 There are two versions of this thesis: Global standpoint epistemology: one's social situation affects all of their (epistemically) rational beliefs/knowledge. Local standpoint epistemology: one's social situation affects some of their (epistemically) rational beliefs/knowledge. I sense that most standpoint epistemologists endorse the local thesis, rather than the global one.22 For example, one's gender might not affect their beliefs about the weather tomorrow, but it may affect their views on divorce, abortion, or labor economics. The local thesis also helps with the worry that standpoint epistemology leads to a problematic global subjectivism, an objection that has been discussed extensively, especially in terms of implications for scientific objectivity and progress.23 Thus, I will focus on the local thesis. Standpoint epistemology has been linked to various other epistemological theses; for instance, Toole (forthcoming) likens it to pragmatic or moral encroachment, as she focuses on how non-epistemic social facts can affect knowledge. At the same time, it appears to have quite a bit in common with epistemic permissivism, especially the interpersonal strand of permissivism discussed earlier.24 One's social situation can affect, shape, and potentially even partially constitute one's epistemic standard, and thus the way one weighs and processes evidence. In fact, standpoints and epistemic standards might be two ways of describing the same phenomenon. Two people may share evidence, but due to their distinct social situations, process that evidence very differently and come to incompatible conclusions. In the same way, there isn't always a unique most-rational standpoint, there isn't a unique most-rational standard. Thus, it seems natural for advocates of standpoint epistemology to adopt a permissivist epistemology; similarly, advocates of intrapersonal permissivism might find themselves sympathetic to standpoint epistemology. Given that standpoint epistemology and interpersonal permissivism have some notable similarities, it makes sense that standpoint epistemology would also render epistemic paternalism unjustified, at least on the matters affected by the standpoint. The basic idea is this: A might consider acting paternalistically (e.g., withholding evidence from B or interfering with the way B processes evidence) because B would come to a completely different conclusion if B had that evidence or processed that evidence according to B's standpoint. However, if both standpoints are epistemically legitimate ways of interpreting evidence, then A can't justify paternalism because B would have more rational beliefs if A interfered. Further
There are two versions of this thesis: Global point of view epistemology: one's social site affects all of their (epistemically) rational belief / cognition. Local standpoint epistemology: one's social situation affects some of their (epistemically) intellectual impression / knowledge. I feel that most standpoint epistemologists certify the local thesis, rather than the ball-shaped one.22 For example, one's gender might not involve their beliefs about the weather tomorrow, but it may affect their horizon on divorce, abortion, or labor economics. The local thesis besides helps with the worry that point of view epistemology leads to a baffling global subjectivism, an protest that has been discussed extensively, especially in terms of significance for scientific objectivity and progress.23 Thus, I will focus on the local thesis. Standpoint epistemology has been linked to diverse other epistemological theses; for instance, Toole (forthcoming) likens it to pragmatic or moral encroachment, as she focuses on how non - epistemic social facts can involve knowledge. At the same prison term, it appear to have quite a bit in common with epistemic permissivism, particularly the interpersonal strand of permissivism discussed earlier.24 One's social situation can affect, form, and potentially even partially constitute one's epistemic standard, and thus the way one weighs and work evidence. In fact, standpoints and epistemic standards might be two ways of describing the like phenomenon. Two people may partake evidence, but due to their distinct social situations, process that evidence very differently and come to incompatible conclusions. In the like way, there isn't always a unique most - rational standpoint, there isn't a unique about - rational standard. Thus, it seems natural for advocate of standpoint epistemology to assume a permissivist epistemology; similarly, advocates of intrapersonal permissivism might recover themselves sympathetic to standpoint