 not a "Platonist" as that term has come to be understood.5 Early in the reception of Plato, according to Lotze, he was misread as "hypostasizing" the Forms. Properly understood, Plato was merely making the distinction between the content of judgement (atemporal and non-spatial propositions, composed of atemporal and non-spatial concepts/Forms) and our spatially located and temporally extended mental events of judging those contents. Lotze distinguishes between the mistaken hypostatic reading of Plato, on which the Forms (concepts, constituents of truths) are treated as entities in their own right, existing in some kind of platonic heaven, and the "true" Platonism, in which the doctrine of Forms is only intended to make the distinction between what exists (mental and physical objects and events) and what is valid (propositions/contents of acts of judgement, and, derivatively, the Forms/concepts composing them). The aim of this essay is to understand Lotze's non-hypostatic Platonism. In order to shed light on Lotze's doctrines, I compare them to those of Gottlob Frege, a near-contemporary whose commitment to Platonism is the subject of a sophisticated scholarly literature. Frege's reputation has undergone the opposite reversal to Lotze's: obscure in his own lifetime until he was "discovered" by Russell and Wittgenstein, Frege is now recognized as one of the main figures of 19th-century philosophy and canonized as a founder of analytic philosophy (at least according 4 Glock (2015), 74. 5 To emphasize that I am not making any claims about the historical Plato, I do not capitalize "Platonism." 140 Nicholas F. Stang to the standard narrative). Although he was a lifelong opponent of psychologism, it is a matter of controversy when, and to what extent, he endorsed a Platonist view about the ontological status of numbers, concepts, and thoughts.6 Looking to Frege in order to understand Lotze is natural, given that Frege was already linked with Lotze in the minds of his contemporaries.7 Bruno Bauch, who invited Frege to publish "Der Gedanke" in his journal, Beiträge zur Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus, prefaced it with an essay of his own, "Lotzes Logik und ihre Bedeutung im deutschen Idealismus," in
not a " Platonist " as that term has come to be understood.5 Early in the reception of Plato, according to Lotze, he was misread as " hypostasizing " the Forms. by rights understand, Plato was merely making the distinction between the contentedness of judgment (atemporal and non - spatial propositions, composed of atemporal and non - spatial concept / Forms) and our spatially located and temporally extended genial event of judging those capacity. Lotze distinguishes between the mistaken hypostatic reading of Plato, on which the Forms (concept, constituents of truths) are treated as entities in their own right, existing in some kind of platonic heaven, and the " truthful " Platonism, in which the doctrine of Forms is only intended to make the eminence between what exists (mental and physical objects and event) and what is valid (propositions / contents of acts of judgement, and, derivatively, the Forms / concept composing them). The aim of this essay is to understand Lotze's non - hypostatic Platonism. In order to shed light on Lotze's doctrine, I compare them to those of Gottlob Frege, a about - contemporary whose committedness to Platonism is the subject of a sophisticated scholarly literature. Frege's reputation has undergone the opposite reversal to Lotze's: obscure in his own lifetime until he was " discover " by Russell and Wittgenstein, Frege is nowadays recognized as one of the main figure of nineteenth - hundred philosophy and canonized as a founder of analytic philosophy (at least according 4 Glock (2015), 74. 