	obligations	even	for	those who	do	not	recognize	those	commands	as	coming	from	God.	To	do	this	two distinctions	must	be	made.	First	one	must	distinguish	between	a	recognition	of	a moral	obligation	and	the	recognition	of	a	moral	obligation	as	a	divine	command. This	distinction	in	turn	requires	that	one	distinguish	a	recognition	of	a	moral obligation	from	an	explanation	of	the	existence	of	a	moral	obligation.	The	defender of	DCT...	must	hold	that	it	is	possible	for	a	reasonable	non-believer	to	recognize	a moral	obligation	without	realizing	that	the	obligation	is	in	fact	a	divine	command. This	ignorance...may	prevent	the	non-believer	from	being	able	to	give	an	adequate explanation	of	the	existence	of	the	moral	obligation,	but	there	are	many	cases	in which	a	person	may	reasonably	accept	the	existence	of	something,	but	lack	an adequate	explanation	of	the	existence	of	something. (Evans	2013,	112-113) There	is	a	lot	going	on	in	this	quoted	passage,	but	the	essence	of	it	is	this: Evans's	Epistemic	Condition:	On	DCT,	a	RNB	can	have	knowledge	of	a	moral obligation	M	provided	that	they	can	recognise	that	M	is	a	moral	obligation; 10 I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for encouraging me to engage with this aspect of Evans's argument. Minor textual note: Evans refers to the epistemological objection as the 'promulgation objection'. The terminological difference is unimportant here. 17 they	do	not	need	to	have	an	adequate	ex
obligations 	 even 	 for 	 those who 	 do 	 not 	 recognize 	 those 	 commands 	 as 	 coming 	 from 	 God. 	 To 	 cause 	 this 	 two distinction 	 must 	 be 	 made. 	 First 	 one 	 must 	 distinguish 	 between 	 a 	 realization 	 of 	 a moral 	 obligation 	 and 	 the 	 recognition 	 of 	 a 	 moral 	 obligation 	 as 	 a 	 providential 	 instruction. This 	 distinction 	 in 	 turn 	 requires 	 that 	 one 	 distinguish 	 a 	 recognition 	 of 	 a 	 moral debt instrument 	 from 	 an 	 explanation 	 of 	 the 	 existence 	 of 	 a 	 moral 	 obligation. 	 The 	 defender of 	 DCT... 	 must 	 declare 	 that 	 it 	 is 	 possible 	 for 	 a 	 reasonable 	 non - believer 	 to 	 recognize 	 a moral 	 obligation 	 without 	 realizing 	 that 	 the 	 obligation 	 is 	 in 	 fact 	 a 	 providential 	 command. This 	 ignorance... may 	 prevent 	 the 	 non - believer 	 from 	 being 	 able 	 to 	 give 	 an 	 adequate explanation 	 of 	 the 	 existence 	 of 	 the 	 moral 	 debt instrument, 	 but 	 there 	 are 	 many 	 cases 	 in which 	 a 	 person 	 may 	 reasonably 	 bear 	 the 	 existence 	 of 	 something, 	 but 	 miss 	 an adequate 	 explanation 	 of 	 the 	 existence 	 of 	 something. (Evans 	 2013, 	 112 - 113) There 	 is 	 a 	 draw 	 going 	 on 	 in 	 this 	 quoted 	 passage, 	 but 	 the 	 perfume 	 of 	 it 	 is 	 this: Evans's 	 Epistemic 	 Condition: 	 On 	 DCT, 	 a 	 RNB 	 can 	 have 	 knowledge 	 of 	 a 	 moral obligation 	 M 	 provided 	 that 	 they 	 can 	 recognise 	 that 	 M 	 is 	 a 	 moral 	 obligation; 10 I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for encouraging me to engage with this aspect of Evans's argument. Minor textual note: Evans refers to the epistemological objection as the' announcement objection'. The terminological difference is insignificant here. 17 they 	 do 	 not 	 necessitate 	 to 	 receive 	 an 	 adequate 	 ex
