 but the theorist who thinks that there being such propositions is a fact over and above the laws of logic. The hypostatic Platonist is the theorist who thinks that there is no purely logical proof (like (1)–(3) earlier) that there are propositions, and thus that there is a substantive question of our epistemic access to their existence.43 43 I would like to thank Fred Beiser, Emily Carson, Michael Forster, Consuelo Preti, Graham Priest, Erich Reck, Jamie Tappenden, and Clinton Tolley, as well as audiences at the 2016 "Logic in Kant's Wake" workshop at McMaster University and at the 2017 meeting of the Canadian Philosophical Association in Toronto, for their responses to earlier versions of this chapter. Special thanks are due to Sandra Lapointe 158 Nicholas F. Stang Primary Texts by Lotze and Frege Frege, G. (1884). Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik, eine logisch mathematische Untersuchung über dem Begriff der Zahl. Breslau: W. Koebner. Repr. (2013). Hildesheim: Georg Olms. Cited by section number. Frege, G. (1891). Funktion und Begriff. Jena: Hermann Pohle. Cited by page numbers in Frege (1990). Frege, G. (1892a). "Über Sinn und Bedeutung." Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik 100: 25–50. Cited by page numbers in Frege (1990). Frege, G. (1892b). "Über Begriff und Gegenstand." Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie 16: 192–205. Cited by the page numbers in Frege (1990). Frege, G. (1893). Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, Bd 1. Jena: H. Pohle. Frege, G. (1918–19). "Der Gedanke." Cited by page numbers in Frege (1990). Frege, G. (1990). Kleine Schriften. I. Angelelli (Ed.). Hildesheim: Georg Olms. Frege, G. (1997). The Frege Reader. M. Beaney (Ed.). Oxford: Blackwell.
but the theorist who thinks that there being such propositions is a fact over and above the laws of logic. The hypostatic Platonist is the theorist who thinks that there be no strictly logical proof (like (1)–(3) sooner) that there be propositions, and thus that there be a meaty question of our epistemic entree to their existence.43 43 I would wish to thank Fred Beiser, Emily Carson, Michael Forster, Consuelo Preti, Graham Priest, Erich Reck, Jamie Tappenden, and Clinton Tolley, as well as audiences at the 2016 " Logic in Kant's Wake " workshop at McMaster University and at the 2017 confluence of the Canadian Philosophical Association in Toronto, for their responses to earlier versions of this chapter. particular thanks are due to Sandra Lapointe 158 Nicholas F. Stang Primary Texts by Lotze and Frege Frege, G. (1884). fail Grundlagen der Arithmetik, eine logisch mathematische Untersuchung über dem Begriff der Zahl. Breslau: W. Koebner. Repr. (2013). Hildesheim: Georg Olms. summon by part number. Frege, G. (1891). Funktion und Begriff. Jena: Hermann Pohle. Cited by page numbers in Frege (1990). Frege, G. (1892a). " Über Sinn und Bedeutung. " Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik 100: 25–50. quote by page numbers in Frege (1990). Frege, G. (1892b). " Über Begriff und Gegenstand. " Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie 16: 192–205. Cited by the page numbers in Frege (1990). Frege, G. (1893). Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, Bd 1. Jena: H. Pohle. Frege, G. (1918–19). " Der Gedanke. " Cited by page numbers pool in Frege (1990). Frege, G. (1990). Kleine Schriften. I. Angelelli (Ed .). Hildesheim: Georg Olms. Frege, G. (1997). The Frege Reader. M. Beaney (Ed .). Oxford: Blackwell.
 buh the theorist who thinkr that there benbg suci propoaitions ks a fact over and above the lqws od logic. The hypostatic Platonisn is the rheocist who thinks vgat thevz is hl puxeoy logical propf (like (1)–(3) edrlier) that thard cre propositions, and thus that there is a sibdtantive questyon ps oud epistemic access to their existehce.43 43 I xould like to tnank Fred Beiser, Emily Cardon, Lichael Forster, Cojsuelo Pretu, Grwyam Priest, Efich Reck, Jamie Tappensen, and Clinton Tolley, as well xs aubiences at jkw 2016 "Pmgic in Kanv's Wakv" workshop at McMastes Univetsity and at tme 2017 mxetibg of the Canadian Phmlosophical Associatyon in Tosouto, for their responsws to edrliar vdesiuns oh tgis chwptxr. Special fhanks are eue to Sandra Lapoimtq 158 Nicholas F. Atang [rymary Texts by Lotze and Frege Frege, G. (1884). Dis Grundlagen der Arithmwtik, eine logisch matjematischq Untersuchung über dem Begriff der Zahl. Breslau: W. Koebief. Rtpv. (2013). Yipdesheim: Georg Olms. Cited by section number. Fwsgt, G. (1891). Funktion und Begriff. Jema: Hrtmann Pohle. Cijed by 'zgs numbers in Frege (1990). Frege, G. (1892a). "Üver Sinn tnd Nedeutung." Zeitschrift für Phulosophie unb pyilosophische Kritnk 100: 25–50. Cited bv page numbrrs in Frege (1990). Frege, G. (1892b). "Über Begriff unf Gegenstzvd." Vierteljahrsszhrpft xür wissenschaftliche Philofophie 16: 192–205. Rited by the pagg numbews in Fregf (1990). Frcce, G. (1893). Grundgesetze der Crithketik, Bd 1. Uena: H. Pohle. Frege, G. (1918–19). "Der Gedanke." Cited by pabe nukbers in Fregc (1990). Frege, G. (1990). Kleyne Schriften. N. Angelejli (Ea.). Hildeshepm: Georg Mlms. Frege, D. (1997). The Frege Sgader. M. Beaneb (Ed.). Oxfowd: Boackqell.
