 such characters; though 'Trump is human' and 'Sherlock Holmes is human' differ in truth-value, the sentences seem prima facie to have the same kind of semantic content, and if 'Trump' refers to Trump and 'Trump is tall' expresses a singular proposition whose truth-conditions depend on how things are with Trump, one may expect the same to apply to 'Holmes'. Prima facie, then, 'Holmes' refers to Holmes, and sentences involving Holmes express singular propositions that are assigned truth conditions the same way sentences containing 'Trump' are. Realists disagree about the nature of these characters, however. According to possibilism, or non-actualism, fictional characters are possible objects. Although Holmes does not actually exist, he could have, and does exist in some possible world different from the actual one. Moreover, we understand sentences containing 'Holmes' at least in part by grasping what things are like in worlds relative to which those sentences are true. In the present article I provide a partial defense of possibilism. However, to do so we should distinguish two distinct goals a possibilist analysis could aim to achieve. First, a possibilist analysis might aim to provide a semantic theory for sentences in fiction, one that assigns intuitively correct truth-conditions to such sentences. Now, I will assume that sentences containing 'Holmes' express singular propositions and that 'Holmes' directly refers to the merely possible object Holmes, who exists in multiple worlds where he instantiates different properties. A challenge to this view that I briefly discuss below is to explain how we can refer to the right individual (see Kripke 2011; Thomasson 1999). To provide a semantic theory that identifies truthconditions for each sentence in a fiction, however, we need not worry for instance about what counts as true in a fiction or whether there is a set of relevant worlds that can serve as truth-makers for the whole fiction. A second goal is to develop a model of fiction as a type of discourse, that can help explain how we interpret, and share interpretations of, fictional narratives. Doing so requires for instance accounts of what counts as being the case in a story, what distinguishes storytelling from counterfactual discourse and how possible worlds can be used to reflect the creative T H E T R U T H A B O U T S H E R L O C K H O L M E S 341 aspect of storytelling. The primary aim of this article is to sketch a framework that can support the second goal.
such characters; though' Trump is human' and' Sherlock Holmes is human' differ in truth - value, the sentences look prima facie to take the same kind of semantic content, and if' Trump' refers to Trump and' Trump is improbable' expresses a singular proposal whose accuracy - conditions depend on how things are with Trump, one may expect the same to give to' Holmes'. Prima facie, then,' Holmes' refers to Holmes, and sentences involve Holmes carry singular propositions that are assigned truth conditions the like way sentences containing' Trump' are. realist disagree about the nature of these characters, however. According to possibilism, or non - actualism, fabricated characters are potential objects. Although Holmes does not actually exist, he could have, and does exist in some possible world different from the actual one. Moreover, we sympathize sentences containing' Holmes' at least in part by grasping what things are like in worlds proportional to which those sentence are true. In the present article I provide a partial defense of possibilism. However, to do so we should distinguish two distinct goals a possibilist psychoanalysis could drive to achieve. First, a possibilist psychoanalysis might target to leave a semantic theory for sentences in fiction, one that assigns intuitively correct truth - conditions to such prison term. Now, I will assume that sentences containing' Holmes' express singular propositions and that' Holmes' immediately refers to the merely possible object Holmes, who exists in multiple worlds where he instantiates different property. A challenge to this view that I briefly discuss below is to explain how we can denote to the right individual (see Kripke 2011; Thomasson 1999). To leave a semantic theory that identifies truthconditions for each sentence in a fiction, however, we need not concern for instance about what counts as true in a fiction or whether there is a stage set of relevant worlds that can service as truth - maker for the whole fabrication. A second goal is to develop a model of fabrication as a type of discourse, that can help explain how we interpret, and share interpretations of, fictional narratives. Doing so requires for case accounts of what counts as being the casing in a story, what distinguishes storytelling from counterfactual discourse and how potential worlds can be used to reflect the creative T H E T R U T H A bacillus oxygen U T S H E R L O coke K H O L M E S 341 aspect of storytelling. The chief purpose of this article is to sketch a framework that can support the second goal.
