 even if I am right in my descriptive claim about how our practices work, do we have good reason to endorse our practices? Can we provide a rationale for having norms and practices that are like the one's we have? Here, we turn from descriptive questions to normative ones. Space does not allow that we pursue methodological issues in any detail, but I shall assume that judging the overall adequacy of an epistemological theory is a matter of that theory's globally cohering with assumptions, views, and theories from common sense and other fields of inquiry. Specifically, there are two dimensions to this sort of holism worth sorting out. First, one would like one's moral epistemology to comport with commonsense assumptions about matters epistemic such as the presumption that many people (at least sometimes) justifiedly believe certain moral propositions. Second, one wants the commitments and implications of one's epistemology to comport with any relevant assumptions, theories, and results from empirical fields such as psychology, biology, and anthropology." Of course, evaluating epistemological theories is a comparative matter. One hopes to show that one's favored epistemological theory does a better job, vis-à-vis any competitors, at satisfying the relevant desiderata. Though I will not argue the case here, let me just conjecture that my contextualist view comports better than do rival views with such commonsense presumptions as that ordinary persons are often epistemically responsible in many of the moral beliefs they hold. I suspect that these rival epistemological views, whatever virtues they may have, tend to impose epistemic burdens on ordinary believers that would imply that such believers are not generally responsible in many of the moral beliefs they hold." So I think contextualism is more plausible than its rivals with regard to the first desideratum of any moral epistemology. I also think that my contextualist epistemology comports nicely with certain empirical data about human beings. Specifically, what I have in mind is the sort of pragmatic rationale hinted at above in the second section in defense of an "in-between" requirement governing our responsibility for dealing with counterpossibilities. In connection with the requirement in question I noted that given our "finitary predicament," including the fact that we are beings with limited cognitive resources, limited time, and other, nonepistemic goals, we would expect that the sorts of epistemic norms in everyday operation would impose the sort of "in-between" level of care for checking counterpossibilities we explored earlier. Moreover, viewing epistemic norms from this pragmatic perspective makes sense of
even if I am right in my descriptive claim about how our practices work, do we get beneficial reason to endorse our practices? Can we put up a rationale for having norms and practice that are like the one's we give birth? Here, we turn from descriptive questions to normative ones. quad does not allow that we pursue methodological consequence in any detail, but I shall assume that judging the overall adequacy of an epistemological hypothesis is a matter of that theory's globally cohering with assumption, views, and theories from coarse sense and early fields of question. Specifically, there are two dimensions to this sort of holism worth classify out. First, one would like one's moral epistemology to comport with commonsense assumptions about matters epistemic such as the given that many citizenry (at least sometimes) justifiedly believe certain moral propositions. Second, one wants the commitments and implications of one's epistemology to comport with any relevant assumptions, theory, and results from empirical field such as psychology, biota, and anthropology. " Of course, evaluating epistemological theories is a comparative matter. One hopes to show that one's favor epistemological theory does a better job, vis - à - vis any competitors, at satisfy the relevant desiderata. Though I will not argue the case here, let me just speculate that my contextualist view comports well than serve rival views with such commonsense presumptions as that ordinary persons are frequently epistemically responsible in many of the moral beliefs they hold. I distrust that these rival epistemological view, whatever virtues they may have, tend to impose epistemic burden on ordinary believer that would imply that such believers are not by and large responsible in many of the moral belief they hold. " thus I think contextualism is more plausible than its rival with regard to the first desideratum of any moral epistemology. I also intend that my contextualist epistemology comports nicely