 only by our cultures but also by our positions within them, like our class, gender, race, sexual orientation, disability status, and so on. Indeed, not all moral relativists are cultural relativists. For example, some Marxists think that moral claims are true and false relative to different social classes, and others have thought the same about a wide range of other factors. All of this leads to the thought that morality isn't relative only to culture, but to all of these things (after all, picking out just one category over the others would be pretty arbitrary). But what happens then, as we go down this road of pulling more and more demographic categories into our relativist theory, is that we 11 gradually move away from the idea that moral claims are true and false relative to different groups, and towards the idea that moral claims are true and false relative to different individuals. At that point, 'this is true for me' stops meaning anything very different from just 'this is what I think'. And so we seem to lose sight of the distinctive, central idea of relativism-that moral judgements are true and false relative to different groups-and end up just with the idea that different people have different moral beliefs, something we already knew. In short, while moral relativism seems to lead to all sorts of problems about how exactly to define the relevant groups, and how to decide which moral claims are true relative to which groups, other kinds of anti-objectivism don't. And that's one of the main reasons why even anti-objectivist philosophers tend not to be relativists. (Or course, both expressivism and error theory have problems of their own-but that's a story for another time.) 6. Concluding Thoughts If I were to go back in time and give philosophical advice to my past self, it would be this. First, take very seriously the idea that there might be a single, universal, objective morality-that idea's not nearly as ridiculous as you think. Second, if after careful reflection you conclude that morality really isn't objective, then consider adopting some other kind of anti-objectivism in place of relativism. It may save you a lot of trouble. Unfortunately, I'll never be able to give this advice to its intended recipient. But I hope, at least, some of it has been useful for you. François Laruelle. A Biography of Ordinary Man: On Authorities and Minorities. Ed. Jessie Hock and Alex Dubilet. Cambridge: Pol
only by our cultures but also by our positions within them, like our course, sex, subspecies, sexual orientation, disability condition, and so on. Indeed, not all moral relativists are cultural relativists. For example, some Marxists remember that moral claims are true and delusive relative to different social classes, and others have think the same about a wide image of early factors. All of this leads to the opinion that morality isn't relative merely to culture, but to all of these things (after wholly, picking out just one class over the others would be pretty arbitrary). But what happen then, as we go down this road of pulling more and more demographic categories into our relativist theory, is that we 11 gradually move aside from the idea that moral claims are true and false relative to different groups, and towards the idea that moral claims are true and false relative to different individuals. At that point,' this is true for me' stops meaning anything very different from merely' this is what I think'. And so we appear to miss sight of the distinctive, central theme of relativism - that moral judgements are true and false relative to different group - and end up just with the idea that different people have different moral beliefs, something we already know. In short, while moral relativism seems to lead to all sorts of problems about how exactly to specify the relevant groups, and how to decide which moral claims are true relative to which groups, early kinds of anti - objectivism don't. And that's one of the main reasons why even anti - objectivist philosophers tend not to be relativists. (Or course, both expressivism and error theory have problem of their own - but that's a story for another time .) 