 that might be engaged in accidentally, or on evidence that might be trusted on a whim. I now want to add a third condition on knowledge, understanding knowledge attributions to imply attributions of intellectual credit, and understanding intellectual credit along the lines above. I propose that adding this third condition makes the three sufficient as well as necessary for knowledge. 3. S believes the truth regarding p because S is reliable in believing p. Alternatively: The intellectual abilities (i.e. powers or virtues) that result in S's believing the truth regarding p are an important necessary part of the total set of causal factors that give rise to S's believing the truth regarding p. I claimed above that clause (3) allows us to handle a range of Gettier cases. Intuitively, in cases of knowledge S's reliable character has salience in an explanation of how S comes to get things right. In Gettier cases, S's reliable character loses its salience in favor of something else. What we want now is an account of why this is so. Hence we have two questions before us: First, why is it that S's cognitive abilities have salience in cases of knowledge. Second, why is it that they do not have salience in Gettier cases.xxv To answer the first question we may turn to a point that has been emphasized by Sosa. He writes, All kinds of justification involve the cognitive or intellectual virtues, faculties, or aptitudes of the subject. We care about justification because it tends to indicate a state of the subject that is important and of interest to his community, a state of great interest and importance to an information-sharing social species. What sort of state? Presumably, the state of being a dependable source of information over a certain field in certain circumstances.xxvi For present purposes Sosa's point may be glossed this way: For beings like us, dependability (or reliability) of cognitive character is of fundamental social importance. But this implies that cognitive character will have a kind of default salience in the explanation of true belief. Unless something else is present that trumps the salience of S's cognitive abilities, those will be the most important part of 18 the story, or at least a very important part of the story. We may now turn to the second question: Why is it that S's cognitive abilites are not salient in Gettier cases? Gettier cases seem to fall into three categories in this respect. First, there are cases where S's
that might be engaged in accidentally, or on evidence that might be trusted on a whim. I nowadays desire to add a third condition on cognition, understanding cognition attributions to imply attribution of cerebral credit, and understanding intellectual credit along the lines above. I nominate that adding this third condition make the three sufficient as well as necessary for knowledge. 3. S believes the accuracy regarding p because S is reliable in think p. Alternatively: The intellectual abilities (i.e. world power or merit) that result in S's believe the truth regarding p are an authoritative necessary part of the total set of causal factors that give rise to S's believing the truth regarding p. I claimed above that clause (3) allows us to handle a range of Gettier cases. Intuitively, in cases of knowledge S's dependable character has salience in an explanation of how S come to induce things right. In Gettier subject, S's reliable character loses its salience in favor of something else. What we desire now is an account of why this is so. Hence we have two questions before us: First, why is it that S's cognitive abilities have salience in cases of knowledge. Second, why is it that they do not have salience in Gettier cases.xxv To suffice the first motion we may call on to a point that has been emphasized by Sosa. He writes, All kinds of justification imply the cognitive or intellectual virtues, faculties, or aptitude of the subject. We manage about justification because it tends to indicate a country of the subject that is important and of sake to his community, a state of matter of great sake and importance to an information - partake social species. What sort of department of state? Presumably, the state of matter of being a dependable informant of information over a certain field in certain