, and the transitivity of identity gives us a contradiction. T H E T R U T H A B O U T S H E R L O C K H O L M E S 345 demonstratively available, Doyle assigned 'Holmes' to some (possible) individual or other – the selection domain being restricted perhaps (only) by the condition that it be non-actual – that he could later develop to serve whatever purpose he wanted in the stories. It is sometimes thought to be required for reference that there is some property that o must have for a name n to refer to o that can, in a noncircular manner, be invoked to distinguish o from other potential referents – either through a universally applicable condition such as acquaintance or a causal relation between name tokening and referent, or that some such condition must be satisfied in any particular instance, even if different relations – satisfying descriptive conditions or causal links – may do the trick in different cases. Of course, according to my suggestion there is a property Holmes has – being arbitrarily selected as the referent of 'Holmes' – in virtue of which the relation holds, but this property cannot be specified without invoking'reference' (or a notion depending on reference, such as 'pick out' or'select'). So, there is no non-circularly specifiable property in virtue of which 'Holmes' refers to a particular individual. Does it matter? There are at least two (compatible) lines of response available to the worry that it does. First, one may deny that such a (non-circular) property is necessary for reference. A no-criterion theory of reference has been defended for names in general (cf. Breckenridge & Magidor 2012), and albeit controversial, I think that approach is more obviously acceptable in the special case of names for fictional characters. After all, given that the properties Doyle associated with Holmes at the introduction weren't contradictory, he was guaranteed that there is an appropriate individual, that the selected referent wasn't the wrong one, and that he would not go on to describe it incorrectly. There was no unique candidate for 'Holmes', but it is not entirely obvious that unique satisfier (across all worlds) is a better criterion for individuating referents than arbitrary selected individual among numerous satisfiers in the context of fiction. Second, what ultimately matters is not whether the relationship between 'Holmes' and the arbitrarily selected object is a reference relation or something else – perhaps schmeference,
, and the transitivity of identity gives us a contradiction. T H E metric ton radius U T H A b-complex vitamin O U triiodothyronine mho H vitamin e R L oxygen C K H O L M E S 345 demonstratively available, Doyle assigned' Holmes' to some (potential) individual or other – the selection knowledge domain being restricted perhaps (merely) by the condition that it be non - actual – that he could later develop to suffice whatever purpose he wanted in the stories. It is sometimes thought to be necessitate for reference that there is some property that o must have for a name n to denote to o that can, in a noncircular manner, be invoked to distinguish o from other potential referents – either through a universally applicable condition such as acquaintance or a causal relation between name tokening and referent, or that some such condition must be satisfied in any particular instance, even if different relations – satisfying descriptive conditions or causal link – may do the trick in unlike case. Of naturally, according to my suggestion there is a property Holmes has – being arbitrarily selected as the referent of' Holmes' – in virtue of which the relation back holds, but this property cannot be specified without invoking'reference' (or a notion depending on reference, such as' nibble out' or'select'). So, there is no non - circularly specifiable property in virtue of which' Holmes' refer to a particular person. Does it count? There constitute at least two (compatible) lines of response available to the worry that it does. foremost, one may deny that such a (non - circular) property is necessary for reference. A no - criterion theory of reference has been defended for name in general (cystic fibrosis. Breckenridge & Magidor 2012), and albeit controversial, I think that approach is more obviously satisfactory in the special case of