 she has all 100 of the chocolate bars in order for Annie's desire to be promoted by making the trade rather than refusing it. So we again get the intuitively correct result that Annie's measure of fit for D​100-bars would have to be extremely peculiar in order for the desire to be promoted by making the trade rather than refusing it. Of course, without specifying more about Annie, her measure of fit might still have such a structure, but its peculiarity explains 29 why our intuitions balk at the suggestion that trading in all those lottery tickets for a single chocolate bar would promote her desires. 7. ​What Kind of Probability? Before concluding, it's worth mentioning one final aspect of our account that might appear to be a lacuna at first glance, but we think is in fact an advantage of the view. Contrastive Expected Fit, like its competitors, appeals to ​probability in analyzing the promotion relation. In particular, it appeals to the probability that one action would result in a world that more closely fits an agent's desire than some contrasting action. But what kind of probability is being employed in this analysis? There are two 49 plausible possibilities: either the kind of probabilities appealed to are ​objective chances, or they are ​subjective probabilities ​of some sort or other. Which do we endorse? Both. To explain, we think that strictly speaking there are two equally good interpretations of Contrastive Expected Fit corresponding to the two kinds of probability. On the ​objective interpretation, the probabilities appealed to in Contrastive Expected Fit should be read as objective chances, and the view yields verdicts regarding what actions ​as a matter of fact promote what desires. That is, it yields objective truths about what actions stand in the promotion relation to what desires. On the subjective interpretation, the probabilities appealed to in Contrastive Expected Fit should be read as subjective probabilities, and the view yields verdicts regarding what actions promote what desires ​according to some subject. ​That is, it yields verdicts about what actions stand in the promotion relation to what desires in the opinion of that agent. Why opt for a view of this sort? Recall from the introduction that the promotion relation is thought to have something to do with agents' reasons: for certain Humean views, ​all reasons are reasons in virtue of facts about promotion, and for non-Humeans, at least some reasons (intuitively the ​instrumental ​reasons) are reasons in virtue of facts about promotion. Now
she has all 100 of the chocolate bars in order for Annie's desire to be advertise by do the trade rather than refusing it. then we again get the intuitively correct consequence that Annie's measure of fit for D​100 - bar would have to be extremely peculiar in club for the desire to be promoted by making the craft preferably than refusing it. Of course, without specifying more about Annie, her measure of fit might however have such a structure, but its peculiarity excuse 29 why our intuitions balk at the suggestion that trading in all those lottery ticket for a single chocolate bar would promote her desires. 7. ​What Kind of Probability? Before conclude, it's worth mentioning one final aspect of our account that might look to be a coffer at beginning glance, but we think is in fact an advantage of the view. Contrastive Expected Fit, like its competitors, appeals to ​probability in analyzing the promotion relation. In particular, it appeal to the probability that one action would result in a worldly concern that more close equip an agent's desire than some contrasting legal action. But what kind of probability is being employed in this analysis? There are two 49 plausible possibilities: either the kind of probability appealed to are ​objective chances, or they are ​subjective probabilities ​of some sort or other. Which do we second? Both. To explain, we think that strictly speaking there be two evenly effective interpretations of Contrastive Expected Fit corresponding to the two kinds of probability. On the ​objective interpretation, the probability appealed to in Contrastive Expected Fit should be read as objective chances, and the opinion yields verdicts regarding what actions ​as a topic of fact promote what desires. That is, it yields objective truths about what actions digest in the promotion sexual intercourse to what desires. On the immanent interpretation, the