 uma função normativa: o que é por natureza é justo e o que é contrário à natureza é por força e, portanto, injusto: Nature supplies the normative element of Aristotle's political philosophy and keeps it from being entirely descriptive and pragmatic. Aristotle believes that nature and justice are connected, and subscribes to two principles relating them: a positive principle linking the just and the natural (I.5, 1255a 1–3; III.17, 1287b 37–39; VII.9, 1329a 13–17) and a negative principle linking the unjust and the unnatural (I.10, 1258a 40– b2; VII.3, 1325b 7–10; and see I.3, 1253b 20–23). (For both principles together see I.5, 1254a 17–20 and III.16, 1287a 8–18.). Though these justice-of-nature principles go unexplained and unsupported in the Politics, they are not ultimate principles for Aristotle. They follow syllogistically from his natural teleology supplemented by one further premise. According to Aristotelian teleology "nature makes everything for the sake of something" (I.2, 1252b 32; PA I.1, 641b 12, 5, 645a 23–26; Fís. II.8), where this something, the end, or goal, of the making, is something good (I.1, 1252b 34–1253a 1; Fís. II.2, 194a 32–33; 3, 195a 23–25; Met. A.3, 983a 31–32 and especially Somno 2, 455b 16–25). To reach the positive principle we need a premise relating goodness and justice (for which see III.12, 1282b 16–17; 13, 1283a 38–40 together with Keyt, 1996, p. 131–2). We then have the following syllogism: Everything natural is good. Everything (within the sphere of social conduct) that is good is just. Therefore, everything (within the sphere of social conduct) that is natural is just. The negative principle, that everything (within the sphere of social conduct) that is unnatural is unjust, can be derived similarly mutatis mutandis (for details see Keyt, 1996, p. 132) (Keyt 2006, 397-398). É curios
uma função normativa: o que é por natureza é justo e o que é contrário à natureza é por força e, portanto, injusto: Nature supplies the normative element of Aristotle's political doctrine and sustain it from being entirely descriptive and pragmatic. Aristotle believe that nature and department of justice are connected, and subscribes to two principle relate them: a positive rationale connect the just and the lifelike (I.5, 1255a 1–3; III.17, 1287b 37–39; VII.9, 1329a 13–17) and a negative principle linking the unjust and the abnormal (I.10, 1258a 40 – b2; VII.3, 1325b 7–10; and see I.3, 1253b 20–23). (For both principles together see I.5, 1254a 17–20 and III.16, 1287a 8–18 .). Though these justice - of - nature principle go unexplained and unsupported in the Politics, they are not ultimate principles for Aristotle. They follow syllogistically from his lifelike teleology supplemented by one further premise. According to Aristotelian teleology " nature make everything for the sake of something " (I.2, 1252b 32; PA I.1, 641b 12, 5, 645a 23–26; Fís. II.8), where this something, the conclusion, or goal, of the qualification, is something good (I.1, 1252b 34–1253a 1; Fís. II.2, 194a 32–33; 3, 195a 23–25; Met. A.3, 983a 31–32 and especially Somno 2, 455b 16–25). To reach the plus principle we need a premise relating goodness and justice (for which determine III.12, 1282b 16–17; 13, 1283a 38–40 together with Keyt, 1996, p. 131–2). We then have the following syllogism: Everything natural is good. Everything (within the sphere of social conduct) that is good is just. Therefore, everything (within the sector of social conduct) that is natural is barely. The negative principle, that everything (within the sphere of social conduct) that is abnormal is unjust, can be derived similarly mutatis mutandis (for details see Keyt, 1996, p. 132) (Keyt 2006, 397 - 398). É curio
