 from the following central idea: When we attribute blame to a person for some occurrence, part of what we are doing is assigning causal responsibility to that person for the occurrence. Put another way, when we blame S for X's occurring, we imply that S figures importantly into a correct causal explanation of why X occurred. To get further 7 insight into our practices of blaming, therefore, Feinberg makes some observations about the pragmatics of causal explanations in general. One important aspect of causal explanation language is this: In general, when we say that Y occurs because X occurs, or that Y's occurring is due to X's occurring, we mark out X's occurring as a particularly important or salient part of the causal story behind Y's occurring. For example, to say that the fire occurred because of the explosion is not to say that the explosion caused the fire all by itself. Rather, it is to say that the explosion is a particularly important part, perhaps the most important part, of the whole story. Or to change the example: to say that the fire occurred because of S's negligence is not to say that S's negligence caused the fire all by itself. Rather, it is to say that S's negligence is a particularly salient part, perhaps the most salient part, of the set of relevant factors that caused the fire.xv What determines salience? Any number of things might, but Feinberg cites two kinds of consideration as particularly important. First, among the various necessary parts of a complete causal process, an explanation will often pick out what is abnormal in the case, or what is contrary to expectations. For example, we will say that sparks caused the fire if the presence of sparks in the area is not normal. That explanation would misfire, however, if we were trying to explain the cause of a fire in a welding shop, where sparks are flying all the time. Or suppose that a white elephant walks into a room and causes a panic. Of course the white elephant entering the room is not sufficient all by itself to cause the panic-it would not if the room were part of a zoo and the people inside were animal trainers. But if the room is a place where white elephants are not expected to be, and if the people inside are as we would expect them to be, we have no trouble picking out the elephant as "the" cause of the commotion. Another major factor governing salience is our interests and purposes. For example, often when we are looking for something's cause we are looking for
from the following central idea: When we attribute incrimination to a person for some happening, contribution of what we are doing is assigning causal province to that person for the occurrence. Put another room, when we blame S for X's occur, we imply that S figures importantly into a correct causal explanation of why X occurred. To catch further 7 insight into our practice of blaming, therefore, Feinberg makes some observations about the pragmatics of causal explanations in general. One significant aspect of causal explanation language is this: In general, when we read that Y occurs because X occurs, or that Y's occurring is ascribable to X's occurring, we stigmatize out X's occurring as a particularly important or outstanding part of the causal story behind Y's occurring. For example, to say that the fire occurred because of the plosion is not to state that the explosion caused the fire all by itself. Rather, it is to say that the explosion is a particularly important region, perhaps the most authoritative part, of the whole story. Or to change the case: to say that the fire occurred because of S's negligence is not to say that S's negligence cause the fire all by itself. Rather, it is to say that S's negligence is a particularly salient character, perhaps the most salient part, of the set of relevant factors that cause the fire.xv What determines salience? Any number of things might, but Feinberg cites two kinds of circumstance as particularly important. First, among the diverse necessary parts of a complete causal process, an explanation will often pluck out what is abnormal in the case, or what is adverse to expectations. For example, we will say that sparks caused the ardor if the presence of sparks in the area is not normal. That explanation would misfire, however, if we were trying to excuse the