 scene in an expanded way, then, is not the consequence of an expanded representation, but of one's capacity to interact with the scene. Next, consider seeing an object. Sensorimotor theorists, following Donald MacKay, have compared the visual experience in object vision to the tactile experience of holding a bottle. The actual tactile contact with the bottle is only limited to where the fingers touch the bottle. Nevertheless, the experience is of a bottle, and not of disconnected bits of hard material. Again, one could invoke a homogenous representation to account for the experience of the whole object. Again the sensorimotor approach prefers an account in terms of being ―attuned‖ to a sensorimotor pattern (O'Regan & Noë 2001). The experience of feeling the whole bottle is then explained by the fact that one is attuned to the changes in stimulation that will occur when one makes certain movements. No representation needs to mediate, underlie or be causally involved in such a state of attunement. The same is claimed for seeing an object. To perceive a 3-D object currently seen only from one side as a 3-D object, one then does not need a representation: it suffices that one is attuned to the kinds of changes in stimulation that will result when either the object moves or when one moves with respect to it. Thirdly, take seeing a color. It is a well-known fact, named ―approximate color constancy,‖ that we more or less see the colors surfaces actually have, even if the stimulus that reaches the eye is a product of both the surface's color and the contingent current illumination. Color experience is not a response to the local light as it currently reaches you; it is sensitive to a permanent surface property. A fundamental challenge for color science is to explain how this can happen. An enactive sensorimotor approach to color experience, in line with the accounts of expanded vision and object vision above, hooks on to the temporal extendedness of color perception (Broackes 1992; Noë 2004; O'Regan 2011). The permanent property of color is identified with a reflectance profile: the way the surface reflects light under different lighting conditions. One can find out about the reflectance profile property by moving the colored object around or by observing surfaces under changing lighting conditions. Over time, one becomes sensitive to the underlying reflectance profile of a surface on the basis of minimal cues. Just as one can recognize a familiar person from a glimpse, one can
scene in an expanded way, then, is not the consequence of an expanded theatrical performance, but of one's capability to interact with the scene. Next, consider witness an aim. Sensorimotor theorists, following Donald MacKay, have compared the ocular experience in object vision to the tactile experience of apply a bottle. The actual tactile contact with the bottle is entirely limited to where the fingers partake the bottle. however, the experience is of a bottle, and not of disconnected bits of unvoiced material. Again, one could invoke a homogeneous representation to account for the experience of the whole aim. Again the sensorimotor approach prefers an account in terms of being ―attuned‖ to a sensorimotor pattern (O'Regan & Noë 2001). The experience of feel the whole bottle is then explained by the fact that one is attuned to the changes in stimulation that will happen when one makes certain movements. No representation needs to mediate, underlie or be causally involve in such a state of attunement. The same is claimed for seeing an object. To perceive a 3 - D object currently seen only from one slope as a 3 - D object, one then does not want a theatrical performance: it suffice that one is attuned to the kinds of changes in stimulation that will result when either the object moves or when one moves with deference to it. Thirdly, take seeing a color. It is a well - know fact, named ―approximate color constancy,‖ that we more or less see the colors surfaces actually have, even if the stimulation that reach the eye is a product of both the surface's semblance and the contingent current illumination. Color experience is not a response to the local light as it presently reaches you; it is sensible to a permanent surface property. A fundamental challenge for color science is to excuse how this can happen. An enactive sensorimotor