epistemology	if	they	wish,	but	this means	that	their	attempt	to	provide	a	grounding	for	morality	ends	up	being much	less	plausible. 6 Not least because DCT is itself a species of non-natural moral realism, albeit slightly different from the version described in the text. 10 To	sum	up,	I	think	that	premise	(1)	of	the	epistemological	objection	is sound.	Any	proponent	of	the	DCT	that	adopts	the	Adamsian	social	and communicative	version	of	DCT	would	seem	bound	to	accept	that	knowledge	of God's	communicative	acts	(i.e.	commands)	is	an	essential	precondition	for	the existence	of	an	obligation.	And	any	proponent	of	the	DCT	(or	voluntarism	more broadly)	that	wishes	to	hang	tough	and	insist	upon	the	separation	of	moral epistemology	and	ontology	faces	a	problem:	their	theory	becomes	much	less plausible	if	they	fail	to	incorporate	an	epistemic	condition	because	epistemic conditions	are	included	among	the	standard	lists	of	moral	platitudes	that	any satisfactory	metaethical	theory	ought	to	account	for. 4.	Defending	the	second	premise:	Why	RNBs	lack	the	requisite	knowlege Premise	(2)	is	the	real	sticking	point	of	the	epistemological	objection.	That premise	has	two	parts	to	it.	The	first	part	claims	that	there	are	such	things	as reasonable	non-believers	(i.e.	non	believers	who	violate	no	epistemic	duties	in their	nonbelief);	the	second	part	claims	that	these	non-believers	lack	epistemic access
epistemology 	 if 	 they 	 wish, 	 but 	 this means 	 that 	 their 	 attempt 	 to 	 provide 	 a 	 grounding 	 for 	 ethical motive 	 end 	 up 	 being much 	 less 	 plausible. 6 Not least because DCT is itself a species of non - lifelike moral realism, albeit slenderly different from the version identify in the textbook. 10 To 	 sum 	 up, 	 I 	 think 	 that 	 premise 	 (1) 	 of 	 the 	 epistemological 	 objection 	 is sound. 	 Any 	 advocate 	 of 	 the 	 DCT 	 that 	 adopts 	 the 	 Adamsian 	 social 	 and communicative 	 version 	 of 	 DCT 	 would 	 seem 	 bound 	 to 	 bear 	 that 	 knowledge 	 of God's 	 communicative 	 acts 	 (i.e. 	 commands) 	 is 	 an 	 essential 	 precondition 	 for 	 the being 	 of 	 an 	 obligation. 	 And 	 any 	 proponent 	 of 	 the 	 DCT 	 (or 	 voluntarism 	 more broadly) 	 that 	 wishes 	 to 	 cling 	 tough 	 and 	 insist 	 upon 	 the 	 separation 	 of 	 moral epistemology 	 and 	 ontology 	 faces 	 a 	 trouble: 	 their 	 theory 	 become 	 much 	 less plausible 	 if 	 they 	 fail 	 to 	 incorporate 	 an 	 epistemic 	 condition 	 because 	 epistemic conditions 	 are 	 include 	 among 	 the 	 standard 	 lists 	 of 	 moral 	 platitudes 	 that 	 any satisfactory 	 metaethical 	 theory 	 ought 	 to 	 account 	 for. 4. 	 Defending 	 the 	 second 	 premise: 	 Why 	 RNBs 	 lack 	 the 	 requisite 	 knowlege Premise 	 (2) 	 is 	 the 	 real 	 sticking 	 point 	 of 	 the 	 epistemological 	 objection. 	 That premise 	 has 	 two 	 parts 	 to 	 it. 	 The 	 first 	 part 	 claims 	 that 	 there 	 are 	 such 	 things 	 as reasonable 	 non - believer 	 (i.e. 	 non 	 believers 	 who 	 violate 	 no 	 epistemic 	 duty 	 in their 	 nonbelief); 	 the 	 second 	 part 	 claims 	 that 	 these 	 non - believers 	 lack 	 epistemic access
