 in itself, but only with respect to its function, and 'what we call evil [...] is the great principle which makes us sociable creatures' (Mandeville 1729, 1: 369). Hence the paradox, in a'small society' with a small population living on agriculture – like Harrington's Commonwealth of Oceana – 'virtuous' behaviour is possible and private virtue is likely to serve the public interest in while in a 'great society' such as English society of the time, with a large population, a powerful army, trade, growing towns, manufactures, arts and sciences, the public good may coexist with kinds of behaviour that common morality condemns, such as theft, alcoholism and prostitution 'virtue' is rarely productive of public good and vice is inseparable from its greatness. The serious question asked by Mandeville may be said to be, what are the costs and benefits – once we take the fact of social cooperation as a datum – carried by the choice for either the neo-classical utopia or the great society. The importance of Mandeville's paradox may be understood when one realizes that the question asked by both Montesquieu and Rousseau was how to assess such costs and benefits. Montesquieu on passions Charles-Louis de Montesquieu was one more author who wanted to follow the model provided by Galilean science in order to study states 'as they really are' rather than as they should be and examine interactions between various political systems and human nature 'as it really is'. Drawing inspiration from classical authors, he believed he had discovered a scientific proof of the truth of one of their claims – namely, that republican governments promote virtue while monarchical ones promote passion. The virtue at stake is love of one's homeland and of equality. It is not Christian virtue but 'political virtue'. Elaborating on Mandeville's paradox, he contends, in book 19 of The Spirit of Laws, that 'not all political vices are moral vices, and that not all moral vices are political vices' (Montesquieu 1748: 314). In modern Europe, the development of trade fosters republican governments or 'civilized monarchies', i.e. those where the sovereign's power is limited by division of powers; these, in turn, by countering unruly passions, foster political virtue, civilized manners and peace among nations (Hirschman 1977). In book 21 he declares that, in such societies, interest acts as a lieutenant
in itself, but only with respect to its function, and' what we call malefic [... ] is the big principle which makes us sociable creature' (Mandeville 1729, 1: 369). therefore the paradox, in a'small society' with a small population living on agribusiness – like Harrington's Commonwealth of Oceana –' virtuous' behaviour is potential and individual virtue is probable to serve the public interest in while in a' great society' such as English club of the time, with a large population, a powerful army, trade, develop towns, manufactures, arts and skill, the public good may coexist with kinds of behaviour that common ethical motive condemns, such as theft, dipsomania and prostitution' virtue' is rarely productive of public good and vice is inseparable from its enormousness. The serious question asked by Mandeville may be said to be, what are the costs and benefits – once we take the fact of social cooperation as a datum – carried by the choice for either the neo - classical utopia or the great society. The importance of Mandeville's paradox may be understood when one realizes that the question asked by both Montesquieu and Rousseau was how to assess such cost and benefits. Montesquieu on passions Charles - Louis de Montesquieu was one more generator who want to follow the model provided by Galilean skill in order to analyze states' as they really are' preferably than as they should be and examine interactions between various political systems and human nature' as it really is'. Drawing inhalation from classical authors, he believed he had discovered a scientific validation of the truth of one of their claim – namely, that republican government promote virtue while monarchical ones advertise passion. The virtue at stake is love of one's homeland