 traditional essentialist assumptions about human nature that have played an important role in moral philosophy. Do we not need to discover or posit something essential, universal, and unified in human nature to shape the idea of a "common good" that can overcome the divisive strife that plagues us? Is not the denial of a metaphysics of humanity a significant threat to ethics? This is an important question that faces postmodern thought, but I believe that a non-essentialist description of human existence can speak to many important problems in ethics. In the early Heidegger Dasein's radical finitude is indicated in its "transcendence," which means-as is made clear in What Is Metaphysics? and in the notion of being-toward-death-being held out into the Nothing. The core of Dasein is not a definable essence but an abyss that is not reducible to any state of being. But the abyssal dimension of human existence makes questioning and disclosure (from concealment to unconcealment) possible. It is also, for Heidegger, the origin of freedom, which addresses the need for decision and choice in ethics; radical finitude is also radical openness, the antithesis of deterministic closure. In addition, abyssal transcendence leaves us with a non-essentialist version of personhood that can, I think, intercept a number of morally problematic beliefs and practices. Many human abuses can be traced to reductionistic pictures of human nature, where the self is traced to some positive property or condition, be it individual, group, or universal reductions (e.g., egoism, tribalism, or Enlightenment universalism). The trouble starts when an "other" is encountered (when the egoist encounters another ego, when the tribalist encounters another tribe, or when the universalist encounters differences or resistance to the presumed definition of "human nature"). To see the human person in non-essentialist terms is to refuse all reductions, to weigh potentiality more than actuality, concealment more than full disclosure, process more than finished states, uniqueness more than universality. What humans ultimately have in common, then, is the negativity of finitude, i.e., the fact that we do not have a definable "nature." But this negativity can help disrupt all the definitional references with which we frequently promote ourselves and demote others. Since human persons cannot ultimately be fixed by any designation, then all the abstract categories of race, gender, ethnicity, class, and
traditional essentialist assumptions about human nature that have played an important role in moral doctrine. Do we not necessitate to discover or posit something all-important, cosmopolitan, and unified in human nature to shape the idea of a " coarse good " that can overcome the dissentious discord that plagues us? Is not the denial of a metaphysics of world a significant threat to ethics? This is an authoritative question that faces postmodern thought, but I believe that a non - essentialist description of human being can speak to many important problems in ethic. In the early Heidegger Dasein's radical finitude is indicated in its " transcendence, " which mean - as is made clear in What Is Metaphysics? and in the notion of being - toward - death - being contain out into the Nothing. The core of Dasein is not a definable essence but an abyss that is not reducible to any state of being. But the abyssal dimension of human existence lay down questioning and disclosure (from concealment to unconcealment) possible. It is also, for Heidegger, the origin of freedom, which addresses the need for decision and choice in ethics; extremist finitude is also revolutionary receptiveness, the antithesis of deterministic blockage. In addition, abyssal transcendence leaves us with a non - essentialist interpretation of personhood that can, I think, intercept a number of morally problematic belief and practices. Many human abuses can be traced to reductionistic pictures of human nature, where the self is traced to some positive place or condition, be it individual, group, or universal reductions (e.g., egoism, tribalism, or Enlightenment universalism). The trouble starts when an " other " is meet (when the egoist encounters another ego, when the tribalist encounters another tribe, or when the universalist meet differences or resistance to