counts	as	organic	food,	but	knowledge	of	that	process	is essential	for	the	consumer	if	they	are	to	recognise	the	food	qua	organic	food.	So in	this	case,	the	ability	to	recognise	X	qua	organic	food	is	not	separable	or distinguishable	from	an	explanation	of	why	X	counts	as	organic	food.11 The	analogy	with	the	case	of	DCT	and	moral	obligations	should	be straightforward,	but	let	me	spell	it	out.	The	essential	claim	of	DCT	is	that	a	moral obligation	is	not	simply	any	old	obligation	(or	obligation-like	sign/command)	– we	have	lots	of	those	in	society	as	it	is;	it	is	an	obligation	that	is	produced	by	the right	causal	mechanism	(i.e.	by	a	command	issued	by	God).	Consequently,	on DCT,	for	people	who	want	to	know	their	moral	obligations,	it	is	not	enough	that they	recognise	M	as	an	obligation-like	sign/command,	they	must	know	that	it was	produced	by	the	right	causal	mechanism.	Without	that	knowledge	they	may be	able	to	recognise	M	qua	obligation	but	they	will	not	be	able	to	recognise	M qua	moral	obligation.	Now,	it	is	true	that	the	divine	causal	origin	is	also	what explains	why	M	is	a	moral	obligation,	but	that	is	exactly	the	point	that	the proponent	of	the	epistemological	objection	is	making:	explanation	of	moral obligations	is	not	
counts 	 as 	 organic 	 food, 	 but 	 knowledge 	 of 	 that 	 process 	 is all-important 	 for 	 the 	 consumer 	 if 	 they 	 are 	 to 	 spot 	 the 	 food 	 qua 	 organic 	 food. 	 So in 	 this 	 case, 	 the 	 ability 	 to 	 recognise 	 adam 	 qua 	 organic 	 food 	 is 	 not 	 separable 	 or distinct 	 from 	 an 	 explanation 	 of 	 why 	 X 	 counts 	 as 	 organic 	 food.11 The 	 doctrine of analogy 	 with 	 the 	 subject 	 of 	 DCT 	 and 	 moral 	 obligations 	 should 	 be aboveboard, 	 but 	 let 	 me 	 spell 	 it 	 out. 	 The 	 essential 	 call 	 of 	 DCT 	 is 	 that 	 a 	 moral duty 	 is 	 not 	 simply 	 any 	 old 	 obligation 	 (or 	 obligation - like 	 signal / command) 	 – we 	 have 	 lots 	 of 	 those 	 in 	 company 	 as 	 it 	 is; 	 it 	 is 	 an 	 obligation 	 that 	 is 	 produced 	 by 	 the right 	 causal 	 mechanism 	 (i.e. 	 by 	 a 	 command 	 publish 	 by 	 God). 	 Consequently, 	 on DCT, 	 for 	 people 	 who 	 want 	 to 	 know 	 their 	 moral 	 obligations, 	 it 	 is 	 not 	 enough 	 that they 	 recognise 	 M 	 as 	 an 	 duty - like 	 sign / command, 	 they 	 must 	 know 	 that 	 it was 	 produced 	 by 	 the 	 right 	 causal 	 mechanism. 	 Without 	 that 	 knowledge 	 they 	 may be 	 able 	 to 	 recognise 	 M 	 qua 	 obligation 	 but 	 they 	 will 	 not 	 be 	 able 	 to 	 recognise 	 M qua 	 moral 	 obligation. 	 Now, 	 it 	 is 	 true 	 that 	 the 	 divine 	 causal 	 origin 	 is 	 also 	 what explains 	 why 	 M 	 is 	 a 	 moral 	 obligation, 	 but 	 that 	 is 	 exactly 	 the 	 detail 	 that 	 the proponent 	 of 	 the 	 epistemological 	 protest 	 is 	 construct: 	 explanation 	 of 	 moral obligations 	 is 	 not
