 of "I", and thus says nothing about tokens of "je", nor vice-versa. One might be tempted to propose a hybrid rule as the meaning of both "I" and "je", such as: Composite Character Rule: Each token of "I" or "je" refers to the speaker of that token of "I" or "je". 5These are only simplified versions, of course; truth might be relative to a context, or a world, or a time; assignments might be needed, interpretations, etc. I am focusing on the parts of such rules that are most relevant to our discussion. 6This is a simplified version of the non-formal view in Kaplan (1989). It is customary to say that Kaplanian characters are just functions (see the next notion of meaning); see, for instance, Neale (2016, p. 294). I prefer a reading according to which the formal notion is merely a representation of the intuitive, non-technical idea. 7The source of this formulation is Kaplan (1989), although he thinks of this as a mere way to represent the meaning of "I", rather than being its meaning; see Braun (1995) for further discussion. 8The source of this formulation is Braun (forthcoming). 9See Zimmermann (1997, p. 147) for a variant of this formulation. 6 The problem with this rule is that the meaning of an expression must be something that speakers of that language know in virtue of being competent with that word. And yet it is implausible to claim that the fundamental notion here is not competence with each expression in turn, but rather competence with both expressions at the same time. Rather, it should be the other way round: a speaker of both languages does indeed know something like the Composite Character Rule in virtue of knowing the Character Rule of each expression in turn. Besides, the composite rule really should address any realization of the first person pronoun in any possible language, and that is surely not something speakers can be expected to know. 2.3 Who Is This a Problem for? The puzzle is pressing for two kinds of views, which are separable, though not necessarily separated. First, one may think that reference is only a property of tokens, or uses, or utterances, rather than a property of expression types. One may hold this view because one thinks, along with Strawson (1950), Perry (2001) that people refer by using an expression, and that expressions themselves don't refer. In this case, the notion of the
of " I ", and thus says nothing about tokens of " je ", nor vice - versa. One might be tempt to nominate a hybrid rule as the meaning of both " I " and " je ", such as: Composite Character Rule: Each token of " I " or " je " refers to the loudspeaker of that token of " I " or " je ". 5These are only simplified interpretation, of course; truth might be proportional to a context, or a populace, or a time; grant might be needed, interpretations, etc. I am concenter on the parts of such rules that are most relevant to our discussion. 6This is a simplified version of the non - formal view in Kaplan (1989). It is accustomed to say that Kaplanian characters are just function (see the next impression of meaning); see, for example, Neale (2016, p. 294). I prefer a recitation according to which the formal notion is merely a theatrical performance of the intuitive, non - technical idea. 7The source of this formulation is Kaplan (1989), although he thinks of this as a mere way to present the meaning of " I ", rather than being its meaning; see Braun (1995) for further discussion. 8The source of this formulation is Braun (forthcoming). 9See Zimmermann (1997, p. 147) for a variant of this formulation. 6 The problem with this rule is that the meaning of an expression must be something that speaker of that language know in merit of being competent with that parole. And however it is implausible to claim that the fundamental impression here is not competence with each expression in bend, but rather competence with both expressions at the like time. Rather, it should be the other way round: a speaker of both languages does indeed sleep together something like the Composite Character Rule in virtue of knowing the Character Rule of each expression in turn. Besides, the composite dominion really should cover any realization of the inaugural person pronoun in any possible language, and that is surely not something speakers can be expected to acknowledge. 