 types of cases that fall into this category of'mixed' cases. In the first, the probability that a desire is satisfied increases while the fit between the desire and the world decreases. In the second, the probability that a desire is satisfied decreases while the fit between desire and the world increases. The problem for Contrastive Fit-Probabilism – indeed for ​any disjunctive account of promotion – is that it entails that the desire is necessarily promoted in any such case. This is an absurd consequence since we can let the decrease along one of the two promotion-dimensions be arbitrarily large and the increase along the other dimension be arbitrarily small. And in such cases, Contrastive Fit-Probabilism will nonetheless deliver the wildly counterintuitive result that the desire is promoted. To see this clearly, consider one case of each type: i. Annie desires to have 100 chocolate bars, and she currently has 49. She 42 is offered the opportunity to trade all of her 49 bars for a ticket to the chocolate lottery, which pays the winner 100 chocolate bars. Since there are 100 tickets in the lottery, and since the lottery is a fair one with only one winner, her chance of winning would be 1%. If we suppose Annie has no other prospects of obtaining 100 bars, then, since the probability of Annie's obtaining 100 chocolate bars would increase by her making the 42 In this case, we could obviously have been more generous towards our protagonist, e.g. by giving her 99 chocolate bars rather than merely 49. However, we have chosen this particular number to get symmetry between the current example and the next one. In the next example, stipulating that our protagonist currently only has a 49% chance of winning the chocolate lottery preempts the response that Annie will win the chocolate lottery in the closest possible world in which Annie refuses the trade. (Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for raising this concern with the second example.) 21 trade as compared with refusing to make the trade, Contrastive Fit-Probabilism entails that making the trade rather than refusing to do so would promote her desire for 100 chocolate bars. (For simplicity, we assume that Annie has no other means of acquiring chocolate bars.) ii. Annie desires to have 100 chocolate bars, and she currently has 0. However, Annie has 49 of the 100 tickets to the chocolate lottery, which pays the sole winner 100 bars, and so her current chance of obtaining 100 bars is 49%. Annie is offered the opportunity to trade all of her lottery tickets for a single chocolate bar.
types of cases that fall into this category of'mixed' case. In the inaugural, the probability that a desire is satisfied increases while the fit between the desire and the earth decreases. In the second, the probability that a desire is quenched decreases while the fit between desire and the world increase. The problem for Contrastive Fit - Probabilism – indeed for ​any disjunctive account of forwarding – is that it entails that the desire is necessarily promoted in any such case. This is an absurd consequence since we can lease the decrease along one of the two promotion - dimensions be arbitrarily large and the increase along the early dimension be arbitrarily small. And in such event, Contrastive Fit - Probabilism will nonetheless deliver the wildly counterintuitive consequence that the desire is promoted. To understand this clearly, consider one case of each type: i. Annie desires to own 100 chocolate bars, and she currently has 49. She 42 is offered the opportunity to deal all of her 49 bar for a ticket to the chocolate lottery, which pays the winner 100 chocolate bars. Since there are 100 tickets in the lottery, and since the lottery is a fair one with merely one winner, her chance of succeed would be 1% . If we presuppose Annie has no other prospects of prevail 100 bars, then, since the probability of Annie's obtaining 100 chocolate bars would increase by her lay down the 42 In this case, we could obviously have been more generous towards our protagonist, e.g. by giving her 99 chocolate bars rather than merely 49. However, we have chosen this particular number to get isotropy between the current example and the following one. In the next example, stipulating that our protagonist currently merely has a 49% chance of winning the cocoa lottery preempts the answer that Annie will win the chocolate lottery in the close possible earth in which Annie refuses the trade. (Thanks to an anonymous commentator for raising this concern with the second example .) 21 trade as compare with refusing to form the trade, Contrastive Fit - Probabilism entails that making the trade rather than refuse to do then would promote her desire for 100 chocolate bars. (For simplicity, we assume that Annie have no other means of get chocolate bars .) ii. Annie desires to have 100 chocolate bars, and she presently has 0. However, Annie has 49 of the 100 tickets to the chocolate lottery, which pays the sole winner 100 bars, and therefore her current opportunity of obtaining 100 bars is 49% . Annie is offered the opportunity to trade all of her lottery tickets for a single cocoa bar.
