 a reason to believe Q. As it stands, (D) does not allow detachment of that sort. It says that believing P gives you a reason to believe Q in a sense, but not in a sense that allows us to say, literally, that if you believe P you have a reason to believe Q. The reason is always relative to your belief in P. Unless it can be detached, it does not determine what you actually have a reason to believe. So unless the reason can be detached, the sense in which believing P gives you a reason to believe Q is decidedly misleading. Detachment requires (E), so we must know whether (E) follows from (D). The following argument shows it does not. Suppose you believe both P and ¬Q. These are inconsistent beliefs, since Q follows from P, but of course you might have inconsistent beliefs. Parallel to (D), we have that B(¬Q) O6 B(¬P) Your belief in P requires you to believe Q, and your belief in ¬Q requires you to believe ¬P. These relative requirements make good sense; it is part of your inconsistent condition that some of your beliefs require you to have beliefs that contradict others of your beliefs. But suppose it was possible to infer (E) from (D). Then we would be able to infer that you have a reason to believe Q and similarly that you have a reason to believe ¬P, both nonrelatively. If you have a reason to believe ¬P, evidently you have a reason not to believe P. So you are supposed to have a reason to believe Q, but this reason is supposed to be derived from your belief in P, which you are supposed to have a reason not to have. This is incredible. If you do not find it immediately incredible, imagine that, apart from their connection with each other, you have no reason to believe P or ¬P, or Q or ¬Q. Then if your belief in P gives you a nonrelative reason to believe Q, you ought to believe Q, because there is no contrary reason. Likewise, if your belief in ¬Q gives you a reason not to believe P, you ought not to believe P. So the claim is that you ought to believe Q, solely because of a belief you ought 7 not to have. This really is incredible. A possible reply is to say that a belief only generates a nonrelative reason if it is consistent with your other beliefs. That is to say,
a reason to believe Q. As it stands, (D) does not leave separation of that sort. It says that believing phosphorus gives you a reason to believe Q in a common sense, but not in a common sense that allows us to say, literally, that if you believe P you have a cause to believe Q. The reason is constantly proportional to your belief in P. Unless it can be detached, it does not settle what you actually have a reason to think. So unless the reason can be detached, the common sense in which believing P gives you a reason to believe Q is decidedly deceptive. Detachment requires (einsteinium), so we must know whether (E) follow from (D). The following argument shows it does not. presuppose you believe both P and ¬Q. These are inconsistent beliefs, since Q follows from P, but of course you might have inconsistent beliefs. Parallel to (D), we suffer that B(¬Q) O6 B(¬P) Your belief in P requires you to think Q, and your impression in ¬Q requires you to believe ¬P. These relative requirements do good sense; it is part of your inconsistent circumstance that some of your beliefs require you to have beliefs that contradict others of your beliefs. But suppose it was possible to infer (E) from (D). Then we would be able to infer that you give birth a rationality to believe Q and similarly that you have a reason to believe ¬P, both nonrelatively. If you have a rationality to believe ¬P, evidently you have a rationality not to believe P. So you are supposed to have a cause to believe Q, but this cause is supposed to be derived from your impression in P, which you are supposed to have a reason not to suffer. This is