 extent that they inform agents of actual states of affairs. Fiction is not so constrained. 352 F R E D R I K H A R A L D S E N The following suggestion makes the constraint more precise: Let the context set be a set W of worlds that contains (or is supposed to contain) the actual world. Contributions to a discourse are felicitous only if they narrow down the information consistent with the initial presuppositions, modeled as removing worlds from W. A counterfactual claim is accordingly felicitous only if it removes at least one world from W. How? Suppose p and q are true in all worlds w ∈ W. A counterfactual claim u to the effect that 'if p weren't the case, q would not have been' asks us to consider what the case might be in the closest worlds w* accessible from the various worlds w where p is not the case, and u removes from W all worlds w from which the closest accessible worlds w* in which although p does not hold, q still does. For fictional discourse, on the other hand, contributions proceed in the manner of normal, non-counterfactual information updates (though it is of course possible to incorporate counterfactual talk in fiction, as when fictional detectives speculate, counterfactually, about possible explanations for observations at a crime scene). Insofar as the difference is a matter of pragmatic felicity constraints defined by discourse goals I predict that the distinction between counterfactual and fictional discourse might sometimes be hard to draw – especially in the absence of explicit conversational markers. This seems correct. For a relatively mundane illustration, consider examples in (say) a law textbook. Such examples may involve relatively elaborate stage setting and even names for characters. Insofar as their purpose is to illustrate facts about the actual world they are reasonably interpreted as describing counterfactual scenarios, yet they often look and behave like brief fictions. According to my proposal the correct classification depends on what role the story in the example is supposed to play, not on its truth-conditional content. 4. Truth in fiction In light of the model we can offer a definition of truth-in-fiction. Now, the proposition expressed by a sentence in a fiction (or its truth-conditions) is of course determined by the (unrestricted) complete set of possible worlds. What counts as true-in-fiction, however, is the subset that reflects the information the fiction conveys, and which is relevant to interpreting T H E T R U T H A
extent that they inform agents of actual states of affairs. Fiction is not therefore constrained. 352 farad R E D gas constant I K H A R A L D S vitamin e N The following suggestion make the constraint more precise: lease the context set be a set W of worldly concern that contains (or is supposed to contain) the actual world. Contributions to a sermon are felicitous only if they narrow down the information coherent with the initial presuppositions, modeled as removing worlds from W. A counterfactual title is accordingly felicitous only if it removes at least one world from W. How? Suppose phosphorus and q are true in all worlds w ∈ W. A counterfactual claim u to the effect that' if p weren't the case, q would not have been' asks us to regard what the casing might be in the closest worlds w * accessible from the various worlds w where p is not the case, and u removes from W all universe w from which the closest accessible world w * in which although phosphorus does not accommodate, q still does. For fabricated discourse, on the early hand, contributions proceed in the manner of normal, non - counterfactual data updates (though it is of course possible to incorporate counterfactual talk in fiction, as when fabricated detectives speculate, counterfactually, about possible explanations for observations at a crime scene). Insofar as the difference is a topic of matter-of-fact felicity constraints defined by discourse goal I predict that the distinction between counterfactual and fictional sermon might sometimes be hard to draw – especially in the absence of explicit colloquial markers. This seems correct. For a relatively mundane illustration, see examples in (say) a jurisprudence textbook. Such examples may imply relatively elaborate stagecoach setting and even names for character. Insofar as their purpose is to illustrate facts about the actual world they are reasonably interpreted as describing counterfactual scenarios, yet they often look and behave like abbreviated fictions. According to my marriage proposal the correct classification depends on what character the story in the example is supposed to play, not on its truth - conditional content. 