 introductions of the characters); the two stories mentioned may, of course, not describe the same worlds of fiction, but that is – given transworld identity – not necessary for the referent T H E T R U T H A B O U T S H E R L O C K H O L M E S 351 to be the same. For (7), it is perhaps best to interpret 'characters' as denoting possible objects and the sentence as making a claim about how those are being presented in the novels. Other cases may be trickier. 'Holmes is famous' arguably seems to predicate a property Holmes cannot have in a world in which he doesn't exist, yet is ostensibly a claim about the actual world. However, the sentence probably requires paraphrase on any view; on abstract artifact theories, for instance, Holmes is an existing abstract object, and abstract objects are not detectives and thus intuitively the wrong targets for ordinary ascriptions of fame. I think a case can be made even at an intuitive level that the ascription requires paraphrase – Holmes does not really have the property of fame in the same way, say, Caligula does. A possibilist could at least say that he is much talked and thought about, so a suitable paraphrase doesn't seem unachievable. 3.2. Fiction and counterfactuals Since fictional characters are possible individuals, and fictional stories represent series of events in possible worlds, the difference between fictional and counterfactual discourse is not a matter of semantic content or the ontological status of the truth-makers for the discourse. There is, of course, intuitive support for this. Although conversational markers like 'consider the following possibility' and 'once upon a time' conventionally serve to signal whether what follows is a counterfactual claim or a piece of fiction, respectively, it seems surprising – to say the least – that this would affect the nature of the proposition expressed by or metaphysical commitments of a subsequent utterance of 'there used to be life on Mars'. That doesn't mean that there is no difference. Counterfactual talk and fictional storytelling are distinguished by felicity constraints on utterances and rules for updating or managing one's beliefs relative to new information. Counterfactual talk should be constrained by the requirement that the worlds of the context set be potential candidates for being the actual world; that is, counterfactual talk is ultimately about the actual world, and utterances of counterfactuals are felicitous only to the
introductions of the characters); the two stories mentioned may, of path, not identify the same worlds of fiction, but that is – yield transworld identity – not necessary for the referent T H vitamin e T R uracil T H A bel O U metric ton S H E R L O coke K H O L M E S 351 to be the same. For (7), it is possibly best to interpret' character' as denote possible object and the sentence as making a claim about how those are being present in the novels. Other cases may be trickier.' Holmes is famous' arguably seem to predicate a property Holmes cannot have in a world in which he doesn't exist, yet is ostensibly a claim about the actual world. However, the sentence probably necessitate paraphrase on any view; on abstract artifact theories, for example, Holmes is an exist abstract object, and abstract objects are not detectives and therefore intuitively the wrong target for ordinary ascriptions of fame. I remember a case can be made even at an intuitive level that the ascription requires paraphrase – Holmes does not really have the property of fame in the same way, say, Caligula serve. A possibilist could at least order that he is much talked and thought about, so a suitable paraphrase doesn't seem unachievable. 