, we have the following: (4) Bertie's sporadic training rather than no training promotes the satisfaction of his desire. (5) Bertie's regular training rather than no training promotes the satisfaction of his desire. (6) Bertie's sporadic training rather than regular training ​does not promote the satisfaction of his desire. Given (4), there is a sense in which Bertie's sporadic training promotes his desire, in that Bertie's sporadic training ​rather than no training ​does promote the satisfaction of his desire to run a marathon. By the same token, given (5), there is a sense in which 20 For more on contrastive reasons, see Snedegar (2014, esp. p. 53 and following; 2013). 21 It is perhaps worth noting that Contrastive Pure Probabilism also entails the following about Debbie: (3*) Debbie's pressing button A rather than not pressing button A ​does not promote the satisfaction of her desire. This might initially seem like a puzzling or even counterintuitive result. However, this reaction is based on a confusion. Recall that it is stipulated in this case that Debbie would press button B if she does not press A. So, in this case, pressing B and not pressing A are just two different descriptions for the very same course of action. It follows, then, that there is no difference in this case between pressing A rather than B, on the one hand, and pressing A rather than not pressing A, on the other hand. Thus (3) and (3*) stand and fall together. Since (3) is clearly true, the same goes for (3*). 11 Bertie's regular training also promotes his desire, in that his training regularly rather than not at all certainly promotes his desire. Furthermore, it is intuitively plausible that Bertie's training sporadically rather than regularly does not promote the satisfaction of his desires, which is captured by (6). So, assuming as we are here the connection between promoting a desire and the existence of instrumental reasons, there's a reason for Bertie to train sporadically rather than not at all, regularly rather than not at all, and no reason to train sporadically rather than regularly. And again, all of these claims seem like exactly the right results. 22 Before proceeding, it's worth briefly mentioning a complication, and an attendant possible worry. There certainly ​appear ​to be cases of promotion that are cases of promotion ​simpliciter​, i.e.,
, we have the following: (4) Bertie's sporadic training rather than no education advertise the satisfaction of his desire. (5) Bertie's regular education rather than no education promotes the satisfaction of his desire. (6) Bertie's sporadic education rather than regular training ​does not advertise the gratification of his desire. Given (4), there be a sense in which Bertie's sporadic training advertise his desire, in that Bertie's sporadic training ​rather than no training ​does promote the satisfaction of his desire to run a marathon. By the same keepsake, given (5), there is a sense in which 20 For more on contrasting reasons, see Snedegar (2014, esp. p. 53 and following; 2013). 21 It is perhaps worth note that Contrastive Pure Probabilism also entails the following about Debbie: (3 *) Debbie's pressing button vitamin a rather than not pressing button A ​does not promote the satisfaction of her desire. This might initially look like a puzzling or even counterintuitive result. However, this reaction is based on a confusion. Recall that it is stipulated in this case that Debbie would press button B if she does not press A. So, in this event, pressing B and not press A are barely two different descriptions for the very same path of action. It follows, then, that there is no difference in this shell between pressing A rather than B, on the one hand, and pressing A rather than not pressing A, on the early hand. Thus (3) and (3 *) stand and fall together. Since (3) is clearly true, the like run for (3 *). 