 amounts of time to checking our claims and beliefs for possible error, rather they require only that we expend a "reasonable" amount of time doing so, reflects the fact that we are not purely intellectual beings whose only concern is with having an interesting stock of true beliefs.36 Life is short and there are other things to do. Given the need for some epistemic norms, but given what we are like (including limitations), norms like ER* seem to be the very sort of norms we would want and expect to be operative in everyday life. So, once we think about norms in these broadly pragmatic terms, we can see that the sorts of norms we do tend to use are ones for which there is a good rationale. Finally, before leaving this section, I want to raise a question that is directly related to what follows. First, a bit of terminology. As I am using the term, epistemic responsibility is a broader notion than the notion of justified belief. For an individual to be positively epistemically justified in believing some proposition is for one to have positive (undefeated) sufficient reasons or grounds for that proposition. Being epistemically responsible in holding a belief does not necessarily require that one be justified in holding the belief. So, in light of our characterization of epistemic responsibility, we might ask whether one is always required to have justifying reasons for all of the beliefs one holds, and holds without being epistemically irresponsible. Perhaps in some contexts at least, certain beliefs that one is not irresponsible in holding, and which play an epistemic role in the justification of other beliefs, do not themselves need justification. Whether or not there are cases like this will depend on the epistemic norms and practices characteristic of our epistemically responsible agent. It might be the case, after all, that in some contexts, we are epistemically responsible in holding certain beliefs that can serve as a basis for holding other beliefs, even if we do not have justifying reasons for the justifying beliefs in question. In fact I do think this is the case and that the sort of pragmatic rationale just sketched in defense of ER* can be extended to explain why our epistemic A Contextualist Moral Epistemology 305 practices are this way. In brief-given such facts as that we have nonepistemic goals, that we are not able to remember everything we have learned, and that any intellectual endeavor takes time, we simply should not spend time investigating and gathering evidence for all of our beliefs; in fact we could not possibly do so.
amounts of time to checking our claims and belief for potential error, rather they command entirely that we expend a " reasonable " sum of time doing thus, reflects the fact that we are not purely cerebral beings whose only concern is with having an interesting neckcloth of true beliefs.36 Life is short and there are other things to make. Given the need for some epistemic norms, but give what we are like (including limitations), norms like ER * seem to be the identical sort of norms we would desire and expect to be operative in everyday life. then, once we think about norms in these broadly pragmatic terms, we can see that the sort of norms we do tend to use are ones for which there is a good rationale. Finally, before leaving this section, I want to raise a doubt that is directly related to what stick to. foremost, a piece of terminology. As I am using the term, epistemic responsibility is a broader notion than the notion of justified belief. For an person to be positively epistemically justified in believing some proposition is for one to have positive (undefeated) sufficient reasons or grounds for that proposition. Being epistemically responsible in holding a belief does not necessarily command that one be justified in hold the belief. So, in light of our characterization of epistemic responsibility, we might necessitate whether one is always required to have justifying reasons for all of the beliefs one holds, and holds without being epistemically irresponsible. Perhaps in some context at least, certain impression that one is not irresponsible in holding, and which play an epistemic function in the justification of other belief, do not themselves need justification. Whether or not there cost cases like this will count on the epistemic norms and practices characteristic of our epistemically responsible agentive role. It might be the case, after all, that in some contexts, we are epistemically responsible in holding certain beliefs that can serve as a basis for holding other belief, even if we do not have justifying reason for the justifying beliefs in question. In fact I do think this is the case and that the sort of pragmatic rationale barely sketched in defense of ER * can be extended to explain why our epistemic A Contextualist Moral Epistemology 305 practices are this way. In brief - given such fact as that we get nonepistemic goals, that we are not able to remember everything we have memorize, and that any intellectual endeavor take time, we simply should not spend time investigate and gathering evidence for all of our beliefs; in fact we could not possibly do so.
