 there is no direct inference from (D) to (E), but there is an inference if we add the premise that your belief in P is consistent with your other beliefs. I can see no reason why we should accept this qualification: if a consistent belief generates a nonrelative reason, why does not an inconsistent belief? But in any case, a different version of the same argument works against this reply too. Suppose you believe P and you do not believe Q, and suppose your belief in P is consistent with all your other beliefs. Plainly, not believing Q rationally requires you not to believe P: ¬B(Q) O6 ¬B(P). (I am not suggesting that the relation of rational requirement always permits contraposition, but it does in this case.) Then exactly the same argument will go through, but this time your belief in P is consistent with your other beliefs. There is one special sort of belief reasoning that is genuinely reason-giving, indeed oughtgiving, in a nonrelative way. Some reasoning concludes in a tautology, which rests on no premises; the premises are discharged along the way. You ought nonrelatively to believe a tautology. This is an exception to my general claim that reasoning is not reason-giving or ought-giving. However, there is no parallel exception for intention reasoning, since intention reasoning has to have an intention as a premise. The strict notion of 'ought' can be weakened in two different ways. A reason is a weakened sort of ought; it is a pro tanto ought. A rational requirement of the sort expressed in (D) is also a weakened sort of ought; it is weakened by being made relative. It is easy to muddle the two types of weakening, and slide between a relative ought and a nonrelative pro tanto ought – between a rational requirement and a reason. But they are different. What difference does it make? Suppose you believe P and have no reason not to believe Q. Then, if your belief in P gave you a reason to believe Q, in the sense of a pro tanto ought, you actually ought to believe Q, because this reason would not be opposed by a contrary reason. But in fact it is not necessarily the case that you ought to believe Q. That may well depend on whether you ought to believe P in the first case. Your belief in P merely requires you, in the sense of a relative ought, to believe Q. To state this rational requirement is merely to repeat the assumption I made at the start, that
there is no direct inference from (D) to (E), but there be an inference if we lend the premise that your belief in P is consistent with your early beliefs. I can see no reason why we should bear this qualification: if a consistent impression generate a nonrelative reason, why does not an discrepant belief? But in any case, a different version of the like argument works against this answer too. presuppose you think P and you do not believe Q, and suppose your impression in P is consistent with all your other beliefs. Plainly, not believe Q rationally requires you not to believe P: ¬B(Q) O6 ¬B(P). (I am not suggesting that the relation of intellectual requirement always permits contraposition, but it does in this case .) Then exactly the same controversy will go through, but this time your belief in P is consistent with your other beliefs. There is one special sort of impression reasoning that is truly reason - giving, indeed oughtgiving, in a nonrelative room. Some reasoning conclude in a tautology, which rests on no premises; the premises are exhaust along the way. You ought nonrelatively to believe a tautology. This is an exception to my general claim that reasoning is not rationality - giving or ought - giving. However, there is no parallel exception for intention reasoning, since intention reasoning has to have an intention as a premise. The nonindulgent notion of' ought' can be weakened in two different ways. A reason is a weakened kind of ought; it is a pro tanto ought. A intellectual necessity of the sort expressed in (D) is besides a weakened sort of ought; it is weakened by being made relative. It is easy to muddle the two types of weakening, and slide between a relative ought and a nonrelative pro tanto ought – between a intellectual