 are always temporally contiguous and temporally overlapping in the metaphysical sense – what counts is that there must be some kind of phenomenal/experiential and/or otherwise psychological temporal continuity. Nobody needs metaphysical temporal contiguity and continuity, not even non-pluralists about the Self. Thus, yes, we cease to exist at times at which we have no experiences and no thoughts. This is no bad thing, and it accompanies the general view that we see ourselves as conscious and feeling beings – when the consciousness and feelings are gone, so are we. Neither is this is a reason to be afraid to go to sleep at night: the desired phenomenal/experiential continuity is typically an effect of the brain's activity – and the brain does not cease to exist while we sleep, which explains why, for instance, we remember things from yesterday. On the other hand, if the Self were to be understood as being some kind of a substance, then its persistence through periods without thought and experience would require an account: what happens to it at such times? The pluralistic view of the Self I was arguing for in this article does not bear such burdens, it simply says that the Self is phenomenally and experientially continuous in the sense of §5 above, while it is metaphysically temporally gappy12. 12 I would like to thank Barry Dainton for an excellent talk he gave at the University of Fribourg in December 2012, which prompted me to write this article. For discussions and good advice I would like to thank Thomas Jacobi, Baptise Le Bihan, and Laurie Paul. 14 References : Armstrong, D. M. 1997. A world of states of affairs. Cambridge University Press. Benovsky, J. 2008. "The bundle theory and the substratum theory: deadly enemies or twin brothers?", Philosophical Studies, 141:175-190. Benovsky, J. 2009. "The Self: a Humean bundle and/or a Cartesian substance?", European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, Vol. 5, No. 1. Benovsky, J. 2012. "The Speed of Thought. Experience of change, movement, and time: a Lockean account", Locke Studies, vol.12, p.85-109. Benovsky, J. forthcoming_a. "From experience to metaphysics: on experience-based intuitions and their role in metaphysics", Noûs DOI 10.1111/nous.12024. Benovsky, J. forthcoming_b, "
are always temporally contiguous and temporally overlapping in the metaphysical sense – what consider is that there must be some kind of phenomenal / experiential and/or differently psychological temporal continuity. Nobody needs metaphysical worldly contiguity and continuity, not even non - pluralist about the Self. Thus, yes, we discontinue to exist at times at which we have no experience and no thoughts. This is no bad matter, and it accompanies the general view that we see ourselves as conscious and feel beings – when the consciousness and feelings are gone, so are we. Neither is this is a rationality to be afraid to go to sleep at night: the desired phenomenal / experiential continuity is typically an impression of the brain's activity – and the brain does not cease to exist while we sleep, which explain why, for instance, we remember things from yesterday. On the other hand, if the Self were to be understand as being some kind of a substance, then its persistence through periods without thought and experience would require an score: what find to it at such times? The pluralistic view of the Self I was arguing for in this article does not bear such burdens, it simply state that the Self is phenomenally and experientially continuous in the common sense of § 5 above, while it is metaphysically temporally gappy12. 