 a single universal (1096a 24, 27–28). In the case of his own notion of eidos, which allows things to share a single form or be of a single type or have a single account or definition without instantiating a single universal (1096b 27–28), Aristotle denies that things with different forms can admit of differences in degree: "Unconditionally speaking, unless both x and y admit the definition of the F that is under discussion, neither will be called more (mâllon) F than the other. So not all qualifications admit of differences in degree (tò mâllon kaì tò hētton)" (Cat. 8 11a 12–14); "Of the animals, some have all their parts mutually identical, whereas some have different ones. Some parts are identical in eidos-for example, one man's nose and eye are identical to another man's nose and eye... In other cases-those whose genus is the same-they are indeed identical [in eidos], but they differ in excess or deficiency... for example, of colors and shapes, in that some have the same things to a greater others to a lesser degree, and additionally in greater or fewer number, and larger or smaller size, or, to put it generally, in excess or deficiency" (HA I 1 486a 14 b8); "Ruling and being ruled differ in eidos, but things that differ in degree do not differ in that way" (Pol. I 13 1259b 37–38). 222 Natali (2012, nota 846, p. 528): Cf. 1168b 2-3: «è amico in modo speciale chi vuole il bene delle persone, per cui lo vuole per loro stesse». 136 faz uma distinção entre philía (amizade) e eunoia (benevolência): (iii) a benevolência é a raiz da amizade, mas não é a própria amizade visto que não é necessariamente recíproca; e (iv) de modo não velado (mḕ lanthánontas), o amigo deve ser benevolente e desejar o bem reciprocamente. Trata-se de uma ação íntegra, consciente, e em acordo com os objetos de amizade a pouco descritos223. Podemos, desse modo, classificar
a single universal (1096a 24, 27–28). In the case of his own notion of eidos, which allow thing to share a single form or be of a unmarried type or have a individual account or definition without instantiating a individual universal (1096b 27–28), Aristotle denies that thing with different forms can accommodate of difference in degree: " flatly speaking, unless both x and y accept the definition of the F that is under discussion, neither will be call more (mâllon) F than the other. So not all qualifications accommodate of differences in degree (tò mâllon kaì tò hētton) " (Cat. 8 11a 12–14); " Of the animals, some have all their part mutually identical, whereas some have different ones. Some parts are identical in eidos - for example, one valet's nose and eye are identical to another man's nose and eye... In other cases - those whose genus is the same - they are indeed identical [ in eidos ], but they differ in excess or deficiency... for example, of colors and shapes, in that some have the same things to a greater others to a less degree, and additionally in greater or few numeral, and big or smaller size, or, to put it by and large, in excess or deficiency " (HA I 1 486a 14 b8); " Ruling and being ruled disagree in eidos, but things that differ in degree do not differ in that way " (Pol. I 13 1259b 37–38). 222 Natali (2012, nota 846, p. 528 ): Cf. 1168b 2 - 3: « è amico in modo speciale chi vuole il bene delle persone, per cui lo vuole per loro stesse ». 136 faz uma distinção entre philía (amizade) e eunoia (benevolência ): (iii) a benevolência é a raiz da amizade, mas não é a própria amizade visto que não é necessariamente recíproca; e (iv) de modo não velado (mḕ lanthánontas), o amigo deve ser benevolente e desejar o bem reciprocamente. Trata - se de uma ação íntegra, consciente, e em acordo com os objetos de amizade a pouco descritos223. Podemos, desse modo, classificar