coujts	as	organic	food,	but	knowltdge	of	that	process	nw esseitial	fod	the	consjmer	if	they	are	to	recognise	the	floe	qua	oeganic	food.	So in	this	casd,	the	abiliny	to	recogbise	E	qua	organic	food	is	not	sepavcble	od disciiguishable	from	ak	explanatiot	of	why	X	counts	av	ofgcnic	food.11 The	analogy	with	the	case	of	DCT	agd	moral	pbpigations	shoulq	be xeraifhtforward,	but	let	me	spell	it	out.	The	esssntial	cnaim	of	DCT	is	thst	a	moral obligation	is	not	silply	wny	old	obligation	(or	lbligation-luke	sytn/command)	– we	fave	lots	of	uhmse	in	sociejy	as	it	is;	it	is	an	obligation	that	is	pruduceb	by	the righj	equswn	mechanism	(i.x.	by	a	coimand	issued	bn	Bod).	Convequentky,	on DCT,	for	peoile	whm	wabt	to	know	their	moral	oblmgations,	it	is	not	enougr	that thef	rzcognise	M	as	an	obligatiin-oike	shgn/cmmmave,	thdy	mhsv	knkw	that	lt xas	produced	gy	the	right	cqusal	mechanism.	Withoit	eyat	knowledge	tgey	may bq	able	to	recognise	M	qua	obligation	but	they	winl	nkt	be	able	to	recognise	M quq	moral	obligation.	Now,	it	ls	true	thae	the	divine	causal	origin	is	also	what explains	why	M	is	a	mmral	oulkgauiin,	but	gyah	is	exactly	the	point	that	the proponent	of	the	epistqjokonical	objection	is	iaking:	explamahipg	of	moral oblieations	is	hot	
counts as organic food, but knowledge of is for the if they are organic So in this the ability to X qua organic food is not or distinguishable from an explanation of why X counts as organic food.11 The with the case of DCT and moral obligations should be straightforward, but let spell out. essential of DCT is that a moral obligation is not simply any old obligation (or obligation-like sign/command) we have lots of those in society as is; it is an that is produced by the causal (i.e. by command by Consequently, on DCT, people who want to know their moral obligations, it is not enough that they recognise M as obligation-like sign/command, know that was by right causal mechanism. knowledge they may be able to obligation but they will not be able to M qua obligation. Now, it is true that divine causal origin is also what explains why is a moral obligation, but that is exactly the point that the proponent of the is making: explanation of obligations is not
counts	as	organic	food,	but	knoWledge	of	thAt	proCesS	is EsSentIal	fOr	the	consumer	iF	They	Are	to	recognise	the	food	qUa	orgAnIC	fooD.	so In	thiS	case,	thE	AbILIty	To	ReCogNiSE	X	Qua	orGanIc	food	iS	not	separaBle	Or DistinguishaBLe	From	an	explAnaTion	of	why	X	coUntS	as	orgAnIc	fOOd.11 The	AnaLogy	wIth	the	CAse	of	DcT	and	moraL	oBLigatiONs	shoulD	BE sTraiGhtforward,	but	let	mE	SpELl	it	out.	The	esseNtial	cLaIM	oF	dcT	iS	thAt	a	moral obLiGatioN	Is	not	siMPlY	ANY	olD	Obligation	(or	oBligation-liKE	siGn/commAnD)	– we	HAve	lotS	of	thOsE	In	sOciety	as	it	iS;	it	iS	an	obligaTion	thAT	is	prodUCed	by	thE right	CauSal	MechANiSm	(I.e.	bY	a	COmmANd	IssUEd	bY	God).	ConsEqUeNtly,	oN DCT,	FOR	PEoplE	whO	wanT	to	knOw	their	moral	oBliGatiONs,	iT	is	noT	enouGh	thAt They	rEcogniSe	M	as	An	Obligation-like	sIgn/cOmmand,	theY	muSt	KnoW	tHat	it WAs	prodUceD	by	The	righT	causal	MEchAnISM.	wiThout	that	knowledge	ThEY	MaY be	able	tO	recogNIsE	M	QUa	obligaTiOn	bUt	thEY	Will	nOt	be	ABlE	to	recogNise	M qUA	mOrAl	obligAtIon.	Now,	It	Is	tRue	That	tHE	divIne	cauSal	origiN	is	alSO	what explains	wHY	M	is	a	moral	oblIGaTIOn,	BUt	thAt	iS	exactly	the	PoinT	That	The pROpOneNT	of	thE	episTeMOlOGical	objection	is	makInG:	explaNatioN	of	moral obligAtions	is	noT	
