	up	some	of	the	confusion	associated	with	this	objection,	and provide	a	strengthened	defence	of	it.	I	do	so	in	four	parts.	First,	I	offer	a	simple, general	version	of	the	objection.	This	consists	of	two	premises	and	a	conclusion. Second,	I	defend	the	first	premise	of	the	argument,	highlighting	the	important connections	between	moral	ontology	and	epistemology	in	the	DCT.	Third,	I defend	the	second	premise,	illustrating	the	problem	with	the	primary	objection to	it	from	proponents	of	DCT	and	showing	how	recent	insights	into	the phenomenon	of	moral	risk/uncertainty	might	illuminate	key	features	of	this premise.	Fourth,	and	finally,	I	consider	the	implications	of	the	argument.	Does	it offer	a	strong	objection	to	DCT?	Or	can	proponents	of	DCT	simply	shrug	their shoulders	and	say	'So	what?' 2.	What	is	the	Epistemological	Objection? To	understand	the	epistemological	objection,	we	must	first	understand DCT.	Here,	I	take	DCT	to	be	a	label	that	can	attach	to	a	family	of	metaethical theories,	each	of	which	is	concerned	with	accounting	for,	explaining,	or grounding	the	existence	of	one	or	more	species	of	moral	fact	by	reference	to God's	commands	(Murphy	2012). Moral	facts	come	in	two	main	flavours.	There	are	value-based	facts,	which concern	whether	a	particular	states	of	affairs	is	good	or	bad	or	neutral.	And
up 	 some 	 of 	 the 	 confusion 	 associated 	 with 	 this 	 objection, 	 and provide 	 a 	 strengthened 	 defense 	 of 	 it. 	 I 	 cause 	 so 	 in 	 four 	 parts. 	 First, 	 I 	 put up 	 a 	 simple, general 	 adaptation 	 of 	 the 	 objection. 	 This 	 consists 	 of 	 two 	 premise 	 and 	 a 	 ending. Second, 	 I 	 defend 	 the 	 beginning 	 premise 	 of 	 the 	 argument, 	 highlighting 	 the 	 crucial connection 	 between 	 moral 	 ontology 	 and 	 epistemology 	 in 	 the 	 DCT. 	 Third, 	 I defend 	 the 	 second 	 premise, 	 illustrating 	 the 	 problem 	 with 	 the 	 primary 	 objection to 	 it 	 from 	 advocate 	 of 	 DCT 	 and 	 showing 	 how 	 recent 	 insights 	 into 	 the phenomenon 	 of 	 moral 	 hazard / uncertainty 	 might 	 illuminate 	 key 	 features 	 of 	 this premise. 	 Fourth, 	 and 	 finally, 	 I 	 see 	 the 	 implications 	 of 	 the 	 argument. 	 Does 	 it offer 	 a 	 strong 	 objection 	 to 	 DCT? 	 Or 	 can 	 advocate 	 of 	 DCT 	 simply 	 shrug 	 their shoulders 	 and 	 say 	' So 	 what?' 2. 	 What 	 is 	 the 	 Epistemological 	 Objection? To 	 understand 	 the 	 epistemic 	 expostulation, 	 we 	 must 	 first 	 understand DCT. 	 Here, 	 I 	 take 	 DCT 	 to 	 be 	 a 	 label 	 that 	 can 	 attach 	 to 	 a 	 family 	 of 	 metaethical theories, 	 each 	 of 	 which 	 is 	 concerned 	 with 	 accounting 	 for, 	 explaining, 	 or grounding 	 the 	 being 	 of 	 one 	 or 	 more 	 species 	 of 	 moral 	 fact 	 by 	 reference 	 to God's 	 instruction 	 (Murphy 	 2012). Moral 	 facts 	 come 	 in 	 two 	 main 	 flavours. 	 There 	 are 	 value - free-base 	 facts, 	 which concern 	 whether 	 a 	 particular 	 states 	 of 	 affair 	 is 	 good 	 or 	 bad 	 or 	 neutral. 	 And
