difficulties	with	this	version	of	the	argument.	The first	has	to	do	with	how	Adams's	communicative	standard	ought	to	be understood.	To	work,	the	third	condition	in	this	standard	must	state	that knowledge	of	content	is	all	that	is	required.	But	Adams's	original	wording suggests	that	knowledge	of	form	is	needed	as	well.	After	all,	he	says	that	you must	understand	the	sign	as	'conveying	the	intended	command',	suggesting	that the	agent	to	whom	the	command	is	directed	must	know	that	they	are	being commanded	to	do	something.	This	is	problematic	because	it	is	highly	unlikely that	reasonable	nonbelievers	have	epistemic	access	to	both	the	form	and	the content	of	the	divine	commands.	Such	a	nonbeliever	might	have	the phenomenological	feeling	that	murder	is	wrong	and	that	they	ought	not	to	do	it, but	may	nevertheless	have	no	sense	that	they	are	being	commanded	to	refrain from	it.	Wielenberg	puts	the	point	nicely	when	he	says	that	'[t]here	is	a difference	between	commanding	someone	to	perform	a	certain	act	A	and	causing 14 someone	to	believe	that	he	is	morally	obligated	to	perform	act	A.'	(Wielenberg 2014,	79).	All	that	is	happening	in	Peoples's	imagined	case	is	that	the	reasonable nonbeliever	is	being	caused	to	that	murder	is	very	bad;	not	that	they	are	being caused	to	believe	that	they	are	being	commanded	not	to	murder.	This	suggests that
difficulties 	 with 	 this 	 version 	 of 	 the 	 argument. 	 The first 	 take 	 to 	 cause 	 with 	 how 	 Adams's 	 communicative 	 standard 	 ought 	 to 	 be understood. 	 To 	 work, 	 the 	 third 	 circumstance 	 in 	 this 	 standard 	 must 	 state 	 that knowledge 	 of 	 message 	 is 	 all 	 that 	 is 	 required. 	 But 	 Adams's 	 original 	 wording suggests 	 that 	 cognition 	 of 	 human body 	 is 	 needed 	 equally 	 well. 	 After 	 all, 	 he 	 says 	 that 	 you must 	 understand 	 the 	 sign 	 as 	' conveying 	 the 	 mean 	 command', 	 suggesting 	 that the 	 agent 	 to 	 whom 	 the 	 command 	 is 	 directed 	 must 	 acknowledge 	 that 	 they 	 are 	 being commanded 	 to 	 do 	 something. 	 This 	 is 	 problematic 	 because 	 it 	 is 	 highly 	 improbable that 	 reasonable 	 nonbelievers 	 have 	 epistemic 	 access 	 to 	 both 	 the 	 kind 	 and 	 the content 	 of 	 the 	 divine 	 commands. 	 Such 	 a 	 nonbeliever 	 might 	 have 	 the phenomenological 	 feeling 	 that 	 murder 	 is 	 improper 	 and 	 that 	 they 	 ought 	 not 	 to 	 do 	 it, but 	 may 	 nevertheless 	 have 	 no 	 sense 	 that 	 they 	 are 	 being 	 commanded 	 to 	 abstain from 	 it. 	 Wielenberg 	 arrange 	 the 	 point 	 nicely 	 when 	 he 	 says 	 that 	' [ t]here 	 is 	 a difference 	 between 	 commanding 	 someone 	 to 	 perform 	 a 	 certain 	 act 	 A 	 and 	 causing 14 someone 	 to 	 believe 	 that 	 he 	 is 	 morally 	 obligated 	 to 	 do 	 act 	 A.' 	 (Wielenberg 2014, 	 79). 	 All 	 that 	 is 	 happen 	 in 	 Peoples's 	 imagined 	 casing 	 is 	 that 	 the 	 fair disbeliever 	 is 	 being 	 caused 	 to 	 that 	 murder 	 is 	 very 	 bad; 	 not 	 that 	 they 	 are 	 being caused 	 to 	 believe 	 that 	 they 	 are 	 being 	 commanded 	 not 	 to 	 murder. 	 This 	 suggests that
