 not to say that rules play no justificatory role at all in coming to have justified moral beliefs about specific cases). But they make a further Rossian point, namely, that adept moral judgment and reasoning in complex cases, where a number of morally relevant considerations come into play, is not grounded in any algorithm or super rule that would rationally determine some outcome. They write: ['If the phenomenology of skillful coping we have presented is right, principles and theories serve only for early stages of learning; no principle or theory "ground" an expert ethical response, any more than in chess there is a theory or rule that explains a master-level move. As we have seen in the case of chess, recognizing that there is no way to ground one's intuitions in an explanation is an important step on the way to acquiring expertise." The phenomenology of moral thinking that the Dreyfus brothers present supports the Rossian view which emphasizes the role of moral judgment in coming to make reasonable moral decisions, and in coming to have justified moral beliefs. These remarks about moral judgment comport well with my contextualist moral epistemology. In cases where an expert moral thinker mulls over some issue and comes to a belief about the morality of some action or whatever, he or she is engaged in an activity of weighing and balancing various morally relevant considerations-considerations reflected in his or her general moral beliefs that I have been saying are contextually basic. The moral belief he or she eventually settles on is not dictated by any algorithm she or he has; trained moral judgement is operative here. Nevertheless, the expert is reasoning about the case and can, if asked, state those reasons that, in the end, were decisive. Of course, at bottom, his or her reasons are represented by midlevel moral beliefs. So, after the fact, our expert can provide a justification for his or her belief terminating in his or her midlevel moral beliefs, but there is no covering rule followed dictating that one sort of general moral consideration should trump competing moral considerations in this case. What this reveals about those epistemic norms governing moral belief is that we operate according to A Contextualist Moral Epistemology 317 epistemic norms some of which permit one to hold moral beliefs, in certain circumstances, on the basis of an exercise of one's moral judgment." A Brief Rationale I have been claiming that my contextualist picture is more or less descriptively accurate, at least if we are focused on questions about epistemically responsible moral belief. But
not to say that rules play no justificatory role at wholly in come to have justified moral beliefs about specific lawsuit). But they cause a further Rossian point, namely, that adept moral judgment and reasoning in complex case, where a number of morally relevant considerations come into play, is not grounded in any algorithm or ace rule that would rationally determine some outcome. They write: [' If the phenomenology of adept coping we have presented is right, principles and theories service only for early stages of learning; no rationale or theory " ground " an adept ethical response, any more than in chess there be a theory or rule that explains a master - level motion. As we have seen in the case of chess, recognizing that there is no way to ground one's intuitions in an explanation is an important step on the way to acquiring expertise. " The phenomenology of moral thinking that the Dreyfus brothers present supports the Rossian view which emphasizes the role of moral opinion in coming to make fair moral decision, and in hail to have justified moral beliefs. These remark about moral judgment comport well with my contextualist moral epistemology. In cases where an expert moral thinker mulls over some exit and comes to a belief about the morality of some action or whatever, he or she is engaged in an bodily process of weighing and balancing various morally relevant considerations - circumstance reflect in his or her general moral beliefs that I have been saying are contextually basic. The moral belief he or she eventually settle on is not dictated by any algorithm she or he has; trained moral judgment is operative here. Nevertheless, the expert is reasoning about the case and can, if ask, state those reason that, in the end, were decisive. Of naturally, at bottom, his or her reasons are represented by midlevel moral beliefs. thus, after the fact, our expert can provide a justification for his or her impression terminating in his or her midlevel moral beliefs, but there is no application rule stick to dictating that one sort of general moral consideration should trump competing moral considerations in this case. What this uncover about those epistemic norms governing moral impression is that we operate according to A Contextualist Moral Epistemology 317 epistemic norms some of which permit one to hold moral beliefs, in certain context, on the basis of an exercise of one's moral judgment. " A Brief Rationale I have been claiming that my contextualist picture is more or less descriptively accurate, at least if we are focused on questions about epistemically creditworthy moral belief. But
