 on false beliefs about, say, biology or geography, or if the story contains unintended plot holes or anachronisms. This is not by itself a problem for our account. We should, however, note that when thinking about fictions containing discontinuities or anachronisms, we are often inclined to engage in repair and, if possible, disregard such errors. I have no detailed story to tell about what (pragmatic) principles we rely on in such cases, but our model is able to accommodate various suggestions. 4.2. Closeness and indeterminacy The context set for the stories, as discussed above, contains all worlds consistent with everything stated in a fiction, and is not limited by closeness – it should be entirely up to an author to suddenly and coherently decide that Greenland doesn't exist in her fiction, for instance, or that different laws of nature hold. Yet when interpreting a story we often assume that – unless contradicted by the story – ordinary facts hold, such as basic geography or laws of nature. I take it that such assumptions play an important role in making sense of and enjoying fiction – at least speculations about what characters could or should have done rely on importing unstated assumptions about the real world such as standard laws or T H E T R U T H A B O U T S H E R L O C K H O L M E S 357 generalizations about psychology. The worlds that determine truth-in-fiction should be a subset of the context set rather than the whole, identified by the proper importation of facts about the real world, according to some parameter. Closeness is an obvious candidate for adding the appropriate restrictions; that is, the worlds that determine truth-in-fiction-f are those consistent with what is stated in or entailed by f and are, on balance, closest to the actual world (or at least do not gratuitously depart from it). Assuming closeness would mean that speculations about details of relevant events not explicitly detailed in the stories may have determinate correctness conditions. And intuitively, we treat them as if they do; even speculations for instance about Holmes's sexual orientation or whether he had a neurodevelopmental disorder often seem to give rise to genuinely factual disputes, and insofar as what is true-in-the-stories is determined by closeness, claims about these matters may indeed (but may of course not) have a determinate truth value, depending on whether enough information is given in the stories, in combination
on false beliefs about, say, biology or geography, or if the story control unintended plot hole or anachronisms. This is not by itself a problem for our account. We should, however, notice that when thinking about fictions containing discontinuity or anachronism, we are often inclined to engage in repair and, if potential, disregard such errors. I have no detailed story to tell about what (matter-of-fact) principles we rely on in such cases, but our model is able to accommodate assorted suggestions. 4.2. Closeness and indeterminacy The context fix for the stories, as discussed above, contains all worlds reproducible with everything stated in a fiction, and is not limited by closeness – it should be entirely up to an writer to suddenly and coherently decide that Greenland doesn't exist in her fiction, for instance, or that different laws of nature hold. Yet when interpreting a story we often assume that – unless contradicted by the story – ordinary facts hold, such as basic geography or laws of nature. I take it that such premise play an important function in making sense of and enjoying fiction – at least speculation about what characters could or should have done rely on importing unstated assumption about the real world such as standard laws or T H E metric ton R U T H A B O uracil T S H E R lambert O C K H oxygen L M E S 357 generalizations about psychology. The world that determine truth - in - fabrication should be a subset of the context set rather than the whole, identified by the proper importation of facts about the actual world, harmonize to some parameter. stuffiness is an obvious candidate for lend the appropriate restrictions; that is, the worlds that settle accuracy - in - fiction - f are those consistent with what is submit in or entailed by f and are, on balance, closest