 of a plausible and attractive account of well-being; I cannot do justice here to all of its valuable lines of enquiry. In the remainder of this review I shall consider some issues which arise from the relationship between goodfor (which is central to Kraut's developmentalism) and reasons for action. Kraut touches on this subject repeatedly without making clear just what this relationship is. Partly as a result, I believe there are real puzzles in making sense of the import of developmentalism for ordinary practice. Kraut's developmentalism bears an uneasy relationship with the eudaimonism of the ancient Greeks, and I shall bring out my concerns about his approach by focusing on some crucial points of disagreement between them. It is striking to consider the contrasts between Kraut's developmentalism and ancient eudaimonism, for two reasons. First, Kraut has written extensively on ancient value theory, in particular the ethics and politics of Plato and Aristotle. It is therefore instructive that he does not toe the ancient line when it comes to an account of what is good for us. Secondly, though Kraut's view is not eudaimonist, it is obviously deeply influenced by his work on the ancient accounts. Moreover, his earlier landmark paper on happiness explicitly challenged contemporary 'conative' theories of happiness from a perspective grounded in ancient thinking about well-being. So his departure from eudaimonism is worth scrutinizing. Where does he part company with the ancients? For one thing, Kraut is interested in a general account of good-for which can apply not only to humans but to all living things. In general the ancients seemed simply not interested in this broader question, at least for purposes of ethical theorizing. More importantly, Kraut departs from the ancients in treating our capacities for engaging reasons as just one more suite of powers among many. On the developmental view, our capacity for rationality matters, but so does our capacity for social development, and our capacity to sense, and feel, and so on. All are equally important in the story of what is good for us, and each has its stake in the demands for development. Not so on ancient accounts, where rationality plays a distinctive role and stands in a special relationship with every other element of our nature. While the ancients agree that we have these other capacities, and that their development matters, they insist that our cognitive powers have a special place in the story of their proper development. This is partly because the complexity of human nature and the
of a plausible and attractive account of well - being; I cannot do justice here to all of its valuable occupation of inquiry. In the remainder of this review I shall consider some issue which arise from the relationship between goodfor (which is cardinal to Kraut's developmentalism) and reasons for action. Kraut touches on this discipline repeatedly without making clear barely what this relationship is. Partly as a resultant role, I believe there are real puzzles in making common sense of the import of developmentalism for ordinary practice. Kraut's developmentalism give birth an uneasy relationship with the eudaimonism of the ancient Greeks, and I shall institute out my concerns about his access by focusing on some crucial points of disagreement between them. It is striking to study the contrasts between Kraut's developmentalism and ancient eudaimonism, for two reasons. First, Kraut has written extensively on ancient value theory, in especial the ethics and politics of Plato and Aristotle. It is therefore instructive that he does not toe the ancient line when it comes to an account of what is good for us. Secondly, though Kraut's view is not eudaimonist, it is obviously deeply influenced by his employment on the ancient accounts. Moreover, his early landmark newspaper on happiness explicitly challenged contemporary' conative' theory of happiness from a perspective grounded in ancient thinking about well - being. So his deviation from eudaimonism is worth scrutinizing. Where does he part company with the ancients? For one thing, Kraut is concerned in a general account of good - for which can apply not only to humans but to all living thing. In cosmopolitan the ancients seemed simply not interested in this broader question, at least for purposes of ethical theorizing. More importantly, Kraut departs from the ancient in treating our capacities for engaging reasons as precisely one more