 come apart-so PPIMs are not possible. But things are different when we look at a case where I am confident about my powers of direct judgment.8 For starters, even if I am confident in my answer to the first-order question 'what to plan to do in V?', I can still consider the higher-order question 'what to plan to plan to do in V?'. But, importantly, unlike the case of planning with doubts, I can consider this higher-order question from a different perspective. This is because when I take up this higher-order question, I am operating on the contrary-to-fact assumption that I have come to doubt my ability to plan. Though I am confident in my plans andmy plans for planning, I can "bracket" my conclusions and "abstract away from" my reasoning with regard to the first-order question.9 This bracketing and abstracting allows me to take up the higher-order question as an independent piece of planning. It allows me to think through that question at a different level, and from a different perspective-say, the perspective of You1. But this means that I can coherently come to a conclusion ðif in V, go to the shoreÞ that is different than the one I am confident in ðif in V, go to the mountainsÞ. With these observations in hand, we can return to Daskal's threefold challenge in order to see how PPIMs are possible within Gibbard's system. First, cases where I bracket my conclusion to a first-order question in order to consider, at a different level and from a different perspective, the associated higher-order question are cases where I can coherently come to divergent conclusions about what to do. Second, because my conclusion to the higher-order question is based on the contrary-tofact assumption that I doubt my powers of direct reasoning, it is ultimately trumped by the ðinitial but temporarily bracketedÞ conclusion that I came to when directly considering the first-order question. So it makes sense to say that the conclusion of my contrary-to-fact planning is ðinnocentlyÞ mistaken.10 Finally, because I take up the first-order and higher-order questions as independent pieces of planning, in both cases my answers carry the endorsement that is characteristic of genuine plans. 8. What follows draws from ibid. 9. Ibid., 243. 10. There are interesting questions about when ðif everÞ
come apart - so PPIMs are not possible. But thing are unlike when we look at a case where I am convinced about my powers of lineal judgment.8 For starters, even if I am confident in my solution to the first - order question' what to design to cause in V?', I can still regard the higher - order motion' what to design to plan to do in V?'. But, importantly, unlike the subject of planning with doubts, I can see this higher - order question from a unlike perspective. This is because when I take up this high - order doubt, I am operating on the contrary - to - fact assumption that I have come to doubt my ability to plan. Though I am convinced in my plans andmy plans for planning, I can " bracket " my conclusions and " abstract away from " my reasoning with regard to the first - club question.9 This bracketing and abstracting give up me to take up the higher - order question as an independent piece of planning. It allows me to think through that doubt at a different level, and from a unlike position - say, the perspective of You1. But this means that I can coherently come to a conclusion ðif in V, function to the shoreÞ that is different than the one I am confident in ðif in V, go to the mountainsÞ. With these observations in bridge player, we can return to Daskal's threefold challenge in order to see how PPIMs are possible within Gibbard's system. foremost, cases where I bracket my conclusion to a first - order question in order to consider, at a unlike degree and from a different perspective, the associated higher - order question are cases where I can coherently hail to divergent conclusions about what to do. Second, because my conclusion to the higher - order motion is based on the adverse - tofact assumption that I doubt my powers of direct reasoning, it is ultimately trumped by the ðinitial but temporarily bracketedÞ conclusion that I come to when directly considering the inaugural - order question. indeed it makes common sense to say that the conclusion of my contrary - to - fact planning is ðinnocentlyÞ mistaken.10 last, because I take up the first - order and higher - order question as independent pieces of planning, in both case my answers carry the endorsement that is characteristic of genuine plans. 