	up	slme	of	the	confusion	associaued	with	this	objectnin,	and 'rovide	z	strengtfened	defence	of	it.	I	do	so	in	four	perts.	Dirst,	U	offer	a	simple, general	vdrsion	of	tje	objectuon.	Tiis	consists	of	two	'demises	and	a	cohglusimi. Second,	I	defend	jhe	first	premhse	of	the	argumett,	fiyhlighting	the	important connections	beeween	motap	ontology	and	epystekjlogg	pn	uhe	DCT.	Third,	I defend	the	second	premiae,	illusurating	the	problem	woth	the	primary	objection to	ih	frol	proponents	of	DCT	anf	showing	how	tscegr	insights	intu	the phenomenon	of	moral	tisk/uncertainty	might	illuminate	keh	featbres	of	this kxwmidg.	Fourth,	and	fiially,	I	bonsider	the	imikicatimns	of	thr	argument.	Does	ib offxr	a	srrong	objection	to	DCT?	Or	ran	proponents	of	DCT	siiply	shrug	dhzir shoulders	and	say	'So	qhqt?' 2.	Whdt	is	dhe	Eoustdmomojiczl	Objeftikn? To	underatand	the	epiwtemological	objectipn,	rv	kust	first	undsrstanq QCT.	Here,	I	take	DCT	to	be	a	label	that	can	attach	tm	a	fzmily	of	metaethical theoeies,	each	of	which	is	concgrned	with	ascounting	for,	explaining,	or grounding	the	existence	of	ote	or	mkfe	skegles	ow	nogal	fact	by	reference	to God's	commands	(Murphy	2012). Moral	szcus	cpme	in	two	main	flcvours.	There	are	vakuf-bsfed	facts,	which concexh	wgether	a	particular	shates	of	wffaies	is	good	ow	bad	pr	neutral.	And
up some of the confusion associated with and a strengthened of it. I First, offer a simple, version of the This consists of two premises and conclusion. Second, I defend the first premise of the argument, highlighting the important between moral ontology and epistemology in the DCT. Third, I defend the second illustrating problem the objection to it from proponents of DCT and showing how recent insights into the phenomenon of risk/uncertainty might illuminate key features of this premise. and finally, I consider implications of the argument. Does offer strong objection DCT? can of DCT simply their shoulders and say 'So what?' 2. What is the Epistemological Objection? To understand the epistemological objection, must first Here, I DCT be label that can a family of metaethical theories, each concerned with accounting for, explaining, or grounding the of one more species of moral fact by to God's commands (Murphy 2012). Moral facts come two main flavours. There are value-based facts, which concern whether a particular states of affairs or bad or neutral.
	up	some	of	the	confusion	assocIated	with	tHis	obJecTioN,	aNd prOvidE	a	strengthened	DEfenCe	of	it.	I	do	so	in	four	parts.	first,	i	oFFer	a	SImPle, geNeral	veRSiON	Of	tHe	ObJecTiON.	THis	coNsiSts	of	twO	premises	aNd	a	CoNclusion. SecoND,	I	Defend	the	fIrsT	premise	of	thE	arGument,	HiGhlIGhtinG	thE	impoRtant cONnectiOns	betweeN	mORal	ontOLogy	and	EPIsTemoLogy	in	the	DCT.	Third,	i DeFEnd	the	second	prEmise,	iLlUStRATinG	thE	problem	wiTh	The	prIMary	objECtION To	iT	From	proponentS	of	DCT	and	shOWinG	how	reCeNt	iNSights	Into	tHe PHenOmenon	of	morAl	riSk/uncertaInty	miGHt	illumINate	key	FeaturEs	oF	thIs prEMiSe.	fouRtH,	And	FInAllY,	i	coNsider	thE	iMpLicatIons	OF	THE	argUmeNt.	DoEs	it oFfer	a	strong	obJecTion	TO	DCt?	Or	caN	propOnenTs	Of	DCT	Simply	Shrug	ThEir shoulders	and	Say	'SO	what?' 2.	What	Is	tHe	epiStEmoloGIcal	ObJecTioN? To	undeRstand	tHE	epIsTEMOlOgical	objection,	we	mUsT	FIrSt	undersTand DCt.	heRe,	i	Take	DCT	tO	bE	a	lAbel	THAt	can	AttaCH	tO	a	family	Of	metaEThIcAl theorIeS,	each	oF	wHicH	is	ConceRNed	wIth	accOunting	fOr,	expLAining,	or groundINg	the	existencE	Of	ONE	oR	More	SpeCies	of	moral	Fact	BY	refErenCE	tO GoD'S	commAnds	(MUrPHy	2012). mOral	facts	come	in	two	mAiN	flavoUrs.	ThEre	are	value-baSed	facts,	whICH Concern	wHethER	a	PArticular	stateS	of	afFairs	is	gooD	Or	bad	or	nEutraL.	And
