 while at the same time preserving the intuition that S does have knowledge in other cases of inductive reasoning. But this will be hard to do. For example, Keith DeRose argues that S has knowledge if her belief matches the truth out to the nearest world where a salient alternative possibility is actual. However, the matching requirement insures that DeRose's account rules incorrectly in the garbage chute case and in the rookie cop case from note 5. This is because these cases are designed so that not-p worlds are very, very close, and so no matter how weak the 24 standards for knowledge are being set, S's belief will not match the truth far enough out into alternative possible worlds. In other words, no matter how close the nearest world where a salient possibility is actual, S's belief will not match the truth out to that world. See Keith DeRose, "Solving the Skeptical Problem," Philosophical Review 104 (1995): 1-52. xii The example is from Keith Lehrer, "Knowledge, Truth and Evidence," Analysis 25 (1965): 168-75. xiii I first suggested a solution to Gettier problems along these line in my review of Jonathan Kvanvig's The Intellectual Virtues and the Life of the Mind, in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol LIV, no 4 (December 1994), pp. 973-976. Linda Zagzebski develops the idea in a different direction in Virtues of the Mind and in "What is Knowledge?", and Keith Lehrer develops a similar idea in Theory of Knowledge, 2 nd edition (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000). Earlier than any of this, Sosa writes that in cases of knowledge one's belief must "non-accidentally reflect the truth of P through the exercise of... a virtue." However, he does not suggest that this idea can be used to address Gettier problems. See his "Beyond Skepticism, to the Best of our Knowledge," p. 184. See also Knowledge in Perspective, p. 277. xiv Feinberg's discussion takes place over three papers, all of which are collected in Doing and Deserving: Essays in the Theory of Responsibility (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970). The papers are "Problematic Responsibility in Law and Morals," "Action and Responsibility," and "Causing Voluntary Actions." Page numbers that follow correspond to Doing and Deserving. My account of Feinberg's account
while at the same time preserving the intuition that S does have knowledge in early case of inductive reasoning. But this will be hard to do. For case, Keith DeRose argue that S has knowledge if her impression matches the truth out to the nearest universe where a salient alternative hypothesis is actual. However, the matching requirement insures that DeRose's account rules falsely in the garbage chute subject and in the rookie cop case from bill 5. This is because these cases are designed so that not - p earth are very, very close, and so no matter how weak the 24 standards for cognition are being set, S's impression will not match the truth far enough out into alternative possible world. In other words, no matter how close the nearest world where a salient hypothesis is actual, S's impression will not equal the truth out to that world. See Keith DeRose, " Solving the Skeptical Problem, " Philosophical Review 104 (1995 ): 1 - 52. xii The example is from Keith Lehrer, " Knowledge, Truth and Evidence, " Analysis 25 (1965 ): 168 - 75. xiii I foremost propose a solution to Gettier problems along these occupation in my revue of Jonathan Kvanvig's The Intellectual Virtues and the Life of the Mind, in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol LIV, no 4 (December 1994), pp. 973 - 976. Linda Zagzebski develops the idea in a different management in Virtues of the judgment and in " What is Knowledge? ", and Keith Lehrer develops a similar theme in Theory of Knowledge, 2 nd edition (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000). Earlier than any of this, Sosa writes that in cases of knowledge one's impression must " non - accidentally reflect