. In fact, the garbage chute case and one's like it were originally formulated as counterexamples to Nozick's account.v b. Sosa's safety account. Let us say that one's belief is sensitive to the truth just in case it satisfies Nozick's clause (3). Ernest Sosa suggests that a belief is better safe than sensitive, where a belief is safe just in case one would have it only if it were true.vi Complications aside, Sosa's suggestion amounts to the following: S knows p just in case 1. p is true 2. S believes p 3 3. S would believe p only if p were true. Alternatively, S would not believe p unless p were true. Sosa's clause (3) is ambiguous between the following two interpretations: Strong Safety: In close worlds, always if S believes p then p is true. Alternatively, in close worlds never does S believe p and p is false. Weak Safety: In close worlds, usually if S believes p then p is true. Alternatively, in close worlds, almost never does S believe p and p is false. But now there is a problem. If Sosa means to endorse strong safety as a condition on knowledge, then his account does no better than Nozick's with Case 1: S would believe that the bag is in the basement even if it were hung up in the chute, and so S fails to satisfy a strong safety condition on knowledge.vii This suggests that Sosa means his safety condition to be interpreted as weak safety. But now his account rules incorrectly that there is knowledge in Case 2: It is true that in close worlds, usually if S believes she will lose the lottery then it is true that she will lose, and so in the lottery case S satisfies a weak safety condition. That is how Sosa's account rules on the lottery case when complications are aside. When complications are not aside, Sosa adds that there are other conditions required for knowledge, or at least for full-blooded, reflective knowledge. For example, in one place Sosa says that a belief's safety "must be fundamentally through the exercise of an intellectual virtue," where an intellectual virtue is a reliable or trustworthy source of truth.viii In another place he says: "For reflective knowledge one not only must believe out of virtue. One must also be aware of doing so"ix But it seems clear that these added requirements do not make a difference in the lottery case, for there S does believe through reliable
. In fact, the garbage chute case and one's like it were originally give voice as counterexample to Nozick's account.v b. Sosa's safety account. lease us allege that one's belief is sensitive to the accuracy just in case it satisfies Nozick's article (3). Ernest Sosa suggest that a belief is well safe than sensitive, where a impression is safe just in case one would have it only if it were true.vi Complications aside, Sosa's trace amounts to the following: S knows phosphorus just in case 1. phosphorus is true 2. S believe p 3 3. S would believe p only if p were genuine. Alternatively, S would not believe p unless p were true. Sosa's clause (3) is ambiguous between the following two interpretations: Strong Safety: In close worlds, always if S believes p then p is true. Alternatively, in close universe never does S believe p and phosphorus is assumed. fallible Safety: In close worlds, usually if S believes p then p is genuine. Alternatively, in close worlds, almost never does S believe p and p is fake. But now there is a problem. If Sosa means to certify strong guard as a condition on knowledge, then his account does no better than Nozick's with Case 1: S would think that the bag is in the basement even if it were hung up in the chute, and so S fails to satisfy a strong safety condition on knowledge.vii This indicate that Sosa means his base hit condition to be interpreted as watery safety. But nowadays his account rule incorrectly that there be knowledge in Case 2: It is true that in close worlds, usually if S believe she will lose the lottery then it is dependable that she will lose, and so in the lottery case S satisfies a weak guard condition. That is how Sosa's account rule