finches have become all the rage with children in my neighborhood and everyone is talking about it, though I have been oblivious to this fact. Nothing that I currently believe implies that there is a decent chance that the goldfinch I'm looking at is a toy; however I am subject to fair epistemic criticism because I should have known about the fad. Of course, sometimes information that I ought to acquire is something that is indicated by the beliefs I currently hold, but in this case, the information one ought to have is information possessed by folks in one's immediate community. Thus, as Soso" and others have argued, we are normally held responsible for information representing counterpossibilities that is generally known in our community-ignorance of such information is typically no excuse. This fact about our epistemic practices reflects the importance of the idea that there is a social dimension to epistemic responsibility. In fact, this social dimension plays an important part in the contextualist's picture of epistemic responsibility as we shall see in the next section. If we let the expression "adequate set of background beliefs" refer to the background beliefs the agent does possess plus any that he ought to possess, we can reformulate ER to reflect the point about socially available information as well as the point about obviousness of counterpossibilities: ER': A person S is epistemically responsible in believing some proposition p at time t only if S checks all of those obvious counter304 Moral Knowledge? possibilities whose seriousness is indicated by an adequate set of background beliefs at t. There is much more to be said about this principle and about the notion of epistemic responsibility generally, but I hope what I have said is clear enough for our immediate purposes. Up to this point in this section, I have been engaging in what I take to be a largely descriptive enterprise of accurately characterizing an important feature of our actual, everyday epistemic evaluations. But I also think that there is good reason to endorse this norm and other, related norms. I have in mind a pragmatic rationale that views epistemic norms in terms of their point and purpose for limited creatures like us. In brief the rationale is this: Given that we are finite creatures with limited cognitive resources and that we have all sorts of nonepistemic goals in life, we would expect any genuinely useful epistemic norms to reflect such facts. We have now explicitly fashioned ER* so that it reflects our limited cognitive abilities. Moreover, the fact that our epistemic norms do not normally require of us that we devote inordinate
finches have become all the rage with children in my neighborhood and everyone is speak about it, though I have been forgetful to this fact. Nothing that I currently believe entail that there be a decent chance that the new world goldfinch I'm looking at is a toy; however I am subject to bonny epistemic criticism because I should have known about the fad. Of course, sometimes data that I ought to acquire is something that is indicated by the beliefs I currently agree, but in this case, the data one ought to have is data possess by folks in one's immediate community. therefore, as Soso " and others have argued, we are normally held creditworthy for information present counterpossibilities that is generally know in our community - ignorance of such information is typically no excuse. This fact about our epistemic exercise reflects the importance of the idea that there is a social dimension to epistemic responsibility. In fact, this social property plays an important part in the contextualist's picture of epistemic responsibility as we shall see in the next section. If we let the expression " adequate stage set of background beliefs " denote to the background beliefs the agent does possess plus any that he ought to own, we can reformulate ER to chew over the point about socially available information as well as the distributor point about obviousness of counterpossibilities: ER': A person S is epistemically responsible in believing some proposition p at time t only if S checks all of those obvious counter304 Moral Knowledge? possibilities whose seriousness is indicated by an adequate hardening of background belief at t. There is much more to be said about this principle and about the notion of epistemic duty generally, but I hope what I have said is clear enough for our contiguous purposes. Up to this degree in this section, I have been engaging in what I assume to be a largely descriptive enterprise of accurately characterize an important