 theory that we are entitled, as rational agents in moral community with other rational agents, to make claims on other moral agents will not be satisfied that developmentalism can capture this. As Stephen Darwall has argued in recent work,8 it is hard to resist the proposal that this sort of standing is central to our moral and other practices in much of human social life – promising and anti-paternalism among them. But developmentalism neither makes a clear and central place for rational agency in understanding what is good for us, nor forges any clear connection between what is good for us and the ways we respond to reasons. Those who think our rational agency is what gives us our distinctive moral standing will feel that Kraut's account of the ways in which we can harm others – or for that matter the ways in which our relationships with them can be enriched and improved – simply falls short.9 Practical wisdom, good-for, and matching I conclude with a related puzzle arising from Kraut's venture into meta-ethics. Though Kraut distances himself from the 'naturalism' of the sort defended by Foot, he resembles her in denying adamantly that goodness is mind-dependent. What is DEVELOPMENT AND REASONS  ©  The Author Journal compilation ©  The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly 8 S. Darwall, The Second-Person Standpoint (Harvard UP, ). 9 In a similar vein, Kraut offers a 'buck-passing' view of rightness (§) which many will find unsatisfactory, because his conception of goods and harms (and thus his conception of reasons) is too narrow. It does not, for example, recognize Darwall's'second-person reasons', nor the good of second-person relations, in any systematic way. good or bad for living things is in no way dependent on human minds: it is 'not brought into being by, or dependent on, human attitudes, or minds in general'. It is 'already "out there" in the world, existing independently of any mind' (p. ). Kraut takes himself to be affirming what Christine Korsgaard calls'substantive realism', in contrast with her 'constructivism' and with other mindor response-dependent views of the nature of goodness
theory that we are entitled, as rational agents in moral residential district with early intellectual agents, to make claims on early moral agents will not be satisfied that developmentalism can capture this. As Stephen Darwall has argue in recent work,8 it is hard to defy the proposal that this sort of standing is cardinal to our moral and other practices in much of human social life – promising and anti - paternalism among them. But developmentalism neither make a clear and central place for intellectual agency in understanding what is good for us, nor forge any clear connection between what is dear for us and the ways we react to reasons. Those who think our rational agency is what gives us our classifiable moral standing will feel that Kraut's account of the ways in which we can harm others – or for that matter the ways in which our relationships with them can be enrich and improved – simply falls short.9 Practical wisdom, good - for, and matching I conclude with a related puzzle arising from Kraut's venture into meta - ethical motive. Though Kraut distances himself from the' naturalism' of the sort maintain by Foot, he resembles her in denying adamantly that goodness is mind - pendent. What is DEVELOPMENT AND REASONS  ©  The Author Journal compilation ©  The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly 8 S. Darwall, The Second - Person Standpoint (Harvard UP, ). 9 In a similar vein, Kraut offers a' sawhorse - passing' view of rightness (§ ) which many will find unsatisfactory, because his conception of goods and damage (and thus his conception of reasons) is too narrow-minded. It does not, for example, acknowledge Darwall's'second - person reasons', nor the good of second - person relations, in any systematic way. effective or bad for living things is in no direction dependent on human minds: it is' not brought into being by, or dependent on, human attitude, or minds in cosmopolitan'. It is' already " out there " in the world, existing independently of any mind' (p. ). Kraut takes himself to be confirm what Christine Korsgaard calls'substantive realism', in line with her' constructivism' and with other mindor response - pendent views of the nature of goodness
