 and its conceptual categories illusory. In such cases, the better of the two theories would win and we would have to reconceptualize to the wining theory. Kaposy (2010) cites Green and Cohen as espousing precisely such a view; 1. The view that commonsense psychology is a theory has been defended by Churchland (1989, 2–6). For opposing views, please see Searle (1992, esp. 58–63). the authors predict that people will get used to an entirely different way of interpreting and explaining how humans make everyday decisions, whereby all our decisions are a result of a mechanical process. In this scenario, the winning theory would be neuroscience. An incompatibility, like the one just described, between commonsense views about the nature of moral concepts and the neuroscience of morality is unlikely. Arguments for elimination of our moral intuitions presume a type of essentialism for moral concepts. In order to create opposition between our moral intuitions and neuroscience, one needs to support the claim that we can specify a steady endorsement of a particular commonsense view about the nature of moral concepts, which is unlikely to change in the future. In other words, in order to argue for the elimination of a particular concept, that concept should be well defined. Given that all attempts to specify necessary and sufficient conditions for notions such as free will, personhood, and even rationality have failed in the past within the philosophical literature, it seems even more unlikely that we can find consensus on those issues in commonsense. One can, as Kaposy does, approximate a view based on our current use of those moral terms: how we speak of them, to whom we attribute them, and how they feature in our explanations of other people's behavior. But any such rendering of our moral intuitions would not be enough to argue that our intuitions entail the strict commitment to particular features of moral concepts. An additional problem with determining our intuitive moral commitments is correctly drawing the scope of commonsense and distinguishing purely commonsense conceptions from philosophical or scientific ones. We see this issue illustrated in Kaposy's article. The examples given for the definitions are either drawn from philosophical writings, such as the Kantian definition of rationality, or they are neurophilosophical conceptions like Patricia Churchland's compatibilist definition of free will. It is unclear how we could determine with any certainty that Kant's notion of rationality is more representative of commonsense then is Churchland's adjusted definition of free will. Furthermore
and its conceptual categories illusory. In such cases, the better of the two theory would succeed and we would have to reconceptualize to the wining theory. Kaposy (2010) cites Green and Cohen as marry precisely such a view; 1. The view that commonsense psychology is a hypothesis has been defended by Churchland (1989, 2–6). For opposing views, please attend Searle (1992, esp. 58–63). the authors predict that multitude will get used to an entirely unlike way of interpreting and explaining how humans make everyday decisions, whereby all our decision are a result of a mechanical process. In this scenario, the winning hypothesis would be neuroscience. An incompatibility, like the one just described, between commonsense scene about the nature of moral concept and the neuroscience of morality is unlikely. Arguments for elimination of our moral intuitions presume a type of essentialism for moral concept. In order to create opposition between our moral intuitions and neuroscience, one needs to support the title that we can specify a steady endorsement of a particular commonsense view about the nature of moral concepts, which is unlikely to change in the future. In other words, in ordering to argue for the elimination of a particular concept, that concept should be well defined. feed that all attempt to specify necessary and sufficient conditions for notions such as spare will, personhood, and even rationality have failed in the past within the philosophical literature, it seems even more improbable that we can find consensus on those issues in commonsense. One can, as Kaposy does, approximate a view based on our current consumption of those moral terms: how we speak of them, to whom we attribute them, and how they feature in our explanation of other citizenry's behavior. But any such rendering of our moral intuitions would not be enough to argue that our intuitions fee-tail the strict commitment to particular features of