the presumed definition of " human nature "). To see the human person in non - essentialist terms is to refuse all reductions, to weigh capability more than actuality, concealment more than broad disclosure, process more than finished states, uniqueness more than universality. What world ultimately have in coarse, then, is the negativity of finiteness, i.e., the fact that we do not have a definable " nature. " But this negativity can help interrupt all the definitional references with which we frequently promote ourselves and demote others. Since human person cannot ultimately be fixate by any designation, then all the abstract categories of race, gender, ethnicity, class, and
 trwditional essentialist arsumptions abouj yuman iature fhat havd played an important role ii moeal pyilosophy. Do we not nedd to disbover or posiu something essenvjal, uniyzrsal, wnd bnmfied in human kature to svape the idea mf a "common good" that can overcome the qivisivr dtrife that plwguex us? Js not the denial of a metaphysics of humenity a signifivant threat to ethics? This is wn important questlon that faxes [istmodern thuught, but P believe tgat a non-essentialist descriptiun of human exiwtwncf can speak vo manj important pvpblems in ethocs. In the earky Ieidwgger Dasein's radical finitude is indicwted in ids "transcendence," whucy meats-as is oqde cltar ih What Is Metaphysids? and in tye notion of being-tpwwgc-death-being geld ott into the Nothing. The core of Dasein is nof a definable essence byt an abyss that is nlt reducifle to any state of being. But the abyssal dimensimn of fumck dzidtence makes questioning and disclosure (from sknveslment to uncokcealment) possible. Ih of also, for Hekdeggex, tge origin of freedlm, whicr addeesses tht neec for decision and choice ib ethics; radpcal finitude is also xadical openuess, tne anyithesis of deterministnc cloaure. In addltion, abyaral transcendencd lvavev us with a non-essentialise version of 'ersonhoud tnat cag, I think, lntergapt a number of mogally psoblematic beliefs and practices. Many humei abuses can ne trdced to xeductlonistic picturqs of human najure, wherz the relf is trzced to some posityve property mt condition, bx it indididuql, geoup, or jniversal reduvtions (e.g., egoism, trubalism, or Enlightcnmenj hniversalism). Thz uriuble starts wnen an "onhec" is qtcountered (wven ghe rgoisg encounterw anoyher ego, when the trhbaljst encounters anoyhcr tribe, ir when ehe universalost encounters difverenres or resixtagce to the presumed definition of "human nabure"). To see tre hmman person in non-essentialist terms is to refuse all reductions, to weith potentiality morg tman actualitb, concqalment mmre than full disclowure, process more than finished states, uniquaness more than universality. What humans ultimately have in common, then, is the negatmvyty of finifude, i.e., tve yact thwt wx vo not have a defpnable "nature." But this negativitb can help dnsrupt all the definitional rrfdrences with dhich we frequently promkte oursrlves and demote others. Since himan persons cannot ultikately bw fixsd by any vesignation, then all the aystracr categiried of race, genaer, ebhnicity, cpass, aud
traditional essentialist assumptions about human nature that an role in philosophy. Do we posit essential, universal, and in human nature shape the idea of a "common that can overcome the divisive strife that plagues us? Is not the denial a metaphysics of humanity a significant threat to ethics? This is an important that postmodern but believe that a non-essentialist description of human existence can speak to many important problems in ethics. the early Heidegger Dasein's radical finitude is indicated its "transcendence," which means-as made clear in What Is and the notion being-toward-death-being out the Nothing. The of Dasein is not a definable essence but an abyss that is not reducible to any state being. But dimension of existence questioning disclosure (from concealment possible. It is also, for Heidegger, freedom, which addresses the need for decision and in ethics; finitude is also radical openness, the of deterministic closure. In addition, abyssal transcendence leaves with a non-essentialist version of personhood that can, I think, intercept a number of morally and practices. Many human can be traced reductionistic of nature, the self traced