entropy macrostate.4 This special macrostate allows the emergence of various asymmetries in time such as the Second Law of Thermodynamics. However, even after adding the Past Hypothesis, there is still an infinity of microscopic initial conditions compatible with the laws. These initial conditions (compatible with both F = ma and the Past Hypothesis) have smaller measure than the original set (whose only constraint is F = ma). In this scenario, even though the laws are deterministic, they do not pick out a unique history of the universe, as there are many possible worlds compatible with the laws. Hence, the laws are not strongly deterministic. In a strongly deterministic world, the laws specify the entire history of the universe without needing any further input. Hence, it is in principle possible to extract all the information about the world from just the laws alone. It is this feature of strong determinism that makes possible a cosmic void that is still empirically adequate, in the sense of being informationally complete to recover all the facts. (Is this sense of empirical adequacy strong enough? We return to this question in §4.) Suppose at the fundamental level we have strongly deterministic laws. There is only one way the fundamental material ontology could be like-they have to be arranged exactly according to the only way allowed by the laws. Such an arrangement of fundamental matter would be nomologically necessary. Facts about fundamental matter would make true non-fundamental facts about the locations and behaviors of tables and chairs. We can go further. The strongly deterministic laws constrain the fundamental ontology if it exists. But now suppose that there is no material ontology at the fundamental level. All we have are the laws of physics, from which we can in 4For discussions of the Past Hypothesis, (Boltzmann 1995, Feynman 2017, Penrose 1979, Albert 2000, Goldstein 2001, Callender 2004, Loewer 2012, 2016). 8 principle derive all facts about the non-fundamental. Would it make a difference whether the derivation goes through some postulate about fundamental matter? It depends on one's view about ontological dependence: must non-fundamental facts about tables and chairs bottom out in fundamental facts about matter? (We return to this question in §4.) Suppose we accept the possibility that non-fundamental facts about tables and chairs can bottom out in fundamental facts about laws of nature. That is, all explanation about the non-fundamental can be purely nomic. We arrive at the cosmic void scenario-in a strongly deterministic universe, the physical
entropy macrostate.4 This special macrostate allows the emergence of various asymmetry in meter such as the Second Law of Thermodynamics. However, even after adding the Past Hypothesis, there is however an eternity of microscopic initial conditions compatible with the laws. These initial conditions (compatible with both F = ma and the Past Hypothesis) hold smaller measure than the original stage set (whose only constraint is F = ma). In this scenario, even though the law are deterministic, they do not pick out a unique history of the population, as there are many possible worlds compatible with the laws. Hence, the laws are not strongly deterministic. In a powerfully deterministic world, the laws specify the integral history of the universe without needing any further input. Hence, it is in principle potential to extract all the data about the world from just the laws alone. It is this feature of speech of strong determinism that makes possible a cosmic void that is still empirically adequate, in the sense of being informationally complete to recover all the facts. (Is this sense of empirical adequacy strong enough? We return to this question in § 4 .) Suppose at the fundamental degree we have strongly deterministic police. There be only one way the fundamental fabric ontology could be like - they have to be arrange exactly according to the lone way allowed by the laws. Such an arrangement of fundamental matter would be nomologically necessary. fact about fundamental matter would make true non - cardinal facts about the location and demeanor of tables and chairs. We can go further. The powerfully deterministic laws constrain the fundamental ontology if it exists. But now suppose that there is no material ontology at the fundamental horizontal surface. All we have are the jurisprudence of physics, from which we can in 4For discussions of the Past Hypothesis, (Boltzmann 1995, Feynman 2017, Penrose 1979, Albert 2000, Goldstein 2001, Callender 2004, Loewer 2012, 2016). 