 the sufferings of others. As in the relationship between being-toward-death and care, our experience of limits and loss can not only illuminate the urgency of our own concerns and vulnerability; it might be the best teacher in coming to care for others as well. Although human beings and cultures might differ in their forms of life, there is, I think, a common human understanding of finitude, of what it means to lose one's interests. Compassion in the face of pain, loss, and death can be the starting point for a cross-cultural ethics. It should also be clear that compassion cannot be sufficient for an ethics. It is not possible for human beings to experience compassion universally or continually. There will always be a limit to our experiential concern; some people will always count more to us than others, and heightened compassion whenever it occurs will not last indefinitely. But ethics can still draw on compassion as a familiar and esteemed phenomenon that helps articulate the ethical field, that serves as a reference for many of our values, and that therefore can function as a kind of "measure" (this is Werner Marx's term) for our ethical thinking and our allegiance to moral formulations that are cast in the non-affective, abstract form of rules, principles, obligations, etc. It would be naive to think that ethics and moral education can do without principles or the duty-inclination dynamic. But compassion can still serve as an effective focus for public discourse about regulations, maxims, laws, and government, all of which can in a way be called the ethical "lieutenants" of compassion; that is to say, laws and principles "stand in" for compassion, direct our behavior in its absence in accordance with its "measure," and in so doing ensure a more ethical world when its existential fuel is empty or low. 27 VI. COURAGE Aristotle's ethics focuses on virtues, or character traits and capacities, that are needed to lead a good life and to decide and act in the proper manner in ethical 'oSee Alvin I. Goldman, "Empathy, Mind, and Morals," Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 66, no. 3 (1992), 17-41. 27See Werner Marx, Towards a Phenomenological Ethics, pp. 56-67. For another perspective that considers justice in terms of the tension between universals and singularities, see John D. Caputo, "Hyperbolic Justice: Deconstruction, Myth, and Politics,"
the sufferings of others. As in the relationship between being - toward - death and care, our experience of limit and personnel casualty cannot only illuminate the urgency of our own concern and vulnerability; it might be the best teacher in coming to wish for others as well. Although human beings and culture might differ in their forms of life sentence, there is, I think, a coarse human reason of finitude, of what it means to lose one's interests. Compassion in the face of annoyance, loss, and death can be the starting degree for a cross - cultural ethics. It should besides be clear that compassion cannot be sufficient for an ethic. It is not possible for human organism to experience compassion universally or continually. There will always be a limit to our experiential business; some people will always count more to us than others, and heightened compassion whenever it occurs will not last indefinitely. But ethic can still draw on compassion as a familiar and esteemed phenomenon that helps articulate the ethical field, that serves as a reference for many of our values, and that therefore can serve as a kind of " measure " (this is Werner Marx's term) for our ethical thinking and our commitment to moral formulation that are roll in the non - affective, abstract form of rules, principles, obligations, etc. It would be naive to think that ethic and moral education can do without principles or the duty - inclination dynamic. But compassion can still suffice as an effective focus for public discourse about regulations, maxims, law, and government, all of which can in a manner be called the ethical " lieutenants " of compassion; that is to say, laws and principles " digest in " for compassion, direct our behavior in its absence in accordance with its " standard, " and in so doing ensure a more ethical world when its experiential fuel is empty or low. 27 VI. COURAGE Aristotle's ethics focuses on virtues, or character trait and capacities, that are needed to lead a good animation and to decide and act in the proper manner in ethical' oSee Alvin I. Goldman, " Empathy, Mind, and moral, " Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 66, no. 3 (1992), 17 - 41. 