 If transcendence is forfeited, then thrownness is forfeited, too. This is to say that with the suffocation of human existence, the thrown situatedness of Western humanity is not understood as the inevitable result of the selfwithdrawal of Being, but rather transforms itself into reality and actuality. In other words, without transcendence thrownness is not understood as thrownness. 20 Heidegger, The Beginning of Western Philosophy, 69. 21 Ibid., 62. In his eagerness to determine the peculiar nature of existence and how it is at stake in the era of nihilism, Heidegger feels the need to draw a distinction between mere human actuality, on the one hand, and human existence on the other. Existence, he says, "signifies the mode of Being of humans." He continues, however, to say that existence does not apply to humans in general and as such: "Not all humans who are actual, were actual, or will be actual do 'exist,' have existed, or will exist - in the sense we understand existence" (ibid., 64). 22 The word that could best describe this danger is the word "nihilism." Heidegger does not use this word in his 1932 lecture, but he devotes a section of his seminar to "the determination of the current situation by Friedrich Nietzsche," thus introducing the idea that the true meaning of Nietzsche's diagnosis of nihilism relates to the danger of non-existence (ibid., 35). 23 Ibid., 59. 24 Martin Heidegger, Being and Truth, trans. Gregory Fried and Richard Polt (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010), 122. 14 SOFIA PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW early Greek thinking, marks for him the transformation of human existence from mere actuality to being-in-a-world and historicality.25 To put this last point differently, it is with the esteeming of Being that worldliness and historical existence happen. From this it follows that with the dis-esteeming/the forgetfulness of Being both of them are in danger. Heidegger seems convinced that his time is one of high stakes, because Western Dasein has alienated itself from the questioning of Being to such an extent that it encounters the danger of plunging itself in a petrified reality (status quo) where there are no other possibilities apart from the ones available.26 This is how Heidegger describes nihilism in Introduction to Metaphysics: But where is the real nihilism at work
If transcendence is forfeited, then thrownness is forfeited, too. This is to say that with the suffocation of human being, the hold situatedness of Western humanity is not understood as the inevitable solution of the selfwithdrawal of Being, but rather transforms itself into world and actuality. In other words, without transcendence thrownness is not understood as thrownness. 20 Heidegger, The Beginning of Western Philosophy, 69. 21 Ibid. , 62. In his readiness to settle the peculiar nature of universe and how it is at stake in the era of nihilistic delusion, Heidegger feels the need to draw a distinction between mere human actuality, on the one hand, and human existence on the early. Existence, he says, " signifies the modality of Being of humans. " He continues, however, to order that existence does not use to humans in general and as such: " Not all humans who are actual, were actual, or will be actual do' exist,' have existed, or will exist - in the sense we sympathize existence " (ibid. , 64). 22 The word that could best describe this danger is the word " nihilistic delusion. " Heidegger does not practice this password in his 1932 lecture, but he devotes a section of his seminar to " the determination of the current situation by Friedrich Nietzsche, " thus introducing the theme that the truthful meaning of Nietzsche's diagnosis of nihilism relates to the risk of non - existence (ibid. , 35). 23 Ibid. , 59. 24 Martin Heidegger, Being and Truth, trans. Gregory Fried and Richard Polt (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010), 122. 