elian Society 70: 121–140. Rödl, S. (2012). Categories of the Temporal. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Sluga, H. (1975). "Frege and the Rise of Analytic Philosophy." Inquiry 18: 471–98. Sluga, H. (1976). "Frege as a Rationalist." In Studies on Frege, Vol. 1: Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics. M. Schirn (Ed.). Stuttgart-Bad Constatt: Friedrich Formmann Verlag. Sluga, H. (1977). "Frege's Alleged Realism." Inquiry 20: 227–42. Sluga, H. (1980). Gottlob Frege. New York: Routledge. Weiner, J. (1990). Frege in Perspective. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. I am a lot of things A pluralistic account of the Self JIRI BENOVSKY §1. When I say that I am a lot of things, I mean it literally and metaphysically speaking. The Self, or so I shall argue, is a plurality (notwithstanding the fact that ordinary language takes "the Self" to be a singular term – but, after all, language is only language). It is not a substance or a substratum, and it is not a collection or a bundle1. The view I wish to advocate for is a kind of reductionism, in line with some – but not all – broadly Humean ideas2. In short, I will defend the view there are the experiences and mental states we have, and that's it: no additional substances, and no bundles. This does not mean, however, that there is no Self – the Self simply is the experiences. I will try to articulate and defend this view by showing that it can accommodate what I take to be the three main desiderata for any theory of the Self to satisfy: first, that the Self is the subject of experience (a subject of mental states, in general); second, that there is a unity to the Self in the sense that our (conscious, phenomenal) experience is at least partly continuous or'stream-like'; and third, that we do not die when we go to sleep or when we otherwise don't have any (conscious, phenomenal) experiences. Let's see how this works. 1 When it comes to arguing about the Self from a metaphysical point of view, philosophers traditionally tend to form
elian Society 70: 121–140. Rödl, S. (2012). Categories of the Temporal. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Sluga, H. (1975). " Frege and the Rise of Analytic Philosophy. " Inquiry 18: 471–98. Sluga, H. (1976). " Frege as a Rationalist. " In Studies on Frege, Vol. 1: Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics. M. Schirn (Ed .). Stuttgart - Bad Constatt: Friedrich Formmann Verlag. Sluga, H. (1977). " Frege's Alleged Realism. " question 20: 227–42. Sluga, H. (1980). Gottlob Frege. New York: Routledge. Weiner, J. (1990). Frege in Perspective. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. I am a fortune of things A pluralistic account of the Self JIRI BENOVSKY § 1. When I suppose that I am a set of things, I mean it literally and metaphysically address. The Self, or indeed I shall argue, is a plurality (notwithstanding the fact that average linguistic process takes " the Self " to be a curious term – but, after wholly, language is only language). It is not a substance or a substratum, and it is not a collection or a bundle1. The view I wish to recommend for is a kind of reductionism, in line with some – but not all – broadly Humean ideas2. In short, I will defend the scene there are the experiences and mental states we experience, and that's it: no additional substances, and no bundles. This does not mean, however, that there is no Self – the Self plainly is the experiences. I will try to articulate and defend this view by showing that it can accommodate what I take to be the three main desiderata for any theory of the Self to satisfy: first, that the Self is the subject of experience (a subject of mental states, in cosmopolitan); second, that there embody a unity to the Self in the common sense that our (conscious, phenomenal) experience is at least partially continuous or'stream - like'; and third, that we do not die when we go to sleep or when we otherwise don't accept any (conscious, phenomenal) experiences. Let's see how this works. 1 When it come to arguing about the Self from a metaphysical point of view, philosophers traditionally tend to shape
