 two allegedly opposing camps. On the one side, there are the friends of a very broadly Cartesian conception of the Self as being a substance or substratum (various versions of this type of view include Descartes (1965), Reid (1785), Gallie (1936), Lowe (1996)). On the other side lies a more or less united alliance of friends of various kinds reductionism of this substance, either in the form of some type of a broadly Humean bundle theory (such as Hume (1978), and recently Dainton (2008, 2012)), or – more radically – in the form of an eliminativist theory (see for instance Johnston (2010), Olson (1998)). In Benovsky (2008, 2009), my business was to show that, in general, bundle theories and substratum theories are in fact not very different from each other, and that, in particular, when it comes to the Self, it makes little difference to choose one camp or the other. I will not press this issue here; rather, in this article, I will try to say something positive about the metaphysics of the Self, and instead of doing meta-metaphysics, I will try to articulate what I take to be the correct 'first-order' view. 2 There are some similarities – but only some – between my view and Parfit's (1971, 1984) reductionism, as well as Galen Strawson's (1997, 1999) Pearl View (a view which itself comes structurally close to the Stage View about persistence through time and personal identity (see Sider (2000, 2001) and Varzi (2003))), and – as far as I am able to tell – the Buddhist view of the Self. Of course, there are also obvious important dissimilarities. 2 §2. The kind of reductionism about the Self I wish to put forward resembles in many places metaphysical eliminativism about ordinary material objects, so I first suggest to make a short detour and consider what metaphysical eliminativism amounts to and why, contrary to what it may look like at a first glance, it actually is not a very revisionary nor counter-intuitive view. This is important: a theory about ordinary objects – the objects of our perception and everyday experience – should account in a proper manner for this everyday experience of the world. Even more importantly, a theory of the Self – that is, the most intimate and central thing there is to ourselves in our everyday experience – should not ask us to be too
two allegedly opposing camps. On the one side, there are the acquaintance of a very broadly Cartesian invention of the Self as being a substance or substratum (various version of this type of view admit Descartes (1965), Reid (1785), Gallie (1936), Lowe (1996) ). On the other side lies a more or less joined confederation of friends of various kind reductionism of this substance, either in the form of some character of a broadly Humean bundle theory (such as Hume (1978), and recently Dainton (2008, 2012) ), or – more radically – in the form of an eliminativist theory (see for instance Johnston (2010), Olson (1998) ). In Benovsky (2008, 2009), my business was to prove that, in general, bundle theories and substratum theory are in fact not very different from each other, and that, in particular, when it occur to the Self, it makes little difference to choose one camp or the other. I will not bid this issue here; rather, in this article, I will try to say something positive about the metaphysics of the Self, and instead of doing meta - metaphysics, I will try to articulate what I take to be the correct' first - order' view. 2 There are some similarities – but only some – between my position and Parfit's (1971, 1984) reductionism, as well as Galen Strawson's (1997, 1999) Pearl View (a view which itself come structurally cheeseparing to the Stage View about persistence through time and personal identity (see Sider (2000, 2001) and Varzi (2003) )), and – as far as I am able to tell – the Buddhist view of the Self. Of course, there constitute also obvious important dissimilarities. 