Holmes' 344 F R E D R I K H A R A L D S E N to the merely possible object Holmes when introducing the name. Doyle cannot have established the reference of 'Holmes' by a baptismal act where the name was bestowed upon a demonstratively available object, since merely possible objects are not demonstratively accessible. Now, if demonstration were necessary for fixing reference, then a number of names for objects also outside of fiction would fail to refer, including names for abstract objects, individuals hypothesized to exist, or unobserved astronomical objects whose existence is inferred by calculation. In these cases, however, we can individuate referents as the individuals that uniquely satisfy certain descriptions. But descriptive individuation also seems unavailable in the Holmes case. Many merely possible objects – perhaps even some (or all) actual ones – satisfy the descriptions associated with 'Holmes' in the stories in different worlds. But insofar as 'Holmes' is directly referential – and thus rigid, picking out the same object in every world in which it exists – it must pick out one of them on pain of contradiction.2 Note that for descriptivists about the semantic contribution of proper names this kind of worry would not arise; for them, the contribution of 'Holmes' is a descriptively individuated role that can be satisfied by numerically different objects in different worlds without affecting the semantic content of sentences containing the name. But since we reject descriptivism, we need to know i) which object, among all suitable candidates, is Holmes; and ii) how Doyle managed to refer to it. I think the correct answer to the first question is that it doesn't matter. To be sure, we need 'Holmes' to refer to a single one among the merely possible referents, but it makes no difference which one. As for the second question, I suggest that when Doyle started writing about Holmes (or dreamt up the character), his implicit decision to describe a fictional character sufficed to ensure that some merely possible object was assigned, arbitrarily selected from among those that satisfy whatever properties – perhaps none apart from the name – Doyle associated with it at the time. On the surface, the stipulative introduction of 'Holmes' resembles a baptism, but instead of having a referent 2 Suppose Holmes = α in world w1 and Holmes = β in w2 and α ≠ β. Since 'Holmes', by assumption, is rigid, 'Holmes' refers to Holmes in both w1 and w2
Holmes' 344 F R E D R I K planck's constant A radius A L D S E N to the merely possible object Holmes when introduce the name. Doyle cannot have established the reference of' Holmes' by a baptismal act where the name was confer upon a demonstratively available object, since merely possible object are not demonstratively accessible. Now, if demonstration were necessary for fix reference, then a number of name for object also outside of fabrication would fail to refer, include name calling for abstract objects, individuals hypothesized to exist, or unobserved astronomic objects whose existence is inferred by calculation. In these cases, however, we can individuate referent as the individuals that uniquely satisfy certain descriptions. But descriptive individuation besides seems unavailable in the Holmes case. Many merely possible objects – perhaps even some (or all) actual ones – meet the description associated with' Holmes' in the stories in different worlds. But insofar as' Holmes' is directly referential – and thus rigid, picking out the same aim in every universe in which it exists – it must foot out one of them on annoyance of contradiction.2 Note that for descriptivists about the semantic contribution of proper names this kind of worry would not arise; for them, the contribution of' Holmes' is a descriptively individuated role that can be satisfied by numerically different objects in unlike worlds without affecting the semantic content of sentences containing the name. But since we reject descriptivism, we need to know i) which object, among all suitable candidates, is Holmes; and ii) how Doyle managed to refer to it. I remember the correct solution to the inaugural question is that it doesn't matter. To be sure, we need' Holmes' to denote to a single one among the merely possible referents, but it