 attempts to reduce it to notions other than knowledge have failed. He then proceeds to show that other notions of philosophical interest such as assertibility and belief and evidence can be illuminated by, or even reduced to, knowledge. Another example is Woodward ([2003]) who shows that one can say many illuminating things about direct causal relevance in terms of other causal notions in a circular, but not viciously circular way. In these two cases the existence and intelligibility of knowledge and causality (that differs from direct causal relevance), respectively, are taken for granted. While one generally has to argue for the existence and intelligibility of the things one postulates, there are clearer cases such as those of knowledge and causality where this is not so urgent, and less clear cases such as that of the confirmation function where this is urgent. Williamson's work on knowledge and Woodward's work on causality belong to the very best of contemporary philosophy, even though their work bears some resemblance to the deus ex machina strategy. It does so by giving up on attempts to reductive analysis, and by stipulating that there exist such things as knowledge and causality 9 and that they have the properties intuition says they have. Therefore it may not be possible to completely do without elements of the deus ex machina strategy. However, we clearly should try to work with as few of those elements as possible. An account that stipulates that there exists a "degrees-of-support function" that is sufficiently independent of and appropriately linked to the agent's degree of belief function to play the role of the confirmation function is presented in Hawthorne ([2005]). Hawthorne's degrees-of-support function is supposed to be a logical or quasi-logical conception of probability that represents objective or public likelihoods (Hawthorne [2005], pp. 298ff). While Hawthorne ([2005]) states a link between his degrees-of-support function and the agent's degree of belief function, he does not say why we are entitled to assume that there exists a degrees-of-support function. Nor does he tell us how we could possibly determine the quasi-logical or logical degree-of-support of a sentence or proposition. Therefore Hawthorne violates the criterion of ascertainability that has been suggested by Salmon ([1966]) as a condition of adequacy on interpretations of probability (the criterion is also favorably discussed in Hájek [2012], sect. 2). "This criterion requires that there be some method by which, in principle at least, we can ascertain values
attempts to reduce it to notions other than cognition have fail. He then proceeds to show that early notions of philosophic interest such as assertibility and belief and evidence can be light by, or even reduced to, knowledge. Another model is Woodward ([ 2003 ]) who shows that one can say many illuminate things about direct causal relevance in term of other causal notions in a circular, but not viciously circular way. In these two font the existence and intelligibility of knowledge and causality (that disagree from direct causal relevance), respectively, are taken for granted. While one generally have to argue for the existence and intelligibility of the things one postulates, there are clearer case such as those of knowledge and causality where this is not so urgent, and less clear cases such as that of the ratification affair where this is urgent. Williamson's work on knowledge and Woodward's work on causality belong to the very best of contemporary philosophy, even though their work wear some resemblance to the deus ex machina strategy. It does indeed by pass up on attempts to reductive analysis, and by stipulating that there exist such things as knowledge and causality 9 and that they have the properties intuition says they accept. Therefore it may not be possible to completely do without elements of the deus ex machina strategy. However, we distinctly should try to work with as few of those elements as potential. An account that stipulate that there exists a " degrees - of - support function " that is sufficiently independent of and appropriately connect to the agent's degree of belief affair to play the role of the confirmation function is present in Hawthorne ([ 2005 ]). Hawthorne's degrees - of - accompaniment function is supposed to be a legitimate or quasi - logical concept of probability that represents objective or public likelihood (Hawthorne [ 2005 ], pp. 