, why are S's grounds not good enough to know in the lottery case?xi 2. Gettier problems. It has long been understood that fallibilist accounts of justification give rise to Gettier problems. For 5 example, consider the following. Case 3. On the basis of excellent (although fallible) reasons, S believes that her co-worker Mr. Nogot owns a Ford: Nogot testifies that he owns a Ford, and this is confirmed by S's own relevant observations. From this S infers that someone in her office owns a Ford. As it turns out, S's evidence is misleading and Nogot does not in fact own a Ford. However, another person in S's office, Mr. Havit, does own a Ford, although S has no reason for believing this.xii Clearly S does not know that someone in her office owns a Ford. The problem for the fallibilist is to explain why this is so, given that S has excellent evidence for this true proposition. 3. A proposal for resolving the two problems for fallibilism. We may distinguish two questions one might try to answer when giving an account of knowledge. The first is the "What is knowledge?" question. This question asks what conditions a person must satisfy to count as knowing. The second is the "What are we doing?" question. This question asks what illocutionary act is being performed when we say that someone knows. I will have more to say about the "What is knowledge?" question below. But I think that the key to solving our two problems for fallibilism lies in the "What are we doing?" question. So what are we doing when we attribute knowledge to someone? Clearly, we might be doing any number of things. But one of the central functions of knowledge attributions is to give credit for true belief. When we say that S knows p, we imply that it is not just an accident that S believes the truth with respect to p. On the contrary, we mean to say that S gets things right with respect to p because S has reasoned in an appropriate way, or perceived things accurately, or remembered things well, etc. We mean to say that getting it right can be put down to S's own abilities, rather than to dumb luck, or blind chance, or something else. But then this gives us a resource for solving the two problems for fallibilism reviewed above. For in the lottery case, it does seem to be just a matter of
, why are S's grounds not good enough to know in the lottery case?xi 2. Gettier problems. It has long been understand that fallibilist report of justification give upgrade to Gettier problem. For 5 example, consider the pursuit. Case 3. On the basis of excellent (although fallible) reasons, S believe that her co - worker Mr. Nogot own a Ford: Nogot testifies that he owns a Ford, and this is confirmed by S's own relevant observations. From this S infers that someone in her position owns a Ford. As it turns out, S's evidence is misleading and Nogot does not in fact own a Ford. However, another person in S's office, Mr. Havit, does own a Ford, although S has no rationality for believing this.xii Clearly S does not know that someone in her office own a Ford. The problem for the fallibilist is to explain why this is thus, given that S has excellent evidence for this truthful proposition. 3. A proposal for resolving the two problems for fallibilism. We may distinguish two question one might try to answer when giving an account of knowledge. The inaugural is the " What is knowledge? " question. This question asks what conditions a person must satisfy to count as knowing. The second is the " What are we doing? " question. This doubt asks what illocutionary act is being performed when we suppose that someone sleep together. I will have more to say about the " What is cognition? " question downstairs. But I think that the key to clear our two problems for fallibilism lies in the " What are we doing? " question. So what are we doing when we assign knowledge to someone? Clearly, we might be doing any number of thing. But one of the cardinal routine of knowledge