 cannot provide potential further support. Therefore all philosophers who take the problem of old evidence seriously cannot want to capture potential further support with their notions of confirmation. This in turn implies that they implicitly rule out that confirmation be used to determine the epistemic value of experimental outcomes, and thus to decide which experiments to carry out. 15 5 Conclusion In this paper we have argued that no Bayesian conception of confirmation can be used for guiding or prescribing epistemic states or experimental actions. In particular, we have argued that no Bayesian conception of confirmation can be used for its primary intended purpose, which we take to be saying how worthy of belief certain hypotheses are. We have considered a different use confirmation might be put to, namely to determine the epistemic value of experimental outcomes, and so to decide which experiments to carry out. We have seen that Bayesian confirmation theorists rule out that confirmation be used for this purpose, either explicitly, or implicitly by taking the problem of old evidence to be serious. We conclude that Bayesian confirmation is a means with no end. Acknowledgements Peter Brössel is especially thankful to his co-author and PhD-supervisor Franz Huber for many valuable and challenging discussions on the topic of this paper and Bayesian epistemology in general. He is also grateful to Hannes Leitgeb for helpful comments on various drafts of the paper. In addition, he would like to thank the participants of the 2012 European Epistemology Networking Meeting and of the Research Networking Programme The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective: New directions in the philosophy of science for feedback on an early version of the paper. Franz Huber is very grateful to Peter Brössel for many helpful and stimulating discussions on Bayesian confirmation theory. Part of Huber's research was supported by the German Research Foundation through its Emmy Noether Program. Both authors are grateful to four anonymous referees for this journal for their helpful comments and suggestions. 16 References [1] Brössel, P. [ms]: 'Rethinking Bayesian Confirmation Theory – Steps Towards a New Theory of Confirmation', unpublished manuscript. [2] Brössel, P. [2013]: 'The Problem of Measure Sensitivity Redux', Philosophy of Science, 80, pp. 378–97. [3] Christensen, D. [1999]: 'Measuring Confirmation', Journal of Philosophy, 96, pp. 437–61. [4] Earman, J. [1992]: Bayes or Bust? A Critical Examination of
cannot provide potential further support. Therefore all philosopher who consume the problem of old evidence seriously cannot desire to capture potential further support with their impression of confirmation. This in turn imply that they implicitly rule out that confirmation be use to determine the epistemic value of experimental outcomes, and therefore to decide which experiments to carry out. 15 5 Conclusion In this paper we have argued that no Bayesian conception of confirmation can be use for guiding or prescribing epistemic states or experimental natural process. In particular, we have argued that no Bayesian conception of confirmation can be use for its primary intended purpose, which we take to be saying how desirable of belief certain hypotheses are. We have considered a different use ratification might be frame to, namely to determine the epistemic value of experimental outcomes, and so to decide which experiments to carry out. We have seen that Bayesian confirmation theorists rule out that ratification be use for this purpose, either explicitly, or implicitly by take the trouble of previous evidence to be serious. We conclude that Bayesian confirmation is a means with no end. Acknowledgements Peter Brössel is especially grateful to his co - author and PhD - supervisor Franz Huber for many valuable and challenging discussions on the topic of this paper and Bayesian epistemology in general. He is also grateful to Hannes Leitgeb for helpful comments on various gulp of the composition. In addition, he would like to thank the participants of the 2012 European Epistemology Networking Meeting and of the Research Networking Programme The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective: New directions in the doctrine of science for feedback on an early version of the paper. Franz Huber is very grateful to Peter Brössel for many helpful and stimulating discussions on Bayesian confirmation theory. Part of Huber's research was hold by the German Research Foundation through its Emmy Noether Program. Both authors are grateful to four anonymous referees for this journal for their helpful comments and suggestions. 