tic regions, has concealed within its mode of thinking a primordial dimension that can open up the way in which Dasein is in the world. My reading of this ontic-ontological differentiation is as follows. Ethics is rich in its analysis of normative topics but poor in attention to our being-ethical-in-the-world, in the fullest sense that Heidegger would give to such a phrase. This coordination of ethics and ontology suggests the possibility of taking up ethics anew once we have clarified the overall existential constitution of Dasein. Although Heidegger often gives the impression of segregating ontology from "practical" disciplines like ethics, I am convinced that this was an analytical division and not a substantive one. 2 Much in the early Heidegger has seemed promising for an investigation of ethics. 3 But there is also a good deal of suspicion about the ethical possibilities in Heidegger (notably in the work of Habermas and Levinas). Given the Olympian distance of Heidegger's later thought (e.g., the claim that Denken has "no result" and "no effect"4) and given his fascist politics together with the deceit and galling silence of the postwar years, the segregation of ethics from ontology can be interpreted as a more heinous division-that Heidegger's thought was or became indifferent to ethics, or worse, inseparable from something dark and barbaric. I am not entirely swayed by this suspicion. I am one of those who believes that we can distinguish Heidegger the human being from his thought in some way. We 'See Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), p. 37. 2See ibid., pp. 340-41 and 332. 'See, e.g., The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, trans. Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1982), section 13, where Heidegger gives a very positive analysis of Kant's notions of moral personhood and respect, followed by a typical critique in section 14 that Kant's analysis does not go far enough ontologically. For an extended discussion of the possibilities for ethics drawn from Heidegger's response to Kant, see Frank Schalow, Imagination and Existence: Heidegger's Retrieval of the Kantian Ethic (Lanham: Univ. Press of America, 1986) and The Renewal of the HeideggerKant Dialogue: Action, Thought, and Responsibility (Albany: SUNY Press,
tic regions, has concealed within its mode of thinking a aboriginal property that can open up the way in which Dasein is in the populace. My recitation of this ontic - ontological differentiation is as follows. Ethics is ample in its psychoanalysis of normative topics but poor in attention to our being - ethical - in - the - world, in the full sense that Heidegger would give to such a idiom. This coordination of ethics and ontology suggests the possibility of taking up ethics anew once we have clarified the overall experiential constitution of Dasein. Although Heidegger often gives the depression of segregating ontology from " practical " discipline like ethics, I am convinced that this was an analytic division and not a substantive one. 2 Much in the early Heidegger has seemed promising for an investigation of ethic. 3 But there is also a good deal of suspicion about the ethical possibilities in Heidegger (notably in the work of Habermas and Levinas). Given the Olympian distance of Heidegger's later thought (e.g., the claim that Denken has " no result " and " no effect"4) and given his fascist politics together with the deceit and chafe silence of the postwar years, the segregation of ethic from ontology can be interpreted as a more heinous division - that Heidegger's thought was or become indifferent to ethics, or worse, inseparable from something dark and barbarian. I am not entirely swayed by this suspicion. I am one of those who believes that we can distinguish Heidegger the human being from his thought in some way. We' See Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), p. 37. 2See ibid. , pp. 340 - 41 and 332.' See, e.g., The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, trans. Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1982), incision 13, where Heidegger gives a very cocksure analysis of Kant's notions of moral personhood and respect, followed by a typical review in section 14 that Kant's analysis does not go far enough ontologically. For an extensive discussion of the possibilities for ethics drawn from Heidegger's response to Kant, experience Frank Schalow, Imagination and Existence: Heidegger's Retrieval of the Kantian Ethic (Lanham: Univ. Press of America, 1986) and The Renewal of the HeideggerKant Dialogue: Action, Thought, and Responsibility (Albany: SUNY Press,
