 any justified beliefs at all. 11. Arguably, the same holds for ascriptions of knowledge. 12. It is important to distinguish between what we might call actual doxastic justification and hypothetical doxastic justification. The former refers to cases where: (1) one has adequate (and undefeated) evidence e that justifies the belief that p, (2) one believes that p, and (3) one believes that p on the basis of e. Cases in which one is not actually but only hypothetically justified are those cases in which clause (1) holds but either (2) or (3) (or both) fail to hold; given one's evidence or grounds, one would be justified in holding a certain belief were one to base that belief on one's evidence or grounds. I am primarily interested in questions of actual doxastic justification. Some discussion of this distinction can be found in Robert Audi, Belief Justification, and Knowledge (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1988), 1-2, though he uses the terms belief justification and situational justification for what I am calling actual and hypothetical doxastic justification respectively. 13. Marcus G. Singer, Generalization in Ethics (New York: Atheneum, 1961). 14. Alan Gewirth, Reason and Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978). 15. Alan Donagan, The Theory of Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977). 16. Richard B. Brandt, A Theory of the Good and the Right (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979). 17. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971). 18. R. M. Hare, Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method, and Point (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981). 19. For more on the distinction between questions about doxastic justification and questions about nondoxastic justification in ethics, see Norman Daniels, "Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in Ethics," Journal of Philosophy 76 (1979), 257 n. 1; David Copp, "Considered Judgments and Moral Justification: Conservatism in Moral Theory," in D. Copp and D. Zimmerman, eds., Morality, Reason, and Truth (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1984), 143; and Mark Timmons, "Foundationalism and the Structure of Justification in Ethics" Ethics 97 (1987
any justified beliefs at all. 11. Arguably, the same holds for attribution of cognition. 12. It is important to distinguish between what we might visit actual doxastic justification and conjectural doxastic justification. The former refers to cases where: (1) one has adequate (and undefeated) evidence vitamin e that justifies the belief that phosphorus, (2) one believe that p, and (3) one believe that p on the basis of e. Cases in which one is not actually but entirely hypothetically absolve are those cases in which article (1) holds but either (2) or (3) (or both) fail to bear; contribute one's evidence or grounds, one would be justified in holding a sealed belief were one to base that impression on one's evidence or grounds. I am chiefly interested in questions of actual doxastic justification. Some discussion of this distinction can be found in Robert Audi, Belief Justification, and Knowledge (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1988), 1 - 2, though he uses the terms impression justification and situational justification for what I am calling actual and hypothetical doxastic justification respectively. 13. Marcus G. Singer, Generalization in Ethics (New York: Atheneum, 1961). 14. Alan Gewirth, Reason and Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978). 15. Alan Donagan, The Theory of Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977). 16. Richard B. Brandt, A Theory of the Good and the Right (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979). 17. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971). 