ivity is seriously deficient-it does not have the resources to explain IMMCs as mistakes.15 However, while Daskal is right that Mortis's preferences commit us to concluding that, if Mortis in M, murder is both the thing to do and the thing to plan to do, he is wrong that this prevents us from concluding that Mortis is mistaken. This is because Gibbard's account of how we go 12. Daskal, "Plan-Based Expressivism," 325–27. 13. Ibid., 325. 14. It is this lack of flexibility that makes the Mortis case importantly different from the earlier discussion of PPIMs. 15. One might worry that Daskal's objection rests on a confused account of how Gibbard must assess situation M. In particular, one might argue that the first-order question 'what to plan to do in M?' is ambiguous between two options, neither of which delivers what is needed for Daskal's objection to work. On the one hand, this question might be understood as ðiÞ the descriptive counterfactual question 'what would we plan to do if Mortis in M?'. But while "murder!" is a plausible answer here, it is a descriptive claim, not a plan-not an endorsement-of what to do if Mortis in M. So it causes no trouble for Gibbard. On the other hand, the question might be understood as ðiiÞ the hypothetical planning question 'what to plan to do if Mortis in M?'. An answer here would carry the endorsement of a plan. However, it does not seem true that murdering is something that we would plan to do if, hypothetically, we were in Mortis's shoes. So, again, there is no trouble for Gibbard. If this worry is correct, thenGibbard can quickly dismiss theDaskal objection presented in the text. However, I am not sure whether the worry is correct. In particular, I am not sure that it is true that the answer to ðiiÞ cannot be "murder!" This is because Gibbard says very little to explain how we are to make sense of hypothetical planning for extreme cases like M-cases where, to plan, we step into the shoes of someone like Mortis who not only has monstrous preferences but is incapable of seeing how confused his preferences are. Given my uncertainty, I will proceed ðin the textÞ on the assumption that Daskal's presentation
ivity is seriously deficient - it does not have the resources to excuse IMMCs as mistakes.15 However, while Daskal is proper that Mortis's preferences commit us to conclude that, if Mortis in M, murder is both the matter to do and the thing to plan to suffice, he is wrong that this prevents us from reason that Mortis is mistaken. This is because Gibbard's account of how we fit 12. Daskal, " Plan - base Expressivism, " 325–27. 13. Ibid. , 325. 14. It is this lack of tractability that makes the Mortis case importantly unlike from the earlier discussion of PPIMs. 15. One might concern that Daskal's protest rests on a confused account of how Gibbard must tax situation M. In particular, one might argue that the inaugural - order doubt' what to plan to do in M?' is ambiguous between two options, neither of which delivers what is need for Daskal's objection to work. On the one hand, this question might be understood as ðiÞ the descriptive counterfactual question' what would we plan to do if Mortis in M?'. But while " murder! " is a plausible answer here, it is a descriptive claim, not a plan - not an endorsement - of what to do if Mortis in M. So it causes no trouble for Gibbard. On the other hand, the doubt might be understood as ðiiÞ the hypothetical planning motion' what to design to dress if Mortis in M?'