 notice that there is a distinction among reasons that corresponds quite nicely to the two plausible interpretations of Contrastive Expected Fit, viz. the distinction between ​objective and ​subjective ​reasons​, where the difference between these two kinds of reasons is understood as a difference between considerations that in fact count in favor of an action and considerations that, from the point of view of some subject, count in favor of an action. So, corresponding to the ​objective interpretation 50 49 This is a question faced by ​any account of promotion that appeals to probabilistic facts. See Behrends & DiPaolo (2016) for a discussion. 50 In the literature, the terms'subjective reason' and 'objective reason' are used to refer to a range of differences among reasons. For instance, some use'subjective reason' to refer to the subset of objective 30 of Contrastive Expected Fit, we have what we might call the ​objective promotion relation that delivers results regarding ​objective reasons​, understood as above. And similarly, corresponding to the ​subjective ​interpretation of Contrastive Expected Fit, we have what we might call the ​subjective ​promotion relation that delivers results regarding subjective reasons​, again understood as above. Now, there are serious disagreements among philosophers about which of these kinds of reasons corresponding to the different promotion relations are ​genuine normative reasons -all views in logical space are occupied. Here, we don't take any stand on which of these views is correct. For all we say here, it could turn out that only objective reasons are genuine, and that subjective reasons aren't reasons at all. It could turn out, in other words, that the fact that from the point of view of some subject one action has a higher expected fit than an alternative action is neither here nor there with respect to what action there is reason for the subject to do. Anyone inclined toward such a view should then insist on the objective interpretation of Contrastive Expected Fit. (The reverse is true for those who think think there are only subjective reasons and no genuine objective reasons..) Since it's not our aim here to decide these difficult questions, we think it's an advantage of our view that it both remains silent on them and allows for a range of possible answers. 8. Conclusion Let's recap. Probabilistic accounts of promotion -Pure Probabilism and Causal Probabilism -are liable to counterexamples that militate in favor of a contrast
notice that there is a distinction among reasons that correspond quite nicely to the two plausible interpretation of Contrastive Expected Fit, viz. the distinction between ​objective and ​subjective ​reasons​, where the difference between these two kinds of reason is understood as a difference between consideration that in fact reckon in favor of an military action and considerations that, from the point of scene of some subject, count in party favor of an action. So, corresponding to the ​objective interpretation 50 49 This is a question faced by ​any account of forwarding that appeals to probabilistic facts. See Behrends & DiPaolo (2016) for a discussion. 50 In the literature, the terms'subjective cause' and' objective reason' are used to mention to a range of difference among reasons. For instance, some use'subjective reason' to refer to the subset of objective 30 of Contrastive Expected Fit, we have what we might shout the ​objective promotion relation that delivers results regarding ​objective reasons​, understand as above. And similarly, represent to the ​subjective ​interpretation of Contrastive Expected Fit, we have what we might call the ​subjective ​promotion relation that delivers results regarding subjective reasons​, again understood as above. nowadays, there are serious disagreement among philosophers about which of these kinds of reasons corresponding to the unlike promotion relation are ​genuine normative reasons -all view in logical space are occupied. Here, we don't take any stand on which of these views is correct. For all we say here, it could turn out that only objective reasons are actual, and that subjective rationality aren't reason at all. It could turn out, in other words, that the fact that from the point of view of some subject one legal action has a higher expected fit than an alternative natural process is neither here nor there with respect to what action there embody reason for the discipline to do. Anyone incline toward such a view should then importune on the objective interpretation of Contrastive Expected Fit. (The reverse is true for those who intend think there be only subjective reasons and no genuine objective reasons ..) Since it's not our aim here to decide these difficult questions, we remember it's an advantage of our view that it both remains dumb on them and allows for a range of potential answers. 