al Epistemology 309 views by stripping away the foundationalist epistemology and nonnaturalist metaphysics, and reinterpret the other claims in light of contextualist epistemology. In fact, claims (1), (3), and (4) represent what I take to be a roughly accurate picture of a good part of the structure of justified moral belief-at least for many people in our culture. Embedded in a contextualist moral epistemology, the structural view involves the following four central claims: Cl: There are a number of irreducible moral generalizations that are defeasible and that we acquire as a result of moral education. In the ordinary context of justification in ethics, these are often epistemically basic. C2: However, they are contextually basic: they do not represent selfevident moral truths knowable a priori nor do they result from the deliverance of some faculty of moral intuition. Rather, their status as basic is relative to context in a way to be elaborated below. C3: The contextually basic beliefs provide (along with relevant nonmoral factual beliefs) the justificatory basis for justified belief in other, nonbasic moral propositions. Thus, (ceteris paribus) other, nonbasic moral beliefs are justified if they are appropriately based on some of the contextually basic ones. C4: However, going from basic moral beliefs-the midlevel moral generalizations-to more specific moral beliefs about particular cases is not always a matter of simply taking the moral generalization together with relevant empirical information and deducing a moral conclusion. In many cases, two or more morally relevant considerations expressed by the basic moral generalizations will be present in a single case, and for these cases we need have no algorithm or ordering system to which we can appeal to adjudicate the conflict. In these cases, moral judgment takes over-something that one can do better or worse but something for which we need not have a covering rule that would dictate what, in particular, it is rational to believe. Nevertheless, in ordinary contexts of moral thought and discussion, individuals can be justified in coming to hold certain moral beliefs in cases calling for moral judgment. Let me elaborate the view. Tenets Cl and C3 together comprise a very familiar idea about the structure of ethical justification-a view common to both foundationalism and contextualism. Support for these tenets comes from commonsense observation and from empirical work in moral psychology. So what does available evidence suggest? If we examine actual bits of human moral reasoning, it is
al Epistemology 309 views by stripping away the foundationalist epistemology and nonnaturalist metaphysics, and reinterpret the other claims in inner light of contextualist epistemology. In fact, claim (1), (3), and (4) represent what I take to be a roughly accurate mental picture of a good part of the social organization of justified moral belief - at least for many people in our culture. implant in a contextualist moral epistemology, the structural view necessitate the following four central call: Cl: There constitute a number of irreducible moral generalizations that are defeasible and that we acquire as a result of moral education. In the average context of justification in ethics, these are often epistemically basic. C2: However, they are contextually basic: they do not represent selfevident moral truth knowable a priori nor do they result from the deliverance of some staff of moral intuition. Rather, their condition as basic is relative to context in a way to be elaborated below. C3: The contextually basic beliefs provide (along with relevant nonmoral actual beliefs) the justificatory basis for justified belief in other, nonbasic moral propositions. therefore, (ceteris paribus) early, nonbasic moral impression are justified if they are appropriately based on some of the contextually basic ones. C4: However, going from basic moral beliefs - the midlevel moral generalizations - to more specific moral beliefs about particular subject is not always a matter of simply remove the moral generalization together with relevant empirical information and deducing a moral conclusion. In many cases, two or more morally relevant considerations express by the basic moral generalizations will be present in a single case, and for these cases we need have no algorithm or order system to which we can appeal to adjudicate the conflict. In these cases, moral judgment consider over - something that one can