ie engages in a sporadic training program (S), his probability of finishing the marathon will be equal to his prior conditional probability of finishing the marathon provided that he started a sporadic training program. That is: pr​t2​(F) = pr​t1​(F|S) =.2 Notice that Bertie's beginning a sporadic training program thus causes a ​decrease rather than an ​increase ​in the probability of his finishing the marathon. So Causal Probabilism entails that beginning a sporadic training program not only does not ​promote Bertie's desire, but in fact significantly ​dispromotes​ his desire. 14 But this is a very awkward result! There is a clear sense in which Bertie's beginning a sporadic training program promotes his desire to finish a marathon -and, correspondingly, a clear sense in which Bertie's desire gives him a reason to begin such a training program. Any adequate view of promotion should account for that. It is of course true that what would ​best promote Bertie's desire to finish -and what Bertie's desire plausibly gives him ​most reason to do -is to train regularly. He obviously has less reason to train sporadically, since this would less effectively promote his desire to finish the marathon. But it doesn't follow that he has ​no reason whatsoever to train sporadically, and, most importantly for our purposes here, it certainly doesn't follow that training sporadically would dispromote his desire to finish the marathon. Bertie's case isn't isolated. Here's the recipe for generating other counterexamples: Take an agent who is antecedently very likely to perform one action that will make it very likely that her desire is satisfied (e.g., R), and who is antecedently very unlikely to do something that will make it somewhat less likely that her desire is satisfied (e.g., S). It will follow, according to Causal Probabilism, that only the thing the agent is 14 Here, and in what follows, we use 'dispromote' as the opposite of 'promote.' 8 antecedently very likely to perform (e.g., R) will promote the satisfaction of her desire, since only the action that makes it very likely that the desire is satisfied will generate the inequalities Causal Probabilism requires. However, in these cases, this is simply the wrong result. Although performing the antecedently likely action is what ​best promotes her desire in these cases,
ie engages in a sporadic training program (S), his probability of finishing the marathon will be adequate to his anterior conditional probability of eat up the marathon provided that he started a sporadic education program. That is: pr​t2​(F) = pr​t1​(F|S) = .2 Notice that Bertie's beginning a sporadic training plan thus causes a ​decrease preferably than an ​increase ​in the probability of his finishing the marathon. So Causal Probabilism fee-tail that beginning a sporadic training platform not only does not ​promote Bertie's desire, but in fact significantly ​dispromotes​ his desire. 14 But this is a very awkward result! There is a clear common sense in which Bertie's beginning a sporadic training program promote his desire to finish a marathon -and, correspondingly, a clear common sense in which Bertie's desire gives him a cause to begin such a education program. Any adequate view of promotion should account for that. It is of class true that what would ​best promote Bertie's desire to finish -and what Bertie's desire plausibly gives him ​most rationality to do -is to train regularly. He obviously has less reason to train sporadically, since this would less effectively promote his desire to finish the marathon. But it doesn't follow that he has ​no rationality whatsoever to train sporadically, and, most importantly for our determination here, it certainly doesn't follow that training sporadically would dispromote his desire to finish the marathon. Bertie's shell isn't isolated. Here's the recipe for generating other counterexamples: drive an agent who is antecedently very likely to perform one action that will make it very probable that her desire is satisfied (e.g., R), and who is antecedently very unlikely to do something that will make it somewhat less probable that her desire is quenched (for example, S). It will follow, according to Causal Probabilism, that only the thing the agent is 14 Here, and in what follows, we use' dispromote' as the opposite of' promote.' 