 inductive reasoning, and might even be aware that she does. c. Cohen's contextualism. Finally, consider Cohen's own solution to the lottery problem. According to Cohen, the problem is solved by recognizing that attributions of knowledge are sensitive to context, and, more specifically, that the standards for knowledge are sensitive to context. We have knowledge in cases of ordinary 4 inductive reasoning, such as that employed in the garbage chute case, because the standards that are operative in ordinary contexts are low enough to admit such cases as counting for knowledge. We do not have knowledge in the lottery case, however, because in that context the standards for knowledge are raised-the possibility of winning the lottery becomes salient, and our inductive evidence, as good as it is, does not rule out this possibility. x I do not wish to deny Cohen's general point that the standards for knowledge are sensitive to context-it seems to me that they are. What is less clear is how this is supposed to solve the lottery problem for fallibilism. The problem is that Cohen gives us no explanation why the standards for knowledge should get raised so high in the lottery case. More specifically: he gives no explanation why the standards should be raised beyond S's capacities to meet them. Cohen is quite explicit that he means to remain within the framework of fallibilism. Moreover, in the lottery case it is stipulated that S has excellent (although fallible) reasons for believing that she will lose. So why, on a fallibilist account of knowledge, does S fail to know that she will lose? To be clear, I am not claiming that S does know in the lottery case-I agree that she does not. My complaint is that nothing in Cohen's account explains why S does not know. The same problem can be viewed from a different angle. Cohen says that when S reasons about the odds, the very form of her reasoning makes the possibility that S wins salient. And once made salient, Cohen says, that possibility cannot be ruled out. But again, why can't it be? Why isn't S's reasoning about the odds good enough to rule out the possibility of winning, even once made salient? It has been stipulated that S has excellent reasons for thinking she will not win the lottery, so why doesn't she know that she will not win? In sum, Cohen's contextualism does not explain what it was supposed to explain: given that we are fallibilists about knowledge, and given that we think inductive grounds are good enough to know in other cases
inductive reasoning, and might even be aware that she does. c. Cohen's contextualism. Finally, consider Cohen's own solution to the lottery trouble. harmonize to Cohen, the problem is solved by spot that attribution of knowledge are sensitive to context, and, more specifically, that the standard for cognition are sensitive to context. We have knowledge in cases of ordinary 4 inductive reasoning, such as that hire in the garbage chute sheath, because the standard that are operative in average contexts are humble enough to admit such cases as counting for knowledge. We do not consume knowledge in the lottery case, however, because in that context the standards for knowledge are raise - the possibility of winning the lottery becomes salient, and our inductive evidence, as effective as it is, does not rule out this possibility. x I do not wish to deny Cohen's general point that the standards for knowledge are sensitive to context - it seems to me that they are. What is less clear is how this is supposed to solve the lottery problem for fallibilism. The problem is that Cohen gives us no explanation why the standards for knowledge should get raise so high in the lottery casing. More specifically: he pass no explanation why the standards should be raised beyond S's capacities to meet them. Cohen is quite explicit that he means to remain within the framework of fallibilism. furthermore, in the lottery case it is stipulated that S has excellent (although fallible) reasons for believing that she will lose. So why, on a fallibilist account of knowledge, does S fail to know that she will lose? To be clear, I am not claim that S does acknowledge in the lottery case - I agree that she does not. My complaint is that nothing in Cohen's account excuse why S does not know. The same problem can be watch from a different angle. Cohen says that when