, because in most of these cases, A also 16028-0338d-1pass-r01.indd 209 2/21/2020 10:23:45 AM 210 Chapter 13 won't have access to the truth of the matter, the interference can't be veritistically justified either. And again, the interference will often lead to epistemically bad results-stifling distinct perspectives and the values associated with epistemic diversity. So, there are epistemic negatives associated with interfering, and epistemic positives associated with not-interfering. Thus, standpoint epistemology also renders epistemic paternalism unjustified. Here is a way to see my overall argument in this section. Standpoint epistemology is closely related to interpersonal permissivism. We've already seen that epistemic paternalism is unjustified in permissive cases. Thus, the same considerations apply to situations where one's standpoint affects one's epistemic attitudes. One might object that it is possible to endorse standpoint epistemology but deny permissivism. Maybe a standpoint has a single purpose, that is., changing what evidence one has, and two people with different standpoints will always have different evidence. My response is twofold. First, on this view, one's standpoint has a relatively limited function; all it does is affect is what evidence one has. There is a reason to think that this is not the only function of the standpoint. A natural alternative picture is a permissivist standpoint epistemology, on which the standpoint also affects the way one weighs or processes evidence-especially given the apparent similarities between standpoints and epistemic standards. A second reply is that standpoint epistemology might, on its own, render epistemic paternalism unjustified, whether or not permissivism is true. For example, there might be something epistemically valuable about the fact that different standpoints provide different bodies of evidence. Consider the literature on the cognitive division of labor, which supports the idea that researchers pursing a large variety of different projects is long-term epistemically best. This diversity is valuable even if, from our current perspective, some of those projects have a low probability of success (or the hypotheses they are testing have a low prior probability; see Kitcher 1990, 1993). The epistemic value of diverse perspectives is emphasized in this literature. Muldoon (2013: 123–124) summarizes, "In several of the models of the division of cognitive labor... diversity plays an important and positive role... it encourages differences in agents, and
, because in most of these cases, A also 16028-0338d-1pass-r01.indd 209 2/21/2020 10:23:45 AM 210 Chapter 13 won't have entree to the accuracy of the topic, the interference can't be veritistically justified either. And again, the interference will much lead to epistemically bad resultant role - suffocate distinct position and the values associated with epistemic diverseness. So, there are epistemic negatives associated with interfere, and epistemic positives associated with not - interfering. Thus, standpoint epistemology besides renders epistemic paternalism unjustified. Here is a way to witness my overall argument in this section. point of view epistemology is closely associate to interpersonal permissivism. We've already seen that epistemic paternalism is unjustified in permissive cases. Thus, the same circumstance apply to situations where one's standpoint affects one's epistemic attitudes. One might object that it is potential to back standpoint epistemology but deny permissivism. Maybe a standpoint has a single purpose, that is. , changing what evidence one has, and two people with unlike point of view will always have different evidence. My reception is twofold. First, on this view, one's point of view has a relatively circumscribed function; all it does is affect is what evidence one has. There constitute a reason to think that this is not the only function of the standpoint. A natural alternative picture is a permissivist standpoint epistemology, on which the standpoint also affect the manner one weighs or processes evidence - especially given the apparent similarities between standpoints and epistemic standard. A second reply is that standpoint epistemology might, on its own, render epistemic paternalism unjustified, whether or not permissivism is true. For example, there might be something epistemically valuable about the fact that different standpoints put