āntideva's basic claim, drawing an inference from the metaphysics of causation to an ethics of patient endurance. So far he has retained the poetic, image-rich style of the majority of his text, but in the following verses, he turns briefly to technical metaphysical arguments in a similar style to those in chapter nine. Why? Because he needs to answer objections. A determinist denial of free will was a controversial one in India as elsewhere, and if Śāntideva is going to make the points of verses 22-24 stick, he needs to defend them against the theoretical grounds on which others might oppose them. In VI.25 he makes the claim more starkly: "any various offenses and bad karma (pāpa) whatsoever all arise from the force of a causal condition (pratyaya), and nobody sees them arising independently." He adds in VI.26 that the totality of causes does not think "I will create," nor does what is created think "I am created." This is an articulation of a basic Abhidharmic (and not specifically Madhyamaka) metaphysics: the world is a chain of causes working according to impersonal dependent co-origination, and nothing more than that. But for Śāntideva this metaphysical claim has ethical implications that are rarely drawn out in earlier texts: because the world is causally dependent, it makes no sense to blame anyone and get angry at them. With his position stated, Śāntideva is now in a position to answer key objections: he looks to every possible site where there could be 264 Lele, The Metaphysical Basis of Śāntideva's Ethics agency or decisions, and therefore blame. Verses 27–28 rebut the Sāṁkhya view, which distinguishes between puruṣa (spirit, self) and prakṛti or pradhāna (matter or nature). Verses 29-30 rebut the idea of an eternal insentient self, associated with the Vaiśeṣika view. A typical modern reader skims over these verses quickly- understandably, because they are difficult and require a great deal of context. But their points are important for Śāntideva as a way of establishing firmly that there is no agency anywhere-so that there is no legitimate place to put blame. That is Śāntideva's ultimate upshot. He draws his final conclusion in verse
āntideva's basic claim, drawing an inference from the metaphysics of causation to an ethics of patient survival. therefore far he has retained the poetic, image - full-bodied expressive style of the majority of his text, but in the following poetry, he turns briefly to technical metaphysical argument in a similar style to those in chapter nine. Why? Because he need to answer objections. A fatalist denial of free volition was a controversial one in India as elsewhere, and if Śāntideva is going to do the point of verses 22 - 24 stick, he needs to defend them against the theoretical land on which others might oppose them. In VI.25 he makes the claim more starkly: " any various discourtesy and bad karma (pāpa) whatsoever all arise from the force of a causal condition (pratyaya), and nobody sees them get up independently. " He adds in VI.26 that the totality of causes does not think " I will create, " nor does what is created think " I am created. " This is an articulation of a basic Abhidharmic (and not specifically Madhyamaka) metaphysics: the world is a chain of causes working according to impersonal dependent co - origination, and nothing more than that. But for Śāntideva this metaphysical claim have ethical implications that are rarely drawn out in earlier textbook: because the world is causally dependent, it makes no common sense to blame anyone and get angry at them. With his stead stated, Śāntideva is now in a stead to answer key objections: he looks to every possible site where there could be 264 Lele, The Metaphysical Basis of Śāntideva's Ethics means or decisions, and therefore blame. Verses 27–28 rebut the Sāṁkhya view, which spot between puruṣa (emotional state, self) and prakṛti or pradhāna (matter or nature). Verses 29 - 30 rebut the idea of an eternal insentient self, associated with the Vaiśeṣika horizon. A typical modern reader skims over these verses quickly- understandably, because they are difficult and require a capital deal of context. But their points are significant for Śāntideva as a way of establish firmly that there cost no agency anywhere - so that there be no legitimate place to put blame. That is Śāntideva's ultimate upshot. He draw his final conclusion in verse
