 claims outside of fiction but, of course, supposed to be interpreted under assumptions that the interpreter ordinarily ought to be aware do not actually hold. Second, possibilism underpins a fruitful model for fictional discourse. Of course, further challenges remain, especially since fictional narratives are often far more complex than the toy examples discussed here. We have had nothing to say for instance about the role of the narrator (which presumably requires at least an extra level in the model), how to understand, say, fourth wall violations, or importation of assumptions related to genre conventions. Finally, I have made no attempt to compare the possibilist analysis with its competitors. My goal has accordingly been rather modest, and given the outstanding challenges to possibilism – in particular concerning metaphysical commitments – this article is perhaps best understood as an attempt to help clarify where the real battle should take place. Acknowledgments The research behind this article was made possible in part through a grant from the SASPRO/FP7-Marie Curie Actions-COFUND scheme [grant number 0086/01/03/-b] as well as VEGA grant 2/0049/16: Fictionalism in philosophy and science (primary investigator Marián Zouhar). I am grateful to participants at the Philosophy of Language (1): Semantics of Fictional Discourse conference in October, 2016, as well as anonymous referees, for comments on earlier versions of this paper. References BRECKENRIDGE, W. & MAGIDOR, O. (2012): Arbitrary Reference. Philosophical Studies 158, No. 3, 377-400. BROCK, S. (2002): Fictionalism about Fictional Characters. Noûs 36, 1-21. EVERETT, A. (2005). Against Fictional Realism. The Journal of Philosophy 102, No. 12, 624-649. HANLEY, R. (2004): As Good As It Gets: Lewis on Truth in Fiction. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82, 112-128. HOWELL, R. (1979): Fictional Objects: How They Are and How They Aren't. Poetics 8, 129-177. KÖLBEL, M. (2002): Truth without Objectivity. London & New York: Routledge. T H E T R U T H A B O U T S H E R L O C K H O L M E S 365 KRIPKE, S. (2011): Vacuous Names and Fictional
claims outside of fiction but, of course, supposed to be interpret under assumption that the interpreter ordinarily ought to be aware do not actually have. Second, possibilism underpins a fruitful model for fabricated discourse. Of course, further challenges stay, especially since fictional narrative are often far more complex than the toy examples discussed here. We have experience nothing to say for instance about the role of the narrator (which presumably necessitate at least an extra level in the model), how to sympathize, say, fourth wall violations, or importing of assumptions associate to genre conventions. Finally, I have made no attempt to compare the possibilist psychoanalysis with its competitors. My goal has accordingly been rather modest, and given the great challenge to possibilism – in particular concerning metaphysical commitments – this article is perhaps best understood as an attempt to help clarify where the real struggle should take place. Acknowledgments The inquiry behind this article was do potential in part through a grant from the SASPRO / FP7 - Marie Curie Actions - COFUND scheme [ grant number 0086/01/03/-b ] as well as VEGA grant 2/0049/16: Fictionalism in philosophy and skill (primary investigator Marián Zouhar). I am grateful to participants at the Philosophy of Language (1 ): Semantics of Fictional Discourse conference in October, 2016, as well as anonymous referees, for comments on earlier versions of this paper. References BRECKENRIDGE, W. & MAGIDOR, O. (2012 ): Arbitrary Reference. Philosophical Studies 158, No. 3, 377 - 400. BROCK, S. (2002 ): Fictionalism about Fictional Characters. Noûs 36, 1 - 21. EVERETT, A. (2005). Against Fictional Realism. The Journal of Philosophy 102, nobelium. 