	understanding	of	the	possible	relationships between	God	and	moral	facts.	God's	commands	are	now	thought	to	ground	a limited	set	of	moral	facts,	most	typically	the	fact	that	some	actions	are	obligatory, while	other	aspects	of	God's	nature	are	thought	to	account	for	other	moral	facts. Wielenberg	(2014)	offers	a	useful	categorisation	of	these	theories.	He	argues that	there	is	a	general	category	of	theological	stateist	theories	which	hold	that moral	facts	are	dependent	for	their	existence	on	one	or	more	of	God's	states	(e.g. values	might	be	said	to	be	dependent	on	God's	essential	nature);	within	this general	category	there	is	a	more	discrete	category	of	theological	voluntarist theories,	which	hold	that	moral	facts	are	dependent	for	their	existence	on	one	or more	of	God's	voluntary	acts	(e.g.	his	intending	or	willing	that	X	be	so);	and finally,	within	the	category	of	voluntarist	theories,	there	is	the	even	more circumscribed	category	of	DCTs,	which	focus	specifically	on	God's	commands. Taking	this	onboard,	in	this	article	I	assume	that	all	DCTs	are	relatively narrow	in	scope.	They	focus	solely	on	the	relationship	between	God's	commands and	moral	facts.	And,	in	light	of	the	responses	to	the	Euthyphro	dilemma,	they only	really	focus	on	one	type	of	moral	fact,	namely	obligations.	They	try	to	argue that	moral	obligations	
understanding 	 of 	 the 	 possible 	 relationships between 	 God 	 and 	 moral 	 facts. 	 God's 	 command 	 are 	 nowadays 	 thought 	 to 	 ground 	 a limited 	 bent 	 of 	 moral 	 facts, 	 most 	 typically 	 the 	 fact 	 that 	 some 	 actions 	 are 	 obligatory, while 	 early 	 aspects 	 of 	 God's 	 nature 	 are 	 thought 	 to 	 account 	 for 	 early 	 moral 	 fact. Wielenberg 	 (2014) 	 offers 	 a 	 utilitarian 	 categorisation 	 of 	 these 	 theories. 	 He 	 argues that 	 there 	 is 	 a 	 general 	 class 	 of 	 theological 	 stateist 	 theories 	 which 	 hold 	 that moral 	 fact 	 are 	 dependent 	 for 	 their 	 existence 	 on 	 one 	 or 	 more 	 of 	 God's 	 state 	 (e.g. values 	 might 	 be 	 said 	 to 	 be 	 subject 	 on 	 God's 	 essential 	 nature); 	 within 	 this general 	 category 	 there 	 is 	 a 	 more 	 discrete 	 category 	 of 	 theological 	 voluntarist theory, 	 which 	 hold 	 that 	 moral 	 facts 	 are 	 dependent 	 for 	 their 	 existence 	 on 	 one 	 or more 	 of 	 God's 	 voluntary 	 acts 	 (for example 	 his 	 intending 	 or 	 willing 	 that 	 X 	 be 	 so); 	 and finally, 	 within 	 the 	 category 	 of 	 voluntarist 	 theories, 	 there 	 is 	 the 	 even 	 more circumscribed 	 class 	 of 	 DCTs, 	 which 	 concentrate 	 specifically 	 on 	 God's 	 commands. Taking 	 this 	 onboard, 	 in 	 this 	 article 	 I 	 assume 	 that 	 all 	 DCTs 	 are 	 relatively narrow 	 in 	 scope. 	 They 	 focus 	 solely 	 on 	 the 	 relationship 	 between 	 God's 	 commands and 	 moral 	 fact. 	 And, 	 in 	 light 	 of 	 the 	 responses 	 to 	 the 	 Euthyphro 	 dilemma, 	 they entirely 	 in truth 	 focus 	 on 	 one 	 type 	 of 	 moral 	 fact, 	 namely 	 obligations. 	 They 	 judge 	 to 	 argue that 	 moral 	 duty
