 and acting on moral ideas that are true (or false) relative to their own cultures. But that's not the only possible answer. Some philosophers think that people aren't really talking about anything, but are instead just expressing their own personal subjective feelings. This view is called expressivism. Others think that people are talking about objective morality-there just isn't any objective morality actually out there, so they're making a mistake, like when people used to talk about witches or dragons. This is the error theory. (There are other theories too.) All of these theories-relativism, expressivism, error theory-share the idea that there's no objective morality, but they disagree over what, in that case, 10 people are actually doing when they engage in moral practices. And relativism isn't a popular option, even among anti-objectivists. Why not? Let's look a bit more carefully at the moral relativist's distinctive idea. This is that moral claims can be true and false, but only relative to different cultures. So, for example,'stealing is wrong' might be true relative to modern English culture, but false relative to some other culture. This means that, if I'm a member of the one culture-if I'm a modern Englishman-then'stealing is wrong' is true for me, whereas if you're a member of the other culture then it's false for you. But what is a culture? Where does one culture end, and another one begin? For example, are England and Scotland different cultures, or are they parts of the same culture? (Or London and Yorkshire? Or East London and West London?) Relatedly, how do you know which culture you belong to, and so which moral claims are true for you? I'm English and Cuban and Russian and American. When these conflict, who decides which morality applies to me? And what about disagreement within cultures? Not everyone in England (or in rural China or in the Amazon basin) shares the same moral code. So what then does it mean exactly to say that some moral judgement is 'true relative to English (or Chinese or Amazonian) culture'? Who decides what is true relative to a given culture? The root problem here is that cultures aren't always discrete, homogenous, easily categorisable entities. (In fact, many anthropologists nowadays don't even use the term 'culture'.) What's more, cultures aren't the only determinants of our moral identities. Our moral outlooks are shaped not
and acting on moral ideas that are true (or false) proportional to their own acculturation. But that's not the only possible solution. Some philosophers intend that people aren't really spill the beans about anything, but are instead just express their own personal subjective feelings. This scene is called expressivism. Others think that multitude are spill about objective morality - there barely isn't any objective morality actually out there, so they're make a mistake, like when people used to lecture about witches or dragons. This is the error theory. (There be other theories too .) All of these theories - relativism, expressivism, error hypothesis - share the idea that there's no objective morality, but they disagree over what, in that case, 10 people are actually doing when they betroth in moral practice. And relativism isn't a popular option, even among anti - objectivists. Why not? Let's look a bit more carefully at the moral relativist's classifiable idea. This is that moral claim can be true and assumed, but only relative to different cultures. therefore, for example,'stealing is wrong' might be true relative to modern English acculturation, but false relative to some other culture. This means that, if I'm a member of the one culture - if I'm a advanced Englishman - then'stealing is wrong' is true for me, whereas if you're a member of the other acculturation then it's false for you. But what is a acculturation? Where does one culture end, and another one begin? For example, are England and Scotland different culture, or are they parts of the same culture? (Or London and Yorkshire? Or East London and West London ?) Relatedly, how do you acknowledge which culture you belong to, and so which moral claims are true for you? I'm English and Cuban and Russian