4. Truth in fiction In light of the model we can volunteer a definition of accuracy - in - fiction. Now, the proposition expressed by a sentence in a fiction (or its truth - conditions) is of path determined by the (unrestricted) complete stage set of potential worlds. What counts as true - in - fiction, however, is the subset that reflects the information the fiction conveys, and which is relevant to represent T H vitamin e T R U T H A
 exhent that they inform agtnts of actual stcres of affaids. Fictiun is not so constrained. 352 F C E E R I K H A R A L D S E N Tfe followpng suggewtioi makes the consvdaint more prsgise: Nxt the context xet be a sat W of worlds tfac contains (or is supposed to contain) the acyuwl world. Contrybutpogs tk a discourse are felicitous only jf they narrow down yhe information consistent witj the initial preskppositions, modqoed as removkng worlds from W. A coonterfactual claim is accordinglh felncitous onli jf ht removes et leaft one world from W. Vow? Suplose p and q ave trne ib all worlds w ∈ W. A cmunterfactual claii u to tha zffect that 'if p wereb't the wase, q wuyld nou heve been' wska us to cohsider what the case might be on nne closest wkrlds r* wccessible from the various worlds w whtre p is not the case, and u eemoves from W all wotlds w froi which the closest accessible worlds w* in which dlthongf p djdw jot hold, q still does. For fictional discourse, kn tme other hand, coktributions proceec ln jhe manner of vormal, noh-counterfactual invormatijn upeates (thotgh ot is of course possible to incorporate xounterfactual taln in fictiou, as wnen foctional detectives speeulate, counterfachually, abkjt possible explxnanionv for observations at a cryme scene). Inspfar as the diffewence is a mattcs of pragmatic fellcity cmnstraints defined by discourse goals I pcxdict that thg dhstpnction bztween counterfactuwl and fictioncl discobrse mkght sometpmes be herd to draw – especially it the absence of explycit concersatiuval markers. Thos seems boxrect. For a relatively mundene kmlustration, conwidtr examples in (ssy) x lww txxtbojn. Such exampnes oay onvolxe relaunveoh elsborate stage settinc ans even names for cnavacters. Ibsofar af their purpoxe is to illustratt factv auout tne wctual world they are reasonabmy interpgetcd as describyng gounjerfactual xcenarios, yet they often look and behavx like brief fictions. Axcording to my proppxal the corcect cjassificadion depends on what role the story ik the example is suppoaed to play, not on its truth-conditional content. 4. Truth in fiction In light of the moeel we can offer a defonitimn pf trueh-in-hirtion. Now, the proiosition expressed by a sentence in a fiwtnon (or its truth-conditions) is ow course detetmined by the (unrestricted) completr set of possible worlds. What cpunts as true-in-fiction, hpwever, iw the subsen tiat reflects the infprmatimn thw fictiin clnveys, and whkch id relevanh to iuterpreting T H E T R U T H A
extent that they inform agents of actual affairs. is not constrained. 352 F K A R A D S E The following suggestion makes the constraint precise: Let the context set be a set W of worlds that contains is supposed to contain) the actual world. Contributions to a discourse are felicitous if narrow the consistent with the initial presuppositions, modeled as removing worlds from W. A counterfactual claim is accordingly only if it removes at least one world W. How? Suppose p q are true in all w W. A claim to effect that 'if weren't the case, q would not have been' asks us to consider what the case might be the closest accessible from various w p is not and u removes from W all which the closest accessible worlds w* in which p does hold, q still does. For fictional on the other hand, contributions proceed in the of normal, non-counterfactual information updates (though it is of course possible to incorporate counterfactual talk as when fictional detectives counterfactually, about possible for at crime Insofar as difference is a matter of pragmatic felicity constraints defined by discourse I predict that the distinction between counterfactual and fictional discourse be to draw – in the absence of conversational This seems correct. For mundane consider a textbook. examples may involve relatively stage setting and even names characters. Insofar as their about the actual world they are reasonably interpreted describing counterfactual scenarios, yet they often look behave like brief fictions. According to my proposal the correct classification depends what role in the example is supposed to play, not its truth-conditional content. 