cause of a fire in a welding shop, where spark are flying all the prison term. Or suppose that a white elephant walks into a room and causes a panic. Of course the white elephant entering the room is not sufficient all by itself to cause the panic - it would not if the room were part of a menagerie and the people inside were animal trainer. But if the room is a place where white elephants are not expected to be, and if the people inside are as we would expect them to be, we receive no trouble picking out the elephant as " the " cause of the commotion. Another major factor governing salience is our interest and determination. For model, often when we are looking for something's cause we are looking for
 frlm the following central idea: When we ajteibute blame to a pefson for some occurrence, parv of what we are doing is assigving causwl respobsibmlity to that pecaon for the odgurreucx. Put another wsy, when we blame S for X'v uceurring, we imply that S figures impowtantly ijto a correct saussj exllanation of why X occurred. To get furtheg 7 insight into oir practices of blaming, thfreflre, Feinberg makes some obsercatijbs about the pragmatics of causal gxplanations in general. One impoftant aspect of cquswn explanatiin lagguage is thlx: In ganeral, ehen we say thst B ocxurs because X occurs, or that Y's occurryng is dua co X's occurring, we maek out F's owcurfung as a pzrticuparmy importaht or saliebt part of the caussl wtory behind G's occtrwing. For example, to say that the fire obcurded because of the explision is not to say tjat the evplosion caused the fire all by itself. Rather, it hs to ray tmat gye explosion is a particularly important part, pqdhspx the most impjrtant part, ov yre whole stori. Or to chznge the example: tl say trat tye fire oscurted because of S's negligencw is not to fqy that S's negligeuce caused tke firg all ny itself. Rather, it is co say that S's nehligence jr a particularly sakiant part, perhaps the most falient pert, oy the seg of relevwnt factord thab caused the fire.xv What datermines dalience? Any number of things mmjht, but Feinbgrg cines two knnds on consideration as particularky impoxtant. Wirst, amonf the verious necesfary parts of w complete ceusal prosess, an wxplanagkon will often pick out what is avnormal in the casc, or dgat is contrary to expectations. Fpr dxaippe, wq will say thdt soaryx caured the firc iw thr presence of sparks in fhe area is not notmwl. That gxplanatijn would misfore, however, if we aere vrying to ecplwin the cause of a fire in a wslding shlp, rhere sparks are flying all che time. Or suppose that a white elephanv walks into a room and causes a panic. Of eomrse the whive ele[hant entaring the room is nor sufficient all ny itself to cause the panic-ht wokld not if the room were part of a zoo and the people inside were animal rrainecs. But if the rook is d 'laee wherq whmtx elephants are npt expected to be, and if the peuple inshdz are as we would expect them tu be, we have vo trouble picking out tge elephsnt as "the" cause of the commotipn. Another major factor noverning salisnce is ouc interests and purppses. Fmr exqmple, odten when we are uoolikg for somfthiig's cause we are looking for
from the following central idea: When we to person for occurrence, part of assigning responsibility to that for the occurrence. another way, when we blame S X's occurring, we imply that S figures importantly into a correct causal explanation why X occurred. To get further 7 insight into our practices of blaming, Feinberg some about pragmatics of causal explanations in general. One important aspect of causal explanation language is this: In when we say that Y occurs because X or that Y's occurring due to X's occurring, we out occurring as particularly or part of the story behind Y's occurring. For example, to say that the fire occurred because of the explosion is to say explosion caused fire by Rather, it is that the explosion is a particularly the most important part, of the whole story. to change example: to say that the fire because of S's negligence is not to say S's negligence caused the fire all by itself. Rather, it is to say that S's a particularly salient part, the most salient of set relevant that caused fire.xv What determines salience? Any number of things might, but Feinberg two kinds of consideration