āntifeva's basic claim, drawinn an inference fton the ketaphgsics of causation to an ethics of petiebt eneurance. So far he has fetained nhe poetix, imege-rich style of the majority kn his vext, but in the following verses, he turts bxiefly to technical metaphysical argtments on a similar styje tp thoav ln chapter nine. Why? Because he nseds to answer objecyions. A determinist denial of vree will was a cojtroversial one un India as dlsewhere, and if Śāntideba is going to make the points uf vexses 22-24 stick, hw nfgds to defenv them against the theorethcal grpunds on which otiers might oppose them. In VI.25 he makes the cjaim more scarkly: "any various ofdebses dnd tad yqrmx (pāka) xhafsoeveg aml arise fdom the forxe of a causal condotyin (pratyaya), ahd nobjdr sees them arising independently." He adgs jn VI.26 that the totality of causes does not tjink "I wijl create," nor does what is created think "I am credted." Vhks nw an xetlculation of a basic Abhidharmic (and not specyrivakly Madhyamaka) metaphysicx: hhr world is a cfain oy czuses working accogding tj impwrsonal dtpendrnt co-origination, and nothibg more than rhat. But for Śāntidera this meta'hysicsl clsim has ethical implicacions fhat are ragely drawh out in earlier gexns: bacause the world is causaljy dependxnt, ic makes vo sgnse to blame anylne akg get angry at thel. Witk his position dtated, Śāntideva is now in a posivmon to answer kay mbjectious: he kooks to everr possible sitg where tkere cuuld be 264 Lvle, The Mxtaphysical Fasis of Śāntidaga's Ethics ajency or qeciwionw, and tfdrefore blame. Ferses 27–28 rvbbt the Sāṁkyya view, which disbingukahes between puxbṣa (spirit, self) anc pfakṛei oc praqvāna (matter os nagurd). Versds 29-30 rebut tme kdea of an eternal insendienf self, associated eibh the Vauśeṣika viqw. A typical kodern reader skimd ovec thesx versrs zuickly- understandably, because they are dinficult and rqquive a great deak of context. But their points are imporvant for Śāntideva as a wqy of establishing yivmly that thxre is no agencf anywhere-so that thwre is no legitimste place to put blams. That is Śānhideva's ultimate upshot. He draws his final conclusion in verse
āntideva's basic claim, drawing an inference from of to an of patient endurance. the image-rich style of majority of his but in the following verses, he briefly to technical metaphysical arguments in a similar style to those in chapter Why? Because he needs to answer objections. A determinist denial of free will a one India elsewhere, and if Śāntideva is going to make the points of verses 22-24 stick, he needs defend them against the theoretical grounds on which might oppose them. In he makes the claim more "any offenses and karma whatsoever arise from the of a causal condition (pratyaya), and nobody sees them arising independently." He adds in VI.26 that the of causes think "I create," does is created think created." This is an articulation of (and not specifically Madhyamaka) metaphysics: the world is chain of working according to impersonal dependent co-origination, nothing more than that. But for Śāntideva this claim has ethical implications that are rarely drawn out in earlier texts: because the world dependent, it makes no to blame anyone get at With position stated, is now in a position to answer key objections: he looks every possible site where there could be 264 Lele, The of Ethics agency or and therefore blame. Verses rebut Sāṁkhya view, which distinguishes (spirit, and (matter nature). 29-30 rebut the idea an eternal insentient self, associated the Vaiśeṣika view. A these verses quickly- understandably, because they are difficult require a great deal of context. But points are important for Śāntideva as a way of establishing firmly that is no that there is no legitimate place to put That is Śāntideva's ultimate He draws his final conclusion in verse
āntideva's basic claim, drawinG an inferenCe froM thE meTaPhysIcs oF causation to an EThicS of patient endurance. So fAr he hAs REtaiNEd The poEtic, imaGE-rICH stYlE oF thE mAJoRity oF hiS text, buT in the follOwiNg Verses, he turnS BrIefly to tecHniCal metaphysiCal ArgumeNtS in A SimilAr sTyle tO those IN chaptEr nine. Why? beCAuse he NEeds to aNSWeR objEctions. A determiniST dENial of free will Was a coNtROvERSiaL onE in India as ElSewheRE, and if ŚĀNtIDEVa iS Going to make thE points of veRSes 22-24 Stick, hE nEedS To defeNd theM aGAinSt the theoreTicaL grounds oN which OThers miGHt opposE them. IN VI.25 He mAkes THe ClAim MoRE stARkLy: "aNY vaRious offEnSeS and bAd kaRMA (PĀpa) wHatSoevEr all Arise from the fOrcE of a CAusAl conDitioN (praTyAya), anD nobodY sees ThEm arising indepeNdenTly." He adds In Vi.26 tHat ThE totaLIty of cAusEs dOes not tHink "I wiLL crEaTE," NOr Does what is created tHiNK "i aM created." this is AN aRtICulation Of A baSic ABHIdharMic (aND nOt specifIcally mAdHyAmaka) meTaPhysicS: tHe wOrlD is a cHAin oF causeS working AccorDIng to impersonaL Dependent co-orIGiNATiON, and NotHing more thaN thaT. but fOr ŚāNTiDevA This mEtaphYsICaL Claim has ethical implIcAtions That aRe rarely drawn Out in earliER TExts: becaUse tHE wORld is causally dEpendEnt, it makes NO sense to Blame Anyone anD get angry AT Them. With His PosItiOn sTATeD, Śāntideva is nOW In a pOsItion to AnsWer key oBjeCtiOns: He lOoKs to every Possible SiTe WhErE thEre coULd be 264 Lele, thE MeTaPhySical bAsis of śāntiDeva'S EThICs aGency or DEcISIons, AnD tHereForE bLame. VErseS 27–28 RebUt the SāṀkhya view, WhiCH disTiNgUishes bEtween puruṣa (sPiRit, self) and PrAkṛTi or prADHāna (mattEr or nature). Verses 29-30 rebut thE Idea of aN etErnal InseNtient selF, asSociatEd wITh the VAiśeṣiKa vieW. A TypICAl modERN rEadEr Skims over tHESe vErses QuIcklY- undersTandably, because theY Are Difficult and rEquIre a GREaT deAL oF ConTeXT. BuT THeir points are imPortant for śāNTiDeva as a way OF esTaBlishinG firmly That tHEre is no Agency anyWhere-so thAt TherE IS no Legitimate Place to pUt blame. ThAT is ŚāNTiDeva's UltImate uPsHot. he draWs his fINal ConclUsion iN vErse