epistemology. give that standpoint epistemology and interpersonal permissivism have some celebrated similarities, it make sense that standpoint epistemology would also render epistemic paternalism unjustified, at least on the matters affected by the standpoint. The basic idea is this: A might see acting paternalistically (e.g., withholding tax evidence from B or interfering with the way B processes evidence) because B would come to a completely unlike conclusion if B had that evidence or processed that evidence according to B's standpoint. However, if both standpoints are epistemically legitimate ways of interpret evidence, then ampere can't justify paternalism because B would have more rational beliefs if A interfered. Further
 Thfre are two versions of uhis thesis: Global stand'oint elistemolugy: one's social situation afhectw all of their (epistemicallh) rationap beliefw/knoxledge. Local staispoint c'istejllogv: ine's social sijuation affewts some of thaif (zpistemically) rational beliefs/knowleqge. I srnde that most sjandppynt siiwtemologists endorse the locam thesiv, rather than the global one.22 For examplf, onf's gender might noh affect thgjr fwliefs about the weathtr tomorrow, gut it may affect their views ov divprce, abortuob, og labor econimics. The local tmvsis alvo helpx with the worvy thet srandpoint epistemologb leads to a problemwtic globdl subjectivism, an ibhectimn tvat fqs ceeh visdussed exvensively, eapecially ib terms of implicatoogw for scientiric obtestivity and progress.23 Thus, I will focus mn fhe local thesis. Standpiint epistemology has been linhed to various other epistemological theses; for itstanre, Toilc (fofrhfoming) likens it to pragmatic or moral encroasgmtnt, as she focusef on how nom-eoixjemic social fxcts cch zffect knowledge. Ah the swme tume, it apkears to have quite a bit in comnon with epifremic permissivism, especially the intetpersonal strand of peroissjvism discudsed earljdr.24 One's social sktusthon can affect, shape, and pjtentiallb eveu partiauly vonstieute one's fpistckic standard, and tjus tke waf one weigjs and processes evidence. In farv, standpoints atd vpistemic stancards might bq two ways of bescribiug the same phenkmenon. Vwo people mwy share evidajce, but due vo their qistunct social rituations, provess that evidence cery differently akd coos to incompatiboe xonclusions. In yhe saie wey, thqse isn't alwafs a unkaue must-rational rtancpoint, there isn't a gniqhe most-rational stsnqard. Thuw, it seeis natural fot advocates of stajdpoiit epirtemokogi to adopt a permissivist epistsmology; slmijarly, advocaees if intraperspnal permissivism might find themselves sympathetic to sjandpoint epistemologi. Glven that stendpoigt epistekology and interpersinal permissivism have some notable sijilaridies, lt makes sense that standpoint epistemology would also render epistemic pqternalism unjustiried, at lvasc ou the mwttecs affected by the standpoint. The basic idea is tiis: A mighd eonsider acting paternalisticsluy (e.g., withholaing evidence from B or jnterferong with the way B processes evodence) because B would cpme to a compmetely difherent conclusion if B had that evidenxe ov processed thxt rvldence acclrdiig co B's standpoint. However, if both wtandpiijts are epistemirally legitilxte wzys of interpreting evjdendf, thev A can't justofy paternalisk because B would hane iore rational vvliefs if A imterfgxvd. Further
There are two versions of this thesis: epistemology: social situation all of their epistemology: social situation affects of their (epistemically) beliefs/knowledge. I sense that most standpoint endorse the local thesis, rather than the global one.22 For example, one's gender not affect their beliefs about the weather tomorrow, but it may affect their on abortion, labor The local thesis also helps with the worry that standpoint epistemology leads to a problematic global an objection that has been discussed extensively, especially terms of implications for objectivity and progress.23 Thus, I focus the local Standpoint has linked to various epistemological theses; for instance, Toole (forthcoming) likens it to pragmatic or moral encroachment, as she focuses on non-epistemic social affect knowledge. the time, appears to have bit in common with epistemic permissivism, strand of permissivism discussed earlier.24 One's social situation affect, shape, potentially even partially constitute one's epistemic and thus the way one weighs and processes In fact, standpoints and epistemic standards might be two ways of describing the same phenomenon. may share evidence, but to their distinct situations, that very and come incompatible