 being in someone else's shoes. For instance, I can plan for the situation of being you as you contemplate what to do on vacation. Second, for a given planning situation, Gibbard's account allows us to ask a rich set of planning questions. In particular, I can think about both what I plan to do in F and what I plan to plan to do in F. In the former, I directly take up the question of what to do inF. In the latter, I am concerned with the ðhigher-orderÞ question of how to address the ðfirst-orderÞ question of what to do in F. When I consider this higher-order question, I develop ðor draw onÞ my plans for how to plan-I think through issues like whether and when I should trust my ability to plan for F and what to do if I come to doubt this ability. For instance, I might conclude that I should directly take up the question of what to do in F only when I am not nervous; I might also conclude that, when nervous, I should follow the advice of someone I trust ðe.g., an idealized version of myself or my spiritual guruÞ. Moreover, in coming to a conclusion about these higher-order planning questions, I indirectly come to a conclusion to the first-order question about what to plan to do inF: if the higher-order plan I settle on tells me to approach the first-order question in a particular way, then by taking this approach, I will come a conclusion about what to do in F. These features of Gibbard's account, when combined with the psychological fact that different people can have different preferences about what to do and how to plan, allow him to make sense of a distinctive form of innocent mistake-pure planning innocent mistakes. To draw this out, consider how I could approach planning for the hypothetical situation V: being you contemplating what to do on vacation. When I directly ask 'what to plan to do in V?', say I come to the conclusion, ð1Þ If in V, go to the mountains. But 3 32, 24 4 now suppose that either I come to doubt the legitimacy of ð1Þ or, gh confident in ð1Þ, I want to give further thought to my answer.4thou Since these doubts and curiosities raise questions about how to plan to plan, they move me from the first-order question 'what to plan
being in someone else's shoes. For instance, I can plan for the situation of being you as you study what to cause on vacation. Second, for a given planning situation, Gibbard's account permit us to ask a rich stage set of planning questions. In particular, I can remember about both what I plan to do in F and what I design to plan to do in F. In the former, I directly drive up the question of what to do inF. In the latter, I am concerned with the ðhigher - orderÞ question of how to address the ðfirst - orderÞ question of what to do in F. When I see this higher - order question, I build up ðor draw onÞ my plans for how to plan - I think through issue like whether and when I should trust my ability to plan for F and what to do if I come to doubt this ability. For instance, I might reason that I should directly take up the question of what to do in F only when I am not nervous; I might also reason that, when anxious, I should follow the advice of someone I trust ðe.g. , an idealized version of myself or my spiritual guruÞ. Moreover, in coming to a conclusion about these higher - order planning question, I indirectly come to a conclusion to the beginning - decree question about what to plan to do inF: if the higher - orderliness design I settle on tells me to approach the inaugural - order question in a particular way, then by taking this approach, I will come a conclusion about what to do in F. These features of Gibbard's account, when combined with the psychological fact that unlike people can have unlike preferences about what to do and how to plan, allow him to make sense of a distinctive mannequin of innocent mistake - pure planning impeccant mistakes. To draw this out, consider how I could approach planning for the conjectural situation V: being you contemplating what to do on vacation. When I directly necessitate' what to plan to do in V?', say I come to the decision, ð1Þ If in V, run low to the mountains. But 3 32, 24 4 now suppose that either I come to doubt the legitimacy of ð1Þ or, gh convinced in ð1Þ, I want to give further thought to my answer.4thou Since these doubt and curiosities raise questions about how to plan to plan, they travel me from the first - order motion' what to plan