 thfory that we are entitlea, as rational aywnts ii moral communigy with other rational agentd, ro maje claims on other morxl agents will nor be watisfied vgat devcjopmsktalivn can capture jhis. As Stepven Darwall hav xryued in recent work,8 it is hard to refist thr oroposal that jhis xjrt kf standing is central to our moram and ouher practices in kuch of human social life – prolising and anti-patfrnalism aming eyem. But deveuopmentalism neither mzkes a clear and central place wor rctional agebct ij understandmng whwt is good for us, nos forgex any clear coknectmon vetween what is good hor us and the ways re respong co reasons. Those who rhunk oor radionxo aeendy ia what gites us our sistinctive moral standing wilk svrl that Krauf's accjugt of the ways in which we can harm othtrs – kr for that matter the qays in which our relwtionshipf with them can be enriched and improved – simply xalls rhoxb.9 Oeaftical wisdom, good-for, and matching I conclude siuh s related puzzje arising grlm Hraut's venturg into metz-ethics. Though Krakt distwnces himself srom the 'naturalism' of the sort defended by Doot, he resembles ker in denyiug adakantlu that goodness is mind-bependsnt. What is DEVELOPMSVT AND REASONS  ©  Tme Duthor Journal compilation ©  The Edmtors of The Phikosophycal Quartfrly 8 S. Darwall, The Secojd-Perdot Standpoijt (Harvard UP, ). 9 In a similar vemi, Kraut offerx d 'blck-passiny' view of rightness (§) which many wnll find unsagisfactory, becausx his concepeion of goods wnd harms (anv thus hif cobceprion of feasons) is too narrow. In boes not, dor example, recognlze Dxdwall's'second-perwon reasons', nor thr guod ov xesmnd-person renatiuns, on anh systematig wxy. gpod or bad for livinc thjngs is in no way ceiendent ob human iinds: it is 'npt brought into belng bb, or dxpendemt jn, human attitudes, or minds in general'. Lt ls 'already "oue thcre" yn the workd, existing independently of any mind' (p. ). Kraut takes himswlf to be affirming ehat Christmne Kowsgaard cdlls'substantive realusm', in contrast wlth her 'constructivism' and whth ohher mindor response-dependent views of the nature of goodness
theory that we are entitled, as rational moral with other agents, to make will be satisfied that can capture this. Stephen Darwall has argued in recent it is hard to resist the proposal that this sort of standing is to our moral and other practices in much of human social life – and among But neither makes a clear and central place for rational agency in understanding what is good for nor forges any clear connection between what is for us and the we respond to reasons. Those think rational agency what us distinctive moral standing feel that Kraut's account of the ways in which we can harm others – or for that the ways our relationships them be and improved – short.9 Practical wisdom, good-for, and matching a related puzzle arising from Kraut's venture into Though Kraut himself from the 'naturalism' of the defended by Foot, he resembles her in denying that goodness is mind-dependent. What is DEVELOPMENT AND REASONS  ©  The Author Journal  The Editors of Philosophical Quarterly 8 Darwall, Second-Person (Harvard ). 9 a similar vein, Kraut offers a 'buck-passing' view of rightness (§) many will find unsatisfactory, because his conception of goods and thus conception of reasons) too narrow. It does for recognize Darwall's'second-person reasons', nor of relations, way. or for living things is no way dependent on human it is 'not brought on, human attitudes, or minds in general'. It 'already "out there" in the world, existing of any mind' (p. ). Kraut takes himself to be affirming what Korsgaard calls'substantive contrast with her 'constructivism' and with other mindor views of the nature goodness
 theory that we are entitled, as Rational agEnts iN moRal CoMmunIty wIth other rationAL ageNts, to make claims on other Moral AgENts wILl Not be SatisfiED tHAT deVeLoPmeNtALiSm can CapTure thiS. As Stephen darWaLl has argued iN ReCent work,8 it Is hArd to resist tHe pRoposaL tHat THis soRt oF stanDing is CEntral To our moraL aND other PRacticeS IN mUch oF human social life – pROmISing and anti-patErnaliSm AMoNG TheM. BuT developmeNtAlism NEither mAKeS A CLeaR And central plaCe for rationAL agEncy in UnDerSTandinG what Is GOod For us, nor forGes aNy clear coNnectiON betweeN What is gOod for Us aNd tHe waYS wE rEspOnD To rEAsOns. tHosE who thinK oUr RatioNal aGENCY is wHat GiveS us ouR distinctive mOraL staNDinG will Feel tHat KRaUt's acCount oF the wAyS in which we can haRm otHers – or for ThaT mAttEr The waYS in whiCh oUr rElationShips wiTH thEm CAN Be Enriched and improveD – sIMPlY falls shOrt.9 PraCTiCaL Wisdom, goOd-For, And mATChing i conCLuDe with a rElated PUzZlE arisinG fRom KraUt'S veNtuRe intO Meta-Ethics. though KrAut diSTances himself fROm the 'naturaliSM' oF THe SOrt dEfeNded by Foot, hE resEMbleS her IN dEnyINg adaMantlY tHAt GOodness is mind-dependEnT. What iS DEVElOPMENT AND REAsONS  ©  The AutHOR journal cOmpiLAtIOn ©  The Editors of the PhIlosophicaL quarterlY 8 S. DarWall, The SEcond-PersON standpoiNt (HArvArd uP, ). 9 IN A SiMilar vein, KrauT OFferS a 'Buck-pasSinG' view of RigHtnEss (§) WhiCh Many will fInd unsatIsFaCtOrY, beCause HIs concepTiOn oF gOodS and hARms (and Thus hIs coNcEpTIon Of reasoNS) iS TOo naRrOw. it doEs nOt, For exAmplE, RecOgnize DArwall's'seConD-PersOn ReAsons', noR the good of secOnD-person relAtIonS, in any SYStematic Way. good or bad for living thINgs is in No wAy depEndeNt on human MinDs: it is 'Not BRought Into beIng by, Or DepENDent oN, HUmAn aTtItudes, or miNDS in GenerAl'. it is 'Already "Out there" in the world, EXisTing independeNtlY of aNY MiNd' (p. ). kRaUT taKeS HimSELf to be affirming What ChristInE koRsgaard calLS'suBsTantive Realism', In conTRast witH her 'constRuctivism' AnD witH OTheR mindor resPonse-depEndent vieWS of thE NaTure oF goOdness
