 Auseinandersetzung between Michael Dummett and Hans Sluga: see Sluga (1975), (1976), (1977), (1980); Dummett (1973), (1976), (1981a), (1981b), (1982). For a discussion of that debate, see the Gottfried Gabriel's Introduction to Lotze (1989a). 9 See §3 for details. 10 See Ricketts (1986) and (1996), Reck (2005) and (2007). Platonism in Lotze and Frege 141 mature Frege, that there are propositions, or, as Frege would call them, thoughts (Gedanken).11 In the section "Validity and Existence in Logik, Book III," I explain Lotze's famous distinction between existence and validity in Book III of Logik. In the following section, "Lotze's Platonism," I put this famous distinction in the context of Lotze's attempt to distinguish his own position from hypostatic Platonism and consider one way of drawing the distinction: the hypostatic Platonist accepts that there are propositions, whereas Lotze rejects this. In the section "Two Perspectives on Frege's Platonism," I argue that this is an unsatisfactory way of reading Lotze's Platonism and that the Ricketts-Reck reading of Frege is in fact the correct way of thinking about Lotze's Platonism. Validity and Existence in Logik, Book III Although Lotze originally introduces the existence–validity distinction in the broader context of his rejection of "hypostatic" Platonism, I am going to explain this distinction first and only then turn to examining Lotze's Platonism. I proceed in this way because the existence–validity distinction will give us key conceptual resources for articulating Lotze's platonic commitments. First of all, Lotze's distinction is not in fact a dichotomy (existence vs. validity) but a fourfold distinction among kinds of "actuality" (Wirklichkeit). This is an odd terminological choice, since at least one of the main categories of actuality, validity, does not act (wirken) in any sense (it has no causal efficacy). It is also crucial, in the context of an essay like this one, not to confuse Lotze's use of the term with Frege's. Frege uses "actual" in a way that one would expect, given its etymology: the
Auseinandersetzung between Michael Dummett and Hans Sluga: see Sluga (1975), (1976), (1977), (1980); Dummett (1973), (1976), (1981a), (1981b), (1982). For a discussion of that debate, see the Gottfried Gabriel's Introduction to Lotze (1989a). 9 visualize § 3 for detail. 10 See Ricketts (1986) and (1996), Reck (2005) and (2007). Platonism in Lotze and Frege 141 mature Frege, that there are suggestion, or, as Frege would call them, thoughts (Gedanken).11 In the part " Validity and Existence in Logik, Book III, " I explain Lotze's famous differentiation between existence and validity in Book III of Logik. In the keep up section, " Lotze's Platonism, " I invest this celebrated distinction in the context of Lotze's attempt to identify his own position from hypostatic Platonism and consider one manner of drawing the distinction: the hypostatic Platonist accepts that there exist propositions, whereas Lotze rejects this. In the section " Two Perspectives on Frege's Platonism, " I argue that this is an unsatisfactory way of read Lotze's Platonism and that the Ricketts - Reck reading of Frege is in fact the correct way of thinking about Lotze's Platonism. Validity and Existence in Logik, Book III Although Lotze primitively introduces the existence – validity distinction in the broader context of his rejection of " hypostatic " Platonism, I am going to explain this distinction first and only then turn to examining Lotze's Platonism. I proceed in this way because the existence – validity distinction will move over us key conceptual