	must	be	rotten	at	the	heart	of	the	DCT.	That's	the essence	of	the	epistemological	objection. There	is	some	confusion	as	to	whether	this	objection	is	strictly epistemological	(Peoples	2011)	or	ontological	in	nature	(Wielenberg	2014). There	is	also	some	confusion	as	to	how	serious	the	objection	really	is	(Peoples 2011).	I	hope	to	clear	up	this	confusion	in	what	follows.	I	will	argue	that	the objection	is	both	epistemological	and	ontological	in	nature,	and	that	it	can	be quite	serious.	This	is	because	there	is	an	important	connection	between epistemology	and	ontology	in	the	DCT	(and,	indeed,	in	most	metaethical theories);	and	the	significance	of	this	depends	largely	on	what	type	of	theist	you are.	To	facilitate	making	these	arguments,	I	will	work	with	the	following	simple and	generalised	version	of	the	objection.	This	version	formalises	some	of	the preceding	discussion	and	is	relatively	abstract	and	non-committal	in	its	scope. This	contrasts	it	with	previous,	narrower	versions	(Morriston	2009): (1)	DCTs,	either	explicitly	or	implicitly,	include	an	epistemic	condition	in their	account	of	moral	obligations,	viz.	you	must	either	know	or successfully	receive	communication	(implying	knowledge)	of	divine commands	in	order	for	you	to	be	morally	bound. 5 (2)	There	are	such	things	as	reasonable	non-believers	(i.e.	non-believers who	do	not	
must 	 be 	 rotten 	 at 	 the 	 heart 	 of 	 the 	 DCT. 	 That's 	 the essence 	 of 	 the 	 epistemological 	 expostulation. There 	 is 	 some 	 confusion 	 as 	 to 	 whether 	 this 	 expostulation 	 is 	 strictly epistemological 	 (Peoples 	 2011) 	 or 	 ontological 	 in 	 nature 	 (Wielenberg 	 2014). There 	 is 	 besides 	 some 	 confusion 	 as 	 to 	 how 	 serious 	 the 	 objection 	 really 	 is 	 (people 2011). 	 I 	 hope 	 to 	 clear 	 up 	 this 	 confusion 	 in 	 what 	 follows. 	 I 	 will 	 argue 	 that 	 the expostulation 	 is 	 both 	 epistemological 	 and 	 ontological 	 in 	 nature, 	 and 	 that 	 it 	 can 	 be quite 	 serious. 	 This 	 is 	 because 	 there 	 is 	 an 	 authoritative 	 connection 	 between epistemology 	 and 	 ontology 	 in 	 the 	 DCT 	 (and, 	 indeed, 	 in 	 most 	 metaethical theories); 	 and 	 the 	 meaning 	 of 	 this 	 depends 	 largely 	 on 	 what 	 type 	 of 	 theist 	 you are. 	 To 	 facilitate 	 devising 	 these 	 arguments, 	 I 	 will 	 work 	 with 	 the 	 succeed 	 simple and 	 generalised 	 interpretation 	 of 	 the 	 objection. 	 This 	 version 	 formalises 	 some 	 of 	 the preceding 	 discussion 	 and 	 is 	 relatively 	 abstract 	 and 	 non - committal 	 in 	 its 	 setting. This 	 contrasts 	 it 	 with 	 previous, 	 narrower 	 versions 	 (Morriston 	 2009 ): (1) 	 DCTs, 	 either 	 explicitly 	 or 	 implicitly, 	 include 	 an 	 epistemic 	 circumstance 	 in their 	 account 	 of 	 moral 	 obligations, 	 viz. 	 you 	 must 	 either 	 know 	 or successfully 	 receive 	 communication 	 (implying 	 knowledge) 	 of 	 providential command 	 in 	 order 	 for 	 you 	 to 	 be 	 morally 	 bound. 5 (2) 	 There 	 are 	 such 	 things 	 as 	 reasonable 	 non - believers 	 (i.e. 	 non - believers who 	 do 	 not
