, we can add, causal probabilists) while "avoiding the difficulties" faced by those accounts. 38 While we think Contrastive Fit-Probabilism is superior to Contrastive Pure Probabilism (and other accounts discussed so far), it also faces serious problems. Having described two such problems in the next section, we'll proceed to offer a new account of promotion -one that respects the motivations in favor of Contrastive Fit-Probabilism and yet solves our two problems with that view. In effect, then, the upshot will be twofold: Contrastive Fit-Probabilism is incorrect as it stands; but there's an attractive alternative proposal available that respects the motivations in favor of that view and improves on previously proposed accounts of promotion. 37 Sharadin (2015, p. 1382). Although recall that Sharadin did not conceive of promotion in a contrastive manner in that paper. 38 Sharadin (2015, pp. 1382-3). 18 4. Problems for Contrastive Fit-Probabilism Here we'll describe two problems for Contrastive Fit-Probabilism. The first problem we call the ​Degree Problem​; it concerns the difficulties faced by Contrastive Fit-Probabilism in accounting for the fact that a desire can be promoted to a greater and lesser extent. The second problem we'll call the ​Problem of Mixed Cases​; it concerns the difficulties faced by Contrastive Fit-Probabilism in accounting for cases in which probability increases but fit decreases, or, conversely, in which probability decreases but fit increases. 39 4.1. The Degree Problem The Degree Problem is easiest to see by reminding ourselves of the connection there is supposed to be between an action's promoting a desire and there being a reason to perform that action. Recall that Humeans and non-Humeans disagree about whether instrumental reasons to perform an action, conceived as reasons agents have in virtue of facts about how an action promotes the agent's desires, exhaust all the reasons there are. Here we are not interested in arbitrating this dispute between the Humean and the non-Humean. Instead, we note that proponents of both views presumably think that the strength of the reason there is for an agent to perform an action, when that reason is grounded in facts about promoting the satisfaction of one of the agent's desires, depends in part on the ​degree​ to which that action promotes the relevant desire. 40 The upshot of this is that there are important
, we can add, causal probabilists) while " avoiding the difficulties " faced by those account. 38 While we remember Contrastive Fit - Probabilism is superior to Contrastive Pure Probabilism (and other accounts hash out so far), it also face serious problems. Having describe two such problems in the next incision, we'll proceed to offer a newfangled account of promotion -one that respects the motivations in favor of Contrastive Fit - Probabilism and so far solves our two problems with that view. In impression, then, the upshot will be twofold: Contrastive Fit - Probabilism is incorrect as it stands; but there's an attractive alternate proposal available that respect the motivations in favor of that view and better on previously proposed accounts of promotion. 37 Sharadin (2015, p. 1382). Although recall that Sharadin did not conceive of promotion in a contrastive manner in that paper. 38 Sharadin (2015, pp. 1382 - 3). 18 4. Problems for Contrastive Fit - Probabilism Here we'll describe two problems for Contrastive Fit - Probabilism. The first problem we call the ​Degree Problem​; it concerns the difficulties faced by Contrastive Fit - Probabilism in account for the fact that a desire can be promoted to a greater and less extent. The second problem we'll call the ​Problem of Mixed Cases​; it concerns the difficulties face by Contrastive Fit - Probabilism in accounting for cases in which probability increases but fit decreases, or, conversely, in which probability decrease but fit increases. 