 characterize some particular moral outlook, and distinguish it from other moral outlooks, is in terms of those morally relevant features mentioned in (1) and (4). Let us say, then, that those morally relevant features of actions, persons, institutions, and so forth that represent (according to the outlook) the most fundamental morally relevant features of things that are the basis of moral evaluation, are distinctive of that particular moral outlook. Midlevel moral generalizations, as I am understanding them, connect those morally relevant features of things with terms of moral evaluation. Hence, we can say that a set of these midlevel generalizations is (partly) constitutive of a particular moral outlook. Thus, in many ordinary, engaged contexts of moral thinking about specific moral questions and issues, these general moral beliefs help structure and organize our moral experience and thought-we think in terms of them. When our focus is on specific issues, they are part of a large body of assumptions that we employ in our thinking. Moreover, such moral beliefs in such contexts are taken for granted: no serious doubts or challenges are considered or taken seriously by the relevant community. Since a large part of being epistemically responsible is a matter of being able to detect and deal with "relevant" challenges, and in the ordinary context of moral justification, challenges to midlevel moral generalizations are not relevant, one's holding such beliefs and basing other, nonbasic beliefs on them is not subject to epistemic criticism and so one is epistemically responsible in holding them without having justifying reasons. So, if I am right, our actual epistemic norms and practices do not, as a matter of fact, require that individuals have justifying reasons for some of their moral beliefs-moral beliefs that often play a crucial epistemic role when it comes to being inferentially justified in holding specific moral beliefs. Context Sensitivity The second feature of contextually basic beliefs to be considered here is the idea that being basic is context-sensitive and so what is basic in one context may not be basic in another. Let us begin by considering different social contexts involving different communities having and inculcating different moral outlooks. Although one would expect that most any two moral outlooks would share many of the same basic moral assumptions (e.g., presumptions A Contextualist Moral Epistemology 313 against killing humans, theft, and so forth), there may be some differences in the specific moral assumptions that these groups by and large take for granted, as well as the moral weight that is attached to the
characterize some particular moral outlook, and distinguish it from early moral lookout, is in terms of those morally relevant features mention in (1) and (4). get us say, then, that those morally relevant features of action, persons, institutions, and thus forth that represent (accord to the outlook) the most cardinal morally relevant features of things that are the basis of moral evaluation, are distinctive of that particular moral outlook. Midlevel moral generalizations, as I am understand them, connect those morally relevant features of things with term of moral evaluation. Hence, we can say that a set of these midlevel generalizations is (partially) constitutive of a finical moral outlook. Thus, in many ordinary, booked contexts of moral thinking about specific moral questions and issues, these general moral beliefs help structure and organize our moral experience and thought - we think in terms of them. When our focus is on specific issues, they are part of a large body of assumptions that we use in our thinking. Moreover, such moral beliefs in such context are remove for granted: no serious doubts or challenges are considered or taken seriously by the relevant community. Since a big part of being epistemically responsible is a matter of being able to detect and deal with " relevant " challenges, and in the ordinary context of moral justification, challenge to midlevel moral generalizations are not relevant, one's holding such beliefs and basing early, nonbasic beliefs on them is not capable to epistemic criticism and so one is epistemically responsible in holding them without having justifying reasons. therefore, if I am right, our actual epistemic norms and practices do not, as a topic of fact, require that individual have justifying reasons for some of their moral impression - moral beliefs that much play a crucial epistemic function when it comes to being inferentially justify in holding specific moral belief. Context Sensitivity The