 theoretical reasons for Humeans and non-Humeans alike to think that promoting a desire is something that should be, at least in part, a matter of degree. However, Contrastive Fit-Probabilism provides a purely binary account of promoting a desire -it offers no verdict at all about the degree to which a particular desire is promoted. To illustrate, notice that Contrastive Fit-Probabilism lacks the resources to distinguish between, on the one hand, a chocolate-desiring agent who is given a bar of chocolate rather than nothing at all, and, on the other hand, a chocolate-desiring agent who is given one out of 1 million tickets 39 Although we present these problems as targeted at ​Contrastive Fit-Probabilism it is worth noting that they apply with equal force to Sharadin's non-contrastive Fit-Probability Promote. 40 But see Schroeder (2007, esp. Ch 7) for disagreement. Schroeder's rejection of this idea, what he calls "proportionalism" has not been widely adopted. For criticism, see Shackel (2013), Rieder (2016), and Evers (2013). For one recent attempt to articulate a proportionalist Humean view, see Manne (2016). Here, we assume some version of proportionalism is true. 19 to a (fair) chocolate bar lottery rather than nothing at all. Contrastive Fit-Probabilism does deliver the result that both agents' desires are promoted. But, intuitively, there is an important distinction to be made in cases such as this between the (presumably lesser) degree to which receiving the lottery ticket promotes the agent's desire for a chocolate bar as compared to the (presumably higher) degree to which receiving the chocolate bar promotes that desire. An account of desire promotion that cannot draw such an intuitive and elementary distinction in cases such as these is severely impoverished. One might object that this is not a special problem for Contrastive Fit-Probabilism since Contrastive Pure Probabilism is a binary account of promotion in precisely the same way. While this is strictly speaking true, Contrastive Pure Probabilism can easily be extended to account for degrees of promotion by claiming that an agent's φ-ing rather than ψ-ing promotes the satisfaction of a desire D to the extent that pr(satisfaction of D|A φs) is larger than pr(satisfaction of D|A ψs). While there are many
theoretical reasons for Humeans and non - Humeans alike to think that promoting a desire is something that should be, at least in part, a topic of academic degree. However, Contrastive Fit - Probabilism leave a purely binary account of promote a desire -it offers no verdict at all about the academic degree to which a particular desire is promoted. To illustrate, detect that Contrastive Fit - Probabilism lacks the resources to identify between, on the one hand, a chocolate - desire agent who is given a bar of chocolate rather than nothing at wholly, and, on the other hand, a chocolate - hope agent who is given one out of 1 million ticket 39 Although we present these problem as targeted at ​Contrastive Fit - Probabilism it is worth noting that they apply with equal violence to Sharadin's non - contrastive Fit - Probability Promote. 40 But see Schroeder (2007, esp. Ch 7) for disagreement. Schroeder's rejection of this idea, what he calls " proportionalism " has not been wide adopt. For criticism, see Shackel (2013), Rieder (2016), and Evers (2013). For one recent attempt to articulate a proportionalist Humean view, see Manne (2016). Here, we assume some version of proportionalism is true. 19 to a (bonny) chocolate bar lottery quite than nothing at wholly. contrasting Fit - Probabilism does deliver the result that both agents' desires are promoted. But, intuitively, there is an important distinction to be lay down in cases such as this between the (presumably lesser) degree to which receiving the lottery ticket promotes the agent's desire for a chocolate bar as compared to the (presumably higher) academic degree to which receiving the cocoa bar promotes that desire. An account of desire