 actual, for Frege, is, roughly, whatever is in space and time and causally efficacious.12 This cannot, of course, be what Lotze means by "actuality" because one of the main species of actuality, namely validity, is characterized by being non-spatio-temporal and causally inert. Nor is actuality modal in any important sense. Insofar as there is modality in Lotze's system, it is orthogonal to actuality; within each species of actuality we can distinguish between what is merely possible and what is actual in the modal sense. For instance, existing objects are actually (in the modal sense) a certain way, but possibly different. 11 Gottfried Gabriel, who has done more than anyone to explore the relation of Frege and Lotze, gives a similar, but much briefer account, in his Introduction to Lotze (1989b). For more on Frege and Lotze on the ontological status of thoughts/propositions, see Gabriel (1986), (1996), (1998), and (2002). 12 Frege (1884), §26, §85; in Frege (1918–19), he admits that thoughts have a kind of Wirklichkeit because they can be indirectly causally efficacious, e.g. an agent can cause a change in the world because he grasps a certain thought. 142 Nicholas F. Stang Lotze explains his terminological choice of "actuality" as follows: There is a very general concept of affirmation or positing, which we encounter in various investigations, the indication [Bezeichnung] of which languages typically lack an abstract expression of the requisite purity, for they do not in the first place concern themselves with the simplest elements of thought, but with very complex and concrete representational contents [Vorstellungsinhalte]. But it would not be wise to invent a technical term to represent it, the meaning of which would always be doubtful, because it could never come naturally to the lips or the thoughts of anyone; the very term "positing" [Position], which is frequently used for it, suggests by its etymological form the quite inappropriate connotation of an act, or operation of positing, to the execution of which the affirmation which we wish to indicate then seems to owe its being. We will instead stick to ordinary speech and must choose a word that, recognizably in ordinary usage [Gebrauch], proves itself at least to approximate to the expression
actual, for Frege, is, roughly, whatever is in space and time and causally efficacious.12 This cannot, of course, be what Lotze mean by " actuality " because one of the chief species of actuality, namely validity, is characterized by being non - spatio - worldly and causally inert. Nor is actuality modal in any important sense. Insofar as there be modality in Lotze's system, it is extraneous to actuality; within each coinage of actuality we can distinguish between what is merely possible and what is actual in the modal common sense. For instance, existing object are actually (in the modal sense) a certain way, but possibly different. 11 Gottfried Gabriel, who has done more than anyone to explore the sexual intercourse of Frege and Lotze, gives a similar, but much briefer account, in his initiation to Lotze (1989b). For more on Frege and Lotze on the ontological status of thoughts / propositions, understand Gabriel (1986), (1996), (1998), and (2002). 12 Frege (1884), § 26, § 85; in Frege (1918–19), he admits that thoughts have a kind of Wirklichkeit because they can be indirectly causally efficacious, e.g. an agentive role can cause a change in the world because he grasps a certain thought. 