think	that	his	or	her	conscience	is	the	product	of	a	divine will,	or	that	the	local	preacher	has	a	hotline	to	God,	or	that	the	Bible	is	a	divinely inspired	text.	They	do	not	share	those	assumptions	with	the	believers. Consequently,	it	is	difficult	to	see	how	they	could	understand	those	signs	as commands	coming	from	a	potentially	legitimate	authority	(Wielenberg	2014,	79). There	is,	however,	another	way	in	which	to	understand	the	argument. Wielenberg's	claim	that	the	reasonable	nonbeliever	won't	interpret	the	sign	as being	a	command	only	really	works	in	the	case	of	moral	conscience	or	intuition. In	the	case	of	signs	communicated	via	a	holy	text	or	through	the	medium	of	a prophet/preacher,	the	command-like	form	of	the	sign	may	be	obvious	enough.	In those	cases,	the	pragmatic	enrichment	interpretation	misses	the	crucial	role	that 22 moral	uncertainty	seems	to	play	in	Evans's	thought	experiment.	We	can	pay	due homage	to	that	role	by	considering	the	argument	in	light	of	the	burgeoning literature	on	the	topic	of	moral	uncertainty	(Lockhart	2000;	Sepielli	2008; Guererro	2007;	Moller	2011;	Weatherson	2014;	Harman	2015). We	need	some	background	first.	The	current	debate	about	moral uncertainty	was	kickstarted	by	a	number	of	philosophers	(Lockhardt	2000; Guererro	2007;	Moller	2011)	claiming	that	uncertainty	as	
think 	 that 	 his 	 or 	 her 	 conscience 	 is 	 the 	 product 	 of 	 a 	 divine will, 	 or 	 that 	 the 	 local 	 preacher 	 take 	 a 	 hotline 	 to 	 God, 	 or 	 that 	 the 	 Bible 	 is 	 a 	 divinely prompt 	 text. 	 They 	 do 	 not 	 share 	 those 	 assumptions 	 with 	 the 	 believer. Consequently, 	 it 	 is 	 difficult 	 to 	 see 	 how 	 they 	 could 	 sympathize 	 those 	 signs 	 as commands 	 coming 	 from 	 a 	 potentially 	 lawful 	 assurance 	 (Wielenberg 	 2014, 	 79). There 	 is, 	 however, 	 another 	 way 	 in 	 which 	 to 	 sympathize 	 the 	 argument. Wielenberg's 	 claim 	 that 	 the 	 reasonable 	 nonbeliever 	 won't 	 translate 	 the 	 sign 	 as being 	 a 	 command 	 only 	 really 	 works 	 in 	 the 	 event 	 of 	 moral 	 conscience 	 or 	 intuition. In 	 the 	 case 	 of 	 signs 	 communicated 	 via 	 a 	 holy 	 textbook 	 or 	 through 	 the 	 medium 	 of 	 a prophet / preacher, 	 the 	 command - alike 	 form 	 of 	 the 	 signal 	 may 	 be 	 obvious 	 enough. 	 In those 	 cases, 	 the 	 pragmatic 	 enrichment 	 interpretation 	 misses 	 the 	 crucial 	 function 	 that 22 moral 	 uncertainty 	 seems 	 to 	 play 	 in 	 Evans's 	 thought 	 experiment. 	 We 	 can 	 pay 	 due homage 	 to 	 that 	 role 	 by 	 considering 	 the 	 argument 	 in 	 light 	 of 	 the 	 burgeoning literature 	 on 	 the 	 topic 	 of 	 moral 	 uncertainty 	 (Lockhart 	 2000; 	 Sepielli 	 2008; Guererro 	 2007; 	 Moller 	 2011; 	 Weatherson 	 2014; 	 Harman 	 2015). We 	 need 	 some 	 background 	 first. 	 The 	 current 	 argument 	 about 	 moral doubt 	 was 	 kickstarted 	 by 	 a 	 number 	 of 	 philosophers 	 (Lockhardt 	 2000; Guererro 	 2007; 	 Moller 	 2011) 	 claiming 	 that 	 doubt 	 equally