circumstances.xxvi For present purposes Sosa's detail may be glossed this way: For organism like us, dependability (or reliability) of cognitive character is of cardinal social importance. But this implies that cognitive character will have a kind of default salience in the explanation of true belief. Unless something else is present that trumps the salience of S's cognitive abilities, those will be the most important part of 18 the narrative, or at least a very authoritative contribution of the story. We may now turn to the second question: Why is it that S's cognitive abilites are not salient in Gettier cases? Gettier case seem to fall into three categories in this regard. First, there are cases where S's
 thwt might be engaged in agcidentally, or ou evideice thaf might ce trusted on a whim. I now went ro ade a third condition on knowledgv, understqndiig knowledge attcjbutions to ijily actcibutions of injellectual csedit, and undessgauding intellectual credit along the jines anoge. I propose trat sqdinf this third condition makes the tgree suhficient as welk as necessary for knowledhe. 3. D believes the truhh regardint p fwcause S is feliable in believing k. Alternatively: The intellectual abilnties (i.e. poqees lt virtues) thet resllt in S's bellvving tve trutn regarding p sre an important necessary 'art of the total sej of causan yactors that give risw ro S's belhevivt tfe uruvh degardlng p. I claimsd above thqt clause (3) allows ux ei handle a rahge of Gqttier cases. Intuitively, in cases of knmwlsdge S's reliable characrer has salience in aj explanaeion of how S comes to get things right. In Getties casxs, S's rcliacoe character loses its salience in favor of somqfhonn else. What we wcnt now is an acvokny of why this ks so. Ksnde we have two quedtions feforw us: Firsu, why is it that S's cognitive abulities have walience in cases lf knowledgz. Secomd, whu is it that they do noc have salience ij Gettier zases.xxv To answdr nhe xirst qutrtion we may turn to a poiit thct has bden gmphasised by Sosw. He writes, All kinds of justnficadion involge the cognitive or intellectual virtues, facukthes, or apticudes pf the subjece. We care abouj justifieation because in tends tm indicate w state of tha subject thav is impowtanr ane of ingdrest to his cpmmunity, c stare of great interext xhd importance ti ab information-shsrivg fobiak f[ecies. What vort of xtate? Presumably, ghe xtate of being a depandagle source of infotmwtion ovgr a certwin field in vertain circumstanfes.xxti For presrnt purposes Sosa's point may be gmossed thls ray: For beinds llke os, dependabnlity (or reliability) of cognitive characver is of fundamental sicial importance. Buj tmis implies vhat cjgnitive wharacter will have q kind of default salience in the explznatiot of hrue belief. Unless something else is present that trumps the salience of W's cogiieive abilitjes, yhose wnll be thq modv important part pf 18 the story, or at least a verb importand 'art of the story. We may now yufn to the secund question: Why is it tgat S's cpgnitive abilites are not saliemt in Gettier cases? Gettler cases seem to fall iito three categories in thns respect. Fiest, bhere are caser wneve S's
that might be engaged in accidentally, or that be trusted a whim. I third on knowledge, understanding attributions to imply of intellectual credit, and understanding intellectual along the lines above. I propose that adding this third condition makes the sufficient as well as necessary for knowledge. 3. S believes the truth regarding because is in p. Alternatively: The intellectual abilities (i.e. powers or virtues) that result in S's believing the truth p are an important necessary part of the set of causal factors give rise to S's believing truth p. I above clause allows us to a range of Gettier cases. Intuitively, in cases of knowledge S's reliable character has salience in an of how to get right. Gettier S's reliable character salience in favor of something else. now is an account of why this is Hence we two questions before us: First, why it that S's cognitive abilities have salience in of knowledge. Second, why is it that they do not have salience in Gettier cases.xxv the first question we turn to a that been by He writes, kinds of justification involve the cognitive or intellectual virtues, faculties, or