 one should allow one's thinking about higher-order questions to affect one's confidence about one's powers of direct judgment. But even if we allow that one's thinking about higher-order questions can ðor This content downloaded from 128.252.58.243 on Fri, 13 Dec 2013 11:00:23 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions This last step might seem suspect. Onemight argue that because my planning with regard to the higher-order question is based on the contrary376 Ethics January 2014to-fact assumption that I have come to doubt my powers of direct reasoning, my plan has a conditional structure: ð3Þ Were I to doubt my powers of direct reasoning, then go to the shore if in V.11One But 1 awkw ð3*ÞW do if thinkmight then argue that a plan with a conditional structure of this sort ot carry the endorsement that is distinctive of planning. But thiscann objection fails. To see why, notice that the conditional structure that we have here is no different than what we find-and have no problem accepting-in the case of the contingency plans discussed above ðSec. IÞ. Contingency plans, recall, are plans that we make because we are unsure about the future or because we want to prepare for certain contingencies-for example, what to do were I to win the lotto. So they result in conditional plans, plans like this: ð4Þ Were I to win the lotto, then head to Vegas. this means the two plans-ð3Þ and ð4Þ-have the same general connal structure: were I to F, then Ψ. Moreover, given that we are com-ditio fortable that ð4Þ carries the endorsement that is distinctive of plans, we should be comfortable that ð3Þ does too. With this objection set aside, we can see that the three parts of Daskal's challenge can be met. But this means that PPIMs are possible within Gibbard's system. III. MAKING SENSE OF INNOCENT MISTAKES OF MENTAL CONSTITUTION Even if we have succeeded in defusing Daskal's first objection, there is still the charge that Gibbard's system cannot explain why IMMCs count as mistakes. As we have just seen, PPIMs are possible because we are able to plan for a situation like V from different perspectives.
one should allow one's thinking about higher - order questions to involve one's assurance about one's powers of direct opinion. But even if we permit that one's thinking about higher - order doubt can ðor This subject downloaded from 128.252.58.243 on Fri, 13 Dec 2013 11:00:23 americium All use subject to JSTOR term and Conditions This last step might seem suspect. Onemight argue that because my planning with regard to the high - order question is based on the contrary376 Ethics January 2014to - fact presumption that I have come to doubt my powers of direct reasoning, my plan have a conditional structure: ð3Þ Were I to doubt my powers of direct reasoning, then go to the shore if in V.11One But 1 awkw ð3*ÞW do if thinkmight then argue that a plan with a conditional social organization of this sort ot carry the endorsement that is distinctive of planning. But thiscann objection fails. To determine why, notice that the conditional structure that we have here is no different than what we find - and have no problem accepting - in the case of the contingency plan discussed above ðSec. IÞ. Contingency plan, recall, are plans that we make because we are unsure about the future or because we want to cook for sealed contingencies - for example, what to do were I to win the lotto. therefore they result in conditional plans, plans like this: ð4Þ Were I to win the lotto, then head to Vegas. this means the two plans - ð3Þ and ð4Þ - have the same general connal structure: were I to F, then Ψ. furthermore, given that we are com - ditio fortable that ð4Þ behave the endorsement that is distinctive of plans, we should be comfortable that ð3Þ does too. With this expostulation set aside, we can see that the three part of Daskal's challenge can be met. But this means that PPIMs are possible within Gibbard's system. three. MAKING SENSE OF INNOCENT MISTAKES OF MENTAL CONSTITUTION Even if we have succeeded in defusing Daskal's first objection, there embody still the care that Gibbard's system cannot excuse why IMMCs count as mistakes. As we have barely seen, PPIMs are possible because we are able to design for a situation like V from different perspectives.
 onf should allow one's thinying about highgr-irder xuestikns to awfect one's confidence about lnw's poqers of direct judgmeng. But evej if we qllox that one's thinking abomc higgcr-ordzr questions can ðor This cmntent downloagea yrom 128.252.58.243 on Fri, 13 Dec 2013 11:00:23 AM All use subjest to JXTLR Terms and Cjndiuiogs Tgps last step might seem suspect. Onemigit argue that brcause my planning with rehard to the higher-ordeg question us bwwed on the cuntrary376 Ethics January 2014to-fact assumption that I have zome co doubt my piwegv of direct reasjning, my plak has a conditoonal structurc: ð3Þ Wece I to doubt my powers oh direct reasoning, tren go to tke shore if in V.11One Byt 1 awkf ð3*ÞW go iw thknkjijht then wrgne that a pman with a xonditional structute if this sort kt carwy the endorsement that is distinctive of plznning. But thiscann objwction fails. To see wjy, notice that the conditional structure that we have here is nk diyncreng tjan what we find-and have no problem accepting-yh uhe case of the cjntingency llwnx discussed abuve ðSee. IÞ. Contingency plans, recall, are plans thau we kake because we are unsure qbout the funure or because we wanc to prepare for certsin contingencies-for excmple, shat to do aere I to din the lotto. So thvy rasult in conditional plans, plans lije tkis: ð4Þ Werd I jo win ehe lotto, hhen maad to Vegas. this leans tve two plajs-ð3Þ and ð4Þ-have the same general coiial structure: ware I to F, chen Ψ. Koreover, giveg that we are eom-ditio fortxble that ð4Þ carriev the endorfement that iv distinctive of planf, we shoyld be zumfortable thay ð3Þ does too. With thus objection set axidg, se can see that tht rhree parts of Darkaj's ciallegce can be med. Bug tfos mexns thau PIIMr arr possible within Gitbars's system. III. MAKIMG SENSE OD INNOCEGT MISTAKES OG MENTAL CONSTITUTLON Eten if we hsve succeeded in defusing Daskal's first obuecbion, there is stiol the chargz that Gibbard's system cannot explain whb IMMCs count as mistakws. As we have just xten, PPIMs are possyble becagse we are able to poan for a situatipn like V from differsnt pesspechives.
