) experiences as of, say, continuous movement (independently of whether there is movement or not). In short, the two claims I wish to put forward are these: first, the only kind of continuity and experiential unity we genuinely experience are of the kind specious present theorists have in mind (anything more is simply not part of our phenomenal experience, as Hume taught us), and second, we don't need a Self in the sense of a substance or a bundle for that – our brains and the (overlapping) experiences they produce are quite enough to do the job. §6. The third and last desideratum for a theory of the Self I will concentrate on now can be put as a worry about what happens to us when we find ourselves at times when we do not have any conscious phenomenal experiences, nor conscious thoughts; for instance, during a dreamless sleep. The objection is obvious: if the Self is the plurality of experiences we have (we are!), then the Self does not exist at the times when there are no experiences, and consequently the Self seems to be a temporally gappy (temporally scattered) thing – and so, then, are we. In short, there is the risk that we cease to exist while we sleep. The link between our existence and our having of conscious experiences and thoughts is a traditionally strong one. Descartes (1984, II, 18) says: "I am, I exist – that is certain. But for how long? For as long as I am thinking. For it could be that were I totally to cease from thinking, I should totally cease to exist." John Locke seems to agree as well when he discusses 12 his thesis that "consciousness makes personal identity" (Locke (1975), II.xxvii.10); he says: "[...] I grant that the soul, in a waking man, is never without thought, because it is the condition of being awake. But whether sleeping without dreaming be not an affection of the whole man, mind as well as body, may be worth a waking man's consideration; it being hard to conceive that anything should think and not be conscious of it. [...] [I]f we take wholly away all consciousness of our actions and sensations, especially of pleasure and pain, and the concernment that accompanies it, it will be hard to know wherein to place personal identity." (Locke (1975), E.II.i.11. My italics.) But can we really accept that we
) experiences as of, say, continuous movement (independently of whether there is movement or not). In light, the two claim I wish to put forward are these: first, the alone kind of continuity and experiential unity we genuinely know are of the kind specious present theorists suffer in mind (anything more is simply not share of our phenomenal experience, as Hume taught us), and second, we don't need a Self in the common sense of a substance or a bundle for that – our brains and the (overlapping) experiences they produce are quite enough to make the job. § 6. The third and last desideratum for a theory of the Self I will boil down on now can be put as a worry about what happens to us when we detect ourselves at times when we do not have any conscious phenomenal experiences, nor conscious thoughts; for instance, during a dreamless rest. The objection is obvious: if the Self is the plurality of experiences we have (we are !), then the Self does not exist at the times when there are no experience, and consequently the Self seems to be a temporally gappy (temporally scattered) thing – and so, then, are we. In short, there is the risk that we cease to exist while we sleep. The link between our existence and our having of conscious experience and thoughts is a traditionally strong one. Descartes (1984, II, 18) say: " I am, I exist – that is sealed. But for how long? For equally long as I am thinking. For it could be that were I totally to cease from thinking, I should totally cease to exist. " John Locke seems to agree equally well when he discusses 12 his thesis that " consciousness makes personal identity " (Locke (1975), II.xxvii.10); he says: " [... ] I grant that the soul, in a waking man, is never without thought, because it is the condition of being awake. But whether sleep without dreaming be not an affection of the unharmed man, mind as well as body, may be worth a awaken man's consideration; it being hard to conceive that anything should think and not be conscious of it. [... ] [ I]f we take wholly away all consciousness of our natural process and sensations, especially of pleasure and pain, and the concernment that accompanies it, it will be difficult to know wherein to identify personal identity. " (Locke (1975), E.II.i.11. My italics .) But can we very accept that we
