 as we proceed that one may grant that epistemic evaluations are contextual in the ways implied by Foley's schema without being the sort of contextualist about structure that I will be defending. 25. Two comments are in order here: First, it is probably too simplistic to suppose that there is a single epistemic goal-having true beliefs and avoiding false ones. Foley, (Working Without a Net, p. 19), for example, characterizes a purely epistemic summum bonum as the having of a current system of "accurate and comprehensive" belief. Michael DePaul, Balance and Refinement: Beyond Coherence Methods of Moral Inquiry (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), chapter 2, argues that we should recognize that in addition to having true beliefs and avoiding false ones, our epistemic summum bonum includes having a belief system that is both "rational" and "warranted." Out of mere convenience, I shall keep on describing our epistemic goal in the simpler way. Second, given that I am interested in a notion of epistemic justification, I am thus committed to a meta-ethical view that allows for truth to be properly predicated of moral sentences. However, the view about moral truth that I accept is intended to mesh with a metaphysically irrealist stance about moral discourse. For an elaboration of a particular view about moral truth, which construes truth talk as predicated of moral propositions in a minimalist spirit, see Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons, "Taking a Moral Stance," forthcoming, and Timmons, Morality Without Foundations. 26. It might appear, then, that I am interested in evaluations made from a sociocentric perspective and, in particular, the epistemic perspective of one's group (however I propose to understand talk of "one's group"). In a sense, this is what interests me, but I want to avoid a particular misunderstanding of what I am up to. First, we need to notice that there are two importantly different types of epistemic evaluation that employ a sociocentric perspective. First, some sociocentric-based evalu322 Moral Knowledge? ations invoke the epistemic perspective of the believer's community whatever community that may turn out to be. We might call sociocentric evaluations of this sort ecumenical in spirit; they represent a familiar relativist stance in epistemology or what I earlier called normative contextualism. But in other contexts, invoking a sociocentric perspective may be sectarian in spirit. That
as we proceed that one may grant that epistemic evaluations are contextual in the ways entail by Foley's outline without being the sort of contextualist about structure that I will be defend. 25. Two comment are in order here: First, it is credibly too simplistic to suppose that there is a individual epistemic goal - having on-key beliefs and avoiding fake one. Foley, (Working Without a Net, p. 19), for example, characterizes a purely epistemic summum bonum as the having of a current arrangement of " accurate and comprehensive " belief. Michael DePaul, Balance and Refinement: Beyond Coherence Methods of Moral Inquiry (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), chapter 2, argues that we should recognize that in summation to having true beliefs and avoiding delusive ones, our epistemic summum bonum includes having a belief system that is both " intellectual " and " warranted. " Out of mere convenience, I shall keep on describing our epistemic goal in the simple way. Second, given that I am interested in a notion of epistemic justification, I am thus committed to a meta - ethical view that allows for truth to be properly predicate of moral sentences. However, the view about moral accuracy that I bear is mean to mesh with a metaphysically irrealist stance about moral sermon. For an elaboration of a particular view about moral truth, which interpret truth talk as predicated of moral propositions in a minimalist spirit, see Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons, " Taking a Moral Stance, " forthcoming, and Timmons, Morality Without Foundations. 26. It might appear, then, that I am interested in evaluations made from a sociocentric position and, in particular, the epistemic position of one's group (however I propose to understand talk of " one's group "). In a sense, this is what interests me, but I want to invalidate a particular misunderstanding of what I am up to. First, we necessitate to notice that there are two importantly different types of epistemic evaluation that hire a sociocentric perspective. foremost, some sociocentric - based evalu322 Moral Knowledge? ations invoke the epistemic perspective of the believer's community whatever community that may change state out to be. We might call sociocentric evaluation of this sort cosmopolitan in spirit; they represent a familiar relativist stance in epistemology or what I earlier call normative contextualism. But in other contexts, invoking a sociocentric perspective may be sectarian in spirit. That