with certain empiric data about human beings. Specifically, what I have in mind is the kind of pragmatic rationale hinted at above in the second section in defense of an " in - between " prerequisite regulate our responsibility for dealing with counterpossibilities. In joining with the requirement in question I note that given our " finitary predicament, " including the fact that we are beings with circumscribed cognitive resources, limited time, and other, nonepistemic goals, we would expect that the sorts of epistemic norms in casual operation would impose the sort of " in - between " level of care for checking counterpossibilities we explored earlier. furthermore, viewing epistemic norms from this pragmatic perspective makes sense of
 evfn if I am right in my dtscriptive claim cvout hmw our practicds work, do we have good reasln to ebdorse our practices? Cxn we pronide a rarionele for having norms and practjges tkav are like the pne's we haee? Here, we turt wrlm descriptive questions to normatide ones. Soace does not wlloe thaf we pursue methodological issues jn any vetail, but I shsll assume that judging thf ovfrall adequacy of wn epistemooogisql theory is a matter of that theoty's globally cohering with assumotionx, views, ane rhelties from conmon fense and otmvr fielgs of imquiry. Specifigally, thwre are two dimensionv to this sort of rolism wostk sorting out. First, obe woulg line ovw's oorzl elistemllojy to compodt with comnonsense assumptionx wvout matters spisteiis such as the presumption that many peokle (af least sometimes) justidiedly believe certaij moral pwopositions. Second, one wants the commitments and hmpliragiouw of ube'd epistemology to comport with any relevant afaukpnions, theories, anb results from ekplrosal fields suzh as 'aydhology, biology, anf anthrjpoloty." Of couwse, rvaluating epistemological rheories is c cimparative matter. Lne hopes tu shpw thst one's favored epistemulogjcal theory does a bsgter job, vis-à-vis xny cmmpetitors, at satisfying tre relevait dexideratx. Thpugh I will not wrgue the case here, let le judt conjecturf that my contextualist view comports better jhat dm rival riews eith such comionsense presukptions as tfat ordinagy personv are often epistemicallf responsible in many of rhe noral bduiefs they holc. I suspebt thar these rival episbemolufical views, whactvet virtues they kay hade, txnd tj impose episdemiz bjtdens on ordinarn bdliefers that would implf thzt such believers src not gengrally refponsible in kany of the moral heliehs theb hold." So I think contextualism is more plausiblf tman its rivalf wibh rggard to thz first desideratum of any moral epistemilogy. I also think that my contextualnsu epistemologb compjrts niceny with certain empieical data about muman beings. Specificamly, whdt I jave in mind is the sort of pragmatic rationale hinted at above in the sexond sxceion in defsnse of at "nn-bztween" wequmrxment governing olr responsibility for dealing wivh counter[ofsibilities. In connection wiyh the requiremgnt in question I noted thzt given our "finitary predicament," inclucing the fact that we arc beings qith mimited cojnitive resources, likited cime, abd othee, nokepistemic goaus, ee would exoect tkat the sorts of epistemic norms un eveeyfay operation wonld impose tme sort of "in-fetween" level of cars for zhecking counyerpossibilitirs we explored earlivr. Ioreover, viewibf epistemic morms fgom this pragkatic perspactive makes sense of
even if I am right in my about our practices do we have practices? we provide a for having norms practices that are like the one's have? Here, we turn from descriptive questions to normative ones. Space does not that we pursue methodological issues in any detail, but I shall assume that the adequacy an theory is a matter of that theory's globally cohering with assumptions, views, and theories from common and other fields of inquiry. Specifically, there are dimensions to this sort holism worth sorting out. First, would one's moral to with assumptions about matters such as the presumption that many people (at least sometimes) justifiedly believe certain moral propositions. Second, one the commitments of one's to with relevant assumptions, theories, from empirical fields such as psychology, Of course, evaluating epistemological theories is a comparative One hopes show that one's favored epistemological theory a better job, vis-à-vis any competitors, at satisfying relevant desiderata. Though I will not argue the case here, let me just conjecture that view comports better than rival views with commonsense as ordinary are often responsible in many of the moral beliefs they hold. I suspect these rival epistemological views, whatever virtues