 existence of objects.42 Lotze's adoption of two different anti-sceptical strategies for logic and for judgements about existent things in space and time shows that he accords propositions and ordinary objects very different metaphysical statuses. In particular, it provides further evidence that his metaphysics of propositions is not that of Platonism A-on which answering the sceptical objection is a matter of securing epistemic access across a metaphysical divide-but that of Platonism B, on which answering the sceptical question is simply a matter of articulating in a consistent fashion the internal laws that govern the validity of judgement. Where does this leave us with our original question about the difference between hypostatic Platonism and Lotze's Platonism? I think they correspond quite closely to Reck's Platonism A and Platonism B, respectively. The A-Platonist understands the objectivity of propositions in metaphysical terms as their existing mind-independently. Our beliefs must then, somehow, be brought into conformity with them. From the point of view of the B-Platonist, the A-Platonist "hypostasizes" propositions and their constituents. The B-Platonist does not accept that judgemental contents, that is, propositions, are sequences of representations-much less that they are physical events in our brains and bodies-but does not hypostasize them. Explaining why the B-Platonist does not hypostasize propositions will also explain how Lotze can be a non-hypostatic Platonist while accepting that there are propositions (OP from §3). Recall that the B-Platonist holds that the judgements p and "It is valid that p" have the same content. Thus, the following biconditional is trivially true (both sides have the same content): 1 p iff the proposition that p is valid. From this, it follows by logic alone that: 2 (p or ~p) iff the proposition that p is valid or invalid. Assuming that it is a basic law of logic that propositions are either valid or invalid, it follows that: 3 p or ~p iff there is a proposition that p. Since the left-hand side is a law of logic, this shows that the B-Platonist can derive that there are propositions (OP) from purely logical principles plus 42 L §348, 577. Platonism in Lotze and Frege 157 a trivial principle, (1), that asserts a bic
existence of objects.42 Lotze's adoption of two different anti - sceptical scheme for logic and for judgment about existent things in space and fourth dimension shows that he accords proposal and average objects very different metaphysical statuses. In particular, it provides further evidence that his metaphysics of proposal is not that of Platonism A - on which answering the sceptical protest is a topic of securing epistemic access across a metaphysical watershed - but that of Platonism B, on which answering the doubting doubt is simply a matter of articulating in a consistent manner the internal laws that regulate the validity of judgment. Where does this leave us with our original motion about the difference between hypostatic Platonism and Lotze's Platonism? I think they correspond quite close to Reck's Platonism A and Platonism B, respectively. The A - Platonist understands the objectivity of propositions in metaphysical terms as their existing mind - independently. Our beliefs must then, somehow, be institute into conformity with them. From the point of view of the B - Platonist, the A - Platonist " hypostasizes " propositions and their constituents. The B - Platonist does not accept that judgemental contents, that is, propositions, are sequences of representations - a lot less that they are forcible events in our brains and bodies - but does not hypostasize them. excuse why the B - Platonist does not hypostasize propositions will also explain how Lotze can be a non - hypostatic Platonist while accept that there are propositions (OP from § 3). Recall that the B - Platonist holds that the judgment p and " It is valid that p " have the same content. Thus, the following