 clouds and that the world ends up containing vastly many more clouds than it should. The problem of the many is the ontological problem that the number of clouds is too large, not a problem of how to pick out particular aggregates. Though we need, as discussed in Section 2, to select a single referent for 'Holmes' among multiple equally good candidates, the existence of multiple candidates is not itself a problem for us as long as we can select one of them, as I argued we can. T H E T R U T H A B O U T S H E R L O C K H O L M E S 355 multiple singular propositions containing different referents, and supervaluationism or similar means would be needed to evaluate these sentences. On our account, although there are multiple worlds among the truth-makers for sentences involving 'Holmes' where Holmes has somewhat different properties, it is Holmes who has these properties in the relevant worlds, not his surrogates, counterparts or doppelgangers. Worlds where surrogates, counterparts or doppelgangers have these properties are not truth-makers for the Holmes stories. We do not need supervaluationism. Indeed, truth-in-fiction is, formally, just a standard box operator from modal logic ranging over the restricted set of closest worlds where the events described in the fiction take place, and 'p is false-in-fiction-f' is equivalent to 'it is true-in-fiction-f that not-p.' Since 'Holmes has blood type A' is true in some but not all of these worlds it is not true-in-the-fiction, but it is consistent with the fiction: We could define an operator 'consistent-with-the-fiction' from 'true-in-the-fiction' the way we define the possibility operator from the necessity operator and negation.6 The tautology 'Holmes either has blood type A or he doesn't,' however, is true-inthe-fiction since it is true in all the truth-making worlds. The consequence that all tautologies are true in any fiction has been criticized (cf. Proudfoot 2006, 11). However, given that the connectives mean the same in fiction as in ordinary speech all tautologies should be true in all fictions. We would have a problem if true-in-fiction-f distributed over the disjunction – that is, if true-in-fiction (p ∨ ¬p
clouds and that the world ends up containing vastly many more cloud than it should. The trouble of the many is the ontological problem that the number of cloud is besides large, not a problem of how to pluck out finical aggregates. Though we necessitate, as discussed in Section 2, to choose a single referent for' Holmes' among multiple equally good candidates, the being of multiple candidates is not itself a problem for us as long as we can select one of them, as I argued we can. thymine H E T radius U T H A bacillus O U T S H east R L O C K H O L M E S 355 multiple singular propositions containing different referents, and supervaluationism or similar means would be needed to evaluate these sentences. On our account, although there embody multiple worlds among the truth - manufacturer for sentences involving' Holmes' where Holmes has somewhat unlike properties, it is Holmes who have these properties in the relevant worlds, not his surrogate, counterparts or doppelgangers. Worlds where surrogates, counterparts or doppelgangers have these place are not truth - makers for the Holmes stories. We do not need supervaluationism. Indeed, truth - in - fiction is, formally, merely a standard box operator from modal logic ranging over the restricted set of closest worldly concern where the events described in the fiction subscribe stead, and' p is false - in - fabrication - f' is equivalent to' it is true - in - fiction - f that not - p.' Since' Holmes has rake type angstrom' is true in some but not all of these populace it is not true - in - the - fabrication, but it is consistent with the fiction: We could define an hustler' consistent - with - the - fiction' from' true - in - the - fiction' the way we define the possibility operator from the necessity operator and negation.6 The tautology' Holmes either has blood type angstrom or he doesn't,' however, is true - inthe - fabrication since it is true in all the truth - making worlds. The consequence that all tautologies are true in any fiction has been criticize (cf. Proudfoot 2006, 11). However, given that the connectives mean the same in fiction as in average speech all tautologies should be truthful in all fictions. We would have a problem if true - in - fiction - f distribute over the disjunction – that is, if true - in - fiction (phosphorus ∨ ¬p
 clluds and that the world tnds up containiny vastlb many jore clojds than it should. The problxm od the many is the ontologicxl problel that tye nnmber of clouds ma too large, nkb a pxoulem of how to kick out pardicular aggregdtds. Though we need, as discussed in Seceion 2, tp delect a singlg reftregt fkg 'Molmes' among multiple equally gokd candpdates, the existemce of multiple candidates is jot itself a problfm for us aw logt as we can relect one of them, as J argued we can. T H E T R U T H A B P U T S H G D P O C K H O O M E S 355 multiple singulas propoxitions contaiking viffwrent referents, and snpervaluationism or fimilar maaus would be needed to ecaluaje thase rwntdncts. Pn our afconnt, althougg there are multiple worlds ampnd the truth-maksrs fow fentences involving 'Holmes' where Holmes haa somewhat different priperties, it is Holmes who has ehese properties in the relevant worlds, not his sgrrogetds, eiuntefpagts or doppelgangers. Worlds where surrogates, skumtvrparts or doppelnangers have these pgolgrties are not truth-maksrs for the Holmes storief. We eo not netd sulervaluationism. Indeed, truty-in-fiction if, formally, just a scandard box uperstor grom modal logic ranginy over the restrifted set kw closest worlds whvre dhe evenur described in thq fiction takz place, xnd 'k is fajse-in-fictiln-f' is equivalent to 'it ls troe-in-fiwtion-f thah not-p.' Since 'Holmes has blood tb'e A' is true on soke but njt alk of these wowlds it is not true-in-che-ficgion, but in is consmstent with ehe fiction: Wa could definx an operwtor 'conwistent-dkth-the-fiction' grom 'true-pn-uhe-fiction' the way we define thg lossibility opexctir from the necrsskty oieretor wtd negation.6 Dhe gaugplogy 'Holmes eitmer has blood type A or he goesh't,' however, is true-onbhe-fictiob since yt is true in all the truth-makijg woclds. Tie conxeqoence that all tautologies are frue in ajy niction has bqen gritycized (cf. 'roudfoot 2006, 11). However, given that the connertives mean the same in fiction as in ordiuavy speech alk taueologies vhould be true in alo fictions. We woukd have a problem if frue-in-xictiln-f distributed over the disjunction – that is, if true-in-fiction (p ∨ ¬p
clouds and that the world ends up many clouds than should. The problem ontological that the number clouds is too not a problem of how to out particular aggregates. Though we need, as discussed in Section 2, to select single referent for 'Holmes' among multiple equally good candidates, the existence of multiple is itself problem us as long as we can select one of them, as I argued we can. T E T R U T H A B U T S H R L O C K O M E 355 singular containing different referents, supervaluationism or similar means would be needed to evaluate these sentences. On our account, although there are worlds among for sentences 'Holmes' Holmes somewhat different properties, Holmes who has these properties in not his surrogates, counterparts or doppelgangers. Worlds where counterparts or have these properties are not truth-makers the Holmes stories. We do not need supervaluationism. truth-in-fiction is, formally, just a standard box operator from modal logic ranging over the restricted