 context.42 Before moving on to questions about moral justification, let me relate the main contextualist themes of this section to the notion of epistemic responsibility sketched in the previous section. One is epistemically responsible vis-à-vis some belief one holds only when one has adequately dealt with those (obvious) counterpossibilities whose seriousness is indicated by one's own background beliefs and those indicated by relevant information widely shared by a relevant community. Those cases in which one holds some belief without having a justifying reason for the belief and in which there are no relevant counterpossibilities of the sort just mentioned are candidate cases in which it seems appropriate to say that one is epistemically permitted and hence responsible in holding that belief. But, in light of the distinction between first-order and second-order conservatism, I think we should add the following proviso to our description of contextually basic beliefs: not only should it be the case that there are no relevant counterpossibilities to the belief in question, but the belief in question, to be properly basic, must also be one that the believer and his or her social group takes to be epistemically sound. The implication about contextually basic beliefs is that their status as basic depends crucially on social context and what sorts of epistemic demands one is expected to meet as well as the group's level of epistemic commitment to the belief in question. Moral Justification in Context In this section, I want to articulate and partially defend contextualism about the structure of moral belief.' My case involves both a descriptive and a normative dimension. First, I am interested in characterizing our actual epistemic practices when it comes to moral belief-in particular, those epistemic practices that bear on being free from or deserving epistemic blame. My 308 Moral Knowledge? descriptive hypothesis is that our epistemic norms, as they apply to moral belief, do not normally require that epistemically responsible agents have justifying reasons for all of their responsibly held moral beliefs. Some moral beliefs, especially those that are partly constitutive of one's moral outlook, serve as a body of very basic moral assumptions which, in ordinary contexts of moral thought and discussion, are not in need of justification. If this descriptive thesis is correct, then it is correct to characterize the structure of moral justification implied by our epistemic norms as contextual. My normative thesis is that there is good reason to reflectively endorse such norms. In order to make a case for my descriptive claim, my plan is to describe a picture about our practices of justifying
context.42 Before moving on to questions about moral justification, let me relate the chief contextualist theme of this section to the notion of epistemic responsibility sketch in the previous section. One is epistemically creditworthy vis - à - vis some belief one holds only when one has adequately deal with those (obvious) counterpossibilities whose seriousness is indicated by one's own backdrop beliefs and those indicated by relevant data widely shared by a relevant community. Those cases in which one holds some belief without having a justifying rationality for the belief and in which there are no relevant counterpossibilities of the sort barely mentioned are candidate cases in which it look appropriate to say that one is epistemically permitted and hence responsible in holding that impression. But, in light of the distinction between first - order and second - order conservatism, I think we should lend the following proviso to our description of contextually basic beliefs: not only should it be the case that there are no relevant counterpossibilities to the belief in question, but the belief in question, to be by rights basic, must besides be one that the believer and his or her social group takes to be epistemically sound. The implication about contextually basic belief is that their status as basic depends crucially on social context and what sorts of epistemic demand one is expect to meet as well as the group's floor of epistemic commitment to the belief in question. Moral Justification in Context In this section, I desire to articulate and partially defend contextualism about the structure of moral belief.' My case involves both a descriptive and a normative property. First, I am interested in characterizing our actual epistemic practices when it comes to moral impression - in particular, those epistemic practices that bear on being free from or deserving epistemic blame. My 308 Moral Knowledge? descriptive hypothesis is that our epistemic norms, as they apply to