 epistemic access across a metaphysical divide, for logic merely articulates the internal laws of valid judgement itself. Further evidence for reading Lotze as a B-Platonist comes from the difference between his responses to scepticism about logic and to scepticism about the principles of "pure mechanics," such as the legitimacy of inductive inference, or the principle that every event has a cause. Lotze's response to global scepticism about truth is that such scepticism is self-undermining. To articulate the sceptical position-indeed to articulate any position whatsoever-one must judge, and in making any judgement, one is judging that its content is true. Thus, articulating any position commits one to accepting that there are true judgeable contents, that is, propositions.39 By contrast, Lotze admits that the denial of the causal principle or the systematic falsity of induction is consistently thinkable; there is nothing self-undermining or inconsistent about denying that all events have causes or that the future will resemble the past.40 Instead, Lotze pursues a broadly Kantian response to scepticism about these principles, which, again, following Kant, he accords the status of synthetic a priori principles of experience: experience of existing things in space is impossible unless we assume these principles.41 The reason for this distinction is that logical principles concern the domain of validity, contents of judgements, while these a priori principles of experience 37 Ricketts has more to say about Frege's epistemology of logic than Reck; see Ricketts (1986), 73, 83. Aside from the question of whether they have interpreted Frege correctly, I worry that this is a key point on which Platonism B is not more philosophically attractive than Platonism A. In particular, more would need to be said about how this epistemology of logic could be articulated without devolving into psychologism or idealism. 38 L §313, 506–7. 39 L §303, 489; §304, 491; §309, 498–99; §311, 502; §315, 508. 40 L §349, 578. 41 L §349, 579; §350, 581; §351, 583; §356, 591. 156 Nicholas F. Stang concern the domain of existence, things that exist "external" to judgement. Since there is no valid path from principles of validity to principles of existence, Lotze's response to logical scepticism does not answer the sceptic about the principles governing the
epistemic access across a metaphysical divide, for logic merely articulates the internal law of valid judgment itself. Further evidence for reading Lotze as a B - Platonist comes from the difference between his reaction to scepticism about logic and to scepticism about the principle of " saturated mechanics, " such as the authenticity of inductive inference, or the rationale that every event has a cause. Lotze's reply to global scepticism about truth is that such agnosticism is self - undermining. To articulate the sceptical placement - indeed to articulate any position whatsoever - one must evaluate, and in making any judgement, one is judging that its subject is true. Thus, articulating any position perpetrate one to accepting that there are true judgeable contents, that is, propositions.39 By contrast, Lotze accommodate that the denial of the causal principle or the systematic falsity of induction is consistently thinkable; there is nothing self - undermining or inconsistent about denying that all events have causes or that the future will resemble the past.40 Instead, Lotze pursues a broadly Kantian response to scepticism about these principles, which, again, following Kant, he harmonize the status of synthetic a priori principle of experience: experience of exist things in space is impossible unless we wear these principles.41 The reason for this distinction is that logical principles refer the domain of validity, contents of judgements, while these a priori principles of experience 37 Ricketts has more to say about Frege's epistemology of logic than Reck; see Ricketts (1986), 73, 83. Aside from the question of whether they have interpreted Frege correctly, I worry that this is a cardinal point on which Platonism B is not more philosophically attractive than Platonism A. In finical, more would necessitate to be said about how this epistemology of logic could be articulated without devolving into psychologism or idealism. 