 the fact that our epistemic norms by 318 Moral Knowledge? and large have an "innocent until proven guilty" bias to them, a conservative leaning that goes to the heart of my contextualism.' If this is right, then since there does not seem to be any special reason for supposing that epistemic requirements attaching to moral belief are different in this respect from those attaching to nonmoral beliefs, the sort of pragmatic rationale described earlier applies to the moral cases as well. Concluding Promissory Note I have tried to make a case for the plausibility of a contextualist epistemology within the realm of moral belief. After sorting and clarifying various contextualist theses, I proceeded to characterize a model epistemic agent that is appropriate for everyday, epistemic evaluation of ordinary people. On the basis of this model, I proceeded to outline a version of contextualism about the structure of responsible moral belief. Let me close by making a partial list of some tasks that lie ahead if one wants to fully defend this view. First, there are notions that play a significant role in my view that I have left largely unclarified. For instance, more must be said about the notion of context and how one's so-called social context is determined for specific epistemic evaluations. Second, I have indicated where some of the key contextualist claims require more defense than I have provided. I suspect, for instance, that more needs to be done by way of supporting the thesis of epistemological conservatism. The same goes for the thesis of epistemic adequacy, according to which nonjustified but responsibly held beliefs can serve as an adequate basis for coming to justifiedly hold other moral beliefs." Third, there are various questions that come to mind about this sort of view, questions that become the basis for objections: "Does not this view just amount to a version of epistemological relativism (normative contextualism) and so implies that even people with crazy moral beliefs, who have undergone a process of "moral" education, will be epistemically responsible in holding outrageous moral beliefs?" "If the view is not, strictly speaking, a version of relativism, will it not still have the same normative implications as a no-holdsbarred version of epistemic relativism?" "Furthermore, even if the view avoids the problems just mentioned, does it not follow that the view is guilty of an unacceptable kind of epistemological dogmatism since the perspective of the model epistemic agent is based on our (largely shared) epistemic
the fact that our epistemic norms by 318 Moral Knowledge? and large have an " innocent until testify guilty " diagonal to them, a conservative leaning that go to the kernel of my contextualism.' If this is right, then since there does not seem to be any particular cause for supposing that epistemic requirement attaching to moral belief are unlike in this respect from those attaching to nonmoral beliefs, the sort of matter-of-fact rationale described earlier applies to the moral cases as well. Concluding Promissory Note I have try on to make a case for the plausibility of a contextualist epistemology within the realm of moral impression. After sorting and clarifying assorted contextualist theses, I continue to characterize a model epistemic agent that is appropriate for everyday, epistemic evaluation of ordinary people. On the footing of this model, I proceeded to outline a version of contextualism about the structure of responsible moral impression. permit me close by making a partial list of some tasks that lie ahead if one wants to fully defend this position. First, there are notion that toy a significant role in my view that I have leave largely unclarified. For instance, more must be said about the notion of context and how one's so - call social context is determined for specific epistemic evaluations. Second, I have indicated where some of the key contextualist claims require more department of defense than I have provided. I suspect, for instance, that more needs to be serve by manner of supporting the thesis of epistemological conservatism. The same goes for the dissertation of epistemic adequacy, according to which nonjustified but responsibly held beliefs can serve as an adequate basis for coming to justifiedly hold early moral beliefs. " Third, there are various questions that come to take care about this sort of position, questions that become the footing for objections: " Does not this view barely amount to a version of epistemic relativism (normative contextualism) and so implies that even people with crazy moral beliefs, who have undergone a process of " moral " education, will be epistemically responsible in holding outrageous moral belief? " " If the view is not, strictly talk, a version of relativism, will it not still have the same normative implications as a no - holdsbarred interpretation of epistemic relativism? " " Furthermore, even if the view avoids the problems just mentioned, does it not follow that the view is guilty of an impossible kind of epistemological dogmatism since the perspective of the model epistemic agent is based on our (largely shared) epistemic
 thf fact that our epistemig norms by 318 Moral Knowlxdge? ans large fave an "innocent until provei guulty" vias to them, a conservxtive leajing thar gots to the heart oh my conbzxtuamlsm.' Iy vhis is right, tmen since tvere does not vedm to be any special reason for suppofing thst epistemic reqoiremtntf atfaching to moral belief are differsnt in uhis respect from yhose attaching to nonmorap bepiefs, the sort of oragmatic rqtiogqle describea earlier applies to tge moral cases as well. Concludivg Prpmissory Nitw I vave tried vo makv a case for bne plagsibiliyy of a contexbualivt wpistemology within tie realm of moral bejief. Aftes aorting and claridyung vdriogs cubtebtuzlmst thesed, I proceeded to charactwrize a model episttmis agent that ia apprjpwiate for everyday, epistemic evaluation of ordinary people. On the basis of this model, L proceedqd to outline a version of contextualism about tha strncgurt if rerpojsible moral belief. Let me close by making a [zruiak list of some tasks that lle whead if one dants ck rully defend this giew. Fitst, thwre are njtioms that play a significant eole in my vpew rhat I have left lcrgely unclaxified. For onstance, more must be scid abkut the notlon of cohgext and how one'r sp-cdlled social context is deeermined hor s'ecific dpisjemic edaluations. Secokg, I have indicated wherg some of the kej contextualist claims require more defense tnat I have prjvidec. I suspect, fjr instance, thct more ueeds go be done by way of supportyng the thesiv of epistemonogical sonswrvarism. Thd same goes for the thesps of wpistemic adequacy, aczkrding to which nobjustified but tesoonfihlb helq beliefs can serxe xx an xdequatt bcsks fpr coming to justifiadly hold other moral nejiefs." Thurd, therq are various questions that cole to miid aboit jhis sort of view, questions thaf become hhe basis for ofjecbionf: "Does not this view just amount to a version of xpistemological relativusm (normative contertmalism) and sp impjies that even people with crqzy moral beliefs, who have undergone a procevs of "moral" education, will be epistemically responsible in holding outrageous noral uejiefs?" "If ths virw is njc, stricely d'eaking, a version of relativism, will it not stilu have tve same normative implications ar a no-holdsbatred version of epistemic delativixm?" "Furthermore, even if the view avoids the problems jusb mentionwd, doss it not hollow that the view is gunlty od an unqcceitable kind of eposbemologicap dojmacism since the perspective of the model eoistemic agent iv based on lmr (larfely srared) epistemic
the fact that our epistemic norms by Knowledge? large have "innocent until proven conservative that goes to heart of my If this is right, then since does not seem to be any special reason for supposing that epistemic requirements to moral belief are different in this respect from those attaching to nonmoral the of rationale earlier applies to the moral cases as well. Concluding Promissory Note I have tried to make case for the plausibility of a contextualist epistemology the realm of moral After sorting and clarifying various theses, proceeded to a epistemic that is appropriate everyday, epistemic evaluation of ordinary people. On the basis of this model, I proceeded to outline a of contextualism structure of moral Let close by making list of some tasks that lie wants to fully defend this view. First, there notions that a significant role in my view I have left largely unclarified. For instance, more be said about the notion of context and how one's so-called social context is determined epistemic evaluations. Second, I indicated where some the contextualist require defense than have provided. I suspect, for instance, that more needs to be by way of supporting the thesis of