�. 7 For formidable versions of this argument, see J. Hampton, 'The Wisdom of the Egoist', Social Philosophy and Policy,  (), pp. –, and 'Feminist Contractarianism', in L. Antony and C. Witt (eds), A Mind of One's Own (Boulder: Westview, ), pp. –. complaint against you. The complaint is not simply that you have damaged our relationship. In fact, given that (by hypothesis) you have actually made me better off, an explanation is needed of why I should think you have damaged it. Simply looking at what is good for me cannot explain this. What does explain it is precisely the 'internal relation' to our own good which each of us has in virtue of our rational agency, and which your action ignores. Because developmentalism loses sight of the crucial role of rational agency in what is good for us, it is prone to get things wrong just when agency matters in ways which concern for good-for can mask. Similar problems arise about Kraut's treatment of the Millian notion that we are entitled to a moral 'wall' protecting us from interference. Kraut rejects what he calls 'pure anti-paternalism', the view that the consent of others is required for interfering in their lives or actions (§). This view is, he says (p. ), 'arbitrary' in holding that another's will should be respected when no good is performed by doing so. We bypass people's will[s] all the time, by preventing them from harming others and requiring them to contribute to the good of others, whether they want to or not. There is no merit in the general idea that we should all be allowed to do whatever we choose. On Kraut's view the only possible point of respecting the wills of others must be that they perform a crucial epistemic service, because they are generally better situated to know what is good for them than we are. This is, of course, very often true, but it fails to capture important intuitions about the respect others may claim from us by right. Those who think it an important feature of normative ethical
�. 7 For formidable versions of this argument, see J. Hampton,' The Wisdom of the Egoist', Social Philosophy and Policy,  (), pp. –, and' Feminist Contractarianism', in L. Antony and C. Witt (eds), A judgment of One's Own (Boulder: Westview, ), pp. –. complaint against you. The ailment is not simply that you have damaged our relationship. In fact, yield that (by hypothesis) you have actually made me good off, an explanation is needed of why I should remember you have damaged it. Simply look at what is good for me cannot explain this. What does explain it is precisely the' internal relation' to our own good which each of us accept in virtue of our rational means, and which your action ignores. Because developmentalism loses sight of the all-important role of intellectual agency in what is good for us, it is prone to get things improper just when agency matters in ways which concern for commodity - for can dissemble. Similar problems arise about Kraut's treatment of the Millian notion that we are entitled to a moral' wall' protecting us from interference. Kraut reject what he calls' pure anti - paternalism', the opinion that the consent of others is want for interfering in their lives or action (§ ). This view is, he says (p. ),' arbitrary' in holding that another's will should be respected when no commodity is performed by doing so. We bypass people's will[s ] all the time, by preventing them from harming others and requiring them to contribute to the good of others, whether they want to or not. There is no deservingness in the general mind that we should all be allowed to do whatever we choose. On Kraut's view the only potential point of respecting the wills of others must be that they perform a crucial epistemic service, because they are generally better situated to sleep together what is good for them than we are. This is, of class, very often true, but it fail to capture significant intuitions about the deference others may claim from us by right. Those who intend it an important feature of normative ethical
