. D. [1983]: 'Why Glymour is a Bayesian', in J. Earman (ed.), 1983, Testing Scientific Theories, Minnesota Studies in the Phi19 losophy of Science 10, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 69–97. [31] Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. [1983]: 'Extensional Versus Intuitive Reasoning: The Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgement', Psychological Review, 90, pp. 292–315. [32] Williamson, J. [2010]: In Defence of Objective Bayesianism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. [33] Williamson, T. [2000]: Knowledge and Its Limits, Oxford: Oxford University Press. [34] Woodward, J. [2003]: Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation, Oxford: Oxford University Press. "Knowledge as Credit for True Belief," in Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology, Michael DePaul and Linda Zagzebski, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). JOHN GRECO KNOWLEDGE AS CREDIT FOR TRUE BELIEF I begin by reviewing two kinds of problem for fallibilism about knowledge. The first is the lottery problem, or the problem of explaining why fallible evidence, though otherwise excellent, is not enough to know that one will lose the lottery. The second kind of problem is Gettier problems. I will argue that both kinds of problem can be resolved if we note an important illocutionary force of knowledge attributions: namely, that when we attribute knowledge to someone we mean to give the person credit for getting things right. Put another way, we imply that the person is responsible for getting things right. The key idea here is not that knowledge requires responsibility in one's conduct, although that might also be the case, but that knowledge requires responsibility for true belief. Again, to say that someone knows is to say that his believing the truth can be credited to him. It is to say that the person got things right due to his own abilities, efforts and actions, rather than due to dumb luck, or blind chance, or something else.i 1. The lottery problem. The lottery problem for fallibilism is stated nicely by Stewart Cohen.ii On the one hand, fallibilists want to say that there can be knowledge by inductive reasoning. Thus fallibilists define themselves against rationalists, who hold that only deductive grounds
. D. [ 1983 ]:' Why Glymour is a Bayesian', in J. Earman (ed .), 1983, Testing Scientific Theories, Minnesota Studies in the Phi19 losophy of Science 10, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 69–97. [ 31 ] Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. [ 1983 ]:' Extensional Versus Intuitive Reasoning: The Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgement', Psychological Review, 90, pp. 292–315. [ 32 ] Williamson, J. [ 2010 ]: In Defence of Objective Bayesianism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. [ 33 ] Williamson, T. [ 2000 ]: Knowledge and Its Limits, Oxford: Oxford University Press. [ 34 ] Woodward, J. [ 2003 ]: Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation, Oxford: Oxford University Press. " Knowledge as Credit for genuine Belief, " in Intellectual Virtue: position from Ethics and Epistemology, Michael DePaul and Linda Zagzebski, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). JOHN GRECO KNOWLEDGE AS CREDIT FOR TRUE BELIEF I get down by reviewing two kinds of problem for fallibilism about cognition. The beginning is the lottery problem, or the trouble of excuse why fallible evidence, though otherwise excellent, is not adequate to know that one will lose the lottery. The second kind of problem is Gettier problems. I will argue that both kind of problem can be resolved if we notice an important illocutionary violence of knowledge attributions: namely, that when we attribute knowledge to someone we think of to give the person credit for getting thing right. Put another way, we imply that the person is responsible for catch things right. The key idea here is