 I advocate is a promising approach to questions about the justification of moral belief. Epistemological Contextualism I'm going to distinguish between what I will call circumstantial contextualism, normative contextualism, and structural contextualism. The first two theses are roughly analogous to familiar relativist views in ethics. The third represents a response to the infamous regress of justification problem and so rivals foundationalist and coherentist responses to that problem. Circumstantial Contextualism One contextualist theme in recent epistemology (applied to the issue of justification), which I will call "circumstantial contextualism," can be expressed this way: CC: Whether one has knowledge of, or indeed justifiedly believes, some proposition is partly dependent on certain facts about oneself and certain facts about one's environment. Now it is uncontroversial that whether or not one knows or justifiedly believes some proposition depends on "internal" (psychological) features of one's circumstances such as evidence one has (whether in the form of other beliefs or certain experiential states), and whether or not one possesses any undermining evidence, and so forth. But many epistemologists have called attention to certain "external" features of one's circumstances that may affect the epistemic status of one's beliefs. Goldman's case of the papier-mfiche barns is a wellknown example.' In that example, one has excellent perceptual evidence that there is a barn in the field though one is unaware of the fact that the surA Contextualist Moral Epistemology 295 rounding countryside is populated with papier-mâché barn facsimiles. In this case one apparently fails to know that there is a barn in the field because of facts about one's immediate environment representing relevant evidence one does not possess. This is a case in which knowledge is sensitive to one's physical environment. The idea that knowledge and justification depend on facts about one's social environment-that epistemic appraisal has a "social dimension"-has been of particular interest in recent epistemology. According to Stewart Cohen and Ernest Sosa, there is an interesting connection between certain social facts-facts about one's community-and requirements relating to the use of an individual's cognitive faculties that nicely illustrates how knowledge and justification can depend on one's social circumstances. Cohen's contextualism emerges from his study of the conditions under which evidence one does possess undermines one's knowledge. He argues first of all that whether or not defeaters one possesses (i.e., beliefs one has that count as evidence against some
I advocate is a promising approach to questions about the justification of moral impression. epistemic Contextualism I'm blend to distinguish between what I will visit circumstantial contextualism, prescriptive contextualism, and structural contextualism. The first two theses are approximately analogous to conversant relativist views in ethics. The third represents a response to the ill-famed regress of justification problem and so rivals foundationalist and coherentist response to that problem. Circumstantial Contextualism One contextualist theme in recent epistemology (applied to the issue of justification), which I will name " circumstantial contextualism, " can be expressed this way: CC: Whether one receive knowledge of, or indeed justifiedly believes, some suggestion is partly dependent on certain facts about oneself and certain fact about one's environment. Now it is uncontroversial that whether or not one knows or justifiedly believes some proposition depends on " internal " (psychological) features of one's circumstances such as evidence one has (whether in the form of other beliefs or certain experiential states), and whether or not one possesses any undermining evidence, and so away. But many epistemologist have called attention to certain " external " feature of one's circumstances that may affect the epistemic status of one's belief. Goldman's case of the papier - mfiche barns is a wellknown example.' In that example, one get excellent perceptual evidence that there is a barn in the field though one is unaware of the fact that the surA Contextualist Moral Epistemology 295 rounding countryside is populated with papier - mâché barn facsimile. In this case one apparently fails to know that there be a barn in the plain because of facts about one's immediate environment representing relevant evidence one does not possess. This is a case in which cognition is sensitive to one's physical environment. The idea that knowledge and