8 previously very likely to do (e.g., R) will promote the satisfaction of her desire, since only the natural process that makes it very likely that the desire is quenched will generate the inequalities Causal Probabilism requires. However, in these cases, this is merely the wrong resultant role. Although performing the antecedently probable action is what ​best promotes her desire in these cases,
ie fngages in a sporadic trxining program (S), his pcobabiljty of fknishing the marathon will bx eqyal ti his prior conditionau probabipity of diniwying the medathon ixovidsf thct he started a xporadic tsaining prograk. Ghct is: pr​t2​(F) = pr​t1​(F|S) =.2 Notice that Bertiq's begimnlng a sporadic trapnyng lgonram thus causes a ​decrease rathsr than an ​increase ​on the probability of his vinidhing the marathon. So Causal Kdobwvilism entaius that beginning a spkradic training program not onlh doex not ​promitw Bfttie's desire, but pn fact signinpcantly ​disprokotes​ his desive. 14 Bnt tyis is a very awkward result! There is a clear setsz in which Bertie's betibning a s[oraauc grajnmng progrwm 'romotes hia desire to finish a marathon -snq, correspondinfly, a slqar sense in which Bertie's desire gives hij a reason to begin sucy a training program. Wny adequwte view of promotion should account for that. It hs of zouxwe trjw hhat what would ​best promote Bertie's desire tj fonpsh -and what Bertle's desire plausibky godes him ​most teason ck so -is to train regklarly. Re obciously hws lrss reason to train sporadixally, since nhis would less effectnvely promotz his cesirr to finish the marathou. But jt doesn't flllow thaf he has ​no reasov wmatvoever to train sporadicaljy, and, mowt ikportangly gor ouw purposes here, it certainly doesn'h folpof that tralning sporadically would dispromote his desirg tm fpnish the marabhon. Bertie's cafe isn't isolatgd. Here's che rezipe for gvnerating other couneerexamples: Tdne an agent xho is aneeceeentoy very uikely to perfprm one abtnon that qill make it very kikglg that her desixt iw satisfied (e.g., T), avd rhl ms aneacedently vesy uvliyrly tu do somethlng thay will make it somewvat mess likely that hrr desire us satissied (e.g., S). It eill follow, accordlng tm Ceusal Lrofabilism, that only the thing tge agent ls 14 Here, and in whab fojlows, we uxe 'dispromote' as the opposite of 'promotx.' 8 antecedently very lijely to perform (e.g., T) wlll promote vhe saeisfactiot of her desire, sincw only the action that makes it very ljkely dhat hhe desire is satisfied will generate the inequalities Causal Probabilism requicef. However, ih thrse cdszs, chis is sim'lb the wrong resuln. Although performing the antecevently likalv action is what ​best promotex fer desire in these cases,
ie engages in a sporadic training program probability finishing the will be equal of the marathon provided he started a training program. That is: pr​t2​(F) = =.2 Notice that Bertie's beginning a sporadic training program thus causes a ​decrease than an ​increase ​in the probability of his finishing the marathon. So Causal entails beginning sporadic program not only does not ​promote Bertie's desire, but in fact significantly ​dispromotes​ his desire. 14 this is a very awkward result! There is clear sense in which beginning a sporadic training program his to finish marathon correspondingly, clear sense in Bertie's desire gives him a reason to begin such a training program. Any adequate view of promotion account for is of true what ​best promote Bertie's finish -and what Bertie's desire plausibly reason to do -is to train regularly. He has less to train sporadically, since this would effectively promote his desire to finish the marathon. it doesn't follow that he has ​no reason whatsoever to train sporadically, and, most importantly purposes here, it certainly follow that training would his to the marathon. case isn't isolated. Here's the recipe for generating other counterexamples: Take agent who is antecedently very likely to perform one action make very likely that desire is satisfied (e.g., and is antecedently very unlikely something will less that desire is satisfied (e.g., It will follow, according to Probabilism, that only the Here, and in what follows, we use 'dispromote' the opposite of 'promote.' 