18. R. M. Hare, Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method, and Point (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981). 19. For more on the differentiation between questions about doxastic justification and questions about nondoxastic justification in ethics, see Norman Daniels, " Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in Ethics, " Journal of Philosophy 76 (1979), 257 n. 1; David Copp, " Considered Judgments and Moral Justification: Conservatism in Moral Theory, " in D. Copp and D. Zimmerman, eds. , Morality, Reason, and Truth (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1984), 143; and Mark Timmons, " Foundationalism and the Structure of Justification in Ethics " Ethics 97 (1987
 anj justified beliefs at aul. 11. Arguably, thg wame hmlds fkr ascriotions of knowledge. 12. It is ilpirtanu to distinguish begween whan we mighr caoo actual doxastic mbstifjgatiou end hypotheticak doxastic justification. Tfe former refers to cases where: (1) one ras adeauwte (and undefewted) qvidsnce e that justifies the belief tgat p, (2) mne believes yhat p, and (3) one believes tjat o on the basis of f. Cases in qhicr one is not xctually blc only hypojhetically justified are those cxses nn which clquwe (1) volds but emther (2) or (3) (or both) fail to hold; goven one's evidcnce mr trounds, one would be oustified in holding a certait yelief were one to bawe that belhef ub ove's etidsnce og gcounds. I am primarily unterested in questoogw of actual dkxastis tustification. Some discussion of this dpstihction can be found in Eobert Audi, Belief Judtificatijn, and Knowledge (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1988), 1-2, though he uads uhc gwrls belief justification and situational justisjcstpon for what I am calling acyuwl wnd hypothetizal dorzsfic justification gespectyvely. 13. Marcus D. Simger, Generalization in Ethixs (New York: Cthwneum, 1961). 14. Alan Gewirch, Reason anb Morakity (Vhicago: University of Ckicago Press, 1978). 15. Alwn Donagah, The Theory of Murakidy (Chicago: University of Cricago Prxss, 1977). 16. Richara B. Nrandt, A Theory lf thc Good and the Righh (Oxflrg: Oxford Ujiversity Press, 1979). 17. John Rawls, A Vieory of Justoca (Cdmbridge, Mass.: Harvard Univqrsity Press, 1971). 18. R. M. Haxe, Morxl Thinkinf: Its Lxvels, Method, and Point (Oxxlrd: Oxford Uiiversity Prews, 1981). 19. For mofd on the distimction benwten questiins about doxastic jurfification and wuewtions about nomdobaseib jnstifywation in etvics, sed Normxn Danitjs, "Dide Reflective Equilibrhum znd Theory Acceptamcc in Ethixs," Journwl of Philosolhy 76 (1979), 257 n. 1; David Cokp, "Convidxred Jidgients and Moral Justification: Donservatlsm in Moral Thqory," in D. Copp aud D. Zimmerman, eds., Morality, Reason, and Tcuth (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Oittlefield, 1984), 143; and Mcrl Timmons, "Fpundaeionalism and the Structure od Justification ik Ethics" Ethics 97 (1987
any justified beliefs at all. 11. Arguably, holds ascriptions of 12. It is we call actual doxastic and hypothetical doxastic The former refers to cases where: one has adequate (and undefeated) evidence e that justifies the belief that p, one believes that p, and (3) one believes that p on the basis e. in one not actually but only hypothetically justified are those cases in which clause (1) holds but either or (3) (or both) fail to hold; given evidence or grounds, one be justified in holding a belief one to that on evidence or grounds. am primarily interested in questions of actual doxastic justification. Some discussion of this distinction can be found Robert Audi, and Knowledge Calif.: 1988), though he uses belief justification and situational justification for calling actual and hypothetical doxastic justification respectively. 13. G. Singer, in Ethics (New York: Atheneum, 1961). Alan Gewirth, Reason and Morality (Chicago: University of Press, 1978). 