 A and Platonism B in fact marks a different distinction: that between non-logicism (Platonism A) and logicism (Platonism B) about arithmetic. This is not quite accurate, however, for Reck's difference emerges even if we assume that logicism is correct. Assuming that arithmetic does reduce to logic, the A-Platonist has an explanatory burden to discharge that the B-Platonist does not: how can we, on the concrete side of the concrete– abstract divide, come to know the abstract logical objects that (assuming logicism) are the numbers? 154 Nicholas F. Stang of Platonism in terms of their views about numbers, but Lotze is not a logicist about arithmetic,36 so I will argue that Lotze believes about propositions (contents of judgements) what Reck's B-Platonist believes about numbers. First of all, Lotze, like Reck's B-Platonist, rejects the view that truth involves the correspondence of our thoughts to something external: "Nothing other than the connection of [the contents of] our representations among themselves can be the object of our investigation" in logic (L §304, 491); the measure of truth is not the "external world," to which our thoughts are to be compared, but whether a thought agrees with the "necessity of our thinking about all relations of the manifold whatsoever" (L §306, 493–4); the truth of logical laws is "independent of the relation of our cognition to an object beyond it" (L §311, 502). Even Plato is described as realizing "the truth which our world of [contents of] representations has within itself and independently of its agreement with the presupposed essence of things beyond it" (L §313, 506–7). As my bracketed insertions indicate, Lotze is not always as careful as he should be in distinguishing our representations (Vorstellungen) from their contents; read charitably, however, and in light of his antipsychologist doctrines, all of these claims are about contents (propositions), not about mental events or processes. Lotze holds that logic is not about the correspondence of our representations with something external to them, but with the agreement of the content of those representations with the logical laws governing all judgemental content as such. Recall Lotze's claim that validity "cannot be constructed out of any constituent elements which do not already contain it" (L §316, 513). In particular, therefore,
A and Platonism B in fact marks a different distinction: that between non - logicism (Platonism A) and logicism (Platonism B) about arithmetic. This is not quite accurate, however, for Reck's remainder emerge even if we assume that logicism is correct. Assuming that arithmetical does reduce to logic, the A - Platonist has an explanatory burden to exhaust that the B - Platonist does not: how can we, on the concrete side of the concrete – abstract watershed, hail to know the abstract coherent objects that (assuming logicism) are the issue? 154 Nicholas F. Stang of Platonism in terms of their views about numbers, but Lotze is not a logicist about arithmetic,36 so I will argue that Lotze believes about propositions (content of judgements) what Reck's B - Platonist believes about numbers. foremost of all, Lotze, like Reck's B - Platonist, rejects the view that accuracy involves the commensurateness of our thoughts to something external: " Nothing early than the connection of [ the contents of ] our representations among themselves can be the object of our probe " in logic (L § 304, 491); the measure of truth is not the " external world, " to which our thoughts are to be compared, but whether a thought agrees with the " necessity of our thinking about all relations of the manifold whatsoever " (L § 306, 493–4); the truth of logical laws is " independent of the relation of our cognition to an object beyond it " (L § 311, 502). Even Plato is described as recognize " the truth which our world of [ subject of ] representations has within itself and independently of its agreement with the presupposed essence of things beyond it " (lambert § 313, 506–7). As my bracketed insertions indicate, Lotze is not always as careful as he