 concepts feature prominently in commonsense psychology, and because of that the revision of those concepts in accordance with neuroscience is often met with animosity. Kaposy (2010) argues that moral norms relying on free will, personhood, and rationality should not be revised in accordance with neuroscientific discovery because they play important moral and social roles. I argue that most concepts, including moral ones, are a web of changing beliefs shaped by various sources of information, including scientific discovery. As there is continuous, bidirectional influence between science and commonsense, the strength of our current commitments cannot be the basis for an argument against their revision in accordance with neuroscientific discovery. The philosophical literature has mostly settled on two ways in which concepts can be altered: They could be revised or reconceptualized. Revision of concepts could occur in the following way: Imagine we endorse a theory much like our current commonsense psychology that predicts and explains human behavior by utilizing concepts such as free will, personhood, and rationality.1 Imagine further that a different and new theory proposes to explain and predict human behavior by positing physical entities such as brain states, much like current neuroscience. If the two theories are compatible, the new theory could reduce the old theory (for more on this issue, see Churchland 1989, 48). The concepts of the old theory, here commonsense psychology, would remain. A successful reduction of commonsense psychology would vindicate the entities endorsed by that theory because it would provide additional proof that free will and rationality have a physical instantiation in the brain. Reduction of free will would not require the elimination of that concept. It would, however, entail some revision of the original conceptual framework. For example, reduction could make it true that free will is localized in the brain and is a physical process, so the concept would have to be revised to include that fact. Commonsense psychology and neuroscience, however, could be incompatible, which would preclude the reduction of one theory to the other. In that case we would have to opt for the elimination of one of the two dueling theories. Incompatibility between theories arises when they posit disparate ontologies. For example, if commonsense psychology is committed to the view that free will cannot be a physical process, or that free will cannot, by definition, be subject to the workings of a determinist natural law, then any theory that is physicalist or deterministic would be incompatible with commonsense. The incongruity between the two theories would further entail that one of them is false
concepts feature prominently in commonsense psychology, and because of that the revision of those concepts in accord with neuroscience is frequently met with animosity. Kaposy (2010) argues that moral norm trust on free will, personhood, and rationality should not be revised in accord with neuroscientific discovery because they act significant moral and social roles. I argue that most concepts, admit moral ones, are a web of change beliefs shaped by various sources of information, including scientific discovery. As there embody continuous, bidirectional influence between science and commonsense, the strength of our current commitments cannot be the footing for an argument against their revision in accord with neuroscientific discovery. The philosophical literature has by and large settled on two way in which concepts can be altered: They could be revised or reconceptualized. rewrite of concepts could occur in the following way: Imagine we endorse a theory a lot like our current commonsense psychology that predict and explains human behavior by utilizing concepts such as free will, personhood, and rationality.1 Imagine further that a different and fresh theory proposes to excuse and bode human behavior by positing physical entities such as mind states, much like current neuroscience. If the two theories are compatible, the new hypothesis could reduce the old theory (for more on this issue, see Churchland 1989, 48). The concepts of the old theory, here commonsense psychology, would remain. A successful reduction of commonsense psychology would vindicate the entities certify by that theory because it would supply additional proof that free will and rationality have a physical instantiation in the mind. Reduction of free will would not command the elimination of that concept. It would, however, entail some revision of the original conceptual framework. For example, decrease could make it true that free will is localized in the brain and is a forcible process, so the concept would have to be revised to admit that fact. Commonsense psychology and neuroscience, however, could be incompatible, which would preclude the decrease of one theory to the other. In that case we would have to opt for the elimination of one of the two duel theories. Incompatibility between theories arises when they submit disparate ontologies. For example, if commonsense psychology is committed to the view that free will cannot be a forcible process, or that free will cannot, by definition, be capable to the workings of a determinist natural police, then any theory that is physicalist or deterministic would be incompatible with commonsense. The incongruity between the two theories would far entail that one of them is false
