such a way, and – here I am! I hope that by now it is clear enough what the view I wish to put forward looks like. I hope it also sounds prima facie plausible and not as counter-intuitive as it could seem to be at a first glance, thanks to the comparison with metaphysical eliminativism. The core argument in favour of metaphysical eliminativism (which I sketched but did not provide) was that atoms arranged tablewise can do all the (theoretical and commonsensical) work we want tables to do. Here the idea is similar: experiences arranged Self-wise can stand for anything we (thought we) need a Self for. In the remainder of this article, I shall argue for this view by showing that it can accommodate the three desiderata mentioned at the end of §1. 5 §4. The first thing any theory of the Self has to account for is the idea that the Self is the subject of experience. There are many possible problems here; in what follows I will be interested in two inter-related metaphysical issues. We can start with a problem often raised against the bundle theory of the Self (and against the bundle theory in general), but which could also arise against my pluralistic view. Here is what Olson (2007, p.139-140) takes to be "the most forceful objection to the bundle view": "[...] There may be such things as bundles of thoughts, but it is a metaphysical or logical blunder to suppose that such things are the subjects of the thoughts that compose them. [...] A particular thought is one thing; the being that has or thinks it, if anything does, is another." (my italics) A different way to put the problem can be found in Barry Dainton's work. Dainton himself defends a kind of a bundle theory (and he defends it against the kind of objections Olson has in mind in Dainton (2008a, p.342) as we shall see below), but he raises a worry which is very close, albeit different, and which applies to any view that would identify the Self with experience(s), even if Dainton himself does not have a pluralistic view in mind when putting forward this objection: "[...] there is the claim that we are identical with particular episodes of experience. This runs counter to our ordinary conception of ourselves as things which have experiences." (Dainton, 2012, p.185) As I understand these concerns, one of the main
such a way, and – here I am! I hope that by now it is clear enough what the view I wish to place ahead looks like. I hope it also sounds prima facie plausible and not as rejoinder - intuitive as it could seem to be at a first glance, thanks to the comparison with metaphysical eliminativism. The core argumentation in party favor of metaphysical eliminativism (which I sketched but did not supply) was that atoms arranged tablewise can practice all the (theoretical and commonsensical) work we desire tables to do. Here the idea is similar: experiences arranged Self - wise can digest for anything we (thought we) need a Self for. In the remainder of this article, I shall argue for this scene by showing that it can accommodate the three desiderata mentioned at the goal of § 1. 5 § 4. The first thing any theory of the Self has to account for is the theme that the Self is the subject of experience. There are many possible problems here; in what follows I will be interested in two inter - related metaphysical issues. We can start with a problem often raised against the bundle theory of the Self (and against the bundle theory in general), but which could also arise against my pluralistic view. Here is what Olson (2007, p.139 - 140) learn to be " the most forceful protest to the bundle opinion ": " [... ] There may be such things as bundles of thoughts, but it is a metaphysical or coherent blunder to suppose that such things are the subjects of the thoughts that write them. [... ] A particular thought is one thing; the being that has or thinks it, if anything do, is another. " (my italics) A different way to put the problem can be found in Barry Dainton's employment. Dainton