 the story, since even contrastive probabilistic accounts of promotion face a peculiar problem first identified by one of the present authors in previous work (Sharadin (2015)). Sharadin suggests solving this problem with a disjunctive account that introduces the notion of "fit" between desire and world. But we'll argue that Sharadin's prior account, even when modified to take account of the contrastive nature of promotion, is also problematic. In section 4, we describe two related problems with Sharadin's view. This completes the main negative argument of the paper: extant proposals regarding promotion are, we think, unacceptable. In sections 5 and 6, we describe our own account, and explain how it accommodates the virtues of Sharadin's earlier account while elegantly solving its problems. In the penultimate section (section 7) we'll explain how our view's neutrality on the question of what sort of probabilities are at issue is a ​feature ​rather than a ​bug of the view. We conclude by reflecting on where this leaves the debate over promotion. 2. Probabilism: Pure, Causal, and Contrastive 2.1. Pure Probabilism One recent proposal is that promoting the satisfaction of a desire -- ​promoting a desire​, for short -is simply a matter of its satisfaction being more probable given the action that it would otherwise be. According to the most general version of this view: Pure Probabilism​: Agent A's φ-ing promotes desire D iff pr(satisfaction of D|A φs) > pr(satisfaction of D|B)​. won't be concerned with the details of the relationship between promotion and instrumental reasons, or promotion and other possible objects of promotion (such as values, or objectives, or ends); instead, with others in the literature (e.g. Behrends and DiPaolo (2015), Lin (2016)), we'll take there to be some plausible relationship between reasons and promotion and we'll treat the promotion relation as independently interesting. We'll also focus our attention in what follows on promoting ​desires (rather than, say, ends or values), but nothing important hangs on this focus. For more on the relationship between reasons and promotion, see the discussion in Kolodny (forthcoming) and Maguire (2016). 2 Where B (for ​B​aseline) is filled in by the specific version of the purely probabilistic view on offer. For instance, Mark Schroeder says that the baseline is the agent performing no action
the story, since even contrastive probabilistic accounts of promotion front a curious problem first identified by one of the present generator in previous work (Sharadin (2015) ). Sharadin indicate resolve this problem with a disjunctive account that introduces the notion of " fit " between desire and worldly concern. But we'll argue that Sharadin's prior account, even when modify to drive account of the contrastive nature of promotion, is also problematic. In part 4, we describe two related problems with Sharadin's view. This complete the main negative argument of the paper: extant proposal regarding promotion are, we think, unacceptable. In sections 5 and 6, we identify our own account, and explain how it accommodates the virtues of Sharadin's earlier account while elegantly solving its problems. In the penultimate section (section 7) we'll explain how our view's neutrality on the question of what sort of probabilities are at topic is a ​feature ​rather than a ​bug of the view. We conclude by reflect on where this leaves the debate over promotion. 2. Probabilism: Pure, Causal, and Contrastive 2.1. arrant Probabilism One recent proposal is that promoting the satisfaction of a desire -- ​promoting a desire​, for light -is simply a matter of its satisfaction being more probable given the action that it would otherwise be. accord to the most general version of this view: arrant Probabilism​: Agent A's φ - ing promotes hope D iff pr(satisfaction of D|A φs) > pr(satisfaction of D|B)​. won't be refer with the details of the relationship between promotion and instrumental cause, or promotion and other possible objects of promotion (such as values, or objectives, or ends); rather, with others in the literature (e.g. Behrends and DiPaolo (2015), Lin (2016) ), we'll consume there to be some plausible relationship between reason and promotion and we'll process the promotion sexual intercourse as independently interesting. We'll besides focus our attention in what follows on promote ​desires (rather than, say, end or values), but nothing important hangs on this focus. For more on the relationship between reasons and promotion, see the discussion in Kolodny (extroverted) and Maguire (2016). 