 that has them – experiences are said not to be ontologically independent enough. But why? Experiences are presumably produced by brains of conscious beings, and in this sense they do not "float free". Why would they not be "ontologically independent enough"? Galen Strawson (1997, p.427) makes an interesting comparison with physics: "'But if there is a process, there must be something – an object or substance – in which it goes on. If something happens, there must be something to which it happens, something which is not just the happening itself.' This expresses our ordinary understanding of things, but physicists are increasingly content with the view that physical reality is itself a kind of pure process – even if it remains hard to know exactly what this idea amounts to. The view that there is some ultimate stuff to which things happen has increasingly ceded to the idea that the existence of anything worthy of the name 'ultimate stuff' consists in the existence of fields of energy – consists, in other words, in the existence of a kind of pure process which is not usefully thought of as something which is happening to a thing distinct from it." Indeed, there does not seem to be anything really implausible in the idea that the ultimate stuff of which reality is made is not object-like in a traditional substantivalist sense. The claim that entities such as experiences are not "independent enough" just seems to me to exhibit a prejudice against the ontological status of experiences. Hawthorne and Cover (1998, §2) call such an attitude an "incredulous stare", when they speak about the worry as applied to the bundle theory: "Perhaps some philosophers will claim to find it just self-evident that universals are had by something. We don't have much to say to such philosophers. We do note, however, that the polemic against the bundle theory has rarely taken the form 'It is simply self-evident that anything quality-like is directly or indirectly predicated of something that isn't like a quality [...]'. If opponents of [...] the Bundle Theory wish to retreat to this form of an incredulous stare, so be it." 8 The idea common to Strawson, Hawthorne and Cover, and my pluralistic view is this: to be ontologically independent enough in order to play the role of a fundamental constituent of reality (or of a Self), an entity does not have to be an object-like substance. Properties (for general bundle theorists) or experiences (for
that has them – experiences are said not to be ontologically independent enough. But why? experience are presumably produce by brains of conscious beings, and in this sense they do not " float detached ". Why would they not be " ontologically independent enough "? Galen Strawson (1997, p.427) makes an interesting comparison with purgative: "' But if there is a process, there must be something – an object or kernel – in which it goes on. If something happens, there must be something to which it happen, something which is not just the happening itself.' This press out our average understanding of things, but physicist are increasingly content with the opinion that physical reality is itself a kind of pure process – even if it persist hard to know exactly what this idea amount to. The view that there is some ultimate stuff to which things happen has increasingly concede to the idea that the existence of anything worthy of the name' ultimate stuff' consists in the existence of fields of energy – consists, in other words, in the existence of a kind of pure process which is not usefully thought of as something which is happening to a thing discrete from it. " Indeed, there does not seem to be anything really farfetched in the theme that the ultimate material of which reality is made is not object - like in a traditional substantivalist sense. The claim that entities such as experiences are not " independent enough " barely seems to me to exhibit a prejudice against the ontological status of experiences. Hawthorne and Cover (1998, § 2) call such an position an " incredulous stare ", when they speak about the worry as applied to the bundle theory: " Perhaps some philosophers will claim to witness it barely self - evident that universals are had by something. We don't accept much to say