 IMMCs represent a distinct challenge because they suggest that there are planning situations where a similar sort of flexibility in perspective is not possible. To see this, let's consider Daskal's example. Daskal considers the hypothetical planning situation M: being Mortis, a psychopath who prefers to murder and who trusts the planning adsometimes shouldÞ influence one's thinking about first-order questions, there is no reason to1. Granted, the conditional plan in ð3Þ is somewhat awkward. But notice that this ardness goes away when we restate ð3Þ using Gibbard's 'is the thing to do' language: ere I to doubt my powers of direct reasoning, then going to the shore is the thing to in V. this will always be the case. So there is no reason to think that PPIMs are not possible. This content downloaded from 128.252.58.243 on Fri, 13 Dec 2013 11:00:23 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions vice only of the idealized murder-happy version of himself, Mortis1.12 He then asks us to consider the first-order question 'what to plan to do in Kurth Expressivism and Innocent Mistakes 377M?'. As we have seen, when we take up this question, we step into Mortis's shoes and plan for the situation of being him. Here we conclude if Mortis in M, murder. As Daskal explains, "it would be unreasonable to deny this, given that Mortis's mental constitution is such that he has no possible access to a perspective from which he could recognize what is wrong with murdering."13 But these facts about Mortis's mental constitution also make it the case that when we take up the higher-order question 'what to plan to plan to do in M?', we have no flexibility when choosing an advisor-we must choose Mortis1.14 The result, says Daskal, is trouble. For starters, it reveals that on Gibbard's account we are forced to conclude that, if Mortis in M, murdering is both the thing to do and the thing to plan to do. But this in turn entails that there is no way for Gibbard to say what is obvious-namely, that given the unfortunate way that Mortis is wired up, he is ðinnocentlyÞmistaken about the appropriateness of murdering. Thus, Gibbard's account of normative object
IMMCs represent a distinct challenge because they suggest that there are plan situation where a similar sort of flexibility in position is not possible. To see this, let's view Daskal's example. Daskal considers the conjectural planning site M: being Mortis, a psychopath who prefer to murder and who trusts the planning adsometimes shouldÞ influence one's thinking about first - decree questions, there is no reason to1. Granted, the conditional plan in ð3Þ is somewhat awkward. But detect that this ardness goes away when we restate ð3Þ use Gibbard's' is the thing to do' language: ere I to doubt my powers of lineal reasoning, then going to the shore is the matter to in V. this will always be the case. So there is no cause to think that PPIMs are not possible. This content downloaded from 128.252.58.243 on Fri, 13 Dec 2013 11:00:23 AM All practice capable to JSTOR term and Conditions vice only of the idealized murder - happy version of himself, Mortis1.12 He then asks us to consider the first - order doubt' what to plan to do in Kurth Expressivism and Innocent Mistakes 377 thousand?'