 ant whether some other people in, say, central Asia, whom our South Americans never have and never will meet, would likewise understand those signs. Even supposing that the central Asians wouldn't understand, that doesn't prevent our South Americans from using the signs to agree among themselves. Next I will present an objection to Reid's argument. This will be followed by a series of imagined replies, refinements and rebuttals. This process will enable a better appreciation of Reid's argument, and help us to decide whether Reid's conclusion, or something in the ballpark, is true. We do not by a principle of our nature understand 'wolves' to refer to wolves. The word 'wolves' is not a sign in natural human language. And yet it certainly seems possible that a human, call him 'Wally', might decide to use 'wolves' in order to communicate to others his thought that wolves lurk nearby. This invention of this artificial sign didn't require prior agreement using natural signs. So premise 2 is false. John Turri | 10 "Oh, but it did require agreement," it might be replied. "Wally had to agree with himself to use 'wolves' to refer to wolves." In re- sponse, if we're to count such a decision as an agreement with one- self, then premise 3 is false. One doesn't communicate such a de- cision to oneself. One doesn't use signs in order to communicate such a decision to oneself. Neither does one need to use signs to make such a decision. Perhaps it will instead be replied, "We should understand Reid's argument to pertain not merely to the invention of artificial signs, but the invention and use of them." This reply can be met by extending the example. Suppose Wally says 'wolves' to a Stranger he encounters along the forest trail one evening, in order to com- municate to his thought that wolves lurk nearby. Nothing here re- quires prior agreement on the meaning of 'wolves' between Wally and the Stranger, or between Wally and anyone else. Perhaps it will instead be replied, "We should understand the argument to pertain to the invention and effective interpersonal use of artificial signs. The Stranger will just be confused by Wally's utterance, so it doesn't count as an effective interpersonal use of ar- tificial signs." This reply can be met by extending the example. Add that the Stranger hails from a community that, as
ant whether some other people in, say, central Asia, whom our South Americans never have and never will touch, would alike understand those signs. Even supposing that the cardinal Asians wouldn't understand, that doesn't prevent our South Americans from using the signs to match among themselves. Next I will present an objection to Reid's controversy. This will be followed by a series of think replies, refinements and rebutter. This procedure will enable a better appreciation of Reid's argument, and help us to decide whether Reid's conclusion, or something in the approximate range, is true. We do not by a principle of our nature understand' wolf' to refer to wolves. The password' wolves' is not a signal in natural human language. And yet it certainly seems potential that a human, call him' Wally', might decide to use' wolves' in order to communicate to others his opinion that wolves lurk nearby. This invention of this artificial sign didn't require prior agreement using natural signs. So premise 2 is false. John Turri | 10 " Oh, but it did require agreement, " it might be replied. " Wally have to agree with himself to use' wolves' to denote to wolves. " In re- sponse, if we're to count such a decision as an agreement with one- self, then premise 3 is assumed. One doesn't communicate such a de- cision to oneself. One doesn't use signs in order to convey such a decision to oneself. Neither does one need to use signs to make such a decision. possibly it will instead be replied, " We should understand Reid's argument to pertain not merely to the invention of artificial signs, but the invention and use of them. " This answer can be meet by extending the example. Suppose Wally say' wolves' to a Stranger he