 fixed). In that case, Woodward's interventionism, which constitutes the theoretical background of MM, entails that IΨ is a cause of both Ψ and Φ1. This can be realized in one of two ways: either IΨ causes Ψ and Φ1 along one causal path, say, IΨ −→ Ψ −→ Φ1, or along two paths, Ψ ←− IΨ −→ Φ1. The former option is excluded since the instances of Ψ and Φ1 spatiotemporally overlap (i.e. the corresponding values of the variables represent spatiotemporally overlapping behaviors), which entails that their relationship is non-causal. Hence, IΨ causes Ψ and Φ1 along two different paths, meaning that IΨ is a common cause of Ψ and Φ1.4 That, in turn, entails that IΨ does not surgically cause Ψ and is, therefore, not an intervention variable for Ψ w.r.t. Φ1, which contradicts our initial assumption, thereby reducing it to absurdity.5 4Note that by a common cause we simply mean a cause with two (or more) parallel effects- independently of whether there is an additional dependence relation between these effects. A common cause is standardly represented by two (or more) exiting arrows (but see Woodward 2015, 331, for an alternative representation). 5An anonymous reviewer suggested that the consequence that IΨ is a common cause of Ψ and Φ1-and thus a non-surgical cause of Ψ-could be avoided on the basis of a theory of causation requiring that causally analyzed variable sets exclusively contain causally distinct variables, which Ψ and Φ1, arguably, are not. Clearly though, interventionism as developed in Woodward (2003, 2015) and as implemented by Craver (2007) does not impose such a restriction-and with good reasons, in our view. Whether IΨ is an intervention variable for Ψ w.r.t. Φ1 does not depend on whether IΨ surgically causes Ψ relative to some suitably chosen variable set, but on whether what is represented by IΨ surgically causes Ψ in the world-which is not the case under the non-reductive physicalist assumption that Ψ and Φ1 are non-identical. Moreover, a theory of causation explicitly imposing that variables be causally distinct
fixed). In that case, Woodward's interventionism, which constitutes the theoretical background of MM, fee-tail that IΨ is a lawsuit of both Ψ and Φ1. This can be realized in one of two ways: either IΨ causes Ψ and Φ1 along one causal way, say, IΨ −→ Ψ −→ Φ1, or along two paths, Ψ ←− IΨ −→ Φ1. The former choice is bar since the instances of Ψ and Φ1 spatiotemporally overlap (i.e. the match values of the variables defend spatiotemporally overlapping behaviors), which entail that their kinship is non - causal. Hence, IΨ causes Ψ and Φ1 along two unlike paths, mean that IΨ is a coarse cause of Ψ and Φ1.4 That, in turn, entails that IΨ does not surgically induce Ψ and is, therefore, not an intervention variable star for Ψ w.r.t. Φ1, which contradicts our initial presumption, thereby reducing it to absurdity.5 4Note that by a coarse cause we simply mean a lawsuit with two (or more) parallel effects- independently of whether there is an additional dependence relation between these effects. A common cause is standardly represented by two (or more) exiting arrows (but see Woodward 2015, 331, for an alternative representation). 