. As we have meet, when we take up this question, we mistreat into Mortis's shoes and plan for the situation of being him. Here we conclude if Mortis in M, murder. As Daskal excuse, " it would be unreasonable to deny this, given that Mortis's mental constitution is such that he has no potential access to a perspective from which he could recognize what is wrong with murdering. "13 But these facts about Mortis's mental fundamental law also make it the case that when we take up the higher - holy order question' what to plan to plan to do in M?', we have no flexibility when choosing an advisor - we must choose Mortis1.14 The solution, says Daskal, is trouble. For starter, it reveals that on Gibbard's history we are forced to reason that, if Mortis in M, murdering is both the thing to cause and the thing to plan to practice. But this in turn entail that there is no means for Gibbard to say what is obvious - namely, that given the unfortunate way that Mortis is wired up, he is ðinnocentlyÞmistaken about the appropriateness of murder. Thus, Gibbard's account of prescriptive object
 IMLCs represent a distinct challenge becaosw they suggeat that ghere are planning situationd qhere a similar sort of flebibility pn perspextivt is not possible. To see bkis, lsb's cousmder Daskal's exsmple. Daskdl considers tve hvpothetical planning situation M: beigg Mortos, a psychopath rho kresers no murder and who trusts the plznning edsometimes shoildÞ influence one's thinkinh ablut first-order quedtions, therg is bo reason to1. Granted, the conditionzl plan in ð3Þ is somewhat awkward. But uotice that tyis drdness goew awaj when we resbste ð3Þ uving Ginbard's 'is the bhing to do' language: ere I to doubt my powers os direct secsoning, then going to tye shmre hs tfw tfinf vo jn V. tjis will alwags be the cqse. So there is no tewwon to think fhat P[IIs are not possible. This content downloddes from 128.252.58.243 on Fri, 13 Dec 2013 11:00:23 AN All use subject to USTOR Teris and Conditions vice only of the idealized murdar-hap'y vexwion ud jimself, Mortis1.12 He then asks us to consider thq forxt-order questijn 'what to llwn jo do in Kurth Expressibism and Innocent Listakef 377M?'. Aw we have seem, when we take up this quesrion, we step unto Mortis's shoes and plan fur tne siyuation of being him. Hexe we donclude if Mortis ih M, murder. As Dasyal efplains, "it would be unreasjnable to denv this, gkven that Iortis's mejtal gmnstitution is sucj thaj he hds no posslble access to a perspective from which he coold rebognize wkat is wrong with mtrdering."13 But tkese faccs abojt Mortis's mental constitutijn also make hj the case thet when wq taje up the hkeher-order quesyion 'what to plan ti plan to do in M?', xe hxbe no flexibilicv qhen choosing am aavifog-we mtvt choose Mostis1.14 Thd resuut, says Dasjxl, ix trouble. For startess, if reveals that on Binbard's acxount we are forced tp conclude that, if Mortms in O, murceryng is both the thing to do ans the thijg bo plan to do. But this in turu entails that there is no way for Gibbacd to say what is obvioys-namely, that given uhe unfortunave way that Mordis is wired up, he iw ðinnocentlyÞmistalen about the approprjatenevs of murdering. Thus, Gibbard's account of normative object
IMMCs represent a distinct challenge because they there planning situations a similar sort not To see this, consider Daskal's example. considers the hypothetical planning situation M: Mortis, a psychopath who prefers to murder and who trusts the planning adsometimes influence one's thinking about first-order questions, there is no reason to1. Granted, the plan ð3Þ somewhat But notice that this ardness goes away when we restate ð3Þ using Gibbard's 'is the thing do' language: ere I to doubt my powers direct reasoning, then going the shore is the thing in this will be case. there is no to think that PPIMs are not possible. This content downloaded from 128.252.58.243 on Fri, 13 Dec 2013 AM All to JSTOR and vice of the idealized of himself, Mortis1.12 He then asks the first-order question 'what to plan to do Kurth Expressivism Innocent Mistakes 377M?'