 to reduce the behaviors of macroscopic systems such as tables and chairs to the behaviors of microscopic constituent objects such as particles and fields. How tables and chairs move around can be explained by how the constituent particles and fields behave. How particles and fields behave can be derived from the laws of physics. If the particles and fields are part of the theory's fundamental material ontology, then the reduction is complete. If they are further reducible to something else in the fundamental material ontology, such as the quantum state, then more reduction is in order. In any case, it is hard to see how to carry out the reduction without the fundamental material ontology. Second, the fundamental material ontology plays a semantic role by being the subject matter of the laws of nature. The terms in the laws of nature refer to properties of the fundamental material ontology. For example, the mass term in F = ma refers to a property of Newtonian point particles. The acceleration term describes the speed of variations in their positions in space. It is hard to see how fundamental physical laws make sense without the fundamental material ontology. Third, the fundamental material ontology plays an informational role in the physical theory. The physical laws are supposed to be simple. But how can such simple laws explain such a wide range of complicated phenomena? How does so much information come from such simple laws? It is made possible by appealing to the complicated initial conditions and boundary conditions of physical systems. 2 The complicated data is stored not in the laws but in the matter distribution, such as the locations of particles and configurations of fields. By postulating a fundamental material ontology, complicated phenomena can be derived from simple laws plus certain contingent (and complicated) facts about fundamental matter. There is a tight connection between fundamental material ontology and laws of physics that we will try to make more precise later. But it is worth noting that we usually put the "mess" in the fundamental material ontology so that the laws can be simple. Those roles are important and seemingly irreplaceable. Hence, the fundamental material ontology seems indispensable to any successful physical theory.1 Given these roles fundamental matter seems to play in successful physical theories, we also have reasons to postulate them in our fundamental metaphysics. However, it can be intellectually healthy to reexamine our assumptions. As Turner (2010) puts it, "we can come to better understand a proposition by studying its opposite." We ask the following question: is a fundamental material ontology really indispensable to any successful physical theory? Reflecting on this question does not require us to reject scientific realism. It may
to reduce the behaviors of macroscopic systems such as tables and president to the demeanor of microscopic constituent objects such as particles and battlefield. How tables and chairs act about can be explained by how the component particles and fields act. How particles and fields behave can be derived from the law of physics. If the particles and fields are part of the theory's cardinal material ontology, then the reduction is complete. If they are far reducible to something else in the fundamental material ontology, such as the quantum state of matter, then more reduction is in ordering. In any case, it is hard to see how to carry out the reduction without the cardinal material ontology. Second, the fundamental material ontology plays a semantic role by being the subject topic of the torah of nature. The terms in the laws of nature refer to properties of the fundamental material ontology. For example, the mass term in F = ma refers to a place of Newtonian detail particles. The acceleration terminus trace the speed of variations in their positions in quad. It is hard to see how fundamental physical law make sense without the fundamental material ontology. Third, the fundamental material ontology play an informational role in the physical theory. The physical law are supposed to be elementary. But how can such simple laws explain such a wide range of complicated phenomenon? How does so much information come from such childlike laws? It is made possible by appealing to the complicated initial condition and boundary conditions of physical systems. 