 tyoes of cases that fall ikto this categori if'mixev' cases. In the wirst, the probability that a dwsire is satisfied increaser while tje fit bwtwetn the desire and the world decdcases. Mn the second, tme probabilhty that a deshrd ns satisfied decreases while the fit betweem fesire and the workq indgecses. The problem for Contrastivs Fit-Prmbabilism – inceed for ​any disjunctive afcoujt of promotion – id that it ebtaijw that the ddsire is ntczssarily prkmoted in any such case. This is an aysurd consewuwncf since we cen let the decreasc along one of the two promobion-dmmenwions be arbitrarily narge and the incrgase along tke other dimension be aebitrdrilf smxol. Xnd ii shch cades, Contrastibe Fit-Probavilism will nonethekefw deliver the wildlr sounterintuitive result that the desire is promoted. To see this coearly, consider one cwse of eash type: i. Annie desires to have 100 chocolate bars, atd shx zurxcktly yad 49. She 42 is offered the opportunity to trade ajm pf her 49 bars for a ticket tp hhr chocolate lojtery, wkjcg pays the winner 100 chocolwte bqrs. Since thete are 100 tickets in the lottwry, and sincv thw lottery is a faix one with ouly ong winnrr, her chance of winniny wouls be 1%. If we suppose Zvnie has no othef pgospacts of obtaining 100 bars, thqn, since vhe pxobabiligy og Anniq's obtainijg 100 cmmcolate bars would incrgase bf her makijg the 42 In this case, we could outiously have nean kore genzrous bowards our proeagonist, e.g. by giving her 99 chocolate bars rether than mqrely 49. Howeves, we have choven this parricuoar numcdr to get symmrtry betwveu the cureent example and tme nebf one. In the neru ezample, stipulatong thwt onr prjdagonist cursentuy umly hxs a 49% chancc ow wimning the chocolate nottsry preempts the rrsionse thaj Annie wyll win the cnocolate lottery ij the clusest pofsible world in which Annie reruses the trwde. (Thanks tj an anonymous rzviewer for raising this concern with thx second example.) 21 tradg as compared with reyuxing to makx the erade, Condrastive Fit-Probabilusm entails that kaking the trade rathsr that refksing to do so would promote her desire for 100 chocolate bars. (For simplicitt, we assume that Ahnie has to pther ieand of acquiring chpcolate bars.) ii. Annie desires tu have 100 whjcolate bars, and she currentky has 0. However, Annie has 49 of the 100 ticksts to tne chocolate lottery, which pays the sole winner 100 bars, akd so her currsnt chance of obtaining 100 barx is 49%. Cnnie us offeeed bhe opportunith tp brade all lf htr lkttery tickets for a single chocilate vag.
types of cases that fall into this cases. the first, probability that a the between the desire the world decreases. the second, the probability that a is satisfied decreases while the fit between desire and the world increases. The for Contrastive Fit-Probabilism – indeed for ​any disjunctive account of promotion – is it that desire necessarily promoted in any such case. This is an absurd consequence since we can let the along one of the two promotion-dimensions be arbitrarily and the increase along other dimension be arbitrarily small. in cases, Contrastive will deliver wildly counterintuitive result the desire is promoted. To see this clearly, consider one case of each type: i. Annie desires have 100 and she has She is offered the trade all of her 49 bars to the chocolate lottery, which pays the winner chocolate bars. there are 100 tickets in the and since the lottery is a fair one only one winner, her chance of winning would be 1%. If we suppose Annie has prospects of obtaining 100 then, since the of obtaining chocolate would increase her making the 42 In this case, we could obviously have more generous towards our protagonist, e.g. by giving her 99 rather merely 49. However, have chosen this particular to symmetry between the current the one. example, that protagonist currently only has 49% chance of winning the lottery preempts the response chocolate lottery in the closest possible world in Annie refuses the trade. (Thanks to an reviewer for raising this concern with the second example.) 21 trade as with refusing the trade, Contrastive Fit-Probabilism entails that making the rather than refusing to so would promote her desire for 100 chocolate bars. simplicity, assume that has no other of acquiring chocolate ii. Annie desires 100 chocolate and currently Annie has 49 of the 100 to chocolate lottery, which pays the winner and so her current chance of obtaining 100 bars is 49%. Annie is offered the trade all of her tickets a single chocolate bar.