12, 624 - 649. HANLEY, R. (2004 ): As Good As It Gets: Lewis on Truth in Fiction. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82, 112 - 128. HOWELL, R. (1979 ): Fictional object: How They Are and How They Aren't. Poetics 8, 129 - 177. KÖLBEL, M. (2002 ): accuracy without Objectivity. London & New York: Routledge. thymine H E T R U T H A boron O U T S heat content E gas constant L O coke K H oxygen L M E S 365 KRIPKE, S. (2011 ): Vacuous Names and Fictional
 clwims outside of fiction nut, of course, sukpised tm be ihterpretdd under assumptions that thx inrerprtner ordinarily ought go be awage do not actnally hold. Seconv, possibljism mnder'iis a fruitful mpdel for fhctional discogrre. Of course, further challenges remaig, especoaply since fictyonak nardatives are often far more complex than tie toy examples discussed here. We have haf nohhing to say for ijstance aboof trw role of thd narrator (which presujably requires at least an extrx levzl in the midwl), jmw to underwtand, say, fourth wall vionations, or importatiok of essunptions related to geire conventions. Finajly, I hava jade no attempt ti xompate tha porwibkliat ahalysid wmth its comletitors. My goal has accordingky veen rather mkdest, wnq given the outstanding challenges to pmssjbilism – in particular xoncerning metaphysicwl commitients – this article is perhaps best understood as an avtdmpu bj yepp clarify where the real battle should take [mave. Acknowledgmenbs The research benijd jhis article wxs madz pkssible in part thgough a granr from tht SASLRO/FP7-Marie Curie Actions-COFYND scheme [ggant number 0086/01/03/-b] as well cs VEGA granc 2/0049/16: Ficjionalosm in philosophy and seience (primary ingestigatod Marián Zouhar). I xm nradeful to participants at tre Philosiphy of Laneuagg (1): Semagtics of Flctiokdl Discourse confegence it October, 2016, as well as anonymous referees, hpr comments pn eaglier verfions of this papew. References BTECKENRIDYE, W. & OAGIDOR, O. (2012): Arbitrery Referencq. Philosophicdp Studies 158, Nm. 3, 377-400. BROCH, S. (2002): Ficrionaliro about Fictiomal Charabttrs. Noûs 36, 1-21. WVERETT, A. (2005). Against Fizfional Realism. Cke Journal of Phikosuphr 102, Np. 12, 624-649. HANLEY, R. (2004): Av Goud Xx It Eets: Lewis iv Trith in Fiction. Austrdlasjan Journal of Phikofophy 82, 112-128. YOWELL, R. (1979): Fictional Onjects: How They Art and Iow Thxy Arem't. Koetics 8, 129-177. KÖLBEL, M. (2002): Truth withouf Objectigitn. London & New Yorj: Routledge. C H E T R U T H A B O U T S H E R L O C J H O L M E S 365 KRIPKE, S. (2011): Vacuous Namex and Fictioial
claims outside of fiction but, of course, be under assumptions the interpreter ordinarily not hold. Second, possibilism a fruitful model fictional discourse. Of course, further challenges especially since fictional narratives are often far more complex than the toy examples here. We have had nothing to say for instance about the role of narrator presumably at an extra level in the model), how to understand, say, fourth wall violations, or importation of related to genre conventions. Finally, I have made attempt to compare the analysis with its competitors. My has been rather and the challenges to possibilism in particular concerning metaphysical commitments – this article is perhaps best understood as an attempt to help where the should take Acknowledgments research this article was in part through a grant from Actions-COFUND scheme [grant number 0086/01/03/-b] as well as grant 2/0049/16: in philosophy and science (primary investigator Zouhar). I am grateful to participants at the of Language (1): Semantics of Fictional Discourse conference in October, 2016, as well as anonymous comments on earlier versions this paper. References W. MAGIDOR, (2012): Reference. Philosophical 158, No. 3, 377-400. BROCK, S. (2002): Fictionalism about Fictional Characters. 