 recognize a reflectance profile on the basis of the behavior of the surface in a minimal set of lighting conditions. Such a minimal set, moreover, is almost always available, as it exists when different nearby objects reflect differently on a surface (Ruppertsberg & Bloj 2007). In short, being capable of seeing colors then consists of being attuned to reflectance profiles, or to the changes in stimulation one would receive under various circumstances (see Phillipona & O'Regan 2006). This way of looking at color illustrates the overall sensorimotor take on the qualitative character of perceptual experience. The sensorimotor approach claims that both the character of sensory qualities within a modality, such as the difference between softness and hardness, as well as differences between the character of modalities as a whole, are determined by differences in classes of sensorimotor contingencies typical of perceptual interactions. The experiential quality of softness differs from the quality of hardness, because of the different effects of pressing or squeezing. Similary, touch differs from vision, among other things because tactile, but not visual experience of an object comes to an end when immediate bodily contact is lost. 5 In the different cases of application of the sensorimotor approach surveyed in the above, the notion of ―being attuned to sensorimotor contingencies‖ has played a prominent role. This raises questions about its precise meaning. What does it mean that a person is attuned to the sensorimotor contingencies of ―red‖ or ―softness‖? A way of answering that question offered in O'Regan and Noë (2001) appeals to the exercise of the ―mastery‖ or ―knowledge‖ of sensorimotor contingencies, building on the already mentioned characterization of ―vision as exploratory activity mediated by knowledge of sensorimotor contingencies.‖ A problem with an appeal to knowledge is that it allows a representational interpretation, while the representationalist framework was resisted in the context of inner simulacra accounting for expanded vision. On such an interpretation, having knowledge about sensorimotor contingencies involves representing those sensorimotor contingencies. Perhaps the specification, in O'Regan & Noë (2001) and elsewhere, that the knowledge is meant to be ―implicit,‖ is aimed at excluding such an interpretation in favor of an approach based on practical know-how, or skills. However, as pointed out by Daniel Hutto, insisting that knowledge is meant to be ―implicit‖
recognize a reflectance profile on the basis of the demeanor of the open in a minimal set of lighting condition. Such a minimal bent, moreover, is almost constantly available, as it exist when different nearby object reflect differently on a surface (Ruppertsberg & Bloj 2007). In brusque, being capable of seeing coloring material then consist of being attuned to reflectance profiles, or to the changes in stimulation one would pick up under various circumstances (see Phillipona & O'Regan 2006). This room of looking at color illustrates the overall sensorimotor take on the qualitative fictional character of perceptual experience. The sensorimotor approach claims that both the character of sensory qualities within a mood, such as the difference between softness and hardness, as well as differences between the character of modality as a whole, are determined by differences in classes of sensorimotor contingencies typical of perceptual interactions. The experiential quality of softness differs from the quality of hardness, because of the unlike consequence of pressing or squeeze. Similary, contact differs from vision, among other things because haptic, but not visual experience of an aim comes to an end when immediate bodily liaison is lost. 5 In the different cases of application of the sensorimotor approach surveyed in the above, the impression of ―being attuned to sensorimotor contingencies‖ has played a prominent role. This raises questions about its precise meaning. What does it mean that a person is attune to the sensorimotor eventuality of ―red‖ or ―softness‖? A way of answering that question offered in O'Regan and Noë (2001) appeal to the exercise of the ―mastery‖ or ―knowledge‖ of sensorimotor contingencies, building on the already mention characterization of ―vision as exploratory activity mediated by knowledge of sensorimotor contingencies.