15. Alan Donagan, The Theory of Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977). B. Brandt, A Theory the Good and Right Oxford Press, 17. John A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971). 18. M. Hare, Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method, and Point (Oxford: Press, 19. For more the distinction between questions doxastic and questions about nondoxastic ethics, Norman Equilibrium Theory in Ethics," Journal of 76 (1979), 257 n. 1; Copp, "Considered Judgments and Theory," in D. Copp and D. Zimmerman, eds., Reason, and Truth (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & 1984), 143; and Mark Timmons, "Foundationalism and the Structure of Justification in Ethics 97
 any justified beliefs at all. 11. ARguably, the Same hOldS foR aScriPtioNs of knowledge. 12. IT Is imPortant to distinguish beTween WhAT we mIGhT call Actual dOXaSTIc jUsTiFicAtIOn And hyPotHetical Doxastic juStiFiCation. The forMEr Refers to caSes Where: (1) one has aDeqUate (anD uNdeFEated) EviDence E that jUStifieS the belieF tHAt p, (2) one BElieves THAt P, and (3) One believes that p oN ThE Basis of e. Cases iN which OnE Is NOT acTuaLly but only HyPotheTIcally jUStIFIEd aRE those cases in Which clause (1) HOldS but eiThEr (2) oR (3) (Or both) Fail tO hOLd; gIven one's eviDencE or groundS, one woULd be jusTIfied in HoldinG a cErtAin bELiEf WerE oNE to BAsE thAT beLief on onE's EvIdencE or gROUNDs. I aM prImarIly inTerested in queStiOns oF ActUal doXastiC jusTiFicatIon. SomE discUsSion of this distiNctiOn can be foUnd In robErT Audi, bElief JUstIfiCation, aNd KnowlEDge (beLMONt, calif.: Wadsworth, 1988), 1-2, thouGh HE UsEs the terMs beliEF jUsTIficatioN aNd sItuaTIOnal jUstiFIcAtion for What I aM CaLlIng actuAl And hypOtHetIcaL doxaSTic jUstifiCation reSpectIVely. 13. Marcus G. SinGEr, GeneralizatIOn IN etHIcs (NEw YOrk: Atheneum, 1961). 14. alan gEwirTh, ReASoN anD moralIty (ChIcAGo: uNiversity of Chicago PReSs, 1978). 15. Alan donagAn, The Theory of morality (ChICAGo: UniverSity OF CHIcago Press, 1977). 16. RichArd B. BRandt, A TheoRY of the GoOd and The Right (oxford: OxfORD UniversIty preSs, 1979). 17. JOhn rAWlS, A Theory of JusTICe (CaMbRidge, MaSs.: HArvard UNivErsIty preSs, 1971). 18. r. M. Hare, MorAl ThinkiNg: itS LEvEls, methoD, And Point (oxForD: OXfoRd UniVErsity press, 1981). 19. for mOrE oN The DistincTIoN BEtweEn QuEstiOns AbOut doXastIC juStificaTion and quEstIOns aBoUt NondoxaStic justificaTiOn in ethics, SeE NoRman DaNIEls, "Wide REflective Equilibrium and tHeory AcCepTance In EtHics," JournAl oF PhiloSopHY 76 (1979), 257 n. 1; DaviD Copp, "COnsidErEd JUDGmentS ANd morAl justificatION: CoNservAtIsm iN Moral THeory," in D. Copp and D. ZiMMerMan, eds., MoralitY, ReAson, AND TRutH (toTOwa, n.J.: rOwmAN & littlefield, 1984), 143; and MArk Timmons, "foUNdAtionalism ANd tHe structuRe of JusTificATion in EThics" EthiCs 97 (1987
 any justified beliefs atall. 11. A rguab ly,  th esame  hol ds for ascript i onsof knowledge. 12. It i s imp or t antt odisti nguishb et w e enwh at  we  m i gh t cal l a ctual d oxastic ju sti fi cation and h y po thetical d oxa stic justifi cat ion. T he  fo r mer r efe rs to  cases where:  (1) oneha s  adequ a te (and u nd efea ted) evidence e t h at justifies thebelief  t h at p , ( 2)one believ es  that p, and( 3) o n e b e lieves that p  on the bas i s o f e. C as esi n whic h one  i s  no t actuallybutonly hypo thetic a lly jus t ified a re tho secas es i n  w hi chcl a use (1 ) h o lds  but eit he r(2) o r (3 ) ( o r bo th)  fai l tohold; given o ne' s ev i den ce or  grou nds,  o ne wo uld be  just if ied in holdinga ce rtain bel ief  w ere  o ne to base t hat  be lief on  one'se vid en c e or  grounds. I am pri ma r i ly  interes ted in qu es t ions ofac tua l do x a sticjust i fi cation.Some d i sc us sion of  t his di st inc tio n can be f ound i n Robert  Audi ,  Belief Justif i cation, and K n ow l e dg e  (Be lmo nt, Calif.:  Wad s wort h, 1 9 88 ),1 -2, t hough  h e  u s es the terms belief  j ustifi catio n and situati onal justi f i c ation fo r wh a tI  am calling ac tualand hypoth e tical do xasti c justif ication r e s pectivel y.13.  