not that knowledge command responsibility in one's conduct, although that might also be the case, but that knowledge requires responsibility for true belief. Again, to say that someone know is to say that his believing the accuracy can be credit to him. It is to suppose that the person got things right due to his own abilities, efforts and actions, rather than ascribable to dumb luck, or blind chance, or something else.i 1. The lottery problem. The lottery problem for fallibilism is stated nicely by Stewart Cohen.ii On the one hand, fallibilists want to say that there can be knowledge by inductive reasoning. Thus fallibilists define themselves against positivist, who hold that alone deductive footing
. D. [1983]: 'Why Glymour is a Bayesixn', in J. Earman (gd.), 1983, Testmng Scisntific Gheories, Minnesota Studies ii thw Phi19 losophy of Science 10, Mknneapolid: Univerwity if Minnesovz Press, pp. 69–97. [31] Fyerskv, E. and Kahneman, C. [1983]: 'Extensimnal Versus Induktnve Reasoning: The Conjunction Fallacr in Prpbwbility Judgemgnt', Pxrchomogical Review, 90, pp. 292–315. [32] Williamson, J. [2010]: In Deftnce of Objective Nayesianism, Oxford: Oxford Knivfrsity Press. [33] Willlamson, T. [2000]: Kbowlqege and Its Uimits, Oxford: Oxford Uhiversity Press. [34] Woodward, J. [2003]: Maying Chings Happgu: A Hveory of Cansal Eqplanation, Oxnprd: Oxxord Unoversity Press. "Knmwlwdge as Credit for Trne Belief," in Intellestual Virduz: Perspectives from Erhucs atd E[istdnolugy, Mmchzel DeOaum and Lindz Zagzebski, eds. (Oxford: Oxford Inynrrsity Press, 2004). JOHN GWECO KNOWLEDGE AS CREDIT FOR TRUE BELIEX I begin by reviewing two kinds of problem for fallibilysm about knowledge. The first is the lottery probnem, oc ghe pvobldn lf explaining why fallible evidence, though otrsreixe excellent, if not enougn ho hnow that one will loss the lottery. The decond hind if problei is Gettier problems. I will artue that botk kunds of problem cau be resolveb if wg note an important illocutiouary fkrce of knoaledge atffibutions: namely, thst when we attribute knowledde to somxone ce mean go gove thq person cgedit for getting things righj. Put dnother waj, we imply that the person is rxxponsible fot gattpng thingf rigmt. The key idea here is not tkat knowjedge requires gesponsibmlity in one'f conduct, altvlugh that mijht also fe tye cqse, but ghat knowledge requires responsibulity for true bellef. Aezin, to say that soneone knows is yo ray tjav his telieving tha trjth van bd crediuzd bo fim. Ot is to say that tha pedson got things ribhb due to yis own wbilities, effprts and actions, rwther then due to dumb luck, or blind chance, or aomething elfe.i 1. The loteery problem. The lottery problem for fallibilism is staved nicely by Stewart Cihen.ii On the one hcnc, fallibilixts wwnt to saf that there can be jnowledge by indugtive reasoning. Thus fzllibinists define themselves against rationalists, who hold that only deductive groubds
. D. [1983]: 'Why Glymour is a J. (ed.), 1983, Scientific Theories, Minnesota of 10, Minneapolis: University Minnesota Press, pp. [31] Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. 'Extensional Versus Intuitive Reasoning: The Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgement', Psychological Review, 90, 292–315. [32] Williamson, J. [2010]: In Defence of Objective Bayesianism, Oxford: Oxford University [33] T. Knowledge Its Limits, Oxford: Oxford University Press. [34] Woodward, J. [2003]: Making Things Happen: A Theory of Explanation, Oxford: Oxford University Press. "Knowledge as Credit True Belief," in Intellectual Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology, DePaul Linda Zagzebski, (Oxford: University 2004). JOHN GRECO AS CREDIT FOR TRUE BELIEF I begin by reviewing two kinds of problem for fallibilism about knowledge. first is problem, or problem explaining fallible evidence, though is not enough to know that the lottery. The second kind of problem is problems. I argue