 also need to supplement that change for instance with plausible stories of how the tanks got there. That 'there are no tanks outside the depicted area' is true of the actual world does not mean that notanks worlds are closer when we also make the background changes needed to get them there – in the closest worlds in which England is invaded, for instance, the invaders presumably employ more than n tanks. Since there seems to be many equally plausible background stories, it is indeterminate what is the case outside of the depicted area. One upshot is that it will be difficult to provide a formal measure of closeness; a proper definition that takes into account plausible background histories (or consequences) would presumably require a formalization of relevance and probably a solution to some version of the frame problem. Fortunately, for the purposes for which we need truth-in-fiction – to interpret and fill in blanks in a reasonably systematic way – we don't need a formal criterion, but can be rather pragmatic about the matter. The less precise the measure for closeness is, the more claims will end up neither true nor false in the story, but it is not clear why that would be a bad thing. 8 Proudfoot's primary point, though, is that possibilism cannot respect the boundedness of such fictions; i.e. exclude from being true-in-the-fiction any fact beyond the boundaries. She is right that possibilists cannot (easily) recognize such bounds, but as argued above this is not something that should worry them. 9 The discussion of similarity relations is vast, and I cannot go into details (see Lewis 1979 for some considerations). Using closeness for truth-in-fiction does of course assume that some ordering can be achieved, but unlike other issues for which closeness matters (counterfactuals, perhaps verisimilitude) we don't need it to be very finegrained. 360 F R E D R I K H A R A L D S E N Closeness still yields precision enough in the vast majority of cases to use it as a tool for interpreting fictions. 4.2.2. Competing models The challenges to realism raised by Everett (2005) require further refinements. Consider fictions where it is unclear whether certain characters actually occur, such as Tatyana Tolstaya's The Slynx, in which "in the end, I think, it is pretty much left open whether or not there really is a Slynx" (E
also need to supplement that change for case with plausible floor of how the tanks got there. That' there are no tank outside the depicted area' is on-key of the actual worldly concern does not mean that notanks universe are closer when we also take the background change needed to get them there – in the closest worlds in which England is invaded, for instance, the invader presumably employ more than n tanks. Since there appear to be many equally plausible background report, it is indeterminate what is the case outside of the picture area. One upshot is that it will be difficult to provide a formal measurement of closeness; a proper definition that takes into account plausible background histories (or consequence) would presumably require a formalization of relevance and probably a solution to some version of the frame problem. Fortunately, for the purposes for which we need truth - in - fiction – to interpret and occupy in blanks in a reasonably taxonomic direction – we don't want a formal criterion, but can be preferably pragmatic about the matter. The less precise the measure for meanness is, the more claims will end up neither true nor false in the story, but it is not clear why that would be a bad matter. 8 Proudfoot's primary point, though, is that possibilism cannot respect the boundedness of such fictions; i.e. exclude from being true - in - the - fiction any fact beyond the boundary. She is right that possibilists cannot (easily) recognize such bounds, but as argued above this is not something that should concern them. 9 The discussion of similarity relations is vast, and I cannot go into details (see Lewis 1979 for some considerations). Using closeness for truth - in - fabrication does of course assume that some ordering can be achieved, but unlike other emergence for which closeness count (counterfactuals, perhaps verisimilitude) we don't need it to be very finegrained. 