 who has heard a wolf howl would recognize. Suppose Howie is exiting the forest along the main path at dusk, having just escaped a ravenous wolf pack, when he notices a Stranger entering the forest. Howie knows that wolves lurk nearby, 15 | Reid on the priority of natural language and howls 'owooo' at the Stranger, in order to communicate this thought. Moreover, Howie knows that any human adult around these parts knows what a wolf howl sounds like. So it stands to reason that the Stranger would interpret Howie as referring to wolves. And the Stranger interprets him precisely that way. This certainly seems to qualify as a witting and effective interpersonal use of artificial language. But it wasn't preceded by any agreement, using natural signs or otherwise, between Howie and the Stranger.5 Thus, in addition to concluding that Reid's original distinction requires improvement, that Reid's original argument fails, and that Reid's original thesis is false, I also conclude that the qualified Re- idian thesis under consideration is false too. The invention of artifi- cial signs does not strictly require prior agreement via natural lan- guage, and neither does the witting and effective interpersonal use of artificial signs. 4. An explanatory hypothesis My critique of Reid relied on possible but highly peculiar cases, some involving coincidences that we couldn't reasonably expect to occur frequently. But if we want to account for the highly systematic 5 Earlier we noted a similarity between Reidian natural signs and Gricean natural meaning. The present example highlights a further similarity, this time in terms of Reidian "artificial signs" and Gricean "nonnatural mean- ing." Gricean nonnatural meaning can be glossed as follows: a speaker S's utterance U means that P because of S's intention that his audience infer, based on the fact that S uttered U, that S intends them to infer that S be- lieves that P (and perhaps also that S intends them to infer that P in part because S believes that P). See Grice 1957 and 1969. Howie has a Gricean reflexive communicative intention. John Turri | 16 and stable institution that is artificial human language, it seems un- likely that we'll be satisfied with an appeal to such coincidences, es- pecially in the quantity that would be required from a thorough ac- counting. It is in the spirit of Reid's original discussion, then, that I offer the following hypothesis.
who has heard a wolf howl would recognize. Suppose Howie is die the forest along the chief path at dusk, having just miss a ravenous wolf battalion, when he notices a Stranger entering the forest. Howie know that wolves lurk nearby, 15 | Reid on the priority of lifelike language and howls' owooo' at the Stranger, in order to communicate this opinion. Moreover, Howie knows that any human adult around these parts knows what a wolf howl sound like. So it stands to reason that the Stranger would understand Howie as referring to wolves. And the Stranger interprets him precisely that way. This surely seems to modify as a witting and effective interpersonal use of artificial language. But it wasn't preceded by any agreement, use natural signs or otherwise, between Howie and the Stranger.5 Thus, in addition to conclude that Reid's original eminence requires improvement, that Reid's original argument fails, and that Reid's original thesis is false, I also conclude that the qualified Re- idian dissertation under circumstance is false besides. The invention of artifi- cial signal does not strictly require prior agreement via lifelike lan- guage, and neither does the witting and effective interpersonal habit of artificial signs. 4. An explanatory hypothesis My review of Reid relied on possible but highly peculiar cases, some involving coincidences that we couldn't sanely expect to occur frequently. But if we want to account for the highly systematic 5 Earlier we noted a similarity between Reidian lifelike polarity and Gricean natural meaning. The present example highlights a further similarity, this meter in terms of Reidian " artificial signs " and Gricean " nonnatural mean- ing. " Gricean nonnatural meaning can be glossed as follow: a loudspeaker S's utterance U means that P because of S's intention that his audience infer, based on the fact that S uttered U, that S intend them to infer that S be- lieves that P (and possibly also that S intends them to infer that P in contribution because S believes that phosphorus). See Grice 1957 and 1969. Howie has a Gricean reflexive communicative purpose. John Turri | 16 and stable institution that is artificial human language, it seems un- likely that we'll be satisfied with an appeal to such coincidences, es- pecially in the quantity that would be required from a thorough ac- counting. It is in the emotional state of Reid's original discussion, then, that I offer the following hypothesis.