probabilities attract to in Contrastive Expected Fit should be read as subjective probability, and the view concede verdicts regarding what actions promote what desires ​according to some subject. ​That is, it yields verdicts about what action stand in the promotion sexual intercourse to what desires in the opinion of that agent. Why opt for a view of this sort? echo from the introduction that the promotion relation is thought to have something to do with agents' reason: for sealed Humean view, ​all reasons are reasons in virtue of facts about promotion, and for non - Humeans, at least some reason (intuitively the ​instrumental ​reasons) are reasons in virtue of facts about forwarding. Now
 shf has all 100 of the chocolxte bars in ordgr for Ainie's dssire to be promoted by making the tcade rathtg than refusing it. So we again get the intnitively correct result bkat Ahkie's kxasure of fit fpr D​100-bars wmuld have to ba dxcremely peculiar in order for the defire to bf promoted by iakimd ths trade rather than refusing it. Of course, without specofying more about Annie, heg mewsure of fit might still have sucr a structure, but its ptcbliarity exklains 29 why our intuitions balk xt thz suggestiob rhah trading in all nhose lottery tickets for a xingle chocolabe bac woyld promote her desirxs. 7. ​What Kind of Profability? Teyore concluding, it's wirrh mettioting ine fihak zspect of our accouht that migyt appear to be a lsctba at first gmance, fue we think is in fact an advantage of tve biew. Contrastive Expectwd Fit, like its compejitors, appqals to ​probability in analyzing the promotion renatioi. Kn kavbicuuqr, it appeals to the probability that one actiog wpukd result in a world that mlrr closely fits an agzht'a desire than some contrafting action. Btt wnat kind of probability is veing employvd ib this analysis? Thzre are two 49 plaosible possibilities: either tke kins of probabllities aloealed to are ​obgecnive chances, or they are ​subjestive prouabilnties ​of somg sort jr other. Wjich do we endorse? Both. Ho exklain, fe think tjat strictly speaking there are two equally gpog itterpretctions of Contrastide Expected Fij correspjndine to the tso kindv of probabylity. On the ​mhjective intxrpretatijn, tye peobabilkgies appealed yo in Connrcstive Expected Fit should ne rexs as objective ekabces, and the virw hiejdd terdisds regarding whag azyions ​as a mattev ow favt promote what desises. Fhat is, it yields pbmective ttuths abott what actioms stand in the prlmotimn celatipn jo what desires. On the subjectibe interpgetwtion, the prjbabllityes appealzd to in Contrastive Expected Fit should be read as subjecrive probabilities, cnc the view bields verdicts regarding what actiins promote what cesires ​according to aome sgbjech. ​That is, it yields verdicts about what actions stand in the promotion reoation to what desjres in tve ppiniog of vhat agent. Why opn for a view of this sort? Recall from tha nntroduction that the promotipn relation is jhought to have something fo do wiyh agents' reasons: for certain Himean views, ​all reasons sre reasins ih virtlg oh facts about promotoon, anb for bon-Humeqns, wt least some resslns (intuihiveky the ​instrumental ​reasons) are reqsons un virtue of facts about promluion. Nos
she has all 100 of the chocolate order Annie's desire be promoted by refusing So we again the intuitively correct that Annie's measure of fit for would have to be extremely peculiar in order for the desire to be by making the trade rather than refusing it. Of course, without specifying more Annie, measure fit still have such a structure, but its peculiarity explains 29 why our intuitions balk at the that trading in all those lottery tickets for single chocolate bar would her desires. 7. ​What Kind Probability? concluding, it's mentioning final of our account might appear to be a lacuna at first glance, but we think is in fact an advantage the view. Fit, like competitors, to in analyzing the In particular, it appeals to the action would result in a world that more fits an desire than some contrasting action. But kind of probability is being employed in this There are two 49 plausible possibilities: either the kind of probabilities appealed to are ​objective they are ​subjective probabilities some sort or Which we Both. explain, we that strictly speaking there are two equally good interpretations of Contrastive Fit corresponding to the two kinds of probability. On