 hand, humans * This is the penultimate version (2013-08-10) of a paper forthcoming in Ca- nadian Journal of Philosophy. Please cite the final, published version if possible. 1 John Turri | 2 routinely invent novel ways of expressing themselves, which other humans have little difficulty understanding, despite the novelty. Thomas Reid fits comfortably into this tradition. Reid thought that language ought to be studied because doing so promises "to lay open some of the first principles of human nature" and in particular the human mind (Reid 1764: 51). One purpose of this paper is to demonstrate, through a careful analysis of Reid's central argument in this area, how naturally Reid fits into the Cartesian linguistic tra- dition. Another purpose is to identify the most plausible version of Reid's argument, which complements Chomsky's own important conclusions about human nature. Reid's discussion of human lan- guage, in particular his distinction between natural and artificial signs, also provides a model for his later discussion of human per- ception (e.g. Reid 1764: ch. 6.24, p. 190), and it would be fruitful to investigate how the conclusions drawn here might be extended to Reid's views on perception. But I will not attempt that task here. It's worth emphasizing at the outset that Reid's philosophy of language has received scant attention in the secondary literature,1 and the central passages and argument I discuss at great length below have previously received no attention. 1 As an indication of this, consider that the index to The Cambridge Com- panion to Thomas Reid doesn't even contain an entry for 'language' (though it does have one for Reid's interest in botany!), and contains only a meagre entry for'signs'. Compare that to the multiple entries for 'language' and extensive entry for'signs' in The Cambridge Companion to Berkeley, and the extensive entry for 'language' in The Cambridge Companion to Locke's "Essay Concerning Human Understanding". Moreover, the Berke- ley Companion dedicates an entire chapter to Berkeley's theory of signs, and the Locke Companion dedicates a chapter to Locke's philosophy of lan- guage. (But compare Jensen 1979 and Castagnetto 1992.) 3 | Reid on the priority of natural language In what follows I critically interpret and evaluate a principal distinction and argument due to Reid. The distinction and argu- ment occur in the following passage, from Chapter 4 of Reid's In- quiry into
hand, humans * This is the penultimate version (2013 - 08 - 10) of a paper forthcoming in Ca- nadian Journal of Philosophy. Please reference the concluding, published version if potential. 1 John Turri | 2 routinely invent novel room of expressing themselves, which other world have little trouble reason, despite the novelty. Thomas Reid meet comfortably into this tradition. Reid thought that language ought to be studied because doing thus promises " to lay open some of the beginning principles of human nature " and in particular the human mind (Reid 1764: 51). One purpose of this composition is to demonstrate, through a careful analysis of Reid's central argument in this area, how naturally Reid fit into the Cartesian linguistic tra- dition. Another purpose is to identify the most plausible version of Reid's argument, which complement Chomsky's own significant conclusions about human nature. Reid's discussion of human lan- guage, in particular his distinction between natural and artificial signs, also provides a model for his later discussion of human per- ception (for example Reid 1764: ch. 6.24, p. 190), and it would be fruitful to investigate how the decision drawn here might be unfold to Reid's scene on perception. But I will not attempt that undertaking here. It's worth emphasizing at the outset that Reid's philosophy of linguistic process has received scant attention in the secondary literature,1 and the central passages and argumentation I discuss at great length below have previously receive no care. 1 As an reading of this, see that the index to The Cambridge Com- panion to Thomas Reid doesn't even contain an entry for' language' (though it does have one for Reid's interest in botany !), and control only a meagre entry for'signs'. Compare that to the multiple entries for' terminology' and extensive submission for'signs' in The Cambridge Companion to Berkeley, and the extensive entry for' speech' in The Cambridge Companion to Locke's " Essay Concerning Human Understanding ". furthermore, the Berke- ley Companion dedicates an entire chapter to Berkeley's theory of signs, and the Locke Companion dedicate a chapter to Locke's philosophy of lan- guage. (But compare Jensen 1979 and Castagnetto 1992 .) 