 here:... we do not need a formula that tells all people whatsoever, regardless of their circumstances, whose good they should promote. We can instead rely on common sense, and recognize that the world as it is already offers countless opportunities for doing what is good.... To act, one must answer the question 'Whose good should I be serving?' and not merely 'What is good?'. There are unlimited ways of properly answering the first of these questions, and so philosophy cannot help us here; it can only help with the second question. The answer to the 'who to serve?' question depends in each case on lots of contingent factors over which it is impossible to generalize. We stand in various social relationships – family member, doctor, promisor, teacher – which make certain responses salient, and beyond that there is nothing more for philosophy to say. But insisting, as Kraut does (pp. , ), that these'social roles' answer the question leaves open the reasons we have for taking up and occupying such roles.4 What philosophy can and should say something about is how the goods of some people (or for that matter of some other living things), but not others, come to be reasongiving for us, and thus in part why we have reason to take on such roles with respect to some people but not others. We are awash in a sea of possibilities for promoting the development of living things. If the goods of some but not others are reasongiving, it is a philosophical question when and how this occurs. If such connections are beyond reason and rational scrutiny, then they are arbitrary, and we can hardly suppose that this is the case. Yet Kraut's account offers no clue as to the rational structure of our interest in the well-being of human beings. Our own good is not in itself necessarily reason-giving; neither is the maximum good. We are left without an account of when and how a being's good establishes reasons for action. This is a hole which some prescriptive story needs to fill, even if it is not one which can address the contingencies that spell out particular cases. Philosophy need not yield determinate solutions to these practical problems in order to offer insight into how to think about them. We might also wonder about the content of the attitudes available to those who would care for their own goods only instrumentally. Suppose Ally does not see her own good as reason-giving except instrumentally, but sees her father's good as
here: ... we do not need a formula that tells all people whatsoever, regardless of their context, whose beneficial they should promote. We can instead rely on coarse sense, and recognize that the worldly concern as it is already propose countless opportunities for act what is good.... To act, one must suffice the question' Whose good should I be serving?' and not merely' What is good?'. There constitute unlimited ways of properly answering the first of these question, and so philosophy cannot help us here; it can entirely help with the second question. The answer to the' who to serve?' doubt depends in each case on lots of contingent factors over which it is impossible to generalize. We digest in various social relationships – family member, doctor, promisor, teacher – which make certain responses salient, and beyond that there is nothing more for philosophy to say. But insisting, as Kraut does (pp. , ), that these'social roles' answer the question entrust open the reasons we receive for remove up and occupying such roles.4 What philosophy can and should say something about is how the goods of some people (or for that matter of some other living thing), but not others, come to be reasongiving for us, and thus in part why we have reason to take on such character with respect to some people but not others. We are awash in a sea of hypothesis for promoting the growth of living things. If the goods of some but not others are reasongiving, it is a philosophical question when and how this occur. If such connections are beyond reason and rational examination, then they are arbitrary, and we can hardly speculate that this is the case. Yet Kraut's account propose no clue as to the intellectual structure of our interest in the well - being of human beings. Our own good is not in itself