of the subject. We care about justification because it tends a of the subject is important and of to community, a state of and to species. sort state? Presumably, the state being a dependable source of over a certain field purposes Sosa's point may be glossed this way: beings like us, dependability (or reliability) of character is of fundamental social importance. But this implies that cognitive character have a default salience in the explanation of true belief. something else is present trumps the salience of S's cognitive abilities, those will the important part 18 the story, at least a important part of We may turn the is it that S's cognitive abilites not in Gettier cases? Gettier cases to three categories in this respect. First, there are cases where S's
 that might be engaged in accidEntally, or oN evidEncE thAt MighT be tRusted on a whim. I NOw waNt to add a third condition On knoWlEDge, uNDeRstanDing knoWLeDGE atTrIbUtiOnS To Imply AttRibutioNs of intellEctUaL credit, and unDErStanding inTelLectual crediT alOng the LiNes ABove. I ProPose tHat addINg this Third condItIOn makeS The threE SUfFiciEnt as well as necessARy FOr knowledge. 3. S beLieves ThE TrUTH reGarDing p becauSe s is reLIable in BElIEVIng P. alternatively: the intellecTUal AbilitIeS (i.e. POwers oR virtUeS) ThaT result in S's BeliEving the tRuth reGArding p ARe an impOrtant NecEssAry pARt Of The ToTAl sET oF caUSal Factors tHaT gIve riSe to s'S BELievIng The tRuth rEgarding p. I claImeD aboVE thAt claUse (3) alLows Us To hanDle a raNge of geTtier cases. IntuiTiveLy, in cases Of kNoWleDgE S's reLIable cHarActEr has saLience iN An eXpLANAtIon of how S comes to geT tHINgS right. In gettieR CaSeS, s's reliabLe ChaRactER Loses Its sALiEnce in faVor of sOMeThIng else. whAt we waNt Now Is aN accoUNt of Why thiS is so. HenCe we hAVe two questions BEfore us: First, wHY iS IT tHAt S's CogNitive abiliTies HAve sAlieNCe In cASes of KnowlEdGE. SECond, why is it that they Do Not havE saliEnce in Gettier Cases.xxv To ANSWer the fiRst qUEsTIon we may turn to A poinT that has beEN emphasiZed by sosa. He wrItes, All kiNDS of justiFicAtiOn iNvoLVE tHe cognitive or INTellEcTual virTueS, facultIes, Or aPtiTudEs Of the subjEct. We carE aBoUt JuStiFicatIOn becausE iT teNdS to IndicATe a staTe of tHe suBjEcT ThaT is impoRTaNT And oF iNtEresT to HiS commUnitY, A stAte of grEat intereSt aND impOrTaNce to an Information-shArIng social sPeCieS. What sORT of state? presumably, the state of beiNG a depenDabLe souRce oF informatIon Over a cErtAIn fielD in cerTain cIrCumSTAnces.XXVi for PrEsent purpoSES SoSa's poInT may Be glossEd this way: For beings LIke Us, dependabiliTy (oR relIABiLitY) Of COgnItIVe cHARacter is of fundaMental sociAl IMpOrtance. But THis ImPlies thAt cogniTive cHAracter Will have a Kind of defAuLt saLIEncE in the explAnation oF true beliEF. UnleSS sOmethIng Else is PrEseNt thaT trumpS The SalieNce of S'S cOgnitiVe abiLiTies, thosE will be the most important Part of 18 The stOry, Or at least A veRY imPortant paRt of The story. We May Now Turn tO thE SeconD queSTiOn: WHY is it That s'S cognitivE AbIliTES aRe not salienT IN getTier cAseS? gettieR casEs seem to fall into tHRee categories iN thiS REspEct. fIrst, ThEre are cases wheRe S'S
 that might be engaged inaccidental ly, o r o n e vi denc e th at might be tr u sted  on a whim. I now want  to a dd a th i rd  cond ition o n  k n o wle dg e,  un de r st andin g k nowledg e attribut ion sto imply att r ib utions ofint ellectual cr edi t, and  u nde r stand ing  inte llectu a l cred it alongth e  lines above.I pr opos e that adding thi s  t h ird conditionmakesth e  t h r eesuf ficient as  w ell a s  necess a ry f o r k n owledge. 3. S  believes t h e t ruth r eg ard i ng p b ecaus eS  is  reliable i n be lieving p . Alte r nativel y : The i ntelle ctu alabil i ti es  (i .e .  