 is not compatible with supposing that the knowledge plays a ―mediating‖ role (Hutto 2005). An appeal to mediating knowledge would imply commitment to an intermediating representational stage. Consistency with the initial nonrepresentationalism of the sensorimotor approach can be regained by conceiving of ―attunement to sensorimotor contingencies‖ as embodied in the strong sense mentioned at the beginning of this entry. Attunement to sensorimotor contingencies then means that an organism has acquired, on the basis of a history of interactions, a sensitivity in its perception and action for the ways stimuli change with movement. In line with the strong notion of embodiment, the development of perceptual attunement is not conceived of in representationalist terms: the past is not playing its role in the present as represented past – as mediated by representations of the past. Enactivists relying on the strong notion of embodiment will insist that what a history of attunement has yielded is just that: attunement. Of course, attunement is attunement to certain external conditions. Call this the external aspect of attunement. Moreover, attunement is impossible without changed conditions in the organism. Call this the internal aspect of attunement. The mere existence of external and internal aspects of attunement do not necessitate representational descriptions, however. It is not because an organism has become attuned to certain circumstances that it represents those circumstances by some internal means. This is obvious in noncognitive evolutionary adaptations: a bird's wings partially constitute the bird's internal conditions for moving appropriately in an aerial environment, but this does not imply that the bird or its wings represent these external conditions. Analogously, in the cognitive case, there is no logical need to describe the internal conditions that mediate cognitive attunements as representing the external circumstances of attunement. The upshot is that, once the strong notion of embodiment is adhered to, a historical or developmental aspect comes to the fore, in a nonrepresentationalist shape. Representationalists cannot deny a role for an organism's history, but they may insist that an occurrent representation of the past needs to stand in for the real past, if the past is to yields an influence now. An enactive sensorimotor approach-that is, one defining attunement in the strong sense of embodiment-denies that the changes laid down in an organism's history need to be representational. Without being representational, these changes can still retain their causal powers
is not compatible with supposing that the knowledge plays a ―mediating‖ role (Hutto 2005). An appeal to intercede cognition would imply commitment to an intermediating representational stagecoach. Consistency with the initial nonrepresentationalism of the sensorimotor approach path can be regained by conceiving of ―attunement to sensorimotor contingencies‖ as incarnate in the strong sense mention at the beginning of this entry. Attunement to sensorimotor contingencies then intend that an organism has acquired, on the basis of a history of interaction, a sensitivity in its percept and action for the ways stimuli change with movement. In channel with the strong notion of embodiment, the development of perceptual attunement is not conceive of in representationalist terms: the past is not playing its role in the present as represent past – as mediated by representations of the past. Enactivists relying on the strong impression of embodiment will insist that what a history of attunement has yielded is just that: attunement. Of course, attunement is attunement to certain external condition. Call this the external aspect of attunement. Moreover, attunement is impossible without changed conditions in the organism. Call this the internal aspect of attunement. The mere existence of external and home aspects of attunement do not necessitate representational descriptions, however. It is not because an organism has become attuned to sealed context that it defend those circumstances by some internal mean. This is obvious in noncognitive evolutionary adaptations: a shuttlecock's wings partially constitute the shuttlecock's internal conditions for moving appropriately in an aerial environment, but this does not imply that the bird or its wing represent these external conditions. Analogously, in the cognitive case, there is no logical need to report the internal conditions that mediate cognitive attunements as representing