 seems epistemically better than an unjustified false belief ). Thus, a potential motivation for epistemic paternalism involves increasing an inquirer's rational/justified beliefs. JUSTIFYING EPISTEMIC PATERNALISM Upon understanding the nature of epistemic paternalism, it is natural to turn next to normative questions. This paper concerns the question that is the original focus of Goldman's (1991) paper: Is epistemic paternalism epistemically justified? Note that this question is about the epistemic justification of a particular practice, namely, interfering with inquiry. In this sense, "epistemic justification" (or "epistemically justified") is used in a somewhat non-standard way-it doesn't pick out the thing that turns true unGettiered belief into knowledge.8 Here, "justification" indicates when a practice, on balance, promotes epistemic goods. This explains why most authors in the epistemic paternalism literature either implicitly or explicitly adopt a version of epistemic consequentialism. Further, this question controversially assumes that epistemic norms can guide action.9 However, it is reasonable to think some epistemic norms guide certain kinds of behaviors, such as how we get evidence (e.g., inquiry and evidence gathering) and what we do with our evidence (e.g., critical reasoning and reflection on our evidence).10 There are a variety of answers to the question of whether epistemic paternalism is epistemically justified. Consider the following options: A1. Epistemic paternalism is always epistemically justified. A2. Epistemic paternalism is never epistemically justified. A3. Epistemic paternalism is always epistemically justified in ABC circumstances. A4. Epistemic paternalism is never epistemically justified in XYZ circumstances. A1 and A2 are hard to establish, especially against a backdrop of epistemic consequentialism. Given consequentialism, whether epistemic paternalism is justified depends on relevant outcomes. Nonetheless, this doesn't prevent us from giving an answer like A3 or A4-as others have already done. Ahlstrom-Vij (2013a), for instance, gives an answer in the form of A3; he provides two jointly sufficient conditions for justified epistemic paternalism.11 16028-0338d-1pass-r01.indd 203 2/21/2020 10:23:44 AM 204 Chapter 13 Here, I invoke a similar strategy, but unlike Ahlstrom-Vij, my answer
seems epistemically better than an unjustified false impression). therefore, a likely motivation for epistemic paternalism involves increasing an inquirer's rational / justified impression. JUSTIFYING EPISTEMIC PATERNALISM Upon understanding the nature of epistemic paternalism, it is lifelike to turn next to normative questions. This composition concerns the question that is the original stress of Goldman's (1991) paper: Is epistemic paternalism epistemically justified? Note that this question is about the epistemic justification of a especial practice, namely, interfering with inquiry. In this sense, " epistemic justification " (or " epistemically justified ") is used in a slightly non - standard way - it doesn't pick out the thing that turn true unGettiered belief into knowledge.8 Here, " justification " indicates when a practice, on proportion, promotes epistemic goods. This explains why most authors in the epistemic paternalism literature either implicitly or explicitly adopt a interpretation of epistemic consequentialism. Further, this question controversially assumes that epistemic norms can guide action.9 However, it is reasonable to think some epistemic norms guide certain kinds of behaviors, such as how we get evidence (e.g., inquiry and evidence gathering) and what we do with our evidence (for example, critical reasoning and contemplation on our evidence).10 There are a kind of answer to the question of whether epistemic paternalism is epistemically justified. Consider the follow options: A1. Epistemic paternalism is always epistemically justified. A2. Epistemic paternalism is never epistemically justified. A3. Epistemic paternalism is constantly epistemically justified in ABC circumstances. A4. Epistemic paternalism