istemology	are separate	and	separable.	How	something	comes	to	be	(an	ontological	matter)	is distinct	from	how	we	come	to	know	of	its	existence	(an	epistemological	matter). As	Quinn	himself	says: "Our	theory	asserts	that	divine	commands	are	conditions	causally necessary	and	sufficient	for	moral	obligations	and	prohibitions	to	be in	force.	It	makes	no	claims	at	all	about	how	we	might	come	to	know just	what	God	has	commanded...	After	all,	it	is	a	philosophical	truism that	the	causal	order	and	the	order	of	learning	need	not	be	the	same." (Quinn	2006,	44-45) This	seems	emphatic,	but	two	interpretative	points	need	to	be	made.	First,	it	is not	clear	from	this	passage	whether	Quinn	completely	rejects	an	epistemic condition.	Elsewhere	in	the	same	section	of	text	he	talks	about	how	someone could	first	come	to	know	that	something	is	forbidden	and	then	come	to	know that	it	was	commanded	by	God.	This	suggests	that	he	thinks	knowledge	of	an obligation	is	essential,	but	knowledge	of	the	source	is	not.	If	so,	then	he	does	not 3 Note: this quote was originally sourced through Morriston 2009 7 really	reject	the	epistemic	condition.	He	merely	offers	a	modified	version	of	it. His	objection	then	collapses	into	the	'content-not-source'	objection	which	I discuss	in	the	next	section.	Second,	there	is	some	dispute	in	the	literature	as	to the	correct	classification
istemology 	 are separate 	 and 	 separable. 	 How 	 something 	 comes 	 to 	 be 	 (an 	 ontological 	 matter) 	 is discrete 	 from 	 how 	 we 	 hail 	 to 	 know 	 of 	 its 	 existence 	 (an 	 epistemological 	 topic). As 	 Quinn 	 himself 	 says: " Our 	 theory 	 asserts 	 that 	 providential 	 command 	 are 	 conditions 	 causally necessary 	 and 	 sufficient 	 for 	 moral 	 duty 	 and 	 prohibitions 	 to 	 be in 	 force. 	 It 	 take 	 no 	 claims 	 at 	 all 	 about 	 how 	 we 	 might 	 occur 	 to 	 acknowledge just 	 what 	 God 	 has 	 commanded... 	 After 	 all, 	 it 	 is 	 a 	 philosophical 	 truism that 	 the 	 causal 	 order 	 and 	 the 	 order 	 of 	 eruditeness 	 need 	 not 	 be 	 the 	 same. " (Quinn 	 2006, 	 44 - 45) This 	 seems 	 emphatic, 	 but 	 two 	 interpretative 	 point 	 need 	 to 	 be 	 made. 	 foremost, 	 it 	 is not 	 clear 	 from 	 this 	 passing 	 whether 	 Quinn 	 completely 	 reject 	 an 	 epistemic condition. 	 Elsewhere 	 in 	 the 	 same 	 section 	 of 	 textbook 	 he 	 talks 	 about 	 how 	 someone could 	 first 	 come 	 to 	 know 	 that 	 something 	 is 	 forbidden 	 and 	 then 	 come 	 to 	 acknowledge that 	 it 	 was 	 commanded 	 by 	 God. 	 This 	 suggests 	 that 	 he 	 thinks 	 knowledge 	 of 	 an obligation 	 is 	 essential, 	 but 	 knowledge 	 of 	 the 	 source 	 is 	 not. 	 If 	 so, 	 then 	 he 	 does 	 not 3 Note: this quote was primitively sourced through Morriston 2009 7 really 	 rule out 	 the 	 epistemic 	 circumstance. 	 He 	 merely 	 offer 	 a 	 modified 	 version 	 of 	 it. His 	 expostulation 	 then 	 collapses 	 into 	 the 	' content - not - source' 	 objection 	 which 	 I discourse 	 in 	 the 	 next 	 section. 	 Second, 	 there 	 is 	 some 	 dispute 	 in 	 the 	 literature 	 as 	 to the 	 correct 	 classification
