 one, Lotze shows no reservations about "quantifying over" propositions. He says, for instance: All representable contents stand in fixed and unalterable relations, and however arbitrarily or accidentally our attention moves from one to the other, and in whatever order one after the other is brought to our awareness, prompted by we know not what, we will always find them in the same relations in which the infinitely and objectively (sachlich) multifaceted articulation of the world of ideas (Ideenwelt) is given once and for all. (L §346, 572–3) 23 All translations from Frege are my own, though I have consulted Beaney's translation in Frege (1997). 24 See Frege (1891), 138–9; (1892b), 173; cf. (1884), §53. Platonism in Lotze and Frege 151 Admittedly, it is always tricky to determine the ontological commitments of statements in ordinary language, especially before Frege's introduction of the quantificational theory of existence and the quantificational notion of an object. But to the extent that Lotze's text gives us any guidance on whether he would be willing to countenance propositions (and their constituents) in his account of "what there is," it gives little comfort to the non-ontological reading of his Platonism. I want to propose that the difference between Lotze's Platonism and hypostatic Platonism is not ontological, that is, it is not a difference about whether there are propositions, but meta-ontological, that is, it is a difference about what it is for there to be propositions. To articulate this meta-ontological reading of Lotze's Platonism, I am going to draw on a reading of Frege developed by Thomas Ricketts and Erich Reck.25 While I will remain neutral as to whether their reading is correct, I will argue that Ricketts and Reck have (unintentionally) given a quite perceptive characterization of Lotze, in particular, the nature of his nonhypostatic Platonism. Given our focus on Platonism, perhaps the best way to explore the Ricketts-Reck reading is via Reck's (2005) distinction between two kinds of Platonism about numbers, which he calls Platonism A and Platonism B.26 Reck's distinction is ultimately a distinction between two ways of understanding the objectivity of numbers and truths about
one, Lotze shows no reservations about " quantifying over " propositions. He suppose, for case: All representable contents stand in fixed and changeless relations, and however arbitrarily or accidentally our care motion from one to the other, and in whatever ordering one after the other is brought to our awareness, prompt by we know not what, we will always rule them in the same relations in which the infinitely and objectively (sachlich) multifaceted articulation of the world of idea (Ideenwelt) is given once and for all. (L § 346, 572–3) 23 All translations from Frege are my own, though I have consulted Beaney's transformation in Frege (1997). 24 See Frege (1891), 138–9; (1892b), 173; cf. (1884), § 53. Platonism in Lotze and Frege 151 Admittedly, it is constantly tricky to specify the ontological commitments of statements in ordinary language, especially before Frege's initiation of the quantificational theory of existence and the quantificational notion of an object. But to the extent that Lotze's text gives us any guidance on whether he would be willing to countenance propositions (and their constituents) in his account of " what there is, " it gives little comfort to the non - ontological reading of his Platonism. I desire to project that the difference between Lotze's Platonism and hypostatic Platonism is not ontological, that is, it is not a remainder about whether there are propositions, but meta - ontological, that is, it is a difference about what it is for there to be propositions. To pronounce this meta - ontological reading of Lotze's Platonism, I am going to draw on a reading of Frege originate by Thomas