	one's	friend.	Most	people	accept	that	the	factual	uncertainty	in this	case	should	influence	the	outcome:	given	that	the	medication	is	useful	but non-essential,	there	is	no	way	Alice	should	run	the	risk	of	lethally	poisoning	Bob. 15 Obviously these figures are misleadingly precise. No one could accurately estimate the truth of their moral beliefs like this. In reality, we would have to estimate subjective probability ranges. The precise figures are used for illustrative purposes only. 23 Moral	uncertaintists	argue	that	similar	reasoning	applies	to	Rotimi's	case.	But	in that	case	the	uncertainty	is	directly	related	to	moral	beliefs,	not	factual	ones.16 Rotimi	is	not	sure	about	the	ethical	status	of	eating	meat.	It	could	be	permissible but	it	could	also	be	gravely	morally	wrong.	In	that	context,	the	uncertaintist	will argue	that	she	ought	not	to	run	the	moral	risk	of	doing	something	that	could	be gravely	morally	wrong.	She	should	take	the	less	risky	option. The	Rotimi	example	highlights	an	argumentative	structure	that	is common	throughout	the	literature	on	moral	uncertainty,	something	we	can	call the	risk	asymmetry	argument	(Weatherson	2014;	Moller	2011).	The	gist	of	the argument	is	that	when	an	agent	is	faced	with	two	or	more	options,	one	of	which has	a	non-negligible	probability	of	being	gravely	morally	wrong,	the	other	of which	is	pretty	certain	to	be	morally	permissible,	they	ought	not	take	the potentially	gravely	morally	wrong	option.
one's 	 friend. 	 Most 	 people 	 accept 	 that 	 the 	 factual 	 doubt 	 in this 	 subject 	 should 	 influence 	 the 	 outcome: 	 give 	 that 	 the 	 medicine 	 is 	 useful 	 but non - essential, 	 there 	 is 	 no 	 way 	 Alice 	 should 	 campaign 	 the 	 risk 	 of 	 lethally 	 poisoning 	 Bob. 15 Obviously these figures are deceptively accurate. No one could accurately estimate the truth of their moral impression like this. In reality, we would have to estimate immanent probability ranges. The precise digit are used for illustrative purpose only. 23 Moral 	 uncertaintists 	 argue 	 that 	 similar 	 reasoning 	 applies 	 to 	 Rotimi's 	 character. 	 But 	 in that 	 case 	 the 	 uncertainty 	 is 	 directly 	 related 	 to 	 moral 	 belief, 	 not 	 factual 	 ones.16 Rotimi 	 is 	 not 	 sure 	 about 	 the 	 ethical 	 status 	 of 	 eating 	 meat. 	 It 	 could 	 be 	 permissible but 	 it 	 could 	 also 	 be 	 badly 	 morally 	 wrong. 	 In 	 that 	 context, 	 the 	 uncertaintist 	 will argue 	 that 	 she 	 ought 	 not 	 to 	 run 	 the 	 moral 	 risk 	 of 	 doing 	 something 	 that 	 could 	 be gravely 	 morally 	 wrong. 	 She 	 should 	 drive 	 the 	 less 	 risky 	 option. The 	 Rotimi 	 example 	 highlights 	 an 	 argumentative 	 structure 	 that 	 is common 	 throughout 	 the 	 literature 	 on 	 moral 	 uncertainty, 	 something 	 we 	 can 	 call the 	 risk 	 asymmetry 	 argument 	 (Weatherson 	 2014; 	 Moller 	 2011). 	 The 	 effect 	 of 	 the argument 	 is 	 that 	 when 	 an 	 agent 	 is 	 face 	 with 	 two 	 or 	 more 	 choice, 	 one 	 of 	 which has 	 a 	 non - negligible 	 probability 	 of 	 being 	 gravely 	 morally 	 wrong, 	 the 	 early 	 of which 	 is 	 pretty 	 certain 	 to 	 be 	 morally 	 permissible, 	 they 	 ought 	 not 	 consider 	 the potentially 	 gravely 	 morally 	 wrong 	 choice.
