 when facing continuity problems or contradictions, and having to resort to such measures is at least no objection to the possibilist account of how claims made in fiction can be meaningful and have truth-conditions. Nor is it an obvious objection to possibilism that it has nothing to say about how to understand surreal stories or events. In the case of apparent violations of the laws of logic, for instance, we should be inclined to say that it becomes unclear what should be considered true-in-the-fiction and even what propositions the text is expressing. Through the Looking Glass, for instance, contains passages where it is less than clear that we have a firm grasp of the truth-conditional content. The unsurprising lesson to draw from such examples is that fiction serves purposes and exhibits qualities not tied to assertions (or pretense assertions) of matters of fact – its propositional, truth-conditional content – that may even depend on us being unable to pinpoint what claim it in fact makes. Similarly, that possible worlds can be used to define truth-conditions for claims in fiction and model important features of narrative fictions, does not mean that they are particularly useful for capturing the value of, say, poetry or humor. Our model is intended as a basic model of fictional storytelling as a type of discourse, not a template for analyzing literary appreciation or explaining all literary tools at an author's disposal. One source of ostensibly problematic examples come from embedded fictions. Now, embedded fictions (modeled using worlds accessible from the worlds of the first-order fiction) are themselves not particularly problematic for possibilism, but sometimes fictions blur the distinction and let characters that are real according to the fiction interact with characters that are fictional according to the fiction, or enter the fiction-within-the-fiction. Insofar as 'fictional' entails 'non-actual', such scenarios are contradictory; in fact, they cannot even be meaningfully described, any more than a fiction using the phrase'married bachelor' in a fiction describes a married bachelor. However, nothing in possibilism rules out worlds where individuals have different relationships with the scenarios they describe in their stories; the stories-within-the-fictions would not be fictions (for the participants in the first-order fiction) in our sense, and their characters not strictly T H E T R U T H A B O U T S H E R L O C K H O L M E S 363 speaking fictional characters (insofar as they are available for causal interaction,
when facing continuity problems or contradictions, and having to fall back to such measuring stick is at least no objection to the possibilist explanation of how claim made in fiction can be meaningful and hold truth - conditions. Nor is it an obvious expostulation to possibilism that it has nothing to say about how to understand dreamlike stories or events. In the sheath of apparent irreverence of the laws of logic, for case, we should be inclined to say that it become unclear what should be considered true - in - the - fabrication and even what propositions the text is express. Through the Looking Glass, for instance, incorporate passages where it is less than clear that we have a firm grasp of the accuracy - conditional content. The unsurprising lesson to draw from such examples is that fiction serves determination and exhibits qualities not tied to assertions (or pretense assertions) of matters of fact – its propositional, truth - conditional content – that may even depend on us being ineffective to pinpoint what claim it in fact create. Similarly, that possible world can be use to define truth - conditions for claim in fabrication and model important features of narrative fiction, does not mean that they are particularly useful for capturing the value of, say, poetry or humor. Our model is intended as a basic model of fictional storytelling as a type of discourse, not a template for analyze literary appreciation or explain all literary tools at an author's disposal. One source of ostensibly debatable examples come from embedded fiction. Now, embedded fictions (modeled use worlds accessible from the world of the first - order fabrication) are themselves not particularly problematic for possibilism, but sometimes fictions blur the differentiation and let character that are real according to the fiction interact with characters that are fictional accord to the fiction, or enter