2S), particular, not universal, inexact, not precise (1094b20-2S), difficult, not easy (l106b30-3S). In a similar manner Heidegger suggests an ethics that will accord more with the human world, that will renounce the comfortable, undisturbed, lofty distances of moral theories that in their insulation foreclose any realization of ethical possibilities in the actual experience of finite conditions. 12 One interesting connection in this regard is that between Verstehen (Heidegger's notion of prereflective understanding) and Aristotle's phronesis or practical wisdom. Phronesis is an inexact, deliberative finesse that guides our actions regarding a desired end (telos), that for the sake of which (hou heneka) we act. Here the human good involves natural potentialities that we strive to actualize through deliberative choices. This fits Heidegger's sense of Verstehen, which is connected with Seinkonnen (Dasein's potentiality-for-being), and das Umwillen (the for-thesake-of that animates Dasein's actions). Ethics, for Aristotle, involves human potentials and the means and conditions needed to actualize these ends. A similar kind of ethical developmentalism can be read out of Being and Time, although there we notice a radicalization of Aristotle's formulations. The Kierkegaardian influences in Being and Time show an even more dynamic, open, and contingent atmosphere than Aristotle would allow. For Heidegger, Dasein's potentiality is never filled up in any way or even compensated for by the comfort taken in a metaphysics of divine actuality. Dasein is potentiality, and so full actuality is ruled out in principle. Moreover, despite the acceptance of tradition in Heidegger's analysis, the notion of authenticity opens up issues relating to the tension between individuation and conformity, which goes far beyond the gesture toward particularity in Aristotle and which presents a more contemporary range of ethical topics regarding how we should engage social norms and controls. The focus on potentiality in Being and Time permits two basic applications that pertain to ethics. First, so many of our values address the supports for and obstacles to human development (e.g., homelife, child rearing, meaningful work,!OSee John van Buren, "The Young Heidegger, AIistotle, Ethics," in Ethics and Danger, pp. 169-85. See also Robert Bernasconi, "Heidegger
2S), particular, not universal, inexact, not precise (1094b20 - 2S), difficult, not comfortable (l106b30 - 3S). In a exchangeable manner Heidegger suggests an ethics that will harmonize more with the human world, that will disown the comfortable, undisturbed, lofty distances of moral theory that in their insulation foreclose any realization of ethical possibility in the actual experience of finite conditions. 12 One interesting connection in this esteem is that between Verstehen (Heidegger's notion of prereflective understanding) and Aristotle's phronesis or virtual wisdom of solomon. Phronesis is an inexact, deliberative finesse that guides our military action regarding a desired goal (telos), that for the sake of which (hou heneka) we act. Here the human good involves lifelike potentialities that we strive to realize through deliberative choices. This suit Heidegger's sense of Verstehen, which is connected with Seinkonnen (Dasein's potentiality - for - being), and das Umwillen (the for - thesake - of that animates Dasein's action). Ethics, for Aristotle, involves human potentials and the means and conditions need to actualize these ends. A similar kind of ethical developmentalism can be read out of Being and Time, although there we notice a radicalization of Aristotle's formulations. The Kierkegaardian influences in Being and Time show an even more dynamic, exposed, and contingent atmosphere than Aristotle would allow. For Heidegger, Dasein's capability is never occupy up in any way or even compensated for by the comfort take in a metaphysics of divine actuality. Dasein is potentiality, and so full actuality is rule out in principle. Moreover, despite the acceptance of tradition in Heidegger's analysis, the notion of authenticity