	such	an	imperfect	system	of	communication.	Theists	will	no	doubt	oblige by	offering	explanations	that	are	broadly	similar	to	those	provided	in	response to	the	problem	of	evil	or	the	problem	of	divine	hiddenness	(e.g.	Evans	2013,	114115).	But	there	is	one	problem	with	all	such	attempts	to	explain	away	the uncertainty.	Remember	what	is	at	stake	if	the	epistemic	condition	is	not satisfied?	Moral	obligations	cease	to	exist	for	a	certain	segment	of	the	population. The	theist	needs	to	explain	why	God	is	entitled	to	run	the	risk	of	excluding people	from	the	realm.of	moral	duty.	For	instance,	a	typical	theodical	response	to the	problem	of	evil	is	to	argue	that	God	cannot	intervene	to	prevent	evil	because it	would	compromise	our	ability	to	develop	and	acquire	true	moral	agency, where	this	agency	consists	in	the	ability	to	recognise	right	or	wrong,	freely 19 This interpretation of the argument subsumes the preceding pragmatic enrichment interpretation because what is now being alleged is that uncertainty with respect to the pragmatic context is sufficient for successful communication of the command. 26 decide	one's	actions,	and	take	moral	responsibility	for	the	outcomes.	A	theist might	be	tempted	to	offer	a	similar	response	in	this	instance,	arguing	that	God doesn't	communicate	his	will	to	us	perfectly	in	order	to	give	us	the	freedom	to develop	our	own	moral	agency.	But	this	theodicy	is	not	going	to	work	in	the present	context.	If	the	div
such 	 an 	 imperfect 	 system 	 of 	 communication. 	 Theists 	 will 	 no 	 doubt 	 oblige by 	 offering 	 explanation 	 that 	 are 	 broadly 	 exchangeable 	 to 	 those 	 provided 	 in 	 response to 	 the 	 problem 	 of 	 evil 	 or 	 the 	 trouble 	 of 	 divine 	 hiddenness 	 (e.g. 	 Evans 	 2013, 	 114115). 	 But 	 there 	 is 	 one 	 problem 	 with 	 all 	 such 	 attempt 	 to 	 explain 	 away 	 the doubt. 	 commend 	 what 	 is 	 at 	 stake 	 if 	 the 	 epistemic 	 circumstance 	 is 	 not satisfied? 	 Moral 	 obligations 	 cease 	 to 	 exist 	 for 	 a 	 certain 	 segment 	 of 	 the 	 population. The 	 theist 	 motivation 	 to 	 explain 	 why 	 God 	 is 	 entitled 	 to 	 run 	 the 	 risk 	 of 	 excluding citizenry 	 from 	 the 	 realm.of 	 moral 	 duty. 	 For 	 instance, 	 a 	 typical 	 theodical 	 response 	 to the 	 trouble 	 of 	 evil 	 is 	 to 	 argue 	 that 	 God 	 cannot 	 intervene 	 to 	 prevent 	 evil 	 because it 	 would 	 compromise 	 our 	 ability 	 to 	 develop 	 and 	 acquire 	 truthful 	 moral 	 agency, where 	 this 	 representation 	 consists 	 in 	 the 	 ability 	 to 	 recognise 	 right 	 or 	 wrong, 	 freely 19 This interpretation of the controversy subsumes the preceding pragmatic enrichment interpretation because what is now being alleged is that uncertainty with respect to the pragmatic context is sufficient for successful communication of the command. 26 decide 	 one's 	 actions, 	 and 	 take 	 moral 	 responsibility 	 for 	 the 	 outcomes. 	 A 	 theist might 	 be 	 tempted 	 to 	 offer 	 a 	 similar 	 reaction 	 in 	 this 	 instance, 	 arguing 	 that 	 God doesn't 	 commune 	 his 	 will 	 to 	 us 	 absolutely 	 in 	 decree 	 to 	 give 	 us 	 the 	 freedom 	 to develop 	 our 	 own 	 moral 	 agency. 	 But 	 this 	 theodicy 	 is 	 not 	 going 	 to 	 work 	 in 	 the present 	 context. 	 If 	 the 	 div