 sufh characters; though 'Truop is human' and 'Sherlork Holmss is huoan' differ in truth-value, the swntenxes seem prima facie tu have thv same kibd oh semantic conteif, and in 'Truji' refzrw to Trump and 'Trump is dall' expresses a snngular proposition whose truth-condieions drpfnd on how thiggs swe wjnh Trump, one may expect the sams to apkly to 'Holmes'. Prims facie, then, 'Holmes' refers to Jolmes, and sentencfs involvint Hojnes express ringular pgmpositions that are assigned truth conditkons che same wai aejjences contamning 'Nrump' are. Realists divagree sbout the natuve of thwse characters, howevec. According to possifilism, or nkn-actualism, fictiinql chdracders qre poasmbls objefts. Although Golmes does not actually exist, hq could have, ahd doef qxist in some possible world different xroj the actual one. Moreovwr, we understand sentgnces contwining 'Holmes' at least in part by grasping what tvings xre llke kb aorlds relative to which those sentences are edut. Ik the present arbicle I provide a lagtowl defense of possiyjljsm. However, to do do we srould distinguysh ywo distinct goals a possibulist analysps ciuld aim to achievz. First, a porsibolist analysis might aim to 'rovids a semantif theory rur sentences in wicnion, one thau assigns intuitivqly corrert trbth-condigionx to stch sentenfes. Now, I will assume thwt seutencas containlng 'Holmes' express singular pro'psitions and tvat 'Holmes' birectky refers to ehe merely posxible oyject Folmes, who exists in multiplq worlds whera he instantietes diffqrenr pripertier. A challenge tp this vivw thar I briefly discusx bglkw is to explaiu yow we can refet tu tre rmght ytdividual (sea Krkpkd 2011; Thooasson 1999). To iroxide a semantic theory tvat jdentifies truthcomdltions fot each segtence in a foction, however, we jeed iot wocry fot igstance about what counts as tdue in a vicbion or whethqr tmere is a set pf relevant worlds that can serve as trnth-makers for the wholg fiction. A second gocl is to devekop a model of fiction as a type od discourse, that gan help explain how ws intespret, and share interpretations of, fictional narratives. Doing so requires for unstanre accounts or whst colntf as beyng vhx case in a story, what distinguishes storytellinj from couttzrfactual discourse and how ppsrible worlds zan be used to reflect tge creatove T H E T R U T H A B O U T S H E R L O C K H O L M E S 341 aspext of storyngllmng. The primary aim pf thiv artucle is to dketch a framdwotk that can supkort the second goal.
such characters; though 'Trump is human' and is differ in the sentences seem same of semantic content, if 'Trump' refers Trump and 'Trump is tall' expresses singular proposition whose truth-conditions depend on how things are with Trump, one may the same to apply to 'Holmes'. Prima facie, then, 'Holmes' refers to Holmes, sentences Holmes singular that are assigned truth conditions the same way sentences containing 'Trump' are. Realists disagree about the of these characters, however. According to possibilism, or fictional characters are possible Although Holmes does not actually he have, and exist some world different from actual one. Moreover, we understand sentences containing 'Holmes' at least in part by grasping what things are in worlds which those are In present article I partial defense of possibilism. However, to should distinguish two distinct goals a possibilist analysis aim to First, a possibilist analysis might aim provide a semantic theory for sentences in fiction, that assigns intuitively correct truth-conditions to such sentences. Now, I will assume that sentences containing singular propositions and that directly refers to merely object who in multiple where he instantiates different properties. A challenge to this view that briefly discuss below is to explain how we can refer right (see Kripke 2011; 1999). To provide a theory identifies truthconditions for each a however, worry instance what counts as true a fiction or whether there a set of relevant truth-makers for the whole fiction. A second goal to develop a model of fiction as type of discourse, that can help explain how we interpret, and share of, fictional so requires for instance accounts of what counts being the case in story, what distinguishes storytelling from counterfactual discourse and how worlds be used reflect the creative H E T U T H O U S E C K H O L M S aspect of storytelling. The primary of is to sketch a framework that can support the second goal.
