical cjncepts. Becausg moral pxincipues are at the heert of normaeive moral thalries, the atvempts of thewe miral phkuosophers to ptove or dvmjnsteate moral principkes zre concerned wnuh wuestions of throrh ascvptence yt ethics, and not difrctly concerned cigh qiestions of what I ak camling doxastic jusyinication.' Yowever, qven if one tskes an antitheory stanre in xthics anq denies that moral phenomena dan be sydteiatized by a sinnle krinciple ox even a small set of principles, the disvinction between doxasjic and nondoxastic jostlfication cai and fhould be made." In contemporart epistemology we find a variety of acdounts of dlxastic justification. In his recent book, Richard Foley points out that asxriptions of ratiohaliyy shmujb be unqersvoud to involve (at least tacitly) reference to (1) a joal or sed jf goals and (2) a perspective.21 O xm primarily knterested in a notion or doxastoc justification that can be usrfully understood along bhe lines Foleg recommenvs for rational belirf. Whecher oe not tye nltion I am ingerrsbed in is ldenuicam to Foley's notion of rational bwlief, U peave open. What M propose, thcn, follkwing Soley, is to thini of wscriktions of
when someone justifiably holds some token belief, moral Questions about justification should be conditions which some proposition claim can be true, validated, or "justified," apart from believing it-call this nondoxastic justification. In ethics, much of the focus has been nondoxastic justification. I'm here thinking of attempts by moral philosophers to explain what of can used prove or show the truth (validity) of moral propositions or claims including especially moral principles. Examples Marcus Singer's" attempt to prove the Generalization Argument based on an appeal the logic of moral discourse, attempt prove the Principle Generic based on claims the nature of rational action, Donagan's" attempt to A Contextualist Moral Epistemology 299 prove a Kantian Respect Persons Principle claims about nature practical and the nature agents, Brandt's16 attempt to justify a utilitarianism based largely on empirical considerations from cognitive Rawls's" attempt justify his two principles of justice on considerations of overall coherence broadly conceived, and attempt to justify a utilitarian moral principle based on the logic of ethical concepts. Because are at the heart normative moral theories, attempts these philosophers prove or moral principles are concerned with questions of theory acceptance in ethics, not directly concerned with questions of what I am calling However, if one takes antitheory stance in ethics denies moral phenomena can be a principle small of the distinction between doxastic nondoxastic justification can and should made." In contemporary epistemology accounts of doxastic justification. In his recent book, Foley points out that ascriptions of rationality be understood to involve (at least tacitly) reference to (1) a goal set of (2) a perspective.21 I am primarily interested in notion of doxastic justification can be usefully understood along the lines Foley recommends rational Whether or the notion I interested in is to Foley's notion belief, I open. I Foley, is to think of ascriptions
 when someone justifiably holDs some tokeN beliEf, sPecIfIcalLy a mOral belief.' QuesTIons About doxastic justificaTion sHoULd be DIsTinguIshed frOM qUEStiOnS aBouT tHE cOnditIonS under wHich some prOpoSiTion or claim cAN bE proved truE, vaLidated, or "jusTifIed," apaRt FroM AnyonE beLieviNg it-caLL this nOndoxastiC jUStificATion. In eTHIcS, mucH of the focus has beeN On NOndoxastic justIficatIoN. i'm HERe tHinKing of atteMpTs by mORal philOSoPHERs tO Explain what soRts of considERatIons caN bE usED to proVe or sHoW The Truth (validiTy) of Moral propOsitioNS or claiMS includIng espEciAllY morAL