 given our interest in characterizing a notion of epistemic justification that is applicable to human beings, we want a notion of epistemic responsibility that is not overly idealized. In short, we want a model of epistemic responsibility that represents a "realistic ideal." With these constraints in mind, let me now proceed to sketch (part of) a model of epistemic responsibility. Epistemic Responsibility Broadly speaking, being epistemically responsible has to do with such activities as: (1) gathering evidence, (2) considering and dealing with counterpossibilities, and (3) dealing with internal conflicts of belief. We normally criticize agents whose beliefs are not based on adequate evidence, who have not checked out relevant counterpossibilities to what they believe, and who fail to eliminate certain conflicts of belief. To be epistemically responsible in what one believes, one must not fall below certain standards or norms governing these activities. What do the norms require? More specifically: How much evidence is enough for having a justified belief? Which counterpossibilities must one check? Which conflicts of belief must one eliminate? Since we are interested in the perspective of the responsible epistemic agent, these questions are about the most general epistemic norms characteristic of this representative agent. Limitations of space do not permit a full treatment of these matters here, but we can provide a partial sketch of an epistemically responsible agent that will be sufficient for present purposes by focusing primarily on those epistemic responsibilities and associated norms that have to do with checking counterpossibilities." Responsibility for checking counterpossibilities to propositions we currently believe (or propositions we are considering) can range from very strict requirements corresponding to a norm requiring persons to check all logically possible counterpossibilities (including the sorts of fanciful skeptical scenarios devised by philosophers) to very lax requirements where, in the limit, there would be a complete freedom from doing any checking at all. In between the extremes is a range of possible norms requiring more or less of an agent. If we begin with the assumption that some sort of "in-between" requirement not only fits actual epistemic practice, but is defensible, then one plausible suggestion for specifying the range of counterpossibilities for which one is epistemically responsible is this:28 ER: A person S is epistemically responsible in believing some proposition p at time t only if S checks all of those counterpossibilities whose seriousness is indicated by S's background beliefs at t.29 This is a start, but it will not do as it stands. For one thing, insofar as the
given our interest in characterizing a notion of epistemic justification that is applicable to human being, we desire a notion of epistemic responsibility that is not excessively idealized. In brusque, we want a model of epistemic duty that represents a " realistic ideal. " With these constraint in mind, let me immediately proceed to sketch (part of) a mannequin of epistemic duty. Epistemic Responsibility Broadly speaking, being epistemically responsible has to do with such activities as: (1) gain evidence, (2) considering and dealing with counterpossibilities, and (3) dealing with inner conflicts of belief. We normally criticize agent whose beliefs are not based on adequate evidence, who have not checked out relevant counterpossibilities to what they believe, and who fail to eliminate sealed conflicts of belief. To be epistemically responsible in what one believes, one must not fall below certain standard or average governing these activities. What do the norms require? More specifically: How much evidence is enough for having a justified belief? Which counterpossibilities must one check? Which conflict of belief must one eliminate? Since we are concerned in the position of the responsible epistemic agent, these questions are about the most cosmopolitan epistemic norms characteristic of this representative agentive role. Limitations of space do not permit a wide treatment of these matters here, but we can provide a partial sketch of an epistemically responsible agent that will be sufficient for present purposes by focusing primarily on those epistemic responsibilities and consociate norms that get to serve with checking counterpossibilities. " Responsibility for checking counterpossibilities to proposition we currently believe (or propositions we are considering) can range from very strict requirements corresponding to a average requiring persons to check all logically possible counterpossibilities (including the kind of fanciful skeptical scenario devised by philosopher) to very lax requirements where, in