 Research in Phenomenology 21 (1991), 3-20. 416 HATAB situations. Virtue ethics has made something of a comeback recently,28 focusing less on rules and principles and more on the kind of person it takes to act ethically. Much in my analysis relates to such an approach, and I want to focus briefly on the virtue of courage with respect to an ethics of finitude. Aristotle defines courage in relation to pain. The courageous person is one who can stand fast in pursuit of a good in the midst of pain or the risk of pain. A coward is someone who cannot or does not act for the good because of pain or fear of pain. 29 Although Aristotle's discussion generally focuses on the obvious example of courage in battle, I think we can add in all sorts of pains, losses, and risks and consequently greatly expand the meaning of courage and cowardice in the ethical domain. In fact to a large extent I think that courage could be called the primary virtue in the moral life, and our analysis of finitude can help articulate why this might be so. I have said that Heidegger's analysis of being-in-the-world involves a reconciliation with finitude, with the limit conditions of existence. One way of understanding the notion of fallenness (Verfallen) is that it is a hyperimmersion in beings as a refuge from radical finitude. Part of authenticity, then, involves a release from this fixation and a capacity to dwell finitely, to accept the movements of presence and absence more readily. It seems to me that such a capacity is exactly what courage means in our being-ethical-in-world. So much of our possessive and abusive behavior that is morally problematical can be understood as stemming from the fear of finitude, of the pain of lacks and losses. A good deal of greed, anger, and violence can be traced to the "fallenness" of self-absorption as a refuge from losses or the threat of losses (which losses can be material, psychological, social, ideological, etc.). Even moderation and self-control can involve courage in that the person who indulges appetites at the expense of himself or others is cowardly in the sense of not being able to withstand the "pain" of an unfulfilled desire (experienced as a "lack"). Moreover, courage and cowardice help explain how and why we often fail to live up to an ethic we affirm in principle and want to enact. In many respects acting according to moral values involves risks,
Research in Phenomenology 21 (1991), 3 - 20. 416 HATAB situations. Virtue ethics has made something of a comeback recently,28 concenter less on rule and principles and more on the kind of person it takes to act ethically. a lot in my analysis relates to such an approach, and I desire to concenter briefly on the merit of courage with obedience to an ethics of finiteness. Aristotle defines courage in relation to pain. The courageous person is one who can digest fast in pursuit of a good in the midst of pain or the risk of pain. A coward is someone who cannot or does not work for the good because of pain or fear of annoyance. 29 Although Aristotle's discussion generally focuses on the obvious model of courage in battle, I remember we can add in all sorts of pains, losses, and risks and consequently greatly elaborate the meaning of courage and cowardice in the ethical domain. In fact to a large extent I think that courage could be called the primary virtue in the moral life, and our analysis of finitude can help articulate why this might be so. I have said that Heidegger's analysis of being - in - the - world involves a reconciliation with finitude, with the terminus ad quem condition of existence. One room of understand the notion of fallenness (Verfallen) is that it is a hyperimmersion in beings as a refuge from extremist finitude. Part of authenticity, then, involves a release from this arrested development and a capacity to dwell finitely, to accept the movements of presence and absence more readily. It appear to me that such a capacity is exactly what courage means in our being - ethical - in - world. therefore much of our possessive and abusive behavior that is morally debatable can be understood as stemming from the fear of finitude, of the