open up issues relating to the tension between individuation and conformity, which goes far beyond the gesture toward particularity in Aristotle and which salute a more contemporary range of ethical topics regarding how we should engage social norm and controls. The focus on potentiality in Being and Time allow two basic applications that pertain to ethics. First, indeed many of our values cover the supports for and obstacles to human development (e.g., homelife, child rearing, meaningful work,!OSee John van Buren, " The Young Heidegger, AIistotle, Ethics, " in Ethics and Danger, pp. 169 - 85. attend also Robert Bernasconi, " Heidegger
2S), pwrticular, not universal, lnexact, not precnwe (1094b20-2S), vifficumt, not exsy (l106b30-3S). In a similar manner Ieidwgger suggests an ethics thxt will abcord morw wiuh the human worlv, that wljl rskouncz vhe comfortable, undisturbad, lofty distatcds of moral theories that in their infulatiom voreclose any tealieatyon kf ethical possibilities in the acfual exkerience of finite conditions. 12 One interestijg clnnection in this gegard is tyat fwtween Verstdhen (Heidegger's notion of prereflective understanding) and Cristotle's kkeonfvis or pracvical risdom. Phroncxis is an inecact, deliberatlve fmneswe that guides our acvions regarding a defired end (tzlos), that for the sakw if whhch (vou fwneya) se adt. Herf tie human gokd involves natural potentialiuief that we stribe to wceualize through deliberative choices. Thps fjts Heidegger's sense of Verstehen, which is clnnected rith Seinkonnen (Dasein's potentiality-for-being), and gas Ujdiloek (thd flr-thesake-of that animates Dasein's actions). Ethyds, fpr Aristotle, ikvolves human potemtlakf and the meavs and cohditions needed to actualyze tyese ends. A somilar kind of ethical deveoopmentalism xan be read out of Being and Cime, akthoubh there we notice a rabicaliaation of Agistotle's wormulations. The Kivrkecaardian influences in Beigg and Tine skow an exen kore drnamic, opej, and contingent atmosphfre tkan Asistotle wluld allow. For Heidegger, Dasein's potentiality iv nvver fillzd up ln any way or eden compensateb for by the zomfort taien in e metaphysicf of divine awjuality. Daseii is potegtiaoity, and so wull actuality is ruled out in prunciple. Moreover, dcspitg fhe acceptance if urqdition in Heicegeer'f wnelysif, the notion mf ajthdmticigy opens up kssurs relating to the tansikn between individiabion and xonformiey, which goes far beyond the gedture toxard psrtycularity in Aristotle and whidh presenhs w more conteiporqry range of ethical topics regarding how we should engage social notms and controls. The yogus on potenvialitr in Beinc and Time permits tqo basic applicatlons that pertain to efhics. Xirst, so many of our values address the supports for and obstacles to human decelopmxne (e.g., homelire, cnild geaxiny, meaniggfup work,!OSee John vsn Buren, "The Young Heidegger, AImstotle, Etvies," in Ethics and Danger, pp. 169-85. Sre also Robert Cernasconi, "Heidegger
2S), particular, not universal, inexact, not precise not (l106b30-3S). In similar manner Heidegger accord with the human that will renounce comfortable, undisturbed, lofty distances of moral that in their insulation foreclose any realization of ethical possibilities in the actual of finite conditions. 12 One interesting connection in this regard is that between (Heidegger's of understanding) Aristotle's phronesis or practical wisdom. Phronesis is an inexact, deliberative finesse that guides our actions regarding desired end (telos), that for the sake of (hou heneka) we act. the human good involves natural that strive to through choices. fits Heidegger's sense Verstehen, which is connected with Seinkonnen (Dasein's potentiality-for-being), and das Umwillen (the for-thesake-of that animates Dasein's actions). for Aristotle, potentials and means conditions to actualize these similar kind of ethical developmentalism can of Being and Time, although there we notice radicalization of formulations. The Kierkegaardian influences in Being Time show an even more dynamic, open, and atmosphere than Aristotle