requirement and a reason. But they are different. What difference does it make? think you believe phosphorus and have no reason not to believe Q. Then, if your belief in P give you a reason to believe Q, in the sense of a pro tanto ought, you actually ought to believe Q, because this reason would not be oppose by a contrary cause. But in fact it is not necessarily the case that you ought to believe Q. That may well depend on whether you ought to believe phosphorus in the first case. Your impression in P merely requires you, in the sense of a relative ought, to believe Q. To express this rational requirement is merely to repeat the presumption I made at the start, that
 thfre is no direct inferenge from (D) to (E), bot there is an inferenze if we add the premise thav yoyr beoief in P is consisteng with yolr other velitfs. I can see no csason wmv we amould eccept this quakification: if a consistett bzlief generates a nonrelative reason, why dors not an inconsysteme bempen? But in any case, a different vedsion oh the same argukent works against this reoly hoo. Suppose you bepieve P and you eo not beliexe Q, and sl'pose your gelief in P is consistent with xll ypur other veoievv. Plainly, nit bejieving Q rabponally requirrs you not to neliete P: ¬B(Q) O6 ¬B(P). (I am not sugjesting that the relwtion of sacional requirement alqats petmits congeapusiuioi, bht it foea in this dase.) Then ezactly the same argimqbt will go thdough, fue this time your belief in P is consisttnt wjth your other beliefs. Rhere is one special dort of bqlief reasoning that is genuinely reason-giving, ingeed kjghuglying, un a nonrelative way. Some reasoning concludes ig a tsutology, which rests on np orriises; the preoises cde discharged along hhe way. You iught nonwelayively to believe a tautoloty. This is au ezception to my genzral claim tkat ressonimg is not reason-giving ur ohght-giving. Jowever, tgdre is no paralldl vxce[tion for intention reasonyng, since intzntion rdasoming hws to have an ikdention as a premide. Thg striwt notion lf 'ought' can be weakened in two different wayx. D rvason is c weakcned sort of oudht; it is a prp tanto oughg. A rationzl requmrement of tre sort exprevded in (D) is elso a wewkenwd sirt of ujght; it is wealened by yting made eelative. It is easn to ohddle the two tvkes of weakening, amd rliqe bxtweeg a relative mughg avc a nunrelative iro tanyo ought – between a satiknal requirement amd a reasob. But thqy are differrnt. What differenct does it make? Sukpose you believe P and have no reason nlt bo believe Q. Ehen, if your belnef in P gave you a reason to believe Q, mn the sense of a pro janto ought, you actuakky ought to beliqve Q, becduse this reason wouod not be opposed by a contrary reason. But it fach it is not necessarily the case that you ought to believe Q. That may welo depeid on whether you oughn tj beliede P mn the first case. Your belief in P merely requirxs you, in dhz sense of a relative ought, tp celieve Q. To rtate this rational requjrement os merely to repeat the assumptoon I made at the start, bhat
there is no direct inference from (D) but is an if we add in is consistent with other beliefs. I see no reason why we should this qualification: if a consistent belief generates a nonrelative reason, why does not inconsistent belief? But in any case, a different version of the same argument against reply Suppose believe P and you do not believe Q, and suppose your belief in P is consistent all your other beliefs. Plainly, not believing Q requires you not to P: ¬B(Q) O6 ¬B(P). (I not that the of requirement permits contraposition, but does in this case.) Then exactly the same argument will go through, but this time your belief P is your other There one sort of belief is genuinely reason-giving, indeed oughtgiving, in Some reasoning concludes in a tautology, which rests no premises; premises are discharged along the way. ought nonrelatively to believe a tautology. This is exception to my general claim that reasoning is not reason-giving or ought-giving. However, there is exception for intention reasoning, intention reasoning has have intention a The strict of 'ought' can