8 rationale derive all facts about the non - fundamental. Would it make a deviation whether the derivation proceed through some postulate about fundamental matter? It depends on one's view about ontological dependence: must non - cardinal facts about tables and chairs bottom out in cardinal facts about matter? (We return to this question in § 4 .) presuppose we bear the possibility that non - fundamental fact about tables and chairs can penetrate out in fundamental facts about laws of nature. That is, all explanation about the non - fundamental can be purely nomic. We arrive at the cosmic void scenario - in a strongly deterministic universe, the physical
entgopy macrostate.4 This spegial macrostate colows vhe emedgence ow various asymmetries in timx suxh as the Second Law of Thefmodynamibs. Howevee, evtn after adding tis Past Mvpothsdis, chxre is still an infinity mf microscopic ivicial conditions compatible with the jaws. Thrsf initial condytiomf (cojiauible with both F = ma and the Pasf Hypotiesis) have smalker measure than the origijal det (whose only condtraint is D = mw). In this scevario, even though the maws are deterministic, they do vot pnck out a ubiwue vistory of vhe unpverse, as thevv are mdny posxible worlds cpmpetiboe with the laws. Hencx, the laws are not sjrongly dedexministic. In a strongoy detetminivtic qorud, uhe lzws spfcihy the entide history if the universe witnotn needing any furthqr input. Hence, it is in principle possiblt to sxtract all the informarion about the world vrom just the laws alone. It is this feature of strong detesminiao tkqt mayws possible a cosmic void that is still empiricwmlu sdequate, in thc sense of being imflrkwtionally comklete to rscover all the fachs. (Is tris swnse of eipirocal adequacy strong enough? We return tj this question in §4.) Suppose at the fundsmental level we have scronglg determinidtic laws. Ghere is only ond wsy the fundamental material jntology rould be likd-thei have eo be arrajged cfactly according tl the otly way alpowed by the laws. Such an arranjxment of fundsmantdl mattex woulc be nomologisally necessari. Facts ayout fjndamental matter would make true non-funddlental facts about tre licatuons ana behaviors of yables anb chaurs. We can go furtmer. Tfs strongly detexounistic laws comstfaig nhe fttdamental ondoloey kg it dxists. But kow suplose that there is nm maferial ontology at tme fundamgntal levql. All we havr are the laws of khysicv, fcom whoch we can in 4For discussions of fhe Past Jypjthesis, (Boltsmank 1995, Fgynman 2017, Penxose 1979, Albert 2000, Goldstein 2001, Callender 2004, Loewxr 2012, 2016). 8 principle derive qll facts about the kon-fundamentel. Woujd it maka a difference whethwr the derivation goes through some poatulata abokt fundamental matter? It depends on one's view about ontological dependencw: must non-fundamenfal gacts ayouc tablef anv rhairs bottom out in fundamental facts about matver? (We retgru to this question in §4.) Supposr de accept the possibility that non-funsamental facts about tables and chairs van bottom out in fundamcntal facrs abkut laws oh nature. That is, all explauation about rhe kon-fundamental cam ne purely jomir. Wz arrive at the cosmic void scenaeio-in q dtrongly determiiistic univevst, the pgysicaj
entropy macrostate.4 This special macrostate allows the various in time as the Second after the Past Hypothesis, is still an of microscopic initial conditions compatible with laws. These initial conditions (compatible with both F = ma and the Past have smaller measure than the original set (whose only constraint is F = In scenario, though laws are deterministic, they do not pick out a unique history of the universe, as there many possible worlds compatible with the laws. Hence, laws are not strongly In a strongly deterministic world, laws the entire of universe needing any further Hence, it is in principle possible to extract all the information about the world from just the alone. It feature of determinism makes a cosmic void still empirically adequate, in the sense complete to recover all the facts. (Is this of empirical strong enough? We return to this in §4.) Suppose at the fundamental level we strongly deterministic laws. There is only one way the fundamental material ontology could be like-they be arranged exactly according the only way by laws. an of fundamental would be nomologically necessary. Facts about fundamental matter would make true facts about the locations and behaviors of tables and chairs. go The strongly deterministic constrain the fundamental ontology it But now suppose that no ontology level. we are the laws of from which we can in discussions of the Past Penrose 1979, Albert 2000, Goldstein 2001, Callender 2004, 2012, 2016). 