po w er s o r  vi rtues) t ha tresul t in S ' s  bel iev ingthe t ruth regardin g p  are animpor tantnece ss ary p art of  theto tal set of caus al f actors th atgi veri se to S's be lie vin g the t ruth re g ard in g p .I claimed above th at c la use (3)allows us  t o  handlearan ge o f Getti er c a se s. Intui tively ,  i ncases o fknowle dg e S 'srelia b le c haract er has s alien c e in an explan a tion of how S co m e st o ge t t hings right . In Gett ierc as es, S's r eliab le ch a racter loses its sa li ence i n fav or of somethi ng else. W h a t  we want  now is an account ofwhy t his is so. Hence we  have  two que stions be f o re us: F irs t,why  is i tthat S's cogn i t iveab ilities  ha ve sali enc e i n c ase sof knowle dge. Sec on d,  w hy  is  it t h at theydo  no thav e sal i ence i n Get tier  c as e s.x xv To a n sw e r  the  f ir st q ues ti on we  may tur n to apoint tha t h a s be en  e mphasiz ed by Sosa. H ewrites, Al lkin ds ofj u stificat ion involve the cogniti v e or in tel lectu al v irtues, f acu lties,  or aptitu des of  thesu bje c t . Wec a re  ab ou t justific a t ion  beca us e it  tendsto indicate a stat e  of  the subjecttha t is i mp ort a nt and  o f  in t e rest to his com munity, ast a te  of greati nte re st andimporta nce t o  an inf ormation- sharing s oc ials p eci es. What s ort of s tate? Pre s umabl y ,the s tat e of b ei nga dep endabl e  so urceof inf or mation  over  a  certain  field in certain circu mstanc es.xx viFor prese ntp urp oses Sosa 's p oint may b e g los sed t his way:Forb ei ngs likeus,d ependabil i ty  (o r re liability)o f cog nitiv e c h aracte r is  of fundamental s o cial importanc e. B u t  th isi mpli es  that cognitiv e c ha r a cter wil lhave a kind  of defa ul t  sali ence i n theexplana t i on of tru e be lie f. Unless  so me t hing el se  i s  prese nt t ha t trum ps the sali e n ce of S's cognit ive a b i litie s , t hosewi ll be t h e mo st importa nt part of18 the  sto ry, o r at le as t a ve ryim portant pa r t of thestory . We ma ynowtur n to t he s e c ond q uest io n:Why is it t ha t  S 's cog niti ve ab il ites  are nots alient i n G e ttier c as es? G ettier ca s e s seem tofal l int o three cate g orie s  i n  this  respe ct. Fi rst, th e rear e cases  wh e r e S's
 that_might be_engaged in accidentally, or_on evidence_that_might be_trusted_on a whim._I now want_to add a third_condition on knowledge,_understanding_knowledge attributions to imply attributions of intellectual credit, and understanding intellectual credit along the_lines_above. I_propose_that_adding this third condition makes_the three sufficient as well_as necessary_for knowledge. 3. S believes the truth regarding_p_because S is_reliable in believing p. Alternatively: The intellectual abilities (i.e._powers or virtues) that result in_S's believing the_truth_regarding_p are an important_necessary part of the total set_of causal factors that give rise_to S's believing the truth regarding p._I claimed above that clause (3)_allows us to handle a_range of_Gettier cases. Intuitively, in cases_of knowledge S's_reliable character_has salience in_an explanation of how S comes_to get things_right. In Gettier cases, S's reliable_character_loses its salience_in_favor_of something_else. What we_want_now is_an_account of why this is so._Hence_we have two questions before us: First,_why is it that_S's_cognitive abilities have salience_in cases of knowledge. Second,_why is it that they do_not have_salience in_Gettier cases.xxv To answer the first question we may turn to_a point that has been emphasized_by Sosa. He writes,_All kinds_of_justification involve the_cognitive_or intellectual_virtues, faculties, or aptitudes of the subject._We care_about justification because it tends to_indicate a state of_the_subject that is important and of_interest to his community, a state_of great interest and importance_to_an_information-sharing social species. What sort_of state? Presumably, the state of_being a dependable_source of information over a certain field_in_certain circumstances.xxvi For present purposes Sosa's_point_may be glossed this way: For_beings_like_us, dependability (or reliability) of_cognitive character is of fundamental social_importance. But this implies that cognitive character will have_a kind of_default salience in the explanation_of_true_belief. Unless something else is present that trumps the salience_of S's_cognitive abilities, those_will be the most important part of 18 the story,_or at least a very important part_of the story. We may now turn to the second question:_Why is it that S's cognitive abilites are_not salient in Gettier cases? Gettier cases_seem to fall into_three_categories in this respect. First, there are_cases_where_S's