 others6 introduced the notion of a "specious present", that is, a non-zero temporal duration which, in our experience, our mind embraces "at once". This notion is indeed very useful to understand the phenomenology of our experience of continuity, such as the apple's movement, and it has given rise to a hot debate between (i) extensionalists7 who claim that the specious present is temporally extended and that our experience is composed of short but temporally extended overlapping experiences featuring temporally extended and temporally ordered content unified into a single experiential episode which appears to us "at once" as present, and (ii) retentionalists8 who argue that the specious present is not temporally extended but rather instantaneous, although it has temporally extended content, because at any point the experience of a falling apple has as components of its content states of the apple at the previous instants all of which are given to us in the one single instantaneous experience together. In one way or the other, the important thing for our discussion now is that somehow (a) our experiences such as the one of the falling apple are experiences as of movement and continuity, and (b) they sort of smoothly flow one into the next. (a) and (b) is what we need to account for, when we talk about the unity and continuity of our experiences. Of course, some will have in mind something stronger when they speak about diachronic continuity and unity of the Self – something like a unity over the whole life of a person – and thus it might seem that my desideratum is not strong and demanding enough. But here, I join with Hume: phenomenologically speaking, there is nothing like such a lifelong unity we experience, we only ever experience the kind of continuity and unity mentioned under (a) and (b) above, and nothing more. This is then what a theory of the Self needs to account for. To insist that a theory of the Self should provide an account of a lifelong-lasting element of unity of the totality of our life experiences would amount to presuppose that any theory of the Self must be a non-pluralistic one, which I take to be both phenomenologically unjustified and dialectically question-begging. How then to reply to the questions raised by (a) and (b)? The short answer is: it is our brain that does the job. Let me elaborate. As John Locke nicely explained9, and as contemporary 6 See inter alia Kant (
others6 introduced the notion of a " specious present ", that is, a non - zero temporal duration which, in our experience, our judgment espouse " at once ". This notion is indeed very useful to understand the phenomenology of our experience of continuity, such as the apple's motion, and it has given rise to a blistering debate between (i) extensionalists7 who claim that the specious present is temporally extend and that our experience is composed of short but temporally carry overlapping experience have temporally extended and temporally ordered content unified into a single experiential sequence which appears to us " at once " as present, and (ii) retentionalists8 who argue that the specious present is not temporally extended but quite instantaneous, although it has temporally extended content, because at any period the experience of a falling apple have as components of its content states of the apple at the previous instants all of which are give to us in the one single instantaneous experience together. In one way or the other, the important matter for our discussion nowadays is that somehow (a) our experiences such as the one of the falling apple are experiences as of movement and continuity, and (b) they sort of smoothly flow one into the next. (a) and (b) is what we need to account for, when we talk about the integrity and continuity of our experiences. Of course, some will receive in judgment something stronger when they speak about diachronic continuity and unity of the Self – something like a oneness over the whole life of a person – and thus it might seem that my desideratum is not firm and demanding enough. But here, I join with Hume: phenomenologically speaking, there is nothing like such a lifelong unity we feel, we only ever experience the kind of continuity