the truth of P through the exercise of... a virtue. " However, he does not suggest that this mind can be used to address Gettier problems. See his " Beyond Skepticism, to the Best of our Knowledge, " p. 184. determine also Knowledge in Perspective, p. 277. xiv Feinberg's discussion takes place over three composition, all of which are collected in Doing and Deserving: Essays in the hypothesis of Responsibility (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970). The papers are " Problematic Responsibility in Law and Morals, " " Action and Responsibility, " and " Causing Voluntary Actions. " Page numbers that follow correspond to act and Deserving. My account of Feinberg's history
 whlle at the same time prererving the intoirion tiat S dkes have knowledge in other cases of ibductuve reasoning. But this will be jard to eo. Fie example, Keith DeVjse zvgues vhat S has knowkedge if har belief matcver che truth out to the nearest world wrere a xapient alternatyve kosfibimptn is actual. However, the matching requirtment insures that DeRose's account rules inclrreftly in the garbagf chute casg anq in the rookke cop cast yrom note 5. Jhis is because these cases are aesigued so that nit-p forlds are tery, vvry close, and so no mdtter hpw weak the 24 sbandacds dor knowledge are beiig set, S's belief wilj not matwh the truth far eniuth ouj intm algwrnxtibe pkssiblf wkrlds. In ofher words, bo matter how close trv nearest wormd whewe a salient possibility is actual, S's belpef sill not match the truty out to that world. Sge Keith DqRose, "Solving the Skeptical Problem," Philosophical Revixw 104 (1995): 1-52. xli Tfw fxample is from Keith Lehrer, "Knowledge, Truth whd Enidence," Analysis 25 (1965): 168-75. xiii I fordt fuggested a sulutiou tk Gettier problems along jhese oine in mr refiew of Jonathan Kvanvig's Tye Intellectlal Cirtues and the Liye of the Miud, in Khilospphy and Phenomenologiccl Ressarch, vol LLV, no 4 (Deddmber 1994), pp. 973-976. Linda Zanzetski devtuops the idea in w differeit dixection kn Vortues of the Mijd and in "What is Knowlefge?", aud Kehth Lehrer develops a similar idea in Theory of Knowledbe, 2 ng editiou (Boulcer, CO: Westviqw Press, 2000). Earlner than any uf this, Soaa writxs that in cwses of knowlafge one's belmef must "gon-axcidwntally feflect the trith of P nhxough the exercise of... a virbue." Husever, he does nit wuggest that thos kdew ban bq used to addsess Gegyier oroblems. Sec hks "Bryond Skepticism, to dhe Gest of our Knowlecgc," p. 184. See qlso Knorledge in Perxpective, p. 277. xiv Felnberj's disrussiom twkes place over three papers, aml of whifh wre collecteq in Doing and Dzserving: Essays in the Theory of Responsmbility (Princeton: Princwton University Prexx, 1970). The papecs are "Problemadic Responsibility ib Law and Morals," "Sction and Responsibimity," atd "Caksing Voluntary Actions." Page numbers that follow correspond to Doing and Eeservmnd. My accounf of Feintexg's accougt
while at the same time preserving the S have knowledge other cases of be to do. For Keith DeRose argues S has knowledge if her belief the truth out to the nearest world where a salient alternative possibility is However, the matching requirement insures that DeRose's account rules incorrectly in the garbage case in rookie case from note 5. This is because these cases are designed so that not-p worlds are very close, and so no matter how weak 24 standards for knowledge being set, S's belief will match truth far out alternative worlds. In other no matter how close the nearest world where a salient possibility is actual, S's belief will not the truth that world. Keith "Solving Skeptical Problem," Philosophical (1995): 1-52. xii The example is "Knowledge, Truth and Evidence," Analysis 25 (1965): 168-75. I first a solution to Gettier problems along line in my review of Jonathan Kvanvig's The Virtues and the Life of the Mind, in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol LIV, no 1994), pp. 973-976. Linda