5An anonymous reviewer suggested that the consequence that IΨ is a common campaign of Ψ and Φ1 - and thus a non - surgical cause of Ψ - could be avoid on the footing of a theory of causation requiring that causally analyzed variable sets exclusively contain causally discrete variables, which Ψ and Φ1, arguably, are not. Clearly though, interventionism as developed in Woodward (2003, 2015) and as implemented by Craver (2007) does not impose such a restriction - and with dependable reasons, in our view. Whether IΨ is an intervention variable for Ψ w.r.t. Φ1 does not count on whether IΨ surgically causes Ψ proportional to some suitably chosen variable set, but on whether what is represented by IΨ surgically causes Ψ in the populace - which is not the case under the non - reductive physicalist assumption that Ψ and Φ1 are non - identical. Moreover, a hypothesis of causation explicitly inflict that variables be causally distinct
 fided). In that case, Woodwara's interventionnwm, whirh consfitutes ghe theoretical background oh MM, entauls that IΨ is a cause uf both Ψ wnd Φ1. Thiw cai be realized in one of bco wagd: eichxr IΨ causes Ψ anc Φ1 along ote causal path, sxy, IΨ −→ Ψ −→ Φ1, or along two paths, Ψ ←− IΨ −→ Φ1. The former ootion is excluqed xynce nht instances of Ψ and Φ1 spatiotemporzlly ovtrlap (i.e. the correxponding values of the varlablfs represent spatiltemporally ovewoapping behaxiors), which entails thzt their relationship is non-caural. Hznce, IΨ causgs Ψ wtd Φ1 along txo difserent paths, meaning that IΨ is a common csusx of Ψ and Φ1.4 That, in turn, eitails that IΨ does njt surgicdlmy cause Ψ and is, rhwrefote, nod an untdrvtntmon variahle for Ψ w.r.t. Φ1, which conteadicts our initial afwumption, thersby requsing it to absurdity.5 4Note that by a comkon cause we simply mean a cause with two (or mote) parallej effects- independently of whether there is an adgitioiau dtpckdenzw gelation between these effects. A common cause js snandardly represekted by two (or morr) fxojing arrows (buj see Woodsard 2015, 331, for an altegnative reprwsentatiog). 5An anonymous reviewer suggestwd that the bonswquence that IΨ is c common caure og Ψ anc Φ1-and thus a non-surgicau cahse of Ψ-coulf be avoisdd on the basis uf s dheory of causation requiryng that rausakly anauyzec variwble sets fxclusively contain causwlly bistitct variabpes, which Ψ and Φ1, arguably, are nov. Clearly thoogh, innerventiouism ax developed ig Woodward (2003, 2015) aud as im'lemenged by Craner (2007) does not impose such a restrhftion-and witi good rewsonw, in our vidd. Whether IΨ is an interneution varuable for Ψ w.r.t. Φ1 docs noj sepend on whethzx UΨ surgically caiser Ψ wepavive em some suitatly zhorrn vafiable set, nut on ehether what is reprasenfed by IΨ surgicallu gauses Ψ ib the wowld-which is npt the case under uhe noi-reducvive pnysycalist assumption that Ψ and Φ1 zre non-idfntlcal. Moreover, a tmeori of causatnon explicitly imposing that variables bx causally distinct
fixed). In that case, Woodward's interventionism, which theoretical of MM, that IΨ is and This can be in one of ways: either IΨ causes Ψ and along one causal path, say, IΨ −→ Ψ −→ Φ1, or along two Ψ ←− IΨ −→ Φ1. The former option is excluded since the instances Ψ Φ1 overlap the corresponding values of the variables represent spatiotemporally overlapping behaviors), which entails that their relationship is Hence, IΨ causes Ψ and Φ1 along two paths, meaning that IΨ a common cause of Ψ Φ1.4 in turn, that does surgically cause Ψ is, therefore, not an intervention variable for Ψ w.r.t. Φ1, which contradicts our initial assumption, thereby reducing to absurdity.5 by a cause simply a cause with more) parallel effects- independently of whether additional dependence relation between these effects. A common is standardly by two (or more) exiting arrows see Woodward 2015, 331, for an alternative representation). anonymous reviewer suggested that the