 intention reasoning, but not a part of it. The validity of the content plays its part in intention reasoning directly, and not by giving you a belief. 4. Restrictions on the notion of intention 4 If you believe the premises of a valid inference, then correct reasoning will bring you to take the conclusion as true; you will believe it. Similarly, if you intend some of the premises of a valid inference, and believe the others, then correct reasoning will bring you to set yourself to make the conclusion true. However, it does not always follow that you will intend the conclusion. Setting yourself to make something true is not necessarily intending it. Our notion of intention does not include all instances of setting to make true. Take this putative case of intention reasoning, for example: I(I am going to St Andrews) and B(If I am going to St Andrews, I shall be kept awake by seagulls) leads to I(I shall be kept awake by seagulls). The content of this reasoning is valid, but the reasoning itself is not an intuitively correct piece of intention reasoning. Intuitively, it seems you need not intend to be kept awake by seagulls, even though you recognize this will be a consequence of what you do intend. True enough, because you intend to go to St Andrews, you must adopt the stance of truth-making towards the proposition that you will be kept awake by seagulls. To fulfil your intention, you must make this proposition true. But we would not say you intend to be kept awake by seagulls. This is partly because of a conventional restriction we normally impose on our use of 'intend': we normally only say you intend something if it is an act of yours. Since being kept awake is not an act, we would not normally say you intend it. If this feature of normal usage was all there was to it, the restriction would be unimportant from the point of view of practical reason, because from that point of view we are only interested in acts. Furthermore, our normal usage might be dispensable and have no philosophical significance. Indeed, we do sometimes dispense with it: we would indeed say you intend to be kept awake by seagulls if that was your purpose in going to St Andrews. But there may also be a restriction that applies even to acts. According to the 'doctrine of double effect', you may intend to do some act, and believe that some other act of yours will be a consequence of doing it, yet not intend to
intention reasoning, but not a part of it. The validity of the content toy its character in intention reasoning directly, and not by yield you a belief. 4. Restrictions on the impression of intention 4 If you believe the premises of a valid inference, then right reasoning will fetch you to take the termination as true; you will believe it. Similarly, if you mean some of the premise of a valid inference, and believe the others, then correct reasoning will fetch you to set yourself to make the decision true. However, it does not always follow that you will mean the conclusion. Setting yourself to make something true is not inevitably intending it. Our impression of intention does not include all instances of setting to cook true. Take this putative case of intention reasoning, for example: I(I am go to St Andrews) and B(If I am going to St Andrews, I shall be kept awake by seagulls) leads to I(I shall be kept awake by seagulls). The content of this reasoning is valid, but the reasoning itself is not an intuitively correct part of intention reasoning. Intuitively, it seems you need not mean to be keep awake by seagulls, even though you recognize this will be a consequence of what you do mean. True enough, because you intend to go to St Andrews, you must adopt the position of truth - making towards the proposition that you will be kept awake by seagulls. To fulfil your intention, you must make this proposition true. But we would not say you mean to be kept alert by gull. This is partially because of a conventional restriction we normally impose on our use of' intend': we normally only say you intend something if it is an act of yours. Since being keep alert is not an act, we would not normally say you intend it. If this feature of normal usage was all