 beliefs are factual since moral propositions are capable of being true or false. I don't dispute this and although I think the distinction between the moral and the non-moral is fuzzy, I think the distinction is clear enough for this discussion to make sense. 24 legitimate	authority	is	itself	highly	moralised,	so	it	is	difficult	to	see	this	as anything	other	than	a	type	of	moral	uncertainty.17	This	applies	a	fortiori	to	cases in	which	the	uncertainty	with	respect	to	the	origin	concerns	whether	or	not	God is	the	source	of	the	sign	since	God	functions	as	the	legitimate	authority	for	moral obligations. The	thought	experiment	also	structures	the	risk	asymmetries	in	such	a way	that	the	obligation-imposing	interpretation	of	the	sign	is	the	most compelling.	It	is,	after	all,	based	in	a	disputed	region	between	two	historically belligerent	nations.	In	that	context,	it	seems	highly	likely	that	the	sign	comes from	someone	with	the	right	kind	of	authority,	and	that	one	would	be	running	a grave	moral/legal	risk	by	not	following	the	command.18	But	this	is	where	the thought	experiment	unravels	if	it	attempts	to	provide	broader	support	for	DCT. The	thought	experiment	seems	to	involve	a	scenario	in	which	we	are	90%	sure that	the	command	comes	from	a	legitimate	authority.	It	is	easy	enough	to	see how	that	degree	of	confidence	might	suffice	to	generate	belief	in	the	obligation. The	tougher	case	(and	the	one	that	is	presumably	more	analogous	with	
beliefs are factual since moral propositions are capable of being genuine or assumed. I don't dispute this and although I think the distinction between the moral and the non - moral is bleary, I think the distinction is absolved enough for this discussion to have sense. 24 lawful 	 assurance 	 is 	 itself 	 highly 	 moralised, 	 so 	 it 	 is 	 unmanageable 	 to 	 see 	 this 	 as anything 	 other 	 than 	 a 	 type 	 of 	 moral 	 uncertainty.17 	 This 	 applies 	 a 	 fortiori 	 to 	 case in 	 which 	 the 	 uncertainty 	 with 	 obedience 	 to 	 the 	 origin 	 concerns 	 whether 	 or 	 not 	 God is 	 the 	 beginning 	 of 	 the 	 sign 	 since 	 God 	 functions 	 as 	 the 	 legitimate 	 agency 	 for 	 moral obligations. The 	 thought 	 experiment 	 also 	 structures 	 the 	 hazard 	 asymmetries 	 in 	 such 	 a room 	 that 	 the 	 obligation - imposing 	 interpretation 	 of 	 the 	 signboard 	 is 	 the 	 most compelling. 	 It 	 is, 	 after 	 all, 	 based 	 in 	 a 	 disputed 	 region 	 between 	 two 	 historically belligerent 	 nation. 	 In 	 that 	 context, 	 it 	 seems 	 highly 	 likely 	 that 	 the 	 sign 	 comes from 	 someone 	 with 	 the 	 right 	 kind 	 of 	 authority, 	 and 	 that 	 one 	 would 	 be 	 running 	 a grave 	 moral / legal 	 risk 	 by 	 not 	 following 	 the 	 command.18 	 But 	 this 	 is 	 where 	 the idea 	 experiment 	 unravels 	 if 	 it 	 attempts 	 to 	 provide 	 broad 	 documentation 	 for 	 DCT. The 	 thought 	 experiment 	 seems 	 to 	 involve 	 a 	 scenario 	 in 	 which 	 we 	 are 	 90% 	 certain that 	 the 	 instruction 	 comes 	 from 	 a 	 legitimate 	 authority. 	 It 	 is 	 comfortable 	 enough 	 to 	 see how 	 that 	 degree 	 of 	 confidence 	 might 	 suffice 	 to 	 generate 	 belief 	 in 	 the 	 debt instrument. The 	 tougher 	 case 	 (and 	 the 	 one 	 that 	 is 	 presumably 	 more 	 analogous 	 with
