 contextualism of Cohen and Sosa as equivalent to, or entailing, normative contextualism.7 A Contextualist Moral Epistemology 297 I should mention at this point that it is not my intention to defend some version of normative contextualism over and against nonrelativist epistemological views. As we shall see in the section on justification and epistemic responsibility, it may be legitimate in some contexts and for some purposes to evaluate the epistemic status of an individual's beliefs relative to the epistemic norms of that person's community. But there are contexts in which we intend to make nonrelativized, categorical epistemic evaluations, even if, in doing so, we obviously employ epistemic norms that we accept. Structural Contextualism In the last two decades, work in analytic epistemology has been dominated by structural issues relating to justification and knowledge. What is called contextualism is often taken to be a thesis about the structure of justification intended as one response to the infamous regress of justification problem. That problem gets generated when we notice that some of the propositions that we (presumably) justifiedly believe owe their justification to other beliefs that we accept-such beliefs forming an epistemic chain. But unless these further, justifying beliefs in the chain are themselves justified we only seem to have what we might call conditional justification: the original link in the chain is justified if the further links are justified. But then how are we to understand the nature of unconditional justification? The two standard options in response to this question are these: 1) epistemic foundationalism: the regress stops with beliefs that are somehow noninferentially justified in the sense of not owing their justification to being inferred from, or otherwise grounded on, other beliefs; 2) epistemic coherentism: there are no regress stoppers, rather justification is a matter of the interconnectedness of a finite set of beliefs. Contextualism represents a third option: 3) epistemic contextualism: the regress ends with beliefs that are not in need of justification in a given context.' So what I'm calling structural contextualism may be informally characterized as follows: SC: Regresses of justification may legitimately terminate with beliefs, which, in the context in question, are not in need of justification. Call these latter beliefs, contextually basic beliefs.' This admittedly rough formulation at best only conveys the basic structural picture of justification the contextualist favors. For one thing talk about "context" is left unexplained, as is talk about beliefs not needing justification. I save
contextualism of Cohen and Sosa as equivalent to, or entailing, normative contextualism.7 A Contextualist Moral Epistemology 297 I should mention at this point that it is not my purpose to maintain some version of normative contextualism over and against nonrelativist epistemic views. As we shall visit in the section on justification and epistemic responsibility, it may be lawful in some context and for some purposes to measure the epistemic condition of an individual's beliefs proportional to the epistemic norms of that person's community. But there be contexts in which we intend to make nonrelativized, categorical epistemic evaluations, even if, in doing thus, we obviously employ epistemic norms that we accept. Structural Contextualism In the final two decades, work in analytic epistemology has been dominated by geomorphologic issues relating to justification and knowledge. What is called contextualism is often consume to be a thesis about the structure of justification intended as one response to the infamous regression of justification trouble. That trouble gets generated when we notice that some of the propositions that we (presumably) justifiedly believe owe their justification to other beliefs that we bear - such belief forming an epistemic chain. But unless these far, apologize beliefs in the chain are themselves justified we only seem to have what we might call conditional justification: the original liaison in the chain is justified if the further links are justified. But then how are we to understand the nature of unconditional justification? The two standard option in response to this question are these: 1) epistemic foundationalism: the regress stops with belief that are somehow noninferentially justified in the common sense of not owe their justification to being inferred from, or otherwise grounded on, other belief; 2) epistemic coherentism: there are no regress stoppers, preferably justification is a matter of the interconnectedness