 I do not intended to offer a comprehensive theory of literary interpretation, of course; questions about the role of the narrator or rhetorical devices such as irony or metaphor, for instance, are beyond the scope of this article and probably beyond what we can expect to model with possible worlds alone. Rather, my goal is to identify some basic tools that can later be supplemented in various ways. To provide such a framework we need an account of what it takes for a claim to count as true in a fiction. A first stab may be: (1) In fiction f,'s' is true iff in the (relevant) possible worlds reflecting f, s. Two points are worth making here. First, we need to specify what it takes for worlds to be relevant. For the moment, think of the relevant worlds as the closest ones in which the events described in f take place. I return to this issue below. Second, (1) assumes that utterances of sentences such as 'Holmes is a detective' are (in the relevant contexts) elliptical for 'in the fiction, Holmes is a detective'. We could, however, interpret such sentences as non-elliptical and literally false but rather understand fiction talk for instance as engendering a shift in the context of assessment (following e.g. Kölbel 2002; MacFarlane 2005). Either option will in principle work for my purposes. Possibilism does not only predict intuitively correct truth-conditions for sentences containing names for fictional characters, but in many cases also their intuitively correct truth-values, and does so in many ways better than other realist theories – Meinongian views, Platonism or abstract artifact theories – or irrealist views. Possibilism predicts that 'Holmes does not exist' and 'there is no Holmes' are true, insofar as existence ascriptions involve implicit restriction to the actual world. 'Holmes is a detective' has both a true and a false reading, depending on the presence or scope of an 'in-the-fiction' operator. Moreover, possibilism seems able to account for issues such as embedded fictions, intertextual comparisons ('Holmes is smarter than Poirot'), meta-fictional claims ('Holmes is a fictional character') and even make sense of speculations about characters' motivations or psychology, also when these are not explicitly detailed, insofar as there may well be a fact of the matter in the closest worlds where a character acts 342 F R E D R I K H
I do not intended to offer a comprehensive theory of literary interpretation, of path; question about the role of the narrator or rhetorical devices such as irony or metaphor, for example, are beyond the scope of this article and probably beyond what we can have a bun in the oven to model with potential worlds alone. Rather, my goal is to identify some basic cock that can later be supplemented in respective way. To provide such a framework we need an account of what it takes for a title to count as true in a fiction. A beginning stab may be: (1) In fiction f,'s' is true iff in the (relevant) possible universe reflecting f, s. Two points are worth making here. First, we necessitate to specify what it takes for worlds to be relevant. For the moment, think of the relevant worlds as the closest ones in which the events described in f take place. I return to this issue below. Second, (1) assumes that utterances of sentence such as' Holmes is a detective' are (in the relevant contexts) elliptical for' in the fabrication, Holmes is a detective'. We could, however, translate such prison term as non - elliptical and literally false but rather understand fiction talk for instance as engender a shift in the context of assessment (following e.g. Kölbel 2002; MacFarlane 2005). Either option will in principle work for my function. Possibilism does not only predict intuitively correct truth - condition for prison term containing names for fictional character, but in many cases also their intuitively correct accuracy - values, and perform so in many ways good than early realist theories – Meinongian views, Platonism or abstract artifact theories – or irrealist views. Possibilism predicts that' Holmes does not exist' and' there embody no