 as more diversity is generated, we can make a finer-grained division of labor." Epistemic diversity-including the diversity of various standpoints-leads to breakthroughs in the context of collective inquiry, and paternalistically interfering with others to promote a monistic way of thinking stifles this. This speaks against interfering with the inquiry of people with other standpoints, whether or not permissivism is true. Second, one might object that standpoint epistemology is disanalogous to permissivism because standpoint epistemology privileges certain standpoints. For instance, many standpoint epistemologists would claim that the female AuQ92 16028-0338d-1pass-r01.indd 210 2/21/2020 10:23:45 AM Epistemic Paternalism, and Epistemic Permissivism 211 standpoint should be privileged over, not merely considered alongside of, the male standpoint when it comes to questions like abortion.25 In response, this is analogous to the way permissivists view epistemic standards, since permissivists don't maintain that any epistemic standard produces rational beliefs. Their view is not that that any standard goes. At the same time, both permissivists and standpoint theorists posit that there are multiple, equally epistemically good standpoints; even if the female standpoint should sometimes be privileged over the male standpoint, we also shouldn't assume all women have the same standpoint-not all women agree on whether and when abortion is morally permitted, for instance. As Bowell (2019: sec. 7a) says, "Feminist standpoint theories can also be misunderstood as proposing a single, monolithic feminist standpoint... [but they] are clearly not committed to the project of formulating a homogenous women's or feminist standpoint." Thus, on both views, certain viewpoints are privileged, but multiple equally good viewpoints sometimes arrive at competing verdicts. CONCLUSION On many epistemic theories, such as permissivism and standpoint theory, there isn't one privileged way of interpreting a body of evidence. I've pointed out that this shared commitment highlights a noteworthy connection between standpoint epistemology and epistemic permissivism, and suggested that prominent versions of standpoint epistemology have much in common with interpersonal permissivism. I've also argued that this points us to a class of cases in which epistemic paternalism is epistemically unjustified. We might be quite confident that we are doing someone an epistemic favor, when in reality, we are imposing our own standards on
as more diversity is generated, we can make a finer - grained part of british labour party. " Epistemic diversity - including the diversity of respective standpoints - leads to discovery in the context of collective inquiry, and paternalistically interfere with others to promote a monistic way of thinking suffocate this. This speaks against interfering with the question of people with other standpoints, whether or not permissivism is true. Second, one might object that standpoint epistemology is disanalogous to permissivism because standpoint epistemology privileges sealed standpoints. For instance, many standpoint epistemologist would claim that the female AuQ92 16028-0338d-1pass-r01.indd 210 2/21/2020 10:23:45 AM Epistemic Paternalism, and Epistemic Permissivism 211 standpoint should be privileged over, not merely considered alongside of, the male standpoint when it occur to questions like abortion.25 In response, this is analogous to the way permissivists view epistemic standards, since permissivists don't conserve that any epistemic standard produces rational beliefs. Their view is not that that any criterion go. At the same time, both permissivists and standpoint theorists posit that there are multiple, equally epistemically good standpoints; even if the female point of view should sometimes be privilege over the male standpoint, we also shouldn't assume all charwoman have the same standpoint - not all charwoman agree on whether and when abortion is morally permitted, for instance. As Bowell (2019: sec. 7a) say, " Feminist standpoint theories can also be misunderstood as proposing a single, monolithic feminist point of view... [ but they ] are clearly not committed to the project of formulating a homogenous women's or feminist standpoint. " therefore, on both view, certain viewpoints are privileged, but multiple evenly good viewpoints sometimes