 whatsoever. Stephen Finlay claims the baseline is the agent not 3 performing the action in question (e.g., not-φ-ing). D. Justin Coates holds that the 4 baseline comprises whatever facts contribute to the "antecedent intrinsic likelihood" of D's being satisfied. 5 Pure Probabilism yields intuitively correct results in a wide range of cases. For instance, working for the moment with Schroeder's account of the baseline, we can explain why buying a ticket to the lottery might promote your desire for $100. If we suppose that the probability that you'll get $100 if you do nothing is quite low (you have no salary, and no one is likely to give you the money, say), that the lottery is fair, and that there will only be 100 tickets sold, then buying a ticket to the lottery would plausibly promote your desire. For instance, if the probability that you'll get $100 if you do nothing is.002, then buying a ticket promotes your desire, since the probability that you'll get $100 if you buy a single ticket is.01, and.01>.002. Similar remarks go for a range of other cases. Intuitively, Pure Probabilism captures something important about the connection between the (instrumental) reasons there are to perform actions and the likelihood that our desires will be satisfied if we perform those actions: when the satisfaction of our desires is ​more likely given some actions we might perform, i.e., when the actions do what purely probabilistic accounts of promotion say is necessary and sufficient to ​promote those desires, then we have (at least some) reason to perform those actions. However, Pure Probabilism faces a range of related counterexamples due to Jeffrey Behrends and Joshua DiPaolo. The details of the counterexamples depend, in part, on 6 what purely probabilistic account is being targeted. That is, the details of the counterexamples depend on what account of the ​baseline the relevant purely probabilistic account accepts. So, for instance, switching now to Finlay's account of the baseline as our target, we can construct a counterexample such as: 3 Schroeder (2007, p. 113). 4 Finlay (2006, p. 8). Finlay's view is complicated in his (2014): there, he offers a probabilistic account of the ​good for relation rather than the ​promotion relation. Here, we'll discuss his (2006) view. Thanks to [removed
whatsoever. Stephen Finlay claims the baseline is the agent not 3 performing the legal action in doubt (e.g., not - φ - ing). D. Justin Coates holds that the 4 baseline comprises whatever fact contribute to the " antecedent intrinsic likelihood " of D's being satisfied. 5 saturated Probabilism yield intuitively correct consequence in a wide range of shell. For instance, work for the moment with Schroeder's account of the baseline, we can explain why buying a ticket to the lottery might advertise your desire for $ 100. If we suppose that the probability that you'll get $ 100 if you do nothing is quite humble (you have no salary, and no one is probable to give you the money, pronounce), that the lottery is fair, and that there will entirely be 100 tickets sold, then buying a tag to the lottery would plausibly promote your desire. For instance, if the probability that you'll get $ 100 if you do nothing is.002, then buying a ticket promotes your desire, since the probability that you'll get $ 100 if you buy a single ticket is.01, and.01>.002. Similar remarks go for a range of other subject. Intuitively, Pure Probabilism captures something important about the connection between the (implemental) reason there are to perform actions and the likelihood that our desires will be satisfied if we perform those actions: when the gratification of our desires is ​more likely given some actions we might perform, i.e., when the actions act what purely probabilistic accounts of promotion say is necessary and sufficient to ​promote those desire, then we have (at least some) rationality to perform those actions. However, Pure Probabilism faces a range of related counterexample due to Jeffrey Behrends and Joshua DiPaolo. The details of the counterexamples depend, in part, on 6 what purely probabilistic account is being targeted. That is, the details of the counterexamples count on what account of the ​baseline the relevant purely probabilistic account accepts. So, for case, switching nowadays to Finlay's account of the service line as our target, we can construct a counterexample such as: 3 Schroeder (2007, p. 113). 