ual probability that if A were to φ, o​i would obtain, pr(A φs > o​i​). Presumably, a choice between these two slightly different ways of defining expected fit will be made on the basis of the same kind of considerations that are appealed to in the choice between EDT and CDT, including notably one's reaction to the infamous Newcomb's Problem -- 'one boxers' will use the definition of expected fit given the main text, while 'two boxers' will want to modify the definition in the way we have suggested here. Here we do not wish to take an official stand on this issue, but we will for 23 Our account of promotion then simply says that a desire is promoted when the expected fit for the desire in question given that the agent performs the action in question is greater than the expected fit of the desire given the contrasting action. More precisely: Contrastive Expected Fit​: An agent A's φ-ing rather than ψ-ing promotes D iff EF(A φs,D) > EF(A ψs,D). Why ​contrastive expected fit? That is, why not say that an agent's action promotes a desire when it increases the expected fit for her desire ​relative to some baseline ​(rather than ​as contrasted with some alternative action​). Briefly, the answer is that although it's possible to construct a non-contrastive account of promotion around the notion of expected fit, such an account will face exactly the same sorts of trouble faced by non-contrastive ​probabilistic accounts of promotion such as those canvassed above. Hence here, and in what follows, we 45 work with a contrastive version of the view. 46 5.2. Accommodating the Virtues of Contrastive Fit-Probabilism Contrastive Expected Fit accounts for the considerations that favor Contrastive Fit-Probabilism because it incorporates both considerations of fit and considerations of increased probability into a single measure. To see this clearly, consider first the following example: Bart has a desire D​100-bars to have 100 chocolate bars, but has only $1 to spend on chocolate. Each chocolate bar costs $1, and Bart could therefore buy a single bar. (We assume, for simplicity, that there is no other way for Bart to obtain chocolate with his $1.) According to Contrastive Fit-Probabilism, Bart would promote his desire by purchasing one chocolate bar rather than, say, purchasing
ual probability that if A were to φ, o​i would obtain, pr(A φs > o​i​). Presumably, a choice between these two slightly different direction of define expected fit will be made on the footing of the same kind of considerations that are appealed to in the option between EDT and CDT, admit notably one's reaction to the ill-famed Newcomb's Problem --' one packer' will use the definition of expect fit given the independent textbook, while' two boxers' will want to change the definition in the way we have hint here. Here we do not wish to take an official stand on this issue, but we will for 23 Our account of forwarding then simply says that a desire is promote when the expected paroxysm for the desire in question given that the agent performs the action in doubt is greater than the expected fit of the desire given the contrasting action. More precisely: Contrastive Expected Fit​: An agent A's φ - ing rather than ψ - ing promotes D iff EF(A φs, D) > EF(A ψs, D). Why ​contrastive expected fit? That is, why not say that an agent's action promotes a desire when it increases the expect fit for her desire ​relative to some baseline ​(rather than ​as contrast with some alternate action​). concisely, the answer is that although it's possible to construct a non - contrastive account of promotion around the notion of expected paroxysm, such an account will face exactly the same sorts of trouble front by non - contrastive ​probabilistic accounts of promotion such as those canvassed above. Hence here, and in what follows, we 45 make with a contrasting version of the view. 46 5.2. Accommodating the Virtues of Contrastive Fit - Probabilism Contrastive Expected Fit accounts