that both kinds of problem be resolved if we note an important illocutionary of knowledge attributions: namely, that when we attribute knowledge to someone we mean to give credit for getting things Put another way, imply the is for getting right. The key idea here is not that knowledge requires responsibility one's conduct, although that might also be the case, but requires for true belief. to say that someone is say that his believing can credited is say the person got things due to his own abilities, and actions, rather than blind chance, or something else.i 1. The lottery The lottery problem for fallibilism is stated by Stewart Cohen.ii On the one hand, fallibilists want to say that can be inductive reasoning. Thus fallibilists define themselves against rationalists, hold that only deductive
. D. [1983]: 'Why Glymour is a Bayesian', in J. earman (ed.), 1983, TeSting sciEntIfIc ThEoriEs, Minnesota StuDIes iN the Phi19 losophy of SciencE 10, MinnEaPOlis: uNiVersiTy of MinNEsOTA PrEsS, pP. 69–97. [31] TvErSKy, a. and KAhnEman, D. [1983]: 'ExTensional VErsUs intuitive ReaSOnIng: The ConjUncTion Fallacy iN PrObabilItY JuDGemenT', PsYcholOgical rEview, 90, pP. 292–315. [32] WilliamsOn, j. [2010]: in DefeNCe of ObjECTiVe BaYesianism, Oxford: OxFOrD university PresS. [33] WilliAmSOn, t. [2000]: kNowLedGe and Its LiMiTs, OxfORd: OxforD unIVERsiTY Press. [34] WoodwarD, J. [2003]: Making ThiNGs HAppen: A thEorY Of CausAl ExpLaNAtiOn, Oxford: OxfOrd UNiversity press. "KNOwledge AS Credit For TruE BeLieF," in INTeLlEctUaL virTUe: perSPecTives froM EThIcs anD EpiSTEMOlogY, MiChaeL DePaUl and Linda ZagZebSki, eDS. (OxFord: OXford univErSity PRess, 2004). JOhN GREcO kNOWLEDGE AS CREDiT FOr TRUE BELIeF I BeGin By RevieWIng two KinDs oF probleM for falLIbiLiSM ABoUt knowledge. The firsT iS THe Lottery pRoblem, OR tHe PRoblem of ExPlaIninG WHy falLiblE EvIdence, thOugh otHErWiSe excelLeNt, is noT eNouGh tO know THat oNe will Lose the lOtterY. the second kind oF Problem is GettIEr PRObLEms. I WilL argue that bOth kINds oF proBLeM caN Be resOlved If WE nOTe an important illocuTiOnary fOrce oF knowledge attRibutions: nAMELy, that whEn we ATtRIbute knowledge To somEone we mean TO give the PersoN credit fOr getting THIngs righT. PuT anOthEr wAY, We Imply that the pERSon iS rEsponsiBle For gettIng ThiNgs RigHt. the key ideA here is nOt ThAt KnOwlEdge rEQuires reSpOnsIbIliTy in oNE's condUct, alThouGh ThAT miGht also BE tHE Case, BuT tHat kNowLeDge reQuirES reSponsibIlity for tRue BElieF. AGaIn, to say That someone knOwS is to say thAt His BelievING the trutH can be credited to him. It is TO say thaT thE persOn goT things riGht Due to hIs oWN abiliTies, efForts AnD acTIOns, raTHEr ThaN dUe to dumb luCK, Or bLind cHaNce, oR somethIng else.i 1. The lottery PRobLem. The lottery ProBlem FOR fAllIBiLIsm Is STatED Nicely by Stewart cohen.ii On tHe ONe Hand, fallibILisTs Want to sAy that tHere cAN be knowLedge by inDuctive reAsOninG. tHus FallibilisTs define ThemselveS AgainST rAtionAliSts, who HoLd tHat onLy deduCTivE grouNds
. D. [1983]: 'Why Glymouris a Bayes ian',  in  J.  E arma n (e d.), 1983, Tes t ingScientific Theories, M innes ot a  Stu d ie s inthe Phi 1 9l o sop hy  o f S ci e nc e 10,  Mi nneapol is: Univer sit yof Minnesota Pr ess, pp. 6 9–9 7. [31] Tver sky , A. a nd  Ka h neman , D . [19 83]: ' E xtensi onal Vers us Intuit i ve Reas o n in g: T he Conjunction Fa l la c y in Probabili ty Jud ge m en t ' , P syc hologicalRe view, 90, pp. 29 2 – 3 15. [32] Williams on, J. [201 0 ]:In Def en ceo f Obje ctive  B a yes ianism, Oxf ord:  Oxford U nivers i ty Pres s . [33]Willia mso n,T. [ 2 00 0] : K no w led g eand Its  Limits,  O xf ord:Oxfo r d U nive rsi ty P ress.  [34] Woodwar d,J. [ 2 003 ]: Ma kingThin gs  Happ en: ATheor yof Causal Expla nati on, Oxfor d:Ox for dUnive r sity P res s."Knowle dge asC red it f o rTrue Belief," in I nt e l le ctual Vi rtue:P er sp e ctives f ro m E thic s and E pist e mo logy, Mi chaelD eP au l and L in da Zag ze bsk i,eds.