moral	intuition,	natural	law	(all	understood	as	forms	of	general revelation)	and	special	revelation.8	Once	we	have	this	enriched	understanding	of the	forms	of	communication,	we	can	start	to	see	how	it	is	possible	for	a reasonable	non-believer	to	acquire	the	requisite	moral	knowledge.	Two 8 Several authors make this point about the diverse forms of divine communication. Peoples (2011) summarises the contributions to the debate. See also Evans (2013), pp 37-45 on the different ways in which God's commands may be promulgated. As one of the anonymous reviewers to this paper pointed out, missing from the list provided in the text are Kant's suggested methods for using reason to arrive at moral knowledge in the Groundwork on the Metaphysics of Morals (2012/1785 at 4: 401-402 and 4:421-424) and Critique of Practical Reason (2015/1788 at 5:25). The Kantian method would seem to deliver moral obligations as dictates/commands of reason. But it is noteworthy in this regard that Kant did not think that the moral law had an author. He thought God had a role to play in morality, but that it was a regulative/practical role, not a constitutive/grounding role. He argued that we needed to postulate God in order to make it practical to attain the highest good (2015/1788 at 5: 113-132), but that the content of the moral law itself was grounded solely in reason. This Kantian view of God's role in the moral order is different from the one being targeted by the epistemological objection. On this interpretation of Kant's argument, see Byrne (2011). 12 arguments	in	particular	can	be	used	to	support	this	conclusion.	I	call	them	them the	'content-not-source'	argument	and	the	'probability-possibility'	argument.	I deal	with	them	both	in	turn. 4.1	–	The	Content	not	Source	Argument The	'content	not	source'	argument	comes	from	the	work	of	Robert	Adams,	as modified	and	expanded
moral 	 intuition, 	 natural 	 law 	 (all 	 understood 	 as 	 forms 	 of 	 cosmopolitan disclosure) 	 and 	 extra 	 revelation.8 	 Once 	 we 	 have 	 this 	 enriched 	 sympathy 	 of the 	 forms 	 of 	 communication, 	 we 	 can 	 start 	 to 	 experience 	 how 	 it 	 is 	 potential 	 for 	 a reasonable 	 non - believer 	 to 	 acquire 	 the 	 requisite 	 moral 	 knowledge. 	 Two 8 Several generator make this point about the divers forms of divine communication. Peoples (2011) summarises the contributions to the debate. See besides Evans (2013), pp 37 - 45 on the different ways in which God's commands may be promulgate. As one of the anonymous reviewers to this paper sharpen out, missing from the tilt provided in the textbook are Kant's suggested methods for using reason to arrive at moral cognition in the Groundwork on the Metaphysics of Morals (2012/1785 at 4: 401 - 402 and 4:421 - 424) and Critique of Practical Reason (2015/1788 at 5:25). The Kantian method would seem to deliver moral obligations as dictates / commands of reason. But it is noteworthy in this regard that Kant did not think that the moral law had an author. He thought God had a role to play in ethical motive, but that it was a regulative / hardheaded role, not a constituent / foundation role. He argued that we needed to postulate God in orderliness to do it practical to attain the high good (2015/1788 at 5: 113 - 132), but that the content of the moral law itself was grounded solely in reason. This Kantian opinion of God's role in the moral order is different from the one being targeted by the epistemological objection. On this rendition of Kant's controversy, see Byrne (2011). 12 arguments 	 in 	 particular 	 can 	 be 	 used 	 to 	 patronize 	 this 	 conclusion. 	 I 	 call 	 them 	 them the 	' content - not - generator' 	 argument 	 and 	 the 	' probability - possibility' 	 argument. 	 I deal 	 with 	 them 	 both 	 in 	 go. 4.1 	 – 	 The 	 Content 	 not 	 Source 	 Argument The 	' capacity 	 not 	 source' 	 argument 	 issue forth 	 from 	 the 	 work 	 of 	 Robert 	 Adams, 	 as modified 	 and 	 expanded
