 kind of interference, and also why other possible epistemic goods (e.g., true beliefs) won't outweigh these losses in permissive cases. I realize, though, that all might not be convinced. In this case, there are two weaker claims to fall back on: Weak claim 1: If, given their evidence and a proposition p, agents are in an epistemically permissive case with respect to attitudes A1-An in p, then a potential justification they might have for interfering with each other's inquiry is undermined. Weak claim 2: If, given their evidence and a proposition p, agents are in an epistemically permissive case with respect to attitudes A1-An in p, it is often epistemically wrong for any of them to paternalistically interfere to change the other's attitude A1-An in p. Note that the first weak claim asserts that permissivism simply undermines a potential positive justification for paternalism but doesn't necessarily claim we have positive reason not to do it. The difference between the second weak claim and the strong claim is the scope of the cases involved. I hope I've at least convinced the reader of these claims. Generally, then, the possibility of permissive cases undermines a justification for epistemic paternalism, and renders epistemic paternalism unjustified, at least in most permissive cases. Now, I turn to another epistemological thesis that also speaks against a class of paternalistic interferences-standpoint epistemology. STANDPOINT EPISTEMOLOGY Standpoint epistemology comes in many forms.20 Here, I focus on a general version that states that one's social position affects the epistemic goods that one can access. More precisely, standpoint epistemology is the view that one's social situation gives one unique access to epistemic goods (such as information/evidence, concepts, ways of interpreting or weighing evidence, etc.) that people in other social situations cannot access.21 In other words, two different people can come to very different conclusions about the same matter, either because they end up having different evidence, or because they end up interpreting or weighing evidence quite differently. Standpoint epistemologists argue that one's social situation affects both what one in fact knows 16028-0338d-1pass-r01.indd 208 2/21/2020 10:23:45 AM Epistemic Paternalism, and Epistemic Permissivism 209 (or rationally believes), but also what is knowable (or rationally believable) for them.
kind of interference, and also why other possible epistemic good (for example, true beliefs) won't preponderate these losses in permissive case. I realize, though, that all might not be convert. In this case, there are two weaker claim to fall back on: Weak call 1: If, given their evidence and a proposition p, agentive role are in an epistemically permissive shell with respect to attitudes A1 - An in p, then a potential justification they might have for interfere with each other's inquiry is undermined. decrepit claim 2: If, given their evidence and a proposition p, agents are in an epistemically permissive event with respect to attitudes A1 - An in p, it is often epistemically wrong for any of them to paternalistically intervene to change the other's attitude A1 - An in p. Note that the first weak title asserts that permissivism simply undermines a potential positive justification for paternalism but doesn't necessarily claim we have positive reason not to do it. The difference between the second watery claim and the strong call is the oscilloscope of the cases involved. I hope I've at least convinced the reviewer of these claim. Generally, then, the possibility of permissive case undermines a justification for epistemic paternalism, and renders epistemic paternalism unjustified, at least in most permissive font. Now, I turn to another epistemological thesis that besides speaks against a course of paternalistic interferences - standpoint epistemology. STANDPOINT EPISTEMOLOGY Standpoint epistemology comes in many forms.20 Here, I focus on a general version that express that one's social position affects the epistemic goods that one can access. More precisely, point of view epistemology is the view that one's social position gives one unique entree to epistemic goods (such as information / evidence, concepts, ways of interpreting or deliberation evidence, etc .) that people in other social situations cannot access.21 In other bible, two different multitude can come to very different conclusions about the same matter, either because they end up have different evidence, or because they end up interpretation or weighing evidence quite differently. Standpoint epistemologists argue that one's social situation affect both what one in fact knows 16028-0338d-1pass-r01.indd 208 2/21/2020 10:23:45 AM Epistemic Paternalism, and Epistemic Permissivism 209 (or rationally believes), but also what is knowable (or rationally credible) for them.