approach to color experience, in line with the accounts of expand vision and object sight above, hooks on to the worldly extendedness of color perception (Broackes 1992; Noë 2004; O'Regan 2011). The permanent property of coloring material is identified with a coefficient of reflection profile: the way the surface chew over light under different lighting conditions. One can find out about the coefficient of reflection profile property by go the colored object around or by observing surfaces under changing lighting condition. Over time, one becomes sensitive to the underlying reflectance profile of a open on the footing of minimal cues. Just as one can recognize a familiar person from a glimpse, one can
 scfne in an expanded way, tmen, is not the consequeice of zn expanaed representation, but of onx's cqpaciuj to interact with thd scene. Nvxt, consieer wweing an ounect. Sekforijltor vheorists, folloeing Donalg MacKay, have woopcred the visual experience in object vision tl the tactile gxperpegce kf holding a bottle. The actual tacfile coitact with the nottle is only limited to aherf the fingers toucj the bottlg. Nedwrtheless, thd experienbz is of a bkttle, and not of disconnected bkts oy hard matetnql. Wcain, one conld innoke a homogekpus re[resentstion to accoukt foc thw experience of the wiole object. Again thg sensorimmtkr approach prefees an awcoutt iv tefms oh bsing ―ahtuied‖ to a sehsorimotor pattern (O'Regan & Noë 2001). Trv experience kf feejigg the whole bottle is then explained bj ths fact that one is attubed to the changes in stimulatyon that will occur when one makes certain movemetts. Nk rekrcfdbtwtion needs to mediate, underlie or be causallr imvplved in such c state of attunrmfny. The same is zlaimeb fkr seeing an objech. To petceive a 3-D objest cirrently seen only from one side as a 3-D ibject, one then dozs not need c reprgsentayion: it suffices that oue is zttuned to hhe kinds uf changes in stkmukadion thau will result when either tie oblect movds ot when jne moves aith vaspect to it. Thirdpy, tane seeing a folor. It is a well-known fact, named ―approximatg cmlog constaney,‖ thab we more or lefs see the colprs suryaces xctually hzve, evei if the stiiulus that redfhes the eye is a prjducr of both tfd surface's colpr and thv eontingenr current illuminabion. Zklor experience is not a response to thq poral lycht as it cusrengly teachds you; it iw senxitive to a permanend sudface property. A finqamental challende for color xcience is to explwin hmw vhis csn rappen. An enactive sensorimotod approacj tj color expewienge, ig line witk the accounts of expanded vision and oboect vision above, hooks on to the temporal txtendedness pf cojor perce[tion (Broackes 1992; Noë 2004; I'Regan 2011). The permakent property of color is idantifled with a reflectance profile: the way the surface reflects light under duffereit lighting ckndiyions. Oue ean finq ouv ebout the reflectsnce profile property by moving the colmrzd object around or by observone surfaces unaer changing lighting cohditions. Over time, one becomes sensitivr to the underlying reflcctance peofils of a surhace on the basis of minimcl cuew. Just qs oke can recognixe s namiliar pfrsoi fxom a glimpse, one can
scene in an expanded way, then, is consequence an expanded but of one's scene. consider seeing an Sensorimotor theorists, following MacKay, have compared the visual experience object vision to the tactile experience of holding a bottle. The actual tactile with the bottle is only limited to where the fingers touch the bottle. the is a and not of disconnected bits of hard material. Again, one could invoke a homogenous representation to for the experience of the whole object. Again sensorimotor approach prefers an in terms of being ―attuned‖ a pattern (O'Regan Noë The of feeling the bottle is then explained by the fact that one is attuned to the changes in stimulation that occur when certain movements. representation to underlie or be in such a state of attunement. claimed for seeing an object. To perceive a object currently only from one side as a object, one then does not need a representation: suffices that one is attuned to the kinds of changes in stimulation that will result the object moves or one moves with to Thirdly, seeing color. It a well-known fact, named ―approximate color constancy,‖ that we more or see the colors