 various morally relevant considerations the rules encapsulate.51 If so, then one way in which being basic is context-sensitive is simply that different groups may take (some) different moral beliefs for granted. For example, in comparing the basic moral outlook of the Amish culture with the outlooks of many non-Amish Westerners, we see striking differences." The underlying spirit of the Amish moral outlook-what is called Gelassenheit, translated as "submission"-puts primary emphasis on the values of submission and obedience to God and community as fundamental for leading a morally proper life. The moral requirement to lead a properly submissive life (which the Amish take as basic and applying to all persons) is understood to imply that individual achievement, self-fulfillment, personal recognition, and other manifestations of the modern spirit of individuality are morally perverse. Even if submissiveness and obedience are morally valued by people generally, nevertheless, these values need not and often do not have the sort of fundamental status and importance that they have in the Amish moral outlook. Amish justifications for specific moral beliefs about actions and practices rest with claims to the effect that such and such actions and practices are required (or forbidden) by Gelassenheit. So, one rather obvious way in which beliefs that do not need justification are contextsensitive is where talk of different social contexts refers to different communities with differing moral outlooks. A more interesting possibility to explore is the extent to which our epistemic evaluations might be context-sensitive in a manner that would imply that an individual might be epistemically responsible in holding some moral belief without justification in one context, though not responsible in holding that same belief in a different context-where differences in context here involve different social groups. Of course, over time an individual may come to have a moral outlook whose basic moral assumptions differ markedly from the assumptions of his former moral outlook (perhaps as a result of a radical moral conversion not mediated by argumentation)." In some ways, this sort of case is like the one described in the previous paragraph: there are two distinct moral outlooks creating two distinct contexts. But even for an individual whose moral outlook remains relatively unchanged over a period of time, and for whom certain moral beliefs are basic in ordinary, engaged contexts of moral thought and deliberation, there may be special contexts in which those moral beliefs are not basic. One kind of case fitting this description is a context in which one is confronted with skeptical challenges to one's moral outlook-challenges that are aimed at those
various morally relevant considerations the rules encapsulate.51 If so, then one direction in which being basic is context - sensible is simply that different group may assume (some) different moral beliefs for accord. For exercise, in comparing the basic moral mentality of the Amish culture with the outlooks of many non - Amish Westerners, we experience striking differences. " The underlie liveliness of the Amish moral outlook - what is called Gelassenheit, translated as " submission"-puts primary emphasis on the value of submission and obedience to God and community as fundamental for lead a morally proper life. The moral requirement to lead a properly slavish life (which the Amish choose as basic and applying to all persons) is understand to imply that individual achievement, self - fulfillment, personal recognition, and other manifestations of the mod spirit of individuality are morally perverse. Even if submissiveness and obedience are morally valued by people generally, nevertheless, these values need not and often do not suffer the sort of fundamental condition and importance that they take in the Amish moral lookout. Amish justifications for specific moral beliefs about actions and practices rest with claims to the effect that such and such action and practices are required (or forbidden) by Gelassenheit. So, one rather obvious way in which impression that do not need justification are contextsensitive is where talk of different social contexts refer to different residential district with differing moral outlooks. A more interesting possibility to explore is the extent to which our epistemic evaluations might be context - sensible in a manner that would imply that an individual might be epistemically responsible in holding some moral belief without justification in one context, though not responsible in holding that same belief in a unlike context - where differences in context here involve different social groups. Of course, over clock time an individual may arrive to have a moral mentality whose basic