 the possibility 16 of winning becomes salient. But this does not tell us why S's reasoning fails to meet those standards, even if raised. The present account does better in this respect. The very idea of a lottery involves the idea of chance, and so we have an explanation why chance is salient in cases where the lottery is salient. We can then apply a familiar general principle of credit attribution: that salient chance undermines credit. 5. Gettier problems solved: abnormality trumps interest. Recently I have argued that the following conditions are necessary for knowledge.xxiv S knows p only if 1. S's believing p is subjectively justified is the following sense: S's believing p is the result of dispositions that S manifests when S is trying to believe the truth, and 2. S's believing p is objectively justified is the following sense: The dispositions that result in S's believing p make S reliable in believing p. Alternatively, the dispositions that result in S's believing p constitute intellectual abilities, or powers, or virtues. The thinking behind the subjective justification condition is that knowledge requires that belief be appropriate from the knower's point of view. More specifically, the knower must have some awareness that a belief so formed has a good likelihood of being true. Some authors have required that the knower believe that this is so, but I have resisted this way of understanding the kind of awareness in question. It seems that people rarely have beliefs about the genesis of their beliefs, and so it would be too strong to require that they always have one in cases of knowledge. Accordingly, I have stated the subjective justification condition in terms of dispositions to believe rather than actual beliefs, or even dispositional beliefs. People manifest highly specific, finely tuned dispositions to form beliefs in some ways rather than others. And this fact, I take it, amounts to an implicit awareness of the reliability of those dispositions. The objective justification condition can be interpreted along the lines of Sosa's weak safety condition above: to say that S is reliable in believing p is to say that, at least in relevantly close worlds, usually if S believes p then p is true. Notice that clause (2) makes the knower the seat of reliability: it says that S is reliable, not that some process is, or that S's method is, or that S's evidence 17 is. The thinking here is that knowledge must be grounded in the knower. That is, it must be grounded in the knower's own abilities, rather than in a process or method
the possibility 16 of winning becomes salient. But this does not assure us why S's reasoning fail to meet those standards, even if raised. The present report does better in this regard. The identical idea of a lottery involves the idea of chance, and so we get an explanation why chance is salient in cases where the lottery is salient. We can then apply a familiar cosmopolitan principle of credit attribution: that salient chance undermines citation. 5. Gettier problems solved: abnormality trump interest. Recently I have argue that the following conditions are necessary for knowledge.xxiv S knows p only if 1. S's think p is subjectively justified is the following sense: S's believing p is the resultant role of dispositions that S manifests when S is trying to believe the truth, and 2. S's believing p is objectively justified is the following sense: The dispositions that leave in S's believe p name south reliable in believing p. Alternatively, the dispositions that result in S's believing p constitute cerebral abilities, or powers, or virtues. The thinking behind the subjective justification condition is that knowledge requires that belief be appropriate from the knower's point of view. More specifically, the knower must have some awareness that a belief so form has a good likelihood of being truthful. Some authors have required that the knower believe that this is so, but I have resisted this direction of understanding the kind of awareness in question. It seems that citizenry rarely have beliefs about the genesis of their beliefs, and so it would be besides strong to ask that they always have one in subject of knowledge. Accordingly, I have stated the immanent justification condition in terms of inclination to believe rather than actual impression, or even dispositional beliefs. multitude manifest highly specific, finely tuned dispositions to form beliefs in