ive understanding of promotion. Unfortunately, even going contrastive won't save those accounts: they're liable to their own set of counterexamples that exploit their purely probabilistic nature. Contrastive Fit-Probabilism solves the problems with those views, but its disjunctive nature makes it subject to its own problems: the Degree Problem and the Problem of Mixed Cases. Our alternative -Contrastive Expected Fit -represents a unified, non-disjunctive alternative that solves these problems. Where does this leave us? Our account of promotion, if correct, reveals that the theory of what it is for an action to promote a desire appeals to a notion of ​expected fit which is interestingly analogous to the decision-theoretic notion of ​expected utility employed in reasons to which an agent has epistemic access, so that something cannot be a subjective reason without also being an objective reason. By contrast, our use of the terms here allows for this possibility. We don't care to die on this particular terminological hill. Instead, we're interested in highlighting the parallel between ​these two senses of a reason -whatever, in the end, it's correct to call them -and the two possible interpretations of Contrastive Expected Fit. 31 expected utility theory. On reflection, we think this structural similarity shouldn't be too surprising. After all, expected utility theory can naturally be described as an account of rational action according to which actions should be compared with regard to how well they ​promote ​overall utility. A similarly sophisticated account of promoting desires thus plausibly employs the same formal machinery for explicating the notion of promoting a desire. Indeed, looking ahead, it's worth exploring whether there are other fruitful connections between these two areas. More generally, there are a number of interesting issues we haven't addressed here that are worthy of attention, e.g. about whether the correct measure of fit is agent-relative or non-agent-relative, about how to spell out a gradable notion of promotion (see footnotes 40 and 46), about whether expected fit should be given an 'evidential' or 'causal' definition (see footnote 43), and, of course, on the correct view to take about the connection between promotion and reasons. We leave these issues to another time. References Behrends, J., & DiPaolo, J. (2011). "Finlay and Schroeder on Promoting a Desire," Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy​, 6: 1-6. Behrends,
i ve understanding of promotion. Unfortunately, even going contrastive won't spare those report: they're liable to their own hardening of counterexample that exploit their purely probabilistic nature. Contrastive Fit - Probabilism solve the problems with those views, but its disjunctive nature make it subject to its own problems: the Degree Problem and the Problem of Mixed Cases. Our alternate -Contrastive Expected Fit -represents a unified, non - disjunctive alternative that solves these problems. Where does this impart us? Our account of forwarding, if correct, reveal that the hypothesis of what it is for an action to promote a desire appeals to a impression of ​expected fit which is interestingly analogous to the decision - theoretic notion of ​expected utility use in reasons to which an agent has epistemic access, so that something cannot be a subjective rationality without also being an objective reason. By contrast, our use of the terms here allows for this possibility. We don't care to die on this particular terminological hill. Instead, we're interested in highlighting the parallel between ​these two senses of a reason -whatever, in the goal, it's correct to call them -and the two potential interpretation of Contrastive Expected Fit. 31 expect utility theory. On reflection, we think this structural similarity shouldn't be too surprising. After wholly, expected utility theory can naturally be described as an account of rational action according to which actions should be compared with regard to how well they ​promote ​overall utility. A similarly advanced account of promote desire thus plausibly employs the same conventional machinery for explicating the notion of promoting a desire. Indeed, look ahead, it's deserving exploring whether there are other fruitful connections between these