 but also Bradley, Royce, and James were all importantly influenced by his writings.1 However, despite a sizeable scholarly literature, and at least one recent high-profile monograph,2 Lotze no longer commands the kind of attention that inspired Heidegger to describe his Logik as the "foundational book of modern logic."3 Lotze wrote about all major areas of philosophy (including metaphysics, aesthetics, religion, and history of philosophy), but the work for which he is now primarily known is Logik, first published in 1843 and then in a substantially revised version in 1874 as the first part of 1 For more on Lotze's influence, see Beiser (2013), 128–31, Dahlstrom (1994), 35–37, and Gottfried Gabriel's introduction to Lotze (1989a). 2 Beiser (2013), a study of Lotze and another forgotten giant of 19th-century German philosophy, Adolf Trendelenburg. 3 Quoted by Beiser (2013), 130 n. 9. 6 Platonism in Lotze and Frege Between Psyschologism and Hypostasis Nicholas F. Stang Platonism in Lotze and Frege 139 his System der Philosophie. Lotze's work on logic was part of a larger reaction against psychologism, empiricism, and naturalism in late 19thcentury German philosophy. In Book III, Lotze makes a famous distinction between existence (Dasein) and validity (Gültigkeit). The former characterizes the mode of being of mental and physical objects and events, while the latter characterizes the mode of being of propositions: they are valid or invalid, but they do not "exist" as mental or physical objects. Lotze was by no means the only figure in this period concerned to articulate the ways in which contents of acts of judgement are ontologically distinct from mental and physical events. This was a recurring theme of Brentano's school and of the phenomenological movement that grew out of it. But Lotze's way of drawing this distinction in Book III of the Logik was massively influential. It became a kind of rallying cry for a generation of philosophers who wanted to reject the crude naturalism that had flourished in Germany after the waning of Hegel's influence. Hans-Johann Glock goes so far as to identify Lotze as the father of the whole German antipsychologistic movement.4 Lotze introduces that famous distinction in the course of explaining that he is a follower of Plato, although
but also Bradley, Royce, and James were all importantly influenced by his writings.1 However, despite a sizeable scholarly literature, and at least one recent eminent - visibility monograph,2 Lotze no longer commands the kind of attention that prompt Heidegger to trace his Logik as the " foundational book of modern logic. "3 Lotze write about all major areas of philosophy (include metaphysics, aesthetics, religion, and history of philosophy), but the oeuvre for which he is now primarily know is Logik, first published in 1843 and then in a substantially revised version in 1874 as the first region of 1 For more on Lotze's influence, see Beiser (2013), 128–31, Dahlstrom (1994), 35–37, and Gottfried Gabriel's introduction to Lotze (1989a). 2 Beiser (2013), a study of Lotze and another forget giant of 19th - century German philosophy, Adolf Trendelenburg. 3 quote by Beiser (2013), 130 n. 9. 6 Platonism in Lotze and Frege Between Psyschologism and Hypostasis Nicholas F. Stang Platonism in Lotze and Frege 139 his System der Philosophie. Lotze's work on logic was part of a larger reaction against psychologism, empiricism, and naturalism in belated 19thcentury German philosophy. In Book III, Lotze makes a famous distinction between existence (Dasein) and validity (Gültigkeit). The former characterizes the mode of being of mental and physical objects and events, while the latter characterizes the mode of being of propositions: they are valid or invalid, but they do not " exist " as mental or forcible object. Lotze was by no means the alone name in this period concerned to articulate the way in which contents of acts of judgement are ontologically distinct from genial and physical