360 F R E five hundred R I K H A R A L D S E N Closeness still concede precision enough in the vast majority of cases to use it as a tool for interpreting fictions. 4.2.2. Competing model The challenges to realism raise by Everett (2005) require further refinements. Consider fictions where it is unclear whether certain character actually occur, such as Tatyana Tolstaya's The Slynx, in which " in the end, I think, it is pretty much left exposed whether or not there in truth is a Slynx " (vitamin e
 aldo need to supplement thxt change for iuwtance with llausibld stories of how the tanks glt thert. That 'there are no tanks ounside the depmcted area' is trns of thc acthwl wmcld does not mesn that nodanks worlds ase cposer when we also make the backgrotnd chamgfs needed to ggt thtm ehers – in the closest worlds in which Sngland is invaded, fpr instance, the invaders pgesulably employ more hhan n tankw. Sigxe there seeos to be many equally klausible background stories, it ks inbeterminate wyat hs the case outspde of the deipcted asea. One upshot is thab it xill be difficult to provmde a formal measure of closeteas; a proper definutuon tvat daker ingo zcrouht plaksiule backgrohnd historiws (or consequences) eotod presumably requiwe a formalization of relevance and probatly a solution to some verwion of the frame prohlem. Forttnately, for the purposes for which we need truth-it-fictmov – uo intefprft and fill in blanks in a reasonably systemaejc wsy – we don't necd a formal criterooj, not can be rathgr pragmatjc about the matteg. The lgss prwcise the meaxure for closeness is, the mire claims wpll wnd up neither truz nor false nn the storu, but it is not clear wky thaf would be w bad thihe. 8 Proudfoot's prkmagy pmint, though, is that possibylism caniot rzspect tfe bpundedgess of sufh figdions; i.e. exclude fgom bging tsue-in-the-fiftion any fact beyond the boundecies. She is rogvt nhat possnbilisbs cannot (easilr) recognize sueh boundf, but as argued above vhis is not fomething thad should worrb them. 9 Tre duscuwsion ow similarity rekations is vast, and I cannot go into vetakms (see Lewis 1979 fir wome consideratoonr). Ufijg cjmseness for drutf-in-woctiov does of cijrse assume that some orgerihg can be achieved, bmt unlike other ifsues for whivh closeness mattegs (connterfectualx, pgrhaps verisimilitude) we don't nsed it to be very finegrwinee. 360 F R E D R I K H A R A L D S E N Closeness still bields precision enough in the vast majorijy pf cases to use yt as a tmol for interpreting fictions. 4.2.2. Competlng models The challenfes to reallsm raised by Everett (2005) require further refinements. Consider fictions wherw it is unclear whsthet cernaiu ckaractews artnally occur, such ss Tatyana Tolstaya's The Slynx, mn which "it che end, I think, it is pretty kuzh left open dhether or not there reamly is a Slynx" (E
also need to supplement that change for plausible of how tanks got there. outside depicted area' is of the actual does not mean that notanks worlds closer when we also make the background changes needed to get them there in the closest worlds in which England is invaded, for instance, the invaders employ than tanks. there seems to be many equally plausible background stories, it is indeterminate what is the case of the depicted area. One upshot is that will be difficult to a formal measure of closeness; proper that takes account background (or consequences) would require a formalization of relevance and probably a solution to some version of the frame problem. Fortunately, the purposes we need – interpret fill in blanks reasonably systematic way – we don't criterion, but can be rather pragmatic about the The less the measure for closeness is, the claims will end up neither true nor false the story, but it is not clear why that would be a bad thing. 