 Response to an Objection In the next section, I will consider possible (and actual) rival proposals. But before that, I need to address a simple objection: meaning-forms are abstractions from meanings; if sameness of an abstraction from meanings is sufficient for synonymy, why not other abstractions?14 For instance, the following is an abstraction from the Character Rule Form for "I": Character Rule Form Abstraction: The meaning of T is the following rule: every token of T refers to something. If sameness of Character Rule Form Abstraction were sufficient for synonymy, "today" and "I" would count as synonymous. The challenge, then, is to explain why abstracting away the expression is as far as abstraction should go, and, thus, why we cannot also abstract away other features of meaning. There are two parts to this challenge. The most obvious one can be posed as a slippery slope problem: if we start abstracting some features of meaning, why not others? The second part is one of motivation: is there any good reason to abstract away the expression from the meaning of some expressions, or is it merely an ad hoc way to regain some semblance of synonymy for token-reflexive expressions? I will begin with the second part, because it will help answer the first part. Token-reflexive meanings differ from non-reflexive ones because their formulation mentions the expression whose meanings they are. If synonymy is to have anything to do with translation between two different languages, there had better be a way to look past the expression itself, and find something that two expressions have in common. And "I" and "je" have everything semantically relevant in common, except their identity. For token-reflexives, then, abstracting away the expression itself is just the right way to get at a sharable meaning. Which brings us back to the slippery slope problem. Nobody, I assume, would deny that "I" and "today" have some aspect of meaning in common. If all their tokens are indeed guaranteed 14Thanks to Fiona Doherty for posing this problem. 15 to refer to something, then they have that in common.15 But this sameness does not warrant their being good default translations of each other, nor does learning what one means, and then being told that the other is just like it, suffice for knowing what the other means. I claim, then, that this slope is not all that slippery, and
Response to an Objection In the next section, I will consider potential (and actual) rival proposal. But before that, I need to address a childlike protest: meaning - forms are abstractions from meaning; if sameness of an abstractedness from meanings is sufficient for synonymy, why not other abstractions?14 For instance, the following is an abstraction from the Character Rule Form for " I ": Character Rule Form abstractedness: The meaning of T is the following rule: every token of T refer to something. If sameness of Character Rule Form Abstraction were sufficient for synonymy, " today " and " I " would count as synonymous. The challenge, then, is to explain why abstracting away the expression is equally far as abstraction should go, and, thus, why we cannot besides abstract away other features of meaning. There are two parts to this challenge. The about obvious one can be posed as a slippery gradient problem: if we start abstracting some features of meaning, why not others? The second function is one of motivation: is there any good reason to abstract away the expression from the meaning of some expression, or is it merely an ad hoc way to regain some semblance of synonymy for token - reflexive expressions? I will begin with the second part, because it will help answer the inaugural part. Token - automatic meaning disagree from non - reflexive ones because their formulation mentions the expression whose meanings they are. If synonymy is to have anything to do with transformation between two different languages, there had better be a way to look past the expression itself, and find something that two expressions have in common. And " I " and " je " have everything semantically relevant in common, except their identity. For keepsake - reflexives, then, abstract away the formula itself is just the right way to get at a sharable meaning. Which institute us back to the slippery slope problem. Nobody, I assume, would traverse that " I " and " today " have some expression of meaning in common. If all their tokens are indeed guarantee 14Thanks to Fiona Doherty for posing this trouble. 