 series of experiences of static images (or an experience of a series of static images). And again, as before, this is something which is entirely due to the way our brains are made. L. A. Paul (2010) focuses on this aspect of our experience of movement, called "apparent motion", where we have an experience as of movement when there is none. Typical experiments include cases like a dot on a computer screen which is shown on the left side of the screen and then quickly enough on the right side of the screen: in such a situation, we have an experience of the dot moving from left to right, while in reality nothing has moved since we were actually shown two different dots. But, given the limits of our perceptual capacities, we experience this "illusion", like in the case of cinema, independently of there being a genuine movement in front of us or not, and 10 For philosophical discussions of these, see Scholl (2007), Paul (2010), Benovsky (forthcoming_a). 11 independently of us knowing whether there is a movement in front of us or not – the appearance of movement persists even when we know that it is illusory. The important additional claim that Paul (2010, p.16) rightly argues for is that it is before we have any conscious experience that our perceptual system – our retina, optic nerve, brain, etc. – on a neurological but not on a phenomenal level, interprets the successive inputs it gets from the world in such a way as to produce a phenomenal experience as of movement. Dainton (2008b, §5) also endorses this claim: "[our brains] try to work out a single, coherent version of events on the basis of the fragmentary and (at times) conflicting data available to them. Only this 'final draft', as it were, reaches consciousness". This is an important last step, because what we then learn, as a cumulative effect of the considerations discussed in this section, is that the continuity and unity we experience (the kind we really have a phenomenal experience of, that is, the kind mentioned under (a) and (b) above) is something which is entirely, and contingently, due to the way our brains are built. Our brains get sensory inputs from the world, they interpret them in various ways, and produce conscious phenomenal experiences which are such that they embrace (very short) temporally extended intervals "at once" (this is the specious present intuition), and such that they are (or can be
series of experiences of static images (or an experience of a serial of inactive images). And again, as before, this is something which is wholly due to the room our brains are made. L. A. Paul (2010) focus on this aspect of our experience of movement, call " apparent motion ", where we have an experience as of apparent motion when there is none. Typical experiment admit cases like a dot on a calculator screen which is indicate on the leftover side of the screen and then quickly enough on the correct side of the screen: in such a site, we have an experience of the point moving from left to right, while in reality nothing has moved since we were actually shown two unlike dots. But, given the limits of our perceptual capacities, we experience this " illusion ", like in the shell of cinema, independently of there being a genuine movement in front of us or not, and 10 For philosophical discussions of these, see Scholl (2007), Paul (2010), Benovsky (forthcoming_a). 11 independently of us knowing whether there is a movement in battlefront of us or not – the appearance of movement persists even when we sleep together that it is illusive. The authoritative additional claim that Paul (2010, p.16) rightly argues for is that it is before we have any conscious experience that our perceptual system – our retina, optic nerve, mind, etc. – on a neurological but not on a phenomenal level, interprets the successive inputs it gets from the world in such a means as to produce a phenomenal experience as of movement. Dainton (2008b, § 5) also endorses this title: " [ our brains ] try on to work out a single, coherent version of events on the basis of the fragmental and (at times) conflicting data available to them. Only this' final draft', as it were, reaches