 like 17 Because he uses this style of argument, Tibetan commentators have described Śāntideva, like Candrakīrti, as a Prāsaṅgika. Saitō (261) urges caution on this matter, however, noting that his views show considerable affinities with non-Prāsaṅgika philosophers. Journal of Buddhist Ethics 275 dreams; on reflection they are like the trunk of a plaintain tree.18 (IX.149–150) So it turns out that chapter six's thinking in terms of blameless causes is inadequate. And the same is true for the argument against lust. At IX.77 he recommends what he calls a "meditation on no-self"-and the self here is thought of in terms of the body. The verses that follow deconstruct the body, as in the earlier chapter-but both no-self and bodily deconstruction now look different. Śāntideva begins this section saying the body is not really existent because we can break it down into parts and smaller parts: foot into toes, toes into joints, joints into their constituent parts. So far, the metaphysics is the same as in the argument against lust. But after that, he breaks down those constituent parts into their smallest possible parts, aṇus. Aṇu (or paramaṇu) is usually translated "atom", and it means this in the Greek sense of a-tomos, indivisible; but the "atom" translation could be misleading in the light of modern chemistry and physics, where we now think of "atoms" as divisible into smaller units. From a modern physicist's perspective, it could be preferable to think of aṇus as quarks rather than atoms. From there Śāntideva takes a further step: "that aṇu too can be divided into directional parts (digvibhāga)" (IX.86). That is, even the smallest possible unit, an atom or quark, must still have directions, or sides-a side that faces north, a side facing south. And those directions are effectively parts, so whatever unit we presume indivisible turns out to be divisible after all. And then finally he adds: "The directional parts, because they have no component parts, are just empty space (ākāśa). 18 The trunk of a plantain tree is hollow. 276 Lele, The Metaphysical Basis of
like 17 Because he uses this style of argument, Tibetan commentators have trace Śāntideva, like Candrakīrti, as a Prāsaṅgika. Saitō (261) cheer caution on this matter, however, noting that his view show considerable affinities with non - Prāsaṅgika philosopher. Journal of Buddhist Ethics 275 pipe dream; on reflection they are like the torso of a plaintain tree.18 (IX.149–150) So it turns out that chapter six's thinking in term of blameless causes is inadequate. And the same is true for the argument against lust. At IX.77 he recommends what he call a " meditation on no - self"-and the self here is thought of in terms of the body. The verse that follow deconstruct the body, as in the earlier chapter - but both no - self and bodily deconstruction nowadays look different. Śāntideva begins this section saying the soundbox is not really existent because we can break it down into parts and smaller parts: foot into toes, toes into joints, joints into their constituent parts. So far, the metaphysics is the same as in the argument against lust. But after that, he break down those constituent parts into their smallest potential part, aṇus. Aṇu (or paramaṇu) is normally translated " atom ", and it means this in the Greek sense of a - tomos, indivisible; but the " atom " translation could be misleading in the light of modern chemistry and physics, where we nowadays think of " atoms " as divisible into smaller units. From a modern physicist's perspective, it could be preferable to intend of aṇus as quarks rather than atoms. From there Śāntideva takes a further dance step: " that aṇu too can be separate into directional parts (digvibhāga) " (IX.86). That is, even the smallest possible unit, an atom or quark, must however have directions, or sides - a slope that faces north, a side facing confederacy. And those directions are effectively parts, so whatever unit we presume indivisible sour out to be divisible after wholly. And then finally he adds: " The directional parts, because they receive no component parts, are just empty space (ākāśa). 18 The trunk of a plantain tree is empty. 276 Lele, The Metaphysical Basis of
