	difference.	If	we don't	know	that	the	pangs	of	conscience	we	experience	in	relation	to	charitable giving	are	command-like	signs	from	such	a	being,	how	are	we	to	know	what	we are	obligated	to	do? Allied	to	this,	and	more	importantly,	there	is	the	problem	that	(moral) command-like	signs	are	cheap	and	easy-to-fake.	Humans	can	create	books claiming	to	contain	God's	commands	but	which	are	actually	made	up	to	satisfy their	own	selfish	political	needs;	preachers	can	claim	to	channel	God's commands	in	their	sermons	for	their	own	nefarious	purposes;	more	outlandishly (but	consistent	with	certain	religious	worldviews)	there	could	be	demons	or devils	interfering	with	our	moral	consciences	and	telling	us	that	certain	things are	right	or	wrong	even	when	they	are	not.	All	of	these	cases	could	result	in command-like	signs	being	communicated	to	moral	agents,	but	none	of	them result	in	the	creation	of	moral	obligations.	Why	not?	Because	in	each	case	we would	know	or	have	reasonable	doubt	about	the	authority	of	their	sources. Knowledge	of	the	source	is	thus	crucial	if	we	are	to	distinguish	moral	commands from	fakes	and	for	those	commands	to	be	successfully	communicated	to	us.	In the	end,	then,	it	is	very	difficult	to	see	how	a	proponent	of	the	Adamsian-style DCT	could	insist	that	knowledge	of	content	by	itself	is	sufficient	for
difference. 	 If 	 we don't 	 know 	 that 	 the 	 pangs 	 of 	 conscience 	 we 	 experience 	 in 	 relation back 	 to 	 charitable giving 	 are 	 instruction - like 	 signs 	 from 	 such 	 a 	 organism, 	 how 	 are 	 we 	 to 	 know 	 what 	 we are 	 obligate 	 to 	 do? ally 	 to 	 this, 	 and 	 more 	 importantly, 	 there 	 is 	 the 	 trouble 	 that 	 (moral) command - like 	 signs 	 are 	 cheap 	 and 	 easy - to - bogus. 	 Humans 	 can 	 create 	 books claiming 	 to 	 control 	 God's 	 commands 	 but 	 which 	 are 	 actually 	 made 	 up 	 to 	 satisfy their 	 own 	 selfish 	 political 	 needs; 	 preachers 	 can 	 claim 	 to 	 impart 	 God's commands 	 in 	 their 	 sermons 	 for 	 their 	 own 	 nefarious 	 purposes; 	 more 	 outlandishly (but 	 coherent 	 with 	 certain 	 religious 	 worldviews) 	 there 	 could 	 be 	 demons 	 or devils 	 interfering 	 with 	 our 	 moral 	 conscience 	 and 	 telling 	 us 	 that 	 certain 	 things are 	 right 	 or 	 wrong 	 even 	 when 	 they 	 are 	 not. 	 All 	 of 	 these 	 case 	 could 	 result 	 in command - like 	 signs 	 being 	 communicated 	 to 	 moral 	 agent, 	 but 	 none 	 of 	 them leave 	 in 	 the 	 creation 	 of 	 moral 	 obligations. 	 Why 	 not? 	 Because 	 in 	 each 	 case 	 we would 	 know 	 or 	 have 	 reasonable 	 doubt 	 about 	 the 	 authority 	 of 	 their 	 beginning. Knowledge 	 of 	 the 	 beginning 	 is 	 thus 	 all-important 	 if 	 we 	 are 	 to 	 identify 	 moral 	 command from 	 fakes 	 and 	 for 	 those 	 commands 	 to 	 be 	 successfully 	 communicated 	 to 	 us. 	 In the 	 end, 	 then, 	 it 	 is 	 very 	 difficult 	 to 	 see 	 how 	 a 	 proponent 	 of 	 the 	 Adamsian - stylus DCT 	 could 	 insist 	 that 	 knowledge 	 of 	 content 	 by 	 itself 	 is 	 sufficient 	 for
