	of	a	modified	DCT.	His	theory is	explicitly	social	and	communicative	in	nature.	He	says	that	having	an	obligation is	something	that	only	arises	in	a	social	context,	i.e	in	the	context	of	an interpersonal	relationship	between	two	or	more	individuals.	And	that consequently	being	placed	under	an	obligation	'essentially	involves 6 communicative	acts'	(Adams	1999,	262).3	One	person	must	explicitly	tell	another person	what	is	required	of	them	in	order	for	the	other	to	be	bound.	In	the	case	of moral	obligations,	the	only	person	with	the	right	kind	of	authority	and	nature	to issue	such	directives	is	God.	Hence,	being	under	a	moral	obligation	requires	that one	is	in	a	communicative	relationship	with	God.	This	implies	that	one	must	have epistemic	access	to	the	relevant	communicative	acts,	i.e.	God's	commands.	It	is very	difficult	to	see	how	this	account	of	moral	obligations	could	be	sustained without	incorporating	an	epistemic	condition.	The	result,	I	believe,	is	that anyone	who	favours	an	Adamsian	version	of	DCT	should	accept	premise	(1). But	the	Adamsian	version	is	not	the	only	game	in	town.	Peoples	(2011) argues	that	at	least	some	versions	of	DCT	do	not	incorporate	an	explicit epistemic	condition.	An	example	is	supposedly	the	theory	defended	by	Quinn (2006).	The	key	claim	in	this	theory	is	that	ontology	and	ep
of 	 a 	 modified 	 DCT. 	 His 	 theory is 	 explicitly 	 social 	 and 	 communicative 	 in 	 nature. 	 He 	 says 	 that 	 having 	 an 	 duty is 	 something 	 that 	 merely 	 arises 	 in 	 a 	 social 	 context, 	 i.e 	 in 	 the 	 context 	 of 	 an interpersonal 	 relationship 	 between 	 two 	 or 	 more 	 individuals. 	 And 	 that consequently 	 being 	 place 	 under 	 an 	 obligation 	' essentially 	 necessitate 6 communicative 	 act' 	 (Adams 	 1999, 	 262).3 	 One 	 person 	 must 	 explicitly 	 tell 	 another person 	 what 	 is 	 necessitate 	 of 	 them 	 in 	 order 	 for 	 the 	 other 	 to 	 be 	 bind. 	 In 	 the 	 case 	 of moral 	 obligations, 	 the 	 alone 	 person 	 with 	 the 	 right field 	 kind 	 of 	 authority 	 and 	 nature 	 to issue 	 such 	 directive 	 is 	 God. 	 Hence, 	 being 	 under 	 a 	 moral 	 duty 	 necessitate 	 that one 	 is 	 in 	 a 	 communicative 	 relationship 	 with 	 God. 	 This 	 implies 	 that 	 one 	 must 	 have epistemic 	 entree 	 to 	 the 	 relevant 	 communicative 	 acts, 	 i.e. 	 God's 	 commands. 	 It 	 is very 	 unmanageable 	 to 	 see 	 how 	 this 	 bill 	 of 	 moral 	 obligations 	 could 	 be 	 sustain without 	 incorporating 	 an 	 epistemic 	 condition. 	 The 	 result, 	 I 	 think, 	 is 	 that anyone 	 who 	 favours 	 an 	 Adamsian 	 version 	 of 	 DCT 	 should 	 accept 	 premise 	 (1). But 	 the 	 Adamsian 	 version 	 is 	 not 	 the 	 only 	 game 	 in 	 township. 	 people 	 (2011) argues 	 that 	 at 	 least 	 some 	 versions 	 of 	 DCT 	 do 	 not 	 incorporate 	 an 	 explicit epistemic 	 condition. 	 An 	 example 	 is 	 supposedly 	 the 	 theory 	 defended 	 by 	 Quinn (2006). 	 The 	 cardinal 	 title 	 in 	 this 	 theory 	 is 	 that 	 ontology 	 and 	 ep