epistemological conservatism. The for thesis of epistemic according to which nonjustified responsibly beliefs can serve as basis coming other beliefs." there are various questions come to mind about this of view, questions that "Does not this view just amount to a of epistemological relativism (normative contextualism) and so that even people with crazy moral beliefs, who have undergone a process "moral" education, epistemically responsible in holding outrageous moral beliefs?" "If view is not, strictly a version of relativism, will it not still have same implications as no-holdsbarred version of relativism?" "Furthermore, even the view avoids just mentioned, it follow is guilty of an unacceptable kind epistemological since the perspective of the epistemic based on our (largely shared) epistemic
 the fact that our epistemic noRms by 318 Moral knowlEdgE? anD lArge Have An "innocent untiL ProvEn guilty" bias to them, a conServaTiVE leaNInG that Goes to tHE hEARt oF mY cOntExTUaLism.' IF thIs is rigHt, then sincE thErE does not seem TO bE any speciaL reAson for suppoSinG that ePiSteMIc reqUirEmentS attacHIng to mOral belieF aRE diffeREnt in thIS ReSpecT from those attachiNG tO Nonmoral beliefS, the soRt OF pRAGmaTic Rationale dEsCribeD Earlier APpLIES to THe moral cases aS well. ConcluDIng promisSoRy NOTe I havE trieD tO MakE a case for thE plaUsibility Of a conTExtualiST episteMology WitHin The rEAlM oF moRaL BelIEf. aftER soRting and ClArIfyinG varIOUS ContExtUaliSt theSes, I proceeded To cHaraCTerIze a mOdel ePistEmIc ageNt that Is appRoPriate for everydAy, epIstemic evAluAtIon Of OrdinARy peopLe. ON thE basis oF this moDEl, I PrOCEEdEd to outline a versioN oF COnTextualiSm abouT ThE sTRucture oF rEspOnsiBLE moraL belIEf. let me cloSe by maKInG a Partial LiSt of soMe TasKs tHat liE AheaD if one Wants to fUlly dEFend this view. FiRSt, there are notIOnS THaT Play A siGnificant roLe in MY vieW thaT i hAve LEft laRgely UnCLaRIfied. For instance, morE mUst be sAid abOut the notion oF context anD HOW one's so-cAlleD SoCIal context is deTermiNed for specIFic epistEmic eValuatioNs. Second, I HAVe indicaTed WheRe sOme OF ThE key contextuaLISt clAiMs requiRe mOre defeNse ThaN I hAve PrOvided. I suSpect, for InStAnCe, ThaT more NEeds to be DoNe bY wAy oF suppORting tHe theSis oF ePiSTemOlogicaL CoNSErvaTiSm. the sAme GoEs for The tHEsiS of episTemic adeqUacY, AccoRdInG to whicH nonjustified BuT responsibLy HelD belieFS Can serve As an adequate basis for comINg to jusTifIedly Hold Other moraL beLiefs." THirD, There aRe variOus quEsTioNS That cOME tO miNd About this sORT of View, qUeStioNs that bEcome the basis for obJEctIons: "Does not thIs vIew jUST aMouNT tO A veRsIOn oF EPistemological rElativism (nOrMAtIve contextUAliSm) And so imPlies thAt eveN People wIth crazy mOral belieFs, Who hAVE unDergone a prOcess of "mOral" educaTIon, wiLL bE episTemIcally ReSpoNsiblE in holDIng OutraGeous mOrAl beliEfs?" "If ThE view is nOt, strictly speaking, a versIon of rElatiVisM, will it noT stILl hAve the samE norMative implIcaTioNs as a No-hOLdsbaRred VErSioN Of epiStemIC relativiSM?" "FUrtHERmOre, even if thE VIEw aVoids The PRoblemS jusT mentioned, does it nOT follow that the View IS GuiLty OF an uNaCceptable kind oF epIsTEMologicaL dOgmatism sinCe the perSpECtive Of the mOdel epIstemic AGEnT Is baseD on oUr (lArgely shaRed) EpIStemic
 the fact that our epistem ic norms b y 318  Mo ral  K nowl edge ? and large ha v e an  "innocent until prove n gui lt y " bi a sto th em, a c o ns e r vat iv elea ni n gthatgoe s to th e heart of  my  c ontextualism . 'If this is  ri ght, then si nce  there  d oes not s eem  to b e anys pecial  reason f or suppos i ng that e pi stem ic requirements a t ta c hing to moralbelief  a r ed i ffe ren t in thisre spect from th o se a t tac h ing to nonmor al beliefs, the  sortof  pr a gmatic  rati on a ledescribed e arli er applie s to t h e moral cases a s well . C onc ludi n gPr omi ss o ryN ot e I hav e triedto  m ake a  cas e f o r th e p laus ibili ty of a conte xtu alis t  ep istem ology  wit hi n the  realm  of m or al belief. Afte r so rting and  cl ar ify in g var i ous co nte xtu alist t heses,I  pr oc e e d ed  to characterize a  m o d el  epistem ic age n tth a t is app ro pri atef o r eve ryda y ,epistemi c eval u at io n of or di nary p eo ple . O n the basi s of t his mode l, Ip roceeded to ou t line a versio n  o f co n text ual ism about t he s t ruct ureo fres p onsib le mo ra l  b e lief. Let me closeby  makin g a p artial list o f some tas k s that lie  ahe a di f one wants to  full y defend t h is view.  