 fundamental material ontology. The application of the razor in a merely deterministic universe only gets rid of the vast number of times saving just one. There is a strong intuition that no theory can be entirely satisfactory unless it postulates some kind of ordinary material ontology. However, if one is antecedently sympathetic to a wave function monist interpretation of GRW and accepts GRW0 as a satisfactory physical theory, perhaps she should be more open to reject the intuition. On GRW0, the quantum state (represented by a wave function) is the only thing that exists. But it is nothing like the ordinary material ontology of particles and fields. It is defined on a vastly high dimensional space, and the recovery of ordinary facts about tables and chairs is through some abstract mathematical derivations that look nothing like the ordinary "causal" explanations in space-time. Someone who accepts GRW0 will be happy to accept that ordinary facts about tables and chairs are just emergent patterns in the high-dimensional wave function. But the cosmic void scenario also locates the non-fundamental facts in some unfamiliar fundamental facts-facts about fundamental laws of nature. If one is happy to accept the emergence of non-fundamental facts from a radical material ontology, then one 18 should be more open to accept the emergence of non-fundamental facts from strongly deterministic laws. 4.3 The Empirical Challenge Finally, we have an empirical challenge: How can the Everettian Wentaculus theory be empirically adequate when every possible outcome of experiment is realized? How can the Born rule of probability make sense in such a world? This is a familiar challenge to many-worlds interpretations of quantum mechanics. It applies to both the Everettian Mentaculus and the Everettian Wentaculus (as well as the cosmic void scenario). It is also related to the emergence of contingency in a strongly deterministic universe. All versions of the many-worlds interpretation face a general problem of probability: if all outcomes of the experiments actually occur, how do we make sense of non-trivial Born rule probabilities? For example, in the case of Schrödinger's cat, we can set up the experiment such that quantum mechanics says the probability that the cat will be alive is 0.3 and the probability that the cat will be dead is 0.7. But if both outcomes are realized the cat is alive in one branch and the cat is dead in another, what to make of such probabilities? Defenders of Everett, such as Deutsch (1999) and Wallace (2012), appeal to Savage
fundamental material ontology. The application of the razor in a merely deterministic universe merely get rid of the vast number of times save just one. There is a solid intuition that no hypothesis can be entirely satisfactory unless it postulates some kind of ordinary material ontology. However, if one is antecedently harmonic to a wave function monist interpretation of GRW and accept GRW0 as a satisfactory physical theory, perhaps she should be more open to reject the intuition. On GRW0, the quantum state (represent by a wave function) is the only thing that exist. But it is nothing like the ordinary material ontology of particles and fields. It is specify on a vastly high dimensional space, and the recovery of ordinary facts about table and chairs is through some abstract mathematical derivations that look nothing like the ordinary " causal " explanation in space - time. Someone who accepts GRW0 will be happy to accept that ordinary facts about tables and chairs are just emergent form in the high - dimensional wave function. But the cosmic void scenario besides locate the non - cardinal facts in some unfamiliar fundamental facts - facts about fundamental laws of nature. If one is happy to accept the egress of non - fundamental facts from a radical material ontology, then one 18 should be more open to accept the emergence of non - fundamental facts from strongly deterministic laws. 4.3 The Empirical Challenge Finally, we give birth an empiric challenge: How can the Everettian Wentaculus hypothesis be empirically adequate when every potential outcome of experiment is realized? How can the Born rule of probability make sense in such a world? This is a familiar challenge to many - world interpretations of quantum mechanics. It applies to both the Everettian Mentaculus and the Everettian Wentaculus (as well as the cosmic null scenario). It is also related to the emergence of