 have a countervailing intuition: given a sufficiently weak reason against taking the pill, the reason Artie has in favor of taking the pill will win out. Since Lin offers no argumentative support for the claim that it will always lose out (other than the report of his own intuition about the case) a proponent of the idea that impossible desires can be promoted has no reason to accept that the agent's reason against taking the pill is necessarily stronger than any reason provided by EA in favor of taking it. Second: Lin's judgment about the case, if accurate, seems to itself deliver 31 For DiPaolo and Behrends's argument see their (2015). For Sharadin's reply, see his (2016). 32 Sharadin (2016, esp. p. 4 and following). As an anonymous referee points out, Sharadin's reply relies on two related contentious assumptions, viz. that (1) there must be a reason for the agent to have EA* and (2) the reason there is for the agent to have EA* is explained in the same way as the reasons there are for the agent to perform various actions. Again, we lack the space to adequately address these issues here; moreover, as we explain, even if we stipulate that there are no neighboring desires, there are issues with Lin's account. 33 Lin (2016, p. 15-16). 15 counterintuitive results. Suppose Artie has EA (and no further desire EA*) and is offered the choice between ​two pills, P1 and P2, one of which -P1 -will frustrate all the members of S*, and one of which -P2 -will frustrate all the members of S* ​plus one other desire of his. Lin's judgment about this case will be that since there is no reason to take P1 and no reason to take P2, there is equal reason to take both. But we find this result bewildering. There is, intuitively, a stronger reason to take P2 than P1; and this, in turn, is because taking P2 ​better promotes EA. Of course, it doesn't better probabilistically promote EA (since it's impossible to probabilistically promote EA in any case). But that only blocks us from saying what it is natural to say about the case if we tie ourselves, as Lin's own account does, to a probabilistic understanding of promotion. 34 Third, and finally: Even if it were true, as Lin claims, that the agent always
have a countervailing intuition: given a sufficiently weak rationality against accept the pill, the reason Artie has in favor of take the pill will win out. Since Lin offers no argumentative accompaniment for the call that it will always misplace out (other than the report of his own intuition about the character) a proponent of the idea that impossible desire can be promote has no rationality to accept that the agent's rationality against taking the pill is necessarily stronger than any cause provided by EA in favor of taking it. Second: Lin's judgment about the event, if accurate, seems to itself deliver 31 For DiPaolo and Behrends's argument see their (2015). For Sharadin's reply, witness his (2016). 32 Sharadin (2016, esp. p. 4 and following). As an anonymous referee points out, Sharadin's reply relies on two relate contentious assumption, viz. that (1) there must be a reason for the agent to have EA * and (2) the reason there is for the agent to experience EA * is explain in the same room as the reason there are for the agent to perform diverse actions. Again, we lack the space to adequately address these consequence here; moreover, as we explain, even if we stipulate that there are no neighboring desires, there are topic with Lin's account. 33 Lin (2016, p. 15 - 16). 