 ways of spelling this out more precisely, the most straightforward approach simply exploits the difference ​between the two probabilities: 41 Contrastive Pure Probabilism*​: Agent A's φ-ing rather than ψ-ing promotes the satisfaction of desire D in proportion to [pr(satisfaction of D|A φs) pr(satisfaction of D|A ψs)]. We are not endorsing this proposal to extend Contrastive Pure Probabilism into an account of degrees of promotion – indeed, we will present our own proposal below. However, this proposal illustrates how effortlessly any purely probabilistic account of promotion can be extended into an account of degrees of promotion, as any account of promotion arguably should be. By contrast, it should be clear that due to the disjunctive nature of Contrastive Fit-Probabilism, no similar extension can be as effortlessly provided for that account. According to Contrastive Fit-Probabilism a desire can be promoted in two quite distinct ways, so an extension of the account to degrees of promotion would need to provide some way of weighting the contribution each way of promoting the desire makes to the degree of promotion. The problem here is not merely that Contrastive Fit-Probabilism is 41 Other ways of spelling this out might exploit the ​ratio between pr(satisfaction of D|A φs) and pr(satisfaction of D|A ψs), or the ​log of the ratio between these two probabilities. These ways of measuring the degree of promotion mirror some different Bayesian measures of incremental confirmation (see, e.g., Fitelson 1999). For a somewhat different proposal regarding degree of promotion, see Manne (2016). 20 so far incomplete since no such weighting is provided by the account. The more serious problem is that Contrastive Fit-Probabilism fails to provide any guidance as to how we should choose between the infinitely many ways of providing such a weighting in a principled manner. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that it is highly doubtful that our intuitions will by themselves deliver anything close to reliable verdicts about which weightings accord better with our sense of what it is for a desire to be promoted to a greater or lesser extent. 4.2. The Problem of Mixed Cases A related problem with disjunctive accounts of promotion such as Contrastive Fit-Probabilism concerns how such accounts deal with cases in which a desire is promoted along one dimension while being dispromoted along the other dimension. There are two
ways of spelling this out more precisely, the most straightforward overture plainly exploits the difference ​between the two probabilities: 41 contrasting Pure Probabilism*​: Agent A's φ - ing rather than ψ - ing promotes the gratification of desire D in proportion to [ pr(satisfaction of D|A φs) pr(satisfaction of D|A ψs) ]. We are not back this proposal to extend Contrastive Pure Probabilism into an score of degrees of promotion – indeed, we will award our own proposal below. However, this proposal illustrates how effortlessly any purely probabilistic account of forwarding can be extended into an account of degrees of forwarding, as any account of promotion arguably should be. By contrast, it should be clear that due to the disjunctive nature of Contrastive Fit - Probabilism, no similar propagation can be as effortlessly provided for that account. According to Contrastive Fit - Probabilism a desire can be promoted in two quite discrete ways, so an extension of the account to degrees of promotion would need to provide some way of weighting the contribution each way of promoting the desire makes to the degree of promotion. The problem here is not merely that Contrastive Fit - Probabilism is 41 Other ways of spelling this out might overwork the ​ratio between pr(satisfaction of D|A φs) and pr(satisfaction of D|A ψs), or the ​log of the proportion between these two probabilities. These ways of measuring the academic degree of forwarding mirror some different Bayesian measures of incremental confirmation (see, e.g., Fitelson 1999). For a somewhat different proposal involve degree of promotion, see Manne (2016). 20 so far incomplete since no such weighting is provided by the bill. The more serious problem is that Contrastive Fit - Probabilism fails to provide any steering as to how we should choose between the infinitely many way of provide such a weighting in a principled manner. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that it is highly doubtful that our intuitions will by themselves surrender anything close to reliable verdicts about which weightings accord better with our sense of what it is for a desire to be promoted to a bang-up or lesser extent. 4.2. The Problem of Mixed case A related problem with disjunctive bill of promotion such as Contrastive Fit - Probabilism refer how such accounts manage with cases in which a desire is advertise along one dimension while being dispromoted along the other proportion. There are two
 wajs of spelling this out oore precisely, jhw most straifhtforwafd approach simply exploits vhe eiffeeence ​between the two orobabilinies: 41 Conrrasuive Pure Probabilism*​: Agekc A's φ-jkg rachxr than ψ-ing prokotes the vatisfaction ox aedire D in proportion to [pr(satisfactyon of C|A φs) pr(satisfactyon ps D|A ψs)]. We are not endorsing this propoaal to txtend Contrastive Pure Probabilism into an wccoknt of degrees of oromotion – undeqe, we will prdsent our own proposal below. However, this proposal iluustrctes how efdoetlfvsly any pucely pgobabilistic account mf promption can be ewtendxd ibto an account of degcees of promotion, as any accognc of promotion arguaboy shound ba. By xongraat, if shoupd ue clear thzt due to tye disjunctive natute if Contrastivs Fit-Pwofabilism, no similar extension can be as efrortlessly provided for that account. Accordijg to Conerastive Fit-Probabilism a desire can be promoted hn twk qunbc dirrijct ways, so an extension of the account to deddets pf promotion wjuld need tp orpdide some way of wenfhfing the contributlon eacr way of promouing yhe desire makes to the degeee of promonion. The problem here ns not merelv that Conttastive Fit-Probabilism ns 41 Otger ways of spelling ghis out might ebplpid the ​rauko between pr(satiffaction if D|C φs) and or(sajisfactyon of D|A ψd), or bve ​log of the ratil betceen dhese two orobabilities. These ways of measuring the degtee of promotijn mivror some diffewent Bayesian keasuref of kncrementam conficmation (see, q.g., Fitelson 1999). Xlr a somewhav differegt peopowal regxfding degree og promotion, see Manbe (2016). 20 so far incompketg aince no such wzngyting is providrd cy ehv arcoune. The more sesiour pfpblem is thau Civtraxtive Fit-Probabilism faims to provide any buldance as to how re should chopse between the invinitxly maiy wayx os providing such a weighting ih a princlplcd manner. Thif priblem is exaeerbated by the fact that it is highly diubtful that our ibtuitions will by tkekselves delmver agything cnose to reliable vereicts about which weightings accord befter whth okr sense of what it is for a desire to be promoted to a greater or lesser extenv. 4.2. The Problej of Mixeg Easzs A rejatev 'roblem with disjlnctive accounts of promotion surh as Contsaftive Fit-Probabilism concernx fow such accoonts deal with cases in whjch a dexire is promoted along one dimemsion while being disprokoted aling tge othvt dmmension. There are teo
ways of spelling this out more precisely, straightforward simply exploits difference ​between the Probabilism*​: A's φ-ing rather ψ-ing promotes the of desire D in proportion to of D|A φs) pr(satisfaction of D|A ψs)]. We are not endorsing this proposal extend Contrastive Pure Probabilism into an account of degrees of promotion – indeed, will our proposal However, this proposal illustrates how effortlessly any purely probabilistic account of promotion can be extended into account of degrees of promotion, as any account promotion arguably should be. contrast, it should be clear due the disjunctive of Fit-Probabilism, similar extension can as effortlessly provided for that account. According to Contrastive Fit-Probabilism a desire can be promoted in two distinct ways, extension of account degrees promotion would need some way of weighting the contribution promoting the desire makes to the degree of The problem is not merely that Contrastive Fit-Probabilism 41 Other ways of spelling this out might the ​ratio between pr(satisfaction of D|A φs) and pr(satisfaction of D|A ψs), or the ​log ratio between these two These ways of the of mirror different Bayesian of incremental confirmation (see, e.g., Fitelson 1999). For a somewhat different regarding degree of promotion, see Manne (2016). 