to such philosophers. We do note, however, that the polemicist against the bundle hypothesis has rarely taken the form' It is simply self - evident that anything quality - comparable is directly or indirectly predicated of something that isn't like a timbre [... ]'. If opponents of [... ] the Bundle Theory wish to retreat to this form of an incredulous stare, so be it. " 8 The mind common to Strawson, Hawthorne and Cover, and my pluralistic opinion is this: to be ontologically independent enough in order to bet the role of a fundamental constituent of reality (or of a Self), an entity does not have to be an object - like substance. Properties (for general bundle theorist) or experiences (for
 thwt has them – experiences are said not to be onvologiczlly inddpendent enough. But why? Expecienxes aee presumably produced by braind of conwcions beings, and in this sekfe tgcy do iot "float free". Ehy would dhey not be "ondouoyically independent enough"? Galen Strwwson (1997, l.427) lakes an intergstinb comlarison with physics: "'But if there js a prmcess, there mist be something – an objech or substance – in whifh it goes in. Is something hxppens, thegz must be skmething to which it happens, sooethiug which is nit uost the happxning ptself.' This ewiresses our orcinary understsndmng if things, but physicivts are increasingjy contend cith the view that phtsucal tealidy ir itrelr e kjnd of puce process – even if it remains hard to knpw vcactly what fhis iqew amounts to. The view that there is somt ultjmate stuff to which thungs happen has increwsingly cqded to the idea that the existence of anything wmrthy uf uhc vqmf 'ultimate stuff' consists in the existence of ritldx of energy – cjnsists, in ptjet words, in the existzhcs of a kind of purf procefs whuch is nou usegully thought of as somethibg which is kappening to a thing bistinct froo it." Inderd, there does not seem co be znything rewlly implzjsible in the idda nhat the ultimate stuff of whish realitb is kade is not objece-like in a tradldional substantivapist detse. The clwim that entities such as expermxnces are not "itdeiendent euough" must seems to mq to exhibit a prejudnce agxinst the kntologmcal status jf experiencev. Hawthorne aid Cover (1998, §2) caol sych an xgtitude an "inctedulous stare", when they speak about bhe wudry as applied cu the bundle thepry: "Pewhwpx fmme philosopvers wiuk clakm to find lt gust self-evident that unhveraals are had by sokebhing. We eon't havq much to say to such philosophtrs. We do note, horever, that the polemic against the bundpe bheory has rawely taken the fprm 'It is simply self-evident that anythmng quality-like is dirgctly or indirectly ptedlcated of sokethigg that ivn't like a quality [...]'. Uf opponents of [...] uhe Bundle Theory wish fo retseat ho this form of an incredulous stare, so be it." 8 The idea common to Strawsob, Hawtiowne and Covsr, amd my pjbralistyc vmex is this: to be omtologically independent enough in ordes co play the role of a fundamemtxl constituenj of reality (or of a Self), zn entitu does not have to be an object-kike substance. Propertiex (for geberal bundlv tieorists) or experienves (fox
that has them – experiences are said be independent enough. why? Experiences are conscious and in this they do not free". Why would they not be independent enough"? Galen Strawson (1997, p.427) makes an interesting comparison with physics: "'But there is a process, there must be something – an object or substance in it on. something happens, there must be something to which it happens, something which is not just the itself.' This expresses our ordinary understanding of things, physicists are increasingly content the view that physical reality itself kind of process even it remains hard know exactly what this idea amounts to. The view that there is some ultimate stuff to which happen has to the that existence anything worthy of 'ultimate stuff' consists in the existence energy – consists, in other words, in the of a of pure process which is not thought of as something which is happening to thing distinct from it." Indeed, there does not seem to be anything really implausible in that the ultimate stuff which reality is is object-like a substantivalist sense. claim that entities such as experiences are not "independent enough" just to me to exhibit a prejudice against the ontological status Hawthorne Cover (1998, §2) such an attitude an stare", they speak about the applied the some will to find it just that universals are had by We don't have much We do note, however, that the polemic against bundle theory has rarely taken the form is simply self-evident that anything quality-like is directly or indirectly predicated of that isn't quality [...]'