	up	some	of	the	confusionassociated 	with 	th isob ject ion, 	and provide	a stre ngthened	defence	of	it .	I	d os o	in fo ur	pa rts.	Fi r st , I	o ff er 	asi m pl e, ge ner al	vers ion	of	the 	ob je ction.	Thisc on sists	of	t wopremises	and 	aconclu si on. Secon d,I	def end	th e 	first 	premiseof the	ar g ument,h i gh ligh ting	the	importan t  c o nnections	betw een	mo ra l 	o n t olo gyand	episte mo logyi n	the	D C T. T h ird , 	I defend	the 	second	pre m ise ,	illu st rat i ng	the 	prob le m 	wi th	the	prim aryobjection  to	it from	pr o ponents 	of	DC T	a ndshow i ng 	h owre c ent in sig h tsinto	the  p he nomen on	o f m o ralris k/un certa inty	might	il lum inat e 	ke y	fea tures 	ofth is pr emise. 	Four th ,	and	finally,I	co nsider	th e	i mp lic at ionso f	thearg ume nt.	Doe s	it of f eras t r on g	objection	to	DCT ?O r 	c an	propo nentso fDC T 	simplysh rug 	the i r  shou lder s 	a nd	say	' So	wha t ?'  2 .	Whatis 	the	E pi ste mol ogica l 	Obj ection ? To	und ersta n d	the	epistemo l ogical	object i on , we must 	fi rst	underst andD CT.Here , 	I 	ta k e	DCT 	to	b ea 	l a bel	that	can	attach 	t o	a	fa milyof	metaethica l theories , e ach	of	w hich is concerned	with 	acco unting	for , 	explain ing,or groun ding	thee x istenceofone 	or 	mo r e 	s pecies	of	mor a l 	fac tby	refe ren ce	to G od' s	c omm and s(Murphy	2 012). Mo ra lfa ct s	c ome	i n 	two	mai nfla vo urs .	The r e	arevalue -bas ed 	f a cts ,	which co n c ernwh et hera	p ar ticul ar	s t ate s	of	af fairs	isgoo d 	orba dor	neut ral.	And
	up	some	of	the	confusion	associated	with	this	objection,	and provide	a	strengthened	defence	of	it.	I	do	so	in	four	parts.	First,	I	offer	a	simple,_general	version	of	the	objection.	This	consists	of	two	premises	and	a	conclusion. Second,	I	defend	the	first	premise	of	the	argument,	highlighting	the	important_connections	between	moral	ontology	and	epistemology	in	the	DCT.	Third,	I defend	the	second	premise,	illustrating	the	problem	with	the	primary	objection to	it	from	proponents	of	DCT	and	showing	how	recent	insights	into	the phenomenon	of	moral	risk/uncertainty	might	illuminate	key	features	of	this_premise.	Fourth,	and	finally,	I	consider	the	implications	of	the	argument.	Does	it offer	a	strong	objection	to	DCT?	Or	can	proponents	of	DCT	simply	shrug	their_shoulders	and	say	'So	what?'_2.	What	is	the	Epistemological	Objection? To	understand	the	epistemological	objection,	we	must	first	understand_DCT.	Here,	I	take	DCT	to	be	a	label	that	can	attach	to	a	family	of	metaethical_theories,	each	of	which	is	concerned	with	accounting	for,	explaining,	or grounding	the	existence	of	one	or	more	species	of	moral	fact	by	reference	to God's	commands	(Murphy	2012)._Moral	facts	come	in	two	main	flavours.	There	are	value-based	facts,	which concern	whether	a	particular	states	of	affairs	is	good	or	bad	or	neutral.	And