arrive at competing verdicts. CONCLUSION On many epistemic theories, such as permissivism and standpoint theory, there isn't one privileged room of interpreting a consistency of evidence. I've pointed out that this shared committedness highlights a noteworthy connection between standpoint epistemology and epistemic permissivism, and suggested that outstanding versions of point of view epistemology have much in common with interpersonal permissivism. I've also argue that this point us to a class of cases in which epistemic paternalism is epistemically unjustified. We might be quite confident that we are doing someone an epistemic favor, when in reality, we are imposing our own standard on
 as more diversity is generxted, we can makg q finec-graines divisiun of labor." Epistemic diversmty-ibcludung the diversity of vxrious stwndpointw-leavs to breakthroujgs in tmz confcxt oy rollective inqulry, and patarnalistically ivtzrfering with others to promote a mogistic eaj of thinking ftifkqs tgps. This speaks against interferjng witi the inquiry og people with other standplintd, whether or not pfrmissivism is eeue. Second, ove might object that sjandpoint epistemology is disanauogoux to permiwsuvidk because svandpopnt epistemology privhleges vertain standppinvs. Fir instance, many stanvpoint epistemologisjs would cnanm that the female AuW92 16028-0338e-1pass-t01.indd 210 2/21/2020 10:23:45 XN Eoisuemmc Laternwliam, and Epiatemic Permussivism 211 standpoinu sriuld be privimeged jvqr, not merely considered alongside of, tve jale standpoint when it comes to questions llke abortyon.25 In response, this is analogous to the way permhssivmsgs rlcw eoushemic standards, since permissivists don't mainezim nhat any epistemig standard producex gayyonal beliefs. Their visw is not that thah any sjandare goes. At the same time, both permissivisrs and standioinr theorists posit chat there axe muljiple, rqually epistemically guod atandpoints; even if ffe female standpuinn shmuld somtgimes be privilegqd over tie make stanapoimt, we wlso shoulfn't assume all women havf the sdme standplint-not all women agree on whetixr and when anostimn is moxally iermitted, for igstance. As Bowgll (2019: sec. 7c) says, "Feminist atandpomnt theories can also be klsunderstood as propjsint a wingle, ounolithic femimist stanbkoint... [but rhey] are clearly npt zkmmitted to the priject of formulstivg w jokodanous women's or wemkmist rtandpoint." Bhur, on both views, certain eiewloints are privilebeq, but muotiple ezually good voewpoints sometimed arrmve at comprtigg verdicts. CONCLUSION On many epistemif tmeories, such ws pcrmifsivism anb standpoint theory, there isn't one privioeged way of intetpreting a body of evndtnce. I've poinved oue that thhs shared commitment highlights a nottworthy connection betwsen stdndpolnt epistemology and epistemic permissivism, and suggested that prominent cersiois of standpojnt rpistvmojpgy hade mnci in common with pnterpersonal permissivism. I've auso arguad that this points us to a clssr of cases in which epistemic paternamism is rpistemically unjustified. We mibht be quite confident tmat we arw doihg somvknx an epistemic favor, when nn reaoity, we are imposing our owm dtandards on
as more diversity is generated, we can finer-grained of labor." diversity-including the diversity in context of collective and paternalistically interfering others to promote a monistic way thinking stifles this. This speaks against interfering with the inquiry of people with standpoints, whether or not permissivism is true. Second, one might object that standpoint is to because epistemology privileges certain standpoints. For instance, many standpoint epistemologists would claim that the female AuQ92 16028-0338d-1pass-r01.indd 2/21/2020 10:23:45 AM Epistemic Paternalism, and Epistemic Permissivism standpoint should be privileged not merely considered alongside of, male when it to like In response, this analogous to the way permissivists view epistemic standards, since permissivists don't maintain that any epistemic standard produces beliefs. Their not that any goes. the same time, and standpoint theorists posit that there epistemically good standpoints; even if the female standpoint sometimes be over the male standpoint, we also assume all women have the same standpoint-not all agree on whether and when abortion is morally permitted, for instance. As Bowell (2019: sec. "Feminist standpoint theories can be misunderstood as a monolithic standpoint... they] are not committed to the project of formulating a homogenous women's or standpoint." Thus, on both views, certain viewpoints are privileged, but good sometimes arrive at verdicts. CONCLUSION On many theories, as permissivism and standpoint isn't privileged a of I've pointed out that shared commitment highlights a noteworthy between standpoint epistemology and prominent versions of standpoint epistemology have much in with interpersonal permissivism. I've also argued that points us to a class of cases in which epistemic paternalism is unjustified. We quite confident that we are doing someone an favor, when in reality, are imposing our own standards on
 as more diversity is generateD, we can make A fineR-grAinEd DiviSion Of labor." EpistemIC divErsity-including the diveRsity Of VArioUS sTandpOints-leADs TO BreAkThRouGhS In The coNteXt of colLective inqUirY, aNd paternalisTIcAlly interfEriNg with others To pRomote A mOniSTic waY of ThinkIng stiFLes thiS. This speaKs AGainst INterferING wIth tHe inquiry of people WItH Other standpoinTs, whetHeR Or NOT peRmiSsivism is tRuE. SecoND, one migHT oBJECt tHAt standpoint ePistemology IS diSanaloGoUs tO PermisSivisM bECauSe standpoinT epiStemology PrivilEGes certAIn standPoints. for InsTancE, MaNy StaNdPOinT EpIstEMolOgists woUlD cLaim tHat tHE FEMale auQ92 16028-0338D-1pasS-r01.indD 210 2/21/2020 10:23:45 AM Epistemic PAteRnalISm, aNd EpiStemiC PerMiSsiviSm 211 stanDpoinT sHould be privilegEd ovEr, not mereLy cOnSidErEd aloNGside oF, thE maLe standPoint whEN it CoMES To Questions like abortIoN.25 iN rEsponse, tHis is aNAlOgOUs to the wAy PerMissIVIsts vIew ePIsTemic staNdards, SInCe PermissIvIsts doN't MaiNtaIn thaT Any ePistemIc standaRd proDUces rational beLIefs. Their view IS nOT ThAT thaT anY standard goEs. At THe saMe tiME, bOth PErmisSivisTs ANd STandpoint theorists pOsIt that There Are multiple, eqUally epistEMICally gooD staNDpOInts; even if the fEmale Standpoint SHould somEtimeS be priviLeged over THE male staNdpOinT, we AlsO SHoUldn't assume alL WOmen HaVe the saMe sTandpoiNt-nOt aLl wOmeN aGree on wheTher and wHeN aBoRtIon Is morALly permiTtEd, fOr InsTance. aS BowelL (2019: sec. 7a) Says, "feMiNIst StandpoINt THEoriEs CaN alsO be MiSundeRstoOD as ProposiNg a single, MonOLithIc FeMinist sTandpoint... [but tHeY] are clearlY nOt cOmmittED To the proJect of formulating a homogENous womEn's Or femInisT standpoiNt." THus, on bOth VIews, ceRtain vIewpoInTs aRE PriviLEGeD, buT mUltiple equALLy gOod viEwPoinTs sometImes arrive at competINg vErdicts. CONCLUsIOn On mANY ePisTEmIC thEoRIes, SUCh as permissivisM and standpOiNT tHeory, there ISn't OnE privilEged way Of intERpretinG a body of eVidence. I'vE pOintED Out That this shAred commItment higHLightS A nOtewoRthY conneCtIon BetweEn stanDPoiNt epiStemolOgY and epIstemIc PermissiVism, and suggested that proMinent VersiOns Of standpoInt EPisTemology hAve mUch in commoN wiTh iNterpErsONal peRmisSIvIsm. i'Ve alsO argUEd that thiS PoIntS US tO a class of caSES In wHich ePisTEmic paTernAlism is epistemicaLLy unjustified. WE migHT Be qUitE ConfIdEnt that we are doIng SoMEOne an epiStEmic favor, whEn in realItY, We are ImposiNg our oWn standARDs ON
 as more diversity is gene rated, wecan m ake  afi ner- grai ned division o f  lab or." Epistemic diversi ty-in cl u ding th e div ersityo fv a rio us  s tan dp o in ts-le ads  to bre akthroughs  in  t he context o f  c ollectiveinq uiry, and pa ter nalist ic all y  inte rfe ringwith o t hers t o promote  a monist i c way o f th inki ng stifles this.T hi s  speaks agains t inte rf e ri n g  wi ththe inquir yof pe o ple wit h  o t h e r s t andpoints, wh ether or no t  pe rmissi vi smi s true . Sec on d , o ne might ob ject  that sta ndpoin t  episte m ology i s disa nal ogo us t o  p er mis si v ism be cau s e s tandpoin tep istem olog y p r ivil ege s ce rtain  standpoints.  Fo r in s tan ce, m any s tand po int e pistem ologi st s would claim t hatthe femal e A uQ 9216 028-0 3 38d-1p ass -r0 1.indd210 2/2 1 /20 20 1 0 :2 3:45 AM EpistemicPa t e rn alism, a nd Epi s te mi c  Permiss iv ism  211 s tandp oint sh ould beprivil e ge dover, n ot  merel ycon sid ereda long side o f, the m ale s t andpoint wheni t comes to qu e st i o ns like  ab ortion.25 I n re s pons e, t h is  is analo gousto th e  way permissivistsvi ew epi stemi c standards,since perm i s s ivists d on't ma i ntain that any  epis temic stan d ard prod ucesrational  beliefs. T heir vie w i s n ottha t th at any standa r d  goe s.  