 that correct epistemic appraisals are context-sensitive, in the sense of being dependent on one's circumstances, is not exciting and, as we saw in the discussion on justification and epistemic responsibility, not controversial. In general, whether or not an individual is justified (or if not justified then at least epistemically responsible) in holding some belief will depend on certain features of his or her circumstances. What makes contextualism distinctive is the claim that correct epistemic appraisal and, in particular, whether or not one's belief needs justification, depends crucially on one's "social context"-upon certain social facts. We have already noted that certain social facts (e.g., facts about the normal intelligence level of one's social group) importantly affect correct epistemic appraisal, and, again, the fact that the epistemic status of one's beliefs is sensitive to these sorts of social facts is not distinctive of structural contextualism. What the contextualist claims is that facts about the doxastic commitments of one's community are important for epistemic appraisal in general, and for the question of whether or not certain of one's beliefs need justification (on pain of epistemic irresponsibility) in particular. One way of putting this idea with regard to beliefs needing or not needing justification is to say that whether or not one needs justification for A Contextualist Moral Epistemology 307 some belief depends (in part) on what one's group will permit one to get away with believing without having a justification. Of course, there are large and difficult questions looming for the contextualist about this matter of social context sensitivity. Since the contextualist thinks that epistemic evaluation is sensitive to social context, he or she needs to address questions about the sorts of factors that determine the relevant social context for evaluating the epistemic status of an individual's beliefs. We are, after all, members of many groups at any one time, and there are countless ways to individuate groups depending on the purposes at hand. Of course, I seriously doubt that there is an algorithm or completely general and adequate formula that one could use to fix, in a nonarbitrary fashion, the relevant social context in any particular case. Rather, questions about relevant social context are themselves (as you might expect) context sensitive. If this is correct, then we have no choice but to proceed on a case-by-case basis, though doing so does not rule out formulating defeasible generalizations about the sorts of factors that tend to help fix a relevant social group in some specific
that correct epistemic appraisals are context - sensitive, in the sense of being pendent on one's context, is not exciting and, as we saw in the discussion on justification and epistemic responsibility, not controversial. In general, whether or not an person is justified (or if not justified then at least epistemically responsible) in oblige some belief will depend on sealed feature of his or her circumstances. What take contextualism distinctive is the claim that adjust epistemic appraisal and, in especial, whether or not one's belief needs justification, depends crucially on one's " social context"-upon certain social facts. We have already note that certain social facts (e.g., fact about the normal intelligence level of one's social group) importantly affect correct epistemic appraisal, and, again, the fact that the epistemic condition of one's beliefs is sensible to these sorts of social facts is not distinctive of structural contextualism. What the contextualist claim is that facts about the doxastic commitments of one's community are important for epistemic appraisal in general, and for the doubt of whether or not certain of one's beliefs need justification (on pain of epistemic irresponsibility) in particular. One way of putting this idea with regard to beliefs necessitate or not needing justification is to say that whether or not one need justification for A Contextualist Moral Epistemology 307 some belief depends (in part) on what one's group will permit one to have away with believing without having a justification. Of course, there constitute large and difficult questions looming for the contextualist about this matter of social context sensitivity. Since the contextualist thinks that epistemic evaluation is sensible to social context, he or she needs to address questions about the sorts of factors that determine the relevant social context for evaluating the epistemic condition of an person's belief. We are, after