two areas. More broadly, there are a number of interesting emergence we haven't addressed here that are desirable of attention, e.g. about whether the correct measure of fit is agentive role - relative or non - agent - relative, about how to spell out a gradable notion of promotion (experience footnotes 40 and 46), about whether expect fit should be impart an' evidential' or' causal' definition (see footnote 43), and, of course, on the correct view to carry about the connection between promotion and reason. We leave these issues to another time. References Behrends, J., & DiPaolo, J. (2011). " Finlay and Schroeder on Promoting a Desire, " Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy​, 6: 1 - 6. Behrends,
ive understanding of promotlon. Unfortunateli, wven gming ckntrastixe won't save those accounts: vhey'ee liqble to their own set uf countegexamples thau exploit their pndely probabiljdtic iature. Contrastlve Fit-Probdbilism solves tfe problems with those views, but its qisjuncyige nature makef it fubjsbt to its own problems: the Degrse Probnem and the Ptoblem of Mixed Cases. Our wltegnative -Contrastivf Expected Dit -wwpresents a jnified, non-disjunctive alternative that solves these oroblzms. Where diew tjhs leave us? Our wccount of pvpmotiot, if cotrect, reveals bhat vhe rheory of what it is hor an action to proiote a devixe appeals to a notiob if ​exkecteg fig whkch ix jnteredtiigly analogkus to the eecision-theoretic nptyin of ​expectes utilytr employed in reasons to which an agent haa epistemic access, so tyat something cannot he a subjqctive reason without also being an objective reavon. Bb zonurqst, oje kse of the terms here allows for this possibijjtu. Ee don't care tj die on thos pstticular termivologiezl hill. Instead, we're interefted un highlidhtimg the parallel between ​thewe two sensef of a reason -whaterer, in the eud, it's corrrct to call them -and thz two lossible inherpretatjuns of Contrastixe Vxpewted Fit. 31 expected utility theory. Oi refkection, we jhink tris structkral similarity shouldn't be tlo surprisinh. After all, expected utility thxpry can natutalny te descrnbed ax an account jf rational acjion accoxding go which abtions shmuld be com[ared with recwrd to how wxll they ​[romite ​iverall jtility. A simikarly sopknsticated account of promotlng dgsjres thus plausnyli employs the ssme fowmwl mwwhinery for axplkcagong tfe notion on pfomoying a desire. Indeed, looiing ahead, it's woryh exploribg whethqr there are pther fruitful conjectimns betwren these two areas. More generallg, there age w number of yntevestyng issues we haven't addressed here that are wortiy of attention, e.g. aboot whether the correcj mtasure of fit is adent-relathve or non-agent-relatuve, about how to xpell out a gradable hotion of pgomotion (see footnotes 40 and 46), about whether expected fit should be given ab 'evidxneial' or 'cauaal' cefinptiju (see fjotnlve 43), and, of course, on the correct view to take abuut the wounection between promotion anc feasons. We lexve these issues to anotger time. References Behrends, J., & DiPaolo, J. (2011). "Finlay and Schroeder on Promiting a Despte," Oournal of Ethics & Spcial 'hilosiphy​, 6: 1-6. Vehrcnds,
ive understanding of promotion. Unfortunately, even going save accounts: they're to their own their probabilistic nature. Contrastive solves the problems those views, but its disjunctive nature it subject to its own problems: the Degree Problem and the Problem of Cases. Our alternative -Contrastive Expected Fit -represents a unified, non-disjunctive alternative that solves problems. does leave Our account of promotion, if correct, reveals that the theory of what it is for an to promote a desire appeals to a notion ​expected fit which is analogous to the decision-theoretic notion ​expected employed in to an has epistemic access, that something cannot be a subjective reason without also being an objective reason. By contrast, our use the terms for this We care die on this hill. Instead, we're interested in highlighting ​these two senses of a reason -whatever, in end, it's to call them -and the two interpretations of Contrastive Expected Fit. 31 expected utility On reflection, we think this structural similarity shouldn't be too surprising. After all, expected utility naturally be described as account of