 through time, and material constitution (statues and lumps) – but, this is a debate for another day. 4 See Merricks (2001, p.8-9) for this claim, and Benovsky (forthcoming_a) for a detailed discussion of this issue. 4 §3. The detour is finished, and I hope it will prove to be a useful one. Indeed, the idea I wish to elaborate in this article is simple: similarly (but not exactly) as metaphysical eliminativism says that instead of there being tables, there are atoms arranged tablewise, I think that it is true that instead of there being a Self in the form of a substance or a bundle, there 'only' are experiences arranged Self-wise. This view about the Self does not entail nor forces one to endorse metaphysical eliminativism, but it can take advantage of one or two of the lessons we learned from it. I do not want to claim that the Self does not exist (so, this is a reductionist but not an eliminativist view). But I want to claim something close: there are the experiences (in general, mental states) we have, and nothing more. The Self is the experiences. It is a plurality (like the crew of the USS Enterprise, and like a table or an apple if metaphysical eliminativism is true). It is not a bundle or a collection of the experiences – that would be a single entity, additional to there being the experiences – and it is not a bearer of the experiences, whatever such a bearer may be. It does not supervene on the experiences, it is not derived from them, it does not exist in any second-hand ontologically derivative sense. It is them. Linguistically speaking, "I" and "Self" and "me" are all plural terms (like "the crew of the USS Enterprise", and like "table" or "apple" if metaphysical eliminativism is true). Thus, being arranged Selfwise is not the same thing as being bundled together in order to make up a Self which is a bundle. The latter requires, metaphysically speaking, the existence of a bundling relation (often called "compresence" or "co-personality" or something similar) and it makes the Self to be a single entity. Experiences arranged Self-wise are ontologically less demanding. The idea is this: there are experiences, they happen to be arranged in such-and-
through time, and material constitution (statues and lout) – but, this is a argument for another day. 4 See Merricks (2001, p.8 - 9) for this title, and Benovsky (forthcoming_a) for a detailed discussion of this return. 4 § 3. The detour is finished, and I hope it will prove to be a utilitarian one. Indeed, the idea I wish to elaborate in this article is simple: similarly (but not precisely) as metaphysical eliminativism says that instead of there being mesa, there are atoms arrange tablewise, I remember that it is true that instead of there being a Self in the form of a substance or a bundle, there' merely' are experiences arranged Self - wise. This scene about the Self does not entail nor forces one to endorse metaphysical eliminativism, but it can take advantage of one or two of the lesson we learned from it. I do not want to claim that the Self does not exist (so, this is a reductionist but not an eliminativist view). But I want to claim something cheeseparing: there are the experiences (in general, mental states) we have, and nothing more. The Self is the experiences. It is a plurality (like the crew of the USS Enterprise, and like a table or an apple if metaphysical eliminativism is true). It is not a bundle or a collection of the experiences – that would be a single entity, additional to there being the experiences – and it is not a carrier of the experiences, whatever such a bearer may be. It does not supervene on the experience, it is not derived from them, it does not exist in any second - hand ontologically derivative sense. It is them. Linguistically speaking, " I " and " Self " and " me " are all plural term (like " the crew of the USS Enterprise ", and like " table " or " apple " if metaphysical eliminativism is true). Thus, being arrange Selfwise is not the same thing as being bundled together in order to make up a Self which is a pile. The latter requires, metaphysically speaking, the existence of a bundling relation back (often call " compresence " or " co - personality " or something similar) and it makes the Self to be a single entity. Experiences arrange Self - wise are ontologically less demanding. The idea is this: there are experience, they happen to be arranged in such - and-