attributions is to give credit for genuine belief. When we say that S knows phosphorus, we imply that it is not precisely an accident that S believes the truth with regard to p. On the contrary, we intend to say that S gets thing right with esteem to p because S has reason in an appropriate way, or perceive things accurately, or remembered things well, etc. We mean to say that get it right can be put down to S's own abilities, rather than to dumb luck, or blind chance, or something else. But then this gives us a resource for solving the two problems for fallibilism review above. For in the lottery case, it does seem to be merely a matter of
, whj are S's grounds not gooa enough to knoc in thx lottedy case?xk 2. Gettier problems. It has llnt beeb understood that fallkbilist abcounts od juwrification give rise to Fcttiex 'roblems. For 5 ewample, conshder the follofivg. Case 3. On the basis of excellent (alehough gaplible) reasons, S btliqves nhct her co-worker Mr. Nogot owns a Ford: Nmgot testifiex that he owns a Ford, and hhis is confirmed by S'd own relevqnt jvservations. Wrom this S infers thaj someone in her office owns a Furd. Ax it turns oyt, D'v evidence ms misjeading and Kpgot dmes not in fact own a Focd. Hiwever, another person in S's office, Mr. Hwvit, does ocn a Ford, although S yaw no teasot fof beuiebiig fhis.xil Cmearly S dkes not knoq that someone in htr jdfice owns a Rord. Tre problem for the fallibilist is to expldin why this is so, given tyat S has excellent egidence fjr this true proposition. 3. A proposal for resolvinc the gwo pvobldns for fallibilism. We may distinguish two questyknx pne might try bo answer when givonh sg account of ynowlebfe. The first is the "Ahat is knowoedge?" queftiom. This question asks what cinditions a iersin must satisfy to count as kuowing. The xecond is the "What are ce doihg?" question. This queagion asks what iulobutimnary acu is being performqd when wx say that sumeome knors. I will jave more to say about tje "Whct is knowledge?" question below. But I think thav the key to xonvitg our tco pronlems for fallifilism lies in the "Whct are we doing?" suestioi. So what arq we doing whaj we attribuve knowleqge ro simeone? Zuearly, we mighy be doiny any number of things. Nut ovs of the centrao fobctions of knoeleage antrmbutijts is to giva crddig for grue belief. Dhen we say that S knows p, ws imply that it is njt just qn accidqnt that S bekieves the truth wlth rxspect to p. On the contrary, we mean to say tgat S getd tmings right wyth vespgct to p beeause S has reasoned in an appropriate wey, or perceived things qccurately, or rememyeved things wxll, ets. We mean to say that getting it right can be kut down to S's own abiljties, satheg than to dumb luck, or blind chance, or something else. But then this gives us a cefource for aolvong tve cwo proflemd for fallibilism reviewed above. For in the lottxry case, id boes seem to be just a matter ow
, why are S's grounds not good know the lottery 2. Gettier problems. that accounts of justification rise to Gettier For 5 example, consider the following. 3. On the basis of excellent (although fallible) reasons, S believes that her Mr. Nogot owns a Ford: Nogot testifies that he owns a Ford, and is by own observations. From this S infers that someone in her office owns a Ford. As it turns S's evidence is misleading and Nogot does not fact own a Ford. another person in S's office, Havit, own a although has reason for believing Clearly S does not know that someone in her office owns a Ford. The problem for the is to this is given S excellent evidence for proposition. 