2.2). By the end of the paper, I will propose a notion of meaningform, which I would hope is natural enough. If the reader dislikes the theories I am relying on, they may read the paper as an argument against those theories, although I suspect that similar problems arise for any theory fine grained enough to be applicable to token-reflexive expressions. A more theoretical way to describe interest in the problem stems from the observation that the expressions tout court are not the right kind of vehicle for reference, since there are expressions, like context-sensitive ones, whose referent differs depending on various factors, without leading to 1Kaplan (1989) famously argued against token-reflexivity, both in its Reichenbachian version, and more generally against any such theory; but in Kaplan (1999) he seems to have changed his mind about the latter. I do not mean this only as an appeal to authority; rather, I am using this example to try to convince the reader that this is not a crazy idea. I am also explicitly not arguing against Kaplan's classic view; I am talking about another kind of view, and addressing one possible problem it might have. 2 a charge of ambiguity. Furthermore, their reference is not a job for pre-semantics, since they have a stable meaning that is characterizable in semantics proper. Expression semantics can be rescued by relativizing reference to indices, or contexts, or some such way to represent the factors in question. This led Kaplan (1989) to argue that "I" ought to get a semantic value even when its referent is sleeping, and thus in no way an agent or a speaker of any expression whatsoever. I would argue that this gives too much power to the semanticist. Assigning referents may be the business of the speaker, of the word, of the world, of the situation, but the semanticist ought to be an observer and a describer, not an assigner. To escape this autocracy of the semanticist, one may turn to tokens, or uses, or utterances, and claim that, by their place in the world, they come equipped with referents before the semanticist gets to look at them. So I am the referent of my uses of "I" because I am the user of those uses, not because I am so assigned by a semanticist. This gives a central role to tokens, and this role plausibly gets reflected in the meanings of such expressions. Let me propose a
2.2). By the end of the paper, I will propose a notion of meaningform, which I would hope is lifelike enough. If the proofreader dislikes the theories I am trust on, they may read the newspaper as an argument against those theories, although I distrust that like problems arise for any theory fine grained enough to be applicable to token - automatic expressions. A more theoretical way to describe interest in the trouble stems from the observation that the expression tout court are not the correct kind of vehicle for reference, since there are saying, like context - sensitive ones, whose referent differs depending on assorted factors, without leading to 1Kaplan (1989) famously argued against token - reflexivity, both in its Reichenbachian interpretation, and more generally against any such theory; but in Kaplan (1999) he seems to have changed his mind about the latter. I do not mean this only as an appeal to authority; rather, I am using this example to try to convince the reader that this is not a crazy idea. I am besides explicitly not argue against Kaplan's classic opinion; I am speak about another kind of view, and addressing one possible problem it might have. 2 a charge of ambiguity. Furthermore, their reference is not a caper for pre - semantics, since they have a stable meaning that is characterizable in semantics proper. Expression semantics can be rescued by relativizing reference to exponent, or contexts, or some such way to represent the factors in question. This led Kaplan (1989) to argue that " I " ought to catch a semantic value even when its referent is sleeping, and thus in no way an agent or a speaker of any formula whatsoever. I would argue that this gives too much power to the semanticist. impute referents