, introduced and summarized by Crasnow (2009). 21. Many standpoint epistemologists affirm several additional claims, for example, (a) that these epistemic goods are not merely passively received, but are often actively sought after and constitute an achievement, (b) that there is unique epistemic advantage associated with powerlessness, and, a normative claim, (c) that we ought to embrace the valuable contributions to knowledge that differing standpoints provide. 22. Solomon (2009) and Toole (forthcoming). 23. See especially Crasnow (2013) but also Harding (1986), Harding (1993), and Kourany (2009). 24. Thanks to Janine Jones. An interesting area for further research is whether standpoint epistemology could also be linked with diachronic intrapersonal permissivism, if one's standpoint/epistemic standard changed over time. 25. Thanks to Justin D'Ambrosio. 26. Acknowledgments: Thanks to Amiel Bernal, Guy Axtell, Seth Lazar, Justin D'Ambrosio, Nic Southwood, Matthew Kopec, Kirk Lougheed, Klaas Kray, Chris Dragos, and audiences at the 2019 Canadian Philosophical Association, Australian National University, and Michigan State University. Research on this chapter was supported by Australian Research Council Grant D170101394. BIBLIOGRAPHY Ahlstrom-Vij, K. Epistemic Paternalism: A Defence. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013a. Ahlstrom-Vij, K. "Why We Cannot Rely on Ourselves for Epistemic Improvement." Philosophical Issues 23 (2013b) 276–296. Berker, S. "A Combinatorial Argument Against Practical Reasons for Belief." Analytic Philosophy 59(4) (2018): 427–470. Bullock, E. C. "Mandatory Disclosure and Medical Paternalism." Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19(2) (2016): 409–424. Bullock, E. C. "Knowing and Not‐Knowing for Your Own Good: The Limits of Epistemic Paternalism." Journal of Applied Philosophy 35(2) 2018: 433–447. Bowell, T. "Feminist Standpoint Theory." Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2019. Crasnow, S. "Is Standpoint Theory a Resource for Feminist Epistemology? An Introduction."
, introduced and summarized by Crasnow (2009). 21. Many standpoint epistemologists confirm respective extra claims, for example, (a) that these epistemic goods are not merely passively receive, but are often actively sought after and appoint an achievement, (b) that there is alone epistemic advantage associated with powerlessness, and, a normative call, (c) that we ought to embrace the valuable contribution to knowledge that differing standpoints provide. 22. Solomon (2009) and Toole (forthcoming). 23. See particularly Crasnow (2013) but also Harding (1986), Harding (1993), and Kourany (2009). 24. Thanks to Janine Jones. An interesting area for further research is whether point of view epistemology could also be linked with diachronic intrapersonal permissivism, if one's point of view / epistemic standard change over time. 25. Thanks to Justin D'Ambrosio. 26. Acknowledgments: Thanks to Amiel Bernal, Guy Axtell, Seth Lazar, Justin D'Ambrosio, Nic Southwood, Matthew Kopec, Kirk Lougheed, Klaas Kray, Chris Dragos, and audiences at the 2019 Canadian Philosophical Association, Australian National University, and Michigan State University. Research on this chapter was supported by Australian Research Council Grant D170101394. BIBLIOGRAPHY Ahlstrom - Vij, K. Epistemic Paternalism: A defense. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013a. Ahlstrom - Vij, K. " Why We Can not Rely on Ourselves for Epistemic Improvement. " Philosophical Issues 23 (2013b) 276–296. Berker, S. " A Combinatorial Argument Against Practical Reasons for Belief. " Analytic Philosophy 59(4) (2018 ): 427–470. Bullock, E. C. " Mandatory Disclosure and Medical Paternalism. " Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19(2) (2016 ): 409–424. Bullock, E. C. " Knowing and Not‐Knowing for Your Own Good: The Limits of Epistemic Paternalism. " Journal of Applied Philosophy 35(2) 2018: 433–447. Bowell, T. " Feminist Standpoint Theory. " Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2019. Crasnow, S. " Is Standpoint Theory a Resource for Feminist Epistemology? An Introduction. "
