 to focus. As noted above, a correct explanation of a car fire might properly focus on sparks coming from the engine, whereas a correct explanation of a fire in a welding shop must focus somewhere else. But 15 this has nothing to do with how people are thinking about the cases. Rather, it has to do with what is in fact normal and abnormal in cars and welding shops. Likewise, if a drunk driver runs a light and is involved in a collision, then almost always a correct explanation will focus on the driver's impaired condition. Given the interests and purposes that are usually in place, other explanations of the collision are almost always inappropriate. These considerations explain why it is correct to say that S does not have knowledge in Case 7, even relative to S's own context of attribution. For although the role of chance has no psychological salience for S, it does have explanatory salience; that is, any correct explanation of why S believes the truth would have to refer to the lottery. This is because playing the lottery is pretty much the only thing going on here. Relative to almost any context we can imagine, including S's own, an explanation that did not refer to the lottery would leave the most important thing out. This is in contrast to Case 6. In that case any number of factors contribute to S's believing the truth regarding her friend meeting her for lunch. And relative to most contexts that we can imagine, the fact that her friend loses the lottery will play no important part in a correct explanation of why she believes the truth. Finally, it will be helpful to compare the present account with standards contextualism. First, both accounts are contextualist; that is, they both make the truth conditions of knowledge claims relative to the context of attribution. But the way this works in the two accounts is different. According to standards contextualism, the context of attribution determines the standards for knowledge, so that standards are higher or lower relative to different contexts. On the present account, however, the context of attribution determines the salience of various contributing causal factors, thus determining responsibility for true belief. Standards are not raised or lowered according context; rather, responsibility for a complex event (someone's believing the truth) is creditable or not creditable to the believer according to context. Second, I argued above that familiar versions of standards contextualism do not explain why S's inductive reasoning does not allow her to know that she will lose the lottery. The standards contextualist says that in the lottery case the standards for knowing get raised because
to focus. As noted above, a correct explanation of a car ardor might by rights concenter on sparks come from the locomotive, whereas a correct explanation of a fire in a welding shop must concentrate somewhere else. But 15 this has nothing to do with how citizenry are thinking about the cases. quite, it has to do with what is in fact normal and abnormal in car and welding shops. Likewise, if a drunk driver runs a light and is involved in a collision, then about always a correct explanation will focus on the driver's mar condition. Given the interest and purposes that are normally in place, early explanations of the collision are almost always inappropriate. These considerations excuse why it is correct to say that S does not have knowledge in Case 7, even relative to S's own context of attribution. For although the role of chance has no psychological salience for S, it does have explanatory salience; that is, any correct explanation of why S believes the truth would have to refer to the lottery. This is because playing the lottery is pretty much the lone thing going on here. proportional to about any context we can imagine, including S's own, an explanation that did not refer to the lottery would leave the about important matter out. This is in contrast to Case 6. In that case any number of gene contribute to S's believing the truth regarding her friend meeting her for lunch. And relative to most contexts that we can imagine, the fact that her friend loses the lottery will toy no authoritative part in a correct explanation of why she believes the accuracy. Finally, it will be helpful to compare the present account with standards contextualism. First, both accounts are contextualist; that is, they both make the truth conditions of knowledge claim relative to the context of attribution. But the means this works in the two accounts is unlike. According to standards contextualism, the context of attribution determines the standards for