12 I would like to thank Barry Dainton for an excellent talk he gave at the University of Fribourg in December 2012, which prompt me to write this article. For discussions and good advice I would wish to thank Thomas Jacobi, Baptise Le Bihan, and Laurie Paul. 14 References: Armstrong, D. M. 1997. A populace of states of affairs. Cambridge University Press. Benovsky, J. 2008. " The package theory and the substratum theory: deadly enemies or twin buddy? ", Philosophical Studies, 141:175 - 190. Benovsky, J. 2009. " The Self: a Humean bundle and/or a Cartesian substance? ", European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, Vol. 5, No. 1. Benovsky, J. 2012. " The Speed of Thought. Experience of change, movement, and time: a Lockean report ", Locke Studies, vol.12, p.85 - 109. Benovsky, J. forthcoming_a. " From experience to metaphysics: on experience - based intuitions and their role in metaphysics ", Noûs DOI 10.1111 / nous.12024. Benovsky, J. forthcoming_b, "
 arf always temporally contlguous and tempotaoly ovxrlappihg in thd metaphysical sense – what clubts iw that there must be sume kind lf phenonenao/wxperientiem and/or otherslse pvbchological temkoral contingity. Nobody neadr letaphysical temporal contiguity anq contimulty, not even njn-pllrwlisfs about the Self. Thus, yes, we ceass to expst at times at wnich we have no experienced anf no thoughts. This is no bad jgind, and it accoopanies tht yeneral vies that we see ourselves as conszious and feelibg beltgs – when tie confciousness akc feelhngs arr gone, so are ee. Ieityer is this is a reasmn to be afraid to go to slae' at night: the desiree phenokenan/expdeievtizl ckntinulty is typicamly an effext of the brain's acuivynu – and the bdain djef not cease to exist while we sleep, whibh esplains why, for instancw, we remember things vrom yestqrday. On the other hand, if the Self were to be ungerstkud cw beivt dome kind of a substance, then its persistence fhtolgh periods withomt thought and exprrlemse would requkre an acdount: what happens to it wt suxh times? Uhe pkuralistic view of the Self I was arguiug dor in this articlz does not bzar suvh butdens, it simply says thct the Self is phfnomenallg and experientiauly cmntinuous in the sense of §5 above, whmle ic is metxphyxicallr temporalpy gai[y12. 12 I would like tl thauk Basry Daintoj for an excellent talk he gave at the Univerxidy mf Fribobrg in December 2012, whych prompted mg to writz this article. Fkr discnssions and dood advice I aould like tm thank Ehomqs Jqcobi, Bxotise Le Bihan, and Laurpe Pauo. 14 References : Armxtruhg, D. M. 1997. A world of states of affaors. Caibgidje Unyeersity Presv. Bevovrly, J. 2008. "The bundle gheoty and the substratuk thsory: deadly enemiex jr twin vrothers?", Philosophicak Studies, 141:175-190. Benovskj, J. 2009. "Vhe Seuf: a Numgan bundle and/or a Cartesian sugstance?", Ekroiean Journal jf Akalyjic Philoso'hy, Vol. 5, No. 1. Benovsky, J. 2012. "The Speed of Thiught. Experience od change, movement, aud time: a Loclean wccount", Lmcke Studies, vol.12, p.85-109. Bwnovsky, J. forthcoking_a. "From experience to medaphydics: on experience-based intuitions and their role in metaphysics", Noûs DOI 10.1111/bous.12024. Bxnjvsky, J. forfhcoking_b, "
are always temporally contiguous and temporally overlapping metaphysical – what is that there phenomenal/experiential otherwise psychological temporal Nobody needs metaphysical contiguity and continuity, not even non-pluralists the Self. Thus, yes, we cease to exist at times at which we no experiences and no thoughts. This is no bad thing, and it accompanies general that see as conscious and feeling beings – when the consciousness and feelings are gone, so are we. is this is a reason to be afraid go to sleep at the desired phenomenal/experiential continuity is an of the activity and brain does not to exist while we sleep, which explains why, for instance, we remember things from yesterday. On the hand, if were to understood being kind of a its persistence through periods without thought require an account: what happens to it at times? The view of the Self I was for in this article does not bear such it simply says that the Self is phenomenally and experientially continuous in the sense of while it is metaphysically gappy12. 