2 Where B (for ​B​aseline) is filled in by the specific version of the strictly probabilistic view on offer. For instance, Mark Schroeder says that the baseline is the agent performing no legal action
 thf story, since even contrxstive probabilnwtic arcounts of promution face a peculiar problel dirst identified by one of ghe presejt authoes ii previous work (Sharadin (2015)). Sharzfin vnggests solving this probnem with a disbuvccive account that introduces the notyon of "gih" between desite anc wormd. But we'll argue that Sharadin's pdior acbount, even when mpdified to take account of the contrastive naturf of promotuon, yw also probldmatic. In section 4, we sescribe two related problems wkth Skaradin's vigc. Thlv completes the iain negativc argumant of yhe paper: extakt prmpowals regarding promotmon are, we think, unasceptable. Iu sections 5 and 6, we dwsxribe our own qccuunu, aid sxplaij hkw it accojmodates thw virtues of Sharadon'f earlier accohnt whylq elegantly solving its problems. In the pehultimate section (sectiin 7) we'll explain how lur view's neutrality on the question of what sort of probatilitmer axc xr lssue is a ​feature ​rather than a ​bug of the vysw. Wv conclude by refjecting on ehfrr this leaves jhe debcfe over promotion. 2. Pgobabilysm: Pyre, Causaj, anc Contrastive 2.1. Pure Probabioism One recvnt proposal is that pxomoting the satosfacyion of a desire -- ​promocing a desire​, for short -is rimply a matter uf pts vatisfacukon being more prjbable giten tke actiov thst it rould othegwise be. According to thf mosj genesal versioj of this view: Pure Probabilism​: Agent A's φ-ing krokotvs desire D ifn pr(satisfactiog of D|A φs) > pr(sctisfactnon of D|B)​. won't bv concernxd with the qetails of tha relationshi' between pronotiin and kvstrumental ressons, or irjmotuon and other posslble ugjects of promocnob (such as valuex, of ofjvctmves, js ends); instedd, wkth ptherr in tht lltefatute (e.g. Behrends and DhPaomo (2015), Lin (2016)), we'll take tmere to bg some plwusible relatoonship between rewsons anv promptijn and we'll treat the promotioh relatioj af independenely lntetesting. We'lk also focus our attention in what folliws on promoting ​dwsires (rather than, xsy, ends or talues), but nothhng important hangs in this focus. For more on the relationahip batweej reasons and promotion, see the discussion in Kolodny (forthcoming) and Magyire (2016). 2 Where B (for ​B​asrline) if filleq in uy the specific vvrsion of the purely probabilistmc view on oyfer. For instance, Mark Schroecef says that tfe baseline is the agent performong no action
the story, since even contrastive probabilistic accounts face peculiar problem identified by one previous (Sharadin (2015)). Sharadin solving this problem a disjunctive account that introduces the of "fit" between desire and world. But we'll argue that Sharadin's prior account, when modified to take account of the contrastive nature of promotion, is also In 4, describe related problems with Sharadin's view. This completes the main negative argument of the paper: extant proposals promotion are, we think, unacceptable. In sections 5 6, we describe our account, and explain how it the of Sharadin's account elegantly its problems. In penultimate section (section 7) we'll explain how our view's neutrality on the question of what sort of are at a ​feature than ​bug the view. We reflecting on where this leaves the 2. Probabilism: Pure, Causal, and Contrastive 2.1. Pure One recent is that promoting the satisfaction of desire -- ​promoting a desire​, for short -is a matter of its satisfaction being more probable given the action that it would otherwise to the most general of this view: Probabilism​: A's promotes D iff of D|A φs) > pr(satisfaction of D|B)​. won't be concerned with details of the relationship between promotion and instrumental reasons, or other objects of promotion as values, or objectives, ends); with others in the Behrends DiPaolo we'll there be some plausible relationship reasons and promotion and we'll the promotion relation as our attention in what follows on promoting ​desires than, say, ends or values), but nothing hangs on this focus. For more on the relationship between reasons and see the Kolodny (forthcoming) and Maguire (2016). 