298ff). While Hawthorne ([ 2005 ]) states a link between his academic degree - of - support function and the agentive role's degree of belief function, he does not say why we are entitled to assume that there exists a degrees - of - support function. Nor does he tell us how we could possibly determine the quasi - legitimate or logical degree - of - accompaniment of a sentence or proposition. consequently Hawthorne violates the criterion of ascertainability that has been suggested by Salmon ([ 1966 ]) as a condition of adequacy on interpretations of probability (the criterion is also favorably discussed in Hájek [ 2012 ], sect. 2). " This criterion necessitate that there be some method acting by which, in principle at least, we can ascertain values
 athempts to reduce it to nutions other thcb knownedge gave faiued. He then proceeds to show tyat ouker notions of philorophical pnterest wuch qs assertiujlity akb beljcf anb xvidence can be illuminatad by, or even seaueed to, knowledge. Another example is Roodwarc ([2003]) who shows thaj one san aay many illuminating things about direct causal relevsnce in terms of other caudal jotions in a circupar, but not vicyiusly circulxr way. In uhzse two casgs the existence and intelligibiuity pf knowledte anf causality (vhat dpffers from dlgect cagsal rekevance), respecbivelb, arw taken for granted. Wiile one generally hws to argge for the existencw qnd ittelnigiculigy kf tge thijgs one postumates, there are clearer cases xusy as those of knowlqdde and causality where this is not so uggenf, and less clear cases wuch as that of the clnfirmatijn function where this is urgent. Williamson's work on kiodlebnc ana Wlodward's work on causality belong to the very gext of contemporavy philosophy, even tjoidh their work bears soje resemblance to hhe deuf ex nachina surateby. It does so by giving up in attempts no rwductive analysis, cnd by stipuuatimg thst there exist such thiugs as knowledge wnd causamkty 9 and that thdy mava the properties intuition says theb havz. Therefure ot may not be podsiblc to completely do aithoot elekents of tje deus ex machina strategy. Howxter, we clearli svound try tj worl with as few of those elemgnts as pjssibue. An accolnt that vtipulates ehat there exhdts a "degreev-of-suppowt fynctuon" thag is sufficientky indepeubent of abd appropriately llnked fo the agent's dzyrte of belief funvtiun eo pkar the role of the covgirmagion functiiv is presented in Hawthosne ([2005]). Hawthorne's degreex-on-support dunction is supposed yo be a logical or quasm-logicel convepjion of probability that repressnts objeftiye or public jikeoihoods (Hawtkorne [2005], pp. 298ff). While Hawthorne ([2005]) states a lmnk between his degrees-if-support function cnc the agent'x degwee of benief function, he doew not say why we sre entitled to assums that therf exists a degrees-of-support function. Nor does he tell us how we could poswibly veeermine the quaxi-logpcaj or lodicap degree-of-support of a sentence or proposition. Tierefore Hdwchorne violates the criterion ow ascertainabklity that has been suggssted by Salmon ([1966]) as a condition of adeqiacy on interpretations pf probavilitg (the btitxrion is also favoranly divcusswd in Háhek [2012], sect. 2). "This cfitrrlon requirfs tiat there be some method by which, ib prinxiole at least, we ran ascertaik yalues
attempts to reduce it to notions other have He then to show that such assertibility and belief evidence can be by, or even reduced to, knowledge. example is Woodward ([2003]) who shows that one can say many illuminating things direct causal relevance in terms of other causal notions in a circular, but viciously way. these cases the existence and intelligibility of knowledge and causality (that differs from direct causal relevance), respectively, taken for granted. While one generally has to for the existence and of the things one postulates, are cases such those knowledge causality where this not so urgent, and less clear cases such as that of the confirmation function where this is Williamson's work and Woodward's on belong the very best philosophy, even though their work bears the deus ex machina strategy. It does so giving up attempts to reductive analysis, and by that there exist such things as knowledge and 9 and that they have the properties intuition says they have. Therefore it may not to completely do without of the deus machina However, clearly try to with as few of those elements as possible. An account that that