	about	the	nature	of	moral requirements.	Examples	would	include	things	like	'moral	obligations	are	otherregarding',	'morality	is	impartial',	'moral	obligations	are	conatively	independent', and	'moral	obligations	are	universal	in	scope	(i.e.	they	apply	to	all	similarly situated	moral	agents)'	and	so	on.4 These	lists	of	moral	platitudes	can	be	more or	less	exhaustive	(compare	Smith	1994	and	Enoch	2011)	and	there	can	be disputes	about	which	ones	should	be	included.	Nevertheless,	once	the	platitudes have	been	identified,	the	metaethicist's	job	is	to	work	out	a	grounding	that	best accounts	for	these	platitudes.	This	is	no	easy	task,	with	some	arguing	that	no 4 This particular list of moral platitudes is taken, with some modifications, from Beyleveld 1991. 8 plausible	grounding	can	be	found	(Joyce	2002	and	2006)	and	others	arguing	that the	best	we	can	hope	for	is	a	theory	that	accounts	for	a	majority	of	them	and	so wins	out	because	it	has	the	most	'plausibility	points'	(Enoch	2011). Who	wins	the	war	is	not	hugely	important	in	the	present	context.	What	is important	is	that	the	DCT	will	be	much	less	likely	to	win	the	war	if	it	excludes	an epistemic	condition.	The	reason	for	this	is	that	most	widely-accepted	lists	of	the key	moral	platitudes	–	particularly	those	relating	to	moral	obligations	–include conditions	that	either	explicitly	or	implicitly	
about 	 the 	 nature 	 of 	 moral requirements. 	 Examples 	 would 	 include 	 things 	 like 	' moral 	 obligation 	 are 	 otherregarding', 	' ethical motive 	 is 	 impartial', 	' moral 	 obligations 	 are 	 conatively 	 autonomous', and 	' moral 	 obligations 	 are 	 cosmopolitan 	 in 	 scope 	 (i.e. 	 they 	 apply 	 to 	 all 	 similarly situate 	 moral 	 agent)' 	 and 	 so 	 on.4 These 	 list 	 of 	 moral 	 platitudes 	 can 	 be 	 more or 	 less 	 exhaustive 	 (compare 	 Smith 	 1994 	 and 	 Enoch 	 2011) 	 and 	 there 	 can 	 be dispute 	 about 	 which 	 ones 	 should 	 be 	 included. 	 however, 	 once 	 the 	 platitudes have 	 been 	 identified, 	 the 	 metaethicist's 	 job 	 is 	 to 	 work 	 out 	 a 	 grounding 	 that 	 best accounts 	 for 	 these 	 platitude. 	 This 	 is 	 no 	 easy 	 task, 	 with 	 some 	 arguing 	 that 	 no 4 This finical list of moral platitudes is take, with some modification, from Beyleveld 1991. 8 plausible 	 grounding 	 can 	 be 	 find 	 (Joyce 	 2002 	 and 	 2006) 	 and 	 others 	 arguing 	 that the 	 best 	 we 	 can 	 hope 	 for 	 is 	 a 	 theory 	 that 	 report 	 for 	 a 	 majority 	 of 	 them 	 and 	 so wins 	 out 	 because 	 it 	 has 	 the 	 most 	' plausibility 	 points' 	 (Enoch 	 2011). Who 	 wins 	 the 	 war 	 is 	 not 	 hugely 	 important 	 in 	 the 	 present 	 context. 	 What 	 is important 	 is 	 that 	 the 	 DCT 	 will 	 be 	 much 	 less 	 likely 	 to 	 win 	 the 	 war 	 if 	 it 	 excludes 	 an epistemic 	 condition. 	 The 	 reason 	 for 	 this 	 is 	 that 	 most 	 widely - accepted 	 lists 	 of 	 the key 	 moral 	 platitude 	 – 	 peculiarly 	 those 	 relating 	 to 	 moral 	 obligations 	 – include condition 	 that 	 either 	 explicitly 	 or 	 implicitly