2 § 2. The kind of reductionism about the Self I wish to put forward resembles in many places metaphysical eliminativism about ordinary fabric objects, so I first suggest to make a short detour and consider what metaphysical eliminativism amount to and why, contrary to what it may look like at a first glance, it actually is not a very revisionary nor counter - intuitive view. This is authoritative: a theory about ordinary objects – the object of our perception and everyday experience – should account in a proper manner for this everyday experience of the worldly concern. Even more importantly, a theory of the Self – that is, the about intimate and central thing there is to ourselves in our everyday experience – should not necessitate us to be too
 twl allegedly opposing camks. On the one sidg, rhere ere the friends of a very broadly Cartesian cincepupon of the Self as bekng a subdtance oe suustratum (various versions of tgls ty'e of view incluce Descartas (1965), Reid (1785), Gallhe (1936), Powe (1996)). On the other side lies a more or lesx knited alliancg of gwienss of various kinds reductionism or this vubstance, eitner in the form of some tyoe ov a broadly Humean bundle theiry (fych as Hume (1978), and recenulv Dainton (2008, 2012)), or – more radically – in the foro of cn eliminatuvust jheory (see fir inftance Johnsbpn (2010), Olvon (1998)). In Benovsky (2008, 2009), my buvinwss was to show that, mn general, bundle thgories and sbbstratum theories arw un fawt nmt vdey aifrecenf from earh other, ans that, in pqrticular, when it cpmqw to the Self, it mahef little difference to choose one camp mr fhe other. I will not prwss this issue here; rwther, in ehis article, I will try to say something positive abouv ghe mctapftslcs of the Self, and instead of doing meta-meta[gyxibs, I will try to crticulate what O halg to be the cotrect 'fndsf-order' view. 2 There are soie sinilaritief – bit only some – between my viww and Parfin's (1971, 1984) reductionism, as wzll as Galen Strswson'x (1997, 1999) Pearl View (a view wkich ifself comes structurzuly close to the Stsga View about persistence trrough tine aud persoval odentiey (see Sidfr (2000, 2001) and Varzi (2003))), and – as var ad H am able ho tell – the Buddhist view of tix Self. Of coutse, thvre are ajso onvious importane dissimilaritnes. 2 §2. Thz kind of reductponism abmut the Sels I wish to pgj forward resxmbles in mant plqces megxphysical elimonativism about ordunary material objccts, rk I first suggewt uo make a short cetuur ajd cjtsider what ketaohyrocal dliminaunviwo ampunts to and why, condrarg to what it may lpoh like aj a first glance, it acyually is not a vegy retisionery not cjunter-intuitive view. This is ijportant: w tmeory about owdinqry objects – the objects of our perception and everbday experience – should account in a propet msnner for tiis evqryday ex[erience of the worle. Even more imporuantly, a theory of the Aelf – dhat ls, the most intimate and central thing there is to ourselves in our everyeay ex'ewience – shohld mot avk bs to bq tol
two allegedly opposing camps. On the one are friends of very broadly Cartesian being substance or substratum versions of this of view include Descartes (1965), Reid Gallie (1936), Lowe (1996)). On the other side lies a more or less alliance of friends of various kinds reductionism of this substance, either in the of type a Humean bundle theory (such as Hume (1978), and recently Dainton (2008, 2012)), or – more radically in the form of an eliminativist theory (see instance Johnston (2010), Olson In Benovsky (2008, 2009), my was show that, general, theories substratum theories are fact not very different from each other, and that, in particular, when it comes to the Self, makes little choose one or other. will not press here; rather, in this article, I say something positive about the metaphysics of the and instead doing meta-metaphysics, I will try to what I take to be the correct 'first-order' 2 There are some similarities – but only some – between my view and Parfit's reductionism, as well as Strawson's (1997, 1999) View view itself structurally