 law from a teleology in nature; Kant's ethics rest on a distinction between the autonomous and heteronomous will. But Buddhist philosophy is often not taken to work this way; its sophisticated rational arguments about the world and the self are treated as if they have little if anything to do with ethical conduct. It is in this context that Damien Keown can deny that such a thing as Buddhist ethics even exists: While Buddhist teachings include normative aspects, such as the Five Precepts and the rules of the Vinaya, these are typically presented simply as injunctions, rather than as conclusions logically deduced from explicitly stated values and principles. In other words, the Precepts are simply announced, and one is left to figure out the invisible superstructure from which they are derived. Thus although Buddhism has normative teachings, it does not have normative ethics. ("Morality" 50) 256 Lele, The Metaphysical Basis of Śāntideva's Ethics I have discussed before ("Revaluation" 45–49) why I think Keown's claim is invalid with respect to Śāntideva, and I think this article provides further demonstration of the point. I think it is relevant that Keown elsewhere-before he said Buddhism had no normative ethics-seemed to have himself taken the position that metaphysics was not helpful for ethics: "to pursue the issue of the ultimate ontological constitution of individual natures in this context is to confuse ethics with metaphysics, and does not make for a fruitful line of enquiry" (Nature 19). By contrast, I offer the suggestion that metaphysical arguments like Śāntideva's are among the most fruitful resources for Buddhist normative ethics. Indeed, by making an interconnected system of metaphysical and ethical arguments, Śāntideva appears more clearly than many other Indian thinkers to be engaging in the traditional Western conception of philosophy as an interconnected system of theoretical and practical philosophy, like Aristotle's or Kant's.8 Śāntideva is not alone in his use of metaphysics as a foundation for ethical claims. Most notably, the Bodhicaryāvatāra's connection of metaphysics to ethics has close resonances to the "four illusions" with which Karen Lang titles her translation of Candrakīrti's commentary on Āryadeva's Catuḥśataka. These, too, are metaphysical errors which lead to ethical missteps. Āryadeva's list of metaphysical errors-perceiving the imper
law from a teleology in nature; Kant's ethics rest on a distinction between the autonomous and heteronomous volition. But Buddhist doctrine is much not taken to make this means; its sophisticated rational argument about the worldly concern and the self are treated as if they suffer little if anything to do with ethical demeanor. It is in this context that Damien Keown can deny that such a thing as Buddhist ethic even exist: While Buddhist teachings include normative aspects, such as the Five Precepts and the rules of the Vinaya, these are typically introduce simply as injunctions, rather than as ending logically deduced from explicitly stated values and principles. In early words, the Precepts are just announced, and one is left to figure out the inconspicuous superstructure from which they are derived. Thus although Buddhism has normative teachings, it does not have normative ethics. (" Morality " 50) 256 Lele, The Metaphysical Basis of Śāntideva's Ethics I have discussed before (" Revaluation " 45–49) why I think Keown's claim is invalid with respect to Śāntideva, and I think this article provides further presentation of the detail. I think it is relevant that Keown elsewhere - before he say Buddhism take no normative ethics - seemed to accept himself taken the position that metaphysics was not helpful for ethics: " to pursue the exit of the ultimate ontological constitution of individual natures in this context is to confuse ethics with metaphysics, and does not make for a fruitful production line of enquiry " (Nature 19). By contrast, I offer the suggestion that metaphysical argumentation like Śāntideva's are among the most fruitful resource for Buddhist normative ethics. Indeed, by making an interconnected system of metaphysical and ethical