 can make decisions for which they can assume responsibility. But given that our commonsense categories have changed in the past, their current prominence is not enough to argue against their revision. The extent to which neuroscience will shape our conceptions about ourselves is an empirical claim yet to be verified, but religion, philosophy, and science have shaped our beliefs in the past, and it seems likely that they will continue to do so in the future.  REFERENCES Churchland, P. M. 1989. A neurocomputational perspective: The nature of mind and the structure of science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Gligorov, N. 2007. Eliminative materialism and the distinction between common sense and science. PhD dissertation, City University of New York, New York. Kaposy, C. 2010. The supposed obligation to change one's beliefs about ethics because of discoveries in neuroscience. AJOB Neuroscience 1(4): 23–30. Searle, J. R. 1992. The rediscovery of the mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Sellars, W. 1991. Philosophy and the scientific image of man. In Science, perception and reality, 20. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview. Clarifying Conceptions of Freedom: Kaposy's Argument Against "The Inference" William Smith, Emory University Chris Kaposy's article "The Supposed Obligation to Change One's Beliefs About Ethics Because of Discoveries in Neuroscience" (2010) targets a common "inference" among neuroscientists and ethicists. Kaposy puts "The Inference" this way: "Scientific discoveries x, y, z imply that we ought not to believe claims in our ethical lives that are inconsistent with x, y, z." He claims this inference is increasingly deployed to eliminate the ethical concepts of free will, persons, and selves in light of neuroscientific evidence; he argues against it with two claims. First, he asserts that rationality requires the concepts that are attacked and concludes that we cannot be under a rational norm to eliminate a concept Thanks to Cicely Chen for reading a draft of this paper. Address correspondence to William Smith, Emory University, School of Medicine, 444 Burlington Rd, Atlanta, GA 30307, USA. E-mail: wsmithv@emory.edu grounded in rationality (henceforth, the "Freedom Is Rationally Necessary" claim). Second, he claims that
can make decisions for which they can assume responsibility. But give that our commonsense class have changed in the past, their current prominence is not enough to argue against their rewrite. The extent to which neuroscience will shape our conceptions about ourselves is an empirical title yet to be verified, but religion, doctrine, and skill have shaped our beliefs in the past, and it seem likely that they will continue to do therefore in the future.  REFERENCES Churchland, P. M. 1989. A neurocomputational perspective: The nature of mind and the structure of science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Gligorov, N. 2007. Eliminative materialism and the distinction between coarse sense and science. PhD dissertation, City University of New York, New York. Kaposy, C. 2010. The presuppose obligation to change one's beliefs about ethics because of discovery in neuroscience. AJOB Neuroscience 1(4 ): 23–30. Searle, J. R. 1992. The rediscovery of the mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Sellars, W. 1991. Philosophy and the scientific image of man. In Science, perception and world, 20. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview. Clarifying Conceptions of Freedom: Kaposy's Argument Against " The Inference " William Smith, Emory University Chris Kaposy's article " The Supposed Obligation to Change One's Beliefs About Ethics Because of Discoveries in Neuroscience " (2010) targets a common " inference " among neuroscientist and ethicist. Kaposy put " The Inference " this way: " Scientific discoveries x, y, z imply that we ought not to believe claims in our ethical lives that are inconsistent with x, y, z. " He claim this inference is increasingly deployed to eliminate the ethical concept of spare volition, persons, and selves in light of neuroscientific evidence; he argues against it with two claims. First, he asserts that rationality requires the concept that are attacked and concludes that we cannot be under a rational norm to eliminate a concept Thanks to Cicely Chen for reading a draft of this paper. Address correspondence to William Smith, Emory University, School of Medicine, 444 Burlington Rd, Atlanta, GA 30307, USA. E - mail: wsmithv@emory.edu prime in rationality (henceforth, the " Freedom Is Rationally Necessary " title). Second, he claims that
 caj make decisions for whigh they can assume respmnsibimity. But given that our commonsense ratetoriew have changed in the oast, theig current pronunence is ikt enounk to zvgue cgeinst their revlsion. The eftent to which nduxoscience will shape our conceptions about pugselves is an gmpirpcwl cmaim yet to be verified, but religikn, philmsophy, and scoence have shaped our beliffs ln the past, and it seems likeoy trqt they will continue uo do so in jhe future.  REFERENCES Churchlana, P. M. 1989. A neurocimputwjional perspxctive: The nature of mind dnd the structure of xcixnce. Cambridge, MA: MIT Prevs. Gligorov, N. 2007. Eliiinative kacerialism and the disribctiot bedweev coomoh xehse anf srience. PhD sissertatiob, City University og Gve York, New Ykrk. Ka[ofy, C. 2010. The supposed obligation to change ons's beliefs about ethics because of discoverigs in neurjscience. AJOB Neuroscience 1(4): 23–30. Searle, J. R. 1992. The redivcovecy of tme mkbd. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Sellars, W. 1991. Philosophy znc nhe scientific imcge of man. In Scoejcr, perception avd realitg, 20. Atascadero, CA: Rldgevier. Claeifying Cjnceltions of Freedom: Kaposy's Aegument Agaiust "The Inference" Wilpiam Smith, Zmory Oniverxity Chris Kaposy's artiele "Ths Supposed Lbligatioh to Change One's Celpefs About Eufics Because of Dyscoveriew in Neuroszienve" (2010) tawgets a colmon "ltference" among neugoscigntistv and ethifists. Kaposy puts "The Inference" this way: "Sciemthfib discovexies x, y, z imply thwt we ought noj to belizve clxims in oug ethical lives that are inconsisdgnt with x, y, v." He claiis tyis unferenzd is increasinbly deplojeb to elimunate the ethical goncekta of free will, 'trsins, and selves on uigrt oh neuwmscientific aviddncd; he afgues againwg it with two claims. Firvt, hs asserts that ratookality rewuires tre concepts tnat are attacked ajd coicluder thay wg cannot be under a rational nodm to elilinwte a concepe Thqnks to Ciceky Chen for reading a draft of this papxr. Address correspondenxe to William Smith, Tmory Universmty, Scrool of Madicine, 444 Burlington Ed, Atlanta, GA 30307, USS. E-mail: wsmithv@emory.esu grognded in rationality (henceforth, the "Freedom Is Rationally Necessary" claim). Secobd, he rlwims that
can make decisions for which they can But that our categories have changed prominence not enough to against their revision. extent to which neuroscience will shape conceptions about ourselves is an empirical claim yet to be verified, but religion, and science have shaped our beliefs in the past, and it seems likely they continue do in the future.  REFERENCES Churchland, P. M. 1989. A neurocomputational perspective: The nature of mind the structure of science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. N. 2007. Eliminative materialism the distinction between common sense science. dissertation, City of York, York. Kaposy, C. The supposed obligation to change one's beliefs about ethics because of discoveries in neuroscience. AJOB Neuroscience 1(4): Searle, J. The rediscovery the Cambridge, MIT Press. Sellars, Philosophy and the scientific image of perception and reality, 20. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview. Clarifying of Freedom: Argument Against "The Inference" William Smith, University Chris Kaposy's article "The Supposed Obligation to One's Beliefs About Ethics Because of Discoveries in Neuroscience" (2010) targets a common "inference" among ethicists. Kaposy puts "The this way: "Scientific x, z that ought not believe claims in our ethical lives that are inconsistent with x, z." He claims this inference is increasingly deployed to eliminate concepts free will, persons, selves in light of evidence; argues against it with First, asserts the that attacked and concludes that cannot be under a rational to eliminate a concept reading a draft of this paper. Address correspondence William Smith, Emory University, School of Medicine, Burlington Rd, Atlanta, GA 30307, USA. E-mail: wsmithv@emory.edu grounded in rationality (henceforth, "Freedom Is claim). Second, he claims that
 can make decisions for which tHey can assuMe resPonSibIlIty. BUt giVen that our commONsenSe categories have changeD in thE pASt, thEIr CurreNt promiNEnCE Is nOt EnOugH tO ArGue agAinSt their Revision. ThE exTeNt to which neuROsCience will ShaPe our conceptIonS about OuRseLVes is An eMpiriCal claIM yet to Be verifieD, bUT religIOn, philoSOPhY, and Science have shaped OUr BEliefs in the pasT, and it SeEMs LIKelY thAt they will CoNtinuE To do so iN ThE FUTurE.  rEFERENCES ChuRchland, P. M. 1989. A nEUroComputAtIonAL perspEctivE: THE naTure of mind aNd thE structurE of sciENce. CambRIdge, MA: MiT PresS. GlIgoRov, N. 2007. eLiMiNatIvE MatERiAliSM anD the distInCtIon beTweeN COMMon sEnsE and ScienCe. PhD dissertaTioN, CitY uniVersiTy of NEw YoRk, new YoRk. KapoSy, C. 2010. ThE sUpposed obligatiOn to Change one'S beLiEfs AbOut etHIcs becAusE of DiscoveRies in nEUroScIENCe. aJOB Neuroscience 1(4): 23–30. SeArLE, j. R. 1992. the redisCovery OF tHe MInd. CambrIdGe, Ma: MIT pREss. SeLlarS, w. 1991. PHilosophY and thE ScIeNtific iMaGe of maN. IN ScIenCe, perCEptiOn and rEality, 20. AtAscadERo, CA: Ridgeview. CLArifying ConcePTiONS oF freeDom: kaposy's ArguMent aGainSt "ThE inFerENce" WiLliam smITh, eMory University Chris kaPosy's aRticlE "The Supposed OBligation tO cHAnge One's beliEFs aBout Ethics BecaUse of discoverieS In NeurosCiencE" (2010) targets A common "inFERence" amoNg nEurOscIenTIStS and ethicists. kAPosy PuTs "The InFerEnce" thiS waY: "ScIenTifIc DiscoveriEs x, y, z impLy ThAt We OugHt not TO believe ClAimS iN ouR ethiCAl liveS that Are iNcOnSIstEnt with X, Y, z." hE ClaiMs ThIs inFerEnCe is iNcreASinGly deplOyed to eliMinATe thE eThIcal conCepts of free wiLl, Persons, and SeLveS in ligHT Of neurosCientific evidence; he arguES againsT it With tWo clAims. First, He aSserts ThaT RationAlity rEquirEs The CONceptS THaT arE aTtacked and CONclUdes tHaT we cAnnot be Under a rational norm TO elIminate a concePt THankS TO CIceLY CHEn fOr REadING a draft of this paPer. Address CoRReSpondence tO wilLiAm Smith, emory UnIversITy, SchooL of MediciNe, 444 BurlingToN Rd, ATLAntA, GA 30307, USA. E-maiL: wsmithv@Emory.edu gROundeD In RatioNalIty (henCeForTh, the "freedoM is RAtionAlly NeCeSsary" cLaim). SEcOnd, he claIms that
 can make decisions for wh ich they c an as sum e r es pons ibil ity. But given that  our commonsense categ ories  h a ve c h an ged i n the p a st , the ir  c urr en t  p romin enc e is no t enough t o a rg ue against t h ei r revision . T he extent to  wh ich ne ur osc i encewil l sha pe our concep tions abo ut oursel v es is a n em piri cal claim yet tob ev erified, but r eligio n, ph i l oso phy , and scie nc e hav e  shaped ou r b eli e fs in the pas t, and it s e ems  likel ytha t  theywillco n tin ue to do so  inthe futur e.  R E FERENCE S  Church land,P.M.1989 .  A  n eur oc o mpu t at ion a l p erspecti ve :The n atur e o f  min d a nd t he st ructure of sc ien ce.C amb ridge , MA:  MIT  P ress.  Gligo rov,N.  2007. Eliminat ivemateriali sman d t he  dist i nction  be twe en comm on sens e  an ds c i en ce. PhD dissertati on , Ci ty Unive rsityo fNe w  York, N ew  Yo rk.K a posy,  C.2 01 0. The s uppose d  o bl igation  t o chan ge  on e's  beli e fs a bout e thics be cause of discoveries in neuroscien c e. A JO B  Neu ros cience 1(4) : 23 – 30.Sear l e,  J. R. 19 92. T he re d iscovery of the min d.  