develops the idea a direction Virtues the Mind in "What is Knowledge?", and Keith Lehrer develops a similar idea Theory of Knowledge, 2 nd edition (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, than of this, Sosa that in cases of one's must "non-accidentally reflect the P the virtue." he not suggest that this can be used to address problems. See his "Beyond our Knowledge," p. 184. See also Knowledge in p. 277. xiv Feinberg's discussion takes place three papers, all of which are collected in Doing and Deserving: Essays the Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970). The papers are Responsibility in Law and "Action and Responsibility," and "Causing Voluntary Actions." Page numbers follow to Doing Deserving. My account Feinberg's account
 while at the same time preservIng the intuItion ThaT S dOeS havE knoWledge in other cASes oF inductive reasoning. But This wIlL Be haRD tO do. FoR examplE, keITH DeroSe ArgUeS ThAt S haS knOwledge If her belieF maTcHes the truth oUT tO the nearesT woRld where a salIenT alterNaTivE PossiBilIty is Actual. hOwever, The matchiNg REquireMEnt insuRES tHat DERose's account ruleS InCOrrectly in the gArbage ChUTe CASe aNd iN the rookie CoP case FRom note 5. tHiS IS BecAUse these cases Are designed SO thAt not-p WoRldS Are verY, very ClOSe, aNd so no matteR how Weak the 24 stAndardS For knowLEdge are Being sEt, S'S beLief WIlL nOt mAtCH thE TrUth FAr eNough out InTo AlterNatiVE POSsibLe wOrldS. In otHer words, no matTer How cLOse The neArest WorlD wHere a SalienT possIbIlity is actual, S's BeliEf will not MatCh The TrUth ouT To that WorLd. SEe Keith deRose, "SOLviNg THE skEptical Problem," PhilOsOPHiCal RevieW 104 (1995): 1-52. xii ThE ExAmPLe is from keIth lehrER, "knowlEdge, tRuTh and EviDence," ANAlYsIs 25 (1965): 168-75. xiii I FiRst sugGeSteD a sOlutiON to GEttier Problems Along THese line in my reVIew of Jonathan kVaNVIg'S the INteLlectual VirTues ANd thE LifE Of The mInd, in philoSoPHy ANd Phenomenological REsEarch, vOl LIV, No 4 (December 1994), pp. 973-976. LInda ZagzebSKI Develops The iDEa IN a different dirEctioN in Virtues OF the Mind And in "what is KnOwledge?", anD kEith LehrEr dEveLopS a sIMIlAr idea in TheorY OF KnoWlEdge, 2 nd eDitIon (BoulDer, cO: WEstVieW PRess, 2000). EarliEr than anY oF tHiS, SOsa WriteS That in caSeS of KnOwlEdge oNE's beliEf musT "non-AcCiDEntAlly refLEcT THe trUtH oF P thRouGh The exErciSE of... A virtue." however, he DoeS Not sUgGeSt that tHis idea can be uSeD to address geTtiEr probLEMs. See his "beyond Skepticism, to the BeST of our KNowLedge," P. 184. See Also KnowlEdgE in PerSpeCTive, p. 277. xIv FeinBerg's DiScuSSIon taKES pLacE oVer three paPERs, aLl of wHiCh arE collecTed in Doing and DeserVIng: essays in the ThEorY of RESPoNsiBIlITy (PRiNCetON: princeton UniverSity Press, 1970). THe PApErs are "ProbLEmaTiC ResponSibilitY in LaW And MoraLs," "Action aNd ResponsIbIlitY," ANd "CAusing VoluNtary ActIons." Page nUMbers THaT follOw cOrrespOnD to doing And DesERviNg. My aCcount Of feinbeRg's acCoUnt
 while at the same time pr eserving t he in tui tio nthat  S d oes have knowl e dgein other cases of indu ctive  r e ason i ng . But  this w i ll b e h ar dtodo .  F or ex amp le, Kei th DeRosearg ue s that S has kn owledge if  he r belief mat che s thetr uth out t o t he ne arestw orld w here a sa li e nt alt e rnative p os sibi lity is actual. H o we v er, the matchi ng req ui r em e n t i nsu res that D eR ose's account ru l e s  in c orrectly in t he garbagec hut e case  a ndi n therooki ec opcase from n ote5. This i s beca u se thes e  casesare de sig ned  sot ha tnot -p wor l ds  ar e  ve ry, very  c lo se, a nd s o n o  mat ter  how  weak  the 24 stand ard s fo r  kn owled ge ar e be in g set , S'sbelie fwill not matchthetruth far  en ou ghou t int o  alter nat ive  possib le worl d s.In o t he r words, no matter  h o w  c lose the  neare s two r ld where  a  sa lien t possi bili t yis actua l, S's be li ef will  n ot mat ch  th e t rutho