moral assumptions disagree markedly from the assumptions of his former moral outlook (possibly as a result of a radical moral conversion not mediated by argumentation). " In some ways, this sort of case is like the one described in the previous paragraph: there are two distinct moral outlooks make two distinct contexts. But even for an person whose moral outlook remains relatively unchanged over a period of time, and for whom certain moral beliefs are basic in average, engaged contexts of moral thought and deliberation, there may be special contexts in which those moral beliefs are not basic. One kind of case match this description is a context in which one is confronted with skeptical challenges to one's moral outlook - challenges that are aimed at those
 vagious morally relevant cunsiderations tkw rulev encalsulate.51 Kf so, then one way in which ueint basuc is context-sensitive is simplj that didfertnt groups may take (some) differskt moxao beliefs for nranted. For example, in cokpxrnng the basic moral outlook of the Aiish cuktkre with the ootloolf of many non-Amish Westerners, we see sfriking differences." Yhe underlying spirit of tje Alish moral outlook-ahat is caloed Dwlassenheit, granslated as "submissikn"-puts primary emphasis on the xaluex of submiwsuon dnd obedienre to Dod and commmmity av fundakental for leacinj a norally proper life. Tie moral requirement to lead d 'roperly submissive lufw (whiwh tve Aoush taie aa basif aid applying to all perwons) is understood uo ynply that indjviduaj wchievement, self-fulfillment, personal rebognjtion, and other manifesrations of the modern spirit os individuality are morally perverse. Even if submhssivxndss akd ocwdlence are morally valued by people generally, gsvtrtmeless, these valmes need not and ogtfn qo not have tfe sorc or fundamental statks and ymporrance thau theu have in the Amish moral oytlook. Amish hustifications for specific mural belirfs about actions and pxacticss rest witj claims fu the effect thag slch dnd such actions and practyces are cequixed (or furbicden) br Gelassenjeit. So, one rather obvioks wai in wvich believs that do not need justification are contextxetsinive is wkere tslk of differqnt social conjexts refzrs to different communmties with dyffering moran outlooks. A kore intqresring possibkuity to explorr is the vxuent to whuch our epistemic cvaluxfions might be eubtext-sensitive on x mwnjec thae would imply thag av indixidual mighb bd epostemically responsitle jn holding some motaj belief without justificatiom in one context, tjough nov resppnsyble in holding that same belisf in a dlffcrent context-rherc disferences nn context here involve different social groups. Of course, iver time an indivibusl may come to hwve a mordl outlook whose basuc moral assumptipns differ markedly fdom tha asskmptions of his former moral outlook (perhaps as a result of a radical morql contewsion not msdiayed bj axgukentatyon)." Mn some ways, this xort of case is like the one dercribed hn the previous paragraph: therr xre two distivct moral outlooks creatjng two cistinct contexts. But even for sn individual whose morak outlooj remzins rvmavively unchanged ovet a pexiod od time, qnd nor whom certakn koval beliefd art baaic in ordinary, engaged contexts of moeap thought and deniberation, bhtre may be spgcial contexts in whidj thore moral belirfs are not baxic. One kind of case fytting this dewbription is a contgrn in which onx is confronded with skeptical challenges to one's moral outlook-bhallenges that arc aimed at those
various morally relevant considerations the rules encapsulate.51 then way in being basic is groups take (some) different beliefs for granted. example, in comparing the basic moral of the Amish culture with the outlooks of many non-Amish Westerners, we see differences." The underlying spirit of the Amish moral outlook-what is called Gelassenheit, translated "submission"-puts emphasis the of submission and obedience to God and community as fundamental for leading a morally proper life. moral requirement to lead a properly submissive life the Amish take as and applying to all persons) understood imply that achievement, personal and other manifestations the modern spirit of individuality are morally perverse. Even if submissiveness and obedience are morally valued by generally, nevertheless, need not often not the sort of and importance that they have in outlook. Amish justifications for specific moral beliefs about and practices with claims to the effect that and such actions and practices are required (or by Gelassenheit. So, one rather obvious way in which beliefs that do not need justification is where talk of social contexts refers different with moral A more possibility to explore is the extent to which our epistemic evaluations be context-sensitive in a manner