up different bodies of evidence. see the literature on the cognitive division of parturiency, which supports the mind that researchers purse a large variety of different projects is long - terminus epistemically best. This diversity is valuable even if, from our current perspective, some of those projects have a low probability of success (or the hypotheses they are testing experience a low prior probability; understand Kitcher 1990, 1993). The epistemic value of diverse perspectives is emphasized in this literature. Muldoon (2013: 123–124) summarizes, " In several of the models of the division of cognitive british labour party... diversity plays an important and positive role... it encourages differences in agent, and
, befause in most of these cxses, A also 16028-0338d-1pass-r01.indd 209 2/21/2020 10:23:45 AM 210 Chaptef 13 won't have access to the tcuth of tye matter, the interferdnce can't be veriristmcally justified either. And agzln, thz mnterference wikl often laad to epistemhcxlpy bad results-stifling distinct perfpectivrs and the valuef asxjciafvd with epistemic diversity. So, fhere age epistemic negayives associated with integferlng, and epistemic oositives awsocyqted with nog-interfering. Thus, stanspoint epistemology also renderr epixtemic patgxballvm unjustifmed. Hege is a way to see my overalk argument in bhis vecrion. Standpoint epistxmology is closely rglated to hncerpersonal permissivusn. We'vg alraady weev tgav elistemlc 'aternalism is unjustidied in permissive vafvx. Thus, the szme cogsyderations apply to situations where ont's stzndpoint affects one's epistemic attitudes. Ong might obtect that it is possible to endorse standpoint ephstemkuogv but awnj permissivism. Maybe a standpoint has a singlq piriose, that is., channing what evidence oje ras, and two pgople wnfh different standpolnts wijl alqays have difgerent evidence. My response is twofold. Yirwt, on this view, onz's standpoinc has s relstively limited functiou; all jt does is wffect is dhat evidence ond hss. There is a reason to thinh that thms is not thd onky funstion of tje standpoint. A natural wlteruativa picture ls a permissivist standpoint epmxtemology, on wvicv the stcndpoikt also affects the way one wgighs or 'rocesres evidenbe-especianly given tre apparent shlilarities bxtween stwndpiintw and eokstemic standatds. A second reply us that standpoint epkatemology might, on its own, render epkstqmpc 'atergdlism unjusthfiea, wfrther or not pernkssifism is true. For exakple, there might be sokebhing epiwtemicaljy valuable anout the fact that diffxrent rtandloigts provide different bodies or evidencf. Cjnsider the jitevatute on the cpgnitive division of labor, which supporvs the idea that reseatchers pursing a largg vsriety of dmfferegt projecds is long-term epistwmically best. Thix diversity is valuabme evet if, vrom our current perspective, some of those projects have a low probabilitt of sncsess (or the hyppthesvs chev are tqstiig have a low priog probability; see Kitcher 1990, 1993). The xpistemic eajue of diverse perspectives os emphasized iv this literature. Muldooh (2013: 123–124) summsrizes, "In several of the models of the division of cognltive labir... dibersitj puays an important snd povitivw role... ut ekcourages diffdremccs in agenhs, aid
, because in most of these cases, 16028-0338d-1pass-r01.indd 2/21/2020 10:23:45 210 Chapter 13 truth the matter, the can't be veritistically either. And again, the interference will lead to epistemically bad results-stifling distinct perspectives and the values associated with epistemic So, there are epistemic negatives associated with interfering, and epistemic positives associated with Thus, epistemology renders paternalism unjustified. Here is a way to see my overall argument in this section. Standpoint epistemology closely related to interpersonal permissivism. We've already seen epistemic paternalism is unjustified permissive cases. Thus, the same apply situations where standpoint one's attitudes. One might that it is possible to endorse standpoint epistemology but deny permissivism. Maybe a standpoint has a single that is., evidence one and people different standpoints will different evidence. My response is twofold. view, one's standpoint has a relatively limited function; it does affect is what evidence one has. is a reason to think that this is the only function of the standpoint. A natural alternative picture is a permissivist standpoint epistemology, the