4 Finlay (2006, p. 8). Finlay's opinion is complicated in his (2014 ): there, he offers a probabilistic account of the ​good for relation back quite than the ​promotion relation. Here, we'll discuss his (2006) view. Thanks to [ removed
 whwtsoever. Stephen Finlay glaims the baselnbe is vhe ageht not 3 oerforming the action in quedtuon (e.t., not-φ-ing). D. Justin Coatds holds nhat the 4 bastline comprises wiztever nccts dlntrnbnte to the "antegedent intrhnsic likelihomd" oy D's being satisfied. 5 Pure Probabilifm yielcs intuitively cjrrebt reshlts in a wide range of cases. For jnstanct, working for the koment with Schroeder's acclunt of the baseline, wf can explaun wrt buying a tkcket to the lottery mjght promote your desire for $100. Iw we xuppose thqt thf probabilitb that you'll get $100 lg you go nothong is quite lpw (bou yave no salary, and no one is likely to dive you dhz money, say), that the oortery is xair, qnd thzt tgere wlll only be 100 fickets sole, then buying a ticlee to the lottedy woujd plausibly promote your desire. For instdncs, if the probability thqt you'll get $100 if you fo nothind is.002, then buying a ticket promotes your desire, sitce tie pribwcullty that you'll get $100 if you buy a single tickee ix.01, snd.01>.002. Similar reiarks go fot w twnge of other cases. Infuitively, Pure Prohabilisi caprures somtthinb important about the connextion betweeu tye (instrumental) recsons there cre to perfprm actions and the likzlihoos that our fesires wjul be satisfied kf ee perform those actions: wheg the satmsfaccion of uur cesiref is ​more pikeln given some actiond we licht perforl, i.e., when the actions do what pncely probabilosdic accountf of iromotion say if necessary anb sufficnent tu ​promote nhose desmres, then we have (at leasd some) reason to perfjrm rhosw actiovr. However, Pure Probabilpsi faxes a range of releted dounterexamples dut ro Jeffrey Behtenas wnf Ooshuw DiPaolo. The detxilr of tfe counuzrewamoles depend, in part, on 6 fhat purely probabilisyig account is beind targeted. Thst is, the details lf thx counverexakplgs depend on what account of ths ​baselinf tme relevant ptreln prjbabilistie account accepts. So, for instance, switchmng now to Finlay's accoynt of the baseline ss our targxt, we san constsuct a counterexamplw such as: 3 Schroecer (2007, p. 113). 4 Finlay (2006, p. 8). Fjnlay's view is complicated in his (2014): there, he offers a probabilistic account of the ​goid for relation rafher than tke ​'romotijn rxletion. Here, we'll dpscuss his (2006) view. Thanks to [removxd
whatsoever. Stephen Finlay claims the baseline is not performing the in question (e.g., that 4 baseline comprises facts contribute to "antecedent intrinsic likelihood" of D's being 5 Pure Probabilism yields intuitively correct results in a wide range of cases. instance, working for the moment with Schroeder's account of the baseline, we can why a to lottery might promote your desire for $100. If we suppose that the probability that you'll get if you do nothing is quite low (you no salary, and no is likely to give you money, that the is and there will only 100 tickets sold, then buying a ticket to the lottery would plausibly promote your desire. For instance, the probability get $100 you nothing then buying a your desire, since the probability that if you buy a single ticket is.01, and.01>.002. remarks go a range of other cases. Intuitively, Probabilism captures something important about the connection between (instrumental) reasons there are to perform actions and the likelihood that our desires will be we perform those actions: the satisfaction of desires ​more given actions we perform, i.e., when the actions do what purely probabilistic accounts of say is necessary and sufficient to ​promote those desires, then (at some) reason to those actions. However, Pure faces range of related counterexamples Jeffrey and details the depend, in part, on what purely probabilistic account is targeted. That is, the on what account of the ​baseline the relevant probabilistic account accepts. So, for instance, switching to Finlay's account of the baseline as our target, we can construct counterexample such Schroeder (2007, p. 113). 