to the actual world (or at least do not gratuitously depart from it). assume closeness would mean that speculations about detail of relevant events not explicitly detailed in the stories may have determinate correctness conditions. And intuitively, we treat them as if they do; even meditation for instance about Holmes's sexual orientation or whether he had a neurodevelopmental disorder often look to contribute emanation to genuinely factual disputes, and insofar as what is true - in - the - stories is determined by stuffiness, claims about these matters may indeed (but may of course not) suffer a definitive truth value, depending on whether enough information is given in the stories, in combination
 on false beliefs about, say, biology or geoyeaphy, mr if fhe storh contains unintended plot hllws or anachronisms. This is vot by itdelf a peobltm for our accounv. We shomjd, hkaevex, iote that when jhinking abogt fictions cottxiuing discontinuities or anachronisms, we are ovten inclined jo enbwge jn repair and, if possible, disregars such trrors. I have no drtailed story to tell abouh whwt (pragmatic) princlples we reoy og in such casds, but our model is abme to accommodate various suggertionx. 4.2. Closenews anf indeterminecy Thv context set for the storiex, as discussed abmve, contains all worlds ronsistent with everithing stadeb in a fiction, and is nit likiteg by xlorentss – jt shokld be entiremy up to an author to suddenly age coherently secide trat Greenland doesn't exist in her fictimn, ror instance, or that didferent laws of naturg hold. Yet when interpreting a story we often assume that – gnlesa coubvadizref by the story – ordinary facts hold, such as bwaiv neography or lawf of nature. I tshe it that suzh assbjpfions play an impogtant rjle ib making fensr of and enjoying fiction – qt least spebularions about what ckaracters cobld or shoukd have done rely on im'ortinf unstated wssumptiohr about the real wogld vuch as standard laws or T H E T R N T H A B O J T X H E W L O C K J O L M E S 357 generalizatlons cbout psychologj. The worlds that determine truvi-in-fiction shpund te a subfet on the context sqt rather than the whjle, iaentified gy the 'roper imporeation of facdd about the ceal worlq, acxordung to rume parameter. Vloseness is an obvuous candidate for adajng the approprnctt eestrictions; tnat is, tje wjslds that dedermkne yruth-kn-fiction-f crd thpse consistent with fhat is stated in or emtwiled by f and awe, on balance, closest to the acuual wmrlv (or ay lgast do not gratuitously depart from it). Wssmming closenefs wiuld mean thct speculations about details of relevanv events not explicitli detailed in the stotiex may have vetermynate corsectness conditions. Qnd intuitively, wt treat them as if they do; evan spfculations for instance about Holmes's sexual orientation or whether he hae a nenrjdevelopmenfal cisorgex oyten seqm tl give rise to gemuinely factual disputes, and inrofar as wkat is true-in-the-stories is deyefmined by cloreness, claims about thess matterx may indeed (but may of course mot) have a determinate tvuth valuw, depsnding on xhether enough inforkation is guven in the stories, in cumbonwtion
on false beliefs about, say, biology or if story contains plot holes or itself problem for our We should, however, that when thinking about fictions containing or anachronisms, we are often inclined to engage in repair and, if possible, such errors. I have no detailed story to tell about what (pragmatic) principles rely in cases, our model is able to accommodate various suggestions. 4.2. Closeness and indeterminacy The context set for stories, as discussed above, contains all worlds consistent everything stated in a and is not limited by – should be up an to suddenly and decide that Greenland doesn't exist in her fiction, for instance, or that different laws of nature hold. when interpreting we often that unless by the story facts hold, such as basic geography nature. I take it that such assumptions play important role making sense of and enjoying fiction at least speculations about what characters could or have done rely on importing unstated assumptions about the real world such as standard laws H E T R T H A O T H R L C K H O L M E S 357 generalizations about The worlds that determine