there was to it, the limitation would be unimportant from the point of view of practical reason, because from that detail of view we are merely interested in act. Furthermore, our normal usage might be dispensable and have no philosophic significance. Indeed, we do sometimes dispense with it: we would indeed say you intend to be kept awake by seagulls if that was your purpose in going to St Andrews. But there may also be a restriction that applies even to acts of the apostles. According to the' doctrine of double impression', you may intend to do some act, and think that some other act of yours will be a consequence of doing it, yet not intend to
 inhention reasoning, but nou a part of it. Thg calidivy of tge contevt plays its part in intentiln reasining directly, and not by givinh you a velitf. 4. Restrictions on the notion kn intznvion 4 If you bekieve the [remises of a eauib inference, then correct reasoning wyll brimg you to take tre cpgcluapok as true; you will believe it. Sijilarly, if you intenc some of the premises of w vapid inference, and helieve the othqes, then corrdct reasonpug will brihg you to set yourself to make ghe cpnclusion jxye. Jmwever, it dies njt always follow thad you woll intend the coicluwion. Setting yourself to make something true is toc necessarily intendibg it. Oor nodion if knttntmon does jot include aml instancew of setting to makt twlr. Take this lutatide case of intention reasoning, for examplt: I(I zm going to St Andrews) qnd B(If I am going to St Andrers, I shall be kept awake by seagulls) leads to I(I vhall ce jeit adqkf by seagulls). The content of this reasoning if vslpd, but the reasonlng itself is not sn imjuitively corrgct piees kf intention reasojing. Injuitivwly, it setms ypu need not intend to be kept awake by fwagulls, even thougk you recognnze thos wikl be a consequence of chat yku do intenf. True enkjgh, because you kntvnd do go to St Andrews, you muft adopt vhe scance of trujh-makind towards hhe pvmposition that you will ba kept awane by seagulls. To fulfil your iivention, you most mane this 'roposltion true. But re would not scy you iutend go be kept awake uy seagulls. Ehis is partlf because of e conventyonao rewtrictiuv we normally ompose on our use od 'intend': we normalky uhly say you intzud something if iy ir ag wcv of rmurs. Since baing keoy awaye is not ak azt, wr would not normally say you intend it. If yhls featurg of normwl usage was sll there was to iu, the cestrirtion eoujd be unimportant from the poiht of viea on practical rqasok, besause from that point of view we are only interesved in acts. Furthermorg, our normal usage miyhu be dispensaule anq have no philosophical signidicance. Indeed, we do sometimes dispenss with it: wf would indeed say you intend to be kept awake by seagulls if that was yoyr pur'ofe in going to Xt Angrzws. But trere oay also be a rextriction that applies even to ects. Accorgiug to the 'doctrine of double rfwect', you may kntend to do some act, ans believr that some other act of yours eill be a consequence of doing ir, yet not intenv to
intention reasoning, but not a part of validity the content its part in by you a belief. Restrictions on the of intention 4 If you believe premises of a valid inference, then correct reasoning will bring you to take conclusion as true; you will believe it. Similarly, if you intend some of premises a inference, believe the others, then correct reasoning will bring you to set yourself to make the conclusion However, it does not always follow that you intend the conclusion. Setting to make something true is necessarily it. Our of does include all instances setting to make true. Take this putative case of intention reasoning, for example: I(I am going to Andrews) and am going St I be kept awake leads to I(I shall be kept The content of this reasoning is valid, but reasoning itself not an intuitively correct piece of reasoning. Intuitively, it seems you need not intend be kept awake by seagulls, even though you recognize this will be a consequence of do intend. True enough, you intend to to Andrews, must the stance truth-making towards the proposition that you will be kept awake by To fulfil your intention, you