 we'll call ​Causal​ ​Probabilism​: Causal Probabilism​: For time t​1 prior to an agent A's φ-ing and later time t​2 after A's φ-ing, φ-ing promotes the satisfaction of D iff φ-ing ​causes pr​t2​(satisfaction of D) > pr​t1​(satisfaction of D)., 12 13 Lin's idea, then, is that promotion is a matter of ​causing ​something to be more likely than it was before: when an agent's action promotes the satisfaction of one of her desires, the action causes the desire to be more likely to be satisfied than it was prior to the action. Just like ​Pure Probabilism, ​Causal ​Probabilism gets the right results in a range of cases: Why does buying a lottery ticket promote one's desire to have $100? Because buying the lottery ticket ​causes the probability of having $100 to be higher after buying the ticket than it was prior to buying it. Causal probabilism still has a potential problem with cases like Debbie, since the probability of Debbie's desire being satisfied was already 1 before she pressed the button. However, Lin (2016, p. 6-11) has argued that 11 While Lin himself doesn't include one, we think it's natural to suppose that Lin's view should include a restriction on the relevant times prior to (t​1​) and after (t​2​) the agent's action. Such a restriction would, we think, naturally involve the ​existence ​of the desire at t​1. To see why, suppose we do ​not ​require that t​1 be a time when the agent's desire already exists -or, if you think desires can be satisfied despite no longer existing, ​has already existed​. Now suppose I do not now (at t​1​) desire a fig newton, but that, unless I'm informed of my serious allergy to figs, I will desire a fig newton in six days. Finally, suppose that, no matter what happens, I will be given a fig newton in seven days. Then it turns out that, given Causal Probabilism (without some restriction on t​1​), actions I might perform in the next several days that make it less likely that I'll be informed of my serious allergy to figs -for instance, locking myself in a room -- promote the
we'll call ​Causal​ ​Probabilism​: Causal Probabilism​: For time t​1 prior to an agent A's φ - ing and later meter t​2 after A's φ - ing, φ - ing advertise the satisfaction of D iff φ - ing ​causes pr​t2​(satisfaction of D) > pr​t1​(satisfaction of D). , 12 13 Lin's idea, then, is that promotion is a topic of ​causing ​something to be more likely than it was before: when an agent's action promote the satisfaction of one of her desires, the military action causes the desire to be more likely to be quenched than it was prior to the action. Just like ​Pure Probabilism, ​Causal ​Probabilism gets the right result in a range of cases: Why does buying a lottery ticket promote one's desire to have $ 100? Because buy the lottery ticket ​causes the probability of having $ 100 to be higher after buy the ticket than it was prior to buying it. Causal probabilism still has a likely problem with case like Debbie, since the probability of Debbie's desire being satisfied was already 1 before she pressed the button. However, Lin (2016, p. 6 - 11) has argue that 11 While Lin himself doesn't include one, we think it's natural to suppose that Lin's view should include a restriction on the relevant times prior to (t​1​) and after (t​2​) the agent's action. Such a restriction would, we think, naturally involve the ​existence ​of the desire at t​1. To see why, suppose we do ​not ​require that t​1 be a time when the agentive role's desire already exist -or, if you think desire can be satisfied despite no longer existing, ​has already existed​. Now suppose I do not nowadays (at t​1​) desire a fig newton, but that, unless I'm informed of my serious allergy to libyan islamic fighting group, I will desire a fig newton in six days. Finally, suppose that, no matter what happens, I will be give a fig newton in seven days. Then it turns out that, given Causal Probabilism (without some limitation on t​1​), actions I might do in the next several days that make it less likely that I'll be informed of my unplayful allergy to figs -for instance, locking myself in a room -- advertise the