‖ A trouble with an appeal to knowledge is that it allows a representational interpretation, while the representationalist framework was defy in the context of inner simulacrum accounting for inflate vision. On such an rendition, having knowledge about sensorimotor contingencies necessitate representing those sensorimotor contingency. Perhaps the specification, in O'Regan & Noë (2001) and elsewhere, that the knowledge is meant to be ―implicit,‖ is aimed at excluding such an interpretation in favor of an approach establish on practical know - how, or skills. However, as indicate out by Daniel Hutto, insisting that knowledge is meant to be ―implicit‖
 refognize a reflectance prufile on the basis of vhe behzvior of the surface in a minimal sev of lighupng conditions. Such a minimal det, moreiver, us almost emways aycilabmc, as nt exists when dlfferent nedrby objects rafueet differently on a surface (Ruppertsferg & Bkou 2007). In short, beyng ba[abls of seeing colors then consists or being attuned to rrflectance profiles, or to hhe fhanges in stimulahion one woomd wwceive under various cpxcumstances (see Phillipona & O'Regan 2006). This wxy of looking aj dopmr illustraves thv overall sensorimotos take pn the qualitabive rharqcter of perceptual eeperience. The sensorymotor ap[rkach claims that vorh thg chasactde ow stnsprg qualltixs within a modality, sych as the differenve vetween softnsss anq rardness, as well as differences between ths character of modalitiws as a whole, are detgrmined by differences in classes of sensorimotor contingenwies vyoicco of owrfeptual interactions. The experiential quality kf spftness differf from the auwlojy of hardness, because kf the different evfects jf prwssing or squrezing. Similary, touch diffees from visijb, among other thinys because tcctile, but mot visual experience oy an ogject comes to an ens when immediate codply wontact is lost. 5 In the disferent ceses pf applkcatoon of the sensogimotor approach surveyef in jhe abmve, the nohion of ―being attuned to sensormkotor continbetcivs‖ has plcyed a prominent roje. This raises questijns acout its pgecise meening. What djes it mean tvwt a person ms attuneq to the sensorkootor contingemcies of ―geb‖ or ―softbess‖? A way of answcring fhat question oyyetwd in O'Regan amd Voë (2001) aipeels tj the exercisa of thd ―mastdry‖ or ―knowoddge‖ of sensorimotor condingsncies, building on tme alreadi mentionqd characteriaation of ―vision ad expnoretory sctyvity mediated by knowledge of sensorimltov contingenciqs.‖ A problem witk an appeal to knowledge is that it alloxs a representational ibterpretation, while uhe representetionajist framawork was resisted ib the context of lnner simulacra accounfing fmr exoanded vision. On such an interpretation, having knowledge about sensorimotir conviggencies inbolvrs reirefznting ehosx rensorimotor conningencies. Perhaps the specificavion, in O'Ragcn & Noë (2001) and elsewhere, that thr ynowledge is oeant to be ―implicit,‖ is zimed at excluding such an interpretatipn in favor of an approagh based in przctical knuw-how, or skills. Hoeever, cs poibted our by Daniel Hutto, inxidting thah knpwmedge is meant to be ―implicit‖
recognize a reflectance profile on the basis behavior the surface a minimal set minimal moreover, is almost available, as it when different nearby objects reflect differently a surface (Ruppertsberg & Bloj 2007). In short, being capable of seeing colors consists of being attuned to reflectance profiles, or to the changes in stimulation would under circumstances Phillipona & O'Regan 2006). This way of looking at color illustrates the overall sensorimotor take on qualitative character of perceptual experience. The sensorimotor approach that both the character sensory qualities within a modality, as difference between and as as differences between character of modalities as a whole, are determined by differences in classes of sensorimotor contingencies typical of interactions. The of softness from quality hardness, because of effects of pressing or squeezing. Similary, vision, among other things because tactile, but not experience of object comes to an end when bodily contact is lost. 5 In the different of application of the sensorimotor approach surveyed in the above, the notion of ―being attuned contingencies‖ has played a role. This raises about precise What it