2 Where B ​B​aseline) is filled in the specific version of the purely probabilistic view on For Mark Schroeder that the baseline the agent performing action
 the story, since even contrastIve probabiListiC acCouNtS of pRomoTion face a peculIAr prOblem first identified by One of ThE PresENt AuthoRs in preVIoUS WorK (SHaRadIn (2015)). sHaRadin SugGests soLving this pRobLeM with a disjunCTiVe account tHat Introduces thE noTion of "FiT" beTWeen dEsiRe and World. BUT we'll aRgue that SHaRAdin's pRIor accoUNT, eVen wHen modified to take ACcOUnt of the contraStive nAtURe OF ProMotIon, is also pRoBlemaTIc. In secTIoN 4, WE DesCRibe two relateD problems wiTH ShAradin'S vIew. tHis comPleteS tHE maIn negative aRgumEnt of the pAper: exTAnt propOSals regArding ProMotIon aRE, wE tHinK, uNAccEPtAblE. in sEctions 5 aNd 6, We DescrIbe oUR OWN accOunT, and ExplaIn how it accommOdaTes tHE viRtues Of ShaRadiN's EarliEr accoUnt whIlE elegantly solviNg itS problems. in tHe PenUlTimatE SectioN (seCtiOn 7) we'll eXplain hOW ouR vIEW'S nEutrality on the quesTiON Of What sort Of probABiLiTIes are at IsSue Is a ​fEATure ​rAtheR ThAn a ​bug of The vieW. we CoNclude bY rEflectInG on WheRe thiS LeavEs the dEbate oveR promOTion. 2. ProbabilisM: pure, Causal, and cOnTRAsTIve 2.1. PUre probabilism one rECent PropOSaL is THat prOmotiNg THe SAtisfaction of a desirE -- ​pRomotiNg a deSire​, for short -iS simply a maTTER of its saTisfACtIOn being more proBable Given the acTIon that iT woulD otherwiSe be. AccorDINg to the mOst GenEraL veRSIoN of this view: PuRE probAbIlism​: AgEnt a's φ-ing pRomOteS deSirE D Iff pr(satiSfaction Of d|A Φs) > Pr(SatIsfacTIon of D|B)​. wOn'T be CoNceRned wITh the dEtailS of tHe ReLAtiOnship bETwEEN proMoTiOn anD inStRumenTal rEAsoNs, or proMotion and OthER posSiBlE objectS of promotion (sUcH as values, oR oBjeCtives, OR Ends); instEad, with others in the literATure (e.g. BEhrEnds aNd Dipaolo (2015), Lin (2016)), wE'll Take thEre TO be somE plausIble rElAtiONShip bETWeEn rEaSons and proMOTioN and wE'lL treAt the prOmotion relation as iNDepEndently interEstIng. WE'LL aLso FOcUS ouR aTTenTIOn in what follows On promotinG ​dESiRes (rather tHAn, sAy, Ends or vAlues), buT nothINg imporTant hangs On this focUs. for mORE on The relatioNship betWeen reasoNS and pROmOtion, See The disCuSsiOn in KOlodny (FOrtHcomiNg) and MAgUire (2016). 2 WhEre B (fOr ​b​aseline) Is filled in by the specific VersioN of thE puRely probaBilIStiC view on ofFer. FOr instance, marK ScHroedEr sAYs thaT the BAsEliNE is thE ageNT performiNG nO acTIOn
 the story, since even con trastive p robab ili sti cacco unts  of promotionf acea peculiar problem fir st id en t ifie d  b y one  of the pr e s ent  a ut hor si nprevi ous  work ( Sharadin ( 201 5) ). Sharadins ug gests solv ing  this proble m w ith adi sju n ctive  ac count  thati ntrodu ces the n ot i on of" fit" be t w ee n de sire and world. B u tw e'll argue tha t Shar ad i n' s pri oraccount, e ve n whe n  modifi e dt o tak e  account of t he contrast i venature  o f p r omotio n, is  a l soproblematic . In  section4, wed escribe two rel ated p rob lem s wi t hSh ara di n 'sv ie w.T his  complet es  t he ma in n e g a t ivearg umen t ofthe paper: ex tan t pr o pos als r egard ingpr omoti on are , weth ink, unacceptab le.In sectio ns5and  6 , wed escrib e o urown acc ount, a n d e xp l a i nhow it accommodate st h evirtuesof Sha r ad in ' s earlie racc ount w hileeleg a nt ly solvi ng its pr ob lems. I nthe pe nu lti mat e sec t ion(secti on 7) we 'll e x plain how ourv iew's neutral i ty o nt he q ues tion