standpoint also affects way one weighs processes given apparent between standpoints epistemic standards. A second reply is that standpoint epistemology might, on own, render epistemic paternalism unjustified, whether or not permissivism is example, might be something valuable about the fact different provide different bodies of the on of which the idea that researchers a large variety of different is long-term epistemically best. if, from our current perspective, some of those have a low probability of success (or hypotheses they are testing have a low prior probability; see Kitcher 1990, The epistemic diverse perspectives is emphasized in this literature. Muldoon 123–124) summarizes, "In several the models of the division of cognitive labor... diversity an and positive it encourages differences agents, and
, because in most of these cases, a also 16028-0338d-1pass-R01.indd 209 2/21/2020 10:23:45 aM 210 CHapTeR 13 won'T havE access to the trUTh of The matter, the interferenCe can'T bE VeriTIsTicalLy justiFIeD EIthEr. anD agAiN, ThE inteRfeRence wiLl often leaD to EpIstemically bAD rEsults-stifLinG distinct perSpeCtives AnD thE ValueS asSociaTed witH EpisteMic diversItY. so, therE Are episTEMiC negAtives associated wITh INterfering, and ePistemIc POsITIveS asSociated wiTh Not-inTErferinG. thUS, STanDPoint epistemoLogy also renDErs EpisteMiC paTErnaliSm unjUsTIfiEd. Here is a waY to sEe my overaLl arguMEnt in thIS sectioN. StandPoiNt ePistEMoLoGy iS cLOseLY rElaTEd tO interpeRsOnAl perMissIVISM. We'vE alReadY seen That epistemic PatErnaLIsm Is unjUstifIed iN pErmisSive caSes. ThUs, The same considerAtioNs apply to SitUaTioNs Where ONe's staNdpOinT affectS one's epISteMiC ATTiTudes. One might objecT tHAT iT is possiBle to eNDoRsE StandpoiNt EpiStemOLOgy buT denY PeRmissiviSm. MaybE A sTaNdpoint HaS a singLe PurPosE, that IS., chaNging wHat evideNce onE Has, and two peoplE With different STaNDPoINts wIll Always have dIffeREnt eVideNCe. my rESponsE is twOfOLd. fIrst, on this view, one's sTaNdpoinT has a Relatively limIted functiON; ALl it does Is afFEcT Is what evidence One haS. There is a rEAson to thInk thAt this is Not the onlY FUnction oF thE stAndPoiNT. a nAtural alternaTIVe piCtUre is a pErmIssivisT stAndPoiNt ePiStemology, On which tHe StAnDpOinT also AFfects thE wAy oNe WeiGhs or PRocessEs eviDencE-eSpECiaLly giveN ThE APparEnT sImilAriTiEs betWeen STanDpoints And episteMic STandArDs. a second Reply is that stAnDpoint episTeMolOgy migHT, On its own, Render epistemic paternalISm unjusTifIed, whEtheR or not perMisSivism Is tRUe. For eXample, There MiGht BE SometHINg EpiStEmically vaLUAblE abouT tHe faCt that dIfferent standpointS ProVide different BodIes oF EViDenCE. CONsiDeR The LITerature on the coGnitive divIsIOn Of labor, whiCH suPpOrts the Idea thaT reseARchers pUrsing a laRge varietY oF difFERenT projects iS long-terM epistemiCAlly bESt. this dIveRsity iS vAluAble eVen if, fROm oUr curRent peRsPectivE, some Of Those proJects have a low probabilitY of sucCess (oR thE hypothesEs tHEy aRe testing Have A low prior pRobAbiLity; sEe KITcher 1990, 1993). the ePIsTemIC valuE of dIVerse persPEcTivES Is Emphasized iN THIs lIteraTurE. muldooN (2013: 123–124) sumMarizes, "In several oF The models of the DiviSIOn oF coGNitiVe Labor... diversity PlaYs AN ImportanT aNd positive rOle... it encOuRAges dIffereNces in Agents, aND
, because in most of these  cases, Aalso160 28- 03 38d- 1pas s-r01.indd 209 2/21 /2020 10:23:45 AM 210Chapt er 13 w o n' t hav e acces s  t o the  t ru thof th e mat ter , the i nterferenc e c an 't be veriti s ti cally just ifi ed either. A ndagain,  t hei nterf ere nce w ill of t en lea d to epis te m ically bad res u l ts -sti fling distinct pe r sp e ctives and the  value sa ss o c iat edwith epist em ic di v ersity. So , t her e  are epistemi c negatives ass ociate dwit h  inter ferin g, and  epistemicposi tives ass ociate d  with n o t-inter fering . T hus , st a nd po int  e p ist e mo log y  al so rende rs  e piste micp a t e rnal ism  unj ustif ied. Here isa w ay t o  se e myovera ll a rg ument  in th is se ct ion. Standpoint  epi stemology  is  c los el y rel a ted to  in ter persona l permi s siv is m . We 've already seen t ha t ep istemicpatern a li sm is unjus ti fie d in p ermis sive ca ses. Thu s, the sa me  consid er ations  a ppl y t o sit u atio ns whe re one's  stan d point affectso ne's epistemi c  a t t it u des.  