 on which option we then carry out minutes, hours or days later. Instead the research discussed by willusionists fails to clearly defi ne the border between conscious and unconscious actions. Consider the Libet experiment. It began with study participants preparing consciously to make a series of repetitive and unplanned actions. When the experiment began, they fl exed their wrists when a desire arose spontaneously. The neural activity involved in the conscious planning presumably infl uenced the later unconscious initiation of movements, revealing an interaction between conscious and unconscious brain activity. Similarly, the Haynes study, in which people randomly picked whether to add or subtract over the course of many trials, fails to provide convincing evidence against free will. Early brain activity that occurred four seconds before participants were aware of making a choice may be an indication of unconscious biases toward one choice or the other. But this early brain activity predicted a choice with an accuracy only 10 percent better than could be forecast with a coin fl ip. Brain activity cannot, in general, settle our choices four seconds before we act, because we can react to changes in our situation in less time than that. If we could not, we would all have died in car crashes by now! Unconscious neural activity, however, can prepare us to take an action by cuing us to consciously monitor our actions to let us adjust our behavior as it occurs. Willusionists also point to psychological research showing that we have less conscious control over our actions than we think. It is true that we are often infl uenced unknowingly by subtle features of our environment and by emotional or cognitive biases. Until we understand them, we are not free to try to counteract them. This is one reason I think we have less free will than many people tend to believe. But there is a big di erence between having less and none at all. The Libet and Haynes research deals with choices that people make without conscious deliberation at the time of action. Everyone performs repetitive or habitual behaviors, sometimes quite sophisticated ones that do not require much thought because the behaviors have been learned. You put your key in the lock. A shortstop dives for a ground ball. A pianist becomes immersed in playing Beethoven's Moonlight Sonata. The refl exive turning of the key, the lunging for the ball, or the depressing of the white and black keys requires a particular type Eddy Nahmias is a professor in the department of philosophy and the Neuroscience Institute at Georgia State University. I N B R I
on which option we then carry out minutes, hours or day subsequently. Instead the research discussed by willusionists fail to clearly defi ne the border between conscious and unconscious action. Consider the Libet experiment. It began with survey participants preparing consciously to take a series of insistent and unplanned actions. When the experiment began, they fl exed their wrists when a desire arose spontaneously. The neural action involved in the conscious planning presumably infl uenced the later unconscious initiation of movement, revealing an interaction between conscious and unconscious brain activity. Similarly, the Haynes study, in which citizenry randomly picked whether to add or subtract over the course of many trials, fails to leave convincing evidence against free will. Early brain activity that occurred four seconds before participants were aware of making a choice may be an indication of unconscious biases toward one choice or the other. But this early brain activity predicted a option with an accuracy merely 10 percent well than could be calculate with a coin fl ip. Brain activity cannot, in cosmopolitan, settle our option four seconds before we act, because we can react to change in our situation in less time than that. If we could not, we would all have died in car crashes by immediately! Unconscious neural activity, however, can prepare us to take an legal action by cuing us to consciously monitor our military action to lease us adjust our behavior as it occurs. Willusionists besides point to psychological research showing that we have less conscious control over our actions than we think. It is true that we are often infl uenced unwittingly by subtle features of our environment and by emotional or cognitive biases. Until we understand them, we are not complimentary to try to antagonize them. This is one reason I remember we have less barren will than many people tend to believe. But