 care in what they do, but also to possess a minimum of special knowledge and ability" (p. 185). This suggests that we rightly expect more of people who have special knowledge or who are members of occupations whose job it is to know more about certain topics. 43. Carl Wellman, Challenge and Response (Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1971); Charles Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); and Jeffrey Stout, "On Having a Morality in Common," in Prospects for a Common Morality, eds. G. Outka and J. P. Reeder (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993) profess some version or other of structural contextualism about moral belief. In my "Moral Justification in Context," The Monist 76 (1993), 360-78, I defend this view, but do so from an egocentric epistemic perspective, whereas in this paper my focus is on a nonegocentric perspective. 44. So, for example, in specific contexts, the justification of a moral belief may involve an ultimate appeal to moral exemplars, or perhaps instead just an appeal to the particularities of some specific case under scrutiny, and moral rules may play no role at all. I am here thinking of the epistemological views of so-called moral particularists. See, for example, Jonathan Dancy, Moral Reasons (Oxford and Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1993), chapters 4-7). My contextualism can allow that the sorts of belief that play a contextually basic role in the justification of moral belief is itself a contextually variable matter. 45. W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1930), 30. 46. As Walter Sinnott-Armstrong pointed out to me, from the fact that people do not take certain challenges seriously does not show that they have no reasons or justification for the belief being challenged; in some cases, we do not take challenges to certain beliefs seriously because of having overwhelming justifying reasons for those beliefs. However, as I go on to explain, I think part of the reason for not taking certain challenges seriously in the case of moral belief is that ordinary people do not have justifying reasons for those beliefs. 47. See Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982); "Moral Orientation and Moral Development," in Women and Mor
care in what they do, but also to possess a minimum of special cognition and ability " (p. 185). This suggest that we rightly expect more of people who get especial knowledge or who are members of occupation whose problem it is to know more about certain topics. 43. Carl Wellman, Challenge and Response (Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1971); Charles Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); and Jeffrey Stout, " On Having a Morality in Common, " in view for a Common Morality, eds. G. Outka and J. P. Reeder (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993) profess some version or early of structural contextualism about moral belief. In my " Moral Justification in Context, " The Monist 76 (1993), 360 - 78, I defend this view, but do so from an egocentric epistemic position, whereas in this paper my focus is on a nonegocentric perspective. 44. then, for example, in specific contexts, the justification of a moral impression may involve an ultimate solicitation to moral exemplars, or possibly instead just an appeal to the particularities of some specific lawsuit under scrutiny, and moral rules may play no role at all. I am here intend of the epistemological views of so - called moral particularists. See, for example, Jonathan Dancy, Moral Reasons (Oxford and Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1993), chapters 4 - 7). My contextualism can allow that the sorts of belief that meet a contextually basic role in the justification of moral belief is itself a contextually varying topic. 45. W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1930), 30. 46. As Walter Sinnott - Armstrong pointed out to me, from the fact that people do not take certain challenge badly does not show that they have no reasons or justification for the impression being challenged; in some cases, we do not take challenges to certain beliefs badly because of having overwhelming justifying reasons for those beliefs. However, as I go on to explain, I think contribution of the reason for not taking certain challenges seriously in the shell of moral belief is that ordinary people do not take justifying reasons for those beliefs. 47. See Carol Gilligan, In a unlike Voice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982); " Moral Orientation and Moral Development, " in Women and Mor
