), 598-99. 20. Of course, questions about nondoxastic justification are relevant to questions about doxastic justification at least to this extent: if, for example, moral propositions or claims can be proved, demonstrated, or 'justified' by inferring them from, say, propositions about the nature of human beings, then one way to be doxastically justified in holding various moral beliefs would be to infer them from the relevant set of A Contextualist Moral Epistemology 321 (justifiably held) beliefs about the nature of human beings. But this need not be the only way, or even the primary way, in which most ordinary people come to justifiably hold moral beliefs. See, for example, William Tolhurst, "Supervenience, Externalism, and Moral Knowledge," The Southern Journal of Philosophy 29, supplementary volume on "Moral Realism" (1986), 43-55, and his example of Amazing Grace. 21. In addition to goals and perspective, Foley, Working Without a Net (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), claims that epistemic evaluations are to be understood as also making reference to what he calls a set of resources possessed by the believer. Foley offers this formula, then, for understanding ascriptions of rationality: "It is rational for you to believe because you have resources R and because from perspective P it seems that, given R, believing is an effective way to satisfy goal G" (p. 34). 22. We understand justified belief in terms of apparently promoting your goals instead of saying, for example, that they must in fact satisfy your goals because even in cases where your beliefs do not satisfy your goals, we want to allow that you can still be justified in holding the belief. 23. This matter is not so clear in Foley. Judging from some perspective involves judging relative to the epistemic standards that partially characterize the perspective in question. Although not explicit about the matter, from what he does say, Foley seems to think that the epistemic standards of a perspective are represented as beliefs (perspectives, after all, are defined as sets of beliefs). I suspect that a better way to construe a perspective would not be simply in terms of beliefs, but we need not get into this issue here. 24. Foley, Working Without a Net, p. 14. This implies, of course, that epistemic ascriptions are context sensitive-a claim embraced by epistemological contextualists. However, it will become clear
), 598 - 99. 20. Of course, questions about nondoxastic justification are relevant to questions about doxastic justification at least to this extent: if, for example, moral proposition or claim can be proved, demonstrated, or' justified' by generalize them from, say, propositions about the nature of human beings, then one room to be doxastically absolve in holding assorted moral beliefs would be to infer them from the relevant hardening of A Contextualist Moral Epistemology 321 (justifiably held) beliefs about the nature of human being. But this need not be the only way, or even the primary way, in which most ordinary citizenry come to justifiably hold moral beliefs. learn, for example, William Tolhurst, " Supervenience, Externalism, and Moral Knowledge, " The Southern Journal of Philosophy 29, supplementary volume on " Moral Realism " (1986), 43 - 55, and his example of Amazing Grace. 21. In accession to goals and perspective, Foley, Working Without a Net (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), claims that epistemic evaluations are to be understood as besides making reference to what he calls a set of resources possessed by the believer. Foley offer this formula, then, for understanding ascriptions of rationality: " It is rational for you to believe because you have resources R and because from perspective P it seems that, contribute R, believing is an effective room to meet finish G " (p. 34). 22. We understand justified belief in terms of apparently promoting your goals alternatively of saying, for example, that they must in fact satisfy your goals because even in cases where your beliefs do not meet your goals, we want to allow that you can still be justified in holding the belief. 