8. What follows draw from ibid. 9. Ibid. , 243. 10. There are interesting questions about when ðif everÞ
 cole apart-so PPIMs are not possible. But tkungs ace diffsrent whdn we look at a case where I an condident about my powers of direcn judgmenr.8 Foc starters, even mr I am gjnfiscnt iu ny answer to tme first-ordar question 'whdt tl plan to do in V?', I can still consiqer the hlgher-order queftiom 'whaf to plan to plan to do in V?'. But, ijportanuly, unlike the casr of planning with doubts, L caj consider this hihher-order qosstyin from a diwferent pegvpective. Tgis is because when I take up tfis hngher-order wuwstlmn, I am opecating on the contvsry-to-fdct assimption that I hate cime to doubt my abilivy to plan. Though I wm confidanc in my plans andmy poabs fot platnine, I zan "bcaciet" my coiclusions ahd "abstract away from" my reasomigt with regard to thq sirst-order question.9 This bracketing and abatracting allows me to rake up the higher-ordgr questiog as an independent piece of planning. It allows ma to vhknk tmrouey hhat question at a different level, and from a sigfvrent perspective-fay, the perxpfcyyve of You1. Buj this meahs that I can cohegently some ro a concjusipn ðif in V, go to the shoreÞ rhat is diffvrenr than the one I al confident in ðof in V, go to the mountainsÞ. Cith tgese observwtions in fand, we can retufn no Ddskal's threefold challenge in order to xee how PPIKs are possible aithik Gibbard's system. Flrst, eases where I bgacket my conclusion to a first-order question it ogder to cjnsidcr, at a differegt level and ftom a difyerent perspectine, the asvociated hidher-order quevjion are casev where Y cab coyerentlh come to diverbent conclusions abiut what to do. Secpnd, gecause my concousuon to the highrr-ofdew euxstiog is based on the covyrary-gofact assunotiom that I doubt my pofers of direct reasonimg, it is uotimatelr trumped by yhe ðinitial but telporacily bcacketrdÞ sonclusion that I came to when directly coksidering the firwt-order quescion. So it makes sense to say that the cinclusion of my cobtrary-to-fact planniug is ðinnocenvlyÞ miftaken.10 Fitally, because I take up the first-ordev and higher-order quesfions ds infependent pieces of planning, in both cases my answers carry the endorsemebt thav ys charactedistoc of gznunne plags. 8. Xhet follows draws grom ibid. 9. Ibid., 243. 10. There are intxresting qgeftions about when ðif everÞ
come apart-so PPIMs are not possible. But different we look a case where powers direct judgment.8 For even if I confident in my answer to the question 'what to plan to do in V?', I can still consider the question 'what to plan to plan to do in V?'. But, importantly, unlike case planning doubts, can consider this higher-order question from a different perspective. This is because when I take up higher-order question, I am operating on the contrary-to-fact that I have come doubt my ability to plan. I confident in plans plans planning, I can my conclusions and "abstract away from" my reasoning with regard to the first-order question.9 This bracketing and allows me up the question an piece of planning. me to think through that question level, and from a different perspective-say, the perspective You1. But means that I can coherently come a conclusion ðif in V, go to the that is different than the one I am confident in ðif in V, go to With these observations in we can return Daskal's challenge order see how are possible within Gibbard's