). Adam Smith Smith declares, in book 7 of his Theory of Moral Sentiments, that there are two 'useful' parts of moral philosophy, namely ethics and jurisprudence (Smith 1759: 340). The latter 'investigates the general principles which ought be the foundation of the laws of all nations' (Smith 1978: 397). Both disciplines should follow a third way between Stoic or Platonic rationalism and Mandevillian relativism (Forbes 1982). Smith's third way entrusts moral standards to the impartial spectator, the source of an open-ended standard that may only be applied to the raw materials represented by historical laws and customs. It is this character that makes room for psychological, sociological and economic reconstructions. The philosopher needs causal explanations of facts in order to appraise the propriety of sympathetic responses in different situations (Haakonnsen 1982: 206–7). The methodological background is anti-Cartesian, ruling out topdown approaches and making room for auxiliary disciplines that are, in turn, not so much deductive Cartesian sciences as conjectural reconstructions of social processes. These take place mainly as unintended results of actions that obey laws independent of the essential qualities of the entities at stake but'superimposed' on them. This reflects, in the social world, the'metaphysics' of modern natural science, with its refusal of Aristotelian essences. Smith wanted to develop a science of man and society and within this an economic science – some kind of systematic reconstruction of economic systems, more comprehensive than cameralist or mercantilist piecemeal theorizing and more empirical than physiocratic natural order. This yielded a division into two parts – a'mitosis' – of the traditional notion of natural law, making room for two different fields: a normative discourse based on judgments formulated by the impartial spectator and a descriptive reconstruction of social phenomena discovering some kind of order in social phenomena. Thus, political economy is understood as value-free science but in a peculiar sense. Causal explanation is a preliminary step for any value judgment since, in order to account for and eventually criticize the judgments of real spectators, the philosopher needs to first reconstruct cause-effect relationships. He needs to show, for example, that the manual labourer is the one who nourishes the whole society in order to make it obvious that the one who maintains the whole society should be well nourished and well fed, or show that gold and silver are not the essence of a nation's wealth in
). Adam Smith Smith declares, in book 7 of his Theory of Moral Sentiments, that there are two' utilitarian' part of moral philosophy, namely ethics and law (Smith 1759: 340). The latter' investigates the cosmopolitan principles which ought be the foundation of the law of all nation' (Smith 1978: 397). Both disciplines should keep up a third way between Stoic or Platonic rationalism and Mandevillian relativism (Forbes 1982). Smith's third way entrusts moral standard to the impartial spectator, the generator of an open - ended standard that may only be applied to the raw material represented by historical laws and custom. It is this character that makes room for psychological, sociological and economic reconstructions. The philosopher necessitate causal explanations of facts in order to appraise the propriety of sympathetic response in different situations (Haakonnsen 1982: 206–7). The methodological background is anti - Cartesian, ruling out topdown approaches and making room for auxiliary disciplines that are, in turn, not so much deductive Cartesian sciences as conjectural reconstructions of social processes. These take place mainly as unintended consequence of actions that obey laws autonomous of the all-important quality of the entities at stake but'superimposed' on them. This reflects, in the social world, the'metaphysics' of modern natural science, with its refusal of Aristotelian effect. Smith wanted to develop a science of man and society and within this an economic science – some kind of taxonomic reconstruction of economic systems, more comprehensive than cameralist or mercantilist piecemeal theorizing and more empirical than physiocratic natural order. This yielded a part into two parts – a'mitosis' – of the traditional notion of natural law, making room for two unlike fields: a normative discourse based on judgments formulated by the impartial spectator and a descriptive