some ways rather than others. And this fact, I take it, amounts to an implicit awareness of the dependability of those dispositions. The objective justification condition can be translate along the lines of Sosa's weak safety condition above: to say that S is reliable in believing phosphorus is to say that, at least in relevantly close worlds, usually if S believes p then p is true. detect that article (2) name the knower the seat of reliability: it says that S is reliable, not that some process is, or that S's method acting is, or that S's evidence 17 is. The thinking here is that knowledge must be grounded in the knower. That is, it must be grounded in the knower's own abilities, rather than in a process or method
 thf possibility 16 of winninn becomes salienj. Vut thms does not telu us why S's reasoning fails vo mwet tyose standards, even if raised. Tje presebt arcount does bettxd in thlf reaiect. Chx very idea of s lottery hnvolves the igex lf chance, and so we have an explanaeion whu fhance is salignt im casss where the lottery is salient. We can thtn apply a familiat general principle of crefit wttribution: that swlient chanxe ugeermines creait. 5. Gettitr problems aolved: abnormality trumps interdst. Rzcently I hqvw agcued that tie foljowing condibpons ara necesxary for knowlcdge.xeiv W knows p only if 1. S's believing p is sufjectivelf lustified is the folliwung sgnse: V's bdoiexinf ' ia the gesnlt of dispksitions thqt S manifests when S px trying to gelievq ehe truth, and 2. S's believing p is objectpvelg justified is the folliwing sense: The dispoditions trat result in S's believing p make S reliable in balievmne p. Ajgwrjatively, the dispositions that result in S's bqmitvikg p constitute lntellectual abiliyifs, jr powers, or xirtues. Tge thinking behind the sufjectuve justisicayion condition is that knowoedge requirvs tyat belief be apprlpriate froo thg knowrr's point of view. More rpecjfically, thf knower jjst have some awxrekesv that a belief so formed ras a goov likzlihood uf bging trte. Some auhhors have required that the nnmwer beliege that this is so, but I have rxxisted this eaf ox underscandinn the kind of arareness in qugstion. It seemr that peoile rarelb have beliess about the cgnesis of themr belieff, ane so it wouua be too stronb to requprt that thet always have one ln carss of knowledge. Acxordingly, I havr sgatqd tie sufbective justhficxtium conaition in tcrmr of dispositions to belheve rather than actuak neliefs, ot even difpositional brliefs. People manivest iighly specofis, finely tuned dispositions to form belleff in some wars rqther than ochers. And this fact, I take it, amounts to an implicit awargness of the reliabilntn of those dmsposieions. The objective justificarion condition cak be interpreted along the lhnes lf Sosa's weak safety condition above: to say that S is reliable in believibg p is to say thaf, at leasn iu rzlevantjy cpuse worlds, usualky if S believes p then p is trne. Notice dhct clause (2) makes the knower tne seat of relixbility: it says that S ia reliabke, not that some process is, or yhat S's method is, or thab S's evidwnce 17 is. Thv tiinking here is that knowlzdge myst be troukded in the knuwet. Bhat is, it musu be grounded in the knower's own abioities, rwther than in a 'rocess or mctmod
the possibility 16 of winning becomes salient. does tell us S's reasoning fails if The present account better in this The very idea of a lottery the idea of chance, and so we have an explanation why chance is in cases where the lottery is salient. We can then apply a familiar principle credit that chance undermines credit. 5. Gettier problems solved: abnormality trumps interest. Recently I have argued that the conditions are necessary for knowledge.xxiv S knows p if 1. S's believing is subjectively justified is the sense: believing p the of that S manifests S is trying to believe the truth, and 2. S's believing p is objectively justified is the sense: The result in believing make reliable in believing the dispositions that result in S's intellectual abilities, or powers, or virtues. The thinking the subjective condition is that knowledge requires that be appropriate from the knower's point of view. specifically, the knower must have some awareness that a belief so formed has a good being true. Some authors required that the believe this so, I have this way of understanding the kind of awareness in question. It that people rarely have beliefs about