second feature of contextually basic impression to be considered here is the idea that being basic is context - sensitive and so what is basic in one context may not be basic in another. Let us get down by considering different social contexts involve different communities having and inculcating different moral mentality. Although one would expect that most any two moral outlooks would partake many of the same basic moral assumptions (e.g., presumptions A Contextualist Moral Epistemology 313 against killing humans, theft, and indeed forth), there may be some differences in the specific moral assumptions that these groups by and large take for allow, equally well as the moral weight that is attached to the
 chwracterize some particulxr moral outlook, and dmstingujsh it ffom other moral outlooks, is mn twrms if those morally relevxnt featuges mentiined un (1) and (4). Lxf us san, theh, thac vhose morally rglevant featgres of actionv, oexsons, institutions, and so forth that represrnh (according to the jutlkok) the most fundamental morally rslevant features of yhings that are the basis lf mlral evaluation, arf distinctice os that particjlar moral outlook. Midmevel moral generalizations, as K am bnderstandibg thfk, connect tiose mjrally relevant featgres of things with tcrms mf noral evaluation. Hencx, we can say that a fet of thasz midlevel generalizariins iv (pastly) xonrtiuutmve of a oarvicular morzl outlook. Rhus, in many ordinaty, vmgaged contests of mjral thinking about specific moral quesuions and issues, these generql moral beliefs help structurq and organize our moral experience and thought-we thini in tcrms if them. When our focus is on specific issues, thqg srv part of a large body of asxulpyyons that we gmploy nh kur thinking. Moreoger, sucr morql belieff in such contexts are taken foe granted: no werious doubts or ehallenges axe conxiderrd or taken seriously bv the delevant colmunity. Sjvce a large part of baing epistemically responsyble is a matcer of bding able eo detect wnd dcdl with "relevant" cjalleuges, dnd in the ordinary context of moral justmhication, chalketgev to midjevel moral generajizations are uot relerant, ove's holdinf such ueliefs and fasing other, tlnbasic belixfs on thqm iw nor subjezg to epistemic criticism and so obe is epistemicalln reskohsible in holdiuy uhwm without havong juftpfymng rqdsons. So, if H am rient, ouf actual eplstdmic norms and practices do hot, as a matter of fwct, requure that individuals nave justifying rewsons foc some of their moral beliefs-moral belisfs that lftcn play a crusial epistemic rple when it comes to being inferentiallb justified in holding wpecific moral beligfs. Context Seisitivyty The sacond feature of conrextually basic btliefs to be considered here hs thf idea that being basic is context-sensitive and so what is basic in one cintext may not be gasiv in dnjcher. Lee us uegin by considerpng different social contexts intolving dixfzrent communities having and onzulcating difwerent moral outlooks. Alfhough ome would expect that most any teo moral outlooks would xhare maby of the same uasic moral assumptipns (e.g., presymptionw A Gontextualist Oorsl Epistemopogy 313 cgainst killing humans, theft, and wo forrh), there may be soke differenger in jhe specyfic moral assumltiohd thaj these groups by and large yake for granted, as fejl as the morao weight that is ajcdched to the
characterize some particular moral outlook, and distinguish other outlooks, is terms of those (1) (4). Let us then, that those relevant features of actions, persons, institutions, so forth that represent (according to the outlook) the most fundamental morally relevant of things that are the basis of moral evaluation, are distinctive of that moral Midlevel generalizations, I am understanding them, connect those morally relevant features of things with terms of moral evaluation. we can say that a set of these generalizations is (partly) constitutive a particular moral outlook. Thus, many engaged contexts moral about moral questions and these general moral beliefs help structure and organize our moral experience and thought-we think in terms of When our on specific they part a large body that we employ in our thinking. beliefs in such contexts are taken for granted: serious doubts challenges are considered or taken seriously the relevant community. Since a large part of epistemically responsible is a matter of being able to detect and deal with "relevant" challenges, the ordinary context of justification, challenges to moral are relevant, holding such and basing other, nonbasic beliefs on them is not subject to criticism and so one is epistemically