closest worlds where the described in the take and is is equivalent 'it is true-in-fiction-f that not-p.' Since 'Holmes has blood type A' true in some but not all of these worlds it true-in-the-fiction, it is consistent the fiction: We could an 'consistent-with-the-fiction' from 'true-in-the-fiction' the define possibility necessity and The tautology 'Holmes either blood type A or he however, is true-inthe-fiction since the truth-making worlds. The consequence that all tautologies true in any fiction has been criticized Proudfoot 2006, 11). However, given that the connectives mean the same in as in all tautologies should be true in all fictions. would have a problem true-in-fiction-f distributed over the disjunction – that is, if (p ¬p
 clouds and that the world ends Up containiNg vasTly ManY mOre cLoudS than it should. THE proBlem of the many is the ontoLogicAl PRoblEM tHat thE number OF cLOUds Is ToO laRgE, NoT a proBleM of how tO pick out paRtiCuLar aggregateS. thOugh we need, As dIscussed in SeCtiOn 2, to seLeCt a SIngle RefErent For 'HolMEs' amonG multiple EqUAlly goOD candidATEs, The eXistence of multiplE CaNDidates is not itSelf a pRoBLeM FOr uS as Long as we caN sElect ONe of theM, As i ARGueD We can. T H E T R U T H a B O U T S H E R L O c k H O l M E S 355 muLtIplE SingulAr proPoSItiOns containiNg diFferent reFerentS, And supeRValuatiOnism oR siMilAr meANs WoUld Be NEedED tO evALuaTe these sEnTeNces. ON our ACCOUnt, aLthOugh There Are multiple woRldS amoNG thE trutH-makeRs foR sEntenCes invOlvinG 'HOlmes' where HolmeS has Somewhat dIffErEnt PrOpertIEs, it is holMes Who has tHese proPErtIeS IN ThE relevant worlds, not HiS SUrRogates, cOunterPArTs OR doppelgAnGerS. WorLDS wherE surROgAtes, counTerparTS oR dOppelgaNgErs havE tHesE prOpertIEs arE not trUth-makerS for tHE Holmes stories. wE do not need supERvALUaTIoniSm. INdeed, truth-iN-ficTIon iS, forMAlLy, jUSt a stAndarD bOX oPErator from modal logiC rAnging Over tHe restricted sEt of closesT WORlds wherE the EVeNTs described in tHe ficTion take plACe, and 'p is False-In-fictioN-f' is equivALEnt to 'it iS trUe-iN-fiCtiON-F tHat not-p.' Since 'HOLMes hAs Blood tyPe A' Is true iN soMe bUt nOt aLl Of these woRlds it is NoT tRuE-iN-thE-fictIOn, but it iS cOnsIsTenT with THe fictIon: We CoulD dEfINe aN operatOR 'cONSistEnT-wIth-tHe-fIcTion' fRom 'tRUe-iN-the-ficTion' the waY we DEfinE tHe PossibiLity operator fRoM the necessItY opErator AND negatioN.6 The tautology 'Holmes eithER has bloOd tYpe A oR he dOesn't,' howeVer, Is true-IntHE-fictiOn sincE it is TrUe iN ALl the TRUtH-maKiNg worlds. ThE COnsEquenCe That All tautOlogies are true in anY FicTion has been crItiCizeD (CF. PRouDFoOT 2006, 11). HoWeVEr, gIVEn that the connecTives mean tHe SAmE in fiction AS in OrDinary sPeech alL tautOLogies sHould be trUe in all fiCtIons. wE WouLd have a proBlem if trUe-in-fictiON-f disTRiButed OveR the diSjUncTion – tHat is, iF TruE-in-fiCtion (p ∨ ¬P
 clouds and that the world  ends up c ontai nin g v as tlymany  more clouds t h an i t should. The problemof th em anyi sthe o ntologi c al p rob le mtha tt he  numb erof clou ds is toolar ge , not a prob l em  of how to  pi ck out parti cul ar agg re gat e s. Th oug h weneed,a s disc ussed inSe c tion 2 ,  to sel e c ta si ngle referent for 'H o lmes' among mu ltiple  e q ua l l y g ood  candidate s,  thee xistenc e  o f m ult i ple candidate s is not it s elf  a pro bl emf or usas lo ng aswe can sele ct o ne of the m, asI  argued we can.  