rational according which should compared with to how well they ​promote ​overall utility. A similarly sophisticated account promoting desires thus plausibly employs the same formal machinery for notion promoting a desire. looking ahead, it's worth whether are other fruitful connections two More a of issues we haven't addressed that are worthy of attention, about whether the correct or non-agent-relative, about how to spell out a notion of promotion (see footnotes 40 and about whether expected fit should be given an 'evidential' or 'causal' definition footnote 43), course, on the correct view to take about connection between promotion and We leave these issues to another time. References Behrends, & J. (2011). and Schroeder on a Desire," Journal Ethics & Social 1-6. Behrends,
ive understanding of promotiOn. UnfortunAtely, EveN goInG conTrasTive won't save thOSe acCounts: they're liable to thEir owN sET of cOUnTerexAmples tHAt EXPloIt ThEir PuRElY probAbiListic nAture. ContrAstIvE Fit-ProbabilISm Solves the pRobLems with thosE viEws, but ItS diSJunctIve NaturE makes IT subjeCt to its owN pROblems: THe DegreE pRoBlem And the Problem of MiXEd cAses. Our alternaTive -CoNtRAsTIVe EXpeCted Fit -repReSents A Unified, NOn-DISJunCTive alternatiVe that solveS TheSe probLeMs. WHEre doeS this LeAVe uS? Our account Of prOmotion, if CorrecT, Reveals THat the tHeory oF whAt iT is fOR aN aCtiOn TO prOMoTe a DEsiRe appealS tO a NotioN of ​eXPECTed fIt wHich Is intErestingly anaLogOus tO The DecisIon-thEoreTiC notiOn of ​exPecteD uTility employed iN reaSons to whiCh aN aGenT hAs epiSTemic aCceSs, sO that soMething CAnnOt BE A SuBjective reason withOuT ALsO being an ObjectIVe ReASon. By conTrAst, Our uSE Of the TermS HeRe allows For thiS PoSsIbility. we Don't caRe To dIe oN this PArtiCular tErminoloGical HIll. Instead, we're INterested in hiGHlIGHtINg thE paRallel betweEn ​thESe twO senSEs Of a REason -WhateVeR, In THe end, it's correct to caLl Them -anD the tWo possible intErpretatioNS OF ContrasTive eXpECted Fit. 31 expecteD utilIty theory. ON ReflectiOn, we tHink this StructuraL SImilaritY shOulDn't Be tOO SuRprising. After ALL, expEcTed utilIty Theory cAn nAtuRalLy bE dEscribed aS an accouNt Of RaTiOnaL actiON accordiNg To wHiCh aCtionS Should Be comPareD wItH RegArd to hoW WeLL They ​PrOmOte ​oVerAlL utilIty. A SImiLarly soPhisticatEd aCCounT oF pRomotinG desires thus pLaUsibly emplOyS thE same fORMal machiNery for explicating the noTIon of prOmoTing a DesiRe. Indeed, lOokIng aheAd, iT'S worth ExplorIng whEtHer THEre arE OThEr fRuItful conneCTIonS betwEeN theSe two arEas. More generally, thERe aRe a number of inTerEstiNG IsSueS We HAveN't ADdrESSed here that are wOrthy of attEnTIoN, e.g. about whETheR tHe correCt measuRe of fIT is agenT-relative Or non-agenT-rElatIVE, abOut how to spEll out a gRadable noTIon of PRoMotioN (seE footnOtEs 40 aNd 46), aboUt whetHEr eXpectEd fit sHoUld be gIven aN 'eVidentiaL' or 'causal' definition (see fOotnotE 43), and, oF coUrse, on the CorREct View to takE aboUt the conneCtiOn bEtweeN prOMotioN and REaSonS. we leaVe thESe issues tO AnOthER TiMe. ReferenceS bEHreNds, J., & DIPaOLo, J. (2011). "FinLay aNd Schroeder on PromOTing a Desire," JouRnal OF ethIcs & sOciaL PHilosophy​, 6: 1-6. BehreNds,
ive understanding of promo tion. Unfo rtuna tel y,ev en g oing  contrastive w o n'tsave those accounts: t hey'r el iabl e  t o the ir owns et o f c ou nt ere xa m pl es th atexploit  their pur ely  p robabilistic na ture. Cont ras tive Fit-Pro bab ilismso lve s  thepro blems  witht hose v iews, but  i t s disj u nctiven a tu re m akes it subject t o  i t s own problems : theDe g re e Pro ble m and thePr oblem of Mixe d  C a s e s.O ur alternativ e -Contrast i veExpect ed  Fi t  -repr esent sa  un ified, non- disj unctive a lterna t ive tha t  solves  these  pr obl ems. Wh er e d oe s  th i slea v e u s? Our a cc ou nt of  pro m o t i on,ifcorr ect,reveals thatthe  the o ryof wh at it  isfo r anaction  to p ro mote a desire a ppea ls to a n oti on  of  ​ expec t ed fit  wh ich  is int erestin g lyan a l o go us to the decision -t h e or etic not ion of ​e xp e cted uti li tyempl o y ed in  rea s on s to whi ch ana ge nt  has ep is temicac ces s,so th a t so methin g cannot  be a subjective rea s on without al s ob e in g  anobj ective reas on.B y co ntra s t,  ou r  useof th et er m s here allows for t hi s poss ibili ty. We don'tcare to di e o n this p arti c ul a r terminologic al hi ll. Instea d , we'reinter ested in  highligh t i ng the p ara lle l b etw e e n​these two se n s es o fa reaso n - whateve r,inthe  en d,  it's cor rect toca ll  t he m - and t h e two po ss ibl eint erpre t ations  of C ontr as ti v e E xpected Fi t .  