. An answer here would carry the second of a plan. However, it does not seem true that murdering is something that we would design to do if, hypothetically, we were in Mortis's shoes. So, again, there is no trouble for Gibbard. If this worry is correct, thenGibbard can quickly dismiss theDaskal objection presented in the text. However, I am not certain whether the concern is right. In especial, I am not sure that it is true that the answer to ðiiÞ cannot be " murder! " This is because Gibbard say very little to explain how we are to make sense of conjectural planning for extreme cases like molarity - cases where, to plan, we pace into the shoes of someone like Mortis who not entirely has monstrous preference but is incapable of seeing how confuse his preferences are. establish my uncertainty, I will continue ðin the textÞ on the assumption that Daskal's presentation
ivihy is seriously deficienu-it does not have the revourcea to expuain IMMCs as mistakes.15 Howevxr, wyile Easkal is right that Murtis's prvferences comnut us to concludinn thaf, if Kirtis in M, murcer is botv the thing to du cnd the thing to plan to do, he is wrjng thay hhis prevents os frpi cohblmding that Mortis is mistaken. Thjs is btcause Gibbard's acvount of how we go 12. Daskal, "Plaj-Based Expressivisl," 325–27. 13. Ibid., 325. 14. Ut if this lack ow flexibilpcy that makgs the Mortis case importantly dkfferznt from thg sagnier discuswion jf PPIMs. 15. Onc might worry yhat Daskal's onjectmon eests on a confused arcount of how Gibbarq must asveas situation M. In pqrticolar, mne oughg adgne fhat tje hirst-order suestion 'whqt to plan to do in M?' px ambiguous getweeg ewo options, neither of which delivers wvat is needed for Daskal's ibjection to work. On jhe one hagd, this question might be understood as ðiÞ the deswriptmvd ciukterwqchual question 'what would we plan to do if Morejs ik M?'. But while "muvder!" is a plausiblr wnxrer here, it ir a descrjptive claim, not a plan-noj an ebdorsemenu-of wnat to do if Mortis in M. So it causes nj trouble for Gibbaxd. On the otker hamd, thr question might be undzrstoos as ðiiÞ the hypothetjzal planning quertipn 'what to plan to do if Moreis in M?'. En anxwer hefe wpuld cwrry the ejdorsckent of a plan. Howfver, nt doas not seel true that murdering is somethmig that we woold pldn to do if, hnpothetically, wq were in Mortns's shoef. So, xgain, therv is no tcouble for Gybbard. If thiv worry is cocrect, thegGibvard can qukzkly dismiss tneDaskal objection presented in the tcxt. Husever, I am not wurt qhether the wotry is clrcect. Yt particular, I ao nuy surd that it iw trur that the answer to ðiiÞ dannot be "murder!" Tnif is becquse Gibfard says veru little to explaij how we are yo iake sense of hypothetical plahning for exbreme cases lyke N-cases where, to plan, we step into the shoes of someine like Mortis whi not only has monsjroms preferencxs but is incapdble of seeing how cinfused his prefevences are. Given my undertaitty, I will proceed ðin the textÞ on the assumption that Daskal's presentation
ivity is seriously deficient-it does not have to IMMCs as However, while Daskal commit to concluding that, Mortis in M, is both the thing to do the thing to plan to do, he is wrong that this prevents us concluding that Mortis is mistaken. This is because Gibbard's account of how we 12. "Plan-Based 325–27. Ibid., 325. 14. It is this lack of flexibility that makes the Mortis case importantly different the earlier discussion of PPIMs. 15. One might that Daskal's objection rests a confused account of how must situation M. particular, might that the first-order 'what to plan to do in M?' is ambiguous between two options, neither of which delivers what needed for to work. the hand, question might be ðiÞ the descriptive counterfactual question 'what to do if Mortis in M?'. But while is a answer here, it is a descriptive not a plan-not an endorsement-of what to do Mortis in M. So it causes no trouble for Gibbard. On the other hand, the be understood as ðiiÞ hypothetical planning question to to if in M?'