 whl has heard a wolf howl dould recognize. Supposx Howie is exitkng the forest along the maii parh at dusk, having just escaoed a ravvnous wold park, when he noticxa a Stranger skteriug the forest. Hoeie knows dhat wolves lusk nzarby, 15 | Reid on the priority of natuwal lanbuwge and howls 'jwoop' at fhe Stranger, in order to communicafe this thought. Morepver, Howie knows that any jumaj adult around thede parts kniws ryat a wolf huwl sounds like. So it atands to reason that the Straneer wpuld interkxwt Jmwie as refxrring to wolves. Akc the Vtranget interprets hlm prxciswly that way. This cervainly seems to qualyfy as a ficting and effective ibtwrpervonan usd of aruifmcizl lanhuaje. But it wzsn't precedwd by any agreement, ufpmg natural sjgns ow jtherwise, between Howie and the Strangeg.5 Thhs, in addition to conclyding that Reid's origlnal distynction requires improvement, that Reid's original drgumxng fcljr, ajd that Reid's original thesis is false, I also domckude that the zualified Rr- ldown thesis undgr consnsedation is false tol. The igventuon of aruifi- vial signs does not strictlt require prpor qgreement via natuxal lan- guagz, and meithrr does the witting and effsctive integpersonal jse of artificiau spgns. 4. An explanatory hypothesif My critmque pf Reid reloed on possible hut hlchly peculiar cased, somg invonving coinfidences that we couldn't reasoneuly expect to owcug frequencly. Bub if we want to account for tke highlv systdmatic 5 Eaglier we ioted a simijarity betweet Reidian natnral signf ane Grucean nxgural meaning. Yhe preseuu example yighlights a furthcr siojlarity, this tine un terms of Reiciav "awtpfirial fhgns" and Griwean "novmaturxl mean- ing." Ericran nonnatural meanitg czn be glossed as fpljows: a skeaker S's utterance U keans that P becaude of S's intemtijn that his audience infer, bassd on the fagt that S uttqred U, that S incends them to infer that S be- lieves thav P (and perhaps also thqt S intends them tp infer that P in part becduse S believes that P). See Grice 1957 and 1969. Howie has a Gricean reflefive fommunicative intention. John Turri | 16 and stable institution that is artifucial iuian languags, it seemv bn- kikely thav xe'll be satisfied with an appeal to such coincidxnces, es- pacnally in the quantity that woila be required from a thorough ac- counfing. It os in the spirit of Reid's origimal discussion, then, that I offer the rollowphg hypothesis.
who has heard a wolf howl would Howie exiting the along the main escaped ravenous wolf pack, he notices a entering the forest. Howie knows that lurk nearby, 15 | Reid on the priority of natural language and howls at the Stranger, in order to communicate this thought. Moreover, Howie knows that human around parts what a wolf howl sounds like. So it stands to reason that the Stranger would interpret as referring to wolves. And the Stranger interprets precisely that way. This seems to qualify as a and interpersonal use artificial But wasn't preceded by agreement, using natural signs or otherwise, between Howie and the Stranger.5 Thus, in addition to concluding that original distinction that Reid's argument and Reid's original thesis I also conclude that the qualified under consideration is false too. The invention of cial signs not strictly require prior agreement via lan- guage, and neither does the witting and interpersonal use of artificial signs. 4. An explanatory hypothesis My critique of Reid relied on highly peculiar cases, some coincidences that we reasonably to frequently. if we to account for the highly systematic 5 Earlier we noted a between Reidian natural signs and Gricean natural meaning. The present a similarity, this time terms of Reidian "artificial and "nonnatural mean- ing." Gricean can glossed speaker utterance means that P because S's intention that his audience based on the fact S intends them to infer that S be- that P (and perhaps also that S them to infer that P in part because S believes that P). Grice 1957 Howie has a Gricean reflexive communicative intention. John | 16 and stable that is artificial human language, it seems un- likely we'll satisfied with appeal to such es- pecially in quantity that would from a ac- It spirit of Reid's original discussion, then, I the following hypothesis.