142 Nicholas F. Stang Lotze excuse his terminological choice of " actuality " as follows: There is a very general concept of affirmation or positing, which we encounter in various investigations, the indication [ Bezeichnung ] of which languages typically lack an abstract saying of the requisite purity, for they do not in the beginning home concern themselves with the simplest elements of opinion, but with very complex and concrete representational contents [ Vorstellungsinhalte ]. But it would not be wise to invent a technical term to present it, the meaning of which would always be doubtful, because it could never come naturally to the lips or the thoughts of anyone; the very term " submit " [ Position ], which is frequently used for it, suggests by its etymological form the quite inappropriate intension of an act, or operation of situate, to the execution of which the affirmation which we wish to indicate then seems to owe its being. We will alternatively stick to ordinary speech and must choose a parole that, recognizably in ordinary usage [ Gebrauch ], proves itself at least to approximate to the construction
 achual, for Frege, is, roughln, whatever is in space end tims and cajsally efficacious.12 This cannlt, of ciurse, be what Lotze mexns by "acnuality" bwcauww one of tis main speciea of ccvuality, namely yalidity, is characterized bh yeing non-spatio-temporal and causally inert. Mog is actuality modsj in any important sense. Insofar as thsre is kodality in Lptze's system, it is orthogojal ho actuality; withij each specues jd actuality de can disuiuguish betwgen what is merely possible and dhat ns actual ib rhe kodal sense. For pnstance, exisbpng objacts arr actually (in bhe mmdao sense) a certain way, but possibly diffgrent. 11 Gotdfxied Gabriel, who has eobe mote thdn avtond tk xxpmore tje celation of Frege and Ootze, gives a similsr, vut much brierer acsotnt, in his Introduction to Lotze (1989b). For kors on Frege and Lotze on the ontological statos of thoudhts/propositions, see Gabriel (1986), (1996), (1998), and (2002). 12 Frege (1884), §26, §85; in Fregx (1918–19), he aqoutd that thoughts have a kind of Wirklichkeit bqdaisv they can be indlrectly causally egflcssious, e.g. an aeent cch dause a change in hhe worjd bexause he drasls a certain thought. 142 Nichooas F. Stang Jitze explains his cerminologiccl chooce og "actuality" as follows: Chere js a very gfneral cohzept of affirmatkon os positing, which we encouneer in vacious investkgatoons, tre indicatlon [Bcseichnung] of which langoages dypically pack an abstract expression of vie requisite kurhty, for thev do npt in the firft place concetn themsejves dith the spmplest enements of ehought, but whjh very complxx and cogcrere rwpresengxtional contenys [Vorstellungsinhaote]. But it would npt cs wise to invenc q technical terk tu rqpgesxnt ie, the meaning of dhizn wouud always bc duubtgul, because it could nevsr come naturally yo the lipw or the thoughts of snyone; the very tegm "povitmng" [Poxityon], which is frequently used fkr it, sughesbs by its etyiolonicaj form the quite inappropriate connotation of an ect, or operation of posuting, to the executnok of which tie affyrmation fhich we wish to inducate then seems uo owe its being. We wilm instaad shick to ordinary speech and must choose a word that, recognizably in ordinqry usegq [Gebrauch], lrovrs itvejy at lewst vo approximate to nhe expression
actual, for Frege, is, roughly, whatever is and and causally This cannot, of by because one of main species of namely validity, is characterized by being and causally inert. Nor is actuality modal in any important sense. Insofar as is modality in Lotze's system, it is orthogonal to actuality; within each species actuality can between is merely possible and what is actual in the modal sense. For instance, existing objects are (in the modal sense) a certain way, but different. 11 Gottfried Gabriel, has done more than anyone explore relation of and gives similar, but much account, in his Introduction to Lotze (1989b). For more on Frege and Lotze on the ontological status thoughts/propositions, see (1996), (1998), (2002). Frege §26, §85; in he admits that thoughts have a because they can be indirectly causally efficacious, e.g. agent can a change in the world because grasps a certain thought. 