 a plausible account of normative objectivity, they identify specific deficiencies in Gibbard's proposal. Second, they also provide an internal critique of Gibbard's expressivism. That is, they maintain that Gibbard's account of normative objectivity fails on its own terms. So unlike other objections to expressivist objectivity, Daskal's arguments seem to avoid the common charge that they beg the question against the expressivist.2 However, in what follows, I argue that both of Daskal's criticisms fall short. Gibbard's expressivism does allow for PPIMs, and it can explain why IMMCs count as mistakes. I conclude by pointing to some implications that my argument has for our thinking about both the viability of the expressivist project and normative objectivity more generally. I. GIBBARD'S ACCOUNT OF PPIMs AND DASKAL'S FIRST OBJECTION A. Gibbard on Innocent Mistakes At a gloss, Gibbard's expressivist proposal in Thinking How to Live takes planning to be best understood in terms of a noncognitive mental state. To plan to X, or in Gibbard's words, to judge X-ing 'the thing to do' is to endorse X-ing-to see it as choiceworthy. His account of innocent mistakes builds from this foundation. But in order to understand it, we need1. Steve Daskal, "Plan-Based Expressivism and Innocent Mistakes," Ethics 119 ð2009Þ: 310–35. Daskal focuses on the expressivist proposal of Allan Gibbard's Thinking How to Live ðCambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003Þ. 2. For a discussion of the claim that ðmostÞ challenges to expressivist accounts beg the question, seeMark Timmons,Morality without Foundations ðOxford:OxfordUniversity Press, 1999Þ, chap. 3. This content downloaded from 128.252.58.243 on Fri, 13 Dec 2013 11:00:23 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions to take a closer look at two features of his general account of planning.3 First, Gibbard endorses a conception of planning that is liberal in its scope. 372 Ethics January 2014Not only can I plan for actual situations ðe.g., what to teach in class tomorrowÞ and contingent ones ðe.g., what to do if I win the lottoÞ but I can also plan for the hypothetical situation of
a plausible account of normative objectivity, they identify specific deficiencies in Gibbard's marriage proposal. Second, they besides supply an internal critique of Gibbard's expressivism. That is, they conserve that Gibbard's account of normative objectivity fail on its own terms. So unlike early protest to expressivist objectivity, Daskal's arguments appear to avoid the common accusation that they solicit the question against the expressivist.2 However, in what follows, I argue that both of Daskal's criticism fall short. Gibbard's expressivism does let for PPIMs, and it can explain why IMMCs count as mistakes. I reason by pointing to some implications that my controversy has for our thinking about both the viability of the expressivist undertaking and normative objectivity more broadly. I. GIBBARD'S ACCOUNT OF PPIMs AND DASKAL'S FIRST OBJECTION A. Gibbard on Innocent Mistakes At a gloss, Gibbard's expressivist marriage proposal in Thinking How to Live takes planning to be best understood in terms of a noncognitive genial state of matter. To plan to X, or in Gibbard's words, to judge X - ing' the thing to do' is to endorse X - ing - to see it as choiceworthy. His account of impeccant mistakes builds from this initiation. But in order to understand it, we need1. Steve Daskal, " Plan - Based Expressivism and Innocent Mistakes, " Ethics 119 ð2009Þ: 310–35. Daskal focus on the expressivist marriage proposal of Allan Gibbard's Thinking How to Live ðCambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003Þ. 2. For a discussion of the claim that ðmostÞ challenge to expressivist accounts beg the question, seeMark Timmons, Morality without Foundations ðOxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 1999Þ, chap. 3. This content downloaded from 128.252.58.243 on Fri, 13 Dec 2013 11:00:23 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions to take a close look at two feature of speech of his general account of planning.3 First, Gibbard endorses a conception of planning that is liberal in its oscilloscope. 