6. reason Thoughts If I were to start back in time and grant philosophical advice to my past self, it would be this. First, take very seriously the idea that there might be a individual, universal, objective ethical motive - that idea's not nearly as ridiculous as you intend. Second, if after careful contemplation you conclude that morality very isn't objective, then consider adopting some early kind of anti - objectivism in place of relativism. It may save you a lot of trouble. Unfortunately, I'll never be able to give this advice to its intended recipient. But I hope, at least, some of it has been useful for you. François Laruelle. A Biography of Ordinary Man: On Authorities and Minorities. Ed. Jessie Hock and Alex Dubilet. Cambridge: Pol
 onpy by our cultures but auso by our posijiins wivhin thsm, like uur class, gender, race, sexual oeientqtion, disability statur, and so ln. Indeee, nou all moral relatmbists avz culfmral xeoativists. For gxample, some Marxists thinn ghct moral claims are true and false rqlative tl different sosial slasavs, and others have thought the aame abmut a wide ramge of other factors. All ov thls leads to the thlught that norajuty isn't relxtive only to culture, gut to all of these things (aftef all, picking ooc judj one categocy oveg the others would be pretty arbitrary). But whet hqppens then, as we go vown this road of pujling mora cnd more demographic xaregorhes hnto iur remavivjst thforb, is that ws 11 graduallt move away from tht iqvs that moral claimf wre true and false relative to differenu grohps, and towards the ideq that moral claims ate true anq false relative to different individuals. At that poinv, 'ghiw ls tfye for me' stops meaning anything very different rrpm just 'this is chat I think'. And sl eg seem to lose sight of the distinctive, cfntral ydea if relatidism-yhat moral judgements are teue and falsv reoative to differenc groups-and znd up just with the idea that difyerent people havf differehg moral beliefs, romvthitg we already knew. In shore, while miral relatixism seems to lead tl all sorts of problems wbout hmw exactly to define the relevant groups, eid how to decoda wvich morcl clalms are true rejative to whick groups, othef kinds of anti-oboectivism dog't. And that's mje of the mamn reasonf wht evwn anti-ucjectivist phikosophers tend not ro be relativists. (Pr zkurse, both exprzrwivism and errot tfeowy heve pwmblems of thair uwn-cit thxt's a sujrn fur amother time.) 6. Concludhng Fhoughts If I were tj go bacj in timq and give pholosophical advice to mb past self, it would be this. First, take very seriouslj tme idea that eherc midht be a snngle, universal, objective morality-that ivea's not nearly as ridixulous as you think. Xecond, if ahter cwreful rexlection you concludw that morality rtally isn't objective, thsn convider adopting some other kind of anti-objectivism in place of relativism. It mat save you a lot or trpuble. Uufoxtunatejy, I'pu never be able no give this advice to its intenved recipianc. But I hope, at least, some of ig has been usgful for you. François Laruemle. A Bipgraphy of Ordinary Man: On Authprities and Minorities. Ec. Jessie Hock and Alex Vubilet. Cambridge: Pok
only by our cultures but also by within like our gender, race, sexual on. not all moral are cultural relativists. example, some Marxists think that moral are true and false relative to different social classes, and others have thought same about a wide range of other factors. All of this leads to thought morality relative to culture, but to all of these things (after all, picking out just one category over others would be pretty arbitrary). But what happens as we go down road of pulling more and demographic into our theory, that 11 gradually move from the idea that moral claims are true and false relative to different groups, and towards the that moral true and relative different At that point, true for me' stops meaning anything just 'this is what I think'. And so seem to sight of the distinctive, central idea relativism-that moral judgements are true and false relative different groups-and end up just with the idea that different people have different moral beliefs, already knew. In short, moral relativism seems lead all of about how to define the relevant groups, and how to decide which moral are true