5 To emphasize that I am not making any claims about the historic Plato, I do not capitalize " Platonism. " 140 Nicholas F. Stang to the standard narrative). Although he was a lifelong opponent of psychologism, it is a matter of controversy when, and to what extent, he endorsed a Platonist view about the ontological status of numbers, concept, and thoughts.6 Looking to Frege in order to understand Lotze is natural, given that Frege was already linked with Lotze in the minds of his contemporaries.7 Bruno Bauch, who invite Frege to publish " Der Gedanke " in his journal, Beiträge zur Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus, prefaced it with an essay of his own, " Lotzes Logik und ihre Bedeutung i m deutschen Idealismus, " in
 noh a "Platonist" as that tevm has come to bg yndersvood.5 Eadly in tfe reception of Plato, accordmng ro Loude, he was misread as "fypostasiding" the Dormw. Properly nhderstood, Plafl wav merely making the distitction between tfe content of judgement (atemporal and non-spayiwl propositionf, cok[oses of atemporal and non-spatial concspts/Forks) and our spstially located and temporwlly extended mental egents of juegind those contevts. Lotze distinguishea between the mistaken hypostatkc recding of Plqti, oj which the Horms (boncepts, consbptuents of truyhs) are treatec av ebtities in their own cight, existing in soie kind ox 'latonic heaven, and tye "true" Pladonirn, iv wgirh fhe doftrmne of Forma is only ibtended to make the dywtinction betseen wrae exists (mental and physical objects ang ebents) and what is valid (propositions/contents of acts jf judgement, and, derivatively, the Forms/concepts cmmposmne tkci). Rhf aim of this essay is to understand Lotze's njh-huppstatic Platonlsm. In order to shrd lodht on Lotze's doctrnhea, I compare them tl those of Gittlob Frtge, a near-contemporary whose comnitment to Pjqtonism is the sublect of a so'histivated scholarly literature. Fxege's deputation jas underfune the opposite renersdl to Louxe's: obscure in hif own lifxtime until fe wss "dissovered" by Russcnl and Wittgensteij, Freye is now recogjized as one of the main figures of 19th-century pvilmsophy aud canpnized as a fjunder of analitic philjsophh (at least accordmng 4 Glock (2015), 74. 5 To emphasiza that I am nmt makind ant clqims abujt the historival Plato, I do not xapitalize "Platonixm." 140 Hicholas F. Stany uo the standard marfatyvv). Aktrmugh he was d liwelumg opoonent of pwhchokogism, it is a mattes of controversy when, snq to whaj extent, re endorsed a Platonist view ablut tie ontulogival status of numbers, concepts, ans thoughtd.6 Ljoking to Frqge ln otder to undzrstand Lotze is natural, given that Fregx was already linked wirh Lotze in the minbs of his convemporwries.7 Bruto Bauch, who invited Frege to publish "Der Gedanke" in his jkurnal, Beitgäge zur Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus, prefaced it with an essay of his oxn, "Lotzes Logjk umd ihge Yedzutung ym dxuvschen Idealismus," in
not a "Platonist" as that term has be Early in reception of Plato, misread "hypostasizing" the Forms. understood, Plato was making the distinction between the content judgement (atemporal and non-spatial propositions, composed of atemporal and non-spatial concepts/Forms) and our located and temporally extended mental events of judging those contents. Lotze distinguishes between mistaken reading Plato, which the Forms (concepts, constituents of truths) are treated as entities in their own right, existing some kind of platonic heaven, and the "true" in which the doctrine Forms is only intended to the between what (mental physical and events) and is valid (propositions/contents of acts of judgement, and, derivatively, the Forms/concepts composing them). The aim of this is to non-hypostatic Platonism. order shed on Lotze's doctrines, them to those of Gottlob Frege, commitment to Platonism is the subject of a scholarly literature. reputation has undergone the opposite reversal Lotze's: obscure in his own lifetime until he "discovered" by Russell and Wittgenstein, Frege is now recognized as one of the main figures philosophy and canonized as founder of analytic (at according Glock 74. 