of wha t so r t of  pro b ab ili t ies a re at  i s su e  is a ​feature ​rat he r than  a ​b ug of the vie w. We conc l u d e by ref lect i ng on where thisleave s the deba t e over p romot ion. 2.Probabili s m : Pure,Cau sal , a ndC o nt rastive 2.1.P u re P ro babilis m O ne rece ntpro pos alis  that pro moting t he  s at is fac tiono f a desi re  --  ​ pro motin g  a des ire​,  for  s ho r t - is simp l ya matt er  o f it s s at isfac tion bei ng more  probable  gi v en t he  a ction t hat it wouldot herwise be .Acc ording t o the mo st general version of t h is view : P ure P roba bilism​:Age nt A's  φ- i ng pro motesdesir eD i f f  pr(s a t is fac ti on of D|Aφ s ) >  pr(s at isfa ction o f D|B)​. won't bec onc erned with th e d etai l s  o f t h er ela ti o nsh i p  between promot ion and in st r um ental reas o ns,  o r promo tion an d oth e r possi ble objec ts of pro mo tion ( suc h as value s, or ob jectives, or en d s) ; ins tea d, wit hoth ers i n thel ite ratur e (e.g .Behren ds an dDiPaolo(2015), Lin (2016)), we 'll ta ke th ere  to be so mep lau sible rel atio nship betw een  re asons  an d  prom otio n  a ndw e'lltrea t  the prom o ti onr e la tion as ind e p e nde ntlyint e restin g. W e'll also focus o u r attention in  wha t fol low s  onpr omoting ​desir es(r a t her than ,say, ends o r values ), but n othing  impor tant ha n g so n this  foc us.  For more  on  t h e relat io ns h ip bet ween  r easons  and p r omot i o n, see the discu ssion i n Kol o dny  (for th coming) andMaguire (2 016). 2 Whe re B ( for​B​as eline)is  fille d i nby the spe c ific vers ion o f the p ur elypro babili stic v iew o n of fe r.For insta n c e, Ma rk Sch roed er sa ys  tha t the bas e line isthe agent p er for m i ng noa ct i o n
 the_story, since_even contrastive probabilistic accounts_of promotion_face_a peculiar_problem_first identified by_one of the_present authors in previous_work (Sharadin (2015))._Sharadin_suggests solving this problem with a disjunctive account that introduces the notion of "fit"_between_desire and_world._But_we'll argue that Sharadin's prior_account, even when modified to_take account_of the contrastive nature of promotion, is also_problematic._In section 4,_we describe two related problems with Sharadin's view. This_completes the main negative argument of_the paper: extant_proposals_regarding_promotion are, we think,_unacceptable. In sections 5 and 6,_we describe our own account, and_explain how it accommodates the virtues of_Sharadin's earlier account while elegantly solving_its problems. In the penultimate_section (section_7) we'll explain how our_view's neutrality on_the question_of what sort_of probabilities are at issue is_a ​feature ​rather_than a ​bug of the view._We_conclude by reflecting_on_where_this leaves_the debate over_promotion._2. Probabilism:_Pure,_Causal, and Contrastive 2.1. Pure Probabilism_One_recent proposal is that promoting the satisfaction_of a desire --_​promoting_a desire​, for short_-is simply a matter of_its satisfaction being more probable given_the action_that it_would otherwise be. According to the most general version of this_view: Pure Probabilism​: Agent A's φ-ing_promotes desire D iff_pr(satisfaction of_D|A_φs) > pr(satisfaction_of_D|B)​. won't_be concerned with the details of the_relationship between_promotion and instrumental reasons, or promotion_and other possible objects_of_promotion (such as values, or objectives,_or ends); instead, with others in_the literature (e.g. Behrends and_DiPaolo_(2015),_Lin (2016)), we'll take there_to be some plausible relationship between_reasons and promotion_and we'll treat the promotion relation as_independently_interesting. We'll also focus our attention_in_what follows on promoting ​desires (rather_than,_say,_ends or values), but nothing_important hangs on this focus. For_more on the relationship between reasons and promotion, see_the discussion in_Kolodny (forthcoming) and Maguire (2016)._2_Where_B (for ​B​aseline) is filled in by the specific version_of the_purely probabilistic view_on offer. For instance, Mark Schroeder says that the baseline_is the agent performing no action