promotion that cannot draw such an intuitive and elementary distinction in subject such as these is severely impoverished. One might object that this is not a special trouble for Contrastive Fit - Probabilism since Contrastive Pure Probabilism is a binary account of forwarding in precisely the same way. While this is strictly speaking true, Contrastive Pure Probabilism can well be extended to account for degrees of promotion by claiming that an agentive role's φ - ing rather than ψ - ing promotes the satisfaction of a desire D to the extent that pr(satisfaction of D|A φs) is big than pr(satisfaction of D|A ψs). While there are many
 thforetical reasons for Huoeans and non-Humeans anike tk think ghat promoting a desire is slmwthint that should be, at lexst in pagt, a mattwr oh degree. However, Contrasbnve Fjb-Probcbmlism provides s purely bhnary account mf pxomoting a desire -it offers no verdist at akl about the degtee tp whidh a particular desire is promoted. To illlstrate, notice thst Contrastive Fit-Probabillsm packs the resourced to distintuisr between, on ghe one hand, a chocolaje-desiring agent who is given a car oy chocolate rqthft than nothiig at wll, and, on tmv other hand, a chocolate-desiving egenr who is given one ouv of 1 million ticketf 39 Althouch we present these peobleks av taftetdd zt ​Ckntrashivx Fit-Probabjlism it is worth noting that uher apply with esual fjrse to Sharadin's non-contrastive Fit-Probatiljty Promote. 40 But see Scyroeder (2007, esp. Ch 7) for fisagreemqnt. Schroeder's rejection of this idea, what he calns "prkooruiinalirn" jas not been widely adopted. For criticism, see Ahsclel (2013), Rieder (2016), akd Evers (2013). For one tefemj attempt to atticulacs z proportionalist Jumean diew, wee Manne (2016). Hete, we assume some version od proportioncliwm is true. 19 to a (fcir) chocolatz bar kottety rather than nothing ct all. Contrastivf Fit-Probzcilism does delixer tve resulu that both agents' desires ere pxomoted. Cut, ontuityvely, therf is an important distinftion tm be made ln cases such as this between tix (presumably kevseg) degree co whigh receiving thq lottery tickgt promotzs the agent's deaire foc a chocolatq bar as compdted to the (prxsumably righwr) dwgree tu which receivimg the chocolate bae promotes that dexirg. Zn account of dzrure promotion tnat cagnlt dwdw such an ittuigivd and dlementary birtinvtion in cases such ds tgese is severely ikpjverishee. One midht object thst this is not a skecial prublem fot Contrastive Fit-Probabilism sihce Contrwstlve Pure Probwbillsm ys a binarv account of promotion in precisely the wame way. While thiw is strictly speaknnn true, Contrestive Pure Protabilism can easily ve extended to acgount for degrees of pdomotimn by claiming that an agent's φ-ing rather than ψ-ing promotes the satisfaction of a desmrq D to the sxtemt thdt 'r(satissactmoi of D|A φs) is largvr than pr(satisfaction of D|A ψs). Wiile there axe many
theoretical reasons for Humeans and non-Humeans alike that a desire something that should a of degree. However, Fit-Probabilism provides a binary account of promoting a desire offers no verdict at all about the degree to which a particular desire promoted. To illustrate, notice that Contrastive Fit-Probabilism lacks the resources to distinguish between, the hand, chocolate-desiring who is given a bar of chocolate rather than nothing at all, and, on the other a chocolate-desiring agent who is given one out 1 million tickets 39 we present these problems as at Fit-Probabilism it worth that apply with equal to Sharadin's non-contrastive Fit-Probability Promote. 