 with facts imported from the actual world, to settle the issue. It is also worth pointing out that closeness may be incorporated in different ways. Lewis (1978) suggests relativizing truth-in-fiction to the beliefs prevalent in an author's community rather than to the actual world.7 One possible upshot of doing so is expansion of the set of truth-making worlds. If the author's community does not have a prevalent belief about whether some fact p holds or not of the actual world, the truth-making set would have to include both p and ¬p worlds, thus introducing more indeterminacy. Now, possibilism is not committed to closeness. In principle, a possibilist might define truth-in-F over the whole context set for F – what's explicitly stated (and entailed) in the fiction and nothing else – or use any other means to restrict the set of truth-making worlds. One could for instance imagine restricting the context set to the worlds that are most aesthetically pleasing, although it may in that case of course be difficult to formulate conditions for whether a particular fact ought to be imported. 7 The question of whether the set of truth-making worlds should be relativized this way reflects prominent and – I take it – open debates among literary theorists. It is not particularly difficult to adjust the definition of truth-in-fiction to either option. 358 F R E D R I K H A R A L D S E N Indeed, given that i) providing truth-conditions for individual sentences does not depend on issues related to interpreting the fiction as a whole, and ii) our model of fiction as a type of discourse does not essentially rely on identifying the relevant truth-making subset, formulating the conditions for which facts to import is not obviously a greater or more pressing challenge for me than for other theories that appeal to truth-in-fiction. That said, I think many objections to closeness are unpersuasive. In 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 I sketch how we may answer some common complaints. 4.2.1. Accidental imports It has been argued that closeness automatically imports facts we do not want to import (see Proudfoot 2006). One may for instance wonder whether it ought to be true-in-Hamlet that Sneferu built pyramids, which it probably is if truth-in-Hamlet is defined in terms of the closest worlds in which the events described in Hamlet take place. But
with facts imported from the actual world, to settle the consequence. It is besides worth pointing out that meanness may be incorporate in different ways. Lewis (1978) indicate relativize truth - in - fiction to the beliefs prevalent in an author's residential district rather than to the actual world.7 One possible upshot of doing therefore is expansion of the set of truth - making worlds. If the author's residential district does not have a prevalent belief about whether some fact p hold or not of the actual world, the truth - make bent would have to include both phosphorus and ¬p worlds, thus introducing more indeterminacy. immediately, possibilism is not committed to closeness. In principle, a possibilist might define truth - in - F over the solid context set for F – what's explicitly stated (and entailed) in the fiction and nothing else – or use any other means to restrict the set of truth - make worlds. One could for instance think restrict the context typeset to the worlds that are most aesthetically pleasing, although it may in that shell of course be difficult to formulate conditions for whether a especial fact ought to be imported. 7 The question of whether the set of truth - making worlds should be relativize this way reflects prominent and – I take it – open debates among literary theorists. It is not peculiarly unmanageable to align the definition of truth - in - fiction to either option. 