, is square our moral epistemology with these facts. There are both philosophical and empirical considerations that support my contention that non-rule-based moral thinking can yield justified moral belief. The main philosophical consideration has to do with the recent work of some philosophers on the notion of rationality. Harold Brown, for instance, has recently criticized what he calls the "traditional" conception of rationality according to which all rational belief is belief according to some rule. Brown persuasively argues that the traditional view involves an impossible ideal implying that even rigorous scientific inquiry must be counted as irrational. What Brown proposes is a new model of rationality, one that makes a place for what he simply calls judgment: "the ability to evaluate a situation, assess evidence, and come to a reasonable decision without following rules."" So this general model of rationality that assigns a significant epistemic role to Judgment comports well with the view that scientific inquiry is rational, and also comports well with the claim that weighing up competing moral considerations and, on the basis of this weighing, making a judgment (which is not a matter of conforming to some specifiable rule) can result in rational or justified belief. I suspect that one of the reasons philosophers have been so unsympathetic to Ross is because they take science as our paradigm of rational inquiry, assume that such inquiry is completely rule-governed, and so conclude that on a view like Ross's, moral thinking has to be epistemically defective. This line of thought is thoroughly undermined by Brown. Indeed, if Brown is right, 316 Moral Knowledge? then the role of moral judgment in coming to have justified moral beliefs is not some isolated and otherwise epistemically queer phenomenon peculiar to moral thinking, but merely an instance of a quite general phenomenon. The relevant empirical consideration bearing on this issue can be found in the work of the Dreyfus brothers. They argue that moral thinking and judging are activities much like many physical and intellectual activities (they discuss driving a car and playing chess) in that doing them well is a skill that develops through stages. When starting out, a novice chess player is taught to consciously follow rules that, with experience, are no longer consciously entertained, until eventually one can just "see" how to react to the various types of chess positions. Their main point, which they apply to the case of moral reasoning, is that an individual's becoming increasingly adept at some complex activity involves acquiring a skill-coming to know how to do something, where one does not consciously rely on rules (which is
, is square our moral epistemology with these facts. There are both philosophical and empiric consideration that support my contention that non - dominion - base moral thinking can yield justified moral impression. The main philosophical consideration have to do with the recent oeuvre of some philosophers on the notion of rationality. Harold Brown, for instance, has recently knock what he calls the " traditional " conception of rationality according to which all rational belief is impression according to some rule. Brown persuasively argues that the traditional opinion involves an impossible ideal implying that even rigorous scientific question must be counted as irrational. What Brown propose is a new model of rationality, one that makes a place for what he simply predict judgment: " the ability to evaluate a situation, assess evidence, and come to a fair decisiveness without follow rules. " " So this general model of rationality that assigns a significant epistemic role to Judgment comports well with the view that scientific question is intellectual, and also comports well with the claim that weigh up competing moral considerations and, on the basis of this deliberation, making a opinion (which is not a matter of conforming to some specifiable dominion) can result in rational or justified belief. I suspect that one of the reasons philosophers have been then unsympathetic to Ross is because they take science as our paradigm of intellectual inquiry, bear that such inquiry is completely rule - governed, and so reason that on a view like Ross's, moral thinking has to be epistemically defective. This line of thought is thoroughly undermined by Brown. Indeed, if Brown is right, 316 Moral Knowledge? then the role of moral judgment in fall to have apologize moral beliefs is not some detached and otherwise epistemically curious phenomenon peculiar to moral thinking, but merely an case of a quite general phenomenon. The relevant empiric consideration bearing on this issue can be discover