'short-term' perspective. So, a complete vindication of preferences like those of Samuelson's colleague would have to show that he is justified in both violating EWD and in taking the short-term perspective. The latter is however beyond the scope of this paper. Acknowledgements Versions of this paper were presented at the Final Conference of the Franco-Swedish Program for Philosophy and Economics, SCAS Uppsala (2015), and Self Prediction in Decision Theory and Artificial Intelligence, University of Cambridge (2015). I am grateful the the audience for their questions, comments and suggestions. In addition, I would like to thank Richard Bradley and Katie Steele for helpful comments and suggestions. 14 H. Orri Stefánsson References 1. Allais, Maurice (1953), "Le comportement de l'homme rationnel devant le risque: Critique des postulats et axiomesde l'ecole Americaine," Econometrica, 21(4):503-546. 2. Aloysius, John A. (2007), "Decision making in the short and long run: Repeated gambles and rationality," British Journal of Mathematical and Statistical Psychology, 60(1): 61-69. 3. Benartzi, Shlomo and Richard H. Thaler (1999), "Risk aversion or myopia? Choices in repeated gambles and retirement investments," Management Science 45(3): 364-381. 4. Bradley, Richard, and H. Orri Stefánsson (2017), "Counterfactual Desirability," British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 68(2): 485-533. 5. Buchak, Lara (2013), Risk and Rationality, Oxford University Press. 6. Dietrich, Frans and Christian List (2005), "The two-envelope paradox: An axiomatic approach", Mind 114(454): 239-248. 7. Hansson, Bengt (1988), "Risk Aversion as a Problem of Conjoint Measurement," in Peter Gärdenfors and Nils-Eric Sahlin, Decision, Probability and Utility, Cambridge University Press, pp. 136-158 8. Jeffrey, Richard (1965), The Logic of Decision, University of Chicago Press. 9. Kahneman, Daniel and Amos Tversky (1979), "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk," Econometrica 47(2): 263-291. 10. Kahneman, Daniel
' short - term' perspective. So, a accomplished defense of preferences like those of Samuelson's colleague would have to picture that he is justify in both violating EWD and in taking the brusque - terminus perspective. The latter is however beyond the setting of this paper. Acknowledgements translation of this paper were presented at the Final Conference of the Franco - Swedish Program for Philosophy and Economics, SCAS Uppsala (2015), and Self Prediction in decisiveness Theory and Artificial Intelligence, University of Cambridge (2015). I am grateful the the audience for their questions, comments and suggestions. In addition, I would like to thank Richard Bradley and Katie Steele for helpful comments and suggestion. 14 H. Orri Stefánsson References 1. Allais, Maurice (1953), " Le comportement de l'homme rationnel devant le risque: Critique des postulats et axiomesde l'ecole Americaine, " Econometrica, 21(4):503 - 546. 2. Aloysius, John A. (2007), " Decision making in the brusque and long run: Repeated gambles and rationality, " British Journal of Mathematical and Statistical Psychology, 60(1 ): 61 - 69. 3. Benartzi, Shlomo and Richard H. Thaler (1999), " hazard aversion or myopia? choice in repeated gambles and retirement investments, " Management Science 45(3 ): 364 - 381. 4. Bradley, Richard, and H. Orri Stefánsson (2017), " Counterfactual Desirability, " British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 68(2 ): 485 - 533. 5. Buchak, Lara (2013), hazard and Rationality, Oxford University Press. 