 who has heard a wolf howl would Recognize. SUpposE HoWie Is ExitIng tHe forest along tHE maiN path at dusk, having just eScapeD a RAvenOUs Wolf pAck, when HE nOTIceS a stRanGeR EnTerinG thE forest. howie knows ThaT wOlves lurk neaRBy, 15 | reid on the pRioRity of naturaL laNguage AnD hoWLs 'owoOo' aT the STrangeR, In ordeR to communIcATe this THought. MOREoVer, HOwie knows that any hUMaN Adult around theSe partS kNOwS WHat A woLf howl sounDs Like. SO It standS To REASon THat the StrangeR would interPRet howie aS rEfeRRing to WolveS. AND thE Stranger inTerpRets him prEciselY That way. tHis certAinly sEemS to QualIFy As A wiTtINg aND eFfeCTivE interpeRsOnAl use Of arTIFICial LanGuagE. But iT wasn't precedeD by Any aGReeMent, uSing nAturAl Signs Or otheRwise, BeTween Howie and thE StrAnger.5 Thus, In aDdItiOn To conCLuding ThaT ReId's origInal disTIncTiON REqUires improvement, thAt rEId'S originaL argumENt FaILs, and thaT REid'S oriGINal thEsis IS fAlse, I alsO conclUDe ThAt the quAlIfied RE- iDiaN thEsis uNDer cOnsideRation is False TOo. The invention OF artifi- cial siGNs DOEs NOt stRicTly require pRior AGreeMent VIa NatURal laN- guagE, aND nEIther does the witting AnD effecTive iNterpersonal uSe of artifiCIAL signs. 4. An ExplANaTOry hypothesis MY critIque of Reid RElied on pOssibLe but higHly peculiAR Cases, somE inVolVinG coINCiDences that we cOULdn't ReAsonablY exPect to oCcuR frEquEntLy. but if we waNt to accoUnT fOr ThE hiGhly sYStematic 5 eaRliEr We nOted a SImilarIty beTweeN REiDIan Natural SIgNS And GRiCeAn naTurAl MeaniNg. ThE PreSent exaMple highlIghTS a fuRtHeR similaRity, this time iN tErms of ReidIaN "arTificiAL Signs" and gricean "nonnatural mean- inG." gricean NonNaturAl meAning can bE glOssed aS foLLows: a sPeaker s's uttErAncE u Means THAt p beCaUse of S's intENTioN that HiS audIence inFer, based on the fact tHAt S Uttered U, that S IntEnds THEm To iNFeR ThaT S BE- liEVEs that P (and perhaPs also that s iNTeNds them to iNFer ThAt P in paRt becauSe S beLIeves thAt P). See GriCe 1957 and 1969. HowiE hAs a GRICeaN reflexive CommunicAtive inteNTion. JOHn turri | 16 And Stable InStiTutioN that iS ArtIficiAl humaN lAnguagE, it seEmS un- likelY that we'll be satisfied witH an appEal to SucH coincideNceS, Es- pEcially in The qUantity thaT woUld Be reqUirED from A thoROuGh aC- CountIng. IT Is in the spIRiT of rEId'S original diSCUSsiOn, theN, thAT I offeR the Following hypothesIS.
 who has heard a wolf howl  would rec ogniz e.Sup po se H owie  is exiting th e  for est along the main pat h atdu s k, h a vi ng ju st esca p ed a  ra ve no uswo l fpack,  wh en he n otices a S tra ng er enteringt he  forest. H owi e knows that  wo lves l ur k n e arby,  15  | Re id ont he pri ority ofna t ural l a nguagea n dhowl s 'owooo' at theS tr a nger, in order  to co mm u ni c a tethi s thought.  M oreov e r, Howi e  k n o w s t h at any humanadult aroun d  th ese pa rt s k n ows wh at awo l f h owl soundslike . So it s tandst o reaso n  that t he Str ang erwoul d  i nt erp re t  Ho w ie  as ref erring t owo lves.  And t h e  Str ang er i nterp rets him prec ise ly t h atway.Thiscert ai nly s eems t o qua li fy as a witting  and  effectiv e i nt erp er sonal use of  ar tif icial l anguage .  Bu ti t wa sn't preceded by a ny a gr eement,usingn at ur a l signsor  ot herw i s e, be twee n  H owie and  the S t ra ng er.5 Th us , in a dd iti onto co n clud ing th at Reid' s ori g inal distincti o n requires im p ro v e me n t, t hat  Reid's ori gina l  arg umen t  f ail s , and  that  R e id ' s original thesis i sfalse,  I al so conclude t hat the qu a l i fied Re-  idi a nt hesis under co nside ration isf alse too . The  inventi on of art i f i- cialsig nsdoe s n o t  s trictly requi r e  pri or  agreem ent  via na tur allan - g ua ge, and n either d oe sth ewit tinga nd effec ti vein ter perso n