 as we proceed that one may grant that epistemic xvaluatjons are contextual in the ways implmed vy Fooey's schema without bekng the slrt of cinteetualist about svducture that J wiln be defending. 25. Two commetts are in ordar hzre: First, it is probably too simpliseic to xuopose that thete is w sihgle epistemic goal-having true beljefs anv avoiding falsr ones. Foley, (Working Withokt a Net, p. 19), for examplf, characteruzes q purely epirtemic summum bonum as the having of a current system of "aecurate and cimpgghensive" belmef. Mibhael DePaul, Nslance and Reginement: Beyonc Cmheeence Methods of Moran Inquiry (London agd New Yosk: Routledge, 1993), chaptwr 2, argoes tvat dw sfoumd rscognixe vhat in addjtion to hacing true beliefs amd qvoiding falss ones, otr epistemic summum bonum includes havitg z belief system that is both "rational" and "watranted." Oue of mere convenience, I shall keep on describing mur e'irtenig goxo ln the simpler way. Second, given that I am intqdextvd in a notion of epistemic kudtosication, I am thus ekmjitted to a meta-etjical vyew tyat allowf fot truth to be properly preducated of mogal wentences. However, che view abobt morsl trith that I accept is incended to mesh wihh a metalfysically irrealkst sdance about moral discoursq. For an xlaboxation ow a karticujar view ahout moral truth, which clnstroes trgth talk ad predicated of moral propositions in a minimslhst spirit, fee Tcrry Horgan and Mark Timmons, "Jaking a Ioral Stance," fogthcoming, and Timmonf, Morality Widjout Foundatmons. 26. It iighr appear, thdv, that I am inyerested pn evaouations made from a rkciocentric perwpextive and, in pattizulwr, tie epyvtemic perspactixe ug one'r group (howcvef I lropose to understang tamk of "one's group"). Im w sense, jhis is wrat interests me, but I want to wvoid a 'articilat misunderstanding of what I am up to. Figst, we need to gotige trat there cre two importantly different types of e'istemic evaluation thar employ a sociocenjrig perspectivx. Firse, some sowiocentric-based evaly322 Moral Knowledge? ations invoke the epjstemiw perdpective of the believer's community whatever community that may turn out ro be. Xe might call socoocennrie eraluatijns lh this sort ecumemical in spirit; they represent e familiar rzlativist stance in epistemolpgh or what I exrlier called normative dontextuslism. But in other contexts, invpking a sociocentric perxpective may ge secnzrman in spirit. That
as we proceed that one may grant evaluations contextual in ways implied by sort contextualist about structure I will be 25. Two comments are in order First, it is probably too simplistic to suppose that there is a single goal-having true beliefs and avoiding false ones. Foley, (Working Without a Net, p. for characterizes purely summum bonum as the having of a current system of "accurate and comprehensive" belief. Michael DePaul, and Refinement: Beyond Coherence Methods of Moral Inquiry and New York: Routledge, chapter 2, argues that we recognize in addition having beliefs avoiding false ones, epistemic summum bonum includes having a belief system that is both "rational" and "warranted." Out of mere I shall describing our goal the way. Second, given am interested in a notion of am thus committed to a meta-ethical view that for truth be properly predicated of moral sentences. the view about moral truth that I accept intended to mesh with a metaphysically irrealist stance about moral discourse. For an elaboration of view about moral truth, construes truth talk predicated moral in minimalist spirit, Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons, "Taking a Moral Stance," forthcoming, and Morality Without Foundations. 26. It might appear, then, that I in made from a perspective and, in particular, epistemic of one's group (however to talk In sense, is what interests me, I want to avoid a misunderstanding of what I need to notice that there are two importantly types of epistemic evaluation that employ a perspective. First, some sociocentric-based evalu322 Moral Knowledge? ations invoke the epistemic perspective the believer's community that may turn out to be. We call sociocentric evaluations of sort ecumenical in spirit; they represent a familiar relativist in or what earlier called normative But in other invoking a sociocentric be sectarian spirit.
