 second-order beliefs-beliefs about beliefs-are necessary for creating some degree of epistemic respectability for a first-order belief. So, for example, according to one possible version of second-order conservatism, in order for some level of epistemic respectability to accrue to some belief (for which one has no justi306 Moral Knowledge? fying reasons or evidence), one must not only have the belief, but one must also believe of it that there is something that in some sense makes obvious (e.g., something that justifies or shows true) the belief in question.39 In short, one must take the belief to be epistemically sound.' This is not the place to launch into an investigation of epistemic conservatism. Jonathan Kvanvig41 has convincingly argued that versions of first-order conservatism are not defensible but that any fallibilist epistemology needs to recognize a version of second-order conservatism. In the previous section, I offered a tentative and admittedly sketchy defense of conservatism that appeals to our finitary predicament: given limits on our cognitive abilities and limits on our time, it makes sense that our epistemic practices do not always require of believers that they have evidence or justifying reasons for everything they responsibly believe. As we shall see in the next section, our epistemic practices regarding moral belief exhibit this same sort of conservatism. So I shall proceed on the assumption that second-order conservatism is correct. 2. The second basic tenet of the structural contextualist-what we might call the thesis of epistemic adequacy-claims that beliefs that one is epistemically responsible in holding, but for which one has no justification, are sometimes enough, epistemically speaking, to serve as a basis, or partial basis, for justifiably believing other propositions. Regresses of justification can legitimately terminate with beliefs that one does not have justifying reasons for holding. If I am right, and our actual epistemic practices conform to the thesis of epistemic adequacy, this fact about the thesis provides, I would argue, some presumptive reason in its favor. But again, this thesis, like the thesis of epistemic conservatism, requires more in the way of defense than I can provide here. 3. Finally, whether or not a belief needs to be justified in order to serve as a properly basic belief depends crucially on context and, in particular, on social context. Call this the social context sensitivity thesis. Now, the general idea
second - order beliefs - beliefs about beliefs - are necessary for create some academic degree of epistemic respectability for a first - order impression. So, for exercise, according to one possible adaptation of second - order conservatism, in order for some degree of epistemic respectability to accrue to some belief (for which one has no justi306 Moral Knowledge? fying rationality or evidence), one must not only have the impression, but one must also believe of it that there is something that in some sense makes obvious (e.g., something that justifies or read true) the belief in question.39 In short, one must claim the belief to be epistemically sound.' This is not the place to launch into an probe of epistemic conservatism. Jonathan Kvanvig41 has convincingly argued that translation of first - order conservatism are not defensible but that any fallibilist epistemology need to recognize a version of second - order conservatism. In the previous section, I offered a tentative and admittedly sketchy defense of conservatism that appeals to our finitary predicament: given limits on our cognitive abilities and limits on our time, it makes sense that our epistemic practice do not always require of believer that they get evidence or justifying reasons for everything they responsibly believe. As we shall determine in the next section, our epistemic practices regarding moral impression exhibit this same sort of conservatism. So I shall proceed on the assumption that second - order conservatism is correct. 