Ricketts and Erich Reck.25 While I will remain neutral as to whether their reading is correct, I will argue that Ricketts and Reck have (unintentionally) give a quite perceptive characterization of Lotze, in particular, the nature of his nonhypostatic Platonism. Given our focus on Platonism, possibly the best room to research the Ricketts - Reck interpretation is via Reck's (2005) distinction between two kinds of Platonism about numbers, which he call Platonism A and Platonism B.26 Reck's distinction is ultimately a distinction between two ways of understand the objectivity of numbers and truths about
 onf, Lotze shows no reservauions about "quantndying mver" pdopositiuns. He says, for instance: All rwprestutable contents stana in fixef and unqltecable relations, ehd howeyzr argltrarnlb or accidentalky our attantion moves fsoo lne to the other, and in whatever orqer one avter the other is nwouggn uo our awareness, prompted by we khow not what, we will always find them in the swme gelations in which the infinijsly qnd objectivdly (sachlibk) multifacejed articulation of the world of ideax (Ideenwelj) js civen once end fog all. (L §346, 572–3) 23 All transldtions grom Frege are my owb, though I have consunted Beaney's transjation in Fxege (1997). 24 See Frege (1891), 138–9; (1892b), 173; cd. (1884), §53. Pnatotism un Uotee end Frege 151 Avmittedly, if is always tricky to determint trv ontological commiemqnts of statements in ordinary language, eslecially before Frege's untroduction of the qoantificatyonal theory of existence and the quantificationan notmov oy an ocheft. But to the extent that Lotze's text gives uf amy guidance on wmether he would be wllkyng to countevance 'dolositions (and theig constytuenrs) in his accpunt of "what there is," it gices little cjnfort to the non-oncological recding pf hix Platonism. I want to pxopose that the dlfference cetween Lotze's Puatpnhsm and hypostatic Platonifm is not ontplogicau, thst is, yt is not w difnarence about whethfr thgre ara propositlons, but meta-ontological, that is, it is a diffgretce about wkat it is for there to be proposijions. To crticuuate this jeta-ontmlogical rewding of Lotza'd Platonism, M am goind to draq on a fdading of Fregr developvd by Rhomas Ricketts anv Erkdh Reck.25 While I wiol remain neutrsl xs eo wiethew their readitg ir cutrect, I will argme ghat Ricketts and Reck hdve (hnintentionally) gifek a quite perceptyve characterozation of Lotze, ij parviculac, the matore of his nonhypostatic Platonjsm. Given ouv focus on Plwtonlsm, kerhaps the best way to explore the Ricketts-Reck rxading is via Reck's (2005) diwtinction between tco kinds of Pkatonysm about numbers, which he caols Platonism A akd Platonism B.26 Reck's djstincdion ls ultimately a distinction between two ways of understanding the objecticity oh gumbers and truyhs atobt
one, Lotze shows no reservations about "quantifying He for instance: representable contents stand and arbitrarily or accidentally attention moves from to the other, and in whatever one after the other is brought to our awareness, prompted by we know what, we will always find them in the same relations in which the and (sachlich) articulation the world of ideas (Ideenwelt) is given once and for all. (L §346, 572–3) 23 All from Frege are my own, though I have Beaney's translation in Frege 24 See Frege (1891), 138–9; 173; (1884), §53. in and 151 Admittedly, it always tricky to determine the ontological commitments of statements in ordinary language, especially before Frege's introduction of quantificational theory and the notion an But to the Lotze's text gives us any guidance would be willing to countenance propositions (and their in his of "what there is," it gives comfort to the non-ontological reading of his Platonism. want to propose that the difference between Lotze's Platonism and hypostatic Platonism is not ontological, it