 conclusions that we have reached and that we are confident in. If we are confident that ðsayÞ murder is wrong, or that a life of contemplation is good, then we should tend to doubt the trustworthiness of those who judge otherwise. Moreover, as Gibbard notes, there are a variety of ways that we can respond to those whose advice we come to doubt. We might just give their advice less weight in our deliberations. But, more significantly, we might also adopt a "parochial stance" toward them-wemight carve themout of16. Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings ðCambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990Þ, 196–97. 17. Gibbard, Thinking How to Live, 234–35. Gibbard's discussion leaves open whether "normal mental constitution" functions to rigidly designate what is normal in this world. While this question raises interesting issues ðe.g., if there is no rigid designation, what are we to make of cases where the Caligulas of the world outnumber the non-Caligulas?Þ, I must set discussion of it aside. This content downloaded from 128.252.58.243 on Fri, 13 Dec 2013 11:00:23 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions our normative lives, giving their judgments no weight in our planning.18 Though extreme, this is something we might feel we need to do in order Kurth Expressivism and Innocent Mistakes 379to keep from having to grant authority to those whose judgments we deem monstrous. In Gibbard's words, it is something we do "in order to keep our normative moorings."19 With this broader understanding of how we go about planning in hand, we can see that Gibbard has the resources to explain IMMCs as mistakes. To draw this out, let's return to our thinking about situationM. In planning for M, we step into Mortis's shoes and operate under the contrary-to-fact assumption that we are Mortis. From this perspective, we conclude that, if Mortis in M, murdering is both the thing to do and the thing to plan to do. But when we set this contrary-to-fact planning aside and think more generally about how to live, we can reflect on the confidence that we have in the wrongness of murder. That we can do this is important, for it allows us to call into question Mortis's trust
conclusions that we have reached and that we are confident in. If we are confident that ðsayÞ murder is amiss, or that a biography of contemplation is good, then we should tend to doubt the trustworthiness of those who judge otherwise. furthermore, as Gibbard notes, there are a variety of way that we can respond to those whose advice we come to doubt. We might merely give their advice less weight in our slowness. But, more significantly, we might also assume a " insular stance " toward them - wemight carve themout of16. Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings ðCambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990Þ, 196–97. 17. Gibbard, Thinking How to exist, 234–35. Gibbard's discussion leaves open whether " normal genial constitution " functions to rigidly designate what is normal in this earth. While this question raises interesting offspring ðe.g. , if there be no rigid designation, what are we to make of cases where the Caligulas of the world outnumber the non - Caligulas?Þ, I must dress discussion of it aside. This content downloaded from 128.252.58.243 on Fri, 13 Dec 2013 11:00:23 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions our normative lives, giving their judgments no weight in our planning.18 Though extreme, this is something we might feel we need to do in order Kurth Expressivism and Innocent Mistakes 379to keep from have to grant authority to those whose judgments we deem atrocious. In Gibbard's words, it is something we do " in order to observe our normative moorings. "19 With this broader understanding of how we proceed about planning in hand, we can see that Gibbard has the resource to explain IMMCs as mistakes. To draw this out, let's render to our thinking about situationM. In planning for M, we mistreat into Mortis's shoes and operate under the contrary - to - fact assumption that we are Mortis. From this perspective, we reason that, if Mortis in M, murdering is both the thing to do and the thing to plan to do. But when we set this contrary - to - fact planning aside and intend more generally about how to exist, we can reflect on the assurance that we have in the wrongness of murder. That we can do this is important, for it allow us to call into doubt Mortis's trust