one should allow one's thinking about higher-order affect confidence about powers of direct allow one's thinking about questions can ðor content downloaded from 128.252.58.243 on Fri, Dec 2013 11:00:23 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions This step might seem suspect. Onemight argue that because my planning with regard to higher-order is on contrary376 Ethics January 2014to-fact assumption that I have come to doubt my powers of direct reasoning, plan has a conditional structure: ð3Þ Were I doubt my powers of reasoning, then go to the if V.11One But awkw do thinkmight then argue a plan with a conditional structure of this sort ot carry the endorsement that is distinctive of But thiscann To see notice the structure that we is no different than what we problem accepting-in the case of the contingency plans above ðSec. Contingency plans, recall, are plans that make because we are unsure about the future because we want to prepare for certain contingencies-for example, what to do were I to lotto. So they result conditional plans, plans this: Were to the lotto, head to Vegas. this means the two plans-ð3Þ and ð4Þ-have the general connal structure: were I to F, then Ψ. Moreover, we com-ditio fortable that carries the endorsement that distinctive plans, we should be ð3Þ too. set we see that the three of Daskal's challenge can be But this means that system. III. MAKING SENSE OF INNOCENT MISTAKES OF CONSTITUTION Even if we have succeeded in Daskal's first objection, there is still the charge that Gibbard's system cannot why IMMCs mistakes. As we have just seen, PPIMs are because we are able plan for a situation like V from different perspectives.
 one should allow one's thinkinG about highEr-ordEr qUesTiOns tO affEct one's confideNCe abOut one's powers of direct jUdgmeNt. bUt evEN iF we alLow that ONe'S THinKiNg AboUt HIgHer-orDer QuestioNs can ðor ThIs cOnTent downloadED fRom 128.252.58.243 on Fri, 13 DeC 2013 11:00:23 AM all use subjecT to jSTOR TErMs aND CondItiOns ThIs last STep migHt seem susPeCT. OnemiGHt argue THAt BecaUse my planning with REgARd to the higher-oRder quEsTIoN IS baSed On the contrArY376 EthiCS JanuarY 2014To-FACT asSUmption that I hAve come to doUBt mY powerS oF diREct reaSoninG, mY PlaN has a conditIonaL structurE: ð3Þ WerE i to doubT My powerS of dirEct ReaSoniNG, tHeN go To THe sHOrE if IN V.11ONe But 1 awkW ð3*þW Do if tHinkMIGHT theN arGue tHat a pLan with a condiTioNal sTRucTure oF this Sort Ot Carry The endOrsemEnT that is distinctIve oF planning. but ThIscAnN objeCTion faIls. to sEe why, noTice thaT The CoNDITiOnal structure that wE hAVE hEre is no dIffereNT tHaN What we fiNd-And Have NO ProblEm acCEpTing-in thE case oF ThE cOntingeNcY plans DiScuSseD abovE ÐSec. iÞ. ContIngency pLans, rECall, are plans thAT we make becausE We ARE uNSure AboUt the future Or beCAuse We waNT tO prEPare fOr cerTaIN cONtingencies-for exampLe, What to Do werE I to win the lotTo. So they reSULT in condiTionAL pLAns, plans like thIs: ð4Þ WEre I to win tHE lotto, thEn heaD to Vegas. This means THE two planS-ð3Þ And Ð4Þ-hAve THE sAme general conNAL strUcTure: werE I tO F, then Ψ. morEovEr, gIveN tHat we are cOm-ditio fOrTaBlE tHat Ð4Þ carRIes the enDoRseMeNt tHat is DIstincTive oF plaNs, We SHouLd be comFOrTABle tHaT ð3þ doeS toO. WIth thIs obJEctIon set aSide, we can See THat tHe ThRee partS of Daskal's chaLlEnge can be mEt. but This meANS that PPIms are possible within GibbARd's systEm. IiI. MAKiNG SeNSE OF INNoCEnT MISTaKEs oF MENTaL CONStITUTiOn EvEN If we hAVE sUccEeDed in defusING DaSkal's FiRst oBjectioN, there is still the chARge That Gibbard's sYstEm caNNOt ExpLAiN Why iMmcs cOUNt as mistakes. As wE have just sEeN, pPiMs are possIBle BeCause we Are able To plaN For a sitUation likE V from difFeRent PERspEctives.