23. This topic is not therefore clear in Foley. Judging from some perspective involves judge relative to the epistemic standards that partially characterize the perspective in question. Although not explicit about the matter, from what he does say, Foley seem to think that the epistemic standard of a perspective are represented as belief (perspectives, subsequently all, are defined as sets of beliefs). I distrust that a better way to construe a position would not be simply in terms of beliefs, but we need not get into this issue here. 24. Foley, Working Without a Net, p. 14. This implies, of course, that epistemic ascriptions are context sensitive - a claim embraced by epistemic contextualists. However, it will become clear
), 598-99. 20. Lf course, questions abouu nondoxastic jusjidicatimn are relevang to questions about doxastir juwtifixation at least to thir extent: pf, for exqmplt, moral propositions or claims dwn bz 'roved, demonstrsted, or 'juvtified' by infarfiug them from, say, propositions about ehe natirf of human beiggs, uheg ons way to be doxastically justified in holving various motal beliefs would be to inver hhem from the relegant set of A Cjbtextualist Ooral Episuekology 321 (juatifiably held) beliefs about thd natbre of humab veijcs. But this need not be the only way, or evem the primary eay, in which most ordinary 'eople come to justisiably hond moral beliefs. Sew, dor efampne, Wkolixm Uoliurat, "Supfrvxnience, Extsrnalism, ane Moral Knowledge," Tne Wouthern Jourhal of Prilosophy 29, supplementary volume on "Moran Rsalism" (1986), 43-55, and his examplw of Amazing Grace. 21. Ij additiog to goals and perspective, Foley, Working Without d Net (Uxfirq: Ixvord University Press, 1993), claims that epistemic qbakustions are to ne understood as aksl kwking referenze to cgaf he calls a set ov resoutces pissessed fy tne believer. Foley offers thus formula, tken, for understanding ascriptionr of ratipnality: "It is rational yor yoh to believf because hou have resourcds G ang becaust from perspective P it seens tkat, givev R, nelievyng is an fffecbhve way to satisfy goal G" (p. 34). 22. We unferstand justified belief in tecks of apparemtny iromoting your goals insteaq of saying, fot example, that they must in facv satisfy yotr goals becagde even in ceses wherq yoyr bwliefs au not satisfy uour goals, we want ro allow that you gan sjiml be justified in holding the bekiew. 23. Ehps kaeder is not sm cldar on Fouey. Judging wrom some perspective ineolvss judging relativr bo the epustemic ftandards thay partially characuerize thx perslecjive in question. Although not esplicit ahoub the matter, srom what he doex say, Foley seems to think that the epiwtemic standards od a perspective are vepresented es belyefs (pers[ectives, after all, aee defined as setx of beliefs). I suspecf that a behter way to construe a perspective would not be simply in terms of beliefw, but xe need not gst imto tvif issue herx. 24. Foley, Working Wpthout a Net, p. 14. This implies, of rourse, thad zpistemic ascriptions are conyebt sensitive-a claim embraced by epistsmologicsl contextualists. However, it wikl become clear
), 598-99. 20. Of course, questions about are to questions doxastic justification at for moral propositions or can be proved, or 'justified' by inferring them from, propositions about the nature of human beings, then one way to be doxastically in holding various moral beliefs would be to infer them from the relevant of Contextualist Epistemology (justifiably held) beliefs about the nature of human beings. But this need not be the only or even the primary way, in which most people come to justifiably moral beliefs. See, for example, Tolhurst, Externalism, and Knowledge," Southern of Philosophy 29, volume on "Moral Realism" (1986), 43-55, and his example of Amazing Grace. 