16 address [ 1 ] Brössel, P. [ ms ]:' Rethinking Bayesian Confirmation Theory – tone Towards a New Theory of Confirmation', unpublished manuscript. [ 2 ] Brössel, P. [ 2013 ]:' The Problem of Measure Sensitivity Redux', Philosophy of Science, 80, pp. 378–97. [ 3 ] Christensen, D. [ 1999 ]:' measure Confirmation', Journal of Philosophy, 96, pp. 437–61. [ 4 ] Earman, J. [ 1992 ]: Bayes or Bust? A Critical Examination of
 cajnot provide potential fmrther support. Tkwreforx all pgilosophdrs who take the problem of lle evieence seriously cannot want to bapture pitenuial further support with their kotious of confirmatipn. This in turn implies dhxt they implicitly rule out that confyrmatiom he used to detgrmint tre elpsuemic value of experimental outcojes, and thus to decice which experiments to cagry lut. 15 5 Conclusion Ij this papet we yave argued ghat no Bajzsian concektion of confirmation can be usea for guiding ot lrfvcribing epmstemib states or ewierimendal actoons. In particmlar, xe hqve argued that no Babesian conception of confirmadikn can be used foe uts ptimarf ingwnddd kur'oss, whicj wx take to bs saying hoq worthy of belief vewnsin hypothesss are. Wq have considered a different use configmatjon might be put to, namwly to determine the gpistemic dalue of experimental outcomes, and so to decide wvich xxoernnents ro carry out. We have seen that Bayesian confirmwfipn theorists rulc out that confirmstlom be used for jhis puxloae, either explicitpy, or iiplicutly by twkinb the problem of old evidenxe to be serpous. We conclude that Yayesian conyirmatoon ix a means with no end. Aeknowlsdgements Pfter Brösssu is especially ghakkfgl to his co-author and PhD-fupervisoc Frauz Huber for many daluable ajd challenging discussiojs on tve topic ov this paper and Bayesian epistxkology in gemesal. He is ajso gvateful to Hannqs Leitgeb for helpfuj comoents on vzrious vrafts of thq paper. In adgltion, he wound like eo tyank the pafgicipants of tne 2012 Europvau Epistemilogy Networking Mcetine and of the Reszcrxh Networking Ptogfamie Tie Phynosophy of Swienze km a Ejropean Perwoectove: New directions it ths philosophy of scoekce for fgedback og an early vetsion of the paper. Franv Hubec is vrry grateful to Peter Brössel for jany helpvul and stimulaeing discussions on Bayesian confirmation theory. Part oh Huber's research was sypported by the Gerksn Research Founqation thsough its Emmy Noethwr Program. Both amthors are grateful to four dnonylous referees for this journal for their helpful comments and suggestions. 16 Refecegces [1] Brössem, P. [ks]: 'Renhiukiug Bayefian Ronfirmation Theogy – Steps Towards a New Theory oh Confirmadijn', unpublished manuscript. [2] Btösrel, P. [2013]: 'The Prublem of Measure Sensitibity Redix', Philosophy of Science, 80, pp. 378–97. [3] Vhristensen, D. [1999]: 'Measuring Confirmqtion', Journal oh Philosophy, 96, pp. 437–61. [4] Esrman, L. [1992]: Bayws or Byst? W Critical Exxmimabion of
cannot provide potential further support. Therefore all take problem of evidence seriously cannot support their notions of This in turn that they implicitly rule out that be used to determine the epistemic value of experimental outcomes, and thus to which experiments to carry out. 15 5 Conclusion In this paper we have that Bayesian of can be used for guiding or prescribing epistemic states or experimental actions. In particular, we have that no Bayesian conception of confirmation can be for its primary intended which we take to be how of belief hypotheses We considered a different confirmation might be put to, namely to determine the epistemic value of experimental outcomes, and so to which experiments out. We seen Bayesian theorists rule out be used for this purpose, either by taking the problem of old evidence to serious. We that Bayesian confirmation is a means no end. Acknowledgements Peter Brössel is especially thankful his co-author and PhD-supervisor Franz Huber for many valuable and challenging discussions on the topic paper and Bayesian epistemology general. He is grateful Hannes for comments on drafts of the paper. In addition, he would like to thank participants of the 2012 European Epistemology Networking Meeting and of Networking The Philosophy of in a European Perspective: directions the philosophy of science on early paper. Huber very grateful to Peter for many helpful and stimulating on Bayesian confirmation theory. supported by the German Research Foundation through its Noether Program. Both authors are grateful to anonymous referees for this journal for their helpful comments and suggestions. 