the fiction - within - the - fiction. Insofar as' fictional' entails' non - actual', such scenarios are contradictory; in fact, they cannot even be meaningfully described, any more than a fabrication using the phrase'married bachelor' in a fabrication describes a married bachelor. However, nothing in possibilism rule out worlds where individuals have unlike relationships with the scenarios they describe in their stories; the stories - within - the - fictions would not be fictions (for the participants in the inaugural - holy order fiction) in our sense, and their characters not strictly T H vitamin e T R U triiodothyronine H A B O U T second H E R L O C kelvin H O L M E S 363 speaking fictional characters (insofar as they are available for causal interaction,
 whfn facing continuity pronlems or contradnxtions, and hzving to resort to such measures is et lwast bo objection to the porsibilist account of iow claims made mh fiction can ne mecnmngful and have truth-condhtions. Nor is ht au obvious objection to possibilism trat it nad nothing to swy anjut gow to understand surreal stories kr evenus. In the case of spparent violations of the lawd of logic, for inshance, we shiuld ve inclined go say thau nt becomes onclear what should be considerea truz-in-the-fictiin anf even what 'roposptions the tewn is ex[ressinb. Through the Koonint Glass, for instance, rontains passages whgre it is neas than clear thar qe haee a firo grxsp oh tge truhh-cknditional content. Thw unsurprising lesspn np draw from auch evaiples is that fiction serves purposes atd sxhibits qualities not ried to assertions (or pretense assertions) of matters of fact – its propositional, truti-cundnblonau clntent – that may even depend on us being unabjs uo iinpoint what clalm it in fact makex. Dikylarly, that pussiblz wkrlds can be used ho defige tryth-condityons for claims in fiction and nodel importcnt features of narracive fictionr, dogs not mean that they are parciculadly useful vor captudkng the value of, saj, poatry or humor. Our model is intended as c basic oodek of fyctional shorytcnling as a type of disclusse, not a hemplate for analyzing literary appreciation pr exilaining cll liberary tools at an author's dixposal. Jne suurce of oatensibny problemaeic examples wlme from embxdded ficeionw. Noq, embedadd fictions (moceled usiuy worlds qccessible from thc woruss of the first-irdtr fiction) are tnemrelded iot pwsticularly psobldmagoc fof possibiliwo, buy sometimes fictions blud the distinction snq let chqracters that are reak according to the fictmon inveract wijh characters that are fictionam accordijg bo the fictiog, or enter the fnction-within-the-fiction. Insofar as 'fictioial' entails 'non-actual', sych scenarios are cpktradictory; mn face, they catnot even be meaningdully described, aky more than a fiction using the ohrase'married bachelor' in a fiction describes a married bachelor. However, bothinj yn possibiljsm tules obt corlds rherx mndividuals have cifferent relationships with thx scenariov chey describe in their storiex; ghe stories-wijhin-the-fictions would not ge fictipns (for the participants in the first-order fiction) in omr sense, qnd tgeir chararters not strictly T H E T R U R H A B O U T S H E R L U C K H O L M F S 363 s'eaking fictional characters (insodar as tjey are availablx for causal lnterabtion,
when facing continuity problems or contradictions, and resort such measures at least no of claims made in can be meaningful have truth-conditions. Nor is it an objection to possibilism that it has nothing to say about how to understand stories or events. In the case of apparent violations of the laws of for we be to say that it becomes unclear what should be considered true-in-the-fiction and even what propositions the is expressing. Through the Looking Glass, for instance, passages where it is than clear that we have firm of the content. unsurprising to draw from examples is that fiction serves purposes and exhibits qualities not tied to assertions (or pretense assertions) of of fact propositional, truth-conditional – may depend on us to pinpoint what claim it in that possible worlds can be used to define for claims fiction and model important features of fictions, does not mean that they are particularly for capturing the value of, say, poetry or humor. Our model is intended as a of fictional storytelling as type of discourse, a for literary or explaining literary tools at an author's disposal. One source of ostensibly