the terminus ad quem, there would be a complete freedom from doing any checking at wholly. In between the extremes is a range of possible norms requiring more or less of an agent. If we begin with the assumption that some sort of " in - between " requirement not only fits actual epistemic exercise, but is defensible, then one plausible suggestion for pin down the range of counterpossibilities for which one is epistemically responsible is this:28 ER: A person S is epistemically responsible in believing some proposition p at prison term t only if S checks all of those counterpossibilities whose seriousness is indicated by S's background belief at t.29 This is a beginning, but it will not suffice as it stands. For one thing, insofar as the
 gigen our interest in charxcterizing a nojiin of xpistemjc justiwication that is applicable vo hyman veings, we want a notiov of episnemic responsmbility that is ikt overly idezpizeb. Mn short, we wanj a model of epistemic res[ovsnbility that represents a "realistic ydeal." Wotj these constrwintx in jpnb, let me now proceed to sketch (lart of) a model of elistemic responsibility. Eplstelic Responsibility Broadly spgzkigt, being episgemically gzsponsible gas to do with such activities xs: (1) gcthering evudwncf, (2) consideriig and dealing witm countarpossinilities, and (3) ceanint with internal conflmcts of belief. We notmally cridieize agents whose belueds arg not basde ov aseauzte evldeice, who havs not checkwd out relevant coumtqglossibilitiea to wrae they believe, and who fail to eliminatt cerfain conflicts of belied. To be epistemically responsifle in what one believes, one must not fall below wertamn stckqxedd or norms governing these activities. What do fht nprms require? Mjre specifivaplu: How much eviaence na snough for having w justisied velief? Whych vounterpossibilities must obe check? Whibh cinflicts of belief must one euimimate? Xince we are interested in fhe perspechive of tgd responsible epkstvmic agent, these questions are about thx mosc generau epostemis norms chwractcsistic of this repgesenjative agent. Limltations of space do not permit a full treatmgnt of these mctters here, but we san provide a kartial shetch of an epiatemicanly responsyble agent thdj will be sufhicient fjr peesebt purpures by focusinb primarily on thosw epistemic responxibkmities and assoenauee norms that hsve to dl xith svecking counderpussknilitkes." Reskjnwkbiloty for checking coutterlossibilities to ptoiositions we currqntly believe (or propositions wt are ronsidxring) van range from very strict requirsments cogrefponding to w novm rgquiring pexsons to check all logically possible connterpossibilities (inclyding the sorts of yakciful skeptmcal ssenarios gevised by philosophwrs) to very lax rtquirements where, in ths limid, thege would be a complete freedom from doing any checking at all. In between rhe exvrqmes is a rznge of pmsfnble nowms ceduiring more or kess of an agent. If we begin wivh the assgm'tion that some sort of "in-beteedn" requiremenj not only fits actual epiatemic ptactice, but is defensible, then pne plausible suggestion for spexifyihg the ranje of counterpossibikities for qhich obe id epistemicaluy tedponsible is uhis:28 ER: A person S is epistemically eesponwihle in believing some propodltion k at timg t only if S chedks zpl of those countetpossibilities whose seriousness iv yndicated by S'w background neliefs at t.29 This ix a start, bgt it will not do as it stands. For one thing, insofat as the
given our interest in characterizing a notion justification is applicable human beings, we responsibility is not overly In short, we a model of epistemic responsibility that a "realistic ideal." With these constraints in mind, let me now proceed to (part of) a model of epistemic responsibility. Epistemic Responsibility Broadly speaking, being epistemically has do such as: (1) gathering evidence, (2) considering and dealing with counterpossibilities, and (3) dealing with internal conflicts belief. We normally criticize agents whose beliefs are based on adequate evidence, have not checked out relevant to they believe, who to certain conflicts of To be epistemically responsible in what one believes, one must not fall below certain standards or norms these activities. the norms More How evidence is enough a justified belief? Which counterpossibilities must conflicts of belief must one eliminate? Since we interested in perspective of the responsible epistemic agent, questions are about the most general epistemic norms of this representative agent. Limitations of space do not permit a full treatment of these but we can provide partial sketch of epistemically agent will sufficient for purposes by focusing primarily on those epistemic responsibilities and associated norms have to do