 the Human Mind:2 By language I understand all those signs which mankind use in order to communicate to others their thoughts and inten- tions, their purposes and desires. And such signs may be conceived to be of two kinds: First, such as have no meaning, but what is affixed to them by compact or agreement among those who use them; these are artificial signs: Secondly, such as, previous to all compact or agreement, have a meaning which every man understands by the principles of his nature. Language, so far as it consists of artificial signs, may be called artificial; so far as it consists of natural signs, I call it natural. Having premised these definitions, I think it is demon- strable, that if mankind had not a natural language, they could never have invented an artificial one by their reason and ingenuity. For all artificial language supposes some compact or agreement to affix a certain meaning to certain signs; therefore there must be compacts or agreements be- fore the use of artificial signs; but there can be no compact or 2 Since Immerwahr 1978, some have accepted that Reid's views changed sig- nificantly between his early work in the Inquiry and his later work in the Essays. I reject this reading of Reid, but it isn't necessary to belabor the point here, because I am focused on Reid's interesting and neglected dis- cussion in the Inquiry. John Turri | 4 agreement without signs, nor without language; and there- fore there must be a natural language before any artificial language can be invented: Which was to be demonstrated. (Reid 1764: section 4.2, p. 51) My subsequent discussion divides into three parts. Section 2 considers Reid's distinction between artificial and natural signs in the first quoted paragraph. Section 3 considers several ways of un- derstanding the argument in the second quoted paragraph. Section 4 advances a different interpretation of Reid's discussion, and relates it to Chomsky's views on grammar. 2. The distinction On Reid's view, human language is the set of signs humans use "in order to communicate to others their thoughts and intentions, their purposes and desires." Reid divides these signs, and by extension language, into two categories: natural and artificial. Artificial signs are defined as those signs which have no meaning except for "what is affixed to them by compact or agreement among those who use them." The English word'star' is an example of an artificial sign. It refers to stars because
the Human Mind:2 By language I understand all those signs which mankind practice in decree to communicate to others their thoughts and inten- tions, their determination and desire. And such signs may be conceived to be of two kind: First, such as have no meaning, but what is affixed to them by compact or agreement among those who practice them; these are artificial sign: Secondly, such as, former to all compact or agreement, have a meaning which every man understands by the principle of his nature. Language, therefore far as it consists of artificial signs, may be call artificial; so far as it consists of natural signboard, I call it natural. Having premised these definitions, I remember it is demon- strable, that if mankind had not a natural language, they could never have invented an artificial one by their rationality and ingenuity. For all artificial language supposes some compact or agreement to affix a certain meaning to certain signs; therefore there must be compacts or agreements be- fore the use of artificial signs; but there can be no compact or 2 Since Immerwahr 1978, some have accepted that Reid's views deepen sig- nificantly between his early work in the Inquiry and his later oeuvre in the Essays. I resist this reading of Reid, but it isn't necessary to belabor the point here, because I am focus on Reid's interesting and neglect dis- cussion in the Inquiry. John Turri | 4 agreement without signs, nor without language; and there- bow there must be a natural language before any artificial language can be invented: Which was to be demonstrated. (Reid 1764: section 4.2, p. 51) My subsequent discussion divides into three parts. Section 2 considers Reid's distinction between artificial and natural sign in the inaugural quoted paragraph. Section 3 considers several ways of un- derstanding the controversy in the second quoted paragraph. Section 4 advances a unlike interpretation of Reid's discussion, and refer it to Chomsky's views on grammar. 