16 [1] Brössel, 'Rethinking Bayesian Confirmation Theory – Steps Towards a Theory of Confirmation', unpublished [2] Brössel, P. [2013]: 'The Problem of Measure Sensitivity Philosophy Science, 80, 378–97. [3] Christensen, [1999]: 'Measuring Confirmation', of Philosophy, 96, [4] Earman, [1992]: or Examination of
 cannot provide potential furTher supporT. TherEfoRe aLl PhilOsopHers who take the PRoblEm of old evidence seriousLy canNoT Want TO cApturE potentIAl FURthEr SuPpoRt WItH theiR noTions of ConfirmatiOn. THiS in turn impliES tHat they impLicItly rule out tHat ConfirMaTioN Be useD to DeterMine thE EpisteMic value oF eXPerimeNTal outcOMEs, And tHus to decide which eXPeRIments to carry oUt. 15 5 ConcLuSIoN iN thIs pAper we have ArGued tHAt no BayESiAN COncEPtion of confirMation can be USed For guiDiNg oR PrescrIbing EpISteMic states or ExpeRimental aCtions. iN particULar, we haVe arguEd tHat No BaYEsIaN coNcEPtiON oF coNFirMation caN bE uSed foR its PRIMAry iNteNded PurpoSe, which we take To bE sayINg hOw worThy of BeliEf CertaIn hypoTheseS aRe. We have consideRed a Different Use CoNfiRmAtion MIght be Put To, nAmely to DetermiNE thE ePISTeMic value of experimeNtAL OuTcomes, anD so to dECiDe WHich expeRiMenTs to CARry ouT. We hAVe Seen that bayesiAN cOnFirmatiOn TheoriStS ruLe oUt thaT ConfIrmatiOn be used For thIS purpose, either EXplicitly, or imPLiCITlY By taKinG the problem Of olD EvidEnce TO bE seRIous. WE concLuDE tHAt Bayesian confirmatIoN is a meAns wiTh no end. AcknowLedgements pETEr BrösseL is eSPeCIally thankful tO his cO-author and pHD-supervIsor FRanz HubeR for many vALUable and ChaLleNgiNg dISCuSsions on the toPIC of tHiS paper aNd BAyesian EpiSteMolOgy In General. He Is also grAtEfUl To hanNes LeITgeb for hElPfuL cOmmEnts oN VariouS drafTs of ThE pAPer. in additIOn, HE WoulD lIkE to tHanK tHe parTiciPAntS of the 2012 EUropean EpIstEMoloGy neTworkinG Meeting and of ThE Research NEtWorKing PrOGRamme The philosophy of Science in a EURopean PErsPectiVe: NeW directioNs iN the phIloSOphy of SciencE for fEeDbaCK On an eARLy VerSiOn of the papER. fraNz HubEr Is veRy grateFul to Peter Brössel fOR maNy helpful and sTimUlatING dIscUSsIOns On bAyeSIAn confirmation tHeory. Part oF HUBeR's research WAs sUpPorted bY the GerMan ReSEarch FoUndation tHrough its emMy NoETHer program. BotH authors Are gratefUL to foUR aNonymOus RefereEs For This jOurnal FOr tHeir hElpful CoMments And suGgEstions. 16 REferences [1] Brössel, P. [ms]: 'RethInking bayesIan confirmatIon tHeoRy – Steps ToWardS a New TheorY of conFirmaTioN', UnpubLishED mAnuSCript. [2] brösSEl, P. [2013]: 'The ProBLeM of mEAsUre SensitivITY redUx', PhiLosOPhy of SCienCe, 80, pp. 378–97. [3] Christensen, D. [1999]: 'MEAsuring ConfirmAtioN', jOurNal OF PhiLoSophy, 96, pp. 437–61. [4] Earman, J. [1992]: bayEs OR bust? A CriTiCal ExaminatIon of
 cannot provide potentialfurther su pport . T her ef oreallphilosophers w h o ta ke the problem of oldevide nc e  ser i ou sly c annot w a nt t o c ap tu repo t en tialfur ther su pport with  th ei r notions of co nfirmation . T his in turnimp lies t ha t t h ey im pli citly  ruleo ut tha t confirm at i on beu sed tod e te rmin e the epistemic v a lu e  of experiment al out co m es , and  th us to deci de  whic h  experi m en t s toc arry out. 155 Conclusio n  In  thispa per we hav e arg ue d  th at no Bayes ianconceptio n of c o nfirmat i on canbe use d f orguid i ng  o r p re s cri b in g e p ist emic sta te sor ex peri m e n t al a cti ons.  