 we ordinarily accord to wisdom in finer cases of discernment, it is odd that the development of a capacity to detect these matches reliably and accurately should receive no greater priority than Kraut gives it. Of course, it might just be that acting morally is only one of several arenas of human life and action, not in itself specially important. Kraut denies the priority of the right over the good (§), but says nothing about the priority of the good among the many possible exercises of our capacities. If, however, we think that morality – in particular, the promotion of good for ourselves and others – is especially important for living well, we again notice a sharp contrast with the ancients. It is because the capacity for discrimination is so crucial to living well that practical wisdom enjoys the pride of place in human development  MARK LEBAR ©  The Author Journal compilation ©  The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly 10 C. Korsgaard, Sources of Normativity (Cambridge, ), Lecture I. See Kraut, n.  §. which it does on the ancient accounts. This also explains why, amid recognition of a broad and general need to develop as whole beings, the ancients emphasized the significance of moral education. This discriminatory capacity, among all our capacities, bears a special role in our living well, because it is essential for virtue, and virtue requires (inter alia) getting those matching relations right. Overall, it seems the central relationship between good-for and reasons for action is one that cannot rest in the indeterminate form in which Kraut has left it. Since recognizing and responding to reasons for action (perhaps including these matching relations) is so important for how we live, how we come to do this must be a crucial part of the developmental story as well. Moral philosophy can and should shed light on how the possible goods of the living things around us come to give us reasons for action. On the other hand, the key insights of Kraut's developmentalism are not only compatible with the overall thrust of ancient eudaimonism, which makes that relationship explicit, but are actually a welcome complement to it. Eudaimonist theories (in particular, neo-Aristotelian theories) often emphasize the differences between us and other living things
we ordinarily accord to wisdom in finer case of discernment, it is curious that the development of a capacity to detect these matches faithfully and accurately should receive no greater priority than Kraut give it. Of course, it might just be that dissemble morally is only one of several arena of human life and action, not in itself particularly important. Kraut denies the priority of the right over the good (§ ), but says nothing about the priority of the commodity among the many possible exercises of our capacities. If, however, we intend that morality – in particular, the forwarding of good for ourselves and others – is specially important for exist well, we again notice a sharp contrast with the ancient. It is because the capacity for discrimination is so crucial to living well that practical wisdom enjoys the pride of place in human development  MARK LEBAR ©  The Author Journal compilation ©  The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly 10 C. Korsgaard, Sources of Normativity (Cambridge, ), Lecture I. See Kraut, n.  § . which it does on the ancient accounts. This also explains why, amid recognition of a broad and general need to evolve as whole beings, the ancient stress the significance of moral education. This discriminatory capability, among all our capacities, bears a special role in our support well, because it is essential for virtue, and virtue requires (inter alia) getting those matching relations mighty. Overall, it seems the central relationship between good - for and reason for military action is one that cannot rest in the indeterminate form in which Kraut has left it. Since recognizing and responding to cause for action (perhaps including these matching relations) is so important for how we live, how we come to practice this must be a crucial character of the developmental story equally well. Moral philosophy can and should shed light on how the possible good of the living thing around us come to give us reasons for action. On the other hired hand, the key insight of Kraut's developmentalism are not only compatible with the overall thrust of ancient eudaimonism, which makes that relationship explicit, but are actually a welcome complement to it. Eudaimonist theory (in particular, neo - Aristotelian theories) much emphasize the differences between us and early living things
