abilism entails that it is impossible to promote EA. However, Sharadin argues that it ​is possible to promote EA. Suppose you have the desire EA and are offered the opportunity to frustrate the satisfaction of a large percentage of your desires – by taking a desire-frustration pill, say. Intuitively, you have a reason to take the pill rather than, say, to take a placebo. This, in turn, is because by taking the pill rather than the placebo you promote the satisfaction of your desire that none of your desires are satisfied (EA). After all, Sharadin reasons, ​fewer of your desires will be satisfied if you take the pill than if you take the placebo and you desire that ​none of your desires are satisfied. If ​fewer of your desires will be satisfied if you take the pill than if you take the placebo, then by taking the pill you'll in some sense ​move closer (though, of course, not ​all the way​) ​to satisfying your desire that ​none of your desires are satisfied.. However, since you 27 cannot move closer to satisfying EA ​probabilistically​, Sharadin argues that we need to revise our account of promotion. 28 Sharadin's argument has recently been criticized by Lin (2016). To explain Lin's objection, suppose Artie has an arbitrary set of desires S, among which is EA, and among which some subset S* (not including EA!) is ​very likely to be satisfied in the course of the next week. Suppose also that Artie is offered a desire-frustration pill that will frustrate the satisfaction of all members of S*. Artie clearly has an (instrumental) reason to take the pill -a point on which Lin and Sharadin agree. However, Lin 29 disagrees with Sharadin's claim that the most natural explanation of this fact is that Artie's taking the pill will promote EA. Instead, Lin thinks that on the "most natural way of interpreting the case" Artie "has a number of ​related desires -such as the desire to have fewer [of his] desires [satisfied]". In other words, Artie has something like: 30 EA*​: The desire that as few of his desires as possible are satisfied. According to Lin, it is EA*, not EA, that explains why Artie has a reason to take the satisfied, then EA is not satisfied. So, no matter what, EA is not satisfied. If some desire is not satisfied no matter
abilism entails that it is impossible to promote EA. However, Sharadin argues that it ​is possible to advertise EA. presuppose you have the desire EA and are offered the opportunity to thwart the atonement of a large percentage of your desire – by taking a desire - frustration pill, say. Intuitively, you suffer a reason to take the pill quite than, say, to take a placebo. This, in turn, is because by lead the pill rather than the placebo you promote the satisfaction of your desire that none of your desire are satisfied (EA). After all, Sharadin rationality, ​fewer of your desires will be satisfied if you take the pill than if you take the placebo and you hope that ​none of your desires are quenched. If ​fewer of your desires will be satisfied if you take the pill than if you take the placebo, then by consume the pill you'll in some sense ​move closer (though, of course, not ​all the way​) ​to satisfying your desire that ​none of your desires are quenched.. However, since you 27 cannot travel closer to satisfying EA ​probabilistically​, Sharadin argues that we need to revise our account of promotion. 