8 antecedently very to perform (e.g., R) will promote the satisfaction of her desire, since the action it very likely that the desire is satisfied generate the inequalities Causal requires. However, in these cases, this is simply the result. performing the likely action is ​best promotes her in these cases,
ie engages in a sporadic trainIng program (s), his pRobAbiLiTy of FiniShing the marathON wilL be equal to his prior condItionAl PRobaBIlIty of FinishiNG tHE MarAtHoN prOvIDeD that He sTarted a Sporadic trAinInG program. That IS: pR​t2​(F) = pr​t1​(F|S) =.2 NoTicE that Bertie's BegInning A sPorADic trAinIng prOgram tHUs causEs a ​decreaSe RAther tHAn an ​incREAsE ​in tHe probability of hiS FiNIshing the maratHon. So CAuSAl pRObaBilIsm entails ThAt begINning a sPOrADIC trAIning program nOt only does nOT ​prOmote BErTie'S Desire, But in FaCT siGnificantly ​DispRomotes​ hiS desirE. 14 but this IS a very aWkward ResUlt! therE Is A cLeaR sENse IN wHicH berTie's begiNnInG a spoRadiC TRAIninG prOgraM promOtes his desire To fInisH A maRathoN -and, cOrreSpOndinGly, a clEar seNsE in which Bertie's DesiRe gives hiM a rEaSon To Begin SUch a trAinIng Program. any adeqUAte ViEW OF pRomotion should accoUnT FOr That. It is Of courSE tRuE That what WoUld ​Best PROmote bertIE's Desire to Finish -ANd WhAt BertiE's Desire PlAusIblY giveS Him ​mOst reaSon to do -iS to trAIn regularly. He oBViously has lesS ReASOn TO traIn sPoradically, SincE This WoulD LeSs eFFectiVely pRoMOtE His desire to finish thE mArathoN. But iT doesn't follow That he has ​nO REAson whatSoevER tO Train sporadicaLly, anD, most imporTAntly for Our puRposes heRe, it certaINLy doesn't FolLow ThaT trAINiNg sporadicallY WOuld DiSpromotE hiS desire To fIniSh tHe mArAthon. BertIe's case iSn'T iSoLaTed. here's THe recipe FoR geNeRatIng otHEr counTerexAmplEs: taKE an Agent whO Is ANTeceDeNtLy veRy lIkEly to PerfORm oNe actioN that will MakE It veRy LiKely thaT her desire is sAtIsfied (e.g., R), aNd Who Is anteCEDently veRy unlikely to do something THat will MakE it soMewhAt less likEly That heR deSIre is sAtisfiEd (e.g., S). it WilL FOllow, ACCoRdiNg To Causal PrOBAbiLism, tHaT onlY the thiNg the agent is 14 Here, anD In wHat follows, we uSe 'dIsprOMOtE' as THe OPpoSiTE of 'PROmote.' 8 antecedentLy very likeLy TO pErform (e.g., R) wILl pRoMote the SatisfaCtion OF her desIre, since oNly the actIoN thaT MAkeS it very likEly that tHe desire iS SatisFIeD will GenErate tHe IneQualiTies CaUSal probaBilism ReQuires. howevEr, In these cAses, this is simply the wronG resulT. AlthOugH performiNg tHE anTecedentlY likEly action iS whAt ​bEst prOmoTEs her DesiRE iN thESe casEs,
ie engages in a sporadic t raining pr ogram  (S ),hi s pr obab ility of finis h ingthe marathon will be e qualto hisp ri or co ndition a lp r oba bi li tyof fi nishi ngthe mar athon prov ide dthat he star t ed  a sporadi c t raining prog ram . That  i s:p r​t2​ (F)  = pr ​t1​(F | S) =.2  Notice t ha t  Berti e 's begi n n in g asporadic training pr o gram thus caus es a ​ de c re a s e r ath er than an  ​ incre a se ​int he p r oba b ility of hisfinishing t h e m aratho n.  So Causal  Prob ab i lis m entails t hatbeginning  a spo r adic tr a ining p rogram  no t o nlyd oe snot  ​ p rom o te  Be r tie 's desir e,  b ut in  fac t s i gnif ica ntly  ​dis promotes​ his  de sire .  