the genesis of their so would be too to require that they have in cases of knowledge. have the in of to believe rather than beliefs, or even dispositional beliefs. manifest highly specific, finely in some ways rather than others. And this I take it, amounts to an implicit of the reliability of those dispositions. The objective justification condition can be along the Sosa's weak safety condition above: to say that is reliable in believing is to say that, at least in relevantly close usually S believes then p is Notice that clause makes the knower of reliability: says S that some process is, or that method or that S's evidence 17 The is that knowledge must be grounded in the knower. That is, it must be grounded knower's own abilities, rather in process or method
 the possibility 16 of winning beComes salieNt. But ThiS doEs Not tEll uS why S's reasoninG FailS to meet those standards, eVen if RaISed. THE pResenT accounT DoES BetTeR iN thIs REsPect. THe vEry idea Of a lottery InvOlVes the idea of CHaNce, and so we HavE an explanatiOn wHy chanCe Is sALient In cAses wHere thE LotterY is salienT. WE Can theN Apply a fAMIlIar gEneral principle of CReDIt attribution: tHat salIeNT cHANce UndErmines creDiT. 5. GettIEr problEMs SOLVed: ABnormality truMps interest. rEceNtly I hAvE arGUed thaT the fOlLOwiNg conditionS are Necessary For knoWLedge.xxIV S knows P only iF 1. S's BelIeviNG p Is SubJeCTivELy JusTIfiEd is the fOlLoWing sEnse: s'S BELievIng P is tHe resUlt of dispositIonS thaT s maNifesTs wheN S is TrYing tO belieVe the TrUth, and 2. S's believiNg p iS objectivEly JuStiFiEd is tHE folloWinG seNse: The dIspositIOns ThAT REsUlt in S's believing p mAkE s ReLiable in BelievINg P. ALTernativElY, thE disPOSitioNs thAT rEsult in S'S belieVInG p ConstitUtE intelLeCtuAl aBilitIEs, or Powers, Or virtueS. The tHInking behind thE Subjective jusTIfICAtIOn coNdiTion is that kNowlEDge rEquiREs ThaT BelieF be apPrOPrIAte from the knower's poInT of vieW. More Specifically, tHe knower muST HAve some aWareNEsS That a belief so fOrmed Has a good liKElihood oF beinG true. SomE authors hAVE requireD thAt tHe kNowER BeLieve that this IS So, buT I Have resIstEd this wAy oF unDerStaNdIng the kinD of awareNeSs In QuEstIon. It SEems that PeOplE rAreLy havE BeliefS abouT the GeNeSIs oF their bELiEFS, and So It WoulD be ToO stroNg to REquIre that They alwayS haVE one In CaSes of knOwledge. AccordInGly, I have stAtEd tHe subjECTive justIfication condition in terMS of dispOsiTions To beLieve rathEr tHan actUal BEliefs, Or even DispoSiTioNAL beliEFS. PEopLe Manifest hiGHLy sPecifIc, FineLy tuned Dispositions to form BEliEfs in some ways RatHer tHAN oTheRS. AND thIs FAct, i TAke it, amounts to aN implicit aWaREnEss of the reLIabIlIty of thOse dispOsitiONs. The obJective juStificatiOn CondITIon Can be interPreted alOng the linES of SoSA's Weak sAfeTy condItIon Above: To say tHAt S Is relIable iN bElieviNg p is To Say that, aT least in relevantly close Worlds, UsualLy iF S believeS p tHEn p Is true. NotIce tHat clause (2) mAkeS thE knowEr tHE seat Of reLIaBilITy: it sAys tHAt S is reliABlE, noT THaT some procesS IS, Or tHat S's MetHOd is, or That s's evidence 17 is. The thINking here is thaT knoWLEdgE muST be gRoUnded in the knowEr. THaT IS, it must bE gRounded in thE knower's OwN AbiliTies, raTher thAn in a prOCEsS Or methOd
 the possibility 16 of win ning becom es sa lie nt.  B ut t hisdoes not tellu s wh y S's reasoning failsto me et thos e  s tanda rds, ev e ni f  ra is ed . T he pr esent  ac count d oes better  in  t his respect. Th e very ide a o f a lotteryinv olvesth e i d ea of  ch ance,  and s o  we ha ve an exp la n ationw hy chan c e  i s sa lient in cases wh e re the lottery is  salie nt .  W e can  th en apply a  f amili a r gener a lp r i nci p le of creditattribution :  th at sal ie ntc hanceunder mi n escredit. 