3 | Reid on the priority of natural language In what follows I critically understand and evaluate a principal distinction and argument due to Reid. The distinction and argu- ment occur in the following passage, from Chapter 4 of Reid's In- quiry into
 hajd, humans * This is the ptnultimate versiou (2013-08-10) of a paper forthcooing in Ca- nadian Journal of Pyilosiphy. Please cite the fknal, publpshed verwion uf possiblx. 1 John Bbrri | 2 rouciiely invent novgl ways of efpressing themveuvzs, which other humans have little disficultu knderstanding, qespptq ths novelty. Thomas Reid fits comfortzbly inuo this tradition. Teid thought that language ougjt to be studied bfcause doint so promises "to uay open some of the fjrst principles of human nature" and nn particulqr thf human mind (Reid 1764: 51). One purpose of thhs papet is to demonsbrate, theough a careful analyvis of Reid's centrwl argumett in this area, how nqturanly Seid ditr ihtp fhe Cagteaian lingujstic tra- dution. Another purpoxe px to identifg the ioft plausible version of Reid's argument, fhidh complements Chomsky's own important concludions abott human nature. Reid's discussion of human lan- guace, in oaruigmlar yid distinction between natural and artificial fjgms, also provides a model fot jix later discusrion oy hhman per- ception (e.h. Reid 1764: ch. 6.24, p. 190), and it woukd be fruitful to investigare how the cjbclusions drawn hexe might be zxtendgd to Teid's views on perceptiun. Bht I will nlt attempf that task here. Kt's wmrth emphasizing at the oueset that Reib's philorophi of lagguage has receleed scant attentioj in jhe sewondary liherature,1 and the central passagxx and argumemt I giscuss ct grest length beljw have previoosly recenved nu attentioh. 1 As ai indication of this, conshfer that the index tj Thw Canbridge Zom- panion to Yhomas Repd doewn't even contain ak entty for 'language' (tkuoth it does havr ove sog Rxid's ytterest in bmtanh!), avc congains only c oeagte entry for'signs'. Cokpars that to the multopje entrigs for 'lagguage' and exyensive entry for'slgns' mn The Cambtidde Companion to Berkeley, and tge extenslve entry for 'lwnguqge' in The Ccmbridge Companion to Locke's "Essay Concecning Human Understandibg". Moreover, the Berlt- ley Companipn deqicates at entire chapter to Verkeley's theory pf signs, and the Locks Compdnion dedicates a chapter to Locke's philosophy of lan- guage. (But compare Jensen 1979 and Raftagnetto 1992.) 3 | Reod on tke 'rioritr of iatural language Pn what follows I critically intxrpret and eraluate a principal distinctipn and argument due to Reid. The distincfion and argu- ment occur in the followimg passage, from Chapter 4 of Reid'w In- suiry phtu
hand, humans * This is the penultimate of paper forthcoming Ca- nadian Journal final, version if possible. John Turri | routinely invent novel ways of expressing which other humans have little difficulty understanding, despite the novelty. Thomas Reid fits into this tradition. Reid thought that language ought to be studied because doing promises lay some the first principles of human nature" and in particular the human mind (Reid 1764: 51). One of this paper is to demonstrate, through a analysis of Reid's central in this area, how naturally fits the Cartesian tra- Another is to identify most plausible version of Reid's argument, which complements Chomsky's own important conclusions about human nature. Reid's discussion human lan- particular his between and signs, also provides for his later discussion of human Reid 1764: ch. 6.24, p. 190), and it be fruitful investigate how the conclusions drawn here be extended to Reid's views on perception. But will not attempt that task here. It's worth emphasizing at the outset that Reid's philosophy has received scant attention the secondary literature,1 the passages argument discuss at length below have previously received no attention. 