 which genuinely fictional characters, by definition, are not).11 Fictions that describe such encounters or interactions do, by the meaning of 'fiction' for us, accordingly not describe interactions with fictions, but perhaps with fictions* – contents of stories that are not separated from life in the world of the fiction by being non-actual relative to that world, but by some other barrier. That leaves us with examples of blatantly contradictory fictions such as Sylvan's Box (cf. Priest 2005), which purports to describe an object that is both there and isn't there at the same time, or Everett's (2005) examples where e.g. the symmetry of identity does not hold. In these examples the contradictions are explicit and central elements of the story, and compartmentalization or local repairs do not help. In such rare cases I am inclined to bite the bullet and deny that the stories are, in fact, best interpreted as completely meaningfully describing a contradictory state of affairs (see Hanley 2004).12 Truth-in-fiction is a species of truth, and unless we are dialetheists 'it is both there and not there the same time' isn't in any sense true, not even true-in-fiction, even if the author claims otherwise. 5. Conclusion I have endeavored to provide a partial defense of a possibilist approach to fiction against some common objections, and to (cursorily) elaborate on some potential advantages. Major obstacles remain. I have not discussed possibilism's potential commitment to modal realism. Nor have I developed my response to the selection problem in detail. But insofar as these questions can be answered, possibilism has some attractive features. First, 11 That is: There is nothing contradictory about me interacting with Holmes, and there are worlds where I do. But it is a contradiction in terms to say that I might (causally) interact with a fictional character as such, and should be on any acceptable analysis of 'fiction'. 12 Indeed, Everett's examples rather call for repair. A non-symmetric relation is by definition not an identity relation, so an author purporting to describe non-symmetric identity is using the word 'identity' wrong; what he or she describes is in fact a different relation, for instance a supervenience relation. 364 F R E D R I K H A R A L D S E N it provides a straightforward account of the meaning of claims made in fiction, which are assigned the same kind of semantic content as
which genuinely fictional characters, by definition, are not).11 Fictions that describe such encounter or interaction do, by the meaning of' fiction' for us, accordingly not trace interactions with fictions, but possibly with fictions * – contents of stories that are not separate from life in the world of the fabrication by being non - actual relative to that world, but by some other barrier. That leaves us with examples of blatantly confounding fictions such as Sylvan's Box (cf. Priest 2005), which purports to describe an object that is both there and isn't there at the like time, or Everett's (2005) examples where e.g. the isotropy of identity does not hold. In these examples the contradictions are explicit and central component of the story, and compartmentalization or local repairs do not help. In such rare cases I am disposed to bite the bullet and deny that the stories are, in fact, best interpreted as wholly meaningfully describe a contradictory state of affairs (see Hanley 2004).12 Truth - in - fiction is a species of truth, and unless we are dialetheists' it is both there and not there the same time' isn't in any common sense truthful, not even true - in - fabrication, even if the writer claim otherwise. 5. Conclusion I have endeavored to provide a partial defense of a possibilist approach to fabrication against some common objections, and to (cursorily) elaborate on some potential advantages. Major obstacles remain. I have not discussed possibilism's potential commitment to modal realism. Nor have I developed my reception to the selection trouble in contingent. But insofar as these question can be answered, possibilism has some attractive features. First, 11 That is: There is nothing contradictory about me interacting with Holmes, and there be worlds where I do. But it is a contradiction in terms to say that I might (causally) interact with a fabricated character as such, and should be on any acceptable analysis of' fiction'. 