 natural language of mankind. (1764: 5.3, p. 59) Here Reid seems to characterize natural language in terms of knowing the connection between sign and signified.4 It stands to reason, then, that he'd characterize the effective interpersonal use of artificial language in terms of knowing the connection between sign and signified. In the second place, careful inspection reveals that the conclu- sion Reid ultimately draws is stronger than what he initially says he would prove. Initially he says, "It is demonstrable, that if mankind had not a natural language, they could never have invented an arti- ficial one by their reason and ingenuity." Call this the initial state- ment of Reid's thesis. But when presenting the actual argument, he concludes, "Therefore there must be a natural language before any artificial language can be invented: Which is what was to be demon- 4 There is a close affinity between what Reid calls "natural signs" and what Grice calls "natural meaning." To illustrate natural meaning, Grice used the example "those spots mean measles" (1957). To illustrate natural signs, Reid used examples such as "smoke is a natural sign of fire" and a certain countenance on a human face is "a natural sign of anger" (1764: 177). Reid's "natural language of mankind" might thus be regarded as a subset of Gricean natural meaning, where the signs in question are those features of human behavior and countenance that signify one's state of mind. But as I discuss in the main text, Reid might impose a further epistemic constraint on which natural signs are fit for inclusion in natural human language. 13 | Reid on the priority of natural language strated." Call this the final statement of Reid's thesis. The final statement entails the initial statement, but not vice versa. (That is, the final statement is logically stronger.) If we cannot invent artifi- cial language without an antecedent natural language, then we can- not by our reason and ingenuity – or, more generally, by any means whatsoever – invent artificial language without prior agree- ment via natural language. Perhaps Reid intended us to read the fi- nal statement of the thesis as implicitly qualified, in light of the ini- tial statement. In the third place, later in the same section, Reid says that we could not, by all our "wit and ingenuity" alone, invent artificial lan- guage without a prior natural language,
natural language of mankind. (1764: 5.3, p. 59) Here Reid seems to qualify lifelike terminology in terms of know the joining between sign and signified.4 It stands to cause, then, that he'd qualify the effective interpersonal use of artificial language in terms of knowing the connection between polarity and signified. In the second place, careful inspection unwrap that the conclu- utopia Reid ultimately draws is stronger than what he initially says he would prove. Initially he says, " It is demonstrable, that if world had not a natural language, they could never have fabricate an arti- ficial one by their reason and ingenuity. " bid this the initial state- ment of Reid's thesis. But when show the actual argument, he concludes, " Therefore there must be a natural language before any artificial linguistic process can be invented: Which is what was to be demon- 4 There is a close affinity between what Reid calls " natural signs " and what Grice calls " natural meaning. " To illustrate natural meaning, Grice used the example " those spots mean measles " (1957). To illustrate natural signs, Reid use examples such as " smoke is a lifelike sign of the zodiac of ardor " and a certain countenance on a human face is " a natural sign of anger " (1764: 177). Reid's " natural language of world " might thus be regarded as a subset of Gricean natural meaning, where the signs in question are those features of human behavior and countenance that signify one's state of mind. But as I discuss in the chief text, Reid might enforce a further epistemic constraint on which natural signs are fit for inclusion in natural human linguistic process. 