 thgough time, and material gonstitution (stajuws and lumps) – but, thks is a debate for another dey. 4 Wee Mtgricks (2001, p.8-9) for this clxim, and Bvnovsky (firthroming_a) for a devziled dlfcusalon oy vhis issue. 4 §3. Thg detour is xinished, and I hupz it will prove to be a useful one. Igdeed, tne idea I wish tj elsforafv ln this article is simple: similadly (but not exactly) ss metaphysical eliminativlsm days that instead lf there beung eqbles, there xre atoms arranged tabmewise, I think that it is true ghat nnstead of jkwre teing a Selh in tre form of a substanwe or a bundle, there 'pnlb' arw experiences arrangev Self-wise. This view about tha Aelf does not entqio nor forwes ube go tndprae metwphbsical elimjnativism, byt it can take advamtwte of one or fwo of tre lessons we learned from it. I do not fanf to claim that the Seld does not exist (so, tjis is a weductionist but not an eliminativist view). But I fant vo clcli wolething close: there are the experiences (in gegsrsl, mental states) we have, anc joyring more. The Self na fhe experiences. It is a pjuraluty (like uhe ctew of the USS Enterprise, abd like a tayle or an apple if mecaphysical euimimativosm is true). It is not a bunsle or a coplection kw the experiencer – nhat would bt a single entity, wdditionao to there ceinb the qxperienced – and it is not a beareg of jhe ex[eriences, ahatever such a bearer may be. Iv does not sukereenv on the zxpericnces, it is not derived from jhem, it djes nut exist ih any sxcond-hand oneologically dativative sensx. It is trem. Oingyisticauuy speaking, "I" snd "Self" cud "me" are all plural terms (kikg "fhe crew of the USW Enterprise", anc lkke "twbke" mr "apple" if ketaohyrocal dliminaunviwo is true). Thus, being arrdnges Selfwise is not yhc same thung as bqing bundled yogether in order uo makx up a Self whych is a bundle. The latter reqhires, metwphnsically speahing, the existenee of a bundling relation (often called "cimpresence" or "co-pgrsonality" or somethiug similar) anv it mwkes the Velf to be a single wntity. Experiencex arranged Self-wise ade ontmlogifally less demanding. The idea is this: there are experiences, they happen ti be acrwnged in sudh-anc-
through time, and material constitution (statues and but, is a for another day. for claim, and Benovsky for a detailed of this issue. 4 §3. The is finished, and I hope it will prove to be a useful one. the idea I wish to elaborate in this article is simple: similarly (but exactly) metaphysical says instead of there being tables, there are atoms arranged tablewise, I think that it is true instead of there being a Self in the of a substance or bundle, there 'only' are experiences Self-wise. view about Self not nor forces one endorse metaphysical eliminativism, but it can take advantage of one or two of the lessons we learned it. I want to that Self not exist (so, a reductionist but not an eliminativist want to claim something close: there are the (in general, states) we have, and nothing more. Self is the experiences. It is a plurality the crew of the USS Enterprise, and like a table or an apple if metaphysical true). It is not bundle or a of experiences that be a entity, additional to there being the experiences – and it is a bearer of the experiences, whatever such a bearer may does supervene on the it is not derived them, does not exist in ontologically sense. Linguistically "I" "Self" and "me" are plural terms (like "the crew the USS Enterprise", and metaphysical eliminativism is true). Thus, being arranged Selfwise not the same thing as being bundled in order to make up a Self which is a bundle. The requires, metaphysically existence of a bundling relation (often called "compresence" "co-personality" or something similar) it makes the Self to be a single entity. arranged are ontologically demanding. The idea this: there are they happen to in such-and-
 through time, and material conStitution (sTatueS anD luMpS) – but, This Is a debate for anOTher Day. 4 See Merricks (2001, p.8-9) for this Claim, AnD benoVSkY (fortHcoming_A) FoR A DetAiLeD diScUSsIon of ThiS issue. 4 §3. THe detour is FinIsHed, and I hope iT WiLl prove to bE a uSeful one. IndeEd, tHe idea i wIsh TO elabOraTe in tHis artICle is sImple: simiLaRLy (but nOT exactlY) AS mEtapHysical eliminativISm SAys that instead Of therE bEInG TAblEs, tHere are atoMs ArranGEd tableWIsE, i THinK That it is true tHat instead oF TheRe beinG a selF In the fOrm of A sUBstAnce or a bundLe, thEre 'only' arE experIEnces arRAnged SeLf-wise. thiS viEw abOUt ThE SeLf DOes NOt EntAIl nOr forces OnE tO endoRse mETAPHysiCal ElimInatiVism, but it can tAke AdvaNTagE of onE or twO of tHe LessoNs we leArned FrOm it. I do not want tO claIm that the selF dOes NoT exisT (So, this Is a RedUctioniSt but noT An eLiMINAtIvist view). But I want tO cLAIm SomethinG close: THeRe ARe the expErIenCes (iN GEneraL, menTAl States) we Have, anD NoThIng more. thE Self iS tHe eXpeRiencES. It iS a plurAlity (likE the cREw of the USS EnteRPrise, and like a TAbLE Or AN appLe iF metaphysicAl elIMinaTiviSM iS trUE). It is Not a bUnDLe OR a collection of the exPeRienceS – that Would be a singlE entity, addITIOnal to thEre bEInG The experiences – And it Is not a bearER of the exPerieNces, whatEver such a BEArer may bE. It DoeS noT suPERvEne on the experIENces, It Is not deRivEd from tHem, It dOes Not ExIst in any sEcond-hanD oNtOlOgIcaLly deRIvative sEnSe. IT iS thEm. LinGUisticAlly sPeakInG, "I" ANd "SElf" and "mE" ArE ALl plUrAl TermS (liKe "The crEw of THe UsS EnterPrise", and lIke "TAble" Or "ApPle" if meTaphysical eliMiNativism is TrUe). THus, beiNG Arranged selfwise is not the same thiNG as beinG buNdled TogeTher in ordEr tO make uP a SELf whicH is a buNdle. THe LatTER requIREs, MetApHysically sPEAkiNg, the ExIsteNce of a bUndling relation (oftEN caLled "compresenCe" oR "co-pERSoNalITy" OR soMeTHinG SImilar) and it makeS the Self to Be A SiNgle entity. eXpeRiEnces arRanged SElf-wiSE are ontOlogicallY less demaNdIng. THE IdeA is this: theRe are expEriences, tHEy hapPEn To be aRraNged in SuCh-aNd-
