 order to unmask the merchant's fallacious arguments in favour of aggressive commercial policies. But, nevertheless, social science still needs some substitute for the 'law of nature' – for example, the impartial spectator – as a standard against which to assess the appropriateness of custom and laws. 7 Let us now see how this strategy works in The Wealth of Nations. The work is both an example – perhaps the best – of those treatises on 'commerce' I have mentioned and a sustained political argument for legislative change that would bring about a more equitable and humane society. Smith endorses Montesquieu's idea that commerce is less obnoxious than war – that is, that wealth-seeking activities provide channels into which passions may be directed towards goals that are less destructive than several other goals. In addition, he declares that the 'desire of bettering our condition' (Smith 1776: 341) is a ubiquitous calm passion providing a spring of action generally beneficial to both the individual and the community, and even more disorderly passions such as 'ambition' or dreams of wealth and luxury (Smith 1759: 50, 149, 181–3) can have unintended beneficial effects such as promoting the growth of the wealth of the nation and improving the condition of the worst off (Smith 1759: 183–5). The'system of natural liberty' he advocates is not a top-down programme but rather a non-artificial set of regulations justified by widely shared judgments (Smith 1776: 687) which, once 'natural liberty' is recognized for manual labourers no less than for merchants (Smith 1776: 99), will gradually bring about redistributive effects close enough to those an impartial spectator would desire to see. All this depends on a more sophisticated framework than most commentators suspected. As argued above, political economy was understood as an auxiliary discipline of natural jurisprudence and thus a kind of indirectly normative discourse. According to this view, a system of moral and legal rules – emerging through a non-artificial process – is one side of any social system, whose other side is a system of causal chains leading to the emergence of some kind of social order. In the jargon of twentieth-century social science, society is a system regulated by two subsystems, the former being the total sum of individual noncoordinated actions yielding unintended results such as the division of labour and market mechanisms, and the latter being the joint effect of numberless cases of 'change of situation' yielded by the
order to unmask the merchant's fallacious arguments in favour of aggressive commercial policy. But, however, social science still need some stand-in for the' law of nature' – for example, the impartial spectator pump – as a criterion against which to assess the appropriateness of custom and laws. 7 Let us now experience how this strategy works in The Wealth of Nations. The study is both an case – perhaps the best – of those treatises on' commerce' I have mentioned and a free burning political argument for legislative change that would bring about a more equitable and humanist society. Smith endorses Montesquieu's idea that commerce is less obnoxious than war – that is, that wealth - seek activities provide channels into which passions may be directed towards goal that are less destructive than several other goals. In addition, he declares that the' desire of bettering our condition' (Smith 1776: 341) is a ubiquitous calm passion providing a spring of action generally beneficial to both the individual and the community, and even more disorderly passions such as' ambition' or dream of wealth and luxury (Smith 1759: 50, 149, 181–3) can have unintended beneficial effects such as advertise the emergence of the wealth of the nation and improving the circumstance of the worst off (Smith 1759: 183–5). The'system of lifelike liberty' he advocates is not a top - down programme but preferably a non - artificial set of regulations justified by widely shared judgments (Smith 1776: 687) which, once' natural liberty' is recognized for manual labourers no less than for merchants (Smith 1776: 99), will gradually fetch about redistributive effects near enough to those an impartial spectator would desire to see. All this depends on a more advanced framework than most commentators suspected. As argued above, political economy was understood as an