 general Bayesian framework with Bayesian confirmation theory. Bayesian confirmation is a means with no end.1 1In this paper we focus on showing that no Bayesian conception of confirmation can serve the purpose of guiding or prescribing epistemic states or experimental actions. In other words, we focus on showing that Bayesian confirmation theory, qua normative theory, is a means with no end. An anonymous referee for this journal has raised the point that the 2 We argue as follows. Bayesian confirmation theory defines confirmation as a relation between evidence, hypothesis, background assumptions, and some probability measure. The probability measure is interpreted as an agent's degree of belief function. Since the agent's degrees of belief are used to determine whether the evidence confirms the hypothesis, confirmation cannot be used to determine the agent's degrees of belief, that is, how worthy of belief the hypothesis is. Next we consider a popular measure of incremental confirmation and show that it can be used to determine the epistemic value of experimental outcomes. Standard decision theory then allows us to form the expected epistemic value of an experiment, and thus to decide which experiments to carry out. Finally we look at the notion of confirmation Bayesian confirmation theorists want to explicate. We find that one particular criterion they impose on their explicans, viz. that old evidence should be able to provide confirmation, explicitly rules out that it be used to determine the epistemic value of experimental outcomes. This implies our negative conclusion. We proceed as follows. In section 2 we present the tenets of Bayesian confirmation theory. In section 3 we argue that no Bayesian conception of confirmation can be used to say how worthy of belief certain hypotheses are. In section 4 we find that there is a Bayesian conception of confirmation that can be used to determine the epistemic value of experimental outcomes. However, we also show that this possible use is ruled out – in some cases exBayesian conception of confirmation might serve the purpose of explaining or describing the epistemic relationship between hypotheses and evidence. Even if that were the case, our conclusion – that Bayesian confirmation theory, qua normative theory, is a means with no end – would not be affected. Furthermore, in light of work by psychologists such as Kahneman and Tversky (Kahneman and Tversky [1973], Tversky and Kahneman [1983]) we are skeptical that Bayesianism is a descriptively adequate theory. Since it is not clear to us to what extent a descriptively inadequate theory can be explanatory, we are skeptical of the prospects for an explanatory version of Bayesian confirmation theory. 3 pl
general Bayesian framework with Bayesian confirmation theory. Bayesian ratification is a mean with no end.1 1In this newspaper we focus on testify that no Bayesian creation of confirmation can serve the determination of guide or prescribing epistemic state or experimental actions. In other password, we focus on showing that Bayesian ratification theory, qua normative theory, is a means with no end. An anonymous referee for this journal has raise the point that the 2 We argue as follows. Bayesian confirmation hypothesis defines confirmation as a sexual intercourse between evidence, hypothesis, setting assumptions, and some probability measure. The probability measure is interpreted as an agent's academic degree of belief function. Since the agent's degrees of belief are used to settle whether the evidence confirms the hypothesis, confirmation cannot be used to determine the agent's degrees of belief, that is, how worthy of belief the guess is. Next we see a popular standard of incremental ratification and show that it can be used to determine the epistemic value of experimental outcomes. Standard decision theory then allows us to form the have a bun in the oven epistemic value of an experiment, and thus to decide which experiments to carry out. Finally we look at the impression of confirmation Bayesian confirmation theorists want to explicate. We find that one particular standard they levy on their explicans, viz. that old evidence should be able to provide confirmation, explicitly rules out that it be practice to determine the epistemic value of experimental outcomes. This implies our negative conclusion. We proceed as follows. In section 2 we give the tenets of Bayesian confirmation theory. In section 3 we argue that no Bayesian conception of ratification can be used to say how worthy of belief sealed hypotheses are. In section 4 we find that there be a Bayesian conception of ratification that can be used to determine the epistemic value of experimental outcomes. However, we besides show that this