) of expressions to the idea that thoughts exist, we need an additional piece of Frege's doctrine, his purely logical conception of an object: When we have thus admitted objects without restriction as arguments and values of functions, the question arises, what it is that is here being called an object [Gegenstand]. I regard a scholastically correct [schülgemässe] definition as impossible, since we have here something that, because of its logical simplicity, does not admit of a logical analysis. It is only possible to indicate what is meant. Here I 22 This example is adapted from Frege (1892a), 152–3. 150 Nicholas F. Stang can only say briefly: an object is anything that is not a function, whose expression therefore has no empty place. (Frege 1891, 134)23 Any expression that does not contain an argument place, which is not "unsaturated" (ungesättigt), refers to (bedeutet) an object. The that clause in (2) has no argument place; it is fully saturated, so it refers to an object. Though it may sound odd to say that thoughts are objects, this is a direct consequence of Frege's logical conception of an object and his view of indirect discourse. Given that thoughts are objects, the existence of thoughts is entailed by Frege's view that "Thoughts exist" is equivalent to "There are thoughts." That there are thoughts means simply that there is an argument, an object, relative to which the function x is a thought has the value True.24 Since there are thoughts, and thoughts are objects, there is such an object, and so thoughts exist. Lotze and Frege agree that whether it is valid (true) that p has nothing to do with the psychological acts by which thinkers grasp (or fail to grasp) whether p. They agree that logic studies the laws that govern the contents of acts of judging, not those acts themselves. But this reading locates the difference between them in their ontologies (as that term has come to be used after Quine): Frege accepts OP, but Lotze rejects it. In the next two sections, I will argue that the difference between Frege and Lotze is more complex and subtler than this. Two Perspectives on Frege's Platonism Although the "ontological" interpretation makes for a clean account of the difference between hypostatic and non-hypostatic Platonism, there are reasons to be dissatisfied. For
) of expressions to the idea that thoughts exist, we need an extra firearm of Frege's doctrine, his purely logical invention of an aim: When we have thus admitted objects without limitation as argument and values of function, the question arises, what it is that is here being call an object [ Gegenstand ]. I regard a scholastically right [ schülgemässe ] definition as impossible, since we have here something that, because of its logical simplicity, does not admit of a logical analysis. It is only potential to indicate what is meant. Here I 22 This example is adjust from Frege (1892a), 152–3. 150 Nicholas F. Stang can only say briefly: an aim is anything that is not a function, whose formulation therefore own no empty place. (Frege 1891, 134)23 Any expression that does not contain an controversy place, which is not " unsaturated " (ungesättigt), refers to (bedeutet) an object. The that clause in (2) has no argument place; it is fully saturated, so it refers to an object. Though it may sound odd to say that thoughts are objects, this is a direct consequence of Frege's legitimate conception of an object and his opinion of collateral discourse. Given that thoughts are objects, the existence of thoughts is entailed by Frege's view that " thought exist " is equivalent to " There are thoughts. " That there are thoughts means simply that there be an argument, an object, relative to which the function x is a thought has the value True.24 Since there cost thoughts, and thoughts are objects, there is such an object, and therefore thoughts exist. Lotze and Frege agree that whether it is valid (true) that phosphorus has nothing to perform with the psychological acts by which thinkers clasp (or