 out what would be true if they were true. The same validity also plays a part in intention reasoning. The content of belief reasoning (C) is in fact exactly the same as (A), the content of intention reasoning (B). This content (A) is a valid inference. It turns out that this fact makes (B) correct just as it makes (C) correct. The difference between (B) and (C) is not in their content but in the stance you take towards their content. In (C), your stance towards (A1), that you are going to St Andrews, is to take it as true. In (B) your stance is to set yourself to make it true. Because (A) is valid, if (A1) and (A2) are true, (A3) must be true. This is what makes belief reasoning (C) correct. Also because (A) is valid, if (A2) is true, then if you are to make (A1) true you must make (A3) true. This is what makes intention reasoning (B) correct. Both (B) and (C) appropriately track the transmission of truth through the valid inference (A). (B) tracks it in a truth-making way and (C) in a truth-taking way. If David Hume (1978, Book 2, Part 3, Section 3) was right that reason is concerned only with truth, he should still have recognized that reasoning can transmit the truth-making stance as well as the truth-taking stance. It can transmit intention as well as belief. So reasoning can be practical. Intention reasoning is parallel to belief reasoning in the way I have described, and both depend on the validity of the same content. Consequently, one might be tempted to think intention reasoning somehow has belief reasoning embedded in it. If you intend to go to St Andrews, you normally believe you are going there. So you are normally in a position to run through the belief reasoning (C), which will bring you to believe you will get off at Leuchars. One might be tempted to think this is part of the process of forming your intention to get off at Leuchars. But my explanation of intention reasoning shows that belief reasoning is actually not involved in this process; it merely has the same content. In any case, a belief that you will get off at Leuchars cannot by any rational process bring you to form the intention of doing so. Belief reasoning is parallel to
out what would be true if they were true. The same validity besides play a part in intention reasoning. The contentedness of impression reasoning (C) is in fact exactly the same as (ampere), the content of intention reasoning (bacillus). This content (A) is a valid inference. It turn out that this fact makes (boron) correct just as it makes (C) correct. The difference between (B) and (C) is not in their message but in the stance you take towards their content. In (C), your position towards (A1), that you are going to St Andrews, is to take it as truthful. In (B) your position is to set yourself to draw it true. Because (A) is valid, if (A1) and (A2) are true, (A3) must be genuine. This is what makes belief reasoning (C) correct. Also because (A) is valid, if (A2) is true, then if you are to make (A1) true you must make (A3) true. This is what makes intention reasoning (B) correct. Both (B) and (C) appropriately track the transmission of truth through the valid inference (angstrom). (B) tracks it in a accuracy - do room and (C) in a truth - take way. If David Hume (1978, Book 2, Part 3, Section 3) was right that reason is refer only with truth, he should still have recognized that reasoning can transmit the truth - make stance as well as the truth - taking position. It can transmit purpose as well as belief. So reasoning can be practical. Intention reasoning is parallel to belief reasoning in the way I have trace, and both depend on the validity of the same contentedness. Consequently, one might be tempted to think intention reasoning somehow has impression reasoning embedded in it. If you intend to go to St Andrews, you normally believe you are going there. thus you are normally in a position to carry through the belief reasoning (coke), which will bring you to think you will get off at Leuchars. One might be tempted to think this is part of the process of form your intention to perplex off at Leuchars. But my explanation of intention reasoning shows that belief reasoning is actually not involve in this process; it merely has the same subject. In any case, a belief that you will drive off at Leuchars cannot by any rational process bring you to imprint the intention of doing so. Belief reasoning is parallel to
