 by (but not incompatible with) the 354 F R E D R I K H A R A L D S E N stories, such as the usual laws of nature and that Edinburgh is to the north of London. Let W be the set of equidistant worlds representing fiction f. We define truth-in-f by quantifying over the members of W as follows: p is true-in-f iff p is true in all worlds w ∈ W p is false-in-f iff p is true in none of the worlds w ∈ W. p is neither-true-nor-false-in-f iff p is true in some worlds w ∈ W but not others. 'Holmes is a detective' is thus true-in-the-fiction, 'Holmes is five feet tall' is false, and 'Holmes has blood type A' is neither, unless of course it is, unknown to us at present, entailed by some property actually ascribed to Holmes in worlds where the usual facts about biology hold. The possibilist definition of truth-in-fiction has sometimes been criticized (cf. Sainsbury 2010; Wright 2014) for helping itself to controversial resources, such as supervaluationism (see Stone 2010).5 Supervaluationism would be needed only if we let every world in which some possible individual – a different one in different worlds – satisfied the descriptions associated with the Holmes stories be a truth-maker for those stories; in that case, sentences of the form 'Holmes is F' would be associated with 5 Stone and Wright both notice similarities between the problem of selecting a referent and the problem of the many, which can be illustrated as follows (cf. Lewis 1993): A cloud is an aggregate of droplets. At the outskirts of the cloud the density of droplets gradually falls off, but since the boundaries are vague it is impossible to tell where the boundaries of the cloud actually are. As a consequence, many different aggregates are equally good candidates to be the cloud, and we seem to have no means of identifying the cloud with any one of these rather than another. But all of the aggregates are clouds. And then we have many clouds, even though there is, of course, only one. The suggestive parallel to the selection problem breaks down quickly, however. Even if we developed a strategy for picking out a particular aggregate – perhaps an arbitrary one – as the value of 'that cloud' it would not solve the problem that the other aggregates are, by definition,
by (but not incompatible with) the 354 F R E D radius I K planck's constant A R A L D S E N stories, such as the common laws of nature and that Edinburgh is to the north of London. Let W be the stage set of equidistant worlds representing fabrication f. We specify truth - in - farad by quantifying over the members of W as follow: p is true - in - f iff p is true in all worlds w ∈ W p is delusive - in - f iff p is true in none of the worlds w ∈ W. p is neither - on-key - nor - false - in - f iff p is true in some worlds w ∈ W but not others.' Holmes is a detective' is thus truthful - in - the - fiction,' Holmes is five feet tall' is false, and' Holmes has rake type A' is neither, unless of course it is, unknown to us at present, entailed by some property actually ascribed to Holmes in worlds where the usual facts about biology hold. The possibilist definition of truth - in - fiction has sometimes been criticized (cf. Sainsbury 2010; Wright 2014) for helping itself to controversial resource, such as supervaluationism (see Stone 2010).5 Supervaluationism would be needed entirely if we lease every world in which some possible individual – a unlike one in different worldly concern – satisfied the descriptions consociate with the Holmes stories be a truth - maker for those stories; in that case, conviction of the form' Holmes is F' would be associated with 5 Stone and Wright both notice similarities between the trouble of selecting a referent and the trouble of the many, which can be illustrated as follows (cf. Lewis 1993 ): A cloud is an aggregate of droplets. At the outskirt of the cloud the density of droplets gradually falls off, but since the boundaries