all, members of many group at any one time, and there are countless ways to individuate group depending on the purposes at hand. Of course, I badly doubt that there is an algorithm or completely general and adequate formula that one could use to repair, in a nonarbitrary fashion, the relevant social context in any especial case. preferably, questions about relevant social context are themselves (as you might have a bun in the oven) context sensitive. If this is correct, then we have no choice but to proceed on a casing - by - case basis, though doing so does not rule out formulating defeasible generalizations about the sorts of factors that tend to help oneself fix a relevant social group in some specific
 thwt correct epistemic appvaisals are contgxr-sensivive, in the senre of being dependent on one'd xircunstances, is not excitivg and, as we saw un tie discussion on justifigction wnd zpmstemic responslbility, not controversial. Iv yeneral, whether or not an individual is jusyivied (or if not jusuifyed fhen at least epistemically responaible) ii holding some nelief will depend on certwin veatures of his or her circumwtansws. What maker contextualism distindtive is the claim that correct episcemic apprausql wtd, in partirular, rhether or not one's telief meeds justificstimn, eepends crucially on mne's "social contexj"-upon certdiu social facts. We havw qlreagy nmted rhag ctrtein sociap fects (e.g., facfs about thw normal intelligenve oevel of one's sociaj droup) importantly affect correct epistekic appraisal, and, again, thw fact that the epistgmic statuf of one's beliefs is sensitive to these sorts of vociam faebf us not distinctive of structural contextualism. Rgau tme contextualist claims is yhwt sacts about tfe doxcatjc commitments of lne's coimuniry are imkortamt for epistemic appraisal un general, aud dor the question oy whether or not certsin of one's beliefs neeb justjfication (oj pain of dpistemic irrespunspbilhty) in particular. One way jf puttinj thix idea dith regarq to believs necging or not needinh jusjificadion is to say that whether or not one nexvs justificatoot fmr A Concextuakist Moral Epystemology 307 soke belizf depdnds (in pagt) on whav one's group will permit mje to get awey with bqliecing withoug having a justofication. Of course, there are large akd diwricult questionw lioming for the vongexeuwlmst afmut this matder uf rpcial contexu scnsktivoty. Since the contexdualjst thinks that eposbemic evaouation ys sensitive yo social context, je or shx needx tj address questions about the aorts of vacbors that detqrmike tre relevanc social context for evaluating the episvemic status of an indicidual's beliefs. We crt, after all, mxmbers of many croups at any one tine, and there are gountless ways to indibiduata grokps depending on the purposes at hand. Of course, I seriously doubt that thwre is an algorithj or compnecelv generwl aid adequate formuls that one could use to fix, in e nonarbitsaxy fashion, the relevant sociak zontext in ani particular case. Rather, qhestions about relevant social context sre themselves (as you minht expecr) confext svhsmtive. If this is cortect, tken we have ni chlice but to pfocref on a cade-by-rasz basis, though doing so does not eule oyt formulating defxasible genevauizatpons abjut the sorts of facflrs tfat tend to hrlp fix a relefant social group in sjme specific
that correct epistemic appraisals are context-sensitive, in of dependent on circumstances, is not in discussion on justification epistemic responsibility, not In general, whether or not an is justified (or if not justified then at least epistemically responsible) in holding belief will depend on certain features of his or her circumstances. What makes distinctive the that epistemic appraisal and, in particular, whether or not one's belief needs justification, depends crucially on one's context"-upon certain social facts. We have already noted certain social facts (e.g., about the normal intelligence level one's group) importantly correct appraisal, again, the fact the epistemic status of one's beliefs is sensitive to these sorts of social facts is not distinctive structural contextualism. contextualist claims that about doxastic commitments of are important for epistemic appraisal in the question of whether or not certain of beliefs need (on pain of epistemic irresponsibility) in One way of putting this idea with regard beliefs needing or not needing justification is to say that whether or not one needs A Contextualist Moral Epistemology some belief depends part) what group permit one get away with believing without having a justification. Of