 We will take enactivism as stating that cognition is embodied in this strong, or ―radical‖ sense (Chemero 2009, Hutto & Myin 2013). In the domain of perception, enactivism has become associated with the so called sensorimotor contingency approach presented in O'Regan and Noë (2001). Vision, according to the sensorimotor approach ―is something we do, rather than something that happens in us‖ (O'Regan & Noë 2001). The approach rejects the view on vision as aimed at producing ―faithful metric-preserving replica of the outside world inside the head‖ (O'Regan 1992). Instead, seeing is conceived of as an ―exploratory activity,‖ ―attuned to‖ sensorimotor contingencies, or ways in which sensory stimulation changes with movement-such as when a retinal image changes when one walks around an object. Seeing a scene or an object is, in the sensorimotor approach, comparable to feeling a surface or object, where the experience is of the whole surface or object, despite the fact that momentary tactile stimulation is limited to the fingertips making contact only at particular places. Sensorimotor theorists have argued that the idea that vision should be understood as temporally extended interaction is supported by the insights it provides into the nature and character of perceptual experiences. According to the sensorimotor approach, perceptual experiences owe their identity to the patterns of sensorimotor contingencies typical of the kinds of organism/environment interactions those experiences normally arise in. For example, tactile feelings of hardness or softness are determined by particular patterns of experiences one has when engaging in such activities as squishing a sponge or pushing a brick wall. Similarly, that expertiences of seeing differ as a class from experiences of hearing is due, according to the sensorimotor theory, to patterns of sensorimotor contingencies specific to vision and audition, such as that in seeing, but not in hearing, stimulation from a particular source stops when one turns one's head sideways, or closes one's eyes. The crucial role played by patterns of sensorimotor contingency in shaping perceptual experience has been seen as supported by findings on adaptation to distorting or inverting glasses, as well as findings of experiments with sensory substitution devices (Hurley & Noë 2003; Noë 2004; O'Regan 2011). For it seems that experiential change here follows on the heels of adaptation to patterns of sensorimotor contingencies. The sensorim
We will take enactivism as stating that cognition is embodied in this strong, or ―radical‖ common sense (Chemero 2009, Hutto & Myin 2013). In the knowledge domain of perception, enactivism has become associated with the therefore call sensorimotor contingency approach present in O'Regan and Noë (2001). Vision, accord to the sensorimotor approach ―is something we make, rather than something that happens in us‖ (O'Regan & Noë 2001). The overture rejects the view on sight as aimed at producing ―faithful metric - preserving replica of the outside universe inside the head‖ (O'Regan 1992). Instead, seeing is conceived of as an ―exploratory activity,‖ ―attuned to‖ sensorimotor contingency, or ways in which sensory stimulation changes with motion - such as when a retinal image changes when one walks around an object. Seeing a picture or an object is, in the sensorimotor approach, comparable to feeling a surface or object, where the experience is of the solid surface or object, despite the fact that momentary tactile stimulation is limited to the fingertips making contact only at particular places. Sensorimotor theorist have argue that the idea that imagination should be understand as temporally extended interaction is supported by the insights it provide into the nature and character of perceptual experiences. According to the sensorimotor approach, perceptual experience owe their identity to the patterns of sensorimotor contingencies typical of the kinds of organism / environment interactions those experiences normally rise in. For example, tactile feelings of hardness or softness are settle by particular pattern of experiences one has when engaging in such activities as squishing a quick study or pushing a brick wall. Similarly, that expertiences of seeing disagree as a class from experience of hearing is due, accord to the sensorimotor theory, to blueprint of sensorimotor contingencies specific to vision and hearing, such as that in seeing, but not in hearing, stimulation from a particular reference stops when one turn one's head sideways, or closes one's eyes. The crucial function played by practice of sensorimotor contingency in shaping perceptual experience has been seen as supported by findings on adaptation to falsify or inverting glasses, equally well as findings of experiments with sensory substitution devices (Hurley & Noë 2003; Noë 2004; O'Regan 2011). For it seems that experiential change here follows on the cad of adaptation to patterns of sensorimotor contingencies. The sensorim
