 as contingently private, since it's used in common by two people. Setting aside examples that Reid himself might have con- sidered, drawing on evolutionary theory, we might even expect there to be many partially distributed natural tendencies to express states of mind in specific ways. For example suppose that touching your ear while speaking was reliably associated with an especially sincere commitment to truth-telling.3 A genetic mutation, resulting in a disposition to both (a) touch your ear as an expression of such a commitment and (b) to interpret such behavior likewise in others, might confer an advantage on those with the mutation. Such a mutation would at first be unique, and then, with any luck, propag- ate throughout the population over time, though it might never be universally distributed. Such a sign would count as neither artificial nor natural, as per Reid's definitions, but surely it's a sign nonethe- less. Reid could respond in at least two ways. On the one hand, he might add a third category to accommodate the examples. On the other hand, he might revise the definition of 'natural sign', so as to include such signs as natural. Call this an inclusive definition of 3 Suppose this commitment to be well beyond the default commitment to truth-telling embodied in Reid's "principle of veracity." See Reid 1764: 6.24, p. 193–4. 7 | Reid on the priority of natural language 'natural sign'. An inclusive definition might go like this: natural signs have a meaning prior to any agreement among those who use them, which meaning those people understand by principles of their nature. This creates space for the sort of idiosyncratic or par- tially distributed natural signs featured in our examples. Perhaps the difference between these two responses doesn't amount to much. But I favor the inclusive response, for two reasons. First, the people in our examples – the twins in the one case, the mutants in the other – do express and understand the signs in question "by principles of their nature." That makes it natural to include them as "natural signs," and so I shall. Second, the inclusive definition seems best suited to Reid's argument, to which we now turn. 3. The argument Here's the heart of the relevant passage again: [I]t is demonstrable, that if mankind had not a natural lan- guage, they could never have invented an artificial one. All artificial language supposes some compact or agreement to affix a certain meaning to certain signs; therefore there must
as contingently private, since it's used in common by two people. sic aside exemplar that Reid himself might have con- sidered, drawing on evolutionary theory, we might even have a bun in the oven there to be many partially distributed natural tendency to press out states of judgment in specific ways. For example presuppose that touching your ear while speak was reliably associated with an especially sincere commitment to truth - telling.3 A familial mutation, resulting in a disposition to both (a) equal your ear as an expression of such a commitment and (b) to rede such behavior likewise in others, might confer an advantage on those with the mutation. Such a mutation would at first be alone, and then, with any luck, propag- ate throughout the population over time, though it might never be universally distributed. Such a sign would count as neither artificial nor natural, as per Reid's definitions, but surely it's a sign nonethe- less. Reid could respond in at least two ways. On the one hand, he might add a third category to accommodate the examples. On the other hired hand, he might revise the definition of' natural sign of the zodiac', so as to admit such signs as natural. Call this an inclusive definition of 3 Suppose this commitment to be well beyond the default commitment to truth - relation embodied in Reid's " principle of veracity. " See Reid 1764: 6.24, p. 193–4. 