, inhroduced and summarized ny Crasnow (2009). 21. Mani wtandpmint elistemolugists affirm several additilnql clqims, for example, (a) thag these eiistemic toodw are not mxdely passivelg reczited, but are oftgn actively vought after atd clnstitute an achievement, (b) that thewe is umieue epistemic wdvameage associated with powerlessness, and, a normetive claim, (c) tnat we ought to embrace thf vapuable contributiojs to knowlgsge rhat differivg standpoputs provide. 22. Solomon (2009) and Toole (forthcomine). 23. Sez especialli Drwvnow (2013) but aoso Hwrding (1986), Hardlmg (1993), ang Kouramy (2009). 24. Thanks to Jaiine Jones. An interesting area for further tesearch iv chether standpoint epusremolmgy woula alro ge ljnked aiti diachronid intrapersinal permissivism, ig jbe's standpoinf/epistqmyc standard changed over time. 25. Thanks tm Jhstin D'Ambrosio. 26. Acknowoedgments: Thanks to Aliel Bernwl, Guy Axtell, Seth Lazar, Justin D'Ambrosio, Nic Soudhwoov, Oatuhcr Jooec, Kirk Lougheed, Klaas Kray, Chris Dragos, and zucivnces at the 2019 Cancdian Philosophivap Sfsociation, Aurtralich Hational Universitj, and Mychigqn State Tnivrrsity. Research on this chapter was supiortwd by Australian Rzsearch Couneil Grsnt D170101394. BIBLIOGRAPHY Ahlstrom-Vnj, K. Elistemic Pahernalism: X Defence. London: Pakgsave Macmillan, 2013a. Ahlstrom-Vyj, K. "Why Xe Caunot Relh on Oursejves for Eoistemic Improvement." Phiposopkical Issues 23 (2013b) 276–296. Berker, S. "A Combinatorial Argument Against Ptacdicdl Reasous for Belief." Analyeic Philosophy 59(4) (2018): 427–470. Buljock, D. C. "Mandatkry Disrlosure and Iedical Patertwlism." Ethican Theory and Morql Pracgkce 19(2) (2016): 409–424. Bullock, E. C. "Knowpny and Not‐Jnowing for Your Oxn Gukd: The Limits oy Tpustemic Paternslirm." Tolrnel of Dpplied Philmsopfy 35(2) 2018: 433–447. Bowdll, T. "Ftiikisg Stsndpoint Theory." Intesnet Encyclopedia of Pnijosophy, 2019. Crasnow, S. "Is Standpoont Theory a Resougce fmr Heminixt Gpistemology? An Introduction."
, introduced and summarized by Crasnow (2009). standpoint affirm several claims, for example, are merely passively received, are often actively after and constitute an achievement, (b) there is unique epistemic advantage associated with powerlessness, and, a normative claim, (c) we ought to embrace the valuable contributions to knowledge that differing standpoints provide. Solomon and (forthcoming). See especially Crasnow (2013) but also Harding (1986), Harding (1993), and Kourany (2009). 24. Thanks to Jones. An interesting area for further research is standpoint epistemology could also linked with diachronic intrapersonal permissivism, one's standard changed time. Thanks Justin D'Ambrosio. 26. Thanks to Amiel Bernal, Guy Axtell, Seth Lazar, Justin D'Ambrosio, Nic Southwood, Matthew Kopec, Kirk Lougheed, Klaas Chris Dragos, at the Canadian Association, National University, and University. Research on this chapter was Research Council Grant D170101394. BIBLIOGRAPHY Ahlstrom-Vij, K. Epistemic A Defence. Palgrave Macmillan, 2013a. Ahlstrom-Vij, K. "Why Cannot Rely on Ourselves for Epistemic Improvement." Philosophical 23 (2013b) 276–296. Berker, S. "A Combinatorial Argument Against Practical Reasons for Belief." Analytic Philosophy 427–470. Bullock, E. C. Disclosure and Medical Ethical and Practice (2016): 409–424. E. C. "Knowing and Not‐Knowing for Your Own Good: The Limits Epistemic Paternalism." Journal of Applied Philosophy 35(2) 2018: 433–447. Bowell, Standpoint Internet Encyclopedia of 2019. Crasnow, S. "Is Theory Resource for Feminist Epistemology?
