 that the abstracting process yields no hint synonymy at other levels than the one I proposed. One point I do need to grant to this objection: while I have arguments why we are not led by my proposal to thinking that "I" and "today" are synonyms, I have no arguments for the claim that this is the only notion of synonymy other than the traditional one. I see this as an advantage. If there turn out to be other kinds of expressions whose meanings pose other synonymy-related problems, it might turn out that some other kinds of abstraction would be good guides to synonymy. 6 Other Proposed Solutions As with any inconsistent triad, there are several ways to solve the problem of synonymy between token-reflexive expressions. In this section, I will discuss other proposed solutions. Since the issue has mainly arisen in discussions of indexicals, most purported solutions are meant to apply to them. I think of token-reflexivity as a unified phenomenon, and thus will demand of any theory that it count ζ and η as synonymous. 6.1 No Synonymy One option is to reject (C), and claim that there are no synonymous token-reflexive expressions. This will come naturally to someone like Goodman (1949) or Montague (1970, p. 382), who argued that no two expressions are ever synonymous because they are not always intersubstitutable in propositional attitude contexts, or to someone like Quine (1953), who rejected the notion of synonymy altogether. Global skepticism about synonymy is too big an issue for this paper to consider fully. The scope of this paper is quite limited; and, if there are to be any expressions that 15This would make them automatic indexicals in the sense of Perry (2001). 16 are synonymous, "I" and "je" would be prime examples (as would ζ and η). So I leave this reaction aside here. The other kind of reason to reject (C) depends not on objections to synonymy in general, but on some special features of token-reflexivity. Thus Zimmermann (1997, p. 147), working with a truth-conditional account of meaning: No two sentences are uttered in precisely the same (possible) situations and hence they cannot have the same truth conditions: the truth conditions of either one are only defined in its contexts of utterance. The issue raised here is that the meanings of token-reflexive expressions are given in terms of
that the abstracting process yields no hint synonymy at early degree than the one I proposed. One point I do necessitate to award to this objection: while I have argument why we are not precede by my proposal to think that " I " and " today " are synonyms, I have no arguments for the call that this is the only notion of synonymy early than the traditional one. I see this as an advantage. If there turn out to be other kinds of expressions whose meanings pose early synonymy - related problems, it might turn out that some early kinds of abstraction would be good guides to synonymy. 6 Other Proposed Solutions As with any discrepant triad, there exist several ways to solve the trouble of synonymy between token - reflexive expressions. In this section, I will discuss other nominate solution. Since the issue has mainly arisen in discussions of indexicals, most purported solutions are mean to use to them. I think of token - reflexivity as a coordinated phenomenon, and therefore will necessitate of any theory that it count ζ and η as synonymous. 6.1 No Synonymy One option is to reject (C), and claim that there are no synonymous token - automatic expressions. This will come naturally to someone like Goodman (1949) or Montague (1970, p. 382), who argued that no two expressions are ever synonymous because they are not always intersubstitutable in propositional attitude contexts, or to someone like Quine (1953), who rejected the notion of synonymy altogether. Global incredulity about synonymy is too large an issue for this paper to consider fully. The scope of this newspaper is quite limited; and, if there are to be any expressions that 15This would seduce them automatic indexicals in the common sense of Perry (2001). 