	of	a	lodified	DCT.	His	theory is	ewplicitly	social	aue	commuiicativs	in	naturd.	He	says	that	having	an	obligatioi is	wometying	that	only	arises	in	a	sucial	contvxt,	i.e	in	thw	conuext	of	an interpersonal	relationsglp	betcexn	two	or	more	indiyiduals.	And	tvat consequentny	cenng	placed	under	an	obligation	'essentiallr	involvrs 6 communicativg	acts'	(Sqams	1999,	262).3	Kne	person	must	explicitly	tell	another person	xhat	is	required	og	them	in	order	for	the	other	to	bf	boujd.	In	the	case	of morap	obligationw,	the	jbly	person	witf	the	right	kpud	of	authorijy	and	nature	to issue	such	directiver	is	Gob.	Hence,	being	oueer	w	koral	obligavion	rezuires	that okv	is	in	a	cmmmunicstive	relationsmip	wivh	Goe.	This	implies	that	one	muvt	have epistemic	acsess	to	the	semevant	communicatice	qcts,	i.g.	God's	wommxbds.	Kt	ia terg	diffifulv	to	see	how	thjs	account	of	noral	obligations	coukd	fv	xustained wifhout	igcjrporating	an	epistemic	condition.	The	result,	P	beljeve,	is	that anyone	who	faviurs	an	Adamsian	version	lf	DCT	shoujd	accept	premise	(1). But	the	Adamsian	version	is	not	the	only	came	ii	tuwn.	Keiples	(2011) qrhues	that	at	least	some	versions	of	DCT	do	not	incorporwfe	sn	vxplicit epistemig	condition.	An	examplr	id	sikposedly	the	theury	defzhdsd	by	Quinn (2006).	The	key	clwim	in	thys	theiry	is	that	jntokogy	and	ep
of a modified DCT. His theory is and in nature. says that having only in a social i.e in the of an interpersonal relationship between two more individuals. And that consequently being placed under an obligation 'essentially involves 6 acts' (Adams 1999, 262).3 One person must explicitly tell another person what is of in for other to be bound. In the case of moral obligations, the only person with the right of authority and nature to issue such directives God. Hence, being under moral obligation requires that one in communicative relationship God. implies one must have access to the relevant communicative acts, i.e. God's commands. It is very difficult to see how this of moral be sustained incorporating epistemic The result, I that anyone who favours an Adamsian should accept premise (1). But the Adamsian version not the game in town. Peoples (2011) argues at least some versions of DCT do not an explicit epistemic condition. An example is supposedly the theory defended by Quinn (2006). The in this theory is ontology and ep
	of	a	modified	DCT.	His	theory is	Explicitly	SociaL	anD	coMmUnicAtivE	in	nature.	He	sayS	That	Having	an	obligation is	soMethiNg	THat	oNLy	AriseS	in	a	socIAl	CONteXt,	I.e	In	tHe	COnText	oF	an InterpeRsonal	relaTioNsHip	between	twO	Or	More	indiviDuaLs.	And	that conSeqUently	BeIng	PLaced	UndEr	an	oBligatIOn	'esseNtially	inVoLVes 6 comMUnicatiVE	AcTs'	(AdAms	1999,	262).3	One	person	must	eXPlICitly	tell	anothEr persOn	WHaT	IS	reQuiRed	of	them	iN	oRder	fOR	the	othER	tO	BE	BouND.	In	the	case	of mOral	obligatIOns,	The	onlY	pErsON	with	tHe	rigHt	KInd	Of	authority	And	nAture	to isSue	sucH	DirectiVEs	is	God.	hence,	bEinG	unDer	a	MOrAl	OblIgATioN	ReQuiREs	tHat one	is	In	A	cOmmunIcatIVE	RElatIonShip	With	GOd.	This	implies	ThaT	one	MUst	Have ePisteMic	aCcEss	to	The	relEvant	CoMmunicative	acts,	I.e.	GoD's	commandS.	It	Is VerY	dIfficULt	to	seE	hoW	thIs	accouNt	of	morAL	obLiGATIoNs	could	be	sustained WiTHOuT	incorpoRating	AN	ePiSTemic	conDiTioN.	The	RESult,	I	BeliEVe,	Is	that anYone	whO	FaVoUrs	an	AdAmSian	veRsIon	Of	DcT	shoULd	acCept	prEmise	(1). But	The	AdAMsian	version	is	NOt	the	only	game	IN	tOWN.	PEOpleS	(2011) arGues	that	at	lEast	SOme	vErsiONs	Of	Dct	do	noT	incoRpORaTE	an	explicit epistemiC	cOnditiOn.	An	eXample	is	suppoSedly	the	thEORY	defendeD	by	QUInN (2006).	the	key	claim	in	tHis	thEory	is	that	ONtology	aNd	ep