morwl	intuition,	natural	law	(all	mnderstood	as	forms	of	genecal revslation)	avd	special	revelation.8	Once	we	havx	thiw	enrixhed	understanding	of thd	forms	of	clmmunicarion,	xe	can	start	to	see	how	it	is	possible	rlr	a xeesonable	non-beligver	to	acquira	the	requisite	mmrxl	nnowledge.	Two 8 Several authors make ehis poonh about the diderst fjrms of divine communication. Peoples (2011) aummarives the controbutions to the debate. See alsl Evans (2013), pp 37-45 on thf different wayf in which Goa's commands may be projulgated. As one of the anonymour revnewers to tyiw pwker pointed iut, mpssing from tmv list [rovidec in the text sre Kabt's suggested methods for using reason jo arrive dt moral knowledge un the Croutdwofj ov tge Mstaphydica of Morala (2012/1785 at 4: 401-402 and 4:421-424) and Critique of Ptasnocal Reason (2015/1788 at 5:25). Tre Kantian method would seem to deliver mmram obligations as dictatws/commands of reason. Hut it is noteworthy in this regard that Kant did not thinn thav ghe mjfql law had an author. He thought God had a role ek klaj in morality, but that it wax w tggulative/practkcal role, not a constitutivf/groundyng rile. He ardued that we needed to postulatw God in ordvr ti make it practicap to attain the highrst good (2015/1788 at 5: 113-132), but that the content of the moram law itself was erolndeg solely in reason. This Kagtian viex of Yod's rold in the mjral order is dlxferent from the oje benng tdrgeted by the epistemological objection. On this interptetdtimn of Kaut's arnument, see Byrnq (2011). 12 arguments	iu	particujar	cav	be	used	to	slpport	thiv	conclusion.	Y	call	them	them jhe	'content-not-vource'	ardumebt	ane	the	'procxbility-possibikity'	argumvnu.	I deal	wity	them	both	in	turn. 4.1	–	Thc	Contgnf	not	Source	Argumzut The	'content	not	spurze'	awglmeit	comqv	from	the	work	mf	Rocerg	Sdams,	xs modified	cna	expsnded
moral intuition, natural law (all understood as general and special Once we have forms communication, we can to see how is possible for a reasonable non-believer acquire the requisite moral knowledge. Two 8 Several authors make this point about diverse forms of divine communication. Peoples (2011) summarises the contributions to the debate. also (2013), 37-45 the different ways in which God's commands may be promulgated. As one of the anonymous reviewers this paper pointed out, missing from the list in the text are suggested methods for using reason arrive moral knowledge the on Metaphysics of Morals at 4: 401-402 and 4:421-424) and Critique of Practical Reason (2015/1788 at 5:25). The Kantian method would to deliver as dictates/commands reason. it noteworthy in this Kant did not think that the an author. He thought God had a role play in but that it was a regulative/practical not a constitutive/grounding role. He argued that we to postulate God in order to make it practical to attain the highest good (2015/1788 113-132), but that the of the moral itself grounded in This Kantian of God's role in the moral order is different from the being targeted by the epistemological objection. On this interpretation of see (2011). 12 arguments particular can be used support conclusion. I call them 'content-not-source' and I with both in turn. 4.1 The Content not Source Argument 'content not source' argument Robert Adams, as modified and expanded
moral	intuition,	natural	law	(aLl	understoOd	as	fOrmS	of	GeNeraL revElation)	and	specIAl	reVelation.8	Once	we	have	this	EnricHeD	UndeRStAndinG	of the	fORmS	OF	coMmUnIcaTiON,	wE	can	sTarT	to	see	hOw	it	is	possIblE	fOr	a reasonablE	NoN-believer	tO	acQuire	the	requIsiTe	moraL	kNowLEdge.	TWo 8 SEveraL authoRS make tHis point aBoUT the diVErse forMS Of DiviNe communication. PeOPlES (2011) summarises the ContriBuTIoNS To tHe dEbate. See alSo evans (2013), PP 37-45 on the dIFfERENt wAYs in which God's Commands may BE prOmulgaTeD. As ONe of thE anonYmOUs rEviewers to tHis pAper pointEd out, mISsing frOM the lisT proviDed In tHe teXT aRe kanT's SUggEStEd mEThoDs for usiNg ReAson tO arrIVE AT morAl kNowlEdge iN the GroundworK on The METapHysicS of MoRals (2012/1785 At 4: 401-402 And 4:421-424) anD CritiQue of prActical Reason (2015/1788 at 5:25). the KAntian metHod WoUld SeEm to dELiver mOraL obLigatioNs as dicTAteS/cOMMAnDs of reason. But it is nOtEWOrThy in thiS regarD ThAt kAnt did noT tHinK thaT THe morAl laW HaD an authoR. He thoUGhT GOd had a rOlE to plaY iN moRalIty, buT That It was a RegulatiVe/praCTical role, not a cONstitutive/groUNdING rOLe. He ArgUed that we neEded TO posTulaTE GOd iN Order To makE iT PrACtical to attain the hiGhEst gooD (2015/1788 at 5: 113-132), buT that the conteNt of the morAL LAw itself Was gROuNDed solely in reaSon. ThIs Kantian vIEw of God's Role iN the moraL order is dIFFerent frOm tHe oNe bEinG TArGeted by the epiSTEmolOgIcal objEctIon. On thIs iNteRprEtaTiOn of Kant's Argument, SeE BYrNe (2011). 12 ArgUmentS	In	particUlAr	cAn	Be	uSed	to	SUpport	This	cOnclUsIoN.	i	caLl	them	tHEm THE	'conTeNt-Not-sOurCe'	ArgumEnt	aND	thE	'probabIlity-possIbiLIty'	aRgUmEnt.	I deaL	with	them	both	In	Turn. 4.1	–	The	ConTeNt	nOt	SourCE	argument the	'content	not	source'	arguMEnt	comeS	frOm	the	Work	Of	Robert	ADamS,	as modIfiED	and	exPanded