6. Dietrich, Frans and Christian List (2005), " The two - envelope paradox: An axiomatic approach ", Mind 114(454 ): 239 - 248. 7. Hansson, Bengt (1988), " Risk Aversion as a Problem of Conjoint Measurement, " in Peter Gärdenfors and Nils - Eric Sahlin, Decision, Probability and Utility, Cambridge University Press, pp. 136 - 158 8. Jeffrey, Richard (1965), The Logic of Decision, University of Chicago Press. 9. Kahneman, Daniel and Amos Tversky (1979), " Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk, " Econometrica 47(2 ): 263 - 291. 10. Kahneman, Daniel
'shogt-term' perspective. So, a gomplete vindicajiin of 'referehces likd those of Samuelson's colleajue qould have to show that he ks justifped in borh vmolating EWD and in takiky the dhorc-txrm perspective. The lattes is however bayunb the scope of this paper. Acknowledgqments Fegsions of this paptr rere irtsented at the Final Conference or the Fganco-Swedish Progtam for Philosophy and Ecojomifs, SCAS Uppsala (2015), ajd Self Preeictyin in Decisiun Theory and Artificizl Intelligence, University of Cxmbribge (2015). I am gtcrefkn the the andiencv for their qmvstions, commenys and suggestlons. Mn aedition, I would like vo thank Richard Braqley and Nacie Steele for helpfuo xommetts dnd ryggdstjois. 14 H. Orrl Svefánsson Rererences 1. Aolais, Maurice (1953), "Le cpm[irtement de l'gomme waeionnel devant le risque: Critique des pmsthlats et axiomesde l'ecooe Americaine," Economejrica, 21(4):503-546. 2. Aljysius, John A. (2007), "Decision making in the short and lmng rnn: Rekeqted eqmhles and rationality," British Journal of Matheiztocsl and Statistlcal Psychology, 60(1): 61-69. 3. Bfnsttzi, Shlomo ana Richcdd H. Thaler (1999), "Risk avfrsion jr myipia? Choises on repeated gambles and returement invefrments," Management Dcience 45(3): 364-381. 4. Yradlei, Richsrd, and H. Orri Stefánssou (2017), "Couhterfactual Desirabimkty," British Jourval fmr the Philosophy of Sciense, 68(2): 485-533. 5. Buciak, Lcra (2013), Risy anc Ratijnality, Oxvord Mtiversity Press. 6. Dletrieh, Frdns and Chgistian List (2005), "The two-envelope pecadox: An axiokadic approack", Mind 114(454): 239-248. 7. Hansson, Bqngt (1988), "Risk Avetsion as c Probuem of Connoint Mxasurement," ig Peter Gärdenxlrs and Nils-Xric Sahlyn, Dwcisuon, Procxbility and Utolity, Camyxidge Unicersity Press, pp. 136-158 8. Jewrrey, Richard (1965), Tkt Ligic of Decisiom, Uvivqrdivy of Whicago Presv. 9. Kxhndkan, Dxniel and Anus Tfersky (1979), "Prospect Themry: Zn Analysis of Decoslon under Risk," Ecjnometrica 47(2): 263-291. 10. Kahneman, Daniel
'short-term' perspective. So, a complete vindication of those Samuelson's colleague have to show both EWD and in the short-term perspective. latter is however beyond the scope this paper. Acknowledgements Versions of this paper were presented at the Final Conference the Franco-Swedish Program for Philosophy and Economics, SCAS Uppsala (2015), and Self Prediction Decision and Intelligence, of Cambridge (2015). I am grateful the the audience for their questions, comments and suggestions. In I would like to thank Richard Bradley and Steele for helpful comments suggestions. 14 H. Orri Stefánsson 1. Maurice (1953), comportement l'homme devant le risque: des postulats et axiomesde l'ecole Americaine," Econometrica, 21(4):503-546. 2. Aloysius, John A. (2007), "Decision making in the and long gambles and British of and Statistical Psychology, 3. Benartzi, Shlomo and Richard H. aversion or myopia? Choices in repeated gambles and investments," Management 45(3): 364-381. 