4. in fiction In light of the model we can a of truth-in-fiction. the proposition expressed a sentence in fiction (or its of course by (unrestricted) possible worlds. What counts as true-in-fiction, is subset that reflects the information fiction which is relevant to interpreting T H E T R U T H A
 extent that they inform agentS of actual sTates Of aFfaIrS. FicTion Is not so constraINed. 352 F r E D R I K H A R A L D S E N The follOwing SuGGestIOn Makes The consTRaINT moRe PrEciSe: lEt The coNteXt set be A set W of worLds ThAt contains (or IS sUpposed to cOntAin) the actual WorLd. ContRiButIOns to A diScourSe are fELicitoUs only if tHeY Narrow DOwn the iNFOrMatiOn consistent with tHE iNItial presupposItions, MoDElED As rEmoVing worlds FrOm W. A cOUnterfaCTuAL CLaiM Is accordingly Felicitous oNLy iF it remOvEs aT Least oNe worLd FRom w. How? Suppose P and Q are true iN all woRLds w ∈ W. A cOUnterfaCtual cLaiM u tO the EFfEcT thAt 'IF p wEReN't tHE caSe, q would NoT hAve beEn' asKS US To coNsiDer wHat thE case might be iN thE cloSEst WorldS w* accEssiBlE from The varIous wOrLds w where p is not The cAse, and u reMovEs FroM W All woRLds w frOm wHicH the cloSest accESsiBlE WORlDs w* in which although P dOES nOt hold, q sTill doES. FOr FIctional DiScoUrse, ON The otHer hANd, ContribuTions pROcEeD in the mAnNer of nOrMal, Non-CountERfacTual inFormatioN updaTEs (though it is of COurse possible TO iNCOrPOratE coUnterfactuaL talK In fiCtioN, As WheN FictiOnal dEtECtIVes speculate, counterFaCtuallY, abouT possible explAnations foR OBServatioNs at A CrIMe scene). Insofar As the Difference IS a matter Of praGmatic feLicity conSTRaints deFinEd bY diScoURSe Goals I predict THAt thE dIstinctIon Between CouNteRfaCtuAl And fictioNal discoUrSe MiGhT soMetimES be hard tO dRaw – EsPecIally IN the abSence Of exPlIcIT coNversatIOnAL MarkErS. THis sEemS cOrrecT. For A RelAtively Mundane ilLusTRatiOn, CoNsider eXamples in (say) a LaW textbook. SUcH exAmples MAY involve Relatively elaborate stagE Setting And Even nAmes For characTerS. InsofAr aS Their pUrpose Is to iLlUstRATe facTS AbOut ThE actual worLD TheY are rEaSonaBly inteRpreted as describinG CouNterfactual scEnaRios, YET tHey OFtEN loOk ANd bEHAve like brief ficTions. AccorDiNG tO my proposaL The CoRrect clAssificAtion DEpends oN what role The story iN tHe exAMPle Is supposed To play, noT on its truTH-condITiOnal cOntEnt. 4. TruTh In fIctioN In ligHT of The moDel we cAn Offer a DefinItIon of truTh-in-fiction. Now, the proposItion eXpresSed By a sentenCe iN A fiCtion (or itS truTh-conditioNs) iS of CoursE deTErminEd by THe (UnrEStricTed) cOMplete set OF pOssIBLe Worlds. What cOUNTs aS true-In-fICtion, hOwevEr, is the subset that REflects the infoRmatION thE fiCTion CoNveys, and which iS reLeVANt to inteRpReting T H E T R u T H A
 extent that they inform a gents of a ctual  st ate sof a ffai rs. Fiction is notso constrained. 352 FR E D  R I KH  A  R AL D S E NT h e f ol lo win gs ug gesti onmakes t he constra int  m ore precise: Le t the cont ext  set be a se t W  of wo rl dst hat c ont ains(or is suppos ed to con ta i n) the actualw o rl d. C ontributions to a di s course are fel icitou so nl y ifthe y narrow d ow n the informa t io n c ons i stent with th e initial p r esu pposit io ns, modele d asre m ovi ng worlds f romW. A coun terfac t ual cla i m is ac cordin gly  fe lici t ou sonl yi f i t  r emo v esat least  o ne  worl d fr o m W . Ho w?Supp ose p  and q are tr uein a l l w orlds  w ∈W. A  c ounte rfactu al cl ai m u to the effe ct t hat 'if p  we re n't  t he ca s e, q w oul d n ot have  been'a sks  u s t oconsider what theca s e  m ight bein the cl os e st world sw*acce s s iblefrom th e variou s worl d swwhere p  i s notth e c ase , and u re movesfrom W a ll wo r lds w from whi c h the closest ac c e ss i blewor lds w* in w hich alth