are vague it is impossible to tell where the boundaries of the cloud actually are. As a consequence, many unlike aggregates are equally good candidates to be the cloud, and we look to have no mean of identifying the cloud with any one of these rather than another. But all of the aggregates are cloud. And then we have many clouds, even though there be, of course, entirely one. The suggestive parallel to the selection problem breaks down quickly, however. Even if we developed a strategy for picking out a especial aggregate – perhaps an arbitrary one – as the value of' that swarm' it would not solve the problem that the other aggregates are, by definition,
 by (but not incompatible wiuh) the 354 F R E D R I K H E R A L D S E N stories, such as the usual lews if naulre and that Edinburgf is to tje north of Oindon. Let X be the set or equndmstant worlds rgpresenting xiction f. We dafknz truth-in-f by quantifying over the mqmbers pf W as follows: k is uruq-in-f pfn p is true in all worlds w ∈ W p is falve-in-f iff p ix true in none of the worlfs w ∈ W. p is neither-trke-nor-false-ib-f isd p is true kn some wognds w ∈ W bot not others. 'Holmes is a detectkve' ix thus trug-nb-thf-xiction, 'Holnes if five feet bsll' is false, snd 'Holmes has blmod type A' is neither, unness of course it ys, unknowt co us at present, entaulwd by soma prupergy zcvuamly asfriued to Holmss in worldw where the usual fscew about biolofy holq. Ehe possibilist definition of truth-in-fibtioh has sometimes been cruticized (cf. Sainsbury 2010; Wright 2014) for helping itself to controversial resources, suwh as ruptrywuyahionism (see Stone 2010).5 Supervaluationism would be hetdec only if we lct every world in ehlcn some possiblg indivnsuzl – a different onf in disferebt worlds – sayisfied the descriptions aswociated witk tye Holmes stories ye a truth-mayer gor tnose stories; in that care, ssntences of the form 'Folmes is F' woula bv asvociated with 5 Stone and Wwight boti notnce simiuarijies beeween the oroblck of selecting a rffereut ang the probpem of the many, which can be illustrated as fplnowv (cf. Lewns 1993): A gloud is an aggwegate of dropkets. At the uutskirts kf the rloud the degsity of dropngts gradually falls osf, byt sunce thd boundaries arr vague in ns impossuble to tell where thg goundaries of tkt cooud actually ate. Xs w bonxezgence, many dhffefeng aggrdgates are cquxlly good candidates to te tge cloud, and we serm to have no meanf of identifyong the cloud with any mne of tnesg rather than another. But all or the agggegwtes are clotds. Qnd then we kave many clouds, even though there is, of course, only one. Jhe suggestive parallgl uo the selectmon prjblem bredks down quickly, howwver. Even if we dtveloped a strategy for pickitg ouh a particular aggregate – perhaps an arbitrary one – as the value of 'that xloud' mt would not aolvr the pxobkem thwt tie other aggregatex are, by definition,
by (but not incompatible with) the 354 E R I H A R N such as the laws of nature that Edinburgh is to the north London. Let W be the set of equidistant worlds representing fiction f. We truth-in-f by quantifying over the members of W as follows: p is true-in-f p true all w ∈ W p is false-in-f iff p is true in none of the worlds w W. p is neither-true-nor-false-in-f iff p is true some worlds w ∈ but not others. 'Holmes is detective' thus true-in-the-fiction, is feet is false, and has blood type A' is neither, unless of course it is, unknown to us at present, entailed some property to Holmes worlds the facts about biology possibilist definition of truth-in-fiction has sometimes Sainsbury 2010; Wright 2014) for helping itself to resources, such supervaluationism (see Stone 2010).5 Supervaluationism would needed only if we let every world in some possible individual – a different one in different worlds – satisfied the descriptions associated Holmes stories be a for those stories; that sentences the 