 umw função normativa: o que é kor natureza é jusjo e o qne é confrário à nxtureza é por força e, portanto, ibjusti: Nature supplies the vormative element of Eristotle's politmdal philosophg and jeeps it from neing entiraly descriptiva xnb pragmatic. Aristotle believes that gature snf justice are sonntctqd, ahd subscribes to two principles remating uhem: a positive pronciple linking the just ajd tje natural (I.5, 1255a 1–3; IIL.17, 1287b 37–39; VII.9, 1329a 13–17) and q negative pfinciple lpuking the uhjust and the unnatural (I.10, 1258a 40– b2; XII.3, 1325b 7–10; and see U.3, 1253v 20–23). (Vmr both priiciplef together scv I.5, 1254a 17–20 dnd III.16, 1287a 8–18.). Though thexe oustuce-of-nature principlev go unexplained agd unsuppmrced in the Politics, tyet are not ultknatd pdiicilles flr Eristotle. Tgey follow wyllogistically frok rpx natural temeologr fupplemented by one further premise. Accmrdjng to Aristotelian telwology "nature makes egerything for the sake of something" (I.2, 1252b 32; PA I.1, 641b 12, 5, 645a 23–26; Fís. II.8), wherx ghiw funehhing, the end, or goal, of the making, is somethyhg gpod (I.1, 1252b 34–1253a 1; Fís. LI.2, 194a 32–33; 3, 195a 23–25; Met. A.3, 983a 31–32 ajd gspecially Somvo 2, 455b 16–25). To reach the positivf princyple qe need a prekise relating goodness and hustice (for chixh see III.12, 1282b 16–17; 13, 1283a 38–40 cogether witk Keyt, 1996, p. 131–2). Ee then have the follownng symlogism: Evegything nzgural is good. Evdrynhinc (within the sphere of socyal condurt) thct is goud ix just. Therefore, everndhing (within the sohere ox social clnduct) that is natural is just. Vie negative ptinwipne, that zverytming (within the sphere of socnal condbct) thxt is unnanural is nnjust, can bq derived simhparly mutativ mutandys (fir dwtails rde Keyt, 1996, p. 132) (Keut 2006, 397-398). É curpof
uma função normativa: o que é por justo o que contrário à natureza injusto: supplies the normative of Aristotle's political and keeps it from being entirely and pragmatic. Aristotle believes that nature and justice are connected, and subscribes to principles relating them: a positive principle linking the just and the natural (I.5, 1–3; 1287b VII.9, 13–17) and a negative principle linking the unjust and the unnatural (I.10, 1258a 40– b2; VII.3, 7–10; and see I.3, 1253b 20–23). (For both together see I.5, 1254a and III.16, 1287a 8–18.). Though justice-of-nature go unexplained unsupported the they are not principles for Aristotle. They follow syllogistically from his natural teleology supplemented by one further premise. According to teleology "nature for the of (I.2, 32; PA I.1, 5, 645a 23–26; Fís. II.8), where end, or goal, of the making, is something (I.1, 1252b 1; Fís. II.2, 194a 32–33; 3, 23–25; Met. A.3, 983a 31–32 and especially Somno 455b 16–25). To reach the positive principle we need a premise relating goodness and justice see III.12, 1282b 16–17; 1283a 38–40 together Keyt, p. We have the syllogism: Everything natural is good. Everything (within the sphere of social that is good is just. Therefore, everything (within the sphere conduct) is natural is The negative principle, that (within sphere of social conduct) unnatural unjust, similarly mutandis details see Keyt, 1996, 132) (Keyt 2006, 397-398). É
 uma função normativa: o que é poR natureza é Justo E o qUe é CoNtráRio à Natureza é por foRÇa e, pOrtanto, injusto: Nature suPplieS tHE norMAtIve elEment of aRiSTOtlE's PoLitIcAL pHilosOphY and keePs it from beIng EnTirely descriPTiVe and pragmAtiC. Aristotle beLieVes thaT nAtuRE and jUstIce arE conneCTed, and SubscribeS tO Two priNCiples rELAtIng tHem: a positive princIPlE Linking the just And the NaTUrAL (i.5, 1255a 1–3; IiI.17, 1287b 37–39; vII.9, 1329a 13–17) and a neGaTive pRInciple LInKING thE Unjust and the uNnatural (I.10, 1258a 40– b2; viI.3, 1325b 7–10; And see i.3, 1253b 20–23). (for BOth priNciplEs TOgeTher see I.5, 1254a 17–20 anD III.16, 1287A 8–18.). Though thEse jusTIce-of-naTUre prinCiples Go uNexPlaiNEd AnD unSuPPorTEd In tHE PoLitics, thEy ArE not uLtimATE PRincIplEs foR ArisTotle. They follOw sYlloGIstIcallY from His nAtUral tEleoloGy supPlEmented by one furTher Premise. AcCorDiNg tO ARistoTElian tEleOloGy "naturE makes eVEryThING FoR the sake of somethinG" (I.2, 1252B 32; pa I.1, 641B 12, 5, 645a 23–26; Fís. II.8), wHere thIS sOmEThing, the EnD, or Goal, OF The maKing, IS sOmething Good (I.1, 1252b 34–1253A 1; fíS. Ii.2, 194a 32–33; 3, 195a 23–25; Met. A.3, 983A 31–32 aNd espeCiAllY SoMno 2, 455b 16–25). TO ReacH the poSitive prIncipLE we need a premisE Relating goodnESs AND jUSticE (foR which see IIi.12, 1282b 16–17; 13, 1283a 38–40 tOGethEr wiTH KEyt, 1996, P. 131–2). we theN have ThE FoLLowing syllogism: EverYtHing naTural Is good. EverythIng (within tHE SPhere of sOciaL CoNDuct) that is good Is jusT. Therefore, EVerythinG (withIn the sphEre of sociAL Conduct) tHat Is nAtuRal IS JuSt. The negative PRInciPlE, that evEryThing (wiThiN thE spHerE oF social coNduct) thaT iS uNnAtUraL is unJUst, can be DeRivEd SimIlarlY MutatiS mutaNdis (FoR dETaiLs see KeYT, 1996, p. 132) (kEYt 2006, 397-398). É cUrIoS
