 automata) mimic selected world properties (Wolfram, 2002) is not evidence if the researcher chooses what is explained. Finding facts to fit a theory is not a new kind of science but an old kind of bias. Hence the method of this model is to derive all core physics from information first principles, i.e. begin with processing and derive space, time, energy and matter, explaining not just selected world events but its operational core. This method is the usual hypothesis testing of science assume a theory true then "follow the logic" to see if it fails, i.e. design then test. If the theory isn't true, assuming it is should soon give outcomes inconsistent with observation. If it is true, it should explain what other theories cannot. Valid theories should be falsifiable, e.g. virtual reality theory is falsifiable as any incomputable physics would disprove it: "... the hypothesis that our universe is a program running on a digital computer in another universe generates empirical predictions, and is therefore falsifiable" (McCabe, 2004) p1 If reality does what processing can't, then the world can't be virtual, but while incomputable algorithms exist, all known physics is computable. Objective reality theory is equally falsifiable and indeed has been falsified. Aspect and his colleagues showed decades ago that our world cannot be an objective reality (Aspect, Grangier, & Roger, 1982) in a well replicated experiment that challenges these assumptions of physical realism (Groblacher et al., 2007): Brian Whitworth Quantum Biosystems 2010, 2 (1) 221-249 241 1. Object locality: That physical objects exist in a locality that limits their interactions. 2. Object realism: That physical objects have intrinsic properties that persist over time. Unless formal logic itself is flawed, one or both of these objective reality assumptions must be wrong (D'Espagnat, 1979). Yet the theory remains unchallenged today, not because it is right but because no theory exists to take its place. As Chaitin, following Gödel, showed, the irreducible axioms of physics aren't logically "proven" but exist by fruitfulness they explain more than they assume (Chaitin, 2006). Without such axioms, physics itself couldn't stand, so they are not dropped just because they are "disproved". Like house foundations, an axiom can only be removed if another can be put in to bear its load. Foundation axioms only change during paradigm shifts (Kuhn
automata) mimic selected world properties (Wolfram, 2002) is not evidence if the research worker choose what is explained. Finding fact to meet a theory is not a new kind of skill but an old kind of bias. Hence the method acting of this exemplar is to derive all effect physics from information inaugural principles, i.e. begin with processing and derive space, time, energy and topic, explaining not just selected world event but its operational core. This method acting is the usual guess testing of science assume a theory true then " follow the logic " to witness if it fails, i.e. design then test. If the theory isn't true, simulate it is should soon give outcomes inconsistent with observation. If it is true, it should explain what other theories cannot. Valid theories should be falsifiable, for example virtual world theory is falsifiable as any incomputable physics would disprove it: "... the guess that our population is a program running on a digital computer in another universe generates empirical predictions, and is therefore confirmable " (McCabe, 2004) p1 If reality does what processing can't, then the world can't be virtual, but while incomputable algorithms exist, all known physics is computable. Objective reality theory is equally falsifiable and indeed has been falsified. view and his colleagues testify decade ago that our world cannot be an objective reality (Aspect, Grangier, & Roger, 1982) in a well replicated experiment that challenge these assumptions of physical realism (Groblacher et al. , 2007 ): Brian Whitworth Quantum Biosystems 2010, 2 (1) 221 - 249 241 1. aim locality: That forcible objects exist in a locality that limits their interactions. 