14  Butthisis a  v ery a wkward  resu lt ! There is a cl earsense inwhi ch  Be rt ie'sb eginni nga s poradic  traini n g p ro g r a mpromotes his desir et o  f inish amarath o n-a n d, corre sp ond ingl y ,  a cl ears en se in wh ich Be r ti e' s desir egiveshi m a  re asont o be gin su ch a tra ining program. Any a d equate view o f  p r o mo t ionsho uld account  for that . It is  of cours e tru et ha t  what would ​best p ro mote B ertie 's desire tofinish -an d w hat Bert ie's de s ire plausiblygives  him ​most reason t o do-is to t rain regu l a rly. Heobv iou sly  ha s le ss reason tot r ainsp oradica lly , since  th iswou ldle ss effect ively pr om ot ehi s d esire to finis hthe  m ara thon. But it  does n'tfo ll o w t hat heh as ​ no r ea so n wh ats oe ver t o tr a insporadi cally, an d,m ostim po rtantly  for our purp os es here, i tcer tainly d oesn't f ollow that training spo r adicall y w oulddisp romote hi s d esiretof inishthe ma ratho n.  Be r t ie'sc a se  is n' t isolated . Her e's t he  rec ipe for  generating otherc oun terexamples:Tak e an a ge ntw ho isan t ece d e ntly very likel y to perfo rm on e action t h atwi ll make  it ver y lik e ly that  her desi re is sat is fied ( e.g ., R), and  who isanteceden t ly ve r yunlik ely  to do  s ome thing  thatw ill  make  it so me what l ess l ik ely that  her desire is satisfie d (e.g ., S) . I t will fo llo w , a ccordingto C ausal Prob abi lis m, th ato nly t he t h in g t h e age nt i s  14 Here, an d i n wh at follows, w e  us e 'di spr o mote'as t he opposite of 'p r omote.' 8 ante cede n t lyver y  lik el y to perform ( e.g ., R ) will p ro mote the sa tisfacti on of he r desi re, si nce onl y th e  actio n th atmakes itver yl ikely t ha tt he des ireis  satis fied w i ll g e n erate the inequa litie s Causa l  Pr obabi li sm requ i res.  However,in these ca ses, t hisis si mply th ewrongres ul t. Althoug h  performi ng th e antec ed entl y l ikelyacti o n  is w hat​b est  promotes h er de si r e i n th ese c as es,
ie engages_in a_sporadic training program (S),_his probability_of_finishing the_marathon_will be equal_to his prior_conditional probability of finishing_the marathon provided_that_he started a sporadic training program. That is: pr​t2​(F) = pr​t1​(F|S) =.2 Notice that_Bertie's_beginning a_sporadic_training_program thus causes a ​decrease_rather than an ​increase ​in_the probability_of his finishing the marathon. So Causal Probabilism_entails_that beginning a_sporadic training program not only does not ​promote Bertie's_desire, but in fact significantly ​dispromotes​_his desire. 14_But_this_is a very awkward_result! There is a clear sense_in which Bertie's beginning a sporadic_training program promotes his desire to finish_a marathon -and, correspondingly, a clear_sense in which Bertie's desire_gives him_a reason to begin such_a training program._Any adequate_view of promotion_should account for that. It is_of course true_that what would ​best promote Bertie's_desire_to finish -and_what_Bertie's_desire plausibly_gives him ​most_reason_to do_-is_to train regularly. He obviously has_less_reason to train sporadically, since this would_less effectively promote his_desire_to finish the marathon._But it doesn't follow that_he has ​no reason whatsoever to_train sporadically,_and, most_importantly for our purposes here, it certainly doesn't follow that training_sporadically would dispromote his desire to_finish the marathon. Bertie's_case isn't_isolated._Here's the recipe_for_generating other_counterexamples: Take an agent who is antecedently_very likely_to perform one action that will_make it very likely_that_her desire is satisfied (e.g., R),_and who is antecedently very unlikely_to do something that will_make_it_somewhat less likely that her_desire is satisfied (e.g., S). It_will follow, according_to Causal Probabilism, that only the thing_the_agent is 14 Here, and in_what_follows, we use 'dispromote' as the_opposite_of_'promote.' 8 antecedently very likely_to perform (e.g., R) will promote_the satisfaction of her desire, since only the action_that makes it_very likely that the desire_is_satisfied_will generate the inequalities Causal Probabilism requires. However, in these_cases, this_is simply the_wrong result. Although performing the antecedently likely action is what_​best promotes her desire in these cases,