reconstruction of social phenomena discover some kind of order in social phenomenon. Thus, political economy is understood as value - complimentary science but in a curious sense. Causal explanation is a preliminary tone for any value judgment since, in decree to account for and eventually knock the judgments of real spectators, the philosopher needs to first reconstruct cause - effect relationships. He needs to show, for example, that the manual laborer is the one who nourishes the whole club in order to make it obvious that the one who maintains the whole society should be well nourished and well fed, or show that gold and silver medal are not the essence of a nation's wealth in
). Adwm Smith Smith declares, ln book 7 of his Jhwory oh Moral Sentimevts, that there are two 'usefup' parts of moral philosophy, nxmely ethpcs and jyriskrudence (Smith 1759: 340). Vge lattcx 'invsdtigctxs the general krinciples wvich ought be dhd youndation of the laws of all nationf' (Smith 1978: 397). Both discipliges xrouls follow a third way between Stoic or Plauonic rationalism snd Mandevillian relativisl (Fogbes 1982). Smith's third way entrusja mjeal standardr to the impartial spedtator, the source of an open-enddd stcndard that mqy ltly be applmed to the raw matcgials rapresenyed by historigal lews qnd customs. It is thiv character that mwkes room fkr psychological, woxiolocican ana ecunojir rsconstgucvions. The pgilosopher beeds causal explanstyins of facts jn ordqr to appraise the propriety of sympathetpc rssponses in different sutuations (Haakonnsen 1982: 206–7). The metrodological background is anti-Cartesian, ruling oud topvodn ciiroazyed and making room for auxiliary disciplines trzt age, in turn, not so much deducyige Sartesian scignces as cknjectural reconstguctionf of wocial prjcesxes. These take place mainly as unintendvd rwsults of actions chat obey lacs indgpendemt of the essential quauitiss of the ejtities af stake but'superiopoxeg' on them. This reflects, in the sociel woxld, the'mdtapnysics' of modern natuvdl science, with itd refosal ox Aristotepian essences. Smith wanted to dxtelop a scienve of man and socicty and within ehis an economnc scienee – sooe kind of systemetic reconstwuction of ecmjomic systemv, more cjmprwhenwive thxv cameralist ot mercantplnst pieceneal theorizing anv mote empirical than phiwiocratic natutal orqeg. Tiis yyalded a divivion ingp two parts – a'mibosks' – pf the traditional nmtioh of natural law, msklng room dor two qifferent fiekds: a normative didcourve uased pn tudgments formulated by the imlartial soecbator and a dqscrlptide reconstxuction of social phenomena discovering wome kind of ordet in social phenomena. Uhus, politicak ecogomy is utderstood as value-frwe science but in a peculiar sense. Cauaal ex[lanahion is a preliminary step for any value judgment since, in order to accoubt for and eventuamly vritibizz tke judgientd of real spectatprs, the philosopher needs to ficst reconsdrbct cause-effect relationships. Hd needs to shuw, for example, that the janual lsbourer is the one who nourishex the whole society in ovder to mqke if obvious vhat the one who maimtains the qhole sicieby should be wdll nlurished wnd xelm fed, or show that gold and silvwr are nlt the essence oh a nation's atalth ih
). Adam Smith Smith declares, in book his of Moral that there are philosophy, ethics and jurisprudence 1759: 340). The 'investigates the general principles which ought the foundation of the laws of all nations' (Smith 1978: 397). Both disciplines follow a third way between Stoic or Platonic rationalism and Mandevillian relativism (Forbes Smith's way moral to the impartial spectator, the source of an open-ended standard that may only be applied to raw materials represented by historical laws and customs. is this character that room for psychological, sociological and reconstructions. philosopher needs explanations facts order to appraise propriety of sympathetic responses in different situations (Haakonnsen 1982: 206–7). The methodological background is anti-Cartesian, ruling out approaches and for auxiliary that in not so much sciences as conjectural reconstructions of social place mainly as unintended results of actions that laws independent the essential qualities of the entities stake but'superimposed' on them. This reflects, in the world, the'metaphysics' of modern natural science, with its refusal of Aristotelian essences. Smith wanted to science of man and and within this economic – kind systematic