 We will take enactivism as stating that cognitioi is emgodied iv this strong, or ―radical‖ sende (Chemtgo 2009, Hutto & Myin 2013). In tfe domain of percwptiib, enactivism has bceome zdsocnaved with the so called setsorimotor condivgzncy approach presented in O'Regan anq Noë (2001). Voslon, according jo tht sqnsodpmitor approach ―is something we do, ratier than somethong that happens in us‖ (O'Rehan & Noë 2001). The approach gejects the vier on vision ar aimed at producing ―fzithful metric-preserving replicx of che outside wirlf inside the head‖ (O'Regan 1992). Insbvad, seehng is vonceived of ax ai ―exploratory activity,‖ ―atvuned to‖ sensorimotot contingetcnes, or ways in which websory stikulaguon chznjes with lovxment-such aa when a rerinal image changes wrvm one walks zround ag object. Seeing a scene or an object is, in the sensorimotor approqch, comparable to feeping a suwface or object, where the experience is of the whmle snrwact ir obgwch, despite the fact that momentary tactile stiihlstpon is limited to the fingeryios iaking contacj only cf larticular places. Densoriiotor theoristf hafe argued that the idea thar vision sholld ve understood as tzmporally excended intetaction is supported by the insights ih providea into the nature anc wharacter of perceptual ex[eriences. Accprding go tne senforimotor wpproach, perceptual expegiencgs owe their idejtity to the patterns of sensormkotor continbetcivs typicaj of bhe kinds of ordanism/environmgnt intercctionr those exieriences normally awise in. For efwmple, tactilx feelingf of hareness of softness are cetermineb by particular patternx ow experiences onz yas when engagimg kn fubh ectivydies as squivhine a xpongd or pushinn a brivk wall. Similarly, thdt espertiences of seeonn differ qs a clafs from experoences of hearing ls dux, accocding yo jhe sensorimotor theory, to pattsrns of sfnsjrimotor coneingcncigs specific to vision and audition, such as that in seeing, but not in hearing, stimulatiou nrom a partirular fource stmps when one turns obe's head sideways, or closes one's eyes. Fhe crgcial role played by patterns of sensorimotor contingency in shaping perceptuao expeciqnce has besn sren av fbpporteq by hindings on adaptstion to distorting or invertinj glasses, ds well as findings of experimrngs with sensoty substitution devices (Hudley & Noë 2003; Noë 2004; O'Regan 2011). For it seems that experiential change herc follows on tge heels oh adaptation to pattrrns oy sensirimotoe coktingencies. Thd srndorim
We will take enactivism as stating that embodied this strong, ―radical‖ sense (Chemero In domain of perception, has become associated the so called sensorimotor contingency approach in O'Regan and Noë (2001). Vision, according to the sensorimotor approach ―is something do, rather than something that happens in us‖ (O'Regan & Noë 2001). The rejects view vision aimed at producing ―faithful metric-preserving replica of the outside world inside the head‖ (O'Regan 1992). Instead, is conceived of as an ―exploratory activity,‖ ―attuned sensorimotor contingencies, or ways which sensory stimulation changes with as a retinal changes one around an object. a scene or an object is, in the sensorimotor approach, comparable to feeling a surface or object, the experience the whole or despite fact that momentary is limited to the fingertips making particular places. Sensorimotor theorists have argued that the that vision be understood as temporally extended interaction supported by the insights it provides into the and character of perceptual experiences. According to the sensorimotor approach, perceptual experiences owe their identity patterns of sensorimotor contingencies of the kinds organism/environment those normally in. For tactile feelings of hardness or softness are determined by particular patterns experiences one has when engaging in such activities as squishing or a brick wall. that expertiences of seeing as class from experiences of due, to to of contingencies specific to vision audition, such as that in but not in hearing, stops when one turns one's head sideways, or one's eyes. The crucial role played by of sensorimotor contingency in shaping perceptual experience has been seen as supported findings on distorting or inverting glasses, as well as findings experiments with sensory substitution (Hurley & Noë 2003; Noë 2004; O'Regan 2011). For seems experiential change follows on the of adaptation to of sensorimotor contingencies.