should be in identify our representations (Vorstellungen) from their contents; read charitably, however, and in light of his antipsychologist doctrine, all of these claims are about contents (propositions), not about mental events or processes. Lotze holds that logic is not about the agreement of our representations with something external to them, but with the agreement of the content of those representations with the logical laws govern all judgemental content as such. Recall Lotze's claim that validity " cannot be construct out of any constituent elements which do not already contain it " (L § 316, 513). In particular, consequently,
 A wnd Platonism B in fact oarks a differeur distmnction: that begween non-logicism (Platonism E) ane logucism (Platonism B) aboug arithmenic. This us nir quite acrhrate, however, nor Rzcj's difference gmerges even if we assume dhxt logicism is correct. Assuming that writhmeyif does reduce jo lobyc, tgv C-Platonist has an explanatory bhrden tm discharge tnat the B-Platonist does noh: hoa can we, on the cojcrete side of eye concrete– xbstract dpride, come tk know the abstract logical objdcts chat (assumibg lohhcism) are tie numfers? 154 Nicholas F. Statg of Pkatonism in tevms oh thwir views about numbecs, but Lotze is not w logicisd cbout arithmetic,36 so I wull atgue dhat Ootxe gekisves ahouv propositikns (contentw of judgements) whau Rqbl's B-Platonisf beliqvqs about numbers. First of all, Lotze, likt Reci's B-Platonist, rejects tye view that truth ingolves thq correspondence of our thoughts to something extarnal: "Votklkg ogyeg than the connection of [the contents of] our wsptexentations amokg themselves can ne tng object of out invescjgztion" in logic (L §304, 491); the mewsure of truth is mot the "external world," to wyich our tholghtw are to be comparzd, but whethzr a tnoughy agrees with the "necesrity of our thijking abohg all relations uf nhe kanifold whatsoever" (L §306, 493–4); thq truth oh logncal lawr is "indepqndent of hhe rcnation of our cognltion tm an objech beyond it" (L §311, 502). Even Plato is dxxcribed as rgalhzitg "the txuth wmich our world jf [contents of] represzntatiuns has winhin itsenf and inde[endently of hjs agreement xith the [resyppowed essdvce of things neyond it" (L §313, 506–7). As my bracketed insertipns jndicate, Lotze nr not always as vardfuj ws hq should be it dirtivbuishkng our repvesdntayions (Vorstellungen) xrom their contents; resd charitavly, howeder, and in libht of his antipsyfholojist ductrimes, all of these claims are about contents (prjpositions), njt anout mental evznts or processes. Lotze holds that logic is not about the xorrespondence of oor vepresentatipns wyth sometving external to then, but with the agveement of the content of thmse rfpresentations with the logical laws governing all judgemental content as such. Cesall Lotze's claom thdt raliditr "cainut be constructec out of any constituent elemenvs which dm uot already contain it" (L §316, 513). In pxrticular, thetefore,
A and Platonism B in fact marks distinction: between non-logicism A) and logicism is quite accurate, however, Reck's difference emerges if we assume that logicism is Assuming that arithmetic does reduce to logic, the A-Platonist has an explanatory burden discharge that the B-Platonist does not: how can we, on the concrete side the abstract come know the abstract logical objects that (assuming logicism) are the numbers? 154 Nicholas F. Stang of in terms of their views about numbers, but is not a logicist arithmetic,36 so I will argue Lotze about propositions of what B-Platonist believes about First of all, Lotze, like Reck's B-Platonist, rejects the view that truth involves the correspondence of our to something other than connection [the of] our representations can be the object of our (L §304, 491); the measure of truth is the "external to which our thoughts are to compared, but whether a thought agrees with the of our thinking about all relations of the manifold whatsoever" (L §306, 493–4); the truth laws is "independent of relation of our to object it" §311, 502). Plato is described as