justification depend on facts about one's social environment - that epistemic appraisal has a " social dimension"-has been of particular interest in late epistemology. According to Stewart Cohen and Ernest Sosa, there is an interesting connection between certain social facts - fact about one's community - and requirement relating to the function of an individual's cognitive staff that nicely illustrates how knowledge and justification can depend on one's social circumstances. Cohen's contextualism emerges from his survey of the conditions under which evidence one does own undermines one's knowledge. He argues first of all that whether or not defeaters one possesses (i.e., impression one have that count as evidence against some
 I wdvocate is a promising xpproach to questions ebout tge justiwication of moral belief. Epidtwmolotical Contextualism I'm going to distingyish vetween whef I will call gircukwtantial contewtualism, nosmative contexduxlnsm, and structural contextualism. The first ywl theses are rjughkr anzlogous to familiar relativist viess in euhics. The third relresents a response to the infwmous regress of jkstificatiob prjvlem and so fivals foundationalist and coherentist responses to tfat pxoblem. Circomatwttial Conteetualifm One contewnualist theme on recent episbemolmgy (applied to the issue of justification), rhich I whlm call "circumstanriql cottexdualkwm," zan bx espressfd vhis way: CC: Whether onw has knowledge of, pr pmdeed justifjedly fejieves, some proposition is partly depengenf on certain facts abour oneself and certain facts abjut one's environment. Now it is uncontroversial thdt whxtfer ov nog oje knows or justifiedly believes some proposiejom cepends on "intcrnal" (psychologicak) vesjures of one's zircumstahces such as evidejce one has (qhether ig thr form of other beliefs or xertain expegienrial states), and whzther or not one possrsses any undermining eridencs, and so fogth. But mzvy epistemologisgs mava called attention to certwin "exterial" fzatures uf ome's ciwcumstanced thab may affect the eplstemnc stdtus of onf's beliefs. Goldman's case of the papier-mfiche nasns is a wejlknoen example.' In that example, pne has exceulent percvptual evmdence that ehere is a basj in the fiend thougr onw is unaward of the fact tnat the slrC Contextyalist Moral Epistcmoloeg 295 rounding couuurywide is populatrd ditr iapmer-mâcré barn facsimhles. In yhis zase ont aipafentky fails to know thad thsre is a barn in tne field bgcause of facts about pne's immediate envlronmxnt re'resenyind relevant evidence one does nkt possesd. Tmis is a case in qhich knowlebge is sensitive to one's physical enviroiment. The idea that knoqledge and justificctlon depend oi factf about ote's social environmebt-that epistemic sppraisal has a "sociam dimetsion"-jas been of particular interest in recent epistemology. According to Stewaet Cohxn and Ernest Soss, thege ns cn intewestmnj connection betwven certain social facts-facts abuut one's cjmmunity-and requirements relstkng to the usg of an individual's cognitjve facukties that nicely illustrates hpw knowledge and justifigation cab depsnd on one'r social circumstamces. Cmhen's contexruallsm emerges frum nid study ov tht couditions under which evidence one does podsess undermines one's knowlcdne. He zrgues first of all thzt wgfther or not defeayers one possexses (i.e., beliefs one vaf that count aw evidence agsinst smme
I advocate is a promising approach to the of moral Epistemological Contextualism I'm I call circumstantial contextualism, contextualism, and structural The first two theses are roughly to familiar relativist views in ethics. The third represents a response to the regress of justification problem and so rivals foundationalist and coherentist responses to that Circumstantial One theme recent epistemology (applied to the issue of justification), which I will call "circumstantial contextualism," can be this way: CC: Whether one has knowledge of, indeed justifiedly believes, some is partly dependent on certain about and certain about environment. it is uncontroversial whether or not one knows or justifiedly believes some proposition depends on "internal" (psychological) features of one's such as has (whether the of beliefs or certain and whether or not one possesses and so forth. But many epistemologists have called to certain features of one's circumstances that may the epistemic status of one's beliefs. Goldman's case the papier-mfiche barns is a wellknown example.' In that example, one has excellent perceptual evidence is a barn in field though one unaware the that surA Contextualist Epistemology 295 rounding countryside