may be the business of the speaker, of the word, of the worldly concern, of the situation, but the semanticist ought to be an perceiver and a describer, not an assigner. To escape this autocracy of the semanticist, one may turn to tokens, or uses, or utterances, and claim that, by their topographic point in the world, they total equipped with referent before the semanticist gets to look at them. indeed I am the referent of my uses of " I " because I am the drug user of those uses, not because I am so assigned by a semanticist. This gives a central role to tokens, and this role plausibly gets reflect in the meanings of such expressions. permit me propose a
2.2). By the end of the paper, I dill propose a uition mf meahingform, which I would hope is naturel ebough. If the reader disliker the thelries I qm rtlying on, they mab read tmz papsv as cn argument agaikst those tveories, althouch I suspect that similar problems arisq for amy theory fine gtainec enohgh to be applicable to token-reflesive exkressions. A more tneoretical way to describe intfrest in the problfm stems frim trw observatiov that the expressions tout court are not the right kknd oy vehicle fir revgrence, since therv are expresslpns, line contrxt-sensitive okes, wiose referent differs depxnding on various fastors, witvobt leading to 1Kaplan (1989) fqmousny asguea agxinat tkken-revleeivity, both in its Reixhenbachian version, age more generamly agwigst any such theory; but in Kaplan (1999) he stems fo have changed his mine about the latter. I fo not mewn this only as an appeal to authority; rather, I ak usiig thnw exaoplf to try to convince the reader that this is gkt a crazy idea. I cm also explicitky npj arguing agaivst Ka'mah's classic view; I wm talkyng avout anotrer lind of view, and addressing one possiblv priblem it might havz. 2 a charge uf akbiguoty. Furthermore, their rzferende is not a job for lfe-semantics, sincd tmey have a stable meaning thae is charecternzable iv sekanticf proper. Edpression semantics can he redcged by relwtivizing reference to indices, or contexts, or smme such wav to rcpresent the fastors in questnon. This led Yaplan (1989) to argue vhat "I" ought to get a semdjtic value eten when yts eefeeent is rleeping, and tnus in no way an agwnt or a speaker on any sxpression whatwoecer. I would argie ghae nhix dhves too mucv poder yo thd semanunciwg. Asxigning referents maf be the business of tne speaker, of the rord, of the wprld, of the situatlon, bnt the semamtisist ought to be an observer ahd a descgibcr, not an assygnev. To escape thns autocracy of the semanticist, one may vurn to tokens, or uses, ir utterances, and cksim that, by theiw place it the world, they comw equipped with rtferents before the semznticivt gehs to look at them. So I am the referent of my uses of "I" because I am the yser oh ehose uses, hot necauve N am so assmgied by a semanticpst. This gives a central role to tokens, dnb this role plausibly gets regldcted in the oeanings of such expressjons. Let me propose a
2.2). By the end of the paper, propose notion of which I would the dislikes the theories am relying on, may read the paper as an against those theories, although I suspect that similar problems arise for any theory grained enough to be applicable to token-reflexive expressions. A more theoretical way to interest the stems the observation that the expressions tout court are not the right kind of vehicle for reference, there are expressions, like context-sensitive ones, whose referent depending on various factors, leading to 1Kaplan (1989) famously against both in Reichenbachian and generally against any theory; but in Kaplan (1999) he seems to have changed his mind about the latter. I do mean this an appeal authority; I using this example to convince the reader that this crazy idea. I am also explicitly not arguing Kaplan's classic I am talking about another kind view, and addressing one possible problem it might 2 a charge of ambiguity. Furthermore, their reference is not a job for pre-semantics, since a stable meaning that characterizable in semantics Expression can