incredible. If you do not find it immediately incredible, think that, apart from their connection with each other, you have no reason to think P or ¬P, or Q or ¬Q. Then if your belief in P impart you a nonrelative reason to believe Q, you ought to believe Q, because there is no adverse reason. Likewise, if your impression in ¬Q gives you a reason not to believe phosphorus, you ought not to believe P. So the claim is that you ought to believe Q, solely because of a belief you ought 7 not to have. This really is incredible. A possible reply is to say that a impression only generates a nonrelative rationality if it is consistent with your other beliefs. That is to say,
 a geason to believe Q. As iu stands, (D) does not allox detacgment of that sort. It says that belixvint P guves you a reason to bdlieve Q pn a sensw, buu not in a sense vgat allows us bo sav, oiterally, that if you benieve P you haee a reason to believe Q. The reason is wlways tepative to your belpes in I. Mnless it can be detached, it doea not dttermine what you sctually have a reason to helifve. So unless the geason can ve dqrached, the sdnse in whpeh believinf P gives you a reason to beliexe Q ns decidedli jidneading. Detechmenn requires (E), so we muvt know whether (E) folkowv feom (D). The following acgument shows it doef not. Sup[oae you believe borh P ang ¬Q. Dhesd ard ihcpnaistenh bxliefs, sincs Q follows from P, but of courxe jpu might havs incogsystent beliefs. Parallel to (D), we have thdt G(¬Q) O6 B(¬P) Your belief in P requires you to belleve Q, anq your belief in ¬Q requires you to believe ¬P. Thesa reletkve rcquifwmfnts make good sense; it is part of your inconfjsuenn condition that fome of yout hekyefs require iou to kzvs beliefs that conhradict othees of youw bekiefs. But suppose it was powsible to inyer (E) from (D). Then we could be ablz to imfer yhat you have a reason co beljeve Q and dimilarly ghat you have a feaxot to believe ¬P, both nonrelwtively. Ih you have a reaxon to believe ¬P, evidcttly you have a rewson uot tm believe O. So you are supposed to have a reason to beloeee X, but thns reaxon is supposqd to be derivgd from yjur bdlief in P, which bou are suppjsed to have d reason not vo have. Tris us ibcredibud. If you do noy find it immediateoy incredible, imaglne tfzt, apart from tktir connection witn exch onhec, you vave no reasmn tu bdkieve P or ¬P, or W or ¬A. Then if your beliex in P gives you a nontejative rgason to felieve Q, you ought to believe E, beceuse tiere ix nj contrary reason. Likewise, if gour beliff ln ¬Q gives yot a veasjn not to yelieve P, you ought not to believe P. So vhe claim is that you oyght to believe Q, spkely becausx of a belief ymu ought 7 not to havw. This really is lncredible. A possible deply hs to say that a belief only generates a nonrelative reason if it is consistenr with your other gelirfs. Tvac ix to swy,
a reason to believe Q. As it does allow detachment that sort. It you reason to believe in a sense, not in a sense that allows to say, literally, that if you believe P you have a reason to Q. The reason is always relative to your belief in P. Unless it be it not what you actually have a reason to believe. So unless the reason can be detached, the in which believing P gives you a reason believe Q is decidedly Detachment requires (E), so we know (E) follows (D). following shows it does Suppose you believe both P and ¬Q. These are inconsistent beliefs, since Q follows from P, but course you inconsistent beliefs. to we that B(¬Q) O6 belief in P requires you to your belief in ¬Q requires you to believe These relative make good sense; it is part your inconsistent condition that some of your beliefs you to have beliefs that contradict others of your beliefs. But suppose it was possible (E) from (D). Then would be able infer you a to believe and similarly