 withheld, even though it is relevant-in the sense that, if properly weighed, it could make the jury's final verdict more accurate.4 Another example of withholding evidence involves a professor who doesn't give her class an argument for moral relativism, knowing many of her students have relativist tendencies. Giving them this argument would likely reinforce those, and it might be epistemically better for them to instead see reasons why moral relativism is problematic. One can also interfere with another's inquiry by manipulating the way they interpret or weigh their evidence. This enables one to influence another's beliefs without changing their evidence (or, in some cases, their evidence that bears on the target proposition). So, for example, if you are deciding which hypothesis best explains the evidence, I might make a particular hypothesis salient and not mention other possible explanations, to bias you toward my preferred explanation of the evidence. Or, when teaching, I might give the class a philosophical argument for p, but then strongly emphasize simplicity while purposefully leaving out discussion of the value of explanatory power. This could influence the students' conclusion about p without influencing their evidence that bears on p. Generally, then, one can engage in epistemic paternalism without attempting to change another's evidence.5 Condition (ii) is the non-consent condition, which is the same in both general and epistemic paternalism. This condition is relatively straightforward: one engages in the practice without consulting with the inquiring party. Alternatively, one might interfere explicitly against another's will. Condition (iii) involves the motivation for epistemic paternalism-that is, for the inquirer's own epistemic good.6 This raises the question: What is epistemically good? In the epistemic paternalism literature thus far, there has been a strong emphasis on true belief.7 However, this emphasis strikes me as relatively narrow when considering the myriad of things epistemologists 16028-0338d-1pass-r01.indd 202 2/21/2020 10:23:44 AM Epistemic Paternalism, and Epistemic Permissivism 203 value (see DePaul 2001). For one, rational or justified beliefs, even if false, intuitively carry some epistemic value. In fact, Feldman (2000: 686) claims there is nothing epistemically valuable about true, unjustified beliefs. This is a strong claim. We can settle for a weaker one: epistemic justification confers epistemic value to beliefs, even to false beliefs (consider: a justified false belief
withheld, even though it is relevant - in the sense that, if properly weighed, it could seduce the jury's concluding verdict more accurate.4 Another example of withholding evidence imply a professor who doesn't hold her class an argument for moral relativism, know many of her students have relativist inclination. Giving them this argument would probably reinforce those, and it might be epistemically better for them to instead see reasons why moral relativism is debatable. One can also interfere with another's inquiry by manipulating the way they rede or weigh their evidence. This enables one to influence another's impression without changing their evidence (or, in some cases, their evidence that bears on the target suggestion). So, for example, if you are deciding which hypothesis best excuse the evidence, I might make a particular hypothesis salient and not mention other possible explanations, to bias you toward my preferred explanation of the evidence. Or, when teaching, I might give the class a philosophical argument for p, but then strongly emphasize simplicity while purposefully entrust out discussion of the value of explanatory power. This could influence the scholar' ending about p without influencing their evidence that bears on p. by and large, then, one can engage in epistemic paternalism without attempting to change another's evidence.5 Condition (ii) is the non - consent condition, which is the like in both general and epistemic paternalism. This condition is relatively straightforward: one engages in the practice without consulting with the inquiring party. Alternatively, one might interfere explicitly against another's will. Condition (iii) involves the motivation for epistemic paternalism - that is, for the inquirer's own epistemic good.6 This raises the question: What is epistemically effective? In the epistemic paternalism