. As we have when we take up this question, we step Mortis's shoes and plan for the situation of being him. Here we conclude if Mortis murder. As Daskal explains, would be unreasonable deny given Mortis's constitution is that he has no possible access to a perspective from which could recognize what is wrong with murdering."13 But these facts mental also make it case that when we up higher-order question 'what to plan do have flexibility choosing an advisor-we must Mortis1.14 The result, says Daskal, trouble. For starters, it we are forced to conclude that, if Mortis M, murdering is both the thing to and the thing to plan to do. But this in turn entails there is for Gibbard to say what is obvious-namely, that the unfortunate way that is wired up, he is ðinnocentlyÞmistaken about the appropriateness murdering. Gibbard's account normative object
 IMMCs represent a distinct chAllenge becAuse tHey SugGeSt thAt thEre are planning SItuaTions where a similar sort Of fleXiBIlitY In PerspEctive iS NoT POssIbLe. to sEe THiS, let's ConSider DaSkal's exampLe. DAsKal considers THe HypotheticAl pLanning situaTioN M: beinG MOrtIS, a psyChoPath wHo prefERs to muRder and whO tRUsts thE PlanninG ADsOmetImes shouldÞ influeNCe ONe's thinking aboUt firsT-oRDeR QUesTioNs, there is nO rEason TO1. GranteD, ThE CONdiTIonal plan in ð3Þ Is somewhat aWKwaRd. But nOtIce THat thiS ardnEsS GoeS away when we RestAte ð3Þ usinG GibbaRD's 'is the THing to dO' languAge: Ere i to dOUbT mY poWeRS of DIrEct REasOning, theN gOiNg to tHe shORE IS the ThiNg to In V. thIs will always bE thE casE. so tHere iS no reAson To Think That PPiMs arE nOt possible. This cOnteNt downloaDed FrOm 128.252.58.243 oN FRi, 13 Dec 2013 11:00:23 am All usE suBjeCt to JSToR Terms ANd COnDITIoNs vice only of the ideAlIZEd Murder-haPpy verSIoN oF Himself, MOrTis1.12 he thEN Asks uS to cONsIder the fIrst-orDEr QuEstion 'wHaT to plaN tO do In KUrth EXPresSivism And InnocEnt MiSTakes 377M?'. As we have SEen, when we take UP tHIS qUEstiOn, wE step into MoRtis'S ShoeS and PLaN foR The siTuatiOn OF bEIng him. Here we concludE iF MortiS in M, mUrder. As Daskal Explains, "it WOULd be unreAsonABlE To deny this, giveN that mortis's menTAl constiTutioN is such tHat he has nO POssible aCceSs tO a pErsPECtIve from which hE COuld ReCognize WhaT is wronG wiTh mUrdEriNg."13 but these fActs abouT MOrTiS's MenTal coNStitutioN aLso MaKe iT the cASe that When wE takE uP tHE hiGher-ordER qUEStioN 'wHaT to pLan To Plan tO do iN m?', we Have no fLexibilitY whEN choOsInG an adviSor-we must chooSe mortis1.14 The rEsUlt, Says DaSKAl, is trouBle. For starters, it reveals THat on GiBbaRd's acCounT we are forCed To concLudE That, if mortis In M, muRdEriNG Is botH THe ThiNg To do and the THIng To plaN tO do. BUt this iN turn entails that thERe iS no way for GibbArd To saY WHaT is OBvIOus-NaMEly, THAt given the unforTunate way tHaT moRtis is wireD Up, hE iS ðinnocEntlyÞmIstakEN about tHe approprIateness oF mUrdeRINg. THus, Gibbard'S account Of normatiVE objeCT
 IMMCs represent a distinc t challeng e bec aus e t he y su gges t that there a r e pl anning situations wher e a s im i lars or t offlexibi l it y inpe rs pec ti v eis no t p ossible . To see t his ,let's consid e rDaskal's e xam ple. Daskalcon siders  t heh ypoth eti cal p lannin g  situa tion M: b ei n g Mort i s, a ps y c ho path  who prefers to m u rd e r and who trus ts the  p l an n i ngads ometimes s ho uldÞi nfluenc e  o n e ' s t h inking aboutfirst-order que stions ,the r e is n o rea so n  to 1. Granted,  the  conditio nal pl a n in ð3 Þ  is som ewhatawk war d. B u tno tic et hat th isa rdn ess goes  a wa y whe n we r e s tate  ð3 Þ us ing G ibbard's 'isthe  thi n g t o do'  lang uage :ere I  to do ubt m ypowers of direc t re asoning,the ngoi ng  to t h e shor e i s t he thin g to in V.th i s wi ll always be the c as e .  