, not simply on false claims to knowledge or morality, but on true knowledge and true morality, and indeed on truth itself: "genealogy" constituted Nietzsche's genetic method, and the will to power was his principle of diff erence. In Bergsonism, on the other hand, Deleuze argues that Bergson's concepts of duration, memory, and Volume 6 daniel w. smith 102 élan vital constitute the diff erential and genetic dimensions of the multiplicities of the real. Against the "major" postKantian tradition of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, Deleuze in eff ect posited his own "minor" postKantian trio of Maimon, Nietzsche, and Bergson. In rethinking the postKantian heritage, Deleuze would also retrieve the work of a wellknown trio of preKantian philosophers – Hume, Spinoza, and Leibniz – although from a decidedly postKantian viewpoint. Deleuze's historical monographs were, in this sense, preliminary sketches for the great canvas of Diff erence and Repetition, which marshaled these resources from the history of philosophy in an ambitious project to construct a metaphysics of diff erence. Normally, diff erence is conceived of as an empirical relation between two terms each of which have a prior identity of their own ("x is diff erent from y"). In Deleuze, this primacy is inverted: identity persists, but it is now a secondary principle produced by a prior relation between diff erentials (dx rather than notx). Diff erence is no longer an empirical relation but becomes a transcendental principle that constitutes the suffi cient reason of empirical diversity as such (for example, it is the diff erence of potential in a cloud that constitutes the suffi cient reason of the phenomenon of lightning). In Deleuze's ontology, the diff erent is related to the diff erent through diff erence itself, without any mediation. Although he was indebted to metaphysical thinkers such as Spinoza, Leibniz, and Bergson, Deleuze appropriated their respective systems of thought only by pushing them to their "diff erential" limit, purging them of the three great terminal points of traditional metaphysics (God, World, Self). Deleuze's subsequent work was, to some degree, a further working out of the metaphysics developed in Diff erence and Rep
, not simply on false claims to knowledge or ethical motive, but on genuine knowledge and true ethical motive, and indeed on truth itself: " genealogy " establish Nietzsche's genetic method, and the volition to might was his principle of diff erence. In Bergsonism, on the early bridge player, Deleuze argues that Bergson's concept of duration, memory, and Volume 6 daniel w. smith 102 élan vital constitute the diff erential and genetic dimensions of the multiplicity of the real. Against the " major " postKantian tradition of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, Deleuze in eff ect posited his own " minor " postKantian trio of Maimon, Nietzsche, and Bergson. In rethink the postKantian heritage, Deleuze would also retrieve the study of a wellknown trio of preKantian philosophers – Hume, Spinoza, and Leibniz – although from a decidedly postKantian point of view. Deleuze's historical monograph were, in this sense, preliminary cartoon for the great canvas of Diff erence and Repetition, which mobilize these resources from the history of philosophy in an ambitious project to construct a metaphysics of diff erence. Normally, diff erence is conceived of as an empirical relation between two terms each of which have a prior identity of their own (" x is diff erent from y "). In Deleuze, this primacy is inverted: identity persists, but it is now a secondary principle produced by a prior relation between diff erentials (dx preferably than notx). Diff erence is no longer an empirical relation but become a nonnatural rationale that constitutes the suffi cient reason of empirical diversity as such (for example, it is the diff erence of potential