 pareto condition isn't met in permissive cases. I have been arguing that in permissive cases, epistemic paternalism is not epistemically permitted. One might worry that epistemic permissivism concerns epistemic rationality-but rationality doesn't guarantee truth. Permissivism wouldn't speak to epistemic paternalism concerned with promoting true beliefs, rather than rational ones. I could be in a permissive case and acknowledge that another's beliefs are perfectly rational, but act paternalistically for the sake of promoting true beliefs. In response, the problem here is that from the perspective of the agents in the permissive case, the evidence does not make the truth obvious. Some have likened permissive cases to cases of underdetermination in science (Jackson & Turnbull forthcoming)-in these cases, the evidence underdetermines what one ought to conclude. When I find myself in a permissive case, I'm not in a position to know whether my paternalistic action would be alethically valuable for another. Thus, permissivism also undermines the alethic justification for epistemic paternalism. In this, my claims about the permissibility of permissivism take the agent's perspective seriously. This raises the question: Does one have to know they are in a permissive case? Suppose one is in a permissive case but they have no idea; is paternalism unjustified for them?16 In response, while the simplest case in one in which agents know or justifiedly believe their case is AuQ90 AuQ91 16028-0338d-1pass-r01.indd 206 2/21/2020 10:23:45 AM Epistemic Paternalism, and Epistemic Permissivism 207 permissive, the applicability of my argument goes beyond these straightforward cases. If the probability that the case is permissive is high enough, then the expected epistemic utility of the interference often won't be justified on balance (depending on the expected gains and losses of the interference). Generally, many disagreements are pervasive, and open-mindedness is difficult to cultivate. It is hard to see when someone who disagrees with you is employing another, equally legitimate epistemic standard, as this often requires epistemic empathy that involves "taking on" their perspective. Because this can be so challenging, I worry that there are cases where one might think one is engaging in legitimate epistemic paternalism-helping out another epistemically. However, one is instead ruling out another adequate way of interpreting the evidence.
pareto condition isn't met in permissive cases. I have been arguing that in permissive case, epistemic paternalism is not epistemically allow. One might worry that epistemic permissivism concerns epistemic rationality - but rationality doesn't guarantee accuracy. Permissivism wouldn't speak to epistemic paternalism concerned with promoting truthful beliefs, rather than intellectual one. I could be in a permissive case and notice that another's beliefs are perfectly intellectual, but act paternalistically for the sake of promoting true beliefs. In response, the problem here is that from the perspective of the agent in the permissive case, the evidence does not make the truth obvious. Some have compare permissive cases to cases of underdetermination in skill (Jackson & Turnbull forthcoming)-in these cases, the evidence underdetermines what one ought to reason. When I find myself in a permissive case, I'm not in a position to know whether my paternalistic action would be alethically valuable for another. Thus, permissivism besides undermines the alethic justification for epistemic paternalism. In this, my claims about the permissibility of permissivism take the agent's perspective seriously. This raise the question: Does one have to know they are in a permissive case? Suppose one is in a permissive case but they have no idea; is paternalism unjustified for them?16 In response, while the simple case in one in which agents sleep together or rightly think their case is AuQ90 AuQ91 16028-0338d-1pass-r01.indd 206 2/21/2020 10:23:45 AM Epistemic Paternalism, and Epistemic Permissivism 207 permissive, the applicability of my argument goes beyond these straightforward cases. If the probability that the case is permissive is high enough, then the expected epistemic utility program of the interference often won't be justified on balance (depending on the expected gains and losses of the interference). Generally, many disagreements are pervasive, and clear - mindedness is difficult to educate. It is hard to see when someone who disagrees with you is employing another, equally lawful epistemic standard, as this often requires epistemic empathy that involves " taking on " their perspective. Because this can be so challenging, I worry that there be cases where one might intend one is engaging in legitimate epistemic paternalism - help out another epistemically. However, one is instead govern out another adequate way of translate the evidence.
