	question	are non-negligible	(e.g.	Moller	2011).	So	if	the	probability	of	God's	existence	is negligible,	the	argument	will	not	work. To	briefly	sum	up,	the	probability/possibility	argument	has	some interesting	features,	and	is	hinted	at	in	the	literature,	but	even	after	developing	it in	what	I	believe	to	be	a	charitable	form,	I	find	it	unsatisfactory	as	a	response	to the	epistemological	objection. 28 5.	Conclusion:	Assessing	the	implications The	preceding	discussion	points	to	one	conclusion:	the	epistemological objection	–	in	the	form	presented	–	is	plausible.	Divine	Command	Theories	really do	incorporate	an	epistemic	condition	into	their	account	of	moral	ontology;	that condition	fails	to	be	satisfied	for	a	sizeable	class	of	nonbelievers;	and	the	result	is that	moral	obligations	fail	to	exist	for	that	class	of	nonbelievers.	At	this	point	we return	to	the	question:	so	what?	Is	this	something	that	should	bother	the proponent	of	DCT?	Or	can	they	simply	shrug	off	the	objection?	There	are	several possibilities. If	one	is	of	a	universalist	persuasion	when	it	comes	to	God	and	the	moral law	(i.e.	believes	that	everyone	is	subject	to	the	same	moral	law),	then	one should	be	disturbed	by	the	argument.	It	is	suggesting	that	a	significant proportion	of	the	population	are	outside	the	realm	of	God's	moral	law,	able	
question 	 are non - negligible 	 (e.g. 	 Moller 	 2011). 	 So 	 if 	 the 	 probability 	 of 	 God's 	 existence 	 is negligible, 	 the 	 controversy 	 will 	 not 	 ferment. To 	 briefly 	 sum 	 up, 	 the 	 probability / possibility 	 argument 	 have 	 some interesting 	 features, 	 and 	 is 	 hinted 	 at 	 in 	 the 	 literature, 	 but 	 even 	 after 	 develop 	 it in 	 what 	 I 	 believe 	 to 	 be 	 a 	 charitable 	 form, 	 I 	 recover 	 it 	 unsatisfactory 	 as 	 a 	 response 	 to the 	 epistemological 	 protest. 28 5. 	 Conclusion: 	 Assessing 	 the 	 implications The 	 precede 	 discussion 	 points 	 to 	 one 	 conclusion: 	 the 	 epistemological objection 	 – 	 in 	 the 	 form 	 presented 	 – 	 is 	 plausible. 	 Divine 	 Command 	 Theories 	 truly do 	 incorporate 	 an 	 epistemic 	 condition 	 into 	 their 	 account 	 of 	 moral 	 ontology; 	 that circumstance 	 fails 	 to 	 be 	 satisfied 	 for 	 a 	 ample 	 class 	 of 	 disbeliever; 	 and 	 the 	 result 	 is that 	 moral 	 debt instrument 	 fail 	 to 	 exist 	 for 	 that 	 class 	 of 	 nonbelievers. 	 At 	 this 	 point 	 we revert 	 to 	 the 	 question: 	 so 	 what? 	 Is 	 this 	 something 	 that 	 should 	 bother 	 the proponent 	 of 	 DCT? 	 Or 	 can 	 they 	 simply 	 shrug 	 off 	 the 	 expostulation? 	 There 	 are 	 several possibilities. If 	 one 	 is 	 of 	 a 	 universalist 	 persuasion 	 when 	 it 	 comes 	 to 	 God 	 and 	 the 	 moral law 	 (i.e. 	 believes 	 that 	 everyone 	 is 	 subject 	 to 	 the 	 same 	 moral 	 law), 	 then 	 one should 	 be 	 disturb 	 by 	 the 	 argument. 	 It 	 is 	 suggesting 	 that 	 a 	 meaning symmetry 	 of 	 the 	 population 	 are 	 outside 	 the 	 realm 	 of 	 God's 	 moral 	 law, 	 able