there exists a "degrees-of-support function" that is sufficiently independent appropriately to the agent's of belief function to the of the confirmation function in ([2005]). is to a logical or quasi-logical of probability that represents objective public likelihoods (Hawthorne [2005], states a link between his degrees-of-support function and agent's degree of belief function, he does say why we are entitled to assume that there exists a degrees-of-support Nor does us how we could possibly determine the quasi-logical logical degree-of-support of a or proposition. Therefore Hawthorne violates the criterion of ascertainability has suggested by ([1966]) as a of adequacy on of probability (the also favorably in [2012], criterion requires that there be some by in principle at least, we ascertain
 attempts to reduce it to notioNs other thaN knowLedGe hAvE faiLed. HE then proceeds tO Show That other notions of philOsophIcAL intEReSt sucH as asseRTiBILitY aNd BelIeF AnD evidEncE can be iLluminated By, oR eVen reduced to, KNoWledge. AnotHer Example is WooDwaRd ([2003]) who sHoWs tHAt one Can Say maNy illuMInatinG things abOuT Direct CAusal reLEVaNce iN terms of other causAL nOTions in a circulAr, but nOt VIcIOUslY ciRcular way. IN tHese tWO cases tHE eXISTenCE and intelligiBility of knoWLedGe and cAuSalITy (that DiffeRs FRom Direct causaL relEvance), resPectivELy, are taKEn for grAnted. WHilE onE genERaLlY haS tO ArgUE fOr tHE exIstence aNd InTelliGibiLITY Of thE thIngs One poStulates, there Are CleaREr cAses sUch as ThosE oF knowLedge aNd cauSaLity where this is Not sO urgent, anD leSs CleAr Cases SUch as tHat Of tHe confiRmation FUncTiON WHeRe this is urgent. WillIaMSOn'S work on kNowledGE aNd wOodward's WoRk oN cauSALity bElonG To The very bEst of cONtEmPorary pHiLosophY, eVen ThoUgh thEIr woRk bearS some resEmblaNCe to the deus ex mAChina strategy. iT dOES sO By giVinG up on attempTs to REducTive ANaLysIS, and bY stipUlATiNG that there exist such ThIngs as KnowlEdge and causalIty 9 and that THEY have the PropERtIEs intuition sayS they Have. TherefORe it may nOt be pOssible tO completeLY Do withouT elEmeNts Of tHE DeUs ex machina stRATegy. hoWever, we CleArly shoUld Try To wOrk WiTh as few of Those eleMeNtS aS pOssIble. AN Account tHaT stIpUlaTes thAT there ExistS a "deGrEeS-Of-sUpport fUNcTIOn" thAt Is SuffIciEnTly inDepeNDenT of and aPpropriatEly LInkeD tO tHe agent'S degree of beliEf Function to PlAy tHe role OF The confiRmation function is presenTEd in HawThoRne ([2005]). HaWthoRne's degreEs-oF-suppoRt fUNction Is suppOsed tO bE a lOGIcal oR QUaSi-lOgIcal concepTIOn oF probAbIlitY that rePresents objective oR PubLic likelihoodS (HaWthoRNE [2005], pP. 298ff). wHiLE HaWtHOrnE ([2005]) STates a link betweEn his degreEs-OF-sUpport funcTIon AnD the ageNt's degrEe of bELief funCtion, he doEs not say wHy We arE ENtiTled to assuMe that thEre exists A DegreES-oF-suppOrt FunctiOn. nor Does hE tell uS How We couLd possIbLy deteRmine ThE quasi-loGical or logical degree-of-sUpport Of a seNteNce or propOsiTIon. therefore hawtHorne violaTes The CriteRioN Of ascErtaINaBilITy thaT has BEen suggesTEd By SALMoN ([1966]) as a conditiON OF adEquacY on INterprEtatIons of probability (THe criterion is aLso fAVOraBly DIscuSsEd in Hájek [2012], sect. 2). "THis CrITErion reqUiRes that therE be some mEtHOd by wHich, in PrinciPle at leAST, wE Can ascErtaIn vAlues
 attempts to reduce it tonotions ot her t han  kn ow ledg e ha ve failed. Het henproceeds to show thatother  n o tion s  o f phi losophi c al i nte re st  su ch as  asse rti bilityand belief  an devidence can be  illuminat edby, or evenred uced t o,  kn o wledg e.Anoth er exa m ple is  Woodward  ( [ 2003]) who sho w s  t hatone can say manyi ll u minating thing s abou td ir e c t c aus al relevan ce  in t e rms ofo th e r cau s al notions in  a circular ,  bu t notvi cio u sly ci rcula rw ay.  In these t wo c ases theexiste n ce andi ntellig ibilit y o f k nowl e dg eand  c a usa l it y ( t hat  differs  f ro m dir ectc a u s al r ele vanc e), r espectively,are  tak e n f or gr anted . Wh il e one  gener allyha s to argue fortheexistence  an dint el ligib i lity o f t hethingsone pos t ula te s , th ere are clearer ca se s su ch as th ose of kn ow l edge and  c aus alit y where  thi s  i s not so  urgen t ,an d lesscl ear ca se s s uch  as t h at o f theconfirma tionf unction wheret his is urgent .  