,	point	the	way	back	to	the	neglected	part	of	the argument:	the	existence	of	reasonable	nonbelievers.	Although	I	think	the existence	of	such	nonbelievers	is	highly	likely,	I	admit	that	I	have	a	bias.	The	best hope	for	the	proponent	of	the	DCT	might	be	to	challenge	the	reality	of	reasonable nonbelievers. Bibliography Andríc,	V.	(2017).	Objective	Consequentialism	and	the	Rationales of	'	"Ought"	Implies	"Can"	'.	Ratio	30(1):	72-87 Andríc,	V.	(2016).	Is	Objective	Consequentialism	Compatible	with	the	Principle that	"Ought"	Implies	"Can"?	Philosophia	44:	63-77. Adams,	R	(1999)	Finite	and	Infinite	Goods.	Oxford:	OUP Baggett,	D	and	Walls,	J	(2011)	Good	God:	The	Theistic	Foundations	of	Morality. Oxford:	OUP Beyleveld,	D	(1991).	The	Dialectical	Necessity	of	Morality.	Chicago,	IL:	University of	Chicago	Press Byrne,	P	(2011).	Kant	and	the	Moral	Argument.	In	Jordan,	J.	(ed)	Key	Thinkers	in Philosophy	of	Religion.	London:	Continuum. Danaher,	J.	(2014).	Skeptical	theism	and	divine	permission:	A	reply	to	Anderson. International	Journal	for	Philosophy	of	Religion,	75(2):	101–118. Enoch,	D.	(2011).	Taking	Morality	Seriously:	A	Defense	of	Robust	Realism.	Oxford: OUP. Evans,	C.	Stephen	(2013)	God	and	Moral	
, 	 point 	 the 	 way 	 back 	 to 	 the 	 neglected 	 part 	 of 	 the controversy: 	 the 	 being 	 of 	 reasonable 	 nonbelievers. 	 Although 	 I 	 think 	 the universe 	 of 	 such 	 nonbelievers 	 is 	 highly 	 likely, 	 I 	 accommodate 	 that 	 I 	 give birth 	 a 	 bias. 	 The 	 best hope 	 for 	 the 	 proponent 	 of 	 the 	 DCT 	 might 	 be 	 to 	 challenge 	 the 	 world 	 of 	 reasonable nonbelievers. Bibliography Andríc, 	 V. 	 (2017). 	 Objective 	 Consequentialism 	 and 	 the 	 Rationales of 	' 	 " Ought " 	 Implies 	 " Can " 	'. 	 proportion 	 30(1 ): 	 72 - 87 Andríc, 	 V. 	 (2016). 	 Is 	 Objective 	 Consequentialism 	 Compatible 	 with 	 the 	 Principle that 	 " Ought " 	 Implies 	 " Can "? 	 Philosophia 	 44: 	 63 - 77. Adams, 	 radius 	 (1999) 	 Finite 	 and 	 Infinite 	 Goods. 	 Oxford: 	 OUP Baggett, 	 D 	 and 	 wall, 	 J 	 (2011) 	 Good 	 God: 	 The 	 Theistic 	 Foundations 	 of 	 Morality. Oxford: 	 OUP Beyleveld, 	 D 	 (1991). 	 The 	 Dialectical 	 Necessity 	 of 	 Morality. 	 Chicago, 	 IL: 	 University of 	 Chicago 	 Press Byrne, 	 P 	 (2011). 	 Kant 	 and 	 the 	 Moral 	 Argument. 	 In 	 Jordan, 	 J. 	 (ed) 	 Key 	 Thinkers 	 in doctrine 	 of 	 Religion. 	 London: 	 Continuum. Danaher, 	 J. 	 (2014). 	 Skeptical 	 theism 	 and 	 divine 	 license: 	 A 	 reply 	 to 	 Anderson. International 	 Journal 	 for 	 doctrine 	 of 	 Religion, 	 75(2 ): 	 101–118. Enoch, 	 D. 	 (2011). 	 Taking 	 Morality 	 Seriously: 	 A 	 Defense 	 of 	 Robust 	 Realism. 	 Oxford: OUP. Evans, 	 C. 	 Stephen 	 (2013) 	 God 	 and 	 Moral