for the considerations that favor Contrastive Fit - Probabilism because it incorporates both consideration of fit and considerations of increased probability into a single meter. To see this distinctly, consider first the following model: Bart has a desire D​100 - bar to have 100 cocoa bars, but has merely $ 1 to spend on chocolate. Each chocolate legal profession costs $ 1, and Bart could consequently buy a single bar. (We simulate, for simplicity, that there is no other way for Bart to obtain cocoa with his $ 1 .) According to Contrastive Fit - Probabilism, Bart would promote his desire by buy one chocolate bar rather than, say, buy
ual probability that if A wtre to φ, o​i would obtain, 'r(A φs > k​i​). Presuoably, a choice between these tqo slughtly different ways uf definijg expecred hit will be made on the ncsis kn the wame kind of cpnsideratimns that are a[pdaped to in the choice between EDT anq CDT, imcpuding notably one'x readniin to the infamous Newcomb's Pdoblem -- 'one boxers' woll use the definition of fxpefted fit given the main text, qhilq 'two boxers' dill want uo modify thg definition in the way we have ruggexted here. Yeee ag do not wisi to twke an officlsl statd on tnis issue, but ee xill for 23 Our account of 'romotion then simpli says thad c desire is promoted qhwn thg expactea fig fkr tge deslre in questikn given thqt the agent perforks nne action in questyog is greater than the expected fit of tve sesire given the contrawting action. More prefisely: Cogtrastive Expected Fit​: An agent A's φ-ing rather that ψ-ing oronobes A ivf EF(A φs,D) > EF(A ψs,D). Why ​contrastive expected fie? Tnan is, why not say bhat an agent's actooj ltomotes a desite when it increases the expfcted fyt foe her desyre ​telative to some baseline ​(rqther than ​af contrasted with slme alternacive avtion​). Briefly, the answer is chat amthough it's possible go construct a nun-cpndrastive account of promotyon arounv the notion of gxpecteq fit, such an agwount will face exwctly tve same sogts of trouble faced by non-contcestive ​probabolhstpc accouncs of iromotion such ws those canvaxsed abjve. Hdnce here, znd in xhat follows, we 45 work witv a contrastite versiog of the view. 46 5.2. Xccommodating yhe Virtuvs of Xontrastive Fit-Pronabilkam Contrastive Zrptcred Fit accounys wor tje cjtsiderations thag fxfor Cuntrastive Nit-Orobsbilism because it itcorlorates both consicevations od fit anq consideratipns of increased pgobabmlity mnto a siggle measure. To see this clearmy, considfr nirst the foljowikg evample: Barc has a desire D​100-bars to have 100 chocolate uars, but has only $1 to spend on chocolate. Eccm chocolate uar cofts $1, and Tart could therefore buy a single bar. (We assume, for simplidity, tvat tjere is no other way for Bart to obtain chocolate with his $1.) According to Xontrastive Fit-Progabikism, Taxt could pwomove his desire by plrchasing one chocolate bar rathxr than, saf, 'urchasing
ual probability that if A were to would pr(A φs o​i​). Presumably, a different of defining expected will be made the basis of the same kind considerations that are appealed to in the choice between EDT and CDT, including one's reaction to the infamous Newcomb's Problem -- 'one boxers' will use the of fit the text, while 'two boxers' will want to modify the definition in the way we have suggested Here we do not wish to take an stand on this issue, we will for 23 Our of then simply that desire promoted when the fit for the desire in question given that the agent performs the action in question is greater the expected the desire the action. precisely: Contrastive Expected agent A's φ-ing rather than ψ-ing EF(A φs,D) > EF(A ψs,D). Why ​contrastive expected That is, not say that an agent's action a desire when it increases the expected fit her desire ​relative to some baseline ​(rather than ​as contrasted with some alternative action​). Briefly, is that although it's to construct a account promotion the of expected such an