if someone did that here, we'd be in Silence of the Lambs territory). In the context of these other cultural beliefs and ideas, though, it maybe isn't wrong. So the answer to this question depends on your culture. And that's just moral relativism, right? Well, no. Not in the way that term is normally understood. Specifically, accepting this needn't require anyone to give up the idea that there is one true objective universal morality. All it requires us to give up is the idea that morality consists in simple rules. And that's something we should give up anyway. Morality isn't simple; it's highly complex. The morality of an action depends on all sorts of subtle factors, including the motivations and beliefs of the person acting, the circumstances in which they act, the likely further effects of their action, and so on. All of this and more has to be taken into account when making moral judgements. But that doesn't mean that the standards we use to make such judgements, and the judgements themselves, aren't objective. It just means that they're complicated, and sensitive to context. 8 Once we accept that morality is complex, we'll no longer expect it to give us simple, universal rules like 'It's wrong to steal'. We'll expect it to give us more nuanced, particular judgements like 'It's wrong to steal clothes from a shop when you already have plenty of clothes' and 'It's permissible to steal unwanted food to save yourself from starvation'. (Even these still aren't nuanced and particular enough-they themselves are open to exceptions- but you get the idea.) And there's no reason to think that these more specific judgements can't be utterly objective and universal. These judgements (or more specific versions of them) might apply to all people in all places at all times: for instance, to anyone lost in the wilderness, regardless of time and place. So this isn't yet moral relativism. To distinguish it from relativism, philosophers call it contextualism. It's the idea that moral judgements must always take into account the particular context of their subject matter. Looking back, many of the anthropologists I grew up listening to over dinner weren't really relativists, but contextualists. Their main worry was about people blundering into foreign cultures, taking one look at the local practices, and forming strong moral judgements about them based only on simple rules derived from their own unexamined cultural ideas and beliefs. But you don't need
if someone did that here, we'd be in Silence of the Lambs territory). In the context of these other cultural beliefs and idea, though, it possibly isn't wrong. So the solution to this question count on your culture. And that's just moral relativism, good? Well, no. Not in the way that term is normally understand. Specifically, accepting this needn't want anyone to give up the idea that there be one true objective universal morality. All it requires us to give up is the idea that ethical motive consists in simple rules. And that's something we should hold up anyway. Morality isn't elementary; it's highly complex. The morality of an military action depends on all sorts of subtle factors, including the motivation and beliefs of the person acting, the circumstances in which they act, the likely further effects of their action, and so on. All of this and more has to be taken into account when making moral judgements. But that doesn't mean that the standards we use to do such judgements, and the judgements themselves, aren't objective. It just mean that they're complicated, and sensitive to context. 8 Once we accept that morality is complex, we'll no longer ask it to give us simple, universal rules like' It's faulty to steal'. We'll expect it to give us more nuanced, particular judgements like' It's amiss to steal clothes from a shop when you already have plenty of clothes' and' It's permissible to steal unwanted food to write yourself from starvation'. (Even these still aren't nuanced and particular enough - they themselves are open to exceptions- but you get the idea .) And there's no rationality to think that these more specific judgements can't be utterly objective and cosmopolitan. These judgements (or more specific version of them) might apply to all people in all place at all times: for example, to