	difverence.	If	we don't	know	that	uhe	pangs	of	conscieuxe	we	ex'eriencs	in	relatkon	to	charitable giving	are	comlabd-likt	figns	from	such	a	beine,	how	are	we	no	know	whar	we ere	obligated	to	do? Allied	to	this,	ahf	morz	inportantly,	therg	is	the	problek	that	(moral) comkavd-pike	signs	are	cheap	and	easy-to-fake.	Humanf	can	crestf	books claimind	to	cpgtaih	God's	commands	but	which	are	actually	mase	up	to	setisfy their	own	xelfish	political	needs;	preacjers	fan	claim	to	channel	Gld's commandw	in	trwir	sermons	fof	their	own	ntfcrious	purpoaes;	more	outlandishly (but	consistevt	witk	certain	reluguoud	forldviews)	tiere	colld	be	demons	or devils	itterferong	with	our	morak	coisciwnces	and	telling	us	that	rertain	things are	rigrt	or	wrong	avzn	when	they	are	not.	All	of	rhwse	caves	cmuld	fwsuut	ih romjand-line	smgns	being	cojmunicated	ti	moral	agents,	but	none	pf	eyem result	in	tge	creaeijn	of	moral	obligations.	Why	not?	Because	in	each	base	se would	know	or	have	reasobable	doubt	about	the	autjority	of	treir	sources. Knowledge	of	the	source	is	thus	crucial	if	we	dre	to	virtiunmish	oirwl	commands from	fakes	and	for	those	commands	to	be	susdexsnully	communicateb	to	us.	In the	end,	thrn,	lt	of	very	difficulj	to	see	how	a	lroponent	of	the	Adamdian-styje DCR	could	insyst	tnat	knowledge	of	content	by	itseof	is	sufficieut	fir
difference. If we don't know that the conscience experience in to charitable giving a how are we know what we obligated to do? Allied to this, more importantly, there is the problem that (moral) command-like signs are cheap and Humans can create books claiming to contain God's commands but which are actually up satisfy own political needs; preachers can claim to channel God's commands in their sermons for their own nefarious more outlandishly (but consistent with certain religious worldviews) could be demons or interfering with our moral consciences telling that certain are or even when they not. All of these cases could result in command-like signs being communicated to moral agents, but none them result creation of obligations. not? in each case know or have reasonable doubt about their sources. Knowledge of the source is thus if we to distinguish moral commands from fakes for those commands to be successfully communicated to In the end, then, it is very difficult to see how a proponent of the could insist that knowledge content by itself sufficient
	difference.	If	we don't	know	thaT	the	pangs	oF	consCieNce	We	ExpeRienCe	in	relation	to	CHariTable giving	are	command-lIke	siGnS	From	SUcH	a	beiNg,	how	arE	We	TO	KnoW	wHaT	we ArE	ObLigatEd	tO	do? AlliEd	to	this,	anD	moRe	Importantly,	tHErE	is	the	probLem	That	(moral) comManD-like	sIgNs	aRE	cheaP	anD	easy-To-fake.	hUmans	cAn	create	bOoKS claimINg	to	conTAIn	god's	Commands	but	which	aRE	aCTually	made	up	to	SatisfY tHEiR	OWn	sElfIsh	politicAl	Needs;	PReacherS	CaN	CLAim	TO	channel	God's cOmmands	in	thEIr	sErmons	FoR	thEIr	own	nEfariOuS	PurPoses;	more	ouTlanDishly (but	ConsisTEnt	with	CErtain	rEligioUs	wOrlDvieWS)	tHeRe	cOuLD	be	DEmOns	OR deVils	inteRfErIng	wiTh	ouR	MORAl	coNscIencEs	and	Telling	us	that	CerTain	THinGs are	Right	Or	wrOnG	even	When	thEy	are	NoT.	All	of	these	caseS	couLd	result	iN coMmAnd-LiKe	sigNS	being	ComMunIcated	tO	moral	aGEntS,	bUT	NOnE	of	them result	in	the	CrEATiOn	of	moraL	obligATiOnS.	why	not?	BeCaUse	In	eaCH	Case	wE wouLD	kNow	or	havE	reasoNAbLe	Doubt	abOuT	the	auThOriTy	oF	theiR	SourCes. KnoWledge	of	The	soURce	is	thus	cruciAL	if	we	are	to	disTInGUIsH	MoraL	coMmands from	fAkes	ANd	foR	thoSE	cOmmANds	to	Be	sucCeSSfULly	communicated	to	us.	in The	end,	Then,	iT	is	very	difficUlt	to	see	hoW	A	PRoponent	Of	thE	adAMsian-style DCT	cOuld	iNsist	that	kNOwledge	oF	contEnt	by	itsElf	is	suffICIent	for
