W by an order ≿​D on ​W so that, for some ​D and for any two worlds w​1 and w​2​, w​1 ≿​D w​2 just in case w​1 fits D at least as well as w​2​. We say that w​1 is a strictly better fit for D than w​2​, w​1 ≻​D w​2​, just in case w​1 ≿​D w​2 but not w​2 ≿​D w​1​; and that w​1 and w​2 fit d equally well, w​1 ∼​D w​2​, just in case w​1 ≿​D w​2 and w​2​ ≿​D​ w​1​. With this model in hand, we can formulate a contrastivist version of Sharadin's sufficient condition for promotion. The most straightforward way of doing so contrasts 35 the fit between desire and world in the closest possible worlds in which the agent performs the contrasted actions φ and ψ respectively. Thus, where w​φ stands for the 36 (closest) world that would be realized were the agent to φ and w​ψ stands for the (closest) world that would be realized were the agent to perform some contrasted action ψ, we have: Contrastive Fit​: Agent A's φ-ing rather than ψ-ing promotes the satisfaction of D if w​φ​ ≻​D​ w​ψ​. Contrastive Fit yields the intuitively correct verdict in cases such as the one involving desire EA above. For notice that, on the plausible assumption that a world where less of your desires are satisfied (w​φ​) exhibits a higher degree of fit with the desire to have none ​of your desires satisfied than the world where more of your desires are satisfied (w​ψ​), taking the desire-frustration pill (φ-ing) rather than taking the placebo (ψ-ing) promotes the satisfaction of your desire to have none of your desires satisfied (EA). But Contrastive Fit, if taken as a necessary condition on promotion as well as a sufficient condition, yields the ​incorrect results in cases like the simple lottery case. For notice that, on the plausible assumption that the closest world where you still have the 35 I.e. a contrastivist modification of what Sharadin calls "Fit-Promote" (Sharadin
W by an order ≿​D on ​W so that, for some ​D and for any two worlds w​1 and w​2​, w​1 ≿​D w​2 just in subject w​1 equip D at least equally well as w​2​. We say that w​1 is a rigorously better fit for D than w​2​, w​1 ≻​D w​2​, just in character w​1 ≿​D w​2 but not w​2 ≿​D w​1​; and that w​1 and w​2 equip d equally well, w​1 ∼​D w​2​, merely in case w​1 ≿​D w​2 and w​2​ ≿​D​ w​1​. With this model in bridge player, we can formulate a contrastivist version of Sharadin's sufficient circumstance for promotion. The most square way of doing thus contrasts 35 the fit between desire and world in the close possible worlds in which the agent performs the contrast actions φ and ψ respectively. Thus, where w​φ stands for the 36 (closest) world that would be understand were the agent to φ and w​ψ stands for the (closest) world that would be realized were the agentive role to do some contrast action ψ, we have: Contrastive Fit​: Agent A's φ - ing rather than ψ - ing promotes the satisfaction of D if w​φ​ ≻​D​ w​ψ​. Contrastive Fit yields the intuitively correct verdict in subject such as the one involving desire EA above. For notice that, on the plausible assumption that a populace where less of your desires are satisfied (w​φ​) exhibits a high degree of fit with the desire to have none ​of your desires satisfied than the populace where more of your desires are satisfied (w​ψ​), taking the desire - frustration pill (φ - ing) rather than taking the placebo (ψ - ing) promotes the atonement of your desire to have none of your desires satisfied (EA). But Contrastive Fit, if taken as a necessary condition on forwarding as well as a sufficient circumstance, yields the ​incorrect results in cases like the simple lottery case. For notice that, on the plausible premise that the closest world where you still take the 35 I.e. a contrastivist modification of what Sharadin calls " Fit - Promote " (Sharadin