moral	intuition,	natural	l aw	(all	un derst ood 	as 	f orms 	ofgeneral revela t ion) 	and	special	revelatio n.8	O nc e 	weh av e	thi s	enric h ed u nde rs ta ndi ng of  thefor ms	of	c ommunicati on, 	w e	can	startt osee	how	it 	is 	possible	fo r	a  reaso na ble non-b eli everto	acq u ire	th e	requisi te moralk nowledg e . 	T wo 8  Several authorsm ak e  this point ab out th ed iv e r sefor ms of divi ne  comm u nicatio n .P e o ple s  (2011) summa rises the c o ntr ibutio ns  to the de bate.  S e e a lso Evans ( 2013 ), pp 37- 45 ont he diff e rent wa ys inwhi chGod' s  c om man ds may be  pr o mul gated. A son e ofthea n o n ymou s r evie wersto this paper  po inte d  ou t, mi ssing  fro mthe l ist pr ovide din the text are  Kan t's sugge ste dmet ho ds fo r  using  re aso n to ar rive at mor al k n ow ledge in the Groun dw o r kon the M etaphy s ic so f Morals  ( 201 2/17 8 5  at 4 : 40 1 -4 02 and 4 :421-4 2 4)  a nd Crit iq ue ofPr act ica l Rea s on ( 2015/1 788 at 5 :25). The Kantian me t hod would see m  t o de l iver  mo ral obligat ions as d icta t es /co m mands  of r ea s on .  But it is notewort hy  in th is re gard that Kan t did nott h i nk thatthem or a l law had an a uthor . He thoug h t God ha d a r ole to p lay in mo r a lity, bu t t hat  it  wa s aregulative/pr a c tica lrole, n ota const itu tiv e/g rou nd ing role.  He argu ed  t ha tweneede d  to post ul ate  G odin or d er tomakeit p ra ct i cal  to att a in t he h ig he st g ood  ( 2015/ 1788 at5: 113- 132), but  th a t th eco ntent o f the moral l aw  itself wa sgro undeds o lely inreason. This Kantian vi e w of Go d's  role  inthe moral  or der is  di f ferent  fromthe o ne  be i n g tar g e te d b ythe episte m o log icalob ject ion. On  this interpretati o n o f Kant's argu men t, s e e  B yrn e  ( 2 011 ). 12a r guments	in	part icular	can 	b e 	u sed	to	sup p ort 	t his	con clusion .	I	c a ll	them 	them the 	'content -n ot-s o u rce '	argument 	and	the 	'probabi l ity-p o ss ibili ty' 	argum en t.I dea l	with the m	bot h	in	t ur n. 4.1 	–	Th eContentnot	Source	Argument The 	'cont ent	n otsource'	a rgu m ent 	comes	fr om	t he	work	of 	Ro ber t	Ada ms, as mo difi e dand expan ded
moral	intuition,	natural	law	(all	understood	as	forms	of	general revelation)	and	special	revelation.8	Once	we	have	this	enriched	understanding	of_the	forms	of	communication,	we	can	start	to	see	how	it	is	possible	for	a reasonable	non-believer	to	acquire	the	requisite	moral	knowledge.	Two_8 Several authors make_this point_about_the diverse_forms_of divine communication._Peoples (2011) summarises_the contributions to the_debate. See also_Evans_(2013), pp 37-45 on the different ways in which God's commands may be promulgated._As_one of_the_anonymous_reviewers to this paper pointed_out, missing from the list_provided in_the text are Kant's suggested methods for using_reason_to arrive at_moral knowledge in the Groundwork on the Metaphysics of_Morals (2012/1785 at 4: 401-402 and_4:421-424) and Critique_of_Practical_Reason (2015/1788 at 5:25)._The Kantian method would seem to_deliver moral obligations as dictates/commands of_reason. But it is noteworthy in this_regard that Kant did not think_that the moral law had_an author._He thought God had a_role to play_in morality,_but that it_was a regulative/practical role, not a_constitutive/grounding role. He_argued that we needed to postulate_God_in order to_make_it_practical to_attain the highest_good_(2015/1788 at_5:_113-132), but that the content of_the_moral law itself was grounded solely in_reason. This Kantian view_of_God's role in the_moral order is different from_the one being targeted by the_epistemological objection._On this_interpretation of Kant's argument, see Byrne (2011). 12 arguments	in	particular	can	be	used	to	support	this	conclusion.	I	call	them	them the	'content-not-source'	argument	and	the	'probability-possibility'	argument.	I deal	with	them	both	in	turn._4.1	–	The	Content	not	Source	Argument The	'content	not	source'	argument	comes	from	the	work	of	Robert	Adams,	as modified	and	expanded