) entailed true-in-fiction-p ∨ true-in-fiction-¬p – but, insofar as true-in-fiction is treated as a restricted box operator, it doesn't. ☐p ∨ ☐q is not a consequence of ☐(p ∨ q) in any normal modal logic. An advantage of our account is that what is true-in-fiction evolves over the course of creating a story. When the author adds information to the stories the set of worlds that reflect the stories – the context set of the stories – shrinks, and information previously consistent-with-the-fiction becomes 6 Alternatively, assuming closeness, we could treat truth-in-fiction as a version of counterfactual reasoning. Let Γ be the set of claims asserted in the fiction. p is true according to the fiction iff Γ ☐→ p. Given the incompleteness of fictional characters we would then have to deny Conditional Excluded Middle, (Γ ☐→ p) ∨ (Γ ☐→ ¬p); claims about Holmes's blood type, for instance, will not have a determinate truth-value. 356 F R E D R I K H A R A L D S E N true-in-the-fiction. By the same token, our account has no problem explaining or predicting continuity across books involving the same universe, or other authors picking up where Doyle left off, inventing new stories involving the (numerically) same characters and settings. The recent TV series locating Holmes in modern-day London, for instance, might be thought of as counterfactual Holmes stories involving the (numerically) same characters. Similarly, Alban Berg's Wozzeck, Manfred Gurlitt's Wozzeck, and Georg Büchner's Woyzeck inhabit slightly different (sets of) worlds that are truth-makers for slightly different stories, but may still concern the (numerically) same individual located in those different worlds. (How to determine whether a character portrayed in one story is the same one portrayed in another will presumably depend either on certain psychological facts about the author, or causal links between an author's portrayal and previous introductions of characters.) Of course, discussions may be had about what counts as indeterminate according to the stories, and the distance between the truth-making worlds for a fiction and the actual world may be different than the author intended if the author relies
) entailed true - in - fiction - p ∨ genuine - in - fiction-¬p – but, insofar as genuine - in - fiction is treated as a restricted box hustler, it doesn't. ☐ p ∨ ☐ q is not a consequence of ☐ (p ∨ q) in any normal modal logic. An advantage of our report is that what is true - in - fiction evolves over the path of creating a story. When the generator adds information to the fib the hardening of worlds that reflect the stories – the context set of the stories – psychiatrist, and information previously consistent - with - the - fiction become 6 Alternatively, assuming closeness, we could process truth - in - fabrication as a version of counterfactual reasoning. get Γ be the set of claims asserted in the fabrication. p is true according to the fiction iff Γ ☐ → p. Given the incompleteness of fictional characters we would then have to deny Conditional Excluded Middle, (Γ ☐ → p) ∨ (Γ ☐ → ¬p); claims about Holmes's blood type, for instance, will not have a determinate accuracy - value. 356 degree fahrenheit R east D R I K H A R A L D S east N true - in - the - fiction. By the same token, our bill has no problem explaining or predicting continuity across books involve the same universe, or other authors pick up where Doyle impart off, inventing new stories involving the (numerically) same character and settings. The recent TV serial locating Holmes in advanced - day London, for instance, might be think of as counterfactual Holmes stories involve the (numerically) same characters. Similarly, Alban Berg's Wozzeck, Manfred Gurlitt's Wozzeck, and Georg Büchner's Woyzeck inhabit slenderly different (sets of) worlds that are truth - maker for slightly unlike stories, but may still concern the (numerically) like individual located in those different worlds. (How to determine whether a character portrayed in one story is the same one portrayed in another will presumably depend either on certain psychological fact about the author, or causal links between an generator's portrayal and previous introduction of characters .) Of course, discussions may be have about what counts as indeterminate according to the stories, and the distance between the truth - making universe for a fabrication and the actual world may be different than the author intended if the author relies
) enhailed true-in-fiction-p ∨ tvue-in-fiction-¬p – bot, insofer as tdue-in-ficgion is treated as a restricved vox okvrator, it doesn't. ☐p ∨ ☐q is not a consequwnce if ☐(p ∨ q) in any normal moswl lmjic. An advantagg of our accmunt is that wvag ns true-in-fiction evolves over the cotrse of cgeating a stori. Whem the author adds information to the stkries tie set of worldx that reflect the stories – thf context set of tje stories – shrybks, and infofmation prtvnously consjstent-with-the-fiction becomes 6 Auternctively, assomjnh closeness, xe coujd treat trubn-in-ficdion as a version of gountxrfaxtual reasoning. Let Γ ue the set of claims asserted iu the fiction. p is trye accotding to gye wicuioi irf Γ ☐→ p. Giten the inckmpleteness of fictional charavtqgx we would tgen hade to deny Conditional Excluded Middle, (Γ ☐→ k) ∨ (Γ ☐→ ¬l); claims about Holmes's vlood type, for instanfe, will njt have a determinate truth-value. 356 F R E D R I K H A R E U D S D N true-in-the-fiction. By the same token, our accougf nax no problem ewplaining or predivtlnb continuity azross ykois involving the swme uniderse, or other autnors picking up where Doyle left off, innentung new stories inrolving the (uumerivally) same characters and sectings. The recent TV seriea locating Holmes in mmdern-day London, for instanse, might ue thpught ow as countqrfactual Jolmes stories involving the (uumerhcally) samf characters. Similarly, Alban Becj's Wozzeck, Mamfsed Gurlitt'f Wozdeck, and Georg Füchner's Woyzecl inhabnt sliehtly diffvrent (setv of) worlds that are trudj-makers for vlightly difderebt storkds, but may stikl conceru the (numerically) same lndivksual located in thise different wprlas. (Roa vo deearmine whethar a chxtactef portrayed kn ome story is the same one portrayed in anotnev will prgsumably qepend either on certain psychopogicel facvs aboit jhe author, or causal links betwsen an auhhov's portrayal wnd irevyous introbuctions of characters.) Of course, discussmons may be had about wyat counts as indetgrmlnate accordmng to the storhes, and the distance between the trutm-making worlds for a fjction and hhe actual world may be different than the author intended if the author eelies
) entailed true-in-fiction-p ∨ true-in-fiction-¬p – but, true-in-fiction treated as restricted box operator, is a consequence of ∨ q) in normal modal logic. An advantage of account is that what is true-in-fiction evolves over the course of creating a When the author adds information to the stories the set of worlds that the – context of the stories – shrinks, and information previously consistent-with-the-fiction becomes 6 Alternatively, assuming closeness, we could truth-in-fiction as a version of counterfactual reasoning. Let be the set of asserted in the fiction. p true to the iff ☐→ Given the incompleteness fictional characters we would then have to deny Conditional Excluded Middle, (Γ ☐→ p) ∨ (Γ ☐→ claims about type, for will have determinate truth-value. 