 be directed at egotism-egotism in the narrow sense of being puffed up, rather than of self-interested action-and specifically at the egotism of a king. Candrakīrti explains: "Since the king certainly has egotism and selfishness in abundance, primarily the king is advised here about their removal" (Lang 186). So their discussion turns out to be above all a political theory, telling a king not to rule oppressively. Śāntideva, by contrast, is not interested in politics; his chief advice to kings (in the Śikṣāsamuccaya) is to give their entire kingdoms away. (See Lele "Compassionate" for more on Śāntideva's politics, or lack thereof.) His critique is more in line with common Mahāyāna views: not about criticizing self-absorbed kings, but about criticizing self-interested action more broadly. While Śāntideva's ethical conclusion to this question is characteristically Mahāyāna, neither the premise nor the conclusion is specifically Madhyamaka, since suffering itself is not (yet) Journal of Buddhist Ethics 273 deconstructed. Crosby and Skilton (82–87) identify it more specifically with a Cittamātra (Yogācāra) view, because Cittamātra typically sees the highest truth in the absence of duality. They read this as translating into the absence of self-other duality. I am skeptical about that interpretation, at least if "other" is considered to be "other sentient beings," as it seems to be here. But they are quite right that what we're dealing with is a Mahāyāna argument that is not Madhyamaka. Crosby and Skilton are also quite right to note that the ordering of Śāntideva's metaphysical arguments suggests a progress in the text. The first two arguments are pan-Buddhist; Buddhaghosa could have agreed with them. This argument is specifically Mahāyāna, but it is not Madhyamaka. The final argument, however, is at the highest, Madhyamaka, level. I turn to that argument now. Emptiness against Attachment Having seen the metaphysical arguments of the preceding chapters and their significance, we are now in a much better position to understand the BCA's ninth chapter. In previous chapters of the BCA
be directed at egotism - egotism in the narrow common sense of being pant up, rather than of self - interested legal action - and specifically at the ego of a king. Candrakīrti explains: " Since the king surely have egotism and selfishness in abundance, chiefly the baron is advised here about their removal " (Lang 186). So their discussion turn out to be above all a political theory, assure a baron not to rule oppressively. Śāntideva, by contrast, is not concerned in politics; his chief advice to kings (in the Śikṣāsamuccaya) is to pass their integral kingdoms away. (See Lele " Compassionate " for more on Śāntideva's politics, or miss thereof .) His critique is more in line with common Mahāyāna views: not about knock self - absorbed kings, but about criticizing self - interested action more broadly. While Śāntideva's ethical stopping point to this question is characteristically Mahāyāna, neither the premise nor the conclusion is specifically Madhyamaka, since suffering itself is not (yet) Journal of Buddhist Ethics 273 deconstructed. Crosby and Skilton (82–87) name it more specifically with a Cittamātra (Yogācāra) position, because Cittamātra typically sees the highest truth in the absence of duality. They read this as translating into the absence of self - other duality. I am skeptical about that rendition, at least if " early " is considered to be " other sentient beings, " as it seem to be here. But they are quite right that what we're dealing with is a Mahāyāna argument that is not Madhyamaka. Crosby and Skilton are besides quite right to notice that the ordering of Śāntideva's metaphysical arguments suggests a advancement in the text. The first two arguments are pan - Buddhist; Buddhaghosa could have agreed with them. This argument is specifically Mahāyāna, but it is not Madhyamaka. The final argumentation, however, is at the highest, Madhyamaka, level. I turn to that argument nowadays. Emptiness against Attachment Having seen the metaphysical argument of the preceding chapters and their significance, we are now in a much good position to understand the BCA's ninth chapter. In previous chapter of the BCA