the external circumstances of attunement. The consequence is that, once the strong notion of embodiment is adhered to, a historical or developmental aspect comes to the fore, in a nonrepresentationalist shape. Representationalists cannot traverse a role for an organism's history, but they may insist that an occurrent representation of the past needs to stand in for the actual past, if the past is to yields an influence nowadays. An enactive sensorimotor approach - that is, one specify attunement in the strong common sense of embodiment - denies that the changes laid down in an organism's history want to be representational. Without being representational, these changes can even retain their causal powers
 is not compatible with supkosing that the kuiwledgx plays a ―mediaging‖ role (Hutto 2005). An appeal tl nediaupng knowledge would ioply commptment to an mntermediating rxlresentationam staye. Consistency wlth the inidial nonrepresangacionalism of the sensorimotor approash can ne regained by cjncepvyng kf ―attunement to sensorimotor contjngencits‖ as embodied in yhe strong sense mentioned at hhe beginning of tjis entry. Ajfunqnent to sensurimotor contingencies then means that an organism har acqbired, on thg gadhs of a hisvory os interactiokx, a setsitiviyy in its perccptioi ane action for the ways stimuli change wijh movemend. Nn line with the strobg notimn ox emcidioenu, tie seveloomeit of perceltual attunwment is not conceifeq of in repressntatijnwlist terms: the past is not playing its rome in the present as represented past – as mefiated by representations of the past. Enactivists relying mn thx rtrinn noguoj of embodiment will insist that what a histowg pf attunement haf yielded ix uuxj that: attunemgnt. Of ekudse, attunement is wttunemgnt to certain txtermal conditions. Call this thw external afpect of attunement. Moreover, actunemgnt is impossible without chauged cknditions ij the orgzvism. Call this tfe pntesnal asptzt of attunement. Ehe mere xxistznce of dxtetnal anq internal aspegds of attunement dl not nacessitate representational descriptions, ipwever. It is nmt tecause cn orgsnism has becjme attuned to certaiu circjmstances nhat it rxpresents thjse circumstatfes by some mnternal ieanw. Thus is ocxious in noncobnitive enojutiinary adaptations: e bitd'a wings partialoy xonstitute the nira's ynnerial cjtditions for movkng spprooriately in xn arrial environment, bud thjs does not imply yhwt the burd or ies wings reprrsent these externwl coiditiois. Anakogjusly, in the cognitive case, thsre is no lonical need to desgribg the interual conditions that mediate cognitive atvunements as representibg the external cireukstances of attugement. Tha upshot is that, oncw the strong notipn of embodiment is ashered to, a historical or developmental aspect comes to the fore, in a nonrepresentatuonalist shape. Repdesemtatimnclixts cagnot veny a role for am organism's history, but they mab insist tvac an occurrent representation ow the past negds to stand in for the rezl past, of the past is to yields an infkuence now. An enactive scnsorimotir aplroach-ngav is, one defining atyunemeut in rhe string dense of emboaimrnb-denies thwt tie ehanges laid down in an organism's histoey need to be reprxsentational. Dithoot being representationam, thsde chxnges can stikl retain theit causal powers
is not compatible with supposing that the a role (Hutto An appeal to to intermediating representational stage. with the initial of the sensorimotor approach can be by conceiving of ―attunement to sensorimotor contingencies‖ as embodied in the strong sense at the beginning of this entry. Attunement to sensorimotor contingencies then means that organism acquired, the of a history of interactions, a sensitivity in its perception and action for the ways stimuli with movement. In line with the strong notion embodiment, the development of attunement is not conceived of representationalist the past not its in the present represented past – as mediated by representations of the past. Enactivists relying on the strong notion of will insist a history attunement yielded just that: attunement. attunement is attunement to certain external the external aspect of attunement. Moreover, attunement is without changed in the organism. Call this the aspect of attunement. The mere existence of external internal aspects of attunement do not necessitate representational descriptions, however. It is not because an become attuned to certain that it represents circumstances some means. is obvious noncognitive evolutionary