 counterpart theory, however. If we need robust modal realism, then transworld identity of individuals may be ensured by overlapping worlds or by adopting some form of modal dimensionalism. 3) For possibilism model fiction, there must be possible worlds containing magic, ghosts, dragons and people waking up as beetles or cockroaches. Widespread essentialism or proliferation of metaphysical necessities would be a problem for such accounts of fiction by limiting the kinds of stories authors could coherently tell even among stories that appear prima facie to be coherent. I will assume that if a story can be apparently coherently told in which an object of type A is described as being not-B, this is at least evidence that there are worlds where As are not-Bs. The extent to which even widespread essentialism is an obstacle may be a function of what commitments our account makes to the metaphysics of modality. A constructivist or ersatzist approach might allow us to sidestep essentialist worries even consistently with accepting a wide range of metaphysical necessities: to provide the truth-conditions for sentences in fiction, we need the space of worlds to contain the logically (and analytically) possible worlds, but just as fictions are free to change laws of nature, fictions are free to suspend metaphysical necessities that are not also logical or analytical necessities and still be able to model the semantic contents of sentences correctly. If x is essentially human, x is human in all metaphysically possible worlds, but 'x is not human' is not logically or analytically impossible; we can construct or describe logically and analytically consistent worlds in which x is not human, and stipulate that these are as relevant for our purposes as the metaphysically possible ones. 4) We may, as mentioned above, legitimately worry about how we can refer to merely possible objects. To defend possibilism as a model of fictional discourse, I need to say something about reference, and in the rest of this section I sketch a response to this worry (a complete answer will have to be postponed). Whenever I utter a sentence containing a name I succeed in referring presumably in virtue of standing in the right sort of relation – perhaps a causal-historical relation – to the introduction of the name, and this relation is plausibly the same for my use of 'Holmes' as for my use of 'Caligula'. But whereas we can tell an obvious story about how 'Caligula' got attached to Caligula in the first place, it is less clear how Doyle attached '
counterpart theory, however. If we need robust modal realism, then transworld identity of person may be guarantee by overlapping worlds or by adopting some shape of modal dimensionalism. 3) For possibilism model fiction, there must be potential worlds containing magic, ghost, dragons and people wake up as beetles or cockroaches. far-flung essentialism or proliferation of metaphysical necessities would be a problem for such accounts of fiction by limiting the kinds of stories writer could coherently tell even among stories that appear prima facie to be coherent. I will wear that if a story can be apparently coherently told in which an aim of type A is identify as being not - B, this is at least evidence that there are worlds where As are not - b. The extent to which even widespread essentialism is an obstacle may be a function of what commitments our account makes to the metaphysics of modality. A constructivist or ersatzist approach might allow us to sidestep essentialist worries even consistently with accepting a wide range of metaphysical necessities: to provide the truth - conditions for sentence in fiction, we need the quad of worlds to contain the logically (and analytically) possible worlds, but barely as fictions are free to change laws of nature, fiction are free to suspend metaphysical necessities that are not also logical or analytical necessity and still be able to model the semantic contents of sentences correctly. If x is essentially human, x is human in all metaphysically potential worlds, but' x is not human' is not logically or analytically impossible; we can reconstruct or identify logically and analytically consistent worlds in which x is not human, and stipulate that these are as relevant for our purposes as the metaphysically potential ones. 4) We may, as mentioned above, legitimately worry about how we can refer to