2 The complicated data is stored not in the torah but in the matter distribution, such as the location of particles and shape of fields. By postulating a fundamental material ontology, complicated phenomena can be deduce from simple law plus certain contingent (and complicated) facts about fundamental matter. There is a taut connection between fundamental fabric ontology and laws of physics that we will try to make more precise later. But it is worth note that we usually put the " mess " in the fundamental material ontology so that the laws can be elementary. Those function are significant and seemingly irreplaceable. Hence, the fundamental material ontology seems indispensable to any successful forcible theory.1 Given these roles fundamental matter seems to play in successful physical theories, we also have reason to postulate them in our fundamental metaphysics. However, it can be intellectually healthy to reexamine our assumptions. As Turner (2010) puts it, " we can arrive to better understand a proposition by studying its opposite. " We ask the following motion: is a fundamental material ontology really indispensable to any successful physical theory? Reflecting on this question does not require us to reject scientific realism. It may
 to reduce the behaviors of macroscopic systems snch as fables avd chairs to the behaviors oh mixroscipic constituent objecgs such ad particoes end fields. How tegles and chaidd more around can be explained by how the cotsgicuent particles and fields behave. Hor partivlfs and fields fehane can be derived from the laws of physids. If tie particles anc fields are part of the tjeorj's fundamental matfrial ontoligy, eyen the reduztion is complete. If tgey are further reducible to sooethiug else in jkw fktdamental meteriaj ontology, smbh as tve quanyum state, then moce rwduction is in order. Mn any case, it is hatd to see voc to carry out the reeuxtion witvout rhe fuhdemehtal mwtecial ontolofy. Second, tye fundamental matetiwo ontology plzys a feiantic role by being the subject matter of the laws of nature. The terms in the laws of nature rqfer to properties of the fundamental material ondologb. Wor ewampuw, hhe mass term in F = ma refers to a property os Ntwtpnian point pavticles. The acceletahipg term descrices thz sleed of variations in theyr powitions ig spsce. It is hard to see how fyndamental pkysucal laws make sende without che fumdamemtal material ontology. Chird, fhe fundamejtal matedkal ontology plahs sn informaukonal role in the physical thepry. The phyxical jaws are skpposcg to be simple. But how ean sgch simple laws explain such a wide range of complicatec [hetomena? Hjw docs so much infowmation come ftom such fimpld laws? It ps made pmssible by wppealing to dje complicatxd initiaj cobdituons ana boundary condotions of physical wystems. 2 The compllcatea data is stored nou un the laws buy iv tre metter gistribution, sucf ar the uocations on pxrtivles and configuratimns kf fields. By postukabing a fubdamentaj material onyology, complicated phenmmeia can be derived from simple laws plus certain fonbingent (and cjmpllcatgd) facts abput fundamental matter. There is a tight connection betwegn fundamental matericl ontology aid lawf of physhcs that we will try to make more pregise later. But it is wkrth nmting that we usually put the "mess" in the fundamental material ontology so thar the laws can be aimpke. Thmsz rples awe il'ortant and seemimgly irreplaceable. Hence, the fuidamental kacerial ontology seems indispemsxble to any soccessful physical theory.1 Fiven thrse roles fundamental matter serms to play in successfuk physicql thsories, we elso have reasons to postunate rhem in our fundamental oetspmysics. Howfver, ic can be intellectually healthy ti reexqmlne our assumptimns. As Turncr (2010) puta it, "wg can come to betfer hjdersjand a proposiyion by studyimg its opposite." We avk the following suestion: is s fundakental matermal ontology really indispensable to any successful physical thgory? Reflecuing on tmis question does iot require us to reject ssientifiz realism. It may
to reduce the behaviors of macroscopic systems tables chairs to behaviors of microscopic and How tables and move around can explained by how the constituent particles fields behave. How particles and fields behave can be derived from the laws physics. If the particles and fields are part of the theory's fundamental material then reduction complete. they are further reducible to something else in the fundamental material ontology, such as the quantum then more reduction is in order. In any it is hard to how to carry out the without fundamental material Second, fundamental ontology plays a role by being the subject matter of the laws of nature. The terms in the laws of refer to the fundamental ontology. example, mass term in ma refers to a property of The acceleration term describes the speed of variations their positions space. It is hard to see fundamental physical laws make sense without the fundamental ontology. Third, the fundamental material ontology plays an informational role in the physical theory. The are supposed to be But how can simple explain a range of phenomena? How does so much information come from such simple laws? is made possible by appealing to the complicated initial conditions conditions physical systems. 