suite of powers among many. On the developmental position, our capacity for rationality matter, but so do our capacity for social exploitation, and our capacity to sense, and feel, and so on. All are evenly important in the story of what is good for us, and each have its stake in the demands for development. Not so on ancient history, where rationality plays a distinctive function and stands in a special relationship with every other element of our nature. While the ancients harmonize that we have these other capacities, and that their development matters, they insist that our cognitive power take a extra place in the story of their proper development. This is partly because the complexity of human nature and the
 of a plausible and attractlve account of wglo-being; I canhot do jjstice here to all of its vapuqble oines of enquiry. In thd remaindvr of thiw retiew I shall consider some isshcs whnci arise from thg relationshhp between googfur (which is central to Kraut's developientalixm) and reasons fjr abtyon. Igamt touches on this subject repeafedly wpthout making clesr just what this relationdhip is. Partly as a redult, I beligbe eyere are reau puzzles pu making sehse of the import of developmengalisk for ordibaey otactice. Krauv's devvlopmentalism bears at uneasu relationship wivh tye eudaimonism of the ancient Greeks, anq I shall bxing out my concerns qbiut hhs a[proxxh cy rorusjng on soje crucial points of eisagreement betweem eyem. It is strjking eo consider the contrasts between Kraut's gevslopmentalism and anciebt eudaimonism, for twl reasons. First, Kraut has written extensively on ancient vdlue vhdorv, in pxetlcular the ethics and politics of Plato and Awjsuotke. It is therenore instructive tnah ng does not toe the audisnt line when it clmes to an axcount of whay is good for us. Secondly, tyough Kraut's ciew is not eudaimlnist, it is obvoouslu deeply influenced by kis wodk on the ajcient acduunts. Moreover, hks varlher landmark paper on happyness expoicicly chaluenggd contqmporary 'clnatiya' theories of happlness fsom a persoective grounded in ancient thiiling about wgll-teitg. So hif depsrture from etdaimonism is corth scxutinixing. Where does hx part compagy with the atfients? For oie thing, Hraur is intererged in a genersl accounn jf giod-for which can aiply vkt only to humaur but to all livong thynhs. Ig general the anckengx seeoed simkjy vot onterested in this bsoadsr question, at leaxt for purkoses of qthical theorozing. More importajtly, Nrant depsrtf from the ancients in treatinf our capwcibies for engading reasons as lust one more suite of powers among many. On the developmenral view, our capacijy nor rationalmty maeters, but so does our capacitt for social devekopment, and our capacjty to sensf, and feel, and so on. All are equally important in the story of what is goid for us, and each has its vtcke in thq delends for developmvnt. Not so on ancient accounts, wiere ratiotajity plays a distinctive rolr xnd stands in a special relationship sith evety other element of our nature. Ehile the ancients agree that we have these othxr capacities, and thst thenr devwlopmenr mabters, they inskst tmat our cohnitmve powers have a special place in rhe stirj of their propec developmenb. Uhis is partli because the comllexjhy of human nature and the
of a plausible and attractive account of cannot justice here all of its the of this review shall consider some which arise from the relationship between (which is central to Kraut's developmentalism) and reasons for action. Kraut touches on subject repeatedly without making clear just what this relationship is. Partly as a I there real in making sense of the import of developmentalism for ordinary practice. Kraut's developmentalism bears an uneasy with the eudaimonism of the ancient Greeks, and shall bring out my about his approach by focusing some points of between It striking to consider contrasts between Kraut's developmentalism and ancient eudaimonism, for two reasons. First, Kraut has written extensively on ancient theory, in ethics and of and It is therefore he does not toe the ancient comes to an account of what is good us. Secondly, Kraut's view is not eudaimonist, it obviously deeply influenced by his work on the accounts. Moreover, his earlier landmark paper on happiness explicitly challenged contemporary 'conative' theories of happiness perspective grounded in ancient about well-being. So departure eudaimonism worth Where does part company with the ancients? For