al use  of a rtif ic ia l  si gns. 4. An e xpla na to ry h ypo th esisMy c r iti que ofReid reli edo n po ss ib le buthighly peculi ar  cases, so me  in volvin g coincide nces that we couldn't r e asonabl y e xpect  tooccur fre que ntly.But if wewant t o acc ou ntf o r the h ig hly  s ystematic5 Ear lierwe  not ed a si milarity between R e idi an natural si gns  and G ri cea n  n a tur al mea n i ng. The present  example h ig h li ghts a fur t her  s imilari ty, thi s tim e  in ter ms of Rei dian "art if icia l sig ns" and Gr icean "n onnatural mean- in g." G ric ean no nn atu ral m eaning can  be g lossed  a s foll ows:aspeakerS's utterance U means t hat Pbecau seof S's in ten t ion  that his  aud ience infe r,bas ed on  th e  fact  tha t  S  ut t eredU, t h at S inte n ds  th e m  t o infer tha t S  be - lie ves that P  (an d perhaps also th a t S intends th em t o inf ert hatPin part becaus e S  b e l ieves th at  P). See Gr ice 1957  a n d 196 9. How ie has  a Gric e a nr eflexi ve c omm unicative  in te n tion. J oh nT urri |  16an d stab le ins t itut i o n that is artifi cialh u man l a ngu age,it  seemsu n- l ikely that  we'll be s atisfi ed w ith a n appea lto suc h c oi ncidences, es- pecia lly i n the q ua ntit y t hat wo uldb e  requ ired  f rom  a thorou g h  a c -co u nti ng.It is  i n th e spirito f Reid's  or i ginal d is cus s i on, th e n, t hat I offe r t he fo l l owing hypo t hesi s .
 who_has heard_a wolf howl would_recognize. Suppose_Howie_is exiting_the_forest along the_main path at_dusk, having just escaped_a ravenous wolf_pack,_when he notices a Stranger entering the forest. Howie knows that wolves lurk nearby,_15_| Reid_on_the_priority of natural language and_howls 'owooo' at the Stranger,_in order_to communicate this thought. Moreover, Howie knows that_any_human adult around_these parts knows what a wolf howl sounds like._So it stands to reason that_the Stranger would_interpret_Howie_as referring to wolves._And the Stranger interprets him precisely_that way. This certainly seems to_qualify as a witting and effective interpersonal_use of artificial language. But it_wasn't preceded by any agreement,_using natural_signs or otherwise, between Howie_and the Stranger.5_Thus, in_addition to concluding_that Reid's original distinction requires improvement,_that Reid's original_argument fails, and that Reid's original_thesis_is false, I_also_conclude_that the_qualified Re- idian_thesis_under consideration_is_false too. The invention of artifi-_cial_signs does not strictly require prior agreement_via natural lan- guage,_and_neither does the witting_and effective interpersonal use of_artificial signs. 4. An explanatory hypothesis_My critique_of Reid_relied on possible but highly peculiar cases, some involving coincidences that_we couldn't reasonably expect to occur_frequently. But if we_want to_account_for the highly_systematic_5 Earlier_we noted a similarity between Reidian natural_signs and_Gricean natural meaning. The present example_highlights a further similarity,_this_time in terms of Reidian "artificial_signs" and Gricean "nonnatural mean- ing."_Gricean nonnatural meaning can be_glossed_as_follows: a speaker S's utterance_U means that P because of_S's intention that_his audience infer, based on the fact_that_S uttered U, that S intends_them_to infer that S be- lieves_that_P_(and perhaps also that S_intends them to infer that P_in part because S believes that P). See Grice_1957 and 1969._Howie has a Gricean reflexive_communicative_intention._John Turri | 16 and stable institution that is artificial_human language,_it seems un-_likely that we'll be satisfied with an appeal to such_coincidences, es- pecially in the quantity that_would be required from a thorough ac- counting. It is in_the spirit of Reid's original discussion, then, that_I offer the following hypothesis.