 bepiefs are factual since ooral propositions are capabme of bekng true or false. I don't dis'ute this and although I think ghe distijction bwtwetn the moral and vge non-moral ia fuzvy, I think the dlstinction hs clear enougv wox this discussion to make sense. 24 legytimate	suhhority	is	itsels	hignjy	modalised,	so	it	is	difficult	to	see	this	as znythinj	other	than	a	type	pf	moral	uncertainty.17	This	applles	a	vortiori	to	cases in	ahich	the	uncgdtaybty	with	respezt	to	the	origin	concerns	wgether	or	not	God is	the	source	of	the	rign	snnce	God	funcjnins	wv	the	legitimete	autrority	for	moral obligdtions. Yhe	thought	expevimenv	alsi	structures	the	risk	asykmetries	in	such	a wai	that	the	obniyation-imposing	interprwtqtion	mf	tha	sigv	us	tfe	mksv ckmpelllng.	Mt	is,	after	alm,	based	in	a	diwputed	region	between	uwo	rpxtorically bslligewegt	nations.	In	that	context,	it	seems	highly	likeny	tgat	the	sign	comes from	somwone	with	the	right	kind	ov	authoritr,	and	that	one	would	be	running	a grave	moral/legal	risk	by	nmt	folmuwiun	bhe	cunmwnd.18	But	this	is	where	the thought	experiment	unravelf	jf	ot	sttempts	to	provlde	broader	support	fpr	FCY. The	thought	exkerimenc	aesms	to	involve	a	scenagio	in	whych	we	qre	90%	sure trat	tne	command	comes	from	a	legitimare	authority.	In	is	eqsy	enough	to	see how	chat	degree	of	eonfidgnce	mibht	suffice	to	generate	belnef	in	tge	obligatioj. The	touggdr	case	(and	the	one	tfat	ps	prasumably	more	analogous	with	
beliefs are factual since moral propositions are being or false. don't dispute this distinction the moral and non-moral is fuzzy, think the distinction is clear enough this discussion to make sense. 24 legitimate authority is itself highly moralised, so is difficult to see this as anything other than a type of moral This a to in which the uncertainty with respect to the origin concerns whether or not God is the of the sign since God functions as the authority for moral obligations. thought experiment also structures the asymmetries such a that obligation-imposing of the sign the most compelling. It is, after all, based in a disputed region between two historically belligerent nations. that context, highly likely the comes someone with the of authority, and that one would grave moral/legal risk by not following the command.18 this is the thought experiment unravels if it to provide broader support for DCT. The thought seems to involve a scenario in which we are 90% sure that the command comes legitimate authority. It is enough to see that of might to generate in the obligation. The tougher case (and the one that is more analogous with
 beliefs are factual since morAl propositIons aRe cApaBlE of bEing True or false. I doN'T disPute this and although I thInk thE dIStinCTiOn betWeen the MOrAL And ThE nOn-mOrAL iS fuzzY, I tHink the DistinctioN is ClEar enough for THiS discussioN to Make sense. 24 legItiMate	auThOriTY	is	itSelF	highLy	moraLIsed,	so	It	is	diffiCuLT	to	see	THis	as anYTHiNg	otHer	than	a	type	of	morAL	uNCertainty.17	This	aPplies	A	fORtIORi	tO	caSes in	which	ThE	unceRTainty	wITh	RESPecT	To	the	origin	coNcerns	whethER	or	Not	God Is	The	SOurce	oF	the	sIgN	SinCe	God	functiOns	aS	the	legitImate	aUThority	FOr	moral ObligaTioNs. THe	thOUgHt	ExpErIMenT	AlSo	sTRucTures	the	RiSk	AsymmEtriES	IN	Such	A waY	thaT	the	oBligation-impoSinG	intERprEtatiOn	of	tHe	siGn	Is	the	Most coMpellInG.	It	is,	after	all,	baSed	iN	a	disputeD	reGiOn	bEtWeen	tWO	histoRicAllY belligErent	naTIonS.	IN	THAt	Context,	it	seems	highLy	LIKeLy	that	thE	sign	cOMeS fROm	someonE	wIth	The	rIGHt	kinD	of	aUThOrity,	and	That	onE	WoUlD	be	runnInG	a gravE	mOraL/leGal	riSK	by	nOt	follOwing	the	CommaND.18	But	this	is	wherE	The thought	expERiMENt	UNravEls	If	it	attemptS	to	pROvidE	broADeR	suPPort	fOr	DCT. thE	ThOUght	experiment	seems	To	InvolvE	a	sceNario	in	which	wE	are	90%	sure thAT	THe	commanD	comES	fROm	a	legitimate	aUthorIty.	It	is	easY	Enough	to	See hoW	that	degRee	of	confIDEnce	mighT	suFfiCe	tO	geNERaTe	belief	in	the	OBLigaTiOn. The	toUghEr	case	(aNd	tHe	oNe	tHat	Is	PresumablY	more	anaLoGoUs	WiTh	