that would imply that an be responsible in holding moral belief without justification one though not responsible in same in differences context involve different social groups. course, over time an individual come to have a assumptions differ markedly from the assumptions of his moral outlook (perhaps as a result of radical moral conversion not mediated by argumentation)." In some ways, this sort case is one described in the previous paragraph: there are distinct moral outlooks creating distinct contexts. But even for an individual whose moral remains unchanged over period of time, for whom certain beliefs are basic engaged contexts moral and be special contexts in which those beliefs not basic. One kind of fitting is a context in which one is confronted with skeptical challenges to one's moral outlook-challenges aimed at those
 various morally relevant conSiderationS the rUleS enCaPsulAte.51 IF so, then one way iN WhicH being basic is context-seNsitiVe IS simPLy That dIfferenT GrOUPs mAy TaKe (sOmE) DiFfereNt mOral belIefs for graNteD. FOr example, in cOMpAring the baSic Moral outlook Of tHe AmisH cUltURe witH thE outlOoks of MAny non-amish WestErNErs, we sEE strikiNG DiFferEnces." The underlyinG SpIRit of the Amish mOral ouTlOOk-WHAt iS caLled GelassEnHeit, tRAnslateD As "SUBMisSIon"-puts primarY emphasis on THe vAlues oF sUbmISsion aNd obeDiENce To God and comMuniTy as fundaMental FOr leadiNG a moralLy propEr lIfe. the mORaL rEquIrEMenT To LeaD A prOperly suBmIsSive lIfe (wHICH The AMisH takE as baSic and applyinG to All pERsoNs) is uNdersTood To Imply That inDividUaL achievement, selF-fulFillment, pErsOnAl rEcOgnitIOn, and oTheR maNifestaTions of THe mOdERN SpIrit of individualitY aRE MoRally perVerse. EVEn If SUbmissivEnEss And oBEDiencE are MOrAlly valuEd by peOPlE gEnerallY, nEverthElEss, TheSe valUEs neEd not aNd often dO not hAVe the sort of funDAmental status ANd IMPoRTancE thAt they have iN the aMish MoraL OuTloOK. AmisH justIfICaTIons for specific moraL bEliefs About Actions and praCtices rest WITH claims tO the EFfECt that such and sUch acTions and prACtices arE requIred (or foRbidden) by gELassenheIt. SO, onE raTheR OBvIous way in whicH BElieFs That do nOt nEed justIfiCatIon Are CoNtextsensItive is wHeRe TaLk Of dIfferENt social CoNteXtS reFers tO DifferEnt coMmunItIeS WitH differINg MORal oUtLoOks. A MorE iNtereStinG PosSibilitY to explorE is THe exTeNt To which Our epistemic eVaLuations miGhT be ContexT-SEnsitive In a manner that would imply THat an inDivIdual MighT be episteMicAlly reSpoNSible iN holdiNg somE mOraL BElief WIThOut JuStificatioN IN onE contExT, thoUgh not rEsponsible in holdinG ThaT same belief in A diFferENT cOntEXt-WHerE dIFfeRENces in context heRe involve dIfFErEnt social gROupS. OF course, Over timE an inDIvidual May come to Have a moraL oUtloOK WhoSe basic morAl assumpTions diffER markEDlY from The AssumpTiOns Of his Former MOraL outlOok (perHaPs as a rEsult Of A radical Moral conversion not mediaTed by aRgumeNtaTion)." In somE waYS, thIs sort of cAse iS like the onE deScrIbed iN thE PreviOus pARaGraPH: therE are TWo distincT MoRal OUTlOoks creatinG TWO diStincT coNTexts. BUt evEn for an individual WHose moral outloOk reMAIns RelATiveLy Unchanged over a PerIoD OF time, and FoR whom certaiN moral beLiEFs are Basic iN ordinAry, engaGED cONtexts Of moRal Thought anD deLiBEration, ThErE May be sPeciAl ContexTs in whICh thOSE moral beliefs are Not baSIC. One kINd oF case FiTting thIS desCription is A context in wHich onE is cOnfroNted witH sKepticAl cHaLlenges to oNE's moral ouTlook-ChallenGeS thaT arE aimed At thOSE
 various morally relevantconsiderat ionsthe  ru le s en caps ulate.51 If so ,  the n one way in which bei ng ba si c  isc on text- sensiti v ei s  si mp ly  th at di ffere ntgroupsmay take ( som e)  different m o ra l beliefsfor  granted. Fo r e xample ,inc ompar ing  thebasicm oral o utlook of  t h e Amis h  cultur e wi th t he outlooks of ma n yn on-Amish Weste rners,  w e  s e e  st rik ing differ en ces." The und e rl y i n g s p irit of the A mish moralo utl ook-wh at  is called  Gela ss e nhe it, transla tedas "submi ssion" - puts pr i mary em phasis  on  th e va l ue sofsu b mis s io n a n d o bedience  t oGod a nd c o m m u nity  as  fun damen tal for leadi nga mo r all y pro per l ife.  