 always makes sense to ask âĂIJwho is the speaker of that token?âĂİ, irrespective of the expression tokened. For demonstratives, like âĂIJthisâĂİ and âĂIJthatâĂİ, we can only ask âĂIJwhat did the speaker intend to refer to by the use of that demonstrative token?âĂİ, or something similar, and that adverts to a contextual feature that is not independent of the expression used.17 The quickest fixes here would be to propose a rule in conditional form, which we could think of as a partial rule, like a partial function. It might look like this: Conditional Character Rule for All Tokens: Relative to any token, the meaning of "this" yields the demonstratum of / relative to the token, if there is one. But when does a token have a demonstratum associated with it? Most obviously, when a demonstrative is used. So this rule boils down to a rule that says that "this" plays a demonstrative role in English. But now we are, more or less, where my proposal is: we are thinking of meaning as assigning a role in a language. 17For more details, see Radulescu (2017). 19 7 Conclusion In this paper, I proposed a notion of synonymy that can account for token-reflexive expressions: it claims that synonymous expressions share meaning-forms. It is, admittedly, a departure from the customary notion of sameness of meaning, but the difference only really matters when reflexivity comes on the stage, since meaning-forms are identical with the corresponding meanings in all other cases. It is, therefore, a reasonably conservative extension of the customary notion. I have also argued that other proposals do not account for ζ and η, which I take to be just as clearly synonymous as "I" and "je", if not more, since I had the privilege to define their meanings into existence. So, even if it turns out, as I think it will not, that there are no natural language token-reflexive expressions, the notion I proposed still has its uses. But more importantly, I find the other theses, (A) and (C), much harder to give up than accepting (B∗). References Bach, K. (1992). Intentions and Demonstrations. Analysis, 52, 140–146. Braun, D. (1995). What Is Character?
always makes sense to ask âĂIJwho is the loudspeaker of that token?âĂİ, regardless of the construction tokened. For demonstratives, like âĂIJthisâĂİ and âĂIJthatâĂİ, we can merely necessitate âĂIJwhat did the speaker intend to refer to by the function of that demonstrative token?âĂİ, or something similar, and that adverts to a contextual feature of speech that is not autonomous of the expression used.17 The quickest fix here would be to propose a rule in conditional form, which we could remember of as a partial rule, like a partial function. It might look like this: Conditional Character Rule for All Tokens: proportional to any token, the meaning of " this " yields the demonstratum of / relative to the nominal, if there is one. But when does a token have a demonstratum associated with it? Most obviously, when a demonstrative pronoun is used. indeed this rule boils down to a rule that allege that " this " plays a demonstrative role in English. But now we are, more or less, where my proposal is: we are thinking of meaning as assign a role in a language. 17For more details, see Radulescu (2017). 19 7 Conclusion In this paper, I proposed a notion of synonymy that can account for token - reflexive pronoun expression: it claims that synonymous construction partake meaning - form. It is, admittedly, a departure from the accustomed notion of monotony of meaning, but the difference only really count when reflexivity comes on the stage, since meaning - forms are identical with the corresponding meanings in all other font. It is, therefore, a reasonably conservative extension of the accustomed notion. I have besides argued that other proposals do not account for ζ and η, which I take to be just equally clearly synonymous as " I " and " je ", if not more, since I had the privilege to define their meanings into existence. So, even if it turns out, as I think it will not, that there be no natural lyric token - reflexive expression, the notion I propose still induce its uses. But more importantly, I receive the other theses, (A) and (C), much harder to grant up than accepting (B∗). References Bach, K. (1992). Intentions and Demonstrations. Analysis, 52, 140–146. Braun, D. (1995). What Is Character?
 alaays makes sense to ask âĂLJwho is the specjer of that foken?âĂİ, irfespective of the expression tikenee. For demonstratives, lkke âĂIJthidâĂİ and âĂIJrhatâĂİ, qe can onlb ask âĂIJwhat djf thz wpeaker intend to refer do by the use mf tkat demonstrative token?âĂİ, or something similat, wnd that adverjs to w cohnewtual feature that is not indepehdent oh the expressiom used.17 The quickest fixes jere would be to propode a rule ib cogeitional foro, which we could think of as a partial rule, like a paftial function. Ut mihvt look likx this: Conditional Charactar Rule for All Tokenx: Rxlatuve to any token, the keaning of "this" yiglds the damknstratum of / relqtuve tm tha toywn, kf uhece js one. Buv when does a token hace a demonstratum axsjboated with if? Most ofviously, when a demonstrative is used. Sm tgis rule boils down to q rule that says that "this" plars a demonstrative role in English. But now we are, more ur oefr, wjere my proposal is: we are thinking of meanind ax sssigning a roje in a lanbuwgr. 17For more detxils, szs Dadulescu (2017). 19 7 Conclksion Ig thiw paper, I prolosed a notion of synonymy rhat can accjynt for token-reflerive expressnons: ij claiks that synonymous exprzssiona share meajing-forms. Kt is, admittedly, a ce[arture from the customary notion oh samzness of meaming, btt the difverenga only really mattfrs wken raflexivity comes on the stage, since meaniij-forms are idgnthcan with tke corvesponding meanyngs in all otker casef. It ks, therefoge, a reasmnably consqrvative extetdion of the rustomary notuon. U have xuso argued thay other pgokosals do bot account for ζ akd η, wfjch I take to bz hust as clearly syvonrmlux wv "I" and "je", ix nog mute, sivce I had tme orivolege to define theis meznings into existemcc. So, even if it ttrns out, as I think it will not, that thxre arr nj natural language token-reflexjve expredsijns, the notijn I proposed stnll has its uses. But more importantly, I hind the other theses, (A) and (C), much harder jo nive up than acce[ting (B∗). Raferences Bach, K. (1992). Inrentions and Demokstrations. Analysis, 52, 140–146. Graun, G. (1995). Whwt Is Character?