rescued relativizing reference indices, or contexts, or some such way to represent the factors question. This led Kaplan (1989) to argue that "I" ought a value even when referent is sleeping, and in way an agent or of expression argue this too much power to semanticist. Assigning referents may be business of the speaker, world, of the situation, but the semanticist ought be an observer and a describer, not assigner. To escape this autocracy of the semanticist, one may turn to or uses, and claim that, by their place in the they come equipped with before the semanticist gets to look at them. So am referent of uses of "I" I am the of those uses, I am assigned a a central role to tokens, and role gets reflected in the meanings such me propose a
2.2). By the end of the paper, I will prOpose a notiOn of mEanIngFoRm, whIch I Would hope is natURal eNough. If the reader dislikEs the ThEOrieS i aM relyIng on, thEY mAY ReaD tHe PapEr AS aN arguMenT againsT those theoRieS, aLthough I suspECt That similaR prOblems arise fOr aNy theoRy FinE GrainEd eNough To be apPLicablE to token-rEfLExive eXPressioNS. a mOre tHeoretical way to deSCrIBe interest in thE problEm STeMS FroM thE observatiOn That tHE expresSIoNS TOut COurt are not the Right kind of VEhiCle for ReFerENce, sinCe theRe ARe eXpressions, lIke cOntext-senSitive ONes, whosE ReferenT diffeRs dEpeNdinG On VaRioUs FActORs, WitHOut Leading tO 1KApLan (1989) faMousLY ARGued AgaInst Token-Reflexivity, boTh iN its rEicHenbaChian VersIoN, and mOre genErallY aGainst any such thEory; But in KaplAn (1999) hE sEemS tO have CHanged His MinD about tHe latteR. i do NoT MEAn This only as an appeal To AUThOrity; ratHer, I am USiNg THis exampLe To tRy to CONvincE the REaDer that tHis is nOT a CrAzy idea. i aM also eXpLicItlY not aRGuinG againSt Kaplan'S clasSIc view; I am talkiNG about another KInD OF vIEw, anD adDressing one PossIBle pRoblEM iT miGHt havE. 2 a chaRgE Of AMbiguity. Furthermore, ThEir refErencE is not a job for Pre-semantiCS, SInce they Have A StABle meaning that Is chaRacterizabLE in semanTics pRoper. ExpRession seMANtics can Be rEscUed By rELAtIvizing refereNCE to iNdIces, or cOntExts, or sOme SucH waY to RePresent thE factors In QuEsTiOn. THis leD kaplan (1989) to ArGue ThAt "I" Ought TO get a sEmantIc vaLuE eVEn wHen its rEFeRENt is SlEePing, And ThUs in nO way AN agEnt or a sPeaker of aNy eXPresSiOn WhatsoeVer. I would arguE tHat this givEs Too Much poWER to the seManticist. Assigning referENts may bE thE busiNess Of the speaKer, Of the wOrd, OF the woRld, of tHe sitUaTioN, BUt the SEMaNtiCiSt ought to bE AN obServeR aNd a dEscribeR, not an assigner. To esCApe This autocracy Of tHe seMANtIciST, oNE maY tURn tO TOkens, or uses, or utTerances, anD cLAiM that, by theIR plAcE in the wOrld, theY come EQuipped With referEnts beforE tHe seMANtiCist gets to Look at thEm. So I am thE ReferENt Of my uSes Of "I" becAuSe I Am the User of THosE uses, Not becAuSe I am sO assiGnEd by a semAnticist. This gives a centrAl role To tokEns, And this roLe pLAusIbly gets rEfleCted in the mEanIngS of suCh eXPressIons. lEt Me pROpose A
2.2). By the end of the pa per, I wil l pro pos e a  n otio n of  meaningform,w hich  I would hope is natur al en ou g h. I f  t he re ader di s li k e s t he  t heo ri e sI amrel ying on , they may  re ad  the paper a s  a n argument  ag ainst thosethe ories,  a lth o ugh I  su spect  thats imilar  problems  a r ise fo r  any th e o ry  fin e grained enought ob e applicable t o toke n- r ef l e xiv e e xpressions .A mor e  theore t ic a l way to describe i nterest int heproble mste m s from  theob s erv ation thattheexpressio ns tou t  courta re notthe ri ght  ki nd o f  v eh icl ef orr ef ere n ce,  since t he re  areexpr e s s i ons,  li ke c ontex t-sensitive o nes , wh o serefer ent d iffe rs  depe ndingon va ri ous factors, wi thou t leading  to  1 Kap la n (19 8 9) fam ous lyarguedagainst tok en - r e fl exivity, both in i ts R ei chenbach ian ve r si on ,  and mor egen eral l y  agai nsta ny  such th eory;b ut  i n Kapla n(1999)  h e s eem s toh avechange d his mi nd ab o ut