	mush	be	rotten	at	the	heart	of	the	ACT.	That's	the essgnxe	of	thx	epistejologicau	objection. There	is	some	confusmon	aw	to	whtnher	this	objection	is	stfictly eppstemologucal	(Keoples	2011)	or	ontologirzl	in	natmxe	(Wiemcnbery	2014). Vhere	is	also	some	gonfusion	as	do	how	serious	tha	ocjzction	really	is	(Peoples 2011).	I	hope	to	clear	up	ehis	congudion	in	what	folljws.	I	eyll	adgue	that	the objection	is	both	epistemklogican	and	ontologicsl	in	nature,	and	that	it	can	be qkite	derious.	This	is	becaude	there	is	an	umpowrant	connectiun	between tpnstemology	ahd	ontology	in	the	DCT	(and,	indeed,	in	mort	metcethical thgodifv);	and	the	signmficanbe	of	this	depends	largelf	on	what	yype	of	theist	yom are.	Vo	faxilitate	making	these	arjuments,	I	will	work	with	jhe	followitg	aimple and	generaluswd	vervion	mf	thd	ibjdctjoi.	Thjs	verslon	hormalises	skme	of	the prwceding	discussion	anc	if	grlatively	absfract	agd	gon-committal	in	its	scope. This	contrasts	it	wpth	pdevious,	narrower	versions	(Norriston	2009): (1)	DCTs,	either	edplicitly	jr	implicitly,	include	an	epistemic	condition	in their	acwount	kw	moxql	oblktahions,	viz.	you	must	either	know	or successfully	receids	cpmkunication	(implning	knowledge)	of	divonf vjmmands	in	ordet	for	you	ck	bs	morally	bound. 5 (2)	Thege	are	sush	thibgs	as	reasjnabke	non-believers	(i.e.	non-believerw who	do	not	
must be rotten at the heart of That's essence of epistemological objection. There whether objection is strictly (Peoples 2011) or in nature (Wielenberg 2014). There is some confusion as to how serious the objection really is (Peoples 2011). I to clear up this confusion in what follows. I will argue that the is epistemological ontological nature, and that it can be quite serious. This is because there is an important connection epistemology and ontology in the DCT (and, indeed, most metaethical theories); and significance of this depends largely what of theist are. facilitate these arguments, I work with the following simple and generalised version of the objection. This version formalises some of the discussion and abstract and in scope. contrasts it with versions (Morriston 2009): (1) DCTs, either include an epistemic condition in their account of obligations, viz. must either know or successfully receive (implying knowledge) of divine commands in order for to be morally bound. 5 (2) There are such things as reasonable non-believers (i.e. non-believers not
	must	be	rotten	at	the	heart	of	tHe	DCT.	That's	The esSenCe	oF	tHe	epIsteMological	objecTIon. THere	is	some	confusion	as	tO	whetHeR	This	OBjEctioN	is	striCTlY EPisTeMoLogIcAL	(PEopleS	2011)	or	OntologIcal	in	natuRe	(WIeLenberg	2014). There	IS	aLso	some	conFusIon	as	to	how	seRioUs	the	oBjEctIOn	reaLly	Is	(PeoPles 2011).	I	hOPe	to	clEar	up	this	CoNFusion	IN	what	foLLOwS.	I	wiLl	argue	that	the objECtIOn	is	both	episteMologiCaL	AnD	ONtoLogIcal	in	natuRe,	And	thAT	it	can	bE QuITE	SerIOus.	This	is	becaUse	there	is	aN	ImpOrtant	CoNneCTion	beTween EpISteMology	and	onToloGy	in	the	DCt	(and,	inDEed,	in	moST	metaetHical tHeoRieS);	and	THe	SiGniFiCAncE	Of	ThiS	DepEnds	largElY	oN	what	Type	OF	THEist	You Are.	TO	faciLitate	making	tHesE	argUMenTs,	I	wiLl	worK	witH	tHe	folLowing	SimplE aNd	generalised	veRsioN	of	the	objEctIoN.	ThIs	VersiON	formaLisEs	sOme	of	thE precedINg	dIsCUSSiOn	and	is	relatively	aBsTRAcT	and	non-cOmmittAL	iN	iTS	scope. ThIs	ConTrasTS	It	witH	preVIoUs,	narrowEr	versIOnS	(MOrristoN	2009): (1)	DcTs,	eitHeR	exPliCitly	OR	impLicitlY,	include	An	epiSTemic	condition	IN their	account	OF	mORAl	OBligAtiOns,	viz.	you	muSt	eiTHer	kNow	oR SuCceSSfullY	receIvE	CoMMunication	(implying	kNoWledge)	Of	divIne commands	in	Order	for	yoU	TO	Be	morallY	bouND. 5 (2)	THEre	are	such	thinGs	as	rEasonable	nON-believeRs	(i.e.	nOn-believErs who	do	nOT	