that you have a reason to believe ¬P, both If you have a reason to believe ¬P, evidently you reason to believe P. you are supposed to a to believe Q, but is to your in which you are supposed have a reason not to This is incredible. If immediately incredible, imagine that, apart from their connection each other, you have no reason to P or ¬P, or Q or ¬Q. Then if your belief in gives you reason to believe Q, you ought to believe because there is no reason. Likewise, if your belief in ¬Q gives you reason to believe you ought not believe P. So claim is that to believe solely of ought 7 not to have. This is A possible reply is to that only generates a nonrelative reason if it is consistent with your other beliefs. That is
 a reason to believe Q. As it stanDs, (D) does not Allow DetAchMeNt of That Sort. It says that BElieVing P gives you a reason to BelieVe q In a sENsE, but nOt in a seNSe THAt aLlOwS us To SAy, LiterAllY, that if You believe p yoU hAve a reason to BElIeve Q. The reAsoN is always relAtiVe to yoUr BelIEf in P. unlEss it Can be dETached, It does not DeTErmine WHat you aCTUaLly hAve a reason to belieVE. SO Unless the reasoN can be DeTAcHED, thE seNse in which BeLieviNG P gives YOu A REAsoN To believe Q is dEcidedly misLEadIng. DetAcHmeNT requiRes (E), sO wE MusT know whetheR (E) foLlows from (d). The foLLowing aRGument sHows it DoeS noT. SupPOsE yOu bElIEve BOtH P aND ¬Q. THese are iNcOnSisteNt beLIEFS, sinCe Q FollOws frOm P, but of coursE yoU migHT haVe incOnsisTent BeLiefs. parallEl to (D), We Have that B(¬Q) O6 B(¬P) YoUr beLief in P reQuiReS yoU tO beliEVe Q, and YouR beLief in ¬Q RequireS You To BELIeVe ¬P. These relative reQuIREmEnts make Good seNSe; It IS part of yOuR inConsISTent cOndiTIoN that somE of youR BeLiEfs requIrE you to HaVe bEliEfs thAT conTradicT others oF your BEliefs. But suppoSE it was possiblE To INFeR (e) froM (D). THen we would bE ablE To inFer tHAt You HAve a rEason To BElIEve Q and similarly thaT yOu have A reasOn to believe ¬P, bOth nonrelaTIVEly. If you Have A ReASon to believe ¬P, eVidenTly you have A Reason noT to beLieve P. So You are supPOSed to havE a rEasOn tO beLIEvE Q, but this reasON Is suPpOsed to bE deRived frOm yOur BelIef In p, which you Are suppoSeD tO hAvE a rEason NOt to have. thIs iS iNcrEdiblE. if you dO not fInd iT iMmEDiaTely incREdIBLe, imAgInE thaT, apArT from TheiR ConNection With each oTheR, You hAvE nO reason To believe P or ¬P, Or q or ¬Q. Then if YoUr bElief iN p Gives you A nonrelative reason to belIEve Q, you OugHt to bElieVe Q, becausE thEre is nO coNTrary rEason. LIkewiSe, If yOUR beliEF In ¬q giVeS you a reasoN NOt tO beliEvE P, yoU ought nOt to believe P. So the cLAim Is that you oughT to BeliEVE Q, SolELy BEcaUsE Of a BELief you ought 7 not To have. This ReALlY is incrediBLe. A PoSsible rEply is tO say tHAt a beliEf only genErates a noNrElatIVE reAson if it is ConsisteNt with youR Other BElIefs. THat Is to saY,
 a reason to believe Q. As  it stands , (D)  do esno t al lowdetachment oft hatsort. It says that bel ievin gP  giv e syou a  reason to b eli ev eQ i na  s ense,  bu t not i n a sensetha tallows us to sa y, literal ly,  that if you  be lievePyou havea r eason  to be l ieve Q . The rea so n  is al w ays rel a t iv e to  your belief in P .  U n less it can be  detac he d ,i t  do esnot determ in e wha t  you ac t ua l l y  ha v e a reason to  believe. S o  un less t he  re a son ca n bede t ach ed, the sen se i n which b elievi n g P giv e s you a  reaso n t o b elie v eQisde c ide d ly  mi s lea ding. De ta ch mentrequ i r e s  (E) , s o we  must  know whether  (E ) fo l low s fro m (D) . Th efollo wing a rgume nt  shows it doesnot.  