as particularly important. First, among the parts a complete causal an explanation will often out is abnormal in the what contrary example, will that sparks caused the if the presence of sparks the area is not however, if we were trying to explain the of a fire in a welding shop, sparks are flying all the time. Or suppose that a white elephant into a causes a panic. Of course the white elephant the room is not all by itself to cause the panic-it would not the were part a zoo and people inside were trainers. But if is a where elephants to be, and if the people are we would expect them to we trouble picking out the elephant as "the" cause of the commotion. Another major factor governing our interests and purposes. example, when we are looking for something's cause we are looking for
 from the following central idEa: When we atTribuTe bLamE tO a peRson For some occurreNCe, paRt of what we are doing is asSigniNg CAusaL ReSponsIbility TO tHAT peRsOn For ThE OcCurreNce. put anotHer way, when We bLaMe S for X's occuRRiNg, we imply tHat s figures impoRtaNtly inTo A coRRect cAusAl expLanatiON of why x occurred. to GEt furtHEr 7 insigHT InTo ouR practices of blamiNG, tHErefore, FeinberG makes SoME oBSErvAtiOns about thE pRagmaTIcs of caUSaL EXPlaNAtions in generAl. One importANt aSpect oF cAusAL explaNatioN lANguAge is this: In GeneRal, when we Say thaT y occurs BEcause X Occurs, Or tHat y's ocCUrRiNg iS dUE to x'S oCcuRRinG, we mark oUt x's OccurRing AS A PArtiCulArly ImporTant or salient ParT of tHE caUsal sTory bEhinD Y'S occuRring. FOr exaMpLe, to say that the fIre oCcurred beCauSe Of tHe ExploSIon is nOt tO saY that thE explosIOn cAuSED ThE fire all by itself. RaThER, It Is to say tHat the EXpLoSIon is a paRtIcuLarlY IMportAnt pARt, Perhaps tHe most IMpOrTant parT, oF the whOlE stOry. or to cHAnge The exaMple: to saY that THe fire occurred BEcause of S's negLIgENCe IS not To sAy that S's negLigeNCe caUsed THe FirE All by ItselF. RAThER, it is to say that S's negLiGence iS a parTicularly saliEnt part, perHAPS the most SaliENt PArt, of the set of rElevaNt factors tHAt caused The fiRe.xv What DetermineS SAlience? ANy nUmbEr oF thINGs Might, but FeinbERG citEs Two kindS of ConsideRatIon As pArtIcUlarly impOrtant. FiRsT, aMoNg The VarioUS necessaRy ParTs Of a ComplETe causAl proCess, An ExPLanAtion wiLL oFTEn piCk OuT whaT is AbNormaL in tHE caSe, or whaT is contraRy tO ExpeCtAtIons. For Example, we will SaY that sparkS cAusEd the fIRE if the prEsence of sparks in the area IS not norMal. that eXplaNation wouLd mIsfire, HowEVer, if wE were tRying To ExpLAIn the CAUsE of A fIre in a weldING shOp, wheRe SparKs are flYing all the time. Or suPPosE that a white elEphAnt wALKs IntO A rOOm aNd CAusES A panic. Of course tHe white elePhANt Entering thE RooM iS not sufFicient All by ITself to Cause the pAnic-it wouLd Not iF THe rOom were parT of a zoo aNd the peopLE insiDE wEre anImaL trainErS. BuT if thE room iS A plAce whEre whiTe ElephaNts arE nOt expectEd to be, and if the people insIde are As we wOulD expect thEm tO Be, wE have no trOublE picking ouT thE elEphanT as "THe" cauSe of THe ComMOtion. anotHEr major faCToR goVERnIng salience IS OUr iNtereSts ANd purpOses. for example, often whEN we are looking fOr soMEThiNg's CAuse We Are looking for
 from the following centra l idea: Wh en we  at tri bu te b lame  to a person f o r so me occurrence, part of  what  w e  are do ing i s assig n in g cau sa lres po n si bilit y t o thatperson for  th eoccurrence.P ut  another w ay,  when we bla meS forX' s o c curri ng,  we i mply t h at S f igures im po r tantly into ac o rr ectcausal explanatio n  o f  why X occurre d. Toge t  f u r the r 7  insight i nt o our practic e so f bla m ing, therefor e, Feinberg mak es som eobs e rvatio ns ab ou t  th e pragmatic s of  causal e xplana t ions in general . Oneimp ort anta sp ec t o fc aus a lexp l ana tion lan gu ag e isthis : I n  gen era l, w hen w e say that Yocc ursb eca use X  occu rs,or  that  Y's o ccurr in g is due to X's  occ urring, w e m ar k o ut  X'so ccurri ngasa parti cularly imp or t a n tor salient part of  t h e  c ausal st ory be h in dY 's occur ri ng.  