with checking counterpossibilities." Responsibility for checking counterpossibilities we believe (or propositions are considering) can range very requirements corresponding to a persons check counterpossibilities the of fanciful skeptical scenarios by philosophers) to very lax where, in the limit, freedom from doing any checking at all. In the extremes is a range of possible requiring more or less of an agent. If we begin with the that some "in-between" requirement not only fits actual epistemic practice, is defensible, then one suggestion for specifying the range of counterpossibilities for which is responsible is ER: A person is epistemically responsible believing some proposition time t if checks counterpossibilities whose seriousness is indicated by background at t.29 This is a but not do as it stands. For one thing, insofar as the
 given our interest in charactErizing a noTion oF epIstEmIc juStifIcation that is aPPlicAble to human beings, we wanT a notIoN Of epIStEmic rEsponsiBIlITY thAt Is Not OvERlY ideaLizEd. In shoRt, we want a mOdeL oF epistemic reSPoNsibility tHat Represents a "rEalIstic iDeAl." WITh theSe cOnstrAints iN Mind, leT me now proCeED to skeTCh (part oF) A MoDel oF epistemic responsIBiLIty. Epistemic ReSponsiBiLItY bRoaDly Speaking, beInG episTEmicallY ReSPONsiBLe has to do with Such activitIEs aS: (1) gatheRiNg eVIdence, (2) ConsiDeRIng And dealing wIth cOunterposSibiliTIes, and (3) dEAling wiTh inteRnaL coNfliCTs Of BelIeF. we nORmAllY CriTicize agEnTs Whose BeliEFS ARe noT baSed oN adeqUate evidence, wHo hAve nOT chEcked Out reLevaNt CountErpossIbiliTiEs to what they belIeve, And who faiL to ElImiNaTe cerTAin conFliCts Of belieF. To be epISteMiCALLy Responsible in what oNe BELiEves, one mUst not FAlL bELow certaIn StaNdarDS Or norMs goVErNing thesE activITiEs. what do tHe Norms rEqUirE? MoRe speCIficAlly: HoW much eviDence IS enough for haviNG a justified beLIeF? wHiCH couNteRpossibilitIes mUSt onE cheCK? WHicH ConflIcts oF bELiEF must one eliminate? SiNcE we are InterEsted in the perSpective of THE ResponsiBle ePIsTEmic agent, these QuestIons are aboUT the most GenerAl episteMic norms cHARacterisTic Of tHis RepRESeNtative agent. LIMItatIoNs of spaCe dO not perMit A fuLl tReaTmEnt of thesE matters HeRe, BuT wE caN provIDe a partiAl SkeTcH of An epiSTemicaLly reSponSiBlE AgeNt that wILl BE SuffIcIeNt foR prEsEnt puRposES by FocusinG primarilY on THose EpIsTemic reSponsibilitieS aNd associatEd NorMs that HAVe to do wiTh checking counterpossibILities." REspOnsibIlitY for checkIng CounteRpoSSibiliTies to PropoSiTioNS We curRENtLy bElIeve (or propOSItiOns we ArE conSiderinG) can range from very sTRicT requirements CorRespONDiNg tO A nORm rEqUIriNG Persons to check aLl logicallY pOSsIble counteRPosSiBilitieS (includIng thE Sorts of Fanciful sKeptical sCeNariOS DevIsed by philOsophers) To very lax REquirEMeNts whEre, In the lImIt, tHere wOuld be A ComPlete FreedoM fRom doiNg any ChEcking at All. In between the extremes Is a ranGe of pOssIble norms ReqUIriNg more or lEss oF an agent. If We bEgiN with The ASsumpTion THaT soME sort Of "in-BEtween" reqUIrEmeNT NoT only fits acTUAL epIstemIc pRActice, But iS defensible, then onE Plausible suggeStioN FOr sPecIFyinG tHe range of countErpOsSIBilities FoR which one is EpistemiCaLLy resPonsibLe is thIs:28 ER: A peRSOn s Is episTemiCalLy responsIblE iN BelieviNg SoME propoSitiOn P at timE t only IF S chECKs all of those counTerpoSSIbiliTIes Whose SeRiousneSS is iNdicated by s's backgrounD belieFs at T.29 This Is a starT, bUt it wiLl nOt Do as it stanDS. For one thIng, inSofar as ThE
 given our interest in cha racterizin g a n oti onof  epi stem ic justificati o n th at is applicable to hu man b ei n gs,w ewanta notio n  o f epi st em icre s po nsibi lit y thatis not ove rly  i dealized. In sh ort, we wa nta model of e pis temicre spo n sibil ity  that  repre s ents a  "realist ic ideal. "  With t h e se  con straints in mind, le t  me now procee d to s ke t ch ( par t o f) a model  o f epi s temic r e sp o n s ibi l ity. Epistemi c Responsib i lit y Broa dl y s p eaking , bei ng epi stemicallyresp onsible h as tod o withs uch act ivitie s a s:(1)g at he rin ge vid e nc e,( 2)consider in gand d eali n g w ithcou nter possi bilities, and  (3 ) de a lin g wit h int erna lconfl icts o f bel ie f. We normallycrit icize age nts  w hos ebelie f s arenot  ba sed onadequat e  ev id e n c e,  who have not chec ke d ou t releva nt cou n te rp o ssibilit ie s t o wh a t  they  bel i ev e, and w ho fai l  t oelimina te  certa in  co nfl ictso f be lief.To be ep istem i cally responsi b le in what on e  b e l ie v es,one  must not f allb elow  cer t ai n s t andar ds or  n o rm s  governing these ac ti vities . Wha t do the norm s require? M o re speci fica l ly :  How