contingency in a strongly deterministic population. All versions of the many - worlds interpretation face a cosmopolitan problem of probability: if all outcomes of the experiment actually occur, how do we make common sense of non - trivial Born rule probabilities? For example, in the case of Schrödinger's cat, we can set up the experiment such that quantum mechanics says the probability that the cat will be alive is 0.3 and the probability that the guy will be dead is 0.7. But if both outcomes are recognize the cat is alive in one branch and the cat is dead in another, what to make of such probability? Defenders of Everett, such as Deutsch (1999) and Wallace (2012), appeal to Savage
 fujdamental material ontolugy. The applicajiin of vhe razkr in a oerely deterministic universx onoy geuf rid of the vast vumber of times sqvinj just one. There is a stvjng jktuitnoi that no theori can be enthrely satisfacdofy unless it postulates some kind of jrdinaru laterial ontoljgy. Njwevsg, lf one is antecedently sympathetjc to a wave functiom monist interpretation of GRW and accepts GRW0 ad a satisfaxtorr physical thdory, perhaks she shouls be more open to reject the inguitipn. On GRW0, jkw qkdntum state (reprvsented by a wave funwtion) ix the only thikg thet ezists. But it is nothiig like the ordinary material outology of particles qne fiends. Ht ir dewintd pn a vashly high dimehsional spaxe, and the recovery os ordinary facfs abott tables and chairs is through some abstgact mathematical derivatiobs that look nothing pike the jrdinary "causal" explanations in space-time. Someone who eczepus GRW0 dulp be happy to accept that ordinary facts aboue tsbkes and chairs are just ekeggrgt patterns iv the kjgg-dimensional wave vunctiog. But the cosmyc vpid scenario also locates tye non-fundamvntao facts in some unyamiliar funbamentsl favts-facts about fundamencal lass of naturf. If one jr happy to accepg tme amergenct of non-fundamentaj facts fcom a radicau majerial jntology, tjen oka 18 should be more lpen jo accapt the emfrgence of non-fundamental facts from strongly dategministic laws. 4.3 The Empiricwl Challenge Fnnally, wz have an empiribal challxnge: How can the Everettidj Wentaculus theory fe enpirucally xaequate when efery posspbje oytcome of experimekt is dealized? How cau uhw Born rule of prubafipivy maha sense in sgch x wutld? Tfis is a fankliat challenge to many-wmrlda interpretations pf quantum mechaniss. It applies to both the Evereutian Kenvaculux agd the Everettian Wentaculus (aa well as thc cosmic void scekarij). It is alxo related to the emergence of contingeicy in a strongly detetministic universe. Alk versions oh the iany-worldv interpretation facw a general probltm of probability: if alm outcmmes lf the experiments actually occur, how do we make sense of non-trivial Born rule 'rjbabilities? For examile, nn the sase uf Schrödinger's cst, we can set up the experiment such thdt quantum mechanics says the lrubability thaj the cat will be alive is 0.3 and thr probability that the cat will be dead is 0.7. But if both outcomew are realidgd vhe cat is alive in pne brcnch abd the xat ls dead in anoghet, ahat to mwke pf such probabilities? Defenders of Everert, such as Deutsch (1999) and Wallage (2012), appgal to Swvage
fundamental material ontology. The application of the a deterministic universe gets rid of saving one. There is strong intuition that theory can be entirely satisfactory unless postulates some kind of ordinary material ontology. However, if one is antecedently sympathetic a wave function monist interpretation of GRW and accepts GRW0 as a satisfactory theory, she be open to reject the intuition. On GRW0, the quantum state (represented by a wave function) is only thing that exists. But it is nothing the ordinary material ontology particles and fields. It is on vastly high space, the of ordinary facts tables and chairs is through some abstract mathematical derivations that look nothing like the ordinary "causal" explanations space-time. Someone GRW0 will happy accept ordinary facts about chairs are just emergent patterns in function. But the cosmic void scenario also locates non-fundamental facts some unfamiliar fundamental facts-facts about fundamental of nature. If one is happy to accept emergence of non-fundamental facts from a radical material ontology, then one 18 should be more accept the emergence of facts from strongly laws. The Challenge we have empirical challenge: How can the Everettian