always makes sense to ask âĂIJwho is of token?âĂİ, irrespective the expression tokened. âĂIJthatâĂİ, can only ask did the speaker to refer to by the use that demonstrative token?âĂİ, or something similar, and that adverts to a contextual feature is not independent of the expression used.17 The quickest fixes here would be propose rule conditional which we could think of as a partial rule, like a partial function. It might look this: Conditional Character Rule for All Tokens: Relative any token, the meaning "this" yields the demonstratum of relative the token, there one. when does a have a demonstratum associated with it? Most obviously, when a demonstrative is used. So this rule boils to a says that plays demonstrative in English. But are, more or less, where my are thinking of meaning as assigning a role a language. more details, see Radulescu (2017). 19 Conclusion In this paper, I proposed a notion synonymy that can account for token-reflexive expressions: it claims that synonymous expressions share meaning-forms. It a departure from the notion of sameness meaning, the only matters when comes on the stage, since meaning-forms are identical with the corresponding in all other cases. It is, therefore, a reasonably conservative the notion. I have argued that other proposals not for ζ and η, take be synonymous "I" "je", if not more, I had the privilege to their meanings into existence. out, as I think it will not, that are no natural language token-reflexive expressions, the I proposed still has its uses. But more importantly, I find the theses, (A) much harder to give up than accepting (B∗). Bach, K. (1992). Intentions Demonstrations. Analysis, 52, 140–146. Braun, D. (1995). What Is
 always makes sense to ask âĂIJWho is the spEaker Of tHat ToKen?âăİ, irRespective of thE ExprEssion tokened. For demonsTratiVeS, Like ÂăIjthisÂĂİ and âăiJTHAtâăİ, We Can OnLY aSk âĂIjwhAt did thE speaker inTenD tO refer to by thE UsE of that demOnsTrative token?ÂĂİ, Or someThIng SImilaR, anD that AdvertS To a conTextual feAtURe that IS not indEPEnDent Of the expression usED.17 THE quickest fixes Here woUlD Be TO ProPosE a rule in coNdItionAL form, whICh WE COulD Think of as a parTial rule, likE A paRtial fUnCtiON. It migHt looK lIKe tHis: ConditioNal CHaracter RUle for aLl TokenS: relativE to any TokEn, tHe meANiNg Of "tHiS" YieLDs The DEmoNstratum Of / ReLativE to tHE TOKen, iF thEre iS one. BUt when does a toKen Have A DemOnstrAtum aSsocIaTed wiTh it? MoSt obvIoUsly, when a demonsTratIve is used. so tHiS ruLe Boils DOwn to a RulE thAt says tHat "this" PLayS a DEMOnStrative role in EnglIsH. bUt Now we are, More or LEsS, wHEre my proPoSal Is: we ARE thinKing OF mEaning as AssignINg A rOle in a lAnGuage. 17FOr MorE deTails, SEe RaDulescU (2017). 19 7 ConclusIon In THis paper, I propoSEd a notion of syNOnYMY tHAt caN acCount for tokEn-reFLexiVe exPReSsiONs: it cLaims ThAT sYNonymous expressions ShAre meaNing-fOrms. It is, admitTedly, a depaRTURe from thE cusTOmARy notion of sameNess oF meaning, buT The diffeRence Only realLy matters WHEn reflexIviTy cOmeS on THE sTage, since meanING-forMs Are idenTicAl with tHe cOrrEspOndInG meanings In all othEr CaSeS. IT is, ThereFOre, a reasOnAblY cOnsErvatIVe exteNsion Of thE cUsTOmaRy notioN. i hAVE alsO aRgUed tHat OtHer prOposALs dO not accOunt for ζ aNd η, WHich i tAkE to be juSt as clearly syNoNymous as "I" aNd "Je", iF not moRE, Since I haD the privilege to define thEIr meaniNgs Into eXistEnce. So, eveN if It turnS ouT, As I thiNk it wiLl not, ThAt tHERe are NO NaTurAl Language toKEN-reFlexiVe ExprEssions, The notion I proposed STilL has its uses. BuT moRe imPORtAntLY, I FInd ThE OthER Theses, (A) and (C), much Harder to giVe UP tHan acceptiNG (B∗). REfErences bach, K. (1992). InTentiONs and DeMonstratiOns. AnalysIs, 52, 140–146. brauN, d. (1995). whaT Is CharactEr?
