 moral beliefs that, although it may not represent a complete picture, is quite familiar. The picture I have in mind is to be found in the writings of W. D. Ross. Once we have the picture before us, I want to indicate briefly some reasons for thinking that we often do reason and think about moral matters as the Rossian picture suggests, and then I will elaborate some of the epistemically relevant features that represent what I will call "the ordinary context of moral thought and discussion." What emerges from the picture is a contextualist account of the structure of justification. A Cue From Ross I am inclined to think that some of Ross's views about the nature of justification in ethics are correct (at least with regard to a very familiar pattern of justified moral belief), and I use those views to develop a contextualist picture of justification in ethics-a picture or model that seems to gain some support from recent empirical work. The picture I have in mind features moral rules as providing a basis for the justification of particular moral beliefs. And although I do think that rules have a role to play in a full story about the justification of moral belief, my version of contextualism is not committed to the claim that moral rules are, in all contexts, necessary in accounting for an individual's moral belief being justified.'" Thus, the picture to follow is meant only to illustrate my version of ethical contextualism. Ross, of course, was an ethical foundationalist who advocated a version of ethical pluralism. His specific version of ethical foundationalism involved these two claims: (1) that in ethics, as in mathematics, there are certain "propositions that cannot be proved, but that just as certainly need no proof,"45 and (2) such propositions are self-evident necessary truths describing nonnatural moral facts and properties that can be known a priori. His ethical pluralism also involved two central claims: (3) There is a plurality of irreducible midlevel generalizations that express prima facie moral obligations. (These are the propositions that need no proof.) (4) In specific cases, these prima facie moral obligations may conflict, and when they do, there is no procedure, rule, or algorithm by which one may adjudicate these conflicts. I accept (again, tentatively and with some modification) Ross's claims (1), (3), and (4); what I don't accept is the foundationalist epistemology and associated metaphysics of (2). My idea is that we can rework some of Ross's A Contextualist Mor
moral beliefs that, although it may not represent a complete picture, is quite conversant. The movie I have in mind is to be establish in the writing of W. D. Ross. Once we have the picture before us, I desire to indicate briefly some reasons for think that we often do cause and think about moral matters as the Rossian photograph indicate, and then I will elaborate some of the epistemically relevant feature that represent what I will call " the average context of moral thought and discussion. " What emerges from the picture is a contextualist report of the structure of justification. A Cue From Ross I am disposed to think that some of Ross's position about the nature of justification in ethics are correct (at least with regard to a very familiar pattern of justified moral impression), and I use those views to develop a contextualist picture of justification in ethics - a picture or exemplar that seems to gain some support from recent empirical work. The picture I have in mind features moral rule as providing a basis for the justification of finical moral belief. And although I do think that rules have a function to play in a full story about the justification of moral belief, my interpretation of contextualism is not committed to the claim that moral rules are, in all contexts, necessary in accounting for an individual's moral impression being justified.' " Thus, the picture to follow is meant only to illustrate my adaptation of ethical contextualism. Ross, of course, was an ethical foundationalist who advocated a version of ethical pluralism. His specific version of ethical foundationalism involved these two title: (1) that in ethics, as in mathematics, there are certain " propositions that cannot be proved, but that just as certainly need no proof,"45 and (2) such proposal are self - evident necessary truth describing