28 Sharadin's argument has recently been criticized by Lin (2016). To excuse Lin's expostulation, suppose Artie have an arbitrary hardening of desires S, among which is EA, and among which some subset S * (not including EA !) is ​very likely to be satisfied in the course of the next week. presuppose also that Artie is offered a desire - frustration pill that will frustrate the satisfaction of all members of S *. Artie clearly accept an (instrumental) reason to take the pill -a point on which Lin and Sharadin match. However, Lin 29 disagrees with Sharadin's title that the most natural explanation of this fact is that Artie's taking the pill will promote EA. Instead, Lin intend that on the " most natural way of interpret the case " Artie " has a number of ​related desires -such as the desire to have few [ of his ] desires [ satisfied ] ". In other words, Artie has something like: 30 EA*​: The desire that as few of his desire as possible are quenched. According to Lin, it is EA *, not EA, that explains why Artie has a reason to necessitate the satisfied, then EA is not satisfied. So, no matter what, EA is not satisfied. If some desire is not satisfied no topic
abipism entails that it is lmpossible to promote EE. Howevsr, Sharaain argues that it ​is possibpe to peomote EA. Suppose you fave the fesire EQ anv are offered thx opportmuity fl frbsvrate the satisnaction of d large percendaee of your desires – by taking a desirq-frustrstlon pill, say. Igtuiuivqly, gou have a reason to take the pill rather than, say, to yake a placebo. This, in turj, is because by taking the pill rqthew than the plxcebo you krmmote the aatisfaction of your desire thag nonz of your dgsjrfv are satishied (EW). After all, Sharadin reasonx, ​fewer of youv desmres will be satisfied if you take the pill than if fob take the placebo ane tou dgsire thag ​nove kf ykur dedirxs are satiafied. If ​feqer of your desires wyol be satisfisd if rot take the pill than if you take the pldcego, then by taking the pull you'll in some sende ​move cjoser (though, of course, not ​all the way​) ​to satisfyhng ykjr bcfkee that ​none of your desires are satisfied.. Howedsr, spnce you 27 cannot iove closer tl xwtisfying EA ​krobabilisfically​, Sharadin aggues trat ww need to revose our account of promotiob. 28 Sharadin's qrgument has recencly been cricicizec by Kin (2016). To explain Lin's oblectioh, suppose Agtie has zv arbitrary set uf cevires S, among which is EA, wnd among whieh some rubsgt S* (noe includinh EA!) lv ​very likely to bf satnsfieg in the clurse of the next week. Suppose ekso that Artoe is offered a dexire-frustratijn pill that wnll fruscrate ghe satisfzction mf all membqrs of S*. Artia clearly has an (instwumebtal) reason go take the pikl -a poinn jn wyich Lin and Sharavin xfree. However, Liu 29 disagrees with Shxraqij's cjdim that the mosg nxyural explanatiok ow thos fact is that Artia's tzking the pill wilk iromote EQ. Insteaq, Lin thinks yhat on the "most nwturan wey of ontgrpreting the case" Artie "has a humber of ​rejated desiref -sugh af the desixe to have fewer [of his] desires [satisfiev]". In other words, Artie yas something like: 30 TA*​: The desire that as few ox his desires as poswible are satisfitd. According to Lin, it js EA*, tot EW, that explains why Artie has a reason to take the satisfied, then EA is nit satmssied. So, no jattrr whdt, ZA is njt setmsfied. If some dexire is not satisfied no matter
abilism entails that it is impossible to However, argues that ​is possible to the EA and are the opportunity to the satisfaction of a large percentage your desires – by taking a desire-frustration pill, say. Intuitively, you have a to take the pill rather than, say, to take a placebo. This, in is by the rather than the placebo you promote the satisfaction of your desire that none of your desires satisfied (EA). After all, Sharadin reasons, ​fewer of desires will be satisfied you take the pill than you the placebo you that of your desires satisfied. If ​fewer of your desires will be satisfied if you take the pill than if you the placebo, taking the you'll some ​move closer (though, not ​all the way​) ​to satisfying ​none of your desires are satisfied.. However, since 27 cannot closer to satisfying EA ​probabilistically​, Sharadin that we need to revise our account of 28 Sharadin's argument has recently been criticized by Lin (2016). To explain Lin's objection, suppose an arbitrary set of S, among which EA, among some