 individuable and identifiable independently of the selves that are their subjects, so that fatal circularity dooms the project. [...] [I]ndividual mental states are necessarily states of persons: they are necessarily 'owned' – necessarily have a subject." Put in this way, the objection is that experiences cannot "float-free" in the sense that they are not independent entities – there must be a subject that has them. Such an objection can be raised against the bundle theory of the Self, but it arises perhaps even more stringently against my pluralistic view, since according to this view there are not even the bundles to play the role of the subject. In a general form, it arises also against any bundle theory, even a bundle theory about ordinary material objects, as Armstrong (1997, p.99) argues: "There is a fundamental difficulty with all bundle theories. It is that properties and relations, whether universals or particulars, seem not suitable to be the ultimate constituents of reality. If they are the ultimate constituents, then, it appears, completely different (non-overlapping) properties and relations will be 'distinct existences' in Hume's sense of the phrase: entities logically capable of independent existence. But are properties and relations really capable of independent existence? Can a certain determinate mass, for instance, whether the universal of that mass or the trope mass of this particular body, exist in logical independence of anything else? It hardly seems so. The case against the possibility of independent existence for relations seems even stronger." 7 How to reply to such a worry? On one side of the debate we have the claim that properties (in the case of a general bundle theory) or experiences and psychological states (in the case of a bundle theory or a pluralistic theory about the Self) cannot exist without a substratum or a subject to ontologically support them. On the other side we have the claim that they can. On behalf of the bundle theory about the Self, Dainton (2008a, p.342, 347-8) claims that it is the bundling ("the unity criterion" in his way of putting things) that provides the desired substantiality. But even if such a response were adequate, it would not be of much help when it comes to the pluralistic view of the Self since there is no bundling in this case. But why does the worry has some force in the first place? The worry claims that experiences are not substantial enough to exist without there being any ontologically independent subject
individuable and identifiable independently of the selves that are their subjects, so that fatal circularity dooms the undertaking. [... ] [ I]ndividual genial department of state are necessarily state of person: they are necessarily' owned' – inevitably have a subject. " Put in this manner, the objection is that experiences cannot " float - barren " in the sense that they are not independent entity – there must be a subject that has them. Such an objection can be raised against the bundle theory of the Self, but it arises perhaps even more strictly against my pluralistic view, since according to this view there be not even the bundles to play the function of the subject. In a cosmopolitan form, it arise also against any bundle theory, even a bundle hypothesis about ordinary material objects, as Armstrong (1997, p.99) argues: " There is a fundamental trouble with all bundle theory. It is that properties and relations, whether universals or particulars, seem not suitable to be the ultimate constituents of reality. If they are the ultimate constituents, then, it look, completely different (non - overlapping) place and relative will be' distinct existences' in Hume's sense of the phrase: entities logically capable of independent being. But are properties and relations really capable of independent existence? Can a sealed determinate mass, for instance, whether the universal of that mass or the trope mass of this particular body, exist in logical independence of anything else? It barely seem so. The case against the possibility of independent being for relations seems even stronger. " 7 How to answer to such a worry? On one english of the debate we have the call that properties (in the sheath of a general bundle hypothesis) or experiences and psychological states (in the case of a bundle theory or a pluralistic hypothesis about the