16 are synonymous, " I " and " je " would be prime examples (as would ζ and η). So I leave this reaction away here. The other kind of reason to refuse (C) depend not on objections to synonymy in cosmopolitan, but on some special features of nominal - reflexivity. Thus Zimmermann (1997, p. 147), working with a truth - conditional account of meaning: No two sentences are utter in precisely the same (possible) situations and hence they cannot have the same truth conditions: the truth weather of either one are only defined in its context of utterance. The issue raised here is that the meaning of token - reflexive expressions are pass in terms of
 thwt the abstracting procers yields no hiur synoiymy at other ldvels than the one I proposev. Onw poibt I do need to grant go this ohjection: whiow I have acfuments why ws are iot led by my ptoposal to tvinking that "I" avd "today" are synonyms, I have no argumqnts fot hhe claim that thix is fhe only notion of synonymy other fhan tht traditional one. O see this as an advantage. If hhere turn out to he other kibds jd expressionr whose meanings pose kther synonymy-related problems, kt miyht turn ouj fhwj some other kindf of abstracbpon wound be gpod guides to xynmnyny. 6 Other Proposed Sonutions As with ani inconsisdeut triad, there are seceeal wdys do suove tht pcobmem of syionymy betwsen token-redlexive expressions. Ig this section, I wilj qiscuss other proposed solutions. Since uhe iasue has mainly arisen un discussions of indgxicals, moft purported solutions are meant to apply to them. I thmny oy tokev-eevlexivity as a unified phenomenon, and thus wijm cekand of any thcory that it count ζ wnc η as synonymoos. 6.1 No Synknymy One option id to retect (X), and claym tnat there are no synonymous token-reflexpve wxpressions. This wnll come natbrally to spmeone like Goodman (1949) or Monfague (1970, p. 382), wjo argued ghat no two exprdsspons are ever synonymous becaufe they ace noc always intgrsubstytutable ij proimsitional attitude contgxts, os to someoje like Quine (1953), who rejected the notion of synpnfmy altogetker. Glpbal skepticifm about synonimy is toj big an issue ror thiv paper to sonsider fullf. The scope oh this pa[er us qyite liokted; and, if thrre are to be any ezpressions that 15Thls wools make them autimauix indexicals im tfe fejsx of [arry (2001). 16 are sfnonhmojx, "I" avd "je" would ce ptime examples (as wound ζ znd η). So I leave thos reactiob aside rere. The othet kind of reason tl rejxct (C) vependx njt on objections to synonymy ih general, bub on some spesial features of token-reflexivity. Thus Zimmermann (1997, p. 147), wirking with a trujh-conditional account pf meaning: Io two sentencev are uttered in prexisely the same (ppssible) situations ans henca thej cannot have the same truth conditions: the truth conditions of either onw are only defined in ots cmncexcs of ueterenre. The issue raisvd here is that the meanings of voken-reflefire expressions are given in trros of
that the abstracting process yields no hint other than the I proposed. One grant this objection: while have arguments why are not led by my proposal thinking that "I" and "today" are synonyms, I have no arguments for the that this is the only notion of synonymy other than the traditional one. see as advantage. there turn out to be other kinds of expressions whose meanings pose other synonymy-related problems, it turn out that some other kinds of abstraction be good guides to 6 Other Proposed Solutions As any triad, there several to the problem of between token-reflexive expressions. In this section, I will discuss other proposed solutions. Since the issue has mainly in discussions most purported are to to them. I token-reflexivity as a unified phenomenon, and of any theory that it count ζ and as synonymous. No Synonymy One option is to (C), and claim that there are no synonymous expressions. This will come naturally to someone like Goodman (1949) or Montague (1970, p. 382), that no two expressions ever synonymous because are always in attitude contexts, to someone like Quine (1953), who rejected the notion of synonymy Global skepticism about synonymy is too big an issue for to fully. The scope this paper is quite and, there are to be that would indexicals the of Perry (2001). 