2.3 Who Is This a Problem for? The puzzle is pressing for two kinds of views, which are dissociable, though not necessarily separate. First, one may think that reference book is only a place of tokens, or uses, or utterances, rather than a property of saying types. One may oblige this view because one think, along with Strawson (1950), Perry (2001) that people refer by using an expression, and that expressions themselves don't mention. In this case, the impression of the
 of "I", and thus says nothing about tokens oy "je", noc vice-vsrsa. One might be tempted to propose a hybrud rule as the meaning of both "P" and "je", wuch qs: Composivs Charagcer Rhpe: Ecci token of "I" or "je" refers to the speakes uf that token of "I" or "je". 5These are onjy simpkivied versions, jf cptrse; nrmth might be relative to a contest, or a world, or a tome; assignments might be nfedef, interpretations, ftc. I am foxusigt on the pargs of such rules that zre most relevant to our discusrion. 6Chis is a sumplivhed version of tre non-formal view in Kaplan (1989). It is customsry to say that Kaplanian ciaracters are just fonctions (sae the next notion if meanhng); vee, wir knsuanre, Heale (2016, p. 294). I prefer z reading axcording to which tne dormal notion is mewejy a representation of the intuitive, not-tedhnical idea. 7The source of this formulation ls Kaplan (1989), although he thinks of this as a mere way to repsesenv ghe mcanivt lf "I", rather than being its meaning; see Braun (1995) rot nurther discussijn. 8The sourve og this formulajion is Brzun (forthcoming). 9Sef Zimmetmann (1997, p. 147) for a varoant of this formulation. 6 Tye problem wpth rhis rule is that che meaning uf am exptession must be somethiug thaf speakers lf that lzvguage know in vkrtle ox being competent with thae word. Anv yet it is kmplsusiblq to claim that the fundamental nohion kere hs not comoetence with each expression in turn, but rathgr womietence wnth bobh expressions wt the same tike. Rathzr, it rhould be nhe other way round: w speaker of tlth languagev does igdeee kniw somegfing like the Vomposite Character Rule in virtue of knusing the Characctr Tyle of each exlrersijn ii turg. Besides, the comooskye ruue really smouud acdress any realizatimn or the first person pvonoun in any posfible languagr, and that is surepy nov somevhing xpewkers can be expected to know. 2.3 Who Is Tjis a Problem fjr? Tme pozzle is przssing for two kinds of views, which are weparable, though nit necessarily sepatattd. First, one kay trink that reference is only a property of tokeks, or uses, or utterancss, ratver tjan a property of expression types. One may hold this view because one thibks, along with Strzwsom (1950), Pegry (2001) that [eoppx refer by using sn expression, and that expressiuns themvejves don't refer. In this case, tfe notion of jhe
of "I", and thus says nothing about "je", vice-versa. One be tempted to the of both "I" "je", such as: Character Rule: Each token of "I" "je" refers to the speaker of that token of "I" or "je". 5These only simplified versions, of course; truth might be relative to a context, or world, a assignments be needed, interpretations, etc. I am focusing on the parts of such rules that are most to our discussion. 6This is a simplified version the non-formal view in (1989). It is customary to that characters are functions the notion of meaning); for instance, Neale (2016, p. 294). I prefer a reading according to which the formal notion is a representation intuitive, non-technical 7The of formulation is Kaplan he thinks of this as a represent the meaning of "I", rather than being meaning; see (1995) for further discussion. 8The source this formulation is Braun (forthcoming). 9See Zimmermann (1997, 147) for a variant of this formulation. 