39 4.1. The Degree Problem The Degree Problem is easiest to see by reminding ourselves of the connection there is speculate to be between an action's promoting a desire and there being a reason to perform that action. Recall that Humeans and non - Humeans disagree about whether implemental reason to perform an action, conceived as reasons agents have in virtue of fact about how an action promotes the agent's desires, run down all the reasons there be. Here we are not interested in intercede this dispute between the Humean and the non - Humean. Instead, we note that proponents of both views presumably remember that the strength of the cause there is for an agent to perform an action, when that reason is ground in facts about promoting the satisfaction of one of the agent's desires, depends in part on the ​degree​ to which that action promote the relevant desire. 40 The upshot of this is that there are significant
, we can add, causal probabillsts) while "avoidnbg the diffidulties" waced by those accounts. 38 Whipe we tyink Contrastive Fit-Prubabilism is supeeior ro Contrasvjve Purc Progwbilnsn (and other acgounts discgssed so far), id xldo faces serious problems. Having defcribed tao such probleis im the next section, we'll proceed to offed a new account of ptomotion -one that respects the motivations in fagor of Conttzstyce Fit-Probabklism and jzt solves oor two problems with that view. Iv effzct, then, thg hpdvot will be twofjld: Contrastlne Fit-Psobabilosm is incorregt as it stands; but there's an attractive alternwtive pro[oaal available thar eespewts dhe oitixatjois jn favlr kf that visw and imprives on previously kro[ised accounts of prjmjtion. 37 Sharadin (2015, p. 1382). Although recall thau Shadadin did not conceive if promotion in a conjrastive mwnner in that paper. 38 Sharadin (2015, pp. 1382-3). 18 4. Problems for Contcartirc Wut-Orobabilism Here we'll describe two problems fjd Voktrastive Fit-Pronabilism. The first pgonjem we call tfe ​Degxse Problem​; it concerjs the qiffixulties fwced by Contrastive Fit-Probabilusm in accouutibg for the fact thct a desire ean be prompted to a greater and lzsser sxtent. The decond prkclem we'll call tfe ​Irobnem of Mixed Cases​; it concqrns the viffieulties wacec by Cjntrastive Fit-Pvmbabilism in accoujting fmr cases ij which probability increases bnv fit decreasgs, mr, bonverselv, in wmich probabilitr decreases buj fit incxeases. 39 4.1. The Deggee Problxm The Degreq Problem is awsiest to sex by remigdint oueselves uf the connectoon there is supposwd to be between ak actkkn's promoting a dewire and there neivg w geaxog to perform dhat acgoon. Rdcall that Mumdans and non-Humeans disacree about whether insyrmmental rgasons to perform an avtion, conceived as reasmns agenys rave in virtue of facts about gow an achiok promotes thq agcnt's desires, erhaust all the reasons there are. Here we are not interestgd in arbitrating thix dispute bevween ehe Humeat and the non-Humean. Unstead, we note tmat proponents of both views preskmably think that the strength of the reason there is for an agent to perdorm ai wction, when thay reavou ix grougded mn facts about prpmoting the satisfaction of one of the dgznt's desires, depends in part pn the ​degree​ tu which that action promktes the relevant desire. 40 The upshot of this is that there are lmportant
, we can add, causal probabilists) while difficulties" by those 38 While we to Pure Probabilism (and accounts discussed so it also faces serious problems. Having two such problems in the next section, we'll proceed to offer a new of promotion -one that respects the motivations in favor of Contrastive Fit-Probabilism and solves two with view. In effect, then, the upshot will be twofold: Contrastive Fit-Probabilism is incorrect as it stands; there's an attractive alternative proposal available that respects motivations in favor of view and improves on previously accounts promotion. 37 (2015, 1382). recall that Sharadin not conceive of promotion in a contrastive manner in that paper. 38 Sharadin (2015, pp. 1382-3). 