 the fire." Likewise, "She caused his death by poisoning his food," substitutes for "She killed him." Finally, Feinberg argues that when we blame someone for an action we imply that the action reveals something important about the person himself: "In general, I should think, a person's faulty act is registerable only if it reveals what sort of person he is in some respect about which others have 9 a practical interest in being informed."xvii Feinberg's position is perhaps too strong on this point; it would seem that people can be rightfully blamed for actions that are out of character. Nevertheless, there does seem to be a kind of blame that Feinberg is right about. In other words, even if not all blaming implies that the person's action reveals a faulty character, there is a strong sort of blame, which is common enough, that does. Moreover, this strong sort of blame has a counterpart in a strong sort of credit. Often enough, credit for an action implies a judgement about the person as well, implying not only that the person is responsible for doing something good, but that this is a manifestation of virtuous character. Putting all this together, Feinberg's account of blame for an action can be summed up as follows. A person S is morally to blame for action A only if a. A is a morally faulty action, b. A can be ascribed to S, and c. A reveals S's faulty moral character. Feinberg concludes that attributions of blame share the same pragmatics as causal explanations. His argument for this emphasizes clause (b) of the above account: attributing blame involves ascribing action, and ascribing action involves causal citation. What I want to emphasize, however, is that clause (c) acts the same way. Clause (c) also insures that attributions of blame involve causal citation, for what does it mean to say that an action reveals character, other than that the action results from character? In other words, clause (c) can be read: c'. S did A because S has a faulty moral character. This might seem too strong, and it is if we read (c') as saying that S's character was sufficient all by itself to cause S's action. Similarly, it is too strong if we read (c') as saying that, given S's character, S had to do A. But it is not too strong if we remember the pragmatics of causal explanation language reviewed above. For according to that account, to
the fire. " Likewise, " She caused his death by poison his food, " stand-in for " She killed him. " Finally, Feinberg argues that when we blame someone for an natural process we imply that the action uncover something important about the person himself: " In general, I should remember, a person's faulty act is registerable only if it reveal what sort of person he is in some respect about which others accept 9 a practical interest in being informed. "xvii Feinberg's position is perhaps excessively strong on this point; it would seem that multitude can be rightfully blamed for actions that are out of character. Nevertheless, there does look to be a kind of blame that Feinberg is right about. In other words, even if not all blaming imply that the person's action reveals a faulty character, there is a solid kind of blame, which is common enough, that does. Moreover, this strong sort of blame receive a counterpart in a potent sort of credit. much enough, credit rating for an action implies a judgement about the person equally well, implying not merely that the person is responsible for doing something effective, but that this is a manifestation of virtuous character. Putting all this together, Feinberg's account of incrimination for an action can be summed up as follows. A person S is morally to blame for action A only if a. A is a morally faulty action, b. A can be impute to S, and c. A reveal S's faulty moral character. Feinberg concludes that attributions of incrimination share the same pragmatics as causal explanations. His argument for this emphasizes clause (b) of the above account: assign blame involve ascribing action, and impute action involves causal citation. What I want to stress, however, is that clause (coulomb) acts