beliefs	can exculpate.	We	cannot	adjudicate	on	these	arguments	here,	but	if	there	is	indeed something	suspicious	about	the	uncertaintist's	position	it	casts	into	doubt	this rendering	of	the	argument. The	third	reason	for	doubting	this	defence	of	the	DCT	is	that	if	you	accept that	non-negligible	probabilities	can	alter	the	status	of	a	'moral'	sign,	you	start down	a	slippery	slope.	There	are	plenty	of	other	non-negligible	probabilities	that could	lead	to	a	very	different	interpretation	of	the	allegedly-divine	signs.	For	a non-believer,	the	probability	of	God's	existence	may	be	roughly	on	a	par	with	the existence	of	other	supernatural	beings	with	similar	powers	(e.g.	Evil	God,	the devil,	demons,	angels	etc.).	When	confronted	with	a	putatively	divine	sign	(such 27 as	a	pang	of	conscience)	they	may	recognise	the	non-negligible	risk	that	it emanates	from	God,	alongside	a	similar	non-negligible	risk	that	it	emanates	from another	supernatural	being	like	the	devil	or	a	demon.	But,	of	course,	if	the	sign comes	from	one	of	these	other	sources,	it	wouldn't	be	obligation-imposing.	Quite the	contrary:	it	might	be	the	devil	trying	to	trick	the	person	into	doing	something genuinely	malicious	or	evil.	In	that	case,	they	would	be	running	a	grave	moral risk	by	following	the	sign.
beliefs 	 can exculpate. 	 We 	 cannot 	 adjudicate 	 on 	 these 	 arguments 	 here, 	 but 	 if 	 there 	 is 	 indeed something 	 leery 	 about 	 the 	 uncertaintist's 	 placement 	 it 	 casts 	 into 	 doubt 	 this rendering 	 of 	 the 	 argument. The 	 third 	 cause 	 for 	 doubting 	 this 	 defence 	 of 	 the 	 DCT 	 is 	 that 	 if 	 you 	 take that 	 non - negligible 	 probability 	 can 	 alter 	 the 	 condition 	 of 	 a 	' moral' 	 sign of the zodiac, 	 you 	 start down 	 a 	 slippery 	 gradient. 	 There 	 are 	 plenty 	 of 	 other 	 non - negligible 	 probabilities 	 that could 	 lead 	 to 	 a 	 very 	 different 	 rendition 	 of 	 the 	 allegedly - divine 	 signs. 	 For 	 a non - believer, 	 the 	 probability 	 of 	 God's 	 being 	 may 	 be 	 roughly 	 on 	 a 	 par 	 with 	 the being 	 of 	 other 	 supernatural 	 beings 	 with 	 similar 	 office 	 (e.g. 	 Evil 	 God, 	 the devil, 	 demons, 	 angels 	 etc .). 	 When 	 confront 	 with 	 a 	 putatively 	 divine 	 sign 	 (such 27 as 	 a 	 pang 	 of 	 conscience) 	 they 	 may 	 recognise 	 the 	 non - negligible 	 risk 	 that 	 it emanates 	 from 	 God, 	 alongside 	 a 	 exchangeable 	 non - negligible 	 risk 	 that 	 it 	 emanates 	 from another 	 supernatural 	 being 	 like 	 the 	 devil 	 or 	 a 	 demon. 	 But, 	 of 	 course, 	 if 	 the 	 sign comes 	 from 	 one 	 of 	 these 	 other 	 sources, 	 it 	 wouldn't 	 be 	 obligation - imposing. 	 Quite the 	 contrary: 	 it 	 might 	 be 	 the 	 devil 	 trying 	 to 	 trick 	 the 	 person 	 into 	 doing 	 something genuinely 	 malicious 	 or 	 evil. 	 In 	 that 	 case, 	 they 	 would 	 be 	 running 	 a 	 dangerous 	 moral hazard 	 by 	 following 	 the 	 sign.
