 of it should be. If not, this goes for oneself as for everyone else" (VIII.103). This comment, I submit, is intended to work similarly to John Stuart Mill's famous remark in the fourth chapter of Utilitarianism that "the sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable, is that people do actually desire it." G. E. Moore famously saw this claim of Mill's as a fallacy resting on linguistic equivocation, but I think Alasdair MacIntyre's more sympathetic reading is more helpful: He treats the thesis that all men desire pleasure as a factual assertion which guarantees the success of an ad hominem appeal to anyone who denies his conclusion. If anyone denies that pleasure is desirable, then we can ask him, But don't you desire it? and we know in advance that he must answer yes, and consequently must admit that pleasure is desirable. (MacIntyre 152) Similarly, Śāntideva does not think anyone is seriously going to dispute that suffering should be prevented. If they really tried to dispute that, it would be just for the sake of argument, not because they actually believe it. So there is no need to argue against such an objection, whereas there is a need to argue against the many real people who would try to prevent only their own suffering and not others'. 272 Lele, The Metaphysical Basis of Śāntideva's Ethics This, then, is a third argument from metaphysics to ethics-this time from metaphysical selflessness to ethical selflessness. Because the self is not real, we should not privilege it over others. This argument became influential in Tibet, but it was relatively new with Śāntideva. It is instructive, for example, to compare it to the approach of Āryadeva and Candrakīrti to self and egotism. They too identify self as a key metaphysical error (as one might expect), and Āryadeva's first verse on the subject sounds similar to Śāntideva's: "What wise person would have pride in thinking 'I' and'mine', since all objects in the cycle of existence are common to all embodied beings?" (Lang 186). But as it turns out, in that text the pride ends up being more important than the "I" and "mine." Āryadeva's argument, and Candrakīrti's commentary on it, turn out in fact to
of it should be. If not, this goes for oneself as for everyone else " (VIII.103). This comment, I submit, is intended to make similarly to John Stuart Mill's celebrated remark in the fourth chapter of Utilitarianism that " the sole evidence it is possible to grow that anything is desirable, is that multitude do actually desire it. " G. E. Moore famously experience this claim of Mill's as a fallacy resting on linguistic evasion, but I remember Alasdair MacIntyre's more sympathetic recitation is more helpful: He treats the thesis that all serviceman desire pleasure as a factual assertion which guarantees the success of an ad hominem entreaty to anyone who denies his conclusion. If anyone denies that joy is desirable, then we can ask him, But don't you desire it? and we acknowledge in advance that he must suffice yes, and consequently must admit that joy is desirable. (MacIntyre 152) Similarly, Śāntideva does not think anyone is seriously going to dispute that distress should be prevented. If they really tried to dispute that, it would be just for the sake of controversy, not because they actually believe it. So there is no need to argue against such an objection, whereas there is a need to argue against the many real people who would try to prevent merely their own suffering and not others'. 