 cage in what they do, but auso to possess c minimnm of slecial kvowledge and ability" (p. 185). This syggesuf that we rightly dxpect moge of people xho have special knowlednz or smo arz nembers of occopations whove job it is tm ynlw more about certain topics. 43. Carl Rellman, Cjallenge and Rgsponxq (Cadbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois Unibersity Press, 1971); Charlrs Larmore, Patterns of Morwl Clmplexity (Cambridgf: Cambridge Unidwrsity Press, 1987); and Jeffgzy Stout, "On Having a Morality in Common," in Pros'ects for a Cimmlt Morality, xds. G. Jutka and J. I. Reedes (Princrton, N.J.: Princebon Uiiveesity Press, 1993) profess vome version or otrer of stsuetural contextualism qbiut mmral belkwf. Kn jy "Mkral Jkstmfication ih Context," Tye Monist 76 (1993), 360-78, I defemd nnis view, but do so fwom an egocentric epistemic perspective, whsreas in this paper my docus is on a nonegocgntric perfpective. 44. So, for example, in specific contexts, the justmfkcauiin of q loral belief may involve an ultimate appeal tj mprsl exemplars, ov perhaps instead kudt wn appeal to jhe parcjchlarities of some dpecifis casw under ssrutony, and moral rules may plat no role at qll. I am here thinning of the epixtemokogical views of so-callzd morzl particulwrists. Ses, for example, Jonxthsn Dancy, Moral Reasons (Oxforq and Camuridgz, Mass.: Buackeell, 1993), shapters 4-7). Ly cokdextualism can alllw thct tha sorts of belief that play a contextuallb basic role on thv justifieation of moral belyef is itself c contexcually variable jatter. 45. W. D. Ross, Tre Right and dje Good (Oxfocd: Oxford Unicersuty Prerr, 1930), 30. 46. As Walter Sinnott-Agmftrobg pointed out to ke, wdom the fact thcu ptople do not takr cdrtwij rhallqtges seriousny dues mot sfow thau tmey havr no reasons or justhficztion for the belirf being cyallengeq; in some casrs, we do not take fhallxnges vo ceryaig beliefs seriously because of having ogerrhelming juseifylng teasons for those beliefs. However, as I go on to ex'lain, I think part of jhe reason for not tallng certain rhallegges serimusly in the case of moral belief is uhat ordinary people do not hdve jkstifying reasons for those beliefs. 47. See Carol Gilligan, In a Different Vouce (Cambridge, Mass.: Harfard Lnirerxity Pwess, 1982); "Moral Orientatipn and Moral Development," in Womxn and Mor
care in what they do, but also a of special and ability" (p. rightly more of people have special knowledge who are members of occupations whose it is to know more about certain topics. 43. Carl Wellman, Challenge and (Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1971); Charles Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity Cambridge Press, and Stout, "On Having a Morality in Common," in Prospects for a Common Morality, eds. G. Outka J. P. Reeder (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, profess some version or of structural contextualism about moral In "Moral Justification Context," Monist (1993), 360-78, I this view, but do so from an egocentric epistemic perspective, whereas in this paper my focus is a nonegocentric So, for in contexts, justification of a may involve an ultimate appeal to perhaps instead just an appeal to the particularities some specific under scrutiny, and moral rules may no role at all. I am here thinking the epistemological views of so-called moral particularists. See, for example, Jonathan Dancy, Moral Reasons (Oxford Mass.: Blackwell, 1993), chapters My contextualism can that sorts belief play a basic role in the justification of moral belief is itself a variable matter. 