the the appealed to in Expected Fit should be as chances, and the view regarding actions of promote desires. That is, it objective truths about what actions in the promotion relation subjective interpretation, the probabilities appealed to in Contrastive Fit should be read as subjective probabilities, the view yields verdicts regarding what actions promote what desires ​according to subject. ​That yields verdicts about what actions stand in the relation to what desires the opinion of that agent. Why opt for a of sort? Recall the introduction that promotion relation is to have something with agents' for Humean are reasons in virtue of facts promotion, for non-Humeans, at least some (intuitively ​reasons) are reasons in virtue of facts about promotion. Now
 she has all 100 of the chocolate baRs in order fOr AnnIe's DesIrE to bE proMoted by making tHE traDe rather than refusing it. so we aGaIN get THe IntuiTively cORrECT reSuLt ThaT ANNiE's meaSurE of fit fOr D​100-bars wouLd hAvE to be extremeLY pEculiar in oRdeR for the desirE to Be promOtEd bY MakinG thE tradE ratheR Than reFusing it. OF cOUrse, wiTHout speCIFyIng mOre about Annie, her mEAsURe of fit might stIll havE sUCh A STruCtuRe, but its peCuLiariTY explaiNS 29 wHY OUr iNTuitions balk aT the suggestIOn tHat traDiNg iN All thoSe lotTeRY tiCkets for a siNgle Chocolate Bar wouLD promotE Her desiRes. 7. ​WhaT KiNd oF ProBAbIlIty? beFOre COnCluDIng, It's worth MeNtIoninG one FINAL aspEct Of ouR accoUnt that might aPpeAr to BE a lAcuna At firSt glAnCe, but We thinK is in FaCt an advantage of The vIew. ContraStiVe expEcTed FiT, Like itS coMpeTitors, aPpeals tO ​ProBaBILItY in analyzing the proMoTIOn Relation. in partICuLaR, It appealS tO thE proBABilitY thaT OnE action wOuld reSUlT iN a world ThAt more ClOseLy fIts an AGent'S desirE than somE contRAsting action. BuT What kind of proBAbILItY Is beIng Employed in tHis aNAlysIs? ThERe Are TWo 49 plaUsiblE pOSsIBilities: either the kiNd Of probAbiliTies appealed tO are ​objectIVE Chances, oR theY ArE ​Subjective probAbiliTies ​of some SOrt or othEr. WhiCh do we enDorse? Both. tO Explain, wE thInk ThaT stRICtLy speaking theRE Are tWo Equally GooD interpRetAtiOns Of COnTrastive EXpected FIt CoRrEsPonDing tO The two kiNdS of PrObaBilitY. on the ​oBjectIve iNtErPRetAtion, thE PrOBAbilItIeS appEalEd To in COntrAStiVe ExpecTed Fit shoUld BE reaD aS oBjectivE chances, and thE vIew yields vErDicTs regaRDIng what aCtions ​as a matter of fact prOMote whaT deSires. that Is, it yieldS obJectivE trUThs aboUt what ActioNs StaND In the PROmOtiOn Relation to WHAt dEsireS. ON the SubjectIve interpretation, tHE prObabilities apPeaLed tO IN COntRAsTIve exPEctED fit should be read As subjectiVe PRoBabilities, ANd tHe View yieLds verdIcts rEGarding What actioNs promote WhAt deSIRes ​According tO some subJect. ​That iS, It yieLDs VerdiCts About wHaT acTions Stand iN The PromoTion reLaTion to What dEsIres in thE opinion of that agent. Why oPt for a View oF thIs sort? RecAll FRom The introdUctiOn that the pRomOtiOn relAtiON is thOughT To HavE SometHing TO do with agENtS' reASOnS: for certain hUMEan Views, ​All REasons Are rEasons in virtue of fACts about promotIon, aND For Non-hUmeaNs, At least some reaSonS (iNTUitively ThE ​instrumentAl ​reasonS) aRE reasOns in vIrtue oF facts aBOUt PRomotiOn. NoW
 she has all 100 of the ch ocolate ba rs in  or der  f or A nnie 's desire to b e  pro moted by making the tr ade r at h er t h an  refu sing it .  S o weag ai n g et th e int uit ively c orrect res ult  t hat Annie'sm ea sure of fi t f or D​100-bar s w ould h av e t o  be e xtr emely  pecul i ar inorder for  t h e desi r e to be p ro mote d by making the t r ad e  rather than r efusin gi t. O f c our se, withou tspeci f ying mo r ea b o utA nnie, her mea sure of fit mig ht sti ll  ha v e such  a st ru c tur e, but itspecu liarity e xplain s  29 why our int uition s b alk  att he  s ugg es t ion th att rad ing in a ll  t hoselott e r y tick ets  for  a si ngle chocolat e b ar w o uld  prom ote h er d es ires.  7. ​W hat K in d of Probabilit y? B efore con clu di ng,  i t's w o rth me nti oni ng onefinal a s pec to f ou r account that mig ht a pp ear to b e a la c un aa t firstgl anc e, b u t  we t hink is  in fact  an ad v an ta ge of t he  view.  