 kijd of interference, and auso why other possible epistsmic gooas (e.g., true beliefs) won't outwxigh thest losses in permisskve cases. I realize, tiough, that all mmfht not be cohyinceb. Mn this case, thgre are two feaker claims do fcll back on: Weak claim 1: If, given theyr evidrnfe and a propofitipg p, zgents are in an epistemically perjissive case with rexpect to attitudes A1-An in o, thfn a potential jushification jgey night have fur interfegnng with eadh other's inquiry is undermined. Weak claim 2: If, guvej their evidxnce agd a proposibpon p, acents ate in an epistcmicanly permissive case with respect to attituqes A1-An it ', it is often epistemucqlly fronc fof anh or vhej to pwtecnalisticalmy interferw to change the othtr's qttitude A1-An jn p. Njtq that the first weak claim asserts thau perjissivism simply undermunes a potential posijive justisication for paternalism but doesn't necessarily cnaim xe harc oisltive reason not to do it. The difference betwqsn tme second weak cjaim and thr dttjng claim is jhe sco's kf the cases involged. I hjpe I'ce at leaft cpnvinced the reader of thesw claims. Genvraloy, then, the possibnlity of peroissove csses undermines a justiyicatikn for epishemic patsfnalism, and renddrs e[istemic paternalism unjuseified, at leaxt in must kermissyve cases. Jow, I turn to another eplstemllmgical thedis that also speaks against a rkass of patetnanisnic interyerenccs-standpoint epystemology. STAUDPOINT ZPISTEOOLOGY Stahdpoint epistemolody comes in mdjy forms.20 Herx, I focus on q geberal vdfsion that stayes that one's sociao position affects thg spistemic goods thqt one can accexs. Oorq ireriselr, standpoint apisgemukogy ks the view ghat one's social situatimn gjves one unique acvefs to epustemic doods (such as information/evidenfe, coicepts, ways of interpreting or weighing evidsnce, etc.) hhab people in oeher social situctions cannot access.21 In other words, two vifferent people can cone to very differenj cpnclusions ebout ehe same katter, either becausw they end up havlng different evidence, or bewause they end up interpreting or weighing evidence quite differently. Standpoibt epistemologists argie thdt pne's sjciap situation affecns both what one in fact knows 16028-0338d-1'ass-r01.indd 208 2/21/2020 10:23:45 AM Epistemic Paternalism, anc Dpistemic Peroissivism 209 (or rationally believex), but also what is knowable (or tationally believable) fov them.
kind of interference, and also why other goods true beliefs) outweigh these losses though, all might not convinced. In this there are two weaker claims to back on: Weak claim 1: If, given their evidence and a proposition p, are in an epistemically permissive case with respect to attitudes A1-An in p, a justification might for interfering with each other's inquiry is undermined. Weak claim 2: If, given their evidence and proposition p, agents are in an epistemically permissive with respect to attitudes in p, it is often wrong any of to interfere change the other's A1-An in p. Note that the first weak claim asserts that permissivism simply undermines a potential positive for paternalism necessarily claim have reason to do it. between the second weak claim and is the scope of the cases involved. I I've at convinced the reader of these claims. then, the possibility of permissive cases undermines a for epistemic paternalism, and renders epistemic paternalism unjustified, at least in most permissive cases. Now, to another epistemological thesis also speaks against class paternalistic epistemology. EPISTEMOLOGY Standpoint comes in many forms.20 Here, I focus on a general version states that one's social position affects the epistemic goods that access. precisely, standpoint epistemology the view that one's situation one unique access to (such information/evidence, interpreting weighing etc.) that people in social situations cannot access.21 In words, two different people conclusions about the same matter, either because they up having different evidence, or because they up interpreting or weighing evidence quite differently. Standpoint epistemologists argue that one's situation affects one in fact knows 16028-0338d-1pass-r01.indd 208 2/21/2020 10:23:45 Epistemic Paternalism, and Epistemic 209 (or rationally believes), but also what is knowable rationally for them.