T he mo ral re quire me nt to lead a pr oper ly submis siv elif e(whic h  the A mis h t ake asbasic a n d a pp l y i ng  to all persons) i su n de rstood t o impl y  t ha t  individ ua l a chie v e ment,  sel f -f ulfillme nt, pe r so na l recog ni tion,an d o the r man i fest ations  of themoder n  spirit of ind i viduality are mo r a ll y  per ver se. Even if  sub m issi vene s sand obedi encear e  m o rally valued by peo pl e gene rally , nevertheles s, these v a l u es neednota nd often do not h ave t he sort of fundamen tal s tatus an d importa n c e that t hey  ha veint h eAmish moral o u t look .Amish j ust ificati ons  fo r s pec if ic moralbeliefsab ou tac tio ns an d  practic es  re st  wi th cl a ims to  theeffe ct  t h atsuch an d  s u c h ac ti on s an d p ra ctice s ar e  re quired(or forbi dde n ) by  G el assenhe it. So, one r at her obviou sway  in wh i c h belief s that do not need just i ficatio n a re co ntex tsensitiv e i s wher e t a lk ofdiffer ent s oc ial c ontex t s  r efe rs  to differ e n t c ommun it ieswith di ffering moral outl o oks . A more inte res ting p os sib i li t y t oe xpl o r e is the extent  to whichou r  e pistemic e v alu at ions mi ght beconte x t-sensi tive in a  manner t ha t wo u l d i mply thatan indiv idual mig h t bee pi stemi cal ly res po nsi ble i n hold i ngsomemoralbe lief w ithou tjustific ation in one context, t houghnot r esp onsible i n h o ldi ng that s amebelief ina d iff erent  co n text- wher e  d iff e rence s in context h e re  in v o lv e different s o cia l gro ups .  Of co urse , over time an in d ividual may co me t o hav e a mora loutlook whosebas ic m oral ass um ptions diff er marke dl y  from  the a ssumpt ions of h is former  mor aloutlook ( per ha p s as are su l t of a  rad ic al mor al con v ersi o n  not mediated by  argu m e ntati o n). " Inso me ways ,  thi s sort ofcase is lik e theonedescr ibed in  t he pre vio us  paragraph :  there ar e two  distin ct  mor aloutloo ks c r e ating  two  d ist inct cont e x ts .  B ut eve n fo r anin divi dual whos e  moral o utl o ok rema in s r e l ativel y  u n c hanged ove r a  peri o d  of time,a nd f o rw hom c ertain  moral  belief s  ar ebasic i n o r d inary, en gaged con t ext sof m oral tho ug ht a nd  de li beration, there  may bespecialc o ntexts  in whic h  those  m oral beliefs  areno t  basic. O nekind of cas e f itt ingthi s de s cription is a context in  whi ch on e  is  conf ronte dwith ske p tica l challe n ges to one'smoral outlook-c h all e nges  th a tar e aimed a t t h ose
 various_morally relevant_considerations the rules encapsulate.51_If so,_then_one way_in_which being basic_is context-sensitive is_simply that different groups_may take (some)_different_moral beliefs for granted. For example, in comparing the basic moral outlook of the_Amish_culture with_the_outlooks_of many non-Amish Westerners, we_see striking differences." The underlying_spirit of_the Amish moral outlook-what is called Gelassenheit, translated_as_"submission"-puts primary emphasis_on the values of submission and obedience to God_and community as fundamental for leading_a morally proper_life._The_moral requirement to lead_a properly submissive life (which the_Amish take as basic and applying_to all persons) is understood to imply_that individual achievement, self-fulfillment, personal recognition,_and other manifestations of the_modern spirit_of individuality are morally perverse._Even if submissiveness_and obedience_are morally valued_by people generally, nevertheless, these values_need not and_often do not have the sort_of_fundamental status and_importance_that_they have_in the Amish_moral_outlook. Amish_justifications_for specific moral beliefs about actions_and_practices rest with claims to the effect_that such and such_actions_and practices are required_(or forbidden) by Gelassenheit. So,_one rather obvious way in which_beliefs that_do not_need justification are contextsensitive is where talk of different social contexts_refers to different communities with differing_moral outlooks. A more_interesting possibility_to_explore is the_extent_to which_our epistemic evaluations might be context-sensitive in_a manner_that would imply that an individual_might be epistemically responsible_in_holding some moral belief without justification_in one context, though not responsible_in holding that same belief_in_a_different context-where differences in context_here involve different social groups. Of_course, over time_an individual may come to have a_moral_outlook whose basic moral assumptions differ_markedly_from the assumptions of his former_moral_outlook_(perhaps as a result of_a radical moral conversion not mediated_by argumentation)." In some ways, this sort of case_is like the_one described in the previous_paragraph:_there_are two distinct moral outlooks creating two distinct contexts. But_even for_an individual whose_moral outlook remains relatively unchanged over a period of time,_and for whom certain moral beliefs are_basic in ordinary, engaged contexts of moral thought and deliberation, there_may be special contexts in which those moral_beliefs are not basic. One kind of_case fitting this description_is_a context in which one is confronted_with_skeptical_challenges_to one's moral_outlook-challenges that are_aimed at those