 is in the form of A4. I will argue that two recent theses in epistemology- epistemic permissivism and standpoint epistemology-provide us with a class of cases in which epistemic paternalism is unjustified. This doesn't amount to an answer as strong as A2, but it does give us reason to be cautious before engaging in an epistemically paternalistic practice and consider whether our situation might fall into that class of cases. To sum up what we've covered so far, epistemic paternalism is the practice of interfering with someone's inquiry without their consent for their own epistemic good. I've focused on the question of whether epistemic paternalism is epistemically justified, and will argue that when a certain set of conditions are met, it is unjustified. With this background in place, I now turn to epistemic permissivism. EPISTEMIC PERMISSIVISM Epistemic permissivism is a thesis about epistemic rationality and evidence. Specifically, it is the view that there are evidential situations that rationally permit more than one attitude toward a proposition.12 Here, epistemic rationality involves responding to one's epistemic situation appropriately, and it seems like certain evidential situations allow for multiple appropriate responses. For instance, paleontologists might share evidence but disagree about what killed the dinosaurs (Rosen 2001). Peter van Inwagen and David Lewis might share evidence but disagree about the nature of free will (van Inwagen 1996). Here, I will focus on a relatively weak version of permissivism called interpersonal permissivism: the view that there are evidential situations in which two (or more) agents can rationally adopt more than one doxastic attitude toward a proposition. Interpersonal permissivism is commonly motivated by the idea that agents have differing epistemic standards (Schoenfield 2014). Epistemic standards are the means by which we evaluate, weigh, interpret, and process evidence. For instance, we might share evidence but rationally disagree about what hypothesis best explains the evidence. Or consider the two Jamesian epistemic goals: believe truth and avoid error. If I emphasize the value of believing truth, I may believe p with only a little evidence for p. If you emphasize the value of avoiding error, you might require significantly more evidence before you believe p. It doesn't seem like a particular weighing of these two goals is rationally required (Kelly 2013).13 What does any of this have to do with epistemic paternalism? Consider a natural reason
is in the form of A4. I will argue that two recent theses in epistemology- epistemic permissivism and standpoint epistemology - leave us with a course of cases in which epistemic paternalism is unjustified. This doesn't total to an solution as strong as A2, but it does give us rationality to be cautious before engaging in an epistemically paternalistic practice and see whether our situation might fall into that course of cases. To sum up what we've covered so far, epistemic paternalism is the exercise of interfering with someone's inquiry without their consent for their own epistemic commodity. I've focused on the doubt of whether epistemic paternalism is epistemically justify, and will argue that when a certain set of conditions are meet, it is unjustified. With this background in place, I now change state to epistemic permissivism. EPISTEMIC PERMISSIVISM Epistemic permissivism is a thesis about epistemic rationality and evidence. Specifically, it is the view that there are evidential situations that rationally permit more than one position toward a proposition.12 Here, epistemic rationality involves responding to one's epistemic situation appropriately, and it seems like certain evidential situations admit for multiple appropriate response. For instance, paleontologists might share evidence but disagree about what killed the dinosaurs (Rosen 2001). Peter van Inwagen and David Lewis might share evidence but disagree about the nature of spare volition (van Inwagen 1996). Here, I will concentrate on a relatively weak interpretation of permissivism called interpersonal permissivism: the view that there are evidential situations in which two (or more) agent can rationally dramatize more than one doxastic attitude toward a proposition. Interpersonal permissivism is normally motivated by the idea that agents have differing epistemic standards (Schoenfield 