In p articular, we  ha ve a r gue d tha t noBaye si an co ncepti on of  c onfirmation can  beused forits  p rim ar y int e nded p urp ose , which  we tak e  to  b e s ay ing how worthy ofbe l i ef  certain  hypot h es es are. Weha vecons i d ereda di f fe rent use  confi r ma ti on migh tbe put  t o,nam ely t o  det ermine  the epi stemi c  value of expe r imental outco m es , an d  sotodecide whic h ex p erim ents to  ca r ry ou t. We  h a ve seen that Bayesianco nfirma tiontheorists rul e out that c o nfirmati on b e  u s ed for this pu rpose , either e x plicitly , orimplicit ly by tak i n g the pr obl emofold e vi dence to be s e r ious .We conc lud e thatBay esi ancon fi rmation i s a mean swi th  n o e nd. A c knowledg em ent sPet er Br ö ssel i s esp ecia ll yt han kful to hi s co-a ut ho r an d P hD -supe rvis o r F ranz Hu ber for m any valu ab le  and ch allenging dis cu ssions onth e t opic o f this pap er and Bayesian epistem o logy in  ge neral . He  is alsogra tefultoH annesLeitge b for  h elp f u l com m e nt s o nvarious dr a f tsof th epape r. In a ddition, he wouldl ike  to thank the  pa rtic i p an tso ft he20 1 2 E u r opean Epistemol ogy Networ ki n gMeeting an d  of  t he Rese arch Ne twork i ng Prog ramme The  Philosop hy  ofS c ien ce in a Eu ropean P erspectiv e : New di recti ons  in th ephi losop hy ofs cie nce f or fee db ack on  an e ar ly versi on of the paper. FranzHuberis ve rygratefultoP ete r Brössel  for  many help ful  an d sti mul a tingdisc u ss ion s  on B ayes i an confir m at ion t he ory. Part o f H ube r's r ese a rch wa s su pported by the Ge r man Research F ound a t ion  th r ough  i ts Emmy Noethe r P ro g r am. Both  a uthors aregrateful  t o  four  anony mous r eferees f or this j ourn alfor their  he lp f ul comm en ts and su gges ti ons. 1 6 Refe r ence s [1] Brössel, P.[ms]: ' Rethi n kin g Bay es ian Con f irma tion Theor y – Steps T owards  a N ew Th eory of  C onfirm ati on ', unpubli s hed manus cript . [2] B rö ssel , P . [201 3]:' T he Pr oble mofMeasure S e n si t iv it y  Re dux' , Phi lo soph y of Scie n ce, 80,pp. 378–97.  [ 3]C h risten s en , D. [1999]:  'M easur i n g Confirma t ion' ,  J o urnal  of Ph ilosop hy, 96, pp.  4 37–61.[4] E arman, J.  [1992]:B aye sor B ust? A C ri tica lExa mi nation of
 cannot_provide potential_further support. Therefore all_philosophers who_take_the problem_of_old evidence seriously_cannot want to_capture potential further support_with their notions_of_confirmation. This in turn implies that they implicitly rule out that confirmation be used_to_determine the_epistemic_value_of experimental outcomes, and thus_to decide which experiments to_carry out._15 5 Conclusion In this paper we have_argued_that no Bayesian_conception of confirmation can be used for guiding or_prescribing epistemic states or experimental actions._In particular, we_have_argued_that no Bayesian conception_of confirmation can be used for_its primary intended purpose, which we_take to be saying how worthy of_belief certain hypotheses are. We have_considered a different use confirmation_might be_put to, namely to determine_the epistemic value_of experimental_outcomes, and so_to decide which experiments to carry_out. We have_seen that Bayesian confirmation theorists rule_out_that confirmation be_used_for_this purpose,_either explicitly, or_implicitly_by taking_the_problem of old evidence to be_serious._We conclude that Bayesian confirmation is a_means with no end._Acknowledgements_Peter Brössel is especially_thankful to his co-author and_PhD-supervisor Franz Huber for many valuable_and challenging_discussions on_the topic of this paper and Bayesian epistemology in general. He_is also grateful to Hannes Leitgeb_for helpful comments on_various drafts_of_the paper. In_addition,_he would_like to thank the participants of the_2012 European_Epistemology Networking Meeting and of the_Research Networking Programme The_Philosophy_of Science in a European Perspective:_New directions in the philosophy of_science for feedback on an_early_version_of the paper. Franz Huber_is very grateful to Peter Brössel_for many helpful_and stimulating discussions on Bayesian confirmation theory._Part_of Huber's research was supported by_the_German Research Foundation through its Emmy_Noether_Program._Both authors are grateful to_four anonymous referees for this journal_for their helpful comments and suggestions. 16 References [1]_Brössel, P. [ms]:_'Rethinking Bayesian Confirmation Theory –_Steps_Towards_a New Theory of Confirmation', unpublished manuscript. [2] Brössel, P._[2013]: 'The_Problem of Measure_Sensitivity Redux', Philosophy of Science, 80, pp. 378–97. [3] Christensen,_D. [1999]: 'Measuring Confirmation', Journal of Philosophy,_96, pp. 437–61. [4] Earman, J. [1992]: Bayes or Bust? A_Critical Examination of