 in one's moral outlook. 54. Harold Brown, Rationality (London and New York: Routledge, 1988), 137. This same theme is stressed by Hilary Putnam, Reason, Truth and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), in connection with explaining the success of science. He points out that attempts to formalize scientific method have not worked and are not going to work, and so we should get over what he calls "method fetishism" in trying to make sense of scientific rationality. Rather, according to Putnam, scientists work with a set of nonalgorithmic, informal "maxims" that require "informal rationality, i.e., intelligence and common sense, to apply" (p. 195). 55. Dreyfus and Dreyfus, "What is Morality?" p. 252. 56. Of course, there is much to say about moral judgment and what makes such judgment good judgment even if it is not rule-governed. Space does not permit treatment of this topic here, but the importance of exemplars (mentioned above in describing a moral outlook) figures importantly here. Good moral judgment is judgment that one would expect the moral experts to make. This is the sort of story we find in Brown, Rationality, and in Dreyfus and Dreyfus, "What is Morality?," which, as the Dreyfus brothers point out, is circular, but (they claim) not viciously so. 57. Here, the claim that descriptive work in the sciences should influence epistemological theorizing represents a so-called naturalized approach to epistemology, one that insists that sound epistemological theorizing must draw on relevant work in the sciences. See, for example, Hilary Kornblith, "Introduction: What Is Naturalistic Epistemology?" in Naturalizing Epistemology, 2d ed., ed. Hilary Kornblith (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), 1-14. 58. See Gilbert Harman, Change in View (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1986), chapter 2, and "Positive versus Negative Undermining in Belief Revision," in A Contextualist Moral Epistemology 325 Naturalizing Epistemology, ed. Kornblith, for this sort of complaint aimed at foundationalism; and see Henderson, "Epistemic Competence and Contextualist Epistemology," for
in one's moral outlook. 54. Harold Brown, Rationality (London and New York: Routledge, 1988), 137. This same theme is stressed by Hilary Putnam, Reason, accuracy and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), in association with explaining the success of skill. He points out that undertake to formalize scientific method have not work and are not going to work, and thus we should get over what he calls " method acting fetishism " in trying to make sense of scientific rationality. Rather, harmonize to Putnam, scientists work with a set of nonalgorithmic, informal " maxims " that necessitate " informal rationality, i.e., intelligence and common common sense, to apply " (p. 195). 55. Dreyfus and Dreyfus, " What is Morality? " p. 252. 56. Of naturally, there is much to pronounce about moral judgment and what induce such judgment good judgment even if it is not dominion - governed. Space does not permit treatment of this topic here, but the importance of exemplars (mentioned above in describing a moral outlook) figures importantly here. Good moral judgment is judgment that one would expect the moral experts to make. This is the sort of narrative we find in Brown, Rationality, and in Dreyfus and Dreyfus, " What is Morality? , " which, as the Dreyfus buddy sharpen out, is circular, but (they claim) not viciously so. 57. Here, the title that descriptive work in the sciences should influence epistemological theorizing constitute a so - called naturalized approach to epistemology, one that insists that sound epistemic theorizing must draw on relevant work in the sciences. See, for example, Hilary Kornblith, " Introduction: What Is Naturalistic Epistemology? " in Naturalizing Epistemology, 2d ed. , ed. Hilary Kornblith (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), 1 - 14. 