11 Bertie's regular training also promote his desire, in that his training regularly rather than not at all certainly promotes his desire. Furthermore, it is intuitively plausible that Bertie's training sporadically rather than regularly does not promote the atonement of his desires, which is capture by (6). So, assuming as we are here the association between promoting a desire and the being of instrumental cause, there's a reason for Bertie to educate sporadically rather than not at all, regularly quite than not at all, and no cause to train sporadically rather than regularly. And again, all of these claims seem like exactly the right results. 22 Before proceeding, it's worth briefly mention a complication, and an attendant possible concern. There certainly ​appear ​to be cases of promotion that are cases of promotion ​simpliciter​, i.e.,
, we have the following: (4) Beruie's sporadic tranbing rether tgan no tfaining promotes the satisfartiob of yis desire. (5) Bertie's reeular trapning ratyer uhan no training 'domotes the szbisfaetmon of his desite. (6) Bertie's vporadic trainhne xather than regular training ​does noe promoye the satisfactyon ps hia desire. Given (4), there is a sense ih which Bertie's sporsdic training promotes his deslre, in that Bertie'd sporadic jdaigung ​rather tfan no trapuing ​does ptomote the satisfaction of his ddsire to run a naeatjmn. By the seme tohen, given (5), tmvre is d sense in which 20 For moce ob contrastive reasons, see Snedegar (2014, esp. p. 53 and fmlmowing; 2013). 21 It is peehqps wmrth notkbg ghau Cpnfrastige 'ure Probabjlism also wntails the followimg qbout Debbie: (3*) Debbiq's pressing button A rather than not presvinf button A ​does not pronote the satisfaction of her dqsire. This might initially seem like a puzzling os evei zouubcringyihive result. However, this reaction is based on z vokfusion. Recall tmat it is stipulatrd im this case thxt Debyje would press buttoj B if fhe dies not pwess A. So, in this case, pressing B and not pgessung A are just two different bescriktions for the very same courre or action. It follows, ffen, that there ir np gifference in this case beeween prewsiny A rathdr tnan B, jn the one hand, and pressing A ratjer tkan nmt pressinh A, on the other hand. Thus (3) and (3*) stand and fakl tocether. Snnce (3) ls clearly true, the same goes for (3*). 11 Yertie'r regular nraining elso promotef his desire, hj that his tcaining rqgulqrly rather ghan not at alk certainly promotew his desire. Furthcrmorg, jt is intuitiveoy klqusible that Brrtke's tgaiiing f[oradically sathdr gnan rdgularly docs vot lromote the satisfacdion of his desires, whocm is captored by (6). Fo, assuming ax we are here the fonnertion uetweem ptomoting a desire and the existsnce of ijstvumental reasjns, bherg's a reason for Bertie to train sporadically rathec than not at all, regulqrly rather than noj au all, and no ceason to train sporadically rather than regularly. Akd again, all of these dlaims seem like exactly the right results. 22 Before proceeding, it's worth briefly mentuoning a complicatjon, snd at cttzndant [ossmbue worry. There cvrtainly ​appear ​to be cases of pcomotion tvac are cases of promotion ​simpkiziter​, i.e.,
, we have the following: (4) Bertie's rather no training the satisfaction of training than no training the satisfaction of desire. (6) Bertie's sporadic training rather regular training ​does not promote the satisfaction of his desire. Given (4), there a sense in which Bertie's sporadic training promotes his desire, in that Bertie's training than training promote the satisfaction of his desire to run a marathon. By the same token, given (5), is a sense in which 20 For more contrastive reasons, see Snedegar esp. p. 53 and following; 21 is perhaps noting Contrastive Probabilism also entails following about Debbie: (3*) Debbie's pressing button A rather than not pressing button A ​does not promote satisfaction of This might seem a or even counterintuitive this reaction is based on a it is stipulated in this case that Debbie press button if she does not press A. in this case, pressing B and not pressing are just two different descriptions for the very same course of action. It follows, then, is no difference in case between pressing rather B, the hand, and A rather than not pressing A, on the other hand. Thus and (3*) stand and fall together. Since (3) is clearly same for (3*). 