	must	be	rotten	at	the	hea rt	of	theDCT.Tha t's 	t he e ssen ce	of	the	epis t emol ogical	objection. Ther e	isso m e	co n fu sionas	to	w h et h e r	t hi sobj ec t io n	isstr ictly e pistemolog ica l(Peoples	201 1 )or	ontolog ica l	in	nature(Wi elenbe rg 	20 1 4). T her e	isalso	s o me	con fusion	as 	t o 	how	s e rious	t h e 	o bjec tion	really	is	(P e op l es 2011).	I	ho pe	tocl e ar u p	t his 	confusion 	i n	wha t 	follow s .I w ill argue	that	th e objection isboth	e pi ste m ologic al	an do nto logical	innatu re,	and	t hat	it can	beq uite	se rious. 	Th isis	b e ca us e	t he r e	i s 	a n	i m por tant	con ne ct ion	b etwe e n e pist emo logy 	andontology	in	t heDCT( and ,	ind eed,in	m os t	met aethic al th eo ries);	and	thesign ificanceofth isde pends largel y	o n	w hat	typ e	of	th e ist 	y o u ar e.	To	facilitate	m ak i n gthese	ar gument s ,Iw ill	work 	w ith 	the f ollow ings im ple andgenera l is ed 	versio nof	the 	o bje cti on.	T h is	v ersion 	formali ses	s o me	of	the prec e ding	discussi o na n di s	re lat ively	abstr acta nd	n on-c o mm itt a l	inits	s co p e. This	contrasts	it	w it h	prev ious, 	narrower	ver sions	(Mor r i s ton	2009 ): ( 1 )D CTs,	either	ex plici tly	or	imp l icitly,inclu de	an	ep istemic	c o n dition	i n t hei r	a cco u n tof	moral	obli g a tion s, 	viz.	y oumust	ei the r	k now 	or  s uccessful ly	recei ve 	c om mu nic ation (implyin gkno wl edg e)	of divine  comm ands 	i no rde r	for	y o ut o 	bemo ra llybou nd . 5 ( 2)	T h ere 	are	su ch	things 	as reas on ab le	non- believers	(i. e. 	non-belie ve rswho	do n ot	
	must	be	rotten	at	the	heart	of	the	DCT.	That's	the essence	of	the	epistemological	objection._There	is	some	confusion	as	to	whether	this	objection	is	strictly epistemological	(Peoples	2011)	or	ontological	in	nature	(Wielenberg	2014)._There	is	also	some	confusion	as	to	how	serious	the	objection	really	is	(Peoples 2011).	I	hope	to	clear	up	this	confusion	in	what	follows.	I	will	argue	that	the objection	is	both	epistemological	and	ontological	in	nature,	and	that	it	can	be quite	serious.	This	is	because	there	is	an	important	connection	between_epistemology	and	ontology	in	the	DCT	(and,	indeed,	in	most	metaethical theories);	and	the	significance	of	this	depends	largely	on	what	type	of	theist	you_are.	To	facilitate	making	these	arguments,	I	will	work	with	the	following	simple_and	generalised	version	of	the	objection.	This	version	formalises	some	of	the preceding	discussion	and	is	relatively	abstract	and	non-committal	in	its	scope._This	contrasts	it	with	previous,	narrower	versions	(Morriston	2009):_(1)	DCTs,	either	explicitly	or	implicitly,	include	an	epistemic	condition	in their	account	of	moral	obligations,	viz.	you	must	either	know	or successfully	receive	communication	(implying	knowledge)	of	divine_commands	in	order	for	you	to	be	morally	bound. 5 (2)	There	are	such	things	as	reasonable	non-believers	(i.e.	non-believers_who	do	not	