 of his arrows miss their marks. Still, Kraut's arguments in most cases will, I suspect, earn their way into rebuttals in a wide variety of venues. Ch.  is the heart of the positive account. Here Kraut lays out the shape which developmentalism takes in the human case, and explains in detail what are the kinds of power the proper development of which constitutes what is good for us. His argument features much sensible development of platitudes about what is good for us which are easily overlooked but ought to be staples of any adequate account of well-being. Many of the platitudes we accept about children and about what counts as good for them in their development carry more force and attract less controversy than vexed questions about what competent adults choose for themselves and the bearing of those choices on their good. Kraut drew attention to the significance of the process of growing up in his  paper, and brings home here the full force of what we believe is right for those becoming fully fledged human beings. Rosalind Hursthouse remarked that Aristotle never forgot that we were once children,2 and Kraut perhaps more than anyone else working in the area has taken this to heart.  MARK LEBAR ©  The Author Journal compilation ©  The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly 1 In this way Kraut's theory is welfarist in the sense identified by L.W. Sumner, Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, ), p. . 2 R. Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (Oxford UP, ), p. . Ch.  applies the insights of developmentalism, with the aim of showing the reach of the theory, in particular that we do not have to go beyond good-for considerations to account for the reasons we have for action. Kraut considers possible sources of demurral on this point – promising, punishment, desert, rights, consent – to argue that none needs to go beyond considerations of good-for to account for the proper sorts of reasons to act in each case. This is an all too brief survey
of his arrows miss their marks. Still, Kraut's argument in most case will, I suspect, earn their way into rebutter in a wide variety of venue. Ch.  is the kernel of the positive account. Here Kraut lays out the shape which developmentalism aim in the human case, and explains in contingent what are the kinds of power the proper development of which constitutes what is good for us. His argument features much reasonable development of platitudes about what is good for us which are well overlooked but ought to be staples of any adequate account of well - being. Many of the platitudes we bear about children and about what counts as good for them in their development impart more force and attract less controversy than vexed questions about what competent adults choose for themselves and the bearing of those option on their good. Kraut drew attention to the significance of the process of growing up in his  paper, and brings home here the full force of what we think is correct for those becoming in full fledge human beings. Rosalind Hursthouse remarked that Aristotle never forgot that we were once children,2 and Kraut possibly more than anyone else working in the sphere has taken this to heart.  MARK LEBAR ©  The Author Journal compilation ©  The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly 1 In this direction Kraut's theory is welfarist in the sense identified by L.W. Sumner, Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, ), p. . 2 R. Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (Oxford UP, ), p. . Ch.  applies the insights of developmentalism, with the aim of showing the reach of the theory, in particular that we do not have to blend beyond good - for retainer to account for the reasons we have for action. Kraut considers potential sources of demurral on this point – promising, punishment, desert, rights, consent – to argue that none needs to go beyond considerations of good - for to report for the proper sorts of reasons to act in each case. This is an all excessively brief sketch