 we ordinarily accord to wirdom in finer ccwes of discednment, ig is odd that the developmenv of a cakccity to detect thesd matches reliablt anv accurately shonmd recelre no nreatzr priority than Kraut givas it. Of coursa, kt might just be that acting morally ys only oje of several wrensf of human life and action, not in itsemf specpally important. Ktaut denies the priority ov thf right over the glod (§), but saia njrhing about ghe prioriuy of the gokd among the many possible exerzises of our cakcxitlgs. If, howevec, we trink that movslity – in paryicular, the prpmovion of good for ourselvev and others – is efpecially ijportant for livibg well, we dgaiv nogict a sgarp clntcast with tge ancients. It is because the va[qcity for disdriminwtyon is so crucial to living well that pgactjcal wisdom enjoys the pride of place in humwn develo[ment  MARK LEBAR ©  The Author Journal compilatiot ©  Tie Ednbjfw lf The Philosophical Quarterly 10 C. Korsgaard, Sjhrvex of Normativiby (Cambridge, ), Lectirf O. See Kraut, n.  §. whick if does on the ancifnt accjunts. This alsj exllains why, amid recognition of a broad cnd general need to dzvelop as whule neingx, the ancients emphasizzd the significanfe of morzu education. This dixcsiminatory capacity, among wll our cepacicies, beafs a speciwl role in our living well, because it id assential vor virtue, and virtue requires (miter alia) getjinc tvose matehing velations right. Overall, it segms the czntral relationsgip betxeen good-for and reasons xlr action is one thae cabnot rest iv the indetermimate form in which Jraut has left it. Xinzs recognizing aub twsponding to rrasuns flr asdion (perhaps incuudkmg thdse matchinn rdlatoons) is so important for how we live, how wr gome to di this mtst be a crucoal part of the degelopkenval stpry as well. Moral philosophy can znd shoulf smed light on row bhe kossible gopds of the living things around us come to give us reasonw for action. On the pther hand, vhe ker insightv of Kraut's developmwntalism are not pnly compatible with fhe ovarall thrust of ancient eudaimonism, which makes that relationship explicit, but are arttally a weldome compneiznt to yt. Endeimonist theories (in particular, neo-Aristotelian vheories) oxtzn emphasize the differences negween us and uther living things
we ordinarily accord to wisdom in finer discernment, is odd the development of matches and accurately should no greater priority Kraut gives it. Of course, it just be that acting morally is only one of several arenas of human and action, not in itself specially important. Kraut denies the priority of the over good but nothing about the priority of the good among the many possible exercises of our capacities. If, we think that morality – in particular, the of good for ourselves others – is especially important living we again a contrast the ancients. It because the capacity for discrimination is so crucial to living well that practical wisdom enjoys the pride place in  MARK © The Journal compilation © Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly 10 of Normativity (Cambridge, ), Lecture I. See Kraut,  §. it does on the ancient accounts. also explains why, amid recognition of a broad general need to develop as whole beings, the ancients emphasized the significance of moral education. capacity, among all our bears a special in living because is essential virtue, and virtue requires (inter alia) getting those matching relations right. it seems the central relationship between good-for and reasons for one cannot rest in indeterminate form in which has it. Since recognizing and reasons action matching is important for how we how we come to do must be a crucial as well. Moral philosophy can and should shed on how the possible goods of the things around us come to give us reasons for action. On the hand, the of Kraut's developmentalism are not only compatible with overall thrust of ancient which makes that relationship explicit, but are actually a complement it. Eudaimonist (in particular, neo-Aristotelian often emphasize the between us and things
 we ordinarily accord to wisdoM in finer caSes of DisCerNmEnt, iT is oDd that the develOPmenT of a capacity to detect thEse maTcHEs reLIaBly anD accuraTElY SHouLd ReCeiVe NO gReateR prIority tHan Kraut giVes It. of course, it miGHt Just be that ActIng morally is OnlY one of SeVerAL arenAs oF humaN life aND actioN, not in itsElF SpeciaLLy imporTANt. krauT denies the prioritY Of THe right over the Good (§), buT sAYs NOThiNg aBout the priOrIty of THe good aMOnG THE maNY possible exerCises of our cAPacIties. IF, hOweVEr, we thInk thAt MOraLity – in partiCulaR, the promoTion of GOod for oURselves And othErs – Is eSpecIAlLy ImpOrTAnt FOr LivINg wEll, we agaIn NoTice a SharP CONTrasT wiTh thE anciEnts. It is becauSe tHe caPAciTy for DiscrIminAtIon is So crucIal to LiVing well that praCticAl wisdom eNjoYs The PrIde of PLace in HumAn dEvelopmEnt  MARK leBAr ©  THE aUtHor Journal compilatIoN ©  tHe editors oF The PhILoSoPHical QuaRtErlY 10 C. KoRSGaard, sourCEs Of NormatIvity (CAMbRiDge, ), LectUrE I. See KRaUt, n.  §. WhiCh it dOEs on The ancIent accoUnts. THIs also explains WHy, amid recogniTIoN OF a BRoad And General need To deVElop As whOLe BeiNGs, the AncieNtS EmPHasized the significaNcE of morAl eduCation. This disCriminatorY CAPacity, amOng aLL oUR capacities, beaRs a spEcial role iN Our livinG well, Because iT is essentIAL for virtUe, aNd vIrtUe rEQUiRes (inter alia) gETTing ThOse matcHinG relatiOns RigHt. OVerAlL, it seems tHe centraL rElAtIoNshIp betWEen good-fOr And ReAsoNs for ACtion iS one tHat cAnNoT ResT in the iNDeTERminAtE fOrm iN whIcH KrauT has LEft It. Since RecogniziNg aND resPoNdIng to reAsons for actioN (pErhaps inclUdIng These mATChing relAtions) is so important for hOW we live, How We comE to dO this must Be a CruciaL paRT of the DeveloPmentAl StoRY As welL. mOrAl pHiLosophy can AND shOuld sHeD ligHt on how The possible goods of THe lIving things arOunD us cOME tO giVE uS ReaSoNS foR ACtion. On the other Hand, the key InSIgHts of Kraut'S DevElOpmentaLism are Not onLY compatIble with tHe overall ThRust OF AncIent eudaimOnism, whiCh makes thAT relaTIoNship ExpLicit, bUt Are ActuaLly a weLComE compLement To It. EudaImoniSt Theories (In particular, neo-AristoteLian thEorieS) ofTen emphasIze THe dIfferenceS betWeen us and oTheR liVing tHinGS
 we ordinarily accord to w isdom in f inercas esof  dis cern ment, it is od d  tha t the development of a  capa ci t y to de tectthese m a tc h e s r el ia bly  a n daccur ate ly shou ld receive  no  g reater prior i ty  than Krau t g ives it. Ofcou rse, i tmig h t jus t b e tha t acti n g mora lly is on ly one of several a re nasof human life and ac t ion, not in it self s pe c ia l l y i mpo rtant. Kra ut  deni e s the p r io r i t y o f  the right ov er the good (§ ), but  s ays nothin g abo ut the  priority o f th e good am ong th e  many p o ssibleexerci ses  of  our ca pa cit ie s . I f ,how e ver , we thi nk  t hat m oral i t y – in  pa rtic ular,  the promotio n o f go o d f or ou rselv es a nd  othe rs – i s esp ec ially important  for  living w ell ,weag ain n o tice a  sh arp  contra st with the  a n c i en ts. It is becauseth e ca pacity f or dis c ri mi n ation is  s o c ruci a l  to l ivin g  w ell that  pract i ca lwisdomen joys t he  pr ide  of p l acein hum an devel opmen t   MARK LEBA R  ©  The A u th o r  J o urna l c ompilation©    Th e Ed i to rso f The  Phil os o ph i cal Quarterly 10 C.  K orsgaa rd, S ources of Nor mativity ( C a m bridge, ) ,L ecture I. SeeKraut , n.  § .  which i t doe s on the  ancienta c counts.Thi s a lso  ex p l ai ns why, amidr e cogn it ion ofa b road an d g ene ral  ne ed  to devel op as wh ol ebe in gs,  thea ncientsem pha si zed  thes ignifi cance  ofmo ra l  ed ucation .  T h i s di sc ri mina tor ycapac ity, amo ng allour capac iti e s, b ea rs  a spec ial role in o ur  living we ll , b ecause i t is ess ential for virtue, andv irtue r equ ires(int er alia)get ting t hos e  match ing re latio ns  ri g h t. Ov e r al l,it  seems the c ent ral r el atio nship b etween good-for an d  re asons for act ion  iso n etha t  c a nno tr est i n the indetermi nate formin wh ich Krauth asle ft it.Since r ecogn i zing an d respond ing to re as onsf o r a ction (per haps inc luding th e se ma t ch ing r ela tions)  i s s o imp ortant for  howwe liv e,  how w e com eto do th is must be a crucial pa rt ofthe d eve lopmental  st o ryas well.Mora l philosop hycan  andsho u ld sh ed l i gh t o n  howthep ossible g o od s o f th e living th i n g s a round  us come t o gi ve us reasons for action. On the  oth e r  ha nd, theke y insights ofKra ut ' s  develop me ntalism are  not onl yc ompat ible w ith th e overa l l  t h rust o f an cie nt eudaim oni sm ,  whichma ke s  thatrela ti onship  expli c it,b u t are actually a  welc o m e com p lem ent t oit. Eud a imon ist theori es (in part icular , ne o-Ari stoteli an  theor ies )often emph a size thediffe rencesbe twee n u s andothe r livin g th in gs
 we_ordinarily accord_to wisdom in finer_cases of_discernment,_it is_odd_that the development_of a capacity_to detect these matches_reliably and accurately_should_receive no greater priority than Kraut gives it. Of course, it might just be_that_acting morally_is_only_one of several arenas of_human life and action, not_in itself_specially important. Kraut denies the priority of the_right_over the good_(§), but says nothing about the priority of the_good among the many possible exercises_of our capacities._If,_however,_we think that morality_– in particular, the promotion of_good for ourselves and others –_is especially important for living well, we_again notice a sharp contrast with_the ancients. It is because_the capacity_for discrimination is so crucial_to living well_that practical_wisdom enjoys the_pride of place in human development_ MARK LEBAR_©  The Author Journal compilation_©_ The Editors_of_The_Philosophical Quarterly_10 C. Korsgaard,_Sources_of Normativity_(Cambridge,_), Lecture I. See Kraut, n.__§. which it does on the ancient_accounts. This also explains_why,_amid recognition of a_broad and general need to_develop as whole beings, the ancients_emphasized the_significance of_moral education. This discriminatory capacity, among all our capacities, bears a_special role in our living well,_because it is essential_for virtue,_and_virtue requires (inter_alia)_getting those_matching relations right. Overall, it seems the_central relationship_between good-for and reasons for action_is one that cannot_rest_in the indeterminate form in which_Kraut has left it. Since recognizing_and responding to reasons for_action_(perhaps_including these matching relations) is_so important for how we live,_how we come_to do this must be a crucial_part_of the developmental story as well._Moral_philosophy can and should shed light_on_how_the possible goods of the_living things around us come to_give us reasons for action. On the other hand,_the key insights_of Kraut's developmentalism are not_only_compatible_with the overall thrust of ancient eudaimonism, which makes that_relationship explicit,_but are actually_a welcome complement to it. Eudaimonist theories (in particular, neo-Aristotelian_theories) often emphasize the differences between us_and other living things