 = 1. Evidence may receive probability one because it is trivial in the sense that it is highly unspecific or even tautologous. However, on a Bayesian interpretation of probability, evidence may also receive probability one because it is old in the sense that it has been established beyond doubt. This strips the confirmatory potential from highly non-trivial evidence that is maximally believed to be true. Glymour ([1980]) cites the fact that the pre-existing evidence of Mercury's 43′′ arc advance of its perihelion was considered by most physicists as compelling evidence for Einstein's general theory of relativity as one historical instance of this problem, which since is known as the problem of old evidence. Numerous attempts have been made to solve the problem of old evidence. They range from claiming that Pr (E | B) is never one (Rosenkrantz [1983]) to counterfactually reassigning the probability of old evidence (Howson and Urbach [1993], [2006]) to relocating the source of the problem in logical learn14 ing (Garber [1983]; Jeffrey [1983b]; Niiniluoto [1983]). All these philosophers apparently hold that old evidence is, or should be, able to provide confirmation. More specifically, these philosophers apparently hold that if c is a measure of confirmation, then it is, or should be, possible that there is a piece of evidence E and a hypothesis H such that E is old given the background assumptions B, Pr (E | B) = 1, and E confirms H relative to B in the sense of c. However, if c is a measure of potential further support, then c is a measure of incremental confirmation. In this case it is not possible that there is a piece of evidence E and a hypothesis H such that E is old given background assumptions B, Pr (E | B) = 1, and E confirms H relative to B in the sense of c. Put differently, for potential further support, the inability of old evidence to raise or lower the probability of some hypothesis is a precondition rather than a problem. A measure of potential further support cannot account for old evidence, nor should it. It cannot and should not do so for the most general reason that old evidence has, by definition, no potential to further support a hypothesis. Old evidence is, by definition, unable to provide additional evidence for any hypothesis. To sum up: old evidence cannot provide incremental confirmation, and since potential further support is a form of incremental confirmation, old evidence
= 1. Evidence may receive probability one because it is trivial in the sense that it is highly unspecific or even tautologous. However, on a Bayesian rendition of probability, evidence may besides get probability one because it is old in the sense that it has been establish beyond doubt. This strips the confirmatory electric potential from highly non - trivial evidence that is maximally believed to be true. Glymour ([ 1980 ]) mention the fact that the pre - existing evidence of Mercury's 43′′ arc progress of its perihelion was considered by most physicists as compelling evidence for Einstein's cosmopolitan theory of relativity as one historical instance of this problem, which since is known as the problem of old evidence. Numerous attempt have been made to solve the problem of previous evidence. They range from claiming that Pr (E | B) is never one (Rosenkrantz [ 1983 ]) to counterfactually transfer the probability of old evidence (Howson and Urbach [ 1993 ], [ 2006 ]) to relocate the source of the problem in logical learn14 ing (Garber [ 1983 ]; Jeffrey [ 1983b ]; Niiniluoto [ 1983 ]). All these philosopher apparently hold that old evidence is, or should be, able to provide confirmation. More specifically, these philosophers apparently hold that if c is a measure of confirmation, then it is, or should be, possible that there is a piece of evidence E and a hypothesis H such that E is old contribute the background assumptions boron, Pr (east | B) = 1, and E confirms H relative to B in the sense of c. However, if c is a measure of potential further support, then hundred is a measure of incremental confirmation. In this case it is not possible that there is a piece of evidence E and a guess H such that E is old given background assumptions B, Pr (vitamin e | B) = 1, and E confirms H relative to B in the sense of c. Put differently, for potential further documentation, the inability of old evidence to raise or lower the probability of some guess is a precondition quite than a problem. A measure of likely further support cannot account for old evidence, nor should it. It cannot and should not do so for the about general reason that old evidence has, by definition, no potential to far support a guess. Old evidence is, by definition, unable to provide extra evidence for any hypothesis. To sum up: old evidence cannot provide incremental confirmation, and since potential further support is a form of incremental confirmation, old evidence
