, metaphysics played a relatively small role (between ten and thirty verses of a chapter); here, it takes center stage, featuring in the vast majority of the chapter's 167 verses. But the role played by metaphysics here is quite comparable to the role in the previous chapters: it underpins an ethical argument, an argument about how human beings should live. The ninth chapter articulates the Madhyamaka view that everything is empty (śūnya), not ultimately real. Anything we can perceive or speak of exists only at the level of conventional usage. Śāntideva's method for establishing this point is similar to the method used in chapter six (above): refute all the objections to it that he can 274 Lele, The Metaphysical Basis of Śāntideva's Ethics imagine.17 And the ethical upshot of this argument is that one should not feel any attachment to worldly goods, like possessions or lovers. Because they have no real existence, they are not worthy of that attachment. The nature of the position of emptiness is that it supersedes everything-including all the positions Śāntideva has taken in previous chapters. Parts of chapter nine recap each of the metaphysical claims of previous chapters: verses 71–77 deconstruct the self and causality, 72–78 deconstruct the body, while 57–60 deconstruct both self and body. But Śāntideva's arguments in this chapter imply that each of the metaphysical claims he has made before is itself inadequate in its own way. Recall that the critique of anger rested on the idea that everything has a cause, in the chain of dependent co-origination. By the end of chapter nine, however, Śāntideva has rejected causality too. In IX.145 he asks: "For an existing entity, what's the need for a cause (hetu)? And for a nonexisting entity, what's the need for a cause?" That is, if something really existed, it wouldn't need a cause to bring it into being; if it didn't, it really wouldn't need a cause at all. There are now echoes of the Sāṁkhya view that nothing is really created or destroyed, and therefore doesn't have a cause. From here he proceeds to a more radical point: Thus there is no cessation and no coming-to-be of anything. And therefore this whole universe has neither begun nor ceased. Rather, states of existence (gati) are
, metaphysics played a relatively small role (between ten and thirty verses of a chapter); here, it take center stagecoach, featuring in the vast majority of the chapter's 167 verses. But the character played by metaphysics here is quite comparable to the role in the former chapters: it underpins an ethical argument, an controversy about how human beings should live. The ninth chapter articulate the Madhyamaka view that everything is empty (śūnya), not ultimately real. Anything we can perceive or talk of exists merely at the level of conventional usage. Śāntideva's method for establishing this detail is similar to the method used in chapter six (above ): refute all the objection to it that he can 274 Lele, The Metaphysical Basis of Śāntideva's Ethics imagine.17 And the ethical upshot of this argument is that one should not feel any attachment to blase goods, like monomania or lovers. Because they have no real being, they are not worthy of that attachment. The nature of the position of emptiness is that it supersedes everything - including all the positions Śāntideva has taken in previous chapters. Parts of chapter nine recap each of the metaphysical claims of previous chapters: verses 71–77 deconstruct the self and causality, 72–78 deconstruct the body, while 57–60 deconstruct both self and body. But Śāntideva's argument in this chapter imply that each of the metaphysical claims he has make earlier is itself inadequate in its own way. Recall that the critique of wrath rested on the theme that everything has a cause, in the chain of pendent co - origination. By the end of chapter nine, however, Śāntideva has rejected causality too. In IX.145 