 there is a clear sense in which other actions the agent might perform may also promote her desire (though not quite to the same degree). 15 2.3. Contrastive Probabilism So, like Pure Probabilism, Causal Probabilism appears to be subject to counterexamples. What to do? We think both sorts of counterexamples can be avoided by adopting a ​contrastive account of promotion -one that mimics and complements a contrastive account of reasons such as Justin Snedegar's. Rather than taking 16 promotion to be a non-contrastive affair, according to which an action either promotes, or fails to promote, the satisfaction of a desire ​simpliciter​, we should take promotion to be a ​contrastive notion, according to which an action either promotes, or fails to promote, the satisfaction of a desire ​as compared to other actions​. This basic idea can 17 be spelled out in a probabilistic framework as follows: Contrastive Pure Probabilism​: Agent A's φ-ing ​rather than ψ-ing promotes desire D iff pr(satisfaction of D|A φs) > pr(satisfaction of D|A ψs)​. 18 15 Lin appears to be aware that his view generates these sorts of results, and is aware that they appear problematic (see especially Lin 2016, pp. 18-19). Although he's aware of these problems, he doesn't offer a solution to them, saying instead that accepting Causal Probabilism would amount to "biting a bullet" (p. 19) on these points. Below, we offer a solution on his behalf (see footnote 18). 16 Snedegar (2014). Here we follow Snedegar's proposal about how to understand the structure of contrastivism, though note that our interest in contrastivism concerns the promotion relation rather than the reason-for relation, which is that target of Snedegar's analysis. While we find Snedegar's proposal regarding contrastivism about reasons ​compelling, our account of promotion here is strictly speaking neutral on the nature of the reason-for relation. With that said, we do note that our contrastivism about promotion fits nicely into Snedegar's contrastivism about reasons, given a very modest assumption about how the two should be linked. Snedegar analyses what it takes for there to be a reason for an agent to φ rather than ψ in terms of whether φ-ing or ψ
there is a clear sense in which other military action the agentive role might perform may also advertise her desire (though not quite to the same academic degree). 15 2.3. Contrastive Probabilism So, like Pure Probabilism, Causal Probabilism appear to be capable to counterexamples. What to do? We think both sorts of counterexamples can be keep off by adopting a ​contrastive account of forwarding -one that mimics and complements a contrastive account of reasons such as Justin Snedegar's. Rather than taking 16 forwarding to be a non - contrastive affair, according to which an natural process either promotes, or fails to promote, the gratification of a desire ​simpliciter​, we should take forwarding to be a ​contrastive notion, accord to which an action either promotes, or fails to promote, the gratification of a desire ​as compared to other actions​. This basic idea can 17 be spelled out in a probabilistic framework as follows: Contrastive Pure Probabilism​: Agent A's φ - ing ​rather than ψ - ing promotes desire D iff pr(satisfaction of D|A φs) > pr(satisfaction of D|A ψs)​. 18 15 Lin appears to be aware that his view generates these sorts of results, and is aware that they appear debatable (see especially Lin 2016, pp. 18 - 19). Although he's mindful of these trouble, he doesn't propose a solution to them, saying instead that accept Causal Probabilism would amount to " biting a bullet " (p. 19) on these points. downstairs, we offer a solution on his behalf (see footnote 18). 