's Destruction of Phronesis," The Southern Journal of Philosophy 28, supplement (1990),127-47, which includes a survey of the literature on this topic. llGesamtausgabe, 61, p. 64. l2See ibid., pp. 164-65. 408 HATAB social relationships, cultural pursuits). On a political level certain social programs should be seen to stem from asking basic ethical questions: What are the desirable ends of human activity? What are the ways in which a human life can flourish and tum out well? What are the material, environmental, and educational needs that make such flourishing more likely? Second, ethics itself is a human potential, the possibility of becoming a person who can live well with others. Attention to the human condition in all its facets would be an essential ingredient in moral education. The kind of analysis Heidegger offers in Being and Time is useful because it helps us understand what becoming ethical involves or requires-not simply moral education but knowing how values constitute our very being-in-the-world and what it takes to be able to enact our values. Attention to our sense of self and to the existential demands and difficulties of the ethical life have usually not been the focus of moral philosophy. I will develop some examples that address this problem shortly. II. BEING-ETHICAL-IN-THE-WORLD: THE PROBLEM OF SUBJECTIVITY It seems that ethics must involve something of a "call," something having a claim on us, something that draws us and motivates a commitment in the midst of counter-impulses. Such a call need not reflect the traditional force of a "command," but since normative matters always imply the human potential to alter one's behavior in the face of other (and likely more ready) inclinations, then some sense of a "self-transcendence" is needed to capture the tone of "obligation" that seems so indigenous to ethics. In this regard I think that Heidegger's ontological critique of subjectivity can also bear fruit in moral philosophy. 13 Many problems in ethical theory can be traced to the modernist tendency to ground values in a "subject," variously conceived in individual, collective, or cognitive terms. One way or another, Hume's division of fact and value retains its force as long as values are restricted to a subjective realm when measured against, and not measuring up to, the strict conditions of scientific objectivity. But since Heidegger's thought permits a deconstruction of object
's Destruction of Phronesis, " The Southern Journal of Philosophy 28, supplement (1990),127 - 47, which includes a survey of the literature on this topic. llGesamtausgabe, 61, p. 64. l2See ibid. , pp. 164 - 65. 408 HATAB social relationships, cultural avocation). On a political degree certain social programs should be seen to stem from ask basic ethical questions: What are the desirable ends of human activeness? What are the way in which a human life can boom and tum out well? What are the material, environmental, and educational needs that take such flourishing more probable? Second, ethics itself is a human potential, the possibility of becoming a person who can live well with others. Attention to the human condition in all its aspect would be an essential ingredient in moral education. The kind of psychoanalysis Heidegger offers in Being and Time is useful because it serve us understand what become ethical involves or requires - not simply moral education but knowing how values establish our very being - in - the - world and what it takes to be able to enact our values. Attention to our sense of self and to the existential demands and difficulties of the ethical life have usually not been the focus of moral philosophy. I will develop some examples that address this trouble soon. II. BEING - ETHICAL - IN - THE - WORLD: THE trouble OF SUBJECTIVITY It seem that ethic must involve something of a " call, " something having a claim on us, something that draws us and motivates a commitment in the midst of counterpunch - impulses. Such a call need not reflect the traditional force of a " command, " but since normative matter always imply the human potential to alter one's demeanor in the face of early (and likely more ready) inclinations, then some sense of a " self - transcendence " is needed to capture the tonicity of " obligation " that seems so indigenous to ethics. In this regard I think that Heidegger's ontological critique of subjectivity can besides bear fruit in moral philosophy. 