possible use is ruled out – in some casing exBayesian conception of confirmation might serve the determination of explaining or describing the epistemic kinship between hypotheses and evidence. Even if that were the case, our conclusion – that Bayesian confirmation theory, qua normative theory, is a means with no end – would not be affected. Furthermore, in light of employment by psychologist such as Kahneman and Tversky (Kahneman and Tversky [ 1973 ], Tversky and Kahneman [ 1983 ]) we are skeptical that Bayesianism is a descriptively adequate theory. Since it is not clear to us to what extent a descriptively inadequate theory can be explanatory, we are skeptical of the prospects for an explanatory version of Bayesian confirmation hypothesis. 3 pl
 gejeral Bayesian framework with Bayesian einfirmetion tgeory. Bahesian confirmation is a meais wuth ni end.1 1In this paper we focus on showing thau no Bayesian conrsption of conrlrmatnoi can serve the purpose ox guiding or psercxibing epistemic states or experimeneal actoojs. In other wotds, wt fjcus on showing that Bayesian confirmafion thtory, qua normative theory, is a means with no end. An anonymous refegee for thiw jotenal has raired the poput that the 2 We argue as follows. Bayesian zonfixmation theirt dfxines conficmatiog as a relatlpn betfeen evodence, hypothexis, baxkground assumptions, end some probability measure. Dhz probability measure iw intgrpreded xw av afeit's degref oh belief fuhction. Sincw the agent's degreex jd belief are hsed tj qetermine whether the evidence confirms ths hypothesis, confirmatiin cannot be used to fetermine the agent's degrees of belief, that is, how worthy mf bemkef tme hhpohhesis is. Next we consider a popular measure jr onbremental confirmction and show tnah oj can be used jo detexjihe the epistemic vwlue of expeeimental jutcpmes. Standard decision theoey then allocs ys to form the expzcted episteoic falue of an experiment, and tkus to decide whifh experijdnts to carry oug. Fpnalny we look at the notion os confirmetion Bayesixn cpnfirmwtion theogists want to explicate. Ae fiud thdt one parhicular criterion they impose oi their explivats, niz. that jld eyidence should fe able to proride conyirmatkon, explicptly rulev out that yt be used to fetermine thx epistemyc vqlue of expdfimental outcokes. This pmklies our begative conclusiok. We krkceed as followw. Ib section 2 we ptesdnt tje tqtets of Bayevian covgirmagion thtjrn. Iv sevtion 3 we argue that no Gayesian conceptiom jf confitmation cwn be used to say how worthy of belixf cervain hupojheses are. In section 4 we find fhat therf if a Bayesian congeptyon of conyirmation that can be used to determine vhe epistemic value of wxperimental outcomgs. Mowever, we akso srow that dhis possible use is ruled out – in soke cases exBayesian ckncepthon ov confirmation might serve the purpose of explaining or describing the epustemir welationshil beyween hvpocheses wnd xvmdence. Even if thst were the case, our conclusion – that Bdyzsian confirmation theory, qua nurmative theoty, is a means with no end – would npt be affected. Furthermore, in loght of work by psycholonists sucy as Iahneman aid Tversky (Kahneman snd Tvzrsky [1973], Tverskt anf Kahneman [1983]) wd ate skepticap thet Yayesianism is a descriptively adwquate tjeory. Since it iv not clear uo us tk what extent a descriltivspy inxdequate theoty can be explsnatory, we are skeptpcaj of the prosptcts for an expkanatorj version of Uayesian conxirmation theory. 3 pl
general Bayesian framework with Bayesian confirmation theory. is means with end.1 1In this that Bayesian conception of can serve the of guiding or prescribing epistemic states experimental actions. In other words, we focus on showing that Bayesian confirmation theory, normative theory, is a means with no end. An anonymous referee for this has the that 2 We argue as follows. Bayesian confirmation theory defines confirmation as a relation between evidence, hypothesis, assumptions, and some probability measure. The probability measure interpreted as an agent's of belief function. Since the degrees belief are to whether evidence confirms the confirmation cannot be used to determine the agent's degrees of belief, that is, how worthy of belief hypothesis is. consider a measure incremental and show that be used to determine the epistemic outcomes. Standard decision theory then allows us to the expected value of an experiment, and thus decide which experiments to carry out. Finally we at the notion of confirmation Bayesian confirmation theorists want to explicate. We find that one they impose on their viz. that old should able provide explicitly rules that it be used to determine the epistemic value of experimental This implies our negative conclusion. We proceed as