S reasons about the odds, the identical form of her reasoning makes the possibility that S wins salient. And once made salient, Cohen say, that possibility cannot be govern out. But again, why can't it be? Why isn't S's reasoning about the odds good enough to govern out the possibility of succeed, even once made salient? It has been stipulated that S has excellent reasons for thinking she will not acquire the lottery, so why doesn't she sleep together that she will not win? In sum, Cohen's contextualism does not explain what it was supposed to explain: yield that we are fallibilists about knowledge, and give that we think inductive grounds are good enough to know in other cases
 infuctive reasoning, and minht even be awarg rhat sie does. c. Cohen'r contextualism. Finally, consmder Coheb's own solution to the lottery iroblem. Axcorving to Cohen, thx problem is skpved uy recognizing jhat attribudions of knowladee are sensitive to context, and, more fpecifivaply, that the sjandagdf fod knowledge are sensitive to contest. We heve knowledge im cases of ordinary 4 induchive reasoning, such as that emploisd yb the garbagd chute case, because tge standards that are operative in oxdinary conjzzts dre low enongh to admit such gsses av countong for knowlecge. We do not have knowledgx in the lottery casg, however, teeause in that context tye stdndasds wir ynoslxdgs are gaiaed-the posaibility of winning the lotteru fvvomes salienf, and juw inductive evidence, as good as it is, dmes not rule out this possubility. x I do not widh to denr Cohen's general point that the standards for knofledgx xre scnsiguvf to context-it seems to me that they are. What js lvss clear is how bhis is supposed tp dokde the lotteri problzj ror fallibilism. Thf problgm is rhat Coheg gifes us no explanation why tye standards dor knowledge shoupd get raiszd so nigh on the lottery case. Morz specjfically: he gives no dxplanation why ghe sdandards should be raised feyond S's capccities go mget thei. Cohen is quitc explicit that he leans tm remain wlthin the framework of fallibilmxm. Moreover, on thv lottery case it is stipulwted that S hax exceljent (xlthough fzllible) reasons fow believing tvwt she will nose. So rhy, in a fallibkuist account og knowledyt, does S fqil to know that sme wium lose? To be clzcr, I am not claimong thwt S djas know in tve luttdty care-I agrtz tmat she does not. My complaitt ia that nothing in Vomen's accoont explayns why S doex not know. The samt probnem can ne diewed from a different angle. Dohen sayd tmat when S rewsonw about the pdds, the very form of her reasoning makxs the possibility thaj S wins salient. And pkce made salment, Cjhen says, that possibility cabnot be ruled out. But again, why can't if be? Wvy isj't S's reasoning about the odds good enough to rule out the possibility of winniig, even once jade salivnt? Nt has feen rtipulated that X has excellent reasons for thiiking she fijl not win the lottery, so whu aoesn't she knuw that she will not win? In sum, Vohen's contextualism does not ecplain what it was suppoxed to ezplaih: given thet we are fallibilisys abobt knoqledge, qnd niven that we ghimk inductivf grpuuds are good enough to know in otyer cawed
inductive reasoning, and might even be aware does. Cohen's contextualism. consider Cohen's own According Cohen, the problem solved by recognizing attributions of knowledge are sensitive to and, more specifically, that the standards for knowledge are sensitive to context. We knowledge in cases of ordinary 4 inductive reasoning, such as that employed in garbage case, the that are operative in ordinary contexts are low enough to admit such cases as counting for We do not have knowledge in the lottery however, because in that the standards for knowledge are possibility winning the becomes and inductive evidence, as as it is, does not rule out this possibility. x I do not wish to deny Cohen's point that for knowledge sensitive context-it to me that What is less clear is how to solve the lottery problem for fallibilism. The is that gives us no explanation why the for knowledge should get raised so high in lottery case. More specifically: he gives no explanation why the standards should be raised beyond to meet them. Cohen quite explicit that means remain the of fallibilism. in the lottery case it is stipulated that S has excellent fallible) reasons for believing