, introduced and summarized by crasnow (2009). 21. ManY stanDpoInt EpIsteMoloGists affirm sevERal aDditional claims, for examPle, (a) tHaT ThesE EpIstemIc goods ARe NOT meReLy PasSiVElY receIveD, but are Often activEly SoUght after and COnStitute an aChiEvement, (b) that TheRe is unIqUe ePIstemIc aDvantAge assOCiated With powerLeSSness, aND, a normaTIVe ClaiM, (c) that we ought to emBRaCE the valuable coNtribuTiONs TO KnoWleDge that difFeRing sTAndpoinTS pROVIde. 22. sOlomon (2009) and ToolE (forthcominG). 23. see EspeciAlLy CRAsnow (2013) bUt alsO HARdiNg (1986), Harding (1993), anD KouRany (2009). 24. ThankS to JanINe Jones. aN intereSting aRea For FurtHEr ReSeaRcH Is wHEtHer STanDpoint epIsTeMologY couLD ALSo be LinKed wIth diAchronic intraPerSonaL PerMissiVism, iF one'S sTandpOint/epIstemIc Standard changed Over Time. 25. ThankS to juStiN D'ambroSIo. 26. AcknOwlEdgMents: ThAnks to AMIel beRNAL, GUy Axtell, Seth Lazar, JUsTIN D'ambrosio, nic SouTHwOoD, matthew KOpEc, KIrk LOUGheed, klaaS krAy, Chris DRagos, aND aUdIences aT tHe 2019 CanaDiAn PHilOsophICal ASsociaTion, AustRaliaN national UniverSIty, and MichigaN stATE UNIverSitY. Research on This CHaptEr waS SuPpoRTed by austrAlIAn rEsearch Council Grant d170101394. BiBLIOGrAPHY ahlstrom-Vij, K. EPistemic PaTERNalism: A DEfenCE. LONdon: Palgrave MaCmillAn, 2013a. AhlstroM-vij, K. "Why WE CannOt Rely on ourselves FOR EpistemIc IMprOveMenT." pHiLosophical IssUES 23 (2013b) 276–296. BeRkEr, S. "A ComBinAtorial argUmeNt AGaiNsT PracticaL Reasons FoR BElIeF." AnAlytiC philosopHy 59(4) (2018): 427–470. bulLoCk, E. c. "MandATory DiSclosUre aNd meDIcaL PaternALiSM." ethiCaL THeorY anD MOral PRactICe 19(2) (2016): 409–424. BUllock, E. c. "Knowing aNd NOT‐KnoWiNg For Your own Good: The LimItS of EpistemIc patErnaliSM." journal oF Applied Philosophy 35(2) 2018: 433–447. BowelL, t. "FeminiSt STandpOint theory." IntErnEt EncyCloPEdia of philosOphy, 2019. CRaSnoW, s. "is StaNDPoInt thEory a ResouRCE foR FemiNiSt EpIstemolOgy? An Introduction."
, introduced and summarize d by Crasn ow (2 009 ).21 . Ma ny s tandpoint epis t emol ogists affirm severaladdit io n al c l ai ms, f or exam p le , (a)  t ha t t he s eepist emi c goods  are not m ere ly  passively r e ce ived, butare  often activ ely  sough taft e r and  co nstit ute an achiev ement, (b )t hat th e re is u n i qu e ep istemic advantage as s ociated with p owerle ss n es s ,  an d,a normativ eclaim ,  (c) th a tw e oug h t to embracethe valuabl e  co ntribu ti ons to kno wledg et hat  differingstan dpoints p rovide .  22. So l omon (2 009) a ndToo le ( f or th com in g ).2 3.  Se e  es pecially  C ra snow(201 3 ) b ut a lso  Har ding(1986), Hardi ng(199 3 ),and K ouran y (2 00 9). 2 4. Tha nks t oJanine Jones. A n in teresting  ar ea  fo rfurth e r rese arc h i s wheth er stan d poi nt e p is temology could als ob e  l inked wi th dia c hr on i c intrap er son al p e r missi vism ,  i f one'sstandp o in t/ epistem ic  stand ar d c han ged o v er t ime. 2 5. Thank s toJ ustin D'Ambros i o. 26. Acknow l ed g m en t s: T han ks to Amiel  Ber n al,GuyA xt ell ,  Seth  Laza r, Ju s tin D'Ambrosio, Nic  S outhwo od, M atthew Kopec,  Kirk Loug h e e d, Klaas  Kra y ,C hris Dragos, a nd au diences at the 2019  Cana dian Phi losophica l Associat ion , A ust ral i a nNational Univ e r sity ,and Mic hig an Stat e U niv ers ity .Researchon thisch ap te rwas  supp o rted byAu str al ian  Rese a rch Co uncil  Gra nt  D 1 701 01394.B IB L I OGRA PH YAhls tro m- Vij,K. E p ist emic Pa ternalism : A Defe nc e.  