 belng in someone else's shots. For instance, I can plen for fhe situxtion of being you as you coitemplate what to do on vacatiov. Second, vor a gicen klanning situatioi, Gibbard's acckmnt anoows us to ask a rich sed of planning xudscions. In particular, I can think aboue both ehwt I plan to dj in S ans what I plan to plan to do in F. Ih the fmrmer, I direcyly take up the question ov whwt to do inF. In thf latter, I qm cjbcerned with the ðhigheg-mrderÞ quesjion of how to address the ðfirst-urderÞ question if whwj to do in F. When I consider bnis hicher-ordrr question, I cevxlop ðor draw onÞ my plans hor how to plan-I thigk througv nssues like whether abd when I svoula trjst mb agility to plan for R and what ro do if I come to cotvt this abilify. For igstance, I might conclude that I should girsctly take up the questuon of what to do in V only whqn I am not nervous; I might also conclude that, whan necvuus, I ryokld follow the advice of someone I trust ðe.g., ag iceslized version of myself pr mu spiritual gutuÞ. Moreoved, in coming to a clnclusijn abiut these higner-order planning questions, I indirectlj cone to a conclusion to the firrt-orcer qiestion about what to puan fo do inF: iv the higgdr-order plan I sdttke on tells me to approach tre first-ocder auestiov in a pareicular waj, thek by taking this aporoack, I whll come a conclusion about what to do in F. These featutes of Gibbard'f accpunt, when comfined with the psychojogicxl fact thzt diffxrent people can have difxgrent prefereices aboue whqt ti do ana how to plan, aklow him no makw sense of a distikctivg rorm of innocenc nistake-pure plamnivg ynjorent ihstakes. To dsaw ghir out, zonsider hoc K coild approach planninc fod the hypothetical sltuation C: being rou contemplaying what to do on vacavion. Wien I cirgctly ask 'what to plan to do in V?', say I fomc to the concjusiin, ð1Þ If in V, yo to the mountains. But 3 32, 24 4 now suppose vhat either I come to diubt the legitimacy pf ð1Þ or, gh cpnfidqnt in ð1Þ, I want to give furthee thought to my akswer.4thou Since these soubts and furiosities raise questions about how to plan to plan, they move me from tye first-order quesfion 'what tj plan
being in someone else's shoes. For instance, plan the situation being you as on Second, for a planning situation, Gibbard's allows us to ask a rich of planning questions. In particular, I can think about both what I plan do in F and what I plan to plan to do in F. the I take the question of what to do inF. In the latter, I am concerned with the ðhigher-orderÞ of how to address the ðfirst-orderÞ question of to do in F. I consider this higher-order question, develop draw onÞ plans how plan-I think through like whether and when I should trust my ability to plan for F and what to do I come this ability. instance, might that I should up the question of what to only when I am not nervous; I might conclude that, nervous, I should follow the advice someone I trust ðe.g., an idealized version of or my spiritual guruÞ. Moreover, in coming to a conclusion about these higher-order planning questions, come to a conclusion the first-order question what plan do if the plan I settle on tells me to approach the first-order question a particular way, then by taking this approach, I will conclusion what to do F. These features of account, combined with the psychological different can about to and how to plan, him to make sense of distinctive form of innocent draw this out, consider how I could approach for the hypothetical situation V: being you what to do on vacation. When I directly ask 'what to plan do in I come to the conclusion, ð1Þ If in go to the mountains. 3 32, 24 4 now suppose that either I to the legitimacy ð1Þ or, gh in ð1Þ, I to give further my answer.4thou these and about how to plan to plan, move from the first-order question 'what plan
 being in someone else's shoes. FOr instance, i can pLan For ThE sitUatiOn of being you as YOu coNtemplate what to do on vacAtion. seCOnd, fOR a Given PlanninG SiTUAtiOn, giBbaRd'S AcCount AllOws us to Ask a rich seT of PlAnning questiONs. in particulAr, I Can think abouT boTh what i pLan TO do in f anD what i plan tO Plan to Do in F. In thE fORmer, I dIRectly tAKE uP the Question of what to dO Inf. in the latter, I am ConcerNeD WiTH The ÐhiGher-orderÞ QuEstioN Of how to ADdRESS thE Ðfirst-orderÞ qUestion of whAT to Do in F. WHeN I cONsider This hIgHEr-oRder questioN, I deVelop ðor dRaw onÞ MY plans fOR how to pLan-I thInk ThrOugh ISsUeS liKe WHetHEr And WHen i should tRuSt My abiLity TO PLAn foR F aNd whAt to dO if I come to douBt tHis aBIliTy. For InstaNce, I MiGht coNclude That I ShOuld directly takE up tHe questioN of WhAt tO dO in F oNLy when i am Not Nervous; i might aLSo cOnCLUDe That, when nervous, I shOuLD FoLlow the aDvice oF SoMeONe I trust Ðe.G., an IdeaLIZed veRsioN Of Myself or My spirITuAl GuruÞ. MoReOver, in CoMinG to A concLUsioN about These higHer-orDEr planning quesTIons, I indirectLY cOME tO A conCluSion to the fiRst-oRDer qUestIOn AboUT what To plaN tO Do INF: if the higher-order pLaN I settLe on tElls me to approAch the firsT-ORDer questIon iN A pARticular way, theN by taKing this apPRoach, I wiLl comE a concluSion about WHAt to do in f. ThEse FeaTurES Of gibbard's accouNT, When CoMbined wIth The psycHolOgiCal FacT tHat differEnt peoplE cAn HaVe DifFerenT PreferenCeS abOuT whAt to dO And how To plaN, allOw HiM To mAke sensE Of A DIstiNcTiVe foRm oF iNnoceNt miSTakE-pure plAnning innOceNT misTaKeS. To draw This out, considEr How I could aPpRoaCh planNINg for the Hypothetical situation V: bEIng you cOntEmplaTing What to do oN vaCation. wheN i direcTly ask 'What tO pLan TO Do in V?', SAY I ComE tO the concluSIOn, ð1þ If in v, gO to tHe mountAins. But 3 32, 24 4 now suppose tHAt eIther I come to dOubT the LEGiTimACy OF ð1Þ Or, GH coNFIdent in ð1Þ, I want tO give furthEr THoUght to my anSWer.4ThOu Since These doUbts aND curiosIties raisE questionS aBout HOW to Plan to plan, They move Me from the FIrst-oRDeR quesTioN 'what tO pLan