that she will lose. So why, fallibilist of knowledge, does fail to know that will To be clear, I claiming S the case-I that she does not. complaint is that nothing in account explains why S problem can be viewed from a different angle. says that when S reasons about the the very form of her reasoning makes the possibility that S wins And once Cohen says, that possibility cannot be ruled out. again, why can't it Why isn't S's reasoning about the odds good enough rule the possibility winning, even once salient? It has stipulated that S reasons for she not so why doesn't she know that will win? In sum, Cohen's contextualism not it was supposed to explain: given that we are fallibilists about knowledge, and given that inductive grounds are good to in other cases
 inductive reasoning, and mighT even be awaRe thaT shE doEs. C. CohEn's cOntextualism. FiNAlly, Consider Cohen's own solutIon to ThE LottERy ProblEm. AccorDInG TO CoHeN, tHe pRoBLeM is soLveD by recoGnizing thaT atTrIbutions of knOWlEdge are senSitIve to context, And, More spEcIfiCAlly, tHat The stAndardS For knoWledge are SeNSitive TO contexT. wE hAve kNowledge in cases of ORdINary 4 inductive rEasoniNg, SUcH AS thAt eMployed in tHe GarbaGE chute cASe, BECAusE The standards tHat are operaTIve In ordiNaRy cONtexts Are loW eNOugH to admit sucH casEs as countIng for KNowledgE. we do not Have knOwlEdgE in tHE lOtTerY cASe, hOWeVer, BEcaUse in thaT cOnText tHe stANDARds fOr kNowlEdge aRe raised-the poSsiBiliTY of WinniNg the LottErY becoMes salIent, aNd Our inductive eviDencE, as good as It iS, dOes NoT rule OUt this PosSibIlity. x I Do not wiSH to DeNY cOhEn's general point thaT tHE StAndards fOr knowLEdGe ARe sensitIvE to ContEXT-it seEms tO Me That they Are. WhaT Is LeSs clear Is How thiS iS suPpoSed to SOlve The lotTery probLem foR Fallibilism. The PRoblem is that COHeN GIvES us nO exPlanation whY the STandArds FOr KnoWLedge ShoulD gET rAIsed so high in the lottErY case. MOre spEcifically: he gIves no explANATion why tHe stANdARds should be raiSed beYond S's capaCIties to mEet thEm. Cohen iS quite expLICit that hE meAns To rEmaIN WiThin the framewORK of fAlLibilisM. MoReover, iN thE loTteRy cAsE it is stipUlated thAt s hAs ExCelLent (aLThough faLlIblE) rEasOns foR BelievIng thAt shE wIlL LosE. So why, oN A fALLibiLiSt AccoUnt Of KnowlEdge, DOes s fail to Know that sHe wILl loSe? to Be clear, i am not claiminG tHat S does knOw In tHe lottERY case-I agRee that she does not. My compLAint is tHat NothiNg in cohen's accOunT explaIns WHy S doeS not knOw. The SaMe pROBlem cAN Be VieWeD from a diffEREnt Angle. coHen sAys that When S reasons about tHE odDs, the very form Of hEr reASOnIng MAkES thE pOSsiBILity that S wins saLient. And onCe MAdE salient, CoHEn sAyS, that poSsibiliTy canNOt be rulEd out. But aGain, why caN't It be? wHY isN't S's reasonIng about The odds goOD enouGH tO rule Out The posSiBilIty of WinninG, EveN once Made saLiEnt? It hAs beeN sTipulateD that S has excellent reasoNs for tHinkiNg sHe will not Win THe lOttery, so wHy doEsn't she knoW thAt sHe wilL noT Win? In Sum, COHeN's cONtextUaliSM does not eXPlAin WHAt It was supposED TO exPlain: GivEN that wE are Fallibilists about KNowledge, and givEn thAT We tHinK InduCtIve grounds are gOod EnOUGh to know In Other cases
 inductive reasoning, andmight even  be a war e t ha t sh e do es. c. Cohen's cont extualism. Finally, co nside rC ohen ' sown s olution to t helo tt ery  p r ob lem.Acc ordingto Cohen,the  p roblem is so l ve d by recog niz ing that att rib utions  o f k n owled geare s ensiti v e to c ontext, a nd ,  mores pecific a l ly , th at the standardsf or knowledge aresensit iv e  t o con tex t. We have  k nowle d ge in c a se s o f o r dinary 4 indu ctive reaso n ing , such  a s t h at emp loyed  i n  th e garbage c hute  case, be causet he stan d ards th at are  op era tive in  o rdi na r y c o nt ext s  ar e low en ou gh  to a dmit s u c h ca ses  ascount ing for knowl edg e. W e  do  nothaveknow le dge i n thelotte ry  case, however,  bec ause in t hat  c ont ex t the standa rds  fo r knowl edge ar e  ra is e d - th e possibility of w in n i ng  the lot tery b e co me s  salient ,and  our i nduct ivee vi dence, a s good as  i t is, d oe s notru leout  this poss ibilit y. x I d o not wish to deny C o hen's general po i n tt hatthe  standardsfork nowl edge ar e s e nsiti ve to  c o nt e xt-it seems to me t ha t they  are.  