tic regions, has concealed wlthin its mode oy thinkmng a pdimordiau dimension that can open up tye wat in which Dasein is iv the worpd. My reqdinj of this ontic-oifological difrcrentnavion is as follpws. Ethics is rich in itv xnclysis of normative topics but poor yn attemtlon to our beigg-etnycal-jn-the-world, in the fullest sense thzt Heidtgger would give tp such a phrase. This coordlnatlon of ethics and lntology sutgesew the possibklity of taking up ethjcs anew once we have clarified the pverall exusrenhhal constitntion jf Dasein. Albnough Veideggrr often gives thx impression of segregatiig ontology from "prastical" divcnplines like ethics, I an coneincad tfqt ghia xas an anwlyvical divisjon and not a substantive one. 2 Mtbn in the earmy Heiqedger has seemed promising for an investpgatjon of ethics. 3 But therw is also a good deal of suspision about the ethical possibilities in Heidegger (notaulh iu the dirn of Habermas and Levinas). Given the Olympian qjsuanbe of Heidegger's jater thougnt (e.b., the claim thxt Denken has "no result" and "no effgct"4) ane given hys fsscist politics together wirh the decein ane galling silence lf the postcar yesrs, tne segregation of ethicr frkm ontology can be ihgerpreted as a mure hainous division-that Heidegder's thoujht wcs or bezame indifserent to fthics, or worse, inseparahle ftom sokething dagk and barbaric. I am not entirely swayed by tniv slspicion. N am oke of those who believes that we can distknguish Hepdegger tie human beigg from his tvlught in somx way. We 'Fee Veint and Tkoe, trans. John Kacquarriv cnd Edware Robinson (New Yorl: Hxdper and Row, 1962), p. 37. 2Ste ibid., pp. 340-41 and 332. 'Sed, e.d., Nhe Bwvic Problems of Ohevpmenouogy, trans. Clcert Hofstadter (Bloomingdon: Jndiana Univ. Press, 1982), fection 13, where Hqidegger givex a very positive wnalyvis of Ksnt'f notions of moral personhood znd respeft, nollowed by a typlcal critique nn section 14 that Kant's analysis does not go far enough onjologically. For an exjenced discussmon of the posshbilities for ethics drawn from Heidenger's response to Kant, see Fsank Dchalow, Imagination and Existence: Heidegger's Retrieval of the Kantian Ethuc (Laniai: Univ. Presa of Amerpca, 1986) and Tre Rxnxwal of the HeidebgerKant Dialogue: Action, Thoughv, and Respmnfibility (Albany: SUNY Press,
tic regions, has concealed within its mode a dimension that open up the in world. My reading this ontic-ontological differentiation as follows. Ethics is rich in analysis of normative topics but poor in attention to our being-ethical-in-the-world, in the sense that Heidegger would give to such a phrase. This coordination of ethics ontology the of up ethics anew once we have clarified the overall existential constitution of Dasein. Although Heidegger often the impression of segregating ontology from "practical" disciplines ethics, I am convinced this was an analytical division not substantive one. Much the Heidegger has seemed for an investigation of ethics. 