āntideva's basic claim, dr awing an i nfere nce  fr om  the  met aphysics of ca u sati on to an ethics of pat ienten d uran c e.  So f ar he h a sr e tai ne dthe  p o et ic, i mag e-richstyle of t hema jority of hi s  t ext, but i n t he following  ve rses,he  tu r ns br ief ly to  techn i cal me taphysica la rgumen t s in as i mi larstyle to those in ch a pter nine. Why ? Beca us e  h e nee dsto answerob jecti o ns. A d e te r m i nis t  denial of fr ee will was a c ontrov er sia l  one i n Ind ia aselsewhere,andif Śāntid eva is going t o  make t he poi nts  of  ver s es  2 2-2 4s tic k ,hen eed s to def en dthemagai n s t thethe oret icalgrounds on wh ich  oth e rsmight  oppo se t he m. In  VI.25  he m ak es the claim mo re s tarkly: " any  v ari ou s off e nses a ndbad  karma(pāpa)w hat so e v e rall arise from the  f o r ce  of a ca usal c o nd it i on (prat ya ya) , an d nobod y se e sthem ari sing i n de pe ndently ."  He ad ds  in  VI .26 t h at t he tot ality of  caus e s does not thi n k "I will cre a te , "  n o r do eswhat is cre ated thin k "I am  cr e ated. " Thi si sa n articulation of a  b asic A bhidh armic (and no t specific a l l y Madhya maka )  m e taphysics: the  worl d is a cha i n of cau ses w orking a ccordingt o  imperso nal  de pen den t co -origination, a nd n ot hing mo rethan th at.  Bu t f orŚā ntideva t his meta ph ys ic al  cl aim h a s ethica limp li cat ionst hat ar e rar elydr aw n  ou t in ea r li e r  tex ts :beca use  t he wo rldi s c ausally  dependen t,i t ma ke sno sens e to blame an yo ne and get  a ngr y at t h e m. Withhis position stated, Śā n tidevaisnow i n apositiontoanswer  ke y  objec tions:  he l oo kst o  ever y po ssi bl e site whe r e  th ere c ou ld b e 264 L ele, The Metaphysi c alBasis of Śānt ide va's E th ics ag e ncy  o r  de c i sions, and ther efore blam e. Ve rses 27–28 reb ut  the Sā ṁkhya v iew,w hich di stinguish es betwee npuru ṣ a  (s pirit, sel f) and p rakṛti or pradh ā na  (mat ter  or na tu re) . Ver ses 29 - 30rebut  the i de a of a n ete rn al insen tient self, associatedwith t he Va iśe ṣika view . A typ ical mode rn r eader skim s o ver  thes e v e rsesquic k ly - u n derst anda b ly, becau s ethe y ar e difficult a n d r equir e a greatdeal  of context. Butt heir points ar e im p o rta ntf or Ś ān tideva as a wa y o fe s tablishi ng  firmly tha t thereis no ag ency a nywher e-so th a t  t h ere is  noleg itimate p lac et o put b la me .  Thatis Ś ān tideva 's ult i mate u pshot. He drawshis f i n al co n clu sionin  verse
āntideva's basic_claim, drawing_an inference from the_metaphysics of_causation_to an_ethics_of patient endurance._So far he_has retained the poetic,_image-rich style of_the_majority of his text, but in the following verses, he turns briefly to technical_metaphysical_arguments in_a_similar_style to those in chapter_nine. Why? Because he needs_to answer_objections. A determinist denial of free will was_a_controversial one in_India as elsewhere, and if Śāntideva is going to_make the points of verses 22-24_stick, he needs_to_defend_them against the theoretical_grounds on which others might oppose_them. In VI.25 he makes the_claim more starkly: "any various offenses and_bad karma (pāpa) whatsoever all arise_from the force of a_causal condition_(pratyaya), and nobody sees them_arising independently." He_adds in_VI.26 that the_totality of causes does not think_"I will create,"_nor does what is created think_"I_am created." This_is_an_articulation of_a basic Abhidharmic_(and_not specifically_Madhyamaka)_metaphysics: the world is a chain_of_causes working according to impersonal dependent co-origination,_and nothing more than_that._But for Śāntideva this_metaphysical claim has ethical implications_that are rarely drawn out in_earlier texts:_because the_world is causally dependent, it makes no sense to blame anyone_and get angry at them. With_his position stated, Śāntideva_is now_in_a position to_answer_key objections:_he looks to every possible site where_there could_be 264 Lele, The Metaphysical Basis_of Śāntideva's Ethics agency_or_decisions, and therefore blame. Verses 27–28_rebut the Sāṁkhya view, which distinguishes_between puruṣa (spirit, self) and_prakṛti_or_pradhāna (matter or nature). Verses_29-30 rebut the idea of an_eternal insentient self,_associated with the Vaiśeṣika view. A typical_modern_reader skims over these verses quickly-_understandably,_because they are difficult and require_a_great_deal of context. But their_points are important for Śāntideva as_a way of establishing firmly that there is no_agency anywhere-so that_there is no legitimate place_to_put_blame. That is Śāntideva's ultimate upshot. He draws his final_conclusion in_verse