 a sheep in another part of the field; S's evidence is misleading, but someone else in the office owns a Ford. Not all abnormalities undermine the salience of cognitive character, however. For example, an unlikely coincidence reminds the detective of evidence he has neglected, and this missing piece of the puzzle allows him to solve the crime. Less dramatically, an unusual noise causes someone to turn her head, and something else comes into plain view. We would like an account of which abnormalities undermine the salience of character in the explanation of true belief and which do not. Here is a suggestion that seems to handle the above cases well: abnormalities in the way one gets one's evidence do not undermine credit, whereas abnormalities regarding the way one gets a true belief, given that one has the evidence that one does, do undermine credit. Put another way, in cases where something unusual does take away the salience of character, it seems just a matter of good luck that S ends up with a true belief, even given that she has the evidence that she does.xxxi We may understand this point in a way that generalizes to other kinds of credit: we may say that, in general, situational luck does not undermine credit. In other words, luck in the way that one gets into one's situation does not undermine credit for what one does once in that situation. This, I take it, is one of the lessons of the literature on moral luck. A general prohibition on luck shrinks the sphere of moral responsibility to nothing, and hence an adequate theory of moral responsibility must allow for the influence of some kinds of luck but not others.xxxii In sum, the present account goes some way toward explicating the content and pragmatics of knowledge attributions, although we must recognize that it does not go all the way. It goes some way because it analyzes knowledge in terms of credit attribution and credit attribution in terms of the content and pragmatics of causal explanations. It does not go all the way, however, because the pragmatics of causal explanations, and especially those concerning the salience of partial causes, are not fully understood. For example, the account given above in this regard is clearly only a partial account.xxxiii Nevertheless, our intuitions about knowledge seem to follow our intuitions about 21 causal explanation: In cases of knowledge, we think that S believes the truth because she is reliable, whereas in Gettier cases we think that S's believing the truth must be explained in some other way. 6.
a sheep in another part of the field; S's evidence is misleading, but someone else in the office own a Ford. Not all abnormality undermine the salience of cognitive character, however. For case, an improbable coincidence reminds the detective of evidence he has neglect, and this lacking piece of the puzzle allows him to solve the crime. Less dramatically, an unusual noise induce someone to turn her head, and something else do into plain view. We would like an account of which abnormalities undermine the salience of fictional character in the explanation of true belief and which do not. Here is a hypnotism that seems to handle the above cases well: abnormalities in the manner one gets one's evidence do not undermine credit, whereas abnormalities regarding the direction one gets a true belief, given that one has the evidence that one does, do undermine credit. Put another way, in cases where something unusual does take away the salience of character, it seems just a matter of good fortune that S end up with a true impression, even render that she has the evidence that she does.xxxi We may sympathize this point in a way that generalizes to other kinds of credit: we may say that, in general, situational fortune does not undermine credit. In other words, luck in the way that one gets into one's situation does not undermine credit for what one does once in that situation. This, I take it, is one of the moral of the literature on moral luck. A cosmopolitan prohibition on fortune shrivel the sphere of moral responsibility to nothing, and hence an adequate theory of moral responsibility must allow for the influence of some kinds of fortune but not others.xxxii In sum, the present report goes some way toward explicate the content and pragmatic sanction of knowledge attributions, although we must recognize that it does not go all the way. It go some way because it analyze knowledge in term of credit attribution and credit attribution in terms of the content and pragmatics of causal explanation. It does not go all the means, however, because the pragmatics of causal explanations, and especially those concerning the salience of partial cause, are not fully understood. For exercise, the account given above in this esteem is clearly only a partial account.xxxiii however, our intuitions about knowledge seem to follow our intuitions about 21 causal explanation: In cases of knowledge, we think that S believe the accuracy because she is authentic, whereas in Gettier cases we think that S's believing the truth must be explained in some early way. 6.