 one should allow one's th inking abo ut hi ghe r-o rd er q uest ions to affect one' s confidence about one 's po we r s of di rectjudgmen t .B u t e ve nifwe al low t hat  one'sthinking a bou thigher-order qu estions ca n ð or This cont ent  downl oa ded from128 .252. 58.243 on Fri , 13 Dec20 1 3 11:0 0 :23 AMA l lusesubject to JSTORT er m s and Conditio ns Thi sl as t ste p m ight seemsu spect .  Onemig h ta r g uet hat because m y planningw ith  regar dtot he hig her-o rd e r q uestion isbase d on thecontra r y376 Et h ics Jan uary 2 014 to- fact as su mpt io n  th a tI h a vecome todo ub t mypowe r s o f di rec t re asoni ng, my plan h asa co n dit ional  stru ctur e:  ð3ÞWere I  to d ou bt my powers of  dir ect reaso nin g,  th en  go t o  the s hor e i f in V. 11One B u t 1  a w k w  ð 3*ÞW do if thinkmi gh t th en argue  thata  p la n  with aco ndi tion a l  stru ctur e  o f this s ort ot ca rr y the e nd orseme nt  th atis di s tinc tive o f planni ng. B u t thiscann obj e ction fails.T os e ew hy,not ice that th e co n diti onal st ruc t ure t hat w eh av e  here is no differe nt  thanwhatwe find-and h ave no pro b l e m accept ing- i nt he case of the  cont ingency pl a ns discu ssedabove ðS ec. IÞ. C o n tingency  pl ans , r eca l l ,are plans tha t we m ak e becau sewe areuns ure  ab out  t he future  or beca us ewe  w ant  to p r epare fo rcer ta inconti n gencie s-for  exa mp le ,  wh at to d o  w e r e Ito  w in t helo tto.So t h eyresultin condit ion a l pl an s,  planslike this: ð4 ÞWere I towi n t he lot t o , then h ead to Vegas. this mean s  the tw o p lans- ð3Þand ð4Þ-h ave  the s ame genera l conn al st ru ctu r e : wer e ItoF,  then Ψ. M o r eov er, g iv en t hat weare com-ditio fort a ble  that ð4Þ car rie s th e en dor s em e ntth a t i s distinctive ofplans, wesh o ul d be comfo r tab le  that ð 3Þ does  too. With th is object ion set a si de,w e  ca n see that  the thr ee partso f Das k al 's ch all enge c an  be  met.  But t h ismeans  thatPP IMs ar e pos si ble with in Gibbard's system. II I. MAK ING S ENS E OF INNO CEN T  MI STAKES OF  MEN TAL CONSTI TUT ION  Even  if we ha ve s u cc eed e d indefu s ing Daska l 's  fi r s tobjection,t h e reis st ill the ch arge  that Gibbard's s y stem cannot ex plai n why  IM M Cs c ou nt as mistakes . A sw e  have ju st  seen, PPIM s are po ss i ble b ecause  we ar e ablet o  p l an for  a s itu ation lik e V  f r om diff er en t  persp ecti ve s.
 one_should allow_one's thinking about higher-order_questions to_affect_one's confidence_about_one's powers of_direct judgment. But_even if we allow_that one's thinking_about_higher-order questions can ðor This content downloaded from 128.252.58.243 on Fri, 13 Dec 2013_11:00:23_AM All_use_subject_to JSTOR Terms and Conditions_This last step might seem_suspect. Onemight_argue that because my planning with regard to_the_higher-order question is_based on the contrary376 Ethics January 2014to-fact assumption that_I have come to doubt my_powers of direct_reasoning,_my_plan has a conditional_structure: ð3Þ Were I to doubt_my powers of direct reasoning, then_go to the shore if in V.11One_But 1 awkw ð3*ÞW do if_thinkmight then argue that a_plan with_a conditional structure of this_sort ot carry_the endorsement_that is distinctive_of planning. But thiscann objection fails._To see why,_notice that the conditional structure that_we_have here is_no_different_than what_we find-and have_no_problem accepting-in_the_case of the contingency plans discussed_above_ðSec. IÞ. Contingency plans, recall, are plans_that we make because_we_are unsure about the_future or because we want_to prepare for certain contingencies-for example,_what to_do were_I to win the lotto. So they result in conditional plans,_plans like this: ð4Þ Were I_to win the lotto,_then head_to_Vegas. this means_the_two plans-ð3Þ_and ð4Þ-have the same general connal structure:_were I_to F, then Ψ. Moreover, given_that we are com-ditio_fortable_that ð4Þ carries the endorsement that_is distinctive of plans, we should_be comfortable that ð3Þ does_too._With_this objection set aside, we_can see that the three parts_of Daskal's challenge_can be met. But this means that_PPIMs_are possible within Gibbard's system. III._MAKING_SENSE OF INNOCENT MISTAKES OF MENTAL_CONSTITUTION_Even_if we have succeeded in_defusing Daskal's first objection, there is_still the charge that Gibbard's system cannot explain why_IMMCs count as_mistakes. As we have just_seen,_PPIMs_are possible because we are able to plan for a_situation like_V from different_perspectives.