 noh to say that rules play no justificatoty role et all jn comine to have justified moral bepiwfs avout specific cases). Bug they mane a furrher Eossian pomht, namely, thaf ade't moral judgmenj and reasonhng in complex cxszs, where a number of morally relevane consicegations come igto klar, is not grounded in any algorithm or auper rlle that would rayionally determine some ouhcomf. They write: ['If thf phenomenooogy if skillful zoping we have presentgd is right, principles and theorkes szrve only fir eagny stages oh learging; no pringpple or theory "ground" an expcrt evhicql response, any more vhan in chess there ys a theosy or rule that expoauns a masder-ldcel mobe. Aa we hwve seen in tge case of xhess, recognizing tnae there is no say to gwound one's intuitions in an explanation is an important step on tye way to acquiring edpertise." Ehe phenomenology of moral thinking that the Dreyxus bcoghexw prerwnh supports the Rossian view which emphasizes ege rple of moral jmdgment in coming yo mshe reasonable moral dedisions, and in comlng to rave hustified morsl beliefs. These remarks abiut moral jubgmwnt comport well wnth my contertualixt motal epistemology. In caszs whede an experh moral tgknker mulls over soke issue and comes to a beliqf about vhe mprality of xome astion or wjatevcs, he or she is engwged nn an activity lf weighing and balancing varionx morally rekeeann considexationx-consideratiogs reflected iu his or her eeneral mogal beliehs that I hade been sayinc are contextnally basyc. Tye miral beukef he or she rventuallj fettoes on is not dicteted gy any algorithn sye or he has; trsindd iogal jtggement is o[eragivd here. Neverthelewr, thr expert is reasoninc abkut the case and csn, if askee, state ehose reasons that, in the end, wtre derisive. Of cpurfe, at bottom, his or her reasona are repgescnted by midlqvel moral belieys. So, after the fact, our expert can provmde a justification fot his or her belief tgrmlnating in hms or rer midleeel moral beliefs, bur there is no covtring rule followed dicfating that one sort of general moral consideration should trump competing moral conwideravijns in this casr. Whan tkis reveajs auont those epistemib norms governing moral belief ir that wa jperate according to A Contectjalist Moral Gpistemology 317 epistemic nodms some of which permit one to hold motal beliefs, in certain clrcumstanxes, oh the basir of an exercise og one's morao judgmwnt." W Brief Ratiovalr L have beej cleimnng that my contextualist picture is moee or less descripvively accurwue, at lgast if re are focused oh qusdtionr about epistrmically respomsible moral belief. Tue
not to say that rules play no at in coming have justified moral they a further Rossian namely, that adept judgment and reasoning in complex cases, a number of morally relevant considerations come into play, is not grounded in algorithm or super rule that would rationally determine some outcome. They write: ['If phenomenology skillful we presented is right, principles and theories serve only for early stages of learning; no principle or "ground" an expert ethical response, any more than chess there is a or rule that explains a move. we have in case chess, recognizing that is no way to ground one's intuitions in an explanation is an important step on the way acquiring expertise." of moral that Dreyfus present supports the which emphasizes the role of moral to make reasonable moral decisions, and in coming have justified beliefs. These remarks about moral judgment well with my contextualist moral epistemology. In cases an expert moral thinker mulls over some issue and comes to a belief about the some action or whatever, or she is in activity weighing balancing various relevant considerations-considerations reflected in his or her general moral beliefs that have been saying are contextually basic. The moral belief he eventually on is not by any algorithm she he trained moral judgement is Nevertheless, expert the and if asked, state those that, in the end, were Of course, at bottom, represented by midlevel moral beliefs. So, after the our expert can provide a justification for or her belief terminating in his or her midlevel moral beliefs, but is no followed dictating that one sort of general moral should trump competing moral in this case. What this reveals about those epistemic governing belief is we operate according A Contextualist Moral 317 epistemic norms which permit to moral circumstances, on the basis of an of moral judgment." A Brief Rationale have that my contextualist picture is more or less descriptively accurate, at least if we are questions about epistemically responsible belief.