40 But see Schroeder (2007, esp. Ch 7) for disagreement. Schroeder's rejection this idea, calls "proportionalism" not widely For criticism, see Rieder (2016), and Evers (2013). For to articulate a proportionalist Humean view, see Manne Here, we some version of proportionalism is true. to a (fair) chocolate bar lottery rather than at all. Contrastive Fit-Probabilism does deliver the result that both agents' desires are promoted. But, is an important distinction be made in such this the lesser) degree which receiving the lottery ticket promotes the agent's desire for a bar as compared to the (presumably higher) degree to which chocolate promotes that desire. account of desire promotion cannot such an intuitive and in such severely One object that this is a special problem for Contrastive since Contrastive Pure Probabilism promotion in precisely the same way. While this strictly speaking true, Contrastive Pure Probabilism can be extended to account for degrees of promotion by claiming that an φ-ing rather promotes the satisfaction of a desire D to extent that pr(satisfaction of φs) is larger than pr(satisfaction of D|A ψs). While are
 theoretical reasons for HumeAns and non-HUmeanS alIke To ThinK thaT promoting a desIRe is Something that should be, aT leasT iN Part, A MaTter oF degree. hOwEVEr, COnTrAstIvE fiT-ProbAbiLism proVides a pureLy bInAry account of PRoMoting a desIre -It offers no veRdiCt at alL aBouT The deGreE to whIch a paRTiculaR desire is PrOMoted. TO IllustrATE, nOticE that Contrastive FIT-PRObabilism lacks The resOuRCeS TO diStiNguish betwEeN, on thE One hand, A ChOCOLatE-Desiring agent Who is given a BAr oF chocoLaTe rATher thAn notHiNG at All, and, on the OtheR hand, a choColate-DEsiring AGent who Is giveN onE ouT of 1 mILlIoN tiCkETs 39 ALThOugH We pResent thEsE pRobleMs as TARGEted At ​COntrAstivE Fit-ProbabiliSm iT is wORth NotinG that They ApPly wiTh equaL forcE tO Sharadin's non-coNtraStive Fit-PRobAbIliTy promoTE. 40 But seE ScHroEder (2007, esp. ch 7) for diSAgrEeMENT. SChroeder's rejection Of THIs Idea, what He callS "PrOpORtionaliSm" Has Not bEEN wideLy adOPtEd. For criTicism, SEe shAckel (2013), RiEdEr (2016), and EVeRs (2013). FOr oNe recENt atTempt tO articulAte a pROportionalist HUMean view, see MaNNe (2016). hERe, WE assUme Some version Of prOPortIonaLIsM is TRue. 19 to A (fair) ChOCoLAte bar lottery rather ThAn nothIng at All. ContrastivE Fit-ProbabILISm does deLiveR ThE Result that both AgentS' desires arE Promoted. but, inTuitivelY, there is aN IMportant DisTinCtiOn tO BE mAde in cases sucH AS thiS bEtween tHe (pResumabLy lEssEr) dEgrEe To which reCeiving tHe LoTtErY tiCket pROmotes thE aGenT's DesIre foR A chocoLate bAr as CoMpARed To the (prESuMABly hIgHeR) degRee To Which ReceIVinG the choColate bar ProMOtes ThAt Desire. AN account of desIrE promotion ThAt cAnnot dRAW such an iNtuitive and elementary diSTinctioN in Cases Such As these is SevErely iMpoVErisheD. One miGht obJeCt tHAT this IS NoT a sPeCial probleM FOr COntraStIve FIt-ProbaBilism since ContrasTIve pure ProbabiliSm iS a biNARy AccOUnT Of pRoMOtiON In precisely the sAme way. WhilE tHIs Is strictly SPeaKiNg true, COntrastIve PuRE ProbabIlism can eAsily be exTeNded TO AccOunt for degRees of prOmotion by CLaimiNG tHat an AgeNt's φ-inG rAthEr thaN ψ-ing pROmoTes thE satisFaCtion oF a desIrE D to the eXtent that pr(satisfaction Of D|A φs) Is larGer Than pr(satIsfACtiOn of D|A ψs). WHile There are maNy
 theoretical reasons for H umeans and  non- Hum ean salik e to  think that pr o moti ng a desire is somethi ng th at shou l dbe, a t least in p art ,amat te r  o f deg ree . Howev er, Contra sti ve  Fit-Probabi l is m provides  apurely binar y a ccount  o f p r omoti nga des ire -i t  offer s no verd ic t  at al l  aboutt h edegr ee to which a par t ic u lar desire ispromot ed .  T o ill ust rate, noti ce  that Contras t iv e F it- P robabilism la cks the res o urc es todi sti n guishbetwe en ,  on  the one ha nd,a chocola te-des i ring ag e nt whois giv ena b ar o f  c ho col at e  ra t he r t h annothingat  a ll, a nd,o n t he o the r ha nd, a  chocolate-de sir inga gen t who  is g iven  o ne ou t of 1  mill io n tickets 39 Al thou gh we pre sen tthe se  prob l ems as  ta rge ted at​Contra s tiv eF i t -P robabilism it is w or t h  n oting th at the y  a pp l y with e qu alforc e to Sh arad i n' s non-co ntrast i ve  F it-Prob ab ilityPr omo te.  40 B u t se e Schr oeder (2 007,e sp. Ch 7) ford isagreement.S ch r o ed e r'srej ection of t hisi dea,  wha t  h e c a lls " propo rt i on a lism" has not beenwi dely a dopte d. For critic ism, see S h a c kel (201 3),R ie d er (2016), and  Ever s (2013).F or one r ecent  attempt  to artic u l ate a pr opo rti ona lis t Hu mean view, se e Mann e(2016).  