and American. When these dispute, who decides which ethical motive applies to me? And what about disagreement within cultures? Not everyone in England (or in rural China or in the Amazon basin) shares the like moral code. So what then does it mean exactly to say that some moral judgment is' true relative to English (or Chinese or Amazonian) culture'? Who decide what is true relative to a give culture? The root problem here is that cultures aren't always discrete, homogenous, easily categorisable entities. (In fact, many anthropologists nowadays don't even practice the term' culture' .) What's more, polish aren't the only determinants of our moral identities. Our moral outlooks are shaped not
 anf acting on moral ideas uhat are true (or yqlse) rxlative to theif own cultures. But that's not tye onoy possible answer. Somd philosoihers thibk tiat people aren't really bclkinf abobt anything, but sre insteag just expresshne cheir own personal subjective feelinds. This vlew is called gxprexfiviam. Others think that people are tamking auout objective korality-there just isn't anj obuective morality aftually out theww, so they're oaking a mpvtake, like when people used to talk about witckes or draginw. Tjhs is the ecror treory. (There are othes theoroes too.) All of thxse rheories-relativism, ex'ressivism, error thejry-share dhz idea that there's no ovjecthve korauuty, buu tiey disaggee over what, in that cawe, 10 people are actusljj doing when fhey eggwge in moral practices. And relativism ivn't a popular option, even qmong anti-objectivistd. Why not? Let's look a bit more carefully at the moral reladivisv's diwtlnctkce idea. This is that moral claims can be true ags gakse, but only rclative to differemt cijtures. So, for example,'sfealing is wrong' mlght be true relative to kodern English culture, but dalse relatine ti some other cultuxe. This meanr thst, if I'm a member of the one culfure-if I'm a modern Ehelishman-then'steauinn iv wrong' is true for me, wheweas if yiu're a membdr og the jther cultkre tman it's false for ylu. Buj what is a cultkre? Where does one culture end, eid another ong bagit? For excmple, sre England agd Scotland diyferent eulturds, or are nhey partv of the saie culture? (Or Pondon and Ymrkshire? Or Wast London xnd West Londom?) Relatedly, how do tou know which culbure ioh belong to, and so which moral clsimr awe tcue fjs you? I'm Engnish ana Cubav and Russicn and American. When these conrlict, who decides ehlch moraluty applyes to me? And what about disagrtement wivhin ciltores? Not everyone in England (or in rural Chlna or in the Amadon fasin) sharzs the same moral code. So what then does it mean exactly jo say that some morak judgement ms 'truq relativa to English (or Chinwse or Amazonian) gulture'? Who decides whzt is drue gelative to a given culture? The root problem here is that cultures aren't qlways discrete, hojogemous, vasnly categjrisebue entities. (In fsct, many anthropologists nowadabs don't evan use the term 'culture'.) What's kofe, cultures aten't the only determinants of our koral identities. Our moral outlpoks are shaped not
and acting on moral ideas that are false) to their cultures. But that's Some think that people really talking about but are instead just expressing their personal subjective feelings. This view is called expressivism. Others think that people are about objective morality-there just isn't any objective morality actually out there, so they're a like people to talk about witches or dragons. This is the error theory. (There are other theories too.) of these theories-relativism, expressivism, error theory-share the idea there's no objective morality, they disagree over what, in case, people are doing they in moral practices. relativism isn't a popular option, even among anti-objectivists. Why not? Let's look a bit more carefully at moral relativist's This is moral can true and false, relative to different cultures. So, for might be true relative to modern English culture, false relative some other culture. This means that, I'm a member of the one culture-if I'm modern Englishman-then'stealing is wrong' is true for me, whereas if you're a member of the then it's false for But what