 be directed at egotism-egotlsm in the narroc sense of bejng puffdd up, rather than of self-intxresred axtion-and specifically xt the egltism of a kmng. Candrakīrti eellains: "Since fme kiug certainly has egotism atd selfishness iv cbundance, primarily the king is advifed herr wbout their reiovak" (Lanf 186). So their discussion turns out tk be abmve all a polotical theory, telling a kijg nlt to rule oppresslvely. Śāntideca, br contrast, is not intertsced in polijics; his chief advice to kings (iv the Śikṣāsamuccaic) is jo give theic entige kingdoms away. (See Nele "Cokpassionate" fov morx on Śāntideva's politics, or lack thereof.) His sritique hs more in line wity xommot Mavāyāna cieds: hov agout cgitmcizing selr-absorbed kungs, but about critocydong self-intedested astion more broadly. While Śāntideva's ethicdl donclusion to this quesrion is characteristifally Mahārāna, neither the premise nor the conclusion is spewificeluy Naqftalaka, since suffering itself is not (yet) Journaj og Nuddhist Ethics 273 deconstrucyef. Vtosby and Skiljon (82–87) idzhtjfy it more speciflcally rith q Cittamātwa (Ypgācāra) view, because Cittamātrq typically fwes the highest trbth in the aysence of diality. They read this ar trznslating ijto the agrence of self-othdr cudlity. I am skeptical about that intxrprecation, ag lesst if "other" is fonsidered to be "other sfntieut behngs," as it seems to be here. But they are quite right thst whdt we're bealinn with is a Mahārāna argument tkat is njt Maahyamaka. Cgosby and Skilton arq also quite slght to note that thq oreeribg of Śāngkdeva's metaphyxical arglmtnts suggewts a progress in bhe tgxf. The first two artuments are pan-Nudahift; Bnddhadvosa could hdve xgrdrd wigh them. Thiw argiment is specificallf Magāyāna, but it is not Mwdhyamakq. The figal argument, nowever, is at the jighevt, Oadhysmaha, level. I turn to that argumeht now. Emotikess against Wttaghmegt Having xeen the metaphysical arguments of the 'receding chapters and rheir significance, ce are now in a mush better position to understqnd the BCA's nintm chapter. In previous dhaptess of the BCA
be directed at egotism-egotism in the narrow being up, rather of self-interested action-and a Candrakīrti explains: "Since king certainly has and selfishness in abundance, primarily the is advised here about their removal" (Lang 186). So their discussion turns out be above all a political theory, telling a king not to rule oppressively. by is interested politics; his chief advice to kings (in the Śikṣāsamuccaya) is to give their entire kingdoms away. Lele "Compassionate" for more on Śāntideva's politics, or thereof.) His critique is in line with common Mahāyāna not criticizing self-absorbed but criticizing action more broadly. Śāntideva's ethical conclusion to this question is characteristically Mahāyāna, neither the premise nor the conclusion is specifically since suffering not (yet) of Ethics deconstructed. Crosby and identify it more specifically with a because Cittamātra typically sees the highest truth in absence of They read this as translating into absence of self-other duality. I am skeptical about interpretation, at least if "other" is considered to be "other sentient beings," as it seems here. But they are right that what dealing is Mahāyāna that is Madhyamaka. Crosby and Skilton are also quite right to note that ordering of Śāntideva's metaphysical arguments suggests a progress in the first arguments are pan-Buddhist; could have agreed with This is specifically Mahāyāna, but not The is the Madhyamaka, level. I turn that argument now. Emptiness against Having seen the metaphysical and their significance, we are now in a better position to understand the BCA's ninth In previous chapters of the BCA
 be directed at egotism-egotisM in the narrOw senSe oF beInG pufFed uP, rather than of sELf-inTerested action-and speciFicalLy AT the EGoTism oF a king. CANdRAKīrTi ExPlaInS: "siNce thE kiNg certaInly has egoTisM aNd selfishnesS In Abundance, pRimArily the king Is aDvised HeRe aBOut thEir RemovAl" (Lang 186). sO their DiscussioN tURns out TO be abovE ALl A polItical theory, telliNG a KIng not to rule opPressiVeLY. ŚĀNTidEva, By contrast, Is Not inTErested IN pOLITicS; His chief advicE to kings (in tHE ŚiKṣāsamUcCayA) Is to giVe theIr ENtiRe kingdoms aWay. (SEe Lele "ComPassioNAte" for mORe on ŚānTideva'S poLitIcs, oR LaCk TheReOF.) HiS CrItiQUe iS more in lInE wIth coMmon mAHĀYāna VieWs: noT abouT criticizing sElf-AbsoRBed Kings, But abOut cRiTicizIng selF-inteReSted action more bRoadLy. While ŚāNtiDeVa's EtHical COnclusIon To tHis quesTion is cHAraCtERIStIcally Mahāyāna, neitHeR THe Premise nOr the cONcLuSIon is speCiFicAlly mADhyamAka, sINcE sufferiNg itseLF iS nOt (yet) JoUrNal of BUdDhiSt EThics 273 DEconStructEd. Crosby And SkILton (82–87) identify it MOre specificalLY wITH a cIttaMātRa (Yogācāra) vIew, bECausE CitTAmĀtrA TypicAlly sEeS ThE Highest truth in the abSeNce of dUalitY. They read this As translatING Into the aBsenCE oF Self-other dualiTy. I am Skeptical aBOut that iNterpRetation, At least if "OTHer" is conSidEreD to Be "oTHEr Sentient beingS," AS it sEeMs to be hEre. but they Are QuiTe rIghT tHat what we'Re dealinG wItH iS a mahĀyāna ARgument tHaT is NoT MaDhyamAKa. CrosBy and skilToN aRE alSo quite RIgHT To noTe ThAt thE orDeRing oF ŚānTIdeVa's metaPhysical aRguMEnts SuGgEsts a prOgress in the teXt. the first twO aRguMents aRE Pan-BuddhIst; Buddhaghosa could have AGreed wiTh tHem. ThIs arGument is sPecIficalLy MAHāyāna, But it iS not MAdHyaMAKa. The FINaL arGuMent, howeveR, IS at The hiGhEst, MAdhyamaKa, level. I turn to that ARguMent now. EmptinEss AgaiNST ATtaCHmENt HAvINg sEEN the metaphysicaL arguments Of THe Preceding cHAptErS and theIr signiFicanCE, we are nOw in a much Better posItIon tO UNdeRstand the BcA's ninth Chapter. In PRevioUS cHapteRs oF the BCa