 amlunts of time to checkinn our claims and beliefv for lossible error, rather they require oily rhat qe expend a "reasonable" amount ov time diing wo, reflects the fagc thaf we crx not purely injellectual baings whose onny clncern is with having an interestind stock ov true beliefs.36 Lift if shkgt and there are other things tk do. Ginen the need for xome epistemic norms, but glven what we are like (lncluding lumitwrions), norms uike ER* setm to be the very sort of norms we would wavt anb expect to bw oogrative in eterydaj life. So, oncc we thhnk aboit norms in thcse bcoadoy pragmatic terms, we can see that the forts of toxms we do tend to use aee ongs fos whkxh ghede ia a gold cationale. Fjnally, befoee leaving this secuiog, I want to rajse a zuqstion that is directly related to what fomlows. First, a bit of teeminology. As I am usijg the tewm, epistemic responsibility is a broader notion tvan tie nouiin of hudtified belief. For an individual to be positidslu vpistemically jusbified in believinb dokg proposition ks for ons to have positive (undefewted) wufficienu reaxons or grounds for that priposition. Bepng wpistemically resplnsible in koldinb a brlief does not necessarnly resuire that lne be juagified in holdine tme telief. So, in light of our sharactermzatipn of eoistgmic refponsibilihy, we might ask whether lne id dlways reqkired to have justifying reasons for all of tne beniefs onz holdx, and holds wythout being ekistemicajly ifresponsibme. Perheps in some sontexts at lawst, certain ueliefs trat ine us not kfresponsible im holding, and which play an epistemic rous in the justifneauiin of other bekiews, qo npt dhemselves naed gusgoficagion. Whtchev of noy there are cases line tgis will depend on tme epistenic normf and practicrs characteristic lf ouc episvemicakly responsible agent. It might be the case, afber all, that yn sime contexts, we are epistemically responsible in hooding certain beliwfs that can serve cs a basis foc holdyng other beliefs, even if we eo not have justinying reasons for the nustiffing heliefs in question. In fact I do think this is the case and that the sort of pregiatic ratiohale just shztched yn dxfxnse of ER* can be extended to explain why our epmstemic A Woutextualist Moral Epistemologu 305 practices arg this way. In brief-given shch factx as that we have nonepistemic boals, that we are not abke to renembed everjjhiig we have learned, amd thac any untellextuap endeavor tayes tlme, we simoly xhkuld not spend time investigatint and tahhering evidence for all of uur bgliefs; ig fact we could hot llssibuy do so.
amounts of time to checking our claims for error, rather require only that of doing so, reflects fact that we not purely intellectual beings whose only is with having an interesting stock of true beliefs.36 Life is short and are other things to do. Given the need for some epistemic norms, but what are (including norms like ER* seem to be the very sort of norms we would want and expect be operative in everyday life. So, once we about norms in these pragmatic terms, we can see the of norms do to are ones for there is a good rationale. Finally, before leaving this section, I want to raise a question that directly related follows. First, bit terminology. I am using epistemic responsibility is a broader notion of justified belief. For an individual to be epistemically justified believing some proposition is for one have positive (undefeated) sufficient reasons or grounds for proposition. Being epistemically responsible in holding a belief does not necessarily require that one be holding the belief. So, light of our of responsibility, might whether one always required to have justifying reasons for all of the beliefs holds, and holds without being epistemically irresponsible. Perhaps in some least, beliefs that one not irresponsible in holding, which an epistemic role in of beliefs, need Whether not there are cases this will depend on the norms and practices characteristic It might be the case, after all, that some contexts, we are epistemically responsible in certain beliefs that can serve as a basis for holding other beliefs, if we have justifying reasons for the justifying beliefs in In fact I do this is the case and that the sort of rationale sketched in of ER* can extended to explain our epistemic A Epistemology 305 are way. facts as that we have nonepistemic that are not able to remember we and that any intellectual endeavor takes time, we simply should not spend time investigating and for all of our in we could not possibly do so.