12 Indeed, Everett's examples preferably call for haunt. A non - symmetric relation is by definition not an identity relation, so an author aim to describe non - symmetric identity is using the word' identity' wrong; what he or she describes is in fact a unlike relation, for instance a supervenience relation. 364 F gas constant E D R I K H A R A L D S vitamin e N it provides a straightforward history of the meaning of claims made in fiction, which are assigned the same kind of semantic content as
 whlch genuinely fictional gharacters, by deyunitioi, are nkt).11 Fictiuns that describe such encouiterw or unteractions do, by the meaning lf 'fictiin' fie us, accorvjngly not desdvibe nnveractions with fictions, tut perhaps widh fnctions* – contents of stories that arq not srpwrated from lise im the world of the fiction by being non-zctual gelative to that eorld, but by some other bagrieg. That leaves us wlth examplew of vlatantly covtradictorj fictions auch as Sylvan's Box (cf. Priest 2005), dhich purports jo dfvcribe an ouject nhat is both bnere atd isn't there at the xamx tine, or Everett's (2005) exampnes where e.g. the simmetry of ibentity does not hold. Ib theve efampuws ghe cpnfradichiois are expljcit and cebtral elements of tne wtory, and comlartmegtwlization or local repairs do not help. Pn shch rare cases I am incoined to bite the bulpet and dqny that the stories are, in fact, best interpreted as ckoplttcjh mfaningfully describing a contradictory state jr sfnairs (see Hanley 2004).12 Truth-in-fivtlom is a species of trbfh, and unless we are dialetreistw 'it is bjth yhere and not there the samw time' isn't pn aby sense true, not zven true-in-fnction, even if the author claims ocherwiae. 5. Concluslon I havs endeavored to pfovpde d partial defense of a posfibilist epprocch to fkctipn agaynst some fommok objections, and to (curslrhly) elaborwte on some potential advantages. Major obstackev rvmain. I hcve nob discussed posfibilism's poteutial coimitmdnt to modzl realmsm. Nor have I developed ki response to the selqctiin peoblem kv detail. But imsofar as these quewtions can be answcred, koasibilism has sime attractive feayurds. Sigst, 11 Evat is: There is votfong cuntradictorn acout me interacting with Holjes, and there are eovlds wherg I do. Bue it is a conyradiction in termd to vay that I iight (causally) interact with a fictionap cmaracter as stch, qnd should bz on any acceptable analysis of 'fiction'. 12 Indeed, Everett's gxamples rather call yov repair. A npn-symietric renation is by definituon not an identiuy relation, so an authod purpmrtinh to describe non-symmetric identity is using the word 'identity' wrong; what he or she describss ix in xaet c diffewent celation, for instsnce a supervenience relation. 364 H R E D R H H H A R A L D S E N it provicer a straightfurward account of the mezning of claims made in fiction, which ate assigned the same kinc of semqntic content ar
which genuinely fictional characters, by definition, are that such encounters interactions do, by us, not describe interactions fictions, but perhaps fictions* – contents of stories that not separated from life in the world of the fiction by being non-actual to that world, but by some other barrier. That leaves us with examples blatantly fictions as Box (cf. Priest 2005), which purports to describe an object that is both there and isn't at the same time, or Everett's (2005) examples e.g. the symmetry of does not hold. In these the are explicit central of story, and compartmentalization local repairs do not help. In such rare cases I am inclined to bite the bullet and that the in fact, interpreted completely describing a contradictory affairs (see Hanley 2004).12 Truth-in-fiction is truth, and unless we are dialetheists 'it is there and there the same time' isn't in sense true, not even true-in-fiction, even if the claims otherwise. 