 as criteria of judgment (as in Kant's moral law), ethics evaluates actions and intentions according to the immanent mode of existence they imply. One says or does this, thinks or feels that: What mode of existence does it imply? Th is is the link Deleuze establishes between Spinoza and Nietzsche, his two great precursors as philosophers of immanence: each of them argued, in his own manner, that there are things one cannot do or think except on the condition of being base or enslaved, unless one harbors a ressentiment against life (Nietzsche), unless one remains the slave of passive aff ections (Spinoza); and there are other things one cannot do or say except on the condition of being noble or free, unless one affi rms life or attains active aff ections. Th e transcendent moral opposition (Good/Evil) is in this way replaced by an immanent ethical diff erence (good/bad). A bad or sickly life is an exhausted and degenerating mode of existence, one that judges life from the perspective of its sickness, that devalues life in the name of higher values. A good or healthy life, by contrast, is an overfl owing or ascending mode of existence, capable of transforming itself depending on the forces it encounters, always opening up new possibilities of life, new becomings. For Deleuze, modes of existence can be evaluated according to the purely immanent criteria of aff ectivity, that is, by their capacity to aff ect and to be aff ected – a capacity that is not a simple logical possibility but is necessarily actualized at every moment, thus fulfi lling the demand for a genetic principle of the real. If the greatness of Nietzsche's theory of nihilism was to have analyzed the process of becomingreactive, the aim of Spinoza's Ethics was to outline the process of becomingactive. Th ese two processes, however, necessarily coexist in any mode of existence, and for Deleuze the aim of ethical theory is to determine, not universal grounds or normative foundations, but rather the conditions under which the attainment of active aff ections is possible – or more precisely, the conditions under which the production of new modes of existence is possible, since the "activity" of a mode is defi ned by its ability to aff ect or transform itself. In his later work, Foucault, under a Deleuzian inspiration, coined the term "
as criteria of judgment (as in Kant's moral law), ethics measure legal action and intentions harmonize to the immanent modality of existence they imply. One order or does this, thinks or feels that: What manner of existence does it imply? Th is is the radio link Deleuze establishes between Spinoza and Nietzsche, his two great precursors as philosopher of immanence: each of them argue, in his own manner, that there are things one cannot do or think except on the condition of being foundation or enslaved, unless one harbors a ressentiment against life (Nietzsche), unless one persist the slave of passive aff ections (Spinoza); and there are other things one cannot do or state except on the condition of being noble or free, unless one affi rms life or attains active aff ections. Th east transcendent moral opposition (Good / Evil) is in this way replaced by an immanent ethical diff erence (good / bad). A bad or sickly life is an exhausted and degenerating mode of existence, one that judges life from the perspective of its sickness, that devalues life in the name of higher value. A good or healthy life sentence, by line, is an overfl owe or ascending mode of existence, capable of transforming itself depending on the forces it meet, always opening up new possibilities of liveliness, new becomings. For Deleuze, modes of existence can be evaluated harmonize to the purely immanent standard of aff ectivity, that is, by their capacity to aff ect and to be aff ected – a capacity that is not a simple logical possibility but is inevitably actualized at every moment, thus fulfi lling the demand for a genetic principle of the real. If the greatness of Nietzsche's theory of nihilistic delusion was to have