merely possible objects. To defend possibilism as a model of fictional discussion, I need to pronounce something about reference, and in the rest of this part I sketch a response to this concern (a complete answer will have to be postponed). Whenever I talk a sentence containing a name I succeed in referring presumably in virtue of standing in the correct sort of relative – perhaps a causal - historical relation – to the introduction of the name, and this relation is credibly the same for my use of' Holmes' as for my function of' Caligula'. But whereas we can tell an obvious story about how' Caligula' got attached to Caligula in the first place, it is less clear how Doyle attached'
 coknterpart theory, however. If we need robosr modan realjsm, then transworld identity of inditiduqls mqy be ensured by overlxpping woglds or bt adipting some form of modal fimeusmonalism. 3) For ppssibilism model fiction, tfexe must be possible worlds containind magic, gjosts, dragons wnd keo[le saking up as beetles or cockroachea. Wideskread essentialism or proliferation of metapjysifal necessities wokld be a priblei for such aczounts of fiction by ljmiting the kinds of stories aughors could cohgxwntpi tell even emong ftories that appear [rima fscie to be cohcrent. I qill assume that if a story can be appatently coharzntly told in which ab ibjecj of dype Q ir dtsccibsd as heiig not-B, thia is at leawt evidence that thtre qre worlds whsre As awe not-Bs. The extent to which even wideskread essentialism is an obsracle may be a functiln of whae commitments our account makes to the metaphysicv of judaoiby. A xojstructivist or ersatzist approach might allor ux no sidestep essenbialist worries evrn cpgsistently wijh acce'fihg a wide range of metaphisical necessityes: yo provide the truth-conditiins for sentvncew in fiction, we nezd the space of eorldx to contain the logicauly (znd analytifally) posakble worlds, but gusn as fictions are free to chande laws oh natbre, fictkons are fwee to susoend metaphysical necesslties tvat are noh also logical or analytical nerxssities and xthll be able to mpdel the semagtic contents pf sentznces zorrectly. Pf x is evsentially ruman, x is hukwn in all mevaphysicajly possuble wofuds, but 'x is npt human' ps not logically or analnticaumy impossible; wz xan construct ot ddscwihe ljcically and dnalhtizslly zonsisttut coflds in which x is not hgman, and stipulate thay bhese are as reledant for our lurposes as the meuaphysmcally possoblg ones. 4) We may, as mentioned abobe, legitilatcly worry abott hiw we can reyer to merely possible objects. To defend possibilism as a nodel of fictional bixcourse, I nxed to say somedhing about referencw, and in the rest of this section I skstch a resplnse to this worry (a complete answer will have to be postponed). Whenever I utter a sentence dontsininc c ncme I stccexd in referring prvsumably in virtue of standing ii the righd fort of relation – perhaps a vajsal-historicau relation – to the introsuction pf the name, and this relation ix plausibly the same for my use if 'Hommes' as foc my use of 'Caligula'. But wkereas we can telp an obvious rtoty about hoa 'Cakiyula' got attached to Caligula in rhe fiesh place, it is levs clear hoa Doylg attachgd '
counterpart theory, however. If we need robust then identity of may be ensured adopting form of modal 3) For possibilism fiction, there must be possible worlds magic, ghosts, dragons and people waking up as beetles or cockroaches. Widespread essentialism proliferation of metaphysical necessities would be a problem for such accounts of fiction limiting kinds stories could coherently tell even among stories that appear prima facie to be coherent. I will assume if a story can be apparently coherently told which an object of A is described as being this at least that are where As are The extent to which even widespread essentialism is an obstacle may be a function of what commitments account makes metaphysics of A or approach might allow sidestep essentialist worries even consistently with range of metaphysical necessities: to provide the truth-conditions sentences in we need the space of worlds contain the logically (and analytically) possible worlds, but as fictions are free to change laws of nature, fictions are free to suspend metaphysical are not also logical analytical necessities and be to the contents of correctly. If x is essentially human, x is human in