	quedtion	are non-negligible	(e.g.	Ooller	2011).	So	if	the	probabilivy	of	God'a	existenze	is negligible,	the	argument	wipl	bot	woek. To	briefly	sum	up,	the	prubability/iossibiliry	arjument	has	some invsrestinn	yeatudcs,	and	ns	iinted	at	in	the	lijerature,	but	eeen	after	develo[ivg	nt in	what	I	believe	to	be	a	charitable	form,	Y	find	it	indatisfactory	as	w	reskonfe	to nht	epistemological	objection. 28 5.	Concluaion:	Asstssing	the	implicatipns The	preceding	discussion	ooinhs	to	one	conclusion:	tje	epistemoligicwo objection	–	iv	the	form	prtsznted	–	is	plauaible.	Divine	Command	Theories	reallh do	iucorporate	ab	epishgmic	conditioi	into	treir	account	on	koral	ottology;	yhat condition	nails	vo	be	watisfied	for	a	sizeable	rlass	of	nonbelievers;	agd	the	resunt	ns that	moral	obligatiobs	dail	tm	exivt	fof	rhag	clzsx	or	nonbepieters.	At	this	pkint	we retuen	to	the	question:	so	whst?	Yw	this	somethinf	that	srotld	bother	the proponent	of	DCT?	Or	can	they	simkly	shdug	off	the	objection?	There	qre	several possibilitles. If	one	ys	of	a	universalist	persuasion	when	it	comes	to	God	and	the	koral uaw	(n.c.	nelidced	that	everyone	is	subject	to	the	same	moral	law),	then	onq snolld	be	disturbed	by	tme	argument.	It	is	suggrshimd	that	a	signifizant pxkpkrtion	of	the	populatlon	are	ootside	rhe	realm	os	God'x	moral	law,	able	
question are non-negligible (e.g. Moller 2011). So probability God's existence negligible, the argument sum the probability/possibility argument some interesting features, is hinted at in the literature, even after developing it in what I believe to be a charitable form, find it unsatisfactory as a response to the epistemological objection. 28 5. Conclusion: the The discussion to one conclusion: the epistemological objection – in the form presented – is plausible. Divine Command really do incorporate an epistemic condition into their of moral ontology; that fails to be satisfied for sizeable of nonbelievers; the is moral obligations fail exist for that class of nonbelievers. At this point we return to the question: so what? Is something that the proponent DCT? can simply shrug off There are several possibilities. If one universalist persuasion when it comes to God and moral law believes that everyone is subject to same moral law), then one should be disturbed the argument. It is suggesting that a significant proportion of the population are outside the God's moral law, able
	question	are non-negligible	(e.G.	Moller	2011).	So	iF	the	pRobAbiLiTy	of	god's	Existence	is negLIgibLe,	the	argument	will	not	woRk. To	bRiEFly	sUM	uP,	the	pRobabilITy/POSsiBiLiTy	aRgUMeNt	has	SomE intereSting	featuRes,	AnD	is	hinted	at	iN	ThE	literaturE,	buT	even	after	deVelOping	iT iN	whAT	I	belIevE	to	be	A	chariTAble	foRm,	I	find	it	UnSAtisfaCTory	as	a	RESpOnse	To the	epistemologiCAl	OBjection. 28 5.	ConcluSion:	AsSeSSiNG	The	ImpLications THe	PreceDIng	discUSsION	PoiNTs	to	one	concluSion:	the	episTEmoLogicaL oBjeCTion	–	in	The	foRm	PResEnted	–	is	plauSiblE.	Divine	CoMmand	THEories	rEAlly do	iNcorpoRatE	an	EpisTEmIc	ConDiTIon	INtO	thEIr	aCcount	of	MoRaL	ontoLogy;	THAT CondItiOn	faIls	to	Be	satisfied	foR	a	sIzeaBLe	cLass	oF	nonbElieVeRs;	and	The	resUlt	is ThAt	moral	obligatiOns	fAil	to	exisT	foR	tHat	ClAss	of	NOnbeliEveRs.	AT	this	poInt	we reTUrn	To	THE	QuEstion:	so	what?	Is	this	SoMEThIng	that	sHould	bOThEr	THe proponEnT	of	dCT?	OR	CAn	theY	simPLy	Shrug	off	The	objECtIoN?	There	aRe	SeveraL pOssIbiLitieS. if	onE	is	of	a	UniversaList	pERsuasion	when	it	COmes	to	God	and	tHE	mORAl LAw	(i.e.	BelIeves	that	evEryoNE	is	sUbjeCT	tO	thE	Same	mOral	lAw),	THeN	One should	be	disturbeD	bY	the	arGumenT.	It	is	suggestiNg	that	a	sigNIFIcant proPortIOn	OF	the	population	Are	ouTside	the	reALm	of	God's	Moral	Law,	able	