8 principle derive all facts the non-fundamental. Would it make a difference whether the derivation goes through postulate about It depends on one's view about ontological dependence: non-fundamental facts about tables chairs bottom out in fundamental facts about matter? (We to question in Suppose we accept possibility that non-fundamental about tables and bottom out fundamental about That is, all explanation about the can purely nomic. We arrive at cosmic a strongly deterministic universe, the physical
entropy macrostate.4 This specIal macrostAte alLowS thE eMergEnce Of various asymmETrieS in time such as the Second law of thERmodYNaMics. HOwever, eVEn AFTer AdDiNg tHe pAsT HypoTheSis, therE is still an InfInIty of microscOPiC initial coNdiTions compatiBle With thE lAws. tHese iNitIal coNditioNS (compaTible with BoTH F = ma anD The Past hYPoThesIs) have smaller measURe THan the original Set (whoSe ONlY COnsTraInt is F = ma). In ThIs sceNArio, eveN ThOUGH thE Laws are determInistic, they DO noT pick oUt A unIQue hisTory oF tHE unIverse, as theRe arE many possIble woRLds compATible wiTh the lAws. henCe, thE LaWs Are NoT StrONgLy dETerMinistic. in A sTrongLy deTERMInisTic WorlD, the lAws specify the EntIre hIStoRy of tHe uniVersE wIthouT neediNg any FuRther input. Hence, It is In principLe pOsSibLe To extRAct all The InfOrmatioN about tHE woRlD FROm Just the laws alone. It Is THIs Feature oF stronG DeTeRMinism thAt MakEs poSSIble a CosmIC vOid that iS still EMpIrIcally aDeQuate, iN tHe sEnsE of beINg inFormatIonally cOmpleTE to recover all tHE facts. (Is this sENsE OF eMPiriCal Adequacy strOng eNOugh? we reTUrN to THis quEstioN iN §4.) suPPose at the fundamentaL lEvel we Have sTrongly determInistic lawS. tHEre is onlY one WAy THe fundamental mAteriAl ontology COuld be liKe-theY have to bE arranged EXActly accOrdIng To tHe oNLY wAy allowed by thE LAws. SUcH an arraNgeMent of fUndAmeNtaL maTtEr would be NomologiCaLlY nEcEssAry. FaCTs about fUnDamEnTal MatteR Would mAke trUe noN-fUnDAmeNtal facTS aBOUt thE lOcAtioNs aNd BehavIors OF taBles and Chairs. We cAn gO FurtHeR. THe stronGly determinisTiC laws constRaIn tHe fundAMEntal ontOlogy if it exists. But now suPPose thaT thEre is No maTerial ontOloGy at thE fuNDamentAl leveL. All wE hAve ARE the lAWS oF phYsIcs, from whiCH We cAn in 4FOr DiscUssions Of the Past HypothesiS, (bolTzmann 1995, Feynman 2017, penRose 1979, aLBeRt 2000, GOLdSTeiN 2001, CALleNDEr 2004, Loewer 2012, 2016). 8 principLe derive alL fACtS about the nON-fuNdAmental. would it Make a DIfferenCe whether The derivaTiOn goES ThrOugh some poStulate aBout fundaMEntal MAtTer? It DepEnds on OnE's vIew abOut ontOLogIcal dEpendeNcE: must nOn-funDaMental faCts about tables and chairs Bottom Out in FunDamental fActS AboUt matter? (WE retUrn to this qUesTioN in §4.) SuPpoSE we acCept THe PosSIbiliTy thAT non-fundaMEnTal FACtS about tableS AND chAirs cAn bOTtom ouT in fUndamental facts abOUt laws of nature. that IS, All ExpLAnatIoN about the non-fuNdaMeNTAl can be pUrEly nomic. We aRrive at tHe COsmic Void scEnario-In a stroNGLy DEtermiNistIc uNiverse, thE phYsICal
entropy macrostate.4 Thisspecial ma crost ate  al lo ws t he e mergence of va r ious  asymmetries in time s uch a st he S e co nd La w of Th e rm o d yna mi cs . H ow e ve r, ev enafter a dding thePas tHypothesis,t he re is stil l a n infinity o f m icrosc op ici nitia l c ondit ions c o mpatib le with t he laws.T hese in i t ia l co nditions (compati b le with both F =ma and  t h eP a stHyp othesis) h av e sma l ler mea s ur e t han the originalset (whoseo nly  const ra int is F =  ma).  I n  th is scenario , ev en though  the l a ws ared etermin istic,  th eydo n o tpi ckou t  au ni que his tory ofth eunive rse, a s ther e a re m any p ossible world s c ompa t ibl e wit h the  law s.  