Self) cannot exist without a substratum or a subject to ontologically confirm them. On the other side we receive the claim that they can. On behalf of the bundle theory about the Self, Dainton (2008a, p.342, 347 - 8) claims that it is the bundling (" the unity criterion " in his way of putting things) that provides the desired substantiality. But even if such a response were adequate, it would not be of much aid when it comes to the pluralistic view of the Self since there be no bundling in this case. But why does the worry has some force in the first place? The concern claims that experiences are not substantial enough to exist without there being any ontologically independent subject
 infividuable and identifianle independentli if the selvea that afe their subjects, so that faval xircuoarity dooms the projezt. [...] [I]ndivpdual menral wrates are iscessarljy sfwtes if persons: thei are necessdrily 'owned' – nacdsdarily have a subject." Put in this wwy, the pbuection is thaj exptriqncea cannot "float-free" in the sense thzt they are not indelendent entities – there mudt bf a subject that hws them. Sucy an ibjection cav be raised against thg bundle theory of the Self, but kt arnses perhapw wvej more strinjently against my ikuralivtic virw, since accorcinj to this view there are iot even the bundles to play dhz role of the subject. Ib a ggneran fofn, ig adixea also ageinst any bhndle theort, even a bundle theprr about ordinady matqryal objects, as Armstrong (1997, p.99) argues: "Thert is z fundamental difficultt with all bundle thelries. It ys that properties and relations, whether universans or oaruigmlarr, sfem not suitable to be the ultimate constituegfs on reality. If then are the ultimate clnxjituents, then, kt appzzra, completely diffegent (nog-overoapping) pwopetties and relations will be 'distinct expstebces' in Hume's sensz of the phrcse: enjities logically capable of iudepensent existejce. But add properties and rekadions really capable of inqependent exixtence? Zan s certwin determlnate mass, for instance, ahethgr the universal of that mass or the trope mass of this partivunar body, exnst in logical inde[endence of anithing elfe? It hardly sevms so. Thx case againft the possibhpity of inde'endent evistwnce for reuxtions seems efen stronytr." 7 How to reply to such a wprri? Kn one side of cke debate we have thd cjapm vhat [soperties (in the carr of x general bmndue tneory) or experiences and psychological stayef (in the case of a bundle thepry or a pluralistlc thxory auout tne Felf) cannot exist without a sugstratum lr w subject to ontilogically sbpport them. On the other side we have thx claim that they can. Ob behalf of the bunblt theory abouv the Felf, Daindon (2008a, p.342, 347-8) claims that it is the bundlikg ("the unity criterion" in hiv way of putting things) that provides the desired substantiality. But even if sych a cefponse were adeauate, ic wpuld njt bx uf much help whem it comes to the pluralistic vmew of the Szlf since there is no bundlinb kn this case. Cut why does the worry hzs some gorce in the first place? The wotry claims that experienges are nit sugstantpzl enough to exist wothout therw being any ontologicallh imdcpendent skbjert
individuable and identifiable independently of the selves their so that circularity dooms the are states of persons: are necessarily 'owned' necessarily have a subject." Put in way, the objection is that experiences cannot "float-free" in the sense that they not independent entities – there must be a subject that has them. Such objection be against bundle theory of the Self, but it arises perhaps even more stringently against my pluralistic view, according to this view there are not even bundles to play the of the subject. In a form, arises also any theory, a bundle theory ordinary material objects, as Armstrong (1997, p.99) argues: "There is a fundamental difficulty with all bundle theories. is that relations, whether or seem suitable to be constituents of reality. If they are then, it appears, completely different (non-overlapping) properties and will be existences' in Hume's sense of the entities logically capable of independent existence. But are and relations really capable of independent existence? Can a certain determinate mass, for instance, whether of that mass or trope mass of particular exist logical of anything It hardly seems so. The case against the possibility of independent for relations seems even stronger." 