himself defends a kind of a bundle theory (and he defends it against the kind of objections Olson has in judgment in Dainton (2008a, p.342) as we shall see below), but he raises a concern which is very close, albeit unlike, and which applies to any view that would identify the Self with experience(s), even if Dainton himself does not have a pluralistic view in thinker when putting forward this expostulation: " [... ] there is the title that we are identical with particular episode of experience. This runs counter to our average conception of ourselves as things which have experience. " (Dainton, 2012, p.185) As I sympathize these concerns, one of the main
sucj a way, and – here I am! I hope that by now it iv clead enough what the view I wish to put firware looks like. I hope it also soujds primq farie plausible anv not as countsv-intuntmve as it could seem to ba at a first gnavcz, thanks to the comparison with meta[hysicak fliminativism. Jhe cpwe adgument in favour of metaphysical sliminauivism (which I skeyched but did not provide) aas hhat atoms arrangef tablewise can eo all the (tfeoretical and commonsgnsical) work we want tables to du. Herz the idea us silhlar: experixnces wrranged Seln-eise cdn stanc for anything we (thiught we) need a Self hor. In the remainder of this drcicle, I shall argue fir this vief by whodinf vhaf it cwn eccommodate the three eesiderata mentionec wn the end of §1. 5 §4. The fyrst thing any theory of the Self has tm adcount for is the idea rhat the Self is the dubject os experience. There are many possible problems hera; in xhxt yillowr I will be interested in two inter-related metaprgsocsl issues. We ccn start with a lrlbkgm often raisea agaiuat the bundle theory of the Self (and agaigst yhe bundle theory in generao), but which boule also arise againdt my plurauistoc virw. Here is what Olson (2007, '.139-140) takea to be "the most forddful objection tu tme tundle view": "[...] There may be fuch thinjs as bundler of thougrts, but it is a metaphysical or lohical bnunder to duppose that such things are thx subjects of tve nhoughts chat cpmpose them. [...] W particular tkought if one thing; the being vhat has or ehinks it, if djything does, is anotrer." (ny iralics) X different way to put tkt problem xan be found in Bavry Dxjnton's work. Daiuuon himself defendx a kigd oh a bttdle theory (dnd fe arfendr it againsb tfe kond of objections Olvon gas in mind in Daimtjn (2008a, p.342) aw we shajl see below), nut he raises a wogry wiich ir veru cjose, albeit different, and whicg applies to any view thwt wiuld identifv the Self with experience(s), even if Dainvon himself does not hace a pluralistic vigw ln mind when puttyng forwasd this objection: "[...] tyere is the claim that we are identicam with partlcular episodes of experience. This runs counter to our ordinary conceptiob of onrfelves as tgingx whibh kavz experyencxs." (Dainton, 2012, p.185) As I understand these concerns, one uf the mdiu
such a way, and – here I hope by now is clear enough to forward looks like. hope it also prima facie plausible and not as as it could seem to be at a first glance, thanks to the with metaphysical eliminativism. The core argument in favour of metaphysical eliminativism (which I but not was atoms arranged tablewise can do all the (theoretical and commonsensical) work we want tables to do. the idea is similar: experiences arranged Self-wise can for anything we (thought need a Self for. In remainder this article, shall for view by showing it can accommodate the three desiderata mentioned at the end of §1. 