but the theorist who thinks that there propositions a fact and above the Platonist the theorist who that there is purely logical proof (like (1)–(3) earlier) there are propositions, and thus that there is a substantive question of our access to their existence.43 43 I would like to thank Fred Beiser, Emily Michael Consuelo Graham Erich Reck, Jamie Tappenden, and Clinton Tolley, as well as audiences at the 2016 "Logic in Wake" workshop at McMaster University and at the meeting of the Canadian Association in Toronto, for their to versions of chapter. thanks due to Sandra 158 Nicholas F. Stang Primary Texts by Lotze and Frege Frege, G. (1884). Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik, logisch mathematische dem Begriff Zahl. W. Repr. (2013). Hildesheim: Cited by section number. Frege, G. Begriff. Jena: Hermann Pohle. Cited by page numbers Frege (1990). G. (1892a). "Über Sinn und Bedeutung." für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik 100: 25–50. Cited page numbers in Frege (1990). Frege, G. (1892b). "Über Begriff und Gegenstand." Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche 192–205. Cited by the numbers in Frege Frege, (1893). der Bd 1. H. Pohle. Frege, G. (1918–19). "Der Gedanke." Cited by page numbers Frege (1990). Frege, G. (1990). Kleine Schriften. I. Angelelli (Ed.). Olms. G. (1997). The Reader. M. Beaney (Ed.). Blackwell.
 but the theorist who thinks thAt there beiNg sucH prOpoSiTionS is a Fact over and aboVE the Laws of logic. The hypostatIc PlaToNIst iS ThE theoRist who THiNKS thAt ThEre Is NO pUrely LogIcal proOf (like (1)–(3) earlIer) ThAt there are prOPoSitions, and ThuS that there is A suBstantIvE quEStion Of oUr epiStemic ACcess tO their exiStENce.43 43 I woULd like tO THaNk FrEd Beiser, Emily CarsON, MIChael Forster, CoNsuelo prETi, gRAhaM PrIest, Erich REcK, JamiE tappendEN, aND cLinTOn Tolley, as welL as audienceS At tHe 2016 "LogiC iN KaNT's Wake" WorksHoP At MCMaster UnivErsiTy and at thE 2017 meetiNG of the CANadian PHilosoPhiCal assoCIaTiOn iN TORonTO, fOr tHEir ResponseS tO eArlieR verSIONS of tHis ChapTer. SpEcial thanks arE duE to SANdrA LapoInte 158 NIchoLaS F. StaNg PrimAry TeXtS by Lotze and FregE FreGe, G. (1884). Die GruNdlAgEn dEr arithMEtik, eiNe lOgiSch mathEmatiscHE UnTeRSUChUng über dem Begriff dEr zAHl. breslau: W. koebneR. rePr. (2013). hIldesheiM: GEorG OlmS. cIted bY secTIoN number. FRege, G. (1891). FUNkTiOn und BeGrIff. JenA: HErmAnn pohle. cIted By page Numbers iN FregE (1990). frege, G. (1892a). "Über SinN Und Bedeutung." ZEItSCHrIFt füR PhIlosophie unD phiLOsopHiscHE KRitIK 100: 25–50. CiteD by paGe NUmBErs in Frege (1990). Frege, G. (1892b). "ÜbEr begrifF und GEgenstand." VierTeljahrsscHRIFt für wisSensCHaFTliche PhilosopHie 16: 192–205. CiTed by the paGE numbers In FreGe (1990). Frege, G. (1893). grundgeseTZE der AritHmeTik, bd 1. JEna: h. pOhLe. Frege, G. (1918–19). "Der GeDANke." CItEd by pagE nuMbers in freGe (1990). FRegE, G. (1990). KLeIne SchrifTen. I. AngeLeLlI (ED.). HIldEsheiM: georg OlmS. FRegE, G. (1997). the frege rEader. M. beaneY (Ed.). OXfOrD: blaCkwell.
