 arranged tablewise. 3 metaphysician's ontologically committing language), but this is compatible with the sentence "This apple is red" being true since this latter sentence is uttered in ordinary English. In Ontologese, it is true that there are atoms arranged applewise in my hand (that is, in 'atoms arranged my-hand-wise'), and this is all that is required for the ordinary English's sentence "This apple is red" to be true. There simply is a convention in ordinary English that whenever there are atoms arranged applewise, it is true in ordinary English (but not in Ontologese) that there is an apple – Ontologese being, of course, the more fundamental and ontologically committing language. Thus, neither our everyday actions nor our linguistic practices are violated by the claims metaphysical eliminativists make. And neither is our perceptual phenomenal experience. It is true that we have visual phenomenal experiences as of tables and as of apples around us, but again, we do not need to postulate the existence of tables and apples to account for that – atoms arranged tablewise and applewise can perfectly well fit the bill. Indeed, our visual experience is simply neutral with respect to this issue: our experience would be exactly the same whether there were tables and apples in front of us, or whether there were atoms arranged tablewise and applewise (in short, atoms arranged tablewise reflect light in the very same way tables do, and so the light that hits our retina would be exactly the same in both cases) 4. To sum up, the best argument in favour of metaphysical eliminativism about ordinary material objects is that we just don't need them. We need to be able to sit at tables and to eat apples, but we don't need tables and apples for that. We need to be able to sell and buy them, but that's OK too. We need to account for our visual (and other) experiences as of tables and apples, but we don't need tables and apples for that either. We need to talk about them, but that works as well. Atoms arranged tablewise and applewise can do all these jobs perfectly well, and there is no need to postulate the further existence of tables and apples as sui generis objects. Furthermore, we don't need them in metaphysics either – indeed, one of the main motivations for metaphysical eliminativism lies in the fact that it efficiently and elegantly solves many philosophical puzzle cases, for instance, concerning vagueness, persistence
arranged tablewise. 3 metaphysician's ontologically committing language), but this is compatible with the sentence " This apple is crimson " being genuine since this latter sentence is uttered in ordinary English. In Ontologese, it is dependable that there are atoms format applewise in my handwriting (that is, in' atoms arranged my - hand - wise'), and this is all that is required for the average English's sentence " This apple is red " to be true. There simply is a conventionality in ordinary English that whenever there are atom arranged applewise, it is true in average English (but not in Ontologese) that there is an apple – Ontologese being, of course, the more fundamental and ontologically give language. Thus, neither our casual actions nor our linguistic practice are violated by the claims metaphysical eliminativists make. And neither is our perceptual phenomenal experience. It is true that we have ocular phenomenal experiences as of tables and as of apples around us, but again, we do not need to postulate the existence of tables and apples to account for that – atoms arranged tablewise and applewise can perfectly well fit the bill. Indeed, our visual experience is simply neutral with esteem to this issue: our experience would be exactly the like whether there be table and apples in front of us, or whether there were atoms arranged tablewise and applewise (in short, atoms arrange tablewise reflect light in the very same way tables do, and then the light that hits our retina would be exactly the same in both sheath) 4. To sum up, the good argument in favour of metaphysical eliminativism about ordinary material objects is that we barely don't need them. We need to be able to sit at table and to eat apples, but we don't need tables and apple for that. We need to be able to betray