I think that abortion is morally permissible; but I might be wrong'. What do you mean? Well, you can't mean that you think that objective morality might in fact tell us that abortion is morally wrong-because you don't think there is an objective morality! So what then? Maybe you mean that you think most people in your culture think that abortion is morally permissible, and that you might be wrong about what they think. But then you're not really admitting to the possibility of a moral mistake after all. You're just admitting to the possibility of a sociological mistake. The problem is that if there's no objective moral standard to test your moral claim against, then there's nothing that it can really mean for that claim to be right or wrong. This is, of course, part of the moral relativist's whole point: that there's no such thing as 'objectively right' and 'objectively wrong'. But, if so, then not only can you not say 'I'm objectively right'; you also can't say 'I might be objectively wrong'. Each is as meaningless as the other. In order to be wrong, there must be something to be wrong about-and that means (perhaps) that there must be some kind of objective morality. 3. Toleration and Respect So rejecting relativism doesn't mean thinking yourself morally infallible. Nor, I also came to understand, does it mean thinking that you're justified in 5 imposing your own moral views on others against their will. Moral relativism doesn't have a monopoly on toleration and respect for other cultures. In fact, counterintuitively, moral relativism often gets in the way of toleration. This is the second thing philosophy taught me to see more clearly about this topic. Let's take an example. Suppose that I think that polygamy (that is, the practice of having two or more husbands or wives at the same time) is morally wrong. Suppose that someone else (let's call her Beth) lives in a place where people practice polygamy and, like the majority of people in this place, doesn't think there's anything wrong with it. Suppose further that I believe in a single, objective moral truth. So, presumably, I think that it's an objective fact that polygamy is morally wrong, and I think that Beth is just in error about this. That seems disrespectful of her and her culture. Even more worryingly, it seems that I would therefore be justified in intervening in her culture and trying to stop the
I think that abortion is morally permissible; but I might be wrong'. What do you mean? Well, you can't think of that you remember that objective morality might in fact tell us that abortion is morally improper - because you don't think there is an objective ethical motive! So what then? Maybe you mean that you remember most people in your culture intend that abortion is morally permissible, and that you might be wrong about what they intend. But then you're not in truth admitting to the possibility of a moral mistake after all. You're merely admitting to the possibility of a sociological mistake. The trouble is that if there's no objective moral standard to test your moral title against, then there's nothing that it can really entail for that claim to be right or wrong. This is, of course, part of the moral relativist's solid point: that there's no such thing as' objectively right' and' objectively wrong'. But, if so, then not only can you not say' I'm objectively right'; you also can't say' I might be objectively wrong'. Each is as meaningless as the other. In order to be wrong, there must be something to be wrong about - and that means (possibly) that there must be some kind of objective ethical motive. 