3.2. fabrication and counterfactuals Since fictional characters are possible individuals, and fictional stories represent series of events in potential worlds, the difference between fictional and counterfactual discourse is not a matter of semantic message or the ontological status of the accuracy - makers for the discourse. There is, of course, intuitive accompaniment for this. Although conversational markers like' consider the following possibility' and' once upon a time' conventionally suffice to signal whether what follows is a counterfactual claim or a piece of fiction, respectively, it seems surprising – to say the least – that this would affect the nature of the proposition express by or metaphysical commitments of a subsequent utterance of' there used to be life sentence on Mars'. That doesn't mean that there is no dispute. Counterfactual talk and fictional storytelling are distinguished by felicity constraints on utterances and rules for updating or managing one's beliefs proportional to new information. Counterfactual lecture should be stiffen by the requirement that the worlds of the context set be potential candidates for being the actual universe; that is, counterfactual talk is ultimately about the actual world, and utterances of counterfactuals are felicitous entirely to the
 inhroductions of the charagters); the two stories mxntiones may, of course, not describe the samx woelds if fiction, but that is – given tgansworld ideitity – not necessary for the rsnerenc V H E T R U T H A B O U T S H E R L O C K H O L M E S 351 to be the same. For (7), it ys perhspd best to intetpret 'sharzbttrs' as denoting possible objects znd the sentence as kaking a claim about how tjose are being presentfd in the nivelf. Other cases may be trpekier. 'Holmea is famous' arguably seems to pfediccte a propetct Hlnmes cannot have in a world lm whicv he dorsn't exist, yet is osrensibly a claim abouv the actual world. Hjwever, tha aentence probably rwquirgs pasaphfqse on aiy biew; oj austract artjfact theorues, for instance, Hokmqw is an existjng abftwact object, and abstract objects are nou detsctives and thus intuituvely the wrong targejs for ordynary ascriptions of fame. I think a case can be mdde etev au qn ingyihive level that the ascription requires paraprdaxe – Holmes does kot really have thr orpkerty of fame kn the saje way, say, Caligulw does. W poswibilist soulc at least say that he is mych talked aud rhought about, so a suitable pcraphrsse dpesn't seem unachievable. 3.2. Fidtion and clunterfacfjals Since fictiunak wharacters are possible inqividuals, and fictioval xtorief represenh serlas of events in podsiblg worlgs, the difverence between fictional and counterfactual civcolrse is njt a katter of semwntic content pr the jntolugical stanus of thx truth-makerf for the diswlurse. There ms, of couwse, untuutive sjoport for this. Although conversatuonal markers like 'covaider the follocnnt possibility' amd 'uncq lpoi a tyke' conventiotallh sdtve tu signal whcthdr wnat follows is a coutterractual claim or a plece of fuction, rqspectively, iy seems surprising – to vay the keaft – that this would affect the nature ov tme propositiog exiresfed by or ketaphysical commitments of a subsequenv utterance of 'there uswd to be life on Mats'. Uhat doesn't mxan thwt there hs no difference. Coubterfactual talk snd fictional storytemling dre dlstinguished by felicity constraints on utterances and rules for updating or maiading one's bsliegs renacivz to ner inhocmation. Counterfabtual talk should be constrained by the sezuirement that the worlds of tfe context sej be potential candidates ror beinb the actual world; that is, counyerfactual talk is ultimstely abiut tge actlzl world, and utteranves of counrerfactyals are felicitojs pnpy to the
introductions of the characters); the two stories of not describe same worlds of given identity – not for the referent H E T R U T A B O U T S H E R L O C K O L M E S 351 to be the same. For (7), it perhaps to 'characters' denoting possible objects and the sentence as making a claim about how those are being presented the novels. Other cases may be trickier. 'Holmes famous' arguably seems to a property Holmes cannot have a in which doesn't yet ostensibly a claim the actual world. However, the sentence probably requires paraphrase on any view; on abstract artifact theories, for Holmes is abstract object, abstract are detectives and thus wrong targets for ordinary ascriptions of a case can be made even at an level that ascription requires paraphrase – Holmes does really have the property of fame in the way, say, Caligula does. A possibilist could at least say that he is much talked about, so a suitable doesn't seem unachievable. Fiction counterfactuals fictional are possible and fictional stories represent series of events in possible worlds, the between fictional and counterfactual discourse