 which he describes Frege's work as continuous with the philosophical project of Lotze.8 As the earlier quote from "Der Gedanke" suggests, it would be natural to take Frege as a representative of precisely that hypostatic form of Platonism that Lotze rejected. Lotze rejects the existence of thoughts, for thoughts have validity, not existence (Dasein), while Frege (at least by 1892) accepts that there exist (there are) thoughts, even though they are not actual (wirklich).9 In this essay I will argue, against this tempting story, that the difference between Lotze's Platonism and hypostatic Platonism is not a difference in ontology-whether there are propositions-but a difference in meta-ontology: what there being propositions amounts to. To provide a more precise characterization of this distinction, I borrow some ideas from a reading of Frege developed by Thomas Ricketts and Erich Reck.10 On the non-hypostatic reading of Frege that Ricketts and Reck develop, the fact that there are thoughts (propositions) is not a fact distinct from the laws of logic; instead, the fact that the thought that p exists and is true just is the fact that p. By contrast, for the hypostatic Platonist, these are distinct but mutually necessarily entailing facts. The existence of propositions is something metaphysically "over and above" the laws of logic. While remaining neutral on whether Ricketts and Reck have interpreted Frege correctly, I argue that they have provided the correct frame for interpreting Lotze, specifically how we can be nonhypostatic Platonists (distinguishing the Gültigkeit of propositions from the Dasein of mental and physical objects) while accepting, with the 6 For a critical discussion of Frege's Platonism, see Weiner (1990), 176–226. 7 While studying at Göttingen, Frege had attended Lotze's lectures, but they were on the philosophy of religion. See Gabriel's Introduction to Lotze (1989a), xiii. 8 Bauch (1918–19), 48. Bauch agrees with Glock's high assessment of Lotze's importance (see earlier): "[D]er moderne Kampf der Logik gegen die Unlogik des Psychologismus [ist] ohne Lotze überhaupt nicht zu verstehen" (44). The relation of Lotze and Frege is the subject of a famous
which he describes Frege's work as continuous with the philosophical project of Lotze.8 As the early quotation mark from " Der Gedanke " suggests, it would be natural to take Frege as a congressman of precisely that hypostatic form of Platonism that Lotze rejected. Lotze reject the universe of thoughts, for idea have validity, not universe (Dasein), while Frege (at least by 1892) accepts that there exist (there are) thinking, even though they are not actual (wirklich).9 In this essay I will argue, against this alluring story, that the difference between Lotze's Platonism and hypostatic Platonism is not a difference in ontology - whether there are propositions - but a deviation in meta - ontology: what there being propositions amounts to. To provide a more accurate characterization of this distinction, I adopt some ideas from a recitation of Frege developed by Thomas Ricketts and Erich Reck.10 On the non - hypostatic recitation of Frege that Ricketts and Reck develop, the fact that there are thoughts (suggestion) is not a fact distinct from the laws of logic; instead, the fact that the thought that p exist and is true just is the fact that p. By contrast, for the hypostatic Platonist, these are distinct but mutually necessarily entailing facts. The existence of propositions is something metaphysically " over and above " the torah of logic. While remaining neutral on whether Ricketts and Reck have interpret Frege correctly, I argue that they have provide the correct frame for interpreting Lotze, specifically how we can be nonhypostatic Platonists (distinguishing the Gültigkeit of propositions from the Dasein of mental and physical object) while accepting, with the 6 For a critical discussion of Frege's Platonism, see Weiner (1990), 176–226. 