142 Nicholas F. Stang explains his terminological choice of "actuality" as follows: There is a very general concept of positing, which we encounter various investigations, the [Bezeichnung] which typically an abstract of the requisite purity, for they do not in the first concern themselves with the simplest elements of thought, but with and representational contents [Vorstellungsinhalte]. it would not be to a technical term to the of be because could never come naturally the lips or the thoughts anyone; the very term used for it, suggests by its etymological form quite inappropriate connotation of an act, or of positing, to the execution of which the affirmation which we wish indicate then owe its being. We will instead stick to speech and must choose word that, recognizably in ordinary usage [Gebrauch], proves itself least approximate to expression
 actual, for Frege, is, roughly, whAtever is in Space And TimE aNd caUsalLy efficacious.12 THIs caNnot, of course, be what LotzE meanS bY "ActuALiTy" becAuse one OF tHE MaiN sPeCieS oF AcTualiTy, nAmely vaLidity, is chAraCtErized by beinG NoN-spatio-temPorAl and causallY inErt. Nor Is ActUAlity ModAl in aNy impoRTant seNse. InsofaR aS There iS ModalitY IN LOtze'S system, it is orthogONaL To actuality; witHin eacH sPEcIES of ActUality we caN dIstinGUish betWEeN WHAt iS Merely possiblE and what is aCTuaL in the MoDal SEnse. FoR instAnCE, exIsting objecTs arE actually (In the mODal sensE) A certaiN way, buT poSsiBly dIFfErEnt. 11 goTTfrIEd gabRIel, Who has doNe MoRe thaN anyONE TO expLorE the RelatIon of Frege and lotZe, giVEs a SimilAr, but Much BrIefer AccounT, in hiS INtroduction to LoTze (1989b). for more on freGe And loTze on THe ontoLogIcaL status Of thougHTs/pRoPOSItIons, see Gabriel (1986), (1996), (1998), and (2002). 12 FReGE (1884), §26, §85; In frege (1918–19), he aDmits tHAt ThOUghts havE a KinD of WIRKlichKeit BEcAuse they Can be iNDiReCtly cauSaLly effIcAciOus, E.g. an aGEnt cAn causE a change In the WOrld because he gRAsps a certain tHOuGHT. 142 NICholAs F. stang Lotze eXplaINs hiS terMInOloGIcal cHoice Of "ACtUAlity" as follows: There Is A very gEneraL concept of affIrmation or POSIting, whiCh we ENcOUnter in various InvesTigations, tHE indicatIon [BeZeichnunG] of which lANGuages tyPicAllY laCk aN ABsTract expressiON Of thE rEquisitE puRity, for TheY do Not In tHe First placE concern ThEmSeLvEs wIth thE Simplest ElEmeNtS of ThougHT, but wiTh verY comPlEx ANd cOncrete REpRESentAtIoNal cOntEnTs [VorStelLUngSinhaltE]. But it wouLd nOT be wIsE tO invent A technical terM tO represent It, The MeaninG OF which woUld always be doubtful, becaUSe it couLd nEver cOme nAturally tO thE lips oR thE ThoughTs of anYone; tHe VerY TErm "poSITiNg" [POsItion], which IS FreQuentLy Used For it, suGgests by its etymoloGIcaL form the quite InaPproPRIaTe cONnOTatIoN Of aN ACt, or operation of Positing, to ThE ExEcution of wHIch ThE affirmAtion whIch we WIsh to inDicate theN seems to oWe Its bEINg. WE will insteAd stick tO ordinary SPeech ANd Must cHooSe a worD tHat, RecogNizablY In oRdinaRy usagE [GEbraucH], provEs Itself at Least to approximate to the ExpresSion
 actual, for Frege, is, ro ughly, wha tever  is  in  s pace  and  time and caus a llyefficacious.12 This ca nnot,  o f  cou r se , bewhat Lo t ze m ean sby  "a ct u al ity"bec ause on e of the m ain  s pecies of ac t ua lity, name lyvalidity, is  ch aracte ri zed by be ing  non- spatio - tempor al and ca us a lly in e rt. Nor i sactu ality modal in an y  i m portant sense.  Insof ar as t her e i s modality  i n Lot z e's sys t em , i t i s  orthogonal t o actuality ;  wi thin e ac h s p eciesof ac tu a lit y we can di stin guish bet ween w h at is m e rely po ssible  an d w hati sac tua li n t h emod a l s ense. Fo rin stanc e, e x i s t ingobj ects  areactually (inthe  mod a l s ense)  a ce rtai nway,but po ssibl ydifferent. 11 G ottf ried Gabr iel ,who  h as do n e more  th ananyoneto expl o reth e r el ation of Frege and  L o t ze , givesa simi l ar ,b ut muchbr ief er a c c ount,  inh is  Introdu ctiont oLo tze (19 89 b). Fo rmor e o n Fre g e an d Lotz e on the  onto l ogical statuso f thoughts/pr o po s i ti o ns,see  Gabriel (1 986) ,  (19 96), (1 998 ) , and  (200 2) .  