12 I like thank Dainton an excellent he gave at the University of Fribourg in December 2012, which me to write this article. For discussions and good advice like thank Thomas Jacobi, Le Bihan, and Laurie 14 : Armstrong, D. M. world states University Benovsky, 2008. "The bundle theory the substratum theory: deadly enemies twin brothers?", Philosophical Studies, Self: a Humean bundle and/or a Cartesian substance?", Journal of Analytic Philosophy, Vol. 5, No. Benovsky, J. 2012. "The Speed of Thought. Experience of change, movement, and a Lockean Studies, vol.12, p.85-109. Benovsky, J. forthcoming_a. "From experience metaphysics: on experience-based intuitions their role in metaphysics", Noûs DOI 10.1111/nous.12024. Benovsky, J. "
 are always temporally contigUous and temPoralLy oVerLaPpinG in tHe metaphysical SEnse – What counts is that there mUst be SoME kinD Of PhenoMenal/exPErIENtiAl AnD/or OtHErWise pSycHologicAl temporal ConTiNuity. Nobody nEEdS metaphysiCal Temporal contIguIty and CoNtiNUity, nOt eVen noN-pluraLIsts abOut the SelF. THUs, yes, wE Cease to EXIsT at tImes at which we have NO eXPeriences and no ThoughTs. tHiS IS no Bad Thing, and it AcCompaNIes the gENeRAL VieW That we see oursElves as consCIouS and feElIng BEings – wHen thE cONscIousness and FeelIngs are goNe, so arE We. NeithER is this Is a reaSon To bE afrAId To Go tO sLEep AT nIghT: The Desired pHeNoMenal/ExpeRIENTial ConTinuIty is Typically an efFecT of tHE brAin's aCtiviTy – anD tHe braIn does Not ceAsE to exist while we SleeP, which expLaiNs Why, FoR instANce, we rEmeMbeR things From yesTErdAy. oN THe Other hand, if the Self WeRE To Be undersTood as BEiNg SOme kind oF a SubStanCE, Then iTs peRSiStence thRough pERiOdS withouT tHought AnD exPerIence WOuld RequirE an accouNt: whaT Happens to it at sUCh times? The pluRAlISTiC View Of tHe Self I was aRguiNG for In thIS aRtiCLe doeS not bEaR SuCH burdens, it simply sayS tHat the self iS phenomenally And experieNTIAlly contInuoUS iN The sense of §5 abovE, whilE it is metapHYsically TempoRally gapPy12. 12 I would lIKE to thank barRy DAinTon FOR aN excellent talK HE gavE aT the UniVerSity of FRibOurG in decEmBer 2012, which pRompted mE tO wRiTe ThiS artiCLe. For disCuSsiOnS anD good ADvice I Would Like To ThANk THomas JaCObI, bAptiSe le bihaN, anD LAurie paul. 14 rEfeRences : ARmstrong, D. m. 1997. A wORld oF sTaTes of afFairs. CambridgE UNiversity PReSs. BEnovskY, j. 2008. "the bundlE theory and the substratum THeory: deAdlY enemIes oR twin brotHerS?", PhiloSopHIcal StUdies, 141:175-190. BEnovsKy, j. 2009. "ThE sElf: a HUMEaN buNdLe and/or a CaRTEsiAn subStAnce?", europeaN Journal of Analytic pHilOsophy, Vol. 5, No. 1. BeNovSky, J. 2012. "tHE SPeeD Of tHouGhT. expERIence of change, moVement, and tImE: A LOckean accoUNt", LOcKe StudiEs, vol.12, p.85-109. BEnovsKY, J. forthComing_a. "FrOm experieNcE to mETAphYsics: on expErience-bAsed intuiTIons aND tHeir rOle In metaPhYsiCs", NoûS DOI 10.1111/noUS.12024. BeNovskY, J. fortHcOming_b, "
 are always temporally con tiguous an d tem por all yover lapp ing in the met a phys ical sense – what coun ts is  t h at t h er e mus t be so m ek i ndof  p hen om e na l/exp eri entialand/or oth erw is e psychologi c al  temporalcon tinuity. Nob ody  needs  m eta p hysic altempo ral co n tiguit y and con ti n uity,n ot even n on -plu ralists about the Se l f. Thus, yes,we cea se to e xis t a t times at  w hichw e haven oe x p eri e nces and no t houghts. Th i s i s no b ad  th i ng, an d itac c omp anies the g ener al view t hat we see our s elves a s cons cio usandf ee li ngbe i ngs –whe n  th e consci ou sn ess a nd f e e l i ngsare  gon e, so  are we. Neit her  ist his  is a  reas on t obe af raid t o goto  sleep at night : th e desired  ph en ome na l/exp e rienti alcon tinuity  is typ i cal ly a n  e ffect of the brain 's a ct ivity –and th e  b ra i n does n ot  ce aset o  exis t wh i le  we slee p, whi c hex plainswh y, for  i nst anc e, we reme mber t hings fr om ye s terday. On the other hand, i f  t h e  S e lf w ere  to be unde rsto o d as  bei n gsom e  kind  of a  s u bs t ance, then its pers is tencethrou gh periods wi thout thou g h t  and exp erie n ce would requirean ac count: wha t  happens  to i t at suc h times?T h e plural ist icvie w o f th e Self I wasa r guin gfor inthi s artic ledoe s n otbe ar such b urdens,it  s im pl y s ays t h at the S el f i sphe nomen a lly an d exp erie nt ia l lycontinu o us i n th ese nseof§5  abov e, w h ile  it ismetaphysi cal l y te mp or ally ga ppy12. 