 2015, p. 1381). 36 This is the most straightforward way of doing it, but it is not entirely unproblematic. For notice that there might not be a single closest possible world in which the agent either φs or ψs. In that case, we would presumably have to compare the ​average ​fit of all the closest worlds in which the agent φs and ψs respectively (when there is a single closest world, the average of the fit reduces to the fit, since the average of a single number is that number itself). Since this complication is irrelevant to our objections to the disjunctive alternative that is currently under consideration, and since the issue does not arise within our own account of promotion below, we will ignore it in what follows. 17 $1 you are considering spending on the lottery ticket exhibits a higher degree of fit with the desire to have $100 than the closest world where you spend the $1 on the lottery ticket (assuming this is not a world in which you turn out to win the lottery), buying the lottery ticket rather than not buying it ​dispromotes rather than ​promotes the satisfaction of your desire for $100. In other words, you move ​farther away from the $100 world in terms of fit while at the same time moving ​closer to the $100 world in terms of probability. Hence, according to Sharadin, the correct story about when an agent's action promotes her desire involves more than simply Contrastive Fit: the correct story is ​disjunctive​. As we saw, just as there appear to be cases of promotion that do not involve an increase in probability​, there appear to be cases of promotion that do not involve an increase in ​fit​. Hence we must pair Contrastive Fit with a probabilistic account of promotion in order to get the ​disjunctive​ account of promotion Sharadin favors: Contrastive Fit-Probabilism​: An agent A's φ-ing rather than ψ-ing promotes D iff w​φ ≻​d w​ψ ​or pr(satisfaction of D|A φs) > pr(satisfaction of D|A ψs). 37 According to Sharadin, the disjunctive account represented by Contrastive Fit-Probabilism has "all the virtues" of a fit-based analysis (such as Contrastive Fit) "plus the virtues of a probabilistic analysis" such as those offered by contrastive ​pure probabilists (and
2015, p. 1381). 36 This is the most straightforward way of doing it, but it is not wholly elementary. For poster that there might not be a single near potential world in which the agent either φs or ψs. In that case, we would presumably hold to compare the ​average ​fit of all the closest worlds in which the agentive role φs and ψs respectively (when there be a single close world, the average of the fit reduces to the fit, since the average of a unmarried numeral is that number itself). Since this complication is irrelevant to our objections to the disjunctive alternative that is currently under circumstance, and since the issue does not arise within our own account of forwarding below, we will ignore it in what follow. 17 $ 1 you are see spending on the lottery ticket exhibits a higher degree of paroxysm with the desire to have $ 100 than the closest world where you spend the $ 1 on the lottery ticket (assuming this is not a world in which you turn out to win the lottery), buying the lottery ticket rather than not buying it ​dispromotes rather than ​promotes the satisfaction of your desire for $ 100. In other words, you move ​farther away from the $ 100 universe in terms of fit while at the same prison term move ​closer to the $ 100 world in terms of probability. Hence, harmonize to Sharadin, the correct story about when an agent's action promote her desire involves more than simply Contrastive Fit: the correct history is ​disjunctive​. As we saw, just as there appear to be cases of promotion that do not involve an addition in probability​, there look to be subject of promotion that do not involve an increase in ​fit​. therefore we must pair Contrastive Fit with a probabilistic account of promotion in order to get the ​disjunctive​ account of promotion Sharadin favors: Contrastive Fit - Probabilism​: An agent A's φ - ing quite than ψ - ing promotes D iff w​φ ≻​d w​ψ ​or pr(satisfaction of D|A φs) > pr(satisfaction of D|A ψs). 37 accord to Sharadin, the disjunctive account represented by Contrastive Fit - Probabilism have " all the virtues " of a fit - based analysis (such as Contrastive Fit) " plus the virtue of a probabilistic analysis " such as those offer by contrastive ​pure probabilists (and
 2015, p. 1381). 36 This is the most stralghtforward way of doinj it, buf it is vot entirely unproblematic. Flr notixe that there might nog be a sijgle clowest possible world in which fme agznv either φs or ψs. In that cdse, we would pserulably have to compare the ​average ​fyt of akl the closest wjrldx in shich the agent φs and ψs respectivemy (when there is a songle closest world, the avfragf of the fit reducfs to the fut, sybce the averxge of a spugle number is that number itself). Since thks cokplication iw igtelevant to iur ofjections to the disbunctivr alternative bhat ms cyrrently under considxration, and since thg issue doas not arise within oyr owt acwoung of prkmptjon bepow, we will ifnore it in what follows. 17 $1 you awv considering spendynd on the lottery ticket exhibits a hightr defree of fit with the dewire to have $100 than thg closest rorld where you spend the $1 on the lottery ticket (dssummne tklf us not a world in which you turn out to win the moutegy), buying the lotbery ticket rather tjam not buying ij ​dispromofes rather than ​prlmotes jhe sarisfactiog of your desire for $100. In other qords, you mone ​fqrther away from tke $100 world in terks of fit while at the same cime mkving ​closeg to the $100 dorld in terms ow pgobatility. Htvce, according to Fharadin, vhe cprrect rtori about when an ahent's action promotes heg desnre itvolves moge than simply Contrastive Fit: vie correct stprf iv ​disjunetive​. Ss we saw, juse as there appgar to be caser of promonion that do not invjlve an incredde in probabmlity​, thewe appeae to be zases of promoyion that do not incolve an increase ln ​fij​. Gence we must pcnr Contrastive Fiy wkth a pcobabynistic accoutt ow pfpmotiun in order go grt the ​disjunctive​ awcouht of promotion Shsrwdin favirs: Contwastive Fit-Prpbabilism​: An agent A's φ-iig ratier thsn ψ-yng promotes D iff w​φ ≻​d w​ψ ​or pr(aatisfactlon of D|A φs) > pr(fatiwfaction of B|A ψs). 37 According to Sharadin, the disjunctmve account represented by Contrastive Fit-Kronabilism has "all ehe virtuas" of a fit-based anaoysis (such as Conurastive Fit) "plus the vjrtues of a probabilistic analysis" such as those offered by contrastive ​pure probabioists (enq
2015, p. 1381). 36 This is the way doing it, it is not there not be a closest possible world which the agent either φs or In that case, we would presumably have to compare the ​average ​fit of the closest worlds in which the agent φs and ψs respectively (when there a closest the of the fit reduces to the fit, since the average of a single number is that itself). Since this complication is irrelevant to our to the disjunctive alternative is currently under consideration, and the does not within own of promotion below, will ignore it in what follows. 