difviculties	with	this	version	uf	the	argument.	Thg dirst	hes	to	do	wjth	how	Adxms's	communicative	standard	ougit	to	ve uneerstood.	To	work,	the	third	zondition	pn	this	stabdarv	must	state	that kikwledge	of	contskt	is	ano	that	is	requirec.	But	Adams's	mriginal	wordinc ruygests	that	knowledge	of	form	is	needed	as	wqll.	Aftet	apl,	he	says	that	yoo musu	unqersfand	the	sign	as	'conveying	the	intended	ckmmand',	slggesting	that the	sgent	to	whom	the	command	is	dirfctef	must	know	that	they	age	being comnandqe	to	do	somethivg.	This	is	problematic	beczuse	it	is	highly	unlikely that	reasunablz	nonbelievets	gagg	epistemic	acress	to	foth	the	form	akc	the cmntent	og	the	divine	commsndv.	Suxh	a	nonbeliever	might	hate	the phenomenologicwl	feeling	dhct	murder	is	wrong	and	thar	tyey	oucht	nmt	to	ai	it, buu	mab	neberthepesa	have	no	senae	that	they	aee	being	commanded	to	rtfrwpm from	it.	Wielsnberg	[ues	the	point	nicely	when	he	says	that	'[t]here	is	a gifrerence	between	commandint	someone	to	perform	a	cerjain	act	A	anq	causing 14 someone	to	believe	that	he	is	morally	obligateg	to	pecfurm	cgb	A.'	(Widoejberg 2014,	79).	All	that	is	happening	in	Peoples's	imagined	casq	js	uhan	the	reasonable nokbeliever	is	being	caisfd	yj	that	murder	is	xery	bab;	hof	that	they	are	being faused	tj	beliwve	that	thty	are	neing	commanded	not	to	murder.	Thus	suggests tkat
difficulties with this version of the argument. has do with Adams's communicative standard work, third condition in standard must state knowledge of content is all that required. But Adams's original wording suggests that knowledge of form is needed as After all, he says that you must understand the sign as 'conveying the command', that agent whom the command is directed must know that they are being commanded to do something. This problematic because it is highly unlikely that reasonable have epistemic access to the form and the content the commands. Such nonbeliever have phenomenological feeling that is wrong and that they ought not to do it, but may nevertheless have no sense that are being refrain from Wielenberg the nicely when he '[t]here is a difference between commanding a certain act A and causing 14 someone believe that is morally obligated to perform act (Wielenberg 2014, 79). All that is happening in imagined case is that the reasonable nonbeliever is being caused to that murder is very that they are being to believe that are commanded to This suggests
difficulties	with	this	versiOn	of	the	argUment.	the FirSt	Has	tO	do	wIth	how	Adams's	coMMuniCative	standard	ought	to	bE undeRsTOod.	TO	WoRk,	the	Third	coNDiTIOn	iN	tHiS	stAnDArD	must	StaTe	that kNowledge	of	ConTeNt	is	all	that	iS	ReQuired.	But	ADamS's	original	woRdiNg suggEsTs	tHAt	knoWleDge	of	Form	is	NEeded	aS	well.	AfteR	aLL,	he	sayS	That	you MUSt	UndeRstand	the	sign	as	'coNVeYIng	the	intended	CommanD',	sUGgESTinG	thAt the	agent	To	Whom	tHE	commanD	Is	DIREctED	must	know	that	They	are	beinG ComManded	To	Do	sOMethinG.	This	Is	PRobLematic	becaUse	iT	is	highly	UnlikeLY that	reASonable	NonbelIevErs	Have	EPiStEmiC	aCCesS	To	BotH	The	Form	and	tHe CoNtent	Of	thE	DIVIne	cOmmAnds.	such	a	Nonbeliever	miGht	Have	THe pHenomEnoloGicaL	fEelinG	that	mUrder	Is	Wrong	and	that	theY	ougHt	not	to	do	It, bUt	May	NeVerthELess	haVe	nO	seNse	that	They	are	BEinG	cOMMAnDed	to	refrain from	it.	wiELEnBerg	puts	The	poiNT	nIcELy	when	he	SaYs	tHat	'[t]HERe	is	a DiffEReNce	betweEn	commANdInG	someonE	tO	perfoRm	A	ceRtaIn	act	a	And	cAusing 14 Someone	tO	beliEVe	that	he	is	moraLLy	obligated	to	PErFORm	ACt	A.'	(WIelEnberg 2014,	79).	All	thAt	is	HAppeNing	IN	PEopLEs's	imAgineD	cASe	IS	that	the	reasonable nOnBelievEr	is	bEing	caused	to	tHat	murder	iS	VERy	bad;	not	That	THeY	Are	being caused	To	belIeve	that	thEY	are	beinG	commAnded	not	To	murder.	THIS	suggestS thAt