truth-in-fiction should be a subset of set than the whole, by the proper importation facts the real world, according parameter. is for the restrictions; that is, the that determine truth-in-fiction-f are those with what is stated and are, on balance, closest to the actual (or at least do not gratuitously depart it). Assuming closeness would mean that speculations about details of relevant events explicitly detailed stories may have determinate correctness conditions. And intuitively, treat them as if do; even speculations for instance about Holmes's sexual orientation whether had a disorder often seem give rise to factual disputes, and what is is by these matters may indeed (but may course have a determinate truth value, on information is given in the stories, in combination
 on false beliefs about, say, bioLogy or geogRaphy, Or iF thE sTory ContAins unintended PLot hOles or anachronisms. This Is not By ITselF A pRobleM for our ACcOUNt. WE sHoUld, HoWEvEr, notE thAt when tHinking aboUt fIcTions containINg DiscontinuItiEs or anachronIsmS, we are OfTen INclinEd tO engaGe in rePAir and, If possiblE, dISregarD Such errORS. I Have No detailed story to TElL About what (pragmAtic) prInCIpLES we RelY on in such cAsEs, but OUr model IS aBLE To aCCommodate variOus suggestiONs. 4.2. CLoseneSs And INdeterMinacY THE coNtext set for The sTories, as dIscussED above, cONtains aLl worlDs cOnsIsteNT wItH evErYThiNG sTatED in A fiction, AnD iS not lImitED BY ClosEneSs – it ShoulD be entirely up To aN autHOr tO suddEnly aNd coHeRentlY decidE that grEenland doesn't exIst iN her fictiOn, fOr InsTaNce, or THat difFerEnt Laws of nAture hoLD. YeT wHEN InTerpreting a story we OfTEN aSsume thaT – unlesS CoNtRAdicted bY tHe sTory – ORDinarY facTS hOld, such aS basic GEoGrAphy or lAwS of natUrE. I tAke It thaT Such AssumpTions plaY an imPOrtant role in maKIng sense of and ENjOYInG FictIon – At least specUlatIOns aBout WHaT chARacteRs couLd OR sHOuld have done rely on iMpOrting UnstaTed assumptionS about the rEAL World sucH as sTAnDArd laws or T H E T R u T H A B o U T S H E R L O C k h O L M E S 357 geNeralIzations About psycHOLogy. The wOrlDs tHat DetERMiNe truth-in-fictION shoUlD be a subSet Of the coNteXt sEt rAthEr Than the whOle, identIfIeD bY tHe pRoper IMportatiOn Of fAcTs aBout tHE real wOrld, aCcorDiNg TO soMe paramETeR. cLoseNeSs Is an ObvIoUs canDidaTE foR adding The appropRiaTE resTrIcTions; thAt is, the worlds ThAt determinE tRutH-in-ficTIOn-f are thOse consistent with what is STated in Or eNtailEd by F and are, on BalAnce, clOseST to the Actual World (Or At lEASt do nOT GrAtuItOusly deparT FRom It). AssUmIng cLosenesS would mean that specULatIons about detaIls Of reLEVaNt eVEnTS noT eXPliCITly detailed in thE stories maY hAVe DeterminatE CorReCtness cOnditioNs. And INtuitivEly, we treaT them as if ThEy do; EVEn sPeculationS for instAnce about hOlmes'S SeXual oRieNtatioN oR whEther He had a NEurOdeveLopmenTaL disorDer ofTeN seem to gIve rise to genuinely factuAl dispUtes, aNd iNsofar as wHat IS trUe-in-the-stOrieS is determiNed By cLosenEss, CLaims AbouT ThEse MAtterS may INdeed (but mAY oF coURSe Not) have a detERMInaTe truTh vALue, depEndiNg on whether enough INformation is giVen iN THe sTorIEs, in CoMbination
 on false beliefs about, s ay, biolog y orgeo gra ph y, o r if  the story con t ains  unintended plot holes  or a na c hron i sm s. Th is is n o tb y  it se lf  apr o bl em fo r o ur acco unt. We sh oul d,  however, no t ethat whenthi nking aboutfic tionsco nta i ningdis conti nuitie s  or an achronism s, we are often i n c li nedto engage in repa i ra nd, if possibl e, dis re g ar d suc h e rrors. I h av e nod etailed st o r y  to tell about wh at (pragmat i c)princi pl esw e rely  on i ns uch  cases, but  our  model is  ablet o accom m odate v arious  su gge stio n s.  4 .2.  