272 Lele, The Metaphysical Basis of Śāntideva's Ethics This, then, is a third argument from metaphysics to ethic - this time from metaphysical selflessness to ethical selflessness. Because the self is not real, we should not privilege it over others. This controversy became influential in Tibet, but it was relatively new with Śāntideva. It is instructive, for example, to compare it to the approach of Āryadeva and Candrakīrti to self and ego. They too identify self as a key metaphysical error (as one might expect), and Āryadeva's first verse on the subject sounds similar to Śāntideva's: " What wise person would have pride in think' I' and'mine', since all object in the cycle of existence are common to all embodied beings? " (Lang 186). But as it turn out, in that text the pride ends up being more important than the " I " and " mine. " Āryadeva's controversy, and Candrakīrti's commentary on it, turn out in fact to
 of it should be. If not, thir goes for onesgld as fmr evedyone elre" (VIII.103). This comment, I submiv, is intebded to work similarly to John Dtuart Mull's damous remedk in tmz foudbh chcpver of Utilitarlanism that "the sole evidanze it is possible to produce that anyehing ix fesirable, is trat keo[le so actually desire it." G. E. Moore fajously vaw this claik of Mill's as a fallacy redtinh on linguistic eqkivocation, vut Y think Alasdxir MacIntjxe's more syjpathetic reading is more helpfjl: He treats thg fhfvis that alo men desire pleasure as d factusl assertion wmich juarqntees the success of an ad hominem appgal to anymnz who denies his concouwion. Hf atyond deviea vhaf pleadurx is desiragle, then we can ask him, But dom't jpu desire it? and wq hnow in advance that he must answer yes, ans consequently must admut that pleasure is dgsirable. (MwcIntyre 152) Similarly, Śāntideva does not think anyone is sxrkouwln gokbg to dispute that suffering should be preventeq. Ig nhey really tried to dispute tjay, it would be gust for fhe sake of argumejt, not fecauwe they astuakly believe it. So there is bo need to aggue against such an oyjection, whexeas tnere os a need to argue agaiust ths many real people wgu would try to pfevvnt mnly their own suffering agd not otiers'. 272 Lele, Tfe Mgtaphysycal Basis of Śānbhdeva's Ethics This, then, iv a third wrgument from metaphysics to etimcs-this time grmm ketaphysncal sclflessness to qthical selflexsness. Yecausd the self is not real, we shjuld not privhpege it over others. Ehis argyment bdzame influentisl in Tibvt, but it was relatively ned with Śāntideva. Ic us instructive, gor exwmile, tj compare it do tfe xlproazh of Āryadeya xnd Vandrakīrti to self atd efotism. They too idrnbify self as a ker metaphysicak error (as one migjt ex'ect), aid Āryacevw's first verse on the subject aounds sililwr to Śāntidevw's: "Wmat rise persou would have pride in thinking 'I' and'mine', since all objects in the cycle of exnsuence are comkon tj all embmdied beings?" (Lang 186). Byt as it turns ouu, in that text the prids ends up bfing more important than the "I" and "mine." Āryadeva's argument, and Candrakīrti's commeitwry on it, thrn put it yacc to
of it should be. If not, this oneself for everyone (VIII.103). This comment, work to John Stuart famous remark in fourth chapter of Utilitarianism that "the evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable, is that people actually desire it." G. E. Moore famously saw this claim of Mill's as fallacy on equivocation, I think Alasdair MacIntyre's more sympathetic reading is more helpful: He treats the thesis that all desire pleasure as a factual assertion which guarantees success of an ad appeal to anyone who denies conclusion. anyone denies pleasure desirable, we can ask But don't you desire it? and we know in advance that he must answer yes, and consequently admit that desirable. (MacIntyre Similarly, does think anyone is to dispute that suffering should be really tried to dispute that, it would be for the of argument, not because they actually it. So there is no need to argue such an objection, whereas there is a need to argue against the many real people try to prevent only own suffering and others'. Lele, Metaphysical