2. The distinction On Reid's scene, human language is the bent of signs humans practice " in order to communicate to others their thoughts and intentions, their purpose and desires. " Reid separate these signs, and by extension terminology, into two categories: lifelike and artificial. Artificial signs are defined as those signs which give birth no meaning except for " what is affixed to them by compact or agreement among those who use them. " The English word'star' is an example of an artificial sign. It mention to stars because
 thf Human Mind:2 By language I understand all thosx signs which mxnkind use in order to commuiicare to others their thoughts and intej- tions, rheic purposes and dxaires. Akb sucg sigus may be conceiyed to be ox two kinds: Fissg, duch as have no meaning, but what is affixec ho them by comkact pw agdvenent among those who use them; these ere artificial xigns: Secondly, such as, pregioud to all compact og agreement, havq a meaning wfich every man understznds by the principles of his nxture. Language, wo fag as it consmsts os artificial signs, mdy be cslled artificisl; vo dar as it consists of natural signs, I cwll it naduxal. Having premised tyewe dexinidionr, I ghihk if is dfmoi- strable, tgat if mankund had not a natursl oanguage, they could nqver have invented an artificial one by thsir reason and ingenuitt. For all artificial panguage fupposes some compact or agreement to affix a cerdain jdannkn to xegtain signs; therefore there must be compacts jd sggeements be- fore bhe use of artificoap xygns; but therg can bz nk compact or 2 Sincf Immerrahr 1978, some havt accrpted that Reid's views chanted sig- nifibantoy between his earpy work in che Inauiry and his later work in che Esaays. I rejeft this rsxding of Reid, bug in ist't necessary to belabor thq point hxre, bzcause I am gocuseq on Reid's intevasting and neglectfd did- wussion in the Inquiry. John Turri | 4 agreement without sogts, tor withjut lsnguage; and trere- fore therg must be a nagural langlage befoce any artifycial languaga can be inveited: Whicr waw to be demuvstrated. (Reid 1764: section 4.2, p. 51) My subwequent discussion dixjdes into three patrs. Section 2 comsiaerf Geiv's difdinction betfeen argoficixl and natuval sigms in the first quotad pzragraph. Section 3 voksiders sgveral wars of un- dersyanding the argumejt in thx secomd zuoted paragraph. Section 4 advahces a divfevent interpreeatiin of Reid's biscussion, and relates it to Chomsky's vixws on grammar. 2. The disrinction On Reid's vnee, human lanjuage ys the sed of signs humans usw "in order to comkunicate to others thsir thmughtd and intentions, their purposes and desires." Reid divides these signs, and vy extxnfion languafe, imto tfo eategoryes: iavural and artificpal. Artificial signs are defined as thosa figns which have no meaning rxzept for "what is affixed to them by ckmpact ot agreement among those who use them." The English word'stsr' is an examlle of an ertificial sign. It rrfers co staes becayse
the Human Mind:2 By language I understand signs mankind use order to communicate inten- their purposes and And such signs be conceived to be of two First, such as have no meaning, but what is affixed to them by or agreement among those who use them; these are artificial signs: Secondly, such previous all or have a meaning which every man understands by the principles of his nature. Language, so far it consists of artificial signs, may be called so far as it of natural signs, I call natural. premised these I it demon- strable, that mankind had not a natural language, they could never have invented an artificial one by their reason ingenuity. For language supposes compact agreement affix a certain certain signs; therefore there must be be- fore the use of artificial signs; but can be compact or 2 Since Immerwahr 1978, have accepted that Reid's views changed sig- nificantly his early work in the Inquiry and his later work in the Essays. I reject of Reid, but it necessary to belabor point because am on Reid's and neglected dis- cussion in the Inquiry. John Turri | 4 without signs, nor without language; and there- fore there must natural before any artificial can be invented: Which to demonstrated. (Reid 1764: section 51) subsequent three Section considers Reid's distinction between and natural signs in the quoted paragraph. Section 3 derstanding the argument in the second quoted paragraph. 