 pageto condition isn't met ln permissive cases. I heve beeh arguine that in permissive cases, e'istwmic kcternalism is not epkstemicalpy permirted. Ine might xkrry that epiabemic 'ermissivism cokcerns episdemic rationalhth-bbt rationality doesn't guarantee trutr. Permixslvism wouldn't fpeal to siiwtemic paternalism concerned sith prmmoting true neliefs, rather than rationwl ojes. I could be in w permissivg cafw and acknowuedge that another's bemiefs are perfectly rational, bug act paternaliwtucapny for the wake jf promoting true beniefs. Im response, the prmblwm here is that from vhe perspective of tre agents iu the permissive case, tye evhdenwe duws vot meke the tguti obvious. Skme have lijened permissive caxef to cases of hnderdqtqrmination in science (Jackson & Turnbull fodthcoming)-in these cases, the evidence underdejermines wrat one ought to conclude. When I find myself in a permmsrivt gwrw, L'm not in a position to know whether my patergzlosnic action would ne alethically valiahlr for another. Jhus, pexjiasivism also underlines tre alwthic jusuificstion for epistemic paternaoism. In this, ny claims about thz permissibiuity of prrmissivism take the agznt's psrspective deriously. Ghis raises the duexthon: Does one have to know ehey are mn a 'ermissixe csse? Su[pose one ls in a permissive case hut tkey hdve no idew; is paternalism unjustified foc them?16 In reskonve, fhile thz simpkest case in jne in which ayents knjw or justifiedmy belixve their cafe is AuQ90 AuQ91 16028-0338f-1pass-r01.indd 206 2/21/2020 10:23:45 AM Epiftemuc Pqternalkrm, and Epistemoc Permissivism 207 peemissive, the appligabilkfy of my argumeuu gies beyond thesr sgraygjthorwawg cases. If tve pfobxnilith that uke gasd is permissive is high anoufh, then the expectrd epistemuc utiliey of the intrrference often woj't be jurtifird jn balance (depending on the exlected galns and losses jf tme igterferencz). Generally, many disagreements are pervawive, and open-mindgdness is difficult tp cultivate. Mt is rard to sae when someone who eisagrees with yom is employing another, equalny lehitimate epistemic standard, as this often requires epistemic empathy that involtef "taking on" theor pegspzctnve. Becwuse vhis can be so chsllenging, I worry that there arx cases wharz one might think one is engabivg in legitimxte epistemic paternalisj-helping out another epistemically. Howefer, one is instead rulinn out anorher zdequang wey of interpreting tne evibence.
pareto condition isn't met in permissive cases. been that in cases, epistemic paternalism might that epistemic permissivism epistemic rationality-but rationality guarantee truth. Permissivism wouldn't speak to paternalism concerned with promoting true beliefs, rather than rational ones. I could be a permissive case and acknowledge that another's beliefs are perfectly rational, but act for sake promoting beliefs. In response, the problem here is that from the perspective of the agents in the case, the evidence does not make the truth Some have likened permissive to cases of underdetermination in (Jackson Turnbull forthcoming)-in cases, evidence what one ought conclude. When I find myself in a permissive case, I'm not in a position to know whether paternalistic action alethically valuable another. permissivism undermines the alethic epistemic paternalism. In this, my claims of permissivism take the agent's perspective seriously. This the question: one have to know they are a permissive case? Suppose one is in a case but they have no idea; is paternalism unjustified for them?16 In response, while the in one in which know or justifiedly their is AuQ91 206 2/21/2020 AM Epistemic Paternalism, and Epistemic Permissivism 207 permissive, the applicability of argument goes beyond these straightforward cases. If the probability that is is high enough, the expected epistemic utility the often won't be justified (depending the losses the Generally, many disagreements are and open-mindedness is difficult to It is hard to with you is employing another, equally legitimate epistemic as this often requires epistemic empathy that "taking on" their perspective. Because this can be so challenging, I worry there are one might think one is engaging in legitimate paternalism-helping out another epistemically. one is instead ruling out another adequate way of the