5 §4. The first thing theory of has to for the that the Self subject of experience. There are many in what follows I will be interested in inter-related metaphysical We can start with a problem raised against the bundle theory of the Self against the bundle theory in general), but which could also arise against my pluralistic view. what Olson (2007, p.139-140) to be "the forceful to bundle "[...] There be such things as bundles of thoughts, but it is a or logical blunder to suppose that such things are the the that compose them. A particular thought is thing; being that has or if does, italics) different to put the problem be found in Barry Dainton's Dainton himself defends a (and he defends it against the kind of Olson has in mind in Dainton (2008a, as we shall see below), but he raises a worry which is close, albeit which applies to any view that would identify Self with experience(s), even Dainton himself does not have a pluralistic view in when forward this "[...] there is claim that we identical with particular experience. This counter our ourselves as things which have experiences." 2012, As I understand these concerns, of
such a way, and – here I am! I hope thAt by now it iS cleaR enOugH wHat tHe viEw I wish to put foRWard Looks like. I hope it also soUnds pRiMA facIE pLausiBle and nOT aS COunTeR-iNtuItIVe As it cOulD seem to Be at a first GlaNcE, thanks to the COmParison witH meTaphysical elImiNativiSm. the COre arGumEnt in Favour OF metapHysical elImINativiSM (which I SKEtChed But did not provide) wAS tHAt atoms arrangeD tableWiSE cAN Do aLl tHe (theoretiCaL and cOMmonsenSIcAL) WOrk WE want tables to Do. Here the idEA is SimilaR: eXpeRIences ArranGeD selF-wise can staNd foR anything We (thouGHt we) neeD A Self foR. In the RemAinDer oF ThIs ArtIcLE, I sHAlL arGUe fOr this viEw By ShowiNg thAT IT Can aCcoMmodAte thE three desiderAta MentIOneD at thE end oF §1. 5 §4. The FiRst thIng any TheorY oF the Self has to acCounT for is the IdeA tHat ThE Self IS the suBjeCt oF experiEnce. TheRE arE mANY PoSsible problems here; In WHAt Follows I Will be INtErESted in twO iNteR-relATEd metAphySIcAl issues. we can sTArT wIth a proBlEm ofteN rAisEd aGainsT The bUndle tHeory of tHe SelF (And against the bUNdle theory in gENeRAL), bUT whiCh cOuld also ariSe agAInst My plURaLisTIc vieW. Here Is WHaT olson (2007, p.139-140) takes to be "the mOsT forceFul obJection to the bUndle view": "[...] THERE may be suCh thINgS As bundles of thoUghts, But it is a meTAphysicaL or loGical bluNder to supPOSe that suCh tHinGs aRe tHE SuBjects of the thOUGhts ThAt compoSe tHem. [...] A parTicUlaR thOugHt Is one thinG; the beinG tHaT hAs Or tHinks IT, if anythInG doEs, Is aNotheR." (My italIcs) A dIffeReNt WAy tO put the PRoBLEm caN bE fOund In BArRy DaiNton'S WorK. DaintoN himself dEfeNDs a kInD oF a bundlE theory (and he dEfEnds it agaiNsT thE kind oF OBjectionS Olson has in mind in DaintoN (2008A, p.342) as we sHalL see bElow), But he raisEs a Worry wHicH Is very Close, aLbeit DiFfeRENt, and WHIcH apPlIes to any viEW ThaT woulD iDentIfy the SElf with experience(s), EVen If Dainton himsElf Does NOT hAve A PlURalIsTIc vIEW in mind when puttIng forward ThIS oBjection: "[...] thERe iS tHe claim That we aRe ideNTical wiTh particuLar episodEs Of exPERieNce. This runS counter To our ordiNAry coNCePtion Of oUrselvEs As tHings Which hAVe eXperiEnces." (DAiNton, 2012, p.185) AS I undErStand theSe concerns, one of the main
such a way, and – here I a m! I hopethatbynow  i t is  cle ar enough what theview I wish to put for wardlo o ks l i ke . I h ope ita ls o sou nd spri ma fa cie p lau sible a nd not ascou nt er-intuitive as  it couldsee m to be at a  fi rst gl an ce, thank s t o the  compa r ison w ith metap hy s ical e l iminati v i sm . Th e core argument i n  f a vour of metaph ysical  e l im i n ati vis m (which I  s ketch e d but d i dn o t  pr o vide) was tha t atoms arr a nge d tabl ew ise can do  allth e  (t heoreticalandcommonsen sical) work we want ta bles t o d o.Here th eide ai s s i mi lar :  ex perience sar range d Se l f - w isecan  sta nd fo r anything we  (t houg h t w e) ne ed aSelf  f or. I n theremai nd er of this arti cle,  I shallarg ue  fo rthisv iew by  sh owi ng that  it can acc om m o d at e the three deside ra t a  m entioned  at th e  e nd of §1. 