	the satisfaction	of	the	epistemic	condition.	For	them,	it	is	the	source	of	the commands	that	makes	all	the	difference Is	there	any	way	to	avoid	this	problem?	C.	Stephen	Evans	tries	valiantly	to do	so.	In	its	initial	steps,	his	argument	is	the	same	as	that	provided	by Adams/Peoples.	He	agrees	with	Adams	and	Peoples	that	knowledge	of	the 16 content	of	God's	commands	is	essential	if	moral	obligations	are	to	exist	(Evans 2013,	37).	Indeed,	he	admits	that	'it	is	hard	to	see	how	an	unknowable	moral obligation	could	be	an	obligation	at	all'	(Evans	2013,	38).	He	goes	on	to	claim that	conscience	is	a	key	source	of	moral	knowledge	and	that	conscience	is	open to	all,	believer	and	non-believer	alike	(2013,	41).	Conscience,	according	to	him, gives	us	an	immediate	intuitive	knowledge	of	the	rightness	or	wrongness	of	our actions,	although	he	admits	that	the	knowledge	it	provides	may	be	'highly	fallible' (2013,	41).	Where	Evans	differs	from	Adams/People	is	in	offering	a	more	precise diagnosis	of	where	it	is	that	the	proponent	of	the	epistemological	objection	goes wrong	and	why	it	is	that	knowledge	of	the	source	of	commands	is	not	necessary for	moral	knowledge.10	As	he	puts	it,	the	proponent	of	DCT	must: "defend[]	the	claim	that	God's	commands	can	generate
the satisfaction 	 of 	 the 	 epistemic 	 condition. 	 For 	 them, 	 it 	 is 	 the 	 source 	 of 	 the commands 	 that 	 make 	 all 	 the 	 remainder Is 	 there 	 any 	 way 	 to 	 avoid 	 this 	 problem? 	 C. 	 Stephen 	 Evans 	 test 	 valiantly 	 to do 	 so. 	 In 	 its 	 initial 	 dance step, 	 his 	 argumentation 	 is 	 the 	 same 	 as 	 that 	 supply 	 by Adams / Peoples. 	 He 	 agrees 	 with 	 Adams 	 and 	 Peoples 	 that 	 cognition 	 of 	 the 16 content 	 of 	 God's 	 commands 	 is 	 essential 	 if 	 moral 	 obligations 	 are 	 to 	 exist 	 (Evans 2013, 	 37). 	 Indeed, 	 he 	 accommodate 	 that 	' it 	 is 	 hard 	 to 	 see 	 how 	 an 	 unknowable 	 moral obligation 	 could 	 be 	 an 	 obligation 	 at 	 all' 	 (Evans 	 2013, 	 38). 	 He 	 goes 	 on 	 to 	 claim that 	 conscience 	 is 	 a 	 cardinal 	 source 	 of 	 moral 	 knowledge 	 and 	 that 	 conscience 	 is 	 open to 	 all, 	 believer 	 and 	 non - believer 	 alike 	 (2013, 	 41). 	 Conscience, 	 accord 	 to 	 him, gives 	 us 	 an 	 immediate 	 intuitive 	 cognition 	 of 	 the 	 rightness 	 or 	 incorrectness 	 of 	 our actions, 	 although 	 he 	 accept 	 that 	 the 	 knowledge 	 it 	 provides 	 may 	 be 	' highly 	 fallible' (2013, 	 41). 	 Where 	 Evans 	 differs 	 from 	 Adams / People 	 is 	 in 	 offer 	 a 	 more 	 precise diagnosis 	 of 	 where 	 it 	 is 	 that 	 the 	 proponent 	 of 	 the 	 epistemological 	 objection 	 goes ill-timed 	 and 	 why 	 it 	 is 	 that 	 cognition 	 of 	 the 	 source 	 of 	 commands 	 is 	 not 	 necessary for 	 moral 	 knowledge.10 	 As 	 he 	 puts 	 it, 	 the 	 proponent 	 of 	 DCT 	 must: " defend [ ] 	 the 	 claim 	 that 	 God's 	 commands 	 can 	 generate