of a finite set of beliefs. Contextualism represent a third option: 3) epistemic contextualism: the regression ends with beliefs that are not in need of justification in a given context.' So what I'm call structural contextualism may be colloquially characterized as follows: security council: Regresses of justification may legitimately terminate with impression, which, in the context in question, are not in indigence of justification. Call these latter beliefs, contextually basic beliefs.' This admittedly rough formulation at best only conveys the basic geomorphologic picture of justification the contextualist favors. For one matter talk about " context " is left unexplained, as is talk about beliefs not needing justification. I save
 cojtextualism of Cohen and Sosa as equivalent to, or enfailing, vormative contextualism.7 A Coitexrualiwt Moral Epistemology 297 I should mention at uhis point that iv is not my infcntiou vo defend some yersion of tormative contaxguclism over and against nonrelativist epistekopogical views. Ws wt srall see in the section on justificatikn and tpistemic responsinility, it may be legitimatf in some contexts and for some podpofws to evaluage the epistemic statua of an individual's beliefs relxtive to the epusremlw norms of vhat pvrson's communlny. But dhere ate contexts in whmch qe intend to make noncelativized, categorisal epistamnc evaluations, even id, un dohng vo, wd obxiohsky emploj e'istemic nodms that we accept. Structural Vognrxtualism In the lwse two decades, work in analytic epistemonogg has been dominated by structural issues repating to justification and knowledge. What is called conteftualmso iw jwrej taken to be a thesis about the structure of nuxtpfication intendeb as one responsr ho jhe infamous rggress of nustification probpem. Thaj proboem gets denetated when we notice that sime of the pgopowitions that we (przsumably) juscifiedky bekieve owe their justifieation to other bfliefs thzg we accept-such celpefs forming an epistemic chaig. But unlxss tkese furgher, justisying beliffs ik the chain are thelselvgs jusdified we lnly seem to have what we might call conditioman jlstificatnon: thc original link in the chain ns justiyied iw the furtger linns are justyfied. But thet how are we vo underseand the nature uf unconditionsl justifpcction? The two standard optipns jn response to ckiw question are yhere: 1) eiisvemic xoundationalhsm: ghe tegrers stops wibh celirfs that are somehow nonjnferentially justofled in thg sense os not owing tneir justification to bxing iiferrec ftom, or otherwise grounded on, otger believs; 2) epistemic cjhercntifm: there axe no regress stoppers, rather justificatmon is a matter of the unterconnectedness pn a finite sxt of feliefs. Cmntextualism represebts a third optiok: 3) epistemic contextuamism: tve rehress ends with beliefs that are not in need of justification in a given xontexv.' Fo what I'm dallong snruetuxal coneextnauism may be infogmally characterized as follows: RC: Regrevszs of justification may legitomxtely terminaje with beliefs, which, in tge contect in question, are not in need pf justification. Call thcse lattee beljefs, conteetually basic beliefx.' This admirtedly eougm formulation xt nedt only clnvebs che basic structural picture of jystifixahion the contextnalist favord. For kne thyng talk about "ckntesh" is ueft unexplaimed, as is talk about beliefs not nvedyng justificatukn. I save
contextualism of Cohen and Sosa as equivalent entailing, contextualism.7 A Moral Epistemology 297 point it is not intention to defend version of normative contextualism over and nonrelativist epistemological views. As we shall see in the section on justification and responsibility, it may be legitimate in some contexts and for some purposes to the status an beliefs relative to the epistemic norms of that person's community. But there are contexts in which intend to make nonrelativized, categorical epistemic evaluations, even in doing so, we employ epistemic norms that we Structural In the two work analytic epistemology has dominated by structural issues relating to justification and knowledge. What is called contextualism is often taken to a thesis structure of intended one to the infamous justification problem. That problem gets generated that some of the propositions that we (presumably) believe owe justification to other beliefs that we beliefs forming an epistemic chain. But unless these justifying beliefs in the chain are themselves justified we only seem to have what we conditional justification: the original in the chain justified the links justified. But how are we to understand the nature of unconditional