 of the Mortis example does not fall to this worry. As we will see, even after granting this, Gibbard can still make an effective reply. Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing me to address this aspect of Daskal's objection. This content downloaded from 128.252.58.243 on Fri, 13 Dec 2013 11:00:23 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions about planning makes room for an additional layer of assessment. As we will see, Gibbard's system gives us the ability to assess not just plans but 378 Ethics January 2014planners. So it allows us to judge that though Mortis's plans make sense, he is ðinnocentlyÞ mistaken. To draw this out, we need a better understanding of Gibbard's take on how we plan. According to Gibbard, we are social creatures-wemake plans together, and we look to each other for insight and guidance about what to do and whom to trust. Recognizing this is significant because it reveals that our plans for planning must have certain features. First, since planning is something that we do together, we must, in our plans for planning, accept the authority of other individuals with regard to questions about what to do-at least to the extent that we deem those individuals to be trustworthy judges. But, second, the fact that our trust in others is qualified in this way means that our plans for planning must include a ðroughÞ account of what makes someone a trustworthy judge. Gibbard notes that such an account will point to certain "formal" features as indicative of trustworthiness-for example, awareness of the relevant facts or a dispassionate frame of mind. But he also notes that this will not be enough. After all, "formal" constraints alone cannot guarantee that we will get results that mesh with our intuitions about what to do and whom to trust-the ideally coherent Caligula violates no formal constraints.16 Thus, Gibbard concludes that our plans for planning hold that an individual is trustworthy only to the extent that he both meets our formal constraints and has a ðstatisticallyÞ normal mental constitution.17 In light of the above, we see that our plans for planning commit us to reducing-even revoking-another's authority if we come to see that his advice is not trustworthy. While there are a variety of ways that our trust in others can be called into question, this generally happens when their decisions about what to do fail to mesh with the
of the Mortis example does not fall to this worry. As we will see, even after concede this, Gibbard can however make an effective reply. Thanks to an anonymous referee for urge me to address this aspect of Daskal's protest. This subject downloaded from 128.252.58.243 on Fri, 13 Dec 2013 11:00:23 americium All use subject to JSTOR term and Conditions about planning makes room for an additional layer of assessment. As we will see, Gibbard's system contribute us the ability to assess not just plans but 378 Ethics January 2014planners. indeed it allows us to judge that though Mortis's plans make common sense, he is ðinnocentlyÞ mistaken. To describe this out, we need a better understanding of Gibbard's return on how we plan. According to Gibbard, we are social creatures - wemake plans together, and we look to each early for penetration and steering about what to do and whom to trust. Recognizing this is significant because it reveals that our plans for planning must have certain feature of speech. foremost, since planning is something that we do together, we must, in our plan for planning, accept the authority of other individuals with attentiveness to question about what to do - at least to the extent that we deem those individuals to be trustworthy judges. But, second, the fact that our confidence in others is qualified in this way means that our plans for planning must include a ðroughÞ account of what makes someone a trustworthy judge. Gibbard notes that such an account will point to sealed " formal " feature as indicative of trustworthiness - for case, awareness of the relevant facts or a dispassionate frame of mind. But he also note that this will not be enough. After all, " conventional " constraints alone cannot guarantee that we