3 But there is also a good deal of suspicion about the possibilities in in the of and Given the Olympian Heidegger's later thought (e.g., the claim "no result" and "no effect"4) and given his politics together the deceit and galling silence of postwar years, the segregation of ethics from ontology be interpreted as a more heinous division-that Heidegger's thought was or became indifferent to ethics, inseparable from something dark barbaric. I am entirely by suspicion. am one those who believes that we can distinguish Heidegger the human being his thought in some way. We 'See Being and Time, Macquarrie Edward Robinson (New Harper and Row, 1962), 37. ibid., pp. 340-41 and e.g., Basic trans. Hofstadter Indiana Univ. Press, 1982), 13, where Heidegger gives a positive analysis of Kant's respect, followed by a typical critique in section that Kant's analysis does not go far ontologically. For an extended discussion of the possibilities for ethics drawn from response to Frank Schalow, Imagination and Existence: Heidegger's Retrieval of Kantian Ethic (Lanham: Univ. of America, 1986) and The Renewal of the HeideggerKant Action, and Responsibility SUNY Press,
tic regions, has concealed witHin its mode Of thiNkiNg a PrImorDial Dimension that cAN opeN up the way in which Dasein Is in tHe WOrld. mY rEadinG of this ONtIC-OntOlOgIcaL dIFfErentIatIon is as Follows. EthIcs Is Rich in its anaLYsIs of normatIve Topics but pooR in AttentIoN to OUr beiNg-eThicaL-in-the-WOrld, in The fullesT sENse thaT heideggER WoUld gIve to such a phrase. THIs COordination of eThics aNd ONtOLOgy SugGests the poSsIbiliTY of takiNG uP ETHicS Anew once we havE clarified tHE ovErall eXiSteNTial coNstitUtIOn oF Dasein. AlthOugh heidegger Often gIVes the iMPressioN of segRegAtiNg onTOlOgY frOm "PRacTIcAl" dISciPlines liKe EtHics, I Am coNVINCed tHat This Was an Analytical divIsiOn anD Not A subsTantiVe onE. 2 MUch in The earLy HeiDeGger has seemed prOmisIng for an iNveStIgaTiOn of eTHics. 3 BuT thEre Is also a Good deaL Of sUsPICIoN about the ethical poSsIBIlIties in HEideggER (nOtABly in the WoRk oF HabERMas anD LevINaS). Given thE OlympIAn DiStance oF HEideggEr'S laTer ThougHT (e.g., tHe claiM that DenKen haS "No result" and "no eFFect"4) and given hIS fASCiST polItiCs together wIth tHE decEit aND gAllINg silEnce oF tHE pOStwar years, the segregAtIon of eThics From ontology cAn be interpRETEd as a morE heiNOuS Division-that HeIdeggEr's thought WAs or becaMe indIfferent To ethics, oR WOrse, inseParAblE frOm sOMEtHing dark and baRBAric. i aM not entIreLy swayeD by ThiS suSpiCiOn. I am one oF those whO bElIeVeS thAt we cAN distingUiSh HEiDegGer thE Human bEing fRom hIs ThOUghT in some WAy. wE 'see BEiNg And TIme, TrAns. JoHn MaCQuaRrie and edward RobInsON (New yoRk: harper aNd Row, 1962), p. 37. 2See ibid., Pp. 340-41 And 332. 'See, e.g., ThE BAsiC ProblEMS of PhenoMenology, trans. Albert HofsTAdter (BlOomIngtoN: IndIana Univ. PResS, 1982), sectiOn 13, wHEre HeiDegger Gives A vEry POSitivE ANaLysIs Of Kant's notIONs oF moraL pErsoNhood anD respect, followed by A TypIcal critique iN seCtioN 14 THaT KaNT's ANalYsIS doES Not go far enough oNtologicalLy. fOr An extended DIscUsSion of tHe possiBilitIEs for etHics drawn From HeideGgEr's rESPonSe to Kant, seE Frank ScHalow, ImagINatioN AnD ExisTenCe: HeidEgGer'S RetrIeval oF The kantiAn EthiC (LAnham: UNiv. PrEsS of AmeriCa, 1986) and The Renewal of the HeiDeggerkant DIalOgue: ActioN, ThOUghT, and RespoNsibIlity (AlbanY: SUnY PRess,
tic regions, has concealed  within it s mod e o f t hi nkin g aprimordial dim e nsio n that can open up the  wayin whic h  D asein  is int he w orl d.  M y r ea d in g ofthi s ontic -ontologic aldi fferentiatio n  i s as follo ws.  Ethics is r ich  in it sana l ysisofnorma tive t o pics b ut poor i na ttenti o n to ou r be ing- ethical-in-the-wo r ld ,  in the fulles t sens et ha t Hei deg ger wouldgi ve to such ap hr a s e . T h is coordinati on of ethic s  an d onto lo gys uggest s the  p o ssi bility of t akin g up ethi cs ane w  once w e  have c larifi edthe  ove r al lexi st e nti a lcon s tit ution of  D as ein.Alth o u g h  Hei deg geroften  gives the im pre ssio n  of  segr egati ng o nt ology  from"prac ti cal" discipline s li ke ethics , I  a m c on vince d  thatthi s w as an a nalytic a l d iv i s i on  and not a substan ti v e  o ne. 2 Mu ch int he  e a rly Heid eg ger  has s eemed  pro m is ing foran inv e st ig ation o fethics .3 B utthere is a lso agood dea l ofs uspicion about the ethical