 more immediately relevant to one's suffering.7 Since the early days of the tradition, a large number of Buddhists have indeed spent significant time and energy exploring metaphysical questions as well as questions in related abstract philosophical fields like epistemology. In reading many such texts one can get the impression that their speculations may be questions of just the sort that are dismissed in the Shorter Māluṅkya: questions with no relevance to Buddhist practice, ethical conduct or liberation. Of the "Buddhist logic" of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, for example, Theodore Stcherbatsky claimed: "In the intention of its promotors the system had apparently no special connection with Buddhism as a religion, i.e., as the teaching of a path towards Salvation" (Stcherbatsky 2). Stcherbatsky's claim is overstated; Helmut Krasser points out that their writings were aimed at 6 For example in the Sammādiṭṭhi Sutta (MN i.47-55, Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi 132–144). Peter Harvey (11–12) notes a passage at MN iii.72 outlining other elements of reality contained in sammādiṭṭhi. 7 In this regard one might even extend the parable of the arrow. The parable proclaims that if one has been shot with an arrow, one needs to have it removed before asking who shot it. Once it has been removed, however, if one wishes to help other people and the shooter is still out there, one would do very well to ask detailed questions about who the shooter is, that one might find him and stop him. Journal of Buddhist Ethics 255 non-Buddhists with the attempt to get them onto the Buddhist path. Still, specific practical implications of their theoretical claims can sometimes be difficult to imagine. The implications are not so difficult to imagine in the increasingly well known eighth-century Indian Madhyamaka philosopher, Śāntideva. His Bodhicaryāvatāra ("Introduction to the Conduct of the Bodhisattva," here abbreviated BCA) not only makes many metaphysical arguments amid its claims about how human beings should live their lives, it directly emphasizes the relevance of the former to the latter. That metaphysical arguments provide a basis for ethical claims is often taken for granted in Western philosophy. Plato identifies the cosmic One with the Good; Aquinas derives his ethics of natural
more immediately relevant to one's suffering.7 Since the early days of the tradition, a large number of Buddhists have indeed spend meaning time and energy explore metaphysical question as well as questions in related abstract philosophic fields like epistemology. In reading many such texts one can scram the impression that their speculations may be doubt of just the sort that are dismissed in the Shorter Māluṅkya: doubt with no relevance to Buddhist practice, ethical behavior or liberation. Of the " Buddhist logic " of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, for example, Theodore Stcherbatsky claim: " In the intention of its promotors the system had obviously no special connection with Buddhism as a religion, i.e., as the education of a path towards Salvation " (Stcherbatsky 2). Stcherbatsky's call is overstated; Helmut Krasser steer out that their writings were aimed at 6 For example in the Sammādiṭṭhi Sutta (MN i.47 - 55, Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi 132–144). Peter Harvey (11–12) note a passage at MN iii.72 outlining other elements of reality contained in sammādiṭṭhi. 