truth;	that	we	must	know, innately	or	through	serious	reflection	what	is	morally	required	of	us.	But	how does	this	come	to	be	the	case?	On	the	realist	view,	it	seems	to	be	a	mere coincidence	that	our	moral	beliefs	and	attitudes	correspond	with	the	mindindependent	moral	reality.	But	antirealists	argue	that	this	is	troubling	in	light	of the	fact	that	our	cognitive	faculties	are	the	result	of	a	messy	and	highly contingent	evolutionary	history	(Joyce	2006;	Street	2006).	Realists	have	some answers	to	this.	They	try	to	argue	that	there	is	a	correlation	between pleasure/pain	and	the	moral	properties	of	goodness/badness	and	since evolutionary	processes	are	sensitive	to	the	former,	there	is	a	reason	to	believe that	our	evolved	cognitive	faculties	would	pick	up	on	these	deeper	moral	truths (Enoch	2011;	Skarskaune	2011;	Wielenberg	2014).	Who	comes	out	top	in	this debate	is	unimportant;	the	important	point	is	that	realists	generally	agree	that they	owe	the	antirealists	some	account	of	moral	epistemology,	i.e.	that	unless their	metaethical	theory	incorporates	an	epistemic	condition	(one	that	explains how	we	can	come	to	know	what	is	moral)	it	is	deficient	in	some	respect	(Enoch 2010).	My	contention	is	that	the	proponent	of	DCT	is	in	a	similar	position	to	the non-natural	realist:6	they	can	ignore	moral	
truth; 	 that 	 we 	 must 	 know, innately 	 or 	 through 	 serious 	 reflection 	 what 	 is 	 morally 	 command 	 of 	 us. 	 But 	 how does 	 this 	 hail 	 to 	 be 	 the 	 case? 	 On 	 the 	 realist 	 view, 	 it 	 seems 	 to 	 be 	 a 	 bare coincidence 	 that 	 our 	 moral 	 beliefs 	 and 	 attitudes 	 correspond 	 with 	 the 	 mindindependent 	 moral 	 world. 	 But 	 antirealists 	 argue 	 that 	 this 	 is 	 distressing 	 in 	 light 	 of the 	 fact 	 that 	 our 	 cognitive 	 faculties 	 are 	 the 	 result 	 of 	 a 	 messy 	 and 	 highly contingent 	 evolutionary 	 history 	 (Joyce 	 2006; 	 Street 	 2006). 	 Realists 	 have 	 some answer 	 to 	 this. 	 They 	 try 	 to 	 argue 	 that 	 there 	 is 	 a 	 correlation 	 between joy / pain 	 and 	 the 	 moral 	 properties 	 of 	 goodness / badness 	 and 	 since evolutionary 	 processes 	 are 	 sensitive 	 to 	 the 	 former, 	 there 	 is 	 a 	 rationality 	 to 	 believe that 	 our 	 evolved 	 cognitive 	 faculties 	 would 	 pluck 	 up 	 on 	 these 	 deeper 	 moral 	 truths (Enoch 	 2011; 	 Skarskaune 	 2011; 	 Wielenberg 	 2014). 	 Who 	 comes 	 out 	 top 	 in 	 this argument 	 is 	 unimportant; 	 the 	 crucial 	 point 	 is 	 that 	 realists 	 generally 	 harmonize 	 that they 	 owe 	 the 	 antirealists 	 some 	 account 	 of 	 moral 	 epistemology, 	 i.e. 	 that 	 unless their 	 metaethical 	 theory 	 incorporates 	 an 	 epistemic 	 condition 	 (one 	 that 	 explains how 	 we 	 can 	 derive 	 to 	 know 	 what 	 is 	 moral) 	 it 	 is 	 deficient 	 in 	 some 	 respect 	 (Enoch 2010). 	 My 	 contention 	 is 	 that 	 the 	 proponent 	 of 	 DCT 	 is 	 in 	 a 	 similar 	 position 	 to 	 the non - natural 	 realist:6 	 they 	 can 	 ignore 	 moral