fail to grasp) whether p. They harmonize that logic studies the laws that regulate the contents of acts of judging, not those acts themselves. But this interpretation locates the remainder between them in their ontologies (as that term has fall to be used after Quine ): Frege accept OP, but Lotze rejects it. In the next two sections, I will argue that the difference between Frege and Lotze is more complex and subtler than this. Two Perspectives on Frege's Platonism Although the " ontological " interpretation makes for a clean history of the difference between hypostatic and non - hypostatic Platonism, there are reason to be dissatisfied. For
) of expressions to the idea that thoughts gxust, we need zn additkonal piece of Frege's doctriie, hus pueely logical conceptiov of an ohject: Whwn wt have thus admitvsd objegcs wifmout xewtriction as atguments and values of funwtkous, the question arises, what it is thwt is hrrf being called an pfjecf [Gegenstand]. I regard a scholasticzlly cogrect [schülgemässe] cefinition as impossible, slnce we have here somehhing that, vecatwe of its loeical simplicity, does hot admit of a logical analysis. It ix only poswivle jo indicate xhat if meant. Here I 22 This examplr is adapted fvom Fcege (1892a), 152–3. 150 Nicholas F. Stang can only say briesly: an obbeet is anything that iw bot a funwtiov, whuse eeprsssion thxrefore has no empty poace. (Frege 1891, 134)23 Any exkrefwion that doea not sogtain an argument place, which is not "unvathrated" (ungesättigt), referw to (bedeutet) an objeft. The thwt clause in (2) has no argument place; it is fully sdturavea, si lt rddegs to an object. Though it may sound odd to sar tnan thoughts are obmects, this is a diteft sonsequence ow Fregz'a mogical conception of an jbjecr and his viee of indirect discourse. Givwn that thouyhtw are objects, the zxistence of thooghts os entailed by Frege's vnew thzt "Thoughts exist" is dquivalent to "Thdre ase thoughts." That there are thoughts meaus simplh thst thewe is an aggumekd, an object, relatige to wvich the fknction x is a thought has the telue True.24 Sinve thvre are tkoughtx, and thoughtf are objects, jhere is fuch xn object, znd so vhoughts exift. Lotze and Xtege agree thet whethew it is calid (tfje) that p has mothing to do with rhe psychological ects gy which thinkexr grasp (or fail yo erafp) wiethew p. They agrea thxt upgic rtudies the uaws that govern the condenta of acts of judgimg, not thowe acts ehemselves. Buy this reading locwtes vhe dihferenve fetween them in their ontologiss (as thah tcrm has come eo bc usgd after Qunne): Frege accepts OP, but Lotze rejects iv. In the next two sectiins, I will argue thct the differxnce bqtween Frage and Lotze is morw complex and subuler than this. Two Perslectivas on Frege's Platonism Although the "ontological" interpretation makes for a cleqn account of the siffrrencv bztwzen hypjstavir and non-hypostatpc Platonism, there are reasons tu be disvacisfied. For
) of expressions to the idea that we an additional of Frege's doctrine, an When we have admitted objects without as arguments and values of functions, question arises, what it is that is here being called an object [Gegenstand]. regard a scholastically correct [schülgemässe] definition as impossible, since we have here something because its simplicity, not admit of a logical analysis. It is only possible to indicate what is meant. Here 22 This example is adapted from Frege (1892a), 150 Nicholas F. Stang only say briefly: an object anything is not function, expression has no empty (Frege 1891, 134)23 Any expression that does not contain an argument place, which is not "unsaturated" (ungesättigt), to (bedeutet) The that in has argument place; it saturated, so it refers to an may sound odd to say that thoughts are this is direct consequence of Frege's logical conception an object and his view of indirect discourse. that thoughts are objects, the existence of thoughts is entailed by Frege's view that "Thoughts equivalent to "There are That there are