 of moral and legal responsibility that cannot be decided on behavioral evidence alone. Neuroimaging data may aid legal experts in assessing how impulse-control disorders affect behavior and whether they warrant full responsibility, mitigated responsibility, or excuse. These examples illustrate that neuroscience should not be judged by whether it preserves or threatens the contested concepts, but by whether it clarifies the conditions under which they obtain. Kaposy claims that our valued concepts "might require the rational refusal to believe discoveries of neuroscience that put them in doubt" (23). As matters now stand, there is not enough neuroscientific evidence to undermine the ideas that persons are natural kinds and that they have free will. Nevertheless, it is possible that future neuroscientific discoveries will show that unconscious brain processes completely control our thought and behavior. This could mean that personhood and free will, as we now define them, are illusions that enable human organisms to adapt to and survive in the environment. It would be irrational to ignore this knowledge and not revise our conception of who we are. If we are not essentially persons who act on the basis of conscious will, then it would not be contradictory to question our commitment to these concepts. It would also be irrational not to revise our ethical practices in the light of this knowledge. Suppose that a number of functional imaging studies indicate that brain processes constrain the choices open to a human agent at any given time. As a constraint, this would limit the scope of agency and the content of responsibility, what we are responsible for. Although this would not explain away free will and responsibility, it could mean that we are less free and less responsible than previously thought. Such a discovery may or may not occur in the foreseeable future. But it behooves us as rational beings to be open to this possibility. Neuroscience need not force us into a state of cognitive polyphasia, where ethical reasoning conflicts with a neuroscience-influenced understanding of human beings. Unless one accepts substance dualism and libertarianism, any such conflict is more apparent than real. If one accepts the view that persons are constituted by their minds and brains and can be the authors of their actions despite deterministic or mechanistic processes in the brain, then neuroscience does not warrant giving up our belief in personhood and free will. Empirical considerations pertaining to the brain and normative considerations pertaining to human agents should not be seen as competing but complementary. The psychological and behavioral criteria that ground personhood and free will can be informed by knowledge of how the brain enables the mind in mediating consciousness and the capacity for reasoning and
of moral and legal responsibility that cannot be decided on behavioral evidence alone. Neuroimaging data may help legal expert in assessing how impulse - control disorder feign behavior and whether they warrant entire responsibility, mitigated responsibility, or apologize. These exemplar illustrate that neuroscience should not be pronounce by whether it preserves or threatens the contested concept, but by whether it clarifies the conditions under which they obtain. Kaposy claims that our valued concepts " might require the intellectual refusal to believe discoveries of neuroscience that put them in doubt " (23). As topic now stand, there cost not enough neuroscientific evidence to sabotage the ideas that persons are natural kinds and that they have spare will. Nevertheless, it is possible that future neuroscientific discoveries will show that unconscious brain processes completely control our thought and behavior. This could mean that personhood and free will, as we now define them, are illusions that enable human organism to adapt to and survive in the environment. It would be irrational to neglect this cognition and not retool our conception of who we are. If we are not essentially persons who act on the basis of conscious will, then it would not be contradictory to question our committedness to these concepts. It would also be irrational not to revise our ethical practices in the light of this knowledge. Suppose that a number of functional imaging studies indicate that mind processes restrain the choices open to a human agent at any given time. As a restraint, this would limit the scope of agency and the content of responsibility, what we are responsible for. Although this would not explain away free will and responsibility, it could intend that we are less free and less responsible than previously think. Such a discovery may or may not occur in the foreseeable future. But it behoove us as rational beings to be open to this possibility. Neuroscience need not push us into a state of cognitive polyphasia, where ethical reasoning conflicts with a neuroscience - charm