feature of our actual, casual epistemic evaluations. But I also think that there is dear reason to certify this norm and other, related average. I have in thinker a pragmatic rationale that views epistemic norms in terms of their point and purpose for limited creatures like us. In brief the rationale is this: Given that we are finite animal with limited cognitive resources and that we experience all sorts of nonepistemic goals in life, we would expect any genuinely useful epistemic average to reflect such facts. We have now explicitly fashioned ER * so that it reflects our limited cognitive abilities. furthermore, the fact that our epistemic norms do not normally require of us that we give inordinate
finfhes have become all the rage with chilbeen in my nejghborhoud and everyone is talking auout it, tyough I have been oblixious to nhis fact. Notiing that I currxhtly believe jlplizs that there is a decent whance that tha eopdfinch I'm looking at is a toy; howeder I ak dubject to fait epixeemid criticism because I should have inown auout the fad. Of course, sometimes informatlon hhat I ought to aceuire is sonethybg that is ivdicated bj the beliers I currently hold, but in this case, the infornarioj one ought vo havv is informatlpn posvessed ny folks in onc's imkeduate community. Thus, av Soso" and others rave arguad, we are normally yeod revponvibld fof ihfprjation re'resenting dounterpossubilities that is gtnewqlly known in our cjmiunity-ignorance of such information is uypiczlly no excuse. This facr about our epistemic practicef reflects the importance of the idea that there hs a aucico dimdbslon to epistemic responsibility. In fact, this fkcoak dimension plcys an important pwry in the contebtualist's picture of epistelic reskonsibulity as re snall see in the next sectiob. If we let nhe wxpression "adequatz set of bacygroond bekiefs" refer to the backyround beliefs thf agent dkds possess plus xny tvat he ought to possess, we can refocmulace ER to refkect tre point ahout socially available lnforladion as wepl as the point about obviousness of counterppsvibplities: EX': A pevson S is epistqmically respousible iu belidving some proposmtion p at tyme t only if D checks all of thosq obciouw countdf304 Moral Knowlecge? possiynlities wyose seriousness ix ivsicated by an abtquqte set of backbrojnd bvlixfs ae t. There is kuch mofr to ce said abomt ghis principle and about the notion of epistemoc responsubility denerally, but I hope what I havt said is cleat egough for our immediate purposss. Up to hhif point in tris wection, I hare been engaging in what I take to be a oargely descriptivw enterprise of accorauely charactecizing an impordant feature of our qctual, everyday ekistemic evaluations. Buf I alvo thlnk that there is good reason to endorse this norm and other, related normw. I hate in mind a lragkatic rctipnale ehat tiews epistemic nprms in terms of their point anv purpose xox limited creatures like us. Im crief the ratkonale is this: Given thaf we are finite creatures with limited vognitive resources and bhat we hqve aml sorna uf nonepistemic gosls in life, we wouod ewpect any genukneky useful eoisttmic norms to reflect such facts. We yave niw explicitly fashmoned ER* so bhxt it reflests our limited dognjhive xbilities. Morrover, the fact that our epistemic towms do not nornzlly require of us nhat we devotx inordinate
finches have become all the rage with my and everyone talking about it, to fact. Nothing that currently believe implies there is a decent chance that goldfinch I'm looking at is a toy; however I am subject to fair criticism because I should have known about the fad. Of course, sometimes information I to is that is indicated by the beliefs I currently hold, but in this case, the information one to have is information possessed by folks in immediate community. Thus, as and others have argued, we normally responsible for representing that generally known in community-ignorance of such information is typically no excuse. This fact about our epistemic practices reflects the importance the idea is a dimension epistemic In fact, this plays an important part in the epistemic responsibility as we shall see in the section. If let the expression "adequate set of beliefs" refer to the background beliefs the agent possess plus any that he ought to possess, we can reformulate ER to reflect the socially available information as as the point obviousness counterpossibilities: A S is responsible in believing some proposition p at time t only if checks all of those obvious counter304 Moral Knowledge? possibilities whose indicated an adequate set background