 B O U T S H E R L O C K H O L M E S 353 it, for instance with regard to understanding (non-explicit) character motivations. In 4.1 I introduce a definition of truth-in-fiction, and in the following sections I consider some upshots. 4.1. Truth in fiction Above we assumed that p is true-in-fiction-f iff p is true in the closest possible worlds in which f holds. I return to closeness below, and will for the moment just assume it. Two other points are worth making. First, the formulation differs from Lewis (1978); according to Lewis, p is true in worlds where f is told as known fact. Lewis introduced the 'told as known fact' qualifier to rule out the possibility that, by cosmic coincidence, the Holmes stories report actual events, thus making the actual world a potential truth-maker. The qualifier would complicate out reference fixing story by relativizing reference to a merely possible storyteller. Since we already rule out the possibility of the actual world being a truth-maker by Doyle's intention to refer to a merely fictional character, however, we do not need the qualifier. Second, fictional characters are incomplete. Many properties, such as a Holmes's blood type, are never settled in the stories in which those characters feature. Possible individuals are complete. In every world where Holmes exists he has a determinate blood type. It should, however, not be true-in-the-stories that Holmes has, say, blood type A rather than B, even if he does in some worlds consistent with the stories. One option we may dismiss is that Holmes is literally an incomplete individual inhabiting an incomplete world. Although fictional characters are under-described, they are often also attributed traits that entail that they are complete. A character described as 'a normal person' has a particular blood type since normal persons have determinate blood types. Incompleteness is not metaphysical incompleteness. Accommodating incompleteness is straightforward on our account. If we follow Lewis and deny that there must be a uniquely closest possible world, then incompleteness just means that different worlds consistent with the story are equally good truth-maker candidates, including worlds that differ only with respect to Holmes's blood type. These worlds also agree on everything explicitly stated in or entailed by the story, including Holmes being a detective and not eight feet tall, and also on a lot of stuff not explicitly asserted
B O U T south planck's constant E R L oxygen C K H O L M E S 353 it, for case with regard to understanding (non - denotative) fictional character motivations. In 4.1 I precede a definition of truth - in - fiction, and in the follow sections I consider some upshots. 4.1. Truth in fiction Above we assumed that phosphorus is true - in - fiction - f iff p is true in the close possible worlds in which f retain. I render to closeness below, and will for the moment just assume it. Two early points are worth making. First, the formulation differs from Lewis (1978); harmonize to Lewis, p is true in worlds where f is told as known fact. Lewis introduced the' told as known fact' qualifier to rule out the hypothesis that, by cosmic concurrence, the Holmes stories report actual events, thus construct the actual world a potential truth - maker. The qualifier would complicate out reference fixing story by relativize reference to a merely possible storyteller. Since we already rule out the possibility of the actual world being a truth - maker by Doyle's intention to refer to a merely fictional character, however, we do not necessitate the qualifier. Second, fabricated character are incomplete. Many properties, such as a Holmes's blood type, are never settle in the stories in which those characters feature. potential individuals are arrant. In every world where Holmes exists he have a definitive blood type. It should, however, not be true - in - the - stories that Holmes has, say, blood character A rather than B, even if he does in some worlds consistent with the floor. One option we may dismiss is that Holmes is literally an incomplete person inhabiting an incomplete world. Although fictional characters are under - described, they are often also attributed traits that entail that they are complete. A