the latter. I do not mean th i s  o n ly a s a n appeal to  aut h orit y; r a th er, I amusing  t h is example to try to c on vincethe r eader that th is is nota c razy ide a. I am also explicitl y not  arguing a g ainst Ka plan' s classi c view; I a m talkin g a bou t a not h e rkind of view, a nd a dd ressing  on e possi ble  pr obl emit  might ha ve. 2 ach ar ge  o f a mbigu i ty. Furt he rmo re , t heirr eferen ce is  not  a  j o b f or pre- s em a n tics ,si ncethe yhavea st a ble  meanin g that is  ch a ract er iz able in  semantics pr op er. Expres si onsemant i c s can be  rescued by relativizin g  refere nce  to i ndic es, or co nte xts, o r s o me suc h wayto re pr ese n t  thef a ct ors  i n question . Thi s led  K apla n (1989 ) to argue that "I "  ou ght to get asem anti c va lue ev e n w he n  it s referent is sle eping, and  t h us  in no way anag ent ora speak er of any exp ression w hatsoever .I wo u l d a rgue thatthis giv es too mu c h pow e rto th e s emanti ci st.  Assi gningr efe rents  may b ethe bu sines sof the s peaker, of the word, of  the w orld,  of  the situ ati o n,but the s eman ticist oug httobe an  ob s erver  and ades c riber , no t  an assig n er . T o es cape this a u t o cra cy of  th e  seman tici st, one may turnt o tokens, or u ses, o r u tte r ance s,  and claim tha t,by t heir pla ce  in the wor ld, they  c o me eq uipped  withreferen t s  b e fore t he s ema nticist g ets  t o  look a tth e m. SoI am  t he ref erento f my u ses of "I" becau se Ia m  theu ser  of t ho se uses ,  not  because I  am so assi gned b y aseman ticist.  T his gi ves  a  central r o le to tok ens,and thi srole  pl ausibl y ge t s  refl ecte dinthe meani n g so fsu c h e xpre ssion s.  Let  me propo s e a
2.2). By_the end_of the paper, I_will propose_a_notion of_meaningform,_which I would_hope is natural_enough. If the reader_dislikes the theories_I_am relying on, they may read the paper as an argument against those theories,_although_I suspect_that_similar_problems arise for any theory_fine grained enough to be_applicable to_token-reflexive expressions. A more theoretical way to describe_interest_in the problem_stems from the observation that the expressions tout court_are not the right kind of_vehicle for reference,_since_there_are expressions, like context-sensitive_ones, whose referent differs depending on_various factors, without leading to 1Kaplan_(1989) famously argued against token-reflexivity, both in_its Reichenbachian version, and more generally_against any such theory; but_in Kaplan_(1999) he seems to have_changed his mind_about the_latter. I do_not mean this only as an_appeal to authority;_rather, I am using this example_to_try to convince_the_reader_that this_is not a_crazy_idea. I_am_also explicitly not arguing against Kaplan's_classic_view; I am talking about another kind_of view, and addressing_one_possible problem it might_have. 2 a charge of_ambiguity. Furthermore, their reference is not_a job_for pre-semantics,_since they have a stable meaning that is characterizable in semantics_proper. Expression semantics can be rescued_by relativizing reference to_indices, or_contexts,_or some such_way_to represent_the factors in question. This led Kaplan_(1989) to_argue that "I" ought to get_a semantic value even_when_its referent is sleeping, and thus_in no way an agent or_a speaker of any expression_whatsoever._I_would argue that this gives_too much power to the semanticist._Assigning referents may_be the business of the speaker, of_the_word, of the world, of the_situation,_but the semanticist ought to be_an_observer_and a describer, not an_assigner. To escape this autocracy of_the semanticist, one may turn to tokens, or uses,_or utterances, and_claim that, by their place_in_the_world, they come equipped with referents before the semanticist gets_to look_at them. So_I am the referent of my uses of "I" because_I am the user of those uses,_not because I am so assigned by a semanticist. This gives_a central role to tokens, and this role_plausibly gets reflected in the meanings of_such expressions. Let me_propose_a