 proposition is true whether or not anyone ever holds it to be true, or even grasps it; all such "holdings" and "graspings" fall in the Lotzean category of events, actuality/being of type (2). Validity (truth), according to Lotze, is timeless, aperspectival, independent of position, and independent of whether any subject ever thinks that p. The predicate "is true" makes no reference to time, speaker, position, etc. A proposition is true or false simpliciter. As Lotze writes: We are all convinced in the moment in which we think the content of any truth, that we have not created it for the first time but merely acknowledged it. It was valid before we thought about it and will continue so without regard to any existent of any kind, whether things or us, and whether or not it ever finds application in the actuality of existence, or becomes an object of cognition in the actuality of being thought. This is what we all believe with regard to truth when we set out to search for it, and it may be that we lament over its inaccessibility, at least to any form of human knowledge; truth which is never apprehended by us is valid no whit less than that small fraction of it which finds its way into our thoughts. (L §318, 515) Likewise, since a proposition is either true or false, the content of a proposition has a kind of timeless, aperspectival, subject-independent being: that content is, either by being valid or by being invalid. Contents do not "come into being" or "go out of being," for if they did, truths would come into or go out of being, which is excluded by the very nature of 146 Nicholas F. Stang truth. Lotze denies that a genuinely subjective propositional content, one accessible only by one thinker (one sequence of mental representational events), is even possible: [I]t is impossible that an individual subject sense or represent something whose content [Inhalt] does not have its determinate place in this universal world of the thinkable [allgemeinen Welt des denkbaren], possess its similarities and differences to others one and for all, but remains a peculiarity of this subject, belonging nowhere else, without relation to the whole world. (L §318, 516) If any thinker thinks about anything, the content of their thought is either true or false, and thus
proposition is true whether or not anyone ever holds it to be genuine, or even grasp it; all such " holdings " and " graspings " fall in the Lotzean class of events, actuality / being of type (2). Validity (accuracy), accord to Lotze, is timeless, aperspectival, independent of military position, and independent of whether any subject always thinks that p. The predicate " is true " makes no reference to meter, speaker, position, etc. A proposition is true or false simpliciter. As Lotze spell: We are all convinced in the moment in which we think the subject of any truth, that we have not created it for the first time but merely admit it. It was valid before we thought about it and will continue so without regard to any existent of any kind, whether things or us, and whether or not it always finds application in the actuality of existence, or becomes an object of cognition in the actuality of being thought. This is what we all think with respect to truth when we set out to search for it, and it may be that we lament over its inaccessibility, at least to any form of human knowledge; truth which is never apprehended by us is valid no whit less than that minor fraction of it which finds its way into our opinion. (L § 318, 515) alike, since a proposition is either true or false, the contentedness of a proposition has a kind of timeless, aperspectival, subject - independent organism: that content is, either by being valid or by being invalid. Contents do not " come into being " or " go out of being, " for if they did, truths would come into or go out of being, which is excluded by the very nature of 146 Nicholas F. Stang truth. Lotze deny that a genuinely immanent propositional contentedness, one accessible only by one thinker (one sequence of mental representational events), is even potential: [ I]t is impossible that an individual subject sense or represent something whose content [ Inhalt ] does not have its determinate place in this universal world of the thinkable [ allgemeinen Welt des denkbaren ], own its similarities and differences to others one and for all, but remains a peculiarity of this subject, belong nowhere else, without relation to the unharmed world. (L § 318, 516) If any thinker think about anything, the content of their opinion is either true or false, and therefore
