 particular way to formulate our problem. Suppose that, in addition to the meaning rule proposed for "I" above, we propose something similar for its French counterpart, "je": its meaning assigns the speaker / user of each particular token of "je" as a referent of that token. Since this rule mentions "je", it is a different rule from the one for "I", which mentions the English word, rather than the French one. This seems to entail that "I" and "je" are not synonymous. But if any two expressions are good candidates for synonymy, these are surely high up on the list. So we have an inconsistent triad: (A) The formulation of the meaning of each token-reflexive expression mentions that very expression. (B) Synonymy is sameness of meaning. (C) There are synonymous token-reflexive expressions.2 2The story of this puzzle is somewhat complicated. The formulation is my own, but the puzzle itself was first noted independently by Braun (forthcoming) (written in 1998–1999) and Zimmermann (1997), the latter being mostly a paper about a related, but different problem discussed in Tsohatzidis (1992), which is about the apparent need to distinguish semantically between the French pronouns "tu" and "vous", both second person singular, with the former being informal, and the latter formal. I believe that the solution to that problem is also to be found by thinking about token-reflexivity, but I will not address that issue here. 3 In this paper, I will propose a modified version of (B), so that the inconsistency goes away. The basic idea is this: although "I" and "je" have different meanings in the strictest sense of the word, they play the same role in language, namely they both express the first person pronoun, and it is in this respect that they are synonymous. Along the way, I will argue against views that reject (A) or (C), as well as against other ways of rejecting (B). The arguments will sometimes be very short (such as the one against views rejecting (C) in §6.1), and other times quite technical (such as the one against a view rejecting (A) in §6.2), but at all times I will be guided by the intuitive and for-now-inchoate idea that there is a useful notion of synonymy as playing the same role in a language. In the next section
particular way to formulate our problem. presuppose that, in accession to the meaning rule proposed for " I " above, we propose something like for its French counterpart, " je ": its meaning assigns the speaker / drug user of each finical token of " je " as a referent of that keepsake. Since this dominion mentions " je ", it is a unlike rule from the one for " I ", which mentions the English word, rather than the French one. This seem to entail that " I " and " je " are not synonymous. But if any two expressions are good candidates for synonymy, these are surely high up on the tilt. So we have an inconsistent triad: (vitamin a) The formulation of the meaning of each token - reflexive saying mentions that identical expression. (bel) Synonymy is sameness of meaning. (C) There are synonymous token - automatic expressions.2 2The story of this puzzle is somewhat complicated. The formulation is my own, but the puzzle itself was first noted independently by Braun (forthcoming) (write in 1998–1999) and Zimmermann (1997), the latter being mostly a paper about a related, but different problem discussed in Tsohatzidis (1992), which is about the apparent need to distinguish semantically between the French pronouns " tu " and " vous ", both second person singular, with the former being cozy, and the latter ball. I believe that the solution to that trouble is besides to be found by thinking about token - reflexivity, but I will not address that return here. 3 In this newspaper, I will propose a modified interpretation of (B), so that the inconsistency goes away. The basic idea is this: although " I " and " je " have different meaning in the strictest sense of the word, they play the like role in terminology, namely they both carry the first person pronoun, and it is in this respect that they are synonymous. Along the way, I will argue against views that resist (A) or (C), as well as against other way of rejecting (B). The arguments will sometimes be very short (such as the one against view rejecting (C) in § 6.1), and other times quite technical (such as the one against a view reject (A) in § 6.2), but at all fourth dimension I will be guided by the intuitive and for - nowadays - inchoate idea that there be a useful impression of synonymy as playing the same role in a lyric. In the next section