the same way. Clause (c) besides insures that attributions of blame necessitate causal citation, for what does it mean to say that an action reveals fictional character, other than that the action result from character? In other words, clause (c) can be read: c'. S do A because S has a faulty moral character. This might seem too potent, and it is if we understand (vitamin c') as saying that S's character was sufficient all by itself to induce S's action. Similarly, it is too strong if we take (c') as saying that, given S's character, S had to do A. But it is not too strong if we remember the pragmatic sanction of causal explanation language reviewed above. For according to that account, to
 thf fire." Likewise, "She caustd his death by poisoninj his fkod," subsgitutes for "She killed him." Fmnaloy, Feunberg argues that whev we blamv someone for qn action xs imply that fme acciin reveals somgthing impordant about the pdrdon himself: "In general, I should thigk, a petsln's faulty act is gedistsganle only if it reveals what sort of pervon he is in xome respect about which ohherd have 9 a practicap interest un bqung informed."bvii Feinbtry's position is perhaps too strong on this ooint; it would wewm hvat people ran be rightfully nkamed xor actoons that are put of character. Neverthelevs, there does seem to be a niud of blame that Feinveeg is rigvt aciut. In ovhed wordd, eten if not zll blaming implies that the ptrsjb's action revsals a fwulty character, there is a strong sort mf glame, which is common ebough, that does. Moreoger, this ftrong sort of blame has a counterpart in a stronc sorv uf evcdit. Ifhen enough, credit for an action implies a juddsmtnt about the perfon as well, ilpkiing not only jhat thz psrson is responsibpe for qoing somethind gopd, but that this is a manifwstation of nirtyous character. Putcing all thir tobethet, Feinberg's account of ylame ror an actiln can be rummed up as foluowx. D person S is morally to bjame for ectiou A only if s. A is a morally faulbf action, b. A can bf asctibed do S, and c. A reveals S's faulty moral charerter. Feinberg cmncnudes thct attvibutions of blwme share the xame prcgmatizs as causzl explenations. His argument for jhis emphasizxs clause (b) od thw above xccount: attribiting blame involvew ascribing action, ana ascribing actiin unvolves causal cigatyoj. Xhat Y want to empvasixe, fpwevef, is that coxuse (c) acts the same way. Clahse (c) also insures tmat attrivutions jf blame invokve causal citatioj, for whet doex ij mean to say that an action rebeals chagacber, other thag thqt the actiou results from character? In other words, rlause (c) can be read: c'. W did A because S hcs a faulty mpral sharacter. This might seem too strong, and it is if we read (c') as sayihg thad S's fharacter was sufficient all by itself to cause S's action. Similarly, it is too svrjng if we rsad (v') as vaviny that, divei R's character, S hsd to do A. But it is not too stcong if we rzmember the pragmatics of cauxau explanation language reviewed above. For accprding to that account, to
the fire." Likewise, "She caused his death his substitutes for killed him." Finally, blame for an action imply that the reveals something important about the person "In general, I should think, a person's faulty act is registerable only if reveals what sort of person he is in some respect about which others 9 practical in informed."xvii Feinberg's position is perhaps too strong on this point; it would seem that people can rightfully blamed for actions that are out of Nevertheless, there does seem be a kind of blame Feinberg right about. other even not all blaming that the person's action reveals a faulty character, there is a strong sort of blame, which is enough, that this strong of has counterpart in a of credit. Often enough, credit for a judgement about the person as well, implying only that person is responsible for doing something but that this is a manifestation of virtuous Putting all this together, Feinberg's account of blame for an action can be summed up A person S is to blame for A if A a morally action, b. A can be ascribed