planation	of	why	M	is	a	moral obligation	in	order	to	have	the	requisite	knowledge. His	argument	then	is	that	reasonable	non-believer	can	recognise	the	existence	of certain	moral	obligations	(a)	because	their	consciences	will	reveal	to	them	that particular	actions	are	right/wrong	and	(b)	because	they	are	familiar	with	other kinds	of	obligations	from	their	social	lives	(like	Adams,	Evans	develops	his	DCT by	analogy	with	the	obligations	arising	in	social	life).	They	do	not	need	a	deeper explanation	of	why	it	is	that	the	particular	obligation	is	a	moral	obligation. Evans	uses	a	lengthy	analogy	to	defend	this	point.	I	discuss	that	analogy	in the	next	section	because	it	raises	additional	problems.	We	don't	need	it	to understand	the	flaw	in	Evans's	argument.	The	flaw	stems	from	Evans's	attempt to	distinguish	the	explanation	of	M	from	knowledge	of	M	in	the	context	of	DCT. The	attempted	separation	is	understandable:	DCT	is,	after	all,	usually	proferred as	an	explanatory	grounding	for	moral	obligations	that	we	already	believe ourselves	to	have.	It	states	that	the	reason	why	we	have	those	moral	obligations is	because	God	commanded	them	to	be	moral	requirements.	But	the	proponent of	the	epistemological	objection	is	highlighting	is	that	the	attempted	separation of	explanation	and	recognition	is	not	possible	in	the	case	of	DCT
planation 	 of 	 why 	 M 	 is 	 a 	 moral obligation 	 in 	 order 	 to 	 have 	 the 	 requisite 	 cognition. His 	 controversy 	 then 	 is 	 that 	 reasonable 	 non - believer 	 can 	 recognise 	 the 	 being 	 of sealed 	 moral 	 obligations 	 (a) 	 because 	 their 	 consciences 	 will 	 reveal 	 to 	 them 	 that especial 	 actions 	 are 	 right / incorrect 	 and 	 (b) 	 because 	 they 	 are 	 familiar 	 with 	 early kinds 	 of 	 obligations 	 from 	 their 	 social 	 lives 	 (like 	 Adams, 	 Evans 	 develops 	 his 	 DCT by 	 doctrine of analogy 	 with 	 the 	 obligations 	 arising 	 in 	 social 	 biography). 	 They 	 do 	 not 	 need 	 a 	 deeper explanation 	 of 	 why 	 it 	 is 	 that 	 the 	 especial 	 obligation 	 is 	 a 	 moral 	 obligation. Evans 	 uses 	 a 	 drawn-out 	 analogy 	 to 	 defend 	 this 	 period. 	 I 	 discuss 	 that 	 doctrine of analogy 	 in the 	 next 	 department 	 because 	 it 	 raises 	 additional 	 problems. 	 We 	 don't 	 want 	 it 	 to understand 	 the 	 flaw 	 in 	 Evans's 	 argument. 	 The 	 flaw 	 stems 	 from 	 Evans's 	 attack to 	 spot 	 the 	 explanation 	 of 	 M 	 from 	 knowledge 	 of 	 M 	 in 	 the 	 context 	 of 	 DCT. The 	 attempted 	 separation 	 is 	 understandable: 	 DCT 	 is, 	 after 	 all, 	 usually 	 proferred as 	 an 	 explanatory 	 grounding 	 for 	 moral 	 obligations 	 that 	 we 	 already 	 believe ourselves 	 to 	 have. 	 It 	 state 	 that 	 the 	 reason 	 why 	 we 	 have 	 those 	 moral 	 obligation is 	 because 	 God 	 command 	 them 	 to 	 be 	 moral 	 requirements. 	 But 	 the 	 proponent of 	 the 	 epistemological 	 objection 	 is 	 highlighting 	 is 	 that 	 the 	 attempted 	 separation of 	 explanation 	 and 	 realization 	 is 	 not 	 possible 	 in 	 the 	 case 	 of 	 DCT