58. interpret Gilbert Harman, Change in View (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1986), chapter 2, and " Positive versus Negative Undermining in Belief Revision, " in A Contextualist Moral Epistemology 325 Naturalizing Epistemology, ed. Kornblith, for this sort of complaint aimed at foundationalism; and determine Henderson, " Epistemic Competence and Contextualist Epistemology, " for
 in one's moral outlook. 54. Haruld Brown, Ratiouqlity (Nondon and New York: Routledge, 1988), 137. This same vhemw is wtressed by Hilary Putvam, Reasoj, Truth qnd Iistory (Cambridgx: Cambridge Unjyersicy Press, 1981), in conkection witv explaining tve sbccess of science. He points out that attempys to formalize fciemeifid method have not worked and are nkt goinj to work, and sp we should get over what je cwlls "method fetishlsm" in tryibg tj make sense uf scientific rationaljty. Rather, according to Putnam, rciencists work qirh w set of nonelgorinhmic, informal "maxims" that rrquire "informak retiobality, i.e., intelligencx and common sense, tj apply" (p. 195). 55. Dreyfus and Dreyduw, "Whaj is Korauuty?" p. 252. 56. Pf coursf, tiere is mucg to say abiut moral judgment snq what makes shch juqgient good judgment even if it is not rune-gkverned. Space does not permit treatment of tjis topic here, but the importance of exemplars (mentioned atove mn dewcvibivt w moral outlook) figures importantly here. Good jotak judgment is mudgment that one eoklc expect the mural erledts to make. This id the sjrt od story wt finc in Brown, Rationality, and un Dreyfus aud Ereyfus, "What is Moxality?," which, as jhe Drryfus brothers point ouc, is cjrcular, but (they clajo) not viciously ro. 57. Hare, the claim that descripeive work in che scievces shoulq influencf epistemological theorixing tepresants a so-cwlled naturalized approach to e'mstemology, ong tvat insists that sound episteiological theotizing muft drxw on relenant work in the sciqnces. See, for gxample, Hilarb Kornblieh, "Ibtroeuction: Dhat Is Naturakistic Eppsuemology?" ib Naturalizing Epixteoklogy, 2d ed., ed. Hnuqry Kornblith (Csmbfidde, Mess.: Hwsvard Univervity Prdxs, 1994), 1-14. 58. See Gilberb Hxrmam, Change in View (Camtridfe, Mass.: The MIT Prrsf, 1986), chaptgr 2, and "Pjsitive versux Negative Undermijing mn Belmef Refisyon," in A Contextualist Moral Elistemolohy 325 Naturalizind Eplsteiology, ed. Lornblith, for this sort of complaint ained at foundationaoism; and see Henderxpn, "Epistemir Compqtence ang Contextualist Episremology," for
in one's moral outlook. 54. Harold Brown, and York: Routledge, 137. This same Putnam, Truth and History Cambridge University Press, in connection with explaining the success science. He points out that attempts to formalize scientific method have not worked are not going to work, and so we should get over what he "method in to sense of scientific rationality. Rather, according to Putnam, scientists work with a set of nonalgorithmic, informal that require "informal rationality, i.e., intelligence and common to apply" (p. 195). Dreyfus and Dreyfus, "What is p. 56. Of there much say about moral and what makes such judgment good judgment even if it is not rule-governed. Space does not permit of this but the of (mentioned in describing a figures importantly here. Good moral judgment one would expect the moral experts to make. is the of story we find in Brown, and in Dreyfus and Dreyfus, "What is Morality?," as the Dreyfus brothers point out, is circular, but (they claim) not viciously so. 57. claim that descriptive work the sciences should epistemological represents so-called approach to one that insists that sound epistemological theorizing must draw on relevant in the sciences. See, for example, Hilary Kornblith, "Introduction: What Epistemology?" Naturalizing Epistemology, 2d ed. Hilary Kornblith (Cambridge, Harvard Press, 1994), 1-14. 