is populated with papier-mâché barn facsimiles. In case one apparently fails to know that there is a the because of facts one's immediate environment representing evidence does not possess. This case which to physical The idea that knowledge justification depend on facts about social environment-that epistemic appraisal of particular interest in recent epistemology. According to Cohen and Ernest Sosa, there is an connection between certain social facts-facts about one's community-and requirements relating to the of an faculties that nicely illustrates how knowledge and justification depend on one's social Cohen's contextualism emerges from his study of the conditions which one does undermines one's knowledge. argues first of that whether or one possesses beliefs has evidence against some
 I advocate is a promising apprOach to quesTions AboUt tHe JustIficAtion of moral beLIef. EPistemological ContextuAlism i'm GOing TO dIstinGuish beTWeEN WhaT I WiLl cAlL CiRcumsTanTial conTextualism, NorMaTive contextuALiSm, and strucTurAl contextualIsm. the firSt Two THeses Are RoughLy analOGous to Familiar rElATivist VIews in eTHIcS. The Third represents a rESpONse to the infamoUs regrEsS Of JUStiFicAtion problEm And so RIvals foUNdATIOnaLIst and coherenTist responsES to That prObLem. cIrcumsTantiAl cOntExtualism OnE conTextualisT theme IN recent EPistemoLogy (apPliEd tO the ISsUe Of jUsTIfiCAtIon), WHicH I will caLl "CiRcumsTantIAL COnteXtuAlisM," can bE expressed thiS waY: CC: WHEthEr one Has knOwleDgE of, or Indeed JustiFiEdly believes, somE proPosition iS paRtLy dEpEndenT On certAin FacTs about Oneself ANd cErTAIN fActs about one's envirOnMENt. now it is uNcontrOVeRsIAl that whEtHer Or noT ONe knoWs or JUsTifiedly BelievES sOmE proposItIon depEnDs oN "inTernaL" (PsycHologiCal) featuRes of ONe's circumstancES such as evidenCE oNE HaS (WhetHer In the form of OtheR BeliEfs oR CeRtaIN expeRientIaL StATes), and whether or not oNe PossesSes anY undermining eVidence, and SO FOrth. But mAny ePIsTEmologists have CalleD attention TO certain "ExterNal" featuRes of one's CIRcumstanCes ThaT maY afFECt The epistemic sTATus oF oNe's beliEfs. goldman'S caSe oF thE paPiEr-mfiche bArns is a wElLkNoWn ExaMple.' IN That examPlE, onE hAs eXcellENt percEptuaL eviDeNcE ThaT there iS A bARN in tHe FiEld tHouGh One is UnawARe oF the facT that the sUrA cOnteXtUaList MorAl EpistemologY 295 rOunding couNtRysIde is pOPUlated wiTh papier-mâché barn facsimILes. In thIs cAse onE appArently faIls To know ThaT There iS a barn In the FiEld BECause OF FaCts AbOut one's immEDIatE enviRoNmenT represEnting relevant evidENce One does not posSesS. ThiS IS a CasE In WHicH kNOwlEDGe is sensitive to One's physicAl ENvIronment. ThE IdeA tHat knowLedge anD justIFicatioN depend on Facts abouT oNe's sOCIal EnvironmenT-that epiStemic appRAisal HAs A "sociAl dImensiOn"-Has Been oF partiCUlaR inteRest in ReCent epIstemOlOgy. AccorDing to Stewart Cohen and ErNest SoSa, theRe iS an intereStiNG coNnection bEtweEn certain sOciAl fActs-fActS About One's COmMunITy-and RequIRements reLAtIng TO ThE use of an indIVIDuaL's cogNitIVe facuLtieS that nicely illustRAtes how knowledGe anD JUstIfiCAtioN cAn depend on one's SocIaL CIrcumstaNcEs. Cohen's conTextualiSm EMergeS from hIs studY of the cONDiTIons unDer wHicH evidence One DoES possesS uNdERmines One's KnOwledgE. He argUEs fiRST of all that whetheR or noT DEfeatERs oNe posSeSses (i.e., bELiefS one has thaT count as eviDence aGainSt somE
 I advocate is a promising  approachto qu est ion sabou t th e justificatio n  ofmoral belief. Epistemo logic al Cont e xt ualis m I'm g o in g todi st ing ui s hbetwe enwhat Iwill callcir cu mstantial co n te xtualism,nor mative conte xtu alism,  a nds truct ura l con textua l ism. T he firsttw o  these s  are ro u g hl y an alogous to famili a rr elativist view s in e th i cs . The  th ird repres en ts ar esponse to t h e i n famous regres s of justif i cat ion pr ob lem and so  riva ls fou ndationalis t an d coheren tist r e sponses to that  probl em.  Ci rcum s ta nt ial  C o nte x tu ali s m O ne conte xt ua listthem e i n  rec ent  epi stemo logy (applied  to  the iss ue of  just ific at ion),  which  I wi ll  call "circumst anti al contex tua li sm, "can b e  expre sse d t his way : CC: W h eth er o n ehas knowledge of,or i nd eed just ifiedl y  b el i eves, so me  pr opos i t ion i s pa r tl y depend ent on ce rt ain fac ts  about  o nes elf  andc erta in fac ts about  one' s  environment.N ow it is unco n tr o v er s ialtha t whether o r no t  one  kno w sorj ustif iedly  b e li e ves some propositio ndepend s on"internal" (p sychologic a l )  feature s of on e 's circumstanc es su ch as evid e nce onehas ( whetherin the fo r m  of othe r b eli efs  or c er tain experien t i al s ta tes), a ndwhether  or  no t o nepo ssesses a ny under mi ni ng  e vid ence, and so f or th.  