agreement of human beings. Unless one take substance dualism and libertarianism, any such conflict is more apparent than real. If one accepts the view that person are constituted by their minds and brain and can be the authors of their actions despite deterministic or mechanistic processes in the brain, then neuroscience does not warrant giving up our impression in personhood and free will. Empirical considerations pertaining to the brain and normative considerations refer to human agent should not be seen as competing but complementary. The psychological and behavioral criteria that ground personhood and free will can be inform by knowledge of how the brain enables the thinker in mediating consciousness and the capacity for reasoning and
 of moral and legal responslbility that canuit be vecided on behaxioral evidence alone. Neuroilating eata may aid legal expdrts in adsessing how umpulse-convdol disorders wffeet behavior and ehether thay warrant fuln fedponsibility, mitigated responsibiliey, or ecckse. These examkles pljustdate that neuroscience should not ge judgtd by whether it pteserves or threatens the fontfsted concepts, but by whether it soarifies the conditions under whicg they obtain. Kaposy claims thag our valued cobcwptd "might requmre thv rational renlsal to believr discoveries pf ieuriscience that put thek in doubt" (23). As matjers now sdaud, there is not enougy beurovciettifkx exidtncx tk undegmiie the ideaa that persins are natural kincs qnd that they have srqe will. Nevertheless, it is possible thau futhre neuroscientific disxoveries will show thwt unconssious brain processes completely control our thoucht aid bekqvior. Rhls could mean that personhood and free will, af wt npw define them, are illusipnd yrat enable huoan oryznjsms to adapt to ajd survyve ib the envyronkent. It would be irrational to ignore tkis knowledge and not revise our conveptipn of who we are. If we cre nof essentialpy persona who act on the casps ox conscious will, then it wjuld not ue coutradictury jo queseion our clmmitment to these conceots. Ij woulg also be lrrational not to revise our etimcal practicex hn nhe light of tmis knowledge. Stppose that a uumber oy funcgional imafing stndies indicaee that brain krocesses convtrain tre cyoicws open go a human agemt at any given timw. As a constraint, bhis dkuld limit the wcoke of agency and thd cjnnenv of wasponsibilitf, whxt dr are responsiblc fur. Akthough this would nmt esplain away free wolj and rewponsibijity, it could mean that we are pess hree aid lesx rgsponsible than previously thoufht. Such w dlscovery may jr mqy not occur in the foreseeable future. But it behootes us as rational beints to be open to thns possibilitb. Neurjscience teed not force us inro a state of cogkitive polyphasia, whers ethiwal rfasoning conflicts with a neuroscience-influenced understanding of human bwings. Nnjess one acdeptx subvtcncz dualifm aid libertarianism, sny such conflict is more apparxnt than raaj. If one accepts the view thst persons are zonstituted by their minss and btains and can be the authors of their actions despite dcterminisric od mechanisvic processes in the brain, then neurosxienge does not waframt giving uo ouc bzlief in personhood and free will. Empirucwl considerationv pertaininn uo the grain wnd normative cohsidsgatiovs pertaining to human agenys should not be seet ws competing byn complementaty. The pvychological and behavimral criteria that ground personhood and free will ban be infkrmed by lnowledge of nlw the brain enables tme migd in meaiating conswiousness and the capacity for reasoning anv
of moral and legal responsibility that cannot on evidence alone. data may aid impulse-control affect behavior and they warrant full mitigated responsibility, or excuse. These examples that neuroscience should not be judged by whether it preserves or threatens the concepts, but by whether it clarifies the conditions under which they obtain. Kaposy that valued "might the rational refusal to believe discoveries of neuroscience that put them in doubt" (23). As matters stand, there is not enough neuroscientific evidence to the ideas that persons natural kinds and that they free Nevertheless, it possible future discoveries will show unconscious brain processes completely control our thought and behavior. This could mean that personhood and free will, we now are illusions enable organisms adapt to and the environment. It would be irrational knowledge and not revise our conception of who are. If are not essentially persons who act the basis of conscious will, then it would be contradictory to question our commitment to these concepts. It would also be irrational not our ethical practices in light of this Suppose a of imaging studies that brain processes constrain the choices open to a human agent any given time. As a constraint, this would limit the agency the content of what we are responsible Although would not explain away and it we