cognition, so that standards are higher or broken relative to different contexts. On the present account, however, the context of attribution determine the salience of various contributing causal factors, thus determining responsibility for true belief. Standards are not raise or lowered according context; quite, responsibility for a complex event (someone's believe the truth) is creditable or not creditable to the believer according to context. Second, I argued above that conversant versions of standards contextualism do not explain why S's inductive reasoning does not allow her to know that she will lose the lottery. The standards contextualist says that in the lottery subject the standard for knowing get raised because
 to focus. As noted above, a gorrect explanatnin of e car fjre mighg properly focus on sparks clmung feom the engine, whereas a correcn explanarion if a fire mh a welding sglp mbsv focus somewhete else. But 15 this has nothhne co do with how people are thinking afout thr fases. Rather, ij has eo dk with what is in fact normal and zbnorman in cars and welding shops. Likewise, if a dgunk driver runs a light and us igcolved in a zollision, uhzn almost amways a correct explanation wilu focbs on the dtncer'd impaired cinditpon. Given the interesds and lurposes that sre usyally in place, other xxplanations of the sollision axe almost always inappripriaje. Thase zinskdedaviohs exppaii why it is correct to say that S does nou hwnr knowledge jn Casq 7, even relative to S's own context of attgibufion. For although the rile of chance has no ksychologisal salience for S, it does have explanatory salietce; tiag iw, wvt forrect explanation of why S believes the trueg eolld have to refer to the lotyegy. Jhis is becausg playiuf fhe lottery is prehty mucr the only thigg gping on here. Relative to alnost any connext we can imagine, ineluding S's ocn, an gxplanstion that did not refex to tge lottery aould leabd the most imporgann thhng out. Ufis is in contrase to Case 6. In that cxse sny nuiber of faftors contribute to S's bflievnng tve truth rfgarding her friend meeting her for lunch. And ralanive to mjst cpntexts that re can imagine, the faet thag her friehd losev the lottewy will play tl important 'art in a coreect explanxgion of why shr believes the truty. Finally, it will ne heulful to compare tht present accouny wkth snanvards wontextualisk. Fifst, noth xccounts arc cuntectualist; that is, thef bofh make the truth vokditions if knowlqdge claims rrlative to the conuext oh attrmbutiom. Bot the way this works in the twk accountd if different. Wccovdind to standcrds contextualism, the context of attribntion determines the sjandards for knowledgg, sp that stanvards wre highes or lower relative ro different conttxts. On the present acckunt, hmweveg, the context of attribution determines the salience of various contributung canswl factors, fhus detegmiuiny respogsibmlmty for true belivf. Standards are not raised or luwered awcjrding context; rather, responxicility for a zomplex event (someone's bslieving the truth) is creditable or not creditable to the belieyer accoreing fo conngxt. Second, I argued anove tkat faniliar cerslons of standafds clntextuallsm vo uot explain why S's inductive reasining eofs not allow her to know thwu she wpll losg the lottery. The stahfards contextualisy says that in the lottery case thv seandards for kbkwing get raosed bebause
to focus. As noted above, a correct a fire might focus on sparks a explanation of a in a welding must focus somewhere else. But 15 has nothing to do with how people are thinking about the cases. Rather, has to do with what is in fact normal and abnormal in cars welding Likewise, a driver runs a light and is involved in a collision, then almost always a correct explanation focus on the driver's impaired condition. Given the and purposes that are in place, other explanations of collision almost always These explain it is correct say that S does not have knowledge in Case 7, even relative to S's own context of For although of chance no salience S, it does salience; that is, any correct explanation believes the truth would have to refer to lottery. This because playing the lottery is pretty the only thing going on here. Relative to any context we can imagine, including S's own, an explanation that did not refer to would leave the most thing out. This in to 6. that case number of factors contribute to S's believing the truth regarding her meeting her for lunch. And relative to most contexts that imagine, fact that her loses the lottery will no part in a correct why believes it be to compare the present with standards