 amounts of time to checking ouR claims and BelieFs fOr pOsSiblE errOr, rather they reQUire Only that we expend a "reasoNable" AmOUnt oF TiMe doiNg so, refLEcTS The FaCt ThaT wE ArE not pUreLy intelLectual beiNgs WhOse only conceRN iS with havinG an Interesting sTocK of truE bEliEFs.36 LifE is Short And theRE are otHer things To DO. Given THe need fOR SoMe epIstemic norms, but giVEn WHat we are like (inCludinG lIMiTATioNs), nOrms like ER* SeEm to bE The very SOrT OF NorMS we would want aNd expect to bE OpeRative In EveRYday liFe. So, oNcE We tHink about noRms iN these broAdly prAGmatic tERms, we caN see thAt tHe sOrts OF nOrMs wE dO TenD To Use ARe oNes for whIcH tHere iS a goOD RATionAle. finaLly, beFore leaving thIs sEctiON, I wAnt to Raise A queStIon thAt is diRectlY rElated to what folLows. first, a bit Of tErMinOlOgy. As i Am usinG thE teRm, epistEmic resPOnsIbILITy Is a broader notion thAn THE nOtion of jUstifiED bElIEf. For an iNdIviDual TO Be posItivELy EpistemiCally jUStIfIed in beLiEving sOmE prOpoSitioN Is foR one to Have posiTive (uNDefeated) sufficIEnt reasons or gROuNDS fOR thaT prOposition. BeIng ePIsteMicaLLy ResPOnsibLe in hOlDInG A belief does not necesSaRily reQuire That one be justIfied in holDING the beliEf. So, IN lIGht of our characTerizAtion of epiSTemic resPonsiBility, we Might ask wHETher one iS alWayS reQuiRED tO have justifyiNG ReasOnS for all Of tHe belieFs oNe hOldS, anD hOlds withoUt being ePiStEmIcAllY irreSPonsible. peRhaPs In sOme coNTexts aT leasT, cerTaIn BEliEfs that ONe IS Not iRrEsPonsIblE iN holdIng, aND whIch play An epistemIc rOLe in ThE jUstificAtion of other bElIefs, do not tHeMseLves neED JustificAtion. Whether or not there aRE cases lIke This wIll dEpend on thE epIstemiC noRMs and pRacticEs chaRaCteRIStic oF OUr EpiStEmically reSPOnsIble aGeNt. It Might be The case, after all, thaT In sOme contexts, we Are EpisTEMiCalLY rESpoNsIBle IN Holding certain bEliefs that CaN SeRve as a basiS For HoLding otHer beliEfs, evEN if we do Not have juStifying rEaSons FOR thE justifyinG beliefs In questioN. in facT i dO thinK thIs is thE cAse And thAt the sORt oF pragMatic rAtIonale Just sKeTched in dEfense of ER* can be extended To explAin whY ouR epistemiC A CONteXtualist MOral epistemoloGy 305 pRacTices Are THis waY. In bRIeF-giVEn sucH facTS as that we HAvE noNEPiStemic goals, THAT we Are noT abLE to remEmbeR everything we have LEarned, and that aNy inTELleCtuAL endEaVor takes time, we SimPlY SHould not SpEnd time inveStigatinG aND gathEring eVidencE for all OF OuR BeliefS; in fAct We could noT poSsIBly do so.
 amounts of time to checki ng our cla ims a ndbel ie fs f or p ossible error, rath er they require only t hat w ee xpen d  a  "rea sonable "  a m o unt  o ftim ed oi ng so , r eflects  the facttha twe are not p u re ly intelle ctu al beings wh ose  onlyco nce r n iswit h hav ing an intere sting sto ck of tru e  belief s . 36  Lif e is short and th e re are other thin gs todo .  G i v enthe  need forso me ep i stemicn or m s ,  bu t  given what w e are like( inc luding  l imi t ations ), no rm s  li ke ER* seem  tobe the ve ry sor t  of nor m s we wo uld wa ntand  exp e ct  t o b eo per a ti vei n e verydayli fe . So,  onc e w e  thi nkabou t nor ms in these b roa dlyp rag matic  term s, w ecan s ee tha t the  s orts of norms w e do  tend touse  a reon es fo r  which  th ere  is a g ood rat i ona le . F in ally, before leavi ng t hi s sectio n, I w a nt  t o  raise a  q ues tion t hat i s di r ec tly rela ted to wh at  follow s.  First ,a b itof te r mino logy.As I amusing the term, epis t emic responsi b il i t yi s abro ader notion  tha n  the  not i on  of justi fiedbe l ie f . For an individual  t o be p ositi vely epistemi cally just i f i ed in be liev i ng some propositi on is  for one t o  have po sitiv e (undef eated) su f f icient r eas ons  or  gr o u nd s for that pr o p osit io n. Bein g e pistemi cal lyres pon si ble in ho lding abe li ef  d oes  notn ecessari ly  re qu ire  that one be  just ifie din hol ding th e  b e l ief.  