argumentation, Śāntideva appears more clearly than many other Indian thinker to be engaging in the traditional Western conception of philosophy as an interconnect system of theoretical and virtual philosophy, like Aristotle's or Kant's.8 Śāntideva is not alone in his use of metaphysics as a basis for ethical claims. about notably, the Bodhicaryāvatāra's connection of metaphysics to ethics has close plangency to the " four illusions " with which Karen Lang titles her transformation of Candrakīrti's commentary on Āryadeva's Catuḥśataka. These, too, are metaphysical errors which lead to ethical missteps. Āryadeva's list of metaphysical errors - perceiving the imper
 laa from a teleology in nauure; Kant's ethics rest oi a disfinction between the autonomous and ieteeonomius will. But Buddhist ohilosophj is ofteb nou taken to work tijs way; lcs solmistieaved rational arnuments abogt the world atd tke self are treated as if they have jittle of anything to dj wiuh qthidal conduct. It is in this context fhat Dakien Keown cam deny that such a thing ad Bufdhist ethics even exists: Whioe Btedhist teachkngs include normative aspects, such as the Five Preceots aud the rulew if hve Vinaya, tiese age typically igesenteg simplu as injunctioks, ravher than as conclusions nogically deduced srom explhcntly stated values ane princhplev. In ithdr socds, the Pgecxpts are sijply announxed, and one is left tj figure out tge invysyble superstructure from which they are dedived. Thus although Budehism has normative tgachings, ie does not have normative ethics. ("Morality" 50) 256 Lele, Dhe Mxtxphvwical Vadis of Śāntideva's Ethics I have discussed beforq ("Rtvakuation" 45–49) why I think Keowm's ckwim is invalia with reapect to Śāntideva, ajd I thynk tyis articje ptovides further demonstratiin of the popnt. U think it is relerant that Keuwn glsewhrre-before he said Buddhnsm has no normatlve ethica-reemed to have hkmsvlf daken tht position that meeaphysics was not heupfuk for qthics: "to oursuc the issue of the kltimcte ottological constitution of individual natnces in this cpndexn is to cjnfusc ethics with mqtaphysics, and does njt maye for a fguitful lmne of enquiwy" (Nature 19). By fontrast, I ohfer the fuggwstiin that oetaphysical atguments like Śāntideca's are among the kosj rruitful resourets dor Buddhist notmagivq vthmcs. Iggeed, by makitg av ivyercovnected sysbem of ketaphysical and ethhcal arguments, Śāntideva aipears mote clearlr than many oyher Indian thinkegs to be engabind in the traditional Western cknception of philosophy ws ak injerconnecteb system of theoretical and practical phmlosophy, like Aristotlg's or Kant's.8 Śāntideva ix not alone mn his use of mataphysics as a founeation for ethicak claims. Most notably, the Bmdhicwryāvatāra's connection of metaphysics to ethics has close resonances to the "four mljusions" witg whoch Kdrzn Kang tytled her translation of Candrakīrti's commentary on Ārbadeva's Caduḥśctaka. These, too, are metaphysivau errors whicf lead to ethical misstels. Āryadefa's list of metaphysical errors-lerceiving the imper
law from a teleology in nature; Kant's on distinction between autonomous and heteronomous often taken to work way; its sophisticated arguments about the world and the are treated as if they have little if anything to do with ethical It is in this context that Damien Keown can deny that such a as ethics exists: Buddhist teachings include normative aspects, such as the Five Precepts and the rules of the Vinaya, are typically presented simply as injunctions, rather than conclusions logically deduced from stated values and principles. In words, Precepts are announced, one left to figure the invisible superstructure from which they are derived. Thus although Buddhism has normative teachings, it does not normative ethics. 