they may have, tend epistemic on ordinary believers would imply that such are generally responsible in many moral they think is plausible than its rivals regard to the first desideratum any moral epistemology. I epistemology comports nicely with certain empirical data about beings. Specifically, what I have in mind the sort of pragmatic rationale hinted at above in the second section defense of requirement governing our responsibility for dealing with counterpossibilities. connection with the requirement question I noted that given our "finitary predicament," including fact we are with limited cognitive limited time, and nonepistemic goals, we that the of norms would impose the sort of "in-between" of for checking counterpossibilities we explored Moreover, norms from this pragmatic perspective makes sense of
 even if I am right in my descripTive claim aBout hOw oUr pRaCticEs woRk, do we have good REasoN to endorse our practices? can we PrOVide A RaTionaLe for haVInG NOrmS aNd PraCtICeS that Are Like the One's we have? herE, wE turn from desCRiPtive questIonS to normative OneS. Space DoEs nOT alloW thAt we pUrsue mEThodolOgical issUeS In any dETail, but i SHaLl asSume that judging thE OvERall adequacy of An episTeMOlOGIcaL thEory is a matTeR of thAT theory'S GlOBALly COhering with asSumptions, viEWs, aNd theoRiEs fROm commOn senSe ANd oTher fields oF inqUiry. SpeciFicallY, There arE Two dimeNsions To tHis Sort OF hOlIsm WoRTh sORtIng OUt. FIrst, one wOuLd Like oNe's mORAL EpisTemOlogY to coMport with commOnsEnse ASsuMptioNs aboUt maTtErs epIstemiC such As The presumption tHat mAny people (At lEaSt sOmEtimeS) JustifIedLy bElieve cErtain mORal PrOPOSiTions. Second, one wantS tHE CoMmitmentS and imPLiCaTIons of onE's EpiStemOLOgy to CompORt With any rElevanT AsSuMptions, ThEories, AnD reSulTs froM EmpiRical fIelds sucH as psYChology, biology, ANd anthropologY." of COUrSE, evaLuaTing epistemOlogICal tHeorIEs Is a COmparAtive MaTTeR. one hopes to show that oNe'S favorEd epiStemological tHeory does a BETTer job, viS-à-viS AnY Competitors, at sAtisfYing the relEVant desiDeratA. Though I Will not arGUE the case HerE, leT me JusT COnJecture that my CONtexTuAlist viEw cOmports BetTer ThaN do RiVal views wIth such cOmMoNsEnSe pResumPTions as tHaT orDiNarY persONs are oFten ePistEmIcALly ResponsIBlE IN manY oF tHe moRal BeLiefs They HOld. i suspecT that thesE riVAl epIsTeMologicAl views, whatevEr Virtues theY mAy hAve, tenD TO impose ePistemic burdens on ordinaRY believErs That wOuld Imply that SucH belieVerS Are not GeneraLly reSpOnsIBLe in mANY oF thE mOral beliefS THey Hold." SO I ThinK contexTualism is more plausIBle Than its rivals WitH regARD tO thE FiRSt dEsIDerATUm of any moral epiStemology. I AlSO tHink that my COntExTualist EpistemOlogy COmports Nicely witH certain eMpIricAL DatA about humaN beings. SPecificalLY, what i HaVe in mInd Is the sOrT of PragmAtic raTIonAle hiNted at AbOve in tHe secOnD section In defense of an "in-between" rEquireMent gOveRning our rEspONsiBility for DealIng with couNteRpoSsibiLitIEs. In cOnneCTiOn wITh the RequIRement in qUEsTioN i NoTed that giveN OUR "fiNitarY prEDicameNt," inCluding the fact thaT We are beings witH limITEd cOgnITive ReSources, limited TimE, aND Other, nonEpIstemic goalS, we would ExPEct thAt the sOrts of EpistemIC NoRMs in evErydAy oPeration wOulD iMPose the SoRt OF "in-betWeen" LeVel of cAre for CHeckING counterpossibilIties WE ExploREd eArlieR. MOreover, VIewiNg epistemiC norms from tHis praGmatIc perSpectivE mAkes seNse Of
 even if I am right in mydescriptiv e cla imabo ut  how  our  practices wor k , do  we have good reason t o end or s e ou r  p racti ces? Ca n  w e pro vi de  ara t io nalefor  having  norms and  pr ac tices that a r elike the o ne' s we have? H ere , we t ur n f r om de scr iptiv e ques t ions t o normati ve ones.S pace do e s  n ot a llow that we purs u em ethodologicalissues  i n  a n y  de tai l, but I s ha ll as s ume tha t  j u d g ing the overall a dequacy ofa n e pistem ol ogi c al the ory i sa  ma tter of tha t th eory's gl obally coherin g  with a ssumpt ion s,view s ,an d t he o rie s  f rom com mon sens ean d oth er f i e l d s of  in quir y. Sp ecifically, t her e ar e  tw o dim ensio ns t othissort o f hol is m worth sorting  out . First,one  w oul dlikeo ne's m ora l e pistemo logy to com po r t wi th commonsense ass um p t io ns about  matte r sep i stemic s uc h a s th e presu mpti o nthat man y peop l e(a t least  s ometim es ) j ust ified l y be lievecertainmoral propositions.S econd, one wa n ts t he comm itm ents and im plic a tion s of on e's epist emolo gy to comport with any re le vant a ssump tions, theori es, and re s u l ts fromempi r ic a l fields suchas ps ychology,b iology,and a nthropol ogy." Ofc o urse, ev alu ati ngepi s t em ological theo r i es i sa compa rat ive mat ter . O nehop es  to showthat one 's  f av or edepist e mologica lthe or y d oes a better  job,  vis -à -v i s a ny comp e ti t o rs,at  s atis fyi ng  therele v ant  deside rata. Tho ugh I wi ll  n ot argu e the case he re , let me j us t c onject u r e that m y contextualist view co m ports b ett er th an d o rival v iew s with  su c h comm onsens e pre su mpt i o ns as t ha t o rd inary pers o n s a re of te n ep istemic ally responsible i n  ma ny of the mor albeli e f sthe y  h o ld.  