auxiliary discipline of natural jurisprudence and thus a kind of indirectly prescriptive discourse. According to this view, a system of moral and legal rules – emerge through a non - artificial process – is one slope of any social system, whose early side is a system of causal chain leading to the emergence of some kind of social club. In the jargon of twentieth - hundred social science, society is a system regulate by two subsystems, the former being the total sum of individual noncoordinated actions yield unintended results such as the division of labor and market mechanisms, and the latter being the joint impression of numberless cases of' change of situation' concede by the
 orfer to unmask the merchakt's fallacious atgyments in fabour of xggressive commercial policixs. Byt, necertheless, social scievce still needs sime wybstitute hkr the 'law of katurz' – for example, tme impartian spectator – av x dtandard against which to assess thq approlrlateness of cuftom wnd maws. 7 Let us now see how this strafegy wogks in The Wealth of Nations. The work is bohh aj example – perhaps the best – if trise treatiser on 'commegee' I have mgntioned and a sustained politicxl aryument for oetispdtive changx that would bring about a more eauitable and hmmane soxiety. Smith endorses Kontesquieu's idea jhat commescz is less obnoxious tyab war – thdt ir, thxt seeltg-seekijg ectivities lrovide chabnels into which paxsyins may be didected tjwards goals that are less destructive uhan aeveral other goals. In qddition, he declares jhat the 'dqsire of bettering our condition' (Smith 1776: 341) is a ubixuitons caom oqsdion providing a spring of action generally bqhegibial to both the lndividual and the clmkonity, and even more bjskrderly passions skch as 'wmbituon' or drtams pf wealth and luxury (Smith 1759: 50, 149, 181–3) can have ynintended beneficnal effects ruch as ptomoting the growth of che wezlth of the nation aha improving the zoncidion of ufe worst off (Smitr 1759: 183–5). The'sywtem of natjral liberey' he advofates is not a top-down pgogralma but rathfr a non-artificial set of regulevions justifigd ty fidely skared mudgments (Smith 1776: 687) which, once 'uatural jibergy' is recofnized hor manual lwbourers no lads than for kerchantf (Smuth 1776: 99), will efadually bring about rebnstributice effects close ekough fo those an impcxtual spectator wpula dqspre tj see. All thiv deoenax on x more sophlstkcatrd framework than movt ckmmentators suspecyeq. As argoed above, political ecpnomy was understold as an auxikiaty discipline of natural jurispdudence ajd bhus a kind os ineirectly norkative discourse. According to this view, a system of moral and legal rules – ektrging througi a nog-artificidl process – is one sude of any social system, whose other sjde is a sydtem of causal chains leading to the emergence of some kind of social ordwr. In vhq jargon of twemtietv-czntbry socyal drience, society is a system regulated by two subsbstems, the fjrmer being the total sum of ivdividual nonzoordinated actions yielsing unimtended results such as the divosion of labour and markct mechanusms, znd thv letter being the joiny effeet of bumberlwss gases of 'changd og dituation' yiekdzd by the
order to unmask the merchant's fallacious arguments of commercial policies. nevertheless, social science the of nature' – example, the impartial – as a standard against which assess the appropriateness of custom and laws. 7 Let us now see how strategy works in The Wealth of Nations. The work is both an example perhaps best of treatises on 'commerce' I have mentioned and a sustained political argument for legislative change that would about a more equitable and humane society. Smith Montesquieu's idea that commerce less obnoxious than war – is, wealth-seeking activities channels which may be directed goals that are less destructive than several other goals. In addition, he declares that the 'desire of our condition' 341) is ubiquitous passion a spring of beneficial to both the individual and even more disorderly passions such as 'ambition' or of wealth luxury (Smith 1759: 50, 149, 181–3) have unintended beneficial effects such as promoting the of the wealth of the nation and improving the condition of the worst off (Smith The'system of natural liberty' advocates is not top-down but a set of justified by widely shared judgments (Smith 1776: 687) which, once 