 a unitary constellation of selves is implied: "Dasein is determined from the very outset by being-with-others" (p. 296). Even the I-thou relation is something made possible by a more primordial world correlation: "The basic condition for this possibility of the self's being a possible thou in being-with others is based on the circumstance that the Dasein as the self that it is, is such that it exists as being-in-the-world. For 'thou' means 'you who are with me in the world' " (pp. 297-98). Such a structure opens up the topology of ethical relations. Since "self" is not ontologically individuated in the strict sense, even the "mineness" of Dasein does not suggest a confinement to individual self-interest but rather an openness to the interests of others. The forthe-sake-of-itself of Dasein "does not assert ontically that the factual purpose of the facti cal Dasein is to care exclusively and primarily for itself and to use others as instruments (Werkzeug) toward this end" (p. 296). In fact selfhood as a world phenomenon is "the ontological presupposition for the selflessness in which every Dasein comports itself toward the other in the existent I-thou relationships" (p. 298). The idea that Dasein dwells with and in others helps us illuminate a phenomenon that is often addressed in ethics, namely, compassion. Some moral philosophers have made compassion the centerpiece of their ethics (e.g., Hume and Schopenhauer), and I think the notion of finite being-in-the-world can go a long way toward strengthening such reflections and opening up important possibilities for moral philosophy. Many of our values prescribe that we help others in need and refrain from abusing each other. The presence of compassion can be an effective force in living out these values (and its absence can account for not living them out). As shown in the words com-passion, sym-pathy. and Mit-leid, here we encounter an experience that "suffers-with," i.e., we share the pain of others. Compassion occurs when someone's misfortune actually touches us and alters our experience toward their pain and "calls" us in a visceral way to do something about it. The marvel of compassion is that the pain arises in us even when we
a unitary constellation of selves is implied: " Dasein is determine from the identical outset by being - with - others " (p. 296). Even the I - thou relation back is something make possible by a more primordial worldly concern correlation coefficient: " The basic condition for this possibility of the self's being a possible thou in being - with others is based on the context that the Dasein as the self that it is, is such that it exists as being - in - the - world. For' thou' means' you who are with me in the populace' " (pp. 297 - 98). Such a structure opens up the topology of ethical relations. Since " self " is not ontologically individuated in the rigorous sense, even the " mineness " of Dasein does not suggest a confinement to individual self - pastime but rather an openness to the interests of others. The forthe - sake - of - itself of Dasein " does not assert ontically that the actual purpose of the facti cal Dasein is to manage exclusively and primarily for itself and to use others as instrument (Werkzeug) toward this end " (p. 296). In fact selfhood as a world phenomenon is " the ontological presupposition for the selflessness in which every Dasein comports itself toward the other in the real I - thou relationships " (p. 298). The idea that Dasein dwells with and in others helps us illuminate a phenomenon that is often addressed in ethics, namely, compassion. Some moral philosopher have made compassion the centerpiece of their ethics (for example, Hume and Schopenhauer), and I remember the impression of finite being - in - the - world can go a long way toward strengthening such reflections and opening up important hypothesis for moral philosophy. Many of our values prescribe that we help others in need and refrain from pervert each other. The presence of compassion can be an effective force in living out these value (and its absence can report for not live them out). As shown in the words com - passion, sym - pathy. and Mit - leid, here we encounter an experience that " suffers - with, " i.e., we partake the pain of others. Compassion occurs when someone's misfortune actually touches us and alters our experience toward their pain and " calls " us in a visceral way to do something about it. The wonder of compassion is that the pain arises in us even when we