372 Ethics January 2014Not only can I plan for actual situations ðe.g. , what to teach in course tomorrowÞ and contingent ones ðe.g. , what to perform if I win the lottoÞ but I can also design for the hypothetical situation of
 a olausible account of noroative objectivnry, theb identjfy speckfic deficiencies in Gibbard'd propowal. Second, they also pfovide an internao crmtique of Gibbarv'a expressivisj. Thac ms, they maintaik that Gibbdrd's account ox voxmative objectivity fails on its own terms. Xo unlike other jbjebtyons no expressivist objectivity, Dasial's arjuments seem to avoid the common charge tjat hhey beg the questlon against the wxpressivist.2 However, in what folloss, I argue that both of Daskal's critncisms fall syorh. Gibbard's eepresspvism does allow for [PIMs, amd it can explsin wht IMMCs count as mistekes. I conclude by pjinting tm aome implications tyat mi arggmeng har fkr ohr thijkiig about bofh the viabulity of the expresxidpxt project ahd noriaeive objectivity more generally. I. GIBBAGD'S ZCCOUNT OF PPIMs AND DAWKAL'S FIRST OBJECTION A. Gibbarq on Innocent Mistakes At a gloss, Gibbard's expresvivisv orokowal iv Tjinking How to Live takes planning to be best hncegstood in terms on a noncognitive mrnhak state. To plav to X, or in Gibbard's words, to judde X-ibg 'the thyng yo do' is to endorse X-ing-to wee it as chjuceworthy. His accobnt of innocznt mixtakex builds from this founbation. But in ordfr to undsfstand it, we neea1. Sneve Daskal, "Kuan-Based Expressidism and Mnnocznt Mistxkes," Ethicf 119 ð2009Þ: 310–35. Daskap focmves on the expresslvist psoposal of Allan Gibbard's Thinking How to Live ðCambridgg, MD: Hdrvard Uuiverslty Press, 2003Þ. 2. For a discussion pf the elaim ghat ðmostÞ bhallengev to expresfivist accoundd beg the quxstion, seqMarj Tinmons,Mofxlity without Goundatiouf ðOxdord:OxfordUniversiby Prgsa, 1999Þ, chap. 3. This cinttnr downloaded ftom 128.252.58.243 og Vrm, 13 Des 2013 11:00:23 AM All usa sucjezy to GSTOR Ttxms xnd Vonditions to take a cloaer look at two festmres of hus generwl account of planning.3 First, Gihbard envorses a sonception of planning that is liberal ln lts scope. 372 Etrics January 2014Not only can I plan for actual situations ðx.g., what to teach in claws tomorrowÞ and conjinnent ones ðe.g., what to do if I win the lottoÞ but I can also plan nor the hypothetical sjtuatimn of
a plausible account of normative objectivity, they deficiencies Gibbard's proposal. they also provide expressivism. is, they maintain Gibbard's account of objectivity fails on its own terms. unlike other objections to expressivist objectivity, Daskal's arguments seem to avoid the common that they beg the question against the expressivist.2 However, in what follows, I that of criticisms short. Gibbard's expressivism does allow for PPIMs, and it can explain why IMMCs count as mistakes. conclude by pointing to some implications that my has for our thinking both the viability of the project normative objectivity generally. GIBBARD'S OF PPIMs AND FIRST OBJECTION A. Gibbard on Innocent Mistakes At a gloss, Gibbard's expressivist proposal in Thinking How to takes planning best understood terms a mental state. To X, or in Gibbard's words, to thing to do' is to endorse X-ing-to see as choiceworthy. account of innocent mistakes builds from foundation. But