eliwn Society 70: 121–140. Rödl, S. (2012). Catenories of the Temporal. Rambridfe, MA: Hafvard University Press. Sluga, H. (1975). "Frete and the Rise of Anauytic Phiposophy." Unqumry 18: 471–98. Sluga, H. (1976). "Fcsge as a Ratikkalisc." Mn Studies on Ftege, Vol. 1: Locic and Philosmpfy of Mathematics. M. Schirn (Ed.). Stuttgawt-Bad Cpndtatt: Friedricr Fogmiann Nevlag. Sluga, H. (1977). "Frege's Alleged Reamism." Inxuiry 20: 227–42. Sluga, H. (1980). Gottlob Frege. New York: Rouhledge. Weiner, J. (1990). Fgege in Perwpeceuve. Ithaca, NH: Cornell Luiversity Ptess. I am a lot of things A plurxlistnc account if thf Self JIRI UENOVSHY §1. When I say that H am a kot of things, L meai it literally and metaphbsically speaking. Thg Self, or vo I shall argue, is a plurdlitf (nogqitfstznvinf the vacv that ordihary languate takes "the Self" tp fv a singular ferm – fue, after all, language is only language). Iu is hot a substance or a suvstratum, and it is noj a colleceion or a bundle1. The view I wish to advocate for hs a iknd on reaychionism, in line with some – but not all – broadjg Nukean ideas2. In fhort, I wilk feggnd the view tfere axs fhe experiences anf mentaj stares we hade, amd that's it: no additional sybstances, anb ni bundles. This doed not mean, kowevet, that there is no Self – the Relf simply is hhe experjdnces. I will try to asticulatt and defend this diew by siowiny that ig cam accoimodate whwt I bdke to be the thref maiu deshderata fog any theory of the Self to satmxfy: first, thst thv Self is the xubject of ex[erience (a sublect of ientau states, ih generel); second, thwt there is a onity to the Velf in ehe wensw that ujr (conscious, pnenomenal) experiencw is at least partky zkntinuous or'strzcm-oike'; and third, yhag wq fo njd die when wa go to xleep or when we uthetwise don't have any (wonsdious, phenomenal) ecpcriences. Oet's see how this worls. 1 When it comes uo argning auout tne Felf from a metaphysical point of view, ohijosophers trwditlonajly tend tp form
elian Society 70: 121–140. Rödl, S. (2012). the Cambridge, MA: University Press. Sluga, Rise Analytic Philosophy." Inquiry 471–98. Sluga, H. "Frege as a Rationalist." In Studies Frege, Vol. 1: Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics. M. Schirn (Ed.). Stuttgart-Bad Constatt: Formmann Verlag. Sluga, H. (1977). "Frege's Alleged Realism." Inquiry 20: 227–42. Sluga, H. Gottlob New Routledge. J. (1990). Frege in Perspective. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. I am a lot of things pluralistic account of the Self JIRI BENOVSKY §1. I say that I a lot of things, I it and metaphysically The or I shall argue, a plurality (notwithstanding the fact that ordinary language takes "the Self" to be a singular term – after all, only language). is a or a substratum, is not a collection or a I wish to advocate for is a kind reductionism, in with some – but not all broadly Humean ideas2. In short, I will defend view there are the experiences and mental states we have, and that's it: no additional no bundles. This does mean, however, that is Self the simply is experiences. I will try to articulate and defend this view by that it can accommodate what I take to be the desiderata any theory of Self to satisfy: first, the is the subject of subject mental second, there a unity to the in the sense that our phenomenal) experience is at third, that we do not die when we to sleep or when we otherwise don't any (conscious, phenomenal) experiences. Let's see how this works. 1 When it to arguing Self from a metaphysical point of view, philosophers tend to form
elian Society 70: 121–140. Rödl, S. (2012). CategoriEs of the TemPoral. camBriDgE, MA: HArvaRd University PrESs. SlUga, H. (1975). "Frege and the Rise of ANalytIc pHiloSOpHy." InqUiry 18: 471–98. SluGA, H. (1976). "fREge As A RAtiOnALiSt." In STudIes on FrEge, Vol. 1: LogiC anD PHilosophy of MAThEmatics. M. ScHirN (Ed.). Stuttgart-bad constaTt: friEDrich forMmann verlag. sLuga, H. (1977). "FRege's AlleGeD realisM." inquiry 20: 227–42. sLUgA, H. (1980). GoTtlob Frege. New York: rOuTLedge. Weiner, J. (1990). FrEge in PErSPeCTIve. ithAca, NY: CorneLl univeRSity PreSS. I AM A Lot OF things A pluraListic accouNT of The SelF JiRI beNOVSKy §1. When i sAY thAt I am a lot of ThinGs, I mean it LiteraLLy and meTAphysicAlly spEakIng. the SELf, Or So I ShALl aRGuE, is A PluRality (noTwItHstanDing THE FAct tHat OrdiNary lAnguage takes "tHe SElf" tO Be a SinguLar teRm – buT, aFter aLl, langUage iS oNly language). It is Not a Substance Or a SuBstRaTum, anD It is noT a cOllEction oR a bundlE1. the ViEW i WiSh to advocate for is a KiND Of ReductioNism, in LInE wITh some – buT nOt aLl – brOADly HuMean IDeAs2. In shorT, I will DEfEnD the vieW tHere arE tHe eXpeRiencES and Mental States we Have, aND that's it: no addiTIonal substancES, aND No BUndlEs. THis does not mEan, hOWeveR, thaT ThEre IS no SeLf – the seLF sIMply is the experienceS. I Will trY to arTiculate and deFend this viEW BY showing That IT cAN accommodate whAt I taKe to be the tHRee main dEsideRata for aNy theory oF THe Self to SatIsfY: fiRst, THAt The Self is the sUBJect Of ExperieNce (A subjecT of MenTal StaTeS, in generaL); second, tHaT tHeRe Is a Unity TO the Self In The SeNse That oUR (conscIous, pHenoMeNaL) ExpErience IS aT LEast PaRtLy coNtiNuOus or'StreAM-liKe'; and thIrd, that we Do nOT die WhEn We go to sLeep or when we oThErwise don't HaVe aNy (consCIOus, phenoMenal) experiences. Let's see HOw this wOrkS. 1 When It coMes to arguIng About tHe SELf from A metapHysicAl PoiNT Of vieW, PHiLosOpHers traditIONalLy tenD tO forM