4 advances a different interpretation of Reid's and relates it to Chomsky's views on grammar. 2. The distinction On view, human the set of signs humans use "in order communicate to others their and intentions, their purposes and desires." Reid divides these and extension language, two categories: natural artificial. Artificial signs defined as those have no except "what them by compact or agreement among who them." The English word'star' is example artificial sign. It refers to stars because
 the Human Mind:2 By language I unDerstand alL thosE siGns WhIch mAnkiNd use in order to COmmuNicate to others their thoUghts AnD InteN- TiOns, thEir purpOSeS ANd dEsIrEs. ANd SUcH signS maY be concEived to be oF twO kInds: First, sucH As Have no meanIng, But what is affIxeD to theM bY coMPact oR agReemeNt amonG Those wHo use them; ThESe are aRTificiaL SIgNs: SeCondly, such as, previOUs TO all compact or aGreemeNt, HAvE A MeaNinG which everY mAn undERstands BY tHE PRinCIples of his natUre. Language, SO faR as it cOnSisTS of artIficiAl SIgnS, may be calleD artIficial; so Far as iT ConsistS Of naturAl signS, I cAll It naTUrAl. havInG PreMIsEd tHEse DefinitiOnS, I Think It is DEMON- strAblE, thaT if maNkind had not a nAtuRal lANguAge, thEy couLd neVeR have InventEd an aRtIficial one by theIr reAson and inGenUiTy. FOr All arTIficiaL laNguAge suppOses somE ComPaCT OR aGreement to affix a ceRtAIN mEaning to CertaiN SiGnS; ThereforE tHerE musT BE compActs OR aGreementS be- forE ThE uSe of artIfIcial sIgNs; bUt tHere cAN be nO compaCt or 2 SincE ImmeRWahr 1978, some have acCEpted that Reid'S ViEWS cHAngeD siG- nificantly BetwEEn hiS earLY wOrk IN the INquirY aND hIS later work in the EssaYs. i rejecT this Reading of Reid, But it isn't nECESsary to bElabOR tHE point here, becaUse I aM focused on rEid's inteRestiNg and negLected dis- CUSsion in tHe INquIry. johN tUrRi | 4 agreement wiTHOut sIgNs, nor wiThoUt languAge; And TheRe- fOrE there musT be a natuRaL lAnGuAge BeforE Any artifIcIal LaNguAge caN Be inveNted: WHich WaS tO Be dEmonstrATeD. (rEid 1764: sEcTiOn 4.2, p. 51) MY suBsEquenT disCUssIon diviDes into thRee PArts. seCtIon 2 consIders Reid's disTiNction betwEeN arTificiAL And naturAl signs in the first quoted PAragrapH. SeCtion 3 ConsIders seveRal Ways of Un- dERstandIng the ArgumEnT in THE secoND QuOteD pAragraph. SeCTIon 4 AdvanCeS a diFferent Interpretation of ReID's dIscussion, and rElaTes iT TO CHomSKy'S VieWs ON grAMMar. 2. The distinctiOn On Reid's vIeW, HuMan languagE Is tHe Set of siGns humaNs use "IN order tO communicAte to otheRs TheiR THouGhts and intEntions, tHeir purpoSEs and DEsIres." REid DivideS tHesE signS, and by EXteNsion LanguaGe, Into twO cateGoRies: natuRal and artificial. ArtificIal sigNs are DefIned as thoSe sIGns Which have No meAning excepT foR "whAt is aFfiXEd to tHem bY CoMpaCT or agReemENt among thOSe Who USE tHem." The EngliSH WOrd'Star' iS an EXample Of an Artificial sign. It rEFers to stars becAuse
 the Human Mind:2 By langu age I unde rstan d a llth osesign s which mankin d  use  in order to communica te to  o t hers th eir t houghts an d int en -tio ns ,  t heirpur poses a nd desires . A nd  such signsm ay  be concei ved  to be of tw o k inds:Fi rst ,  such  as  have  no me a ning,but whatis affixe d  to the m by  com pact or agreement am o ng those who u se the m; th e s e a reartificial  s igns: Secondl y ,s u c h a s , previous to  all compac t  or  agree me nt, have a  mean in g  wh ich every m an u nderstand s by t h e princ i ples of  his n atu re.  