names for fictional character. After wholly, given that the properties Doyle associated with Holmes at the introduction weren't contradictory, he was guarantee that there is an appropriate individual, that the selected referent wasn't the wrong one, and that he would not go on to describe it incorrectly. There was no unique campaigner for' Holmes', but it is not entirely obvious that unique satisfier (across all populace) is a better criterion for individuating referents than arbitrary selected individual among numerous satisfiers in the context of fabrication. Second, what ultimately matters is not whether the relationship between' Holmes' and the arbitrarily selected object is a reference relation or something else – perhaps schmeference,
, anf the transitivity of idtntity gives us a contraviction. T H E T R U T H A B O U T S H E R L O C K Y O L M E S 345 demonstragively avwilable, Eoylt assigned 'Holmes' to some (possigpe) iudmvidual or othet – the selecdion domain behne xestricted perhaps (only) by the condieion thst it be non-actuwl – uhae he bomld later develop to serve whateber purkose he wanted in yhe stories. It is sometimed thlught to be requirfd for refetsncq that there ks some property that k must have for a name n to refdr to o that cab, un w noncirculac mannvr, be invoked to disthnguish o from other iotenvial referents – either thcough a universally wpplicabla eondition such as acqyauntanwe os a zqusxl dekafion bftwxen name toiening and eeferent, or that soke wuch conditioh must bq satisfied in any particular instance, tven jf different relations – satisfying descriptige condityons or causal links – may do the trick in differett caads. If ziugse, according to my suggestion there is a pro[sruy Molmes has – beinn arbitrarily selevtfd ws the referevt of 'Kkljes' – in virtue of ahich tre reoation hojds, nut this property cannot be specified wpthoyt invoking'referenee' (or a notiun dgpendimg on reference, such as 'pici out' or'selfct'). So, thsfe is no non-circjlagly vpecifiable property in viwtue of wiich 'Kolmes' rdferx to a particulag indleidual. Does it mather? Tkere dre at leadt two (compatible) lines of response available tm tve worry that it does. Firse, one may deny that sbch a (von-circulag) propertb is necessawy for referetfe. A no-critecion theowy od rederence fas been defenced for ncies un general (cf. Breclentisge & Magidor 2012), aub qlbeit controvetsixl, Y nhiik thwd approach iv mofe unviourly acct'tanle in yhe special case of tamea for fictional chsrwcters. Adter all, given that tne properties Doylt assoriated with Hojmes at the introduction weren'f contradlctjry, he was gtarakteeq that thexe is an appropriate individual, that the selected referenj wasn't the wrong one, snd that he woulq not go mn to describe it inxorrectly. There wss no unique candidats for 'Volmed', but it is not entirely obvious that unique satisfier (across all worlds) us a bxteer criterikn fpr ingiridbating wefeceits than arbitrarj selected individual among numecous satisxizrs in the context of fiction. Sdcond, what uljimately matters is not whsther thr relationship between 'Holmes' amd the arbitrarily selecbed objecr is z refeggncx relation or somethong elve – pwrhaps wchmcference,
, and the transitivity of identity gives contradiction. H E R U T T H E R O C K O L M E S 345 available, Doyle assigned 'Holmes' to some (possible) individual or other – the selection being restricted perhaps (only) by the condition that it be non-actual – that could develop serve purpose he wanted in the stories. It is sometimes thought to be required for reference that is some property that o must have for name n to refer o that can, in a manner, invoked to o other referents – either a universally applicable condition such as acquaintance or a causal relation between name tokening and referent, or some such be satisfied any instance, if different relations descriptive conditions or causal links – trick in different cases. Of course, according to suggestion there a property Holmes has – being selected as the referent of 'Holmes' – in of which the relation holds, but this property cannot be specified without invoking'reference' (or a on reference, such as out' or'select'). So, is non-circularly property virtue of 'Holmes' refers to a particular individual. Does it matter? There are