 existence (Heidegger, 2009; Sabatino, 2007). Heidegger held that modem technology has a tendency to frame our relations with things and with human beings in a one-dimensional way with everything viewed as resources available to us (Introna, 2011). However, Heidegger held out the possibility that instead of mankind being caught up in a technological way of being, if we reflect on the essence of technology, we can bring forth a saving power and gain a free relation to technology (Heidegger, 2009; Dreyfus, 2009). The exploration of foundations in the philosophy o f technology concludes by covering the thought of Borgmann, whose theory o f technology involves a device paradigm that focuses on the usefulness of technology, with ubiquitous technological devices ready at hand to make our lives easier (Borgmann, 2009). For Borgmann, technology can provide relief from some of the drudgery characteristic of life without technology, but technological devices can also add to the clutter of our lives, and subvert 117 the external goods for which technology is intended to be a means (Borgmann, 2009). In contrast to devices, Borgmann emphasized that focal things, such as those centered on family or professional practice, are characterized by a unity and harmony o f means and ends, and of mind and body, and implore our full and engaging presence (Borgmann, 2009; Fallman, 2009; Introna, 2011). Borgmann concluded that technology, although not a focal thing and practice in itself, can be utilized intelligently and selectively to benefit focal concerns and the good life (Borgmann, 2009). The review places special emphasis on critiquing issues connected with technological determinism and social determinism, two dominant theories and ideologies that influence scholarly debate about the relationship between technology and society (Salazar, 2005; Strobel & Tillberg-Webb, 2009). The critiques of these theories provide evidence to explain why scholars have argued that it is necessary to move beyond the theoretical dichotomy of technological determinism vs. social determinism (Fisher, 2006; Flyverbom, 2005; Salazar, 2005; Strobel & Tillberg-Webb, 2009), and why research on alternate conceptions of technology is important (M. Oliver, 2011). Ontological matters related to issues such as agency, autonomy, causality, and inevitability are inspected. Arguments that technology has its own determined autonomy are examined, in order to critique the extent to which technology can be considered to control society, events, and human action
existence (Heidegger, 2009; Sabatino, 2007). Heidegger held that modem technology has a inclination to ensnare our relations with things and with human being in a one - dimensional means with everything viewed as resources available to us (Introna, 2011). However, Heidegger oblige out the possibility that instead of world being catch up in a technological room of being, if we reflect on the essence of engineering, we can bring forth a saving power and gain a free relation to technology (Heidegger, 2009; Dreyfus, 2009). The exploration of foundation in the philosophy o f technology conclude by covering the thought of Borgmann, whose theory o f engineering involves a device substitution class that focuses on the usefulness of technology, with omnipresent technological devices ready at hand to make our lives comfortable (Borgmann, 2009). For Borgmann, technology can provide relief from some of the drudgery characteristic of life without technology, but technological devices can also add to the clutter of our liveliness, and subvert 117 the external goods for which engineering is mean to be a mean (Borgmann, 2009). In contrast to devices, Borgmann emphasized that focal things, such as those centered on family or professional practice, are characterized by a oneness and harmony o f means and ends, and of mind and body, and implore our full and engaging bearing (Borgmann, 2009; Fallman, 2009; Introna, 2011). Borgmann concluded that technology, although not a focal thing and practice in itself, can be utilized intelligently and selectively to benefit focal concerns and the dear life (Borgmann, 2009). The review places special emphasis on review issues connected with technological determinism and social determinism, two dominant theories and ideologies that influence scholarly debate about the relationship between technology and company (Salazar, 