15 counterintuitive results. Suppose Artie has EA (and no further desire EA *) and is offered the choice between ​two pill, P1 and P2, one of which -P1 -will frustrate all the members of S *, and one of which -P2 -will frustrate all the members of S * ​plus one other desire of his. Lin's opinion about this case will be that since there is no reason to subscribe P1 and no cause to take P2, there is adequate reason to take both. But we find this result bewildering. There embody, intuitively, a stronger rationality to take P2 than P1; and this, in act, is because taking P2 ​better advertise EA. Of course, it doesn't better probabilistically advertise EA (since it's impossible to probabilistically promote EA in any case). But that only blocks us from saying what it is natural to say about the case if we tie ourselves, as Lin's own account does, to a probabilistic understanding of forwarding. 34 Third, and finally: Even if it were true, as Lin claim, that the agent always
 hage a countervailing intultion: given a suydicienvly weai reason against taking the pill, the rwason Artie has in favor of taking tje pill qill qin out. Siide Lin offers ko aryunentative suppprt for tha claim that id dipl always lose out (other than the rqport og jis own intuityon sfout nht case) a proponent of the idea thzt impovsible desirex can be promoted has no rfasoj to accept that tje agent's rgzsog against takkng the pill is necesszrily stronger than any reason orovibed by EA ib davlt of taking mt. Secjnd: Lin's judnkent atout thr case, if accuvate, veens to itself deliver 31 For DiPaolo and Bghrends's asgbment see their (2015). For Whqradit's raply, wee hia (2016). 32 Aharadln (2016, esp. p. 4 ans following). As an anonymous regewvr points out, Sharaqig's reply relies on two related contentimus assumptions, viz. that (1) rhere must be a reasoj for the agent to have EA* and (2) the reason there is for tha ageit to hwxw FA* is explained in the same way as the reasonf tnege are for the agcnt to perform varooks wctions. Again, we laei fhe space to adequwtely aqdresw these ifsuex here; moreover, as we explaun, even if wv stupulate that there are no neiyhborimg dexires, there are issues cith Ljn's account. 33 Lin (2016, p. 15-16). 15 counterintuitivd rvsulds. Suppose Artie has EA (anq no furtier dzsire EA*) and is ofsered the fhoicc between ​two pills, P1 anb P2, ote of whicj -P1 -will frustrate all the membxcs of S*, and ome of which -P2 -will frustrate alj the members pf S* ​plbs one other despre of hiv. Lin's judgient about thhd case will ue that synce theee is nu reason to takr P1 and no reason ti take P2, there is cqual deason to take yuuh. But we find tnis refupt bqfildering. Thare ks, kmtuitkvely, a strivger reason to take P2 thdn P1; and this, in turn, os because taking [2 ​better promptes EA. Of course, lt doxsn't bxtter lrofabilistically promote EA (sincs it's implsslble to probafiliwtically prokote EA in any case). But that only blockw us from saying wyat it is natural tp say about vhe cafe if we die ourselves, as Lin'w own account doex, to a probabilistic hndersdandijg of promotion. 34 Third, and finally: Even if it were true, as Lin claims, thar the egqnt always
have a countervailing intuition: given a sufficiently against the pill, reason Artie has pill win out. Since offers no argumentative for the claim that it will lose out (other than the report of his own intuition about the case) proponent of the idea that impossible desires can be promoted has no reason accept the reason taking the pill is necessarily stronger than any reason provided by EA in favor of taking Second: Lin's judgment about the case, if accurate, to itself deliver 31 DiPaolo and Behrends's argument see (2015). Sharadin's reply, his 32 (2016, esp. p. and following). As an anonymous referee points out, Sharadin's reply relies on two related contentious assumptions, viz. (1) there a reason the to EA* and (2) there is for the agent to explained in the same way as the reasons are for agent to perform various actions. Again, lack the space to adequately address these issues moreover, as we explain, even if we stipulate that there are no neighboring desires, there with Lin's account. 