least two (compatible) lines of response available to the worry does. one may deny such a (non-circular) property necessary reference. A no-criterion theory has defended general Breckenridge Magidor 2012), and albeit I think that approach is obviously acceptable in the fictional characters. After all, given that the properties associated with Holmes at the introduction weren't he was guaranteed that there is an appropriate individual, that the selected wasn't the and that he would not go on to it incorrectly. There was unique candidate for 'Holmes', but it is not entirely that satisfier (across worlds) is a criterion for individuating than arbitrary selected numerous satisfiers the of ultimately matters is not whether the between and the arbitrarily selected object a or something else – perhaps schmeference,
, and the transitivity of identIty gives us A contRadIctIoN. T H E t R U T h A B O U T S H E R L O C K h o L M E s 345 demonstratively availaBle, DoYlE AssiGNeD 'HolmEs' to somE (PoSSIblE) iNdIviDuAL oR otheR – thE selectIon domain bEinG rEstricted perHApS (only) by the ConDition that it Be nOn-actuAl – ThaT He couLd lAter dEvelop TO serve Whatever pUrPOse he wANted in tHE StOrieS. It is sometimes thoUGhT To be required foR referEnCE tHAT thEre Is some propErTy thaT O must haVE fOR A NamE N to refer to o thAt can, in a nonCIrcUlar maNnEr, bE InvokeD to diStINguIsh o from othEr poTential reFerentS – Either tHRough a uNiversAllY apPlicABlE cOndItIOn sUCh As aCQuaIntance oR a CaUsal rElatION BEtweEn nAme tOkeniNg and referent, Or tHat sOMe sUch coNditiOn muSt Be satIsfied In any PaRticular instancE, eveN if differEnt ReLatIoNs – satISfying DesCriPtive coNditionS Or cAuSAL LiNks – may do the trick in DiFFErEnt cases. of courSE, aCcORding to mY sUggEstiON There Is a pROpErty HolmEs has – bEInG aRbitrarIlY selecTeD as The ReferENt of 'holmes' – In virtue Of whiCH the relation hoLDs, but this propERtY CAnNOt be SpeCified withoUt inVOkinG'refEReNce' (OR a notIon dePeNDiNG on reference, such as 'pIcK out' or'SelecT'). So, there is no nOn-circularLY SPecifiabLe prOPeRTy in virtue of whIch 'HoLmes' refers TO a particUlar iNdividuaL. Does it maTTEr? There aRe aT leAst Two (COMpAtible) lines of RESponSe AvailabLe tO the worRy tHat It dOes. fiRst, one may Deny that SuCh A (nOn-CirCular) PRoperty iS nEceSsAry For reFErence. a no-crIterIoN tHEorY of refeREnCE Has bEeN dEfenDed FoR nameS in gENerAl (cf. BreCkenridge & magIDor 2012), aNd AlBeit conTroversial, I thInK that approAcH is More obVIOusly accEptable in the special case OF names fOr fIctioNal cHaracters. aftEr all, gIveN That thE propeRties doYle ASSociaTED wIth hoLmes at the iNTRodUctioN wEren'T contraDictory, he was guaranTEed That there is an AppRoprIATe IndIViDUal, ThAT thE SElected referent Wasn't the wrOnG OnE, and that he WOulD nOt go on tO descriBe it iNCorrectLy. There waS no unique CaNdidATE foR 'Holmes', but It is not eNtirely obVIous tHAt UniquE saTisfieR (aCroSs all Worlds) IS a bEtter CriterIoN for inDividUaTing refeRents than arbitrary selecTed indIviduAl aMong numerOus SAtiSfiers in tHe coNtext of ficTioN. SeCond, wHat ULtimaTely MAtTerS Is not WhetHEr the relaTIoNshIP BeTween 'Holmes' AND The ArbitRarILy seleCted Object is a referencE Relation or someThinG ELse – PerHAps sChMeference,
, and the transitivity ofidentity g ivesusa c on trad icti on. T H E T RU  T H  A B O U T S H E R L O  C KHO  L M ES 345  demons t ra t i vel yav ail ab l e,  Doyl e a ssigned  'Holmes'toso me (possible )  i ndividualorother – thesel ection  d oma i n bei ngrestr ictedp erhaps  (only) b yt he con d ition t h a tit b e non-actual – th a th e could laterdevelo pt os e rve  wh atever pur po se he wantedi nt h e  st o ries. It is s ometimes th o ugh t to b ereq u ired f or re fe r enc e that ther e is  some pro pertyt hat o m u st have  for a  na men to re fe r t oo  th a tcan ,  in  a nonci rc ul ar ma nner , b e  inv oke d to  dist inguish o fro m o ther pot entia l ref eren ts  – ei ther t hroug ha universally a ppli cable con dit io n s uc h asa cquain tan ceor a ca usal re l ati on b e tw een name tokeningan d re ferent,or tha t  s om e  such co nd iti on m u s t besati s fi ed in an y part i cu la r insta nc e, eve nifdif feren t  rel ations  – satis fying descriptive co n ditions or ca u sa l li n ks –  ma y do the tr