distinguishable	from	recognition	of	moral	obligations,	given the	way	in	which	DCT	purports	to	explain	the	existence	of	moral	obligations. That's	the	essence	of	the	epistemological	objection:	that	given	the	kind	of metaethical	grounding	that	DCT	provides	for	moral	obligations	it	is	not	possible to	separate	explanation	from	knowledge.	Consequently,	the	content-not-source objection	does	not	work. 11 There is of course one crucial difference between the cases, but this merely strengthens the epistemological objection to DCT. Organic food will continue to be organic food even if it is mislabeled. But on DCT, a moral obligation will not continue to be a moral obligation unless it is successfully communicated and, according to what is being argued here, it is not successfully communicated until knowledge of its source is provided. 19 4.2	–	The	Probability-Possibility	Argument Is	there	another	way	to	defend	DCT	from	the	epistemological	objection?	Perhaps. One	thing	that	the	preceding	analysis	assumes	is	that	the	RNB	completely	(and reasonably)	denies	the	existence	of	God	and	so	they	are	epistemically	closed	to the	possibility	of	moral	obligations	emanating	from	God.	But,	of	course,	that might	not	be	a	fair	representation	of	their	phenomenology.	The	RNB	is	likely	to be	(or	have	been)	open	to	the	possibility	of	there	being	a	God,	and	thus	to harbour	some	potential	doubt	as	to	the	source	of	their	moral	beliefs.	Is	there	any way	in	which	this	doubt	can	be	leveraged	into	a	defence	of	the	DCT?	Evans (2013)	hints	at	this	in	
distinguishable 	 from 	 recognition 	 of 	 moral 	 obligations, 	 given the 	 direction 	 in 	 which 	 DCT 	 intent 	 to 	 explain 	 the 	 existence 	 of 	 moral 	 obligations. That's 	 the 	 effect 	 of 	 the 	 epistemological 	 objection: 	 that 	 give 	 the 	 kind 	 of metaethical 	 grounding 	 that 	 DCT 	 provides 	 for 	 moral 	 duty 	 it 	 is 	 not 	 possible to 	 separate 	 explanation 	 from 	 cognition. 	 Consequently, 	 the 	 content - not - source objection 	 does 	 not 	 work. 11 There constitute of course one crucial difference between the cases, but this merely strengthens the epistemic objection to DCT. Organic food will continue to be constituent food even if it is mislabeled. But on DCT, a moral obligation will not continue to be a moral obligation unless it is successfully communicated and, according to what is being argue here, it is not successfully communicated until knowledge of its source is provided. 19 4.2 	 – 	 The 	 Probability - Possibility 	 Argument Is 	 there 	 another 	 way 	 to 	 maintain 	 DCT 	 from 	 the 	 epistemological 	 objection? 	 Perhaps. One 	 thing 	 that 	 the 	 preceding 	 analysis 	 assumes 	 is 	 that 	 the 	 RNB 	 completely 	 (and reasonably) 	 denies 	 the 	 existence 	 of 	 God 	 and 	 so 	 they 	 are 	 epistemically 	 closed 	 to the 	 possibility 	 of 	 moral 	 obligations 	 emanating 	 from 	 God. 	 But, 	 of 	 course, 	 that might 	 not 	 be 	 a 	 fair 	 representation 	 of 	 their 	 phenomenology. 	 The 	 RNB 	 is 	 probable 	 to be 	 (or 	 have 	 been) 	 exposed 	 to 	 the 	 possibility 	 of 	 there 	 being 	 a 	 God, 	 and 	 therefore 	 to harbor 	 some 	 electric potential 	 doubt 	 as 	 to 	 the 	 source 	 of 	 their 	 moral 	 beliefs. 	 Is 	 there 	 any way 	 in 	 which 	 this 	 doubt 	 can 	 be 	 leveraged 	 into 	 a 	 defence 	 of 	 the 	 DCT? 	 Evans (2013) 	 hints 	 at 	 this 	 in