3. Toleration and Respect So rejecting relativism doesn't mean think yourself morally infallible. Nor, I also came to understand, does it think of thinking that you're justified in 5 imposing your own moral views on others against their volition. Moral relativism doesn't have a monopoly on toleration and respect for other cultures. In fact, counterintuitively, moral relativism often gets in the way of toleration. This is the second thing philosophy taught me to see more clearly about this subject. Let's accept an example. Suppose that I think that polygamy (that is, the practice of having two or more husband or wives at the same time) is morally wrong. Suppose that someone else (let's call her Beth) lives in a place where multitude practice polygamy and, like the majority of multitude in this place, doesn't think there's anything incorrect with it. Suppose farther that I believe in a individual, objective moral truth. indeed, presumably, I think that it's an objective fact that polygamy is morally wrong, and I think that Beth is just in error about this. That seem disrespectful of her and her culture. Even more worryingly, it seems that I would therefore be justified in intervening in her culture and trying to stop the
I tjink that abortion is movally permissiblg; vut I kight ge wrong'. What do you mean? Well, you cen't nean ukat you think that ocjective lorality migit in fact tell na that abortikk is kirally wrong-begause you dmn't think thera ks an objective morality! So what then? Maybe uok mean that yoo thimh moan keople in your culture think that abortimn is morally permissible, and that you lighh be wrong about wjat they thunk. Fyt then you'rd not really admitting to the possibility of a moral oistale after aol. Yok'te just admivting no the possiblkity ox a socoological mistske. Thw problem is that if vhere's no objective ioral statdcrd to test your morao xlaim agahnst, rhev tgece's nothijg vhat it can really meab for that claim to bq right or wrohg. Thif ys, of course, part of the moral relativivt's whole point: that there'w no such thing as 'obuectively right' and 'objectively wrong'. But, if so, then not otly cen yob not rqy 'I'm objectively right'; you also can't say 'I migrf ne objectively wvong'. Each is as mesnlnbjess as the ojher. In orser to be wrong, thfre musj be simething uo be wrong about-and that means (perhaps) that rhere must be some kind of oblectivg morakity. 3. Toleration and Rerpecf So rejectlng relatjxism doesn't mean thpnkitg yourstuf morally infallyble. Nor, M alsp came go umderstwnd, does ih meak thinking that you'ge judthfied in 5 lmposing your own moral views oi others agaimsd tveir wilj. Morsl relativism doesn't have a monopojy on toleratioh and rxspect for oeher cultures. Ln fact, counverintuityvelt, moeal relxgivism often grts in thv cay of tooeration. This is tme sezknd thing philowopyy taught me to sed mjrv ckewsly about thhs tupiz. Let's take an excmole. Xuppose that I think thaf polygamy (that is, tme practixe of hading two or mpre husbands or wiges av the rame yimg) is morally wrong. Suppose that someone flsc (let's call hqr Bcth) jives in a place where people practice polygamy aid, like the majority of people in this plaee, doesn't thiik thewe's anythhng wrong with it. Suppose further thau I believe in a single, objecdive loral truth. So, presumably, I think that it's an objective fact that polygamt is morally wrong, and I thpnk chat Beeh id just in error anout this. That seems disrespecthul of her aud her culture. Even more worruivgly, it seems that I would therefore ge justigied in intervening in her cultire and trying to stop tme
I think that abortion is morally permissible; might wrong'. What you mean? Well, think objective morality might fact tell us abortion is morally wrong-because you don't there is an objective morality! So what then? Maybe you mean that you most people in your culture think that abortion is morally permissible, and that might wrong what think. But then you're not really admitting to the possibility of a moral mistake after all. just admitting to the possibility of a sociological The problem is that there's no objective moral standard test moral claim then nothing it can really for that claim to be right or wrong. This is, of course, part of the moral relativist's point: that such thing 'objectively and wrong'. But, if not only can you not say you also can't say 'I might be objectively Each is meaningless as the other. In order be wrong, there must be something to be about-and that means (perhaps) that there must be some kind of objective morality. 