surfaces actually have, even if the stimulus the is a product both the surface's color the current illumination. Color experience a to as currently you; it is sensitive a permanent surface property. A challenge for color science can happen. An enactive sensorimotor approach to color in line with the accounts of expanded and object vision above, hooks on to the temporal extendedness of color (Broackes 1992; O'Regan 2011). The permanent property of color is with a reflectance profile: way the surface reflects light under different lighting conditions. can out about reflectance profile property moving the colored around or by under changing conditions. time, to the underlying reflectance profile of surface the basis of minimal cues. as recognize a familiar person from a glimpse, one can
 scene in an expanded way, then, iS not the conSequeNce Of aN eXpanDed rEpresentation, bUT of oNe's capacity to interact wIth thE sCEne. NEXt, ConsiDer seeiNG aN OBjeCt. seNsoRiMOtOr theOriSts, follOwing DonalD MaCKAy, have comparED tHe visual exPerIence in objecT viSion to ThE taCTile eXpeRiencE of holDIng a boTtle. The acTuAL tactiLE contacT WItH the Bottle is only limitED tO Where the fingerS touch ThE BoTTLe. NEveRtheless, thE eXperiENce is of A BoTTLE, anD Not of disconneCted bits of hARd mAteriaL. AGaiN, One couLd invOkE A hoMogenous repReseNtation to AccounT For the eXPeriencE of the WhoLe oBjecT. agAiN thE sENsoRImOtoR AppRoach preFeRs An accOunt IN TERms oF beIng ―aTtuneD‖ to a sensorimoTor PattERn (O'regan & noë 2001). ThE expErIence Of feelIng thE wHole bottle is theN expLained by tHe fAcT thAt One is ATtuned To tHe cHanges iN stimulATioN tHAT WiLl occur when one makeS cERTaIn movemeNts. No rEPrEsENtation nEeDs tO medIATe, undErliE Or Be causalLy invoLVeD iN such a sTaTe of atTuNemEnt. the saME is cLaimed For seeinG an obJEct. To perceive a 3-d Object currentLY sEEN oNLy frOm oNe side as a 3-D oBjecT, One tHen dOEs Not NEed a rEpresEnTAtIOn: it suffices that one Is AttuneD to thE kinds of changEs in stimulATIOn that wiLl reSUlT When either the oBject Moves or wheN One moves With rEspect to It. Thirdly, TAKe seeing A coLor. it iS a wELL-kNown fact, named ―APProxImAte coloR coNstancy,‖ ThaT we MorE or LeSs see the cOlors surFaCeS aCtUalLy havE, Even if thE sTimUlUs tHat reAChes thE eye iS a prOdUcT Of bOth the sURfACE's coLoR aNd thE coNtIngenT curREnt IlluminAtion. ColoR exPErieNcE iS not a reSponse to the loCaL light as it CuRreNtly reACHes you; it Is sensitive to a permanent SUrface pRopErty. A FundAmental chAllEnge foR coLOr scieNce is tO explAiN hoW THis caN HApPen. an Enactive seNSOriMotor ApProaCh to colOr experience, in line WIth The accounts of ExpAndeD VIsIon ANd OBjeCt VIsiON Above, hooks on to tHe temporal ExTEnDedness of cOLor PeRceptioN (BroackEs 1992; Noë 2004; o'regan 2011). ThE permanenT property Of ColoR IS idEntified wiTh a refleCtance proFIle: thE WaY the sUrfAce refLeCts Light Under dIFfeRent lIghtinG cOnditiOns. OnE cAn find ouT about the reflectance proFile prOpertY by Moving the ColORed Object aroUnd oR by observiNg sUrfAces uNdeR ChangIng lIGhTinG CondiTionS. over time, oNE bEcoMES sEnsitive to tHE UNdeRlyinG reFLectanCe prOfile of a surface on THe basis of minimAl cuES. jusT as ONe caN rEcognize a familIar PeRSOn from a gLiMpse, one can
 scene in an expanded way,  then, isnot t hecon se quen ce o f an expandedr epre sentation, but of one' s cap ac i ty t o  i ntera ct with th e sce ne .Nex t, co nside r s eeing a n object.Sen so rimotor theo r is ts, follow ing  Donald MacK ay,  haveco mpa r ed th e v isual  exper i ence i n objectvi s ion to the tac t i le  exp erience of holdin g  a bottle. The ac tual t ac t il e con tac t with the  b ottle is only li m i t edt o where the f ingers touc h  th e bott le . N e verthe less,  t h e e xperience i s of  a bottle , andn ot of d i sconnec ted bi tsofhard ma te ria l. Aga i n,  on e  co uld invo ke  a  homo geno u s r epre sen tati on to  account forthe  exp e rie nce o f the  who le  obje ct. Ag ain t he  sensorimotor a ppro ach prefe rsan  ac co unt i n  terms  of  be ing ―at tuned‖t o a  s e n s or imotor pattern (O' Re g a n& Noë 20 01). T h eex p erienceof  fe elin g the w hole bo ttle isthen e x pl ai ned byth e fact  t hat  on e isa ttun ed tothe chan ges i n  stimulation t h at will occur wh e n  o n e ma kes  certain mo veme n ts.No r e pr ese n tatio n nee ds to mediate, underlie o rbe cau sally  involved insuch a sta t e of attun emen t .T he same is cla imedfor seeing an objec t. To  perceiv e a 3-D o b j ect curr ent lysee n o n l yfrom one side a s a3- D objec t,one the n d oes  no t n ee d a repre sentatio n:  i tsu ffi ces t h at one i satt un edto th e  kinds  of c hang es  i n  st imulati o nt h at w il lresu ltwh en ei ther the  object  moves or  wh e n on emo ves wit h respect toit . Thirdly,  t ake  seein g a color.  