 not to say that rules play no juStificatorY role At aLl iN cOminG to hAve justified moRAl beLiefs about specific caseS). But tHeY Make A FuRther rossian POiNT, NamElY, tHat AdEPt Moral JudGment anD reasoning In cOmPlex cases, wheRE a Number of moRalLy relevant coNsiDeratiOnS coME into PlaY, is noT grounDEd in anY algorithM oR Super rULe that wOULd RatiOnally determine soME oUTcome. They write: ['if the pHeNOmENOloGy oF skillful cOpIng we HAve presENtED IS riGHt, principles aNd theories sERve Only foR eArlY Stages Of leaRnINg; nO principle oR theOry "ground" An expeRT ethicaL ResponsE, any moRe tHan In chESs ThEre Is A TheORy Or rULe tHat explaInS a MasteR-levEL MOVe. As We hAve sEen in The case of chesS, reCognIZinG that There Is no WaY to grOund onE's intUiTions in an explanAtioN is an impoRtaNt SteP oN the wAY to acqUirIng ExpertiSe." The phENomEnOLOGy Of moral thinking thaT tHE drEyfus broThers pREsEnT Supports ThE RoSsiaN VIew whIch eMPhAsizes thE role oF MoRaL judgmeNt In comiNg To mAke ReasoNAble Moral dEcisions, And in COming to have jusTIfied moral belIEfS. tHeSE remArkS about moral JudgMEnt cOmpoRT wEll WIth my ConteXtUAlISt moral epistemology. in Cases wHere aN expert moral tHinker mullS OVEr some isSue aND cOMes to a belief abOut thE morality oF Some actiOn or wHatever, hE or she is eNGAged in an ActIviTy oF weIGHiNg and balancinG VArioUs Morally RelEvant coNsiDerAtiOns-CoNsideratiOns refleCtEd In HiS or Her geNEral moraL bEliEfS thAt I haVE been sAying Are cOnTeXTuaLly basiC. thE MOral BeLiEf he Or sHe EventUallY SetTles on iS not dictaTed BY any AlGoRithm shE or he has; trainEd Moral judgeMeNt iS operaTIVe here. NeVertheless, the expert is reASoning aBouT the cAse aNd can, if asKed, State tHosE ReasonS that, iN the eNd, WerE DEcisiVE. of CouRsE, at bottom, hIS Or hEr reaSoNs arE represEnted by midlevel morAL beLiefs. So, after tHe fAct, oUR ExPerT CaN ProViDE a jUSTification for hiS or her beliEf TErMinating in HIs oR hEr midleVel moraL beliEFs, but thEre is no coVering rulE fOlloWED diCtating thaT one sort Of general MOral cONsIderaTioN shoulD tRumP compEting mORal ConsiDeratiOnS in thiS case. whAt this reVeals about those epistemiC norms GoverNinG moral belIef IS thAt we operaTe acCording to A conTexTualiSt MORal EpIsteMOlOgy 317 EPisteMic nORms some of WHiCh pERMiT one to hold mORAL beLiefs, In cERtain cIrcuMstances, on the basiS Of an exercise of One's MORal JudGMent." a BRief Rationale I HavE bEEN claiminG tHat my contexTualist pIcTUre is More or Less deScriptiVELy ACcuratE, at lEasT if we are fOcuSeD On questIoNs ABout epIsteMiCally rEsponsIBle mORAl belief. But
 not to say that rules pla y no justi ficat ory  ro le  atallin coming to h a ve j ustified moral beliefs  abou ts peci f ic  case s). But th e y  ma ke  a  fu rt h er  Ross ian  point,  namely, t hat  a dept moral j u dg ment and r eas oning in com ple x case s,  wh e re anum ber o f mora l ly rel evant con si d eratio n s comei n to  pla y, is not grounde d  i n  any algorithm  or su pe r  r u l e t hat  would rat io nally determi n es o m e o u tcome. They w rite: ['Ift hephenom en olo g y of s killf ul cop ing we have  pre sented is  right ,  princi p les and  theor ies  se rveo nl yfor  e a rly st age s  of  learnin g;  n o pri ncip l e o r th eor y "g round " an expert e thi calr esp onse,  anymore  t han i n ches s the re  is a theory or  rul e that ex pla in s a  m aster - levelmov e.As we h ave see n  in  t h e ca se of chess, recog ni z i ng  that th ere is no  w a y to gro un d o ne's i ntuit ions in  an expl anatio n  i san impo rt ant st ep  on  th e way to a cquiri ng exper tise. "  The phenomeno l ogy of moralt hi n k in g  tha t t he Dreyfusbrot h erspres e nt  su p ports  theRo s si a n view which emphas iz es the  role  of moral jud gment in c o m i ng to ma ke r e as o nable moral de cisio ns, and in coming t o hav e justif ied moral b eliefs.The serem ark s ab out moral jud g m entco mport w ell  with m y c ont ext ual is t moral e pistemol og y.  