character describe as' a normal person' has a particular lineage type since normal persons have definitive blood types. Incompleteness is not metaphysical incompleteness. Accommodating incompleteness is straightforward on our account. If we follow Lewis and deny that there must be a uniquely closest possible world, then incompleteness just mean that unlike worlds consistent with the story are equally good truth - maker candidates, include worlds that differ only with regard to Holmes's blood type. These worlds also agree on everything explicitly state in or entailed by the story, including Holmes being a detective and not eight feet tall, and also on a batch of stuff not explicitly asserted
 B L U T S H E R L O C K H U L M E S 353 it, for instence wifh regara to understanding (non-explicmt) cyaracuvr motivations. In 4.1 I kntroduce a definutioi of truth-in-fictmkn, and lu the nollociig sections I cpnsider soke upshots. 4.1. Trgtf nn fiction Above we assumed that p if true-im-flction-f iff p ys tguq in nht closest possible worlds in whicg f holvs. I return to vloseness below, and will flr tje moment just asskme it. Two ithew points are dorth making. First, the formulation differs from Lewis (1978); accprding to Oeqis, k is true in worlqs where f is told av known fact. Lewis inbrodured rhe 'told as known facv' qualifier to rule jut the pmsaibility that, by xowmic woinwidevxe, ghe Hpljes stlrixs report adtual eventw, thus making the avttql world a pofentiaj eruth-maker. The qualifier would complicaue ouf reference fixing stort by relativizing refgrence to w merely possible storyteller. Since we already rune ouv ghe pjrwihility of the actual world being a truth-maker gy Dpyle's intentiok to refer to a metepy sictional chatacter, kkwsver, we do not neef the qoalifiwr. Second, ficyional characters are incomplete. Many pgopeeties, such as a Hopmes's blood typg, are mever settled in the sturiea in which hhose chadxcters feature. Pusspble individuals are complete. Yn every xorld where Folmgs exises he has w detcsminate blood type. It skould, however, nlt be true-in-the-stories that Holmes has, say, blpog tjpe A ratker thsn B, even if re does in somg worlds eonsisgent with nhe storixs. One optiog we may dismhds is that Hmlmes is litwraloy an ivzomplete indivodual inhcyiting an incomplete world. Elthuhgh fictional ckcrqcters are undet-dercrybvd, vhey wse often alsm atgricited graits ukat dntaol that they are com[lets. A character desctined as 'a bormal pqrson' has a psrticular blood tyke sinre noroal prrsjns have determinate blood typss. Incomppetcness is not ietaihysycal incom'leteness. Accommodating incompleteness iw straightforward in our account. If wg fpllow Lewis and qeny that there must be a uniwuely closest posxible world, then incojpletetess uust means that different worlds consistent with the story are equally goid truvh-iaker candisatex, incnubiny worldf thet differ only witn respect to Holmes's blood type. These wmrjds also agree on everything ebplicitly stajed in or entailed by the atory, invluding Holmes being a detectivr and not eight feet talk, and alwo on a lot of rtuff not explicitky asszrted
B O U T S H E O K H L M E with to understanding (non-explicit) motivations. In 4.1 introduce a definition of truth-in-fiction, and the following sections I consider some upshots. 4.1. Truth in fiction Above we that p is true-in-fiction-f iff p is true in the closest possible worlds which holds. return closeness below, and will for the moment just assume it. Two other points are worth making. the formulation differs from Lewis (1978); according to p is true in where f is told as fact. introduced the as fact' to rule out possibility that, by cosmic coincidence, the Holmes stories report actual events, thus making the actual world a truth-maker. The complicate out fixing by reference to a storyteller. Since we already rule out the actual world being a truth-maker by Doyle's to refer a merely fictional character, however, we not need the qualifier. Second, fictional characters are Many properties, such as a Holmes's blood type, are never settled in the stories in characters feature. Possible individuals complete. In every where exists has determinate blood It should, however, not be true-in-the-stories that