must make this proposition true. would say you intend be kept awake by This partly because of a we impose of we only say you intend if it is an act yours. Since being kept we would not normally say you intend it. this feature of normal usage was all was to it, the restriction would be unimportant from the point of of practical from that point of view we are only in acts. Furthermore, our usage might be dispensable and have no philosophical significance. we sometimes dispense it: we would say you intend be kept awake if that your in Andrews. But there may also be restriction applies even to acts. According the double effect', you may intend to do some act, and believe that some other act will be a consequence doing yet not intend to
 intention reasoning, but not a Part of it. ThE valiDitY of ThE conTent Plays its part in INtenTion reasoning directly, aNd not By GIvinG YoU a belIef. 4. RestRIcTIOns On ThE noTiON oF inteNtiOn 4 If you Believe the PreMiSes of a valid iNFeRence, then cOrrEct reasoning WilL bring YoU to TAke thE coNclusIon as tRUe; you wIll believE iT. similaRLy, if you INTeNd soMe of the premises of A VaLId inference, and BelievE tHE oTHErs, TheN correct reAsOning WIll brinG YoU TO Set YOurself to make The conclusiON trUe. HoweVeR, it DOes not AlwayS fOLloW that you wilL intEnd the conClusioN. setting YOurself To make SomEthIng tRUe Is Not NeCEssARiLy iNTenDing it. OuR nOtIon of InteNTION doeS noT incLude aLl instances of SetTing TO maKe truE. Take This PuTativE case oF inteNtIon reasoning, for ExamPle: I(I am goIng To st ANdRews) aND B(If I aM goIng To St AndRews, I shALl bE kEPT AwAke by seagulls) leads To i(i ShAll be kepT awake BY sEaGUlls). The cOnTenT of tHIS reasOninG Is Valid, but The reaSOnInG itself Is Not an iNtUitIveLy corREct pIece of IntentioN reasONing. IntuitivelY, It seems you neeD NoT INtENd to Be kEpt awake by sEaguLLs, evEn thOUgH yoU RecogNize tHiS WiLL be a consequence of whAt You do iNtend. true enough, becAuse you intEND To go to St andrEWs, YOu must adopt the StancE of truth-maKIng towarDs the PropositIon that yoU WIll be kepT awAke By sEagULLs. to fulfil your iNTEntiOn, You must MakE this prOpoSitIon TruE. BUt we would Not say yoU iNtEnD tO be Kept aWAke by seaGuLls. thIs iS partLY becauSe of a ConvEnTiONal RestricTIoN WE norMaLlY impOse On Our usE of 'iNTenD': we normAlly only sAy yOU intEnD sOmethinG if it is an act oF yOurs. Since bEiNg kEpt awaKE Is not an aCt, we would not normally say YOu intenD it. if thiS feaTure of norMal Usage wAs aLL there Was to iT, the rEsTriCTIon woULD bE unImPortant froM THe pOint oF vIew oF practiCal reason, because frOM thAt point of view We aRe onLY InTerEStED in AcTS. FuRTHermore, our normaL usage mighT bE DiSpensable aND haVe No philoSophicaL signIFicance. indeed, we dO sometimeS dIspeNSE wiTh it: we woulD indeed sAy you inteND to be KEpT awakE by SeagulLs If tHat waS your pURpoSe in gOing to st andrewS. But tHeRe may alsO be a restriction that applIes eveN to acTs. ACcording tO thE 'DocTrine of doUble Effect', you mAy iNteNd to dO soME act, aNd beLIeVe tHAt somE othER act of youRS wIll BE A cOnsequence oF DOIng It, yet Not INtend tO
 intention reasoning, butnot a part  of i t.The  v alid ityof the content play s its part in intentio n rea so n ingd ir ectly , and n o tb y  gi vi ng  yo ua  b elief . 4 . Restr ictions on  th enotion of in t en tion 4 Ifyou  believe the  pr emises  o f a valid  in feren ce, th e n corr ect reaso ni n g will bring y o u  t o ta ke the conclusion as true; you will  belie ve it . Sim ila rly, if yo uinten d  some o f  t h e pre m ises of a val id inferenc e , a nd bel ie vet he oth ers,th e n c orrect reas onin g will br ing yo u  to set yoursel f to m ake  th e co n cl us ion  t r ue. Ho wev e r,it doesno talway s fo l l o w  tha t y ou w ill i ntend the con clu sion .  Se tting  your self  t o mak e some thing  t rue is not nece ssar ily inten din git.  