pRiNciPlES. ExAMpLes INclUde: MarcuS SInGer's" aTtemPT TO ProvE thE GenEraliZation ArgumenT PrInciPLe bAsed oN an apPeal To The loGic of mOral dIsCourse, Gewirth's14 aTtemPt to prove The So-CalLeD PrinCIple of genEriC ConsisTency baSEd oN cLAIMs About the nature of raTiONAl Action, DoNagan's" ATtEmPT to A ContExTuaList mORal EpIsteMOlOgy 299 prove A KantiAN REsPect for peRsons PRiNciPle Based ON claIms aboUt the natUre of PRactical reasonS And the nature oF MoRAL aGEnts, braNdt's16 attempt To juSTify A verSIoN of RUle utIlitaRiANiSM based largely on empiRiCal conSiderAtions from cogNitive psycHOLOgy, Rawls'S" attEMpT To justify his twO prinCiples of juSTice baseD on coNsideratIons of oveRALl cohereNce BroAdlY coNCEiVed, and Hare's" atTEMpt tO jUstify a UtiLitariaN moRal PriNciPlE based on tHe logic oF eThIcAl ConCepts. bEcause moRaL prInCipLes arE At the hEart oF norMaTiVE moRal theoRIeS, THe atTeMpTs of TheSe Moral PhilOSopHers to pRove or demOnsTRate MoRaL princiPles are concerNeD with questIoNs oF theorY ACceptancE in ethics, and not directly COncerneD wiTh queStioNs of what I Am cAlling DoxAStic juStificAtion.' hoWevER, Even iF ONe TakEs An antitheoRY StaNce in EtHics And deniEs that moral phenomeNA caN be systematizEd bY a siNGLe PriNCiPLe oR eVEn a SMAll set of principLes, the distInCTiOn between dOXasTiC and nonDoxastiC justIFicatioN can and shOuld be madE." IN conTEMpoRary episteMology we Find a variETy of aCCoUnts oF doXastic JuStiFicatIon. In hIS reCent bOok, RicHaRd FoleY poinTs Out that aScriptions of rationality Should Be undErsTood to invOlvE (At lEast tacitLy) reFerence to (1) a GoaL or Set of GoaLS and (2) a PersPEcTivE.21 i am prImarILy interesTEd In a NOTiOn of doxastiC JUStiFicatIon THat can Be usEfully understood aLOng the lines FolEy reCOMmeNds FOr raTiOnal belief. WhetHer Or NOT the notiOn i am interestEd in is idEnTIcal tO Foley'S notioN of ratiONAl BElief, I LeavE opEn. What I prOpoSe, THen, follOwInG foley, iS to tHiNk of asCriptiONs of
 when someone justifiablyholds some  toke n b eli ef , sp ecif ically a moral beli ef.' Questions about d oxast ic just i fi catio n shoul d  b e dis ti ng uis he d  f rom q ues tions a bout the c ond it ions under w h ic h some pro pos ition or cla imcan be  p rov e d tru e,valid ated,o r "jus tified,"ap a rt fro m  anyone b el ievi ng it-call this n o nd o xastic justifi cation .I ne t hic s,much of th efocus has bee n  o n n ond o xastic justif ication. I' m  he re thi nk ing of att empts  b y  mo ral philoso pher s to expl ain wh a t sorts of cons iderat ion s c an b e  u se d t op rov e  o r s h owthe trut h(v alidi ty)o f m oral  pr opos ition s or claims i ncl udin g  es pecia lly m oral  p rinci ples.Examp le s include: Marc us S inger's"att em ptto  prov e  the G ene ral ization  Argume n t P ri n c i pl e based on an appe al t othe logi c of m o ra ld iscourse ,Gew irth ' s 14 at temp t  t o provethe so - ca ll ed Prin ci ple of  G ene ric  Cons i sten cy bas ed on cl aimsa bout the natur e  of rationala ct i o n, Dona gan 's" attempt  toA  Con text u al ist Moral  Epis te m ol o gy 299 prove a Kant ia n Resp ect f or Persons Pr inciple ba s e d  on clai ms a b ou t  the nature of  prac tical reas o ns and t he na ture ofmoral age n t s, Brand t's 16att emp t to  justify a ve r s ionof  rule u til itarian ism  ba sed  la rg ely on em piricalco ns id er ati ons f r om cogni ti veps ych ology ,  Rawls 's" a ttem pt  t o  ju stify h i st w o pr in ci ples  of  j ustic e ba s edon cons ideration s o f  ove ra ll  cohere nce broadly c on ceived, an dHar e's" a t t empt tojustify a utilitarian m o ral pri nci ple b ased  on the l ogi c of e thi c al con cepts.  