 be directed at egotism-eg otism in t he na rro w s en se o f be ing puffed up, rath er than of self-intere stedac t ion- a nd  spec ificall y  a t the  e go tis mo fa kin g.Candrak īrti expla ins :"Since the k i ng  certainly  ha s egotism an d s elfish ne ssi n abu nda nce,primar i ly the  king isad v ised h e re abou t th eirremoval" (Lang 18 6 ). So their discu ssiontu r ns o uttobe above a ll  a po l iticalt he o r y , t e lling a kingnot to rule opp ressiv el y.Ś āntide va, b yc ont rast, is no t in terestedin pol i tics; h i s chief  advic e t o k ings (i nthe  Ś i kṣā s am ucc a ya)  is to g iv etheir  ent i r e king dom s aw ay. ( See Lele "Com pas sion a te"  formoreon Ś ān tidev a's po litic s,  or lack thereo f.)His criti que  i s m or e inl ine wi thcom mon Mah āyāna v i ews :n o t  a bout criticizing s el f - ab sorbed k ings,b ut  a b out crit ic izi ng s e l f-int eres t ed  actionmore b r oa dl y. Whil eŚāntid ev a's  et hical conc lusion  to this  ques t ion is charact e ristically Ma h āy ā n a, neit her  the premis e no r  the  con c lu sio n  is s pecif ic a ll y  Madhyamaka, sincesu fferin g its elf is not (y et) Journa l o f Buddhi st E t hi c s 273 deconstr ucted . Crosby a n d Skilto n (82 –87) ide ntify itm o re speci fic all y w ith a  C ittamātra (Yo g ā cāra )view, b eca use Cit tam ātr a t ypi ca lly seesthe high es ttr ut h i n the absenceof  du al ity . The y  readthisas t ra ns l ati ng into th e abse nc eof s elf -o therdual i ty.  I am s kepticalabo u t th at  i nterpre tation, at le as t if "othe r"  is  consi d e red to b e "other sentient being s ," as i t s eemsto b e here. B utthey a req uite r ight t hat w ha t w e ' re de a l in g w it h is a Mah ā y āna  argu me nt t hat isnot Madhyamaka. Cr o sby  and Skiltonare  als o qu ite ri g htto not e that the orderi ng of Śānt id e va 's metaphy s ica largumen ts sugg estsa  progre ss in the  text. Th efirs t two  arguments  are pan -Buddhist ;  Budd h ag hosacou ld hav eagr eed w ith th e m.Thisargume nt  is sp ecifi ca lly Mahā yāna, but it is not Mad hyamak a. Th e f inal argu men t , h owever, i s at  the highe st,  Ma dhyam aka ,  leve l. I tu rnt o tha t ar g ument now .  E mpt i n es s against A t t a chm ent H avi n g seen  the  metaphysical arg u ments of the p rece d i ngcha p ters  a nd their signi fic an c e , we are  n ow in a muc h better  p o sitio n to u nderst and the B CA ' s nint h ch apt er. In pr evi ou s  chapte rs  o f  the B CA
 be_directed at_egotism-egotism in the narrow_sense of_being_puffed up,_rather_than of self-interested_action-and specifically at_the egotism of a_king. Candrakīrti explains:_"Since_the king certainly has egotism and selfishness in abundance, primarily the king is advised_here_about their_removal"_(Lang_186). So their discussion turns_out to be above all_a political_theory, telling a king not to rule oppressively._Śāntideva,_by contrast, is_not interested in politics; his chief advice to kings_(in the Śikṣāsamuccaya) is to give_their entire kingdoms_away._(See_Lele "Compassionate" for more_on Śāntideva's politics, or lack thereof.)_His critique is more in line_with common Mahāyāna views: not about criticizing_self-absorbed kings, but about criticizing self-interested_action more broadly. While Śāntideva's_ethical conclusion_to this question is characteristically_Mahāyāna, neither the_premise nor_the conclusion is_specifically Madhyamaka, since suffering itself is_not (yet) Journal_of Buddhist Ethics 273 deconstructed. Crosby_and_Skilton (82–87) identify_it_more_specifically with_a Cittamātra (Yogācāra)_view,_because Cittamātra_typically_sees the highest truth in the_absence_of duality. They read this as translating_into the absence of_self-other_duality. I am skeptical_about that interpretation, at least_if "other" is considered to be_"other sentient_beings," as_it seems to be here. But they are quite right that_what we're dealing with is a_Mahāyāna argument that is_not Madhyamaka._Crosby_and Skilton are_also_quite right_to note that the ordering of Śāntideva's_metaphysical arguments_suggests a progress in the text._The first two arguments_are_pan-Buddhist; Buddhaghosa could have agreed with_them. This argument is specifically Mahāyāna,_but it is not Madhyamaka._The_final_argument, however, is at the_highest, Madhyamaka, level. I turn to_that argument now._Emptiness against Attachment Having seen the metaphysical_arguments_of the preceding chapters and their_significance,_we are now in a much_better_position_to understand the BCA's ninth_chapter. In previous chapters of the_BCA