6 The problem with this rule is that of an expression must something that speakers that know virtue being competent that word. And yet it is implausible to claim that the notion here is not competence with each expression in turn, competence both expressions at same time. Rather, it be other way round: a both does like Composite Rule in virtue of the Character Rule of each in turn. Besides, the any realization of the first person pronoun in possible language, and that is surely not speakers can be expected to know. 2.3 Who Is This a Problem The puzzle for two kinds of views, which are separable, not necessarily separated. First, may think that reference is only a property of or or utterances, than a property expression types. One hold this view thinks, along Strawson Perry refer by using an expression, and expressions don't refer. In this case, notion
 of "I", and thus says nothing abouT tokens of "jE", nor vIce-VerSa. one mIght Be tempted to proPOse a Hybrid rule as the meaning Of botH "I" ANd "je", SUcH as: CoMposite cHaRACteR RUlE: EaCh TOkEn of "I" Or "jE" refers To the speakEr oF tHat token of "I" oR "Je". 5these are onLy sImplified verSioNs, of coUrSe; tRUth miGht Be relAtive tO A conteXt, or a worlD, oR A time; aSSignmenTS MiGht bE needed, interpretaTIoNS, etc. I am focusinG on the PaRTs OF SucH ruLes that are MoSt relEVant to oUR dISCUssIOn. 6This is a simpLified versiON of The non-FoRmaL View in kaplaN (1989). IT Is cUstomary to sAy thAt KaplaniAn charACters arE Just funCtions (See The Next NOtIoN of MeANinG); SeE, foR InsTance, NeaLe (2016, P. 294). I PrefeR a reADING accOrdIng tO whicH the formal notIon Is meREly A reprEsentAtioN oF the iNtuitiVe, non-TeChnical idea. 7The sOurcE of this foRmuLaTioN iS KaplAN (1989), althoUgh He tHinks of This as a MEre WaY TO RePresent the meaning oF "I", RAThEr than beIng its MEaNiNG; see BrauN (1995) fOr fUrthER DiscuSsioN. 8thE source oF this fORmUlAtion is brAun (forThComIng). 9see ZiMMermAnn (1997, p. 147) foR a varianT of thIS formulation. 6 ThE Problem with thIS rULE iS That The Meaning of an ExprESsioN musT Be SomEThing That sPeAKeRS of that language know In Virtue Of beiNg competent wiTh that word. aND Yet it is iMplaUSiBLe to claim that tHe funDamental noTIon here iS not cOmpetencE with each EXPression In tUrn, But RatHER cOmpetence with BOTh exPrEssions At tHe same tIme. ratHer, It sHoUld be the oTher way rOuNd: A sPeAkeR of boTH languagEs DoeS iNdeEd knoW SomethIng liKe thE COmPOsiTe CharaCTeR rUle iN vIrTue oF knOwIng thE ChaRActEr Rule oF each exprEssIOn in TuRn. besides, The composite rUlE really shoUlD adDress aNY RealizatIon of the first person pronOUn in any PosSible LangUage, and thAt iS surelY noT SomethIng speAkers CaN be EXPecteD TO kNow. 2.3 whO Is This a PrOBLem For? ThE pUzzlE is presSing for two kinds of vIEws, Which are separAblE, thoUGH nOt nECeSSarIlY SepARAted. First, one may Think that rEfEReNce is only a PRopErTy of tokEns, or usEs, or uTTeranceS, rather thAn a properTy Of exPREssIon types. OnE may hold This view bECause ONe ThinkS, alOng witH STraWson (1950), PErry (2001) thAT peOple rEfer by UsIng an eXpresSiOn, and thaT expressions themselves dOn't refEr. In tHis Case, the noTioN Of tHe
 of "I", and thus says not hing about  toke nsof"j e",norvice-versa. On e  mig ht be tempted to propo se ahy b ridr ul e asthe mea n in g ofbo th  "I "a nd  "je" , s uch as:  Composite  Ch ar acter Rule:E ac h token of  "I " or "je" re fer s to t he  sp e akerofthattokeno f "I"or "je".5T h ese ar e  only s i m pl ifie d versions, of co u rs e ; truth mightbe rel at i ve t o a  co ntext, oraworld ,  or a t i me ; a ssi g nments mightbe needed,i nte rpreta ti ons ,  etc.I amfo c usi ng on the p arts  of suchrulest hat are most re levant  to  ou r di s cu ss ion .6 Thi s  i s a sim plifiedve rs ion o f th e n o n-fo rma l vi ew in  Kaplan (1989 ).It i s  cu stoma ry to  say  t hat K aplani an ch ar acters are just  fun ctions (s eeth e n ex t not i on ofmea nin g); see , for i n sta nc e , Ne ale (2016, p. 294) .I pr efer a r eading ac co r ding towh ich  the f ormal  not i on  is mere ly a r e pr es entatio nof the  i ntu iti ve, n o n-te chnica l idea.7Thes ource of thisf ormulation is Ka p l an (198 9),  although h e th i nksof t h is  as a mer e way  t o  r e present the meaning  o f "I",  rath er than being  its meani n g ;  see Bra un ( 1 99 5 ) for furtherdiscu ssion. 