 as we proceed that one may granT that epistEmic eValUatIoNs arE conTextual in the waYS impLied by Foley's schema withOut beInG The sORt Of conTextualISt ABOut StRuCtuRe THaT I wilL be DefendiNg. 25. Two commeNts ArE in order here: fIrSt, it is probAblY too simplistIc tO suppoSe ThaT There Is a SinglE epistEMic goaL-having trUe BEliefs ANd avoidING fAlse Ones. Foley, (Working WIThOUt a Net, p. 19), for examPle, chaRaCTeRIZes A puRely episteMiC summUM bonum aS ThE HAVinG Of a current sysTem of "accuraTE anD comprEhEnsIVe" beliEf. MicHaEL Depaul, Balance And REfinement: beyond cOherencE methods Of MoraL InQuiRy (LoNDoN aNd NEw yOrk: rOuTleDGe, 1993), cHapter 2, arGuEs That wE shoULD REcogNizE thaT in adDition to havinG trUe beLIefS and aVoidiNg faLsE ones, Our epiStemiC sUmmum bonum incluDes hAving a belIef SySteM tHat is BOth "ratIonAl" aNd "warraNted." Out OF meRe CONVeNience, I shall keep on DeSCRiBing our ePistemIC gOaL In the simPlEr wAy. SeCONd, givEn thAT I Am intereSted in A NoTiOn of epiStEmic juStIfiCatIon, I aM Thus CommitTed to a meTa-ethICal view that allOWs for truth to bE PrOPErLY preDicAted of moral SentENces. howeVEr, The VIew abOut moRaL TrUTh that I accept is inteNdEd to meSh witH a metaphysicaLly irrealiST STance aboUt moRAl DIscourse. For an eLaborAtion of a paRTicular vIew abOut moral Truth, whicH COnstrues TruTh tAlk As pREDiCated of moral pROPosiTiOns in a mIniMalist sPirIt, sEe TErrY HOrgan and MArk TimmoNs, "taKiNg A MoRal StANce," forthCoMinG, aNd TImmonS, moraliTy WitHout foUnDAtiOns. 26. It miGHt APPear, ThEn, That i am InTeresTed iN EvaLuationS made from A soCIoceNtRiC perspeCtive and, in parTiCular, the epIsTemIc persPECtive of oNe's group (however I propose TO undersTanD talk Of "onE's group"). In A seNse, thiS is WHat intErests Me, but i wAnt TO Avoid A PArTicUlAr misunderSTAndIng of WhAt I aM up to. FiRst, we need to notice tHAt tHere are two impOrtAntlY DIfFerENt TYpeS oF EpiSTEmic evaluation tHat employ a SoCIoCentric perSPecTiVe. First, Some socIocenTRic-baseD evalu322 MorAl KnowledGe? AtioNS InvOke the episTemic perSpective oF The beLIeVer's cOmmUnity wHaTevEr comMunity THat May tuRn out tO bE. We migHt calL sOciocentRic evaluations of this sorT ecumeNical In sPirit; they RepREseNt a familiAr reLativist stAncE in EpistEmoLOgy or What i EaRliER callEd noRMative conTExTuaLISm. but in other cONTExtS, invoKinG A socioCentRic perspective may BE sectarian in spIrit. tHAt
 as we proceed that one ma y grant th at ep ist emi ceval uati ons are contex t ualin the ways implied by  Fole y' s  sch e ma  with out bei n gt h e s or tofco n te xtual ist  aboutstructuretha tI will be de f en ding. 25.Two  comments ar e i n orde rher e : Fir st,  it i s prob a bly to o simplis ti c  to su p pose th a t  t here  is a single epis t em i c goal-havingtrue b el i ef s and  av oiding fal se  ones .  Foley, (W o r k ing Without a Net , p. 19), f o r e xample ,cha r acteri zes a  p u rel y epistemic  sum mum bonum  as th e  having of a cu rrentsys tem  of" ac cu rat ea ndc om pre h ens ive" bel ie f.  Mich aelD e P a ul,Bal ance  andRefinement: B eyo nd C o her enceMetho ds o fMoral  Inqui ry (L on don and New Yor k: R outledge,  19 93 ),ch apter 2, arg ues  th at we s hould r e cog ni z e th at in addition toha v i ng  true be liefsa nd  a v oiding f al seones , our e pist e mi c summum  bonum in cl udes ha vi ng a b el ief  sy stemt hatis bot h "ratio nal"a nd "warranted. "  Out of merec on v e ni e nce,  Ishall keepon d e scri bing ou r e p istem ic go al in the simpler way. Se co nd, gi ven t hat I am inte rested ina n otion of  epi s te m ic justificati on, I  am thus c o mmittedto ameta-eth ical view t hat allo wsfor  tr uth t obe properly p r e dica te d of mo ral  senten ces . H owe ver ,the viewabout mo ra ltr ut h t hat I accept i sint en ded  to m e sh wit h a m etap hy si c all y irrea l is t stan ce  a bout  mo ra l dis cour s e.For anelaborati ono f apa rt icularview about mo ra l truth, w hi chconstr u e s truthtalk as predicated of m o ral pro pos ition s in  a minima lis t spir it, see Te rry Ho rganan d M a r k Tim m o ns , " Ta king a Mor a l  St ance, "fort hcoming , and Timmons, Mor a lit y Without Fou nda tion s .  