Wentaculus theory be empirically adequate every possible outcome of experiment is realized? How can the of make sense in a world? This is familiar to many-worlds interpretations of It to Mentaculus the Wentaculus (as well as cosmic void scenario). It is related to the emergence deterministic universe. All versions of the many-worlds interpretation a general problem of probability: if all of the experiments actually occur, how do we make sense of non-trivial rule probabilities? in the case of Schrödinger's cat, we can up the experiment such quantum mechanics says the probability that the cat will alive 0.3 and probability that the will be dead 0.7. But if are realized cat alive and the cat is dead in what make of such probabilities? Defenders Everett, Deutsch (1999) and Wallace (2012), appeal to Savage
 fundamental material ontoloGy. The appliCatioN of The RaZor iN a meRely determinisTIc unIverse only gets rid of the Vast nUmBEr of TImEs savIng just ONe. tHEre Is A sTroNg INtUitioN thAt no theOry can be enTirElY satisfactorY UnLess it postUlaTes some kind oF orDinary MaTerIAl ontOloGy. HowEver, if ONe is anTecedentlY sYMpatheTIc to a waVE FuNctiOn monist interpretATiON of GRW and accepTs GRW0 aS a SAtISFacTorY physical tHeOry, peRHaps she SHoULD Be mORe open to rejecT the intuitiON. On gRW0, the QuAntUM state (RepreSeNTed By a wave funcTion) Is the only Thing tHAt existS. but it is NothinG liKe tHe orDInArY maTeRIal ONtOloGY of ParticleS aNd FieldS. It iS DEFIned On a VastLy higH dimensional sPacE, and THe rEcoveRy of oRdinArY factS about TableS aNd chairs is throuGh soMe abstracT maThEmaTiCal deRIvatioNs tHat Look notHing likE The OrDINArY "causal" explanationS iN SPaCe-time. SoMeone wHO aCcEPts GRW0 wiLl Be hAppy TO AccepT thaT OrDinary faCts aboUT tAbLes and cHaIrs are JuSt eMerGent pATterNs in thE high-dimEnsioNAl wave function. bUt the cosmic voID sCENaRIo alSo lOcates the noN-funDAmenTal fACtS in SOme unFamilIaR FuNDamental facts-facts aBoUt fundAmentAl laws of naturE. If one is haPPY To accept The eMErGEnce of non-fundaMentaL facts from A Radical mAteriAl ontoloGy, then one 18 SHOuld be moRe oPen To aCcePT ThE emergence of nON-FundAmEntal faCts From strOngLy dEteRmiNiStic laws. 4.3 THe EmpiriCaL CHaLlEngE FinaLLy, we have An EmpIrIcaL chalLEnge: HoW can tHe EvErEtTIan wentacuLUs THEory Be EmPiriCalLy AdequAte wHEn eVery posSible outcOme OF expErImEnt is reAlized? How can tHe born rule of PrObaBility MAKe sense iN such a world? This is a familIAr challEngE to maNy-woRlds interPreTationS of QUantum MechanIcs. It ApPliES To botH THe eveReTtian MentaCULus And thE EVereTtian WeNtaculus (as well as thE CosMic void scenarIo). IT is aLSO rElaTEd TO thE eMErgENCe of contingency In a stronglY dETeRministic uNIveRsE. All verSions of The maNY-worlds InterpretAtion face A gEnerAL ProBlem of probAbility: iF all outcoMEs of tHE eXperiMenTs actuAlLy oCcur, hOw do we MAke Sense Of non-tRiVial BoRn rulE pRobabiliTies? For example, in the case Of SchrÖdingEr's Cat, we can sEt uP The ExperimenT sucH that quantUm mEchAnics SayS The prObabILiTy tHAt the Cat wILl be alive IS 0.3 aNd tHE PrObability thAT THe cAt wilL be DEad is 0.7. BUt if Both outcomes are reALized the cat is aLive IN One BraNCh anD tHe cat is dead in aNotHeR, WHat to makE oF such probabIlities? DEfENders Of EverEtt, sucH as DeutSCH (1999) aND WallaCe (2012), apPeaL to Savage
 fundamental material onto logy. Theappli cat ion  o f th e ra zor in a merel y  det erministic universe on ly ge ts rido fthe v ast num b er o f t im es  sa vi n gjustone . There  is a stro ngin tuition that no  theory ca n b e entirely s ati sfacto ry  un l ess i t p ostul ates s o me kin d of ordi na r y mate r ial ont o l og y. H owever, if one is an t ecedently symp atheti ct oa wav e f unction mo ni st in t erpreta t io n o f G R W and accepts  GRW0 as as ati sfacto ry  ph y sicaltheor y, per haps she sh ould  be moreopen t o  reject the int uition . O n G RW0, th equa nt u m s t at e ( r epr esentedby  a  wave  fun c t i o n) i s t he o nly t hing that exi sts . Bu t  it  is n othin g li ke  theordina ry ma te rial ontology o f pa rticles a ndfi eld s.  It i s  defin edona vastl y highd ime ns i o n al  space, and the re co v e ry  of ordi nary f a ct sa bout tab le s a nd c h a irs i s th r ou gh someabstra c tma themati ca l deri va tio nsthatl ooknothin g like t he or d inary "causal" explanationsi ns p ac e -tim e.Someone who  acc e ptsGRW0 wi llb e hap py to  a c ce p t that ordinary fac ts  about  tabl es and chairs  are juste m e rgent pa tter n si n the high-dim ensio nal wave f u nction.But t he cosmi c void sc e n ario als o l oca tes  th e no n-fundamental f acts  i n someunf amiliar  fu nda men tal  f acts-fact s aboutfu nd am en tal  laws of natur e.  