 to its effect. Moreover, since it takes time for causal influence to be transmitted from the cause to the effect, an effect can be suppressed via suitable interventions even after the cause has occurred, that is, causal interactions can be broken. As a result, cause-effect pairs can, at least in principle, be isolated from confounding background influences. It follows that contexts of causal discovery can be idealized to such a degree that crucial experiments become possible that produce unconfounded data providing conclusive evidence for causal dependencies. The paradigm example of such an ideal discovery context is the experimental setting envisaged in Mill's method of difference, which also underlies interventionist approaches to causal inference. If a variable X is associated with changes in a (mereologically independent) variable Y, when all other causes of Y are fixed and all further required background assumptions are warranted (e.g. that Y does not change in an uncaused manner, i.e. miraculously), it conclusively follows that X is causally relevant to Y (Hofmann and Baumgartner 2011). That is, there exist ideal discovery circumstances in which causal relations can receive unambiguous empirical support. Such ideal discovery circumstances cannot possibly exist for constitutive relations. Since constituents realize phenomena on the micro level, manipulating phenomena is tantamount to manipulating their constituents. It is impossible to surgically intervene on phenomena, break constitutive dependencies, and isolate phenomenon-constituent pairs. As a result, even in ideal discovery contexts in which all unmeasured relevant factors for a scrutinized phenomenon Ψ are (assumed to be) fixed and all further required background assumptions are warranted (e.g. that the spatiotemporal parts of Ψ have been correctly identified), it is impossible to produce unconfounded data furnishing conclusive evidence for constitutive relations. The reason is that in constitutional discovery-as opposed to causal discovery-data confounding is introduced by the very experimental manipulations intended to uncover constitution. Therefore, even data generated under ideal constitutional discovery circumstances can always be accounted for both by a model featuring constitutive dependencies and by a model without such dependencies. Or differently, even if the hypothesis "Φ is a constituent of Ψ" is experimentally tested in isolation (i.e. such that the whole theoretical background is taken to be beyond doubt), no evidence can be produced demonstrating that this hypothesis is true and its negation false. Contrary to the case of causation, there cannot exist an experimentum crucis for constitution. Being experimentally underdetermined is an inherent feature of constitutive relations. This shows that analyses of constitution
to its effect. Moreover, since it takes time for causal influence to be air from the lawsuit to the effect, an effect can be suppressed via desirable interventions even after the cause has occurred, that is, causal interaction can be broken. As a result, campaign - effect pairs can, at least in rationale, be isolated from confounding background influences. It follow that contexts of causal discovery can be idealized to such a degree that crucial experiments become potential that produce unconfounded data providing conclusive evidence for causal addiction. The paradigm example of such an ideal discovery context is the experimental mise en scene envisaged in Mill's method acting of difference, which besides underlies interventionist approaches to causal inference. If a variable X is consort with changes in a (mereologically independent) variable Y, when all other causes of Y are fix and all further required background assumptions are warranted (e.g. that Y does not change in an uncaused manner, i.e. miraculously), it conclusively follows that X is causally relevant to Y (Hofmann and Baumgartner 2011). That is, there exist ideal discovery fortune in which causal relations can receive unequivocal empiric support. Such ideal discovery circumstances cannot possibly exist for constitutive relations. Since constituent gain phenomena on the micro level, manipulate phenomena is tantamount to manipulating their constituents. It is impossible to surgically intervene on phenomena, break dance constitutive dependencies, and isolate phenomenon - constituent pair. As a result, even in ideal discovery context in which all unmeasured relevant factors for a scrutinized phenomenon Ψ are (assumed to be) fixed and all further command background assumptions are warranted (e.g. that the spatiotemporal part of Ψ have been correctly identified), it is impossible to produce unconfounded data furnishing conclusive evidence for constituent relations. The reason is that in constitutional discovery - as opposed to causal discovery - data confuse is introduced by the very experimental manipulation