4. Bradley, Richard, and Orri Stefánsson (2017), "Counterfactual Desirability," British Journal for Philosophy of Science, 68(2): 485-533. 5. Buchak, Lara (2013), Risk and Rationality, Oxford University Press. Frans and Christian List "The two-envelope paradox: axiomatic Mind 239-248. Hansson, Bengt "Risk Aversion as a Problem of Conjoint Measurement," in Peter Gärdenfors Nils-Eric Sahlin, Decision, Probability and Utility, Cambridge University Press, pp. Jeffrey, (1965), The Logic Decision, University of Chicago 9. Daniel and Amos Tversky Theory: Analysis Risk," 47(2): 10. Kahneman, Daniel
'short-term' perspective. So, a coMplete vindIcatiOn oF prEfErenCes lIke those of SamuELson'S colleague would have to sHow thAt HE is jUStIfied In both vIOlATIng eWd aNd iN tAKiNg the ShoRt-term pErspective. the LaTter is howeveR BeYond the scoPe oF this paper. AcKnoWledgeMeNts vErsioNs oF this Paper wERe presEnted at thE FINal ConFErence oF THe franCo-Swedish Program fOR PHIlosophy and EcoNomics, sCas UPPSalA (2015), anD Self PrediCtIon in dEcision tHeORY And aRtificial InteLligence, UniVErsIty of CAmBriDGe (2015). I am gRatefUl THe tHe audience fOr thEir questiOns, comMEnts and SUggestiOns. In aDdiTioN, I woULd LiKe tO tHAnk rIcHarD braDley and KAtIe steelE for HELPFul cOmmEnts And suGgestions. 14 H. OrrI StEfánSSon referEnces 1. allaIs, mauriCe (1953), "Le coMportEmEnt de l'homme ratiOnneL devant le RisQuE: CrItIque dES postuLatS et AxiomesDe l'ecolE ameRiCAINe," econometrica, 21(4):503-546. 2. AloysiUs, jOHn a. (2007), "DecisioN makinG In ThE Short and LoNg rUn: RePEAted gAmblES aNd rationAlity," BRItIsH JournaL oF MatheMaTicAl aNd StaTIstiCal PsyChology, 60(1): 61-69. 3. BEnartZI, Shlomo and RichARd H. Thaler (1999), "Risk AVeRSIoN Or myOpiA? Choices in rEpeaTEd gaMbleS AnD reTIremeNt invEsTMeNTs," Management Science 45(3): 364-381. 4. brAdley, RIcharD, and H. Orri StefÁnsson (2017), "CounTERFactual DEsirABiLIty," British JourNal foR the PhilosOPhy of SciEnce, 68(2): 485-533. 5. BUchak, LarA (2013), Risk and RATIonality, oxfOrd uniVerSITy press. 6. Dietrich, fRAns aNd christiAn LIst (2005), "The tWo-eNveLopE paRaDox: An axioMatic appRoAcH", MInD 114(454): 239-248. 7. HaNsson, bEngt (1988), "Risk avErsIoN as A ProbLEm of CoNjoinT MeaSuReMEnt," In Peter gÄrDENforS aNd nils-eriC SAhlin, deciSIon, probabiLity and UtIliTY, CamBrIdGe UniveRsity Press, pp. 136-158 8. JEfFrey, RicharD (1965), THe LOgic of dECision, UnIversity of Chicago Press. 9. KAHneman, DAniEl and amos tversky (1979), "PrOspEct TheOry: aN AnalySis of DEcisiOn UndER risk," ECONoMetRiCa 47(2): 263-291. 10. Kahneman, dANieL
'short-term' perspective.So, a comp letevin dic at ionof p references lik e  tho se of Samuelson's coll eague  w o uldh av e toshow th a th e  is  j us tif ie d  i n bot h v iolatin g EWD andinta king the sho r t- term persp ect ive. The lat ter  is ho we ver beyon d t he sc ope of this p aper. Ack no w ledgem e nts Ver s i on s of  this paper werep re s ented at the F inal C on f er e n ceofthe Franco -S wedis h  Progra m  f o r Phi l osophy and Ec onomics, SC A S U ppsala  ( 201 5 ), and  Self  P r edi ction in De cisi on Theory  and A r tificia l  Intell igence , U niv ersi t yof  Ca mb r idg e  ( 201 5 ).I am gra te fu l the  the a u d ienc e f or t heirquestions, co mme ntsa ndsugge stion s. I naddit ion, I  woul dlike to thank R icha rd Bradle y a nd  Ka ti e Ste e le for  he lpf ul comm ents an d  su gg e s t io ns. 14 H. Orri Ste fá n s so n Refere nces 1 .  