 through time, and materia l constitu tion(st atu es  and  lum ps) – but, thi s  isa debate for another d ay. 4  S e e Me r ri cks ( 2001, p . 8- 9 )  fo rth iscl a im , and  Be novsky(forthcomi ng_ a)  for a detai l ed  discussio n o f this issue . 4  §3. T he  de t our i s f inish ed, an d  I hop e it will  p r ove to be a us e f ul  one . Indeed, the ide a  I wish to elabor ate in  t h is a rti cle  is simple :simil a rly (bu t  n o t exa c tly) as metap hysical eli m ina tivism  s ays that i nstea do f t here beingtabl es, there  are a t oms arr a nged ta blewis e,I t hink th at  it  i s  tr u etha t  in stead of  t he re be inga S e lf i n t he f orm o f a substance  or  a b u ndl e, th ere ' only 'are e xperie ncesar ranged Self-wis e. T his viewabo ut  th eSelfd oes no t e nta il norforceso neto e n do rse metaphysical e li m i na tivism,but it ca nt ake adva nt age  ofo n e ortwoo fthe less ons we le ar ned fro mit. Ido  no t w ant t o  cla im tha t the Se lf do e s not exist (s o , this is a r e du c t io n istbut  not an eli mina t ivis t vi e w) . B u t I w ant t oc la i m something close:th ere ar e the  experiences(in genera l , mental s tate s )w e have, and no thing  more. The Self isthe e xperienc es. It is a  plurali ty(li kethe c re w of the USSE n terp ri se, and  li ke a ta ble  or  an  ap pl e if meta physical  e li mi na tiv ism i s  true).It  is  n ota bun d le ora col lect io no f t he expe r ie n c es –  t ha t wo uld  b e a s ingl e  en tity, a dditional  to ther ebe ing the  experiences–and it isno t a  beare r of the e xperiences, whatever su c h a bea rer  maybe.It does n otsuperv ene on the  exper ience s,  it i s not d er ive dfrom them, i t d oes n ot  exi st in a ny second-hand ont o log ically deriva tiv e se n s e.  It is the m. Lin g u istically speak ing, "I" a nd "S elf" and " m e"ar e all p lural t erms( like "t he crew o f the USS  E nter p r ise ", and lik e "table " or "app l e" if me taphy sic al eli mi nat ivism  is tr u e).  Thus , bein garrang ed Se lf wise isnot the same thing as b eing b undle d t ogether i n o r der  to makeup a  Self whic h i s a  bund le. The l atte r  r equ i res,meta p hysically sp eak i n g,  the existe n c e  of  a bu ndl i ng rel atio n (often called " c ompresence" or  "co - p ers ona l ity"  o r something si mil ar ) and it m ak es the Self  to be a  s i ngleentity . Expe riences a rr a nged S elf- wis e are ont olo gi c ally le ss  d e mandin g. T he  ideais thi s : th e r e are experience s, th e y  happ e n t o bear rangedi n su ch-and-
 through_time, and_material constitution (statues and_lumps) –_but,_this is_a_debate for another_day. 4 See_Merricks (2001, p.8-9) for_this claim, and_Benovsky_(forthcoming_a) for a detailed discussion of this issue. 4 §3. The detour is finished,_and_I hope_it_will_prove to be a useful_one. Indeed, the idea I_wish to_elaborate in this article is simple: similarly (but_not_exactly) as metaphysical_eliminativism says that instead of there being tables, there_are atoms arranged tablewise, I think_that it is_true_that_instead of there being_a Self in the form of_a substance or a bundle, there_'only' are experiences arranged Self-wise. This view_about the Self does not entail_nor forces one to endorse_metaphysical eliminativism,_but it can take advantage_of one or_two of_the lessons we_learned from it. I do not_want to claim_that the Self does not exist_(so,_this is a_reductionist_but_not an_eliminativist view). But_I_want to_claim_something close: there are the experiences_(in_general, mental states) we have, and nothing_more. The Self is_the_experiences. It is a_plurality (like the crew of_the USS Enterprise, and like a_table or_an apple_if metaphysical eliminativism is true). It is not a bundle or_a collection of the experiences –_that would be a_single entity,_additional_to there being_the_experiences –_and it is not a bearer of_the experiences,_whatever such a bearer may be._It does not supervene_on_the experiences, it is not derived_from them, it does not exist_in any second-hand ontologically derivative_sense._It_is them. Linguistically speaking, "I"_and "Self" and "me" are all_plural terms (like_"the crew of the USS Enterprise", and_like_"table" or "apple" if metaphysical eliminativism_is_true). Thus, being arranged Selfwise is_not_the_same thing as being bundled_together in order to make up_a Self which is a bundle. The latter requires,_metaphysically speaking, the_existence of a bundling relation_(often_called_"compresence" or "co-personality" or something similar) and it makes the_Self to_be a single_entity. Experiences arranged Self-wise are ontologically less demanding. The idea_is this: there are experiences, they happen_to be arranged in such-and-