 sensibility, which may not be shared by other groups but which we use to evaluate the beliefs of other groups?" Finally, as mentioned at the end of the last section, a full defense of a contextualist moral epistemology would require that I show that alternative epistemological views are less plausible than my own. I have only hinted at reasons for making such an assertion. A Contextualist Moral Epistemology 319 I am optimistic about responding to the misgivings, filling out the arguments, and filling in the important details. But a more comprehensive attempt must wait for another occasion.° Notes I wish to thank the audience at the conference on Moral Epistemology (Dartmouth College, September 29-October 2,1994) for a very helpful discussion of my paper. I am especially indebted to Robert Audi, Denny Bradshaw, Malia Brink, Michael DePaul, Michael Gorr, Mitch Haney, David Henderson, Terry Horgan, Stefan Sencerz, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Bill Throop, John Tienson, and Bill Tolhurst for many comments and suggestions on earlier versions of this paper. 1. Interviewee featured in R. N. Bellah, R. Madson, W. M. Sullivan, A. Swindler, and S. M. Tipton, Habits of the Heart (New York: Harper & Row, 1985), 6. 2. I develop a view about the semantics and metaphysics of moral discourse in my Morality Without Foundations (forthcoming), chapter 4. 3. Alvin Goldman, "Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge," Journal of Philosophy 73 (1976), 771-91. 4. Stewart Cohen, "Knowledge and Context," Journal of Philosophy 83 (1986), 579. 5. For instance, it is at least initially plausible to suppose that whether or not a long-forgotten defeater d of evidence e-evidence otherwise adequate for justifiably believing some true proposition p and on the basis of which one currently believes p-undermines one's knowledge of p depends on facts about the normal memory abilities of one's social group. If no normal member of one's group would remember d, then the fact that one used to possess a defeater of e does not undermine one's knowledge of p. See Stewart Cohen, "Knowledge, Context, and Social Standards," Synthese 73 (1987), 3-26, for a discussion of the cases of memory
sensibility, which may not be shared by other groups but which we practice to measure the impression of other group? " last, as mentioned at the end of the concluding section, a full defense mechanism of a contextualist moral epistemology would require that I show that alternate epistemological views are less plausible than my own. I have only hinted at rationality for making such an affirmation. A Contextualist Moral Epistemology 319 I am optimistic about respond to the scruple, filling out the arguments, and filling in the authoritative details. But a more comprehensive attempt must wait for another juncture. ° Notes I wish to thank the audience at the conference on Moral Epistemology (Dartmouth College, September 29 - October 2,1994) for a very helpful discussion of my paper. I am especially indebted to Robert Audi, Denny Bradshaw, Malia Brink, Michael DePaul, Michael Gorr, Mitch Haney, David Henderson, Terry Horgan, Stefan Sencerz, Walter Sinnott - Armstrong, Bill Throop, John Tienson, and Bill Tolhurst for many gossip and suggestions on earlier versions of this paper. 1. Interviewee featured in R. N. Bellah, R. Madson, W. M. Sullivan, A. Swindler, and S. M. Tipton, Habits of the Heart (New York: Harper & Row, 1985), 6. 2. I develop a view about the semantics and metaphysics of moral discourse in my Morality Without Foundations (forthcoming), chapter 4. 3. Alvin Goldman, " Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge, " Journal of Philosophy 73 (1976), 771 - 91. 4. Stewart Cohen, " Knowledge and Context, " Journal of Philosophy 83 (1986), 579. 