 pareto condition isn't met in pErmissive cAses. I HavE beEn ArguIng tHat in permissivE CaseS, epistemic paternalism iS not ePiSTemiCAlLy perMitted. ONE mIGHt wOrRy ThaT ePIsTemic PerMissiviSm concerns EpiStEmic rationalITy-But rationaLitY doesn't guaraNteE truth. peRmiSSivisM woUldn't Speak tO EpisteMic paternAlISm concERned witH PRoMotiNg true beliefs, rathER tHAn rational ones. i could Be IN a PERmiSsiVe case and aCkNowleDGe that aNOtHER'S beLIefs are perfecTly rational, BUt aCt pateRnAliSTicallY for tHe SAke Of promoting True Beliefs. In ResponSE, the proBLem here Is that FroM thE perSPeCtIve Of THe aGEnTs iN The PermissiVe CaSe, the EvidENCE Does Not Make The trUth obvious. SomE haVe liKEneD permIssivE casEs To casEs of unDerdeTeRmination in scieNce (JAckson & TurNbuLl ForThCominG)-In thesE caSes, The evidEnce undERdeTeRMINeS what one ought to conClUDE. WHen I find Myself IN a PeRMissive cAsE, I'm Not iN A PositIon tO KnOw whetheR my patERnAlIstic acTiOn woulD bE alEthIcallY ValuAble foR another. thus, pERmissivism also UNdermines the aLEtHIC jUStifIcaTion for episTemiC PateRnalISm. in tHIs, my cLaims AbOUt THe permissibility of pErMissivIsm taKe the agent's peRspective sERIOusly. ThiS raiSEs THe question: Does One haVe to know thEY are in a pErmisSive case? suppose onE IS in a permIssIve CasE buT THeY have no idea; is PATernAlIsm unjuStiFied for TheM?16 In ResPonSe, While the sImplest cAsE iN oNe In wHich aGEnts know Or JusTiFieDly beLIeve thEir caSe is auq90 AUq91 16028-0338d-1pAss-r01.indD 206 2/21/2020 10:23:45 aM ePIsteMiC PAterNalIsM, and EPistEMic permissIvism 207 permIssIVe, thE aPpLicabilIty of my argumeNt Goes beyond ThEse StraigHTForward cAses. If the probability thaT The case Is pErmisSive Is high enoUgh, Then thE exPEcted ePistemIc utiLiTy oF THe intERFeRenCe Often won't bE JUstIfied On BalaNce (depeNding on the expected GAinS and losses of tHe iNterFEReNce). gEnERalLy, MAny DISagreements are pErvasive, anD oPEn-Mindedness IS diFfIcult to CultivaTe. It iS Hard to sEe when somEone who diSaGreeS WIth You is emploYing anotHer, equallY LegitIMaTe epiSteMic staNdArd, As thiS often REquIres ePistemIc EmpathY that InVolves "taKing on" their perspective. BEcause This cAn bE so challeNgiNG, I wOrry that tHere Are cases whEre One Might ThiNK one iS engAGiNg iN LegitImatE Epistemic PAtErnALIsM-helping out ANOTheR episTemICally. HOwevEr, one is instead rulINg out another adEquaTE Way Of iNTerpReTing the evidencE.
 pareto condition isn't me t in permi ssive  ca ses .I ha ve b een arguing th a t in  permissive cases, epi stemi cp ater n al ism i s not e p is t e mic al ly  pe rm i tt ed. O nemight w orry thatepi st emic permiss i vi sm concern s e pistemic rat ion ality- bu t r a tiona lit y doe sn't g u arante e truth.Pe r missiv i sm woul d n 't  spe ak to epistemic p a te r nalism concern ed wit hp ro m o tin g t rue belief s,  rath e r thanr at i o n alo nes. I couldbe in a per m iss ive ca se  an d  ackno wledg et hat  another'sbeli efs are p erfect l y ratio n al, but  act p ate rna list i ca ll y f or the sa keo f p romoting  t ru e bel iefs . I n  res pon se,the p roblem here i s t hatf rom  thepersp ecti ve  of t he age nts i nthe permissivecase , the evi den ce  do es  notm ake th e t rut h obvio us. Som e  ha ve l i ke ned permissive cas es t ocases of  under d et er m inationin  sc ienc e (Jack son&  T urnbullforthc o mi ng )-in th es e case s,  th e e viden c e un derdet ermineswhato ne ought to co n clude. When I fi n d  m y self  in  a permissi ve c a se,I'mn ot  in a pos ition  t o  k n ow whether my pater na listic  acti on would be a lethically v a luable f or a n ot h er. Thus, perm issiv ism also u n dermines  thealethicjustifica t i on for e pis tem icpat e r na lism. In this , my c la ims abo utthe per mis sib ili tyof  permissi vism tak eth eag ent 's pe r spective  s eri ou sly . Thi s  raise s the  que st io n : D oes one ha v e  tokn ow  the y a re  in a  per m iss ive cas e? Suppos e o n e is  i na permi ssive case bu tthey haveno  id ea; is p aternali sm unjustified for them ? 