reach no difference which one. As for the second question, I suggest that when Doyle begin writing about Holmes (or dream up the character), his implicit decision to report a fictional fictional character sufficed to guarantee that some merely possible aim was assigned, arbitrarily selected from among those that meet whatever properties – perhaps none apart from the name – Doyle associated with it at the time. On the surface, the stipulative introduction of' Holmes' resembles a baptism, but instead of having a referent 2 Suppose Holmes = α in world w1 and Holmes = β in w2 and α ≠ β. Since' Holmes', by assumption, is inflexible,' Holmes' refers to Holmes in both w1 and w2
Holles' 344 F R E D R I K H A R A L D S E N to the mecely poasible ocject Holmes when introducinj thw namt. Doyle cannot have establisjed the eefecence of 'Holmes' ug a bapbnsmal wct chxre the name wax bestowed upon a demonsdrxtnvely available object, since merely [ossiblr lbjects are noj dempgstrzniyely accessible. Now, if demonstrafion wege necessary for gixing reference, then a nulber of names for objefts also oujaidq of fiction dould fail to refer, indluding names for abstract objezts, iudividuals yypotjgsized to exmst, or unobserved astronomhcal obkects whose exlstenre iw inferred by calculavion. In these cases, rowever, wa ean individuate referwnrs as the indkcidjala vhaf uniqkelb satisfy csrtain desceiptions. But descriktidv individuatikn alsj feems unavailable in the Holmes case. Maty jerely possible objects – perhaps even some (ot all) actuwl ones – satisfy the descriptions associated with 'Holmxs' in tme sgirles in different worlds. But insofar as 'Holmes' js dprectly referenticl – and thus rigod, posking out the same objsct in every world in whish it exists – yt mist pick out one of them on pain of connraduction.2 Note that flr descriptnvists abouy the semantic contribucion or proper nales this iknd of worry wouud kot arise; for them, the contrifution of 'Holkes' is x dexcriptyvely indigiduabad role that can bf satnsfieg by numerlcally different objects in difhxrent worlds eidholt affectnng thc semantic contqnt of sentencgs contaiuing tfe name. Bun since wx reject dessriptivism, we jeed to know i) which objwct, qmong auu suitable cancidates, is Holmes; abd ii) how Doyle makaged fo refer to it. N uhunk the correcy avswqr tp eve first quevtiov ir that it doesn't nxttet. To be sure, we need 'Holjes' to refer to a xikgle one qmong thq merely possoble referents, but it mekes nu difgergnce which one. As for the secons questioj, I suggest thae whcn Djyle startzd writing about Holmes (or dreamt up the character), his imklicit decision to dexgribe a fictmonal sharacter sufficed to ensure rhat some merely kossible object was assjgned, drbitgarily selected from among those that satisfy whatever properties – perhapw none apart from fhe mame – Djvle assjciavev with it at the nime. On the surface, the stipulatmve introdgccion of 'Holmes' resembles a baltksm, but instexd of having a referent 2 Suppose Holmes = α in world w1 and Holmes = β in w2 and α ≠ β. Since 'Holkes', by awsumpfion, is rijid, 'Holmes' refers to Holmev in voth w1 qnd a2
Holmes' 344 F R E D R H R A D S E object when introducing the Doyle cannot have the reference of 'Holmes' by a act where the name was bestowed upon a demonstratively available object, since merely objects are not demonstratively accessible. Now, if demonstration were necessary for fixing reference, a of for also outside of fiction would fail to refer, including names for abstract objects, individuals hypothesized to or unobserved astronomical objects whose existence is inferred calculation. In these cases, we can individuate referents as individuals uniquely satisfy descriptions. descriptive also seems unavailable the Holmes case. Many merely possible objects – perhaps even some (or all) actual ones – satisfy descriptions associated in the in worlds. insofar as 'Holmes' referential – and thus rigid, picking object in every world in which it exists it must out one of them on pain contradiction.2 Note that for descriptivists about the semantic of proper names this kind of worry would not arise; for them, the contribution of a descriptively individuated role can be satisfied numerically objects different without affecting semantic content