thijk	that	his	or	her	conscience	ls	the	product	of	a	dncine wmll,	or	thzt	the	locxl	preacher	has	a	hotline	to	God,	or	vhat	rhe	Bivle	is	a	divinely inspirea	text.	They	fo	not	shaee	thiwe	assumptions	with	tmz	belisyers. Eoisequently,	it	is	dlfficult	to	sae	how	they	could	gnaexstand	those	signs	as commands	coming	froi	a	potenyiwlly	legitimate	wuthpwity	(Speoenberg	2014,	79). There	is,	however,	another	say	in	whpch	to	understand	thr	argument. Wielenberg's	claim	hhat	hhe	reasonable	nonbepiever	won't	ibter[eet	the	sign	as being	a	command	only	realmy	works	in	the	case	of	moral	conscienze	or	iutuition. In	jkw	cadg	of	signs	commnnicatvd	via	a	holy	texb	pr	throggh	the	mrdium	of	a prophct/preechee,	the	command-like	form	of	vhe	sign	may	be	obvious	egough.	In tvoae	cases,	the	pragmatuc	wnricvmend	intdeprdtauioi	miases	thf	crncial	role	thzt 22 moral	unxertainty	seems	to	plau	ig	Vfans's	thought	sxperiiegt.	We	can	pay	due homage	to	that	role	by	consideging	fhe	argument	in	light	of	the	vurgeoning literature	ln	the	topis	of	moral	uncertainty	(Lockhart	2000;	Sepielli	2008; Guererro	2007;	Molles	2011;	Weatiefsou	2014;	Mwfnaj	2015). We	need	some	background	first.	The	current	debate	abjht	kogal uncertainty	waf	kickstartec	bj	a	momber	of	philosokhers	(Loeihzrdt	2000; Guererro	2007;	Molleg	2011)	claimigg	thar	uncertaigty	ax	
think that his or her conscience is of divine will, that the local God, that the Bible a divinely inspired They do not share those assumptions the believers. Consequently, it is difficult to see how they could understand those as commands coming from a potentially legitimate authority (Wielenberg 2014, 79). There is, another in to the argument. Wielenberg's claim that the reasonable nonbeliever won't interpret the sign as being a command really works in the case of moral conscience intuition. In the case signs communicated via a holy or the medium a the form of the may be obvious enough. In those cases, the pragmatic enrichment interpretation misses the crucial role that 22 uncertainty seems in Evans's experiment. can due homage to by considering the argument in light literature on the topic of moral uncertainty (Lockhart Sepielli 2008; 2007; Moller 2011; Weatherson 2014; Harman We need some background first. The current debate moral uncertainty was kickstarted by a number of philosophers (Lockhardt 2000; Guererro 2007; Moller 2011) uncertainty as
think	that	his	or	her	conscienCe	is	the	proDuct	oF	a	dIviNe Will,	Or	thAt	the	local	preaCHer	hAs	a	hotline	to	God,	or	that	tHe	BibLe	IS	a	diVInEly inSpired	tEXt.	tHEy	dO	nOt	ShaRe	THoSe	assUmpTions	wiTh	the	belieVerS. COnsequently,	iT	Is	Difficult	tO	seE	how	they	coulD	unDerstaNd	ThoSE	signS	as CommaNds	comINg	from	A	potentiaLlY	LegitiMAte	authORItY	(WieLenberg	2014,	79). There	is,	howEVeR,	Another	way	in	whIch	to	uNdERsTANd	tHe	aRgument. WieLeNberg'S	Claim	thAT	tHE	REasONable	nonbelieVer	won't	inteRPreT	the	siGn	As bEIng	a	coMmand	OnLY	reAlly	works	in	The	cAse	of	moraL	conscIEnce	or	iNTuition. in	the	cAse	Of	sIgns	COmMuNicAtED	viA	A	hOly	TExt	Or	througH	tHe	MediuM	of	a PROPHet/pReaCher,	The	coMmand-like	form	Of	tHe	siGN	maY	be	obVious	EnouGh.	in thoSe	caseS,	the	pRaGmatic	enrichmenT	intErpretatiOn	mIsSes	ThE	crucIAl	role	ThaT 22 moRal	unceRtainty	SEemS	tO	PLAy	In	Evans's	thought	expErIMEnT.	We	can	paY	due hoMAgE	tO	That	role	By	ConSideRINg	the	ArguMEnT	in	light	Of	the	bURgEoNing litErAture	oN	tHe	tOpiC	of	moRAl	unCertaiNty	(LockhArt	2000;	SePIelli	2008; Guererro	2007;	MOLler	2011;	WeathersoN	2014;	haRMAn	2015). wE	neeD	soMe	backgrounD	firST.	The	CurrENt	DebATe	aboUt	morAl UNcERtainty	was	kickstartEd	By	a	numBer	of	Philosophers	(LOckhardt	2000; GuERERro	2007;	MolleR	2011)	claIMiNG	that	uncertainTy	as	