W i l li a mson 'swork on kno wled g e an d Wo o dw ard ' s wor k onca u sa l ity belong to the v er y best  of c ontemporary p hilosophy, e v en thoug h th e ir work bears som e res emblance t o  the deu s exmachinastrategy. I t does s o b y g ivi ngu p  o n attempts to r educ ti ve anal ysi s, andbysti pul ati ng  that the re exist  s uc hth ing s ask nowledge  a ndca usa lity9  and t hat t heyha ve the  proper t ie s intu it io n sa ysth ey ha ve.T her efore i t may not  be poss ib le  to com pletely do wi th out elemen ts  of  the d e u s ex mac hina strategy. However, we clea rly  shou ld t ry to wor k w ith as  fe w  of th ose el ement sasp o ssibl e .  A n a cc ount thats t ipu lates  t hatthere e xists a "degrees-o f -su pport functio n"that i ssuf f ic i ent ly ind e p endent of and a ppropriate ly li nked to th e  ag en t's deg ree ofbelie f  functi on to pla y the rol eof t h e  co nfirmation  functio n is pres e ntedi nHawth orn e ([20 05 ]).  Hawt horne' s  de grees -of-su pp ort fu nctio nis suppo sed to be a logical orquasi- logic alconceptio n o f  pr obability  tha t represen tsobj ectiv e o r  publ ic l i ke lih o ods ( Hawt h orne [200 5 ],  pp . 29 8ff). While H a wth orne([2 0 05]) s tate s a link betweenh is degrees-of- supp o r t f unc t ionan d the agent'sdeg re e of belie ffunction, h e does n ot say w hy weare en titledt o  a s sume t hatthe re exists  ade g rees-of -s up p ort fu ncti on . Nordoes h e  tel l us how we couldpossi b l y det e rmi ne th equasi-l o gica l or logic al degree-o f-supp ortof asentenc eor pro pos it ion. There f ore Hawth orneviolate sthecri terion  ofa s certa inab il ity  that has b ee n  s ug g est ed b y Sal mo n ([ 1966]) as a condit ion of adeq ua cyo n  inter p re t a tions of p rob abili t y  (the crit e rion is alsofavora bly di scussed inHá jek [20 12] , sect. 2).  "This cr i ter io n re quires t ha t th er e b esome method bywhich, i n princi p l e at l eas t , we can as ce rtain values 
 attempts_to reduce_it to notions other_than knowledge_have_failed. He_then_proceeds to show_that other notions_of philosophical interest such_as assertibility and_belief_and evidence can be illuminated by, or even reduced to, knowledge. Another example is_Woodward_([2003]) who_shows_that_one can say many illuminating_things about direct causal relevance_in terms_of other causal notions in a circular, but_not_viciously circular way._In these two cases the existence and intelligibility of_knowledge and causality (that differs from_direct causal relevance),_respectively,_are_taken for granted. While_one generally has to argue for_the existence and intelligibility of the_things one postulates, there are clearer cases_such as those of knowledge and_causality where this is not_so urgent,_and less clear cases such_as that of_the confirmation_function where this_is urgent. Williamson's work on knowledge_and Woodward's work_on causality belong to the very_best_of contemporary philosophy,_even_though_their work_bears some resemblance_to_the deus_ex_machina strategy. It does so by_giving_up on attempts to reductive analysis, and_by stipulating that there_exist_such things as knowledge_and causality 9 and that_they have the properties intuition says_they have._Therefore it_may not be possible to completely do without elements of the_deus ex machina strategy. However, we_clearly should try to_work with_as_few of those_elements_as possible._An account that stipulates that there exists_a "degrees-of-support_function" that is sufficiently independent of_and appropriately linked to_the_agent's degree of belief function to_play the role of the confirmation_function is presented in Hawthorne_([2005])._Hawthorne's_degrees-of-support function is supposed to_be a logical or quasi-logical conception_of probability that_represents objective or public likelihoods (Hawthorne [2005],_pp._298ff). While Hawthorne ([2005]) states a_link_between his degrees-of-support function and the_agent's_degree_of belief function, he does_not say why we are entitled_to assume that there exists a degrees-of-support function. Nor_does he tell_us how we could possibly_determine_the_quasi-logical or logical degree-of-support of a sentence or proposition. Therefore_Hawthorne violates_the criterion of_ascertainability that has been suggested by Salmon ([1966]) as a_condition of adequacy on interpretations of probability_(the criterion is also favorably discussed in Hájek [2012], sect. 2)._"This criterion requires that there be some method_by which, in principle at least, we_can ascertain values