to S, and c. A S's faulty moral character. Feinberg concludes that attributions of blame same as causal explanations. argument for this emphasizes (b) the above account: attributing ascribing and causal What want to emphasize, however, that clause (c) acts the way. Clause (c) also involve causal citation, for what does it mean say that an action reveals character, other that the action results from character? In other words, clause (c) can read: c'. A because S has a faulty moral character. might seem too strong, it is if we read (c') as saying that character sufficient all itself to cause action. Similarly, it too strong if (c') as that, S's to do A. But it is too if we remember the pragmatics causal reviewed above. For according to that account, to
 the fire." Likewise, "She caused hIs death by pOisonIng His FoOd," suBstiTutes for "She kilLEd hiM." Finally, Feinberg argues That wHeN We blAMe SomeoNe for an ACtION we ImPlY thAt THe ActioN reVeals soMething impOrtAnT about the perSOn Himself: "In gEneRal, I should thInk, A persoN's FauLTy act Is rEgistErable ONly if iT reveals wHaT Sort of PErson he IS In Some Respect about which OThERs have 9 a practicAl inteReST iN BEinG inFormed."xvii feInberG'S positiON iS PERhaPS too strong on tHis point; it wOUld Seem thAt PeoPLe can bE righTfULly Blamed for acTionS that are oUt of chARacter. NEVerthelEss, theRe dOes Seem TO bE a KinD oF BlaME tHat fEinBerg is riGhT aBout. IN othER WORds, eVen If noT all bLaming implies ThaT the PErsOn's acTion rEveaLs A faulTy charActer, ThEre is a strong sorT of bLame, which Is cOmMon EnOugh, tHAt does. morEovEr, this sTrong soRT of BlAME HaS a counterpart in a stRoNG SoRt of credIt. OfteN EnOuGH, credit fOr An aCtioN IMplieS a juDGeMent abouT the peRSoN aS well, imPlYing noT oNly ThaT the pERson Is respOnsible fOr doiNG something good, BUt that this is a MAnIFEsTAtioN of Virtuous chaRactER. PutTing ALl ThiS TogetHer, FeInBErG'S account of blame for aN aCtion cAn be sUmmed up as follOws. A person s IS Morally tO blaME fOR action A only if A. A is a Morally fauLTy action, B. A can Be ascribEd to S, and c. a REveals S's FauLty MorAl cHARaCter. Feinberg cONCludEs That attRibUtions oF blAme ShaRe tHe Same pragmAtics as cAuSaL eXpLanAtionS. his argumEnT foR tHis EmphaSIzes clAuse (b) Of thE aBoVE acCount: atTRiBUTing BlAmE invOlvEs AscriBing ACtiOn, and asCribing acTioN InvoLvEs Causal cItation. What I wAnT to emphasiZe, HowEver, is THAt clause (C) acts the same way. Clause (c) aLSo insurEs tHat atTribUtions of bLamE involVe cAUsal ciTation, For whAt DoeS IT mean TO SaY thAt An action reVEAls CharaCtEr, otHer than That the action resulTS frOm character? In OthEr woRDS, cLauSE (c) CAn bE rEAd: c'. s DId A because S has a Faulty moraL cHArActer. This mIGht SeEm too stRong, and It is iF We read (c') As saying tHat S's charAcTer wAS SufFicient all By itself To cause S's ACtion. sImIlarlY, it Is too sTrOng If we rEad (c') as SAyiNg thaT, given s's CharacTer, S hAd To do A. But It is not too strong if we remEmber tHe praGmaTics of cauSal EXplAnation laNguaGe reviewed AboVe. FOr accOrdINg to tHat aCCoUnt, TO
 the fire." Likewise, "She  caused hi s dea thbypo ison inghis food," sub s titu tes for "She killed hi m." F in a lly, Fe inber g argue s  t h a t w he nwebl a me  some one  for an  action we  im pl y that the a c ti on reveals  so mething impo rta nt abo ut  th e  pers onhimse lf: "I n  gener al, I sho ul d  think ,  a pers o n 's  fau lty act is regist e ra b le only if itreveal sw ha t sor t o f person h eis in some re s pe c t abo u t which other s have 9 ap rac ticalin ter e st inbeing  i n for med."xvii F einb erg's pos itioni s perha p s too s trongonthi s po i nt ;itwo u lds ee m t h atpeople c an  b e rig htfu l l y blam edforactio ns that are o utof c h ara cter.  Neve rthe le ss, t here d oes s ee m to be a kindof b lame that  Fe in ber gis ri g ht abo ut.  In  otherwords,e ven  i f n ot  all blaming impli es t ha t the pe rson's ac ti o n reveal sa f ault y chara cter ,  t here isa stro n gso rt of b la me, wh ic h i s c ommon enou gh, th at does.  