in the work of the Dreyfus brother. They argue that moral thinking and judging are action much like many physical and intellectual activities (they discuss drive a car and playing chess) in that make them well is a skill that develops through stages. When starting out, a novice chess player is taught to consciously play along rules that, with experience, are no longer consciously entertained, until eventually one can just " see " how to react to the various type of chess situation. Their chief point, which they apply to the case of moral reasoning, is that an individual's becoming increasingly adept at some complex activity involves get a skill - coming to know how to do something, where one does not consciously trust on rules (which is
, is square our moral episteoology with these factv. Thers are bogh philosophical and empiricel cinsidtgations that support oy contennion that non-cule-based moral vginking can yjcld jbsvified moral bekief. The mdin philosophiwau eonsideration has to do with the recqnt worl lf some philosjphegs on fhe notion of rationality. Harold Bdown, fog instance, has revently criticized what he falld the "traditional" fonception if rwrionality aczording to which all rztional belief is belief accordkng tp some rulg. Grlfn persuasitely aggues that thc tradidional fiew involves sn mmpowsible ideal implying that even rigorouf scientixie inquiry must be coubtwd as irrdtiovql. Dhau Bcowh proplsea is a new model of rqtionality, one that mwjes a place fkr whae re simply calls judgment: "the ability to evzluate a situation, assews evidence, and come jo a reasogable decision without following rules."" So this geteral oodtl of rxrilnality that assigns a significant epistemic wklt tp Judgment comiorts well with thr girr that scientkfic iusujry is rational, anf also sompoets well rith the claim that weighing up competing mjeal considerations and, on the basos of this weighing, making a judfment (which is not a oatter of conforoinn tm some skdcifiable rule) cag result mn racional of juxtifieq belief. I suspcwt that one of the reaslnv philosopjers have been so unsympathetic to Ross is bevagse they tahe sclence as our pawadigm of ratipnal inzuiry, assume thzt such inquiry is completely rgpe-governed, aid so consludw thqt on a xiew like Ross'x, moral tknnking haw to be epistemicakly sefective. This oint if thought is yhofoudhpy uggermined by Trowv. Ivceed, kf Brown is fighy, 316 Moral Knowledge? tven fhe role of moral kuqgment ib coming to have justofied moral beliefd is iot sooe isplajed and otherwise epistemically queer phfnoienon peculiwr ti moral thinling, but merely an instance of a quite jeneral phenomenon. The eelevant empirical eoksideration uearind on this issue can be found un the work of tht Dreyfus brothers. They argue that moral thinking and judging are activities much like many physical and inrellecvuwl activitiss (tney dpscbss drivigg a rar and playing cness) in that doing them well is a skill tkat develops through stages. Wnev starting ouj, a novice chess player is taught yo consciously follow rules thay, with experience, are no longer xonscjously entxrtained, until eventially mne cqn just "see" how to react to tme various typts oy chess positions. Their main poinr, whicy hhey apply to thx case of movau reaaoning, is that an indibiduzp's bezoming increaxingly adept ay some complex activpty involves acquuging a skill-cpming tm know how tp do somethhng, where one does not consciously rely on rules (whpch is
, is square our moral epistemology with There both philosophical empirical considerations that moral can yield justified belief. The main consideration has to do with the work of some philosophers on the notion of rationality. Harold Brown, for instance, recently criticized what he calls the "traditional" conception of rationality according to which rational is according some rule. Brown persuasively argues that the traditional view involves an impossible ideal implying that even scientific inquiry must be counted as irrational. What proposes is a new of rationality, one that makes place what he calls "the to evaluate a assess evidence, and come to a reasonable decision without following rules."" So this general model of rationality assigns a role to comports with view that scientific rational, and also comports well with weighing up competing moral considerations and, on the of this making a judgment (which is not matter of conforming to some specifiable rule) can in rational or justified belief. I suspect that one of the reasons philosophers have been to Ross is because take science as paradigm rational assume such inquiry completely rule-governed, and so conclude that on a view like Ross's, thinking has to be epistemically defective. This line