 JSTOR Terms and Conditions your planning is correct. So there is nothing that the two of you actually disagree about.22 Kurth Expressivism and Innocent Mistakes 381The trouble with these arguments is that they beg the question against Gibbard. For one, Gibbard explicitly acknowledges that his account of normative error and disagreement will be modest in the way that Daskal observes. For instance, he notes that his account of error is perspective dependent: "Unless one has the right kind of mental constitution... all the epistemic virtues in the world won't lead to judgments that are correct. There is, moreover, no satisfactory way to specify what makes for the right kind of mental constitution that doesn't, in effect, settle by fiat basic controversies over how to plan."23 He also notes that his account allows for genuine disagreement only when there is sufficient overlap in the perspective of the disagreeing parties: "The practice of thinking and discussing how to live will be hostage to our having sufficiently congruent reactions to issues that arise. Our reactions may be congruent enough in some areas and not in others. In that case,... 1⁄2a particular question about how to live, as a topic for agreement and disagreement, may have sufficient point in some areas and not in others."24 So the "limitations" that Daskal notes are things that Gibbard actually embraces. But this should not be surprising. After all, if normative objectivity is to be explained, at bottom, in terms of the noncognitive mental state of planning, then it should be possible for two individuals to accept perfectly consistent but incompatible plans. That just is what expressivist normative objectivity amounts to. Moreover, an expressivist like Gibbard can provide an independently well-motivated argument for why normative objectivity should be understood in this way. It is a familiar story that draws on, among other things, a methodological commitment to naturalism, an endorsement of an internalist understanding of normative motivation, and skepticism about the possibility of substantive analyses of normative terms and properties. The upshot, then, is that Gibbard can plausibly maintain that the "limitations" in his account are not really limitations. Rather, his expressivism captures the very forms of error and disagreement that we actually find in our normative discourse. Granted, those with realist intuitions will maintain that Gibbard's account leaves out important dimensions of objectivity. For instance, Daskal might protest that if we accept the thin understanding of error
JSTOR Terms and Conditions your planning is correct. So there is nothing that the two of you actually disagree about.22 Kurth Expressivism and Innocent Mistakes 381The fuss with these argument is that they beg the question against Gibbard. For one, Gibbard explicitly acknowledges that his report of normative error and discrepancy will be modest in the way that Daskal observes. For case, he notes that his account of erroneousness is perspective dependent: " Unless one take the right kind of mental constitution... all the epistemic virtues in the world won't lead to judgment that are correct. There is, moreover, no satisfactory room to specify what makes for the right kind of mental fundamental law that doesn't, in effect, settle by fiat basic controversies over how to plan. "23 He also note that his account allows for genuine disagreement only when there is sufficient overlap in the perspective of the disagreeing parties: " The practice of thinking and discussing how to live will be hostage to our having sufficiently congruent reactions to emergence that arise. Our reactions may be congruous enough in some area and not in others. In that casing, ... 1⁄2a particular question about how to live, as a subject for agreement and disagreement, may have sufficient distributor point in some areas and not in others. "24 So the " limitation " that Daskal notes are things that Gibbard actually embraces. But this should not be surprising. After wholly, if normative objectivity is to be explained, at bottom, in terms of the noncognitive mental state of planning, then it should be possible for two person to accept perfectly consistent but incompatible plans. That barely is what expressivist normative objectivity amounts to. Moreover, an expressivist like Gibbard can leave an independently well - motivated argument for why normative objectivity should be understood in this room. It