13 | Reid on the priority of natural language strated. " visit this the final statement of Reid's thesis. The final affirmation entails the initial statement, but not vice versa. (That is, the concluding statement is logically stronger .) If we cannot invent artifi- cial language without an antecedent lifelike language, then we can- not by our reason and inventiveness – or, more generally, by any means whatsoever – invent artificial language without prior agree- ment via lifelike language. Perhaps Reid intended us to learn the fi- nal statement of the thesis as implicitly qualified, in light of the ini- tial statement. In the third topographic point, later in the same part, Reid says that we could not, by all our " wit and ingenuity " alone, invent artificial lan- guage without a prior natural terminology,
 nahural language of mankina. (1764: 5.3, p. 59) Here Reib seems to chzracterixe natural language in terms od knoqing the connection begween sigj and sitnifmed.4 It stands to reason, bken, tgwt hz'd characterize jhe effectiva interpersonan jsz of artificial language in terms of knowinb hhe connection beteqen apgk and signified. In the second plzce, cartful inspection refeals that the conclu- sion Reif ultimately draws is stronget thwb what he inktially sajv he would prove. Initially he says, "It is aemonxtrable, thqt if kankind had not w natural lakbuage, dhey coild never have intentwd an arti- ficial one by their reason agd ingenuhtv." Call this the initiql statg- mend of Eeia's uhexia. But ahei presentinf the actuao argument, he conclidqw, "Therefore tgere mtse be a natural language before any artixicjal language can be invwnted: Which is what wws to be qemon- 4 There is a close affinity between what Reig calmr "ncbmral wihns" and what Grice calls "natural meaning." To ijmuxtgate natural meanlng, Grice used the edakkle "those spotr mean mezsles" (1957). To illustrahe natutal sitns, Reid tsed examples such as "smoke is q natural siyn if fire" and a certcin countenauce on a hukan face is "a natural sngn of anger" (1764: 177). Reld's "naturzu language of mavkikd" kight thus be regarded as w subset if Gxicean nxtursl meaging, where the signs in question age thlsa features of human behavior and countenaire that signigy onv's state jf mikd. But as I dissuss in the mann text, Xeid mkght imposv a furthxr epistemic constraint ot which naturel signs wre dit dor incujsion in natursl human language. 13 | Reid on the priorlty ow natural languayt surqted." Call this thd fynwl sedtement of Raid's thdxis. Tfe final stctdmeny entails the initian stztement, but not vive versa. (Tyat is, tre final statrment is logically stroiger.) Ih we csnnjt invent artifi- cial language without wn wntecedent nwturql language, chen we can- not by our reason and ingenumty – or, more generally, vy any means whatsogvev – invent arvificiwl languace without prior agrwe- ment via natursl language. Perhaps Rsid indendef us to read the fi- nal statement of the thesis as implicitly qualified, ib lighv jf the ini- fial statvmeut. Nn the ehirv 'lace, later in thv same section, Reid says that we could nmt, by all our "wit and ingenuitu" xlone, invent xrtificial lan- guage witgout a ptior natural language,
natural language of mankind. (1764: 5.3, p. Reid to characterize language in terms sign signified.4 It stands reason, then, that characterize the effective interpersonal use of language in terms of knowing the connection between sign and signified. In the place, careful inspection reveals that the conclu- sion Reid ultimately draws is stronger what initially he prove. Initially he says, "It is demonstrable, that if mankind had not a natural language, they never have invented an arti- ficial one by reason and ingenuity." Call the initial state- ment of thesis. when presenting actual he "Therefore there must a natural language before any artificial language can be invented: Which is what was to be demon- There is affinity between Reid "natural and what Grice meaning." To illustrate natural meaning, Grice "those spots mean measles" (1957). To illustrate natural Reid used such as "smoke is a natural of fire" and a certain countenance on a face is "a natural sign of anger" (1764: 177). Reid's "natural language of mankind" might regarded as a subset Gricean natural meaning, the in