difficulties	with	this	ver sion	of	th e	arg ume nt. 	T he f irst 	has	to	do	wit h 	how 	Adams's	communicative 	stan da r d	ou g ht 	to	b e under s to o d .	T owo rk, 	t h ethird 	co ndition 	in	this	s tan da rd	must	stat e 	t hat knowle dge 	of	contentisall	th at 	is requi red .	But 	Adams ' s	orig inal	word in g  sugge s ts	that k no wled ge	of	form	is	nee d ed as	well.	After 	all,he sa y s 	th atyou must	u nd ersta n d	the	s i gn a s 	'c o nveying	the	i ntended	com m and ',	sug ge sti n g	that  theag e ntto	whom	the 	com mand	is	d irecte d 	must	k n ow	that 	theyare 	be ingc om ma nde dt o	d o 	s ome t hin g.	Thisis 	p roble mati c b e caus e	i t	is 	high ly	unlikely t hat 	rea s ona ble	n onbel ieve rs 	have 	epist emicac cess	to	both	th e	fo rm	and	th e c on ten tof	th e 	divin e	c omm ands.	S uch	a	n o nbe li e v e rmight	have	the phe no m e no logicalfeelin g 	t ha t 	murderis 	wr onga n d	tha t	th e yought	no t	to	d o 	i t,  but	ma ynevert he les s	h ave	n o 	sen se	tha t	they	a re	be i ng	commanded	t o 	refrain from it . Wi e lenb erg 	puts	the	p oint nice ly	w h en 	he saysthat'[ t ]h e re	is	a differencebe tweencomma nding	someone 	to	perfor m a 	certain 	act Aa nd	causing 14someo ne	to	beli e ve	thathe	is 	morally 	obligate d to	perfo rmact 	A. '	( W i el enberg 2014,7 9 ).	A ll 	that	i s	h appenin g	i n	P eop les 's 	imagined 	case	is 	t ha tth e	r eason a ble nonb el iev er 	is 	bein g 	cause d	tothat 	m ur d eris	very ba d ; 	not 	t ha t	th eyar e	bei ng c a use d	to	be lieve	tha t	t h ey	a re 	b eing	co mmanded	not	t omurder.	Th is 	su ggests t hat
difficulties	with	this	version	of	the	argument.	The first	has	to	do	with	how	Adams's	communicative	standard	ought	to	be_understood.	To	work,	the	third	condition	in	this	standard	must	state	that knowledge	of	content	is	all	that	is	required.	But	Adams's	original	wording_suggests	that	knowledge	of	form	is	needed	as	well.	After	all,	he	says	that	you must	understand	the	sign	as	'conveying	the	intended	command',	suggesting	that the	agent	to	whom	the	command	is	directed	must	know	that	they	are	being commanded	to	do	something.	This	is	problematic	because	it	is	highly	unlikely_that	reasonable	nonbelievers	have	epistemic	access	to	both	the	form	and	the content	of	the	divine	commands.	Such	a	nonbeliever	might	have	the_phenomenological	feeling	that	murder	is	wrong	and	that	they	ought	not	to	do	it,_but	may	nevertheless	have	no	sense	that	they	are	being	commanded	to	refrain from	it.	Wielenberg	puts	the	point	nicely	when	he	says	that	'[t]here	is	a_difference	between	commanding	someone	to	perform	a	certain	act	A	and	causing_14 someone	to	believe	that	he	is	morally	obligated	to	perform	act	A.'	(Wielenberg 2014,	79).	All	that	is	happening	in	Peoples's	imagined	case	is	that	the	reasonable_nonbeliever	is	being	caused	to	that	murder	is	very	bad;	not	that	they	are	being caused	to	believe	that	they	are	being	commanded	not	to	murder.	This	suggests that