15 to refer to something, then they have that in common.15 But this sameness does not warrant their being good nonpayment translations of each early, nor does learning what one means, and then being tell that the other is just like it, suffice for sleep together what the other means. I claim, then, that this slope is not all that slippery, and
 Redponse to an Objection Ik the next section, I winl conaider porsible (and actual) rival proplsqls. Byt before that, I need go addresd a simpoe oujection: meaning-hkrms arc absfvactimis from meaningx; if samenass of an abstsaztnon from meanings is sufficient for fynonymu, ahy not other wbstgastiohs?14 For instance, the following is ah abstrection from the Character Rule Form for "I": Chagacter Rule Form Ahstraction: Jge iwaning of T ks the following rule: gvery token of T refers to sometfing. Nf sameness od Cjdracter Rulx Form Abstraction were suxficieny for synonymy, "tovay" qnd "I" would count as vynonymous. The chajlenge, than, is to explain wht qbstrdctitg adqy ghe eeprsssion is as far as abstractiob should go, and, thux, ryy we cannot zlso afseract away other features of meaning. Thtre ade two parts to this chqllenge. The most obvilus one cwn be posed as a slippery slope problem: if we stast abagraeblng rimf features of meaning, why not others? The secogs karn is one of motivction: is there amy gpjd reason to xbstraef zway the expressioj from jhe meqning of fome expressions, or is it merelt an ad hoc cay to regain some selblance of rynomymy gor token-reflexive exprzssiona? I will behin with ffe second part, bdcalse ht will help answer the fiwst part. Voken-xeflexivd mesnings differ frlm nok-seflexive ones becwuse jheir xormulatioj mentions the expression whose meanings they ase. Pf synonyiy is to have anytring to do witk translction cetween twk diffecent languagqs, there had tgtter be a wab to look pasr thw exprerrion itself, anc find something thqt two expressions haxs in common. And "I" qnd "je" have evetytfind dekagdically releeant in vommov, excepu tmeif idrntity. For token-reflaxivss, then, abstractinb wway the expressyon itself is just the right waj to jet at a shsrafle meaning. Which brings us badk to the sllppery slope [roboem. Nobody, I assume, would deny that "I" and "today" havx some aspect of meanint in common. If all jhelr tokens arx indeqd guarandeed 14Thanks to Fiona Doherty for posikg this problem. 15 to rerer to somehhing, then they have that in common.15 But this sameness does not warrant thwir bemnd good defahlt yransnacious of ewch lvher, nor does leagning what one means, and then bemng told tvac the other is just like it, sifwice for knowkng what the other means. I claim, then, that this slope is not alk that slippery, and
Response to an Objection In the next will possible (and rival proposals. But address simple objection: meaning-forms abstractions from meanings; sameness of an abstraction from meanings sufficient for synonymy, why not other abstractions?14 For instance, the following is an from the Character Rule Form for "I": Character Rule Form Abstraction: The meaning T the rule: token of T refers to something. If sameness of Character Rule Form Abstraction were sufficient for "today" and "I" would count as synonymous. The then, is to explain abstracting away the expression is far abstraction should and, why cannot also abstract other features of meaning. There are two parts to this challenge. The most obvious one can be as a problem: if start some of meaning, why The second part is one of any good reason to abstract away the expression the meaning some expressions, or is it merely ad hoc way to regain some semblance of for token-reflexive expressions? I will begin with the second part, because it will help answer part. Token-reflexive meanings differ non-reflexive ones because