14 SOFIA PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW early Greek thinking, score for him the transformation of human universe from mere actuality to being - in - a - world and historicality.25 To place this last point differently, it is with the esteeming of Being that worldliness and historical being happen. From this it follows that with the dis - esteeming / the forgetfulness of Being both of them are in danger. Heidegger seems convinced that his time is one of gamey stakes, because Western Dasein has alienated itself from the questioning of Being to such an extent that it encounters the danger of dunk itself in a petrified world (condition quo) where there constitute no other possibilities apart from the one available.26 This is how Heidegger describes nihilism in Introduction to Metaphysics: But where is the veridical nihilism at work
 If transcendence is forfeiued, then thrownness is fmrfeitsd, too. Tfis is to say that with the dudfocaupon of human existencd, the thrlwn situqtediess of Western ihmanity is nof undzrwtood as the ikevitable rasult of the salwwnthdrawal of Being, but rather transfjrms itxepf into realiti and wctuzlity. In other words, without transdendenct thrownness is noy understood as thrownness. 20 Heldegger, The Beginnlng of Westgdn [yilosophy, 69. 21 Kbid., 62. In hpv eagernesa to determine the peculiar natjre oy existence abd jmw it is at stakv in the era of nihilhsm, Heicegger feels tme nexd ti draw a distinction uetween mere human astuality, mn the one hand, and hyman gxistance in ghe ovhed. Exishenre, he says, "aignifies tye mode of Being of htnans." He contihues, hjwqver, to say that existence does not appny fo humans in general ane as such: "Not all humwns who awe actual, were actual, or will be actual do 'exist,' vave xxksttd, or wkol exist - in the sense we understand existence" (ygic., 64). 22 The word thab could best descrobf yris danger is the word "nihilism." Heideggeg does got uwe this wjrd on his 1932 lecture, but he devores a sectiou od his seminar to "tke determinacion og the current situation by Fxiedridh Nietzschf," thus inffoducing the idex tmat the trut meaning of Nietzfche's diajnosix of nifilixm relwtes to thf dannar of non-existence (ibid., 35). 23 Ibid., 59. 24 Magtin Heidegger, Being and Truth, vcans. Gregory Grhed and Rickard Pplt (Bloomingtjn: Indiana Unirersity 'ress, 2010), 122. 14 SOFIA PGILOSOPIICAL REVIEW early Greek djinking, markv for hii thw trqnsformxgion of human rxistence from mere actuality to beinn-in-a-wudld and historiecluty.25 To put this lart [opnt dyxferently, it is ditf the dsteeming on Bding that worldliness ang hiatorical existence hwppen. Frim this yt follows thst with the dis-estteming/vhe focgetfuknefs of Being both of them are ih danger. Jeiqegger seems conyincgd that his time is one of high stakes, because Wesvern Dasein has alienajed itself from the qoesuioning of Bemng to such an axtent that it encoubters the danger pf plunging itself in a petsifief reality (status quo) where there are no other possibilities apart from thw ones available.26 Tgis os hof Keibegger qescciues nihilism in Imtroduction to Metaphysics: But xhere is tve real nihilism at work
If transcendence is forfeited, then thrownness is This to say with the suffocation situatedness Western humanity is understood as the result of the selfwithdrawal of Being, rather transforms itself into reality and actuality. In other words, without transcendence thrownness not understood as thrownness. 20 Heidegger, The Beginning of Western Philosophy, 69. 21 62. his to the peculiar nature of existence and how it is at stake in the era of nihilism, feels the need to draw a distinction between human actuality, on the hand, and human existence on other. he says, the of of humans." He however, to say that existence does not apply to humans in general and as such: "Not all who are actual, or be do have existed, or - in the sense we understand 22 The word that could best describe this is the "nihilism." Heidegger does not use this in his 1932 lecture, but he devotes a of his seminar to "the determination of the current situation by Friedrich Nietzsche," thus introducing that the true meaning Nietzsche's diagnosis of relates the of (ibid., 35). Ibid., 59. 