moral impression, do not normally require that epistemically responsible agents have justifying reasons for all of their responsibly apply moral beliefs. Some moral belief, especially those that are partially constitutive of one's moral outlook, service as a body of very basic moral assumptions which, in average contexts of moral thought and discussion, are not in need of justification. If this descriptive thesis is correct, then it is correct to characterize the structure of moral justification implied by our epistemic norms as contextual. My normative thesis is that there be good reason to reflectively back such norms. In order to make a case for my descriptive claim, my plan is to identify a picture about our practices of justifying
 cojtext.42 Before moving on tu questions aboot moral justirication, let me relate the main contxxtuqlist themes of this sectiov to the jotion od epmstemic responsiujlity sketches in chx previous sectlon. One is apistemically serplnsible vis-à-vis some belief one holdf only ehfn one has adezuattly deamn cith those (obvious) counterpossigilitiev whose serioisness is indicated by one'd owj background believs and thosg inqucated by reuevant information widgly shared by a relevant communigy. Thpse cases un whlwh one holdw somv belief without havitg a juxtifying reasok for thw belief and in which there are no reledant coundexpossibilities of the sirt jost mantiubed art cendjdate fasxs in which it seems appropriate to say tnae one is epistsmicaljy permitted and hence responsible in holginf that belief. But, in litht of the distinctioj between first-order and second-order conservatism, I think fe shkjld aqa tje following proviso to our description of cogfectlally basic beliens: not only should ih ng the case thaj there ars no relevant counherpossybiliries to tre brlief in question, but the bwlief in quefrion, to be properlv basic, must alsp be pne that the believer aud his or her soclal group gakes to be episgempcalny sound. The implication afout contxxtuakly baskc bgliefs ys that thfir sbdtus as basic depejds ctucialny on sociwl context and what sorts of epmxtemic demancs onv is expeeted tp meet as welj as the group'x level of eoistemic ckmmitmeit to the bejief in questhln. Moral Jusvificatiog in Conrext In ghis section, I want to cxticulate and partially defcnd cuhtextualism abobu tye structure of mofal bvlixf.' My wase involvev bogh x descfiptive and x notmative dimension. Fisst, J am interested in cmaracterieing our wctual epistekic practices when it cmmer to korwl belief-in particular, those elistemic oragtices that bqar in being frez from or deserving epistemic blame. My 308 Noral Knowledge? dgscriptive hypothesis ls that our xpisteiic norms, as they apply to moeal belief, do not normally require thaf episdemicwlly responsible agents have justifying reasons for all of their responsivly held moral beljefs. Some mjxal belyefs, xspecially those nhat are partly constitutive of une's mordl outlook, serve as a body of fefy basic morau assumptions which, in oddinary vontexts of moral thought and doscussion, are not in neec of jusrificztion. Pr vhis descriptive thexis is corrwct, theb it is correct tu cnavacterize hhe xtxucture of moral justification implied vy our epistemic nmrms as conbewtual. Jy noriative thesis is thaf therg is good reaspn to reflectifely endorse such nogms. In order to mqie a case fot my dgwcriptive claik, my plan iv to describe a picture about our practices of justpfying
context.42 Before moving on to questions about let relate the contextualist themes of of responsibility sketched in previous section. One epistemically responsible vis-à-vis some belief one only when one has adequately dealt with those (obvious) counterpossibilities whose seriousness is by one's own background beliefs and those indicated by relevant information widely shared a community. cases which one holds some belief without having a justifying reason for the belief and in which are no relevant counterpossibilities of the sort just are candidate cases in it seems appropriate to say one epistemically permitted hence in that belief. But, light of the distinction between first-order and second-order conservatism, I think we should add the following proviso our description basic beliefs: only it the case that no relevant counterpossibilities to the belief the belief in question, to be properly basic, also be that the believer and his or social group takes to be epistemically sound. The about contextually basic beliefs is that their status as basic depends crucially on social context sorts of epistemic demands is expected to as as group's of epistemic to the belief in question. Moral Justification in Context In this I want to articulate and partially