7 How to reply to worry? one side of debate we have the that (in the case of bundle or states the of a bundle theory a pluralistic theory about the cannot exist without a ontologically support them. On the other side we the claim that they can. On behalf the bundle theory about the Self, Dainton (2008a, p.342, 347-8) claims that is the unity criterion" in his way of putting things) provides the desired substantiality. even if such a response were adequate, it would be much help it comes to pluralistic view of Self since there bundling in case. why has some force in the first The claims that experiences are not enough without there being any ontologically independent subject
 individuable and identifiabLe independEntly Of tHe sElVes tHat aRe their subjectS, So thAt fatal circularity doomS the pRoJEct. [...] [I]NDiViduaL mental STaTES arE nEcEssArILy StateS of Persons: They are necEssArIly 'owned' – neceSSaRily have a sUbjEct." Put in this Way, The objEcTioN Is thaT exPerieNces caNNot "floAt-free" in tHe SEnse thAT they arE NOt IndePendent entities – thERe MUst be a subject tHat has ThEM. SUCH an ObjEction can bE rAised AGainst tHE bUNDLe tHEory of the Self, But it arises PErhAps eveN mOre STringeNtly aGaINst My pluralistIc viEw, since acCordinG To this vIEw there Are not EveN thE bunDLeS tO plAy THe rOLe Of tHE suBject. In a GeNeRal foRm, it ARISEs alSo aGainSt any Bundle theory, eVen A bunDLe tHeory About OrdiNaRy matErial oBjectS, aS Armstrong (1997, p.99) arguEs: "ThEre is a funDamEnTal DiFficuLTy with All BunDle theoRies. It iS ThaT pROPErTies and relations, whEtHER uNiversalS or parTIcUlARs, seem noT sUitAble TO Be the UltiMAtE constitUents oF ReAlIty. If thEy Are the UlTimAte ConstITuenTs, then, It appearS, compLEtely different (NOn-overlapping) PRoPERtIEs anD reLations will Be 'diSTincT exiSTeNceS' In HumE's senSe OF tHE phrase: entities logiCaLly capAble oF independent eXistence. BuT ARE propertIes aND rELations really cApablE of indepenDEnt existEnce? CAn a certaIn determiNATe mass, foR inStaNce, WheTHEr The universal oF THat mAsS or the tRopE mass of ThiS paRtiCulAr Body, exist In logicaL iNdEpEnDenCe of aNYthing elSe? it hArDly Seems SO. The caSe agaInst ThE pOSsiBility oF InDEPendEnT eXistEncE fOr relAtioNS seEms even Stronger." 7 HOw tO ReplY tO sUch a worRy? On one side of ThE debate we hAvE thE claim THAt properTies (in the case of a general BUndle thEorY) or exPeriEnces and pSycHologiCal STates (iN the caSe of a BuNdlE THeory OR A pLurAlIstic theorY ABouT the SElF) canNot exisT without a substratuM Or a Subject to ontoLogIcalLY SuPpoRT tHEm. ON tHE otHER side we have the cLaim that thEy CAn. on behalf of THe bUnDle theoRy about The SeLF, DaintoN (2008a, p.342, 347-8) claims That it is tHe BundLINg ("tHe unity criTerion" in His way of pUTting THiNgs) thAt pRovideS tHe dEsireD substANtiAlity. but eveN iF such a RespoNsE were adeQuate, it would not be of much Help whEn it cOmeS to the pluRalIStiC view of thE SelF since therE is No bUndliNg iN This cAse. BUT wHy dOEs the WorrY Has some foRCe In tHE FiRst place? The WORRy cLaims ThaT ExperiEnceS are not substantiaL Enough to exist wIthoUT TheRe bEIng aNy Ontologically iNdePeNDEnt subjeCt
 individuable and identifi able indep enden tly  of  t he s elve s that are the i r su bjects, so that fatalcircu la r ityd oo ms th e proje c t. [ ... ][I ]nd iv i du al me nta l state s are nece ssa ri ly states of pe rsons: the y a re necessari ly'owned '– n e cessa ril y hav e a su b ject."  Put in t hi s  way,t he obje c t io n is  that experiences ca n not "float-fre e" inth e  s e n setha t they are  n ot in d ependen t  e n t i tie s  – there must  be a subje c t t hat ha sthe m . Such  an o bj e cti on can be r aise d against  the b u ndle th e ory ofthe Se lf,  bu t it ar is espe r hap s  e ven mor e string en tl y aga inst m y plur ali stic  view , since accor din g to thi s vie w the re a re  noteven t he bu nd les to play the  rol e of thesub je ct.  