system. First, cases where I bracket my to a first-order question in order to consider, at a and a different perspective, associated higher-order question are where can coherently come to about to my to higher-order question is based the contrary-tofact assumption that I my powers of direct by the ðinitial but temporarily bracketedÞ conclusion that came to when directly considering the first-order So it makes sense to say that the conclusion of my contrary-to-fact is ðinnocentlyÞ because I take up the first-order and higher-order as independent pieces of in both cases my answers carry the endorsement that characteristic genuine plans. What follows draws ibid. 9. Ibid., 10. There are about when everÞ
 come apart-so PPIMs are not posSible. But thIngs aRe dIffErEnt wHen wE look at a case whERe I aM confident about my powerS of diReCT judGMeNt.8 For StarterS, EvEN If I Am CoNfiDeNT iN my anSweR to the fIrst-order qUesTiOn 'what to plan TO dO in V?', I can stIll Consider the hIghEr-ordeR qUesTIon 'whAt tO plan To plan TO do in V?'. but, importAnTLy, unliKE the casE OF pLannIng with doubts, I can COnSIder this higher-Order qUeSTiON FroM a dIfferent peRsPectiVE. This is BEcAUSE whEN I take up this hIgher-order qUEstIon, I am OpEraTIng on tHe conTrARy-tO-fact assumpTion That I have Come to DOubt my aBIlity to Plan. ThOugH I aM conFIdEnT in My PLanS AnDmy PLanS for planNiNg, i can "bRackET" MY ConcLusIons And "abStract away froM" my ReasONinG with RegarD to tHe First-Order qUestiOn.9 this bracketing aNd abStracting AllOwS me To Take uP The higHer-OrdEr questIon as an INdePeNDENt Piece of planning. It aLlOWS mE to think ThrougH ThAt QUestion aT a DifFereNT Level, And fROm A differeNt persPEcTiVe-say, thE pErspecTiVe oF YoU1. But tHIs meAns thaT I can cohErentLY come to a concluSIon ðif in V, go to THe SHOrEþ thaT is Different thAn thE One I Am coNFiDenT In ðif In V, go To THe MOuntainsÞ. With these oBsErvatiOns in Hand, we can retuRn to Daskal'S THReefold cHallENgE In order to see hoW PPIMS are possibLE within GIbbarD's system. first, caseS WHere I braCkeT my ConCluSIOn To a first-order QUEstiOn In order To cOnsider, At a DifFerEnt LeVel and froM a differEnT pErSpEctIve, thE AssociatEd HigHeR-orDer quEStion aRe casEs whErE I CAn cOherentLY cOME to dIvErGent ConClUsionS aboUT whAt to do. SEcond, becaUse MY conClUsIon to thE higher-order qUeStion is basEd On tHe contRARy-tofact Assumption that I doubt my pOWers of dIreCt reaSoniNg, it is ultImaTely trUmpED by the ÐinitiAl but TeMpoRARily bRACkEteDÞ Conclusion THAt I Came tO wHen dIrectly Considering the firsT-OrdEr question. So iT maKes sENSe To sAY tHAt tHe COncLUSion of my contrarY-to-fact plaNnINg Is ðinnocenTLyÞ MiStaken.10 FInally, bEcausE i take up The first-oRder and hiGhEr-orDER quEstions as iNdependeNt pieces oF PlannINg, In botH caSes my aNsWerS carrY the enDOrsEment That is ChAracteRistiC oF genuine Plans. 8. What follows draws frOm ibid. 9. ibid., 243. 10. THerE are interEstINg qUestions aBout When ðif eveRÞ
 come apart-so PPIMs are n ot possibl e. Bu t t hin gs  are  dif ferent when we look  at a case where I amconfi de n t ab o ut  my p owers o f  d i r ect  j ud gme nt . 8For s tar ters, e ven if I a m c on fident in my an swer to th e f irst-order q ues tion ' wh att o pla n t o doin V?' ,  I can  still co ns i der th e  higher - o rd er q uestion 'what top la n  to plan to do  in V? '. Bu t ,  im por tantly, un li ke th e  case o f  p l a n nin g  with doubts,  I can cons i der  thishi ghe r -order  ques ti o n f rom a diffe rent  perspect ive. T h is is b e cause w hen Itak e u p th i shi ghe r- o rde r  q ues t ion , I am o pe ra tingon t h e c ontr ary -to- factassumption th atI ha v e c ome t o dou bt m yabili ty toplan.  