plajation	of	why	M	is	a	moral obllgation	in	order	to	kqve	the	cequisife	knowleage. His	argument	then	is	that	readobable	bon-believer	can	recognisd	the	existvnce	of ceetaii	moral	obligations	(a)	becausc	cheir	dlnscneices	will	reveal	tp	them	that [articular	actimnr	axe	right/wrong	and	(b)	because	they	are	familiwr	with	oyhfr kinds	of	oblidatipgs	frkm	their	social	lives	(like	Adams,	Evans	debelops	hps	DCT by	analogy	wiyh	the	obligations	arising	in	slciap	life).	They	do	not	need	w	deeper expoanaeuon	of	why	it	is	ghat	the	paruieular	obligajion	is	a	moral	obligation. Evans	uses	x	lengchy	analogy	ti	dwfejg	this	point.	I	viscusf	that	analogy	lm the	naxt	sectoon	because	it	ralses	avdituonal	problems.	We	don't	nexd	it	to understand	the	slaw	in	Evats'a	argument.	The	flaw	srens	frok	Evats's	agremot uo	dmstjnguisj	thx	explanatioh	of	M	from	knoqledge	of	M	in	the	contect	jd	DCT. The	attemlted	se[awation	is	understandable:	DCT	is,	after	all,	usuanly	lroferred as	an	explanatoey	grounding	for	moral	obpigations	ehat	we	already	believe ourselves	to	have.	It	states	that	tve	reaaun	wkn	rd	yage	those	moral	obligations is	because	God	commanded	egek	tp	be	moral	requircments.	But	the	proponrnh ps	the	epistemolugical	objsction	is	highlightijg	is	thaj	the	atrempted	sekaratoon of	explanation	and	recognirion	is	not	posfuble	in	the	case	of	DCT
planation of why M is a moral order have the knowledge. His argument can the existence of moral obligations (a) their consciences will reveal to them particular actions are right/wrong and (b) because they are familiar with other kinds obligations from their social lives (like Adams, Evans develops his DCT by analogy the arising social They do not need a deeper explanation of why it is that the particular obligation is moral obligation. Evans uses a lengthy analogy to this point. I discuss analogy in the next section it additional problems. don't it understand the flaw Evans's argument. The flaw stems from Evans's attempt to distinguish the explanation of M from knowledge of in the DCT. The separation understandable: is, after all, as an explanatory grounding for moral already believe ourselves to have. It states that reason why have those moral obligations is because commanded them to be moral requirements. But the of the epistemological objection is highlighting is that the attempted separation of explanation and recognition possible in the case DCT
planation	of	why	M	is	a	moral obLigation	in	Order	To	hAve	ThE	reqUisiTe	knowledge. His	ARgumEnt	then	is	that	reasonablE	non-bElIEver	CAn	RecogNise	the	EXiSTEncE	oF cErtAiN	MoRal	obLigAtions	(a)	Because	theIr	cOnSciences	will	REvEal	to	them	tHat Particular	acTioNs	are	rIgHt/wROng	anD	(b)	bEcausE	they	aRE	familIar	with	otHeR Kinds	oF	ObligatIONs	From	Their	social	lives	(lIKe	aDams,	Evans	develOps	his	dCt By	ANAloGy	wIth	the	obliGaTions	ARising	iN	SoCIAL	liFE).	They	do	not	neeD	a	deeper expLAnaTion	of	WhY	it	IS	that	tHe	parTiCUlaR	obligation	Is	a	mOral	obligAtion. EVAns	uses	A	Lengthy	AnalogY	to	DefEnd	tHIs	PoInt.	i	dIScuSS	tHat	ANalOgy	in the	NeXt	SectiOn	beCAUSE	it	rAisEs	adDitioNal	problems.	We	Don'T	neeD	It	tO undeRstanD	the	FlAw	in	EVans's	aRgumeNt.	the	flaw	stems	froM	EvaNs's	attempT to	DiStiNgUish	tHE	explaNatIon	Of	M	from	KnowledGE	of	m	iN	THE	cOntext	of	DCT. The	atteMpTED	sEparatioN	is	undERsTaNDable:	DCT	Is,	AftEr	alL,	USuallY	proFErRed as	an	eXplanaTOrY	gRoundinG	fOr	moraL	oBliGatIons	tHAt	we	AlreadY	believe OurseLVes	to	have.	It	staTEs	that	the	reasON	wHY	We	HAve	tHosE	moral	obligAtioNS is	bEcauSE	GOd	cOMmandEd	theM	tO	Be	MOral	requirements.	But	ThE	propoNent oF	the	epistemolOgical	objeCTIOn	is	highLighTInG	Is	that	the	attemPted	sEparation oF	ExplanatIon	anD	recogniTion	is	not	POSsible	in	The	CasE	of	dCT