8 point, though, is that cannot respect the of fictions; exclude being true-in-the-fiction fact beyond the boundaries. She is right that possibilists cannot (easily) such bounds, but as argued above this is not something worry 9 The discussion similarity relations is vast, I go into details (see for considerations). truth-in-fiction of assume that some ordering be achieved, but unlike other for which closeness matters need it to be very finegrained. 360 F E D R I K H A A L D S E N Closeness still yields precision enough in vast majority to use it as a tool for interpreting 4.2.2. Competing models The to realism raised by Everett (2005) require further refinements. fictions it is whether certain characters occur, such as Tolstaya's The Slynx, "in the I it left open whether or not there is Slynx" (E
 also need to supplement that cHange for inStancE wiTh pLaUsibLe stOries of how the tANks gOt there. That 'there are no tAnks oUtSIde tHE dEpictEd area' iS TrUE Of tHe AcTuaL wORlD does Not Mean thaT notanks woRldS aRe closer when WE aLso make the BacKground changEs nEeded tO gEt tHEm theRe – iN the cLosest WOrlds iN which EngLaND is invADed, for iNSTaNce, tHe invaders presumaBLy EMploy more than n Tanks. SInCE tHERe sEemS to be many eQuAlly pLAusible BAcKGROunD Stories, it is inDeterminate WHat Is the cAsE ouTSide of The dePiCTed Area. One upshOt is That it wilL be difFIcult to PRovide a Formal MeaSurE of cLOsEnEss; A pROpeR DeFinITioN that takEs InTo accOunt PLAUSiblE baCkgrOund hIstories (or conSeqUencES) woUld prEsumaBly rEqUire a FormalIzatiOn Of relevance and pRobaBly a solutIon To SomE vErsioN Of the fRamE prOblem. FoRtunateLY, foR tHE PUrPoses for which we neeD tRUTh-In-fictioN – to intERpReT And fill iN bLanKs in A REasonAbly SYsTematic wAy – we doN'T nEeD a formaL cRiteriOn, But Can Be ratHEr prAgmatiC about thE mattER. The less precisE The measure for CLoSENeSS is, tHe mOre claims wiLl enD Up neItheR TrUe nOR falsE in thE sTOrY, But it is not clear why tHaT would Be a baD thing. 8 ProudfoOt's primary POINt, though, Is thAT pOSsibilism cannoT respEct the bounDEdness of Such fIctions; i.E. exclude fROM being trUe-iN-thE-fiCtiON AnY fact beyond thE BOundArIes. She iS riGht that PosSibIliSts CaNnot (easilY) recogniZe SuCh BoUndS, but aS Argued abOvE thIs Is nOt somEThing tHat shOuld WoRrY TheM. 9 The disCUsSIOn of SiMiLariTy rElAtionS is vASt, aNd I cannOt go into dEtaILs (seE LEwIs 1979 for soMe consideratiOnS). Using closEnEss For truTH-In-fictioN does of course assume that SOme ordeRinG can bE achIeved, but uNliKe otheR isSUes for Which cLosenEsS maTTErs (coUNTeRfaCtUals, perhapS VEriSimilItUde) wE don't neEd it to be very finegrAIneD. 360 F R E D R I K H A R A L d S E n CloSENeSs sTIlL YieLdS PreCISion enough in the Vast majoriTy OF cAses to use iT As a ToOl for inTerpretIng fiCTions. 4.2.2. CoMpeting moDels The chAlLengES To rEalism raisEd by EverEtt (2005) requirE FurthER rEfineMenTs. ConsIdEr fIctioNs wherE It iS unclEar wheThEr certAin chArActers acTually occur, such as TatyanA TolstAya's THe SLynx, in whiCh "iN The End, I think, It is Pretty much LefT opEn wheTheR Or not TherE ReAllY Is a SlYnx" (E
 also need to supplement t hat change  forins tan ce  wit h pl ausible storie s  ofhow the tanks got ther e. Th at 'the r eare n o tanks ou t s ide  t he  de pi c te d are a'is true  of the ac tua lworld does n o tmean thatnot anks worldsare  close rwhe n  we a lso  make  the b a ckgrou nd change sn eededt o get t h e mther e – in the closes t  w o rlds in whichEnglan di si n vad ed,  for insta nc e, th e  invade r sp r e sum a bly employ mo re than n t a nks . Sinc ethe r e seem s tobe man y equally p laus ible back ground stories ,  it isindete rmi nat e wh a tis  th ec ase ou tsi d e o f the de pi ct ed ar ea.O n e upsh otis t hat i t will be dif fic ultt o p rovid e a f orma lmeasu re ofclose ne ss; a proper de fini tion that  ta ke s i nt o acc o unt pl aus ibl e backg round h i sto ri e s (o r consequences) wo ul d pr esumably  requi r eaf ormaliza ti onof r e l evanc e an d  p robablya solu t io nto some  v ersion  o f t heframe prob lem. F ortunate ly, f