16 synonymous, "I" and "je" would prime examples (as would leave this reaction aside here. The other kind reason to reject (C) depends not on to synonymy in general, but on some special features of token-reflexivity. Thus (1997, p. with a truth-conditional account of meaning: No two are uttered in precisely same (possible) situations and hence they cannot have the truth the truth of either one only defined in contexts of utterance. raised here that meanings are given in terms of
 that the abstracting process Yields no hiNt synOnyMy aT oTher LeveLs than the one I pROposEd. One point I do need to graNt to tHiS ObjeCTiOn: whiLe I have ARgUMEntS wHy We aRe NOt Led by My pRoposal To thinking ThaT "I" And "today" are sYNoNyms, I have nO arGuments for thE clAim thaT tHis IS the oNly NotioN of synONymy otHer than thE tRAditioNAl one. I sEE ThIs as An advantage. If therE TuRN out to be other kInds of ExPReSSIonS whOse meaningS pOse otHEr synonYMy-RELAteD Problems, it migHt turn out thAT soMe otheR kIndS Of abstRactiOn WOulD be good guidEs to Synonymy. 6 OTher PrOPosed SoLUtions AS with aNy iNcoNsisTEnT tRiaD, tHEre ARe SevERal Ways to soLvE tHe proBlem OF SYNonyMy bEtweEn tokEn-reflexive exPreSsioNS. In This sEctioN, I wiLl DiscuSs otheR propOsEd solutions. SincE the Issue has mAinLy AriSeN in diSCussioNs oF inDexicalS, most puRPorTeD SOLuTions are meant to appLy TO ThEm. I think Of tokeN-ReFlEXivity as A uNifIed pHENomenOn, anD ThUs will deMand of ANy ThEory thaT iT count Ζ aNd η As sYnonyMOus. 6.1 NO SynonYmy One opTion iS To reject (C), and clAIm that there arE No SYNoNYmouS toKen-reflexivE expREssiOns. THIs WilL Come nAturaLlY To SOmeone like Goodman (1949) or moNtague (1970, P. 382), who aRgued that no twO expressioNS ARe ever syNonyMOuS Because they are Not alWays intersUBstitutaBle in PropositIonal attiTUDe contexTs, oR to SomEonE LIkE Quine (1953), who rejeCTEd thE nOtion of SynOnymy alTogEthEr. GLobAl SkepticisM about syNoNyMy Is Too Big an ISsue for tHiS paPeR to ConsiDEr fullY. The sCope Of ThIS paPer is quITe LIMiteD; aNd, If thEre ArE to be Any eXPreSsions tHat 15This woUld MAke tHeM aUtomatiC indexicals in ThE sense of PeRrY (2001). 16 arE synonYMOus, "I" and "jE" would be prime examples (as WOuld ζ anD η). SO I leaVe thIs reactioN asIde herE. ThE Other kInd of rEason To RejECT (C) depENDs Not On Objections TO SynOnymy In GeneRal, but oN some special featurES of Token-reflexivIty. thus zIMmErmANn (1997, P. 147), WorKiNG wiTH A truth-conditionAl account oF mEAnIng: No two seNTenCeS are uttEred in pRecisELy the saMe (possiblE) situatioNs And hENCe tHey cannot hAve the saMe truth coNDitioNS: tHe truTh cOnditiOnS of EitheR one arE OnlY defiNed in iTs ContexTs of uTtErance. ThE issue raised here is that tHe meanIngs oF toKen-reflexIve EXprEssions arE givEn in terms oF
 that the abstracting proc ess yields  no h int  sy no nymy  atother levels t h an t he one I proposed. One  poin tI  don ee d togrant t o  t h i s o bj ec tio n: wh ile I  ha ve argu ments whywear e not led by my  proposaltothinking tha t " I" and  " tod a y" ar e s ynony ms, Ih ave no  argument sf or the claim t h a tthis  is the only noti o no f synonymy oth er tha nt he t rad iti onal one.Isee t h is as a n  a d v a nta g e. If there t urn out tob e o ther k in dso f expr essio ns who se meanings  pos e other s ynonym y -relate d  proble ms, it  mi ght  tur n  o ut  th at som e  o the r  ki nds of a bs tr actio n wo u l d be g ood  gui des t o synonymy. 6  Ot herP rop osedSolut ions  A s wit h anyincon si stent triad, th ereare sever alwa ysto  solv e  the p rob lem  of syn onymy b e twe en t o ke n-reflexive expres si o n s.  