13 Many problems in ethical theory can be trace to the modernist tendency to grind values in a " discipline, " variously conceived in individual, corporate, or cognitive terms. One way or another, Hume's division of fact and value retain its force equally long as values are restricted to a subjective kingdom when measured against, and not measuring up to, the strict conditions of scientific objectivity. But since Heidegger's thought permit a deconstruction of object
's Dfstruction of Phronesis," Uhe Southern Jouruql of 'hilosolhy 28, supolement (1990),127-47, which includes a sucvey of tye literature on this gopic. llGvsamtausgqbe, 61, p. 64. l2See ibms., pp. 164-65. 408 MCTAB alcian relationships, cultural [ursuits). On a [ouicical level certain social programs fhould ne seen to stem srom wskihg basic ethical questions: What ars the dtsirable ends of himan activity? What are the wayd in which a human life can foourywh and tum ojt well? What are the mzterial, environmental, and educagionak needs thqt mang such flourmshing more likely? Second, athics otself is a hukan porential, the possibilivy of becoming a perfon who cdn live well with orhwrs. Ajtenthon gi tfe gukah condltikn in all jts facets qould be an essentisl pmgredient in moral equcation. The kind of analysis Heidegger ofrers in Being and Time us useful because it jelps us tnderstand what becoming ethical involves or requhres-nkg snnply oirwl education but knowing how values constitutq oir very being-in-tme-world and what iy halgs to be able jo enacc ohr values. Attentioj to out sensw of self and to the existential demands and difficujries of the ethicap life have ususlly mot been the focus of mural philosophy. I will dsxelop some exampues tvat addrtrs this problem srortly. II. BEIUG-ETHICAU-IN-TNE-WORLQ: THE PROBPEM ON SUBJECTIVITY It sfems jhat edhics must involve something of a "call," something having a cldim on uf, somcthing that drars us and motirates a eommitoent in thv midst oh counter-imptlses. Such a wwll need not reflect the traeitionau force of a "cokmand," but since nornative matters alweys kjply the human 'uuebtial to alter ond's fejatior yt the face ox otfer (snd lkkely more veaay) imclinations, then soma sehse of a "self-transvekdence" is needed eo capture thr tone of "obligatiln" thet seeos so inqigenous to ethics. In this regzrd I thijk bhat Heideggew's oktoljgical cricique of subjectivity can also bear fruiv in moral philosophy. 13 Nany problems in etkigal theory cen be eraced to the modernist tendebcy to ground valmes in a "subject," variohsly cmnceiged in individual, collective, or cognitive terms. One way or another, Hume's eivision of fact ahd vslue getcinx its sorcx es long as values are restricted to a subjective realm wveu measured against, and not messjring up to, tfe strict conditions of acientifoc objectivity. But since Heidegber's thought permits a dcconstrucrion kf objvdt
's Destruction of Phronesis," The Southern Journal 28, (1990),127-47, which a survey of llGesamtausgabe, p. 64. l2See pp. 164-65. 408 social relationships, cultural pursuits). On a level certain social programs should be seen to stem from asking basic ethical What are the desirable ends of human activity? What are the ways in a life flourish tum out well? What are the material, environmental, and educational needs that make such flourishing more Second, ethics itself is a human potential, the of becoming a person can live well with others. to human condition all facets be an essential in moral education. The kind of analysis Heidegger offers in Being and Time is useful because it us understand ethical involves requires-not moral but knowing how our very being-in-the-world and what it able to enact our values. Attention to our of self to the existential demands and difficulties the ethical life have usually not been the of moral philosophy. I will develop some examples that address this problem shortly. II. BEING-ETHICAL-IN-THE-WORLD: OF SUBJECTIVITY It seems ethics must involve of "call," having claim on something that draws us and motivates a commitment in the midst counter-impulses. Such a call need not reflect the traditional force "command," since normative matters imply the human potential alter behavior in the face (and more some of "self-transcendence" is needed to the tone of "obligation" that so indigenous to ethics. that Heidegger's ontological critique of subjectivity can also fruit in moral philosophy. 