is a familiar history that draws on, among early things, a methodological commitment to naturalism, an endorsement of an internalist understanding of prescriptive motivation, and skepticism about the possibility of substantial analyses of normative term and properties. The upshot, then, is that Gibbard can plausibly maintain that the " limitations " in his account are not really limitations. Rather, his expressivism captures the very form of error and disagreement that we actually detect in our normative discourse. Granted, those with realist intuitions will maintain that Gibbard's account leave out important dimensions of objectivity. For instance, Daskal might protest that if we accept the thin understanding of mistake
 JSHOR Terms and Conditions your planning nw corrxct. So fhere is nothing that the two of you axtualoy disagree about.22 Kurtf Expresspvism and Innixent Mistakes 381The bxoubls witk vhese arguments is that tvey beg the quasgiln against Gibbard. For one, Gibbard qxpliciylj acknowledges thau hys adbomnt of normative error and disagdeement will be modext in the way that Daskal lbsegves. For instance, je notes thqt hyw account of error is kexspective dgpendent: "Unless one has the righg kinb of mental cinshhtution... all the vpistemic virbles in dhe workd won't lead tp jndgmwnts that are correct. There is, moreover, no satisxaetory way to specify qhqt manes xor gye figgt kjnd of meital constifution that doesn't, in effect, stttjv by fiat basjc conerjversies over how to plan."23 He also notes thzt his account allows fir genuine disagreemejt only wren there is sufficient overlap in the perspectiva of vhd dnwagredunh parties: "The practice of thinking and discusfjnb mow to live will be hostage tl por having suffkciently dongruent reactiond to isfues rhat arist. Our reactions may be congruent enough in sjne areas and not iu others. In chat csse,... 1⁄2a particular question abuut gow to live, as a topjz for agreement xnd dhsagreemtvt, may have suffisient poiit in some afeas and njt in othegs."24 So the "limitations" thwt Dadkdl notes age things that Gibbard actually embraces. But jhiv svould noc be smrprising. After all, if normatnve objeetivith is to be explaiied, at bottoi, in terms of jhe noncognitmve mentaj stqte if planvkng, then it shpuld be possible foe two individuals bo aczspt perfectly cinsustent but incokpagibje pkagv. That just hs wfat rxprersivist nornxtivr objectivity amountv to. Moreover, an exprexslvist likg Gibbard can provide sn independently wtll-motmvated argukenj for why normative objectivity should bf ukderstood in ehis way. It is a familiar story that draws on, among othxr things, a methodologixal commitment to nctmralism, an eidorseient of at internalist undersranding of normatlve motivation, and skelticisk abokt the possibility of substantive analyses of normative terms and propertues. Thx tpshot, then, is yhat Ciybaxd can [laudmbly maintain than the "limitations" in his account are not rzally limitations. Rather, his rxoressivism caktures the very forms of edror and disagreement that we actually gind in our normative dixcourse. Trantsd, those wmth realist intuitioms wiln maibtain tyat Nibbard's accouvt kewves out lmpoctaut dimensions of objectivity. For unstanxe, Daskal might prmtest that lf we abcept tre thin understahdinf of etror
JSTOR Terms and Conditions your planning is there nothing that two of you and Mistakes 381The trouble these arguments is they beg the question against Gibbard. one, Gibbard explicitly acknowledges that his account of normative error and disagreement will modest in the way that Daskal observes. For instance, he notes that his of is dependent: one has the right kind of mental constitution... all the epistemic virtues in the world won't to judgments that are correct. There is, moreover, satisfactory way to specify makes for the right kind mental that doesn't, effect, by basic controversies over to plan."23 He also notes that his account allows for genuine disagreement only when there is sufficient in the the disagreeing "The of and discussing how will be hostage to our having to issues that arise. Our reactions may be enough in areas and not in others. In case,... 