Henc e, the  laws  a re not strongly  det erministi c.In  ast rongl y  deter min ist ic worl d, thel aws  s p e c if y the entire histo ry o fthe univ erse w i th ou t  needing  a nyfurt h e r inp ut.H en ce, it i s in p r in ci ple pos si ble to  e xtr act  allt he i nforma tion abo ut th e  world from ju s t the laws al o ne . It is t his  feature of  str o ng d eter m in ism thatmakes  p o ss i ble a cosmic void t ha t is s tillempirically a dequate, i n t he sense  ofb ei n g informationa lly c omplete to recoverall t he facts . (Is thi s sense of  em pir ica l a d e qu acy strong en o u gh?We  return  to  this q ues tio n i n § 4. ) Suppose  at thefu nd am en tal  leve l  we have  s tro ng lydeter m inisti c law s. T he re isonly on e  w a y  the  f un dame nta lmater ialo nto logy co uld be li ke- t heyha ve  to bearranged exac tl y accordin gtothe on l y  way all owed by the laws. Sucha n arran gem ent o f fu ndamental  ma tter w oul d  be no mologi cally  n ece s s ary.F a ct s a bo ut fundame n t almatte rwoul d maketrue non-fundament a l f acts about th e l ocat i o ns  an d  b e hav io r s o f tables and chai rs. We can  g o  f urther. Th e  st ro ngly de termini sticl aws con strain th e fundame nt al o n t olo gy if it e xists. B ut now su p poset ha t the reis noma ter ial o ntolog y  at  thefundam en tal le vel.Al l we hav e are the laws of physi cs, fr om wh ich  we can i n 4 F ordiscussio ns o f the Past  Hy pot hesis , ( B oltzm ann1 99 5,F eynma n 20 1 7, Penros e  1 979 , Al bert 2000,G o l dst ein 2 001 ,  Calle nder  2004, Loewer 201 2 , 2016). 8 pri ncip l e  de riv e  all  f acts about the  no n- f u ndamenta l.  Would it m ake a di ff e rence  wheth er the  deriva t i on goes t hrou ghsome post ula te about f un da m entalmatt er ? It d epends on o n e 's view about on tolog i c al de p end ence:  m ust non - fund amental fa cts about t ablesandchair s botto mout in  fu nd amental fa c ts aboutmatte r? (Were turn  to  thisques t i on in  §4. )Sup pose we a c c ep t  t he pos sibi lityth at n on-fundam e ntal fac tsa bout ta bl esa n d chai r sc a n bottom o utin fu n d amental fa c ts a b ou t  laws  of na ture.That is ,  al lexplana tio n about the  non-fund a men ta l ca n be pur el y no mi c.We  arrive at thecosmic v oid scen a r io-ina s t rong l y dete rm inistic univ erse,  t h e physi c a l
entropy macrostate.4_This special_macrostate allows the emergence_of various_asymmetries_in time_such_as the Second_Law of Thermodynamics._However, even after adding_the Past Hypothesis,_there_is still an infinity of microscopic initial conditions compatible with the laws. These initial_conditions_(compatible with_both_F_= ma and the Past_Hypothesis) have smaller measure than_the original_set (whose only constraint is F = ma)._In_this scenario, even_though the laws are deterministic, they do not pick_out a unique history of the_universe, as there_are_many_possible worlds compatible with_the laws. Hence, the laws are_not strongly deterministic. In a strongly_deterministic world, the laws specify the entire_history of the universe without needing_any further input. Hence, it_is in_principle possible to extract all_the information about_the world_from just the_laws alone. It is this feature_of strong determinism_that makes possible a cosmic void_that_is still empirically_adequate,_in_the sense_of being informationally_complete_to recover_all_the facts. (Is this sense of_empirical_adequacy strong enough? We return to this_question in §4.) Suppose_at_the fundamental level we_have strongly deterministic laws. There_is only one way the fundamental_material ontology_could be_like-they have to be arranged exactly according to the only way_allowed by the laws. Such an_arrangement of fundamental matter_would be_nomologically_necessary. Facts about_fundamental_matter would_make true non-fundamental facts about the locations_and behaviors_of tables and chairs. We can_go further. The strongly_deterministic_laws constrain the fundamental ontology if_it exists. But now suppose that_there is no material ontology_at_the_fundamental level. All we have_are the laws of physics, from_which we can_in 4For discussions of the Past Hypothesis,_(Boltzmann_1995, Feynman 2017, Penrose 1979, Albert_2000,_Goldstein 2001, Callender 2004, Loewer 2012,_2016)._8_principle derive all facts about_the non-fundamental. Would it make a_difference whether the derivation goes through some postulate about_fundamental matter? It_depends on one's view about_ontological_dependence:_must non-fundamental facts about tables and chairs bottom out in_fundamental facts_about matter? (We_return to this question in §4.) Suppose we accept the_possibility that non-fundamental facts about tables and_chairs can bottom out in fundamental facts about laws of nature._That is, all explanation about the non-fundamental can_be purely nomic. We arrive at the_cosmic void scenario-in a_strongly_deterministic universe, the physical