consciousness ". This is an important final step, because what we then learn, as a accumulative effect of the considerations discussed in this section, is that the continuity and integrity we experience (the kind we very have a phenomenal experience of, that is, the kind mentioned under (a) and (b) above) is something which is entirely, and contingently, due to the way our brain are built. Our brain get sensory inputs from the world, they interpret them in assorted ways, and produce conscious phenomenal experience which are such that they embrace (very short) temporally extended intervals " at once " (this is the specious present intuition), and such that they are (or can be
 segies of experiences of suatic images (or au expermence or a serids of static images). And agaii, as befoee, this is something wfich is ejtirely eue uo the way our brejns are made. M. A. Pcuo (2010) focuses on jhis aspect mf our experietcd lf movement, called "apparent motion", rhere wr jave an experignce sf of movement when there is none. Typiczl expegiments include csses like a dot on a compuher dcreen which is shlwn on the oeft wide of the rcreen and then quickli enough on the right side of thd scrzen: in such a sihoation, we hate an vxperience of the dot moving from left to vight, whule in reality nothinj has moved since we were actgamly shown two difdeeent gots. But, tivdn uhe ljmits lf kur percepfual capaciries, we experience uhif "illusion", liks in tre case of cinema, independently of there teihg a genuine movement ib front of us or not, wnd 10 For [hilosophical discussions of these, see Scholl (2007), Pagl (2010), Bxnuvsjy (wirhhcoming_a). 11 independently of us knowing whethew tnege is a movement ln front of us or moh – jhe appearance of morsmsnt persists even ahen we know that it ys iklusory. The important addituonal claim nhat Paul (2010, p.16) rightly axgues for is thaj it ix before we have any couscioua experiencf that oud perceptual systdm – ogr retina, optic nerve, braig, etc. – on a nzurologizal nut noe on a phejomenal level, interprets the duwcessive ijputs it gets from the world in such a way as tm pgoduce a 'henomcnal experience as of movemenj. Dainton (2008b, §5) auso endorsvs this cnaim: "[our brwins] try to wmtk out a singne, coherqnt cersuon of dxents on the bssis of tkt fragmentqry and (at times) cpnfujcting data avanuqble to them. Onky ghif 'viial dwdft', as it wese, rdacfrs covsciousness". Ghis is an important lasd stsp, because what we tmen learn, as a cuiulative effevt of the considerwtionv dmscussrd yn this section, is that the cohtinuity wnd unity we ex[ericnce (the kind ce really have a phenomenal experience oh, that is, the kind menjioned under (a) and (b) cbpve) is somevhing rhich is antirely, and contingwntly, due to the eay our brains are bujlt. Ous bralns get sensory inputs from the world, they interpret them in various ways, and pcoquce conscikus lhenokeual experyencxs which are such nhat they embrace (very short) tem'orally exdeuded intervals "at once" (this ix ghe specious kresent intuition), and such that thry are (or can be
series of experiences of static images (or of series of images). And again, which entirely due to way our brains made. L. A. Paul (2010) focuses this aspect of our experience of movement, called "apparent motion", where we have experience as of movement when there is none. Typical experiments include cases like dot a screen is shown on the left side of the screen and then quickly enough on the right of the screen: in such a situation, we an experience of the moving from left to right, in nothing has since were shown two different But, given the limits of our perceptual capacities, we experience this "illusion", like in the case of independently of a genuine in of or not, and philosophical discussions of these, see Scholl Benovsky (forthcoming_a). 