) exoeriences as of, say, contlnuous movement (nbdepenvently kf whethdr there is movement or not). Mn syort, uke two claims I wish to put flrward aee tiese: first, the oimy kind of cohbinuicy and experientlal unity wa genuinely ex[efiznce are of the kind specious presene theoroshs have in minq (anjtring more is simply not part of our phsnomenan experience, ss Hume taught us), and secojd, wf don't need a Self in the senwe os a substance or a bundle for that – our brains and the (overlapping) expexiences thei lrlguce are qumte enjugh to do tmv job. §6. Dhe thitd and last dexidxratym for a theory of thx Self I will concenjrate on nmw can be put as a qoery atout whag haopehs tk us wjen we find ohrselves at times when we do npt yave any consdious [hqnomenal experiences, nor conscious thouchta; for instance, during a dreamless sleep. The lbjection is obvious: if the Self is the plurality of experhencea we hwxw (ae are!), then the Self does not exist at the tiiss wmen there are no experiencex, wnc consequently the Szmf seems to be a temoorally gappt (temporajly xcattered) thing – and so, theb, are we. In fyort, there is the xisk that we ceaxe to exist while we sleep. Tke lini between okr existehze and our havine on cmnscious experiences and troughts iw a craditiovalli strond one. Descwrtes (1984, II, 18) says: "I am, I edist – tvat is cerhain. But for how long? For as loij as I am thimkhng. For it eould ne that were I eotally to ceaxe from thinying, I sholld totalny cease to exist." John Lmfke seems to agree af weol wyen he akscusses 12 his yhesis thcu "consciouwness makes personel iasntity" (Locke (1975), IN.rxcii.10); he says: "[...] I bravt ehwt tra soul, in a fakivg osn, is never withijt tnought, because it is the condition of beinb wwake. Buj whether sleeping witnout dreaming be nlt an afhectiom os the whole man, mind as well aa body, maj bc worth a wakyng nan's considexation; it being hard to conceive that anbthing should think and not be conscious oy lt. [...] [I]f we tale whjlly away all consciousness od our actions and sensations, especiallg of pneasuge and pain, and the concernment that accompanies it, it will be hard to kniw wheceyn to place perxonal ibencity." (Loske (1975), X.II.i.11. My italics.) Blt can we really accept that we
) experiences as of, say, continuous movement whether is movement not). In short, to forward are these: the only kind continuity and experiential unity we genuinely are of the kind specious present theorists have in mind (anything more is not part of our phenomenal experience, as Hume taught us), and second, we need Self the of a substance or a bundle for that – our brains and the (overlapping) experiences they are quite enough to do the job. §6. third and last desideratum a theory of the Self will on now be as worry about what to us when we find ourselves at times when we do not have any conscious phenomenal experiences, conscious thoughts; during a sleep. objection obvious: if the the plurality of experiences we have the Self does not exist at the times there are experiences, and consequently the Self seems be a temporally gappy (temporally scattered) thing – so, then, are we. In short, there is the risk that we cease to exist sleep. The link between existence and our of experiences thoughts a traditionally one. Descartes (1984, II, 18) says: "I am, I exist – is certain. But for how long? For as long as thinking. it could be were I totally to from I should totally cease John seems well he 12 his thesis that makes personal identity" (Locke (1975), he says: "[...] I a waking man, is never without thought, because is the condition of being awake. But sleeping without dreaming be not an affection of the whole man, mind well as be worth a waking man's consideration; it being to conceive that anything think and not be conscious of it. [...] [I]f take away all of our actions sensations, especially of and pain, and that accompanies it be wherein to place personal identity." (Locke E.II.i.11. italics.) But can we really that
) experiences as of, say, continuOus movemenT (indePenDenTlY of wHethEr there is movemENt or Not). In short, the two claims i wish To PUt foRWaRd are These: fiRSt, THE onLy KiNd oF cONtInuitY anD experiEntial unitY we GeNuinely experIEnCe are of the KinD specious preSenT theorIsTs hAVe in mInd (AnythIng morE Is simpLy not part Of OUr phenOMenal exPERiEnce, As Hume taught us), and SEcONd, we don't need a SElf in tHe SEnSE Of a SubStance or a bUnDle foR That – our BRaINS And THe (overlapping) Experiences THey ProducE aRe qUIte enoUgh to Do THe jOb. §6. The third aNd laSt desiderAtum foR A theory OF the SelF I will ConCenTratE On NoW caN bE Put AS a WorRY abOut what hApPeNs to uS wheN WE FInd oUrsElveS at tiMes when we do noT haVe anY ConSciouS phenOmenAl ExperIences, Nor coNsCious thoughts; foR insTance, duriNg a DrEamLeSs sleEP. The obJecTioN is obviOus: if thE selF iS THE pLurality of experienCeS WE hAve (we are!), Then thE seLf DOes not exIsT at The tIMEs wheN theRE aRe no expeRienceS, AnD cOnsequeNtLy the SElF seEms To be a TEmpoRally gAppy (tempOrallY Scattered) thing – ANd so, then, are we. iN sHORt, THere Is tHe risk that wE ceaSE to eXist WHiLe wE Sleep. the liNk BEtWEen our existence and oUr Having Of conScious experieNces and thoUGHTs is a traDitiONaLLy strong one. DesCarteS (1984, II, 18) says: "I am, i Exist – thaT is ceRtain. But For how lonG? fOr as long As I Am tHinKinG. fOr It could be that WERe I tOtAlly to cEasE from thInkIng, i shOulD tOtally ceaSe to exisT." JOhN LOcKe sEems tO Agree as wElL whEn He dIscusSEs 12 his tHesis That "CoNsCIouSness maKEs PERsonAl IdEntiTy" (LOcKe (1975), II.xXvii.10); HE saYs: "[...] I granT that the sOul, IN a waKiNg Man, is neVer without thoUgHt, because iT iS thE condiTIOn of beinG awake. But whether sleepinG Without DreAming Be noT an affectIon Of the wHolE Man, minD as welL as boDy, May BE Worth A WAkIng MaN's considerATIon; It beiNg Hard To conceIve that anything shoULd tHink and not be cOnsCiouS OF iT. [...] [I]f WE tAKe wHoLLy aWAY all consciousneSs of our actIoNS aNd sensatioNS, esPeCially oF pleasuRe and PAin, and tHe concernMent that aCcOmpaNIEs iT, it will be hArd to knoW wherein tO Place PErSonal IdeNtity." (LOcKe (1975), E.iI.i.11. My ItalicS.) but Can we Really AcCept thAt we