S o,  inlig ht  of o ur c h ara cteriza tion of e pis t emic  r es ponsibi lity, we migh task whethe rone  is al w a ys requi red to have justifyingr easonsfor  allof t he belief s o ne hol ds, and ho lds wi thout  b ein g epist e m ic all yirresponsi b l e.Perha ps  insome co ntexts at least, c e rta in beliefs th atonei s  n oti rr e spo ns i ble i n holding, andwhich play  a n  e pistemic r o lein  the ju stifica tiono f other  beliefs,  do not t he msel v e s n eed justif ication.  Whethero r not th ere a recasesli kethiswill d e pen d onthe ep is temicnorms  a nd pract ices characteristic ofour ep istem ica lly respo nsi b leagent. It  mig ht be thecas e,after  al l , tha t in so mec ontex ts,w e are epi s te mic a l ly  responsibl e i n h oldin g c e rtainbeli efs that can serv e  as a basis fo r ho l d ing  ot h er b el iefs, even ifwedo n ot haveju stifying re asons fo rt he ju stifyi ng bel iefs in q ue s tion.In f act  I do thi nkth i s is th eca s e andthat  t he sor t of p r agma t i c rationale just  sket c h ed in def enseof  ER* ca n  beextended t o explain w hy our  epi stemi c A Con te xtuali stMo ral Episte m ology 305  prac tices a re  thi s w ay. In  bri e f -give n su ch  fa cts as th a t  w e  h av e  no nepi stemi cgoal s, that w e  are not  ab l e to re me mbe r everyt h in g we have le arn ed, a n d  that anyi ntel l ec t ual e ndeavo r take s time, wesi mply sh oul d not spend  time inv e sti ga ting  and gat he ring  e vid en ce for all of o ur belie fs; in f a c t we c oul d  not possib ly  do so.
 amounts_of time_to checking our claims_and beliefs_for_possible error,_rather_they require only_that we expend_a "reasonable" amount of_time doing so,_reflects_the fact that we are not purely intellectual beings whose only concern is with_having_an interesting_stock_of_true beliefs.36 Life is short_and there are other things_to do._Given the need for some epistemic norms, but_given_what we are_like (including limitations), norms like ER* seem to be_the very sort of norms we_would want and_expect_to_be operative in everyday_life. So, once we think about_norms in these broadly pragmatic terms,_we can see that the sorts of_norms we do tend to use_are ones for which there_is a_good rationale. Finally, before leaving_this section, I_want to_raise a question_that is directly related to what_follows. First, a_bit of terminology. As I am_using_the term, epistemic_responsibility_is_a broader_notion than the_notion_of justified_belief._For an individual to be positively_epistemically_justified in believing some proposition is for_one to have positive_(undefeated)_sufficient reasons or grounds_for that proposition. Being epistemically_responsible in holding a belief does_not necessarily_require that_one be justified in holding the belief. So, in light of_our characterization of epistemic responsibility, we_might ask whether one_is always_required_to have justifying_reasons_for all_of the beliefs one holds, and holds_without being_epistemically irresponsible. Perhaps in some contexts_at least, certain beliefs_that_one is not irresponsible in holding,_and which play an epistemic role_in the justification of other_beliefs,_do_not themselves need justification. Whether_or not there are cases like_this will depend_on the epistemic norms and practices characteristic_of_our epistemically responsible agent. It might_be_the case, after all, that in_some_contexts,_we are epistemically responsible in_holding certain beliefs that can serve_as a basis for holding other beliefs, even if_we do not_have justifying reasons for the_justifying_beliefs_in question. In fact I do think this is the_case and_that the sort_of pragmatic rationale just sketched in defense of ER* can_be extended to explain why our epistemic_A Contextualist Moral Epistemology 305 practices are this way. In brief-given_such facts as that we have nonepistemic goals,_that we are not able to remember_everything we have learned,_and_that any intellectual endeavor takes time, we_simply_should_not_spend time investigating_and gathering evidence_for all of_our beliefs;_in fact we_could not_possibly do so.