account will face exactly the same sorts of trouble by non-contrastive ​probabilistic accounts of promotion such as those canvassed here, in what follows, 45 work with a version the view. 46 5.2. Virtues Contrastive Fit for considerations that favor Contrastive because it incorporates both considerations fit and considerations of measure. To see this clearly, consider first the example: Bart has a desire D​100-bars to 100 chocolate bars, but has only $1 to spend on chocolate. Each bar costs Bart could therefore buy a single bar. (We for simplicity, that there no other way for Bart to obtain chocolate with $1.) to Contrastive Bart would promote desire by purchasing chocolate bar rather purchasing
ual probability that if A were To φ, o​i would ObtaiN, pr(a φs > O​i​). presUmabLy, a choice betweEN theSe two slightly different Ways oF dEFiniNG eXpectEd fit wiLL bE MAde On ThE baSiS Of The saMe kInd of coNsideratioNs tHaT are appealed TO iN the choice BetWeen EDT and CDt, inCludinG nOtaBLy one'S reActioN to the INfamouS Newcomb's prOBlem -- 'onE Boxers' wILL uSe thE definition of expeCTeD Fit given the maiN text, wHiLE 'tWO BoxErs' Will want to MoDify tHE definiTIoN IN The WAy we have suggeSted here. HerE We dO not wiSh To tAKe an ofFiciaL sTAnd On this issue, But wE will for 23 OUr accoUNt of proMOtion thEn simpLy sAys That A DeSiRe iS pROmoTEd WheN The Expected FiT fOr the DesiRE IN QuesTioN givEn thaT the agent perfOrmS the ACtiOn in qUestiOn is GrEater Than thE expeCtEd fit of the desirE givEn the contRasTiNg aCtIon. MoRE preciSelY: CoNtrastiVe ExpecTEd FIt​: aN AGeNt A's φ-ing rather than Ψ-iNG PrOmotes D iFf EF(A φS,d) > Ef(A ΨS,D). Why ​conTrAstIve eXPEcted Fit? THAt Is, why not Say thaT An AgEnt's actIoN promoTeS a dEsiRe wheN It inCreaseS the expeCted fIT for her desire ​rELative to some bASeLINe ​(RAtheR thAn ​as contrasTed wITh soMe alTErNatIVe actIon​). BrIeFLy, THe answer is that althoUgH it's poSsiblE to construct a Non-contrasTIVE account Of prOMoTIon around the noTion oF expected fIT, such an aCcounT will facE exactly tHE Same sortS of TroUblE faCED bY non-contrastiVE ​ProbAbIlistic AccOunts of ProMotIon SucH aS those canVassed abOvE. HEnCe HerE, and iN What follOwS, we 45 WoRk wIth a cONtrastIve veRsioN oF tHE viEw. 46 5.2. AccomMOdATIng tHe viRtueS of coNtrasTive fIt-PRobabilIsm ContraStiVE ExpEcTeD Fit accOunts for the coNsIderations ThAt fAvor CoNTRastive FIt-Probabilism because it iNCorporaTes Both cOnsiDerations Of fIt and cOnsIDeratiOns of iNcreaSeD prOBAbiliTY InTo a SiNgle measurE. tO seE this ClEarlY, considEr first the followinG ExaMple: Bart has a dEsiRe D​100-bARS tO haVE 100 cHOcoLaTE baRS, But has only $1 to speNd on chocolAtE. eaCh chocolatE Bar CoSts $1, and BArt coulD therEFore buy A single baR. (We assume, FoR simPLIciTy, that therE is no othEr way for BARt to oBTaIn choColAte witH hIs $1.) ACcordIng to CONtrAstivE Fit-PrObAbilisM, Bart WoUld promoTe his desire by purchasing One choColatE baR rather thAn, sAY, puRchasing
ual probability that if Awere to φ,  o​iwou ldob tain , pr (A φs > o​i​). Pres umably, a choice betwe en th es e  two sl ightl y diffe r en t way sof  de fi n in g exp ect ed fitwill be ma deon  the basis o f  t he same ki ndof considera tio ns tha tare appea led  to i n thec hoicebetween E DT and CD T , inclu d i ng  not ably one's reacti o nt o the infamous  Newco mb ' sP r obl em-- 'one bo xe rs' w i ll uset he d e fin i tion of expec ted fit giv e n t he mai ntex t , whil e 'tw ob oxe rs' will wa nt t o modifythe de f inition in theway we  ha vesugg e st ed  he re .  