 such characters; though 'Trump Is human' and 'sherlOck holMeS is hUman' Differ in truth-vALue, tHe sentences seem prima faCie to HaVE the SAmE kind Of semanTIc CONteNt, AnD if 'trUMp' ReferS to trump anD 'Trump is taLl' eXpResses a singuLAr PropositioN whOse truth-condItiOns depEnD on HOw thiNgs Are wiTh TrumP, One may Expect the SaME to appLY to 'HolmES'. prIma fAcie, then, 'Holmes' refERs TO Holmes, and sentEnces iNvOLvING HoLmeS express siNgUlar pROpositiONs THAT arE Assigned truth Conditions tHE saMe way sEnTenCEs contAininG 'TRUmp' Are. Realists DisaGree about The natURe of theSE characTers, hoWevEr. ACcorDInG tO poSsIBilISm, Or nON-acTualism, fIcTiOnal cHaraCTERS are PosSiblE objeCts. Although HoLmeS doeS Not ActuaLly exIst, hE cOuld hAve, and Does eXiSt in some possiblE worLd differeNt fRoM thE aCtual ONe. MoreOveR, we UnderstAnd sentENceS cONTAiNing 'Holmes' at least iN pART bY graspinG what tHInGs ARe like in WoRldS relATIve to WhicH ThOse senteNces arE TrUe. in the prEsEnt artIcLe I ProVide a PArtiAl defeNse of posSibilISm. However, to do sO We should distiNGuISH tWO disTinCt goals a posSibiLIst aNalySIs CouLD aim tO achiEvE. fiRSt, a possibilist analySiS might Aim to Provide a semanTic theory fOR SEntences In fiCTiON, one that assignS intuItively corREct truth-CondiTions to sUch sentenCES. Now, I wilL asSumE thAt sENTeNces containinG 'hOlmeS' eXpress sIngUlar proPosItiOns And ThAt 'Holmes' dIrectly rEfErS tO tHe mErely POssible oBjEct hoLmeS, who eXIsts in MultiPle wOrLdS WheRe he insTAnTIAtes DiFfErenT prOpErtieS. A chALleNge to thIs view thaT I bRIeflY dIsCuss belOw is to explain HoW we can refeR tO thE right INDividual (See Kripke 2011; Thomasson 1999). To proVIde a semAntIc theOry tHat identiFieS truthConDItions For eacH sentEnCe iN A FictiON, HoWevEr, We need not wORRy fOr insTaNce aBout whaT counts as true in a fiCTioN or whether theRe iS a seT OF rEleVAnT WorLdS ThaT CAn serve as truth-mAkers for thE wHOlE fiction. A sEConD gOal is to Develop A modeL Of fictiOn as a type Of discourSe, That CAN heLp explain hOw we inteRpret, and sHAre inTErPretaTioNs of, fiCtIonAl narRativeS. doiNg so rEquireS fOr instAnce aCcOunts of wHat counts as being the case In a stoRy, whaT diStinguishEs sTOryTelling frOm coUnterfactuAl dIscOurse And HOw posSiblE WoRldS Can be Used TO reflect tHE cReaTIVe t H E T R U T H A B O u t s h E R l O C K H o L M e s 341 aspecT of sTorytelling. The priMAry aim of this arTiclE IS to SkeTCh a fRaMework that can sUppOrT THe second GoAl.
 such characters; though ' Trump is h uman'  an d ' Sh erlo ck H olmes is human '  dif fer in truth-value, th e sen te n cess ee m pri ma faci e  t o hav eth e s am e  k ind o f s emantic  content,and  i f 'Trump' re f er s to Trump  an d 'Trump istal l' exp re sse s  a si ngu lar p roposi t ion wh ose truth -c o nditio n s depen d on  how  things are withT ru m p, one may exp ect th es am e toapp ly to 'Hol me s'. P r ima fac i e, t h en, 'Holmes' refe rs to Holme s , a nd sen te nce s  invol vingHo l mes  express si ngul ar propos itions that ar e  assign ed tru thcon diti o ns  t hesa m e w a ysen t enc es conta in in g 'Tr ump' a r e . Re ali stsdisag ree about the  na ture ofthese  char acte rs , how ever.Accor di ng to possibili sm,or non-ac tua li sm,  f ictio n al cha rac ter s are p ossible obj ec t s .  A lthough Holmes doe sn o tactually  exist ,  h ec ould hav e,  an d do e s  exis t in so me possi ble wo r ld  d ifferen tfrom t he  ac tua l one .  Mor eover,  we unde rstan d  sentences con t aining 'Holme s 'a t  l e astinpart by gra spin g  wha t th i ng s a r e lik e inwo r ld s  relative to whichth ose se ntenc es are true.In the pre s e n t articl e Ip ro v ide a partialdefen se of poss i bilism.Howev er, to d o so we s h o uld dist ing uis h t wod i st inct goals ap o ssib il ist ana lys is coul d a imtoach ie ve. First , a poss ib il is tana lysis might ai mtopr ovi de as emanti c the oryfo rs ent ences i n  f i c tion ,on e th atas signs  int u iti vely co rrect tru th- c ondi ti on s to su ch sentences.  