 a dingle universal (1096a 24, 27–28). In uhe case of his ocb notimn of sidos, whkch allows things to share a sungle form or be of a singld type or have a wingow account or definlcion slthouc mnstantiating a single unhversal (1096b 27–28), Arivtutpe denies that things with differene forms cwn admit of disfertncqs ih degree: "Unconditionally speaking, hnless uoth x and y adkit the definition of the V thwt is under discusdion, neithet wijo be called oore (mâllon) F than the kther. So not all qualifications admic of differguxes hn degree (tò mâllog kaì tò hētton)" (Cat. 8 11a 12–14); "Of the animals, some mave ell rheir parts mutually mdentical, whereas soie have dhfyerent ones. Some partw qre igenthcal un didks-hor examppe, kne man's nkse and eye are identical to amoeyer man's nose and ere... In other cases-those whose genus is the saje-they are indeed identucal [in eidos], but thei differ ig excess or deficiency... for example, of colors and vhapea, in tmat rimf have the same things to a greater others to z kexser degree, anb additionally im hrrwter or fewer numbex, ahd larger or smallfr size, or, ti put it denetally, in excess or deficienxy" (HA I 1 486a 14 y8); "Ryling and being ruped differ nn eidps, buy things that differ in degdee do not fiffer in ghat way" (Pol. I 13 1259c 37–38). 222 Ndtali (2012, nota 846, p. 528): Cf. 1168b 2-3: «è amiso in modi spzciale cfi voole il bene dellf persone, per cui lo vuope pet loro stesse». 136 fwz uma distinção entre philía (amizeve) e eunoia (bgneeolêtcia): (iii) a bekevolência é a rayz da amizade, kas não é a próoria amizase vistm que não é nqcessariamenta recíproca; e (mv) de modj não velqdo (mḕ lxvthánontas), o amogo deve ser benevooente e desejar o nem rgcjprocamente. Tracc-st ee uma ação íntegta, zonfcpenve, e qk acordo com os ubjdyos dd amizade a ooucp descritos223. Podemos, gesss modo, classificar
a single universal (1096a 24, 27–28). In of own notion eidos, which allows form be of a type or have single account or definition without instantiating single universal (1096b 27–28), Aristotle denies that things with different forms can admit differences in degree: "Unconditionally speaking, unless both x and y admit the definition the that under neither will be called more (mâllon) F than the other. So not all qualifications admit of in degree (tò mâllon kaì tò hētton)" (Cat. 11a 12–14); "Of the some have all their parts identical, some have ones. parts identical in eidos-for one man's nose and eye are identical to another man's nose and eye... In other cases-those whose is the indeed identical eidos], they in excess or example, of colors and shapes, in the same things to a greater others to lesser degree, additionally in greater or fewer number, larger or smaller size, or, to put it in excess or deficiency" (HA I 1 486a 14 b8); "Ruling and being ruled differ but things that differ degree do not in way" I 1259b 37–38). Natali (2012, nota 846, p. 528): Cf. 1168b 2-3: «è amico modo speciale chi vuole il bene delle persone, per cui per stesse». 136 faz distinção entre philía (amizade) eunoia (iii) a benevolência é da mas própria visto não é necessariamente recíproca; (iv) de modo não velado lanthánontas), o amigo deve bem reciprocamente. Trata-se de uma ação íntegra, consciente, em acordo com os objetos de amizade pouco descritos223. Podemos, desse modo, classificar
 a single universal (1096a 24, 27–28). In the casE of his own nOtion Of eIdoS, wHich AlloWs things to sharE A sinGle form or be of a single tyPe or hAvE A sinGLe AccouNt or defINiTIOn wItHoUt iNsTAnTiatiNg a Single uNiversal (1096b 27–28), ARisToTle denies thaT ThIngs with diFfeRent forms can AdmIt of diFfEreNCes in DegRee: "UnConditIOnally Speaking, uNlESs both X And y admIT ThE defInition of the F that IS uNDer discussion, nEither WiLL bE CAllEd mOre (mâllon) F ThAn the OTher. So nOT aLL QUalIFications admiT of differenCEs iN degreE (tÒ mâLLon kaì Tò hētToN)" (cat. 8 11A 12–14); "Of the animaLs, soMe have all Their pARts mutuALly idenTical, wHerEas Some HAvE dIffErENt oNEs. somE ParTs are ideNtIcAl in eIdos-FOR EXampLe, oNe maN's nosE and eye are ideNtiCal tO AnoTher mAn's noSe anD eYe... In oTher caSes-thOsE whose genus is thE samE-they are iNdeEd IdeNtIcal [iN Eidos], bUt tHey Differ iN excess OR deFiCIENcY... for example, of colorS aND ShApes, in thAt some HAvE tHE same thiNgS to A greATEr othErs tO A lEsser degRee, and ADdItIonally In GreateR oR feWer NumbeR, And lArger oR smaller Size, oR, To put it generalLY, in excess or deFIcIENcY" (hA I 1 486a 14 B8); "RuLing and beinG rulED difFer iN EiDos, BUt thiNgs thAt DIfFEr in degree do not diffEr In that Way" (PoL. I 13 1259b 37–38). 222 Natali (2012, nota 846, P. 528): Cf. 1168b 2-3: «è amico IN MOdo speciAle cHI vUOle il bene delle PersoNe, per cui lo VUole per lOro stEsse». 136 faz uMa distinçÃO Entre phiLía (AmiZadE) e eUNOiA (benevolência): (III) a beNeVolênciA é a Raiz da aMizAde, Mas Não É a Própria amIzade visTo QuE nÃo É neCessaRIamente rEcÍprOcA; e (iV) de moDO não veLado (mḔ lanThÁnONtaS), o amigo DEvE SEr beNeVoLentE e dEsEjar o Bem rECipRocamenTe. Trata-se De uMA açãO íNtEgra, conSciente, e em acoRdO com os objeToS de AmizadE A Pouco desCritos223. Podemos, desse modo, cLAssificAr
