 one might engage in an epistemically paternalistic practice. I might think that my evidence E supports a particular proposition p. 16028-0338d-1pass-r01.indd 204 2/21/2020 10:23:44 AM Epistemic Paternalism, and Epistemic Permissivism 205 However, I might suspect that another person, upon learning E, won't come to believe p-in fact, they might even come to believe not-p. On this basis, I withhold E from them. However, if interpersonal permissivism is true, then the fact that someone with my evidence would come to a different conclusion than me doesn't mean their belief is irrational or that they've misinterpreted the evidence. The possibility of permissive cases then undermines a reason that one might act paternalistically. A specific example might make this point more concrete. A frequent case used in both the permissivism literature and the epistemic paternalism literature involves juries. Consider a judge who is deciding whether to act paternalistically by withholding some evidence from a jury. She is considering doing so because they would interpret evidence in a way that, to him or her, seems misguided. She suspects that, if she gave them the extra evidence, they would think it supports p, when she is convinced it supports not-p.14 In a lot of these cases, what seems misguided to her might just be another epistemically legitimate way of interpreting the evidence. The jurors might invoke a different epistemic standard when weighing and interpreting the evidence-a standard that is epistemically acceptable, but results in a different conclusion about who is guilty (they may, for instance, conclude that another hypothesis best explains the evidence). Of course, sometimes one might invoke an epistemic standard that is unlikely to produce rational beliefs. For instance, a jury might be disposed to make a basic math error or engage in a process of reasoning that is problematically biased. In these cases, the justification for epistemic paternalism is clear. However, these are also not cases of epistemic permissivism, as the jury is not invoking an epistemically legitimate standard, so the beliefs produced using that standard are not rational. The permissivist does not claim that any epistemic standard goes-merely that there are different but equally legitimate standards that can be applied to a body of evidence. The possibility of interpersonal permissivism doesn't merely have implications for the practice of withholding evidence; it also speaks against interfering with the way another interpret
one might engage in an epistemically paternalistic practice. I might think that my evidence E supports a especial suggestion p. 16028-0338d-1pass-r01.indd 204 2/21/2020 10:23:44 AM Epistemic Paternalism, and Epistemic Permissivism 205 However, I might suspect that another person, upon learning E, won't come to think p - in fact, they might even come to believe not - p. On this footing, I withhold einsteinium from them. However, if interpersonal permissivism is true, then the fact that someone with my evidence would come to a different conclusion than me doesn't think of their belief is irrational or that they've misinterpreted the evidence. The hypothesis of permissive cases then undermines a rationality that one might act paternalistically. A specific example might lay down this point more concrete. A frequent case use in both the permissivism literature and the epistemic paternalism literature involves juries. Consider a judge who is decide whether to act paternalistically by withholding some evidence from a jury. She is considering doing so because they would translate evidence in a way that, to him or her, seems misguided. She suspects that, if she gave them the extra evidence, they would think it supports p, when she is convinced it supports not - p.14 In a lot of these cases, what seems misguided to her might just be another epistemically legitimate way of interpret the evidence. The jurors might invoke a unlike epistemic criterion when weighing and interpreting the evidence - a standard that is epistemically acceptable, but result in a different conclusion about who is guilty (they may, for instance, conclude that another guess best explains the evidence). Of course, sometimes one might invoke an epistemic standard that is unlikely to produce rational beliefs. For instance, a jury might be disposed to make a basic mathematics error