and unity mention under (a) and (barn) above, and nothing more. This is then what a theory of the Self needs to account for. To insist that a theory of the Self should leave an account of a lifelong - lasting element of oneness of the totality of our life experiences would amount to presuppose that any hypothesis of the Self must be a non - pluralistic one, which I take to be both phenomenologically unjustified and dialectically question - begging. How then to reply to the question raised by (a) and (bacillus)? The short solution is: it is our brain that does the caper. Let me elaborate. As John Locke nicely explained9, and as contemporaneous 6 See inter alia Kant (
 otjers6 introduced the notiun of a "specious preseit", that is, a nov-zero temporal duration whici, in our tqperience, our mind emcraces "at once". Thus nirion is invsed vern userml to nnderstand the khenomenologf of our experhevcz of continuity, such as the apple's mjvement, ajd it has giveg rixq to a hot debate between (i) extensionamists7 wio claim that tne specious present is temooraply extended and tjat our expgdiegxe is composdd of shoru yut temporamly extended overlapping experidnces featuring twmpltally extendxd and temporally ordered wontent unified into s smnglw experiential episodx which appears to uf "at once" aa present, and (ii) eerentimnalhsts8 qho arfux tgat thf s'ecious preaent is not temporally extendec fly rather insfantanqots, although it has temporally extended bontsnt, because at any poinr the experience of a falling wpple has as components of its content states of dhe a'pue cb gye previous instants all of which are given to ta on the one singlc instantaneous exlegirgce together. Kn one wag or the other, the importwnt tying for jur ciscussion now is that someyow (a) our exieriwnces such as the lne of the yallinb appke are experiences as oy movejent and cojtinuity, zvd (b) they sort ow skomthly flow one into the nevt. (a) and (u) is chat we veed to acsount for, ahen we talk about the ujity cnd cmntinuity lf our experiences. Of course, some will have im king somethnng stvonger when ther speak about biachronnc conginuity ans unity of the Sels – something nlke a unity mver the whooe lufe of x person – and tnus it miykt seem tyat my desideratum is hot strong and btmabding enough. Buy hdre, I jpig with Hume: pvenooenukogicxlly sptckikg, gherr is nothing like suwh a lifelong unity we ewperience, we only ever experiemce the kind of cojtinumty anv unitu mgntioned under (a) and (b) above, ans nothing move. This is thqn wmat w theory oy the Self needs to account for. To insisv that a theory of the Welf should provide sn account pf a jifelong-ldsting element of unuty of the totaliuy of our life experiendes wogld alount to presuppose that any theory of the Self must be a non-pluralistic ine, whmcr I take to be noth iheuomznologisallb nnjustified and dpalectically question-begging. How then to rzply to the questions raised ny (a) and (b)? The rhort answer is: it is oud brain yhat does the job. Let me elaborste. As John Locke nicely explainwd9, ans as conteoporary 6 See inter alia Nant (
others6 introduced the notion of a "specious is, non-zero temporal which, in our once". notion is indeed useful to understand phenomenology of our experience of continuity, as the apple's movement, and it has given rise to a hot debate (i) extensionalists7 who claim that the specious present is temporally extended and that experience composed short temporally extended overlapping experiences featuring temporally extended and temporally ordered content unified into a single experiential which appears to us "at once" as present, (ii) retentionalists8 who argue the specious present is not extended rather instantaneous, it temporally content, because at point the experience of a falling apple has as components of its content states of the apple the previous of which given us the one single together. In one way or the thing for our discussion now is that somehow our experiences as the one of the falling are experiences as of movement and continuity, and they sort of smoothly flow one into the next. (a) and (b) is what we account for, when we about the unity continuity our Of some will in mind something stronger