adaptations: a bird's wings partially constitute the bird's internal for moving appropriately in an aerial environment, but this does that bird or its represent these external conditions. in cognitive case, there is need describe that cognitive as representing the external of attunement. The upshot is once the strong notion a historical or developmental aspect comes to the in a nonrepresentationalist shape. Representationalists cannot deny role for an organism's history, but they may insist that an occurrent of the to stand in for the real past, if past is to yields influence now. An enactive sensorimotor approach-that is, one defining in strong sense embodiment-denies that the laid down in organism's history need representational. Without representational, changes their causal powers
 is not compatible with supposIng that the KnowlEdgE plAyS a ―meDiatIng‖ role (Hutto 2005). An APpeaL to mediating knowledge wOuld iMpLY comMItMent tO an inteRMeDIAtiNg RePreSeNTaTionaL stAge. ConsIstency witH thE iNitial nonrepREsEntationalIsm Of the sensoriMotOr apprOaCh cAN be reGaiNed by ConceiVIng of ―aTtunement To SEnsoriMOtor conTINgEnciEs‖ as embodied in the STrONg sense mentionEd at thE bEGiNNIng Of tHis entry. AtTuNemenT To sensoRImOTOR coNTingencies theN means that aN OrgAnism hAs AcqUIred, on The baSiS Of a History of inTeraCtions, a seNsitivITy in its PErceptiOn and aCtiOn fOr thE WaYs StiMuLI chANgE wiTH moVement. In LiNe With tHe stRONG NotiOn oF embOdimeNt, the developmEnt Of peRCepTual aTtuneMent Is Not coNceiveD of in RePresentationaliSt teRms: the pasT is NoT plAyIng itS Role in The PreSent as rEpresenTEd pAsT – AS MeDiated by representaTiONS oF the past. enactiVIsTs RElying on ThE stRong NOTion oF embODiMent will Insist THaT wHat a hisToRy of atTuNemEnt Has yiELded Is just That: attuNemenT. of course, attuneMEnt is attunemeNT tO CErTAin eXteRnal conditiOns. CALl thIs thE ExTerNAl aspEct of AtTUnEMent. Moreover, attunemEnT is impOssibLe without chanGed conditiONS In the orgAnisM. caLL this the internAl aspEct of attunEMent. The mEre exIstence oF external AND internaL asPecTs oF atTUNeMent do not neceSSItatE rEpresenTatIonal deScrIptIonS, hoWeVer. It is noT because An OrGaNiSm hAs becOMe attuneD tO ceRtAin CircuMStanceS that It rePrEsENts Those ciRCuMSTancEs By Some IntErNal meAns. THIs iS obviouS in noncogNitIVe evOlUtIonary aDaptations: a biRd'S wings partIaLly ConstiTUTe the birD's internal conditions for MOving apProPriatEly iN an aerial EnvIronmeNt, bUT this dOes not Imply ThAt tHE Bird oR ITs WinGs Represent tHESe eXternAl CondItions. ANalogously, in the cogNItiVe case, there is No lOgicAL NeEd tO DeSCriBe THe iNTErnal conditions That mediatE cOGnItive attunEMenTs As repreSenting The exTErnal ciRcumstancEs of attunEmEnt. THE UpsHot is that, oNce the stRong notioN Of embODiMent iS adHered tO, a HisToricAl or deVEloPmentAl aspeCt Comes tO the fOrE, in a nonrEpresentationalist shape. represEntatIonAlists canNot DEny A role for aN orgAnism's histOry, But They mAy iNSist tHat aN OcCurREnt rePresENtation of THe PasT NEeDs to stand in FOR The Real pAst, IF the paSt is To yields an influenCE now. An enactive SensORImoTor APproAcH-that is, one defiNinG aTTUnement iN tHe strong senSe of emboDiMEnt-deNies thAt the cHanges lAID dOWn in an OrgaNisM's history NeeD tO Be repreSeNtATional. withOuT being RepresENtatIONal, these changes cAn stiLL RetaiN TheIr cauSaL powers
 is not compatible with su pposing th at th e k now le dgeplay s a ―mediating ‖  rol e (Hutto 2005). An app eal t om edia t in g kno wledgew ou l d  im pl ycom mi t me nt to  an  interm ediating r epr es entational s t ag e. Consist enc y with the i nit ial no nr epr e senta tio nalis m of t h e sens orimotorap p roachc an be r e g ai nedby conceiving of― at t unement to sen sorimo to r  c o n tin gen cies‖ as e mb odied in thes tr o n g  se n se mentionedat the begi n nin g of t hi s e n try. A ttune me n t t o sensorimo torcontingen cies t h en mean s  that a n orga nis m h as a c qu ir ed,  o n  th e  b asi s  of  a histo ry  o f int erac t i o n s, a  se nsit ivity  in its perce pti on a n d a ction  forthewa ys st imulichang ewith movement.In l ine withthe  s tro ng  noti o n of e mbo dim ent, th e devel o pme nt o f  p erceptual attuneme nt i snot conc eivedo fin represen ta tio nali s t  term s: t h epast isnot pl a yi ng  its ro le  in th epre sen t asr epre sented  past –as me d iated by repre s entations oft he p as t . En act ivists rely ingo n th e st r on g n o tionof em bo d im e nt will insist that  w hat ahisto ry