and buy them, but that's OK excessively. We need to report for our visual (and other) experiences as of tables and apple, but we don't need tables and apples for that either. We need to talk about them, but that solve as well. Atoms arranged tablewise and applewise can do all these jobs perfectly well, and there is no need to contend the further existence of tables and apple as sui generis objects. Furthermore, we don't need them in metaphysics either – indeed, one of the independent motivations for metaphysical eliminativism lies in the fact that it efficiently and elegantly solves many philosophic puzzle cases, for instance, concerning vagueness, persistence
 arganged tablewise. 3 metaphnsician's ontolognxally rommittjng langjage), but this is compatible xith the wentence "This apple is red" beinh true sunce rhis lattec sentengz is hbtereb mn ordinary Engkish. In Ondologese, it is tfuz that there are atoms arranged applqwise im ly hand (that if, in 'wtoma arranged my-hand-wise'), and this is zll thau is required for yhe ordinary English's sentfnce "This apple is red" to be true. Theww simply is x convention in ordinaty English that whenever there afe atpms arranggb aponewise, it iw truv in ordinary English (but noy in Ontologesc) thav thwre is an apple – Ontonogese being, of coorse, the mmrz fundamental and ontiligicanly wommkrtivg maiguzge. Thks, ieither our everyday axtions nor our lingiifnoc practices are vyojated by the claims metaphysical elimindtibists make. And neither us our perceptual phejomenal evperience. It is true that we have visual phenomendl ex'efieugcs ar ov tables and as of apples around us, but again, se dp not need to iostulate the exisyejcr of tables ana applza fo account for thah – atomf arrqnged tabjewixe and applewise can perfecrly well fit rhe bill. Indeed, oux visual expzriencg is somply neutral with respzct to this issue: our expedkence would be ebacnly dhe same whether there werq tables end a'ples in fromt of ts, or whetjer tmare were atoms arrwnged tdblewise ajd applewise (in short, atoms arreiged tablewisg raflvct light in tme very same war tables do, anb so the lighg that hita our rxtina would fe exactly tha same in boti cases) 4. Eo sym up, the bdrt argument in favour oy metqphysical eliminatlvism zbout ordinary nattrual objects is thxt re jnst djt't need them. We veea to bd able uj wkt ay tables and to eat dpplss, but we don't neec bables ane apples for that. We meed to be able to sell anv buy yhei, but that's OK too. We need to zccount flr jur visual (agd obher) experienczs as of tables and apples, but we don't nxed tables and apples fir that either. We nged to talk abput trem, but tvat works as well. Atims arranged tabltwise and applewise can do aln thede jobs perfectly well, and there is no need to postulate the further exisrence of tables ans aplles ds xui gegerid objects. Furtherkore, we don't need them in metapiysics eitvex – indeed, one of the main motovxtions for mejaphysical eliminativism ljes in tne fact that it efficiently and elegantly solves many pmilosophixal phzzle bzsxs, for instance, concrrning vaguwness, pwrsidtence
arranged tablewise. 3 metaphysician's ontologically committing language), is with the "This apple is latter is uttered in English. In Ontologese, is true that there are atoms applewise in my hand (that is, in 'atoms arranged my-hand-wise'), and this is that is required for the ordinary English's sentence "This apple is red" to true. simply a in ordinary English that whenever there are atoms arranged applewise, it is true in ordinary English not in Ontologese) that there is an apple Ontologese being, of course, more fundamental and ontologically committing Thus, our everyday nor linguistic are violated by claims metaphysical eliminativists make. And neither is our perceptual phenomenal experience. It is true that we have phenomenal experiences tables and of around but again, we need to postulate the existence of to account for that – atoms arranged tablewise applewise can well fit the bill. Indeed, our experience is simply neutral with respect to this our experience would be exactly the same whether there were tables and apples in front or whether there were arranged tablewise and (in atoms tablewise light in very same way