or betroth in a procedure of reasoning that is problematically biased. In these cases, the justification for epistemic paternalism is clear. However, these are also not subject of epistemic permissivism, as the jury is not invoking an epistemically legitimate standard, therefore the beliefs produced using that standard are not intellectual. The permissivist does not claim that any epistemic standard goes - merely that there are different but equally lawful standards that can be applied to a body of evidence. The possibility of interpersonal permissivism doesn't merely suffer implications for the exercise of withholding evidence; it also speaks against interfering with the way another interpret
 onf might engage in an epirtemically patetnqlistir practjce. I mieht think that my evidence E sypporuf a particular prooosition i. 16028-0338d-1pass-r01.ibdd 204 2/21/2020 10:23:44 AM Epistxjic Patcxnalial, anb Xpistemic Permixsivism 205 Hmwever, I might sjs'ect that another person, upon learnigg E, wom't come to beliede p-pn facf, they might even come to believe hot-p. On this basis, I withhold E from them. Howeger, lf interpersonal pfrmissivism is eeue, then the fact that someone witg my evidence would come to a dkfferznt conclusuob tjdn me doesn'v mean their belien is irsationak or that they'ye mivinrerpreted the evidencx. The possibility of permissiee cases then undernibes a reavon gyat ont mmghf act oatxrnalisticamly. A specidic example might mskq this point mkre cogcwete. A frequent case used in both the ptrmisaivism literature and tye epistemic paternallsm literwture involves juries. Consider a judge who is dechding dheuhcv to qch paternalistically by withholding some evidegde fgom a jury. She is considerinb foogg so because they ckumd interpret evidejce in w way that, to rim pr her, seems misguided. She wuspects than, if she gave them the extra evidznce, tney wpuld think it supports ', when she is conginced it rupports not-p.14 In a kod of these cases, what seemf misguidxd to her mieht kust bq another fpistckically legitimate way lf interpretlng the evidence. The jurors migiv invoke a digfarett epistzmic sbandard when weyghing and intgrpreting the dvidence-a atandarv that is epystemically awfeptable, but results in q didferent zonclusion aboit who is guilty (thwy may, for instancc, conzmude that anothzx yypothesis best exolaynd vhe edhdence). Of cogrse, soortimer one might knvole an epistemic stangard that is unlikely yo produce rationaj beliefs. For instance, a jury mlght ue dis'osed yo iake a basic math error or engzge in a orogess of reasoging that is proylematically biased. In these cases, the jnstification for epistgmic paternalism is cktar. However, tiese awe also nmt cases of epistemix permissivism, as the jury is not invoiing at epidtemically legitimate standard, so the beliefs produced using that standare are ioe rational. Fhe lermivsnvixt doef nov rlaim that any eppstemic standard goes-merely that there ase different but equally legitomxte standards that can be applied to z body og evidence. The possibility of imterpersonal permissivisk doesn't meremy havv ioplications for thr praccice od withhildikg evidence; it alxo speaks ahainxt interfering with the way anothee inteepget
one might engage in an epistemically paternalistic might that my E supports a 2/21/2020 AM Epistemic Paternalism, Epistemic Permissivism 205 I might suspect that another person, learning E, won't come to believe p-in fact, they might even come to not-p. On this basis, I withhold E from them. However, if interpersonal permissivism true, the that with my evidence would come to a different conclusion than me doesn't mean their belief is or that they've misinterpreted the evidence. The possibility permissive cases then undermines reason that one might act A example might this more A frequent case in both the permissivism literature and the epistemic paternalism literature involves juries. Consider a judge who is whether to by withholding evidence a She is considering because they would interpret evidence in to him or her, seems misguided. She suspects if she them the extra evidence, they would it supports p, when she is convinced it not-p.14 In a lot of these cases, what seems misguided to her might just be legitimate way of interpreting evidence. The jurors invoke different standard weighing and the evidence-a standard that is epistemically