 line 17 Because he uses this style of argumgnr, Tibevan comjentatorr have described Śāntideva, likx Cabdrakīeti, as a Prāsaṅgika. Saitō (261) urges cwution ob thms matter, howevec, noting that gls vizww show considetable affinidies with non-Psāsxṅgnka philosophers. Journal of Buddhist Ethics 275 freams; on reflgctiom theg are like the trunk of a plaintaih tree.18 (PX.149–150) So it turns ouy that chapter six's thinkijg ij terms of blameleds causes iw inweequate. And ghe same is true for tge argument against lust. At IX.77 fe reeommends whqt he walls a "medmtatiog on no-self"-akc the velf hete is thought pf mn twrms of the body. The terses that follow dgconstruct tke body, as in the earoiwr chdptes-but votf nk-sxlf and bldimy deconstduction now look different. Śānticedq begins this sectijn saying the body is not really existent bedause we can break it diwn into parts and smwller pares: foot into toes, toes into joints, joints into thair ckvstnbment pagts. So far, the metaphysics is the same as in ege aggument against lmst. But after that, hf nteaks down thore constifuent parts into tjeir smwllesr possiblt parys, aṇus. Aṇu (or paramaṇu) is usuqlly translaned "qtom", and it means chis in the Yreek xense of a-tomos, indivisible; yut ths "atom" trandlation ckjld be misleadine ik tve light of modern chemistwy and phbsics, where de npw thigk of "atomd" as divisible into smalper uuits. Xrom a modfrn physicist's perspective, it could be prefersbne no think jf aṇux as quarks rwther than atoks. From therd Śāntideva nakes a fnrther step: "ehat aṇu too cdj be divided into diwectuonao parts (aigvibhāga)" (IX.86). Tnat is, evvn the smallest possible unkf, an atom or qucxk, must still havr dkrestponx, js sides-a sida thxt wsces vorth, a sidc fxcinb south. And those disectjons are effectiveky parts, si whatevqr unit we prrsume indivisible uurns mut to br dyvisible after all. And then fihally he wddf: "The directyonao parts, becabse they have no component parts, are jusv empty space (ākāśa). 18 The jrunk of a plantain ttee is hollow. 276 Lele, The Meta[hysical Basis of
like 17 Because he uses this style Tibetan have described like Candrakīrti, as caution this matter, however, that his views considerable affinities with non-Prāsaṅgika philosophers. Journal Buddhist Ethics 275 dreams; on reflection they are like the trunk of a tree.18 (IX.149–150) So it turns out that chapter six's thinking in terms of causes inadequate. the is true for the argument against lust. At IX.77 he recommends what he calls a "meditation no-self"-and the self here is thought of in of the body. The that follow deconstruct the body, in earlier chapter-but no-self bodily now look different. begins this section saying the body is not really existent because we can break it down into and smaller into toes, into joints their constituent parts. the metaphysics is the same as against lust. But after that, he breaks down constituent parts their smallest possible parts, aṇus. Aṇu paramaṇu) is usually translated "atom", and it means in the Greek sense of a-tomos, indivisible; but the "atom" translation could be misleading in of modern chemistry and where we now of as into units. From modern physicist's perspective, it could be preferable to think of aṇus quarks rather than atoms. From there Śāntideva takes a further aṇu can be divided directional parts (digvibhāga)" (IX.86). is, the smallest possible unit, or must or side faces north, a side south. And those directions are parts, so whatever unit to be divisible after all. And then finally adds: "The directional parts, because they have component parts, are just empty space (ākāśa). 18 The trunk of a tree is Lele, The Metaphysical Basis of
 like 17 Because he uses this stylE of argumenT, TibeTan ComMeNtatOrs hAve described ŚāNTideVa, like Candrakīrti, as a PrĀsaṅgIkA. saitŌ (261) UrGes caUtion on THiS MAttEr, HoWevEr, NOtIng thAt hIs views Show considEraBlE affinities wITh Non-PrāsaṅgIka Philosophers. jouRnal of buDdhISt EthIcs 275 DreamS; on refLEction They are liKe THe trunK Of a plaiNTAiN treE.18 (IX.149–150) So it turns out thAT cHApter six's thinkIng in tErMS oF BLamEleSs causes is InAdequATe. And thE SaME IS trUE for the argumeNt against luST. At iX.77 he reCoMmeNDs what He calLs A "MedItation on no-Self"-And the selF here iS Thought OF in termS of the BodY. ThE verSEs ThAt fOlLOw dECoNstRUct The body, aS iN tHe earLier CHAPTer-bUt bOth nO-self And bodily decoNstRuctIOn nOw looK diffErenT. ŚĀntidEva begIns thIs Section saying thE bodY is not reaLly ExIstEnT becaUSe we caN brEak It down iNto partS And SmALLEr Parts: foot into toes, tOeS INtO joints, jOints iNTo ThEIr constiTuEnt PartS. sO far, tHe meTApHysics is The samE As In The arguMeNt agaiNsT luSt. BUt aftER thaT, he breAks down tHose cONstituent parts INto their smallESt POSsIBle pArtS, aṇus. Aṇu (or pAramAṆu) is UsuaLLy TraNSlateD "atom", AnD It MEans this in the Greek sEnSe of a-tOmos, iNdivisible; but The "atom" traNSLAtion couLd be MIsLEading in the ligHt of mOdern chemiSTry and phYsics, Where we nOw think of "ATOms" as divIsiBle IntO smALLeR units. From a moDERn phYsIcist's pErsPective, It cOulD be PreFeRable to thInk of aṇuS aS qUaRkS raTher tHAn atoms. FRoM thErE ŚāNtideVA takes A furtHer sTeP: "tHAt aṆu too caN Be DIVideD iNtO dirEctIoNal paRts (dIGviBhāga)" (IX.86). that is, eveN thE SmalLeSt PossiblE unit, an atom or QuArk, must stiLl HavE direcTIOns, or sidEs-a side that faces north, a sIDe facinG soUth. AnD thoSe directiOns Are effEctIVely paRts, so wHatevEr UniT WE presUME iNdiViSible turns OUT to Be divIsIble After alL. And then finally he aDDs: "THe directional ParTs, beCAUsE thEY hAVe nO cOMpoNENt parts, are just eMpty space (āKāŚA). 18 THe trunk of a PLanTaIn tree iS hollow. 276 lele, THE MetaphYsical BasIs of
 like 17 Because he uses t his styleof ar gum ent ,Tibe tancommentators h a ve d escribed Śāntideva, li ke Ca nd r akīr t i,  as a  Prāsaṅ g ik a .  Sa it ō(26 1) ur ges c aut ion onthis matte r,ho wever, notin g  t hat his vi ews  show consid era ble af fi nit i es wi thnon-P rāsaṅg i ka phi losophers .J ournal of Budd h i st  Eth ics 275 dreams; o n  r e flection theyare li ke th e tru nkof a plain ta in tr e e.18 (I X .1 4 9 – 150 )  So it turnsout that ch a pte r six' sthi n king i n ter ms ofblameless c ause s is inad equate .  And th e  same i s true  fo r t he a r gu me ntag a ins t  l ust .  At  IX.77 h ere comme ndsw h a t  hecal ls a  "med itation on no -se lf"- a ndthe s elf h ereis  thou ght of  in t er ms of the body.  The  verses t hat  f oll ow  deco n struct  th e b ody, as  in the ear li e r ch apter-but both no- se l f  a nd bodil y deco n st ru c tion now  l ook  dif f e rent.  Śān t id eva begi ns thi s  s ec tion sa yi ng the  b ody  is  notr eall y exis tent bec ausew e can break it down into par t sa n ds mall erparts: foot  int o  toe s, t o es  in t o joi nts,jo i nt s  into their constit ue nt par ts. S o far, the me taphysicsi s the same  asi nt he argument ag ainst  lust. But after th at, h e breaks  down tho s e  constit uen t p art s i n t otheir smalles t poss ib le part s,aṇus. A ṇu(or  pa ram aṇ u) is usu ally tra ns la te d"at om",a nd it me an s t hi s i n the Greeksense  ofa- to m os,  indivi s ib l e ; bu tth e "a tom "trans lati o n c ould be  misleadi ngi n th eli ght ofmodern chemis tr y and phys ic s,wherew e  now thi nk of "atoms" as divisi b le into  sm aller  uni ts. Froma m odernphy s icist' s pers pecti ve , i t could b epre fe rable to t h i nkof aṇ us  asquarksrather than atoms. Fro m there Śānti dev a ta k e sa f u rt h erst e p:" t hat aṇu too can  be divide di nt o directio n alpa rts (di gvibhāg a)" ( I X.86).That is,even thesm alle s t  po ssible uni t, an at om or qua r k, mu s tstill  ha ve dir ec tio ns, o r side s -asidethat f ac es nor th, a  s ide faci ng south. And those dir ection s are  ef fectively  pa r ts,  so whate verunit we pr esu meindiv isi b le tu rnso ut  to be di visi b le aftera ll . A n d  t hen finally h e  ad ds: " The direct iona l parts, becauset hey have no co mpon e n t p art s , ar ejust empty spa ce(ā k ā śa). 18Th e trunk ofa planta in treeis hol low. 2 76 Lele , Th e  Metap hysi cal  Basis of 
 like_17 Because_he uses this style_of argument,_Tibetan_commentators have_described_Śāntideva, like Candrakīrti,_as a Prāsaṅgika._Saitō (261) urges caution_on this matter,_however,_noting that his views show considerable affinities with non-Prāsaṅgika philosophers. Journal of Buddhist Ethics_275_dreams; on_reflection_they_are like the trunk of_a plaintain tree.18 (IX.149–150) So_it turns_out that chapter six's thinking in terms of_blameless_causes is inadequate._And the same is true for the argument against_lust. At IX.77 he recommends what_he calls a_"meditation_on_no-self"-and the self here_is thought of in terms of_the body. The verses that follow_deconstruct the body, as in the earlier_chapter-but both no-self and bodily deconstruction_now look different. Śāntideva begins_this section_saying the body is not_really existent because_we can_break it down_into parts and smaller parts: foot_into toes, toes_into joints, joints into their constituent_parts._So far, the_metaphysics_is_the same_as in the_argument_against lust._But_after that, he breaks down those_constituent_parts into their smallest possible parts, aṇus._Aṇu (or paramaṇu) is_usually_translated "atom", and it_means this in the Greek_sense of a-tomos, indivisible; but the_"atom" translation_could be_misleading in the light of modern chemistry and physics, where we_now think of "atoms" as divisible_into smaller units. From_a modern_physicist's_perspective, it could_be_preferable to_think of aṇus as quarks rather than_atoms. From_there Śāntideva takes a further step:_"that aṇu too can_be_divided into directional parts (digvibhāga)" (IX.86)._That is, even the smallest possible_unit, an atom or quark,_must_still_have directions, or sides-a side_that faces north, a side facing_south. And those_directions are effectively parts, so whatever unit_we_presume indivisible turns out to be_divisible_after all. And then finally he_adds:_"The_directional parts, because they have_no component parts, are just empty_space (ākāśa). 18 The trunk of a plantain tree_is hollow. 276_Lele, The Metaphysical Basis of