responsible in holding them justifying So, if I right, our actual epistemic and do not, as a fact, that reasons some their moral beliefs-moral beliefs often play a crucial epistemic when it comes to specific moral beliefs. Context Sensitivity The second feature contextually basic beliefs to be considered here the idea that being basic is context-sensitive and so what is basic one context be basic in another. Let us begin by different social contexts involving communities having and inculcating different moral outlooks. Although one expect most any moral outlooks would many of the basic moral assumptions A Contextualist Epistemology against and so forth), there may be differences the specific moral assumptions that groups large take for granted, as well as the moral weight that is attached to the
 characterize some particulaR moral outlOok, anD diStiNgUish It frOm other moral ouTLookS, is in terms of those moralLy relEvANt feATuRes meNtioned IN (1) aND (4). let Us SaY, thEn, THaT thosE moRally reLevant featUreS oF actions, persONs, InstitutioNs, aNd so forth thaT rePresenT (aCcoRDing tO thE outlOok) the MOst funDamental mOrALly relEVant feaTUReS of tHings that are the baSIs OF moral evaluatiOn, are dIsTInCTIve Of tHat particuLaR moraL Outlook. mIdLEVEl mORal generalizaTions, as I am uNDerStandiNg TheM, ConnecT thosE mORalLy relevant fEatuRes of thinGs with TErms of mORal evalUation. henCe, wE can SAy ThAt a SeT Of tHEsE miDLevEl generaLiZaTions Is (paRTLY) ConsTitUtivE of a pArticular moraL ouTlooK. thuS, in maNy ordInarY, eNgageD conteXts of MoRal thinking abouT speCific moraL quEsTioNs And isSUes, theSe gEneRal moraL beliefS HelP sTRUCtUre and organize our mOrAL ExPerience And thoUGhT-wE Think in tErMs oF theM. wHen ouR focUS iS on speciFic issUEs, ThEy are paRt Of a larGe BodY of AssumPTionS that wE employ iN our tHInking. Moreover, SUch moral belieFS iN SUcH ContExtS are taken foR graNTed: nO serIOuS doUBts or ChallEnGEs ARe considered or taken SeRiouslY by thE relevant commUnity. Since A LARge part oF beiNG ePIstemically resPonsiBle is a mattER of being Able tO detect aNd deal witH "RElevant" cHalLenGes, And IN ThE ordinary contEXT of mOrAl justiFicAtion, chAllEngEs tO miDlEvel moral GeneraliZaTiOnS aRe nOt relEVant, one's HoLdiNg SucH beliEFs and bAsing OtheR, nOnBAsiC beliefS On THEm is NoT sUbjeCt tO ePisteMic cRItiCism and So one is epIstEMicaLlY rEsponsiBle in holding tHeM without haViNg jUstifyING reasons. so, if I am right, our actual epIStemic nOrmS and pRactIces do not, As a Matter Of fACt, requIre thaT indiViDuaLS Have jUSTiFyiNg Reasons for SOMe oF theiR mOral Beliefs-Moral beliefs that ofTEn pLay a crucial epIstEmic ROLe WheN It COmeS tO BeiNG Inferentially juStified in hOlDInG specific mORal BeLiefs. CoNtext SeNsitiVIty The sEcond featUre of contExTualLY BasIc beliefs tO be consiDered here IS the iDEa That bEinG basic Is ConText-sEnsitiVE anD so whAt is baSiC in one ConteXt May not be Basic in another. Let us begiN by conSiderIng Different SocIAl cOntexts inVolvIng differeNt cOmmUnitiEs hAVing aNd inCUlCatINg difFereNT moral outLOoKs. ALTHoUgh one would EXPEct That mOst ANy two mOral Outlooks would sharE Many of the same bAsic MORal AssUMptiOnS (e.g., presumptionS A COnTEXtualist moRal EpistemoLogy 313 agaiNsT KilliNg humaNs, thefT, and so fORTh), THere maY be sOme DifferencEs iN tHE specifIc MoRAl assuMptiOnS that tHese grOUps bY ANd large take for grAnted, AS Well aS The Moral WeIght thaT Is atTached to thE
 characterize some particu lar moraloutlo ok,  an ddist ingu ish it from ot h er m oral outlooks, is in t ermsof thos e  m orall y relev a nt f eat ur es  me nt i on ed in  (1 ) and ( 4). Let us  sa y,  then, thatt ho se morally  re levant featu res  of ac ti ons ,  pers ons , ins tituti o ns, an d so fort ht hat re p resent( a cc ordi ng to the outlook )  t h e most fundame ntal m or a ll y rel eva nt feature sof th i ngs tha t  a r e the basis of mora l evaluatio n , a re dis ti nct i ve ofthatpa r tic ular moraloutl ook. Midl evel m o ral gen e ralizat ions,asI a m un d er st and in g  th e m,  co n nec t thosemo ra lly r elev a n t feat ure s of  thin gs with terms  of  mor a l e valua tion.  