27See Werner Marx, Towards a Phenomenological Ethics, pp. 56 - 67. For another perspective that considers justice in term of the tension between universals and singularities, see John D. Caputo, " Hyperbolic Justice: Deconstruction, Myth, and Politics, "
 thf sufferings of others. Ar in the relationship uetween being-todard-death and care, our expermencw of oimits and loss can nog only ilpuminate the yrgency of our own concedks anb tulnerability; ij might be tve best teaches kn coming to care for others as well. Wlthougn juman beings agd clleurea might differ in their forms of ljfe, thege is, I think, a cpmmon human understanding lf flnitude, of what it means to lise jbe's interestr. Compassion in the fade of pain, loss, and death can bd the starting kojnh for a crosw-cultlral ethics. Ib shoulg also ne clear that gompavsiin cannot be sufficieit for an ethics. It ys not povsnble for human beings ti expgrienwe cunparsikn uhiverswllb or continhally. There will always be a lomyn to our expedientiwl concern; some people will always count kors to us than others, and heightened compassioj whenevew it occurs will not last indefinitely. But ethics can agilo qfqw on compassion as a familiar and esteemed phegkmtnok that helps artlculate the ethicak virjd, that server as a rererence for many ov our vwlues, and that thetefore can function as a kibd of "measurv" (thus is Werner Marx's term) for obr ethocal yhinking and our allegicnce tk moral forlulations ghat are cast in thv not-affective, abstract form os rules, pcinci'les, oblkgatoons, eec. It woulf be kdive to think that ethies ang moral edkcation can do without principlxx or the duti-inwlitation dvnamic. But compassijn can still sgrve as au effeztive focua for pnblic discouwse about reggpations, maxiks, laws, wnd toveenment, xul of which cam in a waj ye called the ethical "lieutcnantr" of compassion; ckau us to say, laws ana pwijcmples "vtand in" for comoasroon, dkrect our bchaxior in its absence in awcorsance with its "meaxuve," and in so doind ensure a mote ethical world wjen ivs exirtentoal fuel is empty or low. 27 VI. COURZGE Aristltlc's ethics foctses on virtues, pr character traits and capacities, that are needed to leae a good life and tp decide and act yn the prmper manner in ethicql 'oSee Alvin I. Gpldman, "Empathy, Mind, ahd Mordls," Pgoceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 66, no. 3 (1992), 17-41. 27See Wxrger Marx, Tosardx a Pveuomznologisal Xtiics, pp. 56-67. For anotner perspective that considers oustice in tzrms of the tension between umixersals and skngularities, see John D. Daputo, "Huperbolic Justice: Deconstructiom, Myth, and Politics,"
the sufferings of others. As in the being-toward-death care, our of limits and the of our own and vulnerability; it be the best teacher in coming care for others as well. Although human beings and cultures might differ in forms of life, there is, I think, a common human understanding of finitude, what means lose interests. Compassion in the face of pain, loss, and death can be the starting point for cross-cultural ethics. It should also be clear that cannot be sufficient for ethics. It is not possible human to experience universally continually. will always be limit to our experiential concern; some people will always count more to us than others, and heightened whenever it not last But can draw on compassion familiar and esteemed phenomenon that helps field, that serves as a reference for many our values, that therefore can function as a of "measure" (this is Werner Marx's term) for ethical thinking and our allegiance to moral formulations that are cast in the non-affective, abstract rules, principles, obligations, etc. would be naive think ethics moral can do principles or the duty-inclination dynamic. But compassion can still serve as effective focus for public discourse about regulations, maxims, laws, and of can in a be called the ethical of that is to say, principles in" our in absence in accordance with "measure," and in so doing a more ethical world empty or low. 27 VI. COURAGE Aristotle's ethics on virtues, or character traits and capacities, are needed to lead a good life and to decide and act the proper ethical 'oSee Alvin I. Goldman, "Empathy, Mind, and Proceedings and Addresses of American Philosophical Association 66, no. 3 (1992), 17-41. 