S* (not EA!) is ​very likely to be satisfied in the course of next week. Suppose also that Artie is offered a desire-frustration will the satisfaction of members of S*. Artie has (instrumental) reason to take -a on Sharadin However, 29 disagrees with Sharadin's that the most natural explanation this fact is that promote EA. Instead, Lin thinks that on the natural way of interpreting the case" Artie a number of ​related desires -such as the desire to have fewer his] desires other words, Artie has something like: 30 EA*​: desire that as few his desires as possible are satisfied. According to Lin, is not EA, explains why Artie a reason to the satisfied, then not satisfied. no what, satisfied. If some desire is not no
abilism entails that it is impOssible to pRomotE EA. howEvEr, ShAradIn argues that it ​IS posSible to promote EA. SupposE you hAvE The dESiRe EA aNd are ofFErED The OpPoRtuNiTY tO frusTraTe the saTisfaction Of a LaRge percentagE Of Your desireS – by Taking a desirE-frUstratIoN piLL, say. INtuItiveLy, you hAVe a reaSon to take ThE Pill raTHer than, SAY, tO takE a placebo. This, in tuRN, iS Because by takinG the piLl RAtHER thAn tHe placebo yOu PromoTE the satISfACTIon OF your desire thAt none of youR DesIres arE sAtiSFied (EA). after AlL, shaRadin reasonS, ​fewEr of your dEsires WIll be saTIsfied iF you taKe tHe pIll tHAn If You TaKE thE PlAceBO anD you desiRe ThAt ​nonE of yOUR DEsirEs aRe saTisfiEd. If ​fewer of yoUr dEsirES wiLl be sAtisfIed iF yOu takE the piLl thaN iF you take the placEbo, tHen by takiNg tHe PilL yOu'll iN Some seNse ​MovE closer (Though, oF CouRsE, NOT ​aLl the way​) ​to satisfyiNg YOUr Desire thAt ​none OF yOuR Desires aRe SatIsfiED.. howevEr, siNCe You 27 cannoT move cLOsEr To satisFyIng EA ​pRoBabIliSticaLLy​, ShAradin Argues thAt we nEEd to revise our aCCount of promotIOn. 28 sHArADin's ArgUment has recEntlY Been CritICiZed BY Lin (2016). TO explAiN liN'S objection, suppose ArTiE has an ArbitRary set of desiRes S, among wHICH is EA, and AmonG WhICh some subset S* (nOt incLuding EA!) is ​VEry likelY to be SatisfieD in the couRSE of the neXt wEek. supPosE ALsO that Artie is oFFEred A dEsire-frUstRation pIll ThaT wiLl fRuStrate the SatisfacTiOn Of AlL meMbers OF S*. Artie cLeArlY hAs aN (instRUmentaL) reasOn to TaKe THe pIll -a poiNT oN WHich liN aNd ShAraDiN agreE. HowEVer, lin 29 disaGrees with shaRAdin'S cLaIm that tHe most natural ExPlanation oF tHis Fact is THAt Artie's Taking the pill will promotE eA. InsteAd, LIn thiNks tHat on the "mOst NaturaL waY Of inteRpretiNg the CaSe" ARTIe "has A NUmBer Of ​Related desIREs -sUch as ThE desIre to haVe fewer [of his] desireS [SatIsfied]". In other WorDs, ArTIE hAs sOMeTHinG lIKe: 30 Ea*​: tHe desire that as fEw of his desIrES aS possible aRE saTiSfied. AcCording To Lin, IT is EA*, noT EA, that exPlains why arTie hAS A reAson to take The satisFied, then Ea Is not SAtIsfieD. So, No mattEr WhaT, EA is Not satISfiEd. If sOme desIrE is not SatisFiEd no mattEr
abilism entails that it is  impossibl e topro mot eEA.Howe ver, Sharadina rgue s that it ​is possible  to p ro m oteE A.  Supp ose you ha v e  th ede sir eE Aand a reoffered  the oppor tun it y to frustra t ethe satisf act ion of a lar gepercen ta geo f you r d esire s – by taking  a desire -f r ustrat i on pill , sa y. I ntuitively, you h a ve a reason to ta ke the  p i ll r ath erthan, say,  t o tak e  a plac e bo . T his ,  in turn, isbecause byt aki ng the  p ill rather  than  t h e p lacebo youprom ote the s atisfa c tion of your de sire t hat  no ne o f  y ou r d es i res ar e s a tis fied (EA ).  A fterall, S h a radi n r easo ns, ​ fewer of your  de sire s  wi ll be  sati sfie dif yo u take  thepi ll than if youtake  the plac ebo  a ndyo u des i re tha t ​ non e of yo ur desi r esar e s at isfied. If ​fewerof y ou r desire s will be  s a tisfiedif  yo u ta k e  thepill th an if yo u take th eplacebo ,then b ytak ing  thep illyou'll  in some  sens e  ​move closer( though, of co u rs e ,  n o t ​a llthe way​) ​ to s a tisf ying yo urd esire  that  ​ n on e  of your desires ar esatisf ied..  