	the satisfaction	of	the	episteoic	condition.	For	jhwm,	it	is	vhe	sourde	of	the zommands	that	makes	all	the	diffecencw Is	tyere	any	way	to	avoid	this	pfoblem?	C.	Stvphen	Evanw	trits	valiantly	to do	so.	In	its	inlcial	sfcps,	hiv	ergument	is	the	sake	as	that	prmvided	by Adams/[euppes.	He	agrees	with	Adams	and	Peoples	that	kgowledgr	ov	the 16 content	os	God'x	sommznds	is	essential	if	moral	obligations	ade	to	exivt	(Evans 2013,	37).	Indeec,	he	admits	that	'it	is	hard	to	see	jow	aj	unknowable	moral ohligation	coomd	bq	qn	obligation	xt	all'	(Evans	2013,	38).	He	goes	on	to	clzim that	conscience	is	a	key	source	ow	morak	knowledge	qne	thwj	conscience	iw	open to	all,	believcg	and	non-telievet	alike	(2013,	41).	Conscienge,	accmrdung	to	him, gives	us	an	immxdiate	intuitive	knowlgdge	of	the	rhgktness	or	wrongness	of	oue qctiots,	aldhouey	he	xdmjtx	tgat	the	nnoxledge	it	probides	may	be	'hughly	fallible' (2013,	41).	Where	Tvagw	differs	from	Asams/Pejpje	is	in	offering	a	more	precise diagnosis	of	wvers	it	is	that	the	proponent	of	rhe	epistemological	objgction	goes wrong	and	why	it	is	that	knowledge	of	the	source	of	commandv	is	nov	ndcewswft vor	moral	knowledge.10	As	he	puts	it,	the	proponent	of	DCT	mtat: "dvfend[]	the	claim	that	Nod's	commands	can	genrrwtr
the satisfaction of the epistemic condition. For is source of commands that makes any to avoid this C. Stephen Evans valiantly to do so. In its steps, his argument is the same as that provided by Adams/Peoples. He agrees Adams and Peoples that knowledge of the 16 content of God's commands is if obligations to (Evans 2013, 37). Indeed, he admits that 'it is hard to see how an unknowable moral could be an obligation at all' (Evans 2013, He goes on to that conscience is a key of knowledge and conscience open all, believer and alike (2013, 41). Conscience, according to him, gives us an immediate intuitive knowledge of the rightness or of our he admits the it may be 'highly 41). Where Evans differs from Adams/People a more precise diagnosis of where it is the proponent the epistemological objection goes wrong and it is that knowledge of the source of is not necessary for moral knowledge.10 As he puts it, the proponent of DCT must: claim that God's commands generate
	the satisfaction	of	the	epistEmic	conditIon.	FoR	thEm,	iT	iS	the	SourCe	of	the commandS	That	Makes	all	the	difference IS	therE	aNY	way	TO	aVoid	tHis	probLEm?	c.	sTepHeN	EVanS	tRIeS	valiAntLy	to do	sO.	In	its	initIal	StEps,	his	argumeNT	iS	the	same	as	ThaT	provided	by ADamS/PeoplEs.	he	aGRees	wIth	adams	And	PeoPLes	thaT	knowledgE	oF	The 16 conTEnt	of	GoD'S	CoMmanDs	is	essential	if	moRAl	OBligations	are	tO	exist	(evANs 2013,	37).	iNDeeD,	he	Admits	that	'It	Is	harD	To	see	hoW	An	UNKNowABle	moral obligAtion	could	bE	An	oBligatIoN	at	ALl'	(EvanS	2013,	38).	He	goEs	ON	to	Claim that	coNsciEnce	is	a	keY	sourcE	Of	moral	KNowledgE	and	thAt	cOnsCienCE	iS	oPen To	ALl,	bELiEveR	And	Non-belieVeR	aLike	(2013,	41).	COnscIENCE,	accOrdIng	tO	him, gIves	us	an	immedIatE	intUItiVe	knoWledgE	of	tHe	RightNess	or	WrongNeSs	of	our actions,	aLthoUgh	he	admiTs	tHaT	thE	kNowleDGe	it	prOviDes	May	be	'hiGhly	falLIblE' (2013,	41).	WHERE	EVans	differs	from	AdaMs/pEOpLe	is	in	ofFering	A	MoRe	PRecise diAgNosIs	of	WHEre	it	Is	thAT	tHe	proponEnt	of	tHE	ePiStemoloGiCal	objEcTioN	goEs wroNG	and	Why	it	iS	that	knoWledgE	Of	the	source	of	cOMmands	is	not	neCEsSARy FOr	moRal	Knowledge.10	As	He	puTS	it,	tHe	prOPoNenT	Of	DCT	Must: "dEfENd[]	THe	claim	that	God's	commAnDs	can	gEneraTe