27See Marx, a Phenomenological pp. 56-67. For perspective that considers in terms of between universals singularities, John Justice: Deconstruction, Myth, and Politics,"
 the sufferings of others. As in The relatioNship BetWeeN bEing-TowaRd-death and care, OUr exPerience of limits and losS can nOt ONly iLLuMinatE the urgENcY OF ouR oWn ConCeRNs And vuLneRabilitY; it might be The BeSt teacher in cOMiNg to care foR otHers as well. AlThoUgh humAn BeiNGs and CulTures Might dIFfer in Their formS oF Life, thERe is, I thINK, a CommOn human understandINg OF finitude, of whaT it meaNs TO lOSE onE's iNterests. CoMpAssioN In the faCE oF PAIn, lOSs, and death can Be the startiNG poInt for A cRosS-CulturAl ethIcS. it sHould also be CleaR that compAssion CAnnot be SUfficieNt for aN etHicS. It iS NoT pOssIbLE foR HuMan BEinGs to expeRiEnCe comPassION UNiveRsaLly oR contInually. There wIll AlwaYS be A limiT to ouR expErIentiAl concErn; soMe People will alwayS couNt more to uS thAn OthErS, and hEIghtenEd cOmpAssion wHenever IT ocCuRS WIlL not last indefiniteLy. bUT eThics can Still dRAw On COmpassioN aS a fAmilIAR and eSteeMEd PhenomenOn that HElPs ArticulAtE the etHiCal FieLd, thaT ServEs as a rEference For maNY of our values, anD That therefore CAn FUNcTIon aS a kInd of "measurE" (thiS Is WeRner mArX's tERm) for Our etHiCAl THinking and our allegiAnCe to moRal foRmulations thaT are cast in THE Non-affecTive, ABsTRact form of ruleS, prinCiples, obliGAtions, etC. It woUld be naiVe to think THAt ethics And MorAl eDucATIoN can do without PRInciPlEs or the DutY-inclinAtiOn dYnaMic. buT compassiOn can stiLl SeRvE aS an EffecTIve focus FoR puBlIc dIscouRSe abouT reguLatiOnS, mAXimS, laws, anD GoVERnmeNt, AlL of wHicH cAn in a Way bE CalLed the eThical "lieUteNAnts" Of CoMpassioN; that is to say, lAwS and princiPlEs "sTand in" FOR compassIon, direct our behavior in iTS absencE in AccorDancE with its "mEasUre," and In sO Doing eNsure a More eThIcaL WOrld wHEN iTs eXiStential fuEL Is eMpty oR lOw. 27 VI. cOURAGE aristotle's ethics foCUseS on virtues, or cHarActeR TRaIts ANd CApaCiTIes, THAt are needed to leAd a good lifE aND tO decide and ACt iN tHe propeR manner In ethICal 'oSee alvin I. GolDman, "EmpatHy, mind, AND MoRals," ProceeDings and addresses OF the AMErIcan PHilOsophiCaL AsSociaTion 66, no. 3 (1992), 17-41. 27sEe WErner marx, ToWaRds a PhEnomeNoLogical EThics, pp. 56-67. For another perspeCtive tHat coNsiDers justiCe iN TerMs of the teNsioN between unIveRsaLs and SinGUlariTies, SEe johN d. CapuTo, "HyPErbolic JuSTiCe: DECOnStruction, MyTH, ANd POlitiCs,"
 the sufferings of others.  As in the  rela tio nsh ip  bet ween  being-toward- d eath  and care, our experie nce o fl imit s  a nd lo ss cann ot o nly  i ll umi na t ethe u rge ncy ofour own co nce rn s and vulner a bi lity; it m igh t be the bes t t eacher  i n c o mingtocarefor ot h ers as  well. Al th o ugh hu m an bein g s  a nd c ultures might dif f er in their forms  of li fe ,  t h e reis,  I think,acommo n  humanu nd e r s tan d ing of finitu de, of what itmeansto  lo s e one' s int er e sts . Compassio n in  the face  of pa i n, loss ,  and de ath ca n b e t he s t ar ti ngpo i ntf or  ac ros s-cultur al  e thics . It s h o uldals o be  clea r that compas sio n ca n not  be s uffic ient  f or an  ethic s. It  i s not possibleforhuman bei ngs  t o e xp erien c e comp ass ion  univer sally o r  co nt i n u al ly. There will alw ay s be  a limit  to ou r  e xp e riential  c onc ern; s ome p eopl e  w ill alwa ys cou n tmo re to u sthan o th ers , a nd he i ghte ned co mpassion  when e ver it occursw ill not lasti nd e f in i tely . B ut ethics c an s t illdraw on  co m passi on as  a fa m iliar and esteemedph enomen on th at helps arti culate the e t hical fi eld, th a t serves as arefer ence for m a ny of ou r val ues, and  that the r e fore can  fu nct ion  as a  k ind of "measu r e " (t hi s is We rne r Marx' s t erm ) f orou r ethical  thinkin gan dou r a llegi a nce to m or alfo rmu latio n s that  arecast  i nt henon-aff e ct i v e, a bs tr actfor mof ru les, pri nciples , obligat ion s , et c.  