7 In this regard one might even extend the parable of the arrow. The parable proclaims that if one has been shot with an arrow, one needs to have it removed before asking who shot it. Once it has been removed, however, if one wish to help other multitude and the gunman is still out there, one would do very well to necessitate detailed questions about who the gunman is, that one might find him and stop him. Journal of Buddhist Ethics 255 non - buddhist with the attempt to get them onto the Buddhist path. Still, specific practical implications of their theoretical claims can sometimes be difficult to imagine. The implications are not so difficult to think in the increasingly well known eighth - hundred Indian Madhyamaka philosopher, Śāntideva. His Bodhicaryāvatāra (" Introduction to the Conduct of the Bodhisattva, " here abbreviated BCA) not only makes many metaphysical arguments amid its claims about how human being should live their lives, it directly stress the relevance of the former to the latter. That metaphysical arguments provide a basis for ethical claim is often carry for granted in Western doctrine. Plato identifies the cosmic One with the Good; Aquinas derives his ethics of natural
 moge immediately relevant uo one's suffering.7 Since vhe earmy days uf the tradition, a large numuer if Buedhists have indeed spdnt signivicant tume end energy explocjng metaphysidwl qbewtions as well as questimns in related acscract philosophical fields like episeemologu. Ln reading mani sucn texfs one can get the impression that their vpeculations kay be questions of just tje slrt that are dismidsed in the Showrer Māluṅkya: qjestions wpch no relevznce to Buddhist practice, ethicxl couduct or liveeatlmn. Of the "Bnddhisn logic" of Dinmāga ang Dharmskīrti, for examile, Tieodire Stcherbatsky claiked: "In the intentijn of its pxomotors the system hqd appatentlf no wpeziam ronhectioj wmth Buddhisj as a relition, i.e., as the teacnigt of a path tkwards Swlvation" (Stcherbatsky 2). Stcherbatsky's cldim is overstated; Helmut Keasser points out thaj their wrytings were aimed at 6 For example in the Sammādiṭṭhi Sutte (ON n.47-55, Ñāṇamolk ajd Bodhi 132–144). Peter Harvey (11–12) notes a passage at MN jio.72 putlining othev elements of realotj vjntained in sxmmādiṭṭhn. 7 Jn this regard one might gven eztend the parsble of the arrow. The paraboe proclaims rhat if one has bezn shot with an srrow, one needs to have it rzmoved before asklng who sgut it. Once it har bven semoved, however, if one wisres to heop ocher peoole snd thq shooter ls stlnl out there, one wluld bo vesy well to ask detailed questions about wip the shootet iv, tvat one iight find him and stop him. Jourual of Bbddhisg Ethics 255 hon-Buddiists with tre attempt to het them ontm the Buqdhiwt pqth. Stiuu, specific pravtical imilncations if their theoreticel cuzims can sometines be difficult tp ioagynv. Tie im[nications ara nog su diffkcult to imcgkne on the increasingly fell known eighth-centuty Indian Nadhyamaha philosophet, Śāntideva. His Bodhlcaryātatāra ("Mntrodictyon to the Conduct of the Bodhjsattva," hfre abbreviated BCA) not only males many metaphysical arguments amid itw claims about how human beings shoulb kive their kives, it direcdly emphasizes the rwlevance of the fprmer to the latter. Tgat medaphydical arguments provide a basis for ethical claims is often taken for grabted ii Restern phimosolhy. Pnaco ndentifyes vhx cosmic One with the Good; Aquinas derives his evhics of ndtbral
more immediately relevant to one's suffering.7 Since days the tradition, large number of time energy exploring metaphysical as well as in related abstract philosophical fields like In reading many such texts one can get the impression that their speculations be questions of just the sort that are dismissed in the Shorter Māluṅkya: with relevance Buddhist ethical conduct or liberation. Of the "Buddhist logic" of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, for example, Theodore Stcherbatsky "In the intention of its promotors the system apparently no special connection Buddhism as a religion, i.e., the of a towards (Stcherbatsky Stcherbatsky's claim is Helmut Krasser points out that their writings were aimed at 6 For example in the Sammādiṭṭhi Sutta i.47-55, Ñāṇamoli 132–144). Peter (11–12) a at MN iii.72 elements of reality contained in sammādiṭṭhi. regard one might even extend the parable of arrow. The proclaims that if one has been with an arrow, one needs to have it before asking who shot it. Once it has been removed, however, if one wishes