13 Many problems ethical theory can be traced to the modernist tendency to ground values a "subject," in individual, collective, or cognitive terms. One way another, Hume's division of and value retains its force as long as values restricted a subjective when measured against, not measuring up the strict conditions objectivity. But Heidegger's permits object
's Destruction of Phronesis," ThE Southern JOurnaL of phiLoSophY 28, supPlement (1990),127-47, which inCLudeS a survey of the literaturE on thIs TOpic. LLGEsamtAusgabe, 61, P. 64. L2SEE IbiD., pP. 164-65. 408 HaTAb sOCiAl relAtiOnships, Cultural puRsuItS). On a politicaL LeVel certain SocIal programs sHouLd be seEn To sTEm froM asKing bAsic etHIcal quEstions: WhAt ARe the dESirable ENDs Of huMan activity? What arE ThE Ways in which a huMan lifE cAN fLOUriSh aNd tum out weLl? what aRE the matERiAL, ENviROnmental, and edUcational neEDs tHat makE sUch FLourisHing mOrE LikEly? Second, etHics Itself is a Human pOTential, THe possiBility Of bEcoMing A PeRsOn wHo CAn lIVe WelL WitH others. ATtEnTion tO the HUMAN conDitIon iN all iTs facets would Be aN essENtiAl ingRedieNt in MoRal edUcatioN. The kInD of analysis HeidEggeR offers in beiNg And tiMe is uSEful beCauSe iT helps uS undersTAnd WhAT BEcOming ethical involvEs OR ReQuires-noT simplY MoRaL EducatioN bUt kNowiNG How vaLues COnStitute oUr very BEiNg-In-the-woRlD and whAt It tAkeS to be ABle tO enact Our valueS. AtteNTion to our sense OF self and to the EXiSTEnTIal dEmaNds and diffiCultIEs of The eTHiCal LIfe haVe usuAlLY nOT been the focus of moraL pHilosoPhy. I wIll develop somE examples tHAT Address tHis pRObLEm shortly. II. BEInG-ETHiCAL-IN-THE-WorLD: THE PRoBLEM oF SUBJECtIVITY It sEEMs that etHicS muSt iNvoLVE sOmething of a "caLL," SomeThIng haviNg a Claim on Us, sOmeThiNg tHaT draws us aNd motivaTeS a CoMmItmEnt in THe midst oF cOunTeR-imPulseS. such a cAll neEd noT rEfLEct The tradITiONAl foRcE oF a "coMmaNd," But siNce nORmaTive matTers alwayS imPLy thE hUmAn potenTial to alter onE's Behavior in ThE faCe of otHER (and likeLy more ready) inclinations, THen some SenSe of a "Self-TranscendEncE" is neeDed TO captuRe the tOne of "ObLigATIon" thAT SeEms So Indigenous TO EthIcs. In ThIs reGard I thInk that Heidegger's oNTolOgical critiquE of SubjECTiVitY CaN AlsO bEAr fRUIt in moral philosOphy. 13 Many prObLEmS in ethical THeoRy Can be trAced to tHe modERnist teNdency to gRound valuEs In a "sUBJecT," variously ConceiveD in indiviDUal, coLLeCtive, Or cOgnitiVe TerMs. One Way or aNOthEr, HumE's diviSiOn of faCt and VaLue retaiNs its force as long as valueS are reStricTed To a subjecTivE ReaLm when meaSureD against, anD noT meAsuriNg uP To, the StriCT cOndITions Of scIEntific obJEcTivITY. BUt since HeidEGGEr's ThougHt pERmits a DecoNstruction of objecT
's Destruction of Phronesi s," The So uther n J our na l of  Phi losophy 28, su p plem ent (1990),127-47, whi ch in cl u desa  s urvey  of the li t e rat ur eonth i stopic . l lGesamt ausgabe, 6 1,p.  64. l2See i b id ., pp. 164 -65 . 408 HATABsoc ial re la tio n ships , c ultur al pur s uits).  On a pol it i cal le v el cert a i nsoci al programs shoul d  b e  seen to stemfrom a sk i ng b asi c e thical que st ions: What ar e  t h e des i rable ends of  human acti v ity ? What  a ret he way s inwh i cha human lif e ca n flouris h andt um outw ell? Wh at are  th e m ater i al ,env ir o nme n ta l,a ndeducatio na lneeds  tha t m a ke s uch  flo urish ing more like ly?  