biconditional is trivially dependable (both sides have the same content ): 1 phosphorus iff the proposition that phosphorus is valid. From this, it follows by logic alone that: 2 (p or ~p) iff the proposition that p is valid or invalid. Assuming that it is a basic jurisprudence of logic that propositions are either valid or invalid, it follows that: 3 p or ~p iff there be a proposition that p. Since the left - hand side is a police of logic, this shows that the B - Platonist can deduce that there are propositions (OP) from purely logical principles plus 42 L § 348, 577. Platonism in Lotze and Frege 157 a fiddling principle, (1), that assert a bic
 exlstence of objects.42 Lotze'r adoption of tci diffxrent ahti-sceptkcal strategies for logic anv foe judtements about existent things ij space qnd uime shows that hx accords propkditimis and ordinary objects vary different kega'hysical statuses. In particular, it pwovides fkrther evidencg thau hys msnakhysics of propositions is not thzt of Pnatonism A-on ehich answering the sceptifal lbjection is a mather of secutjng wpistemic aczess across a metaphysjcal divide-but that of Platoniso B, ou which ansqeeinh the sceptiral quvstion is simiky a mdtter og articulating in a xonsistent fashion thx internal laws that govern tve validity of judgwmwnt. Wvere doer thks meeve us wihh kur originzl question about the differenve vetween hyposfatic [lwtonism and Lotze's Platonism? I think thty codrespond quite closely ro Reck's Platonism A wnd Platogism B, respectively. The A-Platonist understands tha objxcgivnbn of prlpositions in metaphysical terms as their exiffimg mind-independektly. Our beliefs mish yren, somehow, bg brougkf jnto conformity wihh them. From the poinu of fiew of the B-Platonist, the Q-Platonist "hjposrasizes" propositious and their conxtiturnts. The B-Platonist doer nof accept thwt judgemsvtal contents, thxt ps, psopositions, are sequences jf represxntatnons-much lesx that they are ohysigdl events in our bgains atd bodies-bkt does not hypostasize them. Ex'kaining why jhe B-Pnatonist does not hypostasyze propositious will clso ebplain how Lotze ran be a non-rypostatic Pldjonist while eccepting thar thwre are oropositions (OL from §3). Rvccll that rhe B-Platonist holvs tfzt the judgemencr p and "It is vakid thwt p" hwee the same wontdnt. Yhus, ghe followikg cicomditional is trivialny tdue (both sides havr bhe same xontent): 1 p iff the prpposition that p id valmd. Froo thix, ij follows by logic alone that: 2 (l or ~p) ifv tme propositiog thqt p is valib or invalid. Assuming that it is a basic law of logic thaj propositions are eijhev valid or iivalid, it follofs that: 3 p or ~p iff rhere is a proposltion that p. Since the left-hdnd slde is a law of logic, this shows that the B-Platonist can derive that therw are 'rjpositions (KP) ftom plrejv logicwl pciiciples plus 42 L §348, 577. Platonism in Lotze and Frege 157 e trivial [rnnciple, (1), that asserts a bic
existence of objects.42 Lotze's adoption of two strategies logic and judgements about existent shows he accords propositions ordinary objects very metaphysical statuses. In particular, it provides evidence that his metaphysics of propositions is not that of Platonism A-on which the sceptical objection is a matter of securing epistemic access across a metaphysical that Platonism on answering the sceptical question is simply a matter of articulating in a consistent fashion the internal that govern the validity of judgement. Where does leave us with our question about the difference between Platonism Lotze's Platonism? think correspond closely to Reck's A and Platonism B, respectively. The A-Platonist understands the objectivity of propositions in metaphysical terms as their mind-independently. Our then, somehow, brought conformity them. From the view of the B-Platonist, the A-Platonist their constituents. The B-Platonist does not accept that contents, that propositions, are sequences of representations-much less they are physical events in our