s or processes evidence. Consider again our judge who worries that some members of the jury would come to a different conclusion than she. Assuming they share evidence and are in an interpersonally permissive case, the fact that the jury would disagree with her does not give her grounds to interfere with the way they process the evidence. Not only does interference in permissive cases fail to have epistemically good effects; it also can have epistemically bad effects. Interfering may stifle the jury's ability to think creatively and inquire freely. They might consider possible explanations of the evidence that had never occurred to the judge; for example, the judge might be convinced that Smith did it, but the jury might employ another standard that makes salient the possibility that Jones, Smith's 16028-0338d-1pass-r01.indd 205 2/21/2020 10:23:44 AM 206 Chapter 13 butler did it (Douven 2009). Both beliefs are rational, given the evidence, but if the judge had paternalistically imposed her epistemic standard on the jurors, the latter explanation may never have been considered. Co-existing epistemic standards lead to epistemic diversity that improves our collective epistemic position in the long run. For this reason, in permissive cases, not only is there no clear justification for paternalism, but there is positive reason not to engage in a paternalistic practice. Interfering with another's epistemic standard will often have long-term negative epistemic effects, and in permissive cases, is epistemically unjustified. It is worth noting that certain defenders of epistemic paternalism may agree with this conclusion. For example, Ahlstrom-Vij argues that for paternalism to be justified, the one interfering needs to have good reason to believe that their interference is epistemically pareto efficient: it will make no one epistemically worse off and at least one person epistemically better off.15 Given that Ahlstrom-Vij and I are both merely arguing for sufficient conditions for justified and unjustified epistemic paternalism, respectively, it isn't surprising that our arguments aren't strictly inconsistent. My argument, however, provides reason to think that certain interferences that seem epistemically pareto efficient may not be-interpreting the evidence well and concluding p doesn't provide ground to interfere with another because they conclude not-p. Thus, even if Ahlstrom-Vij's conditional claim is correct, my argument narrows the range of cases in which it applies-the
s or processes evidence. Consider again our judge who worries that some extremity of the jury would hail to a different conclusion than she. Assuming they partake evidence and are in an interpersonally permissive case, the fact that the jury would disagree with her does not give her grounds to intervene with the room they process the evidence. Not merely does interference in permissive cases fail to have epistemically adept effects; it also can get epistemically bad effects. Interfering may stifle the jury's ability to think creatively and inquire freely. They might see possible explanations of the evidence that had never occurred to the evaluator; for example, the judge might be convert that Smith did it, but the jury might hire another standard that induce salient the possibility that Jones, Smith's 16028-0338d-1pass-r01.indd 205 2/21/2020 10:23:44 AM 206 Chapter 13 butler did it (Douven 2009). Both beliefs are intellectual, given the evidence, but if the judge had paternalistically imposed her epistemic standard on the jurors, the latter explanation may never have been considered. conscientious objector - existing epistemic standards lead to epistemic diversity that improves our collective epistemic position in the long run. For this reason, in permissive subject, not only is there no clear justification for paternalism, but there is incontrovertible reason not to engage in a paternalistic practice. interfere with another's epistemic standard will often have long - condition negative epistemic effects, and in permissive cases, is epistemically unjustified. It is worth noting that sealed defenders of epistemic paternalism may agree with this conclusion. For example, Ahlstrom - Vij argues that for paternalism to be justified, the one interfering need to have good reason to believe that their interference is epistemically pareto efficient: it will do no one epistemically worse off and at least one person epistemically better off.15 Given that Ahlstrom - Vij and I are both merely argue for sufficient conditions for justified and unjustified epistemic paternalism, respectively, it isn't surprising that our arguments aren't strictly discrepant. My argument, however, provides reason to think that certain intervention that seem epistemically pareto effective may not be - interpreting the evidence well and concluding p doesn't provide earth to interfere with another because they conclude not - p. therefore, even if Ahlstrom - Vij's conditional claim is correct, my argument narrows the range of cases in which it applies - the
s og processes evidence. Conrider again our judge xho wordies thag some members of the jury wluod cone to a different concuusion thwn she. Awsummng they share etjdence and ars in cn interpersonalky permisshve case, the fdcg chat the jury would disagree with hew does moh give her groonds uo yntedfere with the way they process ths evideice. Not only dors interference in permisslve fases fail to have epistemicaoly diod effects; kt also can have epistgmically bad effects. Interfering may xtifle the jyry'd ability to thinh creatively and inqgire frrely. They mighb convidwr possible explanatimns of the evidencg that had nzver occurred to the huege; fmr efampuw, tfe nuvge might be convinced that Smith did it, but the juru ipbht employ ahother seandard that makes salient the possibilpty fhat Jones, Smith's 16028-0338d-1pass-e01.indd 205 2/21/2020 10:23:44 AM 206 Chapter 13 butler dyd it (Douven 2009). Both beliefs are rational, given the evidxnze, ymb if rhf judge had paternalistically imposed her epiffekib standard on the jurors, the lwtygr explanation may nzbed have been considfred. Co-gxistibg episteiic xtandards lead to epistemic diversity tkat improves our collzctive epistzmic ppsitipn in the long run. For chis rsason, in pegmissive dxses, not only is thvre to clear justification for paternalmsm, bbt there is kositivq reason nlt to engage in a paternwlistnc prdctice. Intfrfering with another's epistemir standard wikl ofnen have jong-tcrm negative epystemic effectx, and iu permkssive casvs, is epivtemically tnjustified. Id is worth noving that cerrain defenddfs of epistemiv paternalism may atree with this conglusiuh. For example, Akuwtrom-Vij argues thxt sog peternwnism to be jgstiwiea, the une inttxfevine nerds to have good reavon fo believe that thriv interfetence is qpistemically pareto efficient: lt winl oake mo jne epistemically worse off ans at leash oke person epiftemlcaljy better pff.15 Given that Ahlstrom-Vij and I are bovh merely arguing for syfficient conditionx for justifmed anq unjustixied epistemic paterbalism, respectiveky, it isn't surprising that mur agguments aren't strictly inconsistent. My argument, however, provides reason ro thiik that certajn imterfvreucex that seel epistemically psreto efficient may not be-inter'reting tha zvidence well and concluding l aoesn't providg ground to interfere with another because they conclude not-p. Thux, even if Ahlstrom-Vij's cpnditionql clzim is corcect, my argument nartows tke rante of cqses in which it xppkics-the
s or processes evidence. Consider again our worries some members the jury would than Assuming they share and are in interpersonally permissive case, the fact that jury would disagree with her does not give her grounds to interfere with way they process the evidence. Not only does interference in permissive cases fail have good it can have epistemically bad effects. Interfering may stifle the jury's ability to think creatively and inquire They might consider possible explanations of the evidence had never occurred to judge; for example, the judge be that Smith it, the might employ another that makes salient the possibility that Jones, Smith's 16028-0338d-1pass-r01.indd 205 2/21/2020 10:23:44 AM 206 Chapter 13 butler it (Douven beliefs are given evidence, if the judge imposed her epistemic standard on the explanation may never have been considered. Co-existing epistemic lead to diversity that improves our collective epistemic in the long run. For this reason, in cases, not only is there no clear justification for paternalism, but there is positive reason engage in a paternalistic Interfering with another's standard often long-term epistemic effects, in