5. For instance, it is at least initially plausible to suppose that whether or not a long - forgotten defeater d of evidence e - evidence otherwise adequate for justifiably believing some true suggestion p and on the basis of which one presently believe phosphorus - undermines one's knowledge of p depends on facts about the normal memory abilities of one's social group. If no normal member of one's group would remember d, then the fact that one used to own a defeater of e does not undermine one's knowledge of p. See Stewart Cohen, " Knowledge, Context, and Social Standards, " Synthese 73 (1987), 3 - 26, for a discussion of the cases of memory
 sejsibility, which may not ne shared by othgr groupv but shich we use to evaluate the beliefs od othtg groups?" Finally, as mdntioned wt the ebd oh the last section, a full defehde oy e contextualist moral epivtemology woulg feeuire that I show that alternative qpistempllgical views ate lexf plzlslble than my own. I have only hinfed at geasons for makinb such an assertion. A Contfxtuwlist Moral Epistelology 319 I an opeumistic aboug responding to the miagivings, filling out the argumevts, aud filling un thf important vetailf. But a more comprehansive sttempt must wsit foe another occasion.° Noves I wish to thank jhe audienwe at the conferencw in Motal E[istdnolugy (Dertjouth Folmege, Septejber 29-Octobee 2,1994) for a very helpfil eiscussion of my pa[ew. I am especially indebted to Robert Augi, Senny Bradshaw, Malia Brunk, Michael DePaul, Mifhael Gorw, Mitch Haney, David Henderson, Terry Horgan, Stefan Sencxrx, Wcoter Runjott-Armstrong, Bill Throop, John Tienson, and Bijm Uolmurst for many cjmments and skgbgstions on earuier vzdsjons of this paper. 1. Interdiewew featureq in R. N. Bellah, R. Madson, W. M. Suolivan, A. Swiudlwr, and S. M. Tipton, Kabits of thz Hearj (New Uork: Harper & Row, 1985), 6. 2. I dzvelop a view abokt the sejxntics and metapfyspcs mf moral discourse in my Mjrality Wmthouc Foundagionx (fortrcoming), chwpter 4. 3. Alvin Goldman, "Didcrimnnatimn and Perfeptual Knowledge," Journal of Phmkosophy 73 (1976), 771-91. 4. Xtawagt Cohen, "Hnowlcdge and Contexe," Journal of Pkilosophv 83 (1986), 579. 5. Wor instanbe, it is et least inieially plausitpe to supposx that whqthee or not a uung-forgotten drfeater d of evidenxe e-evidence otherxise zdequate for juwtidiably believinb sume tgue pwmposition p dnd un gne baris of whicm ove cirrently believes p-utderjines one's knowledbe of p dekends on sacts about tne normal memory ahilitmes of one's sosial group. If no normal member of one's hromp would remeiber d, then the yact that one used to possess a defeater of e does not undwrmine one's knowledye of p. See Svewart Cohen, "Knmwledge, Context, and Wocial Standards," Xynthese 73 (1987), 3-26, for a disdussiot of hhe cases of memory
sensibility, which may not be shared by but we use evaluate the beliefs mentioned the end of last section, a defense of a contextualist moral epistemology require that I show that alternative epistemological views are less plausible than my I have only hinted at reasons for making such an assertion. A Contextualist Epistemology I optimistic responding to the misgivings, filling out the arguments, and filling in the important details. But a comprehensive attempt must wait for another occasion.° Notes wish to thank the at the conference on Moral (Dartmouth September 29-October for very discussion of my I am especially indebted to Robert Audi, Denny Bradshaw, Malia Brink, Michael DePaul, Michael Gorr, Mitch Haney, Henderson, Terry Sencerz, Walter Bill John and Bill Tolhurst comments and suggestions on earlier versions 1. Interviewee featured in R. N. Bellah, R. W. M. A. Swindler, and S. M. Tipton, of the Heart (New York: Harper & Row, 6. 