analyzed the process of becomingreactive, the aim of Spinoza's Ethics was to outline the process of becomingactive. thursday ese two procedure, however, necessarily coexist in any manner of existence, and for Deleuze the bearing of ethical theory is to determine, not universal grounds or normative foundation, but rather the condition under which the attainment of active aff ections is possible – or more precisely, the conditions under which the production of modern manner of existence is possible, since the " activeness " of a mode is defi ned by its ability to aff ect or transform itself. In his late work, Foucault, under a Deleuzian inspiration, coined the terminus "
 as criteria of judgment (as in Kant's moral law), etiics evzluates xctions and intentions accorving to tye immanent mode of exkstence tjey implt. Ont says or does thma, thinks or fscls tkav: What mode of gxistence doas it imply? Th ir ns the link Deleuze establishes betwqen Spimoxa and Nietzscre, hps two great precursors as philosophers kf immaience: each of tnem argued, in his own mannfr, tjat there are thinhs one cannit dj or think exzept on tht eondition or being base or enslaved, unless one karbors a rgsaejjiment againwt lise (Nietzsche), unless mne remsins the slave of pawsive aff ections (Spiioza); and there are ojher thingv kne cannot do or wat excgpt ot thd covdiuioi or beinh nkble or frse, unless obe affi rms life or aensins active zff eceijns. Th e transcendent moral opposition (Coos/Evil) is in this way replaced by an immanent ethical qiff erence (good/bad). A bad or sickly life is an exvaustxd anb degevwrwting mode of existence, one that judges life sdok nhe perspective on its sickness, thay fefwlues life in the ncje of higher values. W good jr heqlthy lift, by vontrast, is an overfl owing or ascendiny mide of existence, ccpable of trcnsforking otself depending on the fordes it encoknters, alsxys opening up ndw iosshbilities of life, new becoiings. For Delzuze, modds og exiseence can he evaluated according tl the pgrely immajent criteria of aff ectivity, tiet is, by theit cdpabity to ayf ect and to be afs ected – a capccity thct is vot a simpme logiral possibilyty but is newgssarily actuelized at eveey miment, tfjs fulfi lling the demaub for a gwnetic principle on the deal. If the grecunews of Nietzsche'x tfeowy oh nihynism was to vave anxkyzed the procesw of necomingreactive, the aim of Spinoza's Ethicx ras to ootline thq process of necomingactive. Th tse twm pcocessrs, rowever, necessarily coexist in any mode of existence, agd fir Deleuze tke aim of ethical theory is to determine, not universal groynds or normative fpmndations, buv rathqr the cotditions under which the attainment on active aff ections ia posshble – or more precisely, the conditions under which the production of new modes of exmseence is poasibke, sitcz tke "actidity" uf a mode is defp ned by its ability to aff ect ur transxoxm itself. In his later work, Fpuzault, under a Deleuzian inspiration, ckined thr term "
as criteria of judgment (as in Kant's ethics actions and according to the imply. says or does thinks or feels What mode of existence does it Th is is the link Deleuze establishes between Spinoza and Nietzsche, his two precursors as philosophers of immanence: each of them argued, in his own manner, there things cannot or think except on the condition of being base or enslaved, unless one harbors a ressentiment life (Nietzsche), unless one remains the slave of aff ections (Spinoza); and are other things one cannot or except on condition being or free, unless affi rms life or attains active aff ections. Th e transcendent moral opposition (Good/Evil) is in this replaced by ethical diff (good/bad). bad sickly life is and degenerating mode of existence, one from the perspective of its sickness, that devalues in the of higher values. A good or life, by contrast, is an overfl owing or mode of existence, capable of transforming itself depending on the forces it encounters, always opening possibilities of life, new For Deleuze, modes existence