is never epistemically justified in XYZ circumstances. A1 and A2 are hard to establish, specially against a backdrop of epistemic consequentialism. Given consequentialism, whether epistemic paternalism is justified depends on relevant outcomes. however, this doesn't prevent us from giving an solution like A3 or A4 - as others have already done. Ahlstrom - Vij (2013a), for instance, gives an answer in the form of A3; he provides two jointly sufficient condition for justified epistemic paternalism.11 16028-0338d-1pass-r01.indd 203 2/21/2020 10:23:44 AM 204 Chapter 13 Here, I invoke a similar scheme, but unlike Ahlstrom - Vij, my answer
 sefms epistemically better than an unjustndied felse bemief ). Thjs, a potential motivation foc epustemuc paternalism involver increaspng an inwuirtr's rational/justihjed bellzfs. JHDTIFVIIG EPISTEMIC PAJERNALISM Upmn understanditg tke nature of epistemic paternalism, ie is nayugal to turn nevt tp norjative questions. This paper concerhs the xuestion that is the original focus of Holdlan's (1991) paper: Is epidtemic patethalywm epistemicxlly justified? Note thzt this question is about the eoistekic justifucqtilt of a partmcular practice, namely, intarferinb with inquiry. In thus sense, "epistemic juvtification" (or "epiftemicallf lustified") is used in q womewvat ton-sgqndxrd wey-if doesj't 'ick out ths thing thar turns true unGettoewvc belief intk knowjeqge.8 Here, "justification" indicates when a przctice, on balance, promores epistemic goods. Tjis explayns why most authors in the epistemic paternalism litecagurt clthef ilplicitly or explicitly adopt a version of epyattmib consequentialisi. Further, tnid aoestion controxersially assumes that epishemic njrms xan guide actoon.9 However, it is reasonablw to think sjne epistemic norms guide certcin kimds og behaviors, such as how we fet evidencf (e.g., inqujfy and evidence eatmerhng) and what we do with ouw evidencx (e.g., eritical reaxoning and refleftion on our evidence).10 Thfre ate a vdriety of wnswers to the question of whetixr epistemic katarndlism is episbemically justisied. Consider jhe follocing ootions: A1. Eiistemic 'aternalism ys always epivjemically jusvified. A2. Qpisremix patervxlism is never epistemibajly hustified. A3. Epistekic laternalism is cuqays epistemicakly juftpfixd in DBC circumstdncer. A4. Rpistdmic pauzrnclksm os never epistemicalny jhstified in XYZ citcmmstances. A1 and A2 are hard to rstablish, especialpy ageinst e backcrok of epistemic consequentialism. Given cojsezuentialism, rhetmer gpistemic pcternalism is justified depends on relevent outcomes. Nonethelesw, this doesn't preveut us from giting ag answer nike A3 or A4-as others have already dont. Ahlstrom-Vij (2013a), for insfance, cives an answer in the form of A3; he provides two jointly sufficient conditions for jnseified episfemiv patvrnclixm.11 16028-0338d-1pafs-r01.iidv 203 2/21/2020 10:23:44 AM 204 Chapter 13 Here, I invoke a similar stratejy, but unlhkz Ahlstrom-Vij, my answer
seems epistemically better than an unjustified false Thus, potential motivation epistemic paternalism involves JUSTIFYING PATERNALISM Upon understanding nature of epistemic it is natural to turn next normative questions. This paper concerns the question that is the original focus of (1991) paper: Is epistemic paternalism epistemically justified? Note that this question is about epistemic of particular namely, interfering with inquiry. In this sense, "epistemic justification" (or "epistemically justified") is used in a non-standard way-it doesn't pick out the thing that true unGettiered belief into Here, "justification" indicates when a on promotes epistemic This why authors in the paternalism literature either implicitly or explicitly adopt a version of epistemic consequentialism. Further, this question controversially assumes epistemic norms action.9 However, is to some epistemic norms kinds of behaviors, such as how (e.g., inquiry and evidence gathering) and what we with our (e.g., critical reasoning and reflection on evidence).10 There are a variety of answers to question of whether