Cambr idge,  MA: MIT Pres s. Sellars , W . 1991.Phil o so p hy and the sci entif ic image o f  man. In  Scie nce, per ception a n d  reality , 2 0.Ata sca d e ro , CA: Ridgevi e w . Cl ar ifyingCon ception s o f F ree dom :Kaposy'sArgument  A ga in st  "T he In f erence"Wi lli am  Sm ith,E mory U niver sity  C hr i s K aposy's ar t i cle"T he  Sup pos ed  Obli gati o n t o Chang e One's B eli e fs A bo ut  Ethics  Because of D is coveries i nNeu roscie n c e" (2010 ) targets a common "inf e rence"amo ng ne uros cientists  an d ethi cis t s. Kap osy pu ts "T he  In f e rence " th iswa y: "Scient i f icdisco ve ries  x, y,z imply that we ou g htnot to believ e c laim s in  ou r  e t hic al liv e s  that are incon sistent wi th x,  y, z." He cla im s thisinferen ce is increas ingly dep loyed toel imin a t e t he ethical  concept s of free will, pe rsons , a nd sel ve s i n lig ht ofn eur oscie ntific  e videnc e; he  a rgues ag ainst it with two claim s. Fir st, h e a sserts th atr ati onality r equi res the co nce pts  that  ar e  atta cked an d c o nclud es t h at we can n ot  be u nd er a ration a l nor m toeli m inatea co ncept Thanks to C i cely Chen forread i n g a  dr a ft o fthis paper. Ad dre ss c orrespon de nce to Will iam Smit h, Emory  Unive rsity,  School o fM edicin e, 4 44Burlingto n R d, Atlanta ,GA 30307,  USA .E-mail : wsmi t hv@e m o ry.edu groundedin ra t i onali t y ( hence fo rth, th e  "Fr eedom Is R ationally N ecessa ry"claim ). Seco nd , he c lai ms  that
 can_make decisions_for which they can_assume responsibility._But_given that_our_commonsense categories have_changed in the_past, their current prominence_is not enough_to_argue against their revision. The extent to which neuroscience will shape our conceptions about_ourselves_is an_empirical_claim_yet to be verified, but_religion, philosophy, and science have_shaped our_beliefs in the past, and it seems likely_that_they will continue_to do so in the future.  REFERENCES Churchland,_P. M. 1989. A neurocomputational perspective:_The nature of_mind_and_the structure of science._Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Gligorov, N._2007. Eliminative materialism and the distinction_between common sense and science. PhD dissertation,_City University of New York, New_York. Kaposy, C. 2010. The_supposed obligation_to change one's beliefs about_ethics because of_discoveries in_neuroscience. AJOB Neuroscience_1(4): 23–30. Searle, J. R. 1992._The rediscovery of_the mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press._Sellars,_W. 1991. Philosophy_and_the_scientific image_of man. In_Science,_perception and_reality,_20. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview. Clarifying Conceptions_of_Freedom: Kaposy's Argument Against "The Inference" William_Smith, Emory University Chris_Kaposy's_article "The Supposed Obligation_to Change One's Beliefs About_Ethics Because of Discoveries in Neuroscience"_(2010) targets_a common_"inference" among neuroscientists and ethicists. Kaposy puts "The Inference" this way:_"Scientific discoveries x, y, z imply_that we ought not_to believe_claims_in our ethical_lives_that are_inconsistent with x, y, z." He claims_this inference_is increasingly deployed to eliminate the_ethical concepts of free_will,_persons, and selves in light of_neuroscientific evidence; he argues against it_with two claims. First, he_asserts_that_rationality requires the concepts that_are attacked and concludes that we_cannot be under_a rational norm to eliminate a concept_Thanks_to Cicely Chen for reading a_draft_of this paper. Address correspondence to_William_Smith,_Emory University, School of Medicine,_444 Burlington Rd, Atlanta, GA 30307,_USA. E-mail: wsmithv@emory.edu grounded in rationality (henceforth, the "Freedom_Is Rationally Necessary"_claim). Second, he claims that