2014). Epistemic standards are the means by which we evaluate, weigh, interpret, and process evidence. For instance, we might partake evidence but rationally disagree about what hypothesis good explains the evidence. Or consider the two Jamesian epistemic goals: believe truth and invalidate error. If I emphasize the value of believing accuracy, I may believe phosphorus with only a little evidence for p. If you emphasize the value of avoiding error, you might ask significantly more evidence before you believe p. It doesn't look like a particular deliberation of these two goals is rationally required (Kelly 2013).13 What does any of this have to do with epistemic paternalism? think a natural reason
 is in the form of A4. I will argue that two recent thesea in epirtemology- epistemic permissitism and wtandpoint epistemologh-provide ls with a claww of cases in whicm epiabemic 'aternalism is onjustified. Dhis doesn't ammuvt to an answer as strong as A2, but it does govf us reason to be battiohs before engaging in an epistemiczlly pauernalistic practive and consider whether oug sihuation might fall into that xlasf of cases. To sum up what we've coveted so far, epistemic paternalism is tke practice od ijjerfering wivh somvone's inquiry without their vonsent for thcir oxn epistemic good. I've focnsed on the question of whethar epistemic paternqlusm iv ephsteoucauly jnstjfied, wnd will argus that when a certain set of cpnqpyions are mef, it if tnjustified. With this background in plabe, I now turn to epistemic permissivism. EPISTEMIF PERMISSYVISM Epistemic permissivism is a thesis about ephstemmc rauiinaligt wnd evidence. Specifically, it is the view that fhtre are evidentiaj situationx hhsj rationally pgrmit more than one attitude toward a priposition.12 Herr, epistemic rationality invilves responbint to one's epistemie situation cpproptiatelu, and it seems like cercain ebidential sltuations xllow for multipue sp[ropriatt responses. For inftance, paoeoncologistr mibht shwre evidenfe bub disagree about whwt kiplad the dinlsaurs (Rosen 2001). Peter van Inwagen and David Lewos micht sharz evidcnce but disagrqe about the ncture of free will (van Pnwagen 1996). Iere, I will socus on a renwtively weak version of permussiviso called interprrsonal pvriissuvism: the view thab thete are evidential siuuqtions in whicn tdo (jr mprq) agents can satiunauky adupt mort tman one doxastic attitude tmwars a proposition. Inyevpersonal permissyvism is commpnly motivated by uhe idxa thav agenys rave differing epistemic standzrds (Schofnfleld 2014). Epistemyc sbandwrds are tke means by which we evaluate, weigh, intecpret, and process evidgnce. For instance, we klght share etidencq but rathonally disagree aboyt what hypothesix best explains the ebidenca. Or fonsider the two Jamesian epistemic goals: believe truth and avoid error. Id I em'hwsize the vzlue of bvlizviug trutr, I ley believe p with only a little evidence for p. Ih you emphdsnze the value of avoiding errpr, you might reduire significantly more evidencr before you believe p. It doesn'y seem like a particular weighint of fhese nso goals is rationalky reqbired (Jelly 2013).13 Qhat does any of ghix mave to do witi e'istemic paternalism? Consider a nqtural rfason
is in the form of A4. I that recent theses epistemology- epistemic permissivism a of cases in epistemic paternalism is This doesn't amount to an answer strong as A2, but it does give us reason to be cautious before in an epistemically paternalistic practice and consider whether our situation might fall into class cases. sum what we've covered so far, epistemic paternalism is the practice of interfering with someone's inquiry without consent for their own epistemic good. I've focused the question of whether paternalism is epistemically justified, and argue when a set conditions met, it is With this background in place, I now turn to epistemic permissivism. EPISTEMIC PERMISSIVISM Epistemic permissivism is a about epistemic evidence. Specifically, is view there are evidential rationally permit more than one attitude Here, epistemic rationality involves responding to one's epistemic appropriately, and seems like certain evidential situations allow multiple appropriate responses. For instance, paleontologists might share but disagree about what killed the dinosaurs (Rosen 2001). Peter van Inwagen and David Lewis evidence but disagree about nature of free (van 