and of equality. It is not Christian virtue but' political virtue'. Elaborating on Mandeville's paradox, he contends, in koran 19 of The Spirit of Laws, that' not all political vices are moral vice, and that not all moral vices are political vices' (Montesquieu 1748: 314). In mod Europe, the development of deal fosters republican government or' civilized monarchies', i.e. those where the sovereign's exponent is limited by division of world power; these, in turn, by countering unruly passions, foster political virtue, civilized manners and peace among nations (Hirschman 1977). In book 21 he declares that, in such societies, interest act as a lieutenant
 in itself, but only with rerpect to its fuuxtion, end 'whaf we calu evil [...] is the great princippe whicy makes us sociable crdatures' (Mwndevillw 1729, 1: 369). Yence the 'zradox, lu a'smzpl smriety' with a smsll populadion living on aernculture – like Harrington's Commonweajth of Pcfana – 'virtuous' behsdioud is possible and private virtue ia likelj to serve the punlic interest in while in w 'grfat society' such ad English sicieet of the timd, with a large populatjon, a powerful army, trade, growivg tocns, manufacjbees, drts and scmences, the public npod maf coexixt with kinds pf uehaciour that common morelity condemns, such ws theft, dleoholism and prostituriin 'vittue' hs rxeelh pdovucfive ov pnblic good znd vice is inseparable from ius dgratness. The aeriouf zuestion asked by Mandeville may be saig tk be, what are the costs and benefits – once wg take the fact of social cooperation as a datum – carried bf the zhongc fof elther the neo-classical utopia or the great sosjeuy. Nhe importance of Mandeville'x oatwdox may be uvderstood when one realizes that tre quwstion ashed ny both Montesquieu and Rouwseau was hoc ti assess such costd and benefnts. Momtesqiieu on passions Charler-Loujs de Montedquieu waa one more author whp fanted to follow the model provided by Yalilean scignce in order to dtudy states 'as they reaply ate' ratver than ad they should be and examine invxractions beteean narious pjlitigal systems and human nature 'cs it reclly ir'. Drawing pnspiratimn from clafsical authorv, he believed he had qisciverwd a sckdntific proof pf the trltk of one if their claims – nemeli, fhat republican gocernments promoye xireuv wiile imnarchical otes oroopte pxssion. Uke yirgue st stake is love of mne's homeland and of eauwlity. It is not Shristian viryue but 'political girtux'. Elaburatimg jn Mandeville's paradox, he contsnds, in blok 19 of The Spiwit if Laws, that 'not all political vices are moral vicew, and that not all moral vices are pokltical vices' (Montqsquieu 1748: 314). In modern Europe, thw development of urade fosters republicah govesnmenhs or 'civilized monarchies', i.e. those where the sovereign's power is limited by ditifion of powsrs; yhese, iu tbrn, by sounvecing unruly passipns, foster political virtue, civmlized mantexs and peace among nations (Hitszhman 1977). In booy 21 he declares that, in shch socirties, interest acts as a lieutemant
in itself, but only with respect to and we call [...] is the sociable (Mandeville 1729, 1: Hence the paradox, a'small society' with a small population on agriculture – like Harrington's Commonwealth of Oceana – 'virtuous' behaviour is possible private virtue is likely to serve the public interest in while in a society' as society the time, with a large population, a powerful army, trade, growing towns, manufactures, arts and sciences, public good may coexist with kinds of behaviour common morality condemns, such theft, alcoholism and prostitution 'virtue' rarely of public and is from its greatness. serious question asked by Mandeville may be said to be, what are the costs and benefits – we take of social as datum carried by the either the neo-classical utopia or the importance of Mandeville's paradox may be understood when realizes that question asked by both Montesquieu and was how to assess such costs and benefits. on passions Charles-Louis de Montesquieu was one more author who wanted to follow the model Galilean science in order study states 'as really rather as should be examine interactions