	to	God's	commands	(i.e.	that	they	cannot	know	what	God	has	obligated them	to	do). I	have	relatively	little	to	say	in	defence	of	the	first	part.	There	are	three reasons	for	this.	The	first	is	that	I	think	this	element	of	the	argument	may	be	the one	toward	which	proponents	of	DCT	should	direct	most	of	their	energy.	I	return to	this	point	in	the	final	section.	The	second	is	that,	notwithstanding	what	I	have just	said,	I	think	that	others	have	already	proffered	admirable	defences	of	the existence	of	such	non-believers	(e.g.	Schellenberg	2007),7	and	I	have	nothing new	to	add	to	such	defences.	Certainly,	I	like	to	think	of	myself	as	a	reasonable non-believer,	someone	who	was	once	happy	to	believe,	but	who	lost	their	belief in	the	course	of	an	honest	search	for	the	truth.	I	also	think	the	existence	of numerous	people,	both	past	and	present,	for	whom	belief	in	God	was	never	a	live option	(for	demographic	or	historical	reasons)	is	good	support	for	the	existence 7 Schellenberg now prefers the term nonresistant nonbelief for reasons we will not get into. We stick with the term reasonable nonbelief on the grounds that it is still being used in the literature on the epistemological objection to DCT (e.g. Morriston 2009; Peoples 2011; and Wielenberg 2014). 11 of	reasonable	nonbelievers.	The	third	reason	I	have	little	to	say	in	defence	of their	existence	is	that	I	think	the	argument	may	not	be	limited	to	them
to 	 God's 	 commands 	 (i.e. 	 that 	 they 	 cannot 	 know 	 what 	 God 	 has 	 obligated them 	 to 	 do). I 	 get 	 relatively 	 short 	 to 	 say 	 in 	 defence 	 of 	 the 	 first 	 function. 	 There 	 are 	 three reasons 	 for 	 this. 	 The 	 first 	 is 	 that 	 I 	 intend 	 this 	 component 	 of 	 the 	 argument 	 may 	 be 	 the one 	 toward 	 which 	 proponents 	 of 	 DCT 	 should 	 direct 	 most 	 of 	 their 	 energy. 	 I 	 hark back to 	 this 	 point 	 in 	 the 	 final 	 section. 	 The 	 second 	 is 	 that, 	 notwithstanding 	 what 	 I 	 have just 	 said, 	 I 	 remember 	 that 	 others 	 have 	 already 	 proffered 	 admirable 	 defences 	 of 	 the existence 	 of 	 such 	 non - believer 	 (e.g. 	 Schellenberg 	 2007),7 	 and 	 I 	 have 	 nothing new 	 to 	 add 	 to 	 such 	 defense mechanism. 	 Certainly, 	 I 	 like 	 to 	 think 	 of 	 myself 	 as 	 a 	 reasonable non - believer, 	 someone 	 who 	 was 	 once 	 happy 	 to 	 think, 	 but 	 who 	 lost 	 their 	 belief in 	 the 	 course 	 of 	 an 	 honest 	 search 	 for 	 the 	 truth. 	 I 	 also 	 remember 	 the 	 existence 	 of numerous 	 people, 	 both 	 past 	 and 	 present, 	 for 	 whom 	 belief 	 in 	 God 	 was 	 never 	 a 	 live option 	 (for 	 demographic 	 or 	 historical 	 reasons) 	 is 	 good 	 support 	 for 	 the 	 existence 7 Schellenberg nowadays prefers the term nonresistant nonbelief for reason we will not induce into. We stick with the term fair nonbelief on the grounds that it is however being used in the literature on the epistemological expostulation to DCT (e.g. Morriston 2009; Peoples 2011; and Wielenberg 2014). 11 of 	 reasonable 	 nonbelievers. 	 The 	 third 	 reason 	 I 	 have 	 fiddling 	 to 	 say 	 in 	 defence 	 of their 	 existence 	 is 	 that 	 I 	 think 	 the 	 controversy 	 may 	 not 	 be 	 limited 	 to 	 them
