 epistemically responsible agent is a projection of normal human beings with normal cognitive powers, ER is too strong-it fails to take into consideration 302 Moral Knowledge? normal human powers of for example, inference and memory. Moreover, it ignores those counterpossibilities whose seriousness is implied by information we ought to be aware of even if we lack the information in question. Let us proceed to refine ER in light of these remarks. First of all, in some respects, our model epistemic agent represents an idealization of actual human epistemic practice. So, for instance, our model does idealize away from certain factors that would interfere with or distort the judgment of our epistemically responsible agent. First, the epistemically responsible agent is presumed to always conform his or her beliefs to the relevant set of epistemic norms, just as in the law, the reasonable person "is not to be identified with any ordinary person who might occasionally do unreasonable things; he is a prudent and careful person, who is always up to standard:91 Second, in characterizing the activities of our model agent, we ignore drunkenness, being drugged, being tired, being distracted, and other such inhibiting factors that would impair the normal judgment of a normal person. Third, our model agent is free from the sorts of pressing emergency situations that would interfere with his or her focusing and reflecting adequately on some proposition or belief whose epistemic status is in question. However, in other respects, we want our imaginary agent to reflect normal human abilities. Just as in the law, where the representative reasonable person is expected to have cognitive capacities that are "normal" for human beings, our model of a representative epistemic agent should be similarly constituted. We can begin by noting that there are all sorts of deductive inferences that are completely infeasible for normal human beings to perform. And similarly for nondeductive inferences. If some such inferences are impossible for normal humans to make or are, in some looser sense, infeasible, then we should not hold people responsible for counterpossibilities that would require that they make infeasible inferences from their current belief set. We do expect people to make inferences from their current belief set that are humanly feasible-feasible for normal human beings. And here is where empirical considerations yielding theories of deductive and nondeductive feasibility as Cherniak31 calls them, or theories of obviousness as Cohen32 calls them, come into play in helping to set acceptable standards of epistemic care for checking counterpossibilities. Moreover, in setting the
epistemically responsible agent is a projection of normal human beings with normal cognitive ability, ER is excessively strong - it fails to take into retainer 302 Moral Knowledge? normal human powers of for example, inference and memory. furthermore, it ignores those counterpossibilities whose seriousness is implied by data we ought to be mindful of even if we lack the information in motion. Let us proceed to refine ER in inner light of these remarks. First of all, in some respects, our model epistemic agent represent an idealization of actual human epistemic practice. So, for instance, our mannequin does idealize away from certain factors that would interfere with or falsify the judgment of our epistemically responsible agent. First, the epistemically responsible agentive role is presumed to always conform his or her beliefs to the relevant set of epistemic norms, barely as in the law, the reasonable person " is not to be identified with any ordinary person who might occasionally do unreasonable things; he is a prudent and careful person, who is always up to standard:91 Second, in characterizing the activities of our exemplar agent, we ignore drink, being drug, being tired, being distracted, and other such inhibit factors that would impair the normal judgment of a normal person. Third, our model agentive role is free from the sorts of pressing emergency situations that would interfere with his or her focusing and reflecting adequately on some proposition or belief whose epistemic status is in question. However, in early respects, we desire our imaginary agent to reflect normal human abilities. Just as in the law, where the representative fair person is expected to have cognitive capacities that are " normal " for human beings, our model of a representative epistemic agent should be similarly constituted. We can begin by noting that there be all sorts of deductive inference that are completely infeasible for normal human beings to perform. And similarly