close the Stage View about persistence through time and personal identity (see (2000, 2001) and Varzi (2003))), and – as far as able tell – the view of the Self. course, are also obvious important §2. kind the I to put forward resembles many places metaphysical eliminativism about material objects, so I short detour and consider what metaphysical eliminativism amounts and why, contrary to what it may like at a first glance, it actually is not a very revisionary counter-intuitive view. important: a theory about ordinary objects – the of our perception and experience – should account in a proper manner for everyday of the Even more importantly, theory of the – that is, intimate and thing is our everyday experience – should not us be too
 two allegedly opposing camps. on the one siDe, theRe aRe tHe FrieNds oF a very broadly CARtesIan conception of the Self As beiNg A SubsTAnCe or sUbstratUM (vARIouS vErSioNs OF tHis tyPe oF view inClude DescaRteS (1965), REid (1785), Gallie (1936), LowE (1996)). on The other siDe lIes a more or leSs uNited aLlIanCE of frIenDs of vArious KInds reDuctionisM oF This suBStance, eITHeR in tHe form of some type oF A bROadly Humean bunDle theOrY (SuCH As HUme (1978), And recentlY DAintoN (2008, 2012)), Or – more rADiCALLy – iN The form of an elIminativist THeoRy (see fOr InsTAnce JoHnstoN (2010), OLSon (1998)). in Benovsky (2008, 2009), mY busIness was tO show tHAt, in genERal, bundLe theoRieS anD subSTrAtUm tHeORieS ArE in FAct Not very dIfFeRent fRom eACH OTher, And That, In parTicular, when it ComEs to THe SElf, it Makes LittLe DiffeRence tO chooSe One camp or the othEr. I wIll not preSs tHiS isSuE here; RAther, iN thIs aRticle, I Will try TO saY sOMEThIng positive about thE mETApHysics of The SelF, AnD iNStead of dOiNg mEta-mETAphysIcs, I WIlL try to arTiculaTE wHaT I take tO bE the coRrEct 'FirSt-ordER' vieW. 2 There Are some sImilaRIties – but only soME – between my vieW AnD pArFIt's (1971, 1984) rEduCtionism, as wEll aS galeN StrAWsOn's (1997, 1999) pEarl VIew (a vIeW WhICh itself comes structUrAlly clOse to The Stage View aBout persisTENCe througH timE AnD Personal identiTy (see sider (2000, 2001) and VaRZi (2003))), and – as fAr as I Am able to Tell – the BuDDHist view Of tHe SElf. of cOURsE, there are also OBViouS iMportanT diSsimilaRitIes. 2 §2. the KinD oF reductioNism abouT tHe seLf i wiSh to pUT forward ReSemBlEs iN many PLaces mEtaphYsicAl ElIMinAtivism ABoUT OrdiNaRy MateRiaL oBjectS, so I FIrsT suggesT to make a sHorT DetoUr AnD considEr what metaphySiCal eliminaTiVisM amounTS To and why, Contrary to what it may look LIke at a fIrsT glanCe, it Actually iS noT a very RevISionarY nor coUnter-InTuiTIVe vieW. tHiS is ImPortant: a thEORy aBout oRdInarY objectS – the objects of our peRCepTion and everydAy eXperIENcE – shOUlD AccOuNT in A PRoper manner for tHis everydaY eXPeRience of thE WorLd. even morE importAntly, A Theory oF the Self – tHat is, the mOsT intIMAte And central Thing theRe is to ourSElves IN oUr eveRydAy expeRiEncE – shouLd not aSK us To be tOo
 two allegedly opposing ca mps. On th e one  si de,  t here  are  the friends o f  a v ery broadly Cartesianconce pt i on o f  t he Se lf as b e in g a s ub st anc eo rsubst rat um (var ious versi ons  o f this typeo fview inclu deDescartes (1 965 ), Rei d(17 8 5), G all ie (1 936),L owe (1 996)). On  t h e othe r  side l i e sa mo re or less united al l iance of frien ds ofva r io u s  ki nds  reduction is m oft his sub s ta n c e , e i ther in the f orm of some typ e of a  b roa d ly Hum ean b un d letheory (suc h as  Hume (19 78), a n d recen t ly Dain ton (2 008 , 2 012) ) ,or  –mo r e r a di cal l y –  in thefo rm  of a n el i m i n ativ ist  the ory ( see for insta nce  Joh n sto n (20 10),Olso n(1998 )). In  Beno vs ky (2008, 2009) , my  business  wa stosh ow th a t, ingen era l, bund le theo r ies  a n d su bstratum theoriesar e in  fact no t very di ff e rent fro meac h ot h e r, an d th a t,  in part icular ,  w he n it co me s to t he  Se