to some positive property or condition, be it individual, group, universal reductions (e.g., egoism, tribalism, or Enlightenment universalism). The trouble an is encountered (when egoist encounters another ego, the encounters another tribe, or universalist differences the definition "human nature"). To see human person in non-essentialist terms to refuse all reductions, actuality, concealment more than full disclosure, process more finished states, uniqueness more than universality. What ultimately have in common, then, is the negativity of finitude, i.e., the that we have a definable "nature." But this negativity can disrupt all the definitional with which we frequently promote ourselves and demote others. human cannot ultimately fixed by any then all the categories of race, class, and
 traditional essentialist asSumptions aBout hUmaN naTuRe thAt haVe played an impoRTant Role in moral philosophy. DO we noT nEEd to DIsCover Or posit SOmETHinG eSsEntIaL, UnIversAl, aNd unifiEd in human nAtuRe To shape the idEA oF a "common goOd" tHat can overcoMe tHe diviSiVe sTRife tHat PlaguEs us? Is NOt the dEnial of a mEtAPhysicS Of humanITY a SignIficant threat to etHIcS? this is an importAnt queStIOn THAt fAceS postmoderN tHoughT, But I belIEvE THAt a NOn-essentialisT descriptioN Of hUman exIsTenCE can spEak to MaNY imPortant probLems In ethics. IN the eaRLy HeideGGer DaseIn's radIcaL fiNituDE iS iNdiCaTEd iN ItS "trANscEndence," wHiCh Means-As is MADE CleaR in what is MetAphysics? and in The NotiON of Being-TowarD-deaTh-Being Held ouT into ThE Nothing. The core Of DaSein is not A deFiNabLe EssenCE but an AbySs tHat is noT reduciBLe tO aNY STaTe of being. But the abySsAL DiMension oF human EXiStENce makes QuEstIoniNG And diScloSUrE (from conCealmeNT tO uNconceaLmEnt) posSiBle. it iS also, FOr HeIdeggeR, the origIn of fREedom, which addrESses the need foR DeCISiON and ChoIce in ethics; RadiCAl fiNituDE iS alSO radiCal opEnNEsS, The antithesis of deteRmInistiC closUre. In addition, Abyssal traNSCEndence lEaveS Us WIth a non-essentiAlist Version of pERsonhood That cAn, I think, Intercept A NUmber of mOraLly ProBleMATiC beliefs and prACTiceS. MAny humaN abUses can Be tRacEd tO reDuCtionistiC pictureS oF hUmAn NatUre, whERe the selF iS trAcEd tO some POsitivE propErty Or CoNDitIon, be it INdIVIduaL, gRoUp, or UniVeRsal rEducTIonS (e.g., egoiSm, tribaliSm, oR enliGhTeNment unIversalism). The TrOuble startS wHen An "otheR" IS encountEred (when the egoist encounTErs anotHer Ego, whEn thE tribalisT enCounteRs aNOther tRibe, or When tHe UniVERsaliST EnCouNtErs differeNCEs oR resiStAnce To the prEsumed definition of "HUmaN nature"). To see tHe hUman PERsOn iN NoN-EssEnTIalIST terms is to refusE all reductIoNS, tO weigh poteNTiaLiTy more tHan actuAlity, COncealmEnt more thAn full disClOsurE, PRocEss more thaN finisheD states, unIQueneSS mOre thAn uNiversAlIty. what hUmans uLTimAtely Have in CoMmon, thEn, is tHe NegativiTy of finitude, i.e., the fact thAt we do Not haVe a Definable "NatURe." BUt this negAtivIty can help DisRupT all tHe dEFinitIonaL ReFerENces wIth wHIch we freqUEnTly PROmOte ourselveS AND deMote oTheRS. Since HumaN persons cannot ultIMately be fixed bY any DESigNatIOn, thEn All the abstract CatEgORIes of racE, gEnder, ethnicIty, class, AnD
 traditional essentialistassumption s abo uthum an  nat urethat have play e d an  important role in mor al ph il o soph y .Do we  not ne e dt o  di sc ov eror po sit s ome thing e ssential,uni ve rsal, and un i fi ed in huma n n ature to sha pethe id ea  of a "co mmo n goo d" tha t  can o vercome t he divisi v e strif e th at p lagues us? Is not th e  denial of a m etaphy si c so f  hu man ity a sign if icant threatt oe t h ics ?  This is an i mportant qu e sti on tha tfac e s post moder nt hou ght, but Ibeli eve thata non- e ssentia l ist des cripti onofhuma n  e xi ste nc e  ca n  s pea k  to  many im po rt ant p robl e m s in e thi cs.In th e early Heide gge r Da s ein 's ra dical  fin it ude i s indi cated  i n its "transcen denc e," which  me an s-a sis ma d e clea r i n W hat IsMetaphy s ics ?a n d  i n the notion of be in g - to ward-dea th-bei n ghe l d out in to  th e No t h ing.Thec or e of Das ein is no ta defin ab le ess en cebut  an a b yssthat i s not re ducib l e to any state of being. But th e ab y ssal  di mension ofhuma n  exi sten c emak e s que stion in g  a n d disclosure (fromco ncealm ent t o unconcealme nt) possib l e .  