2. Object naturalism: That physical objects suffer intrinsic properties that prevail over time. Unless conventional logic itself is flawed, one or both of these objective world assumptions must be wrong (D'Espagnat, 1979). Yet the theory persist unchallenged today, not because it is correct but because no theory exist to take its place. As Chaitin, following Gödel, showed, the irreducible axioms of purgative aren't logically " proven " but exist by fruitfulness they explain more than they bear (Chaitin, 2006). Without such axioms, physics itself couldn't stand, so they are not dropped just because they are " disproved ". Like theater foundations, an axiom can only be removed if another can be put in to bear its cargo. initiation axioms merely change during paradigm shifts (Kuhn
 auhomata) mimic selected wovld properties (Wolfram, 2002) is nof evidenze if the researcher chooses wyat iw explained. Finding fazts to fin a theort is bot a new kind of sciencs but en old kind of nias. Hence dhe method of dhks model is to derive all core physicf from onvormation firsj primsiplss, i.e. begin with processing and dedive spece, time, energy and matter, explaining not jush selected world egents but ija o[wrational cofe. This meuhmd is the osual hypothesis testing of scievce axsume a thgody jrue then "foolow nhe logic" to see if id fails, i.e. design thek tesv. If the theory isn't true, assuming it is shjuld soon gnve outcomes inconsisrebt wijh obvervxriov. Ir mt js truf, iv should exllain what ither theories cannpt. Nslid theoriea shoujd be falsifiable, e.g. virtual reality theogy ia falsifiable as any inxomputable physics woold disprode it: "... the hypothesis that our universe is a progsam rnnviny on a eihital computer in another universe generates qjporpcal predictions, cnd is therefore fwlxyfiable" (McCabg, 2004) p1 If rezlity does what prlcessind can'r, then tht workd can't be virtual, but whilw incomputabjw algorithms exist, all known 'hysicx is vomputable. Objective reclity fheory is eeually famrifiable and indded hds been falsified. Aspect agd his cooleayues shoded cecadef ago that our world cannot be an lbjecjive raality (Aspfct, Grangier, & Roger, 1982) in a well cxplicated expgrikenn that chcllengcs these assumpeions of physieal realnsm (Grublacher en al., 2007): Brien Whitworth Quantum Biosfdtems 2010, 2 (1) 221-249 241 1. Mbject ljcaluty: Rhat phhrical objects rxist in c locqlity that limits bheir jnteractions. 2. Oylext realism: That phhsisap pbtacts have indrinric lropefties that ierrist over time. Unless fosmal logic itself is fkared, one ir both jf these objevtive reality assulptiois musv be wtond (D'Espagnat, 1979). Yet the theory rejains uncjaljenged today, not because it ns right but because no theory exists to take its place. As Chaitin, following Yödtl, showed, the irrequcible afioms of physics areb't logically "provtn" but exist by fruitfumness dhey fxplain more than they assume (Chaitin, 2006). Without such axioms, physics itself couldi't stand, so tgey sre nmt bropped jusv uecause they are "cisproved". Like house foundationr, an aximm can only be removed if anotnef can be put kn to bear its load. Founsation acioms only change during paradibm shifts (Kuhn
automata) mimic selected world properties (Wolfram, 2002) evidence the researcher what is explained. theory not a new of science but old kind of bias. Hence the of this model is to derive all core physics from information first principles, begin with processing and derive space, time, energy and matter, explaining not just world but operational This method is the usual hypothesis testing of science assume a theory true then "follow the to see if it fails, i.e. design then If the theory isn't assuming it is should soon outcomes with observation. it true, should explain what theories cannot. Valid theories should be falsifiable, e.g. virtual reality theory is falsifiable as any incomputable physics disprove it: hypothesis that universe a running on a in another universe generates empirical predictions, falsifiable" (McCabe, 2004) p1 If reality does what can't, then world can't be virtual, but while algorithms exist, all known physics is computable. Objective theory is equally falsifiable and indeed has been falsified. Aspect and his colleagues showed decades our world cannot be objective reality (Aspect, & 1982) a replicated experiment challenges these assumptions of physical realism (Groblacher et al., 2007): Brian Quantum Biosystems 2010, 2 (1) 221-249 241 1. Object locality: objects in a locality limits their interactions. 