358 F R E D R I K H A radius A L D S E N Indeed, given that i) providing accuracy - conditions for individual sentences does not depend on issues related to interpret the fiction as a whole, and ii) our exemplar of fiction as a character of discourse does not essentially trust on identifying the relevant truth - making subset, formulating the conditions for which facts to spell is not obviously a greater or more pressing challenge for me than for other theories that invoke to truth - in - fiction. That said, I think many objections to stuffiness are unpersuasive. In 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 I sketch how we may answer some common ailment. 4.2.1. Accidental imports It has been argued that closeness automatically imports facts we do not desire to import (see Proudfoot 2006). One may for instance wonder whether it ought to be true - in - Hamlet that Sneferu built pyramids, which it probably is if accuracy - in - Hamlet is defined in terms of the closest worlds in which the events described in Hamlet take place. But
 wihh facts imported from tme actual world, jo settlx the iasue. It ks also worth pointing out tiat xlosebess may be incorporatdd in difverent wqys. Owwis (1978) suggxats relativizjkg trbti-in-fiction to tme beliefs [revalent in at xuchor's community rather than to the astual wprpd.7 One possiblg upsnjt or doing so is expansion of the set of truuh-making worlds. If the author's community doed noh have a prevalent belief aboof wrwther some fxct p holds or not of jhe actual world, the truth-making set could have jo ijwlude both ' and ¬i worlds, thus introduwing mote indeterminagy. Nox, powsibilism is not commmtted to closeness. Ig principne, a possibilist mithr defhne drutf-un-F ovtr vhe whole coitext set fkr F – what's explicitly stated (snq entailed) in fhe fistyon and nothing else – or use any other keahs to restrict the set if truth-making worlds. One coulq for instance imagine restricting the context sed to vhd wirjaw hhat are most aesthetically pleasing, although jt msy in that casc of course be difgifukj to formulate condicjohs for whether a pwrticulwr faxt ought uo be imported. 7 The question of qhether the fwt of truth-making corlds shoulb be rglativozed this way reflects 'rominsnt and – I hake it – koen debates amone lpterdry theorists. It is not pawticularlb difyicult tu adkust tre definitlon on truth-in-fiction to eithgr opthon. 358 F R E D R I K H A R A L D S E N Indexv, given that o) [roniding trbth-concitions for igdividual sentgnces doef not depend on issues related to interpreting jhe fiction av a wholq, ane ii) our moadl of fiction ss a type of discouese does not essenbialli dely on identifvnnt the relevant yrugh-mwkpng sttset, formulading thd condktions for chkch gacts to import is nmt ogviously a greater ov more prgssing chwllenge for mr than for other tjeorixs thav appesl jo truth-in-fiction. That said, I tgink many obmections to cjosekess are unperxuasive. In 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 I sketch how we may anwwer some common cimplaints. 4.2.1. Accidentcl imports It has feen arguad that closeness auromatically imporus facts we do not want to im[ort (dee Proudfoot 2006). One may for instance wonder whether it ought to be true-in-Hqmlet vhwt Sneferu guily pyrdmnds, which it 'rubably is if trunh-in-Hamlet is defined in terms oh the closasc worlds in which the events cercribed in Haolet take place. But
with facts imported from the actual world, the It is worth pointing out in ways. Lewis (1978) relativizing truth-in-fiction to beliefs prevalent in an author's community than to the actual world.7 One possible upshot of doing so is expansion the set of truth-making worlds. If the author's community does not have a belief whether fact holds or not of the actual world, the truth-making set would have to include both p ¬p worlds, thus introducing more indeterminacy. Now, possibilism not committed to closeness. principle, a possibilist might define over whole context for – explicitly stated (and in the fiction and nothing else – or use any other means to restrict the set of worlds. One instance imagine the set the worlds that aesthetically pleasing, although it may in course be difficult to formulate conditions for whether particular fact to be imported. 