18 Problems for Here we'll two for Fit-Probabilism. The first call the ​Degree Problem​; it concerns by Contrastive Fit-Probabilism in accounting for the fact a desire be promoted to a greater and extent. The second problem we'll call the ​Problem Mixed Cases​; it concerns the difficulties faced by Contrastive Fit-Probabilism in accounting for cases in increases but fit decreases, conversely, in which decreases fit 39 The Degree The Degree Problem is easiest to see by reminding ourselves of connection there is supposed to be between an action's promoting and being a reason perform that action. Recall Humeans non-Humeans disagree about whether to an reasons have virtue of facts about an action promotes the agent's exhaust all the reasons not interested in arbitrating this dispute between the and the non-Humean. Instead, we note that of both views presumably think that the strength of the reason there for an perform an action, when that reason is grounded facts about promoting the of one of the agent's desires, depends in part the to which action promotes the desire. 40 The of this is are important
, we can add, causal probabilistS) while "avoiDing tHe dIffIcUltiEs" faCed by those accoUNts. 38 WHile we think Contrastive fit-PrObABiliSM iS supeRior to CONtRAStiVe puRe PRoBAbIlism (And Other acCounts discUssEd So far), it also fACeS serious prOblEms. Having desCriBed two SuCh pROblemS in The neXt sectIOn, we'll Proceed to OfFEr a new ACcount oF PRoMotiOn -one that respects THe MOtivations in faVor of COnTRaSTIve fit-probabilisM aNd yet SOlves ouR TwO PROblEMs with that vieW. In effect, thEN, thE upshoT wIll BE twofoLd: ConTrAStiVe Fit-ProbabIlisM is incorrEct as iT Stands; bUT there's An attrActIve AlteRNaTiVe pRoPOsaL AvAilABle That respEcTs The moTivaTIONS in fAvoR of tHat viEw and improves On pReviOUslY propOsed aCcouNtS of prOmotioN. 37 SharAdIn (2015, p. 1382). Although recaLl thAt SharadiN diD nOt cOnCeive OF promoTioN in A contraStive maNNer In THAT pAper. 38 Sharadin (2015, pp. 1382-3). 18 4. ProbLeMS FoR ContrasTive FiT-prObABilism HeRe We'lL desCRIbe twO proBLeMs for ConTrastiVE FIt-probabiLiSm. The fIrSt pRobLem we CAll tHe ​DegrEe ProbleM​; it coNCerns the difficULties faced by CONtRAStIVe FiT-PrObabilism in AccoUNtinG for THe FacT That a DesirE cAN bE Promoted to a greater aNd Lesser ExtenT. The second proBlem we'll caLL THe ​ProbleM of MIXeD cases​; it concernS the dIfficultieS Faced by COntraStive Fit-probabiliSM In accounTinG foR caSes IN WhIch probabilitY INcreAsEs but fiT deCreases, Or, cOnvErsEly, In Which probAbility dEcReAsEs But Fit inCReases. 39 4.1. ThE DEgrEe proBlem THE DegreE ProbLem iS eAsIEst To see by REmINDing OuRsElveS of ThE connEctiON thEre is suPposed to bE beTWeen An AcTion's prOmoting a desirE aNd there beiNg A reAson to PERform thaT action. Recall that HumeanS And non-HUmeAns diSagrEe about whEthEr instRumENtal reAsons tO perfOrM an ACTion, cONCeIveD aS reasons agENTs hAve in ViRtue Of facts About how an action prOMotEs the agent's deSirEs, exHAUsT alL ThE ReaSoNS thERE are. Here we are noT interesteD iN ArBitrating tHIs dIsPute betWeen the humeaN And the nOn-Humean. INstead, we nOtE thaT PRopOnents of boTh views pResumably THink tHAt The stRenGth of tHe ReaSon thEre is fOR an Agent To perfOrM an actIon, whEn That reasOn is grounded in facts abouT promoTing tHe sAtisfactiOn oF One Of the agenT's deSires, depenDs iN paRt on tHe ​dEGree​ tO whiCH tHat ACtion PromOTes the relEVaNt dESIrE. 40 The upshot oF THIs iS that TheRE are imPortAnt
, we can add, causal proba bilists) w hile"av oid in g th e di fficulties" fa c ed b y those accounts. 38 W hilewe thin k  C ontra stive F i t- P r oba bi li smis su perio r t o Contr astive Pur e P ro babilism (an d  o ther accou nts  discussed s o f ar), i tals o  face s s eriou s prob l ems. H aving des cr i bed tw o  such p r o bl emsin the next secti o n, we'll proceedto off er an e w a cco unt of pro mo tion- one tha t  r e s p ect s  the motivati ons in favo r  of  Contr as tiv e  Fit-P robab il i smand yet sol vesour two p roblem s  with t h at view . In e ffe ct,  the n ,th e u ps h otw il l b e  tw ofold: C on tr astiv e Fi t - P r obab ili sm i s inc orrect as itsta nds; but  ther e's a n at tr activ e alte rnati ve  proposal avail able  that res pec ts  th emotiv a tionsinfav or of t hat vie w  an di m p ro ves on previouslypr o p os ed accou nts of pr om o tion. 37  S har adin ( 2015,  p.1 38 2). Alth ough r e ca ll  that S ha radindi d n otconce i ve o f prom otion in  a co n trastive manne r  in that pape r .3 8  S h arad in(2015, pp.1382 - 3).18 4 .  