Holmes' are true, insofar as being ascriptions necessitate implicit restriction to the actual world.' Holmes is a detective' has both a true and a false recitation, depending on the presence or scope of an' in - the - fiction' operator. Moreover, possibilism seems able to account for issues such as implant fictions, intertextual comparisons (' Holmes is smart than Poirot'), meta - fictional claims (' Holmes is a fictional character') and even make sense of meditation about characters' motivations or psychology, also when these are not explicitly detailed, insofar as there may well be a fact of the matter in the closest universe where a fictional character act 342 F R E vitamin d R I K H
 I fo not intended to offer a comprehensivg rheory of liferary ivterpretation, of course; quesvionw aboyt the role of the narfator or ghetoricao detices such as irony or mccaphod, for mnstance, are beiond the sco[e of this arthcue and probably beyond what we can ex[ect to mldel with possyble rorlss alone. Rather, my goal is to idenfify soke basic toolx that can later be supplelentfd in various ways. To provide sucr a framework we need an account of what it takes for a claim to cuunt cs true in q dichhon. A first stab may be: (1) In npction x,'s' is ttue iff in the (renevqnt) possible worlds rxflecting f, s. Two poynts are foxth making here. First, ww neeg to spezufy whzt if taked fkr worlds fo be relevqnt. For the moment, uhigj of the relebant wjrjds as the closest ones in which the evtnts sescribed in f take plaxe. I return to this idsue belor. Second, (1) assumes that utterances of sentences suwh as 'Folnef us a detective' are (in the relevant contexts) ellyltocsl for 'in the niction, Holmes is s feygctive'. We coula, howersr, interpret such sejtences as nin-elliptisal snd literally false but ratyer understaud diction talk for iustance as eugendeting a shift in the context oy asseasment (folllwing e.g. Iöubel 2002; MacFarlane 2005). Epthes option will in principle work for my 'urposes. Posxibilifm does noh onln predict intuitivepy cotrect druth-condihions for sentences containing iemes for fictootal charactzrs, bub in many cases also their injuitively corrdct truth-vzlues, aid does so ig many ways bajter than othxr realise thworiws – Meivungian views, Pkatonism or abstracr artifact theoriex – ud irrealist viecr. Possibilism prrdizts tjav 'Holias does not axisg' avc 'thefe is no Hoooes' sre true, insofar as axisfence ascriptions onyolve impoicit reftriction to yhe actual world. 'Hllmes is a deyecjive' has both a true and a falss reading, deiending on thq prcsense or scopz of an 'in-the-fiction' operator. Moreover, pissibilism seems avle to account for nsxues such ax embqdded ficdions, intertextual cimparisons ('Holmes is smarter than Poirkt'), metd-fictlonal claims ('Holmes is a fictional character') and even make sense of specuoations about charzctets' monivctipns or psyrhulogy, also when nhese are not explicitly detailev, insofar ds there may well be a fact of tfe matter in jhe closest worlds where a charactrr acts 342 F R E D R I K H
I do not intended to offer a of interpretation, of questions about the rhetorical such as irony metaphor, for instance, beyond the scope of this article probably beyond what we can expect to model with possible worlds alone. Rather, goal is to identify some basic tools that can later be supplemented in ways. provide a we need an account of what it takes for a claim to count as true in fiction. A first stab may be: (1) In f,'s' is true iff the (relevant) possible worlds reflecting s. points are making First, need to specify it takes for worlds to be relevant. For the moment, think of the relevant worlds as the ones in events described f place. return to this Second, (1) assumes that utterances of 'Holmes is a detective' are (in the relevant elliptical for the fiction, Holmes is a detective'. could, however, interpret such sentences as non-elliptical and false but rather understand fiction talk for instance as engendering a shift in the context (following e.g. Kölbel 2002; 2005). Either option in work my Possibilism does only predict intuitively correct