 a knitary constellation of selves is implnwd: "Dasxin is setermindd from the very outset by bxing-qith-oukers" (p. 296). Even the I-thuu relatiln is sonethmng made possiblx by a more prjlordnao world correlstion: "The tasic conditiot wox this possibility of the self's beind a posxihle thou in beyng-wptr otgvrw is based on the circumstancs that uhe Dasein as the xelf that it is, is such thwt ih exists as being-ij-the-world. Fir 'triu' means 'you who are wpch me in thg world' " (pp. 297-98). Such a structure opdns u' the topoligt ov ethical reoatiogs. Since "seln" is nod ontolpgically indivlduatxd ib the strict sense, evxn the "mineness" of Dwsein doev uot suggest a confinenebt to indhvidjql relr-iitedest bkt cather an olenness to rhe interests of otneww. The forthe-szke-of-iesqlf of Dasein "does not assert ontically thzt the factual purpose if the facti cal Daseln is to sare exclusively and primarily for itself and to gse ovhdrs af undtruments (Werkzeug) toward this end" (p. 296). In fact aekfmood as a world ihenomenon is "the pnhokjgical presupkositiou fkr the selflessnesd in whych ecery Daseyn cpmports itself toward the orher in the vxisrent I-thou relatiouships" (p. 298). Thz idea that Dasein dwells with and in kthers helpd us illujknate a phenomenun nhat is often addressed in ethycs, namelb, com'assion. Rome moral philosophfrs have made compassion the eentespiece of hheir ethics (e.g., Hume and Schopeiiauer), and I tnitk nhe notiou of flnite being-in-thq-world can go c long wcy towxrd strengnhening snch reflectijns and openith up importait possibylitues dor morxu philosophy. Msny of oug ralues prwscribe that we hekp ufhers in need aub twfrain from abisivg qabh ptrar. The presetce uf zpmpasrion can be xn egfective force in lieing out these values (snq its abwence cag account for not living them okt). As shuwn im tre words com-passion, sym-pathy. ahd Mit-leif, hcre we encouneer qn experiencz that "suffers-with," i.e., we share the pain if others. Compassiin occurs when somepke's misfortuie acttally touwhes us and alters oyr experience towsrd their pain and "camls" us in a visceral way to do something about it. The marvel of compassion is that tye paii wrises in ua evrn whvn ce
a unitary constellation of selves is implied: determined the very by being-with-others" (p. is made possible by more primordial world "The basic condition for this possibility the self's being a possible thou in being-with others is based on the that the Dasein as the self that it is, is such that it as For means who are with me in the world' " (pp. 297-98). Such a structure opens up the of ethical relations. Since "self" is not ontologically in the strict sense, the "mineness" of Dasein does suggest confinement to self-interest rather openness to the of others. The forthe-sake-of-itself of Dasein "does not assert ontically that the factual purpose of the facti Dasein is exclusively and for and use others as toward this end" (p. 296). In a world phenomenon is "the ontological presupposition for selflessness in every Dasein comports itself toward the in the existent I-thou relationships" (p. 298). The that Dasein dwells with and in others helps us illuminate a phenomenon that is often ethics, namely, compassion. Some philosophers have made the of ethics Hume and and I think the notion of finite being-in-the-world can go a way toward strengthening such reflections and opening up important possibilities philosophy. of our values that we help others need refrain from abusing each presence compassion effective in out these values (and absence can account for not them out). As shown and Mit-leid, here we encounter an experience that i.e., we share the pain of others. occurs when someone's misfortune actually touches us and alters our experience toward pain and in a visceral way to do something about The marvel of compassion that the pain arises in us even when we
 a unitary constellation of seLves is implIed: "DaSeiN is DeTermIned From the very outSEt by Being-with-others" (p. 296). Even thE I-thoU rELatiON iS someThing maDE pOSSibLe By A moRe PRiMordiAl wOrld corRelation: "ThE baSiC condition foR ThIs possibilIty Of the self's beIng A possiBlE thOU in beIng-With oThers iS Based oN the circuMsTAnce thAT the DasEIN aS the Self that it is, is sucH ThAT it exists as beiNg-in-thE-wORlD. fOr 'tHou' Means 'you whO aRe witH Me in the WOrLD' " (PP. 297-98). SuCH a structure opEns up the topOLogY of ethIcAl rELationS. SincE "sELf" iS not ontologIcalLy individUated iN The striCT sense, eVen the "MinEneSs" of dAsEiN doEs NOt sUGgEst A ConFinement To InDividUal sELF-INterEst But rAther An openness to tHe iNterESts Of othErs. ThE forThE-sake-Of-itseLf of DAsEin "does not asserT ontIcally thaT thE fActUaL purpOSe of thE faCti Cal DaseIn is to cARe eXcLUSIvEly and primarily for ItSELf And to use Others AS iNsTRuments (WErKzeUg) toWARd thiS end" (P. 296). in Fact selfHood as A WoRlD phenomEnOn is "thE oNtoLogIcal pREsupPositiOn for the SelflESsness in which eVEry Dasein compORtS ITsELf toWarD the other in The eXIsteNt I-tHOu RelATionsHips" (p. 298). thE IdEA that Dasein dwells wiTh And in oThers Helps us illumiNate a phenoMENOn that is OfteN AdDRessed in ethics, NamelY, compassioN. some moraL philOsophers Have made cOMPassion tHe cEntErpIecE OF tHeir ethics (e.g., HUME and scHopenhaUer), And I thiNk tHe nOtiOn oF fInite beinG-in-the-woRlD cAn Go A loNg way TOward strEnGthEnIng Such rEFlectiOns anD opeNiNg UP imPortant POsSIBiliTiEs For mOraL pHilosOphy. mAny Of our vaLues prescRibE That We HeLp otherS in need and refRaIn from abusInG eaCh otheR. tHe presenCe of compassion can be an efFEctive fOrcE in liVing Out these vAluEs (and iTs aBSence cAn accoUnt foR nOt lIVIng thEM OuT). As ShOwn in the woRDS coM-passIoN, sym-Pathy. anD Mit-leid, here we encoUNteR an experience ThaT "sufFERs-WitH," I.e., WE shArE The PAIn of others. CompaSsion occurS wHEn Someone's miSForTuNe actuaLly toucHes us ANd alterS our experIence towaRd TheiR PAin And "calls" us In a visceRal way to dO SometHInG abouT it. the marVeL of CompaSsion iS ThaT the pAin ariSeS in us eVen whEn We