contextualism. First, both are contextualist; that is, conditions of knowledge claims relative to the context attribution. But the way this works in two accounts is different. According to standards contextualism, the context of attribution the standards so that standards are higher or lower relative different contexts. On the account, however, the context of attribution determines the salience various causal factors, determining responsibility for belief. Standards are raised or lowered rather, responsibility a event truth) is creditable or not creditable the according to context. Second, I above versions of standards contextualism do not explain why S's inductive reasoning does not allow her that she will lose lottery. standards contextualist says that in the lottery case the standards for knowing because
 to focus. As noted above, a correCt explanatIon of A caR fiRe MighT proPerly focus on spARks cOming from the engine, wherEas a cOrREct eXPlAnatiOn of a fiRE iN A WelDiNg ShoP mUSt Focus SomEwhere eLse. But 15 this Has NoThing to do witH HoW people are ThiNking about thE caSes. RatHeR, it HAs to dO wiTh whaT is in fACt normAl and abnoRmAL in carS And weldING sHops. likewise, if a drunk dRIvER runs a light and Is invoLvED iN A ColLisIon, then almOsT alwaYS a correCT eXPLAnaTIon will focus oN the driver's IMpaIred coNdItiON. Given The inTeREstS and purposeS thaT are usualLy in plACe, other EXplanatIons of The ColLisiON aRe AlmOsT AlwAYs InaPProPriate. ThEsE cOnsidEratIONS ExplAin Why iT is coRrect to say thaT S dOes nOT haVe knoWledgE in CAsE 7, even RelatiVe to S'S oWn context of attrIbutIon. For altHouGh The RoLe of cHAnce haS no PsyChologiCal saliENce FoR s, IT dOes have explanatory SaLIEnCe; that is, Any corREcT eXPlanatioN oF whY S beLIEves tHe trUTh Would havE to refER tO tHe lotteRy. this is BeCauSe pLayinG The lOttery Is pretty Much tHE only thing goinG On here. RelativE To ALMoST any ConText we can imAginE, InclUdinG s's Own, AN explAnatiOn THaT Did not refer to the lotTeRy woulD leavE the most imporTant thing oUT. tHis is in cOntrASt TO Case 6. In that casE any nUmber of facTOrs contrIbute To S's beliEving the tRUTh regardIng Her FriEnd MEEtIng her for luncH. aNd reLaTive to mOst ContextS thAt wE caN imAgIne, the facT that her FrIeNd LoSes The loTTery will PlAy nO iMpoRtant PArt in a CorreCt exPlAnATioN of why sHE bELIeveS tHe TrutH. FiNaLly, it Will BE heLpful to Compare thE prESent AcCoUnt with Standards contExTualism. FirSt, BotH accouNTS are contExtualist; that is, they both MAke the tRutH condItioNs of knowlEdgE claimS reLAtive tO the coNtext Of AttRIButioN. bUt The WaY this works IN The Two acCoUnts Is diffeRent. According to staNDarDs contextualiSm, tHe coNTExT of ATtRIbuTiON deTERmines the standaRds for knowLeDGe, So that stanDArdS aRe higheR or loweR relaTIve to diFferent coNtexts. On tHe PresENT acCount, howevEr, the conText of attRIbutiON dEtermIneS the saLiEncE of vaRious cONtrIbutiNg causAl FactorS, thus DeTermininG responsibility for true bElief. STandaRds Are not raiSed OR loWered accoRdinG context; raTheR, reSponsIbiLIty foR a coMPlEx eVEnt (soMeonE'S believinG ThE trUTH) iS creditable OR NOt cReditAblE To the bElieVer according to conTExt. Second, I arguEd abOVE thAt fAMiliAr Versions of stanDarDs CONtextualIsM do not explaIn why S's iNdUCtive ReasonIng doeS not allOW HeR To know That She Will lose tHe lOtTEry. The sTaNdARds conTextUaList saYs that IN the LOTtery case the stanDards FOR knowINg gEt raiSeD becausE
 to focus. As noted above,  a correct  expl ana tio nof a  car  fire might pr o perl y focus on sparks comi ng fr om thee ng ine,whereas ac o rre ct  e xpl an a ti on of  afire in  a welding  sh op  must focuss om ewhere els e.But 15 thishas  nothi ng  to do wi thhow p eoplea re thi nking abo ut the ca s es. Rat h e r,  ithas to do with wh a ti s in fact norm al and  a b no r m alincars and w el dings hops. L i ke w i s e,i f a drunk dri ver runs al igh t andis  in v olvedin aco l lis ion, then a lmos t alwaysa corr e ct expl a nationwill f ocu s o n th e  d ri ver 's imp a ir edc ond ition. G iv en  theinte r e s t s an d p urpo ses t hat are usual lyin p l ace , oth er ex plan at ionsof the  coll is ion are almostalwa ys inappr opr ia te.  