 the task of clarifying these crucial notions until I have clarified (in the next section) the specific notion of epistemic appraisal operative in my thinking. However, before going on, note that SC, as formulated, does not require that all inferentially justified beliefs be based on contextually basic beliefs, rather it allows that regresses may legitimately terminated with such beliefs. This means that the contextualist can allow (strictly speaking) that an individual's justified beliefs may exhibit either a foundationalist or a coherentist structure.'° 298 Moral Knowledge? What the contextualist claims is that the contextualist picture represents a realistic and largely accurate picture of the actual structure of an ordinary individual's justified beliefs. And this indeed is what I plan to argue in connection with moral belief. To conclude, we should recognize three general contextualist theses. I take circumstantial contextualism to be fairly uncontroversial, though epistemologists may disagree over the sorts of circumstantial factors that affect the epistemic status of an individual's beliefs. As we shall see, the moral epistemology that I go on to defend features the importance of one's social circumstances in coming to have justified moral beliefs. Normative contextualism (i.e., epistemological relativism) is quite controversial and should not be confused with circumstantial or structural contextualism. The contextualist moral epistemology I plan to defend is not intended as a version of normative contextualism. Finally, I do plan to defend a version of structural contextualism about justified moral belief, which will occupy most of my attention in what follows. Justification and Epistemic Responsibility To set the stage for the version of epistemological contextualism I propose to defend, I first need to specify the notion of epistemic appraisal at work in my thinking. My primary interest here is with questions about the justification of moral belief and not with questions of proving, showing, or demonstrating moral principles. I need to clarify what I mean here, and I also need to say something about how certain terms of epistemic evaluation (such as "justification," "rationality") work. As I will explain, ascriptions of justification (and rationality) are best interpreted as involving certain contextually variable parameters." Getting clear about these matters will allow me to clarify the specific notion of doxastic justification that interests me, the notion of being episternically responsible in what one believes. Let me elaborate. Preliminary Remarks about Justification In this paper I am interested in questions about doxastic justification, that is, with questions of
the task of clarifying these crucial notions until I have clarify (in the future section) the specific notion of epistemic appraisal operative in my thinking. However, before go on, note that SC, as formulated, does not want that all inferentially absolve beliefs be establish on contextually basic beliefs, rather it allow that regresses may legitimately terminated with such beliefs. This means that the contextualist can allow (strictly talk) that an individual's justified beliefs may exhibit either a foundationalist or a coherentist social organization.' ° 298 Moral Knowledge? What the contextualist claims is that the contextualist picture represent a realistic and largely accurate painting of the actual structure of an ordinary individual's justified beliefs. And this indeed is what I plan to argue in association with moral belief. To conclude, we should recognize three general contextualist theses. I take circumstantial contextualism to be fairly uncontroversial, though epistemologists may disagree over the sorts of circumstantial factors that affect the epistemic status of an individual's beliefs. As we shall see, the moral epistemology that I go on to defend feature the importance of one's social circumstances in coming to have apologize moral impression. Normative contextualism (i.e., epistemological relativism) is quite controversial and should not be confuse with circumstantial or geomorphologic contextualism. The contextualist moral epistemology I plan to defend is not mean as a version of normative contextualism. Finally, I do plan to defend a version of morphologic contextualism about justified moral belief, which will occupy most of my attention in what follows. Justification and Epistemic Responsibility To dress the stage for the adaptation of epistemological contextualism I propose to defend, I first need to intend the notion of epistemic appraisal at work in my thinking. My primary sake here is with questions about the justification of moral belief and not with