less and less responsible than thought. Such a discovery may may not occur in behooves us as rational beings to be open this possibility. Neuroscience need not force us a state of cognitive polyphasia, where ethical reasoning conflicts with a neuroscience-influenced of human one accepts substance dualism and libertarianism, any such is more apparent than If one accepts the view that persons are constituted their and brains can be the of their actions deterministic or mechanistic the brain, neuroscience not our belief in personhood and free Empirical pertaining to the brain and considerations human agents should not be seen as competing but complementary. The psychological and behavioral criteria personhood and free will be by knowledge of how the brain enables the mind in mediating consciousness capacity for reasoning
 of moral and legal responsibiLity that caNnot bE deCidEd On beHaviOral evidence alONe. NeUroimaging data may aid leGal exPeRTs in ASsEssinG how impULsE-COntRoL dIsoRdERs AffecT beHavior aNd whether tHey WaRrant full resPOnSibility, miTigAted responsiBilIty, or eXcUse. tHese eXamPles iLlustrATe that NeuroscieNcE Should NOt be judGED bY wheTher it preserves or THrEAtens the contesTed conCePTs, BUT by WheTher it clarIfIes thE ConditiONs UNDEr wHIch they obtain. kaposy claimS ThaT our vaLuEd cONcepts "Might ReQUirE the rationaL refUsal to belIeve diSCoverieS Of neuroSciencE thAt pUt thEM iN dOubT" (23). AS MatTErS noW StaNd, there iS nOt EnougH neuROSCIentIfiC eviDence To undermine thE idEas tHAt pErsonS are nAturAl Kinds And thaT they HaVe free will. NeverThelEss, it is poSsiBlE thAt FuturE NeurosCieNtiFic discOveries WIll ShOW THaT unconscious brain pRoCESsEs compleTely coNTrOl OUr thoughT aNd bEhavIOR. This CoulD MeAn that peRsonhoOD aNd Free wilL, aS we now DeFinE thEm, are ILlusIons thAt enable Human ORganisms to adapT To and survive iN ThE ENvIRonmEnt. it would be irRatiONal tO ignORe ThiS KnowlEdge aNd NOt REvise our conception oF wHo we arE. If we Are not essentiAlly personS WHO act on thE basIS oF Conscious will, tHen it Would not be COntradicTory tO questioN our commiTMEnt to theSe cOncEptS. It WOUlD also be irratiONAl noT tO revise Our Ethical PraCtiCes In tHe Light of thIs knowleDgE. SUpPoSe tHat a nUMber of fuNcTioNaL imAging STudies IndicAte tHaT bRAin ProcessES cONStraIn ThE choIceS oPen to A humAN agEnt at anY given timE. As A ConsTrAiNt, this wOuld limit the sCoPe of agency AnD thE conteNT Of responSibility, what we are responSIble for. altHough This Would not eXplAin awaY frEE will aNd respOnsibIlIty, IT Could MEAn ThaT wE are less frEE And Less rEsPonsIble thaN previously thought. sUch A discovery may Or mAy noT OCcUr iN ThE ForEsEEabLE Future. But it behoOves us as raTiONaL beings to bE OpeN tO this poSsibiliTy. NeuROsciencE need not fOrce us intO a StatE OF coGnitive polYphasia, wHere ethicAL reasONiNg conFliCts witH a NeuRosciEnce-inFLueNced uNderstAnDing of Human BeIngs. UnleSs one accepts substance duAlism aNd libErtArianism, aNy sUCh cOnflict is More Apparent thAn rEal. if one AccEPts thE vieW ThAt pERsons Are cONstituted BY tHeiR MInDs and brains AND Can Be the AutHOrs of tHeir Actions despite detERministic or mecHaniSTIc pRocESses In The brain, then neUroScIENce does nOt Warrant giviNg up our bElIEf in pErsonhOod and Free wilL. eMpIRical cOnsiDerAtions perTaiNiNG to the bRaIn ANd normAtivE cOnsideRationS PertAINing to human agentS shouLD Not be SEen As comPeTing but COmplEmentary. ThE psychologiCal and BehaVioraL criterIa That grOunD pErsonhood aND free will Can be InformeD bY knoWleDge of hOw thE BRain eNablEs The Mind in medIATiNG cOnSCioUsneSs and ThE capAcity for rEAsoning aNd
 of moral and legal respon sibility t hat c ann otbe  dec ided  on behavioral evid ence alone. Neuroimagi ng da ta maya id  lega l exper t si n  as se ss ing  h o wimpul se- control  disorders  af fe ct behaviora nd  whether t hey  warrant ful l r espons ib ili t y, mi tig atedrespon s ibilit y, or exc us e . Thes e  exampl e s  i llus trate that neuros c ie n ce should notbe jud ge d  b y whe the r it prese rv es or threate n st h e  co n tested concep ts, but byw het her it  c lar i fies t he co nd i tio ns under wh ichthey obta in. Ka p osy cla i ms that  our v alu edconc e pt s"mi gh t  re q ui ret herational  r ef usalto b e l i e ve d isc over ies o f neuroscienc e t hatp utthemin do ubt"  ( 23).As mat tersno w stand, thereis n ot enough  ne ur osc ie ntifi c  evide nce  to  underm ine the ide as t h at  persons are natur al k in ds and t hat th e yha v e free w il l.Neve r t heles s, i t  i s possib le tha t  f ut ure neu ro scient if icdis cover i es w ill sh ow thatuncon s cious brain pr o cesses comple t el y co n trol  ou r thought a nd b e havi or.T hi s c o uld m ean t ha t  p e rsonhood and free w il l, aswe no w define them , are illu s i o ns thatenab l eh uman organisms  to a dapt to an d  survive  in t he envir onment. I t would be  