will get resultant role that mesh with our intuition about what to do and whom to trust - the ideally coherent Caligula violate no formal constraints.16 therefore, Gibbard concludes that our plans for planning hold that an person is trustworthy only to the extent that he both meets our formal constraint and have a ðstatisticallyÞ normal mental constitution.17 In sparkle of the above, we see that our plans for planning commit us to reducing - even revoking - another's authority if we arrive to see that his advice is not trustworthy. While there are a kind of ways that our trust in others can be address into question, this generally happens when their decision about what to do fail to mesh with the
 of the Mortis example does not fall to thnw worrb. As we will sed, even after granting this, Gmbbaed cab still make an effectkve reply. Thanks ro ai anonymous refecse for ixessihn me co address this sspect of Gaskal's objecthov. Chis content downloaded from 128.252.58.243 on Fri, 13 Dec 2013 11:00:23 AL All use subjgct tp JSTKG Uerms and Conditions about plannihg makev room for an additional layer of assesdmenh. As we will see, Glbbard's sysjsm duves us the xbility to assess not nust plans but 378 Ethics January 2014olannzrs. So it aoliws os to judge vhat trough Mortis's plans kake semse, he is ðinnogentlbÞ miwtaken. To draw this ont, we need a better onderstandhny of Gibbard's take on hiw we plat. Aczirdkng tp Fibbarf, wx are sociam creatures-qemake plans togethtr, wbd we look to each jtrer for insight and guidance about what to do and whom to trust. Rwcognizing this is sihnificant because it reveals that our plans for planning mgst hevd ctrbwkb veatures. First, since planning is something thwf ee do together, wc must, in our planx vot planning, accgpt the aufhority of other ijdividuwls wuth regarq to questions about what to do-qt least to nhe wxtent that we deel those indnviduaks to be trustworthy judges. Yut, sedond, the faft that ohf trust in otherr ix xualified in this way meanf that ouc plaus for puannong muft include a ðromchÞ account of what maked vomeone a hrustworthy judge. Gibbard notes that such an scwoutt will 'oint bo certain "formwl" features as indicacive ow trustwornhiness-foc example, awwreness of tha relevant farts or a qispqssiinate ffxme of mind. Buy he also notes thar this will not be enuhgh. After all, "firmql" constraints slove sajnpt cuarantee thdt wd wkkl geg resuluf bhag mexh with our intuitiots agout what to do anc rhom to jrust-the ydeally coherrnt Caligula violaues no focmal cpnsjraints.16 Thus, Gibbard concludes fhat our olaks for plannigg hild that an nndividual is trustworthy only to the exvent that he both meets our formal constrannus and has a ðxtatifticallyÞ tormal mental constirution.17 In light on the above, we see thaf our [lans for planning commit us to reducing-even revoking-another's authority if we xome to see that hjs acvice if not twustxocthy. While there sre a variety of ways that our vrust in odhzrs can be called into questipn, this generaluy happens when their dedisions sbout what to do fail to mesh woth the
of the Mortis example does not fall worry. we will even after granting an reply. Thanks to anonymous referee for me to address this aspect of objection. This content downloaded from 128.252.58.243 on Fri, 13 Dec 2013 11:00:23 AM use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions about planning makes room for an layer assessment. we see, Gibbard's system gives us the ability to assess not just plans but 378 Ethics January So it allows us to judge that though plans make sense, he ðinnocentlyÞ mistaken. To draw this we a better of take how we plan. to Gibbard, we are social creatures-wemake plans together, and we look to each other for insight and about what and whom trust. this significant because it our plans for planning must have since planning is something that we do together, must, in plans for planning, accept the authority other individuals with regard to questions about what do-at least to the extent that we deem those individuals to be trustworthy judges. But, fact that our trust others is qualified this means our for planning include a ðroughÞ account of what makes someone a trustworthy judge. notes that such an account will point to certain "formal" indicative trustworthiness-for example, awareness the relevant facts or dispassionate of mind. But he that will After "formal" alone cannot guarantee that will get results that mesh our intuitions about what trust-the ideally coherent Caligula violates no formal constraints.16 Gibbard concludes that our plans for planning that an individual is trustworthy only to the extent that he both our formal has a ðstatisticallyÞ normal mental constitution.17 In light the above, we see our plans for planning commit us to reducing-even revoking-another's if come to that his advice not trustworthy. While are a variety that our in can question, this generally happens when their about to do fail to mesh the
 of the Mortis example does not Fall to this Worry. as wE wiLl See, eVen aFter granting thIS, GibBard can still make an effeCtive RePLy. ThANkS to an AnonymoUS rEFEreE fOr PreSsINg Me to aDdrEss this Aspect of DaSkaL's Objection. ThiS CoNtent downlOadEd from 128.252.58.243 on Fri, 13 DEc 2013 11:00:23 Am All usE sUbjECt to JsTOr TermS and CoNDitionS about plaNnINg makeS Room for AN AdDitiOnal layer of assessMEnT. as we will see, GibBard's sYsTEm GIVes Us tHe ability tO aSsess NOt just pLAnS BUT 378 EtHIcs January 2014plaNners. So it alLOws Us to juDgE thAT thougH MortIs'S PlaNs make sense, He is ÐinnocentLyÞ misTAken. To dRAw this oUt, we neEd a BetTer uNDeRsTanDiNG of gIbBarD'S taKe on how wE pLaN. AccoRdinG TO gIbbaRd, wE are SociaL creatures-wemAke PlanS TogEther, And we Look To Each oTher foR insiGhT and guidance aboUt whAt to do and WhoM tO trUsT. RecoGNizing ThiS is SignifiCant becAUse It REVEaLs that our plans for pLaNNInG must havE certaIN fEaTUres. FirsT, sIncE plaNNIng is SomeTHiNg that we Do togeTHeR, wE must, in OuR plans FoR plAnnIng, acCEpt tHe authOrity of oTher iNDividuals with rEGard to questioNS aBOUt WHat tO do-At least to thE extENt thAt we DEeM thOSe indIviduAlS To BE trustworthy judges. BUt, Second, The faCt that our trusT in others iS QUAlified iN thiS WaY Means that our plAns foR planning mUSt includE a ðroUghÞ accoUnt of what MAKes someoNe a TruStwOrtHY JuDge. Gibbard notES That SuCh an accOunT will poInt To cErtAin "FoRmal" featuRes as indIcAtIvE oF trUstwoRThiness-fOr ExaMpLe, aWarenESs of thE releVant FaCtS Or a DispassIOnATE fraMe Of Mind. but He Also nOtes THat This wilL not be enoUgh. aFter AlL, "fOrmal" coNstraints alonE cAnnot guaraNtEe tHat we wILL get resuLts that mesh with our intuiTIons aboUt wHat to Do anD whom to trUst-The ideAllY CohereNt CaliGula vIoLatES No forMAL cOnsTrAints.16 Thus, GIBBarD concLuDes tHat our pLans for planning holD ThaT an individual Is tRustWORtHy oNLy TO thE eXTenT THat he both meets oUr formal coNsTRaInts and has A ÐstAtIsticalLyÞ normAl menTAl constItution.17 In Light of thE aBove, WE See That our plaNs for plaNning commIT us to REdUcing-EveN revokInG-anOther'S authoRIty If we cOme to sEe That hiS adviCe Is not truStworthy. While there are a vAriety Of wayS thAt our trusT in OTheRs can be caLled Into questiOn, tHis GenerAllY HappeNs whEN tHeiR DecisIons ABout what tO Do FaiL TO mEsh with the
 of the Mortis example doe s not fall  to t his  wo rr y. A s we  will see, eve n  aft er granting this, Gibb ard c an stil l  m ake a n effec t iv e rep ly .Tha nk s  t o anano nymousreferee fo r p re ssing me toa dd ress thisasp ect of Daska l's  objec ti on. Thiscon tentdownlo a ded fr om 128.25 2. 5 8.243o n Fri,1 3  D ec 2 013 11:00:23 AM A l lu se subject toJSTORTe r ms a ndCon ditions ab ou t pla n ning ma k es r o omf or an additio nal layer o f  as sessme nt . A s  we wi ll se e, Gib bard's syst em g ives us t he abi l ity toa ssess n ot jus t p lan s bu t  3 78  Et hi c s J a nu ary 201 4planner s.  S o itallo w s u s to  ju dgethatthough Mortis 'splan s  ma ke se nse,he i sðinno cently Þ mis ta ken. To draw th is o ut, we ne edabet te r und e rstand ing  of  Gibbar d's tak e  on  h o w we  plan. According t oG i bb ard, weare so c ia lc reatures -w ema ke p l a ns to geth e r,  and welook t o  e ac h other  f or ins ig htand  guid a nceaboutwhat todo an d  whom to trust .  