justification? The standard options in response to this question are these: 1) the stops with beliefs are somehow noninferentially justified the of not owing their being from, on, beliefs; epistemic coherentism: there are regress stoppers, rather justification is matter of the interconnectedness beliefs. Contextualism represents a third option: 3) epistemic the regress ends with beliefs that are in need of justification in a given context.' So what I'm calling contextualism may characterized as follows: SC: Regresses of justification may terminate with beliefs, which, the context in question, are not in need of Call latter beliefs, basic beliefs.' This rough formulation at only conveys the picture of the favors. talk about "context" is left unexplained, is about beliefs not needing justification. save
 contextualism of Cohen and SoSa as equivaLent tO, or EntAiLing, NormAtive contextuaLIsm.7 A contextualist Moral EpisTemolOgY 297 i shoULd MentiOn at thiS PoINT thAt It Is nOt MY iNtentIon To defenD some versiOn oF nOrmative contEXtUalism over And Against nonreLatIvist ePiSteMOlogiCal Views. as we shALl see iN the sectiOn ON justiFIcation AND ePistEmic responsibilitY, It MAy be legitimate In some CoNTeXTS anD foR some purpoSeS to evALuate thE EpISTEmiC Status of an indIvidual's belIEfs RelatiVe To tHE epistEmic nOrMS of That person's CommUnity. But tHere arE ContextS In which We inteNd tO maKe noNReLaTivIzED, caTEgOriCAl ePistemic EvAlUatioNs, evEN IF, In doIng So, we ObvioUsly employ epiSteMic nORms That wE accePt. StRuCturaL ConteXtualIsM In the last two deCadeS, work in anAlyTiC epIsTemolOGy has bEen DomInated bY structURal IsSUES rElating to justificaTiON AnD knowledGe. What IS cAlLEd contexTuAliSm is OFTen taKen tO Be A thesis aBout thE StRuCture of JuStificAtIon IntEnded AS one ResponSe to the iNfamoUS regress of justIFication problEM. THAT pRObleM geTs generated When WE notIce tHAt SomE Of the PropoSiTIoNS that we (presumably) juStIfiedlY beliEve owe their juStificatioN TO Other belIefs THaT We accept-such beLiefs Forming an ePIstemic cHain. BUt unless These furtHER, justifyIng BelIefS in THE cHain are themseLVEs juStIfied we OnlY seem to HavE whAt wE miGhT call condItional jUsTiFiCaTioN: the oRIginal liNk In tHe ChaIn is jUStifieD if thE furThEr LInkS are jusTIfIED. But ThEn How aRe wE tO undeRstaND thE nature Of uncondiTioNAl juStIfIcation? the two standarD oPtions in reSpOnsE to thiS QUestion aRe these: 1) epistemic foundatIOnalism: The RegreSs stOps with beLieFs that Are SOmehow NoninfErentIaLly JUStifiED In The SeNse of not owING thEir juStIficAtion to Being inferred from, oR OthErwise groundeD on, OtheR BElIefS; 2) EpISteMiC CohEREntism: there are nO regress stOpPErS, rather jusTIfiCaTion is a Matter oF the iNTerconnEctedness Of a finite SeT of bELIefS. ContextuaLism reprEsents a thIRd optIOn: 3) EpistEmiC conteXtUalIsm: thE regreSS enDs witH belieFs That arE not iN nEed of jusTification in a given conteXt.' So whAt I'm cAllIng structUraL ConTextualisM may Be informalLy cHarActerIzeD As folLows: sc: REgrESses oF jusTIfication MAy LegITImAtely terminATE WitH beliEfs, WHich, in The cOntext in question, aRE not in need of juStifICAtiOn. CALl thEsE latter beliefs, ConTeXTUally basIc Beliefs.' This AdmittedLy ROugh fOrmulaTion at Best onlY COnVEys the BasiC stRuctural pIctUrE Of justiFiCaTIon the ContExTualisT favorS. for oNE Thing talk about "coNtext" IS Left uNExpLaineD, aS is talk ABout Beliefs not Needing justIficatIon. I Save
 contextualism of Cohen an d Sosa asequiv ale ntto , or  ent ailing, normat i ve c ontextualism.7 A Conte xtual is t  Mor a lEpist emology 29 7 I s ho ul d m en t io n atthi s point  that it i s n ot  my intentio n  t o defend s ome  version ofnor mative  c ont e xtual ism  over  and a g ainstnonrelati vi s t epis t emologi c a lview s. As we shall se e  i n  the section o n just if i ca t i onand  epistemic  r espon s ibility ,  i t m ayb e legitimatein some con t ext s andfo r s o me pur poses  t o  ev aluate theepis temic sta tus of an indi v idual's  belie fsrel ativ e  t othe  e p ist e mi c n o rms  of that  p er son's  com m u n i ty.But  the re ar e contexts in  wh ichw e i ntend  to m akeno nrela tivize d, ca te gorical epistem ic e valuation s,ev enif , ind oing s o,weobvious ly empl o y e pi s t e mi c norms that we ac ce p t .Structur al Con t ex tu a lism Inth e l astt w o dec ades ,  w ork in a nalyti c  e pi stemolo gy  has b ee n d omi nated by s tructu ral issu es re l ating to justi f ication and k n ow l e dg e . Wh atis called c onte x tual ismi soft e n tak en to  b e  a thesis about the st ru ctureof ju stification i ntended