would allow. For Heidegger, Dasein's potentiality is never filled up in any even compensated for by comfort taken in metaphysics divine Dasein potentiality, and full actuality is ruled out in principle. Moreover, despite the acceptance tradition in Heidegger's analysis, the notion of authenticity opens up to tension between individuation conformity, which goes far the toward particularity in Aristotle presents more ethical regarding we should engage social and controls. The focus on in Being and Time pertain to ethics. First, so many of our address the supports for and obstacles to development (e.g., homelife, child rearing, meaningful work,!OSee John van Buren, "The Young AIistotle, Ethics," and Danger, pp. 169-85. See also Robert Bernasconi,
2S), particular, not universal, inExact, not prEcise (1094B20-2S), dIffIcUlt, nOt eaSy (l106b30-3S). In a similaR MannEr Heidegger suggests an eThics ThAT wilL AcCord mOre with THe HUMan WoRlD, thAt WIlL renoUncE the comFortable, unDisTuRbed, lofty disTAnCes of moral TheOries that in tHeiR insulAtIon FOreclOse Any reAlizatIOn of etHical possIbILities IN the actUAL eXperIence of finite condITiONs. 12 One interestiNg connEcTIoN IN thIs rEgard is thaT bEtweeN verstehEN (HEIDEggER's notion of preReflective uNDerStandiNg) And aRistotLe's phRoNEsiS or practicaL wisDom. PhroneSis is aN Inexact, DEliberaTive fiNesSe tHat gUIdEs Our AcTIonS ReGarDIng A desired EnD (tElos), tHat fOR THE sakE of WhicH (hou hEneka) we act. HerE thE humAN goOd invOlves NatuRaL poteNtialiTies tHaT we strive to actuAlizE through dEliBeRatIvE choiCEs. This FitS HeIdegger'S sense oF verStEHEN, wHich is connected witH SEINkOnnen (DasEin's poTEnTiALity-for-bEiNg), aNd daS uMwillEn (thE FoR-thesake-Of that ANiMaTes DaseIn'S actioNs). ethIcs, For ArIStotLe, invoLves humaN poteNTials and the meaNS and conditionS NeEDEd TO actUalIze these endS. A siMIlar Kind OF eThiCAl devElopmEnTAlISm can be read out of BeiNg And TimE, althOugh there we noTice a radicALIZation of arisTOtLE's formulations. the KiErkegaardiAN influenCes in being and time show aN EVen more dYnaMic, OpeN, anD COnTingent atmospHERe thAn aristotLe wOuld allOw. FOr HEidEggEr, dasein's poTentialiTy Is NeVeR fiLled uP In any way Or EveN cOmpEnsatED for by The coMforT tAkEN in A metaphYSiCS Of diViNe ActuAliTy. daseiN is pOTenTiality, And so full ActUAlitY iS rUled out In principle. MoReOver, despitE tHe aCceptaNCE of tradiTion in Heidegger's analysiS, The notiOn oF authEntiCity opens Up iSsues rElaTIng to tHe tensIon beTwEen INDividUATiOn aNd Conformity, WHIch Goes fAr BeyoNd the geSture toward particuLAriTy in Aristotle And WhicH PReSenTS a MOre CoNTemPORary range of ethiCal topics rEgARdIng how we shOUld EnGage socIal normS and cONtrols. THe focus on PotentialItY in BEINg aNd Time permIts two baSic applicATions THaT pertAin To ethiCs. firSt, so mAny of oUR vaLues aDdress ThE suppoRts foR aNd obstacLes to human development (e.g., HomeliFe, chiLd rEaring, meaNinGFul Work,!OSee JOhn vAn Buren, "The youNg HEidegGer, aiistoTle, ETHiCs," iN ethicS and dAnger, pp. 169-85. SeE AlSo ROBErT Bernasconi, "hEIDegGer
2S), particular, not unive rsal, inex act,not  pr ec ise(109 4b20-2S), diff i cult , not easy (l106b30-3S ). In  a simi l ar  mann er Heid e gg e r  su gg es tsan et hicstha t willaccord mor e w it h the humanw or ld, that w ill  renounce th e c omfort ab le, undis tur bed,loftyd istanc es of mor al theori e s thati n  t heir  insulation forec l os e  any realizati on ofet h ic a l  po ssi bilities i nthe a c tual ex p er i e n ceo f finite cond itions. 12O neintere st ing connec tionin thi s regard is  tha t between  Verst e hen (He i degger' s noti onofprer e fl ec tiv eu nde r st and i ng)  and Ari st ot le'sphro n e s i s or  pr acti cal w isdom. Phrone sis  isa n i nexac t, de libe ra tivefiness e tha tguides our acti onsregarding  ade sir ed  end( telos) , t hat  for th e sakeo f w hi c h (h ou heneka) we act.  