pain of lack and losses. A good deal of greed, anger, and violence can be traced to the " fallenness " of self - absorption as a refuge from loss or the threat of losses (which losses can be material, psychological, social, ideological, etc .). Even moderation and self - control condition can involve courage in that the person who indulge appetites at the expense of himself or others is cowardly in the common sense of not being able to withstand the " pain " of an unfulfilled desire (experienced as a " lack "). furthermore, courage and cowardice help explain how and why we often fail to live up to an ethic we affirm in principle and want to enact. In many respects acting according to moral values involve risks,
 Redearch in Phenomenology 21 (1991), 3-20. 416 HATAB situajiins. Victue etgics has made something of a comebacn eecenujy,28 focusing less ov rules ajd princuplew and more on the klud of iersou mt takes to act ethically. Much in my andlhsns relates to such an approach, and I want tp vocus briefly jn tnq vidnut of courage with respect to an efhics oh finitude. Arisyotle defines courage in rflatlon to pain. The cokrageous petaon us one who cxn stand fast in pursujt of a good in the midst of pakn or the risk if palt. A coward ms somvone who cannot or doas not sct for the gopd uecayse of pain or fear oh pain. 29 Although Ariftotle's dhseussion generally focysws on the obvkius exzm'le of cokraje in battls, I think ww can add in all sottf of pains, losaes, anq wisks and consequently greatly expand tve jeaning of courage and xowardice in the ethifal domaig. In fact to a large extent I think that courage would ce eqlled rhf primary virtue in the moral life, and our anwmyxix of finitude gan help articulatr ahu this might bg so. I kzvs said that Heidegher's anwlysiw of beind-in-tne-world involves a reconciluation with yinutude, with the limnt conditionr of exisyence. One way of underscandinf the notioj of fallsvness (Verfallen) ks nhat it is a hyperimmersion in beings aw a xefuge ffom tadical finitude. Oart of authenticity, thej, invllees a relewse from this fixation and a ca'ecity to dwelk xinptely, to cccept the movementf of presence cnd abseuce mofe readily. It seeks to me thwt such a capdfity is exacvly what sourqge neans iv our being-ethival-in-worlb. So nuch of our possesxivg znd abusive behcriir that is morakly prjbpekaehcal can be gndefstupd as stemming fvom the fear of finitude, of the pain of lacks and ljsses. A tood deaj of greed, anber, and violence cwn be treced tp tre "fallenness" of self-absorptioh as a revugc from losses or bhe jhreat of lpsses (which losses can be material, psyciological, social, ideolotical, etc.). Even modetatlon and self-rontroj can invmlve courage in that the person who ikdulges appetites at tge expanse lf himself or others is cowardly in the sense of not being able to withstqnd thx "[ain" of an hnfukfillvd besnre (expqrieicxd as a "lack"). Morepver, courage and cowardice help explain hjw and why we often fail to kixe up to an ejhic we affirm in principls and wamt to enact. In many respects acying according to moral yalues incolvea risks,
Research in Phenomenology 21 (1991), 3-20. 416 Virtue has made of a comeback and and more on kind of person takes to act ethically. Much in analysis relates to such an approach, and I want to focus briefly on virtue of courage with respect to an ethics of finitude. Aristotle defines courage relation pain. courageous is one who can stand fast in pursuit of a good in the midst of pain the risk of pain. A coward is someone cannot or does not for the good because of or of pain. Although discussion focuses on the example of courage in battle, I think we can add in all sorts of pains, losses, and and consequently the meaning courage cowardice the ethical domain. to a large extent I think be called the primary virtue in the moral and our of finitude can help articulate why might be so. I have said that Heidegger's of being-in-the-world involves a reconciliation with finitude, with the limit conditions of existence. One way the notion of fallenness is that it a in as refuge from finitude. Part of authenticity, then, involves a release from this fixation a capacity to dwell finitely, to accept the movements of absence readily. It seems me that such a is what courage means in So of abusive that morally problematical can be as stemming from the fear finitude, of the pain good deal of greed, anger, and violence can traced to the "fallenness" of self-absorption as refuge from losses or the threat of losses (which losses can be psychological, social, Even moderation and self-control can involve courage in the person who indulges at the expense of himself or others is cowardly the of not able to withstand "pain" of an desire (experienced as Moreover, courage cowardice explain we often fail to live up an we affirm in principle and to many respects acting according to moral values involves risks,
 Research in Phenomenology 21 (1991), 3-20. 416 HAtAB situatiOns. ViRtuE etHiCs haS madE something of a cOMebaCk recently,28 focusing less On rulEs ANd prINcIples And more ON tHE KinD oF pErsOn IT tAkes tO acT ethicaLly. Much in mY anAlYsis relates tO SuCh an approaCh, aNd I want to focUs bRiefly On The VIrtue Of cOuragE with rESpect tO an ethics Of FInitudE. aristotLE DeFineS courage in relatioN To PAin. The courageoUs persOn IS oNE Who Can Stand fast iN pUrsuiT Of a good IN tHE MIdsT Of pain or the riSk of pain. A coWArd Is someOnE whO Cannot Or doeS nOT acT for the good BecaUse of pain Or fear OF pain. 29 AlTHough ArIstotlE's dIscUssiON gEnEraLlY FocUSeS on THe oBvious exAmPlE of coUragE IN BAttlE, I tHink We can Add in all sorts Of pAins, LOssEs, and Risks And cOnSequeNtly grEatly ExPand the meaning oF couRage and coWarDiCe iN tHe ethICal domAin. in fAct to a lArge extENt I ThINK ThAt courage could be caLlED ThE primary Virtue IN tHe MOral life, AnD ouR anaLYSis of FiniTUdE can help ArticuLAtE wHy this mIgHt be so. i hAve SaiD that hEideGger's aNalysis oF beinG-In-the-world invoLVes a reconciliATiON WiTH finItuDe, with the liMit cONditIons OF eXisTEnce. ONe way Of UNdERstanding the notion oF fAllennEss (VeRfallen) is that It is a hyperIMMErsion in BeinGS aS A refuge from radIcal fInitude. ParT Of authenTicitY, then, invOlves a relEASe from thIs fIxaTioN anD A CaPacity to dwell FINiteLy, To accepT thE movemeNts Of pResEncE aNd absence More readIlY. IT sEeMs tO me thAT such a caPaCitY iS exActly WHat couRage mEans In OuR BeiNg-ethicAL-iN-WOrld. so MuCh of Our PoSsessIve aND abUsive beHavior thaT is MOralLy PrOblematIcal can be undeRsTood as stemMiNg fRom the FEAr of finiTude, of the pain of lacks and LOsses. A gOod Deal oF greEd, anger, anD viOlence Can BE traceD to the "FalleNnEss" OF Self-aBSOrPtiOn As a refuge fROM loSses oR tHe thReat of lOsses (which losses caN Be mAterial, psychoLogIcal, SOCiAl, iDEoLOgiCaL, Etc.). eVEn moderation and Self-controL cAN iNvolve courAGe iN tHat the pErson whO induLGes appeTites at thE expense oF hImseLF Or oThers is cowArdly in tHe sense of NOt beiNG aBle to WitHstand ThE "paIn" of aN unfulFIllEd desIre (expErIenced As a "laCk"). moreover, Courage and cowardice help ExplaiN how aNd wHy we often FaiL To lIve up to an EthiC we affirm iN prIncIple aNd wANt to eNact. iN mAny REspecTs acTIng accordINg To mORAl Values involVES RisKs,
 Research in Phenomenology  21 (1991) , 3-2 0.416  H ATAB  sit uations. Virtu e  eth ics has made something  of a  c o meba c krecen tly,28f oc u s ing  l es s o nr ul es an d p rincipl es and mor e o nthe kind ofp er son it tak esto act ethic all y. Muc hinm y ana lys is re latest o such  an appro ac h , andI  want t o fo cusbriefly on the vi r tu e  of courage wi th res pe c tt o  an  et hics of fi ni tude. Aristot l ed e f ine s  courage in r elation top ain . Theco ura g eous p erson  i s  on e who can s tand  fast inpursui t  of a g o od in t he mid stofpain or  t heri s k o f  p ain .  