W bj an order ≿​D on ​W so thau, for some ​D and yir any two wkrlds w​1 xnd w​2​, w​1 ≿​D w​2 just in case w​1 fmts E at oeast as well as w​2​. We ray that a​1 is a srriculy better fit foc D than w​2​, w​1 ≻​D a​2​, juvv in case w​1 ≿​D w​2 but not w​2 ≿​D w​1​; and that f​1 xnb w​2 fit d equally well, w​1 ∼​D w​2​, just in case w​1 ≿​D w​2 and w​2​ ≿​D​ w​1​. Wyth uhif mosvl in hand, we can formulate a ckntrastpvist version of Xharadin's sufficient condihion for promotion. The most straithtfjeward way of doing so bmntrasts 35 jhe fit between desire and world in tke closest koasltle worlds mn whibh the agent ivrforms the comtrasted actioks φ aid ψ eespectively. Thus, whece w​φ stands for the 36 (closest) foxld that would be reaoized wgre tve aewnt to φ end w​ψ stajds for the (cmosest) worle that would be reakisvc were the afent tj [erform some contrasted action ψ, we have: Cohtrastive Fit​: Agent A's φ-ung rather than ψ-ing ptomotes thq satisfaction of D if w​φ​ ≻​D​ w​ψ​. Contrastive Fit yielgs thx kntblbiveut forrect verdict in cases such as the one invojbimg desire EA aboye. For notice that, oj yre plausible xssumpcjoh that a world whege less of yiur desirts arr satisfied (w​φ​) exhibits a hither degree jd fit with the desnre to have uone ​og yout desires satisfied thau the sorld where more of guur desires are ratpsfiad (w​ψ​), taking the desire-fruseration pmll (φ-iug) rathef thsn takyng the plwcebo (ψ-ing) promotes the swtisfcctiot of your fesire to have none of your desmces satisfied (ED). Blt Contraftive Fit, if taken as a necessari conditijn on promotion as weln as a suffycient condithln, yields thx ​incorrest rwsulrs in cxres like the somple lotnexy case. Fir notice that, on bhe puzusible assumptnub that the closrst wowlf xhere fou still haee tfe 35 O.e. a zontrasunviwg mocification of what Svarasin calls "Fit-Promoye" (Sharadib
W by an order ≿​D on ​W for ​D and any two worlds w​2 in case w​1 D at least well as w​2​. We say that is a strictly better fit for D than w​2​, w​1 ≻​D w​2​, just case w​1 ≿​D w​2 but not w​2 ≿​D w​1​; and that w​1 and fit equally w​1 w​2​, just in case w​1 ≿​D w​2 and w​2​ ≿​D​ w​1​. With this model in hand, can formulate a contrastivist version of Sharadin's sufficient for promotion. The most way of doing so contrasts the between desire world the possible worlds in the agent performs the contrasted actions φ and ψ respectively. Thus, where w​φ stands for the 36 world that realized were agent φ w​ψ stands for world that would be realized were perform some contrasted action ψ, we have: Contrastive Agent A's rather than ψ-ing promotes the satisfaction D if w​φ​ ≻​D​ w​ψ​. Contrastive Fit yields intuitively correct verdict in cases such as the one involving desire EA above. For notice the plausible assumption that world where less your are (w​φ​) a higher of fit with the desire to have none ​of your desires than the world where more of your desires are satisfied the pill (φ-ing) rather taking the placebo (ψ-ing) the of your desire to of desires Contrastive if as a necessary condition promotion as well as a condition, yields the ​incorrect simple lottery case. For notice that, on the assumption that the closest world where you have the 35 I.e. a contrastivist modification of what Sharadin calls "Fit-Promote"
W by an order ≿​D on ​W so that, for soMe ​D and for aNy two WorLds W​1 aNd w​2​, w​1 ≿​d w​2 juSt in case w​1 fits D AT leaSt as well as w​2​. We say that w​1 iS a strIcTLy beTTeR fit fOr D than W​2​, W​1 ≻​D W​2​, JUst In CaSe w​1 ≿​d w​2 BUt Not w​2 ≿​D W​1​; anD that w​1 aNd w​2 fit d equAllY wEll, w​1 ∼​D w​2​, just in CAsE w​1 ≿​D w​2 and w​2​ ≿​D​ w​1​. witH this model in HanD, we can FoRmuLAte a cOntRastiVist veRSion of sharadin's SuFFicienT ConditiON FoR proMotion. The most straIGhTForward way of doIng so cOnTRaSTS 35 thE fiT between deSiRe and WOrld in tHE cLOSEst POssible worlds In which the aGEnt PerforMs The COntrasTed acTiONs φ And ψ respectIvelY. Thus, wherE w​φ staNDs for thE 36 (Closest) World tHat WouLd be REaLiZed WeRE thE AgEnt TO φ aNd w​ψ stanDs FoR the (cLoseST) WORld tHat WoulD be reAlized were the AgeNt to PErfOrm soMe conTrasTeD actiOn ψ, we hAve: CoNtRastive Fit​: Agent a's φ-iNg rather tHan Ψ-iNg pRoMotes THe satiSfaCtiOn of D if W​φ​ ≻​D​ w​ψ​. CoNTraStIVE fiT yields the intuitivElY COrRect verdIct in cASeS sUCh as the oNe InvOlviNG DesirE EA aBOvE. For notiCe that, ON tHe PlausibLe AssumpTiOn tHat A worlD WherE less oF your desIres aRE satisfied (w​φ​) exHIbits a higher dEGrEE Of FIt wiTh tHe desire to hAve nONe ​of Your DEsIreS SatisFied tHaN ThE World where more of youR dEsires Are saTisfied (w​ψ​), takiNg the desirE-FRUstratioN pilL (Φ-iNG) rather than takIng thE placebo (ψ-iNG) promoteS the sAtisfactIon of your DESire to haVe nOne Of yOur DESiRes satisfied (Ea). bUt CoNtRastive fit, If taken As a NecEssAry CoNdition on PromotioN aS wElL aS a sUfficIEnt condiTiOn, yIeLds The ​inCOrrect ResulTs in CaSeS LikE the simPLe LOTterY cAsE. For NotIcE that, On thE PlaUsible aSsumption ThaT The cLoSeSt world Where you still HaVe the 35 I.e. a coNtRasTivist MODificatiOn of what Sharadin calls "FiT-promote" (shaRadin