questions of proving, showing, or demonstrate moral principles. I want to clarify what I mean here, and I also necessitate to say something about how sealed terms of epistemic evaluation (such as " justification, " " rationality ") work. As I will explain, ascriptions of justification (and rationality) are well interpreted as involving certain contextually variable parameters. " get clear about these matters will allow me to clarify the specific notion of doxastic justification that interests me, the notion of being episternically responsible in what one believes. Let me complicate. Preliminary Remarks about Justification In this paper I am interested in motion about doxastic justification, that is, with questions of
 thf task of clarifying there crucial notions untml I habe clariwied (in the next section) the specifuc notion of epistemic appraisap operatuve mn my thinking. However, bcyore fling in, note that SG, as formuldted, does not sedunre that all inferentially justified beliefx he based on cogtexuuajly gasic beliefs, rather it allows thaf regrevses may legiyimately terminated with skch heliefs. This means that the cintevrualist can xllow (stribcly speakinf) that an individual's justified belizfs may exhubut fhther a fouidatiogalist or a gpherendist sttucture.'° 298 Moral Knmwlwdge? What the contextnalist claims is thaj the contaxcualist picture reprewebts a reanistkx avd macgemy acckrave picture kf the actuql structure of an prqpmary individhal's jtseified beliefs. And this indeed is what P plzn to argue in connectiin with moral belief. Jo concludq, we should recognize three general contextualist thesxs. I uaje cifxulstantial contextualism to be fairly uncontrodsrxisl, though episbemologists may dixahrrg over the sorjs of cndchmstantial factors that asfect the episuemic status of an individual's bwliefs. As we whall see, the morap epistemolugy jhat I go on to defend featurzs the importance of one's aucial circumstanzes it coming to have justified moral beoiefx. Normagive contevtualism (i.f., epistemological relatigism) ns quhte controgersial and should not be confused with circuksdannial or scructuval contextualifm. The contextoalist moxal epkstemology I plan to defend ys not intendaf as a versimn of nowmatuve xontextjxlism. Finally, O do plan to defend a version of strugturau contextualism cyoor justified motal bejivf, xhich fill occupy kost of ky atgention in chxt fpllows. Justification and Epistemic Responsobllity To wet the ftage for the version of epistelologmcal cuntexyuajism I propose to defend, I firat need tl siecify the noeion of epistemie appraisal at work in my thinking. My prmmary interest here is qith questions abouj tme justificavion os moral balief and not with qyestions of provikg, showing, or demonstrzting koral principles. I need to clarify what I mean here, and I also need to say somwthing about how csrtaon tegms pf epiftemmc evaluation (such as "justification," "rationality") wurk. As I wnll explain, ascriptions of juxtkfication (and rationality) are best inferpretec as involving certain contextuslly variable parameters." Getting clead aboun tiese matters will alkow me to coarify rhe dpecific notiun pf doxastic jusuifieation that interests me, the notiin of velng episternicalny responsinlt in whzt one believes. Let me elaglrate. Preliminary Temarks about Kustification In thiv [aper I am inttrested in quesjions abmut doxastic justificathon, that is, with questions of
the task of clarifying these crucial notions have (in the section) the specific in thinking. However, before on, note that as formulated, does not require that inferentially justified beliefs be based on contextually basic beliefs, rather it allows that may legitimately terminated with such beliefs. This means that the contextualist can allow speaking) an justified may exhibit either a foundationalist or a coherentist structure.'° 298 Moral Knowledge? What the contextualist claims that the contextualist picture represents a realistic and accurate picture of the structure of an ordinary individual's beliefs. this indeed what plan argue in connection moral belief. To conclude, we should recognize three general contextualist theses. I take circumstantial contextualism to be uncontroversial, though disagree over sorts circumstantial that affect the of an individual's beliefs. As we moral epistemology that I go on to defend the importance one's social circumstances in coming to justified moral beliefs. Normative contextualism (i.e., epistemological relativism) quite controversial and should not be confused with circumstantial or structural contextualism. The contextualist moral plan to defend is intended as a of contextualism. I plan to a version of structural contextualism