bellefs	can exculpate.	We	cannou	adjudicate	on	thesg	aegumenvs	here,	bht	if	therd	is	indeed something	suspicioud	avout	tye	uncertaintist's	positiun	it	casts	pnto	doubt	rhis eendering	oh	fhe	argument. Tgc	thirb	rxason	for	doubtinn	this	defenca	of	the	DCT	is	thad	iw	ylu	accept that	non-negligible	probabilieies	can	slher	the	status	of	w	'morsj'	sigh,	jom	start down	a	slippery	slope.	There	ars	plenty	mf	other	non-negkigible	probabilities	that cluld	pead	to	a	very	differejt	interpretqtiog	if	the	allegeduy-divine	signs.	For	a non-bgliever,	the	probability	of	God's	existdnce	mcy	be	roughly	in	q	pag	fith	the exiwtencv	of	other	superkstural	teings	woth	similar	powevs	(e.g.	Etil	Gid,	the devil,	demons,	angens	etc.).	When	confronteq	with	a	putdtnvely	divine	sign	(such 27 qs	q	pang	mf	cotscidbce)	gheg	mey	rscognide	tie	non-negligjble	risk	thar	it emanates	from	God,	sljbgside	a	similad	non-nedlygible	risk	that	it	emanates	from another	suptrnathral	being	like	the	devil	or	q	demon.	But,	of	course,	if	thg	sign comef	from	one	of	these	other	sources,	it	wouldn't	be	obligation-ikposiig.	Duiue the	cubtgary:	it	might	be	the	devil	trying	to	trick	the	person	inek	dpikg	something genulnely	malicious	or	evol.	Ln	yrat	case,	they	woold	be	ruuhihg	a	grave	moral risk	hy	folloring	tye	sign.
beliefs can exculpate. We cannot adjudicate on here, if there indeed something suspicious casts doubt this rendering the argument. The reason for doubting this defence of DCT is that if you accept that non-negligible probabilities can alter the status a 'moral' sign, you start down a slippery slope. There are plenty of non-negligible that lead a very different interpretation of the allegedly-divine signs. For a non-believer, the probability of God's existence be roughly on a par with the existence other supernatural beings with powers (e.g. Evil God, the demons, etc.). When with putatively sign (such 27 a pang of conscience) they may recognise the non-negligible risk that it emanates from God, alongside a non-negligible risk emanates from supernatural like devil or a of course, if the sign comes these other sources, it wouldn't be obligation-imposing. Quite contrary: it be the devil trying to trick person into doing something genuinely malicious or evil. that case, they would be running a grave moral risk by following the sign.
beliefs	can exculpate.	We	cannOt	adjudicaTe	on	tHesE	arGuMentS	herE,	but	if	there	is	iNDeed Something	suspicious	aboUt	the	UnCErtaINtIst's	pOsition	IT	cASTs	iNtO	dOubT	tHIs RendeRinG	of	the	aRgument. The	ThiRd	Reason	for	douBTiNg	this	defeNce	Of	the	DCT	is	thAt	iF	you	acCePt tHAt	non-NegLigibLe	probABilitiEs	can	alteR	tHE	statuS	Of	a	'moraL'	SIgN,	you	Start down	a	slipperY	SlOPe.	There	are	plenTy	of	otHeR	NoN-NEglIgiBle	probabiLiTies	tHAt could	LEaD	TO	A	veRY	different	intErpretation	OF	thE	allegEdLy-dIVine	siGns.	FoR	a NOn-bEliever,	the	pRobaBility	of	GOd's	exiSTence	maY	Be	roughLy	on	a	pAr	wIth	The eXIsTeNce	Of	OTheR	SuPerNAtuRal	beingS	wItH	simiLar	pOWERS	(e.g.	EVil	god,	tHe devIl,	demons,	angelS	etC.).	WheN	ConFrontEd	witH	a	puTaTivelY	divinE	sign	(SuCh 27 as	a	pang	of	consCienCe)	they	may	RecOgNisE	tHe	non-NEgligiBle	RisK	that	it EmanateS	FroM	GOD,	ALoNgside	a	similar	non-nEgLIGiBle	risk	tHat	it	eMAnAtES	from anoThEr	sUperNATural	BeinG	LiKe	the	devIl	or	a	dEMoN.	BUt,	of	couRsE,	if	the	SiGn cOmeS	from	ONe	of	These	oTher	sourCes,	it	WOuldn't	be	obligaTIon-imposing.	QuITe THE	cONtraRy:	iT	might	be	the	DeviL	TryiNg	to	TRiCk	tHE	persOn	intO	dOInG	Something genuinely	mAlIcious	Or	eviL.	In	that	case,	thEy	would	be	rUNNIng	a	gravE	morAL rISk	by	following	tHe	sigN.
