Sm) we discussed in §3.1. The definition of the matter density is the same in both theories. However, they differ in the dynamics of the wave function. They also have different interpretations of the nature of probability. Third, there is the GRW theory with a flash ontology (GRWf), where the matter-density ontology is replaced by discrete events in space-time. 17 Both GRWf and GRWm postulate something fundamental and material in physical space-time. (The flash ontology and the matter-density ontology are called the primitive ontology in the literature.) The configuration of matter in space-time are derived from the universal wave function. So in principle we just need the information about the wave function to derive the information about everything else. Maudlin (2007) suggests that even though the GRW wave function is informationally complete in this sense, it should not be thought of as ontologically complete that all there is in the theory is the wave function. After all, which material ontology is privileged in the GRW theory? Is it the flash ontology or the matter-density ontology? They are two different ways to define the material ontology in space-time. A defender of GRW0 may respond that both ontologies can be taken as derivative physical structure that we can use to make precise the connection between theory and evidence. However, whether the response is acceptable may depend on one's view about primitive ontology. We can ask a similar question about the cosmic void scenario. Even though we can derive everything from the strongly deterministic laws, it only shows that the laws are informationally complete, and it does not follow that they are ontologically complete. It requires a further assumption and perhaps additional justification to postulate that the laws are all there is. At this point, a defender of the cosmic void scenario may appeal to Ockham's razor: it is more parsimonious to postulate just the strongly deterministic laws than to postulate both the laws plus some material ontology. This is different from the application of the razor in a merely deterministic universe: since we can derive all facts about the past and the future from the laws and the complete state of the universe at some time, perhaps we can get rid of all the other times (Maudlin 2007, p. 3153). We can care about minimizing the kinds of things without caring so much about minimizing the number of things in the same category. The application of Ockham's razor in the strongly deterministic universe gets rid of an entire category of things:
Sm) we discussed in § 3.1. The definition of the matter density is the like in both theory. However, they differ in the dynamics of the wave affair. They besides have different interpretations of the nature of probability. Third, there be the GRW theory with a flash ontology (GRWf), where the matter - concentration ontology is replace by discrete events in quad - time. 17 Both GRWf and GRWm postulate something cardinal and material in physical quad - time. (The flash ontology and the matter - concentration ontology are called the primitive ontology in the literature .) The configuration of topic in space - time are derived from the universal wave function. thus in principle we just need the information about the wave function to deduce the information about everything else. Maudlin (2007) suggests that even though the GRW wave function is informationally complete in this sense, it should not be thought of equally ontologically accomplished that all there is in the theory is the wave function. After all, which material ontology is privileged in the GRW theory? Is it the flash ontology or the matter - concentration ontology? They are two unlike ways to define the material ontology in quad - time. A defender of GRW0 may respond that both ontologies can be take as derivative physical structure that we can use to make accurate the connection between theory and evidence. However, whether the response is acceptable may depend on one's view about primitive ontology. We can ask a similar question about the cosmic void scenario. Even though we can derive everything from the powerfully deterministic laws, it entirely indicate that the laws are informationally complete, and it does not follow that they are ontologically accomplished. It requires a further assumption and perhaps extra justification to postulate that the law are all there is. At this point, a defender of the cosmic null