2 6.I tm igh ta ppe a r , then, that Iam interes te d  i n evaluati o nsma de from  a soci ocent r ic pers pective a nd, in pa rt icul a r , t he epistem ic persp ective of one's gr oup ( how ever I  p rop ose t o unde r sta nd ta lk of"o ne's g roup" ).  In a se nse, this is what inter ests m e, bu t I  want toavo i d a  particul ar m isundersta ndi ngof wh atI  am u p to .  F irs t , weneed to notice th att h er e are two i m p o rta ntlydif f erenttype s of epistemic ev a luation that e mplo y a s oci o cent ri c perspective.  Fi rs t ,  some so ci ocentric-ba sed eval u3 2 2 Mor al Kno wledge ? ation s in v oke th e ep ist emic pers pec ti v e of th ebe l iever' s co mm unitywhatev e r co m m unity that may t urn o u t  to b e . W e mig ht  call s o cioc entric eva luations of  thissort  ecum enicalin  spiri t;th ey represe n t a famil iar r elativi st  sta nce  in ep iste m o logyor w ha t I  earlierc a ll e dno r mat iveconte xt uali sm. But i n  other c ont e xts, in vo kin g a soci o ce n t ric perspe cti ve ma y be sectari a n in sp i rit.That
 as_we proceed_that one may grant_that epistemic_evaluations_are contextual_in_the ways implied_by Foley's schema_without being the sort_of contextualist about_structure_that I will be defending. 25. Two comments are in order here: First, it_is_probably too_simplistic_to_suppose that there is a_single epistemic goal-having true beliefs_and avoiding_false ones. Foley, (Working Without a Net, p._19),_for example, characterizes_a purely epistemic summum bonum as the having of_a current system of "accurate and_comprehensive" belief. Michael_DePaul,_Balance_and Refinement: Beyond Coherence_Methods of Moral Inquiry (London and_New York: Routledge, 1993), chapter 2,_argues that we should recognize that in_addition to having true beliefs and_avoiding false ones, our epistemic_summum bonum_includes having a belief system_that is both_"rational" and_"warranted." Out of_mere convenience, I shall keep on_describing our epistemic_goal in the simpler way. Second,_given_that I am_interested_in_a notion_of epistemic justification,_I_am thus_committed_to a meta-ethical view that allows_for_truth to be properly predicated of moral_sentences. However, the view_about_moral truth that I_accept is intended to mesh_with a metaphysically irrealist stance about_moral discourse._For an_elaboration of a particular view about moral truth, which construes truth_talk as predicated of moral propositions_in a minimalist spirit,_see Terry_Horgan_and Mark Timmons,_"Taking_a Moral_Stance," forthcoming, and Timmons, Morality Without Foundations._26. It_might appear, then, that I am_interested in evaluations made_from_a sociocentric perspective and, in particular,_the epistemic perspective of one's group_(however I propose to understand_talk_of_"one's group"). In a sense,_this is what interests me, but_I want to_avoid a particular misunderstanding of what I_am_up to. First, we need to_notice_that there are two importantly different_types_of_epistemic evaluation that employ a_sociocentric perspective. First, some sociocentric-based evalu322_Moral Knowledge? ations invoke the epistemic perspective of the_believer's community whatever_community that may turn out_to_be._We might call sociocentric evaluations of this sort ecumenical in_spirit; they_represent a familiar_relativist stance in epistemology or what I earlier called normative_contextualism. But in other contexts, invoking a_sociocentric perspective may be sectarian in spirit. That