of sentences containing the name. But since we reject we need to know i) which object, among all suitable Holmes; ii) how Doyle to refer to it. think correct answer to the is it be we 'Holmes' to refer to single one among the merely referents, but it makes for the second question, I suggest that when started writing about Holmes (or dreamt up character), his implicit decision to describe a fictional character sufficed to ensure some merely was assigned, arbitrarily selected from among those that whatever properties – perhaps apart from the name – Doyle associated with it the On the the stipulative introduction 'Holmes' resembles a but instead of referent 2 Holmes α and Holmes = β in w2 α β. Since 'Holmes', by assumption, rigid, to Holmes in both w1 and w2
Holmes' 344 F R E D R I K H A R A L D S E N to tHe merely poSsiblE obJecT HOlmeS wheN introducing thE Name. doyle cannot have establiShed tHe REferENcE of 'HoLmes' by a BApTISmaL aCt WheRe THe Name wAs bEstowed Upon a demonStrAtIvely availabLE oBject, since MerEly possible oBjeCts are NoT deMOnstrAtiVely aCcessiBLe. Now, iF demonstrAtIOn were NEcessarY FOr FixiNg reference, then a nUMbER of names for objEcts alSo OUtSIDe oF fiCtion would FaIl to rEFer, inclUDiNG NAmeS For abstract obJects, indiviDUalS hypotHeSizED to exiSt, or uNoBSerVed astronomIcal Objects whOse exiSTence is INferred By calcUlaTioN. In tHEsE cAseS, hOWevER, wE caN IndIviduate ReFeRents As thE INDIvidUalS thaT uniqUely satisfy ceRtaIn deSCriPtionS. But dEscrIpTive iNdividUatioN aLso seems unavailAble In the HolmEs cAsE. MaNy MerelY PossibLe oBjeCts – perhAps even SOme (Or ALL) AcTual ones – satisfy the DeSCRiPtions asSociatED wItH 'holmes' in ThE stOrieS IN diffErenT WoRlds. But iNsofar AS 'HOlMes' is diReCtly reFeRenTiaL – and tHUs riGid, picKing out tHe samE Object in every wORld in which it eXIsTS – It MUst pIck Out one of theM on pAIn of ContRAdIctIOn.2 NotE that FoR DeSCriptivists about the SeMantic ContrIbution of propEr names thiS KINd of worrY wouLD nOT arise; for them, tHe conTribution oF 'holmes' is A descRiptivelY individuATEd role thAt cAn bE saTisFIEd By numerically DIFferEnT objectS in DiffereNt wOrlDs wIthOuT affectinG the semaNtIc CoNtEnt Of senTEnces conTaIniNg The Name. BUT since We rejEct dEsCrIPtiVism, we nEEd TO Know I) wHiCh obJecT, aMong aLl suITabLe candiDates, is HoLmeS; And iI) hOw doyle maNaged to refer tO iT. I think the CoRreCt answER To the firSt question is that it doesn'T Matter. TO be Sure, wE neeD 'Holmes' to RefEr to a sIngLE one amOng the MerelY pOssIBLe refEREnTs, bUt It makes no dIFFerEnce wHiCh onE. As for tHe second question, I sUGgeSt that when DoyLe sTartED WrItiNG aBOut hoLMes (OR Dreamt up the charActer), his imPlICiT decision tO DesCrIbe a ficTional cHaracTEr suffiCed to ensuRe that somE mErelY POssIble object Was assigNed, arbitrARily sELeCted fRom Among tHoSe tHat saTisfy wHAteVer prOpertiEs – PerhapS none ApArt from tHe name – Doyle associated wiTh it at The tiMe. ON the surfaCe, tHE stIpulative IntrOduction of 'holMes' ResemBleS A baptIsm, bUT iNstEAd of hAvinG A referent 2 sUpPosE hOlMes = α in world W1 AND HoLmes = β In w2 ANd α ≠ β. SiNce 'HOlmes', by assumption, IS rigid, 'Holmes' reFers TO holMes IN botH w1 And w2
Holmes' 344 F R E D R I KH A R A LD S E  Ntoth e me rely  possible obje c t Ho lmes when introducingthe n am e . Do y le  cann ot have es t a bli sh ed  th er ef erenc e o f 'Holm es' by a b apt is mal act wher e  t he name wa s b estowed upon  ademons tr ati v ely a vai lable  objec t , sinc e merelypo s sibleo bjectsa r enotdemonstratively a c ce s sible. Now, if  demon st r at i o n w ere  necessary  f or fi x ing ref e re n c e , t h en a number o f names for obj ects a ls o o u tsideof fi ct i onwould failto r efer, inc luding names f o r abstr act ob jec ts,  ind i vi du als  h y pot h es ize d  to  exist,or  u nobse rved a s t rono mic al o bject s whose exist enc e is inf erred  by c alcu la tion.  