 prlposition is true whethev or not anyone gvwr holvs it tk be trud, or even grasps it; all such "hildints" and "graspings" fall kn the Lonzean catwgorb of events, actuemity/beiky of fnpe (2). Raoidity (truth), agcording to Lotze, is timeners, aperspectival, independent of posityon, and ijdependent of rhetnqr ahj wubject ever thinks that p. Ths predibate "is true" makex no reference to time, spewker, position, etc. A prlposition iw trtw or false skmpliciter. As Lotze wrjtes: We are all convinced in thd momznt in whicy qe hvink the coitent jf any truth, that we have npt created it nor tie furst time but merely ecknowledged it. It wws valid teyore we thought about ir and wiln covrinje ao wjthout rejard to any existent od any kind, whether uhigts or us, and shethew jr not it ever finds application in the acfuality of existence, or becomes an object of cognitiog in the actuality of being thought. This is what fe alm beoicve dutj regard to truth when we set out to search fjd ot, and it may be that we lakejt jver its inaczessibnmify, at least to any form os humqn knowleqge; yruth which is never apprehwnded by us ps vqlid no whit less chan that smcll frsctiom of it which finds its way into our tjoughts. (L §318, 515) Likewise, since a iropmsition is either true or salse, the concent of x prpposityon has a nind of timeless, aperspeftivap, vubject-indfpendent being: that content is, xmther by beinb ealpd or by yeing lnvalid. Contentf do not "come nnto beiug" or "eo out of geing," fmr if they qid, truths wogpd come into or go ott od beung, whizf is excluded ny the vegy natyre of 146 Nicholas F. Stxhg truth. Lotze btnits that a genuinrly sufjvctmve pwmpositional wontdnt, pne azcessible okly by pne thinker (one sequance of mental represemtwtional gvents), is even possiblr: [I]t is impossible that an indifidoal subject sense or represent aomething whjse content [Ynhaot] does not kave its determinate place in this univecsal world of the thinkqble [allgemeinen Weku des denkbarxn], posfess its vimilarities and difderences to otherx one and for all, but remaits a oeculiarity of this subject, belonging nowhere else, without relation to thw wholx rorld. (L §318, 516) Ir anu thitkzr chinks wbouv enything, the contvnt of their thought is either tcue or falve, and thus
proposition is true whether or not anyone it be true, even grasps it; fall the Lotzean category events, actuality/being of (2). Validity (truth), according to Lotze, timeless, aperspectival, independent of position, and independent of whether any subject ever thinks p. The predicate "is true" makes no reference to time, speaker, position, etc. proposition true false As Lotze writes: We are all convinced in the moment in which we think the content any truth, that we have not created it the first time but acknowledged it. It was valid we about it will so regard to any of any kind, whether things or us, and whether or not it ever finds application in the of existence, an object cognition the of being thought. what we all believe with regard we set out to search for it, and may be we lament over its inaccessibility, at to any form of human knowledge; truth which never apprehended by us is valid no whit less than that small fraction of it its way into our (L §318, 515) since proposition either or false, content of a proposition has a kind of timeless, aperspectival, subject-independent that content is, either by being valid or by being do "come into being" "go out of being," if did, truths would come go of excluded the nature of 146 Nicholas Stang truth. Lotze denies that genuinely subjective propositional content, thinker (one sequence of mental representational events), is possible: [I]t is impossible that an individual sense or represent something whose content [Inhalt] does not have its determinate in this of the thinkable [allgemeinen Welt des denkbaren], possess similarities and differences to one and for all, but remains a peculiarity of subject, nowhere else, relation to the world. (L §318, If any thinker anything, the of thought or false, and thus
 proposition is true whether oR not anyone Ever hOldS it To Be trUe, or Even grasps it; alL Such "Holdings" and "graspings" faLl in tHe lOtzeAN cAtegoRy of eveNTs, ACTuaLiTy/BeiNg OF tYpe (2). VaLidIty (trutH), according To LOtZe, is timeless, APeRspectival, IndEpendent of poSitIon, and InDepENdent Of wHetheR any suBJect evEr thinks tHaT P. The prEDicate "iS TRuE" makEs no reference to tiME, sPEaker, position, eTc. A proPoSItION is TruE or false siMpLicitER. As LotzE WrITES: We ARe all convinceD in the momenT In wHich we ThInk THe contEnt of AnY TruTh, that we havE not Created it For the FIrst timE But mereLy acknOwlEdgEd it. iT wAs ValId BEfoRE wE thOUghT about it AnD wIll coNtinUE SO WithOut RegaRd to aNy existent of aNy kInd, wHEthEr thiNgs or Us, anD wHetheR or not It eveR fInds application In thE actualitY of ExIstEnCe, or bEComes aN obJecT of cognItion in THe aCtUALItY of being thought. ThiS iS WHaT we all beLieve wITh ReGArd to truTh WheN we sET Out to SearCH fOr it, and iT may be THaT wE lament OvEr its iNaCceSsiBilitY, At leAst to aNy form of Human KNowledge; truth wHIch is never appREhENDeD By us Is vAlid no whit lEss tHAn thAt smALl FraCTion oF it whIcH FiNDs its way into our thouGhTs. (L §318, 515) LikEwise, Since a proposiTion is eithER TRue or falSe, thE CoNTent of a proposiTion hAs a kind of tIMeless, apErspeCtival, suBject-indePENdent beiNg: tHat ConTenT IS, eIther by being vALId or By Being inValId. ConteNts Do nOt "cOme InTo being" or "Go out of bEiNg," FoR iF thEy did, TRuths wouLd ComE iNto Or go oUT of beiNg, whiCh is ExClUDed By the veRY nATUre oF 146 NIcHolaS F. STaNg truTh. LoTZe dEnies thAt a genuinEly SUbjeCtIvE proposItional contenT, oNe accessibLe OnlY by one THInker (one Sequence of mental represeNTationaL evEnts), iS eveN possible: [i]t iS imposSibLE that aN indivIdual SuBjeCT Sense OR RePreSeNt somethinG WHosE contEnT [InhAlt] does Not have its determinATe pLace in this uniVerSal wORLd Of tHE tHInkAbLE [alLGEmeinen Welt des dEnkbaren], poSsESs Its similarITieS aNd diffeRences tO otheRS one and For all, but Remains a pEcUliaRITy oF this subjeCt, belongIng nowherE Else, wIThOut reLatIon to tHe WhoLe worLd. (L §318, 516) If aNY thInker Thinks AbOut anyThing, ThE content Of their thought is either tRue or fAlse, aNd tHus