5 emphasize that I am not making any claims about the historical I do not capitalize "Platonism." 140 Nicholas F. Stang to narrative). he was a opponent of psychologism, it a of controversy when, and extent, endorsed about ontological of numbers, concepts, and Looking to Frege in order understand Lotze is natural, linked with Lotze in the minds of his Bruno Bauch, who invited Frege to publish Gedanke" in his journal, Beiträge zur Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus, prefaced it an essay own, "Lotzes Logik und ihre Bedeutung im deutschen in
 not a "Platonist" as that term haS come to be uNdersTooD.5 EaRlY in tHe reCeption of Plato, ACcorDing to Lotze, he was misreaD as "hyPoSTasiZInG" the FOrms. ProPErLY UndErStOod, plATo Was meRelY making The distincTioN bEtween the conTEnT of judgemeNt (aTemporal and nOn-sPatial PrOpoSItionS, coMposeD of ateMPoral aNd non-spatIaL ConcepTS/Forms) aND OuR spaTially located and tEMpORally extended mEntal eVeNTs OF JudGinG those contEnTs. LotZE distinGUiSHES beTWeen the mistakEn hypostatiC ReaDing of plAto, ON which The FoRmS (ConCepts, constiTuenTs of truthS) are trEAted as eNTities iN their Own RigHt, exIStInG in SoME kiND oF plATonIc heaven, AnD tHe "truE" PlaTONISm, in WhiCh thE doctRine of Forms is OnlY intENdeD to maKe the DistInCtion BetweeN what ExIsts (mental and phYsicAl objects And EvEntS) aNd whaT Is valiD (prOpoSitions/ContentS Of aCtS OF JuDgement, and, derivatiVeLY, ThE Forms/coNcepts COmPoSIng them). THe Aim Of thIS Essay Is to UNdErstand LOtze's nON-hYpOstatic plAtonisM. IN orDer To sheD LighT on LotZe's doctrInes, I COmpare them to thOSe of Gottlob FrEGe, A NEaR-ContEmpOrary whose cOmmiTMent To PlAToNisM Is the SubjeCt OF a SOphisticated scholarLy LiteraTure. FRege's reputatiOn has underGONE the oppoSite REvERsal to Lotze's: obScure In his own liFEtime untIl he wAs "discovEred" by RusSELl and WitTgeNstEin, freGE Is Now recognized AS One oF tHe main fIguRes of 19th-CenTurY phIloSoPhy and canOnized as A fOuNdEr Of aNalytIC philosoPhY (at LeAst AccorDIng 4 GloCk (2015), 74. 5 To eMphaSiZe THat i am not mAKiNG Any cLaImS aboUt tHe HistoRicaL plaTo, I do noT capitaliZe "PLAtonIsM." 140 NIcholas f. Stang to the stAnDard narratIvE). AlThough HE Was a lifeLong opponent of psychologISm, it is a MatTer of ContRoversy whEn, aNd to whAt eXTent, he EndorsEd a PlAtOniST View aBOUt The OnTological sTATus Of numBeRs, coNcepts, aNd thoughts.6 Looking tO freGe in order to unDerStanD lOtZe iS NaTUraL, gIVen THAt Frege was alreaDy linked wiTh lOtZe in the minDS of HiS contemPorarieS.7 BrunO bauch, whO invited FRege to pubLiSh "DeR gEdaNke" in his joUrnal, BeiTräge zur PHIlosoPHiE des dEutSchen IDeAliSmus, pRefaceD It wIth an Essay oF hIs own, "LOtzes loGik und ihRe Bedeutung im deutschen IDealisMus," in
 not a "Platonist" as that  term hascometobeun ders tood .5 Early in th e  rec eption of Plato, accor dingto Lotz e ,he wa s misre a da s  "h yp os tas iz i ng " the  Fo rms. Pr operly und ers to od, Plato wa s  m erely maki ngthe distinct ion  betwe en  th e  cont ent  of j udgeme n t (ate mporal an dn on-spa t ial pro p o si tion s, composed of at e mp o ral and non-sp atialco n ce p t s/F orm s) and our  s patia l ly loca t ed a n d t e mporally exte nded mental eve nts of  j udg i ng tho se co nt e nts . Lotze dis ting uishes be tweent he mist a ken hyp ostati c r ead ingo fPl ato ,o n w h ic h t h e F orms (co nc ep ts, c onst i t u e ntsoftrut hs) a re treated as  en titi e s i n the ir ow n ri gh t, ex isting  in s om e kind of plato nicheaven, a ndth e " tr ue" P l atonis m,inwhich t he doct r ine  o f F or ms is only intende dt o  m ake thedistin c ti on betweenwh atexis t s  (men tala nd  physica l obje c ts  a nd even ts ) andwh atisvalid (pro positi ons/cont entso f acts of judg e ment, and, de r iv a t iv e ly,the  Forms/conc epts comp osin g  t hem ) . The  aimof th i s essay is to under st and Lo tze's  non-hypostat ic Platoni s m .  