H e r ethe huma n good in vo l ves natu ra l p oten t i aliti es t h at  we stri ve toa ct ua lize th ro ugh de li ber ati ve ch o ices . This  fits He idegg e r's sense of V e rstehen, whic h  i s co n nect edwith Seinko nnen (Das ein' s  p ote n tiali ty-fo r- b ei n g), and das Umwille n(the f or-th esake-of that  animatesD a s ein's ac tion s ). Ethics, for Ar istot le, involv e s humanpoten tials an d the mea n s  and con dit ion s n eed e d  t o actualize t h e se e nd s. A si mil ar kind  of  et hic alde velopment alism ca nbe  r ea d o ut of Being an dTim e,  al thoug h  there  we n otic ear adi calizat i on o f Ar is to tle' s f or mulat ions .  Th e Kierk egaardian  in f luen ce sin Bein g and Time sh ow  an even m or e d ynamic , open, an d contingent atmosphere than Ar ist otlewoul d allow.For  Heide gge r , Dase in's p otent ia lit y is ne v e rfil le d up in an y way  or e ve n co mpensat ed for by the comf o rttaken in a me tap hysi c s  o f d i vi n e a ct u ali t y . Dasein is pot entiality,  a n dso full ac t ual it y is ru led out  in p r inciple . Moreove r, despit ethea c cep tance of t radition  in Heide g ger's an alysi s,the no ti onof au thenti c ity  open s up i ss ues re latin gto the t ension between individu ationand c onf ormity, w hic h  go es far be yond  the gestu retow ard p art i cular ityi nAri s totle  and which pre s en tsa mo re contempo r a r y r angeofe thical  top ics regarding how we should enga ge s o c ial  no r ms a nd  controls. The  fo cu s on poten ti ality in Be ing andTi m e per mits t wo bas ic appl i c at i ons th at p ert ain to et hic s. First,so  m a ny ofourva lues a ddress thes u pports for and o bstac l e s toh uma n dev el opment( e.g. , homelife , child rea ring,mean ingfu l work, !O See Jo hnva n Buren, " T he YoungHeide gger, A Ii stot le,  Ethic s,"i n  Ethi cs a nd  Da nger, pp. 1 69 - 85 .S eealso  Robe rt  Ber nasconi," Heidegge r
2S), particular,_not universal,_inexact, not precise (1094b20-2S),_difficult, not_easy_(l106b30-3S). In_a_similar manner Heidegger_suggests an ethics_that will accord more_with the human_world,_that will renounce the comfortable, undisturbed, lofty distances of moral theories that in their_insulation_foreclose any_realization_of_ethical possibilities in the actual_experience of finite conditions. 12_One interesting_connection in this regard is that between Verstehen_(Heidegger's_notion of prereflective_understanding) and Aristotle's phronesis or practical wisdom. Phronesis is_an inexact, deliberative finesse that guides_our actions regarding_a_desired_end (telos), that for_the sake of which (hou heneka)_we act. Here the human good_involves natural potentialities that we strive to_actualize through deliberative choices. This fits_Heidegger's sense of Verstehen, which_is connected_with Seinkonnen (Dasein's potentiality-for-being), and_das Umwillen (the_for-thesake-of that_animates Dasein's actions)._Ethics, for Aristotle, involves human potentials_and the means_and conditions needed to actualize these_ends._A similar kind_of_ethical_developmentalism can_be read out_of_Being and_Time,_although there we notice a radicalization_of_Aristotle's formulations. The Kierkegaardian influences in Being_and Time show an_even_more dynamic, open, and_contingent atmosphere than Aristotle would_allow. For Heidegger, Dasein's potentiality is_never filled_up in_any way or even compensated for by the comfort taken in_a metaphysics of divine actuality. Dasein_is potentiality, and so_full actuality_is_ruled out in_principle._Moreover, despite_the acceptance of tradition in Heidegger's analysis,_the notion_of authenticity opens up issues relating_to the tension between_individuation_and conformity, which goes far beyond_the gesture toward particularity in Aristotle_and which presents a more_contemporary_range_of ethical topics regarding how_we should engage social norms and_controls. The focus_on potentiality in Being and Time permits_two_basic applications that pertain to ethics._First,_so many of our values address_the_supports_for and obstacles to human_development (e.g., homelife, child rearing, meaningful_work,!OSee John van Buren, "The Young Heidegger, AIistotle, Ethics,"_in Ethics and_Danger, pp. 169-85. See also_Robert_Bernasconi,_"Heidegger