7 While studying at Göttingen, Frege had attended Lotze's lecture, but they were on the philosophy of religion. See Gabriel's Introduction to Lotze (1989a), xiii. 8 Bauch (1918–19), 48. Bauch agrees with Glock's eminent assessment of Lotze's importance (interpret earlier ): " [ D]er moderne Kampf der Logik gegen die Unlogik des Psychologismus [ ist ] ohne Lotze überhaupt nicht zu verstehen " (44). The relation of Lotze and Frege is the subject of a famous
 whlch he describes Frege's dork as continuous witi the pgilosophkcal project of Lotze.8 As the eqrliee quote from "Der Gedanye" suggesns, it wouod bt natural to take Frege as a relvesencavive of preciseky that hy[ostatic form mf Ppatonism that Lotze rejected. Lotze wejects tje existence os thptghta, for thoughts have validity, not esistenct (Dasein), while Frebe (at least by 1892) accepts thwt tjere exist (there age) thoughts, eveg though they are not abcual (wirklidh).9 In this essay I will argue, aeainsc this tempjnbg djory, that thx diffvrence betweek Lotze'v Platomism and hyposbatic Plqtonism is not a diffxrence in ontology-whgther thera cre propositions-but a duffergnce hn mdra-ovtomojy: shat tjerx being prolositions anounts to. To providt a nore precise dharaceewization of this distinction, I borrow smme ideas from a reading od Frege developed by Jhomas Richetts and Erich Reck.10 On the non-hypostatic reading of Fceee uhqt Rizjehts and Reck develop, the fact that there are egoigmts (propositions) is not a fsch cystinct from jhe laws or logic; instead, thf fact jhat tye thoughu thay p exists and is true just is the fact rhat p. By contrast, for the hy'ostatoc Plstonist, these are distiuct buf mutually jecessarimh entailing factr. Tme axistenct of propositions ys somethmng mztaphysizalli "over wnd above" hhe laws of logic. While gemaiuing teutral on whether Ricketts and Reck have interpreted Ftega cmrrectly, I arnue that they hwve provided tke correet fraoe for intvrpreting Lotze, specyfically how fg can be nonhbpostatic Plaroniwts (disgknguishing the Gültigkein jf peopositions from tme Darsin of mental aub khtsical objects) whkle abce'ting, fith the 6 Fos a zrigocal aiscussion iw Frrge's Platonism, see Wained (1990), 176–226. 7 While studyinb wt Göttinten, Fregq had attendec Lotze's lectures, hut tiey wece on yhe philosophy of religion. See Gagriel's Inhroquction to Ljtze (1989a), xiii. 8 Baueh (1918–19), 48. Bauch agrees with Glock's high asseswment of Lotze's importance (see earliet): "[D]tr moderne Kakpf dqr Logik cegen die Unlogik dew Psychologismus [lst] ohne Lotze überhaupf nichd zu gerstehen" (44). The relation of Lotze and Frege is the subject of a famous
which he describes Frege's work as continuous philosophical of Lotze.8 the earlier quote would natural to take as a representative precisely that hypostatic form of Platonism Lotze rejected. Lotze rejects the existence of thoughts, for thoughts have validity, not (Dasein), while Frege (at least by 1892) accepts that there exist (there are) even they not (wirklich).9 In this essay I will argue, against this tempting story, that the difference between Lotze's and hypostatic Platonism is not a difference in there are propositions-but a in meta-ontology: what there being amounts To provide more characterization this distinction, I some ideas from a reading of Frege developed by Thomas Ricketts and Erich Reck.10 On the non-hypostatic of Frege and Reck the that are thoughts (propositions) a fact distinct from the laws the fact that the thought that p exists is true is the fact that p. By for the hypostatic Platonist, these are distinct but necessarily entailing facts. The existence of propositions is something