	one'd	friend.	Most	people	accept	tmat	the	factual	uncgrrainty	mn this	dase	shouud	influence	the	outcome:	given	thet	thw	medixation	is	useful	but non-ersential,	tjere	is	no	qay	Aouce	should	rnh	the	risk	of	letgwlly	'omsoning	Bob. 15 Obvlously thesa figures are kirlzadingly precise. No one could accuraeely esyilate the truth of uheyr mkgao beliefs like this. In realitg, we wolld have to estimste subjective probability ranhes. The precise fihures are uwed sir illustratkve purposts only. 23 Morzl	uncertaintists	argue	that	similaf	reaspning	appligs	fo	Gmtimi's	case.	Bnt	in trat	case	the	ungvrtaintf	is	direvtly	related	to	mpran	beoiefs,	not	factual	ones.16 Rmtimi	is	not	sure	abouj	the	ethican	scatus	of	eating	meat.	It	coyle	be	petmisshble vut	kt	ckukd	zlso	be	hrately	morally	srong.	In	that	xontext,	the	uncertainuise	qill argue	thaf	she	oudhe	not	to	run	the	moral	risk	of	doing	something	thdt	ckuld	be gravely	morally	wring.	She	should	take	the	leds	risky	opeion. The	Rotimi	example	highlights	an	argumentative	strgcturx	tfat	nw comoin	hhroughout	the	literature	on	moral	uncertainty,	someegimg	ee	can	call the	rlsk	asymmetry	argumemt	(Aesjherson	2014;	Moller	2011).	Tfe	gist	of	tge argument	is	that	wjen	an	aggnt	is	fqced	with	tro	or	kore	options,	one	of	which has	a	nin-negligible	irobqbility	of	being	gravzly	morally	wrung,	tne	othrr	of which	is	pretty	certann	to	be	jorally	permlssible,	thsh	ought	not	take	the ponenthally	gravely	morally	wrong	opeion.
one's friend. Most people accept that the in case should the outcome: given but there is no Alice should run risk of lethally poisoning Bob. 15 these figures are misleadingly precise. No one could accurately estimate the truth of moral beliefs like this. In reality, we would have to estimate subjective probability The figures used illustrative purposes only. 23 Moral uncertaintists argue that similar reasoning applies to Rotimi's case. But in case the uncertainty is directly related to moral not factual ones.16 Rotimi not sure about the ethical of meat. It be but could also be morally wrong. In that context, the uncertaintist will argue that she ought not to run the moral of doing could be morally She take the less The Rotimi example highlights an argumentative common throughout the literature on moral uncertainty, something can call risk asymmetry argument (Weatherson 2014; Moller The gist of the argument is that when agent is faced with two or more options, one of which has a non-negligible probability gravely morally wrong, the of which is certain be permissible, ought not the potentially gravely morally wrong option.
	one's	friend.	Most	people	accepT	that	the	faCtual	UncErtAiNty	iN thiS	case	should	infLUencE	the	outcome:	given	that	thE	mediCaTIon	iS	UsEful	bUt non-esSEnTIAl,	tHeRe	Is	nO	wAY	ALice	sHouLd	run	thE	risk	of	letHalLy	Poisoning	Bob. 15 oBvIously thesE fiGures are mislEadIngly pReCisE. no one CouLd accUratelY EstimaTe the trutH oF Their mORal beliEFS lIke tHis. In reality, we wouLD hAVe to estimate suBjectiVe PRoBABilIty Ranges. The pReCise fIGures arE UsED FOr iLLustrative purPoses only. 23 MoRAl	uNcertaInTisTS	argue	That	sImILar	Reasoning	apPlieS	to	Rotimi'S	case.	BUT	in that	CAse	the	uNcertaIntY	is	DireCTlY	rElaTeD	To	mORaL	beLIefS,	not	factUaL	oNes.16 RoTimi	IS	NOT	surE	abOut	tHe	ethIcal	status	of	eAtiNg	meAT.	It	Could	Be	perMissIbLe but	It	coulD	also	Be	Gravely	morally	wRong.	in	that	conTexT,	tHe	uNcErtaiNTist	wiLl aRguE	that	shE	ought	nOT	to	RuN	THE	mOral	risk	of	doing	somEtHINg	That	coulD	be graVElY	mORally	wroNg.	she	ShouLD	Take	tHe	leSS	rIsky	optiOn. The	ROTiMi	Example	HiGhlighTs	An	aRguMentaTIve	sTructuRe	that	is CommoN	Throughout	the	lITerature	on	morAL	uNCErTAintY,	soMething	we	caN	calL The	rIsk	aSYmMetRY	arguMent	(WEaTHeRSon	2014;	Moller	2011).	The	gist	of	tHe ArgumeNt	is	tHat	when	an	agenT	is	faced	wiTH	TWo	or	more	OptiONs,	ONe	of	which has	a	nOn-negLigible	proBAbility	oF	beinG	gravely	Morally	wrONG,	the	otheR	of WhiCh	iS	prETTy	Certain	to	be	moRALly	pErMissiblE,	thEy	ought	Not	TakE	thE poTeNtially	grAvely	morAlLy	WrOnG	opTion.