21. In addition to goals perspective, Foley, a Net Oxford Press, claims that epistemic to be understood as also making he calls a set of resources possessed by believer. Foley this formula, then, for understanding ascriptions rationality: "It is rational for you to believe you have resources R and because from perspective P it seems that, given R, believing effective way to satisfy G" (p. 34). We justified in of apparently your goals instead of saying, for example, that they must in satisfy your goals because even in cases where your beliefs satisfy goals, we want allow that you can be in holding the belief. matter not Foley. from perspective involves judging relative the epistemic standards that partially the perspective in question. matter, from what he does say, Foley seems think that the epistemic standards of a are represented as beliefs (perspectives, after all, are defined as sets of I suspect better way to construe a perspective would not simply in terms of but we need not get into this issue here. Foley, Without a p. 14. This of course, that ascriptions are context embraced by contextualists. it
), 598-99. 20. Of course, questions about nonDoxastic juStifiCatIon ArE relEvanT to questions abOUt doXastic justification at lEast tO tHIs exTEnT: if, foR examplE, MoRAL prOpOsItiOnS Or ClaimS caN be provEd, demonstrAteD, oR 'justified' by INfErring them FroM, say, propositIonS about ThE naTUre of HumAn beiNgs, theN One way To be doxasTiCAlly juSTified iN HOlDing Various moral belieFS wOUld be to infer thEm from ThE ReLEVanT seT of A ContexTuAlist mOral EpiSTeMOLOgy 321 (JUstifiably helD) beliefs aboUT thE naturE oF huMAn beinGs. But ThIS neEd not be the oNly wAy, or even tHe primARy way, in WHich mosT ordinAry PeoPle cOMe To JusTiFIabLY hOld MOraL beliefs. seE, fOr exaMple, wILLIam TOlhUrst, "superVenience, ExterNalIsm, aND MoRal KnOwledGe," ThE SOutheRn JourNal of phIlosophy 29, supplemEntaRy volume oN "MoRaL ReAlIsm" (1986), 43-55, anD His exaMplE of amazing grace. 21. In ADdiTiON TO gOals and perspective, foLEY, WOrking WiThout a nEt (oxFOrd: OxforD UNivErsiTY press, 1993), ClaiMS tHat epistEmic evALuAtIons are To Be undeRsTooD as Also mAKing RefereNce to whaT he caLLs a set of resourCEs possessed by THe BELiEVer. FOleY offers this FormULa, thEn, foR UnDerSTandiNg ascRiPTiONs of rationality: "It is RaTional For yoU to believe becAuse you havE RESources R And bECaUSe from perspectIve P iT seems that, GIven R, belIevinG is an effEctive way TO Satisfy gOal g" (p. 34). 22. WE unDerSTAnD justified belIEF in tErMs of appAreNtly proMotIng YouR goAlS instead oF saying, fOr ExAmPlE, thAt theY Must in faCt SatIsFy yOur goALs becaUse evEn in CaSeS WheRe your bELiEFS do nOt SaTisfY yoUr Goals, We waNT to Allow thAt you can sTilL Be juStIfIed in hoLding the belieF. 23. THis matter iS nOt sO clear IN foley. JudGing from some perspective INvolves JudGing rElatIve to the ePisTemic sTanDArds thAt partIally ChAraCTErize THE pErsPeCtive in queSTIon. althoUgH not ExpliciT about the matter, froM WhaT he does say, FolEy sEems TO ThInk THaT The EpISteMIC standards of a peRspective aRe REpResented as BEliEfS (perspeCtives, aFter aLL, are defIned as setS of beliefS). I SuspECT thAt a better wAy to consTrue a persPEctivE WoUld noT be Simply In TerMs of bEliefs, BUt wE need Not get InTo this Issue HeRe. 24. Foley, WOrking Without a Net, p. 14. This iMplies, Of couRse, That epistEmiC AscRiptions aRe coNtext sensiTivE-a cLaim eMbrACed by EpisTEmOloGIcal cOnteXTualists. HOWeVer, IT WiLl become cleAR
), 598-99. 20. Of course,questionsabout  no ndo xa stic  jus tification are rele vant to questions abou t dox as t ic j u st ifica tion at le a s t t oth isex t en t: if , f or exam ple, moral  pr op ositions orc la ims can be  pr oved, demons tra ted, o r'ju s tifie d'by in ferrin g  themfrom, say ,p roposi t ions ab o u tthenature of human b e in g s, then one wa y to b ed ox a s tic all y justifie din ho l ding va r io u s mor a l beliefs wou ld be to in f erthem f ro m t h e rele vantse t  of  A Contextu alis t Moral E pistem o logy 32 1  (justi fiably  he ld)  bel i ef sabo ut the na tur e  of  human b ei ng s. Bu t th i s n eednot  bethe o nly way, or e ven  the pri maryway,in w hi ch mo st ord inary  p eople come to j usti fiably ho ldmo ral  b elief s . See,  fo r e xample,  Willia m  To lh u r s t,  "Supervenience, E xt e r na lism, an d Mora l  K no w ledge,"Th e S outh e r n Jou rnal of  Philoso phy 29 ,  s up plement ar y volu me  on  "M oralR eali sm" (1 986), 43 -55,a nd his example of Amazing Gr a ce . 21 .  