resources for pronounce Lotze's platonic commitment. First of all, Lotze's distinction is not in fact a dichotomy (existence vs. validity) but a fourfold distinction among kinds of " actuality " (Wirklichkeit). This is an curious terminological choice, since at least one of the main categories of actuality, validity, does not act (wirken) in any sense (it accept no causal efficacy). It is also crucial, in the context of an essay like this one, not to confuse Lotze's use of the condition with Frege's. Frege uses " actual " in a manner that one would expect, given its etymology: the
 Audeinandersetzung between Michael Dummetj qnd Hais Slugz: see Sljga (1975), (1976), (1977), (1980); Dummett (1973), (1976), (1981a), (1981b), (1982). For a duscuswion of that debate, sed the Gotnfried Gavrieo'w Introducvjon to Lotze (1989z). 9 Sez §3 for details. 10 Xee Ricketds (1986) and (1996), Reck (2005) avd (2007). Platonism in Lotze and Frege 141 mattre Frebe, that there arg prokosytiohs, or, as Frege would call them, thohghts (Gtdanken).11 In the secyion "Validity and Existencf in Logik, Book III," I fxplain Lotes's sqmous distinztion betwteu existence and validity in Book III of Loeik. Iu the folloqibg dgction, "Lotze'w Planonism," I put bnis fakous dixtinction in tme coitexr of Lotze's attempt tm distinguish his jwn posithou from hypostatic Plarobism dnd wonskeer ont wey kf draainj the distihction: the yypostatic Platonisu asbrpts that thsre arq [ropositions, whereas Lotze rejects this. In the section "Two Perspextives on Frege's Platlnism," I awgue that this is an unsatisfactory way of readinc Lotve'r Poabonirn wnd that the Ricketts-Reck reading of Frege is jn fsct the correcb way of thinking sbluy Lotze's Platovism. Vcmisity and Existence in Logyk, Boik III Aluhougn Lotze originally introducws the existvnce–calidity distinctiln in the bxoader contrxt of his rejection of "hypkstatic" Plahonism, I zo going to explakn nhis distincukon first and onlr then tucn to examinkng Kotze's Platonism. I proceed in this way bfcausg the axistence–vwlidity distinction will give us key conceptusl revources yor arbiculating Lotzq's platonic cokmitmencs. Firrt of all, Motze's vistinction ys not in facd a dichotomy (existense vw. vaoidity) cjt a fourfold cistinction among kunds of "actuality" (Xirkujchkeit). This is an odd terminologocau cropce, sytce at least one of yhe mxin cattyorles of sctuality, validity, dmes hot act (wirken) in snn sense (ij has no sausal efficavy). It is also cruclal, ii the rontexy os an essay like this one, not tk confuse Lobze's use of tre tcrm rith Frege'x. Frege uses "actual" in a way that one wiuld expect, given uts etymology: the
Auseinandersetzung between Michael Dummett and Hans Sluga: (1975), (1977), (1980); (1973), (1976), (1981a), of debate, see the Gabriel's Introduction to (1989a). 9 See §3 for details. See Ricketts (1986) and (1996), Reck (2005) and (2007). Platonism in Lotze and 141 mature Frege, that there are propositions, or, as Frege would call them, (Gedanken).11 the "Validity Existence in Logik, Book III," I explain Lotze's famous distinction between existence and validity in Book of Logik. In the following section, "Lotze's Platonism," put this famous distinction the context of Lotze's attempt distinguish own position hypostatic and one way of the distinction: the hypostatic Platonist accepts that there are propositions, whereas Lotze rejects this. In the section Perspectives on I argue this an way of reading and that the Ricketts-Reck reading of fact the correct way of thinking about Lotze's Validity and in Logik, Book III Although Lotze introduces the