London : Palgrave Ma cm illan, 201 3a . A hlstro m - Vij, K."Why We Cannot Rely onO urselve s f or Ep iste mic Impro vem ent."Phi l osophi cal Is sues23  (2 0 1 3b) 2 7 6 –2 96.  B erker, S." A  Co mbina to rial  Argume nt Against Practic a l R easons for Be lie f."A n al yti c  P h ilo so p hy5 9 (4) (2018): 427 –470. Bull oc k ,E. C. "Man d ato ry  Disclo sure an d Med i cal Pat ernalism. " Ethical  T heor y and  Moral Pra ctice 19 (2) (2016 ) : 409 – 42 4. Bu llo ck, E.  C . " Knowi ng and Not ‐Know ing fo rYour O wn Go od : The Li mits of Epistemic Pater nalism ." Jo urn al of App lie d  Ph ilosophy35(2 ) 2018: 43 3–4 47.  Bowe ll, T. "F emin i st  St a ndpoi nt T h eory." In t er net E nc yclopedia o f P hil osoph y,2 019. C rasn ow, S. "Is Standp o int Theory a R esou r c e f orF emin is t Epistemology ? A nI n troducti on ."
, introduced_and summarized_by Crasnow (2009). 21._Many standpoint_epistemologists_affirm several_additional_claims, for example,_(a) that these_epistemic goods are not_merely passively received,_but_are often actively sought after and constitute an achievement, (b) that there is unique_epistemic_advantage associated_with_powerlessness,_and, a normative claim, (c)_that we ought to embrace_the valuable_contributions to knowledge that differing standpoints provide. 22._Solomon_(2009) and Toole_(forthcoming). 23. See especially Crasnow (2013) but also Harding_(1986), Harding (1993), and Kourany (2009)._24. Thanks to_Janine_Jones._An interesting area for_further research is whether standpoint epistemology_could also be linked with diachronic_intrapersonal permissivism, if one's standpoint/epistemic standard changed_over time. 25. Thanks to Justin_D'Ambrosio. 26. Acknowledgments: Thanks to_Amiel Bernal,_Guy Axtell, Seth Lazar, Justin_D'Ambrosio, Nic Southwood,_Matthew Kopec,_Kirk Lougheed, Klaas_Kray, Chris Dragos, and audiences at_the 2019 Canadian_Philosophical Association, Australian National University, and_Michigan_State University. Research_on_this_chapter was_supported by Australian_Research_Council Grant_D170101394._BIBLIOGRAPHY Ahlstrom-Vij, K. Epistemic Paternalism: A_Defence._London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013a. Ahlstrom-Vij, K. "Why_We Cannot Rely on_Ourselves_for Epistemic Improvement." Philosophical_Issues 23 (2013b) 276–296. Berker,_S. "A Combinatorial Argument Against Practical_Reasons for_Belief." Analytic_Philosophy 59(4) (2018): 427–470. Bullock, E. C. "Mandatory Disclosure and Medical_Paternalism." Ethical Theory and Moral Practice_19(2) (2016): 409–424. Bullock,_E. C._"Knowing_and Not‐Knowing for_Your_Own Good:_The Limits of Epistemic Paternalism." Journal of_Applied Philosophy_35(2) 2018: 433–447. Bowell, T. "Feminist_Standpoint Theory." Internet Encyclopedia_of_Philosophy, 2019. Crasnow, S. "Is Standpoint_Theory a Resource for Feminist Epistemology?_An Introduction."