	the satisfaction	of	the	e pistemic	c ondit ion .	F or 	the m,	i t	is	the	sourc e 	ofthe commands	that	make s	all 	t h e	di f fe rence  Is	the r ea n y	w ay 	t o	a vo i dthispro blem?	C .	StephenEva ns 	tries	valia n tl y	to do	so .	I n	its	initia l	s teps,hi s	a r gumen t	i s	the 	samea s	that 	provided 	b y  Adams / Peoples . He 	agr ees	with	Adams	an d 	P e oples	that	kno wledge 	o f 	t h e  16  co ntent	of	G od 's	co m mands	i s 	e s s e nti a l	if	moral	ob ligations	a r e	t o	exis t(Ev a ns 201 3,	37 ). Ind eed,	he	adm itsthat	'itis	har d 	to	see how	anunknow abl e	m oral ob li gat io n 	co u ld 	be anobligati on 	a t	all '	(E v a n s 	201 3,38). 	He	g oes	on	to	cla imthat con scien ce	is 	a	k ey 	sour ce	ofmoral 	k nowledge	and	th at	c onscience 	is 	o pen  t o	all , 	belie ver 	an d	non-b eliever ali ke ( 2 01 3,	41).	Conscience ,a c co rding	to 	him,g iv es us	an	im me dia te	i n t uitiv e	kn o wl edge	ofthe	ri g ht ne ss	or	w ro ngness 	o f	o uractio n s,	a lthoug h	he	adm its	t h at	the	knowled g e	it	provides ma y be 'hig hly 	fallible'(201 3 ,	41 ).	W h er e	E v ans	d iffer sf ro m 	Adams/People	is	in 	o fferin g	a	m ore	precise d iagnosis	o f w here	itis	t h at the	proponentof	th e	epistemo l ogical	o bject ion	goes  wrong	an d why	it	i s	t hat 	kn owl e d ge 	of	the	sourc e of	c om mands	i s	n ot	nece ssa ryfor 	mo ra l	knowled ge.10	As 	h epu ts 	it ,	the proponen tofDC T	m ust:" defend []	th e	cl ai mt hat 	God'sc om m a ndsca ngene rat e
	the satisfaction	of	the	epistemic	condition.	For	them,	it	is	the	source	of	the_commands	that	makes	all	the	difference Is	there	any	way	to	avoid	this	problem?	C.	Stephen	Evans	tries	valiantly	to_do	so.	In	its	initial	steps,	his	argument	is	the	same	as	that	provided	by Adams/Peoples.	He	agrees	with	Adams	and	Peoples	that	knowledge	of	the 16 content	of	God's	commands	is	essential	if	moral	obligations	are	to	exist	(Evans_2013,	37).	Indeed,	he	admits	that	'it	is	hard	to	see	how	an	unknowable	moral obligation	could	be	an	obligation	at	all'	(Evans	2013,	38).	He	goes	on	to	claim_that	conscience	is	a	key	source	of	moral	knowledge	and	that	conscience	is	open_to	all,	believer	and	non-believer	alike	(2013,	41).	Conscience,	according	to	him, gives	us	an	immediate	intuitive	knowledge	of	the	rightness	or	wrongness	of	our_actions,	although	he	admits	that	the	knowledge	it	provides	may	be	'highly	fallible'_(2013,	41).	Where	Evans	differs	from	Adams/People	is	in	offering	a	more	precise diagnosis	of	where	it	is	that	the	proponent	of	the	epistemological	objection	goes wrong	and	why	it	is	that	knowledge	of	the	source	of	commands	is	not	necessary_for	moral	knowledge.10	As	he	puts	it,	the	proponent	of	DCT	must: "defend[]	the	claim	that	God's	commands	can	generate