 apparently simply reiterat- ing what he takes himself to have proven. In light of these three considerations, it is at least plausible that Reid intended to conclude only that we cannot wittingly invent arti- ficial language without prior agreement via natural language. To wittingly invent an artificial sign is to invent a sign, knowing what it signifies. This is an interesting objection, which leads us in a potentially promising direction. But first notice that it doesn't fully deliver on what our critic initially promised. Even accepting the weaker inter- pretation of the argument, featuring the initial statement of Reid's thesis, we may not conclude that Reid was concerned with the wit- ting and effective interpersonal use of artificial language. He liter- ally speaks only of the invention – the witting invention, if you like – of artificial language. This thesis succumbs to our initial example, John Turri | 14 wherein Wally decides to use 'wolves' to refer to wolves. Surely there's no problem supposing that he wittingly does so. Indeed, this is the natural understanding of the case. It would be odd to suggest that despite consciously deciding to use 'wolves' that way, he never- theless doesn't know that he does so. So even taking into account the emphasis on knowledge found elsewhere, we still must substan- tially depart from the letter of the text in order to focus on the wit- ting and effective interpersonal use of artificial language. But let's set aside, for the moment at least, any concern about literal fidelity to Reid's text. Having come this far, it's worth asking whether this Reidian thesis – I don't say Reid's thesis – is true. I suspect that even this thesis is false. To substantiate this suspicion, we must construct a new example, involving onomatopoeia. We do not, by a principle of our nature, understand the cry 'owooo' to mean anything. The cry 'owooo' is not a sign in natural human language. And yet it certainly seems possible that a human with some experience with wolves, call him 'Howie', might decide to use the cry 'owooo' in order to communicate to others his thought that wolves lurk nearby. The invention of this artificial sign didn't require prior agreement using natural signs. And it seems quite nat- ural that Howie would settle on this artificial sign for wolves, having learned that wolves uniquely cry 'owooo' in that distinctive sort of way, which anyone
apparently simply reiterat- ing what he takes himself to have proven. In inner light of these three consideration, it is at least plausible that Reid intended to conclude only that we cannot wittingly invent arti- ficial lyric without prior agreement via natural terminology. To wittingly fabricate an artificial sign is to invent a sign, knowing what it signifies. This is an interesting protest, which leads us in a potentially promising steering. But first notice that it doesn't fully deliver on what our critic initially promised. Even accepting the weak inter- pretation of the argument, featuring the initial statement of Reid's dissertation, we may not conclude that Reid was concerned with the wit- ting and effective interpersonal function of artificial language. He liter- ally talk only of the invention – the witting invention, if you like – of artificial language. This thesis succumbs to our initial example, John Turri | 14 wherein Wally decide to use' wolves' to refer to wolves. Surely there's no problem supposing that he wittingly does so. Indeed, this is the natural understanding of the case. It would be odd to suggest that despite consciously deciding to use' wolves' that way, he never- theless doesn't acknowledge that he does so. indeed even remove into account the emphasis on knowledge found elsewhere, we still must substan- tially depart from the letter of the text in order to focus on the wit- ting and effective interpersonal habit of artificial language. But let's set aside, for the moment at least, any concern about actual fidelity to Reid's text. Having come this far, it's worth asking whether this Reidian thesis – I don't say Reid's thesis – is truthful. I suspect that even this thesis is false. To substantiate this suspicion, we must manufacture a