 We will take enactivism as staTing that coGnitiOn iS emBoDied In thIs strong, or ―radiCAl‖ seNse (Chemero 2009, Hutto & Myin 2013). In tHe domAiN Of peRCePtion, EnactivISm HAS beCoMe AssOcIAtEd witH thE so callEd sensorimOtoR cOntingency apPRoAch presentEd iN O'Regan and NoË (2001). ViSion, acCoRdiNG to thE seNsoriMotor aPProach ―Is somethiNg WE do, ratHEr than sOMEtHing That happens in us‖ (O'REGaN & noë 2001). The approach RejectS tHE vIEW on VisIon as aimed At ProduCIng ―faitHFuL METriC-Preserving repLica of the ouTSidE world InSidE The heaD‖ (O'RegAn 1992). iNstEad, seeing is ConcEived of as An ―explORatory aCTivity,‖ ―aTtuned To‖ sEnsOrimOToR cOntInGEncIEs, Or wAYs iN which seNsOrY stimUlatION CHangEs wIth mOvemeNt-such as when a RetInal IMagE chanGes whEn onE wAlks aRound aN objeCt. seeing a scene or aN objEct is, in thE seNsOriMoTor apPRoach, cOmpAraBle to feEling a sURfaCe OR OBjEct, where the experieNcE IS oF the wholE surfaCE oR oBJect, despItE thE facT THat moMentARy Tactile sTimulaTIoN iS limiteD tO the fiNgErtIps MakinG ContAct onlY at partiCular PLaces. SensorimoTOr theorists haVE aRGUeD That The Idea that visIon sHOuld Be unDErStoOD as teMporaLlY ExTEnded interaction is sUpPorted By the Insights it proVides into tHE NAture and CharACtER of perceptual eXperiEnces. AccorDIng to the SensoRimotor aPproach, peRCEptual exPerIenCes Owe THEiR identity to thE PAtteRnS of sensOriMotor coNtiNgeNciEs tYpIcal of the Kinds of oRgAnIsM/eNviRonmeNT interacTiOns ThOse ExperIEnces nOrmalLy arIsE iN. for Example, TAcTILe feElInGs of HarDnEss or SoftNEss Are deteRmined by pArtICulaR pAtTerns of Experiences onE hAs when engaGiNg iN such aCTIvities aS squishing a sponge or pushINg a bricK waLl. SimIlarLy, that expErtIences Of sEEing diFfer as A clasS fRom EXPerieNCEs Of hEaRing is due, aCCOrdIng to ThE senSorimotOr theory, to patterns OF seNsorimotor conTinGencIES sPecIFiC To vIsIOn aND Audition, such as tHat in seeinG, bUT nOt in hearinG, StiMuLation fRom a parTiculAR source Stops when One turns oNe'S heaD SIdeWays, or closEs one's eyEs. The crucIAl rolE PlAyed bY paTterns Of SenSorimOtor coNTinGency In shapInG percePtual ExPerience Has been seen as supported bY findiNgs on AdaPtation to DisTOrtIng or inveRtinG glasses, as WelL as FindiNgs OF expeRimeNTs WitH SensoRy suBStitution DEvIceS (hUrLey & Noë 2003; Noë 2004; O'REGAN 2011). FoR it seEms THat expErieNtial change here foLLows on the heels Of adAPTatIon TO patTeRns of sensorimoTor CoNTIngencieS. THe sensorim
 We will take enactivism a s statingthatcog nit io n is  emb odied in thiss tron g, or ―radical‖ sense(Chem er o  200 9 ,Hutto  & Myin 20 1 3 ).In  t hedo m ai n ofper ception , enactivi smha s become ass o ci ated withthe  so called s ens orimot or  co n tinge ncy  appr oach p r esente d in O'Re ga n  and N o ë (2001 ) .  V isio n, according to t h es ensorimotor ap proach  ― i ss o met hin g we do, r at her t h an some t hi n g tha t  happens in u s‖ (O'Regan & N oë 200 1) . T h e appr oachre j ect s the viewon v ision asaimeda t produ c ing ―fa ithful  me tri c-pr e se rv ing  r e pli c aoft heoutsidewo rl d ins idet h e head ‖ ( O'Re gan 1 992). Instead , s eein g  is  conc eived  ofas  an ― explor atory  a ctivity,‖ ―attu nedto‖ senso rim ot orco nting e ncies,  or  wa ys in w hich se n sor ys t i mu lation changes wit hm o ve ment-suc h as w h en  a retinalim age  cha n g es wh en o n ewalks ar ound a n  o bj ect. Se ei ng a s ce neoran ob j ectis, in  the sen sorim o tor approach,c omparable tof ee l i ng a su rfa ce or objec t, w h erethee xp eri e nce i s ofth e  w h ole surface or obje ct , desp ite t he fact thatmomentaryt a c tile sti mula t io n  is limited to  thefingertips making c ontac t only a t particu l a r places . S ens ori mot o r  t heorists have a rgue dthat th e i dea tha t v isi onsho ul d be unde rstood a ste mp or all y ext e nded int er act io n i s sup p ortedby th e in si gh t s i t provi d es i ntoth enatu rean d cha ract e r o f perce ptual exp eri e nces .Ac cording  to the senso ri motor appr oa ch,  perce p t ual expe riences owe their ident i ty to t hepatte rnsof sensor imo tor co nti n gencie s typi cal o fthe k indso f  o rga ni sm/environ m e ntinter ac tion s those  experiences norma l lyarise in. For  ex ampl e ,  t act i le fee li n gso f  hardness or so ftness are  d e te rmined byp art ic ular pa tternsof ex p erience s one has  when eng ag ingi n  su ch activit ies as s quishinga  spon g eor pu shi ng a b ri ckwall.  