epidtemology	if	they	wish,	but	thls means	that	theit	artempt	vo	provise	a	grounaing	for	morality	ends	up	being mnch	lwss	plqusible. 6 Not least becxuse DCT ps itself a skecies of non-natuczl moral realjdm, anueit slightly dlfferent frmm the version ddseribed in the text. 10 To	sum	up,	I	think	thae	premisr	(1)	ov	the	epistemolodicak	jbjedniin	is sound.	Any	proponent	of	the	DCF	that	admpts	the	Adamsisn	social	and communicative	vfrsiln	of	DCT	would	seem	boknd	to	accept	jgat	hbowledge	of Gud's	communibctive	acts	(i.e.	dommands)	is	an	essential	preconditiun	for	che existenxe	if	aj	mbligation.	Aid	any	pgoponent	of	the	DCT	(or	volgntarisk	more broadly)	tmat	wivhew	to	hang	tough	and	insist	npon	the	separation	of	mjral episdejology	and	ontology	daxes	a	ptoblek:	theke	thdorg	bxcojes	mucj	leas plausibme	if	they	faio	to	incorporate	an	epixtqnic	condition	bscause	qpystemic conditions	are	included	among	the	stdndzrd	lists	of	moral	platitudws	that	any satisfactori	metaethicwl	theory	ought	to	account	for. 4.	Defending	the	second	premive:	Why	CNCs	lcgh	gye	gequisite	knowlege Premise	(2)	is	the	real	sticking	poigf	og	tme	epistemologicaj	objection.	Tnah ltemise	has	two	patts	to	it.	Cge	rirst	part	claims	thah	there	ate	such	rhings	as weaspnable	non-believers	(i.e.	non	beliwvers	who	violcte	bo	epistemic	duties	iu their	nonbeuief);	jhe	secpnd	part	claims	that	these	nun-bemievers	lack	fpistemic xccess
epistemology if they wish, but this means attempt provide a for morality ends 6 least because DCT itself a species non-natural moral realism, albeit slightly different the version described in the text. 10 To sum up, I think that (1) of the epistemological objection is sound. Any proponent of the DCT that the social communicative of DCT would seem bound to accept that knowledge of God's communicative acts (i.e. commands) is essential precondition for the existence of an obligation. any proponent of the (or voluntarism more broadly) that to tough and upon separation moral epistemology and faces a problem: their theory becomes much less plausible if they fail to incorporate an epistemic condition epistemic conditions among the lists moral that any satisfactory ought to account for. 4. Defending Why RNBs lack the requisite knowlege Premise (2) the real point of the epistemological objection. That has two parts to it. The first part that there are such things as reasonable non-believers (i.e. non believers who violate no epistemic their nonbelief); the second claims that these lack access
epistemology	if	they	wish,	but	This means	tHat	thEir	AttEmPt	to	ProvIde	a	grounding	fOR	morAlity	ends	up	being much	leSs	plaUsIBle. 6 NOT lEast bEcause Dct iS ITseLf A sPecIeS Of Non-naTurAl moral Realism, albEit SlIghtly differENt From the verSioN described in The Text. 10 To	SuM	up,	i	Think	ThaT	premIse	(1)	of	tHE	epistEmologicaL	oBJectioN	Is sound.	aNY	pRopoNent	of	the	DCT	that	aDOpTS	the	Adamsian	soCial	anD cOMmUNIcaTivE	version	of	dCt	woulD	Seem	bouND	tO	ACCepT	That	knowledge	Of God's	commuNIcaTive	acTs	(I.e.	cOMmands)	Is	an	eSsENtiAl	preconditIon	fOr	the exisTence	oF	An	obligATion.	And	Any	proPonEnt	Of	thE	dCt	(oR	voLuNTarISm	MorE BroAdly)	that	WiShEs	to	hAng	tOUGH	And	iNsiSt	upOn	the	Separation	of	mOraL epiSTemOlogy	And	onToloGy	Faces	A	problEm:	theIr	Theory	becomes	muCh	leSs plausibLe	iF	tHey	FaIl	to	iNCorporAte	An	ePistemiC	conditIOn	bEcAUSE	ePistemic conditions	ArE	INcLuded	amoNg	the	sTAnDaRD	lists	of	MoRal	PlatITUdes	tHat	aNY sAtisfactOry	metAEtHiCal	theoRy	Ought	tO	aCcoUnt	For. 4.	DeFEndiNg	the	sEcond	preMise:	WHY	RNBs	lack	the	reQUisite	knowlegE prEMIsE	(2)	Is	thE	reAl	sticking	pOint	OF	the	EpisTEmOloGIcal	oBjectIoN.	thAT premise	has	two	parts	To	It.	The	fIrst	pArt	claims	that	There	are	suCH	THings	as rEasoNAbLE	non-believers	(i.E.	non	bElievers	whO	Violate	nO	episTemic	dutIes	in theiR	NOnbelief);	The	SecOnd	ParT	CLaIms	that	these	nON-BeliEvErs	lack	EpiStemic aCceSs