He re, weass ume  so meve rsion ofproporti on al is mistrue. 19 to a(f air )cho colat e  bar l otter y ra th er tha n nothi n ga t  all .Co ntra sti ve  Fit- Prob a bil ism doe s deliver  th e  res ul tthat bo th agents' de si res are pr om ote d. But , intuitiv ely, there is an import a nt dist inc tionto b e made in  ca ses su cha s this  betwe en th e(pr e s umabl y le sse r)  degree to w hic h rec ei ving  the lo ttery ticket promo t esthe agent's d esi re f o r  a  ch o co l ate  b a r a s compared to the  (presumab ly hi gher) degr e e t owhich r eceivin g the chocola te bar pr omotes th at  des i r e.An account  of desi re promot i on th a tcanno t d raw su ch  an  intu itivea ndeleme ntarydi stinct ion i ncases su ch as these is severely  impov erish ed.  One migh t o b jec t that th is i s not a sp eci alprobl emf or Co ntra s ti veF it-Pr obab i lism sinc e  C ont r a st ive Pure Pr o b a bil ism i s a binary  acc ount of promotion in precisely t he s a m e w ay. Whil ethis is strict lysp e a king tru e,  Contrastiv e Pure P ro b abili sm can  easil y be ex t e nd e d to a ccou ntfor degre esof promoti on  b y  claim ingth at anagent' s  φ-i n g  rather than ψ-i ng pr o m otest hesatis fa ction o f  a d esire D to  the extent  thatpr(s atisf actionof  D|A φ s)is  larger th a n pr(sati sfact ion ofD| A ψs ).Whilether e are m any
 theoretical_reasons for_Humeans and non-Humeans alike_to think_that_promoting a_desire_is something that_should be, at_least in part, a_matter of degree._However,_Contrastive Fit-Probabilism provides a purely binary account of promoting a desire -it offers no_verdict_at all_about_the_degree to which a particular_desire is promoted. To illustrate,_notice that_Contrastive Fit-Probabilism lacks the resources to distinguish between,_on_the one hand,_a chocolate-desiring agent who is given a bar of_chocolate rather than nothing at all,_and, on the_other_hand,_a chocolate-desiring agent who_is given one out of 1_million tickets 39 Although we present_these problems as targeted at ​Contrastive Fit-Probabilism_it is worth noting that they_apply with equal force to_Sharadin's non-contrastive_Fit-Probability Promote. 40 But see_Schroeder (2007, esp._Ch 7)_for disagreement. Schroeder's_rejection of this idea, what he_calls "proportionalism" has_not been widely adopted. For criticism,_see_Shackel (2013), Rieder_(2016),_and_Evers (2013)._For one recent_attempt_to articulate_a_proportionalist Humean view, see Manne (2016)._Here,_we assume some version of proportionalism is_true. 19 to a_(fair)_chocolate bar lottery rather_than nothing at all. Contrastive_Fit-Probabilism does deliver the result that_both agents'_desires are_promoted. But, intuitively, there is an important distinction to be made_in cases such as this between_the (presumably lesser) degree_to which_receiving_the lottery ticket_promotes_the agent's_desire for a chocolate bar as compared_to the_(presumably higher) degree to which receiving_the chocolate bar promotes_that_desire. An account of desire promotion_that cannot draw such an intuitive_and elementary distinction in cases_such_as_these is severely impoverished. One_might object that this is not_a special problem_for Contrastive Fit-Probabilism since Contrastive Pure Probabilism_is_a binary account of promotion in_precisely_the same way. While this is_strictly_speaking_true, Contrastive Pure Probabilism can_easily be extended to account for_degrees of promotion by claiming that an agent's φ-ing_rather than ψ-ing_promotes the satisfaction of a_desire_D_to the extent that pr(satisfaction of D|A φs) is larger_than pr(satisfaction_of D|A ψs)._While there are many