	obllgations	even	for	those who	ao	not	recognize	tkise	comkands	aa	coming	ffom	God.	To	do	this	two distinctiois	muwt	be	mqde.	First	one	must	distingjish	betwevn	a	recognutioi	of	a moral	obligavjon	and	tmz	recofkitiou	oh	a	moral	obligatipn	as	a	divina	command. This	dhsgiuction	in	turn	requires	that	one	distinguifh	a	recobnltion	of	a	moral jblibwtioh	from	an	explanation	of	the	existence	of	z	moral	ouligation.	The	defrnder of	DCT...	must	hold	that	it	id	posdible	for	a	reasonablf	non-believet	fo	rqxognize	a morxl	obligation	without	reamizing	that	the	obligation	is	in	fact	x	diviue	command. Tyiw	igjmrance...may	prxvent	tre	non-believev	grom	behng	able	yo	give	an	adequabe ex'lanqtion	of	the	existence	of	vhe	moral	obligation,	buj	there	are	mdnv	cases	in which	a	person	nat	reasmnabny	aczwpt	ghe	txixtsnce	of	domxthing,	but	ladk	an adequare	explanation	of	the	ecifnrnce	of	somethjng. (Evwnf	2013,	112-113) There	is	a	lot	going	on	in	this	quoted	passage,	tut	fhe	essence	of	it	is	this: Evqns's	Epistemic	Conditioj:	On	DCT,	a	RNF	can	have	knowledge	of	a	moral obligation	M	provided	that	dhey	cen	fecigkise	gyah	M	is	a	moral	obligation; 10 I am indebted to an anoggmpux reviewer for encouraginb le jo engage with this capsct of Evans's argulent. Migor twxtual noue: Evsns refers to the epistemoligical objecnion as the 'promulgatiln objectiou'. The jerminplogical difference is bnimpodtant here. 17 they	do	nof	veed	to	have	an	adeqjatv	ex
obligations even for those who do not commands coming from To do this First must distinguish between recognition of a obligation and the recognition of a obligation as a divine command. This distinction in turn requires that one distinguish recognition of a moral obligation from an explanation of the existence of a obligation. defender DCT... hold that it is possible for a reasonable non-believer to recognize a moral obligation without realizing the obligation is in fact a divine command. ignorance...may prevent the non-believer being able to give an explanation the existence the obligation, there are many in which a person may reasonably accept the existence of something, but lack an adequate explanation of existence of 2013, 112-113) is lot on in this but the essence of it is Condition: On DCT, a RNB can have knowledge a moral M provided that they can recognise M is a moral obligation; 10 I am to an anonymous reviewer for encouraging me to engage with this aspect of Evans's argument. note: Evans refers to epistemological objection as 'promulgation The difference unimportant here. they do not need to have an adequate ex
	obligations	even	for	those whO	do	not	recoGnize	ThoSe	cOmMandS	as	cOming	from	God.	To	DO	thiS	two distinctions	must	be	Made.	FIrST	one	MUsT	distInguish	BEtWEEn	a	ReCoGniTiON	oF	a morAl	oBligatiOn	and	the	reCogNiTion	of	a	moral	OBlIgation	as	a	DivIne	command. ThIs	dIstincTiOn	iN	Turn	rEquIres	tHat	one	DIstingUish	a	recoGnITion	of	A	Moral obLIGaTion	From	an	explanation	OF	tHE	existence	of	a	mOral	obLiGAtION.	ThE	deFender of	DCt...	mUst	hoLD	that	it	IS	pOSSIblE	For	a	reasonablE	non-believeR	To	rEcogniZe	A moRAl	obliGatioN	wIThoUt	realizing	That	The	obligaTion	is	IN	fact	a	dIVine	comMand. ThIs	iGnoRancE...MaY	pRevEnT	The	NOn-BelIEveR	from	beiNg	AbLe	to	gIve	aN	ADEQuatE exPlanAtion	Of	the	existencE	of	The	mORal	ObligAtion,	But	tHeRe	are	Many	caSes	in WhIch	a	person	may	reAsonAbly	accepT	thE	eXisTeNce	of	SOmethiNg,	bUt	lAck	an adEquate	eXPlaNaTION	oF	the	existence	of	somEtHINg. (evans	2013,	112-113) TheRe	is	a	lOT	gOiNG	on	in	thiS	qUotEd	paSSAge,	buT	the	ESsEnce	of	it	Is	this: eVaNs'S	EpisteMiC	CondiTiOn:	ON	DCt,	a	RNB	CAn	haVe	knowLedge	of	a	Moral OBligation	M	provIDed	that	they	caN	ReCOGnISe	thAt	M	Is	a	moral	oblIgatIOn; 10 I aM indEBtEd tO An anoNymouS rEViEWer for encouraging me To Engage With tHis aspect of EvAns's argumeNT. mInor textUal nOTe: eVans refers to thE episTemologicaL ObjectioN as thE 'promulgAtion objeCTIon'. The teRmiNolOgiCal DIFfErence is unimpORTant HeRe. 17 they	dO	noT	need	to	HavE	an	AdeQuaTe	Ex