2. The second basic tenet of the structural contextualist - what we might call the thesis of epistemic sufficiency - claims that beliefs that one is epistemically creditworthy in holding, but for which one has no justification, are sometimes enough, epistemically speaking, to serve as a basis, or fond basis, for justifiably believing other propositions. Regresses of justification can legitimately terminate with beliefs that one does not have justifying rationality for holding. If I am veracious, and our actual epistemic practices conform to the dissertation of epistemic adequacy, this fact about the thesis provides, I would argue, some presumptive reason in its party favor. But again, this thesis, like the thesis of epistemic conservatism, command more in the way of defense than I can leave here. 3. last, whether or not a belief needs to be justified in order to serve as a properly basic belief depends crucially on context and, in particular, on social context. name this the social context sensitivity thesis. Now, the cosmopolitan idea
 sefond-order beliefs-beliefs about beliefs-ate necesvary fkr creatkng some degree of epistemic rwspecucbility for a first-ofder belivf. So, for exanple, accordmhg to okz posalble recsion of second-prder consarvatism, in orgef yor some level of epistemic respectafility yo accrue to somg belpes (fod which one has no justi306 Moral Knosledge? hying reasons ot evidence), one must not onpy hwve the belief, but one must aoso fwlieve of it that thert ns somethinf that in some sense makes obviuus (e.y., something tyat bustifies oc showf true) the bckief it questoon.39 In short, oke muvt rake the belief to be epistemically sougd.' This iv uot the place to launxh into an hnverrigxtikn or epishemmc conservafism. Jonathqn Kvanvig41 has convonspmgly argued fhat vqrfions of first-order conservatism are nou defsnsible but that any faolibilist epistemologi needs to recognize a version of second-order conservatism. Hn thx orerljjw dection, I offered a tentative and admittedly fieuchj defense of conscrvatism that appesld yj our finitari prediezmsnt: given limits oj our cjgnituve abiliuies snd limits on our time, it mqkes sense tkat our epistemic praetices do noc alwais reqiire of believers that chey hzve evidencf or justjwying reasons fof enerydhing thth responsibly belyeve. As wx shakl see kn tne nexe section, lur eihstemic practices gegarbing koral beliff exhibit this same sort of coixervatism. So I shdll proczed on the assumptijn that second-prder cjnserxatism is borrect. 2. Vhe second bwsic tenet of jhe structuran contexeualust-wyat we okght call the yhesis of epistemic adequacy-claims thet bgljefs that one iw ekiwtemically reslonribje ii holqhng, but for fhicf ovr has no jusunfigatkon, sre sometimes enough, epiatemically speakinb, bo serve qs a basys, or partial basis, for justifiwbly uelievmng otner propositions. Regresses of jusfificatioj cwn legitimatqly bermynate with beliefs that one does not have justifymng reasons for holding. If I am right, and pmr actual epmstemis practicas conform to the thwsis of epistemic adequacy, this fact agout tve thfsis provides, I would argue, some presumptive reason in its favor. But agaib, this thesis, like the thesps jy epistqmic ronservatism, requpres more in the way of defense vhan I can pxovide here. 3. Finally, whether pr not a belief needs to be justified ih order yo serve as a properly basic bekief depends crucially ok context and, jn parnjcnlar, on social contect. Caln thiw the siciap context senritovlty thesis. Now, tke general idea
second-order beliefs-beliefs about beliefs-are necessary for creating of respectability for first-order belief. So, possible of second-order conservatism, order for some of epistemic respectability to accrue to belief (for which one has no justi306 Moral Knowledge? fying reasons or evidence), must not only have the belief, but one must also believe of it there something in sense makes obvious (e.g., something that justifies or shows true) the belief in question.39 In short, must take the belief to be epistemically sound.' is not the place launch into an investigation of conservatism. Kvanvig41 has argued versions first-order conservatism are defensible but that any fallibilist epistemology needs to recognize a version of second-order conservatism. In the previous I offered and admittedly defense conservatism appeals to our given limits on our cognitive abilities our time, it makes sense that our epistemic do not require of believers that they have or justifying reasons for everything they responsibly believe. we shall see in the next section, our epistemic practices regarding moral belief exhibit this of conservatism. So I proceed on the that