about justified moral belief, which will most of my attention in what follows. Justification and Epistemic set stage for the of epistemological contextualism I to I first need to notion epistemic in thinking. primary interest here is questions about the justification of belief and not with demonstrating moral principles. I need to clarify what mean here, and I also need to something about how certain terms of epistemic evaluation (such as "justification," "rationality") As I ascriptions of justification (and rationality) are best interpreted involving certain contextually variable Getting clear about these matters will allow me to the notion of justification that interests the notion of episternically responsible in believes. Let elaborate. Remarks this paper I am interested in about justification, that is, with questions
 the task of clarifying these cRucial notiOns unTil i haVe ClarIfieD (in the next sectIOn) thE specific notion of epistEmic aPpRAisaL OpEratiVe in my tHInKINg. HOwEvEr, bEfORe Going On, nOte that sC, as formulAteD, dOes not requirE ThAt all inferEntIally justifiEd bEliefs Be BasED on coNteXtualLy basiC BeliefS, rather it AlLOws thaT RegressES MaY legItimately terminatED wITh such beliefs. THis meaNs THaT THe cOntExtualist cAn Allow (STrictly SPeAKINg) tHAt an individuaL's justified BEliEfs may ExHibIT eitheR a fouNdATioNalist or a coHereNtist struCture.'° 298 MORal KnowLEdge? WhaT the coNteXtuAlisT ClAiMs iS tHAt tHE cOntEXtuAlist picTuRe RepreSentS A REAlisTic And lArgelY accurate pictUre Of thE ActUal stRuctuRe of An OrdinAry indIviduAl'S justified belieFs. AnD this indeEd iS wHat i pLan to ARgue in ConNecTion witH moral bELieF. TO CONcLude, we should recognIzE THrEe generaL conteXTuAlISt theses. i tAke CircUMStantIal cONtExtualisM to be fAIrLy UncontrOvErsial, ThOugH epIstemOLogiSts may Disagree Over tHE sorts of circumSTantial factorS ThAT AfFEct tHe ePistemic staTus oF An inDiviDUaL's bELiefs. as we sHaLL sEE, the moral epistemoloGy That I gO on to Defend featureS the importANCE of one's sOciaL CiRCumstances in coMing tO have justiFIed moral BelieFs. NormatIve contexTUAlism (i.e., ePisTemOloGicAL ReLativism) is quiTE ContRoVersial And Should nOt bE coNfuSed WiTh circumsTantial oR sTrUcTuRal ConteXTualism. THe ConTeXtuAlist MOral epIstemOlogY I PlAN to Defend iS NoT INtenDeD aS a veRsiOn Of norMatiVE coNtextuaLism. FinalLy, I DO plaN tO dEfend a vErsion of strucTuRal contextUaLisM about JUStified mOral belief, which will occuPY most of My aTtentIon iN what follOws. justifIcaTIon and episteMic ReSpOnsIBIlity tO SeT thE sTage for the VERsiOn of ePiStemOlogicaL contextualism I proPOse To defend, I firsT neEd to SPEcIfy THe NOtiOn OF epISTemic appraisal aT work in my tHiNKiNg. My primarY IntErEst here Is with qUestiONs about The justifIcation of MoRal bELIef And not with QuestionS of provinG, ShowiNG, oR demoNstRating MoRal PrincIples. I NEed To claRify whAt i mean hEre, anD I Also need To say something about how cErtain Terms Of ePistemic eValUAtiOn (such as "jUstiFication," "raTioNalIty") woRk. AS i will ExplAIn, AscRIptioNs of JUstificatIOn (And RATiOnality) are bEST IntErpreTed AS involVing Certain contextualLY variable paramEterS." gEttIng CLear AbOut these matterS wiLl ALLow me to cLaRify the specIfic notiOn OF doxaStic juStificAtion thAT InTErests Me, thE noTion of beiNg ePiSTernicaLlY rESponsiBle iN wHat one BelievES. Let ME Elaborate. PrelimiNary REMArks aBOut justiFiCation IN This Paper I am inTerested in qUestioNs abOut doXastic jUsTificaTioN, tHat is, with qUEstions of
 the task of clarifying th ese crucia l not ion s u nt il I  hav e clarified (i n  the  next section) the spe cific  n o tion of  epis temic a p pr a i sal  o pe rat iv e  i n mythi nking.However, b efo re  going on, n o te  that SC,asformulated,doe s notre qui r e tha t a ll in ferent i ally j ustifiedbe l iefs b e  basedo n  c onte xtually basic bel i ef s , rather it al lows t ha t  r e g res ses  may legit im ately termina t ed w i ths uch beliefs.This meanst hat  the c on tex t ualist  canal l ow(strictly s peak ing) that  an in d ividual ' s justi fied b eli efs  may ex hi bit  e i the r  a  fo u nda tionalis tor  a co here n t i s t st ruc ture .'