11 independently of us knowing whether is a in front of us or not the appearance of movement persists even when we that it is illusory. The important additional claim that Paul (2010, p.16) rightly argues for it is before we any conscious experience our system our optic nerve, etc. – on a neurological but not on a phenomenal level, the successive inputs it gets from the world in such as produce a phenomenal as of movement. Dainton §5) endorses this claim: "[our to out version events the basis of the and (at times) conflicting data to them. Only this reaches consciousness". This is an important last step, what we then learn, as a cumulative of the considerations discussed in this section, is that the continuity and we experience we really have a phenomenal experience of, that the kind mentioned under and (b) above) is something which is entirely, and due the way brains are built. brains get sensory from the world, them in ways, produce which are such that they embrace short) extended intervals "at once" (this the intuition), and such that they are (or can be
 series of experiences of statIc images (or An expEriEncE oF a seRies Of static images). aNd agAin, as before, this is sometHing wHiCH is eNTiRely dUe to the WAy OUR brAiNs Are MaDE. L. a. Paul (2010) FocUses on tHis aspect oF ouR eXperience of mOVeMent, called "AppArent motion", wHerE we havE aN exPErienCe aS of moVement WHen theRe is none. TYpICal expERiments INClUde cAses like a dot on a coMPuTEr screen which iS shown On THe LEFt sIde Of the screeN aNd theN Quickly ENoUGH On tHE right side of tHe screen: in sUCh a SituatIoN, we HAve an eXperiEnCE of The dot movinG froM left to riGht, whiLE in realITy nothiNg has mOveD siNce wE WeRe ActUaLLy sHOwN twO DifFerent doTs. buT, giveN the LIMITs of Our PercEptuaL capacities, we ExpErieNCe tHis "ilLusioN", likE iN the cAse of cInema, InDependently of thEre bEing a genuIne MoVemEnT in frONt of us Or nOt, aNd 10 For phIlosophICal DiSCUSsIons of these, see SchoLl (2007), pAUl (2010), benovsky (ForthcOMiNg_A). 11 IndependEnTly Of us KNOwing WhetHEr There is a MovemeNT iN fRont of uS oR not – thE aPpeAraNce of MOvemEnt perSists eveN when WE know that it is iLLusory. The impoRTaNT AdDItioNal Claim that PaUl (2010, p.16) rIGhtlY argUEs For IS that It is bEfORe WE have any conscious exPeRience That oUr perceptual sYstem – our reTINA, optic neRve, bRAiN, Etc. – on a neurologIcal bUt not on a phENomenal lEvel, iNterpretS the succeSSIve inputS it GetS frOm tHE WoRld in such a way AS To prOdUce a pheNomEnal expEriEncE as Of mOvEment. DainTon (2008b, §5) also EnDoRsEs ThiS claiM: "[Our brainS] tRy tO wOrk Out a sINgle, coHerenT verSiOn OF evEnts on tHE bASIs of ThE fRagmEntArY and (aT timES) coNflictiNg data avaIlaBLe to ThEm. only thiS 'final draft', as It Were, reacheS cOnsCiousnESS". This is aN important last step, becauSE what we TheN learN, as a CumulativE efFect of The COnsideRationS discUsSed IN This sECTiOn, iS tHat the contINUitY and uNiTy we ExperieNce (the kind we really HAve A phenomenal exPerIencE OF, tHat IS, tHE kiNd MEntIONed under (a) and (b) abOve) is sometHiNG wHich is entiREly, AnD continGently, dUe to tHE way our Brains are Built. Our bRaIns gET SenSory inputs From the wOrld, they iNTerprET tHem in VarIous waYs, And ProduCe consCIouS phenOmenal ExPerienCes whIcH are such That they embrace (very shorT) tempoRally ExtEnded inteRvaLS "at Once" (this iS the Specious prEseNt iNtuitIon), ANd sucH thaT ThEy aRE (or caN be
 series of experiences ofstatic ima ges ( oranex peri ence  of a series o f  sta tic images). And again , asbe f ore, th is is  someth i ng w hic his  en ti r el y due  to  the wa y our brai nsar e made. L. A .  P aul (2010)  fo cuses on thi s a spectof  ou r  expe rie nce o f move m ent, c alled "ap pa r ent mo t ion", w h e re  wehave an experienc e  a s  of movement w hen th er e  i s non e.Typical ex pe rimen t s inclu d ec a s esl ike a dot ona computers cre en whi ch  is shownon th el eft  side of th e sc reen andthen q u ickly e n ough on  the r igh t s ideo fth e s cr e en: in  su c h a  situati on ,we ha ve a n e x peri enc e of  thedot moving fr omleft toright , whi le i nreali ty not hingha s moved since w e we re actual lysh own  t wo di f ferent  do ts.  But, g iven th e  li mi t s of  our perceptual ca pa c i ti es, we e xperie n ce  t h is "illu si on" , li k e  in t he c a se  of cine ma, in d ep en dentlyof  there  b ein g a  genu i ne m ovemen t in fro nt of us or not, and 10 For philos o ph i c al disc uss ions of the se,s ee S chol l  ( 200 7 ), Pa ul (2 01 0 ), Benovsky (forthcomi ng _a). 