do better or worse but something for which we need not have a covering dominion that would dictate what, in particular, it is rational to think. Nevertheless, in average contexts of moral thought and discussion, individuals can be justified in coming to reserve certain moral belief in cases call for moral judgment. permit me elaborate the opinion. Tenets Cl and C3 together constitute a very conversant idea about the structure of ethical justification - a view coarse to both foundationalism and contextualism. Support for these tenets comes from commonsense observation and from empirical employment in moral psychology. So what does available evidence suggest? If we analyze actual bits of human moral reasoning, it is
al Fpistemology 309 views by suripping away the foundavionaliat epistdmology and nonnaturalist mevaphtsics, and reinterpret the ogher clails in litht id contextuemist eplftemkpogy. Mn fact, claims (1), (3), and (4) repsesent what I daye to be a roughly accurate picture os a gooc oart of the sttuctuge of nlsuified moral belief-at least for mzny peokle in our culture. Embedded in a contextualidt mlral epistemology, hhe structutzl duew involves the following four cehtral claims: Cl: There are a numcer oy irreduciboe mogdl generalivationf that are dcgeasibne and yhat we acquirc as e rewult of moral educatimn. In the ordinary context mf justification in erhics, theve afw owteh xpiatemicwllb basic. C2: Hkwever, they are contextually bssyb: they do not reprefegt selfevident moral truths knowable a kriorj nor do they result frim the deliverance of some factlty of moral intuition. Rather, their status as bavic ia reoabive ro context in a way to be elaborated below. C3: Thq cpnnextually basic bcliefs provide (alomg wojh relevant novmoral fadtual beliefs) the uustifisatort basis fjr jistified belief in other, nobbasic moral propositions. Thus, (eeteris pariyus) otner, npnbasic moral beliefs axe jusfified if tjey are aloropriately basea ok smme of the contextually bafic ones. R4: Howzver, goivg ftom basyc moral bfliefs-the midlevel moral genetalizadions-to moge specific moral beliefs about particular caxev iv not alcays a matter of siiply taking thg moral gzneralkzation tofether xith relevane empirical itvormation anv deducind a norao concljrion. In many csses, two or more moeally relevant conxidgrztions expresseb vy the basic motal gegegalmzatijts will be psesevt km a skngle case, cna fot these cases we neeg habe no algorithm or ovdering sistem to rhich we can sppeal to adjudicaue the coiflict. In these cases, moral judgment taies over-slmebhing that onq cak do better or worse but something for which we need iot have a covering rulw that would dictatg wmat, in partirular, yt is rathonal to believe. Nevwrtheless, in ordikary contexts of moral thougvt anf discussion, individuals can be justified in coming to hold certain moral beliehs in cases czllimg fog mjxal juddmenv. Uet me elaborate the view. Tenets Cl and C3 togetier comprive a very familiar idea about yhd structure ow ethical justification-a view cokmon to both foundationalism anc contextualism. Support nor these tenefs comva hrom commonsense obsrrvatimn ane from wmpivical work in oorsl psycholohy. Sp chat does available evidence suggwst? If wf examine actual bits of hulxn motal reasjning, it is
al Epistemology 309 views by stripping away epistemology nonnaturalist metaphysics, reinterpret the other epistemology. fact, claims (1), and (4) represent I take to be a roughly picture of a good part of the structure of justified moral belief-at least many people in our culture. Embedded in a contextualist moral epistemology, the structural involves following central Cl: There are a number of irreducible moral generalizations that are defeasible and that we acquire a result of moral education. In the ordinary of justification in ethics, are often epistemically basic. C2: they contextually basic: do represent moral truths knowable priori nor do they result from the deliverance of some faculty of moral intuition. Rather, their status basic is context in way be below. C3: The beliefs provide (along with relevant nonmoral justificatory basis for justified belief in other, nonbasic propositions. Thus, paribus) other, nonbasic moral beliefs are if they are appropriately based on some of contextually basic ones. C4: However, going from basic moral beliefs-the midlevel moral generalizations-to more specific about particular cases is always a matter simply the generalization with relevant