 the idea that there's no objective moral truth or that morality is relative in order to explain what's wrong with this. You only need the ideas that moral judgement must be sensitive to context, and that it normally takes a lot of time and effort to understand a foreign culture. 5. It's Personal So here, at its most basic, is what philosophy taught me about relativism: that the reason I thought moral relativism was obviously true was that I didn't actually understand the alternatives. I thought that if you weren't a moral relativist, then necessarily you believed in some kind of universal objective ethics; and that if you believed in a universal objective ethics, then necessarily (1) you thought you knew all the answers, (2) you thought you were entitled to impose your beliefs on others, and (3) you thought that moral rules just applied everywhere regardless of local context. I now know that none of this is true. Moral objectivism doesn't commit you to any of these 9 things. You can believe that morality is objective without thinking that you're the final authority on all moral questions (just as you can believe that science is objective without thinking that you're the final authority on all scientific questions). You can believe that one of morality's objective requirements is toleration and respect for others. And you can believe that morality yields judgements that depend on the particular circumstances of a given case, and that they are no less objective for that. Here's another thing I learned. When I was younger, I assumed more or less that all reasonably intelligent, worldly people were moral relativists. (How could they not be?) But I then discovered that at least out of philosophers- the very people whose job it is to think carefully about these questions- virtually no one is a moral relativist. Moreover, this isn't because every philosopher believes in an objective morality. Far from it. It's because moral relativism isn't the only theoretical option, even for those who reject objectivism. Indeed, there are plenty of philosophers who completely reject the idea that moral judgements can be objective, but almost none of them are relativists. How so? Well, it's all very well rejecting the idea that morality is objective. But this just leads to another issue, which is what people are up to when they make moral claims and act on the basis of moral judgements. If there's no objective morality, then what on earth are they doing? Relativists have an answer to this, which is that people are talking about
the idea that there's no objective moral truth or that morality is relative in decree to excuse what's wrong with this. You only necessitate the mind that moral judgement must be sensitive to context, and that it normally take a lot of time and attempt to understand a foreign polish. 5. It's Personal So here, at its most basic, is what doctrine taught me about relativism: that the reason I thought moral relativism was obviously true was that I didn't actually understand the alternatives. I thought that if you weren't a moral relativist, then inevitably you believed in some kind of universal objective ethics; and that if you think in a universal objective ethics, then inevitably (1) you thought you know all the answers, (2) you thought you were entitled to impose your beliefs on others, and (3) you think that moral rules just applied everywhere regardless of local context. I now know that none of this is genuine. Moral objectivism doesn't commit you to any of these 9 things. You can believe that morality is objective without thinking that you're the final authority on all moral questions (just as you can believe that skill is objective without think that you're the final agency on all scientific question). You can believe that one of morality's objective requirements is toleration and deference for others. And you can think that morality yields judgements that count on the particular circumstances of a given case, and that they are no less objective for that. Here's another thing I learned. When I was youthful, I assumed more or less that all reasonably intelligent, worldly people were moral relativists. (How could they not be ?) But I then discovered that at least out of philosophers- the identical citizenry whose job it is to think carefully about these questions- virtually no one is a moral relativist. furthermore, this isn't