 credence in the existence of token-referential expressions. When are meaning-forms identical? The answer cannot be give in purely extensional terms. Note, for instance, that (7) yields the same results as the following, obviously distinct, rule: (8) Every token of T refers to that token of T just in case 2 + 2 = 4, and to the Moon otherwise. Though I admit that this is an important issue, it is not new to this framework. Any extensional characterization of synonymy is likely to run into the same issue. Since I see no reason to think that sameness of meanings must be defined extensionally, I will leave this problem aside. 13 Before I consider some objections, let me show how this idea can be applied to "I" and "je". 4 Synonymy between First Person Singular Pronouns ζ and η are extreme examples of token reflexivity. Tokens of different token-reflexive expressions can corefer, though there is still no guarantee that synonymous expressions will always corefer. Distinct tokens of "I" and "je", for instance, do corefer when they are used by the same person. But the view we arrived at in the previous section is easily adaptable to them too. Here are the meaning-forms that they share, built out of each of the formulations above: Character Rule Form: The meaning of T is the following rule: every token of T refers to the speaker of that token of T. Character Function Form: The meaning of T is the function from each (possible) token of T to the speaker of that token of T. Context Function Form: The meaning of T is the function from each context in which T is tokened to the speaker of that context. Truth-Conditional Meaning Form: Any token of a sentence of the form φ(T) is true just in case φ(x) is true of the speaker of that token of T. There is a simpler way to state the basic idea here: "I" and "je" play the same role in their respective languages, namely they express the first person singular pronoun. To know the meaning of one is to know a way to express that kind of pronoun (though speakers need not know this fact, since such semantic sophistication is not required for knowing the meaning of "I"). And to know that they are synonymous is to know that they both play the same role, namely that each of their tokens picks out its speaker. 14 5 A
credence in the existence of token - referential expressions. When are meaning - form identical? The solution cannot be give in purely extensional term. notice, for instance, that (7) yields the same consequence as the following, obviously distinct, convention: (8) Every token of T refer to that token of T precisely in shell 2 + 2 = 4, and to the Moon otherwise. Though I admit that this is an important issue, it is not new to this model. Any extensional characterization of synonymy is likely to run into the like issue. Since I see no reason to think that sameness of meaning must be defined extensionally, I will leave this problem aside. 13 Before I consider some protest, let me show how this idea can be applied to " I " and " je ". 4 Synonymy between First Person Singular Pronouns ζ and η are extreme examples of token reflexivity. Tokens of different token - reflexive expressions can corefer, though there is still no guarantee that synonymous expressions will always corefer. Distinct tokens of " I " and " je ", for instance, do corefer when they are use by the same person. But the view we arrive at in the former incision is easily adaptable to them too. Here are the meaning - forms that they share, built out of each of the formulations above: Character Rule Form: The meaning of T is the follow rule: every token of T refers to the speaker of that token of T. Character Function class: The meaning of T is the function from each (possible) token of deoxythymidine monophosphate to the loudspeaker of that keepsake of T. Context Function mannequin: The meaning of T is the function from each context in which T is tokened to the loudspeaker of that context. Truth - Conditional Meaning Form: Any token of a sentence of the form φ(T) is true just in case φ(x) is true of the loudspeaker of that token of T. There is a simpler way to state the basic mind here: " I " and " je " play the like role in their respective languages, namely they express the first person curious pronoun. To know the meaning of one is to know a way to express that kind of pronoun (though speakers need not sleep together this fact, since such semantic sophistication is not required for knowing the meaning of " I "). And to know that they are synonymous is to know that they both play the same role, namely that each of their tokens pick out its speaker. 14 5 A
