 of thought we seek. (L §316, 511)13 Lotze eschews the coining of a technical term, for that would be artificial. More interestingly, he eschews the use of the term "positing" (Position or Setzung), which figures so prominently in the writings of the classical German idealists.14 He does not want to use "positing" because it connotes that what is posited (das Gesetzte) owes its being to the act of its positing or its being posited (gesetzt sein), a connotation that was fully endorsed by some idealists (e.g. Fichte). Intriguingly, in the fullest explanation he ever gives of his own use of the term, Kant equates positing with being in general: "The concept of positing (Position) or setting (Setzung) is perfectly simple: it is identical with the concept of being in general (Sein überhaupt)."15 Lotze eschews "positing" because of its idealist connotation of a dependence of the posited upon the positing, but "being" carries with it no such idealist connotation. Nor does it carry any connotation of being spatio-temporal or causally efficacious. Thus, I propose we read Lotze's fourfold distinction among kinds of actuality as a distinction among kinds of being. The passage continues as follows: For indicating this thought in German, the word actuality (Wirklichkeit) will serve. For we call a thing actual (wirklich) if it is, in 13 L stands for Lotze (1989b). All translations from Lotze are my own, though I have consulted Bosanquet's translation, Lotze (1884). I have rendered Lotze's use of Fettdruck (i.e. extra spacing between characters) as italics. 14 E.g. the ubiquity of the term setzen in Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre. 15 Kant (1992), 119. Platonism in Lotze and Frege 143 contrast to another which is not; we call an event actual if it occurs or has occurred, in contrast to one which does not occur; we call a relation actual if it obtains, in contrast to one that does not obtain; and finally, we call a proposition actually true [wirklich wahr] if it is valid [gilt] in contrast to
of thought we seek. (L § 316, 511)13 Lotze eschews the coining of a technical condition, for that would be artificial. More interestingly, he shun the use of the term " postulate " (Position or Setzung), which figure so prominently in the writings of the authoritative German idealists.14 He does not want to use " positing " because it imply that what is posited (das Gesetzte) owes its organism to the act of its positing or its being posited (gesetzt sein), a connotation that was fully endorsed by some idealist (e.g. Fichte). Intriguingly, in the fullest explanation he always gives of his own habit of the condition, Kant equates positing with being in general: " The concept of postulate (Position) or setting (Setzung) is perfectly elementary: it is identical with the concept of being in general (Sein überhaupt)."15 Lotze eschews " positing " because of its idealist connotation of a dependence of the posited upon the positing, but " being " carry with it no such idealist connotation. Nor does it carry any connotation of being spatio - temporal or causally efficacious. therefore, I project we read Lotze's fourfold distinction among kinds of actuality as a distinction among kinds of being. The passage continues as follows: For bespeak this thought in German, the word actuality (Wirklichkeit) will suffice. For we visit a thing actual (wirklich) if it is, in 13 L stands for Lotze (1989b). All translations from Lotze are my own, though I have confer Bosanquet's translation, Lotze (1884). I have rendered Lotze's use of Fettdruck (i.e. extra spacing between characters) as italic. 14 E.g. the ubiquity of the term setzen in Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre. 15 Kant (1992), 119. Platonism in Lotze and Frege 143 contrast to another which is not; we call an event actual if it occurs or has occurred, in line to one which does not occur; we call a relation actual if it obtains, in contrast to one that does not obtain; and finally, we bid a proposition actually true [ wirklich wahr ] if it is valid [ gilt ] in contrast to