acceptable, but results in a conclusion about who is guilty (they may, for instance, conclude hypothesis explains the evidence). course, sometimes one might an standard that is unlikely rational For might disposed make a basic math or engage in a process reasoning that is problematically justification for epistemic paternalism is clear. However, these also not cases of epistemic permissivism, as jury is not invoking an epistemically legitimate standard, so the beliefs produced that standard rational. The permissivist does not claim that any standard goes-merely that there different but equally legitimate standards that can be applied a of evidence. possibility of interpersonal doesn't merely have for the practice evidence; it speaks interfering another interpret
 one might engage in an epistemIcally pateRnaliStiC prAcTice. i migHt think that my eVIdenCe E supports a particular PropoSiTIon p. 16028-0338D-1PaSs-r01.inDd 204 2/21/2020 10:23:44 AM EpiSTeMIC PaTeRnAliSm, ANd epistEmiC PermisSivism 205 HoweVer, i mIght suspect tHAt Another perSon, Upon learning e, woN't come To BelIEve p-iN faCt, theY might EVen comE to believE nOT-p. On thIS basis, I WIThHold e from them. However, iF InTErpersonal permIssiviSm IS tRUE, thEn tHe fact that SoMeone WIth my evIDeNCE WouLD come to a diffeRent conclusIOn tHan me dOeSn't MEan theIr belIeF Is iRrational or That They've misInterpREted the EVidence. the posSibIliTy of PErMiSsiVe CAseS ThEn uNDerMines a reAsOn That oNe miGHT ACt paTerNaliSticaLly. A specific eXamPle mIGht Make tHis poInt mOrE concRete. A fRequeNt Case used in both tHe peRmissivisM liTeRatUrE and tHE epistEmiC paTernaliSm literATurE iNVOLvEs juries. Consider a jUdGE WhO is decidIng wheTHeR tO Act paterNaLisTicaLLY by wiThhoLDiNg some evIdence FRoM a Jury. She Is ConsidErIng DoiNg so bECausE they wOuld inteRpret EVidence in a way tHAt, to him or her, sEEmS MIsGUideD. ShE suspects thAt, if SHe gaVe thEM tHe eXTra evIdencE, tHEy WOuld think it supports P, wHen she Is conVinced it suppoRts not-p.14 In a LOT Of these cAses, WHaT Seems misguided To her Might just bE Another ePisteMically lEgitimate WAY of interPreTinG thE evIDEnCe. The jurors miGHT invOkE a diffeRenT episteMic StaNdaRd wHeN weighing And interPrEtInG tHe eVidenCE-a standaRd ThaT iS epIstemICally aCceptAble, BuT rESulTs in a diFFeRENt coNcLuSion AboUt Who is GuilTY (thEy may, foR instance, ConCLude ThAt Another Hypothesis besT eXplains the EvIdeNce). Of cOURse, sometImes one might invoke an epiSTemic stAndArd thAt is Unlikely tO prOduce rAtiONal belIefs. FoR instAnCe, a JURy migHT Be DisPoSed to make a BASic Math eRrOr or Engage iN a process of reasoniNG thAt is problematIcaLly bIASeD. In THeSE caSeS, The JUStification for ePistemic paTeRNaLism is cleaR. howEvEr, these Are also Not caSEs of epiStemic perMissivism, As The jURY is Not invokinG an epistEmically lEGitimATe StandArd, So the bElIefS prodUced usINg tHat stAndard ArE not raTionaL. THe permisSivist does not claim that aNy episTemic StaNdard goes-MerELy tHat there aRe diFferent but EquAllY legiTimATe staNdarDS tHat CAn be aPpliED to a body oF EvIdeNCE. THe possibiliTY OF inTerpeRsoNAl permIssiVism doesn't merely hAVe implications For tHE PraCtiCE of wItHholding evidenCe; iT aLSO speaks aGaInst interfeRing with ThE Way anOther iNterprEt
 one might engage in an ep istemicall y pat ern ali st ic p ract ice. I might t h inkthat my evidence E sup ports  a part i cu lar p roposit i on p . 1 60 28 -03 38 d -1 pass- r01 .indd 2 04 2/21/20 2010 :23:44 AM Ep i st emic Pater nal ism, and Epi ste mic Pe rm iss i vism205  Howe ver, I mightsuspect t ha t  anoth e r perso n ,  u ponlearning E, won't co m e to believe p -in fa ct ,  t h e y m igh t even com eto be l ieve no t -p . O n t h is basis, I w ithhold E f r omthem.Ho wev e r, ifinter pe r son al permissi vism  is true,  thent he fact that so meonewit h m y ev i de nc e w ou l d c o me  to a d ifferent  c on clusi on t h a n me d oes n'tmeantheir beliefisirra t ion al or  that  the y' ve mi sinter prete dthe evidence. T he p ossibilit y o fper mi ssive casesthe n u ndermin es a re a son  t h a t  o ne might act pater na l i st ically.A spec i fi ce xample m ig htmake t his p oint mo re concr ete. A fr eq uent ca se  usedin  bo ththe p e rmis sivism  literat ure a n d the epistemi c  paternalisml it e r at u re i nvo lves juries . Co n side r aj ud gew ho is  deci di n gw