	to	Gld's	commands	(i.e.	that	they	cankot	know	what	God	has	obligaved thej	to	do). I	hxve	relatively	little	to	say	in	dehencw	of	tht	yirst	part.	There	are	thrde reasond	for	this.	Rhe	fmrst	is	that	I	think	vgis	elemcut	of	tgc	argukxnt	may	be	the one	joward	which	psoponents	of	DCT	vhuupd	direct	most	of	their	energy.	I	return to	ehis	poimt	ln	the	final	sectyon.	Tnq	secknd	is	that,	notwithstanding	what	I	have nust	saiv,	I	think	that	othets	have	already	proffered	admigablf	defences	of	the exidtence	of	sucy	non-fwlievers	(e.g.	Scfellenberg	2007),7	and	I	have	nothjng new	to	add	to	such	defences.	Certaknly,	I	kike	to	thinj	od	mydglf	as	a	reasoneble njn-believer,	someone	who	fas	once	nappy	to	believe,	nut	whm	lowt	their	belief in	the	conrse	of	an	honest	search	sor	the	trudh.	N	also	think	the	existencw	od numgrous	[eopuw,	bogh	pzsv	ans	presejt,	fkr	whom	belisf	in	God	was	nwver	a	live option	(for	ceiigraphic	or	hisforicaj	rqasons)	is	good	support	for	the	existence 7 Schtllengerg now prefers the teem nonresistant nonbepief for weasons we will not get into. We stick with the tesm reesunayoe novvepief on the grounds that it is still being usqs on the literaturc on the epistemolpglcsj objection tu DCT (z.f. Jorriston 2009; Peoples 2011; and Wyelenverg 2014). 11 of	weaspnable	nonbelievers.	The	third	rwason	I	have	lintle	ro	say	in	defence	of tkeir	existencz	is	thaj	I	thinl	the	argument	may	not	be	limnted	to	fhem
to God's commands (i.e. that they cannot God obligated them do). I have defence the first part. are three reasons this. The first is that I this element of the argument may be the one toward which proponents of should direct most of their energy. I return to this point in the section. second that, what I have just said, I think that others have already proffered admirable defences of the of such non-believers (e.g. Schellenberg 2007),7 and I nothing new to add such defences. Certainly, I like think myself as reasonable someone was once happy believe, but who lost their belief in the course of an honest search for the truth. I think the numerous people, past present, whom belief in never a live option (for demographic is good support for the existence 7 Schellenberg prefers the nonresistant nonbelief for reasons we will get into. We stick with the term reasonable on the grounds that it is still being used in the literature on the epistemological DCT (e.g. Morriston 2009; 2011; and Wielenberg 11 reasonable The reason I little to say in defence of their existence is that I the argument may not be limited to them
	to	God's	commands	(i.e.	that	they	cAnnot	know	wHat	GoD	haS	obLiGateD theM	to	do). I	have	relaTIvelY	little	to	say	in	defence	oF	the	fIrST	parT.	thEre	arE	three rEAsONS	foR	tHiS.	ThE	fIRsT	is	thAt	I	Think	thIs	element	oF	thE	aRgument	may	be	THe One	toward	wHicH	proponents	oF	DCt	shoulD	dIreCT	most	Of	tHeir	eNergy.	I	REturn tO	this	poinT	iN	The	finAL	sectioN.	tHe	SecoNd	is	that,	notwithstANdINg	what	I	have jusT	said,	I	ThINk	THAt	oTheRs	have	alreAdY	profFEred	admIRaBLE	DefENces	of	the exisTence	of	such	NOn-bElieveRs	(E.g.	SCHellenBerg	2007),7	aNd	i	HavE	nothing new	To	adD	to	such	deFences.	cErtainlY,	i	like	to	Think	oF	mySelF	as	a	REaSoNabLe NOn-bELiEveR,	SomEone	who	wAs	OnCe	hapPy	to	BELIEve,	bUt	wHo	loSt	theIr	belief in	the	CouRse	oF	An	hOnest	SearcH	for	ThE	trutH.	I	also	Think	ThE	existence	of numErouS	people,	boTh	pAsT	anD	pResenT,	For	whoM	beLieF	in	God	wAs	never	A	LivE oPTIOn	(For	demographic	or	hiStORIcAl	reasonS)	is	gooD	SuPpORt	for	the	ExIstEnce 7 sCHelleNberG NoW prefers The terM NoNrEsistanT nOnbeliEf For ReaSons wE Will Not get Into. We stIck wiTH the term reasonABle nonbelief oN ThE GRoUNds tHat It is still beIng uSEd in The lITeRatURe on tHe epiStEMoLOgical objection to DCt (e.G. MorriSton 2009; PEoples 2011; and WielEnberg 2014). 11 of	reASONable	nonBeliEVeRS.	The	third	reasoN	I	havE	little	to	sAY	in	defenCe	of tHeir	exisTence	is	thAT	i	think	thE	arGumEnt	May	NOT	bE	limited	to	theM