20 so far no weighting is provided the account. The more problem that Contrastive Fit-Probabilism fails any as should between infinitely many ways of such a weighting in a manner. This problem is it is highly doubtful that our intuitions will themselves deliver anything close to reliable verdicts which weightings accord better with our sense of what it is for desire to to a greater or lesser extent. 4.2. The of Mixed Cases A problem with disjunctive accounts of promotion such as Contrastive concerns such accounts with cases in a desire is along one dimension dispromoted along other There
 ways of spelling this out more Precisely, tHe mosT stRaiGhTforWard Approach simply EXploIts the difference ​betweeN the tWo PRobaBIlIties: 41 contrasTIvE pUre prObAbiLiSM*​: AGent A'S φ-iNg ratheR than ψ-ing pRomOtEs the satisfaCTiOn of desire d in Proportion to [Pr(sAtisfaCtIon OF D|A φs) Pr(sAtisfAction OF D|A ψs)]. WE are not enDoRSing thIS proposAL To ExteNd Contrastive Pure pRoBAbilism into an aCcount Of DEgREEs oF prOmotion – indEeD, we wiLL presenT OuR OWN prOPosal below. HowEver, this proPOsaL illusTrAteS How effOrtleSsLY anY purely probAbilIstic accoUnt of pROmotion CAn be extEnded iNto An aCcouNT oF dEgrEeS Of pROmOtiON, as Any accouNt Of PromoTion ARGUAbly ShoUld bE. By coNtrast, it shoulD be CleaR ThaT due tO the dIsjuNcTive nAture oF ContRaStive Fit-ProbabiLism, No similar ExtEnSioN cAn be aS EffortLesSly ProvideD for thaT AccOuNT. aCcOrding to ContrastivE FIT-prObabilisM a desiRE cAn BE promoteD iN twO quiTE DistiNct wAYs, So an exteNsion oF ThE aCcount tO dEgrees Of ProMotIon woULd neEd to prOvide somE way oF Weighting the coNTribution each WAy OF PrOMotiNg tHe desire makEs to THe deGree OF pRomOTion. THe proBlEM hERe is not merely that CoNtRastivE Fit-PRobabilism is 41 OTher ways of SPELling thiS out MIgHT exploit the ​ratIo betWeen pr(satiSFaction oF D|A φs) And pr(satIsfaction OF d|A ψs), or thE ​loG of The RatIO BeTween these two PRObabIlIties. ThEse Ways of mEasUriNg tHe dEgRee of promOtion mirRoR sOmE dIffErent bAyesian mEaSurEs Of iNcremENtal coNfirmAtioN (sEe, E.G., FiTelson 1999). FOR a SOMewhAt DiFferEnt PrOposaL regARdiNg degreE of promotIon, SEe MaNnE (2016). 20 sO far incOmplete since nO sUch weightiNg Is pRovideD BY the accoUnt. The more serious probleM Is that COntRastiVe FiT-ProbabilIsm Fails tO prOVide anY guidaNce as To How WE ShoulD CHoOse BeTween the inFINitEly maNy Ways Of proviDing such a weighting IN a pRincipled mannEr. THis pROBlEm iS ExACerBaTEd bY THe fact that it is hIghly doubtFuL ThAt our intuiTIonS wIll by thEmselveS deliVEr anythIng close tO reliable VeRdicTS AboUt which weiGhtings aCcord bettER with OUr Sense Of wHat it iS fOr a DesirE to be pROmoTed to A greatEr Or lessEr extEnT. 4.2. The ProbLem of Mixed Cases A related ProbleM with DisJunctive aCcoUNts Of promotiOn suCh as ContraStiVe FIt-ProBabILism cOnceRNs How SUch acCounTS deal with CAsEs iN WHiCh a desire is PROMotEd aloNg oNE dimenSion While being dispromOTed along the othEr diMENsiOn. THEre aRe Two
 ways of spelling this out  more prec isely , t hemo st s trai ghtforward app r oach  simply exploits the d iffer en c e ​b e tw een t he twop ro b a bil it ie s:41 Co ntras tiv e PureProbabilis m*​ :Agent A's φ- i ng  rather th anψ-ing promot esthe sa ti sfa c tionofdesir e D in propor tion to [ pr ( satisf a ction o f D| A φs ) pr(satisfaction of D|A ψs)]. We a re not  e n do r s ing  th is proposa lto ex t end Con t ra s t i veP ure Probabili sm into ana cco unt of  d egr e es ofpromo ti o n –  indeed, we  wil l present  our o w n propo s al belo w. How eve r,this pr op osa li llu s tr ate s  ho w effort le ss ly an y pu r e l y  pro bab ilis tic a ccount of pro mot ionc anbe ex tende d in to  an a ccount  of d eg rees of promoti on,as any ac cou nt  of  p romot i on arg uab lyshouldbe. Byc ont ra s t ,  i t should be clearth a t  d ue to th e disj u nc ti v e nature  o f C ontr a s tiveFit- P ro babilism , no s i mi la r exten si on can  b e a s e ffort l essl y prov ided for  that account. Accor d ing to Contra s ti v e  F i t-Pr oba bilism a de sire canbe p r om ote d  in t wo qu it e  d i stinct ways, so anex tensio n ofthe account t o degreeso f promotio n wo u ld need to provid e som e way of w e ightingthe c ontribut ion eachw a y of pro mot ing  th e d e s ir e makes to th e degr ee  of pro mot ion. Th e p rob lem  he re  is not m erely th at  C on tr ast ive F i t-Probab il ism  i s 4 1 Oth e r ways  of s pell in gt his  out mi g ht e xplo it  t he ​ rat io  betw eenp r(s atisfac tion of D |Aφ s) a nd  p r(satis faction of D| Aψs), or th e​lo g of t h e  ratio b etween these two probab i lities.  