 if Finlay's account is correct, then we are barred from saying this: for, since pressing A doesn't promote the satisfaction of Debbie's desire, there's no 7 Behrends and DiPaolo (2011, p. 2). In order for this counterexample to work, the counterfactual statement at the end of the example must be understood as implying that Debbie's probability of pushing B given that she doesn't push A is 1. 8 Let S​D​ be the proposition that Debbie's desire is satisfied, and let P​A​ and P​B​ be the propositions that Debbie presses A and B respectively. Now, it is theorem of the probability calculus that pr(S​D​|¬​P​A​) = pr(S​D​|​P​B​) pr(P​B​|¬​P​A​) + pr(S​D​|¬​P​B​) pr(​¬​P​B​|¬​P​A​)​. In Buttons, it is meant to be stipulated that pr(P​B​|¬​P​A​) = 1 (see the previous footnote), and thus that pr(​¬​P​B​|¬​P​A​) = 0. It follows from the theorem that pr(S​D​|¬​P​A​) = pr(S​D​|​P​B​). 4 (promotive, instrumental) reason for Debbie to press A. It might seem as if this counterexample depends on Finlay's idiosyncratic view of what the ​baseline is. There's something right about this suspicion. As we mentioned above, the details of the counterexamples to purely probabilistic accounts of promotion do depend on the particular purely probabilistic account of promotion being targeted: such counterexamples exploit the purely probabilistic nature of those accounts ​together with the particular account's view of what the baseline is. For instance, returning to Schroeder's account of the baseline (viz., the agent's ​doing nothing​), we can generate a counterexample by imagining a case where the agent's desire will be satisfied ​iff she in fact ​does nothing​. In such a case, Schroeder's view will deliver the counterintuitive result that the agent's doing nothing does ​not promote her desire (despite guaranteeing it will be
if Finlay's account is correct, then we are barred from saying this: for, since weigh A doesn't advertise the satisfaction of Debbie's desire, there's no 7 Behrends and DiPaolo (2011, p. 2). In order for this counterexample to make, the counterfactual affirmation at the end of the example must be understand as incriminate that Debbie's probability of pushing bacillus given that she doesn't push A is 1. 8 lease S​D​ be the proposition that Debbie's desire is satisfied, and lease P​A​ and P​B​ be the propositions that Debbie presses A and B respectively. Now, it is theorem of the probability calculus that pr(S​D​|¬​P​A​) = pr(S​D​|​P​B​) pr(P​B​|¬​P​A​) + pr(S​D​|¬​P​B​) pr(​¬​P​B​|¬​P​A​)​. In button, it is meant to be stipulated that pr(P​B​|¬​P​A​) = 1 (see the former footnote), and thus that pr(​¬​P​B​|¬​P​A​) = 0. It follows from the theorem that pr(S​D​|¬​P​A​) = pr(S​D​|​P​B​). 4 (promotive, implemental) reason for Debbie to weight-lift A. It might seem as if this counterexample count on Finlay's idiosyncratic view of what the ​baseline is. There's something right about this suspicion. As we mention above, the details of the counterexamples to purely probabilistic accounts of promotion do depend on the particular purely probabilistic account of promotion being targeted: such counterexamples exploit the purely probabilistic nature of those accounts ​together with the particular account's position of what the baseline is. For instance, retort to Schroeder's explanation of the baseline (viz. , the agent's ​doing nothing​), we can generate a counterexample by imagine a case where the agent's desire will be satisfied ​iff she in fact ​does nothing​. In such a case, Schroeder's horizon will deliver the counterintuitive result that the agent's doing nothing does ​not advertise her desire (despite guaranteeing it will be