5. Conclusion I have endeavored to provide a partial defense of a possibilist fiction against some common and to (cursorily) on potential Major remain. I not discussed possibilism's potential commitment to modal realism. Nor have I my response to the selection problem in detail. But insofar questions be answered, possibilism some attractive features. First, That There is nothing contradictory interacting Holmes, worlds I But it is a in terms to say that might (causally) interact with and should be on any acceptable analysis of 12 Indeed, Everett's examples rather call for A non-symmetric relation is by definition not an identity relation, so an purporting to identity is using the word 'identity' wrong; what or she describes is fact a different relation, for instance a supervenience relation. F E D I K H R A L S E N a straightforward of meaning in fiction, which are assigned the kind semantic content as
 which genuinely fictional chAracters, by DefinItiOn, aRe Not).11 FIctiOns that describE Such Encounters or interactioNs do, bY tHE meaNInG of 'fiCtion' foR Us, ACCorDiNgLy nOt DEsCribe IntEractioNs with fictIonS, bUt perhaps witH FiCtions* – contEntS of stories thAt aRe not sEpAraTEd froM liFe in tHe worlD Of the fIction by bEiNG non-acTUal relaTIVe To thAt world, but by some oTHeR Barrier. That leaVes us wItH ExAMPleS of Blatantly cOnTradiCTory ficTIoNS SUch AS Sylvan's Box (cf. priest 2005), which PUrpOrts to DeScrIBe an obJect tHaT Is bOth there and Isn't There at thE same tIMe, or EveREtt's (2005) exaMples wHerE e.g. The sYMmEtRy oF iDEntITy DoeS Not Hold. In thEsE eXamplEs thE CONTradIctIons Are exPlicit and centRal ElemENts Of the Story, And cOmPartmEntaliZatioN oR local repairs do Not hElp. In such RarE cAseS I Am incLIned to BitE thE bullet And deny THat ThE STOrIes are, in fact, best inTeRPReTed as comPletelY MeAnINgfully dEsCriBing A COntraDictORy State of aFfairs (SEe haNley 2004).12 TruTh-In-fictIoN is A spEcies OF truTh, and uNless we aRe diaLEtheists 'it is boTH there and not tHErE THe SAme tIme' Isn't in any seNse tRUe, noT eveN TrUe-iN-FictiOn, eveN iF ThE Author claims otherwiSe. 5. concluSion I Have endeavoreD to provide A PARtial defEnse OF a POssibilist apprOach tO fiction agAInst some CommoN objectiOns, and to (cURSorily) elAboRatE on SomE POtEntial advantaGES. MajOr ObstaclEs rEmain. I hAve Not DisCusSeD possibilIsm's poteNtIaL cOmMitMent tO Modal reaLiSm. NOr HavE I devELoped mY respOnse To ThE SelEction pRObLEM in dEtAiL. But InsOfAr as tHese QUesTions caN be answerEd, pOSsibIlIsM has somE attractive feAtUres. First, 11 THaT is: there iS NOthing coNtradictory about me interACting wiTh HOlmes, And tHere are woRldS where i do. bUt it is A contrAdictIoN in TERms to SAY tHat i mIght (causalLY) IntEract WiTh a fIctionaL character as such, anD ShoUld be on any accEptAble ANAlYsiS Of 'FIctIoN'. 12 indEED, Everett's examplEs rather caLl FOr Repair. A non-SYmmEtRic relaTion is bY defiNItion noT an identiTy relatioN, sO an aUTHor Purporting To descriBe non-symmETric iDEnTity iS usIng the WoRd 'iDentiTy' wronG; WhaT he or She desCrIbes is In facT a DifferenT relation, for instance a suPervenIence RelAtion. 364 F R E D r I K h a R A l D S E N it prOvidEs a straighTfoRwaRd accOunT Of the MeanINg Of cLAims mAde iN Fiction, whICh Are ASSiGned the same KIND of SemanTic COntent As
 which genuinely fictional  character s, by  de fin it ion,  are  not).11 Ficti o ns t hat describe such enco unter so r in t er actio ns do,b yt h e m ea ni ngof 'f ictio n'for us,  according lyno t describe i n te ractions w ith  fictions, b utperhap swit h  fict ion s* –conten t s of s tories th at are no t  separa t e dfrom  life in the worl d  o f  the fiction b y bein gn on - a ctu alrelative t othatw orld, b u tb y som e  other barrie r. That lea v esus wit hexa m ples o f bla ta n tly  contradict oryfictionssuch a s  Sylvan ' s Box ( cf. Pr ies t 2 005) ,  w hi chpu r por t stod esc ribe anob je ct th at i s b o th t her e an d isn 't there at t hesame tim e, or  Ever ett' s(2005 ) exam pleswh ere e.g. the sy mmet ry of ide nti ty  do es  noth old. I n t hes e examp les the con tr a d i ct ions are explicitan d ce ntral el ements of  t h e story,  a ndcomp a r tment aliz a ti on or lo cal re p ai rs  do not  h elp. I nsuc h r are c a sesI am i nclinedto bi t e the bullet a n d deny that t h es t or i es a re,  in fact, b esti nter pret e dasc omple telyme a ni n gfully describing a  c ontrad ictor y state of af fairs (see H a nley 200 4).1 2  T r uth-in-fiction  is a  species o f  truth,and u nless we  are dial e t heists ' itisbot h t h e re  and not ther e thesa me time ' i sn't in  an y s ens e t ru e, not ev en true- in -f ic ti on,  even if the a ut hor  c lai ms ot h erwise . 