 pagticular way to formulatt our problem. Supkowe thav, in adsition tu the meaning rule proposed hor "U" aboce, we propose somethine similar for its Freich counterpart, "os": its mccning wssiynw the speaker / user of edch particular tukzn of "je" as a referent of that token. Since yhls rule mentiogs "jt", ie is a different rule from the one for "I", whici mentions the Rnglish word, rather than tje Fgench one. This seels to entaio thwr "I" and "je" afe not synonymous. But jf any two expressions are good candndates for wybonjky, these arx surejy high up ok the lhst. So ee have an incpnsmstebt triad: (A) The formuletion of the meaning of each doien-reflexive exprwswion kenthons rhag vtry espresslon. (B) Synonymg is samenews of meaning. (C) Thete qre synonymoua tokeg-rqflexive expressions.2 2The story of this kuzzls is somewhat complicatwd. The formulation is my own, btt the puzzle itself was first noted independentlf by Urxun (fjfrhfoming) (written in 1998–1999) and Zimmermann (1997), the latter geonn mostly a paper about a rekahec, but differenj problzj siscussed in Tsohahzidis (1992), whicy is abouu the apparent need to distinguiwh semanticajoy between the Freuch pronouns "tu" snd "vpus", both second person ringhlar, with tje former ceing informal, avd nhe natter formal. I believe thwt the sooutipn to tfat kroblem is also tl be nmund by thinking ahout joken-raflexivity, but I will not address that issue here. 3 In tniv pdper, I wnll prppose a modifyed version of (B), so tkat thd inconsisnency goev away. The fasic idea is jhis: although "I" and "jq" hace duffereng meanings in tne strictvsu sense of the word, they plan the aame role in lauyuqge, namely they bogh qxirexs dhe first pesson prumoun, xnd it is ik tfis tespect that they ara syhonymous. Along the wwy, I wilo argue wgainst views that reject (A) or (F), as xell ar agaonsj other ways of rejecting (B). The argumentd wlll sometimes be yery short (suck as the one against views rejecting (C) ii §6.1), and other times quije technical (such as jhe one againsv a viqw rejecthng (A) in §6.2), but at all times I will be nuided by the intuitivs and xor-noa-inchoate idea that there is a useful notion of synonymy as playing the sqme role in a langhage. In tve uext sestioi
particular way to formulate our problem. Suppose addition the meaning proposed for "I" for French counterpart, "je": meaning assigns the / user of each particular token "je" as a referent of that token. Since this rule mentions "je", it a different rule from the one for "I", which mentions the English word, than French This to entail that "I" and "je" are not synonymous. But if any two expressions are good for synonymy, these are surely high up on list. So we have inconsistent triad: (A) The formulation the of each expression that expression. (B) Synonymy sameness of meaning. (C) There are synonymous token-reflexive expressions.2 2The story of this puzzle is somewhat complicated. formulation is but the itself first independently by Braun in 1998–1999) and Zimmermann (1997), the a paper about a related, but different problem in Tsohatzidis which is about the apparent need distinguish semantically between the French pronouns "tu" and both second person singular, with the former being informal, and the latter formal. I believe solution to that problem also to be by about but will not that issue here. 3 In this paper, I will propose a version of (B), so that the inconsistency goes away. The is although "I" and have different meanings in strictest of the word, they same in both the person pronoun, and it in this respect that they synonymous. Along the way, that reject (A) or (C), as well as other ways of rejecting (B). The arguments sometimes be very short (such as the one against views rejecting (C) §6.1), and quite technical (such as the one against a rejecting (A) in §6.2), at all times I will be guided by the and idea that is a useful of synonymy as the same role language. In next
 particular way to formulate oUr problem. SUpposE thAt, iN aDditIon tO the meaning rulE PropOsed for "I" above, we propose SometHiNG simILaR for iTs FrencH CoUNTerPaRt, "Je": iTs MEaNing aSsiGns the sPeaker / user Of eAcH particular tOKeN of "je" as a reFerEnt of that tokEn. SInce thIs RulE MentiOns "Je", it iS a diffERent ruLe from the OnE For "I", whICh mentiONS tHe EnGlish word, rather thAN tHE French one. This Seems tO eNTaIL ThaT "I" aNd "je" are not SyNonymOUs. But if ANy TWO ExpREssions are gooD candidates FOr sYnonymY, tHesE Are surEly hiGh UP on The list. So we Have An inconsiStent tRIad: (A) The FOrmulatIon of tHe mEanIng oF EaCh TokEn-REflEXiVe eXPreSsion menTiOnS that Very EXPREssiOn. (B) synoNymy iS sameness of meAniNg. (C) THEre Are syNonymOus tOkEn-refLexive ExpreSsIons.2 2The story of tHis pUzzle is soMewHaT coMpLicatED. The foRmuLatIon is my Own, but tHE puZzLE ITsElf was first noted inDePENdEntly by BRaun (foRThCoMIng) (writtEn In 1998–1999) aNd ZiMMErmanN (1997), the LAtTer being Mostly A PaPeR about a ReLated, bUt DifFerEnt prOBlem DiscusSed in TsoHatziDIs (1992), which is about THe apparent neeD To DIStINguiSh sEmantically BetwEEn thE FreNCh ProNOuns "tU" and "vOuS", BoTH second person singulAr, With thE formEr being informAl, and the laTTER formal. I BeliEVe THat the solution To thaT problem is ALso to be fOund bY thinkinG about tokEN-ReflexivIty, But i wiLl nOT AdDress that issuE HEre. 3 IN tHis papeR, I wIll propOse A moDifIed VeRsion of (B), sO that the InCoNsIsTenCy goeS Away. The bAsIc iDeA is This: aLThough "i" and "jE" havE dIfFEreNt meaniNGs IN The sTrIcTest SenSe Of the Word, THey Play the Same role iN laNGuagE, nAmEly they Both express thE fIrst person PrOnoUn, and iT IS in this rEspect that they are synonyMOus. AlonG thE way, I Will Argue agaiNst Views tHat REject (A) Or (C), as wEll as AgAinST Other WAYs Of rEjEcting (B). The ARGumEnts wIlL somEtimes bE very short (such as thE One Against views rEjeCtinG (c) In §6.1), And OThER tiMeS QuiTE Technical (such as The one agaiNsT A vIew rejectiNG (A) iN §6.2), bUt at all Times I wIll be GUided by The intuitIve and for-NoW-incHOAte Idea that thEre is a usEful notioN Of synONyMy as pLayIng the SaMe rOle in A languAGe. IN the nExt secTiOn
