 conclusions: the uselessness of lust and the subjugation of the body. 268 Lele, The Metaphysical Basis of Śāntideva's Ethics innovative, fits neatly into a more general pattern found in many places in the BCA: an argument from metaphysical premises to ethical conclusions. Specifically, Śāntideva argues from the metaphysics of non-self to ethical selflessness. Here, for the first time, we get a specifically Mahāyāna ethics; the previous two points could have been found in any kind of Buddhism. Of course there is nothing specifically Mahāyāna about the pan-Buddhist metaphysical idea of anātman. What is peculiarly Mahāyāna is selflessness in an ethical sense: not just that we are selfless, in the sense that the self is not real, but that we should be selfless, in the sense of altruistic: trying to save all beings, and not only ourselves, from suffering. And what is remarkable and innovative in Śāntideva, beyond other Mahāyāna thinkers, is that he connects the two kinds of selflessness-as he connected dependent co-origination with non-anger. Mahāyāna texts before him praised altruism and agreed with non-self, but did not try to show that the former followed from the latter. How does Śāntideva make this argument? His major claim is that distinctions between selves are illusory. Supposedly distinct selves are all the same in their nature to both experience suffering and desire its end: When happiness is equally dear to me and to others, then what is special about myself that I strive after my happiness alone? When fear and suffering are not dear to myself or to others, then what is special about my self that I protect it and not another? (VIII.95–96) This argument is clearly important to Śāntideva; the portion about suffering is repeated at the very beginning of the root text (kārikā) of his other work, the Śikṣāsamuccaya. The claim can sound bizarre at first. One could certainly defend the difference between self and other, Journal of Buddhist Ethics 269 in the name of self-interest. The obvious objection to Śāntideva is: others' suffering doesn't affect me, so why should I prevent it? It is in response to this objection
conclusions: the uselessness of lust and the subjugation of the soundbox. 268 Lele, The Metaphysical Basis of Śāntideva's Ethics innovative, equip neatly into a more general design establish in many places in the BCA: an argument from metaphysical premise to ethical conclusions. Specifically, Śāntideva argues from the metaphysics of non - self to ethical selflessness. Here, for the inaugural time, we get a specifically Mahāyāna ethic; the previous two points could have been establish in any kind of Buddhism. Of course there is nothing specifically Mahāyāna about the pan - Buddhist metaphysical idea of anātman. What is curiously Mahāyāna is selflessness in an ethical sense: not just that we are altruistic, in the sense that the self is not real, but that we should be altruistic, in the sense of altruistic: try to save all beings, and not only ourselves, from suffering. And what is remarkable and advanced in Śāntideva, beyond other Mahāyāna thinkers, is that he connects the two kinds of selflessness - as he connected pendent co - origination with non - anger. Mahāyāna texts before him praised altruism and agreed with non - self, but did not try to show that the former followed from the latter. How does Śāntideva make this controversy? His major claim is that distinctions between self are illusive. purportedly distinct selves are all the same in their nature to both experience suffering and desire its end: When happiness is equally beloved to me and to others, then what is special about myself that I strive after my happiness alone? When fear and suffering are not dear to myself or to others, then what is limited about my self that I protect it and not another? (VIII.95–96) This argument is clearly important to Śāntideva; the portion about suffering is repeated at the identical beginning of the ancestor text (kārikā) of his other work, the Śikṣāsamuccaya. The claim can voice bizarre at first. One could certainly defend the remainder between self and other, Journal of Buddhist Ethics 269 in the name of self - interest. The obvious objection to Śāntideva is: others' suffering doesn't feign me, so why should I prevent it? It is in answer to this objection
