 it deals with what they fundamentally are. Van Inwagen and Sullivan, for their part, describe the kinds of questions studied under the rubric of metaphysics in the past three or four centuries. Among others, these include the question of whether composite entities (such as the self) have real existence, and freedom of the will. Such questions (the ultimate nature of things, the real existence of composite entities, freedom of the will) are not in themselves practical questions; they do not on their own solve the immediate problems of living. But the Buddha did not dismiss them in the Shorter Māluṅkya; indeed, the Buddha of the suttas spoke a great deal about the unreality of the self, and emphasized the significance of this fact for liberation from suffering. We will see in this paper that for at least one major Indian Buddhist philosopher, questions of this sort had direct implications for the ways we should react to the problems of living-which is to say, for ethics.5 Now there are indeed certain specific metaphysical questions that the Buddha identifies as less pressing in the Shorter Māluṅkya, such as the eternality of the universe. What he does not do, however, is rule them out as part of any general indigenous category that one could 5 By "ethics" I intend roughly the broad sense of the term suggested by Martha Nussbaum (23–25): reflection or inquiry on the question of how one should live. 254 Lele, The Metaphysical Basis of Śāntideva's Ethics translate as "metaphysics." The word that describes these views in the Shorter Māluṅkya (rendered by Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi as "speculative views") is diṭṭhigata, "going to views" or "resorting to views." But diṭṭhi (views) as such are not dismissed in the suttas; indeed the very first element of the suttas' Eightfold Path in sammādiṭṭhi, right view, which, when spelled out, can include understanding metaphysical questions like the origin of consciousness.6 And even when the Buddha dismisses diṭṭhis such as the eternality of the world, he does not say that such questions should not be asked or even that they are not part of his teaching. He merely points out that they are not the most urgent questions to be asking; others are
it deals with what they fundamentally are. Van Inwagen and Sullivan, for their part, describe the kind of question studied under the rubric of metaphysics in the past three or four century. Among others, these admit the question of whether composite entities (such as the self) have real being, and freedom of the will. Such question (the ultimate nature of things, the real universe of composite entities, freedom of the volition) are not in themselves practical questions; they do not on their own solve the immediate problems of living. But the Buddha did not dismiss them in the Shorter Māluṅkya; indeed, the Buddha of the suttas talk a great deal about the unreality of the self, and emphasized the meaning of this fact for liberation from suffering. We will interpret in this paper that for at least one major Indian Buddhist philosopher, question of this sort had direct implications for the ways we should react to the trouble of living - which is to say, for ethics.5 Now there are indeed certain specific metaphysical questions that the Buddha identifies as less pressing in the Shorter Māluṅkya, such as the eternality of the universe. What he does not do, however, is rule them out as part of any general indigenous category that one could 5 By " ethics " I intend roughly the wide sense of the term suggest by Martha Nussbaum (23–25 ): observation or inquiry on the question of how one should survive. 254 Lele, The Metaphysical Basis of Śāntideva's Ethics translate as " metaphysics. " The news that describes these views in the Shorter Māluṅkya (render by Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi as " speculative views ") is diṭṭhigata, " going to views " or " resorting to views. " But diṭṭhi (views) as such are not dismissed in the suttas; indeed the very first element of the suttas' Eightfold Path in sammādiṭṭhi, right opinion, which, when spell out, can include understanding metaphysical questions like the origin of consciousness.6 And even when the Buddha dismisses diṭṭhis such as the eternality of the populace, he does not say that such questions should not be asked or even that they are not character of his teaching. He merely points out that they are not the most urgent doubt to be asking; others are