C ont ras tiveE xpec ted Fi t, likeits c o mpetitors, app e als to ​proba b il i t yi n an aly zing the pr omot i on r elat i on . I n  part icula r, it appeals to the prob ab ilitythatone action wo uld result i n  a world  tha t  m o re closely fit s anagent's de s ire than  some  contras ting acti o n . But wh atkin d o f p r o ba bility is bei n g  emp lo yed inthi s analy sis ? T her e a re  two 49 p lausible  p os si bi lit ies:e ither th ekin dofproba b ilitie s app eale dto are  ​objec t iv e chan ce s,  orthe yare ​ subj e cti ve prob abilities  ​o f  som eso rt or o ther. Which d owe endorse ?Bot h. Toe x plain, w e think that strictly s p eakingthe re ar e tw o equally  go od int erp r etatio ns ofContr as tiv e Expec t e dFit  c orrespondi n g  to  thetw o ki nds ofprobability. On th e  ​o bjective inte rpr etat i o n,  th e  p r oba bi l iti e s  appealed to in  Contrasti ve Ex pected Fit sho ul d be re ad as o bject i ve chan ces, andthe viewyi elds v erd icts regar ding wha t actions ​as a ma tteroffact p ro mot e wha t desi r es.  That  is, i tyields  obje ct ive trut hs about what actions s tand i n the  pr omotion r ela t ion  to whatdesi res. On th e s ubj ectiv e i n terpr etat i on , t h e pro babi l ities app e al edt o  i n Contrasti v e Exp ected  Fi t  shoul d be  read as subjecti v e probabilitie s, a n d  th e v i ew y ie lds verdicts r ega rd i n g what a ct ions promot e what d es i res ​ accord ing to  some s u b je c t. ​Th at i s,it yields  ve rd i cts abo ut  w h at act ions  s tand i n thep romo t i on relation to w hat d e s iresi n t he op in ion oft hatagent. Why  opt for aview o f th is so rt? Rec al l from  th eintroducti o n that th e pro motionre lati onis tho ught t o hav e so me thi ng to dow i th ag en t s'reas ons:fo r ce rtain Hum e an views , ​ a ll reas on s a r e  reaso n si n  virtue of  fa cts a b o ut promoti o n, a n df or no n-Hume ans, a t least som ereasons  (i n t uitivelythe ​inst r ume nt al ​ reasons)  a re r ea son sin virtue of fa cts abou t promot i o n. Now 
 she_has all_100 of the chocolate_bars in_order_for Annie's_desire_to be promoted_by making the_trade rather than refusing_it. So we_again_get the intuitively correct result that Annie's measure of fit for D​100-bars would have_to_be extremely_peculiar_in_order for the desire to_be promoted by making the_trade rather_than refusing it. Of course, without specifying more_about_Annie, her measure_of fit might still have such a structure, but_its peculiarity explains 29 why our_intuitions balk at_the_suggestion_that trading in all_those lottery tickets for a single_chocolate bar would promote her desires._7. ​What Kind of Probability? Before concluding,_it's worth mentioning one final aspect_of our account that might_appear to_be a lacuna at first_glance, but we_think is_in fact an_advantage of the view. Contrastive Expected_Fit, like its_competitors, appeals to ​probability in analyzing_the_promotion relation. In_particular,_it_appeals to_the probability that_one_action would_result_in a world that more closely_fits_an agent's desire than some contrasting action._But what kind of_probability_is being employed in_this analysis? There are two_49 plausible possibilities: either the kind_of probabilities_appealed to_are ​objective chances, or they are ​subjective probabilities ​of some sort_or other. Which do we endorse?_Both. To explain, we_think that_strictly_speaking there are_two_equally good_interpretations of Contrastive Expected Fit corresponding to_the two_kinds of probability. On the ​objective_interpretation, the probabilities appealed_to_in Contrastive Expected Fit should be_read as objective chances, and the_view yields verdicts regarding what_actions_​as_a matter of fact promote_what desires. That is, it yields_objective truths about_what actions stand in the promotion relation_to_what desires. On the subjective interpretation,_the_probabilities appealed to in Contrastive Expected_Fit_should_be read as subjective probabilities,_and the view yields verdicts regarding_what actions promote what desires ​according to some subject._​That is, it_yields verdicts about what actions_stand_in_the promotion relation to what desires in the opinion of_that agent._Why opt for_a view of this sort? Recall from the introduction that_the promotion relation is thought to have_something to do with agents' reasons: for certain Humean views, ​all_reasons are reasons in virtue of facts about_promotion, and for non-Humeans, at least some_reasons (intuitively the ​instrumental_​reasons)_are reasons in virtue of facts about_promotion._Now