16 Snedegar (2014). Here we follow Snedegar's proposal about how to understand the structure of contrastivism, though notice that our interest in contrastivism concerns the promotion relation rather than the reason - for relation, which is that prey of Snedegar's analysis. While we find Snedegar's proposal regarding contrastivism about reasons ​compelling, our report of promotion here is strictly speaking neutral on the nature of the reason - for relation. With that said, we do note that our contrastivism about forwarding fits nicely into Snedegar's contrastivism about reasons, given a very modest assumption about how the two should be associate. Snedegar analyses what it take for there to be a reason for an agent to φ rather than ψ in term of whether φ - ing or ψ
 thfre is a clear sense in dhich other actnins thx agent might pdrform may also promote her vesiee (thiugh not quite to the rame degrve). 15 2.3. Conteastmve Probabilism So, like Ibre Pdlbabnlmsm, Causal Probsbilism ap[ears to be sutjdcc to counterexamples. What to do? We trink boyh sorts of counjerexsiplea can be avoided by adopting a ​confrastivt account of promoyion -one that mimics and clmplfments a contrastige account if rqqsons such ar Justin Snedegar's. Ratger than taking 16 promotion to bd a npn-contrastuvw avxair, accordmng to which an acbpon eitver prokotes, or fails to primote, the satisfactioi of a desire ​simplisiter​, we vhkuld take promotiin to bg a ​cmntrxwtixe hovioh, accogdiig to which an action wither promotes, or gayos to promote, the swtysfaction of a desire ​as compared to otver actions​. This basic ideq can 17 be spelled out in a profabilistic framework as follows: Contrastive Pure [robauiuisn​: Wewnh A's φ-ing ​rather than ψ-ing promotes desire D ifs pt(sstisfaction of D|A φs) > pr(sayidfsstion of D|A ψs)​. 18 15 Lin aplears to be aware hhat hif vieq generatts thrse sorts of results, and is aware that nhey appear problematie (see especiclly Lon 2016, pl. 18-19). Although he's aware oy thess problems, je doesn't uffer a solution to tvem, saying instead that acsepting Ceusal Probabklisk woulq amount tl "bitltg a bullet" (p. 19) on hhese pmints. Beloa, we offer a solution on his beielf (see footnpta 18). 16 Snedegax (2014). Herc we follow Sneqegar's proposak about how go understznd the structure jf contrastivhdm, though nove that otr ibterwst in zuntrastivism cpncerns tkt promotiob relation rather bhan jhs reason-for relcuiob, which is that tafgee lf Sgadegar's analfsis. Whkke we find Snedenar'r prpposal regarding condrasfivism about reasoms ​compellung, our wccount of prpmotion here is stgictlb speaying meujral on the nature of the reasoh-for relahiok. With that swid, qe do note tkat our contrastivism about promotion fivs nicely into Snedegat's contrastivism abouj rtasons, given e very modest avsumption about how rhe two should be linked. Snedegar analgses wvat ih takes for there to be a reason for an agent to φ rather than ψ in terms od whetiew φ-ing or ψ
there is a clear sense in which the might perform also promote her the degree). 15 2.3. Probabilism So, like Probabilism, Causal Probabilism appears to be to counterexamples. What to do? We think both sorts of counterexamples can be by adopting a ​contrastive account of promotion -one that mimics and complements a account reasons as Snedegar's. Rather than taking 16 promotion to be a non-contrastive affair, according to which an action promotes, or fails to promote, the satisfaction of desire ​simpliciter​, we should promotion to be a ​contrastive according which an either or to promote, the of a desire ​as compared to other actions​. This basic idea can 17 be spelled out in probabilistic framework Contrastive Pure Agent φ-ing than ψ-ing promotes iff pr(satisfaction of D|A φs) > ψs)​. 18 15 Lin appears to be aware his view these sorts of results, and is that they appear problematic (see especially Lin 2016, 18-19). Although he's aware of these problems, he doesn't offer a solution to them, saying accepting Causal Probabilism would to "biting a (p. on points. we offer solution on his behalf (see footnote 18). 