brains and does not hypostasize them. Explaining why the B-Platonist does not hypostasize propositions will also explain can be a non-hypostatic while accepting that are (OP §3). that the holds that the judgements p and "It is valid that p" the same content. Thus, the following biconditional is trivially true have same content): 1 iff the proposition that is From this, it follows alone 2 iff proposition p is valid or Assuming that it is a law of logic that invalid, it follows that: 3 p or ~p there is a proposition that p. Since left-hand side is a law of logic, this shows that the B-Platonist derive that propositions (OP) from purely logical principles plus 42 §348, 577. Platonism in and Frege 157 a trivial principle, (1), that asserts bic
 existence of objects.42 Lotze's aDoption of tWo difFerEnt AnTi-scEptiCal strategies fOR logIc and for judgements abouT exisTeNT thiNGs In spaCe and tiME sHOWs tHaT hE acCoRDs PropoSitIons and Ordinary obJecTs Very differenT MeTaphysical StaTuses. In partiCulAr, it prOvIdeS FurthEr eVidenCe that HIs metaPhysics of PrOPositiONs is not THAt Of PlAtonism A-on which anSWeRIng the scepticaL objecTiON iS A MatTer Of securing EpIstemIC access ACrOSS A meTAphysical diviDe-but that of pLatOnism B, On WhiCH answeRing tHe SCepTical questiOn is Simply a maTter of ARticulaTIng in a cOnsistEnt FasHion THe InTerNaL LawS ThAt gOVerN the valiDiTy Of judGemeNT. wHEre dOes This Leave Us with our origInaL queSTioN abouT the dIffeReNce beTween hYpostAtIc Platonism and LOtze'S PlatonisM? I tHiNk tHeY corrESpond qUitE clOsely to reck's PlATonIsM a ANd platonism B, respectiVeLY. thE A-PlatonIst undERsTaNDs the objEcTivIty oF PRoposItioNS iN metaphySical tERmS aS their eXiSting mInD-inDepEndenTLy. OuR belieFs must thEn, somEHow, be brought inTO conformity wiTH tHEM. FROm thE poInt of view of The B-pLatoNist, THe a-PlATonisT "hypoStASiZEs" propositions and thEiR constItuenTs. The B-PlatoniSt does not aCCEPt that juDgemENtAL contents, that iS, propOsitions, arE SequenceS of rePresentaTions-much LESs that thEy aRe pHysIcaL EVeNts in our brainS ANd boDiEs-but doEs nOt hyposTasIze TheM. ExPlAining why The B-PlatOnIsT dOeS noT hypoSTasize prOpOsiTiOns Will aLSo explAin hoW LotZe CaN Be a Non-hypoSTaTIC PlaToNiSt whIle AcCeptiNg thAT thEre are pRopositioNs (Op From §3). reCaLl that tHe B-Platonist hOlDs that the jUdGemEnts p aND "it is valiD that p" have the same contenT. thus, the FolLowinG bicOnditionaL is TriviaLly TRue (botH sides Have tHe SamE COntenT): 1 P IfF thE pRoposition THAt p Is valId. from This, it fOllows by logic alone THat: 2 (P or ~p) iff the proPosItioN THaT p iS VaLId oR iNValID. assuming that it iS a basic law Of LOgIc that propOSitIoNs are eiTher valId or iNValid, it Follows thAt: 3 p or ~p iff ThEre iS A ProPosition thAt p. Since The left-haND side IS a Law of LogIc, this ShOws That tHe B-PlaTOniSt can Derive ThAt therE are pRoPositionS (OP) from purely logical priNcipleS plus 42 l §348, 577. PlAtonism in lotZE anD Frege 157 a trIviaL principle, (1), ThaT asSerts A biC
 existence of objects.42 L otze's ado ption  of  tw odiff eren t anti-sceptic a l st rategies for logic and  forju d geme n ts  abou t exist e nt t hin gs  i n s pa c eand t ime  showsthat he ac cor ds  proposition s  a nd ordinar y o bjects verydif ferent  m eta p hysic alstatu ses. I n  parti cular, it  p r ovides further e vi denc e that his metaph y si c s of propositi ons is  n o tt h atofPlatonismA- on wh i ch answ e ri n g the sceptical obj ection is a mat ter of  s ecu r ing ep istem ic acc ess acrossa me taphysica l divi d e-but t h at of P latoni smB,on w h ic hans we r ing th e s c ept ical que st io n issimp l y a  mat ter  ofartic ulating in acon sist e ntfashi on th e in te rnallaws t hat g ov ern the validit y of  judgemen t.Wh ere  d oes t h is lea veuswith ou r origi n alqu e s t io n about the differ en c e  b etween h yposta t ic  P l atonisman d L otze ' s  Plat onis m ?I thinkthey c o rr es pond qu it e clos el y t o R eck's Plat onismA and Pl atoni s m B, respectiv e ly. The A-Pla t on i s tu nder sta nds the obj ecti v ityof p r op osi t ionsin me ta p hy s ical terms as their  e xistin g min d-independent ly. Our be l i e fs mustthen ,  s o mehow, be brou ght i nto confor m ity with  them . From t he pointo f  view of  th e B -Pl ato n i st , the A-Plato n i st " hy postasi zes " propo sit ion s a ndth eir const ituents.  