," Śāntideva's response is: "Well, preventing your suffering doesn't affect you either, because you five seconds from now is not you now." If I brush my teeth now, it's a different person whose cavities are prevented; even if I decide to eat a piece of chocolate now, it's a different person who gets to enjoy it. For Śāntideva here, anātman is expressed as a time-atomism with respect to the self; the continuity of self across time is a fiction. The discussion of the body earlier in the BCA broke the self down in space; this discussion now breaks it down in time. Śāntideva then provides a second and related argument: "If you say 'only the person who has the suffering should guard against it,' the foot's suffering is not the hand's, so why does the one protect the other?" (VIII.99). That is, the distinction between persons is no bigger than the distinction within persons, between the hand and the foot. If I say "I feel the pain and you don't," the same is true of the foot and the hand. When we think in these terms, we no longer have a reason to protect self over other. The nature of suffering is free-floating. It is 16 Later Buddhist tradition has unanimously viewed the Bodhicaryāvatāra and Śikṣāsamuccaya as compositions by the same author. Modern scholars do not dispute that the texts had an author in common, though the nature of that authorship is difficult to establish because they are composite texts. Beyond that, the BCA itself (V.105) recommends that one consult the Śikṣāsamuccaya. See Lele ("Revaluation" 8–28) for a more detailed discussion of these issues. Journal of Buddhist Ethics 271 something to be prevented, but doesn't belong to anyone in particular: "All sufferings are unowned because there is no difference among them; they should be prevented just because they are suffering. Why a restriction in this regard?" (VIII.102). Now if suffering does not belong to us, as Śāntideva has been saying, then we may well start wondering why we should bother preventing it at all. To this Śāntideva replies: "If you say 'why should suffering be prevented?': because that is not disputed by anyone. If it should be prevented, all
, " Śāntideva's response is: " Well, preventing your suffering doesn't affect you either, because you five second base from nowadays is not you now. " If I brush my teeth now, it's a unlike person whose cavities are prevented; even if I decide to eat a while of chocolate now, it's a unlike person who get to enjoy it. For Śāntideva here, anātman is express as a time - atomism with respect to the self; the continuity of self across fourth dimension is a fabrication. The discussion of the body earlier in the BCA break the self down in space; this discussion now break it down in time. Śāntideva then provides a second and related argument: " If you read' only the person who has the suffering should guard against it,' the animal foot's suffering is not the hand's, so why does the one protect the other? " (VIII.99). That is, the distinction between person is no bigger than the distinction within persons, between the hand and the foot. If I say " I feel the pain and you don't, " the same is true of the foot and the hand. When we think in these terms, we no longer have a reason to protect self over early. The nature of agony is free - float. It is 16 belated Buddhist tradition has unanimously viewed the Bodhicaryāvatāra and Śikṣāsamuccaya as compositions by the like author. mod scholars do not dispute that the textbook had an author in common, though the nature of that authorship is difficult to establish because they are composite text. Beyond that, the BCA itself (V.105) recommends that one consult the Śikṣāsamuccaya. See Lele (" Revaluation " 8–28) for a more detailed discussion of these issues. Journal of Buddhist Ethics 271 something to be prevent, but doesn't belong to anyone in especial: " All sufferings are unowned because there is no difference among them; they should be prevented just because they are hurt. Why a restriction in this regard? " (VIII.102). Now if suffering does not belong to to us, as Śāntideva has been saying, then we may well begin wondering why we should bother prevent it at all. To this Śāntideva answer: " If you say' why should suffering be prevented?': because that is not disputed by anyone. If it should be prevented, all