one thing, Kraut is interested a general account of good-for which can apply not only but all living things. general the ancients seemed not in this broader question, for of importantly, departs the ancients in treating capacities for engaging reasons as one more suite of developmental view, our capacity for rationality matters, but does our capacity for social development, and capacity to sense, and feel, and so on. All are equally important the story is good for us, and each has its in the demands for Not so on ancient accounts, where rationality plays a role stands in special relationship with other element of nature. While the that we these capacities, development matters, they insist that our powers a special place in the of development. This is partly because the complexity of human nature and the
 of a plausible and attractive Account of wEll-beIng; i caNnOt do JustIce here to all of ITs vaLuable lines of enquiry. In The reMaINder OF tHis reView I shALl CONsiDeR sOme IsSUeS whicH arIse from The relatioNshIp Between goodfOR (wHich is centRal To Kraut's deveLopMentalIsM) anD ReasoNs fOr actIon. KraUT touchEs on this sUbJEct repEAtedly wITHoUt maKing clear just what THiS Relationship is. partly As A ReSULt, I BelIeve there aRe Real pUZzles in MAkING SenSE of the import oF developmenTAliSm for oRdInaRY practIce. KrAuT'S deVelopmentalIsm bEars an uneAsy relATionshiP With the EudaimOniSm oF the ANcIeNt GReEKs, aND I ShaLL brIng out my CoNcErns aBout HIS APproAch By foCusinG on some cruciaL poInts OF diSagreEment BetwEeN them. it is stRikinG tO consider the conTrasTs between kraUt'S deVeLopmeNTalism And AncIent eudAimonisM, For TwO REAsOns. First, Kraut has wrItTEN eXtensiveLy on anCIeNt VAlue theoRy, In pArtiCULar thE ethICs And politIcs of PLAtO aNd AristOtLe. It is ThEreForE instRUctiVe that He does noT toe tHE ancient line whEN it comes to an aCCoUNT oF What Is gOod for us. SecOndlY, ThouGh KrAUt'S viEW is noT eudaImONiST, it is obviously deeplY iNfluenCed by His work on the aNcient accoUNTS. MoreoveR, his EArLIer landmark papEr on hAppiness exPLicitly cHalleNged contEmporary 'cONAtive' theOriEs oF haPpiNESs From a perspectIVE groUnDed in anCieNt thinkIng AboUt wEll-BeIng. So his dEparture FrOm EuDaImoNism iS Worth scrUtIniZiNg. WHere dOEs he paRt comPany WiTh THe aNcients? fOr ONE thiNg, krAut iS inTeResteD in a GEneRal accoUnt of good-For WHich CaN aPply not Only to humans bUt To all livinG tHinGs. In geNERal the anCients seemed simply not inTErested In tHis brOadeR question, At lEast foR puRPoses oF ethicAl theOrIziNG. more iMPOrTanTlY, Kraut depaRTS frOm the AnCienTs in treAting our capacities FOr eNgaging reasonS as Just ONE mOre SUiTE of PoWErs AMOng many. On the devElopmental ViEW, oUr capacity FOr rAtIonalitY matterS, but sO Does our Capacity fOr social dEvElopMENt, aNd our capacIty to senSe, and feel, ANd so oN. alL are eQuaLly impOrTanT in thE story OF whAt is gOod for Us, And eacH has iTs Stake in tHe demands for development. not so oN anciEnt Accounts, wHerE RatIonality pLays A distinctiVe rOle And stAndS In a spEciaL ReLatIOnshiP witH Every otheR ElEmeNT Of Our nature. WhILE The AncieNts AGree thAt we Have these other capACities, and that tHeir DEVelOpmENt maTtErs, they insist tHat OuR COgnitive PoWers have a spEcial plaCe IN the sTory of Their pRoper deVELoPMent. ThIs is ParTly becausE thE cOMplexitY oF hUMan natUre aNd The
 of a plausible and attrac tive accou nt of  we ll- be ing;  I c annot do justi c e he re to all of its valua ble l in e s of en quiry . In th e  r e m ain de rofth i srevie w I  shallconsider s ome  i ssues whicha ri se from th e r elationshipbet ween g oo dfo r  (whi chis ce ntralt o Krau t's devel op m entali s m) andr e as onsfor action. Kraut to u ches on this s ubject  r e pe a t edl y w ithout mak in g cle a r justw ha t t his relationshipis. Partlya s a  resul t,  Ib elieve  ther ea rereal puzzle s in  making s ense o f  the im p ort ofdevelo pme nta lism fo rord in a ryp ra cti c e.Kraut'sde ve lopme ntal i s m bear s a n un easyrelationshipwit h th e  eu daimo nismof t he  anci ent Gr eeks,  a nd I shall brin g ou t my conc ern sabo ut  hisa pproac h b y f ocusing  on som e  cr uc i a l  p oints of disagreem en t be tween th em. It is  s t riking t ocon side r the c ontr a st s betwee n Krau t 's  d evelopm en talism  a ndanc iente udai monism , for tw o rea s ons. First, Kr a ut has writte n  e x t en s ivel y o n ancient v alue theo ry,i npar t icula r the  e t hi c s and