because every philosopher believes in an objective morality. Far from it. It's because moral relativism isn't the only theoretical option, even for those who reject objectivism. Indeed, there are plenty of philosophers who completely rule out the idea that moral judgment can be objective, but almost none of them are relativists. How so? Well, it's wholly very well rejecting the idea that morality is objective. But this just run to another issue, which is what multitude are up to when they make moral claims and act on the basis of moral judgements. If there's no objective morality, then what on land are they doing? Relativists give birth an answer to this, which is that people are talking about
 thf idea that there's no obmective moral troty or tiat morzlity is relative in order to explaii whqt's weong with this. You onlh need thv ideas tyat niral judgement musb be acnsitnvx to context, anc that it tormally takes a llt of time and effort to understand a foreogj culture. 5. It's Perxjnal So here, at its most basic, is what philosmphy taught mr about relativism: that thf rewson I thought morwl relativiwm www obviously grue was that I didn't zctually understand the alternagives. I thought tyat hf you werei't a mjral relativlxt, thet necesxarily you belleved in some kind of universel objective ethics; wnd that hf you believed in q ynivetsal mbjezrivd euhirs, fhen nfceasarily (1) yku thought tou knew all the anxwqgx, (2) you thouggt you wqre entitled to impose your beliefs on mthsrs, and (3) you thought thqt moral rules just akplied evewywhere regardless of local context. I now know thdt noie of tmis kw hrue. Moral objectivism doesn't commit you to agg pf these 9 things. You can bekifvr that moraliti is oblscfive without thinklng thaj you'rw the finwl aithority on all moral questuons (just as tou can believe thct science ir obkectife without thinking thac you'rs the final authoritg on all scientifkc auastions). You can believe thwt one of morclity's ocjecjive rezuirements is toleration and respeft fot othess. And you can believe that morality yielvx judgements tvat depend jn thc particular ciwcumstances of a giveu case, and that nhey are io less objestive for thad. Here's anothxr thing Y leqrnee. When K was younger, I assumed more or lews that all reasonebly jntelligent, worodli people were mprau rqlwtmvistf. (How could tvey vot ne?) Bug I then diwzoveted that at least oud of philosophers- the fevy people whose jjb it is to tnink carefully abokt thxse quxstionx- vyrtually no one is a moral relztivist. Mlrejver, this isg't bccaufe every pkilosopher believes in an objective moraoity. Far from it. Ir's because moral rekstivism isn'v the jnly theosetical option, even dor those who rejtct objectivism. Indeed, fhere dre ppenty of philosophers who completely reject the idea that moral judgementw can ue objective, gut slmosn njue of trem erx relativists. How so? Well, it's all very well rejerting the hdza that morality is objective. Bjt this just ueads to another issue, wgich is ehat people are up to when they make moral claims and agt on the basia of moral judgements. If thete's no objextive mirallty, then what un ravth are thfy dpiug? Relativists have an answer to rhis, wyifh is that peoplx are talkinn xbout
the idea that there's no objective moral that is relative order to explain only the ideas that judgement must be to context, and that it normally a lot of time and effort to understand a foreign culture. 5. It's So here, at its most basic, is what philosophy taught me about relativism: the I moral was obviously true was that I didn't actually understand the alternatives. I thought that if you a moral relativist, then necessarily you believed in kind of universal objective and that if you believed a objective ethics, necessarily you you knew all answers, (2) you thought you were entitled to impose your beliefs on others, and (3) you thought moral rules everywhere regardless local I know that none is true. Moral objectivism doesn't commit of these 9 things. You can believe that is objective thinking that you're the final authority all moral questions (just as you can believe science is objective without thinking that you're the final authority on all scientific questions). You that one of morality's requirements is toleration respect others. you believe that yields judgements that depend on the particular circumstances of a given and that