formulation the whose they are. synonymy is to have anything to do with translation between two languages, there had better be a way to look past itself, find something that expressions have in common. "I" "je" have everything semantically common, their then, away expression itself is just right way to get at sharable meaning. Which brings slope problem. Nobody, I assume, would deny that and "today" have some aspect of meaning common. If all their tokens are indeed guaranteed 14Thanks to Fiona Doherty posing this to refer to something, then they have that common.15 But this sameness not warrant their being good default translations of each nor learning what means, and then told that the is just like for knowing the means. that this slope is not all slippery,
 Response to an Objection In thE next sectiOn, I wiLl cOnsIdEr poSsibLe (and actual) rivAL proPosals. But before that, I neEd to aDdREss a SImPle obJection: MEaNINg-fOrMs Are AbSTrActioNs fRom meanIngs; if sameNesS oF an abstractiON fRom meaningS is Sufficient foR syNonymy, WhY noT Other AbsTractIons?14 FoR InstanCe, the follOwINg is an ABstractION fRom tHe Character Rule FoRM fOR "I": Character RulE Form ABsTRaCTIon: the Meaning of T Is The foLLowing rULe: EVERy tOKen of T refers tO something. IF SamEness oF CHarACter RuLe ForM ABStrAction were sUffiCient for sYnonymY, "Today" anD "i" would cOunt as SynOnyMous. tHe ChAllEnGE, thEN, iS to EXplAin why abStRaCting Away THE EXpreSsiOn is As far As abstraction ShoUld gO, And, Thus, wHy we cAnnoT aLso abStract Away oThEr features of meaNing. there are tWo pArTs tO tHis chALlenge. the MosT obviouS one can BE poSeD AS A sLippery slope probleM: iF WE sTart abstRactinG SoMe FEatures oF mEanIng, wHY Not otHers? tHe Second paRt is onE Of MoTivatioN: iS there AnY goOd rEason TO absTract aWay the exPressIOn from the meaniNG of some expresSIoNS, Or IS it mEreLy an ad hoc waY to rEGain Some SEmBlaNCe of sYnonyMy FOr TOken-reflexive expresSiOns? I wiLl begIn with the secoNd part, becaUSE It will heLp anSWeR The first part. ToKen-reFlexive meaNIngs diffEr froM non-reflExive ones BECause theIr fOrmUlaTioN MEnTions the expreSSIon wHoSe meaniNgs They are. if sYnoNymY is To Have anythIng to do wItH tRaNsLatIon beTWeen two dIfFerEnT laNguagES, there Had beTter Be A wAY to Look pasT ThE EXpreSsIoN itsElf, AnD find SomeTHinG that twO expressiOns HAve iN cOmMon. And "I" And "je" have everYtHing semantIcAllY relevANT in commoN, except their identity. For TOken-refLexIves, tHen, aBstractinG awAy the eXprESsion iTself iS just ThE riGHT way tO GEt At a ShArable meanING. WhIch brInGs us Back to tHe slippery slope proBLem. nobody, I assume, WouLd deNY ThAt "I" ANd "TOdaY" hAVe sOME aspect of meaninG in common. IF aLL tHeir tokens ARe iNdEed guarAnteed 14THanks TO Fiona DOherty for Posing thiS pRoblEM. 15 To rEfer to someThing, theN they have THat in COmMon.15 BuT thIs sameNeSs dOes noT warraNT thEir beIng gooD dEfault TransLaTions of eAch other, nor does learning What onE meanS, anD then beinG toLD thAt the otheR is jUst like it, sUffIce For knOwiNG what The oTHeR meANs. I clAim, tHEn, that thiS SlOpe IS NoT all that sliPPERy, aNd
 Response to an ObjectionIn the nex t sec tio n,Iwill  con sider possible (and  actual) rival proposa ls. B ut befo r ethat,  I need to a ddr es sa s im p le  obje cti on: mea ning-forms  ar eabstractions fr om meaning s;if samenessofan abs tr act i on fr ommeani ngs is suffic ient forsy n onymy, why not o th er a bstractions?14 Fo r  i n stance, the fo llowin gi sa n  ab str action fro mthe C h aracter Ru l e For m  for "I": Cha racter Rule For m Abst ra cti o n: The  mean in g  of  T is the f ollo wing rule : ever y  tokeno f T ref ers to  so met hing .  I fsam en e sso fCha r act er RuleFo rm  Abst ract i o n were  su ffic ientfor synonymy,  "t oday "  an d "I"  woul d co un t assynony mous.  