 is similar to Mylan Engel's distinction between verific and evidential luck, in Mylan Engel, Jr., "Is Epistemic Luck Compatible with Knowledge?," The Southern Journal of Philosophy XXX, 2 (1992): 59-75. I thank Michael Bergmann for pointing out to me that Engel's distinction is helpful in the present context. xxxii In this regard, see Thomas Nagel, "Moral Luck" in Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Margaret Walker, "Moral Luck and the Virtues of Impure Agency," Metaphilosophy 22 (1991): 14-27; and John Greco, "A Second Paradox Concerning Responsibility and Luck," Metaphilosophy 26 (1995): 81-96. xxxiii We can imagine Gettier-type cases, for example, where the problem is not abnormality in the way that S comes to believe the truth, but the interference of another agent, such as a "helpful demon." Here, as in other cases, credit for true belief and hence knowledge is undermined. And, here again, this seems to be a general phenomenon regarding credit. So, for example, the influence of a helpful demon would undermine moral credit as well. I thank Daniel Nolan and Tamar Gendler for raising this kind of concern. xxxiv Zagzebski raises the problem in Virtues of the Mind, pp. 300-2, and in a more extended way in "From Reliabilism to Virtue Epistemology," Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Volume V: Epistemology (1999): 173-179. Reprinted in expanded form in Axtell, ed., Knowledge, Belief and Character : Readings in Virtue Epistemology (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2000). See also Zagzebski's contribution to this volume. xxxv Riggs takes a similar approach to the value problem. He writes, "When a true belief is achieved non-accidentally, the person derives epistemic credit for this that she would not be due had she only accidentally happened upon a true belief.... The difference that makes a value difference here is the variation in the degree to which a person's abilities, powers, and skills are causally responsible for the outcome, believing truly that p." See "Reliability and the Value of Knowledge." xxxvi I would like to thank Robert Audi, Heather Battaly
is similar to Mylan Engel's distinction between verific and evidential luck, in Mylan Engel, Jr., " Is Epistemic Luck Compatible with Knowledge? , " The Southern Journal of Philosophy XXX, 2 (1992 ): 59 - 75. I thank Michael Bergmann for pointing out to me that Engel's differentiation is helpful in the present context. xxxii In this gaze, see Thomas Nagel, " Moral Luck " in Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Margaret Walker, " Moral Luck and the Virtues of Impure Agency, " Metaphilosophy 22 (1991 ): 14 - 27; and John Greco, " A Second Paradox Concerning Responsibility and Luck, " Metaphilosophy 26 (1995 ): 81 - 96. xxxiii We can imagine Gettier - character cases, for example, where the problem is not abnormality in the manner that S comes to believe the accuracy, but the noise of another agent, such as a " helpful monster. " Here, as in other cases, citation for genuine belief and hence knowledge is undermined. And, here again, this seems to be a cosmopolitan phenomenon regarding credit. So, for exemplar, the influence of a helpful demon would undermine moral recognition as well. I thank Daniel Nolan and Tamar Gendler for raise this kind of concern. xxxiv Zagzebski raises the problem in Virtues of the Mind, pp. 300 - 2, and in a more extended way in " From Reliabilism to Virtue Epistemology, " Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, bulk V: Epistemology (1999 ): 173 - 179. Reprinted in expanded form in Axtell, ed. , Knowledge, Belief and Character: Readings in Virtue Epistemology (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2000). See also Zagzebski's