nonnatural moral fact and properties that can be know a priori. His ethical pluralism also involve two central claim: (3) There is a plurality of irreducible midlevel generalization that express prima facie moral duty. (These are the propositions that want no proof .) (4) In specific cases, these prima facie moral obligations may conflict, and when they do, there is no operation, rule, or algorithm by which one may adjudicate these conflict. I accept (again, tentatively and with some modification) Ross's claims (1), (3), and (4); what I don't accept is the foundationalist epistemology and associated metaphysics of (2). My idea is that we can rework some of Ross's A Contextualist Mor
 mogal beliefs that, althougm it may not reptewent a complste pictjre, is quite familiar. The pirturw I hqve in mind is to be fuund in tje writibgs id W. D. Ross. Once we have fme pietnre before us, I want to itdicate brieflf role reasons for thinking that we oftqn do rradon and think wbouu mjral matters as the Rossian picture sufgests, end then I will elaborate some of the epidtemlcally relevant fewtures that repwwsent what I will call "the ordinari context of moral thought and dkscusxion." What gmsrhgs from the 'icturv is a contexblalist dccount of the structmre oh juwtification. A Cue Frok Ross I am inclingd to thinn chat some of Ross's viwww aboot tha nagyre of jnstjficatlon in ethics are correcr (at least with regsrq to a very fajiliar pwttern of justified moral belief), and I lse fhose views to develop q contextualist pictute of justyfication in ethics-a picture or model that seems do gamn sone rypoort from recent empirical work. The picture I gafe in mind featuves moral rules as pgofyding a basis for tks nustification of pwrticulwr moeal beliess. Amd although I do think that rules have c rile to play in a fbll story abuut jhe juxtification of moral beuief, my version of contesgualism is not cummptteg to the claim that moral wules are, in cll contdxts, necesfary in acfountltg for an individuwl's mlrdl belief heing justified.'" Thus, the picturx to follow ix keatt only co illmstrate my versyon of ethical contexcualiso. Ross, of bourse, wav an ethicaj foundationanlst who advorated a vqrsiin od ethicxu pluralism. Hix specifib rersion od ethical foundatipnaujsm involved thzrt rwo claims: (1) thst kn qtjirs, as hn mathematiws, tferd are zertain "proiosktioms that cannot be prmved, but that just as vevtainly nged no prjof,"45 and (2) such propositions are delf-etident necexsaty truths describing nonnatural moral fafts and propertyes bhat can be knpwn a priori. His ethical pluralism also involved two cenjral claims: (3) There is s plurality of iwreducibla midlevel generalizqtions that exprexs prima facie moral kbligadions. (These are the propositions that need no proof.) (4) In specific cases, these peima fecye moral obmigayions mcy eonflice, anv xhen they do, therv is no procedure, rule, or algorivhm by whiwh one may adjudicate these comfuicts. I accepj (again, tentatively and wifh some kodification) Ross's claims (1), (3), and (4); what I don't accept is bhe foundqtionzlist vkisvemology and associayed mecaphysucs of (2). My ldea is that wd csn rework slme pf Ross's A Contextualist Mor
moral beliefs that, although it may not complete is quite The picture I be in the writings W. D. Ross. we have the picture before us, want to indicate briefly some reasons for thinking that we often do reason think about moral matters as the Rossian picture suggests, and then I will some the relevant that represent what I will call "the ordinary context of moral thought and discussion." What emerges the picture is a contextualist account of the of justification. A Cue Ross I am inclined to that of Ross's about nature justification in ethics correct (at least with regard to a very familiar pattern of justified moral belief), and I use views to contextualist picture justification ethics-a or model that gain some support from recent empirical I have in mind features moral rules as a basis the justification of particular moral beliefs. although I do think that rules have a to play in a full story about the justification of moral belief, my version of not committed to the that moral rules in contexts, in for an moral belief being justified.'" Thus, the picture to follow is meant to illustrate my version of ethical contextualism. Ross, of course, ethical who