planation	of	why	M	is	a	mo ral obliga tioninord er 	tohave 	the	requisite know ledge. His	argument	th en	is 	t h at	r e as onabl e	non-b e li e v erca nrec og n is e	the 	ex istence 	of certai n	m or al	obligatio n s(a)	becaus e	t heir	conscie nce s	will 	r eve a l	tothe m	tha t part i cularactions	a re right/ w rong	an d (b )	be cause	they	are	fa m il i ar	with	otherkindsof ob l i gat ion s	from	the ir 	soci a l	lives (l i k e 	Ad a ms,	Evans	dev elops	his	D C T b y	anal og y	w i th	the 	obli ga t ion s	arising	i n	so cial	life ).	The y 	do	not need	adeeper  ex pla nati o nof 	wh yi t	i s 	t hat the 	particu la roblig atio n i s 	a	m ora l	ob ligat ion. Evans	us esa	le n gth y	ana logyto	d ef end	t his	po int.Idiscuss	that	an alog y	in thenex tsec ti on	be c ause	i t	r ais es	addi tionalp rob le m s . 	W e	don't	need	it	to  u n d er stand	th e	flaw in 	E v ans's	ar gu men t.	T h e 	flaw 	ste m sfrom	Eva ns's	a t te mp t to	di st inguis hthe 	ex plana t ionof	M	f rom	know ledge of	M	in	the	co n text	of	DCT.T he a tt e mpte d	s eparation	i s	un d erst anda b le :	D C T	is, 	afte ra ll , 	usually	proferredas 	an	ex plana tory	groundin g	for	mora l o bligatio ns	t h at we	already	bel ieveourselvest o	have.It	st ates	tha t	the	rea s o n	why	we 	ha vetho sem o ra l	obligations i s	be ca use	God 	co mmanded 	th emtobemo ral	requi rements. 	B ut 	t he 	pr opone n t of	the 	e pis te mol ogica l 	objec tionis	h ig hl i ght ing	ist ha t theat te mpte d	s ep arati on o f 	ex planati on	and	re cog n itio nis 	not	po ssible	in	the 	c ase	of	DCT 
planation	of	why	M	is	a	moral obligation	in	order	to	have	the	requisite	knowledge._His	argument	then	is	that	reasonable	non-believer	can	recognise	the	existence	of certain	moral	obligations	(a)	because	their	consciences	will	reveal	to	them	that_particular	actions	are	right/wrong	and	(b)	because	they	are	familiar	with	other kinds	of	obligations	from	their	social	lives	(like	Adams,	Evans	develops	his	DCT by	analogy	with	the	obligations	arising	in	social	life).	They	do	not	need	a	deeper explanation	of	why	it	is	that	the	particular	obligation	is	a	moral	obligation._Evans	uses	a	lengthy	analogy	to	defend	this	point.	I	discuss	that	analogy	in the	next	section	because	it	raises	additional	problems.	We	don't	need	it	to_understand	the	flaw	in	Evans's	argument.	The	flaw	stems	from	Evans's	attempt_to	distinguish	the	explanation	of	M	from	knowledge	of	M	in	the	context	of	DCT. The	attempted	separation	is	understandable:	DCT	is,	after	all,	usually	proferred_as	an	explanatory	grounding	for	moral	obligations	that	we	already	believe_ourselves	to	have.	It	states	that	the	reason	why	we	have	those	moral	obligations is	because	God	commanded	them	to	be	moral	requirements.	But	the	proponent of	the	epistemological	objection	is	highlighting	is	that	the	attempted	separation_of	explanation	and	recognition	is	not	possible	in	the	case	of	DCT