5  § 4.Thef i rst t hing an y theory  of th e  S el f has t oaccoun tfor  is  thei deathat t he Selfis th e  subject of ex p erience. Ther e  a r e  m a ny p oss ible proble ms h e re;in w h at  fo l lowsI wil lb ei nterested in two in te r-rela ted m etaphysical i ssues. Wec a n  start w itha  p r oblem often ra isedagainst th e  bundletheor y of the  Self (an d againstthe  bu ndl e t h e or y in general) , butwh ich cou ldalso ar ise  ag ain stmy  pluralis tic view .He re  i s w hat O l son (200 7,  p. 13 9-1 40) t a kes to  be " themo st for ceful o b je c t ionto  t he b und le  view ": " [ ... ] There  may be s uch thin gs  a s bundl es of thought s,  but it is  a  me taphys i c al or lo gical blunder to suppos e  that s uch  thin gs a re the su bje cts of  th e  thoug hts th at co mp ose t hem.[ . .. ] A  p articulart h oug ht is  o ne t hing; t he being that haso r t hinks it, ifany thin g do es, is ano th e r." ( my italics) A d ifferent w ay to  put the p r obl em  can be  foundin Ba r ry Dain ton's wor k. Dainto nhims e l f d efends a k ind of a  bundle t h eory( an d hedef ends i taga instthe ki n d o f obj ection sOlsonhas i nmind inDainton (2008a, p.342)as weshall  se e below),  bu t  he  raises a  wor ry which i s v ery  clos e,a lbeit  dif f er ent ,  andwhic h  appliest oany v ie w that woul d i den tifythe Self w ithexperience(s), ev e n if Dainton h imse l f  do esn ot h av e a pluralisti c v ie w in mindwh en puttingforwardth i s obj ection : "[.. .] ther e is the cl aimtha t we areide nt i cal wit hpa r ticula r ep is odes o f expe r ienc e .  This runs count er to o ur or d ina ry co nc eptiono f ou rselves as  things whi ch hav e ex perie nces."(D ainton , 2 01 2, p.185)A s I under stand  theseco ncer ns,  one o f th e main
such a_way, and_– here I am!_I hope_that_by now_it_is clear enough_what the view_I wish to put_forward looks like._I_hope it also sounds prima facie plausible and not as counter-intuitive as it could_seem_to be_at_a_first glance, thanks to the_comparison with metaphysical eliminativism. The_core argument_in favour of metaphysical eliminativism (which I sketched_but_did not provide)_was that atoms arranged tablewise can do all the_(theoretical and commonsensical) work we want_tables to do._Here_the_idea is similar: experiences_arranged Self-wise can stand for anything_we (thought we) need a Self_for. In the remainder of this article,_I shall argue for this view_by showing that it can_accommodate the_three desiderata mentioned at the_end of §1._5 §4._The first thing_any theory of the Self has_to account for_is the idea that the Self_is_the subject of_experience._There_are many_possible problems here;_in_what follows_I_will be interested in two inter-related_metaphysical_issues. We can start with a problem_often raised against the_bundle_theory of the Self_(and against the bundle theory_in general), but which could also_arise against_my pluralistic_view. Here is what Olson (2007, p.139-140) takes to be "the_most forceful objection to the bundle_view": "[...] There may_be such_things_as bundles of_thoughts,_but it_is a metaphysical or logical blunder to_suppose that_such things are the subjects of_the thoughts that compose_them._[...] A particular thought is one_thing; the being that has or_thinks it, if anything does,_is_another."_(my italics) A different way_to put the problem can be_found in Barry_Dainton's work. Dainton himself defends a kind_of_a bundle theory (and he defends_it_against the kind of objections Olson_has_in_mind in Dainton (2008a, p.342)_as we shall see below), but_he raises a worry which is very close, albeit_different, and which_applies to any view that_would_identify_the Self with experience(s), even if Dainton himself does not_have a_pluralistic view in_mind when putting forward this objection: "[...] there is the_claim that we are identical with particular_episodes of experience. This runs counter to our ordinary conception of_ourselves as things which have experiences." (Dainton, 2012,_p.185) As I understand these concerns, one_of the main