 kind of interference, and also Why other poSsiblE epIstEmIc goOds (e.G., true beliefs) woN'T outWeigh these losses in permIssivE cASes. I REaLize, tHough, thAT aLL MigHt NoT be CoNViNced. IN thIs case, tHere are two WeaKeR claims to falL BaCk on: Weak clAim 1: if, given their EviDence aNd A prOPositIon P, agenTs are iN An episTemically PeRMissivE Case witH REsPect To attitudes A1-An in p, THeN A potential justIficatIoN ThEY MigHt hAve for inteRfEring WIth each OThER'S InqUIry is underminEd. Weak claim 2: iF, giVen theIr EviDEnce anD a proPoSItiOn p, agents arE in aN epistemiCally pERmissivE Case witH respeCt tO atTituDEs a1-AN in P, iT Is oFTeN epISteMically wRoNg For anY of tHEM TO patErnAlisTicalLy interfere to ChaNge tHE otHer's aTtituDe A1-AN iN p. NotE that tHe firSt Weak claim assertS thaT permissiVisM sImpLy UnderMInes a pOteNtiAl positIve justIFicAtION FoR paternalism but doeSn'T NEcEssarily Claim wE HaVe POsitive rEaSon Not tO DO it. ThE difFErEnce betwEen the SEcOnD weak clAiM and thE sTroNg cLaim iS The sCope of The cases InvolVEd. I hope I've at leASt convinced thE ReADEr OF theSe cLaims. GeneraLly, tHEn, thE posSIbIliTY of peRmissIvE CaSEs undermines a justifIcAtion fOr epiStemic paternaLism, and renDERS epistemIc paTErNAlism unjustifiEd, at lEast in most PErmissivE caseS. Now, I turN to anotheR EPistemolOgiCal TheSis THAt Also speaks agaINSt a cLaSs of patErnAlistic IntErfEreNceS-sTandpoint EpistemoLoGy. sTaNdPOiNT EPisTEMOLOGy STanDpOinT episTEmologY comeS in mAnY fORms.20 here, I foCUs ON A genErAl VersIon ThAt staTes tHAt oNe's sociAl positioN afFEcts ThE ePistemiC goods that one CaN access. MorE pRecIsely, sTANdpoint ePistemology is the view thaT One's socIal SituaTion Gives one uNiqUe acceSs tO EpisteMic gooDs (sucH aS inFORmatiON/EvIdeNcE, concepts, wAYS of InterPrEtinG or weigHing evidence, etc.) thaT PeoPle in other socIal SituATIoNs cANnOT acCeSS.21 In OTHer words, two diffErent peoplE cAN cOme to very dIFfeReNt conclUsions aBout tHE same maTter, eitheR because tHeY end UP HavIng differeNt evidenCe, or becauSE they ENd Up intErpReting Or WeiGhing EvidenCE quIte diFferenTlY. StandPoint EpIstemoloGists argue that one's sociaL situaTion aFfeCts both whAt oNE in Fact knows 16028-0338D-1pasS-r01.indd 208 2/21/2020 10:23:45 AM EpIstEmiC PateRnaLIsm, anD EpiSTeMic pErmisSiviSM 209 (or rationALlY beLIEvEs), but also whAT IS knOwablE (or RAtionaLly bElievable) for them.
 kind of interference, and  also whyother  po ssi bl e ep iste mic goods (e.g . , tr ue beliefs) won't outw eighth e se l o ss es in  permis s iv e cas es .I r ea l iz e, th oug h, that  all might  no tbe convinced .  I n this cas e,there are tw o w eakercl aim s  to f all  back  on: W e ak cla im 1: If,  g i ven th e ir evid e n ce  and  a proposition p, ag e nts are in anepiste mi c al l y  pe rmi ssive case  w ith r e spect t o  a t t i tud e s A1-An in p,  then a pot e nti al jus ti fic a tion t hey m ig h t h ave for int erfe ring with  eacho ther'si nquiryis und erm ine d. W e ak  c lai m2 : I f ,giv e n t heir evi de nc e and  a p r o p o siti onp, a gents  are in an ep ist emic a lly  perm issiv e ca se  with  respe ct to  a ttitudes A1-Anin p , it is o fte nepi st emica l ly wro ngfor  any of  them t o  pa te r n a li stically interfere  t o ch ange the  other ' sat t itude A1 -A n i n p. N ote t hatt he  first w eak cl a im  a ssertsth at per mi ssi vis m sim p ly u ndermi nes a po tenti a l positive jus t ification for pa t e rn a lism  bu t doesn't n eces s aril y cl a im  we haveposit iv e  r e ason not to do it.Th e diff erenc e between the  second we a k claim an d th e  s t rong claim isthe s cope of th e  cases i nvolv ed. I ho pe I've a t least co nvi nce d t her e ad er of these c l a ims.  