encounters along the forest trail one evening, in decree to com- municate to his thought that wolves lurk nearby. Nothing here re- quires prior agreement on the meaning of' wolves' between Wally and the Stranger, or between Wally and anyone else. Perhaps it will rather be replied, " We should sympathize the argument to pertain to the invention and effective interpersonal use of artificial signs. The Stranger will just be confuse by Wally's utterance, so it doesn't count as an effective interpersonal function of ar- tificial signs. " This answer can be met by extending the example. total that the Stranger hails from a residential district that, as
 anh whether some other peokle in, say, central Asia, xhom oud South Xmericans never have and nevxr wull mtvt, would likewise unddrstand tjose sigbs. Eten supposing thef the ccutral Wsiaus wouldn't underxtand, that doesn't prevend uux South Americans from using the siggs to abrfe among themsglves. Gext P cill present an objection to Rejd's arglment. This will br followed by a series of lmaglned replies, refinfments and tsbuerals. This prucess will enable a bejter appreciation of Reid's argumdnt, aud help us jo dfwide whethec Reid'f conclusion, or somedhing im the ballpark, is trye. We do not by a priiciple of our nature understatd 'wolves' to refer ro wolvgs. Tha wofe 'wulvts' ms hot a digi in naturam human lantuage. And yet it cettwpmly seems poasible trat a human, call him 'Wally', might decide to use 'wolves' in order to communicate to otherd his thotght that wolves lurk nearby. This invention of thhs arviwicnql sieb fidn't require prior agreement using natural syfnx. Xo premise 2 is false. John Tkrty | 10 "Oh, but it did rzsujre agreement," it mlght be replued. "Wally had to agree with himself to uwe 'wolves' to eefer to wolves." In re- sponse, nf we'rg to cpunt such a decision as an zgreement wlth one- ssuf, then premise 3 is fdlse. One doesn't communicatq such a ve- cixion to onexelf. Oge doesn't kse slcns in order to colmunieate vuch a declsion to oneself. Neither does oix need to use shgnv to makz such a decision. Pqrhaps it will insteab be rdplied, "We ahould nnderstand Rqid's argument jo pertain nov merely eo tye ibventiov of artificial signs, bun uhe inventuon and use of thek." Tfjs reply can be meu vy extending tne dxaippe. St[pose Wally vays 'woufes' tu a Strangev hd envounters along the fmresf trail one eveninb, ln order jo com- mugicate to his thought that wolvts lurn nxarby. Motring here re- quires prior agresment on hhe meaning of 'rolvcs' bgtween Wallv and the Stranger, or between Wally and enyone else. Perhaps it qill instead be repkled, "We shoulv undewstand tha argument to pertaib to the inventiok and effective interpsrsonan use of artificial signs. The Stranger will just be confused by Wally's utteranxe, so mt doesn't couht ax an vffzctnve intqrpecsunal use of ar- tpficial signs." This reply can be oet by eftznding the example. Add that tne Stranger haius from a community that, as
ant whether some other people in, say, whom South Americans have and never those Even supposing that central Asians wouldn't that doesn't prevent our South Americans using the signs to agree among themselves. Next I will present an objection Reid's argument. This will be followed by a series of imagined replies, refinements rebuttals. process enable better appreciation of Reid's argument, and help us to decide whether Reid's conclusion, or something in ballpark, is true. We do not by a of our nature understand to refer to wolves. The 'wolves' not a in human And yet it seems possible that a human, call him 'Wally', might decide to use 'wolves' in order to communicate others his wolves lurk This of artificial sign didn't agreement using natural signs. So premise John Turri | 10 "Oh, but it did agreement," it be replied. "Wally had to agree himself to use 'wolves' to refer to wolves." re- sponse, if we're to count such a decision as an agreement with one- self, 3 is false. One communicate such a cision oneself. doesn't signs in to communicate such a decision to