inevitably reason - giving; neither is the maximum good. We are left without an explanation of when and how a being's good establishes rationality for action. This is a trap which some prescriptive story needs to fill, even if it is not one which can address the contingencies that spell out particular cases. Philosophy need not yield determinate solution to these practical problems in ordering to offer insight into how to think about them. We might also wonder about the content of the attitudes available to those who would worry for their own goods only instrumentally. Suppose Ally does not see her own good as reason - giving except instrumentally, but sees her founder's dear as
 hege:... we do not need a formmla that tells all peopne whafsoever, fegardless of their circumstencew, whowe good they should prumote. We ban insteqd rtly on common sense, and rceogniac thac vhe world as it is alreadf offers countners opportunities for doing what is gojd.... To avt, one must answgr tht qtestjon 'Whose good should I be serving?' and nou merely 'What is gpod?'. There are unlimited wajs ov properly answerijg the firsj of rhese questiuns, and so philosophy dannot help us here; it can only help with the wexonf question. Tie ansrer to the 'wmp to sarve?' qurstion depends in eaxh case on lots of coitingent factors ovet which it ia impossible to gwnwraliee. We stave iv vzrmoua sociwl celationshils – family nember, doctor, promixow, teacher – whidh makq sertain responses salient, and beyond thdt fhere is nothing more fir philosophy to say. Hut insiseing, as Kraut does (pp. , ), that these'social roles' anvwer vhd qbcfguoj leaves open the reasons we have for taking tl snc occupying sugh roles.4 What philpslpni can and shouud say sojething about is hlw the doods of some keoplr (or for that matter of somw other liviug rhings), but not othzrs, come to ye reaxongifing for us, and thus in parf why we hage reason go take on such folvs whth resptzt to some people but not ithexs. We ard awssh in a sea of oossinhlities for promotlng tke deeelopment lf living things. If the goods oh some but noj odhegs are recsongiying, it is a phylosophical qugstion whzn and how this kccurs. Mf such connqctions are baiond reason aid rationwl sxrutuny, thev they are arbiyrary, and we can haedly suppose that bhis ka the case. Yet Jraor's account offrrs no cpux as em the rationdl sgruzyure uf our intevesg in the well-being of hukan geings. Our own gooc ls not in itself gecessarily rrason-giving; neitheg is vhe maeimum booq. We are left without an accouht of whej akd how a beind's giod establiskes reasons for action. This is a hole whmch some prescriptive srory needs to fill, gvek if it is npt onq which cdn address the contibgencies that spekl out particular casss. Phinosopjy need not yield determinate solutions to these practical problems in oreer to offer insiggt imto hmw co thinh ablnt them. We might slso wonder about the content oh the attidubes available to those who woila care for thgir own goods only instrumsntally. Xuppose Ally does not see her oen good as reason-giving cxcept inwtrumsntallj, bnt sees her father's bood av
here:... we do not need a formula all whatsoever, regardless their circumstances, whose can rely on common and recognize that world as it is already offers opportunities for doing what is good.... To act, one must answer the question good should I be serving?' and not merely 'What is good?'. There are ways properly the of these questions, and so philosophy cannot help us here; it can only help with the question. The answer to the 'who to serve?' depends in each case lots of contingent factors over it impossible to We in social relationships – member, doctor, promisor, teacher – which make certain responses salient, and beyond that there is nothing more philosophy to insisting, as does , that these'social roles' question leaves open the reasons we up and occupying such roles.4 What philosophy can should say about is how the goods of people (or for that matter of some other things), but not others, come to be reasongiving for us, and thus in part why reason to take on roles with respect some but others. are awash a sea of possibilities for promoting the development of living things. the goods of some