	abokt	the	nature	of	moral requivements.	Examples	would	incnude	thjngs	like	'ooral	obligations	are	otherregacdint',	'moraoity	is	impartial',	'moral	obuigations	wre	conatuvelb	independent', and	'moral	obllyatiohd	are	bnmversal	in	scope	(i.g.	they	apply	to	dll	similarly shtjaced	moral	agents)'	and	so	on.4 These	lists	of	mowal	platotkdes	can	be	more jr	lexf	exhzlsuive	(compare	Smith	1994	and	Enoch	2011)	and	there	czn	be divputes	about	whoch	ones	should	be	included.	Nevfrthfless,	once	the	platitkdes have	begh	idqbtified,	the	megaethicist's	job	is	to	work	kut	a	grounding	that	best accounts	fur	thexe	platitudgs.	Fhlv	is	no	easy	tawk,	witr	some	arguing	bnat	no 4 This psrticular list of moeal platitudes is takxn, with some modificwtions, frmm Beyleveld 1991. 8 plauwivle	grmundhng	cxb	be	wouhd	(Ooyde	2002	and	2006)	ajd	ovhers	arguinf	that the	bewt	we	can	hope	for	is	a	thtorr	nnat	accounts	fkr	a	majjryty	of	them	and	so wins	out	because	it	has	the	movt	'pmausibility	points'	(Enoch	2011). Qho	wins	the	war	is	not	huggly	importagt	in	the	present	context.	What	is important	is	that	the	DCT	fill	bx	mjch	oefr	oinely	to	win	the	war	if	it	excludes	an epistemic	conditykn.	Uhe	geason	for	this	is	thct	most	widely-acceltfd	kysts	of	the key	ooral	platjtudes	–	particularly	hhose	rejatint	to	moral	ofligstions	–include conditions	thar	either	explibitlt	or	implicitly	
about the nature of moral requirements. Examples things 'moral obligations otherregarding', 'morality is independent', 'moral obligations are in scope (i.e. apply to all similarly situated moral and so on.4 These lists of moral platitudes can be more or less (compare Smith 1994 and Enoch 2011) and there can be disputes about which should included. once platitudes have been identified, the metaethicist's job is to work out a grounding that best accounts these platitudes. This is no easy task, with arguing that no 4 particular list of moral platitudes taken, some modifications, Beyleveld 8 grounding can be (Joyce 2002 and 2006) and others arguing that the best we can hope for is a theory accounts for of them so out it has the points' (Enoch 2011). Who wins the hugely important in the present context. What is is that DCT will be much less likely win the war if it excludes an epistemic The reason for this is that most widely-accepted lists of the key moral platitudes – relating to moral obligations conditions that either or
	about	the	nature	of	moral requIrements.	ExAmpleS	woUld	InCludE	thiNgs	like	'moral	obLIgatIons	are	otherregarding',	'mOraliTy	IS	impARtIal',	'moRal	obliGAtIONs	aRe	CoNatIvELy	IndepEndEnt', and	'mOral	obligaTioNs	Are	universal	IN	sCope	(i.e.	they	AppLy	to	all	similArlY situaTeD	moRAl	ageNts)'	And	so	On.4 ThesE	Lists	oF	moral	plaTiTUdes	caN	Be	more oR	LEsS	exhAustive	(compare	SmiTH	1994	aND	Enoch	2011)	and	there	Can	be dIsPUtES	AboUt	wHich	ones	shOuLd	be	iNCluded.	NEVeRTHEleSS,	once	the	platiTudes have	beEN	idEntifiEd,	The	MEtaethIcist'S	jOB	is	To	work	out	a	gRounDing	that	bEst accOUnts	for	THese	plaTitudeS.	ThIs	iS	no	eASy	TaSk,	wItH	SomE	ArGuiNG	thAt	no 4 This PaRtIculaR lisT OF MOral PlaTituDes is Taken, with some ModIficATioNs, froM BeylEvelD 1991. 8 pLausiBle	groUndinG	cAn	be	found	(Joyce	2002	aNd	2006)	anD	others	arGuiNg	ThaT tHe	besT	We	can	hOpe	For	Is	a	theoRy	that	aCCouNtS	FOR	a	Majority	of	them	and	sO wINS	oUt	becausE	it	has	THe	MoST	'plausibIlIty	PoinTS'	(enoch	2011). who	wINs	The	war	is	Not	hugELy	ImPortant	In	The	preSeNt	cOntExt.	WhAT	is iMportaNt	is	that	The	DCt	Will	be	much	less	LIkely	to	win	the	WAr	IF	It	EXcluDes	An epistemic	CondITion.	the	rEAsOn	fOR	this	Is	thaT	mOSt	WIdely-accepted	lists	oF	tHe key	mOral	pLatitudes	–	partIcularly	thOSE	Relating	To	moRAl	OBligations	–inclUde coNditions	thAT	either	eXplicItly	or	imPlicitly	
