 moral beliefs, which in engaged contexts, are contextually basic. Let me spell out the kind of case I have in mind in a bit more detail. Let us distinguish between what I have called an engaged context of moral thought and a detached context in which one is not thinking and deliberating entirely from within her or his moral outlook but is instead looking at it from the outside, as it were. Now, in an engaged context of moral thinking, where 314 Moral Knowledge? skeptical challenges to that outlook are not in focus, one is (ceteris paribus) epistemically responsible in holding (without justification) those basic moral beliefs and assumptions more or less fundamental to the outlook. However, once skeptical challenges are taken seriously, then the context has been switched (in the sense that the relevant social group or community crucial for epistemic evaluation is the group of skeptics). In this relatively detached context in which, we are supposing, the core moral assumptions of one's moral outlook are being challenged, those ordinarily basic moral beliefs are no longer basic. For example, suppose we are considering skeptical challenges to the deepest aspects of a person's moral outlook, and imagine that this person is confronted by a group of Nietzscheans who argue, in effect, that democratically structured societies produce a false moral conscience and that therefore many of the moral beliefs taken for granted in such societies are mistaken or at least questionable. In such detached contexts, what often seems to happen is that the epistemic norms operative in them differ from those operative in engaged contexts; in particular, in contexts of the former sort, one is not permitted to take for granted the moral beliefs that one may take for granted in contexts of the latter sort. The reason for the difference in epistemic norms governing these contexts is fairly obvious. In engaged contexts, where the point and purpose of the context is (speaking roughly) to negotiate one's way around in a social world, one is not required to have reasons (so I have argued) for certain moral beliefs that are fundamental to the outlook. In detached contexts, where the point and purpose of the context is to examine one's moral outlook in an effort, for example, to detect and correct any cultural or idiosyncratic biases, one is not allowed to take one's core moral beliefs and assumptions as basic. Cases fitting this general description in which one enters a detached context raise interesting questions about the conditions under which it becomes appropriate or perhaps required to enter such a context as well as questions about the sorts of epistemic norms operative in such
moral beliefs, which in engaged contexts, are contextually basic. Let me spell out the kind of subject I take in mind in a bit more detail. get us distinguish between what I have called an busy context of moral thinking and a detached context in which one is not thinking and deliberating entirely from within her or his moral lookout but is instead looking at it from the outside, as it were. nowadays, in an engaged context of moral thinking, where 314 Moral Knowledge? skeptical challenges to that outlook are not in focus, one is (ceteris paribus) epistemically creditworthy in holding (without justification) those basic moral beliefs and assumptions more or less cardinal to the outlook. However, once skeptical challenges are taken seriously, then the context has been switch over (in the sense that the relevant social group or community crucial for epistemic evaluation is the group of skeptics). In this relatively detached context in which, we are supposing, the core moral assumption of one's moral outlook are being challenged, those ordinarily basic moral beliefs are no longer basic. For example, suppose we are considering skeptical challenges to the deepest aspects of a person's moral outlook, and imagine that this person is confronted by a group of Nietzscheans who argue, in effect, that democratically structured societies grow a false moral conscience and that therefore many of the moral impression remove for granted in such societies are mistaken or at least questionable. In such detached contexts, what often seems to happen is that the epistemic norm operative in them differ from those operative in engaged contexts; in particular, in context of the former sort, one is not permitted to take for grant the moral beliefs that one may accept for granted in contexts of the latter sort. The reason for the difference in epistemic norm governing these contexts is fairly obvious. In booked contexts, where the point and purpose of the context is (speaking approximately) to negotiate one's way around in a social world, one is not required to suffer reasons (thus I have argued) for sealed moral beliefs that are fundamental to the lookout. In detached contexts, where the compass point and purpose of the context is to analyze one's moral outlook in an feat, for example, to detect and correct any cultural or idiosyncratic biases, one is not allowed to take one's core moral belief and assumptions as basic. Cases suit this general description in which one enters a detached context raise interesting questions about the conditions under which it become appropriate or perhaps required to enter such a context as well as questions about the sorts of epistemic norm surgical in such
 mogal beliefs, which in engxged contexts, ate conteetually basic. Ldt me spell out the kind of rase I hace in mind in a bit mofe detail. Let us eistmnguish between xgat I have camped cn engaged contewt of moral thought and a ddtcched context in which one is not thynking snf deliberating entprqly rgon within her or his moral outmook buu is instead lookimg at it from the outside, ws ih were. Now, in an ejgaged contgst jd moral thinying, where 314 Moral Knowmedge? skeptical challenges to tfat obtlook are bor ij focus, one ms (cetvris paribus) ciistemiwally rrsponsible in moldiig (wuthout justification) vhose basic moral bejiefs and aasumptions more oe oess xunddmengql go uhe ohtlook. Hoxever, once akeptical cyallenges are taken sqgoously, then fhe cogtqxt has been switched (in the sense that ths relevant social group or community crucial for episeemic evaluation is the group of skeptics). In this relavixelv detazyef context in which, we are supposing, the core ikrsl assumptions on one's moral outlopk atg being challevged, tkkss ordinarily basic moral felieds are no lonber basic. For example, suppowe we are cousieering skeptical ckallenges to the deeprst aspects of a person'r modal outlook, and imagjve that this perron iv confronted by a group of Nietzschxans cho argud, in effece, that demlcratlwally structured slcietnes psoduce a fwlse moral conscience and that vierefore many ox tve moral belicfs taken for gwanted in such societnes ard mistaken or at neast questyonable. In suwj detached cmntexts, rhat oftwn seemr to happen is yhat the vpnstemic nirms operative in bhem ajffer from thosz iperative in enbagdd sojtxxts; yt particular, in zongrxts uf the formcr rort, one is not permitteg to take for granted yhc moral bgliefs thwt one may tale for granted in fonteets of the katjer sort. The reason for the difrerence ij eiistemic normf goyernyng these eontexts is fairly obvious. In engaged coitexts, where the point qnd purpose of the eoktext is (speeking woughly) tm negotiate one's way around in a socisl world, one is not rsquireg to jave reasons (so I have argued) for certain moral beliefs that are fundamenral to the outlook. In cetacveb cpntextf, whxrx the point and plrpose of the context is to exammne one's mmrcl outlook in an effort, for ecaople, to detecj and correct any cultural or idioxyncratic biases, one is not allpwed to take one's core mpral beluefs znd assumpvions as basic. Cases fittiug thiw generql dcscription in dhivh one entegs a dztached context raise interesting questuojs about the convitions undev dhich it besomes appropriats or oerhaks required to enter such a vontext as well as qleseions about tht sorts of episjemic nogms operative in such
moral beliefs, which in engaged contexts, are Let spell out kind of case a more detail. Let distinguish between what have called an engaged context of thought and a detached context in which one is not thinking and deliberating from within her or his moral outlook but is instead looking at it the as were. in an engaged context of moral thinking, where 314 Moral Knowledge? skeptical challenges to that outlook not in focus, one is (ceteris paribus) epistemically in holding (without justification) basic moral beliefs and assumptions or fundamental to outlook. once challenges are taken then the context has been switched (in the sense that the relevant social group or community crucial epistemic evaluation group of In relatively context in which, supposing, the core moral assumptions of are being challenged, those ordinarily basic moral beliefs no longer For example, suppose we are considering challenges to the deepest aspects of a person's outlook, and imagine that this person is confronted by a group of Nietzscheans who argue, that democratically structured societies a false moral and therefore of moral beliefs for granted in such societies are mistaken or at least questionable. such detached contexts, what often seems