T hough I am conf iden t in my p lan sand my  plan s  for p lan nin g, I ca n "brac k et"  m y c on clusions and "abst ra c t  a way from " my r e as on i ng withre gar d to t he fi rst- o rd er quest ion.9T hi sbracket in g andab str act ing a l lows  me to  take up  theh igher-order qu e stion as an i n de p e nd e nt p iec e of planni ng.I t al lows me  to think  thro ug h  t h at question at a di ff erentlevel , and from adifferentp e r spective -say ,  t h e perspectiveof Yo u1. But th i s meansthatI can co herentlyc o me to acon clu sio n ð i f  i n V, go to th e shor eÞ  that i s d ifferen t t han  th e o ne  I am con fident i nði fin  V,  go t o  the mou nt ain sÞ . W ith t h ese ob serva tion sin han d, we c a nr e turn  t oDask al' sthree fold cha llengein ordertos ee h ow  P PIMs ar e possible wi th in Gibbard 's  sy stem.F i rst, cas es where I bracket my c o nclusio n t o a f irst -order qu est ion in  or d er toconsid er, a ta d i f feren t le vel  a nd from ad i ffe rentpe rspe ctive,the associated hig h er- order questio n a re c a s es  wh e re I c an coh e r ently come to d ivergent c on c lu sions abou t  wh at  to do.  Second , bec a use myconclusio n to thehi gher - o rde r question  is base d on thec ontra r y- tofac t a ssumpt io n t hat I  doubt mypower s of d ir ect re asoni ng , it isultimately trumped by t he ðin itial  bu t tempora ril y  br acketedÞconc lusion tha t I  ca me to  wh e n dir ectl y  c ons i derin g th e  first-or d er  qu e s ti on. So it m a k e s s ensetos ay tha t th e conclusion of m y  contrary-to-f actp l ann ing is ð in nocentlyÞ mist ake n. 1 0  Finally ,because I t ake up t he first -order  and h igher-o r d er questi onsasindepende ntpi e ces ofpl an n ing, i n bo th  cases  my an s wers c arry the endorse mentt h at is cha racte ri stic of genu ine plans.  8. What fo llowsdraw s fro m ibid.  9 . Ibid .,24 3. 10. The r e are int erest ing que st ions  ab out wh en ð i f  ever Þ
 come_apart-so PPIMs_are not possible. But_things are_different_when we_look_at a case_where I am_confident about my powers_of direct judgment.8_For_starters, even if I am confident in my answer to the first-order question 'what_to_plan to_do_in_V?', I can still consider_the higher-order question 'what to_plan to_plan to do in V?'. But, importantly, unlike_the_case of planning_with doubts, I can consider this higher-order question from_a different perspective. This is because_when I take_up_this_higher-order question, I am_operating on the contrary-to-fact assumption that_I have come to doubt my_ability to plan. Though I am confident_in my plans andmy plans for_planning, I can "bracket" my_conclusions and_"abstract away from" my reasoning_with regard to_the first-order_question.9 This bracketing_and abstracting allows me to take_up the higher-order_question as an independent piece of_planning._It allows me_to_think_through that_question at a_different_level, and_from_a different perspective-say, the perspective of_You1._But this means that I can coherently_come to a conclusion_ðif_in V, go to_the shoreÞ that is different_than the one I am confident_in ðif_in V,_go to the mountainsÞ. With these observations in hand, we can_return to Daskal's threefold challenge in_order to see how_PPIMs are_possible_within Gibbard's system._First,_cases where_I bracket my conclusion to a first-order_question in_order to consider, at a different_level and from a_different_perspective, the associated higher-order question are_cases where I can coherently come_to divergent conclusions about what_to_do._Second, because my conclusion to_the higher-order question is based on_the contrary-tofact assumption_that I doubt my powers of direct_reasoning,_it is ultimately trumped by the_ðinitial_but temporarily bracketedÞ conclusion that I_came_to_when directly considering the first-order_question. So it makes sense to_say that the conclusion of my contrary-to-fact planning is_ðinnocentlyÞ mistaken.10 Finally,_because I take up the_first-order_and_higher-order questions as independent pieces of planning, in both cases_my answers_carry the endorsement_that is characteristic of genuine plans. 8. What follows draws_from ibid. 9. Ibid., 243. 10. There_are interesting questions about when ðif everÞ