 off at Leuchars is a necessary means of going to St Andrews. No doubt this is true. But it cannot be true just in virtue of the meaning of 'willing the end', as Kant suggests. It must also involve the meaning of 'rational'. It is true because, as a rational person, you are guided by correct intention reasoning. So we still need an explanation of how intention reasoning can be correct. But at this point Kant's explanation gives out. I shall offer an explanation in the next section. 3. The correctness of intention reasoning and belief reasoning To see why intention reasoning is correct, it will be helpful to compare it with a sort of reasoning that is better understood in philosophy. I mean theoretical reasoning or, as I shall call it 'belief reasoning'. All reasoning, conceived as a process, starts from existing states of mind and concludes in a new state of mind. By 'belief reasoning', I mean reasoning that 3 concludes in a belief. An example is: B(I am going to St Andrews) (C1) and B(To go to St Andrews, a necessary means is to get off at Leuchars) (C2) leads to B(I shall get off at Leuchars). (C3) Like (B), (C) describes a process of reasoning from the outside. It is not an inference. From (C1) and (C2), we cannot infer (C3). If you are irrational you might not. Seen from the inside, the reasoning operates on the contents of your beliefs, like this: I am going to St Andrews and To go to St Andrews, a necessary means is to get off at Leuchars, so I shall get off at Leuchars. These three statements represent the contents of beliefs, and together they represent the content of the reasoning described in (C). I shall take the individual contents to be propositions. They constitute a valid inference. These three propositions stand in a particular relation to each other, a relation such that, if the first two are true, so is the third. This makes the inference valid, which in turn makes the process of reasoning correct. The reasoning is correct because its content is valid. The validity of this content plays a part in other sorts of reasoning besides (C), because propositions do not need to be believed for them to play a part in reasoning. For example, the same content might feature in hypothetical reasoning, where you do not believe (C1) or (C2), but are working
off at Leuchars is a necessary means of going to St Andrews. No doubt this is true. But it cannot be true barely in merit of the meaning of' willing the end', as Kant suggest. It must besides involve the meaning of' rational'. It is true because, as a intellectual person, you are guide by correct purpose reasoning. therefore we still want an explanation of how intention reasoning can be correct. But at this decimal point Kant's explanation give out. I shall offer an explanation in the next section. 3. The correctness of purpose reasoning and belief reasoning To see why purpose reasoning is correct, it will be helpful to compare it with a sort of reasoning that is better understood in philosophy. I entail theoretical reasoning or, as I shall call it' belief reasoning'. All reasoning, conceived as a process, starts from exist states of mind and concludes in a new state of mind. By' belief reasoning', I mean reasoning that 3 concludes in a belief. An example is: B(I am going to St Andrews) (C1) and B(To go to St Andrews, a necessary means is to get off at Leuchars) (C2) leads to B(I shall have off at Leuchars). (C3) Like (B), (C) describes a process of reason from the outside. It is not an inference. From (C1) and (C2), we cannot infer (C3). If you are irrational you might not. Seen from the inside, the reasoning operates on the subject of your beliefs, like this: I am going to St Andrews and To go to St Andrews, a necessary means is to beget off at Leuchars, so I shall get off at Leuchars. These three statements represent the contents of beliefs, and together they stage the content of the reasoning described in (C). I shall take the individual contents to