scenario may appeal to Ockham's razor: it is more parsimonious to postulate just the strongly deterministic laws than to contend both the laws plus some fabric ontology. This is different from the application of the razor in a merely deterministic universe: since we can derive all fact about the past and the future from the laws and the complete state of the universe at some time, possibly we can get rid of all the other times (Maudlin 2007, p. 3153). We can manage about minimizing the kinds of things without caring so a lot about minimizing the number of thing in the same category. The application of Ockham's razor in the strongly deterministic universe gets rid of an entire category of thing:
Sm) ae discussed in §3.1. The deflnition of the mcrter dxnsity js the sxme in both theories. However, tyey duffer in the dynamics uf the wane functiin. Tiey also have dihrerent luterpdctatimis of the naturg of probabinity. Third, these id the GRW theory with a flash ontoljgy (GRWg), ahere the mattgr-denxyty kntology is replaced by discrete ebents ii space-time. 17 Boyh GRWf and GRWm postulate somfthing fundamental and materiql ig physical spxce-time. (Tht ylash ontolkgy and the matter-density ontolugy axe called tye prlkitive ontooogy pn the literablre.) The configiration of matber ii spqce-time are derived fcom the universal wade functimn. So in principle qe just neeg thd inworjavioh abouh tie wave fundtion to deeive the informatiom wvout everythihg elsq. Iaudlin (2007) suggests that even though the CRW wave function is infornationally complete ij this segse, it should not be thought of as ontologically womplxtd tkqt alu tjere is in the theory is the wave function. Afesr akl, which materlal ontology is provllrded in the GRD theoxg? Js it the flash onhology jr thw matter-dtnsitu ontology? They are two difderent ways no dwfine the material ontology iu spacg-time. S defender of GRW0 may rzspond that both lntologiea can be taken as degivadive physical structure thwt we can use to makd prgcise tre connectlon bcdween theory and egidenee. Hofever, whetjer the response is acceptable may depend on pna's niew abouc primltive ontology. Re can ask a snmilar qbestiov about thv cosmic toid scenarij. Even though ae can derivx everythyng drom the stfungly determinostic laws, it only whows that the lawx ate informationallv xomplete, and it dods gon fpljmw that they are ongplogizally complcte. It tequires a further avsumltion and perhaps sdqitional justifisation to posyulate that the laas arx all vhere os. Wt this point, a defender of ths cosmic goiq scenario mwy aipeaj to Ockhak's razor: it is more parsimonious to posvulate just the stronglt deterministic lawx than to poxtulaee both tve laws plus some marerial ontology. Tmis is different from fhe ap[licahion of the razor in a merely deterministic universe: since we can derive qll fartf about the pasy and tke yuture srom vhe laws and the bomplete state of the universe av some tima, 'erhaps we can get rid of all tfe other timer (Maudlin 2007, p. 3153). We can cars about kinimizing the kinds of things eithout caring so much anout mininizinf the numbxr of things in the xame cctegort. The appligation of Ockhxm's rwzor in tje suronyly deterministic universe gets rud of qn entire category of things:
Sm) we discussed in §3.1. The definition matter is the in both theories. dynamics the wave function. also have different of the nature of probability. Third, is the GRW theory with a flash ontology (GRWf), where the matter-density ontology replaced by discrete events in space-time. 17 Both GRWf and GRWm postulate something and in space-time. flash ontology and the matter-density ontology are called the primitive ontology in the literature.) The configuration matter in space-time are derived from the universal function. So in principle just need the information about wave to derive information everything Maudlin (2007) suggests even though the GRW wave function is informationally complete in this sense, it should not be thought as ontologically all there in theory the wave function. which material ontology is privileged in Is it the flash ontology or the matter-density They are different ways to define the material in space-time. A defender of GRW0 may respond both ontologies can be taken as derivative physical structure that we can use to make connection between theory and However, whether the is may on view about ontology. We can ask a similar question about the cosmic void Even though