information and deducing a moral conclusion. In many cases, two or morally relevant considerations expressed by the basic moral generalizations will in single case, and these cases we need no or ordering system to can to In cases, judgment takes over-something that can do better or worse something for which we rule that would dictate what, in particular, it rational to believe. Nevertheless, in ordinary contexts moral thought and discussion, individuals can be justified in coming to hold moral beliefs calling for moral judgment. Let me elaborate the Tenets Cl and C3 comprise a very familiar idea about the structure of justification-a common to foundationalism and contextualism. for these tenets from commonsense observation empirical work moral So evidence suggest? If we examine actual of moral reasoning, it is
al Epistemology 309 views by striPping away tHe fouNdaTioNaList EpisTemology and nonNAturAlist metaphysics, and reiNterpReT The oTHeR claiMs in ligHT oF COntExTuAliSt EPiStemoLogY. In fact, Claims (1), (3), and (4) rEprEsEnt what I take TO bE a roughly aCcuRate picture oF a gOod parT oF thE StrucTurE of juStifieD Moral bElief-at leAsT For manY People iN OUr CultUre. Embedded in a conTExTUalist moral epiStemolOgY, ThE STruCtuRal view invOlVes thE FollowiNG fOUR CenTRal claims: Cl: ThEre are a numbER of IrreduCiBle MOral geNeralIzATioNs that are deFeasIble and thAt we acQUire as a REsult of Moral eDucAtiOn. In THe OrDinArY ConTExT of JUstIficatioN iN eThics, ThesE ARE OfteN epIsteMicalLy basic. C2: HowevEr, tHey aRE coNtextUally BasiC: tHey do Not repResenT sElfevident moral TrutHs knowablE a pRiOri NoR do thEY resulT frOm tHe delivErance oF SomE fACULtY of moral intuition. RAtHER, tHeir statUs as baSIc Is RElative tO cOntExt iN A Way to Be elABoRated belOw. C3: The COnTeXtually BaSic belIeFs pRovIde (alONg wiTh releVant nonmOral fACtual beliefs) thE Justificatory BAsIS FoR JustIfiEd belief in oTher, NOnbaSic mORaL prOPositIons. THuS, (CeTEris paribus) other, nonBaSic morAl belIefs are justifIed if they aRE APpropriaTely BAsED on some of the coNtextUally basic ONes. C4: HoweVer, goIng from bAsic moral BELiefs-the MidLevEl mOraL GEnEralizations-tO MOre sPeCific moRal Beliefs AboUt pArtIcuLaR cases is nOt always A mAtTeR oF siMply tAKing the mOrAl gEnEraLizatIOn togeTher wIth rElEvANt eMpiricaL InFORmatIoN aNd deDucInG a morAl coNCluSion. In mAny cases, tWo oR More MoRaLly releVant consideraTiOns expressEd By tHe basiC MOral geneRalizations will be presenT In a singLe cAse, anD for These caseS we Need haVe nO AlgoriThm or oRderiNg SysTEM to whICH wE caN aPpeal to adjUDIcaTe the CoNfliCt. In theSe cases, moral judgmeNT taKes over-somethIng That ONE cAn dO BeTTer Or WOrsE BUt something for wHich we need NoT HaVe a coverinG RulE tHat woulD dictatE what, IN particUlar, it is rAtional to BeLievE. nEveRtheless, in Ordinary Contexts oF Moral THoUght aNd dIscussIoN, inDividUals caN Be jUstifIed in cOmIng to hOld ceRtAin moral Beliefs in cases calling foR moral JudgmEnt. let me elabOraTE thE view. TeneTs Cl And C3 togethEr cOmpRise a VerY FamilIar iDEa AboUT the sTrucTUre of ethiCAl JusTIFiCation-a view COMMon To botH foUNdatioNaliSm and contextualisM. support for thesE tenETS coMes FRom cOmMonsense observAtiOn AND from empIrIcal work in mOral psycHoLOgy. So What doEs avaiLable evIDEnCE suggeSt? If We eXamine actUal BiTS of humaN mOrAL reasoNing, It Is
al Epistemology 309 viewsby strippi ng aw aythe  f ound atio nalist epistem o logy  and nonnaturalist met aphys ic s , an d  r einte rpret t h eo t her  c la ims  i n  l ightofcontext ualist epi ste mo logy. In fac t ,claims (1) , ( 3), and (4)rep resent  w hat I tak e t o bea roug h ly acc urate pic tu r e of a good pa r t  o f th e structure of ju s ti f ied moral beli ef-atle a st f orman y people i nour c u lture.E mb e d d edi n a contextua list morale pis temolo gy , t h e stru ctura lv iew  involves t he f ollowingfour c e ntral c l aims: C l: The reare  a n u mb er  of  i r red u ci ble mor al gener al iz ation s th a t a re d efe asib le an d that we acq uir e as a r esult  of m oral  e ducat ion. I n the  o rdinary context  ofjustifica tio ninet hics, theseare  of ten epi stemica l lyba s i c .C2: However, theyar e co ntextual ly bas i c:  t h ey do no trep rese n t  self evid e nt  moral t ruthsk no wa ble a p ri ori no rdothe y res u lt f rom th e delive rance of some facult y  of moral int u it i o n. Rath er,  their stat us a s  bas ic i s  r ela t ive t o con te x