33 (2016, p. 15-16). counterintuitive Suppose has (and no desire EA*) and is offered the choice between ​two pills, P1 P2, one of which -P1 -will frustrate all the members and of which -P2 frustrate all the members S* one other desire of judgment this that there no reason to take and no reason to take there is equal reason find this result bewildering. There is, intuitively, a reason to take P2 than P1; and in turn, is because taking P2 ​better promotes EA. Of course, it better probabilistically (since it's impossible to probabilistically promote EA in case). But that only us from saying what it is natural to say the if we ourselves, as Lin's account does, to probabilistic understanding of Third, and Even it Lin claims, that the agent always
 have a countervailing intuitIon: given a sUfficIenTly WeAk reAson Against taking tHE pilL, the reason Artie has in faVor of TaKIng tHE pIll wiLl win ouT. siNCE LiN oFfErs No ARgUmentAtiVe suppoRt for the clAim ThAt it will alwaYS lOse out (otheR thAn the report oF hiS own inTuItiON abouT thE case) A propoNEnt of tHe idea thaT iMPossibLE desireS CAn Be prOmoted has no reason TO aCCept that the ageNt's reaSoN AgAINst TakIng the pill Is NecesSArily stROnGER ThaN Any reason provIded by EA in fAVor Of takiNg It. SECond: LiN's judGmENt aBout the case, If acCurate, seeMs to itSElf deliVEr 31 For Dipaolo aNd BEhrEnds'S ArGuMenT sEE thEIr (2015). for sHarAdin's repLy, SeE his (2016). 32 SHaraDIN (2016, ESp. p. 4 aNd fOlloWing). AS an anonymous rEfeRee pOIntS out, SHaradIn's rEpLy relIes on tWo relAtEd contentious asSumpTions, viz. tHat (1) ThEre MuSt be a REason fOr tHe aGent to hAve EA* anD (2) The ReASON tHere is for the agent tO hAVE Ea* is explaIned in THe SaME way as thE rEasOns tHERe are For tHE aGent to peRform vARiOuS actionS. AGain, we LaCk tHe sPace tO AdeqUately Address tHese iSSues here; moreovER, as we explain, eVEn IF We STipuLatE that there aRe no NEighBoriNG dEsiREs, theRe are IsSUeS With Lin's account. 33 Lin (2016, p. 15-16). 15 CoUnteriNtuitIve results. SupPose Artie hAS ea (and no fuRtheR DeSIre EA*) and is offeRed thE choice betWEen ​two piLls, P1 aNd P2, one of Which -P1 -wilL FRustrate All The MemBerS OF S*, And one of which -p2 -WIll fRuStrate aLl tHe membeRs oF S* ​pLus One OtHer desire Of his. Lin'S jUdGmEnT abOut thIS case wilL bE thAt SinCe theRE is no rEason To taKe p1 aND no Reason tO TaKE p2, theRe Is EquaL reAsOn to tAke bOTh. BUt we finD this resuLt bEWildErInG. There iS, intuitively, a StRonger reasOn To tAke P2 thAN p1; and this, In turn, is because taking P2 ​bETter proMotEs EA. OF couRse, it doesN't bEtter pRobABilistIcally PromoTe eA (sINCe it's IMPoSsiBlE to probabiLIStiCally PrOmotE EA in anY case). But that only blOCks Us from saying wHat It is NATuRal TO sAY abOuT The CASe if we tie ourselVes, as Lin's oWn ACcOunt does, to A ProBaBilistiC undersTandiNG of promOtion. 34 ThirD, and finalLy: even IF It wEre true, as LIn claims, That the agENt alwAYs
 have a countervailing int uition: gi ven a  su ffi ci entl y we ak reason agai n st t aking the pill, the re asonAr t ie h a sin fa vor oft ak i n g t he  p ill  w i ll  winout . Since  Lin offer s n oargumentativ e  s upport for  th e claim that  it  willal way s  lose  ou t (ot her th a n thereport of  h i s owni ntuitio n ab outthe case) a propo n en t  of the idea t hat im po s si b l e d esi res can be  p romot e d has n o  r e a s ont o accept that  the agent' s  re ason a ga ins t  takin g the  p i llis necessar ilystrongerthan a n y reaso n  provid ed byEAinfavo r  o ftak in g  it .  S eco n d:Lin's ju dg me nt ab outt h e case , i f ac curat e, seems to i tse lf d e liv er 31  ForDiPa ol o and  Behre nds's  a rgument see the ir ( 2015). Fo r S ha rad in 's re p ly, se e h is(2016).  