1 As an indication this, consider that the index to The Cambridge Com- panion Reid even contain an for 'language' (though it have for Reid's interest in contains a Compare to multiple entries for 'language' extensive entry for'signs' in The Companion to Berkeley, and in The Cambridge Companion to Locke's "Essay Concerning Understanding". Moreover, the Berke- ley Companion dedicates entire chapter to Berkeley's theory of signs, and the Locke Companion dedicates chapter to of lan- guage. (But compare Jensen 1979 and 1992.) 3 | Reid the priority of natural language In what follows I interpret evaluate a distinction and argument to Reid. The and argu- ment the following from 4 quiry into
 hand, humans * This is the penultImate versiOn (2013-08-10) of a PapEr fOrThcoMing In Ca- nadian JourNAl of philosophy. Please cite thE finaL, pUBlisHEd VersiOn if posSIbLE. 1 johN TUrRi | 2 rOuTInEly inVenT novel wAys of expreSsiNg Themselves, whICh Other humanS haVe little diffIcuLty undErStaNDing, dEspIte thE novelTY. ThomaS Reid fits CoMFortabLY into thIS TrAditIon. Reid thought thaT LaNGuage ought to be StudieD bECaUSE doIng So promises "To Lay opEN some of THe FIRSt pRInciples of humAn nature" and IN paRticulAr The HUman miNd (ReiD 1764: 51). ONE puRpose of this PapeR is to demoNstratE, Through A Careful AnalysIs oF ReId's cENtRaL arGuMEnt IN tHis ARea, How naturAlLy reid fIts iNTO THe CaRteSian LinguIstic tra- ditioN. AnOtheR PurPose iS to idEntiFy The moSt plauSible VeRsion of Reid's argUmenT, which comPleMeNts chOmsky'S Own impOrtAnt ConclusIons aboUT huMaN NATuRe. Reid's discussion oF hUMAn Lan- guage, In partICuLaR His distiNcTioN betWEEn natUral ANd ArtificiAl signS, AlSo ProvideS a Model fOr His LatEr disCUssiOn of huMan per- cePtion (E.G. Reid 1764: ch. 6.24, p. 190), and it wOUld be fruitful TO iNVEsTIgatE hoW the conclusIons DRawn Here MIgHt bE ExtenDed to reID's VIews on perception. But i wIll not AttemPt that task herE. It's worth eMPHAsizing aT the OUtSEt that Reid's phiLosopHy of languaGE has receIved sCant atteNtion in thE SEcondary LitEraTurE,1 anD THe Central passagES And aRgUment I dIscUss at grEat LenGth BelOw Have previOusly recEiVeD nO aTteNtion. 1 aS an indicAtIon Of ThiS, consIDer thaT the iNdex To thE camBridge COM- pANIon tO THoMas REid DoEsn't eVen cONtaIn an entRy for 'langUagE' (ThouGh It Does havE one for Reid's iNtErest in botAnY!), anD contaINS only a meAgre entry for'signs'. ComparE That to tHe mUltipLe enTries for 'lAngUage' anD exTEnsive Entry fOr'sigNs' In THE cambrIDGe comPaNion to BerkELEy, aNd the ExTensIve entrY for 'language' in The CAMbrIdge Companion To LOcke'S "eSsAy CONcERniNg hUmaN uNderstanding". MorEover, the BeRkE- LeY Companion DEdiCaTes an enTire chaPter tO berkeleY's theory oF signs, and ThE LocKE comPanion dediCates a chApter to LoCKe's phILoSophy Of lAn- guagE. (BUt cOmparE JenseN 1979 And castaGnetto 1992.) 3 | reId on thE prioRiTy of natuRal language In what followS I critIcallY inTerpret anD evALuaTe a princiPal dIstinction And ArgUment Due TO Reid. the dIStIncTIon anD argU- Ment occur IN tHe fOLLoWing passage, FROM ChApter 4 Of REId's In- qUiry Into
 hand, humans * This is th e penultim ate v ers ion  ( 2013 -08- 10) of a paper fort hcoming in Ca- nadianJourn al of P h il osoph y. Plea s ec i teth efin al ,  p ublis hed  versio n if possi ble .1 John Turri |2 routinel y i nvent novelway s of e xp res s ing t hem selve s, whi c h othe r humansha v e litt l e diffi c u lt y un derstanding, desp i te the novelty. T homasRe i df i tscom fortably i nt o thi s  tradit i on . R eid thought thatlanguage ou g htto best udi e d beca use d oi n g s o promises"tolay opensome o f  the fi r st prin ciples  of  hu mann at ur e"an d  in pa rti c ula r the hu ma nmind(Rei d 1 7 64:51) . On e pur pose of thispap er i s  to  demo nstra te,th rough  a car efulan alysis of Reid' s ce ntral arg ume nt  in  t his a r ea, ho w n atu rally R eid fit s  in to t h eCartesian linguist ic t ra - dition . Anot h er  p u rpose is  t o i dent i f y the  mos t  p lausible  versi o nof  Reid's  a rgumen t,  wh ich  comp l emen ts Cho msky's o wn im p ortant conclus i ons about hum a nn a tu r e. R eid 's discussi on o f  hum an l a n-  gu a ge, i n par ti c ul a r his distinction b et ween n atura l and artific ial signs, a l so provi desa  m o del for his la ter d iscussiono f humanper-ception(e.g. Rei d 1764: ch . 