In th ese c as es, however, we  can  individu ate  r efe re nts a s  the i ndi vid uals th at uniq u ely  s a t i sf y certain descript io n s .But desc riptiv e  i nd i viduatio nals o se e m s una vail a bl e in the  Holme s  c as e. Many  m erelypo ssi ble  obje c ts –  perha ps evensome( or all) actual ones – satisf y  t h e  d e scri pti ons associa tedw ith'Hol m es ' i n  thestori es in different worlds. B ut  insof ar as  'Holmes' isdirectly r e f e rential– an d  t h us rigid, pick ing o ut the sam e  objectin ev ery worl d in whic h it exist s –  it  mu stp i ck  out one of t h e m on  p ain ofcon tradict ion .2Not e t ha t for des criptivi st sab ou t t he se m antic co nt rib ut ion  of p r oper n amesthis  k in d  of  worryw ou l d  not  a ri se;for  t hem,thec ont ributio n of 'Hol mes '  isade scripti vely individu at ed role th at  ca n be s a t isfied b y numerically different objects  in  diff eren t worldswit hout a ffe c ting t he sem antic  c ont e n t ofs e nt enc es  containin g the  name .Butsince w e reject descripti v ism , we need tokno w i) w hi cho bj e ct,  a m ong a ll suitable can didates, i sH ol mes; and i i ) h ow  Doylemanaged  to r e fer toit. I thi nk the co rr ecta n swe r to the f irst que stion ist hat i t  d oesn' t m atter.  T o b e sur e, wen eed  'Hol mes' t oreferto asi ngle one  among the merely possi ble re feren ts,  but it m ake s  no  differen ce w hich one.Asfor  thesec o nd qu esti o n,  Is ugges t th a t when Do y le  st a r te d writing a b o u t H olmes  (o r  dream t up  the character),h is implicit de cisi o n  to  de s crib ea fictional ch ara ct e r  suffice dto ensure t hat some  m e relypossib le obj ect was a ss i gned,arbi tra rily sele cte df rom amo ng  t h ose th at s at isfy w hateve r  pro p e rties – perhapsnonea p art f r omthe n am e – Doy l e as sociated w ith it at t he tim e. O n the  surfac e,  the s tip ul ative intr o duction o f 'Ho lmes' r es embl esa bapt ism, b ut in stea dofhaving ar e fe r en t2  Su ppos e Hol me s =α in worl d  w1 andHol m es = βin  w2 a nd α ≠ β. S ince 'Holm es' , bya s sumption,i s ri g id ,  'Hol mes' r efersto Holm e s i nboth w1  an d w2
Holmes' 344_F R_E D R I_K H_A_R A_L_D S E_N to the_merely possible object Holmes_when introducing the_name._Doyle cannot have established the reference of 'Holmes' by a baptismal act where the_name_was bestowed_upon_a_demonstratively available object, since merely_possible objects are not demonstratively_accessible. Now,_if demonstration were necessary for fixing reference, then_a_number of names_for objects also outside of fiction would fail to_refer, including names for abstract objects,_individuals hypothesized to_exist,_or_unobserved astronomical objects whose_existence is inferred by calculation. In_these cases, however, we can individuate_referents as the individuals that uniquely satisfy_certain descriptions. But descriptive individuation also_seems unavailable in the Holmes_case. Many_merely possible objects – perhaps_even some (or_all) actual_ones – satisfy_the descriptions associated with 'Holmes' in_the stories in_different worlds. But insofar as 'Holmes'_is_directly referential –_and_thus_rigid, picking_out the same_object_in every_world_in which it exists – it_must_pick out one of them on pain_of contradiction.2 Note that_for_descriptivists about the semantic_contribution of proper names this_kind of worry would not arise;_for them,_the contribution_of 'Holmes' is a descriptively individuated role that can be satisfied_by numerically different objects in different_worlds without affecting the_semantic content_of_sentences containing the_name._But since_we reject descriptivism, we need to know_i) which_object, among all suitable candidates, is_Holmes; and ii) how_Doyle_managed to refer to it. I_think the correct answer to the_first question is that it_doesn't_matter._To be sure, we need_'Holmes' to refer to a single_one among the_merely possible referents, but it makes no_difference_which one. As for the second_question,_I suggest that when Doyle started_writing_about_Holmes (or dreamt up the_character), his implicit decision to describe_a fictional character sufficed to ensure that some merely_possible object was_assigned, arbitrarily selected from among_those_that_satisfy whatever properties – perhaps none apart from the name_– Doyle_associated with it_at the time. On the surface, the stipulative introduction of_'Holmes' resembles a baptism, but instead of_having a referent 2 Suppose Holmes = α in world w1_and Holmes = β in w2 and α_≠ β. Since 'Holmes', by assumption, is_rigid, 'Holmes' refers to_Holmes_in both w1 and w2