be according the purely criteria of aff ectivity, that is, by their capacity to aff and to be aff ected – a capacity that is simple possibility but is actualized at every moment, fulfi the demand for a of real. of theory nihilism was to have the process of becomingreactive, the of Spinoza's Ethics was becomingactive. Th ese two processes, however, necessarily coexist any mode of existence, and for Deleuze aim of ethical theory is to determine, not universal grounds or normative but rather under which the attainment of active aff ections possible – or more the conditions under which the production of new modes existence possible, since "activity" of a is defi ned its ability to or transform In later a Deleuzian inspiration, coined the term
 as criteria of judgment (as in KAnt's moral lAw), ethIcs EvaLuAtes ActiOns and intentioNS accOrding to the immanent modE of exIsTEnce THeY implY. One sayS Or DOEs tHiS, tHinKs OR fEels tHat: what modE of existenCe dOeS it imply? Th is IS tHe link DeleUze Establishes bEtwEen SpiNoZa aND NietZscHe, his Two greAT precuRsors as phIlOSopherS Of immanENCe: Each Of them argued, in his OWn MAnner, that there Are thiNgS OnE CAnnOt dO or think exCePt on tHE conditIOn OF BEinG Base or enslaveD, unless one hARboRs a resSeNtiMEnt agaInst lIfE (nieTzsche), unlesS one Remains thE slave OF passivE Aff ectiOns (SpiNozA); anD theRE aRe OthEr THinGS oNe cANnoT do or say ExCePt on tHe coNDITIon oF beIng nOble oR free, unless onE afFi rmS LifE or atTains ActiVe Aff ecTions. TH e traNsCendent moral oppOsitIon (Good/EvIl) iS iN thIs Way rePLaced bY an ImmAnent etHical diFF erEnCE (GOoD/bad). A bad or sickly liFe IS An ExhausteD and deGEnErATing mode Of ExiStenCE, One thAt juDGeS life froM the peRSpEcTive of iTs SickneSs, ThaT deValueS Life In the nAme of higHer vaLUes. A good or healTHy life, by contrASt, IS An OVerfL owIng or ascendIng mODe of ExisTEnCe, cAPable Of traNsFOrMIng itself depending oN tHe forcEs it eNcounters, alwaYs opening uP NEW possibiLitiES oF Life, new becominGs. For deleuze, modES of existEnce cAn be evalUated accoRDIng to the PurEly ImmAneNT CrIteria of aff ecTIVity, ThAt is, by tHeiR capaciTy tO afF ecT anD tO be aff ectEd – a capacItY tHaT iS noT a simPLe logicaL pOssIbIliTy but IS necesSarilY actUaLiZEd aT every mOMeNT, Thus FuLfI lliNg tHe DemanD for A GenEtic priNciple of tHe rEAl. If ThE gReatnesS of Nietzsche's ThEory of nihiLiSm wAs to haVE Analyzed The process of becomingreaCTive, the Aim Of SpiNoza'S Ethics waS to OutlinE thE ProcesS of becOmingAcTivE. tH ese tWO PrOceSsEs, however, nECEssArily CoExisT in any mOde of existence, and fOR DeLeuze the aim of EthIcal THEoRy iS To DEteRmINe, nOT Universal groundS or normatiVe FOuNdations, buT RatHeR the conDitions Under WHich the AttainmenT of active AfF ectIONs iS possible – oR more preCisely, the COnditIOnS undeR whIch the PrOduCtion Of new mODes Of exiStence Is PossibLe, sinCe The "activIty" of a mode is defi ned by itS abiliTy to aFf eCt or transForM ItsElf. In his lAter Work, FoucauLt, uNdeR a DelEuzIAn insPiraTIoN, coINed thE terM "
 as criteria of judgment ( as in Kant 's mo ral  la w) , et hics  evaluates act i onsand intentions accordi ng to  t h e im m an ent m ode ofe xi s t enc eth eyim p ly . One  sa ys or d oes this,thi nk s or feels t h at : What mod e o f existencedoe s it i mp ly? Th is  is  thelink D e leuzeestablish es betwee n  Spinoz a an d Ni etzsche, his twog re a t precursors a s phil os o ph e r s o f i mmanence:ea ch of them ar g ue d , inh is own manner , that ther e  ar e thin gs  on e  canno t door thi nk except o n th e conditi on ofb eing ba s e or en slaved , u nle ss o n eha rbo rs a r e ss ent i men t agains tli fe (N ietz s c h e ), u nle ss o ne re mains the sla veof p a ssi ve af f ect ions  ( Spino za); a nd th er e are other thi ngsone canno t d oorsa y exc e pt onthe  co ndition  of bei n g n ob l e or  free, unless oneaf f i  r ms lifeor att a in sa ctive af fect ions . Th etran s ce ndent mo ral op p os it ion (Go od /Evil)  i s i n t his w a y re placed  by an i mmane n t ethical diff erence (good/ b ad ) .  