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 Entities._In: Philosophical_Troubles: Collected Papers Volume_1. Oxford:_Oxford_University Press,_52-75._LEWIS, D. (1978):_Truth in Fiction._American Philosophical Quarterly 15,_37-46. LEWIS, D._(1979):_Counterfactual Dependence and Time's Arrow. Noûs 13, 455-476. LEWIS, D. (1983): Postscripts to Truth_in_Fiction. In:_Philosophical_Papers._Oxford: Oxford University Press, 276-280._LEWIS, D. (1993): Many, But_Almost One._In: Bacon, J., Campbell, K. & Reinhardt, L._(eds.):_Ontology, Causality and_Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 23-42. MACFARLANE, J. (2005):_Making Sense of Relative Truth. Proceedings_of the Aristotelian_Society_105,_321-339. PRIEST, G. (2005):_Towards Non-Being. The Logic and Metaphysics_of Intentionality. Oxford: Clarendon Press. PROUDFOOT,_D. (2006): Possible Worlds Semantics and Fiction._Journal of Philosophical Logic 35, 9-40._SAINSBURY, M. (2010): Fiction and_Fictionalism. London:_Routledge. STALNAKER, R. (1978): Assertion._In: Cole, P._(ed.): Syntax_and Semantics, Vol_9. New York: Academic Press, 315-332._STONE, J. (2010):_Harry Potter and the Spectre of_Imprecision._Analysis 70, 4,_638644._SULLIVAN,_A. (2005):_Rigid Designation, Direct_Reference,_and Modal_Metaphysics._Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86, 577-599. THOMASSON,_A._(1999): Fiction and Metaphysics. Cambridge: Cambridge University_Press. VAN INWAGEN, P._(1977):_Creatures of Fiction. American_Philosophical Quarterly 4, 299-308. WRIGHT,_B. (2014): Many, But Almost Holmes?_In: García-Carpintero,_M. &_Martí, G. (eds.): Empty Representations: Reference and Non-Existence. Oxford: Oxford University_Press, 290-306. International Journal of Academic_Pedagogical Research (IJAPR) ISSN:_2000-004