24 Martin Heidegger, Being and Truth, trans. Gregory Fried Richard Polt (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010), 122. 14 SOFIA early thinking, marks for the transformation of human from actuality to being-in-a-world and put last is the of Being that worldliness historical existence happen. From this follows that with the of them are in danger. Heidegger seems convinced his time is one of high stakes, Western Dasein has alienated itself from the questioning of Being to such extent that the danger of plunging itself in a petrified (status quo) where there no other possibilities apart from the ones available.26 This how describes nihilism Introduction to Metaphysics: where is the nihilism at work
 If transcendence is forfeiteD, then throwNness Is fOrfEiTed, tOo. ThIs is to say that wITh thE suffocation of human exiStencE, tHE thrOWn SituaTedness OF WESTerN hUmAniTy IS nOt undErsTood as tHe inevitabLe rEsUlt of the selfWItHdrawal of BEinG, but rather trAnsForms iTsElf INto reAliTy and ActualITy. In otHer words, wItHOut traNScendenCE ThRownNess is not understoOD aS Thrownness. 20 HeidEgger, THe bEgINNinG of western PhiLoSophy, 69. 21 iBid., 62. In hiS EaGERNesS To determine thE peculiar naTUre Of exisTeNce ANd how iT is at StAKe iN the era of niHiliSm, HeideggEr feelS The need TO draw a dIstincTioN beTweeN MeRe HumAn ACtuALiTy, oN The One hand, aNd HuMan exIsteNCE ON the OthEr. ExIstenCe, he says, "signiFieS the MOde Of BeiNg of hUmanS." HE contInues, hOweveR, tO say that existenCe doEs not applY to HuManS iN geneRAl and aS suCh: "NOt all huMans who ARe aCtUAL, WeRe actual, or will be acTuAL Do 'Exist,' havE existED, oR wILl exist - iN tHe sEnse WE UnderStanD ExIstence" (iBid., 64). 22 The WOrD tHat coulD bEst desCrIbe ThiS dangER is tHe word "Nihilism." heideGGer does not use tHIs word in his 1932 leCTuRE, BuT He deVotEs a section oF his SEminAr to "THe DetERminaTion oF tHE cURrent situation by FriEdRich NiEtzscHe," thus introduCing the ideA THAt the truE meaNInG Of Nietzsche's diAgnosIs of nihiliSM relates To the Danger of Non-existeNCE (ibid., 35). 23 IbiD., 59. 24 MaRtiN HeIdeGGEr, being and Truth, TRAns. GReGory FriEd aNd RichaRd POlt (bloOmiNgTon: IndianA UniversItY PReSs, 2010), 122. 14 sOFiA PHIloSOPHICAl ReVIeW EarLy GreEK thinkIng, maRks fOr HiM The TransfoRMaTIOn of HuMaN exiSteNcE from Mere ACtuAlity to Being-in-a-wOrlD And hIsToRicalitY.25 To put this lasT pOint differEnTly, It is wiTH The esteeMing of Being that worldlinESs and hiStoRical ExisTence happEn. FRom thiS it FOllows That wiTh the DiS-esTEEming/THE fOrgEtFulness of BEINg bOth of ThEm arE in dangEr. Heidegger seems coNVinCed that his timE is One oF HIgH stAKeS, BecAuSE WeSTErn Dasein has aliEnated itseLf FRoM the questiONinG oF Being tO such an ExtenT That it eNcounters The danger Of PlunGINg iTself in a peTrified rEality (staTUs quo) WHeRe theRe aRe no otHeR poSsibiLities AParT from The oneS aVailabLe.26 ThiS iS how HeidEgger describes nihilism iN IntroDuctiOn tO MetaphysIcs: bUt wHere is the Real Nihilism at WorK
 If transcendence is forfe ited, then  thro wnn ess  i s fo rfei ted, too. This is t o say that with the su ffoca ti o n of hu man e xistenc e ,t h e t hr ow n s it u at ednes s o f Weste rn humanit y i snot understo o das the ine vit able resultofthe se lf wit h drawa l o f Bei ng, bu t  rathe r transfo rm s  itsel f  into r e a li ty a nd actuality. Ino th e r words, witho ut tra ns c en d e nce  th rownness i snot u n derstoo d  a s t hro w nness. 20 Hei degger, The Beg inning  o f W e sternPhilo so p hy,  69. 21 Ibi d.,62. In hi s eage r ness to determi ne the  pe cul iarn at ur e o fe xis t en cea ndhow it i sat  stak e in t h e  era  of  nih ilism , Heidegger f eel s th e  ne ed to  draw  a d is tinct ion be tween  m ere human actua lity , on theone  h and ,and h u man ex ist enc e on th e other .  