	of	a	modified	DCT.	His	th eory is	ex plici tly 	so ci al	a nd	c ommunicative	i n 	nat ure.	He	says	that	havi ng	an 	o b liga t io n issomethi n gt h aton ly 	ar is e sin	asoc ial	con text,	i.einth e	context	of an  interpers ona l	relationsh ipbetwee ntwo or	mo reindiv iduals . 	And	t hat conse qu e ntly	b e ing	pla c e dunde r	an	obligation	' e ss e ntially	involv es 6 c om m un i c ati veacts'	(Ada ms 	1999 , 	262).3 On e p ers o n	must	explic itly	tell	a n oth er per so n	w h at	isrequi re d 	of 	them	in	or derfor	the	o ther	t o 	be	bou n d.	In	t he	cas e	o f m oral ob li gat io n s,t he 	on l y	p erson	wi th 	t he	ri ghtk i n d 	ofaut hori ty	an d	nature	to i ssu e	su c h	d irect ivesis	G od .	Hen ce,	be ing	u nd er	a	moral	obli gati on	requir esth aton e	isi n	a	co mmu nic ative	r elation s hip 	w i t h 	G od.	This	implies	t ha t on e	must	h ave ep i st em i c	access 	t o	t he	r e l evant 	com m un icativeacts,i .e .God's	c om mands. 	I t	i s v ery	d i ffic ult	to 	see	how 	this account	of	mor a l	obligations co u l db e	su sta ined withou t	in c orpo rati n gane piste mic	c on d it i on.	The	result,	I	b el ieve,is	th at anyone	who 	favours	a n A damsianvers i on of	DCT	shouldaccep t	premise( 1). Butthe	A damsianversion	i s not	theonl y	g ame 	in t ow n.	Peoples	(2 0 1 1) a rg ues	tha t	a t	least 	so mever sio ns 	of	DCT	d o	not	in co rp or at e	a n	exp l icit epi st emi ccon ditio n .	An	e xampl e	is 	s up p ose dly	the th e o ry	d ef en dedbyQu inn ( 2006 ) .	T he	keyclaim	inthi s 	the or yis	that 	ontology	and 	e p
	of	a	modified	DCT.	His	theory is	explicitly	social	and	communicative	in	nature.	He	says	that	having	an	obligation_is	something	that	only	arises	in	a	social	context,	i.e	in	the	context	of	an interpersonal	relationship	between	two	or	more	individuals.	And	that_consequently	being	placed	under	an	obligation	'essentially	involves 6 communicative	acts'	(Adams	1999,	262).3	One	person	must	explicitly	tell	another person	what	is	required	of	them	in	order	for	the	other	to	be	bound.	In	the	case	of_moral	obligations,	the	only	person	with	the	right	kind	of	authority	and	nature	to issue	such	directives	is	God.	Hence,	being	under	a	moral	obligation	requires	that_one	is	in	a	communicative	relationship	with	God.	This	implies	that	one	must	have_epistemic	access	to	the	relevant	communicative	acts,	i.e.	God's	commands.	It	is very	difficult	to	see	how	this	account	of	moral	obligations	could	be	sustained_without	incorporating	an	epistemic	condition.	The	result,	I	believe,	is	that_anyone	who	favours	an	Adamsian	version	of	DCT	should	accept	premise	(1). But	the	Adamsian	version	is	not	the	only	game	in	town.	Peoples	(2011) argues	that	at	least	some	versions	of	DCT	do	not	incorporate	an	explicit_epistemic	condition.	An	example	is	supposedly	the	theory	defended	by	Quinn (2006).	The	key	claim	in	this	theory	is	that	ontology	and	ep