5.Conc lu si o n I  have e n de a v ored  t oprov ide  a  part iald efe nse ofa possibi lis t  app ro ac h to fi ction against  s ome common  o bje ctions , and to ( cursorily) elaborate on some po ten tialadva ntages. M ajo r obst acl e s rema in. Ihaveno t d i s cusse d po ssi bi lism's pot e n tia l com mi tmen t to mo dal realism. Nor h a veI developed m y r espo n s etot he sel ec t ion p roblem in detai l. But ins of a ras these q u est io ns canbe answ ered, possibi lism hassome attr ac tive f eat ures. Firs t, 11 Th at is: Th e re is no thing  co ntradi ct ory  abou t me i n ter actin g with  H olmes,  andth ere areworlds where I do. Butit isa con tra diction i n t e rms  to say t hatI might (c aus all y) in ter a ct wi th a fi cti o nal c hara c ter as su c h,  an d sh ould be ona n y  ac cepta ble analys is o f 'fiction'. 12 I n deed, Everett' s ex a m ple s r a ther  c all for repair . A  n o n -symmetr ic  relation i s by def in i tionnot an  ident ity rel a t io n , so a n au tho r purport ing  t o  descri be  n o n-symm etri cidenti ty isu sing t he word 'identit y' wr o n g; wh a t h e orsh e descr i besis in fact  a differen t rela tion , for  instan ce  a sup erv en ience rela t ion. 364F R E  D R IKH AR A  L D S  E N i t pro vide sa s traightfo r w ar d  a cc o unt  ofthe m ea ning  of claim s  made in  fi c tion, w hi cha r e assi g ne d the same k ind  of s e m antic cont e nt a s 
 which_genuinely fictional_characters, by definition, are_not).11 Fictions_that_describe such_encounters_or interactions do,_by the meaning_of 'fiction' for us,_accordingly not describe_interactions_with fictions, but perhaps with fictions* – contents of stories that are not separated_from_life in_the_world_of the fiction by being_non-actual relative to that world,_but by_some other barrier. That leaves us with examples_of_blatantly contradictory fictions_such as Sylvan's Box (cf. Priest 2005), which purports_to describe an object that is_both there and_isn't_there_at the same time,_or Everett's (2005) examples where e.g._the symmetry of identity does not_hold. In these examples the contradictions are_explicit and central elements of the_story, and compartmentalization or local_repairs do_not help. In such rare_cases I am_inclined to_bite the bullet_and deny that the stories are,_in fact, best_interpreted as completely meaningfully describing a_contradictory_state of affairs_(see_Hanley_2004).12 Truth-in-fiction_is a species_of_truth, and_unless_we are dialetheists 'it is both_there_and not there the same time' isn't_in any sense true,_not_even true-in-fiction, even if_the author claims otherwise. 5._Conclusion I have endeavored to provide_a partial_defense of_a possibilist approach to fiction against some common objections, and to_(cursorily) elaborate on some potential advantages._Major obstacles remain. I_have not_discussed_possibilism's potential commitment_to_modal realism._Nor have I developed my response to_the selection_problem in detail. But insofar as_these questions can be_answered,_possibilism has some attractive features. First,_11 That is: There is nothing_contradictory about me interacting with_Holmes,_and_there are worlds where I_do. But it is a contradiction_in terms to_say that I might (causally) interact with_a_fictional character as such, and should_be_on any acceptable analysis of 'fiction'._12_Indeed,_Everett's examples rather call for_repair. A non-symmetric relation is by_definition not an identity relation, so an author purporting_to describe non-symmetric_identity is using the word_'identity'_wrong;_what he or she describes is in fact a different_relation, for_instance a supervenience_relation. 364 F R E D R I K H_A R A L D S E_N it provides a straightforward account of the meaning of claims_made in fiction, which are assigned the same_kind of semantic content as