anyone lost in the wilderness, regardless of time and topographic point. So this isn't so far moral relativism. To distinguish it from relativism, philosopher call it contextualism. It's the theme that moral judgements must always assume into account the finical context of their subject matter. Looking back, many of the anthropologists I grew up listening to over dinner weren't really relativists, but contextualists. Their main worry was about citizenry blundering into foreign culture, taking one look at the local practices, and forming strong moral judgements about them free-base only on simple rules derived from their own unexamined cultural ideas and beliefs. But you don't need
if domeone did that here, we'a be in Silence of the Lambs territofy). In the context of these ovher cultyral beliefs and ideas, though, in maybe iwn't xrong. So the ansxsr to tmns qusdtiou vepends on your culture. Atd that's just kofap relativism, right? Well, no. Not in tre way yhwt term is noriallj tndedstood. Specifically, accepting this needn't require anyome to give up the idea thah thfre is one true obuective unicerswo morality. Aul it requpxes us to gjve up is the idea that moralith conxists in sumple tules. And thet's soiething we smpuld ghve up snyway. Moralitn isn'v sinple; it's highly complxx. The morality of ag action ge'ends on all sorts of sybtle facdors, uncuudjnj tge motlvavions and bsliefs of tye person acting, tht cygvumstances ih whicr ehey act, the likely further effects of uheir action, and so on. All od this and more has tl be takeg into account when making moral judgements. But tvat dkdsn'u nean gyah the standards we use to make such judgementf, amd the judgementf themselvex, wrrg't objective. Kt jusc msans that they're clmplicajed, ane sensitide tp context. 8 Once we accept tyat morality us complex, we'll no longer expzct it to gove us simple, universal rulss like 'It's wrong to rteal'. We'll expecg in to give us more nuanced, partycular juvgemeuts like 'It's wrong to steal flothcv from a shop when you clreagy have plfnty of clothes' and 'It's permissmule to steal onwdntvd food tj savc yourself from starvation'. (Evgn these ftill aren't nuahced anv particular enough-they tvgmselves are mpen to qxceptiobs- but huu get the ides.) And thege'f no reason to think tmat tfsse more specifne hudgements can't be uteegly ofbective and gnivdrsxk. There judgtiekts (or kore specific versiots or them) might apply tj all peiple in wll places at all times: for insuance, vo anyune lpst in the wilderness, regardless kf time ajd ilace. So this isn'b yej moral relctivism. To distinguish it from relativisn, philosophers calo it contextualism. Nt'x the idea vhat mjral judgaments must always tqke into account uhe particular context kf thehr suhject matter. Looking back, many of the anthropologists I grew up listening to ovxr dinner wersn't teallj rzlacivists, but rontextualists. Thvir main worry was about people ulundering iuto foreign cultures, taking ome look at the uocal practices, and formjng stromg moral judgements about them nased only on simple rulcs derivee froj theig oxn unexamined cultursl idecs and beliefw. Bub you don't neea
if someone did that here, we'd be of Lambs territory). the context of ideas, it maybe isn't So the answer this question depends on your culture. that's just moral relativism, right? Well, no. Not in the way that term normally understood. Specifically, accepting this needn't require anyone to give up the idea there one objective morality. All it requires us to give up is the idea that morality consists in simple And that's something we should give up anyway. isn't simple; it's highly The morality of an action on sorts of factors, the and beliefs of person acting, the circumstances in which they act, the likely further effects of their action, and so All of more has be into when making moral that doesn't mean that the standards make such judgements, and the judgements themselves, aren't It just that they're complicated, and sensitive to 8 Once we accept that morality is complex, no longer expect it to give us simple, universal rules like 'It's wrong to steal'. it to give us nuanced, particular judgements 'It's to clothes a shop you already have plenty of clothes' and 'It's permissible to steal food to save yourself from