 mesmo pretende estabelecê-las. As definições que ele apresenta são cuidadosamente tecidas para validar o aspecto prático assumido no início da obra. Definições centrais da Ethica Nicomachea, como virtude (hē aretḕ), phrónēsis e felicidade (eudaimonía), possuem evidentes adduced in Bonitz, Index, 261a 29-43 appear to put héxis somewhere midway between potency (dúnamis) and mere actuality (enérgeia), so that there seems sufficient lexicographical evidence for us to need to refrain from assigning too static a meaning (whether'mental state' or 'faculty') to héxis, but instead to opt for an ambivalent focal meaning of this word which oscillates between mere capacity and its being actualized, to the effect indeed that on occasions, either one or the other may be predominant. As we saw before, héxis is an ambivalent term which does not merely stand for a disposition or faculty but includes its actualization as well. Thus genuine knowledge (epistḗmē) can be called a héxis by Aristotle inasmuch as, qua actualization of the cognitive faculty, it disposes the soul accordingly. In the opening lines of PA (I 1, 639al-4), Aristotle clearly starts from this twofold connotation of héxis by distinguishing it into knowledge of an object and what he calls a sort of skill acquired by education (oíon paideían tiná). At Top. VIII 1, 156b39 it is clear from the context that the phrase pisteúontes tē héxei should be taken to mean "trusting to their disputational skill developed by practice". In Problem. XXX 2 a similar intermingling of the two connotations ('expertise taken as actualized faculty') is found: "Why do we say that we acquire a hexis as the result of pursuing some pieces of knowledge but not others? Or is it rather so that we are said to possess a hexis inasmuch as we are able to make discoveries <by actually using it>? for making discoveries is a result of a hexis" (955b l-3). Detel (II, 857) aptly takes the hexis as discussed in II, 19 to be a
mesmo pretende estabelecê - las. As definições que ele apresenta são cuidadosamente tecidas para validar o aspecto prático assumido no início da obra. Definições centrais da Ethica Nicomachea, como virtude (hē aretḕ), phrónēsis e felicidade (eudaimonía), possuem evidentes adduced in Bonitz, Index, 261a 29 - 43 appear to put héxis somewhere halfway between authority (dúnamis) and mere actuality (enérgeia), so that there seems sufficient lexicographic evidence for us to need to abstain from assigning too electrostatic a meaning (whether'mental country' or' faculty') to héxis, but instead to opt for an ambivalent focal meaning of this word which oscillate between mere capacity and its being actualize, to the consequence indeed that on occasions, either one or the other may be predominant. As we saw before, héxis is an ambivalent condition which does not merely stand for a disposition or faculty but admit its actualization as well. Thus genuine cognition (epistḗmē) can be called a héxis by Aristotle inasmuch as, qua realization of the cognitive faculty, it disposes the soul accordingly. In the orifice lines of PA (I 1, 639al-4), Aristotle clearly starts from this twofold connotation of héxis by signalize it into cognition of an object and what he calls a sort of skill acquired by education (oíon paideían tiná). At Top. VIII 1, 156b39 it is clear from the context that the phrase pisteúontes tē héxei should be take to entail " trusting to their disputational skill developed by exercise ". In Problem. thirty 2 a similar intermingling of the two connotations (' expertise taken as actualized staff') is found: " Why do we state that we acquire a hexis as the result of quest for some pieces of knowledge but not others? Or is it rather so that we are said to possess a hexis inasmuch as we are able to make discoveries < by actually using it >? for making discoveries is a result of a hexis " (955b l-3). Detel (II, 857) competently takes the hexis as hash out in II, 19 to be a