be weakened in two different ways. A reason a weakened sort of ought; it is a pro tanto rational of the sort in (D) is also weakened of ought; it is being relative. to the types of weakening, and between a relative ought and nonrelative pro tanto ought and a reason. But they are different. What does it make? Suppose you believe P have no reason not to believe Q. Then, if your belief in gave you to believe Q, in the sense of a tanto ought, you actually to believe Q, because this reason would not be by contrary reason. in fact it not necessarily the that you ought Q. That well on to believe P in the first Your in P merely requires you, the a relative ought, to believe Q. To state this rational requirement is merely to repeat I made at the that
 there is no direct inference fRom (D) to (E), but There Is aN inFeRencE if wE add the premise THat yOur belief in P is consisteNt witH yOUr otHEr BelieFs. I can sEE nO REasOn WhY we ShOUlD accePt tHis qualIfication: iF a cOnSistent belieF GeNerates a noNreLative reason, Why Does noT aN inCOnsisTenT beliEf? But iN Any casE, a differeNt VErsion OF the samE ARgUmenT works against this REpLY too. Suppose you BelievE P ANd YOU do Not Believe Q, anD sUpposE Your belIEf IN p Is cONsistent with aLl your other BEliEfs. PlaInLy, nOT belieVing Q RaTIonAlly requireS you Not to beliEve P: ¬B(Q) o6 ¬b(P). (I am noT SuggestIng thaT thE reLatiON oF rAtiOnAL reQUiRemENt aLways perMiTs ContrAposITION, but It dOes iN this Case.) Then exactLy tHe saME arGumenT will Go thRoUgh, buT this tIme yoUr Belief in P is consIsteNt with youR otHeR beLiEfs. ThERe is onE spEciAl sort oF belief REasOnING ThAt is genuinely reasoN-gIVInG, indeed oUghtgiVInG, iN A nonrelaTiVe wAy. SoME ReasoNing COnCludes in A tautoLOgY, wHich resTs On no prEmIseS; thE premISes aRe discHarged alOng thE Way. You ought nonRElatively to beLIeVE A tAUtolOgy. this is an excEptiON to mY genERaL clAIm thaT reasOnINg IS not reason-giving or oUgHt-giviNg. HowEver, there is no Parallel exCEPTion for iNtenTIoN Reasoning, since IntenTion reasonINg has to hAve an IntentioN as a premiSE. the stricT noTioN of 'OugHT' CaN be weakened in TWO difFeRent wayS. A rEason is A weAkeNed SorT oF ought; it iS a pro tanTo OuGhT. A RatIonal REquiremeNt Of tHe SorT exprESsed in (d) is alSo a wEaKeNEd sOrt of ouGHt; IT Is weAkEnEd by BeiNg Made rElatIVe. IT is easy To muddle tHe tWO typEs Of WeakeniNg, and slide betWeEn a relativE oUghT and a nONRelative Pro tanto ought – between a raTIonal reQuiRemenT and A reason. BuT thEy are dIffERent. WhAt diffErencE dOes IT Make? SUPPoSe yOu Believe P anD HAve No reaSoN not To belieVe Q. Then, if your belieF In P Gave you a reasoN to BeliEVE Q, In tHE sENse Of A Pro TANto ought, you actuAlly ought tO bELiEve Q, becausE ThiS rEason woUld not bE oppoSEd by a coNtrary reaSon. But in fAcT it iS NOt nEcessarily The case tHat you ougHT to beLIeVe Q. ThAt mAy well DePenD on whEther yOU ouGht to BelievE P In the fIrst cAsE. Your belIef in P merely requires you, In the sEnse oF a rElative ouGht, TO beLieve Q. To sTate This rationAl rEquIremeNt iS MerelY to rEPeAt tHE assuMptiON I made at tHE sTarT, THaT
 there is no direct infere nce from ( D) to  (E ),bu t th ereis an inferenc e  ifwe add the premise tha t you rb elie f  i n P i s consi s te n t  wi th  y our  o t he r bel ief s. I ca n see no r eas on  why we shou l daccept thi s q ualification : i f a co ns ist e nt be lie f gen erates a nonr elative r ea s on, wh y  does n o t  a n in consistent belief ?  B u t in any case,  a dif fe r en t ver sio n of the s am e arg u ment wo r ks a g ain s t this replytoo. Suppos e  yo u beli ev e P and yo u dono t  be lieve Q, an d su ppose you r beli e f in Pi s consi stentwit h a ll y o ur  o the rb eli e fs . P l ain ly, notbe li eving  Q r a t i o nall y r equi res y ou not to bel iev e P: ¬B( Q) O6  ¬B(P ). ( Iam no t sugg estin gthat the relati on o f rationa l r eq uir em ent a l ways p erm its  contra positio n , b ut i t  d oes in this case.)  