defend contextualism about the moral My case involves a descriptive and a dimension. I am interested in actual practices to belief-in those epistemic practices that on being free from or epistemic blame. My 308 that our epistemic norms, as they apply to belief, do not normally require that epistemically agents have justifying reasons for all of their responsibly held moral beliefs. moral beliefs, that are partly constitutive of one's moral outlook, as a body of basic moral assumptions which, in ordinary contexts of moral and are not need of justification. this descriptive thesis correct, then it to characterize structure moral our epistemic norms as contextual. My thesis that there is good reason reflectively norms. In order to make a case for my descriptive claim, my plan is to picture about our practices justifying
 context.42 Before moving on to quEstions aboUt morAl jUstIfIcatIon, lEt me relate the mAIn coNtextualist themes of thiS sectIoN To thE NoTion oF episteMIc RESpoNsIbIliTy SKeTched In tHe previOus section. one Is EpistemicallY ReSponsible vIs-à-Vis some belieF onE holds OnLy wHEn one Has AdequAtely dEAlt witH those (obvIoUS) countERpossibILItIes wHose seriousness is INdICated by one's own BackgrOuND bELIefS anD those indiCaTed by RElevant INfORMAtiON widely shared By a relevant COmmUnity. THoSe cASes in wHich oNe HOldS some belief WithOut having A justiFYing reaSOn for thE belieF anD in WhicH ThErE arE nO RelEVaNt cOUntErpossibIlItIes of The sORT JUst mEntIoneD are cAndidate cases In wHich IT seEms apProprIate To Say thAt one iS episTeMically permitteD and Hence respOnsIbLe iN hOldinG That beLieF. BuT, in lighT of the dIStiNcTION bEtween first-order anD sECOnD-order coNservaTIsM, I THink we shOuLd aDd thE FOllowIng pROvIso to our DescriPTiOn Of conteXtUally bAsIc bEliEfs: noT Only Should It be the cAse thAT there are no relEVant counterpoSSiBILiTIes tO thE belief in quEstiON, but The bELiEf iN QuestIon, to Be PRoPErly basic, must also be OnE that tHe belIever and his or Her social gROUP takes to Be epIStEMically sound. ThE implIcation aboUT contextUally Basic belIefs is thaT THeir statUs aS baSic DepENDs Crucially on soCIAl coNtExt and wHat Sorts of EpiSteMic DemAnDs one is exPected to MeEt As WeLl aS the gROup's leveL oF epIsTemIc comMItment To the BeliEf In QUesTion. MorAL JUSTifiCaTiOn in conTeXt In tHis sECtiOn, I want To articulAte ANd paRtIaLly defeNd contextualiSm About the stRuCtuRe of moRAL belief.' MY case involves both a descrIPtive anD a nOrmatIve dImension. FIrsT, I am inTerESted in CharacTerizInG ouR ACtual EPIsTemIc Practices wHEN it Comes To MoraL belief-In particular, those ePIstEmic practices ThaT beaR ON bEinG FrEE frOm OR deSERving epistemic bLame. My 308 MoraL KNOwLedge? descrIPtiVe HypotheSis is thAt our EPistemiC norms, as tHey apply tO mOral BELieF, do not normAlly requIre that epIStemiCAlLy resPonSible aGeNts Have jUstifyINg rEasonS for alL oF their RespoNsIbly held Moral beliefs. Some moral beLiefs, eSpeciAllY those thaT arE ParTly constiTutiVe of one's moRal OutLook, sErvE As a boDy of VErY baSIc morAl asSUmptions wHIcH, in ORDiNary contextS OF MorAl thoUghT And disCussIon, are not in need of JUstification. If This DEScrIptIVe thEsIs is correct, theN it Is CORrect to cHaRacterize thE structuRe OF moraL justiFicatiOn impliED By OUr episTemiC noRms as contExtUaL. my normaTiVe THesis iS thaT tHere is Good reASon tO REflectively endorSe sucH NOrms. IN OrdEr to mAkE a case fOR my dEscriptive Claim, my plan Is to deScriBe a piCture abOuT our prActIcEs of justifYIng
 context.42 Before movingon to ques tions  ab out  m oral  jus tification, le t  merelate the main contex tuali st them e sof th is sect i on t o t he  n oti on of  epis tem ic resp onsibility  sk et ched in thep re vious sect ion . One is epi ste micall yres p onsib levis-à -vis s o me bel ief one h ol d s only when on e ha s ad equately dealt wi t ht hose (obvious)  count er p os s i bil iti es whose s er iousn e ss is i n di c a t edb y one's own b ackground b e lie fs and  t hos e  indic atedby rel evant infor mati on widely  share d  by a r e levantcommun ity . T hose ca se s i nw hic h  o neh old s some b el ie f wit hout h a v inga j usti fying  reason for t hebeli e f a nd in  whic h th er e are  no re levan tcounterpossibil itie s of thesor tjus tmenti o ned ar e c and idate c ases in whi ch i t  s eems appropriate t os a ythat one  is ep i st em i cally pe rm itt ed a n d  henc e re s po nsible i n hold i ng  t hat bel ie f. But ,inlig ht of thedistin ction be tween first-order an d  second-order co n s er v atis m,I think weshou l d ad d th e  f oll o wingprovi so to our description ofco ntextu allybasic beliefs : not only s h ould itbe t h ec ase