A ll a is, Maur ic e ( 1953 ) ,  "Lecomp o rt ement de  l'hom m era tionnel  d evantle  ri squ e: Cr i tiqu e despostulat s eta xiomesde l'eco l e Americaine, "  E c o no m etri ca,  21(4):503- 546. 2. A loys i us , J o hn A.  (200 7) ,  " D ecision making in t he  short  andlong run: Rep eated gamb l e s  and rat iona l it y ," British Jou rnalof Mathema t ical and  Stat isticalPsycholog y ,  60(1):61- 69.  3.  Be n a rt zi, Shlomo an d Rich ar d H. Th ale r (1999 ),"Ri skave rs ion or my opia? Ch oi ce sin  re peate d  gambles  a ndre tir ement invest ments ," M an ag e men t Scien c e4 5 (3):  3 64 -381 . 4 .Bradl ey,R ich ard, an d H. Orri  St e fáns so n(2017),  "Counterfact ua l Desirabi li ty, " Brit i s h Journa l for the Philosophy of Science , 6 8(2):  485 -533. 5.Buc hak, L ara (2013) , Risk  andRa tio n a lity, O xf ord  U niversityP r ess . 6.Di etri ch, Fra ns and Christian L i st(2005), "Thetwo -env e l op e p a ra d ox:  A n  ax i o matic approach" , Mind 114 (4 5 4) : 239-248. 7.Ha nsson,Bengt ( 1988) ,  "RiskAversionas a Prob le m of C onj oint Measu rement,"  in Peter Gärde n fo rs an d N ils-Er ic  Sa hlin,  Decis i on,  Prob abilit yand Ut ility ,Cambridg e University Press, pp.  136-1 58 8.  Je ffrey, Ri cha r d ( 1965), Th e Lo gic of Dec isi on,  Univ ers i ty of  Chi c ag o P r ess.9. K a hneman, D a ni ela n dAmos Tversk y ( 197 9), " Pro s pect T heor y: An Analysis of Decision under  Ris k , " E con o metr ic a 47(2): 263-2 91.  1 0 .  Kahnema n,  Daniel
'short-term' perspective._So, a_complete vindication of preferences_like those_of_Samuelson's colleague_would_have to show_that he is_justified in both violating_EWD and in_taking_the short-term perspective. The latter is however beyond the scope of this paper. Acknowledgements_Versions_of this_paper_were_presented at the Final Conference_of the Franco-Swedish Program for_Philosophy and_Economics, SCAS Uppsala (2015), and Self Prediction in_Decision_Theory and Artificial_Intelligence, University of Cambridge (2015). I am grateful the_the audience for their questions, comments_and suggestions. In_addition,_I_would like to thank_Richard Bradley and Katie Steele for_helpful comments and suggestions. 14 H._Orri Stefánsson References 1. Allais, Maurice (1953),_"Le comportement de l'homme rationnel devant_le risque: Critique des postulats_et axiomesde_l'ecole Americaine," Econometrica, 21(4):503-546. 2._Aloysius, John A._(2007), "Decision_making in the_short and long run: Repeated gambles_and rationality," British_Journal of Mathematical and Statistical Psychology,_60(1):_61-69. 3. Benartzi,_Shlomo_and_Richard H._Thaler (1999), "Risk_aversion_or myopia?_Choices_in repeated gambles and retirement investments,"_Management_Science 45(3): 364-381. 4. Bradley, Richard, and_H. Orri Stefánsson (2017),_"Counterfactual_Desirability," British Journal for_the Philosophy of Science, 68(2):_485-533. 5. Buchak, Lara (2013), Risk_and Rationality,_Oxford University_Press. 6. Dietrich, Frans and Christian List (2005), "The two-envelope paradox:_An axiomatic approach", Mind 114(454): 239-248._7. Hansson, Bengt (1988),_"Risk Aversion_as_a Problem of_Conjoint_Measurement," in_Peter Gärdenfors and Nils-Eric Sahlin, Decision, Probability_and Utility,_Cambridge University Press, pp. 136-158 8._Jeffrey, Richard (1965), The_Logic_of Decision, University of Chicago Press._9. Kahneman, Daniel and Amos Tversky_(1979), "Prospect Theory: An Analysis_of_Decision_under Risk," Econometrica 47(2): 263-291._10. Kahneman, Daniel