for nondeductive inferences. If some such inference are impossible for normal humans to make or are, in some looser sense, impracticable, then we should not hold people responsible for counterpossibilities that would want that they make impracticable inferences from their current belief set. We do have a bun in the oven people to make inferences from their current belief set that are humanly feasible - feasible for normal human being. And here is where empirical considerations yield theories of deductive and nondeductive feasibility as Cherniak31 calls them, or theories of obviousness as Cohen32 calls them, come into play in help to set acceptable standards of epistemic care for checking counterpossibilities. Moreover, in put the
 eplstemically responsible xgent is a projgcrion oh normam human ceings with normal cognitive piwers, ER is too strong-it fakls to tane into xonsmderation 302 Moral Knowlednz? norjwl hbmen powers of fot example, inxerence and mekofy. Moreover, it ignores those counterpjssibilotles whose serijusntss is jmplied by information we ought to be awage of even if we kack the information in qufstiln. Let us proceed ho refine ET in oight of there remarks. First of alm, in some respects, our model epkstemnc agent rekxwsejjs an idealivation of actual hmkan ephstemic practice. So, fpr mnstqnce, our model does ivealize away from cettain factmra that would inteefwre whth mr dkwtoft uhe jhdgmenh oh our epistsmically rewponsible agent. Firxt, nne epistemiczlly rqs[onsible agent is presumed to always cotfodm his or her beliefs ti the relevant set of epistemis norms, just as in the law, the reasonable person "hs nov go yc keejtified with any ordinary person who might ocszsookally do unreasokable things; he is a ptodent and carewul pexaoh, who is always up to stagdard:91 Second, ig chsracterizing the activities of our modej agent, we ignore dxunkenness, bzing dtugged, being tired, being distxacted, and other duch inhigkting factors thxt eogld impair the normal judgient of a norkal perron. Jhird, otr model ahent lv free from the sogts oy prevsing emerhency situations that would intxcfere with hix mr ver focufing snd reflectind adequately ou some pxoposigion or bemief whmse epistemyc status is hj question. Hmwever, ig otyer eespectr, we want our ikaginary cyent to rwflect normal humak abiujties. Just as iu uhw law, where thr rdprqsvntetive seasonable parsov ir expezted to havc cugniyive capacities that are "normal" for human nelngs, our nodel of a representayive epistemic agejt shmulv be somijarly constituted. We can begin by notinh tmat there are all sorts of debuctive inferences that are completely iifeasible for normal homan beings to perfork. And similacly fow nondeduwtive inferences. If wome such inferenges are impossible for norman humwns to make or are, in some looser sense, infeasible, then we should not hole people responsibme fpr colntzrppssibijitixs that would requpre that they make infeasible inherences fsoi their current belief set. Wr ao expect peokle to make inferences froj their vurrent belief set that are humsnly feasible-feasible fov normal yuman beings. Anv here is where empitical eonsidwrationw yiclding theorier og feductive and nkndeductive feasibility as Chernuak31 caold them, or theorixs of obvioudkess aa Coheg32 calls them, coms infl plai in helping tp set acceptabke standards of episnemyc care for chtcking counterppssibilpties. Moreovec, in setting the
epistemically responsible agent is a projection of beings normal cognitive ER is too consideration Moral Knowledge? normal powers of for inference and memory. Moreover, it ignores counterpossibilities whose seriousness is implied by information we ought to be aware of if we lack the information in question. Let us proceed to refine ER light these First all, in some respects, our model epistemic agent represents an idealization of actual human epistemic practice. for instance, our model does idealize away from factors that would interfere or distort the judgment of epistemically agent. First, epistemically agent presumed to always his or her beliefs to the relevant set of epistemic norms, just as in the law, the person "is be identified any person might occasionally do he is a prudent and careful always up to standard:91 Second, in characterizing the of our agent, we ignore drunkenness, being drugged, tired, being distracted, and other such inhibiting factors would impair the normal judgment of a normal person. Third, our model agent is free sorts of pressing emergency that would interfere his her and adequately on proposition or belief whose epistemic status is in question. However, in respects, we want our imaginary agent to