in order to understand it, we Steve Daskal, "Plan-Based Expressivism and Innocent Mistakes," Ethics 119 ð2009Þ: 310–35. Daskal focuses on the of Allan Gibbard's Thinking to Live ðCambridge, Harvard Press, 2. a discussion the claim that ðmostÞ challenges to expressivist accounts beg the question, Timmons,Morality without Foundations ðOxford:OxfordUniversity Press, 1999Þ, chap. 3. This content 128.252.58.243 Fri, 13 Dec 11:00:23 AM All use to Terms and Conditions to closer at his account planning.3 First, Gibbard endorses conception of planning that is in its scope. 372 I plan for actual situations ðe.g., what to in class tomorrowÞ and contingent ones ðe.g., to do if I win the lottoÞ but I can also plan the hypothetical
 a plausible account of normatIve objectiVity, tHey IdeNtIfy sPeciFic deficiencieS In GiBbard's proposal. Second, thEy alsO pROvidE An InterNal critIQuE OF GiBbArD's eXpREsSivisM. ThAt is, theY maintain tHat giBbard's accounT Of Normative oBjeCtivity fails On iTs own tErMs. SO UnlikE otHer obJectioNS to expRessivist ObJEctiviTY, Daskal'S ARgUmenTs seem to avoid the cOMmON charge that theY beg thE qUEsTIOn aGaiNst the exprEsSivisT.2 however, IN wHAT FolLOws, I argue that Both of DaskaL'S crIticisMs FalL Short. GIbbarD's EXprEssivism doeS allOw for PPIMS, and it CAn explaIN why IMMcs counT as MisTakeS. i cOnCluDe BY poINtIng TO soMe implicAtIoNs thaT my aRGUMEnt hAs fOr ouR thinKing about both The ViabILitY of thE exprEssiViSt proJect anD normAtIve objectivity mOre gEnerally. I. gIBbArD'S aCcOUNT of PPIMs aND dASkAL'S FIRsT OBJECtiON a. GIBBArD on Innocent MistakeS AT A GlOss, GibbaRd's expREsSiVIst propoSaL in thinKINg How To LiVE tAkes planNing to BE bEsT undersToOd in teRmS of A noNcognITive Mental State. To pLan to x, Or in Gibbard's woRDs, to judge X-ing 'THe THInG To do' Is tO endorse X-inG-to sEE it aS choICeWorTHy. His AccouNt OF iNNocent mistakes buildS fRom thiS founDation. But in orDer to underSTANd it, we neEd1. StEVe dAskal, "Plan-Based expreSsivism and iNnocent MIstakEs," Ethics 119 Ð2009Þ: 310–35. Daskal fOCUses on thE exPreSsiVisT PRoPosal of Allan GIBBard'S THinking how To Live ðcamBriDge, mA: HArVard UniveRsity PreSs, 2003þ. 2. FOr A dIscUssioN Of the claIm ThaT ðMosTÞ chaLLenges To expRessIvIsT AccOunts beG ThE QUestIoN, sEeMaRk TImMons,MOralITy wIthout FOundationS ðOXFord:oxFoRdUniveRsity Press, 1999Þ, chAp. 3. this contenT dOwnLoaded FROm 128.252.58.243 on Fri, 13 DEc 2013 11:00:23 AM All use subject to JSTOr terms anD CoNditiOns tO take a cloSer Look at Two FEatureS of his GenerAl AccOUNt of pLANnIng.3 fiRst, Gibbard ENDorSes a cOnCeptIon of plAnning that is liberaL In iTs scope. 372 Ethics janUary 2014nOT oNly CAn i PlaN fOR acTUAl situations ðe.g., What to teacH iN ClAss tomorroWþ anD cOntingeNt ones ðE.g., whaT To do if I Win the lotToÞ but I caN aLso pLAN foR the hypothEtical siTuation of
 a plausible account of no rmative ob jecti vit y,th ey i dent ify specific d e fici encies in Gibbard's pr oposa l. Seco n d,  they  also p r ov i d e a nin ter na l  c ritiq ueof Gibb ard's expr ess iv ism. That is ,  t hey mainta inthat Gibbard 'saccoun tofn ormat ive  obje ctivit y  fails  on its o wn terms. So unli k e  o ther  objections to ex p re s sivist objecti vity,Da s ka l ' s a rgu ments seem  t o avo i d the c o mm o n cha r ge that theybeg the que s tio n agai ns t t h e expr essiv is t .2However, in  wha t follows , I ar g ue that both of  Daska l's  cr itic i sm sfal ls hor t .Gib b ard 's expre ss iv ism d oesa l l o w fo r P PIMs , and  it can expla inwhyI MMC s cou nt as  mis ta kes.I conc ludeby  pointing to so me i mplicatio nsth atmy  argu m ent ha s f orour thi nking a b out  b o t h  t he viability of th ee x pr essivist  proje c tan d  normati ve  ob ject i v ity m oreg en erally.I. GIB B AR D' S ACCOU NT  OF PP IM s A NDDASKA L 'S F IRST O BJECTION  A. G i bbard on Innoc e nt Mistakes A t  a g lo s s, G ibb ard's expre ssiv i st p ropo s al  in Think ing H ow to Live takes planning  t o be b est u nderstood interms of a n o ncogniti ve m e nt a l state. To pl an to  X, or inG ibbard's  word s, to ju dge X-ing ' the thin g t o d o'ist o  e ndorse X-ing- t o  see  i t as ch oic eworthy . H isacc oun tof innoce nt mista ke sbu il dsfromt his foun da tio n.  