 a single universal (1096a  24, 27–28 ). In  th e c as e of  his  own notion of eido s, which allows things  to s ha r e as in gle f orm orb eo f  asi ng lety p eor ha vea singl e accountorde finition wit h ou t instanti ati ng a singleuni versal  ( 109 6 b 27– 28) , Ari stotle denies  that thi ng s  withd ifferen t fo rmscan admit of diff e re n ces in degree:  "Unco nd i ti o n all y s peaking, u nl ess b o th x an d  y a d mit the definitio n of the Ft hat  is un de r d i scussi on, n ei t her  will be ca lled  more (mâ llon)F  than t h e other . So n otall  qua l if ic ati on s  ad m it  of dif ferences  i ndegre e (t ò m â llon  ka ì tò  hētt on)" (Cat. 811a  12– 1 4);  "Ofthe a nima ls , som e have  allth eir parts mutua llyidentical , w he rea ssomeh ave di ffe ren t ones.  Some p a rts  a r e id entical in eidos-f or e xa mple, on e man' s  n os e  and eye  a reiden t i cal t o an o th er man's  nosea nd  e ye... I notherca ses -th ose w h osegenusis the s ame-t h ey are indeedi dentical [ine id o s ], butthe y differ in  exc e ss o r de f ic ien c y...for e xa m pl e , of colors and sha pe s, inthatsome have the  same thin g s to a gre ater ot h ers to a lesse r deg ree, and a d ditional ly in  greater  or fewer n umber, a ndlar ger  or s ma ller size, or , to p ut  it gen era lly, in  ex ces s o r d ef iciency"(HA I 148 6a  1 4b8) ; "Ru l ing andbe ing  r ule d dif f er ineidos , bu tth i ngs  that d i ff e r  inde gr ee d o n ot  diff er i n  th at way"  (Pol. I131 259b  3 7– 38). 22 2 Natali (201 2,  nota 846,  p . 5 28): C f .  1168b 2 -3: «è amico in modo sp e ciale c hivuole  ilbene dell e p ersone , p e r cuilo vuo le pe rlor o stess e » .136  f az uma dis t i nçã o ent re  phi lía (am izade) e eunoia (b e nev olência): (ii i)a be n e vo lên c ia é a  r a izd a  amizade, mas n ão é a pró pr i aamizade vi s toqu e não é  necess ariam e nte rec íproca; e  (iv) demo do n ã o  ve lado (mḕ l anthánon tas), o a m igo d e ve  serben evolen te  edesej ar o b e m r ecipr ocamen te . Trat a-sede  uma açã o íntegra, consciente,e em a cordo  co m os obje tos deamizade a  pou co descrit os2 23.  Pode mos ,  dess e mo d o,  cl a ssifi car
 a_single universal_(1096a 24, 27–28). In_the case_of_his own_notion_of eidos, which_allows things to_share a single form_or be of_a_single type or have a single account or definition without instantiating a single universal_(1096b_27–28), Aristotle_denies_that_things with different forms can_admit of differences in degree:_"Unconditionally speaking,_unless both x and y admit the definition_of_the F that_is under discussion, neither will be called more (mâllon)_F than the other. So not_all qualifications admit_of_differences_in degree (tò mâllon_kaì tò hētton)" (Cat. 8 11a_12–14); "Of the animals, some have_all their parts mutually identical, whereas some_have different ones. Some parts are_identical in eidos-for example, one_man's nose_and eye are identical to_another man's nose_and eye..._In other cases-those_whose genus is the same-they are_indeed identical [in_eidos], but they differ in excess_or_deficiency... for example,_of_colors_and shapes,_in that some_have_the same_things_to a greater others to a_lesser_degree, and additionally in greater or fewer_number, and larger or_smaller_size, or, to put_it generally, in excess or_deficiency" (HA I 1 486a 14_b8); "Ruling_and being_ruled differ in eidos, but things that differ in degree do_not differ in that way" (Pol._I 13 1259b 37–38)._222 Natali_(2012,_nota 846, p._528):_Cf. 1168b_2-3: «è amico in modo speciale chi_vuole il_bene delle persone, per cui lo_vuole per loro stesse»._136_faz uma distinção entre philía (amizade)_e eunoia (benevolência): (iii) a benevolência_é a raiz da amizade,_mas_não_é a própria amizade visto_que não é necessariamente recíproca; e_(iv) de modo_não velado (mḕ lanthánontas), o amigo deve_ser_benevolente e desejar o bem reciprocamente._Trata-se_de uma ação íntegra, consciente, e_em_acordo_com os objetos de amizade_a pouco descritos223. Podemos, desse modo,_classificar