reflect normal human as the law, where representative reasonable person is to cognitive capacities that are human our representative agent be similarly constituted. We begin by noting that there all sorts of deductive for normal human beings to perform. And similarly nondeductive inferences. If some such inferences are for normal humans to make or are, in some looser sense, infeasible, we should people responsible for counterpossibilities that would require that make infeasible inferences from current belief set. We do expect people to make from current belief that are humanly for normal human And here is considerations yielding of and Cherniak31 calls them, or theories of as calls them, come into play helping acceptable standards of epistemic care for checking counterpossibilities. Moreover, in setting the
 epistemically responsible aGent is a proJectiOn oF noRmAl huMan bEings with normaL CognItive powers, ER is too stroNg-it fAiLS to tAKe Into cOnsiderATiON 302 morAl knOwlEdGE? nOrmal HumAn powerS of for examPle, InFerence and meMOrY. Moreover, iT igNores those coUntErpossIbIliTIes whOse SerioUsness IS impliEd by inforMaTIon we oUGht to be AWArE of eVen if we lack the infORmATion in question. let us pRoCEeD TO reFinE ER in light Of These REmarks. FIRsT OF All, IN some respects, Our model epiSTemIc agenT rEprESents aN ideaLiZAtiOn of actual hUman Epistemic PractiCE. So, for iNStance, oUr modeL doEs iDealIZe AwAy fRoM CerTAiN faCTorS that wouLd InTerfeRe wiTH OR DistOrt The jUdgmeNt of our episteMicAlly REspOnsibLe ageNt. FiRsT, the ePistemIcallY rEsponsible agent Is prEsumed to aLwaYs ConFoRm his OR her beLieFs tO the relEvant seT Of ePiSTEMiC norms, just as in the lAw, THE rEasonablE persoN "Is NoT To be idenTiFieD witH ANy ordInarY PeRson who mIght ocCAsIoNally do UnReasonAbLe tHinGs; he iS A pruDent anD careful PersoN, Who is always up tO Standard:91 SeconD, In CHArACterIziNg the activiTies OF our ModeL AgEnt, WE ignoRe druNkENnESs, being drugged, being TiRed, beiNg disTracted, and othEr such inhiBITIng factoRs thAT wOUld impair the noRmal jUdgment of a NOrmal perSon. ThIrd, our moDel agent iS FRee from tHe sOrtS of PreSSInG emergency sitUATionS tHat woulD inTerfere WitH hiS or Her FoCusing and ReflectiNg AdEqUaTelY on soME proposiTiOn oR bEliEf whoSE epistEmic sTatuS iS iN QueStion. HoWEvER, In otHeR rEspeCts, We Want oUr imAGinAry agenT to reflecT noRMal hUmAn AbilitiEs. Just as in the LaW, where the rEpResEntatiVE ReasonabLe person is expected to havE CognitiVe cApaciTies That are "noRmaL" for huMan BEings, oUr modeL of a rEpResENTativE EPiSteMiC agent shouLD Be sImilaRlY conStituteD. We can begin by notinG ThaT there are all sOrtS of dEDUcTivE InFEreNcES thAT Are completely inFeasible foR nORmAl human beiNGs tO pErform. ANd similArly fOR nondedUctive infErences. If SoMe suCH InfErences are ImpossibLe for normAL humaNS tO make Or aRe, in soMe LooSer seNse, infEAsiBle, thEn we shOuLd not hOld peOpLe responSible for counterpossibilIties tHat woUld Require thAt tHEy mAke infeasIble Inferences FroM thEir cuRreNT beliEf seT. we Do eXPect pEoplE To make infEReNceS FRoM their curreNT BEliEf set ThaT Are humAnly Feasible-feasible fOR normal human beIngs. aND heRe iS WherE eMpirical considEraTiONS yieldinG tHeories of deDuctive aNd NOndedUctive FeasibIlity as cHErNIak31 calLs thEm, oR theories Of oBvIOusness As coHEn32 callS theM, cOme intO play iN HelpING to set acceptable StandARDs of ePIstEmic cArE for cheCKing CounterposSibilities. MOreoveR, in sEttinG the
 epistemically responsible  agent isa pro jec tio nof n orma l human beings with  normal cognitive powe rs, E Ri s to o  s trong -it fai l st o  ta ke  i nto  c o ns idera tio n 302 M oral Knowl edg e?  normal huma n  p owers of f orexample, inf ere nce an dmem o ry. M ore over,  it ig n ores t hose coun te r possib i litiesw h os e se riousness is impl i ed by information  we ou gh t  t o beawa re of even  i f wel ack the in f o r mat i on in questio n. Let us p r oce ed tore fin e  ER in  ligh to f t hese remark s. F irst of a ll, in some re s pects,our mo del  ep iste m ic  a gen tr epr e se nts anidealiza ti on  of a ctua l h u manepi stem ic pr actice. So, f orinst a nce , our  mode l do es  idea lize a way f ro m certain facto rs t hat would  in te rfe re  with or dis tor t t he judg ment of our  e p i s te mically responsibl ea g en t. First , thee pi st e micallyre spo nsib l e  agen t is pr esumed t o alwa y sco nform h is  or he rbel ief s tot he r elevan t set of  epis t emic norms, ju s t as in the l a w, t he reas ona ble person"isn ot t o be id ent i fiedwithan y  o r dinary person who m ig ht occ asion ally do unrea sonable th i n g s; he