when they speak about diachronic continuity and of the Self – something like a unity over the of person – and it might seem that desideratum not strong and demanding here, join speaking, is like such a lifelong we experience, we only ever the kind of continuity and (b) above, and nothing more. This is what a theory of the Self needs account for. To insist that a theory of the Self should provide account of element of unity of the totality of our experiences would amount to that any theory of the Self must be a one, I take be both phenomenologically and dialectically question-begging. then to reply questions raised (a) (b)? is: it is our brain that the Let me elaborate. As John nicely as contemporary 6 See inter alia Kant (
 others6 introduced the notion Of a "speciouS presEnt", ThaT iS, a noN-zerO temporal duratIOn whIch, in our experience, our mInd emBrACes "aT OnCe". ThiS notion IS iNDEed VeRy UseFuL To UnderStaNd the phEnomenologY of OuR experience oF CoNtinuity, suCh aS the apple's moVemEnt, and It Has GIven rIse To a hoT debatE BetweeN (i) extensiOnALists7 wHO claim tHAT tHe spEcious present is teMPoRAlly extended anD that oUr EXpERIenCe iS composed oF sHort bUT temporALlY EXTenDEd overlapping Experiences FEatUring tEmPorALly extEnded AnD TemPorally ordeRed cOntent uniFied inTO a singlE ExperieNtial ePisOde WhicH ApPeArs To US "at ONcE" as PResEnt, and (ii) ReTeNtionAlisTS8 WHO argUe tHat tHe speCious present iS noT temPOraLly exTendeD but RaTher iNstantAneouS, aLthough it has temPoraLly extendEd cOnTenT, bEcausE At any pOinT thE experiEnce of a FAllInG APPlE has as components of ItS COnTent statEs of thE ApPlE At the preViOus InstANTs all Of whICh Are given To us in THe OnE single InStantaNeOus ExpErienCE togEther. IN one way oR the oTHer, the importanT Thing for our diSCuSSIoN Now iS thAt somehow (a) oUr exPErieNces SUcH as THe one Of the FaLLiNG apple are experienceS aS of movEment And continuity, And (b) they soRT OF smoothlY floW OnE Into the next. (a) anD (b) is wHat we need tO Account fOr, wheN we talk aBout the unITY and contInuIty Of oUr eXPErIences. Of coursE, SOme wIlL have in MinD somethIng StrOngEr wHeN they speaK about diAcHrOnIc ConTinuiTY and unitY oF thE SElf – SometHIng likE a uniTy ovEr ThE WhoLe life oF A pERSon – aNd ThUs it MigHt Seem tHat mY DesIderatuM is not strOng ANd deMaNdIng enouGh. But here, I joiN wIth Hume: pheNoMenOlogicALLy speakiNg, there is nothing like sucH A lifeloNg uNity wE expErience, we OnlY ever eXpeRIence tHe kind Of conTiNuiTY And unITY mEntIoNed under (a) aND (B) abOve, anD nOthiNg more. THis is then what a theoRY of The Self needs tO acCounT FOr. to iNSiST thAt A TheORY of the Self shoulD provide an AcCOuNt of a lifelONg-lAsTing eleMent of uNity oF The totaLity of our Life experIeNces WOUld Amount to prEsuppose That any thEOry of THe self mUst Be a non-PlUraListiC one, whICh I Take tO be botH pHenomeNologIcAlly unjuStified and dialectically QuestiOn-begGinG. How then tO rePLy tO the questIons Raised by (a) aNd (b)? the Short AnsWEr is: iT is oUR bRaiN That dOes tHE job. Let me ELaBorATE. AS John Locke nICELy eXplaiNed9, ANd as coNtemPorary 6 See inter aliA kant (
 others6 introduced the no tion of a"spec iou s p re sent ", t hat is, a non- z erotemporal duration whic h, in  o u r ex p er ience , our m i nd e mbr ac es  "a to nc e". T his  notion  is indeed  ve ry  useful to u n de rstand the  ph enomenologyofour ex pe rie n ce of  co ntinu ity, s u ch asthe apple 's moveme n t, andi t  h as g iven rise to a ho t  d e bate between ( i) ext en s io n a lis ts7  who claim  t hat t h e speci o us p r ese n t is temporal ly extended and  thatou r e x perien ce is  c o mpo sed of shor t bu t tempora lly ex t ended o v erlappi ng exp eri enc es f e at ur ing  t e mpo r al lye xte nded and  t em poral ly o r d e r ed c ont entunifi ed into a sin gle  exp e rie ntial  epis odewh ich a ppears  to u s"at once" as pr esen t, and (i i)re ten ti onali s ts8 wh o a rgu e thatthe spe c iou sp r e se nt is not temporal ly e xt ended bu t rath e rin s tantaneo us , a ltho u g h ithast em porallyextend e dco ntent,be causeat  an y p ointt he e xperie nce of a  fall i ng apple has a s  components o f  i t s  c o nten t s tates of th e ap p le a t th e  p rev i ous i nstan ts al l  of which are given  t o us i n the  one single i nstantaneo u s experien ce t o ge t her. In one wa y orthe other, the impo rtant  thing f or our di s c ussion n owistha t s o m eh ow (a) our ex p e rien ce s suchasthe one  of  th e f all in g apple a re exper ie nc es  a s o f mov e ment and  c ont in uit y, an d  (b) t hey s ortof  s m oot hly flo w  o n e  int oth e ne xt.  ( a) an d (b )  is  what w e need to  ac c ount  f or , whenwe talk about  t he unity a nd  co ntinui t y  of ourexperiences. Of course, some wi llhavein m ind somet hin g stro nge r  whenthey s peakab out d iachr o n ic  co nt inuity and u nit y ofth e Se lf – so mething like a uni t y o ver the whole  li fe o f aper s on – a nd thu s it might seem t hat my des id e ra tum is not str on g and d emandin g eno u gh. But  here, Ijoin with  H ume: p hen omenologic ally spe aking, th e re is no thing  li ke suc ha l ifelo ng uni t y w e exp erienc e,  we on ly ev er  experie nce the kind of continu ity an d uni tymentioned  un d er(a) and ( b) a bove, andnot hin g mor e.T his i s th e nwha t  a th eory of the Se l fnee d s  t o account f o r .  To  insi stt hat atheo ry of the Self sh o uld provide an  acc o u ntofa  lif el ong-lasting el eme nt o f unityof  the totali ty of ou rl ife e xperie nces w ould am o u nt to pre supp ose  that any  th eo r y of th eSe l f must  beanon-pl uralis t ic o n e , which I take t o beb o th ph e nom enolo gi cally u n just ified anddialectical ly que stio n-beg ging. H ow  thentore ply to the questions  rais ed by ( a)  and  (b )? The  sho r t  answ er i s:  it  is our b r a in th at doe s th e job .Letme elabor a te. As J ohn Locke n ic ely e xplain e d9 , and as con tem porar y 6 See inte r  ali a  K a nt (
 others6_introduced the_notion of a "specious_present", that_is,_a non-zero_temporal_duration which, in_our experience, our_mind embraces "at once"._This notion is_indeed_very useful to understand the phenomenology of our experience of continuity, such as the_apple's_movement, and_it_has_given rise to a hot_debate between (i) extensionalists7 who_claim that_the specious present is temporally extended and that_our_experience is composed_of short but temporally extended overlapping experiences featuring temporally_extended and temporally ordered content unified_into a single_experiential_episode_which appears to us_"at once" as present, and (ii)_retentionalists8 who argue that the specious_present is not temporally extended but rather_instantaneous, although it has temporally extended_content, because at any point_the experience_of a falling apple has_as components of_its content_states of the_apple at the previous instants all_of which are_given to us in the one_single_instantaneous experience together._In_one_way or_the other, the_important_thing for_our_discussion now is that somehow (a)_our_experiences such as the one of the_falling apple are experiences_as_of movement and continuity,_and (b) they sort of_smoothly flow one into the next._(a) and_(b) is_what we need to account for, when we talk about the_unity and continuity of our experiences._Of course, some will_have in_mind_something stronger when_they_speak about_diachronic continuity and unity of the Self_– something_like a unity over the whole_life of a person_–_and thus it might seem that_my desideratum is not strong and_demanding enough. But here, I_join_with_Hume: phenomenologically speaking, there is_nothing like such a lifelong unity_we experience, we_only ever experience the kind of continuity_and_unity mentioned under (a) and (b)_above,_and nothing more. This is then_what_a_theory of the Self needs_to account for. To insist that_a theory of the Self should provide an account_of a lifelong-lasting_element of unity of the_totality_of_our life experiences would amount to presuppose that any theory_of the_Self must be_a non-pluralistic one, which I take to be both phenomenologically_unjustified and dialectically question-begging. How then to_reply to the questions raised by (a) and (b)? The short_answer is: it is our brain that does_the job. Let me elaborate. As John_Locke nicely explained9, and_as_contemporary 6 See inter alia Kant (