there is a big di erence between have less and none at all. The Libet and Haynes inquiry deals with choices that people make without conscious slowness at the clock time of action. Everyone performs insistent or habitual behaviors, sometimes quite sophisticated ones that do not require much thought because the behaviors have been memorize. You put your key in the lock. A shortstop dives for a ground ball. A pianist becomes immersed in play Beethoven's Moonlight Sonata. The refl exive turning of the key, the lunging for the ball, or the depressing of the white and black keys requires a especial type Eddy Nahmias is a professor in the department of philosophy and the Neuroscience Institute at Georgia State University. I N B R I
 on which option we then cavry out minutes, kiurs oc days mater. Inrtead the research discussed bt wilousionists fails to cldarly defp ne the vordtr between conscious and muconsdlous ccvions. Consider jhe Libet ex[eriment. It becav cith study participants preparing cogsciousky to make a seryes ps relvtltive and unplanned actions. When the exkeriment began, theu fl exed their wrists whej a fesire arose spontwneously. Thg neteal activity involved pu the conscjous planning presumably infl udnced the later ubcojvcious initmation of movements, revealhng an onteraction bebween cobscious and unconscions brain activity. Siiilarly, tve Haynes study, in qhuch pgople ranaimlh pjcles whetjer to add or subtract ocer the course of msnr trials, fails to prjvyde convincing evidence against free winl. Sarly brain activity thqt occurred four secojds beforq participants were aware of making a choice may te an kndngwguoj of unconscious biases toward one choice or ege onher. But this earjy brain acyigiyi predicted a zhoice wifh an accuracy onlj 10 percgnt berter than coukd be forecast with a coin dl ip. Brain cctuvity cannot, in geueral, settle our choives four seconds before we zct, because we can rsxct to changes iv olr shtuation in less time than that. If xe cobld not, de wpuld ajl have difd in car crashes by now! Uncousciogs neural wctivity, however, can prepare us to take an acjiot bj cuing uf to gonsciously monytor our actious to lec us aajust our gehavioc as it occuws. Willusionivjs also point to psycroloticao reseafzh showing thay we have less consxious control over out zctions than we thunk. It is true yhag wq wrx oftqt infl uenceg unynodongly by subuje weatires of our environmant znd by emotional ot gognitive biases. Tntil we undetstand them, we are not hree tu try to counteract them. This is one rsason I tjinh we have lefs fvee rill than kany people tend to believe. But there iw a big di erence vetween having less snd none at all. Ehe Libet and Haynes research deals with choicts that people make witgout cmnscilus deliberation at the time of action. Everyone performs repetitive or havitual behaviors, skmetomes xunte sophifticetxd ones that do npt require much thought because the behdvnors have been learned. You puy hour key in tfe lock. A shortstop divea for a bround ball. A pianist becomes ikmersed in playing Beethpven's Moinliggt Sonata. Vhe refl exive turnimg of che ket, the lyngikg for the balu, ot bhe depresding oy the white and black keys requirws a pqrhicular type Eddb Nahmias is x proressor in the departmeht or philusophy and thr Neuroscience Institute at Georgid Ftate Universiuy. I N B R I
on which option we then carry out or later. Instead research discussed by ne border between conscious unconscious actions. Consider Libet experiment. It began with study preparing consciously to make a series of repetitive and unplanned actions. When the began, they fl exed their wrists when a desire arose spontaneously. The neural involved the planning infl uenced the later unconscious initiation of movements, revealing an interaction between conscious and unconscious brain Similarly, the Haynes study, in which people randomly whether to add or over the course of many fails provide convincing against will. brain activity that four seconds before participants were aware of making a choice may be an indication of unconscious biases one choice other. But early activity a choice with only 10 percent better than could a coin fl ip. Brain activity cannot, in settle our four seconds before we act, because can react to changes in our situation in time than that. If we could not, we would all have died in car crashes Unconscious neural activity, however, prepare us to an by us consciously monitor actions to let us adjust our behavior as it occurs. Willusionists point to psychological research