° 2 98 Moral Know led ge?W hat  theconte xtua li st cl aims i s tha tthe contextuali st p icture re pre se nts  a  real i stic a ndlar gely ac curatep ict ur e o fthe actual structu re o fan ordin ary in d iv id u al's jus ti fie d be l i efs.Andt hi s indeed  is wh a tIplan to  a rgue i ncon nec tionw ithmoralbelief.To co n clude, we shou l d recognize t h re e ge n eral  co ntextualist  the s es.I ta k ecir c umsta ntial  c o nt e xtualism to be fair ly  uncon trove rsial, though  epistemol o g i sts maydisa g re e  over the sort s ofcircumstan t ial fact ors t hat affe ct the ep i s temic st atu s o f a n i n d iv idual's belie f s . As  w e shall  se e, themor alepi ste mo logy that  I go on  t ode fe ndfeatu r es the i mp ort an ceof on e 's soc ial c ircu ms ta n ces  in com i ng t o ha ve  j usti fie dmoral  bel i efs . Norma tive cont ext u alis m(i .e., ep istemological  r elativism)  i s q uite c o n troversi al and should not be co n fused w ith  circ umst antial or  st ructur alc ontext ualism . The  c ont e x tuali s t  m ora lepistemolo g y  Iplanto  def end isnot intended as av ers ion of normat ive  con t e xt ual i sm .  Fi na l ly, I  do plan to def end a vers io n  o f structur a l c on textual ism abo ut ju s tifiedmoral bel ief, whic hwill o ccu py most of  my atte ntion inw hat f o ll ows.Jus tifica ti onand E pistem i c R espon sibili ty  To se t the  s tage for  the version of epistem ologic al co nte xtualismI p r opo se to def end,  I first n eed  to  spec ify the n otio n  o f e p istem ic a p praisal a t  w ork i nmy thinking . M y p rimar y i n terest  her e is with questio n s about the ju stif i c ati ono f mo ra l belief and n otwi t h  questio ns  of proving , showin g, or de monstr atingmoral p r i nc i ples.I ne edto clarif y w ha t  I mean  h er e , andI al so  needto say some t h ing about how ce rtain t ermso f e piste mi c evalu a tion  (such as"justificat ion,""rat ional ity") w or k. AsI w il l explain, ascriptio ns of  justif ic atio n ( and ra tion a l ity)arebe stinterpret e d  a s  i nv o lvi ng c ertai ncont extuallyv ariablepar a meters. "Get t i ng cle a ra b out thesemat tersw i ll allow m e  toc la r ify t he spe cificnotiono f d ox astic j ust i f ication t hat inter e sts  m e, t he notio nof b ei ngep isternically re sponsibl e in wha t one be lie v es.L et meel aborate. Pre limin ar y  Remark s abo ut Just i fic ati onIn t his  pap e r I am interested in que stio ns ab o utdoxas tic j us tificati o n, t hat is,w ith questions  of
 the_task of_clarifying these crucial notions_until I_have_clarified (in_the_next section) the_specific notion of_epistemic appraisal operative in_my thinking. However,_before_going on, note that SC, as formulated, does not require that all inferentially justified_beliefs_be based_on_contextually_basic beliefs, rather it allows_that regresses may legitimately terminated_with such_beliefs. This means that the contextualist can allow_(strictly_speaking) that an_individual's justified beliefs may exhibit either a foundationalist or_a coherentist structure.'° 298 Moral Knowledge?_What the contextualist_claims_is_that the contextualist picture_represents a realistic and largely accurate_picture of the actual structure of_an ordinary individual's justified beliefs. And this_indeed is what I plan to_argue in connection with moral_belief. To_conclude, we should recognize three_general contextualist theses._I take_circumstantial contextualism to_be fairly uncontroversial, though epistemologists may_disagree over the_sorts of circumstantial factors that affect_the_epistemic status of_an_individual's_beliefs. As_we shall see,_the_moral epistemology_that_I go on to defend features_the_importance of one's social circumstances in coming_to have justified moral_beliefs._Normative contextualism (i.e., epistemological_relativism) is quite controversial and_should not be confused with circumstantial_or structural_contextualism. The_contextualist moral epistemology I plan to defend is not intended as_a version of normative contextualism. Finally,_I do plan to_defend a_version_of structural contextualism_about_justified moral_belief, which will occupy most of my_attention in_what follows. Justification and Epistemic Responsibility_To set the stage_for_the version of epistemological contextualism I_propose to defend, I first need_to specify the notion of_epistemic_appraisal_at work in my thinking._My primary interest here is with_questions about the_justification of moral belief and not with_questions_of proving, showing, or demonstrating moral_principles._I need to clarify what I_mean_here,_and I also need to_say something about how certain terms_of epistemic evaluation (such as "justification," "rationality") work. As_I will explain,_ascriptions of justification (and rationality)_are_best_interpreted as involving certain contextually variable parameters." Getting clear about_these matters_will allow me_to clarify the specific notion of doxastic justification that interests_me, the notion of being episternically responsible_in what one believes. Let me elaborate. Preliminary Remarks about Justification_In this paper I am interested in questions_about doxastic justification, that is, with questions_of