new example, involving onomatopoeia. We do not, by a rationale of our nature, understand the war cry' owooo' to mean anything. The cry' owooo' is not a sign in natural human language. And even it certainly seems potential that a human with some experience with wolves, call him' Howie', might decide to use the war cry' owooo' in order to communicate to others his opinion that wolves lurk nearby. The invention of this artificial sign didn't require anterior agreement using natural signs. And it seems quite nat- ural that Howie would settle on this artificial sign for wolves, having learned that wolves uniquely cry' owooo' in that distinctive sort of manner, which anyone
 apoarently simply reiterat- ing what he takes himvelf tk have pfoven. In light of these threx cobsideeations, it is at least plausiblv that Reud iitended to conclnse only that sc canuov wittingly invgnt arti- fichal language whtfobt prior agreement via natural languwge. To eihtingly invent an swtifjbicl sign is to invent a sign, knosing whet it signifies. This is an interesting obuectlon, which leads us in a potenjjaljt promising airection. But first nojice that it doesn't fully delivef on chat our crutuc ltitially primiseq. Even accepbpng the weaker inter- pretatipn mf rhe argument, featurinj the initial statemgnt of Reig's thesis, we may nor xonclode tvat Fwid waa ronderned wivh the wit- fing and efdective interpersonsl lxe of artifidial lwnduage. He liter- ally speaks only of the pnvehtion – the witting invebtion, if you like – of artificiwl language. This thesis succumbs to our initial efamplx, Gohu Turrk | 14 wherein Wally decides to use 'wolves' to refer fo wplves. Surely tmere's no problem sipooxyng that he wkttingly soes so. Indeed, thid is thg natueal underftancing of the case. It would bw odd to sugyesr that despite condciously deeiding to uxe 'wolves' that way, he nzver- tgeless doesj't know tgxt he does so. So evvn tdking inuu account the emprasis on jnowkedge fuund elsewrere, we stlll mmvt substan- tially feparj from the letteg of the text in order to focus on the wit- timg ang effectnve inberpersonal use of artificial languaye. But let's set zside, fmr the momegt at least, ati concern abont literaj fieeliry to Rdkd's text. Havinb come thps far, it's worth asking xhetfsr this Reidian thtsus – I don't say Rekd's tjexif – is true. I vuspdct yhat dven this tmesks ix false. To substantidte fhis suspicion, we kuft consttuct a ner example, invplving onomatopoeiw. We vo not, by a prynciple of our nature, understahd the crj 'orooo' to mean anybhind. The cry 'pwooo' is not a sign in natural human laiguage. And yet it certaunly seems possible uhat a human xith sjme experhence with wolves, caol him 'Howie', mighu decide to use the cry 'owooo' in ogder to communicate to others his thought that wolves lurk nearby. The invwntion of this artjficoal spgn bidn't rqquice prior agreement using natural signs. And it seeos quite nct- ural that Howie would settke on this artiwicial sign for wolves, hzving lesrned that wolves uniquely cry 'pwooo' in that distinctivc sort of way, shich anyoie
apparently simply reiterat- ing what he takes have In light these three considerations, that intended to conclude that we cannot invent arti- ficial language without prior via natural language. To wittingly invent an artificial sign is to invent a knowing what it signifies. This is an interesting objection, which leads us in potentially direction. first that it doesn't fully deliver on what our critic initially promised. Even accepting the weaker inter- of the argument, featuring the initial statement of thesis, we may not that Reid was concerned with wit- and effective use artificial He liter- ally only of the invention – the witting invention, if you like – of artificial language. This thesis to our John Turri 14 Wally to use 'wolves' to wolves. Surely there's no problem wittingly does so. Indeed, this is the natural of the It would be odd to suggest despite consciously deciding to use 'wolves' that way, never- theless doesn't know that he does so. So even taking into account the emphasis found elsewhere, we still substan- tially depart the of text order to on the wit- ting and effective interpersonal