all possible worlds, but 'x is not human' is not logically impossible; can construct or logically and analytically consistent in x is not human, that are our as metaphysically possible ones. 4) may, as mentioned above, legitimately about how we can To defend possibilism as a model of fictional I need to say something about reference, in the rest of this section I sketch a response to this (a complete have to be postponed). Whenever I utter a containing a name I in referring presumably in virtue of standing in the sort relation – a causal-historical relation to the introduction the name, and is plausibly same my as for my use of 'Caligula'. whereas can tell an obvious story how attached to Caligula in the first place, it is less clear how Doyle attached '
 counterpart theory, however. IF we need robUst moDal ReaLiSm, thEn trAnsworld identiTY of iNdividuals may be ensured By oveRlAPpinG WoRlds oR by adopTInG SOme FoRm Of mOdAL dImensIonAlism. 3) FoR possibiliSm mOdEl fiction, theRE mUst be possiBle Worlds contaiNinG magic, GhOstS, DragoNs aNd peoPle wakINg up as Beetles or CoCKroachES. WidespREAd EsseNtialism or prolifeRAtIOn of metaphysicAl neceSsITiES WouLd bE a problem fOr Such aCCounts oF FiCTIOn bY Limiting the kiNds of storieS AutHors coUlD coHErentlY tell EvEN amOng stories tHat aPpear primA facie TO be coheREnt. I wilL assumE thAt iF a stORy CaN be ApPAreNTlY coHEreNtly told In WhIch an ObjeCT OF Type a is DescRibed As being not-B, thIs iS at lEAst EvideNce thAt thErE are wOrlds wHere AS aRe not-Bs. The extenT to wHich even wIdeSpReaD eSsentIAlism iS an ObsTacle maY be a funCTioN oF WHAt Commitments our accoUnT MAkEs to the mEtaphySIcS oF Modality. a cOnsTrucTIVist oR ersATzIst approAch migHT aLlOw us to sIdEstep eSsEntIalIst woRRies Even coNsistentLy witH Accepting a wide RAnge of metaphySIcAL NeCEssiTieS: to provide tHe trUTh-coNditIOnS foR SenteNces iN fICtIOn, we need the space of wOrLds to cOntaiN the logically (And analytiCALLy) possibLe woRLdS, But just as fictiOns arE free to chaNGe laws of NaturE, fictionS are free tO SUspend meTapHysIcaL neCESsIties that are nOT Also LoGical or AnaLytical NecEssItiEs aNd Still be abLe to modeL tHe SeMaNtiC contENts of senTeNceS cOrrEctly. iF x is esSentiAlly HuMaN, X is Human in ALl METaphYsIcAlly PosSiBle woRlds, BUt 'x Is not huMan' is not lOgiCAlly Or AnAlyticaLly impossible; We Can construCt Or dEscribE LOgically And analytically consisteNT worlds In wHich x Is noT human, and StiPulate ThaT These aRe as reLevanT fOr oUR PurpoSES aS thE mEtaphysicaLLY poSsiblE oNes. 4) WE may, as mEntioned above, legitIMatEly worry about How We caN REfEr tO MeREly PoSSibLE Objects. To defend PossibilisM aS A mOdel of fictIOnaL dIscoursE, I need tO say sOMething About refeRence, and iN tHe reST Of tHis section i sketch a Response tO This wORrY (a comPleTe answEr WilL have To be poSTpoNed). WhEnever i uTter a sEntenCe ContainiNg a name I succeed in referrIng preSumabLy iN virtue of StaNDinG in the rigHt soRt of relatiOn – pErhAps a cAusAL-histOricAL rElaTIon – to The iNTroductioN Of The NAMe, And this relaTION is PlausIblY The samE for My use of 'Holmes' as foR My use of 'CaligulA'. But WHEreAs wE Can tElL an obvious storY abOuT HOw 'CaliguLa' Got attached To CaliguLa IN the fIrst plAce, it iS less clEAR hOW Doyle AttaCheD '
 counterpart theory, howev er. If weneedrob ust  m odal  rea lism, then tra n swor ld identity of individ ualsma y  bee ns uredby over l ap p i ngwo rl dsor by  adop tin g someform of mo dal  d imensionalis m .3) For pos sib ilism modelfic tion,th ere mustbepossi ble wo r lds co ntainingma g ic, gh o sts, dr a g on s an d people waking u p  a s  beetles or co ckroac he s .W i des pre ad essenti al ism o r  prolif e ra t i o n o f  metaphysical  necessitie s  wo uld be  a  pr o blem f or su ch acc ounts of fi ctio n by limi ting t h e kinds of stor ies au tho rscoul d  c oh ere nt l y t e ll  ev e n a mong sto ri es  that  app e a r prim a f acie  to b e coherent. I  wi ll a s sum e tha t ifa st or y can  be ap paren tl y coherently to ld i n which a n o bj ect  o f typ e  A isdes cri bed asbeing n o t-B ,t h i sis at least eviden ce t ha t thereare wo r ld sw here Asar e n ot-B s .  Theexte n tto which  evenw id es pread e ss ential is m i s a n obs t acle  may b e a func tiono f what commitm e nts our accou n tm a ke s  tothe  metaphysic s of moda lity .  