 a relation between name and referent characteristic for individuating characters in fiction. What matters is that we can associate singular propositions with sentences containing 'Holmes' that have the truth-conditions they are supposed to have and play the role in our 346 F R E D R I K H A R A L D S E N theories of meaning and intentionality3 they are supposed to play. This is something singular propositions containing arbitrarily selected, possible individuals seem able to do even if the relation between name and object is schmeference rather than reference. The idea, then, is that when introducing the Holmes, Doyle selected a merely possible object to serve as referent for 'Holmes' among numerous potential candidates. Given transworld identity, the arbitrarily selected referent exists in multiple worlds where he instantiates different properties. Presumably, he is a barrel maker in some of these worlds, a detective in others, and a future space-traveler in yet others. When making the initial selection, Doyle didn't select any particular world; if he had not yet even decided that Holmes was going to be a detective when he started writing about him, Doyle had not yet ruled out the barrel-maker worlds. As long as the selected individual satisfies the properties Doyle ultimately came to associate with it in the stories in some world in which it exists, Doyle selected the right one. To guarantee that Doyle selected the right one, then, we need to ensure that the selected referent could play the role of Holmes. I suspect that any merely possible object can do so, in which case we get the guarantee for free. This claim may be challenged. In particular, if many properties are essential properties of any individual that instantiates them, the guarantee would be harder to obtain. If being human is an essential property of any human, then Doyle must have decided to select a referent among possible individuals that are human. Having decided on species membership is perhaps not an unreasonable condition for making a correct selection, but any further properties taken to be essential makes the guarantee consecutively harder to obtain; if, say, height were an essential property, my account would be in trouble if Doyle initially selected someone shorter or taller than he eventually described Holmes as being. As mentioned above possibilism 3 Questions of reference have, of course, both a semantic side and a cognitive side. I am here concerned with the former and have little to say about the latter. I assume, however, that singular thoughts are singular in virtue of their form, and hence that one can entertain a singular thought
a relation between name and referent characteristic for individuating characters in fabrication. What count is that we can consociate singular proposition with conviction containing' Holmes' that have the accuracy - conditions they are supposed to have and meet the role in our 346 F R east D R I K planck's constant A R A L D S E N theories of meaning and intentionality3 they are supposed to play. This is something remarkable propositions containing arbitrarily choose, possible individuals look able to do even if the sexual intercourse between name and object is schmeference rather than reference. The idea, then, is that when introducing the Holmes, Doyle choose a merely possible object to serve as referent for' Holmes' among numerous potential candidates. Given transworld identity, the randomly choose referent exists in multiple world where he instantiates different properties. Presumably, he is a barrel maker in some of these worlds, a detective in others, and a future space - traveler in yet others. When making the initial selection, Doyle didn't choose any especial world; if he had not however even decide that Holmes was going to be a detective when he started writing about him, Doyle had not so far ruled out the barrel - maker worlds. As long as the choose individual satisfies the properties Doyle ultimately came to associate with it in the stories in some world in which it exists, Doyle selected the right one. To guarantee that Doyle selected the right one, then, we necessitate to ensure that the choose referent could bring the role of Holmes. I suspect that any merely possible aim can do so, in which case we get the guarantee for free. This claim may be challenged. In particular, if many properties are substantive properties of any person that instantiates them, the guarantee would be harder to obtain. If being human is an essential property of any homo, then Doyle must have decided to select a referent among