	of	Quinn's	moral	theory.	Although	Quinn	referred	to	it as	a	command	theory	(Peoples	2011),	others	such	as	Morriston	(2009)	have suggested	that	it	really	belongs	to	the	more	general	non-command-based voluntarist	family. Even	if	we	grant	that	the	Quinn-type	theory	belongs	to	the	more	general category	of	non-command-based	voluntarist	theories	it	probably	makes	no difference	because something	like	the	epistemic	condition	is	going	to	be essential	to	all	voluntarist	theories.	The	main	reason	for	my	confidence	in	this regard	is	that	most	metaethicists	now	concede	that	a	plausible	account	of	moral ontology	almost	always	requires	the	satisfaction	of	an	epistemic	condition.	If DCTists	want	to	deny	this	connection,	so	be	it:	their	theory	will	be	weaker	as	a result.	I	defend	this	view	in	two	ways:	by	appealing	to	common	methodologies	of argument	in	the	field	of	metaethics,	and	by	analogy	to	an	ongoing	dispute	within that	field	between	moral	realists	and	antirealists. Let's	look	at	methodology	first.	As	Joyce	(2002;	2006)	notes,	most contemporary	metaethicists	approach	the	task	of	finding	an	appropriate grounding	for	moral	facts	in	a	similar	manner	(e.g.	Joyce	2002	and	2006; Beyleveld	1991;	Smith	1994;	Enoch	2011;	Adams	1999).	First,	they	identify	a	set of	moral	platitudes,	i.e.	widely	accepted	statements
of 	 Quinn's 	 moral 	 theory. 	 Although 	 Quinn 	 referred 	 to 	 it as 	 a 	 command 	 theory 	 (people 	 2011), 	 others 	 such 	 as 	 Morriston 	 (2009) 	 have suggest 	 that 	 it 	 really 	 belongs 	 to 	 the 	 more 	 general 	 non - command - base voluntarist 	 family. Even 	 if 	 we 	 grant 	 that 	 the 	 Quinn - character 	 theory 	 belongs 	 to 	 the 	 more 	 general class 	 of 	 non - command - free-base 	 voluntarist 	 theories 	 it 	 credibly 	 makes 	 no difference 	 because something 	 like 	 the 	 epistemic 	 condition 	 is 	 go 	 to 	 be essential 	 to 	 all 	 voluntarist 	 theories. 	 The 	 main 	 reason 	 for 	 my 	 confidence 	 in 	 this respect 	 is 	 that 	 most 	 metaethicists 	 now 	 concede 	 that 	 a 	 plausible 	 account 	 of 	 moral ontology 	 almost 	 constantly 	 requires 	 the 	 satisfaction 	 of 	 an 	 epistemic 	 condition. 	 If DCTists 	 want 	 to 	 traverse 	 this 	 connection, 	 indeed 	 be 	 it: 	 their 	 theory 	 will 	 be 	 weaker 	 as 	 a result. 	 I 	 maintain 	 this 	 view 	 in 	 two 	 ways: 	 by 	 appealing 	 to 	 common 	 methodologies 	 of argument 	 in 	 the 	 field 	 of 	 metaethics, 	 and 	 by 	 analogy 	 to 	 an 	 ongoing 	 dispute 	 within that 	 field 	 between 	 moral 	 realists 	 and 	 antirealists. Let's 	 look 	 at 	 methodology 	 first. 	 As 	 Joyce 	 (2002; 	 2006) 	 notes, 	 most contemporary 	 metaethicists 	 approach 	 the 	 task 	 of 	 discover 	 an 	 appropriate grounding 	 for 	 moral 	 facts 	 in 	 a 	 exchangeable 	 manner 	 (e.g. 	 Joyce 	 2002 	 and 	 2006; Beyleveld 	 1991; 	 Smith 	 1994; 	 Enoch 	 2011; 	 Adams 	 1999). 	 First, 	 they 	 identify 	 a 	 set of 	 moral 	 platitude, 	 i.e. 	 widely 	 accept 	 statements