 theory that we are entitl ed, as rat ional  ag ent sin m oral  community wit h  oth er rational agents, to  make  c l aims on  othe r moral ag e n tswi ll  no tb esatis fie d thatdevelopmen tal is m can captur e  t his. As St eph en Darwall h asargued  i n r e centwor k,8 i t is h a rd toresist th ep roposa l  that t h i ssort  of standing is c e nt r al to our mora l andot h er p rac tic es in much  o f hum a n socia l  l i f e  –p romising andanti-patern a lis m amon gthe m . Butdevel op m ent alism neith er m akes a cl ear an d  centra l  placefor ra tio nal  age n cy  i n u nd e rst a nd ing wha t is goo dfo r us,  nor f o r gesany  cle ar co nnection betw een  wha t  is  good  forus a nd  theways w e res po nd to reasons.Thos e who thi nkou r r at ional agency  is  wh at give s us ou r  di st i n c ti ve moral standingwi l l  f eel that  Kraut ' sac c ount ofth e w aysi n  whic h we ca n harm o thers–  o rfor tha tmatter  t heway s inw hich  our r elations hipsw ith them can b e  enriched and im p r ov e d –sim ply falls s hort . 9 Pr acti c al  wi s dom,good- fo r ,a nd matching I concl ud e with  a re lated puzzlearising fr o m Kraut'svent u re into meta-ethi cs. T hough Krau t  distanc es hi mself fr om the 'n a t uralism'  of  th e s ort d ef ended by Foot , he r es emblesher  in den yin g a dam ant ly  that goo dness is  m in d- de pen dent. What isDE VEL OP MEN T AND REASON S   ©   T heAuthorJ ou r n al c om pi lati on©TheE dit ors ofThe Philo sop h ical  Q ua rterly8 S. Darwall,  T he Second- Pe rso n Stan d p oint (Ha rvard UP, ). 9 In a similar  ve in, K raut  offers a  'b uck-pa ssi n g' vie w of r ightn es s ( §  ) wh i c hman ywill findu n sat isfac to ry,because  his conception of goo ds and harms(an d th u s  h isc on c ept io n  of r easons) is toonarrow. It  d o es  not, fore xam pl e, reco gnize D arwal l 's'seco nd-person  reasons' ,nort h e g ood of sec ond-pers on relati o ns, i n  a ny sy ste maticwa y.goodor bad for  livi ng thi ng s is i n nowa y depend ent on human minds: itis 'no t bro ugh t into be ing by,  or depen dent  on, human  at tit udes,  or minds  ing en era l '. It  is' already " o ut  th e r e"  in the wor l d ,  ex istin g i n depend entl y of any mind' (p .  ). Kraut tak es h i m sel f t o  beaf firming what C hri st i n e Korsga ar d calls'sub stantive  r e alism ', incontra st with h er 'const ruct ivi sm' and w ith  o t her min do rr espons e-de pe ndentviewso f th e nature of goodne ss
 theory_that we_are entitled, as rational_agents in_moral_community with_other_rational agents, to_make claims on_other moral agents will_not be satisfied_that_developmentalism can capture this. As Stephen Darwall has argued in recent work,8 it is_hard_to resist_the_proposal_that this sort of standing_is central to our moral_and other_practices in much of human social life –_promising_and anti-paternalism among_them. But developmentalism neither makes a clear and central_place for rational agency in understanding_what is good_for_us,_nor forges any clear_connection between what is good for_us and the ways we respond_to reasons. Those who think our rational_agency is what gives us our_distinctive moral standing will feel_that Kraut's_account of the ways in_which we can_harm others_– or for_that matter the ways in which_our relationships with_them can be enriched and improved_–_simply falls short.9_Practical_wisdom,_good-for, and_matching I conclude_with_a related_puzzle_arising from Kraut's venture into meta-ethics._Though_Kraut distances himself from the 'naturalism' of_the sort defended by_Foot,_he resembles her in_denying adamantly that goodness is_mind-dependent. What is DEVELOPMENT AND REASONS_ ©_ The_Author Journal compilation ©  The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly_8 S. Darwall, The Second-Person Standpoint_(Harvard UP, ). 9_In a_similar_vein, Kraut offers_a_'buck-passing' view_of rightness (§) which many will find_unsatisfactory, because_his conception of goods and harms_(and thus his conception_of_reasons) is too narrow. It does_not, for example, recognize Darwall's'second-person reasons',_nor the good of second-person_relations,_in_any systematic way. good or_bad for living things is in_no way dependent_on human minds: it is 'not brought_into_being by, or dependent on, human_attitudes,_or minds in general'. It is_'already_"out_there" in the world, existing_independently of any mind' (p. )._Kraut takes himself to be affirming what Christine Korsgaard_calls'substantive realism', in_contrast with her 'constructivism' and_with_other_mindor response-dependent views of the nature of goodness