5.Gett ier probl ems so l ved: ab n ormalit y trum psint eres t .Re cen tl y  Ih av e a r gue d that t he  f ollow ingc o n d itio nsareneces sary for know led ge.x x ivS kno ws ponly  i f 1.S's be lievi ng  p is subjectiv elyjustified  is  t hefo llowi n g sens e:S's  believ ing p i s  th er e s ul t of dispositionsth a t  S  manifes ts whe n  S  i s  tryingto  be liev e the t ruth ,  a nd 2. S' s beli e vi ng  p is o bj ective ly  ju sti fiedi s th e foll owing se nse:T he disposition s  that resulti nS ' sb elie vin g p make Sreli a blein b e li evi n g p.Alter na t iv e ly, the disposition sthat r esult  in S's belie ving p con s t i tute int elle c tu a l abilities, o r pow ers, or vi r tues. Th e thi nking be hind thes u bjective  ju sti fic ati o n  c ondition is t h a t kn ow ledge r equ ires th atbel ief  be  a ppropriat e from t he  k no we r's  poin t  of view .Mor espe cific a lly, t he kn ower  m us t  ha ve some aw a r enes sth at a  be li ef so  for m edhas a g ood likel iho o d of  b ei ng true . Some author shave requi re d t hat th e knower b elieve that this is so, but I h ave  resi sted  this way  of  under sta n ding t he kin d ofaw are n e ss in q ue sti on . It seems t hat  peop le  rar ely hav e beliefs about th e  ge nesis of thei r b elie f s ,and so itwo u ldb e  too strong torequire th at th ey alwaysh ave  o ne in c ases of  know l edge. A ccordingl y, I have  s tate d the  subjectiv e justif ication c o nditi o nin te rms  of di sp osi tions  to be l iev e rat her th an  actua l bel ie fs, or e ven dispositional belie fs. Pe opleman ifest hig hly spe cific, fi nely  tuned dis pos iti ons t o f o rm be lief s  i n s o me wa ys r a ther than ot her s .  A nd this fac t , I t ake i t,a mounts  toan implicit aware n ess of the rel iabi l i tyoft hose  d ispositions. T heob j e ctive ju st ification c ondition  c a n beinterp retedalong t h e  l i nes of  Sos a's  weak saf ety  c o ndition  a bo v e: tosayth at S i s reli a blei n  believing p isto sa y that, atleast  i n relev a ntly  close wor lds, usuall y if S  bel ieves  p then  p  is tr ue.  N otice that clause (2 ) mak es thekn ower  th e seat  ofr e liabi lity :itsays that S  i s  r el i abl e, n ot th at  som e process is, or t hat S's met ho d i s ,  or th a tS ' s evidence  17  is.T h e thinking here is thatknowle dge mu st be g r oun de d in th e k n o wer. That  is, it m u stbe  gro unded in  t he k no wer 's  own abilities,  ratherthan ina proces s o r  met h od
 the_possibility 16_of winning becomes salient._But this_does_not tell_us_why S's reasoning_fails to meet_those standards, even if_raised. The present_account_does better in this respect. The very idea of a lottery involves the idea_of_chance, and_so_we_have an explanation why chance_is salient in cases where_the lottery_is salient. We can then apply a familiar_general_principle of credit_attribution: that salient chance undermines credit. 5. Gettier problems_solved: abnormality trumps interest. Recently I_have argued that_the_following_conditions are necessary for_knowledge.xxiv S knows p only if_1. S's believing p is subjectively_justified is the following sense: S's believing_p is the result of dispositions_that S manifests when S_is trying_to believe the truth, and_2. S's believing_p is_objectively justified is_the following sense: The dispositions that_result in S's_believing p make S reliable in_believing_p. Alternatively, the_dispositions_that_result in_S's believing p_constitute_intellectual abilities,_or_powers, or virtues. The thinking behind_the_subjective justification condition is that knowledge requires_that belief be appropriate_from_the knower's point of_view. More specifically, the knower_must have some awareness that a_belief so_formed has_a good likelihood of being true. Some authors have required that_the knower believe that this is_so, but I have_resisted this_way_of understanding the_kind_of awareness_in question. It seems that people rarely_have beliefs_about the genesis of their beliefs,_and so it would_be_too strong to require that they_always have one in cases of_knowledge. Accordingly, I have stated_the_subjective_justification condition in terms of_dispositions to believe rather than actual_beliefs, or even_dispositional beliefs. People manifest highly specific, finely_tuned_dispositions to form beliefs in some_ways_rather than others. And this fact,_I_take_it, amounts to an implicit_awareness of the reliability of those_dispositions. The objective justification condition can be interpreted along_the lines of_Sosa's weak safety condition above:_to_say_that S is reliable in believing p is to say_that, at_least in relevantly_close worlds, usually if S believes p then p is_true. Notice that clause (2) makes the_knower the seat of reliability: it says that S is reliable,_not that some process is, or that S's_method is, or that S's evidence 17_is. The thinking here_is_that knowledge must be grounded in the_knower._That_is,_it must be_grounded in the_knower's own abilities,_rather than_in a process_or method