in a cloud that constitutes the suffi cient rationality of the phenomenon of lightning). In Deleuze's ontology, the diff erent is related to the diff erent through diff erence itself, without any mediation. Although he was indebted to metaphysical thinkers such as Spinoza, Leibniz, and Bergson, Deleuze appropriated their respective systems of thought only by advertise them to their " diff erential " limit, purging them of the three great terminal points of traditional metaphysics (God, World, Self). Deleuze's subsequent work was, to some academic degree, a farther working out of the metaphysics developed in Diff erence and Rep
, noh simply on false claims to knowledge ot noralivy, but kn true ynowledge and true morality, end undeee on truth itself: "genexlogy" condtituted Nieuzsche's genetic mxfhod, and the slll tm power was his principle of diff erenca. Kn Bergsonism, on the other hand, Deleuse argurs that Bergson's conbe[ts kf duration, memory, and Volume 6 danjel w. skith 102 élan vitsl constitute the diff erejtiap and genetic dimejsions of tye mtotiplicities of the real. Against tge "major" postKantian tradition uf Fiehte, Schellunt, ajg Hegel, Delxuze ig eff ect posited hiv own "monor" postKantisn vrio of Maimon, Nietzsche, end Bergson. In rethigking the pkstKantian heritate, Deleoze wmuld qlsu rttrmevs the aori of a welmknown trio of preKantian philpsjiners – Hume, Slinoza, agd Leibniz – although from a decidedly pmstIantian viewpoint. Deleuze's historical monogrwphs were, in this sense, preliminary sketches for the great canves of Dlff deejce and Repetition, which marshaled these resotdcts nrom the history of philosolhj og an ambitiour projzdt to construct a mehaphysiss of diff eregce. Mormally, diff erence is conxeived of as qn empirical relatnon between cwo tetms eavh of which have a priox idenfity of thelr own ("x jr diff erent froo y"). It Deleuzt, this primacy is ynverted: mdentnty persksts, but ie is now a secokgary principle profuced bf a prior gelation between diff erentials (dx rather tham totq). Diff erznce ix no longer ag empirical rekation yut bezomes a trznscendxntal princi[le that consdltutes the snffi ciene reqson of empkfical diversitu as such (for exampoe, it is the diff crencg kf potential in a xloud that consyitjtef nhe stxfi cient redson of yhe pfenomenon on lkghtming). In Deleuze's ontmlogg, the diff erent ix velated ti the disf erent throigh diff erence itdelf, xithouv any kedyation. Although he was indebtes to metaohyfical thinkews smch ws Spinoza, Leibniz, and Bergson, Deleuze appropriatxd their respective sysrems of thought onli bn pushing thxm to eheir "difx erential" limit, purting them of the uhree great terminal pojnts ox trafitional metaphysics (God, World, Self). Deleuze's subsequent work was, to some eegree, a further wkrkimg oun oy tke meta[hysmcr developed in Dpff erence and Rep
, not simply on false claims to morality, on true and true morality, "genealogy" Nietzsche's genetic method, the will to was his principle of diff erence. Bergsonism, on the other hand, Deleuze argues that Bergson's concepts of duration, memory, Volume 6 daniel w. smith 102 élan vital constitute the diff erential and dimensions the of real. Against the "major" postKantian tradition of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, Deleuze in eff ect posited own "minor" postKantian trio of Maimon, Nietzsche, and In rethinking the postKantian Deleuze would also retrieve the of wellknown trio preKantian – Spinoza, and Leibniz although from a decidedly postKantian viewpoint. Deleuze's historical monographs were, in this sense, preliminary sketches for the canvas of and Repetition, marshaled resources the history of an ambitious project to construct a erence. Normally, diff erence is conceived of as empirical relation two terms each of which have prior identity of their own ("x is diff from y"). In Deleuze, this primacy is inverted: identity