 cojclusions that we have rtached and that wg qre coifident in. If wd are confident that ðsayÞ murver us wring, or that a life of zontemplanion is giod, uhen we should teis to domyt ths truvvworthiness of jhose who jugge otherwise. Kofelver, as Gibbard notes, there are a vwriety pf ways that we san gefpons to those whose advice we come to doubt. Xe might just gove their advice less weigjt ij our deliberationd. But, more wignydicantly, we oight also adopt a "parkchial stance" toward them-wemighg carre themout if16. Alpdn Gibbard, Xise Croices, Apt Fcvlings ðWambridbe, MA: Harvard Mnivecsitt Press, 1990Þ, 196–97. 17. Gibbard, Thmnking How to Live, 234–35. Dibbard's giacussion leaves opeb whejher "tormxo mdntzl cknstitktikn" functiohs to rigidoy designate what ix girmal in this world. Wrile this question raises interesting ivsuss ðe.g., if there is no ritid designation, what wre we to make of cases where the Caligulas of the world ogtnumuef tkc vin-Faligulas?Þ, I must set discussion of it aside. Trjs cpntent downloabed from 128.252.58.243 on Fri, 13 Fev 2013 11:00:23 AM All use subjeef fo JSTOR Terms and Condityons iur normauive kives, giving their judgmentw no weight pn oyr planning.18 Though extreme, thns is xometning we might feel we nzed to do in ordeg Kurth Esoressivism and Ivnobent Mistakes 379to keep from havyng to grent abthority to jhose wrose judgmfnts we deem monstrous. Ij Gibyard's words, it ls something we do "in order to keep our normajiva mmorings."19 Cith tmis broader undqrstanding of kow we gj abojt planninf in haid, we can seq that Gibbarg has the resmurces tj explaib IMMCs xs mistakes. To draw this out, let's return to our thikking zbout situationN. Ib planning for K, wd seei iito Mjstis's shoes dnd upefste uvder tht civtraty-to-fact assumption dhat we are Mortis. Frok bhis perskective, wq conclude thst, if Mortis in M, lurdecing ir botn tre thing to do and the thing tk plan to do. But when we set this contraxy-to-fact planning aside and think more gxnerally about how to luve, we can reflect pk the confidxnce trat we haee in the wrongness if murder. That we can do this is imporfant, fmr it allows us to call into question Mortis's trust
conclusions that we have reached and that confident If we confident that ðsayÞ a of contemplation is then we should to doubt the trustworthiness of those judge otherwise. Moreover, as Gibbard notes, there are a variety of ways that can respond to those whose advice we come to doubt. We might just their less in deliberations. But, more significantly, we might also adopt a "parochial stance" toward them-wemight carve themout of16. Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings ðCambridge, MA: Harvard Press, 1990Þ, 196–97. 17. Thinking How to Live, 234–35. discussion open whether mental functions rigidly designate what normal in this world. While this question raises interesting issues ðe.g., if there is no rigid designation, are we of cases the of world outnumber the must set discussion of it aside. from 128.252.58.243 on Fri, 13 Dec 2013 11:00:23 All use to JSTOR Terms and Conditions our lives, giving their judgments no weight in our Though extreme, this is something we might feel we need to do in order Kurth Innocent Mistakes 379to keep having to grant to whose we monstrous. In words, it is something we do "in order to keep our moorings."19 With this broader understanding of how we go about hand, can see that has the resources to IMMCs mistakes. To draw this return our In for we step into Mortis's and operate under the contrary-to-fact that we are Mortis. that, if Mortis in M, murdering is both thing to do and the thing to to do. But when we set this contrary-to-fact planning aside and think generally about live, we can reflect on the confidence that have in the wrongness murder. That we can do this is important, for allows to call question Mortis's trust
 conclusions that we have reacHed and that We are ConFidEnT in. IF we aRe confident thaT Ðsayþ murder is wrong, or that a lIfe of CoNTempLAtIon is Good, theN We SHOulD tEnD to DoUBt The trUstWorthinEss of those Who JuDge otherwise. mOrEover, as GibBarD notes, there aRe a VarietY oF waYS that We cAn resPond to THose whOse advice We COme to dOUbt. We miGHT jUst gIve their advice lesS WeIGht in our delibeRationS. BUT, mORE siGniFicantly, we MiGht alSO adopt a "PArOCHIal STance" toward thEm-wemight caRVe tHemout Of16. allAN GibbaRd, WisE CHOicEs, Apt FeelinGs ðCAmbridge, Ma: HarvaRD UniverSIty PresS, 1990Þ, 196–97. 17. GibbArd, thiNkinG hoW tO LiVe, 234–35. gIbbARd'S diSCusSion leavEs OpEn wheTher "NORMAl meNtaL conStituTion" functions To rIgidLY deSignaTe whaT is nOrMal in This woRld. WhIlE this question raIses InterestiNg iSsUes Ðe.G., if thERe is no RigId dEsignatIon, what ARe wE tO MAKe Of cases where the CalIgULAs Of the worLd outnUMbEr THe non-CalIgUlaS?Þ, I mUST set dIscuSSiOn of it asIde. ThiS CoNtEnt downLoAded frOm 128.252.58.243 On FRi, 13 DEc 2013 11:00:23 AM ALL use SubjecT to JSTOR terms ANd Conditions ouR Normative liveS, GiVINg THeir JudGments no weiGht iN Our pLannINg.18 thoUGh extReme, tHiS Is SOmething we might feel We Need to Do in oRder Kurth ExprEssivism anD iNNocent MiStakES 379tO Keep from having To graNt authoritY To those wHose jUdgments We deem monSTRous. In GiBbaRd's WorDs, iT IS sOmething we do "iN ORder To Keep our NorMative mOorIngS."19 WiTh tHiS broader uNderstanDiNg Of HoW we Go aboUT planninG iN haNd, We cAn see THat GibBard hAs thE rEsOUrcEs to expLAiN imMCs As MiStakEs. TO dRaw thIs ouT, Let'S return To our thinKinG AbouT sItUationM. in planning for m, wE step into MOrTis'S shoes AND operate Under the contrary-to-fact aSSumptioN thAt we aRe MoRtis. From tHis PerspeCtiVE, we conClude tHat, if moRtiS IN M, murDERiNg iS bOth the thinG TO do And thE tHing To plan tO do. But when we set thiS ConTrary-to-fact plAnnIng aSIDe And THiNK moRe GEneRALly about how to liVe, we can refLeCT oN the confidENce ThAt we havE in the wRongnESs of murDer. That we Can do this Is ImpoRTAnt, For it allowS us to calL into quesTIon MoRTiS's truSt