In this  secti o n,  I will dis cu ssothe r propo seds ol utions.Sincet he  i ssue ha smainly  a ris enin di s cuss ions o f indexi cals, most purported solutions are me a n tt o ap ply  to them. I  thi n k of  tok e n- ref l exivi ty as  a un i fied phenomenon, an dthus w ill d emand of anytheory tha t i t countζ an d  η as synonymous.  6.1No Synonym y  One opt ion i s to rej ect (C),a n d claimtha t t her e a r e  n o synonymoust o ken- re flexive  ex pressio ns.  Th iswil lcome natu rally to  s om eo ne  li ke Go o dman (19 49 ) o rMon tague (1970,  p. 3 82),  w ho arg ued tha t  n o twoex pr essi ons  a re ev er s y non ymous b ecause th eya re n ot  a lways i ntersubstitut ab le in prop os iti onal a t t itude co ntexts, or to someone l i ke Quin e ( 1953) , wh o rejecte d t he not ion of syn onymyaltog et her . Globa l sk ept ic ism abouts y non ymy i stoobig anissue for this pap e r t o consider fu lly . Th e sc ope of thi sp ape r is quite limite d; and, if  t h er e are to b e  an yexpress ions th at 15 T his wou ld make t hem autom at ic i n d exi cals in th e senseof Perry( 2001) .  1 6 are  sy nonymo us , " I" an d "je" wou ld be  prime  e xample s (as  w ould ζ a nd η). So I leave thisreacti on as ide  here. Th e o t her  kind ofreas on to reje ct(C)  depe nds not o n ob j ec tio n s tosyno n ymy in ge n er al, b ut  on some sp e c i alfeatu res of tok en-r eflexivity. ThusZ immermann (199 7, p . 147 ),w orki ng  with a truth- con di t i onal acc ou nt of meani ng: No t wo sente nces a re utt ered in p re c iselythesam e (possib le)  s i tuation san d  hence  the ycannot  havet he s a m e truth conditio ns: t h e  trut h  co nditi on s of ei t herone are on ly definedin its  con texts  of utt er ance.The  i ssue raise d  here isthatthe mea ni ngsoftoken- refl e x ive e xpre ss ion s are giv e n  i n  t er m s o f
 that_the abstracting_process yields no hint_synonymy at_other_levels than_the_one I proposed._One point I_do need to grant_to this objection:_while_I have arguments why we are not led by my proposal to thinking that_"I"_and "today"_are_synonyms,_I have no arguments for_the claim that this is_the only_notion of synonymy other than the traditional one._I_see this as_an advantage. If there turn out to be other_kinds of expressions whose meanings pose_other synonymy-related problems,_it_might_turn out that some_other kinds of abstraction would be_good guides to synonymy. 6 Other_Proposed Solutions As with any inconsistent triad,_there are several ways to solve_the problem of synonymy between_token-reflexive expressions._In this section, I will_discuss other proposed_solutions. Since_the issue has_mainly arisen in discussions of indexicals,_most purported solutions_are meant to apply to them._I_think of token-reflexivity_as_a_unified phenomenon,_and thus will_demand_of any_theory_that it count ζ and η_as_synonymous. 6.1 No Synonymy One option is_to reject (C), and_claim_that there are no_synonymous token-reflexive expressions. This will_come naturally to someone like Goodman_(1949) or_Montague (1970,_p. 382), who argued that no two expressions are ever synonymous_because they are not always intersubstitutable_in propositional attitude contexts,_or to_someone_like Quine (1953),_who_rejected the_notion of synonymy altogether. Global skepticism about_synonymy is_too big an issue for this_paper to consider fully._The_scope of this paper is quite_limited; and, if there are to_be any expressions that 15This_would_make_them automatic indexicals in the_sense of Perry (2001). 16 are_synonymous, "I" and_"je" would be prime examples (as would_ζ_and η). So I leave this_reaction_aside here. The other kind of_reason_to_reject (C) depends not on_objections to synonymy in general, but_on some special features of token-reflexivity. Thus Zimmermann (1997,_p. 147), working_with a truth-conditional account of_meaning:_No_two sentences are uttered in precisely the same (possible) situations_and hence_they cannot have_the same truth conditions: the truth conditions of either one_are only defined in its contexts of_utterance. The issue raised here is that the meanings of token-reflexive_expressions are given in terms of