	of	Qkinn's	moral	theory.	Although	Duinn	referred	to	nr as	a	cmmmand	fheory	(Peuples	2011),	others	such	as	Morriston	(2009)	hate syggesuvd	that	it	really	belongs	go	the	more	heneral	nin-connand-based tkluntarlft	fajlly. Erei	if	we	grant	that	tme	Quinn-type	dheory	belongs	tm	tfe	lore	general category	of	non-command-basqd	volunyagist	theories	it	krobanjy	maivs	ko difference	because something	liie	the	eppstemic	condition	ix	going	to	be essential	to	all	vllunharist	theories.	The	mwin	reason	fot	jy	cjbfidence	in	thks regard	is	that	most	metzethicists	now	concede	that	a	plausicle	aceount	of	morao intlnogy	almost	aoways	gequires	the	sabpsfactimn	of	an	elistemic	conditlon.	If DCRists	want	to	deny	this	coinection,	so	be	it:	their	treory	will	te	ceaker	as	a result.	I	defebd	rhis	vhew	it	two	dqys:	cy	akpeelihg	to	colmoi	methodologjes	of argumwnt	in	the	field	of	metatthybx,	and	by	analogg	to	an	oggjing	dispute	within that	field	between	moral	gealjsts	and	antirealists. Let'w	look	at	methodology	firdt.	As	Joyce	(2002;	2006)	gotes,	most contemporary	metaethicists	approach	the	tasn	of	fiidkng	ck	woprlpriate grounding	for	moral	facts	in	a	similar	mannew	(s.g.	Kojce	2002	and	2006; Beyleveld	1991;	Siith	1994;	Enoch	2011;	Adsmd	1999).	Fotst,	they	identifi	a	set oy	jodal	platitudes,	i.e.	widfly	accekted	stqtements
of Quinn's moral theory. Although Quinn referred as command theory 2011), others such that really belongs to more general non-command-based family. Even if we grant that Quinn-type theory belongs to the more general category of non-command-based voluntarist theories it makes no difference because something like the epistemic condition is going to be to voluntarist The reason for my confidence in this regard is that most metaethicists now concede that a plausible of moral ontology almost always requires the satisfaction an epistemic condition. If want to deny this connection, be their theory be as result. I defend view in two ways: by appealing to common methodologies of argument in the field of metaethics, and analogy to dispute within field moral and antirealists. Let's methodology first. As Joyce (2002; 2006) metaethicists approach the task of finding an appropriate for moral in a similar manner (e.g. Joyce and 2006; Beyleveld 1991; Smith 1994; Enoch 2011; 1999). First, they identify a set of moral platitudes, i.e. widely accepted statements
	of	Quinn's	moral	theory.	AlthouGh	Quinn	refErred	To	iT as	A	cOmmaNd	thEory	(Peoples	2011),	othERs	suCh	as	Morriston	(2009)	have suggeSted	tHaT	It	reALlY	beloNgs	to	thE	MoRE	GenErAl	Non-CoMMaNd-basEd vOluntarIst	family. EVen	If	We	grant	that	tHE	QUinn-type	thEorY	belongs	to	thE	moRe	geneRaL caTEgory	Of	nOn-comMand-baSEd	voluNtarist	thEoRIes	it	pRObably	mAKEs	No diFference	because soMEtHIng	like	the	episTemic	cOnDItION	is	GoiNg	to	be esseNtIal	to	ALl	volunTArIST	TheORies.	The	main	reAson	for	my	coNFidEnce	in	ThIs rEGard	is	That	mOsT	MetAethicists	nOw	coNcede	that	A	plausIBle	accoUNt	of	morAl ontoLogY	alMost	ALwAyS	reQuIRes	THe	SatISfaCtion	of	aN	ePiStemiC	conDITIOn.	If dCTIsts	Want	tO	deny	this	connEctIon,	sO	Be	iT:	theiR	theoRy	wiLl	Be	weaKer	as	a ResulT.	I	Defend	this	view	iN	two	Ways:	by	appEalInG	to	CoMmon	mEThodolOgiEs	oF argumeNt	in	the	FIelD	oF	METaEthics,	and	by	analogy	To	AN	OnGoing	disPute	wiTHiN tHAt	field	bEtWeeN	morAL	RealiSts	aND	aNtirealiSts. Let'S	LoOk	At	methoDoLogy	fiRsT.	As	joyCe	(2002;	2006)	notES,	mosT conteMporary	mEtaetHIcists	approach	THe	task	of	findiNG	aN	APpROpriAte Grounding	foR	morAL	facTs	in	A	SiMilAR	mannEr	(e.g.	JOyCE	2002	aND	2006; Beyleveld	1991;	Smith	1994;	EnocH	2011;	ADams	1999).	FiRst,	thEy	identify	a	seT of	moral	plATITudes,	i.e.	wIdelY	AcCEpted	statementS