In orde r to sh e d light on Lot ze'sdoctrines, I compar e the m to tho se of Got t l ob Frege , a  ne ar- con t e mp orary whose c o m mitm en t to Pl ato nism is  th e s ubj ect  o f a sophi sticated  s ch ol ar lyliter a ture. Fr eg e's  r epu tatio n  has u nderg oneth eo ppo site re v er s a l to  L ot ze's : o bs curein h i s o wn life time unti l h e  was  " di scovere d" by Russell  a nd Wittgen st ein , Freg e is now r ecognized as one of the main fi gur es of  19t h-century  ph ilosop hya nd can onized  as a  f oun d e r ofa n al yti cphilosophy ( atleast  a ccor ding 4Glock (2015), 74.5  To  emphasize th atI am n ot  ma k in g  an yc lai m s  about the hist orical Pla to ,  I  do not ca p ita li ze "Pla tonism. " 140 Nichola s F. Stan g to thest anda r d  na rrative).Although  he was a lifel o ng  oppo nen t of p sy cho logis m, iti s a  matt er ofco ntrove rsy w he n, and t o what extent, he endor sed aPlato nis t view ab out the  ontologi calstatus ofnum ber s, co nce p ts, a nd t h ou ght s .6 Lo okin g  to Frege in  or d e rto understa n d Lot ze is  na t ural,give n that Frege wasa lready linkedwith L otz e i n  the  m inds of his co nte mp o r aries.7Br uno Bauch,who invi te d  Freg e to p ublish  "Der G e d an k e" inhisjou rnal, Bei trä ge zur Phi lo so p hie de s de ut schenIdeali s mus, p refaced it withan es s a y ofh isown,"L otzes L o gikund ihre B edeutung im  deuts chen  Idea lismus, "in
 not_a "Platonist"_as that term has_come to_be_understood.5 Early_in_the reception of_Plato, according to_Lotze, he was misread_as "hypostasizing" the_Forms._Properly understood, Plato was merely making the distinction between the content of judgement (atemporal_and_non-spatial propositions,_composed_of_atemporal and non-spatial concepts/Forms) and_our spatially located and temporally_extended mental_events of judging those contents. Lotze distinguishes between_the_mistaken hypostatic reading_of Plato, on which the Forms (concepts, constituents of_truths) are treated as entities in_their own right,_existing_in_some kind of platonic_heaven, and the "true" Platonism, in_which the doctrine of Forms is_only intended to make the distinction between_what exists (mental and physical objects_and events) and what is_valid (propositions/contents_of acts of judgement, and,_derivatively, the Forms/concepts_composing them)._The aim of_this essay is to understand Lotze's_non-hypostatic Platonism. In_order to shed light on Lotze's_doctrines,_I compare them_to_those_of Gottlob_Frege, a near-contemporary_whose_commitment to_Platonism_is the subject of a sophisticated_scholarly_literature. Frege's reputation has undergone the opposite_reversal to Lotze's: obscure_in_his own lifetime until_he was "discovered" by Russell_and Wittgenstein, Frege is now recognized_as one_of the_main figures of 19th-century philosophy and canonized as a founder of_analytic philosophy (at least according 4_Glock (2015), 74. 5_To emphasize_that_I am not_making_any claims_about the historical Plato, I do not_capitalize "Platonism."_140 Nicholas F. Stang to the_standard narrative). Although he_was_a lifelong opponent of psychologism, it_is a matter of controversy when,_and to what extent, he_endorsed_a_Platonist view about the ontological_status of numbers, concepts, and thoughts.6_Looking to Frege_in order to understand Lotze is natural,_given_that Frege was already linked with_Lotze_in the minds of his contemporaries.7_Bruno_Bauch,_who invited Frege to publish_"Der Gedanke" in his journal, Beiträge_zur Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus, prefaced it with an_essay of his_own, "Lotzes Logik und ihre_Bedeutung_im_deutschen Idealismus," in