	sucj	an	imperfect	system	of	commmnication.	Theists	cull	no	dmubt	obmige by	owfering	explanations	that	are	brlaely	sinilar	to	those	provided	in	fesponse no	the	proboem	oh	evil	or	the	problem	of	divinc	kiddehkess	(e.y.	Etans	2013,	114115).	But	there	is	oke	problem	widh	all	such	attem[tr	tl	explain	away	the uncertainty.	Remember	rhat	is	ay	shake	if	the	epistgmic	cpgditjon	is	not satisfied?	Moral	obligations	dease	to	txist	for	a	certain	sebment	of	the	population. The	thfist	jeeds	to	explain	why	Gld	is	entitlee	to	rtb	the	risk	of	exzluding people	from	the	rgalm.of	moral	duty.	For	instance,	a	typicxl	thepdical	respinwe	tl the	problem	if	evij	is	to	argue	that	God	cantot	intetvene	to	prevent	cvil	bxcauwe it	would	compromise	onr	ability	to	develop	anq	acquire	tsuz	moral	agency, where	thiw	atency	wonshsts	kb	thd	abjlmty	fo	recohniae	right	or	wdong,	freely 19 This interpretatiom jd the argumenf substmqs the preceding pragmatic enrichment ittedpretation because what is now being alleged is that tncertainty with respect to the pragmatic context is snfwicnckt fue duccessful communication of the command. 26 deciqs	ome'x	actions,	and	takc	moral	responsibiliyy	vot	jhe	outcomes.	A	thgist miygt	ge	tempted	to	offer	a	slmilar	rgsponsw	in	this	inftanve,	arguing	that	God doesn't	commynicate	his	wijo	to	us	perfectly	in	orber	to	give	us	tke	freecom	to develop	our	own	moral	ageney.	But	tgis	theodicy	ls	not	goinf	go	work	in	the presdnt	bontaxt.	If	the	div
such an imperfect system of communication. Theists doubt by offering that are broadly response the problem of or the problem divine hiddenness (e.g. Evans 2013, 114115). there is one problem with all such attempts to explain away the uncertainty. what is at stake if the epistemic condition is not satisfied? Moral obligations to for certain of the population. The theist needs to explain why God is entitled to run the risk excluding people from the realm.of moral duty. For a typical theodical response the problem of evil is argue God cannot to evil it would compromise ability to develop and acquire true moral agency, where this agency consists in the ability to recognise or wrong, This interpretation the subsumes preceding pragmatic enrichment what is now being alleged is respect to the pragmatic context is sufficient for communication of command. 26 decide one's actions, and moral responsibility for the outcomes. A theist might tempted to offer a similar response in this instance, arguing that God doesn't communicate his us perfectly in order give us the to our moral But this is not going to work in the present context. If the
	such	an	imperfect	system	of	coMmunicatioN.	TheiSts	WilL	nO	douBt	obLige by	offering	EXplaNations	that	are	broadly	sImilaR	tO	ThosE	PrOvideD	in	respONsE TO	thE	pRoBleM	oF	EvIl	or	tHe	pRoblem	oF	divine	hidDenNeSs	(e.g.	Evans	2013,	114115).	But	THeRe	is	one	proBleM	with	all	such	AttEmpts	tO	eXplAIn	awaY	thE unceRtaintY.	remembEr	what	is	aT	sTAke	if	tHE	episteMIC	cOndiTion	is	not satisfieD?	moRAl	obligations	cEase	to	ExISt	FOR	a	cErtAin	segment	Of	The	poPUlation. tHe	THEIst	NEeds	to	explain	Why	God	is	entITleD	to	run	ThE	riSK	of	excLudinG pEOplE	from	the	reaLm.of	Moral	duty.	for	insTAnce,	a	tyPIcal	theOdical	ResPonSe	to THe	PrOblEm	OF	evIL	iS	to	ARguE	that	God	CaNnOt	intErveNE	TO	PrevEnt	Evil	BecauSe it	would	compRomIse	oUR	abIlity	To	devElop	AnD	acquIre	truE	moraL	aGency, where	this	aGencY	consists	In	tHe	AbiLiTy	to	rECognisE	riGht	Or	wrong,	Freely 19 THIs iNtERPReTation of the argumenT sUBSuMes the prEcedinG PrAgMAtic enriChMenT intERPretaTion BEcAuse what Is now bEInG aLleged iS tHat uncErTaiNty With rESpecT to the PragmatiC contEXt is sufficient FOr successful cOMmUNIcATion Of tHe command. 26 deCide	ONe's	aCtioNS,	aNd	tAKe	morAl	resPoNSiBIlity	for	the	outcomes.	a	tHeist mIght	bE	tempted	to	offEr	a	similar	RESPonse	in	tHis	iNStANce,	arguing	that	god doEsn't	communICate	his	wIll	to	Us	perfecTly	in	ordeR	TO	give	us	tHe	fReeDom	To dEVElOp	our	own	moral	AGEncy.	buT	this	thEodIcy	is	noT	goIng	To	wOrk	In	The presenT	context.	if	ThE	dIv
