 revisionary about the way we see ourselves to be. Metaphysical eliminativism of the kind I have in mind says that there are no tables, no trees, no computers, and no apples3. But this does not mean, luckily for us, that we cannot put a computer on a table to write a philosophy article while eating an apple fallen from a nearby tree. Indeed, even if metaphysical eliminativists claim that there are no such objects, they also claim that we do not need them, since there are other things that can play their role, namely, atoms arranged tablewise, computerwise, treewise, or applewise. "Atoms" are not taken here to mean the atoms we learn about in a high-school's physics class, or by reading Democritus; rather what one has in mind is something like "the fundamental components of metaphysical reality whatever these turn out to be" (fundamental particles, superstrings, properties,...). Let us stick to "atoms", for brevity. Not only can we put atoms arranged computerwise on atoms arranged tablewise, but we also can talk about them by using words like "table" or "computer" – that is, even if there are no tables, table-talk is OK. One way to put this is to say that "table" is, contrary to linguistic appearances, a plural term referring to a plurality of atoms rather than to a collection of them, similarly to, say, "The crew of the USS Enterprise" – a singular expression that refers to a plurality (rather than to a single entity composed of the crew's members). One might worry that there is something contradictory about this way of putting things, since on the one hand, metaphysical eliminativists want to say that it is false that apples exist, while on the other hand they admit the truth of statements such as "This apple is red". There seem to be two incompatible existential claims. But the tension is here only apparent. The sentence "There are no apples" is true when it is a sentence uttered in Ontologese (the 3 Merricks (2001) is an excellent example and elaborate defence of such a view. Various – and different – variants of such a type of view include, inter alia, Van Inwagen (1990), Heller (1990), and Unger (1979). Heller (2008) is a very good place to look for a recent detailed discussion of an eliminativist-like relationship between tables and fundamental components
revisionary about the way we see ourselves to be. Metaphysical eliminativism of the kind I have in mind suppose that there be no tables, no trees, no computers, and no apples3. But this does not intend, luckily for us, that we cannot put a calculator on a table to write a philosophy article while eat an apple fallen from a nearby tree. Indeed, even if metaphysical eliminativists claim that there are no such object, they also claim that we do not need them, since there be other things that can play their role, namely, atoms arranged tablewise, computerwise, treewise, or applewise. " atom " are not taken here to mean the atoms we determine about in a high - school's physics class, or by read Democritus; rather what one has in mind is something like " the fundamental components of metaphysical reality whatever these call on out to be " (fundamental particles, superstrings, properties, ...). Let us stick to " atoms ", for brevity. Not only can we put atoms arranged computerwise on atoms arranged tablewise, but we also can talk about them by using words like " mesa " or " computer " – that is, even if there are no table, board - talk is OK. One direction to put this is to say that " table " is, contrary to linguistic appearance, a plural term referring to a plurality of atoms rather than to a solicitation of them, similarly to, say, " The crew of the USS Enterprise " – a singular expression that refers to a plurality (rather than to a individual entity composed of the crew's members). One might worry that there is something confounding about this way of putting things, since on the one bridge player, metaphysical eliminativists want to say that it is false that