 if Finlay's account is corrtct, then we are bcered fcom sayjng this: for, since pressing A doesn't peomott the satisfaction uf Debbie'd desire, thece's no 7 Behrends and DiPaolo (2011, l. 2). In irder for this counterexdmple to work, dhd eounterfactual statement at the end jf the rxwmple must be onderxeood as implying that Debbie's probabiljty of kushing B given thst she doesn't push A is 1. 8 Pet D​D​ be the propositlon that Devbie'f desire is sxtisfied, and let P​A​ ans P​B​ be the propositions that Ddbbie presses A abd H respectiveoy. Nor, it is theovvm of tve probsbility calculms thet pe(S​D​|¬​P​A​) = pr(S​D​|​P​B​) pr(P​B​|¬​P​A​) + pr(S​D​|¬​P​B​) pr(​¬​P​B​|¬​P​A​)​. In Futtons, id ns meant to be stipulqtwd thdt ps(P​B​|¬​P​X​) = 1 (ree tie lrevioks hootnote), ans thus that pr(​¬​P​B​|¬​P​A​) = 0. It followx sgpm the theorsm thae [r(S​D​|¬​P​A​) = pr(S​D​|​P​B​). 4 (promotive, instrumental) geaskn for Debbie to press Q. It might seem as if this cougterexample depends on Finlay's idiosyncratic view of wiag tkc ​cqsfline is. There's something right about this suflivipn. As we mentijned above, yhf cgtails of the zountexsxzmples to purely pgobabilystic accounts of lromotion do depend on the particular plrelt probabilistic aceount of proootipn beong targeted: such countzrexamlles exploih the pursuy probabilistic nanure of thost accounts ​togethew with thx parcicular xccoont's viqw of what the ndseline is. For inshance, raturning tl Schroeder's account of the basxkine (viz., the acenn's ​doing uothinn​), we can generaee a counterexcmple by imagkning a caae wherx the agent's desire will tg satisfied ​ihf she in facr ​dows nothkvg​. In such a csse, Schrovdtr's view wull deliver the comnterkhtuitive result thqt the agent's dpine njtjiig doqv ​not promota hef ddxire (aespite guavangeeimg it will be
if Finlay's account is correct, then we from this: for, pressing A doesn't desire, no 7 Behrends DiPaolo (2011, p. In order for this counterexample to the counterfactual statement at the end of the example must be understood as that Debbie's probability of pushing B given that she doesn't push A is 8 S​D​ the that Debbie's desire is satisfied, and let P​A​ and P​B​ be the propositions that Debbie presses and B respectively. Now, it is theorem of probability calculus that pr(S​D​|¬​P​A​) pr(S​D​|​P​B​) pr(P​B​|¬​P​A​) + pr(S​D​|¬​P​B​) pr(​¬​P​B​|¬​P​A​)​. Buttons, is meant be that = 1 (see previous footnote), and thus that pr(​¬​P​B​|¬​P​A​) = 0. It follows from the theorem that pr(S​D​|¬​P​A​) = pr(S​D​|​P​B​). (promotive, instrumental) Debbie to A. might as if this on Finlay's idiosyncratic view of what There's something right about this suspicion. As we above, the of the counterexamples to purely probabilistic of promotion do depend on the particular purely account of promotion being targeted: such counterexamples exploit the purely probabilistic nature of those accounts the particular account's view what the baseline For returning Schroeder's of the (viz., the agent's ​doing nothing​), we can generate a counterexample by a case where the agent's desire will be satisfied ​iff fact nothing​. In such case, Schroeder's view will the result that the agent's does promote guaranteeing will
 if Finlay's account is correct, Then we are bArred FroM saYiNg thIs: foR, since pressing a DoesN't promote the satisfactiOn of DEbBIe's dESiRe, theRe's no 7 BeHReNDS anD DIPAolO (2011, p. 2). iN oRder fOr tHis counTerexample To wOrK, the counterfACtUal statemeNt aT the end of the ExaMple muSt Be uNDerstOod As impLying tHAt DebbIe's probabIlITy of puSHing B giVEN tHat sHe doesn't push A is 1. 8 LeT s​D​ BE the propositioN that DEbBIe'S DEsiRe iS satisfied, AnD let P​a​ And P​B​ be THe PROPosITions that DebbIe presses A aND B rEspectIvEly. nOw, it is TheorEm OF thE probabilitY calCulus that Pr(S​D​|¬​P​A​) = PR(S​D​|​P​B​) pr(p​b​|¬​P​A​) + pr(S​D​|¬​p​B​) pr(​¬​P​B​|¬​p​A​)​. IN BuTtonS, It Is MeaNt TO be STiPulATed That pr(P​B​|¬​p​A​) = 1 (SeE the pReviOUS FOotnOte), And tHus thAt pr(​¬​P​B​|¬​P​A​) = 0. It folLowS froM The TheorEm thaT pr(S​d​|¬​P​a​) = pr(S​D​|​p​B​). 4 (promOtive, InStrumental) reasoN for debbie to pResS A. it mIgHt seeM As if thIs cOunTerexamPle depeNDs oN FINLAy'S idiosyncratic view Of WHAt The ​baselIne is. THErE's SOmething RiGht AbouT THis suSpicIOn. as we mentIoned aBOvE, tHe detaiLs Of the cOuNteRexAmpleS To puRely prObabilisTic acCOunts of promotiON do depend on thE PaRTIcULar pUreLy probabiliStic ACcouNt of PRoMotIOn beiNg tarGeTEd: SUch counterexamples eXpLoit thE pureLy probabilistIc nature of THOSe accounTs ​toGEtHEr with the partiCular Account's viEW of what tHe basEline is. FOr instancE, REturning To SChrOedEr's ACCoUnt of the baselINE (viz., ThE agent's ​DoiNg nothiNg​), wE caN geNerAtE a counterExample bY iMaGiNiNg a Case wHEre the agEnT's dEsIre Will bE SatisfIed ​ifF she In FaCT ​doEs nothiNG​. IN SUch a CaSe, schrOedEr'S view Will DEliVer the cOunterintUitIVe reSuLt That the Agent's doing noThIng does ​not PrOmoTe her dESIre (despiTe guaranteeing it will be
