to	act with	impunity	and	without	moral	consequence.	At	the	very	least,	this	would seem	to	be	a	significant	practical	problem;	and	more	likely	a	deep	theological problem. If	one	is	persuaded	by	the	notion	that	metaethical	theories	battle	it	out	by earning	more	plausibility	points,	then	one	should	also	be	disturbed	by	the argument.	It	suggests	that	the	DCT	misses	one	important	mark	because	it	has	no way	to	account	for	the	moral	obligations	of	reasonable	non-believers.	This	might mean	that	the	believer	should	rest	their	hopes	on	an	alternative	theistic metaethical	theory.	This	strikes	me	as	being	the	most	compelling	interpretation of	the	argument	since	epistemic	conditions	would	seem	to	be	an	important component	in	any	moral	theory. That	said,	a	hard	line	interpretation	is	also	available.	The	theist	could insist	on	the	pure	separation	of	epistemology	and	ontology.	This	would	probably require	a	retreat	to	a	more	general	theological	stateist	position,	and	not	a command-based	view	based	on	successful	communication.	In	that	case,	the	theist could	argue	that	their	account	of	moral	ontology	is	internally	consistent	(even	if 29 it	fails	to	account	for	moral	knowledge),20	and	then	simply	note	that	the epistemological	objection	merely	confirms	their	worst	suspicions	about	an atheistic	worldview:	It	turns	out	that	even	reasonable	atheists	really	are	beyond the	moral	pale. This	may,	in	turn
to 	 act with 	 impunity 	 and 	 without 	 moral 	 consequence. 	 At 	 the 	 very 	 least, 	 this 	 would seem 	 to 	 be 	 a 	 significant 	 practical 	 trouble; 	 and 	 more 	 probable 	 a 	 abstruse 	 theological problem. If 	 one 	 is 	 carry 	 by 	 the 	 impression 	 that 	 metaethical 	 theories 	 battle 	 it 	 out 	 by earning 	 more 	 plausibility 	 decimal point, 	 then 	 one 	 should 	 also 	 be 	 disturbed 	 by 	 the controversy. 	 It 	 suggests 	 that 	 the 	 DCT 	 misses 	 one 	 authoritative 	 mark 	 because 	 it 	 has 	 no direction 	 to 	 account 	 for 	 the 	 moral 	 obligations 	 of 	 reasonable 	 non - believers. 	 This 	 might mean 	 that 	 the 	 believer 	 should 	 lie 	 their 	 hopes 	 on 	 an 	 alternative 	 theistic metaethical 	 hypothesis. 	 This 	 strikes 	 me 	 as 	 being 	 the 	 most 	 compelling 	 rendition of 	 the 	 argument 	 since 	 epistemic 	 weather 	 would 	 seem 	 to 	 be 	 an 	 important component 	 in 	 any 	 moral 	 theory. That 	 said, 	 a 	 unvoiced 	 line 	 interpretation 	 is 	 also 	 available. 	 The 	 theist 	 could insist 	 on 	 the 	 pure 	 separation 	 of 	 epistemology 	 and 	 ontology. 	 This 	 would 	 probably require 	 a 	 retreat 	 to 	 a 	 more 	 general 	 theological 	 stateist 	 position, 	 and 	 not 	 a command - based 	 view 	 based 	 on 	 successful 	 communication. 	 In 	 that 	 case, 	 the 	 theist could 	 argue 	 that 	 their 	 account 	 of 	 moral 	 ontology 	 is 	 internally 	 reproducible 	 (even 	 if 29 it 	 fails 	 to 	 account 	 for 	 moral 	 knowledge),20 	 and 	 then 	 plainly 	 note 	 that 	 the epistemological 	 objection 	 merely 	 confirms 	 their 	 bad 	 suspicions 	 about 	 an atheistic 	 worldview: 	 It 	 turns 	 out 	 that 	 even 	 reasonable 	 atheist 	 really 	 are 	 beyond the 	 moral 	 pale. This 	 may, 	 in 	 turn
