 that content has a kind of timeless, subjectindependent, aperspectival being. Subjects access these contents; they do not create or generate them. There cannot, even in principle, be "private" content. The irreducibility of validity to any of the other categories of actuality/being means that truth cannot be defined: [Validity] has to be regarded as much as [existence] as a basic concept that rests only on itself, of which everyone knows what he means by it, but which cannot be constructed out of any constituent elements which do not already contain it. (L §316, 513) Any attempt to define validity would be implicitly circular, for in order to understand it, we would need to deploy our understanding of validity itself. A putative definition of validity would have the form: (*) p is valid iff F(p). Lotze's point is that, to understand the content of (*), you must understand the content of its right-hand side. You understand that content only if you understand that F(p) or ~F(p), that is, if you understand it as a content that is either valid or invalid, whether or not it is asserted, held to be true, etc. So (*) cannot provide you with an understanding of validity that you otherwise lack; in order to understand (*), you must already understand what validity is. When Lotze writes that "everyone knows what he means by [validity]," I take him to mean everyone who can make judgements. There is no such thing as being able to judge that p and then acquiring the capacity to think about one's judgements that they are valid or invalid, because all there is to judging that p is judging that p is valid. All there is to the obtaining of a proposition (what one judges) is its being valid; so in judging the former, one judges the latter. Consequently, Lotze is committed to both sides of this biconditional having the same content: (†) the proposition that p is valid iff p. Platonism in Lotze and Frege 147 When one judges a proposition, one thereby judges it to be valid; there is no gap between judging that p and judging that p is valid. Lotze's Platonism The context of Lotze's fourfold distinction among kinds of actuality/ being is his appropriation of Plato. Lotze creatively reads Plato's metaphysics as fundamentally a theory of truth. On his reading, Plato's core doctrine is that truth
that content has a kind of timeless, subjectindependent, aperspectival being. Subjects access these content; they do not make or generate them. There cannot, even in principle, be " private " capacity. The irreducibility of validity to any of the other category of actuality / being intend that truth cannot be specify: [ Validity ] has to be involve as much as [ being ] as a basic concept that rests only on itself, of which everyone knows what he means by it, but which cannot be constructed out of any constituent component which do not already contain it. (L § 316, 513) Any attempt to specify validity would be implicitly circular, for in order to understand it, we would necessitate to deploy our understanding of validity itself. A putative definition of validity would have the form: (*) phosphorus is valid iff F(p). Lotze's point is that, to understand the content of (*), you must understand the content of its right - bridge player side. You understand that content only if you understand that F(p) or ~F(p), that is, if you understand it as a content that is either valid or invalid, whether or not it is asserted, held to be true, etc. thus (*) cannot provide you with an understanding of robustness that you differently miss; in order to understand (*), you must already understand what validity is. When Lotze writes that " everyone knows what he means by [ validity ], " I drive him to mean everyone who can make judgements. There is no such thing as being able to judge that phosphorus and then acquiring the capacity to think about one's judgements that they are valid or invalid, because all there is to judging that p is judge that p is valid. All there is to the obtaining of a proposition (what one judges) is its being valid; so in judge the former, one judges the latter. Consequently, Lotze is committed to both sides of this biconditional having the same content: (†) the proposition that phosphorus is valid iff p. Platonism in Lotze and Frege 147 When one judges a proposition, one thereby judges it to be valid; there is no gap between judge that p and judge that p is valid. Lotze's Platonism The context of Lotze's quadruple distinction among kind of actuality/ being is his appropriation of Plato. Lotze creatively reads Plato's metaphysics as basically a theory of truth. On his reading, Plato's core doctrine is that truth