W by an order ≿​D on ​W so  that, for  some  ​D  an dforanytwo worlds w​1 andw​2​, w​1 ≿​D w​2 just  in c as e  w​1 fi ts Dat leas t  a s wel las  w​ 2​ .  W e say  th at w​1is a stric tly  b etter fit fo r  D  than w​2​ , w ​1 ≻​D w​2​,  ju st inca sew ​1 ≿​ D w ​2 bu t notw ​2 ≿​D  w​1​; an dt hat w​ 1  and w​ 2 fi t dequally well, w​1 ∼​ D  w​2​, just in  casew​ 1  ≿ ​ D  w​ 2 a nd w​2​ ≿​ D​  w​1​ .  With t h is m o del in hand, we c an formulat e  acontra st ivi s t vers ion o fS har adin's suff icie nt condit ion fo r  promot i on. The  moststr aig htfo r wa rd  wa yo f d o in g s o  co ntrasts35  t he fi t be t w e e n de sir e an d wor ld in the clo ses t po s sib le wo rldsin w hi ch th e agen t per fo rms the contras tedactions φ  an dψ r es pecti v ely. T hus , w here w​ φ stand s  fo rt h e  3 6 (closest) worldth a t  w ould berealiz e dwe r e the ag en t t o φa n d w​ψ  sta n ds  for the  (clos e st )world t ha t woul dberea lized were  the a gent toperfo r m some contras t ed action ψ,w eh a ve :  Con tra stive Fit​:  Age n t A' s φ- i ng  ra t her t han ψ -i n gp romotes the satisfa ct ion of  D if  w​φ​ ≻​D​ w​ ψ​. Contra s t i ve Fit y ield s  t h e intuitivelycorre ct verdict in cases  such  as theone invol v i ng desir e E A a bov e.F o rnotice that,o n  the  p lausibl e a ssumpti ontha t a  wo rl d where l ess of y ou rde si res  ares atisfied  ( w​φ ​)  ex hibit s  a hig her d egre eof fit  with t h ed e sire  t ohave  no ne  ​ofyour des ires sa tisfied t han thewo rl d where  more of your  d esires are  s ati sfied( w ​ψ​), ta king the desire-frustra t ion pil l ( φ-ing ) ra ther than  ta king t hep lacebo  (ψ-in g) pr om ote s the s a t is fac ti on of your d esi re to  h avenone of  your desires sati s fie d (EA). But C ont rast i v eFit ,  i f  ta ke n  as a  necessary cond ition on p ro m ot ion as wel l  as  a  suffic ient co nditi o n, yiel ds the ​i ncorrectre sult s incases like  the sim ple lotte r y cas e .For n oti ce tha t,  on  theplausi b leassum ptionth at the  clos es t worldwhere you still have th e 35 I .e. a  co ntrastivi stm odi ficationof w hat Sharad incal ls "F it- P romot e" ( S ha rad i n
W by_an order_≿​D on ​W so_that, for_some_​D and_for_any two worlds_w​1 and w​2​,_w​1 ≿​D w​2 just_in case w​1_fits_D at least as well as w​2​. We say that w​1 is a strictly_better_fit for_D_than_w​2​, w​1 ≻​D w​2​, just_in case w​1 ≿​D w​2_but not_w​2 ≿​D w​1​; and that w​1 and w​2_fit_d equally well,_w​1 ∼​D w​2​, just in case w​1 ≿​D w​2_and w​2​ ≿​D​ w​1​. With this_model in hand,_we_can_formulate a contrastivist version_of Sharadin's sufficient condition for promotion._The most straightforward way of doing_so contrasts 35 the fit between desire_and world in the closest possible_worlds in which the agent_performs the_contrasted actions φ and ψ_respectively. Thus, where_w​φ stands_for the 36_(closest) world that would be realized_were the agent_to φ and w​ψ stands for_the_(closest) world that_would_be_realized were_the agent to_perform_some contrasted_action_ψ, we have: Contrastive Fit​: Agent_A's_φ-ing rather than ψ-ing promotes the satisfaction_of D if w​φ​_≻​D​_w​ψ​. Contrastive Fit yields_the intuitively correct verdict in_cases such as the one involving_desire EA_above. For_notice that, on the plausible assumption that a world where less_of your desires are satisfied (w​φ​)_exhibits a higher degree_of fit_with_the desire to_have_none ​of_your desires satisfied than the world where_more of_your desires are satisfied (w​ψ​), taking_the desire-frustration pill (φ-ing)_rather_than taking the placebo (ψ-ing) promotes_the satisfaction of your desire to_have none of your desires_satisfied_(EA)._But Contrastive Fit, if taken_as a necessary condition on promotion_as well as_a sufficient condition, yields the ​incorrect results_in_cases like the simple lottery case._For_notice that, on the plausible assumption_that_the_closest world where you still_have the 35 I.e. a contrastivist_modification of what Sharadin calls "Fit-Promote" (Sharadin