think	that	his	or	her	cons cience	isthe	p rod uct 	o f	adivi ne will,	or	th a t	th e	local	preacher	has	a 	hotl in e 	toG od ,	orthat	th e 	B i b leis 	a 	di vi n el y ins pir ed	text .	They	donot 	s hare	those	a s su mptions	wi ththe	believer s.Conseq ue ntl y ,	itisdiffi cult	t o 	see	h ow	they	c ou l d	unde r stand	t h o se 	sig ns	as commands	co m in g 	from	a	potent iallyle g it i m ate 	au thority	(W ie lenbe r g	2014, 79 ) . The r e	is,	however ,	another	w a y	i n	whic htou nderst and	t he arg ument. Wiel enbe rg's	clai m	that the	rea s onablenonbel iev erwon' t 	i nt erp re t 	th e 	s ign asbeing	aco mm and	o nlyr e a l ly	w ork s	in 	thecase	of	moral 	co nsci e nce 	or	i ntuit ion.  I n	the 	caseof	si gn s	communicatedviaa	holy	te xtor 	th ro ugh	t h e	medi umofa proph et/prea c her ,t h e 	c ommand-like	form	o ft h esign	may 	be	ob v io us enough.In  th osec a ses,thep ra gmatic	e nrichm e nt 	i nterpre ta tion	m is ses 	th e	cru c ialrole	t hat 22 m oralu ncertainty	see m s	to	play	inE va n s 's thou ght 	experiment .	We canpayd ue  ho m age	t o	tha tr ol e 	by	considering	the 	a rgumen t	inlight	of	theburgeoning l i terature 	ont he topic	of	moral 	unce rtainty	(L o ckhart	2 000;Sepielli 	2008; Gu e r erro	200 7;Mol ler 	20 1 1 ;Weatherson	20 1 4 ;	Ha rm an	2015 ).We	need 	so mebac kgr ou nd	first. 	The	cur re nt 	d eb ate 	abou t 	moral u nc ert ai nty 	wask icksta rtedby	a 	n um b erof	phil o so p h ers(L oc khar dt20 00; G uere r ro2007;	M oller	201 1)c laim in gthat	un certainty	as
think	that	his	or	her	conscience	is	the	product	of	a	divine will,	or	that	the	local	preacher	has	a	hotline	to	God,	or	that	the	Bible	is	a	divinely_inspired	text.	They	do	not	share	those	assumptions	with	the	believers. Consequently,	it	is	difficult	to	see	how	they	could	understand	those	signs	as_commands	coming	from	a	potentially	legitimate	authority	(Wielenberg	2014,	79). There	is,	however,	another	way	in	which	to	understand	the	argument. Wielenberg's	claim	that	the	reasonable	nonbeliever	won't	interpret	the	sign	as being	a	command	only	really	works	in	the	case	of	moral	conscience	or	intuition._In	the	case	of	signs	communicated	via	a	holy	text	or	through	the	medium	of	a prophet/preacher,	the	command-like	form	of	the	sign	may	be	obvious	enough.	In_those	cases,	the	pragmatic	enrichment	interpretation	misses	the	crucial	role	that_22 moral	uncertainty	seems	to	play	in	Evans's	thought	experiment.	We	can	pay	due_homage	to	that	role	by	considering	the	argument	in	light	of	the	burgeoning_literature	on	the	topic	of	moral	uncertainty	(Lockhart	2000;	Sepielli	2008; Guererro	2007;	Moller	2011;	Weatherson	2014;	Harman	2015). We	need	some	background	first.	The	current	debate	about	moral_uncertainty	was	kickstarted	by	a	number	of	philosophers	(Lockhardt	2000; Guererro	2007;	Moller	2011)	claiming	that	uncertainty	as	