of Śāntideva's This, then, is a third argument from metaphysics to ethics-this time metaphysical selflessness to ethical selflessness. Because the self is not should privilege it over This argument became influential Tibet, it was relatively new It instructive, compare to approach of Āryadeva and to self and egotism. They identify self as a might expect), and Āryadeva's first verse on the sounds similar to Śāntideva's: "What wise person have pride in thinking 'I' and'mine', since all objects in the cycle existence are all embodied beings?" (Lang 186). But as it out, in that text pride ends up being more important than the "I" "mine." argument, and commentary on it, out in fact
 of it should be. If not, this goes For oneself As for EveRyoNe Else" (vIII.103). this comment, I suBMit, iS intended to work similarLy to JOhN stuaRT MIll's fAmous reMArK IN thE fOuRth ChAPtEr of UTilItarianIsm that "the SolE eVidence it is pOSsIble to prodUce That anything Is dEsirabLe, Is tHAt peoPle Do actUally dESire it." g. E. Moore faMoUSly saw THis claiM OF MIll's As a fallacy resting ON lINguistic equivoCation, BuT i tHINk ALasDair MacIntYrE's morE SympathETiC REAdiNG is more helpfuL: He treats thE TheSis thaT aLl mEN desirE pleaSuRE as A factual assErtiOn which guAranteES the sucCEss of an Ad homiNem AppEal tO AnYoNe wHo DEniES hIs cONclUsion. If aNyOnE deniEs thAT PLEasuRe iS desIrablE, then we can ask Him, but dON't yOu desIre it? And wE kNow in AdvancE that He Must answer yes, anD conSequently MusT aDmiT tHat plEAsure iS deSirAble. (Macintyre 152) SIMilArLY, śĀnTideva does not think AnYONe Is seriouSly goiNG tO dISpute thaT sUffErinG SHould Be prEVeNted. If thEy realLY tRiEd to disPuTe that, It WouLd bE just FOr thE sake oF argumenT, not bECause they actuaLLy believe it. So THeRE Is NO neeD to Argue againsT sucH An obJectIOn, WheREas thEre is A nEEd TO argue against the manY rEal peoPle whO would try to prEvent only tHEIR own suffErinG AnD Not others'. 272 Lele, THe MetAphysical BASis of ŚānTidevA's Ethics this, then, iS A Third argUmeNt fRom MetAPHySics to ethics-tHIS timE fRom metaPhySical seLflEssNesS to EtHical selfLessness. beCaUsE tHe sElf is NOt real, we ShOulD nOt pRivilEGe it ovEr othErs. THiS aRGumEnt becaME iNFLuenTiAl In TiBet, BuT it waS relATivEly new wIth ŚāntidEva. iT is iNsTrUctive, fOr example, to coMpAre it to the ApProAch of ĀRYAdeva and candrakīrti to self and egoTIsm. They Too IdentIfy sElf as a key MetAphysiCal ERror (as One migHt expEcT), anD āRyadeVA'S fIrsT vErse on the sUBJecT sounDs SimiLar to ŚāNtideva's: "What wise peRSon Would have pridE in ThinKINg 'i' anD'MiNE', siNcE All OBJects in the cycle Of existencE aRE cOmmon to all EMboDiEd beingS?" (Lang 186). BuT as it TUrns out, In that texT the pride EnDs up BEIng More importAnt than tHe "I" and "minE." āryadEVa'S arguMenT, and CaNdRakĪrti's CommenTAry On it, tUrn out In Fact to
 of it should be. If not,this goesfor o nes elf  a s fo r ev eryone else" ( V III. 103). This comment, Isubmi t, is i n te ndedto work si m i lar ly  t o J oh n  S tuart  Mi ll's fa mous remar k i nthe fourth c h ap ter of Uti lit arianism tha t " the so le  ev i dence  it  is p ossibl e  to pr oduce tha ta nythin g  is des i r ab le,is that people do ac t ually desire i t." G.  E .  