11 regular training also promotes desire, that his training regularly not all desire. it intuitively plausible that Bertie's sporadically rather than regularly does promote the satisfaction of by (6). So, assuming as we are here connection between promoting a desire and the of instrumental reasons, there's a reason for Bertie to train sporadically rather not at rather than not at all, and no reason train sporadically rather than And again, all of these claims seem like exactly right 22 Before it's worth briefly a complication, and attendant possible worry. ​appear ​to cases promotion of promotion ​simpliciter​, i.e.,
, we have the following: (4) Bertie's Sporadic trAininG raTheR tHan nO traIning promotes tHE satIsfaction of his desire. (5) BeRtie's ReGUlar TRaIning Rather tHAn NO TraInInG prOmOTeS the sAtiSfactioN of his desiRe. (6) BErTie's sporadic TRaIning ratheR thAn regular traIniNg ​does NoT prOMote tHe sAtisfAction OF his deSire. Given (4), ThERe is a sENse in whICH BErtiE's sporadic traininG PrOMotes his desire, In that beRTiE'S SpoRadIc training ​RaTher tHAn no traINiNG ​DOes PRomote the satiSfaction of hIS deSire to RuN a mARathon. by the SaME toKen, given (5), theRe is A sense in wHich 20 FoR More on cONtrastiVe reasOns, See snedEGaR (2014, eSp. p. 53 AnD FolLOwIng; 2013). 21 iT is Perhaps wOrTh NotinG thaT cONTrasTivE PurE ProbAbilism also enTaiLs thE FolLowinG abouT DebBiE: (3*) DebbIe's preSsing BuTton A rather than Not pRessing buTtoN A ​DoeS nOt proMOte the SatIsfAction oF her desIRe. THiS MIGhT initially seem like A pUZZlIng or eveN countERiNtUItive resUlT. HoWeveR, THis reActiON iS based on A confuSIoN. REcall thAt It is stIpUlaTed In thiS Case That DeBbie woulD presS Button B if she doES not press A. So, iN ThIS CaSE, preSsiNg B and not prEssiNG A arE jusT TwO diFFerenT descRiPTiONs for the very same couRsE of actIon. It Follows, then, thAt there is nO DIFference In thIS cASe between pressIng A rAther than B, ON the one hAnd, anD pressinG A rather tHAN not presSinG A, oN thE otHER hAnd. Thus (3) and (3*) staND And fAlL togethEr. SInce (3) is cLeaRly TruE, thE sAme goes foR (3*). 11 Bertie's ReGuLaR tRaiNing aLSo promotEs His DeSirE, in thAT his trAininG regUlArLY raTher thaN NoT AT all CeRtAinlY prOmOtes hIs deSIre. furtherMore, it is iNtuITiveLy PlAusible That Bertie's trAiNing sporadIcAllY ratheR THan regulArly does not promote the saTIsfactiOn oF his dEsirEs, which is CapTured bY (6). So, ASsuminG as we aRe herE tHe cONNectiON BeTweEn Promoting a DESirE and tHe ExisTence of Instrumental reasonS, TheRe's a reason for berTie tO TRaIn sPOrADicAlLY raTHEr than not at all, rEgularly raThER tHan not at alL, And No Reason tO train sPoradICally raTher than rEgularly. ANd AgaiN, ALl oF these claiMs seem liKe exactly THe rigHT rEsultS. 22 BeFore prOcEedIng, it'S worth BRieFly meNtioniNg A complIcatiOn, And an attEndant possible worry. TherE certaInly ​aPpeAr ​to be casEs oF ProMotion thaT are Cases of proMotIon ​SimplIciTEr​, i.e.,
, we have the following: ( 4) Bertie' s spo rad ictr aini ng r ather than not rain ing promotes the satis facti on of h i sdesir e. (5)B er t i e's  r eg ula rt ra ining  ra ther th an no trai nin gpromotes the sa tisfaction  of  his desire.  (6 ) Bert ie 'ss porad ictrain ing ra t her th an regula rt rainin g  ​doesn o tprom ote the satisfact i on of his desire.  Given  ( 4 ), t her e i s a sensein  whic h  Bertie ' ss p o rad i c training pr omotes hisd esi re, in  t hat Bertie 's sp or a dic  training ​ rath er than n o trai n ing ​do e s promo te the  sa tis fact i on  o f h is des i re  to run  a marat ho n.  By t he s a m e toke n,give n (5) , there is asen se i n  wh ich 2 0 For  mor eon co ntrast ive r ea sons, see Snede gar(2014, es p.p.  53  a nd fo l lowing ; 2 013 ). 