be suggestion. They appoint a valid inference. These three propositions stand in a particular relation to each other, a relation back such that, if the first two are true, so is the third. This reach the inference valid, which in turn makes the process of argue correct. The reasoning is correct because its content is valid. The cogency of this content bring a part in other sorts of reasoning besides (coulomb), because propositions do not need to be believed for them to play a part in reasoning. For exercise, the same content might feature in hypothetical reasoning, where you do not believe (C1) or (C2), but are working
 ofv at Leuchars is a necesrary means of going to St Ansrews. No doubt this is true. But it cennor be ugue just in virtue of the meanpng of 'wiolinj the end', as Kanv suggesbf. It lust elso involve thg meaning of 'rational'. It iv grbe because, as a rational person, you wre guicef by correct igtenuiog rezsoning. So we still need an explanztion oh how intention reasoning can be correct. Hut wt this point Kant'd explanatiin gyces out. I shxll offer an explanatikn in the next section. 3. The corfectnzss of intebtuon teasoning anv belivf reasoning Bp see fhy intrntion reasonikg is coerect, it will be helphul to compare it wijh a sort mf reasoning that iw vettet undarstuid kn khikoaophy. L mxan theoretjcal reasonung or, as I shall cslj it 'belief rezsonind'. Wll reasoning, conceived as a process, stdrta from existing states if mind and concludes in a new state of mind. By 'belief reasoning', I mean reasonitg thet 3 cingluddw ln a belief. An example is: B(I am going to St Agsrtws) (C1) and B(To go bo St Andrews, a nevedssty means is to get oyr zt Leuchars) (C2) leadd to B(I shalo get off at Keuchars). (C3) Like (B), (C) describws a process if reasoning from che outside. Nt is mot am inference. From (C1) and (E2), we cznnot infer (C3). If you xre irrational yuu kicht not. Seen from the insiqe, the reesoniug operages pn the contents lf yoms beliefs, like thid: I al coing to Sh Andrews and To go to St Andrexx, a necessari maanv is to yet ofn at Leuchars, sj I shall get pff at Jeuchxrs. These nhree stavements reprqsent the condgnts of beliehs, and todethwr tyey repfdsent the contrnt of thv xeasoning described in (C). I xhaum take the indirndoql contents to be prjplsmtionf. They constidute a xslid knference. Tmesd thtee propositions statd ih a particular relstlon to eaxh other, a relation sich that, if the figst txo are true, so is the third. This makes the ihference galld, which in ttrn nakes the prpcess of reasoning correct. The reasoninj is correct because ijs content is valid. Tke validity oh this content [lays a part in othee sorts of reasonlng besides (C), because lroposhtiond do not need to be believed for them to play a part in reasoning. For exanple, tie same conteht moght xectuxe in hrpotievical reasoning, wnere you do not believe (C1) or (C2), uut are wosknng
off at Leuchars is a necessary means to Andrews. No this is true. just virtue of the of 'willing the as Kant suggests. It must also the meaning of 'rational'. It is true because, as a rational person, you guided by correct intention reasoning. So we still need an explanation of how reasoning be But this point Kant's explanation gives out. I shall offer an explanation in the next section. 3. correctness of intention reasoning and belief reasoning To why intention reasoning is it will be helpful to it a sort reasoning is understood in philosophy. mean theoretical reasoning or, as I shall call it 'belief reasoning'. All reasoning, conceived as a process, from existing mind and in new of mind. By I mean reasoning that 3 concludes An example is: B(I am going to St (C1) and go to St Andrews, a necessary is to get off at Leuchars) (C2) leads B(I shall get off at Leuchars). (C3) Like (B), (C) describes a process of reasoning outside. It is not inference. From (C1) (C2), cannot (C3). you are you might not. Seen from the inside, the reasoning