 but the theorist who thin ks that th ere b ein g s uc h pr opos itions is a fa c t ov er and above the lawsof lo gi c . Th e  h ypost atic Pl a to n i stis  t heth e or ist w hothinksthat there  is  n o purely log i ca l proof (l ike  (1)–(3) ear lie r) tha tthe r e are  pr oposi tions, and th us that t he r e is a substan t i ve  que stion of our epis t em i c access to th eir ex is t en c e .43  43  I would l ik e tot hank Fr e dB e i ser ,  Emily Carson , Michael F o rst er, Co ns uel o  Preti , Gra ha m  Pr iest, Erich  Rec k, JamieTappen d en, and Clinton  Tolle y,aswell as  a udi en c esa tthe 201 6 "Logic  i nKant' s Wa k e " work sho p at  McMa ster Universi tyanda t t he 20 17 me etin gof th e Cana dianPh ilosophical Ass ocia tion in T oro nt o,fo r the i r resp ons esto earl ier ver s ion so f th is chapter. Specia lt h an ks are d ue toS an dr a  Lapoint e158  Nic h o las F . St a ng  Primary  Texts by  L otze an dFregeFr ege , G . (18 8 4).Die Gr undlagen  derA rithmetik, ein e  logisch math e ma t i sc h e Un ter suchung übe r de m  Beg riff de r Z a hl. B resla u: W. Koebner. Repr. (201 3) . Hild eshei m: Georg Olms . Cited by s e ction nu mber .  F r ege, G. (1891) . Fun ktion undB egriff.Jena:  Hermann  Pohle. C i t ed by pa genum ber s i n Fr ege (1990). F r e ge,G.  (1892a )."Über S inn  un d B ede ut ung." Zei tschrift  f ür  P hi los ophie und phil os oph is che  Krit i k 100:  25–5 0. C it ed bypage nu m be r s  inFr eg e (1 990 ).  Freg e, G .  (1 892b)."Über Beg rif f  und  G eg enstand ." Vierteljah rs schrift fü rwis sensch a f tliche P hilosophie 16: 192–205. Cited b y t he pa ge n umbers in  Fr ege (1 990 ) . Freg e, G.(1893 ).  Gr u n dgese t z eder  A rithmetik, B d 1 . Jen a:  H.Pohle.Frege, G. (1918–19 ) . " Der Gedanke."  Ci tedb y  p age nu m ber si n F r e ge (1990). Freg e, G. (199 0) .  K leine Schr i fte n.  I. Ang elelli(Ed.) .  Hildes heim: Geo rg Olms.Fr ege, G . ( 1997). The  Frege R eader. M. Beane y  ( Ed.).  Ox ford:Bl ack well. 
 but_the theorist_who thinks that there_being such_propositions_is a_fact_over and above_the laws of_logic. The hypostatic Platonist_is the theorist_who_thinks that there is no purely logical proof (like (1)–(3) earlier) that there are_propositions,_and thus_that_there_is a substantive question of_our epistemic access to their_existence.43 43_I would like to thank Fred Beiser, Emily_Carson,_Michael Forster, Consuelo_Preti, Graham Priest, Erich Reck, Jamie Tappenden, and Clinton_Tolley, as well as audiences at_the 2016 "Logic_in_Kant's_Wake" workshop at McMaster_University and at the 2017 meeting_of the Canadian Philosophical Association in_Toronto, for their responses to earlier versions_of this chapter. Special thanks are_due to Sandra Lapointe 158_Nicholas F._Stang Primary Texts by Lotze_and Frege Frege,_G. (1884)._Die Grundlagen der_Arithmetik, eine logisch mathematische Untersuchung über_dem Begriff der_Zahl. Breslau: W. Koebner. Repr. (2013)._Hildesheim:_Georg Olms. Cited_by_section_number. Frege,_G. (1891). Funktion_und_Begriff. Jena:_Hermann_Pohle. Cited by page numbers in_Frege_(1990). Frege, G. (1892a). "Über Sinn und_Bedeutung." Zeitschrift für Philosophie_und_philosophische Kritik 100: 25–50._Cited by page numbers in_Frege (1990). Frege, G. (1892b). "Über_Begriff und_Gegenstand." Vierteljahrsschrift_für wissenschaftliche Philosophie 16: 192–205. Cited by the page numbers in_Frege (1990). Frege, G. (1893). Grundgesetze_der Arithmetik, Bd 1._Jena: H._Pohle._Frege, G. (1918–19)._"Der_Gedanke." Cited_by page numbers in Frege (1990). Frege,_G. (1990)._Kleine Schriften. I. Angelelli (Ed.). Hildesheim:_Georg Olms. Frege, G._(1997)._The Frege Reader. M. Beaney (Ed.)._Oxford: Blackwell.