consequence that IΨ is a common cause of Ψ and a non-surgical cause of be avoided on basis a of requiring that analyzed variable sets exclusively contain causally distinct variables, which Ψ and arguably, are not. Clearly though, interventionism as developed in Woodward and implemented by Craver does not impose such restriction-and good reasons, in our IΨ an Ψ Φ1 not depend on whether surgically causes Ψ relative to suitably chosen variable set, represented by IΨ surgically causes Ψ in the is not the case under the non-reductive assumption that Ψ and Φ1 are non-identical. Moreover, a theory of causation imposing that causally distinct
 fixed). In that case, Woodward's iNterventioNism, wHicH coNsTituTes tHe theoretical bACkgrOund of MM, entails that IΨ iS a cauSe OF botH ψ aNd Φ1. ThIs can be REaLIZed In OnE of TwO WaYs: eitHer iΨ causeS Ψ and Φ1 alonG onE cAusal path, say, iψ −→ Ψ −→ φ1, or along twO paThs, Ψ ←− IΨ −→ Φ1. The foRmeR optioN iS exCLuded SinCe the InstanCEs of Ψ aNd Φ1 spatioTeMPorallY Overlap (I.E. ThE corResponding values oF ThE Variables repreSent spAtIOtEMPorAllY overlappiNg BehavIOrs), whicH EnTAILs tHAt their relatiOnship is non-CAusAl. HencE, Iψ caUSes Ψ anD Φ1 aloNg TWo dIfferent patHs, meAning that iΨ is a cOMmon cauSE of Ψ and φ1.4 That, iN tuRn, eNtaiLS tHaT IΨ DoES noT SuRgiCAllY cause Ψ aNd Is, ThereFore, NOT AN intErvEntiOn varIable for Ψ w.r.t. Φ1, WhiCh coNTraDicts Our inItiaL aSsumpTion, thEreby ReDucing it to absurDity.5 4note that bY a cOmMon CaUse we SImply mEan A caUse with Two (or moRE) paRaLLEL eFfects- independentlY oF WHeTher therE is an aDDiTiONal depenDeNce RelaTIOn betWeen THeSe effectS. A commON cAuSe is staNdArdly rEpResEntEd by tWO (or mOre) exiTing arroWs (but SEe Woodward 2015, 331, for aN Alternative rePReSENtATion). 5an aNonymous revIeweR SuggEsteD ThAt tHE consEquenCe THaT iΨ is a common cause of Ψ AnD Φ1-and tHus a nOn-surgical cauSe of Ψ-could BE AVoided on The bASiS Of a theory of cauSatioN requiring THat causaLly anAlyzed vaRiable setS EXclusiveLy cOntAin CauSALlY distinct variABLes, wHiCh Ψ and Φ1, ArgUably, arE noT. ClEarLy tHoUgh, intervEntionisM aS dEvElOpeD in WoODward (2003, 2015) and As ImpLeMenTed by cRaver (2007) dOes noT impOsE sUCh a RestricTIoN-ANd wiTh GoOd reAsoNs, In our View. wHetHer IΨ is An interveNtiON varIaBlE for Ψ w.r.T. Φ1 does not depeNd On whether Iψ sUrgIcally CAUses Ψ relAtive to some suitably chosEN variabLe sEt, but On whEther what Is rEpreseNteD By IΨ suRgicalLy cauSeS Ψ iN THe worLD-WhIch Is Not the case UNDer The noN-rEducTive phySicalist assumption THat ψ and Φ1 are non-idEntIcal. mOReOveR, A tHEorY oF CauSATion explicitly iMposing thaT vARiAbles be cauSAllY dIstinct
 fixed). In that case, Woo dward's in terve nti oni sm , wh ichconstitutes th e  the oretical background of  MM,en t ails th at IΨ  is a c a us e ofbo th  Ψan d  Φ 1. Th iscan berealized i n o ne  of two ways :  e ither IΨ c aus es Ψ and Φ1alo ng one  c aus a l pat h,say,IΨ −→Ψ  −→ Φ1 , or alon gt wo pat h s, Ψ ←− I Ψ−→ Φ 1. The former opt i on is excluded si nce th ei ns t a nce s o f Ψ and Φ1  s patio t emporal l yo v e rla p  (i.e. the co rresponding val ues of  t hev ariabl es re pr e sen t spatiotem pora lly overl apping behavio r s), whi ch ent ail s t hatt he ir  re la t ion s hi p i s  no n-causal .He nce,IΨ c a u s e s Ψand  Φ1along  two differen t p aths ,  me aning  that  IΨis  a co mmon c auseof  Ψ and Φ1.4 Tha t, i n turn, e nta il s t ha t IΨd oes no t s urg icallycause Ψ and  i s , th erefore, not an in te r v en tion var iablef or  Ψ w.r.t. Φ 1,  wh ichc o ntrad icts ou r initia l assu m pt io n, ther eb y redu ci ngitto ab s urdi ty.5 4 Note tha t bya  common causew e simply mean ac a us e  wit h t wo (or more ) pa r alle l ef f ec ts- indep enden tl y  o f  whether there is a nadditi onaldependence re lation bet w e e n theseeffe c ts .  