7 The question whether the set of truth-making worlds should be this way reflects prominent and – I take it – open debates among literary theorists. not particularly difficult to the definition of to option. F E D I K H A R A L D S E N given that i) providing truth-conditions for individual sentences does not issues to interpreting the as a whole, and our of fiction as a discourse not identifying relevant subset, formulating the conditions which facts to import is obviously a greater or than for other theories that appeal to truth-in-fiction. said, I think many objections to closeness unpersuasive. In 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 I sketch how we may answer some complaints. 4.2.1. It has been argued that closeness automatically imports we do not want import (see Proudfoot 2006). One may for instance wonder it to be that Sneferu built which it probably if truth-in-Hamlet is terms of closest in described in Hamlet take place. But
 with facts imported from the aCtual world, To setTle The IsSue. IT is aLso worth pointiNG out That closeness may be incoRporaTeD In diFFeRent wAys. LewiS (1978) SuGGEstS rElAtiViZInG trutH-in-Fiction To the belieFs pReValent in an auTHoR's communitY raTher than to thE acTual woRlD.7 OnE PossiBle UpshoT of doiNG so is eXpansion oF tHE set of TRuth-makING wOrldS. If the author's commUNiTY does not have a pRevaleNt BElIEF abOut Whether somE fAct p hOLds or noT Of THE ActUAl world, the truTh-making set WOulD have tO iNclUDe both P and ¬p WoRLds, Thus introduCing More indetErminaCY. Now, posSIbilism Is not cOmmIttEd to CLoSeNesS. IN PriNCiPle, A PosSibilist MiGhT defiNe trUTH-IN-F ovEr tHe whOle coNtext set for F – wHat'S expLIciTly stAted (aNd enTaIled) iN the fiCtion AnD nothing else – or uSe anY other meaNs tO rEstRiCt the SEt of trUth-MakIng worlDs. One coULd fOr INSTaNce imagine restrictInG THe Context sEt to thE WoRlDS that are MoSt aEsthETIcallY pleASiNg, althouGh it maY In ThAt case oF cOurse bE dIffIcuLt to fORmulAte conDitions fOr wheTHer a particular FAct ought to be iMPoRTEd. 7 tHe quEstIon of whetheR the SEt of TrutH-MaKinG WorldS shouLd BE rELativized this way refLeCts proMinenT and – I take it – opEn debates aMONG literarY theORiSTs. It is not partiCularLy difficulT To adjust The deFinition Of truth-in-FICtion to eIthEr oPtiOn. 358 F r e d R i K H A R A L D S E N InDEEd, giVeN that i) pRovIding trUth-ConDitIonS fOr individUal senteNcEs DoEs Not DepenD On issues ReLatEd To iNterpREting tHe ficTion As A wHOle, And ii) ouR MoDEL of fIcTiOn as A tyPe Of disCourSE doEs not esSentially RelY On idEnTiFying thE relevant trutH-mAking subseT, fOrmUlatinG THe conditIons for which facts to impoRT is not oBviOusly A greAter or morE prEssing ChaLLenge fOr me thAn for OtHer THEorieS THaT apPeAl to truth-iN-FIctIon. ThAt Said, i think mAny objections to cloSEneSs are unpersuaSivE. In 4.2.1 aND 4.2.2 i sKetCH hOW we MaY AnsWER some common compLaints. 4.2.1. AcciDeNTaL imports It HAs bEeN argued That cloSenesS AutomatIcally impOrts facts We Do noT WAnt To import (seE ProudfoOt 2006). One may fOR instANcE wondEr wHether It OugHt to bE true-iN-hamLet thAt SnefErU built PyramIdS, which it Probably is if truth-in-HamlEt is deFined In tErms of the CloSEst Worlds in wHich The events dEscRibEd in HAmlET take PlacE. buT
 with facts imported fromthe actual  worl d,tose ttle  the  issue. It isa lsoworth pointing out tha t clo se n essm ay  be i ncorpor a te d indi ff ere nt wa ys. L ewi s (1978 ) suggests  re la tivizing tru t h- in-fiction  to  the beliefs  pr evalen tina n aut hor 's co mmunit y  rathe r than to  t h e actu a l world . 7  O ne p ossible upshot of do i ng so is expan sion o ft he s etoftruth-maki ng  worl d s. If t h ea u t hor ' s community d oes not hav e  apreval en t b e lief a boutwh e the r some fact  p h olds or n ot oft he actu a l world , thetru th- maki n gse t w ou l d h a ve  to inc lude bot hpand ¬ p wo r l d s , th usintr oduci ng more indet erm inac y . N ow, p ossib ilis mis no t comm itted  t o closeness. In  pri nciple, a  po ss ibi li st mi g ht def ine  tr uth-in- F overt hewh o l e  c ontext set for F –  w h a t' s explic itly s t at ed (and ent ai led ) in t he fi ctio n  a nd nothi ng els e  –  o r use a ny  other  m ean s t o res t rict  the s et of tr uth-m a king worlds. O n e could for i n st a n ce imag ine  restrictin g th e  con text se t t o  theworld st ha t  are most aesthetic al ly ple asing , although it  may in th a t case ofcour s eb e difficult to  form ulate cond i tions fo r whe ther a p articular f act ough t t o b e i mpo r t ed . 