Holmes has, say, blood A rather than B, even if he does in some with stories. One option may dismiss is that is an incomplete individual inhabiting world. fictional they often attributed traits that entail they are complete. A character as 'a normal person' since normal persons have determinate blood types. Incompleteness not metaphysical incompleteness. Accommodating incompleteness is straightforward our account. If we follow Lewis and deny that there must be uniquely closest then incompleteness just means that different worlds consistent the story are equally truth-maker candidates, including worlds that differ only with respect Holmes's type. These also agree on explicitly stated in entailed by the Holmes being detective not and also on a lot of not asserted
 B O U T S H E R L O C K H O L M E S 353 it, for inStance with RegarD to UndErStanDing (Non-explicit) chaRActeR motivations. In 4.1 I introduCe a deFiNItioN Of Truth-In-fictiON, aND In tHe FoLloWiNG sEctioNs I ConsideR some upshoTs. 4.1. TRuTh in fiction ABOvE we assumed ThaT p is true-in-fiCtiOn-f iff P iS trUE in thE clOsest PossibLE worldS in which f HoLDs. I retURn to cloSENeSs beLow, and will for the mOMeNT just assume it. TWo otheR pOInTS Are WorTh making. FiRsT, the fORmulatiON dIFFErs FRom Lewis (1978); accorDing to Lewis, P Is tRue in wOrLds WHere f iS told As KNowN fact. Lewis iNtroDuced the 'tOld as kNOwn fact' QUalifieR to rulE ouT thE posSIbIlIty ThAT, by COsMic COinCidence, tHe hoLmes sToriES REPort ActUal eVents, Thus making the ActUal wORld A poteNtial TrutH-mAker. THe qualIfier WoUld complicate ouT refErence fixIng StOry By RelatIVizing RefEreNce to a mErely poSSibLe STORyTeller. Since we alreaDy RULe Out the poSsibilITy Of THe actual WoRld BeinG A Truth-MakeR By doyle's inTentioN To ReFer to a mErEly ficTiOnaL chAractER, howEver, we Do not neeD the qUAlifier. Second, fICtional characTErS ARe INcomPleTe. Many propeRtieS, Such As a HOLmEs's BLood tYpe, arE nEVeR Settled in the stories In Which tHose cHaracters featUre. PossiblE INDividualS are COmPLete. In every worLd wheRe Holmes exISts he has A deteRminate bLood type. IT SHould, howEveR, noT be TruE-IN-tHe-stories that hOLmes HaS, say, bloOd tYpe A ratHer ThaN B, eVen If He does in sOme worldS cOnSiStEnt With tHE stories. onE opTiOn wE may dISmiss iS that holmEs Is LIteRally an INcOMPletE iNdIvidUal InHabitIng aN IncOmplete World. AlthOugH FictIoNaL characTers are under-dEsCribed, they ArE ofTen alsO ATtributeD traits that entail that thEY are comPleTe. A chAracTer descriBed As 'a norMal PErson' hAs a parTiculAr BloOD Type sINCe NorMaL persons haVE DetErminAtE bloOd types. incompleteness is noT MetAphysical incoMplEtenESS. ACcoMMoDAtiNg INcoMPLeteness is straiGhtforward On OUr Account. If wE FolLoW Lewis aNd deny tHat thERe must bE a uniquelY closest pOsSiblE WOrlD, then incomPletenesS just meanS That dIFfErent WorLds conSiSteNt witH the stORy aRe equAlly goOd Truth-mAker cAnDidates, iNcluding worlds that diffeR only wIth reSpeCt to HolmeS's bLOod Type. These WorlDs also agreE on EveRythiNg eXPliciTly sTAtEd iN Or entAileD By the storY, InCluDINg holmes being A DETecTive aNd nOT eight Feet Tall, and also on a lot OF stuff not expliCitlY ASseRteD
 B O U T S H E R L O C K H  O L M E S  353it,  fo rinst ance  with regard t o  und erstanding (non-explic it) c ha r acte r  m otiva tions.I n4 . 1 I  i nt rod uc e  a  defi nit ion oftruth-in-f ict io n, and in th e  f ollowing s ect ions I consi der  someup sho t s. 4. 1.Truth  in fi c tion A bove we a ss u med th a t p ist r ue -in- fiction-f iff p i s  t r ue in the clos est po ss i bl e wor lds  in whichfholds .  I retu r nt o clo s eness below,and will fo r  th e mome nt  ju s t assu me it .T woother point s ar e worth m aking. First,t he form ulatio n d iff ersf ro mLew is (19 7 8) ; a c cor ding toLe wi s, pis t r u e in w orl ds w heref is told askno wn f a ct.  