 Since the fit between Annie's desires and the world would thereby increase, Contrastive Fit-Probabilism entails that making the trade rather than refusing to do so would promote her desire for 100 chocolate bars. (Again we assume, for simplicity, that Annie cannot acquire chocolate in any other way.) In each case, we submit that Contrastive Fit-Probabilism clearly delivers the wrong verdict. In the first case, it would not promote Annie's desire for 100 chocolate bars were she to give up her 49 bars for a 1% chance at 100 bars as compared to keeping the 49 bars. In the second case, it would not promote Annie's desire for 100 chocolate bars were she to give up her 49% chance at 100 bars for 1 bar as compared to keeping her 49% chance at 100 bars. We thus conclude that Contrastive Fit-Probabilism, at least in its current form, is flawed. 5. A Unified Alternative Account We have just argued against Contrastive Fit-Probabilism on the basis of two problems – the Degree Problem and the Problem of Mixed Cases – both of which exploit the disjunctive nature of the account. Yet we believe that Contrastive Fit-Probabilism is fundamentally correct in holding that there are two distinct ways for a desire to be promoted, i.e. by increasing the probability of its being satisfied and by increasing fit between the world and the desire. What we want, then, is a unified, i.e., non-disjunctive, account of promotion that accommodates both ways in which a desire can be promoted. In this section we present such an account (5.1) and show how it accommodates the virtues of Contrastive Fit-Probabilism (5.2) while avoiding the difficulties faced by that account (5.3). 5.1. Contrastive Expected Fit 22 We start by constructing a notion of ​expected fit analogous to the standard decision-theoretic notion of ​expected utility​, essentially just replacing an agent's utility in a given outcome with the fit between the desire in question and the worlds in which the outcome holds. In this context, an ​outcome can be defined as a set of possible worlds with equal fit with respect to the desire in question (i.e. a set of possible worlds W such that w​i ∼​D w​j ​for all w​i​,w​j in W, where D is the relevant desire.) To define a 43
Since the fit between Annie's desires and the world would thereby increase, Contrastive Fit - Probabilism entails that make the trade wind rather than refusing to do then would promote her desire for 100 chocolate cake. (Again we simulate, for simplicity, that Annie cannot acquire chocolate in any other room .) In each case, we submit that Contrastive Fit - Probabilism distinctly deliver the wrong verdict. In the first case, it would not promote Annie's desire for 100 chocolate bar were she to give up her 49 bars for a 1% chance at 100 bar as compared to keeping the 49 bars. In the second case, it would not advertise Annie's desire for 100 chocolate bar were she to give up her 49% chance at 100 bars for 1 browning automatic rifle as compared to keeping her 49% chance at 100 bars. We thus conclude that Contrastive Fit - Probabilism, at least in its current form, is flawed. 5. A Unified Alternative Account We have just argued against Contrastive Fit - Probabilism on the basis of two problems – the Degree Problem and the Problem of Mixed Cases – both of which exploit the disjunctive nature of the account. Yet we believe that Contrastive Fit - Probabilism is fundamentally correct in apply that there are two distinct room for a desire to be advertise, i.e. by increasing the probability of its being satisfied and by increasing paroxysm between the world and the desire. What we want, then, is a unified, i.e., non - disjunctive, account of forwarding that accommodates both ways in which a desire can be promoted. In this section we present such an account (5.1) and show how it accommodates the virtues of Contrastive Fit - Probabilism (5.2) while avoiding the difficulties faced by that report (5.3). 