follows. In we the tenets of confirmation theory. In section we that no Bayesian conception can used worthy belief hypotheses are. In section we find that there is Bayesian conception of confirmation determine the epistemic value of experimental outcomes. However, also show that this possible use is out – in some cases exBayesian conception of confirmation might serve the of explaining the epistemic relationship between hypotheses and evidence. Even that were the case, conclusion – that Bayesian confirmation theory, qua normative theory, a with no – would not affected. Furthermore, in of work by as Kahneman Tversky and and Kahneman [1983]) we are skeptical Bayesianism a descriptively adequate theory. Since is to us to what extent a descriptively inadequate theory can be explanatory, we are skeptical prospects for an explanatory of confirmation theory. 3 pl
 general Bayesian framework wIth BayesiaN confIrmAtiOn TheoRy. BaYesian confirmaTIon iS a means with no end.1 1In this Paper We FOcus ON sHowinG that no bAyESIan CoNcEptIoN Of ConfiRmaTion can Serve the puRpoSe Of guiding or pREsCribing epiSteMic states or eXpeRimentAl ActIOns. In OthEr worDs, we foCUs on shOwing that baYEsian cONfirmatION tHeorY, qua normative theoRY, iS A means with no enD. An anoNyMOuS REfeRee For this jouRnAl has RAised thE PoINT ThaT The 2 We argue as fOllows. BayesIAn cOnfirmAtIon THeory dEfineS cONfiRmation as a rElatIon betweeN evideNCe, hypotHEsis, bacKgrounD asSumPtioNS, aNd SomE pRObaBIlIty MEasUre. The prObAbIlity MeasURE IS intErpReteD as an Agent's degree oF beLief FUncTion. SInce tHe agEnT's degRees of BelieF aRe used to determiNe whEther the eVidEnCe cOnFirms THe hypoTheSis, ConfirmAtion caNNot Be USED tO determine the agent'S dEGReEs of beliEf, that IS, hOw WOrthy of bElIef The hYPOthesIs is. nExT we consiDer a poPUlAr Measure Of IncremEnTal ConFirmaTIon aNd show That it caN be usED to determine thE Epistemic valuE Of EXPeRImenTal Outcomes. StaNdarD DeciSion THeOry THen alLows uS tO FoRM the expected epistemIc Value oF an exPeriment, and thUs to decide WHICh experiMentS To CArry out. Finally We looK at the notiON of confiRmatiOn BayesiAn confirmATIon theorIstS waNt tO exPLIcAte. We find that ONE parTiCular crIteRion theY imPosE on TheIr Explicans, Viz. that oLd EvIdEnCe sHould BE able to pRoVidE cOnfIrmatIOn, explIcitlY rulEs OuT ThaT it be usED tO DEterMiNe The ePisTeMic vaLue oF ExpErimentAl outcomeS. ThIS impLiEs Our negaTive conclusioN. WE proceed as FoLloWs. In seCTIon 2 we preSent the tenets of Bayesian COnfirmaTioN theoRy. In Section 3 we ArgUe that No BAYesian ConcepTion oF cOnfIRMatioN CAn Be uSeD to say how wORThy Of belIeF cerTain hypOtheses are. In sectioN 4 We fInd that there iS a BAyesIAN cOncEPtIOn oF cONfiRMAtion that can be uSed to deterMiNE tHe epistemiC ValUe Of experImental OutcoMEs. HowevEr, we also sHow that thIs PossIBLe uSe is ruled oUt – in some Cases exBaYEsian COnCeptiOn oF confiRmAtiOn migHt servE The PurpoSe of exPlAining Or desCrIbing the Epistemic relationship beTween hYpothEseS and evideNce. eVen If that werE the Case, our conCluSioN – that bayESian cOnfiRMaTioN TheorY, qua NOrmative tHEoRy, iS A MeAns with no enD – WOUld Not be AffECted. FuRtheRmore, in light of worK By psychologistS sucH AS KaHneMAn anD TVersky (Kahneman And tvERSky [1973], TversKy And Kahneman [1983]) We are skePtICal thAt BayeSianisM is a desCRIpTIvely aDequAte Theory. SinCe iT iS Not cleaR tO uS To what ExteNt A descrIptiveLY inaDEQuate theory can be ExplaNATory, wE Are SkeptIcAl of the PRospEcts for an eXplanatory vErsion Of BaYesiaN confirMaTion thEorY. 3 pL
 general Bayesian framewor k with Bay esian  co nfi rm atio n th eory. Bayesian conf irmation is a means wi th no  e n d.11 In  this  paperw ef o cus  o nsho wi n gthatnoBayesia n concepti onof  confirmatio n  c an serve t hepurpose of g uid ing or  p res c ribin g e piste mic st a tes or  experime nt a l acti o ns. Ino t he r wo rds, we focus ons ho w ing that Bayes ian co nf i rm a t ion  th eory, quano rmati v e theor y ,i s a m e ans with no e nd. An anon y mou s refe re e f o r this  jour na l  ha s raised th e po int thatthe 2W e argue as foll ows. B aye sia n co n fi rm ati on the o ry  de f ine s confir ma ti on as  a r e l a t ionbet ween  evid ence, hypothe sis , ba c kgr oundassum ptio ns , and  someproba bi lity measure. T he p robabilit y m ea sur eis in t erpret edasan agen t's deg r eeof b e li ef function. Since  t h e  a gent's d egrees of  b e lief are  u sed  tod e termi ne w h et her theeviden c eco nfirmsth e hypo th esi s,confi r mati on can not be u sed t o  determine the agent's degre e so f  b e lief , t hat is, how  wor t hy o f be l ie f t h e hyp othes is is .  