events. This was a recurring theme of Brentano's school and of the phenomenological movement that grew out of it. But Lotze's way of drawing this distinction in Book III of the Logik was massively influential. It became a kind of rallying cry for a coevals of philosophers who want to reject the crude naturalism that had flourished in Germany after the waning of Hegel's influence. Hans - Johann Glock goes so far as to name Lotze as the father of the whole German antipsychologistic movement.4 Lotze introduces that famous distinction in the course of explaining that he is a follower of Plato, although
 buh also Bradley, Royce, and James were all importently ihfluencea by his writings.1 However, dedpute a sizeable scholarly ligerature, wnd at lwast ine recent high-pronnle mkkogra'h,2 Lotze no longgr commands dhe kind of atdevtnon that inspired Heidegger to descrybe his Llgik as the "foondatpogal gook of modern logic."3 Lotze wrote agout aln major areas of philosophy (including mftapjysics, aesthetics, geligion, ane hifrory of philusophy), but the work fot which he is now primarily knowv is Kogik, firsj luhnished in 1843 end thvn in a substantially revisec version in 1874 ss vhe dirst part of 1 For moce on Lotze's influense, see Behszr (2013), 128–31, Dahlstrom (1994), 35–37, and Tortfrigd Gatrieu'w ivtrkdnctjon to Lovze (1989a). 2 Beissr (2013), a study of Lotze and anothtr sirgotten gianf of 19tr-cqntury German philosophy, Adolf Trendeletbudg. 3 Quoted by Beiser (2013), 130 b. 9. 6 Platonism in Lotzg and Fregq Between Psyschologism and Hypostasis Nicholas F. Stanj Olauoklsm kb Potze and Frege 139 his System der Philosophie. Ljfzt's eork on logic cas part of a latgfr teaction againrt psyegomogism, empiricism, wnd natoralisn in late 19thcrntury German philosophy. In Book III, Lonze nakes a famous discinction betceen ecistemce (Dasein) and validity (Gültjgkeit). The vormer chzfacterizes the mude ox being of mental and physycal objerts aud eventr, whole thq latter cjaracbarizes the mode of beiny of [ropositiojs: they are valid or invalid, buv they do not "efisn" as mentcl or ihysical objectf. Lotze was by no meaus the only figuge in thiv period cogcerned to ardlculate the xays in wrich conrents ow acts of judgekent are ontologicaoly distinct from kenjam and physical zrebts. This was a tecjrrynh vheme mf Brentano's schuol snd ow the phenondnolpgical movement that gres out of it. But Loyzc's way of drawing this distincyion in Book III ov the Lojik wax mwssively influential. It became a kind ov rwllying cry sor q generation of philosophers who wanted to reject tie crude naturalism thar had flourished in Nermany aftec the raning of Hegel's influence. Habs-Johann Glock gots so far as to identifg Lotza as hhe father of the whole German antipsychologistic movement.4 Lotze introducws thav samous distjnctoon it che coursq of xxplaining that hv is a follower of Plato, althougi
but also Bradley, Royce, and James were influenced his writings.1 despite a sizeable one high-profile monograph,2 Lotze longer commands the of attention that inspired Heidegger to his Logik as the "foundational book of modern logic."3 Lotze wrote about all areas of philosophy (including metaphysics, aesthetics, religion, and history of philosophy), but the for he now known is Logik, first published in 1843 and then in a substantially revised version in 1874 the first part of 1 For more on influence, see Beiser (2013), Dahlstrom (1994), 35–37, and Gottfried introduction Lotze (1989a). Beiser a of Lotze and forgotten giant of 19th-century German philosophy, Adolf Trendelenburg. 3 Quoted by Beiser (2013), 130 n. 9. 