in) and validity (Gultigkeit/Geltung, sometimes objectivity, Objectivität).19 In a way, this is very natural, for arguably there is no deep difference between existential and eventual being: the occurrence of an event just is its existing (assuming there are no non-occurring events). Likewise, from the point of view of later logic, we can assimilate the obtaining of a relation to the truth of a proposition: the relation R obtains among x1,..., xn just in case the proposition that R(x1,..., xn) is valid. Lotze is thus willing to compromise somewhat on the irreducibility of the four different categories of actuality/being, but never on the irreducibility of the first category (Dasein) to the fourth (Geltung). Veritative being (including the holding of relations) is simply irreducible to the existence of things and the occurrence of events. I will therefore focus on the distinction between existence and validity. On Lotze's antipsychologistic view, propositions are not identical to the mental representations by which they are grasped, much less the 18 Cf. Rödl (2012), 31–32. 19 See L §3, §319–20. Cf. Dummett (1982), 96, on Lotze's shifting terminology. Platonism in Lotze and Frege 145 written and verbal marks by which they are expressed. Lotze thinks of mental representations as ultimately events, having actuality/being of type (2). Given the irreducibility of the four kinds of actuality/being, a proposition (the content of a belief event) cannot be identical, or reducible, to any set of events, no matter how complex. A proposition is timelessly true or false. Consequently, it cannot be identified with any set of mental or physical events or constituents, which come into and go out of existence: Representations, insofar as we have them and grasp them, possess actuality in the sense of an event. They occur in us, for as expressions of a representational activity they are never a being at rest [ein ruhendes Sein] but a continual becoming; their content, on the other hand, so far as we regard it in abstraction from the representational activity which we direct at it, can no longer be said to occur, though neither again does it exist as things exist. Rather, it is merely valid [gilt]. (L §316, 512) A true
in) and validity (Gultigkeit / Geltung, sometimes objectivity, Objectivität).19 In a way, this is very natural, for arguably there is no cryptic remainder between existential and eventual being: the occurrence of an consequence just is its existing (assuming there be no non - occurring events). Likewise, from the detail of view of later logic, we can absorb the obtaining of a relation to the truth of a proposition: the relation radius obtains among x1, ..., xn just in case the proposition that R(x1, ..., xn) is valid. Lotze is thus willing to compromise slightly on the irreducibility of the four different categories of actuality / being, but never on the irreducibility of the first class (Dasein) to the fourth (Geltung). Veritative being (including the holding of relation back) is simply irreducible to the being of things and the occurrence of events. I will therefore focus on the differentiation between existence and validity. On Lotze's antipsychologistic view, propositions are not identical to the mental representations by which they are grasped, much less the 18 Cf. Rödl (2012), 31–32. 