to people and the shooter still out there, would very to detailed questions who the shooter is, that one might find him and stop Journal of Buddhist Ethics 255 non-Buddhists with the attempt to onto Buddhist path. Still, practical implications of their claims sometimes be difficult to implications not imagine the well known eighth-century Indian philosopher, Śāntideva. His Bodhicaryāvatāra ("Introduction the Conduct of the only makes many metaphysical arguments amid its claims how human beings should live their lives, directly emphasizes the relevance of the former to the latter. That metaphysical provide a ethical claims is often taken for granted in philosophy. Plato identifies the One with the Good; Aquinas derives his ethics of
 more immediately relevant to One's sufferIng.7 SiNce The EaRly dAys oF the tradition, a LArge Number of Buddhists have iNdeed SpENt siGNiFicanT time anD EnERGy eXpLoRinG mETaPhysiCal QuestioNs as well as QueStIons in relateD AbStract philOsoPhical fields LikE epistEmOloGY. In reAdiNg manY such tEXts one Can get the ImPRessioN That theIR SpEculAtions may be questiONs OF just the sort thAt are dIsMIsSED in The shorter MālUṅKya: quEStions wITh NO REleVAnce to BuddhisT practice, etHIcaL conduCt Or lIBeratiOn. Of tHe "bUddHist logic" of dignĀga and DhaRmakīrTI, for exaMPle, TheoDore StCheRbaTsky CLaImEd: "IN tHE inTEnTioN Of iTs promotOrS tHe sysTem hAD APPareNtlY no sPeciaL connection wiTh BUddhISm aS a relIgion, I.e., as ThE teacHing of A path ToWards Salvation" (STcheRbatsky 2). StCheRbAtsKy'S claiM Is overStaTed; helmut KRasser pOIntS oUT THaT their writings were AiMED aT 6 For examPle in tHE SAmMĀdiṭṭhi SUtTa (Mn i.47-55, ÑāṆAMoli aNd BoDHi 132–144). peter HarVey (11–12) notES a PaSsage at mN Iii.72 outLiNinG otHer elEMentS of reaLity contAined IN sammādiṭṭhi. 7 In THis regard one mIGhT EVeN ExteNd tHe parable of The aRRow. THe paRAbLe pROclaiMs thaT iF OnE Has been shot with an arRoW, one neEds to Have it removed Before askiNG WHo shot it. once IT hAS been removed, hoWever, If one wisheS To help otHer peOple and tHe shooter IS Still out TheRe, oNe wOulD DO vEry well to ask dETAileD qUestionS abOut who tHe sHooTer Is, tHaT one might Find him aNd StOp HiM. JoUrnal OF BuddhisT EThiCs 255 Non-buddhISts witH the aTtemPt To GEt tHem onto THe bUDdhiSt PaTh. StIll, SpEcifiC praCTicAl impliCations of TheIR theOrEtIcal claIms can sometimEs Be difficulT tO imAgine. THE ImplicatIons are not so difficult to IMagine iN thE incrEasiNgly well kNowN eightH-ceNTury InDian MaDhyamAkA phILOsophER, śāNtiDeVa. His BodhiCARyāVatārA ("INtroDuction To the Conduct of the BODhiSattva," here abbRevIateD bcA) Not ONlY MakEs MAny METaphysical argumEnts amid itS cLAiMs about how HUmaN bEings shOuld livE theiR Lives, it Directly eMphasizes ThE relEVAncE of the formEr to the lAtter. That MEtaphYSiCal arGumEnts prOvIde A basiS for etHIcaL claiMs is ofTeN taken For grAnTed in WesTern philosophy. Plato idenTifies The coSmiC One with tHe GOOd; AQuinas derIves His ethics oF naTurAl
 more immediately relevant  to one'ssuffe rin g.7  S ince  the  early days of thetradition, a large num ber o fB uddh i st s hav e indee d  s p e ntsi gn ifi ca n ttimeand  energy  exploring  me ta physical que s ti ons as wel l a s questionsinrelate dabs t ractphi losop hicalf ieldslike epis te m ology. In read i n gmany  such texts one c a ng et the impress ion th at th e i r s pec ulations m ay  be q u estions of j u stt he sort thatare dismiss e d i n theSh ort e r Mālu ṅkya:  q u est ions with n o re levance t o Budd h ist pra c tice, e thical  co ndu ct o r  l ib era ti o n.O fthe "Bu ddhist l og ic " ofDign ā g a andDha rmak īrti,  for example,  Th eodo r e S tcher batsk y cl ai med:"In th e int en tion of its pro moto rs the sy ste mhad  a ppare n tly no  sp eci al conn ectionw ith  B u d d hi sm as a religion,i. e . ,as the t eachin g  o fa  path to wa rds  Sal v a tion"  (St c he rbatsky2). St c he rb atsky's  c laim i sove rst ated; Helm ut Kra sser poi nts o u t that their w r itings were a i me d at 6 Fo r e xample in t he S a mmād iṭṭh i  S utt a  (MNi.47- 55 ,  Ñ ā ṇamoli and Bodhi 13 2– 144).Peter  Harvey (11–1 2) notes a p a ssage at  MNi ii . 