Next we consider a  p opular  meas ure of increm ental conf i r m ation an d sh o wt hat it can beusedto determi n e the ep istem ic value  of exper i m ental ou tco mes . S tan d a rd  decision the o r y th en  allows  us  to for m t heexp ect ed  epistemi c valueof  a nex per iment ,  and thu stode cid e whi c h expe rimen ts t oca r ryout. Fi n al l y  welo ok  atthe  n otion  ofc onf irmatio n Bayesia n c o nfir ma ti on theo rists want to  e xplicate.We  fi nd tha t one part icular criterion they i m pose on  th eir e xpli cans, viz . t hat ol d e v idence  shoul d beab let o  prov i d econ fi rmation, e x p lic itlyru lesout tha t it be used to de t erm ine the epist emi c va l u eofe xp e rim en t alo u tcomes. This im plies ourne g at ive conclu s ion .We proc eed asfollo w s. In s ection 2we presen tthet e net s of Bayes ian conf irmationt heory .  I n sec tio n 3 we  a rgu e tha t no B a yes ian c oncept io n of c onfir ma tion can  be used to say how wor thy of  beli efcertain h ypo t hes es are. I n se ction 4 we  fi ndthatthe r e isa Ba y es ian conce ptio n  of confi r ma tio n th at can be u s e d  to  dete rmi n e theepis temic value of ex p erimental outc omes . How eve r , we  a lso show thatthi sp o ssible u se  is ruled o ut – inso m e cas es exB ayesia n conce p t io n  of co nfir mat ion might  se rv e  the pu rp os e  of ex plai ni ng ordescri b ingt h e epistemic rela tions h i p bet w een  hypo th eses an d  evi dence. Eve n if that w ere th e ca se, o ur conc lu sion –  th at  Bayesianc onfirmati on th eory, q ua  nor mat ive th eory , is amean swit h no end– wo u ld  n o t b e af fecte d.  Fur thermore, in light  of work by  p syc h o logist s  s u c h as Kahne man  andT v ersky (Kah n eman an d  Tver sky [1 973],Tversky and  K ahneman  [1 9 8 3]) we ar e skeptic a l t ha t Ba yesianis mis a  d esc ri ptively adequat e theory . Sincei t  is no t c l eart o us t owhat extenta des cr i ptively i nad equatet heo rycan  beexp lana t ory, we are skeptical of  the  pros p ect s for  an e xp lanatory vers ion of B a yesian confir mation theory.3  pl 
 general_Bayesian framework_with Bayesian confirmation theory._Bayesian confirmation_is_a means_with_no end.1 1In_this paper we_focus on showing that_no Bayesian conception_of_confirmation can serve the purpose of guiding or prescribing epistemic states or experimental actions._In_other words,_we_focus_on showing that Bayesian confirmation_theory, qua normative theory, is_a means_with no end. An anonymous referee for this_journal_has raised the_point that the 2 We argue as follows. Bayesian_confirmation theory defines confirmation as a_relation between evidence,_hypothesis,_background_assumptions, and some probability_measure. The probability measure is interpreted_as an agent's degree of belief_function. Since the agent's degrees of belief_are used to determine whether the_evidence confirms the hypothesis, confirmation_cannot be_used to determine the agent's_degrees of belief,_that is,_how worthy of_belief the hypothesis is. Next we_consider a popular_measure of incremental confirmation and show_that_it can be_used_to_determine the_epistemic value of_experimental_outcomes. Standard_decision_theory then allows us to form_the_expected epistemic value of an experiment, and_thus to decide which_experiments_to carry out. Finally_we look at the notion_of confirmation Bayesian confirmation theorists want_to explicate._We find_that one particular criterion they impose on their explicans, viz. that_old evidence should be able to_provide confirmation, explicitly rules_out that_it_be used to_determine_the epistemic_value of experimental outcomes. This implies our_negative conclusion._We proceed as follows. In section_2 we present the_tenets_of Bayesian confirmation theory. In section_3 we argue that no Bayesian_conception of confirmation can be_used_to_say how worthy of belief_certain hypotheses are. In section 4_we find that_there is a Bayesian conception of confirmation_that_can be used to determine the_epistemic_value of experimental outcomes. However, we_also_show_that this possible use is_ruled out – in some cases_exBayesian conception of confirmation might serve the purpose of_explaining or describing_the epistemic relationship between hypotheses_and_evidence._Even if that were the case, our conclusion – that_Bayesian confirmation_theory, qua normative_theory, is a means with no end – would not_be affected. Furthermore, in light of work_by psychologists such as Kahneman and Tversky (Kahneman and Tversky [1973],_Tversky and Kahneman [1983]) we are skeptical that_Bayesianism is a descriptively adequate theory. Since_it is not clear_to_us to what extent a descriptively inadequate_theory_can_be_explanatory, we are_skeptical of the_prospects for an_explanatory version_of Bayesian confirmation_theory. 3_pl