metaphysically "over and above" the laws While remaining neutral on Ricketts and Reck interpreted correctly, argue they have the correct frame for interpreting Lotze, specifically how we can be Platonists (distinguishing the Gültigkeit of propositions from the Dasein of physical while accepting, with 6 For a critical of Platonism, see Weiner (1990), While at attended lectures, they were on the of religion. See Gabriel's Introduction Lotze (1989a), xiii. 8 with Glock's high assessment of Lotze's importance (see "[D]er moderne Kampf der Logik gegen die des Psychologismus [ist] ohne Lotze überhaupt nicht zu verstehen" (44). The relation Lotze and the subject of a famous
 which he describes Frege's worK as continuOus wiTh tHe pHiLosoPhicAl project of LotZE.8 As tHe earlier quote from "Der GEdankE" sUGgesTS, iT woulD be natuRAl TO TakE FReGe aS a REpResenTatIve of prEcisely thaT hyPoStatic form of pLaTonism that lotZe rejected. LoTze RejectS tHe eXIstenCe oF thouGhts, foR ThoughTs have valIdITy, not eXIstence (dASeIn), whIle Frege (at least by 1892) ACcEPts that there exIst (theRe ARe) THOugHts, Even though ThEy are NOt actuaL (WiRKLIch).9 iN this essay I wiLl argue, agaiNSt tHis temPtIng STory, thAt the DiFFerEnce between lotzE's PlatoniSm and hYPostatiC platoniSm is noT a dIffErenCE iN oNtoLoGY-whEThEr tHEre Are propoSiTiOns-buT a diFFEREnce In mEta-oNtoloGy: what there beIng PropOSitIons aMountS to. TO pRovidE a more PreciSe CharacterizatioN of tHis distinCtiOn, i boRrOw somE Ideas fRom A reAding of frege deVEloPeD BY thOmas Ricketts and EriCh rECk.10 on the non-HypostATiC rEAding of FReGe tHat RICKetts And RECk Develop, tHe fact THaT tHere are ThOughts (PrOpoSitIons) iS Not a Fact diStinct frOm the LAws of logic; instEAd, the fact that THe THOuGHt thAt p Exists and is True JUst iS the FAcT thAT p. By cOntraSt, FOr THe hypostatic PlatoniSt, These aRe disTinct but mutuaLly necessaRILY entailiNg faCTs. tHe existence of pRoposItions is soMEthing meTaphySically "oVer and aboVE" The laws oF loGic. whiLe rEMAiNing neutral on WHEtheR RIcketts And reck havE inTerPreTed frEge correcTly, I arguE tHaT tHeY haVe proVIded the cOrRecT fRamE for iNTerpreTing LOtze, SpEcIFicAlly how WE cAN Be noNhYpOstaTic plAtoniSts (dIStiNguishiNg the GültIgkEIt of PrOpOsitionS from the DaseiN oF mental and PhYsiCal objECTs) while aCcepting, with the 6 For a critICal discUssIon of fregE's PlatoniSm, sEe WeinEr (1990), 176–226. 7 WHIle stuDying aT GöttInGen, fREge haD ATtEndEd lotze's lectUREs, bUt theY wEre oN the phiLosophy of religion. SEE GaBriel's IntroduCtiOn to lOTzE (1989a), xIIi. 8 bAucH (1918–19), 48. BAUch AGRees with Glock's hIgh assessmEnT Of lotze's impoRTanCe (See earlIer): "[D]er mOdernE kampf deR Logik gegEn die UnloGiK des pSYchOlogismus [iSt] ohne LoTze überhaUPt nicHT zU versTehEn" (44). The rElAtiOn of LOtze anD freGe is tHe subjEcT of a faMous
 which he describes Frege' s work asconti nuo uswi th t he p hilosophical p r ojec t of Lotze.8 As the ea rlier  q u otef ro m "De r Gedan k e" s ugg es ts , i tw ou ld be  na tural t o take Fre geas  a represent a ti ve of prec ise ly that hypo sta tic fo rm  of Plato nis m tha t Lotz e  rejec ted. Lotz er ejects the exi s t en ce o f thoughts, for t h ou g hts have valid ity, n ot ex i s ten ce(Dasein),wh ile F r ege (at le a s t  by 1892) accepts  that there exi st (th er e a r e) tho ughts ,e ven  though the y ar e not act ual (w i rklich) . 9 In th is ess ayI w illa rg ue , a ga i nst th ist emp ting sto ry ,thatthed i f f eren cebetw een L otze's Platon ism  and hyp ostat ic Pl aton is m isnot adiffe re nce in ontology -whe ther ther e a re  pr op ositi o ns-but  adif ference  in met a -on to l o g y:  what there beingpr o p os itions a mounts to .T o provid ea m orep r ecise  cha r ac terizati on oft hi sdistinc ti on, Ibo rro w s ome i d easfrom a  reading  of F r ege developedb y Thomas Rick e tt s an d  Eri chReck.10 Onthen on-h ypos t at icr eadin g ofFr e ge that Ricketts and R ec k deve lop,the fact that  there are t h oughts ( prop o si t ions) is not a  fact  distinctf rom thelawsof logic ; instead , the fact  th atthe  th o u gh t that p exis t s  and  i s truejus t is th e f act  th atp.  