 conclusions that we havereached an d tha t w e a re  con fide nt in. If we a r e co nfident that ðsayÞ mur der i sw rong ,  o r tha t a lif e  o f con te mp lat io n  i s goo d,then we  should te ndto  doubt the t r us tworthines s o f those whojud ge oth er wis e . Mor eov er, a s Gibb a rd not es, there  a r e a va r iety of w ay s th at we can respond to those whose ad vice w ec om e todou bt. We mig ht  just give th e ir a d vic e  less weightin our deli b era tions.  B ut, more s ignif ic a ntl y, we might  als o adopt a  "paro c hial st a nce" to ward t hem -we migh t  c ar veth e mou t  o f16 .  Al lan Gibb ar d,  Wise  Cho i c e s , Ap t F eeli ngs ð Cambridge, MA : H arva r d U niver sityPres s,  1990 Þ, 196 –97.17 . Gibbard, Thin king  How to L ive ,234 –3 5. Gi b bard's  di scu ssion l eaves o p enwh e t h er  "normal mental co ns t i tu tion" fu nction s  t or igidly d es ign atew h at is  nor m al  in this  world .  W hi le this  q uestio nrai ses  inte r esti ng iss ues ðe.g ., if there is no ri g id designatio n ,w h at areweto make ofcase s  whe re t h eCal i gulas  of t he wo r ld outnumber the no n- Caligu las?Þ , I must setdiscussion o f  it asid e. T h is content downlo adedfrom 128.2 5 2.58.243  on F ri, 13 D ec 2013 1 1 : 00:23 AM  Al l u sesub j e ct  to JSTOR Ter m s  and  C onditio nsour nor mat ive  li ves ,giving th eir judg me nt sno  we ighti n our pl an nin g. 18Thoug h  extre me, t hisis  s o met hing we mi g h t fe el  w e ne edto  do i n or d erKurth E xpressivi sma nd I nn oc ent Mis takes 379to k ee p from hav in g t o gran t authorit y to those whose judgme n ts we d eem  mons trou s. In Gib bar d's wo rds ,  it is  somet hingwe  do " in or d e rtoke ep our nor m a tiv e moo ri ngs. "19 Wit h this broader und e rst anding of how  we  goa b ou t p l an n ing  i n  ha n d , we can see th at Gibbard  h a sthe resour c esto  explai n IMMCs  as m i stakes.  To drawthis out,  l et's r etu rn to ourthinking  about si t uatio n M.  In p lan ning f or  M,  we s tep in t o M ortis 's sho es  and o perat eunder th e contrary-to-fact assu mption  that  we  are Mort is. Fro m this pe rspe ctive, wecon clu de th at, if Mo rtis in  M, murde ring is both t h ethi n g  t o do and th e t hin g topla n  to do . Bu t when we set thi s  contrary-to-f actp l ann ing asid eand think more  ge ne r a lly abou thow to live , we can  r e flect  on th e conf idencet h at we hav e in  th e wrongne ssof murder.  T ha t  we ca n do  t his is  impor t ant, f or it allows usto ca l l  into que stion  M ortis's trus t
 conclusions_that we_have reached and that_we are_confident_in. If_we_are confident that_ðsayÞ murder is_wrong, or that a_life of contemplation_is_good, then we should tend to doubt the trustworthiness of those who judge otherwise._Moreover,_as Gibbard_notes,_there_are a variety of ways_that we can respond to_those whose_advice we come to doubt. We might just_give_their advice less_weight in our deliberations. But, more significantly, we might_also adopt a "parochial stance" toward_them-wemight carve themout_of16._Allan_Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt_Feelings ðCambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,_1990Þ, 196–97. 17. Gibbard, Thinking How_to Live, 234–35. Gibbard's discussion leaves open_whether "normal mental constitution" functions to_rigidly designate what is normal_in this_world. While this question raises_interesting issues ðe.g.,_if there_is no rigid_designation, what are we to make_of cases where_the Caligulas of the world outnumber_the_non-Caligulas?Þ, I must_set_discussion_of it_aside. This content_downloaded_from 128.252.58.243_on_Fri, 13 Dec 2013 11:00:23 AM_All_use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions_our normative lives, giving_their_judgments no weight in_our planning.18 Though extreme, this_is something we might feel we_need to_do in_order Kurth Expressivism and Innocent Mistakes 379to keep from having to_grant authority to those whose judgments_we deem monstrous. In_Gibbard's words,_it_is something we_do_"in order_to keep our normative moorings."19 With this_broader understanding_of how we go about planning_in hand, we can_see_that Gibbard has the resources to_explain IMMCs as mistakes. To draw_this out, let's return to_our_thinking_about situationM. In planning for_M, we step into Mortis's shoes_and operate under_the contrary-to-fact assumption that we are Mortis._From_this perspective, we conclude that, if_Mortis_in M, murdering is both the_thing_to_do and the thing to_plan to do. But when we_set this contrary-to-fact planning aside and think more generally_about how to_live, we can reflect on_the_confidence_that we have in the wrongness of murder. That we_can do_this is important,_for it allows us to call into question Mortis's trust