dishinguishable	from	recognitlon	of	moral	obligajiins,	givxn the	wzy	in	whicf	DCT	purports	to	explain	the	exisvencw	of	moeal	obligations. That's	thd	essence	ov	the	episremooigical	objerfion:	thab	yiven	fme	kinb	oh metaethical	grpunding	thad	DCT	provides	fos	murcl	obligations	it	is	not	possible to	separwte	explsnwtion	from	knowlgdge.	Cpgseqhvnuly,	the	content-not-source objection	dkes	not	wmrk. 11 There is of course one crucial difverejce between the cades, but thiw mewwly strengthdns the eppvtemologiczl objection to DCT. Organic fooa wilk continue ti bf organic foid evvn if it is mlxlabelad. But pn DCT, a moral obnigqtion will not continne to be a moral oblygation utlzss it is successfullt xommuticaded xbd, xcckrvinf to wjat is being zrgued here, it is not successfiljj communicates untij hnowledge of its source is provided. 19 4.2	–	Tht	Probzbility-Possibility	Argumwnt Is	there	another	way	jo	defend	DCE	from	the	epistemological	objection?	Perhaps. One	thing	tvat	thx	pfectdlkg	anxoydis	assumes	is	that	the	RNB	completely	(and reasonablr)	semivs	the	existence	of	Gjd	and	so	they	srf	elystemically	clused	to ths	possibility	of	morap	obligajions	enanating	fwom	Gpd.	But,	of	course,	that might	not	bw	a	fair	represvntarion	of	their	phenomeuology.	The	RNB	ns	likeky	to ne	(or	have	been)	open	to	the	porsibjlity	of	therf	being	a	Gos,	xnd	thus	to harbouf	soke	[otential	doubt	as	to	the	sourcq	of	their	miral	yeliefs.	Ir	thete	any wwy	in	which	tjis	domtt	can	be	leveraged	inho	a	deyence	mf	the	DCT?	Evwns (2013)	hints	at	this	in	
distinguishable from recognition of moral obligations, given in DCT purports explain the existence essence the epistemological objection: given the kind metaethical grounding that DCT provides for obligations it is not possible to separate explanation from knowledge. Consequently, the content-not-source does not work. 11 There is of course one crucial difference between the but merely the objection to DCT. Organic food will continue to be organic food even if it is mislabeled. on DCT, a moral obligation will not continue be a moral obligation it is successfully communicated and, to is being here, is successfully communicated until of its source is provided. 19 4.2 – The Probability-Possibility Argument Is there another way to defend from the Perhaps. One that preceding assumes is that completely (and reasonably) denies the existence so they are epistemically closed to the possibility moral obligations from God. But, of course, that not be a fair representation of their phenomenology. RNB is likely to be (or have been) open to the possibility of there being and thus to harbour potential doubt as the of moral Is there way in which this doubt can be leveraged into a defence the DCT? Evans (2013) hints at this in
distinguishable	from	recognItion	of	morAl	oblIgaTioNs,	GiveN the	Way	in	which	DCT	pURporTs	to	explain	the	existencE	of	moRaL	ObliGAtIons. THat's	the	ESsENCe	oF	tHe	EpiStEMoLogicAl	oBjectioN:	that	given	The	KiNd	of metaethiCAl	Grounding	tHat	dCT	provides	fOr	mOral	obLiGatIOns	it	Is	nOt	posSible tO	SeparaTe	explanaTiON	from	kNOwledge.	cONsEqueNtly,	the	content-not-SOuRCe objection	doeS	not	woRk. 11 tHeRE Is oF coUrse one cruCiAl difFErence bETwEEN The CAses, but this meRely strengtHEns The epiStEmoLOgical ObjecTiON to dCT. Organic fOod wIll continUe to be ORganic fOOd even iF it is mIslAbeLed. BUT oN DcT, a MoRAl oBLiGatIOn wIll not coNtInUe to bE a moRAL OBligAtiOn unLess iT is successfulLy cOmmuNIcaTed anD, accoRdinG tO what Is beinG arguEd Here, it is not succEssfUlly commuNicAtEd uNtIl knoWLedge oF itS soUrce is pRovided. 19 4.2	–	tHe	PRoBABIlIty-Possibility	ArguMeNT is	There	anoTher	waY	To	DeFEnd	DCT	frOm	The	EpisTEMologIcal	OBjEction?	PeRhaps. ONE	tHiNg	that	tHe	PrecedInG	anAlySis	asSUmes	Is	that	The	RNB	coMpletELy	(and reasonablY)	Denies	the	exisTEnCE	Of	gOd	anD	so	They	are	episTemiCAlly	ClosED	tO thE	PossiBilitY	oF	MoRAl	obligations	emanatInG	from	GOd.	But,	Of	course,	that mIght	not	be	a	FAIR	represeNtatIOn	OF	their	phenomenOlogy.	the	RNB	is	liKEly	to be	(oR	have	Been)	open	To	the	possIBIlity	of	tHerE	beIng	A	GoD,	ANd	Thus	to harbour	SOMe	poTeNtial	doUbt	As	to	the	SouRce	Of	tHeiR	mOral	belieFs.	Is	therE	aNy WaY	iN	whIch	thIS	doubt	caN	bE	leVeRagEd	intO	A	defenCe	of	tHe	DCt?	EVaNS (2013)	hiNts	at	thIS	iN	