356 E D R I K H L D S E N true-in-the-fiction. By the token, our has no problem explaining or predicting across books involving the same universe, or other picking up where Doyle left off, inventing new stories involving the (numerically) same characters and recent TV series locating in modern-day London, instance, be of counterfactual Holmes involving the (numerically) same characters. Similarly, Alban Berg's Wozzeck, Manfred Gurlitt's and Georg Büchner's Woyzeck inhabit slightly different (sets of) worlds truth-makers slightly different stories, may still concern the same located in those different to whether in story the same one portrayed another will presumably depend either certain psychological facts about between an author's portrayal and previous introductions of Of course, discussions may be had about counts as indeterminate according to the stories, and the distance between the worlds for and the actual world may be different than author intended if the relies
) entailed true-in-fiction-p ∨ truE-in-fiction-¬P – but, iNsoFar As True-In-fiCtion is treated AS a reStricted box operator, it dOesn't. ☐P ∨ ☐q IS not A CoNsequEnce of ☐(p ∨ Q) In ANY noRmAl ModAl LOgIc. An aDvaNtage of Our account Is tHaT what is true-iN-FiCtion evolvEs oVer the course Of cReatinG a StoRY. When The AuthoR adds iNFormatIon to the sToRIes the SEt of worLDS tHat rEflect the stories – tHE cONtext set of the sTories – ShRInKS, And InfOrmation prEvIouslY ConsistENt-WITH-thE-Fiction becomeS 6 AlternativELy, aSsuminG cLosENess, we Could TrEAt tRuth-in-fictiOn as A version oF countERfactuaL ReasoniNg. Let Γ Be tHe sEt of CLaImS asSeRTed IN tHe fICtiOn. p is truE aCcOrdinG to tHE FICtioN ifF Γ ☐→ p. GIven tHe incompletenEss Of fiCTioNal chAractErs wE wOuld tHen havE to deNy conditional ExclUded middle, (Γ ☐→ p) ∨ (Γ ☐→ ¬P); clAiMs aBoUt HolMEs's bloOd tYpe, For instAnce, wilL Not HaVE A DeTerminate truth-valuE. 356 F r e d R i K H A R A L D s E N truE-In-ThE-Fiction. BY tHe sAme tOKEn, our AccoUNt Has no proBlem exPLaInIng or prEdIcting CoNtiNuiTy acrOSs boOks invOlving thE same UNiverse, or other AUthors picking UP wHERe dOyle LefT off, inventiNg neW StorIes iNVoLviNG the (nUmeriCaLLy) SAme characters and setTiNgs. The RecenT TV series locaTing Holmes IN MOdern-day londON, fOR instance, might Be thoUght of as coUNterfactUal HoLmes storIes involvING the (numeRicAllY) saMe cHARaCters. SimilarlY, aLban beRg's WozzEck, manfred gurLitT's WOzzEcK, and Georg büchner's woYzEcK iNhaBit slIGhtly difFeRenT (sEts Of) worLDs that Are trUth-mAkErS For SlightlY DiFFErenT sToRies, But MaY stilL conCErn The (numeRically) saMe iNDiviDuAl Located In those differEnT worlds. (How To DetErmine WHEther a chAracter portrayed in one stORy is the SamE one pOrtrAyed in anoTheR will pResUMably dEpend eIther On CerTAIn psyCHOlOgiCaL facts abouT THe aUthor, Or CausAl links Between an author's poRTraYal and previouS inTrodUCTiOns OF cHAraCtERs.) OF COurse, discussionS may be had aBoUT wHat counts aS IndEtErminatE accordIng to THe storiEs, and the dIstance beTwEen tHE TruTh-making woRlds for a Fiction anD The acTUaL worlD maY be difFeRenT than The autHOr iNtendEd if thE aUthor rElies
) entailed true-in-fiction -p ∨ true- in-fi cti on- ¬p  – b ut,insofar as tru e -in- fiction is treated asa res tr i cted bo x ope rator,i td o esn 't .☐p∨☐ qis no t a  conseq uence of ☐ (p∨q) in any no r ma l modal lo gic . An advanta geof our  a cco u nt is  th at wh at ist rue-in -fictionev o lves o v er thec o ur se o f creating a stor y .W hen the author  addsin f or m a tio n t o the stor ie s the set ofw or l d s  th a t reflect the  stories –t hecontex tset of the  stor ie s  –shrinks, an d in formation  previ o usly co n sistent -with- the -fi ctio n  b ec ome s6  Al t er nat i vel y, assum in gclose ness , w e  cou ldtrea t tru th-in-fiction  as  a v e rsi on of  coun terf ac tualreason ing.Le t Γ be the setof c laims ass ert ed  in  t he fi c tion.p i s t rue acc ordingt o t he f i ct ion iff Γ ☐→ p. Gi ve n th e incomp letene s sof fictiona lcha ract e r s wewoul d  t hen have  to de n yCo ndition al  Exclu de d M idd le, ( Γ  ☐→p) ∨ ( Γ ☐→ ¬p) ; cla i ms about Holme s 's blood type ,  f o r  i n stan ce,  will not h avea  det ermi n at e t r uth-v alue.  3 5 6F  R E D R I K H A RAL D SE N t rue-in-the-fi ction. Byt h e  same to ken, ou r  account has n o pro blem expla i ning orpredi cting co ntinuitya c ross boo ksinv olv ing t he  same univers e ,  orot her aut hor s picki ngupwhe reDo yle leftoff, inv en ti ng  n ewstori e s involv in g t he  (n umeri c ally)samechar ac te r s a nd sett i ng s .  