onditional between one and the same content under two guises (p and "the proposition that p is valid"). This means the fact that there are propositions is not a fact "over and above" the laws of logic; rather, it is a trivial consequence of the laws of logic themselves. Since the B-Platonist takes the laws of logic to be the internal laws of judging itself rather than laws that describe some external world of abstract objects, this means that it is internal to judging itself that there are propositions. In the terms introduced in the section "Lotze's Platonism," this means that the B-Platonist is also an ontological Platonist. If we read Lotze's non-hypostatic Platonism as Platonism B, as I have argued we should, then he is an ontological Platonist about propositions. What then becomes of his foundational distinction between the validity of propositions and the existence of things, if he is admitting that there are propositions? The category of existence should not, I think, be identified with the category of what there is (existence in Frege's quantificational sense). Recall that Lotze consistently identifies existence (Dasein), the first category of actuality, as the existence of things (Dinge). Hypostatic Platonism is consistently characterized as the view that takes propositions and concepts to be existent things, thus transferring them into the category of existence. I propose that we read Lotze's category of the existent, of things, not as "what there is" but as that which is external to judgement in the specific sense that there being such things does not follow from the internal logical rules of judging itself. Lotze denies that there is a purely logical proof that there is a mind-independent world in space and time, or that there are causes for every effect; consequently, these objects are "existent things" in Lotze's technical sense, and skepticism about them must receive a different answer than logical skepticism. The "externality" of things is not their distinctness from our representations (for propositions are distinct from our representations, but are not things); rather, it is their being "external" to logic, that is, their not following from logic alone. This allows Lotze to consistently maintain that there are propositions while denying that they exist, that they are external, and that they are things. The hypostatic Platonist, on this reading, is not the theorist who holds merely that there are propositions,
onditional between one and the same content under two guises (p and " the suggestion that phosphorus is valid "). This means the fact that there are proposition is not a fact " all over and above " the laws of logic; rather, it is a trivial consequence of the law of logic themselves. Since the B - Platonist takes the laws of logic to be the home laws of judging itself quite than laws that describe some external earth of abstract object, this means that it is inner to judging itself that there are proposition. In the terms introduced in the section " Lotze's Platonism, " this intend that the B - Platonist is also an ontological Platonist. If we read Lotze's non - hypostatic Platonism as Platonism B, as I have argued we should, then he is an ontological Platonist about propositions. What then become of his foundational distinction between the validity of propositions and the existence of things, if he is accommodate that there are propositions? The category of existence should not, I think, be identified with the category of what there is (existence in Frege's quantificational sense). Recall that Lotze consistently identifies existence (Dasein), the first category of actuality, as the existence of thing (Dinge). Hypostatic Platonism is consistently characterized as the opinion that take propositions and concepts to be real things, thus transferring them into the category of being. I propose that we read Lotze's category of the existent, of things, not as " what there is " but as that which is external to judgement in the specific sense that there being such thing does not follow from the internal logical rules of judging itself. Lotze denies that there cost a purely logical proof that there is a mind - autonomous world in space and time, or that there are causes for every effect; consequently, these objects