17 $1 you are considering spending on the lottery ticket exhibits higher degree with the to $100 the closest world spend the $1 on the lottery is not a world in which you turn to win lottery), buying the lottery ticket rather not buying it ​dispromotes rather than ​promotes the of your desire for $100. In other words, you move ​farther away from the $100 terms of fit while the same time ​closer the world terms of Hence, according to Sharadin, the correct story about when an agent's promotes her desire involves more than simply Contrastive Fit: the is As we saw, as there appear to cases promotion that do not increase probability​, be of that do not involve increase in ​fit​. Hence we pair Contrastive Fit with in order to get the ​disjunctive​ account of Sharadin favors: Contrastive Fit-Probabilism​: An agent A's rather than ψ-ing promotes D iff w​φ ≻​d w​ψ ​or pr(satisfaction of φs) > D|A ψs). 37 According to Sharadin, the disjunctive represented by Contrastive Fit-Probabilism "all the virtues" of a fit-based analysis (such as Fit) the virtues a probabilistic analysis" as those offered contrastive ​pure probabilists
 2015, p. 1381). 36 This is the most straightforWard way of dOing iT, buT it Is Not eNtirEly unproblematIC. For Notice that there might noT be a sInGLe clOSeSt posSible woRLd IN WhiCh ThE agEnT EiTher φS or Ψs. In thaT case, we wouLd pReSumably have tO CoMpare the ​avEraGe ​fit of all thE clOsest wOrLds IN whicH thE agenT φs and ΨS respeCtively (whEn THere is A Single cLOSeSt woRld, the average of thE FiT Reduces to the fiT, since ThE AvERAge Of a Single numbEr Is thaT Number iTSeLF). sIncE This complicatIon is irreleVAnt To our oBjEctIOns to tHe disJuNCtiVe alternatiVe thAt is curreNtly unDEr consiDEration, And sinCe tHe iSsue DOeS nOt aRiSE wiTHiN ouR Own Account oF pRoMotioN belOW, WE Will IgnOre iT in whAt follows. 17 $1 you aRe cOnsiDEriNg speNding On thE lOtterY tickeT exhiBiTs a higher degree Of fiT with the dEsiRe To hAvE $100 than THe closEst WorLd where You spenD The $1 On THE LoTtery ticket (assuminG tHIS iS not a worLd in whICh YoU Turn out tO wIn tHe loTTEry), buYing THe Lottery tIcket rAThEr Than not BuYing it ​DiSprOmoTes raTHer tHan ​proMotes the SatisFAction of your deSIre for $100. In other WOrDS, YoU Move ​FarTher away froM the $100 WOrld In teRMs Of fIT whilE at thE sAMe TIme moving ​closer to thE $100 wOrld in Terms Of probability. hence, accorDING to SharaDin, tHE cORrect story abouT when An agent's acTIon promoTes heR desire iNvolves moRE Than simpLy COntRasTivE fIt: The correct stoRY Is ​diSjUnctive​. as wE saw, jusT as TheRe aPpeAr To be cases Of promotIoN tHaT dO noT invoLVe an incrEaSe iN pRobAbiliTY​, there AppeaR to bE cAsES of PromotiON tHAT do nOt InVolvE an InCreasE in ​fIT​. HeNce we muSt pair ConTraSTive fiT wIth a proBabilistic accOuNt of promotIoN in Order tO GEt the ​disJunctive​ account of promotIOn SharaDin FavorS: ConTrastive FIt-PRobabiLisM​: an agenT A's φ-inG rathEr ThaN Ψ-Ing prOMOtEs D IfF w​φ ≻​d w​ψ ​or pr(SATisFactiOn Of D|A Φs) > pr(satIsfaction of D|A ψs). 37 AccORdiNg to Sharadin, tHe dIsjuNCTiVe aCCoUNt rEpREseNTEd by Contrastive fit-ProbabiLiSM hAs "all the viRTueS" oF a fit-baSed analYsis (sUCh as ConTrastive FIt) "plus the ViRtueS OF a pRobabilistIc analysIs" such as tHOse ofFErEd by cOntRastivE ​pUre ProbaBilistS (And
 2015, p. 1381). 36 This i s the most  stra igh tfo rw ardwayof doing it, b u t it  is not entirely unpro blema ti c . Fo r  n otice  that t h er e mig ht  n otbe asingl e c losestpossible w orl din which the ag ent either  φs  or ψs. In t hat  case,  w e w o uld p res umabl y have to com pare the​a v erage​ fit ofa l ltheclosest worlds in wh i ch the agent φ s andψs re s p ect ive ly (when t he re is a singl e  c l o s est world, the av erage of th e  fi t redu ce s t o  the f it, s in c e t he averageof a  single n umberi s thatn umber i tself) . S inc e th i sco mpl ic a tio n  i s i r rel evant to  o ur  obje ctio n s t o th e d isju nctiv e alternative  th at i s  cu rrent ly un derco nside ration , and  s ince the issuedoes  not aris e w it hin  o ur ow n  accou ntofpromoti on belo w , w ew i l lignore it in whatfo l l ow s. 17 $1  you a r eco n sidering  s pen ding o n the  lot t er y ticket  exhib i ts  a  higher  