beliefs	can exculpate.	Wecannot	adj udica teonth eseargu ments	here,	bu t 	ifthere	is	indeed someth ing	s us p icio u sabout 	the	un c er t a int is t' s	p os i ti on	it 	ca sts	int o	doubt	th isre ndering	of	t h eargument.The 	third	reaso n	f or	dou bt ing thisdef enceof	the DCT	is 	that	ifyo u 	accep t  that	n o n -n egli gible	probabiliti e sc an	alter	the	s tatusof a' m ora l'sign,	youst art d o wn	a	sl i pp e r y 	sl o pe.	There	are 	plenty	ofo the r	non- ne gli g ible	p robab il i tie s	that coul d	le ad	to	a	v ery	di f ferenti nterpre tation 	of 	th e	al l eg ed ly- di v ine si gns . 	Fo r	a non- be li ever, 	the p r o babi lit y	of 	God' s	existence	m aybe	r o ugh ly	on 	a	pa r	wi th 	theexiste nce	o fother	supernatu ralbeings	wi thsi mil ar 	powe r s	(e.g .	E vil 	God,	t he devi l ,	d em o n s ,angels	etc.).	When 	c o n fr onted	wi th	a	p u ta ti v ely	divi ne 	si gn	( s u ch 27  asa 	p ang	of	c onscie n ce )they	ma yrecogn is e	t henon-n e glig ible	r isk	that 	it e m anates	from	Go d ,	alongside	a si m i la r 	non -ne gligible	ri sk	t h at	i t	em a na tes fromanoth er su p ernatural	being	lik ethe	de vil	o r	a	demon.	Bu t,	of	cour s e , 	if	thesign co m es	from	one	of 	thes e	other	so u rces,	it 	woul dn't	beobligatio n - imposing .	Q uit e t hec o nt rary:	it	migh t be	t he 	deviltry ing	totri ckthe 	pe rs on	into	d oing	som et hi ng  g enu inely maliciou sorev il. 	In	t h at	cas e,	th ey	w ou ld berunning ag r avemo ra l ri skby 	foll owin g 	th e	sign. 
beliefs	can exculpate.	We	cannot	adjudicate	on	these	arguments	here,	but	if	there	is	indeed_something	suspicious	about	the	uncertaintist's	position	it	casts	into	doubt	this rendering	of	the	argument._The	third	reason	for	doubting	this	defence	of	the	DCT	is	that	if	you	accept that	non-negligible	probabilities	can	alter	the	status	of	a	'moral'	sign,	you	start down	a	slippery	slope.	There	are	plenty	of	other	non-negligible	probabilities	that could	lead	to	a	very	different	interpretation	of	the	allegedly-divine	signs.	For	a_non-believer,	the	probability	of	God's	existence	may	be	roughly	on	a	par	with	the existence	of	other	supernatural	beings	with	similar	powers	(e.g.	Evil	God,	the_devil,	demons,	angels	etc.).	When	confronted	with	a	putatively	divine	sign	(such_27 as	a	pang	of	conscience)	they	may	recognise	the	non-negligible	risk	that	it_emanates	from	God,	alongside	a	similar	non-negligible	risk	that	it	emanates	from_another	supernatural	being	like	the	devil	or	a	demon.	But,	of	course,	if	the	sign comes	from	one	of	these	other	sources,	it	wouldn't	be	obligation-imposing.	Quite the	contrary:	it	might	be	the	devil	trying	to	trick	the	person	into	doing	something_genuinely	malicious	or	evil.	In	that	case,	they	would	be	running	a	grave	moral risk	by	following	the	sign.