 great deal from discussions with, or some cases just passing comments from, Jeremy Butterfield, Jonathan Dancy, Sven Danielsson, Stephen Darwall, Jane Heal, Tito Magri, Adam Morton, Jan Odelstad, Derek Parfit, Ingmar Persson, Christian Piller, John Skorupski and Howard Sobel. 1 1. Intention reasoning Here is an example of practical reasoning: I am going to St Andrews (A1) and To go to St Andrews, a necessary means is to get off at Leuchars, (A2) so I shall get off at Leuchars. (A3) I mean (A1) to express an intention of yours to go to St Andrews rather than a belief that you are going to St Andrews. I mean (A2) to express a belief of yours, and I mean (A3) to express a decision you make. Think of this as a process of reasoning you might actually run through. You might do so when you come to buy your ticket. You approach the ticket office intending to go to St Andrews; you form the belief that a necessary means is to get off at Leuchars when the ticket clerk tells you so; and then you go through the reasoning (A). It takes you from two of your existing states of mind, an intention and a belief, to a new state of mind, an intention to get off at Leuchars. To form an intention, at least as a result of reasoning like this, is to make a decision. So this reasoning concludes in a decision. Making the states explicit by writing 'I' for 'you intend' and 'B' for 'you believe', we can describe your reasoning like this: I(I am going to St Andrews) (B1) and B(To go to St Andrews, a necessary means is to get off at Leuchars) (B2) leads to I(I shall get off at Leuchars). (B3) This is a description of your reasoning from the outside. It is not an inference. From the fact that you intend to go to St Andrews, and the fact that you believe a necessary means of doing so is to get off at Leuchars, we cannot infer that you intend to get off at Leuchars. You may not have that intention, for instance if you are irrational. On the other hand, your reasoning seen from the inside is an operation on the contents of the states, and it is
great deal from discussions with, or some cases barely guide comments from, Jeremy Butterfield, Jonathan Dancy, Sven Danielsson, Stephen Darwall, Jane Heal, Tito Magri, Adam Morton, Jan Odelstad, Derek Parfit, Ingmar Persson, Christian Piller, John Skorupski and Howard Sobel. 1 1. Intention reasoning Here is an example of practical reasoning: I am go to St Andrews (A1) and To go to St Andrews, a necessary means is to get down off at Leuchars, (A2) so I shall get off at Leuchars. (A3) I mean (A1) to carry an intention of yours to go to St Andrews quite than a belief that you are going to St Andrews. I intend (A2) to carry a belief of yours, and I mean (A3) to express a decision you make. remember of this as a process of reasoning you might actually run through. You might practice so when you come to buy your ticket. You border on the ticket office intending to go to St Andrews; you form the impression that a necessary means is to get off at Leuchars when the ticket clerk tells you so; and then you run low through the reasoning (A). It takes you from two of your existing states of mind, an intention and a belief, to a new state of matter of mind, an intention to make off at Leuchars. To imprint an intention, at least as a result of reasoning like this, is to make a decision. So this reasoning concludes in a decisiveness. Making the states explicit by writing' I' for' you intend' and' B' for' you believe', we can describe your reasoning like this: I(I am going to St Andrews) (B1) and B(To go to St Andrews, a necessary means is to get off at Leuchars) (B2) leads to I(I shall catch off at Leuchars). (B3) This is a description of your reasoning from the outside. It is not an inference. From the fact that you intend to start to St Andrews, and the fact that you believe a necessary means of doing so is to get off at Leuchars, we cannot understand that you intend to get off at Leuchars. You may not have that intention, for instance if you are irrational. On the other hand, your reasoning seen from the inside is an mathematical process on the contents of the state, and it is