reconstruction economic systems, more comprehensive than cameralist or mercantilist piecemeal theorizing and empirical than physiocratic natural order. This yielded a division into – – of the notion of natural law, room two different fields: a based judgments impartial and descriptive reconstruction of social discovering some kind of order social phenomena. Thus, political science but in a peculiar sense. Causal explanation a preliminary step for any value judgment in order to account for and eventually criticize the judgments of real the philosopher first reconstruct cause-effect relationships. He needs to show, example, that the manual is the one who nourishes the whole society in to it obvious the one who the whole society be well nourished fed, or that and the essence of a nation's wealth
). Adam Smith Smith declares, in bOok 7 of his ThEory oF MoRal seNtimEnts, That there are twO 'UsefUl' parts of moral philosopHy, namElY EthiCS aNd jurIsprudeNCe (sMIth 1759: 340). thE lAttEr 'INvEstigAteS the genEral princiPleS wHich ought be tHE fOundation oF thE laws of all naTioNs' (SmitH 1978: 397). BOth DIscipLinEs shoUld folLOw a thiRd way betwEeN stoic oR platoniC RAtIonaLism and MandevilliAN rELativism (Forbes 1982). smith's ThIRd WAY enTruSts moral stAnDards TO the impARtIAL SpeCTator, the sourcE of an open-enDEd sTandarD tHat MAy only Be appLiED to The raw materIals RepresentEd by hiSTorical LAws and cUstoms. it iS thIs chARaCtEr tHaT MakES rOom FOr pSychologIcAl, SocioLogiCAL ANd ecOnoMic rEconsTructions. The pHilOsopHEr nEeds cAusal ExplAnAtionS of facTs in oRdEr to appraise the PropRiety of syMpaThEtiC rEsponSEs in diFfeRenT situatIons (HaaKOnnSeN 1982: 206–7). tHE mEthodological backgRoUND iS anti-CarTesian, RUlInG Out topdoWn AppRoacHES and mAkinG RoOm for auxIliary DIsCiPlines tHaT are, in TuRn, nOt sO much DEducTive CaRtesian sCiencES as conjectural REconstructionS Of SOCiAL proCesSes. These takE plaCE maiNly aS UnIntENded rEsultS oF AcTIons that obey laws indEpEndent Of the Essential qualIties of the ENTIties at sTake BUt'SUperimposed' on tHem. ThIs reflects, IN the sociAl worLd, the'metAphysics' oF MOdern natUraL scIenCe, wITH iTs refusal of ArISToteLiAn essenCes. smith waNteD to DevEloP a Science of Man and soCiEtY aNd WitHin thIS an econoMiC scIeNce – Some kINd of syStemaTic rEcOnSTruCtion of ECoNOMic sYsTeMs, moRe cOmPreheNsivE ThaN cameraList or merCanTIlisT pIeCemeal tHeorizing and mOrE empirical ThAn pHysiocRATic naturAl order. This yielded a diviSIon into Two Parts – A'mitOsis' – of the TraDitionAl nOTion of NaturaL law, mAkIng ROOm for TWO dIffErEnt fields: a NORmaTive dIsCourSe based On judgments formulaTEd bY the impartial SpeCtatOR AnD a dEScRIptIvE RecONStruction of sociAl phenomenA dIScOvering somE KinD oF order iN social PhenoMEna. Thus, Political Economy is UnDersTOOd aS value-free Science bUt in a pecuLIar seNSe. causaL exPlanatIoN is A prelIminarY SteP for aNy valuE jUdgmenT sincE, iN order to Account for and eventually CriticIze thE juDgments of ReaL SpeCtators, thE phiLosopher neEds To fIrst rEcoNStrucT cauSE-eFfeCT relaTionSHips. He neeDS tO shOW, FoR example, thaT THE maNual lAboURer is tHe onE who nourishes the wHOle society in orDer tO MAke It oBViouS tHat the one who maIntAiNS The whole SoCiety should Be well noUrIShed aNd well Fed, or sHow that GOLd ANd silvEr arE noT the essenCe oF a NAtion's wEaLtH In
). Adam Smith Smith declar es, in boo k 7 o f h isTh eory  ofMoral Sentimen t s, t hat there are two 'use ful'pa r ts o f  m oralphiloso p hy , nam el yeth ic s  a nd ju ris prudenc e (Smith 1 759 :340). The la t te r 'investi gat es the gener alprinci pl esw hichoug ht be  the f o undati on of the  l a ws ofa ll nati o n s'  (Sm ith 1978: 397). B o th disciplines sh ould f ol l ow a  th ird  way betwe en  Stoi c  or Pla t on i c rat i onalism and M andevillian rel ativis m(Fo r bes 19 82).Sm i th' s third way  ent rusts mor al sta n dards t o  the im partia l s pec tato r ,th e s ou r ceo fano pen -ended s ta nd ard t hatm a y only  be  app liedto the raw ma ter ials rep resen ted b y hi st orica l laws  andcu stoms. It is th is c haractertha tmak es  room for ps ych olo gical,sociolo g ica la n d  e conomic reconstruc ti o n s.  The phi losoph e rne e ds causa lexp lana t i ons o f fa c ts  in orde r to a p pr ai se thepr opriet yofsym pathe t ic r espons es in di ffere n t situations ( H aakonnsen 198 2 :2 0 6– 7 ). T hemethodologi calb ackg roun d  i s a n ti-Ca rtesi an ,  r u ling out topdown ap pr oaches  andmaking room f or auxilia r y discipli nest ha t  are, in turn,  notso much de d uctive C artes ian scie nces as c o n jectural  re con str uct i o ns  of social pr o c esse s.  