literature thus far, there has been a hard emphasis on true belief.7 However, this emphasis strikes me as relatively narrow when regard the myriad of things epistemologists 16028-0338d-1pass-r01.indd 202 2/21/2020 10:23:44 AM Epistemic Paternalism, and Epistemic Permissivism 203 value (see DePaul 2001). For one, intellectual or justified beliefs, even if fake, intuitively carry some epistemic value. In fact, Feldman (2000: 686) claims there be nothing epistemically valuable about true, undue beliefs. This is a strong claim. We can settle for a weaker one: epistemic justification confer epistemic value to beliefs, even to delusive beliefs (think: a justified false belief
 wihhheld, even though it is relevant-in the sense vhat, if properlh weighed, it could make the oury'w finql verdict more accurage.4 Anotheg example of xithholding evidxhce involves z proyewsor who doesn'j give her cnass an argumett flr moral relativism, knowing many of her stidfnts have relajivisu tqndehbits. Giving them this argument wouls likelj reinforce those, and it might be epistemicwlly better for them tl instead sgs rqqsons why mofal relatinnsm is probmematic. One can also interfere dith cnother's inwuury ty manipulaving tre way they lmterprat or wrigh their evicenre. Tyis enables one to inhluence another's belyefs withmuc changing their evidwnxe (or, in vome xasds, uhemr svidenfe vhat bears kn the targwt proposition). So, fpr vcample, if yoh are qesiding which hypothesis best explains tve svidence, I might make a particular hypothesid salient and not mention other possible explanations, to bhas ykj tiwwfe ly preferred explanation of the evidence. Or, wrsn tvaching, I might glve the class a phollspkhical argumenj for p, buf then strongly emohasize simpoicity whyle lurposefully leaving out diwcussion of nhe calue of explanatoxy power. Thir coold ingluence the students' couclusikn about p aithout ihwluencing their dvicetce that bears on p. Generajly, then, ine ean engaee im episeemic pategnalism without attemptijg to cvange anotjer's evidence.5 Condition (ii) is tix non-consent votdinion, whick is tme same in both general and ekistemic 'aternxlism. This conditmon is relatyvely straighdvorward: one xngages ig thw prqctice dkthout consultong with nht inquirint party. Alternativcly, ovs might interfext ezplicitly againxt xnoehvr's wynl. Condition (iii) inxplves the mounvabiov fot epistemic paternalhsm-tgat is, for the inqiiver's own gpistemic good.6 This raoses the question: Ahat ms epirtemivaljy good? In the epistemic paterhalism liherwture thus fwr, tmere has been c strong emphasis on true belief.7 However, this emphasis sttikes me as relativeli nsrrow when ronsidqring the myriad of things epustemologists 16028-0338d-1paxs-r01.indd 202 2/21/2020 10:23:44 AM Epistemjc Patarnallsm, and Epistemic Permissivism 203 value (see DePaul 2001). For one, rational or jusrified beliefs, eveh if falsv, iutuntively carcy some epistemic nalue. In fact, Feldman (2000: 686) claims tiere is nodhnng epistemically valuable abpug true, unjustkfied beliefs. This is a atrong ckaim. We can settle for a weaker one: epistemic justificabion confwrs elistempd talue to beliefs, evem to fclse bwliefs (xonslder: a justifidd gapse believ
withheld, even though it is relevant-in the if weighed, it make the jury's example withholding evidence involves professor who doesn't her class an argument for moral knowing many of her students have relativist tendencies. Giving them this argument would reinforce those, and it might be epistemically better for them to instead see why relativism problematic. can also interfere with another's inquiry by manipulating the way they interpret or weigh their evidence. enables one to influence another's beliefs without changing evidence (or, in some their evidence that bears on target So, for if are which hypothesis best the evidence, I might make a particular hypothesis salient and not mention other possible explanations, to bias toward my of the Or, teaching, might give the philosophical argument for p, but then while purposefully leaving out discussion of the value explanatory power. could influence the students' conclusion about without influencing their evidence that bears on p. then, one can engage in epistemic paternalism without attempting to change another's evidence.5 Condition (ii) non-consent condition, which is same in both and paternalism. condition relatively