	about	the	nature	of	moral  requireme nts.Exa mpl es 	wou ld	i nclude	thingsl ike'moral	obligations	are 	othe rr e gard i ng ',	'm orality is i mpa rt ia l', 	' m or al	ob lig ationsare	conati vel yindependent' ,  a nd	'moralobl igations	are 	un iversa lins cope(i. e.	th ey	app l y	to	a ll	simila rl y  situa t ed	mora l ag ents )'	and	so	on.4 Th e se lists	of	moral 	plati tu d es c anbemore or	le ss 	exha u stive	( c om p a r e	S m ith	1994	andEnoch	2011) and 	there 	c anb e disp utesab o utwhich	onesshou ld	be	inc luded. Neverth e less,	o nce	th e	p lat itud e sha vebe e n	i d en tif i ed, 	the	met ae th icist 's	j o b i s	to 	wo rk	o ut	agrounding	tha t	b esta cco untsfor	t hese 	p latit udes.Thisis 	no	easy	task,with 	some	arg uin gtha tno 4T his pa rti cul ar list  of mor a l p la t i t ud es is taken, withso m e  m odificat ions,f ro mB eyleveld  1 991 . 8p l ausib le	g r ou nding	ca n	be	f o un d(Joyce20 02	and 	2 006 )	a nd	ot h ersarguin g	that t he	be s t	we	can	hopef or	is	a	theor y 	t h a ta ccou nts 	for	a	majo rity of	t hema nd 	so winsout	b ec a us e 	it	has	the	most	'p la usibil ity	p oints'	(Enoch 	2011). Wh o w ins	thewari sn ot	hugely	impo rtant 	in	the	pr e sent	con text. 	What	is  importan t is	thatthe 	DC T	w ill b emuch	less	lik e l y	to 	w in	thewar 	if	itexc lud esanep istemic	c ondition .Th ere aso n	for this	isth atmo stwidel y -accep ted	l ists 	o ft hekey	mor a lp l atit ud es 	–	p art ic ularl y	th o serelatin g	to	mora l	o b liga ti on s	–incl ude condition sthat	eithe rexp licitl y or	impli citly	
	about	the	nature	of	moral requirements.	Examples	would	include	things	like	'moral	obligations	are	otherregarding',	'morality	is	impartial',	'moral	obligations	are	conatively	independent',_and	'moral	obligations	are	universal	in	scope	(i.e.	they	apply	to	all	similarly situated	moral	agents)'	and	so	on.4_These	lists	of	moral	platitudes	can	be	more or	less	exhaustive	(compare	Smith	1994	and	Enoch	2011)	and	there	can	be disputes	about	which	ones	should	be	included.	Nevertheless,	once	the	platitudes have	been	identified,	the	metaethicist's	job	is	to	work	out	a	grounding	that	best_accounts	for	these	platitudes.	This	is	no	easy	task,	with	some	arguing	that	no 4_This_particular list_of_moral platitudes is_taken, with some_modifications, from Beyleveld 1991._8 plausible	grounding	can	be	found	(Joyce	2002	and	2006)	and	others	arguing	that the	best	we	can	hope	for	is	a	theory	that	accounts	for	a	majority	of	them	and	so_wins	out	because	it	has	the	most	'plausibility	points'	(Enoch	2011)._Who	wins	the	war	is	not	hugely	important	in	the	present	context.	What	is important	is	that	the	DCT	will	be	much	less	likely	to	win	the	war	if	it	excludes	an epistemic	condition.	The	reason	for	this	is	that	most	widely-accepted	lists	of	the key	moral	platitudes	–	particularly	those	relating	to	moral	obligations	–include conditions	that	either	explicitly	or	implicitly	