elian Society 70: 121–140.  Rödl, S.(2012 ).Cat eg orie s of  the Temporal. Camb ridge, MA: Harvard Uni versi ty Pres s .Sluga , H. (1 9 75 ) .  "F re ge  an dt he  Rise  of  Analyt ic Philoso phy ."  Inquiry 18: 47 1–98. Slug a,H. (1976). " Fre ge asaRat i onali st. " InStudie s  on Fr ege, Vol.  1 :  Logic and Phi l o so phyof Mathematics. M .  S c hirn (Ed.). St uttgar t- B ad C ons tat t: Friedri ch  Form m ann Ver l ag . S lug a , H. (1977)."Frege's Al l ege d Real is m." Inquir y 20:  2 2 7–4 2. Sluga, H . (1 980). Got tlob F r ege. Ne w  York:Routle dge . W eine r ,J.  (1 99 0 ).F re gei n P erspecti ve .Ithac a, N Y : C orne llUniv ersit y Press. I am  aloto f t hings  A pl ural is tic a ccount  of t he  Self JIRI BENO VSKY  §1. When  Isa y t ha t I a m  a lot  of  th ings, I  mean i t  li te r a l ly  and metaphysicall ys p ea king. Th e Self ,  o rs o I shal larg ue,i s  a pl ural i ty  (notwit hstand i ng  t he fact  t hat or di nar y l angua g e ta kes "t he Self"  to b e  a singular te r m – but, afte r  a l l ,l angu age  is only la ngua g e).It i s  n ota  subs tance  o r  a substratum, and itis  not a  coll ection or a b undle1. Th e v iew I wi sh t o  a d vocate for isa kin d of reduc t ionism,in li ne withsome – bu t not all– b roa dly  Hu m e an  ideas2. In s h o rt,Iwill de fen d the v iew  th ere  ar ethe exper iences a nd  m en ta l s tates we have,  a ndth at' s it: no add ition al s ub st a nce s, andn ob u ndle s.  T hisdoe snot m ean, how ever, t hat there  is no S el f– the S elf simply is  t he experie nc es.  I wil l try to a rticulate and defend th i s viewbyshowi ng t hat it ca n a ccommo dat e  whatI take  to b ethe t hreem a in  de si derata for a nytheor yof t he Self  to satisfy: first ,  th at the Self i s t he s u b je cto fe xpe ri e nce ( a subject of me ntal state s, in  general); sec on d, that  thereis au nity to  the Self  in the s en se t h a t o ur (consci ous, phe nomenal)e xperi e nc e isatleastpa rtl y con tinuou s  or 'stre am-lik e' ; andthird ,that wedo not die when we go t o slee p orwhe n we othe rwi s e d on't have  any  (consciou s,phe nomen al) exper ienc e s.  Le t 's se e ho w  this wor k s.  1W h en  it comes t o a rgu ing a bou t  the S elffrom a metaphysic a l point of vie w, p h i los oph e rs t ra ditionally ten d t of o rm
elian Society_70: 121–140._Rödl, S. (2012). Categories_of the_Temporal._Cambridge, MA:_Harvard_University Press. Sluga,_H. (1975). "Frege_and the Rise of_Analytic Philosophy." Inquiry_18:_471–98. Sluga, H. (1976). "Frege as a Rationalist." In Studies on Frege, Vol. 1:_Logic_and Philosophy_of_Mathematics._M. Schirn (Ed.). Stuttgart-Bad Constatt:_Friedrich Formmann Verlag. Sluga, H._(1977). "Frege's_Alleged Realism." Inquiry 20: 227–42. Sluga, H. (1980)._Gottlob_Frege. New York:_Routledge. Weiner, J. (1990). Frege in Perspective. Ithaca, NY:_Cornell University Press. I am a_lot of things_A_pluralistic_account of the Self_JIRI BENOVSKY §1. When I say_that I am a lot of_things, I mean it literally and metaphysically_speaking. The Self, or so I_shall argue, is a plurality_(notwithstanding the_fact that ordinary language takes_"the Self" to_be a_singular term –_but, after all, language is only_language). It is_not a substance or a substratum,_and_it is not_a_collection_or a_bundle1. The view_I_wish to_advocate_for is a kind of reductionism,_in_line with some – but not all_– broadly Humean ideas2._In_short, I will defend_the view there are the_experiences and mental states we have,_and that's_it: no_additional substances, and no bundles. This does not mean, however, that_there is no Self – the_Self simply is the_experiences. I_will_try to articulate_and_defend this_view by showing that it can accommodate_what I_take to be the three main_desiderata for any theory_of_the Self to satisfy: first, that_the Self is the subject of_experience (a subject of mental_states,_in_general); second, that there is_a unity to the Self in_the sense that_our (conscious, phenomenal) experience is at least_partly_continuous or'stream-like'; and third, that we_do_not die when we go to_sleep_or_when we otherwise don't have_any (conscious, phenomenal) experiences. Let's see_how this works. 1 When it comes to arguing_about the Self_from a metaphysical point of_view,_philosophers_traditionally tend to form