 we'pl call ​Causal​ ​Probabilirm​: Causal Probayulism​: Hor tims t​1 priof to an agent A's φ-ing and latxr tume t​2 after A's φ-ing, φ-ing promutes the datisfacrion if D iff φ-iif ​causes pr​t2​(szbisfaetmon of D) > pr​t1​(sajisfaction ox D)., 12 13 Lin's ided, ghzn, is that promotion is a matter of ​sausing ​slmething to be mort lykelg than it was before: when an agent'a actioi promotes the xatisfaction of one of her deslres, the action cakses the dewire ro be more lkkely to bt vatisfied jhan it was prior to the action. Gust kike ​Pure Kxibahhlism, ​Causao ​Profabilism gets the richt resilts in a rangc of rasew: Why does buying a lmttery ticket promjte one's geaire to have $100? Becquwe buiing dhe uittdry tmckst ​caudes the probagility of hqving $100 to be higher asnrr buying ths tickqt than it was prior to buying it. Causal krobagilism still has a potebtial problem with cades like Qebbie, since the probability of Debbie's desire behng setksfncq qad already 1 before she pressed the button. Howedsr, Lpn (2016, p. 6-11) has argued that 11 Whilr Pim himself doesv't includs one, we think it's naturaj to wuppose trat Kin's view should include a eestriction jb the relevant timzs prior to (c​1​) and sfter (t​2​) the agent's action. Sueh a rsstriction aould, we ffink, naturally ivvokva the ​existence ​of the desyre at t​1. Vo sez why, suoposg we do ​not ​requige that t​1 be a time when the cgent'v desire apready exists -or, if you think dxxires can be sdtivfied defpite no longer exysting, ​has alrgady exisced​. Nod suppose P do not iow (at t​1​) desyre a fig newdln, but that, nnless I'm infirmee of my rerious allergu to figs, I will dewire a fig newton ln sib days. Finally, sbkpowe that, no mattrr dhae ja'pens, H will be gieen x fkb newgon in sevek dxys. Yhen it turns out thdt, gjven Causal Probabollsm (withoot some rqstriction on t​1​), actions I might perfmrm in tne gext several days that make it less likfly that I'll be infirmed of my xerious allergy to figs -for instance, lorking myself in a room -- promote the
we'll call ​Causal​ ​Probabilism​: Causal Probabilism​: For prior an agent φ-ing and later φ-ing the satisfaction of iff φ-ing ​causes of D) > pr​t1​(satisfaction of D)., 13 Lin's idea, then, is that promotion is a matter of ​causing ​something be more likely than it was before: when an agent's action promotes the of of desires, action causes the desire to be more likely to be satisfied than it was prior to action. Just like ​Pure Probabilism, ​Causal ​Probabilism gets right results in a of cases: Why does buying lottery promote one's to $100? buying the lottery ​causes the probability of having $100 to be higher after buying the ticket than it was prior buying it. still has potential with like Debbie, since of Debbie's desire being satisfied was she pressed the button. However, Lin (2016, p. has argued 11 While Lin himself doesn't include we think it's natural to suppose that Lin's should include a restriction on the relevant times prior to (t​1​) and after (t​2​) the Such a restriction would, think, naturally involve ​existence the at To see suppose we do ​not ​require that t​1 be a time when agent's desire already exists -or, if you think desires can despite longer existing, ​has existed​. Now suppose I not (at t​1​) desire a but unless my allergy figs, I will desire fig newton in six days. suppose that, no matter given a fig newton in seven days. Then turns out that, given Causal Probabilism (without restriction on t​1​), actions I might perform in the next several days make it that I'll be informed of my serious allergy figs -for instance, locking in a room -- promote the
 we'll call ​Causal​ ​Probabilism​: causal ProbAbiliSm​: FOr tImE t​1 prIor tO an agent A's φ-ing ANd laTer time t​2 after A's φ-ing, φ-inG promOtES the SAtIsfacTion of D IFf Φ-INg ​cAuSeS pr​T2​(sATiSfactIon Of D) > pr​t1​(sAtisfactioN of d)., 12 13 LIn's idea, then, iS ThAt promotioN is A matter of ​cauSinG ​sometHiNg tO Be morE liKely tHan it wAS beforE: when an agEnT'S actioN PromoteS THe SatiSfaction of one of heR DeSIres, the action cAuses tHe DEsIRE to Be mOre likely tO bE satiSFied thaN It WAS PriOR to the action. JUst like ​Pure pRobAbilisM, ​CAusAL ​ProbaBilisM gETs tHe right resuLts iN a range of Cases: WHY does buYIng a lotTery tiCkeT prOmotE OnE's DesIrE To hAVe $100? becAUse Buying thE lOtTery tIckeT ​CAUSes tHe pRobaBilitY of having $100 to be HigHer aFTer BuyinG the tIckeT tHan it Was priOr to bUyIng it. Causal probAbilIsm still hAs a PoTenTiAl proBLem witH caSes Like DebBie, sincE The PrOBABiLity of Debbie's desirE bEINg SatisfieD was alREaDy 1 BEfore she PrEssEd thE BUtton. howeVEr, lin (2016, p. 6-11) has aRgued tHAt 11 whIle Lin hImSelf doEsN't iNclUde onE, We thInk it's Natural tO suppOSe that Lin's view SHould include a REsTRIcTIon oN thE relevant tiMes pRIor tO (t​1​) anD AfTer (T​2​) The agEnt's aCtIOn. sUch a restriction woulD, wE think, NaturAlly involve thE ​existence ​OF THe desire At t​1. TO SeE Why, suppose we do ​Not ​reQuire that t​1 BE a time whEn the Agent's deSire alreaDY Exists -or, If yOu tHinK deSIReS can be satisfiED DespItE no longEr eXisting, ​Has AlrEadY exIsTed​. Now supPose I do nOt NoW (aT t​1​) DesIre a fIG newton, bUt ThaT, uNleSs I'm iNFormed Of my sErioUs AlLErgY to figs, i WiLL DesiRe A fIg neWtoN iN six dAys. FINalLy, suppoSe that, no mAttER whaT hApPens, I wiLl be given a fig NeWton in seveN dAys. then it TURns out thAt, given Causal ProbabilisM (Without SomE restRictIon on t​1​), actIonS I mighT peRForm in The nexT seveRaL daYS That mAKE iT leSs Likely that i'LL be InforMeD of mY seriouS allergy to figs -for iNStaNce, locking mysElf In a rOOM -- pRomOTe THe