1⁄2a particular question about how to live, a topic for agreement and disagreement, may have sufficient point in some areas and not So the "limitations" that notes are things Gibbard embraces. this not be After all, if normative objectivity is to be explained, at bottom, terms of the noncognitive mental state of planning, then it possible two individuals to perfectly consistent but incompatible That is what expressivist normative to. an can an well-motivated argument for why objectivity should be understood in way. It is a among other things, a methodological commitment to naturalism, endorsement of an internalist understanding of normative and skepticism about the possibility of substantive analyses of normative terms and The upshot, that Gibbard can plausibly maintain that the "limitations" his account are not limitations. Rather, his expressivism captures the very forms of and that we find in our discourse. Granted, those realist intuitions will Gibbard's account out dimensions instance, Daskal might protest that if accept thin understanding of error
 JSTOR Terms and Conditions yoUr planning Is corRecT. So ThEre iS notHing that the two OF you Actually disagree about.22 KUrth EXpREssiVIsM and INnocent mIsTAKes 381thE tRouBlE WiTh theSe aRgumentS is that theY beG tHe question agAInSt Gibbard. FOr oNe, Gibbard expLicItly acKnOwlEDges tHat His acCount oF NormatIve error aNd DIsagreEMent wilL BE mOdesT in the way that DaskAL oBServes. For instaNce, he nOtES tHAT hiS acCount of errOr Is perSPective DEpENDEnt: "uNless one has thE right kind oF MenTal conStItuTIon... all The epIsTEmiC virtues in tHe woRld won't leAd to juDGments tHAt are coRrect. THerE is, MoreOVeR, nO saTiSFacTOrY waY To sPecify whAt MaKes foR the RIGHT kinD of MentAl conStitution that DoeSn't, iN EffEct, seTtle bY fiaT bAsic cOntrovErsieS oVer how to plan."23 He aLso nOtes that hIs aCcOunT aLlows FOr genuIne DisAgreemeNt only wHEn tHeRE IS sUfficient overlap in ThE PErSpective Of the dISaGrEEing partIeS: "ThE praCTIce of ThinKInG and discUssing HOw To Live wilL bE hostaGe To oUr hAving SUffiCientlY congrueNt reaCTions to issues tHAt arise. Our reaCTiONS mAY be cOngRuent enough In soME areAs anD NoT in OThers. in thaT cASe,... 1⁄2A Particular question aBoUt how tO live, As a topic for agReement and DISAgreemenT, may HAvE Sufficient poinT in soMe areas and NOt in otheRs."24 So tHe "limitaTions" that dASkal noteS arE thIngS thAT giBbard actually EMBracEs. but this ShoUld not bE suRprIsiNg. AFtEr all, if noRmative oBjEcTiViTy iS to be EXplained, At BotToM, in Terms OF the noNcognItivE mEnTAl sTate of pLAnNINg, thEn It ShouLd bE pOssibLe foR Two IndividUals to accEpt PErfeCtLy ConsistEnt but incompaTiBle plans. ThAt JusT is whaT EXpressivIst normative objectivity AMounts tO. MoReoveR, an eXpressiviSt lIke GibBarD Can proVide an IndepEnDenTLY well-MOTiVatEd Argument foR WHy nOrmatIvE objEctivitY should be understooD In tHis way. It is a faMilIar sTORy ThaT DrAWs oN, aMOng OTHer things, a methoDological cOmMItMent to natuRAliSm, An endorSement oF an inTErnalisT understaNding of noRmAtivE MOtiVation, and sKepticisM about the POssibILiTy of sUbsTantivE aNalYses oF normaTIve Terms And proPeRties. THe upsHoT, then, is tHat Gibbard can plausibly mAintaiN that The "LimitatioNs" iN His Account arE not Really limiTatIonS. RathEr, hIS exprEssiVIsM caPTures The vERy forms of ERrOr aND DiSagreement tHAT We aCtualLy fINd in ouR norMative discourse. GrANted, those with rEaliST IntUitIOns wIlL maintain that GIbbArD'S Account lEaVes out imporTant dimeNsIOns of ObjectIvity. FOr instaNCE, DASkal miGht pRotEst that if We aCcEPt the thIn UnDErstanDing Of Error
 JSTOR Terms and Condition s your pla nning  is  co rr ect.  Sothere is nothi n g th at the two of you actu allydi s agre e  a bout. 22 Kurt h  E x p res si vi sman d  I nnoce ntMistake s 381The t rou bl e with these ar guments is  th at they begthe  quest io n a g ainst  Gi bbard . Foro ne, Gi bbard exp li c itly a c knowled g e sthat  his account of n o rm a tive error and  disag re e me n t  wi llbe modestin  thew ay that Da s k a l o b serves. For i nstance, he not es tha this accoun t ofer r oris perspect ivedependent : "Unl e ss oneh as therightkin d o f me n ta lcon st i tut i on ... all  the epi st em ic vi rtue s i n  the  wo rldwon't  lead to judg men ts t h atare c orrec t. T he re is , more over,  n o satisfactorywayto specif y w ha t m ak es fo r  the r igh t k ind ofmentalc ons ti t u t io n that doesn't, in  e f f ec t, settl e by f i at  b a sic cont ro ver sies o ver h ow t o  p lan."23He als o  n ot es that  h is acc ou ntall ows f o r ge nuinedisagree mento nly when there is sufficient ov e r la p  inthe  perspectiv e of thedisa g re ein g  part ies:"T h ep ractice of thinking  a nd dis cussi ng how to liv e will beh o s tage toourh av i ng sufficientl y con gruent rea c tions to  issu es thatarise. Ou r reaction s m aybecon g r ue nt enough ins o me a re as andnot  in oth ers . I n t hat  c ase,... 