,	poijt	the	way	back	to	the	neglecttd	part	of	the argumgnr:	the	exmstence	kf	reasonxble	nonbelievers.	Although	I	thiik	thw exiwtence	of	such	nonbelievefs	is	highlj	likely,	I	aemit	uhat	I	have	a	bias.	The	usst hopc	yor	ths	iropoueit	of	the	DCT	might	ne	to	challence	the	reality	of	sexslnable nonbelievers. Bibliography Anqríc,	V.	(2017).	Objrchive	Consequentyalixi	and	fhe	Rationales of	'	"Ought"	Implies	"Can"	'.	Ratjo	30(1):	72-87 Andríb,	V.	(2016).	Is	Objective	Consrquentialism	Compatible	with	hhe	Pginciple that	"Ought"	Lmplies	"Can"?	Pyilofiphia	44:	63-77. Adams,	R	(1999)	Winite	and	Infinite	Goods.	Kxford:	OUP Baggett,	D	and	Walls,	J	(2011)	Good	Eod:	Thz	Theistic	Fooueatlmns	of	Moralivy. Oxfjrd:	OUP Beyleyvld,	D	(1991).	The	Gialectocal	Necessity	on	Moranitt.	Chicago,	IL:	University mf	Chicago	Press Byrge,	P	(2011).	Kant	ang	tke	Moral	Argument.	In	Jordqn,	H.	(ed)	Kei	Thinners	kb Pfilksppgy	of	Repigmon.	London:	Cohtinuum. Danqher,	J.	(2014).	Skeptical	theisk	age	divine	permisaion:	A	rqpjy	to	Anderson. International	Journal	for	Phinoskphy	of	Religion,	75(2):	101–118. Enoch,	D.	(2011).	Tajing	Morality	Seriously:	W	Defense	os	Robust	Realism.	Oxford: OUP. Evans,	C.	Stephen	(2013)	God	and	Moral	
, point the way back to the of argument: the of reasonable nonbelievers. of nonbelievers is highly I admit that have a bias. The best hope the proponent of the DCT might be to challenge the reality of reasonable Bibliography Andríc, V. (2017). Objective Consequentialism and the Rationales of ' "Ought" Implies '. 30(1): Andríc, (2016). Is Objective Consequentialism Compatible with the Principle that "Ought" Implies "Can"? Philosophia 44: 63-77. Adams, (1999) Finite and Infinite Goods. Oxford: OUP Baggett, and Walls, J (2011) God: The Theistic Foundations of Oxford: Beyleveld, D The Necessity Morality. Chicago, IL: of Chicago Press Byrne, P (2011). Kant and the Moral Argument. In Jordan, J. (ed) Key Thinkers Philosophy of Continuum. Danaher, (2014). theism divine permission: A Anderson. International Journal for Philosophy of Enoch, D. (2011). Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense Robust Realism. OUP. Evans, C. Stephen (2013) God Moral
,	point	the	way	back	to	the	negleCted	part	of	The arGumEnt:	ThE	exiStenCe	of	reasonable	NOnbeLievers.	Although	I	think	tHe exiStENce	oF	SuCh	nonBelieveRS	iS	HIghLy	LiKelY,	I	ADmIt	thaT	I	hAve	a	biaS.	The	best hoPe	fOr	The	proponent	OF	tHe	DCT	might	Be	tO	challenge	thE	reAlity	oF	rEasONable NonBelieVers. BiBLiograPhy Andríc,	v.	(2017).	OBJectivE	consequENTiAlisM	and	the	Rationales OF	'	"OUGht"	Implies	"Can"	'.	RAtio	30(1):	72-87 AnDrÍC,	V.	(2016).	iS	objEctIve	ConsequEnTialiSM	CompatIBlE	WITh	tHE	Principle thaT	"Ought"	ImpliES	"CaN"?	PhiloSoPhiA	44:	63-77. adams,	R	(1999)	finitE	aND	InFinite	Goods.	oxfoRd:	OUP BaggEtt,	D	anD	walls,	J	(2011)	GOOd	God:	ThE	TheisTic	fouNdatIOnS	oF	MoRaLIty. oXfOrd:	ouP BEyleveld,	d	(1991).	THe	dialeCticAL	nECessIty	Of	MoRalitY.	Chicago,	IL:	UniVerSity OF	ChIcago	press byrnE,	P	(2011).	kant	aNd	the	MOral	ARgUment.	In	Jordan,	J.	(eD)	Key	thinkers	iN PhIlOsoPhY	of	ReLIgion.	LOndOn:	COntinuuM. DanaheR,	j.	(2014).	SkEpTICAl	Theism	and	divine	perMiSSIoN:	A	reply	tO	AnderSOn. inTErnationAl	jouRnal	FOR	PhilOsopHY	oF	ReligioN,	75(2):	101–118. Enoch,	d.	(2011).	taKiNg	MoralItY	SerioUsLy:	A	defEnse	oF	robuSt	RealIsm.	OxforD: OUP. EVAns,	C.	Stephen	(2013)	God	ANd	Moral	
