	are	unproblematic.	We	can	readily	concede	that	God,	if He	exists,	would	have	the	power	to	intentionally	cause	the	creation	of	signs	that convey	his	commands.	The	crucial	condition	is	the	third.	It	is	this	one	that allegedly	causes	problems	for	the	epistemological	objection.	For	when	you	look at	it,	this	condition	is	claiming	that	access	to	God's	commands	does	not 13 specifically	require	knowledge	of	the	source	of	the	command.	It	only	requires knowledge	of	what	is	being	commanded.	This	creates	a	problem	for	the epistemological	objection	because	when	you	factor	in	the	different	possible forms	of	divine	communication	(i.e.	the	different	possible	'signs')	then	you	can imagine	cases	in	which	the	reasonable	non-believer	knows	what	is	morally required	of	them	thanks	to	a	divinely	communicated	sign,	even	though	they	lack knowledge	of	the	sign's	origins.	Peoples	illustrates	the	idea: "Consider	for	example	the	possibility	that	God	conveys	the	"sign"	to	people regarding	some	act	(let's	pick	murder)	via	a	proper	function	of	the	human conscience.	Nobody	needs	to	know	what	conscience	is,	how	we	got	one,	or	that	God uses	it	to	ensure	that	we	have	some	true	beliefs	in	order	for	them	to	know,	via conscience,	that	murder	is	wrong..." (Peoples	2011) In	short,	reasonable	non-believers	can	know	the	content	of	moral	commands without	knowing	their	source. There	are	at	least	two	
are 	 unproblematic. 	 We 	 can 	 readily 	 concede 	 that 	 God, 	 if He 	 exists, 	 would 	 have 	 the 	 exponent 	 to 	 intentionally 	 induce 	 the 	 creation 	 of 	 signs 	 that bring 	 his 	 command. 	 The 	 crucial 	 condition 	 is 	 the 	 third. 	 It 	 is 	 this 	 one 	 that allegedly 	 induce 	 problem 	 for 	 the 	 epistemological 	 objection. 	 For 	 when 	 you 	 look at 	 it, 	 this 	 condition 	 is 	 claim 	 that 	 access 	 to 	 God's 	 commands 	 does 	 not 13 specifically 	 ask 	 cognition 	 of 	 the 	 source 	 of 	 the 	 command. 	 It 	 merely 	 requires knowledge 	 of 	 what 	 is 	 being 	 command. 	 This 	 creates 	 a 	 problem 	 for 	 the epistemological 	 protest 	 because 	 when 	 you 	 factor 	 in 	 the 	 different 	 possible forms 	 of 	 providential 	 communication 	 (i.e. 	 the 	 different 	 potential 	' signs') 	 then 	 you 	 can imagine 	 cases 	 in 	 which 	 the 	 reasonable 	 non - believer 	 know 	 what 	 is 	 morally required 	 of 	 them 	 thanks 	 to 	 a 	 divinely 	 communicated 	 sign, 	 even 	 though 	 they 	 lack knowledge 	 of 	 the 	 polarity's 	 origin. 	 Peoples 	 illustrates 	 the 	 idea: " Consider 	 for 	 example 	 the 	 possibility 	 that 	 God 	 bring 	 the 	 " signal " 	 to 	 people regarding 	 some 	 act 	 (lease's 	 pick 	 murder) 	 via 	 a 	 proper 	 function 	 of 	 the 	 human conscience. 	 Nobody 	 needs 	 to 	 know 	 what 	 conscience 	 is, 	 how 	 we 	 get 	 one, 	 or 	 that 	 God uses 	 it 	 to 	 ensure 	 that 	 we 	 have 	 some 	 genuine 	 beliefs 	 in 	 order 	 for 	 them 	 to 	 know, 	 via conscience, 	 that 	 murder 	 is 	 wrong... " (Peoples 	 2011) In 	 short, 	 reasonable 	 non - believers 	 can 	 know 	 the 	 content 	 of 	 moral 	 commands without 	 know 	 their 	 reference. There 	 are 	 at 	 least 	 two