N ow, I will  a ssu me tha t sentence s containing 'Holmes' e x press s ing ularprop ositionsand  that'Ho l mes' d irectl y ref er s t o the m e r el y p os sible obje c t  Ho lmes,  w ho e xists i n multiple worldsw her e he instanti ate s di f f er ent pr o per ti e s.A challenge to th is view th at Ibriefly di s cus sbelow i s to ex plain how wecan refer  to the r ig ht i n d ivi dual (seeKripke 2 011; Thom a sson1 99 9). T o p rovide  a  se manti c theo r y t hat i dentif ie s trut hcond it ions for  each sentence in a fic tion,howev er,  we neednot wor ry for in stan ce about w hat  co untsast rue i n af ic tio n  or w heth e r there i s  a  se t of  relevant w o r l dsthatcan serveas t ruth-makers for t h e whole fictio n. A s eco ndg oalis  to develop amod el o f fictio nas a type o f discou rs e , tha t canhelp e xplainh o ww e inte rpre t,and share  in te r pretati on so f, fic tion al  narra tives. Doin g so requires forinsta n c e acc o unt s ofwh at coun t s as  being the  case in astory,  wha t dis tinguis he s stor yte ll ing from c o unterfact ual d iscours eandhow  possi blew o rldscanbe  us ed to ref l e ct th ec rea tive  T HET RU T H A B O U T SH E R L O C  K  HO L M ES  3 4 1  aspect of  st oryte l l ing. The p r imar y  a i m ofthis a rticle  is tos ket ch  a fram ewo r k  that can  supportt hese cond  goal.
 such_characters; though_'Trump is human' and_'Sherlock Holmes_is_human' differ_in_truth-value, the sentences_seem prima facie_to have the same_kind of semantic_content,_and if 'Trump' refers to Trump and 'Trump is tall' expresses a singular proposition_whose_truth-conditions depend_on_how_things are with Trump, one_may expect the same to_apply to_'Holmes'. Prima facie, then, 'Holmes' refers to Holmes,_and_sentences involving Holmes_express singular propositions that are assigned truth conditions the_same way sentences containing 'Trump' are._Realists disagree about_the_nature_of these characters, however._According to possibilism, or non-actualism, fictional_characters are possible objects. Although Holmes_does not actually exist, he could have,_and does exist in some possible_world different from the actual_one. Moreover,_we understand sentences containing 'Holmes'_at least in_part by_grasping what things_are like in worlds relative to_which those sentences_are true. In the present article_I_provide a partial_defense_of_possibilism. However,_to do so_we_should distinguish_two_distinct goals a possibilist analysis could_aim_to achieve. First, a possibilist analysis might_aim to provide a_semantic_theory for sentences in_fiction, one that assigns intuitively_correct truth-conditions to such sentences. Now,_I will_assume that_sentences containing 'Holmes' express singular propositions and that 'Holmes' directly refers_to the merely possible object Holmes,_who exists in multiple_worlds where_he_instantiates different properties._A_challenge to_this view that I briefly discuss below_is to_explain how we can refer to_the right individual (see_Kripke_2011; Thomasson 1999). To provide a_semantic theory that identifies truthconditions for_each sentence in a fiction,_however,_we_need not worry for instance_about what counts as true in_a fiction or_whether there is a set of relevant_worlds_that can serve as truth-makers for_the_whole fiction. A second goal is_to_develop_a model of fiction as_a type of discourse, that can_help explain how we interpret, and share interpretations of,_fictional narratives. Doing_so requires for instance accounts_of_what_counts as being the case in a story, what distinguishes_storytelling from_counterfactual discourse and_how possible worlds can be used to reflect the creative_T H E T R U T_H A B O U T S H E R L_O C K H O L M E_S 341 aspect of storytelling. The primary_aim of this article_is_to sketch a framework that can support_the_second_goal.