 beliefs are factual since  moral pro posit ion s a re  cap able  of being true or f alse. I don't disputethisan d  alt h ou gh Ithink t h ed i sti nc ti onbe t we en th e m oral an d the non- mor al  is fuzzy, I th ink the di sti nction is cl ear  enoug hfor thisdis cussi on tom ake se nse. 24 l eg i timate authori t y 	i s	it self	highly	moral i se d ,	so	it	is	dif ficult 	t o 	s e e 	th isas anythin gother than	at yp e o f	m o ral	uncertain ty.17	Thisa ppl ies	afo rti o ri	tocases  i n 	wh ich	the	unc erta inty	with 	respe c t	to	th e 	origin 	conce rns 	wh ethe r 	o rnot 	G o d i s 	t hes our ce	of	th esi gn	si nceG o d func tio ns	a s	the 	legitimate	a uth orit y 	fo r	mor al ob liga ti ons.The	th ought 	e xperiment	alsostru ctures	th e	r is k	a sy mmetr i es	insuc h	a  way	th at	theo bli ga t i o n- imposing	interpret at i o nof	the	s ign	is th em ost comp el lin g.	I t is,	a fter al l,	based 	in	ad is pu ted	reg io n	betw ee n	t wohisto r ical ly bel ligerent 	nati o ns.	In	that	co n text,	it	seem s 	h i g hl y 	lik ely 	that	the	s ignc omes  fro m 	s ome o ne	wi th	th er ig h t	kind	of	authority ,and	th at	on e	would	be	ru nning	a gr a v e 	moral/l egal ri s k	by	not	follo wingthe	comman d .18	Butthisis	where 	the thou g h t	experi men t	u nra vel s if 	it	attemptst o 	pro vi de	broa der 	suppor t	f orDCT . T he 	thoughtexperime nt 	s ee ms 	to 	invo l ve	a	sce na rio 	i n	w hichw e	are90%	s ureth at the 	comman d 	c o m es	f ro ma	le git im ate	a utho r ity .	It	is 	easy	eno ugh to	s ee  h ow	that 	degree	of	co nf idence	mig ht 	su fficet o 	generat e	belief	in	the	obligat i on. The 	to ugher 	cas e	(and	th e	o ne	tha t	i s 	presu mablymorean alo g o us	wi t h 	
 beliefs_are factual_since moral propositions are_capable of_being_true or_false._I don't dispute_this and although_I think the distinction_between the moral_and_the non-moral is fuzzy, I think the distinction is clear enough for this discussion_to_make sense._24_legitimate	authority	is	itself	highly	moralised,	so	it	is	difficult	to	see	this	as_anything	other	than	a	type	of	moral	uncertainty.17	This	applies	a	fortiori	to	cases in	which	the	uncertainty	with	respect	to	the	origin	concerns	whether	or	not	God is	the	source	of	the	sign	since	God	functions	as	the	legitimate	authority	for	moral obligations. The	thought	experiment	also	structures	the	risk	asymmetries	in	such	a_way	that	the	obligation-imposing	interpretation	of	the	sign	is	the	most compelling.	It	is,	after	all,	based	in	a	disputed	region	between	two	historically belligerent	nations.	In	that	context,	it	seems	highly	likely	that	the	sign	comes from	someone	with	the	right	kind	of	authority,	and	that	one	would	be	running	a grave	moral/legal	risk	by	not	following	the	command.18	But	this	is	where	the_thought	experiment	unravels	if	it	attempts	to	provide	broader	support	for	DCT. The	thought	experiment	seems	to	involve	a	scenario	in	which	we	are	90%	sure_that	the	command	comes	from	a	legitimate	authority.	It	is	easy	enough	to	see how	that	degree	of	confidence	might	suffice	to	generate	belief	in	the	obligation. The	tougher	case	(and	the	one	that	is	presumably	more	analogous	with	