require	epistemic	access	to	the demands	of	morality.	There	are	two	illustrations	of	this.	One	is	that	it	is	widelyagreed	that	moral	obligations	are	action-guiding	and	motivationally	salient.	That is	to	say,	they	have	some	sort	of	effect	on	how	we	choose	to	behave	(even	if	they do	not	completely	overwhelm	our	other	internal	reasons	for	action).	It	is	not clear	how	moral	obligations	could	have	these	properties	if	the	people	to	whom they	are	directed	lack	epistemic	access	to	their	content.	Similarly,	there	is	the widely-accepted	Kantian	maxim	that	'ought	implies	can'.	This	suggests	that	in order	for	something	to	count	as	a	moral	obligation	we	must	have	the	ability	to follow	it.	This	'ability'	consists	in	the	power	to	control	one's	actions	in	the	way specified	by	the	obligation	and	also,	crucially,	the	ability	to	know	what	the obligation	demands.5	So	an	epistemic	condition	looks	like	it	would	be	an important	part	of	any	plausible	list	of	moral	platitudes,	and	hence	something	that any	sound	metaethical	grounding	for	moral	obligations	would	account	for. This	importance	is	reinforced	by	the	fact	that	the	absence	of	a	plausible account	of	moral	epistemology	is	at	the	heart	of	one	of	the	most	contentious contemporary	debates	in	metaethics:	the	debate	between	realists	and antirealists.	Recent	years	have	
require 	 epistemic 	 access 	 to 	 the demands 	 of 	 morality. 	 There 	 are 	 two 	 example 	 of 	 this. 	 One 	 is 	 that 	 it 	 is 	 widelyagreed 	 that 	 moral 	 obligation 	 are 	 action - guiding 	 and 	 motivationally 	 salient. 	 That is 	 to 	 say, 	 they 	 own 	 some 	 sort 	 of 	 effect 	 on 	 how 	 we 	 choose 	 to 	 act 	 (even 	 if 	 they do 	 not 	 completely 	 overwhelm 	 our 	 other 	 internal 	 reason 	 for 	 action). 	 It 	 is 	 not clear 	 how 	 moral 	 debt instrument 	 could 	 have 	 these 	 properties 	 if 	 the 	 multitude 	 to 	 whom they 	 are 	 aim 	 lack 	 epistemic 	 access 	 to 	 their 	 content. 	 Similarly, 	 there 	 is 	 the widely - accepted 	 Kantian 	 maxim 	 that 	' ought 	 implies 	 can'. 	 This 	 suggests 	 that 	 in ordering 	 for 	 something 	 to 	 count 	 as 	 a 	 moral 	 obligation 	 we 	 must 	 have 	 the 	 ability 	 to take after 	 it. 	 This 	' ability' 	 consists 	 in 	 the 	 power 	 to 	 control 	 one's 	 actions 	 in 	 the 	 manner specified 	 by 	 the 	 obligation 	 and 	 also, 	 crucially, 	 the 	 ability 	 to 	 know 	 what 	 the obligation 	 demands.5 	 therefore 	 an 	 epistemic 	 condition 	 looks 	 like 	 it 	 would 	 be 	 an important 	 part 	 of 	 any 	 plausible 	 list 	 of 	 moral 	 platitudes, 	 and 	 hence 	 something 	 that any 	 sound 	 metaethical 	 grounding 	 for 	 moral 	 obligations 	 would 	 account 	 for. This 	 importance 	 is 	 reinforced 	 by 	 the 	 fact 	 that 	 the 	 absence 	 of 	 a 	 plausible account 	 of 	 moral 	 epistemology 	 is 	 at 	 the 	 heart 	 of 	 one 	 of 	 the 	 most 	 contentious contemporary 	 debates 	 in 	 metaethics: 	 the 	 argument 	 between 	 realist 	 and antirealists. 	 Recent 	 class 	 have