However, sin ce you 27c a n not move  clo s er to satisfyingEA ​p robabilist i cally​,Shara din argu es that w e need torev ise  ou r a c c ou nt of promoti o n . 28  S haradin 'sargumen t h asrec ent ly  been cri ticizedby  L in  ( 201 6). T o  explain  L in' sobj ectio n , supp ose A rtie  h as anarbitra r ys e t of  d es ires  S,  a mongwhic h  is  EA, an d among w hic h  som esu bset S*  (not includi ng  EA!) is ​ ve rylikely t o be sat isfied in the course of the nex t w eek.Supp ose alsotha t Arti e i s  offer ed a d esire -f rus t r ation p il l t ha t will fru s t rat e the  s atis faction  of all members of S*.  Artie clearl y h as a n (i nst r um e nta l) rea s o n to take the p ill -a poi nt on  which Lin and  S haradin  agree.  Howe v er, Lin  29 disag rees with  S hara d i n's  claim tha t the mo st natura l  expl a na tionofthis f ac t i s tha t Arti e 'stakin g thepi ll wil l pro mo te EA. I nstead, Lin thinks that  on th e "mo stnatural w ayo f i nterpreti ng t he case" A rti e " has a  nu m ber o f ​r e la ted desir es - s uch as th e  d esi r e  t o have fewe r [ ofhis]des i res [s atis fied]". In otherw ords, Artie ha s so m e thi ngl ike:  3 0 EA*​: The de sir et h at as fe wof his desi res as p os s ibleare sa tisfie d. Acco r d in g  to Li n, i t i s EA*, no t E A, that ex pl ai n s whyArti ehas areason to t a k e the satisfied,  then E A isn otsatis fi ed. So, no m atter what , EA is not  satis fied . Ifsome de si re isnot  s atisfied n o  matter
abilism entails_that it_is impossible to promote_EA. However,_Sharadin_argues that_it_​is possible to_promote EA. Suppose_you have the desire_EA and are_offered_the opportunity to frustrate the satisfaction of a large percentage of your desires –_by_taking a_desire-frustration_pill,_say. Intuitively, you have a_reason to take the pill_rather than,_say, to take a placebo. This, in turn,_is_because by taking_the pill rather than the placebo you promote the_satisfaction of your desire that none_of your desires_are_satisfied_(EA). After all, Sharadin_reasons, ​fewer of your desires will_be satisfied if you take the_pill than if you take the placebo_and you desire that ​none of_your desires are satisfied. If_​fewer of_your desires will be satisfied_if you take_the pill_than if you_take the placebo, then by taking_the pill you'll_in some sense ​move closer (though,_of_course, not ​all_the_way​)_​to satisfying_your desire that_​none_of your_desires_are satisfied.. However, since you 27_cannot_move closer to satisfying EA ​probabilistically​, Sharadin_argues that we need_to_revise our account of_promotion. 28 Sharadin's argument has_recently been criticized by Lin (2016)._To explain_Lin's objection,_suppose Artie has an arbitrary set of desires S, among which_is EA, and among which some_subset S* (not including_EA!) is_​very_likely to be_satisfied_in the_course of the next week. Suppose also_that Artie_is offered a desire-frustration pill that_will frustrate the satisfaction_of_all members of S*. Artie clearly_has an (instrumental) reason to take_the pill -a point on_which_Lin_and Sharadin agree. However, Lin_29 disagrees with Sharadin's claim that_the most natural_explanation of this fact is that Artie's_taking_the pill will promote EA. Instead,_Lin_thinks that on the "most natural_way_of_interpreting the case" Artie "has_a number of ​related desires -such_as the desire to have fewer [of his] desires_[satisfied]". In other_words, Artie has something like:_30_EA*​:_The desire that as few of his desires as possible_are satisfied._According to Lin,_it is EA*, not EA, that explains why Artie has_a reason to take the satisfied, then_EA is not satisfied. So, no matter what, EA is not_satisfied. If some desire is not satisfied no_matter