. If opponents of [...] the Bundle wish to retreat to form of an incredulous stare, so be it." 8 idea to Strawson, and Cover, and pluralistic view is to be ontologically in order play role constituent of reality (or of a an does not have to be object-like (for general bundle theorists) or experiences (for
 that has them – experiences are Said not to bE ontoLogIcaLlY indEpenDent enough. But wHY? ExpEriences are presumably pRoducEd BY braINs Of conScious bEInGS, And In ThIs sEnSE tHey do Not "Float frEe". Why would TheY nOt be "ontologiCAlLy independEnt Enough"? Galen STraWson (1997, p.427) mAkEs aN InterEstIng coMparisON with pHysics: "'But If THere is A Process, THErE musT be something – an objECt OR substance – in whIch it gOeS On. iF SomEthIng happens, ThEre muST be someTHiNG TO whICh it happens, soMething whicH Is nOt just ThE haPPening ItselF.' THIs eXpresses our OrdiNary underStandiNG of thinGS, but phySicistS arE inCreaSInGlY coNtENt wITh The VIew That physIcAl RealiTy is ITSELf a kInd Of puRe proCess – even if it rEmaIns hARd tO know ExactLy whAt This iDea amoUnts tO. THe view that there Is soMe ultimatE stUfF to WhIch thINgs hapPen Has IncreasIngly ceDEd tO tHE IDeA that the existence oF aNYThIng worthY of the NAmE 'uLTimate stUfF' coNsisTS In the ExisTEnCe of fielDs of enERgY – cOnsists, In Other wOrDs, iN thE exisTEnce Of a kinD of pure pRocesS Which is not usefULly thought of aS SoMEThINg whIch Is happening To a tHIng dIstiNCt FroM It." IndEed, thErE DoES not seem to be anythinG rEally iMplauSible in the ideA that the ulTIMAte stuff Of whICh REality is made is Not obJect-like in A TraditioNal suBstantivAlist sensE. tHe claim tHat EntItiEs sUCH aS experiences aRE Not "iNdEpendenT enOugh" jusT seEms To mE to ExHibit a preJudice agAiNsT tHe OntOlogiCAl status Of ExpErIenCes. HaWThorne And CoVer (1998, §2) cAlL sUCh aN attituDE aN "INcreDuLoUs stAre", WhEn theY speAK abOut the wOrry as appLieD To thE bUnDle theoRy: "Perhaps some PhIlosophers WiLl cLaim to FINd it just Self-evident that universaLS are had By sOmethIng. WE don't have MucH to say To sUCh philOsopheRs. We dO nOte, HOWever, THAt The PoLemic againST The BundlE tHeorY has rarEly taken the form 'It iS SimPly self-evidenT thAt anYTHiNg qUAlITy-lIkE Is dIREctly or indirectLy predicatEd OF sOmething thAT isN't Like a quAlity [...]'. If OpponENts of [...] thE Bundle ThEory wish tO rEtreAT To tHis form of aN increduLous stare, SO be it." 8 tHe Idea cOmmOn to StRaWsoN, HawtHorne aND CoVer, anD my pluRaListic View iS tHis: to be oNtologically independent Enough In ordEr tO play the rOle OF a fUndamentaL conStituent of ReaLitY (or of A SeLF), an enTity DOeS noT Have tO be aN Object-likE SuBstANCe. properties (fOR GEneRal buNdlE TheoriSts) oR experiences (for
 that has them – experienc es are sai d not  to  be  o ntol ogic ally independe n t en ough. But why? Experie ncesar e  pre s um ablyproduce d  b y bra in sofco n sc iousbei ngs, an d in thissen se  they do not "f loat free" . W hy would the y n ot be"o nto l ogica lly  inde penden t  enoug h"? Galen  S t rawson (1997,p . 42 7) m akes an interesti n gc omparison with  physi cs :  " ' B utifthere is a  p roces s , there mu s t bes omething – an  object ors ubs tance–inw hich i t goe so n.If somethin g ha ppens, th ere mu s t be so m ethingto whi chithapp e ns ,som et h ing wh ich isnot just  t he  happ enin g i t self .'This  expr esses our ord ina ry u n der stand ing o f th in gs, b ut phy sicis ts  are increasing ly c ontent wi thth e v ie w tha t  physi cal  re ality i s itsel f  aki n d of  pure process – ev en i fit remai ns har d  t ok now exac tl y w hatt h is id ea a m ou nts to.The vi e wth at ther eis som eult ima te st u ff t o whic h things  happ e n has increasi n gly ceded tot he i de a  tha t t he existenc e of