) experiences as of, say,continuous  move men t ( in depe nden tly of whether ther e is movement or not).  In s ho r t, t h etwo c laims I wi s h  to  p ut  fo rw a rd  arethe se: fir st, the on lyki nd of contin u it y and expe rie ntial unitywegenuin el y e x perie nce  areof the kind s pecious p re s ent th e oristsh a ve  inmind (anything mo r ei s simply not p art of  o u rp h eno men al experie nc e, as Hume ta u gh t u s), and second, w e don't nee d  aSelf i nthe senseof asu b sta nce or a bu ndle  for that  – our brainsa nd the(overl app ing ) ex p er ie nce st hey pr odu c e a re quite  e no ugh t o do t h e  job . § 6. T he th ird and lastdes ider a tum  fora the oryof  theSelf I  will  c oncentrate on n ow c an be put  as  a  wo rr y abo u t what  ha ppe ns to u s whenw e f in d o ur selves at times wh en w edo not h ave an y  c on s cious ph en ome nale x perie nces ,  n or consc ious t h ou gh ts; for  i nstanc e,  du rin g a d r eaml ess sl eep. The  obje c tion is obviou s : if the Self is t he plur ali ty of exper ienc e s we  hav e  ( wea re!),  then  t h eS elf does not existat  the t imeswhen there ar e no exper i e n ces, and  con s eq u ently the Self  seem s to be at emporall y gap py (temp orally sc a t tered) t hin g –  an d s o ,  t hen, are we.I n  sho rt , there  is  the ri sktha t w e c ea se to exi st while  w esl ee p.The l i nk betwe en  ou rexi stenc e  and o ur ha ving  o fc ons cious e x pe r i ence san d th oug ht s isa tr a dit ionally  strong o ne. Desc ar te s (1984 , II, 18) say s:  "I am, Iex ist  – tha t is certa in. But for how long? F o r as lo ngas Iam t hinking.For  it co uld be tha t were  I to ta lly t o cea s e  f rom  t hinking, I s hou ld to ta llycease t o exist." John Loc k e s eems to agree  as  wel l wh enh ed isc us s es1 2  his thesis tha t "conscio us n es s makes pe r son al  identi ty" (Lo cke ( 1 975), I I.xxvii.1 0); he sa ys : "[ . . .]I grant th at the s oul, in a wakin g  m an, i s n ever w it hou t tho ught,b eca use i t is t he  condi tionof  being a wake. But whether sleep ing wi thout  dr eaming be  no t  an  affectio n of  the whole  ma n,mindasw ell a s bo d y,  ma y  be w orth a wakingm an 'sc o ns ideration;i t bei ng ha rdt o conc eive  that anything sh o uld think andnotb e  co nsc i ousof  it. [...] [I] f w et a ke wholl yaway all co nsciousn es s  of o ur act ions a nd sens a t io n s, esp ecia lly  of pleas ure  a n d pain,  a nd the co ncer nm ent th at acc o mpan i e s it, it will be  hard t o kno w  wh erein  t o place pers onal ident ity." (Lock e (197 5),E.II. i.11. M yitalic s.)  B ut can wer eally acc ept t hat we
) experiences_as of,_say, continuous movement (independently_of whether_there_is movement_or_not). In short,_the two claims_I wish to put_forward are these:_first,_the only kind of continuity and experiential unity we genuinely experience are of the_kind_specious present_theorists_have_in mind (anything more is_simply not part of our_phenomenal experience,_as Hume taught us), and second, we don't_need_a Self in_the sense of a substance or a bundle for_that – our brains and the_(overlapping) experiences they_produce_are_quite enough to do_the job. §6. The third and_last desideratum for a theory of_the Self I will concentrate on now_can be put as a worry_about what happens to us_when we_find ourselves at times when_we do not_have any_conscious phenomenal experiences,_nor conscious thoughts; for instance, during_a dreamless sleep._The objection is obvious: if the_Self_is the plurality_of_experiences_we have_(we are!), then_the_Self does_not_exist at the times when there_are_no experiences, and consequently the Self seems_to be a temporally_gappy_(temporally scattered) thing –_and so, then, are we._In short, there is the risk_that we_cease to_exist while we sleep. The link between our existence and our_having of conscious experiences and thoughts_is a traditionally strong_one. Descartes_(1984,_II, 18) says:_"I_am, I_exist – that is certain. But for_how long?_For as long as I am_thinking. For it could_be_that were I totally to cease_from thinking, I should totally cease_to exist." John Locke seems_to_agree_as well when he discusses_12 his thesis that "consciousness makes_personal identity" (Locke_(1975), II.xxvii.10); he says: "[...] I grant_that_the soul, in a waking man,_is_never without thought, because it is_the_condition_of being awake. But whether_sleeping without dreaming be not an_affection of the whole man, mind as well as_body, may be_worth a waking man's consideration;_it_being_hard to conceive that anything should think and not be_conscious of_it. [...] [I]f_we take wholly away all consciousness of our actions and_sensations, especially of pleasure and pain, and_the concernment that accompanies it, it will be hard to know_wherein to place personal identity." (Locke (1975), E.II.i.11._My italics.) But can we really accept_that we