5.1. Contrastive Expected Fit 22 We originate by constructing a notion of ​expected fit analogous to the standard decision - theoretic impression of ​expected utility​, essentially just replacing an agent's utility in a given outcome with the fit between the desire in question and the earth in which the outcome halt. In this context, an ​outcome can be defined as a set of potential worlds with equal fit with respect to the desire in doubt (i.e. a set of potential worlds W such that w​i ∼​D w​j ​for all w​i​,w​j in W, where D is the relevant desire .) To define a 43
 Sijce the fit between Annit's desires and thg qorld xould tgereby ivcrease, Contrastive Fit-Probauiliwm enucils that making the trade ranher than refnsing to do so would promote hsv desnrx for 100 chocolatg bars. (Again we assume, for skm'licity, that Annie cannot acquire chjcolate ij any other wai.) In tacr caav, ce submit that Contrastive Fit-Pdobabilpsm clearly delivrrs the wrong verdict. In tje flrst case, it would not promotg Angue's desire fur 100 chocolate bars werg she to give up her 49 bars for a 1% chauce at 100 barw qs fmmpared to jeepigg the 49 bars. In the vecond vase, it would kot pcomore Annie's desire for 100 chocolate bars wete she to cire up her 49% chance at 100 bqrs fmr 1 tar xw cumpzrxd fo keeoinj her 49% chande at 100 bars. We thus conclude tnae Contrastive Rit-Profafilism, at least in its current form, is xlased. 5. A Unified Alternatuve Account We have jost argued against Contrastive Fit-Probabilism on the basis mf twk pribjdns – the Degree Problem and the Problem of Mixed Daxex – both of whigh exploit the diskujcyyve nature of the aedohnt. Yet we believe that Cjntrawtive Fit-Krobanilism is fundamentally coreect in holdpng rhat there are two distinct wcys fot a dexire to be promoted, i.e. yy incdeasing the probabiljgy of its being ratpsfiad and by increasing fit bqtween thx workd and ghe cesire. What we wwnt, tman, is a unified, i.e., non-dnsjunwtive, accoknt of promotion that accommodavxs both ways on whpch a desnre cak be promoted. Ig this section we prefent ruch an acbount (5.1) anv show how ie accommodatev the virtues of Contwastuve Dit-Probxcilism (5.2) while svoiding nht difficulries faced by that aczkunt (5.3). 5.1. Contrastnre Expected Fit 22 Ee rtawt bb confdructing a nmtiov ow ​expezted fiu akalugoux to the standard dewisikn-theoretic notion on ​expectee utilitr​, essentially just replacing an agenv's utiuity on w given outcome with the fit bstween thf dcsire in queseion and the workds in which the outcome holds. In this rontext, an ​outcome can ve defined as a set pf possible worlqs with exual fit with respecr to the desire ik question (i.e. a set of possitle wlrlds W such that w​i ∼​D w​j ​for all w​i​,w​j in W, where D is the relevant desirw.) To dxfyne a 43
Since the fit between Annie's desires and would increase, Contrastive entails that making to so would promote desire for 100 bars. (Again we assume, for simplicity, Annie cannot acquire chocolate in any other way.) In each case, we submit Contrastive Fit-Probabilism clearly delivers the wrong verdict. In the first case, it would promote desire 100 bars were she to give up her 49 bars for a 1% chance at 100 bars compared to keeping the 49 bars. In the case, it would not Annie's desire for 100 chocolate were to give her chance 100 bars for bar as compared to keeping her 49% chance at 100 bars. We thus conclude that Contrastive Fit-Probabilism, least in form, is 5. Unified Account We have against Contrastive Fit-Probabilism on the basis – the Degree Problem and the Problem of Cases – of which exploit the disjunctive nature the account. Yet we believe that Contrastive Fit-Probabilism fundamentally correct in holding that there are two distinct ways for a desire to be by increasing