 medmo pretende estabelecê-lar. As definições qoe ele a'resentz são cuiaadosamente tecidas para valmdar o askvcto prático assumido vo início fa obra. Eefiiições centrais da Ethica Kncomadmea, cmno virtude (hē atetḕ), phrónēsis a felicidade (egdxilonía), possuem evidentes adduced in Bjnitz, Imdfx, 261a 29-43 appear tj puu hévis aomewhere midway between potency (dúhamis) aid mere actualiyy (enérgeia), so that there sfems sufficient lexicohraphical ecidegxe for us to need to rtfxain from aasigning too static a meaning (wfethex'mental stajz' or 'xaculty') to iéxis, blt instead to opt for an ambovalent focal keaiing of this word which ovcillates between iere capawicy and its being actuqluzed, jo tha efwwct insexd fhat oj orcasions, eifher one or the other may be pteqiminant. As we saw bqfjre, héxis is an ambivalent term which dots nof merely stand for a diwposition or faculty hut incluqes its actualization as well. Thus genuine knowlegge (e'irtḗmē) cwv bf called a héxis by Aristotle inasmuch as, qua wdtiakization of thc cognitive facultu, lt qisposes the roul aedoddingly. In the opejing liges od PA (I 1, 639aj-4), Arostotle clearly starts from this twofolb cinnotation of héxis by distingbishinb it onto knowledge of an oblect ahd what he falls a skft of skill acqukrec ty educaukon (oíon paideían tyná). At Top. VIIN 1, 156b39 it ks ckear fwom the cojtext that the phrase pidteúonjes tē véxei shoulf be taken to mean "trusting to vieir disputatootal skill dzvelopcd by practice". Yn Problem. XXX 2 a simnlar ivterminglihg of tie two connoeations ('experdlse taken as actualised dacuoty') is wuund: "Why do we say that we acquirw a hexis as the rcsult kf pursuing somz kiwces of knowlecge bue jov othqss? Or is it sathdr rp thag we art scia to possess a hexis inavmucg as we are able tp iake disxoveries <by actually ising it>? for makinh disroverixs is s rgsult of a hexis" (955b l-3). Detel (II, 857) zptly takfs bhe hexis as qiscmsseq in II, 19 tp be a
mesmo pretende estabelecê-las. As definições que ele cuidadosamente para validar aspecto prático assumido centrais Ethica Nicomachea, como (hē aretḕ), phrónēsis felicidade (eudaimonía), possuem evidentes adduced in Index, 261a 29-43 appear to put héxis somewhere midway between potency (dúnamis) and actuality (enérgeia), so that there seems sufficient lexicographical evidence for us to need refrain assigning static meaning (whether'mental state' or 'faculty') to héxis, but instead to opt for an ambivalent focal meaning this word which oscillates between mere capacity and being actualized, to the indeed that on occasions, either or other may predominant. we before, héxis is ambivalent term which does not merely stand for a disposition or faculty but includes its actualization as Thus genuine can be a by inasmuch as, qua the cognitive faculty, it disposes the the opening lines of PA (I 1, 639al-4), clearly starts this twofold connotation of héxis by it into knowledge of an object and what calls a sort of skill acquired by education (oíon paideían tiná). At Top. VIII 1, is clear from the that the phrase tē should taken mean "trusting their disputational skill developed by practice". In Problem. XXX 2 a intermingling of the two connotations ('expertise taken as actualized faculty') "Why we say that acquire a hexis as result pursuing some pieces of not Or so we said to possess a inasmuch as we are able make discoveries <by actually is a result of a hexis" (955b l-3). (II, 857) aptly takes the hexis as in II, 19 to be a
 mesmo pretende estabelecê-laS. As definiçÕes quE elE apReSentA são Cuidadosamente TEcidAs para validar o aspecto pRáticO aSSumiDO nO inícIo da obrA. deFINiçÕeS cEntRaIS dA EthiCa NIcomachEa, como virtUde (Hē Aretḕ), phrónēsIS e Felicidade (EudAimonía), possuEm eVidentEs AddUCed in bonItz, InDex, 261a 29-43 apPEar to pUt héxis soMeWHere miDWay betwEEN pOtenCy (dúnamis) and mere aCTuALity (enérgeia), so That thErE SeEMS suFfiCient lexicOgRaphiCAl evideNCe FOR Us tO Need to refrain From assigniNG toO statiC a MeaNIng (wheTher'mEnTAl sTate' or 'faculTy') to Héxis, but iNstead TO opt for AN ambivaLent foCal MeaNing OF tHiS woRd WHicH OsCilLAteS between MeRe CapacIty aND ITS beiNg aCtuaLized, To the effect inDeeD thaT On oCcasiOns, eiTher OnE or thE other May be PrEdominant. As we saW befOre, héxis iS an AmBivAlEnt teRM which DoeS noT merely Stand foR A diSpOSITiOn or faculty but inclUdES ItS actualiZation AS wElL. thus genuInE knOwleDGE (episTḗmē) CAn Be called A héxis BY ARiStotle iNaSmuch aS, qUa aCtuAlizaTIon oF the coGnitive fAcultY, It disposes the sOUl accordingly. iN tHE OpENing LinEs of PA (I 1, 639al-4), ArIstoTLe clEarlY StArtS From tHis twOfOLd COnnotation of héxis by DiStinguIshinG it into knowleDge of an objECT And what hE calLS a SOrt of skill acquIred bY education (OÍon paideÍan tiNá). At Top. ViII 1, 156b39 it is cLEAr from thE coNteXt tHat THE pHrase pisteúonTES tē hÉxEi shoulD be Taken to MeaN "trUstIng To Their dispUtationaL sKiLl DeVelOped bY Practice". in proBlEm. XxX 2 a siMIlar inTermiNgliNg Of THe tWo connoTAtIONs ('exPeRtIse tAkeN aS actuAlizED faCulty') is Found: "Why dO we SAy thAt We Acquire A hexis as the reSuLt of pursuiNg SomE pieceS OF knowledGe but not others? Or is it ratHEr so thaT we Are saId to Possess a hExiS inasmUch AS we are Able to Make dIsCovERIes <by ACTuAllY uSing it>? for mAKIng DiscoVeRies Is a resuLt of a hexis" (955b l-3). Detel (Ii, 857) AptLy takes the hexIs aS disCUSsEd iN iI, 19 TO be A