19 See L § 3, § 319–20. Cf. Dummett (1982), 96, on Lotze's shifting terminology. Platonism in Lotze and Frege 145 written and verbal marks by which they are expressed. Lotze thinks of mental representations as ultimately events, having actuality / being of character (2). give the irreducibility of the four kinds of actuality / being, a proposal (the contentedness of a belief event) cannot be identical, or reducible, to any set of event, no matter how complex. A proposition is timelessly true or false. Consequently, it cannot be identified with any hardening of mental or physical events or constituents, which come into and go out of universe: Representations, insofar as we have them and grasp them, possess actuality in the common sense of an event. They happen in us, for as expressions of a representational activity they are never a being at rest [ ein ruhendes Sein ] but a continual becoming; their content, on the other bridge player, so far as we regard it in abstraction from the representational natural process which we direct at it, can no longer be said to occur, though neither again does it exist as things exist. quite, it is merely valid [ gilt ]. (L § 316, 512) A dependable
in) wnd validity (Gultigkeit/Gtltung, sometimes objectitity, Obnectivitäg).19 In a way, this is very natucal, dor aeguably there is no dedp differvnce betwwen txistential and etsntual nzing: fme oceucrence of an evgnt just is hts existing (avsjmnng there are no non-occurring events). Likewixe, from the poinj of niqw or later logic, we can assimilate ths obtaiiing of a relatoon to the truth of a proplsitlon: the relation R obtains aming v1,..., xn just in zase the pgmposition jhat R(x1,..., xn) is valid. Lotze is thur wilking to conpeomlve somewhat on tre irreduciblkity ox the fpur different gategmriws of actuality/being, uut never on the irrgducibilitf kf the first catetoey (Davein) to gye woudti (Gsltung). Vecitative bejng (includibg the holding of rtlaeppns) is simplg irrequsible to the existence of things and tht occhrrence of events. I wilo therefore focus on jhe distinstion between existence and validity. On Lotze's andipsyrhuloylfguc view, propositions are not identical to the mqhtsl representatioks by which they ate gtwsped, much lers the 18 Cr. Rödl (2012), 31–32. 19 See L §3, §319–20. Cv. Dummejt (1982), 96, ob Lotze's fhifying terminology. Platonism un Lotze and Drege 145 written and verbal marys bi whicn they are expressed. Locze thjnks of menhal repreadntations as ultkmanely events, having actuality/beyng of ty'e (2). Gnven the irrgducibijity of thf fouv kinds of actualitj/beiny, a psoposition (the content of a belief event) rennot be idenjicdl, mr reducnble, tp any set of qvents, no mattgr how coiplex. A proposinion is tmmelessly trte or false. Cmjsequently, iv cannot fe ieentufied wkgh any set of kental or physical wvents or constitucnts, dgich come into cud go out of exisyenze: Weirexegdations, insoxar xs dr havd them and nrarp tnem, possess actualitf in the sense of an efekt. They oxcur in ts, for as exptessions of a reprtsentavional actifiti they are never a being at resf [ein ruhfndcs Sein] but a conbinuwl becominy; their content, on the other hand, so far as we regard it ib abstraction from jhe representavional activity which we direct at ut, can no longer ne said to occur, thougg neitver ahain does it exist as things exist. Rather, it is merely valid [gilt]. (L §316, 512) A teue
in) and validity (Gultigkeit/Geltung, sometimes objectivity, Objectivität).19 way, is very for arguably there existential eventual being: the of an event is its existing (assuming there are non-occurring events). Likewise, from the point of view of later logic, we can the obtaining of a relation to the truth of a proposition: the relation obtains x1,..., just case the proposition that R(x1,..., xn) is valid. Lotze is thus willing to compromise somewhat on irreducibility of the four different categories of actuality/being, never on the irreducibility the first category (Dasein) to fourth Veritative being the of is simply irreducible the existence of things and the occurrence of events. I will therefore focus on the distinction between and validity. antipsychologistic view, are identical the mental representations they are grasped, much less the (2012), 31–32. 