truth-conditions for sentences containing names for fictional but in many cases also their intuitively correct truth-values, and in ways better than realist theories – Meinongian Platonism abstract artifact theories – views. predicts not and is no Holmes' are insofar as existence ascriptions involve restriction to the actual has both a true and a false reading, on the presence or scope of an operator. Moreover, possibilism seems able to account for issues such as embedded intertextual comparisons smarter than Poirot'), meta-fictional claims ('Holmes is a character') and even make of speculations about characters' motivations or psychology, also when are explicitly detailed, as there may be a fact the matter in worlds where character 342 D R I K H
 I do not intended to offer a comPrehensive TheorY of LitErAry iNterPretation, of couRSe; quEstions about the role of tHe narRaTOr or RHeToricAl devicES sUCH as IrOnY or MeTApHor, foR inStance, aRe beyond thE scOpE of this articLE aNd probably BeyOnd what we can ExpEct to mOdEl wITh posSibLe worLds aloNE. RatheR, my goal is To IDentifY Some basIC ToOls tHat can later be suppLEmENted in various wAys. To pRoVIdE SUch A frAmework we nEeD an acCOunt of wHAt IT TAkeS For a claim to coUnt as true in A FicTion. A fIrSt sTAb may bE: (1) In fiCtIOn f,'S' is true iff iN the (Relevant) pOssiblE Worlds rEFlectinG f, s. Two PoiNts Are wORtH mAkiNg HEre. fIrSt, wE NeeD to speciFy WhAt it tAkes FOR WOrldS to Be reLevanT. For the moment, ThiNk of THe rElevaNt worLds aS tHe cloSest onEs in wHiCh the events descRibeD in f take pLacE. I RetUrN to thIS issue BelOw. SEcond, (1) asSumes thAT utTeRANCeS of sentences such as 'hoLMEs Is a detecTive' arE (In ThE Relevant CoNteXts) eLLIpticAl foR 'In The fictiOn, HolmES iS a DetectiVe'. we coulD, hOweVer, InterPRet sUch senTences as Non-elLIptical and liteRAlly false but rAThER UnDErstAnd Fiction talk For iNStanCe as ENgEndERing a Shift In THe COntext of assessment (fOlLowing E.g. KölBel 2002; MacFarlane 2005). either optiON WIll in priNcipLE wORk for my purposeS. PossIbilism doeS Not only pRedicT intuitiVely correCT Truth-conDitIonS foR seNTEnCes containing NAMes fOr FictionAl cHaracteRs, bUt iN maNy cAsEs also theIr intuitIvElY cOrRecT trutH-Values, anD dOes So In mAny waYS betteR than OtheR rEaLIst TheorieS – meINOngiAn ViEws, PLatOnIsm or AbstRAct ArtifacT theories – Or iRRealIsT vIews. PosSibilism prediCtS that 'HolmeS dOes Not exiST' And 'there Is no Holmes' are true, insofaR As existEncE ascrIptiOns involvE imPlicit ResTRictioN to the ActuaL wOrlD. 'hOlmes IS A dEteCtIve' has both A TRue And a fAlSe reAding, dePending on the presenCE or Scope of an 'in-thE-fiCtioN' OPeRatOR. MOReoVeR, PosSIBilism seems able To account fOr ISsUes such as eMBedDeD fictioNs, interTextuAL comparIsons ('HolmEs is smartEr Than pOIroT'), meta-fictiOnal claiMs ('Holmes iS A fictIOnAl chaRacTer') and EvEn mAke seNse of sPEcuLatioNs abouT cHaractErs' moTiVations oR psychology, also when thesE are noT explIciTly detailEd, iNSofAr as there May wEll be a fact Of tHe mAtter In tHE closEst wORlDs wHEre a cHaraCTer acts 342 F R e d R i K H
 I do not intended to offe r a compre hensi vethe or y of  lit erary interpre t atio n, of course; question s abo ut ther ol e ofthe nar r at o r  or  r he tor ic a ldevic essuch as  irony ormet ap hor, for ins t an ce, are be yon d the scopeofthis a rt icl e  andpro bably  beyon d  whatwe can ex pe c t to m o del wit h po ssib le worlds alone.R at h er, my goal is  to id en t if y som e b asic tools  t hat c a n later be s u ppl e mented in var ious ways.T o p rovide  s uch a fram ework  w e  ne ed an accou nt o f what it  takes for a c l aim tocountastru e in afi cti on .  Af ir sts tab  may be:  ( 1)  In f icti o n f ,'s'  is  tru e iff  in the (rele van t) p o ssi ble w orlds  ref le cting  f, s.  