we can derive everything from the strongly deterministic only that the laws informationally complete, and it not that they are ontologically requires further additional to that the laws are there is. At this point, defender of the cosmic Ockham's razor: it is more parsimonious to postulate the strongly deterministic laws than to postulate the laws plus some material ontology. This is different from the application the razor merely deterministic universe: since we can derive all about the past and future from the laws and the complete state of universe some time, we can get of all the times (Maudlin 2007, We can about the without caring so much about minimizing number things in the same category. application razor in the strongly deterministic universe gets rid of an entire category of things:
Sm) we discussed in §3.1. The definitIon of the maTter dEnsIty Is The sAme iN both theories. HOWeveR, they differ in the dynamiCs of tHe WAve fUNcTion. THey also HAvE DIffErEnT inTeRPrEtatiOns Of the naTure of probAbiLiTy. Third, there IS tHe GRW theorY wiTh a flash ontoLogY (GRWf), wHeRe tHE mattEr-dEnsitY ontolOGy is rePlaced by dIsCRete evENts in spACE-tIme. 17 BOth GRWf and GRWm posTUlATe something funDamentAl ANd MATerIal In physical SpAce-tiME. (The flaSH oNTOLogY And the matter-dEnsity ontolOGy aRe callEd The PRimitiVe ontOlOGy iN the literatUre.) THe configuRation OF matter IN space-tIme are DerIveD froM ThE uNivErSAl wAVe FunCTioN. So in priNcIpLe we jUst nEED THe inForMatiOn aboUt the wave funcTioN to dERivE the iNformAtioN aBout eVerythIng elSe. maudlin (2007) suggests That Even thougH thE GrW wAvE funcTIon is iNfoRmaTionallY compleTE in ThIS SEnSe, it should not be thoUgHT Of As ontoloGicallY CoMpLEte that aLl TheRe is IN The thEory IS tHe wave fuNction. aFtEr All, whicH mAteriaL oNtoLogY is prIVileGed in tHe GRW theOry? Is IT the flash ontolOGy or the matter-DEnSITy ONtolOgy? they are two dIffeREnt wAys tO DeFinE The maTeriaL oNToLOgy in space-time. A defeNdEr of GRw0 may rEspond that botH ontologieS CAN be taken As deRIvATive physical stRuctuRe that we caN Use to makE precIse the coNnection bETWeen theoRy aNd eVidEncE. hOwEver, whether thE REspoNsE is accePtaBle may dEpeNd oN onE's vIeW about priMitive onToLoGy. we Can Ask a sIMilar queStIon AbOut The coSMic voiD scenArio. evEn THouGh we can DErIVE eveRyThIng fRom ThE stroNgly DEteRministIc laws, it oNly SHows ThAt The laws Are informatioNaLly completE, aNd iT does nOT Follow thAt they are ontologically cOMplete. IT reQuireS a fuRther assuMptIon and PerHAps addItionaL justIfIcaTIOn to pOSTuLatE tHat the laws ARE alL therE iS. At tHis poinT, a defender of the cosMIc vOid scenario maY apPeal TO ocKhaM'S rAZor: It IS moRE Parsimonious to pOstulate juSt THe Strongly deTErmInIstic laWs than tO postULate botH the laws pLus some maTeRial ONTolOgy. This is dIfferent From the apPLicatIOn Of the RazOr in a mErEly DeterMinistIC unIversE: since We Can derIve alL fActs abouT the past and the future froM the laWs and The Complete sTatE Of tHe universE at sOme time, perHapS we Can geT riD Of all The oTHeR tiMEs (MauDlin 2007, P. 3153). we can care ABoUt mINImIzing the kinDS OF thIngs wIthOUt cariNg so Much about minimiziNG the number of thIngs IN The SamE CateGoRy. The applicatiOn oF OCKHam's razoR iN the stronglY determiNiSTic unIverse Gets riD of an enTIRe CAtegorY of tHinGs:
Sm) we discussed in §3.1.The defini tionofthe  m atte r de nsity is the s a me i n both theories. Howev er, t he y  dif f er  in t he dyna m ic s ofth ewav ef un ction . T hey als o have dif fer en t interpreta t io ns of thenat ure of proba bil ity. T hi rd, there  is  theGRW th e ory wi th a flas ho ntolog y  (GRWf) , wh erethe matter-densit y  o n tology is repl aced b yd is c r ete  ev ents in sp ac e-tim e . 17 Bo t hG R W f a n d GRWm postul ate somethi n g f undame nt ala nd mat erial  i n  ph ysical spac e-ti me. (Theflasho ntology and the  matte r-d ens ityo nt ol ogy  a r e c a ll edt heprimitiv eon tolog y in t h e  lit era ture .) Th e configurati onof m a tte r inspace -tim eare d erived  from  t he universal wa ve f unction.Soin  pr in ciple we jus t n eed  the in formati o n a bo u t th e wave function to  d e r iv e the in format i on  a b out ever yt hin g el s e . Mau dlin (2 007) sug gestst ha teven th ou gh the  G RWwav e fun c tion  is in formatio nally complete in th i s sense, it s h ou l d  n o t be  th ought of as  ont o logi call y  c omp l ete t hat a ll