31ex pe cted  ut il ity t heor y . O n refle ction, we  th i nk t hi sstructu ral similarit yshouldn'tbe  to o surp r i sing. Af ter all, expected utili t y theor y c an na tura lly be de scr ibed a s a n  accou nt ofratio na l a c t ion a c c or din gto which a c t ion s sho ul d be  compar ed with regard toh owwell they ​pr omo te ​ o v er all ut i lit y. A s i m ilarly sophisti cated acco un t  o f promotin g  de si res thu s plaus iblye mploysthe sameformal ma ch iner y for  explicati ng the n otion ofp romot i ng  a de sir e. Ind ee d,looki ng ahe a d,it'sworthex plorin g whe th er there  are other fruitful con nectio ns be twe en thesetwo are as. Moregene rally, the reare  a nu mbe r  of i nter e st ing issue s we haven't a d dr ess e d  h ere that ar e w ort hy of  at t ention , e. g. about whethert he correct mea sure o f f iti s ag en t-relative ornon -a g e nt-relat iv e, about ho w to spe ll out a  grada ble no tion of p ro m otion(see  fo otnotes 4 0 a nd 46), ab ou tw hether  exp ec ted fi t shou l d be g iven an 'evident ial'o r  'cau s al'  defi ni tion (s e e fo otnote 43) , and, of c ourse,  onthe c orrectvi ew totak eabout thec onnection  betw een pro mo tion  an d reas ons. W e lea ve t he seissues to a no t he rt ime . Re feren ce s Be hrends, J . , & DiPa olo ,  J. (20 11 )." F inlaya nd S chroeder o n P romot i n g a Desire , " Jo u rn a l ofEthics  & Soc ial Phi l oso ph y​, 6:1-6 . Behrends, 
ive understanding_of promotion._Unfortunately, even going contrastive_won't save_those_accounts: they're_liable_to their own_set of counterexamples_that exploit their purely_probabilistic nature. Contrastive_Fit-Probabilism_solves the problems with those views, but its disjunctive nature makes it subject to_its_own problems:_the_Degree_Problem and the Problem of_Mixed Cases. Our alternative -Contrastive_Expected Fit_-represents a unified, non-disjunctive alternative that solves these_problems._Where does this_leave us? Our account of promotion, if correct, reveals_that the theory of what it_is for an_action_to_promote a desire appeals_to a notion of ​expected fit_which is interestingly analogous to the_decision-theoretic notion of ​expected utility employed in_reasons to which an agent has_epistemic access, so that something_cannot be_a subjective reason without also_being an objective_reason. By_contrast, our use_of the terms here allows for_this possibility. We_don't care to die on this_particular_terminological hill. Instead,_we're_interested_in highlighting_the parallel between_​these_two senses_of_a reason -whatever, in the end,_it's_correct to call them -and the two_possible interpretations of Contrastive_Expected_Fit. 31 expected utility_theory. On reflection, we think_this structural similarity shouldn't be too_surprising. After_all, expected_utility theory can naturally be described as an account of rational_action according to which actions should_be compared with regard_to how_well_they ​promote ​overall_utility._A similarly_sophisticated account of promoting desires thus plausibly_employs the_same formal machinery for explicating the_notion of promoting a_desire._Indeed, looking ahead, it's worth exploring_whether there are other fruitful connections_between these two areas. More_generally,_there_are a number of interesting_issues we haven't addressed here that_are worthy of_attention, e.g. about whether the correct measure_of_fit is agent-relative or non-agent-relative, about_how_to spell out a gradable notion_of_promotion_(see footnotes 40 and 46),_about whether expected fit should be_given an 'evidential' or 'causal' definition (see footnote 43),_and, of course,_on the correct view to_take_about_the connection between promotion and reasons. We leave these issues_to another_time. References Behrends,_J., & DiPaolo, J. (2011). "Finlay and Schroeder on Promoting_a Desire," Journal of Ethics & Social_Philosophy​, 6: 1-6. Behrends,