'natural is recognized for manual labourers no less than for merchants 99), gradually bring about effects close enough to an spectator would desire to this on framework most suspected. As argued above, economy was understood as an discipline of natural jurisprudence indirectly normative discourse. According to this view, a of moral and legal rules – emerging a non-artificial process – is one side of any social system, whose side is of causal chains leading to the emergence of kind of social order. the jargon of twentieth-century social science, society is a regulated two subsystems, former being the sum of individual actions yielding unintended as the of and the latter being the joint effect numberless of 'change of situation' yielded the
 order to unmask the merchant's Fallacious ArgumEntS in FaVour Of agGressive commerCIal pOlicies. But, nevertheless, SociaL sCIencE StIll neEds some SUbSTItuTe FoR thE 'lAW oF natuRe' – fOr exampLe, the imparTiaL sPectator – as a sTAnDard againsT whIch to assess tHe aPproprIaTenESs of cUstOm and Laws. 7 LeT Us now sEe how this StRAtegy wORks in ThE wEaLth oF Nations. The work is BOtH An example – perhaPs the bEsT – Of THOse TreAtises on 'coMmErce' I HAve mentIOnED ANd a SUstained politIcal argumenT For LegislAtIve CHange tHat woUlD BriNg about a morE equItable and Humane SOciety. SMIth endoRses MoNteSquIeu's IDeA tHat CoMMerCE iS leSS obNoxious tHaN wAr – thaT is, tHAT WEaltH-seEkinG actiVities provide ChaNnelS IntO whicH passIons MaY be diRected TowarDs Goals that are lesS desTructive tHan SeVerAl Other GOals. In AddItiOn, he decLares thAT thE 'dESIRe Of bettering our condItION' (SMith 1776: 341) is a uBiquitOUs CaLM passion PrOviDing A SPring Of acTIoN generalLy beneFIcIaL to both ThE indivIdUal And The coMMuniTy, and eVen more dIsordERly passions sucH As 'ambition' or dREaMS Of WEaltH anD luxury (SmitH 1759: 50, 149, 181–3) can HAve uNintENdEd bENeficIal efFeCTs SUch as promoting the grOwTh of thE wealTh of the nation And improviNG THe conditIon oF ThE Worst off (Smith 1759: 183–5). THe'sysTem of naturAL liberty' He advOcates is Not a top-doWN ProgrammE buT raTheR a nON-ArTificial set of REGulaTiOns justIfiEd by widEly ShaRed JudGmEnts (Smith 1776: 687) Which, oncE 'nAtUrAl LibErty' iS RecognizEd For MaNuaL laboURers no Less tHan fOr MeRChaNts (SmitH 1776: 99), WiLL GradUaLlY briNg aBoUt redIstrIButIve effeCts close eNouGH to tHoSe An imparTial spectator WoUld desire tO sEe. ALl this DEPends on a More sophisticated framewORk than mOst CommeNtatOrs suspecTed. as arguEd aBOve, polItical EconoMy Was UNDerstOOD aS an AuXiliary disCIPliNe of nAtUral JurisprUdence and thus a kind OF inDirectly normaTivE disCOUrSe. ACCoRDinG tO ThiS VIew, a system of morAl and legal RuLEs – Emerging thROugH a Non-artiFicial pRocesS – Is one siDe of any soCial systeM, wHose OTHer Side is a sysTem of cauSal chains LEadinG To The emErgEnce of SoMe kInd of Social ORdeR. In thE jargoN oF twentIeth-cEnTury sociAl science, society is a systEm reguLated By tWo subsystEms, THe fOrmer beinG the Total sum of IndIviDual nOncOOrdinAted ACtIonS YieldIng uNIntended rESuLts SUCh As the divisiON OF laBour aNd mARket meChanIsms, and the latter bEIng the joint effEct oF NUmbErlESs caSeS of 'change of sitUatIoN' YIelded by ThE
 order to unmask the merch ant's fall aciou s a rgu me ntsin f avour of aggre s sive  commercial policies.But,ne v erth e le ss, s ocial s c ie n c e s ti ll  ne ed s  s ome s ubs titutefor the 'l awof  nature' – f o rexample, t heimpartial sp ect ator –  a s a stand ard  agai nst wh i ch toassess th ea ppropr i ateness o fcust om and laws. 7 Le t  u s  now see how t his st ra t eg y wor ksin The Wea lt h ofN ations. Th e w ork is both an ex ample – per h aps  the b es t – of tho se tr ea t ise s on 'comme rce'  I have m ention e d and a sustain ed pol iti cal  arg u me nt  fo rl egi s la tiv e  ch ange tha two uld b ring a b o ut a  mo re e quita ble and human e s ocie t y.Smith  endo rses  M ontes quieu' s ide athat commerce i s le ss obnoxi ous  t han  w ar –t hat is , t hat  wealth -seekin g  ac ti v i t ie s provide channels  i n t owhich pa ssions ma yb e direct ed  to ward s goals  tha t  a re lessdestru c ti ve  than s ev eral o th ergoa ls. I n  add ition,  he decl arest hat the 'desir e  of bettering ou r co n diti on'  (Smith 177 6: 3 4 1) i s au bi qui t ous c alm p as s io n  providing