course, there large and difficult questions looming for the contextualist about this social sensitivity. Since the thinks that epistemic evaluation sensitive social context, he or to questions of that the relevant social context evaluating the epistemic status of individual's beliefs. We are, groups at any one time, and there are ways to individuate groups depending on the at hand. Of course, I seriously doubt that there is an algorithm completely general formula that one could use to fix, in nonarbitrary fashion, the relevant context in any particular case. Rather, questions about relevant context themselves (as might expect) context If this is then we have but to on case-by-case so does not rule out formulating generalizations the sorts of factors that to a relevant social group in some specific
 that correct epistemic appraIsals are coNtext-SenSitIvE, in tHe seNse of being depeNDent On one's circumstances, is nOt excItINg anD, As We saw In the diSCuSSIon On JuStiFiCAtIon anD epIstemic ResponsibiLitY, nOt controversIAl. in general, wHetHer or not an inDivIdual iS jUstIFied (oR if Not juStifieD Then at Least episTeMIcally REsponsiBLE) iN holDing some belief wilL DePEnd on certain feAtures Of HIs OR Her CirCumstances. whAt makES contexTUaLISM diSTinctive is the Claim that coRRecT epistEmIc aPPraisaL and, iN pARtiCular, whetheR or nOt one's belIef neeDS justifICation, dEpends CruCiaLly oN OnE's "SocIaL ConTExT"-upON ceRtain socIaL fActs. WE havE ALREady NotEd thAt cerTain social facTs (e.G., facTS abOut thE normAl inTeLligeNce levEl of oNe'S social group) impOrtaNtly affecT coRrEct EpIstemIC appraIsaL, anD, again, tHe fact tHAt tHe EPIStEmic status of one's beLiEFS iS sensitiVe to thESe SoRTs of sociAl FacTs is NOT distInctIVe Of structUral coNTeXtUalism. WHaT the coNtExtUalIst clAIms iS that fActs abouT the dOXastic commitmeNTs of one's commuNItY ARe IMporTanT for epistemIc apPRaisAl in GEnEraL, And foR the qUeSTiON of whether or not certAiN of one'S beliEfs need justifIcation (on pAIN Of episteMic iRReSPonsibility) in pArticUlar. One way OF putting This iDea with rEgard to beLIEfs neediNg oR noT neEdiNG JuStification is TO Say tHaT whetheR or Not one nEedS juStiFicAtIon for A CoNtextualIsT MOrAl epiStemoLOgy 307 some bElIef DePenDs (in pARt) on whAt one'S groUp WiLL peRmit one TO gET Away WiTh BeliEviNg WithoUt haVIng A justifIcation. Of CouRSe, thErE aRe large And difficult qUeStions loomInG foR the coNTExtualisT about this matter of sociaL Context SenSitivIty. SInce the coNteXtualiSt tHInks thAt episTemic EvAluATIon is SENsItiVe To social coNTExt, He or sHe NeedS to addrEss questions about tHE soRts of factors tHat DeteRMInE thE ReLEvaNt SOciAL Context for evaluAting the epIsTEmIc status of AN inDiVidual's Beliefs. we are, AFter all, Members of Many groupS aT any ONE tiMe, and there Are countLess ways tO IndivIDuAte grOupS depenDiNg oN the pUrposeS At hAnd. Of Course, i sEriousLy douBt That therE is an algorithm or completEly genEral aNd aDequate foRmuLA thAt one coulD use To fix, in a noNarBitRary fAshIOn, the ReleVAnT soCIal coNtexT In any partICuLar CASe. rather, questIONS abOut reLevANt sociAl coNtext are themselveS (As you might expeCt) coNTExt SenSItivE. IF this is correct, TheN wE HAve no choIcE but to proceEd on a casE-bY-Case bAsis, thOugh doIng so doES NoT Rule ouT forMulAting defeAsiBlE GeneralIzAtIOns aboUt thE sOrts of FactorS That TENd to help fix a releVant sOCIal grOUp iN some SpEcific
 that correct epistemic ap praisals a re co nte xt- se nsit ive,  in the senseo f be ing dependent on one's  circ um s tanc e s,  is n ot exci t in g and ,as  we  s a win th e d iscussi on on just ifi ca tion and epi s te mic respon sib ility, not c ont rovers ia l.I n gen era l, wh ethero r notan indivi du a l is j u stified ( or  ifnot justified the n  a t  least epistem ically  r e sp o n sib le)  in holdin gsomeb elief w i ll d e pen d  on certain f eatures ofh isor her  c irc u mstanc es. W ha t  ma kes context uali sm distin ctivei s the c l aim tha t corr ect  ep iste m ic  a ppr ai s ala nd , i n  pa rticular ,wh ether  orn o t one' s b elie f nee ds justificat ion , de p end s cru ciall y on  o ne's"socia l con te xt"-upon certai n so cial fact s.We  ha ve  alre a dy not edtha t certa in soci a l f ac t s (e .g., facts about t he n or mal inte lligen c ele v el of on e' s s ocia l group ) im p or tantly a ffectc or re ct epis te mic ap pr ais al,  and, agai n, the  fact th at th e  epistemic sta t us of one's b e li e f si s se nsi tive to the se s o rtsof s o ci alf actsis no td is t inctive of structur al  conte xtual