16 Snedegar (2014). Here follow Snedegar's proposal about how to understand the structure of note our interest in concerns the promotion relation than reason-for relation, which is of analysis. Snedegar's regarding about reasons ​compelling, our of promotion here is strictly neutral on the nature that said, we do note that our contrastivism promotion fits nicely into Snedegar's contrastivism about given a very modest assumption about how the two should be linked. analyses what for there to be a reason for an to φ rather than in terms of whether φ-ing or ψ
 there is a clear sense in which Other actioNs the AgeNt mIgHt peRforM may also promotE Her dEsire (though not quite to tHe samE dEGree). 15 2.3. cOnTrastIve ProbABiLISm SO, lIkE PuRe pRoBabilIsm, causal PRobabilism AppEaRs to be subjecT To CounterexaMplEs. What to do? We ThiNk both SoRts OF counTerExampLes can BE avoidEd by adoptInG A ​contrAStive acCOUnT of pRomotion -one that miMIcS And complements A contrAsTIvE ACcoUnt Of reasons sUcH as JuSTin SnedEGaR'S. rAthER than taking 16 prOmotion to be A Non-ContraStIve AFfair, aCcordInG To wHich an actioN eitHer promotEs, or faILs to proMOte, the sAtisfaCtiOn oF a deSIrE ​sImpLiCIteR​, We ShoULd tAke promoTiOn To be a ​ContRASTIve nOtiOn, acCordiNg to which an acTioN eitHEr pRomotEs, or fAils To PromoTe, the sAtisfAcTion of a desire ​as CompAred to othEr aCtIonS​. THis baSIc idea Can 17 Be sPelled oUt in a prOBabIlISTIc Framework as follows: coNTRaStive PurE ProbaBIlIsM​: agent A's φ-InG ​raTher THAn ψ-inG proMOtEs desire d iff pr(SAtIsFaction Of d|A φs) > pr(SaTisFacTion oF d|A ψs)​. 18 15 lin appEars to be Aware THat his view geneRAtes these sortS Of RESuLTs, anD is Aware that thEy apPEar pRoblEMaTic (SEe espEcialLy lIn 2016, PP. 18-19). Although he's aware of ThEse proBlems, He doesn't offer A solution tO THEm, saying InstEAd THat accepting CaUsal PRobabilism WOuld amouNt to "bIting a buLlet" (p. 19) on thESE points. BEloW, we OffEr a SOLuTion on his behaLF (See fOoTnote 18). 16 SnEdeGar (2014). Here We fOllOw SNedEgAr's proposAl about hOw To UnDeRstAnd thE StructurE oF coNtRasTivisM, Though Note tHat oUr InTEreSt in conTRaSTIvisM cOnCernS thE pRomotIon rELatIon rathEr than the ReaSOn-foR rElAtion, whIch is that targEt Of Snedegar'S aNalYsis. WhILE we find SNedegar's proposal regardiNG contraStiVism aBout Reasons ​coMpeLling, oUr aCCount oF promoTion hErE is STRictlY SPeAkiNg Neutral on tHE NatUre of ThE reaSon-for rElation. With that saiD, We dO note that our cOntRastIVIsM abOUt PRomOtIOn fITS nicely into SnedEgar's contrAsTIvIsm about reASonS, gIven a veRy modesT assuMPtion abOut how the Two should Be LinkED. sneDegar analySes what iT takes for THere tO Be A reasOn fOr an agEnT to Φ rathEr than Ψ In tErms oF whethEr Φ-ing or Ψ
 there is a clear sense in  which oth er ac tio nsth e ag entmight performm ay a lso promote her desire  (tho ug h  not qu ite t o the s a me d egr ee ).  15  2 . 3.  Cont ras tive Pr obabilismSo,  l ike Pure Pro b ab ilism, Cau sal  Probabilism  ap pearsto  be subje ctto co untere x amples . What to  d o ? We t h ink bot h so rtsof counterexample s  c a n be avoided b y adop ti n ga ​co ntr astive acc ou nt of promoti o n- o n e t h at mimics and  complement s  acontra st ive accoun t ofre a son s such as J usti n Snedega r's. R a ther th a n takin g 16 p rom oti on t o  b ea n on - con t ra sti v e a ffair, a cc or dingto w h i c h  anact ioneithe r promotes, o r f ails topromo te, t he s at isfac tion o f a d es ire ​simplicite r​,we should  ta ke  pr om otion to bea ​ con trastiv e notio n , a cc o r d in g to which an acti on e it her prom otes,o rfa i ls to pr om ote , th e satis fact i on  of a de sire ​ a sco mparedto  other  a cti ons ​. Th i s ba sic id ea can 1 7 bes pelled out ina  probabilisti c  f r a me w orkasfollows: Co ntra s tive  Pur e  P rob a bilis m​: A ge n tA 's φ-ing ​rather th an  ψ-ing  prom otes desire D  iff pr(sa t i s factionof D | Aφ s) > pr(satisf actio n of D|A ψ s )​. 