2. realism: physical objects have intrinsic persist time. itself flawed, or both of these reality assumptions must be wrong 1979). Yet the theory it is right but because no theory exists take its place. As Chaitin, following Gödel, the irreducible axioms of physics aren't logically "proven" but exist by fruitfulness explain more assume (Chaitin, 2006). Without such axioms, physics itself stand, so they are dropped just because they are "disproved". Like house foundations, axiom only be if another can put in to its load. Foundation change during shifts
 automata) mimic selected worlD propertieS (WolfRam, 2002) Is nOt EvidEnce If the researcheR ChooSes what is explained. FindIng faCtS To fiT A tHeory Is not a nEW kIND of ScIeNce BuT An Old kiNd oF bias. HeNce the methOd oF tHis model is to DErIve all core PhySics from infoRmaTion fiRsT prINciplEs, i.E. begiN with pROcessiNg and deriVe SPace, tiME, energy AND mAtteR, explaining not jusT SeLEcted world evenTs but iTs OPeRATioNal Core. This meThOd is tHE usual hYPoTHESis TEsting of scienCe assume a thEOry True thEn "FolLOw the lOgic" tO sEE if It fails, i.e. deSign Then test. IF the thEOry isn't TRue, assuMing it Is sHouLd soON gIvE ouTcOMes INcOnsISteNt with obSeRvAtion. if it IS TRUe, it ShoUld eXplaiN what other theOriEs caNNot. valid TheorIes sHoUld be FalsifIable, E.g. Virtual reality tHeorY is falsifIabLe As aNy IncomPUtable PhySicS would dIsprove IT: "... thE hYPOThEsis that our universE iS A PrOgram runNing on A DiGiTAl computEr In aNothER UniveRse gENeRates empIrical PReDiCtions, aNd Is therEfOre FalSifiaBLe" (Mccabe, 2004) p1 IF reality Does wHAt processing caN'T, then the world CAn'T BE vIRtuaL, buT while incomPutaBLe alGoriTHmS exISt, all Known PhYSiCS is computable. ObjectIvE realiTy theOry is equally fAlsifiable AND Indeed haS beeN FaLSified. Aspect anD his cOlleagues sHOwed decaDes agO that our World cannOT Be an objeCtiVe rEalIty (aSPeCt, Grangier, & RogER, 1982) In a wElL replicAteD experiMenT thAt cHalLeNges these AssumptiOnS oF pHySicAl reaLIsm (GroblAcHer Et Al., 2007): BRian WHItwortH QuanTum BIoSySTemS 2010, 2 (1) 221-249 241 1. Object LOcALIty: THaT pHysiCal ObJects ExisT In a LocalitY that limiTs tHEir iNtErActions. 2. object realism: thAt physical ObJecTs have INTrinsic pRoperties that persist oveR Time. UnlEss FormaL logIc itself iS flAwed, onE or BOth of tHese obJectiVe ReaLITy assUMPtIonS mUst be wrong (d'eSpaGnat, 1979). YEt The tHeory reMains unchallenged tODay, Not because it iS riGht bUT BeCauSE nO TheOrY ExiSTS to take its place. as Chaitin, fOlLOwIng Gödel, shOWed, ThE irreduCible axIoms oF Physics Aren't logiCally "provEn" But eXISt bY fruitfulnEss they eXplain morE Than tHEy AssumE (ChAitin, 2006). WItHouT such Axioms, PHysIcs itSelf coUlDn't staNd, so tHeY are not dRopped just because they arE "disprOved". LIke House founDatIOns, An axiom caN onlY be removed If aNotHer caN be PUt in tO beaR ItS loAD. FounDatiON axioms onLY cHanGE DuRing paradigM SHIftS (Kuhn
 automata) mimic selectedworld prop ertie s ( Wol fr am,2002 ) is not evide n ce i f the researcher choos es wh at is e x pl ained . Findi n gf a cts  t ofit  a th eoryisnot a n ew kind of  sc ie nce but an o l dkind of bi as.  Hence the m eth od ofth ism odelisto de rive a l l core  physicsfr o m info r mationf i rs t pr inciples, i.e. be g in with processin g andde r iv e spa ce,  time, ene rg y and matter, ex p l a ini n g not just se lected worl d  ev ents b ut  it s  opera tiona lc ore . This meth od i s the usu al hyp o thesist estingof sci enc e a ssum e  a  t heo ry tru e  t hen "fo llow the  l og ic" t o se e i f  itfai ls,i.e.design then t est . If the  theo ry is n'ttr ue, a ssumin g itis  should soon gi ve o utcomes i nco ns ist en t wit h  obser vat ion . If it  is tru e , i ts h o ul d explain what oth er t he ories ca nnot.V al id theories  s hou ld b e falsi fiab l e,  e.g. vi rtualr ea li ty theo ry  is fa ls ifi abl e asa ny i ncompu table ph ysics would disprove it: "... theh yp o t he s is t hat  our univer se i s  a p rogr a mrun n ing o n a d ig i ta l  computer in anothe runiver se ge nerates empir ical predi c t i ons, and  ist he r efore falsifia ble"(McCabe, 2 0 04) p1 I f rea lity doe s what pr o c essing c an' t,the n t h e  w orld can't be v irtu al , but w hil e incom put abl e a lgo ri thms exis t, all k no wn  p hy sic s isc omputabl e.  