use of artificial language. let's set aside, for the moment at least, any concern fidelity Reid's text. Having this far, it's worth whether Reidian thesis – I Reid's – suspect even thesis is false. To this suspicion, we must construct new example, involving onomatopoeia. principle of our nature, understand the cry 'owooo' mean anything. The cry 'owooo' is not sign in natural human language. And yet it certainly seems possible that human with with wolves, call him 'Howie', might decide to the cry 'owooo' in to communicate to others his thought that wolves lurk The of this sign didn't require agreement using natural And it seems ural that would on for wolves, having learned that wolves cry in that distinctive sort of which
 apparently simply reiterat- iNg what he taKes hiMseLf tO hAve pRoveN. In light of thesE ThreE considerations, it is at lEast pLaUSiblE ThAt ReiD intendED tO COncLuDe OnlY tHAt We canNot WittingLy invent arTi- fIcIal language wIThOut prior agReeMent via naturAl lAnguagE. TO wiTTinglY inVent aN artifICial siGn is to invEnT A sign, kNOwing whAT It SignIfies. This is an inteREsTIng objection, whIch leaDs US iN A PotEntIally promiSiNg dirECtion. BuT FiRST NotICe that it doesn'T fully delivER on What ouR cRitIC initiAlly pRoMIseD. Even acceptIng tHe weaker iNter- prETation oF The arguMent, feAtuRinG the INiTiAl sTaTEmeNT oF ReID's tHesis, we mAy NoT concLude THAT reid Was ConcErned With the wit- tinG anD effECtiVe intErperSonaL uSe of aRtificIal laNgUage. He liter- ally SpeaKs only of tHe iNvEntIoN – the wITting iNveNtiOn, if you Like – of aRTifIcIAL LaNguage. This thesis suCcUMBs To our iniTial exAMpLe, jOhn Turri | 14 WhEreIn WaLLY deciDes tO UsE 'wolves' tO refer TO wOlVes. SureLy There's No ProBleM suppOSing That he WittinglY does SO. Indeed, this is tHE natural underSTaNDInG Of thE caSe. It would be Odd tO SuggEst tHAt DesPIte coNscioUsLY dECiding to use 'wolves' thAt Way, he nEver- tHeless doesn't kNow that he dOES So. So even TakiNG iNTo account the emPhasiS on knowledGE found elSewheRe, we stilL must subsTAN- tially dEpaRt fRom The LETtEr of the text in ORDer tO fOcus on tHe wIt- ting aNd eFfeCtiVe iNtErpersonaL use of arTiFiCiAl LanGuage. bUt let's seT aSidE, fOr tHe momENt at leAst, anY conCeRn ABouT literaL FiDELity To reId's tExt. haVing cOme tHIs fAr, it's woRth asking WheTHer tHiS REidian tHesis – I don't say reId's thesis – iS tRue. i suspeCT That even This thesis is false. To subsTAntiate ThiS suspIcioN, we must coNstRuct a nEw eXAmple, iNvolviNg onoMaTopOEIa. We dO NOt, By a PrInciple of oUR NatUre, unDeRstaNd the crY 'owooo' to mean anythiNG. ThE cry 'owooo' is noT a sIgn iN NAtUraL HuMAn lAnGUagE. aNd yet it certainlY seems possIbLE tHat a human wITh sOmE experiEnce witH wolvES, call hiM 'Howie', migHt decide tO uSe thE CRy 'oWooo' in ordeR to commuNicate to oTHers hIS tHoughT thAt wolvEs LurK nearBy. The iNVenTion oF this aRtIficiaL sign DiDn't requiRe prior agreement using naTural sIgns. ANd iT seems quiTe nAT- urAl that HowIe woUld settle oN thIs aRtifiCiaL Sign fOr woLVeS, haVIng leArneD That wolveS UnIquELY cRy 'owooo' in thAT DIstInctiVe sORt of waY, whiCh anyone
 apparently simply reitera t- ing wha t hetak eshi msel f to  have proven.I n li ght of these three con sider at i ons, it  is a t least pl a u sib le  t hat  R e id  inte nde d to co nclude onl y t ha t we cannotw it tingly inv ent  arti- ficia l l anguag ewit h out p rio r agr eement via na tural lan gu a ge. To witting l y  i nven t an artificial s i gn is to invent a  sign,  k n ow i n g w hat  it signif ie s. Th i s is an in t e r est i ng objection,  which lead s  us  in apo ten t iallypromi si n g d irection. B ut f irst noti ce tha t  it doe s n't ful ly del ive r o n wh a tou r c ri t ici ni tia l lypromised .Ev en ac cept i n g thewea kerinter - pretation o f t he a r gum ent,featu ring  t he in itialstate me nt of Reid's th esis , we maynot  c onc lu de th a t Reid  wa s c oncerne d witht hewi t - ti ng and effective i nt e r pe rsonal u se ofa rt if i cial lan gu age . He l iter-  all y  s peaks on ly oft he  i nventio n– thewi tti nginven t ion,  if yo u like –  of a r tificial langu a ge. This thes i ss u cc u mbstoour initial  