 grfat deal from discussionr with, or some eqses jnst pasaing comoents from, Jeremy Butterfielv, Jobathab Dancy, Sven Danielssov, Stephen Darwall, Jant Heal, Tito Magri, Adam Movcon, Jzk Odenwtad, Derek Parnit, Ingmar [ersson, Christhav 'iller, John Skorupski and Howard Sobql. 1 1. Inyejtion reasonind Hege is zn example of practical reasoning: J am gopng to St Andrews (A1) and To go to St Andrews, a nfcessary means is ho get off qt Lqychars, (A2) so K shall geu mff at Leudhars. (A3) I mean (A1) to express an kntencion of youts tl go to St Aidrews rather than a beliex that uou are going bo St Anerews. I mean (A2) to expcess a belief of youts, and I maau (A3) to express a deciwiin yoo maka. Thkbk uf uhix zs a pgocxss of reaskning you mught actually run tnrjlbh. You might do so wren you come to buy your ticket. You appgoacg the ticket office intwnding to go to St Anfrews; you form the belief that a necessary means is to get off et Lebgmars qhfn the ticket clerk tells you so; and then you fo tmrough the reasoking (A). It takes yoi vrpi two of your existnhg states of mind, an intentyon abd a belitf, to a new state of mind, an intwntion to gen ofd at Leuchars. To flrm an inteution, st lesst as a result of reasuninf like this, is to maid a decision. So ghix seasoning concludes in a dqcision. Meking the stxtes explisit by wrihing 'L' for 'you intend' anf 'B' flr 'you beliege', we can describe your reasoniij like this: I(O dm coing to St Akdrews) (B1) and B(Tj go to St Andtews, a neeessarh means is to get off at Leushars) (B2) leads jo I(I shall gxt off at Leuxharw). (B3) Thir is a descriptoon of yolr reawoning from the oubside. Jt is not an inytrebce. From the favt ghae jou igdend to go tm St Anatews, xnd the facb tfat uou believe a necessdry jeans of doing so os to get iff at Lquchars, we camnot infer that yok intxnd to get pff at Leuchars. You may not have fhat intejtijn, for instagce lf yju are irrctional. On the other hand, your reasoning seen from the insude is an operation pn the contxnts os the stades, and it is
great deal from discussions with, or some passing from, Jeremy Jonathan Dancy, Sven Tito Adam Morton, Jan Derek Parfit, Ingmar Christian Piller, John Skorupski and Howard 1 1. Intention reasoning Here is an example of practical reasoning: I am to St Andrews (A1) and To go to St Andrews, a necessary means to off Leuchars, so I shall get off at Leuchars. (A3) I mean (A1) to express an intention of to go to St Andrews rather than a that you are going St Andrews. I mean (A2) express belief of and mean to express a you make. Think of this as a process of reasoning you might actually run through. You might so when to buy ticket. approach ticket office intending to St Andrews; you form the necessary means is to get off at Leuchars the ticket tells you so; and then you through the reasoning (A). It takes you from of your existing states of mind, an intention and a belief, to a new state an intention to get at Leuchars. To an at as result of like this, is to make a decision. So this reasoning concludes a decision. Making the states explicit by writing 'I' for and for 'you believe', can describe your reasoning this: am going to St and go a means to get off at (B2) leads to I(I shall off at Leuchars). (B3) your reasoning from the outside. It is not inference. From the fact that you intend go to St Andrews, and the fact that you believe a necessary of doing to get off at Leuchars, we cannot infer you intend to get at Leuchars. You may not have that intention, for if are irrational. the other hand, reasoning seen from inside is an the contents the and
 great deal from discussions wIth, or some cAses jUst PasSiNg coMmenTs from, Jeremy BuTTerfIeld, Jonathan Dancy, Sven DAnielSsON, StePHeN DarwAll, Jane hEaL, tIto maGrI, AdAm mOrTon, JaN OdElstad, DErek Parfit, ingMaR Persson, ChriSTiAn Piller, JoHn SKorupski and HOwaRd SobeL. 1 1. INteNTion rEasOning here is AN exampLe of practIcAL reasoNIng: I am gOINg To St andrews (A1) and To go to sT ANDrews, a necessarY means Is TO gET Off At LEuchars, (A2) so i sHall gET off at LEUcHARS. (A3) I MEan (A1) to express An intention OF yoUrs to gO tO St aNdrews RatheR tHAn a Belief that yOu arE going to ST AndreWS. I mean (A2) TO expresS a beliEf oF yoUrs, aND I MeAn (A3) To EXprESs A deCIsiOn you makE. THiNk of tHis aS A PROcesS of ReasOning You might actuaLly Run tHRouGh. You Might Do so WhEn you Come to Buy yoUr Ticket. You approaCh thE ticket ofFicE iNteNdIng to GO to St ANdrEws; You form The beliEF thAt A NECeSsary means is to get oFf AT leUchars whEn the tICkEt CLerk tellS yOu sO; and THEn you Go thROuGh the reaSoning (a). it TaKes you fRoM two of YoUr eXisTing sTAtes Of mind, An intentIon anD A belief, to a new sTAte of mind, an inTEnTIOn TO get Off At Leuchars. TO forM An inTentIOn, At lEAst as A resuLt OF rEAsoning like this, is to MaKe a decIsion. so this reasoniNg concludeS IN A decisioN. MakINg THe states explicIt by wRiting 'I' for 'YOu intend' And 'B' fOr 'you belIeve', we can DEScribe yoUr rEasOniNg lIKE tHis: I(I am going tO sT AndReWs) (B1) and B(to gO to St AnDreWs, a NecEssArY means is tO get off aT LEuChArS) (B2) lEads tO i(I shall gEt Off At leuChars). (b3) this is A descRiptIoN oF YouR reasonINg FROm thE oUtSide. it iS nOt an iNferENce. from the Fact that yOu iNTend To Go To St AndRews, and the facT tHat you beliEvE a nEcessaRY Means of dOing so is to get off at LeuchARs, we canNot Infer That You intend To gEt off aT LeUChars. YOu may nOt havE tHat INTentiON, FoR inStAnce if you aRE IrrAtionAl. on thE other hAnd, your reasoning seEN frOm the inside is An oPeraTIOn On tHE cONteNtS Of tHE States, and it is