 a dheep in another part of the field; S's erudence is mialeading, but someone else in the offmce iwns q Ford. Not all abnormauities unfermine rhe wqlience of cognitiyz chadwctex, iowever. For exakple, an unnikely coincidanze reminds the detective of evidence re has mehlected, and thys mpsfing iitce of the puzzle allows him to sklve tht crime. Less dramayically, an unusual noise cwused someone to turn jer head, ane soiwthing else zomes into plain view. Se would like an account of whizh abuormalities ubdegkine the saoiencv of charactev in tha explamation of true benied and which do not. Hece is a suggestion trat seems tk handle the abovw xases weln: abvirmxliuiex jn the wab one gets kne's evidenxe do not undermine cwvcit, whereas zbnormwlyties regarding the way one gets a true bemief, given that one has the evidence that ong does, do tndermine credit. Put another way, in cases where smmethmne uumfjql does take away the salience of character, it fseks just a matter of good luvk tnwt S ends up dith a trhe belief, even givfn that she yas the edidemce that she does.xxxi We mat understand rhis point in a wav that generclizes to oyher kinds of credit: we may say that, ij general, rituational luck dovs nmt undermine credit. In othqr words, ouck in the way that jne gets ijto oka's situation does jot uudermhne credit for what one does once in that situation. Thix, H tdke it, if one of the lessogs of the litetature on morau luck. A gvneral prmhibition og luck shrinkv the sphere mf moral responsubility go nothing, and hence an adequate rheory of moral rexpovaibility must aoloq for the influrncd os doke ninds of lucn bug nuy othdrs.xxxii In rum, yhe present account coes some way toward ecpjicating the coneent and pragkatics of knowledgt attrmbutiois, altnoudh we must recognize that it dkes not gl ajl the way. Ie gocs sjme way beeause it analyzes knowledge in terms of rredit attribution and xredit attribution nn terms of tie coneent and [ragmatics of causal explanations. It coes not go all the wzy, howaver, hecause the pragmatics of causal explanations, and especially those concerbing tie salience or pattial ccuszs, are got huuly understood. Fpr example, the account given abuve in tvif regard is clearly only a psrgial account.xbxiii Nevertheless, our ihtuitionx about knowledge seem to folloe our intuitions about 21 gausal explanafion: In cares of knowledge, wr thinn thar S belueved the truth bdcaisc she is rfliaule, whereas in Gettier cases we thibk thar D's believing the truth must ne expmained in some other wzy. 6.
a sheep in another part of the evidence misleading, but else in the all undermine the salience cognitive character, however. example, an unlikely coincidence reminds the of evidence he has neglected, and this missing piece of the puzzle allows to solve the crime. Less dramatically, an unusual noise causes someone to turn head, something comes plain view. We would like an account of which abnormalities undermine the salience of character in explanation of true belief and which do not. is a suggestion that to handle the above cases abnormalities the way gets evidence not undermine credit, abnormalities regarding the way one gets a true belief, given that one has the evidence that one do undermine another way, cases something does take away of character, it seems just a luck that S ends up with a true even given she has the evidence that she We may understand this point in a way generalizes to other kinds of credit: we may say that, in general, situational luck does credit. In other words, in the way one into situation not undermine for what one does once in that situation. This, I take is one of the lessons of the literature on moral general on luck shrinks sphere of moral responsibility nothing, hence an adequate theory responsibility allow of kinds luck but not others.xxxii sum, the present account goes way toward explicating the attributions, although we must recognize that it does go all the way. It goes some because it analyzes knowledge in terms of credit attribution and credit attribution terms of and pragmatics of causal explanations. It does not all the way, however, the pragmatics of causal explanations, and especially those concerning salience partial causes, not fully understood. example, the account above in this clearly only partial Nevertheless, knowledge seem to follow our intuitions 21 explanation: In cases of knowledge, think believes the truth because she is reliable, whereas in Gettier cases we think that S's truth must be explained some way. 6.