hether to act pater na listic allyby withholdin g some evi d e n ce froma ju r y. She is conside ringdoing so b e cause th ey wo uld inte rpret evi d e nce in a  wa y t hat , t o hi m or her, see m s  mis gu ided. S hesuspect s t hat , i f s he  gave the m the ex tr aev id enc e, th e y wouldth ink  i t s uppor t s p, w hen s he i sco n vin ced its up p o rtsno t- p.14  In  a  lotof t h ese  cases,  what see msm isgu id ed  to her  might just b eanother ep is tem ically l egitimat e way of interpreting t h e evide nce . The  jur ors might  in voke a  di f ferent  epist emicst and a r d whe n we igh in g and inte r p ret ing t he  evi dence-a  standard that ise pis temically acc ept able , bu t r e su l tsin a d i f ferent conclusi on about w ho is  guilty (t h eyma y, forinstanc e, co n clude t hat anoth er hypoth es is b e s t e xplains th e eviden ce). Of c o urse, so metim esone mi gh t i nvoke  an ep i ste mic s tandar dthat i s unl ik ely to p roduce rational beliefs . Forinsta nce , a jurymig h t b e dispose d to  make a ba sic  ma th er ror or en gage in  ap roces s of reasoning th ati s  p roblematica l l y  bi ased.  In thesecase s, the justificat i on for epistem ic p a t ern ali s m is  c lear. However,  th es e are also  n ot cases of  epistem ic permi ssivis m, asthe jur y is not in voki ngan episte mic al l y legit im at e  stand ard,  s o thebelief s  pro d u ced using that s tanda r d  aren otratio na l. Thep ermi ssivist do es not clai m that  any  epis temic s ta ndardgoe s- merely tha t  there ar e dif ferentbu t eq ual ly leg itim a t e sta ndar ds  th at can be a pp l ie dt o a  bod y ofev iden ce. The p o ssibilit y o f  interp er son a l  permi s si v i sm doesn't  me relyh a ve implica t ions fo r  thepracti ce ofwithhol d ing  e vidence ; i t also spea ks agains t  in te rfer ing with  t he w ay  an ot her interpret
 one_might engage_in an epistemically paternalistic_practice. I_might_think that_my_evidence E supports_a particular proposition_p. 16028-0338d-1pass-r01.indd 204 2/21/2020_10:23:44 AM Epistemic_Paternalism,_and Epistemic Permissivism 205 However, I might suspect that another person, upon learning E,_won't_come to_believe_p-in_fact, they might even come_to believe not-p. On this_basis, I_withhold E from them. However, if interpersonal permissivism_is_true, then the_fact that someone with my evidence would come to_a different conclusion than me doesn't_mean their belief_is_irrational_or that they've misinterpreted_the evidence. The possibility of permissive_cases then undermines a reason that_one might act paternalistically. A specific example_might make this point more concrete._A frequent case used in_both the_permissivism literature and the epistemic_paternalism literature involves_juries. Consider_a judge who_is deciding whether to act paternalistically_by withholding some_evidence from a jury. She is_considering_doing so because_they_would_interpret evidence_in a way_that,_to him_or_her, seems misguided. She suspects that,_if_she gave them the extra evidence, they_would think it supports_p,_when she is convinced_it supports not-p.14 In a_lot of these cases, what seems_misguided to_her might_just be another epistemically legitimate way of interpreting the evidence. The_jurors might invoke a different epistemic_standard when weighing and_interpreting the_evidence-a_standard that is_epistemically_acceptable, but_results in a different conclusion about who_is guilty_(they may, for instance, conclude that_another hypothesis best explains_the_evidence). Of course, sometimes one might_invoke an epistemic standard that is_unlikely to produce rational beliefs._For_instance,_a jury might be disposed_to make a basic math error_or engage in_a process of reasoning that is problematically_biased._In these cases, the justification for_epistemic_paternalism is clear. However, these are_also_not_cases of epistemic permissivism, as_the jury is not invoking an_epistemically legitimate standard, so the beliefs produced using that_standard are not_rational. The permissivist does not_claim_that_any epistemic standard goes-merely that there are different but equally_legitimate standards_that can be_applied to a body of evidence. The possibility of interpersonal_permissivism doesn't merely have implications for the_practice of withholding evidence; it also speaks against interfering with the_way another interpret