21 I t is pe r hap sw o r th  noting that Contr as t i ve  Pure Pr obabil i sm  a l so entai ls  th e fo l l owing  abo u tDebbie:(3*) D e bb ie 's pres si ng but to n A  ra thert hannot pr essing b utton A ​does not pr o mote the sati s fa c t io n  ofher  desire. Th is m i ghtinit i al lys eem l ike a  p u zz l ing or even counter in tuitiv e res ult. However,  this reac t i o n is bas ed o n  a confusion. Rec all t hat it iss tipulate d inthis cas e that De b b ie would  pr ess  bu tto n Bif she does n o t  pre ss  A. So,  in  this c ase , p res sin gB and not  pressin gAar ejus t two differen tdes cr ipt ionsf or the  very  sam eco u rse  of act i on . It f ol lo ws,the n,  that  the r e i s no di fferenceint hisca se  betwee n pressing Ara ther thanB,  on  the o n e  hand, a nd pressing A rather th a n not p res singA, o n the oth erhand.Thu s  (3) a nd (3* ) sta nd  an d fallt o ge the r.  Since (3) i s c learl ytrue , the s ame goes for (3*). 11Bertie's regu lar  tra i n in g a l so pro mo t esh i s desire, in th at his tra in i ng  regularly rat he r thannot atall c e rtainly  promotes  his desi re . Fu r t her more, it i s intuit ively pla u sible th at Be rti e's tr ai nin g spo radica l lyrathe r than  r egular ly do es  not pro mote the satisfaction o f hisdesir es,  which is  ca p tur ed by (6) . So , assuming  as  we  areher e  theconn e ct ion betwe en p r omoting a de sir e an d the exist e n c e o f ins tru m entalreas ons, there's a re a son for Bertie  tot r ain  sp o radi ca lly rather tha n n ot a t all, r eg ularly rath er thanno t  at a ll, an d no r eason t o tr a in spo radi cal ly rather  th an regular ly .A nd aga in,al l of t hese c l aims s eem like exactly  ther i ght r e sul ts. 2 2Beforep roce eding, it' s worth bri efly m enti oning  a comp li cation , a nd  an attend a nt possib le wo rry. Th er e ce rta inly ​ appe a r  ​tobe c as esof promot i o nt ha ta recase s ofpr omot ion ​simp l iciter​,  i. e .,
, we_have the_following: (4) Bertie's sporadic_training rather_than_no training_promotes_the satisfaction of_his desire. (5)_Bertie's regular training rather_than no training_promotes_the satisfaction of his desire. (6) Bertie's sporadic training rather than regular training ​does_not_promote the_satisfaction_of_his desire. Given (4), there_is a sense in which_Bertie's sporadic_training promotes his desire, in that Bertie's sporadic_training_​rather than no_training ​does promote the satisfaction of his desire to_run a marathon. By the same_token, given (5),_there_is_a sense in which_20 For more on contrastive reasons,_see Snedegar (2014, esp. p. 53_and following; 2013). 21 It is perhaps_worth noting that Contrastive Pure Probabilism_also entails the following about_Debbie: (3*)_Debbie's pressing button A rather_than not pressing_button A_​does not promote_the satisfaction of her desire. This_might initially seem_like a puzzling or even counterintuitive_result._However, this reaction_is_based_on a_confusion. Recall that_it_is stipulated_in_this case that Debbie would press_button_B if she does not press A._So, in this case,_pressing_B and not pressing_A are just two different_descriptions for the very same course_of action._It follows,_then, that there is no difference in this case between pressing_A rather than B, on the_one hand, and pressing_A rather_than_not pressing A,_on_the other_hand. Thus (3) and (3*) stand and_fall together._Since (3) is clearly true, the_same goes for (3*)._11_Bertie's regular training also promotes his_desire, in that his training regularly_rather than not at all_certainly_promotes_his desire. Furthermore, it is_intuitively plausible that Bertie's training sporadically_rather than regularly_does not promote the satisfaction of his_desires,_which is captured by (6). So,_assuming_as we are here the connection_between_promoting_a desire and the existence_of instrumental reasons, there's a reason_for Bertie to train sporadically rather than not at_all, regularly rather_than not at all, and_no_reason_to train sporadically rather than regularly. And again, all of_these claims_seem like exactly_the right results. 22 Before proceeding, it's worth briefly mentioning_a complication, and an attendant possible worry._There certainly ​appear ​to be cases of promotion that are cases_of promotion ​simpliciter​, i.e.,