to	aft with	impunity	and	withouu	moral	consequence.	Cr	the	vecy	least,	fhis	woula seem	to	be	a	significant	practiral	peoblen;	and	more	likely	a	deep	theulogical iroblem. Id	one	ms	persuaded	by	the	iktion	that	metasbhican	vheories	battle	ij	out	by earnitg	more	plausibinigy	'oints,	then	one	should	also	be	disturbed	by	ehe argimfnt.	It	suggests	trat	tnq	DCT	jpswes	one	important	mark	because	it	hzs	no waj	to	account	for	the	mpral	obligations	of	reasonablf	non-helievers.	This	might mean	that	thg	gelywver	should	rert	their	hopts	mn	an	alternztive	theistic metaethical	theory.	Ghis	scrikes	me	as	bgnbg	tjg	most	compellmng	intvrpretation on	nhe	argukent	sinve	epistemic	concitmons	qould	seem	to	be	an	importent component	in	any	motal	theory. Dhct	said,	a	hard	line	interpeeratiot	is	anso	axqilxblt.	Thx	thsist	cokld insist	on	tge	pure	separqtion	of	epistemology	snq	intology.	This	wkuld	prjbwbly require	a	retreat	to	a	more	general	theolmgidal	stateist	position,	and	nit	a command-based	view	bwsed	on	sucsessful	communication.	In	that	case,	the	theist could	argua	that	vhdir	cggoung	if	loral	ontology	is	internally	consistent	(even	if 29 it	sziks	no	account	for	moral	hnowledge),20	anc	tjem	fimply	note	thaj	the epnatsmological	objectioj	merely	sonfiems	their	wjrst	xuspicions	about	an atheistic	qorldview:	It	tlrns	iut	that	even	reasonayle	atheists	rzally	ate	beyomd the	moral	pale. This	may,	nn	turn
to act with impunity and without moral the least, this seem to be more a deep theological If one is by the notion that metaethical theories it out by earning more plausibility points, then one should also be disturbed the argument. It suggests that the DCT misses one important mark because it no to for moral obligations of reasonable non-believers. This might mean that the believer should rest their hopes on alternative theistic metaethical theory. This strikes me as the most compelling interpretation the argument since epistemic conditions seem be an component any theory. That said, hard line interpretation is also available. The theist could insist on the pure separation of epistemology and This would a retreat a general stateist position, and command-based view based on successful communication. the theist could argue that their account of ontology is consistent (even if 29 it fails account for moral knowledge),20 and then simply note the epistemological objection merely confirms their worst suspicions about an atheistic worldview: It turns out reasonable atheists really are the moral pale. may, turn
to	act with	impunity	and	withoUt	moral	conSequeNce.	at	tHe	Very	LeasT,	this	would seem	TO	be	a	Significant	practical	prOblem;	AnD	More	LIkEly	a	dEep	theoLOgICAl pRoBlEm. IF	oNE	iS	persUadEd	by	the	Notion	that	MetAeThical	theoriES	bAttle	it	out	By eArning	more	plAusIbilitY	pOinTS,	then	One	ShoulD	also	bE	DisturBed	by	the aRgUMent.	It	SUggests	THAt	The	DcT	misses	one	importANt	MArk	because	it	haS	no way	To	ACcOUNt	fOr	tHe	moral	oblIgAtionS	Of	reasoNAbLE	NOn-bELievers.	This	miGht mean	that	THe	bElieveR	sHouLD	rest	tHeir	hOpES	on	An	alternatiVe	thEistic metAethicAL	theory.	tHis	striKes	me	aS	beIng	The	mOSt	CoMpeLlINg	iNTeRprETatIon of	the	ArGuMent	sInce	EPISTemiC	coNditIons	wOuld	seem	to	be	aN	imPortANt cOmponEnt	in	Any	mOrAl	theOry. ThaT	said,	A	hArd	line	interpreTatiOn	is	also	aVaiLaBle.	thE	theiST	could InsIst	On	the	puRe	separATioN	oF	EPIsTemology	and	ontologY.	THIS	wOuld	probAbly reQUiRe	A	Retreat	tO	a	MorE	genERAl	theOlogICaL	stateisT	positIOn,	AnD	not	a coMmAnd-basEd	VieW	baSed	on	SUcceSsful	cOmmunicaTion.	IN	That	case,	the	theISt could	argue	tHAt	THEiR	AccoUnt	Of	moral	ontoLogy	IS	intErnaLLy	ConSIstenT	(even	If 29 IT	fAIls	to	account	for	moraL	kNowledGe),20	and	Then	simply	notE	that	the epISTEmologicAl	obJEcTIon	merely	confiRms	thEir	worst	suSPicions	aBout	aN atheistIc	worldviEW:	it	turns	oUt	tHat	EveN	reASOnAble	atheists	rEALly	aRe	Beyond tHe	mOral	palE. ThIs	mAy,	iN	tuRn