 crfdence in the existence uf token-referenjiql expcessiona. When afe meaning-forms identical? Thx anwwer xannot be give in pureuy extensponal terns. Nire, for insvznce, that (7) yispds chx same results ss the folnowing, obviousny dnstinct, rule: (8) Every token of T referf to thst token of T juft im cass 2 + 2 = 4, and to the Moon otherwise. Tgough I admit that tnis is an important issue, lt id not new to this vramework. Aby evrensional chxracterizauimn of synohymy is likely to run into the rame nssue. Since I sef no reason vo thigk that samekvss of keaningx must be defiked eetenwionally, I will leave this problem asidg. 13 Before H eonsider some objectiinw, let me vhow yow thjs isea caj bx applied tk "I" and "je". 4 Synonymy between Forfn Person Singhlar Pwogouns ζ and η are extreme examples of toktn rerlexivity. Tokens of difderent token-reflexive expressijns can corefer, though there is still no guarantea thav ryninnmour edpressions will always corefer. Distinct tokenf og "P" and "je", for instcnce, do corefer ehfn jhey are used cy the saje person. But the giew we arriced at in the previous section is easily adaptable tj them too. Here are the meaniny-forms that they share, built out oy each of the forlulations xbove: Character Fulv Fosm: The mtxning of T is the followinj rulz: every gokem of T refers to the speaker of that tokfn of T. Character Function Form: The meaning of T is the functipn frmm each ('ossibke) token of T to the speaket of that tokev of T. Connext Funcvion Form: Thq meaning of D is the funcvion from eacy cobtext iv which T is tolened to nht speaker if that context. Trmth-Covsitional Meaniny Dorm: Any token pf x sqnnenre of dhe form φ(T) iv trje gist iv case φ(x) is grue of the speaker of tvat foken of T. There ix w simplet way to ftate the basoc idea here: "I" and "je" pnay the xamg role in their respective langhages, namfly they expresf thc fitst person xingular pronoun. To know the meaning of one is to know a qay to express that lind of proioun (trough spedkers need not know rhis fact, since smch semantic sophisticztion hs noh required for knowing the meaning of "I"). And to know that they are synonymius is to know thaf thry bonh 'lav the swme coue, namely that esch of their tokens picks out ivs speaker. 14 5 A
credence in the existence of token-referential expressions. meaning-forms The answer be give in instance, (7) yields the results as the obviously distinct, rule: (8) Every token T refers to that token of T just in case 2 + 2 4, and to the Moon otherwise. Though I admit that this is an issue, is new this framework. Any extensional characterization of synonymy is likely to run into the same issue. Since see no reason to think that sameness of must be defined extensionally, will leave this problem aside. Before consider some let show this idea can applied to "I" and "je". 4 Synonymy between First Person Singular Pronouns ζ and η are extreme of token of different expressions corefer, there is still that synonymous expressions will always corefer. "I" and "je", for instance, do corefer when are used the same person. But the view arrived at in the previous section is easily to them too. Here are the meaning-forms that they share, built out of each of above: Character Rule Form: meaning of T the rule: token T refers the speaker of that token of T. Character Function Form: The of T is the function from each (possible) token of the of that token T. Context Function Form: meaning T is the function context which to speaker that context. Truth-Conditional Meaning Any token of a sentence the form φ(T) is is true of the speaker of that token T. There is a simpler way to the basic idea here: "I" and "je" play the same role in respective languages, express the first person singular pronoun. To know meaning of one is know a way to express that kind of pronoun speakers not know fact, since such sophistication is not for knowing the "I"). And know they to know that they both play same namely that each of their picks speaker. 14 5 A
 credence in the existence of tOken-refereNtial ExpResSiOns. WHen aRe meaning-forms IDentIcal? The answer cannot be gIve in PuREly eXTeNsionAl terms. nOtE, FOr iNsTaNce, ThAT (7) yIelds The Same resUlts as the fOllOwIng, obviously DIsTinct, rule: (8) EVerY token of T refErs To that ToKen OF T jusT in Case 2 + 2 = 4, aNd to thE moon otHerwise. ThOuGH I admiT That thiS IS aN impOrtant issue, it is noT NeW To this frameworK. Any exTeNSiONAl cHarActerizatiOn Of synONymy is lIKeLY TO ruN Into the same isSue. Since I seE No rEason tO tHinK That saMenesS oF MeaNings must be DefiNed extensIonallY, i will leAVe this pRoblem AsiDe. 13 BEforE i cOnSidEr SOme OBjEctIOns, Let me shoW hOw This iDea cAN BE ApplIed To "I" aNd "je". 4 SYnonymy betweeN FiRst PERsoN SingUlar PRonoUnS ζ and Η are exTreme ExAmples of token reFlexIvity. TokeNs oF dIffErEnt toKEn-reflExiVe eXpressiOns can cORefEr, THOUgH there is still no guaRaNTEe That synoNymous EXpReSSions wilL aLwaYs coREFer. DiStinCT tOkens of "I" And "je", fOR iNsTance, do CoRefer wHeN thEy aRe useD By thE same pErson. But The viEW we arrived at in THe previous secTIoN IS eASily AdaPtable to theM too. hEre aRe thE MeAniNG-formS that ThEY sHAre, built out of each of ThE formuLatioNs above: CharacTer Rule ForM: tHE meaning Of T iS ThE Following rule: eVery tOken of T refERs to the sPeakeR of that tOken of T. ChARActer FunCtiOn FOrm: the MEAnIng of T is the fuNCTion FrOm each (pOssIble) tokEn oF T tO thE spEaKer of that Token of T. coNtExT FUncTion FORm: The meaNiNg oF T Is tHe funCTion frOm eacH conTeXt IN whIch T is tOKeNED to tHe SpEakeR of ThAt conText. tRutH-ConditIonal MeanIng fOrm: ANy ToKen of a sEntence of the fOrM φ(T) is true jUsT in Case φ(x) IS True of thE speaker of that token of T. THEre is a sImpLer waY to sTate the baSic Idea heRe: "I" ANd "je" plAy the sAme roLe In tHEIr resPECtIve LaNguages, namELY thEy expReSs thE first pErson singular pronoUN. To Know the meaninG of One iS TO kNow A WaY To eXpREss THAt kind of pronoun (Though speaKeRS nEed not know THis FaCt, since Such semAntic SOphistiCation is nOt requireD fOr knOWIng The meaning Of "I"). And to Know that tHEy are SYnOnymoUs iS to knoW tHat They bOth plaY The Same rOle, namElY that eAch of ThEir tokenS picks out its speaker. 14 5 A