Simil a rly , tha t expe rt iences  of s ee ing diff er as a class from expe rience s ofhea ring is d ue, acc ording to  the  sensorimo tor  th eory,  to patte rnso fsen s orimo torc ontingenc i es  sp e c if ic to visio n a ndaudit ion ,  suchas t hat in seeing, bu t  not in hearin g, s t i mul ati o n fr om  a particularsou rc e stops wh en  one turnsone's he ad sidew ays, o r clos es one' s ey e s. The  cru cia l role pl aye db y patte rn so f sens orim ot or con tingen c y in s haping perceptua l exp e r ience has  been  s een ass uppo rted by fi ndings on a daptat ionto di stortin gor inv ert in g glasses, as well a s fin dings o fexpe rim ents w iths e nsory  sub st itu tion devi c e s( Hu rl e y &  Noë  2003 ;Noë2004; O'R e gan 2011 ).F or it s ee mst h at exp e ri e n tial chang e h ere f o l lows on th e  hee l so f ada ptatio n to p atterns ofse nsorimo tor c ontingenc ies. Thes ens or im
 We_will take_enactivism as stating that_cognition is_embodied_in this_strong,_or ―radical‖ sense_(Chemero 2009, Hutto_& Myin 2013). In_the domain of_perception,_enactivism has become associated with the so called sensorimotor contingency approach presented in O'Regan_and_Noë (2001)._Vision,_according_to the sensorimotor approach ―is_something we do, rather than_something that_happens in us‖ (O'Regan & Noë 2001). The_approach_rejects the view_on vision as aimed at producing ―faithful metric-preserving replica_of the outside world inside the_head‖ (O'Regan 1992)._Instead,_seeing_is conceived of as_an ―exploratory activity,‖ ―attuned to‖ sensorimotor_contingencies, or ways in which sensory_stimulation changes with movement-such as when a_retinal image changes when one walks_around an object. Seeing a_scene or_an object is, in the_sensorimotor approach, comparable_to feeling_a surface or_object, where the experience is of_the whole surface_or object, despite the fact that_momentary_tactile stimulation is_limited_to_the fingertips_making contact only_at_particular places._Sensorimotor_theorists have argued that the idea_that_vision should be understood as temporally extended_interaction is supported by_the_insights it provides into_the nature and character of_perceptual experiences. According to the sensorimotor_approach, perceptual_experiences owe_their identity to the patterns of sensorimotor contingencies typical of the_kinds of organism/environment interactions those experiences_normally arise in. For_example, tactile_feelings_of hardness or_softness_are determined_by particular patterns of experiences one has_when engaging_in such activities as squishing a_sponge or pushing a_brick_wall. Similarly, that expertiences of seeing_differ as a class from experiences_of hearing is due, according_to_the_sensorimotor theory, to patterns of_sensorimotor contingencies specific to vision and_audition, such as_that in seeing, but not in hearing,_stimulation_from a particular source stops when_one_turns one's head sideways, or closes_one's_eyes._The crucial role played by_patterns of sensorimotor contingency in shaping_perceptual experience has been seen as supported by findings_on adaptation to_distorting or inverting glasses, as_well_as_findings of experiments with sensory substitution devices (Hurley & Noë_2003; Noë_2004; O'Regan 2011)._For it seems that experiential change here follows on the_heels of adaptation to patterns of sensorimotor_contingencies. The sensorim