Hen ce , wecan sa y tha ta set of thesemidl evel gene ral iz ati on s is( partly ) c ons titutiv e of ap art ic u l a rmoral outlook. Thu s, i nmany ord inary, en ga g ed conte xt s o f mo r a l thi nkin g  a bout spe cificm or al  questi on s andis sue s,these gene ral mo ral beli efs h e lp structure a n d organize ou r  m o r al expe rie nce and tho ught - we t hink in  te r ms of  them .W he n  our focus is on sp ec ific i ssues , they are pa rt of a la r g e  body of  ass u mp t ions that we e mploy  in our th i nking. M oreov er, such  moral be l i efs in s uch  co nte xts a re  taken for gr a n ted:  n o serio usdoubtsorcha lle nge sare consi dered or  t ak en  s eri ously by the r el eva nt  co mmuni t y. Sin ce alarg epa r t o f being ep i s temi ca ll y re spo ns ibleis a mat ter ofbeing abl e t o  det ec tand dea l with "relev an t" challen ge s,and in t he ordin ary context of moral ju s tificat ion , cha llen ges to mi dle vel mo ral genera lizati ons a re  no t relev a n t,  on e' s holdings u chbelie fs  and  basing  other, nonbasic b e lie fs on them is  no t su b j ec t t o  e p ist em i c c r i ticism and so o ne is epis te m ic ally respo n sib le  in hol ding th em wi t hout ha ving just ifying re as ons. S o,if I am ri ght, our  actual e p istem i cnorms  an d prac ti ces  do n ot, as a m atter  of fa ct , requ ire t ha t indivi duals have justifying r easons  forsom e of thei r m o ral  beliefs- mora l beliefstha t o ftenpla y  a cr ucia l  e pis t emicrole when it c o me s t o be ing inferen t i a lly  just ifi e d in h oldi ng specific moral beliefs. Conte xt S e n sit ivi t y Th esecond feature  of  c o n textuall ybasic belie fs to be  c o nside red he re isthe ide a th a t bein g ba sic  is conte xt- se n sitivean ds o what  isba sic in  one c o ntex t may not be basic  in a n o ther. Let  us b eg in by c o nsid ering diff erent socia l cont exts  invo lving d if ferent  co mm unities ha v ing and i nculc ating d if fere ntmoraloutl o o ks. A ltho ug h o ne woulde x pe c tth a t m ostany t wo  mor al outloo k s wouldsha r e manyof  th e same b a si c moral assu mpt ions( e .g., presu m ptio n sA  Cont extual ist Mo ral Epi s tem ol ogy 313  ag a i nst killi ng humans ,  th ef t, a nd so fo rt h),th ere  m ay be some diff erencesin the s p e cificmor a l as s umptio ns  that thesegroup sb y and l a r getake fo r  gr ant ed,  aswel l as the moral weight that is  att ached tothe
 characterize_some particular_moral outlook, and distinguish_it from_other_moral outlooks,_is_in terms of_those morally relevant_features mentioned in (1)_and (4). Let_us_say, then, that those morally relevant features of actions, persons, institutions, and so forth_that_represent (according_to_the_outlook) the most fundamental morally_relevant features of things that_are the_basis of moral evaluation, are distinctive of that_particular_moral outlook. Midlevel_moral generalizations, as I am understanding them, connect those_morally relevant features of things with_terms of moral_evaluation._Hence,_we can say that_a set of these midlevel generalizations_is (partly) constitutive of a particular_moral outlook. Thus, in many ordinary, engaged_contexts of moral thinking about specific_moral questions and issues, these_general moral_beliefs help structure and organize_our moral experience_and thought-we_think in terms_of them. When our focus is_on specific issues,_they are part of a large_body_of assumptions that_we_employ_in our_thinking. Moreover, such_moral_beliefs in_such_contexts are taken for granted: no_serious_doubts or challenges are considered or taken_seriously by the relevant_community._Since a large part_of being epistemically responsible is_a matter of being able to_detect and_deal with_"relevant" challenges, and in the ordinary context of moral justification, challenges_to midlevel moral generalizations are not_relevant, one's holding such_beliefs and_basing_other, nonbasic beliefs_on_them is_not subject to epistemic criticism and so_one is_epistemically responsible in holding them without_having justifying reasons. So,_if_I am right, our actual epistemic_norms and practices do not, as_a matter of fact, require_that_individuals_have justifying reasons for some_of their moral beliefs-moral beliefs that_often play a_crucial epistemic role when it comes to_being_inferentially justified in holding specific moral_beliefs._Context Sensitivity The second feature of_contextually_basic_beliefs to be considered here_is the idea that being basic_is context-sensitive and so what is basic in one_context may not_be basic in another. Let_us_begin_by considering different social contexts involving different communities having and_inculcating different_moral outlooks. Although_one would expect that most any two moral outlooks would_share many of the same basic moral_assumptions (e.g., presumptions A Contextualist Moral Epistemology 313 against killing humans,_theft, and so forth), there may be some_differences in the specific moral assumptions that_these groups by and_large_take for granted, as well as the_moral_weight_that_is attached to_the