S o thereis nor ea so n  to thin ktha t PP I M s are  not po ssible.This c o nt en t downl oa ded fr om  12 8.2 52.58 . 243on Fri , 13 Dec  2013 11:00:23 AM Al l  use subjectt oJ S TO R  Ter msand Conditi onsv iceonly of  th e  idea lized  m u rd e r-happy version ofhi mself,  Mort is1.12 He the n asks ust o consider  the fi r st-order quest ion ' what to pl a n to doin Ku rth Expr essivisma n d Innoce ntMis tak es3 7 7M ?'. As we hav e seen ,when we  ta ke up t his  qu est ion ,we step i nto Mort is 's  s ho esand p l an for t he  si tu ati on of beinghim.Here  w ec onc lude if Mo r t is i nM,  mur der .As Da skal exp lains,"it would  be unre as on able to  deny this, g iv en that Mo rt is' s ment a l  constit ution is such that he h a s no po ssi ble a cces s to a pe rsp ective  fr o m whic h he c ouldre cog n i ze wh a t  i s w ro ng with mu r d eri ng."1 3Butthese f acts about Mortis' s  me ntal constitu tio n al s o  m ake it the  c a set h at when we take  up the hi gh e r- order ques t ion  ' what to  plan t o pla n  to doin M?', w e have no  f lexi b i lit y when cho osing an  advisor- w e mus t  c hoose  Mo rtis1. 14  Th e res ult, s a ysDaska l, istr ouble.  Forst arters,it reveals that on Gibb ard'saccou ntwe are fo rce d  to  conclude  tha t, if Mort isinM, mu rde r ing i s bo t hthe thing  tod o and the th ing t oplan to do. B u t t his i n t u rn ent ails  that there is no way for Gibbar d to s aywha t  isob vious-namely,tha tg i ven theun fortunate w ay thatMo r tis i s wire d up,he is ð i n no c entlyÞ mist ake n about t heap p ropriat en es s  of mu rder in g. Thu s, Gib b ard' s account of norma tiveo b ject
 IMMCs_represent a_distinct challenge because they_suggest that_there_are planning_situations_where a similar_sort of flexibility_in perspective is not_possible. To see_this,_let's consider Daskal's example. Daskal considers the hypothetical planning situation M: being Mortis, a_psychopath_who prefers_to_murder_and who trusts the planning_adsometimes shouldÞ influence one's thinking_about first-order_questions, there is no reason to1. Granted, the_conditional_plan in ð3Þ_is somewhat awkward. But notice that this ardness goes_away when we restate ð3Þ using_Gibbard's 'is the_thing_to_do' language: ere I_to doubt my powers of direct_reasoning, then going to the shore_is the thing to in V. this_will always be the case. So_there is no reason to_think that_PPIMs are not possible. This_content downloaded from_128.252.58.243 on_Fri, 13 Dec_2013 11:00:23 AM All use subject_to JSTOR Terms_and Conditions vice only of the_idealized_murder-happy version of_himself,_Mortis1.12_He then_asks us to_consider_the first-order_question_'what to plan to do in_Kurth_Expressivism and Innocent Mistakes 377M?'. As we_have seen, when we_take_up this question, we_step into Mortis's shoes and_plan for the situation of being_him. Here_we conclude_if Mortis in M, murder. As Daskal explains, "it would be_unreasonable to deny this, given that_Mortis's mental constitution is_such that_he_has no possible_access_to a_perspective from which he could recognize what_is wrong_with murdering."13 But these facts about_Mortis's mental constitution also_make_it the case that when we_take up the higher-order question 'what_to plan to plan to_do_in_M?', we have no flexibility_when choosing an advisor-we must choose_Mortis1.14 The result,_says Daskal, is trouble. For starters, it_reveals_that on Gibbard's account we are_forced_to conclude that, if Mortis in_M,_murdering_is both the thing to_do and the thing to plan_to do. But this in turn entails that there_is no way_for Gibbard to say what_is_obvious-namely,_that given the unfortunate way that Mortis is wired up,_he is_ðinnocentlyÞmistaken about the_appropriateness of murdering. Thus, Gibbard's account of normative object