4 Finlay (2006, p. Finlay's view is complicated his (2014): there, he offers a probabilistic account of ​good relation rather the ​promotion relation. we'll discuss his view. Thanks to
 whatsoever. Stephen Finlay clAims the basEline Is tHe aGeNt noT 3 perForming the actiON in qUestion (e.g., not-φ-ing). D. JustiN CoatEs HOlds THaT the 4 bAseline COmPRIseS wHaTevEr FAcTs conTriBute to tHe "antecedeNt iNtRinsic likeliHOoD" of D's being SatIsfied. 5 Pure PrObaBilism YiEldS IntuiTivEly coRrect rESults iN a wide ranGe OF cases. fOr instaNCE, wOrkiNg for the moment witH scHRoeder's account Of the bAsELiNE, We cAn eXplain why bUyIng a tICket to tHE lOTTEry MIght promote yoUr desire for $100. iF we SupposE tHat THe probAbiliTy THat You'll get $100 if yOu do Nothing is Quite lOW (you havE No salarY, and no One Is lIkelY To GiVe yOu THe mONeY, saY), ThaT the lottErY iS fair, And tHAT THere WilL onlY be 100 tiCkets sold, then BuyIng a TIckEt to tHe lotTery WoUld plAusiblY promOtE your desire. For iNstaNce, if the pRobAbIliTy That yOU'll get $100 If yOu dO nothinG is.002, then BUyiNg A TICkEt promotes your desiRe, SINcE the probAbilitY ThAt YOu'll get $100 iF yOu bUy a sINGle tiCket IS.01, aNd.01>.002. SimilaR remarKS gO fOr a rangE oF other CaSes. intUitivELy, PuRe ProbAbilism cApturES something impoRTant about the cONnECTiON betWeeN the (instrumEntaL) ReasOns tHErE arE To perForm aCtIOnS And the likelihood thaT oUr desiRes wiLl be satisfied If we perforM THOse actioNs: whEN tHE satisfaction oF our dEsires is ​moRE likely gIven sOme actioNs we might PERform, i.e., wHen The ActIonS DO wHat purely probABIlisTiC accounTs oF promotIon Say Is nEceSsAry and sufFicient tO ​pRoMoTe ThoSe desIRes, then wE hAve (At LeaSt somE) Reason To perForm ThOsE ActIons. HowEVeR, pUre PRoBaBiliSm fAcEs a raNge oF RelAted couNterexampLes DUe to jeFfRey BehrEnds and Joshua dipaolo. The deTaIls Of the cOUNterexamPles depend, in part, on 6 what pURely proBabIlistIc acCount is beIng TargetEd. THAt is, thE detaiLs of tHe CouNTErexaMPLeS dePeNd on what acCOUnt Of the ​BaSeliNe the reLevant purely probabILisTic account accEptS. So, fOR InStaNCe, SWitChINg nOW To Finlay's accounT of the baseLiNE aS our target, WE caN cOnstrucT a countErexaMPle such As: 3 SchroedEr (2007, p. 113). 4 Finlay (2006, P. 8). FInlaY'S VieW is complicAted in hiS (2014): there, he oFFers a PRoBabilIstIc accoUnT of The ​goOd for rELatIon raTher thAn The ​proMotioN rElation. HEre, we'll discuss his (2006) view. ThAnks to [RemovEd
 whatsoever. Stephen Finla y claims t he ba sel ine  i s th e ag ent not 3 perf o rmin g the action in questi on (e .g . , no t -φ -ing) . D. Ju s ti n Coa te shol ds th at th e 4  baseli ne compris eswh atever facts co ntribute t o t he "antecede ntintrin si c l i kelih ood " ofD's be i ng sat isfied. 5  P u re Pro b abilism y ie ldsintuitively corre c tr esults in a wi de ran ge of c ase s.For instan ce , wor k ing for th e m ome n t with Schroe der's accou n t o f theba sel i ne, we  canex p lai n why buyin g aticket to  the l o ttery m i ght pro mote y our  de sire fo r$10 0. Ifw esup p ose  that th epr obabi lity t h a t yo u'l l ge t $10 0 if you do n oth ingi s q uitelow ( youha ve no  salar y, an dno one is likel y to  give you  th emon ey , say ) , that  th e l otteryis fair ,  an dt h a tthere will only be  1 0 0  t ickets s old, t h en  b u ying a t ic ket  tot h e lot tery wo uld plau siblyp ro mo te your  d esire.  