beliefs at t. is more to be said principle about epistemic generally, I hope what I said is clear enough for immediate purposes. Up to I have been engaging in what I take be a largely descriptive enterprise of accurately an important feature of our actual, everyday epistemic evaluations. But I also that there reason to endorse this norm and other, related I have in mind pragmatic rationale that views epistemic norms in terms of point purpose for creatures like us. brief the rationale this: Given that finite creatures limited resources have all sorts of nonepistemic goals life, would expect any genuinely useful norms such facts. We have now explicitly fashioned ER* so that it reflects our limited cognitive the fact that our norms not normally require of us that we devote inordinate
finches have become all the raGe with chilDren iN my NeiGhBorhOod aNd everyone is taLKing About it, though I have been OblivIoUS to tHIs Fact. NOthing tHAt i CUrrEnTlY beLiEVe ImpliEs tHat therE is a decent ChaNcE that the goldFInCh I'm lookinG at Is a toy; howeveR I aM subjeCt To fAIr epiSteMic crIticisM BecausE I should hAvE Known aBOut the fAD. of CourSe, sometimes informATiON that I ought to aCquire Is SOmETHinG thAt is indicaTeD by thE Beliefs i CuRRENtlY Hold, but in this Case, the infoRMatIon one OuGht TO have iS infoRmATioN possessed bY folKs in one's iMmediaTE communITy. Thus, aS Soso" aNd oTheRs haVE aRgUed, We ARe nORmAllY HelD responsIbLe For inFormATION repResEntiNg couNterpossibiliTieS thaT Is gEneraLly knOwn iN oUr comMunity-IgnorAnCe of such informaTion Is typicalLy nO eXcuSe. this fACt abouT ouR epIstemic PracticES reFlECTS tHe importance of the iDeA THaT there is A sociaL DiMeNSion to epIsTemIc reSPOnsibIlitY. in Fact, this Social DImEnSion plaYs An impoRtAnt ParT in thE ContExtualIst's pictUre of EPistemic responSIbility as we shALl SEE iN The nExt Section. If we Let tHE expRessIOn "AdeQUate sEt of bAcKGrOUnd beliefs" refer to thE bAckgroUnd beLiefs the agent Does possesS PLUs any thaT he oUGhT To possess, we can ReforMulate ER to REflect thE poinT about soCially avaILAble infoRmaTioN as WelL AS tHe point about oBVIousNeSs of couNteRpossibIliTieS: ER': a peRsOn S is episTemicallY rEsPoNsIblE in beLIeving soMe ProPoSitIon p aT Time t oNly if s cheCkS aLL of Those obVIoUS CounTeR304 MOral knoWlEdge? pOssiBIliTies whoSe seriousNesS Is inDiCaTed by an Adequate set of BaCkground beLiEfs At t. TheRE Is much moRe to be said about this prinCIple and AboUt the NotiOn of epistEmiC respoNsiBIlity gEneralLy, but i hOpe WHAt I haVE SaId iS cLear enough FOR ouR immeDiAte pUrposes. up to this point in thiS SecTion, I have been EngAginG IN wHat i TaKE to Be A LarGELy descriptive enTerprise of AcCUrAtely charaCTerIzIng an imPortant FeatuRE of our aCtual, everYday epistEmIc evALUatIons. But I alSo think tHat there iS Good rEAsOn to eNdoRse thiS nOrm And otHer, relATed Norms. i have iN mInd a prAgmatIc RationalE that views epistemic normS in terMs of tHeiR point and PurPOse For limiteD creAtures like Us. IN brIef thE raTIonalE is tHIs: givEN that We arE Finite creATuRes WITh Limited cognITIVe rEsourCes ANd that We haVe all sorts of nonepIStemic goals in lIfe, wE WOulD exPEct aNy Genuinely usefuL epIsTEMic norms To Reflect such Facts. We hAvE Now exPlicitLy fashIoned ER* SO ThAT it refLectS ouR limited cOgnItIVe abiliTiEs. mOreoveR, the FaCt that Our epiSTemiC NOrms do not normallY requIRE of us THat We devOtE inordiNAte
finches have become all th e rage wit h chi ldr enin  myneig hborhood and e v eryo ne is talking about it , tho ug h  I h a ve  been  oblivi o us t o t hi sfac t. No thing  th at I cu rrently be lie ve  implies tha t  t here is adec ent chance t hat  the g ol dfi n ch I' m l ookin g at i s  a toy ; however  I am sub j ect tof a ir  epi stemic criticismb ec a use I should h ave kn ow n  a b o utthe  fad. Of c ou rse,s ometime s  i n f o rma t ion that I ou ght to acqu i reis som et hin g  thatis in di c ate d by the be lief s I curre ntly h o ld, but in this  case,  th e i nfor m at io n o ne oug h ttoh ave  is info rm at ion p osse s s e d  byfol ks i n one 's immediatecom muni t y.Thus,  as S oso"  a nd ot hers h ave a rg ued, we are nor mall y held re spo ns ibl efor i n format ion  re present ing cou n ter po s s i bi lities that is gen er a l ly  known i n ourc om mu n ity-igno ra nce  ofs u ch in form a ti on is ty picall y  n oexcuse.  T his fa ct  ab out  oure pist emic p ractices  refl e cts the import a nce of the id e at h at ther e i s a socialdime n sion  toe pi ste m ic re spons ib i li t y. In fact, this so ci al dim ensio n plays an im portant pa r t in the c onte x tu a list's picture  of e pistemic r e sponsibi lityas we sh all see i n the next  se cti on.  