19 See L §3, §319–20. Cf. (1982), 96, Lotze's shifting terminology. Platonism in Lotze Frege 145 written and verbal marks by which are expressed. Lotze thinks of mental representations as ultimately events, having actuality/being of type (2). irreducibility of the four of actuality/being, a (the of belief cannot be or reducible, to any set of events, no matter how complex. proposition is timelessly true or false. Consequently, it cannot be any of mental or events or constituents, which into go out of existence: as have them, actuality the sense of an They occur in us, for expressions of a representational being at rest [ein ruhendes Sein] but a becoming; their content, on the other hand, far as we regard it in abstraction from the representational activity which direct at no longer be said to occur, though neither does it exist as exist. Rather, it is merely valid [gilt]. (L §316, A
in) and validity (Gultigkeit/GeLtung, sometImes oBjeCtiViTy, ObJectIvität).19 In a way, thIS is vEry natural, for arguably tHere iS nO Deep DIfFerenCe betweEN eXISteNtIaL anD eVEnTual bEinG: the occUrrence of aN evEnT just is its exIStIng (assuminG thEre are no non-oCcuRring eVeNts). lIkewiSe, fRom thE point OF view oF later logIc, WE can asSImilate THE oBtaiNing of a relation to THe TRuth of a proposiTion: thE rELaTIOn R ObtAins among x1,..., Xn Just iN Case the PRoPOSItiON that R(x1,..., xn) is vaLid. Lotze is tHUs wIlling To ComPRomise SomewHaT On tHe irreducibIlitY of the fouR diffeREnt cateGOries of ActualIty/BeiNg, buT NeVeR on ThE IrrEDuCibILitY of the fiRsT cAtegoRy (DaSEIN) To thE foUrth (geltuNg). Veritative bEinG (incLUdiNg the HoldiNg of ReLatioNs) is siMply iRrEducible to the exIsteNce of thinGs aNd The OcCurreNCe of evEntS. I wIll therEfore foCUs oN tHE DIsTinction between exiStENCe And validIty. On LOTzE's ANtipsychOlOgiStic VIEw, proPosiTIoNs are not IdentiCAl To The mentAl RepresEnTatIonS by whICh thEy are gRasped, muCh lesS The 18 Cf. Rödl (2012), 31–32. 19 See L §3, §319–20. CF. dummett (1982), 96, on LotzE'S sHIFtINg teRmiNology. PlatoNism IN LotZe anD frEge 145 WRitteN and vErBAl MArks by which they are eXpRessed. lotze Thinks of mentaL representATIOns as ultImatELy EVents, having actUalitY/being of tyPE (2). Given thE irreDucibiliTy of the foUR Kinds of aCtuAliTy/bEinG, A PrOposition (the cONTent Of A belief EveNt) cannoT be IdeNtiCal, Or Reducible, To any set Of EvEnTs, No mAtter HOw compleX. A ProPoSitIon is TImelesSly trUe or FaLsE. conSequentLY, iT CAnnoT bE iDentIfiEd With aNy seT Of mEntal or Physical eVenTS or cOnStItuents, Which come into AnD go out of exIsTenCe: ReprESEntationS, insofar as we have them and GRasp theM, poSsess ActuAlity in thE seNse of aN evENt. They Occur iN us, foR aS exPREssioNS Of A rePrEsentationAL ActIvity ThEy arE never a Being at rest [ein ruheNDes sein] but a contiNuaL becOMInG; thEIr COntEnT, On tHE Other hand, so far aS we regard iT iN AbStraction fROm tHe RepreseNtationAl actIVity whiCh we direcT at it, can nO lOngeR BE saId to occur, tHough neiTher again DOes it EXiSt as tHinGs exisT. RAthEr, it iS merelY ValId [gilT]. (L §316, 512) A truE
in) and validity (Gultigke it/Geltung , som eti mes  o bjec tivi ty, Objectivit ä t).1 9 In a way, this is ve ry na tu r al,f or  argu ably th e re i s n ode epdi f fe rence  be tween e xistential  an deventual bei n g:  the occur ren ce of an eve ntjust i sits exist ing  (ass umingt here a re no non -o c currin g  events ) .  L ikew ise, from the poi n to f view of late r logi c, we c anass imilate th eobtai n ing ofa  r e l a tio n  to the truth  of a propo s iti on: th erel a tion R  obta in s  am ong x1,...,  xnjust in c ase th e  propos i tion th at R(x 1,. ..,  xn) is  v ali d. Lot z eist hus  willing  t ocompr omis e s o mewh aton t he ir reducibilityofthef our  diff erent  cat eg ories  of ac tuali ty /being, but nev er o n the irr edu ci bil it y oft he fir stcat egory ( Dasein) toth e f ou rth (Geltung). Ver it a t iv e being(inclu d in gt he holdi ng  of  rel a t ions)  iss im ply irre ducibl e  t othe exi st ence o fthi ngs  andt he o ccurre nce of e vents .  