mean a person is attuned to the sensorimotor contingencies of ―red‖ or A way of answering that question offered in O'Regan and appeals the exercise of ―mastery‖ or ―knowledge‖ of contingencies, on the already mentioned ―vision exploratory knowledge sensorimotor A problem with an to knowledge is that it a representational interpretation, while in the context of inner simulacra accounting for vision. On such an interpretation, having knowledge sensorimotor contingencies involves representing those sensorimotor contingencies. Perhaps the specification, in O'Regan Noë (2001) that the knowledge is meant to be ―implicit,‖ aimed at excluding such interpretation in favor of an approach based on practical or However, as out by Daniel insisting that knowledge meant to be
 recognize a reflectance profIle on the baSis of The BehAvIor oF the Surface in a miniMAl seT of lighting conditions. SUch a mInIMal sET, mOreovEr, is almOSt ALWayS aVaIlaBlE, As It exiSts When difFerent nearBy oBjEcts reflect dIFfErently on a SurFace (RuppertsBerG & Bloj 2007). IN sHorT, Being CapAble oF seeinG Colors Then consiStS Of beinG Attuned TO ReFlecTance profiles, or to THe CHanges in stimulAtion oNe WOuLD RecEivE under variOuS circUMstanceS (SeE pHIllIPona & O'Regan 2006). ThiS way of lookiNG at Color iLlUstRAtes thE overAlL SenSorimotor taKe on The qualitAtive cHAracter OF percepTual exPerIenCe. ThE SeNsOriMoTOr aPPrOacH ClaIms that bOtH tHe chaRactER OF SensOry QualIties Within a modaliTy, sUch aS The DiffeRence BetwEeN softNess anD hardNeSs, as well as diffeRencEs between The ChAraCtEr of mODalitiEs aS a wHole, are DetermiNEd bY dIFFErEnces in classes of seNsORImOtor contIngencIEs TyPIcal of peRcEptUal iNTEractIons. tHe ExperienTial quALiTy Of softnEsS diffeRs FroM thE qualITy of HardneSs, becausE of thE Different effecTS of pressing or SQuEEZiNG. SimIlaRy, touch diffErs fROm viSion, AMoNg oTHer thIngs bEcAUsE Tactile, but not visual ExPerienCe of aN object comes tO an end when IMMEdiate boDily COnTAct is lost. 5 In the DiffeRent cases oF ApplicatIon of The sensoRimotor apPROach survEyeD in The AboVE, ThE notion of ―beinG ATtunEd To sensoRimOtor conTinGenCieS‖ haS pLayed a proMinent roLe. thIs RaIseS quesTIons abouT iTs pReCisE meanINg. What Does iT meaN tHaT A peRson is aTTuNED to tHe SeNsorImoToR contIngeNCieS of ―red‖ oR ―softness‖? a waY Of anSwErIng that Question offerEd In O'Regan anD NOë (2001) aPpeals TO The exercIse of the ―mastery‖ or ―knowleDGe‖ of senSorImotoR conTingencieS, buIlding On tHE alreaDy mentIoned ChAraCTErizaTIOn Of ―vIsIon as exploRATorY actiViTy meDiated bY knowledge of sensorIMotOr contingenciEs.‖ A ProbLEM wIth AN aPPeaL tO KnoWLEdge is that it allOws a represEnTAtIonal interPRetAtIon, whilE the repResenTAtionalIst framewOrk was resIsTed iN THe cOntext of inNer simulAcra accouNTing fOR eXpandEd vIsion. ON sUch An intErpretATioN, haviNg knowLeDge aboUt senSoRimotor cOntingencies involves repResentIng thOse SensorimoTor COntIngencies. perhAps the specIfiCatIon, in o'ReGAn & Noë (2001) And eLSeWheRE, that The kNOwledge is MEaNt tO BE ―iMplicit,‖ is aiMED At eXcludIng SUch an iNterPretation in favor oF An approach baseD on pRACtiCal KNow-hOw, Or skills. HoweveR, as PoINTed out by daNiel Hutto, inSisting tHaT KnowlEdge is Meant tO be ―implICIt‖
 recognize a reflectance p rofile onthe b asi s o fthebeha vior of the su r face  in a minimal set of l ighti ng cond i ti ons.Such am in i m alse t,  mo re o ve r, is  al most al ways avail abl e,  as it exist s  w hen differ ent  nearby obje cts  refle ct  di f feren tly  on a  surfa c e (Rup pertsberg  & Bloj 2 0 07). In s ho rt,being capable ofs ee i ng colors then  consi st s  o f bei ngattuned to  r eflec t ance pr o fi l e s , o r  to the chang es in stimu l ati on one  w oul d  recei ve un de r  va rious circu msta nces (see  Phill i pona &O 'Regan2006).  Th iswayo flo oki ng atc ol ori llu stratesth eovera ll s e n s o rimo tor  tak e onthe qualitati vechar a cte r ofperce ptua lexper ience.  These nsorimotor appr oach  claims t hat  b oth  t he ch a racter  of  se nsory q ualitie s  wi th i n amodality, such asth e di fference  betwe e nso f tness an dhar dnes s ,  as w ella sdifferen ces be t we en  the ch ar acterof  mo dal ities as a  whole , are de termi n ed by differen c es in classes of s en s orim oto r contingen cies typi calo fper c eptua l int er a ct i ons. The experienti al  quali ty of  softness dif fers fromt h e  quality  ofh ar d ness, becauseof th e differen t  effects  of p ressingor squeez i n g. Simil ary , t ouc h d i f fe rs from visio n ,  amo ng  otherthi ngs bec aus e t act ile ,but not v isual ex pe ri en ce  of  an o b ject com es  to  a n e nd wh e n imme diate  bod il yc ont act isl os t .  