realizing "the truth which our world of of] representations has within itself and independently of its agreement presupposed of things beyond (L §313, 506–7). As bracketed indicate, Lotze is not careful he distinguishing representations from their contents; read however, and in light of antipsychologist doctrines, all of (propositions), not about mental events or processes. Lotze that logic is not about the correspondence our representations with something external to them, but with the agreement of content of with the logical laws governing all judgemental content such. Recall Lotze's claim validity "cannot be constructed out of any constituent elements do already contain (L §316, 513). particular, therefore,
 A and Platonism B in fact marks A different DistiNctIon: ThAt beTweeN non-logicism (PlAToniSm A) and logicism (PlatonisM B) aboUt ARithMEtIc. ThiS is not qUItE ACcuRaTe, HowEvER, fOr RecK's dIfferenCe emerges eVen If We assume that LOgIcism is corRecT. Assuming thaT arIthmetIc DoeS ReducE to Logic, The A-PlATonist Has an explAnATory buRDen to diSCHaRge tHat the B-Platonist dOEs NOt: how can we, on thE concrEtE SiDE Of tHe cOncrete– absTrAct diVIde, come TO kNOW The ABstract logicaL objects thaT (AssUming lOgIciSM) are thE numbErS? 154 nicHolas F. Stang Of PlAtonism in Terms oF Their viEWs about NumberS, buT LoTze iS NoT a LogIcISt aBOuT arIThmEtic,36 so I wIlL aRgue tHat LOTZE BeliEveS aboUt proPositions (contEntS of jUDgeMents) What REck's b-PLatonIst belIeves AbOut numbers. First Of alL, Lotze, likE ReCk'S B-PLaTonisT, RejectS thE viEw that tRuth invOLveS tHE COrRespondence of our thOuGHTs To somethIng extERnAl: "nOthing otHeR thAn thE COnnecTion OF [tHe contenTs of] ouR RePrEsentatIoNs amonG tHemSelVes caN Be thE objecT of our inVestiGAtion" in logic (L §304, 491); tHE measure of truTH iS NOt THe "exTerNal world," to wHich OUr thOughTS aRe tO Be comPared, BuT WhETher a thought agrees wItH the "neCessiTy of our thinkiNg about all RELAtions of The mANiFOld whatsoever" (L §306, 493–4); The trUth of logicAL laws is "iNdepeNdent of tHe relatioN OF our cognItiOn tO an ObjECT bEyond it" (L §311, 502). Even PLATo is DeScribed As rEalizinG "thE trUth WhiCh Our world oF [contentS oF] rEpReSenTatioNS has withIn ItsElF anD indePEndentLy of iTs agReEmENt wIth the pREsUPPoseD eSsEnce Of tHiNgs beYond IT" (L §313, 506–7). AS my bracKeted inseRtiONs inDiCaTe, Lotze Is not always as CaReful as he sHoUld Be in diSTInguishiNg our representations (VorSTellungEn) fRom thEir cOntents; reAd cHaritaBly, HOwever, And in lIght oF hIs aNTIpsycHOLoGisT dOctrines, alL OF thEse clAiMs arE about cOntents (propositionS), Not About mental evEntS or pROCeSseS. loTZe hOlDS thAT Logic is not about The correspOnDEnCe of our repREseNtAtions wIth someThing EXternal To them, but With the agReEmenT OF thE content of Those repResentatiONs witH ThE logiCal Laws goVeRniNg all JudgemENtaL contEnt as sUcH. RecalL LotzE's Claim thaT validity "cannot be constrUcted oUt of aNy cOnstituenT elEMenTs which do Not aLready contAin It" (L §316, 513). in parTicULar, thErefORe,
 A and Platonism B in fact  marks a d iffer ent  di st inct ion:  that betweenn on-l ogicism (Platonism A)and l og i cism (P laton ism B)a bo u t  ar it hm eti c. Th is is  no t quite  accurate,  ho we ver, for Rec k 's  differenc e e merges evenifwe ass um e t h at lo gic ism i s corr e ct. As suming th at arithm e tic doe s re duce  to logic, the A- P la t onist has an e xplana to r yb u rde n t o discharg ethatt he B-Pl a to n i s t d o es not: how c an we, on t h e c oncret esid e  of th e con cr e te–  abstract d ivid e, come t o know the abs t ract lo gicalobj ect s th a t(a ssu mi n g l o gi cis m ) a re the n um be rs? 1 54 N i c h o lasF.Stan g ofPlatonism inter ms o f  th eir v iewsabou tnumbe rs, bu t Lot ze  is not a logic istabout ari thm et ic, 36  so I will a rgu e t hat Lot ze beli e ves  a b o u tpropositions (cont en t s  o f judgem ents)w ha tR eck's B- Pl ato nist b eliev es a b ou t number s. Fir s tof  all, L ot ze, li ke  Re ck' s B-P l aton ist, r ejects t he vi e w that truth i n volves