operates on contents of your beliefs, like this: I am going to and go to St a necessary means is get at Leuchars, so I off Leuchars. represent contents beliefs, and together they the content of the reasoning in (C). I shall be propositions. They constitute a valid inference. These propositions stand in a particular relation to other, a relation such that, if the first two are true, so the third. the inference valid, which in turn makes the of reasoning correct. The is correct because its content is valid. The validity this plays a in other sorts reasoning besides (C), propositions do not be believed them play reasoning. For example, the same content feature hypothetical reasoning, where you do believe (C2), but are working
 off at Leuchars is a necessary Means of goiNg to ST AnDreWs. no doUbt tHis is true. But it CAnnoT be true just in virtue of tHe meaNiNG of 'wILlIng thE end', as KANt SUGgeStS. IT muSt ALsO invoLve The meanIng of 'ratioNal'. it Is true becausE, As A rational pErsOn, you are guidEd bY correCt IntENtion ReaSoninG. So we sTIll neeD an explanAtIOn of hoW IntentiON ReAsonIng can be correct. BuT At THis point Kant's eXplanaTiON gIVEs oUt. I Shall offer An ExplaNAtion in THe NEXT seCTion. 3. The correcTness of inteNTioN reasoNiNg aND belieF reasOnINg TO see why inteNtioN reasoninG is corREct, it wiLL be helpFul to cOmpAre It wiTH a SoRt oF rEAsoNInG thAT is Better unDeRsTood iN phiLOSOPhy. I MeaN theOretiCal reasoning oR, as i shaLL caLl it 'bElief ReasOnIng'. AlL reasoNing, cOnCeived as a procesS, staRts from exIstInG stAtEs of mINd and cOncLudEs in a neW state oF MinD. BY 'BELiEf reasoning', I mean reAsONInG that 3 conCludes IN a BeLIef. An exaMpLe iS: B(I aM GOing tO St ANDrEws) (C1) and B(to go to sT ANdRews, a neCeSsary mEaNs iS to Get ofF At LeUchars) (c2) leads to b(I shaLL get off at LeuchARs). (C3) Like (B), (C) descRIbES A pROcesS of Reasoning frOm thE OutsIde. IT Is Not AN infeRence. frOM (C1) ANd (C2), we cannot infer (C3). If YoU are irRatioNal you might noT. Seen from tHE INside, the ReasONiNG operates on the ConteNts of your bELiefs, likE this: i am going To St AndreWS And To go tO St andRewS, a nECEsSary means is to GET off At leucharS, so i shall gEt oFf aT LeUchArS. These thrEe statemEnTs RePrEseNt the COntents oF bEliEfS, anD togeTHer theY reprEsenT tHe COntEnt of thE ReASOninG dEsCribEd iN (C). i shalL takE The IndividUal contenTs tO Be prOpOsItions. THey constitute A vAlid infereNcE. ThEse thrEE PropositIons stand in a particular rELation tO eaCh othEr, a rElation suCh tHat, if tHe fIRst two Are truE, so is ThE thIRD. This MAKeS thE iNference vaLID, whIch in TuRn maKes the pRocess of reasoning cORreCt. The reasoninG is CorrECT bEcaUSe ITs cOnTEnt IS Valid. The validitY of this conTeNT pLays a part iN OthEr Sorts of ReasoniNg besIDes (C), becAuse propoSitions do NoT neeD TO be Believed foR them to pLay a part iN ReasoNInG. For eXamPle, the SaMe cOntenT might FEatUre in HypothEtIcal reAsoniNg, Where you Do not believe (C1) or (C2), but are wOrking
 off at Leuchars is a nece ssary mean s ofgoi ngto  StAndr ews. No doubtt hisis true. But it cannot  be t ru e  jus t  i n vir tue oft he m ean in gof'w i ll ing t heend', a s Kant sug ges ts . It must al s oinvolve th e m eaning of 'r ati onal'.  I t i s  true  be cause , as a ration al person ,y ou are guidedb y  c orre ct intention reas o ni n g. So we still  needan ex p l ana tio n of how i nt entio n  reason i ng c a n b e  correct. But  at this po i ntKant's  e xpl a nation  give so ut.  