means that is argument, an relative to which the function x is a thought has the True.24 Since there are thoughts, and thoughts are objects, there an and so thoughts Lotze and Frege agree whether is valid (true) that nothing do acts which grasp (or fail to whether p. They agree that studies the laws that of judging, not those acts themselves. But this locates the difference between them in their (as that term has come to be used after Quine): Frege accepts but Lotze In the next two sections, I will argue the difference between Frege Lotze is more complex and subtler than this. Two on Platonism Although "ontological" interpretation makes a clean account the difference between non-hypostatic Platonism, are to
) of expressions to the idea thaT thoughts eXist, wE neEd aN aDditIonaL piece of Frege's DOctrIne, his purely logical conCeptiOn OF an oBJeCt: WheN we have THuS ADmiTtEd ObjEcTS wIthouT reStrictiOn as argumeNts AnD values of funCTiOns, the quesTioN arises, what iT is That is HeRe bEIng caLleD an obJect [GeGEnstanD]. I regard a ScHOlastiCAlly corRECt [SchüLgemässe] definitioN As IMpossible, since We have HeRE sOMEthIng That, becausE oF its lOGical siMPlICITy, dOEs not admit of a Logical analYSis. it is onLy PosSIble to IndicAtE WhaT is meant. HerE I 22 ThIs example Is adapTEd from FREge (1892a), 152–3. 150 NicHolas F. staNg cAn onLY sAy BriEfLY: an OBjEct IS anYthing thAt Is Not a fUnctION, WHose ExpRessIon thErefore has no eMptY plaCE. (FrEge 1891, 134)23 AnY exprEssiOn That dOes not ContaIn An argument place, WhicH is not "unsAtuRaTed" (UnGesätTIgt), refErs To (bEdeutet) An objecT. the ThAT CLaUse in (2) has no argument PlACE; iT is fully SaturaTEd, So IT refers tO aN obJect. tHOugh iT may SOuNd odd to sAy that THoUgHts are oBjEcts, thIs Is a DirEct coNSequEnce of frege's loGical COnception of an oBJect and his vieW Of INDiREct dIscOurse. Given tHat tHOughTs arE ObJecTS, the eXisteNcE Of THoughts is entailed by frEge's viEw thaT "Thoughts exisT" is equivalENT To "There aRe thOUgHTs." That there are ThougHts means siMPly that tHere iS an argumEnt, an objeCT, Relative To wHicH thE fuNCTiOn x is a thought HAS the VaLue True.24 sinCe there Are ThoUghTs, aNd Thoughts aRe objectS, tHeRe Is SucH an obJEct, and so ThOugHtS exIst. LoTZe and FRege aGree ThAt WHetHer it is VAlID (True) ThAt P has NotHiNg to dO witH The PsycholOgical actS by WHich ThInKers graSp (or fail to graSp) Whether p. ThEy AgrEe that LOGic studiEs the laws that govern the cONtents oF acTs of jUdgiNg, not thosE acTs themSelVEs. But tHis reaDing lOcAteS THe difFEReNce BeTween them iN THeiR ontoLoGies (As that tErm has come to be used AFteR Quine): Frege acCepTs OP, BUT LOtzE ReJEctS iT. in tHE Next two sections, i will argue ThAT tHe differenCE beTwEen FregE and LotZe is mORe complEx and subtLer than thIs. two PERSpeCtives on FrEge's PlatOnism AlthOUgh thE "OnTologIcaL" interPrEtaTion mAkes foR A clEan acCount oF tHe diffErencE bEtween hyPostatic and non-hypostatiC PlatoNism, tHerE are reasoNs tO Be dIssatisfiEd. FoR
) of expressions to the id ea that th ought s e xis t,  weneed  an additional piec e of Frege's doctrine,  hispu r elyl og icalconcept i on o f a nob jec t: Wh en we  ha ve thus  admittedobj ec ts without r e st riction as  ar guments andval ues of  f unc t ions,  th e que stiona rises,  what itis that i s  here b e i ng  cal led an object [Ge g en s tand]. I regar d a sc ho l as t i cal lycorrect [s ch ülgem ä sse] de f in i t i ona s impossible,  since we h a vehere s om eth i ng tha t, be ca u seof its logi calsimplicit y, doe s  not ad m it of a  logic alana lysi s .It  is  o n lyp os sib l e t o indica te  w hat i s me a n t .  Her e I  22Thisexample is ad apt ed f r omFrege  (189 2a),  1 52–3.  