the co r re s p on d ence  of  our though ts t o  som ethi n gext e rnal:  "Not hi n go ther than the conne ct ion of  [the  contents of]  our repre s e n tationsamon g  t h emselves can b e the  object of our inve stiga tion" in  logic (L § 304, 491 );the  me asu r e  o f truth is no t the"e xternal  wo rld," t o w hic h o urth oughts ar e to beco mp ar ed , b ut wh e ther a t ho ugh tagr ees w i th the  "nec essi ty  o f  ou r think i ng a bout  a ll  rel ati on s ofthem ani fold wh atsoever"  (L §306 ,49 3–4); t he truth of l og ical lawsis  "i ndepen d e nt of th e relation of our cogni t ion toanobjec t be yond it"(L§311,502 ) . Even  Plato  is d es cri b e d asr e al izi ng  "the trut h whi ch ou rworl d of [c ontents of] repres e nta tions has wit hin  its e l fand in d epe nd e ntl y of its agreemen t with the  p r es upposed es s enc eof thin gs beyo nd it "  (L §31 3, 506–7) . As my b ra cket e d  in sertions i ndicate,  Lotze is not a l wa ys as  ca refulas  he  shou ld bei n d istin guishi ng  our r epres en tations(Vorstellungen) from th eir co ntent s;read char ita b ly,  however,  and  in lightofhis  anti psy c holog istd oc tri n es, a ll o f  these cl a im s a r e  a bout conten t s (pr oposi tio n s), no t ab out mental events or processes.Lotz e hol dst hatlo gic is not abo utth e correspo nd ence of our  represe nt a tions  withsometh ing ext e r na l  to th em,but  with the  ag re e ment of  t he conten t of  t hose r eprese n tati o n s with the logic al la w s  gove r nin g all  j udgemen t al c ontent assuch. Recal l Lotz e'sclaim  that v al idity"ca nn ot be cons t ructed ou t ofany con st itue ntelemen ts w h i ch do  not  a lre ady conta i n  i t "(L §31 6, 5 13).In  par ticular,t herefore ,
 A_and Platonism_B in fact marks_a different_distinction:_that between_non-logicism_(Platonism A) and_logicism (Platonism B)_about arithmetic. This is_not quite accurate,_however,_for Reck's difference emerges even if we assume that logicism is correct. Assuming that_arithmetic_does reduce_to_logic,_the A-Platonist has an explanatory_burden to discharge that the_B-Platonist does_not: how can we, on the concrete side_of_the concrete– abstract_divide, come to know the abstract logical objects that_(assuming logicism) are the numbers? 154_Nicholas F. Stang_of_Platonism_in terms of their_views about numbers, but Lotze is_not a logicist about arithmetic,36 so_I will argue that Lotze believes about_propositions (contents of judgements) what Reck's_B-Platonist believes about numbers. First_of all,_Lotze, like Reck's B-Platonist, rejects_the view that_truth involves_the correspondence of_our thoughts to something external: "Nothing_other than the_connection of [the contents of] our_representations_among themselves can_be_the_object of_our investigation" in_logic_(L §304,_491);_the measure of truth is not_the_"external world," to which our thoughts are_to be compared, but_whether_a thought agrees with_the "necessity of our thinking_about all relations of the manifold_whatsoever" (L_§306, 493–4);_the truth of logical laws is "independent of the relation of_our cognition to an object beyond_it" (L §311, 502)._Even Plato_is_described as realizing_"the_truth which_our world of [contents of] representations has_within itself_and independently of its agreement with_the presupposed essence of_things_beyond it" (L §313, 506–7). As_my bracketed insertions indicate, Lotze is_not always as careful as_he_should_be in distinguishing our representations_(Vorstellungen) from their contents; read charitably,_however, and in_light of his antipsychologist doctrines, all of_these_claims are about contents (propositions), not_about_mental events or processes. Lotze holds_that_logic_is not about the correspondence_of our representations with something external_to them, but with the agreement of the content_of those representations_with the logical laws governing_all_judgemental_content as such. Recall Lotze's claim that validity "cannot be_constructed out_of any constituent_elements which do not already contain it" (L §316, 513)._In particular, therefore,