 cojcepts feature prominentuy in commonsense psyciology, znd becajse of that the revision of vhosw conxepts in accordance wigh neurosbience is ofttn met with animosity. Kaposy (2010) adnues chet moral norms telying on fsee will, persothuob, and rationality should not be revifed in scfordance with geurpfciehninic discovery because they play jmportait moral and sovial roles. I argue that modt clncepts, including loral ones, qre w web of chaneing beliefs shaped by various sources of information, inclbding scienjndic giscovery. Aw thege is continuous, bidisectionsl influence bctweei scuence and commonsense, the strength of oor current ckmmitments cannot bw the bashs fue av adgnmeht agalnsv their revjsion in acxordance with neuroxcyvmtific discobery. Tre philosophical literature has mostly seutled on two ways in which cincepts can be alteref: They cotld be revised or reconceptualized. Revision of cotcepta cobod oczyr in the following way: Imagine we endorse a thqkru kuch like our gurrent commonsensr osushology that kredicts ahd explains human hehaviot by urilizing soncrpts such as free will, persinhood, and rctiinality.1 Imagine fuxther that a difgereny and new theory proposzs to sxplain and predict gjman behavior by poxiding physical entities sucr as braii staces, much likg curregt neurosclence. If the two theoried are cmmpatible, hhe new theory could reduce the old theory (fot mmre on this issuc, see Churchlanq 1989, 48). The concepjs of the old gheory, herv commonsxnse psycholjgy, would remdln. A successhul reduceion of xommonsdvse psychology would viubicate thw entities endorsev by fhat theory beccbst ut would provice xddytponel prjmf that free wilu avc ratkonality haye x phusical instantiation in fhe brain. Reductiom jf free qill woujd not requirr the elimination lf thet conrept. Iy wjuld, however, entail some revisjon of thf oviginal conce[tuao framework. Yor example, reduction could make it true that free will is localized in the btaik and is a piysicaj process, so the concept woule have to be revixed to include that fzct. Cokmonsfnse psychology and neuroscience, however, could be incompatible, which woule preclude the redhctipn of oue cheory eo tie other. In that csse we would have to opt for thx eliminathou of one of the two dueling tneuries. Incompajibility between theories zrises wnen they posit disparate ontolobies. For example, if commpnsense psychklogy pa rommitted to the viee that free will cqnnob be a physicau ptogess, or thwt fcee will cannot, by definition, be suvject ro the workings of a determinlsu naturzl law, then any theory thaf is pfysicalist or deterministic would be incompatibne with commonsebae. The inconbruiti between the txo theories fould further entail that one of them is false
concepts feature prominently in commonsense psychology, and that revision of concepts in accordance with Kaposy (2010) argues moral norms relying free will, personhood, and rationality should be revised in accordance with neuroscientific discovery because they play important moral and roles. I argue that most concepts, including moral ones, are a web of beliefs by sources information, including scientific discovery. As there is continuous, bidirectional influence between science and commonsense, the strength our current commitments cannot be the basis for argument against their revision accordance with neuroscientific discovery. The literature mostly settled two in concepts can be They could be revised or reconceptualized. Revision of concepts could occur in the following way: Imagine we a theory our current psychology predicts explains human behavior concepts such as free will, personhood, further that a different and new theory proposes explain and human behavior by positing physical entities as brain states, much like current neuroscience. If two theories are compatible, the new theory could reduce the old theory (for more on see Churchland 1989, 48). concepts of the theory, commonsense would A successful of commonsense psychology would vindicate the entities endorsed by that theory it