 uma função normativa: o q ue é por n ature zaé j us to e  o q ue é contrário à na tureza é por força e,porta nt o , in j us to: N ature s u pp l i esth enor ma t iv e ele men t of Ar istotle'spol it ical philoso p hy  and keeps  it  from beingent irelyde scr i ptive  an d pra gmatic .  Arist otle beli ev e s that naturea n djust ice are connected ,  a n d subscribes t o twopr i nc i p les  re lating the m:  a po s itive p r in c i p lel inking the ju st and then atu ral (I .5 , 1 2 55a 1– 3; II I. 1 7,1287b 37–39 ; VI I.9, 1329 a 13–1 7 ) and a negativ e prin cip lelink i ng  t heun j ust an d t h e u nnatural  ( I. 10, 1 258a 4 0 –  b2;  VI I.3,  1325 b 7–10; and s eeI.3, 125 3b 20 –23).  (Fo rbothprinci plesto gether see I.5,  125 4a 17–20and  I II. 16 , 128 7 a 8–18 .).  Th ough th ese jus t ice -o f - n at ure principles goun e x pl ained an d unsu p po rt e d in the  P oli tics , theyaren ot  ultimat e prin c ip le s for A ri stotle .The y f ollow syll ogisti cally fr om hi s  natural teleo l ogy supplemen t ed b yo ne f urt her premise . Ac c ordi ng t o  A ris t oteli an te le o lo g y "nature makes eve ry thingfor t he sake of so mething" ( I . 2 , 1252b32;P AI .1, 641b 12, 5 , 645 a 23–26; F í s. II.8) , whe re thissomething , the end,  or  go al,  of t he  making, is s o m ethi ng  good ( I.1 , 1252b  34 –12 53a  1;  F ís. II.2,  194a 32 –3 3;  3 ,195 a 23– 2 5; Met.A. 3,98 3a31–32 and es pecia llySo mn o  2,  455b 1 6 –2 5 ) . To  r ea ch t hepo sitiv e pr i nci ple weneed a pr emi s e re la ti ng good ness and just ic e (for whi ch  se e III. 1 2 , 1282b16–17; 13, 1283a 38–40t ogether  wi th Ke yt,1996, p.131 –2). W e t h en hav e thefollo wi ngs y llogi s m :Eve ry thing natu r a l i s goo d.  Eve rything  (within the spher e  of  social condu ct)  tha t is  go o di s j us t . T h e refore, everyth ing (withi nt he  sphere of soc ia l condu ct) tha t isn aturalis just.The negat iv e pr i n cip le, that e verythin g (within the s p he re of  so cial c on duc t) th at isu nna tural  is un ju st, ca n bede rived si milarly mutatis mutandi s (for  deta ils  see Keyt , 1 9 96,  p. 132)(Key t 2006, 39 7-3 98) . É c uri o s
 uma_função normativa:_o que é por_natureza é_justo_e o_que_é contrário à_natureza é por_força e, portanto, injusto:_Nature supplies the_normative_element of Aristotle's political philosophy and keeps it from being entirely descriptive and pragmatic._Aristotle_believes that_nature_and_justice are connected, and subscribes_to two principles relating them:_a positive_principle linking the just and the natural (I.5,_1255a_1–3; III.17, 1287b_37–39; VII.9, 1329a 13–17) and a negative principle linking_the unjust and the unnatural (I.10,_1258a 40– b2;_VII.3,_1325b_7–10; and see I.3,_1253b 20–23). (For both principles together_see I.5, 1254a 17–20 and III.16,_1287a 8–18.). Though these justice-of-nature principles go_unexplained and unsupported in the Politics,_they are not ultimate principles_for Aristotle._They follow syllogistically from his_natural teleology supplemented_by one_further premise. According_to Aristotelian teleology "nature makes everything_for the sake_of something" (I.2, 1252b 32; PA_I.1,_641b 12, 5,_645a_23–26;_Fís. II.8),_where this something,_the_end, or_goal,_of the making, is something good_(I.1,_1252b 34–1253a 1; Fís. II.2, 194a 32–33;_3, 195a 23–25; Met._A.3,_983a 31–32 and especially_Somno 2, 455b 16–25). To_reach the positive principle we need_a premise_relating goodness_and justice (for which see III.12, 1282b 16–17; 13, 1283a 38–40_together with Keyt, 1996, p. 131–2)._We then have the_following syllogism:_Everything_natural is good._Everything_(within the_sphere of social conduct) that is good_is just._Therefore, everything (within the sphere of_social conduct) that is_natural_is just. The negative principle, that_everything (within the sphere of social_conduct) that is unnatural is_unjust,_can_be derived similarly mutatis mutandis_(for details see Keyt, 1996, p._132) (Keyt 2006,_397-398). É curios