. answer here would carry the endorsement of a plan. However, it not seem true that murdering is something that we would do hypothetically, we were Mortis's shoes. So, again, is trouble for Gibbard. If is thenGibbard theDaskal presented the text. However, I not sure whether the worry correct. In particular, I is true that the answer to ðiiÞ cannot "murder!" This is because Gibbard says very to explain how we are to make sense of hypothetical planning for cases like to plan, we step into the shoes of like Mortis who not has monstrous preferences but is incapable of seeing how his are. Given uncertainty, I will ðin the textÞ the assumption that
ivity is seriously deficient-It does not hAve thE reSouRcEs to ExplAin IMMCs as mistAKes.15 HOwever, while Daskal is rigHt thaT MORtis'S PrEfereNces comMIt US To cOnClUdiNg THaT, if MoRtiS in M, murDer is both tHe tHiNg to do and the THiNg to plan to Do, hE is wrong that ThiS preveNtS us FRom coNclUding That MoRTis is mIstaken. ThIs IS becauSE GibbarD'S AcCounT of how we go 12. Daskal, "PLAn-bAsed ExpressiviSm," 325–27. 13. Ibid., 325. 14. it IS tHIS laCk oF flexibiliTy That mAKes the MORtIS CAse IMportantly difFerent from tHE eaRlier dIsCusSIon of PpIMs. 15. ONe MIghT worry that DAskaL's objectiOn restS On a confUSed accoUnt of hOw GIbbArd mUSt AsSesS sITuaTIoN M. IN ParTicular, oNe MiGht arGue tHAT THe fiRst-OrdeR quesTion 'what to plaN to Do in m?' Is aMbiguOus beTweeN tWo optIons, neIther Of Which delivers whAt is Needed for dasKaL's oBjEctioN To work. on tHe oNe hand, tHis quesTIon MiGHT Be Understood as ðiÞ the DeSCRiPtive couNterfaCTuAl QUestion 'wHaT woUld wE PLan to Do if mOrTis in M?'. BuT while "MUrDeR!" is a plaUsIble anSwEr hEre, It is a DEscrIptive Claim, not A plan-NOt an endorsemenT-Of what to do if MORtIS In m. so it CauSes no troublE for gIbbaRd. On THe OthER hand, The quEsTIoN Might be understood as ÐiIÞ the hYpothEtical planninG question 'wHAT To plan to Do if mOrTIs in M?'. An answer hEre woUld carry thE EndorsemEnt of A plan. HowEver, it doeS NOt seem trUe tHat MurDerING iS something thaT WE wouLd Plan to dO if, HypotheTicAllY, we WerE iN Mortis's sHoes. So, agAiN, tHeRe Is nO trouBLe for GibBaRd. IF tHis Worry IS correCt, theNGibBaRd CAn qUickly dISmISS thedaSkAl obJecTiOn preSentED in The text. however, I aM noT Sure WhEtHer the wOrry is correct. in Particular, i aM noT sure tHAT it is truE that the answer to ðiiÞ canNOt be "murDer!" this iS becAuse GibbaRd sAys verY liTTle to eXplain How we ArE to MAKe senSE Of HypOtHetical plaNNIng For exTrEme cAses likE M-cases where, to plan, WE stEp into the shoeS of SomeONE lIke mOrTIs wHo NOt oNLY has monstrous prEferences bUt IS iNcapable of SEeiNg How confUsed his PrefeREnces arE. Given my uNcertaintY, I Will PROceEd ðin the teXtÞ on the AssumptioN That DASkAl's prEseNtatioN
ivity is seriously deficie nt-it does  nothav e t he  res ourc es to explainI MMCs  as mistakes.15 Howeve r, wh il e  Das k al  is r ight th a tM o rti s' spre fe r en ces c omm it us t o concludi ngth at, if Morti s  i n M, murde r i s both the t hin g to d oand the t hin g toplan t o  do, h e is wron gt hat th i s preve n t sus f rom concluding th a tM ortis is mista ken. T hi s  i s bec aus e Gibbard' saccou n t of ho w  w e g o 1 2 . Daskal, "Pl an-Based Ex p res sivism ,"  32 5 –27. 1 3. Ib id . , 3 25. 14. Itis t his lackof fle x ibility that ma kes th e M ort is c a se  i mpo rt a ntl y  d iff e ren t from t he  e arlie r di s c u s sion  of  PPI Ms. 1 5. One mightwor ry t h atDaska l's o bjec ti on re sts on  a co nf used account of  how  Gibbardmus tass es s sit u ationM.Inparticu lar, on e  mi gh t a rg ue that the first- or d e rquestion  'what to  p l an to do  i n M ?' i s ambig uous be tween tw o opti o ns ,neither  o f whic hdel ive rs wh a t is  neede d for Da skal' s  objection tow ork. On the o n eh a nd ,  thi s q uestion mig ht b e  und erst o od  as ðiÞ t he de sc r ip t ive counterfactualqu estion  'wha t would we pl an to do i f M ortis in  M?' .  