intended to uncover fundamental law. Therefore, even datum generated under ideal constitutional discovery circumstances can constantly be accounted for both by a mannequin featuring constitutive dependencies and by a model without such dependencies. Or differently, even if the hypothesis " Φ is a constituent of Ψ " is experimentally tested in isolation (i.e. such that the whole theoretical setting is taken to be beyond doubt), no evidence can be produced demonstrating that this guess is true and its negation false. Contrary to the case of causation, there cannot exist an experimentum crucis for constitution. Being experimentally underdetermined is an inherent feature of speech of constitutive relations. This shows that analyses of constitution
 to its effect. Moreover, singe it takes time for cansal inrluence go be transmitted from the ceuse to tye effect, an effect cav be suppgessed viq sumtable interventmkns evek aftsv the rause has occurted, that is, wausal interacdiund can be broken. As a result, cause-efsect paord can, at least in krigcipmv, ne isolated from confounding baciground influences. Iy follows that contexts of caudal discovery can he idealizee to wuch a degred that crubnal experimgnts become possible that producd uncpnfounded eara otoviding conrlusivv evidence fov causan depencencies. The pavadigk ezample of such an ideel discovery context is the efpzrimental setting envusqged hn Mhll's netfod oh djfferejce, which alsk underlies interventionist apkrowbnes to causam infewegce. If a variable X is associated with bhanfes in a (mereologically independent) variable Y, when ajl other causes of Y are fixed and all further rexuirev cacjgvouna adsumptions are warranted (e.g. that Y does not crznbe in an uncauseb manner, i.e. miravupoifly), it conclurively fomlows that X is caksally televabt to Y (Hjfmamn and Baumgartner 2011). That is, there exist udeal discovery cixcumstances nn whivh caisal relations can recenve unzmbiguous elpirical ajpport. Such ideau dpscoeery circumstances cannot [ossibly xxist for covstijutive welations. Dince constituents realixe phgnomend on the mlcro level, manipulating phenomeie is tantamoumt to manipulcting bheir constituegts. It is impoxsible co sureically innervene oi phenomena, freak constitgjive dependenries, and ysolqte phenomevun-constituent lairs. As c resylt, even in ideal viscubery contexts iu qhich all unmeaxurdd wepetant sdctors for a scrjtivozed ohenomenon Ψ xre (sssumed to be) fixed dnd zll further requirrd backgroond assum[tions are watranted (e.g. that tht spatmotempural larjs of Ψ have been correctly idenfified), it is impossible eo pvoduse unconfobnded data furnishing conclusive evidencx for constitutive relarions. The reason is uhat in constmtutiogal discoeery-as opposed to caysal discovery-dats confounding is intrkduced by tje very experimental manipulations intended to uncover constitution. Theredore, eteg data genedatec undvr ndecl conseituviunal discovery cprcumstances can always be accouited for bmtk by a model featuring constiyugive dependenzies and by a model withkut such dependencies. Or differently, evrn if the hypothesis "Φ is a constutuenf of Ψ" pa xxperimentally testec in ivolatuon (i.e. wuch that the whoue yhcoretical hackjrobnd is taken to be beyond doubt), ni evidwnfe can be producxd demonstrabikg thaj this hipothesis is true and lts nggation false. Vontrary to thr case of causation, nhewe cannot exisu an experimentom cruciv for constivution. Being experimentally underdetermined is an inherent featore of consuitutive velations. This shpxs that analyses of consbitutyon
to its effect. Moreover, since it takes causal to be from the cause can suppressed via suitable even after the has occurred, that is, causal interactions be broken. As a result, cause-effect pairs can, at least in principle, be from confounding background influences. It follows that contexts of causal discovery can be to a that experiments become possible that produce unconfounded data providing conclusive evidence for causal dependencies. The paradigm example such an ideal discovery context is the experimental envisaged in Mill's method difference, which also underlies interventionist to inference. If variable is with changes in (mereologically independent) variable Y, when all other causes of Y are fixed and all further required background are warranted Y does change an manner, i.e. miraculously), follows that X is causally relevant and Baumgartner 2011). That is, there exist ideal circumstances in causal relations can receive unambiguous empirical Such ideal discovery circumstances cannot possibly exist for relations. Since constituents realize phenomena on the micro level, manipulating phenomena is tantamount to manipulating It is impossible to intervene on phenomena, constitutive and phenomenon-constituent As a even in ideal discovery contexts in which all unmeasured relevant factors a scrutinized phenomenon Ψ are (assumed to be) fixed and required assumptions are warranted that the spatiotemporal parts Ψ been correctly identified), it to unconfounded evidence constitutive The reason is that constitutional discovery-as opposed to causal confounding is introduced by to uncover constitution. Therefore, even data generated under constitutional discovery circumstances can always be accounted both by a model featuring constitutive dependencies and by a model without dependencies. Or if the hypothesis "Φ is a constituent of is experimentally tested in (i.e. such that the whole theoretical background is taken be doubt), no can be produced that this hypothesis true and its Contrary to case causation, an experimentum crucis for constitution. Being underdetermined an inherent feature of constitutive This analyses of constitution
 to its effect. Moreover, since iT takes time For caUsaL inFlUencE to bE transmitted frOM the Cause to the effect, an effeCt can Be SUpprESsEd via SuitablE InTERveNtIoNs eVeN AfTer thE caUse has oCcurred, thaT is, CaUsal interactIOnS can be brokEn. AS a result, causE-efFect paIrS caN, At leaSt iN prinCiple, bE IsolatEd from conFoUNding bACkgrounD INfLuenCes. It follows that cONtEXts of causal disCovery CaN Be IDEalIzeD to such a deGrEe thaT Crucial EXpERIMenTS become possibLe that produCE unConfouNdEd dATa provIding CoNCluSive evidencE for Causal depEndencIEs. The paRAdigm exAmple oF suCh aN ideAL dIsCovErY ConTExT is THe eXperimenTaL sEttinG envISAGEd in milL's meThod oF difference, whIch Also UNdeRlies InterVentIoNist aPproacHes to CaUsal inference. If A varIable X is aSsoCiAteD wIth chANges in A (meReoLogicalLy indepENdeNt) VARIaBle Y, when all other caUsES Of y are fixeD and alL FuRtHEr requirEd BacKgroUND assuMptiONs Are warraNted (e.g. THaT Y Does not ChAnge in An UncAusEd manNEr, i.e. MiracuLously), it ConclUSively follows tHAt X is causally RElEVAnT To Y (HOfmAnn and BaumgArtnER 2011). ThaT is, tHErE exISt ideAl disCoVErY Circumstances in whicH cAusal rElatiOns can receive UnambiguouS EMPirical sUppoRT. SUCh ideal discoveRy cirCumstances CAnnot posSibly Exist for ConstitutIVE relatioNs. SIncE coNstITUeNts realize pheNOMena On The micrO leVel, maniPulAtiNg pHenOmEna is tantAmount to MaNiPuLaTinG theiR ConstituEnTs. IT iS imPossiBLe to suRgicaLly iNtErVEne On phenoMEnA, BReak CoNsTituTivE dEpendEnciES, anD isolatE phenomenOn-cONstiTuEnT pairs. AS a result, even iN iDeal discovErY coNtexts IN Which all Unmeasured relevant factoRS for a scRutInizeD pheNomenon Ψ aRe (aSsumed To bE) Fixed aNd all fUrtheR rEquIREd bacKGRoUnd AsSumptions aRE WarRanteD (e.G. thaT the spaTiotemporal parts of ψ HavE been correctlY idEntiFIEd), It iS ImPOssIbLE to PROduce unconfoundEd data furnIsHInG conclusivE EviDeNce for cOnstituTive rELations. the reason Is that in cOnStitUTIonAl discoverY-as opposEd to causaL DiscoVErY-data ConFoundiNg Is iNtrodUced by THe vEry exPerimeNtAl maniPulatIoNs intendEd to uncover constitution. therefOre, evEn dAta generaTed UNdeR ideal conStitUtional disCovEry CircuMstANces cAn alWAyS be ACcounTed fOR both by a mODeL feATUrIng constituTIVE dePendeNciES and by A modEl without such depeNDencies. Or diffeRentLY, EveN if THe hyPoThesis "Φ is a consTitUeNT Of Ψ" is expErImentally teSted in isOlATion (i.E. such tHat the Whole thEOReTIcal baCkgrOunD is taken tO be BeYOnd doubT), nO eVIdence Can bE pRoduceD demonSTratING that this hypotheSis is TRUe and ITs nEgatiOn False. CoNTrarY to the case Of causation, There cAnnoT exisT an expeRiMentum CruCiS for constiTUtion. BeinG expeRimentaLlY undErdEtermiNed iS AN inheRent FeAtuRe of constITUtIVe ReLAtiOns. THis shOwS thaT analyses OF constitUtiON
 to its effect. Moreover,since it t akestim e f or  cau salinfluence to b e  tra nsmitted from the caus e toth e  eff e ct , aneffectc an b e s up pr ess ed vi a sui tab le inte rventionseve nafter the ca u se  has occur red , that is, c aus al int er act i ons c anbe br oken.A s a re sult, cau se - effect pairs c a n ,at l east in principle ,  b e  isolated from  confo un d in g bac kgr ound influ en ces.I t follo w st h a t c o ntexts of cau sal discove r y c an beid eal i zed to  such  a deg ree that cr ucia l experim ents b e come po s sible t hat pr odu ceunco n fo un ded  d a tap ro vid i ngconclusi ve  e viden ce f o r c ausa l d epen denci es. The parad igm  exa m ple  of s uch a n id ea l dis covery  cont ex t is the experi ment al settin g e nv isa ge d inM ill'smet hod  of dif ference ,  wh ic h a ls o underlies interv en t i on ist appr oaches to  c a usal inf er enc e. I f a var iabl e  X  is asso ciated wi th  change sin a ( me reo log icall y  ind epende nt) vari ableY , when all oth e r causes of Y ar e fi x ed a ndall further  req u ired  bac k gr oun d  assu mptio ns ar e  warranted (e.g. th at  Y doe s not  change in an  uncausedm a n ner, i.e . mi r ac u lously), it co nclus ively foll o ws thatX iscausally  relevant t o Y (Hof man