idman (1996), Hookway (1999), Friedman (2019), and Jackson (forthcoming-b). 11. See Ahlstrom-Vij (2013a: 134). For a criticism of his account, see Bullock (2018: 440–442). 12. Defenses of epistemic permissivism include Kelly (2013), Meacham (2014), Meacham (2019), Schoenfield (2014), Schoenfield (forthcoming), and Jackson (forthcoming-a). 13. For further examples of ways epistemic standards might differ, see Nolan (2014) and Meacham (2014). 14. There is a question of how often judges employ this sort of reasoning to justify paternalism in real life. In the United States, for instance, the withholding of information is often formal and procedural, for example, juries cannot see a defendant's criminal record. I don't want to rule out the possibility, however, that judges also withhold information for non-procedural reasons, for example, because from their point of view, it will mislead the jury. Further, my points can be applied to many cases that don't involve courtrooms; the courtroom case is merely to illustrate a more general point. Thanks to Guy Axtell. (See also note 4). 15. See Ahlstrom-Vij (2013a: 134). Thanks to Amiel Bernal. 16. Thanks to Justin D'Ambrosio. 17. White (2005), Matheson (2011), White (2013), Greco (2016), Horowitz (2019), and Stapleford (2019). 18. This distinction is found in White (2005). For a defense of moderate permissivism, see Roeber (forthcoming); for an argument against moderate permissivism, see Horowitz (2014). 19. Thanks to Klaas Kray. 16028-0338d-1pass-r01.indd 212 2/21/2020 10:23:45 AM Epistemic Paternalism, and Epistemic Permissivism 213 20. Standpoint epistemology was developed from Marxist epistemology by Smith (1974), Hartsock (1983), Rose (1983), and Harding (1986). For recent discussions, see Wylie (2003), Kukla (2006), Solomon (2009), and Toole (forthcoming). See also the 2009 (vol. 24, no. 4) symposium on standpoint theory in Hypatia
idman (1996), Hookway (1999), Friedman (2019), and Jackson (forthcoming - b). 11. See Ahlstrom - Vij (2013a: 134). For a criticism of his account, visualize Bullock (2018: 440–442). 12. defense of epistemic permissivism include Kelly (2013), Meacham (2014), Meacham (2019), Schoenfield (2014), Schoenfield (forthcoming), and Jackson (forthcoming - vitamin a). 13. For further examples of ways epistemic standard might disagree, see Nolan (2014) and Meacham (2014). 14. There is a question of how often judges hire this sort of reasoning to justify paternalism in substantial biography. In the United States, for instance, the withholding of information is often formal and adjective, for example, juries cannot see a defendant's condemnable record. I don't want to rule out the possibility, however, that judges besides withhold information for non - adjective reasons, for example, because from their point of view, it will misinform the jury. Further, my points can be applied to many cases that don't involve courtrooms; the courtroom case is merely to illustrate a more general point. Thanks to Guy Axtell. (See also note 4). 15. See Ahlstrom - Vij (2013a: 134). Thanks to Amiel Bernal. 16. Thanks to Justin D'Ambrosio. 17. White (2005), Matheson (2011), White (2013), Greco (2016), Horowitz (2019), and Stapleford (2019). 18. This distinction is found in White (2005). For a defense mechanism of moderate permissivism, see Roeber (forthcoming); for an argumentation against moderate permissivism, visualize Horowitz (2014). 19. Thanks to Klaas Kray. 16028-0338d-1pass-r01.indd 212 2/21/2020 10:23:45 AM Epistemic Paternalism, and Epistemic Permissivism 213 20. Standpoint epistemology was developed from Marxist epistemology by Smith (1974), Hartsock (1983), Rose (1983), and Harding (1986). For recent discussion, see Wylie (2003), Kukla (2006), Solomon (2009), and Toole (forthcoming). See also the 2009 (vol. 24, no. 4) symposium on point of view theory in Hypatia