6 .24 , p . 1 9 0 ),  and it would b e fr ui tful to  in vestiga tehow  th e c on clusionsdrawn he re  m ig ht  be  exte n ded to R ei d's  v iew s onp ercept ion.ButIwi l l n ot atte m pt t hatta sk  her e.It 's wo rthe mph asizing  at the o uts e t th at  R eid's p hilosophy ofla nguage has  r ece ived s c a nt atten tion in the secondary l i teratur e,1  andthecentral p ass ages a nda rgumen t I di scuss  a t g r e at le n g th  be lo w have pre v i ous ly re ce ived  no att ention. 1 As an in d ica tion of this,  co nsid e r  t hat th e  in de x  to T he Cambridge Co m- panionto Th omas Reidd oes n' t evencontain  an e n try for  'languag e' (thoug hit d o e s h ave one fo r Reid's  interest in bo t an y!),and  conta in s o nly a  meagr e  en try f or'sig ns '. Com pareth at to th e multiple entries for'langu age'and  extensiv e e n try  for'sign s' i n The Camb rid geCompa nio n  to B erke l ey , a n d the  ext e nsive ent r yfor ' la nguage' inT h e  Ca mbrid geC ompani on t o Locke's "EssayC oncerning Huma n Un d e rst and i ng".  M oreover, the B erk e- l ey Compa ni on dedicate s an ent ir e  chap ter to  Berke ley's t h e or y  of si gns,  an d the Loc keCo m panionde di c ates a  cha pt er toLocke' s  phi l o sophy of lan- gu age.( B ut co m par e Jen se n 1979a nd C astagnetto  1992.) 3 |  Reidon t he pr iorityof  natur alla nguage Inw hat follo ws Icritica ll y in ter pret a nd e v a luate  a p ri nci pal disti n c ti o nan d  ar gume nt du eto R eid. Thed istincti ona nd argu -men t occuri nt h e followin g p assag e ,  from Chap t er 4 of Reid' s In-quiryinto
 hand,_humans *_This is the penultimate_version (2013-08-10)_of_a paper_forthcoming_in Ca- nadian_Journal of Philosophy._Please cite the final,_published version if_possible._1 John Turri | 2 routinely invent novel ways of expressing themselves, which other_humans_have little_difficulty_understanding,_despite the novelty. Thomas Reid_fits comfortably into this tradition._Reid thought_that language ought to be studied because doing_so_promises "to lay_open some of the first principles of human nature"_and in particular the human mind_(Reid 1764: 51)._One_purpose_of this paper is_to demonstrate, through a careful analysis_of Reid's central argument in this_area, how naturally Reid fits into the_Cartesian linguistic tra- dition. Another purpose_is to identify the most_plausible version_of Reid's argument, which complements_Chomsky's own important_conclusions about_human nature. Reid's_discussion of human lan- guage, in_particular his distinction_between natural and artificial signs, also_provides_a model for_his_later_discussion of_human per- ception_(e.g._Reid 1764:_ch._6.24, p. 190), and it would_be_fruitful to investigate how the conclusions drawn_here might be extended_to_Reid's views on perception._But I will not attempt_that task here. It's worth emphasizing_at the_outset that_Reid's philosophy of language has received scant attention in the secondary_literature,1 and the central passages and_argument I discuss at_great length_below_have previously received_no_attention. 1_As an indication of this, consider that_the index_to The Cambridge Com- panion to_Thomas Reid doesn't even_contain_an entry for 'language' (though it_does have one for Reid's interest_in botany!), and contains only_a_meagre_entry for'signs'. Compare that to_the multiple entries for 'language' and_extensive entry for'signs'_in The Cambridge Companion to Berkeley, and_the_extensive entry for 'language' in The_Cambridge_Companion to Locke's "Essay Concerning Human_Understanding"._Moreover,_the Berke- ley Companion dedicates_an entire chapter to Berkeley's theory_of signs, and the Locke Companion dedicates a chapter_to Locke's philosophy_of lan- guage. (But compare_Jensen_1979_and Castagnetto 1992.) 3 | Reid on the priority of_natural language_In what follows_I critically interpret and evaluate a principal distinction and argument_due to Reid. The distinction and argu-_ment occur in the following passage, from Chapter 4 of Reid's_In- quiry into