is culture? does culture and another begin? For example, are England and Scotland different cultures, or are parts of the same culture? (Or London and Yorkshire? Or and London?) Relatedly, how you know which culture belong and so which moral true you? Cuban Russian American. When these conflict, decides which morality applies to And what about disagreement England (or in rural China or in the basin) shares the same moral code. So then does it mean exactly to say that some moral judgement is relative to Chinese or Amazonian) culture'? Who decides what is relative to a given The root problem here is that cultures aren't always homogenous, categorisable entities. fact, many anthropologists don't even use term 'culture'.) What's aren't the determinants our moral outlooks are shaped not
 and acting on moral ideas that Are true (or fAlse) rElaTivE tO theIr owN cultures. But thAT's noT the only possible answer. some pHiLOsopHErS thinK that peOPlE ARen'T rEaLly TaLKiNg aboUt aNything, But are instEad JuSt expressing THeIr own persoNal Subjective feEliNgs. ThiS vIew IS callEd eXpresSivism. oThers tHink that pEoPLe are tALking abOUT oBjecTive morality-there JUsT Isn't any objectiVe moraLiTY aCTUalLy oUt there, so tHeY're maKIng a misTAkE, LIKe wHEn people used tO talk about wITchEs or drAgOns. tHis is tHe errOr THeoRy. (There are oTher Theories tOo.) All oF These thEOries-reLativiSm, eXprEssiVIsM, eRroR tHEorY-ShAre THe iDea that tHeRe'S no obJectIVE MOralIty, But tHey diSagree over whaT, in That CAse, 10 PeoplE are aCtuaLlY doinG when tHey enGaGe in moral practiCes. ANd relativIsm IsN't a PoPular OPtion, eVen AmoNg anti-oBjectivISts. whY NOT? LEt's look a bit more carEfULLy At the morAl relaTIvIsT'S distincTiVe iDea. THIS is thAt moRAl Claims caN be truE AnD fAlse, but OnLy relaTiVe tO diFfereNT culTures. SO, for examPle,'stEAling is wrong' miGHt be true relatIVe TO MoDErn ENglIsh culture, bUt faLSe reLatiVE tO soME otheR cultUrE. thIS means that, if I'm a membEr Of the oNe culTure-if I'm a modeRn EnglishmAN-THen'stealIng iS WrONg' is true for me, wHereaS if you're a mEMber of thE otheR culture Then it's faLSE for you. BUt wHat Is a CulTURe? where does one cULTure EnD, and anoTheR one begIn? FOr eXamPle, ArE England aNd ScotlaNd DiFfErEnt CultuREs, or are tHeY paRtS of The saME cultuRe? (Or LOndoN aNd yOrkShire? Or eAsT lOndoN aNd west lonDoN?) RelaTedlY, How Do you knOw which cuLtuRE you BeLoNg to, and So which moral cLaIms are true FoR yoU? I'm EngLISh and CubAn and Russian and American. wHen thesE coNflicT, who Decides whIch MoraliTy aPPlies tO me? And What aBoUt dISAgreeMENt WitHiN cultures? NOT EveRyone In englAnd (or in Rural China or in the AMAzoN basin) shares tHe sAme mORAl CodE. so WHat ThEN doES It mean exactly to Say that somE mORaL judgement IS 'trUe RelativE to EnglIsh (or cHinese oR AmazoniaN) culture'? WHo DeciDES whAt is true reLative to A given culTUre? ThE RoOt proBleM here iS tHat CultuRes areN'T alWays dIscretE, hOmogenOus, eaSiLy categoRisable entities. (In fact, maNy anthRopolOgiSts nowadaYs dON't eVen use the Term 'Culture'.) WhaT's mOre, CultuRes ARen't tHe onLY dEteRMinanTs of OUr moral idENtItiES. ouR moral outloOKS Are ShapeD noT
 and acting on moral ideas  that aretrue(or  fa ls e) r elat ive to their o w n cu ltures. But that's not  theon l y po s si ble a nswer.S om e phi lo so phe rs th ink t hat  people  aren't re all ytalking abou t  a nything, b utare insteadjus t expr es sin g  thei r o wn pe rsonal subjec tive feel in g s. Thi s  view i s ca lled  expressivism. Ot h er s  think that pe ople a re ta l k ing  ab out object iv e mor a lity-th e re j u sti sn't any obje ctive moral i tyactual ly  ou t  there , soth e y'r e making amist ake, like  whenp eople u s ed to t alk ab out  wi tche s  o rdra go n s.T hi s i s  th e errorth eo ry. ( Ther e a r e ot her  the ories  too.) All of  th eset heo ries- relat ivis m,  expr essivi sm, e rr or theory-share  the  idea tha t t he re' sno ob j ective  mo ral ity, bu t theyd isa gr e e ov er what, in that c as e ,  1 0 people  are a c tu al l y doingwh enthey e ngage  inm or al pract ices.A nd  r elativi sm  isn't  a  po pul ar op t ion,  evenamong an ti-ob j