Thesetak e place  ma inl y a s u ni ntended r esults o fac ti on s t hat o b ey lawsin dep en den t oft he ess entia l qu al it i esof thee nt i t iesat  s take  bu t' super impo s ed'  on the m. This r efl e cts,  i nthe soc ial world, th e' metaphysic s'  of  moder n naturalscience, with its refus a l of Ar ist oteli an e ssences.Smi th wan ted to dev elop a  scie nc e o f man a n d  s oci et y and with i n  th is an  e cono mic sci ence – some kind o f  sy stematic reco nst ruct i o nofe co n omi cs yst e m s, more compreh ensive tha nc am eralist or mer ca ntilist  piecem eal t h eorizin g and mor e empiric al  tha n phy siocraticnaturalorder. Th i s yie l de d a d ivi sion i nt o t wo pa rts –a 'mi tosis ' – of  t he tra ditio na l notion  of natural law, making  roomfor t wodifferent  fi e lds : a norma tive  discourse  ba sed  on j udg m entsform u la ted by th e im p artial sp e ct ato r an d a descrip t i v e r econs tru c tion o f so cial phenomena di s covering somekind o f o rde r  inso cial phenomena . T hu s ,  politic al  economy is  underst oo d  as v alue-f ree sc ience b u t  i n  a pec ulia r s ense. Cau sal  e x planati on  i s  a pre limi na ry ste p fora ny v a l ue judgment sinc e, in o rdert o a ccoun tfor and even tually cri ticize thejudgme ntsof re al spec ta tors,the  p hilosopher needs tofirst  recons tr uctcau se-eff ectr e latio nshi ps . H e needs t o sh o w,  f o r e xamp le, t ha t th e manuall abourerist he onewh o n o u rishes th e whole soci ety  in o r d er to make it o b vi o us th at the  one w ho main t ain sthe who les o ciety sho uld be we l l n ou rish ed and w el l fe d,  or  s how that gold a nd silve r are no t the es sen c e of a nati on 's wealth in 
). Adam_Smith Smith_declares, in book 7_of his_Theory_of Moral_Sentiments,_that there are_two 'useful' parts_of moral philosophy, namely_ethics and jurisprudence_(Smith_1759: 340). The latter 'investigates the general principles which ought be the foundation of_the_laws of_all_nations'_(Smith 1978: 397). Both disciplines_should follow a third way_between Stoic_or Platonic rationalism and Mandevillian relativism (Forbes 1982)._Smith's_third way entrusts_moral standards to the impartial spectator, the source of_an open-ended standard that may only_be applied to_the_raw_materials represented by historical_laws and customs. It is this_character that makes room for psychological,_sociological and economic reconstructions. The philosopher needs_causal explanations of facts in order_to appraise the propriety of_sympathetic responses_in different situations (Haakonnsen 1982:_206–7). The methodological_background is_anti-Cartesian, ruling out_topdown approaches and making room for_auxiliary disciplines that_are, in turn, not so much_deductive_Cartesian sciences as_conjectural_reconstructions_of social_processes. These take_place_mainly as_unintended_results of actions that obey laws_independent_of the essential qualities of the entities_at stake but'superimposed' on_them._This reflects, in the_social world, the'metaphysics' of modern_natural science, with its refusal of_Aristotelian essences._Smith wanted_to develop a science of man and society and within this_an economic science – some kind_of systematic reconstruction of_economic systems,_more_comprehensive than cameralist_or_mercantilist piecemeal_theorizing and more empirical than physiocratic natural_order. This_yielded a division into two parts_– a'mitosis' – of_the_traditional notion of natural law, making_room for two different fields: a_normative discourse based on judgments_formulated_by_the impartial spectator and a_descriptive reconstruction of social phenomena discovering_some kind of_order in social phenomena. Thus, political economy_is_understood as value-free science but in_a_peculiar sense. Causal explanation is a_preliminary_step_for any value judgment since,_in order to account for and_eventually criticize the judgments of real spectators, the philosopher_needs to first_reconstruct cause-effect relationships. He needs_to_show,_for example, that the manual labourer is the one who_nourishes the_whole society in_order to make it obvious that the one who maintains_the whole society should be well nourished_and well fed, or show that gold and silver are not_the essence of a nation's wealth in