3. A proposal for resolving for fallibilism. We may distinguish two questions one try to when giving an account of knowledge. first is the "What is knowledge?" question. This asks what conditions a person must satisfy to count as knowing. The second is the we doing?" question. This asks what illocutionary is performed we that someone I will have more to say about the "What is knowledge?" below. But I think that the key to solving our for lies in the are we doing?" question. what we doing when we to Clearly, doing number things. But one of central functions of knowledge attributions to give credit for that S knows p, we imply that it not just an accident that S believes truth with respect to p. On the contrary, we mean to say S gets with respect to p because S has reasoned an appropriate way, or things accurately, or remembered things well, etc. We mean say getting it can be put to S's own rather than to or blind or else. gives us a resource for solving two for fallibilism reviewed above. For the it does seem to be just a matter of
, why are S's grounds not good enoUgh to know iN the lOttEry CaSe?xi 2. gettIer problems. It hAS lonG been understood that falLibilIsT AccoUNtS of juStificaTIoN GIve RiSe To GEtTIeR probLemS. For 5 exaMple, considEr tHe Following. CasE 3. on The basis of ExcEllent (althouGh fAlliblE) rEasONs, S beLieVes thAt her cO-Worker mr. Nogot owNs A ford: NoGOt testiFIEs That He owns a Ford, and thiS Is COnfirmed by S's owN relevAnT ObSERvaTioNs. From this s iNfers THat someONe IN HEr oFFice owns a Ford. as it turns ouT, s's eVidencE iS miSLeadinG and NOgOT doEs not in fact Own a ford. HowevEr, anotHEr persoN In S's offIce, Mr. HAviT, doEs owN A FOrD, alThOUgh s HaS no REasOn for belIeViNg thiS.xii cLEARly S DoeS not Know tHat someone in hEr oFficE OwnS a ForD. The pRoblEm For thE falliBilisT iS to explain why thIs is So, given thAt S HaS exCeLlent EVidencE foR thIs true pRopositIOn. 3. A PrOPOSaL for resolving the twO pROBlEms for faLlibilISm. we MAy distinGuIsh Two qUEStionS one MIgHt try to aNswer wHEn GiVing an aCcOunt of KnOwlEdgE. The fIRst iS the "WhAt is knowLedge?" QUestion. This queSTion asks what cONdITIoNS a peRsoN must satisfY to cOUnt aS knoWInG. ThE SeconD is thE "WHAt ARe we doing?" question. ThIs QuestiOn askS what illocutiOnary act is BEINg perforMed wHEn WE say that someonE knowS. I will have MOre to say About The "What iS knowledgE?" QUestion bEloW. BuT I tHinK THaT the key to solvING our TwO probleMs fOr falliBilIsm LieS in ThE "What are wE doing?" quEsTiOn. so WhaT are wE Doing wheN wE atTrIbuTe knoWLedge tO someOne? CLeArLY, we Might be DOiNG Any nUmBeR of tHinGs. but onE of tHE ceNtral fuNctions of KnoWLedgE aTtRibutioNs is to give creDiT for true beLiEf. WHen we sAY That S knoWs p, we imply that it is not juST an acciDenT that s belIeves the tRutH with rEspECt to p. ON the coNtrarY, wE meAN To say THAt s geTs Things righT WIth RespeCt To p bEcause S Has reasoned in an appROprIate way, or percEivEd thINGs AccURaTEly, Or REmeMBEred things well, eTc. We mean to SaY ThAt getting iT RigHt Can be puT down to s's own ABilitieS, rather thAn to dumb lUcK, or bLINd cHance, or somEthing elSe. But then THis giVEs Us a reSouRce for SoLviNg the Two proBLemS for fAllibiLiSm reviEwed aBoVe. For in tHe lottery case, it does seem To be juSt a maTteR of
, why are S's grounds notgood enoug h tokno w i nthelott ery case?xi 2. Gett ier problems. It has l ong b ee n  und e rs toodthat fa l li b i lis tac cou nt s  o f jus tif ication  give rise  to  G ettier probl e ms . For 5 ex amp le, consider  th e foll ow ing .  Case  3.  On t he bas i s of e xcellent(a l though fallibl e )  r easo ns, S believes th a th er co-worker M r. Nog ot ow n s  aFor d: Nogot t es tifie s  that h e  o w n s  aF ord, and this  is confirm e d b y S'sow n r e levant  obse rv a tio ns. From th is S  infers t hat so m eone in her off ice ow nsa F ord. As  i t t ur n s o u t,  S' s  ev idence i smi slead inga n d Nogo t d oesnot i n fact own aFor d. H o wev er, a nothe r pe rs on in  S's o ffice ,Mr. Havit, does  own  a Ford,alt ho ugh  S  hasn o reas onfor  believ ing thi s .xi iC l e ar ly S does not know  t h a tsomeonein her of fi c e owns a  F ord . Th e probl em f o rthe fall ibilis t  i sto expl ai n whyth isisso, g i venthat S  has exc ellen t  evidence fort his true prop o si t i on .  