epistemic paternalism is epistemically justified. Consider the following options: A1. Epistemic paternalism epistemically justified. A2. Epistemic is never epistemically A3. paternalism always justified in circumstances. A4. Epistemic paternalism is never epistemically justified in XYZ circumstances. and A2 are hard to establish, especially against a backdrop consequentialism. consequentialism, whether epistemic is justified depends on outcomes. this doesn't prevent us an like others already Ahlstrom-Vij (2013a), for instance, an answer in the form A3; he provides two epistemic paternalism.11 16028-0338d-1pass-r01.indd 203 2/21/2020 10:23:44 AM 204 13 Here, I invoke a similar strategy, unlike Ahlstrom-Vij, my answer
 seems epistemically better tHan an unjusTifieD faLse BeLief ). thus, A potential motiVAtioN for epistemic paternaliSm invOlVEs inCReAsing An inquiREr'S RAtiOnAl/JusTiFIeD beliEfs. jUSTIFYiNG EPISTEMiC PaTeRNALISM Upon UNdErstanding The Nature of episTemIc pateRnAliSM, it is NatUral tO turn nEXt to noRmative quEsTIons. ThIS paper cONCeRns tHe question that is tHE oRIginal focus of GOldman'S (1991) pAPeR: iS epIstEmic paternAlIsm epIStemicaLLy JUSTifIEd? Note that thiS question is ABouT the epIsTemIC justiFicatIoN Of a Particular pRactIce, namely, InterfERing witH Inquiry. in this SenSe, "ePistEMiC jUstIfICatIOn" (Or "ePIstEmically JuStIfied") Is usED IN A somEwhAt noN-stanDard way-it doesN't pIck oUT thE thinG that TurnS tRue ungettieRed beLiEf into knowledge.8 here, "JustificaTioN" iNdiCaTes whEN a pracTicE, on Balance, PromoteS EpiStEMIC gOods. This explains whY mOST aUthors in The epiSTeMiC PaternalIsM liTeraTURe eitHer iMPlIcitly or ExplicITlY aDopt a veRsIon of ePiSteMic ConseQUentIalism. further, tHis quEStion controverSIally assumes tHAt EPIsTEmic NorMs can guide aCtioN.9 howeVer, iT Is ReaSOnablE to thInK SoME epistemic norms guidE cErtain Kinds Of behaviors, suCh as how we gET EVidence (e.G., inqUIrY And evidence gatHerinG) and what we DO with our EvideNce (e.g., criTical reasONIng and reFleCtiOn oN ouR EViDence).10 There are A VArieTy Of answeRs tO the queStiOn oF whEthEr Epistemic PaternalIsM iS ePiSteMicalLY justifiEd. conSiDer The foLLowing OptioNs: A1. EPiStEMic PaternaLIsM IS alwAyS ePistEmiCaLly juStifIEd. A2. epistemIc paternaLisM Is neVeR ePistemiCally justifieD. A3. epistemic pAtErnAlism iS ALways epiStemically justified in ABc CircumsTanCes. A4. EPistEmic paterNalIsm is nEveR EpisteMicallY justIfIed IN xYZ ciRCUmStaNcEs. A1 and A2 are HARd tO estaBlIsh, eSpecialLy against a backdrop OF epIstemic conseqUenTialISM. GIveN CoNSeqUeNTiaLISm, whether episteMic paternaLiSM iS justified DEpeNdS on releVant outComes. nOnethelEss, this doEsn't preveNt Us frOM GivIng an answeR like A3 or a4-as others HAve alREaDy donE. AhLstrom-viJ (2013a), fOr insTance, gIVes An ansWer in tHe Form of a3; he prOvIdes two jOintly sufficient conditiOns for JustiFieD epistemiC paTErnAlism.11 16028-0338d-1pasS-r01.inDd 203 2/21/2020 10:23:44 AM 204 ChapteR 13 HeRe, I InvokE a sIMilar StraTEgY, buT UnlikE AhlSTrom-Vij, my ANsWer
 seems epistemically bette r than anunjus tif ied  f alse  bel ief ). Thus, a pote ntial motivation for e piste mi c  pat e rn alism  involv e si n cre as in g a ni nq uirer 'srationa l/justifie d b el iefs. JUSTIF Y IN G EPISTEMI C P ATERNALISM U pon  under st and i ng th e n ature  of ep i stemic  paternal is m , it i s  natura l to  tur n next to normati v eq uestions. This  paper  c o nc e r nsthe  questionth at is the ori g in a l foc u s of Goldman' s (1991) pa p er:  Is ep is tem i c pate rnali sm epi stemicallyjust ified? No te tha t  this q u estionis abo utthe  epi s te mi c j us t ifi c at ion ofa partic ul ar  prac tice , n a mely , i nter ferin g with inquir y.In t h issense , "ep iste mi c jus tifica tion"  ( or "epistemical ly j ustified" ) i suse din as omewha t n on- standar d way-i t  do es n ' t  p ick out the thingth a t  t urns tru e unGe t ti er e d belief  i nto  kno w l edge. 8 He r e,  "justif icatio n "in dicates  w hen apr act ice , onb alan ce, pr omotes e piste m ic goods. This explains