lf,  it m a keslittle  differe nce t o  choose one ca m p or the othe r .I wi l l no t p ress this i ssue here ; ra t he r,i n thi s art ic l e, I will try to say s om ething  posi tive about th e metaphys i c s  of theSelf ,  a n d instead of d oingmeta-metap h ysics, I  will  try toarticulat e what I t ake  to  be  th e co rrect 'first- o r der'  v iew. 2The re aresom e s imi lar it ies – but  only so me  –  b et wee n myv iew andPa rfi t' s ( 1971, 1984)reduc tion is m, aswell as Ga l e n St ra ws on's  (1 99 7, 19 99)P ear l View(a view w hic h  its el fcomes s tructurally c lo se to theSt age  Viewa b out pers istence through time an d  person alident ity(see Side r ( 2000,200 1 ) andVarzi(2003 )) ),a n d – a s fa r a sI am ablet o  te ll –th e Bu ddhistview of the Self.O f c ourse, thereare  als o ob vio u si mpo rt a ntd i ssimilarities.2 §2. Theki n dof reducti o nis mabout t he Self  I wi s h to pu t forward  resemble sin m a n y p laces meta physical  eliminat i visma bo ut or din ary ma te ria l obj ects,s o I  firs t sugg es t to m ake a  s hort det our and consider what m etaphy sical  el iminativi sma mou nts to an d wh y, contrar y t o w hat i t m a y loo k li k eata  firs t gl a nce, it a c tu all y is  not a very r e vis ionar y n o r coun ter- intuitive view. T h is is importan t: a t heo rya bout  o rdinary object s –  t h e  objects  o f our perce ption an de veryd ay exp erienc e – sho u l da ccount  ina p roper man ner  f o r thisev er y day ex peri en ce ofthe wo r ld.E v en more importan tly,a theor y  of  theSe lf – th a t is , the most  intimate a nd cen tral  thin g there  i s to o urs el ves in our everydayexper ience –  s houl d n ot ask  ust o  be t oo
 two_allegedly opposing_camps. On the one_side, there_are_the friends_of_a very broadly_Cartesian conception of_the Self as being_a substance or_substratum_(various versions of this type of view include Descartes (1965), Reid (1785), Gallie (1936),_Lowe_(1996)). On_the_other_side lies a more or_less united alliance of friends_of various_kinds reductionism of this substance, either in the_form_of some type_of a broadly Humean bundle theory (such as Hume_(1978), and recently Dainton (2008, 2012)),_or – more_radically_–_in the form of_an eliminativist theory (see for instance_Johnston (2010), Olson (1998)). In Benovsky_(2008, 2009), my business was to show_that, in general, bundle theories and_substratum theories are in fact_not very_different from each other, and_that, in particular,_when it_comes to the_Self, it makes little difference to_choose one camp_or the other. I will not_press_this issue here;_rather,_in_this article,_I will try_to_say something_positive_about the metaphysics of the Self,_and_instead of doing meta-metaphysics, I will try_to articulate what I_take_to be the correct_'first-order' view. 2 There are_some similarities – but only some_– between_my view_and Parfit's (1971, 1984) reductionism, as well as Galen Strawson's (1997,_1999) Pearl View (a view which_itself comes structurally close_to the_Stage_View about persistence_through_time and_personal identity (see Sider (2000, 2001) and_Varzi (2003))),_and – as far as I_am able to tell_–_the Buddhist view of the Self._Of course, there are also obvious_important dissimilarities. 2 §2. The_kind_of_reductionism about the Self I_wish to put forward resembles in_many places metaphysical_eliminativism about ordinary material objects, so I_first_suggest to make a short detour_and_consider what metaphysical eliminativism amounts to_and_why,_contrary to what it may_look like at a first glance,_it actually is not a very revisionary nor counter-intuitive_view. This is_important: a theory about ordinary_objects_–_the objects of our perception and everyday experience – should_account in_a proper manner_for this everyday experience of the world. Even more importantly,_a theory of the Self – that_is, the most intimate and central thing there is to ourselves_in our everyday experience – should not ask_us to be too