th e re is in the theory  i s thewavefunction. Aft er all, wh i c h  materia l on t ol o gy is privileg ed in  the GRW t h eory? Is  it t he flash  ontology o r the ma tte r-d ens ity o nt ology? They a r e  two  d ifferen t w ays todef ine  th e m at erial ont ology in  s pa ce -t ime . A d e fender o fGRW 0may  resp o nd tha t bot h on to lo g ies  can be ta k e n as  d er ivat ive  p hysic al s t ruc ture th at we can  us e  toma ke  precis e the connect io n betweenth eor y ande v idence.However, whether the re s ponse i s a ccept able  may depe ndon one 'sv iew ab out pr imiti ve  on t o logy. W ecan  a sk a simil a r  qu estio nabou t the c osmic void scenari o . E ven though we  ca n de r i ve  ev e ry t hin gf rom t he strongly det erministic  l a ws , it onlys how sthat th e lawsare i n formati onally co mplete, a nd  itd o esnot follow  that th ey are on t ologi c al ly co mpl ete. I treq uires  a fur t her  assu mption  a nd per hapsad ditional  justification to postu late t hat t helaws areall the re is. At  thi s point, a  de fen der o f t h e cos micv oi d s c enari o ma y  appeal t o  O ckh a m 's  razor: iti s mor e par sim o niousto p ostulate just the strongly deter mini s t iclaw s  tha nto postulate b oth  t h e  laws pl us  some mater ial onto lo g y. Th is isdiffer ent fro m th e  appli cati onof the ra zor  i n  a mere ly  d e termin isti cuniver se: si n ce w e can derive all f actsa b out t h e p ast a nd  the fu t urefrom the l aws and the  compl etestate  of the  u nivers e a tsome time, perhaps w e can  get ri dof a llthe ot hert i mes ( Maud li n 2 007, p. 3 1 5 3) .  W ec ancare  abou tmini mizing th e  kinds o f t h ings wi th out c arings om u ch about m ini mizin g the number of t h in g s inthe sa me cat egory.T heap plicati ono f  Ockham's  razor in the  s tron gly dete rm inis ti c u ni verse gets ridof an en tire cat e g ory of  th i ngs: 
Sm) we_discussed in_§3.1. The definition of_the matter_density_is the_same_in both theories._However, they differ_in the dynamics of_the wave function._They_also have different interpretations of the nature of probability. Third, there is the GRW_theory_with a_flash_ontology_(GRWf), where the matter-density ontology_is replaced by discrete events_in space-time._17 Both GRWf and GRWm postulate something fundamental_and_material in physical_space-time. (The flash ontology and the matter-density ontology are_called the primitive ontology in the_literature.) The configuration_of_matter_in space-time are derived_from the universal wave function. So_in principle we just need the_information about the wave function to derive_the information about everything else. Maudlin_(2007) suggests that even though_the GRW_wave function is informationally complete_in this sense,_it should_not be thought_of as ontologically complete that all_there is in_the theory is the wave function._After_all, which material_ontology_is_privileged in_the GRW theory?_Is_it the_flash_ontology or the matter-density ontology? They_are_two different ways to define the material_ontology in space-time. A_defender_of GRW0 may respond_that both ontologies can be_taken as derivative physical structure that_we can_use to_make precise the connection between theory and evidence. However, whether the_response is acceptable may depend on_one's view about primitive_ontology. We_can_ask a similar_question_about the_cosmic void scenario. Even though we can_derive everything_from the strongly deterministic laws, it_only shows that the_laws_are informationally complete, and it does_not follow that they are ontologically_complete. It requires a further_assumption_and_perhaps additional justification to postulate_that the laws are all there_is. At this_point, a defender of the cosmic void_scenario_may appeal to Ockham's razor: it_is_more parsimonious to postulate just the_strongly_deterministic_laws than to postulate both_the laws plus some material ontology._This is different from the application of the razor_in a merely_deterministic universe: since we can_derive_all_facts about the past and the future from the laws_and the_complete state of_the universe at some time, perhaps we can get rid_of all the other times (Maudlin 2007,_p. 3153). We can care about minimizing the kinds of things_without caring so much about minimizing the number_of things in the same category. The_application of Ockham's razor_in_the strongly deterministic universe gets rid of_an_entire_category_of things: