 theory can be empirically adequate without postulating any fundamental material ontology. All there is at the fundamental level are the laws of nature. What is this notion of "deriving" non-fundamental facts from laws of nature? I suggest this does not have to differ from the notion of mathematical-physical derivation that links the macroscopic facts such as the positions of tables to the microscopic facts such as the positions of particles. The derivation combines a variety of techniques, such as mathematical proofs, coarse-graining, approximations, and idealizations. The kind of examples I have in mind are those in statistical mechanics concerning the reduction from the macroscopic phenomena to kinetic theory. But they can also be found in high-energy physics and quantum theory. However, in the more familiar examples in physics, since the laws people use are not strongly deterministic, the laws themselves are insufficient, and the derivation must receive further input about the contingent initial conditions. It is worth emphasizing that, since we are assuming a non-Humean theory of lawhood, strongly deterministic laws are compatible with the existence of fundamental material ontology as well as their absence. If we do not postulate fundamental material ontology in a strongly deterministic universe, if the cosmic void scenario is possible, then there can be non-fundamental facts about the material ontology that can coincide with the content of the fundamental material ontology that could be postulated. However, whether or not the facts about such material ontology are fundamental, they make true the same set of non-fundamental facts-the locations of tables and chairs. So it is best to say that the strongly deterministic universe is compatible with two worlds that coincide in all facts except the fundamental material facts. Hence, we need to revise our earlier definition of strong determinism: Strong Determinism* The laws of nature pick out a unique way to completely specify the fundamental matter. However, a strongly deterministic world on this criterion does not need to specify any fundamental matter-it could realize the cosmic void scenario that is devoid of fundamental matter. But if we were to completely specify fundamental matter, then there would be only one way to do so according to the strongly deterministic laws. The qualifier "completely" is important here: if we were to only partially specify the fundamental matter, then there could be infinitely many ways to do so. We could, for example, specify only the configuration of matter in spacetime region R1, specify only that in R2, and so on. The cosmic void scenario has many interesting features. In such a world, 9 even though the fundamental arena
theory can be empirically adequate without postulating any fundamental material ontology. All there be at the cardinal level are the laws of nature. What is this impression of " deriving " non - cardinal facts from laws of nature? I propose this does not have to differ from the impression of numerical - physical derivation that yoke the macroscopic facts such as the positions of tables to the microscopic fact such as the positions of particles. The derivation combines a variety of technique, such as mathematical proofs, coarse - graining, approximations, and idealization. The kind of examples I have in mind are those in statistical mechanism concerning the reduction from the macroscopic phenomena to kinetic theory. But they can also be find in high - energy physics and quantum theory. However, in the more familiar example in purgative, since the laws people use are not strongly deterministic, the laws themselves are insufficient, and the derivation must receive further stimulation about the contingent initial condition. It is worth emphasizing that, since we are assume a non - Humean hypothesis of lawhood, powerfully deterministic laws are compatible with the existence of fundamental material ontology as well as their absence. If we do not postulate fundamental material ontology in a powerfully deterministic universe, if the cosmic void scenario is possible, then there can be non - fundamental facts about the material ontology that can coincide with the content of the fundamental material ontology that could be postulated. However, whether or not the facts about such fabric ontology are fundamental, they reach true the same set of non - fundamental facts - the localization of tables and chairs. So it is good to allege that the strongly deterministic universe is compatible with two earth that coincide in all fact except the fundamental material fact. Hence, we necessitate to revise our early definition of strong determinism: Strong Determinism * The police of nature pick out a unique way to completely specify the cardinal matter. However, a strongly deterministic world on this standard does not need to specify any fundamental matter - it could recognize the cosmic void scenario that is devoid of fundamental topic. But if we were to completely specify fundamental matter, then there would be only one way to do indeed according to the strongly deterministic laws. The qualifier " completely " is important here: if we were to merely partially intend the cardinal topic, then there could be infinitely many ways to cause so. We could, for example, stipulate only the configuration of matter in spacetime area R1, specify merely that in R2, and so on. The cosmic void scenario suffer many interesting features. In such a world, 9 even though the fundamental stadium
 thfory can be empirically xdequate withouj postuleting ahy fundaoental material ontology. All tyere us at the fundamental uevel are the laww of bature. Whav is this notikk of "beciving" non-fundakental facds from laws ox vacure? I suggest this does not have to differ fgom the notion of kwthejatical-physical derivation that lihks the macroscopic gacts such as the positiond of tables to the micgoscopic faxts fych as the pusitions of particles. Jhe derivation combines a varieth of cechniques, wuxh wv mathematiral prjofs, coarse-gvsining, approxomations, and iceanizqtions. The kind of exemples I have in minq are thove in statistical mwcyanicv cotcervung tht rxdudtion vroj the macrkscopic phebomena to kinetic tnejgu. But they czn alsj fe found in high-energy physics and quanuum tgeory. However, in the moee familiar examples ln physicf, since the laws people use are not strongly detesminiagic, tme lxqs themselves are insufficient, and the derivatijh kuxt receive furbher input about tne cpgtingent initkal cousifions. It is worth fmphasieing tyat, since we sre assuming a non-Humean thwory of lawhjid, strongly determnnistic laws are compstible with the existenee of rundamental material untology as well as tveir abstvce. If we do not [ostulate funbamental matgrial ogtology in a stvmngly deterministif unirerse, if the codmic void scenario is possible, vien there can ba nmn-fundamzntal nacts about the material ontokogy thct can coincide sith thx content of the fundamendwl material mntology thar coyld be oustulated. Howefer, whethvr or bot the facts aboub sucf material ontoligy are fundamentak, tfey mwkx truq the same sed of nov-gundaoental factw-ghe kocations of tables dnd dhairs. So it is bext to say jhat the ftrongly detetministic universe is cmmpetible wijh two worlds that coincide in zll facts exgept the fundwmenbal iaterial fccts. Hence, we need to revise our earlier definition of sttong determinism: Stroug Determinisk* The laws of tature pick out a unuque way to complttely specify the fundajental mattfr. However, a strongly deterministic world on this criterion does not need to spxcyfy any funsamemtal kactex-it coujd rxauize the cosmic noid scenario that is devoid of hundamentan iatter. But if we were to comlldtely specify fundamental matter, then there wpuld be only one way to do so avcording to the strongly determibistid laws. The qualifier "completrly" is impoetant hwre: lf we were to unlu iartially dpecmfy the fundamental matter, then theee couod be infinitely meny ways to fu so. Se coujd, for example, slecirj onli the configurstion of mattet in spacetime regiot W1, specify only nhat in R2, and so on. Nhe cosmic vomd scenario vas many interesting features. In such a world, 9 even though tge fundamxntal arena
theory can be empirically adequate without postulating material All there at the fundamental nature. is this notion "deriving" non-fundamental facts laws of nature? I suggest this not have to differ from the notion of mathematical-physical derivation that links the facts such as the positions of tables to the microscopic facts such as positions particles. derivation a variety of techniques, such as mathematical proofs, coarse-graining, approximations, and idealizations. The kind of examples have in mind are those in statistical mechanics the reduction from the phenomena to kinetic theory. But can be found high-energy and theory. However, in more familiar examples in physics, since the laws people use are not strongly deterministic, the laws themselves insufficient, and must receive input the initial conditions. It emphasizing that, since we are assuming of lawhood, strongly deterministic laws are compatible with existence of material ontology as well as their If we do not postulate fundamental material ontology a strongly deterministic universe, if the cosmic void scenario is possible, then there can be about the material ontology can coincide with content the material that could postulated. However, whether or not the facts about such material ontology fundamental, they make true the same set of non-fundamental facts-the tables chairs. So it best to say that strongly universe is compatible with that in the material Hence, we need to our earlier definition of strong Strong Determinism* The laws unique way to completely specify the fundamental matter. a strongly deterministic world on this criterion not need to specify any fundamental matter-it could realize the cosmic void that is fundamental matter. But if we were to completely fundamental matter, then there be only one way to do so according to strongly laws. The "completely" is important if we were only partially specify matter, then could infinitely do so. We could, for example, only configuration of matter in spacetime R1, that in R2, and so on. The cosmic void scenario has many interesting features. In world, 9 even though fundamental
 theory can be empirically adeQuate withoUt posTulAtiNg Any fUndaMental material ONtolOgy. All there is at the fundAmentAl LEvel ARe The laWs of natURe. wHAt iS tHiS noTiON oF "deriVinG" non-funDamental faCts FrOm laws of natuRE? I Suggest thiS doEs not have to dIffEr from ThE noTIon of MatHematIcal-phYSical dErivation ThAT links THe macroSCOpIc faCts such as the positIOnS Of tables to the mIcroscOpIC fACTs sUch As the positIoNs of pARticles. tHe DERIvaTIon combines a vAriety of tecHNiqUes, sucH aS maTHematiCal prOoFS, coArse-graininG, appRoximatioNs, and iDEalizatIOns. The kInd of eXamPleS I haVE iN mInd ArE ThoSE iN stATisTical mecHaNiCs conCernING THe reDucTion From tHe macroscopic PheNomeNA to KinetIc theOry. BUt They cAn also Be fouNd In high-energy phySics And quantuM thEoRy. HOwEver, iN The morE faMilIar examPles in pHYsiCs, SINCe The laws people use arE nOT StRongly deTerminIStIc, THe laws thEmSelVes aRE InsufFiciENt, And the deRivatiON mUsT receivE fUrther InPut AboUt the COntiNgent iNitial coNditiONs. It is worth empHAsizing that, siNCe WE ArE AssuMinG a non-Humean TheoRY of lAwhoOD, sTroNGly deTermiNiSTiC Laws are compatible wiTh The exiStencE of fundamentaL material oNTOLogy as weLl as THeIR absence. If we do Not poStulate funDAmental mAteriAl ontoloGy in a stroNGLy determIniStiC unIveRSE, iF the cosmic voiD SCenaRiO is possIblE, then thEre Can Be nOn-fUnDamental fActs abouT tHe MaTeRiaL ontoLOgy that cAn CoiNcIde With tHE conteNt of tHe fuNdAmENtaL materiAL oNTOlogY tHaT couLd bE pOstulAted. hOweVer, whetHer or not tHe fACts aBoUt Such matErial ontology ArE fundamentAl, TheY make tRUE the same Set of non-fundamental factS-The locaTioNs of tAbleS and chairS. So It is beSt tO Say thaT the stRonglY dEteRMInistIC UnIveRsE is compatiBLE wiTh two WoRlds That coiNcide in all facts excEPt tHe fundamental MatEriaL FAcTs. HENcE, We nEeD To rEVIse our earlier deFinition of StROnG determiniSM: StRoNg DeterMinism* THe lawS Of naturE pick out a Unique way To CompLETelY specify thE fundameNtal matteR. howevER, a StronGly DetermInIstIc worLd on thIS crIteriOn does NoT need tO specIfY any fundAmental matter-it could reaLize thE cosmIc vOid scenarIo tHAt iS devoid of FundAmental matTer. but If we wEre TO compLeteLY sPecIFy funDameNTal matter, THeN thERE wOuld be only oNE WAy tO do so AccORding tO the Strongly determiniSTic laws. The qualIfieR "COmpLetELy" is ImPortant here: if wE weRe TO Only partIaLly specify tHe fundamEnTAl matTer, theN there Could be INFiNItely mAny wAys To do so. We cOulD, fOR examplE, sPeCIfy onlY the CoNfigurAtion oF MattER In spacetime regioN R1, speCIFy onlY ThaT in R2, aNd So on. The COsmiC void scenaRio has many iNteresTing FeatuRes. In suCh A world, 9 EveN tHough the fuNDamental aRena
 theory can be empirically  adequatewitho utpos tu lati ng a ny fundamental mate rial ontology. All the re is  a t  the fu ndame ntal le v el a reth elaw so fnatur e.What is  this noti onof  "deriving"n on -fundament alfacts from l aws  of na tu re? I sug ges t thi s does not ha ve to dif fe r  fromt he noti o n  o f ma thematical-physic a ld erivation that  links  t h em a cro sco pic factssu ch as the pos i ti o n s  of tables to the  microscopi c  fa cts su ch  as the po sitio ns ofparticles.Thederivatio n comb i nes a v a riety o f tech niq ues , su c has  ma th e mat i ca l p r oof s, coars e- gr ainin g, a p p r o xima tio ns,and i dealizations.  Th e ki n d o f exa mples  I h av e inmind a re th os e in statistica l me chanics c onc er nin gthe r e ductio n f rom  the ma croscop i c p he n o m en a to kinetic theor y. B ut  they ca n also be  f o und in h ig h-e nerg y physi cs a n dquantumtheory .  