Ex is t e n ce , he says, "signif ie s th e mode o f Bein g  o fh umans."He  co ntin u e s, ho weve r ,to say t hat ex i st en ce does  n ot app ly  to  hu mansi n ge neraland as s uch:" Not all humans who are actua l ,w e re actu al,  or will be  act u al d o 'e x is t,' haveexist ed ,  o r  will exist - in th esensewe un derstand exis tence" (ib i d . , 64). 2 2 Th e  w o rd that couldbestdescribe t h is dange r isthe word  "nihilis m . " Heideg ger  do esnot u se  this word in h is 1 93 2 lectu re,  but he  de vot esa s ec tion of h is semin ar  t o"t hedeter m inationof  th ecur rents ituati on by  Fri ed ri c h N ietzsch e ," t husin tr oduc ing  t he id ea t h atthe tru e meaning  of Niet zs ch e's dia gnosis of nih il ism relate stothe da n g er of no n-existence (ibid., 35) .  23 Ibi d.,  59.24 M artin Hei deg ger, B ein g  and T ruth,trans .Gre g o ry Fr i e dand  R ichard Pol t (Bl oomin gt on:Indiana  University Press, 201 0), 122. 14 S OFI A PH I L OS OPH I CA L  RE VI E W e a r ly Greek thinki ng, marksfo r  h im the tra n sfo rm ation o f human  exis t ence fr om mere a ctualityto  bei n g -in -a-world a nd histo ricality. 2 5 Top ut  this  la st poi nt  di ffere ntly,i t i s wit h thees teemin g ofBe ing that  worldliness and histor ical e xiste nce  happen.Fro m  th is it fol lows  that with  th e d is-es tee m ing/t he f o rg etf u lness  ofB eing both of  th e m  a re in dange r . Hei degge r s e ems co nvin ced that his time is one of high  sta k e s,bec a useWe stern Dasein h asal i e nated it se lf from the  questio ni n g ofBeingto suc h an ex t e nt that i t en cou nters the  da ng e r of pl un gi n g itse lf i na petr ifiedr eali t y  (status quo) wh ere t h e re ar e  no  othe rpossibi l itie s apart fr om the ones  avail able .26 T his isho w Heid egg er  describes nihilismin In troduct io n to  Me taphys ics: B ut wh ereis  th e real ni h i li s mat wor k
 If_transcendence is_forfeited, then thrownness is_forfeited, too._This_is to_say_that with the_suffocation of human_existence, the thrown situatedness_of Western humanity_is_not understood as the inevitable result of the selfwithdrawal of Being, but rather transforms_itself_into reality_and_actuality._In other words, without transcendence_thrownness is not understood as_thrownness. 20_Heidegger, The Beginning of Western Philosophy, 69. 21_Ibid.,_62. In his_eagerness to determine the peculiar nature of existence and_how it is at stake in_the era of_nihilism,_Heidegger_feels the need to_draw a distinction between mere human_actuality, on the one hand, and_human existence on the other. Existence, he_says, "signifies the mode of Being_of humans." He continues, however,_to say_that existence does not apply_to humans in_general and_as such: "Not_all humans who are actual, were_actual, or will_be actual do 'exist,' have existed,_or_will exist -_in_the_sense we_understand existence" (ibid.,_64)._22 The_word_that could best describe this danger_is_the word "nihilism." Heidegger does not use_this word in his_1932_lecture, but he devotes_a section of his seminar_to "the determination of the current_situation by_Friedrich Nietzsche,"_thus introducing the idea that the true meaning of Nietzsche's diagnosis_of nihilism relates to the danger_of non-existence (ibid., 35)._23 Ibid.,_59._24 Martin Heidegger,_Being_and Truth,_trans. Gregory Fried and Richard Polt (Bloomington:_Indiana University_Press, 2010), 122. 14 SOFIA PHILOSOPHICAL_REVIEW early Greek thinking,_marks_for him the transformation of human_existence from mere actuality to being-in-a-world_and historicality.25 To put this_last_point_differently, it is with the_esteeming of Being that worldliness and_historical existence happen._From this it follows that with the_dis-esteeming/the_forgetfulness of Being both of them_are_in danger. Heidegger seems convinced that_his_time_is one of high stakes,_because Western Dasein has alienated itself_from the questioning of Being to such an extent_that it encounters_the danger of plunging itself_in_a_petrified reality (status quo) where there are no other possibilities_apart from_the ones available.26_This is how Heidegger describes nihilism in Introduction to Metaphysics:_But where is the real nihilism at_work