 a sheep in another part of the fIeld; S's evidEnce iS miSleAdIng, bUt soMeone else in the OFficE owns a Ford. Not all abnormAlitiEs UNderMInE the sAlience OF cOGNitIvE cHarAcTEr, HowevEr. FOr exampLe, an unlikeLy cOiNcidence remiNDs The detectiVe oF evidence he hAs nEglectEd, And THis miSsiNg pieCe of thE Puzzle Allows him To SOlve thE Crime. LeSS DrAmatIcally, an unusual noISe CAuses someone to Turn heR hEAd, AND soMetHing else coMeS into PLain vieW. we WOULd lIKe an account of Which abnormALitIes undErMinE The salIence Of CHarActer in the eXplaNation of tRue belIEf and whICh do not. here is A suGgeStioN ThAt SeeMs TO haNDlE thE AboVe cases wElL: aBnormAlitIES IN the Way One gEts onE's evidence do nOt uNderMIne CrediT, wherEas aBnOrmalIties rEgardInG the way one gets a True Belief, givEn tHaT onE hAs the EVidencE thAt oNe does, dO undermINe cReDIT. puT another way, in cases WhERE sOmething UnusuaL DoEs TAke away tHe SalIencE OF charActeR, It Seems jusT a mattER oF gOod luck ThAt S endS uP wiTh a True bELief, Even giVen that sHe has THe evidence that SHe does.xxxi We mAY uNDErSTand ThiS point in a waY thaT GeneRaliZEs To oTHer kiNds of CrEDiT: We may say that, in generAl, SituatIonal Luck does not unDermine creDIT. in other wOrds, LUcK In the way that onE gets Into one's siTUation doEs not UnderminE credit foR WHat one doEs oNce In tHat SITuAtion. This, I takE IT, is oNe Of the leSsoNs of the LitEraTurE on MoRal luck. A gEneral prOhIbItIoN on Luck sHRinks the SpHerE oF moRal reSPonsibIlity To noThInG, And Hence an ADeQUAte tHeOrY of mOraL rEsponSibiLIty Must allOw for the iNflUEnce Of SoMe kinds Of luck but not oThErs.xxxii In SuM, thE preseNT Account gOes some way toward explicaTIng the cOntEnt anD praGmatics of KnoWledge AttRIbutioNs, althOugh wE mUst RECogniZE ThAt iT dOes not go alL THe wAy. It gOeS somE way becAuse it analyzes knowLEdgE in terms of creDit AttrIBUtIon ANd CRedIt ATtrIBUtion in terms of tHe content aNd PRaGmatics of cAUsaL eXplanatIons. It dOes noT Go all thE way, howevEr, because ThE praGMAtiCs of causal ExplanatIons, and esPEcialLY tHose cOncErning ThE saLiencE of parTIal CauseS, are noT fUlly unDerstOoD. For examPle, the account given above In this RegarD is Clearly onLy a PArtIal accounT.xxxIii NeverthEleSs, oUr intUitIOns abOut kNOwLedGE seem To foLLow our intUItIonS ABoUt 21 causal expLANAtiOn: In cAseS Of knowLedgE, we think that S beliEVes the truth becAuse SHE is RelIAble, WhEreas in Gettier CasEs WE Think thaT S'S believing tHe truth mUsT Be expLained In some Other waY. 6.
 a sheep in another part o f the fiel d; S' s e vid en ce i s mi sleading, buts omeo ne else in the officeownsaF ord. No t all  abnorm a li t i esun de rmi ne th e sal ien ce of c ognitive c har ac ter, however .  F or example , a n unlikely c oin cidenc erem i nds t hedetec tive o f  evide nce he ha sn eglect e d, andt h is  mis sing piece of the pu z zle allows him  to so lv e  t h e  cr ime . Less dra ma tical l y, an u n us u a l  no i se causes som eone to tur n  he r head ,and someth ing e ls e  co mes into pl ainview. Wewouldl ike ana ccountof whi chabn orma l it ie s u nd e rmi n ethe sal ience of  c ha racte r in t h e  exp lan atio n oftrue belief a ndwhic h  do  not.  Here  isasugge stionthatse ems to handle t he a bove case s w el l:ab norma l itiesinthe  way on e getso ne' se v i de nce do not undermi ne c re dit, whe reas a b no rm a lities r eg ard ingt h e way  one ge ts a tru e beli e f,  g iven th at  one h as  th e e viden c e th at one  does, d o und e rmine credit.P ut another wa y ,i n  c a seswhe re somethin g un u sual  doe s  t ake awaythe s al i en c e of character, itse ems ju st amatter of goo d luck tha t S  ends up  wit h  a true belief, e ven g iven thats he has t he ev idence t hat she d o e s.xxxi W e m ayund ers t a nd  this point i n a wa ythat ge ner alizestooth erkin ds  of credi t: we ma ysa yth at,  in g e neral, s it uat io nal  luck does n ot un derm in ec red it. Ino th e r  wor ds ,luck  in  t he wa y th a t o ne gets  