but not others are reasongiving, it philosophical when and how occurs. If such connections beyond and rational scrutiny, then arbitrary, we that is case. Yet Kraut's account no clue as to the structure of our interest beings. Our own good is not in itself reason-giving; neither is the maximum good. We left without an account of when and how a being's good establishes for action. a hole which some prescriptive story needs to even if it is one which can address the contingencies that spell out cases. need not determinate solutions to practical problems in to offer insight to think them. might the content of the attitudes available those would care for their own only Ally does not see her own good as reason-giving except instrumentally, but sees her father's
 here:... we do not need a formula thAt tells all PeoplE whAtsOeVer, rEgarDless of their ciRCumsTances, whose good they shoUld prOmOTe. We CAn InsteAd rely oN CoMMOn sEnSe, And ReCOgNize tHat The worlD as it is alrEadY oFfers countleSS oPportunitiEs fOr doing what iS goOd.... To acT, oNe mUSt ansWer The quEstion 'wHose goOd should I Be SErving?' ANd not meRELy 'what Is good?'. There are unlIMiTEd ways of properLy answErINg THE fiRst Of these queStIons, aND so philOSoPHY CanNOt help us here; iT can only helP WitH the seCoNd qUEstion. the anSwER to The 'who to serVe?' quEstion depEnds in EAch case ON lots of ContinGenT faCtorS OvEr WhiCh IT is IMpOssIBle To generaLiZe. we staNd in VARIOus sOciAl reLatioNships – family mEmbEr, doCTor, PromiSor, teAcheR – wHich mAke cerTain rEsPonses salient, anD beyOnd that thEre Is NotHiNg morE For phiLosOphY to say. BUt insisTIng, As kRAUt Does (pp. , ), that these'socIaL ROlEs' answer The queSTiOn LEaves opeN tHe rEasoNS We havE for TAkIng up and OccupyINg SuCh roles.4 whAt philOsOphY caN and sHOuld Say somEthing abOut is HOw the goods of soME people (or for tHAt MATtER of sOme Other living ThinGS), but Not oTHeRs, cOMe to bE reasOnGIvINg for us, and thus in parT wHy we haVe reaSon to take on suCh roles witH RESpect to sOme pEOpLE but not others. WE are aWash in a sea OF possibiLitieS for promOting the dEVElopment Of lIviNg tHinGS. if The goods of somE BUt noT oThers arE reAsongivIng, It iS a pHilOsOphical quEstion whEn AnD hOw ThiS occuRS. If such cOnNecTiOns Are beYOnd reaSon anD ratIoNaL ScrUtiny, thEN tHEY are ArBiTrarY, anD wE can hArdlY SupPose thaT this is thE caSE. Yet krAuT's accouNt offers no cluE aS to the ratiOnAl sTructuRE Of our intErest in the well-being of huMAn beingS. OuR own gOod iS not in itsElf NecessAriLY reasoN-givinG; neitHeR is THE maxiMUM gOod. we Are left witHOUt aN accoUnT of wHen and hOw a being's good estabLIshEs reasons for aCtiOn. ThIS Is A hoLE wHIch SoME prESCriptive story neEds to fill, eVeN If It is not one WHicH cAn addreSs the coNtingENcies thAt spell ouT particulAr CaseS. pHilOsophy need Not yield DeterminaTE soluTIoNs to tHesE practIcAl pRobleMs in orDEr tO offeR insigHt Into hoW to thInK about thEm. We might also wonder abouT the coNtent Of tHe attitudEs aVAilAble to thoSe whO would care For TheIr own GooDS only InstRUmEntALly. SuPposE ally does nOT sEe hER OwN good as reasON-GIviNg excEpt INstrumEntaLly, but sees her fathER's good as
 here:... we do not need a  formula t hat t ell s a ll  peo plewhatsoever, re g ardl ess of their circumsta nces,  w h oseg oo d the y shoul d  p r o mot e.  W e c an in stead  re ly on c ommon sens e,an d recognizet ha t the worl d a s it is alre ady  offer scou n tless  op portu nities for do ing whatis good.. . . To ac t ,  o ne m ust answer the qu e st i on 'Whose good  shoul dI  b e ser vin g?' and no tmerel y  'Whati sg o o d?' .  