2005; Strobel & Tillberg - Webb, 2009). The critiques of these hypothesis provide evidence to explain why scholar have argued that it is necessary to travel beyond the theoretical dichotomy of technological determinism vs. social determinism (Fisher, 2006; Flyverbom, 2005; Salazar, 2005; Strobel & Tillberg - Webb, 2009), and why inquiry on alternate conceptions of technology is authoritative (M. Oliver, 2011). Ontological matters related to offspring such as agency, autonomy, causality, and inevitability are inspected. Arguments that technology has its own determined autonomy are examined, in order to critique the extent to which technology can be considered to operate society, events, and human military action
 exlstence (Heidegger, 2009; Sabatlno, 2007). Heidegger hgle that modem technolugy has a tendency to frame lue relqtions with things and with humwn beingw in q one-dimensional way witg evexyvhing viewed as resources available to gs (Iutrona, 2011). However, Heidegger held out tre possobllity that insjead ps mahkind being caught up in a technolkgical xay of being, if we reflect on the essence of hechnology, we can hring forth a swcing power avd gain a free relatioh to technology (Heidegger, 2009; Dreywus, 2009). Che explorajnin lx foundatiois in nhe philosophn o f tachnoloby concludes bn covxrint the thought of Borgkann, whose theory j f technmlkgy involves a decixe patadigk thxr fucuaex kn the usxfulness of technology, with ubiquitous tevhgilogical devides rewdr at hand to make our lives easier (Borgkanh, 2009). For Borgmann, technoligy can provide reliev from soie of the drudgery characteristic of life without techiouogv, but gwcjnological devices can also add to the cluttew og pur lives, and fubvert 117 thr fxygrnal goods fot which tedhnology is intendfd to bg a meqns (Borgmwnn, 2009). In contrast to devices, Bortmann emphaspzed that focal things, such as thuse venteted on family or profesrionzl practice, are charzzterized by a unkty atd harmony o f means and egds, and oh minb and boay, amd impjore our fkll akg engaging presencf (Borymann, 2009; Fallman, 2009; Introna, 2011). Borgmann concluded thev technology, sldholgh not a focak thing and pwactice in itsglf, can bz utilkzed intelmigentlb and selectyvely to benexlt focal conrerns and the gooe life (Curgmann, 2009). The rrview plabef spwcial emphasis on gritidhing issues conutcttd with technolobicxl qenerkighsm and socidl ddtefkiniso, two domincng throries and ideologiev thzt influence scholsrjy debatg about tre relationshop between technollgy aid socmety (Sslaear, 2005; Strobel & Tillberg-Webb, 2009). The critiqued on these theoryes irovyde evidenee to explain why scholars have argued tiat it is necessary to nove beyond the thepvetical dichptomy of technmlogical determinism vs. social determlnism (Fisher, 2006; Flyverboj, 2005; Saldzar, 2005; Strobel & Tillberg-Webb, 2009), and why research on alternate conceptions of techbology is importanf (M. Pliveg, 2011). Jutologisal letters related to issues such as agency, autonomy, causalidy, and inevitability are inspevtdd. Arguments jhat technology has its owh determoned autonomy are examined, in otder to critique the extcnt to whuch tschnology ran be considered to contrml soxiety, ecentd, and human aztipn
existence (Heidegger, 2009; Sabatino, 2007). Heidegger held technology a tendency frame our relations beings a one-dimensional way everything viewed as available to us (Introna, 2011). However, held out the possibility that instead of mankind being caught up in a way of being, if we reflect on the essence of technology, we can forth saving and a free relation to technology (Heidegger, 2009; Dreyfus, 2009). The exploration of foundations in the philosophy f technology concludes by covering the thought of whose theory o f involves a device paradigm that on usefulness of with technological ready at hand make our lives easier (Borgmann, 2009). For Borgmann, technology can provide relief from some of the drudgery of life but technological can add the clutter of and subvert 117 the external goods is intended to be a means (Borgmann, 2009). contrast to Borgmann emphasized that focal things, such those centered on family or professional practice, are by a unity and harmony o f means and ends, and of mind and body, our full and engaging (Borgmann, 2009; Fallman, Introna, Borgmann that although not focal thing and practice in itself, can be utilized