Twopo ints are worthmaki ng here.Fir st , w eneedt o spec ify  wh at it t akes fo r  wo rl d s to  be relevant. Forth e mo ment, th ink of th er elevantwo rld s as t he cl oses t  o nes in w hich t h eev ents de sc ribedin  ftak e pla c e. I  retur n to thi s iss u e below. Secon d , (1) assumes th a t  u t tera nce s of senten cess uchas ' H ol mes is adetec ti v e' are (in the relevan tcontex ts) e lliptical for  'in the f i c t ion, Hol mesi sa  detective'. W e cou ld, howeve r , interp ret s uch sent ences asn o n-ellipt ica l a ndlit e r al ly false butr a ther  u ndersta ndfiction  ta lkfor  in st ance as e ngenderi ng  a  s hi ftin th e  context  o f a ss ess ment( follow ing e .g.Kö lb e l 2 002; Ma c Fa r l ane20 05 ). E ith er  opti on w i llin prin ciple wor k f o r my  p ur poses.Possibilism d oe s not only  p red ict in t u itivelycorrect truth-condition s  for se nte ncescont aining na mes  for f ict i onal c haract ers,bu t i n manyc a se s a ls o their in t u iti velyco rrec t truth -values, and doess o i n many ways b ett er t h a noth e rr eal is t  th e o ries – Meinongi an views,Pl a to nism or ab s tra ct  artifa ct theo ries–  or irr ealist vi ews. Poss ib ilis m pre dicts that  'Holmes  does not exist '  a nd 't her e is n oHol mes'are tr u e,insof ar asex istenc e asc ri ptions i nvolve implicit restric tion t o the  ac tual worl d.' Hol mes is adete ctive' has  bo tha tru e a n d a f alse re adi n g, de pend i ng on the pr ese n c eor scope of a n  'i n-the -fi c tion'oper ator. Moreover, p o ssibilism seem s ab l e  to  ac c ount  f or issues such  as  e m b edded fi ct ions, inter textualco m paris ons (' Holmes  is sma r t er than P oiro t') , meta-fi cti on a l claim s(' H olmesis a  f iction al cha r acte r ' ) and even makesense o f spe c ula tions  a bout ch a ract ers' motiv ations or p sychol ogy,  also  when t he se are  no texplicitly detailed,  inso far asth eremay  wellbe a f act o f th emat ter in th e cl o se st wor ldswhere  a  cha racter ac t s 342 FR E D R I K  H 
 I_do not_intended to offer a_comprehensive theory_of_literary interpretation,_of_course; questions about_the role of_the narrator or rhetorical_devices such as_irony_or metaphor, for instance, are beyond the scope of this article and probably beyond_what_we can_expect_to_model with possible worlds alone._Rather, my goal is to_identify some_basic tools that can later be supplemented in_various_ways. To provide_such a framework we need an account of what_it takes for a claim to_count as true_in_a_fiction. A first stab_may be: (1) In fiction f,'s'_is true iff in the (relevant)_possible worlds reflecting f, s. Two points_are worth making here. First, we_need to specify what it_takes for_worlds to be relevant. For_the moment, think_of the_relevant worlds as_the closest ones in which the_events described in_f take place. I return to_this_issue below. Second,_(1)_assumes_that utterances_of sentences such_as_'Holmes is_a_detective' are (in the relevant contexts)_elliptical_for 'in the fiction, Holmes is a_detective'. We could, however,_interpret_such sentences as non-elliptical_and literally false but rather_understand fiction talk for instance as_engendering a_shift in_the context of assessment (following e.g. Kölbel 2002; MacFarlane 2005). Either_option will in principle work for_my purposes. Possibilism does_not only_predict_intuitively correct truth-conditions_for_sentences containing_names for fictional characters, but in many_cases also_their intuitively correct truth-values, and does_so in many ways_better_than other realist theories – Meinongian_views, Platonism or abstract artifact theories_– or irrealist views. Possibilism_predicts_that_'Holmes does not exist' and_'there is no Holmes' are true,_insofar as existence_ascriptions involve implicit restriction to the actual_world._'Holmes is a detective' has both_a_true and a false reading, depending_on_the_presence or scope of an_'in-the-fiction' operator. Moreover, possibilism seems able_to account for issues such as embedded fictions, intertextual_comparisons ('Holmes is_smarter than Poirot'), meta-fictional claims_('Holmes_is_a fictional character') and even make sense of speculations about_characters' motivations_or psychology, also_when these are not explicitly detailed, insofar as there may_well be a fact of the matter_in the closest worlds where a character acts 342 F R_E D R I K H