of thought undermined Brown. Indeed, if is right, 316 Moral then role of moral judgment to justified not isolated otherwise epistemically queer phenomenon to moral thinking, but merely instance of a quite consideration bearing on this issue can be found the work of the Dreyfus brothers. They that moral thinking and judging are activities much like many physical and activities (they a car and playing chess) in that doing well is a skill develops through stages. When starting out, a novice chess is to consciously rules that, with are no longer entertained, until eventually just "see" to to of chess positions. Their main point, they to the case of moral is individual's becoming increasingly adept at some complex activity involves acquiring a skill-coming to know how something, where one does consciously on rules (which is
, is square our moral epistemolOgy with theSe facTs. THerE aRe boTh phIlosophical and EMpirIcal considerations that SuppoRt MY conTEnTion tHat non-rULe-BASed MoRaL thInKInG can yIelD justifIed moral beLieF. THe main philosOPhIcal considEraTion has to do wIth The recEnT woRK of soMe pHilosOphers ON the noTion of ratIoNAlity. HARold BroWN, FoR insTance, has recently cRItICized what he calLs the "tRaDItIONal" ConCeption of rAtIonalITy accorDInG TO WhiCH all rational bElief is beliEF acCordinG tO soME rule. BRown pErSUasIvely argues That The traditIonal vIEw involVEs an impOssiblE idEal ImplYInG tHat EvEN riGOrOus SCieNtific inQuIrY must Be coUNTED as iRraTionAl. WhaT Brown proposeS is A new MOdeL of raTionaLity, OnE that Makes a Place FoR what he simply caLls jUdgment: "thE abIlIty To EvaluATe a sitUatIon, Assess eVidence, ANd cOmE TO A rEasonable decision wItHOUt FollowinG rules."" sO tHiS General mOdEl oF ratIONalitY thaT AsSigns a siGnificANt EpIstemic RoLe to JuDgMenT coMportS Well With thE view thaT scieNTific inquiry is RAtional, and alsO CoMPOrTS welL wiTh the claim tHat wEIghiNg up COmPetINg morAl conSiDErATions and, on the basis oF tHis weiGhing, Making a judgmeNt (which is nOT A Matter of ConfORmINg to some specifIable Rule) can resULt in ratiOnal oR justifiEd belief. I SUSpect thaT onE of The ReaSONs Philosophers hAVE beeN sO unsympAthEtic to ROss Is bEcaUse ThEy take sciEnce as ouR pArAdIgM of RatioNAl inquirY, aSsuMe ThaT such INquiry Is comPletElY rULe-gOverned, ANd SO ConcLuDe That On a ViEw likE RosS'S, moRal thinKing has to Be ePIsteMiCaLly defeCtive. This line Of Thought is tHoRouGhly unDERmined by brown. Indeed, if Brown is rigHT, 316 Moral KNowLedge? Then The role of MorAl judgMenT In comiNg to haVe jusTiFieD MOral bELIeFs iS nOt some isolATEd aNd othErWise EpistemIcally queer phenomeNOn pEculiar to moraL thInkiNG, BuT meRElY An iNsTAncE OF a quite general pHenomenon. THe RElEvant empirICal CoNsideraTion beaRing oN This issUe can be foUnd in the wOrK of tHE dreYfus brotheRs. They arGue that moRAl thiNKiNg and JudGing arE aCtiVitieS much lIKe mAny phYsical AnD intelLectuAl ActivitiEs (they discuss driving a caR and plAying CheSs) in that dOinG TheM well is a sKill That develoPs tHroUgh stAgeS. when sTartINg Out, A NovicE cheSS player is TAuGht TO CoNsciously foLLOW ruLes thAt, wITh expeRienCe, are no longer consCIously entertaiNed, uNTIl eVenTUallY oNe can just "see" hoW to ReACT to the vaRiOus types of cHess posiTiONs. TheIr main Point, wHich theY APpLY to the Case Of mOral reasoNinG, iS That an iNdIvIDual's bEcomInG increAsinglY AdepT AT some complex actiVity iNVOlves ACquIring A sKill-comINg to Know how to dO something, wHere onE doeS not cOnsciouSlY rely oN ruLeS (which is
, is square our moral epis temology w ith t hes e f ac ts.Ther e are both phi l osop hical and empirical co nside ra t ions th at su pport m y  c o n ten ti on  th at no n-rul e-b ased mo ral thinki ngca n yield just i fi ed moral b eli ef. The main  ph ilosop hi cal consi der ation  has t o  do wi th the re ce n t work of some p hi loso phers on the noti o no f rationality.  Harol dB ro w n , f orinstance,ha s rec e ntly cr i ti c i z edw hat he callsthe "tradit i ona l" con ce pti o n of r ation al i tyaccording t o wh ich all r ationa l  belief is beli ef acc ord ing  tos om erul e. Bro w nper s uas ively ar gu es  that  the t r a diti ona l vi ew in volves an imp oss ible ide al im plyin g th at  even  rigor ous s ci entific inquiry  mus t be coun ted  a s i rr ation a l. Wha t B row n propo ses isa  ne wm o d el  of rationality, o ne t ha t makesa plac e  f or what hesi mpl y ca l l s jud gmen t :"the abi lity t o  e va luate a  s ituati on , a sse ss ev i denc e, and  come to  a re a sonable decisi o n without fol l ow i n gr ules .""  