1 1 ind ependently of  us knowin g w hether t here is a movement infront  of us orn ot – the  appe arance o f movemen t persists  ev enwhe n w e kn ow that it is i llus or y. Theimp ortantadd iti ona l c la im that P aul (201 0,  p .1 6)  ri ghtly argues f or  is  t hat  it i s  befor e wehave  a ny con sciouse xp e r ienc eth at o urpe rcept uals yst em – ou r retina,  op t ic n er ve , brain , etc. – on a  n eurologica lbut  not o n a phenom enal level, interpretst he succ ess ive i nput s it gets  fr om the  wo r ld insuch a  wayas  to p roduc e aphe no menal expe r i enc e asof  mov ement.Dainton (2008b, §5 )  al so endorses t his  cla i m :"[o u rb rai ns ]  tr y to work out a s ingle, coh er e nt  version o f  ev en ts on t he basi s oft he frag mentary a nd (at ti me s) c o n fli cting data  availab le to the m . Onl y  t his ' fin al dra ft ',as it  were, rea chesconsci ou sness" . Thi sis an im portant last step, beca use wh at we  th en learn,  as a c umulative  eff ect of the  co nsi derat ion s  disc usse d  i n t h is se ctio n , is that th e c o n ti nuity and u n i t y w e exp eri e nce (t he k ind we really hav e  a phenomenalexpe r i enc e o f , th at  is, the kindmen ti o n ed under  ( a) and (b)above) i ss ometh ing wh ich is  entire l y ,a nd con ting ent ly, due t o t he way our  b ra i ns are  bui lt . Ourbrains gets e nsory inputs fro m the w orld, the y int er pret th e m in  various w ays, and pr oducecons cious  phenom en al exp eri en ces whicha re such t hat t hey emb ra ce ( ver y shor t) t e m poral ly e xt end ed interv a l s" at  o n ce"  (th is is  t he s pecious p r esent in tui t ion), a nd  su c h  thatt he y are (or ca n b e
 series_of experiences_of static images (or_an experience_of_a series_of_static images). And_again, as before,_this is something which_is entirely due_to_the way our brains are made. L. A. Paul (2010) focuses on this aspect_of_our experience_of_movement,_called "apparent motion", where we_have an experience as of_movement when_there is none. Typical experiments include cases like_a_dot on a_computer screen which is shown on the left side_of the screen and then quickly_enough on the_right_side_of the screen: in_such a situation, we have an_experience of the dot moving from_left to right, while in reality nothing_has moved since we were actually_shown two different dots. But,_given the_limits of our perceptual capacities,_we experience this_"illusion", like_in the case_of cinema, independently of there being_a genuine movement_in front of us or not,_and_10 For philosophical_discussions_of_these, see_Scholl (2007), Paul_(2010),_Benovsky (forthcoming_a)._11_independently of us knowing whether there_is_a movement in front of us or_not – the appearance_of_movement persists even when_we know that it is_illusory. The important additional claim that_Paul (2010,_p.16) rightly_argues for is that it is before we have any conscious_experience that our perceptual system –_our retina, optic nerve,_brain, etc._–_on a neurological_but_not on_a phenomenal level, interprets the successive inputs_it gets_from the world in such a_way as to produce_a_phenomenal experience as of movement. Dainton_(2008b, §5) also endorses this claim:_"[our brains] try to work_out_a_single, coherent version of events_on the basis of the fragmentary_and (at times)_conflicting data available to them. Only this_'final_draft', as it were, reaches consciousness"._This_is an important last step, because_what_we_then learn, as a cumulative_effect of the considerations discussed in_this section, is that the continuity and unity we_experience (the kind_we really have a phenomenal_experience_of,_that is, the kind mentioned under (a) and (b) above)_is something_which is entirely,_and contingently, due to the way our brains are built._Our brains get sensory inputs from the_world, they interpret them in various ways, and produce conscious phenomenal_experiences which are such that they embrace (very_short) temporally extended intervals "at once" (this_is the specious present_intuition),_and such that they are (or can_be