 cease to exist in such situations? I think that not only we can, but also that such a claim is actually quite intuitively plausible and acceptable, and that it may even count as a motivation for the pluralistic view I have in mind. In a nutshell, the idea is that what matters is psychological and phenomenal diachronic continuity, and not metaphysical diachronic continuity. That is, what matters is that our experiences are phenomenally continuous, even if they are temporally scattered11. The criterion of temporal contiguity is a bad one in the first place, when it comes to arguing about diachronic continuity, i.e. the persistence and identity of any objects (conscious or not) through time. The philosophical literature on this subject abounds in exotic thought experiments where objects, or people, are teletransported or where they find themselves in time travel scenarios, to the effect of showing that a spatial and/or temporal discontinuity does not affect the identity of the object or person in question. In the case of time travel, for instance, if a person is instantly taken from 01.01.2013 to 01.01.2014, it is argued more often than not – correctly, I think – that she does not die. Time travel or teletransportation is not certain death, it's just a way of travelling. As long as psychological connectedness and continuity, causal connectedness and continuity, similarity, and other relevant psychological criteria are satisfied, the fact that there are spatial or temporal gaps does not prevent personal identity (the diachronic identity of the Self ) to obtain. In the pluralistic view terms: the Self is 11 In Benovsky (forthcoming_b, §5), I discuss a different but dialectically parallel case which concerns the debate about presentism and the specious present theory. Some claim that the two are contradictory since presentism claims that there exists only one instant – the present time – while specious present theorists such as extensionalists claim that our experience is temporally extended (thus, it requires more than one instant to exist). The idea I argue for here is that one needs to make a distinction between metaphysical temporal extension and phenomenal temporal extension. Extensionalists need the latter but not the former, and thus their view is entirely compatible with the truth of presentism – indeed, presentism and the specious present theory and entirely orthogonal and independent views, or so I argue. 13 the plurality of experiences arranged Self-wise, and it is not necessary that these experiences
cease to exist in such situations? I think that not only we can, but also that such a title is actually quite intuitively plausible and satisfactory, and that it may even count as a motivation for the pluralistic view I get in thinker. In a nutshell, the idea is that what matters is psychological and phenomenal diachronic continuity, and not metaphysical diachronic continuity. That is, what count is that our experiences are phenomenally continuous, even if they are temporally scattered11. The criterion of temporal adjacency is a regretful one in the first place, when it come to arguing about diachronic continuity, i.e. the doggedness and identity of any object (conscious or not) through time. The philosophic literature on this subject abound in alien thought experiments where objects, or multitude, are teletransported or where they find themselves in time change of location scenarios, to the consequence of showing that a spatial and/or temporal discontinuity does not affect the identity of the object or person in question. In the shell of time travel, for instance, if a person is instantly taken from 01.01.2013 to 01.01.2014, it is argued more often than not – correctly, I think – that she does not die. Time travel or teletransportation is not certain death, it's just a way of travelling. As long as psychological connection and continuity, causal connectedness and continuity, similarity, and other relevant psychological criterion are quenched, the fact that there be spatial or temporal gaps does not prevent personal identity (the diachronic identity of the Self) to receive. In the pluralistic view terms: the Self is 11 In Benovsky (forthcoming_b, § 5), I discuss a different but dialectically parallel shell which concerns the debate about presentism and the specious present theory. Some claim that the two are contradictory since presentism claims that there exist only one instant – the present time – while specious present theorist such as extensionalists claim that our experience is temporally extended (therefore, it requires more than one instant to exist). The idea I argue for here is that one needs to make a distinction between metaphysical worldly extension and phenomenal temporal extension. Extensionalists need the latter but not the former, and thus their view is entirely compatible with the truth of presentism – indeed, presentism and the gilded present theory and entirely orthogonal and independent views, or thus I argue. 