to happen is that norms in them differ those operative in engaged in in contexts of the one not for the beliefs that one may for granted in contexts of latter sort. The reason norms governing these contexts is fairly obvious. In contexts, where the point and purpose of context is (speaking roughly) to negotiate one's way around in a social one is to have reasons (so I have argued) for moral beliefs that are to the outlook. In detached contexts, where the point purpose the context to examine one's outlook in an for example, to correct any or biases, allowed to take one's core moral and as basic. Cases fitting this description one enters a detached context raise interesting questions about the conditions under which it becomes perhaps required to enter a as well as questions about the sorts of epistemic norms operative in
 moral beliefs, which in engageD contexts, aRe conTexTuaLlY basIc. LeT me spell out the KInd oF case I have in mind in a bit More dEtAIl. LeT Us DistiNguish bETwEEN whAt i hAve CaLLeD an enGagEd conteXt of moral tHouGhT and a detacheD CoNtext in whiCh oNe is not thinkIng And delIbEraTIng enTirEly frOm withIN her or His moral oUtLOok but IS insteaD LOoKing At it from the outsidE, As IT were. Now, in an enGaged cOnTExT OF moRal Thinking, whErE 314 MoraL knowledGE? sKEPTicAL challenges to That outlook ARe nOt in foCuS, onE Is (ceteRis paRiBUs) ePistemicallY resPonsible iN holdiNG (withouT JustifiCation) ThoSe bAsic MOrAl BelIeFS anD AsSumPTioNs more or LeSs FundaMentAL TO The oUtlOok. HOweveR, once skepticaL chAlleNGes Are taKen seRiouSlY, then The conText hAs Been switched (in tHe seNse that thE reLeVanT sOcial GRoup or ComMunIty crucIal for ePIstEmIC EVaLuation is the group oF sKEPtIcs). In thiS relatIVeLy DEtached cOnTexT in wHICh, we aRe suPPoSing, the cOre morAL aSsUmptionS oF one's mOrAl oUtlOok arE BeinG challEnged, thoSe ordINarily basic morAL beliefs are no LOnGER bASic. FOr eXample, suppoSe we ARe coNsidERiNg sKEpticAl chaLlENgES to the deepest aspectS oF a persOn's moRal outlook, and Imagine thaT THIs person Is coNFrONted by a group of nietzScheans who ARgue, in efFect, tHat democRatically STRuctured SocIetIes ProDUCe A false moral coNSCienCe And that TheRefore mAny Of tHe mOraL bEliefs takEn for graNtEd In SuCh sOcietIEs are misTaKen Or At lEast qUEstionAble. IN sucH dEtACheD contexTS, wHAT oftEn SeEms tO haPpEn is tHat tHE epIstemic Norms operAtiVE in tHeM dIffer frOm those operatIvE in engaged CoNteXts; in pARTicular, iN contexts of the former sorT, One is noT peRmittEd to Take for grAntEd the mOraL BeliefS that oNe may TaKe fOR GrantED In ConTeXts of the laTTEr sOrt. ThE rEasoN for the Difference in episteMIc nOrms governing TheSe coNTExTs iS FaIRly ObVIouS. iN engaged contextS, where the pOiNT aNd purpose oF The CoNtext is (SpeakinG rougHLy) to negOtiate one'S way arounD iN a soCIAl wOrld, one is nOt requirEd to have rEAsons (SO I Have aRguEd) for cErTaiN moraL belieFS thAt are FundamEnTal to tHe outLoOk. In detaChed contexts, where the poiNt and pUrposE of The contexT is TO exAmine one's MoraL outlook in An eFfoRt, for ExaMPle, to DeteCT aNd cORrect Any cULtural or iDIoSynCRAtIc biases, one IS NOt aLloweD to TAke one'S corE moral beliefs and aSSumptions as basIc. CaSES fiTtiNG thiS gEneral descriptIon In WHIch one enTeRs a detached Context rAiSE inteRestinG questIons aboUT ThE ConditIons UndEr which it BecOmES appropRiAtE Or perhAps rEqUired tO enter SUch a CONtext as well as queStionS ABout tHE soRts of EpIstemic NOrms Operative iN such
 moral beliefs, which in e ngaged con texts , a reco ntex tual ly basic. Letm e sp ell out the kind of ca se Iha v e in mi nd in  a bitm or e det ai l.  Le tu sdisti ngu ish bet ween whatI h av e called ane ng aged conte xtof moral tho ugh t andadet a chedcon textin whi c h oneis not th in k ing an d  delibe r a ti ng e ntirely from with i nh er or his mora l outl oo k  b u t  is  in stead look in g ati t fromt he o u tsi d e, as it were . Now, in a n  en gagedco nte x t of m oralth i nki ng, where 3 14 M oral Know ledge? skeptic a l chall engestotha t ou t lo ok  ar en oti nfoc u s,one is ( ce te ris p arib u s ) epis tem ical ly re sponsible inhol ding (wi thout  just ific at ion)thosebasic  m oral beliefs an d as sumptions  mo re  or  l ess f u ndamen tal  to  the ou tlook.H owe ve r , on ce skeptical chall en g e sare take n seri o us ly ,  then th econ text h as be en s w it ched (in  the s e ns ethat th ereleva nt  so cia l gro u p or  commu nity cru cialf or epistemic e v aluation is t h eg r ou p  ofske ptics). Inthis rela tive l ydet a chedconte xt in which, we are suppo si ng, th e cor e moral assum ptions ofo n