	such	an	imperfect	systemof	communi catio n.The is ts	w illno	doubt	oblig e  byoffering	explanationsthatar e 	bro a dl y	sim ilar	to th o s e	p ro vi ded 	i n 	r espon seto	theproblem	of 	ev il 	or	the	prob l em 	of	divine 	hi ddenness	(e. g.Evans20 13, 11411 5). 	Buttherei s	oneproblem	w it h 	all	s u ch	atte m p ts 	toexplain	away	theu nc e rtainty.	Remem ber	wh at is a t	s tak e	if	the	e pi stemi c 	condit i on i s 	no t  satisfied?	M oral	obliga t ion s	ceas etoe xist	f or	ace r tai n	segment	o f	th e	populat ion. T h e	theis t 	needsto	exp lai n	w hy	G o dis 	en ti t led to 	ru n 	th e	risk	o fex cludi ng p e o p l e	fr omtherealm .of	moral	dut y.Fori nst ance, 	a	ty pica ltheod ical	r espon se 	to the	problem 	ofevil	is	t o	a rg ueth at	Go d 	canno t	i nte rvene	t o	preve n t	e vi l b ec ause it	would	comp ro m i se 	our	abi lity	t o 	d ev e lop	andac qui re	t r u e	mor al	a g en cy, wher e	this ag en cy	cons is ts	inth e	a bil ity	t o 	rec ognise 	right	o r	wro n g,	freely 19 T h is interpreta t io n of thearg ument subsu mest he p rece d in g p r agmat ic en ri c hm e nt interpretation b ec ause w hat i s now being a lleged ist h a t uncert aint y  w i th respect tothe p ragmatic c o ntext is  suff icient f or succes s f ul commu nic ati onoft h ecommand. 26 d e c ideon e's	act ion s,	andtak e	m ora l	r es ponsibili ty	for	t he 	o ut co mes .	A	t h eist mig ht 	be 	t emp ted	t o 	offer 	a	si mila rre s pon se	in	t h is i nsta nc e, 	arg uin gthatGodd oes n't	com municatehis will 	t ous	perf ectly	in	orde rto	give	us 	t hefreedo m to devel op	our	own	moral	agency . 	But	th istheod icyis	not	go ing 	to	wo rki n	thepresen t	con te xt. I f	the d iv 
	such	an	imperfect	system	of	communication.	Theists	will	no	doubt	oblige by	offering	explanations	that	are	broadly	similar	to	those	provided	in	response_to	the	problem	of	evil	or	the	problem	of	divine	hiddenness	(e.g.	Evans	2013,	114115).	But	there	is	one	problem	with	all	such	attempts	to	explain	away	the uncertainty.	Remember	what	is	at	stake	if	the	epistemic	condition	is	not_satisfied?	Moral	obligations	cease	to	exist	for	a	certain	segment	of	the	population. The	theist	needs	to	explain	why	God	is	entitled	to	run	the	risk	of	excluding people	from	the	realm.of	moral	duty.	For	instance,	a	typical	theodical	response	to the	problem	of	evil	is	to	argue	that	God	cannot	intervene	to	prevent	evil	because_it	would	compromise	our	ability	to	develop	and	acquire	true	moral	agency, where	this	agency	consists	in	the	ability	to	recognise	right	or	wrong,	freely_19_This interpretation_of_the argument subsumes_the preceding pragmatic_enrichment interpretation because what_is now being_alleged_is that uncertainty with respect to the pragmatic context is sufficient for successful communication_of_the command._26_decide	one's	actions,	and	take	moral	responsibility	for	the	outcomes.	A	theist_might	be	tempted	to	offer	a	similar	response	in	this	instance,	arguing	that	God doesn't	communicate	his	will	to	us	perfectly	in	order	to	give	us	the	freedom	to develop	our	own	moral	agency.	But	this	theodicy	is	not	going	to	work	in	the present	context.	If	the	div