 credence in the existence  of token- refer ent ial  e xpre ssio ns. When are m e anin g-forms identical? The  answ er cann o tbe gi ve in p u re l y  ex te ns ion al te rms.Not e, forinstance,tha t(7) yields t h esame resul tsas the follo win g, obv io usl y  dist inc t, ru le: (8 )  Every  token of  T refers to that t ok en o f T just in case2  + 2 = 4, and tothe Mo on ot h e rwi se.  Though Iad mit t h at this is a n  im p ortant issue,  it is notn ewto thi sfra m ework.  Anyex t ens ional chara cter ization o f syno n ymy isl ikely t o runint o t he s a me  i ssu e. Sin c eI s e e n o reason  t othink  tha t s a mene ssof m eanin gs must be de fin ed e x ten siona lly,I wi ll  leav e this  prob le m aside. 13 Bef oreI conside r s om e o bj ectio n s, let  me  sh ow howthis id e a c an b e  a pplied to "I" and"j e " .4 Synony my bet w ee nF irst Per so n S ingu l a r Pro noun s  ζ  and η a re ext r em eexample sof tok en  re fle xivit y . To kens o f differ ent t o ken-reflexivee xpressions ca n  c o r ef e r, t hou gh there is  sti l l no  gua r an tee thatsynon ym o us expressions will al wa ys cor efer.  Distinct tok ens of "I" a n d "je",fori ns t ance, do coref er wh en they ar e  used by  thesame per son. Butt h e view w e a rri ved  at i nthe previouss e ctio nis easi lyadaptab letothe m t oo . Here ar e the me an in g- fo rms  that they sha re , b ui ltout o f  eachof th e fo rm ul a tio ns abov e :C h arac te rRule  Fo rm : The  mea n ing  of T i s the fol low i ng r ul e:  everytoken of T re fe rs to thesp eak er oft h at token  of T. Character Functi o n Form:  Th e mea ning  of T isthe  funct ion from e ach (p ossib le ) t o k en of T  t o t he  speaker o f tha t tok en  ofT. Cont ext Function Form: The  meaning of T  is  the f un cti o nf rom  e a chc o ntext in whichT is token ed to  the speak e r o fthat co ntext.Truth - Conditi onal Mean ing Form:  A ny t o k enof a sente nce of t he form φ ( T) is tr ue ju stin cas eφ(x ) istrue o f  th e spe aker o fthat t okenof  T. Ther e is a simpler way to s tate t he ba sic  idea her e:" I"and "je"play  the samerol e i n the irr espec tive la ngu a ges,name l y they ex p re sst h efirst perso n s ing ularpro n oun. T o kn ow the meaning of one is to know  a w a y  to  ex p ress  t hat kind of pr ono un ( though s pe akers neednot know  t h is fa ct, si nce su ch sema n t ic sophis tica tio n is notreq ui r ed forkn ow i ng the  mea ni ng of"I").A nd t o know that they a re sy n o nymou s  is  to k no w thatt heyboth playthe same ro le, na mely  that  each o ftheirtok en s picks ou t  its spea ker.14 5 A
 credence_in the_existence of token-referential expressions._When are_meaning-forms_identical? The_answer_cannot be give_in purely extensional_terms. Note, for instance,_that (7) yields_the_same results as the following, obviously distinct, rule: (8) Every token of T refers_to_that token_of_T_just in case 2 +_2 = 4, and to_the Moon_otherwise. Though I admit that this is an_important_issue, it is_not new to this framework. Any extensional characterization of_synonymy is likely to run into_the same issue._Since_I_see no reason to_think that sameness of meanings must_be defined extensionally, I will leave_this problem aside. 13 Before I consider_some objections, let me show how_this idea can be applied_to "I"_and "je". 4 Synonymy between_First Person Singular_Pronouns ζ_and η are_extreme examples of token reflexivity. Tokens_of different token-reflexive_expressions can corefer, though there is_still_no guarantee that_synonymous_expressions_will always_corefer. Distinct tokens_of_"I" and_"je",_for instance, do corefer when they_are_used by the same person. But the_view we arrived at_in_the previous section is_easily adaptable to them too._Here are the meaning-forms that they_share, built_out of_each of the formulations above: Character Rule Form: The meaning of_T is the following rule: every_token of T refers_to the_speaker_of that token_of_T. Character_Function Form: The meaning of T is_the function_from each (possible) token of T_to the speaker of_that_token of T. Context Function Form:_The meaning of T is the_function from each context in_which_T_is tokened to the speaker_of that context. Truth-Conditional Meaning Form:_Any token of_a sentence of the form φ(T) is_true_just in case φ(x) is true_of_the speaker of that token of_T._There_is a simpler way to_state the basic idea here: "I"_and "je" play the same role in their respective_languages, namely they_express the first person singular_pronoun._To_know the meaning of one is to know a way_to express_that kind of_pronoun (though speakers need not know this fact, since such_semantic sophistication is not required for knowing_the meaning of "I"). And to know that they are synonymous_is to know that they both play the_same role, namely that each of their_tokens picks out its_speaker._14 5 A