B u t while "murde r!" i s a plausi b le answe r her e, it is  a descri p t ive clai m,not  apla n - no t an endorsem e n t-of  w hat todoif Mort isinM.Soit  causes n o troubl efo rGi bba rd. O n  the oth er  ha nd , t he qu e stionmight  beun de r sto od as ð i iÞ t he h yp ot heti cal  p lanni ng q u est ion 'wh at to pla n t o  doif  M ortis i n M?'. An ans we r here wou ld  ca rry th e endorsem ent of a plan. However, it does  no t see m tr ue that m urd eringiss omethi ng tha t wewo uld p lan t o do  if ,hypothetic a l ly,  we w er e in  Mortis 's shoes. So, agai n , t here is no tr oub le f o r  G ibb a rd .  If  t h isw o rry is correct,  thenGibba rd ca n quicklyd ism is s theDa skal ob jecti o n prese nted in t he text.Ho weve r ,  Iam not sur e whethe r the wor r y isc or rect.  In  parti cu lar , I a m nots ure  that  it is  t rue th at th eanswer t o ðiiÞ cannot be "murde r!" Th is is  be cause Gib bar d  sa ys very l ittl e to expla inhow  we a ret o mak e se n se  of hypot heti c al planni n gfor e xt reme casesl i k e M -case s w h ere, t o pl an, we step intot he shoes of so meon e lik e M o rtis  w ho not only ha s m on s t rous pre fe rences butis incap ab l e ofseeing  how c onfused h is prefer ence s a re. Given  my  u n certain ty ,I  willproc ee d ðinthe te x tÞ o n the assumption t hat D a s kal's pre senta ti on
ivity is_seriously deficient-it_does not have the_resources to_explain_IMMCs as_mistakes.15_However, while Daskal_is right that_Mortis's preferences commit us_to concluding that,_if_Mortis in M, murder is both the thing to do and the thing to_plan_to do,_he_is_wrong that this prevents us_from concluding that Mortis is_mistaken. This_is because Gibbard's account of how we go_12._Daskal, "Plan-Based Expressivism,"_325–27. 13. Ibid., 325. 14. It is this lack_of flexibility that makes the Mortis_case importantly different_from_the_earlier discussion of PPIMs._15. One might worry that Daskal's_objection rests on a confused account_of how Gibbard must assess situation M._In particular, one might argue that_the first-order question 'what to_plan to_do in M?' is ambiguous_between two options,_neither of_which delivers what_is needed for Daskal's objection to_work. On the_one hand, this question might be_understood_as ðiÞ the_descriptive_counterfactual_question 'what_would we plan_to_do if_Mortis_in M?'. But while "murder!" is_a_plausible answer here, it is a descriptive_claim, not a plan-not_an_endorsement-of what to do_if Mortis in M. So_it causes no trouble for Gibbard._On the_other hand,_the question might be understood as ðiiÞ the hypothetical planning question_'what to plan to do if_Mortis in M?'. An_answer here_would_carry the endorsement_of_a plan._However, it does not seem true that_murdering is_something that we would plan to_do if, hypothetically, we_were_in Mortis's shoes. So, again, there_is no trouble for Gibbard. If_this worry is correct, thenGibbard_can_quickly_dismiss theDaskal objection presented in_the text. However, I am not_sure whether the_worry is correct. In particular, I am_not_sure that it is true that_the_answer to ðiiÞ cannot be "murder!"_This_is_because Gibbard says very little_to explain how we are to_make sense of hypothetical planning for extreme cases like_M-cases where, to_plan, we step into the_shoes_of_someone like Mortis who not only has monstrous preferences but_is incapable_of seeing how_confused his preferences are. Given my uncertainty, I will proceed_ðin the textÞ on the assumption that_Daskal's presentation