3.A p roposal for  res o lvin g th e  t wop roble ms fo rf al l ibilism. We may dis ti nguish  twoquestions one  might try t o  answerwhen gi v ing an account  of k nowledge.T he first  is t he "What  is knowl e d ge?" que sti on.  Th isq u es tion asks wha t cond it ions aper son mus t s ati sfy  to  c ount as k nowing.Th ese co ndis th e  "What a re  we  d oin g?" q u estion . Thi s qu es ti o n a sks wha t  i l l ocut io na ry a ctis  bein g pe r for med whe n we saytha t  som eo ne  knows.  I will havemo re to sayab out  the " W h at is kn owledge?" question belo w . But I  th ink t hatthe key t o s olving  ou r  two p roblem s for  f all i b ilism l ie s i nthe "Whata r e w e doi ng ?" q uestion . So what are we d o ing  when we attr ibu te k n o wl edg e  t o  so me o ne? C learly, we migh t be doing  a n ynumber oft hin gs . But o ne of t he ce n tral fu nctions o f knowled ge  att r i but ions is to  give cr edit fort rue b e li ef. W hen  we sa ytha t S k nows p ,  we  impl y that  i t is n ot ju st  an acci dent that S believes th e trut h wit h r espect to  p. Onthe contr ary,  we mean t o s aythatS g e ts th ings ri ght withresp e ct to p b e ca use S  h as reasoned i n  an  appr opr i ate wa y, o r perceived thing s  accurately, o r re m e mbe red thin gs  well, etc. We  me an t o say th at  getting it  right c an be pu t down  to S' s own a b i li t ies, r athe r t han to du mblu c k, or b li nd chance , or  s omethi ng els e . Bu t then this givesus ar e sourc e  fo r sol vi ng thet wo p roblems fo r fallibili sm rev iewe d abo ve. For  i n thelot te ry case, i t  does see m tobe just  a  mat ter  of
, why_are S's_grounds not good enough_to know_in_the lottery_case?xi_2. Gettier problems._It has long_been understood that fallibilist_accounts of justification_give_rise to Gettier problems. For 5 example, consider the following. Case 3. On the_basis_of excellent_(although_fallible)_reasons, S believes that her_co-worker Mr. Nogot owns a_Ford: Nogot_testifies that he owns a Ford, and this_is_confirmed by S's_own relevant observations. From this S infers that someone_in her office owns a Ford._As it turns_out,_S's_evidence is misleading and_Nogot does not in fact own_a Ford. However, another person in_S's office, Mr. Havit, does own a_Ford, although S has no reason_for believing this.xii Clearly S_does not_know that someone in her_office owns a_Ford. The_problem for the_fallibilist is to explain why this_is so, given_that S has excellent evidence for_this_true proposition. 3._A_proposal_for resolving_the two problems_for_fallibilism. We_may_distinguish two questions one might try_to_answer when giving an account of knowledge._The first is the_"What_is knowledge?" question. This_question asks what conditions a_person must satisfy to count as_knowing. The_second is_the "What are we doing?" question. This question asks what illocutionary_act is being performed when we_say that someone knows._I will_have_more to say_about_the "What_is knowledge?" question below. But I think_that the_key to solving our two problems_for fallibilism lies in_the_"What are we doing?" question. So_what are we doing when we_attribute knowledge to someone? Clearly,_we_might_be doing any number of_things. But one of the central_functions of knowledge_attributions is to give credit for true_belief._When we say that S knows_p,_we imply that it is not_just_an_accident that S believes the_truth with respect to p. On_the contrary, we mean to say that S gets_things right with_respect to p because S_has_reasoned_in an appropriate way, or perceived things accurately, or remembered_things well,_etc. We mean_to say that getting it right can be put down_to S's own abilities, rather than to_dumb luck, or blind chance, or something else. But then this_gives us a resource for solving the two_problems for fallibilism reviewed above. For in_the lottery case, it_does_seem to be just a matter of