C l ose n es s a n d i ndetermi na cy  Thecont e x t setfor  the  stor ies, as discu sse d ab o ve,  cont ainsallwo rldsconsis tentwi th everything s tate d in a fi cti on , a nd  is n o t limi ted  by  closen ess – i t  sh ou l d be  entirely up to an  a u t ho r to sud denlya nd  c o herently  d eci de t h a t Gre enla n ddoesn'texisti nhe r ficti on , forin sta nce , ort hatdiffer ent laws  of n a ture hold. Yet when interpre t in g as tory  we  often assu me t h at –  unl e ss  co n tradi ctedby th e  story – ordinary f ac ts hol d, su ch as basic g eography o r l aws of n atur e .I  take it thatsuchassumption s  play an  impo rtant ro le in mak i n g senseofand  en joy i n gfiction – atl e astsp eculati ons  aboutwha t c har act er s could o r should  h av edo nerelyo n import in g u ns tat ed as s umptio ns ab outth er eal  worlds uc h as s ta nd ardlaw sor TH ET  RU T H A  B O U TS H E RLOC K H O  L M E S 357ge neralizati on s a bout p s y chology.  The worlds that determ i ne trut h-i n-fic tion  should b e a  subse t o f  the c ontext  setra the r thant h ewho le , identifi e d  by  thepr oper  import ation of facts abo u t t he real world , a ccor d i ng  to so m e p ar a met e r . Closeness isan obvious  c a nd idate fora ddi ng  the ap propria te re s trictio ns; thatis, the w or ldst h atdeterminetruth-in -fiction- f  aret ho se co nsi stentwi thwhatis sta t edin or  entai le d by f  andar e, on ba lance, closest to the a ctualworld  (o r at leas t d o  no t gratuit ousl y depart f rom  it ). As sum i ng cl osen e ss  wo u ld me an t h at specul a ti ons a bo ut detailso f rel evant  ev e nts no t ex plicitly detailed in the stories  may h ave  de t ermi na te correctness  co nd i t ions. An dintuitively , we tre at themas ifthey d o; even s pe c ulatio ns f orinstanceabo ut Holmes' sse x ual or ient at ion or  wheth e r he h ad a neurodevelo pment a l  diso r der  ofte nseem to give  rise to g enuinely fa ctualdisp utes,  and in so far as  wh at  is true-i n -the-stor ies i s deter mi nedbyclosen ess, c laims  abo ut  th ese matte r s  m a yin d eed  (bu t may  o f co urse not) have a d ete r minatetr uth v alue,d ep e n ding on wh eth er en o u gh informa t ioni sg ivenin the  stori es, inc omb in ation
 on_false beliefs_about, say, biology or_geography, or_if_the story_contains_unintended plot holes_or anachronisms. This_is not by itself_a problem for_our_account. We should, however, note that when thinking about fictions containing discontinuities or anachronisms,_we_are often_inclined_to_engage in repair and, if_possible, disregard such errors. I_have no_detailed story to tell about what (pragmatic) principles_we_rely on in_such cases, but our model is able to accommodate_various suggestions. 4.2. Closeness and indeterminacy_The context set_for_the_stories, as discussed above,_contains all worlds consistent with everything_stated in a fiction, and is_not limited by closeness – it should_be entirely up to an author_to suddenly and coherently decide_that Greenland_doesn't exist in her fiction,_for instance, or_that different_laws of nature_hold. Yet when interpreting a story_we often assume_that – unless contradicted by the_story_– ordinary facts_hold,_such_as basic_geography or laws_of_nature. I_take_it that such assumptions play an_important_role in making sense of and enjoying_fiction – at least_speculations_about what characters could_or should have done rely_on importing unstated assumptions about the_real world_such as_standard laws or T H E T R U T H_A B O U T S_H E R L_O C_K_H O L_M_E S_357 generalizations about psychology. The worlds that_determine truth-in-fiction_should be a subset of the_context set rather than_the_whole, identified by the proper importation_of facts about the real world,_according to some parameter. Closeness_is_an_obvious candidate for adding the_appropriate restrictions; that is, the worlds_that determine truth-in-fiction-f_are those consistent with what is stated_in_or entailed by f and are,_on_balance, closest to the actual world_(or_at_least do not gratuitously depart_from it). Assuming closeness would mean_that speculations about details of relevant events not explicitly_detailed in the_stories may have determinate correctness_conditions._And_intuitively, we treat them as if they do; even speculations_for instance_about Holmes's sexual_orientation or whether he had a neurodevelopmental disorder often seem_to give rise to genuinely factual disputes,_and insofar as what is true-in-the-stories is determined by closeness, claims_about these matters may indeed (but may of_course not) have a determinate truth value,_depending on whether enough_information_is given in the stories, in combination