2 complicated data is stored in laws but in the such the and of By postulating a fundamental ontology, complicated phenomena can be from simple laws plus about fundamental matter. There is a tight connection fundamental material ontology and laws of physics we will try to make more precise later. But it is worth that we the "mess" in the fundamental material ontology so the laws can be Those roles are important and seemingly irreplaceable. Hence, the material seems indispensable any successful physical Given these roles matter seems to successful physical we have them in our fundamental metaphysics. However, can intellectually healthy to reexamine our As puts it, "we can come to better understand a proposition by studying its opposite." We following question: is a material really indispensable to any successful physical theory? Reflecting on this question does us to reject
 to reduce the behaviors of macRoscopic syStems SucH as TaBles And cHairs to the behaVIors Of microscopic constitueNt objEcTS sucH As PartiCles and FIeLDS. HoW tAbLes AnD ChAirs mOve Around cAn be explaiNed By How the constiTUeNt particleS anD fields behavE. HoW partiClEs aND fielDs bEhave Can be dERived fRom the lawS oF PhysicS. if the paRTIcLes aNd fields are part of THe THeory's fundamenTal matErIAl ONTolOgy, Then the redUcTion iS CompletE. if THEY arE Further reduciBle to somethINg eLse in tHe FunDAmentaL mateRiAL onTology, such aS the Quantum stAte, theN More redUCtion is In ordeR. In Any Case, IT iS hArd To SEe hOW tO caRRy oUt the redUcTiOn witHout THE FUndaMenTal mAteriAl ontology. SecOnd, The fUNdaMentaL mateRial OnTologY plays A semaNtIc role by being thE subJect matteR of ThE laWs Of natURe. The tErmS in The laws Of naturE RefEr TO PRoPerties of the fundamEnTAL mAterial oNtologY. foR eXAmple, the MaSs tErm iN f = Ma refErs tO A pRoperty oF NewtoNIaN pOint parTiCles. ThE aCceLerAtion TErm dEscribEs the speEd of vARiations in theiR Positions in spACe. iT Is HArd tO seE how fundameNtal PHysiCal lAWs MakE Sense WithoUt THe FUndamental material oNtOlogy. THird, tHe fundamental Material onTOLOgy plays An inFOrMAtional role in tHe phySical theorY. the physiCal laWs are supPosed to be SIMple. But hOw cAn sUch SimPLE lAws explain sucH A Wide RaNge of coMplIcated pHenOmeNa? HOw dOeS so much inFormatioN cOmE fRoM suCh simPLe laws? It Is MadE pOssIble bY AppealIng to The cOmPlICatEd initiAL cONDitiOnS aNd boUndArY condItioNS of PhysicaL systems. 2 THe cOMpliCaTeD data is Stored not in thE lAws but in thE mAttEr distRIBution, suCh as the locations of partiCLes and cOnfIguraTionS of fields. by pOstulaTinG A fundaMental MaterIaL onTOLogy, cOMPlIcaTeD phenomena CAN be DerivEd From Simple lAws plus certain contINgeNt (and complicaTed) FactS ABoUt fUNdAMenTaL MatTER. There is a tight cOnnection bEtWEeN fundamentAL maTeRial ontOlogy anD laws OF physicS that we wiLl try to maKe More PREciSe later. But It is wortH noting thAT we usUAlLy put The "Mess" in ThE fuNdameNtal maTEriAl ontOlogy sO tHat the Laws cAn Be simple. those roles are important aNd seemIngly IrrEplaceablE. HeNCe, tHe fundameNtal Material onTolOgy Seems IndISpensAble TO aNy sUCcessFul pHYsical theORy.1 givEN ThEse roles funDAMEntAl matTer SEems to Play In successful physiCAl theories, we alSo haVE ReaSonS To poStUlate them in our FunDaMENtal metaPhYsics. HoweveR, it can be InTEllecTually HealthY to reexAMInE Our assUmptIonS. As Turner (2010) PutS iT, "We can coMe To BEtter uNderStAnd a prOpositIOn by STUdying its oppositE." We asK THe folLOwiNg queStIon: is a fUNdamEntal materIal ontology Really IndiSpensAble to aNy SuccesSfuL pHysical theORy? ReflectIng on This queStIon dOes Not reqUire US To rejEct sCiEntIfic realiSM. it MAy
 to reduce the behaviors o f macrosco pic s yst ems  s uchas t ables and chai r s to  the behaviors of micr oscop ic cons t it uentobjects su c h  as  p ar tic le s  a nd fi eld s. Howtables and  ch ai rs move arou n dcan be exp lai ned by how t heconsti tu ent parti cle s and  field s  behav e. How pa rt i cles a n d field s be have  can be derived f r om the laws of ph ysics.  I f  t h e  pa rti cles and f ie lds a r e parto ft h e  th e ory's fundame ntal materi a l o ntolog y,  th e n thereduc ti o n i s complete.  Ifthey arefurthe r  reduci b le to s omethi ngels e in th efun da m ent a lmat e ria l ontolo gy ,suchas t h e q uant umstat e, th en more reduc tio n is inorder . Inanyca se, i t is h ard t osee how to carr y ou t the red uct io n w it houtt he fun dam ent al mate rial on t olo gy . S ec ond, the fundament al m at erial on tology pl ay s  a seman ti c r oleb y  bein g th e  s ubject m attero fth e lawsof  natur e.  Th e t ermsi n th e laws  of natu re re f er to properti e s of the fund a me n t al mate ria l ontology.  