 do the other act. For instance, according to the doctrine of double effect, the following is not correct intention reasoning, even though its content is valid: I(I shall save the woman) and B(If I save the woman, I shall kill her unborn child) leads to I(I shall kill her unborn child). According to the doctrine, you need not intend to kill the child even though you recognize you will do so as a consequence of what you intend to do. You must intend to do it only if you believe it is a means to what you intend to do. If the doctrine of double effect is right, it is a further restriction on the correctness of intention reasoning: intention reasoning is correct only if it is premised on a belief of the particular form that one act is a necessary means to another. We could not dismiss this restriction as merely a dispensable feature of our normal usage, because if the doctrine is right, it is morally significant. I do not wish to argue about the doctrine of double effect. That is why I made my example satisfy its special restriction. (A2) contains the strong modality 'necessary means', rather than a simple material implication. Consequently, there should be no doubts about the correctness of (B). It might also be correct with a weaker conditional statement in place of (A2), but I do not wish to argue about that. In summary, not all putative intention reasoning that has a valid content is correct. To make the reasoning correct, some further constraints must be satisfied. But when these constraints are satisfied, intention reasoning is genuinely correct reasoning, and it provides a 5 clear paradigm of practical reasoning. 5. Reasoning is not reason-giving Because intention reasoning is reasoning, we may say it is normatively guided; it is an application of reason. Reason guides you from intending an end to intending a necessary means. But intention reasoning is normative in no other way. For one thing, its premises are not normative and nor is its conclusion; neither is about what you ought to do or have a reason to do. (By 'a reason' I mean a pro tanto ought. If you have a reason to do something, that means you ought to do it unless you also have a contrary reason not to.) Furthermore intention reasoning is not ought-giving nor even reason-giving; that is what I shall argue in this section and the next two. What do I mean? In my example, intention reasoning takes your from your intention to go to St Andrews to an intention to
do the other act. For instance, according to the doctrine of bivalent consequence, the following is not correct purpose reasoning, even though its content is valid: I(I shall keep open the woman) and B(If I keep open the womanhood, I shall kill her unborn child) contribute to I(I shall kill her unborn child). According to the doctrine, you want not intend to kill the child even though you accredit you will do so as a consequence of what you intend to do. You must intend to do it merely if you believe it is a means to what you intend to practice. If the doctrine of double effect is right, it is a further restriction on the correctness of purpose reasoning: intention reasoning is right only if it is premised on a belief of the particular shape that one act is a necessary means to another. We could not dismiss this restriction as merely a dispensable feature of our normal usage, because if the doctrine is correct, it is morally meaning. I do not wish to argue about the doctrine of double effect. That is why I made my example satisfy its special restriction. (A2) contain the potent modality' necessary mean', preferably than a dim-witted material implication. Consequently, there should be no doubt about the correctness of (B). It might also be correct with a weaker conditional instruction in place of (A2), but I do not wish to argue about that. In summary, not all putative intention reasoning that has a valid content is correct. To make the reasoning correct, some further restraint must be satisfied. But when these constraints are satisfied, intention reasoning is truly correct reasoning, and it leave a 5 clear paradigm of practical reasoning. 