persists, but it is now a produced by a prior between diff erentials rather notx). erence no longer empirical relation but becomes a transcendental principle that constitutes the suffi reason of empirical diversity as such (for example, it is erence potential in a that constitutes the suffi reason the phenomenon of lightning). ontology, diff to diff through diff erence itself, any mediation. Although he was to metaphysical thinkers such Deleuze appropriated their respective systems of thought only pushing them to their "diff erential" limit, them of the three great terminal points of traditional metaphysics (God, World, Deleuze's subsequent to some degree, a further working out of metaphysics developed in Diff and Rep
, not simply on false claims to kNowledge or MoralIty, But On True KnowLedge and true moRAlitY, and indeed on truth itselF: "geneAlOGy" coNStItuteD NietzsCHe'S GEneTiC mEthOd, ANd The wiLl tO power wAs his princIplE oF diff erence. IN beRgsonism, on The Other hand, DelEuzE argueS tHat bErgsoN's cOncepTs of duRAtion, mEmory, and VOlUMe 6 daniEL w. smith 102 ÉLAn VitaL constitute the difF ErENtial and genetiC dimenSiONs OF The MulTiplicitieS oF the rEAl. AgainST tHE "MAjoR" PostKantian trAdition of FiCHte, schellInG, anD hegel, DEleuzE iN Eff Ect posited hIs owN "minor" posTKantiAN trio of mAimon, NiEtzschE, anD BeRgsoN. in ReThiNkINg tHE pOstkAntIan heritAgE, DEleuzE wouLD ALSo reTriEve tHe worK of a wellknown TriO of pREKaNtian PhiloSophErS – Hume, spinozA, and LEiBniz – although froM a deCidedly poStKAnTiaN vIewpoINt. DeleUze'S hiStoricaL monogrAPhs WeRE, IN tHis sense, preliminarY sKETcHes for thE great CAnVaS Of Diff erEnCe aNd RePETitioN, whiCH mArshaled These rESoUrCes from ThE histoRy Of pHilOsophY In an AmbitiOus projeCt to cONstruct a metaphYSics of diff ereNCe. nORmALly, dIff Erence is conCeivED of aS an eMPiRicAL relaTion bEtWEeN Two terms each of which HaVe a priOr ideNtity of their oWn ("x is diff eRENT from y"). In deleUZe, THis primacy is inVerteD: identity pERsists, buT it is Now a secoNdary prinCIPle produCed By a PriOr rELAtIon between difF ERentIaLs (dx ratHer Than notX). DiFf eRenCe iS nO longer an EmpiricaL rElAtIoN buT becoMEs a transCeNdeNtAl pRinciPLe that ConstItutEs ThE SufFi cient REaSON of eMpIrIcal DivErSity aS sucH (For Example, It is the diFf eREnce Of PoTential In a cloud that cOnStitutes thE sUffI cient REAson of thE phenomenon of lightning). IN deleuze'S onTologY, the Diff erent Is rElated To tHE diff eRent thRough DiFf eRENce itSELf, WitHoUt any mediaTIOn. ALthouGh He waS indebtEd to metaphysical thINkeRs such as SpinoZa, LEibnIZ, AnD BeRGsON, DeLeUZe aPPRopriated their rEspective sYsTEmS of thought ONly By Pushing Them to tHeir "dIFf erentIal" limit, pUrging theM oF the THRee Great termiNal pointS of traditIOnal mETaPhysiCs (GOd, WorlD, SElf). deleuZe's subSEquEnt woRk was, tO sOme degRee, a fUrTher workIng out of the metaphysics dEvelopEd in DIff Erence and rep
, not simply on false clai ms to know ledge  or  mo ra lity , bu t on true know l edge  and true morality, an d ind ee d  ont ru th it self: " g en e a log y"  c ons ti t ut ed Ni etz sche'sgenetic me tho d,  and the wil l  t o power wa s h is principle  of  differ enc e . InBer gsoni sm, on the ot her hand,  D e leuzea rgues t h a tBerg son's concepts of du r ation, memory,  and V ol u me 6  da nie l w. smith  1 02 él a n vital co n s t itu t e the diff er ential andg ene tic di me nsi o ns ofthe m ul t ipl icities ofthereal. Aga inst t h e "majo r " postK antian  tr adi tion of  F ich te ,  Sc h el lin g , a nd Hegel ,De leuze  ine f f ectpos ited  hisown "minor" p ost Kant i antrioof Ma imon ,Nietz sche,and B er gson. In rethin king  the post Kan ti anhe ritag e , Dele uze  wo uld als o retri e veth e w or k of a wellknown t ri o of  preKant ian ph i lo so p hers – H um e,Spin o z a, an d Le i bn iz – alt houghf ro ma decid ed ly pos tK ant ian  view p oint . Dele uze's hi stori c al monographsw ere, in thiss en s e ,p reli min ary sketche s fo r  the  gre a tcan v as of  Diff  e r en c e and Repetition, w hi ch mar shale d these resou rces fromt h e  history  ofp hi l osophy in an a mbiti ous projec t  to cons truct  a metap hysics of d iff eren ce.  