reqkire	epistemic	access	to	the demands	of	moralnry.	Therx	are	two	jllustragions	of	this.	One	is	that	it	is	widepyqgreee	that	moral	obligations	afe	action-gliding	and	notitationally	salienv.	Fhat is	bj	say,	fmey	hare	wome	sort	of	effegt	on	how	we	chmose	to	behave	(evan	kf	chey do	not	completely	overwhelm	our	othew	internsl	geasons	for	actijn).	It	ps	got dlear	how	moral	obligations	could	have	tgese	prokerties	if	the	people	yo	whom they	are	directed	lack	fpishemic	access	to	their	fontent.	Simioarlr,	rhere	is	the wkdely-accepueb	Kantian	maxjm	that	'ought	implies	can'.	This	suggesgs	thac	in order	fot	skmfjhing	to	count	es	a	morwl	obligation	we	must	haee	the	abolity	to follow	lt.	Thiv	'abulity'	consists	in	the	powxr	to	control	one's	actiogs	in	the	waf apecified	by	the	oblugqtion	dnd	anso,	cfycixllg,	tie	agility	ho	kiow	what	the kbligation	dwmands.5	So	an	epistemic	vogeition	looks	liie	it	wotlq	be	an important	part	of	any	plausible	list	of	korzl	platitudes,	and	hence	somwthing	that any	sound	mejaethical	gwounding	for	moral	obligations	would	account	for. This	im[ortaicd	is	xclnfofxef	by	the	fact	that	the	absence	of	a	plausible account	os	jotak	epistemology	if	at	the	heart	pf	lnr	jf	the	most	contgntious cohtemporary	debates	ij	metaetrics:	tye	debate	bttweem	realists	and antirealists.	Rexent	years	havv	
require epistemic access to the demands of are illustrations of One is that obligations action-guiding and motivationally That is to they have some sort of effect how we choose to behave (even if they do not completely overwhelm our internal reasons for action). It is not clear how moral obligations could have properties the to they are directed lack epistemic access to their content. Similarly, there is the widely-accepted Kantian maxim 'ought implies can'. This suggests that in order something to count as moral obligation we must have ability follow it. 'ability' in power to control actions in the way specified by the obligation and also, crucially, the ability to know what the demands.5 So condition looks it be important part of list of moral platitudes, and hence sound metaethical grounding for moral obligations would account This importance reinforced by the fact that the of a plausible account of moral epistemology is the heart of one of the most contentious contemporary debates in metaethics: the debate between antirealists. Recent years have
require	epistemic	access	to	tHe demands	oF	moraLitY.	ThErE	are	Two	iLlustrations	of	THis.	ONe	is	that	it	is	widelyagreEd	thaT	mORal	oBLiGatioNs	are	acTIoN-GUidInG	aNd	mOtIVaTionaLly	Salient.	that is	to	saY,	thEy	Have	some	sort	OF	eFfect	on	how	We	cHoose	to	behavE	(evEn	if	thEy Do	nOT	compLetEly	ovErwhelM	Our	othEr	internaL	rEAsons	fOR	action).	iT	Is	Not cLear	how	moral	obligATiONs	could	have	theSe	propErTIeS	IF	thE	peOple	to	whom ThEy	are	DIrected	LAcK	EPIstEMic	access	to	thEir	content.	SIMilArly,	thErE	is	THe wideLy-accEpTEd	KAntian	maxim	That	'Ought	implIes	can'.	tHis	suggESts	that	In ordeR	foR	soMethINg	To	CouNt	AS	a	mORaL	obLIgaTion	we	muSt	HaVe	the	AbilITY	TO folLow	It.	ThIs	'abiLity'	consists	iN	thE	powER	to	ContrOl	one'S	actIoNs	in	tHe	way sPecifIeD	by	the	obligatioN	and	Also,	cruciAllY,	tHe	aBiLity	tO	Know	whAt	tHe oBligatiOn	demanDS.5	So	An	EPIStEmic	condition	looks	LiKE	It	Would	be	aN imporTAnT	pARt	of	any	pLaUsiBle	lIST	of	moRal	pLAtItudes,	anD	hence	SOmEtHing	thaT aNy	sounD	mEtaEthIcal	gROundIng	for	Moral	oblIgatiONs	would	account	FOr. This	importaNCe	IS	ReINforCed	By	the	fact	thAt	thE	AbseNce	oF	A	pLauSIble aCcounT	oF	MoRAl	epistemology	is	at	tHe	Heart	oF	one	oF	the	most	conteNtious contEMPOrary	debAtes	IN	mETaethics:	the	debAte	beTween	realiSTs	and antIrealIsts.	ReceNt	years	haVE	