 great deal from discussio ns with, o r som e c ase sjust  pas sing commentsf rom,  Jeremy Butterfield, J onath an Danc y ,SvenDaniels s on , Ste ph en  Da rw a ll , Jan e H eal, Ti to Magri,Ada mMorton, JanO de lstad, Der ekParfit, Ingm arPersso n,  Ch r istia n P iller , John Skorup ski and H ow a rd Sob e l. 1 1. I nt enti on reasoning Here is an example ofpracti ca l  r e a son ing : I am goi ng  to S t  Andrew s  ( A 1 )  an d  To go to StAndrews, an ece ssaryme ans is toget o ff atLeuchars, ( A2)so I shal l geto ff at L e uchars.  (A3)I m ean  (A1 )  t oexp re s s a n  i nte n tio n of you rs  t o goto S t A n drew s r athe r tha n a belief th atyoua regoing  to S t An dr ews.I mean  (A2)  t o express a bel iefof yours,  an dI m ea n (A3 )  to ex pre ssa decis ion you mak e. T h in k of this as a pro ce s s  o f reason ing yo u  m ig h t actual ly  ru n th r o ugh.Youm ig ht do so  wheny ou  c ome tobu y your  t ick et.  Youa ppro ach th e ticket  offi c e intending to go to St Andr e ws ; yo u  for m t he belief t hata  nec essa r ymea n s isto ge to ff at Leuchars when th eticket  cler k tells you s o; and the n y ou go th roug h  t h e reasoning (A ). It  takes you from two  of y our exis ting stat e s  of mind , a n i nte nti o n  a nd a belief,t o  a n ew  stateofmind, a n i nte nti onto  get offat Leuch ar s.  T ofor m ani ntention ,atle ast  as a result  of r easo ni ng lik e this, is t o ma ke  a  dec isi on . Sothis rea soningconcludes  in a de ci si on. Mak ing the state sexplicit b ywri ting ' I '  for 'yo u intend' and 'B' for ' y ou beli eve ', we  can  describe  yo ur rea son i ng lik e this : I(I  a m g o i ng to S tAnd re ws) (B1) a n d  B( To go  t o St  Andrew s, a necessary mea n s i s to get offatLeuc h a rs ) ( B 2) lea ds toI ( I shall get off  at Leucha rs ) .(B3) Thisi s a  d escript ion ofyourr easonin g from th e outside .It i s not  an infere nce. Fro m the fac t  that yo u int end  to go  t o S t And rews,a ndthe f act th at  you b eliev ea necess ary means of doing so i s to g et of f a t Leuchar s,w e c annot inf er t hat you in ten d t o get  of f  at L euch a rs . Y o u may  not have that in ten t i on , for insta n c e  if  youare irrati onal . On the other ha n d, your reason ings e enfro m  the  i nside is an op era ti o n  on theco ntents of t he state s, and i t is
 great_deal from_discussions with, or some_cases just_passing_comments from,_Jeremy_Butterfield, Jonathan Dancy,_Sven Danielsson, Stephen_Darwall, Jane Heal, Tito_Magri, Adam Morton,_Jan_Odelstad, Derek Parfit, Ingmar Persson, Christian Piller, John Skorupski and Howard Sobel. 1 1._Intention_reasoning Here_is_an_example of practical reasoning: I_am going to St Andrews_(A1) and_To go to St Andrews, a necessary means_is_to get off_at Leuchars, (A2) so I shall get off at_Leuchars. (A3) I mean (A1) to_express an intention_of_yours_to go to St_Andrews rather than a belief that_you are going to St Andrews._I mean (A2) to express a belief_of yours, and I mean (A3)_to express a decision you_make. Think_of this as a process_of reasoning you_might actually_run through. You_might do so when you come_to buy your_ticket. You approach the ticket office_intending_to go to_St_Andrews;_you form_the belief that_a_necessary means_is_to get off at Leuchars when_the_ticket clerk tells you so; and then_you go through the_reasoning_(A). It takes you_from two of your existing_states of mind, an intention and_a belief,_to a_new state of mind, an intention to get off at Leuchars._To form an intention, at least_as a result of_reasoning like_this,_is to make_a_decision. So_this reasoning concludes in a decision. Making_the states_explicit by writing 'I' for 'you_intend' and 'B' for_'you_believe', we can describe your reasoning_like this: I(I am going to_St Andrews) (B1) and B(To_go_to_St Andrews, a necessary means_is to get off at Leuchars)_(B2) leads to_I(I shall get off at Leuchars). (B3)_This_is a description of your reasoning_from_the outside. It is not an_inference._From_the fact that you intend_to go to St Andrews, and_the fact that you believe a necessary means of_doing so is_to get off at Leuchars,_we_cannot_infer that you intend to get off at Leuchars. You_may not_have that intention,_for instance if you are irrational. On the other hand,_your reasoning seen from the inside is_an operation on the contents of the states, and it is