Lan g ua ge , s of ara sitc ons ists ofar ti ficia l si g n s ,  may  be  cal led a rtificial; so  fa r as itconsi sts o f na tu ral s igns,I cal lit natural. Hav ingpremisedthe se  de fi nitio n s, I t hin k i t is de mon- st r abl e, t h at  if mankind had no ta na tural la nguage ,  t he y  could n ev erhave i nvent ed a n  a rtificia l oneb yth eir rea so n andin gen uit y. Fo r  all  artif icial la nguag e  supposes some compact or ag r ee m e nt to a ffi x a certain  mea n ingto c e rt ain signs ; the re f or e  there must be comp ac ts oragree ments be- for e the useo f artifici al s i gn s ; but there ca n beno compact or 2 Sin ce Im merwahr1978, som e have acc ept edtha t R e i d' s views chang e d  sig -nifican tly  betwee n h isear lywo rk in the  Inquiry  a nd  h is  la ter w o rk in th eEss ay s.I rej e ct thi s rea ding  o fR eid , but i t  i s n 't n ec es sary  to  b elabo r th e  po int her e, becaus e I am f oc us ed on R eid's interes ti ng and neg le cte d dis- c ussion i n the Inquiry. John Tur r i | 4 a gre ement  wit hout sign s,nor wi tho u t lang uage;and t he re- f ore t h e re  mu st  be a natu r a l l angua ge  bef ore any  artificial langua g e c an be invente d:Whic h wa s t o  b e  de mo n str a t ed. (Reid 1764:  section 4 .2 ,  p . 51) My s u bse qu ent dis cussion  divi d es into  three pa rts. Sect io n 2c o nsi ders Reid' s distin ction bet w een a r ti ficia l a nd nat ur alsigns  in th e  fi rst q uotedpa ragrap h. Se ct ion 3 co nsiders several ways of  un- d ersta ndi ng the ar gum e ntin the se cond  quoted pa rag rap h. Se cti o n 4 a dvan c es  ad iffer enti nterpreta t io n o f Re id's discus s i o n,and r ela t es itto C homsky's views on grammar. 2. Th e di s t inc tio n  OnRe id's view, hum anla n g uage isth e set of si gns huma ns use " in ord er tocommuni c a te to oth ersthe ir though tsan d  intent io ns ,  their  pur po ses an d desi r es." R eid divides thes e sig n s , and byexten si on lang u age,  into twocategories:  natur al a nd ar tificia l.  Artif ici al  signs are defined a s tho se sign swhic h h ave no  mea n i ng ex cept  f or"what isa f fi x ed  t o  th em b y com pa ct o r agreeme n t amongtho s e who u se  th e m ." The En g l ish word's tar ' isa n  example o f  ana rt i ficia l sign . It r efers t o  st ar s becau se
 the_Human Mind:2_By language I understand_all those_signs_which mankind_use_in order to_communicate to others_their thoughts and inten-_tions, their purposes_and_desires. And such signs may be conceived to be of two kinds: First, such_as_have no_meaning,_but_what is affixed to them_by compact or agreement among_those who_use them; these are artificial signs: Secondly, such_as,_previous to all_compact or agreement, have a meaning which every man_understands by the principles of his_nature. Language, so_far_as_it consists of artificial_signs, may be called artificial; so_far as it consists of natural_signs, I call it natural. Having premised_these definitions, I think it is_demon- strable, that if mankind_had not_a natural language, they could_never have invented_an artificial_one by their_reason and ingenuity. For all artificial_language supposes some_compact or agreement to affix a_certain_meaning to certain_signs;_therefore_there must_be compacts or_agreements_be- fore_the_use of artificial signs; but there_can_be no compact or 2 Since Immerwahr_1978, some have accepted_that_Reid's views changed sig-_nificantly between his early work_in the Inquiry and his later_work in_the Essays._I reject this reading of Reid, but it isn't necessary to_belabor the point here, because I_am focused on Reid's_interesting and_neglected_dis- cussion in_the_Inquiry. John_Turri | 4 agreement without signs, nor_without language;_and there- fore there must be_a natural language before_any_artificial language can be invented: Which_was to be demonstrated. (Reid 1764:_section 4.2, p. 51) My_subsequent_discussion_divides into three parts. Section_2 considers Reid's distinction between artificial_and natural signs_in the first quoted paragraph. Section 3_considers_several ways of un- derstanding the_argument_in the second quoted paragraph. Section_4_advances_a different interpretation of Reid's_discussion, and relates it to Chomsky's_views on grammar. 2. The distinction On Reid's view,_human language is_the set of signs humans_use_"in_order to communicate to others their thoughts and intentions, their_purposes and_desires." Reid divides_these signs, and by extension language, into two categories: natural_and artificial. Artificial signs are defined as_those signs which have no meaning except for "what is affixed_to them by compact or agreement among those_who use them." The English word'star' is_an example of an_artificial_sign. It refers to stars because