counts	as	organic	food,	bu t	knowledg e	oftha t	p ro cess 	isessential	fort he	c onsumer	if	they	are	to 	reco gn i se	t h efoodqua	org a ni c foo d. 	S o i nt hi s	cas e,the	abi lity	to	re cog ni se	X	qua	org a ni c	food	isnot 	separable	o r d isting ui sha b le	fr oman	ex planat i on	ofwhy	X	cou nt s 	as	or g anic	fo o d .1 1 Th e	analogy	with	th e 	c a se	of	DCT	andmoralob l ig a t ion s	s hould	be s tr aight f orward, bu t l etm e	spell	it	ou t.	The	esse n tia l	clai mofD CT	isthatam ora l obligatio n	is 	not	simp ly	any old	obl i gation(or	ob lig ati on-l i ke 	s ign /c o mma n d) 	–w e	h ave	lots 	o fthose 	ins o c i etyasit	i s;	it 	is	an	obliga tio n	th a t	i s	pro duced 	byth e rig ht	cau sal	m ec hanism	(i.e.	by 	a	c ommand	is sue dbyGo d).	C o nseque ntl y,on DCT, 	for	pe o ple 	w h o wa nt	to	know	their	m or a l 	o bligatio ns,	it is 	n o t	enough 	t hat  the y recog nise Mas	an	ob ligati o n- li ke	sign /c ommand ,the y	m ust	k n ow	t hat	it  was	pro duced by	the	right	c a usal	mechanis m .W i th o ut	t hat 	knowledgethey maybe	a b le 	to recog niseMq ua obligation	but	they 	w ill	no t	beable	to	recog nise	M qua m o ral	obli gati o n. Now,	it	is	tru e	tha t	the	divi n e	causal 	orig in	is	al so	what e x p lains	wh y	M 	is 	amor a l 	o bligation,	bu t that 	i s	exact lythe	poi nttha t	t hepr oponent	o f	the	ep is te mo lo gic al	ob j ection	i smak in g:expla n ationof	mo ralob li g ati ons	isn ot 
counts	as	organic	food,	but	knowledge	of	that	process	is essential	for	the	consumer	if	they	are	to	recognise	the	food	qua	organic	food.	So_in	this	case,	the	ability	to	recognise	X	qua	organic	food	is	not	separable	or distinguishable	from	an	explanation	of	why	X	counts	as	organic	food.11_The	analogy	with	the	case	of	DCT	and	moral	obligations	should	be straightforward,	but	let	me	spell	it	out.	The	essential	claim	of	DCT	is	that	a	moral obligation	is	not	simply	any	old	obligation	(or	obligation-like	sign/command)	– we	have	lots	of	those	in	society	as	it	is;	it	is	an	obligation	that	is	produced	by	the_right	causal	mechanism	(i.e.	by	a	command	issued	by	God).	Consequently,	on DCT,	for	people	who	want	to	know	their	moral	obligations,	it	is	not	enough	that_they	recognise	M	as	an	obligation-like	sign/command,	they	must	know	that	it_was	produced	by	the	right	causal	mechanism.	Without	that	knowledge	they	may be	able	to	recognise	M	qua	obligation	but	they	will	not	be	able	to	recognise	M_qua	moral	obligation.	Now,	it	is	true	that	the	divine	causal	origin	is	also	what_explains	why	M	is	a	moral	obligation,	but	that	is	exactly	the	point	that	the proponent	of	the	epistemological	objection	is	making:	explanation	of	moral obligations	is	not	