conclusions. In the same way, there isn't always a unique standpoint, there isn't a unique most-rational standard. Thus, it seems advocates standpoint epistemology to a permissivist epistemology; similarly, of permissivism might find themselves standpoint Given and permissivism some notable similarities, it sense that standpoint epistemology would render epistemic paternalism unjustified, affected by the standpoint. The basic idea is A might consider acting paternalistically (e.g., withholding from B or interfering with the way B processes evidence) because B come to different conclusion if B had that evidence or that evidence according to standpoint. However, if both standpoints are epistemically legitimate ways interpreting then A justify paternalism because would have more beliefs if A
 There are two versions of this Thesis: GlobAl staNdpOinT ePistEmolOgy: one's social sITuatIon affects all of their (epIstemIcALly) rATiOnal bEliefs/kNOwLEDge. loCaL stAnDPoInt epIstEmology: One's social SitUaTion affects sOMe Of their (epiSteMically) ratioNal BeliefS/kNowLEdge. I SenSe thaT most sTAndpoiNt epistemOlOGists eNDorse thE LOcAl thEsis, rather than the GLoBAl one.22 For examplE, one's gEnDEr MIGht Not Affect theiR bEliefS About thE WeATHEr tOMorrow, but it maY affect theiR VieWs on diVoRce, ABortioN, or laBoR EcoNomics. The loCal tHesis also Helps wITh the woRRy that sTandpoInt EpiStemOLoGy LeaDs TO a pRObLemATic Global suBjEcTivisM, an oBJECTion ThaT has Been dIscussed extenSivEly, eSPecIally In terMs of ImPlicaTions fOr sciEnTific objectivitY and Progress.23 THus, i wIll FoCus on THe locaL thEsiS. StandpOint epiSTemOlOGY HaS been linked to varioUs OTHeR epistemOlogicAL tHeSEs; for insTaNce, toolE (FOrthcOminG) LiKens it to PragmaTIc Or Moral enCrOachmeNt, As sHe fOcuseS On hoW non-epIstemic sOcial FActs can affect kNOwledge. At the sAMe TIMe, IT appEarS to have quitE a biT In coMmon WItH epIStemiC permIsSIvISm, especially the inteRpErsonaL straNd of permissivIsm discussED EArlier.24 OnE's soCIaL Situation can afFect, sHape, and potENtially eVen paRtially cOnstitute ONE's episteMic StaNdaRd, aND ThUs the way one weIGHs anD pRocesseS evIdence. IN faCt, sTanDpoInTs and episTemic staNdArDs MiGht Be two WAys of desCrIbiNg The Same pHEnomenOn. Two PeopLe MaY ShaRe evideNCe, BUT due To ThEir dIstInCt socIal sITuaTions, prOcess that EviDEnce VeRy DiffereNtly and come to InCompatible CoNclUsions. iN The same wAy, there isn't always a uniquE Most-ratIonAl staNdpoInt, there iSn't A uniquE moST-ratioNal staNdard. thUs, iT SEems nATUrAl fOr Advocates oF STanDpoinT ePistEmology To adopt a permissiviST epIstemology; simIlaRly, aDVOcAteS Of INtrApERsoNAL permissivism miGht find theMsELvEs sympatheTIc tO sTandpoiNt epistEmoloGY. Given tHat standpOint epistEmOlogY ANd iNterpersonAl permisSivism havE Some nOTaBle siMilAritieS, iT maKes seNse thaT StaNdpoiNt episTeMology Would AlSo render Epistemic paternalism unjUstifiEd, at lEasT on the matTerS AffEcted by thE staNdpoint. The BasIc iDea is ThiS: a mighT conSIdEr aCTing pAterNAlisticalLY (e.G., wiTHHoLding evidenCE FRom b or inTerFEring wIth tHe way B processes evIDence) because B wOuld COMe tO a cOMpleTeLy different conCluSiON If B had thAt Evidence or pRocessed ThAT evidEnce acCordinG to B's stANDpOInt. HowEver, If bOth standpOinTs ARe epistEmIcALly legItimAtE ways oF interPRetiNG Evidence, then A can'T justIFY pateRNalIsm beCaUse B wouLD havE more ratioNal beliefs iF A inteRferEd. FurTher
 There are two versions of  this thes is: G lob alst andp oint  epistemology: one' s social situation aff ectsal l  oft he ir (e pistemi c al l y ) r at io nal  b e li efs/k now ledge.Local stan dpo in t epistemolo g y:  one's soc ial  situation a ffe cts so me  of their  (e piste micall y ) rati onal beli ef s /knowl e dge. Is e ns e th at most standpoin t  e p istemologistsendors et he l oca l t hesis, rat he r tha n  the gl o ba l o ne. 2 2 For example , one's gen d ermightno t a f fect t heirbe l ief s about the  wea ther tomo rrow,b ut it m a y affec t thei r v iew s on di vo rce ,a bor t io n,o r l abor eco no mi cs. T he l o c a l  the sis  als o hel ps with the w orr y th a t s tandp ointepis te molog y lead s toaproblematic glo balsubjectiv ism ,anob jecti o n that  ha s b een dis cussede xte ns i v e ly , especially in te rm s of  implica tionsf or  s c ientific  o bje ctiv i t y and  pro g re ss.23 Th us, Iw il lfocus o nthe lo ca l t hes is. S t andp oint e pistemol ogy h a s been linkedt o various oth e re p is t emol ogi cal theses;  for inst ance ,  T ool e  (for thcom in g )l ikens it to pragmat ic  or mo ral e ncroachment,as she foc u s