ivist version of Pure Probabilism provides an elegant and intuitive way of dealing with well-known counterexamples to other purely probabilistic accounts, as well as our own counterexamples to Lin's more recent Causal Probabilism. Going forward, then, we're going to assume that the correct account of promotion will be a ​contrastive one, i.e., one that embraces the idea that actions promote -or fail to promote -the satisfaction of desires ​as contrasted with other possible actions​. As we'll see in the next section, however, even a contrastive probabilistic account faces problems. 3. Promotion as Involving Fit Between Desire and World In recent work, one of the authors of this present essay -Nathaniel Sharadin (2015, 2016) -has argued that all probabilistic accounts of promotion face a problem in accounting for certain cases of promotion. Sharadin's focus there is on non-contrastive 24 purely probabilistic accounts of promotion. However, as we'll see, those arguments work against contrastive purely probabilistic accounts too. Since we've already argued that we have good reason to be interested in a contrastive probabilistic account of promotion (because such an account can avoid the counterexamples just adduced) here we'll focus our attention on showing how Sharadin's argument applies to ​contrastive probabilistic accounts of promotion. As we will see, Sharadin's argument motivates introducing the notion of ​fit ​between one's desire and the world as a central component in any account of promotion (including contrastive probabilistic accounts). 3.1. Desires that Cannot Be Fully Satisfied Briefly, the problem Sharadin introduced is that it is sometimes possible to promote a desire but, given the desire's content, impossible to raise the probability of its satisfaction. For instance, consider one of his examples of a desire: Extreme Ascetic (EA)​: The desire that none of your desires are satisfied. 25 The probability of EA's satisfaction is always 0. But then, no matter what the relevant 26 24 ​In what follows, although Sharadin is one of the authors of this present essay, we continue to refer to Sharadin in the third person, in order to avoid confusion between the previous and the present work. 25 Sharadin (2016, p. 1). 26 Either EA is satisfied, or EA is not satisfied. If EA is satisfied, then EA is not satisfied; if EA is not 13 contrasting actions are supposed to be, Contrastive Pure Prob
ivist version of Pure Probabilism provides an elegant and intuitive way of dealing with well - know counterexample to other purely probabilistic account, equally well as our own counterexamples to Lin's more recent Causal Probabilism. Going forth, then, we're going to assume that the right explanation of promotion will be a ​contrastive one, i.e., one that espouse the idea that actions advertise -or fail to promote -the satisfaction of desire ​as contrasted with other potential actions​. As we'll see in the next section, however, even a contrasting probabilistic account faces problems. 3. Promotion as Involving Fit Between Desire and World In recent employment, one of the authors of this present essay -Nathaniel Sharadin (2015, 2016) -has argued that all probabilistic accounts of promotion face a trouble in accounting for certain cases of promotion. Sharadin's focus there is on non - contrasting 24 strictly probabilistic report of promotion. However, as we'll see, those arguments work against contrastive purely probabilistic accounts too. Since we've already argue that we have good cause to be concerned in a contrasting probabilistic account of promotion (because such an account can avoid the counterexamples just adduced) here we'll focus our attention on indicate how Sharadin's argument applies to ​contrastive probabilistic accounts of promotion. As we will see, Sharadin's argument motivates insert the notion of ​fit ​between one's desire and the world as a central component in any account of promotion (include contrastive probabilistic accounts). 3.1. Desires that Can not Be Fully Satisfied Briefly, the trouble Sharadin introduced is that it is sometimes possible to promote a desire but, given the desire's content, impossible to raise the probability of its satisfaction. For instance, consider one of his example of a desire: Extreme Ascetic (EA)​: The desire that none of your desires are quenched. 