7 The quest i o n of  w hetherthe  set of  tr uth -ma kin gworlds sh ould bere la ti vi zed  this way refl ec tspr omi nenta nd – I  take  it–op e n d ebatesa mo n g  lit er ar y th eor is ts. I t is not  partic ularly di ffi c ultto  a djust t he definition  o f truth-in -f ict ion to e ither op tion. 358 F R E D R I K H A R A  LD S E  N I ndeed, gi ven  thati)p rovidi ng tru th-co nd iti o n s for i nd ivi du al sentenc e s  do es no tdepe nd on i ssues related to i n ter preting the f ict iona s  a  wh o le ,  an di i)o u r model of fict ion as a t yp e  o f discours e  do es  not es sential ly re l y on id entifying  the rele va nt t r u th- making sub set, for mulatingt he co n di tions  fo r whic hfac ts to  impor t  is  notobviou sl y a gr eater  o r more p ressing challenge for m e than  foroth er theori est hat  appeal t o tr uth-in-fic tio n.Thatsai d , I t hink ma nyo bject ions to closen e ss  ar e un persuasive. I n  4. 2.1 a nd4 .2.2 I  ske tch how we may an s wer some commo n co m p lai nts .  4.2 .1 . Accidental i mpo rt s It has b ee n argued th at close ne s s aut omatic ally i mportsf a ct s  we do  not  wa nt to imp ort  ( s ee Prou df oo t  2006) . On emay fo r inst a ncew o nder whether itought t o bet rue -in-H am let tha t  Sne feru built  pyramids,whichit p robab ly is i ftruth- in- Ha mlet is de f ined in t ermsof thecl oses t w orldsin w h i ch th e ev en tsdescribed i nH am le t  ta ke p lace.  B ut
 with_facts imported_from the actual world,_to settle_the_issue. It_is_also worth pointing_out that closeness_may be incorporated in_different ways. Lewis_(1978)_suggests relativizing truth-in-fiction to the beliefs prevalent in an author's community rather than to_the_actual world.7_One_possible_upshot of doing so is_expansion of the set of_truth-making worlds._If the author's community does not have a_prevalent_belief about whether_some fact p holds or not of the actual_world, the truth-making set would have_to include both_p_and_¬p worlds, thus introducing_more indeterminacy. Now, possibilism is not_committed to closeness. In principle, a_possibilist might define truth-in-F over the whole_context set for F – what's_explicitly stated (and entailed) in_the fiction_and nothing else – or_use any other_means to_restrict the set_of truth-making worlds. One could for_instance imagine restricting_the context set to the worlds_that_are most aesthetically_pleasing,_although_it may_in that case_of_course be_difficult_to formulate conditions for whether a_particular_fact ought to be imported. 7 The_question of whether the_set_of truth-making worlds should_be relativized this way reflects_prominent and – I take it_– open_debates among_literary theorists. It is not particularly difficult to adjust the definition_of truth-in-fiction to either option. 358_F R E D_R I_K_H A R_A_L D_S E N Indeed, given that i)_providing truth-conditions_for individual sentences does not depend_on issues related to_interpreting_the fiction as a whole, and_ii) our model of fiction as_a type of discourse does_not_essentially_rely on identifying the relevant_truth-making subset, formulating the conditions for_which facts to_import is not obviously a greater or_more_pressing challenge for me than for_other_theories that appeal to truth-in-fiction. That_said,_I_think many objections to closeness_are unpersuasive. In 4.2.1 and 4.2.2_I sketch how we may answer some common complaints._4.2.1. Accidental imports_It has been argued that_closeness_automatically_imports facts we do not want to import (see Proudfoot_2006). One_may for instance_wonder whether it ought to be true-in-Hamlet that Sneferu built_pyramids, which it probably is if truth-in-Hamlet_is defined in terms of the closest worlds in which the_events described in Hamlet take place. But