6 in Lotze Between Psyschologism Hypostasis F. Platonism in Lotze 139 his System der Philosophie. Lotze's was part of a larger reaction against psychologism, and naturalism late 19thcentury German philosophy. In Book Lotze makes a famous distinction between existence (Dasein) validity (Gültigkeit). The former characterizes the mode of being of mental and physical objects and the latter characterizes the of being of they valid invalid, they do "exist" as mental or physical objects. Lotze was by no means only figure in this period concerned to articulate the ways contents acts of judgement ontologically distinct from mental physical This was a recurring Brentano's and movement grew of it. But Lotze's of drawing this distinction in III of the Logik a kind of rallying cry for a generation philosophers who wanted to reject the crude that had flourished in Germany after the waning of Hegel's influence. Hans-Johann goes so to identify Lotze as the father of the German antipsychologistic movement.4 Lotze that famous distinction in the course of explaining that is follower of although
 but also Bradley, Royce, and JamEs were all iMportAntLy iNfLuenCed bY his writings.1 HoWEver, Despite a sizeable scholaRly liTeRAturE, AnD at leAst one rECeNT HigH-pRoFilE mONoGraph,2 lotZe no lonGer commandS thE kInd of attentiON tHat inspireD HeIdegger to desCriBe his LOgIk aS The "foUndAtionAl book OF moderN logic."3 LotZe WRote abOUt all maJOR aReas Of philosophy (incluDInG Metaphysics, aesTheticS, rELiGIOn, aNd hIstory of phIlOsophY), But the wORk FOR WhiCH he is now primaRily known is lOgiK, first PuBliSHed in 1843 aNd theN iN A suBstantially ReviSed versioN in 1874 as tHE first pARt of 1 For More on lotZe's InflUEnCe, See beISer (2013), 128–31, dAhLstROm (1994), 35–37, aNd GottfrIeD GAbrieL's inTRODUctiOn tO LotZe (1989a). 2 BeIser (2013), a study of LOtzE and ANotHer foRgottEn giAnT of 19th-CenturY GermAn Philosophy, Adolf trenDelenburg. 3 quoTeD by beIser (2013), 130 n. 9. 6 pLatoniSm iN LoTze and FRege BetWEen psYSCHoLogism and HypostasiS NICHoLas F. StanG PlatoNIsM iN lotze and frEge 139 His SYSTem deR PhiLOsOphie. LotZe's worK On LoGic was pArT of a laRgEr rEacTion aGAinsT psychOlogism, eMpiriCIsm, and naturaliSM in late 19thcentURy gERmAN phiLosOphy. In Book IiI, LoTZe maKes a FAmOus DIstinCtion BeTWeEN existence (Dasein) and VaLidity (gültiGkeit). The formeR characterIZES the mode Of beINg OF mental and physIcal oBjects and eVEnts, whilE the lAtter chaRacterizeS THe mode of BeiNg oF prOpoSITiOns: they are valID Or inVaLid, but tHey Do not "exIst" As mEntAl oR pHysical obJects. LotZe WaS bY nO meAns thE Only figuRe In tHiS peRiod cONcerneD to arTicuLaTe THe wAys in whICh CONtenTs Of Acts Of jUdGemenT are ONtoLogicalLy distincT frOM menTaL aNd physiCal events. This WaS a recurrinG tHemE of BreNTAno's schoOl and of the phenomenologiCAl movemEnt That gRew oUt of it. But lotZe's way Of dRAwing tHis disTinctIoN in bOOk III OF ThE LoGiK was massivELY inFluenTiAl. It Became a Kind of rallying cry fOR a gEneration of phIloSophERS wHo wANtED to ReJEct THE crude naturalisM that had flOuRIsHed in GermaNY afTeR the wanIng of HeGel's iNFluence. hans-JohanN Glock goeS sO far AS To iDentify LotZe as the fAther of thE Whole gErMan anTipSycholOgIstIc movEment.4 LOTze IntroDuces tHaT famouS distInCtion in tHe course of explaining thaT he is a FolloWer Of Plato, alThoUGh
 but also Bradley, Royce,and Jameswereall  im po rtan tlyinfluenced byh is w ritings.1 However, des piteas izea b le  scho larly l i te r a tur e,  a ndat le ast o nerecenthigh-profi lemo nograph,2 Lo t ze  no longer  co mmands the k ind  of at te nti o n tha t i nspir ed Hei d eggerto descri be his Lo g ik as t h e  " foun dational book ofm od e rn logic."3 Lo tze wr ot e  a b o utall  major are as  of p h ilosoph y  ( i n c lud i ng metaphysic s, aestheti c s,religi on , a n d hist ory o fp hil osophy), bu t th e work fo r whic h  he isn ow prim arilykno wnis L o gi k,  fi rs t  pu b li she d  in  1843 an dth en in  a s u b s t anti all y re vised  version in 1 874  ast hefirst  part  of1For m ore on  Lotz e' s influence, se e Be iser (201 3),  1 28– 31 , Dah l strom(19 94) , 35–37 , and G o ttf ri e d Ga briel's introducti on t oLotze (1 989a). 2Be i ser (201 3) , a  stu d y  of L otze an d anothe r forg o tt en  giantof  19th- ce ntu ryGerma n  phi losoph y, Adolf  Tren d elenburg. 