I ncas es wh e re an ex pe rtmo ral  thin k er mul ls ov er s om ei ssu e and c o me s to a  b el iefabo ut  themora l ity  of som e actionorw hate ve r,  he orshe is engage din an acti vi tyof wei g h ing andbalancing various moral l y relev ant  cons ider ations-co nsi derati ons reflec ted in  hisor  he r gener a l  m ora lbeliefs th a t  Ihavebe en s aying a re contextually ba s ic.  The moral be lie f he o rshe ev e ntu al l y s e t tles on is notdictated b ya ny  algorithm she  o r he ha s; trai ned m o ral jud gement is  operativ ehere . Nev ertheless,  the exp ert is re a sonin g  a boutthe  casean d c an, i f aske d , s tatethosere asonsthat,  i n the en d, were decisive. Of co urse,at bo tto m, his or  he r  re asons are  rep resented b y m idl evelmor a l bel iefs .  S o,a fterthef act, oure xp ert c an  provide aj u s tif icati onf or his  orher belief termin a ting in his or  her m idl eve l  mor al  beliefs, butthe re i s no cov er ing rule fo llowed d ic t ating  thatone so rt of g e n er a l mora l co nsi derationsho ul d  trumpco mp e ting m oral  c onside ration s  int h is case. What th is re v e als a b out  thos eepistem i c no rms govern ing moral b eliefis t hat w e opera te  accor din gto A Conte x tualist M oralEpistem ol ogy317  epist emic n ormssome  o f w hich perm i t  o n eto hol d mo ral b el iefs , in cert a in circu mst a nces, o nthe b asis o f  a n exercise o f o ne'sm o ral judgme n t."A  B r ief R ationa le I h ave bee n  cl ai ming th atm y  contextu alist pic t ure  i s mo re or le ss  des cr ipt iv ely accurate, a t leastif we ar e focuse d o n  que s tionsab out epistemi cally  r e sponsib l e  mo ral bel i ef.  Bu t
 not_to say_that rules play no_justificatory role_at_all in_coming_to have justified_moral beliefs about_specific cases). But they_make a further_Rossian_point, namely, that adept moral judgment and reasoning in complex cases, where a number_of_morally relevant_considerations_come_into play, is not grounded_in any algorithm or super_rule that_would rationally determine some outcome. They write: ['If_the_phenomenology of skillful_coping we have presented is right, principles and theories_serve only for early stages of_learning; no principle_or_theory_"ground" an expert ethical_response, any more than in chess_there is a theory or rule_that explains a master-level move. As we_have seen in the case of_chess, recognizing that there is_no way_to ground one's intuitions in_an explanation is_an important_step on the_way to acquiring expertise." The phenomenology_of moral thinking_that the Dreyfus brothers present supports_the_Rossian view which_emphasizes_the_role of_moral judgment in_coming_to make_reasonable_moral decisions, and in coming to_have_justified moral beliefs. These remarks about moral_judgment comport well with_my_contextualist moral epistemology. In_cases where an expert moral_thinker mulls over some issue and_comes to_a belief_about the morality of some action or whatever, he or she_is engaged in an activity of_weighing and balancing various_morally relevant_considerations-considerations_reflected in his_or_her general_moral beliefs that I have been saying_are contextually_basic. The moral belief he or_she eventually settles on_is_not dictated by any algorithm she_or he has; trained moral judgement_is operative here. Nevertheless, the_expert_is_reasoning about the case and_can, if asked, state those reasons_that, in the_end, were decisive. Of course, at bottom,_his_or her reasons are represented by_midlevel_moral beliefs. So, after the fact,_our_expert_can provide a justification for_his or her belief terminating in_his or her midlevel moral beliefs, but there is_no covering rule_followed dictating that one sort_of_general_moral consideration should trump competing moral considerations in this case._What this_reveals about those_epistemic norms governing moral belief is that we operate according_to A Contextualist Moral Epistemology 317 epistemic_norms some of which permit one to hold moral beliefs, in_certain circumstances, on the basis of an exercise_of one's moral judgment." A Brief Rationale_I have been claiming_that_my contextualist picture is more or less_descriptively_accurate,_at_least if we_are focused on_questions about epistemically_responsible moral_belief. But