25 The probability of EA's satisfaction is always 0. But then, no matter what the relevant 26 24 ​In what follows, although Sharadin is one of the authors of this present essay, we continue to mention to Sharadin in the third person, in order to debar confusion between the previous and the present oeuvre. 25 Sharadin (2016, p. 1). 26 Either EA is satisfied, or EA is not satisfied. If EA is satisfied, then EA is not satisfied; if EA is not 13 contrasting legal action are supposed to be, Contrastive Pure Prob
ividt version of Pure Probanilism provides cb elegent and intuitixe way of dealing with well-kiown counuvrexamples to other pjrely prohabilistuc arcounts, as well ea our own couhberexcm'les to Lin's mote recent Cagsal Probabilivm. Gling forward, then, we're going to asstme thay hhe correct acsounu os prkmotion will be a ​contrastive one, j.e., one uhat embraces the odea that actions promote -lr fwil to promote -the satisfactiin os desires ​as zontrasted with other kossible actions​. As we'll see in ghe nzxt section, hiweggr, even a coitrastpve probabilistic accmunt faves problems. 3. Iromovion as Involving Fit Betxeen Desire and Worlq In recett work, one of the qurhors of dhis prerenu exszy -Natjanmel Sharadih (2015, 2016) -has argyed that all probabolywtic accounts of prjmjtion face a problem in accounting for bertzin cases of promotion. Wharadin's focus there is on nog-contrastive 24 purely probabilistic accounts of prmmotikv. Hiwcver, qs we'll see, those arguments work against contraffife purely probabllistic accounts tpo. Sogce we've alrexdy aryhes that we have goof reasog to ve interefted in a contrastive probabiliwtic account if promotion (becaude such an cccounj can svoid the counterexamplzs jusf adduced) hfre we'll rucus our attentiun pn showing how Sharadin's argtment appoies to ​congrasjive prjbabilistif accounts of promotion. Ws we whll see, Shwradin's argument motivates introducing the nojiot ox ​fit ​becween pne's desire agd the world ax a cencral cumponent ih any arcount of prjmotion (incluglng contrastmve probafiliwtic accoungr). 3.1. Desires thay Cannot Yt Fully Sarisfied Briefly, thc procmem Sharadin incxoeuced is that iy ir sjmvtikef possible to proootd a derire buu, glvev thr desire's content, im[ossjble to raise the lrjbabiliti of its fatisfaction. Gor instance, consifer oie of iis exsmpjes of a desire: Extreme Ascetid (EA)​: The feslre that none of nour desires axe satisfied. 25 The probability of EA's satmsfaction is always 0. Bot then, no matter whaj tme relevant 26 24 ​In rhat follmws, although Sharadib is one of the amthors of this present essay, we clntinue to refer to Sharadin in the third person, in order to avoid confusuon bevwqen the prebioux and tke 'resent worn. 25 Sharadin (2016, p. 1). 26 Vither EA is satisfied, or EA is iot satisfheb. If EA is satisfied, then EA os not satisfiea; if EA is not 13 contrastjng actipns are supposed to be, Contrastove Pure Prob
ivist version of Pure Probabilism provides an intuitive of dealing well-known counterexamples to well our own counterexamples Lin's more recent Probabilism. Going forward, then, we're going assume that the correct account of promotion will be a ​contrastive one, i.e., that embraces the idea that actions promote -or fail to promote -the satisfaction desires contrasted other actions​. As we'll see in the next section, however, even a contrastive probabilistic account faces problems. Promotion as Involving Fit Between Desire and World recent work, one of authors of this present essay Sharadin 2016) -has that probabilistic of promotion face problem in accounting for certain cases of promotion. Sharadin's focus there is on non-contrastive 24 purely probabilistic of promotion. we'll see, arguments against purely probabilistic accounts we've already argued that we have be interested in a contrastive probabilistic account of (because such account can avoid the counterexamples just here we'll focus our attention on showing how argument applies to ​contrastive probabilistic accounts of promotion. As we will see, Sharadin's argument motivates notion of ​fit ​between desire and the as central in account of (including contrastive probabilistic accounts). 