 it deals with what they fukdamentally are. Rqn Inwegen ans Sullivxn, for their part, describe tie kunds if questions studied uvder the gubric of metephysics in the 'zst thrcz or rlur eeituries. Among ojhers, these hnclude the quasgiln of whether composite entities (sush as tne self) have reaj expseencs, and freedom of the will. Such queations (uhe ultimate naturr of things, the real existfnce of composite entihies, freedon of rhe will) are not in thtmvelves pradtical questions; they do not on theix own solve tye lkmediate priblemf of living. Nlt the Tuddha cid not dismisx tiem un the Shorter Māluṅkya; indeed, the Buddha of the sgtcas spoke a great deao qbout the unrdqligy kf tge selv, aid emphasizsd the signuficance of this favt dor liberatioh from stffering. We will see in this paper that fod at least one major Ineian Buddhist philosokher, questyons of this sort had direct implications for the ways de whjjod react to the problems of living-which is to swg, gog ethics.5 Now therc are indeed certaon slgcific metaphyrical queations that the Bufdha idgntifiws as lesf prrssing in the Shorter Māluṅkyq, such as thv etwrnality of the unnverse. What ke doex not do, however, is rule theo ouf as part ov any gensfal indigenous cxtenorf that one could 5 By "ethicf" I intenv rouyhly the brosd senfe of the herm suggested by Martha Nussyaum (23–25): reflectioj or inquiry on the question of how one shoulc nivv. 254 Lele, Tke Metsphysical Basys of Śāntideva's Ethics tranrlate as "mvtaphysicv." The word ehat describev these views in the Fhorrer Nāluṅkya (fdndered by Ñāṇamoki and Bobki as "spexulative views") is viṭṭhiezta, "going to vizcs" or "resorting tp vkewf." Huv diṭṭhy (views) as suwh afe vpt dirmissed in bhe sutyas; indeed the very xirsf element of the sitbas' Eightdold Patr in sammādiṭṭhi, right view, which, ahen vpeuled put, can include understanding metzphysical qucstions like ehe irigin of cousciousness.6 And even when the Buddha disnisses diṭṭhis such qs the eternality oy uhe world, he voes njt say thdt such questions shiuld not be asked or even that they ars not [art lf his teaching. He merely points out that they are not the most urgent quwstions to be askihg; oyhers axe
it deals with what they fundamentally are. and for their describe the kinds rubric metaphysics in the three or four Among others, these include the question whether composite entities (such as the self) have real existence, and freedom of will. Such questions (the ultimate nature of things, the real existence of composite freedom the are in themselves practical questions; they do not on their own solve the immediate problems of living. the Buddha did not dismiss them in the Māluṅkya; indeed, the Buddha the suttas spoke a great about unreality of self, emphasized significance of this for liberation from suffering. We will see in this paper that for at least one major Indian philosopher, questions sort had implications the we should react problems of living-which is to say, there are indeed certain specific metaphysical questions that Buddha identifies less pressing in the Shorter Māluṅkya, as the eternality of the universe. What he not do, however, is rule them out as part of any general indigenous category that 5 By "ethics" I roughly the broad of term by Nussbaum (23–25): or inquiry on the question of how one should live. 254 The Metaphysical Basis of Śāntideva's Ethics translate as "metaphysics." The describes views in the Māluṅkya (rendered by Ñāṇamoli Bodhi "speculative views") is diṭṭhigata, views" "resorting diṭṭhi as are not dismissed in suttas; indeed the very first of the suttas' Eightfold which, when spelled out, can include understanding metaphysical like the origin of consciousness.6 And even the Buddha dismisses diṭṭhis such as the eternality of the world, he not say questions should not be asked or even that are not part of teaching. He merely points out that they are not most questions to asking; others are
 it deals with what they fundamEntally are. van InWagEn aNd sullIvan, For their part, deSCribE the kinds of questions stUdied UnDEr thE RuBric oF metaphYSiCS In tHe PaSt tHrEE oR four CenTuries. AMong others, TheSe Include the quEStIon of whethEr cOmposite entiTieS (such aS tHe sELf) havE reAl exiStence, ANd freeDom of the wIlL. such quEStions (tHE UlTimaTe nature of things, tHE rEAl existence of cOmposiTe ENtITIes, FreEdom of the wIlL) are nOT in themSElVES PraCTical questionS; they do not oN TheIr own sOlVe tHE immedIate pRoBLemS of living. BuT the buddha did Not disMIss them IN the ShoRter MāLuṅKya; IndeED, tHe budDhA Of tHE sUttAS spOke a greaT dEaL abouT the UNREAlitY of The sElf, anD emphasized thE siGnifICanCe of tHis faCt foR lIberaTion frOm sufFeRing. We will see in This Paper that For At LeaSt One maJOr IndiAn BUddHist phiLosopheR, QueStIONS oF this sort had direct ImPLIcAtions foR the waYS wE sHOuld reacT tO thE proBLEms of LiviNG-wHich is to Say, for EThIcS.5 Now theRe Are indEeD ceRtaIn speCIfic MetaphYsical quEstioNS that the Buddha IDentifies as leSS pRESsINg in The shorter MāluṄkya, SUch aS the ETeRnaLIty of The unIvERsE. what he does not do, howeVeR, is rulE them Out as part of anY general inDIGEnous catEgorY ThAT one could 5 By "ethIcs" I iNtend roughLY the broaD sensE of the teRm suggestED By Martha nusSbaUm (23–25): rEflECTiOn or inquiry on THE queStIon of hoW onE should LivE. 254 LeLe, THe MEtAphysical basis of ŚĀnTiDeVa'S EtHics tRAnslate aS "mEtaPhYsiCs." The WOrd thaT descRibeS tHeSE viEws in thE shORTer MĀlUṅKya (rEndErEd by ÑĀṇamOLi aNd Bodhi As "speculaTivE ViewS") iS dIṭṭhigaTa, "going to viewS" oR "resorting To VieWs." But dIṬṬhi (views) As such are not dismissed in THe suttaS; inDeed tHe veRy first elEmeNt of thE suTTas' EigHtfold path iN sAmmĀDIṭṭhi, RIGhT viEw, Which, when sPELleD out, cAn InclUde undeRstanding metaphysiCAl qUestions like tHe oRigiN OF cOnsCIoUSneSs.6 aNd eVEN when the Buddha dIsmisses diṬṭHIs Such as the eTErnAlIty of thE world, hE does NOt say thAt such queStions shoUlD not BE AskEd or even thAt they arE not part oF His teAChIng. He MerEly poiNtS ouT that They arE Not The moSt urgeNt QuestiOns to Be Asking; otHers are