It is a well-known fac t , named  ―a pprox imat e color c ons tancy, ‖ t h at wemore o r les ssee t he co l o rs  su rf aces actua l l y h ave,ev en i f the s timulus that reach e s t he eye is a p rod ucto f  b oth th e  su rf a ce' s color and the c ontingentcu r re nt illumin a tio n.  Colorexperie nce i s  not aresponseto the lo ca l li g h t a s it curre ntly rea ches you; it is se nsiti veto a p er man ent s urface pro perty . A fu nd amenta l cha ll enge for  color science is to ex plainhow t his  can happ en. Anenactivesens orimotor a ppr oac h tocol o r exp erie n ce , i n  line  wit h  the acco u nt s o f ex panded visi o n and  obje ctv isionabov e, hooks on to th e  temporal exte nded n e ssofc olor  p erception (Bro ack es 1 992; Noë  2 004; O'Rega n 2011).  T h e per manent  prope rty ofc o lo r  is id enti fie d with aref le c tance p ro fi l e: the  way  t he sur face r e flec t s  light under dif feren t light i ngcondi ti ons. On e  can  find outabout the r eflect ance  prof ile pro pe rty by  mo vi ng the col o red objec t aro und orby  obs erv ing su rfac e s  unde r ch an gin g lightin g co n di ti o ns.  Ove r tim e,  one  becomess ensitive  to the und er lyi n g  refle c ta n c e profileofa sur f a ce on theb asis of minim al cue s. Jus t as on e  ca nrecogni zea familiarperson fr o m a  g limp se, oneca n
 scene_in an_expanded way, then, is_not the_consequence_of an_expanded_representation, but of_one's capacity to_interact with the scene._Next, consider seeing_an_object. Sensorimotor theorists, following Donald MacKay, have compared the visual experience in object vision_to_the tactile_experience_of_holding a bottle. The actual_tactile contact with the bottle_is only_limited to where the fingers touch the bottle._Nevertheless,_the experience is_of a bottle, and not of disconnected bits of_hard material. Again, one could invoke_a homogenous representation_to_account_for the experience of_the whole object. Again the sensorimotor_approach prefers an account in terms_of being ―attuned‖ to a sensorimotor pattern_(O'Regan & Noë 2001). The experience_of feeling the whole bottle_is then_explained by the fact that_one is attuned_to the_changes in stimulation_that will occur when one makes_certain movements. No_representation needs to mediate, underlie or_be_causally involved in_such_a_state of_attunement. The same_is_claimed for_seeing_an object. To perceive a 3-D_object_currently seen only from one side as_a 3-D object, one_then_does not need a_representation: it suffices that one_is attuned to the kinds of_changes in_stimulation that_will result when either the object moves or when one moves_with respect to it. Thirdly, take_seeing a color. It_is a_well-known_fact, named ―approximate_color_constancy,‖ that_we more or less see the colors_surfaces actually_have, even if the stimulus that_reaches the eye is_a_product of both the surface's color_and the contingent current illumination. Color_experience is not a response_to_the_local light as it currently_reaches you; it is sensitive to_a permanent surface_property. A fundamental challenge for color science_is_to explain how this can happen._An_enactive sensorimotor approach to color experience,_in_line_with the accounts of expanded_vision and object vision above, hooks_on to the temporal extendedness of color perception (Broackes_1992; Noë 2004;_O'Regan 2011). The permanent property_of_color_is identified with a reflectance profile: the way the surface_reflects light_under different lighting_conditions. One can find out about the reflectance profile property_by moving the colored object around or_by observing surfaces under changing lighting conditions. Over time, one becomes_sensitive to the underlying reflectance profile of a_surface on the basis of minimal cues._Just as one can_recognize_a familiar person from a glimpse, one_can