256 Lele, Metaphysical of Ethics I have ("Revaluation" 45–49) why I think Keown's with respect to Śāntideva, and I think this provides further of the point. I think it relevant that Keown elsewhere-before he said Buddhism had normative ethics-seemed to have himself taken the position that metaphysics was not helpful for ethics: the issue of the ontological constitution of natures this is confuse ethics metaphysics, and does not make for a fruitful line of enquiry" 19). By contrast, I offer the suggestion that metaphysical arguments are the most fruitful for Buddhist normative ethics. by an interconnected system of ethical Śāntideva than other thinkers to be engaging the traditional Western conception of as an interconnected system like Aristotle's or Kant's.8 Śāntideva is not alone his use of metaphysics as a foundation ethical claims. Most notably, the Bodhicaryāvatāra's connection of metaphysics to ethics has resonances to illusions" with which Karen Lang titles her translation Candrakīrti's commentary on Āryadeva's These, too, are metaphysical errors which lead to ethical Āryadeva's of metaphysical the imper
 law from a teleology in nature; kant's ethicS rest On a DisTiNctiOn beTween the autonoMOus aNd heteronomous will. But BUddhiSt PHiloSOpHy is oFten not TAkEN To wOrK tHis WaY; ItS sophIstIcated rAtional argUmeNtS about the worLD aNd the self aRe tReated as if thEy hAve litTlE if ANythiNg tO do wiTh ethiCAl condUct. It is in ThIS conteXT that DaMIEn keowN can deny that such a THiNG as Buddhist ethIcs eveN eXIsTS: whiLe BUddhist teaChIngs iNClude noRMaTIVE asPEcts, such as the five PreceptS And The rulEs Of tHE VinayA, thesE aRE tyPically presEnteD simply as InjuncTIons, ratHEr than aS conclUsiOns LogiCAlLy DedUcED frOM eXplICitLy stated VaLuEs and PrinCIPLEs. In OthEr woRds, thE Precepts are sImpLy anNOunCed, anD one iS lefT tO figuRe out tHe invIsIble superstructUre fRom which tHey ArE deRiVed. ThUS althoUgh budDhism haS normatIVe tEaCHINgS, it does not have normAtIVE eThics. ("MorAlity" 50) 256 LELe, thE metaphysIcAl BAsis OF śāntiDeva'S etHics I havE discuSSeD bEfore ("ReVaLuatioN" 45–49) wHy I ThiNk KeoWN's clAim is iNvalid wiTh resPEct to Śāntideva, ANd I think this aRTiCLE pROvidEs fUrther demonStraTIon oF the POiNt. I THink iT is reLeVAnT That Keown elsewhere-bEfOre he sAid BuDdhism had no noRmative ethICS-Seemed to Have HImSElf taken the posItion That metaphYSics was nOt helPful for eThics: "to puRSUe the issUe oF thE ulTimATE oNtological conSTItutIoN of indiVidUal natuRes In tHis ConTeXt is to conFuse ethiCs WiTh MeTapHysicS, And does nOt MakE fOr a FruitFUl line Of enqUiry" (naTuRE 19). By ContrasT, i oFFEr thE sUgGestIon ThAt metAphySIcaL argumeNts like ŚāNtiDEva's ArE aMong the Most fruitful rEsOurces for BUdDhiSt normATIve ethicS. Indeed, by making an intercONnected SysTem of MetaPhysical aNd eThical ArgUMents, ŚĀntideVa appEaRs mORE cleaRLY tHan MaNy other IndIAN thInkerS tO be eNgaging In the traditional WeSTerN conception of PhiLosoPHY aS an INtERcoNnECteD SYstem of theoretiCal and pracTiCAl Philosophy, LIke arIstotle'S or Kant'S.8 ŚāntIDeva is nOt alone in His use of mEtAphySICs aS a foundatiOn for ethIcal claimS. most nOTaBly, thE BoDhicarYāVatĀra's cOnnectIOn oF metaPhysicS tO ethicS has cLoSe resonaNces to the "four illusions" wIth whiCh KarEn LAng titles Her TRanSlation of candRakīrti's coMmeNtaRy on ĀRyaDEva's CAtuḥŚAtAka. tHese, tOo, arE MetaphysiCAl ErrORS wHich lead to eTHICal MisstEps. āRyadevA's liSt of metaphysical eRRors-perceiving The iMPEr
 law from a teleology in n ature; Kan t's e thi csre st o n adistinction be t ween  the autonomous and he teron om o us w i ll . But  Buddhi s tp h ilo so ph y i so ft en no t t aken to  work this  wa y;  its sophist i ca ted ration alarguments ab out  the w or lda nd th e s elf a re tre a ted as  if theyha v e litt l e if an y t hi ng t o do with ethical co n duct. It is in  thisco n te x t  th atDamien Keo wn  cand eny tha t  s u c h  at hing as Buddh ist ethicse ven  exist s:  Wh i le Bud dhist  t e ach ings includ e no rmative a spects ,  such a s  the Fi ve Pre cep tsandt he  r ule so f t h eVin a ya,  these a re  t ypica llyp r e s ente d s impl y asinjunctions,rat hert han  as c onclu sion slogic ally d educe dfrom explicitly  sta ted value s a nd  pr in ciple s . In o the r w ords, t he Prec e pts  a r e si mply announced, an do n eis leftto fig u re  o u t the in vi sib le s u p erstr uctu r efrom whi ch the y  a re  derive d.  Thusal tho ugh  Budd h ismhas no rmativeteach i ngs, it does n o t have normat i ve e th i cs.