relative to which groups, other kinds of anti-objectivism that's of the main why even anti-objectivist philosophers not be relativists. (Or course, and theory their that's story for another time.) Concluding Thoughts If I were go back in time my past self, it would be this. First, very seriously the idea that there might a single, universal, objective morality-that idea's not nearly as ridiculous as you Second, if reflection you conclude that morality really isn't objective, consider adopting some other of anti-objectivism in place of relativism. It may save a of trouble. I'll never be to give this to its intended I hope, least, of useful for you. François Laruelle. A of Man: On Authorities and Minorities. Jessie Alex Dubilet. Cambridge: Pol
 only by our cultures but also bY our positiOns wiThiN thEm, Like Our cLass, gender, race, SExuaL orientation, disability StatuS, aND so oN. inDeed, nOt all moRAl RELatIvIsTs aRe CUlTural RelAtivistS. For examplE, soMe marxists thinK ThAt moral claIms Are true and faLse RelatiVe To dIFfereNt sOcial ClasseS, And othErs have thOuGHt the sAMe about A WIdE ranGe of other factors. ALL oF This leads to the ThoughT tHAt MORalIty Isn't relatiVe Only tO Culture, BUt TO ALl oF These things (afTer all, pickiNG ouT just oNe CatEGory ovEr the OtHErs Would be pretTy arBitrary). BuT what hAPpens thEN, as we go Down thIs rOad Of puLLiNg MorE aND moRE dEmoGRapHic categOrIeS into Our rELATIvisT thEory, Is thaT we 11 gradually mOve Away FRom The idEa thaT morAl ClaimS are trUe and FaLse relative to diFferEnt groups, And ToWarDs The idEA that mOraL clAims are True and FAlsE rELATiVe to different indivIdUALs. at that poInt, 'thiS Is TrUE for me' stOpS meAninG ANythiNg veRY dIfferent From juST 'tHiS is what i tHink'. AnD sO we SeeM to loSE sigHt of thE distincTive, cENtral idea of relATivism-that morAL jUDGeMEnts Are True and falsE relATive To diFFeRenT GroupS-and eNd UP jUSt with the idea that diFfErent pEople Have different Moral belieFS, SOmething We alREaDY knew. In short, whIle moRal relativISm seems tO lead To all sorTs of problEMS about hoW exActLy tO deFINe The relevant grOUPs, anD hOw to decIde Which moRal ClaIms Are TrUe relativE to which GrOuPs, OtHer Kinds OF anti-objEcTivIsM doN't. And THat's onE of thE maiN rEaSOns Why even ANtI-OBjecTiViSt phIloSoPhers Tend NOt tO be relaTivists. (Or CouRSe, boTh ExPressivIsm and error thEoRy have probLeMs oF their OWN-but that'S a story for another time.) 6. CoNCluding thoUghts if I wEre to go baCk iN time aNd gIVe philOsophiCal adViCe tO MY past SELf, It wOuLd be this. FiRST, taKe verY sErioUsly the Idea that there might BE a sIngle, universaL, obJectIVE mOraLItY-ThaT iDEa's NOT nearly as ridicuLous as you tHiNK. SEcond, if aftER caReFul reflEction yOu conCLude thaT morality Really isn'T oBjecTIVe, tHen consideR adoptinG some otheR Kind oF AnTi-objEctIvism iN pLacE of reLativiSM. It May saVe you a LoT of troUble. UNfOrtunateLy, I'll never be able to give tHis advIce to Its Intended rEciPIenT. But I hope, At leAst, some of iT haS beEn useFul FOr you. franÇOiS LaRUelle. a BioGRaphy of OrDInAry mAN: ON AuthoritieS AND MiNoritIes. eD. JessiE HocK and Alex Dubilet. CaMBridge: Pol
 only by our cultures butalso by ou r pos iti ons  w ithi n th em, like our c l ass,  gender, race, sexualorien ta t ion, di sabil ity sta t us , and  s oon.  I n de ed, n otall mor al relativ ist sare cultural re lativists.  Fo r example, s ome  Marxi st s t h ink t hat  mora l clai m s aretrue andfa l se rel a tive to d if fere nt social classes ,  a n d others havethough tt he s ame  ab out a wide  r angeo f other fa c t o rs. All of this l eads to the tho ught t ha t m o rality  isn' tr ela tive only t o cu lture, bu t to a l l of th e se thin gs (af ter  al l, p i ck in g o ut jus t  o nec ate gory ove rth e oth ersw o u l d be  pr etty  arbi trary). But w hat  hap p ens  then , aswe g odownthis r oad o fpulling more an d mo re demogr aph ic  ca te gorie s  intoour  re lativis t theor y , i st h a twe 11 gradually mo ve a wa y from t he ide a  t ha t  moral c la ims  are t rue a nd f a ls e relati ve tod if fe rent gr ou ps, an dtow ard s the idea  thatmoral cl aimsa re true and fa l se relative t o  d i f fe r entind ividuals. A t th a t po int, 't his is tr ue fo rm e' stops meaning anyth in g very  diff erent from ju st 'this i s w hat I th ink' .  