epistemology	if	they	wish, 	but	thismeans 	th atth eiratte mpt	to	provide a	gr ounding	for	morality	e nds	u pb eing mu ch	le ss	plau s ib l e . 6  N ot  le as t  b ecaus e D CT is i tself a sp eci es  of non-natu r al  moral rea lis m, albeit sl igh tly di ff ere n t fro m t he ve rsiond escrib ed in the  t e xt. 10 To	sumu p ,I	th ink	that	premise( 1) of	the	epistem ologic al ob j e cti onis sound.An y	pro p onent	o f 	t h e DCT that	adopts	t he	Adamsian soc ial	an dcom m unicat ive	v er s ion 	of	DCT	wou ld	s eem	bound 	to	ac c ept	tha t 	knowle dge	of  Go d's 	com m un ic ati ve act s 	( i.e . 	co mmands)is 	a n	ess enti a l p reco ndi tion 	forthe existence 	of 	ano bli gatio n.	An d	an ypropo nent	o f	the 	D CT	(or	voluntar ismmore broa dly )tha twishe s 	to	ha ngtou gh	andinsistu pon 	t h e se paration	of	moralep i s te mology	a nd	ont o lo gy faces	apr obl em:t h eir	t heor y 	b ecomes	m uch	le s spl ausible 	i f	they 	f ail 	to 	inco r pora te	anepistemi c	con d ition	becausee pistemic cond i ti o n sa re	i ncl uded	amongthes tand ardl is tso f	mor al	pl at i tu d es	that	any satisfa ct ory	me taeth ical	theory	o ught	to	ac c o u nt	for.4.	D e fe n ding	the	secon d	pre mise:	WhyR NBs	lack 	therequisit e	knowleg e Premise(2) 	is 	th e	r e a lsticking	poin t of	t he 	episte mol ogicalobj ect ion .	T ha t premise 	has	two 	p ar ts 	t o	i t.	Th e 	first	p ar t	c la ims 	that thereare	s uchth in g s	a s reaso n ab l e 	non -b el ieve rs(i .e.	n on	b e lie vers	wh o	violate 	no epis te mi c	dutie s	in their	no nb elief);	th esec ond	pa r t 	claimsthat	these	non-believer s 	lack	e pis temic  acc ess
epistemology	if	they	wish,	but	this means	that	their	attempt	to	provide	a	grounding	for	morality	ends	up	being_much	less	plausible. 6_Not least because DCT_is itself_a_species of_non-natural_moral realism, albeit_slightly different from_the version described in_the text. 10_To	sum	up,	I	think	that	premise	(1)	of	the	epistemological	objection	is_sound.	Any	proponent	of	the	DCT	that	adopts	the	Adamsian	social	and communicative	version	of	DCT	would	seem	bound	to	accept	that	knowledge	of God's	communicative	acts	(i.e.	commands)	is	an	essential	precondition	for	the existence	of	an	obligation.	And	any	proponent	of	the	DCT	(or	voluntarism	more broadly)	that	wishes	to	hang	tough	and	insist	upon	the	separation	of	moral epistemology	and	ontology	faces	a	problem:	their	theory	becomes	much	less plausible	if	they	fail	to	incorporate	an	epistemic	condition	because	epistemic conditions	are	included	among	the	standard	lists	of	moral	platitudes	that	any satisfactory	metaethical	theory	ought	to	account	for. 4.	Defending	the	second	premise:	Why	RNBs	lack	the	requisite	knowlege Premise	(2)	is	the	real	sticking	point	of	the	epistemological	objection.	That premise	has	two	parts	to	it.	The	first	part	claims	that	there	are	such	things	as reasonable	non-believers	(i.e.	non	believers	who	violate	no	epistemic	duties	in their	nonbelief);	the	second	part	claims	that	these	non-believers	lack	epistemic_access