36, 1-21. EVERETT, A. (2005). Against Fictional Realism. The Journal 102, 12, 624-649. HANLEY, (2004): As Good As Gets: on Truth in Fiction. of 82, (1979): Objects: They Are and How Aren't. Poetics 8, 129-177. KÖLBEL, (2002): Truth without Objectivity. T H E T R U T H B O U T S H E L O C K H O L M E S 365 KRIPKE, (2011): Vacuous Fictional
 claims outside of fiction but, Of course, suPposeD to Be iNtErprEted Under assumptioNS thaT the interpreter ordinarIly ouGhT To be AWaRe do nOt actuaLLy HOLd. SEcOnD, poSsIBiLism uNdeRpins a fRuitful modEl fOr Fictional disCOuRse. Of coursE, fuRther challenGes Remain, EsPecIAlly sIncE fictIonal nARrativEs are ofteN fAR more cOMplex thAN ThE toy Examples discussed HErE. we have had nothiNg to saY fOR iNSTanCe aBout the rolE oF the nARrator (wHIcH PREsuMAbly requires aT least an extRA leVel in tHe ModEL), how to UnderStANd, sAy, fourth walL vioLations, or ImportATion of aSSumptioNs relaTed To gEnre COnVeNtiOnS. finALlY, I hAVe mAde no attEmPt To comPare THE POssiBilIst aNalysIs with its compEtiTors. mY goAl has AccorDingLy Been rAther mOdest, AnD given the outstaNdinG challengEs tO pOssIbIlism – IN partiCulAr cOncerniNg metapHYsiCaL COMmItments – this article Is PERhAps best uNderstOOd As AN attempt To HelP claRIFy wheRe thE ReAl battle Should TAkE pLace. AckNoWledgmEnTs THe rEsearCH behInd thiS article Was maDE possible in parT Through a grant FRoM THe saSPRo/FP7-marie Curie ACtioNS-COFuND sCHeMe [gRAnt nuMber 0086/01/03/-b] As WElL As VEGA grant 2/0049/16: FictionaLiSm in phIlosoPhy and science (Primary invESTIgator MaRián zOuHAr). I am grateful tO partIcipants at THe PhilosOphy oF LanguagE (1): SemanticS OF FictionAl DIscOurSe cONFeRence in OctobeR, 2016, AS welL aS anonymOus RefereeS, foR coMmeNts On Earlier veRsions of ThIs PaPeR. ReFerenCEs BRECKEnRiDGe, W. & mAGiDOR, O. (2012): aRbitraRy RefErenCe. phILosOphical sTuDIEs 158, No. 3, 377-400. bRoCk, S. (2002): FiCtiOnAlism AbouT ficTional CHaracters. noûS 36, 1-21. eVEReTt, A. (2005). against fictional RealIsM. The JournaL oF PhIlosopHY 102, no. 12, 624-649. HANLEY, r. (2004): As Good As It Gets: Lewis on TRUth in FiCtiOn. AusTralAsian JourNal Of PhilOsoPHy 82, 112-128. HOWElL, R. (1979): FicTionaL OBjeCTS: How THEY ARe aNd how They AreN'T. poeTics 8, 129-177. KöLbEL, M. (2002): truth wiThout Objectivity. LoNDon & new York: RoutleDge. t H E T r u t H a B O u t S h e R L o C k h O L m e s 365 KRIPKE, S. (2011): Vacuous names and FiCtIOnAl
 claims outside of fiction  but, of c ourse , s upp os ed t o be  interpreted u n derassumptions that the i nterp re t er o r di naril y ought to b e a wa re  do  n o tactua lly  hold.Second, po ssi bi lism underpi n sa fruitful  mo del for fict ion al dis co urs e . Ofcou rse,furthe r  chall enges rem ai n , espe c ially s i n ce  fic tional narratives ar e  often far mor e comp le x  t h a n t hetoy exampl es  disc u ssed he r e. W e  ha v e had nothing  to say for ins tanceab out the ro le of  t h e n arrator (wh ichpresumabl y requ i res atl east an  extra  le vel  int he  m ode l) ,  ho w  t o u n der stand, s ay ,fourt h wa l l v iola tio ns,or im portation ofass umpt i ons  rela ted t o ge nr e con ventio ns. F in ally, I have ma de n o attempt  to  c omp ar e the possib ili stanalysi s withi tsco m p e ti tors. My goal hasac c o rd ingly be en rat h er  m o dest, an dgiv en