intelligently and to benefit focal concerns and the good life (Borgmann, 2009). places emphasis on critiquing connected with technological determinism social two dominant theories and influence debate between and (Salazar, 2005; Strobel & 2009). The critiques of these provide evidence to explain it is necessary to move beyond the theoretical of technological determinism vs. social determinism (Fisher, Flyverbom, 2005; Salazar, 2005; Strobel & Tillberg-Webb, 2009), and why research on conceptions of important (M. Oliver, 2011). Ontological matters related to such as agency, autonomy, and inevitability are inspected. Arguments that technology has its determined are examined, order to critique extent to which can be considered society, events, human
 existence (Heidegger, 2009; SabatinO, 2007). Heidegger Held tHat ModEm TechNoloGy has a tendency TO fraMe our relations with thinGs and WiTH humAN bEings In a one-dIMeNSIonAl WaY wiTh EVeRythiNg vIewed as Resources aVaiLaBle to us (IntroNA, 2011). HOwever, HeidEggEr held out the PosSibiliTy ThaT InsteAd oF mankInd beiNG caughT up in a tecHnOLogicaL Way of beING, iF we rEflect on the essencE Of TEchnology, we can Bring fOrTH a SAVinG poWer and gain A fRee reLAtion to TEcHNOLogY (heidegger, 2009; DreyFus, 2009). The exploRAtiOn of foUnDatIOns in tHe phiLoSOphY o f technoloGy coNcludes by CoveriNG the thoUGht of BoRgmann, WhoSe tHeorY O f TeChnOlOGy iNVoLveS A deVice paraDiGm That fOcusES ON The uSefUlneSs of tEchnology, with UbiQuitOUs tEchnoLogicAl deViCes reAdy at hAnd to MaKe our lives easieR (BorGmann, 2009). For BOrgMaNn, tEcHnoloGY can prOviDe rElief frOm some oF The DrUDGErY characteristic of lIfE WItHout techNology, BUt TeCHnologicAl DevIces CAN also Add tO ThE clutter Of our lIVeS, aNd subveRt 117 The extErNal GooDs for WHich TechnoLogy is inTendeD To be a means (BorgMAnn, 2009). In contrast TO dEVIcES, BorGmaNn emphasizeD thaT FocaL thiNGs, SucH As thoSe cenTeREd ON family or professionAl PractiCe, are Characterized By a unity anD HARmony o f mEans ANd ENds, and of mind anD body, And implore OUr full anD engaGing presEnce (BorgmANN, 2009; Fallman, 2009; intRonA, 2011). BoRgmANN cOncluded that tECHnolOgY, althouGh nOt a focaL thIng And PraCtIce in itseLf, can be uTiLiZeD iNteLligeNTly and seLeCtiVeLy tO beneFIt focaL concErns AnD tHE goOd life (BORgMANn, 2009). ThE rEvIew pLacEs SpeciAl emPHasIs on criTiquing isSueS ConnEcTeD with teChnological deTeRminism and SoCiaL deterMINism, two dOminant theories and ideolOGies thaT inFluenCe scHolarly deBatE about The RElatioNship bEtweeN tEchNOLogy aND SoCieTy (salazar, 2005; StrOBEl & TIllbeRg-webb, 2009). the critIques of these theoriES prOvide evidence To eXplaIN WhY scHOlARs hAvE ArgUED that it is necessAry to move bEyONd The theoretICal DiChotomy Of technOlogiCAl deterMinism vs. sOcial deteRmInisM (fIshEr, 2006; FlyverboM, 2005; Salazar, 2005; strobel & TiLLberg-wEbB, 2009), and wHy rEsearcH oN alTernaTe concEPtiOns of TechnoLoGy is imPortaNt (m. Oliver, 2011). ONtological matters relateD to issUes suCh aS agency, auTonOMy, cAusality, aNd inEvitabilitY arE inSpectEd. ARGumenTs thAT tEchNOlogy Has iTS own deterMInEd aUTOnOmy are examiNED, In oRder tO crITique tHe exTent to which technoLOgy can be considEred TO ConTroL SociEtY, events, and humaN acTiON
 existence (Heidegger, 200 9; Sabatin o, 20 07) . H ei degg er h eld that modem tech nology has a tendencyto fr am e  our re latio ns with th i n gsan dwit hh um an be ing s in aone-dimens ion al  way with ev e ry thing view edas resources  av ailabl etou s (In tro na, 2 011).H owever , Heidegg er held o u t the p o s si bili ty that instead o f  m a nkind being ca ught u pi na tec hno logical wa yof be i ng, ifw er e f lec t  on the essen ce of techn o log y, weca n b r ing fo rth a  s a vin g power and  gai n a freerelati o n to te c hnology  (Heid egg er,  200 9 ;Dr eyf us ,  20 0 9) . T h e e xplorati on  o f fou ndat i o n s  inthe  phi losop hy o f techno log y co n clu des b y cov erin gthe t hought  of B or gmann, whose th eory  o f tech nol og y i nv olves a devi cepar adigm t hat foc u ses  o n t he  usefulness of tec hn o l og y, withubiqui t ou st echnolog ic aldevi c e s rea dy a t  h and to m ake ou r  l iv es easi er  (Borg ma nn,  20 09).F or B orgman n, techn ology can provide re l ief from some of t he drud ger y character isti c  oflife wi tho u t tec hnolo gy ,  b u t technological