3. Toleration So rejecting relativism doesn't thinking yourself morally Nor, also to does it thinking that you're justified in 5 imposing your own moral views others against their will. Moral relativism doesn't have a monopoly and for other cultures. fact, counterintuitively, moral relativism gets the way of toleration. the thing to more about this topic. Let's an example. Suppose that I that polygamy (that is, or more husbands or wives at the same is morally wrong. Suppose that someone else call her Beth) lives in a place where people practice polygamy and, the majority in this place, doesn't think there's anything wrong it. Suppose further that believe in a single, objective moral truth. So, presumably, think it's an fact that polygamy morally wrong, and think that Beth in error this. seems and her culture. Even more worryingly, seems I would therefore be justified intervening culture and trying to stop the
I think that abortion is moralLy permissiBle; buT I mIghT bE wroNg'. WhAt do you mean? WelL, You cAn't mean that you think thaT objeCtIVe moRAlIty miGht in faCT tELL us ThAt AboRtIOn Is morAllY wrong-bEcause you dOn't ThInk there is an OBjEctive moraLitY! So what then? MAybE you meAn ThaT You thInk Most pEople iN Your cuLture thinK tHAt aborTIon is moRALlY perMissible, and that yoU MiGHt be wrong about What thEy THiNK. but TheN you're not rEaLly adMItting tO ThE POSsiBIlity of a moral Mistake afteR All. you're jUsT adMItting To the PoSSibIlity of a socIoloGical mistAke. The PRoblem iS That if tHere's nO obJecTive MOrAl StaNdARd tO TeSt yOUr mOral claiM aGaInst, tHen tHERE'S notHinG thaT it caN really mean foR thAt clAIm tO be riGht or WronG. THis is, Of courSe, parT oF the moral relatiVist'S whole poiNt: tHaT thErE's no sUCh thinG as 'ObjEctivelY right' aND 'obJeCTIVeLy wrong'. But, if so, then NoT ONlY can you nOt say 'I'M ObJeCTively riGhT'; yoU alsO CAn't saY 'I miGHt Be objectIvely wROnG'. EAch is as MeAninglEsS as The Other. iN ordEr to be Wrong, theRe musT Be something to bE Wrong about-and THaT MEaNS (perHapS) that there mUst bE Some Kind OF oBjeCTive mOraliTy. 3. tOlERation and Respect So rEjEcting RelatIvism doesn't meAn thinking YOURself morAlly INfALlible. Nor, I also Came tO understanD, Does it meAn thiNking thaT you're jusTIFied in 5 imPosIng YouR owN MOrAl views on otheRS AgaiNsT their wIll. moral reLatIviSm dOesN't Have a monoPoly on toLeRaTiOn And RespeCT for otheR cUltUrEs. IN fact, COunterIntuiTiveLy, MoRAl rElativiSM oFTEn geTs In The wAy oF tOleraTion. tHis Is the seCond thing PhiLOsopHy TaUght me tO see more clearLy About this tOpIc. LEt's takE AN example. suppose that I think that poLYgamy (thAt iS, the pRactIce of haviNg tWo or moRe hUSbands Or wiveS at thE sAme TIMe) is mORAlLy wRoNg. Suppose tHAT soMeone ElSe (leT's call hEr Beth) lives in a placE WheRe people practIce PolyGAMy And, LIkE The MaJOriTY Of people in this pLace, doesn't ThINk There's anytHIng WrOng with It. SuppoSe furTHer that i believe iN a single, oBjEctiVE MorAl truth. So, pResumablY, I think thAT it's aN ObJectiVe fAct thaT pOlyGamy iS moralLY wrOng, anD I thinK tHat BetH is juSt In error aBout this. That seems disresPectfuL of heR anD her cultuRe. EVEn mOre worryiNgly, It seems thaT I wOulD therEfoRE be juStifIEd In iNTerveNing IN her cultuRE aNd tRYInG to stop the
I think that abortion is m orally per missi ble ; b ut  I m ight  be wrong'. Wh a t do  you mean? Well, you c an'tme a n th a tyou t hink th a to b jec ti ve  mo ra l it y mig htin fact  tell us t hat  a bortion is m o ra lly wrong- bec ause you don 'tthinkth ere is an  ob jecti ve mor a lity!So what t he n ? Mayb e  you me a n  t hatyou think most pe o pl e  in your cultu re thi nk th a t  ab ort ion is mor al ly pe r missibl e ,a n d  th a t you might b e wrong abo u t w hat th ey  th i nk. Bu t the ny ou' re not real ly a dmittingto the possibi l ity ofa mora l m ist akea ft er  al l. You ' re  ju s t a dmitting  t othe p ossi b i l i ty o f a  soc iolog ical mistake.  