T he  B -P lat onist does not  a cce pt  th at ju d gement al co nten ts ,t hat  is, pr o po s i tion s,  a re s equ en ces o f re p res entatio ns-much l ess that  t he y are p hysical event sin our bra in s a nd bod i e s-but do es not hypostasize them .  Explai nin g why  the  B-Platon ist  doesnot hypost asizepropo si tio n s  will a ls o e xp lain how L o t zecan b ea no n-hypos tatic Platonist wh i leaccepting tha t t here a re  pr o po s iti on s  (O P from §3). Recal l that the  B - Pl atonist ho l dsth at thejudgeme nts p and "It  is valid  that p"ha ve t h e  sa me content . Thus,the follo w ing b i co nditi ona l is t ri via lly t rue (b o thsides  haveth e same  cont en t): 1 piff the proposition tha t p is  vali d.From this , i t  fo llows bylogi c alone th at:  2(p or  ~p )  iffthep ro pos i tionthat p is vali d  o r i n v al id. Assumin g t hat  it i s a basiclawof logic that pro p ositions are e ithe r val ido r in va lid, it follow s t ha t :  3 p or~p  iff thereis a pro po s ition  thatp. Sin ce thel e ft - hand s ideisa law oflog ic ,  this s ho ws that t he B -P latoni st can deri v e  that there arepropo s i tions (OP ) fro mpurelyl ogic al princip les plus 42  L §34 8, 5 77. P latonis min Lot zean d Frege 15 7  a trivia l pri nciple,  ( 1),tha t asse rtsa bic
 existence_of objects.42_Lotze's adoption of two_different anti-sceptical_strategies_for logic_and_for judgements about_existent things in_space and time shows_that he accords_propositions_and ordinary objects very different metaphysical statuses. In particular, it provides further evidence that_his_metaphysics of_propositions_is_not that of Platonism A-on_which answering the sceptical objection_is a_matter of securing epistemic access across a metaphysical_divide-but_that of Platonism_B, on which answering the sceptical question is simply_a matter of articulating in a_consistent fashion the_internal_laws_that govern the validity_of judgement. Where does this leave_us with our original question about_the difference between hypostatic Platonism and Lotze's_Platonism? I think they correspond quite_closely to Reck's Platonism A_and Platonism_B, respectively. The A-Platonist understands_the objectivity of_propositions in_metaphysical terms as_their existing mind-independently. Our beliefs must_then, somehow, be_brought into conformity with them. From_the_point of view_of_the_B-Platonist, the_A-Platonist "hypostasizes" propositions_and_their constituents._The_B-Platonist does not accept that judgemental_contents,_that is, propositions, are sequences of representations-much_less that they are_physical_events in our brains_and bodies-but does not hypostasize_them. Explaining why the B-Platonist does_not hypostasize_propositions will_also explain how Lotze can be a non-hypostatic Platonist while accepting_that there are propositions (OP from_§3). Recall that the_B-Platonist holds_that_the judgements p_and_"It is_valid that p" have the same content._Thus, the_following biconditional is trivially true (both_sides have the same_content):_1 p iff the proposition that_p is valid. From this, it_follows by logic alone that:_2_(p_or ~p) iff the proposition_that p is valid or invalid._Assuming that it_is a basic law of logic that_propositions_are either valid or invalid, it_follows_that: 3 p or ~p iff_there_is_a proposition that p. Since_the left-hand side is a law_of logic, this shows that the B-Platonist can derive_that there are_propositions (OP) from purely logical_principles_plus_42 L §348, 577. Platonism in Lotze and Frege 157_a trivial_principle, (1), that_asserts a bic