problematic come from embedded fictions. Now, embedded fictions (modeled using worlds the of the first-order are themselves not particularly for but sometimes fictions blur and characters according the interact with characters that fictional according to the fiction, enter the fiction-within-the-fiction. Insofar scenarios are contradictory; in fact, they cannot even meaningfully described, any more than a fiction the phrase'married bachelor' in a fiction describes a married bachelor. However, nothing possibilism rules where individuals have different relationships with the scenarios describe in their stories; stories-within-the-fictions would not be fictions (for the participants in first-order in our and their characters strictly T H T R U A B U S L O C K H O M S 363 speaking fictional characters as available for causal interaction,
 when facing continuity problEms or contrAdictIonS, anD hAvinG to rEsort to such meaSUres Is at least no objection to The poSsIBiliST aCcounT of how cLAiMS MadE iN fIctIoN CaN be meAniNgful anD have truth-ConDiTions. Nor is it AN oBvious objeCtiOn to possibilIsm That it HaS noTHing tO saY abouT how to UNderstAnd surreaL sTOries oR Events. IN THe Case Of apparent violatiONs OF the laws of logiC, for inStANcE, WE shOulD be inclineD tO say tHAt it becOMeS UNCleAR what should be Considered tRUe-iN-the-fiCtIon ANd even What pRoPOsiTions the texT is eXpressing. througH The LookINg Glass, For insTanCe, cOntaINs PaSsaGeS WheRE iT is LEss Than cleaR tHaT we haVe a fIRM GRasp Of tHe trUth-coNditional contEnt. the uNSurPrisiNg lesSon tO dRaw frOm such ExampLeS is that fiction sErveS purposes And ExHibItS qualITies noT tiEd tO assertIons (or pREteNsE ASSeRtions) of matters of fAcT – ITs PropositIonal, tRUtH-cONditionaL cOntEnt – tHAT may eVen dEPeNd on us beIng unaBLe To PinpoinT wHat claIm It iN faCt makES. SimIlarly, That possIble wORlds can be used tO Define truth-coNDiTIOnS For cLaiMs in fiction And mODel iMporTAnT feATures Of narRaTIvE Fictions, does not mean ThAt they Are paRticularly useFul for captURINg the valUe of, SAy, POetry or humor. OuR modeL is intendeD As a basic Model Of fictioNal storytELLing as a tYpe Of dIscOurSE, NoT a template for ANAlyzInG literaRy aPpreciaTioN or ExpLaiNiNg all liteRary toolS aT aN aUtHor'S dispOSal. One soUrCe oF oSteNsiblY ProbleMatic ExamPlEs COme From embEDdED FictIoNs. now, eMbeDdEd ficTionS (ModEled usiNg worlds aCceSSiblE fRoM the worLds of the first-OrDer fiction) ArE thEmselvES Not partiCularly problematic for poSSibilisM, buT someTimeS fictions BluR the diStiNCtion aNd let cHaracTeRs tHAT are rEAL aCcoRdIng to the fiCTIon InterAcT witH characTers that are fictionAL acCording to the fIctIon, oR ENtEr tHE fICtiOn-WIthIN-The-fiction. InsofAr as 'fictioNaL' EnTails 'non-acTUal', SuCh scenaRios are ContrADictory; In fact, theY cannot evEn Be meANIngFully descrIbed, any mOre than a fICtion USiNg the PhrAse'marRiEd bAchelOr' in a fICtiOn desCribes A mArried BacheLoR. However, Nothing in possibilism rulEs out wOrlds WheRe individUalS HavE differenT relAtionships WitH thE scenAriOS they DescRIbE in THeir sToriES; the storiES-wIthIN-ThE-fictions woULD Not Be ficTioNS (for thE parTicipants in the firST-order fiction) iN our SENse, And THeir ChAracters not strIctLy t h e T R U T H A B o U t S H E R L O C K H O l M E S 363 speaKiNG fictIonal cHaractErs (insoFAR aS They arE avaIlaBle for cauSal InTEractioN,
 when facing continuity pr oblems orcontr adi cti on s, a nd h aving to resor t  tosuch measures is at le ast n oo bjec t io n tothe pos s ib i l ist  a cc oun to fhow c lai ms made  in fictio n c an  be meaningf u land have t rut h-conditions . N or isit  an obvio usobjec tion t o  possi bilism th at it has nothing t osayabout how to unde r st a nd surreal sto ries o re ve n t s.Inthe case o fappar e nt viol a ti o n s  of the laws of l ogic, for i n sta nce, w esho u ld beincli ne d  to  say that i t be comes unc lear w h at shou l d be co nsider edtru e-in - th e- fic ti o n a n deve n  wh at propo si ti ons t he t e x t is e xpr essi ng. T hrough the Lo oki ng G l ass , for  inst ance ,conta ins pa ssage swhere it is les s th an cleartha tweha ve af irm gr asp  of  the tr uth-con d iti on a l co ntent. The unsurpr is i n glesson t o draw fr om such exa mp les  ist h at fi ctio n  s erves pu rposes an dexhibit squalit ie s n ottiedt o as sertio ns (or p reten s e assertions)o f matters off ac t –i ts p rop ositional,trut h -con diti o na l c o ntent  – th at ma y  even depend on usbe ing un ableto pinpoint w hat claimi t in factmake s .S imilarly, that  poss ible world s  can beusedto defin e truth-c o n ditionsfor  cl aim s i n fi ction and mod e l  imp or tant fe atu res ofnar rat ive  fi ct ions, doe s not me an  t ha tthe y are particul ar lyus efu l for captur ing t he v al ue of,  say, p o et r y  orhu mo r. O urmo del i s in t end ed as a  basic mo del of f ic ti onal st orytelling as  a  type of d is cou rse, n o t  a templ ate for analyzing liter a ry appr eci ation  orexplainin g a ll lit era r y tool s at a n aut ho r's d ispos a l .One  s ource of o s t ens iblypr oble matic e xamples come frome mbe dded fictions . N ow,e m be dde d  f i cti on s  (m o d eled using worl ds accessi bl e  f rom the wo r lds  o f the f irst-or der f i ction)are thems elves not  p arti c u lar ly problem atic for  possibil i sm, b u tsomet ime s fict io nsblurthe di s tin ction  and l et  chara cters  t hat arereal according to the f iction  inte rac t with ch ara c ter s that ar e fi ctional ac cor din g tothe ficti on,o rent e r the  fic t ion-withi n -t he- f i ct ion. Insofa r a s ' ficti ona l ' enta ils'non-actual', suc h  scenarios are  con t r adi cto r y; i nfact, they can not  e v e n be mea ni ngfully des cribed,an y  more  thana fict ion usi n g  t h e phra se'm arr ied bache lor 'i n a fic ti on descri besamarrie d bach e lor. H owever, nothingin po s s ibili s m r ulesou t world s  whe re individ uals have d iffere nt r elati onships  w ith th e s ce narios the y  describe  in t heir st or ies;  th e stor ies- w i thin- the- fi cti ons would n ot be  f i cti ons(forth e pa rticipant s  in thefir s t-order  f ict i o n) ino ur s ense, andthe ir ch a r acters not stri c tl y  T HE T RU T HA B O U T S  H  E R LO C K  H O L ME S 363 s p eak in g fi ctionalch arac te rs(i nsofar as theyare avai lable fo r causal  in t erac t ion,
 when_facing continuity_problems or contradictions, and_having to_resort_to such_measures_is at least_no objection to_the possibilist account of_how claims made_in_fiction can be meaningful and have truth-conditions. Nor is it an obvious objection to_possibilism_that it_has_nothing_to say about how to_understand surreal stories or events._In the_case of apparent violations of the laws of_logic,_for instance, we_should be inclined to say that it becomes unclear_what should be considered true-in-the-fiction and_even what propositions_the_text_is expressing. Through the_Looking Glass, for instance, contains passages_where it is less than clear_that we have a firm grasp of_the truth-conditional content. The unsurprising lesson_to draw from such examples_is that_fiction serves purposes and exhibits_qualities not tied_to assertions_(or pretense assertions)_of matters of fact – its_propositional, truth-conditional content_– that may even depend on_us_being unable to_pinpoint_what_claim it_in fact makes._Similarly,_that possible_worlds_can be used to define truth-conditions_for_claims in fiction and model important features_of narrative fictions, does_not_mean that they are_particularly useful for capturing the_value of, say, poetry or humor._Our model_is intended_as a basic model of fictional storytelling as a type of_discourse, not a template for analyzing_literary appreciation or explaining_all literary_tools_at an author's_disposal._One source_of ostensibly problematic examples come from embedded_fictions. Now,_embedded fictions (modeled using worlds accessible_from the worlds of_the_first-order fiction) are themselves not particularly_problematic for possibilism, but sometimes fictions_blur the distinction and let_characters_that_are real according to the_fiction interact with characters that are_fictional according to_the fiction, or enter the fiction-within-the-fiction. Insofar_as_'fictional' entails 'non-actual', such scenarios are_contradictory;_in fact, they cannot even be_meaningfully_described,_any more than a fiction_using the phrase'married bachelor' in a_fiction describes a married bachelor. However, nothing in possibilism_rules out worlds_where individuals have different relationships_with_the_scenarios they describe in their stories; the stories-within-the-fictions would not_be fictions_(for the participants_in the first-order fiction) in our sense, and their characters_not strictly T H E T R_U T H A B O U T S H E_R L O C K H O L_M E S 363 speaking fictional characters_(insofar as they are_available_for causal interaction,