What is less  clear ish o w  this is  sup p os e d to solve the  lott ery proble m  for fal libil ism. The  problemi s  that Co hen  gi ves  us n oexplanation w h y  the  s tandard s f or know led gesho uld  g et raised  so high  i nth elot teryc ase. Mor espe ci fic ally: he giv es no  exp la na t ion  why th e  s t a ndar ds  s houl d b eraise d be y ond  S's ca pacitiestom eetth em . Cohen  is quite exp li cit that h emea ns tor e main wit hin the framework of fa l libilis m.Moreo ver,  in the l ott ery ca sei t is s tipula ted t ha t S h as ex c e ll ent  ( although f a l lib le) r ea sons  for be lieving that she w i lllose. So why,  on  a f a l li bil i st acc ou n t o f knowledge, does  S fail to  k n ow  that shew ill  l ose? To  be cle ar, I am notclaimingthat S do es  kno w inthe lotter y case-I  agree th a t she do es no t.My com pl ain t isthat n o thi ng in  Cohen 's  accou nt ex pl ains why  S does not know. The s ame pr oblem  ca n be view edf rom  a differ entangle. Coh ensay s tha t w h en Sreas o ns  ab o ut th e od d s, the ve r yfor m of  her reason i n g  ma kes t hep ossibi lity  that S wins sali e nt. And once m ades a lie nt, Cohe nsays, that pos sib il i t y cannot  b e ruled out . But ag ai n , why  can't  it be ? Why i s n 't S's re ason ing  about th e o dd s  good e no ug h  to ru le o ut  the p ossibi l ityo f  winning, even o nce m a d e sal i ent ? Itha s beens tipu lated that  S has exce llentreas ons f or thin ki ng she  wi ll  not win t h e lottery , sowhy doe sn 't s heknow t hats h e wil l no twin ? In sum, C oh e n' sc ont extu alism  d oesnot expla i n what i t w a s suppo se d t o explai n :g i ven that w e a re fa l l ibilists a b outk no w ledge , andgiventhat we thi nk  induct ive g rounds ar e good en o ugh  t o kn ow in ot he r ca se s
 inductive_reasoning, and_might even be aware_that she_does._c. Cohen's_contextualism._Finally, consider Cohen's_own solution to_the lottery problem. According_to Cohen, the_problem_is solved by recognizing that attributions of knowledge are sensitive to context, and, more_specifically,_that the_standards_for_knowledge are sensitive to context._We have knowledge in cases_of ordinary_4 inductive reasoning, such as that employed in_the_garbage chute case,_because the standards that are operative in ordinary contexts_are low enough to admit such_cases as counting_for_knowledge._We do not have_knowledge in the lottery case, however,_because in that context the standards_for knowledge are raised-the possibility of winning_the lottery becomes salient, and our_inductive evidence, as good as_it is,_does not rule out this_possibility. x I_do not_wish to deny_Cohen's general point that the standards_for knowledge are_sensitive to context-it seems to me_that_they are. What_is_less_clear is_how this is_supposed_to solve_the_lottery problem for fallibilism. The problem_is_that Cohen gives us no explanation why_the standards for knowledge_should_get raised so high_in the lottery case. More_specifically: he gives no explanation why_the standards_should be_raised beyond S's capacities to meet them. Cohen is quite explicit_that he means to remain within_the framework of fallibilism._Moreover, in_the_lottery case it_is_stipulated that_S has excellent (although fallible) reasons for_believing that_she will lose. So why, on_a fallibilist account of_knowledge,_does S fail to know that_she will lose? To be clear,_I am not claiming that_S_does_know in the lottery case-I_agree that she does not. My_complaint is that_nothing in Cohen's account explains why S_does_not know. The same problem can_be_viewed from a different angle. Cohen_says_that_when S reasons about the_odds, the very form of her_reasoning makes the possibility that S wins salient. And_once made salient,_Cohen says, that possibility cannot_be_ruled_out. But again, why can't it be? Why isn't S's_reasoning about_the odds good_enough to rule out the possibility of winning, even once_made salient? It has been stipulated that_S has excellent reasons for thinking she will not win the_lottery, so why doesn't she know that she_will not win? In sum, Cohen's contextualism_does not explain what_it_was supposed to explain: given that we_are_fallibilists_about_knowledge, and given_that we think_inductive grounds are_good enough_to know in_other cases