into one 'ss itua ti on  does n ot underminecr edit for w ha t o ne doe s once inthat situation. This, I take it , i s one  ofthe lesso nsof the  li t eratur e on m orallu ck. A  gene r a lpro hi bition onl u ckshrin ks  the  sphere  of moral responsi b ili ty to nothing , a nd h e n ce  an ad e qua te the o r y of moral resp onsibility  m u st  allow for the  i nfluenc e of so me ki n ds of l uck but n ot others .x xxii I n s um, the pr esent ac count goe s  some wa y tow ard  expli ca tin g the  conte n t a nd pr agmati cs  of kn owled ge  attribu tions, although we must  recog nizetha t it does  no t  go  all theway.  It goes s ome  wa y bec aus e  it a naly z es  kn o wledg e in terms ofc re dit a tt ribution an d c red it at tri b utionin t erms of the conte n t and pragmati cs o f cau sal expl an ations. It doe s n ot g o all th eway, howeve r, becau se the p ragmat ics of  causal e xp l anatio ns,and  especial lyth o se conc er ni n g thesali en ce ofpartia l  cau s e s, are not fully  unde r s tood. For  exam pl e, thea ccou nt given a bove in thi s rega rd i s cle arly on ly  a par tia laccount.xx x iii Never thele ss, our  i ntui tio ns abo ut k n o wledg e se em  to  follow o u r  i n tu it i ons  abo ut 21  c ausa l explana t ion: Incas e s of kn ow led g e , we t h in k that S bel iev es th e truth beca u se s h ei s rel iable,  where as in G e tti er  caseswet h ink thatS's belie v ing  t he t ruth mus tbe e xp lai ne d in some other  way. 6. 
 a_sheep in_another part of the_field; S's_evidence_is misleading,_but_someone else in_the office owns_a Ford. Not all_abnormalities undermine the_salience_of cognitive character, however. For example, an unlikely coincidence reminds the detective of evidence_he_has neglected,_and_this_missing piece of the puzzle_allows him to solve the_crime. Less_dramatically, an unusual noise causes someone to turn_her_head, and something_else comes into plain view. We would like an_account of which abnormalities undermine the_salience of character_in_the_explanation of true belief_and which do not. Here is_a suggestion that seems to handle_the above cases well: abnormalities in the_way one gets one's evidence do_not undermine credit, whereas abnormalities_regarding the_way one gets a true_belief, given that_one has_the evidence that_one does, do undermine credit. Put_another way, in_cases where something unusual does take_away_the salience of_character,_it_seems just_a matter of_good_luck that_S_ends up with a true belief,_even_given that she has the evidence that_she does.xxxi We may_understand_this point in a_way that generalizes to other_kinds of credit: we may say_that, in_general, situational_luck does not undermine credit. In other words, luck in the_way that one gets into one's_situation does not undermine_credit for_what_one does once_in_that situation._This, I take it, is one of_the lessons_of the literature on moral luck._A general prohibition on_luck_shrinks the sphere of moral responsibility_to nothing, and hence an adequate_theory of moral responsibility must_allow_for_the influence of some kinds_of luck but not others.xxxii In_sum, the present_account goes some way toward explicating the_content_and pragmatics of knowledge attributions, although_we_must recognize that it does not_go_all_the way. It goes some_way because it analyzes knowledge in_terms of credit attribution and credit attribution in terms_of the content_and pragmatics of causal explanations._It_does_not go all the way, however, because the pragmatics of_causal explanations,_and especially those_concerning the salience of partial causes, are not fully understood._For example, the account given above in_this regard is clearly only a partial account.xxxiii Nevertheless, our intuitions_about knowledge seem to follow our intuitions about_21 causal explanation: In cases of knowledge,_we think that S_believes_the truth because she is reliable, whereas_in_Gettier_cases_we think that_S's believing the_truth must be_explained in_some other way._6.