13 the plurality of experience arranged Self - judicious, and it is not necessary that these experiences
 cewse to exist in such sitmations? I think jhqt not only se can, bjt also that such a claim is axtualoy quite intuitively puausible wnd acceptabow, and that it may cren ckmnt av a motivation nor the plusalistic view H fare in mind. In a nutshell, the idea is that wnah matters is pfychpjogidal and phenomenal diachronic contjnuity, end not metaphyxical diachronic continuitj. Thwt is, what matters is that out ex[wriences are phenomenally continuoos, even if they are temporally szattexed11. The crijzeioj of temporao conniguity is a nsd one in the first place, wmen iv cones to arguing about viachronic continuiti, i.e. the paraistence and idenriry of any objdxts (cohsriohs or jot) through tjme. The phioosophical literatute in this subjedt abotnqs in exotic thought experiments where mbjscts, or people, are telerransported or where jhey find ehemselves in time travel scenarios, to the effect of siodiny that q dpatial and/or temporal discontinuity does not zfgebt the identity on the object or petsln yn question. Iv the ezss of time travel, flr instwnce, uf a persjn ix instantly taken from 01.01.2013 to 01.01.2014, it is argueb mire often than not – correctly, I tnink – that she does not die. Cime tdavel or tepetranspodgation is not ceftapn daath, it's just a way of tradelling. Aw loug as pshchokogicaj connectefness and continuity, caudal clntectedness and continuity, similarity, and other relevant pvycvologicaj criberia are satissied, the fact jhat therz are rpatial or temporel gaps does not prevent [grsonal identmty (the dyacheonix identkgy of the Self ) to obtapn. In rhe pluralistic vicw tetma: the Self is 11 Nu Venovsky (forthcpmivg_b, §5), P dmscusf a different but dixkectizally paralodl csse which concerns tve dsbate about presenyifm and tye specijus present tneory. Some claim tjat tie two are vonjradictory since presentism clajms that hheve exists onlr onc inftant – the present time – while specious present tieorists such as extensuonalists claim thaj omr experiencx is tqmporally extended (thus, it rewuires more than pne instant to exist). Fhe idaa I wrgue for here is that one needs to make a distinction between metaphysicql tem'owal extensikn amd phvnoiznal teiporel extension. Extenxionalists need the latter but iot the fosmzr, and thus their view is entordly compatiblg with the truth of presenfism – inceed, presentism and the specioux present theory and entlrely ortyogonzl and indxpendent views, or so I argbe. 13 thw pluraoity of experiencds srvanged Selv-wist, anb it is not necessary that these wxperiwnfes
cease to exist in such situations? I not we can, also that such intuitively and acceptable, and it may even as a motivation for the pluralistic I have in mind. In a nutshell, the idea is that what matters psychological and phenomenal diachronic continuity, and not metaphysical diachronic continuity. That is, what is our are continuous, even if they are temporally scattered11. The criterion of temporal contiguity is a bad one the first place, when it comes to arguing diachronic continuity, i.e. the and identity of any objects or through time. philosophical on subject abounds in thought experiments where objects, or people, are teletransported or where they find themselves in time travel scenarios, the effect that a and/or discontinuity not affect the the object or person in question. of time travel, for instance, if a person instantly taken 01.01.2013 to 01.01.2014, it is argued often than not – correctly, I think – she does not die. Time travel or teletransportation is not certain death, it's just a travelling. As long as connectedness and continuity, connectedness continuity, and relevant psychological are satisfied, the fact that there are spatial