O ur no t ion of  in ten tion do es noti ncl ud e a ll  instances of sett in g to  make tr ue. Ta k eth i s putati ve  ca se o f inten tion re asoning,  for e x am pl e: I(Iam  going  t o S t A ndrew s ) an d B(If  I am go ing t o  St Andrews, I shall be kept aw a k eb y se agu lls) leadsto I ( I sh allb ekep t  awak e byse a gu l ls). The content of  t his re asoni ng is valid,but the re a s o ning its elfi sn ot an intuitiv ely c orrect pie c e of int entio n reason ing. Intu i t ively, i t s eem s y oun e ed  not intend t o be k ep t awake  by  seagul ls,  ev entho ug h you rec ognize t hi swi ll  be  a co n sequence  o f w ha t y ou do intend . Tru e en ou gh ,  be cause y o ui n tend  t ogo t o S tAndre ws,y oumust ad opt the s tan c e of  t ru th-maki ng towards th epropositio ntha t youw i ll be ke pt awake by seagulls. T o  fulfil  yo ur in tent ion, youmus t make  th i s prop ositio n tru e.  Bu t we wo u l dnot  s ay you int e n d t o beke pt a wake by  seagulls. This is par tly because o f a  con v e nt ion a lr est ri c tio n we normally imp ose on our  u s eof 'intend ' : w enormall y onlysay y o u inten d somethi ng if itis  ana c t o f yours. S ince bei ng kept a w ake i s  n ot an  ac t, wewo uld  notnormal l y s ay yo u inte nd  it. I f thi sfeatureof normal usage was all  there  wastoit, the r est r ict ion would  beunimportan t f rom  thepoi n t ofview of  pr a ctica l re a son, beca u se  fr o m  t hat point o f v iew  we a reo nly in tere sted in acts. Fur t hermore, our n orma l usa gem ight  b e dispensableand  h a v e no phi lo sophical si gnifican ce .  Inde ed, we  do so metimes d is p ense w ithit:  we would  in de e d say y ou  i n tend t o be  k ept aw ake by seag u l ls if that was y our p u r posei n g oingto  St And r ews.  But there  may also b e a re stri ction  that a pp lies e ven  t o acts. Ac c ording to  the'doctri ne  ofdou ble ef fect ' ,  youmayin ten d to do s o m ea ct ,a ndbeli eve t ha t so me othera ct of yo urs will be  a  co n s equenc e  o f doing it,yet  noti n tend to
 intention_reasoning, but_not a part of_it. The_validity_of the_content_plays its part_in intention reasoning_directly, and not by_giving you a_belief._4. Restrictions on the notion of intention 4 If you believe the premises of_a_valid inference,_then_correct_reasoning will bring you to_take the conclusion as true;_you will_believe it. Similarly, if you intend some of_the_premises of a_valid inference, and believe the others, then correct reasoning_will bring you to set yourself_to make the_conclusion_true._However, it does not_always follow that you will intend_the conclusion. Setting yourself to make_something true is not necessarily intending it._Our notion of intention does not_include all instances of setting_to make_true. Take this putative case_of intention reasoning,_for example:_I(I am going_to St Andrews) and B(If I_am going to_St Andrews, I shall be kept_awake_by seagulls) leads_to_I(I_shall be_kept awake by_seagulls)._The content_of_this reasoning is valid, but the_reasoning_itself is not an intuitively correct piece_of intention reasoning. Intuitively,_it_seems you need not_intend to be kept awake_by seagulls, even though you recognize_this will_be a_consequence of what you do intend. True enough, because you intend_to go to St Andrews, you_must adopt the stance_of truth-making_towards_the proposition that_you_will be_kept awake by seagulls. To fulfil your_intention, you_must make this proposition true. But_we would not say_you_intend to be kept awake by_seagulls. This is partly because of_a conventional restriction we normally_impose_on_our use of 'intend': we_normally only say you intend something_if it is_an act of yours. Since being kept_awake_is not an act, we would_not_normally say you intend it. If_this_feature_of normal usage was all_there was to it, the restriction_would be unimportant from the point of view of_practical reason, because_from that point of view_we_are_only interested in acts. Furthermore, our normal usage might be_dispensable and_have no philosophical_significance. Indeed, we do sometimes dispense with it: we would_indeed say you intend to be kept_awake by seagulls if that was your purpose in going to_St Andrews. But there may also be a_restriction that applies even to acts. According_to the 'doctrine of_double_effect', you may intend to do some_act,_and_believe_that some other_act of yours_will be a_consequence of_doing it, yet_not intend_to