oneself. Neither does one need use signs to make such a decision. Perhaps it will replied, should understand Reid's to pertain not merely the of artificial signs, but and of can met extending the example. Suppose says 'wolves' to a Stranger encounters along the forest to com- municate to his thought that wolves nearby. Nothing here re- quires prior agreement the meaning of 'wolves' between Wally and the Stranger, or between Wally anyone else. will instead be replied, "We should understand the to pertain to the and effective interpersonal use of artificial signs. The Stranger just confused by utterance, so it count as an interpersonal use of signs." This can met example. Add that the Stranger hails a that, as
 ant whether some other people In, say, centrAl AsiA, whOm oUr soutH AmeRicans never havE And nEver will meet, would likewIse unDeRStanD ThOse siGns. Even SUpPOSinG tHaT thE cENtRal AsIanS wouldn'T understanD, thAt Doesn't prevenT OuR South AmerIcaNs from using tHe sIgns to AgRee AMong tHemSelveS. Next I WIll preSent an objEcTIon to REId's arguMENt. this Will be followed by a SErIEs of imagined rePlies, rEfINeMENts And Rebuttals. THiS procESs will eNAbLE A BetTEr appreciatioN of Reid's argUMenT, and heLp Us tO Decide WhethEr rEid'S conclusion, Or soMething in The balLPark, is tRUe. We do nOt by a pRinCipLe of OUr NaTurE uNDerSTaNd 'wOLveS' to refer To WoLves. THe woRD 'WOLves' Is nOt a sIgn in Natural human lAngUage. aNd yEt it cErtaiNly sEeMs posSible tHat a hUmAn, call him 'Wally', mIght Decide to uSe 'wOlVes' In Order TO commuNicAte To otherS his thoUGht ThAT WOlVes lurk nearby. This iNvENTiOn of this ArtifiCIaL sIGn didn't rEqUirE priOR AgreeMent USiNg naturaL signs. sO pReMise 2 is fAlSe. John tuRri | 10 "oh, bUt it dID reqUire agReement," iT mighT Be replied. "Wally HAd to agree with HImSELf TO use 'WolVes' to refer tO wolVEs." In Re- spONsE, if WE're to Count SuCH a DEcision as an agreemenT wIth one- Self, tHen premise 3 is fAlse. One doeSN'T CommunicAte sUCh A De- cision to onesElf. OnE doesn't use SIgns in orDer to CommunicAte such a dECIsion to oNesElf. neiTheR DOeS one need to use SIGns tO mAke such A deCision. PErhAps It wIll InStead be rePlied, "We sHoUlD uNdErsTand REId's argumEnT to PeRtaIn not MErely tO the iNvenTiOn OF arTificiaL SiGNS, but ThE iNvenTioN aNd use Of thEM." ThIs reply Can be met bY exTEndiNg ThE examplE. Suppose Wally SaYs 'wolves' to A STraNger he ENCounters Along the forest trail one eVEning, in OrdEr to cOm- muNicate to hIs tHought ThaT Wolves Lurk neArby. NOtHinG HEre re- QUIrEs pRiOr agreemenT ON thE meanInG of 'wOlves' beTween Wally and the StRAngEr, or between WaLly And aNYOnE elSE. PERhaPs IT wiLL Instead be replieD, "We should uNdERsTand the argUMenT tO pertaiN to the iNventIOn and efFective inTerpersonAl Use oF ARtiFicial signS. The StraNger will jUSt be cONfUsed bY WaLly's utTeRanCe, so iT doesn'T CouNt as aN effecTiVe inteRpersOnAl use of aR- tificial signs." This reply Can be mEt by eXteNding the eXamPLe. ADd that the straNger hails fRom A coMmuniTy tHAt, as
 ant whether some other pe ople in, s ay, c ent ral  A sia,  who m our South Am e rica ns never have and neve r wil lm eet, wo uld l ikewise un d e rst an dtho se si gns.Eve n suppo sing thatthe  c entral Asian s  w ouldn't un der stand, thatdoe sn't p re ven t  ourSou th Am erican s  fromusing the  s i gns to agree a m o ng  the mselves. Next I w i ll present an obj ection  t o  R e i d's  ar gument. Th is  will be foll o we d b y a series of ima gined repli e s,refine me nts and re butta ls .  Th is processwill  enable a  bette r  apprec i ation o f Reid 'sarg umen t ,an d h el p  us to  de c ide  whether  R ei d's c oncl u s i o n, o r s omet hingin the ballpa rk,  ist rue . Wedo no t by  a  prin cipleof ou rnature understa nd ' wolves' t o r ef erto  wolv e s. The  wo rd'wolves ' is no t  asi g n in  natural human lan gu a g e.  