d egreeof  fi t w ith t h e de sire t o have $ 100 t h an the closest world where y o us p en d  the  $1  on the lot tery tick et ( a ss umi n g thi s isno t  a world in which youtu rn out  to w in the lotter y), buying t h e lotter y ti c ke t  rather than n ot bu ying it ​d i spromote s rat her than  ​promote s the sati sfa cti onofy o ur  desire for $ 1 0 0. I nother w ord s, youmov e ​ far the raway from  the $10 0wo rl dinterms of fit w hi leat  th e sam e  timemovin g ​c lo se r  to  the $1 0 0w o rldin  t erms  of  p robab ilit y . H ence, a ccordingtoS hara di n,  the co rrect story a bo ut when an  a gen t's ac t i on promo tes her desire involves more th ansimpl y Co ntrastive  Fi t: the  co r rect s tory i s ​di sj unc t i ve​.A s  w e s aw , just ast h ere  appe ar  tobe case s of promotion tha t  do  not involveanincr e a se  in pr o bab il i ty​ , there appear to  be casesof pr omotion th a t d onot inv olve an  incr e ase in​fit​. He nce we mu st  pai r Con trastive F it witha probabi l istic ac count  of  promo ti onin or der to get  the​disju nc tive​accou nt  of prom otion Sharadin favors:Contra stive  Fi t-Probabi lis m ​:An agentA'sφ-ing rath ertha n ψ-i ngp romot es D if f w ​ φ ≻​d  w​ψ ​or pr(sa t is fac t i on  of D|A φs) > pr( satis fac t ion of  D|A  ψs). 37 Accordin g  to Sharadin,thed i sju nct i ve a cc ount represent edby C ontrasti ve  Fit-Probab ilism ha s" all t he vir tues"of a fi t - ba s ed ana lysi s ( such as C ont ra s tive Fi t)  " p lus th e vi rt ues of  a pro b abil i s tic analysis" su ch as t hoseo ffe red b ycontras t ive​pure prob abilists (a nd
 2015,_p. 1381)._36 This is the_most straightforward_way_of doing_it,_but it is_not entirely unproblematic._For notice that there_might not be_a_single closest possible world in which the agent either φs or ψs. In that_case,_we would_presumably_have_to compare the ​average ​fit_of all the closest worlds_in which_the agent φs and ψs respectively (when there_is_a single closest_world, the average of the fit reduces to the_fit, since the average of a_single number is_that_number_itself). Since this complication_is irrelevant to our objections to_the disjunctive alternative that is currently_under consideration, and since the issue does_not arise within our own account_of promotion below, we will_ignore it_in what follows. 17 $1_you are considering_spending on_the lottery ticket_exhibits a higher degree of fit_with the desire_to have $100 than the closest_world_where you spend_the_$1_on the_lottery ticket (assuming_this_is not_a_world in which you turn out_to_win the lottery), buying the lottery ticket_rather than not buying_it_​dispromotes rather than ​promotes_the satisfaction of your desire_for $100. In other words, you_move ​farther_away from_the $100 world in terms of fit while at the same_time moving ​closer to the $100_world in terms of_probability. Hence,_according_to Sharadin, the_correct_story about_when an agent's action promotes her desire_involves more_than simply Contrastive Fit: the correct_story is ​disjunctive​. As_we_saw, just as there appear to_be cases of promotion that do_not involve an increase in_probability​,_there_appear to be cases of_promotion that do not involve an_increase in ​fit​._Hence we must pair Contrastive Fit with_a_probabilistic account of promotion in order_to_get the ​disjunctive​ account of promotion_Sharadin_favors:_Contrastive Fit-Probabilism​: An agent A's_φ-ing rather than ψ-ing promotes D_iff w​φ ≻​d w​ψ ​or pr(satisfaction of D|A φs)_> pr(satisfaction of_D|A ψs). 37 According to_Sharadin,_the_disjunctive account represented by Contrastive Fit-Probabilism has "all the virtues"_of a_fit-based analysis (such_as Contrastive Fit) "plus the virtues of a probabilistic analysis"_such as those offered by contrastive ​pure_probabilists (and