	obligations	even	for	thos e who	do	n ot	re cog niz ethos e	co mmands	as	comi n g	fr om	God.	To	do	this	two  dist in c tion s 	m ust	b e	made. Fi r s t	o ne 	m ust 	d i st ingui shbetween 	a	recogni tio nof	a moral	o b li gation	and 	th e	recognitio n	o f	a	mo ra l	o b ligat ion 	as	a 	divin e 	comma nd. Thisdi s tincti o n	in	tu r n 	r equi res	that	one	dist i ng u ish	a	recognit ion	of 	a mo r a l o bli gation	fro man	ex p lanatio n 	o f t hee xistence	of	a 	moral	obli g ati on.	Th edef e nder o f	DCT .. . 	mu st	hold	tha t	it 	is	possi ble	fo r 	a	reas o nable	n on-bel iev erto	r e co gn ize 	a mor a lobl i gat ion	with ou treali zing t h a t	th e	o blig ation 	is	in	fact	a 	di vine com mand.  This 	ign or ance. ..maypreve nt 	the	non-believ er	f rom	being 	ab le 	to 	g ive	a n 	adequ ate  ex planati on	of	t h e	e xi s t e nc e	of	the	moral	obl ig a t io n,	but	t here	a r ema n y	casesin  wh icha perso n	ma y 	r easonabl y	acce p tth e	exist en ce	ofso met hin g,	bu t 	lac k	an a dequateexpla n ation	of	the	e x istence	of	so m et h i ng .  (Ev ans 	2013,	112- 113) Ther e	is alot going 	on	i nt hi s 	quoted	passage,	bu tthe	es sence 	of	it	is	thi s: Evans's E p istemicCond i ti o n:	On	DCT,	a	R NB	ca n	have	kno w ledge	of 	a	mo ral obli gation	Mp r ovided	t hat 	th eycan r ec ognise	that	M i s	amo ral	obl iga tion; 1 0 I  am  in deb te d to an a nonymous  r ev ie we r f or en c ouraging  m e t oeng age w i th thi s asp ectof  E v ans 's argu m en t .  Min or  t extu alno te: E vans ref ers tothe epist emo l ogic al  o bjectio n as the 'pro mu lgation ob je cti on'. T h e  termino logical difference is u n importa nthere.  17they	do	n otneed	t o	h a ve	anadequa te	ex 
	obligations	even	for	those who	do	not	recognize	those	commands	as	coming	from	God.	To	do	this	two_distinctions	must	be	made.	First	one	must	distinguish	between	a	recognition	of	a moral	obligation	and	the	recognition	of	a	moral	obligation	as	a	divine	command._This	distinction	in	turn	requires	that	one	distinguish	a	recognition	of	a	moral obligation	from	an	explanation	of	the	existence	of	a	moral	obligation.	The	defender of	DCT...	must	hold	that	it	is	possible	for	a	reasonable	non-believer	to	recognize	a moral	obligation	without	realizing	that	the	obligation	is	in	fact	a	divine	command._This	ignorance...may	prevent	the	non-believer	from	being	able	to	give	an	adequate explanation	of	the	existence	of	the	moral	obligation,	but	there	are	many	cases	in_which	a	person	may	reasonably	accept	the	existence	of	something,	but	lack	an_adequate	explanation	of	the	existence	of	something. (Evans	2013,	112-113)_There	is	a	lot	going	on	in	this	quoted	passage,	but	the	essence	of	it	is	this:_Evans's	Epistemic	Condition:	On	DCT,	a	RNB	can	have	knowledge	of	a	moral obligation	M	provided	that	they	can	recognise	that	M	is	a	moral	obligation; 10_I am indebted_to an anonymous reviewer_for encouraging me_to_engage with this aspect of Evans's argument. Minor textual note: Evans refers to the_epistemological_objection as_the_'promulgation_objection'. The terminological difference is_unimportant here. 17 they	do	not	need	to	have	an	adequate	ex