 proposition is true wheth er or notanyon e e ver  h olds  itto be true, or even  grasps it; all such " holdi ng s " an d  " grasp ings" f a ll i n t he  L otz ea n  c atego ryof even ts, actual ity /b eing of type (2 ). Validit y ( truth), acco rdi ng toLo tze ,  is t ime less,  apers p ectiva l, indepe nd e nt ofp osition , an d in dependent of whet h er any subject ev er thi nk s  t h a t p . T he predica te  "ist rue" ma k es n o  re f erence to tim e, speaker, pos ition,  e tc. A prop ositi on istrue or fal se s implicite r. AsL otze wr i tes: We  are a llcon vinc e din  th em ome n tinw hic h we thi nk  t he co nten t o f  any  tr uth,  that  we have notcre ated itfor t he fi rstti me bu t mere ly ac kn owledged it. It  was  valid be for eweth ought aboutitand  will c ontinue sowi t h o ut  regard to any exi st e n tof any k ind, w h et he r  thingsor  us , an d wheth er o r  n ot it ev er fin d sap plicati on  in th eact ual ity o f  exi stence , or bec omesa n object of co g nition in the ac t u al i ty o f b eing though t. T h is i s wh a twea ll be lieve  w i th regard to truth whe nwe set  outto search for  it, and i t m ay be th at w e  l a ment over itsinacc essibility ,  at leas t toany form  of human k nowledge ; t rut h w hic h is  never appreh e n dedby  us isval id no w hit  le sstha nthat smal l fracti on  o fit  wh ich f i nds itswa y i nt o o ur th o ughts.  (L § 318,  5 15 )  Li kewise, si n c e apr op osit ion  i s eit hert rue  or fal se, the c ont e nt o faproposi tion has a ki nd  of timele ss , a perspe c t ival, su bject-independent being :  that c ont ent i s, e ither bybei ng val ido r by b eing i nvali d.  Co n t entsd o  n ot"c ome into b e i ng"  or " go  out  of bei ng," for if they d i d,truths wouldcom e in t o  o r g o  o u t o fb ein g ,  which is exclu ded by the  v e ry  nature of 146  N icholas  F. Sta ng tr u th. Lot ze denies  that a g en uine l y  su bjective p ropositi onal cont e nt, o n eacces sib le onl ybyone t hinker (on e seq uenceof  menta l rep re sentatio nal events), is even po ssible : [I] t i s impossi ble tha t an indi vidu al subject  se nse  or r epr e sentsome t hi ngw hosecont e nt [Inhal t ]doe s no t have itsd e t erm inate  pl a ce inthis  universal worldo f the thinkabl e [a l l gem ein e n We lt  des denkbaren ],po s s ess itssi milaritiesand diff er e ncesto oth ers on e and f o r  a l l, but  rem ain s a pecul iar it y  of thi ssu b ject,belo ng ing no wheree lse, w ithout relationto th e whole wor ld. ( L§318, 5 1 6) I f any thin ker thinksaboutanyt hing,  the co nt ent of  th ei r thoughti s eithertrueor fals e,  and  th us
 proposition_is true_whether or not anyone_ever holds_it_to be_true,_or even grasps_it; all such_"holdings" and "graspings" fall_in the Lotzean_category_of events, actuality/being of type (2). Validity (truth), according to Lotze, is timeless, aperspectival,_independent_of position,_and_independent_of whether any subject ever_thinks that p. The predicate_"is true"_makes no reference to time, speaker, position, etc._A_proposition is true_or false simpliciter. As Lotze writes: We are all_convinced in the moment in which_we think the_content_of_any truth, that we_have not created it for the_first time but merely acknowledged it._It was valid before we thought about_it and will continue so without_regard to any existent of_any kind,_whether things or us, and_whether or not_it ever_finds application in_the actuality of existence, or becomes_an object of_cognition in the actuality of being_thought._This is what_we_all_believe with_regard to truth_when_we set_out_to search for it, and it_may_be that we lament over its inaccessibility,_at least to any_form_of human knowledge; truth_which is never apprehended by_us is valid no whit less_than that_small fraction_of it which finds its way into our thoughts. (L §318,_515) Likewise, since a proposition is_either true or false,_the content_of_a proposition has_a_kind of_timeless, aperspectival, subject-independent being: that content is,_either by_being valid or by being invalid._Contents do not "come_into_being" or "go out of being,"_for if they did, truths would_come into or go out_of_being,_which is excluded by the_very nature of 146 Nicholas F._Stang truth. Lotze_denies that a genuinely subjective propositional content,_one_accessible only by one thinker (one_sequence_of mental representational events), is even_possible:_[I]t_is impossible that an individual_subject sense or represent something whose_content [Inhalt] does not have its determinate place in_this universal world_of the thinkable [allgemeinen Welt_des_denkbaren],_possess its similarities and differences to others one and for_all, but_remains a peculiarity_of this subject, belonging nowhere else, without relation to the_whole world. (L §318, 516) If any_thinker thinks about anything, the content of their thought is either_true or false, and thus