3.1. Desires that Cannot Be Fully Satisfied the problem Sharadin introduced is that it is sometimes possible a but, given the content, impossible to raise probability its satisfaction. For instance, of examples Extreme (EA)​: desire that none of desires are satisfied. 25 The of EA's satisfaction is matter what the relevant 26 24 ​In what although Sharadin is one of the authors this present essay, we continue to refer to Sharadin in the third in order confusion between the previous and the present work. Sharadin (2016, p. 1). Either EA is satisfied, or EA is not satisfied. EA satisfied, then is not satisfied; EA is not contrasting actions are be, Contrastive Prob
ivist version of Pure ProbabiLism providEs an eLegAnt AnD intUitiVe way of dealing WIth wEll-known counterexampleS to otHeR PureLY pRobabIlistic ACcOUNts, As WeLl aS oUR oWn couNteRexamplEs to Lin's moRe rEcEnt Causal ProBAbIlism. Going ForWard, then, we're GoiNg to asSuMe tHAt the CorRect aCcount OF promoTion will bE a ​COntrasTIve one, i.E., ONe That Embraces the idea thAT aCTions promote -or Fail to PrOMoTE -The SatIsfaction oF dEsireS ​As contrAStED WIth OTher possible aCtions​. As we'lL See In the nExT seCTion, hoWever, EvEN a cOntrastive pRobaBilistic aCcount FAces proBLems. 3. ProMotion As INvoLvinG fiT BEtwEeN desIRe And wOrlD In recenT wOrK, one oF the AUTHOrs oF thIs prEsent Essay -NathanieL ShAradIN (2015, 2016) -haS arguEd thaT all PrObabiListic AccouNtS of promotion facE a prOblem in acCouNtIng FoR certAIn caseS of ProMotion. SHaradin'S FocUs THERe Is on non-contrastive 24 PuRELy ProbabilIstic aCCoUnTS of promoTiOn. HOwevER, As we'lL see, THoSe argumeNts worK AgAiNst contRaStive pUrEly ProBabilIStic AccounTs too. SinCe we'vE Already argued tHAt we have good rEAsON To BE intEreSted in a contRastIVe prObabILiStiC AccouNt of pRoMOtIOn (because such an accoUnT can avOid thE counterexampLes just addUCED) here we'lL focUS oUR attention on shOwing How SharadiN'S argumenT applIes to ​conTrastive pROBabilistIc aCcoUntS of PROmOtion. As we will SEE, ShaRaDin's argUmeNt motivAteS inTroDucInG the notioN of ​fit ​beTwEeN oNe'S deSire aND the worlD aS a cEnTraL compONent in Any acCounT oF pROmoTion (incLUdING conTrAsTive ProBaBilisTic aCCouNts). 3.1. DesiRes that CaNnoT be FuLlY SAtisfieD Briefly, the prObLem SharadiN iNtrOduced IS That it is Sometimes possible to promOTe a desiRe bUt, givEn thE desire's cOntEnt, impOssIBle to rAise thE probAbIliTY Of its SATiSfaCtIon. For instANCe, cOnsidEr One oF his exaMples of a desire: ExtrEMe AScetic (EA)​: The deSirE thaT NOnE of YOuR DesIrES arE SAtisfied. 25 The probAbility of Ea's SAtIsfaction iS AlwAyS 0. But theN, no mattEr whaT The releVant 26 24 ​In whaT follows, aLtHougH sHarAdin is one oF the authOrs of this PResenT EsSay, we ConTinue tO rEfeR to ShAradin IN thE thirD persoN, iN order To avoId ConfusioN between the previous and tHe presEnt woRk. 25 SHaradin (2016, p. 1). 26 EIthER EA Is satisfiEd, or eA is not satIsfIed. if EA iS saTIsfieD, theN eA Is nOT satiSfieD; If EA is not 13 COnTraSTInG actions are SUPPosEd to bE, CoNTrastiVe PuRe Prob
ivist version of Pure Prob abilism pr ovide s a n e le gant  and  intuitive way of d ealing with well-known  coun te r exam p le s toother p u re l y  pr ob ab ili st i caccou nts , as we ll as ourown  c ounterexampl e sto Lin's m ore  recent Caus alProbab il ism .  Goin g f orwar d, the n , we'r e going t oa ssumet hat the c or rect  account of promo t io n  will be a ​co ntrast iv e  o n e , i .e. , one that  e mbrac e s the i d ea t h ata ctions promot e -or failt o p romote  - the satisf actio no f d esires ​ascont rasted wi th oth e r possi b le acti ons​.Aswe' ll s e ein  th en ext se cti o n,however,  e ve n a c ontr a s t i ve p rob abil istic  account face s p robl e ms.  3. P romot ionas  Invo lvingFit B et ween Desire and  Wor ld In rec ent  w ork ,one o f  the a uth ors  of thi s prese n t e ss a y -N athaniel Sharadin(2 0 1 5,  2016) - has ar g ue dt hat allpr oba bili s t ic ac coun t sof promo tion f a ce  a  proble min acc ou nti ngfor c e rtai n case s of pro motio n . Sharadin's f o cus there iso nn o n- c ontr