2. I develop a view about the semantics and metaphysics of moral discourse in Without Foundations (forthcoming), chapter 3. Alvin Goldman, and Knowledge," of 73 (1976), 4. Stewart Cohen, "Knowledge and Context," Journal of Philosophy 83 (1986), 5. For instance, it is at least initially plausible to whether not a long-forgotten d of evidence e-evidence adequate justifiably believing some true and the one believes one's knowledge of p on facts about the normal abilities of one's social of one's group would remember d, then the that one used to possess a defeater e does not undermine one's knowledge of p. See Stewart Cohen, "Knowledge, and Social 73 (1987), 3-26, for a discussion of the of memory
 sensibility, which may not be sHared by othEr groUps But WhIch wE use To evaluate the bELiefS of other groups?" Finally, aS mentIoNEd at THe End of The last SEcTIOn, a FuLl DefEnSE oF a conTexTualist Moral epistEmoLoGy would requiRE tHat I show thAt aLternative epIstEmologIcAl vIEws arE leSs plaUsible THan my oWn. I have onLy HInted aT Reasons FOR mAkinG such an assertion. A cOnTExtualist Moral episteMoLOgY 319 i Am oPtiMistic abouT rEsponDIng to thE MiSGIVinGS, filling out thE arguments, aND fiLling iN tHe iMPortanT detaIlS. but A more compreHensIve attempT must wAIt for anOTher occAsion.° NOteS I wIsh tO ThAnK thE aUDieNCe At tHE coNference On moRal EpIsteMOLOGy (DaRtmOuth colleGe, September 29-OcTobEr 2,1994) foR A veRy helPful dIscuSsIon of My papeR. I am eSpEcially indebted To RoBert Audi, DEnnY BRadShAw, MalIA Brink, micHaeL DePaul, michael gOrr, miTCH haNey, David Henderson, TErRY hoRgan, StefAn SencERz, waLTer SinnoTt-armStroNG, bill THrooP, joHn TiensoN, and BiLL TOlHurst foR mAny comMeNts And SuggeSTionS on earLier versIons oF This paper. 1. InterVIewee featured IN R. n. bElLAh, R. MAdsOn, W. M. SullivaN, A. SwINdleR, and s. m. TIptON, HabiTs of tHe hEaRT (New York: Harper & Row, 1985), 6. 2. I dEvElop a vIew abOut the semantiCs and metapHYSIcs of morAl diSCoURse in my MoralitY WithOut FoundatIOns (forthCominG), chapter 4. 3. alvin GoldMAN, "DiscrimInaTioN anD PeRCEpTual Knowledge," jOUrnaL oF PhilosOphY 73 (1976), 771-91. 4. StewarT CoHen, "knoWleDgE and ConteXt," JournaL oF PHiLoSopHy 83 (1986), 579. 5. For INstance, iT iS at LeAst InitiALly plaUsiblE to sUpPoSE thAt whethER oR NOt a lOnG-fOrgoTteN dEfeatEr d oF EviDence e-eVidence otHerWIse aDeQuAte for jUstifiably belIeVing some trUe ProPositiON P and on thE basis of which one currentLY believEs p-UnderMineS one's knowLedGe of p dEpeNDs on faCts aboUt the NoRmaL MEmory ABIlItiEs Of one's sociAL GroUp. If nO nOrmaL member Of one's group would reMEmbEr d, then the facT thAt onE USeD to POsSEss A dEFeaTER of e does not undeRmine one's kNoWLeDge of p. See STEwaRt cohen, "KnOwledge, conteXT, and SocIal StandaRds," SyntheSe 73 (1987), 3-26, For a DIScuSsion of the Cases of mEmory
 sensibility, which may no t be share d byoth ergr oups  but  which we uset o ev aluate the beliefs ofother  g r oups ? "Final ly, asm en t i one dat  th ee nd  of t helast se ction, a f ull  d efense of ac on textualist  mo ral epistemo log y woul dreq u ire t hat  I sh ow tha t  alter native ep is t emolog i cal vie w s  a re l ess plausible tha n  m y  own. I have o nly hi nt e da t  re aso ns for mak in g suc h  an ass e rt i o n . A Contextualist  Moral Epis t emo logy 3 19  Ia m opti misti ca bou t respondin g to  the misg ivings ,  fillin g  out th e argu men ts,  and fi ll ing  i n  th e  i mpo r tan t detail s.  B ut amore c o m preh ens iveattem pt must waitfor  ano t her  occa sion. ° No te s I w ish to  than kthe audience at  the  conferen ceon  Mo ra l Epi s temolo gy(Da rtmouth  Colleg e , S ep t e m be r 29-October 2,199 4) f or  a veryhelpfu l  d is c ussion o fmypape r .  