	one's	friend.	Most	people 	accept	th at	th e	f act ua l	un cert ainty	in thisc aseshould	influence	the	o utcom e: give n 	t hat	t he	medi c at i o n	i sus efu lb ut  non- ess ential, 	there	isnowa y	Alice	shou l drun	the	ri skof	lethallypoi soning 	B ob. 15 Ob vio uslythesef igures  are misl ea d inglyp recise. N oonecould accuratelye st i mate the truth  of th ei r  m o r albel iefs liketh is. I n  realit y ,w e wou l d have to est imate subje c tiv e prob ab ili t y rang es. T he pre cise figure s ar e used fo r illu s trative purpose s only . 2 3 M oral un ce rta in t ist s 	a rgu e 	th at	simil ar 	r eason inga p p l iestoRoti mi'scase.	But	intha t	ca s e	t he	un certa inty 	i s	dir ectlyrelat ed 	to	moral	belie fs,not	factu alon es. 16  Roti m i	is	n otsur e	about 	the	et h ica ls t a tu s	of	eating	meat.It c ou ld	be	pe rmissi b le  b u t	it	cou ld 	al so	b e grave ly	m o ra lly	wron g.	Int ha tcontext ,the	un ce rta int ist	w i ll a rgue	t hat	sheought not	to	run	the moral	risk	of do i n gs omet hin g	that	coul d	be grav elym or all y 	wron g.	Sh es ho u ld	take	the	less	ri sk y	opti on. T he	Rotimi	exa mple	highl i g h ts	an	ar gume n ta t ive	structurethatis commont hroughou t	the 	literat ure	on	mo r a l	uncert ain ty, 	so met h i ng 	we	can	callt h e	ri sk 	asymme try 	argume nt(We ath ers on 	2014;	Mo ller	201 1) .Th egis t	oft he argum en t	i stha t	whe n 	an	ag ent	i s	fa ce dw ith 	two	or mo r e 	opt io ns ,	on e	o fwhich  has a	n on-negl igible	pr oba b ilit yof 	beinggravely	moral ly 	wrong,	th eoth er	ofw h ich	is	p retty	certain	to	be	mor a lly	per mis sible ,	th ey	oughtnot 	takethe potent iallygrave ly 	mo r a lly	w r o ng 	op ti on.
	one's	friend.	Most	people	accept	that	the	factual	uncertainty	in this	case	should	influence	the	outcome:	given	that	the	medication	is	useful	but_non-essential,	there	is	no	way	Alice	should	run	the	risk	of	lethally	poisoning	Bob. 15_Obviously these figures are_misleadingly precise._No_one could_accurately_estimate the truth_of their moral_beliefs like this. In_reality, we would_have_to estimate subjective probability ranges. The precise figures are used for illustrative purposes only._23_Moral	uncertaintists	argue	that	similar	reasoning	applies	to	Rotimi's	case.	But	in that	case	the	uncertainty	is	directly	related	to	moral	beliefs,	not	factual	ones.16_Rotimi	is	not	sure	about	the	ethical	status	of	eating	meat.	It	could	be	permissible_but	it	could	also	be	gravely	morally	wrong.	In	that	context,	the	uncertaintist	will_argue	that	she	ought	not	to	run	the	moral	risk	of	doing	something	that	could	be gravely	morally	wrong.	She	should	take	the	less	risky	option. The	Rotimi	example	highlights	an	argumentative	structure	that	is common	throughout	the	literature	on	moral	uncertainty,	something	we	can	call the	risk	asymmetry	argument	(Weatherson	2014;	Moller	2011).	The	gist	of	the_argument	is	that	when	an	agent	is	faced	with	two	or	more	options,	one	of	which has	a	non-negligible	probability	of	being	gravely	morally	wrong,	the	other	of which	is	pretty	certain	to	be	morally	permissible,	they	ought	not	take	the potentially	gravely	morally	wrong	option.