, Michelfelder (2010) interpreted Borgmann by stating that the technologies associated with pervasive computing are designed to transparently recede into the background of the daily contexts in which we use the technologies. However, Borgmann emphasized that critical reflection is needed to bring to the forefront how ubiquitous digital technologies shape our lives (Michelfelder, 2010). Michelfelder (2010) argued that such philosophical reflection about pervasive technology is important in order to preserve the moral good of personal privacy, and maintain existential autonomy so that we do not lose control over our personal information. Critique of Technological Determinism Questioning technological determinism. Misa (2009) argued that technological determinism is a scholarly and practical problem that has merited philosophical reflection and critique for decades. What follows is a critique of technological determinism that considers different accounts and interpretations of technological determinism, and examines their adequacy as purported theories for explaining the interconnections 89 between technology and society. As presented previously in the Introduction, technological determinism is the ideological viewpoint that sees technology as an autonomous causal agent and force driving inevitable change in society (Kanuka, 2008; Leonardi, 2008; Marx & Smith, 1994; Smith, 1994). The critique will critically examine the assumptions implicitly held in the technological determinist perspective, which include technology operating according to its own internal logic (Strobel & TillbergWebb, 2009), in an inevitable maimer (Instone, 2004; Leonardi, 2008) as an autonomous force outside of social control (Feenberg, 2010; Leonardi, 2009). The critique will contrast the differences between hard technological determinism, which sees technology acting as a singularly autonomous agent, and soft technological determinism, which asserts that technology drives social change, but does so along with a complex interaction of social factors (Marx & Smith, 1994). Above all, a crucial issue for inquiry concerns the relationship between human agency and technological development and implementation, and the responsibility that human beings have for technology in society and education (Hofmann, 2006; Kritt & Winegar, 2010). Few people admit to being proponents o f the technological determinist philosophical viewpoint, and the label of technological determinism tends to have negative connotations (Kanuka, 2008). The characterization o f technological determinism in the literature often uses highly critical terms. For example, technological determinism has been described as a misconception (Aibar, 2010; Pearson & Young, 2002), a myth (Buckingham, 2006; Burnett, Senker & Walker
, Michelfelder (2010) interpreted Borgmann by stating that the technologies associated with permeant computer science are designed to transparently recede into the setting of the casual contexts in which we use the technologies. However, Borgmann stress that critical reflection is needed to institute to the forefront how ubiquitous digital engineering shape our lives (Michelfelder, 2010). Michelfelder (2010) argue that such philosophic reflection about pervasive engineering is important in orderliness to preserve the moral good of personal privacy, and maintain existential autonomy so that we do not suffer control over our personal information. Critique of Technological Determinism Questioning technological determinism. Misa (2009) argue that technological determinism is a scholarly and practical problem that has merited philosophical mirror image and critique for decades. What follows is a critique of technological determinism that considers different accounts and interpretations of technological determinism, and examines their adequacy as purported theories for explaining the interconnections 89 between technology and club. As presented previously in the Introduction, technological determinism is the ideological vantage point that see technology as an autonomous causal agent and force drive inevitable change in society (Kanuka, 2008; Leonardi, 2008; Marx & Smith, 1994; Smith, 1994). The critique will critically examine the assumption implicitly held in the technological determinist perspective, which include technology engage according to its own internal logic (Strobel & TillbergWebb, 2009), in an inevitable maimer (Instone, 2004; Leonardi, 2008) as an autonomous force outside of social restraint (Feenberg, 2010; Leonardi, 2009). The critique will contrast the remainder between hard technological determinism, which sees technology acting as a singularly autonomous agentive role, and soft technological determinism, which asserts that technology drives social change, but does so along with a complex interaction of social factors (Marx & Smith, 1994). Above all, a all-important issue for inquiry concerns the relationship between human agency and technical development and implementation, and the responsibility that human beings suffer for technology in club and education (Hofmann, 2006; Kritt & Winegar, 2010). Few people accommodate to being proponents o f the technical determinist philosophical viewpoint, and the label of technical determinism tends to have negative connotations (Kanuka, 2008). The portrayal oxygen f technological determinism in the literature often practice highly critical terms. For example, technological determinism has been described as a misconception (Aibar, 2010; Pearson & Young, 2002), a myth (Buckingham, 2006; Burnett, Senker & Walker
, Mifhelfelder (2010) interpreted Norgmann by statnbg thav the tschnologkes associated with pervasivx conputibg are designed to travsparentlj recede unto rhe background of bke dajpy cmitexts in which we use tha technologies. Huwzver, Borgmann emphasized that criticwl reflrchion is needed to nwing no the forefront how ubiquitous digitan technologiex shape our lives (Michelfepder, 2010). Michelfelder (2010) arhued that sodh [yilosophical reflection about pervzsive technology is important iv ordzr to presetrw tjg moral good of pvrsonal privagj, and mdintain existential amtonoky wo that we do not losx control over our pgrsonal inxoxmation. Critique of Twcynolocican Degwrmkniam Qhestiojinj technologjcal determunism. Misa (2009) argued uhae technologicam detewmynism is a scholarly and practical probnem that has merited philowophical reflection ajd critiqte for decades. What follows is a critique of techtologmcxl bcbermkbidm that considers different accounts and intewlrttanions of technolonical determinism, snf rvamines their adequcdy as purported theogies fot explqining tht intrrconnections 89 between techbology and sjxiety. As presented previously in jhe Inyroduction, technologicau deferminism id the idekuogical viewpoing tmat sees technology as an autjnomous ceusal agent xnd gorce qriving infvitanne change in sociehy (Kauuka, 2008; Leonardi, 2008; Marx & Smith, 1994; Smith, 1994). The critiqnx will criticslny vxamine tke assmmptions implicytly held in tke technjlogizal determpnist pervpective, whych include tafhnology opecating acsordung ro its udn internal lobic (Strobvl & TiolbergWebb, 2009), in an lnevijagle maimer (Instine, 2004; Leonardi, 2008) as sn xutjnlmpuf force outsige ow suvial zontrol (Feekbefg, 2010; Keonardi, 2009). The critiqge wjll contrast the dofnerences vetween rard technolobical determinism, ahich sexs tecnnojogy acting as a singularly aufonomous wgekt, and soft tqchnilogical detzrminism, which asserts that technology dcives social change, buj does so along with c gomplex intecactiog of socidl factors (Marx & Smirh, 1994). Above all, a cvucial issue for inquidy conwerns the relationship between human agency and technological development and umplemxneation, and fhe tespotsnbikity trat iuoan beings have gor technology in society and evucation (Hmfiann, 2006; Kritt & Winegar, 2010). Few peppue admit to bging proponents o f the tedhnologival determinist philosophical voewpoint, and the label on technoligicam detegjiiism tends to have nrgativz connitationw (Kakuka, 2008). The charxctrrlzation o v terhnklogical determinism in the liteeature ovten uses highly critical tcros. Fot examplg, technological dsterjlnism has been desvribed as a mixconception (Aibar, 2010; Pvarfon & Young, 2002), a njth (Buckinghak, 2006; Butuvtt, Senker & Welker
, Michelfelder (2010) interpreted Borgmann by stating technologies with pervasive are designed to of daily contexts in we use the However, Borgmann emphasized that critical reflection needed to bring to the forefront how ubiquitous digital technologies shape our lives 2010). Michelfelder (2010) argued that such philosophical reflection about pervasive technology is important order preserve moral of personal privacy, and maintain existential autonomy so that we do not lose control over our information. Critique of Technological Determinism Questioning technological determinism. (2009) argued that technological is a scholarly and practical that merited philosophical and for What follows is critique of technological determinism that considers different accounts and interpretations of technological determinism, and examines their adequacy purported theories the interconnections between and As presented previously Introduction, technological determinism is the ideological technology as an autonomous causal agent and force inevitable change society (Kanuka, 2008; Leonardi, 2008; Marx Smith, 1994; Smith, 1994). The critique will critically the assumptions implicitly held in the technological determinist perspective, which include technology operating according to internal logic (Strobel & 2009), in an maimer 2004; 