Inadd ition to go alsa nd p ersp e ct ive ,  Fole y, Wo rk i ng Without a Net (Oxfo rd : Oxfo rd Un iversity Pres s, 1993),c l a ims that  epi s te m ic evaluations  areto be unde r stood as  also  makingreference t o what h e c all s a  se t of  resources po s s esse dby thebel iever.Fol eyoff ers  t his formu la, then ,fo run der stand i ng ascri pt ion sofratio n ality:  "Itis r at io n alfor you to b elie ve  b ecau seyo u hav e re s our ces R a nd becaus e f r om p er sp ectiveP it seems th at , given R,  b eli evingi s  an effe ctive way to satisfy go a l G" (p . 3 4). 2 2. W e underst and  justi fie d  belie f in t ermsof  ap p a rentl y pr omo ti ng your go a l s i nstea dof s aying,for example, thatt hey  must in fact  sa tisf y yo urg oa l s b ec a use e ven in cases wh ere your b el i ef s do not s a tis fy  your g oals, w e wan t  to all ow that y ou can st il l be j ust ified in h olding t he belief .  23.T hi s mat ter  is no tsoclear  in Fo l ey.  Judg ing fr om  somepersp ec tive inv olves judging relativeto the  epis tem ic standa rds tha t partial ly c haracteriz e t hepersp ect i ve in  que s ti on. Altho ughn ot explic i tabo u t  t he matter,f r o m w hat h e d o es say , Fo ley seems to thin k  that the epis temi c sta nda r ds o fa perspectiveare  r e p resented  a s beliefs ( perspect iv e s, af ter al l, are  define d as sets o f be lie fs). I su spe ct that abe tt e r wayto c on struea pers p ecti v e  would not be si mplyi n  term s  of  beli ef s, butw e ne ed not get  into thisissuehere . 24.  Foley,  W orking  Wi th out a Net, p. 14. Th is im plies,of  cou rse , that  epi s t emicascr ip tio ns are co n t ex t  s en s iti ve-a  clai membr aced by e p istemolo gic a l conte xt ual i s ts. Ho w ev e r , it willbec ome c l e ar
), 598-99._20. Of_course, questions about nondoxastic_justification are_relevant_to questions_about_doxastic justification at_least to this_extent: if, for example,_moral propositions or_claims_can be proved, demonstrated, or 'justified' by inferring them from, say, propositions about the_nature_of human_beings,_then_one way to be doxastically_justified in holding various moral_beliefs would_be to infer them from the relevant set_of_A Contextualist Moral_Epistemology 321 (justifiably held) beliefs about the nature of_human beings. But this need not_be the only_way,_or_even the primary way,_in which most ordinary people come_to justifiably hold moral beliefs. See,_for example, William Tolhurst, "Supervenience, Externalism, and_Moral Knowledge," The Southern Journal of_Philosophy 29, supplementary volume on_"Moral Realism"_(1986), 43-55, and his example_of Amazing Grace._21. In_addition to goals_and perspective, Foley, Working Without a_Net (Oxford: Oxford_University Press, 1993), claims that epistemic_evaluations_are to be_understood_as_also making_reference to what_he_calls a_set_of resources possessed by the believer._Foley_offers this formula, then, for understanding ascriptions_of rationality: "It is_rational_for you to believe_because you have resources R_and because from perspective P it_seems that,_given R,_believing is an effective way to satisfy goal G" (p. 34)._22. We understand justified belief in_terms of apparently promoting_your goals_instead_of saying, for_example,_that they_must in fact satisfy your goals because_even in_cases where your beliefs do not_satisfy your goals, we_want_to allow that you can still_be justified in holding the belief._23. This matter is not_so_clear_in Foley. Judging from some_perspective involves judging relative to the_epistemic standards that_partially characterize the perspective in question. Although_not_explicit about the matter, from what_he_does say, Foley seems to think_that_the_epistemic standards of a perspective_are represented as beliefs (perspectives, after_all, are defined as sets of beliefs). I suspect_that a better_way to construe a perspective_would_not_be simply in terms of beliefs, but we need not_get into_this issue here._24. Foley, Working Without a Net, p. 14. This implies,_of course, that epistemic ascriptions are context_sensitive-a claim embraced by epistemological contextualists. However, it will become clear