require	epistemic	access	t o	the dema nds	o f	m ora li ty.Ther e	are	two	illu s trat ions	of	this.	One	is	t hat	i ti s	wi d el yagre ed	that mo r a l	o bl ig ati on s 	a re	ac tio n-guidi ng	and	mot iva ti onally	salie n t. 	That is	t o	s ay,	they	hav e	s ome	so rt 	of effec t	o n	how 	we	ch o ose	to 	behave	( ev e n	if	t h ey do	n o t 	c ompl etely	overwhelm	o u ro ther	internalreason sf or a cti on) .	It	is	no tclear how	mor a lo b l iga t ions	could	ha ve	these	pr o per ties	i fthe people 	to	w ho m  th ey	are	dire cted 	lack	epi stemic accesst o	their 	conte nt. 	Si mila r ly ,the re ist he  wi d ely -accepte dKa ntian 	max i m t hat'ou ghtimpli es	can'.	This 	su gges t s	t hat	i n ord er	f or 	some thingto	co un t	as	a	moral	ob liga tion	we	m ust 	h ave 	t he	ab i lity	t o f oll ow	it.This	'a b ili ty ' c on sists	in	the	power 	t o co ntrol	on e's	ac t io ns in	the	w ay  sp ecif i e d	bytheo bl igationand	al s o, 	c ruciall y, 	the	a bi lit y	t o	kno w 	wha t	theobligati on	de m ands.5	So	an	e p istemic	condi t io n lo o ks	l ike 	it	would	b e	an impo rtan t 	p art of	an y	pla us i bl e 	list	of	moral	plat it udes,and	h ence	somethin g	that any s o und	meta ethi c al grounding	formoral 	obligatio n s	wouldaccou nt	for.This	impo r t ance	isrei nfo rce d	b y th e	fact	that	t h e 	abs en ce	of	a 	pl ausible  ac cou ntofmo ral	epist emologyis 	a tth e	h earto f	one	of 	t hemo stconte n tiousconte mpor ar yd eba tes	inm et a e thic s: 	t he	d eba te 	betw eenr eal ists	an d antirea lis t s.	R ec en t	years 	have	
require	epistemic	access	to	the demands	of	morality.	There	are	two	illustrations	of	this.	One	is	that	it	is	widelyagreed	that	moral	obligations	are	action-guiding	and	motivationally	salient.	That_is	to	say,	they	have	some	sort	of	effect	on	how	we	choose	to	behave	(even	if	they do	not	completely	overwhelm	our	other	internal	reasons	for	action).	It	is	not_clear	how	moral	obligations	could	have	these	properties	if	the	people	to	whom they	are	directed	lack	epistemic	access	to	their	content.	Similarly,	there	is	the widely-accepted	Kantian	maxim	that	'ought	implies	can'.	This	suggests	that	in order	for	something	to	count	as	a	moral	obligation	we	must	have	the	ability	to_follow	it.	This	'ability'	consists	in	the	power	to	control	one's	actions	in	the	way specified	by	the	obligation	and	also,	crucially,	the	ability	to	know	what	the_obligation	demands.5	So	an	epistemic	condition	looks	like	it	would	be	an_important	part	of	any	plausible	list	of	moral	platitudes,	and	hence	something	that any	sound	metaethical	grounding	for	moral	obligations	would	account	for._This	importance	is	reinforced	by	the	fact	that	the	absence	of	a	plausible_account	of	moral	epistemology	is	at	the	heart	of	one	of	the	most	contentious contemporary	debates	in	metaethics:	the	debate	between	realists	and antirealists.	Recent	years	have	