5 I nth e di ffe re nt ca seso f a pplicat ion of th e s e nsor im ot or appr oach surveyed  i n the abov e,  th e noti o n  of ―bei ng attuned to sensorimo t or cont ing encie s‖ h as played  apromin ent role.This r aises  q ues t i ons a b o ut  it sprecise me a n ing . Wha tdoes  it mea n that a person is att uned to the s ens orim o t or  co n ti n gen ci e s o f ―red‖ or ―softn ess‖? A wa yo fansweringt hat  q uestion  offere d inO 'Reganand Noë ( 2001) app ea ls t o the  exerciseof the ― mastery‖o r ―kn o wl edge‖  of  senso ri mot or co ntinge n cie s, bu ilding  o n thealrea dy  mention ed characterization of―visio n asexp loratoryact i vit y mediate d by  knowledge  of  se nsori mot o r con ting e nc ies . ‖ A p robl e m with an ap pea l to  knowledgei s tha t itall o ws a r epre sentational inter p retation, whil e th e rep res e ntat io nalist framewo rkwa s resisted  i n the conte xt of in ne r  simu lacraaccoun ting fo r ex p andedvisi on.  On suchanin t erpreta ti on ,  havin g kn ow ledgeabouts enso r i motor contingenc ies i n v olves rep resen ti ng thos e  sen sorimotorcontingenci es. Pe rhap s the  specif ic ation,  in  O 'Regan & N o ë (2001)and e lsewher e,  tha t t he kno wled g e  is m eant  t o b e ―implic i t ,‖ is  a i med  atexclu di ng s uch an in t erpretat ion in favo rofa n  appro a ch b ased on pr act icalk n ow-how, or skil l s. Howev er, as  point ed outb y D an iel Hut to, i nsistingthat know l edg eis m eant tobe  ―im pl ici t‖ 
 recognize_a reflectance_profile on the basis_of the_behavior_of the_surface_in a minimal_set of lighting_conditions. Such a minimal_set, moreover, is_almost_always available, as it exists when different nearby objects reflect differently on a surface_(Ruppertsberg_& Bloj_2007)._In_short, being capable of seeing_colors then consists of being_attuned to_reflectance profiles, or to the changes in stimulation_one_would receive under_various circumstances (see Phillipona & O'Regan 2006). This way_of looking at color illustrates the_overall sensorimotor take_on_the_qualitative character of perceptual_experience. The sensorimotor approach claims that_both the character of sensory qualities_within a modality, such as the difference_between softness and hardness, as well_as differences between the character_of modalities_as a whole, are determined_by differences in_classes of_sensorimotor contingencies typical_of perceptual interactions. The experiential quality_of softness differs_from the quality of hardness, because_of_the different effects_of_pressing_or squeezing._Similary, touch differs_from_vision, among_other_things because tactile, but not visual_experience_of an object comes to an end_when immediate bodily contact_is_lost. 5 In the_different cases of application of_the sensorimotor approach surveyed in the_above, the_notion of_―being attuned to sensorimotor contingencies‖ has played a prominent role. This_raises questions about its precise meaning._What does it mean_that a_person_is attuned to_the_sensorimotor contingencies_of ―red‖ or ―softness‖? A way of_answering that_question offered in O'Regan and Noë_(2001) appeals to the_exercise_of the ―mastery‖ or ―knowledge‖ of_sensorimotor contingencies, building on the already_mentioned characterization of ―vision as_exploratory_activity_mediated by knowledge of sensorimotor_contingencies.‖ A problem with an appeal_to knowledge is_that it allows a representational interpretation, while_the_representationalist framework was resisted in the_context_of inner simulacra accounting for expanded_vision._On_such an interpretation, having knowledge_about sensorimotor contingencies involves representing those_sensorimotor contingencies. Perhaps the specification, in O'Regan & Noë_(2001) and elsewhere,_that the knowledge is meant_to_be_―implicit,‖ is aimed at excluding such an interpretation in favor_of an_approach based on_practical know-how, or skills. However, as pointed out by Daniel_Hutto, insisting that knowledge is meant to_be ―implicit‖