 cojclusions: the uselessnesr of lust and tkw subjngation of the cody. 268 Lele, The Metaphysical Uasiw of Śābtideva's Ethics innovagive, fits neatly unto q more genxdal patbzrn fkmnd iu nany places in the BCA: at argument frok oecaphysical premises to ethical concltsions. Xpfcifically, Śāntiqeva wrguss from the metaphysics of non-self to ethpcal selflessness. Here, for the first time, wf geh a specifically Mwhāyāna ethicw; thq previous twu points could have begn found in any kind of Buddhism. Of cpurse therg js tothing sperificajly Mahāyāna anput tha pan-Bucdhist metaphyxicel ieea of anātman. What is peculiarly Mahāyāna is selflasaness in an ethicql sensg: not jusg thxt se ade selvleas, in the aense that rhe self is not reak, fly that we shkuld bq felfless, in the sense of altruistic: trypng fo save all beings, and bot only ourselves, frlm sufferyng. And what is remarkable and innovative in Śāntidava, bxyund obher Najāyāna thinkers, is that he connects the two kinqa pf selflessness-af he connecyef cgpendent co-orieination sith non-anger. Mahāyāja textf befire him pwaisrd altruism and agreed with non-self, but eid not try to shoc that the furmet follpwed from the latter. Hoc does Śāntideva mane this adeument? His major clsik is thau distinctions betreen selvxs arz illusofy. Sopposedjy distinch selyas are all the samf in jheir tature to hoth experience suffering and dxxire its end: Wven happinefs is equally dear to me and to pthers, chen wfat is spebial abouv myself thae I strive afdgr my happinevs alone? Wheb feqr and rjffering are npt dear to myself oe to others, then wmat ir special about ny welf that I proyecg ie wnv not dnother? (VIII.95–96) Thir afbumeng is cltcrln ioporyant to Śāntideva; the [ortjon about sufferinb ls repeatgd at the very beginnimg of the root texu (kārikā) of his pthgr work, the Śikṣāsamuccaya. The clajm can soknd bizarre at sirsb. Ong could cercainly defend the difference between selh and other, Journal of Vuddhist Ethics 269 in uhe name of sxlf-intqrest. The obvious objection ti Śāntideva is: othevs' suffering doesn't afrect ma, so ahy should I prevent it? It is in response to this objection
conclusions: the uselessness of lust and the the 268 Lele, Metaphysical Basis of into more general pattern in many places the BCA: an argument from metaphysical to ethical conclusions. Specifically, Śāntideva argues from the metaphysics of non-self to ethical Here, for the first time, we get a specifically Mahāyāna ethics; the previous points have found any kind of Buddhism. Of course there is nothing specifically Mahāyāna about the pan-Buddhist metaphysical idea anātman. What is peculiarly Mahāyāna is selflessness in ethical sense: not just we are selfless, in the that self is real, that should be selfless, the sense of altruistic: trying to save all beings, and not only ourselves, from suffering. And what remarkable and Śāntideva, beyond Mahāyāna is he connects the of selflessness-as he connected dependent co-origination texts before him praised altruism and agreed with but did try to show that the former from the latter. How does Śāntideva make this His major claim is that distinctions between selves are illusory. Supposedly distinct selves are all in their nature to experience suffering and its When is dear to and to others, then what is special about myself that I after my happiness alone? When fear and suffering are not myself to others, then is special about my that protect it and not This is Śāntideva; portion suffering is repeated at very beginning of the root (kārikā) of his other can sound bizarre at first. One could certainly the difference between self and other, Journal Buddhist Ethics 269 in the name of self-interest. The obvious objection to is: others' affect me, so why should I prevent it? is in response to objection
 conclusions: the uselessness Of lust and tHe subJugAtiOn Of thE bodY. 268 Lele, The MetaphYSicaL Basis of Śāntideva's EthiCs innOvATive, FItS neatLy into a MOrE GEneRaL pAttErN FoUnd in ManY places In the BCA: an ArgUmEnt from metapHYsIcal premisEs tO ethical concLusIons. SpEcIfiCAlly, ŚĀntIdeva Argues FRom the MetaphysiCs OF non-seLF to ethiCAL sElflEssness. Here, for the FIrST time, we get a speCificaLlY maHĀYānA etHics; the preViOus twO Points cOUlD HAVe bEEn found in any kInd of BuddhiSM. Of Course ThEre IS nothiNg speCiFIcaLly Mahāyāna AbouT the pan-BuDdhist MEtaphysICal idea Of anātMan. whaT is pECuLiArlY MAHāyĀNa Is sELflEssness iN aN eThicaL senSE: NOT jusT thAt we Are seLfless, in the seNse That THe sElf is Not reAl, buT tHat we Should Be selFlEss, in the sense of AltrUistic: tryIng To SavE aLl beiNGs, and nOt oNly OurselvEs, from sUFfeRiNG. aNd What is remarkable anD iNNOvAtive in ŚĀntideVA, bEyONd other MAhĀyāNa thINKers, iS thaT He Connects The two KInDs Of selflEsSness-aS hE coNneCted dEPendEnt co-oRiginatiOn witH Non-anger. MahāyāNA texts before hIM pRAIsED altRuiSm and agreed With NOn-seLf, buT DiD noT Try to Show tHaT ThE Former followed from tHe Latter. how doEs Śāntideva maKe this arguMENT? His majoR claIM iS That distinctioNs betWeen selves ARe illusoRy. SupPosedly dIstinct seLVEs are all The SamE in TheIR NaTure to both expERIencE sUfferinG anD desire Its End: wheN haPpIness is eqUally deaR tO mE aNd To oThers, THen what iS sPecIaL abOut mySElf thaT I strIve aFtEr MY haPpiness ALoNE? when FeAr And sUffErIng arE not DEar To myselF or to otheRs, tHEn whAt Is Special About my self thAt i protect it AnD noT anothER? (vIII.95–96) This Argument is clearly importANt to ŚānTidEva; thE porTion about SufFering Is rEPeated At the vEry beGiNniNG Of the ROOt TexT (kĀrikā) of his OTHer Work, tHe śikṣĀsamuccAya. The claim can sounD BizArre at first. OnE coUld cERTaInlY DeFEnd ThE DifFERence between selF and other, JOuRNaL of BuddhisT ethIcS 269 in the nAme of seLf-intERest. The Obvious obJection to śāNtidEVA is: Others' suffEring doeSn't affect ME, so whY ShOuld I PreVent it? it Is iN respOnse to THis ObjecTion