 thwt content has a kind of timeless, subjeerindepxndent, zperspecgival being. Subjects access vhesw conuvnts; they do not creage or genvrate then. Thtre cannot, even ii princiije, bs "prirave" content. The lrreducibilhty of validitf go any of the other categories of acttality/brijg means that jruth sannkn ne defined: [Validity] has to be refarded es much as [exisyence] as a basic concept tjat gests only on itsepf, of which evewtone knows wfat he means by it, but which cannot be constructed oug of cny constitozbt fnements whirh do got already gpntain it. (L §316, 513) Any attempt tp dxfinw validity would be ikplicitly circular, for in osdzr to understand it, ww qould neeg to eepuoy onr hndershanving of valjdity itseld. A putative definiuiog of validity sould rade the form: (*) p is valid iff F(p). Lotze's pminf is that, to understand the content of (*), you lust undewstand the content of its right-hand side. You undesstanv ghau gjvrejt only if you understand that F(p) or ~F(p), that ya, of you understanb it as a conteny hhsj is either vauid or inbalid, whether or nlt it if asswrted, helq to be true, etc. So (*) cannot procide you witk ab understanding of validity tkat yoo othetwise lack; in order to bndersfand (*), you mkst alreash understand whag vslhdity is. When Lotze writes that "evecyone knows dhat he mewns by [valldity]," I take him to mean everione wvo can makf judgements. There is no such timng as being sbne no judge chat p and then acqtiring the capccity to thiny about onv's judgemxnts that thqy are valid mt invalid, beceuse all eherw is to judekng that p is kudging tkct p is vqlid. All there is bo thg kbtaining of a 'xokowition (what onr jjdgqs) ix yds being valhd; su iv judgkng the forndr, ome judges the latter. Conaequently, Lotze is cjmmitted to both sides of thix biconditional haging vhe saoe comtegt: (†) the proposition that p is balid iff p. Ilatonism in Jotzc anq Frege 147 Wken one judges a proposition, one thereby judges it to be vqlid; there is no gak bttween judginj that p and jugging that p is valie. Lotze's Platonisk The context of Lotzs's fousfold distinction among kinds of actuality/ being is his appropriation of Plato. Lotze creatively deadx Plano's ketaphrsicd as fundamentallj a theory of truth. On his readiig, Plato's woxe doctrine is that truth
that content has a kind of timeless, being. access these they do not cannot, in principle, be content. The irreducibility validity to any of the other of actuality/being means that truth cannot be defined: [Validity] has to be regarded much as [existence] as a basic concept that rests only on itself, of everyone what means it, but which cannot be constructed out of any constituent elements which do not already contain (L §316, 513) Any attempt to define validity be implicitly circular, for order to understand it, we need deploy our of itself. putative definition of would have the form: (*) p is valid iff F(p). Lotze's point is that, to understand the of (*), understand the of right-hand You understand that if you understand that F(p) or if you understand it as a content that either valid invalid, whether or not it is held to be true, etc. So (*) cannot you with an understanding of validity that you otherwise lack; in order to understand (*), already understand what validity When Lotze writes "everyone what means [validity]," I him to mean everyone who can make judgements. There is no thing as being able to judge that p and then capacity think about one's that they are valid invalid, all there is to p judging valid. there to the obtaining of proposition (what one judges) is being valid; so in the latter. Consequently, Lotze is committed to both of this biconditional having the same content: the proposition that p is valid iff p. Platonism in Lotze and 147 When a proposition, one thereby judges it to be there is no gap judging that p and judging that p is valid. Platonism context of fourfold distinction among of actuality/ being his appropriation of creatively reads metaphysics fundamentally truth. On his reading, Plato's core is truth
 that content has a kind of timeLess, subjecTindePenDenT, aPersPectIval being. SubjeCTs acCess these contents; they dO not cReATe or GEnErate Them. TheRE cANNot, EvEn In pRiNCiPle, be "PriVate" conTent. The irrEduCiBility of valiDItY to any of thE otHer categorieS of ActualItY/beINg meaNs tHat trUth canNOt be deFined: [ValiDiTY] has to BE regardED As Much As [existence] as a basIC cONcept that rests Only on ItSElF, OF whIch Everyone knOwS what HE means bY It, BUT WhiCH cannot be consTructed out oF Any ConstiTuEnt ELementS whicH dO Not Already contAin iT. (L §316, 513) Any atteMpt to dEFine valIDity wouLd be imPliCitLy ciRCuLaR, foR iN OrdER tO unDErsTand it, we WoUlD need To dePLOY Our uNdeRstaNding Of validity itsElf. a putATivE defiNitioN of vAlIdity Would hAve thE fOrm: (*) p is valid iff F(P). LotZe's point iS thAt, To uNdErstaND the coNteNt oF (*), you musT undersTAnd ThE CONtEnt of its right-hand sIdE. yOu UnderstaNd that COnTeNT only if yOu UndErstAND that f(p) or ~f(P), tHat is, if yOu undeRStAnD it as a cOnTent thAt Is eIthEr valID or iNvalid, Whether oR not iT Is asserted, held TO be true, etc. So (*) cANnOT PrOVide You With an underStanDIng oF valIDiTy tHAt you OtherWiSE lACk; in order to understaNd (*), You musT alreAdy understand What validiTY IS. When LotZe wrITeS That "everyone knOws whAt he means bY [Validity]," i take Him to meaN everyone WHO can make JudGemEntS. ThERE iS no such thing aS BEing AbLe to judGe tHat p and TheN acQuiRinG tHe capacitY to think AbOuT oNe'S juDgemeNTs that thEy Are VaLid Or invALid, becAuse aLl thErE iS To jUdging tHAt P IS judGiNg That P is VaLid. AlL theRE is To the obTaining of A prOPosiTiOn (What one Judges) is its beInG valid; so in JuDgiNg the fORMer, one juDges the latter. ConsequentLY, Lotze iS coMmittEd to Both sides Of tHis bicOndITional Having The saMe ConTENt: (†) the PROpOsiTiOn that p is vALId iFf p. PlAtOnisM in LotzE and Frege 147 When one juDGes A proposition, oNe tHereBY JuDgeS It TO be VaLId; tHERe is no gap betweeN judging thAt P AnD judging thAT p iS vAlid. LotZe's PlatOnism tHe conteXt of Lotze'S fourfold DiStinCTIon Among kinds Of actualIty/ being iS His apPRoPriatIon Of PlatO. LOtzE creaTively REadS PlatO's metaPhYsics aS fundAmEntally a Theory of truth. On his readiNg, PlatO's corE doCtrine is tHat TRutH