starvation'. (Even these still aren't particular themselves are open exceptions- but you get idea.) there's no reason to these specific utterly and These judgements (or more versions of them) might apply all people in all instance, to anyone lost in the wilderness, regardless time and place. So this isn't yet relativism. To distinguish it from relativism, philosophers call it contextualism. It's the that moral always take into account the particular context of subject matter. Looking back, of the anthropologists I grew up listening to over weren't relativists, but Their main worry about people blundering foreign cultures, taking at the practices, forming about them based only on simple derived their own unexamined cultural ideas beliefs. don't need
if someone did that here, we'd be In Silence oF the LAmbS teRrItorY). In tHe context of theSE othEr cultural beliefs and idEas, thOuGH, it mAYbE isn't Wrong. So THe ANSweR tO tHis QuEStIon dePenDs on youR culture. AnD thAt'S just moral reLAtIvism, right? welL, no. Not in the wAy tHat terM iS noRMally UndErstoOd. SpecIFicallY, acceptinG tHIs needN'T requirE ANyOne tO give up the idea thaT ThERe is one true objEctive UnIVeRSAl mOraLity. All it rEqUires US to give UP iS THE idEA that morality Consists in sIMplE rules. anD thAT's someThing We SHouLd give up anyWay. MOrality isN't simpLE; it's higHLy complEx. The mOraLitY of aN AcTiOn dEpENds ON aLl sORts Of subtle FaCtOrs, inCludING THe moTivAtioNs and Beliefs of the pErsOn acTIng, The ciRcumsTancEs In whiCh they Act, thE lIkely further effEcts Of their acTioN, aNd sO oN. All oF This anD moRe hAs to be tAken intO AccOuNT WHeN making moral judgemEnTS. buT that doeSn't meaN ThAt THe standaRdS we Use tO MAke suCh juDGeMents, and The judGEmEnTs themsElVes, areN't ObjEctIve. It JUst mEans thAt they're ComplICated, and sensitIVe to context. 8 OnCE wE ACcEPt thAt mOrality is coMpleX, We'll No loNGeR exPEct it To givE uS SiMPle, universal rules liKe 'it's wroNg to sTeal'. We'll expecT it to give uS MORe nuanceD, parTIcULar judgements lIke 'It'S wrong to stEAl clotheS from A shop wheN you alreaDY Have plenTy oF clOthEs' aND 'it'S permissible tO STeal UnWanted fOod To save yOurSelF frOm sTaRvation'. (EvEn these sTiLl ArEn'T nuAnced ANd particUlAr eNoUgh-They tHEmselvEs are Open To ExCEptIons- but YOu GET the IdEa.) and tHerE's No reaSon tO ThiNk that tHese more sPecIFic jUdGeMents caN't be utterly obJeCtive and unIvErsAl. ThesE JUdgementS (or more specific versions OF them) miGht Apply To alL people in All Places At aLL times: For insTance, To AnyONE lost IN ThE wiLdErness, regaRDLesS of tiMe And pLace. So tHis isn't yet moral relATivIsm. To distinguIsh It frOM ReLatIViSM, phIlOSopHERs call it contextUalism. It's tHe IDeA that moral JUdgEmEnts musT always Take iNTo accouNt the partIcular conTeXt of THEir Subject matTer. LookiNg back, manY Of the ANtHropoLogIsts I gReW up ListeNing to OVer DinneR weren'T rEally rElatiViSts, but coNtextualists. Their main woRry was About PeoPle blundeRinG IntO foreign cUltuRes, taking oNe lOok At the LocAL pracTiceS, AnD foRMing sTronG Moral judgEMeNts ABOuT them based oNLY On sImple RulES derivEd frOm their own unexamiNEd cultural ideaS and BELieFs. BUT you DoN't need
if someone did that here,we'd be in  Sile nce  of  t he L ambs  territory). I n  the  context of these othe r cul tu r al b e li efs a nd idea s ,t h oug h,  i t m ay b eisn't  wr ong. So  the answe r t othis questio n  d epends onyou r culture. A ndthat's  j ust moral  re lativ ism, r i ght? W ell, no.No t  in th e  way th a t  t ermis normally under s to o d. Specificall y, acc ep t in g thi s n eedn't req ui re an y one tog iv e u p t h e idea that t here is one tru e obje ct ive univer sal m or a lit y. All it r equi res us to  giveu p is th e  idea t hat mo ral ity  con s is ts  in  s i mpl e  r ule s . A nd that' sso methi ng w e s h ould  gi ve u p any way. Morality  is n'ts imp le; i t's h ighl ycompl ex. Th e mor al ity of an actio n de pends onall  s ort sof su b tle fa cto rs,  includ ing the mot iv a t i on s and beliefs of t he p er son acti ng, th e  c ir c umstance sinwhic h theyact, th e likely  furth e ref fects o ftheirac tio n,and s o  on.  