At the  sa me time , b oth  pe rmi ss ivists an d standp oi nt  t he ori sts p o sit that  t her eare  mult i ple, e quall y ep is te m ica lly goo d  s t a ndpo in ts ; ev enif  thefema l e s tandpoi nt should  so m etim es  b e privi leged over th emale stand po int , we a l s o should n't assume all women ha v e the s ame  stan dpoi nt-not al l w omen a gre e  on wh etherand w he n a b o rtion i smor al ly permitt e d , f or in st ance . As Bo well (2019: sec. 7 a ) s ays, "Feminis t s tand p o in t t h eo r ies  c a n a l s o be misunderst ood as pro po s in g a single ,  mo no lithicfeminis t sta n dpoint. .. [but t hey] arecl earl y not  committed  to theproject o f  form u la tinga h omogen ou s w omen' s or f e min ist s tandpo in t." Th us, o nboth vie ws, certain viewpointsare pr ivile ged , but mul tip l e e qually go od v iewpointssom eti mes a rri v e atcomp e ti ngv erdic ts.C ONCLUSION On  ma n y  e pistemic th e o r ies , suc h a s  permi ssiv ism and standpoin t  theory, there  isn ' t  on e p r ivil eg ed way of inte rpr et i n g a body  o f evidence.  I've po in t ed ou t that  thissharedc o mm i tmenthigh lig hts a not ewo rt h y conne ct io n  betwe en s ta ndpoin t epis t emol o g y and epistemicpermi s s ivism ,  an d sug ge sted th a t pr ominent ve rsions of s tandpo intepist emology  h ave mu chin  common wi t h interpe rsona l permi ss ivis m.I've a lsoa r guedthat  t his  points u s to acl a ssof c asesin  whi ch episte m ic pater nal i sm is e pi ste m i callyu nj u s tified. We  mi ght b e quite conf i dent th a t weare do ing so meone a n  ep is temic f avo r ,  when inreality,w e a re  imp osing ou rownst and ar ds on
 as_more diversity_is generated, we can_make a_finer-grained_division of_labor."_Epistemic diversity-including the_diversity of various_standpoints-leads to breakthroughs in_the context of_collective_inquiry, and paternalistically interfering with others to promote a monistic way of thinking stifles_this._This speaks_against_interfering_with the inquiry of people_with other standpoints, whether or_not permissivism_is true. Second, one might object that standpoint_epistemology_is disanalogous to_permissivism because standpoint epistemology privileges certain standpoints. For instance,_many standpoint epistemologists would claim that_the female AuQ92_16028-0338d-1pass-r01.indd_210_2/21/2020 10:23:45 AM Epistemic_Paternalism, and Epistemic Permissivism 211 standpoint_should be privileged over, not merely_considered alongside of, the male standpoint when_it comes to questions like abortion.25_In response, this is analogous_to the_way permissivists view epistemic standards,_since permissivists don't_maintain that_any epistemic standard_produces rational beliefs. Their view is_not that that_any standard goes. At the same_time,_both permissivists and_standpoint_theorists_posit that_there are multiple,_equally_epistemically good_standpoints;_even if the female standpoint should_sometimes_be privileged over the male standpoint, we_also shouldn't assume all_women_have the same standpoint-not_all women agree on whether_and when abortion is morally permitted,_for instance._As Bowell_(2019: sec. 7a) says, "Feminist standpoint theories can also be misunderstood_as proposing a single, monolithic feminist_standpoint... [but they] are_clearly not_committed_to the project_of_formulating a_homogenous women's or feminist standpoint." Thus, on_both views,_certain viewpoints are privileged, but multiple_equally good viewpoints sometimes_arrive_at competing verdicts. CONCLUSION On many_epistemic theories, such as permissivism and_standpoint theory, there isn't one_privileged_way_of interpreting a body of_evidence. I've pointed out that this_shared commitment highlights_a noteworthy connection between standpoint epistemology and_epistemic_permissivism, and suggested that prominent versions_of_standpoint epistemology have much in common_with_interpersonal_permissivism. I've also argued that_this points us to a class_of cases in which epistemic paternalism is epistemically unjustified._We might be_quite confident that we are_doing_someone_an epistemic favor, when in reality, we are imposing our_own standards_on