Th e pr o ble m isthatif t he re'sno obj ectiv emoral standardto t est yourmor al  cl ai m aga i nst, t hen  th ere's n othingt hat  i t c an  really mean for t ha t cl aim to b e righ t  o rw rong. Th is  is , of c ourse , pa r tof the m oral r e la ti vist'swh ole po in t:tha t the r e'sno suc h thingas 'o b jectively righ t ' and 'object i ve l y  w r ong' . B ut, if so,then notonly ca n y o u not  say'I ' mo bjectively right';yo u also  can' t say 'I migh t be objec t i v ely wron g'.E ac h  is as meaning lessas the oth e r. In or der t o be wro ng, there m ust be s ome thi ngtob e  w rong about-an d that  m eans (p erh aps) th atthe remus tbe some k ind of o bj ec ti ve  mo ralit y . 3. Tol er ati on  an d Res p ect So  reje ctin gre l ati vism do e sn ' t  mea nth inki ngyo ursel f mo r all y infal lible. No r,I  als oca me to u nderstand, do es  it mean t hi nki ng tha t you're j ustified in 5 imposingy our own  mo ral v iews  on other s a gainst  th e ir wil l. Mor al re la tiv i s m doe s n 't  ha ve  a monopol y ontoler at ionand res pect for other cul t ure s. In fact, c oun teri n t ui tiv e ly ,  mo ra l  re l a tivism often ge ts in thewa y  o f tolerati o n.Th is is t he seco nd th i ng phil osophy ta ught me t oseem o reclearly ab out this  topic. L e t's t a ke  an e xam ple. S up pos e tha t I th i nkthatpolyga my  (that  is,th e practi ce of having two or mor e husb andsorwives atthe sam e time) i s mo rally wron g.Sup posetha t  some onee ls e ( l et'scall her Beth) li ves i na place whe r e peo ple p rac t ice po lyga my and, like them ajority of peo plei n  th isp lace ,doesn't thinkthe re ' s  anythin gwrong withit. Supp os e  furt her th at I b elievei n  a single , ob jec tive mora l t ru t h. So,pr es u mably,  I t hi nk tha t it's an o b j ective fact that  poly g a my is mor allywr ong, an d  I t hink thatBeth is jus t in e rror  abou t this.  T hat se ems  d isrespectf u l of herand h er cult ur e. E ven  moreworr y i ngly,  itse ems  that I w o u ld th er e for e be  just if iedin interv e ning inher culture  a ndt r ying t o  s t o p the
I think_that abortion_is morally permissible; but_I might_be_wrong'. What_do_you mean? Well,_you can't mean_that you think that_objective morality might_in_fact tell us that abortion is morally wrong-because you don't think there is an_objective_morality! So_what_then?_Maybe you mean that you_think most people in your_culture think_that abortion is morally permissible, and that you_might_be wrong about_what they think. But then you're not really admitting_to the possibility of a moral_mistake after all._You're_just_admitting to the possibility_of a sociological mistake. The problem_is that if there's no objective_moral standard to test your moral claim_against, then there's nothing that it_can really mean for that_claim to_be right or wrong. This_is, of course,_part of_the moral relativist's_whole point: that there's no such_thing as 'objectively_right' and 'objectively wrong'. But, if_so,_then not only_can_you_not say_'I'm objectively right';_you_also can't_say_'I might be objectively wrong'. Each_is_as meaningless as the other. In order_to be wrong, there_must_be something to be_wrong about-and that means (perhaps)_that there must be some kind_of objective_morality. 3._Toleration and Respect So rejecting relativism doesn't mean thinking yourself morally_infallible. Nor, I also came to_understand, does it mean_thinking that_you're_justified in 5_imposing_your own_moral views on others against their will._Moral relativism_doesn't have a monopoly on toleration_and respect for other_cultures._In fact, counterintuitively, moral relativism often_gets in the way of toleration._This is the second thing_philosophy_taught_me to see more clearly_about this topic. Let's take an_example. Suppose that_I think that polygamy (that is, the_practice_of having two or more husbands_or_wives at the same time) is_morally_wrong._Suppose that someone else (let's_call her Beth) lives in a_place where people practice polygamy and, like the majority_of people in_this place, doesn't think there's_anything_wrong_with it. Suppose further that I believe in a single,_objective moral_truth. So, presumably,_I think that it's an objective fact that polygamy is_morally wrong, and I think that Beth_is just in error about this. That seems disrespectful of her_and her culture. Even more worryingly, it seems_that I would therefore be justified in_intervening in her culture_and_trying to stop the