p o ss i b il i ties  in  Heidegger(not a blyin t h ewor k  of H aberm as an d  Levinas). Given th eOlympi an di stance of Hei degger's l a t e r though t (e . g. ,  the claim tha t Den ken has "n o  result"  and"no effe ct"4) and g iven his  fa sci stpol i t ic s together wi t h  the  d eceit a ndgalling  si len ceofth e postwar  years,th ese gr ega tiono f ethics  f rom  o nto logyc an beinter pret ed  a s  amore he i no u s  div is io n-th atHe idegg er's tho ught wa s or beca mei ndif fe re nt to e thics, or wor se , insepara bl e f rom so m e thing da rk and barbaric. I am n o t entir ely  sway ed b y this su spi cion.I a m  one o f thos e who  b eli e v es th a t  w e c an  distingui s h  He idegg er  the  humanbeing from his tho u ght  in some way.  We  'Se e Be ing an d  Ti me ,  tr a n s. John Macquar rie and Ed wa r dRobinson ( N ewYo rk: Har per and  Row, 1962),p. 37. 2S ee ibid.,  p p. 3 4 0 -41  and 332.'See, e. g., The B a sic P r ob lemsofPhenom en olo gy, t rans.A lbe rt Ho fstadt er  (Bloo mingt on : Indian a Univ. Press, 1982), s ection  13,whe re Heideg ger giv es a very  pos itive anal ysi s o f Kan t's notio ns o f  m ora l  pers onho o d and res p ec t,f o ll owed by a t y p i cal  crit iqu e  in se ctio n 14 that Kant'sa nalysis does n ot g o far  en o ughon tologically. F oran e xtendeddi scussion of  the pos si b iliti es for  ethic s drawn f ro m  Heide gger 'sresponsetoKa n t, seeFr an k  Schal ow,Im aginat ion an d  Exi s t ence: Heidegger' s Ret r i evalo f t he Ka nt ian Eth i c (L anham: Uni v. Press of  Ameri ca,1986)  and Th eRenewa l o fthe Heideg g erKant Di alogu e: Acti on , Th oug ht, an d Re s p onsib ilit y(Al bany: SUN Y Pr e ss ,
tic regions,_has concealed_within its mode of_thinking a_primordial_dimension that_can_open up the_way in which_Dasein is in the_world. My reading_of_this ontic-ontological differentiation is as follows. Ethics is rich in its analysis of normative_topics_but poor_in_attention_to our being-ethical-in-the-world, in the_fullest sense that Heidegger would_give to_such a phrase. This coordination of ethics and_ontology_suggests the possibility_of taking up ethics anew once we have clarified_the overall existential constitution of Dasein._Although Heidegger often_gives_the_impression of segregating ontology_from "practical" disciplines like ethics, I_am convinced that this was an_analytical division and not a substantive one._2 Much in the early Heidegger_has seemed promising for an_investigation of_ethics. 3 But there is_also a good_deal of_suspicion about the_ethical possibilities in Heidegger (notably in_the work of_Habermas and Levinas). Given the Olympian_distance_of Heidegger's later_thought_(e.g.,_the claim_that Denken has_"no_result" and_"no_effect"4) and given his fascist politics_together_with the deceit and galling silence of_the postwar years, the_segregation_of ethics from ontology_can be interpreted as a_more heinous division-that Heidegger's thought was_or became_indifferent to_ethics, or worse, inseparable from something dark and barbaric. I am_not entirely swayed by this suspicion._I am one of_those who_believes_that we can_distinguish_Heidegger the_human being from his thought in some_way. We_'See Being and Time, trans. John_Macquarrie and Edward Robinson_(New_York: Harper and Row, 1962), p._37. 2See ibid., pp. 340-41 and_332. 'See, e.g., The Basic_Problems_of_Phenomenology, trans. Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington:_Indiana Univ. Press, 1982), section 13,_where Heidegger gives_a very positive analysis of Kant's notions_of_moral personhood and respect, followed by_a_typical critique in section 14 that_Kant's_analysis_does not go far enough_ontologically. For an extended discussion of_the possibilities for ethics drawn from Heidegger's response to_Kant, see Frank_Schalow, Imagination and Existence: Heidegger's_Retrieval_of_the Kantian Ethic (Lanham: Univ. Press of America, 1986) and_The Renewal_of the HeideggerKant_Dialogue: Action, Thought, and Responsibility (Albany: SUNY Press,