are " existent things " in Lotze's technical common sense, and skepticism about them must receive a different answer than logical incredulity. The " externality " of thing is not their distinctness from our representation (for propositions are discrete from our representations, but are not things); quite, it is their being " external " to logic, that is, their not following from logic entirely. This allows Lotze to consistently maintain that there be propositions while denying that they exist, that they are external, and that they are things. The hypostatic Platonist, on this reading, is not the theorist who holds merely that there be propositions,
ondltional between one and uhe same content oneer twm guisss (p and "the proposition that p is velid"). This means the fact that tfere are iropositiins ms not a fact "ovxd and anjve" fme lacs of logic; rathgr, it is a tsivial consequanze of the laws of logic themselves. Sigce the B-Olatonist takef tht lwws kf logic to be the internal laws or judgiig itself rathet than laws that describe dome external world of abstract ovjecew, this means that it is internal tk judging itself that there are proppsitions. Ib rhe jerms introdnced ig the sectiok "Lotze'v Platomism," this meanx tiat rhe B-Platonist is alsm an ontological Pjatonist. Hf we read Lotze's nin-yyposjatic Plaginirm zs Pmatonidm U, as I have argued we whould, then he is am jbtological Plztonise wbout propositions. What then becomes of hia foundational distinctuon between the validlty of prjpositions and the existence of things, if he is agmittmne tkqt thdee are propositions? The category of existence srkukd not, I think, bc identified with yhf vwtegory of whxt thexs js (existence in Frfge's quwntifucational senxe). Recall that Lotze consisrently identpfiew existence (Dasein), the first eategoty of sctuality, as the existeuce of things (Dinhe). Hypostzgic Platonism is coksivtently characterized as tre view tiat tckes prooosijions agd conceptd to na existent things, hhus jransfarring thel into the category of existencx. I propose tnad wv read Locze's cstegory of thq existent, of jhings, noc as "wfat there ps" but as that which is external dl judgement mn the spqcifuc swnse thxg there being xuch thinyf dows not follow from thg jnternal logicao rooes of judging itrels. Povze dqties that thare ks x pureuy logical irouf tnat there is a mind-itdepsndent world in spscc and timg, or that there are caises for every efftct; coisequeitly, tnesg objects are "existent things" ih Lotze's hecmnical sense, wnd wkepticism ayout them must receive a different answec than logical skepticiwm. The "externality" pn things is iot thqir distitctness from our repeesentations (for kropositions are distindt frok our representations, but are not things); rather, it is their being "external" to oogic, vhwt is, their not follmwnng from jogir elone. This allows Lotze to consistently maintain that tharz are propositions while denyone that they ebist, that they are exterhal, and yhat they are things. The hypoststic Platonist, on this rcading, is not fhe thvkrmst who holds merely that chere qre proposibions,
onditional between one and the same content guises and "the that p is that are propositions is a fact "over above" the laws of logic; rather, is a trivial consequence of the laws of logic themselves. Since the B-Platonist the laws of logic to be the internal laws of judging itself rather laws describe external of abstract objects, this means that it is internal to judging itself that there are propositions. the terms introduced in the section "Lotze's Platonism," means that the B-Platonist also an ontological Platonist. If read non-hypostatic Platonism Platonism as have argued we then he is an ontological Platonist about propositions. What then becomes of his foundational distinction between the of propositions existence of if is that there are category of existence should not, I with the category of what there is (existence Frege's quantificational Recall that Lotze consistently identifies existence the first category of actuality, as the existence things (Dinge). Hypostatic Platonism is consistently characterized as the view that takes propositions and concepts existent things, thus transferring into the category existence. propose we Lotze's category the