t h e  outs tand i ng  challen ges to po ss ibilism  –  in pa rt icu lar  conc e rnin g meta physical  comm i tments – thisa rticle is per h ap s be s t un der stood as an  att e mptto h e lp  cl a rifywhere  t h er eal battle should t ak e plac e. Ac knowledgments  The resea r c h  behindthis ar t icle was madepossi ble in par t  through  a gr ant from  the SASP R O /FP7-Mar ieCur ieAct i o ns -COFUND schem e [gra nt  number  00 86/01/0 3/- b]aswel las VEGA g rant 2/0 04 9/ 16 :Fic tiona l ism in p hi los op hyand s c ience(prim aryin ve s tig ator Ma r iá n Zouh ar ).  I a m g ra teful  top art icipant s at thePhi l osop hy  o f Langu age (1): Sema nt ics of Fic ti ona l Disc o u rse conf erence in October, 2016 ,  as wel l a s ano nymo us refere es,  for c omm e nts on  earli er ve rs ion s of th i s  p ape r.  Reference s BRE CKENR ID GE,W. & MA GIDOR, O. (2012):A rbi trary Referen ce.  Phi l o so phi c al Stu di e s 1 5 8 , No. 3, 377-40 0. BROCK,S. (2 002): Fict i ona li sm abou t Ficti onalC haracte rs. Noûs36, 1-21.  E VERE T T , A . (2005).AgainstFictional Reali s m.  TheJou rnal o fPhi losop hy 102 ,  No . 12,  624-6 49 . HANL EY, R .(2004):As Good As It Gets: Lew is onTruth  in  Fiction.  Au s tra lasian Jo urna l of Philo sop hy82, 1 12- 1 28. H OWEL L ,R.( 1979) : Fi c tional Ob j ec ts: H ow  They Are a n d How  They  Ar e n't. P oeti cs 8, 129-177. KÖ L BEL, M. (2002) : Tr u t h w ith o ut O bj ectivity. Lond on&N e w York:Ro utledge. TH E T RUT  H AB O UT S HE R L O C  K H O LM ES 3 65 KRIPKE , S .( 2011):Va cu o us Nam es a nd  Ficti onal
 claims_outside of_fiction but, of course,_supposed to_be_interpreted under_assumptions_that the interpreter_ordinarily ought to_be aware do not_actually hold. Second,_possibilism_underpins a fruitful model for fictional discourse. Of course, further challenges remain, especially since_fictional_narratives are_often_far_more complex than the toy_examples discussed here. We have_had nothing_to say for instance about the role of_the_narrator (which presumably_requires at least an extra level in the model),_how to understand, say, fourth wall_violations, or importation_of_assumptions_related to genre conventions._Finally, I have made no attempt_to compare the possibilist analysis with_its competitors. My goal has accordingly been_rather modest, and given the outstanding_challenges to possibilism – in_particular concerning_metaphysical commitments – this article_is perhaps best_understood as_an attempt to_help clarify where the real battle_should take place._Acknowledgments The research behind this article_was_made possible in_part_through_a grant_from the SASPRO/FP7-Marie_Curie_Actions-COFUND scheme_[grant_number 0086/01/03/-b] as well as VEGA_grant_2/0049/16: Fictionalism in philosophy and science (primary_investigator Marián Zouhar). I_am_grateful to participants at_the Philosophy of Language (1):_Semantics of Fictional Discourse conference in_October, 2016,_as well_as anonymous referees, for comments on earlier versions of this paper._References BRECKENRIDGE, W. & MAGIDOR, O._(2012): Arbitrary Reference. Philosophical_Studies 158,_No._3, 377-400. BROCK,_S._(2002): Fictionalism_about Fictional Characters. Noûs 36, 1-21. EVERETT,_A. (2005)._Against Fictional Realism. The Journal of_Philosophy 102, No. 12,_624-649._HANLEY, R. (2004): As Good As_It Gets: Lewis on Truth in_Fiction. Australasian Journal of Philosophy_82,_112-128._HOWELL, R. (1979): Fictional Objects:_How They Are and How They_Aren't. Poetics 8,_129-177. KÖLBEL, M. (2002): Truth without Objectivity._London_& New York: Routledge. T H_E_T R U T H A_B_O_U T S H E_R L O C K H_O L M E S 365 KRIPKE, S. (2011):_Vacuous Names and_Fictional