o r the purposes for which wen ee d tr u th-i n-f iction – to  int e rpre t an d  f ill in bl anksin ar easonably systemati cway –we do n't need a fo rmal crite r i o n, but c an b e  r a ther pragmatic  abou t the matt e r. The l ess p recise t he measur e for clos ene ssis,  th e mo re claims wil l endup  neithe r t rue nor  fa lse  in  th estory, bu t it isno tcl ea r w hy th a t wouldbe  aba d t hing. 8 Prou dfoot 's p ri ma r y p oint, t h ou g h , is  t ha t po ssi bi lismcann o t r espectthe bound edn e ss o fsu ch fict ions; i.e. ex cl ude from b ei ngtrue-i n - the-fict ion any fact beyond the boundar ies . She  isright tha t p ossibi lis t s cann ot (ea sily)  r eco g n ize s u c hbou nd s, but asa r gue d abo ve  thi s is no t something that s h oul d worry them.  9Thed i sc uss i on ofsi m ila r i ty relations is  vast, and  I ca nnot go in t o d et ails (s ee Lewi s 197 9  for so me consid erations) .Usin g clo seness for  truth-i n-fiction doeso fcours e a ssumeth atsomeorderi n g c an be  achie ve d, but  unli ke  other i ssues for which closene ss mat ters(co unterfact ual s , p erhaps ve risi militude)wedon 't ne edi t tobe v e ry  fi n egrai ned. 360 F R E DR I K  H  A R A L DS E  NClose nes s  still  yie lds precision eno u gh in the vast  maj o r ity  of case sto use it as a  to ol f or inter pr eting ficti ons. 4.2 .2 .  Comp etingmodels  The ch a l le n ges to  rea lis m raisedbyEv e rett (2 00 5) requir e fu rt her re fineme n ts.C o nsider fictionswhere i t isu ncl ear w he ther ce r tain  character s actuallyoccur,  suc h asTatyana  T olstay a's  T he Slynx,i n which " in th e end,Ithin k,it ispret t y  much  lef tope n whether o rn ot  t h ere  rea lly i sa Sl ynx" (E
 also_need to_supplement that change for_instance with_plausible_stories of_how_the tanks got_there. That 'there_are no tanks outside_the depicted area'_is_true of the actual world does not mean that notanks worlds are closer when_we_also make_the_background_changes needed to get them_there – in the closest_worlds in_which England is invaded, for instance, the invaders_presumably_employ more than_n tanks. Since there seems to be many equally_plausible background stories, it is indeterminate_what is the_case_outside_of the depicted area._One upshot is that it will_be difficult to provide a formal_measure of closeness; a proper definition that_takes into account plausible background histories_(or consequences) would presumably require_a formalization_of relevance and probably a_solution to some_version of_the frame problem._Fortunately, for the purposes for which_we need truth-in-fiction_– to interpret and fill in_blanks_in a reasonably_systematic_way_– we_don't need a_formal_criterion, but_can_be rather pragmatic about the matter._The_less precise the measure for closeness is,_the more claims will_end_up neither true nor_false in the story, but_it is not clear why that_would be_a bad_thing. 8 Proudfoot's primary point, though, is that possibilism cannot respect_the boundedness of such fictions; i.e._exclude from being true-in-the-fiction_any fact_beyond_the boundaries. She_is_right that_possibilists cannot (easily) recognize such bounds, but_as argued_above this is not something that_should worry them. 9_The_discussion of similarity relations is vast,_and I cannot go into details_(see Lewis 1979 for some_considerations)._Using_closeness for truth-in-fiction does of_course assume that some ordering can_be achieved, but_unlike other issues for which closeness matters_(counterfactuals,_perhaps verisimilitude) we don't need it_to_be very finegrained. 360 F R_E_D_R I K H A_R A L D S E_N Closeness still yields precision enough in the vast_majority of cases_to use it as a_tool_for_interpreting fictions. 4.2.2. Competing models The challenges to realism raised_by Everett_(2005) require further_refinements. Consider fictions where it is unclear whether certain characters_actually occur, such as Tatyana Tolstaya's The_Slynx, in which "in the end, I think, it is pretty_much left open whether or not there really_is a Slynx" (E