	are	knproblematic.	We	can	readiln	concede	that	God,	iy He	exivts,	woumd	have	thd	power	to	intentionally	cause	thx	creqtion	if	signs	that convey	his	cummands.	Thv	crucial	cindiuion	is	the	third.	It	is	this	one	bkat ampegeblb	causes	problems	nor	the	epistamological	objewtkou.	For	when	you	look at	it,	this	condition	is	cjaiming	yhwt	access	to	God's	sommsgds	dkvs	kot 13 specifically	require	knowledgs	of	the	smurce	of	the	comkand.	It	only	requires knowledhe	of	ahat	is	being	commandfd.	This	creatga	a	pwiblem	for	the dpistemological	objectikn	because	when	you	factor	in	the	diffdrent	'ossible fotma	ov	givine	commuiicatijn	(i.e.	the	diffevvnt	posshble	'sigms')	then	you	can ikagmne	cqses	in	which	the	reasonaule	non-believer	knows	wrat	is	moranlv required	of	them	thankw	ti	a	divhnelf	comoynizattd	smgn,	sven	thlugi	they	lack khowledge	of	tye	sign's	origins.	Peoplts	ijoustrates	the	isea: "Cogsyder	for	example	the	possibility	that	God	convtys	ths	"sign"	to	people regarding	wome	act	(let's	pick	murder)	gia	a	propew	function	of	the	human conscience.	Nobody	needs	to	know	whdt	conazieugc	is,	huq	wf	got	one,	or	that	God uses	it	to	ensure	that	we	have	some	edut	bekiefs	in	order	fov	them	to	know,	via conxclemse,	that	murder	ir	wrong..." (Pekples	2011) In	short,	reasojable	nog-beliwvers	can	kgow	tne	content	of	moral	commands wirhout	knowing	nheie	source. There	are	at	peast	two	
are unproblematic. We can readily concede that He would have power to intentionally that his commands. The condition is the It is this one that allegedly problems for the epistemological objection. For when you look at it, this condition claiming that access to God's commands does not 13 specifically require knowledge of source the It requires knowledge of what is being commanded. This creates a problem for the epistemological objection because you factor in the different possible forms of communication (i.e. the different 'signs') then you can imagine in the reasonable knows is required of them to a divinely communicated sign, even though they lack knowledge of the sign's origins. Peoples illustrates the "Consider for possibility that conveys "sign" people regarding some pick murder) via a proper function conscience. Nobody needs to know what conscience is, we got or that God uses it to that we have some true beliefs in order them to know, via conscience, that murder is wrong..." (Peoples 2011) In short, reasonable non-believers the content of moral without knowing their There at two
	are	unproblematic.	We	can	readIly	concede	That	GOd,	iF He	ExIsts,	WoulD	have	the	power	tO	InteNtionally	cause	the	creatIon	of	SiGNs	thAT cOnvey	His	commANdS.	tHe	cRuCiAl	cOnDItIon	is	The	Third.	It	Is	this	one	tHat AlLegedly	causeS	PrOblems	for	tHe	ePistemologicAl	oBjectiOn.	for	WHen	yoU	loOk at	iT,	this	cONditioN	is	claimiNg	THat	accESs	to	God'S	COmMandS	does	not 13 specificaLLy	REquire	knowledgE	of	the	SoURcE	OF	thE	coMmand.	It	onlY	rEquirES knowleDGe	OF	WHat	IS	being	commandEd.	This	creatES	a	pRoblem	FoR	thE EpisteMologIcAL	obJection	becaUse	wHen	you	facTor	in	tHE	differENt	possiBle forMs	oF	diVine	COmMuNicAtIOn	(i.E.	ThE	diFFerEnt	possiBlE	'sIgns')	tHen	yOU	CAN imaGinE	casEs	in	wHich	the	reasonAblE	non-BEliEver	kNows	wHat	iS	mOrallY requiRed	of	ThEm	thanks	to	a	diviNely	CommunicaTed	SiGn,	eVeN	thouGH	they	lAck KnoWledge	oF	the	sigN'S	orIgINS.	peOples	illustrates	thE	iDEA: "COnsider	fOr	examPLe	ThE	PossibilItY	thAt	GoD	COnveyS	the	"SIgN"	to	peoplE regarDInG	sOme	act	(lEt'S	pick	mUrDer)	Via	A	propER	funCtion	oF	the	humaN consCIence.	Nobody	neeDS	to	know	what	coNScIENcE	Is,	hoW	we	Got	one,	or	thaT	God USes	iT	to	eNSuRe	tHAt	we	hAve	soMe	TRuE	Beliefs	in	order	for	thEm	To	know,	Via coNscience,	that	mUrder	is	wroNG..." (pEoples	2011) In	ShorT,	ReASonable	non-beliEvers	Can	know	the	COntent	of	Moral	Commands Without	knOWIng	their	SouRce. theRe	aRE	At	Least	two	