icki n di ffer e nt  ca s es. O f cou rs e ,a ccording to my sugg es tion t hereis a property  Holmes ha s –  being a rbit r ar i ly selected as  thereferent o f  'Holmes ' – i n virtue  of which t he relat ion  ho lds , b u t  t his propertyc a nnot  b e speci fie d witho utinv oki ng' re ference'(or a no ti on  d ep end ing o n  referen ce , s uc h a s 'pi c k out'  or's elec t' ). So,  therei sn o  non -c ir cula rly  s pecif iabl e  pr opertyin virtue  of whic h'H olmes'refers to a p ar ticular in di vid ual. D o e s it mat ter? There are at least two (co mpa tible ) li nes of re spo nse av ail a ble to  the w orryth ati t  does . Fi rst ,one may de n y  th at su ch  a ( non-cir cular) property is nec essary for re fer ence . Ano- c ri t eri on the o r y of referencehas been d ef e nd ed for nam e s i ngeneral  (cf. B recke n ridge &  Magidor2012), an dalbe i t  co ntroversia l, I thi nk that a p proac h  i s mor e o bvious ly  ac cepta ble in the  spec ial ca se  of na mes f or  fiction al characters. After al l, giv en th atthe prope rti e s D oyle asso ciat ed with Ho lme s a t the  in t roduc tion we ren ' t con trad i ctory, he wa s g u a ra nteed thatt h e reis an  ap p ropria te i ndividual, that t h e selected ref eren t was n't thewr ong one, and t hat  h e would no tgo on to de scribe i ti ncorr ectly.  There  was no u ni q ue can dida tefor 'Holm es' ,b ut it i sno t  entir elyob viousthat u n ique s atisfier (across  allw o rlds) isa bet te r crite r ionfor indivi duating ref erents  tha n arb itraryse lected  in di vidual amo n g numerou s sat isfiers  i n th e c ontext  off i ction . Se co nd,  what ult i m at e ly  m a tte rs i s not  w heth er the re l ationshi p b e tween ' Ho lme s '  and t h ea r bitrarilysel ected o bject is a refe r en c e rel ationor som ethinge lse  –  perhap s s c h meference ,
, and_the transitivity_of identity gives us_a contradiction._T_H E_T_R U T_H A B_O U T S_H E R_L_O C K H O L M E S 345 demonstratively available, Doyle assigned_'Holmes'_to some_(possible)_individual_or other – the selection_domain being restricted perhaps (only)_by the_condition that it be non-actual – that he_could_later develop to_serve whatever purpose he wanted in the stories. It_is sometimes thought to be required_for reference that_there_is_some property that o_must have for a name n_to refer to o that can,_in a noncircular manner, be invoked to_distinguish o from other potential referents_– either through a universally_applicable condition_such as acquaintance or a_causal relation between_name tokening_and referent, or_that some such condition must be_satisfied in any_particular instance, even if different relations_–_satisfying descriptive conditions_or_causal_links –_may do the_trick_in different_cases._Of course, according to my suggestion_there_is a property Holmes has – being_arbitrarily selected as the_referent_of 'Holmes' – in_virtue of which the relation_holds, but this property cannot be_specified without_invoking'reference' (or_a notion depending on reference, such as 'pick out' or'select'). So,_there is no non-circularly specifiable property_in virtue of which_'Holmes' refers_to_a particular individual._Does_it matter?_There are at least two (compatible) lines_of response_available to the worry that it_does. First, one may_deny_that such a (non-circular) property is_necessary for reference. A no-criterion theory_of reference has been defended_for_names_in general (cf. Breckenridge &_Magidor 2012), and albeit controversial, I_think that approach_is more obviously acceptable in the special_case_of names for fictional characters. After_all,_given that the properties Doyle associated_with_Holmes_at the introduction weren't contradictory,_he was guaranteed that there is_an appropriate individual, that the selected referent wasn't the_wrong one, and_that he would not go_on_to_describe it incorrectly. There was no unique candidate for 'Holmes',_but it_is not entirely_obvious that unique satisfier (across all worlds) is a better_criterion for individuating referents than arbitrary selected_individual among numerous satisfiers in the context of fiction. Second, what_ultimately matters is not whether the relationship between_'Holmes' and the arbitrarily selected object is_a reference relation or_something_else – perhaps schmeference,