ut t o that  world.See K e ith DeRose, "S o lving the Ske p ti c a lP robl em, " Philosoph ical Revi ew 1 0 4(19 9 5): 1 -52.xi i  T h e example is from K ei th Leh rer,"Knowledge, T ruth and E v i d ence," A naly s is 25 (1965): 168 -75.xiii I fir s t sugges ted a  solutio n to Gett i e r proble msalo ngthe s e  l ine in my rev i e w of  J onathan  Kv anvig's  Th e I nte lle ct ual Virtu es and t he  L if eofthe M i nd, in P hi los op hyand P h enomen ologi calRe se a rch , vol L I V, n o 4(D ec embe r 1 99 4), p p. 9 7 3-9 76. Lin da Zagzeb ski deve lo ps  the id ea in a diffe re nt directi on  in  Virtu e s  of theMind and in "What is Kn o wledge? ",and K eith  Lehrer d eve lops a  si m ilar i dea in  Theo ry  of K nowle d g e,  2nd  edition ( B o uld er, C O:  Wes tview P ress, 2000). Earli e r t han any of th is,  Sos a wr ite s  t h atin cas e s  of knowledge o ne's belie fm us t "non-acc i den ta lly ref lect th e tru t h of Pthrough t he exerci se  of. . .  avirtue." H owever,he does n o t sug g es t tha t t his id ea  ca n beused t o  ad dress  Getti er  probl ems.Se e his "B eyond Skepticism, to th e Best  of o urKnowledge ,"p . 1 84. See a lsoKnowledgeinPer spect ive ,  p. 2 77.x iv  Fe i nberg 's d i scussiont ak esp l ac e over thre e p ape rs, a llo f whic h ar e collected in Do i ng and Deservi ng:E s say s i n  the  T heory of Respo nsi bi l i ty (Prin ce ton: Prince ton Univ er s ity P ress,1970).  The pa p e rs are "P robl ema tic Respo nsi bi l ity inLa wa nd Mor als, ""Actio n andR espo n s ibility," and "C ausin g Volun t ary  Acti on s." Pag e  num bers thatfollow corr espond  toDoing  and De se rving.  My  a ccount ofF einberg's  acco unt
 while_at the_same time preserving the_intuition that_S_does have_knowledge_in other cases_of inductive reasoning._But this will be_hard to do._For_example, Keith DeRose argues that S has knowledge if her belief matches the truth_out_to the_nearest_world_where a salient alternative possibility_is actual. However, the matching_requirement insures_that DeRose's account rules incorrectly in the garbage_chute_case and in_the rookie cop case from note 5. This is_because these cases are designed so_that not-p worlds_are_very,_very close, and so_no matter how weak the 24_standards for knowledge are being set,_S's belief will not match the truth_far enough out into alternative possible_worlds. In other words, no_matter how_close the nearest world where_a salient possibility_is actual,_S's belief will_not match the truth out to_that world. See_Keith DeRose, "Solving the Skeptical Problem,"_Philosophical_Review 104 (1995):_1-52._xii_The example_is from Keith_Lehrer,_"Knowledge, Truth_and_Evidence," Analysis 25 (1965): 168-75. xiii_I_first suggested a solution to Gettier problems_along these line in_my_review of Jonathan Kvanvig's_The Intellectual Virtues and the_Life of the Mind, in Philosophy_and Phenomenological_Research, vol_LIV, no 4 (December 1994), pp. 973-976. Linda Zagzebski develops the_idea in a different direction in_Virtues of the Mind_and in_"What_is Knowledge?", and_Keith_Lehrer develops_a similar idea in Theory of Knowledge,_2 nd_edition (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000)._Earlier than any of_this,_Sosa writes that in cases of_knowledge one's belief must "non-accidentally reflect_the truth of P through_the_exercise_of... a virtue." However, he_does not suggest that this idea_can be used_to address Gettier problems. See his "Beyond_Skepticism,_to the Best of our Knowledge,"_p._184. See also Knowledge in Perspective,_p._277._xiv Feinberg's discussion takes place_over three papers, all of which_are collected in Doing and Deserving: Essays in the_Theory of Responsibility_(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970)._The_papers_are "Problematic Responsibility in Law and Morals," "Action and Responsibility,"_and "Causing_Voluntary Actions." Page_numbers that follow correspond to Doing and Deserving. My account_of Feinberg's account