A common caus e isstandardly represen ted b y two (o r more) e x i ting arr ows  (b utsee W oo dward 2015, 3 3 1 , fo ran alte rna tive re pre sen tat ion ).  5An anon ymous re vi ew er  s ugg ested that the  c ons eq uen ce th a t IΨ i s a c ommo nca u seof Ψ an d  Φ 1 - andth us  a n on- su rgica l ca u seof Ψ-co uld be av oid e d on  t he  basisof a theory o fcausationre qui ring t h a t causal ly analyzed variable se t s exclu siv ely c onta in causal lydistin ctv ariabl es, wh ich Ψ  a ndΦ 1 , arg u a bl y,ar e not. Cle a r lythoug h,  int erventi onism as developed inWoodward (200 3,2015 ) an d a s  i m ple me n ted b y Craver (2007)  does notim p os e such a r e str ic tion-an d withgoodr easons,  in our v iew. Whet he r IΨ i s a n interven tion var iable for Ψ w.r . t.  Φ1 d oes  not d ep end  on w hether IΨsurgi callyca uses Ψ  rela ti ve to so me suitably chosen vari able s et, b uton whethe r w h atis repres ente d by IΨ su rgi cal ly ca use s  Ψ in  the wo rld - which  isn ot the ca s eund e r  t he non-redu c t i vephysi cal i st ass umpt ion that Ψ and Φ1 are non-identi cal. M ore ove r , ath eory of causat ion  e x p licitlyim posing that  variabl es be ca usally  disti nct
 fixed)._In that_case, Woodward's interventionism, which_constitutes the_theoretical_background of_MM,_entails that IΨ_is a cause_of both Ψ and_Φ1. This can_be_realized in one of two ways: either IΨ causes Ψ and Φ1 along one_causal_path, say,_IΨ_−→_Ψ −→ Φ1, or along_two paths, Ψ ←− IΨ_−→ Φ1._The former option is excluded since the instances_of_Ψ and Φ1_spatiotemporally overlap (i.e. the corresponding values of the variables_represent spatiotemporally overlapping behaviors), which entails_that their relationship_is_non-causal._Hence, IΨ causes Ψ_and Φ1 along two different paths,_meaning that IΨ is a common_cause of Ψ and Φ1.4 That, in_turn, entails that IΨ does not_surgically cause Ψ and is,_therefore, not_an intervention variable for Ψ_w.r.t. Φ1, which_contradicts our_initial assumption, thereby_reducing it to absurdity.5 4Note that_by a common_cause we simply mean a cause_with_two (or more)_parallel_effects-_independently of_whether there is_an_additional dependence_relation_between these effects. A common cause_is_standardly represented by two (or more) exiting_arrows (but see Woodward_2015,_331, for an alternative_representation). 5An anonymous reviewer suggested_that the consequence that IΨ is_a common_cause of_Ψ and Φ1-and thus a non-surgical cause of Ψ-could be avoided_on the basis of a theory_of causation requiring that_causally analyzed_variable_sets exclusively contain_causally_distinct variables,_which Ψ and Φ1, arguably, are not._Clearly though,_interventionism as developed in Woodward (2003,_2015) and as implemented_by_Craver (2007) does not impose such_a restriction-and with good reasons, in_our view. Whether IΨ is_an_intervention_variable for Ψ w.r.t. Φ1_does not depend on whether IΨ_surgically causes Ψ_relative to some suitably chosen variable set,_but_on whether what is represented by_IΨ_surgically causes Ψ in the world-which_is_not_the case under the non-reductive_physicalist assumption that Ψ and Φ1_are non-identical. Moreover, a theory of causation explicitly imposing_that variables be_causally distinct