much evid enceis enoughf or havin g a j ustified  belief?W h ich coun ter pos sib ili t i es  must one che c k ? Wh ic h confl ict s of be lie f m ust  on eeliminate ? Sincewe  a re  i nte reste d  in thepe rsp ec tiv e oft he res ponsi bleep is t emi c agent ,  t h e se q ue st ions  ar eabout  the mos t gener al episte mic norm sch aracter istic of this  r epresentat iv e a gent.L i mitation s of space do not permi t  a full  tr eatme nt o f these m att ers he re, but we  can p rovid ea p a r tials k et chof  an episte m i cal ly re sp onsi ble age nt that will be su f fic ient for pres ent  pur p o se s b y  f o cus in g  pr i m arily on thoseepistemicre s po nsibilitie s  an dassocia ted nor ms th a t haveto do wit h checkin gcoun t e rpo ssibilitie s." Resp onsibilit y  forc he cking  co unterp os sib iliti es top rop ositi ons we  c urrent ly be li eve (orpropositions we are con sideri ng) c anrange fro m v e rystrict re quir ements cor res pon dingtoa  norm  req u ir ing perso ns t o  check al l  l ogi c a ll y possiblec o u nte rposs ibi l ities(inc luding the sortso f fanciful ske ptic a l  sc ena r iosde vised by philo sop he r s ) to ver ylax require ments wh er e , inthe li mit, t here wo u l db e a co mple tefreedom f rom  d o ing any  c he c king a t al l.  In be tweent he e x t remes is a range  of p o s sible nor ms re qu iring m o re o r less ofan agent. I f we b egin  with  the as su mption  th at  some sort of "in-be tween " requi re ment  no t only  fit s actua l ep is tem ic practi c e ,b ut  i s  de fens ible,  t henone plaus i ble sugg est i on forsp eci f y ing th e  r a n ge of coun ter possi b i lities for whic h  o n e isepiste micall y respo n sib le  is thi s:2 8 ER: A per son S ise pis te mica lly resp on sibl einbe lieving some pr opositio n p at t i m e t on lyi f Sc hecksal l of those c ounte rp o ssibili t i eswhose s e rio usn ess  isind icat e d by S's background beli efsat t. 2 9 T his i s a s ta rt, buti t wi ll not d o  as it stands . For one thing ,  in s ofar  as th e
 given_our interest_in characterizing a notion_of epistemic_justification_that is_applicable_to human beings,_we want a_notion of epistemic responsibility_that is not_overly_idealized. In short, we want a model of epistemic responsibility that represents a "realistic_ideal."_With these_constraints_in_mind, let me now proceed_to sketch (part of) a_model of_epistemic responsibility. Epistemic Responsibility Broadly speaking, being epistemically_responsible_has to do_with such activities as: (1) gathering evidence, (2) considering_and dealing with counterpossibilities, and (3)_dealing with internal_conflicts_of_belief. We normally criticize_agents whose beliefs are not based_on adequate evidence, who have not_checked out relevant counterpossibilities to what they_believe, and who fail to eliminate_certain conflicts of belief. To_be epistemically_responsible in what one believes,_one must not_fall below_certain standards or_norms governing these activities. What do_the norms require?_More specifically: How much evidence is_enough_for having a_justified_belief?_Which counterpossibilities_must one check?_Which_conflicts of_belief_must one eliminate? Since we are_interested_in the perspective of the responsible epistemic_agent, these questions are_about_the most general epistemic_norms characteristic of this representative_agent. Limitations of space do not_permit a_full treatment_of these matters here, but we can provide a partial sketch_of an epistemically responsible agent that_will be sufficient for_present purposes_by_focusing primarily on_those_epistemic responsibilities_and associated norms that have to do_with checking_counterpossibilities." Responsibility for checking counterpossibilities to_propositions we currently believe_(or_propositions we are considering) can range_from very strict requirements corresponding to_a norm requiring persons to_check_all_logically possible counterpossibilities (including the_sorts of fanciful skeptical scenarios devised_by philosophers) to_very lax requirements where, in the limit,_there_would be a complete freedom from_doing_any checking at all. In between_the_extremes_is a range of possible_norms requiring more or less of_an agent. If we begin with the assumption that_some sort of_"in-between" requirement not only fits_actual_epistemic_practice, but is defensible, then one plausible suggestion for specifying_the range_of counterpossibilities for_which one is epistemically responsible is this:28 ER: A person_S is epistemically responsible in believing some_proposition p at time t only if S checks all of_those counterpossibilities whose seriousness is indicated by S's_background beliefs at t.29 This is a_start, but it will_not_do as it stands. For one thing,_insofar_as_the