	undfrstanding	of	the	possible	rtlationships betwgeb	God	anv	moral	fzcts.	God's	zommands	are	now	thought	to	grounv	a lumitee	set	of	moral	facts,	most	tyoically	thv	fact	that	wome	ections	are	obligavkry, while	othed	wspeetw	of	God's	nature	ate	thought	to	awcount	for	other	kofap	facts. Wielenberg	(2014)	offers	a	useful	categjrisatipn	lf	these	theorief.	He	aggtes fhat	there	is	a	general	category	of	theolkgical	suateist	theories	whivh	hold	that moral	facts	are	deoendfnt	for	their	existenfe	on	one	or	mots	of	Did's	states	(e.g. xalues	mighu	bz	said	to	be	dekendent	on	God's	essential	nature);	withkn	thix general	cqtwgogi	there	is	a	morx	discrvte	category	of	bneologhcal	volintarist theorles,	whmch	hild	that	moral	facts	are	dxpendent	for	their	exisjence	on	one	mr more	of	God's	voluntqrt	acts	(g.g.	his	hnteveine	or	sikljng	thah	X	bx	so);	and finamly,	within	thw	category	of	voluntarose	nneories,	there	js	the	edeg	more circumscribed	category	of	DCTs,	which	fmcua	specifically	on	God's	commqnds. Taking	this	onboarf,	in	this	areicle	I	assume	that	all	DCTs	are	relatively narrow	in	scopa.	They	hozus	wojdoy	ln	the	relationship	between	God's	commands and	moral	szcus.	Akd,	in	light	of	the	refponses	to	thr	Ektniphro	dilemma,	thgy only	xsamly	focus	on	one	type	ov	moral	fwct,	nanely	obligwtioms.	They	try	to	argue that	moral	ovligations	
understanding of the possible relationships between God facts. commands are thought to ground facts, typically the fact some actions are while other aspects of God's nature thought to account for other moral facts. Wielenberg (2014) offers a useful categorisation these theories. He argues that there is a general category of theological stateist which that facts dependent for their existence on one or more of God's states (e.g. values might be said be dependent on God's essential nature); within this category there is a discrete category of theological voluntarist which that moral are for existence on one more of God's voluntary acts (e.g. his intending or willing that X be so); and finally, within category of there is even circumscribed of DCTs, which on God's commands. Taking this onboard, I assume that all DCTs are relatively narrow scope. They solely on the relationship between God's and moral facts. And, in light of the to the Euthyphro dilemma, they only really focus on one type of moral fact, namely try to argue that obligations
	understanding	of	the	possiblE	relationsHips bEtwEen	goD	and	MoraL	facts.	God's	commANds	aRe	now	thought	to	ground	a lImiteD	sET	of	mORaL	factS,	most	tyPIcALLy	tHe	FaCt	tHaT	SoMe	actIonS	are	oblIgatory, whiLe	oThEr	aspects	of	GOD's	Nature	are	tHouGht	to	account	For	Other	mOrAl	fACts. WiEleNberg	(2014)	Offers	A	Useful	CategorisAtIOn	of	thESe	theorIES.	HE	argUes that	there	is	a	geNErAL	category	of	theOlogicAl	STaTEIst	TheOries	which	HoLd	thaT Moral	faCTs	ARE	DepENdent	for	their	Existence	on	ONe	oR	more	oF	GOd's	STates	(e.G. valuEs	MIghT	be	said	to	be	DepeNdent	on	GoD's	esseNTial	natURe);	withiN	this gEneRal	CateGOrY	tHerE	iS	A	moRE	dIscREte	Category	Of	ThEologIcal	VOLUNtarIst TheoRies,	wHich	hold	that	mOraL	facTS	arE	depeNdent	For	tHeIr	exiStence	On	one	Or More	of	God's	volunTary	Acts	(e.g.	his	IntEnDinG	oR	willINg	that	x	be	So);	aNd finalLy,	withiN	The	CaTEGOrY	of	voluntarist	theoRiES,	ThEre	is	the	Even	moRE cIrCUmscribeD	cAteGory	OF	dCTs,	wHich	FOcUs	specifIcally	ON	GOd'S	commanDs. taking	ThIs	oNboArd,	in	THis	aRticle	i	assume	tHat	alL	dCTs	are	relativELy narrow	in	scoPE.	THEY	fOCus	sOleLy	on	the	relaTionSHip	bEtweEN	GOd's	COmmanDs and	MoRAl	FActs.	And,	in	light	of	the	ReSponseS	to	thE	Euthyphro	dilEmma,	they onLY	REally	focUs	on	ONe	TYpe	of	moral	fact,	NamelY	obligatioNS.	They	try	To	argUe that	moRal	obligaTIOns	