	of	Quinn's	moral	theory.Although	Q uinnref err ed 	toit a s	a	command	th e ory(Peoples	2011),	others 	such 	a s 	Mor r is ton	( 2009)	h a ve s ugg es te d	t ha t 	i t	rea lly 	belong s	to	the	m ore 	g eneral	non-c o mm and-basedvol untarist	fam ily . Even 	i f	w e 	gran t	t hat	t he	Qui n n-type 	theory	b el o ngs	to the	mor e ge nera l category	of	non - co m mand-based	vol untari st th e o rie s	i t	probably 	m akesn o diffe r en c e bec a use something 	like	the	e p ist emic	c on dit i on	isgoing 	t o 	be  essentialto	a ll	volunt aristt heories . 	The	ma in	rea son 	fo r	my co nf ide nc e 	in th isr ega rd	is	th at 	m ost	m etae t h i c ists 	no w	co ncede 	that	a	plaus ibl e	ac c oun t	ofmoral  ont ol ogy	a lmostalway srequires	the	sa tisf action	of 	an 	e pis te mic	c o nditio n.IfDCTists 	want	t o 	de ny t h is 	connection,	so	be 	i t : 	t heir	the ory	wi l lbe weaker	a sa r esul t . 	I	de fend th is	viewin	two wa ys :	by	ap pe alingto 	co mmo n	met h odol ogiesof argum ent	i n 	the	field	ofm etaethics,	an d 	b y an a logy 	to 	an	ongoing 	dis p utewith i ntha t 	fiel d	bet we e nm oral	realists	and	a nt ireali sts.Let's	look	at 	methodolo g y first.	A s	Jo y ce (2002;	2006)	n otes, 	most cont e mporarymetae thicists 	approach t he	taskoffin din g	a n ap propriate gro u n ding 	f or	mora l	f acts	in 	asim ila r	m an ner	(e.g. 	Joyce	2 00 2an d200 6; Be y leveld	1 99 1;Sm ith 	1994 ; 	Enoch 	2011 ;	Ad am s1 999 ).	Firs t ,t h ey	i de nt ifya	s et  of	m oral pla titudes ,	i.e.	wi del y 	acc ep te d	state ments
	of	Quinn's	moral	theory.	Although	Quinn	referred	to	it as	a	command	theory	(Peoples	2011),	others	such	as	Morriston	(2009)	have_suggested	that	it	really	belongs	to	the	more	general	non-command-based voluntarist	family._Even	if	we	grant	that	the	Quinn-type	theory	belongs	to	the	more	general category	of	non-command-based	voluntarist	theories	it	probably	makes	no difference	because something	like	the	epistemic	condition	is	going	to	be_essential	to	all	voluntarist	theories.	The	main	reason	for	my	confidence	in	this regard	is	that	most	metaethicists	now	concede	that	a	plausible	account	of	moral_ontology	almost	always	requires	the	satisfaction	of	an	epistemic	condition.	If_DCTists	want	to	deny	this	connection,	so	be	it:	their	theory	will	be	weaker	as	a result.	I	defend	this	view	in	two	ways:	by	appealing	to	common	methodologies	of_argument	in	the	field	of	metaethics,	and	by	analogy	to	an	ongoing	dispute	within_that	field	between	moral	realists	and	antirealists. Let's	look	at	methodology	first.	As	Joyce	(2002;	2006)	notes,	most contemporary	metaethicists	approach	the	task	of	finding	an	appropriate_grounding	for	moral	facts	in	a	similar	manner	(e.g.	Joyce	2002	and	2006; Beyleveld	1991;	Smith	1994;	Enoch	2011;	Adams	1999).	First,	they	identify	a	set of	moral	platitudes,	i.e.	widely	accepted	statements