I n a g e neralfor m,it aris es also aga in s t an y bundle theory, e ve n abundle t heorya bo ut ordinary  m ate rial o bject s, a s  A rmstrong  (1997 ,  p .9 9) argu es : "The re  is  afunda m enta l diff iculty w ith a l l bundle theor i es. It is tha t  p r o pe r ties  an d relations , wh e ther  uni v er sal s  or p artic ul a rs ,  seem not suitableto  be th e ult imate constit uents of r e a l ity. Ifthey ar e  the ultimateconst ituents, t h en, it a ppear s, compl etely dif f e rent (no n-o ver lap pin g )  p roperties and r elat io ns will  be  'disti nct  ex ist enc es ' in Hume 's sense  o fth ephr ase:e ntitieslo gic al lycapab l e of i ndepe nden tex i ste nce. Bu t  a r e  pro pe rt iesand  r elati onsr eal ly capa ble of in dep e nden tex istence ? Can a certa in  determina te  ma ss, fo r instance , whether the universal of that  ma ss or  the  trope ma ssof thi s p a rticul ar bod y, ex is t i n logic a l  i nde pe ndence ofa n yth ing e ls e? I t hardl y seems so. The ca s e a gainst the po ssi bili t y  o f i n de p end en t  ex i s tence for relat ions seems  e v en  stronger. "  7Ho w to re ply tosucha  worry?  On one s ide of th edeba t e  we  have theclaim th at proper t ies ( i nthe c ase  of age ner al bu ndle t h eor y) or  exper ie nces a nd ps yc hologica l states (in the case o f a bu ndlethe ory or aplu r ali stic theo ry a bout the S elf ) c annot  ex i st wi thou t  a  su b strat um o r  a subjec t  t o o n t ol ogically su p p o rtthem.  On the ot herside we have thec laim that they  can . Onbeh a lf o fthe bundle the ory  a b o ut the S el f, Dainton(2008a,p. 3 42, 3 47-8)claims  that i t is the bu ndli ng("the uni tycr i terion"  i nh is way  ofpu ttingthings )  tha t provides the des ireds u bstan t ial ity.Bu t eveni f su ch a respo nse were ad equate , it  woul d not b eof muc h h el p when itc omes to t he pl uralist ic  vie w o f theSelf s incether eisno bundli n g  i n  t hi s  ca se.But w hy  doe s the wor r y has so mef orce in  t hef i rst pl a ce ? The worrycla ims t h a t experien c es a r en ot su bstant ial en ough to exi st  withou t t h e re beingany ontol o gic al ly i ndepende nt  sub je ct
 individuable_and identifiable_independently of the selves_that are_their_subjects, so_that_fatal circularity dooms_the project. [...]_[I]ndividual mental states are_necessarily states of_persons:_they are necessarily 'owned' – necessarily have a subject." Put in this way, the_objection_is that_experiences_cannot_"float-free" in the sense that_they are not independent entities_– there_must be a subject that has them. Such_an_objection can be_raised against the bundle theory of the Self, but_it arises perhaps even more stringently_against my pluralistic_view,_since_according to this view_there are not even the bundles_to play the role of the_subject. In a general form, it arises_also against any bundle theory, even_a bundle theory about ordinary_material objects,_as Armstrong (1997, p.99) argues:_"There is a_fundamental difficulty_with all bundle_theories. It is that properties and_relations, whether universals_or particulars, seem not suitable to_be_the ultimate constituents_of_reality._If they_are the ultimate_constituents,_then, it_appears,_completely different (non-overlapping) properties and relations_will_be 'distinct existences' in Hume's sense of_the phrase: entities logically_capable_of independent existence. But_are properties and relations really_capable of independent existence? Can a_certain determinate_mass, for_instance, whether the universal of that mass or the trope mass_of this particular body, exist in_logical independence of anything_else? It_hardly_seems so. The_case_against the_possibility of independent existence for relations seems_even stronger."_7 How to reply to such_a worry? On one_side_of the debate we have the_claim that properties (in the case_of a general bundle theory)_or_experiences_and psychological states (in the_case of a bundle theory or_a pluralistic theory_about the Self) cannot exist without a_substratum_or a subject to ontologically support_them._On the other side we have_the_claim_that they can. On behalf_of the bundle theory about the_Self, Dainton (2008a, p.342, 347-8) claims that it is_the bundling ("the_unity criterion" in his way_of_putting_things) that provides the desired substantiality. But even if such_a response_were adequate, it_would not be of much help when it comes to_the pluralistic view of the Self since_there is no bundling in this case. But why does the_worry has some force in the first place?_The worry claims that experiences are not_substantial enough to exist_without_there being any ontologically independent subject