T H E  TR U  T H ABO U  T S H ER L O C  K H O L  M  E  S 35 5 mu l t i p le s ing ular  prop ositions cont ain ingd iff erent  refe rent s,  andsuperv aluat io nism or similar  mea ns wouldbene ede dto ev a luatethe sesentenc es. Ono urac c o u nt , although there a re m ul tiple wo rlds a m on gt he truth -m ake rs f o r  sent ence s  i nvolving  'Holm e s'  w here Ho lm es has  s ome wha t dif f eren t prop erties,it is Holmes who has these propert i es i nt he r ele vant worlds , no t  his  sur r og ate s , cou nterp ar t so r doppelgangers. Wo rl ds whe re su rrogates, cou nterpartso r doppelga nger s  h a ve these prope rties  are not t r uth-make rs fo r the Ho lmes stor i e s. We do  no t n eed  su p e rv aluationism.I n deed ,truth-i n-f ictionis,  fo rma lly ,just a st andard b ox  o pe ra tor  from modal lo gi c r an gin g ove r  the r estri cted  s et ofclosest wo r l ds w he re  the  ev en ts de scri b edin thefiction t ake plac e,  a nd 'p i s false-in-fi ct ion-f' iseq uiv alentt o  'it istrue-in-fiction-f thatn ot-p.'Sin ce 'H olme s has blo odtype A ' i s  truein som e but  n ota l l oft h es e w or lds it isn o t t rue-i n- the- fiction , but it is consis t ent  with the fic tio n: W e co uld de f ine  a n  op e r ator 'consisten t-with-the -f i ct ion' from' tru e- in-the- fiction ' the way wedefine th e possibi li ty o p e rat or from th e necess ity opera t or an d  n egati on. 6 Theta uto logy'Holme s  ei therhas bl oo d type  A or  h e doesn' t,' however, is true-in the-fi ction  si nce it is  tr u e i n all the  tru th-makingwor lds . The  co n seque ncet ha t a l l tau tolo g ies are t r ue  in a ny  fiction ha s b een  crit ici z ed (cf . Pr oudfoot 2006, 11) .  However, give n th a t  th e c o nnec ti ves mean the s ame  i n fictionas  in ordinar y speech  a l l tau tologi es sho uld bet r ue in all  fic tio ns. We wo uld  h a ve a pr ob le m  if tr ue-i n- fictio n-f di s trib u t ed over the disj uncti o n  – th a t i s, if  t rue-in- f icti on (p ∨ ¬p 
 clouds_and that_the world ends up_containing vastly_many_more clouds_than_it should. The_problem of the_many is the ontological_problem that the_number_of clouds is too large, not a problem of how to pick out particular_aggregates._Though we_need,_as_discussed in Section 2, to_select a single referent for_'Holmes' among_multiple equally good candidates, the existence of multiple_candidates_is not itself_a problem for us as long as we can_select one of them, as I_argued we can._T_H_E T R U_T H A B O U_T S H E R L_O C K H O L M_E S 355 multiple singular propositions_containing different referents, and supervaluationism_or similar_means would be needed to_evaluate these sentences._On our_account, although there_are multiple worlds among the truth-makers_for sentences involving_'Holmes' where Holmes has somewhat different_properties,_it is Holmes_who_has_these properties_in the relevant_worlds,_not his_surrogates,_counterparts or doppelgangers. Worlds where surrogates,_counterparts_or doppelgangers have these properties are not_truth-makers for the Holmes_stories._We do not need_supervaluationism. Indeed, truth-in-fiction is, formally,_just a standard box operator from_modal logic_ranging over_the restricted set of closest worlds where the events described in_the fiction take place, and 'p_is false-in-fiction-f' is equivalent_to 'it_is_true-in-fiction-f that not-p.'_Since_'Holmes has_blood type A' is true in some_but not_all of these worlds it is_not true-in-the-fiction, but it_is_consistent with the fiction: We could_define an operator 'consistent-with-the-fiction' from 'true-in-the-fiction'_the way we define the_possibility_operator_from the necessity operator and_negation.6 The tautology 'Holmes either has_blood type A_or he doesn't,' however, is true-inthe-fiction since_it_is true in all the truth-making_worlds._The consequence that all tautologies are_true_in_any fiction has been criticized_(cf. Proudfoot 2006, 11). However, given_that the connectives mean the same in fiction as_in ordinary speech_all tautologies should be true_in_all_fictions. We would have a problem if true-in-fiction-f distributed over_the disjunction_– that is,_if true-in-fiction (p ∨ ¬p