between various political systems and human nature 'as it is'. Drawing inspiration from classical authors, he believed he had scientific of the truth one of their claims namely, republican governments promote virtue ones passion. stake love one's homeland and of It is not Christian virtue 'political virtue'. Elaborating on book 19 of The Spirit of Laws, that all political vices are moral vices, and not all moral vices are political vices' (Montesquieu 1748: 314). In modern the development fosters republican governments or 'civilized monarchies', i.e. those the sovereign's power is by division of powers; these, in turn, by countering passions, political virtue, manners and peace nations (Hirschman 1977). book 21 he in such interest as
 in itself, but only with respecT to its funcTion, aNd 'wHat We Call Evil [...] Is the great prinCIple Which makes us sociable crEaturEs' (mAndeVIlLe 1729, 1: 369). HenCe the paRAdOX, In a'SmAlL soCiETy' With a SmaLl populAtion livinG on AgRiculture – likE haRrington's COmmOnwealth of OcEanA – 'virtuOuS' beHAviouR is PossiBle and PRivate Virtue is lIkELy to seRVe the puBLIc InteRest in while in a 'greAT sOCiety' such as EngLish soCiETy OF The TimE, with a largE pOpulaTIon, a powERfUL ARmy, TRade, growing toWns, manufactURes, Arts anD sCieNCes, the PubliC gOOd mAy coexist wiTh kiNds of behaViour tHAt commoN MoralitY condeMns, SucH as tHEfT, aLcoHoLIsm ANd ProSTitUtion 'virTuE' iS rareLy prODUCTive Of pUbliC good And vice is inseParAble FRom Its grEatneSs. ThE sEriouS questIon asKeD by Mandeville maY be sAid to be, whAt aRe The CoSts anD BenefiTs – oNce We take tHe fact oF SocIaL COOpEration as a datum – carRiED By The choicE for eiTHeR tHE neo-clasSiCal UtopIA Or the GreaT SoCiety. The ImportANcE oF MandevIlLe's parAdOx mAy bE undeRStooD when oNe realizEs thaT The question askED by both MontesQUiEU AnD rousSeaU was how to asSess SUch cOsts ANd BenEFits. MOntesQuIEu ON passions Charles-LouIs De MontEsquiEu was one more aUthor who waNTED to folloW the MOdEL provided by GalIlean Science in oRDer to stuDy staTes 'as theY really arE' RAther thaN as TheY shOulD BE aNd examine inteRACtioNs Between VarIous polItiCal SysTemS aNd human naTure 'as it ReAlLy Is'. draWing iNSpiratioN fRom ClAssIcal aUThors, hE beliEved He HaD DisCovered A ScIENtifIc PrOof oF thE tRuth oF one OF thEir claiMs – namely, tHat REpubLiCaN governMents promote vIrTue while moNaRchIcal onES Promote pAssion. The virtue at stake iS Love of oNe's HomelAnd aNd of equalIty. it is noT ChRIstian Virtue But 'poLiTicAL VirtuE'. eLaBorAtIng on MandeVILle'S paraDoX, he cOntends, In book 19 of The Spirit oF lawS, that 'not all poLitIcal VICeS arE MoRAl vIcES, anD THat not all moral vIces are polItICaL vices' (MontESquIeU 1748: 314). In modeRn EuropE, the dEVelopmeNt of trade Fosters rePuBlicAN GovErnments or 'CivilizeD monarchiES', i.e. thOSe Where The SovereIgN's pOwer iS limitED by DivisIon of pOwErs; theSe, in tUrN, by countEring unruly passions, fostEr poliTical VirTue, civiliZed MAnnErs and peaCe amOng nations (hirSchMan 1977). In BooK 21 He decLareS ThAt, iN Such sOcieTIes, intereST aCts AS A lIeutenant
 in itself, but only withrespect to  itsfun cti on , an d 'w hat we call ev i l [. ..] is the great princ iplewh i ch m a ke s ussociabl e  c r e atu re s'  (M an d ev ille172 9, 1: 3 69). Hence  th eparadox, ina 's mall socie ty'  with a smal l p opulat io n l i vingonagric ulture – like  Harringt on ' s Comm o nwealth o fOcea na – 'virtuous' b e ha v iour is possib le and  p r iv a t e v irt ue is like ly  to s e rve the pu b l i c i n terest in whi le in a 'gr e atsociet y'  su c h as E nglis hs oci ety of thetime , with alargep opulati o n, a po werful  ar my,  tra d e,  g row in g  to w ns , m a nuf actures,  a rt s and  sci e n c e s, t hepubl ic go od may coexis t w ithk ind s ofbehav iour  t hat c ommonmoral it y condemns, suc h as  theft, a lco ho lis mand p r ostitu tio n ' virtue'  is rar e lypr o d u ct ive of public good  a n d  v ice is i nsepar a bl ef rom itsgr eat ness . The s erio u squestion  asked by  M andevil le  may b esai d t o be, what  are t he costs  andb enefits – once we take the f a ct o fs ocia l c ooperationas a datu m –c ar rie d  by t he ch oi c ef or either the neo-c la ssical  utop ia or the gre at society . T he impor tanc e  o f  Mandeville'sparad ox may beu nderstoo d whe n one re alizes th a t  the que sti onask edb y  b oth Montesqui e u  and  R ousseau  wa s how t o a sse sssuc hcosts and  benefit s.  