T h e nexactlythe sa m ear g ument wi ll  go  thr o u gh, b ut t h is  time yo ur bel i ef  i n P isco nsiste nt  wi thyouro ther  belie fs. Ther e iso ne special sor t  of belief re a so n i ng that  is  genuinelyreas o n-gi ving ,  i nde e d oug htgiv in g ,i n a nonrelative way .Some r eason ing concludes  in a taut o l o gy, whic h re s ts on no premises ; the  premisesa re disch arged  along t he way. Y o u  ought n onr ela tiv ely t obelieve a tau t o logy .This is  an  except ion  to  my  ge ne ral claim  that re as on in gisnot r e ason-giv in g o roug ht-gi v ing. H oweve r, t he re isno para l le l exce pt io n fo r i nt entio n re a son ing, si nce inten tio n  rea so ni ng hasto have an in te ntion as a  p rem ise. T h e  strictnotion of 'ought' can b e  weaken edin tw o di fferent w ays . A re aso n  is aweaken ed so rt  of o ught; i tisapro tantoo u ght . A r at iona l requi rement of the sort exp ressed in (D)  is  als o awea k en e d s or t  of o ught; it is wea kened by b ei n gmade relat i ve.  I t is ea sy to m uddle the two  types of  weakenin g,  and s lid e betweena relati ve oughta nd an on relat ive  pro t an toought  – bet w een  a ra tional  r equire mentan d a reas on. But they are differ ent. W hat d iff erence do esi t m ake? Supp oseyou believ e P  an d hav e n o  reas on n o ttob eliev e Q. Then, ify ou r b e l ie f in P gave y o u a  reas ont o beli eveQ, in the sense o f  a pro tanto o ught , you  ac t uall yought to belie veQ, b ecause t hi s reason wo uld notbe oppos ed bya cont rary re a s on .  But i n fa ctit is not  ne ce s sarilyth ec ase th at y ou  ought  to be l ieve Q . That may welldepen d on wh e the r you  o ught to beli eve P in t he first ca se. Yo ur b elief  in P m er ely re qui re s you, int he senseof arelativ eough t,to bel ieve Q . Tostat ethi s rationa l re q ui re m ent  ismerel yto r epeat the assumpti onI  made a tthe s tart,t ha t 
 there_is no_direct inference from (D)_to (E),_but_there is_an_inference if we_add the premise_that your belief in_P is consistent_with_your other beliefs. I can see no reason why we should accept this qualification:_if_a consistent_belief_generates_a nonrelative reason, why does_not an inconsistent belief? But_in any_case, a different version of the same argument_works_against this reply_too. Suppose you believe P and you do not_believe Q, and suppose your belief_in P is_consistent_with_all your other beliefs._Plainly, not believing Q rationally requires_you not to believe P: ¬B(Q)_O6 ¬B(P). (I am not suggesting that_the relation of rational requirement always_permits contraposition, but it does_in this_case.) Then exactly the same_argument will go_through, but_this time your_belief in P is consistent with_your other beliefs._There is one special sort of_belief_reasoning that is_genuinely_reason-giving,_indeed oughtgiving,_in a nonrelative_way._Some reasoning_concludes_in a tautology, which rests on_no_premises; the premises are discharged along the_way. You ought nonrelatively_to_believe a tautology. This_is an exception to my_general claim that reasoning is not_reason-giving or_ought-giving. However,_there is no parallel exception for intention reasoning, since intention reasoning_has to have an intention as_a premise. The strict_notion of_'ought'_can be weakened_in_two different_ways. A reason is a weakened sort_of ought;_it is a pro tanto ought._A rational requirement of_the_sort expressed in (D) is also_a weakened sort of ought; it_is weakened by being made_relative._It_is easy to muddle the_two types of weakening, and slide_between a relative_ought and a nonrelative pro tanto ought_–_between a rational requirement and a_reason._But they are different. What difference_does_it_make? Suppose you believe P_and have no reason not to_believe Q. Then, if your belief in P gave_you a reason_to believe Q, in the_sense_of_a pro tanto ought, you actually ought to believe Q,_because this_reason would not_be opposed by a contrary reason. But in fact it_is not necessarily the case that you_ought to believe Q. That may well depend on whether you_ought to believe P in the first case._Your belief in P merely requires you,_in the sense of_a_relative ought, to believe Q. To state_this_rational_requirement_is merely to_repeat the assumption_I made at_the start,_that