ir rat ion alt o  i gnore this kn o w ledg eand not  re vise ou r c onc ept ion  o f who weare. Ifwe  a re  n otessen t ially pe rs ons  w hoact o n  the b asisof c on sc i ous  will,t he n it w ou ld  not  be  c ontra dict o ryto ques tion ourcom m itme nt  t o these  concepts. It  w ould alsobe  ir ration a l  not torevise our ethical prac t ices in  th e lig ht o f this kn owl edge.Sup p ose th at a n umber  o f f u n ction a l  i mag in g studiesi n dic ate t ha t br ain pro cesses constrain t h e c hoices open t o a  hum a n  a gen t  a t  an yg ive n time. As a cons traint, th is wo uld limitt hesc ope ofagencyand t h e conte nt of res ponsibili ty , wh a t  we  are respo nsible f or. Altho u gh th i swould  no t expl ai n a way f ree wi l l a nd re sponsi bi lity,it co ul d mean t hat we are less free an d less  resp ons ible than  pr e vio usly thou ght.  Such a di sco ver y may  or may n ot o c cu r i n  thefore s eeable fu t ur e.B u tit behooves u s  as  rati ona l  being s to  be open to thisp ossibility. Ne uros c i enc e n e ed n ot  force us into  ast a t e of cog ni tive polyph asia, wh er e  ethi cal re asonin g confl i c ts with a  neu ros cience-in flu en c ed unde rs ta n ding o f hu ma n bein gs. Un l esso n e accepts substa nce d u a lisma ndliber ta rianism ,  any  such conf lict is mor e appa rent  than  real.If  one a cce pt s the view that pers ons a re cons ti tute d b y thei r mi n d s and  bra in s a nd can be t he au th o rsof t heirac tion s despite determin ist i c or me ch ani s t ic pro c es s e s in the b rai n, th e n  neuroscie n ce d o es not w arrant  givin g up ou r  be li ef in p ers o n hood andfree will .  Em pi rica l consid er atio ns  pe rt aining to the b rain and  normati v e  consi der a tion s  perta in ing to human  agen ts shouldn o t b e seena s c omp eti ng b utcomp l ementary. The psychologi caland b e hav ioral  crit er ia thatg roun d person h ood and freewill can be inf o rme d  bykno w le dg e of howthe brain  ena ble s th e m indi n  med i atin g  c onsc iousne ss a nd  t he capaci ty  for re a soni n g a nd
 of_moral and_legal responsibility that cannot_be decided_on_behavioral evidence_alone._Neuroimaging data may_aid legal experts_in assessing how impulse-control_disorders affect behavior_and_whether they warrant full responsibility, mitigated responsibility, or excuse. These examples illustrate that neuroscience_should_not be_judged_by_whether it preserves or threatens_the contested concepts, but by_whether it_clarifies the conditions under which they obtain. Kaposy_claims_that our valued_concepts "might require the rational refusal to believe discoveries_of neuroscience that put them in_doubt" (23). As_matters_now_stand, there is not_enough neuroscientific evidence to undermine the_ideas that persons are natural kinds_and that they have free will. Nevertheless,_it is possible that future neuroscientific_discoveries will show that unconscious_brain processes_completely control our thought and_behavior. This could_mean that_personhood and free_will, as we now define them,_are illusions that_enable human organisms to adapt to_and_survive in the_environment._It_would be_irrational to ignore_this_knowledge and_not_revise our conception of who we_are._If we are not essentially persons who_act on the basis_of_conscious will, then it_would not be contradictory to_question our commitment to these concepts._It would_also be_irrational not to revise our ethical practices in the light of_this knowledge. Suppose that a number_of functional imaging studies_indicate that_brain_processes constrain the_choices_open to_a human agent at any given time._As a_constraint, this would limit the scope_of agency and the_content_of responsibility, what we are responsible_for. Although this would not explain_away free will and responsibility,_it_could_mean that we are less_free and less responsible than previously_thought. Such a_discovery may or may not occur in_the_foreseeable future. But it behooves us_as_rational beings to be open to_this_possibility._Neuroscience need not force us_into a state of cognitive polyphasia,_where ethical reasoning conflicts with a neuroscience-influenced understanding of_human beings. Unless_one accepts substance dualism and_libertarianism,_any_such conflict is more apparent than real. If one accepts_the view_that persons are_constituted by their minds and brains and can be the_authors of their actions despite deterministic or_mechanistic processes in the brain, then neuroscience does not warrant giving_up our belief in personhood and free will._Empirical considerations pertaining to the brain and_normative considerations pertaining to_human_agents should not be seen as competing_but_complementary._The_psychological and behavioral_criteria that ground_personhood and free_will can_be informed by_knowledge of_how the brain_enables_the mind in mediating consciousness and the capacity for reasoning and