existence–validity distinction in the broader context his rejection of "hypostatic" Platonism, I am going to explain this distinction first and only to examining Lotze's Platonism. proceed in this because existence–validity will us key resources for articulating Lotze's platonic commitments. First of all, Lotze's distinction not in fact a dichotomy (existence vs. validity) but a among of "actuality" (Wirklichkeit). is an odd terminological since least one of the of validity, (wirken) any (it has no causal It is also crucial, in context of an essay confuse Lotze's use of the term with Frege's. uses "actual" in a way that one expect, given its etymology: the
 Auseinandersetzung between michael DumMett aNd HAns slUga: sEe SlUga (1975), (1976), (1977), (1980); Dummett (1973), (1976), (1981a), (1981b), (1982). FoR A disCussion of that debate, see The GoTtFRied gAbRiel's introduCTiON To LOtZe (1989A). 9 SeE §3 fOR dEtailS. 10 SeE RicketTs (1986) and (1996), Reck (2005) aNd (2007). PLaTonism in LotzE AnD Frege 141 matuRe FRege, that therE arE propoSiTioNS, or, as freGe wouLd call THem, thoUghts (GedaNkEN).11 In the SEction "VALIdIty aNd Existence in LogiK, boOK III," I explain LoTze's faMoUS dISTinCtiOn between eXiStencE And valiDItY IN booK iII of Logik. In tHe following SEctIon, "LotZe'S PlATonism," i put tHiS FamOus distinctIon iN the conteXt of LoTZe's atteMPt to disTinguiSh hIs oWn poSItIoN frOm HYpoSTaTic pLatOnism and CoNsIder oNe waY OF DRawiNg tHe diStincTion: the hypostAtiC PlaTOniSt accEpts tHat tHeRe are ProposItionS, wHereas Lotze rejeCts tHis. In the sEctIoN "TwO PErspeCTives oN FrEge'S PlatonIsm," I argUE thAt THIS iS an unsatisfactory wAy OF ReAding LotZe's PlaTOnIsM And that tHe ricKettS-rEck reAdinG Of frege is iN fact tHE cOrRect way Of ThinkiNg AboUt LOtze's pLatoNism. VaLidity anD ExisTEnce in Logik, BooK iII Although LoTZe ORIgINallY inTroduces the ExisTEnce–ValiDItY diSTinctIon in ThE BrOAder context of his rejEcTion of "HyposTatic" PlatonisM, I am going tO EXPlain thiS disTInCTion first and onLy theN turn to exaMIning LotZe's PlAtonism. I Proceed in THIs way becAusE thE exIstENCe–Validity distiNCTion WiLl give uS keY concepTuaL reSouRceS fOr articulAting LotZe'S pLaToNic CommiTMents. FirSt Of aLl, lotZe's diSTinctiOn is nOt in FaCt A DicHotomy (eXIsTENce vS. vAlIditY) buT a FourfOld dIStiNction aMong kinds Of "aCTualItY" (WIrklichKeit). This is an oDd TerminologIcAl cHoice, sINCe at leasT one of the main categories OF actualIty, ValidIty, dOes not act (WirKen) in aNy sENse (it hAs no caUsal eFfIcaCY). it is aLSO cRucIaL, in the contEXT of An essAy Like This one, Not to confuse Lotze's USe oF the term with FRegE's. FrEGE uSes "ACtUAl" iN a WAy tHAT one would expect, Given its etYmOLoGy: the
 Auseinandersetzung betwee n MichaelDumme ttand  H ansSlug a: see Sluga ( 1 975) , (1976), (1977), (198 0); D um m ett( 19 73),(1976), (1 9 8 1a) ,(1 981 b) ,  ( 1982) . F or a di scussion o f t ha t debate, se e  t he Gottfri edGabriel's In tro ductio ntoL otze(19 89a).  9 See §3 for  details.  1 0  See R i cketts( 1 98 6) a nd (1996), Reck ( 2 00 5 ) and (2007).Platon is m  i n Lot zeand Frege14 1 mat u re Freg e ,t h a t t h ere are propo sitions, or ,  as  Frege  w oul d  callthem,  t h oug hts (Gedank en). 11 In the  secti o n "Vali d ity and  Exist enc e i n Lo g ik ,Boo kI II, "  I  ex p lai n Lotze' sfa mousdist i n c t ionbet ween  exis tence and val idi ty i n  Bo ok II I ofLogi k.  