The  r ec entTVse riesloca t ing  Holmes  in moder n-d a y Lo nd on , for i nstance, migh tbe thought  o f a s coun t e rfactual  Holmes stories involvi n g the ( num erica lly)  same cha rac ters.Sim i larly,  Alban  Berg 's  Wo z z eck,M a nf red  G urlitt's W o z zec k, an dGeor g Büchn er's Woyzeck inhab i t s lightly diffe ren t (s e t sof) wo r lds  t h ata r e truth-makersfor slight ly di fferent st o rie s,  but ma y still  conc e rn the(numerica lly) same  i ndiv i d ual  located i n thosedifferent world s .(Howtodeterm in e w hethe r a ch a rac ter p ortray ed  in on e sto ry  is thesame one portrayed in a nother  will  pr esumablydep e ndeither on  cer tain psych olo gic al fa cts about  the au tho r , orcaus a l links b e tw een a nauthor's po r t r aya l and  pr e viousintr oductions of char a cters.) Of cou rse, d isc uss i onsma y be had about  wh at c ounts as  i ndeterminat e accord in g  to t he sto ries,and the d is t ance b etwe enthe truth -ma ki n g world sfo r  a fic tion  a nd the  actua l  wor l d  may be differen t tha n the a u tho r int en ded ift he a uthor reli es
) entailed_true-in-fiction-p ∨_true-in-fiction-¬p – but, insofar_as true-in-fiction_is_treated as_a_restricted box operator,_it doesn't. ☐p_∨ ☐q is not_a consequence of_☐(p_∨ q) in any normal modal logic. An advantage of our account is that_what_is true-in-fiction_evolves_over_the course of creating a_story. When the author adds_information to_the stories the set of worlds that reflect_the_stories – the_context set of the stories – shrinks, and information_previously consistent-with-the-fiction becomes 6 Alternatively, assuming_closeness, we could_treat_truth-in-fiction_as a version of_counterfactual reasoning. Let Γ be the_set of claims asserted in the_fiction. p is true according to the_fiction iff Γ ☐→ p. Given_the incompleteness of fictional characters_we would_then have to deny Conditional_Excluded Middle, (Γ_☐→ p)_∨ (Γ ☐→_¬p); claims about Holmes's blood type,_for instance, will_not have a determinate truth-value. 356_F_R E D_R_I_K H_A R A_L_D S_E_N true-in-the-fiction. By the same token,_our_account has no problem explaining or predicting_continuity across books involving_the_same universe, or other_authors picking up where Doyle_left off, inventing new stories involving_the (numerically)_same characters_and settings. The recent TV series locating Holmes in modern-day London,_for instance, might be thought of_as counterfactual Holmes stories_involving the_(numerically)_same characters. Similarly,_Alban_Berg's Wozzeck,_Manfred Gurlitt's Wozzeck, and Georg Büchner's Woyzeck_inhabit slightly_different (sets of) worlds that are_truth-makers for slightly different_stories,_but may still concern the (numerically)_same individual located in those different_worlds. (How to determine whether_a_character_portrayed in one story is_the same one portrayed in another_will presumably depend_either on certain psychological facts about the_author,_or causal links between an author's_portrayal_and previous introductions of characters.) Of_course,_discussions_may be had about what_counts as indeterminate according to the_stories, and the distance between the truth-making worlds for_a fiction and_the actual world may be_different_than_the author intended if the author relies