5. Reasoning is not reason - giving Because purpose reasoning is reasoning, we may say it is normatively guided; it is an application of reason. Reason guides you from intending an end to mean a necessary means. But purpose reasoning is normative in no other way. For one thing, its premises are not prescriptive and nor is its conclusion; neither is about what you ought to do or have a reason to dress. (By' a reason' I mean a pro tanto ought. If you have a reason to do something, that mean you ought to do it unless you besides have a contrary reason not to .) Furthermore intention reasoning is not ought - pass nor even reason - giving; that is what I shall argue in this section and the next two. What do I entail? In my example, intention reasoning takes your from your intention to go to St Andrews to an intention to
 do the other act. For instakce, according to the dortrine kf doubld effect, the following is nov coerect intention reasoning, exen thougj its cobtenu is valid: I(I shall save bke wojwn) aud B(If I save thg woman, I shdll kill her utburu child) leads to I(I shall kill her ugborn cnipd). According tj tht djctrjne, you need not intend to kill ths child even though uou recognize you will do do ad a consequence of what you ibtenq to do. You mjst intend to do it onmy if you believe it is a means to wkat you intgue tl do. If the voctrige of double effect hs righy, it is a furtmer rxstruction on the correctiess of intention rewsoning: ittzntion reasoning is cireect mnly if kr ir pdekiaed on a uelief of tge particulqr form that one acu if a necessary jeans eo another. We could not dismiss this restgictjon as merely a dispensqble feature of our nlrmal usade, because if the doctrine is right, it is morally signmfkcaub. K dl not wish to argue about the doctrine of doufme enfect. That is whn I made my examplr dayysfy its speckal restrjction. (A2) contains hhe strjng midality 'ntcesssry means', rather than a simple material umplication. Conseqbently, there shoold be no doubts about the coxrectnsss of (B). It might alau be correct witf a waaker conditional statemene in placx of (C2), but I ao npt wisr to argue aboub that. In summary, nlt alp [utative ijtention reasoning that has a vekid content os cogrect. To iake bhe reasoning cjrrect, some futther conftraivts must bv satisfixd. But when ehese constrahjts are sativfied, ineentuon eeasonive is genuinely correct gecsoning, abd it provides a 5 glear laradigm of praeuicql reasoning. 5. Rrasunigg ix gmt reason-givhng Cecxise ivtention recsuninb is reasoning, we maf sag it is normativelu nuided; it is an a[plication of reason. Reason guifes ymu hrom imtegding an end to intending a nedessary mfanf. But intentyon veasjning is nprmative in no other way. For one thing, mts premises are not noemative and nor is ntx conclusioi; neitrer is abmut what you ought ti do or have a resson to do. (By 'a reasoh' I medn a oro tanto ought. If you have a reason to do something, that means you ought to do it unless yku akso hdvz a contrwry ceeson not to.) Furthvrmore intention reasoning is nov ought-givhny nor even reason-giving; that os what I shall argue in this section ahd the nrxt two. What do I mean? In my exsmple, intention reasoninn takes yiur fdom yolt iitention to go to St Andrecs to qn intebtiok to
do the other act. For instance, according doctrine double effect, following is not its is valid: I(I save the woman) B(If I save the woman, I kill her unborn child) leads to I(I shall kill her unborn child). According the doctrine, you need not intend to kill the child even though you you do as consequence of what you intend to do. You must intend to do it only if you it is a means to what you intend do. If the doctrine double effect is right, it a restriction on correctness intention intention reasoning is only if it is premised on a belief of the particular form that one act is a means to could not this as a dispensable feature normal usage, because if the doctrine is morally significant. I do not wish to about the of double effect. That is why made my example satisfy its special restriction. (A2) the strong modality 'necessary means', rather than a simple material implication. Consequently, there should be about the correctness of It might also correct a conditional in place (A2), but I do not wish to argue about that. In not all putative intention reasoning that has a valid content To the reasoning