politics of P la to and  Aris totle. It isthereforei n s tructive  tha t  h e  does not toethe a ncient lin e  when it  come s to anaccount o f what isgoo d f orus. S ec ondly, though K raut 's  view i s n ot euda imo nis t,itis  obviousl y deeply  i nf lu en ced  by h i s work o nthe  a nci ent a c counts . Mor eove r,  h i s e arlierl an d m arkpa pe r on  ha pp iness  exp l ici tly cha llenged c ont e mpor ar y'conati ve' theoriesof  happiness  f rom  a per s p ective g rounded in ancient thin k ing abo utwell- bein g. So his  de partur e f r om eud aimoni sm is  w ort h scrut i n iz ing .Where does h e p art c om pany  with t he ancients? For o n e t hing, Kraut i s i nter e s te d i n  a gen er a l a c c ount of good-fo r which ca na pp ly not onl y  to  h umans b ut to a ll li v ing thi ngs. In g eneral th eanci e n tsseemed sim ply notintereste d  in t h is  broa der  quest io n,at le ast fo r  pu rpose s of e th ical t heori zi ng. More  importantly, Kraut dep arts f rom t heancientsint rea ting ourcapa cities for  en gag ing r eas o ns as  jus t  o nem ore s uite of powers am ong m an y. On the d e v e lop menta l v i ew, ou r ca pacity for ration a lity matters,buts o  do eso ur c ap acity for soci alde v e lopment,  a nd our capa city tose n se, a nd fee l, and  so on. A ll are eq uall y i mportantinth e  storyof  w h at isgood  f or us,  and e a ch h a s  its stake in th e dem a n ds fo r  de velop me nt. Not so o n ancientaccounts, w here r atio nalit y plays  a  disti nct iv e role and stands in  a sp ecial r el atio nsh ip wit h ev e r y oth er e le men t of ourn a tu r e.  W h ile  the  anci en ts a gree that we havethe s e other  c apa c i ties,a nd t hat theirdev elopm e n t matters, they in s ist t hat ou r cogn itive p o wer shave aspe c i al placein the st o ryof  the ir prope rdeve lo pme nt . This is partl y becaus e the co m p lexity  of huma n  natur eand the
 of_a plausible_and attractive account of_well-being; I_cannot_do justice_here_to all of_its valuable lines_of enquiry. In the_remainder of this_review_I shall consider some issues which arise from the relationship between goodfor (which is_central_to Kraut's_developmentalism)_and_reasons for action. Kraut touches_on this subject repeatedly without_making clear_just what this relationship is. Partly as a_result,_I believe there_are real puzzles in making sense of the import_of developmentalism for ordinary practice. Kraut's_developmentalism bears an_uneasy_relationship_with the eudaimonism of_the ancient Greeks, and I shall_bring out my concerns about his_approach by focusing on some crucial points_of disagreement between them. It is_striking to consider the contrasts_between Kraut's_developmentalism and ancient eudaimonism, for_two reasons. First,_Kraut has_written extensively on_ancient value theory, in particular the_ethics and politics_of Plato and Aristotle. It is_therefore_instructive that he_does_not_toe the_ancient line when_it_comes to_an_account of what is good for_us._Secondly, though Kraut's view is not eudaimonist,_it is obviously deeply_influenced_by his work on_the ancient accounts. Moreover, his_earlier landmark paper on happiness explicitly_challenged contemporary_'conative' theories_of happiness from a perspective grounded in ancient thinking about well-being._So his departure from eudaimonism is_worth scrutinizing. Where does_he part_company_with the ancients?_For_one thing,_Kraut is interested in a general account_of good-for_which can apply not only to_humans but to all_living_things. In general the ancients seemed_simply not interested in this broader_question, at least for purposes_of_ethical_theorizing. More importantly, Kraut departs_from the ancients in treating our_capacities for engaging_reasons as just one more suite of_powers_among many. On the developmental view,_our_capacity for rationality matters, but so_does_our_capacity for social development, and_our capacity to sense, and feel,_and so on. All are equally important in the_story of what_is good for us, and_each_has_its stake in the demands for development. Not so on_ancient accounts,_where rationality plays_a distinctive role and stands in a special relationship with_every other element of our nature. While_the ancients agree that we have these other capacities, and that_their development matters, they insist that our cognitive_powers have a special place in the_story of their proper_development._This is partly because the complexity of_human_nature_and_the