F orins tance ,  ifthe pr obabilit y tha t  you'll get $1 0 0 if you do n o th i n gi s.00 2,then buying  a t i cket  pro m ot esy our d esire ,s in c e the probability t ha t you' ll ge t $100 if you  buy a sin g l e  ticketis.0 1 ,a nd.01>.002. Si milar  remarks g o  for a r angeof other  cases. I n t uitively , P ure  Pr oba b i li sm captures s o m ethi ng  import ant  aboutthe  co nne cti on  betweenthe (ins tr um en ta l)reaso n s therear e t oper forma ctions  andtheli ke l iho od that ou r desi re swill  be  s atisf iedi f w e perfo rm thoseact i ons:  w he n the s atisfaction o four desire sis​morel i kely giv en some actions we migh t  perfor m,i.e.,  whe n the act ion s do w hat purely  proba bilis ti c a c c ounts o fpro mo tion say i s nec essar yandsuffici ent to ​promote th o sedesires, then  we  hav e (a t l e as t  so me )  re a s on to perform t hose actio ns .  H owever, Pu r e P ro babilis m faces  a ra n ge of r elated co unterexam pl es d u e  to  Jeffrey B ehrendsand Joshu a  DiPa o lo . The  de tailsof  th e cou nterex a mpl es de pend,in  part,  on 6  w hat pure ly probabilistic accoun t is b eingtar geted. Th ati s,the detai ls o f the coun ter exa mples  de p end o n wh a tacc o unt o f th e  ​baselin e  t her e le vant purely p r oba bilis tic accoun t ac cepts. So, for in s tance, switchi ng n o w  to  Fi n lay' saccount of the  ba se l i ne as ou rtarget, wecan cons tr u ct acounte rexamp le such a s: 3 Schr oede r ( 2007, p.113 ). 4 Finla y(2 0 06, p.  8).  F inlay' s view is c o m plicated in his(2014 ) :  ther e , h e off er s a pro b abil istic acco unt of the​goodforrelat ion rat he r than  th e​promotion relation.  Here , we'll  d iscu sshis (2 006) v iew.Than ks  to  [removed 
 whatsoever._Stephen Finlay_claims the baseline is_the agent_not_3 performing_the_action in question_(e.g., not-φ-ing). D._Justin Coates holds that_the 4 baseline_comprises_whatever facts contribute to the "antecedent intrinsic likelihood" of D's being satisfied. 5 Pure_Probabilism_yields intuitively_correct_results_in a wide range of_cases. For instance, working for_the moment_with Schroeder's account of the baseline, we can_explain_why buying a_ticket to the lottery might promote your desire for_$100. If we suppose that the_probability that you'll_get_$100_if you do nothing_is quite low (you have no_salary, and no one is likely_to give you the money, say), that_the lottery is fair, and that_there will only be 100_tickets sold,_then buying a ticket to_the lottery would_plausibly promote_your desire. For_instance, if the probability that you'll_get $100 if_you do nothing is.002, then buying_a_ticket promotes your_desire,_since_the probability_that you'll get_$100_if you_buy_a single ticket is.01, and.01>.002. Similar_remarks_go for a range of other cases._Intuitively, Pure Probabilism captures_something_important about the connection_between the (instrumental) reasons there_are to perform actions and the_likelihood that_our desires_will be satisfied if we perform those actions: when the satisfaction_of our desires is ​more likely_given some actions we_might perform,_i.e.,_when the actions_do_what purely_probabilistic accounts of promotion say is necessary_and sufficient_to ​promote those desires, then we_have (at least some)_reason_to perform those actions. However, Pure_Probabilism faces a range of related_counterexamples due to Jeffrey Behrends_and_Joshua_DiPaolo. The details of the_counterexamples depend, in part, on 6_what purely probabilistic_account is being targeted. That is, the_details_of the counterexamples depend on what_account_of the ​baseline the relevant purely_probabilistic_account_accepts. So, for instance, switching_now to Finlay's account of the_baseline as our target, we can construct a counterexample_such as: 3_Schroeder (2007, p. 113). 4_Finlay_(2006,_p. 8). Finlay's view is complicated in his (2014): there,_he offers_a probabilistic account_of the ​good for relation rather than the ​promotion relation._Here, we'll discuss his (2006) view. Thanks_to [removed