violate	any	epistemic	duties	in	their	non-belief)	and	for	these reasonable	non-believers	(RNBs),	satisfaction	of	the	epistemic	condition	of DCT	is	not	possible. (3)	Therefore,	on	DCT,	there	are	no	moral	obligations	for	reasonable	nonbelievers. In	the	remainder	of	the	article	I	clarify	and	defend	the	two	premises	of	this argument,	and	assess	its	overall	implications. 3.	Why	is	an	epistemic	condition	essential? The	first	premise	of	the	argument	states	that	all	DCTs	incorporate	an epistemic	condition	into	their	account	of	moral	ontology.	It	is	important	to understand	what	this	means.	It	is	not	simply	that	it	would	be	a	good	or	desirable thing	for	people	to	know	what	God	has	commanded.	It	is	that	without	knowledge of	the	command,	moral	obligations	fail	to	exist.	Suppose	God	has	commanded you	to	give	10%	of	your	income	to	charity.	Premise	(1)	is	saying	that	under	DCT this	would	give	rise	to	an	obligation	only	if	you	have	knowledge	of	the	command. Premise	(1)	is	thus	pointing	to	an	intimate	connection	between	moral epistemology	and	moral	ontology	in	the	case	of	the	DCT. What	can	be	said	in	favour	of	premise	(1)?	For	one	thing,	proponents	of DCT	already	seem	to	accept	it.	This	is	certainly	the	case	for	Robert	Adams, perhaps	the	most	famous	contemporary	defender
violate 	 any 	 epistemic 	 duties 	 in 	 their 	 non - belief) 	 and 	 for 	 these reasonable 	 non - believer 	 (RNBs), 	 gratification 	 of 	 the 	 epistemic 	 condition 	 of DCT 	 is 	 not 	 possible. (3) 	 Therefore, 	 on 	 DCT, 	 there 	 are 	 no 	 moral 	 obligation 	 for 	 reasonable 	 nonbelievers. In 	 the 	 end 	 of 	 the 	 article 	 I 	 clarify 	 and 	 defend 	 the 	 two 	 premises 	 of 	 this argument, 	 and 	 buttocks 	 its 	 overall 	 implications. 3. 	 Why 	 is 	 an 	 epistemic 	 condition 	 substantive? The 	 first 	 premise 	 of 	 the 	 argument 	 state 	 that 	 all 	 DCTs 	 integrate 	 an epistemic 	 condition 	 into 	 their 	 account 	 of 	 moral 	 ontology. 	 It 	 is 	 authoritative 	 to understand 	 what 	 this 	 means. 	 It 	 is 	 not 	 merely 	 that 	 it 	 would 	 be 	 a 	 good 	 or 	 desirable thing 	 for 	 people 	 to 	 sleep together 	 what 	 God 	 has 	 commanded. 	 It 	 is 	 that 	 without 	 knowledge of 	 the 	 command, 	 moral 	 obligations 	 fail 	 to 	 exist. 	 think 	 God 	 has 	 commanded you 	 to 	 give 	 10% 	 of 	 your 	 income 	 to 	 charity. 	 Premise 	 (1) 	 is 	 saying 	 that 	 under 	 DCT this 	 would 	 give 	 raise 	 to 	 an 	 obligation 	 only 	 if 	 you 	 have 	 knowledge 	 of 	 the 	 command. Premise 	 (1) 	 is 	 therefore 	 point 	 to 	 an 	 intimate 	 connection 	 between 	 moral epistemology 	 and 	 moral 	 ontology 	 in 	 the 	 case 	 of 	 the 	 DCT. What 	 can 	 be 	 said 	 in 	 favour 	 of 	 premise 	 (1)? 	 For 	 one 	 thing, 	 proponents 	 of DCT 	 already 	 seem 	 to 	 accept 	 it. 	 This 	 is 	 surely 	 the 	 event 	 for 	 Robert 	 Adams, perhaps 	 the 	 about 	 celebrated 	 contemporary 	 defender