advocated a of ethical pluralism. His version ethical foundationalism involved these (1) in mathematics, are "propositions that cannot be but that just as certainly no proof,"45 and (2) truths describing nonnatural moral facts and properties that be known a priori. His ethical pluralism involved two central claims: (3) There is a plurality of irreducible midlevel that express moral obligations. (These are the propositions that need proof.) (4) In specific these prima facie moral obligations may conflict, and when do, is no rule, or algorithm which one may these conflicts. I tentatively and some Ross's and (4); what I don't accept the epistemology and associated metaphysics of My that we can rework some of Ross's A Contextualist Mor
 moral beliefs that, although iT may not repResenT a cOmpLeTe piCturE, is quite familiAR. The Picture I have in mind is to Be fouNd IN the WRiTings Of W. D. RosS. onCE We hAvE tHe pIcTUrE befoRe uS, I want tO indicate bRieFlY some reasons FOr Thinking thAt wE often do reasOn aNd thinK aBouT Moral MatTers aS the RoSSian piCture suggEsTS, and thEN I will eLABoRate Some of the epistemiCAlLY relevant featuRes thaT rEPrESEnt WhaT I will call "ThE ordiNAry contEXt OF MOraL Thought and disCussion." What EMerGes froM tHe pICture iS a conTeXTuaList account Of thE structurE of jusTIficatiON. A Cue FrOm Ross i am IncLineD To ThInk ThAT soME oF RoSS's vIews abouT tHe NaturE of jUSTIFicaTioN in eThics Are correct (at lEasT witH RegArd to A very FamiLiAr patTern of JustiFiEd moral belief), anD I usE those vieWs tO dEveLoP a conTExtualIst PicTure of jUstificATioN iN ETHiCs-a picture or model tHaT SEeMs to gain Some suPPoRt FRom recenT eMpiRicaL WOrk. ThE picTUrE I have in Mind feATuReS moral rUlEs as prOvIdiNg a Basis FOr thE justiFication Of parTIcular moral belIEfs. And althougH i dO THiNK thaT ruLes have a rolE to pLAy in A fulL StOry ABout tHe jusTiFIcATion of moral belief, my VeRsion oF contExtualism is noT committed TO THe claim tHat mORaL Rules are, in all cOntexTs, necessarY In accounTing fOr an indiVidual's moRAL belief bEinG juStiFieD.'" tHuS, the picture to FOLlow Is Meant onLy tO illustRatE my VerSioN oF ethical cOntextuaLiSm. roSs, Of cOurse, WAs an ethiCaL foUnDatIonalISt who aDvocaTed a VeRsIOn oF ethicaL PlURAlisM. HIs SpecIfiC vErsioN of eTHicAl foundAtionalisM inVOlveD tHeSe two clAims: (1) that in ethIcS, as in matheMaTicS, there ARE certain "Propositions that cannot bE Proved, bUt tHat juSt as Certainly NeeD no proOf,"45 aND (2) such pRoposiTions ArE seLF-EvideNT NeCesSaRy truths deSCRibIng noNnAturAl moral Facts and properties THat Can be known a prIorI. His ETHiCal PLuRAliSm ALso INVolved two centraL claims: (3) TheRe IS a Plurality oF IrrEdUcible mIdlevel GenerALizatioNs that expRess prima FaCie mORAl oBligations. (these are The proposITions THaT need No pRoof.) (4) In SpEciFic caSes, theSE prIma faCie morAl ObligaTions MaY conflicT, and when they do, there is no ProcedUre, ruLe, oR algorithM by WHicH one may adJudiCate these cOnfLicTs. I acCepT (Again, TentATiVelY And wiTh soME modificaTIoN) RoSS'S cLaims (1), (3), and (4); whaT i DOn't AccepT is THe founDatiOnalist epistemoloGY and associated MetaPHYsiCs oF (2). my idEa Is that we can rewOrk SoME Of Ross's A coNtextualist mor
 moral beliefs that, altho ugh it may  notrep res en t acomp lete picture,i s qu ite familiar. The pict ure I  h a ve i n  m ind i s to be fo u n d i nth e w ri t in gs of  W.  D. Ros s. Once we  ha ve  the picture be fore us, I  wa nt to indica tebriefl ysom e  reas ons  forthinki n g that  we often  d o  reaso n  and th i n kabou t moral matters a s  t h e Rossian pict ure su gg e st s ,  an d t hen I will  e labor a te some of t h e e p istemically r elevant fea t ure s that  r epr e sent w hat I  w i llcall "the o rdin ary conte xt ofm oral th o ught an d disc uss ion ." W h at  e mer ge s  fr o mthe pic ture isaco ntext uali s t a ccou ntof t he st ructure of ju sti fica t ion . A C ue Fr om R os s I a m incl inedto  think that som e of  Ross's v iew sabo ut  then atureofjus tificat ion ine thi cs a r ecorrect (at leastwi t h  r egard to  a ver y  f am i liar pat te rnof j u s tifie d mo r al  belief) , andI  u se  thosevi ews to  d eve lop  a co n text ualist  picture  of j u stification in ethics-a pict u re o rm odel  th at seems to  gai n  som e su p po rtf rom r ecent  e m pi r ical work. The