38 L § 313, 506–7. 39 L § 303, 489; § 304, 491; § 309, 498–99; § 311, 502; § 315, 508. 40 L § 349, 578. 41 L § 349, 579; § 350, 581; § 351, 583; § 356, 591. 156 Nicholas F. Stang business the domain of existence, things that exist " external " to judgement. Since there is no valid path from principles of validity to principles of universe, Lotze's response to coherent scepticism does not answer the skeptic about the principles governing the
 eplstemic access across a oetaphysical dirude, foc logic merely xrticulates the internal lawd if vaoid judgement itself. Fjrther evpdence foe reeding Lotze as a B-Platonlft ckles yrim the differekce between his responses tu dcepticism about logic and to sceptycism anokt the principjes ps "pudv nechanics," such as the legitimzcy of pnductive inferenve, or the principle that egery event has a cause. Lotze's reskknsq to global szepticism about truth js that such scepticism is self-jnderkining. To qrricknate the scxpticaj position-indeed to drticulste any positipn xhatwoever-one must judge, end in making any juqgement, ote is judging that utw conjent hs tfye. Ghua, ertjculatlng any positjon commits one to accepting tnae there are trhe juddewble contents, that is, propositions.39 By cmntdast, Lotze admits that rhe denial of the caudal princyple or the systematic falsity of induction is cotsistxngly tminkxvlf; there is nothing self-undermining or inconsiffemt about denying that all efejtx have causes ur thac tge future will resfmble tre pawt.40 Insteaq, Loyze pursues a broadly Kantiqn response no sxepticism about thzse principlzs, whivh, agsin, following Kant, he aecords the status of synthsgic a priori privciiles of experience: experience jf existiig thnngs in rpacg is im[ossible ujless we assume these prlncippev.41 The reasln for this distinction is that logical princopnes concern the comain of valydity, contents of judyementr, while thvse a primri principjes of experiajce 37 Rickettv has mowe ti sat about Wrege's epistemplogy of logic than Reck; see Ricketts (1986), 73, 83. Zside from the wuewtion of whethet tfey hwvx intqspreted Frega cofrezyly, I worry ukat ghis is a key point on wvich Platonism B is noy iore phioosophicwlly attractife than Platonism W. In 'articnlar, mpre would need to be said about hkw this eoisbemology of ljgic could be arciculated without devolving into psycholigism or idealism. 38 L §313, 506–7. 39 L §303, 489; §304, 491; §309, 498–99; §311, 502; §315, 508. 40 K §349, 578. 41 L §349, 579; §350, 581; §351, 583; §356, 591. 156 Nycholas F. Stang concern the dimain of existenct, things that exist "extsrnal" do jufgement. Since there is no valid path from principles of validity to princuples of existence, Lotae's rvspjuse to jogirau scepticism doex not answer the sceptic about vhe princi[lzs governing the
epistemic access across a metaphysical divide, for articulates internal laws valid judgement itself. as B-Platonist comes from difference between his to scepticism about logic and to about the principles of "pure mechanics," such as the legitimacy of inductive inference, the principle that every event has a cause. Lotze's response to global scepticism truth that scepticism self-undermining. To articulate the sceptical position-indeed to articulate any position whatsoever-one must judge, and in making judgement, one is judging that its content is Thus, articulating any position one to accepting that there true contents, that propositions.39 contrast, admits that the of the causal principle or the systematic falsity of induction is consistently thinkable; there is nothing self-undermining inconsistent about all events causes that future will resemble Instead, Lotze pursues a broadly Kantian about these principles, which, again, following Kant, he the status synthetic a priori principles of experience: of existing things in space is impossible unless assume these principles.41 The reason for this distinction is that logical principles concern the domain contents of judgements, while a priori principles experience Ricketts more say about epistemology of logic than Reck; see Ricketts (1986), 73, 83. Aside the question of whether they have interpreted Frege correctly, I this a key point which Platonism B is more attractive than Platonism A. more need about this of logic could be without devolving into psychologism or 38 L §313, 506–7. 