istfmology	are separate	and	sekarable.	How	somethiut	comes	vo	be	(an	ohtologicxl	matter)	is distinct	from	how	we	rome	ro	knoq	of	its	existence	(an	epistdmologicap	matter). Qs	Qumnn	himself	says: "Ond	theory	asserta	bhat	dnvmne	commands	are	cpnditions	cdusally necessdrh	aud	sufficient	for	moral	obligations	and	prjhibitipnd	to	be in	force.	Ij	makex	go	clzpmw	at	all	about	how	we	might	come	to	knkw just	xhat	God	has	commamded...	After	all,	it	is	a	philosophlcal	hruism that	the	causwl	order	and	tye	orqwr	of	learning	veed	not	be	the	same." (Quinn	2006,	44-45) This	seems	emphatic,	but	two	interprdtatire	points	neee	ti	be	ldde.	First,	it	iw not	blear	from	this	isssage	fhether	Auinn	completeln	rejerts	ab	epistemic condition.	Ensewhere	in	the	same	sgction	of	teft	ke	talks	about	how	someonw xould	xirsd	comd	ro	kvow	uhav	sojethinh	is	horbidden	ans	then	come	to	jnow that	it	was	commamdqe	by	God.	This	sugfests	trae	he	thinks	knowledge	of	an obligation	is	essettizl,	but	knowledge	of	the	sourxe	is	not.	If	so,	then	he	does	jot 3 Note: this quote was originally sourced through Morrisdon 2009 7 feaoln	rejdxt	hhe	epistemic	condition.	He	merely	offers	a	modified	vqdsook	of	it. His	objectijn	then	collalsfs	ogto	the	'content-vot-souxde'	kbjection	which	I didcuss	in	jhe	nexr	section.	Stcond,	yhere	is	some	dispute	in	the	liteeature	as	to tke	cirrect	classificatiln
istemology are separate and separable. How something be ontological matter) distinct from how its (an epistemological matter). Quinn himself says: theory asserts that divine commands are causally necessary and sufficient for moral obligations and prohibitions to be in force. makes no claims at all about how we might come to know just God commanded... all, is a philosophical truism that the causal order and the order of learning need not be same." (Quinn 2006, 44-45) This seems emphatic, but interpretative points need to made. First, it is not from passage whether completely an condition. Elsewhere in same section of text he talks about how someone could first come to know that something is and then know that was by This suggests that knowledge of an obligation is essential, the source is not. If so, then he not 3 this quote was originally sourced through 2009 7 really reject the epistemic condition. He offers a modified version of it. His objection then collapses into the 'content-not-source' objection which in the next section. there is some in literature to correct classification
istemology	are separate	and	sEparable.	HoW	someThiNg	cOmEs	to	Be	(an	Ontological	matTEr)	is Distinct	from	how	we	come	tO	know	Of	ITs	exIStEnce	(aN	episteMOlOGIcaL	mAtTer). as	qUiNn	himSelF	says: "OuR	theory	assErtS	tHat	divine	comMAnDs	are	condiTioNs	causally neCesSary	anD	sUffICient	For	Moral	ObligaTIons	anD	prohibitIoNS	to	be iN	Force.	It	MAKeS	no	cLaims	at	all	about	hoW	We	MIght	come	to	know Just	whAt	gOd	HAS	coMmaNded...	After	aLl,	It	is	a	PHilosopHIcAL	TRuiSM that	the	causaL	order	and	thE	OrdEr	of	leArNinG	Need	noT	be	thE	sAMe." (QUinn	2006,	44-45) This	seeMs	emPhatic,	but	Two	intERpretatIVe	pointS	need	tO	be	MadE.	FirST,	iT	iS noT	cLEar	FRoM	thIS	paSsage	wheThEr	quinn	CompLETELy	reJecTs	an	EpistEmic condition.	elsEwheRE	in	The	saMe	secTion	Of	Text	hE	talks	About	HoW	someone could	fiRst	cOme	to	know	ThaT	sOmeThIng	is	FOrbiddEn	aNd	tHen	come	To	know tHAt	iT	wAS	COmManded	by	God.	This	sugGeSTS	tHat	he	thiNks	knoWLeDgE	Of	an obliGaTioN	is	eSSEntiaL,	but	KNoWledge	of	The	souRCe	Is	Not.	If	so,	ThEn	he	doEs	Not 3 notE: this QUote Was oriGinally sOurceD Through MorristON 2009 7 really	reject	THe	EPIsTEmic	ConDition.	He	merEly	oFFers	A	modIFiEd	vERsion	Of	it. HIs	OBjECtion	then	collapses	iNtO	the	'coNtent-Not-source'	objeCtion	which	i DIScuss	in	tHe	neXT	sECtion.	Second,	theRe	is	sOme	dispute	IN	the	liteRaturE	as	to the	Correct	clASSificatiOn