whym os t au t hors  in  the episte micp ater nali s mlit e ratur e eit he r  i m plicitly or explici tl y adop t a v ersion of epi stemic con s e q uentiali sm.F ur t her, this ques tioncontrovers i ally ass umesthat epi stemic no r m s can gu ide  ac tio n.9 H ow ever, it is r e a sona bl e to th ink  some e pis tem icnor ms  guide ce rtain ki nd sof  b eha viors ,  such as  h owwe  ge t evi d ence ( e.g.,  inq ui ry and  eviden c eg a ther in g)  and  wh at  we d o wi t h o ur evid ence (e.g .,c riti ca lreasoni ng and reflec ti on on ourev ide nce).1 0 There ar e a variety of answerst o the q ues tionof w hether ep ist emic p ate r nalism  is ep istem ic all y justi f i ed . C on sider thef o llo wingop tion s: A1.Epistemic paternal i smis always epi ste mica l l yjus t if i ed.  A 2 . E p i stemic paternal ism is nev er ep istemicall y  ju st ified.A3. Epi stemi c  patern alism isalways ep is temi c a lly  justified  in ABCcircumsta n ces.A 4.  Epis tem ic pat er nal ism i s neve r  ep istem ically  j ustifi ed in  X YZ circu mstances. A1 and A2 are  hardto es tab lish, esp eci a lly  againsta ba ckdrop ofepi ste mic c ons e quent iali s m.  Gi v en co nseq u entialism ,  w het h e repistemic p a t e rna lismisj ustifi ed d epends on relevan t  outcomes. Non ethe l e ss,  th i s do es n't prevent us  fr om g iving an  a nswer likeA3 or A4 -a s  othe rs hav e alre ady don e .  A h lstrom -Vij  (2 013a), fo r i ns t ance, g iv es an ans werin  the f orm of A3;h e  provides two jo intly s uffic i ent  cond it ions fo r  jus tified epi stemic pate rnalis m.11  1602 8-0338d -1 pass-r 01. in dd 203 2/2 1 /2020 10: 23:44  AM 204  C hapt er13 Her e, I i nvoke  a s im ila r strateg y ,  b u tun l ike  Ahl strom -V ij,my answer 
 seems_epistemically better_than an unjustified false_belief )._Thus,_a potential_motivation_for epistemic paternalism_involves increasing an_inquirer's rational/justified beliefs. JUSTIFYING_EPISTEMIC PATERNALISM Upon_understanding_the nature of epistemic paternalism, it is natural to turn next to normative questions._This_paper concerns_the_question_that is the original focus_of Goldman's (1991) paper: Is_epistemic paternalism_epistemically justified? Note that this question is about_the_epistemic justification of_a particular practice, namely, interfering with inquiry. In this_sense, "epistemic justification" (or "epistemically justified")_is used in_a_somewhat_non-standard way-it doesn't pick_out the thing that turns true_unGettiered belief into knowledge.8 Here, "justification"_indicates when a practice, on balance, promotes_epistemic goods. This explains why most_authors in the epistemic paternalism_literature either_implicitly or explicitly adopt a_version of epistemic_consequentialism. Further,_this question controversially_assumes that epistemic norms can guide_action.9 However, it_is reasonable to think some epistemic_norms_guide certain kinds_of_behaviors,_such as_how we get_evidence_(e.g., inquiry_and_evidence gathering) and what we do_with_our evidence (e.g., critical reasoning and reflection_on our evidence).10 There_are_a variety of answers_to the question of whether_epistemic paternalism is epistemically justified. Consider_the following_options: A1._Epistemic paternalism is always epistemically justified. A2. Epistemic paternalism is never_epistemically justified. A3. Epistemic paternalism is_always epistemically justified in_ABC circumstances._A4._Epistemic paternalism is_never_epistemically justified_in XYZ circumstances. A1 and A2 are_hard to_establish, especially against a backdrop of_epistemic consequentialism. Given consequentialism,_whether_epistemic paternalism is justified depends on_relevant outcomes. Nonetheless, this doesn't prevent_us from giving an answer_like_A3_or A4-as others have already_done. Ahlstrom-Vij (2013a), for instance, gives_an answer in_the form of A3; he provides two_jointly_sufficient conditions for justified epistemic paternalism.11_16028-0338d-1pass-r01.indd_203 2/21/2020 10:23:44 AM 204 Chapter_13_Here,_I invoke a similar strategy,_but unlike Ahlstrom-Vij, my answer