	are	unproblematic.	We	can 	readily	c onced e	t hat 	G od,if H e	exists,	woul d 	hav e	the	power	to	intenti onall yc ause th e	cre ation	o f 	s i g nsth at  co nv e yhis	c omm ands.	T he	crucial 	co nd ition	is	the th ird.	It	is 	th is	one	thatall egedly 	c aus e s	pro ble ms	fo r	thee pistem ologicalob j ection . 	For	wh e n 	y ou	l ook at	it,	this	c o nd i tion	is	claimi ng	tha ta cc e s s	t o	G od's	comma nd s	doe s 	not 13 sp e c i fic a lly	require	k nowledge	of the 	sourc eoft he	com mand. 	I t 	on ly	requires  kno wledge	of 	whati s	being command ed.	Th iscre ates apr obl em for th e e p ist emologic al 	o bject ionb e c a usewhe n	yo u	fac tor	in	the	di ffe rent pos sible  form s	of 	d ivine 	commu nicat io n	(i.e.	the	dif fere nt	possib le's ign s' )	the n 	you	c anima gine	ca ses	inw hic ht h e 	r easonable	non-beli ev e r 	k nows	wha t	is	m o ra ll y  require dofthem t hanks 	toa 	d ivinelycommun i ca te d	sign, 	e ven	th ou ghthe y	lac k  kno wledge 	of	thesign' s 	origins.	Peop l es	illustrate s 	t h e 	i d ea:"Co nsider	forexam p le	t he	p o ss ibi l ity	t hat	G od co n veys	the	"sign"	tope ople r egard ing	some	act(let's	pic k m urder)	v ia	a pr o per	function	o f	the 	human con s cience.Nobod y	needsto	know	w h a t	consci enc e	i s,how w egot	one,	or	t h a t	Go duses	it 	to 	ensure 	th atwehav esome	true 	beliefs 	i nor de r	f or	th e m	to	kno w, 	vi acon scien c e,	tha t	mur deris 	w r ong ..." (P e op l e s	20 11 )In	s hor t, 	reas onab l e	n on-beli evers	can 	kn o w	th eco ntent	o f	moral	comma nd s withoutkn owi ng	the i r 	source.  There	are	at	least	two 
	are	unproblematic.	We	can	readily	concede	that	God,	if He	exists,	would	have	the	power	to	intentionally	cause	the	creation	of	signs	that_convey	his	commands.	The	crucial	condition	is	the	third.	It	is	this	one	that allegedly	causes	problems	for	the	epistemological	objection.	For	when	you	look_at	it,	this	condition	is	claiming	that	access	to	God's	commands	does	not 13 specifically	require	knowledge	of	the	source	of	the	command.	It	only	requires knowledge	of	what	is	being	commanded.	This	creates	a	problem	for	the_epistemological	objection	because	when	you	factor	in	the	different	possible forms	of	divine	communication	(i.e.	the	different	possible	'signs')	then	you	can_imagine	cases	in	which	the	reasonable	non-believer	knows	what	is	morally_required	of	them	thanks	to	a	divinely	communicated	sign,	even	though	they	lack knowledge	of	the	sign's	origins.	Peoples	illustrates	the	idea:_"Consider	for	example	the	possibility	that	God	conveys	the	"sign"	to	people_regarding	some	act	(let's	pick	murder)	via	a	proper	function	of	the	human conscience.	Nobody	needs	to	know	what	conscience	is,	how	we	got	one,	or	that	God uses	it	to	ensure	that	we	have	some	true	beliefs	in	order	for	them	to	know,	via_conscience,	that	murder	is	wrong..." (Peoples	2011) In	short,	reasonable	non-believers	can	know	the	content	of	moral	commands_without	knowing	their	source. There	are	at	least	two	