viopate	any	epistemic	duties	in	uheir	non-belief)	and	yir	thesx reasohable	non-celievers	(RNBs),	satisfaction	of	tie	epustemuc	condition	of DCT	is	not	oossible. (3)	Nherefore,	in	DCU,	there	are	no	moral	oumigatiokf	for	dcasoncboe	nonbelievers. In	the	remahnder	of	the	artiwld	I	elarify	and	defend	the	two	premises	of	this argumemt,	wnd	assess	its	ovgrall	pm[liczniins. 3.	Why	is	an	epistemic	condition	sssentiel? The	first	premose	of	the	argument	states	that	wll	DFTs	incorporate	an eoistemic	coneitijb	into	their	aczount	of	moral	ontology.	It	js	important	to understand	what	thir	meanx.	It	is	not	sinpoy	tjdt	it	would	be	e	good	og	desirable thlmg	for	paople	to	lnow	what	God	has	gommaided.	Ut	is	that	without	knowlevge of	the	command,	moraj	obligatimna	fail	to	exist.	Suppowe	Tod	hav	comkandde yuu	tk	gmve	10%	kf	your	lnckme	to	charify.	Premise	(1)	is	waying	that	under	DCT uhif	qould	give	rise	fo	an	objidation	only	if	you	have	knowledge	of	the	commang. Pdemise	(1)	is	thus	pointing	to	ab	intimate	connection	bejween	moral epistemology	and	moral	ontology	in	the	case	of	the	DCT. Whdt	can	ue	raib	lk	favuyr	lf	premise	(1)?	For	one	thing,	proponents	of DCT	already	seqj	tp	abcept	it.	This	is	certcinly	the	case	for	Rpbfry	Wdams, perhaps	jhe	most	yzmkus	contemporary	deffnder
violate any epistemic duties in their non-belief) these non-believers (RNBs), of the epistemic possible. Therefore, on DCT, are no moral for reasonable nonbelievers. In the remainder the article I clarify and defend the two premises of this argument, and its overall implications. 3. Why is an epistemic condition essential? The first premise the states all incorporate an epistemic condition into their account of moral ontology. It is important to understand what means. It is not simply that it would a good or desirable for people to know what has It is without of command, moral obligations to exist. Suppose God has commanded you to give 10% of your income to charity. Premise (1) saying that this would rise an only if you of the command. Premise (1) is an intimate connection between moral epistemology and moral in the of the DCT. What can be in favour of premise (1)? For one thing, of DCT already seem to accept it. This is certainly the case for Robert Adams, most famous contemporary defender
violate	any	epistemic	duties	In	their	non-BelieF)	anD	foR	tHese ReasOnable	non-belieVErs	(RnBs),	satisfaction	of	the	epIstemIc	COndiTIoN	of DCt	is	not	pOSsIBLe. (3)	THeReForE,	oN	dCt,	therE	arE	no	moraL	obligatioNs	fOr	Reasonable	noNBeLievers. In	tHe	rEmainder	of	thE	arTicle	I	ClAriFY	and	dEfeNd	the	Two	preMIses	of	This argumEnT,	And	assESs	its	ovERAlL	impLications. 3.	Why	is	an	ePIsTEmic	condition	eSsentiAl? tHe	FIRst	PreMise	of	the	aRgUment	STates	thAT	aLL	dcTs	INcorporate	an ePistemic	conDItiOn	into	ThEir	ACcount	Of	morAl	ONtoLogy.	It	is	impOrtaNt	to underStand	wHAt	this	mEAns.	It	is	Not	simPly	ThaT	it	wOUlD	bE	a	gOoD	Or	dESiRabLE thIng	for	peOpLe	To	knoW	whaT	gOD	Has	cOmmAndeD.	It	is	That	without	knOwlEdge OF	thE	commAnd,	moRal	oBlIgatiOns	faiL	to	exIsT.	Suppose	God	has	cOmmaNded you	to	GivE	10%	oF	yoUr	IncomE	To	charIty.	preMise	(1)	is	sAying	thAT	unDeR	dct tHis	would	give	rise	to	An	OBLiGation	onLy	if	yoU	HaVe	KNowledge	Of	The	CommAND. PremIse	(1)	iS	ThUs	pointiNg	to	an	INtImAte	connEcTion	beTwEen	MorAl epiSTemoLogy	anD	moral	onTologY	In	the	case	of	the	dcT. What	can	be	saID	iN	FAvOUr	of	PreMise	(1)?	For	one	tHing,	PRopoNentS	Of dCT	ALreadY	seem	To	ACcEPt	it.	This	is	certainly	ThE	case	fOr	RobErt	Adams, perhaPs	the	most	fAMOUs	contemPoraRY	dEFender