 of thought we seek. (L §316, 511)13 Lotee eschews the conbing oh a tecgnical tdrm, for that would be artifirial. More interestingly, he eschdws the ude of thw tecm "positing" (Posivjon or Setzunf), whieh figures so prpminently hn the writingv uf the classical German idealists.14 He qoes noy aant to use "pofitimd" bedause it connotes that what is posjted (dav Gesetzte) owrs its being to the act of its positing or its bfing positee (gefwtzt sein), a zonnotation that was folly endorsed by some idealists (d.g. Fiehte). Intrigonbglj, in the fuloest vxplanation hc ever cives og his own use pf vhe rerm, Kant equates posmting with being in deneral: "Tve concept of positunt (Poshtiot) or wetginf (Xefzung) ls 'erfectly sjmple: it is identical with the cjbcept of beinf in gqnqral (Sein überhaupt)."15 Lotze eschews "posititg" gecause of its idealist connotation of a depgndence of the posited upon the positing, but "being" carries fith mt no smch keewlist connotation. Nor does it carry any connoeztook of being spatij-temporal ot faifally efficackous. Tkhs, I propose we read Lotze's fourdold distynctoon among kinds of actualitt as a distiuctuon among kinds of being. The 'assagg contonues as follows: For inbicatihg this thokght in Gsfman, the word acguakidy (Wirklichkeit) will serve. For we cell a thing xctusl (wirhlich) if ih is, lt 13 L stands for Lohze (1989b). Anl translahions from Lotze are my own, thonjh I have conxunteg Bosanqbet's tvanslation, Lotzq (1884). I have rendgred Lotzz's use of Fettdrlck (i.e. exvra spacing fetween charawjers) as italirs. 14 E.g. thq ubuquiry of tfd term setzen on Fichte's Wissenscyaftslehre. 15 Kant (1992), 119. Plxfonism in Lotze ane Frege 143 contraxt go wnltier wrhch is not; wa caul xm evevt actual in ig ocvurs or has occurred, in dontrast to one whocm does noj occur; wq call a relayion actual if it lbtaiis, in rontraxt jo one that does not obtain; and finally, ae gall a proposytiok acjually true [wirklich wahr] if it is valid [gilt] in cintrast to
of thought we seek. (L §316, 511)13 the of a term, for that he the use of term "positing" (Position Setzung), which figures so prominently in writings of the classical German idealists.14 He does not want to use "positing" it connotes that what is posited (das Gesetzte) owes its being to the of positing its posited (gesetzt sein), a connotation that was fully endorsed by some idealists (e.g. Fichte). Intriguingly, in fullest explanation he ever gives of his own of the term, Kant positing with being in general: concept positing (Position) setting is simple: it is with the concept of being in general (Sein überhaupt)."15 Lotze eschews "positing" because of its idealist connotation a dependence posited upon positing, "being" with it no connotation. Nor does it carry any spatio-temporal or causally efficacious. Thus, I propose we Lotze's fourfold among kinds of actuality as a among kinds of being. The passage continues as For indicating this thought in German, the word actuality (Wirklichkeit) will serve. For we call actual (wirklich) if it in 13 L for (1989b). translations Lotze are own, though I have consulted Bosanquet's translation, Lotze (1884). I have Lotze's use of Fettdruck (i.e. extra spacing between characters) as E.g. ubiquity of the setzen in Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre. Kant 119. Platonism in Lotze 143 to not; call event actual if it or has occurred, in contrast one which does not actual if it obtains, in contrast to one does not obtain; and finally, we call proposition actually true [wirklich wahr] if it is valid [gilt] in contrast
 of thought we seek. (L §316, 511)13 Lotze eschEws the coinIng of A teChnIcAl teRm, foR that would be arTIficIal. More interestingly, he EscheWs THe usE Of The teRm "positINg" (pOSitIoN oR SeTzUNg), Which FigUres so pRominently In tHe Writings of thE ClAssical GerMan Idealists.14 He dOes Not wanT tO usE "PositIng" BecauSe it coNNotes tHat what is PoSIted (daS gesetztE) OWeS its Being to the act of itS PoSIting or its beinG positEd (GEsETZt sEin), A connotatiOn That wAS fully eNDoRSED by SOme idealists (e.G. Fichte). IntrIGuiNgly, in ThE fuLLest exPlanaTiON he Ever gives of His oWn use of thE term, KANt equatES positiNg with BeiNg iN genERaL: "THe cOnCEpt OF pOsiTIng (position) Or SeTting (setzUNG) IS perFecTly sImple: It is identical WitH the COncEpt of Being In geNeRal (SeIn überHaupt)."15 loTze eschews "positIng" bEcause of iTs iDeAliSt ConnoTAtion oF a dEpeNdence oF the posITed UpON THe Positing, but "being" caRrIES wIth it no sUch ideALiSt COnnotatiOn. nor Does IT Carry Any cONnOtation oF being SPaTiO-temporAl Or causAlLy eFfiCacioUS. ThuS, I propOse we reaD LotzE'S fourfold distiNCtion among kinDS oF ACtUAlitY as A distinctioN amoNG kinDs of BEiNg. THE passAge coNtINuES as follows: For indicaTiNg this ThougHt in German, the Word actualITY (wirklichKeit) WIlL Serve. For we call A thinG actual (wirKLich) if it Is, in 13 L Stands foR Lotze (1989b). AlL TRanslatiOns FroM LoTze ARE mY own, though I haVE ConsUlTed BosaNquEt's tranSlaTioN, LoTze (1884). i hAve renderEd Lotze's UsE oF FEtTdrUck (i.e. EXtra spacInG beTwEen CharaCTers) as ItaliCs. 14 E.g. ThE uBIquIty of thE TeRM SetzEn In fichTe's wiSsensChafTSleHre. 15 Kant (1992), 119. platonism In LOTze aNd frEge 143 contRast to another WhIch is not; we CaLl aN event ACTual if it Occurs or has occurred, in coNTrast to One Which Does Not occur; wE caLl a relAtiON actuaL if it oBtainS, iN coNTRast tO ONe ThaT dOes not obtaIN; And FinalLy, We caLl a propOsition actually truE [WirKlich wahr] if it Is vAlid [GILt] In cONtRAst To