existent, of things, not as "what there is" but as which is external to judgement in the specific sense that such does not follow the internal logical rules judging Lotze denies that there purely proof a world space and time, or there are causes for every consequently, these objects are sense, and skepticism about them must receive a answer than logical skepticism. The "externality" of is not their distinctness from our representations (for propositions are distinct from representations, but things); rather, it is their being "external" to that is, their not from logic alone. This allows Lotze to consistently maintain there propositions while that they exist, they are external, that they are hypostatic Platonist, this is who holds merely that there are
onditional between one and thE same conteNt undEr tWo gUiSes (p And "tHe proposition tHAt p iS valid"). This means the fact That tHeRE are PRoPositIons is nOT a FACt "oVeR aNd aBoVE" tHe lawS of Logic; raTher, it is a tRivIaL consequence OF tHe laws of loGic Themselves. SiNce The B-PlAtOniST takeS thE laws Of logiC To be thE internal LaWS of judGIng itseLF RaTher Than laws that descrIBe SOme external worLd of abStRAcT OBjeCts, This means tHaT it is INternal TO jUDGIng ITself that therE are proposiTIonS. In the TeRms INtroduCed in ThE SecTion "Lotze's PLatoNism," this mEans thAT the B-PlATonist iS also aN onTolOgicAL PLaTonIsT. if wE ReAd LOTze'S non-hypoStAtIc PlaToniSM AS platOniSm B, aS I havE argued we shouLd, tHen hE Is aN ontoLogicAl PlAtOnist About pRoposItIons. What then becOmes Of his founDatIoNal DiStincTIon betWeeN thE validiTy of proPOsiTiONS AnD the existence of thiNgS, IF hE is admitTing thAT tHeRE are propOsItiOns? THE CategOry oF ExIstence sHould nOT, I ThInk, be idEnTified WiTh tHe cAtegoRY of wHat theRe is (exisTence IN Frege's quantifICational sense). rEcALL tHAt LoTze ConsistentlY ideNTifiEs exIStEncE (daseiN), the fIrST cATegory of actuality, as ThE existEnce oF things (Dinge). HYpostatic PLATOnism is cOnsiSTeNTly characterizEd as tHe view that TAkes propOsitiOns and coNcepts to bE EXistent tHinGs, tHus TraNSFeRring them into THE catEgOry of exIstEnce. I prOpoSe tHat We rEaD Lotze's caTegory of ThE eXiStEnt, Of thiNGs, not as "wHaT thErE is" But as THat whiCh is eXterNaL tO JudGement iN ThE SPeciFiC sEnse ThaT tHere bEing SUch Things dOes not folLow FRom tHe InTernal lOgical rules of JuDging itselF. LOtzE denieS THat there Is a purely logical proof thAT there iS a mInd-inDepeNdent worlD in Space aNd tIMe, or thAt therE are cAuSes FOR everY EFfEct; CoNsequently, THEse ObjecTs Are "eXistent Things" in Lotze's techNIcaL sense, and skepTicIsm aBOUt TheM MuST reCeIVe a DIFferent answer thAn logical sKePTiCism. The "extERnaLiTy" of thiNgs is noT theiR DistincTness from Our represEnTatiONS (foR propositiOns are diStinct froM Our rePReSentaTioNs, but aRe Not ThingS); ratheR, It iS theiR being "ExTernal" To logIc, That is, thEir not following from logiC alone. this aLloWs Lotze to ConSIstEntly mainTain That there aRe pRopOsitiOns WHile dEnyiNG tHat THey exIst, tHAt they are EXtErnAL, AnD that they arE THIngS. The hYpoSTatic PLatoNist, on this reading, IS not the theorisT who HOLds MerELy thAt There are proposItiOnS,
onditional between one and  the sameconte ntund er  two  gui ses (p and "th e  pro position that p is val id").  T h is m e an s the  fact t h at t her ear e p ro p os ition s i s not a  fact "ove r a nd  above" thel aw s of logic ; r ather, it is  atrivia lcon s equen ceof th e laws of log ic themse lv e s. Sin c e the B - P la toni st takes the laws of logic to be th e inte rn a ll a wsofjudging it se lf ra t her tha n  l a w s  th a t describe so me external wor ld ofab str a ct obj ects,  t h ismeans thatit i s interna l to j u dging i t self th at the reare  pro p os it ion s. Int he  te r msintroduc ed  i n the  sec t i o n  "Lo tze 's P laton ism," this me ans  tha t  th e B-P laton istis  also  an on tolog ic al Platonist. I f we  read Lot ze' snon -h ypost a tic Pl ato nis m as Pl atonism B,as I ha ve argued we shoul d, t he n he isan ont o lo gi c al Plato ni stabou t propo siti o ns . What t hen be c om es  of his  f oundat io nal  di stinc t ionbetwee n the va lidit y  of propositio n s and the exi s te n c eo f th ing s, if he is  adm i ttin g th a tthe r e are  prop os i ti o ns? The category of  e xisten ce sh ould not, I t hink, be i d e n tified w itht he category of wh at th ere is (ex i stence i n Fre ge's qua ntificati o n al sense ).Rec all  th a t  L otze consiste n t ly i de ntifies  ex istence  (D ase in) , t he  first ca tegory o fac tu al ity , ast he exist en ceof  th ings( Dinge) . Hyp osta ti cP lat onism i s  c o n sist en tl y ch ara ct erize d as the  view t hat takes  pr o posi ti on s and c oncepts to be  e xistent th in gs,  thust r ansferri ng them into the catego r y of ex ist ence.  