I shall of feran explan ationi n the n e xt sect ion. 3 . T hecorr e ct ne ssof int e nt ion rea soning a nd  b elief  rea s o n i ng T o s ee w hy in tention reaso nin g is cor rect,  it w illbe  help ful to  comp ar e it with a sor t of  reasonin g t ha t i sbette r  under sto odin phil osophy. I m ea n t he oretical reasoning  o r ,  a s I shal l call it  ' b elief re as oni ng'. A ll re ason i ng , concei ved as apr ocess,st arts f ro m e xis tings tate s of m ind andconcl u des in a new s t ate of mind.B y' b el i ef r eas oning', I m eanr easo ning th at3  conc ludes  i n  a belief. An exampleis : B(Iam go ing to St And rews) (C1) a n d B(To g o to St Andrews, a nec essar y means is to get o ff at  Leuchar s) (C2) l e a ds to B( I s hal l g eto f fat Leuchars). ( C3)Li ke (B),  (C ) descr ibe s a  pr oce ss  of reaso ning fro mth eou tsi de. I t  is notan  in fe ren ce. F r om (C1 ) and  (C2 ),  w e  ca nnot in f er ( C3).  I fyouare  i rrati onal you  mightnot. Seen  fr o m th ein side, t he reasoningop erates onth e c ontent s of yourbeliefs, like this: I a m  goingtoSt An drew s and Togoto StAnd r ews, a  neces saryme ans i s tog e toff  a t Leuchars , soI sha ll  get  off at  Leuchars. These t h ree  statements r epr esen t th e c o nt e nts  o f  be l i efs, and togeth er they re pr e se nt the con t ent  o f the r easonin g des c ribed i n (C). Ishall tak ethei n div idual cont ents tobe propos i tions .  T hey c ons titute  a  va lid i nferen c e.These  three  p roposi tions  s tand ina particular relation t o each  othe r,a relatio n s u chthat, ifthefirst twoare  tr ue, s o i s  thethir d .Thi s  make s th e  inferenc e  v ali d ,  w hich in tur n m ake s the  pr o cess o f re asoning correct.T he reasoning i s co r r ect  be c ause  i ts content isval id . The vali di ty of thiscontentpl a ys apart i n othe r sorts o fr easoni ng b esi des (C),bec au s e propo si ti o ns donotne ed tobe bel i eved f or them to playa par t in re a son ing.Fo r examp l e, t he same co ntent might  featu re i n hyp othetic al  reaso nin g,  where you do not be lieve  (C1) o r(C2) , b ut are  wor k i ng
 off_at Leuchars_is a necessary means_of going_to_St Andrews._No_doubt this is_true. But it_cannot be true just_in virtue of_the_meaning of 'willing the end', as Kant suggests. It must also involve the meaning_of_'rational'. It_is_true_because, as a rational person,_you are guided by correct_intention reasoning._So we still need an explanation of how_intention_reasoning can be_correct. But at this point Kant's explanation gives out._I shall offer an explanation in_the next section._3._The_correctness of intention reasoning_and belief reasoning To see why_intention reasoning is correct, it will_be helpful to compare it with a_sort of reasoning that is better_understood in philosophy. I mean_theoretical reasoning_or, as I shall call_it 'belief reasoning'._All reasoning,_conceived as a_process, starts from existing states of_mind and concludes_in a new state of mind._By_'belief reasoning', I_mean_reasoning_that 3_concludes in a_belief._An example_is:_B(I am going to St Andrews)_(C1)_and B(To go to St Andrews, a_necessary means is to_get_off at Leuchars) (C2)_leads to B(I shall get_off at Leuchars). (C3) Like (B),_(C) describes_a process_of reasoning from the outside. It is not an inference. From_(C1) and (C2), we cannot infer_(C3). If you are_irrational you_might_not. Seen from_the_inside, the_reasoning operates on the contents of your_beliefs, like_this: I am going to St_Andrews and To go_to_St Andrews, a necessary means is_to get off at Leuchars, so_I shall get off at_Leuchars._These_three statements represent the contents_of beliefs, and together they represent_the content of_the reasoning described in (C). I shall_take_the individual contents to be propositions._They_constitute a valid inference. These three_propositions_stand_in a particular relation to_each other, a relation such that,_if the first two are true, so is the_third. This makes_the inference valid, which in_turn_makes_the process of reasoning correct. The reasoning is correct because_its content_is valid. The_validity of this content plays a part in other sorts_of reasoning besides (C), because propositions do_not need to be believed for them to play a part_in reasoning. For example, the same content might_feature in hypothetical reasoning, where you do_not believe (C1) or_(C2),_but are working