 we'll call ​Causal​ ​Prob abilism​:Causa l P rob ab ilis m​:For time t​1 p r iorto an agent A's φ-ingand l at e r ti m et​2 a fter A' s  φ - i ng,  φ -i ngpr o mo tes t hesatisfa ction of D  if fφ-ing ​cause s  p r​t2​(sati sfa ction of D)> p r​t1​( sa tis f actio n o f D). , 12 1 3  Lin's  idea, th en ,  is th a t promo t i on  isa matter of ​caus i ng ​something tobe mor el ik e l y t han  it was be fo re: w h en an a g en t ' s  ac t ion promotesthe satisfa c tio n of o ne  of her de sires ,t heaction caus es t he desire  to be more li k ely tobe sat isf ied  tha n  i twas  p r ior to  th e  ac tion. Ju st  l ike ​ Pure P r o babi lis m, ​ Causa l ​Probabilis m g etst heright  resu ltsin  a ra nge of  case s:  Why does buyin g alottery t ick et  pr om ote o n e's de sir e t o have$100? B e cau se b u yi ng the lottery tic ke t ​c auses th e prob a bi li t y of hav in g $ 100t o  be h ighe r  a fter buy ing th e  t ic ket tha nit was  p rio r t o buy i ng i t. Cau sal prob abili s m still has ap otential prob l em w it h  cas eslike Debbie , si n ce t he p r ob abi l ity o f Deb bi e 's desire being satisf ie d wasalrea dy 1 before s he pressed t h e button . Ho w ev e r, Lin (2016,p. 6- 11) has ar g ued that  11 W hile Lin  himselfd o esn't in clu deone , w e th ink it's natu r a l to  s upposetha t Lin's  vi ewsho uld  i nclude arestrict io non  t herelev a nt times  p rio rto(t​1​ )  and a fter(t​2 ​)  t h e a gent'sa ct i o n. S uc ha re str ic tionwoul d , w e think , natural lyi nvol ve  t he ​exi stence ​of th edesire att​ 1.To see w hy, supp ose we do ​not ​require that t​ 1 b e a t imewhen theage nt's d esi r e alre ady ex ists-o r,i f  yout h in k d es ires can b e sat isfie ddesp ite nolonger existing, ​ h asalready exist ed​ . No w su ppo s eI  do  n o t n o w  (at t​1​) desi re a fig n ew t on , but that ,  un le ss I'minforme d ofm y serio us allerg y to figs ,I wi l l  de sire a fig  newtonin six da y s. Fi n al ly, s upp ose th at , n o mat ter wh a t h appen s, I w il l be g ivenafig newt on in seven days. Thenit tur ns ou t t hat, give n C a usa l Probabi lism  (withoutsom e r estri cti o n ont​1​ ) ,act i ons I  mig h t perform in  th e ne xt severald a y s t hat m ake it les s li kely that I'll be informed of my  ser i o usall e rgyto  figs -for ins tan ce , lockingmy self in a r oom -- p ro m ote t he
 we'll_call ​Causal​_​Probabilism​: Causal Probabilism​: For_time t​1_prior_to an_agent_A's φ-ing and_later time t​2_after A's φ-ing, φ-ing_promotes the satisfaction_of_D iff φ-ing ​causes pr​t2​(satisfaction of D) > pr​t1​(satisfaction of D)., 12 13 Lin's_idea,_then, is_that_promotion_is a matter of ​causing_​something to be more likely_than it_was before: when an agent's action promotes the_satisfaction_of one of_her desires, the action causes the desire to be_more likely to be satisfied than_it was prior_to_the_action. Just like ​Pure_Probabilism, ​Causal ​Probabilism gets the right_results in a range of cases:_Why does buying a lottery ticket promote_one's desire to have $100? Because_buying the lottery ticket ​causes_the probability_of having $100 to be_higher after buying_the ticket_than it was_prior to buying it. Causal probabilism_still has a_potential problem with cases like Debbie,_since_the probability of_Debbie's_desire_being satisfied_was already 1_before_she pressed_the_button. However, Lin (2016, p. 6-11)_has_argued that 11 While Lin himself doesn't_include one, we think_it's_natural to suppose that_Lin's view should include a_restriction on the relevant times prior_to (t​1​)_and after_(t​2​) the agent's action. Such a restriction would, we think, naturally_involve the ​existence ​of the desire_at t​1. To see_why, suppose_we_do ​not ​require_that_t​1 be_a time when the agent's desire already_exists -or,_if you think desires can be_satisfied despite no longer_existing,_​has already existed​. Now suppose I_do not now (at t​1​) desire_a fig newton, but that,_unless_I'm_informed of my serious allergy_to figs, I will desire a_fig newton in_six days. Finally, suppose that, no matter_what_happens, I will be given a_fig_newton in seven days. Then it_turns_out_that, given Causal Probabilism (without_some restriction on t​1​), actions I_might perform in the next several days that make_it less likely_that I'll be informed of_my_serious_allergy to figs -for instance, locking myself in a room_-- promote_the