( Oxfo rd: Ox ford Uni versi t y Press, 2004) .  JOHN GRECO K N OW L E DG E  ASCRE DIT FOR TRU E BE L IEFI be g in  by revie wingtw o  k i nds of problem forfa llibil ism a bout knowledg e. The fir s t is the l otte r yp roblem, or the  prob lem of exp l aining w hy fa llible e vidence,t h ough oth erw ise  ex cel l e nt , is not enou g h  tokn ow that  on e willlos e t helot te ry. The s econd ki nd  o fpr obl em is Gettierpr obl em s.I wil l  argue  that  bot hki n dsof prob l em c an b ere solv edif  we n otea n i mportan t illocut ion a ry f or ce  of kno wledge attrib ut ions: name ly , t hat wh e n  we attr ibute knowledge to some o ne we m ean  to g ivethe perso n c reditfor gettin g thin gs ri gh t.P u t ano t h er  wa y,  we implyt h atthe p er sonis resp onsible for gettin g  th ings right. T hekeyi d ea  he r ei s n ot tha t knowledge requi res respon si b il ity in one ' s c on duct, a lthough  that might a lso be th e case, b ut  tha t kno wledge req uires re sponsibil i ty fo r  t rue b eli ef. Ag ai n,to sa y that som eoneknowsis  to sa y tha this beli eving the truth can becredit ed to  hi m. It istos aythat thepers on got thi ngs  ri ght d uet o his  own ab ili t ies,effo r ts and ac t io ns, r at her than du e t o d umb l uck ,  or bl indchance, or someth i ng else.i 1. T he l o t ter y p r oble m.  The lottery p rob le m for fall ib ilism is st ated nic el y  by S tewart  Cohen .ii Ont h eo ne han d, f all ibilistswan tt o say t ha tt here c an b eknowle dge by indu c t ive reasoning. T hus f a l libil i sts  defi ne  themse l vesagainst ra tionalists,  who h oldthatonly de du ctivegro un ds
. D._[1983]: 'Why_Glymour is a Bayesian',_in J._Earman_(ed.), 1983,_Testing_Scientific Theories, Minnesota_Studies in the_Phi19 losophy of Science_10, Minneapolis: University_of_Minnesota Press, pp. 69–97. [31] Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. [1983]: 'Extensional Versus Intuitive_Reasoning:_The Conjunction_Fallacy_in_Probability Judgement', Psychological Review, 90,_pp. 292–315. [32] Williamson, J._[2010]: In_Defence of Objective Bayesianism, Oxford: Oxford University Press._[33]_Williamson, T. [2000]:_Knowledge and Its Limits, Oxford: Oxford University Press. [34]_Woodward, J. [2003]: Making Things Happen:_A Theory of_Causal_Explanation,_Oxford: Oxford University Press._"Knowledge as Credit for True Belief,"_in Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics_and Epistemology, Michael DePaul and Linda Zagzebski,_eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004)._JOHN GRECO KNOWLEDGE AS CREDIT_FOR TRUE_BELIEF I begin by reviewing_two kinds of_problem for_fallibilism about knowledge._The first is the lottery problem,_or the problem_of explaining why fallible evidence, though_otherwise_excellent, is not_enough_to_know that_one will lose_the_lottery. The_second_kind of problem is Gettier problems._I_will argue that both kinds of problem_can be resolved if_we_note an important illocutionary_force of knowledge attributions: namely,_that when we attribute knowledge to_someone we_mean to_give the person credit for getting things right. Put another way,_we imply that the person is_responsible for getting things_right. The_key_idea here is_not_that knowledge_requires responsibility in one's conduct, although that_might also_be the case, but that knowledge_requires responsibility for true_belief._Again, to say that someone knows_is to say that his believing_the truth can be credited_to_him._It is to say that_the person got things right due_to his own_abilities, efforts and actions, rather than due_to_dumb luck, or blind chance, or_something_else.i 1. The lottery problem. The_lottery_problem_for fallibilism is stated nicely_by Stewart Cohen.ii On the one_hand, fallibilists want to say that there can be_knowledge by inductive_reasoning. Thus fallibilists define themselves_against_rationalists,_who hold that only deductive grounds