'Holmes is would be associated with 5 Stone and Wright both notice similarities the problem of selecting a referent and the problem of which be illustrated as (cf. Lewis 1993): A is aggregate of droplets. At of cloud droplets falls but since the boundaries vague it is impossible to where the boundaries of a consequence, many different aggregates are equally good to be the cloud, and we seem have no means of identifying the cloud with any one of these than another. of the aggregates are clouds. And then we many clouds, even though is, of course, only one. The suggestive parallel to selection breaks down however. Even if developed a strategy picking out a – perhaps arbitrary – of 'that cloud' it would not the that the other aggregates are, definition,
 by (but not incompatible with) tHe 354 F R E D R I K H a R A L D s E N StoRiEs, suCh as The usual laws of NAturE and that Edinburgh is to tHe norTh OF LonDOn. let W bE the set OF eQUIdiStAnT woRlDS rEpresEntIng fictIon f. We defiNe tRuTh-in-f by quantIFyIng over the MemBers of W as folLowS: p is trUe-In-f IFf p is TruE in alL worldS W ∈ W p is fAlse-in-f ifF p IS true iN None of tHE WoRlds W ∈ W. p is neither-true-nOR-fALse-in-f iff p is trUe in soMe WOrLDS w ∈ W But Not others. 'HOlMes is A DetectiVE' iS THUs tRUe-in-the-fictioN, 'Holmes is fiVE feEt tall' Is FalSE, and 'HoLmes hAs BLooD type A' is neiTher, Unless of cOurse iT Is, unknoWN to us at PresenT, enTaiLed bY SoMe ProPeRTy aCTuAllY AscRibed to HOlMeS in woRlds WHERE the UsuAl faCts abOut biology holD. ThE posSIbiList dEfiniTion Of Truth-In-fictIon haS sOmetimes been criTiciZed (cf. SainSbuRy 2010; wriGhT 2014) for hELping iTseLf tO controVersial REsoUrCES, SuCh as supervaluationIsM (SEe stone 2010).5 SupErvaluATiOnISm would bE nEedEd onLY If we lEt evERy World in wHich soME pOsSible inDiVidual – A dIffEreNt one IN difFerent Worlds – saTisfiED the descriptioNS associated wiTH tHE hoLMes sTorIes be a truth-MakeR For tHose SToRieS; In thaT case, SeNTeNCes of the form 'Holmes iS F' Would bE assoCiated with 5 StoNe and WrighT BOTh notice SimiLArITies between the ProblEm of selectINg a referEnt anD the probLem of the mANY, which caN be IllUstRatED As Follows (cf. LewiS 1993): a ClouD iS an aggrEgaTe of droPleTs. AT thE ouTsKirts of thE cloud thE dEnSiTy Of dRopleTS gradualLy FalLs Off, But siNCe the bOundaRies ArE vAGue It is impOSsIBLe to TeLl WherE thE bOundaRies OF thE cloud aCtually arE. As A ConsEqUeNce, many Different aggrEgAtes are equAlLy gOod canDIDates to bE the cloud, and we seem to havE No means Of iDentiFyinG the cloud WitH any onE of THese raTher thAn anoThEr. BUT All of THE aGgrEgAtes are cloUDS. AnD then We Have Many cloUds, even though there IS, of Course, only one. the SuggESTiVe pARaLLel To THe sELEction problem brEaks down quIcKLy, However. EveN If wE dEvelopeD a stratEgy foR Picking Out a partiCular aggrEgAte – pERHapS an arbitraRy one – as tHe value of 'THat clOUd' It wouLd nOt solvE tHe pRobleM that tHE otHer agGregatEs Are, by dEfiniTiOn,
 by (but not incompatiblewith) the354 F  RE D  R  I K  H A  R A L D S E N stor ies, such as the usual  laws  o f  nat u re  andthat Ed i nb u r ghis  t o t he no rth o f L ondon.Let W be t hese t of equidis t an t worlds r epr esenting fic tio n f. W edef i ne tr uth -in-f  by qu a ntifyi ng over t he member s  of W a s fo llow s: p is true-in-f if f  p is true inall wo rl d sw ∈ W  pis false-i n- f iff p is tr u ei n non e  of the world s w ∈ W. pi s n either -t rue - nor-fa lse-i n- f  if f p is true  insome worl ds w ∈ W but n o t other s. 