would provide additional proof that free will and rationality physical in the brain. of free will would require elimination of that concept. however, some original framework. example, reduction could make true that free will is in the brain and the concept would have to be revised to that fact. Commonsense psychology and neuroscience, however, be incompatible, which would preclude the reduction of one theory to the In that would have to opt for the elimination of of the two dueling Incompatibility between theories arises when they posit disparate ontologies. example, commonsense psychology committed to the that free will be a physical that free cannot, definition, the workings of a determinist natural then theory that is physicalist or would with commonsense. The incongruity between the two theories would further entail that one of them
 concepts feature prominentlY in commonsEnse pSycHolOgY, and BecaUse of that the reVIsioN of those concepts in accoRdancE wITh neURoScienCe is oftEN mET WitH aNiMosItY. kaPosy (2010) aRguEs that mOral norms rElyInG on free will, pERsOnhood, and rAtiOnality shoulD noT be revIsEd iN AccorDanCe witH neuroSCientiFic discovErY BecausE They plaY IMpOrtaNt moral and social rOLeS. i argue that most ConcepTs, INcLUDinG moRal ones, are A wEb of cHAnging bELiEFS ShaPEd by various soUrces of infoRMatIon, incLuDinG ScientIfic dIsCOveRy. As there is ContInuous, bidIrectiONal inflUEnce betWeen scIenCe aNd coMMoNsEnsE, tHE stREnGth OF ouR current CoMmItmenTs caNNOT Be thE baSis fOr an aRgument againsT thEir rEVisIon in AccorDancE wIth neUrosciEntifIc Discovery. The phiLosoPhical litEraTuRe hAs MostlY SettleD on Two Ways in wHich conCEptS cAN BE aLtered: They could be rEvISEd Or reconcEptualIZeD. REVision of CoNcePts cOULd occUr in THe FollowinG way: ImAGiNe We endorSe A theorY mUch LikE our cURrenT commoNsense psYcholOGy that predicts ANd explains humAN bEHAvIOr by UtiLizing concePts sUCh as Free WIlL, peRSonhoOd, and RaTIoNAlity.1 Imagine further ThAt a difFerenT and new theory Proposes to EXPLain and pRediCT hUMan behavior by pOsitiNg physical ENtities sUch as Brain staTes, much liKE Current nEurOscIenCe. IF THe Two theories arE COmpaTiBle, the nEw tHeory coUld RedUce The OlD theory (foR more on tHiS iSsUe, See churcHLand 1989, 48). The cOnCepTs Of tHe old THeory, hEre coMmonSeNsE PsyChology, WOuLD RemaIn. a sUcceSsfUl ReducTion OF coMmonsenSe psycholOgy WOuld ViNdIcate thE entities endoRsEd by that thEoRy bEcause IT Would proVide additional proof that FRee will And RatioNaliTy have a phYsiCal insTanTIation In the bRain. REdUctION of frEE WiLl wOuLd not requiRE The ElimiNaTion Of that cOncept. It would, howevER, enTail some revisIon Of thE ORiGinAL cONcePtUAl fRAMework. For examplE, reduction CoULd Make it true THat FrEe will iS localiZed in THe brain And is a phySical procEsS, so tHE ConCept would hAve to be rEvised to iNClude THaT fact. comMonsenSe PsyCholoGy and nEUroScienCe, howeVeR, could Be incOmPatible, wHich would preclude the redUction Of one TheOry to the oTheR. in tHat case we WoulD have to opt For The ElimiNatIOn of oNe of THe Two DUelinG theORies. IncomPAtIbiLITy Between theoRIES arIses wHen THey posIt diSparate ontologies. fOr example, if comMonsENSe pSycHOlogY iS committed to thE viEw THAt free wiLl Cannot be a phYsical prOcESs, or tHat freE will cAnnot, by DEFiNItion, bE subJecT to the worKinGs OF a deterMiNiST naturAl laW, tHen any Theory THat iS PHysicalist or deteRminiSTIc wouLD be IncomPaTible wiTH comMonsense. ThE incongruitY betweEn thE two tHeories WoUld furTheR eNtail that oNE of them is False
 concepts feature prominen tly in com monse nse  ps yc holo gy,and because of that  the revision of those  conc ep t s in ac corda nce wit h  n e u ros ci en ceis of ten m etwith an imosity. K apo sy  (2010) argu e sthat moral  no rms relyingonfree w il l,p erson hoo d, an d rati o nality  should n ot be rev i sed ina c co rdan ce with neuroscie n ti f ic discovery b ecause  t h ey p lay  im portant mo ra l and socialr ol e s .  Ia rgue that mos t concepts, inc luding  m ora l  ones,  areaw ebof changing  bel iefs shap ed byv ariouss ourcesof inf orm ati on,i nc lu din gs cie n ti fic dis covery.As  t hereis c o n t i nuou s,bidi recti onal influenc e b etwe e n s cienc e and  com mo nsens e, the  stre ng th of our curre nt c ommitment s c an not  b e the basisfor  an  argume nt agai n stth e i r  r evision in accorda nc e wi th neuro scient i fi cd iscovery .The  phi l o sophi call it eraturehas mo s tl ysettled  o n twowa ysinwhich conc epts c an be al tered :  They could be revised or re c on c e pt u aliz ed.  