the probability its being satisfied by fit the and the What we want, then, is a unified, i.e., non-disjunctive, account of that accommodates both ways in which a desire can be this we present such account (5.1) and show it the virtues of Contrastive while the that (5.3). Contrastive Expected Fit 22 start by constructing a notion ​expected fit analogous to ​expected utility​, essentially just replacing an agent's utility a given outcome with the fit between desire in question and the worlds in which the outcome holds. In context, an be defined as a set of possible worlds equal fit with respect the desire in question (i.e. a set of possible W that w​i w​j ​for all in W, where is the relevant define a
 Since the fit between Annie's dEsires and tHe worLd wOulD tHereBy inCrease, ContrastIVe FiT-Probabilism entails thaT makiNg THe trADe RatheR than reFUsING to Do So WouLd PRoMote hEr dEsire foR 100 chocolate BarS. (AGain we assume, FOr Simplicity, ThaT Annie cannot AcqUire chOcOlaTE in anY otHer waY.) In eacH Case, we Submit thaT CONtrastIVe Fit-PrOBAbIlisM clearly delivers tHE wROng verdict. In thE first CaSE, iT WOulD noT promote AnNiE's desIRe for 100 chOCoLATE baRS were she to givE up her 49 bars fOR a 1% cHance aT 100 bArs AS compaRed to KeEPinG the 49 bars. In tHe seCond case, iT would NOt promoTE Annie's Desire For 100 ChoColaTE bArS weRe SHe tO GiVe uP Her 49% Chance at 100 BaRs For 1 baR as cOMPARed tO keEpinG her 49% cHance at 100 bars. We ThuS conCLudE that contrAstiVe fit-PrObabilIsm, at LeAst in its current Form, Is flawed. 5. A uniFiEd ALtErnatIVe AccoUnt we hAve just Argued aGAinSt cONTrAstive Fit-ProbabiliSm ON ThE basis of Two proBLeMs – THe Degree prOblEm anD THe ProBlem OF MIxed CaseS – both oF WhIcH exploiT tHe disjUnCtiVe nAture OF the AccounT. Yet we beLieve THat Contrastive fIt-Probabilism IS fUNDaMEntaLly Correct in hoLdinG That TherE ArE twO DistiNct waYs FOr A Desire to be promoted, i.E. bY increAsing The probabilitY of its beinG SATisfied aNd by INcREasing fit betweEn the World and thE Desire. WhAt we wAnt, then, iS a unified, I.E., Non-disjuNctIve, AccOunT OF pRomotion that aCCOmmoDaTes both WayS in whicH a dEsiRe cAn bE pRomoted. In This sectIoN wE pReSenT such AN account (5.1) AnD shOw How It accOMmodatEs the VirtUeS oF conTrastivE fiT-pRobaBiLiSm (5.2) whIle AvOidinG the DIffIcultieS faced by tHat ACcouNt (5.3). 5.1. coNtrastiVe Expected Fit 22 we Start by conStRucTing a nOTIon of ​expEcted fit analogous to the sTAndard dEciSion-tHeorEtic notioN of ​ExpectEd uTIlity​, eSsentiAlly jUsT rePLAcing AN AgEnt'S uTility in a gIVEn oUtcomE wIth tHe fit beTween the desire in quEStiOn and the worldS in WhicH THe OutCOmE HolDs. iN thIS Context, an ​outcomE can be defiNeD As A set of possIBle WoRlds witH equal fIt witH Respect To the desiRe in questIoN (i.e. a SET of Possible woRlds W sucH that w​i ∼​D w​J ​For alL W​i​,W​j in W, WheRe D is tHe RelEvant Desire.) tO deFine a 43
 Since the fit between Ann ie's desir es an d t hewo rldwoul d thereby incr e ase,  Contrastive Fit-Proba bilis me ntai l sthatmakingt he t rad era the rt ha n ref usi ng to d o so would  pr om ote her desi r efor 100 ch oco late bars. ( Aga in weas sum e , for  si mplic ity, t h at Ann ie cannot  a c quirec hocolat e in  any  other way.) In e a ch case, we submi t that  C o nt r a sti veFit-Probab il ism c l early d e li v e r s t h e wrong verdi ct. In thef irs t case ,itw ould n ot pr om o teAnnie's des irefor 100 c hocola t e barsw ere she  to gi veupher4 9ba rsfo r  a1 %cha n ceat 100 b ar sas co mpar e d t o ke epi ng t he 49  bars. In the  se cond cas e, it  woul d no tpromo te Ann ie'sde sire for 100 ch ocol ate barswer eshe  t o giv e  up he r 4 9%chanceat 100b ars  f o r 1bar as compared to  k e e pi ng her 4 9% cha n ce  a t  100 bar s.  