In t he fol lowin gsection, "Lotze 's P latonism, " I  p utth is fa m ous di sti nct ion inthe con t ext  o f L ot ze's attempt to di st i n gu ish hisown po s it io n  from hy po sta ticP l atoni sm a n dconsider  one w a yof  drawin gthe di st inc tio n: th e  hyp ostati c Platon ist a c cepts that the r e are proposi t io n s ,w here asLotze rejec ts t h is.In t h esec t ion " Two P er s pe c tives on Frege's Pl at onism, " I a rgue that thi s is an un s a t isfactor y wa y  o f  reading Lotze 's Pl atonism an d  that th e Ric ketts-Re ck readin g of Frege  is  in  fa ctt h ecorrect way o f thin ki ng abou t L otze'sPla ton ism . V al idity and  Existen ce  i nLo gik , Boo k  III Alt ho ugh  L otz e ori g inally  intr oduc es  t h e e xistenc e –v a l idit ydi stin cti on  in t he b r oad er cont ext of hi s r e ject io nof "hyp ostatic" Plat on ism, I amgo ing  to ex p l ain this  distinction first ando nly the n t urn t o ex amining L otz e's Pl ato n ism. I  proce ed in  t his w ay be c a us e t he  existence – v ali ditydi stin ction w ill give us key co n cep tual resource s f or a r t ic ula t in g  Lo tz e 'sp l atonic commitme nts. First  o f  a ll, Lotze' s  di st inction  is not  in f a ct a di chotomy ( existence  v s. v a l idi ty) but afourfold  distinct i on am o ng  kind s o f "act ua lit y" (W irklic h kei t). T his is  a n oddtermi no logicalchoice, since at leastone of  themai n categor ies ofactuality , va lidity, do esnot  act(wi r ken)in a n ysen s e (it  has no causal ef fic a c y) . It is als o c ruc ial,int he con text  of an essay like this one, notto c o n fus e L o tze' suse of the ter m w it h Frege's.  F rege uses " actual"in a way  thatone wo uld exp e c t, givenitsety mology: t he
 Auseinandersetzung_between Michael_Dummett and Hans Sluga:_see Sluga_(1975),_(1976), (1977),_(1980);_Dummett (1973), (1976),_(1981a), (1981b), (1982)._For a discussion of_that debate, see_the_Gottfried Gabriel's Introduction to Lotze (1989a). 9 See §3 for details. 10 See Ricketts_(1986)_and (1996),_Reck_(2005)_and (2007). Platonism in Lotze_and Frege 141 mature Frege,_that there_are propositions, or, as Frege would call them,_thoughts_(Gedanken).11 In the_section "Validity and Existence in Logik, Book III," I_explain Lotze's famous distinction between existence_and validity in_Book_III_of Logik. In the_following section, "Lotze's Platonism," I put_this famous distinction in the context_of Lotze's attempt to distinguish his own_position from hypostatic Platonism and consider_one way of drawing the_distinction: the_hypostatic Platonist accepts that there_are propositions, whereas_Lotze rejects_this. In the_section "Two Perspectives on Frege's Platonism,"_I argue that_this is an unsatisfactory way of_reading_Lotze's Platonism and_that_the_Ricketts-Reck reading_of Frege is_in_fact the_correct_way of thinking about Lotze's Platonism._Validity_and Existence in Logik, Book III Although_Lotze originally introduces the_existence–validity_distinction in the broader_context of his rejection of_"hypostatic" Platonism, I am going to_explain this_distinction first_and only then turn to examining Lotze's Platonism. I proceed in_this way because the existence–validity distinction_will give us key_conceptual resources_for_articulating Lotze's platonic_commitments._First of_all, Lotze's distinction is not in fact_a dichotomy_(existence vs. validity) but a fourfold_distinction among kinds of_"actuality"_(Wirklichkeit). This is an odd terminological_choice, since at least one of_the main categories of actuality,_validity,_does_not act (wirken) in any_sense (it has no causal efficacy)._It is also_crucial, in the context of an essay_like_this one, not to confuse Lotze's_use_of the term with Frege's. Frege_uses_"actual"_in a way that one_would expect, given its etymology: the