on the lottery case when complications are aside. When complications are not aside, Sosa adds that there be other conditions required for knowledge, or at least for full - blooded, brooding knowledge. For example, in one position Sosa says that a belief's safety " must be fundamentally through the exercise of an intellectual merit, " where an intellectual virtue is a reliable or trustworthy source of truth.viii In another place he says: " For reflective knowledge one not only must believe out of merit. One must also be aware of doing so"ix But it seems clear that these added requirements do not reach a difference in the lottery case, for there S does believe through reliable
. In fact, the garbage chute gase and one's like it wxre orifinally wormulated as counterexampled ro Noepck's account.v b. Sosa's safety abcount. Ler us way that ois's belicy is acnsitnvx to the truth must in casa it satisfies Nuznck's clause (3). Ernest Sosa suggests thwt a bekiff is better swfe uhag sehsitive, where a belief is safe jusf in cave one would nave it only if it were trke.vi Complications asife, Sosa's sutgeseuon amounts go the following: S knoss p just in case 1. p is true 2. S belizves p 3 3. S qoyld telieve p oily if p were true. Alternadively, X would not bekiete p unless p were true. Smsa's clause (3) is amfiguous batceen the following twi unterkretadionr: Stfonf Xarety: Ij cmose worlda, always if S believes p then k if true. Alternafively, ig close worlds never does S believe p atd l is false. Weak Safety: Un close worlds, usualpy if S bqlieves p then p is true. Alternatively, in close wmrlds, xlmisb nexwr does S believe p and p is false. But now therq ix s problem. If Sjsa means tp fncjrse strong sxfety ca z condition on knoaledge, jhen hus accounu doex no better than Nozick's wirh Case 1: S wjyld believe that tke bag is in the basekent even if it were huug up jn the chutf, and so A fails to satisfh a sdrong safety condition on hnowledge.tii Tkis suggdsts that Fosa means his safety condition to be iuterpseted as wfak safety. But now his account cnles incorrecjly thdt there is kkowledge in Casq 2: It is true jhat in cjose dorlds, usuzlly if S believes she will losa the lottery then it is rrue that sfd will lose, anc so in tkt lottery xase S satisfies a wexi safety conditnub. That is how Spsa'r ascluit rujas on the lodterh cxxe whdn complicabiovs ate aside. When compliwatikns are not aside, Xofa adds jhat therq are other cpnditions required for nnoxledge, or at least for full-blooded, reflsctive knlwlcdge. For exam[le, ln oge place Spsa says that a belief's safety "must be hundamentally through jhe exercise of an injelkectual virvue," whqre an indellectual virtue is a reliable or trmstworthy source of trhth.viih In wnother place he says: "For reflective knowledge one not only must believe iut of virtue. One just also bz acare of doiig so"ix But it seeks clear that these added requicements do njt make a difference in the kogtery case, fot there S does believe thrkugh reloable
. In fact, the garbage chute case like were originally as counterexamples to account. us say that belief is sensitive the truth just in case it Nozick's clause (3). Ernest Sosa suggests that a belief is better safe than where a belief is safe just in case one would have it only it true.vi aside, suggestion amounts to the following: S knows p just in case 1. p is true 2. believes p 3 3. S would believe p if p were true. S would not believe p p true. Sosa's (3) ambiguous the following two Strong Safety: In close worlds, always if S believes p then p is true. Alternatively, in close never does p and is Weak In close worlds, S believes p then p is close worlds, almost never does S believe p p is But now there is a problem. Sosa means to endorse strong safety as a on knowledge, then his account does no better than Nozick's with Case 1: S would the bag is in basement even if were up the and so fails to satisfy a strong safety condition on knowledge.vii This suggests Sosa means his safety condition to be interpreted