is not a matter of or ontological status of truth-makers for the discourse. is, course, intuitive support for conversational like possibility' 'once a time' conventionally serve signal whether what follows is counterfactual claim or a seems surprising – to say the least – this would affect the nature of the expressed by or metaphysical commitments of a subsequent utterance of 'there used be life That doesn't mean that there is no difference. talk and fictional storytelling distinguished by felicity constraints on utterances and rules for or one's beliefs to new information. talk should be by the requirement worlds of context be being the actual world; that is, talk ultimately about the actual world, utterances are felicitous only to the
 introductions of the charactErs); the two sTorieS meNtiOnEd maY, of cOurse, not descriBE the Same worlds of fiction, but That iS – gIVen tRAnSworlD identiTY – nOT NecEsSaRy fOr THe ReferEnt t H E T R U T h A B O U T S H E R l O C k H o L M E S 351 to be the SAmE. For (7), it is peRhaPs best to inteRprEt 'charAcTerS' As denOtiNg posSible oBJects aNd the sentEnCE as makINg a claiM ABoUt hoW those are being preSEnTEd in the novels. OTher caSeS MaY BE trIckIer. 'Holmes iS fAmous' ARguably SEeMS TO prEDicate a properTy Holmes canNOt hAve in a WoRld IN which He doeSn'T ExiSt, yet is osteNsibLy a claim aBout thE Actual wORld. HoweVer, the SenTenCe prOBaBlY reQuIRes PArAphRAse On any vieW; oN aBstraCt arTIFACt thEorIes, fOr insTance, Holmes is An eXistINg aBstraCt objEct, aNd AbstrAct objEcts aRe Not detectives anD thuS intuitivEly ThE wrOnG targETs for oRdiNarY ascripTions of FAme. i tHINK a Case can be made even aT aN INtUitive leVel thaT ThE aSCription ReQuiRes pARAphraSe – HoLMeS does not Really HAvE tHe propeRtY of famE iN thE saMe way, SAy, CaLigula Does. A posSibilISt could at least SAy that he is mucH TaLKEd ANd thOugHt about, so a sUitaBLe paRaphRAsE doESn't seEm unaChIEvABle. 3.2. Fiction and counteRfActualS SincE fictional chaRacters are POSSible indIvidUAlS, And fictional stOries Represent sERies of evEnts iN possiblE worlds, thE DIfferencE beTweEn fIctIONaL and counterfaCTUal dIsCourse iS noT a matteR of SemAntIc cOnTent or the OntologiCaL sTaTuS of The trUTh-makers FoR thE dIscOurse. tHere is, Of couRse, iNtUiTIve Support FOr THIs. AlThOuGh coNveRsAtionAl maRKerS like 'coNsider the FolLOwinG pOsSibilitY' and 'once upon a TiMe' conventiOnAllY serve TO Signal whEther what follows is a counTErfactuAl cLaim oR a piEce of fictIon, RespecTivELy, it seEms surPrisiNg – To sAY The leAST – tHat ThIs would affECT thE natuRe Of thE proposItion expressed by or MEtaPhysical commiTmeNts oF A SuBseQUeNT utTeRAncE OF 'there used to be lIfe on Mars'. THaT DoEsn't mean thAT thErE is no diFferencE. CounTErfactuAl talk and Fictional StOrytELLinG are distinGuished bY felicity COnstrAInTs on uTteRances AnD ruLes foR updatINg oR manaGing onE's BeliefS relaTiVe to new iNformation. CounterfactuaL talk sHould Be cOnstraineD by THe rEquiremenT thaT the worlds Of tHe cOntexT seT Be potEntiAL cAndIDates For bEIng the actUAl WorLD; ThAt is, counterFACTuaL talk Is uLTimateLy abOut the actual world, ANd utterances of CounTERfaCtuALs arE fElicitous only tO thE
 introductions of the char acters); t he tw o s tor ie s me ntio ned may, of co u rse,  not describe the same  worl ds of f i ct ion,but tha t  i s – g iv en  tr an s wo rld i den tity –not necess ary  f or the refer e nt  T H E T R  UT H A B O UT S  H E R  L  OC  K HO L  M ES 351t o be t he same.Fo r  (7),i t is pe r h ap s be st to interpret ' c ha r acters' as den otingpo s si b l e o bje cts and th esente n ce as m a ki n g a c l aim about how  those areb ein g pres en ted in the  nove ls .  Ot her cases m ay b e trickie r. 'Ho l mes isf amous'arguab lysee ms t o  p re dic at e  ap ro per t y H olmes ca nn ot  have  ina w o rldinwhic h hedoesn't exist , y et i s  os tensi bly a  cla im  abou t theactua lworld. However,  the  sentence  pr ob abl yrequi r es par aph ras e on an y view; onab s t r ac t artifact theorie s, f or  instanc e, Hol m es  i s  an exis ti ngabst r a ct ob ject ,  a nd abstr act ob j ec ts  are no tdetect iv esand  thus intu itivel y the wr ong t a rgets for ordi n ary ascriptio n so f  f a me.I t hink a case  can be m adee ve n a t  an i ntuit iv e  l e vel that the ascrip ti on req uires  paraphrase –  Holmes do e s not real ly h a ve the property o f fam e in the s a me way,say,Caligula  does. Ap o ssibilis t c oul d a t l e a st  say that hei s  muc htalkedand  though t a bou t,soasuitableparaphra se  d oe sn 'tseemu nachieva bl e.3. 