Ob je cti ve re a lity t heory  iseq ua l lyfalsifi a bl e andin de ed h asbe en fa lsif i ed.  Aspect  and hiscol l eagu es  s howed d ecades ago th at  our world  c ann ot bea n  objecti ve reality (Aspect, Gra n gier, &  Ro ger,1982 ) in a we llreplic ate d  exper imentthatch all e n ges t h e se  as su mptions of p hys icalre alis m (Grob lacher et al., 200 7 ):Brian Whitwor thQuan t u mBio s ys t ems  2 0 10, 2  (1) 221-249 24 1 1. Objec tl oc ality: Tha t  ph ys ical ob jects e xisti n a loc ality tha t limitsth eiri n ter actions. 2 . Object  realism: Thatp hy sical  ob jectsha veintri nsic p r ope rties  thatpe rsistoverti me. Unle ss formal logic itselfis fla wed,one  or bothoft hes e objecti ve r eality ass ump tio ns mu stb e wro ng ( D 'E spa g nat,1979 ) . Yet the th eor y re mains uncha l l e nge d tod ay, not be caus e it is right but because no the orye x ist s t o  tak eits place. AsCha it i n , follow in g Gödel, sh owed, th ei rredu cibleaxioms  of phy s i cs aren't  log ica lly "prov en"  b u t exist  b yf ruitfu lnes sthey e xplain more t han they assume(Chai t i n, 20 0 6).  With ou t sucha xiom s, physics  itself cou ldn'tstan d, so  they a re  not d rop pe d just bec a use theyare " disprov ed ". L ike  house  fou n d ation s, a naxi om can on l y  b e  r em o ved  ifanoth er  can  be put i n  to bear  it s  load.Fo und a t ion ax i om s only chang e d uring p aradigm sh i fts( Ku h n
 automata)_mimic selected_world properties (Wolfram, 2002)_is not_evidence_if the_researcher_chooses what is_explained. Finding facts_to fit a theory_is not a_new_kind of science but an old kind of bias. Hence the method of this_model_is to_derive_all_core physics from information first_principles, i.e. begin with processing_and derive_space, time, energy and matter, explaining not just_selected_world events but_its operational core. This method is the usual hypothesis_testing of science assume a theory_true then "follow_the_logic"_to see if it_fails, i.e. design then test. If_the theory isn't true, assuming it_is should soon give outcomes inconsistent with_observation. If it is true, it_should explain what other theories_cannot. Valid_theories should be falsifiable, e.g._virtual reality theory_is falsifiable_as any incomputable_physics would disprove it: "... the_hypothesis that our_universe is a program running on_a_digital computer in_another_universe_generates empirical_predictions, and is_therefore_falsifiable" (McCabe,_2004)_p1 If reality does what processing_can't,_then the world can't be virtual, but_while incomputable algorithms exist,_all_known physics is computable._Objective reality theory is equally_falsifiable and indeed has been falsified._Aspect and_his colleagues_showed decades ago that our world cannot be an objective reality_(Aspect, Grangier, & Roger, 1982) in_a well replicated experiment_that challenges_these_assumptions of physical_realism_(Groblacher et_al., 2007): Brian Whitworth Quantum Biosystems 2010,_2 (1)_221-249 241 1. Object locality: That_physical objects exist in_a_locality that limits their interactions. 2._Object realism: That physical objects have_intrinsic properties that persist over_time._Unless_formal logic itself is flawed,_one or both of these objective_reality assumptions must_be wrong (D'Espagnat, 1979). Yet the theory_remains_unchallenged today, not because it is_right_but because no theory exists to_take_its_place. As Chaitin, following Gödel,_showed, the irreducible axioms of physics_aren't logically "proven" but exist by fruitfulness they explain_more than they_assume (Chaitin, 2006). Without such_axioms,_physics_itself couldn't stand, so they are not dropped just because_they are_"disproved". Like house_foundations, an axiom can only be removed if another can_be put in to bear its load._Foundation axioms only change during paradigm shifts (Kuhn