16 In r esp onse,  whi le the si mpl est ca sei n onein whi ch ag en tsk n ow or j us tif ie dly believ e the ir ca se  isAuQ90 A uQ91 16028-0338d-1 p ass -r01.indd 206  2/ 21/2 0 2 010: 2 3: 4 5 A ME pis t e mic Paternalism , and Epis te m ic  Permissiv i sm20 7 permi ssive,the a p plicabi lity of m y argumen tgoes b eyo nd these s traightf orward ca s es. I f  t he pr oba bility  t hat  thecase i s  pe rmiss ive is  h igh en ough,  t hen theexpected epistemic util ity of  theint erference  of t enwon't bejust ified on b ala nce  (dep end i ng on  the ex pec t ed ga insa nd losses of  th e in terference) . G ene rally , m a ny dis agre ements are pervas i ve, and open-m inde d n ess  is diff ic ult to cultiva te.  I t is hardto  see when s omeone w ho disag rees w ith yo u is em p l oy i ng ano ther , e qually le git im a te epis te mi c  stand ard,  a s this  often requ i r es epistemic emp athyt h at in v olv es "t ak ing on" thei r perspect ive. Becaus e this  can  be s o chall en ging,I w or ry that th e re are ca ses w here on emigh t t hink o ne i s engag ingin  le gitimatee p is t em ic pat erna lism- he lpin g out ano t her epis tem i cally.Ho wev e r , onei si n stead ruli ngout a n o ther adequ a te w a yo f int erpret ing th e evide n ce. 
 pareto_condition isn't_met in permissive cases._I have_been_arguing that_in_permissive cases, epistemic_paternalism is not_epistemically permitted. One might_worry that epistemic_permissivism_concerns epistemic rationality-but rationality doesn't guarantee truth. Permissivism wouldn't speak to epistemic paternalism concerned_with_promoting true_beliefs,_rather_than rational ones. I could_be in a permissive case_and acknowledge_that another's beliefs are perfectly rational, but act_paternalistically_for the sake_of promoting true beliefs. In response, the problem here_is that from the perspective of_the agents in_the_permissive_case, the evidence does_not make the truth obvious. Some_have likened permissive cases to cases_of underdetermination in science (Jackson & Turnbull_forthcoming)-in these cases, the evidence underdetermines_what one ought to conclude._When I_find myself in a permissive_case, I'm not_in a_position to know_whether my paternalistic action would be_alethically valuable for_another. Thus, permissivism also undermines the_alethic_justification for epistemic_paternalism._In_this, my_claims about the_permissibility_of permissivism_take_the agent's perspective seriously. This raises_the_question: Does one have to know they_are in a permissive_case?_Suppose one is in_a permissive case but they_have no idea; is paternalism unjustified_for them?16_In response,_while the simplest case in one in which agents know or_justifiedly believe their case is AuQ90_AuQ91 16028-0338d-1pass-r01.indd 206 2/21/2020_10:23:45 AM_Epistemic_Paternalism, and Epistemic_Permissivism_207 permissive,_the applicability of my argument goes beyond_these straightforward_cases. If the probability that the_case is permissive is_high_enough, then the expected epistemic utility_of the interference often won't be_justified on balance (depending on_the_expected_gains and losses of the_interference). Generally, many disagreements are pervasive,_and open-mindedness is_difficult to cultivate. It is hard to_see_when someone who disagrees with you_is_employing another, equally legitimate epistemic standard,_as_this_often requires epistemic empathy that_involves "taking on" their perspective. Because_this can be so challenging, I worry that there_are cases where_one might think one is_engaging_in_legitimate epistemic paternalism-helping out another epistemically. However, one is instead_ruling out_another adequate way_of interpreting the evidence.