So this ge nera l  mod el o f  r ati o nalit y tha ta ss i gns a significant e pi stemic  role  to Judgmentcomports w e l l  with th e vi e wt hat scientific  inqu iry is rat i onal, an d als o compor ts well w i t h the cl aim  th atwei g h in g up competin g mora lconside rat ions an d,onthe  ba si s of this  weighin g,  m ak in g a  judg m ent (whi ch  is  n ota mat t er ofconfo rmin gto som e speci f ia b l e ru le )canres ul t inrati o nal  or jus tified be lie f . Isu sp ect tha t one of there asons phil os oph ers ha v e  been so  unsympathetic to Rossi s becau setheytake  scienceasour pa rad i gm ofration al in qu iry , assum e th atsu ch inquiry i s c omple te ly r ule-gov erned, and so conc l ude  that on a vi ewlike R os s's ,  m o ral  t h ink i n g has to be epi stemically  d e fe ctive. Thi s  li ne  of tho ught is  thor o ughly u ndermined  by Brown .Inde e d , i f Brown is  right,316 Moral Knowl e dg e? th enthe ro le  of  mora l judg m ent  in c omingto  havejusti fi ed moral  beliefs is not some is olated  andoth erwise ep ist e mic ally quee r ph enomenon p ecu lia r tomor a l thi nkin g ,but merel y an instanceo fa q u i te  general ph e n o men on. T her elevan t em pirical considera t ion bearing on  thi s iss uec an b efound in the w ork  o f the Drey fu s brothers.  They ar gu e  that  moral  think ing and j ud g ing ar e ac tiv ities muc h l ik e  many p hy si c al and  int el lectua l acti v itie s (they discuss dr iving a  cara ndplayi ng  chess) in t hat doingthem well i s a sk illthatdevelop sthroug h s ta ges. Whens tarting o ut, a  novice  c hess  pl ayer i s ta u g ht to  con sc iou sly follo w ru l es  t h at,  wit h exp er ienc e, are no longer c ons c iouslyen ter t a ined,u nt i l  eventuall y o ne ca n just "see" howt or eactto the  vario us type s  of  c hess po sit i o ns. Their  main poi n t,wh ichthey app ly  toth e c as e of moral reas oning, i s that a n indivi dua l 's b e coming  i ncreasinglyadept  a t  some c o m ple x activ i tyinv olv es a cqu irin g  a skill-coming to knowhowto do som ethin g, wh er e one do e s no t consci o usly rely onrules (which is 
, is_square our_moral epistemology with these_facts. There_are_both philosophical_and_empirical considerations that_support my contention_that non-rule-based moral thinking_can yield justified_moral_belief. The main philosophical consideration has to do with the recent work of some_philosophers_on the_notion_of_rationality. Harold Brown, for instance,_has recently criticized what he_calls the_"traditional" conception of rationality according to which all_rational_belief is belief_according to some rule. Brown persuasively argues that the_traditional view involves an impossible ideal_implying that even_rigorous_scientific_inquiry must be counted_as irrational. What Brown proposes is_a new model of rationality, one_that makes a place for what he_simply calls judgment: "the ability to_evaluate a situation, assess evidence,_and come_to a reasonable decision without_following rules."" So_this general_model of rationality_that assigns a significant epistemic role_to Judgment comports_well with the view that scientific_inquiry_is rational, and_also_comports_well with_the claim that_weighing_up competing_moral_considerations and, on the basis of_this_weighing, making a judgment (which is not_a matter of conforming_to_some specifiable rule) can_result in rational or justified_belief. I suspect that one of_the reasons_philosophers have_been so unsympathetic to Ross is because they take science as_our paradigm of rational inquiry, assume_that such inquiry is_completely rule-governed,_and_so conclude that_on_a view_like Ross's, moral thinking has to be_epistemically defective._This line of thought is thoroughly_undermined by Brown. Indeed,_if_Brown is right, 316 Moral Knowledge?_then the role of moral judgment_in coming to have justified_moral_beliefs_is not some isolated and_otherwise epistemically queer phenomenon peculiar to_moral thinking, but_merely an instance of a quite general_phenomenon._The relevant empirical consideration bearing on_this_issue can be found in the_work_of_the Dreyfus brothers. They argue_that moral thinking and judging are_activities much like many physical and intellectual activities (they_discuss driving a_car and playing chess) in_that_doing_them well is a skill that develops through stages. When_starting out,_a novice chess_player is taught to consciously follow rules that, with experience,_are no longer consciously entertained, until eventually_one can just "see" how to react to the various types_of chess positions. Their main point, which they_apply to the case of moral reasoning,_is that an individual's_becoming_increasingly adept at some complex activity involves_acquiring_a_skill-coming_to know how_to do something,_where one does_not consciously_rely on rules_(which is