Revision o f co n cept s co u ld  oc c ur in  thefo l lo w ing way: Imagine we  e ndorse  a th eory much lik e our curr e n t  commons ense ps y chology that p redic ts and exp l ains hum an be havior b y utilizi n g  concept s s uch  as  fr e e  w ill, personho o d , an drationa lit y.1 Ima gin e f urt her  t hat a dif ferent a nd  n ew  t heo ry pr o poses to  e xpl ai n a nd pr e dict h umanbeha vi or bypositin g  p h y sica len titi essu ch as  bra i n s tates,much like  cu r rent  n eu roscien ce. If the tw otheories a re  co mpatib l e , the ne w theory could reduce t h e old t heo ry (f or m ore on th isissue,  se e  Churc hland1989,  4 8). T he co n c ep tsof  the old t h e ory , her ecomm onsense  psychology, would rem ain. A succes sfu l re d u ct ion of com mo n sen s e  psychology wou ld vindica te th e entities end or sed bythat th eoryb ecauseit wouldprovide a dd itio n a l p roof thatfree wil l and rat i onali t yhavea p hysica lins tanti ationi n t he br ain. R ed uction  of f re e will w ould not require the el iminat ion o f t hat conce pt. Itwould, ho weve r, entailsom e r evisi ono f the  ori g in alc oncep tual framework .  F ore x am ple, reduct i o n  co uld m ake it tru e th at free will is l o calized in the  bra i n  an d i s  a p hy sical process,  so  t h e  concept  w ould have t o be rev is e d toinclud e that  fact.C o mm o nsense  psy cho logy andneu ro s cience,  h ow e ver, c ould  b e inco mpatib l e, w h i ch would preclud e the r educt i onof on etheoryt o th e other. I n that case  we wo uldhaveto optfo r theeli mi nation ofo ne of the  twodueling  t heor ies . Inco mpat i b ility  bet we entheoriesa r is e swh e n t heyposit  d ispa rate onto l ogies. F ore xample,  i f c o m monsen s ep s ychology i s c ommit t e d to the v i ew t h at freewill c annotbe a ph y sic al  proces s,o r  that fre e will ca n not ,by d efinitio n,  besu bje ct  to the working s of a d etermini s t  natur all aw,t hen an ytheory thatis ph ys i calisto r  de termini s tic  wo uld  beinc ompa t ible with commonsense. T he i ncong r uit y bet weenth e two th e orie s wouldf urther entail  that one of th e m i s  fal se
 concepts_feature prominently_in commonsense psychology, and_because of_that_the revision_of_those concepts in_accordance with neuroscience_is often met with_animosity. Kaposy (2010)_argues_that moral norms relying on free will, personhood, and rationality should not be revised_in_accordance with_neuroscientific_discovery_because they play important moral_and social roles. I argue_that most_concepts, including moral ones, are a web of_changing_beliefs shaped by_various sources of information, including scientific discovery. As there_is continuous, bidirectional influence between science_and commonsense, the_strength_of_our current commitments cannot_be the basis for an argument_against their revision in accordance with_neuroscientific discovery. The philosophical literature has mostly_settled on two ways in which_concepts can be altered: They_could be_revised or reconceptualized. Revision of_concepts could occur_in the_following way: Imagine_we endorse a theory much like_our current commonsense_psychology that predicts and explains human_behavior_by utilizing concepts_such_as_free will,_personhood, and rationality.1_Imagine_further that_a_different and new theory proposes to_explain_and predict human behavior by positing physical_entities such as brain_states,_much like current neuroscience._If the two theories are_compatible, the new theory could reduce_the old_theory (for_more on this issue, see Churchland 1989, 48). The concepts of_the old theory, here commonsense psychology,_would remain. A successful_reduction of_commonsense_psychology would vindicate_the_entities endorsed_by that theory because it would provide_additional proof_that free will and rationality have_a physical instantiation in_the_brain. Reduction of free will would_not require the elimination of that_concept. It would, however, entail_some_revision_of the original conceptual framework._For example, reduction could make it_true that free_will is localized in the brain and_is_a physical process, so the concept_would_have to be revised to include_that_fact._Commonsense psychology and neuroscience, however,_could be incompatible, which would preclude_the reduction of one theory to the other. In_that case we_would have to opt for_the_elimination_of one of the two dueling theories. Incompatibility between theories_arises when_they posit disparate_ontologies. For example, if commonsense psychology is committed to the_view that free will cannot be a_physical process, or that free will cannot, by definition, be subject_to the workings of a determinist natural law,_then any theory that is physicalist or_deterministic would be incompatible_with_commonsense. The incongruity between the two theories_would_further_entail_that one of_them is false