Lewi s int rodu ce d the  'told  as k no wn fact' qualif ierto rule o utth e p os sibil i ty tha t,bycosmiccoincid e nce ,t h e  H olmes stories repo rt a ct ual even ts, th u sma k ing theac tua l wo r l d a p oten t ia l truth- maker. Th equalifi er  would  c omp lic ate o u t re ferenc e fixing  stor y  by relativizi n g reference t o  a m er e ly p oss ible storyt elle r . Si ncew ealr e ady r ule o ut th e  possibility of the  a ctualworld  being a trut h-maker by D o yle's in tent i on to refer to amerel y fictiona l  charact er, h owever,we do not n eed thequa lif ier . S e c on d, fictionalc h arac te rs areinc omplete . M any  pr ope rt ies, such  as a Ho lm es 's  b loo d typ e , are ne ve r s et tle d int he sto riesin w hi ch tho se char a ct e r s fe at ur e. P oss ib le in divi d ual s are c omplete.Ine very  w or ld wher e Holmes exis ts  he has ade ter minate b lood typ e. It should, however,n ot be t rue -in-t he-s tories th atHolmes  ha s , say,  blood  type  A  ra t h er th a n  B , e ve n if he do e s  in  some  w orld s consi stent with the sto r ies . One optionwemayd i sm iss is tha tH olm e s  is literally a n incomple te in dividual i n hab it ing anincompl ete w o rld. Al though fi ctional c ha ract e r s a re under-d escribed , they ar e  ofte n  a lso a ttr ibuted  t rai ts th at ent a ilthatthey a re  compl ete.Acharacte r described as 'a norma l pers on' h asa particu lar blo od type s ince  normal pe rso nshavedet e rmina te b l oo d t y pes.Inco m pleteness is  no t me taphysicali n c omp leten ess .  Accom moda ting incompletene s s is straightf orwa r d  on  ou r  acc ou nt. If we foll owLe w i s and de ny  that there  must be  a uniqu ely cl osestpossibl e wo r ld, th en i nco mpletenes s j us t  meansth at differ entwo rlds c onsist e nt w i t h the story areequal l y  good tru th-ma ke r candi d ates , includin g worlds th at dif feronlywith re sp ect to  Ho lm es's blood type. The se wo rlds al so  agr eeon eve ryth i n g exp lici tl y s tated ino r  e n ta il e d b y th e sto ry , in cluding H o lmes bei nga  detect iv e a n d  not e i gh t feet tall,  an d als o on a lot o f  stu f fn ot ex plicit ly ass erted
 B_O U_T S H E_R L_O_C K_H_O L M_E S 353_it, for instance with_regard to understanding_(non-explicit)_character motivations. In 4.1 I introduce a definition of truth-in-fiction, and in the following_sections_I consider_some_upshots._4.1. Truth in fiction Above_we assumed that p is_true-in-fiction-f iff_p is true in the closest possible worlds_in_which f holds._I return to closeness below, and will for the_moment just assume it. Two other_points are worth_making._First,_the formulation differs from_Lewis (1978); according to Lewis, p_is true in worlds where f_is told as known fact. Lewis introduced_the 'told as known fact' qualifier_to rule out the possibility_that, by_cosmic coincidence, the Holmes stories_report actual events,_thus making_the actual world_a potential truth-maker. The qualifier would_complicate out reference_fixing story by relativizing reference to_a_merely possible storyteller._Since_we_already rule_out the possibility_of_the actual_world_being a truth-maker by Doyle's intention_to_refer to a merely fictional character, however,_we do not need_the_qualifier. Second, fictional characters_are incomplete. Many properties, such_as a Holmes's blood type, are_never settled_in the_stories in which those characters feature. Possible individuals are complete. In_every world where Holmes exists he_has a determinate blood_type. It_should,_however, not be_true-in-the-stories_that Holmes_has, say, blood type A rather than_B, even_if he does in some worlds_consistent with the stories._One_option we may dismiss is that_Holmes is literally an incomplete individual_inhabiting an incomplete world. Although_fictional_characters_are under-described, they are often_also attributed traits that entail that_they are complete._A character described as 'a normal person'_has_a particular blood type since normal_persons_have determinate blood types. Incompleteness is_not_metaphysical_incompleteness. Accommodating incompleteness is straightforward_on our account. If we follow_Lewis and deny that there must be a uniquely_closest possible world,_then incompleteness just means that_different_worlds_consistent with the story are equally good truth-maker candidates, including_worlds that_differ only with_respect to Holmes's blood type. These worlds also agree on_everything explicitly stated in or entailed by_the story, including Holmes being a detective and not eight feet_tall, and also on a lot of stuff_not explicitly asserted