M o o refam ously sawth is cl a im of M i ll ' s asa  fallacy rest ing on ling u ist ic equ iv oca t ion, b ut Ith i nkAlasdair Ma cInt yre's mor e symp a theticr eadingis mor e h elp ful: He  t rea ts the th esi s  th at all m en  d esire  ple a s u r e as  afact ual a ssertion whic h g uara n tee s the  succ essof  an a d homi nem a pp eal to anyone w ho d enies his  co nc lus io n. If anyone  de nie s thatpleasur e  is  d e s i ra ble, then we can a sk h im , But do n't yo u  d es i re it? a nd  we  kno w in ad vanc e  t hat he m ust an s we ryes, an dconseq ue ntl y m ust a d mitthat p leasureis de s irable. (MacIn t yre 152) Simi l ar l y ,Ś ānti dev a does notthin k  any onei sser i ously  goin gt od ispute that sufferi ng  shoul d beprevented. If  they real l y tried to  dis p ut e  that, it woul d bejust for t h e sake o f arg ument, n ot becaus e they act ual lybel iev e it . So there is n o ne ed  to arg ueagainst  su chanobj ec tion, whe reas the re  i sanee d toa rgue aga in stth e m any r e al peo ple w ho w ou ld try  to pre v en t only  t he ir o wnsu fferi ng a n d n ot othe rs'. 272Lel e , Th eMe taphysi cal Basis ofŚā ntideva'sEt hic s This , then, is  a third argument fromm etaphys ics  to e thic s-this ti mefrom m eta p hysica l self lessn es s t o ethic a l  s elf le ssness. Be c a use  these lf i s not r eal, we should not pri vilege it ove r o ther s .  T his ar g ume nt bec a m e influential i n Tibet, b ut it  was relat i vel ynew wit h Śānti deva. It is i nstructiv e, for ex am ple, t o c ompare itto the a pproach o f  Ārya d ev a and  Ca ndrakī rt i t o sel f ande got ism.They t oo  ident ify s el f as a k ey metaphysical error ( as one  migh t e xpect), a ndĀ rya deva's fi rstverse on t hesub jectsou n ds si mila r  t o Ś ā ntide va's :  "What wi s eper s o nwould havep r i dein th ink i ng 'I'  and 'mine', since all objects in the  cyc l e  of  ex i sten ce  are common to  al le m bodied b ei ngs?" (Lang  186). B ut as it  turns  out,in that t ex t  the p ride  en ds up bei ngmo r e impor ta nt than t he " I"  and " mine." Ārya d e va's argument, a nd Ca n d rakīr t i's  comm en tary on it,turn out i n fact to
 of_it should_be. If not, this_goes for_oneself_as for_everyone_else" (VIII.103). This_comment, I submit,_is intended to work_similarly to John_Stuart_Mill's famous remark in the fourth chapter of Utilitarianism that "the sole evidence it_is_possible to_produce_that_anything is desirable, is that_people do actually desire it."_G. E._Moore famously saw this claim of Mill's as_a_fallacy resting on_linguistic equivocation, but I think Alasdair MacIntyre's more sympathetic_reading is more helpful: He treats_the thesis that_all_men_desire pleasure as a_factual assertion which guarantees the success_of an ad hominem appeal to_anyone who denies his conclusion. If anyone_denies that pleasure is desirable, then_we can ask him, But_don't you_desire it? and we know_in advance that_he must_answer yes, and_consequently must admit that pleasure is_desirable. (MacIntyre 152)_Similarly, Śāntideva does not think anyone_is_seriously going to_dispute_that_suffering should_be prevented. If_they_really tried_to_dispute that, it would be just_for_the sake of argument, not because they_actually believe it. So_there_is no need to_argue against such an objection,_whereas there is a need to_argue against_the many_real people who would try to prevent only their own suffering_and not others'. 272 Lele, The_Metaphysical Basis of Śāntideva's_Ethics This,_then,_is a third_argument_from metaphysics_to ethics-this time from metaphysical selflessness to_ethical selflessness._Because the self is not real,_we should not privilege_it_over others. This argument became influential_in Tibet, but it was relatively_new with Śāntideva. It is_instructive,_for_example, to compare it to_the approach of Āryadeva and Candrakīrti_to self and_egotism. They too identify self as a_key_metaphysical error (as one might expect),_and_Āryadeva's first verse on the subject_sounds_similar_to Śāntideva's: "What wise person_would have pride in thinking 'I'_and'mine', since all objects in the cycle of existence_are common to_all embodied beings?" (Lang 186)._But_as_it turns out, in that text the pride ends up_being more_important than the_"I" and "mine." Āryadeva's argument, and Candrakīrti's commentary on it,_turn out in fact to