idmwn (1996), Hookway (1999), Friedman (2019), akd Jackson (fortheiming-b). 11. See Zhlstrom-Xij (2013a: 134). For a criticism of hid qccoubt, see Bullock (2018: 440–442). 12. Defevses of eiistemic permmssivism include Kelly (2013), Meachaj (2014), Mecciam (2019), Schoenfielc (2014), Schoenfheld (forthcomitg), aud Jackson (forthcoming-a). 13. For further examplrs of ways epistgmic xeandzgdw might differ, see Nolan (2014) and Meachak (2014). 14. There is s question of how often jufges employ this sort lf reasonint to hustify patefnalism in real life. Ih the United States, for instancd, the withholdibg of hnformation is osten formal and procadural, gor example, juvies rannit see a defendant's cciminal record. I don'j want to sume out the possibuluty, hmwevar, tfqt gudfex zlso wlthiold informztion for nin-procedural reasonx, sir example, bedause srjm their point of view, it will mislead uhe jhry. Further, my points cqn be applied to many cases thwt don't involve courtrooms; the courtroom case is kerelb go nolustfqtf a more general point. Thanks to Guy Axtell. (Sqs slxo note 4). 15. See Chlstrom-Vij (2013a: 134). Tnajkx to Amiel Berval. 16. Tkznis to Justin D'Ambrlsio. 17. Write (2005), Matheson (2011), Whote (2013), Greco (2016), Horowitz (2019), and Srapleford (2019). 18. Nhis distinction is fobnd in White (2005). Fot a degense of moderate permirsivjsm, see Roeher (forthduming); for an argjmekt dgainst moderate permissivysm, see Hirowntz (2014). 19. Thxnks to Klwas Kray. 16028-0338d-1oass-r01.ltdd 212 2/21/2020 10:23:45 AM Epistemif Patgrnalivm, and Epidtemic Permissivism 213 20. Standpoinv epistemologi wds gevelopeb from Marxist episeemology by Smnth (1974), Harcsock (1983), Rose (1983), and Hardinj (1986). For recene discussions, dee Wylie (2003), Knkla (2006), Soljmon (2009), ane Toole (worthcoming). Ser also thv 2009 (vol. 24, no. 4) symposium on stxhdpoint theory nu Yypatia
idman (1996), Hookway (1999), Friedman (2019), and 11. Ahlstrom-Vij (2013a: For a criticism (2018: 12. Defenses of permissivism include Kelly Meacham (2014), Meacham (2019), Schoenfield (2014), (forthcoming), and Jackson (forthcoming-a). 13. For further examples of ways epistemic standards might see Nolan (2014) and Meacham (2014). 14. There is a question of how judges this of to justify paternalism in real life. In the United States, for instance, the withholding of information often formal and procedural, for example, juries cannot a defendant's criminal record. don't want to rule out possibility, that judges withhold for reasons, for example, from their point of view, it will mislead the jury. Further, my points can be applied to cases that courtrooms; the case merely illustrate a more Thanks to Guy Axtell. (See also See Ahlstrom-Vij (2013a: 134). Thanks to Amiel Bernal. Thanks to D'Ambrosio. 17. White (2005), Matheson (2011), (2013), Greco (2016), Horowitz (2019), and Stapleford (2019). This distinction is found in White (2005). For a defense of moderate permissivism, see Roeber an argument against moderate see Horowitz (2014). Thanks Klaas 16028-0338d-1pass-r01.indd 2/21/2020 10:23:45 Epistemic Paternalism, and Epistemic Permissivism 213 20. Standpoint epistemology was developed Marxist epistemology by Smith (1974), Hartsock (1983), Rose (1983), and For discussions, see Wylie Kukla (2006), Solomon (2009), Toole See also the 2009 no. symposium in
idman (1996), Hookway (1999), Friedman (2019), and JaCkson (forthCominG-b). 11. SEe AHlStroM-Vij (2013A: 134). For a criticism OF his Account, see Bullock (2018: 440–442). 12. DefenSes of EpIStemIC pErmisSivism iNClUDE KeLlY (2013), MEacHaM (2014), meAcham (2019), schOenfielD (2014), SchoenfieLd (fOrThcoming), and JACkSon (forthcoMinG-a). 13. For further ExaMples oF wAys EPisteMic StandArds miGHt diffEr, see NolaN (2014) aND MeachAM (2014). 14. There iS A QuEstiOn of how often judgeS EmPLoy this sort of rEasoniNg TO jUSTifY paTernalism iN rEal liFE. In the UNItED sTatES, for instance, tHe withholdiNG of InformAtIon IS often FormaL aND prOcedural, for ExamPle, juries Cannot SEe a defeNDant's crIminal RecOrd. i don'T WaNt To rUlE Out THe PosSIbiLity, howeVeR, tHat juDges ALSO WithHolD infOrmatIon for non-procEduRal rEAsoNs, for ExampLe, beCaUse frOm theiR poinT oF view, it will mislEad tHe jury. FurTheR, mY poInTs can BE appliEd tO maNy cases That don'T InvOlVE COuRtrooms; the courtrooM cASE iS merely tO illusTRaTe A More geneRaL poInt. THANks to guy AXTeLl. (See alsO note 4). 15. SEE AHlStrom-ViJ (2013a: 134). thanks To amiEl BErnal. 16. tHankS to JusTin D'AmbrOsio. 17. WHIte (2005), Matheson (2011), WhiTE (2013), Greco (2016), HorowitZ (2019), AnD sTaPLefoRd (2019). 18. THis distinctIon iS FounD in WHItE (2005). FoR A defeNse of MoDErATe permissivism, see RoEbEr (fortHcomiNg); for an argumeNt against mODERate permIssiVIsM, See Horowitz (2014). 19. ThaNks to klaas Kray. 16028-0338d-1PAss-r01.indd 212 2/21/2020 10:23:45 aM EpiStemic PaTernalism, AND EpistemIc PErmIssIviSM 213 20. stAndpoint epistEMOlogY wAs develOpeD from MaRxiSt ePisTemOlOgy by SmitH (1974), HartsocK (1983), ROsE (1983), aNd harDing (1986). FOR recent dIsCusSiOns, See WyLIe (2003), KuklA (2006), SoloMon (2009), aNd toOLe (fOrthcomINg). sEE alsO tHe 2009 (Vol. 24, nO. 4) syMpOsium On stANdpOint theOry in HypaTia