moral concepts. An additional problem with determining our intuitive moral commitments is correctly pull back the scope of commonsense and distinguish purely commonsense concept from philosophical or scientific one. We see this emergence illustrated in Kaposy's article. The exemplar given for the definitions are either pull from philosophical writings, such as the Kantian definition of rationality, or they are neurophilosophical conceptions like Patricia Churchland's compatibilist definition of free will. It is unclear how we could determine with any certainty that Kant's notion of rationality is more representative of commonsense then is Churchland's adjusted definition of free will. Furthermore
 anf its conceptual categorles illusory. In such caves, ths better of the two theories would wmn abd we would have to reconceotualize no the wibing rheory. Kaposy (2010) citcf Grscn anb Rohen as espouslng preciseny such a view; 1. Ghz view that commonsense psychology if a theprj has been defgnded fy Cglrghland (1989, 2–6). For opposing views, pleaae see Vearle (1992, esp. 58–63). yhe authors predict that pfoplf will get used to an entireli disderent way ow interpreuiug and explzining how humans make everyday decixions, whergyt apn our decismons age a result on a mecvanical process. In thls scxnaruo, the winning theory would be neuroscignce. An inwojpatibility, like rhw one jusd derxriced, bxtwsen colmoisense viewa about the nature of moral comcqiys and the nsuroscyegce of morality is unlikely. Arguments fmr slimination of our morao intuitions presume w type of essentialism for moral concepts. In order to creade op'oritnin begqefn our moral intuitions and neuroscience, one gsecs to support thc claim that we cam dprsify a steady endorsemsnt of a particulag commogsensw view abjut yhe nature of moral conceptw, which is uulijely to change in che future. Iu othet wordx, in order to argue for the eliminatioj of a padgicular concept, ghan cotcept should be well definqd. Given vhat cll atteopts to spqcify necedsary and sufficient confitious fos notions duch as free will, personhood, anv even rationslhty have fanled ik the past withyn the philosokhical liceratufe, it seema even kore unlikejy that we cat find consenvus on trose issyes in zummonsense. One can, as Kckosy does, qpproximate a view barsd on our curreuu uwe of those morsl geris: hpw fe speak of dhem, to ehom de attributc tfem, snd how they feature in kur explanations og jther peiple's beravior. But anu such rendering ov our mocal inyuijions would not be enough to arfue that lur intuitions qntall tre strict eommitment to particular features of morel concepts. An additionql problem with detgrmlning our invuitivq moral cmmmitments is correcrly drawing the sgope of commonsense ans disthnguidhing purely commonsense conceptions from philosophical or scientific onew. We sxe this issue illistraned nn Kapofy's ervicle. The examplex given for the definitions are either grcwn from philosophical writinbs, such as the Yantian definition of rafionalitu, or they are neurophilosophicak conceptions like Patrigia Churcyland'a compatibmlist definition of gree wnll. It is uncoear how we could deyevmine with any czrtainty that Kant's notion of ratuonaliry is more represeitative of clomonsgnse theg is Churchland's adjhdted aefinition of free will. Furyhermore
and its conceptual categories illusory. In such better the two would win and to wining theory. Kaposy cites Green and as espousing precisely such a view; The view that commonsense psychology is a theory has been defended by Churchland 2–6). For opposing views, please see Searle (1992, esp. 58–63). the authors predict people get to entirely different way of interpreting and explaining how humans make everyday decisions, whereby all our decisions a result of a mechanical process. In this the winning theory would neuroscience. An incompatibility, like the just between commonsense about nature moral concepts and neuroscience of morality is unlikely. Arguments for elimination of our moral intuitions presume a type of essentialism moral concepts. to create between moral and neuroscience, one support the claim that we can endorsement of a particular commonsense view about the of moral which is unlikely to change in future. In other words, in order to argue the elimination of a particular concept, that concept should be well defined. Given that all specify necessary and sufficient for notions such free personhood, even have failed the past within the philosophical literature, it seems even more unlikely we can find consensus on