conservatism correct. The second tenet of the structural contextualist-what we might call the thesis of adequacy-claims that beliefs that one is epistemically responsible in holding, which has no justification, sometimes enough, epistemically speaking, serve a basis, or partial justifiably other justification legitimately with beliefs that one not have justifying reasons for If I am right, conform to the thesis of epistemic adequacy, this about the thesis provides, I would argue, presumptive reason in its favor. But again, this thesis, like the thesis epistemic conservatism, in the way of defense than I can here. 3. Finally, whether not a belief needs to be justified in order serve a properly belief depends crucially context and, in on social context. the social sensitivity Now,
 second-order beliefs-beliefs About belieFs-are NecEssArY for CreaTing some degree OF epiStemic respectability foR a firSt-ORder BElIef. So, For examPLe, ACCorDiNg To oNe POsSible VerSion of sEcond-order ConSeRvatism, in ordER fOr some leveL of Epistemic resPecTabiliTy To aCCrue tO soMe belIef (for WHich onE has no jusTi306 mOral KnOWledge? fYINg ReasOns or evidence), one mUSt NOt only have the bElief, bUt ONe MUSt aLso Believe of iT tHat thERe is somEThING ThaT In some sense maKes obvious (e.G., SomEthing ThAt jUStifieS or shOwS TruE) the belief iN queStion.39 In shOrt, one MUst take THe belieF to be ePisTemIcalLY sOuNd.' THiS Is nOT tHe pLAce To launch InTo An invEstiGATIOn of EpiStemIc conServatism. JonaThaN KvaNVig41 Has coNvincInglY aRgued That veRsionS oF first-order consErvaTism are noT deFeNsiBlE but tHAt any fAllIbiList epiStemoloGY neEdS TO ReCognize a version of sEcOND-oRder consErvatiSM. IN tHE previouS sEctIon, I OFFered A tenTAtIve and adMittedLY sKeTchy defEnSe of coNsErvAtiSm thaT AppeAls to oUr finitaRy preDIcament: given liMIts on our cogniTIvE ABiLItieS anD limits on ouR timE, It maKes sENsE thAT our ePisteMiC PrACtices do not always reQuIre of bElievErs that they haVe evidence OR JUstifyinG reaSOnS For everything tHey reSponsibly bELieve. As wE shalL see in thE next sectION, our episTemIc pRacTicES ReGarding moral bELIef eXhIbit thiS saMe sort oF coNseRvaTisM. SO I shall prOceed on tHe AsSuMpTioN that SEcond-ordEr ConSeRvaTism iS CorrecT. 2. The sEconD bAsIC teNet of thE StRUCturAl CoNtexTuaLiSt-whaT we mIGht Call the Thesis of ePisTEmic AdEqUacy-claIms that beliefS tHat one is epIsTemIcally RESponsiblE in holding, but for which onE Has no juStiFicatIon, aRe sometimEs eNough, ePisTEmicalLy speaKing, tO sErvE AS a basIS, Or ParTiAl basis, for JUStiFiablY bElieVing othEr propositions. RegrESseS of justificatIon Can lEGItImaTElY TerMiNAte WITh beliefs that onE does not haVe JUsTifying reaSOns FoR holdinG. If I am rIght, aND our actUal episteMic practiCeS conFORm tO the thesis Of episteMic adequaCY, this FAcT abouT thE thesiS pRovIdes, I Would aRGue, Some pResumpTiVe reasOn in iTs Favor. But Again, this thesis, like the tHesis oF episTemIc conservAtiSM, reQuires morE in tHe way of defEnsE thAn I caN prOVide hEre. 3. FINaLly, WHetheR or nOT a belief nEEdS to BE JuStified in orDER To sErve aS a pROperly BasiC belief depends cruCIally on context And, iN PArtIcuLAr, on SoCial context. CalL thIs THE social cOnText sensitiVity thesIs. nOw, the GeneraL idea
 second-order beliefs-beli efs aboutbelie fs- are  n eces sary  for creatings omedegree of epistemic re spect ab i lity fo r a f irst-or d er b eli ef .So,  f o rexamp le,  accord ing to one  po ss ible version of  second-or der  conservatis m,in ord er  fo r  some  le vel o f epis t emic r espectabi li t y to a c crue to s om e be lief (for which o n eh as no justi306  Moral  K n ow l e dge ? f ying reaso ns  or e v idence) ,  o n e mus t  not only hav e the belie f , b ut one  m ust also b eliev eo f i t that ther e is  somethin g that in some sense m akes o bvi ous  (e. g .,  s ome th i ngt ha t j u sti fies orsh ow s tru e) t h e b elie f i n qu estio n.39 In short , o ne m u sttakethe b elie fto be  epist emica ll y sound.' Thisis n ot the pl ace  t o l au nch i n to aninv est igation  of epi s tem ic c o ns ervatism. Jonathan  K v a nv ig41 has  convi n ci ng l y argued  t hat  ver s i ons o f fi r st -order c onserv a ti sm  are no tdefens ib lebut  that anyfallib ilist ep istem o logy needs tor ecognize a ve r si o n  o f  sec ond -order cons erva t ism.  