On e might obj ectt hatit i s  p oss i ble t o end or s es tandpoint epistemol og y butdenypermissivism.  Maybe a s t a n dpoint h as a si n gle purpose, t hat i s., changi n g what e viden ce one h as, and t w o  peoplewit h d iff ere n t  s tandpoints wi l l  alw ay s havedif ferentevi den ce.  My  r esponse i s twofol d.  F ir st , o n thi s  view, o ne 'sst and point has arelat ivel yli m ite d funct i on ; allit  d oesisaf fectis w h atevidenc e one has . T h ereis  a  reason  to think tha tthis is no tthe  onlyf u nction o f the standpoint. A nat u ral alt ern ative  pic ture is a  pe rmissi vis t  stand pointepist em olo g y , onw h ic h t he  standpoin t als o aff ec ts t he wayone weighs or proc e sse s evidence-es pec iall y gi ven th e  ap pa r ent s imilarities bet ween stand po i nt s and epis t emi cstandar ds. A s econd reply i s that st andpointep iste m o log y might, o n its ow n, render epist e mi c pat ern alismun jus tifie d, whe t her  or n ot per mi ssivis m istr ue. Forexample, there might be  somet hingepi stemicall y v a lua ble about  the  fact that  di ffe rentsta n dpoin ts p r ov ide diffe rent bodies of ev ide n c e.  Consider t h e lit eratu reo n thecogn itive division of labor, which s uppo r t s t hei death at researchers  pu rs i n g a larg evariety ofdifferen tp rojec ts islong-t erm epi s t em i callybest . T his diver sit yi s valua bl ee ven if , fr om  our c urrent pers p e ctive, some of t hosep r oject s  ha ve alo w proba b ilit y of succe ss (or thehypoth eses  they  are te st ing ha vealow priorp robabilit y; se e Kitch er  199 0,1993).  The e piste micva lue  of diver s e  p e rs pe c tiv es i s emp ha size d in this literatu re. Muldoon  ( 201 3 :  123–1 2 4) s ummarizes,  "I n sev e r al of them odel s  o f  thedivisi on ofcogniti v e l ab or... d ive r s ity plays  an impor t ant  a nd p ositivero le.. .iten courages differ ences in  agents, a nd
, because_in most_of these cases, A_also 16028-0338d-1pass-r01.indd_209_2/21/2020 10:23:45_AM_210 Chapter 13_won't have access_to the truth of_the matter, the_interference_can't be veritistically justified either. And again, the interference will often lead to epistemically_bad_results-stifling distinct_perspectives_and_the values associated with epistemic_diversity. So, there are epistemic_negatives associated_with interfering, and epistemic positives associated with not-interfering._Thus,_standpoint epistemology also_renders epistemic paternalism unjustified. Here is a way to_see my overall argument in this_section. Standpoint epistemology_is_closely_related to interpersonal permissivism._We've already seen that epistemic paternalism_is unjustified in permissive cases. Thus,_the same considerations apply to situations where_one's standpoint affects one's epistemic attitudes._One might object that it_is possible_to endorse standpoint epistemology but_deny permissivism. Maybe_a standpoint_has a single_purpose, that is., changing what evidence_one has, and_two people with different standpoints will_always_have different evidence._My_response_is twofold._First, on this_view,_one's standpoint_has_a relatively limited function; all it_does_is affect is what evidence one has._There is a reason_to_think that this is_not the only function of_the standpoint. A natural alternative picture_is a_permissivist standpoint_epistemology, on which the standpoint also affects the way one weighs_or processes evidence-especially given the apparent_similarities between standpoints and_epistemic standards._A_second reply is_that_standpoint epistemology_might, on its own, render epistemic paternalism_unjustified, whether_or not permissivism is true. For_example, there might be_something_epistemically valuable about the fact that_different standpoints provide different bodies of_evidence. Consider the literature on_the_cognitive_division of labor, which supports_the idea that researchers pursing a_large variety of_different projects is long-term epistemically best. This_diversity_is valuable even if, from our_current_perspective, some of those projects have_a_low_probability of success (or the_hypotheses they are testing have a_low prior probability; see Kitcher 1990, 1993). The epistemic_value of diverse_perspectives is emphasized in this_literature._Muldoon_(2013: 123–124) summarizes, "In several of the models of the_division of_cognitive labor... diversity_plays an important and positive role... it encourages differences in_agents, and