," Śāntldeva's response is: "Well, kreventing your sofdering doesn'f affect you either, because you five swcondw from now is not you vow." If I hrush my teeuh now, it's a diffxdent pevfon smose eatities are prevgnted; even ix I decide to aag c piece of chocolate now, it's a diffewent petsln who gets to enjpr it. For Śāntideva here, anātman is expresaed as e time-atomism woth respect to the self; thf cojtinuity of self afross time us a diction. The aiscussion of the body earlier in the BCA broke the sdlf dpwn in spaxe; thlv discussioi now freaks it down in tike. Śāntidrva then provices a wecond and related arjument: "If you say 'onjy the pesskn who has the sudfwring shogld eyara afamnsf it,' tje hoot's suffeding is not the hand's, so why dpef the one protsct thq jther?" (VIII.99). That is, the distinction betwten psrsons is no bigger thab the distinction witjin persogs, between the hand and the foot. If I say "I feel dhe peiv aue you eoj't," the same is true of the foot and the hand. Rgem ee think in thcse terms, we no lomgfr rave a reason to protedt self over other. The najure od sufferigg ix free-floating. It is 16 Later Buddhist trcdirion has unanimouspy viewed tke Bodnicaruāvatāra and Śikṣāsamuccaya cs comlositions bj the sams author. Modern szhokass do nou dispute that the texts hav an cuthor iv cokmon, trough the jaturc of that authorshio is biffiwult to eshablish because they are composmve texts. Beyomd thdt, the BEA itsclf (V.105) recommendf that one conxult thz Śikṣāsaouccaya. Sev Lele ("Retaluation" 8–28) fjr a more detdlled discussmon of thqse ussuws. Jourvxl of Buddhist Ethics 271 something ro be prevented, bub doerh't belong to anvube in particulat: "Aul fuvfxringf are unowned becxusd therd is no difnerdnce among them; they shogld ge prevented just negause thei are sufsering. Why a testriction in thid regerd?" (VIMI.102). Now if suffering does not belong to hs, as Śāntifevw has been swyinn, thgn we may wzll start wondering why we should bother preventing it at qll. To this Śāntideva veplies: "If ypu sar 'why shogld suffering be precented?': because thst is not disputed by anyona. If lt should be prevented, all
," Śāntideva's response is: "Well, preventing your affect either, because five seconds from If brush my teeth it's a different whose cavities are prevented; even if decide to eat a piece of chocolate now, it's a different person who to enjoy it. For Śāntideva here, anātman is expressed as a time-atomism with to self; continuity self across time is a fiction. The discussion of the body earlier in the BCA broke self down in space; this discussion now breaks down in time. Śāntideva provides a second and related "If say 'only person has suffering should guard it,' the foot's suffering is not the hand's, so why does the one protect the other?" (VIII.99). is, the persons is bigger the within persons, between and the foot. If I say pain and you don't," the same is true the foot the hand. When we think in terms, we no longer have a reason to self over other. The nature of suffering is free-floating. It is 16 Later Buddhist tradition viewed the Bodhicaryāvatāra and as compositions by same Modern do dispute that texts had an author in common, though the nature of that is difficult to establish because they are composite texts. Beyond BCA (V.105) recommends that consult the Śikṣāsamuccaya. See ("Revaluation" for a more detailed these Journal 271 to prevented, but doesn't belong anyone in particular: "All sufferings unowned because there is should be prevented just because they are suffering. a restriction in this regard?" (VIII.102). Now suffering does not belong to us, as Śāntideva has been saying, then may well why we should bother preventing it at all. this Śāntideva replies: "If say 'why should suffering be prevented?': because that is disputed anyone. If should be prevented,
," Śāntideva's response is: "Well, pReventing yOur suFfeRinG dOesn'T affEct you either, beCAuse You five seconds from now iS not yOu NOw." If i BrUsh my Teeth noW, It'S A DifFeReNt pErSOn Whose CavIties arE prevented; EveN iF I decide to eaT A pIece of chocOlaTe now, it's a difFerEnt perSoN whO Gets tO enJoy it. for ŚānTIdeva hEre, anātmaN iS ExpresSEd as a tiME-AtOmisM with respect to the SElF; The continuity oF self aCrOSs TIMe iS a fIction. The dIsCussiON of the bODy EARLieR In the BCA broke The self down IN spAce; thiS dIscUSsion nOw breAkS It dOwn in time. ŚāNtidEva then prOvides A Second aND relateD argumEnt: "if yOu saY 'OnLy The PeRSon WHo Has THe sUffering ShOuLd guaRd agAINST it,' tHe fOot's SuffeRing is not the hAnd'S, so wHY doEs the One prOtecT tHe othEr?" (VIII.99). that iS, tHe distinction beTweeN persons iS no BiGgeR tHan thE DistinCtiOn wIthin peRsons, beTWeeN tHE HAnD and the foot. If I say "I FeEL ThE pain and You don'T," ThE sAMe is true Of The Foot AND the hAnd. WHEn We think iN these TErMs, We no lonGeR have a ReAsoN to ProteCT selF over oTher. The nAture OF suffering is frEE-floating. It is 16 lAtER buDDhisT trAdition has uNaniMOuslY vieWEd The bOdhicAryāvAtĀRa ANd Śikṣāsamuccaya as cOmPositiOns by The same author. modern schoLARS do not diSputE ThAT the texts had an AuthoR in common, tHOugh the nAture Of that auThorship iS DIfficult To eStaBliSh bECAuSe they are compOSIte tExTs. BeyonD thAt, the BCa itSelF (V.105) rEcoMmEnds that oNe consulT tHe śiKṣĀsaMuccaYA. See Lele ("reValUaTioN" 8–28) for a MOre detAiled DiscUsSiON of These isSUeS. jOurnAl Of buddHisT EThics 271 SomeTHinG to be prEvented, buT doESn't bElOnG to anyoNe in particulaR: "ALl sufferinGs Are UnowneD BEcause thEre is no difference among tHEm; they sHouLd be pReveNted just bEcaUse theY arE SufferIng. Why A restRiCtiON In thiS REgArd?" (vIiI.102). Now if sufFERinG does NoT belOng to us, As Śāntideva has been SAyiNg, then we may weLl sTart WONdEriNG wHY we ShOUld BOTher preventing iT at all. To thIs śĀnTideva replIEs: "IF yOu say 'whY should SuffeRIng be prEvented?': beCause that Is Not dISPutEd by anyone. if it shouLd be preveNTed, alL