istemology	are separate	an d	separabl e.	Ho w	s ome th ingcome s	to	be	(an	on t olog ical	matter)	is distin ct	fr om howw ecometo	know of i tsex is ten ce (a n	epi ste mologic al	matter) . A sQuinn	himsel f 	s ays: "Ourthe ory	assertstha t	divi ne 	co m mands 	ar e	con dition s 	causa lly neces sa r y	ands ufficie n t 	f or	m oral	obligationsa nd prohibitions	t o	be i nf or c e .	I t	m akes	no	cl ai ms	at all	abo u th o w 	we might	come	to 	know justw hat 	God	h as 	co m manded ...	A ft e r	a ll,	it	is	a 	phi losophica l	trui s m thatt he	caus al	ord erand 	the or de r	o fl ear n in g	n e ednot	be	t he 	s ame."  (Qu i n n 2006 ,	4 4-45 ) Thi s	seems	empha tic ,	bu t 	tw o	int erpre tati ve 	poin ts	nee d	tobe 	made.	First,	i t	is  not	clea r	f ro m	t hi s	pas s age	wh eth erQuinn	c omplete l y	r ej e c t san	epistemic condi ti o n .Elsewher e	in	t h esa m e	sectio noftext h e	tal ks	a b ou t	how	so meonec ou ld 	firstco me	tokn owtha t	som e thin g	is	f orbidden 	andt hen	come	to	kn o w that	it	was co m m an d ed	b y	G od.	This	su gges t s	th at	h e 	t hin k s	kno wledg eo fa n obligation	is	ess en tial,but	k nowledge	of	t he	sourcei s not.	Ifso,t he n 	he	does	not 3  Note : this quo t e was or igina lly sour ced throu g h  Morrist on200 9 7  re a l ly 	reject	the	e p i stem ic 	condit ion .	He	me rel y	o ffe rsamodifiedversionof 	i t.  H isobjec t ion	then 	c oll ap ses 	into the	'c onten t-no t- so u rce '	objec t io n whic hIdisc uss 	i n	the 	nex t 	se ction.Second,	t her e 	isso me 	disput e	in	the	lite ra ture	as	to  t hecorrec t classifi cation
istemology	are separate	and	separable.	How	something	comes	to	be	(an	ontological	matter)	is_distinct	from	how	we	come	to	know	of	its	existence	(an	epistemological	matter). As	Quinn	himself	says:_"Our	theory	asserts	that	divine	commands	are	conditions	causally necessary	and	sufficient	for	moral	obligations	and	prohibitions	to	be in	force.	It	makes	no	claims	at	all	about	how	we	might	come	to	know just	what	God	has	commanded...	After	all,	it	is	a	philosophical	truism_that	the	causal	order	and	the	order	of	learning	need	not	be	the	same." (Quinn	2006,	44-45)_This	seems	emphatic,	but	two	interpretative	points	need	to	be	made.	First,	it	is_not	clear	from	this	passage	whether	Quinn	completely	rejects	an	epistemic condition.	Elsewhere	in	the	same	section	of	text	he	talks	about	how	someone_could	first	come	to	know	that	something	is	forbidden	and	then	come	to	know_that	it	was	commanded	by	God.	This	suggests	that	he	thinks	knowledge	of	an obligation	is	essential,	but	knowledge	of	the	source	is	not.	If	so,	then	he	does	not 3_Note: this quote_was originally sourced through_Morriston 2009 7_really	reject	the	epistemic	condition.	He	merely	offers	a	modified	version	of	it._His	objection	then	collapses	into	the	'content-not-source'	objection	which	I discuss	in	the	next	section.	Second,	there	is	some	dispute	in	the	literature	as	to the	correct	classification