For exam ple, th e m a ss te rm in  F =m a refers to a prope rt y of N ewton ian point par ticles. Th e a ccelerat iont er m  describes the  spee d of varia t ions intheir  positio ns in spa c e . It ishar d t o s eeh o wfundamental p h y sica llaws ma kesense w ith out  th e f un damentalmaterial  o nt ol og y.Third ,  the fun da men ta l m ateri a l onto logyplay san inf ormatio n al r olein  t he p hys ic al th eory .  Th e physi cal lawsare supp os ed  to besimple. But h ow  can suchsi mpl e laws e xplain s uch a wide range of com p licated  ph enome na?How doessomuch i nfo r mation  comefromsu chs i mplel a ws ? I tis made po s s ibl e byap peal ing tothe complicated in i tia l conditionsand  bou n d ar y c o nd i tio ns ofp h ysical systems.  2 The com pl i ca ted data i s  st or ed notin thelawsb ut in t he matter  distribu ti on,s u chas the loc ations o f particl e s and co nfigu rat ions o ffie lds.By pos t ula tinga fund am entalmater ia l ontolo gy, complicated phenome na can  be d eri ved fromsim p lelaws plus  cer tain conti nge nt(andcom p licat ed)f ac tsa boutfund a mental ma t te r.T h er e is a tigh t c onn ectio n b e tweenfund amental materialo ntology and la ws o f phy sic s  tha twe will try to  ma ke m ore prec is e later. Bu t it iswo r th no ting t hat we  usuall y pu t  the " mess " i n the fun dam en t al mate ri al ontolo gy s othat t he law s  can b e simple. Thoseroles a re im p ort ant a nd  seemin g ly i rreplaceab le. Hence,the fu ndam ental  materi al  ontol ogy  s eems indis p ensable t o any  succes sf ul p hys ical t heor y . 1 Giv en t he seroles fun d a me n ta lm att er s eemsto  pla y in succ e ssful ph ysi c al theo ri es, w e also ha v e  reasons t o p ostul a t e them ino ur f u nd a menta l meta physic s. Howe v er,  i t can b e i n t ellectual ly health y  to  r eexa mine our  a ssum pt ion s.  As Turner (201 0) putsit, "wec a n come  to bett e r unde rs tand a propo sitio nb y study i n g i ts oppo s ite ."Weaskthe  fol l owing question: is a fun dame ntalm ate rialontol og y really indi spensabl e  to any succe ssful physicalt heo r y? R efl e ct in g on this  qu e stion  doe s n ot r equ ireu s  tor ejec t  s cien tificreal is m.  It may
 to_reduce the_behaviors of macroscopic systems_such as_tables_and chairs_to_the behaviors of_microscopic constituent objects_such as particles and_fields. How tables_and_chairs move around can be explained by how the constituent particles and fields behave._How_particles and_fields_behave_can be derived from the_laws of physics. If the_particles and_fields are part of the theory's fundamental material_ontology,_then the reduction_is complete. If they are further reducible to something_else in the fundamental material ontology,_such as the_quantum_state,_then more reduction is_in order. In any case, it_is hard to see how to_carry out the reduction without the fundamental_material ontology. Second, the fundamental material_ontology plays a semantic role_by being_the subject matter of the_laws of nature._The terms_in the laws_of nature refer to properties of_the fundamental material_ontology. For example, the mass term_in_F = ma_refers_to_a property_of Newtonian point_particles._The acceleration_term_describes the speed of variations in_their_positions in space. It is hard to_see how fundamental physical_laws_make sense without the_fundamental material ontology. Third, the_fundamental material ontology plays an informational_role in_the physical_theory. The physical laws are supposed to be simple. But how_can such simple laws explain such_a wide range of_complicated phenomena?_How_does so much_information_come from_such simple laws? It is made possible_by appealing_to the complicated initial conditions and_boundary conditions of physical_systems._2 The complicated data is stored_not in the laws but in_the matter distribution, such as_the_locations_of particles and configurations of_fields. By postulating a fundamental material_ontology, complicated phenomena_can be derived from simple laws plus_certain_contingent (and complicated) facts about fundamental_matter._There is a tight connection between_fundamental_material_ontology and laws of physics_that we will try to make_more precise later. But it is worth noting that_we usually put_the "mess" in the fundamental_material_ontology_so that the laws can be simple. Those roles are_important and_seemingly irreplaceable. Hence,_the fundamental material ontology seems indispensable to any successful physical_theory.1 Given these roles fundamental matter seems_to play in successful physical theories, we also have reasons to_postulate them in our fundamental metaphysics. However, it_can be intellectually healthy to reexamine our_assumptions. As Turner (2010)_puts_it, "we can come to better understand_a_proposition_by_studying its opposite."_We ask the_following question: is_a fundamental_material ontology really_indispensable to_any successful physical_theory?_Reflecting on this question does not require us to reject scientific realism. It may