 if Finlay's account is co rrect, the n weare  ba rr ed f romsaying this: f o r, s ince pressing A doesn' t pro mo t e th e  s atisf actiono fD e bbi e' sdes ir e ,there 'sno 7 Be hrends and  Di Pa olo (2011, p .  2 ). In orde r f or this coun ter exampl etow ork,the  coun terfac t ual st atement a tt he end of thee x am plemust be understoo d  a s  implying that  Debbi e' s  p r o bab ili ty of push in g B g i ven tha t  s h e doe s n't push A is  1. 8 Let S ​ D​be the  p rop o sition  that  D e bbi e's desireis s atisfied,  and l e t P​A​a nd P​B​  be th e p rop osit i on stha tD ebb i epre s ses  A and B  r es pecti vely . N o w, i t i s th eorem  of the proba bil ityc alc ulusthatpr(S ​D ​|¬​P ​A​) =  pr(S ​D ​|​P​B​) pr(P​B ​|¬​ P​A​) + p r(S ​D ​|¬ ​P ​B​)p r(​¬​P ​B​ |¬​ P​A​)​.  In But t ons ,i t is  meant to be stipu la t e dthat pr( P​B​|¬ ​ P​ A​ )  = 1 (se ethe  pre v i ous f ootn o te ), and t hus th a tpr (​¬​P​B ​| ¬​P​A​ )= 0 . I t fol l owsfrom t he theor em th a t pr(S​D​|¬​P​ A ​) = pr(S​D​| ​ P​ B ​ ). 4 (p rom otive, inst rume n tal)  rea s on  fo r  Debb ie to  p r es s  A. It might seem a sif thi s cou nterexample d epends onF i n lay's id iosy n cr a tic view of wh at th e ​baselin e  is. The re'ssomethin g right a b o ut thissus pic ion . A s we  mentioned ab o v e, t he  detail s o f the c oun ter exa mpl es  to purel y probab il is ti cacc ounts of promo ti ondo  de pendo n theparti cula rpu r ely  probab i li s t ic a cc ou nt o f p ro motio n be i ngtargete d: such c oun t erex am pl es expl oit the purel yprobabilis ti c n atureo f  those a ccounts ​together witht he part icu lar a ccou nt's view  of  whatthe baseli ne is.  Forin sta n c e, re t u rn ing  t o Schroede r ' s a ccoun tof t he base line (viz., the ag e nt' s ​doing noth ing ​),w e  c ang en e rat ea  co u n terexample by i magining a  c a se  where the age nt 's desi re will  be s a tisfied  ​iff she  in fact​d oesn o thi ng​. In su ch a cas e, Schroe d er'sv ie w wil l d eliver  t hecount erintu i tiv e res ult th at  the a gent' sdoing no thing does ​not promote  her d esire  (d espite gu ara n tee ing it wi ll b e
 if_Finlay's account_is correct, then we_are barred_from_saying this:_for,_since pressing A_doesn't promote the_satisfaction of Debbie's desire,_there's no 7_Behrends_and DiPaolo (2011, p. 2). In order for this counterexample to work, the counterfactual_statement_at the_end_of_the example must be understood_as implying that Debbie's probability_of pushing_B given that she doesn't push A is_1._8 Let S​D​_be the proposition that Debbie's desire is satisfied, and_let P​A​ and P​B​ be the_propositions that Debbie_presses_A_and B respectively. Now,_it is theorem of the probability_calculus that pr(S​D​|¬​P​A​) = pr(S​D​|​P​B​) pr(P​B​|¬​P​A​)_+ pr(S​D​|¬​P​B​) pr(​¬​P​B​|¬​P​A​)​. In Buttons, it is_meant to be stipulated that pr(P​B​|¬​P​A​)_= 1 (see the previous_footnote), and_thus that pr(​¬​P​B​|¬​P​A​) = 0._It follows from_the theorem_that pr(S​D​|¬​P​A​) =_pr(S​D​|​P​B​). 4 (promotive, instrumental) reason for_Debbie to press_A. It might seem as if_this_counterexample depends on_Finlay's_idiosyncratic_view of_what the ​baseline_is._There's something_right_about this suspicion. As we mentioned_above,_the details of the counterexamples to purely_probabilistic accounts of promotion_do_depend on the particular_purely probabilistic account of promotion_being targeted: such counterexamples exploit the_purely probabilistic_nature of_those accounts ​together with the particular account's view of what the_baseline is. For instance, returning to_Schroeder's account of the_baseline (viz.,_the_agent's ​doing nothing​),_we_can generate_a counterexample by imagining a case where_the agent's_desire will be satisfied ​iff she_in fact ​does nothing​._In_such a case, Schroeder's view will_deliver the counterintuitive result that the_agent's doing nothing does ​not_promote_her_desire (despite guaranteeing it will_be