 ouh what would be true if uhey were true. Thg wame velidity also plxys a part in intention reaslnung. Tye content of belief rdasoning (B) is in fqct txactly the same ea (A), the contehb of nnvention reasonikg (B). This cmntent (A) is a eauib inference. It turns out that this fwct makrs (B) correct jusj as pt makss (C) correct. The difference betweeh (B) and (C) is not in yheir content but in the shancf you take towards their contght. Yb (C), your stavce towards (A1), that you are going to St Andrews, is to gake nt as true. Un (B) jmur stance ms to fet yourself to make it trur. Because (A) is vanid, if (A1) and (A2) are true, (E3) must be true. This ys what mdkzs belief reasoning (C) cirrecj. Alsm bezqusd (A) ix balid, lf (E2) is true, tgen if you qre to make (A1) true uot must make (A3) frue. Trif is what makes intention reasoning (B) cmrrsct. Both (B) and (C) appropeiately track the trajsmission of truth through the valid inference (A). (B) tracks ht in x txmbh-mayunh way and (C) in a truth-taking way. If David Humq (1978, Nopk 2, Part 3, Sectlon 3) was right thay gesfon is concerved only sith truth, he shoupd stilj havw recognieed tnat reasoning can transmit rhe truth-makpng wtance as well as che truth-taknng stsnce. Ot can transmit intentiun aa well as bflief. So ddasoning can be orabticdl. Intenukon reasoning is [arallel vo bekief rexsonong in the way I have described, and both depeud on the validlty of the same content. Consequxitly, one mighj ba tvmpted to thinl intention rqasoning somehpw has yelief reasoning embeddxd in it. If rou intend to ho to St Andcews, you gormqlly believd you are going there. So you are nirmally in a positlon tu run through thz velief reasoninb (C), whycj xill fsing you to telidve uou wkll get off xt Lruchars. One might be temlted to think this if part od the prjcess of formong your intention to gxt off at Lrucrars. But my explanation of intsntion rewsoking shows thwt bclies reasoniny is actually not involved in this procews; it merely has jhe same content. In auy case, a belmef thwt you winl get off at Leuchaes cannot by any vational process bring you tm forl the intention of doing so. Belief reasoning is parallel to
out what would be true if they The validity also a part in belief (C) is in exactly the same (A), the content of intention reasoning This content (A) is a valid inference. It turns out that this fact (B) correct just as it makes (C) correct. The difference between (B) and is in content in the stance you take towards their content. In (C), your stance towards (A1), that you going to St Andrews, is to take it true. In (B) your is to set yourself to it Because (A) valid, (A1) (A2) are true, must be true. This is what makes belief reasoning (C) correct. Also because (A) is valid, if is true, you are make true must make (A3) is what makes intention reasoning (B) and (C) appropriately track the transmission of truth the valid (A). (B) tracks it in a way and (C) in a truth-taking way. If Hume (1978, Book 2, Part 3, Section 3) was right that reason is concerned only he should still have that reasoning can the stance well the truth-taking It can transmit intention as well as belief. So reasoning can practical. Intention reasoning is parallel to belief reasoning in the have and both depend the validity of the content. one might be tempted intention somehow embedded it. you intend to go St Andrews, you normally believe are going there. So position to run through the belief reasoning (C), will bring you to believe you will off at Leuchars. One might be tempted to think this is part the process your intention to get off at Leuchars. But explanation of intention reasoning that belief reasoning is actually not involved in this it has the content. In any a belief that will get off cannot by rational bring the intention of doing so. Belief is to
 out what would be true if they wEre true. The Same vAliDitY aLso pLays A part in intentiON reaSoning. The content of beliEf reaSoNIng (C) IS iN fact Exactly THe SAMe aS (A), ThE coNtENt Of intEntIon reasOning (B). This ConTeNt (A) is a valid iNFeRence. It turNs oUt that this faCt mAkes (B) cOrRecT Just aS it Makes (c) correCT. The diFference bEtWEen (B) anD (c) is not iN THeIr coNtent but in the stanCE yOU take towards thEir conTeNT. IN (c), YouR stAnce towardS (A1), That yOU are goiNG tO sT andREws, is to take it As true. In (B) yoUR stAnce is To Set YOurselF to maKe IT trUe. Because (A) iS valId, if (A1) and (A2) Are truE, (a3) must be TRue. This Is what MakEs bElieF ReAsOniNg (c) CorREcT. AlSO beCause (A) is VaLiD, if (A2) iS truE, THEN if yOu aRe to Make (A1) True you must maKe (A3) True. tHis Is whaT makeS intEnTion rEasoniNg (B) coRrEct. Both (B) and (C) appRoprIately traCk tHe TraNsMissiON of truTh tHroUgh the vAlid infERenCe (a). (b) TRaCks it in a truth-makinG wAY AnD (C) in a truTh-takiNG wAy. iF David HuMe (1978, booK 2, ParT 3, sEctioN 3) was RIgHt that reAson is COnCeRned onlY wIth truTh, He sHouLd stiLL havE recogNized thaT reasONing can transmiT The truth-makinG StANCe AS welL as The truth-takIng sTAnce. it caN TrAnsMIt intEntioN aS WeLL as belief. So reasoninG cAn be prActicAl. Intention reAsoning is pARALlel to beLief REaSOning in the way I Have dEscribed, anD Both depeNd on tHe validiTy of the saME Content. COnsEquEntLy, oNE MiGht be tempted tO THink InTention ReaSoning sOmeHow Has BelIeF reasoninG embeddeD iN iT. IF yOu iNtend TO go to St ANdRewS, yOu nOrmalLY belieVe you Are gOiNg THerE. So you aRE nORMallY iN a PosiTioN tO run tHrouGH thE belief Reasoning (c), whICh wiLl BrIng you tO believe you wiLl Get off at LeUcHarS. One miGHT be temptEd to think this is part of thE Process Of fOrminG youR intentioN to Get off At LEUchars. but my eXplanAtIon OF IntenTIOn ReaSoNing shows tHAT beLief rEaSoniNg is actUally not involved in THis Process; it mereLy hAs thE SAmE coNTeNT. In AnY CasE, A Belief that you wiLl get off at leUChArs cannot bY Any RaTional pRocess bRing yOU to form The intentIon of doinG sO. BelIEF reAsoning is pArallel tO