 of his arrows miss their mxrks. Still, Krauj's argumxnts in most cares will, I suspect, earn theic wat inti rebuttals in a wide xariety ov venues. Ch.  us the heacf of thc posjbive ccrount. Here Krauj lays out tve shape which ddvzlopmentalism takes in the human casq, and ecppains in detaij whse ars the kinds of power the proper debelopmeit of which conxtitutes what is good for ks. Hls argument featurfs much senwiblq development of platitlbes about wgat is good for us which are earily pverlooked byt loght to be svaples of any adeqmste acwount og well-being. Maky of thw platitudes we accepv about children and about whdt counts as good fir them in dheif dexelkpkeht cargy jore force and attracr less controversy uhag vexed questikns abjue what competent adults choose for themvelbes and the bearing of rhose choices on theit good. Kratt drew attention to the significance of the procass oh eroclkg uo ij his  paper, and brings home here the full fowde on what we believc is right for thoxe brsoming fully wledgeb hhman beings. Rosalijd Hursjhouse remarked thay Aristotle never forgot thqt we were ouce children,2 and Krauc perhaps moxe tham anypne else working in the arez has taken this to gdart.  MARK LEBAR ©  Nhe Duthor Journal compilation ©  The Edmtors of The Phikosophycal Quartfrly 1 In this way Kraut's theoty is felfarist ln the sense identified by L.W. Snkner, Welfare, Hdpppness, and Ethigs (Oxford: Claregdon Press, ), p. . 2 R. Hurfthoure, On Virtle Ethics (Oxford UP, ), p. . Ch.  appliad the insighvs of devqlopnentqlism, wkgh the aim of xhowing tkt reach of the theory, in parbiculxd that we do noc yave to go beyomd eooq-flr cjtsiderations to xccuint fur the reasivs wr have for action. Krdut donsiders possible sjurces od demurrwl on this poont – promising, punlshmeit, desxrt, ribhtf, consent – to argue that none heeds to ho neyond considqratlons of good-fox to account for the proper sorts of reawons to act in eacy case. This is an akk too brief survqy
of his arrows miss their marks. Still, in cases will, suspect, earn their wide of venues. Ch. is the heart the positive account. Here Kraut lays the shape which developmentalism takes in the human case, and explains in detail are the kinds of power the proper development of which constitutes what is for His features sensible development of platitudes about what is good for us which are easily overlooked but ought be staples of any adequate account of well-being. of the platitudes we about children and about what as for them their carry force and attract controversy than vexed questions about what competent adults choose for themselves and the bearing of those choices their good. attention to significance the of growing up  paper, and brings home here of what we believe is right for those fully fledged beings. Rosalind Hursthouse remarked that Aristotle forgot that we were once children,2 and Kraut more than anyone else working in the area has taken this to heart.  MARK  The Author Journal ©  The of Philosophical 1 this way theory is welfarist in the sense identified by L.W. Sumner, Welfare, and Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, ), p. . 2 R. Virtue (Oxford UP, ), . Ch.  applies insights developmentalism, with the aim the of particular we not have to go good-for considerations to account for reasons we have for of demurral on this point – promising, punishment, rights, consent – to argue that none to go beyond considerations of good-for to account for the proper sorts reasons to each case. This is an all too brief
 of his arrows miss their marks. still, Kraut'S arguMenTs iN mOst cAses Will, I suspect, eaRN theIr way into rebuttals in a wIde vaRiETy of VEnUes. Ch.  Is the heARt OF The PoSiTivE aCCoUnt. HeRe KRaut layS out the shaPe wHiCh developmenTAlIsm takes in The Human case, and ExpLains iN dEtaIL what Are The kiNds of pOWer the Proper devElOPment oF Which coNSTiTuteS what is good for us. HIS aRGument features Much seNsIBlE DEveLopMent of platItUdes aBOut what IS gOOD For US which are easiLy overlookeD But Ought tO bE stAPles of Any adEqUAte Account of weLl-beIng. Many of The plaTItudes wE Accept aBout chIldRen And aBOuT wHat CoUNts AS gOod FOr tHem in theIr DeVelopMent CARRY morE foRce aNd attRact less contrOveRsy tHAn vExed qUestiOns aBoUt whaT compeTent aDuLts choose for theMselVes and the BeaRiNg oF tHose cHOices oN thEir Good. KraUt drew aTTenTiON TO tHe significance of thE pROCeSs of growIng up iN HiS  pAPer, and brInGs hOme hERE the fUll fORcE of what wE belieVE iS rIght for ThOse becOmIng FulLy fleDGed hUman beIngs. RosaLind HURsthouse remarkED that AristotlE NeVER fORgot ThaT we were once ChilDRen,2 aNd KrAUt PerHAps moRe thaN aNYoNE else working in the arEa Has takEn thiS to heart.  MARK LeBAR ©  The AutHOR journal cOmpiLAtIOn ©  The Editors of the PhIlosophicaL quarterlY 1 In thIs way KraUt's theory IS WelfarisT in The SenSe iDENtIfied by L.W. SumnER, welfArE, HappinEss, And EthiCs (OXfoRd: CLarEnDon Press, ), p. . 2 r. HursthoUsE, ON VIrTue ethicS (oxford UP, ), P. . CH.  apPlIes The inSIghts oF deveLopmEnTaLIsm, With the AIm OF ShowInG tHe reAch Of The thEory, IN paRticulaR that we do Not HAve tO gO bEyond goOd-for considerAtIons to accoUnT foR the reASOns we havE for action. Kraut considerS PossiblE soUrces Of deMurral on tHis Point – pRomISing, puNishmeNt, desErT, riGHTs, conSENt – To aRgUe that none NEEds To go bEyOnd cOnsiderAtions of good-for to aCCouNt for the propeR soRts oF REaSonS To ACt iN eACh cASE. This is an all too Brief surveY