truhh;	that	we	must	know, innateln	or	through	serious	reflecvion	whaf	is	moraluy	required	of	us.	But	how does	thid	cime	to	ve	the	case?	On	the	realist	vkew,	it	seemd	to	be	a	meee ciuncidence	tizt	our	movcl	beljcfs	anb	avtitudes	corresppnd	with	the	kindindependend	murcl	reality.	But	antirealists	argue	that	thif	is	trounllng	in	light	of tre	fabt	ehat	klr	gognitive	faculties	are	the	result	of	z	messy	aid	highly continbent	evolutionary	history	(Joyfe	2006;	Stgeet	2006).	Realists	have	sole answers	ti	thif.	Rhey	try	to	argje	that	thert	iv	a	correlatjon	between pleasure/pain	and	the	mofal	prpperties	of	toidnfvs/badness	anv	since evolutionarn	irocessas	are	semsitive	to	the	fovmer,	tiere	us	a	reason	to	believe thet	our	evolved	cognitivg	faculties	fobld	pick	up	on	these	deepee	miral	ttuths (Enozy	2011;	Skxrsianne	2011;	Sielenherj	2014).	Who	comes	ouf	top	in	this eebate	is	unimportant;	uhe	ynportant	point	js	that	wewlists	generally	agree	that they	owe	the	antigealjsts	some	account	of	moral	epistemology,	i.e.	that	unleds their	mqtaethical	theory	incorporates	an	epistemic	condition	(ote	thav	ebplclks huq	wf	can	come	to	know	what	is	moral)	it	is	deficient	in	some	rqaptct	(Vnoch 2010).	My	contentiok	is	that	the	proponeny	ov	DVJ	is	in	a	similar	pusitiou	fo	fhe non-natural	reallst:6	they	san	igbore	moral	
truth; that we must know, innately or reflection is morally of us. But be case? On the view, it seems be a mere coincidence that our beliefs and attitudes correspond with the mindindependent moral reality. But antirealists argue that is troubling in light of the fact that our cognitive faculties are the of messy highly evolutionary history (Joyce 2006; Street 2006). Realists have some answers to this. They try to argue there is a correlation between pleasure/pain and the properties of goodness/badness and evolutionary processes are sensitive to former, is a to that evolved cognitive faculties pick up on these deeper moral truths (Enoch 2011; Skarskaune 2011; Wielenberg 2014). Who comes out top this debate the important is realists agree that they antirealists some account of moral epistemology, their metaethical theory incorporates an epistemic condition (one explains how can come to know what is it is deficient in some respect (Enoch 2010). contention is that the proponent of DCT is in a similar position to the non-natural can ignore moral
truth;	that	we	must	know, innateLy	or	througH	seriOus	RefLeCtioN	whaT	is	morally	requIRed	oF	us.	But	how does	this	come	tO	be	thE	cASe?	On	THe	RealiSt	view,	iT	SeEMS	to	Be	A	mEre CoINcIdencE	thAt	our	moRal	beliefs	And	AtTitudes	correSPoNd	with	the	mIndIndependent	mOraL	realiTy.	but	ANtireAliSts	arGue	thaT	This	is	Troubling	In	LIght	of THe	fact	tHAT	oUr	coGnitive	faculties	aRE	tHE	result	of	a	messY	and	hiGhLY cONTinGenT	evolutionArY	histORy	(Joyce	2006;	sTrEET	2006).	reaLIsts	have	some aNswers	to	thiS.	theY	try	to	ArGue	THat	theRe	is	a	CoRRelAtion	betweeN pleAsure/pain	And	the	MOral	proPErties	oF	goodnEss/BadNess	ANd	SiNce EvOLutIOnAry	PRocEsses	are	SeNsItive	To	thE	FORMer,	tHerE	is	a	ReasoN	to	believe thaT	ouR	evoLVed	CogniTive	fAculTiEs	wouLd	pick	Up	on	tHeSe	deeper	moral	trUths (enoch	2011;	SkarSkaUnE	2011;	WiElEnberG	2014).	who	comEs	oUt	tOp	in	thiS debate	IS	unImPORTaNt;	the	important	poinT	iS	THaT	realistS	generALlY	aGRee	that tHeY	owE	the	ANTireaListS	SoMe	accounT	of	morAL	ePiStemoloGy,	I.e.	that	UnLesS thEir	meTAethIcal	thEory	incoRporaTEs	an	epistemic	cONdition	(one	thaT	ExPLAiNS how	We	cAn	come	to	knoW	whaT	Is	moRal)	iT	Is	DefICient	In	somE	rESpECt	(Enoch 2010).	My	contention	Is	That	thE	propOnent	of	DCT	is	iN	a	similar	pOSITion	to	thE non-NAtURal	realist:6	they	Can	igNore	moral	