as weak now account rules incorrectly there is knowledge in 2: is true that in usually S lose lottery it is true that will lose, and so in lottery case S satisfies is how Sosa's account rules on the lottery when complications are aside. When complications are aside, Sosa adds that there are other conditions required for knowledge, or least for knowledge. For example, in one place Sosa says a belief's safety "must fundamentally through the exercise of an intellectual virtue," where intellectual is a or trustworthy source truth.viii In another he says: "For one not must out must also be aware of doing But seems clear that these added do a difference in the lottery case, for there S does believe through reliable
. In fact, the garbage chute case And one's likE it weRe oRigInAlly FormUlated as counteRExamPles to Nozick's account.v b. sosa's SaFEty aCCoUnt. LeT us say tHAt ONE's bElIeF is SeNSiTive tO thE truth jUst in case iT saTiSfies Nozick's CLaUse (3). Ernest SOsa Suggests that A beLief is BeTteR Safe tHan SensiTive, whERe a belIef is safe JuST in casE One woulD HAvE it oNly if it were true.vi cOmPLications aside, sosa's sUgGEsTIOn aMouNts to the foLlOwing: s Knows p jUSt IN CAse 1. P Is true 2. S believEs p 3 3. S would beLIevE p only If P weRE true. ALternAtIVelY, S would not bElieVe p unless P were tRUe. Sosa's CLause (3) is AmbiguOus BetWeen THe FoLloWiNG twO InTerPRetAtions: StRoNg safetY: In cLOSE WorlDs, aLwayS if S bElieves p then p Is tRue. ALTerNativEly, in ClosE wOrlds Never dOes S bElIeve p and p is falsE. WeaK Safety: In CloSe WorLdS, usuaLLy if S bEliEveS p then p Is true. ALTerNaTIVElY, in close worlds, almoSt NEVeR does S beLieve p ANd P iS False. But NoW thEre iS A ProblEm. If sOsA means to EndorsE StRoNg safetY aS a condItIon On kNowleDGe, thEn his aCcount doEs no bETter than Nozick'S With Case 1: S woulD BeLIEvE That The Bag is in the bAsemENt evEn if IT wEre HUng up In the ChUTe, ANd so S fails to satisfy A sTrong sAfety Condition on knOwledge.vii tHIS suggestS thaT soSA means his safetY condItion to be iNTerpreteD as weAk safety. but now his ACCount rulEs iNcoRreCtlY THaT there is knowlEDGe in caSe 2: It is tRue That in cLosE woRldS, usUaLly if S belIeves she WiLl LoSe The LotteRY then it iS tRue ThAt sHe wilL Lose, anD so in The lOtTeRY caSe S satiSFiES A weaK sAfEty cOndItIon. ThAt is HOw SOsa's accOunt rules On tHE lotTeRy Case wheN complicationS aRe aside. WheN cOmpLicatiONS are not aSide, Sosa adds that there arE Other coNdiTions RequIred for knOwlEdge, or At lEAst for Full-blOoded, ReFleCTIve knOWLeDge. foR example, in ONE plAce SoSa Says That a beLief's safety "must be fUNdaMentally throuGh tHe exERCiSe oF An INteLlECtuAL Virtue," where an inTellectual ViRTuE is a reliabLE or TrUstwortHy sourcE of trUTh.viii IN another pLace he sayS: "FOr reFLEctIve knowledGe one not Only must bELieve OUt Of virTue. one musT aLso Be awaRe of doINg sO"ix BuT it seeMs Clear tHat thEsE added reQuirements do not make a difFerencE in thE loTtery case, For THerE S does belIeve Through relIabLe
. In fact, the garbage chu te case an d one 'slik eit w ereoriginally for m ulat ed as counterexamplesto No zi c k'sa cc ount. v b. So s a' s saf et yacc ou n t.  Letussay tha t one's be lie fis sensitive to  the truth  ju st in case i t s atisfi es  No z ick's  cl ause(3). E r nest S osa sugge st s  thata  belief i sbett er safe than sens i ti v e, where a bel ief is  s a fe j ust  in  case onewo uld h a ve it o n ly i f  it were true.viComplicatio n s a side,So sa' s  sugge stion  a m oun ts to the f ollo wing: S k nows p just in case 1.  p istru e 2 . Sb el ie ves  p 3 3 .  S  wo u ldbelievepon ly if  p w e r e true . A lter nativ ely, S wouldnot  bel i eve  p un lessp we re  true . Sosa 's cl au se (3) is ambig uous  betweenthe  f oll ow ing t w o inte rpr eta tions:StrongS afe ty : I nclose worlds, alwa ys i fS believ es p t h en  p is true.  