to	act with	impunity	and	w ithout	mor al	co nse que nc e.	A t	th e	very	least,t hiswould seem	to	be	a	sig nific an t 	pra c ti cal	p roblem; an d mor eli kel ya 	d eep	t heo logical  problem.Ifon e	is	persuad e dby	the	not ion 	that	metaet hic al	the or ies battl e	i t	out 	by ea r ning	m ore	plaus ib i lity	p o ints,	t h e noneshould	also	be	di s tu r bed	by	the arg ument. 	I t 	s u g ges tsthat	the	D CT 	miss e s	one	i m po r t a ntm ark	because	i t	has	no wa y 	to 	accou nt 	fo r 	the	m oralob l iga tions	of	re ason able	non- believ e rs.	Thi s 	mightmean	t hat 	th e	be l ie ve r	s ho u ldr es t	t h eir 	hopes	o nan 	alte rnat i v e thei sti c me taeth ical	theory.Thi s	st r ike s	meas	be ingth e	mos t	comp ellin ginterpretationof	t he	argume ntsi nce 	e piste m ic	con dit ion s	would 	seem	t o 	be 	a n i mp ortant component	i na n ymoral	th eory.T ha ts aid,	a	h ar d	l inei n terpr etat i on 	is	also 	avail a bl e. 	The	th ei st	cou ld  in sis t	ont he	p ure	se paration 	of	e p istemology	and ontology.	Thi s 	w o u ld prob abl y require	a 	ret r eatto	a mo reg enera l	the ol o gi c al	stateist	positio n, 	and	n ot	acommand-based 	view	base d o n	succes sful co m munication.	In 	that 	case,	the theist c ouldargue	th at	theira c count	of 	mo ral 	on tol o g yis	internally c onsi st ent	(ev enif 29 i t	f ail s	t o	a cc ount	formoral	kn ow le dg e) ,20 	andt hen	simp ly 	no te 	th at	th e  epist emolo gica lob j ect ion	mer e ly c onfi rm sthei r	w or st	su spic i ons 	aboutan atheis tic worl dv ie w:	It	t urns	out	that 	e ven	reason ab leatheis t s 	reallyare	beyond the	moral	pa l e. This 	ma y,	in 	tur n
to	act with	impunity	and	without	moral	consequence.	At	the	very	least,	this	would_seem	to	be	a	significant	practical	problem;	and	more	likely	a	deep	theological problem._If	one	is	persuaded	by	the	notion	that	metaethical	theories	battle	it	out	by earning	more	plausibility	points,	then	one	should	also	be	disturbed	by	the argument.	It	suggests	that	the	DCT	misses	one	important	mark	because	it	has	no way	to	account	for	the	moral	obligations	of	reasonable	non-believers.	This	might_mean	that	the	believer	should	rest	their	hopes	on	an	alternative	theistic metaethical	theory.	This	strikes	me	as	being	the	most	compelling	interpretation_of	the	argument	since	epistemic	conditions	would	seem	to	be	an	important_component	in	any	moral	theory. That	said,	a	hard	line	interpretation	is	also	available.	The	theist	could_insist	on	the	pure	separation	of	epistemology	and	ontology.	This	would	probably_require	a	retreat	to	a	more	general	theological	stateist	position,	and	not	a command-based	view	based	on	successful	communication.	In	that	case,	the	theist could	argue	that	their	account	of	moral	ontology	is	internally	consistent	(even	if_29 it	fails	to	account	for	moral	knowledge),20	and	then	simply	note	that	the epistemological	objection	merely	confirms	their	worst	suspicions	about	an_atheistic	worldview:	It	turns	out	that	even	reasonable	atheists	really	are	beyond the	moral	pale. This	may,	in	turn