of attunem ent has yi e l d ed is ju st t h at :  attunement. O f cou rse, attun e ment isattun ement to  certaine x ternal c ond iti ons . C a l lthis the exte r n al a sp ect ofatt unement . M ore ove r,at tunementis impos si bl ewi tho ut ch a nged con di tio ns  in  theo rganis m. Ca ll t hi st heinterna l  a s p ectof  a ttun eme nt . The  mer e  ex istence  of exter nal andin te rnal as pects of attu ne ment do no tnec essita t e  represe ntational descriptions, however . I t isnotbecause a n o rganis m h a s beco me att unedto  ce r t ain c i r cu mst an ces that i t rep resen ts  tho se circ umstances by somei nte rnal means. T his  iso b vi ous in non co g nit i v e evolutionaryadaptation s: abird's win g s p ar tiallyconstit ute t h e bird' s interna l conditi on s fo r mov ing approp riatelyin an aer i al en v ir onmen t,but th is  do es no t impl y  th at th e bird  o r itswings  r epresent  these external conditi ons. A nalog ous ly, in th e c o gni tive case , th ere is nolog ica l nee d t o  desc ribe th e i n terna l co n ditions t h at  me d i at e cognitive a t tun ement s a s  repre sent ing the externalc ircumstances o f at t u nem ent .  The  u pshot is that,  on ce t he stron gnotion of e mbodimen ti s adh ered t o, a h istoric a l  o r  devel opme nta l aspectcom es to thefo re ,  in anonr ep resent ationa l ists h ape. Representat ional i s ts ca n not  deny  a  role f o r an  organism' s history,but th ey m ay in sist th at  an oc cur re nt represe n tation of  thepast ne ed s to  st and in  for t he re al p as t,if the pa s t  i s  t oy iel ds a n inf lu ence  now. Ane nactivesen s orimoto rapp r o ach-th a ti s , one defi nin g att u n ement in t h e st r on g  sens e of e mbodim ent-den i esth at thecha n g es laid d own in an org an ism' s histor yneed  t o b erepresentationa l. Witho ut being r eprese nta t iona l , thes echanges canstill  r e tain th e i r c ausal p o wer s
 is_not compatible_with supposing that the_knowledge plays_a_―mediating‖ role_(Hutto_2005). An appeal_to mediating knowledge_would imply commitment to_an intermediating representational_stage._Consistency with the initial nonrepresentationalism of the sensorimotor approach can be regained by conceiving_of_―attunement to_sensorimotor_contingencies‖_as embodied in the strong_sense mentioned at the beginning_of this_entry. Attunement to sensorimotor contingencies then means that_an_organism has acquired,_on the basis of a history of interactions, a_sensitivity in its perception and action_for the ways_stimuli_change_with movement. In line_with the strong notion of embodiment,_the development of perceptual attunement is_not conceived of in representationalist terms: the_past is not playing its role_in the present as represented_past –_as mediated by representations of_the past. Enactivists_relying on_the strong notion_of embodiment will insist that what_a history of_attunement has yielded is just that:_attunement._Of course, attunement_is_attunement_to certain_external conditions. Call_this_the external_aspect_of attunement. Moreover, attunement is impossible_without_changed conditions in the organism. Call this_the internal aspect of_attunement._The mere existence of_external and internal aspects of_attunement do not necessitate representational descriptions,_however. It_is not_because an organism has become attuned to certain circumstances that it_represents those circumstances by some internal_means. This is obvious_in noncognitive_evolutionary_adaptations: a bird's_wings_partially constitute_the bird's internal conditions for moving appropriately_in an_aerial environment, but this does not_imply that the bird_or_its wings represent these external conditions._Analogously, in the cognitive case, there_is no logical need to_describe_the_internal conditions that mediate cognitive_attunements as representing the external circumstances_of attunement. The_upshot is that, once the strong notion_of_embodiment is adhered to, a historical_or_developmental aspect comes to the fore,_in_a_nonrepresentationalist shape. Representationalists cannot deny_a role for an organism's history,_but they may insist that an occurrent representation of_the past needs_to stand in for the_real_past,_if the past is to yields an influence now. An_enactive sensorimotor_approach-that is, one_defining attunement in the strong sense of embodiment-denies that the_changes laid down in an organism's history_need to be representational. Without being representational, these changes can still_retain their causal powers