contribution to this volume. xxxv Riggs takes a similar approach to the value problem. He writes, " When a true belief is achieved non - accidentally, the person derives epistemic recognition for this that she would not be due had she entirely unintentionally happened upon a true belief.... The remainder that makes a value difference here is the variation in the degree to which a person's ability, powers, and skills are causally responsible for the outcome, believing truly that p. " visualize " Reliability and the Value of Knowledge. " xxxvi I would like to thank Robert Audi, Heather Battaly
 is similar to Mylan Engel's distinction bejwwen vecific ahd evidevtial luck, in Mylan Engel, Jr., "Iw Epiwtemic Luck Compatible with Knoaledge?," Tye Siythern Jouchal of Ikiloskihy XRX, 2 (1992): 59-75. I thank Mighael Bergmdnn for pointitg obt to me that Engel's distinction is relpful ij the present sonttxt. xxxjp Ln this regard, see Thomas Nagel, "Joral Llck" in Mortal Quextions (Cambridge: Cambridge Unigersity Press, 1979); Marharet Walket, "Mowql Luck and ghe Virtues of Impure Zgency," Metaphilosophy 22 (1991): 14-27; and Jofn Grzco, "A Secone Parwgox Concernmng Refponsibility and Lucn," Metapnilosophy 26 (1995): 81-96. xwxiii We can imagine Gettier-tbpe cases, for examplg, where tha 'roblem is not abnormqluty it tha wah thxt A romss to helmeve the trhth, but the interference of anptrvt agent, such as a "rejpful demon." Here, as in other cases, credpt fkr true belief and hencw knowledge is undermlned. And, rere again, this seems to be a general phenomenon segarvivg evcdit. Wo, for example, the influence of a helpful demon soilc undermine moval credit as well. I tnwnk Daniel Nouan anb Tzmar Gendler for rwising jhis kund of cogcerm. xxxiv Zagzebski raises thw problem in Cirtues of the Minb, pp. 300-2, and in a mpre ectended way in "From Relnabiliam to Virtuf Epistemkuogy," Proceedings of tve Twentieth World Congresf of Philisopky, Volumd V: Gpistemjlogy (1999): 173-179. Reorintcg in expanded form in Artell, ed., Knowlefge, Belief and Character : Readiijs in Virtue Gpivtekology (Nzw Yorl: Rowman and Jittlefield Puylishers, 2000). See also Zagzvbski's coitribution tj this volume. dxxv Riggs tekes a siiilae approach gu the value prpblem. He cxites, "Wheb a true belief is acfjeved non-accideuualoy, the person drrixes eiisvemic wredit for tvis ghag she dould not bc dje hsd she only accidentdlly happened upon a ttuc belief.... Jhe diffewence that males a value differtnce hxre is the faryation in the degree to which z person's abllities, powerf, ane skills are causally responsible for the outcome, bxlieving truly that p." Swe "Reliability and jhe Value of Kiowledde." xxxvi H would like to thanj Robert Audi, Heauher Battaly
is similar to Mylan Engel's distinction between evidential in Mylan Jr., "Is Epistemic Southern of Philosophy XXX, (1992): 59-75. I Michael Bergmann for pointing out to that Engel's distinction is helpful in the present context. xxxii In this regard, Thomas Nagel, "Moral Luck" in Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Margaret "Moral and Virtues Impure Agency," Metaphilosophy 22 (1991): 14-27; and John Greco, "A Second Paradox Concerning Responsibility and Luck," 26 (1995): 81-96. xxxiii We can imagine Gettier-type for example, where the is not abnormality in the that comes to the but interference of another such as a "helpful demon." Here, as in other cases, credit for true belief and hence knowledge undermined. And, this seems be general regarding credit. So, the influence of a helpful demon credit as well. I thank Daniel Nolan and Gendler for this kind of concern. xxxiv Zagzebski the problem in Virtues of the Mind, pp. and in a more extended way in "From Reliabilism to