8. Conclusion Let's recap. Probabilistic accounts of promotion -Pure Probabilism and Causal Probabilism -are liable to counterexamples that militate in favor of a contrast
 nohice that there is a disuinction among recwons tiat cordesponds quite nicely to the two plansiboe inuvrpretations of Contrxstive Exiected Fir, vie. the distinction between ​objecflve aud ​subjective ​ressons​, whera the differenwe bztween these two kinds of reasons is undersyold as a differgnce nqtwesn considerations that in fact couht in fevor of an actipn and considerations that, frol the point of viea of some sogjesr, count in fxvor of an action. So, ckrresponding to the ​objective ivterpxetation 50 49 Jkus lv a questioi faceq by ​any account of [romotipn that appealx tm peobabilistic facts. Sex Behrends & DiPaolo (2016) for a divcbssion. 50 In the literaruee, thg terks'suchecgivt rxaskn' and 'oboective reaaon' are usee to refer to a ranbe if differencea amond weasons. For instance, some use'subjective rezson' to refer to the suvset of objective 30 of Contrastyve Expected Fit, we have what we might call the ​otjectmvd pximotiub gelation that delivers results regarding ​objesfife reasons​, underftood as abpvf. Sgd similarly, zorres'knsing to the ​subjechive ​injerpreration of Conyrastive Expected Fit, we hace what we mpght call the ​subjectire ​promotion relstion that delivers results xegardjng subjectlve reasohr​, again understoud ss above. Now, there are seriots disagrxemencs among phikosophqrs about ahich of these kinds of geasous cosrespondinh to the different promotion relations are ​gemuhne normatire reaxons -all viewf in logical skace are jccupked. Here, wv don't tane any stanq on which of jhese views iv correce. Foe alo we sah here, it could turn out that only objective reasons arg fenuine, and thac wubjective reaspns arqn'n rxasonf at all. It cmuld tufm out, in othtx wifds, yhat the fact that fsom fhe point of view pf some suvject onq action has s higher expected vit tian an altetnajive action is neither here nor there wihh vespect to whwt agtiog there is reason for the subject to do. Anyone inrlined toward such a viww should then insixu on the objertive ynterpretdtion of Contrastive Expected Fit. (The reverse is true for fhose fho tjink think there are only subjective reasons and no genuine objective reawons..) Smnse it's not kur sim hvre co deciqe tiere difficult quextions, we think it's an advantagx of our vhec that it both remains silent ov them and aluows for a range of possjble anseers. 8. Conclusion Let's recap. Pronabilistic accounts of pvomotion -Pure Lrobabpmirm and Causal Probsbilisk -are liable to gounterexampler tnab militate in havkr of a contrast
notice that there is a distinction among corresponds nicely to two plausible interpretations the between ​objective and ​reasons​, where the between these two kinds of reasons understood as a difference between considerations that in fact count in favor of action and considerations that, from the point of view of some subject, count favor an So, to the ​objective interpretation 50 49 This is a question faced by ​any account of promotion appeals to probabilistic facts. See Behrends & DiPaolo for a discussion. 50 the literature, the terms'subjective reason' 'objective are used refer a of differences among For instance, some use'subjective reason' to refer to the subset of objective 30 of Contrastive Expected Fit, have what call the promotion that results regarding ​objective as above. And similarly, corresponding to of Contrastive Expected Fit, we have what we call the ​promotion relation that delivers results regarding reasons​, again understood as above. Now, there are disagreements among philosophers about which of these kinds of reasons corresponding to the different promotion ​genuine normative reasons -all in logical space occupied. we take stand on of these views is correct. For all we say here, it turn out that only objective reasons are genuine, and that aren't at all. It turn out, in other that fact that from the view some has higher fit than an alternative is neither here nor there respect to what action subject to do. Anyone inclined toward such a should then insist on the objective interpretation Contrastive Expected Fit. (The reverse is true for those who think think are only and no genuine objective reasons..) Since it's not aim here to decide difficult questions, we think it's an advantage of our that both remains on them and for a range possible answers. 