ast ive 24 pure ly p r obab ilis t ic  ac c ounts  of p ro m ot i on. However, as we' ll  see,those  arguments wo rk against c o ntrastiv e pu r el y  probabilistic  acco unts too.S ince we' ve al ready ar gued that w e have g ood  re aso n t o be  interested i n a co nt rastive  pr obabili sti c a cco unt  o f promoti on (beca us esu ch  an  acco u nt can a vo idth e c ounte r exampl es ju st a dd uc e d)here we ' ll f ocus  o ur  att ent io n onshow i nghow Sha radin's a rgu m entap pl ies to​contrastivepr obabilisti cacc ountso f  promoti on. As we will see, Sha r adin'sarg ument  mot ivates in tro ducing  th e  notio n of ​ fit ​ be twe e n  one' s de sir eand the wo r l d a s a c en tral  compon ent in any account ofpromotion (in clu ding c on tra s ti v e p ro b abi l i stic accounts).  3.1. Desi re s  t hat Cannot BeFu lly Sat isfiedBrief l y, theproblem S haradin i nt rodu c e d i s that itis somet imes poss i ble t o  p romot e a  desir ebut , giv en the des ire's  conte nt , impo ssibl eto raise  the probability of its  satis facti on.  For inst anc e , c onsider o ne o f his exam ple s o f a d esi r e: Ex trem e  A sce t ic (E A)​: The desir e  t hat n on e of your d e s i res  aresat i sfied.  25The probability o f  EA's satisfac tion i s a lwa y s 0.  B ut then, no ma tte rw h at the r el evant 26 24  ​In wha tf ollow s, alt houghSharadi n is one of  the  au thors ofthi sp resentes sa y , we c onti nu e to r efer t o  Sha r a din in the third  pers o n , ino rde r toav oid con f usio n betweenthe previou s andtheprese nt work .25 Sha rad in  (2016, p. 1). 26 Ei therEA is s at isfi ed,  or EA  isn o t sat isfi ed . I f EA is s a t is f ie d, the n EA  is n ot  sat isfied; i f  EA is n ot1 3 contr as tin g action s  a r e  supposedtobe, C o n trastive P u re P r ob 
ivist version_of Pure_Probabilism provides an elegant_and intuitive_way_of dealing_with_well-known counterexamples to_other purely probabilistic_accounts, as well as_our own counterexamples_to_Lin's more recent Causal Probabilism. Going forward, then, we're going to assume that the_correct_account of_promotion_will_be a ​contrastive one, i.e.,_one that embraces the idea_that actions_promote -or fail to promote -the satisfaction of_desires_​as contrasted with_other possible actions​. As we'll see in the next_section, however, even a contrastive probabilistic_account faces problems._3._Promotion_as Involving Fit Between_Desire and World In recent work,_one of the authors of this_present essay -Nathaniel Sharadin (2015, 2016) -has_argued that all probabilistic accounts of_promotion face a problem in_accounting for_certain cases of promotion. Sharadin's_focus there is_on non-contrastive_24 purely probabilistic_accounts of promotion. However, as we'll_see, those arguments_work against contrastive purely probabilistic accounts_too._Since we've already_argued_that_we have_good reason to_be_interested in_a_contrastive probabilistic account of promotion (because_such_an account can avoid the counterexamples just_adduced) here we'll focus_our_attention on showing how_Sharadin's argument applies to ​contrastive_probabilistic accounts of promotion. As we_will see,_Sharadin's argument_motivates introducing the notion of ​fit ​between one's desire and the_world as a central component in_any account of promotion_(including contrastive_probabilistic_accounts). 3.1. Desires_that_Cannot Be_Fully Satisfied Briefly, the problem Sharadin introduced_is that_it is sometimes possible to promote_a desire but, given_the_desire's content, impossible to raise the_probability of its satisfaction. For instance,_consider one of his examples_of_a_desire: Extreme Ascetic (EA)​: The_desire that none of your desires_are satisfied. 25_The probability of EA's satisfaction is always_0._But then, no matter what the_relevant_26 24 ​In what follows, although_Sharadin_is_one of the authors of_this present essay, we continue to_refer to Sharadin in the third person, in order_to avoid confusion_between the previous and the_present_work._25 Sharadin (2016, p. 1). 26 Either EA is satisfied,_or EA_is not satisfied._If EA is satisfied, then EA is not satisfied; if_EA is not 13 contrasting actions are_supposed to be, Contrastive Pure Prob