�. 7 Flr formidable versions on this argument, see J. Hempton, 'Fhe Wisdum of the Egoist', Social Phillsiphy qnd Policy,  (), pp. –, and 'Fdminist Clntractaeianmsm', in L. Antony ehd C. Wibc (eds), W Miud of One's Own (Bpulder: Wesdview, ), pp. –. com[lxiut against you. The complaint is not fimply yhwt you have daiagec our geoationship. In fact, given that (by hypmthesis) you hsve actually made me betteg ofv, an explanation id needed of why U should thivk you havt bamaged it. Aimply looking at what is good wor mz cannot exklzij this. What voes eqplain it is igeciself the 'imternal relatipn' vo oyr own good which eaci of us has in virtug of our rdtnonal agency, and whicy tour dctimn iebords. Gerauae devflo'mentalism moses sight of the crucial rolt os rational agehcy in wrat is good for us, it is prone to get tvinfs wrong just when agenxy matters in ways whlch concewn for good-for can mask. Similar problems arise abmut Kcajt's tveatownh of the Millian notion that we are entitled ek s koral 'wall' probecting us from inyegfrtence. Kraut regects cgaf he calls 'pure anhi-patergalisn', the vier thst the consent of others is required fog inrerfering in their lives or aetions (§). Thix view is, he says (p. ), 'aryitrarg' in holdinh that ankgher's will shoula bv revpected when no good is pewformed bb doiug so. We bypsss pejple's will[d] all the time, by prevenhing jhem fsom harminh others and requiring them to rpntribute to tve cood of jtherx, whether ther want to or npt. Therz is nu merit in the geieral idea trat we should wll be allowxd to do rhatwver we choure. On Kraut's voew the oujy pissible point of rcspecjihg the wills of otyers must be thst gher ierhorm w crucial epivtemkc rrrvicd, because tmey are generally better siduatsd to know what is gjod for jhem than we are. This os, of course, very lften trne, but it fails to capture important infuitions wbomt the respece otmers may claim from us by right. Those who think it an important featurg of normative ethicak
�. 7 For formidable versions of this J. 'The Wisdom the Egoist', Social pp. and 'Feminist Contractarianism', L. Antony and Witt (eds), A Mind of One's (Boulder: Westview, ), pp. –. complaint against you. The complaint is not simply you have damaged our relationship. In fact, given that (by hypothesis) you have made better an is needed of why I should think you have damaged it. Simply looking at what is for me cannot explain this. What does explain is precisely the 'internal to our own good which of has in of rational and which your ignores. Because developmentalism loses sight of the crucial role of rational agency in what is good for it is get things just agency in ways which good-for can mask. Similar problems arise of the Millian notion that we are entitled a moral protecting us from interference. Kraut rejects he calls 'pure anti-paternalism', the view that the of others is required for interfering in their lives or actions (§). This view is, (p. ), 'arbitrary' in that another's will be when good performed by so. We bypass people's will[s] all the time, by preventing them harming others and requiring them to contribute to the good whether want to or There is no merit the idea that we should allowed do On view only possible point of the wills of others must that they perform a are generally better situated to know what is for them than we are. This is, course, very often true, but it fails to capture important intuitions about respect others from us by right. Those who think it important feature of normative
�. 7 For formidable versions of thIs argument, See J. HAmpTon, 'thE WisDom oF the Egoist', SociAL PhiLosophy and Policy,  (), pp. –, and 'FEminiSt cOntrACtArianIsm', in L. ANToNY And c. WItT (edS), A mInD of OnE's OWn (BouldEr: Westview, ), Pp. –. cOmPlaint againsT YoU. The complaInt Is not simply tHat You havE dAmaGEd our RelAtionShip. In FAct, givEn that (by hYpOThesis) YOu have aCTUaLly mAde me better off, an eXPlANation is needed Of why I ShOUlD THinK yoU have damagEd It. SimPLy lookiNG aT WHAt iS Good for me cannOt explain thIS. WhAt does ExPlaIN it is pRecisElY The 'Internal relAtioN' to our own Good whICh each oF Us has in Virtue Of oUr rAtioNAl AgEncY, aND whICh YouR ActIon ignorEs. beCause DeveLOPMEntaLisM losEs sigHt of the cruciaL roLe of RAtiOnal aGency In whAt Is gooD for us, It is pRoNe to get things wrOng jUst when agEncY mAttErS in waYS which ConCerN for gooD-for can MAsk. siMILAr Problems arise about krAUT's TreatmenT of the mIlLiAN notion tHaT we Are eNTItled To a mORaL 'wall' proTectinG Us FrOm interFeRence. KRaUt rEjeCts whAT he cAlls 'puRe anti-paTernaLIsm', the view that THe consent of otHErS IS rEQuirEd fOr interferiNg in THeir LiveS Or ActIOns (§). ThIs vieW iS, He SAys (p. ), 'arbitrary' in holdInG that aNotheR's will should bE respected WHEN no good iS perFOrMEd by doing so. We bYpass People's wilL[S] all the tIme, by PreventiNg them froM HArming otHerS anD reQuiRINg Them to contribUTE to tHe Good of oTheRs, whethEr tHey WanT to Or Not. There iS no merit In ThE gEnEraL idea THat we shoUlD alL bE alLowed TO do whaTever We chOoSe. oN KrAut's vieW ThE ONly pOsSiBle pOinT oF respEctiNG thE wills oF others muSt bE That ThEy Perform A crucial epistEmIc service, bEcAusE they aRE GenerallY better situated to know whAT is good For Them tHan wE are. This iS, of Course, VerY Often tRue, but It faiLs To cAPTure iMPOrTanT iNtuitions aBOUt tHe resPeCt otHers may Claim from us by right. tHosE who think it an ImpOrtaNT FeAtuRE oF NorMaTIve ETHical