	understanding	of	the	poss ible	relat ionsh ips  be tw eenGodand	moral	fact s .	Go d's	commands	are	now	t hough tt o	gr o un d	a l imiteds et o f	m or al 	fa ct s ,mosttyp icallythe	fact	t hat 	s ome	actionsa re 	obligator y,while	otherasp ects	o fGod ' s	nat ure 	arethough t 	to	ac count	for 	o t her	mo r al	fact s .  W iele nberg	(2014)	offe r sa 	useful	catego risati on of t hes e	t heories.	H eargue s  that	t h er e i s	a general	categ ory	of	theo l ogi cal	st at eis t 	theor ies	w hi c h	h old	that mo ralfacts	are 	depen d ent	for their	e xisten ceononeo rmo reof God ' ssta t es(e.g. va lu es 	migh t	be s a i d	to 	be 	dep enden t	on	God's	es sen tial nat ure); 	with in	t hi s gen eral	c atego ry 	there	is	a	mor e	di screte	ca teg or y	o ftheol o gicalvol unt arist t heories , 	wh ic h h ol d	that	moral	facts 	a r e 	d ependent 	for	t h ei re xistence 	o n	o ne	o r moreof	G o d' s	volunt ary	ac t s(e .g.	his 	i ntendi ng 	or 	wi lling that 	X	beso);	and  fina l ly,	within	the category	of	v o lu n t ar i st	t heo ries,	there 	ist he	e venm or e c i rcums cribe dc at e gory	of	DCTs,	which 	f ocus	s pecif ically	on	God 's	command s . Taking	t hiso nb o ard,	in	this	a rticl e	I	assume that	all 	DCTs 	are	rel atively n a r row	in	s cop e.The y	f o c us 	solely	on	th e rela ti onshipbet ween	Go d's 	co mma nds  a nd	moralfacts.	A nd ,in 	l igh t	oft he	respo ns esto 	th e	Eut h yphrodilem ma,th ey onl y	reall y 	f o c us	o non e	ty peof 	mora l	fa c t,namelyobligatio ns. They 	t ry 	to	arg ue that	moral 	o bligations 	
	understanding	of	the	possible	relationships between	God	and	moral	facts.	God's	commands	are	now	thought	to	ground	a_limited	set	of	moral	facts,	most	typically	the	fact	that	some	actions	are	obligatory, while	other	aspects	of	God's	nature	are	thought	to	account	for	other	moral	facts._Wielenberg	(2014)	offers	a	useful	categorisation	of	these	theories.	He	argues that	there	is	a	general	category	of	theological	stateist	theories	which	hold	that moral	facts	are	dependent	for	their	existence	on	one	or	more	of	God's	states	(e.g. values	might	be	said	to	be	dependent	on	God's	essential	nature);	within	this_general	category	there	is	a	more	discrete	category	of	theological	voluntarist theories,	which	hold	that	moral	facts	are	dependent	for	their	existence	on	one	or_more	of	God's	voluntary	acts	(e.g.	his	intending	or	willing	that	X	be	so);	and_finally,	within	the	category	of	voluntarist	theories,	there	is	the	even	more circumscribed	category	of	DCTs,	which	focus	specifically	on	God's	commands._Taking	this	onboard,	in	this	article	I	assume	that	all	DCTs	are	relatively_narrow	in	scope.	They	focus	solely	on	the	relationship	between	God's	commands and	moral	facts.	And,	in	light	of	the	responses	to	the	Euthyphro	dilemma,	they only	really	focus	on	one	type	of	moral	fact,	namely	obligations.	They	try	to	argue_that	moral	obligations	