A lte rnat i v ely,in c l os e worlds  never do es  S beli ev e p an dp i s f alse. Weak  Safet y: In cl ose w o rlds, usuallyi f S believesp  t h e np  istru e. Alternat ivel y , in  clo s ewor l ds, a lmost  n e ve r  does S believe p a nd  p isfalse . But now the re is a pr o b l em. If S osam ea n s to endorse s trong  safety as a condit ion o n knowle dge, then h is accou ntdoe s n o b e t te r than Nozick ' s  wit hCase 1:  Swould b eli eve  th atth e bag isin the b as em en teve n ifi t were h un g u pinthe c h ute, a nd so  S f ai ls tosatisfy as t rong  s af etycon di tionon k n owl edge.vi i This su gge s ts t ha tSosa me ans his safet yconditionto  be  inter p r eted asweak safety. But now hi s  accoun t r ulesinco rrectly t hat  there  is knowle dge in  Case  2 : I t is tr u e  t hat  i n close wo r l ds,  usua ll y if  S beli eves she will lose the  lottery then  it  ist r ue  th a ts hewi l l l o s e, and so in th e lotteryca s eS satisfie s  awe ak safe ty cond ition .  That i s how Sos a's accou nt  rul e s  on  the lotte ry casewhen comp l icati o ns  areasi de. Wh en  co mplic ations are  notaside,  S osa ad ds th at  there a re other conditions req uiredfor k now ledge, or  at lea st for fu ll-b looded, re fle cti ve kn owl e dge.Fore xa mpl e , inonep lace Sosa sa yst h at  a belief's s a fet y "mu stb e fund amen tally through the exercise of an  int e l lec tua l  vir tu e," where an i nte ll e c tual vir tu e is a reli able ortr u stwor thy so urce o f truth . v ii i  In an othe r p lace he s ays :" For ref le ct i ve kno wled ge  one n ot onl y  mus t believe out of v irtue . One m u stalsobe  awareo f do ing so"ixBut it seem s clea r th at th ese add ed  requi rem en ts do notm ake a dif feren ce in t he  lot ter y case , fo r there  S d oe s b elieve th r o ug h  r el i abl e
. In_fact, the_garbage chute case and_one's like_it_were originally_formulated_as counterexamples to_Nozick's account.v b._Sosa's safety account. Let_us say that_one's_belief is sensitive to the truth just in case it satisfies Nozick's clause (3)._Ernest_Sosa suggests_that_a_belief is better safe than_sensitive, where a belief is_safe just_in case one would have it only if_it_were true.vi Complications_aside, Sosa's suggestion amounts to the following: S knows_p just in case 1. p_is true 2._S_believes_p 3 3. S_would believe p only if p_were true. Alternatively, S would not_believe p unless p were true. Sosa's_clause (3) is ambiguous between the_following two interpretations: Strong Safety:_In close_worlds, always if S believes_p then p_is true._Alternatively, in close_worlds never does S believe p_and p is_false. Weak Safety: In close worlds,_usually_if S believes_p_then_p is_true. Alternatively, in_close_worlds, almost_never_does S believe p and p_is_false. But now there is a problem._If Sosa means to_endorse_strong safety as a_condition on knowledge, then his_account does no better than Nozick's_with Case_1: S_would believe that the bag is in the basement even if_it were hung up in the_chute, and so S_fails to_satisfy_a strong safety_condition_on knowledge.vii_This suggests that Sosa means his safety_condition to_be interpreted as weak safety. But_now his account rules_incorrectly_that there is knowledge in Case_2: It is true that in_close worlds, usually if S_believes_she_will lose the lottery then_it is true that she will_lose, and so_in the lottery case S satisfies a_weak_safety condition. That is how Sosa's_account_rules on the lottery case when_complications_are_aside. When complications are not_aside, Sosa adds that there are_other conditions required for knowledge, or at least for_full-blooded, reflective knowledge._For example, in one place_Sosa_says_that a belief's safety "must be fundamentally through the exercise_of an_intellectual virtue," where_an intellectual virtue is a reliable or trustworthy source of_truth.viii In another place he says: "For_reflective knowledge one not only must believe out of virtue. One_must also be aware of doing so"ix But_it seems clear that these added requirements_do not make a_difference_in the lottery case, for there S_does_believe_through_reliable