ough pdoe s  nothold,  q st i ll does. For fictio na l disc ourse , on the othe r hand, co n t r ibutions  pro c ee d  in the manner  of n ormal, non - counterf actua l inform ation upd a t es (thou ghitisofc o ur se possible t o inco rp orate c oun terfact ual  ta lkinfi ction, as  when fi ct io na ldet ectiv e s specul at e,co unt erfac t ually,  abou t po ss ib l e e xplanat i on s forob se rvat ion sat acrim e  sc ene). I nsofar as  th e  dif fe re nce isa matter of p ra gmatic fel ic ity  const r a ints def ined by discourse goals I predi ctthatthedistincti onbetwee n c o unterf actual  andfi cti o n al di s c ou rse  m ight somet i m esbe ha rd  todraw –especially in thea bse nce of explic itconv e r sa tio n al mar ke r s.T h is seems correc t. For a r el a ti vely munda n e i ll ustrati on, con sider example s in (say ) a law t ex tboo k .  Su ch example s may in volve rel a tivel y  e labor ate  stage  s ett ing a nd eve n  na mes f or cha ra cters.  Inso fa r as the ir purpose is to illust rate f actsabo ut the ac tua l  wo rld theyarereasonably  in ter prete d a s  desc ribi n gcou n terfa ctua l  scenario s ,yet t he y often loo k a ndbehav e l i ke bri ef f ictions. Accordin g  to my proposa l th e cor rec t  cla ss ification depe nds  o n what rol ethe story i n the ex am p le is  suppo sed to  play,n o to n itstrut h-c onditiona l c on t ent. 4.  T ru t h in f icti on  In li ght of them o del we can offer  a de f i nitio n  of  trut h- in-fict i on.Now, the p ropositionexpres sedby asentenc ein a f ict io n (or itst ruth-cond ition s) is o fcour sedeterm ined b y the  (un re str icted) co m p le t ese t  of  pos sible  w orld s. What c o unts astru e -in-fic ti on, h owever ,  i s the subset  th at re f l ects the i n form a ti o n the  ficti on con veys, a n d w hi ch is r ele v a nt to int erpreting T H  E  T R  U T H A 
 extent_that they_inform agents of actual_states of_affairs._Fiction is_not_so constrained. 352_F R E_D R I K_H A R_A_L D S E N The following suggestion makes the constraint more precise: Let_the_context set_be_a_set W of worlds that_contains (or is supposed to_contain) the_actual world. Contributions to a discourse are felicitous_only_if they narrow_down the information consistent with the initial presuppositions, modeled_as removing worlds from W. A_counterfactual claim is_accordingly_felicitous_only if it removes_at least one world from W._How? Suppose p and q are_true in all worlds w ∈ W._A counterfactual claim u to the_effect that 'if p weren't_the case,_q would not have been'_asks us to_consider what_the case might_be in the closest worlds w*_accessible from the_various worlds w where p is_not_the case, and_u_removes_from W_all worlds w_from_which the_closest_accessible worlds w* in which although_p_does not hold, q still does. For_fictional discourse, on the_other_hand, contributions proceed in_the manner of normal, non-counterfactual_information updates (though it is of_course possible_to incorporate_counterfactual talk in fiction, as when fictional detectives speculate, counterfactually, about_possible explanations for observations at a_crime scene). Insofar as_the difference_is_a matter of_pragmatic_felicity constraints_defined by discourse goals I predict that_the distinction_between counterfactual and fictional discourse might_sometimes be hard to_draw_– especially in the absence of_explicit conversational markers. This seems correct._For a relatively mundane illustration,_consider_examples_in (say) a law textbook._Such examples may involve relatively elaborate_stage setting and_even names for characters. Insofar as their_purpose_is to illustrate facts about the_actual_world they are reasonably interpreted as_describing_counterfactual_scenarios, yet they often look_and behave like brief fictions. According_to my proposal the correct classification depends on what_role the story_in the example is supposed_to_play,_not on its truth-conditional content. 4. Truth in fiction In_light of_the model we_can offer a definition of truth-in-fiction. Now, the proposition expressed_by a sentence in a fiction (or_its truth-conditions) is of course determined by the (unrestricted) complete set_of possible worlds. What counts as true-in-fiction, however,_is the subset that reflects the information_the fiction conveys, and_which_is relevant to interpreting T H E_T_R_U_T H A