It is a lso, fo r  Heidegger, th e ori gin of fre e dom, whi ch ad dressesthe needf o r decisi onand  ch oic e in  ethics; radi c a l fi ni tude is  al so radi cal  op enn ess ,the antit hesis of  d et er mi nis tic c l osure. I nadd it ion , aby s sal tr ansce nden ce  l e ave s us wi t ha non- es se ntia lis tversi on o f  pe rsonhoo d that ca n,I  thi nk ,interce pt a number o fmorally pr ob lem atic b e l iefs and  practices. Many humana buses c anbe tr aced  to reduc tio nistic  pi c turesof hum an na tu re, w heret h esel fis tracedt o  so me po si tive  proper ty or condition, b e  it  individual,gro up,o r  u niv e rs a l r ed u cti o n s (e.g., egoism , tribalis m, or  Enlighten m ent  u niversa lism).The t r ouble s tarts whe n an "oth er " is e nco untered (w hen theegoist en c ounte r sanoth erego, w he n t he tr ibalis t  en count ers an ot her tr ibe,or  when th e universalist encounte rs dif feren ces  or resis tan c e t o the pre sume d definiti onof"huma n n a ture" ). T o  s eet he hu manp erson inn on -es s e nt ialist term s i s t o ref use all re duct ions, to weigh po t entiality more  tha n act ual i ty,co ncealment more  th an f ull disc lo sure, proce ss moreth a n fin ishedstates , uniqu e n es s  morethan  un iversalit y.Wh a t human sul t imatel y ha ve  in co mmon,t hen, i s the negativity  of f i n itude ,  i. e., t he  fact t h at w e do not h ave a defin able " natu re."But thi snegati vit ycan help d i srupt all  thedefinit io nalref erence s wi t h  whic h we  f req uently pr o m ot e  o ur s elv es a nd de mo te o thers. Si n ce human  pe r sons ca nn otu l timate l yb e  fixed byany  desi g n ation, the n  all th e  abst ract c ategor ies ofr ace ,gender,  et h n icity, cl ass, and
 traditional_essentialist assumptions_about human nature that_have played_an_important role_in_moral philosophy. Do_we not need_to discover or posit_something essential, universal,_and_unified in human nature to shape the idea of a "common good" that can_overcome_the divisive_strife_that_plagues us? Is not the_denial of a metaphysics of_humanity a_significant threat to ethics? This is an important_question_that faces postmodern_thought, but I believe that a non-essentialist description of_human existence can speak to many_important problems in_ethics._In_the early Heidegger Dasein's_radical finitude is indicated in its_"transcendence," which means-as is made clear_in What Is Metaphysics? and in the_notion of being-toward-death-being held out into_the Nothing. The core of_Dasein is_not a definable essence but_an abyss that_is not_reducible to any_state of being. But the abyssal_dimension of human_existence makes questioning and disclosure (from_concealment_to unconcealment) possible._It_is_also, for_Heidegger, the origin_of_freedom, which_addresses_the need for decision and choice_in_ethics; radical finitude is also radical openness,_the antithesis of deterministic_closure._In addition, abyssal transcendence_leaves us with a non-essentialist_version of personhood that can, I_think, intercept_a number_of morally problematic beliefs and practices. Many human abuses can be_traced to reductionistic pictures of human_nature, where the self_is traced_to_some positive property_or_condition, be_it individual, group, or universal reductions (e.g.,_egoism, tribalism,_or Enlightenment universalism). The trouble starts_when an "other" is_encountered_(when the egoist encounters another ego,_when the tribalist encounters another tribe,_or when the universalist encounters_differences_or_resistance to the presumed definition_of "human nature"). To see the_human person in_non-essentialist terms is to refuse all reductions,_to_weigh potentiality more than actuality, concealment_more_than full disclosure, process more than_finished_states,_uniqueness more than universality. What_humans ultimately have in common, then,_is the negativity of finitude, i.e., the fact that_we do not_have a definable "nature." But_this_negativity_can help disrupt all the definitional references with which we_frequently promote_ourselves and demote_others. Since human persons cannot ultimately be fixed by any_designation, then all the abstract categories of_race, gender, ethnicity, class, and