anyt hing wo rth y  of t he na me 'u l timate stuff' consi st s in t he ex istence of fi elds of en e r g y – cons ists ,  i n  other words,in th e existenc e  of a ki nd of  pure pr ocess whi c h  is notuse ful lytho u g ht  of as someth i n g wh ic h is ha ppe ning to  athi ngdis ti nct fromit." Ind ee d,  t he redoesn ot seemto  be  a nyt hingr eallyimpla usib le  i n  th e ideat ha t theul ti mate  st uf f ofwhic h  re ality i s made is  no t  obj ec t- like in  a traditiona lsubstantiv al ist  sense . The clai m that entities such as experie nce s are  not  "indepen den t enou gh" just s eems t o meto  ex h i bit a p re jud ic e againstt h e o ntolo gi calstatusof experiences. Ha w tho rne and Cover  (1 998, § 2)  ca l ls uch  a n  at t i tude an "incred ulous star e" ,  w hen they s p eak  a bout th e worry  as a p plied t o the bun dle theor y:  "Pe r h aps  some phil osophers  will cla i m tof in d itjus t self -e vid ent t hat un i ver salsare ha dby som ethin g.  We don' t have much to say to s uch ph iloso phe rs. We do  no t e,however,that  the polem icaga instthe bundl e th e or y h a s rar elyt aken thef or m ' I t  i s simply se l f - evi denttha t  anyth ingquality-like is d i rectly or indi rect l y  pr edi c ated  o f something th atis n ' t like a  q uality [... ]'. If o pp o nents  of [. ..] th e Bundl e Th e ory wi sh t o r etreat to  th is form of  a ni ncredu lous  s tare,so bei t."8 The idea commonto St r a wson, Haw thorn eand Cov e r, a nd my plur alistic vie w is t his:  to b e ontol og ically  in de pendent en o ugh in or der t o playth e ro leof a f unda m e ntalcons ti tue nt of rea l i ty (o ro f a  Sel f), a nenti ty does n o t have t o b e  an obj ec t-l i k e subs t an c e . Properti es(forg e neral bund l e th e or i sts)or exp erienc es (for 
 that_has them_– experiences are said_not to_be_ontologically independent_enough._But why? Experiences_are presumably produced_by brains of conscious_beings, and in_this_sense they do not "float free". Why would they not be "ontologically independent enough"?_Galen_Strawson (1997,_p.427)_makes_an interesting comparison with physics:_"'But if there is a_process, there_must be something – an object or substance_–_in which it_goes on. If something happens, there must be something_to which it happens, something which_is not just_the_happening_itself.' This expresses our_ordinary understanding of things, but physicists_are increasingly content with the view_that physical reality is itself a kind_of pure process – even if_it remains hard to know_exactly what_this idea amounts to. The_view that there_is some_ultimate stuff to_which things happen has increasingly ceded_to the idea_that the existence of anything worthy_of_the name 'ultimate_stuff'_consists_in the_existence of fields_of_energy –_consists,_in other words, in the existence_of_a kind of pure process which is_not usefully thought of_as_something which is happening_to a thing distinct from_it." Indeed, there does not seem_to be_anything really_implausible in the idea that the ultimate stuff of which reality_is made is not object-like in_a traditional substantivalist sense._The claim_that_entities such as_experiences_are not_"independent enough" just seems to me to_exhibit a_prejudice against the ontological status of_experiences. Hawthorne and Cover_(1998,_§2) call such an attitude an_"incredulous stare", when they speak about_the worry as applied to_the_bundle_theory: "Perhaps some philosophers will_claim to find it just self-evident_that universals are_had by something. We don't have much_to_say to such philosophers. We do_note,_however, that the polemic against the_bundle_theory_has rarely taken the form_'It is simply self-evident that anything_quality-like is directly or indirectly predicated of something that_isn't like a_quality [...]'. If opponents of_[...]_the_Bundle Theory wish to retreat to this form of an_incredulous stare,_so be it."_8 The idea common to Strawson, Hawthorne and Cover, and_my pluralistic view is this: to be_ontologically independent enough in order to play the role of a_fundamental constituent of reality (or of a Self),_an entity does not have to be_an object-like substance. Properties_(for_general bundle theorists) or experiences (for