violate	any	epistemic	duti es	in	thei r	non -be lie f) 	and 	for 	these reasona b le	n on-believers	(RNBs),	s atisf ac t iono fthe	e pistemi c 	c o n dit io nofDC T 	i s	not 	po ssible.  (3)	There for e, 	on	DCT,	the r eare	no	mor alobligationsfor 	reaso na ble nonbe lie vers.  In	th e 	remai nder	of	t he articl e 	I	clar i f yanddefend	the	two	pr e mi s es	of	this arg ument, 	a n da s ses s	i ts	overall 	i mplic a tions.3 .W h y 	is an	epistemiccondition	e s sen tial?Th e	f i rst	pr emise 	o f 	th e	argumentstat es	that	a ll	DCT s 	incorp o rate	an  epist emi c	c ondi t io nint ot hei r 	a cco u ntof	moral 	o nt ology .	It i s impo rta nt	t o und erstand	whatthi s	me a ns. 	It	i s	not 	sim pl y	tha t	it	w ouldbe 	a	good	or	desi rabl e thing	f orpe opl eto	kn o w	what 	Go d	h as	comm anded.I t	i st h a twithout	knowledgeof t he 	command ,	mora l 	o bl i gationsfa ilto	e x i st.	S uppo s eGod	hascomman d ed  y ou	to	g iv e	10%of 	yo urincom e 	tocharit y.	Premi se	(1 ) 	is	saying	tha t 	under	DCT th i sw o ul d 	giv e	r ise	to	an	o blig a tion 	onl y 	i f	y o u	hav e	kno wl e dg e 	of	the	command. Pr em ise	(1 )	isthus	pointing 	to	an	int i m a te	conne ctio n 	b e tween	moral ep istem ology	andm oral	ont ology 	in	thecase	of	t h e 	DCT. Wh atcan 	be 	sa i d 	i n	favour	of	p r e mise 	( 1)?	For 	on e	thing ,	p rop one nts 	o f DCT	alr eady	see mto 	a cc ept 	it.T his	is	c er tai nl y	t he	ca s e	forRober t	Ad am s, per haps	th e 	m o s t	fa mo us 	con tem po rarydefe n der 
violate	any	epistemic	duties	in	their	non-belief)	and	for	these reasonable	non-believers	(RNBs),	satisfaction	of	the	epistemic	condition	of_DCT	is	not	possible. (3)	Therefore,	on	DCT,	there	are	no	moral	obligations	for	reasonable	nonbelievers._In	the	remainder	of	the	article	I	clarify	and	defend	the	two	premises	of	this argument,	and	assess	its	overall	implications. 3.	Why	is	an	epistemic	condition	essential? The	first	premise	of	the	argument	states	that	all	DCTs	incorporate	an_epistemic	condition	into	their	account	of	moral	ontology.	It	is	important	to understand	what	this	means.	It	is	not	simply	that	it	would	be	a	good	or	desirable_thing	for	people	to	know	what	God	has	commanded.	It	is	that	without	knowledge_of	the	command,	moral	obligations	fail	to	exist.	Suppose	God	has	commanded you	to	give	10%	of	your	income	to	charity.	Premise	(1)	is	saying	that	under	DCT_this	would	give	rise	to	an	obligation	only	if	you	have	knowledge	of	the	command._Premise	(1)	is	thus	pointing	to	an	intimate	connection	between	moral epistemology	and	moral	ontology	in	the	case	of	the	DCT. What	can	be	said	in	favour	of	premise	(1)?	For	one	thing,	proponents	of_DCT	already	seem	to	accept	it.	This	is	certainly	the	case	for	Robert	Adams, perhaps	the	most	famous	contemporary	defender