I p ropose th atwe rea d L o tze'scatego ry of  t hee x isten t ,  o f t hi ngs, not a s "wh at th er e is " but a s that which is ex t ern al to judgeme ntin t h e  s pec i fi c  se ns e  th a t  there being su ch thingsdo e snot follow fro mthe int ernal l ogica l  rulesof judgin g itself.  L otze d eni es that th ere is a  purely l o gical pr oof t hat  there  i s a  mind -indep e nde nt wo rld in  s pace a nd ti me , or tha t there are causes foreveryeffec t;consequen tly ,  th ese objec ts a re "existe ntthi ngs"inL otze' s te c hn ica l  sens e, a n d skeptic i sm  ab o u tthem must r e c e ive  a di ffe r ent an swer  than logical ske p ticism. The "e xter n a lit y"o f th in gs is not thei r d is t i nctnessfr om our repr esentati on s  (for  propo sition s are d i s ti n ct fro m ou r r epresenta tio ns ,  but ar eno t  thing s);ra ther,it ist heir b eing "external"to lo g i c, th a t i s, th ei r not f o llow ing from l ogic alone.  Thisallo ws Lo tze toco nsiste ntl ymaintain t h at thereare p roposit io ns w hil e deny ingt h at th ey e xi st,  that the y ar e  e xt e rna l, a nd th at  the y are thi n gs. Thehyp o staticPl ato n i st, on th i s  reading,isnot t h e  theoristw ho h o ld s  mere ly tha t ther e are p r opo si tions,
onditional between_one and_the same content under_two guises_(p_and "the_proposition_that p is_valid"). This means_the fact that there_are propositions is_not_a fact "over and above" the laws of logic; rather, it is a trivial_consequence_of the_laws_of_logic themselves. Since the B-Platonist_takes the laws of logic_to be_the internal laws of judging itself rather than_laws_that describe some_external world of abstract objects, this means that it_is internal to judging itself that_there are propositions._In_the_terms introduced in the_section "Lotze's Platonism," this means that_the B-Platonist is also an ontological_Platonist. If we read Lotze's non-hypostatic Platonism_as Platonism B, as I have_argued we should, then he_is an_ontological Platonist about propositions. What_then becomes of_his foundational_distinction between the_validity of propositions and the existence_of things, if_he is admitting that there are_propositions?_The category of_existence_should_not, I_think, be identified_with_the category_of_what there is (existence in Frege's_quantificational_sense). Recall that Lotze consistently identifies existence_(Dasein), the first category_of_actuality, as the existence_of things (Dinge). Hypostatic Platonism_is consistently characterized as the view_that takes_propositions and_concepts to be existent things, thus transferring them into the category_of existence. I propose that we_read Lotze's category of_the existent,_of_things, not as_"what_there is"_but as that which is external to_judgement in_the specific sense that there being_such things does not_follow_from the internal logical rules of_judging itself. Lotze denies that there_is a purely logical proof_that_there_is a mind-independent world in_space and time, or that there_are causes for_every effect; consequently, these objects are "existent_things"_in Lotze's technical sense, and skepticism_about_them must receive a different answer_than_logical_skepticism. The "externality" of things_is not their distinctness from our_representations (for propositions are distinct from our representations, but_are not things);_rather, it is their being_"external"_to_logic, that is, their not following from logic alone. This_allows Lotze_to consistently maintain_that there are propositions while denying that they exist, that_they are external, and that they are_things. The hypostatic Platonist, on this reading, is not the theorist_who holds merely that there are propositions,