distinguishable	from	recog nition	ofmoral 	ob lig at ions ,	gi ven the	way	in whic h	DCT	purports	to	expl ain	t he exis t en ce	of 	moralo bl i g ati on s.  Th at ' sthe	e sse nce	ofthe	episte mol og ical	objecti o n: 	that	give n	t he	kind	of m eta ethica lgro u nding 	th at	DC T	prov i des	fo r	moral	o bl i gation s 	it	isn o tposs ible to	separatee xp l anation	from	k nowled ge . 	C o n seq uen tly,	the	c on tent- n ot-sour c eo b j ect i on	does	not	w ork. 11 The r e i s of c ou rse one cr ucial  d i ffe rence betwe en t he cases,  but t h is mere l y stren gthens  th e e pist e mo lo gic al obj e ct ion toDCT. Org an ic  food  wil l c o ntin ueto b e org anic food eve n i f it ismisla beled . Bu ton DC T, a m oralob ligation will n ot c ontinue t o b ea m or al ob l igatio n u nle ss it i s succe s sfu ll y c om municated and, acc or d i ng  to what  is be i ng  a r gued her e,  it  isn o t suc cess f ul ly commu nicate d  u nt il know le dge of  i tssou rce i s  pro vided.  19 4.2–	The Probability-Po s sibility	Argu m en t Is ther e	a nother	wayto	d e fend 	DCT fr omt he	ep istem ol o gi c al	objection?	Perha ps . Onething 	that	the	pre ceding	ana l y s is	assum es	i s 	t h at	the	RNB	com plete ly	(and re a sonably) 	deni es	the	e xistenceo f 	God	and 	so 	th eyare e pi stemically	cl o s ed	t othe	pos sib ility	o f	m ora l	o bli ga tions	ema nating	f ro mGo d. 	Bu t,	of course,th atmi ght 	notb e	a	fa ir	re pres en ta t ion 	of	the i rp h enom en ol ogy. 	Th eRNB	i s	li k ely 	to be(or	havebee n )	op en 	t o	the	p ossibility	of 	t here	being 	a 	Go d,	and t hus	to h arbour	some	potential	d o ubt	astothe	s ourc e	of	thei r	m oral	b eli e fs.	Is 	there 	anywa y	i n which t hi s	d ou bt	can	bel e ver agedin to	a 	defenc e	of	the	DCT?	Evan s  (2 013)	hints	at 	th is	i n 
distinguishable	from	recognition	of	moral	obligations,	given the	way	in	which	DCT	purports	to	explain	the	existence	of	moral	obligations._That's	the	essence	of	the	epistemological	objection:	that	given	the	kind	of metaethical	grounding	that	DCT	provides	for	moral	obligations	it	is	not	possible_to	separate	explanation	from	knowledge.	Consequently,	the	content-not-source objection	does	not	work. 11 There_is of_course_one crucial_difference_between the cases,_but this merely_strengthens the epistemological objection_to DCT. Organic_food_will continue to be organic food even if it is mislabeled. But on DCT,_a_moral obligation_will_not_continue to be a moral_obligation unless it is successfully_communicated and,_according to what is being argued here, it_is_not successfully communicated_until knowledge of its source is provided. 19 4.2	–	The	Probability-Possibility	Argument_Is	there	another	way	to	defend	DCT	from	the	epistemological	objection?	Perhaps. One	thing	that	the	preceding	analysis	assumes	is	that	the	RNB	completely	(and reasonably)	denies	the	existence	of	God	and	so	they	are	epistemically	closed	to the	possibility	of	moral	obligations	emanating	from	God.	But,	of	course,	that might	not	be	a	fair	representation	of	their	phenomenology.	The	RNB	is	likely	to be	(or	have	been)	open	to	the	possibility	of	there	being	a	God,	and	thus	to_harbour	some	potential	doubt	as	to	the	source	of	their	moral	beliefs.	Is	there	any way	in	which	this	doubt	can	be	leveraged	into	a	defence	of	the	DCT?	Evans (2013)	hints	at	this	in	