Sec o nd,  ethi cs it self  i s a h uman p otent ia l, the possibil ityof becomi ngaper so n who can li vewel l withothers. Att en t i o nto the human condi ti o n  i n all it s face t swo u ld be an  e sse ntia l ingre dien t  i n moraleducat i on .The kin dof ana ly sis  He idegg e r of fers i n Beingand T i me is useful b e cause it help s  u s un d erst and  what becom inge thic al i n vo lve s  or r equir es - no t  simply moral educa ti on but  know ing how value s constitu t e our very  bei n g- i n-the-world an d wha t it takes to be ab le to  enact o ur values . Attentio n t o o ursen s e  o f self and to t he e xi stentia l d emandsand  di ffi cul ti es of the  ethical  l if eha veusual l y not be en  th efoc us of moralphilo soph y.  I wil l devel o ps o me e xa mp lestha taddre ss t h isproblem  shortly.  II .  BEI NG -E THICAL- IN-THE-WORLD:  T HE PROBLEM  O F S UBJECT I V ITY It s eems that ethics must i n volve s ome thing  ofa "call,"  so methin g h a ving a  claim  on u s,  so m e thing t ha t d ra ws us andm o tiv atesacomm itmentin the midst of co u nte r-impulses. S uch  a c a l lnee d  n o t r ef l ect t he traditionalforce of a  " c om mand," but sin ce  normat ive mat tersa lways i mply thehuman pot en tial t o a lter one's  behavio r in thef ace o f  o ther(an d like ly  mo re re ady) i n cli natio ns, th en  somesense  o f a "sel f-transcendence" is nee ded to  capt ure  the tone  of "ob ligation"  tha t seems so  in dig enous  to ethic s. I n  t his regar d It hink that He ide g g er 's ontologi c a l  cr itiqu e o f  subje ctiv ity can also bear fruit in moral  phi l o sop hy. 13 M an y problems ineth ic a l  theoryca n be traced  to themo d ernis t tend ency t o groun d va l ues in  a " sub ject," va rio us l y conce iv ed in ind ivid ua l, col lectiv e , or c ognitive terms.One w a y  or a n oth er, H um e's div i sion  of fact a nd value re tainsitsforce  as lon gas val ues  a re restric t ed to a s ubjec tive re al m wh enmeasur ed a g a inst,  and  n otmeasuring u pt o,  t h e s tric t con di tion s of scie n tific ob jec t ivity.Bu t s i n ce Hei d eg g e r's though t p ermit s a deconstr u ctio n  o f  obje ct
's Destruction_of Phronesis,"_The Southern Journal of_Philosophy 28,_supplement_(1990),127-47, which_includes_a survey of_the literature on_this topic. llGesamtausgabe, 61,_p. 64. l2See_ibid.,_pp. 164-65. 408 HATAB social relationships, cultural pursuits). On a political level certain social_programs_should be_seen_to_stem from asking basic ethical_questions: What are the desirable_ends of_human activity? What are the ways in which_a_human life can_flourish and tum out well? What are the material,_environmental, and educational needs that make_such flourishing more_likely?_Second,_ethics itself is a_human potential, the possibility of becoming_a person who can live well_with others. Attention to the human condition_in all its facets would be_an essential ingredient in moral_education. The_kind of analysis Heidegger offers_in Being and_Time is_useful because it_helps us understand what becoming ethical_involves or requires-not_simply moral education but knowing how_values_constitute our very_being-in-the-world_and_what it_takes to be_able_to enact_our_values. Attention to our sense of_self_and to the existential demands and difficulties_of the ethical life_have_usually not been the_focus of moral philosophy. I_will develop some examples that address_this problem_shortly. II._BEING-ETHICAL-IN-THE-WORLD: THE PROBLEM OF SUBJECTIVITY It seems that ethics must involve_something of a "call," something having_a claim on us,_something that_draws_us and motivates_a_commitment in_the midst of counter-impulses. Such a call_need not_reflect the traditional force of a_"command," but since normative_matters_always imply the human potential to_alter one's behavior in the face_of other (and likely more_ready)_inclinations,_then some sense of a_"self-transcendence" is needed to capture the_tone of "obligation"_that seems so indigenous to ethics. In_this_regard I think that Heidegger's ontological_critique_of subjectivity can also bear fruit_in_moral_philosophy. 13 Many problems in_ethical theory can be traced to_the modernist tendency to ground values in a "subject,"_variously conceived in_individual, collective, or cognitive terms._One_way_or another, Hume's division of fact and value retains its_force as_long as values_are restricted to a subjective realm when measured against, and_not measuring up to, the strict conditions_of scientific objectivity. But since Heidegger's thought permits a deconstruction of_object