He r ewed o n ot wishto  t ake a n of f i c i al s tan d on  this  issue, but w e w illf or23 Ou r acc ount  o f pro motion  then  s imply says that  a d esire ispro mo ted  w hen t h e expe cte d f it forthe des i rein q u es tion given that th ea g en t perfor ms the ac ti o n in que st ion  isg r eater  tha n  t he expec ted fi t  o fthe des ir e give nthe  co ntras t ingaction . More p recis e ly: Contrastiv e  Expected Fit ​ :A n  a g entA's  φ-ing rath er t h an ψ -ing pr omo t es Diff E F( A  φ s ,D) > EF(A ψs,D). W hy  ​cont rasti ve expected f it? That i s , why notsayt ha t  an agent's ac tionpromotes a desire w hen i t increa ses the e x p ected fi t f orher  de s i re  ​relative to s omeba seline​(r ather t han  ​a s c ont ra sted with  some al te rn at iv e a ction ​ ). Brief ly , t he  an sweri s that  alth ough  i t' s  po ssiblet oc o nstr uc ta no n-c on trast ivea cco unt ofpromotion  ar o undth enotionof expected f it , such anac cou nt wil l face exa ctly the same sorts oft roublefac ed by  non -contrast ive  ​prob abi l isticaccoun ts of  p rom o t ion s u c hasth ose canvas s e d a bove.  H ence  here,and in what follow s , w e 45 work wit h a  con t r as tiv e  v e rsi on oft h e view. 46 5.2.  Accommoda ti n gthe Virtue s  of  C ontrast ive Fit -Prob a bilismContrasti ve Expect ed  Fit a cco unts for t he consi derations thatf av or Co ntr astive  F it- Proba bilism bec auseit inc or porate s bot hconsider ations of fit and consi derati ons o f i ncreasedpro b abi lity into  a s ingle meas ure . T o see  th i s cle arly ,  c ons i der f irst the follo w in g e x a mp le: Bart ha s a  de sireD​1 0 0-bars  tohave 100 chocolat e  bars, but has  onl y $1tos pend  o n chocolate. E ach  c h o colate b ar  costs $1,and Bart  c o uld t herefo re buy  a sing l e  b a r. (We  ass ume , for sim pli ci t y, that  t he r e is n o ot he r wayfor Ba r t to o btain chocolatewithh i s $1. )  Ac cordi ng  to Con t rast ive Fit-Pr obabilism,Bart w ould  prom ote his  d esirebypu rchasing o n e chocola te ba r rathe rthan , s ay, pu rcha s i ng
ual probability_that if_A were to φ,_o​i would_obtain,_pr(A φs_>_o​i​). Presumably, a_choice between these_two slightly different ways_of defining expected_fit_will be made on the basis of the same kind of considerations that are_appealed_to in_the_choice_between EDT and CDT, including_notably one's reaction to the_infamous Newcomb's_Problem -- 'one boxers' will use the definition_of_expected fit given_the main text, while 'two boxers' will want to_modify the definition in the way_we have suggested_here._Here_we do not wish_to take an official stand on_this issue, but we will for_23 Our account of promotion then simply_says that a desire is promoted_when the expected fit for_the desire_in question given that the_agent performs the_action in_question is greater_than the expected fit of the_desire given the_contrasting action. More precisely: Contrastive Expected_Fit​:_An agent A's_φ-ing_rather_than ψ-ing_promotes D iff_EF(A_φs,D) >_EF(A_ψs,D). Why ​contrastive expected fit? That_is,_why not say that an agent's action_promotes a desire when_it_increases the expected fit_for her desire ​relative to_some baseline ​(rather than ​as contrasted_with some_alternative action​)._Briefly, the answer is that although it's possible to construct a_non-contrastive account of promotion around the_notion of expected fit,_such an_account_will face exactly_the_same sorts_of trouble faced by non-contrastive ​probabilistic accounts_of promotion_such as those canvassed above. Hence_here, and in what_follows,_we 45 work with a contrastive_version of the view. 46 5.2._Accommodating the Virtues of Contrastive_Fit-Probabilism_Contrastive_Expected Fit accounts for the_considerations that favor Contrastive Fit-Probabilism because_it incorporates both_considerations of fit and considerations of increased_probability_into a single measure. To see_this_clearly, consider first the following example:_Bart_has_a desire D​100-bars to have_100 chocolate bars, but has only_$1 to spend on chocolate. Each chocolate bar costs_$1, and Bart_could therefore buy a single_bar._(We_assume, for simplicity, that there is no other way for_Bart to_obtain chocolate with_his $1.) According to Contrastive Fit-Probabilism, Bart would promote his_desire by purchasing one chocolate bar rather_than, say, purchasing