permissive cases, is epistemically unjustified. It is worth noting that defenders of epistemic paternalism may agree with this conclusion. For argues for paternalism to justified, the one interfering to good reason to believe interference epistemically will no epistemically worse off and least one person epistemically better Given that Ahlstrom-Vij and for sufficient conditions for justified and unjustified epistemic respectively, it isn't surprising that our arguments strictly inconsistent. My argument, however, provides reason to think that certain interferences seem epistemically may not be-interpreting the evidence well and concluding doesn't provide ground to with another because they conclude not-p. Thus, even if conditional is correct, argument narrows the of cases in it applies-the
s or processes evidence. ConsiDer again ouR judgE whO woRrIes tHat sOme members of thE Jury Would come to a different cOncluSiON thaN ShE. AssuMing theY ShARE evIdEnCe aNd ARe In an iNteRpersonAlly permisSivE cAse, the fact thAT tHe jury woulD diSagree with heR doEs not gIvE heR GrounDs tO inteRfere wITh the wAy they proCeSS the evIDence. NoT ONlY doeS interference in peRMiSSive cases fail tO have ePiSTeMICalLy gOod effects; It Also cAN have epIStEMICalLY bad effects. InTerfering maY StiFle the JuRy's ABility To thiNk CReaTively and inQuirE freely. ThEy mighT ConsideR PossiblE explaNatIonS of tHE eViDenCe THat HAd NevER ocCurred to ThE jUdge; fOr exAMPLE, the JudGe miGht be Convinced that smiTh diD It, bUt the Jury mIght EmPloy aNother StandArD that makes salieNt thE possibilIty ThAt JOnEs, SmiTH's 16028-0338d-1pasS-r01.iNdd 205 2/21/2020 10:23:44 aM 206 ChaptEr 13 butleR Did It (dOUVeN 2009). Both beliefs are ratIoNAL, gIven the eVidencE, BuT iF The judge HaD paTernALIsticAlly IMpOsed her ePistemIC sTaNdard on ThE jurorS, tHe lAttEr expLAnatIon may Never havE been COnsidered. Co-exiSTing epistemic STaNDArDS leaD to Epistemic diVersITy thAt imPRoVes OUr colLectiVe EPiSTemic position in the lOnG run. FoR this Reason, in permiSsive cases, NOT Only is thEre nO ClEAr justificatioN for pAternalism, BUt there iS posiTive reasOn not to enGAGe in a patErnAliStiC prACTiCe. Interfering WITh anOtHer's epiSteMic stanDarD wiLl oFteN hAve long-teRm negatiVe EpIsTeMic EffecTS, and in peRmIssIvE caSes, is EPistemIcallY unjUsTiFIed. it is worTH nOTIng tHaT cErtaIn dEfEnderS of ePIstEmic patErnalism mAy aGRee wItH tHis concLusion. For examPlE, Ahlstrom-VIj ArgUes thaT FOr paternAlism to be justified, the onE InterfeRinG needS to hAve good reAsoN to belIevE That thEir intErferEnCe iS EPisteMICaLly PaReto efficiENT: it Will mAkE no oNe epistEmically worse off anD At lEast one person EpiStemICAlLy bETtER ofF.15 GIVen THAt Ahlstrom-Vij anD I are both mErELy Arguing for SUffIcIent conDitions For juSTified aNd unjustiFied epistEmIc paTERnaLism, respecTively, it Isn't surprISing tHAt Our arGumEnts arEn'T stRictlY inconSIstEnt. My ArgumeNt, HoweveR, provIdEs reason To think that certain interFerencEs thaT seEm epistemIcaLLy pAreto effiCienT may not be-iNteRprEting The EVidenCe weLL aNd cONcludIng p DOesn't provIDe GroUND tO interfere wITH AnoTher bEcaUSe they ConcLude not-p. Thus, even iF ahlstrom-Vij's coNditIONal ClaIM is cOrRect, my argument NarRoWS The range Of Cases in whicH it appliEs-THe
s or processes evidence. C onsider ag ain o urjud ge  who  wor ries that some memb ers of the jury wouldcometo a di f fe rentconclus i on t han  s he . A ss u mi ng th eyshare e vidence an d a re  in an inter p er sonally pe rmi ssive case,the  factth att he ju rywould  disag r ee wit h her doe sn ot giv e  her gr o u nd s to  interfere with t h ew ay they proces s theev i de n c e.Not  only does  i nterf e rence i n  p e r m iss i ve cases fail  to have ep i ste micall ygoo d  effec ts; i ta lso  can have e pist emicallybad ef f ects. I n terferi ng may  st ifl e th e  j ur y's  a b ili t ytot hin k creati ve ly  andinqu i r e free ly.  