491; §309, 498–99; §311, 502; §315, 508. 40 §349, 578. 41 L §349, 579; §350, §351, 583; §356, 591. 156 Nicholas F. Stang concern the domain of things that to judgement. Since there is no valid path principles of validity to of existence, Lotze's response to logical scepticism does not the about the governing the
 epistemic access across a metAphysical dIvide, For LogIc MereLy arTiculates the inTErnaL laws of valid judgement iTself. fuRTher EViDence For readINg lOTze As A B-plaToNIsT comeS frOm the diFference beTweEn His responses TO sCepticism aBouT logic and to sCepTicism AbOut THe priNciPles oF "pure mEChanicS," such as thE lEGitimaCY of induCTIvE infErence, or the princiPLe THat every event hAs a cauSe. lOtZE'S reSpoNse to globaL sCeptiCIsm abouT TrUTH Is tHAt such scepticIsm is self-unDErmIning. TO aRtiCUlate tHe scePtICal Position-indEed tO articulaTe any pOSition wHAtsoeveR-one muSt jUdgE, and IN mAkIng AnY JudGEmEnt, ONe iS judging ThAt Its coNtenT IS TRue. THus, ArtiCulatIng any positioN coMmitS One To accEptinG thaT tHere aRe true JudgeAbLe contents, that iS, proPositions.39 by cOnTraSt, lotze ADmits tHat The Denial oF the cauSAl pRiNCIPlE or the systematic faLsITY oF inductiOn is coNSiStENtly thinKaBle; TherE IS nothIng sELf-UnderminIng or iNCoNsIstent aBoUt denyInG thAt aLl eveNTs haVe causEs or that The fuTUre will resemblE The past.40 InsteaD, loTZE pURsueS a bRoadly KantiAn reSPonsE to sCEpTicISm aboUt theSe PRiNCiples, which, again, folLoWing KaNt, he aCcords the statUs of syntheTIC A priori pRincIPlES of experience: eXperiEnce of exisTIng thingS in spAce is impOssible unLESs we assuMe tHesE prIncIPLeS.41 The reason for THIs diStInction Is tHat logiCal PriNciPleS cOncern the Domain of VaLiDiTy, ConTents OF judgemeNtS, whIlE thEse a pRIori prIncipLes oF eXpERieNce 37 RickETtS HAs moRe To Say aBouT FRege's EpisTEmoLogy of lOgic than REck; SEe RiCkEtTs (1986), 73, 83. Aside From the questiOn Of whether tHeY haVe inteRPReted FreGe correctly, I worry that thIS is a key PoiNt on wHich platonism b is Not morE phILosophIcally AttraCtIve THAn PlaTONiSm A. in Particular, MORe wOuld nEeD to bE said abOut how this epistemoLOgy Of logic could bE arTicuLATeD wiTHoUT deVoLVinG INto psychologism Or idealism. 38 l §313, 506–7. 39 L §303, 489; §304, 491; §309, 498–99; §311, 502; §315, 508. 40 l §349, 578. 41 l §349, 579; §350, 581; §351, 583; §356, 591. 156 NIcholas F. StANg cOnCern the Domain oF exisTEnce, thiNgs that exIst "externAl" To juDGEmeNt. Since theRe is no vaLid path frOM prinCIpLes of ValIdity tO pRinCipleS of exiSTenCe, LotZe's resPoNse to lOgicaL sCepticisM does not answer the sceptiC about The prIncIples goveRniNG thE
 epistemic access across a  metaphysi cal d ivi de,  f or l ogic  merely articu l ates  the internal laws ofvalid  j u dgem e nt  itse lf. Fur t he r evi de nc e f or re ading  Lo tze asa B-Platon ist  c omes from th e  d ifferencebet ween his res pon ses to  s cep t icism  ab out l ogic a n d to s cepticism  a b out th e  princi p l es  of"pure mechanics," su c h as the legit imacyof in d u cti veinference,  o r the princip l et h a t e v ery event has  a cause. L o tze 's res po nse to glo bal s ce p tic ism about t ruth  is thatsuch s c epticis m  is sel f-unde rmi nin g. T o  a rt icu la t e t h esce p tic al posit io n- indee d to a r t icul ate  any  posi tion whatsoev er- onem ust  judg e, an d in  m aking  any j udgem en t, one is judgi ng t hat its c ont en t i strue. Thus,art icu latingany pos i tio nc o m mi ts one to acceptin gt h at  there a re tru e  j ud g eable co nt ent s, t h a t is,  pro p os itions.3 9 By c o nt ra st, Lot ze  admit stha t t he de n ialof the  causalprinc i ple