A  co n struc tivis to re rsatzist approach m ig ht all ow us  to sidestepessentiali s t worrieseven co n sistently with  acce pting a wi d e rangeof me taphysic al necess i t ies: topro vid e t het r ut h-conditionsf o r se nt ences i n f iction,  we  ne edthe  s pace of w orlds to  c on ta in  th e log i cally (a nd  an al yti cally )  possi ble w orld s,  b u t j ust asf ic t i onsar efree  to  c hange  law s  of  nature , fiction s a r e fr ee  t o suspe nd metaphysic al  necessiti es  th at are n ot alsological or analytical n e cessiti esand s till  be abletomodelthe semant ic con tents  o f s e n tence s co rre ct ly. If x i s ess entia ll y hu man, xis human in all me t aph ysically poss ibl e wo r l ds , b u t' x i sn oth u man' is not log ically oran a ly tically im p oss ib le; wecan con struc t  or des cribe log ically an danal y t ica lly consis tent wor lds in wh i ch xi snot h uma n, and  s tip ulate  thatt hes e are  as re le vant f or ou rpurposes  as the metaphysicallypossib le on es.  4) We ma y,a s m entionedabov e, legitim ate lyworry  ab o ut ho w we ca n r e fer t o me r ely possi b le  ob j e ct s. To defen d p oss ibili sma s a mo delof fictional disc o urse, I need t o sa y som eth i ng a bo ut reference,and  i n the rest  o f this sect ion I sk et c h a r espons e to t his wor r y  ( a  compl eteans wer willhav et o be po st po n ed). W hene ve r I ut ter as ente n c e containing a n ame I s uccee d  in  refe rr ing pre s umab ly in virt ue of stand ing in  the  righ t sortof  relat ion  –  perhaps a causal-hi stori cal rel at ion– t o theintr o d uctio n of  t hename, and t hi s  r el a tio n is  plau si blythe samef or my us e o f  'Holme s'  as f or myu se o f 'Caligul a'.  Butw h ereas we c a n te l la n obv ious s tory a bout ho w  'C al igula'got a ttached t o Caligul a  in  t he f irst pla ce , it  i s l es s clear how Doy le attac hed '
 counterpart_theory, however._If we need robust_modal realism,_then_transworld identity_of_individuals may be_ensured by overlapping_worlds or by adopting_some form of_modal_dimensionalism. 3) For possibilism model fiction, there must be possible worlds containing magic, ghosts,_dragons_and people_waking_up_as beetles or cockroaches. Widespread_essentialism or proliferation of metaphysical_necessities would_be a problem for such accounts of fiction_by_limiting the kinds_of stories authors could coherently tell even among stories_that appear prima facie to be_coherent. I will_assume_that_if a story can_be apparently coherently told in which_an object of type A is_described as being not-B, this is at_least evidence that there are worlds_where As are not-Bs. The_extent to_which even widespread essentialism is_an obstacle may_be a_function of what_commitments our account makes to the_metaphysics of modality._A constructivist or ersatzist approach might_allow_us to sidestep_essentialist_worries_even consistently_with accepting a_wide_range of_metaphysical_necessities: to provide the truth-conditions for_sentences_in fiction, we need the space of_worlds to contain the_logically_(and analytically) possible worlds,_but just as fictions are_free to change laws of nature,_fictions are_free to_suspend metaphysical necessities that are not also logical or analytical necessities_and still be able to model_the semantic contents of_sentences correctly._If_x is essentially_human,_x is_human in all metaphysically possible worlds, but_'x is_not human' is not logically or_analytically impossible; we can_construct_or describe logically and analytically consistent_worlds in which x is not_human, and stipulate that these_are_as_relevant for our purposes as_the metaphysically possible ones. 4) We_may, as mentioned_above, legitimately worry about how we can_refer_to merely possible objects. To defend_possibilism_as a model of fictional discourse,_I_need_to say something about reference,_and in the rest of this_section I sketch a response to this worry (a_complete answer will_have to be postponed). Whenever_I_utter_a sentence containing a name I succeed in referring presumably_in virtue_of standing in_the right sort of relation – perhaps a causal-historical relation_– to the introduction of the name,_and this relation is plausibly the same for my use of_'Holmes' as for my use of 'Caligula'. But_whereas we can tell an obvious story_about how 'Caligula' got_attached_to Caligula in the first place, it_is_less_clear_how Doyle attached_'