 of his arrows miss theirmarks. Sti ll, K rau t's  a rgum ents  in most cases will , I suspect, earn thei r way  i n to r e bu ttals  in a w i de v ari et yofve n ue s. Ch .   is the  heart ofthe  p ositive acco u nt . Here Kra utlays out the  sh ape wh ic h d e velop men talis m take s  in th e human c as e , ande xplains i ndeta il what are the k i nd s  of power theproper  d e ve l o pme ntof which c on stitu t es what is g o odf or us. His ar gument feat u res  muchse nsi b le dev elopm en t  of  platitudes  abo ut what i s good for usw hich ar e easi lyove rloo k ed  b utou g htt obes tap les of a ny  a dequa te a c c o u nt o f w ell- being . Many of the  pl atit u des  we a ccept  abo ut  chil dren a nd ab ou t what counts a s go od for th emin  th ei r dev e lopmen t c arr y moreforce a n d a tt r a c tless controversy t ha n ve xed ques tionsa bo ut what com pe ten t ad u l ts ch oose fo r themse lves a n dth e beari ng  of th os e c hoi ces o n  the ir goo d. Kraut  drew attention to t h e significanc e  o f th e  pro ces s of growin g up in h is     pa p er, a nd br in g sh ome here the full f or ce ofwhatwe believe is  right for t h ose beco ming fu l ly fledged hum an be ings. Rosa l ind Hurs thous e remark ed that A r i stotle n eve r f org ott h at  we were once c hild re n,2 and  Kr aut per hap s m ore  th an  anyone e lse work in gin  t heareah as taken  t his  t o h eart.  MA RK LE BAR©   T he Auth o rJ o urna lco mpil ati on  ©   T h e E ditorsof The Ph ilo s ophi ca lQuarter ly 1 In thiswa y Kraut'sth eor y is w e l farist i n the sense identifiedb y L.W.Sum ner,Welf are, Happ ine ss, an d E t hics ( Oxford : Cla re ndo n Press ,  ) ,p. . 2R .  Hu rstho us e, O n Virtu e Ethics (Oxford U P ,  ), p. .Ch.   a p p li est he ins ig h tso f  developmentali sm, with t he ai m of showi n g t he  reachof thetheor y , in pa rticularthat we d onoth a veto go beyo nd good- for consi d erati o ns  to a cco unt fo rthe  reas ons we hav e for  actio n.  Kraut  cons id ers poss ible sources of demurra l on t his p oin t – promi sin g , p unishment , de sert, righ ts,  co nsent  –t o arg ue t h at  no n e nee ds t o  go beyon d  c ons i d er ations of g o o d -fo r toacc o unt fo r th e proper sorts of reasons to act  ine a chcas e . Th is  is an all too  br ie f survey
 of_his arrows_miss their marks. Still,_Kraut's arguments_in_most cases_will,_I suspect, earn_their way into_rebuttals in a wide_variety of venues._Ch._ is the heart of the positive account. Here Kraut lays out the shape_which_developmentalism takes_in_the_human case, and explains in_detail what are the kinds_of power_the proper development of which constitutes what is_good_for us. His_argument features much sensible development of platitudes about what_is good for us which are_easily overlooked but_ought_to_be staples of any_adequate account of well-being. Many of_the platitudes we accept about children_and about what counts as good for_them in their development carry more_force and attract less controversy_than vexed_questions about what competent adults_choose for themselves_and the_bearing of those_choices on their good. Kraut drew_attention to the_significance of the process of growing_up_in his _paper,_and_brings home_here the full_force_of what_we_believe is right for those becoming_fully_fledged human beings. Rosalind Hursthouse remarked that_Aristotle never forgot that_we_were once children,2 and_Kraut perhaps more than anyone_else working in the area has_taken this_to heart._ MARK LEBAR ©  The Author Journal compilation © _The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly_1 In this way_Kraut's theory_is_welfarist in the_sense_identified by_L.W. Sumner, Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics (Oxford:_Clarendon Press,_), p. . 2 R. Hursthouse,_On Virtue Ethics (Oxford_UP,_), p. . Ch.  applies_the insights of developmentalism, with the_aim of showing the reach_of_the_theory, in particular that we_do not have to go beyond_good-for considerations to_account for the reasons we have for_action._Kraut considers possible sources of demurral_on_this point – promising, punishment, desert,_rights,_consent_– to argue that none_needs to go beyond considerations of_good-for to account for the proper sorts of reasons_to act in_each case. This is an_all_too_brief survey