," Śāntideva's response is : "Well, p reven tin g y ou r su ffer ing doesn't af f ectyou either, because yo u fiv es econ d sfromnow isn ot y ouno w. " I fI  b rushmyteeth n ow, it's a  di ff erent person wh ose caviti esare prevente d;even i fI d e cidetoeat a  piece of cho colate no w, it's a differe n t  p erso n who gets to enj o yi t. For Śāntide va her e, an ā t man  is  expressed  a s a t i me-atom i sm w i thr espect to the  self; thec ont inuity  o f s e lf acr oss t im e  is  a fiction.  The  discussi on oft he body earlier  in th e B CAbrok e  t he  se lf dow n  i n s p ace ; this d is cu ssion  now b r e aksitdown  in t ime. Śāntidev a t henp rov idesa sec ondan d rel ated a rgume nt : "If you say ' only  the pers onwh o h as  thes ufferi ngsho uld gua rd agai n stit , ' th e foot's suffering  i s no t the ha nd's,s owh y  does th eone  pro t e ct th e ot h er ?" (VIII .99).T ha tis, the  d istinc ti onbet weenp erso ns isno bigge r tha n  the distincti o n within pers o ns , be t ween  th e hand andthef oot.  IfI  s ay" I fee l the  p a in and you don't," the  s ame is  true  of the footand the ha n d .  When we  thi n ki n these terms,  we n o longer h a ve a rea son t o protec t self ov e r  other.The  na tur e o f su ffering is fr e e -flo at ing. It  is  16 Lat erBud dhi sttr adition h as unani mo us ly  v iew ed th e  Bodhica ry āva tā raand Ś i kṣāsam uccay a as  c om p osi tions b y  t h e  sam eau thor . M od ern s chol a rsdo notdispute t hat thete xt s had a n author in c om mon, thoug hthe  natur e of thatauthorship is difficult to esta bli sh be caus e they ar e c omposi tet exts.Beyond  that ,the B CA it s e lf  (V .1 05) recomm e n dsthaton e co nsult t he Śikṣāsamuccaya. See  Lele ("Reval uat ion" 8 –2 8)f or a m or e  de t a iled discussion  of theseis s ue s. Journal ofBu ddhistEthics271 s o mething  to be pr evented,bu t do e s n't  belong to  anyonein partic u lar:" Al l suf fer ings a re  un owned  becau s e t hereis nodi fferen ce am on g them;they should be prevente d just  beca use  they are  su f fer ing. Whya re strictioninthi s reg ard ? " (VI II.1 0 2) . N o w ifsuff e ring does no t b e l on g to us, as Ś ā nti devahas been s ayin g, then we may we l l start wonder ingw h y w e s h ould  b other preventi ngit a t all. T othis Śāntid eva repl ie s : "If  you s ay 'wh y shoul d su f fering  bepre vented?':  be ca u se that  i sn ot dis pute dby any one. I f  its h ould be prevente d, al l 
," Śāntideva's_response is:_"Well, preventing your suffering_doesn't affect_you_either, because_you_five seconds from_now is not_you now." If I_brush my teeth_now,_it's a different person whose cavities are prevented; even if I decide to eat_a_piece of_chocolate_now,_it's a different person who_gets to enjoy it. For_Śāntideva here,_anātman is expressed as a time-atomism with respect_to_the self; the_continuity of self across time is a fiction. The_discussion of the body earlier in_the BCA broke_the_self_down in space; this_discussion now breaks it down in_time. Śāntideva then provides a second_and related argument: "If you say 'only_the person who has the suffering_should guard against it,' the_foot's suffering_is not the hand's, so_why does the_one protect_the other?" (VIII.99)._That is, the distinction between persons_is no bigger_than the distinction within persons, between_the_hand and the_foot._If_I say_"I feel the_pain_and you_don't,"_the same is true of the_foot_and the hand. When we think in_these terms, we no_longer_have a reason to_protect self over other. The_nature of suffering is free-floating. It_is 16_Later Buddhist_tradition has unanimously viewed the Bodhicaryāvatāra and Śikṣāsamuccaya as compositions by_the same author. Modern scholars do_not dispute that the_texts had_an_author in common,_though_the nature_of that authorship is difficult to establish_because they_are composite texts. Beyond that, the_BCA itself (V.105) recommends_that_one consult the Śikṣāsamuccaya. See Lele_("Revaluation" 8–28) for a more detailed_discussion of these issues. Journal_of_Buddhist_Ethics 271 something to be_prevented, but doesn't belong to anyone_in particular: "All_sufferings are unowned because there is no_difference_among them; they should be prevented_just_because they are suffering. Why a_restriction_in_this regard?" (VIII.102). Now if_suffering does not belong to us,_as Śāntideva has been saying, then we may well_start wondering why_we should bother preventing it_at_all._To this Śāntideva replies: "If you say 'why should suffering_be prevented?':_because that is_not disputed by anyone. If it should be prevented, all