possible individuals that are human. Having decide on species membership is perhaps not an unreasonable condition for making a right selection, but any further properties taken to be substantive makes the guarantee consecutively harder to obtain; if, say, height were an essential place, my account would be in trouble if Doyle initially choose someone shorter or taller than he eventually identify Holmes as being. As mentioned above possibilism 3 Questions of reference have, of class, both a semantic side and a cognitive side. I am here concerned with the former and have little to state about the latter. I wear, however, that remarkable thoughts are singular in virtue of their form, and hence that one can entertain a remarkable thought
 a gelation between name ana referent charcxterisvic for individjating characters in fiction. Wyat mqtters is that we can xssociate singulae pripositions xjth senbznces gontannmng 'Holmes' that have the druth-conditionv ghzy are supposed to have and play the role im lur 346 F R E D R I K R A D A L D S E N theories of meaning znd inttntionality3 they ate supposed to play. This id solething singular pgopositions coneqining arbitfarily seltcced, possiblg individuals seem able to do evdn if the relatuob bfjween name aid objvct is schmefcgence rdther tnan reference. Bhe ivea, rhen, is that when intcoducing the Holmes, Qoyle selacced a merely possible ovject to vervd as rerecenf for 'Joljes' among humerous porential candidates. Bidvm transworld identytr, the arbitrarily selected referent exivts in multiple worlds wheee he instantiates divferent pwoperties. Presumably, he is a barrel maker in some of tiere cirlds, q fetective in others, and a future space-travelew im jet others. When mcking the initiak dekgction, Doyle dkdn't szmedt any particular aorld; is he yad not ytt evrn decided that Holmes was toing to be c dwtective when he scarted writiug aboot him, Doyle had not yet ruleb out fhe barrel-mwker worlsr. As long as the sekewted individual satisfies ehe propecties Doyle jltikately came to adsociate with it in the dtorigs in vome world in which it exists, Doyle selecvxd the right pna. Tm guarancee thst Doyle selested the right one, thzn, we veed to enaure thet the seleceed referent wluld play thx role of Holnes. U suspezg that any merrly possiyje ovject can do so, in whkdh case we get cke guarantee for gred. Trid rlaim kay be challangea. Iv partkcular, if mcnh prpperties are essentidl pdoperties of any imdlvidual tyat instwntiates them, the guarantee woupd be hacder tp oftain. If being human is an esssntial prlpevty of any huian, bhen Doyle musc have decided to select a referent amonj possible individuals rhat are human. Haviug decided on specyes membesship is perhaps not an unreasonable gondition for making a correwt sepection, but any further properties taken to be essential makes the guaranree coisqcutively hzrdet to mbcaiu; if, sar, hemgit were an essentpal property, my account would be in troutlz if Doyle initially selected sumeone shortet or taller than he eventuzlly desvribed Holmes as being. As mentipned above possibilism 3 Auestionw of deference iave, of course, both s semautic sude and a clgnitive side. I sm here conferntd wnth the former and have little to say avokt the latter. I essume, howevcr, that singujar thoughts are sinfklar kn virtue of yheir form, and hence that one can vntqrtain a singuozr thought
a relation between name and referent characteristic characters fiction. What is that we sentences 'Holmes' that have truth-conditions they are to have and play the role our 346 F R E D R I K H A R A D S E N theories of meaning and intentionality3 they are supposed to This something propositions arbitrarily selected, possible individuals seem able to do even if the relation between name and object schmeference rather than reference. The idea, then, is when introducing the Holmes, selected a merely possible object serve referent for among potential Given transworld identity, arbitrarily selected referent exists in multiple worlds where he instantiates different properties. Presumably, he is a barrel in some worlds, a in and future space-traveler in When making the initial selection, Doyle particular world; if he had not yet even that Holmes going to be a detective when started writing about him, Doyle had not yet out the barrel-maker worlds. As long as the selected individual satisfies the properties Doyle ultimately associate with it in stories in some in it Doyle the right To guarantee that Doyle selected the right one, then, we need ensure that the selected referent could play the role of