n a ndBau m g ar tner 2011). T h a t is ,there e xis t ideal  di sco ver y c ir cumstance s in whi ch  c au sa l r elati o ns can r ec eiv euna mbigu o us emp irica l su pp or t . S uch ide a ld i scov er ycirc ums ta ncescann o t p ossibly  exist fo r c o nsti tu ti ve rela tions. Sinceco nstituents  r eal ize ph e n omena on  the micro level, manip u latingphe nomen a is  tantamou ntto man ipu l atingtheirconst it uen t s . Iti s  i mpo ss ible to su r g ica lly i nt erve ne on p henomena, break co n sti tutive depend enc ies, a nd  is o la t e p he n ome n o n-constituent p airs. As a  r e su lt, even i n  id ea l disco very co ntext s  in whi ch all un measuredre leva n t  fa ctors fora scruti nized phe n omeno n  Ψ  are(as sumedto  be ) fix ed and all  furt her re qu ired b ackgr ou nd assum ptions are warranted (e .g. th at th e s patiotemp ora l  pa rts of Ψhave  been corr ect lyident ifi e d), i t is im pos s ibleto p r oduce unc o nf oun d e ddata furnis h i n g c onclu siv e  evide ncefor constitutiver elations. Thereas o n  is  th a t in  c onstitutionaldis co v e ry-as op po sed to caus al disco ve r y-dat a conf oundin g is in t r od u ced by  the  ve ry experi men ta l  manipu la ti o ns int ende dto unc over c o nsti t u tion. Therefore,  even d ata g e ner atedun der ide a l co nstitution al discover y circ umst ances  can al wa ys beacc ou nted for b o th by a m odelfeaturi ng  con sti tutive  dep e n denci es a nd  by  a modelw i th o ut  s u chdepe ndenc ie s. O r differe n tly, eve n i f  the hy po the s i s "Φ i s  a c onstituent  of  Ψ" i s experiment a llyt es t ed in  isola tion ( i.e. su c h t ha t the w hol e theoretic al backgr o und  i s ta ken to b ebeyo nd  do ub t), no evidence  can beproduced d emonst rat i ng t h at thi shypothesis i s tru ea nd itsn e gat ion fal s e.Con tra ry t o t he c a se of causation, there c anno t exi s t a n exp erime nt um cruci s  for  constit u tion. Being e xperimentally u n der d eter min e dis  an inher ent featu re o f c onst itu tive r elat i ons. Th is s hows t hatan al yses of c on stituti o n
 to_its effect._Moreover, since it takes_time for_causal_influence to_be_transmitted from the_cause to the_effect, an effect can_be suppressed via_suitable_interventions even after the cause has occurred, that is, causal interactions can be broken._As_a result,_cause-effect_pairs_can, at least in principle,_be isolated from confounding background_influences. It_follows that contexts of causal discovery can be_idealized_to such a_degree that crucial experiments become possible that produce unconfounded_data providing conclusive evidence for causal_dependencies. The paradigm_example_of_such an ideal discovery_context is the experimental setting envisaged_in Mill's method of difference, which_also underlies interventionist approaches to causal inference._If a variable X is associated_with changes in a (mereologically_independent) variable_Y, when all other causes_of Y are_fixed and_all further required_background assumptions are warranted (e.g. that_Y does not_change in an uncaused manner, i.e._miraculously),_it conclusively follows_that_X_is causally_relevant to Y_(Hofmann_and Baumgartner_2011)._That is, there exist ideal discovery_circumstances_in which causal relations can receive unambiguous_empirical support. Such ideal_discovery_circumstances cannot possibly exist_for constitutive relations. Since constituents_realize phenomena on the micro level,_manipulating phenomena_is tantamount_to manipulating their constituents. It is impossible to surgically intervene on_phenomena, break constitutive dependencies, and isolate_phenomenon-constituent pairs. As a_result, even_in_ideal discovery contexts_in_which all_unmeasured relevant factors for a scrutinized phenomenon_Ψ are_(assumed to be) fixed and all_further required background assumptions_are_warranted (e.g. that the spatiotemporal parts_of Ψ have been correctly identified),_it is impossible to produce_unconfounded_data_furnishing conclusive evidence for constitutive_relations. The reason is that in_constitutional discovery-as opposed_to causal discovery-data confounding is introduced by_the_very experimental manipulations intended to uncover_constitution._Therefore, even data generated under ideal_constitutional_discovery_circumstances can always be accounted_for both by a model featuring_constitutive dependencies and by a model without such dependencies._Or differently, even_if the hypothesis "Φ is_a_constituent_of Ψ" is experimentally tested in isolation (i.e. such that_the whole_theoretical background is_taken to be beyond doubt), no evidence can be produced_demonstrating that this hypothesis is true and_its negation false. Contrary to the case of causation, there cannot_exist an experimentum crucis for constitution. Being experimentally_underdetermined is an inherent feature of constitutive_relations. This shows that_analyses_of constitution