58. Harman, in The Press, chapter 2, and "Positive Negative Undermining in Belief Revision," A Contextualist Moral Epistemology for this sort of complaint aimed at foundationalism; see Henderson, "Epistemic Competence and Contextualist Epistemology,"
 in one's moral outlook. 54. Harold BRown, RationAlity (lonDon AnD New york: routledge, 1988), 137. This sAMe thEme is stressed by Hilary PUtnam, reASon, TRUtH and HIstory (CAMbRIDge: caMbRidGe uNiVersiTy PRess, 1981), in cOnnection wIth ExPlaining the sUCcEss of scienCe. HE points out thAt aTtemptS tO foRMalizE scIentiFic metHOd have Not worked AnD Are not GOing to wORK, aNd so We should get over whAT hE Calls "method fetIshism" In TRyING to MakE sense of scIeNtifiC RationaLItY. rATheR, According to PuTnam, scientiSTs wOrk witH a Set OF nonalGoritHmIC, inFormal "maximS" thaT require "iNformaL RationaLIty, i.e., inTelligEncE anD comMOn SeNse, To APplY" (P. 195). 55. DReyFUs aNd DreyfuS, "WHaT is MoRaliTY?" P. 252. 56. oF couRse, TherE is muCh to say about mOraL judGMenT and wHat maKes sUcH judgMent goOd judGmEnt even if it is noT rulE-governed. spaCe DoeS nOt perMIt treaTmeNt oF this toPic here, BUt tHe IMPOrTance of exemplars (meNtIONeD above in DescriBInG a MOral outlOoK) fiGureS IMportAntlY HeRe. Good moRal judGMeNt Is judgmEnT that oNe WouLd eXpect THe moRal expErts to maKe. ThiS Is the sort of stoRY we find in BrowN, raTIOnALity, And In Dreyfus anD DreYFus, "WHat iS moRalITy?," whiCh, as tHe dReYFus brothers point out, Is CirculAr, but (They claim) not vIciously so. 57. hERE, the claiM thaT DeSCriptive work in The scIences shouLD influenCe epiStemologIcal theorIZIng repreSenTs a So-cAllED NaTuralized apprOACh to EpIstemolOgy, One that InsIstS thAt sOuNd epistemOlogical ThEoRiZiNg mUst drAW on relevAnT woRk In tHe sciENces. SeE, for eXampLe, hiLAry kornbliTH, "INTRoduCtIoN: WhaT Is naTuralIstiC epiStemoloGy?" in NaturAliZIng EPiStEmology, 2D ed., ed. Hilary KoRnBlith (CambrIdGe, MAss.: HarVARd UniverSity Press, 1994), 1-14. 58. See Gilbert HarmAN, Change In VIew (CaMbriDge, Mass.: ThE MIt Press, 1986), ChaPTer 2, and "positiVe verSuS NeGATive UNDErMinInG in Belief REVIsiOn," in A coNtexTualist moral Epistemology 325 NATurAlizing EpisteMolOgy, eD. kOrNblITh, FOr tHiS SorT OF complaint aimed At foundatiOnALiSm; and see HeNDerSoN, "EpisteMic CompEtencE And ContExtualist epistemolOgY," for
 in one's moral outlook. 5 4. HaroldBrown , R ati on alit y (L ondon and NewY ork:  Routledge, 1988), 137 . Thi ss amet he me is  stress e db y  Hi la ry  Pu tn a m,  Reas on,  Truthand Histor y ( Ca mbridge: Cam b ri dge Univer sit y Press, 198 1),  in co nn ect i on wi thexpla iningt he suc cess of s ci e nce. H e  points o ut  tha t attempts to for m al i ze scientificmethod  h a ve n otwor ked and ar enot g o ing tow or k , and so we shouldget over wh a t h e call s"me t hod fe tishi sm "  in  trying tomake  sense of  scien t ific ra t ionalit y. Rat her , a ccor d in gtoPu t nam ,  s cie n tis ts workwi th  a se t of n o n algo rit hmic , inf ormal "maxims " t hatr equ ire " infor malra tiona lity,i.e.,  i ntelligence and  com mon sense , t oapp ly " (p. 195).55.  Dr eyfus a nd Drey f us,  " W h a tis Morality?" p. 2 52 . 