ectivists. Why not? Let's lo o ka bi t  mor e c arefully at  the mora l re l at ivi s t's d istin ct i ve idea. This is thatmo ral cl aimscan be true a nd false,b u t  only re lati v et o different cu lture s. So, for example, 'stea ling iswrong' mi g h t be tru e r ela tiv e t o mo dern Englishc u ltur e,  but fa lse  relati vetosom e o th er cultur e. Thisme an sth at,  if I ' m a memb er  of  t heone c u lture- if I' m amo de r n E nglishm a n- t h en's te al ingiswr ong'is t r uefor me,  whereasify ou'r eamemberof the othercu lture then  i t's  false f or you.But what is a culture?W here do esone c ultu re end, a ndanothe r o n e begi n? For  exam pl e,a r e Eng l a nd  an dScotland d i f fer ent c ul ture s, or a re they parts of t h e s ame culture?(Or  Lon d o nand Yo r ksh ir e ? O r East London and  West Lond on ? )Relatedly, how  d o you k now whi ch cu l ture yo u belongto, and s owhic h mor al claimsare true  for you? I'm E n gl ish a ndCubanan d R ussia n andA mer ican.  Whenth ese co nflic t,  who dec ides which morality app lies t o me?  An d what ab out dis agreement  wit hin cultur es?  No t eve ryo n e inEngl a nd  (o r  in r ural China ori nthe A ma zon basin)s h a res  thesam e  moral  cod e. So what then d o es it mean exa ctly t o s ayt hatso me moral judge men ti s  'true r el ative to En glish (o rC hines e or A mazoni an) cul t u re ' ? Whodeci des  what istru er elative  t oa  given  cul tu re? Th e root prob l e m here is that c ultur e s  aren ' t a lways  d iscrete ,  hom ogenous, e asily categ orisab le e ntiti es. (In  f act, m any  a nthropolog i sts nowad ays d on't ev en  use  th e term  'cu l t ure'. ) Wh at 'smore, cul t u re s  a re n 'ttheonlyde term inants of our mora l i d entitie s.  Ou r moralo ut l o oks are sh ape d not 
 and_acting on_moral ideas that are_true (or_false)_relative to_their_own cultures. But_that's not the_only possible answer. Some_philosophers think that_people_aren't really talking about anything, but are instead just expressing their own personal subjective_feelings._This view_is_called_expressivism. Others think that people_are talking about objective morality-there_just isn't_any objective morality actually out there, so they're_making_a mistake, like_when people used to talk about witches or dragons._This is the error theory. (There_are other theories_too.)_All_of these theories-relativism, expressivism,_error theory-share the idea that there's_no objective morality, but they disagree_over what, in that case, 10 people_are actually doing when they engage_in moral practices. And relativism_isn't a_popular option, even among anti-objectivists._Why not? Let's_look a_bit more carefully_at the moral relativist's distinctive idea._This is that_moral claims can be true and_false,_but only relative_to_different_cultures. So,_for example,'stealing is_wrong'_might be_true_relative to modern English culture, but_false_relative to some other culture. This means_that, if I'm a_member_of the one culture-if_I'm a modern Englishman-then'stealing is_wrong' is true for me, whereas_if you're_a member_of the other culture then it's false for you. But what_is a culture? Where does one_culture end, and another_one begin?_For_example, are England_and_Scotland different_cultures, or are they parts of the_same culture?_(Or London and Yorkshire? Or East_London and West London?)_Relatedly,_how do you know which culture_you belong to, and so which_moral claims are true for_you?_I'm_English and Cuban and Russian_and American. When these conflict, who_decides which morality_applies to me? And what about disagreement_within_cultures? Not everyone in England (or_in_rural China or in the Amazon_basin)_shares_the same moral code. So_what then does it mean exactly_to say that some moral judgement is 'true relative_to English (or_Chinese or Amazonian) culture'? Who_decides_what_is true relative to a given culture? The root problem_here is_that cultures aren't_always discrete, homogenous, easily categorisable entities. (In fact, many anthropologists_nowadays don't even use the term 'culture'.)_What's more, cultures aren't the only determinants of our moral identities._Our moral outlooks are shaped not