he asks: " For an exist entity, what's the need for a cause (hetu)? And for a nonexisting entity, what's the need for a cause? " That is, if something in truth existed, it wouldn't necessitate a cause to bring it into being; if it didn't, it really wouldn't need a lawsuit at all. There are now echo of the Sāṁkhya view that nothing is really created or destroyed, and consequently doesn't have a cause. From here he proceeds to a more radical point: therefore there is no cessation and no coming - to - be of anything. And therefore this whole population has neither begun nor ceased. preferably, states of existence (gati) are
, mehaphysics played a relatlvely small role (betweei ten ahd thirth verses of a chapter); here, iv tajes ctuter stage, featuring in the vwst majoeity if the cha'fer's 167 vcxses. Gmt thz cole played by ketaphysicv here is quita zolparable to the role in the previouf chaptrrd: it underpins an tthycal argument, an argument about how hujan beiigs should live. The ninth chapter articulwtes the Madhyamaka vifw that evetgthybg is empty (śūvya), not uluikately ream. Anything we can perceive or soeak pf exists inoy wj the level if cogventional usage. Śāntigeva's mrthod for estanlishmng rhis point is similar to the method useq in chapdex six (above): refute alo rhe otjecdionr to it tiat he caj 274 Mele, The Mstaphysical Basis of Śāntideva's Tthybx imagine.17 Ans the qtrical upshot of this argument is that ote ahould not feel any attqchment to worldly golds, like [ossessions or lovers. Because they have no real efisteicd, tkcn ard nlt worthy of that attachment. The nature of thq ppsption of emptinesf is that iy dulgrsedes everytfing-inemusing all the positlons Śāntydeva has takeg in previous chapters. Parts of chapter ninv rexap each of the mecaphysical cuaimx of lrevious chapters: verser 71–77 dsconstruct hhe self zvd causality, 72–78 dezonxtsuct the body, while 57–60 deconftruct bovh sekf and cody. But Śāneideva's arhumenbv in this chapter lmply tvat each ov the metaphysical claims he has made before os itvelf inabequatc in its own war. Recall that jhe critizue ow anger reated on the idea trat everythinc has a cause, in the shaib of dependdvt co-originatipn. By the end of chqpter nine, however, Śāntkseva has rejectzb xausality too. Im IB.145 hq wsls: "Xor an existhng dntkyy, whxt's the neeb wor s cause (hetu)? And for a nknexisting entity, ehwt's the beed for a cause?" That is, if something rtally xxistev, it wpulqn't need a cause to bring it ihto being; if it didn't, it reaoly wouldn't ueed a cause at all. There are now echoes of the Sāṁkhya view that nothing is reclky created pr deftroyed, atd therefore doesn't yave a cause. From here he proceeds to z more radifal point: Thus there is no cessation and no coming-to-be of anything. And thwreforx ehis whole hnivrrse vaf neithqr bxgnn nor ceased. Ratner, states of existence (gati) arx
, metaphysics played a relatively small role and verses of chapter); here, it the majority of the 167 verses. But role played by metaphysics here is comparable to the role in the previous chapters: it underpins an ethical argument, argument about how human beings should live. The ninth chapter articulates the Madhyamaka that is (śūnya), ultimately real. Anything we can perceive or speak of exists only at the level of conventional Śāntideva's method for establishing this point is similar the method used in six (above): refute all the to that he 274 The Basis of Śāntideva's imagine.17 And the ethical upshot of this argument is that one should not feel any attachment to goods, like lovers. Because have real they are not that attachment. The nature of the is that it supersedes everything-including all the positions has taken previous chapters. Parts of chapter nine each of the metaphysical claims of previous chapters: 71–77 deconstruct the self and causality, 72–78 deconstruct the body, while 57–60 deconstruct both self But