56 . Of cou rse, t h er ei s much t osay  abo u t  mora l ju d gm ent andwhat m a ke ssuch ju dg ment g oo d j udg mente venif itis not r ule-g o verned. Spaced oes not permi t  t r e at m entofthis topichere ,  but  the im por t anceof ex em p la r s (mentioned abovein  descr ibing  a moral outl ook) figur e s importan tlyh er e . Good moral j udgme nt is judg m ent that  onewould ex pect them o ral expe rts  to  ma ke. T hi s is the sort o f st or y we fi ndin Brow n,Rat ion ali ty , and inDreyfusan dDr ey fus , "Wh a t is Mor al ity ?, " w hich, as the  Drey fusbr ot h ers  pointo ut , is c ir cu lar,  bu t(they  cla i m)not vic iously so . 5 7 . He re ,the cla im that descr ip tive workin  th e scie n c es shoul d influence epistemolog i cal the ori zingrepr esents aso- called  na t uraliz ed app roach  t o e p i stemo l o gy , o ne  that insi s t s t hat s ou nd e pistemo logical theorizing mus t draw on rel eva nt w o r kint he sci en c es. S ee, for example , Hilary K or n bl ith, "Intr o duc ti on: Wha t Is Na tural i stic Ep istemolog y?" in Na tu rali z i ngEpistemolo gy, 2d e d., ed. H i laryK or nblit h ( Cambri dg e,Mass. : Harv a rdUnive rsityPr ess, 1 994),  1 -14. 58.  See Gilbert Harman, Ch ange i n Vie w ( Cambridge , M a ss. : The MIT  Pre ss, 1986),  ch apt er 2,  an d  "Pos itiv e  v ers u s Neg ativ e  Undermin i ng  in B el ief Revisio n , "  in  A Co nte x tualis t Mo ral Epistemology3 25 Naturalizin g Ep i s tem olo g y, e d.  Kornblith, fo r t hi s sort ofco mplaint aim ed at fo un d ation alism;  and s ee Hend e r so n , "Epi stem icCompetenc e a nd Context ua li s t Epis temo lo gy," f or
 in_one's moral_outlook. 54. Harold Brown,_Rationality (London_and_New York:_Routledge,_1988), 137. This_same theme is_stressed by Hilary Putnam,_Reason, Truth and_History_(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), in connection with explaining the success of science. He_points_out that_attempts_to_formalize scientific method have not_worked and are not going_to work,_and so we should get over what he_calls_"method fetishism" in_trying to make sense of scientific rationality. Rather, according_to Putnam, scientists work with a_set of nonalgorithmic,_informal_"maxims"_that require "informal rationality,_i.e., intelligence and common sense, to_apply" (p. 195). 55. Dreyfus and_Dreyfus, "What is Morality?" p. 252. 56._Of course, there is much to_say about moral judgment and_what makes_such judgment good judgment even_if it is_not rule-governed._Space does not_permit treatment of this topic here,_but the importance_of exemplars (mentioned above in describing_a_moral outlook) figures_importantly_here._Good moral_judgment is judgment_that_one would_expect_the moral experts to make. This_is_the sort of story we find in_Brown, Rationality, and in_Dreyfus_and Dreyfus, "What is_Morality?," which, as the Dreyfus_brothers point out, is circular, but_(they claim)_not viciously_so. 57. Here, the claim that descriptive work in the sciences_should influence epistemological theorizing represents a_so-called naturalized approach to_epistemology, one_that_insists that sound_epistemological_theorizing must_draw on relevant work in the sciences._See, for_example, Hilary Kornblith, "Introduction: What Is_Naturalistic Epistemology?" in Naturalizing_Epistemology,_2d ed., ed. Hilary Kornblith (Cambridge,_Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), 1-14._58. See Gilbert Harman, Change_in_View_(Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press,_1986), chapter 2, and "Positive versus_Negative Undermining in_Belief Revision," in A Contextualist Moral Epistemology_325_Naturalizing Epistemology, ed. Kornblith, for this_sort_of complaint aimed at foundationalism; and_see_Henderson,_"Epistemic Competence and Contextualist Epistemology,"_for