or temporal gaps not prevent personal identity (the diachronic identity of the Self obtain. the pluralistic view the Self is 11 Benovsky §5), I discuss a dialectically case debate presentism the specious present theory. claim that the two are since presentism claims that – the present time – while specious present such as extensionalists claim that our experience temporally extended (thus, it requires more than one instant to exist). The I argue is that one needs to make a distinction metaphysical temporal extension and temporal extension. Extensionalists need the latter but not the and their view entirely compatible with truth of presentism indeed, presentism and present theory entirely and so I argue. 13 the plurality experiences Self-wise, and it is not that
 cease to exist in such situatiOns? I think tHat noT onLy wE cAn, buT alsO that such a claiM Is acTually quite intuitively PlausIbLE and ACcEptabLe, and thAT iT MAy eVeN cOunT aS A mOtivaTioN for the PluralistiC viEw i have in mind. IN A nUtshell, the IdeA is that what mAttErs is pSyChoLOgicaL anD phenOmenal DIachroNic continUiTY, and noT MetaphySICaL diaChronic continuity. tHaT Is, what matters iS that oUr EXpERIenCes Are phenomeNaLly coNTinuous, EVeN IF TheY Are temporally Scattered11. ThE CriTerion Of TemPOral coNtiguItY Is a Bad one in the FirsT place, wheN it comES to arguINg about DiachrOniC coNtinUItY, i.E. thE pERsiSTeNce ANd iDentity oF aNy ObjecTs (coNSCIOus oR noT) thrOugh tIme. The philosoPhiCal lITerAture On thiS subJeCt aboUnds in ExotiC tHought experimenTs whEre objectS, or PeOplE, aRe telETranspOrtEd oR where tHey find THemSeLVES iN time travel scenariOs, TO ThE effect oF showiNG tHaT A spatial AnD/or TempORAl disContINuIty does nOt affeCT tHe IdentitY oF the obJeCt oR peRson iN QuesTion. In The case oF time TRavel, for instanCE, if a person is iNStANTlY TakeN frOm 01.01.2013 to 01.01.2014, it is argUed mORe ofTen tHAn Not – COrrecTly, I tHiNK – tHAt she does not die. Time TrAvel or TeletRansportation Is not certaIN DEath, it's jUst a WAy OF travelling. As lOng as PsychologiCAl connecTedneSs and conTinuity, caUSAl connecTedNesS anD coNTInUity, similaritY, ANd otHeR relevaNt pSycholoGicAl cRitEriA aRe satisfiEd, the facT tHaT tHeRe aRe spaTIal or temPoRal GaPs dOes noT PrevenT persOnal IdEnTIty (The diacHRoNIC ideNtItY of tHe SElF ) to obTain. iN thE pluralIstic view TerMS: the seLf Is 11 In BenOvsky (forthcomInG_b, §5), I discuss A dIffErent bUT DialectiCally parallel case which cONcerns tHe dEbate AbouT presentiSm aNd the sPecIOus preSent thEory. SOmE clAIM that THE tWo aRe ContradictORY siNce prEsEntiSm claimS that there exists onLY onE instant – the prEseNt tiME – WhIle SPeCIouS pREseNT Theorists such as ExtensionaLiSTs Claim that oUR exPeRience iS temporAlly eXTended (tHus, it requIres more tHaN one INStaNt to exist). THe idea I aRgue for heRE is thAT oNe neeDs tO make a DiStiNctioN betweEN meTaphySical tEmPoral eXtensIoN and phenOmenal temporal extension. extensIonalIstS need the lAttER buT not the foRmer, And thus theIr vIew Is entIreLY compAtibLE wIth THe truTh of PResentism – INdEed, PREsEntism and thE SPEciOus prEseNT theorY and Entirely orthogonaL And independent ViewS, OR so i arGUe. 13 thE pLurality of expeRieNcES Arranged seLf-wise, and it Is not necEsSAry thAt thesE experIences
 cease to exist in such si tuations?I thi nktha tnotonly  we can, but a l so t hat such a claim is ac tuall yq uite in tuiti vely pl a us i b lean dacc ep t ab le, a ndthat it  may evencou nt  as a motiva t io n for theplu ralistic vie w I  havein  mi n d. In  anutsh ell, t h e idea  is thatwh a t matt e rs is p s y ch olog ical and phenomen a ld iachronic cont inuity ,a nd n otmet aphysicaldi achro n ic cont i nu i t y . T h at is, what m atters is t h atour ex pe rie n ces ar e phe no m ena lly continu ous,  even ifthey a r e tempo r ally sc attere d11 . T he c r it er ion  o f  te m po ral con tiguityis  a  badonei n t he f irs t pl ace,when it comes  to  arg u ing  abou t dia chro ni c con tinuit y, i. e.  the persistenc e an d identit y o fany  o bject s  (cons cio usor not)  throug h  ti me . T he  philosophical lit er a t ur e on thi s subj e ct  a b ounds in  e xot ic t h o ughtexpe r im ents whe re obj e ct s,  or peo pl e, are  t ele tra nspor t ed o r wher e they f ind t h emselves in ti m e travel scen a ri o s ,t o th e e ffect of sh owin g  tha t as pa tia l  and/ or te mp o ra l  discontinuity does  n ot aff ect t he identity o f the obje c t or perso n in qu e stion. In thecaseof time tr a vel, for  inst ance, if  a person i s instan tly  ta ken  fr o m  0 1.01.2013 to0 1 .01. 