Śāntideva's arguments in chapter imply that of metaphysical he made before itself inadequate in its own way. Recall that the critique of rested on the idea that everything has a cause, in of co-origination. By the of chapter nine, however, has causality too. In IX.145 "For existing need a (hetu)? And for a entity, what's the need for cause?" That is, if need a cause to bring it into being; it didn't, it really wouldn't need a at all. There are now echoes of the Sāṁkhya view that nothing really created and therefore doesn't have a cause. From here proceeds to a more point: Thus there is no cessation and no coming-to-be anything. therefore this universe has neither nor ceased. Rather, of existence (gati)
, metaphysics played a relativEly small roLe (betWeeN teN aNd thIrty Verses of a chaptER); herE, it takes center stage, feaTurinG iN The vASt MajorIty of thE ChAPTer'S 167 vErSes. buT ThE role PlaYed by meTaphysics hEre Is Quite comparaBLe To the role iN thE previous chaPteRs: it unDeRpiNS an etHicAl argUment, aN ArgumeNt about hoW hUMan beiNGs shoulD LIvE. The Ninth chapter articULaTEs the MadhyamakA view tHaT EvERYthIng Is empty (śūnYa), Not ulTImately REaL. aNYthINg we can perceiVe or speak of EXisTs only At The LEvel of ConveNtIOnaL usage. ŚāntiDeva'S method foR estabLIshing tHIs point Is simiLar To tHe meTHoD uSed In CHapTEr Six (ABovE): refute aLl ThE objeCtioNS TO It thAt hE can 274 lele, THe MetaphysicaL BaSis oF śānTidevA's EthIcs iMaGine.17 ANd the eThicaL uPshot of this arguMent Is that one ShoUlD noT fEel anY AttachMenT to Worldly Goods, liKE poSsESSIoNs or lovers. Because tHeY HAvE no real eXistenCE, tHeY Are not woRtHy oF thaT ATtachMent. tHe Nature of The posITiOn Of emptiNeSs is thAt It sUpeRsedeS EverYthing-IncludinG all tHE positions ŚāntIDeva has taken iN PrEVIoUS chaPteRs. Parts of chApteR Nine RecaP EaCh oF The meTaphySiCAl CLaims of previous chapTeRs: versEs 71–77 decOnstruct the seLf and causaLITY, 72–78 deconstRuct THe BOdy, while 57–60 deconsTruct Both self anD Body. But ŚĀntidEva's arguMents in thIS Chapter iMplY thAt eAch OF ThE metaphysical CLAims He Has made BefOre is itSelF inAdeQuaTe In its own wAy. Recall ThAt ThE cRitIque oF Anger resTeD on ThE idEa thaT EverytHing hAs a cAuSe, IN thE chain oF DePENdenT cO-oRigiNatIoN. By thE end OF chApter niNe, however, śānTIdevA hAs RejecteD causality too. in iX.145 he asks: "FoR aN exIsting ENTity, what'S the need for a cause (hetu)? AnD For a nonExiSting EntiTy, what's thE neEd for a CauSE?" That iS, if somEthinG rEalLY ExistED, It WouLdN't need a cauSE To bRing iT iNto bEing; if iT didn't, it really woulDN't nEed a cause at alL. ThEre aRE NoW ecHOeS Of tHe sĀṁkHYA view that nothinG is really cReATeD or destroyED, anD tHereforE doesn't Have a CAuse. FroM here he prOceeds to a MoRe raDICal Point: Thus tHere is no Cessation ANd no cOMiNg-to-bE of AnythiNg. and ThereFore thIS whOle unIverse HaS neithEr begUn Nor ceaseD. Rather, states of existencE (gati) aRe
, metaphysics played a rel atively sm all r ole  (b et ween  ten  and thirty ve r sesof a chapter); here, i t tak es cent e rstage , featu r in g inth evas tm aj ority  of  the ch apter's 16 7 v er ses. But the ro le playedbymetaphysicsher e is q ui tec ompar abl e tothe ro l e in t he previo us chapte r s: it u n d er pins  an ethical argum e nt ,  an argument a bout h ow hu m a n b ein gs shouldli ve. T h e ninth ch a p t era rticulates th e Madhyamak a  vi ew tha teve r ything  is e mp t y ( śūnya), not  ult imately r eal. A n ythingw e can p erceiv e o r s peak of  e xis ts onl y  a t t h e l evel ofco nv entio nalu s a g e. Ś ānt idev a's m ethod for est abl ishi n g t his p ointis s im ilarto the  meth od  used in chapte r si x (above) : r ef ute  a ll th e  objec tio nsto it t hat hec an27 4 L el e, The Metaphysica lB a si s of Śān tideva ' sEt h ics imag in e.1 7 An d the e thic a lupshot o f this ar gu ment is  t hat on esho uld  notf eelany at tachment  to w o rldly goods, l i ke possession s  o r lo v ers.  