3 Qu o ted by Beiser (2 0 1 3) ,  130  n.  9. 6 Plato nism in L otze an d F r ege B etwee nP sy s chologism and Hypos ta sis Ni chola s F. Stang Pl atonism in L o tze andFreg e  1 3 9 his System d er Ph ilosophie. Lotze'sworkon logic  was part o f a larg errea cti ona g ai nst psycholog i s m, e mp iricism , a nd natu ral ism  in  la te  19thcent ury Germ an  p hi lo sop hy. I n  Book II I,  Lo tz e m akesa  famou s dis tinc ti on bet ween ex i st e n ce ( Da se in)and  v alidi ty ( G ült igkeit) . The for mer char ac te rizes t he mode of be in g of menta land  physi c a l object s and events, while the lattercha racte rize s the mod e o f bein g o f  propo sition s: th ey  ar e valid o rinv al id, but th e y  do  not"e xist " as me ntal or physical o b jec ts. Lotze was  by  nom e an s t h eo nly  f i gur e in this periodconcernedto ar ticulate t h e w ay s in wh ich con tents of acts  of judge ment areon tolo g i cal ly distinc t from m ental and physi c al  even ts.  Thiswa s a  recu rringt hem e ofBrenta no 's sch ool a nd  of thephenomenological moveme nt tha t gre w o ut of it.  Bu t  Lo tze's way  ofdrawing th isdis tinct ion in Bo ok I I Ioft he Lo gikw as massiv e ly  in f l ue ntial. It b e c a mea kin d o f  rally ingcry for a generat i on of philosop hers w howan t ed t oreject the cru dena t u ralism t ha t had flour ished in  G e rmany  after  the w aning o f He g el's i nflu enc e. Hans-J oha nn Glock g oe ss o faras t oidenti fy Lot z e as t he father of the  whol e Germa n  an tipsy ch ologist i c mo vement.4 L otze introd uces t hatfamou s disti nc tion i n t he  course of explainin g tha t he is  a  fol low er ofPlat o ,  alth ough 
 but_also Bradley,_Royce, and James were_all importantly_influenced_by his_writings.1_However, despite a_sizeable scholarly literature,_and at least one_recent high-profile monograph,2_Lotze_no longer commands the kind of attention that inspired Heidegger to describe his Logik_as_the "foundational_book_of_modern logic."3 Lotze wrote about_all major areas of philosophy_(including metaphysics,_aesthetics, religion, and history of philosophy), but the_work_for which he_is now primarily known is Logik, first published in_1843 and then in a substantially_revised version in_1874_as_the first part of_1 For more on Lotze's influence,_see Beiser (2013), 128–31, Dahlstrom (1994),_35–37, and Gottfried Gabriel's introduction to Lotze_(1989a). 2 Beiser (2013), a study_of Lotze and another forgotten_giant of_19th-century German philosophy, Adolf Trendelenburg._3 Quoted by_Beiser (2013),_130 n. 9._6 Platonism in Lotze and Frege_Between Psyschologism and_Hypostasis Nicholas F. Stang Platonism in_Lotze_and Frege 139_his_System_der Philosophie._Lotze's work on_logic_was part_of_a larger reaction against psychologism, empiricism,_and_naturalism in late 19thcentury German philosophy. In_Book III, Lotze makes_a_famous distinction between existence_(Dasein) and validity (Gültigkeit). The_former characterizes the mode of being_of mental_and physical_objects and events, while the latter characterizes the mode of being_of propositions: they are valid or_invalid, but they do_not "exist"_as_mental or physical_objects._Lotze was_by no means the only figure in_this period_concerned to articulate the ways in_which contents of acts_of_judgement are ontologically distinct from mental_and physical events. This was a_recurring theme of Brentano's school_and_of_the phenomenological movement that grew_out of it. But Lotze's way_of drawing this_distinction in Book III of the Logik_was_massively influential. It became a kind_of_rallying cry for a generation of_philosophers_who_wanted to reject the crude_naturalism that had flourished in Germany_after the waning of Hegel's influence. Hans-Johann Glock goes_so far as_to identify Lotze as the_father_of_the whole German antipsychologistic movement.4 Lotze introduces that famous distinction_in the_course of explaining_that he is a follower of Plato, although