("M orality" 50 ) 25 6  Lel e, T h eMet a physi cal B as i so f Śāntideva's Ethic sI have  disc ussed before("Revaluat i o n " 45–49)  why It hink Keown's c laimis invalid with res pectto Śānti deva, and I  think t his  ar tic lep r ov ides furtherd e mons tr ation o f t he poin t.I t hin k i tis releva nt thatKe ow nel sew here- b efore he  s aid  B udd hismh ad nonorma tive  e th i cs- seemedt oh a ve h im se lf t ake nthe p osit i onthat me taphysics  wa s  not  h el pful fo r ethics: "to  p ursue theis sue  of th e ultimate  ontological constituti o n of in div idual  nat ures in t his  conte xti s to c onfuse  ethi cs  wi t h  meta p h ys ics ,and does n o t  ma ke fo ra fr uitfulline of enquiry" ( N atu re 19). By co ntr ast, I  o ffe r  t h e s ug g est i o n that metaphys ical argum en t slike Śānti d eva 's  are am ong the  most fruitfu l resourc es for Bu dd hist n orm ative ethi cs. Inde ed, by ma k ing a n  i nterc onn ectedsy ste m ofmetaph y sic al an d ethi ca l argu ments ,Śāntidev a appears more clearlythan m any o the r Indianthi n ker s to be e ngag ing in the  tr adi tiona l W e stern  con c ep tio n  of p hilo s ophy as a n  i nte r c on nected syst e m oftheor eti c al and  pra ctical philosophy ,  like Aristotl e'so r  Ka nt' s .8 Ś ān tideva is notalo ne i n his us eof metaphys ics as a  f o undat ion fo r ethi cal cla i m s. Most n otab ly,  the Bodh ica ry ā vatāra' sco n nectio n of  m etaphy sics t o  eth i c s has close reso nance s to th e  "f our i ll usions" with  which Kar en Lang tit les he r tr ansla tion of  C andrak īrt i' s commenta r y on Ārya deva' s Catuḥ śa taka . T hese,too, a re me taph ys ica l errorsw h ic h  l ea d  to  eth icalmi sste ps. Āryad e va's lis t o f  metaph ys ica l errors - pe r c eiving the  im per
 law_from a_teleology in nature; Kant's_ethics rest_on_a distinction_between_the autonomous and_heteronomous will. But_Buddhist philosophy is often_not taken to_work_this way; its sophisticated rational arguments about the world and the self are treated_as_if they_have_little_if anything to do with_ethical conduct. It is in_this context_that Damien Keown can deny that such a_thing_as Buddhist ethics_even exists: While Buddhist teachings include normative aspects, such_as the Five Precepts and the_rules of the_Vinaya,_these_are typically presented simply_as injunctions, rather than as conclusions_logically deduced from explicitly stated values_and principles. In other words, the Precepts_are simply announced, and one is_left to figure out the_invisible superstructure_from which they are derived._Thus although Buddhism_has normative_teachings, it does_not have normative ethics. ("Morality" 50)_256 Lele, The_Metaphysical Basis of Śāntideva's Ethics I_have_discussed before ("Revaluation"_45–49)_why_I think_Keown's claim is_invalid_with respect_to_Śāntideva, and I think this article_provides_further demonstration of the point. I think_it is relevant that_Keown_elsewhere-before he said Buddhism_had no normative ethics-seemed to_have himself taken the position that_metaphysics was_not helpful_for ethics: "to pursue the issue of the ultimate ontological constitution_of individual natures in this context_is to confuse ethics_with metaphysics,_and_does not make_for_a fruitful_line of enquiry" (Nature 19). By contrast,_I offer_the suggestion that metaphysical arguments like_Śāntideva's are among the_most_fruitful resources for Buddhist normative ethics._Indeed, by making an interconnected system_of metaphysical and ethical arguments,_Śāntideva_appears_more clearly than many other_Indian thinkers to be engaging in_the traditional Western_conception of philosophy as an interconnected system_of_theoretical and practical philosophy, like Aristotle's_or_Kant's.8 Śāntideva is not alone in_his_use_of metaphysics as a foundation_for ethical claims. Most notably, the_Bodhicaryāvatāra's connection of metaphysics to ethics has close resonances_to the "four_illusions" with which Karen Lang_titles_her_translation of Candrakīrti's commentary on Āryadeva's Catuḥśataka. These, too, are_metaphysical errors_which lead to_ethical missteps. Āryadeva's list of metaphysical errors-perceiving the imper