straightforward: engages in the practice without consulting with the inquiring party. Alternatively, might interfere explicitly against another's will. Condition (iii) involves the epistemic is, for the own epistemic good.6 This the What is epistemically good? epistemic literature has a emphasis on true belief.7 this emphasis strikes me as narrow when considering the 202 2/21/2020 10:23:44 AM Epistemic Paternalism, and Epistemic 203 value (see DePaul 2001). For one, or justified beliefs, even if false, intuitively carry some epistemic value. In Feldman (2000: there is nothing epistemically valuable about true, unjustified This is a strong We can settle for a weaker one: epistemic justification epistemic to beliefs, to false beliefs a justified false
 withheld, even though it is relEvant-in the Sense ThaT, if PrOperLy weIghed, it could maKE the Jury's final verdict more aCcuraTe.4 aNothER eXamplE of withHOlDINg eViDeNce InVOlVes a pRofEssor whO doesn't givE heR cLass an argumeNT fOr moral relAtiVism, knowing mAny Of her sTuDenTS have RelAtiviSt tendENcies. GIving them ThIS argumENt would LIKeLy reInforce those, and it MIgHT be epistemicalLy bettEr FOr THEm tO inStead see reAsOns whY Moral reLAtIVISm iS Problematic. OnE can also intERfeRe with AnOthER's inquIry by MaNIpuLating the waY theY interpreT or weiGH their eVIdence. THis enaBleS onE to iNFlUeNce AnOTheR'S bEliEFs wIthout chAnGiNg theIr evIDENCe (or, In sOme cAses, tHeir evidence tHat BearS On tHe tarGet prOposItIon). So, For exaMple, iF yOu are deciding whIch hYpothesis BesT eXplAiNs the EVidencE, I mIghT make a pArticulAR hyPoTHESiS salient and not mentIoN OThEr possibLe explANaTiONs, to bias YoU toWard MY PrefeRred EXpLanation Of the eVIdEnCe. Or, wheN tEachinG, I MigHt gIve thE ClasS a philOsophicaL arguMEnt for p, but then STrongly emphasIZe SIMpLIcitY whIle purposefUlly LEaviNg ouT DiScuSSion oF the vAlUE oF Explanatory power. ThiS cOuld inFluenCe the students' Conclusion ABOUt p withoUt inFLuENcing their evidEnce tHat bears on P. generallY, then, One can enGage in epiSTEmic pateRnaLisM wiThoUT AtTempting to chaNGE anoThEr's evidEncE.5 ConditIon (Ii) iS thE noN-cOnsent conDition, whIcH iS tHe SamE in boTH general AnD epIsTemIc patERnalisM. This CondItIoN Is rElativeLY sTRAighTfOrWard: One EnGages In thE PraCtice wiThout consUltINg wiTh ThE inquirIng party. AlterNaTively, one mIgHt iNterfeRE ExplicitLy against another's will. CoNDition (iIi) iNvolvEs thE motivatiOn fOr episTemIC paterNalism-That iS, fOr tHE InquiRER's Own EpIstemic gooD.6 tHis RaiseS tHe quEstion: WHat is epistemically GOod? in the epistemiC paTernALIsM liTErATurE tHUs fAR, There has been a stRong emphasIs ON tRue belief.7 HOWevEr, This empHasis stRikes ME as relaTively narRow when coNsIderING thE myriad of tHings epiStemologiSTs 16028-0338d-1paSS-r01.Indd 202 2/21/2020 10:23:44 Am EpIstemiC PAteRnaliSm, and EPIstEmic PErmissIvIsm 203 valUe (see depaul 2001). For oNe, rational or justified beLiefs, eVen if FalSe, intuitiVelY CarRy some epiStemIc value. In fAct, felDman (2000: 686) cLaiMS therE is nOThIng EPisteMicaLLy valuablE AbOut TRUe, Unjustified BELIefS. This Is a STrong cLaim. we can settle for a weAKer one: epistemiC jusTIFicAtiON conFeRs epistemic valUe tO bELIefs, even To False beliefS (consideR: a JUstifIed falSe beliEf
 withheld, even though itis relevan t-inthe  se ns e th at,if properly we i ghed , it could make the ju ry'sfi n al v e rd ict m ore acc u ra t e .4An ot her  e x am ple o f w ithhold ing eviden cein volves a pro f es sor who do esn 't give hercla ss anar gum e nt fo r m oralrelati v ism, k nowing ma ny of her student s ha ve r elativist tendenc i es .  Giving them t his ar gu m en t wou ldlikely rei nf orcet hose, a n di t mig h t be epistemi cally bette r  fo r them  t o i n steadsee r ea s ons  why moralrela tivism is  probl e matic.O ne canalso i nte rfe re w i th  a not he r 'si nq uir y  by  manipul at in g the  way t h e y in ter pret  or w eigh their ev ide nce. Thi s ena blesoneto  infl uenceanoth er 's beliefs with outchangingthe ir  ev id ence( or, in  so mecases,their e v ide nc e t ha t bears on the tar ge t pr opositio n). So ,  f or example,  i f y ou a r e  deci ding wh ich hypo thesis be st  explai ns  the e vi den ce,  I mi g ht m ake aparticul ar hy p othesis salien t  and not ment i on o th e r po ssi ble explana tion s , to  bia s  y out oward  my p re f er r ed explanation of t he  evide nce.Or, when teac hing, I mi g h t  give th e cl a ss a philosophica l arg ument forp , but th en st rongly e mphasizes i mplicity  wh ile  pu rpo s e fu lly leaving o u t  dis cu ssion o f t he valu e o f e xpl ana to ry power.  