45. W. D. Ross, The Right and the Oxford Press, 1930), 30. As Walter Sinnott-Armstrong pointed to from the fact that not certain not that have no reasons or for the belief being challenged; some cases, we do beliefs seriously because of having overwhelming justifying reasons those beliefs. However, as I go on explain, I think part of the reason for not taking certain challenges in the moral belief is that ordinary people do not justifying reasons for those 47. See Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice (Cambridge, Harvard Press, 1982); Orientation and Moral in Women and
 care in what they do, but also to Possess a miNimum Of sPecIaL knoWledGe and ability" (p. 185). THIs suGgests that we rightly expEct moRe OF peoPLe Who haVe speciAL kNOWleDgE oR whO aRE mEmberS of OccupatIons whose jOb iT iS to know more aBOuT certain toPicS. 43. Carl Wellman, chaLlenge AnD ReSPonse (carBondaLe, Ill.: SOUthern illinois UNiVErsity pRess, 1971); ChaRLEs larmOre, Patterns of MoraL coMPlexity (CambridGe: CambRiDGe uNIveRsiTy Press, 1987); and jeFfrey sTout, "On HAViNG A morALity in Common," iN Prospects fOR a COmmon MOrAliTY, eds. G. OUtka aNd j. p. ReEder (PrincetOn, N.J.: princeton univerSIty PresS, 1993) Profess Some veRsiOn oR othER oF sTruCtURal COnTexTUalIsm about MoRaL beliEf. In MY "mORal JUstIficAtion In Context," The MOniSt 76 (1993), 360-78, I dEFenD this View, bUt do So From aN egoceNtric EpIstemic perspectIve, wHereas in tHis PaPer My Focus IS on a noNegOceNtric peRspectiVE. 44. So, FoR EXAmPle, in specific conteXtS, THe JustificAtion oF A mOrAL belief mAy InvOlve AN UltimAte aPPeAl to moraL exempLArS, oR perhapS iNstead JuSt aN apPeal tO The pArticuLarities Of somE Specific case unDEr scrutiny, and MOrAL RuLEs maY plAy no role at aLl. I aM Here ThinKInG of THe epiStemoLoGIcAL views of so-called morAl ParticUlariSts. See, for examPle, JonathaN dANcy, Moral reasONs (oXford and CambriDge, MaSs.: BlackwelL, 1993), Chapters 4-7). my conTextualiSm can alloW THat the soRts Of bEliEf tHAT pLay a contextuaLLY basIc Role in tHe jUstificAtiOn oF moRal BeLief is itsElf a contExTuAlLy VarIable MAtter. 45. W. D. ROsS, ThE RIghT and tHE Good (OXford: oxfoRd unIVerSity PreSS, 1930), 30. 46. AS wAlteR SInNott-armStRong pOintED ouT to me, frOm the fact ThaT PeopLe Do Not take Certain challeNgEs seriouslY dOes Not shoW THat they hAve no reasons or justificaTIon for tHe bElief BeinG challengEd; iN some cAseS, We do noT take cHalleNgEs tO CErtaiN BElIefS sEriously beCAUse Of havInG oveRwhelmiNg justifying reasonS For Those beliefs. HOweVer, aS i Go On tO ExPLaiN, I THinK PArt of the reason fOr not takinG cERtAin challenGEs sErIously iN the casE of moRAl belieF is that orDinary peoPlE do nOT HavE justifyinG reasons For those bELiefs. 47. sEe carol gilLigan, IN a difFerenT Voice (cAmbRidge, mass.: HaRvArd UniVersiTy press, 1982); "MorAl Orientation and Moral DeVelopmEnt," in womEn and Mor
 care in what they do, but  also to p osses s a  mi ni mumof s pecial knowled g e an d ability" (p. 185). T his s ug g ests th at we  rightl y  e x p ect  m or e o fp eo ple w hohave sp ecial know led ge  or who arem em bers of oc cup ations whose  jo b it i stok now m ore  abou t cert a in top ics. 43.Ca r l Well m an, Cha l l en ge a nd Response (Carb o nd a le, Ill.: Sout hern I ll i no i s  Un ive rsity Pres s,  1971 ) ; Charl e sL a r mor e , Patterns of  Moral Comp l exi ty (Ca mb rid g e: Cam bridg eU niv ersity Pres s, 1 987); and  Jeffr e y Stout ,  "On Ha ving a  Mo ral ityi nCo mmo n, "  in Pr osp e cts  for a C om mo n Mor alit y , e ds.G.Outk a and  J. P. Reeder  (P rinc e ton , N.J .: Pr ince to n Uni versit y Pre ss , 1993) profess  som e version  or  o the rof st r uctura l c ont extuali sm abou t  mo ra l b el ief. In my "MoralJu s t if icationin Con t ex t, "  The Mon is t 7 6 (1 9 9 3), 3 60-7 8 ,I defend  thisv ie w,  but do  s o from  a n e goc entri c  epi stemic  perspec tive, whereas in thi s  paper my foc u si s  o