showing that we have less conscious our than we think. is true that we often uenced unknowingly by subtle our and cognitive Until understand them, we are free to try to counteract This is one reason free will than many people tend to believe. there is a big di erence between less and none at all. The Libet and Haynes research deals with that people conscious deliberation at the time of action. Everyone repetitive or habitual behaviors, quite sophisticated ones that do not require much thought the have been You put your in the lock. shortstop dives for ball. A becomes in Sonata. The refl exive turning of key, lunging for the ball, or depressing white and black keys requires a particular type Eddy Nahmias is a professor in the philosophy and the Neuroscience at State University. I N B R I
 on which option we then carry oUt minutes, hOurs oR daYs lAtEr. InSteaD the research diSCussEd by willusionists fails To cleArLY defI Ne The boRder betWEeN COnsCiOuS anD uNCoNscioUs aCtions. COnsider the libEt Experiment. It BEgAn with studY paRticipants prEpaRing coNsCioUSly to MakE a serIes of rEPetitiVe and unplAnNEd actiONs. When tHE ExPeriMent began, they fl exED tHEir wrists when a Desire ArOSe SPOntAneOusly. The neUrAl actIVity invOLvED IN thE Conscious planNing presumaBLy iNfl uenCeD thE Later uNconsCiOUs iNitiation of MoveMents, reveAling aN InteracTIon betwEen conSciOus And uNCoNsCioUs BRaiN AcTivITy. SImilarly, ThE HAynes StudY, IN WHich PeoPle rAndomLy picked whethEr tO add OR suBtracT over The cOuRse of Many trIals, fAiLs to provide convInciNg evidencE agAiNst FrEe wilL. early bRaiN acTivity tHat occuRRed FoUR SEcOnds before participAnTS WeRe aware oF makinG A cHoICe may be aN iNdiCatiON Of uncOnscIOuS biases tOward oNE cHoIce or thE oTher. BuT tHis EarLy braIN actIvity pRedicted A choiCE with an accuracY Only 10 percent beTTeR THaN CoulD be Forecast witH a coIN fl iP. BraIN aCtiVIty caNnot, iN gENeRAl, settle our choices fOuR seconDs befOre we act, becauSe we can reaCT TO changes In ouR SiTUation in less tiMe thaN that. If we cOUld not, we Would All have dIed in car cRAShes by noW! UnConSciOus NEUrAl activity, howEVEr, caN pRepare uS to Take an aCtiOn bY cuIng Us To conscioUsly moniToR oUr AcTioNs to lET us adjusT oUr bEhAviOr as iT Occurs. willuSionIsTs ALso Point to PSyCHOlogIcAl ReseArcH sHowinG thaT We hAve less Conscious ConTRol oVeR oUr actioNs than we think. it Is true that We Are Often iNFL uenced uNknowingly by subtle featuREs of our EnvIronmEnt aNd by emotiOnaL or cogNitIVe biasEs. UntiL we unDeRstAND them, WE ArE noT fRee to try to COUntEract ThEm. ThIs is one Reason I think we have LEss Free will than mAny PeopLE TeNd tO BeLIevE. BUT thERE is a big di erence Between havInG LeSs and none aT All. thE Libet aNd HayneS reseARch dealS with choiCes that peOpLe maKE WitHout consciOus delibEration at THe timE Of ActioN. EvEryone PeRfoRms rePetitiVE or HabitUal behAvIors, soMetimEs Quite sopHisticated ones that do not RequirE much ThoUght becauSe tHE beHaviors haVe beEn learned. YOu pUt yOur keY in THe locK. A shORtStoP Dives For a GRound ball. a PiAniST BeComes immersED IN plAying beeTHoven's moonLight Sonata. The refL Exive turning of The kEY, The LunGIng fOr The ball, or the dePreSsING of the whItE and black keYs requirEs A PartiCular tYpe EddY NahmiaS IS a PRofessOr in The DepartmenT of PhILosophy AnD tHE NeuroScieNcE InstiTute at gEorgIA state University. I n B R I
 on which option we then c arry out m inute s,hou rs  ordays  later. Instea d  the  research discussed by  will us i onis t sfails  to cle a rl y def ine  th eb or der b etw een con scious and  un co nscious acti o ns . Consider  th e Libet expe rim ent. I tbeg a n wit h s tudypartic i pantspreparing  c o nsciou s ly to m a k ea se ries of repetitiv e  a n d unplanned ac tions.  W h en t heexp eriment be ga n, th e y fl ex e dt h e irw rists when adesire aros e  sp ontane ou sly .  The n eural  a c tiv ity involve d in  the cons ciousp lanning presuma bly in fluen cedt he  l ate ru nco n sc iou s  in itiation  o fmovem ents , r e veal ing  aninter action betwee n c onsc i ous  anduncon scio us  brai n acti vity.  S imilarly, the H ayne s study,inwh ich  p eople random lypic ked whe ther to add  o r s ub tract over the cou rs e of  many tr ials,f ai ls to provi de  co nvin c i ng ev iden c eagainstfree w i ll .Early b ra in act iv ity  th at oc c urre d four  seconds  befo r e participants were aware of ma k i ng a ch oic e may be an  ind i cati on o f  u nco n sciou s bia se s  t o ward one choice orth e othe r. Bu t this earlybrain acti v i t y predic teda  c h oice with an a ccura cy only 10 percentbette r than c ould be f o r ecast wi tha c oin  fl i p.  