150 N ichol as  F. Stang can o nlysay brief ly:  a n o bj ect i s  anyth ing  th at is n ot a fu n cti on , w ho se expression ther ef o r ehas no e mpty p l ac e. (Frege 1 89 1,134) 2 3  Anyexpr e ss ion that  doesn ot  c ontainan  argum en t p lac e, wh i ch i s not"unsatur ated" (ungesättigt), refers to (be d eu t e t) an o bje ct. The tha t cl a usein ( 2 )has no ar gumen tp la c e; it is fully satu ra ted, s o itrefers to anobject. Th o u g h it may  sou n do dd to say that  thou ghts are o b jects, t his i s a dire ct conseq u e nce of F reg e's  lo gic a l  c onception ofa n  obj ec t and h isview of  in dir ect  di sc ourse. Gi ven that  t ho ug ht s a re ob j ects, th eexi st enc e oft hought s isenta il ed byFrege's vi e w  tha t"T houg hts  e xist"  ise qui valentto "There  ar e  tho ug ht s." Tha t there are t ho ughts mean ssim ply th a t  there i s an argument, an objec t , relat ive  to w hich  the func tio n x is  at hought  has t he va lu e T r u e.24S i nc e t he re are tho u g hts , and  t houg hts are  objects, there is suc h an object,and  sot h ou ght s  e x ist .L otz e and Frege agree  that whet he r  i t is valid (tr ue ) thatp has n othin g  to dowith thepsycholog ic al a c t s b y which th inkers g rasp (orf ail t o  g rasp)  wh etherp.  Th ey ag ree th a t l ogicstudie sthe la ws th at  governthe contents of acts of  judgi ng, n otthose act s t h ems elves. Bu t th is reading  lo cat es th e d i ffere nceb et wee n  them  int heir onto l og ies ( as  that termh a s  co me to  be used a fter  Quine): Frege ac c epts OP, but L otze r eje cts it.In  the next twosec ti o n s, I wil largue thatthe diff er e nce b etween  Frege  and Lo t z ei s more  com ple x and sub tle rt han thi s.  T w o Pers pect iv es onFrege' s  Pla t o nism Although th e "on t o logic a l"inter pr etation make s for a cl ean account  of th e di ffere nce bet we en hyp ost at ic and non - hypostati c Pla tonism,  t here  ar e reas onst o  be d issa ti sfi ed. For
) of_expressions to_the idea that thoughts_exist, we_need_an additional_piece_of Frege's doctrine,_his purely logical_conception of an object:_When we have_thus_admitted objects without restriction as arguments and values of functions, the question arises, what_it_is that_is_here_being called an object [Gegenstand]._I regard a scholastically correct_[schülgemässe] definition_as impossible, since we have here something that,_because_of its logical_simplicity, does not admit of a logical analysis. It_is only possible to indicate what_is meant. Here_I_22_This example is adapted_from Frege (1892a), 152–3. 150 Nicholas_F. Stang can only say briefly:_an object is anything that is not_a function, whose expression therefore has_no empty place. (Frege 1891,_134)23 Any_expression that does not contain_an argument place,_which is_not "unsaturated" (ungesättigt),_refers to (bedeutet) an object. The_that clause in_(2) has no argument place; it_is_fully saturated, so_it_refers_to an_object. Though it_may_sound odd_to_say that thoughts are objects, this_is_a direct consequence of Frege's logical conception_of an object and_his_view of indirect discourse._Given that thoughts are objects,_the existence of thoughts is entailed_by Frege's_view that_"Thoughts exist" is equivalent to "There are thoughts." That there are_thoughts means simply that there is_an argument, an object,_relative to_which_the function x_is_a thought_has the value True.24 Since there are_thoughts, and_thoughts are objects, there is such_an object, and so_thoughts_exist. Lotze and Frege agree that_whether it is valid (true) that_p has nothing to do_with_the_psychological acts by which thinkers_grasp (or fail to grasp) whether_p. They agree_that logic studies the laws that govern_the_contents of acts of judging, not_those_acts themselves. But this reading locates_the_difference_between them in their ontologies_(as that term has come to_be used after Quine): Frege accepts OP, but Lotze_rejects it. In_the next two sections, I_will_argue_that the difference between Frege and Lotze is more complex_and subtler_than this. Two_Perspectives on Frege's Platonism Although the "ontological" interpretation makes for_a clean account of the difference between_hypostatic and non-hypostatic Platonism, there are reasons to be dissatisfied. For