as o n e respon se t o  t h e infamous reg ressof justifi c ation pr oblem . That p roblem ge t s  generat edwhe n w e n o t ic e that some o f thepr opositi ons  that w e ( pre sum abl y)  justifie dly beli ev eow ethe ir ju s tificati on  to  o the r bel i efs th at we  acc ep t- s uch  belief s  f o r ming  a nepis tem ic  chai n. B u t u nless t hese furt her ,  jus ti fy ing bel iefs in the c ha in are the ms elv es jus t i fied weonly seem to have whatw e might  ca ll co ndit ional jus tif icatio n:t he ori ginallinkin  th e chain i sjus ti fied if th e fur therli nksare jus tified. But then h o w a re we to unde rst andt h enat u re ofun c ond i t ional justifica tion? Thetw o  s tandard op t ion sin resp onse to  this questio n are the se: 1) ep is temi c fou ndationali sm: theregress s t ops w i th  beli efs  thatar e s omeho w noni n fer entia lly ju st ifiedin th esense of  not owing their justif icatio n tobei ng inferr edf rom , or othe rwis e grounded  on , o therbel i efs;2) e p is tem i c coh eren t ism: ther e  a ren o  r egress stop p e r s,rathe r j u stific atio n is a matter oft he interconnec tedn e s s o f a fini te  set of belief s.Co n t extualis mrepresentsa thirdop t ion:3) epi stemic  contex t u al i sm: th e re gre ss ends w ith  b e liefs t ha ta re not  inne ed ofjustif i cati o n  in a given cont ext.' S o wha t  I' m cal li ng stru c tura l contextu alism may b e info rmal ly ch aracter iz ed asfol lo ws: SC: Re g resses of  just ificati on  may  le gitima tely t ermin atewi thbeliefs,w h ic h ,in the  con textin  que stion, ar e  not innee d  of jus ti fic a t ion. C a ll t hese latte r b elief s ,  contextua l ly b a si c  beli efs.'This a dmitted l y r ou gh form ula t i on at bes t only co n vey sthebasic st ru ctur al  pi ct ure of justific ation th e contex t u alistfav o rs.F or one  t hing talk ab out " co n text" i s lef t unexp l ain ed,  as  istal k ab o ut beliefs not needing j usti ficat i on.  I sa ve
 contextualism_of Cohen_and Sosa as equivalent_to, or_entailing,_normative contextualism.7_A_Contextualist Moral Epistemology_297 I should_mention at this point_that it is_not_my intention to defend some version of normative contextualism over and against nonrelativist epistemological_views._As we_shall_see_in the section on justification_and epistemic responsibility, it may_be legitimate_in some contexts and for some purposes to_evaluate_the epistemic status_of an individual's beliefs relative to the epistemic norms_of that person's community. But there_are contexts in_which_we_intend to make nonrelativized,_categorical epistemic evaluations, even if, in_doing so, we obviously employ epistemic_norms that we accept. Structural Contextualism In_the last two decades, work in_analytic epistemology has been dominated_by structural_issues relating to justification and_knowledge. What is_called contextualism_is often taken_to be a thesis about the_structure of justification_intended as one response to the_infamous_regress of justification_problem._That_problem gets_generated when we_notice_that some_of_the propositions that we (presumably) justifiedly_believe_owe their justification to other beliefs that_we accept-such beliefs forming_an_epistemic chain. But unless_these further, justifying beliefs in_the chain are themselves justified we_only seem_to have_what we might call conditional justification: the original link in the_chain is justified if the further_links are justified. But_then how_are_we to understand_the_nature of_unconditional justification? The two standard options in_response to_this question are these: 1) epistemic_foundationalism: the regress stops_with_beliefs that are somehow noninferentially justified_in the sense of not owing_their justification to being inferred_from,_or_otherwise grounded on, other beliefs;_2) epistemic coherentism: there are no_regress stoppers, rather_justification is a matter of the interconnectedness_of_a finite set of beliefs. Contextualism_represents_a third option: 3) epistemic contextualism:_the_regress_ends with beliefs that are_not in need of justification in_a given context.' So what I'm calling structural contextualism_may be informally_characterized as follows: SC: Regresses_of_justification_may legitimately terminate with beliefs, which, in the context in_question, are_not in need_of justification. Call these latter beliefs, contextually basic beliefs.' This_admittedly rough formulation at best only conveys_the basic structural picture of justification the contextualist favors. For one_thing talk about "context" is left unexplained, as_is talk about beliefs not needing justification._I save