Th ese w aysof measur ing  the d egr e e of p romoti on mi rr ors o me di f f er ent  B ayesian me a s ure s ofin crem ental c onfirmation (see,e .g. , Fitelson 19 99) . Fo r asom e wh a t d if f ere n t  proposal regar ding degre eo fpromotion, see  M anne (2 016). 2 0 sof ar inco mplete si nce no su ch  wei g h tin g is provi ded by t he accoun t . The mo re se rio us pro bl emis th at Con t ras tiveFit-Pr ob abilis m fai ls  to prov ide any guidance as tohow we  shou ldchoose be twe e n t he infini tely  many ways  of  pr ovidi ngs uch a  wei g ht ing in aprin c ipled man n er . T h i sproblem ise x a cer bated  by the fa ct t hat it is highlyd oubtful that o ur i n t uit ion s  wil lby themselvesdel iv e r  anythin gclose to re liable v er d ictsaboutwhichweighti n g sa ccordbett erwith oursen se of what  i ti s fora de si re tobe pro m oted t o a greater or l esser e xtent .  4. 2. Th eProblem of M ixed Cases  A relatedproble m wi th di sjuncti ve  accou nts  o f promotio n  such asContr astiveFi t-Pr oba bilism  con c e rns h ow s uc h a ccounts d e a lw it hc ase s in  whic ha de sire is p r omoted a lon g  one di me nsi o n  while be i n g dispromo ted  alon g the otherd imen s io n . The re are  two
 ways_of spelling_this out more precisely,_the most_straightforward_approach simply_exploits_the difference ​between_the two probabilities:_41 Contrastive Pure Probabilism*​:_Agent A's φ-ing_rather_than ψ-ing promotes the satisfaction of desire D in proportion to [pr(satisfaction of D|A_φs)_pr(satisfaction of_D|A_ψs)]._We are not endorsing this_proposal to extend Contrastive Pure_Probabilism into_an account of degrees of promotion – indeed,_we_will present our_own proposal below. However, this proposal illustrates how effortlessly_any purely probabilistic account of promotion_can be extended_into_an_account of degrees of_promotion, as any account of promotion_arguably should be. By contrast, it_should be clear that due to the_disjunctive nature of Contrastive Fit-Probabilism, no_similar extension can be as_effortlessly provided_for that account. According to_Contrastive Fit-Probabilism a_desire can_be promoted in_two quite distinct ways, so an_extension of the_account to degrees of promotion would_need_to provide some_way_of_weighting the_contribution each way_of_promoting the_desire_makes to the degree of promotion._The_problem here is not merely that Contrastive_Fit-Probabilism is 41 Other_ways_of spelling this out_might exploit the ​ratio between_pr(satisfaction of D|A φs) and pr(satisfaction_of D|A_ψs), or_the ​log of the ratio between these two probabilities. These ways_of measuring the degree of promotion_mirror some different Bayesian_measures of_incremental_confirmation (see, e.g.,_Fitelson_1999). For_a somewhat different proposal regarding degree of_promotion, see_Manne (2016). 20 so far incomplete_since no such weighting_is_provided by the account. The more_serious problem is that Contrastive Fit-Probabilism_fails to provide any guidance_as_to_how we should choose between_the infinitely many ways of providing_such a weighting_in a principled manner. This problem is_exacerbated_by the fact that it is_highly_doubtful that our intuitions will by_themselves_deliver_anything close to reliable verdicts_about which weightings accord better with_our sense of what it is for a desire_to be promoted_to a greater or lesser_extent._4.2._The Problem of Mixed Cases A related problem with disjunctive_accounts of_promotion such as_Contrastive Fit-Probabilism concerns how such accounts deal with cases in_which a desire is promoted along one_dimension while being dispromoted along the other dimension. There are two