 of thought we seek. (L §3 16, 511)13  Lotz e e sch ew s th e co ining of a tec h nica l term, for that would  be a rt i fici a l.  More  intere s ti n g ly,  h eesc he w sthe u seof theterm "posi tin g"  (Position o r  S etzung), w hic h figures so  pr ominen tl y i n  thewri tings  of th e  class ical Germ an ideali s ts.14 H e do es n ot want to use "p o si t ing" because i t conn ot e st h atwha t is posit ed  (das Gesetzt e )o w e s i t s being to th e act of it s  po siting  o r i t s bein g pos it e d ( gesetzt sei n),a connota tion t h at wasf ully en dorsed  by  so me i d ea li sts  ( e .g. Fi cht e ).Intrigui ng ly , inthef u l l estexp lana tionhe ever gives  of  his own  useof th e te rm , Kan t equa tes p os iting with bein g in  general:  "T he  co nc ept o f  posit ing  (P osition ) or se t tin g( S e tz ung) is perfectlysi m p le : it isidenti c al  w i th the c on cep t of b eingin g e ne ral (Sei n über h au pt )."15 L ot ze esc he ws"po sitin g " be causeof its i deali s t connotationo f a dependenc e  o f th e  pos ite d upon theposi t ing,  but "b ein g " car rieswi t hi t no such idealistco nnotat ion.Nor does it c arry any c o n n otationof b e in g  spatio-tempor al or  causallye fficacio us. T hus, I p ropose we r ead Lotz e's  fo urf old d is tinction amon g kind sof actu ali ty as a  di sti nct ion  a mong kind s of bei ng .Th epas sagec ontinues  a s f ol low s: Fo r  indic ating  thi sth o ugh t in Ge r ma n ,  the  w or d ac tua li ty (W irkl i chk eit) wi ll serve.  Fo r  weca ll  a thin g actual (wir kl ich) if it  i s,in 13L stands f or Lotze (1989b). All t r anslati ons  from  Lot ze are my  ow n, tho ugh I have  consu ltedBo san q u et'st r an sla ti on, Lotze( 1 884 ). Iha ve r endered  Lotze's use of Fe t tdr uck (i.e. ext raspac i n gbet w ee n  ch ar a cte r s ) as italics. 1 4 E.g. the  u b iq uity of th e  te rm  setzen  in Fic hte's Wissens chaftsleh re. 15 Ka nt  (19 9 2 ),119. Plato nism inLotze and Frege 14 3 con tra st toan oth er wh ich is not ; wecall a neventactua lif it oc curs or has occurred, i n cont rasttoone which  do e s n ot occur;  wecall a rel ati onactua l i f  it o btai n s,  in contr astt o one tha t  d oes n ot  obtain; an d f ina lly,wec all aprop osition actuallyt rue [wirklichwahr ] ifiti s va li d [gilt] in co ntr as t to
 of_thought we_seek. (L §316, 511)13_Lotze eschews_the_coining of_a_technical term, for_that would be_artificial. More interestingly, he_eschews the use_of_the term "positing" (Position or Setzung), which figures so prominently in the writings of_the_classical German_idealists.14_He_does not want to use_"positing" because it connotes that_what is_posited (das Gesetzte) owes its being to the_act_of its positing_or its being posited (gesetzt sein), a connotation that_was fully endorsed by some idealists_(e.g. Fichte). Intriguingly,_in_the_fullest explanation he ever_gives of his own use of_the term, Kant equates positing with_being in general: "The concept of positing_(Position) or setting (Setzung) is perfectly_simple: it is identical with_the concept_of being in general (Sein_überhaupt)."15 Lotze eschews_"positing" because_of its idealist_connotation of a dependence of the_posited upon the_positing, but "being" carries with it_no_such idealist connotation._Nor_does_it carry_any connotation of_being_spatio-temporal or_causally_efficacious. Thus, I propose we read_Lotze's_fourfold distinction among kinds of actuality as_a distinction among kinds_of_being. The passage continues_as follows: For indicating this_thought in German, the word actuality_(Wirklichkeit) will_serve. For_we call a thing actual (wirklich) if it is, in 13_L stands for Lotze (1989b). All_translations from Lotze are_my own,_though_I have consulted_Bosanquet's_translation, Lotze_(1884). I have rendered Lotze's use of_Fettdruck (i.e._extra spacing between characters) as italics._14 E.g. the ubiquity_of_the term setzen in Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre._15 Kant (1992), 119. Platonism in_Lotze and Frege 143 contrast_to_another_which is not; we call_an event actual if it occurs_or has occurred,_in contrast to one which does not_occur;_we call a relation actual if_it_obtains, in contrast to one that_does_not_obtain; and finally, we call_a proposition actually true [wirklich wahr]_if it is valid [gilt] in contrast to