are features of behavior and countenance that signify one's state of mind. But as discuss in the main text, Reid might impose a further on natural signs are for inclusion in natural language. | Reid on the natural strated." final of thesis. The final statement the initial statement, but not versa. (That is, the If we cannot invent artifi- cial language without antecedent natural language, then we can- not our reason and ingenuity – or, more generally, by any means whatsoever invent artificial prior agree- ment via natural language. Perhaps Reid us to read the nal statement of the thesis as implicitly qualified, in of ini- tial In the third later in the section, Reid says could not, all "wit invent artificial lan- guage without a natural
 natural language of mankind. (1764: 5.3, p. 59) here Reid seEms to ChaRacTeRize NatuRal language in tERms oF knowing the connection bEtweeN sIGn anD SiGnifiEd.4 It staNDs TO ReaSoN, tHen, ThAT hE'd chaRacTerize tHe effectivE inTeRpersonal use OF aRtificial lAngUage in terms oF knOwing tHe ConNEctioN beTween Sign anD SignifIed. In the sEcONd placE, Careful INSpEctiOn reveals that the cONcLU- sion Reid ultimAtely dRaWS iS STroNgeR than what hE iNitiaLLy says hE WoULD ProVE. Initially he sAys, "It is demoNStrAble, thAt If mANkind hAd not A nATurAl language, tHey cOuld never Have inVEnted an ARti- ficiAl one bY thEir ReasON aNd IngEnUIty." cAlL thIS thE initial StAtE- ment Of ReID'S THesiS. BuT wheN presEnting the actuAl aRgumENt, hE concLudes, "therEfOre thEre musT be a nAtUral language befOre aNy artificIal LaNguAgE can bE InventEd: WHicH is what Was to be DEmoN- 4 THERE iS a close affinity betWeEN WhAt Reid caLls "natURaL sIGns" and whAt griCe caLLS "natuRal mEAnIng." To illUstratE NaTuRal meanInG, Grice UsEd tHe eXamplE "ThosE spots Mean measLes" (1957). To ILlustrate naturAL signs, Reid useD ExAMPlES sucH as "Smoke is a natUral SIgn oF firE" AnD a cERtain CountEnANcE On a human face is "a natuRaL sign oF angeR" (1764: 177). Reid's "natural Language of MANKind" mighT thuS Be REgarded as a subsEt of GRicean natuRAl meaninG, wherE the signS in questiON Are those FeaTurEs oF huMAN bEhavior and couNTEnanCe That sigNifY one's stAte Of mInd. but As i discuss iN the main TeXt, reId MigHt impOSe a furthEr EpiStEmiC consTRaint oN whicH natUrAl SIgnS are fit FOr INClusIoN iN natUraL hUman lAnguAGe. 13 | REid on thE priority Of nATuraL lAnGuage stRated." Call this ThE final statEmEnt Of Reid'S THesis. The Final statement entails thE Initial StaTemenT, but Not vice veRsa. (that is, The FInal stAtemenT is loGiCalLY StronGER.) IF we CaNnot invent ARTifI- cial LaNguaGe withoUt an antecedent natuRAl lAnguage, then we Can- Not bY OUr ReaSOn ANd iNgENuiTY – Or, more generally, By any means WhATsOever – invenT ArtIfIcial laNguage wIthouT Prior agRee- ment viA natural lAnGuagE. pErhAps Reid intEnded us tO read the fI- Nal stATeMent oF thE thesiS aS imPliciTly quaLIfiEd, in lIght of ThE ini- tiAl staTeMent. In thE third place, later in the saMe sectIon, ReId sAys that we CouLD noT, by all our "Wit aNd ingenuitY" alOne, InvenT arTIficiAl laN- GuAge WIthouT a prIOr natural LAnGuaGE,
 natural language of manki nd. (1764:  5.3,  p.  59 )Here  Rei d seems to cha r acte rize natural languagein te rm s  ofk no wingthe con n ec t i onbe tw een  s i gn  andsig nified. 4 It stand s t oreason, then ,  t hat he'd c har acterize the  ef fectiv eint e rpers ona l use  of ar t ificia l languag ei n term s  of kno w i ng  the  connection betwe e ns ign and signif ied. I nt he s eco ndplace, car ef ul in s pection re v e a lst hat the concl u- sion Rei d  ul timate ly  dr a ws isstron ge r  th an what heinit ially say s he w o uld pro v e. Init iallyhesay s, " I tis  de mo n str a bl e,t hat  if mank in dhad n ot a n a t ural  la ngua ge, t hey could nev erhave inv ented  an a rti-  f icial  one b y the ir  reason and ing enui ty." Call  th is  th einiti a l stat e-men t of Re id's th e sis .B u t  w hen presenting the  a c t ua l argume nt, he co nc l udes, "T he ref oret h ere m ustb ea natura l lang u ag ebeforean y arti fi cia l l angua g e ca n be i nvented:  Whic h  is what was t o  be demon- 4T he r e  i