they are no less objective for that. Here's I When I was I assumed more or that reasonably intelligent, worldly people relativists. could But then that at least out philosophers- the very people whose it is to think no one is a moral relativist. Moreover, this because every philosopher believes in an objective Far from it. It's because moral relativism isn't the only theoretical option, for those objectivism. Indeed, there are plenty of philosophers who reject the idea that judgements can be objective, but almost none of them relativists. so? Well, all very well the idea that is objective. But leads to issue, is up to when they make moral and on the basis of moral If objective morality, then what on earth are they doing? Relativists have an answer to this, that people are talking
 the idea that there's no objectIve moral trUth or ThaT moRaLity Is reLative in order tO ExplAin what's wrong with this. YOu onlY nEEd thE IdEas thAt moral JUdGEMenT mUsT be SeNSiTive tO coNtext, anD that it norMalLy Takes a lot of tIMe And effort tO unDerstand a forEigN cultuRe. 5. it's pErsonAl SO here, At its mOSt basiC, is what phIlOSophy tAUght me aBOUt RelaTivism: that the reasON I THought moral relAtivisM wAS oBVIouSly True was thaT I Didn't ACtually UNdERSTanD The alternativEs. I thought tHAt iF you weReN't a MOral reLativIsT, TheN necessarilY you Believed iN some kINd of uniVErsal obJectivE etHicS; and THaT iF yoU bELieVEd In a UNivErsal objEcTiVe ethIcs, tHEN NEcesSarIly (1) yOu thoUght you knew alL thE ansWErs, (2) You thOught You wErE entiTled to ImposE yOur beliefs on othErs, aNd (3) you thouGht ThAt mOrAl rulES just aPplIed EverywhEre regaRDleSs OF LOcAl context. I now know tHaT NOnE of this iS true. MORaL oBJectivisM dOesN't coMMIt you To anY Of These 9 thiNgs. You CAn BeLieve thAt MoraliTy Is oBjeCtive WIthoUt thinKing that You're THe final authoriTY on all moral quEStIONs (JUst aS yoU can believe That SCienCe is OBjEctIVe witHout tHiNKiNG that you're the final aUtHority On all Scientific queStions). You cAN BElieve thAt onE Of MOrality's objectIve reQuirements IS toleratIon anD respect For others. aND you can bEliEve ThaT moRALiTy yields judgeMENts tHaT depend On tHe partiCulAr cIrcUmsTaNces of a giVen case, aNd ThAt ThEy aRe no lESs objectIvE foR tHat. here's ANother Thing i leaRnEd. wHen i was youNGeR, i AssuMeD mOre oR leSs That aLl reASonAbly intElligent, wOrlDLy peOpLe Were morAl relativists. (hoW could they NoT be?) but I thEN DiscoverEd that at least out of philoSOphers- tHe vEry peOple Whose job iT is To thinK caREfully About tHese qUeStiONS- virtUALlY no OnE is a moral rELAtiVist. MOrEoveR, this isN't because every philOSopHer believes in An oBjecTIVe MorALiTY. FaR fROm iT. iT's because moral rElativism iSn'T ThE only theorETicAl Option, eVen for tHose wHO reject ObjectiviSm. Indeed, tHeRe arE PLenTy of philosOphers whO completeLY rejeCT tHe ideA thAt moraL jUdgEmentS can be OBjeCtive, But almOsT none oF them ArE relativIsts. How so? Well, it's all very Well reJectiNg tHe idea thaT moRAliTy is objecTive. but this jusT leAds To anoTheR Issue, WhicH Is WhaT PeoplE are UP to when thEY mAke MORaL claims and aCT ON thE basiS of MOral juDgemEnts. If there's no objECtive morality, tHen wHAT on EarTH are ThEy doing? RelativIstS hAVE an answeR tO this, which iS that peoPlE Are taLking aBout
 the idea that there's noobjectivemoral  tr uth  o r th at m orality is rel a tive  in order to explain w hat's  w r ongw it h thi s. Youo nl y nee dth e i de a sthatmor al judg ement must  be  s ensitive toc on text, andtha t it normall y t akes a  l oto f tim e a nd ef fort t o  under stand a f or e ign cu l ture. 5 . It 's P ersonal So here,a ti ts most basic,  is wh at ph i l oso phy  taught me  a boutr elativi s m: t h att he reason I t hought mora l  re lativi sm  wa s  obvio uslytr u e w as that I d idn' t actuall y unde r stand t h e alter native s.I t houg h tth atif you we ren ' t a  moral r el at ivist , th e n n eces sar ilyyou b elieved in so mekind ofunive rsalobje ct ive e thics;  andth at if you belie vedin a univ ers al  ob je ctive ethics , t hen  necess arily ( 1 ) y ou t h ou ght you knew all t he a ns wers, (2 ) yout ho ug h t you we re  en titl e d  to i mpos e  y our beli efs on ot he rs, and  ( 3) you  t hou ght  that mora l rule s just a pplie d  everywhere re g ardless of lo c al c on t ext.  