ti n a way to be elabo ra ted be low.C3: The conte xtually ba s i c  beliefs  pro v id e  (along with r eleva nt nonmora l  factual  beli efs) the  justific a t ory basi s f orjus tif i e dbelief in oth e r , no nb asic mo ral  propos iti ons . T hus ,(ceterisparibus)  o th er ,non basic moral be li efs  a rejusti f ied if  they  are  a pp r opr iatelyb as e d  onso me  ofthe  c ontex tual l y b asic on es. C4: H owe v er,go in g frombasic moral b el iefs-the m id lev el mor a l  general izations-to more specif i c moral  be liefs  abo ut partic ula r case s i s  not a lwaysa mat te r o f simpl y ta kin gthe moralg e ner aliza ti on t ogether  with relevant emp i ric al informatio n a nd d e d uc ing am ora lc onc l u sion. In many c ases, twoor mo re morally rel ev ant con siderat ionse xpresse d by thebasic mor al  gen e r ali zations wi ll be pr esent ina  sing l ecase,  an d forth ese  case s we n e edhaveno alg or ithm o r ord er ing syst em to which we can appe al toadjud ica te the co nfl i ct.  In these  cas es, moraljud gme nt ta kes over- some t hi ngt hat o ne c a n do bett e rorw o rs e but somet h i n g f or wh ich we nee d no t have a covering rule that woul d di c t ate  wh a t, i nparticular, it  is  r a t ional to  b elieve. Nev ertheles s, in or dinary  conte xts ofm o ra l  thoug ht a nddiscussio n,in d ividual sca n  be ju stif ie d in c omingt o ho l d  certain moral b elief s in ca s escalli ng  for mo r al j udgment. L et me elabo rate t he v iew.TenetsCl  and C 3 t og ether comp r ise a ver y fam iliar i de a ab out  the s truc t u re of  eth ic aljustifica t i on - avi e w c ommo n tobo th f oundation a lism and  co n textual is m.S u pportf or t hese tenet s c omesf r om commons e nseo bs e rvati on and  fromempiric a l w or k in mo ral p sychology . So what doe savai lable ev id ence  s ugg es t? If we examin e actual  bits of h uman m ora l  rea s oning,  i t is
al Epistemology_309 views_by stripping away the_foundationalist epistemology_and_nonnaturalist metaphysics,_and_reinterpret the other_claims in light_of contextualist epistemology. In_fact, claims (1),_(3),_and (4) represent what I take to be a roughly accurate picture of a_good_part of_the_structure_of justified moral belief-at least_for many people in our_culture. Embedded_in a contextualist moral epistemology, the structural view_involves_the following four_central claims: Cl: There are a number of irreducible_moral generalizations that are defeasible and_that we acquire_as_a_result of moral education._In the ordinary context of justification_in ethics, these are often epistemically_basic. C2: However, they are contextually basic:_they do not represent selfevident moral_truths knowable a priori nor_do they_result from the deliverance of_some faculty of_moral intuition._Rather, their status_as basic is relative to context_in a way_to be elaborated below. C3: The_contextually_basic beliefs provide_(along_with_relevant nonmoral_factual beliefs) the_justificatory_basis for_justified_belief in other, nonbasic moral propositions._Thus,_(ceteris paribus) other, nonbasic moral beliefs are_justified if they are_appropriately_based on some of_the contextually basic ones. C4:_However, going from basic moral beliefs-the_midlevel moral_generalizations-to more_specific moral beliefs about particular cases is not always a matter_of simply taking the moral generalization_together with relevant empirical_information and_deducing_a moral conclusion._In_many cases,_two or more morally relevant considerations expressed_by the_basic moral generalizations will be present_in a single case,_and_for these cases we need have_no algorithm or ordering system to_which we can appeal to_adjudicate_the_conflict. In these cases, moral_judgment takes over-something that one can_do better or_worse but something for which we need_not_have a covering rule that would_dictate_what, in particular, it is rational_to_believe._Nevertheless, in ordinary contexts of_moral thought and discussion, individuals can_be justified in coming to hold certain moral beliefs_in cases calling_for moral judgment. Let me_elaborate_the_view. Tenets Cl and C3 together comprise a very familiar_idea about_the structure of_ethical justification-a view common to both foundationalism and contextualism. Support_for these tenets comes from commonsense observation_and from empirical work in moral psychology. So what does available_evidence suggest? If we examine actual bits of_human moral reasoning, it is