B utmanye pistem ologi stsha ve cal led att e nt i o n to  c er tain  "e xt ernal " fe a tur es of o ne's circ ums t ance sth at mayaffect the ep is temic stat us  of  one's b eliefs.Goldman's case of the p a pier-mf ich e bar ns i s a wellk now n exam ple . ' In t hat ex ample ,one h as ex c e ll ent  p erceptuale v ide nce t ha t th ere isa barn in the fiel d  th ough one is u naw areo f  t hef ac t  th at the s urA Contextuali st Moral E pi s te mology 295 rou nd ing cou ntrysid e isp opulate d with pa pier-mâch ébarn f acs imiles. In  this ca se one ap p arent l yfails  to  knowth atthere  is ab arn  in t he fie ld  becau se of  f acts abo ut one's immediate envi ronmen t rep res enting re lev a ntevidenceonedoes not p oss ess . Thi s i s  a ca se i n  w hic h  know ledg e  is sensi t iv e t o on e's physica l e nvi ronme nt. The id ea t hat knowledge and justificationdepe n d  on  fa c ts a bo ut one's socia l e nv i r onment-t ha t epistemic  apprais al has a  "soci al dim ension" - h as been o f pa rti cular int ere st in rece nt  e p istemo logy .Accord ing to Stew a r t Cohen and Erne st So s a , the r e i s anin teresti n g co nnection b etween cert ain so cial  fact s-facts  a bout o ne' scommunity- a nd requir ement s relat in g to  th e useof a n indiv idua l' s c ognitivef a cu l ti es tha t ni celyil lust rates how knowledg e a n d justi fi cat i o n cand ep e n d on one's  so cialc i rcumstance s . Co h en ' s con textua lism e mergesf rom  h is stud y o f the condi tions und e r w hi ch e videnceon e do es  po ss ess underminesone's kn owledge. H e argu esf irst of all  t hat whetheror no td efeater s one  posses s es(i. e.,  bel ief s on e  has that count as evide nceagain s t s ome
 I_advocate is_a promising approach to_questions about_the_justification of_moral_belief. Epistemological Contextualism_I'm going to_distinguish between what I_will call circumstantial_contextualism,_normative contextualism, and structural contextualism. The first two theses are roughly analogous to familiar_relativist_views in_ethics._The_third represents a response to_the infamous regress of justification_problem and_so rivals foundationalist and coherentist responses to that_problem._Circumstantial Contextualism One_contextualist theme in recent epistemology (applied to the issue_of justification), which I will call_"circumstantial contextualism," can_be_expressed_this way: CC: Whether_one has knowledge of, or indeed_justifiedly believes, some proposition is partly_dependent on certain facts about oneself and_certain facts about one's environment. Now_it is uncontroversial that whether_or not_one knows or justifiedly believes_some proposition depends_on "internal"_(psychological) features of_one's circumstances such as evidence one_has (whether in_the form of other beliefs or_certain_experiential states), and_whether_or_not one_possesses any undermining_evidence,_and so_forth._But many epistemologists have called attention_to_certain "external" features of one's circumstances that_may affect the epistemic_status_of one's beliefs. Goldman's_case of the papier-mfiche barns_is a wellknown example.' In that_example, one_has excellent_perceptual evidence that there is a barn in the field though_one is unaware of the fact_that the surA Contextualist_Moral Epistemology_295_rounding countryside is_populated_with papier-mâché_barn facsimiles. In this case one apparently_fails to_know that there is a barn_in the field because_of_facts about one's immediate environment representing_relevant evidence one does not possess._This is a case in_which_knowledge_is sensitive to one's physical_environment. The idea that knowledge and_justification depend on_facts about one's social environment-that epistemic appraisal_has_a "social dimension"-has been of particular_interest_in recent epistemology. According to Stewart_Cohen_and_Ernest Sosa, there is an_interesting connection between certain social facts-facts_about one's community-and requirements relating to the use of_an individual's cognitive_faculties that nicely illustrates how_knowledge_and_justification can depend on one's social circumstances. Cohen's contextualism emerges_from his_study of the_conditions under which evidence one does possess undermines one's knowledge._He argues first of all that whether_or not defeaters one possesses (i.e., beliefs one has that count_as evidence against some