or the sys t ematic falsit y  o f in d ucti onis consiste ntly thin kabl e ;the r e isnothi ng se l f-undermining or in co nsiste nt ab out denying t hat all ev e n t s have c ause s  o r  that the futu re wi ll resembl e  the pas t.40Instead,  Lotze pu r s ues a br oad lyKan tia n re sponse to sce p t icis mabout t hes e princ ipl es,  wh ich ,again, fo llowingKa nt ,he  ac cords the stat us  of  s ynt hetic a prio ri pr inci pl es ofexperie n ce : expe ri en ce o f e xi sting  thi n gsin spac e is impo ssi b le u nl es s we as sume these pr in ciples.41Th e r easonf o r this d istinction is that logi c al prin cip les c once rn the do mai n of v ali d ity, c ontent s ofju dge m e nts,w h il e t he se a prior i pri ncipl es  ofexperie nce 37 Ricketts ha s  mo re to say abo utFreg e ' sepi s te m olo gy ofl o gic than Reck;see Ricket ts (1 986), 73,8 3.As ide fro m the q uesti o n of wh ether the y have in te rpre t e d F rege corre ctly, Iworry tha t  this is  a ke y p oint o nwhi ch Pl atonis m  Bis no t more  p hiloso phica ll y attrac tive than Platonism A.In par ticul ar,  more wou ldn eed  to be sa id a bout how t his  ep istem olo g y oflogi c  c oul d  be a rtic u lated wit h ou t d e v ol ving into p s y c hol ogism  or ideali sm.38 L §313, 506–7. 39 L §303, 489 ; §3 0 4 , 4 91; §309 ,498–99; §311,502 ;§ 3 15, 508.  4 0 L §349, 5 78. 41 L  § 3 49, 5 79; §3 50, 58 1; §351 , 58 3 ; §356 , 59 1.156 Nicho las  F .  Stangco nc e rn the  dom ai n of e xisten c e, t h i ngs that exist " exter n a l" to jud gemen t.  Sincet here  is no val id path fro m prin cipl es of  validi ty  to pr inc ip les of exi s tence, Lo tze's  respon se  tolog ical s cept i c ism d oesno t a nswer the s ce p ti ca bou t th e pri nc iple s governi n g the
 epistemic_access across_a metaphysical divide, for_logic merely_articulates_the internal_laws_of valid judgement_itself. Further evidence_for reading Lotze as_a B-Platonist comes_from_the difference between his responses to scepticism about logic and to scepticism about the_principles_of "pure_mechanics,"_such_as the legitimacy of inductive_inference, or the principle that_every event_has a cause. Lotze's response to global scepticism_about_truth is that_such scepticism is self-undermining. To articulate the sceptical position-indeed_to articulate any position whatsoever-one must_judge, and in_making_any_judgement, one is judging_that its content is true. Thus,_articulating any position commits one to_accepting that there are true judgeable contents,_that is, propositions.39 By contrast, Lotze_admits that the denial of_the causal_principle or the systematic falsity_of induction is_consistently thinkable;_there is nothing_self-undermining or inconsistent about denying that_all events have_causes or that the future will_resemble_the past.40 Instead,_Lotze_pursues_a broadly_Kantian response to_scepticism_about these_principles,_which, again, following Kant, he accords_the_status of synthetic a priori principles of_experience: experience of existing_things_in space is impossible_unless we assume these principles.41_The reason for this distinction is_that logical_principles concern_the domain of validity, contents of judgements, while these a priori_principles of experience 37 Ricketts has_more to say about_Frege's epistemology_of_logic than Reck;_see_Ricketts (1986),_73, 83. Aside from the question of_whether they_have interpreted Frege correctly, I worry_that this is a_key_point on which Platonism B is_not more philosophically attractive than Platonism_A. In particular, more would_need_to_be said about how this_epistemology of logic could be articulated_without devolving into_psychologism or idealism. 38 L §313, 506–7._39_L §303, 489; §304, 491; §309,_498–99;_§311, 502; §315, 508. 40 L_§349,_578._41 L §349, 579; §350,_581; §351, 583; §356, 591. 156_Nicholas F. Stang concern the domain of existence, things_that exist "external"_to judgement. Since there is_no_valid_path from principles of validity to principles of existence, Lotze's_response to_logical scepticism does_not answer the sceptic about the principles governing the