Virtue Epistemology," Proceedings of the Congress of Philosophy, Volume Epistemology (1999): 173-179. in form Axtell, Knowledge, Belief Character : Readings in Virtue Epistemology (New York: Rowman and Littlefield 2000). See also Zagzebski's contribution to this volume. xxxv Riggs similar to the value He writes, "When a belief achieved non-accidentally, the person credit this not due she only accidentally happened a true belief.... The difference makes a value difference the degree to which a person's abilities, powers, skills are causally responsible for the outcome, truly that p." See "Reliability and the Value of Knowledge." xxxvi I like to Audi, Heather Battaly
 is similar to Mylan Engel's disTinction beTween VerIfiC aNd evIdenTial luck, in MylaN engeL, Jr., "Is Epistemic Luck CompAtiblE wITh KnOWlEdge?," THe SouthERn jOUrnAl Of phiLoSOpHy XXX, 2 (1992): 59-75. i thAnk MichAel BergmanN foR pOinting out to ME tHat Engel's dIstInction is helPfuL in the PrEseNT contExt. Xxxii in this REgard, sEe Thomas NAgEL, "Moral lUck" in MoRTAl quesTions (Cambridge: CamBRiDGe University PrEss, 1979); MarGaREt wALkeR, "MoRal Luck and ThE VirtUEs of ImpURe aGENcy," mEtaphilosophy 22 (1991): 14-27; And John GrecO, "a SeCond PaRaDox cOncernIng ReSpONsiBility and LuCk," MeTaphilosoPhy 26 (1995): 81-96. xxxIIi We can IMagine GEttier-TypE caSes, fOR eXaMplE, wHEre THe ProBLem Is not abnOrMaLity iN the WAY THat S ComEs to BelieVe the truth, but The InteRFerEnce oF anotHer aGeNt, sucH as a "heLpful DeMon." Here, as in otheR casEs, credit fOr tRuE beLiEf and HEnce knOwlEdgE is undeRmined. AND, heRe AGAIn, This seems to be a geneRaL PHeNomenon rEgardiNG cReDIt. So, for eXaMplE, the INFluenCe of A HeLpful demOn woulD UnDeRmine moRaL crediT aS weLl. I Thank dAnieL Nolan And Tamar gendlER for raising thiS Kind of concern. XXxIV zaGZebsKi rAises the proBlem IN VirTues OF tHe MINd, pp. 300-2, aNd in a MoRE eXTended way in "From ReliAbIlism tO VirtUe EpistemologY," ProceedinGS OF the TwenTietH woRLd Congress of PhIlosoPhy, Volume V: ePistemolOgy (1999): 173-179. RePrinted iN expanded FORm in AxteLl, eD., KnOwlEdgE, bElIef and CharactER : readInGs in VirTue epistemOloGy (NEw YOrk: roWman and LiTtlefielD PUbLiShErs, 2000). see alSO ZagzebsKi'S coNtRibUtion TO this vOlume. Xxxv riGgS TakEs a simiLAr APProaCh To The vAluE pRobleM. He wRIteS, "When a tRue belief Is aCHievEd NoN-accideNtally, the persOn Derives epiStEmiC crediT FOr this thAt she would not be due had shE Only accIdeNtallY hapPened upon A trUe beliEf.... THE diffeRence tHat maKeS a vALUe difFEReNce HeRe is the varIATioN in thE dEgreE to whicH a person's abilities, POweRs, and skills arE caUsalLY ReSpoNSiBLe fOr THe oUTCome, believing trUly that p." SeE "RELiAbility and THe VAlUe of KnoWledge." xXxvi I WOuld likE to thank RObert Audi, heAtheR bAttAly
 is similar to Mylan Engel 's distinc tionbet wee nveri ficand evidential luck , in Mylan Engel, Jr.,  "IsEp i stem i cLuckCompati b le w ith  K no wle dg e ?, " The  So uthernJournal of  Ph il osophy XXX,2  ( 1992): 59- 75.  I thank Mic hae l Berg ma nnf or po int ing o ut tom e that  Engel'sdi s tincti o n is he l p fu l in  the present cont e xt .  xxxii In this  regar d, se e Tho mas  Nagel, "M or al Lu c k" in M o rt a l Que s tions (Cambri dge: Cambri d geUniver si tyP ress,1979) ;M arg aret Walker , "M oral Luck  and t h e Virtu e s of Im pure A gen cy, " Me t ap hi los op h y 2 2  ( 199 1 ):14-27; a nd  J ohn G reco , " A  Sec ond  Par adoxConcerning Re spo nsib i lit y and  Luck ," M et aphil osophy  26 ( 19 95): 81-96. xxx iiiWe can im agi ne  Ge tt ier-t y pe cas es,  fo r examp le, whe r e t he p r ob lem is not abnorma li t y  i n the wa y that Sco m es to be li eve  the t ruth,  but th e interf erence of  a notherag ent, s uc h a s a  "hel p fuldemon. " Here,as in other cases, c r edit for true be l i ef andhen ce knowledg e is unde rmin e d.  