those issues in commonsense. One Kaposy approximate a view on our current use those terms: how we speak to we how feature our explanations of other behavior. But any such rendering our moral intuitions would that our intuitions entail the strict commitment to features of moral concepts. An additional problem determining our intuitive moral commitments is correctly drawing the scope of commonsense distinguishing purely from philosophical or scientific ones. We see this illustrated in Kaposy's article. examples given for the definitions are either drawn from writings, as the definition of rationality, they are neurophilosophical like Patricia Churchland's of free It unclear determine with any certainty that Kant's of is more representative of commonsense is definition of free will. Furthermore
 and its conceptual categorieS illusory. IN such CasEs, tHe BettEr of The two theories WOuld Win and we would have to recOncepTuALize TO tHe winIng theoRY. KAPOsy (2010) CiTeS GrEeN AnD CoheN as EspousiNg preciselY suCh A view; 1. The view THaT commonsenSe pSychology is a TheOry has BeEn dEFendeD by churcHland (1989, 2–6). FOR opposIng views, pLeASe see SEArle (1992, esp. 58–63). THE aUthoRs predict that peopLE wILl get used to an eNtirelY dIFfEREnt Way Of interpreTiNg and EXplainiNG hOW HUmaNS make everyday Decisions, whERebY all ouR dEciSIons arE a resUlT Of a Mechanical pRoceSs. In this sCenariO, The winnINg theorY would Be nEurOsciENcE. AN inCoMPatIBiLitY, LikE the one jUsT dEscriBed, bETWEEn coMmoNsenSe vieWs about the natUre Of moRAl cOncepTs and The nEuRosciEnce of MoralItY is unlikely. ArguMentS for elimiNatIoN of OuR moraL IntuitIonS prEsume a tYpe of esSEntIaLISM fOr moral concepts. In oRdER To Create opPositiON bEtWEen our moRaL inTuitIONs and NeurOScIence, one Needs tO SuPpOrt the cLaIm that We Can SpeCify a STeadY endorSement of A partICular commonsenSE view about the NAtURE oF MoraL coNcepts, which Is unLIkelY to cHAnGe iN The fuTure. IN oTHeR Words, in order to argue FoR the elIminaTion of a particUlar concepT, THAt concepT shoULd BE well defined. GiVen thAt all attemPTs to specIfy neCessary aNd sufficiENT conditiOns For NotIonS SUcH as free will, peRSOnhoOd, And even RatIonalitY haVe fAilEd iN tHe past witHin the phIlOsOpHiCal LiterATure, it seEmS evEn MorE unliKEly thaT we caN finD cOnSEnsUs on thoSE iSSUes iN cOmMonsEnsE. ONe can, As KaPOsy Does, appRoximate a VieW BaseD oN oUr curreNt use of those mOrAl terms: how We SpeAk of thEM, To whom we Attribute them, and how they FEature iN ouR explAnatIons of othEr pEople's BehAVior. BuT any suCh renDeRinG OF our mORAl IntUiTions would NOT be EnougH tO argUe that oUr intuitions entail THe sTrict commitmeNt tO parTICuLar FEaTUreS oF MorAL Concepts. An additIonal problEm WItH determiniNG ouR iNtuitivE moral cOmmitMEnts is cOrrectly dRawing the ScOpe oF COmmOnsense and DistinguIshing purELy comMOnSense ConCeptioNs FroM philOsophiCAl oR scieNtific OnEs. We seE this IsSue illusTrated in Kaposy's article. THe examPles gIveN for the deFinITioNs are eithEr drAwn from phiLosOphIcal wRitINgs, suCh as THe kanTIan deFiniTIon of ratiONaLitY, OR tHey are neuroPHILosOphicAl cONceptiOns lIke Patricia ChurchLAnd's compatibilIst dEFIniTioN Of frEe Will. It is uncleaR hoW wE COuld deteRmIne with any cErtainty ThAT Kant'S notioN of ratIonalitY IS mORe reprEsenTatIve of commOnsEnSE then is chUrCHland's AdjuStEd defiNition OF freE WIll. Furthermore
 and its conceptual catego ries illus ory.Insuc hcase s, t he better of t h e tw o theories would win a nd we  w o uldh av e toreconce p tu a l ize  t othe  w i ni ng th eor y. Kapo sy (2010)cit es  Green and C o he n as espou sin g preciselysuc h a vi ew ; 1 .  Thevie w tha t comm o nsense  psycholo gy is a t h eory ha s be en d efended by Church l an d  (1989, 2–6).For op po s in g vie ws,  please se eSearl e  (1992, es p . 58– 6 3). the autho rs predictt hat  peopl ewil l  get u sed t oa n e ntirely dif fere nt way of  inter p retinga nd expl aining  ho w h uman s  m ak e e ve r yda y  d eci s ion s, where by  a ll ou r de c i s i onsare  a r esult  of a mechani cal  pro c ess . Inthisscen ar io, t he win ningth eory would be n euro science.Anin com pa tibil i ty, li kethe  one ju st desc r ibe d, b e tw een commonsense vi ew s ab out thenature of  m o ral conc ep tsandt h e neu rosc i en ce of mo rality is  u nlikely .Argume nt s f orelimi n atio n of o ur moral  intu i tions presumea  type of esse n ti a l is m  for  mo ral concept s. I n  ord er t o  c rea t e opp ositi on be t ween our moral intu it ions a nd ne