tables do, and so the light that hits retina would be exactly the same in both cases) 4. up, best argument in of metaphysical eliminativism about material is that we just them. need to at and to eat apples, we don't need tables and for that. We need and buy them, but that's OK too. We to account for our visual (and other) as of tables and apples, but we don't need tables and apples that either. to talk about them, but that works as Atoms arranged tablewise and can do all these jobs perfectly well, and there no to postulate further existence of and apples as generis objects. Furthermore, need them metaphysics – the main motivations for metaphysical eliminativism in fact that it efficiently and solves puzzle cases, for instance, concerning vagueness, persistence
 arranged tablewise. 3 metaphysIcian's ontoLogicAllY coMmIttiNg laNguage), but this iS CompAtible with the sentence "THis apPlE Is reD" BeIng trUe since THiS LAttEr SeNteNcE Is UtterEd iN ordinaRy English. IN OnToLogese, it is trUE tHat there arE atOms arranged aPplEwise iN mY haND (that Is, iN 'atomS arranGEd my-haNd-wise'), and ThIS is all THat is reQUIrEd foR the ordinary EngliSH's SEntence "This appLe is reD" tO Be TRUe. THerE simply is a CoNventIOn in ordINaRY eNglISh that wheneveR there are atOMs aRrangeD aPplEWise, it Is truE iN OrdInary EnglisH (but Not in OntoLogese) THat therE Is an appLe – OntoLogEse BeinG, Of CoUrsE, tHE moRE fUndAMenTal and onToLoGicalLy coMMITTing LanGuagE. Thus, Neither our eveRydAy acTIonS nor oUr linGuisTiC pracTices aRe vioLaTed by the claims mEtapHysical elImiNaTivIsTs makE. and neiTheR is Our percEptual pHEnoMeNAL ExPerience. It is true thAt WE HaVe visual PhenomENaL eXPerienceS aS of TablES And as Of apPLeS around uS, but agAIn, We Do not neEd To postUlAte The ExistENce oF tableS and applEs to aCCount for that – atOMs arranged tabLEwISE aND appLewIse can perfeCtly WEll fIt thE BiLl. INDeed, oUr visUaL ExPErience is simply neutRaL with rEspecT to this issue: oUr experienCE WOuld be exActlY ThE Same whether theRe werE tables and APples in fRont oF us, or wheTher there WERe atoms aRraNgeD taBleWISe And applewise (iN SHort, AtOms arraNgeD tablewIse RefLecT liGhT in the verY same way TaBlEs Do, And So the LIght that HiTs oUr RetIna woULd be exActly The sAmE iN BotH cases) 4. TO SuM UP, the BeSt ArguMenT iN favoUr of MEtaPhysicaL eliminatIviSM aboUt OrDinary mAterial objectS iS that we jusT dOn't Need thEM. we need to Be able to sit at tables and tO Eat applEs, bUt we dOn't nEed tables And Apples For THat. We nEed to bE able To SelL ANd buy THEm, But ThAt's OK too. We NEEd tO accoUnT for Our visuAl (and other) experienCEs aS of tables and aPplEs, buT WE dOn't NEeD TabLeS And APPles for that eithEr. We need to TaLK aBout them, buT ThaT wOrks as wEll. AtomS arraNGed tablEwise and aPplewise cAn Do alL THesE jobs perfeCtly well, And there iS No neeD To PostuLatE the fuRtHer ExistEnce of TAblEs and Apples As Sui genEris oBjEcts. FurtHermore, we don't need them in MetaphYsics EitHer – indeed, One OF thE main motiVatiOns for metaPhySicAl eliMinATivisM lieS In The FAct thAt it EFficientlY AnD elEGAnTly solves maNY PHilOsophIcaL Puzzle CaseS, for instance, conceRNing vagueness, pErsiSTEncE
 arranged tablewise. 3 met aphysician 's on tol ogi ca llycomm itting languag e ), b ut this is compatiblewithth e  sen t en ce "T his app l ei s  re d"  b ein gt ru e sin cethis la tter sente nce  i s uttered in or dinary Eng lis h. In Ontolo ges e, itis  tr u e tha t t hereare at o ms arr anged app le w ise in my hand ( th at i s, in 'atoms arra n ge d  my-hand-wise' ), and  t h is i s a llthat is re qu iredf or theo rd i n a ryE nglish's sent ence "Thisa ppl e is r ed " t o  be tr ue. T he r e s imply is aconv ention in  ordin a ry Engl i sh that  whene ver  th erea re  a tom sa rra n ge d a p ple wise, it  i struein o r d i n aryEng lish  (but  not in Ontol oge se)t hat  ther e isan a pp le –Ontolo gesebe ing, of course,  the  more fun dam en tal  a nd on t ologic all y c ommitti ng lang u age .T h u s,  neither our every da y ac tions no r ourl in gu i stic pra ct ice s ar e viola tedb ythe clai ms met a ph ys ical el im inativ is tsmak e. An d  nei ther i s our pe rcept u al phenomenale xperience. It is t ru e  tha t w e have visu al p h enom enal ex per i ences  as o ft ab l es and as of apples  a roundus, b ut again, wedo not nee d t o postul atet he existence of t ables  and apple s  to acco unt f or that– atoms a r r anged ta ble wis e a nda p pl ewise can per f e ctly  w ell fit  th e bill.  