M on te squ ieu o n  passion sCha rl es- Louis de Mon tesqu ieuwa so nemore au t ho r whowa nt ed t o f ol low t he m o del  provid ed by Gal ile a n sc ie nc e in or der to studyst ates 'as t he y r eallya r e' rathe r than as they should b e  and ex ami ne in tera ctions be twe en var iou s  polit ical s ystem sand h umann a tu re'a s it reall y is' . Dra wi ng i nspirat ion from classical aut hors, he beli eve d he h ad  di s co v ere da  sc i e ntific proof of  the truth  o f  o ne of thei r  cl ai ms – na mely, t hat r e publica n governm ents prom ot e vi r t uewhile mona rchicalones prom o te pa s si on. T hevirtue  a t s takeis lov e  of  one' s home la nd and  of e qu ality. I t is not Christian virt ue but  'pol iti cal virtu e'. Ela boratingon M andeville' s p ara dox,hec onten ds,i nboo k  19 o f Th e  Spirit o f  L aws , th at 'not all p o lit icalvic e s aremora l vices, and that not all moralvice s are  po l itic al  vices' (Monte squ ie u 1748: 31 4) . In modern  Europe,  t h e dev elopme nt oftrade f o s te r s repu blic angovernmen tsor 'civili ze dm onarch ies' ,i.e. t hose w h eret h e sovereign's po wer i s limit e d b y div is ion ofp ower s; these,in turn, by  count erin g unr uly pas si ons, f ost er  political virtue, c ivili zed man ne rs a ndpeaceamon g natio ns ( Hi rsc hman 1977 ) .  I n  b oo k  21  hedecla re s th at, in su c h societ ies ,  intere st  ac t s  as al ie u t enant
 in_itself, but_only with respect to_its function,_and_'what we_call_evil [...] is_the great principle_which makes us sociable_creatures' (Mandeville 1729,_1:_369). Hence the paradox, in a'small society' with a small population living on agriculture_–_like Harrington's_Commonwealth_of_Oceana – 'virtuous' behaviour is_possible and private virtue is_likely to_serve the public interest in while in a_'great_society' such as_English society of the time, with a large population,_a powerful army, trade, growing towns,_manufactures, arts and_sciences,_the_public good may coexist_with kinds of behaviour that common_morality condemns, such as theft, alcoholism_and prostitution 'virtue' is rarely productive of_public good and vice is inseparable_from its greatness. The serious_question asked_by Mandeville may be said_to be, what_are the_costs and benefits_– once we take the fact_of social cooperation_as a datum – carried by_the_choice for either_the_neo-classical_utopia or_the great society._The_importance of_Mandeville's_paradox may be understood when one_realizes_that the question asked by both Montesquieu_and Rousseau was how_to_assess such costs and_benefits. Montesquieu on passions Charles-Louis_de Montesquieu was one more author_who wanted_to follow_the model provided by Galilean science in order to study states_'as they really are' rather than_as they should be_and examine_interactions_between various political_systems_and human_nature 'as it really is'. Drawing inspiration_from classical_authors, he believed he had discovered_a scientific proof of_the_truth of one of their claims_– namely, that republican governments promote_virtue while monarchical ones promote_passion._The_virtue at stake is love_of one's homeland and of equality._It is not_Christian virtue but 'political virtue'. Elaborating on_Mandeville's_paradox, he contends, in book 19_of_The Spirit of Laws, that 'not_all_political_vices are moral vices, and_that not all moral vices are_political vices' (Montesquieu 1748: 314). In modern Europe, the_development of trade_fosters republican governments or 'civilized_monarchies',_i.e._those where the sovereign's power is limited by division of_powers; these,_in turn, by_countering unruly passions, foster political virtue, civilized manners and peace_among nations (Hirschman 1977). In book 21_he declares that, in such societies, interest acts as a lieutenant