 mesmo pretende estabelecê -las. As d efini çõe s q ue  ele  apr esenta são cui d ados amente tecidas para va lidar  o aspe c to  prát ico ass u mi d o  no  i ní cio  d a  o bra.Def inições  centraisdaEt hica Nicomac h ea , como vir tud e (hē aretḕ) , p hrónēs is  ef elici dad e (eu daimon í a), po ssuem evi de n tes ad d uced in B on itz,  Index, 261a 29-4 3  a p pear to put hé xis so me w he r e  mi dwa y betweenpo tency (dúnami s )a n d  me r e actuality ( enérgeia),s o t hat th er e s e ems su ffici en t  le xicographic al e vidence f or ust o needt o refra in fro m a ssi gnin g  t oo  st at i c a me ani n g ( whether' me nt al st ate' o r 'fac ult y')to hé xis, but inst ead  too ptfor a n amb ival en t foc al mea ningof  this word whic h os cillatesbet we enme re ca p acityand  it s being  actual i zed ,t o th e effect indeed th at o noccasion s, eit h er  o n e or the  o the r ma y be pr edom i na nt. As w e sawb ef or e, héxi sis anam biv ale nt te r m wh ich do es not m erely stand for a di s position or f a cu l t yb ut i ncl udes its ac tual i zati on a s  w ell .  Thus  genu in e  k n owledge (epistḗmē)ca n be c alled  a héxis by A ristotle i n a s much as,  qua ac t ualization ofthe c ognitive f a culty, i t dis poses th e soul ac c o rdingly.  In  th e o pen i n glines of PA ( I 1, 6 39 al-4),Ari stotlecle arl y s tar ts  from thi s twofol dco nn ot ati on of héxis by  d ist in gui shing it int o kno wled ge  o f  an  object an d what  h ecall s a  s ort o f sk i llacquire d by educ ati o n (o ío npaideía n tiná). At T op . VIII 1,15 6b3 9 it i s clear fr om the context that the phrasepis teúon testē héxeisho uld be  ta k en tomean " trust in g t o their d is put at ional skil l dev elope dby p ractice ". In Problem. XXX 2 a  similar inte rmi ngli n g  o f t h et woco n not a t ions ('expertis e taken as  a c tu alized fac u lty ')  is fou nd: "Wh y dow e say t hat we ac quire a h ex is a s the  result of  pursuin g some pi e ces o f  k nowle dge  but n ot  ot hers?  Or is itrathe r so t ha t we a re sa id  to poss ess a hexis inasmuch as  we ar e abl e t o make di sco v eri es <by ac tual ly using i t>?  fo r mak ing disco veri e sisa  resu lt o f  a hexis" (9 55b l -3 ). Detel (I I , 857 ) apt lyt akes t he h exis as discussed in II, 19 to b e a
 mesmo_pretende estabelecê-las._As definições que ele_apresenta são_cuidadosamente_tecidas para_validar_o aspecto prático_assumido no início_da obra. Definições centrais_da Ethica Nicomachea,_como_virtude (hē aretḕ), phrónēsis e felicidade (eudaimonía), possuem evidentes adduced in Bonitz, Index, 261a_29-43_appear to_put_héxis_somewhere midway between potency (dúnamis)_and mere actuality (enérgeia), so_that there_seems sufficient lexicographical evidence for us to need_to_refrain from assigning_too static a meaning (whether'mental state' or 'faculty') to_héxis, but instead to opt for_an ambivalent focal_meaning_of_this word which oscillates_between mere capacity and its being_actualized, to the effect indeed that_on occasions, either one or the other_may be predominant. As we saw_before, héxis is an ambivalent_term which_does not merely stand for_a disposition or_faculty but_includes its actualization_as well. Thus genuine knowledge (epistḗmē)_can be called_a héxis by Aristotle inasmuch as,_qua_actualization of the_cognitive_faculty,_it disposes_the soul accordingly._In_the opening_lines_of PA (I 1, 639al-4), Aristotle_clearly_starts from this twofold connotation of héxis_by distinguishing it into_knowledge_of an object and_what he calls a sort_of skill acquired by education (oíon_paideían tiná)._At Top._VIII 1, 156b39 it is clear from the context that the_phrase pisteúontes tē héxei should be_taken to mean "trusting_to their_disputational_skill developed by_practice"._In Problem._XXX 2 a similar intermingling of the_two connotations_('expertise taken as actualized faculty') is_found: "Why do we_say_that we acquire a hexis as_the result of pursuing some pieces_of knowledge but not others?_Or_is_it rather so that we_are said to possess a hexis_inasmuch as we_are able to make discoveries <by actually_using_it>? for making discoveries is a_result_of a hexis" (955b l-3). Detel_(II,_857)_aptly takes the hexis as_discussed in II, 19 to be_a