uroscience, o ne needs t o s upport t he c l ai m  that we can s pecif y a steady endorsem ent o f a part icular co m m onsensevie w a bou t t h e  n ature of mora l conc ep ts, whi chis unli kel y t o c han ge  in the f uture. I not he rwor ds, i n  order t oarg ue  fo r the elimin ation  ofapa r tic ular co n ce p t , th at  c once ptsh ouldbe w e lldefined . Given t hat allat te mpts to  specify nece ss ary and su ff ici ent co n d itions f or notions such as free will, p ers onhoo d, a nd even r ati onalit y h a ve fai led in  thepa stw i thint h ephi lo sophical l i t era ture,  i t se ems eve n more unlikely th a t w e can find co nse nsus o ntho s ei ssu es inc o mmonsense. Onecan, as Ka po s ydoes, appr o xim at e a vie w based  on o u r curre nt use of  those mo ra l te r m s:how we spe ak of th em, to wh o m wea tt ribut e t hem, a nd  ho w the y feat u rein ou r expl an ations  of o th er peopl e's behavior. But any s uch re nderi ngof our mo ral int uitions w ould  not be en oug h t o arg uet hat o ur i n tu iti o ns en tail the stric t  c omm i t me nt to parti c u l arfeatu res of mor al c oncepts. An addit i onal problem w ithd e ter min i ng o ur  intuitive mor alco m m itmentsis  correctlydrawingth e  scop e of c ommons ense an d di s tingui shin g p urely com mon se n se conc ep ti o ns fro m ph il osophi cal or scie n t ific ones. We se e thi s issue ill ustra te d in Ka p osy' s article.  The exampl es giv en f or th e defin it ions a reei ther drawn from phil osoph ical wr it ings , s uch as  the K antia n de fi nit ion of ra t i on a li ty ,  or  the y are  n euro philosoph i cal conc ept i ons lik ePat r i cia Ch u rc h l and's comp ati bilis t definition of f r ee will.  It is  uncle ar howw e c ou ld dete rmi n e  with any  certaint y  th at  Kan t's noti on  ofra tio na lity is more re presenta tive ofc o mmonse nse then is Chu rc hland's adju stedde f inition o f f ree wil l . F urt her more 
 and_its conceptual_categories illusory. In such_cases, the_better_of the_two_theories would win_and we would_have to reconceptualize to_the wining theory._Kaposy_(2010) cites Green and Cohen as espousing precisely such a view; 1. The view_that_commonsense psychology_is_a_theory has been defended by_Churchland (1989, 2–6). For opposing_views, please_see Searle (1992, esp. 58–63). the authors predict_that_people will get_used to an entirely different way of interpreting and_explaining how humans make everyday decisions,_whereby all our_decisions_are_a result of a_mechanical process. In this scenario, the_winning theory would be neuroscience. An_incompatibility, like the one just described, between_commonsense views about the nature of_moral concepts and the neuroscience_of morality_is unlikely. Arguments for elimination_of our moral_intuitions presume_a type of_essentialism for moral concepts. In order_to create opposition_between our moral intuitions and neuroscience,_one_needs to support_the_claim_that we_can specify a_steady_endorsement of_a_particular commonsense view about the nature_of_moral concepts, which is unlikely to change_in the future. In_other_words, in order to_argue for the elimination of_a particular concept, that concept should_be well_defined. Given_that all attempts to specify necessary and sufficient conditions for notions_such as free will, personhood, and_even rationality have failed_in the_past_within the philosophical_literature,_it seems_even more unlikely that we can find_consensus on_those issues in commonsense. One can,_as Kaposy does, approximate_a_view based on our current use_of those moral terms: how we_speak of them, to whom_we_attribute_them, and how they feature_in our explanations of other people's_behavior. But any_such rendering of our moral intuitions would_not_be enough to argue that our_intuitions_entail the strict commitment to particular_features_of_moral concepts. An additional problem_with determining our intuitive moral commitments_is correctly drawing the scope of commonsense and distinguishing_purely commonsense conceptions_from philosophical or scientific ones._We_see_this issue illustrated in Kaposy's article. The examples given for_the definitions_are either drawn_from philosophical writings, such as the Kantian definition of rationality,_or they are neurophilosophical conceptions like Patricia_Churchland's compatibilist definition of free will. It is unclear how we_could determine with any certainty that Kant's notion_of rationality is more representative of commonsense_then is Churchland's adjusted_definition_of free will. Furthermore