Bu t ino rder t o und erst an di t,we need 1 .S t eveDa sk al,"Pl an -Base d Ex p res sivismand Innoc ent Mist ak es ," Ethi cs 119 ð2009Þ :310–35. Da sk alfocuse s on the e xpressivist proposal of Allan G ibb ard's  Thi nking How  to  LiveðCa m bridge , MA:Harva rd  Un i v ersit y Pr ess ,2003Þ. 2.F o r a  disc us sion  of the  claim that ðmostÞ cha llenges to ex pre ssiv i s tacc o un t s b eg the q uestion, seeMar k Timmons, Mo r al ity withou t  Fo un dations  ðOxfor d:Oxf o rdUnive rsity Pre ss, 1999Þ ,chap . 3.This conte nt downl oaded fro m  128. 2 52 .58.2 43on Fri ,13Dec 2 013 11 : 00: 23 AM  All u se  subje ct to  J STOR Ter ms and Conditions to ta ke a c loser  lo ok at two  fe a tur es of his  gen eral accou ntofplann ing . 3 Fir st,G ib bar d  endo rses a concept i on  of p la nning thati s lib eralini ts sco pe.372 Ethics Januar y  2014Not onlycanI pla n f o r ac tu al situationsðe. g. , what tote ach in clas s tomorr ow Þ  andcontin gent o nes ðe. g . ,w hat to  doifI win the  lo tt o Þ but I  c an also p lanfo r thehypoth e tica l situation of
 a_plausible account_of normative objectivity, they_identify specific_deficiencies_in Gibbard's_proposal._Second, they also_provide an internal_critique of Gibbard's expressivism._That is, they_maintain_that Gibbard's account of normative objectivity fails on its own terms. So unlike other_objections_to expressivist_objectivity,_Daskal's_arguments seem to avoid the_common charge that they beg_the question_against the expressivist.2 However, in what follows, I_argue_that both of_Daskal's criticisms fall short. Gibbard's expressivism does allow for_PPIMs, and it can explain why_IMMCs count as_mistakes._I_conclude by pointing to_some implications that my argument has_for our thinking about both the_viability of the expressivist project and normative_objectivity more generally. I. GIBBARD'S ACCOUNT_OF PPIMs AND DASKAL'S FIRST_OBJECTION A._Gibbard on Innocent Mistakes At_a gloss, Gibbard's_expressivist proposal_in Thinking How_to Live takes planning to be_best understood in_terms of a noncognitive mental state._To_plan to X,_or_in_Gibbard's words,_to judge X-ing_'the_thing to_do'_is to endorse X-ing-to see it_as_choiceworthy. His account of innocent mistakes builds_from this foundation. But_in_order to understand it,_we need1. Steve Daskal, "Plan-Based_Expressivism and Innocent Mistakes," Ethics 119_ð2009Þ: 310–35._Daskal focuses_on the expressivist proposal of Allan Gibbard's Thinking How to Live_ðCambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003Þ._2. For a discussion_of the_claim_that ðmostÞ challenges_to_expressivist accounts_beg the question, seeMark Timmons,Morality without Foundations_ðOxford:OxfordUniversity Press,_1999Þ, chap. 3. This content downloaded_from 128.252.58.243 on Fri,_13_Dec 2013 11:00:23 AM All use_subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions_to take a closer look_at_two_features of his general account_of planning.3 First, Gibbard endorses a_conception of planning_that is liberal in its scope. 372_Ethics_January 2014Not only can I plan_for_actual situations ðe.g., what to teach_in_class_tomorrowÞ and contingent ones ðe.g.,_what to do if I win_the lottoÞ but I can also plan for the_hypothetical situation of