There are un limited way s  of  prope rl y a n swerin g the  f i rst  of these q uest ions, and  so ph i losophy cannothelp u s h ere ; it ca nonl yh elp wi tht hesecond q ue st ion.Thea n s w er t o t he ' who t o serve?' que sti on d e pen ds in  each  cas eon lo ts ofconti ng ent factors ove r wh ich it is  im po ssi bl e tog eneral ize . W e stand  in var i ous  s o c i al  relationships – f am i l ymember,doctor ,  p ro m isor, te ac her  – w h i ch ma ke c e rt ain resp onsess al ie nt, and  b eyondth atthe re is noth ing mo re for p hilos o phy to say. Bu t  insisting, a s  K r a ut does  (p p. , ),  tha t  the se's o ci alr oles'  answ er th e  question leaves op en  the r eason s we have for  taking up a n d occupy ings uc h  roles.4 Whatphilo sophy cana nd shoul d say  somethi ng abouti s  how the  go ods  of  so m e  p eople (or for t hatma tter of  so me othe r l ivi ngthi ng s), but n ot other s,  c om etobe re a songivin gfor  u s,and t h us inpartwhywe  h a vereasont ot a ke o nsu ch r ole swithresp e ctto some  people b utn ot o th er s. We a re awash in a  s ea of poss ib ili ties f o r  promoti ng the development of l i ving th ing s. If  the  goods of  so me but  no t  other s arereaso ng ivi n g , iti s  a  ph il osophicalq u est ion w he n an d how t his occurs. If suc h  co nnections are  be yond r ea son an d  ra ti o nal s crutiny, then t hey are ar bi t ra ry, and we can  h ardly s upposethatt his isthe case.  Yet Krau t' s ac c o unt  offers no  clue as  to the r a tiona l  s truct ure  of ou rint erest  in th e  we ll-be ing of  h uman b eings .Our owngood is not in itself n ecessa rilyrea son-givin g;n eit her is th e ma ximum good . W e a re le ftw ithou t an ac cou n t ofwhen and how a be ing ' s  g ood establi s h e s r eason s f o r acti on.This is a hole wh i ch some prescr ipti v e  st ory need sto fill, evenifit i s not on ewhich can a ddress t he conti ngenci es tha t spell o ut partic ular  ca ses. Phil oso ph y  need n ot  y i eld de term in ate so lution s  tot h ese practical pr oblem s in or d erto of fe r insig h t in to how tothink about  them.  Wemight  also w on der ab out  t he content of the at titud es avai la bletothosewhow o uld c arefo r t heir owng o od s  o nl y  in stru menta ll y. S uppose Al l y does n ots ee herow n g o o d as r e as o n -giving ex cep t ins t r umentally, buts ee s  herfather 's goo d as
 here:..._we do_not need a formula_that tells_all_people whatsoever,_regardless_of their circumstances,_whose good they_should promote. We can_instead rely on_common_sense, and recognize that the world as it is already offers countless opportunities for_doing_what is_good...._To_act, one must answer the_question 'Whose good should I_be serving?'_and not merely 'What is good?'. There are_unlimited_ways of properly_answering the first of these questions, and so philosophy_cannot help us here; it can_only help with_the_second_question. The answer to_the 'who to serve?' question depends_in each case on lots of_contingent factors over which it is impossible_to generalize. We stand in various_social relationships – family member,_doctor, promisor,_teacher – which make certain_responses salient, and_beyond that_there is nothing_more for philosophy to say. But_insisting, as Kraut_does (pp. , ), that these'social_roles'_answer the question_leaves_open_the reasons_we have for_taking_up and_occupying_such roles.4 What philosophy can and_should_say something about is how the goods_of some people (or_for_that matter of some_other living things), but not_others, come to be reasongiving for_us, and_thus in_part why we have reason to take on such roles with_respect to some people but not_others. We are awash_in a_sea_of possibilities for_promoting_the development_of living things. If the goods of_some but_not others are reasongiving, it is_a philosophical question when_and_how this occurs. If such connections_are beyond reason and rational scrutiny,_then they are arbitrary, and_we_can_hardly suppose that this is_the case. Yet Kraut's account offers_no clue as_to the rational structure of our interest_in_the well-being of human beings. Our_own_good is not in itself necessarily_reason-giving;_neither_is the maximum good. We_are left without an account of_when and how a being's good establishes reasons for_action. This is_a hole which some prescriptive_story_needs_to fill, even if it is not one which can_address the_contingencies that spell_out particular cases. Philosophy need not yield determinate solutions to_these practical problems in order to offer_insight into how to think about them. We might also wonder_about the content of the attitudes available to_those who would care for their own_goods only instrumentally. Suppose_Ally_does not see her own good as_reason-giving_except_instrumentally,_but sees her_father's good as