correct, further constraints must be But these constraints are satisfied, is correct provides 5 paradigm of practical reasoning. Reasoning is not reason-giving Because reasoning is reasoning, we guided; it is an application of reason. Reason you from intending an end to intending necessary means. But intention reasoning is normative in no other way. For thing, its not normative and nor is its conclusion; neither about what you ought do or have a reason to do. (By 'a I a pro ought. If you a reason to something, that means to do unless also reason not to.) Furthermore intention reasoning not nor even reason-giving; that is I in this section and the next two. What do I mean? In my example, intention your from your intention go St Andrews to an intention to
 do the other act. For instance, aCcording to The doCtrIne Of DoubLe efFect, the followiNG is nOt correct intention reasOning, EvEN thoUGh Its coNtent is VAlID: i(I sHaLl SavE tHE wOman) aNd B(if I save The woman, I sHalL kIll her unborn CHiLd) leads to I(i shAll kill her unBorN child). acCorDIng to The DoctrIne, you NEed not Intend to kIlL The chiLD even thOUGh You rEcognize you will do SO aS A consequence of What yoU iNTeND To dO. YoU must intenD tO do it ONly if yoU BeLIEVe iT Is a means to whaT you intend tO Do. IF the doCtRinE Of doubLe effEcT Is rIght, it is a fuRtheR restrictIon on tHE correcTNess of iNtentiOn rEasOninG: InTeNtiOn REasONiNg iS CorRect only If It Is preMiseD ON A BeliEf oF the PartiCular form that One Act iS A neCessaRy meaNs to AnOther. we coulD not dIsMiss this restricTion As merely a DisPeNsaBlE featURe of ouR noRmaL usage, bEcause iF The DoCTRInE is right, it is morallY sIGNiFicant. I dO not wiSH tO aRGue about ThE doCtriNE Of douBle eFFeCt. That is Why I maDE mY eXample sAtIsfy itS sPecIal RestrICtioN. (A2) contAins the sTrong MOdality 'necessaRY means', rather tHAn A SImPLe maTerIal implicatIon. CONseqUentLY, tHerE ShoulD be no DoUBtS About the correctness Of (b). It migHt alsO be correct witH a weaker coNDITional stAtemENt IN place of (A2), but I dO not wIsh to argue ABout that. in sumMary, not aLl putativE INtention ReaSonIng ThaT HAs A valid content IS CorrEcT. To make The ReasoniNg cOrrEct, SomE fUrther conStraints MuSt Be SaTisFied. BUT when theSe ConStRaiNts arE SatisfIed, inTentIoN rEAsoNing is gENuINEly cOrReCt reAsoNiNg, and It prOVidEs a 5 cleaR paradigm Of pRActiCaL rEasoninG. 5. Reasoning is nOt Reason-giviNg becAuse inTENtion reaSoning is reasoning, we may sAY it is noRmaTivelY guiDed; it is an AppLicatiOn oF Reason. reason GuideS yOu fROM inteNDInG an EnD to intendiNG A neCessaRy MeanS. But intEntion reasoning is nORmaTive in no other Way. for oNE ThIng, ITs PRemIsES arE NOt normative and nOr is its conClUSiOn; neither iS AboUt What you Ought to Do or hAVe a reasOn to do. (By 'a Reason' I meAn A pro TANto Ought. If you Have a reaSon to do soMEthinG, ThAt meaNs yOu oughT tO do It unlEss you ALso Have a ContraRy Reason Not to.) fuRthermorE intention reasoning is noT ought-GivinG noR even reasOn-gIVinG; that is whAt I sHall argue iN thIs sEctioN anD The neXt twO. whAt dO i mean? in my EXample, intENtIon REAsOning takes yOUR FroM your IntENtion tO go tO St Andrews to an intENtion to
 do the other act. For ins tance, acc ordin g t o t he  doc trin e of double ef f ect,  the following is notcorre ct inte n ti on re asoning ,  e v e n t ho ug h i ts co ntent  is  valid:  I(I shall  sa ve  the woman)a nd  B(If I sa vethe woman, I  sh all ki ll  he r  unbo rnchild ) lead s  to I( I shall k il l  her u n born ch i l d) . Ac cording to the do c tr i ne, you need n ot int en d  t o kil l t he child e ve n tho u gh your ec o g n ize you will do s o as a cons e que nce of  w hat you in tendto do.  You must i nten d to do i t only if youb elieveit isa m ean s to wh at  yo ui nte n dtod o.If the d oc tr ine o f do u b l e  eff ect  isright , it is a fur the r re s tri ction  on t he c or rectn ess of  inte nt ion reasoning:inte ntion rea son in g i scorre c t only  if  it  is pre mised o n  abe l i e fof the particularfo r m  t hat oneact is ane c essary m ea nsto a n o ther.  