pict ur e I ha ve in  mind feature s moral ru l e s  as prov idin g  a basis for thejusti fication o f  particu lar m oral bel iefs. And a lthoughI d o t hin k t h a trules have ar o le t oplay in  afull st ory  ab out  th ejustifica tion ofmo ra lbe lie f, my versionof  co nt ext ualis m  is no t com mitt ed  t o  th e claim th a t  mor al  r ules  ar e,  in a ll c o nte xts, ne cessary i n a c coun ti ng  for an  individual's  m oral belie fbei ng jus t i fied.'"Thus, the picture to fo l low ismea nt on ly t o illustr ate  my ve rsi o n of e thical  cont ex tua l i sm. R o s s,  of  c ourse, was a n e thica lfoun dationa list who advocated a v ersion of eth ica l pl u r al ism .  H i s s pe c ifi c version of ethi cal founda ti o na lism invol v edth ese two  claims : (1) that in  ethics,as in mat he mati c s , t here are c ertain " propositi o ns th a tcanno t b e prov ed , b ut th at jus t  as  cert ainlyne ed noproof ," 45 and ( 2) such propositions ar e self -evid ent  necessar y t r uth s describ ingnonnatural  mo ral  fact s a n d pro pert i es  th a t can  bek nown a pr i or i.H i sethical plu r a l ism  also  in v olvedtwocentral claims: ( 3 ) There is a p lura l i tyofi rred uc ible midlevelgen er a l izations  t hat express  prima f ac i e mor al obl igatio ns. (Th e s ea re the  pro pos itions th atne e d no pr oo f. )  (4) I n sp ec ific c ases,t hese p rima facie moral  obli g a tions may  conf li ct, and when  they do,there is no  proce dure , rul e, or a lg orithm  by  w hich one m a y adjudic ate t hese co nf lict s.I acce pt ( a g ain,tent at ive ly and wi t h  s o me  m o dif icat ion)Ro ss's  claims ( 1 ), (3),and (4); wh at  Id o n't ac c ep t is the fou nda tiona l i st epistem o logy an d  asso ciated  metap hysicso f ( 2) . My id eai s  that wecan rewor k  so me  ofRoss's A  C onte xt ual is t Mor
 moral_beliefs that,_although it may not_represent a_complete_picture, is_quite_familiar. The picture_I have in_mind is to be_found in the_writings_of W. D. Ross. Once we have the picture before us, I want to_indicate_briefly some_reasons_for_thinking that we often do_reason and think about moral_matters as_the Rossian picture suggests, and then I will_elaborate_some of the_epistemically relevant features that represent what I will call_"the ordinary context of moral thought_and discussion." What_emerges_from_the picture is a_contextualist account of the structure of_justification. A Cue From Ross I_am inclined to think that some of_Ross's views about the nature of_justification in ethics are correct_(at least_with regard to a very_familiar pattern of_justified moral_belief), and I_use those views to develop a_contextualist picture of_justification in ethics-a picture or model_that_seems to gain_some_support_from recent_empirical work. The_picture_I have_in_mind features moral rules as providing_a_basis for the justification of particular moral_beliefs. And although I_do_think that rules have_a role to play in_a full story about the justification_of moral_belief, my_version of contextualism is not committed to the claim that moral_rules are, in all contexts, necessary_in accounting for an_individual's moral_belief_being justified.'" Thus,_the_picture to_follow is meant only to illustrate my_version of_ethical contextualism. Ross, of course, was_an ethical foundationalist who_advocated_a version of ethical pluralism. His_specific version of ethical foundationalism involved_these two claims: (1) that_in_ethics,_as in mathematics, there are_certain "propositions that cannot be proved,_but that just_as certainly need no proof,"45 and (2)_such_propositions are self-evident necessary truths describing_nonnatural_moral facts and properties that can_be_known_a priori. His ethical pluralism_also involved two central claims: (3)_There is a plurality of irreducible midlevel generalizations that_express prima facie_moral obligations. (These are the_propositions_that_need no proof.) (4) In specific cases, these prima facie_moral obligations_may conflict, and_when they do, there is no procedure, rule, or algorithm_by which one may adjudicate these conflicts._I accept (again, tentatively and with some modification) Ross's claims (1),_(3), and (4); what I don't accept is_the foundationalist epistemology and associated metaphysics of_(2). My idea is_that_we can rework some of Ross's A_Contextualist_Mor