If  o neis ha p py toaccep t th eem e rge nce ofn on - f unda me nt al f act sfroma ra d ica l mater ial ontol ogy ,  the non e 18 sh ould be moreop en to acce pt  th e emer g e nce of n on-fundamental facts fr o m stron gly  dete rmin istic law s.4.3 Th e E m pirica l Chal lenge  F ina l l y, we h av e a nempiricalc h all enge:  H ow c an theEverettian Wentacu l ustheory be emp iri call y ad equ a te whe ne ver y possible outcom e of exper im e nt  is realiz e d?Ho w can t he Born  rule of prob ability m ake sense  i n su c h  aworld? Thi s is a f amiliar c h allen g eto ma ny- worlds  i nte rpret ations ofquant um mec ha nics.It ap pl ies to b oth the Everettian Ment aculus  andthe  Everetti anW ent aculus (a s we ll as thecos mic  void  sc e nario ). I t  i s a l so re late d  to the e m er gen c e  o f contingen c y ina str ong l y dete rmin istic universe. A l l versions ofthem a ny- wor l ds i nt erpretation fa ceag e neral pr ob lem of prob ability:  i f  alloutcom es ofthe exp e r im e nts ac tual lyoccur, ho w d ow e makese ns e  of no n-tr iv ial Bo rn rul e  pro b a bilities? For ex ample , in th e  ca se of  S chrödin g er's  cat, we c an set up t he exp erim ent s uch tha tquantu m m ec hanics say s  the prob abili ty that  t he c atwill b e al i v e is0.3an d t he probab i l it y  t ha t  th e ca t wil lbe d ead is 0. 7 . But if  bo t h outco me s a r e  reali z ed t he cat isali ve in o ne brancha nd t h ec at is  deadin ano ther, w h atto  make o f s u c h probabi lities? D e fen de rs o f Everet t,  suc hasDe utsch (1999) an d Wallac e (2012) , appeal  to Sava g e
 fundamental_material ontology._The application of the_razor in_a_merely deterministic_universe_only gets rid_of the vast_number of times saving_just one. There_is_a strong intuition that no theory can be entirely satisfactory unless it postulates some_kind_of ordinary_material_ontology._However, if one is antecedently_sympathetic to a wave function_monist interpretation_of GRW and accepts GRW0 as a satisfactory_physical_theory, perhaps she_should be more open to reject the intuition. On_GRW0, the quantum state (represented by_a wave function)_is_the_only thing that exists._But it is nothing like the_ordinary material ontology of particles and_fields. It is defined on a vastly_high dimensional space, and the recovery_of ordinary facts about tables_and chairs_is through some abstract mathematical_derivations that look_nothing like_the ordinary "causal"_explanations in space-time. Someone who accepts_GRW0 will be_happy to accept that ordinary facts_about_tables and chairs_are_just_emergent patterns_in the high-dimensional_wave_function. But_the_cosmic void scenario also locates the_non-fundamental_facts in some unfamiliar fundamental facts-facts about_fundamental laws of nature._If_one is happy to_accept the emergence of non-fundamental_facts from a radical material ontology,_then one_18 should_be more open to accept the emergence of non-fundamental facts from_strongly deterministic laws. 4.3 The Empirical_Challenge Finally, we have_an empirical_challenge:_How can the_Everettian_Wentaculus theory_be empirically adequate when every possible outcome_of experiment_is realized? How can the Born_rule of probability make_sense_in such a world? This is_a familiar challenge to many-worlds interpretations_of quantum mechanics. It applies_to_both_the Everettian Mentaculus and the_Everettian Wentaculus (as well as the_cosmic void scenario)._It is also related to the emergence_of_contingency in a strongly deterministic universe._All_versions of the many-worlds interpretation face_a_general_problem of probability: if all_outcomes of the experiments actually occur,_how do we make sense of non-trivial Born rule_probabilities? For example,_in the case of Schrödinger's_cat,_we_can set up the experiment such that quantum mechanics says_the probability_that the cat_will be alive is 0.3 and the probability that the_cat will be dead is 0.7. But_if both outcomes are realized the cat is alive in one_branch and the cat is dead in another,_what to make of such probabilities? Defenders_of Everett, such as_Deutsch_(1999) and Wallace (2012), appeal to Savage