Supposeyou  b eli ev e bot h  P and  ¬Q . T hese ar e incon s ist en t b el iefs, since Q foll ow s fr om P, bu t of c o ur se you migh thav e in c o nsist entb el iefs. Pa rallel to  ( D), weha ve tha tB(¬ Q)O6 B( ¬ P) Y our be lief inP req u ires you to be l ieve Q, and y o ur b el i ef i n ¬ Q requiresyout o be liev e  ¬ P.T heserelat iv e  r e quirements make goo dsense;  it i s part of you r inconsis t e n t condit iont ha t  some of yourbelie fs require you to h ave b eliefs t hat contr a d ict othe rsofyou r b e l ie fs. But suppo s e  itwa s possi ble  to inf er(E)  fr om(D ). Then w e wouldbe  a bl etoinfer that you  h ave  a  re asont o beli eve Q  and  s im i lar ly that yo u have  a  r easo n t obelie ve ¬ P , b oth non relativel y.I f yo uha ve a re ason to belie ve  ¬P, evide nt lyyou ha v e  a reaso n not to believe P. Soy ou aresup posed  tohave a re aso n to b eli e ve Q,but th is re as oni s  supp o s ed  to  b e derivedf r omyourbe lief  in P,which you are supp o sed  to have a re aso n no t to  ha v e. Thi si s i n c redible. If you  do not fi nd it  immediate l y i nc redible , imagi ne th a t, apar t from th eir conne ct ionw i theach other , you ha ve no rea s on to be lieve  Por ¬P,  o r Q  or ¬ Q. The n  if  your  belie fin P g ivesyo u a nonr elative reason to belie ve Q,you o ugh t to beli eve Q,because t here  is no con tra ryreaso n.L ikewi se,i fyou r  beli ef i n  ¬Q gives yo u a r ea son not tob e l iev e P,you oughtnotto believe P. Sot he claim is th at y o u  ou ght to b el ieve Q, solely  be ca u s e of a b el ief you oug ht 7 not  t o  have . This  reall y is in c r ed i ble. A  pos sib le replyisto say tha tab eliefonly  g enerat es a n o nrel a t ive reason if it  is c o n siste n t w ith y ou r other beli efs. Thatis to say,
 a_reason to_believe Q. As it_stands, (D)_does_not allow_detachment_of that sort._It says that_believing P gives you_a reason to_believe_Q in a sense, but not in a sense that allows us to say,_literally,_that if_you_believe_P you have a reason_to believe Q. The reason_is always_relative to your belief in P. Unless it_can_be detached, it_does not determine what you actually have a reason_to believe. So unless the reason_can be detached,_the_sense_in which believing P_gives you a reason to believe_Q is decidedly misleading. Detachment requires_(E), so we must know whether (E)_follows from (D). The following argument_shows it does not. Suppose_you believe_both P and ¬Q. These_are inconsistent beliefs,_since Q_follows from P,_but of course you might have_inconsistent beliefs. Parallel_to (D), we have that B(¬Q)_O6_B(¬P) Your belief_in_P_requires you_to believe Q,_and_your belief_in_¬Q requires you to believe ¬P._These_relative requirements make good sense; it is_part of your inconsistent_condition_that some of your_beliefs require you to have_beliefs that contradict others of your_beliefs. But_suppose it_was possible to infer (E) from (D). Then we would be_able to infer that you have_a reason to believe_Q and_similarly_that you have_a_reason to_believe ¬P, both nonrelatively. If you have_a reason_to believe ¬P, evidently you have_a reason not to_believe_P. So you are supposed to_have a reason to believe Q,_but this reason is supposed_to_be_derived from your belief in_P, which you are supposed to_have a reason_not to have. This is incredible. If_you_do not find it immediately incredible,_imagine_that, apart from their connection with_each_other,_you have no reason to_believe P or ¬P, or Q_or ¬Q. Then if your belief in P gives_you a nonrelative_reason to believe Q, you_ought_to_believe Q, because there is no contrary reason. Likewise, if_your belief_in ¬Q gives_you a reason not to believe P, you ought not_to believe P. So the claim is_that you ought to believe Q, solely because of a belief_you ought 7 not to have. This really_is incredible. A possible reply is to_say that a belief_only_generates a nonrelative reason if it is_consistent_with_your_other beliefs. That_is to say,