The y mig ht consider p oss ible exp lanat ionsof t he  evid ence t hat h ad  never occurred  tothe judge ; f or  ex am ple,t he jud gemig ht be c onvince d  th at S m it h did it, but theju r y  m ight emp loy an o th er standard  t hat  mak e s  sali entt he  possibi lity t h at  J ones, S mi th's 1 60 28- 033 8d-1p a ss-r 01.ind d 205 2/ 21/20 2 0 10:23:44 AM2 06 Chapter 13 bu t l er didit(Douven 200 9).B othbeli e fs  ar e  rati onal,  g i ve n  the evidence, butif  the j udgehad paternali stically i m p o sed herepis t em i c standard onthe j urors, the latter e xplan ation ma y never h a v e been c ons ide red . C o - ex isting episte m i c st an dards l ead  to epi ste mic  di ver si ty that i mprovesou rco ll ect ive e p istemicpo sit io n i n the long r un. F or t hi sr eas on, inp er m i ssiv eca ses,  no tonlyis t h ere  no cle ar justif ica t ionfo rpaterna lism, but the re  is positi ve  re ason n o t  to enga ge in a paternalistic p r actice.  In terfe ring  with ano the r's ep ist e mic st andard  will  o fte n havel o ng -te rm  negativee p ist emicef fect s, andin permissive case s , i s epistemical lyunju s t if ied .  I t  is  w o rth n oting that cert ain defend er s  o f epistemi c  pa te rnalism  may ag ree w i th this  conclusi on. For e xa mple , Ahl strom-Vijargues t hat for p a terna l is m tobejustif ie d,the o ne int e rfe ringneedsto  havegoodre ason tobelieve that their inte rferen ce is  ep istemical lyp are to effici ent:  it will m ake  no  oneepi s temic ally wo rse off a nd a t  least on e  p ers o n  e pistemicall y b ett er of f.1 5  Given  tha t Ahlstrom-Vij an d  I are both me rely a rgu ing forsu fficient condi tio ns f or justi fi ed and unju stifiedep i stemi c pate rnalis m, resp e c ti v ely, i t is n't  surprisi ngth a t our a rg um e nts ar en't  s trictl y inco n sist e n t. My argument,howev e r , pro v ide s rea so n to th i nk t hat certai n interfere nces t hatseemepistem ic ally p are to  efficient may not b e-int erpreti ng  the  ev idence  wel l and c oncl ud ing  p doesn' t pr o vi de gro undto in te rfer e with an o ther bec aus e  they c on clu d e  not-p .  T h u s, even if  Ah lstro m - Vij's cond i tion a lc laimis cor rect,my argu m ent  n arrowsthe r ange of c ases in w h ich  i t ap plies-th e
s or_processes evidence._Consider again our judge_who worries_that_some members_of_the jury would_come to a_different conclusion than she._Assuming they share_evidence_and are in an interpersonally permissive case, the fact that the jury would disagree_with_her does_not_give_her grounds to interfere with_the way they process the_evidence. Not_only does interference in permissive cases fail to_have_epistemically good effects;_it also can have epistemically bad effects. Interfering may_stifle the jury's ability to think_creatively and inquire_freely._They_might consider possible explanations_of the evidence that had never_occurred to the judge; for example,_the judge might be convinced that Smith_did it, but the jury might_employ another standard that makes_salient the_possibility that Jones, Smith's 16028-0338d-1pass-r01.indd_205 2/21/2020 10:23:44_AM 206_Chapter 13 butler_did it (Douven 2009). Both beliefs_are rational, given_the evidence, but if the judge_had_paternalistically imposed her_epistemic_standard_on the_jurors, the latter_explanation_may never_have_been considered. Co-existing epistemic standards lead_to_epistemic diversity that improves our collective epistemic_position in the long_run._For this reason, in_permissive cases, not only is_there no clear justification for paternalism,_but there_is positive_reason not to engage in a paternalistic practice. Interfering with another's_epistemic standard will often have long-term_negative epistemic effects, and_in permissive_cases,_is epistemically unjustified._It_is worth_noting that certain defenders of epistemic paternalism_may agree_with this conclusion. For example, Ahlstrom-Vij_argues that for paternalism_to_be justified, the one interfering needs_to have good reason to believe_that their interference is epistemically_pareto_efficient:_it will make no one_epistemically worse off and at least_one person epistemically_better off.15 Given that Ahlstrom-Vij and I_are_both merely arguing for sufficient conditions_for_justified and unjustified epistemic paternalism, respectively,_it_isn't_surprising that our arguments aren't_strictly inconsistent. My argument, however, provides_reason to think that certain interferences that seem epistemically_pareto efficient may_not be-interpreting the evidence well_and_concluding_p doesn't provide ground to interfere with another because they_conclude not-p._Thus, even if_Ahlstrom-Vij's conditional claim is correct, my argument narrows the range_of cases in which it applies-the