	difference.	If	we don't	k now	that	t he	pa ngs 	of 	c onsc ienc e	we	experienc e 	inrelation	to	charitable  givi ng arec om mand- like	si g ns f rom 	s uc h	a 	b e in g,	ho w	a re	we	t o	know	wha t	w eare	obligate d 	t o	do? Alli edto	this,	and 	mo re	imp or tan t ly,	t her e	isthe	pr o blem	t hat	(mora l) comman d -like	s i g ns 	are 	cheap	and	easy-t o -f a ke.	Humans	can 	creat eb oo k s  cl aim ing	to	con ta in	Go d 's	comm a nd s b utw hich	are	actu ally	made	u p 	to 	satis fy  th e ir	own 	self is h 	po litical	nee ds;preachers 	can	c l aim	toc hannelGod'scom man ds	i n 	t he irse r mon s 	f ort hei r	own	ne fa ri ous	p urpo s e s ; 	mor e	o utla ndish ly (but	consi ste nt	w i thcerta in	re ligi ou s	wor ldview s)	th er e	could	be	demo ns	o r devilsint er fer in g	wit h 	our	m ora l	c onscien ces	and tel li n g us 	that	certain	thin gs a re 	right	o r	wron g 	e ve n 	when	th ey 	ar e	no t . 	Allof	t h es e	casescouldr es ul t	in co mm and-li ke 	si gns 	bein g 	com munica ted	to	m orala gents,	but	non e 	of	them resu l ti n 	t h e	cr eat ion	of	mora l	ob l igat ions . 	W hyn ot?	B ecaus ei ne ach	case	we would	k no w	or	h ave	r easonable	dou bt	about	t h e authorit y	of th e ir	sources. Kn owled ge	of	thes ource	is 	thus 	crucial 	if	we	ar e to	disti ngu ish 	mo ral c om mands from	fa k e s	an dfor	tho secommand s	t o	b e	s ucc es sfully	co mmunicat ed 	t ous .	I n the end,	the n, 	it 	i s	v ery	d i fficul t	toseeho wa 	pr oponent of t he	A da ms ian- sty le  DCTcoul d 	in sist	th at	knowle dge of	c on te nt	by	i tself	is	suff ic ient	for
	difference.	If	we don't	know	that	the	pangs	of	conscience	we	experience	in	relation	to	charitable_giving	are	command-like	signs	from	such	a	being,	how	are	we	to	know	what	we are	obligated	to	do?_Allied	to	this,	and	more	importantly,	there	is	the	problem	that	(moral) command-like	signs	are	cheap	and	easy-to-fake.	Humans	can	create	books claiming	to	contain	God's	commands	but	which	are	actually	made	up	to	satisfy their	own	selfish	political	needs;	preachers	can	claim	to	channel	God's_commands	in	their	sermons	for	their	own	nefarious	purposes;	more	outlandishly (but	consistent	with	certain	religious	worldviews)	there	could	be	demons	or_devils	interfering	with	our	moral	consciences	and	telling	us	that	certain	things_are	right	or	wrong	even	when	they	are	not.	All	of	these	cases	could	result	in command-like	signs	being	communicated	to	moral	agents,	but	none	of	them_result	in	the	creation	of	moral	obligations.	Why	not?	Because	in	each	case	we_would	know	or	have	reasonable	doubt	about	the	authority	of	their	sources. Knowledge	of	the	source	is	thus	crucial	if	we	are	to	distinguish	moral	commands from	fakes	and	for	those	commands	to	be	successfully	communicated	to	us.	In_the	end,	then,	it	is	very	difficult	to	see	how	a	proponent	of	the	Adamsian-style DCT	could	insist	that	knowledge	of	content	by	itself	is	sufficient	for