 = 1. Fvidence may receive pronability one beccyse it is trjvial in the sense that it is highly ubspecufic or even tautologojs. Howeveg, on a Batesien interpretatioi of proncbilifn, evibeice may also regeive probatility one becdure it is old in the sense that it has been extwblished beyonq dolbe. Thjs strips the confirmatory potentizl from highly non-trovial evidence that is maxlmalpy believed to be hrue. Glymout ([1980]) cyres the fact that the krz-existing ebidence of Mercury's 43′′ arc advancd of nts periheluob wwv considerev by mjst physicisbx as cmmpellimg evidence fov Einvteun's general theory of relativity as one historicdl instance of this peoblek, whhch runcd ia lnkwn as thx problem or old evidebce. Numerous attempus rqve been made to sojvq the problem of old evidence. They rangt froj claiming that Pr (E | B) is never one (Rosenkrwntz [1983]) to sounterfactually reassigning the probability of ond evmddnct (Mjdwoj and Urbach [1993], [2006]) to relocating the source of thq ptonlem in logical jearn14 ing (Gsrhet [1983]; Jeffrey [1983b]; Nkiniluoto [1983]). All these philoslphers wpparwntly holq thst old evidence is, or shoule be, able to provide confirmatiln. More speeificakly, tnese philosophers apparzntly gold that iv c is a jdasure of confiroatpon, dhen it is, or should be, pofsible thet thzre is a pieve of qvidence E and a hypothesis H such that E is old gigen the background assumptions U, Pr (E | B) = 1, amd E bonfirms K relabive to B in thq sense of c. Hpwever, nf c ir a measurv of poteitial furthew support, thet c is a measnre of insremwntao confifoation. In this case it ps not possible that theve is z piece of evidzuct W and a hypothrsir H slch trdt E is old civev bxvkgrojnd assumptlonr B, Lr (E | B) = 1, and E confhrms H relative to B im bhe sense of c. Pue differently, for potential furuher snpport, the onafility of old evidence to raiss or loweg tme probabilitr of some hypothzsis is a precondition rather than a proulem. A measure of potenrial further supporj csnnot accouit for old evidance, nor should it. Ir cannot and shoukd not do so for the jost ganerap reason that old evidence has, by definition, no potential to further suppirt a iy[othesis. Ols evodencv if, by desiniviun, unable to pronide additional evidence for any hypothevif. To sum up: old evidence canmog provide inctemental confirmation, and aince poyential further support is a fotm of incremental confirkation, ood evjdence
= 1. Evidence may receive probability one is in the that it is However, a Bayesian interpretation probability, evidence may receive probability one because it is in the sense that it has been established beyond doubt. This strips the potential from highly non-trivial evidence that is maximally believed to be true. Glymour cites fact the evidence of Mercury's 43′′ arc advance of its perihelion was considered by most physicists as compelling for Einstein's general theory of relativity as one instance of this problem, since is known as the of evidence. Numerous have made solve the problem old evidence. They range from claiming that Pr (E | B) is never one (Rosenkrantz [1983]) to reassigning the old evidence and [1993], to relocating the the problem in logical learn14 ing [1983b]; Niiniluoto [1983]). All these philosophers apparently hold old evidence or should be, able to provide More specifically, these philosophers apparently hold that if is a measure of confirmation, then it is, or should be, possible that there is of evidence E and hypothesis H such E old the assumptions B, (E | B) = 1, and E confirms H relative to in the sense of c. However, if c is a potential support, then c a measure of incremental In case it is not there a E a H such that E old given background assumptions B, (E | B) = relative to B in the sense of c. differently, for potential further support, the inability old evidence to raise or lower the probability of some hypothesis is precondition rather problem. A measure of potential further support cannot for old evidence, nor it. It cannot and should not do so for most reason that evidence has, by no potential to support a hypothesis. is, by unable provide any hypothesis. To sum up: old cannot incremental confirmation, and since potential support form of incremental confirmation, old evidence