Firs t, there  are noti o n s that p lay  asig nif i c an t role in myv i ew t ha t I hav e l eft lar gel y u ncl ari fi ed. For i nstance,  m or emu stbe sa i d aboutth e n ot ion  of c o ntextand h ow o ne 's so- calleds oc i a l co nt ex t is  de te rmine d fo r  sp ecificepistemic  ev a luat io ns . Secon d, I have ind ic ated where  s ome  of th e key cont extualist claims requir e  more d efe nse t hanI have pr ovi ded. I  su s pect,for in stanc e,  th a t  more n ee dsto  be done b y way  of s up port ing the  thesis of epistem o log ical conserva tis m. T h e  s ame go e s f or the t hesis of episte mic adequa cy ,  a ccording t o  wh ic h nonju stified  butr esponsi bly heldbeliefs c an  ser v e  as  an adequa te basis  for comi n g toj us tifie dly  holdot her  mora l beli e fs. " Thi rd, th er e arevario us  questio ns that come to mind ab out th is so rtof view,que s tio ns that b ecom e the basi s f orobjec tio n s: "D oesn ot  th i s vie w ju s t amountt oa v e r si on of epist e m o log icalrel a tivism  (no rmative contextua l ism) and so im plie s tha t e v en p eo ple with crazy  mo ra l beliefs,  w ho have und ergone a  p r ocess  of "m oral"educati o n ,w ill be  epi ste mically r esp on s ible in  h ol d ing ou trag eo us mor al bel i efs? " "If the view isnot,s t rictl y  sp eakin g,  a vers i on o f relativi sm, will it  not s till  have  the sa me  norma tiv eimplicatio n s as a no -hold sbarred  v ersi onof epi stem i c  rela tivi sm ?""Furtherm o r e, ev en iftheviewav oids  the prob l ems just  me n tioned,  d oes i t notf ol l o w that the  vi ew is g uilty of a n  una c ce p table  kindof epi stemolo g ica ldogmati sms i nce the p erspectiv e  of  t he m odel epi st emic  a gen tis based on our  (largel y shared ) episte mic 
 the_fact that_our epistemic norms by_318 Moral_Knowledge?_and large_have_an "innocent until_proven guilty" bias_to them, a conservative_leaning that goes_to_the heart of my contextualism.' If this is right, then since there does not_seem_to be_any_special_reason for supposing that epistemic_requirements attaching to moral belief_are different_in this respect from those attaching to nonmoral_beliefs,_the sort of_pragmatic rationale described earlier applies to the moral cases_as well. Concluding Promissory Note I_have tried to_make_a_case for the plausibility_of a contextualist epistemology within the_realm of moral belief. After sorting_and clarifying various contextualist theses, I proceeded_to characterize a model epistemic agent_that is appropriate for everyday,_epistemic evaluation_of ordinary people. On the_basis of this_model, I_proceeded to outline_a version of contextualism about the_structure of responsible_moral belief. Let me close by_making_a partial list_of_some_tasks that_lie ahead if_one_wants to_fully_defend this view. First, there are_notions_that play a significant role in my_view that I have_left_largely unclarified. For instance,_more must be said about_the notion of context and how_one's so-called_social context_is determined for specific epistemic evaluations. Second, I have indicated where_some of the key contextualist claims_require more defense than_I have_provided._I suspect, for_instance,_that more_needs to be done by way of_supporting the_thesis of epistemological conservatism. The same_goes for the thesis_of_epistemic adequacy, according to which nonjustified_but responsibly held beliefs can serve_as an adequate basis for_coming_to_justifiedly hold other moral beliefs."_Third, there are various questions that_come to mind_about this sort of view, questions that_become_the basis for objections: "Does not_this_view just amount to a version_of_epistemological_relativism (normative contextualism) and so_implies that even people with crazy_moral beliefs, who have undergone a process of "moral"_education, will be_epistemically responsible in holding outrageous_moral_beliefs?"_"If the view is not, strictly speaking, a version of_relativism, will_it not still_have the same normative implications as a no-holdsbarred version of_epistemic relativism?" "Furthermore, even if the view_avoids the problems just mentioned, does it not follow that the_view is guilty of an unacceptable kind of_epistemological dogmatism since the perspective of the_model epistemic agent is_based_on our (largely shared) epistemic