18 1 5 Lin  appears  to be aw a r e that h isvie w g ene r a te s these sorts o f re su lts, an d i s aware  th atthe y a pp ear probl ematic ( se ees pe cia lly L i n 2016,pp . 1 8- 19) . Alt h ough h e's a ware  o ft hes e probl e ms , he d oe sn 't o ffe ra sol utio n  to  them,saying in ste a d th at  a cceptin g Causal Prob ab ilism woul damo unt to " biting a  bullet" (p. 19) on the s e point s.Below , we  offer asol utiononh is beh alf (s ee fo ot not e 18).1 6  S ned eg ar (2014). H ere  we f ol lowSnedega r's proposal about how  to understan d t he s t r uc tur e  o f  co nt r ast i v ism, though not e that our  i n te rest in co n tra st ivism c oncerns  thep romotio n relatio n ratherth an t h e  re ason-for r elation,  which is thatt ar get o f S nedega r' s a nalys is. Wh i lewe fi nd Sne de gar'spropo sa l regard ing contrastivism about  reaso ns ​c omp elling, o ura cco unt of pr omot ion here i s s tri ctlyspe a kingneut r al  on the n atur e  of the r e as on- f o rrelation. W i t h  th at sa id, we donote  that our contras t ivism about pr omot i o n f its nice ly  into Snedegar 'sco n t rastivis mabout reaso ns, give na  very  modes t assu mptiona b ou t  how t he t woshould be  li nk e d. Sned eg ar analys es w ha t it t akes f o r th e r e to be a reason  fora n  agen t  to  φ ra th er than ψ in  terms ofwhether φ-i ng orψ
 there_is a_clear sense in which_other actions_the_agent might_perform_may also promote_her desire (though_not quite to the_same degree). 15_2.3._Contrastive Probabilism So, like Pure Probabilism, Causal Probabilism appears to be subject to counterexamples._What_to do?_We_think_both sorts of counterexamples can_be avoided by adopting a_​contrastive account_of promotion -one that mimics and complements a_contrastive_account of reasons_such as Justin Snedegar's. Rather than taking 16 promotion_to be a non-contrastive affair, according_to which an_action_either_promotes, or fails to_promote, the satisfaction of a desire_​simpliciter​, we should take promotion to_be a ​contrastive notion, according to which_an action either promotes, or fails_to promote, the satisfaction of_a desire_​as compared to other actions​._This basic idea_can 17_be spelled out_in a probabilistic framework as follows:_Contrastive Pure Probabilism​:_Agent A's φ-ing ​rather than ψ-ing_promotes_desire D iff_pr(satisfaction_of_D|A φs)_> pr(satisfaction of_D|A_ψs)​. 18_15_Lin appears to be aware that_his_view generates these sorts of results, and_is aware that they_appear_problematic (see especially Lin_2016, pp. 18-19). Although he's_aware of these problems, he doesn't_offer a_solution to_them, saying instead that accepting Causal Probabilism would amount to "biting_a bullet" (p. 19) on these_points. Below, we offer_a solution_on_his behalf (see_footnote_18). 16_Snedegar (2014). Here we follow Snedegar's proposal_about how_to understand the structure of contrastivism,_though note that our_interest_in contrastivism concerns the promotion relation_rather than the reason-for relation, which_is that target of Snedegar's_analysis._While_we find Snedegar's proposal regarding_contrastivism about reasons ​compelling, our account_of promotion here_is strictly speaking neutral on the nature_of_the reason-for relation. With that said,_we_do note that our contrastivism about_promotion_fits_nicely into Snedegar's contrastivism about_reasons, given a very modest assumption_about how the two should be linked. Snedegar analyses_what it takes_for there to be a_reason_for_an agent to φ rather than ψ in terms of_whether φ-ing_or ψ