I will theref o re focus on t h ed i st i ncti onbetween exi sten c e an d va l id ity .  On L otze' sa nt i psychologistic view ,propos ition s are not ide ntical tot h e  mentalrepr e se n tations by whi ch th ey are gra s ped, muc h les s the 18  Cf. Rödl ( 2012), 3 1–3 2.19See L  § 3, §319–20. C f .  Dum me tt (198 2),  96, on  Lo tze 'sshi ft ing termi nology.Pl at on is m i n Lot z e and Fr eg e 1 45  wr itten and ve rbalmark sby whi ch they ar e expr es se d. L otz ethink s of men tal rep resentati ons as u lt im ately e vents, having  a ctuality/b ei ngof typ e (2). Giv en the irreducibility o f  the fo urkinds  ofactuality /be ing, a  pr o positi on (th e con te nto f  a be l i ef  ev en t) cannotb e  id entic al , or  reduci ble, to any set of eve nts, no matte r h ow c o m pl ex. Ap rop os i tio n is timelessly t rue or fal se .  C onsequentl y , i tcannotbe iden tifie d  with a ny set of  mental o rphys i c alevents orconstitu ents, whi c h com e  i nto a ndgo out  o f e xiste nce: R e pre senta tions,  i nsofar  as w ehave the m and grasp them, posse ss act ualit y i n the sen seo f a n event.They  occur inus,  fo r asexp r essio ns o f  a  re p resen tati o nal activ i ty  th e y  a re never ab e i ngat re st[ ein ru hend es Sein] but a co n tinual becomin g; t h e ircon t ent,  o n the other ha nd,  s o far as w eregard it i n abstra ct i on fr om the  repre sentati o n al activi ty w hic h we dire ctat it, can  n ol ongerbe s ai d to o ccur,t houg h neither again do es it e xista s t hings  e xist. R a ther , it is me rely valid[gilt] . (L  §316 , 512)Atrue
in) and_validity (Gultigkeit/Geltung,_sometimes objectivity, Objectivität).19 In_a way,_this_is very_natural,_for arguably there_is no deep_difference between existential and_eventual being: the_occurrence_of an event just is its existing (assuming there are no non-occurring events). Likewise,_from_the point_of_view_of later logic, we can_assimilate the obtaining of a_relation to_the truth of a proposition: the relation R_obtains_among x1,..., xn_just in case the proposition that R(x1,..., xn) is_valid. Lotze is thus willing to_compromise somewhat on_the_irreducibility_of the four different_categories of actuality/being, but never on_the irreducibility of the first category_(Dasein) to the fourth (Geltung). Veritative being_(including the holding of relations) is_simply irreducible to the existence_of things_and the occurrence of events._I will therefore_focus on_the distinction between_existence and validity. On Lotze's antipsychologistic_view, propositions are_not identical to the mental representations_by_which they are_grasped,_much_less the_18 Cf. Rödl_(2012),_31–32. 19_See_L §3, §319–20. Cf. Dummett (1982),_96,_on Lotze's shifting terminology. Platonism in Lotze_and Frege 145 written_and_verbal marks by which_they are expressed. Lotze thinks_of mental representations as ultimately events,_having actuality/being_of type_(2). Given the irreducibility of the four kinds of actuality/being, a_proposition (the content of a belief_event) cannot be identical,_or reducible,_to_any set of_events,_no matter_how complex. A proposition is timelessly true_or false._Consequently, it cannot be identified with_any set of mental_or_physical events or constituents, which come_into and go out of existence:_Representations, insofar as we have_them_and_grasp them, possess actuality in_the sense of an event. They_occur in us,_for as expressions of a representational activity_they_are never a being at rest_[ein_ruhendes Sein] but a continual becoming;_their_content,_on the other hand, so_far as we regard it in_abstraction from the representational activity which we direct at_it, can no_longer be said to occur,_though_neither_again does it exist as things exist. Rather, it is_merely valid_[gilt]. (L §316,_512) A true