2008) an autonomous outside of social control (Feenberg, 2010; Leonardi, 2009). The critique will the differences between hard technological determinism, which sees technology acting singularly agent, and soft determinism, which asserts that drives change, but does so a interaction (Marx Smith, Above all, a crucial for inquiry concerns the relationship human agency and technological responsibility that human beings have for technology in and education (Hofmann, 2006; Kritt & Winegar, Few people admit to being proponents o f the technological determinist philosophical and the technological determinism tends to have negative connotations (Kanuka, The characterization o f determinism in the literature often uses highly critical terms. example, determinism has described as a (Aibar, 2010; Pearson Young, 2002), a 2006; Burnett, &
, Michelfelder (2010) interpreted BoRgmann by stAting ThaT thE tEchnOlogIes associated wITh peRvasive computing are desIgned To TRansPArEntly Recede iNTo THE baCkGrOunD oF ThE dailY coNtexts iN which we usE thE tEchnologies. HOWeVer, BorgmanN emPhasized that CriTical rEfLecTIon is NeeDed to Bring tO The forEfront how UbIQuitouS Digital TEChNoloGies shape our lives (mIcHElfelder, 2010). MichelFelder (2010) ArGUeD THat SucH philosophIcAl refLEction aBOuT PERvaSIve technology Is important IN orDer to pReSerVE the moRal goOd OF peRsonal privaCy, anD maintain ExisteNTial autONomy so tHat we dO noT loSe coNTrOl OveR oUR peRSoNal INfoRmation. CRiTiQue of techNOLOGicaL DeTermInism questioning teChnOlogICal DeterMinisM. MisA (2009) aRgued That teChnolOgIcal determinism Is a sCholarly aNd pRaCtiCaL probLEm that Has MerIted phiLosophiCAl rEfLECTiOn and critique for deCaDES. WHat folloWs is a cRItIqUE of technOlOgiCal dETErminIsm tHAt ConsiderS diffeREnT aCcounts AnD interPrEtaTioNs of tEChnoLogicaL determiNism, aND examines their ADequacy as purpORtED ThEOrieS foR explaining The iNTercOnneCTiOns 89 BEtweeN techNoLOgY And society. As presentEd PrevioUsly iN the IntroductIon, technolOGICal deterMiniSM iS The ideological ViewpOint that seES technolOgy as An autonoMous causaL AGent and fOrcE drIviNg iNEViTable change in SOCietY (KAnuka, 2008; LeOnaRdi, 2008; Marx & smiTh, 1994; SMitH, 1994). ThE cRitique wiLl criticAlLy ExAmIne The asSUmptions ImPliCiTly Held iN The tecHnoloGicaL dEtERmiNist perSPeCTIve, wHiCh InclUde TeChnolOgy oPEraTing accOrding to iTs oWN intErNaL logic (STrobel & TillberGWEbb, 2009), in an ineViTabLe maimER (instone, 2004; LEonardi, 2008) as an autonomous foRCe outsiDe oF sociAl coNtrol (FeenBerG, 2010; LeonaRdi, 2009). tHe critIque wiLl conTrAst THE diffEREnCes BeTween hard tECHnoLogicAl DeteRminism, Which sees technologY ActIng as a singulaRly AutoNOMoUs aGEnT, And SoFT teCHNological determInism, which AsSErTs that techNOloGy Drives sOcial chAnge, bUT does so Along with A complex iNtEracTIOn oF social facTors (Marx & smith, 1994). AbovE All, a cRUcIal isSue For inqUiRy cOncerNs the rELatIonshIp betwEeN human AgencY aNd technoLogical development and imPlemenTatioN, anD the respoNsiBIliTy that humAn beIngs have foR teChnOlogy In sOCiety And eDUcAtiON (HofmAnn, 2006; KRItt & WinegaR, 2010). feW peOPLe Admit to beinG PROpoNents O f tHE technOlogIcal determinist phILosophical viewPoinT, ANd tHe lABel oF tEchnological deTerMiNISm tends tO hAve negative ConnotatIoNS (KanuKa, 2008). The cHaractErizatiON O f TEchnolOgicAl dEterminisM in ThE LiteratUrE oFTen useS higHlY critiCal terMS. For EXAmple, technologicAl detERMinisM Has Been dEsCribed aS A misConception (aibar, 2010; PearsoN & Young, 2002), A mytH (BuckIngham, 2006; BUrNett, SeNkeR & WAlker
, Michelfelder (2010) inte rpreted Bo rgman n b y s ta ting  tha t the technolo g iesassociated with pervas ive c om p utin g  a re de signedt ot r ans pa re ntl yr ec ede i nto  the ba ckground o f t he  daily conte x ts  in whichweuse the tech nol ogies.  H owe v er, B org mannemphas i zed th at critic al reflec t ion isn e ed ed t o bring to the fo r ef r ont how ubiqui tous d ig i ta l tec hno logies sha pe  ourl ives (M i ch e l f eld e r, 2010). Mic helfelder ( 2 010 ) argu ed  th a t such  phil os o phi cal reflect ionabout per vasive technol o gy is i mporta ntinorde r  t opre se r vet he  mo r algood ofpe rs onalpriv a c y ,  and  ma inta in ex istential aut ono my s o  th at we  do n ot l os e con trol o ver o ur  personal infor mati on. Criti que  o f T ec hnolo g ical D ete rmi nism Qu estioni n g t ec h n o lo gical determinism.  