I sus p e ct that these r ival epist em o lo gical view s , w ha tever v irtuestheym ay have , tend to  impose e pi stem i c  bu rdens on o rdinarybelievers thatw ou ld im ply  thatsu chbelie vers a r e n ot ge nerall yrespon sible  i n many o f the moral beliefs the y hold ." So  Ithink con tex t ual ism is mo re p lausible t han  it s riv als withrega r dtot he fi rstd esideratu m  o f a n y  m oral episte m o l ogy . I a lso thinkthat  my contextualist epistemology c ompo r t s n ice l y wi th  certain empir ica ld a ta about  h uman beings . Specif ic a lly,what I  havein mind i st he sor t of  pr agmatic r ati on a le hint ed  a t  above  inth e seco nd sec t ioni n  defense of an " in-be t w een"r equ ireme nt  govern i ng o ur respons ibility for  deali ng w ith c ounterp os sibili tie s.  In connec t ion withthe r equirem en t in  qu estion  I n o t ed th at g iv enour "fini t a ry pr ed i cam ent, " inc lu ding  the fact that weare beingswi thl i mitedc og n i tive resou rce s, li m i ted time,a nd o t he r , non episte mic go als, we wou ld  expect  th a t  the sort s of epis t emi cnorm s in eve ry dayop era ti on would impose  the sor t of "in - b etween " l e velo f care  f or checkingcount er p ossibil i t ies  we exp l ore d e arl ier.  Mo reov e r, viewing epistemic nor ms f rom t h ispragm aticpe rspectiv e  mak es sense of
 even_if I_am right in my_descriptive claim_about_how our_practices_work, do we_have good reason_to endorse our practices?_Can we provide_a_rationale for having norms and practices that are like the one's we have? Here,_we_turn from_descriptive_questions_to normative ones. Space does_not allow that we pursue_methodological issues_in any detail, but I shall assume that_judging_the overall adequacy_of an epistemological theory is a matter of that_theory's globally cohering with assumptions, views,_and theories from_common_sense_and other fields of_inquiry. Specifically, there are two dimensions_to this sort of holism worth_sorting out. First, one would like one's_moral epistemology to comport with commonsense_assumptions about matters epistemic such_as the_presumption that many people (at_least sometimes) justifiedly_believe certain_moral propositions. Second,_one wants the commitments and implications_of one's epistemology_to comport with any relevant assumptions,_theories,_and results from_empirical_fields_such as_psychology, biology, and_anthropology."_Of course,_evaluating_epistemological theories is a comparative matter._One_hopes to show that one's favored epistemological_theory does a better_job,_vis-à-vis any competitors, at_satisfying the relevant desiderata. Though_I will not argue the case_here, let_me just_conjecture that my contextualist view comports better than do rival views_with such commonsense presumptions as that_ordinary persons are often_epistemically responsible_in_many of the_moral_beliefs they_hold. I suspect that these rival epistemological_views, whatever_virtues they may have, tend to_impose epistemic burdens on_ordinary_believers that would imply that such_believers are not generally responsible in_many of the moral beliefs_they_hold."_So I think contextualism is_more plausible than its rivals with_regard to the_first desideratum of any moral epistemology. I_also_think that my contextualist epistemology comports_nicely_with certain empirical data about human_beings._Specifically,_what I have in mind_is the sort of pragmatic rationale_hinted at above in the second section in defense_of an "in-between"_requirement governing our responsibility for_dealing_with_counterpossibilities. In connection with the requirement in question I noted_that given_our "finitary predicament,"_including the fact that we are beings with limited cognitive_resources, limited time, and other, nonepistemic goals,_we would expect that the sorts of epistemic norms in everyday_operation would impose the sort of "in-between" level_of care for checking counterpossibilities we explored_earlier. Moreover, viewing epistemic_norms_from this pragmatic perspective makes sense of