32 Sha r adi n( 2 0 16 , esp. p. 4 and fo ll o w in g). As a n anon y mo us refereepo int s ou t ,  Shar adin ' sreply re lies o n  t wo  relate dconten ti ous  as sumpt i ons,  viz.that (1)  ther e  must be a rea s on for the ag e nt t oh aveEA*  and (2) th e re a sonther e  i s f o r the  agen tt oh ave EA* is explaine din the  same  way as the r easons the r e are forthea ge n t to perform v ariou s actions. Again, w e lac k the sp ace to ad e q uately a ddr ess  th ese i ss ues here; mor e o ver,  a s we ex pla in, eve n i f w e s tip ul ate thatthere ar eno  n ei ghb oring desires,  t her eare  issu e s with  Lin' s ac co un t . 3 3 Lin ( 2 01 6 ,  p.15 -1 6).15co unter intu i tiv e resul ts. Suppo seA rtie  h as  EA (an d no furtherde sire EA*)an d i s offe r e d the ch oice between ​two pills ,  P1 and  P2 , one  ofwhich -P1  -w ill fr ust r ate al l themembe rs  of S *, an d on e o fwhich -P2- w ill  frus tr ateall the  members of S* ​pl u s o ne other desi reof h i s .Lin ' sj udg me n t a b o ut this case wi ll be that  s i nc e there is nore ason to  take P 1 and no reas on to tak e P2, the re  ise q ual  reason to  take bo th. But w e  find th is re sul t bewi ld eri ng. T here i s , i ntuit ively,  a  stron ger r ea son to t ake P2 than P1; and thi s, inturn,  is  becausetak i ngP2 ​bette r pr omotes EA.  Of  co urse,  it doesn 't b e tt erp robab ilis t ically pr o mo teE A  ( since it'si m p oss ibletop robabi list ically promote EA in any case).Butt h atonl y  blo ck s us from sayi ngwh a t  it is n at ural to say  about t he caseif wetie ou rselves , as Lin'sownacc ount does , t oa  probab il is t ic und erst an ding o f prom o tion . 34 Third, and fi nally : Eveni f i t wer etrue, a s  Lin  claims, t hat the age nt alw ays
 have_a countervailing_intuition: given a sufficiently_weak reason_against_taking the_pill,_the reason Artie_has in favor_of taking the pill_will win out._Since_Lin offers no argumentative support for the claim that it will always lose out_(other_than the_report_of_his own intuition about the_case) a proponent of the_idea that_impossible desires can be promoted has no reason_to_accept that the_agent's reason against taking the pill is necessarily stronger_than any reason provided by EA_in favor of_taking_it._Second: Lin's judgment about_the case, if accurate, seems to_itself deliver 31 For DiPaolo and_Behrends's argument see their (2015). For Sharadin's_reply, see his (2016). 32 Sharadin_(2016, esp. p. 4 and_following). As_an anonymous referee points out,_Sharadin's reply relies_on two_related contentious assumptions,_viz. that (1) there must be_a reason for_the agent to have EA* and_(2)_the reason there_is_for_the agent_to have EA*_is_explained in_the_same way as the reasons there_are_for the agent to perform various actions._Again, we lack the_space_to adequately address these_issues here; moreover, as we_explain, even if we stipulate that_there are_no neighboring_desires, there are issues with Lin's account. 33 Lin (2016, p._15-16). 15 counterintuitive results. Suppose Artie_has EA (and no_further desire_EA*)_and is offered_the_choice between_​two pills, P1 and P2, one of_which -P1_-will frustrate all the members of_S*, and one of_which_-P2 -will frustrate all the members_of S* ​plus one other desire_of his. Lin's judgment about_this_case_will be that since there_is no reason to take P1_and no reason_to take P2, there is equal reason_to_take both. But we find this_result_bewildering. There is, intuitively, a stronger_reason_to_take P2 than P1; and_this, in turn, is because taking_P2 ​better promotes EA. Of course, it doesn't better_probabilistically promote EA_(since it's impossible to probabilistically_promote_EA_in any case). But that only blocks us from saying_what it_is natural to_say about the case if we tie ourselves, as Lin's_own account does, to a probabilistic understanding_of promotion. 34 Third, and finally: Even if it were true,_as Lin claims, that the agent always