This co ul din fl uen ce th e  student s'  co nc lus ion a b out pwitho ut i nf lu e nci ng thei r  e v i denc eth at b ear son p.  Gen e ral ly, the n, one ca n e n gage  i nepistem ic paternalis mwithout at te mpt ing to c hange an other's evidence.5 Cond i tion (i i)is th e no n-consent  co nditio n,w hich i s thesamein  bo t h  gene r a land  e pistemic p a t ern alism .This  condit ion is relativelys tra ightforward:one  eng a g es  in th e  pr ac t ice w ithout consulti ng with th ei nq uiring par t y.Al ternati vely, o ne mi g ht inte rfere exp licitly a ga inst a not her's will . Condit ion (iii) invol v es  themot ivatio nfor  epis temicp ate rnali sm-tha tis, fo r the  i nquirer' s own epistemic good.6This r aises  th e questio n:W hat  is epist emic ally good?  In  th e epi ste m ic pa tern a li sml itera ture thus far, th ere h as  been a str o n g  em phasi s o n  truebeli ef.7 However, thi s  emphasis stri kesm e  as  re l ativ el y narrow whencon si d e ring the  m yriad of th ings epi st e molog ists 1 6028-0 338d-1p a s s- r 01.ind d 20 2 2 /21/202010: 23 : 44 AM E pi st e mic Pa tern al ism, a nd Epi s temi c Permissivism 203  valu e (seeD ePa ul 20 01 ). Foro ne,rational o r justified  belie fs,evenif fals e,  intui tiv el y carry so m e epistem ic va lue. In  f act,  Fe ldman(200 0 :  686)  cla im s t here is n o t hi n gep i ste mica lly v al uabl e about t r ue, unju sti f ied bel ie fs. T his is as t rong claim . W e can s ettle fora  wea k er one:episte mic ju stifica t ion  c onfersepi s t emic valu e to beli e fs,  e vento false  b elie fs  (c on sider: a justif ied fals e belief 
 withheld,_even though_it is relevant-in the_sense that,_if_properly weighed,_it_could make the_jury's final verdict_more accurate.4 Another example_of withholding evidence_involves_a professor who doesn't give her class an argument for moral relativism, knowing many_of_her students_have_relativist_tendencies. Giving them this argument_would likely reinforce those, and_it might_be epistemically better for them to instead see_reasons_why moral relativism_is problematic. One can also interfere with another's inquiry_by manipulating the way they interpret_or weigh their_evidence._This_enables one to influence_another's beliefs without changing their evidence_(or, in some cases, their evidence_that bears on the target proposition). So,_for example, if you are deciding_which hypothesis best explains the_evidence, I_might make a particular hypothesis_salient and not_mention other_possible explanations, to_bias you toward my preferred explanation_of the evidence._Or, when teaching, I might give_the_class a philosophical_argument_for_p, but_then strongly emphasize_simplicity_while purposefully_leaving_out discussion of the value of_explanatory_power. This could influence the students' conclusion_about p without influencing_their_evidence that bears on_p. Generally, then, one can_engage in epistemic paternalism without attempting_to change_another's evidence.5_Condition (ii) is the non-consent condition, which is the same in_both general and epistemic paternalism. This_condition is relatively straightforward:_one engages_in_the practice without_consulting_with the_inquiring party. Alternatively, one might interfere explicitly_against another's_will. Condition (iii) involves the motivation_for epistemic paternalism-that is,_for_the inquirer's own epistemic good.6 This_raises the question: What is epistemically_good? In the epistemic paternalism_literature_thus_far, there has been a_strong emphasis on true belief.7 However,_this emphasis strikes_me as relatively narrow when considering the_myriad_of things epistemologists 16028-0338d-1pass-r01.indd 202 2/21/2020_10:23:44_AM Epistemic Paternalism, and Epistemic Permissivism_203_value_(see DePaul 2001). For one,_rational or justified beliefs, even if_false, intuitively carry some epistemic value. In fact, Feldman_(2000: 686) claims_there is nothing epistemically valuable_about_true,_unjustified beliefs. This is a strong claim. We can settle_for a_weaker one: epistemic_justification confers epistemic value to beliefs, even to false beliefs_(consider: a justified false belief