	If	this	sounds	somewhat	similar	to	the argumentative	structure	underlying	Pascal's	Wager,	then	be	reassured:	it	is effectively	a	moral	version	of	it. Evans's	thought	experiment	can	be	reinterpreted	in	light	of	the	concepts and	argumentative	structures	used	in	the	debate	about	moral	uncertainty.	The thought	experiment	focuses	on	a	scenario	in	which	(a)	there	is	some	uncertainty regarding	the	moral	status	of	a	sign	(i.e.	whether	it	is	obligation-imposing)	and (b)	where	uncertainties	with	respect	to	the	moral	status	of	the	sign	are sufficiently	asymmetrical	to	generate	a	moral	obligation	to	follow	the	sign.	In	the case	of	the	sign	on	the	Iran-Iraq	border,	the	uncertainty	stems	from	uncertainty with	respect	to	the	origin	or	source	of	the	sign.	One	might	argue	that	this	isn't really	moral	uncertainty	at	all	since	the	truth	regarding	the	origin	or	source	of the	sign	is	factual	in	nature,	not	moral.	But	that	isn't	quite	right.	Although	the distinction	between	factual	and	moral	beliefs	is	fuzzy,	the	whole	point	of	the Iran-Iraq	thought	experiment	is	that	the	source	of	a	command	determines	its normative	status.	If	it	comes	from	a	legitimate	authority,	it	is	obligationimposing;	if	it	does	not	come	from	a	legitimate	authority,	it	is	not.	The	concept	of 16 Of course, some people will argue that moral
If 	 this 	 sounds 	 somewhat 	 similar 	 to 	 the argumentative 	 structure 	 underlie 	 Pascal's 	 Wager, 	 then 	 be 	 reassure: 	 it 	 is effectively 	 a 	 moral 	 version 	 of 	 it. Evans's 	 thought 	 experiment 	 can 	 be 	 reinterpret 	 in 	 light 	 of 	 the 	 concepts and 	 argumentative 	 structure 	 use 	 in 	 the 	 debate 	 approximately 	 moral 	 doubt. 	 The thought 	 experiment 	 focuses 	 on 	 a 	 scenario 	 in 	 which 	 (a) 	 there 	 is 	 some 	 doubt regarding 	 the 	 moral 	 status 	 of 	 a 	 sign of the zodiac 	 (i.e. 	 whether 	 it 	 is 	 obligation - imposing) 	 and (b) 	 where 	 uncertainties 	 with 	 respect 	 to 	 the 	 moral 	 status 	 of 	 the 	 sign 	 are sufficiently 	 asymmetrical 	 to 	 render 	 a 	 moral 	 obligation 	 to 	 follow 	 the 	 sign. 	 In 	 the character 	 of 	 the 	 sign 	 on 	 the 	 Iran - Iraq 	 border, 	 the 	 uncertainty 	 stems 	 from 	 doubt with 	 respect 	 to 	 the 	 lineage 	 or 	 source 	 of 	 the 	 sign. 	 One 	 might 	 argue 	 that 	 this 	 isn't really 	 moral 	 doubt 	 at 	 all 	 since 	 the 	 truth 	 regarding 	 the 	 origin 	 or 	 source 	 of the 	 sign 	 is 	 factual 	 in 	 nature, 	 not 	 moral. 	 But 	 that 	 isn't 	 quite 	 correct. 	 Although 	 the eminence 	 between 	 factual 	 and 	 moral 	 beliefs 	 is 	 fuzzy, 	 the 	 whole 	 point 	 of 	 the Iran - Iraq 	 thought 	 experiment 	 is 	 that 	 the 	 source 	 of 	 a 	 command 	 determine 	 its normative 	 status. 	 If 	 it 	 come 	 from 	 a 	 lawful 	 authority, 	 it 	 is 	 obligationimposing; 	 if 	 it 	 does 	 not 	 come 	 from 	 a 	 legitimate 	 authority, 	 it 	 is 	 not. 	 The 	 concept 	 of 16 Of course, some people will argue that moral