that there  areno relevan t  counter possi bilities  to the b e l ief in q ues tio n,but t he  belief in qu e s tion ,to be p rop erly ba sic , m ust  al so  be one t hat thebe li ev er  an d his or her s oc ial  g rou p tak e s to b e epi stem ic al l y s ound. T h ei m plic at io n ab out  c ontex tual l y b asic be liefs istha t  the ir  s tatus a s basic depen ds  crucially  o n s ocialc o ntext an d what sorts of epistem i c deman dsone i s ex pected to  me et aswel l  as th e grou p's l ev elo f  epis t e mi c c om mitment to t hebelie fin q uestion . Moral Justificat i onin Context In  th is s e c ti on, Iw ant  t o  ar t i culate and part ially defe nd co ntextualis m  ab ou t the s tructur e ofm oral be lief.' My  case inv ol vesb o tha descript ive anda normati v e dim e ns ion.Fir st, Iam  in teres ted in cha racte rizing  o ur act ual e pi stemic p ractices when it comesto mor al be lie f-in part icu l ar,  those ep iste mic practi ces  th at be aro n bei ng f r ee  fr o m ordese r ving epis t em icb l am e. My 308 M o r a l K nowle dge ?  descr ipti ve hypothesis ist hat our episte micn o rms , a s  the yapply to moral  be li e f , do not  n ormally req uire tha te piste micall y resp onsible a ge n ts hav e ju sti fying rea son sf or allof  t h eir re spon si bly he ld mor a l be l i efs. Some moralbelie f s , esp e cia lly t ho se that arepartly con stitutive o f one' s mo ral o utlook,  s erve a s a  b ody of ver y  basic mo ral a ssumpti on s wh ich , in o rdin a r y con text sofmoral tho u g ht an dd isc ussi on, a re  not  in needo f justif ica t ion. If  t his d escrip t iv e thesis iscor rect, t hen it isc orre c tt o cha racter ize th e struc t ure  o f moral  ju s t ification  impliedb y o ur  epi stemic n or ms a scon te xtual. My norma tive the sis is t h a t ther e i s  goo d  reaso nto reflectiv ely e nd o rse suc h nor ms. Ino rde r t o m akea c asef or my descriptive claim,  myplani s t o des cribe  a  picture abou t our pr a ctices of jus tifying
 context.42_Before moving_on to questions about_moral justification,_let_me relate_the_main contextualist themes_of this section_to the notion of_epistemic responsibility sketched_in_the previous section. One is epistemically responsible vis-à-vis some belief one holds only when_one_has adequately_dealt_with_those (obvious) counterpossibilities whose seriousness_is indicated by one's own_background beliefs_and those indicated by relevant information widely shared_by_a relevant community._Those cases in which one holds some belief without_having a justifying reason for the_belief and in_which_there_are no relevant counterpossibilities_of the sort just mentioned are_candidate cases in which it seems_appropriate to say that one is epistemically_permitted and hence responsible in holding_that belief. But, in light_of the_distinction between first-order and second-order_conservatism, I think_we should_add the following_proviso to our description of contextually_basic beliefs: not_only should it be the case_that_there are no_relevant_counterpossibilities_to the_belief in question,_but_the belief_in_question, to be properly basic, must_also_be one that the believer and his_or her social group_takes_to be epistemically sound._The implication about contextually basic_beliefs is that their status as_basic depends_crucially on_social context and what sorts of epistemic demands one is expected_to meet as well as the_group's level of epistemic_commitment to_the_belief in question._Moral_Justification in_Context In this section, I want to_articulate and_partially defend contextualism about the structure_of moral belief.' My_case_involves both a descriptive and a_normative dimension. First, I am interested_in characterizing our actual epistemic_practices_when_it comes to moral belief-in_particular, those epistemic practices that bear_on being free_from or deserving epistemic blame. My 308_Moral_Knowledge? descriptive hypothesis is that our_epistemic_norms, as they apply to moral_belief,_do_not normally require that epistemically_responsible agents have justifying reasons for_all of their responsibly held moral beliefs. Some moral_beliefs, especially those_that are partly constitutive of_one's_moral_outlook, serve as a body of very basic moral assumptions_which, in_ordinary contexts of_moral thought and discussion, are not in need of justification._If this descriptive thesis is correct, then_it is correct to characterize the structure of moral justification implied_by our epistemic norms as contextual. My normative_thesis is that there is good reason_to reflectively endorse such_norms._In order to make a case for_my_descriptive_claim,_my plan is_to describe a_picture about our_practices of_justifying