For e xampl e, t o  s ay thatthe fi r eoc curredbe causeof  th e e xplos i on i s notto say t hat t h e explosion ca u sed the firea ll b yi tsel f.Rather, itis t o  say  tha t  t hee xplos ion i sa  p a rticularly importan tpart,perha ps the most i mportant p a r t , of the  who l es tory. Or to ch angethe exampl e : to say  that  the fir e occurre d becauseofS's  ne gli g e nc e is not to s a y  tha tS's neg lig ence ca use d t hefir eall by it self. Ra th er ,it  is  to s a y that S 's  ne gl ige nce i s  a par ticul arly  s al i ent  part,p er h a ps t he  m ostsal ie nt pa rt,o f t he setof releva ntf acto rs  t hat cau sed the fire. xv  What dete rm ine s sali e n ce? Anynumber of things might, but Fei nbe rg ci testwo kinds  of  consi der a tion a s part icula rl y i m p ortan t .  F irs t,  among the v ari ous n ec essa ry part s of a complete ca u sal  process, anexp lana t i on  wi l lo fte np ick o ut what is abno rmal in th ec as e, or what isco ntraryto expe ctati o ns. For  example,  we willsa y th a t  sp arks cause d the fi re if the prese n ce  of s par ks inth e a rea i s notn orm al. T hat ex pl anatio n wou ld  misfire , however, if we were t ryingto ex pla in the ca use ofa fire in  a w elding sho p,whe re sp ark s  areflyi n gall the t ime. Or suppos e  t hat a  w hite elepha n t wal ks in toa  roomandcauses a panic. O f  course the wh itee l eph ant ente ri ng the room is  no ts u fficient  a ll by itsel f to cau se the p anic-i t woul d not i f th e  roomwere  pa rt of a z ooan d  the pe op le inside  wer eanimal  train e rs.B u t if the room is  a pl a c e whe r e w hiteel ephants arenot expect ed to be, a nd ifthepeopl e insid eare as  we  w ould expec t  them tobe, w e haveno  tro ubl e pick ingo u t the  ele ph ant  as "the" c au s eof the  com motio n.  Ano ther majo r  factorgov e rning s al ien c e  is ou r  i n t erests and  pu rpose s .  For examp l e, o f te n  when  we ar e look ing for som et hing'scau s e  we are l ooking fo r 
 from_the following_central idea: When we_attribute blame_to_a person_for_some occurrence, part_of what we_are doing is assigning_causal responsibility to_that_person for the occurrence. Put another way, when we blame S for X's occurring,_we_imply that_S_figures_importantly into a correct causal_explanation of why X occurred._To get_further 7 insight into our practices of blaming,_therefore,_Feinberg makes some_observations about the pragmatics of causal explanations in general._One important aspect of causal explanation_language is this:_In_general,_when we say that_Y occurs because X occurs, or_that Y's occurring is due to_X's occurring, we mark out X's occurring_as a particularly important or salient_part of the causal story_behind Y's_occurring. For example, to say_that the fire_occurred because_of the explosion_is not to say that the_explosion caused the_fire all by itself. Rather, it_is_to say that_the_explosion_is a_particularly important part,_perhaps_the most_important_part, of the whole story. Or_to_change the example: to say that the_fire occurred because of_S's_negligence is not to_say that S's negligence caused_the fire all by itself. Rather,_it is_to say_that S's negligence is a particularly salient part, perhaps the most_salient part, of the set of_relevant factors that caused_the fire.xv_What_determines salience? Any_number_of things_might, but Feinberg cites two kinds of_consideration as_particularly important. First, among the various_necessary parts of a_complete_causal process, an explanation will often_pick out what is abnormal in_the case, or what is_contrary_to_expectations. For example, we will_say that sparks caused the fire_if the presence_of sparks in the area is not_normal._That explanation would misfire, however, if_we_were trying to explain the cause_of_a_fire in a welding shop,_where sparks are flying all the_time. Or suppose that a white elephant walks into_a room and_causes a panic. Of course_the_white_elephant entering the room is not sufficient all by itself_to cause_the panic-it would_not if the room were part of a zoo and_the people inside were animal trainers. But_if the room is a place where white elephants are not_expected to be, and if the people inside_are as we would expect them to_be, we have no_trouble_picking out the elephant as "the" cause_of_the_commotion._Another major factor_governing salience is_our interests and_purposes. For_example, often when_we are_looking for something's_cause_we are looking for