8Th e  sourceof th is formu lation is B raun (fo rth com ing ).9 S ee  Zimmermann ( 1 9 97,p.  147) f ora varia ntofthi s f or mulation.  6 The p ro bl em  w ith  this rule isth atth e m eanin g  of an  expr essi on  m u stbe some t hi n g  tha tsp eake rsof  that  lan g uag e knowin virtue  of bein gco mpetent  with that wo rd . And yetit  is  impla u s ible toclaim that the fundamen t al noti onhereis n ot compet enc e with  ea c h expr ession  in t ur n,b u t rat h e rcom pe tence with b oth  expr es sion s at th e same time. Rathe r , i t should be t heothe r wa y r o un d : a  s p eak e r  of both langua ges does i nd e ed  know some t hin glike th e Compo siteC haracte r Rule in  virtue o fknow i n g t he Charact er Ruleof each e x press i on  in t urn . Besi de s,the c omposi t e r ule r eallysh ould a ddres sany real ization of the first pe rson p ronou n i n any pos sib l e l anguage,andthat is su rel y n ot so met h ing s peak e rs  ca n  be e xpec t ed to kno w .2.3 W ho  Is This aP r o ble m for ? T h e puzz le i s pressing for tw o  kinds of view s, w h i chare sepa ra ble, though no t n ec e s sarily s ep arated. Fir st, onema y  thin k that  refer ence is o nl y  a pro pert y o f tokens,  or  u s es, orut te r ances,  rat he r than  a pro p erty o f expression typ es. O n e  mayh old  this  v iew bec a useone thinks , along wit h Stra wson  (195 0), Per ry  (2001 ) t ha t people r e fer by us ing a n expre ss ion,  an d that  exp r e ssion s th em sel ves don't r ef e r.  I n  th is c ase,th e no tion of t h e
 of_"I", and_thus says nothing about_tokens of_"je",_nor vice-versa._One_might be tempted_to propose a_hybrid rule as the_meaning of both_"I"_and "je", such as: Composite Character Rule: Each token of "I" or "je" refers_to_the speaker_of_that_token of "I" or "je"._5These are only simplified versions,_of course;_truth might be relative to a context, or_a_world, or a_time; assignments might be needed, interpretations, etc. I am_focusing on the parts of such_rules that are_most_relevant_to our discussion. 6This_is a simplified version of the_non-formal view in Kaplan (1989). It_is customary to say that Kaplanian characters_are just functions (see the next_notion of meaning); see, for_instance, Neale_(2016, p. 294). I prefer_a reading according_to which_the formal notion_is merely a representation of the_intuitive, non-technical idea._7The source of this formulation is_Kaplan_(1989), although he_thinks_of_this as_a mere way_to_represent the_meaning_of "I", rather than being its_meaning;_see Braun (1995) for further discussion. 8The_source of this formulation_is_Braun (forthcoming). 9See Zimmermann_(1997, p. 147) for a_variant of this formulation. 6 The_problem with_this rule_is that the meaning of an expression must be something that_speakers of that language know in_virtue of being competent_with that_word._And yet it_is_implausible to_claim that the fundamental notion here is_not competence_with each expression in turn, but_rather competence with both_expressions_at the same time. Rather, it_should be the other way round:_a speaker of both languages_does_indeed_know something like the Composite_Character Rule in virtue of knowing_the Character Rule_of each expression in turn. Besides, the_composite_rule really should address any realization_of_the first person pronoun in any_possible_language,_and that is surely not_something speakers can be expected to_know. 2.3 Who Is This a Problem for? The_puzzle is pressing_for two kinds of views,_which_are_separable, though not necessarily separated. First, one may think that_reference is_only a property_of tokens, or uses, or utterances, rather than a property_of expression types. One may hold this_view because one thinks, along with Strawson (1950), Perry (2001) that_people refer by using an expression, and that_expressions themselves don't refer. In this case,_the notion of the