2.Ficti o n andcount erfa ct ua l s S ince fi c ti o n al c ha ra cter s a re  poss ible ind ividual s, and fi cti o nalst or ies rep resent series  o f events i npos siblew o rlds, th e difference between fi c tionaland  coun terf actual di sco urse i s n o t a ma tter o f sem an tic c onten t or  th eontologica l sta tus o fthetruth-m akers for the disc o urs e. There is,ofcour s e ,int u it i vesu p por t for this. Altho ugh conver sa t io nal marker s  li ke  'consi der the  foll o wing po ssibility ' and 'on ce  upo n a t ime' conve ntionall y serve t o  sign a lwheth erwhat f ol low s isa coun t erf actua l clai mor a p ieceof  fiction , respectively, it seem s surp risin g –  to say t hel eas t – thatthis  would aff ect  th e nat ure of th e pr o po sit i on ex pres s ed by orm et aph y s ic al commitme n t s  of  a su bse q uent u tter ance of 'there us e d to be life o n Ma r s '.Tha t  doe sn 't mean that t her ei s  no diff er ence. Count erfactua lt alk a nd fic tional  storyt e l li n g aredist ing uished by  fe li c ity con st ra i nts on  utt er ancesand ru l es f o r  updating or man aging o ne'sb eli efs r el ative t o  new  informati on. Counter factua l ta lk sh ould be  c onstra ine dby the req u irement t hat t he worl ds  ofthe  conte xt s e t  be p oten ti alcandidate s fo r  b ei n g t he a ctual  w orld ; that is ,  counter fac t ual tal kisu l timate l ya b out the ac tua l wor l d , and utte r ance s  o f  coun terfac tualsare fel i cit ou s onlytot h e
 introductions_of the_characters); the two stories_mentioned may,_of_course, not_describe_the same worlds_of fiction, but_that is – given_transworld identity –_not_necessary for the referent T H E T R U T H A B_O_U T_S_H_E R L O C_K H O L M_E S_351 to be the same. For (7), it_is_perhaps best to_interpret 'characters' as denoting possible objects and the sentence_as making a claim about how_those are being_presented_in_the novels. Other cases_may be trickier. 'Holmes is famous'_arguably seems to predicate a property_Holmes cannot have in a world in_which he doesn't exist, yet is_ostensibly a claim about the_actual world._However, the sentence probably requires_paraphrase on any_view; on_abstract artifact theories,_for instance, Holmes is an existing_abstract object, and_abstract objects are not detectives and_thus_intuitively the wrong_targets_for_ordinary ascriptions_of fame. I_think_a case_can_be made even at an intuitive_level_that the ascription requires paraphrase – Holmes_does not really have_the_property of fame in_the same way, say, Caligula_does. A possibilist could at least_say that_he is_much talked and thought about, so a suitable paraphrase doesn't seem_unachievable. 3.2. Fiction and counterfactuals Since_fictional characters are possible_individuals, and_fictional_stories represent series_of_events in_possible worlds, the difference between fictional and_counterfactual discourse_is not a matter of semantic_content or the ontological_status_of the truth-makers for the discourse._There is, of course, intuitive support_for this. Although conversational markers_like_'consider_the following possibility' and 'once_upon a time' conventionally serve to_signal whether what_follows is a counterfactual claim or a_piece_of fiction, respectively, it seems surprising_–_to say the least – that_this_would_affect the nature of the_proposition expressed by or metaphysical commitments_of a subsequent utterance of 'there used to be_life on Mars'._That doesn't mean that there_is_no_difference. Counterfactual talk and fictional storytelling are distinguished by felicity_constraints on_utterances and rules_for updating or managing one's beliefs relative to new information._Counterfactual talk should be constrained by the_requirement that the worlds of the context set be potential candidates_for being the actual world; that is, counterfactual_talk is ultimately about the actual world,_and utterances of counterfactuals_are_felicitous only to the