8. recap. Probabilistic of -Pure Probabilism -are liable to counterexamples that in of a contrast
 notice that there is a distincTion among rEasonS thAt cOrRespOnds Quite nicely to tHE two Plausible interpretatioNs of COnTRastIVe expecTed Fit, vIZ. tHE DisTiNcTioN bETwEen ​obJecTive and ​Subjective ​ReaSoNs​, where the diFFeRence betweEn tHese two kinds Of rEasons Is UndERstooD as A diffErence BEtween ConsideraTiONs that IN fact coUNT iN favOr of an action and coNSiDErations that, frOm the pOiNT oF VIew Of sOme subject, CoUnt in FAvor of aN AcTION. So, COrresponding tO the ​objectiVE inTerpreTaTioN 50 49 this is A quesTiON faCed by ​any accOunt Of promotiOn that APpeals tO ProbabiListic FacTs. SEe BeHReNdS & DipaOLo (2016) fOR a DisCUssIon. 50 In the LiTeRaturE, the TERMS'subJecTive ReasoN' and 'objective ReaSon' aRE usEd to rEfer tO a raNgE of diFferenCes amOnG reasons. For instAnce, Some use'suBjeCtIve ReAson' tO Refer tO thE suBset of oBjectivE 30 Of COnTRAStIve Expected Fit, we haVe WHAt We might cAll the ​OBjEcTIve promoTiOn rElatION that DeliVErS results RegardINg ​ObJective ReAsons​, uNdErsTooD as abOVe. AnD similArly, corrEsponDIng to the ​subjecTIve ​interpretaTIoN OF CONtraStiVe Expected FIt, we HAve wHat wE MiGht CAll thE ​subjEcTIvE ​Promotion relation thAt DeliveRs resUlts regarding Subjective REASons​, agaiN undERsTOod as above. Now, tHere aRe serious dISagreemeNts amOng philoSophers abOUT which of TheSe kIndS of REAsOns correspondING to tHe DiffereNt pRomotioN reLatIonS arE ​gEnuine norMative reAsOnS -aLl VieWs in lOGical spaCe Are OcCupIed. HeRE, we don'T take Any sTaNd ON whIch of thESe VIEws iS cOrRect. for AlL we saY herE, It cOuld turN out that oNly OBjecTiVe Reasons Are genuine, and ThAt subjectiVe ReaSons arEN'T reasons At all. It could turn out, in otHEr words, ThaT the fAct tHat from thE poInt of vIew OF some sUbject One acTiOn hAS A highER ExPecTeD fit than an ALTerNativE aCtioN is neitHer here nor there witH ResPect to what actIon TherE IS rEasON fOR thE sUBjeCT To do. Anyone incliNed toward sUcH A vIew should tHEn iNsIst on thE objectIve inTErpretaTion of ConTrastive EXpEcteD fIt. (THe reverse iS true for Those who tHInk thINk There Are Only suBjEctIve reAsons aND no GenuiNe objeCtIve reaSons..) SInCe it's not Our aim here to decide these DifficUlt quEstIons, we thiNk iT'S an Advantage Of ouR view that iT boTh rEmainS siLEnt on Them ANd AllOWs for A ranGE of possibLE aNswERS. 8. COnclusion LeT'S REcaP. ProbAbiLIstic aCcouNts of promotion -PurE probabilism and causAL proBabILism -ArE liable to countEreXaMPLes that mIlItate in favoR of a contRaST
 notice that there is a di stinctionamong  re aso ns  tha t co rresponds quit e  nic ely to the two plausib le in te r pret a ti ons o f Contr a st i v e E xp ec ted  F i t,  viz.  th e disti nction bet wee n​objective a n d​subjectiv e ​ reasons​, wh ere  the d if fer e nce b etw een t hese t w o kind s of reas on s  is un d erstood a sa di fference betweenc on s iderations tha t in f ac t  c o u ntinfavor of a nactio n  and co n si d e r ati o ns that, from  the pointo f v iew of  s ome subjec t, co un t  in  favor of a n ac tion. So,  corre s ponding to the​objec tiv e i nter p re ta tio n5 0 4 9  T his isa questi on  f acedby ​ a n y acco unt  ofpromo tion that app eal s to pro babil istic  fac ts . See  Behre nds &  D iPaolo (2016) f or a  discussi on.  5 0 I nthe l i teratu re,  th e terms 'subjec t ive  r e a s on ' and 'objective r ea s o n'  are use d to r e fe rt o a rang eofdiff e r ences  amo n greasons.  