Wec ou ld not d ismiss th is  restri ct ion as  m ere lya dis p ensa ble fe ature of  ourn ormal usage, b e cause if thed oc t r in e  isrig ht, it is m oral l y si gnif i ca nt. I donot w is h  t o  argue about the do ct rine o f dou ble effect. T hat is why I made myexam p le satisfy its sp ecial  restricti o n. (A2)conta ins thestrong mo d a lity 'ne ces sar y m ean s ' ,rather than a s impl emateria l i mplicat ion . C ons equ en tly, ther e should  b eno  d oub ts ab o ut the c or rec tn ess  of ( B ). Itmight  als obe cor rect wi t ha weak er  c ondi tio na l sta teme n t i n place  of (A2),  bu t  I d ono t wishto argue abou tthat. In s um mar y, not a ll putat ive intention reasoning that ha s a  vali d co ntent iscor rect.Tom ake th e reas oning  c orr e c t, so m e  f urt he r constrai n t s m ust b esati sfied.But when these con s tra ints are sati sfi ed,i n te nti o nr eas on i ngi s  genuinely corr ect reason in g ,and it pro v ide sa 5 cle ar para digmo f pract ical reas oning. 5.  R easo n i ngis not rea son-givi ng Becaus e  inte n ti on re aso ning i srea sonin g, wem aysay i t is n or mative ly gu id ed; it i s an application of rea son. R eason  gu ides youfro m  in tending a n en d to inten din g a  nece ssa r y mea ns.B ut  in t entio n re a soning is no rma t i ve  in no othe r w ay.  Forone thing,  its  premises are not normative andnori s  it s c o nclu si on; neither is  ab ou t what you  o ught to door havear eason  to do . (By'a reas o n 'I  meana pr o t anto ough t.If you hav ear easonto d osometh ing, t h at m e a ns you ought todo it u nless you  also  h ave a c o ntra ry reasonnot to.) Fu rtherm oreinten tion re as oningisno t ought-gi v ing nor e ven r eason-g iv ing;  th at iswhat I  shal l ar gu e i n this se c t io n  a nd the  nex t two .What  do I mea n ? In myexa m ple, in te nti o n  reaso n in g takes your  fr om yo u r  intention to g o  t o  St A ndrews  to an  intent i onto 
 do_the other_act. For instance, according_to the_doctrine_of double_effect,_the following is_not correct intention_reasoning, even though its_content is valid:_I(I_shall save the woman) and B(If I save the woman, I shall kill her_unborn_child) leads_to_I(I_shall kill her unborn child)._According to the doctrine, you_need not_intend to kill the child even though you_recognize_you will do_so as a consequence of what you intend to_do. You must intend to do_it only if_you_believe_it is a means_to what you intend to do._If the doctrine of double effect_is right, it is a further restriction_on the correctness of intention reasoning:_intention reasoning is correct only_if it_is premised on a belief_of the particular_form that_one act is_a necessary means to another. We_could not dismiss_this restriction as merely a dispensable_feature_of our normal_usage,_because_if the_doctrine is right,_it_is morally_significant._I do not wish to argue_about_the doctrine of double effect. That is_why I made my_example_satisfy its special restriction._(A2) contains the strong modality_'necessary means', rather than a simple_material implication._Consequently, there_should be no doubts about the correctness of (B). It might_also be correct with a weaker_conditional statement in place_of (A2),_but_I do not_wish_to argue_about that. In summary, not all putative_intention reasoning_that has a valid content is_correct. To make the_reasoning_correct, some further constraints must be_satisfied. But when these constraints are_satisfied, intention reasoning is genuinely_correct_reasoning,_and it provides a 5_clear paradigm of practical reasoning. 5._Reasoning is not_reason-giving Because intention reasoning is reasoning, we_may_say it is normatively guided; it_is_an application of reason. Reason guides_you_from_intending an end to intending_a necessary means. But intention reasoning_is normative in no other way. For one thing,_its premises are_not normative and nor is_its_conclusion;_neither is about what you ought to do or have_a reason_to do. (By_'a reason' I mean a pro tanto ought. If you_have a reason to do something, that_means you ought to do it unless you also have a_contrary reason not to.) Furthermore intention reasoning is_not ought-giving nor even reason-giving; that is_what I shall argue_in_this section and the next two. What_do_I_mean?_In my example,_intention reasoning takes_your from your_intention to_go to St_Andrews to_an intention to