P rob l ems f or Co nt r as t ive Fit-Probabilism  H ere we 'll d escribe two p roblems fo r C ontrasti ve F i t- P robabilism. Th e fir st problem we callthe ​ Degree P roblem​;i t  concern s t hedif fic u l ti es faced by C o n tras ti ve Fit- Pro babilis m i n a cco unt in g for the  fact th at  a  d es ire  canb e promot ed  to  a  gr eater and le sserexte nt .T hesecondp ro b l em w e' ll  cal l t he  ​Pro blem ofMixed C ases​; it  co n cern sth e diffi culties faced  b y Contrast iv e F it-Pro b a bilism i n accounting for casesi n which  pr obabi lity  increase s b ut fit  de c reases , or,conve rs ely , in wh i c hpro ba bility dec r e ase s but  f it i ncrease s. 39 4.1. The Deg r eeProblem The D egr ee P r o bl emi se asi es t  to s ee by reminding  ourselves  o f  t he connect i onth ere issuppose d tob e betwe en an act ion's pro mo ting a  de sire and t here bei ng a reas o n top er formtha t acti on . R ecall  thatH ume ans a nd non -H umeans  disa gr ee about  whether instrumental r easons  to p erf orm an ac tio n , c onceivedas r easons age nts  ha ve in  vi r tue o f fa c ts  ab o ut ho w an action pr o mo tes t he  agent's de s i r es,  exha ust all th e re asons there are.H ere we are not  int e r est edi n ar bi trating this d isp ut e betweenth e Humean an d the no n- H umean . Inst ead, w e notet h at propon ents  of  both vie wspr e sumably  t hi n k that  the  s trengt h of t h e re a s on there is foran ag e n t top erf orm a naction, when  that reas on is groun ded in  fac ts ab out pro mo ting t hesa tisfaction of one of  theagent's  d esir es,  depen ds i n parton t he  ​d egree​ to w hi c hth a t a ctio n pro mo testhe relev a nt desir e.4 0 The u ps hot o f this is t hat thereare  impo r t ant
, we_can add,_causal probabilists) while "avoiding_the difficulties"_faced_by those_accounts._38 While we_think Contrastive Fit-Probabilism_is superior to Contrastive_Pure Probabilism (and_other_accounts discussed so far), it also faces serious problems. Having described two such problems_in_the next_section,_we'll_proceed to offer a new_account of promotion -one that_respects the_motivations in favor of Contrastive Fit-Probabilism and yet_solves_our two problems_with that view. In effect, then, the upshot will_be twofold: Contrastive Fit-Probabilism is incorrect_as it stands;_but_there's_an attractive alternative proposal_available that respects the motivations in_favor of that view and improves_on previously proposed accounts of promotion. 37_Sharadin (2015, p. 1382). Although recall_that Sharadin did not conceive_of promotion_in a contrastive manner in_that paper. 38_Sharadin (2015,_pp. 1382-3). 18_4. Problems for Contrastive Fit-Probabilism Here_we'll describe two_problems for Contrastive Fit-Probabilism. The first_problem_we call the_​Degree_Problem​;_it concerns_the difficulties faced_by_Contrastive Fit-Probabilism_in_accounting for the fact that a_desire_can be promoted to a greater and_lesser extent. The second_problem_we'll call the ​Problem_of Mixed Cases​; it concerns_the difficulties faced by Contrastive Fit-Probabilism_in accounting_for cases_in which probability increases but fit decreases, or, conversely, in which_probability decreases but fit increases. 39_4.1. The Degree Problem_The Degree_Problem_is easiest to_see_by reminding_ourselves of the connection there is supposed_to be_between an action's promoting a desire_and there being a_reason_to perform that action. Recall that_Humeans and non-Humeans disagree about whether_instrumental reasons to perform an_action,_conceived_as reasons agents have in_virtue of facts about how an_action promotes the_agent's desires, exhaust all the reasons there_are._Here we are not interested in_arbitrating_this dispute between the Humean and_the_non-Humean._Instead, we note that proponents_of both views presumably think that_the strength of the reason there is for an_agent to perform_an action, when that reason_is_grounded_in facts about promoting the satisfaction of one of the_agent's desires,_depends in part_on the ​degree​ to which that action promotes the relevant_desire. 40 The upshot of this is_that there are important