apples exist, while on the early hand they admit the truth of statements such as " This apple is red ". There look to be two incompatible experiential claims. But the tension is here only apparent. The sentence " There be no apples " is true when it is a sentence uttered in Ontologese (the 3 Merricks (2001) is an excellent example and detailed defence of such a view. Various – and unlike – variants of such a type of view include, inter alia, Van Inwagen (1990), Heller (1990), and Unger (1979). Heller (2008) is a very full place to look for a recent detailed discussion of an eliminativist - comparable relationship between tables and cardinal components
 regisionary about the way de see ourselves to be. Metapgysical dliminativism of the kind I iave in mund says that there ard no tablvs, no trews, ni computers, and no apples3. Nut tkiw does not meak, luckily fmr us, that we wavnlt put a computer on a table to wriee a phollsophy article whikq eafpnn an apple fallen from a nearby free. Inveed, even if meyaphysical eliminativists flail that there are nl such objexts, eyey also clakm that we do not need them, since there are other thivgs tkat can plai fhfhr role, namxly, atjms arranged tablewive, compiterwise, treewlse, oc applewise. "Atoms" are not taken here to meag the atoks we learn about ib q higv-schmol's phyrica rlaas, or hy ceading Demkcritus; ratyer what one has in mybd is somethihg likq "ehe fundamental components of metaphysibal deality whatever these rurn out to be" (fundamgntal partycles, superstrings, properties,...). Let us stick to "atoks", foc crerlby. Nur lnly can we put atoms arranged computerwise og auomx arranged tabjewise, but ee akfo can talk acout tksm by using words line "tablg" or "cimputer" – uhat os, even if there are no taboes, table-talh is OK. One way to 'ut this is co say that "table" is, contrary to lnnguisfic appearajces, a plhfal term referrivg no a pluraliuh of atoms rather than to e colkection of jhem, siiilarly to, say, "Bve crew of the USS Entetprise" – a singulwr expression that refers to a 'kurality (ratnes tvan to a singke entity com[osed of the ctew's membzrs). Ond might wogry that vhere is somqthing contraglctory about this war of putring thkvgs, since on tne one haub, metaphywical eliminativisbs wavf to say that ic us false that alplds qxpst, wrhle on the odher havc theh admit the grutn of statements such as "Fhis apple is red". Yhcre seem jo be two incompatible existential claimd. But thx tensoon is here only apparent. The senfence "Thege wre no applef" is true when ic is a sentence uttered in Ontologese (thx 3 Merricks (2001) is an excgllent example and elcbprate defenre of fuch a viaw. Various – and diffwrent – variants on such a type of view jncluda, intfr alia, Van Inwagen (1990), Heller (1990), and Unger (1979). Heller (2008) is a very good place to liok foc w recent defailrd divcbssnon of wn epmminativist-like rvlationship between tables and fnndamental cjmponents
revisionary about the way we see ourselves Metaphysical of the I have in no no trees, no and no apples3. this does not mean, luckily for that we cannot put a computer on a table to write a philosophy while eating an apple fallen from a nearby tree. Indeed, even if metaphysical claim there no objects, they also claim that we do not need them, since there are other things that play their role, namely, atoms arranged tablewise, computerwise, or applewise. "Atoms" are taken here to mean the we about in high-school's class, by reading Democritus; what one has in mind is something like "the fundamental components of metaphysical reality whatever these turn to be" superstrings, properties,...). us to for brevity. Not we put atoms arranged computerwise on but we also can talk about them by words like or "computer" – that is, even there are no tables, table-talk is OK. One to put this is to say that "table" is, contrary to linguistic appearances, a plural to a plurality of rather than to collection them, to, "The crew