exa m ple,  Joh n  T urr i  | 14  wher ei n  W a lly decides to use'w olves'  to r efer to wolve s. Surelyt h e re's noprob l em supposing that  he w ittingly d o es so. I ndeed , this i s the nat u r al under sta ndi ngoft h ecase. It woul d be o dd  to sug ges t thatdes pit e c ons ci ously dec iding to  u se  ' wo lve s' th a t way, h enev er - t heles s  doesn 't kn ow t ha th e d oes so. So e venta ki ng i nto  a ccoun t th e  em phasison knowle dge foun del sewhere , we still mu st  substan-ti all y depa r t  from th e letter of the text in order t o f ocuson t he wit- t ing  and e ffe c tive i nterpe rsona luse o f art i f ic ial  l anguage. B u t  le t's s et  asi de, for  the moment at lea s t,any concern a bou t li t e ra l f i de l ity  t o  Re i d 's text. Having  come this  f a r,  it's wort h  as ki ng whet her thi s Rei d ian the sis – I d on't sayRe id's t hes is – is tr ue. I su spect tha t  even th is th esi s is f al se.  To s ubstan t iat e thi s susp ic ion, w e mus tconstruc t a new example, involv ing on omato poe ia. We do  no t , b y a princ iple  of our na tur e,under sta n d the  cry 'o woo o ' tomean anything. Th e c r y  ' owooo' is n o t a s ign i n n a turalhuma n language. And y e t it certainly  see m s  po ssi b le t ha t a human with  so me e xperienc ewith wolves , call h im 'Howi e', mi ght de cide to u se the cr y 'o woo o' in ord erto communi ca te to oth ershi s thou ght th a t wo l v es lurk nearby.The i n v entio n  of  this  a rtifici a l si gn didn'trequire pri or agr eeme nt us ing nat ur al sig ns.  A nd it seem s  quite na t- ur al that  H owie  wo uld se ttle o n thi s ar ti fic ial signf o rw ol ve s , h avin g lea rn ed t hat wolve s  uniquel y c r y 'owoo o'  in t hat di s ti n c tive sortofway,w h ich anyone 
 apparently_simply reiterat-_ing what he takes_himself to_have_proven. In_light_of these three_considerations, it is_at least plausible that_Reid intended to_conclude_only that we cannot wittingly invent arti- ficial language without prior agreement via natural_language._To wittingly_invent_an_artificial sign is to invent_a sign, knowing what it_signifies. This_is an interesting objection, which leads us in_a_potentially promising direction._But first notice that it doesn't fully deliver on_what our critic initially promised. Even_accepting the weaker_inter-_pretation_of the argument, featuring_the initial statement of Reid's thesis,_we may not conclude that Reid_was concerned with the wit- ting and_effective interpersonal use of artificial language._He liter- ally speaks only_of the_invention – the witting invention,_if you like_– of_artificial language. This_thesis succumbs to our initial example,_John Turri |_14 wherein Wally decides to use_'wolves'_to refer to_wolves._Surely_there's no_problem supposing that_he_wittingly does_so._Indeed, this is the natural understanding_of_the case. It would be odd to_suggest that despite consciously_deciding_to use 'wolves' that_way, he never- theless doesn't_know that he does so. So_even taking_into account_the emphasis on knowledge found elsewhere, we still must substan- tially_depart from the letter of the_text in order to_focus on_the_wit- ting and_effective_interpersonal use_of artificial language. But let's set aside,_for the_moment at least, any concern about_literal fidelity to Reid's_text._Having come this far, it's worth_asking whether this Reidian thesis –_I don't say Reid's thesis_–_is_true. I suspect that even_this thesis is false. To substantiate_this suspicion, we_must construct a new example, involving onomatopoeia._We_do not, by a principle of_our_nature, understand the cry 'owooo' to_mean_anything._The cry 'owooo' is not_a sign in natural human language._And yet it certainly seems possible that a human_with some experience_with wolves, call him 'Howie',_might_decide_to use the cry 'owooo' in order to communicate to_others his_thought that wolves_lurk nearby. The invention of this artificial sign didn't require_prior agreement using natural signs. And it_seems quite nat- ural that Howie would settle on this artificial_sign for wolves, having learned that wolves uniquely_cry 'owooo' in that distinctive sort of_way, which anyone