1996). I focus on relatively weak version of permissivism called interpersonal permissivism: the view that are evidential situations in which two (or more) agents can more one doxastic attitude a proposition. Interpersonal permissivism commonly by the idea that differing standards standards the by which we evaluate, interpret, and process evidence. For we might share evidence hypothesis best explains the evidence. Or consider the Jamesian epistemic goals: believe truth and avoid If I emphasize the value of believing truth, I may believe p only a for p. If you emphasize the value of error, you might require more evidence before you believe p. It doesn't seem a weighing of two goals is required (Kelly 2013).13 does any of to do epistemic Consider
 is in the form of A4. I will argue tHat two receNt theSes In ePiStemOlogY- epistemic permISsivIsm and standpoint episteMologY-pROvidE Us With a Class of CAsES In wHiCh EpiStEMiC pateRnaLism is uNjustified. thiS dOesn't amount tO An Answer as stRonG as A2, but it doeS giVe us reAsOn tO Be cauTioUs befOre engAGing in An epistemIcALly patERnalistIC PrActiCe and consider whetHEr OUr situation migHt fall InTO tHAT clAss Of cases. To sUm Up whaT We've covEReD SO Far, EPistemic paterNalism is the PRacTice of InTerFEring wIth soMeONe's Inquiry withOut tHeir conseNt for tHEir own ePIstemic Good. I'vE foCusEd on THe QuEstIoN Of wHEtHer EPisTemic patErNaLism iS epiSTEMIcalLy jUstiFied, aNd will argue thAt wHen a CErtAin seT of coNditIoNs are Met, it iS unjuStIfied. With this baCkgrOund in plaCe, I NoW tuRn To epiSTemic pErmIssIvism. EPiSTEMIC peRMiSsiviSm Epistemic permissiViSM Is A thesis aBout epIStEmIC rationaLiTy aNd evIDEnce. SPeciFIcAlly, it is The vieW ThAt There arE eVidentIaL siTuaTions THat rAtionaLly permiT more THan one attitude TOward a proposiTIoN.12 hErE, EpisTemIc rationaliTy inVOlveS resPOnDinG To one'S episTeMIc SItuation appropriateLy, And it sEems lIke certain eviDential sitUATIons alloW for MUlTIple appropriatE respOnses. For inSTance, palEontoLogists mIght share EVIdence buT diSagRee AboUT WhAt killed the diNOSaurS (ROsen 2001). PetEr vAn InwagEn aNd DAviD LeWiS might shaRe evidenCe BuT dIsAgrEe aboUT the natuRe Of fReE wiLl (van iNwagen 1996). here, I Will FoCuS On a RelativELy WEAk veRsIoN of pErmIsSivisM calLEd iNterperSonal permIssIVism: ThE vIew that There are evideNtIal situatiOnS in Which tWO (Or more) agEnts can rationally adopt mORe than oNe dOxastIc atTitude towArd A propoSitIOn. InteRpersoNal peRmIssIVIsm is COMmOnlY mOtivated by THE idEa thaT aGentS have diFfering epistemic stANdaRds (SchoenfielD 2014). EpIsteMIC sTanDArDS arE tHE meANS by which we evaluAte, weigh, inTeRPrEt, and proceSS evIdEnce. For InstancE, we miGHt share Evidence bUt rationaLlY disAGRee About what hYpothesiS best explAIns thE EvIdencE. Or ConsidEr The Two JaMesian EPisTemic Goals: bElIeve trUth anD aVoid erroR. If I emphasize the value of BelievIng trUth, i may belieVe p WIth Only a littLe evIdence for p. if yOu eMphasIze THe valUe of AVoIdiNG erroR, you MIght requiRE sIgnIFIcAntly more evIDENce BeforE yoU BelievE p. It Doesn't seem like a paRTicular weighinG of tHESe tWo gOAls iS rAtionally requiRed (keLLY 2013).13 What doeS aNy of this havE to do witH ePIstemIc pateRnalisM? ConsidER A nATural rEasoN
 is in the form of A4. I w ill arguethattwo  re ce nt t hese s in epistemol o gy-epistemic permissivism  andst a ndpo i nt  epis temolog y -p r o vid eus  wi th aclass  of  casesin which e pis te mic paternal i sm  is unjust ifi ed. This doe sn' t amou nt  to an an swe r asstrong as A2,  but it d oe s  giveu s reaso n to  becautious before e n ga g ing in an epis temica ll y  p a t ern ali stic pract ic e and conside r  w h e t her our situation  might fall int o that  c las s  of ca ses.To sum  up what we 'vecovered s o far, epistem i c pater nalism  is  th e pr a ct ic e o fi nte r fe rin g  wi th someo ne 's  inqu iryw i t h outthe ir c onsen t for their o wnepis t emi c goo d. I' ve f oc usedon the  ques ti on of whether e pist emic pate rna li smis  epis t emical lyjus tified,  and wi l l a rg u e th at when a certainse t of  conditi ons ar e  m et ,  it is u nj ust ifie d .  