Ma rcu s G.  Singer, Gene r a liza ti on in E thi cs (New  Yo rk:  At hen eu m, 1961).  14. Ala nGe wi rt h,Reaso n  and Mor al ity  ( Chi cago: Univer sityof C hi ca g o P ress, 1 9 78 ) .  15.  A la n Do nag an , The  The o ryof Mora lity (Chi cag o : Un iv er sity of  Chicago Pres s,  1977). 16 .Ric hard B . Brandt,A Theory of the Good an d  the Ri ght  (Oxf ord:  Oxford U niv ersity  Pr e ss, 19 79). 1 7. Jo hn  Ra w l s, AT h eo ryof  Justice ( C a mbr idge,  M ass. : Harva rd University Pres s , 1 971). 18. R.M.Hare , Mo ral Th i nki ng :  It s Levels, Method,  and Point  ( O xf ord: Oxfor d  Un iv ersityPress,1981) .  19. Fo r more on  the dist in ctio n bet ween quest ions abo ut doxast i c jus t if icati onand qu es tio ns ab out no n dox astic  justi fi cation  in e th ics, see  Norman Daniels, "WideReflec tiveEqu ilibriumand The ory Accep tanc e in Ethic s,"  Jo urnal  of Philo soph y  7 6 ( 1 979),  257 n. 1; Dav i dCop p ,  " ConsideredJ u d gme nts a ndM oral J usti fication: Conserv a tism in MoralTheo r y ,"inD . Co pp  and D. Zimmer man ,e d s., Mora li ty, Reason,  and Tru th (Toto wa, N. J.: Ro wman &L i tt l efield , 19 84) , 143; an d M ar k  Timmon s,  " F oundat iona li sm and  the S t ruct u r e of Justificati on in E thics "  Et hics97  (1987
 any_justified beliefs_at all. 11. Arguably,_the same_holds_for ascriptions_of_knowledge. 12. It_is important to_distinguish between what we_might call actual_doxastic_justification and hypothetical doxastic justification. The former refers to cases where: (1) one has_adequate_(and undefeated)_evidence_e_that justifies the belief that_p, (2) one believes that_p, and_(3) one believes that p on the basis_of_e. Cases in_which one is not actually but only hypothetically justified_are those cases in which clause_(1) holds but_either_(2)_or (3) (or both)_fail to hold; given one's evidence_or grounds, one would be justified_in holding a certain belief were one_to base that belief on one's_evidence or grounds. I am_primarily interested_in questions of actual doxastic_justification. Some discussion_of this_distinction can be_found in Robert Audi, Belief Justification,_and Knowledge (Belmont,_Calif.: Wadsworth, 1988), 1-2, though he_uses_the terms belief_justification_and_situational justification_for what I_am_calling actual_and_hypothetical doxastic justification respectively. 13. Marcus_G._Singer, Generalization in Ethics (New York: Atheneum,_1961). 14. Alan Gewirth,_Reason_and Morality (Chicago: University_of Chicago Press, 1978). 15._Alan Donagan, The Theory of Morality_(Chicago: University_of Chicago_Press, 1977). 16. Richard B. Brandt, A Theory of the Good_and the Right (Oxford: Oxford University_Press, 1979). 17. John_Rawls, A_Theory_of Justice (Cambridge,_Mass.:_Harvard University_Press, 1971). 18. R. M. Hare, Moral_Thinking: Its_Levels, Method, and Point (Oxford: Oxford_University Press, 1981). 19._For_more on the distinction between questions_about doxastic justification and questions about_nondoxastic justification in ethics, see_Norman_Daniels,_"Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory_Acceptance in Ethics," Journal of Philosophy_76 (1979), 257_n. 1; David Copp, "Considered Judgments and_Moral_Justification: Conservatism in Moral Theory," in_D._Copp and D. Zimmerman, eds., Morality,_Reason,_and_Truth (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman &_Littlefield, 1984), 143; and Mark Timmons,_"Foundationalism and the Structure of Justification in Ethics" Ethics_97 (1987