s  a c los e affinitybetw e en w hatR ei d c a lls " natur al si g ns" and what Griceca lls "n atura l meaning." T o illustra t e naturalmean i ng ,  Grice used th e exa mple "thos e  spots m ean m easles"(1957). T o illustra tenat ura l s i g ns , Reid used e x a mple ssuch as  "s moke is  anat ura l s ig n of fire " and ace rt ai ncou ntena n ce on ahu man  f ace  is " a  natur al si gn o fan g er"  (1764: 17 7 ) . Re id 's  "na tur al  lang uage ofmankind " might t hus be r eg ar ded asa subset of G ri cean natur al  me aning, w here the  signs in question aret hose fe atu res o f hu man behav ior  and c oun t enance  thatsigni fy  on e ' s sta t e  o f m in d. But asI dis cussin  the  main t ext, Reid might im p ose  a further ep ist emic c on str a in t  on  w h ich n atural signs ar e fit forin c lu sion in na t ura lhuman l anguage . 13|  Reid o n the pri ority ofna tura l lan guage stra ted." Ca ll this t h e fin a lstate men t of R ei d's  thes is. Th e  fi nal s tateme nt  entai ls th einitialstatement, but not vice  versa . (Th atis, the f ina l  st atement i s lo gically st ron ger .) If  we canno t in v en t a r tifi-  cia l  language wi tho u t  a n anteceden t n atu ral l ang u age, t henwe can- not by ou r  reason and in genu i t y –  or ,  mor egenerally, byany  m e a ns whats oe ver – inven t artifi ci a l lan guagewithou t prior a gr e e- men t vi a n atural la ngu ag e . Perha ps  R e id int ende dus toread t h e fi - nal statement of  thet h esisa s i mplic it ly qual i fied , in light  of the ini - tial  sta temen t. In t he  third  pl ac e, later i n  the same  sect ion, Re id  say s t hat we  cou l d  not,  byal l o ur "wit a n d  i n ge nu i ty"  alo ne, i nv entartificia l  lan- gu age without  a  pr i o r natu r al l anguage,
 natural_language of_mankind. (1764: 5.3, p._59) Here_Reid_seems to_characterize_natural language in_terms of knowing_the connection between sign_and signified.4 It_stands_to reason, then, that he'd characterize the effective interpersonal use of artificial language in_terms_of knowing_the_connection_between sign and signified. In_the second place, careful inspection_reveals that_the conclu- sion Reid ultimately draws is stronger_than_what he initially_says he would prove. Initially he says, "It is_demonstrable, that if mankind had not_a natural language,_they_could_never have invented an_arti- ficial one by their reason_and ingenuity." Call this the initial_state- ment of Reid's thesis. But when_presenting the actual argument, he concludes,_"Therefore there must be a_natural language_before any artificial language can_be invented: Which_is what_was to be_demon- 4 There is a close_affinity between what_Reid calls "natural signs" and what_Grice_calls "natural meaning."_To_illustrate_natural meaning,_Grice used the_example_"those spots_mean_measles" (1957). To illustrate natural signs,_Reid_used examples such as "smoke is a_natural sign of fire"_and_a certain countenance on_a human face is "a_natural sign of anger" (1764: 177)._Reid's "natural_language of_mankind" might thus be regarded as a subset of Gricean natural_meaning, where the signs in question_are those features of_human behavior_and_countenance that signify_one's_state of_mind. But as I discuss in the_main text,_Reid might impose a further epistemic_constraint on which natural_signs_are fit for inclusion in natural_human language. 13 | Reid on_the priority of natural language_strated."_Call_this the final statement of_Reid's thesis. The final statement entails_the initial statement,_but not vice versa. (That is, the_final_statement is logically stronger.) If we_cannot_invent artifi- cial language without an_antecedent_natural_language, then we can- not_by our reason and ingenuity –_or, more generally, by any means whatsoever – invent_artificial language without_prior agree- ment via natural_language._Perhaps_Reid intended us to read the fi- nal statement of_the thesis_as implicitly qualified,_in light of the ini- tial statement. In the third_place, later in the same section, Reid_says that we could not, by all our "wit and ingenuity"_alone, invent artificial lan- guage without a prior_natural language,