suspect any merely possible can do so, in case get the guarantee for claim be if properties essential properties of any that instantiates them, the guarantee be harder to obtain. essential property of any human, then Doyle must decided to select a referent among possible that are human. Having decided on species membership is perhaps not an condition for correct selection, but any further properties taken to essential makes the guarantee harder to obtain; if, say, height were an essential my would be trouble if Doyle selected someone shorter taller than he Holmes as As above of reference have, of course, both semantic and a cognitive side. I here the former and have little to say about the latter. I assume, however, that singular singular in virtue of form, hence that one can entertain a singular thought
 a relation between name and reFerent charActerIstIc fOr IndiViduAting characterS In fiCtion. What matters is that We can AsSOciaTE sIngulAr propoSItIONs wItH sEntEnCEs ContaIniNg 'HolmeS' that have tHe tRuTh-conditions THeY are supposEd tO have and play The Role in OuR 346 F R e d R I K H a R A l D S E N TheoriES of meaNing and inTeNTionalITy3 they aRE SuPposEd to play. This is somEThINg singular propOsitioNs COnTAIniNg aRbitrarily SeLecteD, PossiblE InDIVIduALs seem able to dO even if the rELatIon betWeEn nAMe and oBject Is SChmEference ratHer tHan refereNce. The IDea, then, IS that whEn intrOduCinG the hOlMeS, DoYlE SelECtEd a MEreLy possibLe ObJect tO serVE AS RefeRenT for 'holmeS' among numerouS poTentIAl cAndidAtes. GIven TrAnswoRld ideNtity, ThE arbitrarily selEcteD referent ExiStS in MuLtiplE Worlds WheRe hE instanTiates dIFfeReNT PRoPerties. Presumably, hE iS A BaRrel makeR in somE Of ThESe worlds, A dEteCtivE IN otheRs, anD A fUture spaCe-travELeR iN yet othErS. When mAkIng The InitiAL selEction, doyle didN't selECt any particulaR World; if he had nOT yET EvEN decIdeD that Holmes Was gOIng tO be a DEtEctIVe wheN he stArTEd WRiting about him, Doyle HaD not yeT ruleD out the barrel-Maker worldS. aS Long as thE selECtED individual satIsfieS the properTIes Doyle UltimAtely camE to associATE with it iN thE stOriEs iN SOmE world in which IT ExisTs, doyle seLecTed the rIghT onE. To GuaRaNtee that DOyle seleCtEd ThE rIghT one, tHEn, we need To EnsUrE thAt the SElecteD refeRent CoUlD PlaY the rolE Of hOLmes. i sUsPect ThaT aNy merEly pOSsiBle objeCt can do so, In wHIch cAsE wE get the Guarantee for fReE. This claim MaY be ChalleNGEd. In partIcular, if many properties aRE essentIal PropeRtieS of any indIviDual thAt iNStantiAtes thEm, the GuAraNTEe wouLD Be HarDeR to obtain. IF BEinG humaN iS an eSsentiaL property of any humaN, TheN Doyle must havE deCideD TO sEleCT a REfeReNT amONG possible indiviDuals that aRe HUmAn. Having deCIdeD oN specieS memberShip iS Perhaps Not an unreAsonable cOnDitiON For Making a corRect seleCtion, but aNY furtHEr PropeRtiEs takeN tO be EssenTial maKEs tHe guaRantee CoNsecutIvely HaRder to obTain; if, say, height were an esSentiaL propErtY, my accounT woULd bE in troublE if DOyle initiaLly SelEcted SomEOne shOrteR Or TalLEr thaN he eVEntually dEScRibED hoLmes as being. aS MEntIoned AboVE possiBiliSm 3 Questions of refeREnce have, of courSe, boTH A seManTIc siDe And a cognitive sIde. i aM HEre conceRnEd with the foRmer and hAvE LittlE to say About tHe latteR. i AsSUme, howEver, ThaT singular ThoUgHTs are siNgUlAR in virTue oF tHeir foRm, and hENce tHAT one can entertain A singULAr thoUGht
 a relation between name a nd referen t cha rac ter is ticforindividuatingc hara cters in fiction. What  matt er s  ist ha t wecan ass o ci a t e s in gu lar  p r op ositi ons  with s entences c ont ai ning 'Holmes '  t hat have t hetruth-condit ion s they  a res uppos edto ha ve and play t he role i no ur 346 F R E D R  I  K H  A R A L D S E Nt he o ries of meanin g andin t en t i ona lit y3 they ar esuppo s ed to p l ay . T his is somethingsingular pr o pos itions  c ont a iningarbit ra r ily  selected,poss ible indi vidual s  seem a b le to d o even  if  th e re l at io n b et w een na mea ndobject i ssc hmefe renc e r a ther  th an r efere nce. The idea , t hen, isthatwhenintr od ucing  the H olmes ,Doyle selecteda me rely poss ibl eobj ec t tos erve a s r efe rent fo r 'Holm e s'am o n g  n umerous potentialca n d id ates. Gi ven tr a ns wo r ld ident it y,thea r bitra rily se lected r eferen t  e xi sts inmu ltiple  w orl dswhere he i nstant iates di ffere n t properties.P resumably, he is a  b a rrel  ma ker in some  oft hese  wor l ds , a detec tivein ot h ers, and a future s pa ce-tra veler  in yet other s. When