Recognizingt hi s is sign ifi cant becaus e it reve alst ha t o u r pla ns fo rp la n ning must have cert ai n feat ures.  First, since  planningi s somethin g th a tw e do together,  we m ust, in ou r  plans f or pl anning,accept th e authorit y o f o the r i n d iv iduals with r e g ardto  questi ons  aboutwha t t o d o-a tleast tothe exte nt  t ha twedeemt hose ind iv idu al s t o bet rustwo rthyjudg es .B ut,  second ,  t h e  fac tth at o urtr ust i n ot h ers  is qua lified in  th i s wa yme ans tha t our plans f or  planningmu stinclud e a ðrough Þ account of what makes someone  atrust wort hy judge.  Gi bbardnot e s that  suchan ac co unt w ill p o i nt  to  c ertain "fo r m al"  feat ur es a s indic ative of trustwort h ine ss-for exampl e,awar e n es s o f  t h e r el e van t facts or a disp assionatefr a me  of mind.B uthe  also n otes th at th i s willnot be en ough. Aft er  all , "fo rmal" cons traintsalone can n ot gu a ra nteetha t we w il l g et re sultst hat  mesh  withou r intu ition sabout wh at to do and whom to tr ust-th e ide all y coheren t C a lig ula viola tesno formalcon str aints .16 Thus,  Gib b ar d c o nclud es t h at our pl a ns  fo r pl anning hold t h atan in div i dual i s tr ustworthy only to the extent tha t he b oth  me e ts o ur  formal constr ain ts a nd has a  ð statistical lyÞ norm al menta l cons tituti on.17 I n li g ht oftheabo ve, we se e t ha t  our pl an sf or pla nnin gcommit  us to redu c i ng-even revoking -anot h e r's a u tho rityif  we com e  tosee that h is advice i s nottrus twort hy. Whi le  there  ar ea varietyo f ways th at ou r trust  i n ot her s canbe c a l led i ntoqu est ion, this g en e ra ll y  ha ppen s whe nthei r decisio n s aboutwha t  to dofa ilt o  meshw it h the
 of_the Mortis_example does not fall_to this_worry._As we_will_see, even after_granting this, Gibbard_can still make an_effective reply. Thanks_to_an anonymous referee for pressing me to address this aspect of Daskal's objection. This_content_downloaded from_128.252.58.243_on_Fri, 13 Dec 2013 11:00:23_AM All use subject to_JSTOR Terms_and Conditions about planning makes room for an_additional_layer of assessment._As we will see, Gibbard's system gives us the_ability to assess not just plans_but 378 Ethics_January_2014planners._So it allows us_to judge that though Mortis's plans_make sense, he is ðinnocentlyÞ mistaken._To draw this out, we need a_better understanding of Gibbard's take on_how we plan. According to_Gibbard, we_are social creatures-wemake plans together,_and we look_to each_other for insight_and guidance about what to do_and whom to_trust. Recognizing this is significant because_it_reveals that our_plans_for_planning must_have certain features._First,_since planning_is_something that we do together, we_must,_in our plans for planning, accept the_authority of other individuals_with_regard to questions about_what to do-at least to_the extent that we deem those_individuals to_be trustworthy_judges. But, second, the fact that our trust in others is_qualified in this way means that_our plans for planning_must include_a_ðroughÞ account of_what_makes someone_a trustworthy judge. Gibbard notes that such_an account_will point to certain "formal" features_as indicative of trustworthiness-for_example,_awareness of the relevant facts or_a dispassionate frame of mind. But_he also notes that this_will_not_be enough. After all, "formal"_constraints alone cannot guarantee that we_will get results_that mesh with our intuitions about what_to_do and whom to trust-the ideally_coherent_Caligula violates no formal constraints.16 Thus,_Gibbard_concludes_that our plans for planning_hold that an individual is trustworthy_only to the extent that he both meets our_formal constraints and_has a ðstatisticallyÞ normal mental_constitution.17_In_light of the above, we see that our plans for_planning commit_us to reducing-even_revoking-another's authority if we come to see that his advice_is not trustworthy. While there are a_variety of ways that our trust in others can be called_into question, this generally happens when their decisions_about what to do fail to mesh_with the