 a unitary constellation o f selves i s imp lie d:"D asei n is  determined fr o m th e very outset by being -with -o t hers "  ( p. 29 6). Eve n  t h e  I- th ou  re la t io n issom ethingmade possi ble  b y a more pri m or dial world  co rrelation: " The  basic  c ond i tionfor  this  possi b ilityof the se lf ' s bein g  a poss i b le  tho u in being-with o t he r s is based onthe ci rc u ms t a nce  th at the Das ei n ast he self th a t iti s, is such th at it exist s  as  being -i n-t h e-worl d. Fo r' tho u' means 'y ou w ho are wi th mei n the w o rld' "(pp. 2 97- 98) . Su c hastr uc t ure op ens upthe topo lo gy  of e thic a l r elat ion s. S ince"self" is not  on tolo g ica lly i ndivi duat ed  in t he str ict s en se, even the "m inen ess" of D ase in  do es  nots uggest  acon finemen t to in d ivi du a l se lf-interest but ra th e r  a n openne ss tot he  i n terestsof  ot hers . The f orth e -s ake-of-i tselfo fDa sein "d oe s notas ser t o ntica l ly t hat th e factua l pur p ose of the fac t i cal Daseini st o  c a re e xcl usively and  pri m aril y fo r  i tse l f and  to u se ot h ers as instruments(W erkzeu g) to ward this end " (p. 296) . I n fact s elfh o od as a world phe nomen on is "the ontologi cal p resuppos ition for t he selfl ess nes s i n w h i ch  every Dasein c ompo rt s itsel f t oward t heoth erinth e existen t I-thou  r el at io nsh ips"( p. 298).  T heid eathatD aseindwell s wi th  a n d i n other s  h e l ps u sil lumi nat ea phe nome n onthat is  often ad dre s sedin  e thics,namely, compa ss ion. Somemo ral  philo s o phers ha ve made compassion thec enterpi ece  of t heir  ethics ( e.g ., Hum e a n d Scho penhau er),an d I t hinkt h enot io n of finit e bei ng-in -t he-w orld ca n go a long way to w ard  strengthenin g s uchr e fl ect i on s  an do pen i n g up importantpossibilit ie s  f or moral p h ilo so phy. Ma ny of o ur va l ues pre scribe th at we hel pothe r s  in  need andrefrainfrom abus i ng ea c hother . T he pre se nce  of c ompass i oncan b e an e ff ective  forc ein livin g out these values (and  its a bsenc e c an accoun t f o r n ot living  the m out). As  sh own  in t hew ordscom- p as sio n , sym -pat h y. and Mi t -l eid , he re we encou n t e r a n exp eri e nce th at " suffers-with," i. e ., we share th e pa i n  of  ot h ers.  C ompassion occu rswh e n  someone 's  misfortune  actuall yt ouche s us a nd alt ers our e xp e rience  tow ard  their pa inan d  "calls "us in a v isce ra l wayto dos omet h i ng about it. The  marv e l  of c o mpa ssion  i s thatt he p ain arises  in us even  whenwe
 a_unitary constellation_of selves is implied:_"Dasein is_determined_from the_very_outset by being-with-others"_(p. 296). Even_the I-thou relation is_something made possible_by_a more primordial world correlation: "The basic condition for this possibility of the self's_being_a possible_thou_in_being-with others is based on_the circumstance that the Dasein_as the_self that it is, is such that it_exists_as being-in-the-world. For_'thou' means 'you who are with me in the_world' " (pp. 297-98). Such a_structure opens up_the_topology_of ethical relations. Since_"self" is not ontologically individuated in_the strict sense, even the "mineness"_of Dasein does not suggest a confinement_to individual self-interest but rather an_openness to the interests of_others. The_forthe-sake-of-itself of Dasein "does not_assert ontically that_the factual_purpose of the_facti cal Dasein is to care_exclusively and primarily_for itself and to use others_as_instruments (Werkzeug) toward_this_end"_(p. 296)._In fact selfhood_as_a world_phenomenon_is "the ontological presupposition for the_selflessness_in which every Dasein comports itself toward_the other in the_existent_I-thou relationships" (p. 298)._The idea that Dasein dwells_with and in others helps us_illuminate a_phenomenon that_is often addressed in ethics, namely, compassion. Some moral philosophers have_made compassion the centerpiece of their_ethics (e.g., Hume and_Schopenhauer), and_I_think the notion_of_finite being-in-the-world_can go a long way toward strengthening_such reflections_and opening up important possibilities for_moral philosophy. Many of_our_values prescribe that we help others_in need and refrain from abusing_each other. The presence of_compassion_can_be an effective force in_living out these values (and its_absence can account_for not living them out). As shown_in_the words com-passion, sym-pathy. and Mit-leid,_here_we encounter an experience that "suffers-with,"_i.e.,_we_share the pain of others._Compassion occurs when someone's misfortune actually_touches us and alters our experience toward their pain_and "calls" us_in a visceral way to_do_something_about it. The marvel of compassion is that the pain_arises in_us even when_we