ma k i n g the in itia l  s e lection, Doyle  didn 't selecta ny parti cular  world;if he had n ot yet e ven  de cid edt h at  Holmes was g o i ng t obe a de tec tive wh enhesta rte dwriting a bout him ,Do yl ehad  noty et ruled  o utth e b arrel - makerworld s. A slo n g a s the s e le c t ed i nd iv idua l s at isfie s th e  pr opertie s Doyle u lti m atel yca me to a ssociate with  i t in the s to rie s in s o m e worldin which it exists, Doy l e selec ted  therigh t one. To  gu arante e t h at Doy le sel ected  t her i ght o n e ,the n,  we need t o ens ure t ha t th e selec ted referent could pla y the role of  Ho lmes . Isus p ec t  th at any m erely possibleobject can  d o  s o, in whic h  ca se  we get  the gu arant e e for f ree. This  claim ma ybe c h a lle nged. In p articula r, if man y  prop e rt ies a reessent ia l p roper ties o f  an y ind ividua lthat i nstan ti ates the m, the guarantee wouldbe har der t o o btain. If  be i nghuman isan e ssential p rop ert y ofany human , th e nDoy l e mus t ha v e decided to  se l e ct  a referent a m ong  poss ibl e  indiv idua ls that are human .  Having decide d on s pec ies memb er ship is perhap s n ot a n unreas on able condit ion forma k ing a  corre ct sel ection, b ut any fu rthe r p roperties  ta ke n  to bees se n tial m akes  t he gua rantee cons e c utively harder t o obt a i n; if ,  sa y, he ig ht were an e ssential p roperty, my  accou nt w ouldbe in t ro uble i f D oy le initial l y selecte d som eone sh or terortaller  tha n he ev entu al lydescribed H ol m es  a s  be ing.  As m en tion ed abovep ossibili sm3  Questi on s o f refere n ce h ave, of co urs e, bo t h  a semanti c  sid e  a n d a c ogniti ve sid e. I am her econcern edw i th the fo rmer andh ave  l ittl e to say  a bout  t hela tter. I assume,  however , that s i n gulartho u ghts are si ng ular in virt ue of  t h eir for m ,  an d hence tha t o necanent erta i n a singular thought
 a_relation between_name and referent characteristic_for individuating_characters_in fiction._What_matters is that_we can associate_singular propositions with sentences_containing 'Holmes' that_have_the truth-conditions they are supposed to have and play the role in our 346_F_R E_D_R_I K H A R_A L D S E_N theories_of meaning and intentionality3 they are supposed to_play._This is something_singular propositions containing arbitrarily selected, possible individuals seem able_to do even if the relation_between name and_object_is_schmeference rather than reference._The idea, then, is that when_introducing the Holmes, Doyle selected a_merely possible object to serve as referent_for 'Holmes' among numerous potential candidates._Given transworld identity, the arbitrarily_selected referent_exists in multiple worlds where_he instantiates different_properties. Presumably,_he is a_barrel maker in some of these_worlds, a detective_in others, and a future space-traveler_in_yet others. When_making_the_initial selection,_Doyle didn't select_any_particular world;_if_he had not yet even decided_that_Holmes was going to be a detective_when he started writing_about_him, Doyle had not_yet ruled out the barrel-maker_worlds. As long as the selected_individual satisfies_the properties_Doyle ultimately came to associate with it in the stories in_some world in which it exists,_Doyle selected the right_one. To_guarantee_that Doyle selected_the_right one,_then, we need to ensure that the_selected referent_could play the role of Holmes._I suspect that any_merely_possible object can do so, in_which case we get the guarantee_for free. This claim may_be_challenged._In particular, if many properties_are essential properties of any individual_that instantiates them,_the guarantee would be harder to obtain._If_being human is an essential property_of_any human, then Doyle must have_decided_to_select a referent among possible_individuals that are human. Having decided_on species membership is perhaps not an unreasonable condition_for making a_correct selection, but any further_properties_taken_to be essential makes the guarantee consecutively harder to obtain;_if, say,_height were an_essential property, my account would be in trouble if Doyle_initially selected someone shorter or taller than_he eventually described Holmes as being. As mentioned above possibilism 3_Questions of reference have, of course, both a_semantic side and a cognitive side. I_am here concerned with_the_former and have little to say about_the_latter._I_assume, however, that_singular thoughts are_singular in virtue_of their_form, and hence_that one_can entertain a_singular_thought