 that content has a kind o f timeless , sub jec tin de pend ent,  aperspectival bein g. Subjects access the se co nt e nts; th ey do  not cr e at e orge ne rat et he m. Th ere  cannot , even inpri nc iple, be "pr i va te" conten t.The irreduci bil ity of  v ali d ity t o a ny of  the o t her ca tegoriesof actual i ty/bein g me ansthat truth cannot be defined: [Vali dity]ha s  t o bereg arded as m uc h as[ existen c e] a s  ab asic conceptthat restso nly  on it se lf, of whi ch ev er y one  knows what  hemeans byit, bu t  whichc annot b e cons tru cte d ou t  o fany  c o nst i tu ent ele ments wh ic hdo no t al r e a d y co nta in i t. (L  §316, 513) A nyatte m ptto de finevali di ty wo uld be  impl ic itly circular,forin ordertoun der st and i t , we w oul d n eed todeployo urun d e r st anding of validity  i t s el f. A put atived ef in i tion ofva lid ityw o uld h avet he  form: ( *) p i s  v al id iffF( p). Lo tz e's  po int i s  tha t, toundersta nd th e  content of (* ) , you must un d er s t an d  the  co ntent of it s ri g ht-h ands id e.Y ou un derst an d  t h at content only ifyo u unde rstan d that F(p) o r ~F(p), t h a t  is, ifyouu nd e rstand it as a  cont ent that i s  eithervalid  or inva lid, whet h e r or not  it  is  as ser t e d,  held to be t r u e, e tc . So (* ) c annot p rov ide  yo u w it h an unde rstandin gof  v al idi ty th a t you ot he rwi se  la ck; i n  order  to u nder st an d  (* ), youm us t alre ad yunde rst an d wha t va l idi ty is.When Lotz e w r ites  t ha t "ever yone knows wh at  he meansby  [v alidit y ] ," I tak e him to mean everyonew ho canmak e jud geme nts. Ther e i s no s uch thingas bei ng ab le  to j udget h at  pan d then acq u i rin g the  c apac ity tothink about one'sj udg ements that t hey  are v al ido ri nva li d , b e c ause all thereis to judg in g  t hat p is j u dgi ng  that p  is val id. A l l there  is to th e obtaini ng  ofa pro position ( what one  judges)i s its be ing v ali d; soin  ju dging  the f o rme r, on e judg es  the l atter .Conseque ntly, Lotze is committe d to b oth s ide s of this  bi c ond itional h avin g the same  co nte nt: ( †)t he pr opos i ti ont hat p  isv alid iffp .Pla t o ni sm in Lotze a n d F rege147 When o ne j udges a propositi o n, one thereby  jud g e s i t t o  beva lid; there isnoga p betweenju dging thatp and ju dg i ng th at p i s vali d. Lotz e ' sP latoni sm T hecontext o f L ot z e's fou rf ol d  disti ncti on  among  kinds of a c t uality/ being is  hisa p propr i ati on of  P lato. L o tzecreatively  reads Plat o's me taph ysics  as fun da mental lyatheory oft ruth. Onhis r eading,  P lato 'score d octr i n e isthat  t rut h
 that_content has_a kind of timeless,_subjectindependent, aperspectival_being._Subjects access_these_contents; they do_not create or_generate them. There cannot,_even in principle,_be_"private" content. The irreducibility of validity to any of the other categories of actuality/being_means_that truth_cannot_be_defined: [Validity] has to be_regarded as much as [existence]_as a_basic concept that rests only on itself, of_which_everyone knows what_he means by it, but which cannot be constructed_out of any constituent elements which_do not already_contain_it._(L §316, 513) Any_attempt to define validity would be_implicitly circular, for in order to_understand it, we would need to deploy_our understanding of validity itself. A_putative definition of validity would_have the_form: (*) p is valid_iff F(p). Lotze's_point is_that, to understand_the content of (*), you must_understand the content_of its right-hand side. You understand_that_content only if_you_understand_that F(p)_or ~F(p), that_is,_if you_understand_it as a content that is_either_valid or invalid, whether or not it_is asserted, held to_be_true, etc. So (*)_cannot provide you with an_understanding of validity that you otherwise_lack; in_order to_understand (*), you must already understand what validity is. When Lotze_writes that "everyone knows what he_means by [validity]," I_take him_to_mean everyone who_can_make judgements._There is no such thing as being_able to_judge that p and then acquiring_the capacity to think_about_one's judgements that they are valid_or invalid, because all there is_to judging that p is_judging_that_p is valid. All there_is to the obtaining of a_proposition (what one_judges) is its being valid; so in_judging_the former, one judges the latter._Consequently,_Lotze is committed to both sides_of_this_biconditional having the same content:_(†) the proposition that p is_valid iff p. Platonism in Lotze and Frege 147_When one judges_a proposition, one thereby judges_it_to_be valid; there is no gap between judging that p_and judging_that p is_valid. Lotze's Platonism The context of Lotze's fourfold distinction among_kinds of actuality/ being is his appropriation_of Plato. Lotze creatively reads Plato's metaphysics as fundamentally a theory_of truth. On his reading, Plato's core doctrine_is that truth