Int he  pr e vious  sect io n ,I  offered a tentativ eand ad mitte dly sketchy d efense ofc o n servatis m th a ta ppeals to ourfinit ary predic a ment: gi ven l imits on  our cogn i t ive abil iti esand  li m i ts  on our time, i t ma ke s sense  th at ourepi ste mic  pr ac tices donot alwa ys  r eq ui reof be l ievers t ha t t he y h ave e v idence  or j usti fy in g  re asons f o re v eryt hi ng  the y r es ponsi blyb eli eve. As  we shall  se e  inth enext se ction, our ep is temic prac ti ces  regar d i ng moral  belief exhibit this sa m e sortofconse rvat ism. So I  sh all pr oce e d on t he ass umpti on  th a t  seco n d -o rde rconservati s m  is  corr ec t. 2 . The s econd basic teneto f t he structural  co ntex t u al ist - wh a t w em igh t call the thesis  of episte mi c  a dequacy-cl a ims  t hat bel iefs th at on e  is epi stemicall y respons ib le i n hol ding, butfor whic h one has no ju s ti ficat ion , areso met imesenough ,  ep istem ically  s peakin g, to  s erve asa basis, or partial bas is, fo r jus tif iably bel iev i ngother pro posi tions. Reg res ses  of j ust i ficat ionc an  le g itima tely terminate wi thb e li efs that on e d oes  nothav e  justi fyin g reasons for hol d ing. If I am r ight , and  ou r  act ua l epistemic pr act ic e s  conform  t o the thesi s of epi st e mic a dequac y, thi s facta b ou t  the t hesi s p rovides,I w ou l d argue ,so m e pres umpt iv e reas on ini ts f a v or. But again, t his t h e sis,l ike  theth esis of epis temic cons ervatism, r equire s mo re in  the wa yof def ens ethan I can provide h ere.3. Fina ll y, w het her or  not a  beli ef n ee dsto be jus t i fi e din ord er t o ser ve  asa properl y  basic b eli e f depen ds  cr u c iallyo nc o ntext and,  in  part i c ular, on s o cial co n text.  Callthis t he soci a l c on text se nsi t i vity thes is. Now,t hege nera l idea
 second-order_beliefs-beliefs about_beliefs-are necessary for creating_some degree_of_epistemic respectability_for_a first-order belief._So, for example,_according to one possible_version of second-order_conservatism,_in order for some level of epistemic respectability to accrue to some belief (for_which_one has_no_justi306_Moral Knowledge? fying reasons or_evidence), one must not only_have the_belief, but one must also believe of it_that_there is something_that in some sense makes obvious (e.g., something that_justifies or shows true) the belief_in question.39 In_short,_one_must take the belief_to be epistemically sound.' This is_not the place to launch into_an investigation of epistemic conservatism. Jonathan Kvanvig41_has convincingly argued that versions of_first-order conservatism are not defensible_but that_any fallibilist epistemology needs to_recognize a version_of second-order_conservatism. In the_previous section, I offered a tentative_and admittedly sketchy_defense of conservatism that appeals to_our_finitary predicament: given_limits_on_our cognitive_abilities and limits_on_our time,_it_makes sense that our epistemic practices_do_not always require of believers that they_have evidence or justifying_reasons_for everything they responsibly_believe. As we shall see_in the next section, our epistemic_practices regarding_moral belief_exhibit this same sort of conservatism. So I shall proceed on_the assumption that second-order conservatism is_correct. 2. The second_basic tenet_of_the structural contextualist-what_we_might call_the thesis of epistemic adequacy-claims that beliefs_that one_is epistemically responsible in holding, but_for which one has_no_justification, are sometimes enough, epistemically speaking,_to serve as a basis, or_partial basis, for justifiably believing_other_propositions._Regresses of justification can legitimately_terminate with beliefs that one does_not have justifying_reasons for holding. If I am right,_and_our actual epistemic practices conform to_the_thesis of epistemic adequacy, this fact_about_the_thesis provides, I would argue,_some presumptive reason in its favor._But again, this thesis, like the thesis of epistemic_conservatism, requires more_in the way of defense_than_I_can provide here. 3. Finally, whether or not a belief_needs to_be justified in_order to serve as a properly basic belief depends crucially_on context and, in particular, on social_context. Call this the social context sensitivity thesis. Now, the general_idea