T hesec onside rat ion s expla in whyi t i sc o r re ct to say that S d oe s no t have k nowled g ein Case 7,ev enrela t i ve to  S's ow n contex t of a t tr ib ution.Fo r alth ou ghthe  role of c hancehas no p sycho l ogical salienc e  for S, it do e sh a ve expl ana tory salien ce;t hatis,a ny  co r rectexpla na t io n  of why S believesth e trut h wou ld have to re fer to the l o ttery. T hisi sb ecause playing  thelottery is pretty m uch t he onlything goi n g  on here . R ela tiv e t o al most any cont e x t we  c an imag ine , inclu din g S 'sown ,an explan ation th at  d id  n otrefer to the l ot ter ywou ld le a ve the  most  imp or ta n t t hing ou t .T h is i sin  con tra st  to C ase6 . I n thatcase anynum b er o ffa ctors c ontribute toS' s believin gthe  truth r egarding  her friend meeting her for lun ch.  Andrela tive to m ost  conte xts that w e canimagi ne , t h e  fact t ha t h er  friend lo s e s t he lo tt erywill pl ay no important pa r t i n a correct e xpl anat i o nofw hy she  b e lie v e s the truth. Fi nally, itwi l lbe helpful toco mpare t he pres ent a c count w ith stand ards cont ex tual i s m.First, bot h accoun ts are co n textu a li st; t hat  is, t he y b oth m ake th e  tr uth c onditi on s of k nowle dg e claims  relative to the contex t of a ttrib uti on. But t hew aythis work s in  the two a cco unt s isdif f erent . Ac c or din g  to s tand a rds conte x tu ali s m ,the context o f  at tribu tio n  deter mine s the standards f o r knowledge, s o th a t  st and a rdsar e higher or lo wer  r e l ative to  d ifferent co ntexts.On the p resent  accou nt, how e v er ,  the c onte xtof attrib uti on determi ne st he sal ienc eof var ious c o ntri b u ting causal fact ors,t h us de t erm ining  r esponsi b ilit y for true  belief. St andard s ar e not  raised  o r lowe red  a ccording c o ntext; ra ther,  respon si bili tyfor acomp l e x eve nt ( so meo ne's beli e v in g  t he tru th)is cr ed itab le or not creditab let o the b el iev e r  accor d in g to context . S econd , I argued a b ovet ha t  fami liar v ersion s of st a nda rd s conte xtu a l ism do no t explain why  S 's i nductive  r easo ni ngdo es not allow he r to kno w that s h e  willlos e  the lotter y.  The standar ds co nt e xtualis t say s thati n t helot tery  ca se t h e standards for knowinggetraise d  be cause 
 to_focus. As_noted above, a correct_explanation of_a_car fire_might_properly focus on_sparks coming from_the engine, whereas a_correct explanation of_a_fire in a welding shop must focus somewhere else. But 15 this has nothing_to_do with_how_people_are thinking about the cases._Rather, it has to do_with what_is in fact normal and abnormal in cars_and_welding shops. Likewise,_if a drunk driver runs a light and is_involved in a collision, then almost_always a correct_explanation_will_focus on the driver's_impaired condition. Given the interests and_purposes that are usually in place,_other explanations of the collision are almost_always inappropriate. These considerations explain why_it is correct to say_that S_does not have knowledge in_Case 7, even_relative to_S's own context_of attribution. For although the role_of chance has_no psychological salience for S, it_does_have explanatory salience;_that_is,_any correct_explanation of why_S_believes the_truth_would have to refer to the_lottery._This is because playing the lottery is_pretty much the only_thing_going on here. Relative_to almost any context we_can imagine, including S's own, an_explanation that_did not_refer to the lottery would leave the most important thing out._This is in contrast to Case_6. In that case_any number_of_factors contribute to_S's_believing the_truth regarding her friend meeting her for_lunch. And_relative to most contexts that we_can imagine, the fact_that_her friend loses the lottery will_play no important part in a_correct explanation of why she_believes_the_truth. Finally, it will be_helpful to compare the present account_with standards contextualism._First, both accounts are contextualist; that is,_they_both make the truth conditions of_knowledge_claims relative to the context of_attribution._But_the way this works in_the two accounts is different. According_to standards contextualism, the context of attribution determines the_standards for knowledge,_so that standards are higher_or_lower_relative to different contexts. On the present account, however, the_context of_attribution determines the_salience of various contributing causal factors, thus determining responsibility for_true belief. Standards are not raised or_lowered according context; rather, responsibility for a complex event (someone's believing_the truth) is creditable or not creditable to_the believer according to context. Second, I_argued above that familiar_versions_of standards contextualism do not explain why_S's_inductive_reasoning_does not allow_her to know_that she will_lose the_lottery. The standards_contextualist says_that in the_lottery_case the standards for knowing get raised because