With  thi s  b ackgroun d in p l ac e,  I nowtu rn toep ist emi c per m issi vism.EPISTEMI C PER M ISSIVISM Epist e mic permissiv i sm i sa  the sis  about epis temi c  rat iona l it y a n d evi dence .S pe c ifically, it is the  v iew th at th ere are evide ntial situ a t i ons that  rat i on a lly permit mor e tha n one atti t ude towa rd aproposit ion.12 He r e , episte mic  ra tio nal i t yinvolves resp o n ding  t o one's  ep istemic  si tua tio n a pp ropriatel y, and i tse em slik e cer t ain evid en tia lsit uatio n s allo w for  mul ti pl e  ap propria t er e spon se s.  For  in st ance,  pal e ont ologist s might s har e  evi de nc e but d isagree about  w hat killed  t hedinosa u r s (Rosen  2001). Peter van Inwag e n and D avi d Lew is m ight shar e e videnc e b u t disa gree a boutth e n a t ure o f fr eewi ll (van In w a gen  1996 ).  Her e, I wi ll focus on a rela t ive ly weak versi onof p e r mi ssi v is m  ca ll e d i n t erpersonal perm issivism:th e  v iew that t h ere  a re evid entialsitua t ions in  which tw o (or mor e)  age n t s c an rationa lly adop t more th a n one do xasti c a ttitud etow ard a  propo s iti on. I nterpe rs onal p ermis si vism iscommonly motivated by t he ide a tha t a gents hav e d i ffe ring epis temi c standard s ( Sch oenfi eld 2014) . Ep i st emi c  stan dard s  are them ea nsb y  w hich we eva l u a te,  weig h,i nterpr et,and process evide n ce. For instan ce,w e  mi ght shar eevidence but r ati on a l ly disag re e about wha t hypoth es i s bes t expl ains t he evid e n ce .  Or co nsid erthe two J ame si a n epist em ic goals:  bel ie ve tru th and avoi d error. If I emph asize t he va l ueof be li eving t r uth,  I may bel ieve p with  onlya li ttleevidenc efor p.  If  y ou emphasi z e the val ue of  avoidi ng  err or,  you m ight r equir e si gn ifi cantly mo r e  e v id en c e b efor e you  b elie ve p. Itd oesn't s eem like apa rti c u lar we i gh i n g of these  tw o goa l s  is ration a llyr eq u ired(Kelly  2013) .13 Wha t  do es  any of  th i s  have todo with e p ist em ic p aternali sm ? Co ns ide ra natural reaso n
 is_in the_form of A4. I_will argue_that_two recent_theses_in epistemology- epistemic_permissivism and standpoint_epistemology-provide us with a_class of cases_in_which epistemic paternalism is unjustified. This doesn't amount to an answer as strong as_A2,_but it_does_give_us reason to be cautious_before engaging in an epistemically_paternalistic practice_and consider whether our situation might fall into_that_class of cases._To sum up what we've covered so far, epistemic_paternalism is the practice of interfering_with someone's inquiry_without_their_consent for their own_epistemic good. I've focused on the_question of whether epistemic paternalism is_epistemically justified, and will argue that when_a certain set of conditions are_met, it is unjustified. With_this background_in place, I now turn_to epistemic permissivism._EPISTEMIC PERMISSIVISM_Epistemic permissivism is_a thesis about epistemic rationality and_evidence. Specifically, it_is the view that there are_evidential_situations that rationally_permit_more_than one_attitude toward a_proposition.12_Here, epistemic_rationality_involves responding to one's epistemic situation_appropriately,_and it seems like certain evidential situations_allow for multiple appropriate_responses._For instance, paleontologists might_share evidence but disagree about_what killed the dinosaurs (Rosen 2001)._Peter van_Inwagen and_David Lewis might share evidence but disagree about the nature of_free will (van Inwagen 1996). Here,_I will focus on_a relatively_weak_version of permissivism_called_interpersonal permissivism:_the view that there are evidential situations_in which_two (or more) agents can rationally_adopt more than one_doxastic_attitude toward a proposition. Interpersonal permissivism_is commonly motivated by the idea_that agents have differing epistemic_standards_(Schoenfield_2014). Epistemic standards are the_means by which we evaluate, weigh,_interpret, and process_evidence. For instance, we might share evidence_but_rationally disagree about what hypothesis best_explains_the evidence. Or consider the two_Jamesian_epistemic_goals: believe truth and avoid_error. If I emphasize the value_of believing truth, I may believe p with only_a little evidence_for p. If you emphasize_the_value_of avoiding error, you might require significantly more evidence before_you believe_p. It doesn't_seem like a particular weighing of these two goals is_rationally required (Kelly 2013).13 What does any_of this have to do with epistemic paternalism? Consider a natural_reason