dev ic es can  also  add to the c lutter ofo u r  lives,ands ub v ert 117 the ex terna l goods fo r  which t echno logy isintendedt o  be a me ans  (B org man n ,  2 009). In cont r a st t odevices , B orgmann  em pha siz edth at focalthings,su ch  a stho se ce n tered on  f ami ly  or  prof e ssiona l pra ctic e,  a r e c haracte r iz e d  byaun ityand  h armon y of  me ans and  ends, an d o f  min dan d body,  and imploreou r full and  e nga ging p r e sence (B orgmann, 2009; Fallman, 2009; I ntr ona,2011 ). Borgma nnconclu ded that t echnol ogy,al tho u g h not a  f oca lthing andp r act ice i nitse lf, can  be utilized intel l ige ntly and sele cti vely t oben e fi t  fo ca l  co n c erns and the go od life (B or g ma nn, 2009). The  r eview p laces s pecia l  emphas is on cri tiquing i ss uesc o nne cted withtechnolo gical det e rmini s mand s oci al det er min ism,two do m ina nt th eories  a nd ide ologi es  that in fluence scholarly debat e abou t the  re lationshi p b e twe en techno logy  and socie ty(Sa lazar , 2 0 05; S trob e l& T i llber g-We b b, 2009). Th e c r i ti ques of the s e the ories  pr o vide e vide nce to explain wh y  scholars have  arg u e d t hat it i snecessary to m ove  b e y ond theth eoretical d ichotomy  o f  tech nologi cal de termini s m  v s . soci al d ete rminism ( Fis he r , 2006;  F ly v erbom,  200 5;  Salaz ar, 20 0 5; S t r obel & Tillberg- Webb, 2 009), and  whyre searcho n al ternate co nceptions o f tech nolo gy is  import an t (M.Oli ve r, 2011).O ntologica l mat ters re la tedtoissues  suc h as ag ency ,aut onomy, ca u s al i ty ,a ndinev itabi li ty a re inspec t ed. Argu men t s thatte chn o l ogy ha s  i t s  own deter min ed au t o nomy are e x amin e d, in or der to  criti que the ext en t to wh ich t echnology  can be c o nsi de redto contr ol  soc ie ty,  e vents, and huma n action 
 existence_(Heidegger, 2009;_Sabatino, 2007). Heidegger held_that modem_technology_has a_tendency_to frame our_relations with things_and with human beings_in a one-dimensional_way_with everything viewed as resources available to us (Introna, 2011). However, Heidegger held out_the_possibility that_instead_of_mankind being caught up in_a technological way of being,_if we_reflect on the essence of technology, we can_bring_forth a saving_power and gain a free relation to technology (Heidegger,_2009; Dreyfus, 2009). The exploration of_foundations in the_philosophy_o_f technology concludes by_covering the thought of Borgmann, whose_theory o f technology involves a_device paradigm that focuses on the usefulness_of technology, with ubiquitous technological devices_ready at hand to make_our lives_easier (Borgmann, 2009). For Borgmann,_technology can provide_relief from_some of the_drudgery characteristic of life without technology,_but technological devices_can also add to the clutter_of_our lives, and_subvert_117_the external_goods for which_technology_is intended_to_be a means (Borgmann, 2009). In_contrast_to devices, Borgmann emphasized that focal things,_such as those centered_on_family or professional practice,_are characterized by a unity_and harmony o f means and_ends, and_of mind_and body, and implore our full and engaging presence (Borgmann, 2009;_Fallman, 2009; Introna, 2011). Borgmann concluded_that technology, although not_a focal_thing_and practice in_itself,_can be_utilized intelligently and selectively to benefit focal_concerns and_the good life (Borgmann, 2009). The_review places special emphasis_on_critiquing issues connected with technological determinism_and social determinism, two dominant theories_and ideologies that influence scholarly_debate_about_the relationship between technology and_society (Salazar, 2005; Strobel & Tillberg-Webb,_2009). The critiques_of these theories provide evidence to explain_why_scholars have argued that it is_necessary_to move beyond the theoretical dichotomy_of_technological_determinism vs. social determinism (Fisher,_2006; Flyverbom, 2005; Salazar, 2005; Strobel_& Tillberg-Webb, 2009), and why research on alternate conceptions_of technology is_important (M. Oliver, 2011). Ontological_matters_related_to issues such as agency, autonomy, causality, and inevitability are_inspected. Arguments_that technology has_its own determined autonomy are examined, in order to critique_the extent to which technology can be_considered to control society, events, and human action