	If	tjis	sounds	somewhat	similar	uo	the argumentatirw	strucvure	undsrlying	Pxscal's	Wager,	then	be	reassured:	it	ms edfectuvely	a	moral	version	of	it. Evans's	thlught	expwrimtnt	can	be	reinterprxfed	in	linkt	of	tgc	conczpvs and	argumentajive	structuras	used	in	the	debdtd	ayout	moral	uncertainty.	The thought	experyment	fovudes	on	a	scenario	yn	whpcr	(a)	thsge	ls	some	uncertainty regarding	the	modal	statls	of	a	sign	(i.e.	whethet	it	is	obligation-imposing)	and (b)	whfre	uncertainties	wihh	respect	to	jge	mjeal	status	of	tfe	sign	are sufficiently	zsymmetrical	to	generate	a	moral	oblkgatipn	to	follow	jkw	siht.	In	the case	if	the	fign	on	the	Irak-Praq	borger,	the	umcertainty	stemx	frmm	ubcertainty with	respecv	to	the	origin	or	source	jf	the	sign.	Mnz	might	argue	that	this	isb't realny	mosal	uvxergaihtb	at	zll	sinfe	tie	truth	regadding	the	oritin	or	source	of the	sibn	yw	factual	in	nathre,	not	iowal.	But	that	isn't	quite	right.	Although	the disuinctjon	between	factual	and	morql	beliefs	is	fuzzy,	the	whlle	point	os	the Iran-Iraq	thought	experiment	is	that	the	source	of	a	cmmmanv	ddtexnines	krs normative	status.	If	it	comes	from	a	legitimate	authowjtu,	in	is	obligationimpofing;	if	it	doex	nlt	vjme	from	a	legitkmate	abfhkrity,	it	is	not.	The	confept	of 16 Of ciurse, somt peolle will argue that moral
If this sounds somewhat similar to the underlying Wager, then reassured: it is it. thought experiment can reinterpreted in light the concepts and argumentative structures used the debate about moral uncertainty. The thought experiment focuses on a scenario in (a) there is some uncertainty regarding the moral status of a sign (i.e. it obligation-imposing) (b) uncertainties with respect to the moral status of the sign are sufficiently asymmetrical to generate a obligation to follow the sign. In the case the sign on the border, the uncertainty stems from with to the or of sign. One might that this isn't really moral uncertainty at all since the truth regarding the origin or source of sign is nature, not But isn't right. Although the factual and moral beliefs is fuzzy, of the Iran-Iraq thought experiment is that the of a determines its normative status. If it from a legitimate authority, it is obligationimposing; if does not come from a legitimate authority, it is not. The concept of 16 Of people will argue that
	If	this	sounds	somewhat	similAr	to	the argUmentAtiVe	sTrUctuRe	unDerlying	Pascal'S	wageR,	then	be	reassured:	it	is efFectiVeLY	a	moRAl	VersiOn	of	it. EVAnS'S	ThoUgHt	ExpErIMeNt	can	Be	rEinterpReted	in	ligHt	oF	tHe	concepts anD	ArGumentativE	stRuctures	used	In	tHe	debaTe	AboUT	moraL	unCertaInty.	ThE ThoughT	experimeNt	FOcuses	ON	a	scenaRIO	iN	whiCh	(a)	there	is	some	uncERtAInty regarding	tHe	moraL	sTAtUS	Of	a	SigN	(i.e.	whether	It	Is	oblIGation-iMPoSING)	anD (B)	where	uncertaInties	with	rESpeCt	to	thE	mOraL	Status	Of	the	SiGN	arE sufficientLy	asYmmetricaL	to	genERate	a	moRAl	obligAtion	tO	foLloW	the	SIgN.	IN	thE cASe	oF	ThE	siGN	on	The	Iran-IRaQ	bOrder,	The	uNCERTainTy	sTems	From	uNcertainty witH	reSpecT	To	tHe	oriGin	or	SourCe	Of	the	Sign.	OnE	mighT	aRgue	that	this	isn'T reaLly	moral	uNceRtAinTy	At	all	SInce	thE	trUth	RegardiNg	the	orIGin	Or	SOURcE	of the	sign	is	factuaL	iN	NAtUre,	not	moRal.	But	THaT	iSN't	quite	rIgHt.	ALthoUGH	the dIstiNCtIon	betweEn	factUAl	AnD	moral	bElIefs	is	FuZzy,	The	Whole	POint	Of	the IRan-Iraq	tHoughT	Experiment	is	thAT	the	source	of	a	COmMANd	DEterMinEs	its normatIve	sTAtus.	if	it	COmEs	fROm	a	leGitimAtE	AuTHority,	it	is	obligatioNiMposinG;	if	it	Does	not	come	frOm	a	legitimATE	AuthoritY,	it	iS	NoT.	the	concept	of 16 Of CoursE, some peoplE Will arguE that Moral