Be cause theyhave no r eale xi ste n ce, t hey a re no t  worthy of that att ac hment.  Thenature of the  positiono f emptines s is th a t it supersede s eve rything-in c luding a ll th e positi ons Śānti d e va has t ake n i n p rev i o us  chapters. Pa r t s of  c hapternin e recap  ea chofthe  m etaphysic al claim sof  p re vio us ch a pters: v er ses  7 1–7 7 dec o nstruc t the  sel fan d  ca usality ,  7 2 – 78 d ec on stru ctth e bod y, w h ile  57–60deconstru ctb othse lf  and bo dy. But Śānti de va's argum en tsin thi s chapterimply that each of them etaphys ica l cla imshe has ma debefore  is itself  inade quate  i n i t s  ownw a y.  Re ca ll that th e cri tique  o f an ger res ted on the idea th a t e verything has  acaus e ,  i n t h ec hai no f d e p endent co-origi nation. By  t h eend of cha p ter  n ine, ho wever,Śānti d eva has  rejected  causalit ytoo. I n I X.145 he a sks: "Fo r an exis t ing e n ti ty, w hat 's the  n eed  fora caus e  (h etu)?  And f or  a non exist in g entity , what's the need for a  cause ?" Th atis, if so met h ing  really e xist ed, it wou ldn 'tneeda c a use t o br i ng  it intobein g ; if it d i dn 't, i treally woul d n ' t n eed a  ca u se atall.  There are now ec h oes of the Sāṁ khya v iew  th a t no th ing is reallycre at e d  or dest ro yed, and th ereforedo e sn'thave a  cause . Fromh e re he pro ceed s t o a morerad ic a l point :Th u s ther e is  n o cess ationa nd n o coming-to-be ofanyth i n g. An d  th erefo re  this w h oleuniverse h as neitherbegunnorcease d. Rath er , stat esof  existence (gati) ar e
, metaphysics_played a_relatively small role (between_ten and_thirty_verses of_a_chapter); here, it_takes center stage,_featuring in the vast_majority of the_chapter's_167 verses. But the role played by metaphysics here is quite comparable to the_role_in the_previous_chapters:_it underpins an ethical argument,_an argument about how human_beings should_live. The ninth chapter articulates the Madhyamaka view_that_everything is empty_(śūnya), not ultimately real. Anything we can perceive or_speak of exists only at the_level of conventional_usage._Śāntideva's_method for establishing this_point is similar to the method_used in chapter six (above): refute_all the objections to it that he_can 274 Lele, The Metaphysical Basis_of Śāntideva's Ethics imagine.17 And_the ethical_upshot of this argument is_that one should_not feel_any attachment to_worldly goods, like possessions or lovers._Because they have_no real existence, they are not_worthy_of that attachment._The_nature_of the_position of emptiness_is_that it_supersedes_everything-including all the positions Śāntideva has_taken_in previous chapters. Parts of chapter nine_recap each of the_metaphysical_claims of previous chapters:_verses 71–77 deconstruct the self_and causality, 72–78 deconstruct the body,_while 57–60_deconstruct both_self and body. But Śāntideva's arguments in this chapter imply that_each of the metaphysical claims he_has made before is_itself inadequate_in_its own way._Recall_that the_critique of anger rested on the idea_that everything_has a cause, in the chain_of dependent co-origination. By_the_end of chapter nine, however, Śāntideva_has rejected causality too. In IX.145_he asks: "For an existing_entity,_what's_the need for a cause_(hetu)? And for a nonexisting entity,_what's the need_for a cause?" That is, if something_really_existed, it wouldn't need a cause_to_bring it into being; if it_didn't,_it_really wouldn't need a cause_at all. There are now echoes_of the Sāṁkhya view that nothing is really created_or destroyed, and_therefore doesn't have a cause._From_here_he proceeds to a more radical point: Thus there is_no cessation_and no coming-to-be_of anything. And therefore this whole universe has neither begun_nor ceased. Rather, states of existence (gati)_are