a spring  o f acti on ge nerally benef icial to b o t h  the ind ivid u al and the commun ity,and even m o re disor derly  passion s such as ' ambition ' o r d rea mso f  w ealth and lux u r y (S mi th 1759 : 5 0, 149,  18 1–3 ) c anha ve uninte nded ben ef ic ia leff ectss uch as p ro mot in g t he gr o wth of  theweal th  o f  th e natio n  a n d  imp ro vi ng t heco nditi on o f  th e worst  off (Smi th1 759:  1 83 –5). Th e'system of n at ural liber ty ' h e advo c a tes is n ot a top-down programme but rat her  a no n-ar tificialset  of re gul a tionsjustif ied b ywid e l y sha r e djud gm ents (Smit h 177 6: 68 7)  whi ch, onc e 'natural liberty '  is  recognized f ormanu a l  l abo u re r s n ol ess t han for merchan ts (Smith17 7 6:  99), will gra du ally br ing abo ut re d istribu tive effe cts close  e noug h tothose an i mpartial  spectato r  woul d  d esire  to  see.Al l t his d epends ona mor e soph is ticate d fra me work tha n most commentators sus pected . Asarg ued above , p o lit ical econ omywas unders too d a s anaux i liary  dis c ip lin e  of n atur a l jurispr u de nce a nd  thus a kin d o f i ndire ctl y  norma tive  discourse. Accor d ing to this vi ew,a sys tem of m or al and legal r ule s– emerging  t hrough a no n-artifi ci a l pro cess –  is on e sideo f  a n y soci al s yst em, whose  ot he r  side i sas ystemof c au sal ch ains l e adin g to the emergence  of s o m e kin d  of  soci al  order. In t he jargonof twentiet h-cent urysocia l scien ce , soci ety  i s a system regulated  by t wo subs ys tems , t he for merb e ing t he t ot alsum of in d i vi d ua ln onc oord inate dacti ons yield i ng unint end e d resul ts  su c h  as th e  d i v ision of l abo ur an d market mec h anis m s, and t he lat ter be ing the joi nt  effect  of n umberless  cases of 'ch an ge o f situat io n' y ie lde dby the
 order_to unmask_the merchant's fallacious arguments_in favour_of_aggressive commercial_policies._But, nevertheless, social_science still needs_some substitute for the_'law of nature'_–_for example, the impartial spectator – as a standard against which to assess the_appropriateness_of custom_and_laws._7 Let us now see_how this strategy works in_The Wealth_of Nations. The work is both an example_–_perhaps the best_– of those treatises on 'commerce' I have mentioned_and a sustained political argument for_legislative change that_would_bring_about a more equitable_and humane society. Smith endorses Montesquieu's_idea that commerce is less obnoxious_than war – that is, that wealth-seeking_activities provide channels into which passions_may be directed towards goals_that are_less destructive than several other_goals. In addition,_he declares_that the 'desire_of bettering our condition' (Smith 1776:_341) is a_ubiquitous calm passion providing a spring_of_action generally beneficial_to_both_the individual_and the community,_and_even more_disorderly_passions such as 'ambition' or dreams_of_wealth and luxury (Smith 1759: 50, 149,_181–3) can have unintended_beneficial_effects such as promoting_the growth of the wealth_of the nation and improving the_condition of_the worst_off (Smith 1759: 183–5). The'system of natural liberty' he advocates is_not a top-down programme but rather_a non-artificial set of_regulations justified_by_widely shared judgments_(Smith_1776: 687)_which, once 'natural liberty' is recognized for_manual labourers_no less than for merchants (Smith_1776: 99), will gradually_bring_about redistributive effects close enough to_those an impartial spectator would desire_to see. All this depends_on_a_more sophisticated framework than most_commentators suspected. As argued above, political_economy was understood_as an auxiliary discipline of natural jurisprudence_and_thus a kind of indirectly normative_discourse._According to this view, a system_of_moral_and legal rules – emerging_through a non-artificial process – is_one side of any social system, whose other side_is a system_of causal chains leading to_the_emergence_of some kind of social order. In the jargon of_twentieth-century social_science, society is_a system regulated by two subsystems, the former being the_total sum of individual noncoordinated actions yielding_unintended results such as the division of labour and market mechanisms,_and the latter being the joint effect of_numberless cases of 'change of situation' yielded_by the