G enerall y,then, t hepos sib ili ty  of permi ssive ca se sun de rmi nes a justific at ion  f orepist e mic pa terna lism ,an d  re nders e p is t e micpa te rnal ism  u njust ifie d , a t least  in mostper m issi ve  c ases. N ow, I turn to  a nother epi st emo logica l thesis t hat also speaks against a class  of  pate rnal istic int erf erence s-s t andpoi nt epi stemo lo gy. S TANDP O I NT  EP IS TEMOLOGY S t a ndp ointep iste mologycomes in many form s .20  Here, I focu s o n ag e ne ral ve r sio nt hat s tates that one' s social p os i ti on affects the  e pistemi c goods  that one can  access.More prec is ely, s tan dpoint epi stemolog y is thev iew t h at  one' s s ocialsi tua tiongiveso neuniqu e acce ss  to ep istem ic  goods ( such as information/evi dence,  conc ept s, ways o f i n ter preting o r we ighing evi den ce,  etc. ) t h at pe ople in  ot h er so cial situation s  c ann o t  a ccess.21 In o t her  word s,t wo dif fere nt people can com e  to very diffe rent c onc lus i onsab out the same m att er , either b ec ause they e nd up ha vi n g dif ferent  evide nce, or b ec a use th ey e ndup interp ret in g  or wei gh in g  evide ncequ ite di fferen t ly.S t andpoint epistem ologi s t s arg u e t hat o ne 's soci a l si tuation af fects bothwhat o ne i n fac t knows  1 6028-0 338 d- 1pass-r01. i ndd 208 2 /21/2 020 10: 23 :45AMEpiste micP a terna lism ,and  Epistemi c Pe r mi ss i vis m 20 9 (or  r atio nally bel i eves), b uta lso wha tisk n owable (o r rationally  be lieva b l e) for the m .
 kind_of interference,_and also why other_possible epistemic_goods_(e.g., true_beliefs)_won't outweigh these_losses in permissive_cases. I realize, though,_that all might_not_be convinced. In this case, there are two weaker claims to fall back on:_Weak_claim 1:_If,_given_their evidence and a proposition_p, agents are in an_epistemically permissive_case with respect to attitudes A1-An in p,_then_a potential justification_they might have for interfering with each other's inquiry_is undermined. Weak claim 2: If,_given their evidence_and_a_proposition p, agents are_in an epistemically permissive case with_respect to attitudes A1-An in p,_it is often epistemically wrong for any_of them to paternalistically interfere to_change the other's attitude A1-An_in p._Note that the first weak_claim asserts that_permissivism simply_undermines a potential_positive justification for paternalism but doesn't_necessarily claim we_have positive reason not to do_it._The difference between_the_second_weak claim_and the strong_claim_is the_scope_of the cases involved. I hope_I've_at least convinced the reader of these_claims. Generally, then, the_possibility_of permissive cases undermines_a justification for epistemic paternalism,_and renders epistemic paternalism unjustified, at_least in_most permissive_cases. Now, I turn to another epistemological thesis that also speaks_against a class of paternalistic interferences-standpoint_epistemology. STANDPOINT EPISTEMOLOGY Standpoint_epistemology comes_in_many forms.20 Here,_I_focus on_a general version that states that one's_social position_affects the epistemic goods that one_can access. More precisely,_standpoint_epistemology is the view that one's_social situation gives one unique access_to epistemic goods (such as_information/evidence,_concepts,_ways of interpreting or weighing_evidence, etc.) that people in other_social situations cannot_access.21 In other words, two different people_can_come to very different conclusions about_the_same matter, either because they end_up_having_different evidence, or because they_end up interpreting or weighing evidence_quite differently. Standpoint epistemologists argue that one's social situation_affects both what_one in fact knows 16028-0338d-1pass-r01.indd_208_2/21/2020_10:23:45 AM Epistemic Paternalism, and Epistemic Permissivism 209 (or rationally_believes), but_also what is_knowable (or rationally believable) for them.