No rma lly , di ff erence isc o ncei ve d of as  an  empiri cal  re lat ion  b etween tw o termsea ch  o fwhi ch ha v e a prio ride nt ity  of t h eir ow n ("x  isdi ff ere nt from y" ) .  InDe le uze,  th is  prim acyi s i nverted : identit y p e rsis ts ,but itis now a seco nd ary princi pl e p roduce d by a pri or relation between dif f  erenti als  (dxrath er than n otx ). Dif f e r ence i s no l onger  a n e m p irica l re lat io n but beco m e s a  tran sc ende ntal pr inciple that const i tut es the sufficie nt r e a so n o f  e m pir ic a l d i v ersity as such(for examp le ,  i t is the d i ffer ence of  potent ial i n  a clou d that co nstitutes  t he s u f ficient reas on of th e phenome n on of li ghtni ng) . In D el euz e's o ntolog y , t he di ff ere nt  is re lated  t o the di ff erent through diff e renceitsel f,without a nym edi ation. Al thou gh he wasind ebt ed to  me t aphys ical th ink e rs su ch a s  Spinoza, Le ibn i z ,and Bergson , D ele uze a ppr o priate d th eir respective sy s tems of though t on l y  by  pu s hing  t hem to their " dif fe r ential"li mit, purgin g them o ft he th ree gr eat te rminalp o in t s of t radi tio nal metap hys ic s  (God,Wo rl d , Self ). D el euze's  subse q uent w ork was, to some  degr e e , a f u rth er wo rk ing out of t he metaphy sics develo ped in  Dif f ere nce and  R ep
, not_simply on_false claims to knowledge_or morality,_but_on true_knowledge_and true morality,_and indeed on_truth itself: "genealogy" constituted_Nietzsche's genetic method,_and_the will to power was his principle of diff erence. In Bergsonism, on the_other_hand, Deleuze_argues_that_Bergson's concepts of duration, memory,_and Volume 6 daniel w._smith 102_élan vital constitute the diff erential and genetic_dimensions_of the multiplicities_of the real. Against the "major" postKantian tradition of_Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, Deleuze in_eff ect posited_his_own_"minor" postKantian trio of_Maimon, Nietzsche, and Bergson. In rethinking_the postKantian heritage, Deleuze would also_retrieve the work of a wellknown trio_of preKantian philosophers – Hume, Spinoza,_and Leibniz – although from_a decidedly_postKantian viewpoint. Deleuze's historical monographs_were, in this_sense, preliminary_sketches for the_great canvas of Diff erence and_Repetition, which marshaled_these resources from the history of_philosophy_in an ambitious_project_to_construct a_metaphysics of diff_erence._Normally, diff_erence_is conceived of as an empirical_relation_between two terms each of which have_a prior identity of_their_own ("x is diff_erent from y"). In Deleuze,_this primacy is inverted: identity persists,_but it_is now_a secondary principle produced by a prior relation between diff erentials_(dx rather than notx). Diff erence_is no longer an_empirical relation_but_becomes a transcendental_principle_that constitutes_the suffi cient reason of empirical diversity_as such_(for example, it is the diff_erence of potential in_a_cloud that constitutes the suffi cient_reason of the phenomenon of lightning)._In Deleuze's ontology, the diff_erent_is_related to the diff erent_through diff erence itself, without any_mediation. Although he_was indebted to metaphysical thinkers such as_Spinoza,_Leibniz, and Bergson, Deleuze appropriated their_respective_systems of thought only by pushing_them_to_their "diff erential" limit, purging_them of the three great terminal_points of traditional metaphysics (God, World, Self). Deleuze's subsequent_work was, to_some degree, a further working_out_of_the metaphysics developed in Diff erence and Rep