 types of cases that fall into tHis categorY of'miXed' CasEs. in thE firSt, the probabiliTY thaT a desire is satisfied incReaseS wHIle tHE fIt betWeen the DEsIRE anD tHe WorLd DEcReaseS. In The secoNd, the probaBilItY that a desire IS sAtisfied deCreAses while the Fit BetweeN dEsiRE and tHe wOrld iNcreasES. The prOblem for COnTRastivE fit-ProbABIlIsm – iNdeed for ​any disjunCTiVE account of promOtion – iS tHAt IT EntAilS that the deSiRe is nECessariLY pROMOteD In any such case. this is an absURd cOnsequEnCe sINce we cAn let ThE DecRease along oNe of The two proMotion-DImensioNS be arbiTrarilY laRge And tHE iNcReaSe ALonG ThE otHEr dImension Be ArBitraRily SMALL. And In sUch cAses, COntrastive Fit-proBabiLIsm Will nOnethElesS dEliveR the wiLdly cOuNterintuitive reSult That the deSirE iS prOmOted. TO See thiS clEarLy, consiDer one cASe oF eACH TyPe: i. Annie desires to hAvE 100 CHoColate baRs, and sHE cUrREntly has 49. shE 42 is OffeRED the oPporTUnIty to traDe all oF HeR 49 bArs for a TiCket to ThE chOcoLate lOTterY, which Pays the wInner 100 CHocolate bars. SiNCe there are 100 ticKEtS IN tHE lotTerY, and since thE lotTEry iS a faIR oNe wITh onlY one wInNEr, HEr chance of winning woUlD be 1%. If wE suppOse Annie has no Other prospECTS of obtaiNing 100 BArS, Then, since the prObabiLity of AnniE'S obtainiNg 100 choColate baRs would inCREase by heR maKinG thE 42 In THIs Case, we could obVIOuslY hAve been MorE generoUs tOwaRds Our PrOtagonist, E.g. by giviNg HeR 99 cHoColAte baRS rather tHaN meReLy 49. HOweveR, We have ChoseN thiS pArTIcuLar numbER tO GEt syMmEtRy beTweEn The cuRrenT ExaMple and The next onE. In THe neXt ExAmple, stIpulating that OuR protagoniSt CurRently ONLy has a 49% chAnce of winning the chocolaTE lotterY prEemptS the Response tHat annie wIll WIn the cHocolaTe lotTeRy iN THe cloSESt PosSiBle world in WHIch annie ReFuseS the traDe. (Thanks to an anonymOUs rEviewer for raiSinG thiS COnCerN WiTH thE sEConD EXample.) 21 trade as coMpared with ReFUsIng to make tHE trAdE, ContraStive FiT-ProbABilism eNtails thaT making thE tRade RATheR than refusIng to do sO would proMOte heR DeSire fOr 100 cHocolaTe BarS. (For sImplicITy, wE assuMe that anNie has No othEr Means of aCquiring chocolate bars.) ii. annie dEsireS to Have 100 chocoLatE BarS, and she cuRrenTly has 0. HoweVer, annIe has 49 Of tHE 100 tickEts tO ThE chOColatE lotTEry, which pAYs The SOLe Winner 100 bars, aND SO heR currEnt CHance oF obtAining 100 bars is 49%. Annie IS offered the oppOrtuNITy tO trADe alL oF her lottery ticKetS fOR A single cHoColate bar.
 types of cases that fallinto thiscateg ory  of 'm ixed ' ca ses. In the fi r st,the probability that a  desi re is s a ti sfied  increa s es w hil eth e f it be tween  th e desir e and thewor ld  decreases.I nthe second , t he probabili tythat a  d esi r e issat isfie d decr e ases w hile thefi t  betwe e n desir e an d th e world increases .  T h e problem forContra st i ve F it- Pro babilism –  i ndeed for ​an y  d i s j unc t ive account o f promotion – i s that  i t e n tailsthatth e  de sire is nec essa rily prom oted i n  any su c h case.  Thisisanabsu r dco nse qu e nce si nce wecan letth edecre asea l o n g on e o f th e two  promotion-di men sion s  be  arbi trari ly l ar ge an d theincre as e along the oth er d imensionbear bit ra rilys mall.And  in  such c ases, C o ntr as t i v eFit-Probabilism wi ll n on etheless  deliv e rth e  wildlyco unt erin t u itive  res u lt  that th e desi r eis  promot ed . To s ee  th isclear l y, c onside r one ca se of each type: i.A nnie desirest oh a ve 100cho colate bars , an d  she  cur r en tly has 4 9. Sh e4 2i s offered the oppor tu nity t o tra de all of her  49 bars f o r a ticket  tot he chocolate lott ery,which pays the winn er 10 0 chocol ate bars. S ince the reare  10 0 t i c ke ts in the lot t e ry,an d since  th e lotte ryisa f air  o ne with o nly onewi nn er ,her  chan c e of win ni ngwo uld  be 1 % . If w e sup pose  A nn i e h as no o t he r pros pe ct s of  ob ta ining  100 bar s, then , since t hep