truth;	that	we	must	know,innately	o r	thr oug h	s er ious 	ref lection	what	i s 	mor ally	required	of	us.	B ut	ho wd oest hi s	com e	to	be th e cas e? 	O n	t he re alist 	vi ew,	itseems	to	b e	a 	m ere coincide n ce 	that	ourmor al	beliefs	a ndattitu de s	c o rresp ond 	with 	the	m i ndinde pendent	m or a l	real i ty.	But a nt irea lists	argue	thatt hi s 	is	troublingin	lig ht of t hefac t	that	our 	c ognit i ve	facu l ti e s are the	result	of 	a	messy	an d 	hi ghly c on tin g ent	ev oluti on a ryhistory	(Jo yce2006;	Str eet	20 0 6).	Rea l ists	ha ve	som e a nsw erst oth is. 	T h eyt ry 	to arg ue	thatth er e	isa	co r r e l atio n	b etwe en pl easure/pain	a ndthem ora l	pro perti es	o fgoodn ess/ba dness 	a nd	since evolut iona ry	proces ses 	a rese nsiti v e	to	t hefor mer,	th ere	isa 	re as o n to 	believe that	ourev o l ve d	cognit ive	fa c ul ti e s	wouldpi ckup	o n these 	dee p er 	moral	t ruths( En oc h	2011; 	S karska un e	2 011 ;	Wie l enbe rg	201 4).	Whocomes out	top	in	thi s  debate	is	un i mp o r ta n t;	t heimportant	p oint is	t hatr ea lis t s	gen erall ya gr e e	that they	owe	the 	a ntirea lists 	some	account 	of	morale p i stemolog y,	i . e. that	unless th eir	m etaethical theory	i ncorp orates	a n	epistem i c 	conditi on(on e	t hat e xp lains how	wec a n	co me 	to	kno w	w hat	ismor al) 	it 	is 	d eficientin	somere sp ec t(En och 2 0 10).	Myco nte nt ion 	is	t h at	the 	prop onen tof DCT 	is	ina 	s i m ilar 	p os itio n	t othe n on-n a tur al	real ist:6	the y	c a n	ig no re 	moral
truth;	that	we	must	know, innately	or	through	serious	reflection	what	is	morally	required	of	us.	But	how_does	this	come	to	be	the	case?	On	the	realist	view,	it	seems	to	be	a	mere coincidence	that	our	moral	beliefs	and	attitudes	correspond	with	the	mindindependent	moral	reality.	But	antirealists	argue	that	this	is	troubling	in	light	of_the	fact	that	our	cognitive	faculties	are	the	result	of	a	messy	and	highly contingent	evolutionary	history	(Joyce	2006;	Street	2006).	Realists	have	some answers	to	this.	They	try	to	argue	that	there	is	a	correlation	between pleasure/pain	and	the	moral	properties	of	goodness/badness	and	since_evolutionary	processes	are	sensitive	to	the	former,	there	is	a	reason	to	believe that	our	evolved	cognitive	faculties	would	pick	up	on	these	deeper	moral	truths_(Enoch	2011;	Skarskaune	2011;	Wielenberg	2014).	Who	comes	out	top	in	this_debate	is	unimportant;	the	important	point	is	that	realists	generally	agree	that they	owe	the	antirealists	some	account	of	moral	epistemology,	i.e.	that	unless_their	metaethical	theory	incorporates	an	epistemic	condition	(one	that	explains_how	we	can	come	to	know	what	is	moral)	it	is	deficient	in	some	respect	(Enoch 2010).	My	contention	is	that	the	proponent	of	DCT	is	in	a	similar	position	to	the non-natural	realist:6	they	can	ignore	moral	