Acoward i sso meone  who c a n notordoes  notact for the g ood  bec a use  of p ain o r fe ar  of p ain. 2 9 Alt ho ugh Aristotle's  dis cussion g ene ra lly  f ocuse s  on th e o bvi ous exa mple of cou ra g e in  battle, I think w ec a nadd in a ll sor t sof pains, l os ses , an d risks  and co nsequent ly gre a tl yexpandth e mean in g o f c ourag e  and  cowar dice inthe e t hical domain.I n fact to a l a rg e ex t entI t hink that c oura g e co uldb ecal l ed th e pri ma r yv irtue in the moralli fe, an d our  analysis offinitude c a n help art icul a te why this might  be s o. I haves aid that  Heid egger'sanalysiso f  being-i n-t he- wor ldi n vo lves a reconc i l iati on  with f ini tude, w ith  th e l imi tcondition s of exi st en ce .One  wayo f unders ta ndi ng  th e not i on offalle nnes s(V e rfa llen) i s  t h a t it  i sa hy per im mersi on i n  be ings as  a refuge  fr o m ra di ca l finit ude. Part ofau thenticity ,the n, inv o l ves a re lease from this fixatio n  and acap acity  todwell fin ite ly, to  ac c ept th e move ments  o f p r e sence a nd  ab se nce more r e a dil y. It  s eems  to methat such a capaci t y i s exactly wha t c oura g e  m ean s  i n  ou rb ein g - ethical-in-worl d. So much  o f  o ur possess i vean d abusi ve beha viort hat ismorally p roblemati ca l ca n beunderstood  as stem ming from the f e ar  of f ini tude,of  th e pai n of l a cks  andlosses .A good  deal  o f greed,  anger, and violence ca n be t raced  to  the "fal len n ess " of self -abs orption as  aref uge f rom losse s or th e t h reatof l o sses (whi c hlos s e scan be mate r i a l,psych olo g ical,soci al, ideological,e tc.). Even mod erat i o n a nds elf- co ntrol can invo lve  c o u rage inth at the pers on who i nd u lgesappeti tes at  the ex p e ns e  of hi msel f o r othersisco w ardly i nth e  sense  ofno t bein g able to w i t hstand the "pain " ofa n  unfu l fil led d es ire (ex p erie nced as a"lack"). Mo reover , co urage  and co wa rdicehel pexplain ho w  and whywe of ten fai lto l ive  up to  ane t hic w e af fi rmin princi p l ea nd  w a ntto e nact.  I n ma ny respec t s acting  ac c ordingto  mo r a l valu e si n volves ris ks, 
 Research_in Phenomenology_21 (1991), 3-20. 416_HATAB situations._Virtue_ethics has_made_something of a_comeback recently,28 focusing_less on rules and_principles and more_on_the kind of person it takes to act ethically. Much in my analysis relates_to_such an_approach,_and_I want to focus briefly_on the virtue of courage_with respect_to an ethics of finitude. Aristotle defines courage_in_relation to pain._The courageous person is one who can stand fast_in pursuit of a good in_the midst of_pain_or_the risk of pain._A coward is someone who cannot_or does not act for the_good because of pain or fear of_pain. 29 Although Aristotle's discussion generally_focuses on the obvious example_of courage_in battle, I think we_can add in_all sorts_of pains, losses,_and risks and consequently greatly expand_the meaning of_courage and cowardice in the ethical_domain._In fact to_a_large_extent I_think that courage_could_be called_the_primary virtue in the moral life,_and_our analysis of finitude can help articulate_why this might be_so._I have said that_Heidegger's analysis of being-in-the-world involves_a reconciliation with finitude, with the_limit conditions_of existence._One way of understanding the notion of fallenness (Verfallen) is that_it is a hyperimmersion in beings_as a refuge from_radical finitude._Part_of authenticity, then,_involves_a release_from this fixation and a capacity to_dwell finitely,_to accept the movements of presence_and absence more readily._It_seems to me that such a_capacity is exactly what courage means_in our being-ethical-in-world. So much_of_our_possessive and abusive behavior that_is morally problematical can be understood_as stemming from_the fear of finitude, of the pain_of_lacks and losses. A good deal_of_greed, anger, and violence can be_traced_to_the "fallenness" of self-absorption as_a refuge from losses or the_threat of losses (which losses can be material, psychological,_social, ideological, etc.)._Even moderation and self-control can_involve_courage_in that the person who indulges appetites at the expense_of himself_or others is_cowardly in the sense of not being able to withstand_the "pain" of an unfulfilled desire (experienced_as a "lack"). Moreover, courage and cowardice help explain how and_why we often fail to live up to_an ethic we affirm in principle and_want to enact. In_many_respects acting according to moral values involves_risks,