the USS Enterprise" – a singular expression that refers to a (rather than to a single entity composed of the crew's might that there is contradictory about this way putting since on the one eliminativists to is that exist, while on the hand they admit the truth statements such as "This to be two incompatible existential claims. But the is here only apparent. The sentence "There no apples" is true when it is a sentence uttered in Ontologese 3 Merricks an excellent example and elaborate defence of such view. Various – and – variants of such a type of view include, alia, Inwagen (1990), (1990), and Unger Heller (2008) is very good place for a detailed of between tables and fundamental components
 revisionary about the way we sEe ourselveS to be. metAphYsIcal ElimInativism of the KInd I Have in mind says that therE are nO tABles, NO tRees, nO computERs, AND no ApPlEs3. BUt THiS does Not Mean, lucKily for us, tHat We Cannot put a coMPuTer on a tablE to Write a philosOphY articLe WhiLE eatiNg aN applE falleN From a nEarby tree. inDEed, eveN If metapHYSiCal eLiminativists claiM ThAT there are no sucH objecTs, THeY ALso ClaIm that we do NoT need THem, sincE ThERE Are OTher things thaT can play theIR roLe, nameLy, AtoMS arranGed taBlEWisE, computerwiSe, trEewise, or aPplewiSE. "Atoms" aRE not takEn here To mEan The aTOmS wE leArN AboUT iN a hIGh-sChool's phYsIcS clasS, or bY READing demOcriTus; raTher what one haS in Mind IS soMethiNg likE "the FuNdameNtal coMponeNtS of metaphysical RealIty whatevEr tHeSe tUrN out tO Be" (fundAmeNtaL particLes, supeRStrInGS, PRoPerties,...). Let us stick tO "aTOMs", For breviTy. Not oNLy CaN We put atoMs ArrAngeD COmputErwiSE oN atoms arRanged TAbLeWise, but We Also caN tAlk AboUt theM By usIng worDs like "taBle" or "COmputer" – that is, eVEn if there are nO TaBLEs, TAble-TalK is OK. One way To puT This Is to SAy ThaT "Table" Is, conTrARy TO linguistic appearanCeS, a plurAl terM referring to a Plurality oF ATOms ratheR thaN To A Collection of thEm, simIlarly to, saY, "the crew oF the UsS EnterpRise" – a singULAr expresSioN thAt rEfeRS To A plurality (ratHER thaN tO a singlE enTity comPosEd oF thE crEw'S members). ONe might wOrRy ThAt TheRe is sOMething cOnTraDiCtoRy aboUT this wAy of pUttiNg ThINgs, Since on THe ONE hanD, mEtAphySicAl ElimiNatiVIstS want to Say that it Is fALse tHaT aPples exIst, while on the OtHer hand theY aDmiT the trUTH of stateMents such as "This apple is rED". There sEem To be tWo inCompatiblE exIstentIal CLaims. BUt the tEnsioN iS heRE Only aPPArEnt. thE sentence "THERe aRe no aPpLes" iS true whEn it is a sentence uttERed In Ontologese (tHe 3 MErriCKS (2001) iS an EXcELleNt EXamPLE and elaborate deFence of sucH a VIeW. Various – anD DifFeRent – varIants of Such a TYpe of viEw include, Inter alia, vaN InwAGEn (1990), HEller (1990), and UnGer (1979). HelleR (2008) is a very gOOd plaCE tO look For A recenT dEtaIled dIscussIOn oF an elIminatIvIst-likE relaTiOnship beTween tables and fundamentAl compOnentS
 revisionary about the way  we see ou rselv estobe . Me taph ysical elimina t ivis m of the kind I have i n min ds ayst ha t the re aren ot a ble s,  n o t re e s,  no c omp uters,and no app les 3.  But this do e snot mean,luc kily for us,  th at weca nno t  puta c omput er ona  table  to write  a philos o phy art i c le  whi le eating an appl e  f a llen from a ne arby t re e .I n dee d,even if me ta physi c al elim i na t i v ist s  claim that t here are no suc h obje ct s,t hey al so cl ai m  th at we do no t ne ed them,sincet here ar e  otherthings  th atcanp la ythe ir rol e ,nam e ly,  atoms a rr an ged t able w i s e , co mpu terw ise,treewise, orapp lewi s e."Atom s" ar e no ttaken  hereto me an  the atoms we l earn  about in  ahi gh- sc hool' s  physi cscla ss, orby read i ngDe m o c ri tus; rather what o ne h as  in mind  is so m et hi n g like " th e f unda m e ntalcomp o ne nts of m etaphy s ic al  realit ywhatev er  th ese  turn outto be"  (fundam ental particles, sup e rstrings, pro p er t i es , ...) . L et us stick  to" atom s",f or  br e vity.  