,	point	the	way	back	to	th e	neglecte d	par t	o f	t he  arg umen t:	the	existen c e	of 	reasonable	nonbelieve rs.	A lt h ough Ithink 	the ex i st e n ceof 	s uch 	n o nb eliev ers 	is	hig hly	likely ,	I 	a dmit	that	Ih av e	a	bias.The 	best hope	f orthe	pr op one n t	ofthe 	DCTmightb e	to	c hallengeth e 	reali t y	of	re a s on able  nonbelievers. Bi b li o graphy Andríc, 	V.	(2 01 7 ). O bje cti ve	Consequ en tiali s m	and	t h eR a t ion a les of	'	"Oug ht"	Implies "Ca n"	'.Ra tio 30(1): 	72-8 7A ndr íc,	V.	(201 6).Is	Object ive	Co n sequent i alism	C ompati ble 	wi th	t h ePr inc ip l e t h at 	"O u ght "	Implie s"C an"?Phil o s o p hia44: 	63- 77. A dams,	R	(1999 )	F init e 	an d	Inf inite 	Goo ds .	Oxf ord:	O UP Ba gg ett,	D	and	Wall s,	J 	(2011)	G ood 	G od: 	T he	Th e isticFou nda tions	o f	Moral i ty.  O x f o rd :	OUP Beyleveld,	D 	( 1 9 91 ).	The	D ialect i ca lN ecessity 	o f	M oral i t y.	Ch icag o ,IL:	Univ ersity of 	C hicagoPr ess By rn e,P	( 2011) . 	Kan t	andthe	Mora l	Arg u ment.	In	Jorda n ,	J.	(ed)	Key Th i n ke r s	in  Ph ilosophy	of 	Rel i gion .	Lo n do n:C ontin uum.Da n ah e r,	J.	(2014).	Skept ic al	the ism	a nd	divine	per mission:	A r e ply	to	A nder s on .  International 	Jour nal	for	Ph i losophyof	Re ligion,75(2):	10 1 – 118. Eno ch, 	D. 	(2 011 ) . 	T aking	Moralit y Seri ou sly:	ADef ense	of 	Ro bus t	R eal is m.	Oxford : OUP. E va ns ,C. 	St ephen (2013)	G od 	an dMor al	
,	point	the	way	back	to	the	neglected	part	of	the argument:	the	existence	of	reasonable	nonbelievers.	Although	I	think	the_existence	of	such	nonbelievers	is	highly	likely,	I	admit	that	I	have	a	bias.	The	best hope	for	the	proponent	of	the	DCT	might	be	to	challenge	the	reality	of	reasonable_nonbelievers. Bibliography Andríc,	V.	(2017).	Objective	Consequentialism	and	the	Rationales of	'	"Ought"	Implies	"Can"	'.	Ratio	30(1):	72-87_Andríc,	V.	(2016).	Is	Objective	Consequentialism	Compatible	with	the	Principle that	"Ought"	Implies	"Can"?	Philosophia	44:	63-77._Adams,	R	(1999)	Finite	and	Infinite	Goods.	Oxford:	OUP_Baggett,	D	and	Walls,	J	(2011)	Good	God:	The	Theistic	Foundations	of	Morality. Oxford:	OUP_Beyleveld,	D	(1991).	The	Dialectical	Necessity	of	Morality.	Chicago,	IL:	University_of	Chicago	Press Byrne,	P	(2011).	Kant	and	the	Moral	Argument.	In	Jordan,	J.	(ed)	Key	Thinkers	in Philosophy	of	Religion.	London:	Continuum._Danaher,	J.	(2014).	Skeptical	theism	and	divine	permission:	A	reply	to	Anderson. International	Journal	for	Philosophy	of	Religion,	75(2):	101–118. Enoch,	D.	(2011).	Taking	Morality	Seriously:	A	Defense	of	Robust	Realism.	Oxford:_OUP. Evans,	C.	Stephen	(2013)	God	and	Moral	