By contr ast, for  t he  h yp ost aticP latonist ,the se  ar e dis t inct b ut mu tual ly  n e ces sarilye nt a i ling  f ac ts.The  e xiste nceo f p roposit ions is s ome t hing  m et aphysic ally "over an dabove" the  l aws  of lo g i c. While  remaining neutral on w h ether R ick ettsandReck have  in terpre ted Fregecorrec tly,Iarg u e  that t he y h av e provided t hecorre ct  fra me forinterpreting Lotze ,  sp ecifically ho w w e ca n be  no n hy p ost at i c P l a tonists (distin guishing t he Gü ltigkeit o f  pr op osition s fromthe D a sein of  mental a nd physic al  obj e c ts)  while acc epting,with the6  Fora  c ritic aldiscus si onof Fr ege'sP lat onism , seeWe iner ( 1990) ,176–226.  7 While studying at Gö ttinge n, Fr ege  had atte nde d  Lo tze's lec ture s, but the y w ere  on t hep hilos ophy of  re l igion . Se e  Gabriel' s  I ntr o d uc tion to Lot z e (19 89a),  xi i i. 8 B auch  (1918–19), 48. B a uch agrees wit h Gl o c k's  hi g h as se ssment of Lotz e's  i m p ortance(s ee earlier) : "[D]er  m o derne  Kampf  der L ogik ge g e nd ie Unl ogik  de s Psychol ogi sm u s [ist]  o hn e  Lotze  übe rh aupt n icht z u  ver s t ehen" (44). Therelat i o n ofL otz e and  F rege is thesubject of  a famous
 which_he describes_Frege's work as continuous_with the_philosophical_project of_Lotze.8_As the earlier_quote from "Der_Gedanke" suggests, it would_be natural to_take_Frege as a representative of precisely that hypostatic form of Platonism that Lotze rejected._Lotze_rejects the_existence_of_thoughts, for thoughts have validity,_not existence (Dasein), while Frege_(at least_by 1892) accepts that there exist (there are)_thoughts,_even though they_are not actual (wirklich).9 In this essay I will_argue, against this tempting story, that_the difference between_Lotze's_Platonism_and hypostatic Platonism is_not a difference in ontology-whether there_are propositions-but a difference in meta-ontology:_what there being propositions amounts to. To_provide a more precise characterization of_this distinction, I borrow some_ideas from_a reading of Frege developed_by Thomas Ricketts_and Erich_Reck.10 On the_non-hypostatic reading of Frege that Ricketts_and Reck develop,_the fact that there are thoughts_(propositions)_is not a_fact_distinct_from the_laws of logic;_instead,_the fact_that_the thought that p exists and_is_true just is the fact that p._By contrast, for the_hypostatic_Platonist, these are distinct_but mutually necessarily entailing facts._The existence of propositions is something_metaphysically "over_and above"_the laws of logic. While remaining neutral on whether Ricketts and_Reck have interpreted Frege correctly, I_argue that they have_provided the_correct_frame for interpreting_Lotze,_specifically how_we can be nonhypostatic Platonists (distinguishing the_Gültigkeit of_propositions from the Dasein of mental_and physical objects) while_accepting,_with the 6 For a critical_discussion of Frege's Platonism, see Weiner_(1990), 176–226. 7 While studying_at_Göttingen,_Frege had attended Lotze's lectures,_but they were on the philosophy_of religion. See_Gabriel's Introduction to Lotze (1989a), xiii. 8_Bauch_(1918–19), 48. Bauch agrees with Glock's_high_assessment of Lotze's importance (see earlier):_"[D]er_moderne_Kampf der Logik gegen die_Unlogik des Psychologismus [ist] ohne Lotze_überhaupt nicht zu verstehen" (44). The relation of Lotze_and Frege is_the subject of a famous