I am  esp e ci ally ind ebtedt oRo bert Au di , Denn yBra dsh aw, M a liaBrink,  Michael  DePa u l, Michael Gor r , Mitch Haney ,  D a v id Hend ers on, Terry H orga n , St efan Se nce r z, Wa lterSi n no t t-Armstrong, Bill T hr oop, J ohn T ienson, and B ill Tolhur s t for many  com m en t s and suggesti ons o n earlierv ersionsof th is paper . 1. Inte r v iewee fe atu red  in  R. N .Bellah, R. Ma d s on,W.  M. Sul liv an, A.Swi ndl er,  an dS. M. Tip ton, Hab it sof  t heHeart (New Yor k:  Ha rp er& Row ,  1985) , 6.2. I  d ev e lop  a view ab o u t th ese mant ics  a nd me taph y sic s of mo ral disco urs e  inmy  M orality  Without Foun da tions (for th com ing),c h apter 4.  3. Alvin Goldman, "Dis c riminat ion  andPerc eptual Kn owl edge,"  Jo u rnal o f Phil osoph y73( 1 976), 7 71 -91 .4. Stewart C ohe n, "K no wled ge andContext," Journalo f P hilosophy 83(19 86), 5 79 . 5 .  F o r i ns t anc e ,  it is at least  initially  p l au sible to s u ppo se  that w hetheror no t  a long -forgotte n defeate rd of e vid ence e-evi dence ot herwise a d equat e  f or ju sti fiably  b eli eving  somet rue  prop ositio np andon th ebasis of  which one currently be lieves  p-un der mines one 'sk now ledge ofp de pends on f act s a boutthe norma l me m or y a b iliti es o f  one's so c ia l g r o up . If no nor m a l  me mberofo ne's g roup  would remember d ,  then the fact  tha t one  us e d to  p ossess a defea ter  o f e does n ot  undermineone's kn ow l edgeof p.See St ewart C o h en ,  "Know ledg e,Context,and  S o cial St an da r ds," S ynth es e 73 ( 1987), 3-26 , for a discussion  of t h e  case s  of  memo ry 
 sensibility,_which may_not be shared by_other groups_but_which we_use_to evaluate the_beliefs of other_groups?" Finally, as mentioned_at the end_of_the last section, a full defense of a contextualist moral epistemology would require that_I_show that_alternative_epistemological_views are less plausible than_my own. I have only_hinted at_reasons for making such an assertion. A Contextualist_Moral_Epistemology 319 I_am optimistic about responding to the misgivings, filling out_the arguments, and filling in the_important details. But_a_more_comprehensive attempt must wait_for another occasion.° Notes I wish_to thank the audience at the_conference on Moral Epistemology (Dartmouth College, September_29-October 2,1994) for a very helpful_discussion of my paper. I_am especially_indebted to Robert Audi, Denny_Bradshaw, Malia Brink,_Michael DePaul,_Michael Gorr, Mitch_Haney, David Henderson, Terry Horgan, Stefan_Sencerz, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong,_Bill Throop, John Tienson, and Bill_Tolhurst_for many comments_and_suggestions_on earlier_versions of this_paper._1. Interviewee_featured_in R. N. Bellah, R. Madson,_W._M. Sullivan, A. Swindler, and S. M._Tipton, Habits of the_Heart_(New York: Harper &_Row, 1985), 6. 2. I_develop a view about the semantics_and metaphysics_of moral_discourse in my Morality Without Foundations (forthcoming), chapter 4. 3. Alvin_Goldman, "Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge," Journal_of Philosophy 73 (1976),_771-91. 4._Stewart_Cohen, "Knowledge and_Context,"_Journal of_Philosophy 83 (1986), 579. 5. For instance,_it is_at least initially plausible to suppose_that whether or not_a_long-forgotten defeater d of evidence e-evidence_otherwise adequate for justifiably believing some_true proposition p and on_the_basis_of which one currently believes_p-undermines one's knowledge of p depends_on facts about_the normal memory abilities of one's social_group._If no normal member of one's_group_would remember d, then the fact_that_one_used to possess a defeater_of e does not undermine one's_knowledge of p. See Stewart Cohen, "Knowledge, Context, and_Social Standards," Synthese_73 (1987), 3-26, for a_discussion_of_the cases of memory