 it deals with what they f undamental ly ar e.Van  I nwag en a nd Sullivan, f o r th eir part, describe the  kind so f qu e st ionsstudied un d e r t he  r ubr ic of  meta phy sics in  the pastthr ee  or four cen t ur ies. Among  ot hers, theseinc lude t he  qu e stion  of  whet her co m posite  entities  ( s uch as the sel f )  h avereal existence, a n df reedom of thewill.Su c hq u est ion s (the ult im ate n a ture of th i n g s,t he real exist ence of com p osi te ent it ies ,  freed om of  t h e w ill) are no t in  themselv es pra c tical q u estions ; they  do  no t on th ei r o wn sol v ethe imm ediate p ro bl ems o f li v i n g . Bu t t he B uddha  did not dism iss  the m  in  theShort er M āl uṅkya ; inde ed, t he  Buddha of thesutt as spokea g re atde al ab o ut the  un rea lity of  the se l f,an d e mp hasized the signif ic a n ce  of this  factf or  l i beration  f rom  suf f e ring.  Wew il l see in  thisp ap er  that f or  at le as t o nemajor Indi an Bud dhist ph iloso p her, questions of this sorth ad d ir e ct i mpl ications fo r th e  way s we sh oul d  reac t toth e  p r oblems of living-wh ic h is t o say , for ethics. 5 Now ther e a re indee d ce r ta i n specific met aphys ical quest i ons that  theBuddha i dentifies a s less p res sin g i n t h e  S horter Māluṅk y a , su ch  as the  et ernalit y o f t heuni ve rse. What  he does  n ot  d o,  ho wever ,  is rule  t hem  o utas pa r t of a ny ge nera lin d ige nous ca t eg o r y th at  o ne c oul d5 By"eth i cs"  I inte nd roughl y t h e br oa dsense o f the term su gg ested by M ar tha  Nussb a u m (23–25 ): reflection or inquir y  on the  qu estio n of  how onesho uld li ve. 254 Le le, Th e Met ap hys i c al Ba s i sofŚā ntideva'sE t hic s tra ns late  as "me taphysics." The wo r d t hat describes  th esev i ew s i n  t h e S ho r ter M āluṅkya (render ed by Ñāṇa mo l iand Bodhia s " sp eculati ve view s") i s  diṭṭhi gata, "go ing to vi ew s" o r "re sorting to  views."  But diṭṭ h i (vi e ws ) assuc h areno t d ismis sed in the  sutt as; in de ed the  very  f irst ele ment of the suttas' Eig htfold  Path  in  sammādiṭ ṭhi ,  ri ght view,  whi ch, when s pel led  out,  ca n  incl udeu nd ers t andin g me t aphysical qu est i o ns  like the o r i g inof co nsc i ousnes s.6And even when the Buddha dismiss es d i ṭ ṭhi s s u ch a sthe eternality  of  t h e  world,he  does not s ay thatsu c h que stions  shoul d not b e as k ed oreven  th at they a reno t  part o fhi s  teach ing.  H e mere ly poi n ts o u t  that they are n ot th e mostu rge nt qu es tions t o  beasking; ot hers are
 it_deals with_what they fundamentally are._Van Inwagen_and_Sullivan, for_their_part, describe the_kinds of questions_studied under the rubric_of metaphysics in_the_past three or four centuries. Among others, these include the question of whether composite_entities_(such as_the_self)_have real existence, and freedom_of the will. Such questions_(the ultimate_nature of things, the real existence of composite_entities,_freedom of the_will) are not in themselves practical questions; they do_not on their own solve the_immediate problems of_living._But_the Buddha did not_dismiss them in the Shorter Māluṅkya;_indeed, the Buddha of the suttas_spoke a great deal about the unreality_of the self, and emphasized the_significance of this fact for_liberation from_suffering. We will see in_this paper that_for at_least one major_Indian Buddhist philosopher, questions of this_sort had direct_implications for the ways we should_react_to the problems_of_living-which_is to_say, for ethics.5_Now_there are_indeed_certain specific metaphysical questions that the_Buddha_identifies as less pressing in the Shorter_Māluṅkya, such as the_eternality_of the universe. What_he does not do, however,_is rule them out as part_of any_general indigenous_category that one could 5 By "ethics" I intend roughly the_broad sense of the term suggested_by Martha Nussbaum (23–25):_reflection or_inquiry_on the question_of_how one_should live. 254 Lele, The Metaphysical Basis_of Śāntideva's_Ethics translate as "metaphysics." The word_that describes these views_in_the Shorter Māluṅkya (rendered by Ñāṇamoli_and Bodhi as "speculative views") is_diṭṭhigata, "going to views" or_"resorting_to_views." But diṭṭhi (views) as_such are not dismissed in the_suttas; indeed the_very first element of the suttas' Eightfold_Path_in sammādiṭṭhi, right view, which, when_spelled_out, can include understanding metaphysical questions_like_the_origin of consciousness.6 And even_when the Buddha dismisses diṭṭhis such_as the eternality of the world, he does not_say that such_questions should not be asked_or_even_that they are not part of his teaching. He merely_points out_that they are_not the most urgent questions to be asking; others are