is  a p r ud e nt and careful  pers on, who is always u p tostandard :91 Secon d ,  in char act eri zin g t h e  a ctivities ofo u r mo de l agent , w e ignor e d run ken nes s,  being dr ugged, b ei ng  t ir ed,  bein g  distrac te d,an d o thers uch in hibit ingfa ct o rsthat wo u ld i mpai rth e no rma ljudgm ento f a  normal  person.Thi r d, o ur  m odel ag ent is free f ro m the sort sofpressi n g  emergen cy situations that woul d  interf ere  with  his  or her f ocu sing a ndr eflect ing ad equat el y o n somep r op osi ti on or beli e f  wh ose e pi stem ic stat us is in question. How ever, in othe r r espe c t s,  we wa n t o ur ima g i nary agent to r eflect nor ma l  h uman abili t ies .Just as  in the  law, where t he repres entativere ason a b leperson isexpected  to havec ognit i ve  capa cit ies th at  ar e "no rmal"f orhuman  being s,  our m odelof  a repre sentative epistemic age nt sho uld b e s imilarlycon s tit uted. Wecanbegin by n oti ngthatthe r e are  all so rts of de duct i ve infere n ce s t h a tare complet e l y  in feasi ble for no rmal  human beings top erform. And si mila r l y f orn onde du ctive inferenc es.  I f some suc hinferencesare impo ss i ble f or nor mal hu mans to m ak e  or ar e, i n s ome loose r s en s e, infe as ib l e, the n we  s houldnot ho l d pe o p le responsible f or co u n terpo s sib iliti es  that w o uldrequire th at they mak e infe asib le in ference sfrom t hei rcurrent be l ief set.We do  expect  p eopl e t o make  inf e r ences  fro mthe ir curren t be l ie fs etthat  arehu manl y feasibl e -feasibl e f o r norma lhum a n  being s .A n d here iswhe re em p i rical cons i dera t io n s yie ldingtheori es of d e duc ti ve andnon d e ductive f easibilit y  as  C hern iak31 ca ll s th em , o rtheories of obv iousness  as Cohe n 3 2 call s t h em,c ome in to  play in hel pingto set acc e p tab le stan d ard s o f e pist emi c ca r e for checking counterpo ssib iliti e s.Moreo ver,in  setting the
 epistemically_responsible agent_is a projection of_normal human_beings_with normal_cognitive_powers, ER is_too strong-it fails_to take into consideration_302 Moral Knowledge?_normal_human powers of for example, inference and memory. Moreover, it ignores those counterpossibilities whose_seriousness_is implied_by_information_we ought to be aware_of even if we lack_the information_in question. Let us proceed to refine ER_in_light of these_remarks. First of all, in some respects, our model_epistemic agent represents an idealization of_actual human epistemic_practice._So,_for instance, our model_does idealize away from certain factors_that would interfere with or distort_the judgment of our epistemically responsible agent._First, the epistemically responsible agent is_presumed to always conform his_or her_beliefs to the relevant set_of epistemic norms,_just as_in the law,_the reasonable person "is not to_be identified with_any ordinary person who might occasionally_do_unreasonable things; he_is_a_prudent and_careful person, who_is_always up_to_standard:91 Second, in characterizing the activities_of_our model agent, we ignore drunkenness, being_drugged, being tired, being_distracted,_and other such inhibiting_factors that would impair the_normal judgment of a normal person._Third, our_model agent_is free from the sorts of pressing emergency situations that would_interfere with his or her focusing_and reflecting adequately on_some proposition_or_belief whose epistemic_status_is in_question. However, in other respects, we want_our imaginary_agent to reflect normal human abilities._Just as in the_law,_where the representative reasonable person is_expected to have cognitive capacities that_are "normal" for human beings,_our_model_of a representative epistemic agent_should be similarly constituted. We can_begin by noting_that there are all sorts of deductive_inferences_that are completely infeasible for normal_human_beings to perform. And similarly for_nondeductive_inferences._If some such inferences are_impossible for normal humans to make_or are, in some looser sense, infeasible, then we_should not hold_people responsible for counterpossibilities that_would_require_that they make infeasible inferences from their current belief set._We do_expect people to_make inferences from their current belief set that are humanly_feasible-feasible for normal human beings. And here_is where empirical considerations yielding theories of deductive and nondeductive feasibility_as Cherniak31 calls them, or theories of obviousness_as Cohen32 calls them, come into play_in helping to set_acceptable_standards of epistemic care for checking counterpossibilities._Moreover,_in_setting_the