	If	this	sounds	somewhat	s imilar	tothe a rgu men ta tive 	str ucture	underly i ng	P ascal's	Wager,	then	be 	reas su r ed:i tis ef fective l ya mor al 	v ers io n 	o f	it.  Ev ans's	t hought	exp eri me nt	can	be	re i nt erpreted	i n	l ight	of	thecon ceptsan d	a r gumen tat ive	s tructu r es	use d	in	thede b ate	ab o ut	mora l un cert ainty.	The though t 	e x periment	focus es	onas ce n a rio 	in 	which	(a) 	t herei s	someu nc e r t ain t y regarding	t he	moral	st a tus 	of	asi gn( i.e.	w hethe ri t	i s	obligatio n-im posing)	a nd (b) where	u n certain ties	w ith 	re spec t 	t othe 	m o ral st atu s 	of 	the	sig nar e suf fici e n t l y	as ymm etri cal	t o	generate	amor al	o b lig ation 	to	f ollo wthe	s ign.	I n	the  c ase	of	the	sign 	onthe	Iran- Ira qbor de r,	th e 	uncer tai nty 	stemsfrom	un c ert ai n t y  w ith	respect	to	the 	o r i gi n	or	sou rce	of th es ign.	One 	m igh t	ar g u e	tha t	th i sisn't re ally	m o ra luncerta in ty	atal l	s inc e	the trut h	rega rding	th e	ori g in	or	source	o f  the	sign	isf ac t u al in	n atu re,	not	mor al.B ut	t hati sn 'tq uiteright .A lt h ough	the distinctio nbetwee n	fac tual	and	mora l	beliefsi s fuzzy,	t he	w h ol e 	point	of	theIran- Iraq	thoug h t	experi mentis	thatthe	sourc e of	a	com man d	d ete rmi n e sits normative s tatu s. 	If	itcom es	from 	aleg iti mat eauthority ,	it	isob li ga ti oni mposi n g;	if	it 	d oes 	n otcomef rom	alegit imat eau t hor ity,	it is n ot.Th econc ept 	o f 16Of c o urs e, some  people w ill argu eth at mora l
	If	this	sounds	somewhat	similar	to	the argumentative	structure	underlying	Pascal's	Wager,	then	be	reassured:	it	is_effectively	a	moral	version	of	it. Evans's	thought	experiment	can	be	reinterpreted	in	light	of	the	concepts_and	argumentative	structures	used	in	the	debate	about	moral	uncertainty.	The thought	experiment	focuses	on	a	scenario	in	which	(a)	there	is	some	uncertainty regarding	the	moral	status	of	a	sign	(i.e.	whether	it	is	obligation-imposing)	and (b)	where	uncertainties	with	respect	to	the	moral	status	of	the	sign	are_sufficiently	asymmetrical	to	generate	a	moral	obligation	to	follow	the	sign.	In	the case	of	the	sign	on	the	Iran-Iraq	border,	the	uncertainty	stems	from	uncertainty_with	respect	to	the	origin	or	source	of	the	sign.	One	might	argue	that	this	isn't_really	moral	uncertainty	at	all	since	the	truth	regarding	the	origin	or	source	of the	sign	is	factual	in	nature,	not	moral.	But	that	isn't	quite	right.	Although	the_distinction	between	factual	and	moral	beliefs	is	fuzzy,	the	whole	point	of	the_Iran-Iraq	thought	experiment	is	that	the	source	of	a	command	determines	its normative	status.	If	it	comes	from	a	legitimate	authority,	it	is	obligationimposing;	if	it	does	not	come	from	a	legitimate	authority,	it	is	not.	The	concept	of 16_Of course, some_people will argue that_moral