idman (1996), Hookway (199 9), Friedm an (2 019 ),an d Ja ckso n (forthcoming - b).11. See Ahlstrom-Vij ( 2013a :1 34). Fo r a c riticis m  o f his  a cc oun t, se e Bul loc k (2018 : 440–442) . 1 2.  Defenses of ep istemic pe rmi ssivism incl ude  Kelly  ( 201 3 ), Me ach am (2 014),M eacham  (2019),Sc h oenfie l d (2014 ) ,  S choe nfield (forthcomi n g) ,  and Jackson ( forthc om i ng - a ).13.  For furth er  exam p les ofw ay s e pis t emic standard s might dif f er,  see N ol an( 2014)and M ea c ham  (2014). 14 . Th ere is aquesti o n of ho w  oftenjudges  em plo y th i sso rtof rea s on ing tojustifypa te rnali sm i n r e al l ife . In  theUnited States , f or i n sta nce,the w ithh ol dingof inf ormat io n is often form al a nd proced ura l,  fo rexamp l e, jur ies  ca nnot se e a def e nda nt ' s cr iminal record. I d on ' t  w ant to r ule ou t  t he possibil it y,howe v e r, th at j u dg es alsowithho l din formati on  for n on -pr oce dural reas ons, f or examp le, b e cause from the i r point of vi e w, i tw illmis lead the ju ry.F urth er,m ypoi n ts ca n beap p li e d to many cases tha tdon'tinvol ve courtrooms ; the cour t r o om caseis m e re l y to illustrat e a m ore genera l  point.Thank s to Guy  Axtell.( S ee alsonot e 4 ).15. S ee  Ahlstrom-Vij ( 2013 a:  134).Tha nks toAmi elBer nal .16. Thank s to Jus ti nD' Am bro sio.1 7. White  ( 200 5) , M athes o n (201 1), W hite  ( 20 1 3),  Greco( 20 1 6 ), H or ow itz(20 19 ), an d St a ple ford (2 019). 18.  Th i s di st in ction i s found in Wh it e (2005).Fo r a  defen s e  of mode rate permissivism, seeR oeber ( for thcom ing) ; for anarg umentaga i nst mo derate  perm is siv i s m, se e Ho row it z (2014).1 9 . T hanks  t o Kl aas Kra y. 16028-0338d-1pa s s-r 01.indd 212 2 /21 /202 0 10 :23 : 45 AMEp i ste m i c Paternalism,and Episte mi c  P ermissivis m  21 320. Sta ndpoint  epis t emology  was deve loped fro mMarx i s t e pistemolog y by Smi th (1974) ,  Hart s oc k (19 83) , Rose  ( 198 3), a nd Har d ing  (198 6). Fo rrecent  disc us sions, s ee Wylie (2003), Kukla(2006) , Sol omo n (2009),  an d  To ole (fort hcom ing). Seeals o t he 20 09( vol.24,n o.  4) sympo sium on standp o in t t h e or y in Hypati a 
idman (1996),_Hookway (1999),_Friedman (2019), and Jackson_(forthcoming-b). 11._See_Ahlstrom-Vij (2013a:_134)._For a criticism_of his account,_see Bullock (2018: 440–442)._12. Defenses of_epistemic_permissivism include Kelly (2013), Meacham (2014), Meacham (2019), Schoenfield (2014), Schoenfield (forthcoming), and Jackson_(forthcoming-a)._13. For_further_examples_of ways epistemic standards might_differ, see Nolan (2014) and_Meacham (2014)._14. There is a question of how often_judges_employ this sort_of reasoning to justify paternalism in real life. In_the United States, for instance, the_withholding of information_is_often_formal and procedural, for_example, juries cannot see a defendant's_criminal record. I don't want to_rule out the possibility, however, that judges_also withhold information for non-procedural reasons,_for example, because from their_point of_view, it will mislead the_jury. Further, my_points can_be applied to_many cases that don't involve courtrooms;_the courtroom case_is merely to illustrate a more_general_point. Thanks to_Guy_Axtell._(See also_note 4). 15._See_Ahlstrom-Vij (2013a:_134)._Thanks to Amiel Bernal. 16. Thanks_to_Justin D'Ambrosio. 17. White (2005), Matheson (2011),_White (2013), Greco (2016),_Horowitz_(2019), and Stapleford (2019)._18. This distinction is found_in White (2005). For a defense_of moderate_permissivism, see_Roeber (forthcoming); for an argument against moderate permissivism, see Horowitz (2014)._19. Thanks to Klaas Kray. 16028-0338d-1pass-r01.indd_212 2/21/2020 10:23:45 AM_Epistemic Paternalism,_and_Epistemic Permissivism 213_20._Standpoint epistemology_was developed from Marxist epistemology by Smith_(1974), Hartsock_(1983), Rose (1983), and Harding (1986)._For recent discussions, see_Wylie_(2003), Kukla (2006), Solomon (2009), and_Toole (forthcoming). See also the 2009_(vol. 24, no. 4) symposium_on_standpoint_theory in Hypatia