A n d so we seem t o los e sight of the dist incti ve, cent ral ideao f  relativ ism -th atmor a l  j udgements are t ruean d false  re lativetodif fer ent  g roups-and  end upju st  w it h t he id e a that d if fer en t p eople have d iffer entmo ra l  be liefs,s om e t hing  w ealre ady  k new.In s h ort , while  moral re lat i vism  s ee ms to l ead to all so rt s of probl em s a bout h o w  exactly  to define the relevant groups,  an d how  todecide wh ich  moral  cl a ims ar e true  rela ti vet o  whic h gr oup s,  other kin d s  of  anti -o bjec tivismdon't. And that'so neof the main r eas onsw h yeve n  a n ti- ob j ect i v ist philosopher s tend not  t o  b e relativi s ts.  ( Or cour se, bot h exp r essivis m and err or theory  h avep r obl ems of the ir own-b ut that's a sto r yfor a not her ti me .)6. Co ncludi n g T hough ts IfIwere t o goba ck in ti me and give philosophic al adv ice t o m y past se lf, itwould bethis . First, t ake  ve ry se rio u sly t he i d ea  th a t the re m i ght be as in gle , un iversal, ob j e c tiv e mor ali t y-that  ide a's not nearly as ridiculous asyout h ink . S e cond ,if after caref ulre f l ection y ou  conclude t hat mora li t y rea lly is n't ob jective , th e n cons ider  ad opting so meot h er kind  o fa nti-ob ject iv ism in  place of r e l ativism. It maysavey o u a l o t o f tro ub le. Unf o rtun ately, I'l l never beable t o gi ve th is advi ce  to it s i nt ended reci p ient. But  I ho pe, atle ast,  so me ofit h a s  been  use fu l f or you. F r a nç o is  L a rue lle.  A Bi og raph y of Ordi n ary Man:  On Authori ti esa n d Mino r it i e s. Ed. Jes sie  Hock a nd Alex Du b ilet .  C a mbrid ge: Po l
 only_by our_cultures but also by_our positions_within_them, like_our_class, gender, race,_sexual orientation, disability_status, and so on._Indeed, not all_moral_relativists are cultural relativists. For example, some Marxists think that moral claims are true_and_false relative_to_different_social classes, and others have_thought the same about a_wide range_of other factors. All of this leads to_the_thought that morality_isn't relative only to culture, but to all of_these things (after all, picking out_just one category_over_the_others would be pretty_arbitrary). But what happens then, as_we go down this road of_pulling more and more demographic categories into_our relativist theory, is that we_11 gradually move away from_the idea_that moral claims are true_and false relative_to different_groups, and towards_the idea that moral claims are_true and false_relative to different individuals. At that_point,_'this is true_for_me'_stops meaning_anything very different_from_just 'this_is_what I think'. And so we_seem_to lose sight of the distinctive, central_idea of relativism-that moral_judgements_are true and false_relative to different groups-and end_up just with the idea that_different people_have different_moral beliefs, something we already knew. In short, while moral relativism_seems to lead to all sorts_of problems about how_exactly to_define_the relevant groups,_and_how to_decide which moral claims are true relative_to which_groups, other kinds of anti-objectivism don't._And that's one of_the_main reasons why even anti-objectivist philosophers_tend not to be relativists. (Or_course, both expressivism and error_theory_have_problems of their own-but that's_a story for another time.) 6._Concluding Thoughts If_I were to go back in time_and_give philosophical advice to my past_self,_it would be this. First, take_very_seriously_the idea that there might_be a single, universal, objective morality-that_idea's not nearly as ridiculous as you think. Second,_if after careful_reflection you conclude that morality_really_isn't_objective, then consider adopting some other kind of anti-objectivism in_place of_relativism. It may_save you a lot of trouble. Unfortunately, I'll never be_able to give this advice to its_intended recipient. But I hope, at least, some of it has_been useful for you. François Laruelle. A Biography_of Ordinary Man: On Authorities and Minorities._Ed. Jessie Hock and_Alex_Dubilet. Cambridge: Pol