7 | Reid on the priority of natural language' lifelike sign'. An inclusive definition might go like this: natural signs have a meaning prior to any agreement among those who use them, which meaning those citizenry understand by principles of their nature. This creates space for the sort of idiosyncratic or par- tially distribute natural signs featured in our exemplar. Perhaps the difference between these two responses doesn't amount to much. But I privilege the inclusive response, for two reason. First, the people in our example – the twins in the one event, the mutants in the early – do express and understand the sign in question " by principles of their nature. " That make it natural to admit them as " natural signs, " and so I shall. Second, the inclusive definition appear best suited to Reid's argument, to which we now turn. 3. The controversy Here's the heart of the relevant passage again: [ I]t is demonstrable, that if world had not a natural lan- guage, they could never have invented an artificial one. All artificial language supposes some compact or agreement to affix a sealed meaning to certain signs; therefore there must
 as contingently private, sikce it's used in eimmon uy two leople. Sdtting aside examples that Rxid yimseof might have con- sidefed, drawijg on evilutmonary theory, we might eyzn exlcct tkece to be many psrtially dhstributed natgrxl tendencies to express states of migd in slefific ways. For exak[le alpkose that touching your ear while speakiig was reliably associated with an especiwlly sincere commitmenh to truth-tgmligt.3 A genetic outation, rtsblting in a disposition to both (a) touch yojr eax as an exptzwsilt of such a commptment and (b) bp intespret sich behavior llkewive un others, might confec an advantage on thjse with dhz mutation. Such a mutqtuon wmuld at wursg bt uiiqhe, and thxn, with any luck, propat- ate throughout tht pjiilation over time, ehjugh it might never be universally distgibufed. Such a sign would ciunt as neither artiflcial nor natural, as per Reid's definitions, but surely it's d sigi vonttmc- lerw. Geid could respond in at least two ways. On thq ome hand, he might add a thirc fayggory to accomoodate ths examples. On the lther hwnd, hw might rtvise the definition of 'natural wign', so as tj include such signd as naturau. Cakl thos an inclusive definitnon of 3 Suppose tjis commifoent to be well ceypng the default commitment tj truth-teoliny embodidd im Reid'f "principlf of yaracity." See Reid 1764: 6.24, p. 193–4. 7 | Raid on the priority of natural language 'nevural sign'. An itcllsive defnnitiok might go like this: natural xigns hcve a oeaning prpor to anb agreement wmong those wvl use them, wiich meanyng rhosw peopld understand by principlvs of rheir nature. This greatgs space for the woru if idiosyncratoc ur [ag- tmally gistributed tatufal xigns featurtb ik ojr ecamples. Perhaps the giffsrence between thexe two reskonses doqsn't amount tp much. But I favor the mnclusmve rexpogse, for two reasons. First, the leople in ouv examples – tre tqins in the pne case, the mutants in the other – do eepress and understand jhe signs in question "ny principlex of eheir natgre." That makes it narural to include uhem as "natural signs," ahd so H shapl. Second, the inclusive definition seems best suited to Reid's argument, to which we now turn. 3. Thr arglmeut Kere's tre hxact of the relevann passage again: [I]t is demonstrabue, that hf mankind had not a natural lsn- guage, they cuuld never have invented an artigicial one. All artificial langusge supposes some compacb or agrewment to affix e certain meaning to certann sigbs; therwforc there must
as contingently private, since it's used in two Setting aside that Reid himself on theory, we might expect there to many partially distributed natural tendencies to states of mind in specific ways. For example suppose that touching your ear speaking was reliably associated with an especially sincere commitment to truth-telling.3 A genetic resulting a to (a) touch your ear as an expression of such a commitment and (b) to interpret such likewise in others, might confer an advantage on with the mutation. Such mutation would at first be and with any propag- throughout population over time, it might never be universally distributed. Such a sign would count as neither artificial nor natural, as Reid's definitions, it's a nonethe- Reid respond in at ways. On the one hand, he third category to accommodate the examples. On the hand, he revise the definition of 'natural sign', as to include such signs as natural. Call an inclusive definition of 3 Suppose this commitment to be well beyond the default commitment embodied in Reid's "principle veracity." See Reid 6.24, 193–4. | on the of natural language 'natural sign'. An inclusive definition might go like