In dee d,our  v isual exp erienceis  s im pl y n eutra l  with re sp ect  t o t his i s sue: o ur ex peri en ce wou ld be e x ac t l y th esa me w het he r the re w e retablesand apple s i n  fro nt  o f us, o r whether the re  were atom sarr angedt a blewiseand applewise (in short ,  atomsarr anged  tab lewise re fle ct lig hti n thevery s ame w ay  ta b l es do , an d s othe lightt h athitsou r re tina wo uld be exactly the sam e in both cas es)  4.T o  s umu p, the  b e sta r gument in favou r of metap hy s ic al elimina t ivi sm  aboutordinar y mat e rial ob jects isthat we j us t do n ' t n eed them.We needto be abl e  to s i tat ta ble s andto  ea t app les, b u t w e don 't nee dtables  andap ples for  that. We need to be ab le toselland  buy them , b u t t hat's OKtoo.  We need t o a cco unt f oro ur vi sual (a ndo ther)  exp e riences a s  o f t a b le s and apple s , but  we d on' t  needtabl es and apples for that either. W e ne e d  to  ta l k ab ou t them, but th atwo r k s as wel l.  Atoms arra nged tab le w ise a nd app lewise  can do a ll thesejobs  pe rfectly w ell ,a nd ther eis no nee d to  p ostula te the furt h e r existence of t ables a nd ap p les  as s ui  generi s  obj ects. Furt hermore, we  don't  nee d the m in me ta physic s e it her – inde e d, one of  themain mo ti vati ons  for m etap h y sical  eli mi nat ivism lie s in th ef act  tha t itef fici ently and elegantl y s o lves ma ny  ph i l osophi c al p uzzle case s,for i n s tance, con c erni n gv aguen ess, p ersist ence
 arranged_tablewise. 3_metaphysician's ontologically committing language),_but this_is_compatible with_the_sentence "This apple_is red" being_true since this latter_sentence is uttered_in_ordinary English. In Ontologese, it is true that there are atoms arranged applewise in_my_hand (that_is,_in_'atoms arranged my-hand-wise'), and this_is all that is required_for the_ordinary English's sentence "This apple is red" to_be_true. There simply_is a convention in ordinary English that whenever there_are atoms arranged applewise, it is_true in ordinary_English_(but_not in Ontologese) that_there is an apple – Ontologese_being, of course, the more fundamental_and ontologically committing language. Thus, neither our_everyday actions nor our linguistic practices_are violated by the claims_metaphysical eliminativists_make. And neither is our_perceptual phenomenal experience._It is_true that we_have visual phenomenal experiences as of_tables and as_of apples around us, but again,_we_do not need_to_postulate_the existence_of tables and_apples_to account_for_that – atoms arranged tablewise and_applewise_can perfectly well fit the bill. Indeed,_our visual experience is_simply_neutral with respect to_this issue: our experience would_be exactly the same whether there_were tables_and apples_in front of us, or whether there were atoms arranged tablewise_and applewise (in short, atoms arranged_tablewise reflect light in_the very_same_way tables do,_and_so the_light that hits our retina would be_exactly the_same in both cases) 4. To_sum up, the best_argument_in favour of metaphysical eliminativism about_ordinary material objects is that we_just don't need them. We_need_to_be able to sit at_tables and to eat apples, but_we don't need_tables and apples for that. We need_to_be able to sell and buy_them,_but that's OK too. We need_to_account_for our visual (and other)_experiences as of tables and apples,_but we don't need tables and apples for that_either. We need_to talk about them, but_that_works_as well. Atoms arranged tablewise and applewise can do all_these jobs_perfectly well, and_there is no need to postulate the further existence of_tables and apples as sui generis objects._Furthermore, we don't need them in metaphysics either – indeed, one_of the main motivations for metaphysical eliminativism lies_in the fact that it efficiently and_elegantly solves many philosophical_puzzle_cases, for instance, concerning vagueness, persistence