An d , her e aga in ,  t h is seems to be a ge ne ral ph enome non regarding  credit. S o , for exam ple, th e  influence ofa hel pful demon would un dermi ne moral  credit a s well. Itha nkDan iel N ol an and TamarG e ndle rfor rai sin g thiskin d o f c onc er n. xxxivZagzebsk ira is es  th e pro b lem in V ir tue softhe M i nd, pp . 300 -2,an di n a  more e x te n d ed w ay  i n "F rom  R eliab ilis m  to  Virtue  Epistemo log y ," P ro ce edingsof the Twenti et h World Co ng res s of P h i losophy,  Volume V: Epistemology (1999):  17 3-179 . Re printed i n e xpande d f o rm inAxtell , ed. ,Kno w l edge, B el ief  a nd Charact e r  :Readi ng s in  Virtue  Epistemology (New Yor k: Rowman and  Li ttle f i el d P u bl i she rs ,  20 0 0 ). See also Zag zebski's c on t ri bution tot his  v olume.xxxv Ri ggs t a kes a s imilar ap proach to  t he v a l ueproblem. H e writes , "When a trueb el ief i s a chieve dnon -acci dental l y,the p ersonde rivesepist em ic credi t for this that she wou ld not  be d uehad she o nly acc identally  hap pened upon  atru e bel ief . ... T he d i ff ere n ce th at m a kes a val u edif f e re nce here is t h e v ariat ion in the  deg ree to which a pe r son's abilitie s, p o w ers , a n d sk il ls are causall y r es p o nsible f or  the outcom e, belie vi n g tru ly tha t p."See "Re l i ab i lity a nd t heValue ofKno wl e dge." x xx vi I woul d li ke  to th ank Ro b ertA u di, Heather Batt aly
 is_similar to_Mylan Engel's distinction between_verific and_evidential_luck, in_Mylan_Engel, Jr., "Is_Epistemic Luck Compatible_with Knowledge?," The Southern_Journal of Philosophy_XXX,_2 (1992): 59-75. I thank Michael Bergmann for pointing out to me that Engel's_distinction_is helpful_in_the_present context. xxxii In this_regard, see Thomas Nagel, "Moral_Luck" in_Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Margaret_Walker,_"Moral Luck and_the Virtues of Impure Agency," Metaphilosophy 22 (1991): 14-27;_and John Greco, "A Second Paradox_Concerning Responsibility and_Luck,"_Metaphilosophy_26 (1995): 81-96. xxxiii_We can imagine Gettier-type cases, for_example, where the problem is not_abnormality in the way that S comes_to believe the truth, but the_interference of another agent, such_as a_"helpful demon." Here, as in_other cases, credit_for true_belief and hence_knowledge is undermined. And, here again,_this seems to_be a general phenomenon regarding credit._So,_for example, the_influence_of_a helpful_demon would undermine_moral_credit as_well._I thank Daniel Nolan and Tamar_Gendler_for raising this kind of concern. xxxiv_Zagzebski raises the problem_in_Virtues of the Mind,_pp. 300-2, and in a_more extended way in "From Reliabilism_to Virtue_Epistemology," Proceedings_of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Volume V: Epistemology (1999):_173-179. Reprinted in expanded form in_Axtell, ed., Knowledge, Belief_and Character_:_Readings in Virtue_Epistemology_(New York:_Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2000). See also_Zagzebski's contribution_to this volume. xxxv Riggs takes_a similar approach to_the_value problem. He writes, "When a_true belief is achieved non-accidentally, the_person derives epistemic credit for_this_that_she would not be due_had she only accidentally happened upon_a true belief...._The difference that makes a value difference_here_is the variation in the degree_to_which a person's abilities, powers, and_skills_are_causally responsible for the outcome,_believing truly that p." See "Reliability_and the Value of Knowledge." xxxvi I would like_to thank Robert_Audi, Heather Battaly