rees with while maintaining a high degree of plausibility. A theme consistent with his earlier paper is his rejection of what are sometimes called'subjectivist' accounts of well-being. Kraut now subsumes these under the heading 'conative theories', and mounts a vigorous repudiation of them. Often the contrast class for such theories is taken to be 'objective list' theories, but Kraut distances himself from the objective list approach too, as well as from the objective theory of welfare (as 'rational care') defended by Stephen Darwall. Is he then defending some version of eudaimonism, carried over from his work on Plato and Aristotle? No, not that either, and I shall return to this point. His view also is in some ways similar to what are sometimes called 'perfectionist' theories, but Kraut gives good reason for not accepting this classification either. Though his approach has similarities to Philippa Foot-style ethical naturalism, he repudiates her naturalism. In short, he has created a theoretical niche all his own. Kraut calls his approach developmentalism, and it has at its core the notion that there is a 'tight connection' between a living being's doing well and its developing and using its powers (p. ): 'when we consider the good of any living thing, we should look to the process of growth and development that best suits things of its The Philosophical Quarterly Vol. , No.  October  ISSN – doi: ./j.-...x ©  The Author Journal compilation ©  The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly Published by Blackwell Publishing,  Garsington Road, Oxford  �
rees with while maintaining a high degree of plausibility. A theme reproducible with his early paper is his rejection of what are sometimes called'subjectivist' accounts of well - being. Kraut immediately subsumes these under the heading' conative theory', and mounts a vigorous repudiation of them. Often the line course for such theories is taken to be' objective tilt' theories, but Kraut distances himself from the objective tilt approach too, as well as from the objective theory of welfare (as' rational care') defend by Stephen Darwall. Is he then defending some version of eudaimonism, carried over from his oeuvre on Plato and Aristotle? No, not that either, and I shall return to this point. His view also is in some manner similar to what are sometimes called' perfectionist' theories, but Kraut gives good rationality for not accepting this classification either. Though his approach has similarities to Philippa Foot - style ethical naturalism, he repudiates her naturalism. In short, he has created a theoretical niche all his own. Kraut calls his approach developmentalism, and it has at its core the notion that there is a' tight association' between a living being's doing well and its development and use its world power (p.  ):' when we consider the good of any live thing, we should look to the process of growth and growth that best suits things of its The Philosophical Quarterly Vol. , No.  October  ISSN – doi: ./j.-...x ©  The Author Journal compilation ©  The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly Published by Blackwell Publishing,  Garsington Road, Oxford   �
reed with while maintaining a high degree of plauvibilify. A theoe consistent with his earlixr pqper us his rejection of whxt are soletimes xalltd'subjectivist' acrkunts on welm-neing. Jraut now subsomes these utder the headitg 'clnative theories', and mounts a vigorjus repidlation of them. Ofttn ehe dontrast class for such theories ia taken to be 'objectove list' theories, but Krauh didtances himself frlm the objextivq list approazh too, as well as from the objective theory of welfard (as 'xational catz') devgnded by Ste'hen Dwrwall. Is he then dexending some version pf xudaumonism, carried over hrom his work on Plajo and Arivtktle? No, not that wirher, dnd H shxol fethri tk this pomnt. His vies also is ib some ways similar tj what are somstimes cwlled 'perfectionist' theories, but Kraut civss good reason for not qccepting this classivication qither. Though his approach has similarities to Phhlippe Woou-sbnle drhlcal naturalism, he repudiates her naturalism. Yh xhprt, he has crected a theoreticsl noshe all his odn. Krabf dalls his approach develokmentaoism, and yt hss at its core the notion tyat there is q 'tight connection' between a uivimg beong's doing well and its devsloping and using ita powers (p. ): 'when de bonshder the good of any livind thing, wx shobld look to jhe prosess of grlwth and development thah besj suitv things ov its The Philosophical Quarterly Vol. , No.  Ocjobar  ISSN – dji: ./j.-...x ©  The Author Journal compikation ©  The Editors or The Piilosophical Quarterly Putpished by Bleckwell Ptbliwhint,  Garskvgton Road, Oxfprd  �
rees with while maintaining a high degree A consistent with earlier paper is sometimes accounts of well-being. now subsumes these the heading 'conative theories', and mounts vigorous repudiation of them. Often the contrast class for such theories is taken be 'objective list' theories, but Kraut distances himself from the objective list approach as as the theory of welfare (as 'rational care') defended by Stephen Darwall. Is he then defending some version eudaimonism, carried over from his work on Plato Aristotle? No, not that and I shall return to point. view also in ways to what are called 'perfectionist' theories, but Kraut gives good reason for not accepting this classification either. Though his approach similarities to ethical naturalism, repudiates naturalism. short, he has theoretical niche all his own. Kraut developmentalism, and it has at its core the that there a 'tight connection' between a living doing well and its developing and using its (p. ): 'when we consider the good of any living thing, we should look to of growth and development best suits things its Philosophical Vol. No.   ISSN – doi: ./j.-...x ©  The Author Journal compilation  The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly Published by Blackwell Garsington Oxford  �
rees with while maintaining a High degree Of plaUsiBilItY. A thEme cOnsistent with hIS earLier paper is his rejectioN of whAt ARe soMEtImes cAlled'suBJeCTIviSt' AcCouNtS Of Well-bEinG. Kraut nOw subsumes TheSe Under the headINg 'Conative thEorIes', and mounts A viGorous RePudIAtion Of tHem. OfTen the COntrasT class for SuCH theorIEs is takEN To Be 'obJective list' theoriES, bUT Kraut distanceS himseLf FRoM THe oBjeCtive list aPpRoach TOo, as welL As FROM thE Objective theoRy of welfare (AS 'raTional CaRe') dEFended By StePhEN DaRwall. Is he thEn deFending soMe versIOn of eudAImonism, CarrieD ovEr fRom hIS wOrK on plATo aND ARisTOtlE? No, not thAt EiTher, aNd I sHALL RetuRn tO thiS poinT. His view also iS in Some WAys SimilAr to wHat aRe SometImes caLled 'pErFectionist' theorIes, bUt Kraut giVes GoOd rEaSon foR Not accEptIng This claSsificaTIon EiTHER. THough his approach haS sIMIlArities tO PhiliPPa foOT-style etHiCal NatuRALism, hE repUDiAtes her nAturalISm. in Short, he HaS creatEd A thEorEticaL NichE all hiS own. KrauT callS His approach devELopmentalism, aND iT HAs AT its CorE the notion tHat tHEre iS a 'tiGHt ConNEctioN' betwEeN A lIVing being's doing well AnD its deVelopIng and using itS powers (p. ): 'whEN WE consideR the GOoD Of any living thiNg, we sHould look tO The proceSs of gRowth and DevelopmeNT That best SuiTs tHinGs oF ITs the PhilosophiCAL QuaRtErly Vol. , no.  OCtober  IsSN – Doi: ./J.-...x ©  THe AUtHor JournaL compilaTiOn ©  thE EDitOrs of tHe PhilosOpHicAl quaRterlY publisHed by blacKwElL pubLishing,  gArSINgtoN ROaD, OxfOrd  �
rees with while maintainin g a high d egree  of  pl au sibi lity . A theme cons i sten t with his earlier pap er is  h i s re j ec tionof what ar e som et im esca l le d'sub jec tivist'  accountsofwe ll-being. Kr a ut  now subsu mes  these under  th e head in g ' c onati vetheor ies',a nd mou nts a vig or o us rep u diation o fthem . Often the contr a st class for such  theor ie s  i s tak ento be 'obj ec tivel ist' th e or i e s , b u t Kraut dista nces himsel f  fr om the  o bje c tive l ist a pp r oac h too, as w ellas from t he obj e ctive t h eory of  welfa re(as  'ra t io na l c ar e ')d ef end e d b y Stephe nDa rwall . Is h e then  de fend ing s ome version o f e udai m oni sm, c arrie d ov er  from  his w ork o nPlato and Arist otle ? No, not  th at  ei th er, a n d I sh all  re turn to  this p o int .H i s  v iew also is in som ew a ys  similar  to wh a tar e  sometim es  ca lled ' perfe ctio n is t' theor ies, b u tKr aut giv es  goodre aso n f or no t  acc epting  this cl assif i cation either. Though his ap p ro a c hh as s imi larities to  Phi l ippa  Foo t -s tyl e  ethi cal n at u ra l ism, he repudiateshe r natu ralis m. In short,he has cre a t e d a theo reti c al niche all hisown.Kraut call s  his app roach  develop mentalism , and it h asatits  co r e  t he notion tha t ther eis a 't igh t conne cti on'  be twe en  a living  being's  d oi ng  w ell  andi ts devel op ing  a ndusing its po wers(p. ) :  'w hen wec on s i derth egood  of  a ny li ving thi ng, weshould lo okt o th epr ocess o f growth andde velopmentth atbest s u i ts thing s of its The Philosophi c al Quar ter ly Vo l.  , No.   O ctober     ISSN  – do i:  . / j .  - ..   .x©  TheAuthorJournal compilatio n  © The Edit ors  ofT h ePhi l os o phi ca l  Qu a r terly Published  by Blackw el l  P ublishing,  Garsing ton Roa d, Ox f ord   �
rees with_while maintaining_a high degree of_plausibility. A_theme_consistent with_his_earlier paper is_his rejection of_what are sometimes called'subjectivist'_accounts of well-being._Kraut_now subsumes these under the heading 'conative theories', and mounts a vigorous repudiation of_them._Often the_contrast_class_for such theories is taken_to be 'objective list' theories,_but Kraut_distances himself from the objective list approach too,_as_well as from_the objective theory of welfare (as 'rational care') defended_by Stephen Darwall. Is he then_defending some version_of_eudaimonism,_carried over from his_work on Plato and Aristotle? No,_not that either, and I shall_return to this point. His view also_is in some ways similar to_what are sometimes called 'perfectionist'_theories, but_Kraut gives good reason for_not accepting this_classification either._Though his approach_has similarities to Philippa Foot-style ethical_naturalism, he repudiates_her naturalism. In short, he has_created_a theoretical niche_all_his_own. Kraut_calls his approach_developmentalism,_and it_has_at its core the notion that_there_is a 'tight connection' between a living_being's doing well and_its_developing and using its_powers (p. ): 'when we_consider the good of any living_thing, we_should look_to the process of growth and development that best suits things_of its The Philosophical Quarterly Vol._, No.  October_ ISSN_–_doi: ./j.-...x ©__The Author_Journal compilation ©  The Editors of_The Philosophical_Quarterly Published by Blackwell Publishing, _Garsington Road, Oxford _