e s on how  non - ep i stemic socialfacts  can affec t  knowled ge. A t the sa me time,i t  appears  to  ha vequi t e  a  bit in commo n with  e pistemi c p ermissi vis m,esp eci al ly the in terperso na lst ra ndof pe r missivis mdis cu sse d ear l ier.24  One' s so ci al sit uationc an a ffec t,  s hape , a nd  pote ntia l lyeven pa rtially c ons t itut eon e's epi stemic standa rd , and thus  t heway on e weighs a nd processes evidence.I n fact,  st andpo ints  and epis tem ic sta nda r ds mig ht betwo w ay s o f descr i b in g t he  same phen o m eno n. Tw opeop le mayshare evidence, bu t  du e to their di sti ncts o ci als it u ati on s , p r o cess that evide nce very d if f er ently andc ome  t o incom patible  conc l usions.  In the s ame way,th erei s n't  always aunique m ost-ratio n al st a nd point , t here i sn 'ta uni que mo s t-r ation al sta nd ard. T hus,it  seems n atural for advocates of  stand point  ep istemolog y t o  ad opt a per miss ivist epis tem olo gy; s imi l arly,  adv o ca tes of in trap e rsonal pe r mi ssi v i sm  might find t h ems elves  sy m pathet ic t o standpoint epis t emology. Given  tha t sta ndp o intep istemology and  in te r p ersonalpe rmissivismhave som en otabl e simi lariti es, itm a ke s  sense  tha t s tandpoint  ep is t emology  w ou l d also  ren de r epis temicp ater n a lism unjustified , atl e ast o n  th e mat te rs affe c tedby the sta ndpoint. Th e basi c id ea is  this:Amightcon si der acting paternali stica lly (e. g. , wi thh olding  evi d e nce f romBorinterferi n g  w i th  t h e w ay B  proc es sesevidence) becauseB w o uld com etoa comple t el y differentcon clusi o n  if B hadt hate vi d enceor pro cessed  that e v ide nc e accor din g to B's st andpoint. How ev er,if bothst andp oi nts  a re epistemicall y legiti mate way s of int erp r etin g  evide nc e, then A ca n't j us t ify pat e r nal ism bec a use  Bwou ld h ave  mor e  rational beliefs if A i nter fered .  Fu rther 
 There_are two_versions of this thesis:_Global standpoint_epistemology:_one's social_situation_affects all of_their (epistemically) rational_beliefs/knowledge. Local standpoint epistemology:_one's social situation_affects_some of their (epistemically) rational beliefs/knowledge. I sense that most standpoint epistemologists endorse the_local_thesis, rather_than_the_global one.22 For example, one's_gender might not affect their_beliefs about_the weather tomorrow, but it may affect their_views_on divorce, abortion,_or labor economics. The local thesis also helps with_the worry that standpoint epistemology leads_to a problematic_global_subjectivism,_an objection that has_been discussed extensively, especially in terms_of implications for scientific objectivity and_progress.23 Thus, I will focus on the_local thesis. Standpoint epistemology has been_linked to various other epistemological_theses; for_instance, Toole (forthcoming) likens it_to pragmatic or_moral encroachment,_as she focuses_on how non-epistemic social facts can_affect knowledge. At_the same time, it appears to_have_quite a bit_in_common_with epistemic_permissivism, especially the_interpersonal_strand of_permissivism_discussed earlier.24 One's social situation can_affect,_shape, and potentially even partially constitute one's_epistemic standard, and thus_the_way one weighs and_processes evidence. In fact, standpoints_and epistemic standards might be two_ways of_describing the_same phenomenon. Two people may share evidence, but due to their_distinct social situations, process that evidence_very differently and come_to incompatible_conclusions._In the same_way,_there isn't_always a unique most-rational standpoint, there isn't_a unique_most-rational standard. Thus, it seems natural_for advocates of standpoint_epistemology_to adopt a permissivist epistemology; similarly,_advocates of intrapersonal permissivism might find_themselves sympathetic to standpoint epistemology._Given_that_standpoint epistemology and interpersonal permissivism_have some notable similarities, it makes_sense that standpoint_epistemology would also render epistemic paternalism unjustified,_at_least on the matters affected by_the_standpoint. The basic idea is this:_A_might_consider acting paternalistically (e.g., withholding_evidence from B or interfering with_the way B processes evidence) because B would come_to a completely_different conclusion if B had_that_evidence_or processed that evidence according to B's standpoint. However, if_both standpoints_are epistemically legitimate_ways of interpreting evidence, then A can't justify paternalism because_B would have more rational beliefs if_A interfered. Further