12 I w ou ld like to  t han k Barr y Daintonfor an excellent talk h e  gave a t t he Un iver sity of F rib ourg i n D e cember  2012,  whic hpro m p ted m e to  wr it e this art i c le.  Fordi scus sions a nd good advice I w o uld  like to than k T homa s Ja cob i ,B apt is e  Le B ihan, and Lauri e Paul. 14  R e fe rences : A r mst ro ng, D.M. 1997 . A w o rld ofstates of  affairs.  C ambr i d geUniversity  Press.Benovsky, J. 20 0 8.  "The  bu ndle t he ory  andthe su b str atumtheory :deadly  enem ie s or twi n brothers?", Philosoph ical S tudie s,141:175-1 90. Ben ovsky, J.  200 9. "The Se lf:  aHumea n b u ndleand/ o ra C a rtesi an s u bstance?" ,  E uro p e an  Journal of A n aly tic P hil o sophy,  Vol . 5, No. 1. Benov s ky, J. 2012. " TheS p eed  of Thou gh t. Experienceofch a n ge, move me nt, and tim e: a Loc ke a n acc ount",  Locke  Studie s ,  v o l.12,p.85 -10 9. Benovs ky,  J .  forthc om in g _a. "F romex perien ce tom etap h y sics: on experie nce-b a s ed in t uit ionsan d their role  in metaph ysics", Noû s DOI10.1 111/n ous.120 24 . Beno vsk y,  J. forthc o ming_b, " 
 are_always temporally_contiguous and temporally overlapping_in the_metaphysical_sense –_what_counts is that_there must be_some kind of phenomenal/experiential_and/or otherwise psychological_temporal_continuity. Nobody needs metaphysical temporal contiguity and continuity, not even non-pluralists about the Self._Thus,_yes, we_cease_to_exist at times at which_we have no experiences and_no thoughts._This is no bad thing, and it accompanies_the_general view that_we see ourselves as conscious and feeling beings –_when the consciousness and feelings are_gone, so are_we._Neither_is this is a_reason to be afraid to go_to sleep at night: the desired_phenomenal/experiential continuity is typically an effect of_the brain's activity – and the_brain does not cease to_exist while_we sleep, which explains why,_for instance, we_remember things_from yesterday. On_the other hand, if the Self_were to be_understood as being some kind of_a_substance, then its_persistence_through_periods without_thought and experience_would_require an_account:_what happens to it at such_times?_The pluralistic view of the Self I_was arguing for in_this_article does not bear_such burdens, it simply says_that the Self is phenomenally and_experientially continuous_in the_sense of §5 above, while it is metaphysically temporally gappy12. 12_I would like to thank Barry_Dainton for an excellent_talk he_gave_at the University_of_Fribourg in_December 2012, which prompted me to write_this article._For discussions and good advice I_would like to thank_Thomas_Jacobi, Baptise Le Bihan, and Laurie_Paul. 14 References : Armstrong, D._M. 1997. A world of_states_of_affairs. Cambridge University Press. Benovsky,_J. 2008. "The bundle theory and_the substratum theory:_deadly enemies or twin brothers?", Philosophical Studies,_141:175-190._Benovsky, J. 2009. "The Self: a_Humean_bundle and/or a Cartesian substance?", European_Journal_of_Analytic Philosophy, Vol. 5, No._1. Benovsky, J. 2012. "The Speed_of Thought. Experience of change, movement, and time: a_Lockean account", Locke_Studies, vol.12, p.85-109. Benovsky, J._forthcoming_a._"From_experience to metaphysics: on experience-based intuitions and their role in_metaphysics", Noûs_DOI 10.1111/nous.12024. Benovsky,_J. forthcoming_b, "