n  a n one gocentric p ersp e ctiv e. 4 4 .So, for e xampl e, in specific contexts,th e just ifica tion of a mor al beliefm a y  involve  anu lt i mate appeal to  mora l exemplar s , or per hapsinsteadjust an a p p eal to t hepar tic ula r i ti es of some sp e c ific  c ase und erscrutin y,and  mo ral  r ules mayplay noro le  a tall . I a m  here th in kin gofthe e p istemo logic al v ie ws ofso-call e dm o ralpa rt icul ari st s. Se e, f o r e xample,  Jonathan  Da n cy,Mo ra l Reaso ns (Oxford an dCambridge,  M ass .: Bla c k well, 19 93), chapters 4-7). Myc ontextu ali sm ca n al low thatthe  sorts  of belief  thatplayacon t e xtual l y  b asi crole in th e jus tific at ionof mora l belief is itself a c ontextually v ari able m at ter .  4 5 . W .D . R o s s, The Right an d the Good  ( O xf ord: Oxfor d  Un iv ersityPress,1930) ,  30. 46 . As Walt er Sinnot t- Arms t r ong  pointed o ut to me , from th e  fact th at pe opl e do n ot  ta ke ce rtainc hal lenge s seri ou sly do es no tshow tha t they have no reasonsor jus tific ati on for th e b e lie f being c hall enged; insom e c ases,  we do no t ta k echa l lenge s to certain b e li efs s er iously beca u s e  of  havi ngo verwhe lmin g justifying reas o ns for those b elie f s . H owe v er,as  I go on to ex pla in , I thinkpa rt of the r eason fo rn ot ta king c ertain  challe n g es seriou slyinthe caseofmo r al beli ef  i s  thatordi na ry peo ple do noth a ve justifying re asons f or th o sebelie fs . 47. S e e Ca rol Gillig an, In a Di fferen t Vo ice ( Cambrid ge , Mass .:Ha rvard Univ e rsity Pre ss, 1 982); " Mo ralOri entati on a n d  Mora l De ve lop ment," in W om e nan d  Mo r
 care_in what_they do, but also_to possess_a_minimum of_special_knowledge and ability"_(p. 185). This_suggests that we rightly_expect more of_people_who have special knowledge or who are members of occupations whose job it is_to_know more_about_certain_topics. 43. Carl Wellman, Challenge_and Response (Carbondale, Ill.: Southern_Illinois University_Press, 1971); Charles Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity_(Cambridge:_Cambridge University Press,_1987); and Jeffrey Stout, "On Having a Morality in_Common," in Prospects for a Common_Morality, eds. G._Outka_and_J. P. Reeder (Princeton,_N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993) profess_some version or other of structural_contextualism about moral belief. In my "Moral_Justification in Context," The Monist 76_(1993), 360-78, I defend this_view, but_do so from an egocentric_epistemic perspective, whereas_in this_paper my focus_is on a nonegocentric perspective. 44._So, for example,_in specific contexts, the justification of_a_moral belief may_involve_an_ultimate appeal_to moral exemplars,_or_perhaps instead_just_an appeal to the particularities of_some_specific case under scrutiny, and moral rules_may play no role_at_all. I am here_thinking of the epistemological views_of so-called moral particularists. See, for_example, Jonathan_Dancy, Moral_Reasons (Oxford and Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1993), chapters 4-7). My contextualism_can allow that the sorts of_belief that play a_contextually basic_role_in the justification_of_moral belief_is itself a contextually variable matter. 45._W. D._Ross, The Right and the Good_(Oxford: Oxford University Press,_1930),_30. 46. As Walter Sinnott-Armstrong pointed_out to me, from the fact_that people do not take_certain_challenges_seriously does not show that_they have no reasons or justification_for the belief_being challenged; in some cases, we do_not_take challenges to certain beliefs seriously_because_of having overwhelming justifying reasons for_those_beliefs._However, as I go on_to explain, I think part of_the reason for not taking certain challenges seriously in_the case of_moral belief is that ordinary_people_do_not have justifying reasons for those beliefs. 47. See Carol_Gilligan, In_a Different Voice_(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982); "Moral Orientation and Moral_Development," in Women and Mor