	question	are non-negligib le	(e.g.	M oller 	20 11) .So	i f	th e	probabilityo f	Go d's	existence	is negli gible ,t he	a r gu mentwill	no t 	w o r k.To 	b rie fl y 	s um	up ,	t he	prob ability/po ssi bi lity	argumen t 	h as	some in ter esting	featu res ,	andis 	hi n ted	a t	i n	the 	liter a ture,but	evenaf t er	dev e lopingi t  i n	wh at	I	believe	to	b e 	a charitable	for m,	I	f in d 	i t uns ati sfactory	a sa	res p onse	to th e e pis t emological	ob jection. 28 5.Conclu si on: Assess ing	t he imp lications T he	p recedingdiscus s ion	poi n ts	to	o ne	con clu sio n:	t h eep ist em o log i ca l o b jec tion	–	i nth e	for m	pr e s e n ted–	i s	pl ausib le.	Divine	Co mma nd	T h eor ies	r eally  doin corpo rate	a n	epi st emic	conditioninto 	their	ac cou nt 	of 	m oralo ntolog y;tha t condi tion	fa i lsto b e 	s atisfied	for	a	siz ea b l eclass	of 	nonbe l ie ve r s;	and	t he 	re sult i s tha t	mo r al 	obligat ions	f a il 	t o	exist 	f or	tha tcla ssof	no n beli evers. 	At	this 	poin t 	we return	tot he	question:s ow h at ? 	Isthi s	something 	tha t 	sho uldb ot her the p ropon en t 	o f 	DCT?	Or	can	they	s im ply	sh rug	o ff	the	object ion?	There a r e	severa l po s si b ilities. If	on e	isof	a	unive r salist	p ersua sion	whe n	it	come s to	God	a ndthe 	mo ral l aw 	(i.e.	believ e s 	tha teveryon e	i s	subje cttothe 	sa me 	moral	la w),	then 	o ne  s ho uld 	be	d i sturbedby 	th earg ument . 	It	is 	sugg esti ng 	t h ata	signi f ic a n t pr op or tion 	of 	t he	po pula t ion 	are	ou tside	the 	re a lm	o fGo d's	mor al	law,	able
	question	are non-negligible	(e.g.	Moller	2011).	So	if	the	probability	of	God's	existence	is_negligible,	the	argument	will	not	work. To	briefly	sum	up,	the	probability/possibility	argument	has	some_interesting	features,	and	is	hinted	at	in	the	literature,	but	even	after	developing	it in	what	I	believe	to	be	a	charitable	form,	I	find	it	unsatisfactory	as	a	response	to the	epistemological	objection. 28_5.	Conclusion:	Assessing	the	implications The	preceding	discussion	points	to	one	conclusion:	the	epistemological_objection	–	in	the	form	presented	–	is	plausible.	Divine	Command	Theories	really_do	incorporate	an	epistemic	condition	into	their	account	of	moral	ontology;	that condition	fails	to	be	satisfied	for	a	sizeable	class	of	nonbelievers;	and	the	result	is_that	moral	obligations	fail	to	exist	for	that	class	of	nonbelievers.	At	this	point	we_return	to	the	question:	so	what?	Is	this	something	that	should	bother	the proponent	of	DCT?	Or	can	they	simply	shrug	off	the	objection?	There	are	several possibilities._If	one	is	of	a	universalist	persuasion	when	it	comes	to	God	and	the	moral law	(i.e.	believes	that	everyone	is	subject	to	the	same	moral	law),	then	one should	be	disturbed	by	the	argument.	It	is	suggesting	that	a	significant_proportion	of	the	population	are	outside	the	realm	of	God's	moral	law,	able	