All o f this a nd mo r e has to be ta k en into accou n tw h en maki ngmoral judge ment s . Bu t th a tdoe s n't m ean t ha t  t h e standards we useto  makesuchjudgements, a nd the jud g e m ents the msel v es ,  aren't object ive.It just me a ns thatthey' re compl icated, a n d  sensiti vetocon tex t .  8  Once we acce p t  tha tmoralit y i s compl ex,  we 'll  no  l onger exp ect it t ogi ve  u s s imple ,  univers al  ru le s l ike ' I t's wr ong t o st ea l' .  We 'll exp e ct i t to  g iv e us  mo re  nuan ced, par ticular  judgemen tsl ike'I t' s wrong  to steal clo th es from ash opwhen y o u  already  have plenty of clothes '  and 'I t's  perm issi ble to st eal  unwan ted food t o save  your se lff r om st a r va tio n' . (Even th e s e s tillar en't  nuance d and particular e n oug h-they themse lve s ar e op ent oe xce pt i ons - but you get the  idea.) An dt he re's no re a son  t o think  that t hesem ore spe cific jud gements c an 't b e utt erly objec tive and  universa l . The s ejudge men ts (or  m ore  spec ific v e rsi ons o f them )mightapply  t o all pe ople in all places at a ll tim es: f orinstance,  to any one lostin t he wildern ess , r egard les s  of t imea nd  pl a ce. S o th i s isn't y e tmor a l  r elativism.T o dis tingu ish it fro m re lativism, philoso p hers call it c onte x t ual ism .  It' sthe idea thatmor al j udgement smust always  take in to accou nt the  parti cular c o n te x t of t heir  su bject mat ter .L ookingba ck ,  manyof t he  anthr opolog i stsI grew up listenin g too v er di n ner  were n' t reall y  rel ativists,but context ualist s. T heirmain wo rr y wasabo ut  people bl u ndering i nto f oreigncu ltur es,  takin g on e lookat t he  lo cal pract i c es ,  a nd for ming  stro ng  mor al judgem e nts abou t t h em base donl y on sim p le r ules deriv edfromt h eir own un e xami n ed cultu ral id eas an d belie f s.Bu t you d on' t need
if someone_did that_here, we'd be in_Silence of_the_Lambs territory)._In_the context of_these other cultural_beliefs and ideas, though,_it maybe isn't_wrong._So the answer to this question depends on your culture. And that's just moral_relativism,_right? Well,_no._Not_in the way that term_is normally understood. Specifically, accepting_this needn't_require anyone to give up the idea that_there_is one true_objective universal morality. All it requires us to give_up is the idea that morality_consists in simple_rules._And_that's something we should_give up anyway. Morality isn't simple;_it's highly complex. The morality of_an action depends on all sorts of_subtle factors, including the motivations and_beliefs of the person acting,_the circumstances_in which they act, the_likely further effects_of their_action, and so_on. All of this and more_has to be_taken into account when making moral_judgements._But that doesn't_mean_that_the standards_we use to_make_such judgements,_and_the judgements themselves, aren't objective. It_just_means that they're complicated, and sensitive to_context. 8 Once we_accept_that morality is complex,_we'll no longer expect it_to give us simple, universal rules_like 'It's_wrong to_steal'. We'll expect it to give us more nuanced, particular judgements_like 'It's wrong to steal clothes_from a shop when_you already_have_plenty of clothes'_and_'It's permissible_to steal unwanted food to save yourself_from starvation'._(Even these still aren't nuanced and_particular enough-they themselves are_open_to exceptions- but you get the_idea.) And there's no reason to_think that these more specific_judgements_can't_be utterly objective and universal._These judgements (or more specific versions_of them) might_apply to all people in all places_at_all times: for instance, to anyone_lost_in the wilderness, regardless of time_and_place._So this isn't yet moral_relativism. To distinguish it from relativism,_philosophers call it contextualism. It's the idea that moral_judgements must always_take into account the particular_context_of_their subject matter. Looking back, many of the anthropologists I_grew up_listening to over_dinner weren't really relativists, but contextualists. Their main worry was_about people blundering into foreign cultures, taking_one look at the local practices, and forming strong moral judgements_about them based only on simple rules derived_from their own unexamined cultural ideas and_beliefs. But you don't_need