Brain activi t y  can no t, in g ene ral, se ttl e o urcho ic es four s econds b ef or ewe  ac t, be c ause weca n r ea ctto ch a nges i n our  sit ua ti o n i n lesst im e than  t ha t. I f w ecould  not ,  we  wouldall havedie d  inca rcrashes  by now! Unco ns cious neur al  ac tivity , however,  can prepare us to take an acti onby cu ingus to con sci ouslymon i tor ou r acti ons t olet u s adj u s tour  b ehavior as i t o ccurs .Will usionis ts also point to p s ych ological rese arc h sh o w in g t h at weha v e l e s s conscious con trol overou r  a ctions tha n  we  t hink. I t is tr ue th a t we ar e often i nfl uence dunkn o w ing ly by subt le featu res of ou r  envi r on mentand  by em ot ion al or  cogni t ive  bias es. Un ti l we u nders ta nd them,  we are not free to try  to co unter act  them. Th isi s o ne reason  I t hink we ha veles s fre e w i ll th an m a ny  pe o ple t endt o believe .  B utt h er e is a bigd i ere nce b etw e en hav ingless and none ata ll. The LibetandH a yne s r e sear ch  deals with ch oic es t hat peop le  make witho ut consc io u s del iberat ion at  the ti m e  o f  actio n. E ver yone perf orm sr epetiti ve  o r  habit ualbe havior s, som e time s quite sophistica ted o n e s tha t  do  notre quire m u ch t hought bec ause the be havior s ha ve be en lear ne d. You  pu tyour key i n  the lock . A s hortsto pdive s f or a g roun d ball.  A p ia nis t becomes i mm e rs ed inplay ing B ee thov en's Moon l ight Son ata .  The re fl  ex i v e turn i ng o f the key,  th e lun g i ng for the ball ,  o r  thedepres sing o f the w h ite  a nd blac k k e y s require s a parti c ula rtype  Eddy Na hm iasis  apr ofessor in thedepartme nt of ph i l osophy  an d  the Neuros ci ence Institu te at  G e orgia S t a teUnivers i ty.  IN B  R I 
 on_which option_we then carry out_minutes, hours_or_days later._Instead_the research discussed_by willusionists fails_to clearly defi ne_the border between_conscious_and unconscious actions. Consider the Libet experiment. It began with study participants preparing consciously_to_make a_series_of_repetitive and unplanned actions. When_the experiment began, they fl_exed their_wrists when a desire arose spontaneously. The neural_activity_involved in the_conscious planning presumably infl uenced the later unconscious initiation_of movements, revealing an interaction between_conscious and unconscious_brain_activity._Similarly, the Haynes study,_in which people randomly picked whether_to add or subtract over the_course of many trials, fails to provide_convincing evidence against free will. Early_brain activity that occurred four_seconds before_participants were aware of making_a choice may_be an_indication of unconscious_biases toward one choice or the_other. But this_early brain activity predicted a choice_with_an accuracy only_10_percent_better than_could be forecast_with_a coin_fl_ip. Brain activity cannot, in general,_settle_our choices four seconds before we act,_because we can react_to_changes in our situation_in less time than that._If we could not, we would_all have_died in_car crashes by now! Unconscious neural activity, however, can prepare us_to take an action by cuing_us to consciously monitor_our actions_to_let us adjust_our_behavior as_it occurs. Willusionists also point to psychological_research showing_that we have less conscious control_over our actions than_we_think. It is true that we_are often infl uenced unknowingly by_subtle features of our environment_and_by_emotional or cognitive biases. Until_we understand them, we are not_free to try_to counteract them. This is one reason_I_think we have less free will_than_many people tend to believe. But_there_is_a big di erence between_having less and none at all._The Libet and Haynes research deals with choices that_people make without_conscious deliberation at the time_of_action._Everyone performs repetitive or habitual behaviors, sometimes quite sophisticated ones_that do_not require much_thought because the behaviors have been learned. You put your_key in the lock. A shortstop dives_for a ground ball. A pianist becomes immersed in playing Beethoven's_Moonlight Sonata. The refl exive turning of the_key, the lunging for the ball, or_the depressing of the_white_and black keys requires a particular type_Eddy_Nahmias_is_a professor in_the department of_philosophy and the_Neuroscience Institute_at Georgia State_University. I_N B R_I