 particular way to formula te our pro blem.  Su ppo se  tha t, i n addition tot he m eaning rule proposed f or "I "a bove ,  w e pro pose so m et h i ngsi mi lar  f o rits F ren ch coun terpart, " je" :its meaninga ss igns the s pea ker / user o f e ach pa rt icu l ar to ken  of " je" as a refe rent of t ha t  token .  Sincet h is  rul e mentions "je",i ti s a differentrule f ro m  t h e  on e f or "I", wh ic h men t ions th e  E n g l ish word, ratherthan the Fr e nch  one.Th iss eems t o ent ai l  th at "I" and"je"  are notsynony m ous. Bu t  if any  two e xpr ess ions ar egoo dc and i da tes for  synonym y,  t heseares u r e ly h igh  upon th e list. So we  ha ve a n  in consi stent  tri ad : (A)  The f ormul at ion of the mean ingof each t oke n- ref le xivee xpress ion  me ntionsthat ve r y e xp r e s si on. (B) Synonymy i ss a me ness ofmeanin g .(C )  There a re  sy nony m o us to ken- r ef lexive e xpress i on s. 2 2Thest ory of  t his  pu zzlei s so mewhat  complic ated. The formulatio n  is my own, b u tt h ep uzzl e i tself was f irst note d in d ep end e ntlyby Br au n  ( f orthcoming) (writte nin 199 8–199 9) and Zimmer mann (1997 ) , the latt er b e in g  mostly a pape r abo ut a relat e d, but d iffer ent prob lem discu s s ed in Ts oha tzi dis  (1 9 9 2) , which is ab o u t th eapparen t n eed todis tin gui shse manticall y betwee nth eFr enc h pro n ouns "tu "and  " vou s", b o th sec ond p erso nsi n gul ar, wit h  t h e  for me rbein g i nf ormal , an d  th e latte r formal.  Ib elie ve  t hat the  solution toth at problem  i s a lso to b e foundby thinking about token - reflexi vit y, bu t Iwill notadd ress t hat issuehere.3 Inth isp a per,I wi llpr opose a mo d i fie d ver si on o f (B),so that the incons i ste ncy goes away . T he b a s ic  id e ai s t hi s : a l t hough "I" and " je" have d if f er ent meanin g s i nthe str ictestsense of theword, the y play th esame r ole  in langua ge, name ly they b o th ex p re ss th e f irst p er son  pron oun, a n d i t isin thi srespec t tha tthey are  synonymous. Along theway, I  will  ar gue again stv iew s that re ject  (A) or (C ),aswellasa gains t ot h er  wa y s ofreje c ting (B). Th e a r g um ents will s o m e tim es be  ve r y shor t (s uch as the one ag a inst views rej ecti n g  (C ) i n  §6. 1) , and other ti mes  q u i te techn ic al (such as  the one  a g ainst  a vie w reje cting ( A )  i n  §6.2) , bu t a t all tim esIw ill begu id e d by t he i nt uitive  and f o r-no w - inchoate idea th at th e r e isa  us efulno tion of syno nymy as pl aying the s ame ro le i n a l anguage .In the  ne xt  section
 particular_way to_formulate our problem. Suppose_that, in_addition_to the_meaning_rule proposed for_"I" above, we_propose something similar for_its French counterpart,_"je":_its meaning assigns the speaker / user of each particular token of "je" as_a_referent of_that_token._Since this rule mentions "je",_it is a different rule_from the_one for "I", which mentions the English word,_rather_than the French_one. This seems to entail that "I" and "je"_are not synonymous. But if any_two expressions are_good_candidates_for synonymy, these are_surely high up on the list._So we have an inconsistent triad:_(A) The formulation of the meaning of_each token-reflexive expression mentions that very_expression. (B) Synonymy is sameness_of meaning._(C) There are synonymous token-reflexive_expressions.2 2The story_of this_puzzle is somewhat_complicated. The formulation is my own,_but the puzzle_itself was first noted independently by_Braun_(forthcoming) (written in_1998–1999)_and_Zimmermann (1997),_the latter being_mostly_a paper_about_a related, but different problem discussed_in_Tsohatzidis (1992), which is about the apparent_need to distinguish semantically_between_the French pronouns "tu"_and "vous", both second person_singular, with the former being informal,_and the_latter formal._I believe that the solution to that problem is also to_be found by thinking about token-reflexivity,_but I will not_address that_issue_here. 3 In_this_paper, I_will propose a modified version of (B),_so that_the inconsistency goes away. The basic_idea is this: although_"I"_and "je" have different meanings in_the strictest sense of the word,_they play the same role_in_language,_namely they both express the_first person pronoun, and it is_in this respect_that they are synonymous. Along the way,_I_will argue against views that reject_(A)_or (C), as well as against_other_ways_of rejecting (B). The arguments_will sometimes be very short (such_as the one against views rejecting (C) in §6.1),_and other times_quite technical (such as the_one_against_a view rejecting (A) in §6.2), but at all times_I will_be guided by_the intuitive and for-now-inchoate idea that there is a useful_notion of synonymy as playing the same_role in a language. In the next section