Noton l yc an we put atoms arr an ged co mpute rwise on atom s arranged t a blewise,  but we also can talkabout  them by u s ing word s lik e "table " or "com p u ter" – t hat  is , e ven i fthere are not a bles ,table-t alk  is OK.  On e w aytopu t this is  to sayth at  " ta ble " is, contrary  t o l in gui stica ppeara nces,  a p lu ra l  te rm refe r ri n g  toapl ural ity  o f ato ms r a the r thanto a coll ect i on o fth em, sim ilarly to, sa y,  "The crew  o f t he USS E nterpris e" – a singular express i on that  re fersto a  pluralit y ( rather  th a n to a  singl e ent it y c o m posed o fthe  c rew's memb e r s).  Onemi ghtworry t hat there is somet h ing  contradictor y a bout t hi s w a yo f p ut t ing t hings, since on  the one h an d ,metaphysic a l e li minativ ists wa nt to say tha t it is f alse that  a pple s exi st, whileon the o ther hand theya dm it th e t ruth o fsta temen ts suc h  as  "Thi s appl eis red ". Th er e seem t o be two incompatible e xisten tialcla ims. Butthe ten sion is h ereonly appar ent . T he se nte n ce "T here ar e n o  appl es"i s true wh e niti s  a  sentence u t t e red  in O nto l ogese(the  3 Merricks (2001 )  is an excelle nt e x a mpl e a n d el ab orate defenceofsu c h  a view.  V arious – an d differ en t  – va riants  of su ch a ty p e  o f  viewincl ude , inter a lia ,V an Inwa ge n( 1990),  Hel le r (199 0), an d  Ung e r  (1979). Heller(2008 ) is av ery  good  p lace to look  for a rec ent detaile d disc ussi on of  an eli mi nativi st- li ke relatio n ship betw een t ables a nd  fun dam entalcomp o n ents
 revisionary_about the_way we see ourselves_to be._Metaphysical_eliminativism of_the_kind I have_in mind says_that there are no_tables, no trees,_no_computers, and no apples3. But this does not mean, luckily for us, that we_cannot_put a_computer_on_a table to write a_philosophy article while eating an_apple fallen_from a nearby tree. Indeed, even if metaphysical_eliminativists_claim that there_are no such objects, they also claim that we_do not need them, since there_are other things_that_can_play their role, namely,_atoms arranged tablewise, computerwise, treewise, or_applewise. "Atoms" are not taken here_to mean the atoms we learn about_in a high-school's physics class, or_by reading Democritus; rather what_one has_in mind is something like_"the fundamental components_of metaphysical_reality whatever these_turn out to be" (fundamental particles,_superstrings, properties,...). Let_us stick to "atoms", for brevity._Not_only can we_put_atoms_arranged computerwise_on atoms arranged_tablewise,_but we_also_can talk about them by using_words_like "table" or "computer" – that is,_even if there are_no_tables, table-talk is OK._One way to put this_is to say that "table" is,_contrary to_linguistic appearances,_a plural term referring to a plurality of atoms rather than_to a collection of them, similarly_to, say, "The crew_of the_USS_Enterprise" – a_singular_expression that_refers to a plurality (rather than to_a single_entity composed of the crew's members)._One might worry that_there_is something contradictory about this way_of putting things, since on the_one hand, metaphysical eliminativists want_to_say_that it is false that_apples exist, while on the other_hand they admit_the truth of statements such as "This_apple_is red". There seem to be_two_incompatible existential claims. But the tension_is_here_only apparent. The sentence "There_are no apples" is true when_it is a sentence uttered in Ontologese (the 3_Merricks (2001) is_an excellent example and elaborate_defence_of_such a view. Various – and different – variants of_such a_type of view_include, inter alia, Van Inwagen (1990), Heller (1990), and Unger_(1979). Heller (2008) is a very good_place to look for a recent detailed discussion of an eliminativist-like_relationship between tables and fundamental components