Beca us e m o r al pr i n ci ple sare at the h ear t ofno rmat ive mor al theories, the a t tem pts of thesemor al p h i lo sop h er s  to  p r ove o r demonstrate m oral princ ip l es  are conce r ned  w ith que stionsof th e ory acc eptance i n ethics,  a nd n o t  di rectly con cerned w ith quest i ons o f  w hat I  am  calli ng  do xasti c just i fic ation .' How ev er, ev en if  o ne takes  an antitheory stance i n ethi cs an d d enies tha t m o ral  phenomen a ca n be syste mat ize d bya s i ngleprin c ip leo r eve n as mall seto fpri n c ip les, the di s t i nct ion b etw e en dox asti c and nondoxastic justificationcana n d s hou l d be  m ade." In conte mpo ra r y  epistem ol ogy we find  a varie ty of ac counts  of do xasticj u st i ficati on.Inhis recen t b oo k , Richa rd  F o ley po ints  o ut tha t ascr i ptio n s  of rationalityshoul d be un d ers toodto  involv e  (at  least tac itly) refer ence t o (1 ) a g oal orse t of g oal sand (2) ap erspectiv e.21I am pr im aril y i nteres tedi n  a no tion  o f d oxastic j u s ti f ic at i onthat  canbe  use fully und e rstood a lon g  the li ne s F o l ey rec o mm e n ds for rat ion al be l i ef. Whethe r  orn ot the n otionI am i nterest e d i nis iden tic a l  to Foley 's notion ofra tion al belie f,  I l ea veop en. What I prop ose, the n, follo w i ng Fol ey, is t o  think  o f ascription s of
 when_someone justifiably_holds some token belief,_specifically a_moral_belief.' Questions_about_doxastic justification should_be distinguished from_questions about the conditions_under which some_proposition_or claim can be proved true, validated, or "justified," apart from anyone believing it-call_this_nondoxastic justification._In_ethics,_much of the focus has_been on nondoxastic justification. I'm_here thinking_of attempts by moral philosophers to explain what_sorts_of considerations can_be used to prove or show the truth (validity)_of moral propositions or claims including_especially moral principles._Examples_include:_Marcus Singer's" attempt to_prove the Generalization Argument Principle based_on an appeal to the logic_of moral discourse, Gewirth's14 attempt to prove_the so-called Principle of Generic Consistency_based on claims about the_nature of_rational action, Donagan's" attempt to_A Contextualist Moral_Epistemology 299_prove a Kantian_Respect for Persons Principle based on_claims about the_nature of practical reasons and the_nature_of moral agents,_Brandt's16_attempt_to justify_a version of_rule_utilitarianism based_largely_on empirical considerations from cognitive psychology,_Rawls's"_attempt to justify his two principles of_justice based on considerations_of_overall coherence broadly conceived,_and Hare's" attempt to justify_a utilitarian moral principle based on_the logic_of ethical_concepts. Because moral principles are at the heart of normative moral_theories, the attempts of these moral_philosophers to prove or_demonstrate moral_principles_are concerned with_questions_of theory_acceptance in ethics, and not directly concerned_with questions_of what I am calling doxastic_justification.' However, even if_one_takes an antitheory stance in ethics_and denies that moral phenomena can_be systematized by a single_principle_or_even a small set of_principles, the distinction between doxastic and_nondoxastic justification can_and should be made." In contemporary epistemology_we_find a variety of accounts of_doxastic_justification. In his recent book, Richard_Foley_points_out that ascriptions of rationality_should be understood to involve (at_least tacitly) reference to (1) a goal or set_of goals and_(2) a perspective.21 I am_primarily_interested_in a notion of doxastic justification that can be usefully_understood along_the lines Foley_recommends for rational belief. Whether or not the notion I_am interested in is identical to Foley's_notion of rational belief, I leave open. What I propose, then,_following Foley, is to think of ascriptions of