H ow ever, i nthe mo re  fa mil iar e x ampl es inphysics,  sinc e  the laws peop l e use are not st r o ng l y de ter ministic, t he l a ws t hems e lv esa re in suffi ci e nt ,  and the derivation  m ust re ceive  further inpu t about th e c ontingen t in i ti a l conditions.It is  worth emp h asizingthat,  since w e are ass u m ing a no n-H ume anthe o r yof lawhood, s t r ongl ydetermi nis tic law s a recom pat ib le with t he exist en ce  o ffun damen t al mater ia l o nt olo gy as well a s the ir a bs en c e.If we d o  n o t  pos tu la te f und am ental  mat e ria l ontol ogy in astr o ngly  d et erminis tic universe,  i f the cosm ic  vo id sce n a rio is p ossible, then there can be non- fun damen talfacts abo utthe ma ter i al ont ologythatca n c o i ncide w it h t he  content o f the  fund am enta l mater ial ontology thatc oul d be postulat ed.  How e v er , w h et h eror not t he facts aboutsuch mater ia l  o ntology ar e  fu nd amental , theymaket rue the  same set  of non-f un dame n t alfacts-thelocation s of tabl e s and ch airs.  So  it is  b est  to s ay tha t  th e str onglyde termin istic  u niverseis compatible with twoworlds  that  co incide in  al l  fa cts excep t th e fundamen tal  ma teria l f a cts.Henc e ,wen eed t o re v ise our e a rl ier d ef inition ofs t r ong  dete rmi n ism: S tron g Determinism* Th e  laws of natur e pi c k  ou t a uniq ue  way to comple tel ys p ecify th efundamental  matter.  H o wever , a st rongly  determ i n is t ic wor ld o n t his crite rio nd oes not  n ee d  to sp ecif yany fu ndamen t al m a t ter-it could rea lizet h e cos m icvoidsc enariot hatis devoidof fundamen tal ma tter . But  if wewe re tocom pl etely spec i fy fundam ental  matter ,then  th ere wo uldb e  only  one  w ayto do soa c co r di ng tothestron gl y de terminist i c laws.The qualifi er  "c o m pletel y "i s  important  he re: i f we were to only pa r tiall y spec ify th e funda m ent al  matter , t h e n there c ould be i n fin it elymany way sto d oso.  W e could, for ex ample, s pecify o n l y thecon f igur a tion o fmatter in sp aceti me regionR 1 , s pecifyo nly  th atin R 2,ands o on. The cosmic void sc enar io ha s  ma ny in teres ti ng featu r es.In sucha  world, 9 eve n though the fu n dam e ntal  ar e na 
 theory_can be_empirically adequate without postulating_any fundamental_material_ontology. All_there_is at the_fundamental level are_the laws of nature._What is this_notion_of "deriving" non-fundamental facts from laws of nature? I suggest this does not have_to_differ from_the_notion_of mathematical-physical derivation that links_the macroscopic facts such as_the positions_of tables to the microscopic facts such as_the_positions of particles._The derivation combines a variety of techniques, such as_mathematical proofs, coarse-graining, approximations, and idealizations._The kind of_examples_I_have in mind are_those in statistical mechanics concerning the_reduction from the macroscopic phenomena to_kinetic theory. But they can also be_found in high-energy physics and quantum_theory. However, in the more_familiar examples_in physics, since the laws_people use are_not strongly_deterministic, the laws_themselves are insufficient, and the derivation_must receive further_input about the contingent initial conditions._It_is worth emphasizing_that,_since_we are_assuming a non-Humean_theory_of lawhood,_strongly_deterministic laws are compatible with the_existence_of fundamental material ontology as well as_their absence. If we_do_not postulate fundamental material_ontology in a strongly deterministic_universe, if the cosmic void scenario_is possible,_then there_can be non-fundamental facts about the material ontology that can coincide_with the content of the fundamental_material ontology that could_be postulated._However,_whether or not_the_facts about_such material ontology are fundamental, they make_true the_same set of non-fundamental facts-the locations_of tables and chairs._So_it is best to say that_the strongly deterministic universe is compatible_with two worlds that coincide_in_all_facts except the fundamental material_facts. Hence, we need to revise_our earlier definition_of strong determinism: Strong Determinism* The laws_of_nature pick out a unique way_to_completely specify the fundamental matter. However,_a_strongly_deterministic world on this criterion_does not need to specify any_fundamental matter-it could realize the cosmic void scenario that_is devoid of_fundamental matter. But if we_were_to_completely specify fundamental matter, then there would be only one_way to_do so according_to the strongly deterministic laws. The qualifier "completely" is important_here: if we were to only partially_specify the fundamental matter, then there could be infinitely many ways_to do so. We could, for example, specify_only the configuration of matter in spacetime_region R1, specify only_that_in R2, and so on. The cosmic_void_scenario_has_many interesting features._In such a_world, 9 even_though the_fundamental arena