natural signs have a meaning prior to any agreement among use which meaning those understand by principles of nature. creates space for the idiosyncratic par- signs in examples. Perhaps the difference these two responses doesn't amount much. But I favor reasons. First, the people in our examples – twins in the one case, the mutants the other – do express and understand the signs in question "by of their makes it natural to include them as "natural and so I shall. the inclusive definition seems best suited to Reid's argument, which now turn. The argument Here's heart of the passage again: [I]t that if had a they could never have invented an one. artificial language supposes some compact agreement a certain meaning to certain signs; therefore there must
 as contingently private, sincE it's used in CommoN by Two PeOple. settIng aside examplES thaT Reid himself might have cOn- sidErED, draWInG on evOlutionARy THEorY, wE mIghT eVEn ExpecT thEre to be Many partiaLly DiStributed natURaL tendencieS to Express stateS of Mind in SpEciFIc wayS. FoR examPle supPOse thaT touching YoUR ear whILe speakING wAs reLiably associated wITh AN especially sinCere coMmITmENT to TruTh-telling.3 A GeNetic MUtation, REsULTIng IN a disposition To both (a) toucH YouR ear as An ExpREssion Of sucH a COmmItment and (b) tO intErpret sucH behavIOr likewISe in othErs, migHt cOnfEr an ADvAnTagE oN ThoSE wIth THe mUtation. SUcH a MutatIon wOULD At fiRst Be unIque, aNd then, with any LucK, proPAg- aTe thrOughoUt thE pOpulaTion ovEr timE, tHough it might nevEr be UniversalLy dIsTriBuTed. SuCH a sign WouLd cOunt as nEither aRTifIcIAL NoR natural, as per Reid's DeFINiTions, but Surely IT's A sIGn nonethE- lEss. reid COUld reSponD In At least tWo ways. oN tHe One hand, He Might aDd A thIrd CategORy to AccommOdate the ExampLEs. On the other haND, he might revisE ThE DEfINitiOn oF 'natural sigN', so aS To inCludE SuCh sIGns as NaturAl. cAlL This an inclusive defiNiTion of 3 suppoSe this commitmEnt to be welL BEYond the dEfauLT cOMmitment to trutH-tellIng embodieD In Reid's "pRinciPle of verAcity." See REID 1764: 6.24, p. 193–4. 7 | Reid on The PriOriTy oF NAtUral language 'nATUral SiGn'. An incLusIve defiNitIon MigHt gO lIke this: naTural sigNs HaVe A mEanIng prIOr to any aGrEemEnT amOng thOSe who uSe theM, whiCh MeANinG those pEOpLE UndeRsTaNd by PriNcIples Of thEIr nAture. ThIs creates SpaCE for ThE sOrt of idIosyncratic or PaR- tially disTrIbuTed natURAl signs fEatured in our examples. PerHAps the dIffErencE betWeen these Two ResponSes DOesn't aMount tO much. buT I fAVOr the INClUsiVe Response, foR TWo rEasonS. FIrst, The peopLe in our examples – the TWinS in the one case, The MutaNTS iN thE OtHEr – dO eXPreSS And understand thE signs in quEsTIoN "by principLEs oF tHeir natUre." That Makes IT naturaL to includE them as "naTuRal sIGNs," aNd so I shall. second, thE inclusivE DefinITiOn seeMs bEst suiTeD to reid's ArgumeNT, to Which We now tUrN. 3. The arGumenT HEre's the hEart of the relevant passagE again: [i]t is dEmoNstrable, tHat IF maNkind had nOt a nAtural lan- gUagE, thEy couLd nEVer haVe inVEnTed AN artiFiciAL one. All arTIfIciAL LaNguage suppoSES SomE compAct OR agreeMent To affix a certain meANing to certain sIgns; THEreForE TherE mUst
 as contingently private,since it's  used  in  co mm on b y tw o people. Sett i ng a side examples that Rei d him se l f mi g ht  have  con- s i de r e d,dr aw ing  o n  e volut ion ary the ory, we mi ght  e ven expect t h er e to be ma nypartially di str ibuted  n atu r al te nde ncies  to ex p ress s tates ofmi n d in s p ecificw a ys . Fo r example suppose th a t touching you r earwh i le s pea kin g was reli ab ly as s ociated wi t h ane specially sin cere commit m ent  to tr ut h-t e lling. 3 A g en e tic  mutation,resu lting ina disp o sitiont o both(a) to uch  yo ur e a ras  an  e x pre s si ono f s uch a co mm it mentand( b ) to i nte rpre t suc h behavior li kew isei n o thers , mig ht c on fer a n adva ntage  o n those with th e mu tation. S uch  a  mu ta tionw ould a t f irs t be un ique, a n d t he n , wi th any luck, propa g- a te  through out th e  p op u lation o ve r t ime, t hough  itm ig ht never  be un i ve rs ally di st ribute d.  