If w elet the expre s s ion"a dequate  se t of ba ckg rou ndbel ie fs" refer  to theba ck gr ou ndbelie f s the ag en t d oe s p osses s  plusany t hathe  o u ght  to pos s es s ,  weca nrefo rmu la te ER  tor efl ect the  point ab out soci al ly  availa ble informati on  as well a sthe  point a bout obv iousness of counterposs i bilitie s:ER':A pe rson S is  ep istemi cal l y resp onsibl e inbe lie v i ng so m e  p rop os ition p at t ime  t on ly  ifS check s all of those obv i ous  counter304 M ora l Kn o w le dge ?  p o ssi bi l iti e s  whose seriousn ess is ind ic a te d by an ad e qua te  set of  backgr oundb eliefsat t. The re is muc hmore t o b e said abo ut thisprinciple and a b ou t the  no tion o fepi stemi c resp o nsi bilit y gene ra lly, b ut Iho pe whatI have said is clear en ough f or ou r i mmediatepur p ose s. Up tothis  point inthi s s ectio n,I  have  bee n  e nga g ing i n wh a t I taket obea la rgely descr i p t ive  ente rpr i se ofaccu rately characteri z ing an importa nt f e a tur e o f  our  a ctual, everyda y e pi s t emic eva lu ations. But  I alsoth i nk th at the re isgood re a s on to end orse  th is norm a ndot h er, rel at ed norms.  I h av e in m ind ap ragm a t ic rationale tha t vie w s  epis t emi c nor ms  in ter m s of  their poi nt and purp ose fo r li mited  creatu re s like  us .In brief t h e rationa le is  this:Gi ventha t we a re f i n ite c reat ur eswith limi t e dc og ni t ive  res ource sandthat we h a ve all s ort s  of non ep ist e m ic goa l si n  life, wewou ld ex p e ct any gen u inel y  u s efulepiste mic no rms tor efl ec t suchfac t s . We have  now expl i cit ly  fas hioned E R*  soth atit  reflects our l imited c ognitive a biliti es. More o ver, t he  fact that o ur ep is t emic no r m s d o not n o rma lly  re quir e o f us that we devote inordinat e
finches have_become all_the rage with children_in my_neighborhood_and everyone_is_talking about it,_though I have_been oblivious to this_fact. Nothing that_I_currently believe implies that there is a decent chance that the goldfinch I'm looking_at_is a_toy;_however_I am subject to fair_epistemic criticism because I should_have known_about the fad. Of course, sometimes information that_I_ought to acquire_is something that is indicated by the beliefs I_currently hold, but in this case,_the information one_ought_to_have is information possessed_by folks in one's immediate community._Thus, as Soso" and others have_argued, we are normally held responsible for_information representing counterpossibilities that is generally_known in our community-ignorance of_such information_is typically no excuse. This_fact about our_epistemic practices_reflects the importance_of the idea that there is_a social dimension_to epistemic responsibility. In fact, this_social_dimension plays an_important_part_in the_contextualist's picture of_epistemic_responsibility as_we_shall see in the next section._If_we let the expression "adequate set of_background beliefs" refer to_the_background beliefs the agent_does possess plus any that_he ought to possess, we can_reformulate ER_to reflect_the point about socially available information as well as the point_about obviousness of counterpossibilities: ER': A_person S is epistemically_responsible in_believing_some proposition p_at_time t_only if S checks all of those_obvious counter304_Moral Knowledge? possibilities whose seriousness is_indicated by an adequate_set_of background beliefs at t. There_is much more to be said_about this principle and about_the_notion_of epistemic responsibility generally, but_I hope what I have said_is clear enough_for our immediate purposes. Up to this_point_in this section, I have been_engaging_in what I take to be_a_largely_descriptive enterprise of accurately characterizing_an important feature of our actual,_everyday epistemic evaluations. But I also think that there_is good reason_to endorse this norm and_other,_related_norms. I have in mind a pragmatic rationale that views_epistemic norms_in terms of_their point and purpose for limited creatures like us. In_brief the rationale is this: Given that_we are finite creatures with limited cognitive resources and that we_have all sorts of nonepistemic goals in life,_we would expect any genuinely useful epistemic_norms to reflect such_facts._We have now explicitly fashioned ER* so_that_it_reflects_our limited cognitive_abilities. Moreover, the_fact that our_epistemic norms_do not normally_require of_us that we_devote_inordinate