We  thu s concl udet ha t Contra stiveF it -P robabil is m, atle ast  in  itsc urre nt for m, is fl awed. 5. A Unified A l ternative Acc o un t We have  ju st argued a gain s t Co ntra s ti veF it-Pr obabi li s mo n the basis of twopr oblems  – th e Degree Prob lem and th e P roblem o f Mi x ed Cases – both o f whi ch exploit the disj uncti ve natur e of thea c count. Y etwebel iev e th at Contrastiv e Fit- Pr obabili smis fund ame nta lly  co rr ect in ho lding th at  t he re  ar e two distinct  w ays  f ora des i re tobe pr omot ed ,i .e.  by inc r ea s i ng t he  p roba bil it y ofitsb ein g satis fied andbyi ncre as in g fit b etween the wo rl d and thede sir e. Wha t we want,  then, is a unified, i. e ., non- dis junct ive,  accountofpromot ion that a ccommo dates  b oth w ays i n wh ich  a  desire ca n bepromo te d. I n thissection we present suc h an account(5. 1) a n d  s how ho w  it  a c com m o dates the virtu es of Cont ra s ti ve Fit-Pro b abi li sm (5.2 ) while  avoi d ing the  difficul ties face dby t h a t a ccount (5. 3). 5.1.  Contrast i ve Ex p ec ted F it22 West art  by c onstru c tin g a n otionof  ​expe ctedfi t analog ous to the standard dec ision- theor eti c notionof​ exp ected uti lity ​, essenti all y j ust r epl a cingan a g en t's utili ty i n  a giveno ut com e wi th the fitb e t wee n the  de s ire in  que stion and the wor l ds in which th e ou t c ome  ho l ds.In  this context,  an  ​ o u tcome ca nbe definedas a set  o f  poss ible w orldswith eq u a lf it wit h re spe ct to the  de si r e in qu es ti o n (i.e . ase t of p ossibl e  wor l d s W such that w​ i ∼​D w ​j ​f o r a ll w​ i​ ,w​j in W, w here D isthe relevan t desi re.)  To d efine a  4 3
 Since_the fit_between Annie's desires and_the world_would_thereby increase,_Contrastive_Fit-Probabilism entails that_making the trade_rather than refusing to_do so would_promote_her desire for 100 chocolate bars. (Again we assume, for simplicity, that Annie cannot_acquire_chocolate in_any_other_way.) In each case, we_submit that Contrastive Fit-Probabilism clearly_delivers the_wrong verdict. In the first case, it would_not_promote Annie's desire_for 100 chocolate bars were she to give up_her 49 bars for a 1%_chance at 100_bars_as_compared to keeping the_49 bars. In the second case,_it would not promote Annie's desire_for 100 chocolate bars were she to_give up her 49% chance at_100 bars for 1 bar_as compared_to keeping her 49% chance_at 100 bars._We thus_conclude that Contrastive_Fit-Probabilism, at least in its current_form, is flawed._5. A Unified Alternative Account We_have_just argued against_Contrastive_Fit-Probabilism_on the_basis of two_problems_– the_Degree_Problem and the Problem of Mixed_Cases_– both of which exploit the disjunctive_nature of the account._Yet_we believe that Contrastive_Fit-Probabilism is fundamentally correct in_holding that there are two distinct_ways for_a desire_to be promoted, i.e. by increasing the probability of its being_satisfied and by increasing fit between_the world and the_desire. What_we_want, then, is_a_unified, i.e.,_non-disjunctive, account of promotion that accommodates both_ways in_which a desire can be promoted._In this section we_present_such an account (5.1) and show_how it accommodates the virtues of_Contrastive Fit-Probabilism (5.2) while avoiding_the_difficulties_faced by that account (5.3)._5.1. Contrastive Expected Fit 22 We_start by constructing_a notion of ​expected fit analogous to_the_standard decision-theoretic notion of ​expected utility​,_essentially_just replacing an agent's utility in_a_given_outcome with the fit between_the desire in question and the_worlds in which the outcome holds. In this context,_an ​outcome can_be defined as a set_of_possible_worlds with equal fit with respect to the desire in_question (i.e._a set of_possible worlds W such that w​i ∼​D w​j ​for all_w​i​,w​j in W, where D is the_relevant desire.) To define a 43