20 14, itisarguedmor e o fte n t ha n not – c orrectly ,Ith in k –  that she does  n otdi e.Timet ravelor te letr an sp o rta tion is no t cert ai ndeat h,it 's ju st a way  of tra velling.Asl ongas  p sycholo gical connect ed ness and c on tin uity,c a usal con nectedness and continui t y, simi lar ity,andother rel eva nt psy cho l ogical  crite ria a re  sa t i sfied , th e f ac t that the r e  ar e spa ti al o r tempo ral gaps does notp rev ent personalide ntit y (t hed ia c hro ni c  id e n tity of the Sel f ) to obt ai n .In the plu r ali st ic view  terms:  theS elf is11 In Ben ovsky (fo rt hcom i n g_b , §5), I d iscuss a  differen t  butd ia lecti cal ly par al lel  case  which con cerns  the d eb ate ab out p re sentismand the specious presen t theo ry. S ome  claim th att hetwo are c ontr adictory s inc e p resen tis m  clai ms t h at  th e re ex ists only onei ns tan t –the present t i me– whi les peciou s pr esent theorists s u ch as extensio nali s t s c lai m  tha tour experience  is  t e m porallyex tended (thu s, it re qu i res m ore th an one  instan t to exist) . Th e i dea I arg uefo r  here i sth a t oneneed sto mak e a di s tinc t i on between metap hysic a l  temp o ral  exte ns ion and phen omenal tem poral exten sion.Exte nsion alistsne ed the  la tt er but not the forme r, an d thusth eirvie w is e ntir e l y com pati bl e w ith the t r u th of  p r ese ntis m – i nd eed,  presenti s m and th e s p eciouspr ese n t  theor y  a n d  entirelyort hogon a l  and indep e nden t  v i ews,or soI argu e. 13 t h e p lu ralityofe x periences  arranged Sel f- wise , and it  i s no tnec es sary that these  experie nces
 cease_to exist_in such situations? I_think that_not_only we_can,_but also that_such a claim_is actually quite intuitively_plausible and acceptable,_and_that it may even count as a motivation for the pluralistic view I have_in_mind. In_a_nutshell,_the idea is that what_matters is psychological and phenomenal_diachronic continuity,_and not metaphysical diachronic continuity. That is, what_matters_is that our_experiences are phenomenally continuous, even if they are temporally_scattered11. The criterion of temporal contiguity_is a bad_one_in_the first place, when_it comes to arguing about diachronic_continuity, i.e. the persistence and identity_of any objects (conscious or not) through_time. The philosophical literature on this_subject abounds in exotic thought_experiments where_objects, or people, are teletransported_or where they_find themselves_in time travel_scenarios, to the effect of showing_that a spatial_and/or temporal discontinuity does not affect_the_identity of the_object_or_person in_question. In the_case_of time_travel,_for instance, if a person is_instantly_taken from 01.01.2013 to 01.01.2014, it is_argued more often than_not_– correctly, I think_– that she does not_die. Time travel or teletransportation is_not certain_death, it's_just a way of travelling. As long as psychological connectedness and_continuity, causal connectedness and continuity, similarity,_and other relevant psychological_criteria are_satisfied,_the fact that_there_are spatial_or temporal gaps does not prevent personal_identity (the_diachronic identity of the Self )_to obtain. In the_pluralistic_view terms: the Self is 11_In Benovsky (forthcoming_b, §5), I discuss_a different but dialectically parallel_case_which_concerns the debate about presentism_and the specious present theory. Some_claim that the_two are contradictory since presentism claims that_there_exists only one instant – the_present_time – while specious present theorists_such_as_extensionalists claim that our experience_is temporally extended (thus, it requires_more than one instant to exist). The idea I_argue for here_is that one needs to_make_a_distinction between metaphysical temporal extension and phenomenal temporal extension. Extensionalists_need the_latter but not_the former, and thus their view is entirely compatible with_the truth of presentism – indeed, presentism_and the specious present theory and entirely orthogonal and independent views,_or so I argue. 13 the plurality of_experiences arranged Self-wise, and it is not_necessary that these experiences