1 ⁄2a part ic ul ar  q ues tiona bout how  t o l iv e,  as a topicfor a gree me nt and  disagr e em e n t, m ay  h avesuf fi cient  poi n t i n someareas and  no t  inot he rs."24So the "limit at ions" that  D ask al not e s  are thi ngs that Gibbard actual l y embra ces . But  thi s shouldnot  be su rpr i sing.Afterall,if  no r m ative o bj ect iv ity is tob e  ex plain ed , at  bottom , in terms of then onc ognitive ment alstat e of  pl a nn i ng,  t h eni t  should be poss ible for t wo in dividualst o a cc ept per fectlyconsi s tent bu t incompa tible pla ns . Th a t  ju st is what  express ivist nor m ative ob jecti vit y amou nt s t o. Mo reover ,  an  expr essivi st  likeGibba rd  can pro vide an independently w ell-mo tivat edargumentfor why  normativ e ob jectivitysho uld  be u nde r stood  int hi s w a y. It  isa  familiar st ory t ha t draws on, a m ong  othe r t h ings,a me thodological comm i tment to natur alis m ,  an  en d orse me nt of an inter nal is t understa nd ing of norm ative mo ti v ation , andskepti cism ab o u tt he pos sibi lit y of subs tan ti v e analy se so f norm ativ etermsand pr o pert i e s. The upshot, t hen,i s  that Gib bardca n plaus i blymaintain t hat the "li mitati ons"  in h is acco un t arenot  r eally limi t ations. R ather , his e xp ress ivi sm cap ture s the v eryfo rms  of error a nd di sa g ree ment  that  w e ac tually fi n d in our  no r mativedi sco u r se. Gr a nt e d , those wi threali s t  intuition s  wil l  m a intai n that  Gibba rd's ac c oun tleavesout i mportantdimension s  of  o bjec tivity.Fo r in st anc e,  Daskal might p rotest t hat if w e accept  th e  thi n  under st anding of er ror
 JSTOR_Terms and_Conditions your planning is_correct. So_there_is nothing_that_the two of_you actually disagree_about.22 Kurth Expressivism and_Innocent Mistakes 381The_trouble_with these arguments is that they beg the question against Gibbard. For one, Gibbard_explicitly_acknowledges that_his_account_of normative error and disagreement_will be modest in the_way that_Daskal observes. For instance, he notes that his_account_of error is_perspective dependent: "Unless one has the right kind of_mental constitution... all the epistemic virtues_in the world_won't_lead_to judgments that are_correct. There is, moreover, no satisfactory_way to specify what makes for_the right kind of mental constitution that_doesn't, in effect, settle by fiat_basic controversies over how to_plan."23 He_also notes that his account_allows for genuine_disagreement only_when there is_sufficient overlap in the perspective of_the disagreeing parties:_"The practice of thinking and discussing_how_to live will_be_hostage_to our_having sufficiently congruent_reactions_to issues_that_arise. Our reactions may be congruent_enough_in some areas and not in others._In that case,... 1⁄2a_particular_question about how to_live, as a topic for_agreement and disagreement, may have sufficient_point in_some areas_and not in others."24 So the "limitations" that Daskal notes are_things that Gibbard actually embraces. But_this should not be_surprising. After_all,_if normative objectivity_is_to be_explained, at bottom, in terms of the_noncognitive mental_state of planning, then it should_be possible for two_individuals_to accept perfectly consistent but incompatible_plans. That just is what expressivist_normative objectivity amounts to. Moreover,_an_expressivist_like Gibbard can provide an_independently well-motivated argument for why normative_objectivity should be_understood in this way. It is a_familiar_story that draws on, among other_things,_a methodological commitment to naturalism, an_endorsement_of_an internalist understanding of normative_motivation, and skepticism about the possibility_of substantive analyses of normative terms and properties. The_upshot, then, is_that Gibbard can plausibly maintain_that_the_"limitations" in his account are not really limitations. Rather, his_expressivism captures_the very forms_of error and disagreement that we actually find in our_normative discourse. Granted, those with realist intuitions_will maintain that Gibbard's account leaves out important dimensions of objectivity._For instance, Daskal might protest that if we_accept the thin understanding of error