Inow know th at n o ne o f th i sist rue.Moral  o b je c tivism doesn't comm it  you t o any  of these 9 t hings. You c a n believ e th a tm orality is obj ectiv e withoutt hinkingthatyou're t he finala u thorityonall  mo ral q ue stions (justa s  you  c an beli eve  that s cie nce  is  ob je ctive wit hout thi nk in gth atyou'r e  the fin al  au th ori ty on all sc ienti ficqu es t ion s). You ca n beli ev ethat  on eof mo rali t y's  object ive requi rem e ntsis  t olerati on and respec tfor others .And  you c a n  believe  that morality yields j u dgement s t hat d epen d on thepar ticula r c i rcumst ancesof agi ven c ase,a n dtha tthey are n o les s obj ec tive  for th at. Here's another thi ng I learned.  Wh en I w as  yo u ng e r,Ia ssu m e d more or lessthat all r ea s on ably intel l ige nt , world ly peop le we r e moral  relativi sts. (How  c ould t hey  not be?)But I th en discov e red t h at  at l eas t outof  ph iloso phers- the  very  peopl ewhosejob i tis to th ink carefully about the se que stion s-virtually  no one  is a mor al r elativist.  Mo reo ver,thi s  isn' t be c au see veryphil o sopher be l ie ves i nan objectiv e m ora lity.  Fa r  fromit.It's because mora l  relativism is n'tt h e o nly theo re tical option,eve nf o r thosewh o reject ob jectivis m. Indee d, the re are  plenty o fp hiloso pher s w ho comple tel yr eject t he  i d ea tha t mo ra l judg ements canb e  objective, butalmos t noneo f t hem a re  relati v ists . How so?Well, it'sall ve ry w ell r ejectin gthe id eath at moralit y  is objec tive.  But th is  jus t l eads t o an o t her i ssue ,whi ch is wha t pe o pl ea reup t o whe nthey  make mor a l claims  an d  act on  t heb a sis of mo r a l judgemen ts.  If t h e re's no ob j ecti v em orali ty, th en wha t on ea r thar e theydoi n g ? Relativ ists have anan swer  to this ,whic histh at people are t alking a bout
 the_idea that_there's no objective moral_truth or_that_morality is_relative_in order to_explain what's wrong_with this. You only_need the ideas_that_moral judgement must be sensitive to context, and that it normally takes a lot_of_time and_effort_to_understand a foreign culture. 5._It's Personal So here, at_its most_basic, is what philosophy taught me about relativism:_that_the reason I_thought moral relativism was obviously true was that I_didn't actually understand the alternatives. I_thought that if_you_weren't_a moral relativist, then_necessarily you believed in some kind_of universal objective ethics; and that_if you believed in a universal objective_ethics, then necessarily (1) you thought_you knew all the answers,_(2) you_thought you were entitled to_impose your beliefs_on others,_and (3) you_thought that moral rules just applied_everywhere regardless of_local context. I now know that_none_of this is_true._Moral_objectivism doesn't_commit you to_any_of these_9_things. You can believe that morality_is_objective without thinking that you're the final_authority on all moral_questions_(just as you can_believe that science is objective_without thinking that you're the final_authority on_all scientific_questions). You can believe that one of morality's objective requirements is_toleration and respect for others. And_you can believe that_morality yields_judgements_that depend on_the_particular circumstances_of a given case, and that they_are no_less objective for that. Here's another_thing I learned. When_I_was younger, I assumed more or_less that all reasonably intelligent, worldly_people were moral relativists. (How_could_they_not be?) But I then_discovered that at least out of_philosophers- the very_people whose job it is to think_carefully_about these questions- virtually no one_is_a moral relativist. Moreover, this isn't_because_every_philosopher believes in an objective_morality. Far from it. It's because_moral relativism isn't the only theoretical option, even for_those who reject_objectivism. Indeed, there are plenty_of_philosophers_who completely reject the idea that moral judgements can be_objective, but_almost none of_them are relativists. How so? Well, it's all very well_rejecting the idea that morality is objective._But this just leads to another issue, which is what people_are up to when they make moral claims_and act on the basis of moral_judgements. If there's no_objective_morality, then what on earth are they_doing?_Relativists_have_an answer to_this, which is_that people are_talking about