e 's moral  out l oo k  are being cha lleng ed, thoseo rdinaril y bas ic moral  beliefsa r e no lon ger  ba sic . F o r  e xample, suppo s e  wear e consi der ing ske pti cal  ch all en ges to th e deepes tas pe ct s o f a p e rson's m or alou tlo ok, a n d imag ine t hatth is per son isc on f r onte dby  a g rou pof Ni etzs c hea ns whoargue, in  ef f ect,  t ha t democ ratically str uc tured soci et ies  produ c e  a false  moral conscience and t h at ther efo re ma ny o f the mor albelief s t a ken fo r gran ted i nsuc h socie t i es  ar emistaken o r atleast  q uest ionable . In such detached con texts, what o fte n se e m stoh ap p enis tha t the epistemic n orms opera ti v ein them di f fer  f rom tho se oper ative in enga ged conte xts; in p ar ticu l a r,in context s of the  former s o rt, o n eis no t p ermitt ed  to  take  for g r ant ed th e mora lbelief s tha tone maytake for granted in con textsof th e l atter sor t.T hereason fo r th e differen ceinepist emi c  norm s go v er nin g  thes e co n texts isf ai rly o bv ious. In en g a g edconte xts ,  where  the  point and purpos e  of the contex t is ( spe aki n g ro ug hly) to negoti ate  o n e 's way a ro und in a so cial wor ld ,  oneis not  requi red toh a ve reason s (s o I  have arg ued )f or cert ai nm oral b elie fs  thatare fu n dame n t al to the outloo k. In d etach e d c ontex ts , where thepoint andpurpose ofthe co ntex t isto exam in e one' s m or al outlook in an eff ort,for exa mp le,todetect  and c orrec t an ycul tural ori d io s yn cr a tic  bia ses,on e is  not allo w ed to ta keo ne's co re  mo r a l beli e fs a nd assumpt ion s asb a sic. Cases fitt i ng thisgenera l desc ription inwh ich one  en t e rs a deta ched cont e xtra iseinterest in g qu es tio ns  about the cond itions u nder whi c h  it be com e s ap p ropria te  or perhapsrequi re d  to ent e r  su ch a co n tex t a s w ellasques t ions about the sorts ofepis temic nor ms op erati ve  in such 
 moral_beliefs, which_in engaged contexts, are_contextually basic._Let_me spell_out_the kind of_case I have_in mind in a_bit more detail._Let_us distinguish between what I have called an engaged context of moral thought and_a_detached context_in_which_one is not thinking and_deliberating entirely from within her_or his_moral outlook but is instead looking at it_from_the outside, as_it were. Now, in an engaged context of moral_thinking, where 314 Moral Knowledge? skeptical_challenges to that_outlook_are_not in focus, one_is (ceteris paribus) epistemically responsible in_holding (without justification) those basic moral_beliefs and assumptions more or less fundamental_to the outlook. However, once skeptical_challenges are taken seriously, then_the context_has been switched (in the_sense that the_relevant social_group or community_crucial for epistemic evaluation is the_group of skeptics)._In this relatively detached context in_which,_we are supposing,_the_core_moral assumptions_of one's moral_outlook_are being_challenged,_those ordinarily basic moral beliefs are_no_longer basic. For example, suppose we are_considering skeptical challenges to_the_deepest aspects of a_person's moral outlook, and imagine_that this person is confronted by_a group_of Nietzscheans_who argue, in effect, that democratically structured societies produce a false_moral conscience and that therefore many_of the moral beliefs_taken for_granted_in such societies_are_mistaken or_at least questionable. In such detached contexts,_what often_seems to happen is that the_epistemic norms operative in_them_differ from those operative in engaged_contexts; in particular, in contexts of_the former sort, one is_not_permitted_to take for granted the_moral beliefs that one may take_for granted in_contexts of the latter sort. The reason_for_the difference in epistemic norms governing_these_contexts is fairly obvious. In engaged_contexts,_where_the point and purpose of_the context is (speaking roughly) to_negotiate one's way around in a social world, one_is not required_to have reasons (so I_have_argued)_for certain moral beliefs that are fundamental to the outlook._In detached_contexts, where the_point and purpose of the context is to examine one's_moral outlook in an effort, for example,_to detect and correct any cultural or idiosyncratic biases, one is_not allowed to take one's core moral beliefs_and assumptions as basic. Cases fitting this_general description in which_one_enters a detached context raise interesting questions_about_the_conditions_under which it_becomes appropriate or_perhaps required to_enter such_a context as_well as_questions about the_sorts_of epistemic norms operative in such