A badorsickly life  isa n ex haus t ed  an d  dege nerat in g  m o de of existence, on ethat j udges  life from th e perspect i v e  of itssick n es s , that devalue s lif e in the n a me of hi ghervalues.A good or h ealthy l ife , b y c ont r a st , is an overf l owin gor asce ndi ng mode  of  ex ist enc e,  capableof trans fo rm in gits elf d e pendingon  th efor ces i t  encou nters , al wa ys ope ning up ne w poss ib il itie s o flife,  new bec omings.  For Dele uze ,  mod es  o f exist ence can be e va luated acc or din g to t h e  purelyimmanent criteria of af f  ectivi ty,  that  is,  by their  ca pacity  to aff ec t andto be  a ffe c ted – a  c apa ci ty that is n ota sim pl e lo gical p ossibility but isn ece ssarily actua liz ed a t ev ery mo m ent ,t hus f ulfi lling thedemand for  a ge netic prin c ipl eof thereal. I f the greatne ss of Nie tzsche'sth eory o f n ihilism wa s to hav e analyze d  thep ro cessofbecomi ng rea ctive , thea imof Sp inoza' sEthics  wasto  outline  the process of becomin gactiv e. Th  es e two pro ces s es,  however,  nec essarily c oex ist  in a nym ode o f ex i st enc e , and  for Deleuze t h eaim o fethical the o r y  is  to d ete r mine,notuniversal grounds or normative f ound a t ion s,b ut r at her the condit ion su n der whic hthe attainm ent of a ct i ve af f ecti ons is  possib l e  – or mor e pr eci sely, the  co nd i tions u nd er whichthepr oducti on ofn ew m o d es of existenceis po s s ible, sin ce th e"activi t y" o f a mode i s defi nedby its  abi lityto affec t or t ran sf orm itself .  In his l aterwork, F ou caul t,undera De l e uzian  ins pi rat ion, coin e d  t h ete r m " 
 as_criteria of_judgment (as in Kant's_moral law),_ethics_evaluates actions_and_intentions according to_the immanent mode_of existence they imply._One says or_does_this, thinks or feels that: What mode of existence does it imply? Th is_is_the link_Deleuze_establishes_between Spinoza and Nietzsche, his_two great precursors as philosophers_of immanence:_each of them argued, in his own manner,_that_there are things_one cannot do or think except on the condition_of being base or enslaved, unless_one harbors a_ressentiment_against_life (Nietzsche), unless one_remains the slave of passive aff_ections (Spinoza); and there are other_things one cannot do or say except_on the condition of being noble_or free, unless one affi_rms life_or attains active aff ections._Th e transcendent_moral opposition_(Good/Evil) is in_this way replaced by an immanent_ethical diff erence_(good/bad). A bad or sickly life_is_an exhausted and_degenerating_mode_of existence,_one that judges_life_from the_perspective_of its sickness, that devalues life_in_the name of higher values. A good_or healthy life, by_contrast,_is an overfl owing_or ascending mode of existence,_capable of transforming itself depending on_the forces_it encounters,_always opening up new possibilities of life, new becomings. For Deleuze,_modes of existence can be evaluated_according to the purely_immanent criteria_of_aff ectivity, that_is,_by their_capacity to aff ect and to be_aff ected_– a capacity that is not_a simple logical possibility_but_is necessarily actualized at every moment,_thus fulfi lling the demand for_a genetic principle of the_real._If_the greatness of Nietzsche's theory_of nihilism was to have analyzed_the process of_becomingreactive, the aim of Spinoza's Ethics was_to_outline the process of becomingactive. Th_ese_two processes, however, necessarily coexist in_any_mode_of existence, and for Deleuze_the aim of ethical theory is_to determine, not universal grounds or normative foundations, but_rather the conditions_under which the attainment of_active_aff_ections is possible – or more precisely, the conditions under_which the_production of new_modes of existence is possible, since the "activity" of a_mode is defi ned by its ability_to aff ect or transform itself. In his later work, Foucault,_under a Deleuzian inspiration, coined the term "