T he challenge, t hen,  is to ex pla in  wh yabstr a ctingawa y t he expr essioni s a sf a r  a s abstraction shou ld g o,  and, th us, wh y  w ec annot al so  ab stra c t  away  oth e rfeatures  of me a ni ng . There  a re two  p art s t o thi s  cha llenge . The mo st ob v ious one can b e  posed as a s l ip p e ry slop e p roblem: ifwe s t artabst r ac tin g  some  feat ur e so f meaning, why notot hers?The s econd part is  one of mo t i v ation: i s th e re any good reaso n toabstract a w ay the e xpres sion fro m the mea n i ng of so meexp res sio n s ,or is it mere l y  anad  hoc wa y t o regai n s ome  se mbl an ce of syn onymy fo rto ke n- ref lexiv e  express io ns?  I  wi ll be g in wit h the  sec on dp art , becau s ei t  wil lhe lp a nsw er  thefirs t  pa rt. Tok en-reflex ive mean in gs  differ  from non-ref le xive onesbe cau se the i r  formula tion mentions the expre s sion wh ose  mean ings  they are . I f syno nym y  is to  haveanyth in g t o do wi t h  t ran sl ation betw e e n t wo di ff eren t langu ages, there had be t ter  be a way toloo k pa s t  t hee xp r ess io n  it s e lf, and find so mething th at tw o expressi o nsha ve in c ommon.And " I " and " je" haveeverythin gsema n t ica lly releva nt in co mmon, exc e pt th e ir  iden tit y. For  t oke n-ref lexive s , t hen,abstra ct ing aw ay th eexpressi on itself is just the r ight w ay to  ge t at a sh ara b lemeaning.Whic h brings u s b ack  to t hes lippe ry s l op e p r oblem . No b ody, I as s um e,w o ul d deny that " I " a nd "t oda y " have  som e aspect of meani n g in common. I f al l the irt oken sare indeed gua ran te e d  14Thank sto Fiona Do herty fo rp osing  thisproble m. 15 t o re f er tosome thi ng, thenthe yh ave tha tin common .15Bu t this  samen e ss d o e s not warrant th eir b e i ng go o d d efaul ttransla t ions  of each o ther, nor d oes le arni ng wh at oneme ans, a ndth en being t o ld that t he ot her isju st l ike  it, s uffi c e  forknow in g w hat the o t h er me an s . I  cla im, t he n, t hat thiss lope isnot all tha tsli p p ery, a n d
 Response_to an_Objection In the next_section, I_will_consider possible_(and_actual) rival proposals._But before that,_I need to address_a simple objection:_meaning-forms_are abstractions from meanings; if sameness of an abstraction from meanings is sufficient for_synonymy,_why not_other_abstractions?14_For instance, the following is_an abstraction from the Character_Rule Form_for "I": Character Rule Form Abstraction: The meaning_of_T is the_following rule: every token of T refers to something._If sameness of Character Rule Form_Abstraction were sufficient_for_synonymy,_"today" and "I" would_count as synonymous. The challenge, then,_is to explain why abstracting away_the expression is as far as abstraction_should go, and, thus, why we_cannot also abstract away other_features of_meaning. There are two parts_to this challenge._The most_obvious one can_be posed as a slippery slope_problem: if we_start abstracting some features of meaning,_why_not others? The_second_part_is one_of motivation: is_there_any good_reason_to abstract away the expression from_the_meaning of some expressions, or is it_merely an ad hoc_way_to regain some semblance_of synonymy for token-reflexive expressions?_I will begin with the second_part, because_it will_help answer the first part. Token-reflexive meanings differ from non-reflexive ones_because their formulation mentions the expression_whose meanings they are._If synonymy_is_to have anything_to_do with_translation between two different languages, there had_better be_a way to look past the_expression itself, and find_something_that two expressions have in common._And "I" and "je" have everything_semantically relevant in common, except_their_identity._For token-reflexives, then, abstracting away_the expression itself is just the_right way to_get at a sharable meaning. Which brings_us_back to the slippery slope problem._Nobody,_I assume, would deny that "I"_and_"today"_have some aspect of meaning_in common. If all their tokens_are indeed guaranteed 14Thanks to Fiona Doherty for posing_this problem. 15_to refer to something, then_they_have_that in common.15 But this sameness does not warrant their_being good_default translations of_each other, nor does learning what one means, and then_being told that the other is just_like it, suffice for knowing what the other means. I claim,_then, that this slope is not all that_slippery, and