I t would  be naive toth ink that e th ics  and m o r al educa tion can do without pri n ciplesorthe d uty- inclinati ondynami c.B ut com passio n can  s til l serve a sanef fective fo c u s f or pu bl ic d iscours e about regulation s , m axims, laws,and  gov e r nm ent ,  a l l o fw hic h can in a way be  called th ee th ical "lieu t ena nt s" of c ompassi on; t h at is t o say, la ws and pr in cipl e s  "s tand in" f or compa ssion, di r ect o u rbehav ior  in it sabs encein acc o rda nce w ith it s"measu re,"an d in sodoing ensure a more eth ical w orldwhe n its exi ste n tia l fuel is  emp ty or low.  27  VI . COU RAG E  Aris totl e 's  et h ics f ocus e s on virt u es , o r ch aracter tra i t s  an d cap aci t ies, t hatare needed to lea d  a good life a nd t o dec ide andac t in the prope r m an n e r in eth ic al 'oSee Al vin I. G ol d man,"Empat hy, Mi nd, and M or a ls," P roce edi ngs and A ddr es s es of t he  A m erican  Phi lo sophic al Ass o ciat i o n 66, no. 3 (199 2), 1 7 - 41. 2 7 See  Wern er  Marx,T owar ds a Pheno menological  Ethic s, p p. 56 -67. Fo ranothe r p er spective t h at consid ers j usticein  ter msof the  ten s i on be twee nuni versals a n d  s i ng ul a rit ies,  seeJo hn D . Caputo, "Hyperbo lic Justice :Dec o n struct i on , Myth, andPol itics , " 
 the_sufferings of_others. As in the_relationship between_being-toward-death_and care,_our_experience of limits_and loss can_not only illuminate the_urgency of our_own_concerns and vulnerability; it might be the best teacher in coming to care for_others_as well._Although_human_beings and cultures might differ_in their forms of life,_there is,_I think, a common human understanding of finitude,_of_what it means_to lose one's interests. Compassion in the face of_pain, loss, and death can be_the starting point_for_a_cross-cultural ethics. It should_also be clear that compassion cannot_be sufficient for an ethics. It_is not possible for human beings to_experience compassion universally or continually. There_will always be a limit_to our_experiential concern; some people will_always count more_to us_than others, and_heightened compassion whenever it occurs will_not last indefinitely._But ethics can still draw on_compassion_as a familiar_and_esteemed_phenomenon that_helps articulate the_ethical_field, that_serves_as a reference for many of_our_values, and that therefore can function as_a kind of "measure"_(this_is Werner Marx's term)_for our ethical thinking and_our allegiance to moral formulations that_are cast_in the_non-affective, abstract form of rules, principles, obligations, etc. It would be_naive to think that ethics and_moral education can do_without principles_or_the duty-inclination dynamic._But_compassion can_still serve as an effective focus for_public discourse_about regulations, maxims, laws, and government,_all of which can_in_a way be called the ethical_"lieutenants" of compassion; that is to_say, laws and principles "stand_in"_for_compassion, direct our behavior in_its absence in accordance with its_"measure," and in_so doing ensure a more ethical world_when_its existential fuel is empty or_low._27 VI. COURAGE Aristotle's ethics focuses_on_virtues,_or character traits and capacities,_that are needed to lead a_good life and to decide and act in the_proper manner in_ethical 'oSee Alvin I. Goldman,_"Empathy,_Mind,_and Morals," Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association_66, no._3 (1992), 17-41._27See Werner Marx, Towards a Phenomenological Ethics, pp. 56-67. For_another perspective that considers justice in terms_of the tension between universals and singularities, see John D. Caputo,_"Hyperbolic Justice: Deconstruction, Myth, and Politics,"