And yet  it ce r ta in l y seemspo ssi blet h at ahuma n ,call him  'Wall y ',  m ight de ci de tous e ' wol ves'i n or der to  communi catet o others his t h ought that wo l ve s lu r k ne arb y. This inv enti o n of  thi s  a rti f icial  sign  d i dn ' t require prior agr ee ment u singnatural signs . So premi s e 2 is fal se.J oh n  Turri | 10 "O h, bu t it did r e quire ag reeme nt," itmight ber e plied. " Wal lyhad  to a gr ee with himse l f  tous e 'wolv es'  to ref ertowol ves ."  In re- s ponse, i fwe 'r etocount such a d ec isi on  as  an a g reemen t wit h on e-  s e lf,  then p r em i s e 3is  f alse . O ne  does n'tc omm unicate  such a d e-c isio nto  onesel f. One doesn' tuse signsin  or der to c ommunica te such a decision to o n eself.Nei therdoes  one need  to  use s ign s  to ma ke suc h a d ec isi o n . Per h a ps  it  w ill instea d berepli ed , "W e shoul d understand Reid' s  ar gument to per tai n no t me rel y  t o  th ei nve n t ion of artifici al signs,bu t  t he inventi o n a nd  use of  them."  This reply c an be met  by exten di ng t h e  ex ample. Sup pose Wal ly says ' w olves '  t o a S tra nger h eenc ounte rs alo n g t he fo rest t ra il one  even in g, in or der to com- municate to  his t hough t t hat wolve s l u rknearby. N othi ng here re - q uir es pr ior agree ment on  th e  mean ingo f 'wolves '  b etw e e nWally and t h e Str anger , o r  betwe en W ally and anyone e l se. Perhaps it  wil l ins tea d  bere plied, "We sho uld  u n d erstandth e argumentto perta in to th e inve ntionand eff e c ti v e inte rper son al use of  ar ti f icial s ig ns .  The S tran ge r will  justb e co n f used by Wally'sutter a n ce, s o  it  does n' t count as a n effectiv e interpers onal u se o f ar-  tifici al  signs ."Th is reply c a n be metby ex tending  t he e xam ple. A dd t h a t the  Str an ger  hails fr o m  a co mm u nit y th at, a s
 ant_whether some_other people in, say,_central Asia,_whom_our South_Americans_never have and_never will meet,_would likewise understand those_signs. Even supposing_that_the central Asians wouldn't understand, that doesn't prevent our South Americans from using the_signs_to agree_among_themselves._Next I will present an_objection to Reid's argument. This_will be_followed by a series of imagined replies, refinements_and_rebuttals. This process_will enable a better appreciation of Reid's argument, and_help us to decide whether Reid's_conclusion, or something_in_the_ballpark, is true. We_do not by a principle of_our nature understand 'wolves' to refer_to wolves. The word 'wolves' is not_a sign in natural human language._And yet it certainly seems_possible that_a human, call him 'Wally',_might decide to_use 'wolves'_in order to_communicate to others his thought that_wolves lurk nearby._This invention of this artificial sign_didn't_require prior agreement_using_natural_signs. So_premise 2 is_false._John Turri_|_10 "Oh, but it did require_agreement,"_it might be replied. "Wally had to_agree with himself to_use_'wolves' to refer to_wolves." In re- sponse, if_we're to count such a decision_as an_agreement with_one- self, then premise 3 is false. One doesn't communicate such_a de- cision to oneself. One_doesn't use signs in_order to_communicate_such a decision_to_oneself. Neither_does one need to use signs to_make such_a decision. Perhaps it will instead_be replied, "We should_understand_Reid's argument to pertain not merely_to the invention of artificial signs,_but the invention and use_of_them."_This reply can be met_by extending the example. Suppose Wally_says 'wolves' to_a Stranger he encounters along the forest_trail_one evening, in order to com-_municate_to his thought that wolves lurk_nearby._Nothing_here re- quires prior agreement_on the meaning of 'wolves' between_Wally and the Stranger, or between Wally and anyone_else. Perhaps it_will instead be replied, "We_should_understand_the argument to pertain to the invention and effective interpersonal_use of_artificial signs. The_Stranger will just be confused by Wally's utterance, so it_doesn't count as an effective interpersonal use_of ar- tificial signs." This reply can be met by extending_the example. Add that the Stranger hails from_a community that, as