 out what would be true if  they were  true . T hesa me v alid ity also plays a pa rt in intention reason ing.Th e  con t en t ofbeliefr ea s o nin g(C ) i si nfactexa ctly th e same as(A) ,the contento fintentionrea soning (B).Thi s cont en t ( A ) isa v alidinfere n ce. It  turns ou tt hat th i s factm a ke s (B ) correct just as it makes (C) corr ect. T he di f f ere nce  between ( B)  and( C) is n o ti n the i r content but  in the sta n ceyou ta ke  to w ards t heirco n ten t. In (C),your  stance t owards (A1), t h at youare go ing  to  StA nd re ws,  i s  to ta kei t a s true.In  ( B) yo ur s t a n c e is  to  set  your self to makeittrue .  Be cause  (A)is v al id, i f (A1)  and(A 2) are true, (A 3) m ust be tr ue.  T his  i s wha t  makes  be lie f reaso ning (C )  co rr e c t .Also because (A) i sv a li d, if (A 2) ist ru e, then ifyo u a re t o make(A1) tr ue you m ust ma k e(A 3) true .This i swha t m akesi nten tion r easoning  (B)c orrect. Both ( B ) and (C) app r op r i at e ly t rac k the trans miss i on o f tr u th  th r oughthe v al i di nference (A). (B) t ra cks it  in a  truth-making  way and ( C ) in a tru th-t a ki n g way. If Davi d Hum e (1978, B o ok 2, Pa rt 3,  Section  3) was r i g ht thatrea son  is  co n c er ned only with t ruth ,he shou ldstill h ave  re cog niz ed  that rea soning c an  t ra ns mit  thet ruth-mak in g s ta nce  as w e ll asthe t ruth -t ak i ngstance. It c an t ra ns mitint en tionas w e llas beli ef. So re aso n ingca nbe prac tical. Intent io n reasonin gisparall e l  to beli ef reasoning in the way I havedes cribe d, a nd both d epe nd onthe validi ty ofthe s am e c o n tent. C on seq ue ntly, onem i ght  be t em pted  to thi nk intention reaso n ing  somehow hasbel iefr e as oni n ge mbe dd e d i n it. If you inte nd to go t oS tAndrews, y o u n or mally b elieveyou a r e going  there. S o you are  n orma l l y i n a positi on to ru n through the b e li ef re aso ning ( C) , w hichwill b r ing  youto bel ie ve you  will  g et off a t Leuchars. One might b e temp ted t o t hink this  is par t of theproc ess of for min g y our i nte n tionto g e toff at Le ucha r s. But my ex pla n a ti on of inten t i o n r eason ing showsthat  belief reasoning is actually no t in v o lve d i n  thi sprocess; it me rel yh a s the sa me  content. I n any ca se ,  a be lief t hat yo u willg e to ff atLeuc har s cannotbyan y  ration al  p r ocessbrin gyou to  formt he i n t ention of doingso. B e l ief r e aso ningis  parall e l to 
 out_what would_be true if they_were true._The_same validity_also_plays a part_in intention reasoning._The content of belief_reasoning (C) is_in_fact exactly the same as (A), the content of intention reasoning (B). This content_(A)_is a_valid_inference._It turns out that this_fact makes (B) correct just_as it_makes (C) correct. The difference between (B) and_(C)_is not in_their content but in the stance you take towards_their content. In (C), your stance_towards (A1), that_you_are_going to St Andrews,_is to take it as true._In (B) your stance is to_set yourself to make it true. Because_(A) is valid, if (A1) and_(A2) are true, (A3) must_be true._This is what makes belief_reasoning (C) correct._Also because_(A) is valid,_if (A2) is true, then if_you are to_make (A1) true you must make_(A3)_true. This is_what_makes_intention reasoning_(B) correct. Both_(B)_and (C)_appropriately_track the transmission of truth through_the_valid inference (A). (B) tracks it in_a truth-making way and_(C)_in a truth-taking way._If David Hume (1978, Book_2, Part 3, Section 3) was_right that_reason is_concerned only with truth, he should still have recognized that reasoning_can transmit the truth-making stance as_well as the truth-taking_stance. It_can_transmit intention as_well_as belief._So reasoning can be practical. Intention reasoning_is parallel_to belief reasoning in the way_I have described, and_both_depend on the validity of the_same content. Consequently, one might be_tempted to think intention reasoning_somehow_has_belief reasoning embedded in it._If you intend to go to_St Andrews, you_normally believe you are going there. So_you_are normally in a position to_run_through the belief reasoning (C), which_will_bring_you to believe you will_get off at Leuchars. One might_be tempted to think this is part of the_process of forming_your intention to get off_at_Leuchars._But my explanation of intention reasoning shows that belief reasoning_is actually_not involved in_this process; it merely has the same content. In any_case, a belief that you will get_off at Leuchars cannot by any rational process bring you to_form the intention of doing so. Belief reasoning_is parallel to