�. 7 For formidable versio ns of this  argu men t,se e J.  Ham pton, 'The Wis d om o f the Egoist', SocialPhilo so p hy a n dPolic y,  (    ) , p p.   – , an d 'Fe min ist Con tractarian ism ',  in L. Anton y  a nd C. Witt  (e ds), A MindofOne'sOw n ( B oulde r:Westv iew,   ), p p. – .c omplai n t again s t  y ou.The complaint isn ot simply that yo u have  d a ma g e d o urrelationsh ip . Inf act, gi v en t h at( by hypothesis ) you havea ctu ally m ad e m e  bette r off ,a n e xplanationis n eeded ofwhy Is hould t h ink you  havedam age d it .  S im ply  l o oki n gatw hat  is good  f or  me c anno t e x plai n t his.  What  does explain  it  isp rec isely  the'int er nal r elatio n' to  o ur own good whi ch e ach of us  ha sinvi rtueo f ourrat ion al agen cy, and whi ch y o ur  action ignores. B ec a u se  develop mental i sm  l o ses sigh tofthec r ucial  rol e  o f ration al age n cy  i n whatis  goodfo r u s,it is pron e to g et thing s wro n g just when ag e ncy matters i n  w a y sw hich  co ncern for g ood- f or c an m a sk . S i milar  prob le m sa rise about Kraut'str eatmen t ofthe Millian n otion that w e  are ent itle d  t o  a moral 'wall ' pro tecting us from int erfer ence. Kr aut rejec t s  what he  ca lls  'p ure a nt i-paternalism ' ,  the  v iew tha t t he cons ent  of  ot her sis requir ed for i nt er fe ri ngin th e ir lives  o r a ct ion s (§  ). Thi s vie w is ,he say s (p.   ) , 'arb it ra ry'inho lding  tha t  an other's  will sho uld be r es pe cted wh en no good is  p erformed b ydoi ng so. W e bypass  people's will[s] all t h e time,  by  prev enti ng them f rom  harmi ngo thersand re quiri ng  th e m  to c o n tr ibu te  to the go o d  of  othe rs , wh ether t hey want to or not .  Th ere is no mer itin t h e  g ene r al ide at hat w e should all be  allowed t od owhatever w e  ch oo se. OnKraut's  view the onl y possibl e point o fresp e c tin g the will s of oth ers mustb e tha t  t hey p erf orm acr uci al ep istemi c  se rvice , beca us e they  arege nerallybetter situated to know  whatis go odfor themtha n  we  are. Thi s is , of cours e,ver y oft ent rue,buti tfai l s tocapt u re import a nt  in t u it ions aboutt h e  re spect  ot h ers ma y cl aim from us by ri g ht. Those whothin k itani mpor ta nt feature ofnor ma t i ve ethic al 
�. 7_For formidable_versions of this argument,_see J._Hampton,_'The Wisdom_of_the Egoist', Social_Philosophy and Policy,_ (), pp. –,_and 'Feminist Contractarianism',_in_L. Antony and C. Witt (eds), A Mind of One's Own (Boulder: Westview, ),_pp._–. complaint_against_you._The complaint is not simply_that you have damaged our_relationship. In_fact, given that (by hypothesis) you have actually_made_me better off,_an explanation is needed of why I should think_you have damaged it. Simply looking_at what is_good_for_me cannot explain this._What does explain it is precisely_the 'internal relation' to our own_good which each of us has in_virtue of our rational agency, and_which your action ignores. Because_developmentalism loses_sight of the crucial role_of rational agency_in what_is good for_us, it is prone to get_things wrong just_when agency matters in ways which_concern_for good-for can_mask._Similar_problems arise_about Kraut's treatment_of_the Millian_notion_that we are entitled to a_moral_'wall' protecting us from interference. Kraut rejects_what he calls 'pure_anti-paternalism',_the view that the_consent of others is required_for interfering in their lives or_actions (§)._This view_is, he says (p. ), 'arbitrary' in holding that another's will_should be respected when no good_is performed by doing_so. We_bypass_people's will[s] all_the_time, by_preventing them from harming others and requiring_them to_contribute to the good of others,_whether they want to_or_not. There is no merit in_the general idea that we should_all be allowed to do_whatever_we_choose. On Kraut's view the_only possible point of respecting the_wills of others_must be that they perform a crucial_epistemic_service, because they are generally better_situated_to know what is good for_them_than_we are. This is, of_course, very often true, but it_fails to capture important intuitions about the respect others_may claim from_us by right. Those who_think_it_an important feature of normative ethical