 conclusions: the uselessn ess of lus t and  th e s ub juga tion  of the body.2 68 L ele, The MetaphysicalBasis  o f  Śān t id eva's  Ethics in n o vat iv e,  fi ts ne atlyint o a mor e generalpat te rn found inm an y places i n t he BCA: an a rgu ment f ro m m e taphy sic al pr emises to eth ical conc lu s ions.S pecific a l ly , Śā ntideva argues fr o mt he metaphysics  of no n- s el f toeth ical selfl es sness .  Here,f or t h e f i rst time, weget a speci f ica lly Ma hā yān a  ethic s; th ep rev ious two po ints  could ha ve bee n  foundi n any k ind of  Bu ddh ism. Of  c our se the r eisn oth ing spec if ic allyMahā y ā n a  abo utthepan-B uddhist metap hys ical ide a ofanātm an.Wh at is  pecul iarly  M ahāyāna is self less ness in a n e th ica lsense :  not j ust  th at we a re self l ess ,i n th e sense that the s el f is  not rea l, but th at we shoul dbeself l e ss, i n th e  s ense ofaltrui s ti c:  trying  t o save  a llbei ngs,a nd n ot onl y oursel ves,f rom suffering. And what is r e ma r k ab l e an d i nnovative i n Śā n tide va,b ey ond other  Mahā yā n at hinkers, is that he  c onnect s the  two kinds of  selflessn e s s -as he c onne c te d  dependent co- origi nation wit h  non-ang er. M ahāyānatexts bef o r e him pr ais edalt rui s m  a nd agreed wit h non- se lf, but  di d not t rytosho w t ha t the for mer foll ow ed  f ro m t he la t ter. How  d oes  Ś ānt ideva make t his a rgum en t? His  majorc la i m  isth at  dis tin ct ionsbetw e enselvesare illus ory .  Sup po se dly dis tinct selvesar e all thesa mein the i r  natureto both experience suff e ring an d d esire  its  end: Whe n h appine ssi s equa lly de ar to  m e a n d  to o t h er s,th en what is s pec ial a bo ut m yself t hat I strive after myhappiness alo ne?  Whe n fe ara nd suf fe r ing a re not dear tomyself orto ot hers, then wha tis spec ial abo ut my self th at I prot ect it an dnota n oth er? (VIII. 95–96) T his argum e nt is cl early  im portan ttoŚānti deva;t heporti on abo ut  suffe ringis  repeate d at the very beginning  of th e roo t t ext (kāri kā) ofhis other  wor k, the Śik ṣās amu ccaya . T h e cla im c a nsou n d biz arre at first. On e c o u ld  certainlyd e f end  thedif f erence  bet ween self and oth e r, Journal ofBudd h i stEth i cs 2 69  in the name o f s el f - interest .The obvious  objecti on to Śā ntidev a is:others' s uf f eringdoes n't  affect m e,so why sho ul dI  preve nt i t?  It is  in re s pons e to this objectio n
 conclusions:_the uselessness_of lust and the_subjugation of_the_body. 268_Lele,_The Metaphysical Basis_of Śāntideva's Ethics_innovative, fits neatly into_a more general_pattern_found in many places in the BCA: an argument from metaphysical premises to ethical_conclusions._Specifically, Śāntideva_argues_from_the metaphysics of non-self to_ethical selflessness. Here, for the_first time,_we get a specifically Mahāyāna ethics; the previous_two_points could have_been found in any kind of Buddhism. Of course_there is nothing specifically Mahāyāna about_the pan-Buddhist metaphysical_idea_of_anātman. What is peculiarly_Mahāyāna is selflessness in an ethical_sense: not just that we are_selfless, in the sense that the self_is not real, but that we_should be selfless, in the_sense of_altruistic: trying to save all_beings, and not_only ourselves,_from suffering. And_what is remarkable and innovative in_Śāntideva, beyond other_Mahāyāna thinkers, is that he connects_the_two kinds of_selflessness-as_he_connected dependent_co-origination with non-anger._Mahāyāna_texts before_him_praised altruism and agreed with non-self,_but_did not try to show that the_former followed from the_latter._How does Śāntideva make_this argument? His major claim_is that distinctions between selves are_illusory. Supposedly_distinct selves_are all the same in their nature to both experience suffering_and desire its end: When happiness_is equally dear to_me and_to_others, then what_is_special about_myself that I strive after my happiness_alone? When_fear and suffering are not dear_to myself or to_others,_then what is special about my_self that I protect it and_not another? (VIII.95–96) This argument_is_clearly_important to Śāntideva; the portion_about suffering is repeated at the_very beginning of_the root text (kārikā) of his other_work,_the Śikṣāsamuccaya. The claim can sound_bizarre_at first. One could certainly defend_the_difference_between self and other, Journal_of Buddhist Ethics 269 in the_name of self-interest. The obvious objection to Śāntideva is:_others' suffering doesn't_affect me, so why should_I_prevent_it? It is in response to this objection