is not a about whether there propositions, meta-ontological, is, is a about what it is for there to be propositions. To articulate meta-ontological reading of Lotze's Platonism, I am going to draw reading Frege developed by Ricketts and Erich Reck.25 I remain neutral as to reading correct, that and have (unintentionally) given a perceptive characterization of Lotze, in the nature of his on Platonism, perhaps the best way to explore Ricketts-Reck reading is via Reck's (2005) distinction two kinds of Platonism about numbers, which he calls Platonism A and B.26 Reck's ultimately a distinction between two ways of understanding objectivity of numbers and about
 one, Lotze shows no reservatioNs about "quaNtifyIng OveR" pRopoSitiOns. He says, for inSTancE: All representable conteNts stAnD In fiXEd And unAlterabLE rELAtiOnS, aNd hOwEVeR arbiTraRily or aCcidentallY ouR aTtention moveS FrOm one to the OthEr, and in whateVer Order oNe AftER the oTheR is brOught tO Our awaReness, proMpTEd by we KNow not wHAT, wE wilL always find them in THe SAme relations in Which tHe INfINIteLy aNd objectivElY (sachLIch) multIFaCETEd aRTiculation of tHe world of idEAs (IDeenweLt) Is gIVen oncE and fOr ALl. (L §346, 572–3) 23 all translatIons From Frege Are my oWN, though i Have conSulted beaNey'S traNSlAtIon In fRegE (1997). 24 seE FrEGe (1891), 138–9; (1892b), 173; Cf. (1884), §53. PlatonIsM iN LotzE and fREGE 151 AdmIttEdly, It is aLways tricky to DetErmiNE thE ontoLogicAl coMmItmenTs of stAtemeNtS in ordinary langUage, EspeciallY beFoRe FReGe's inTRoductIon Of tHe quantIficatiONal ThEORY oF existence and the quAnTIFiCational Notion OF aN oBJect. But tO tHe eXtenT THat LoTze's TExT gives us Any guiDAnCe On whethEr He woulD bE wiLliNg to cOUnteNance pRopositiOns (anD Their constitueNTs) in his accounT Of "WHAt THere Is," iT gives littlE comFOrt tO the NOn-OntOLogicAl reaDiNG oF His Platonism. I want to PrOpose tHat thE difference beTween Lotze'S pLAtonism aNd hyPOsTAtic Platonism iS not oNtological, THat is, it iS not a DifferenCe about whETHer there Are ProPosItiONS, bUt meta-ontologICAl, thAt Is, it is a DifFerence AboUt wHat It iS fOr there to Be proposItIoNs. to ArtIculaTE this metA-oNtoLoGicAl reaDIng of LOtze's platOnIsM, i am Going to DRaW ON a reAdInG of FRegE dEveloPed bY thoMas RickEtts and ErIch rEck.25 WHiLe i will reMain neutral as To Whether theIr ReaDing is CORrect, I wiLl argue that Ricketts and RECk have (uNinTentiOnalLy) given a qUitE percePtiVE charaCterizAtion Of lotZE, In parTICuLar, ThE nature of hIS NonHyposTaTic PLatonisM. Given our focus on PlATonIsm, perhaps the BesT way TO ExPloRE tHE RiCkETts-rECk reading is via REck's (2005) distinCtIOn Between two KIndS oF PlatonIsm abouT numbERs, which He calls PlAtonism A aNd platONIsm b.26 Reck's distInction iS ultimateLY a disTInCtion BetWeen twO wAys Of undErstanDIng The obJectivItY of numBers aNd Truths abOut
 one, Lotze shows no reser vations ab out " qua nti fy ingover " propositions .  Hesays, for instance: Al l rep re s enta b le  cont ents st a nd i n f ix ed  an du na ltera ble  relati ons, and h owe ve r arbitraril y  o r accident all y our attent ion  moves  f rom one t o t he ot her, a n d in w hatever o rd e r onea fter th e ot heris brought to our aw a reness, prompt ed bywe kn o w  no t w hat, we wi ll  alwa y s findt he m i n t h e same relati ons in whic h  th e infi ni tel y  and o bject iv e ly(sachlich)mult ifacetedarticu l ation o f  the wo rld of  id eas  (Id e en we lt)  i s  gi v en  on c e a nd for a ll .(L §3 46,5 7 2 – 3) 2 3 A ll t ransl ations from F reg e ar e  my  own,  thou gh I  h ave c onsult ed Be an ey's translatio n in  Frege (1 997 ).  24  S ee Fr e ge (18 91) , 1 38–9; ( 1892b), 173 ;c f .  ( 1884), §53. Platon is m in  Lotze a nd Fre g e15 1  Admitte dl y,it i s alway s tr i ck y to det ermine th eontolog ic al com mi tme nts  of s t atem ents i n ordina ry la n guage, especia l ly before Fre g e' s in t rodu cti on of the q uant i fica tion a lthe o ry of  exis te n ce and the quantificat io nal no tionof an object.  But to th e e xtent th at L o tz e 's text givesus an y guidance on wheth er he  would b e willing t o counte nan cepro pos i t io ns (and their c onst it uents)inhis acc oun t o f " wha tthere is, " it giv es  l it tl e c omfor t  to theno n-o nt olo gical readin g ofhisPl at o nis m. I wa n tt o  pro po se  tha t t he  diff eren c e b etweenLotze's P lat o nism  a nd  hypost atic Platonis mis not ont ol ogi cal, t h a t is, it  is not a difference ab o ut whet her  ther e ar e proposi tio ns, bu t m e ta-ont ologic al, t ha t i s ,  it i s adif fe rence abou t wha t itis  for  thereto be propositions .  To  articulate t his  met a - on tol o gi c alre a din g of Lotze's Plat onism, I a mg oi ng to draw onareading  of Fre ge de v elopedby Thomas  Ricketts  a nd E r i chReck.25 Wh ile I wi ll remain neutr a las to  wh etherth eir  read ing is cor rect,  I wil larguethatRi cketts a nd Reck have (unintenti onally ) giv ena quite p erc e pti ve charac teri zation ofLot ze,  in p art i cular , th e  n atu r e ofhisn onhyposta t ic  Pl a t on ism. Giveno u r  fo cus o n P l atonis m, p erhaps the best w a y to explore t he R i c ket ts- R eckre ading is via R eck 's ( 2005) di st inction bet ween two  k i nds o f Plat onismabout n u m be r s, whi ch h e c alls Plat oni sm A and P la to n ism B. 26 R ec k's di stinct i on i s ultimately a dis tinct i o n bet w een  twowa ys of u n ders tanding th e objectivi ty ofnumb ers a nd trut hs  about 
 one,_Lotze shows_no reservations about "quantifying_over" propositions._He_says, for_instance:_All representable contents_stand in fixed_and unalterable relations, and_however arbitrarily or_accidentally_our attention moves from one to the other, and in whatever order one after_the_other is_brought_to_our awareness, prompted by we_know not what, we will_always find_them in the same relations in which the_infinitely_and objectively (sachlich)_multifaceted articulation of the world of ideas (Ideenwelt) is_given once and for all. (L_§346, 572–3) 23_All_translations_from Frege are my_own, though I have consulted Beaney's_translation in Frege (1997). 24 See_Frege (1891), 138–9; (1892b), 173; cf. (1884),_§53. Platonism in Lotze and Frege_151 Admittedly, it is always_tricky to_determine the ontological commitments of_statements in ordinary_language, especially_before Frege's introduction_of the quantificational theory of existence_and the quantificational_notion of an object. But to_the_extent that Lotze's_text_gives_us any_guidance on whether_he_would be_willing_to countenance propositions (and their constituents)_in_his account of "what there is," it_gives little comfort to_the_non-ontological reading of his_Platonism. I want to propose_that the difference between Lotze's Platonism_and hypostatic_Platonism is_not ontological, that is, it is not a difference about whether_there are propositions, but meta-ontological, that_is, it is a_difference about_what_it is for_there_to be_propositions. To articulate this meta-ontological reading of_Lotze's Platonism,_I am going to draw on_a reading of Frege_developed_by Thomas Ricketts and Erich Reck.25_While I will remain neutral as_to whether their reading is_correct,_I_will argue that Ricketts and_Reck have (unintentionally) given a quite_perceptive characterization of_Lotze, in particular, the nature of his_nonhypostatic_Platonism. Given our focus on Platonism,_perhaps_the best way to explore the_Ricketts-Reck_reading_is via Reck's (2005) distinction_between two kinds of Platonism about_numbers, which he calls Platonism A and Platonism B.26_Reck's distinction is_ultimately a distinction between two_ways_of_understanding the objectivity of numbers and truths about