'Ho lme s i s ad et ec tiv e' ist hu s t r ue- in-the-f ic ti on, ' Holm e s i s fi vefeet  tall ' is false, a nd'Hol m eshas b loodtype  A ' isneithe r, un le ss of course it  is,  unknowntous  at  p resen t , enta ile d b y somepropert y  ac tu a l l yascribed to Holmes  i n wo rlds whe re the us ua l  facts a bo utbiol o g y hol d. T h epossibil ist de f in it ion oftr uth-in -f ict ion  hass omet imes b een crit icize d  (cf. Sainsbur y  2010; Wright 20 1 4 )f or h elp ing itselfto c o ntro vers i al  re s ource s, su ch as supervaluationism ( se e Ston e 201 0).5 Superval uationismw o u ld be ne eded on l y if we let ev ery w orld in wh i ch somepossi ble indi vidual –a differen t o neindif f e re nt worlds – s a t isfi ed  the de scr iptions  as soc iat edwi th the Ho lmes sto ri es  b ea t ruth- m aker for  t hos esto ries; in tha t cas e, s en te n ces  of the fo r m  'Ho lm es  isF'wo uld b e as s oci ated wi th 5 Ston e a n d Wr ig ht  both n otice similar it ies betwee nthe  probl e m  of sele cting a referent and th e  proble m o f the  man y, whichcan  be il lus t ratedas fol lows(c f.L e wis 1 9 9 3) : A  c loud is an a ggr egate  o f dr oplets.  At the outskirtso f t he cloud theden sity o fdro p le t s g ra d ual l y  falls off, but  since the  b o un daries are vag ue  it isimpossi ble t o  tell w here theboundarie sof t h e  cl oud actual ly are.As a cons e quenc e ,manydif ferent  a ggr egate s aree qua lly g ood ca nd idates  to b ethe clou d, and we seem to haveno mea ns of  id entifying  th e  cl oud withanyone of the serat her t han anoth er.B ut  al l  of t he a g gregatesa re  cl o u ds . And thenw e hav e man y c l ouds,even  though there is, of course, onl y on e .  Th e s u gges ti ve parallel to  th es e lectionpr oblem break s down q ui c kly,howeve r. Eve n if we d ev e lopeda st rat egy for p ick in g  out apa rt i cularaggr eg ate –perhap s  ana r bitrary one – as  thev a lue o f  't hat c lo ud' itw ould  not solve  the proble m that  the  othe r aggre ga tes ar e,by  definitio n ,
 by_(but not_incompatible with) the 354_F R_E_D R_I_K H A_R A L_D S E N_stories, such as_the_usual laws of nature and that Edinburgh is to the north of London. Let_W_be the_set_of_equidistant worlds representing fiction f._We define truth-in-f by quantifying_over the_members of W as follows: p is true-in-f_iff_p is true_in all worlds w ∈ W p is false-in-f_iff p is true in none_of the worlds_w_∈_W. p is neither-true-nor-false-in-f_iff p is true in some_worlds w ∈ W but not_others. 'Holmes is a detective' is thus_true-in-the-fiction, 'Holmes is five feet tall'_is false, and 'Holmes has_blood type_A' is neither, unless of_course it is,_unknown to_us at present,_entailed by some property actually ascribed_to Holmes in_worlds where the usual facts about_biology_hold. The possibilist_definition_of_truth-in-fiction has_sometimes been criticized_(cf._Sainsbury 2010;_Wright_2014) for helping itself to controversial_resources,_such as supervaluationism (see Stone 2010).5 Supervaluationism_would be needed only_if_we let every world_in which some possible individual_– a different one in different_worlds –_satisfied the_descriptions associated with the Holmes stories be a truth-maker for those_stories; in that case, sentences of_the form 'Holmes is_F' would_be_associated with 5_Stone_and Wright_both notice similarities between the problem of_selecting a_referent and the problem of the_many, which can be_illustrated_as follows (cf. Lewis 1993): A_cloud is an aggregate of droplets._At the outskirts of the_cloud_the_density of droplets gradually falls_off, but since the boundaries are_vague it is_impossible to tell where the boundaries of_the_cloud actually are. As a consequence,_many_different aggregates are equally good candidates_to_be_the cloud, and we seem_to have no means of identifying_the cloud with any one of these rather than_another. But all_of the aggregates are clouds._And_then_we have many clouds, even though there is, of course,_only one._The suggestive parallel_to the selection problem breaks down quickly, however. Even if_we developed a strategy for picking out_a particular aggregate – perhaps an arbitrary one – as the_value of 'that cloud' it would not solve_the problem that the other aggregates are,_by definition,