For i n st an ce, som euse'su bj ect ive  reas o n' t o refe r to the  subs e t of objective 30 of Contras t iv e Ex p ecte d F it, we have  wha t  wemigh t  c all the ​ objec ti v ep romotion relation t ha t deli versresults regar ding ​obje c t i ve reaso ns​, un d erstood as abo ve. A nd similar l y, corre spond ing to t he ​subje c t ive ​int erp ret ati ono f  C ontrastive Ex p e cted  F it, wehav e whatwemig htcal lthe ​subj ective ​ pr om ot io n r elati o n that d el ive rs  re sults regard ing s ubje ct iv e  re asons​, ag a i n un de rs tood  as  a bove.  Now ,  th ere are  seriousdis a gree me nt s among  philosophers  a bout which  o f t hese k i n ds of re asons corresponding tot he diff ere nt pr omot ion relat ion s are​ge n uine n ormati ve re as ons - all v i e ws  in  l ogical spa c e  ar e occ up ied.  Here,we don't take anys tan d on which of  th esev i ew s i s  c o rre ct .  Fo r all we say here , it could  t u rn  out thato nly  o bjectiv e reaso ns ar e  genuin e, and th at subjec ti ve r e a son s aren't r easons a t all. It could tu rn ou t,in oth er  wo rds,that t h e f act t hat fr om  the p ointof  view of  some subject one actio n hasa hig her  expected  fi t  th an an alt erna tive actio n i s n eithe r h e re no r th e re  wi t h res pect to what a c ti ont h er e is reason f o r t he su bje c t to d o. A nyone inclined to w ard such a vie w sh o u ldthe n  ins is t on the objec tiv ei n terpreta ti on of Contr astive E xp e ctedFit. ( The re verse i s tr u e forthos e w ho thinkthi nk there a re  o n ly sub ject iv e reas ons an d  nog e nuine objectivereaso n s ..) S i nce  it's  n ot oura im h ere to dec ide these d ifficu lt q uesti ons, we  t hink i t's  a n advantag e  of our v iew t hat itbo th r ema ins si lent o n the m an dall ows for a r an g eof pos sibl e ans we rs.8. Conclu s ion Let' s r e cap. Pr ob abi l i stic a c co u n ts of prom oti on -P u r e Probabil i sm a n dC ausal  Proba bilism  -are l i abl eto coun ter e x amples th at milita t e i nfavo r of a c on tras t
 notice_that there_is a distinction among_reasons that_corresponds_quite nicely_to_the two plausible_interpretations of Contrastive_Expected Fit, viz. the_distinction between ​objective_and_​subjective ​reasons​, where the difference between these two kinds of reasons is understood as_a_difference between_considerations_that_in fact count in favor_of an action and considerations_that, from_the point of view of some subject, count_in_favor of an_action. So, corresponding to the ​objective interpretation 50 49_This is a question faced by_​any account of_promotion_that_appeals to probabilistic facts._See Behrends & DiPaolo (2016) for_a discussion. 50 In the literature,_the terms'subjective reason' and 'objective reason' are_used to refer to a range_of differences among reasons. For_instance, some_use'subjective reason' to refer to_the subset of_objective 30_of Contrastive Expected_Fit, we have what we might_call the ​objective_promotion relation that delivers results regarding_​objective_reasons​, understood as_above._And_similarly, corresponding_to the ​subjective_​interpretation_of Contrastive_Expected_Fit, we have what we might_call_the ​subjective ​promotion relation that delivers results_regarding subjective reasons​, again_understood_as above. Now, there_are serious disagreements among philosophers_about which of these kinds of_reasons corresponding_to the_different promotion relations are ​genuine normative reasons -all views in logical_space are occupied. Here, we don't_take any stand on_which of_these_views is correct._For_all we_say here, it could turn out that_only objective_reasons are genuine, and that subjective_reasons aren't reasons at_all._It could turn out, in other_words, that the fact that from_the point of view of_some_subject_one action has a higher_expected fit than an alternative action_is neither here_nor there with respect to what action_there_is reason for the subject to_do._Anyone inclined toward such a view_should_then_insist on the objective interpretation_of Contrastive Expected Fit. (The reverse_is true for those who think think there are_only subjective reasons_and no genuine objective reasons..)_Since_it's_not our aim here to decide these difficult questions, we_think it's_an advantage of_our view that it both remains silent on them and_allows for a range of possible answers._8. Conclusion Let's recap. Probabilistic accounts of promotion -Pure Probabilism and_Causal Probabilism -are liable to counterexamples that militate_in favor of a contrast