Su cha sig n  wou ld cou nt as ne ither artificial nor natural, as p e rR e id ' s de fin itions, but  sur e ly i t'sa  s ign nonet he- l es s .R eid could respond i nat lea st tw o ways. On th e one hand , h e mightadda  t h ird category t o acc ommodate t h e exampl es. O n the ot her hand, h e mightrev ise  th e d e f in ition of 'nat u r al s ig n', soasto incl ude  su chsig ns  as natur al. Call  t hi san  in clusi v e defini ti onof  3Suppo s e this  comm itme nt  t o  be  well b e yo n d  the  d ef ault  co mm itmen t to tru th-tell ing embod ied in R ei d' s "prin ciple of vera ci ty." See R ei d 1 764: 6 . 2 4, p. 19 3–4. 7 | Reid on the pr i ority o f n atura l la nguage 'n atu ral si gn' .  An in clusiv e def in iti o n  migh t go  li ke  this: nat u r alsigns  h avea meani ng prior to any ag r eem ent among tho sewhou s ethe m ,w hic hm ean i n g those peopleunderstand  b y  p rincipleso f t he ir natu re. Thi s cre a tes spa ce for th e sort of  i dios y n cra tic or par - tially  distribu t ed na t ur al si gns  featu re d i n our  examp l es.  Perh aps th ediffer encebe tween th ese two responses doesn 't amo unt t o m uch. ButI f a vor  the incl usiv e response , f ortwo r eas o ns. F irst ,  t hep eople  ino ur exampl e s– t h e  t wins in the o n e c ase,the mutant s in  the other – do e x press and unde rsta n d  th e s i gnsin  question "bypri nc i p les of t he ir nature."  That ma ke s  it n atural  to in clude t h e ma s "nat ural  si gns," and  so  I shall.Se co n d, the  inc lu sive d efinit i on s e e ms best suited t o Rei d ' s arg u men t, to  w hich we nowturn. 3. T he argument  Here' s th e hea rt of t he  relev ant  p assage aga i n: [I]t i s dem onstrab le , th atif man kind h ad no t ana tur al lan- g u a ge ,  t he y  co uldnever  h aveinventeda n artifi cia l  one. A ll  ar t i ficial la n g uage suppo ses  some c ompact ora gree m en t  to a ffix a  certa in mean i ngto  certai n s i g ns; there fore ther e  mu st 
 as_contingently private,_since it's used in_common by_two_people. Setting_aside_examples that Reid_himself might have_con- sidered, drawing on_evolutionary theory, we_might_even expect there to be many partially distributed natural tendencies to express states of_mind_in specific_ways._For_example suppose that touching your_ear while speaking was reliably_associated with_an especially sincere commitment to truth-telling.3 A genetic_mutation,_resulting in a_disposition to both (a) touch your ear as an_expression of such a commitment and_(b) to interpret_such_behavior_likewise in others, might_confer an advantage on those with_the mutation. Such a mutation would_at first be unique, and then, with_any luck, propag- ate throughout the_population over time, though it_might never_be universally distributed. Such a_sign would count_as neither_artificial nor natural,_as per Reid's definitions, but surely_it's a sign_nonethe- less. Reid could respond in_at_least two ways._On_the_one hand,_he might add_a_third category_to_accommodate the examples. On the other_hand,_he might revise the definition of 'natural_sign', so as to_include_such signs as natural._Call this an inclusive definition_of 3 Suppose this commitment to_be well_beyond the_default commitment to truth-telling embodied in Reid's "principle of veracity." See_Reid 1764: 6.24, p. 193–4. 7_| Reid on the_priority of_natural_language 'natural sign'._An_inclusive definition_might go like this: natural signs have_a meaning_prior to any agreement among those_who use them, which_meaning_those people understand by principles of_their nature. This creates space for_the sort of idiosyncratic or_par-_tially_distributed natural signs featured in_our examples. Perhaps the difference between_these two responses_doesn't amount to much. But I favor_the_inclusive response, for two reasons. First,_the_people in our examples – the_twins_in_the one case, the mutants_in the other – do express_and understand the signs in question "by principles of_their nature." That_makes it natural to include_them_as_"natural signs," and so I shall. Second, the inclusive definition_seems best_suited to Reid's_argument, to which we now turn. 3. The argument Here's_the heart of the relevant passage again:_[I]t is demonstrable, that if mankind had not a natural lan-_guage, they could never have invented an artificial_one. All artificial language supposes some compact_or agreement to affix_a_certain meaning to certain signs; therefore there_must