	to	God's	commands	(i.e.	t hat	they	c annot 	kn owwh at	G od	h as	obligated t h em	t o	do). I	have	relative ly	li tt l e	to sa y	indefence of t hefi rs t	p ar t .There 	ar e	three  reasons	f orth is.	The	firs t 	i s	that	I	t hin k	this	eleme ntof	the 	a rgu m ent	m aybe	th e onet owardwhich	pro po n ents	o f 	DCT	sh o u ld 	dir ect	most	of	their en e rgy.	I	returnto	thi sp oi n t 	in 	th e	final	se ct ion.T he	seco n di s tha t ,	notwithstan ding	what	I hav e just 	s aid , 	I	thi nk	th at oth ers	have	al read y	proffer ed	adm i rable	d e fencesof	the  ex ist ence of 	s uch 	n o n-b e li eve r s	( e.g.	Sch el le nberg 	200 7 ) , 7 	and 	Ihave 	noth ing new	to	ad d	t o	su c h	d efenc es.	C erta in ly,	I 	liketo	th in k	of	myself	asa	re asonablenon -b eli ev er,	s o meonewho 	wa s	oncehappy	t o 	be li e v e ,but	who	lost	their 	b e l ie f in	the 	cours e 	o fa n	honest 	s ear ch	f o r 	thetrut h .I	also	t hink	t h eex istence 	o f nume ro uspeo ple,b othpast	a nd	prese nt,	f o r	whom	beliefi n	God	was	nev e ra li v e op tio n	(for	demo grap h ic	o r	hi s to ric a l	rea sons) 	i s 	g o od	support	for	theex istenc e 7 S chellenberg n ow prefers t h e term n onre s is t ant nonbelieffor r easons wew ill notget i nto. Westick wit h the term  re aso nab len o nb elief on theg r ound sthat it  is  stillbei nguse d i nthe liter ature on  t he  e pi ste molog i cal obje ct ion  t o D CT (e . g. Mor risto n 20 09 ;P eop les 201 1 ;a n d Wi el en berg  20 14 ). 11  ofr eas onablenonbeliev ers . 	The 	t hi rd	reas on	I	have	lit tl e	to	say	i ndef ence	o f their	ex istence	is	that	I	think the	arg ume nt	ma y	no t	be	limi ted 	to	th em
	to	God's	commands	(i.e.	that	they	cannot	know	what	God	has	obligated them	to	do)._I	have	relatively	little	to	say	in	defence	of	the	first	part.	There	are	three reasons	for	this.	The	first	is	that	I	think	this	element	of	the	argument	may	be	the_one	toward	which	proponents	of	DCT	should	direct	most	of	their	energy.	I	return to	this	point	in	the	final	section.	The	second	is	that,	notwithstanding	what	I	have just	said,	I	think	that	others	have	already	proffered	admirable	defences	of	the existence	of	such	non-believers	(e.g.	Schellenberg	2007),7	and	I	have	nothing_new	to	add	to	such	defences.	Certainly,	I	like	to	think	of	myself	as	a	reasonable non-believer,	someone	who	was	once	happy	to	believe,	but	who	lost	their	belief_in	the	course	of	an	honest	search	for	the	truth.	I	also	think	the	existence	of_numerous	people,	both	past	and	present,	for	whom	belief	in	God	was	never	a	live option	(for	demographic	or	historical	reasons)	is	good	support	for	the	existence_7_Schellenberg now prefers_the term nonresistant_nonbelief for reasons we_will not get_into._We stick with the term reasonable nonbelief on the grounds that it is still_being_used in_the_literature_on the epistemological objection to_DCT (e.g. Morriston 2009; Peoples_2011; and_Wielenberg 2014). 11 of	reasonable	nonbelievers.	The	third	reason	I	have	little	to	say	in	defence	of their	existence	is	that	I	think	the	argument	may	not	be	limited	to	them