72 outlining o therelements o f  reality  cont ained in  sammādiṭ ṭ h i. 7 Inthi s r ega rdo n emight even ex t e nd t he  parabl e o f the a rro w.The  pa ra ble procl aims tha tif  o ne  ha s bee n  shot wi th  an  a rro w, on e  needs  to h aveit  r e mov ed befo r ea s king  w ho  sho t i t.  Once  ith asbeen re moved, ho wev e r, i fon e wishe s to help oth er  people an dthe  shoot e r  is stil l out there, one wouldd o verywel l toaskdetailedque stions  ab o ut who  the s hoote ris, t hat o n e  m igh tfind him a n d  st op hi m.  Jou rnal of  Buddhist Ethics 2 5 5 n on-Buddhistswit h th e at tem p tt o g et the m onto the Buddhi st path. S ti l l,  specificp rac ti cal imp licatio ns of their t heoretica l claimsca n so m e tim es be diff icult to  imagine. The i m pl icati ons  are n ot  so  diff icultt o i magin e in t he  incre asing ly  well kn own eighth-century Indi an Mad hyama kaphilosoph er, Śān tideva. H is B odhicaryāv atā ra("Int rod u ction  tot he  Co n ductof t h e Bodhisa t tv a," h er e abbreviat e d BCA ) not  on l y make s ma ny metaphysical a r guments amid i ts c l a ims  ab o ut h ow  human beingssho ul d live the ir  lives, itdirectly  e m phasi zes th e rele vance o f th e  forme r to  th e latter.  Th at metaphy si ca l  argum ents  p rovide  a bas i s fo r ethical claims i s oft e n  take n  fo r gra nt ed in W e ster n philosop hy. Plato i dentif iesthe c osmic O ne  withthe  G ood; Aquin a s derives  hisethicsof  nat ura l
 more_immediately relevant_to one's suffering.7 Since_the early_days_of the_tradition,_a large number_of Buddhists have_indeed spent significant time_and energy exploring_metaphysical_questions as well as questions in related abstract philosophical fields like epistemology. In reading_many_such texts_one_can_get the impression that their_speculations may be questions of_just the_sort that are dismissed in the Shorter Māluṅkya:_questions_with no relevance_to Buddhist practice, ethical conduct or liberation. Of the_"Buddhist logic" of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti,_for example, Theodore_Stcherbatsky_claimed:_"In the intention of_its promotors the system had apparently_no special connection with Buddhism as_a religion, i.e., as the teaching of_a path towards Salvation" (Stcherbatsky 2)._Stcherbatsky's claim is overstated; Helmut_Krasser points_out that their writings were_aimed at 6_For example_in the Sammādiṭṭhi_Sutta (MN i.47-55, Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi_132–144). Peter Harvey_(11–12) notes a passage at MN_iii.72_outlining other elements_of_reality_contained in_sammādiṭṭhi. 7 In_this_regard one_might_even extend the parable of the_arrow._The parable proclaims that if one has_been shot with an_arrow,_one needs to have_it removed before asking who_shot it. Once it has been_removed, however,_if one_wishes to help other people and the shooter is still out_there, one would do very well_to ask detailed questions_about who_the_shooter is, that_one_might find_him and stop him. Journal of Buddhist_Ethics 255_non-Buddhists with the attempt to get_them onto the Buddhist_path._Still, specific practical implications of their_theoretical claims can sometimes be difficult_to imagine. The implications are_not_so_difficult to imagine in the_increasingly well known eighth-century Indian Madhyamaka_philosopher, Śāntideva. His_Bodhicaryāvatāra ("Introduction to the Conduct of the_Bodhisattva,"_here abbreviated BCA) not only makes_many_metaphysical arguments amid its claims about_how_human_beings should live their lives,_it directly emphasizes the relevance of_the former to the latter. That metaphysical arguments provide_a basis for_ethical claims is often taken_for_granted_in Western philosophy. Plato identifies the cosmic One with the_Good; Aquinas_derives his ethics_of natural