 being in someone else's s hoes. Forinsta nce , I  c an p lanfor the situat i on o f being you as you con templ at e  wha t  t o doon vaca t io n .  Se co nd , f or agiven  pl anningsituation,  Gi bb ard's accoun t  a llows us t o a sk a rich se t o f plan ni ngq uesti ons . Inpartic u lar, I  can thin ka bout b o th what I  p lanto do in F and wh a tI  plan to planto doin F. I n t heformer, Idi rectl y  take u p  t h e que s tion of whatto do inF.I n t he lat te r,I  am co ncern ed wit h the ðhigh er-o rderÞ que stiono f how t o  addres s theðfi rst -ord e rÞ  q ues ti o n o f  w hat todo in F.  W he n I c onsi d e r this  hi gher -orde r question, I  de velo p  ðo r dra w onÞ  mypl ans f or how  to p la n-I think throu gh i ssues lik e w he the rand w h en I s hou ldtrust m y abili t y t op l a nfor F and what todo i fI come t o doub t  t hi s  ability .For  ins t a nce,I mi g ht  conclud e that Ish ould di re ctly t ak e u p t he qu e stio n of w hat to d o inF  only when I a m  not nervous; Im i gh t  als o c onclude tha t, w h en n ervo u s,  Is hould  foll ow th e  advice of someoneItrustðe.g. , an idealize d versiono f myself o r my sp i ritual guruÞ.Moreo ver, in co m ing to a  conc lusion a bout thes e higher-o rde r p lan nin g qu estions, I in d i rect ly  come t o a  conclu sio n t o t hefi rst-order  questio nab ou twha t top lan to d oinF :ifthe h i gher-o rderplan  I  s e ttl e on te l ls m e to  a pp roac h t he  firs t-or d erquestio n in a pa rti c ular  w ay , thenby taking thi sapproach,Iwil l come a  conclus ion about what to do in F. Thes e f eatur es o f Gibbard 'saccoun t,w hen co mbined  with  t hep s ychol o g ic alfa ct that di f f ere nt pe op le c an have  different prefere n ces  about what t o d o an d ho w t o  p l an,  a l low h im to make sens e of a dis ti n ct ive form o f  in no cent mi stake-p ure p l anninginnocentmistakes.  T o dr a w  th is out, co nsider h ow I coul d  appr o ac h pla nni ng for  t hehypot hetica l  si tuati on V:be ing yo u con te mplating  what to do on vacation . When  I di rec tly ask ' wha t  to  plan todo i n V?', say  Icom e tothe concl usio n ,ð1Þ If in  V,g o to them ou nta i n s.  But 3 32,2 4 4 n ow su ppo s e that  eit her I come to dou b t the legitima cy o f ð1Þ  or ,  ghco nfident in ð1Þ , I  w a n t to giv efurther tho ught tomy answe r.4tho u Sinc e these d ou b ts and  cur ios ities rai sequ e stionsab ou t  how t o pl an  to pl an, th e y mo v e  me from the fir st-or d e r que s tio n 'wh at  to pla n 
 being_in someone_else's shoes. For instance,_I can_plan_for the_situation_of being you_as you contemplate_what to do on_vacation. Second, for_a_given planning situation, Gibbard's account allows us to ask a rich set of planning_questions._In particular,_I_can_think about both what I_plan to do in F_and what_I plan to plan to do in F._In_the former, I_directly take up the question of what to do_inF. In the latter, I am_concerned with the_ðhigher-orderÞ_question_of how to address_the ðfirst-orderÞ question of what to_do in F. When I consider_this higher-order question, I develop ðor draw_onÞ my plans for how to_plan-I think through issues like_whether and_when I should trust my_ability to plan_for F_and what to_do if I come to doubt_this ability. For_instance, I might conclude that I_should_directly take up_the_question_of what_to do in_F_only when_I_am not nervous; I might also_conclude_that, when nervous, I should follow the_advice of someone I_trust_ðe.g., an idealized version_of myself or my spiritual_guruÞ. Moreover, in coming to a_conclusion about_these higher-order_planning questions, I indirectly come to a conclusion to the first-order_question about what to plan to_do inF: if the_higher-order plan_I_settle on tells_me_to approach_the first-order question in a particular way,_then by_taking this approach, I will come_a conclusion about what_to_do in F. These features of_Gibbard's account, when combined with the_psychological fact that different people_can_have_different preferences about what to_do and how to plan, allow_him to make_sense of a distinctive form of innocent_mistake-pure_planning innocent mistakes. To draw this_out,_consider how I could approach planning_for_the_hypothetical situation V: being you_contemplating what to do on vacation._When I directly ask 'what to plan to do_in V?', say_I come to the conclusion,_ð1Þ_If_in V, go to the mountains. But 3 32, 24_4 now_suppose that either_I come to doubt the legitimacy of ð1Þ or, gh_confident in ð1Þ, I want to give_further thought to my answer.4thou Since these doubts and curiosities raise_questions about how to plan to plan, they_move me from the first-order question 'what_to plan