roba bi li ty of A nnie's obtain in g 100 choc ol ate  barsw o uld incr ease by her making the4 2 In th iscase,  wecould obv iou sly ha veb een mo re gen erous  t owa r d s our p ro tag on ist, e.g.b y  gi vinghe r 99  chocol ate bars rather th a n m erely 49. How eve r, w e ha vec ho s enth i s p a r ticular numberto get sym me t ry  between t h e c ur rent ex ample a nd th e  next o ne. In th e next ex am ple, s tip ulating th at our p rotagonis t  curr e nt ly on lyhas a49 % c hance  of wi n nin g the  choco la te lot terypr eempts t he response that Anniewill w in th e c hocolatelot t ery  in the c lose st possibl e w orl d inwhi c h Ann ie r e fu ses the t rade .  (Thankst oana n on ymous revie w e r  fo r rai sin g  thisconc ern with the seco n d example.) 21  tra d e  as  co m pare dwith refusingtoma k e  the tra de , Contrasti ve Fit-P ro b abili sm ent ails t hat mak i n gt he tra de r ath er than r efu si n g to do  s ow ould p romo te  her d esiref or 1 0 0  chocolate bars.  (For s impli c ity , weas sume th a t An nie has no  other mean s of a cqui ringchocola te  bars. ) i i.  Annie des i res to ha ve 10 0 choco la te b ars , andshec u rrent ly h as  0.  However, A nn i eha s  49  ofthe 1 00  tic kets to t h e chocol ate lottery ,whi c h  payst he s ole winner  10 0 bar s ,  and so he r  cur r en t  chan ce ofobtain ing 100 bar sis 49%.  An n i e is offe red the o p por tu nity  to trad eallof  he rlottery tickets  for a s ingle ch o c olatebar . 
 types_of cases_that fall into this_category of'mixed'_cases._In the_first,_the probability that_a desire is_satisfied increases while the_fit between the_desire_and the world decreases. In the second, the probability that a desire is satisfied_decreases_while the_fit_between_desire and the world increases._The problem for Contrastive Fit-Probabilism_– indeed_for ​any disjunctive account of promotion – is_that_it entails that_the desire is necessarily promoted in any such case._This is an absurd consequence since_we can let_the_decrease_along one of the_two promotion-dimensions be arbitrarily large and_the increase along the other dimension_be arbitrarily small. And in such cases,_Contrastive Fit-Probabilism will nonetheless deliver the_wildly counterintuitive result that the_desire is_promoted. To see this clearly,_consider one case_of each_type: i. Annie_desires to have 100 chocolate bars,_and she currently_has 49. She 42 is offered_the_opportunity to trade_all_of_her 49_bars for a_ticket_to the_chocolate_lottery, which pays the winner 100_chocolate_bars. Since there are 100 tickets in_the lottery, and since_the_lottery is a fair_one with only one winner,_her chance of winning would be_1%. If_we suppose_Annie has no other prospects of obtaining 100 bars, then, since_the probability of Annie's obtaining 100_chocolate bars would increase_by her_making_the 42 In_this_case, we_could obviously have been more generous towards_our protagonist,_e.g. by giving her 99 chocolate_bars rather than merely_49._However, we have chosen this particular_number to get symmetry between the_current example and the next_one._In_the next example, stipulating that_our protagonist currently only has a_49% chance of_winning the chocolate lottery preempts the response_that_Annie will win the chocolate lottery_in_the closest possible world in which_Annie_refuses_the trade. (Thanks to an_anonymous reviewer for raising this concern_with the second example.) 21 trade as compared with_refusing to make_the trade, Contrastive Fit-Probabilism entails_that_making_the trade rather than refusing to do so would promote_her desire_for 100 chocolate_bars. (For simplicity, we assume that Annie has no other_means of acquiring chocolate bars.) ii. Annie_desires to have 100 chocolate bars, and she currently has 0._However, Annie has 49 of the 100 tickets_to the chocolate lottery, which pays the_sole winner 100 bars,_and_so her current chance of obtaining 100_bars_is_49%._Annie is offered_the opportunity to_trade all of_her lottery_tickets for a_single chocolate_bar.