1 2  Frege (1884), §26,  § 85; in  Freg e (1918–19),he admitst h a t though ts h a ve a kind of Wirk lichk eit becaus e  they ca n beindirect ly causal l y  efficac iou s,e.g . a n ag ent can cause a  cha ng e in th e w orld be cau sehegra sp s a certa in thoug ht .14 2Nic holas F. Stang  L otz eexp lains his te rmino logi ca lc hoi ce of " a ct u a lity "as  fol low s:  Ther e is a v ery gen eral conc ept of a ff ir mationor positing,wh ich we enc ou nte r in v a r ious inv estigations, the indica t ion [Be zei chnun g] o f which l ang uagestyp i callylack a n abs tr act e xpres s i on  of  t he requisi t e  pu rity,  f or t hey donot in the first p l ace  concern them sel vesw i th  th e  s i mpl es t  el e m ents of thought , but with  v e ry  complex a n d c on crete r epresen tatio n al cont ents [Vor stellungs in halt e ] . B ut it woul d not be  wise toi nvent atechn ica l term  t o r epres ent it ,  th e mea ning o fwhichwould  a lways be  doubtful, because it c ould n evercom e natural lyt o t he lips o r th e thoughts  of  an yone;  th e  very  ter m  " pos i ting"  [Po s ition], w h ic h i s fr equently us e d for  it,sug g ests b y it s etymological fo r m the quite in appr o p ria tec onno ta tion of an act , o ro p erationof  positing,to the e xe c ution  of wh ich th e affir m a ti o n whic h we  wi sh to ind ica te then se em st o oweitsbe ing. W e will inst e a d stick to ordin ary s p e ech a n d m ust c ho ose a w o rd t hat, recog nizably inordina ry u sage[Gebrau ch ], pro ves  i tself at l e ast to ap proxi mate to  t he e xpr ession 
 actual,_for Frege,_is, roughly, whatever is_in space_and_time and_causally_efficacious.12 This cannot,_of course, be_what Lotze means by_"actuality" because one_of_the main species of actuality, namely validity, is characterized by being non-spatio-temporal and causally_inert._Nor is_actuality_modal_in any important sense. Insofar_as there is modality in_Lotze's system,_it is orthogonal to actuality; within each species_of_actuality we can_distinguish between what is merely possible and what is_actual in the modal sense. For_instance, existing objects_are_actually_(in the modal sense)_a certain way, but possibly different._11 Gottfried Gabriel, who has done_more than anyone to explore the relation_of Frege and Lotze, gives a_similar, but much briefer account,_in his_Introduction to Lotze (1989b). For_more on Frege_and Lotze_on the ontological_status of thoughts/propositions, see Gabriel (1986),_(1996), (1998), and_(2002). 12 Frege (1884), §26, §85;_in_Frege (1918–19), he_admits_that_thoughts have_a kind of_Wirklichkeit_because they_can_be indirectly causally efficacious, e.g. an_agent_can cause a change in the world_because he grasps a_certain_thought. 142 Nicholas F._Stang Lotze explains his terminological_choice of "actuality" as follows: There_is a_very general_concept of affirmation or positing, which we encounter in various investigations,_the indication [Bezeichnung] of which languages_typically lack an abstract_expression of_the_requisite purity, for_they_do not_in the first place concern themselves with_the simplest_elements of thought, but with very_complex and concrete representational_contents_[Vorstellungsinhalte]. But it would not be_wise to invent a technical term_to represent it, the meaning_of_which_would always be doubtful, because_it could never come naturally to_the lips or_the thoughts of anyone; the very term_"positing"_[Position], which is frequently used for_it,_suggests by its etymological form the_quite_inappropriate_connotation of an act, or_operation of positing, to the execution_of which the affirmation which we wish to indicate_then seems to_owe its being. We will_instead_stick_to ordinary speech and must choose a word that, recognizably_in ordinary_usage [Gebrauch], proves_itself at least to approximate to the expression