 always makes sense to ask  âĂIJwho i s the  sp eak er  ofthat  token?âĂİ, ir r espe ctive of the expressio n tok en e d. F o rdemon strativ e s, l ike  â ĂI Jth is â Ăİ  andâĂI JthatâĂ İ, we canonl yask âĂIJwhat di d the spea ker  intend to r efe r to b ythe use o f t hat d emonst r ativetoken?âĂİ ,o r some t hing si m i la r, a nd that adverts t o  a contextual fea ture t ha t  i s not  in dependentof  thee xpressi o nu s e d.1 7  The quickest  fixes here wou ld beto  pr o pose a  rule  i n  co nditional f orm,  which we  could think o f  as a p artial  ru le,  lik e  a  p art ia l  fu n ct ion .  It  might l oo klikethis : C o ndit ion al C harac ter Rule forAll  Tok e ns:  Rela tiveto a ny  toke n, the  mean in g of "this" yie ldsthe demon str at umof  / re l ativetothe  token,  if the r e i so n e .But when does a to ke n ha ve a dem onstra t um  a s sociated  w ith  it? M ost o bvio u sl y, whena demo n st ra tive is  u sed. S othi s r ule b o ilsdown t o a rule  that says that "thi s " plays a dem o ns t r at i ve r ole  in English . Bu t  now  wea re , m o re or  less ,w he r e my proposal is: w eare th inkin g of meaningas assigni n g a role i n al an g uage. 17For mo re de tails, see Radulesc u (20 17). 197 Conclus i o n In thi s p ape r,I p r o po sed a notiono f  syn on ymy tha t c an acco unt  fo r t oke n- reflexive  express io ns :it  cl aimst hat syno ny mou sexp ressi o ns sha re me anin g- fo r ms.  It is, ad m i tted ly ,a de par tu re fr om t h e c ustomar y notionofs amen es sof mean ing, but thedi fference o nl y r eallym a tters wh en reflexivity comes on the sta ge,  sinc e me aning-for msare id ent i cal wi th the  corr es pon d i ng me a n in gsin  all other c ase s. It  i s, t herefor e, a reasonably co n ser vative extens ion  oft h ecus t om a ryno t ion . I have also arg ued that o th e rproposalsd o n ot  accoun t for ζ  andη , which  I take t o be just  a s cl e a rly  synonymou s as "I"  and "je" ,  if n o tmore,  si nce Iha d t he pr ivileg e  to  defi ne the ir  meani ngs i nt o existe nce. So, even if it tur ns out , asI t hink it w ill not , that th ereare no nat ura l l angua get oken- refl e xi vee xpres sion s , the not i on  Ip r op osed stillh a s  it s use s.B ut mor e im portantly, I find the other thes es,( A ) a nd( C),mu ch harder to g ive  u p than acc ep ting (B∗).Referenc es Bach,  K. (1 992).Intenti o n sa nd Dem onst rat ions. Ana lys is ,  52, 14 0– 14 6 . Brau n, D .(1995) . What Is C h a racter?
 always_makes sense_to ask âĂIJwho is_the speaker_of_that token?âĂİ,_irrespective_of the expression_tokened. For demonstratives,_like âĂIJthisâĂİ and âĂIJthatâĂİ,_we can only_ask_âĂIJwhat did the speaker intend to refer to by the use of that demonstrative_token?âĂİ,_or something_similar,_and_that adverts to a contextual_feature that is not independent_of the_expression used.17 The quickest fixes here would be_to_propose a rule_in conditional form, which we could think of as_a partial rule, like a partial_function. It might_look_like_this: Conditional Character Rule_for All Tokens: Relative to any_token, the meaning of "this" yields_the demonstratum of / relative to the_token, if there is one. But_when does a token have_a demonstratum_associated with it? Most obviously,_when a demonstrative_is used._So this rule_boils down to a rule that_says that "this"_plays a demonstrative role in English._But_now we are,_more_or_less, where_my proposal is:_we_are thinking_of_meaning as assigning a role in_a_language. 17For more details, see Radulescu (2017)._19 7 Conclusion In_this_paper, I proposed a_notion of synonymy that can_account for token-reflexive expressions: it claims_that synonymous_expressions share_meaning-forms. It is, admittedly, a departure from the customary notion of_sameness of meaning, but the difference_only really matters when_reflexivity comes_on_the stage, since_meaning-forms_are identical_with the corresponding meanings in all other_cases. It_is, therefore, a reasonably conservative extension_of the customary notion._I_have also argued that other proposals_do not account for ζ and_η, which I take to_be_just_as clearly synonymous as "I"_and "je", if not more, since_I had the_privilege to define their meanings into existence._So,_even if it turns out, as_I_think it will not, that there_are_no_natural language token-reflexive expressions, the_notion I proposed still has its_uses. But more importantly, I find the other theses,_(A) and (C),_much harder to give up_than_accepting_(B∗). References Bach, K. (1992). Intentions and Demonstrations. Analysis, 52,_140–146. Braun,_D. (1995). What_Is Character?