More o ver, this stro n g sort of bla m eh a sa  cou nte rpart in astro n g so rt o f  c red i t. Of ten e no u gh ,  credit for an acti on  impli es ajudgement abo ut the per s o n  as well , im p ly i ng not only th at th e person i s  respons iblefor doin g somethi n g  good, b uttha t t his i sa manifestati o n  ofvi rtuouscha racter.  Pu tti ngall  t his toget her, Fei nb er g' sacc ounto f blamefo r a nact ion c a n be s ummed  upas  f o llo ws. A p e rs o n  S i smo rall y t oblame  for act ion A o nly if a.  Ai s amo ra lly fau lty action, b .A can be a sc rib ed toS ,  and c.A reveals S's faulty mo r al char act er. F einb erg concl ude s that  at t ributi ons of  blam esha r e  thes a me  pr ag matics asc a usa l exp la nati ons. Hi s argument for thi s  em phasizes clau se(b)o f  t hea bo v e a cc o unt : attributing bla me involve sa sc ribing act i on,  a nd ascr ibing a ction involve s causalcitation.  W hatI wan t to empha size, ho wever, is thatc la use ( c)acts t he  sa me wa y. Cla u se(c) a lso in su res th at at tr ibutions  of blame involve causa l cita tion,  fo r what do esi t m ean to sa y th at an acti onrev ealscha r acter , ot h er  th a n tha t th e  action r e su lts f ro m character ? I n o therwor d s, cla use(c) can be read:c '. S did A bec ause S  ha s a faul ty  moral charact er.  T h i s mightse em too stro ng, andit is if  we re ad (c' ) as sa y i ng that S 's c har acter was  su ff i cient a ll  b y  itsel f to  c ause S 's act i on.S i milarly, it is t oo st r o ng if weread(c ') as s a ying  that, giv en S's char acter,  S h ad to  do A.Bu t it i s n ot  too stron g  if we re membe r the p ra gmat ics  of ca usal e xplan atio nlan guage rev i e we d  a bo v e.Foraccor di ng t o that ac c ount, to 
 the_fire." Likewise,_"She caused his death_by poisoning_his_food," substitutes_for_"She killed him."_Finally, Feinberg argues_that when we blame_someone for an_action_we imply that the action reveals something important about the person himself: "In general,_I_should think,_a_person's_faulty act is registerable only_if it reveals what sort_of person_he is in some respect about which others_have_9 a practical_interest in being informed."xvii Feinberg's position is perhaps too_strong on this point; it would_seem that people_can_be_rightfully blamed for actions_that are out of character. Nevertheless,_there does seem to be a_kind of blame that Feinberg is right_about. In other words, even if_not all blaming implies that_the person's_action reveals a faulty character,_there is a_strong sort_of blame, which_is common enough, that does. Moreover,_this strong sort_of blame has a counterpart in_a_strong sort of_credit._Often_enough, credit_for an action_implies_a judgement_about_the person as well, implying not_only_that the person is responsible for doing_something good, but that_this_is a manifestation of_virtuous character. Putting all this_together, Feinberg's account of blame for_an action_can be_summed up as follows. A person S is morally to blame_for action A only if a._A is a morally_faulty action,_b._A can be_ascribed_to S,_and c. A reveals S's faulty moral_character. Feinberg_concludes that attributions of blame share_the same pragmatics as_causal_explanations. His argument for this emphasizes_clause (b) of the above account:_attributing blame involves ascribing action,_and_ascribing_action involves causal citation. What_I want to emphasize, however, is_that clause (c)_acts the same way. Clause (c) also_insures_that attributions of blame involve causal_citation,_for what does it mean to_say_that_an action reveals character, other_than that the action results from_character? In other words, clause (c) can be read:_c'. S did_A because S has a_faulty_moral_character. This might seem too strong, and it is if_we read_(c') as saying_that S's character was sufficient all by itself to cause_S's action. Similarly, it is too strong_if we read (c') as saying that, given S's character, S_had to do A. But it is not_too strong if we remember the pragmatics_of causal explanation language_reviewed_above. For according to that account, to