M i s a(2009) a rguedt ha tt echnolog ic aldete r m inism  isa  s cholarly  and p r ac ti cal pro bl em tha thas  me rited phil osophi cal refl ectio n  and critiquef or decades. W h at f ol l owsisa critiqueof t e chno logi c al  de t ermin ism t ha t  c o nsiders different a cc ountsand i nterpretation s of techn o l o gical de term i ni s m, and examine s the ir adequac y  as purp orted  theorie s for exp l a ining th e i nte rco nne c t io ns 89 between t echn ol ogy and  so ciety.Aspre sen ted  p reviously  in theIn tr od uc tio n, te c hnologic al  de te rmi nismi s theideol ogic al  v i ewp oint th a ts e es t ec hn olog y a san au tono m ous  causal  agent an d f o rcedr iv ing ine vitable chang ein society  ( Kan uka, 2 0 0 8; Leona rdi, 2008; Marx & Smith ,  1994;Smi th, 1 994) . The cri tiq ue wil l c r itical ly exa mineth e a s s umpti o n simp li citly held i n t he te ch nolo gical d eterminist perspec t ive , which inclu detech n o lo gyo pe r ati ng acc o r ding to its own  internallo g ic  (Strobel&  Ti ll bergWeb b, 2009 ), in an inev itable ma imer (Ins to ne,2 0 04;  Leonardi,  2008) a s an auto n omous fo rce o uts ide of  s oci al co ntrol( Fee nberg , 2010 ;Leonar di, 2 00 9). Thecritique will contrastthe di ffere nce s between  ha r d t echnologi caldeterminis m,whi ch se est echno logy ac tin g  as a  sin g ularly au t on omo u s  a gent, and s o f t  te chnol ogi c al det ermi nism, which asser t s that technol ogyd r ive s s o cial  c hange, but doe s s oa l ong with  a  complex in teractio no f soc ial fa ctors(Marx & S mi t h, 199 4).Abo ve all, a  cr uc i al issu efo r  inqui ry c on cernsthe re l atio n s hip between huma n age n c y and tec hnolo gi cal dev e lopm ent and im plementatio n, and  the  resp onsibil it y that  hu ma n beings h a ve for te chnol ogy inso ciet y a nd edu cati o n  (Hof mann ,200 6; Kritt& Wi n eg ar ,  20 10).  Fewpe ople  admit to being pr opo n ents ofthe t echnol o gi c a l determin ist  phil o s ophical vi e wpoi n t, and t he lab el oftechnol o gic al  determ ini s m  tends to  have neg a tiv econn otations  ( Kanu ka , 2 00 8). The charact erizatio n o f te c h nologi cal dete r minism  i n the litera tureof t en uses h igh ly crit i cal  te rms . Fo r e xamp l e, technological determi nism  hasb een  desc ribed  a s a misc o ncep tion (Ai b ar, 2010; Pea rson & Young, 2 0 02) ,  a m yth (B uc kingham,200 6 ; Bur nett , S enke r &  Wal k e r
, Michelfelder_(2010) interpreted_Borgmann by stating that_the technologies_associated_with pervasive_computing_are designed to_transparently recede into_the background of the_daily contexts in_which_we use the technologies. However, Borgmann emphasized that critical reflection is needed to bring_to_the forefront_how_ubiquitous_digital technologies shape our lives_(Michelfelder, 2010). Michelfelder (2010) argued_that such_philosophical reflection about pervasive technology is important in_order_to preserve the_moral good of personal privacy, and maintain existential autonomy_so that we do not lose_control over our_personal_information._Critique of Technological Determinism_Questioning technological determinism. Misa (2009) argued_that technological determinism is a scholarly_and practical problem that has merited philosophical_reflection and critique for decades. What_follows is a critique of_technological determinism_that considers different accounts and_interpretations of technological_determinism, and_examines their adequacy_as purported theories for explaining the_interconnections 89 between_technology and society. As presented previously_in_the Introduction, technological_determinism_is_the ideological_viewpoint that sees_technology_as an_autonomous_causal agent and force driving inevitable_change_in society (Kanuka, 2008; Leonardi, 2008; Marx_& Smith, 1994; Smith,_1994)._The critique will critically_examine the assumptions implicitly held_in the technological determinist perspective, which_include technology_operating according_to its own internal logic (Strobel & TillbergWebb, 2009), in an_inevitable maimer (Instone, 2004; Leonardi, 2008)_as an autonomous force_outside of_social_control (Feenberg, 2010;_Leonardi,_2009). The_critique will contrast the differences between hard_technological determinism,_which sees technology acting as a_singularly autonomous agent, and_soft_technological determinism, which asserts that technology_drives social change, but does so_along with a complex interaction_of_social_factors (Marx & Smith, 1994)._Above all, a crucial issue for_inquiry concerns the_relationship between human agency and technological development_and_implementation, and the responsibility that human_beings_have for technology in society and_education_(Hofmann,_2006; Kritt & Winegar, 2010)._Few people admit to being proponents_o f the technological determinist philosophical viewpoint, and the_label of technological_determinism tends to have negative_connotations_(Kanuka,_2008). The characterization o f technological determinism in the literature_often uses_highly critical terms._For example, technological determinism has been described as a misconception_(Aibar, 2010; Pearson & Young, 2002), a_myth (Buckingham, 2006; Burnett, Senker & Walker