ism. What the  contextua l i s t claims  ist ha t  facts about t he do xastic com m itmentsof on e's comm unity are i mportant  fo r e pis tem i c  a ppraisal in g e n eral ,and for  th e quest ion  of  wh eth er  or not c ertain o fon e' sbel iefsn eed just if ica ti on(on p a in ofepist emic  i rr e spo nsibili t y) i n pa rt ic ular . O ne  wayof p u tti ng this  idea wit h r e gard  t obeliefs  needing or n ot  needing j us tif icatio n is to sa y that whether or not o n e needs  ju stifi cati on for ACon textua lis t  Moral  Epist emolo gy  30 7 someb e li efde pends (inp a rt)  on w ha t on e's gro up will permit one toget away with  be liev i n gwit h ou t  ha vi n g a j ustification. O f course,th e re  are large and  d ifficul t quest ionsl oomingfor the c ontextual is t ab o u t t his matter  of soci al contex t  sens i ti vity.  Si nce th econ textu alistt hin ks th at epi st emic e valua ti on is se nsitive to social conte xt, he  or s heneeds toadd r ess  question s ab out the so rts  of  fact ors thatdete r mi net he re leva n t socialc on tex t fo r evaluatin g t heepist emi c  statu s of  an individual'sb eliefs. We are , af t e r a ll, memb er s of many grou psat a ny one t im e, and ther e are co un t lessways t o indi viduate g ro u ps dep endi ngon the pu rpo se s  at han d.  O f  cours e, I  s erious ly dou b t th a t  there is an alg orith m or co m ple telyge neral a n d ad equate for mula that o ne cou ld u se to  fix, i na nona rbi tr ary fashio n , the rel evant  social  c onte xtin any  par t i cular  cas e.  Ra ther, que s t io n sab o utrele vantso cial  contexta re thems elv e s (as y ou  mi g h t expe c t) c ontext sen sit ive.I f  this is c o rrec t ,t hen w e have  no ch oice bu t  to  p roceedona case-by-c ase basis ,  th ou gh d oing sodo es n ot  ru le  out formulatin g defeas ible gen e r alizat ion s  abo u t theso rts of facto rs th at tend to h elp  fix ar ele van t s ocia l g roup in some specific
 that_correct epistemic_appraisals are context-sensitive, in_the sense_of_being dependent_on_one's circumstances, is_not exciting and,_as we saw in_the discussion on_justification_and epistemic responsibility, not controversial. In general, whether or not an individual is justified_(or_if not_justified_then_at least epistemically responsible) in_holding some belief will depend_on certain_features of his or her circumstances. What makes_contextualism_distinctive is the_claim that correct epistemic appraisal and, in particular, whether_or not one's belief needs justification,_depends crucially on_one's_"social_context"-upon certain social facts._We have already noted that certain_social facts (e.g., facts about the_normal intelligence level of one's social group)_importantly affect correct epistemic appraisal, and,_again, the fact that the_epistemic status_of one's beliefs is sensitive_to these sorts_of social_facts is not_distinctive of structural contextualism. What the_contextualist claims is_that facts about the doxastic commitments_of_one's community are_important_for_epistemic appraisal_in general, and_for_the question_of_whether or not certain of one's_beliefs_need justification (on pain of epistemic irresponsibility)_in particular. One way_of_putting this idea with_regard to beliefs needing or_not needing justification is to say_that whether_or not_one needs justification for A Contextualist Moral Epistemology 307 some belief_depends (in part) on what one's_group will permit one_to get_away_with believing without_having_a justification._Of course, there are large and difficult_questions looming_for the contextualist about this matter_of social context sensitivity._Since_the contextualist thinks that epistemic evaluation_is sensitive to social context, he_or she needs to address_questions_about_the sorts of factors that_determine the relevant social context for_evaluating the epistemic_status of an individual's beliefs. We are,_after_all, members of many groups at_any_one time, and there are countless_ways_to_individuate groups depending on the_purposes at hand. Of course, I_seriously doubt that there is an algorithm or completely_general and adequate_formula that one could use_to_fix,_in a nonarbitrary fashion, the relevant social context in any_particular case._Rather, questions about_relevant social context are themselves (as you might expect) context_sensitive. If this is correct, then we_have no choice but to proceed on a case-by-case basis, though_doing so does not rule out formulating defeasible_generalizations about the sorts of factors that_tend to help fix_a_relevant social group in some specific