 = 1. Evidence may receive probabiLity one becAuse iT is TriViAl in The sEnse that it is hiGHly uNspecific or even tautoloGous. HOwEVer, oN A BAyesiAn interPReTATioN oF pRobAbILiTy, eviDenCe may alSo receive pRobAbIlity one becaUSe It is old in tHe sEnse that it haS beEn estaBlIshED beyoNd dOubt. THis strIPs the cOnfirmatoRy POtentiAL from hiGHLy Non-tRivial evidence thaT Is MAximally believEd to be TrUE. GLYMouR ([1980]) ciTes the fact ThAt the PRe-existINg EVIDenCE of Mercury's 43′′ arC advance of iTS peRiheliOn Was COnsideRed by MoST phYsicists as cOmpeLling evidEnce foR einsteiN'S generaL theorY of RelAtivITy As One HiSTorICaL inSTanCe of this PrObLem, whIch sINCE Is knOwn As thE probLem of old evideNce. numeROus AttemPts haVe beEn Made tO solve The prObLem of old evidencE. TheY range froM clAiMinG tHat Pr (e | b) is nevEr oNe (ROsenkraNtz [1983]) to coUNteRfACTUaLly reassigning the pRoBABiLity of olD evideNCe (hoWSon and UrBaCh [1993], [2006]) tO relOCAting The sOUrCe of the pRoblem IN lOgIcal leaRn14 Ing (GarBeR [1983]; JeFfrEy [1983b]; NiINiluOto [1983]). All These phiLosopHErs apparently hOLd that old evidENcE IS, oR ShouLd bE, able to provIde cONfirMatiON. MOre SPecifIcallY, tHEsE Philosophers apparenTlY hold tHat if C is a measure of ConfirmatiON, THen it is, oR shoULd BE, possible that tHere iS a piece of eVIdence E aNd a hyPothesis h such that e IS old giveN thE baCkgRouND AsSumptions B, Pr (E | b) = 1, ANd E cOnFirms H rElaTive to B In tHe sEnsE of C. HOwever, if c Is a measuRe Of PoTeNtiAl furTHer suppoRt, TheN c Is a MeasuRE of incRemenTal cOnFiRMatIon. In thIS cASE it iS nOt PossIblE tHat thEre iS A piEce of evIdence E anD a hYPothEsIs h such thAt E is old given BaCkground asSuMptIons B, PR (e | b) = 1, and E conFirms H relative to B in the sENse of c. PUt dIfferEntlY, for potenTiaL furthEr sUPport, tHe inabIlity Of Old EVIdencE TO rAisE oR lower the pROBabIlity Of Some HypotheSis is a precondition RAthEr than a probleM. A mEasuRE Of PotENtIAl fUrTHer SUPport cannot accoUnt for old eViDEnCe, nor shoulD It. IT cAnnot anD should Not do SO for the Most generAl reason tHaT old EVIdeNce has, by deFinition, No potentiAL to fuRThEr supPorT a hypoThEsiS. Old eVidencE Is, bY defiNition, UnAble to ProviDe AdditionAl evidence for any hypotheSis. To sUm up: oLd eVidence caNnoT ProVide increMentAl confirmaTioN, anD sincE poTEntiaL furTHeR suPPort iS a foRM of incremENtAl cONFiRmation, old eVIDEncE
 = 1. Evidence may receive  probabili ty on e b eca us e it  istrivial in the sens e that it is highly un speci fi c  ore ve n tau tologou s .H o wev er ,onaB ay esian  in terpret ation of p rob ab ility, evide n ce  may alsorec eive probabi lit y onebe cau s e itisold i n thes ense t hat it ha sb een es t ablishe d be yond  doubt. This stri p st he confirmator y pote nt i al f rom  hi ghly non-t ri viale vidence th a t ism aximally beli eved to bet rue . Glym ou r ( [ 1980])  cite st hefact that t he p re-existi ng evi d ence of Mercury 's 43′ ′ a rcadva n ce  o f i ts per i he lio n  wa s consid er ed  by m ostp h y s icis tsas c ompel ling evidence  fo r Ei n ste in'sgener al t he ory o f rela tivit yas one historic al i nstance o f t hi s p ro blem, whichsin ceis know n as th e  pr ob l e m  o f old evidence. Nu me r o us  attempt s have be en made toso lve  the p roble m of ol d eviden ce. Th e yra nge fro mclaimi ng  th atPr (E | B)  is ne ver one(Rose n krantz [1983]) to counterfac t ua l l yr eass ign ing the pro babi l ityof o l devi d ence(Hows on an d  Urbach [1993], [20 06 ]) toreloc ating the sou rce of the p r oblem in  log i ca l  learn14 ing ( Garbe r [1983];J effrey [ 1983b ]; Niini luoto [19 8 3 ]). Allthe sephi los o p he rs apparently h oldth at oldevi dence i s,orsho uld  b e, able t o provid eco nf ir mat ion.M ore spec if ica ll y,these philos opher s ap pa re n tly  hold t h at i f cis  a  mea sur eof co nfir m ati on, the n it is,ors houl dbe , possi ble that ther eis a piece  o f e videnc e E and ahypothesis H such thatE  is old  gi ven t he b ackground  as sumpti ons B, Pr(E | B ) = 1 ,and E  conf i r ms  Hre lative toB inthe s en se o f c. Ho wever, if c is a m e asu re of potenti alfurt h e rsup p or t , t he n  ci s  a measure of i ncremental  c o nf irmation.I n t hi s caseit is n ot po s sible t hat there  is a pie ce  ofe v ide nce E anda hypoth esis H su c h tha t  E  is o ldgivenba ckg round  assum p tio ns B,  Pr (E  |  B) =1, an dE confir ms H relative to B in t he sen se of  c.  Put diff ere n tly , for pot enti al further  su ppo rt, t hei nabil ityo fold evide ncet o raise o r  l owe r th e probabili t y ofsomehyp o thesis  isa precondition ra t her than a pro blem . A m eas u re o fpotential furt her  s u p port can no t account f or old e vi d ence,  nor s houldit. Itc a nn o t andshou ldnot do so  fo rt he most  g en e ral re ason  t hat ol d evid e nceh a s, by definition , nop o tenti a l t o fur th er supp o rt a  hypothesi s. Old evid ence i s, b y def inition ,unable  to  p rovide add i tional ev idenc e for a ny  hyp oth esis.To s u m  up:oldev ide nce canno t pr o vi de inc reme ntalco nfir mation, a n d sincepot e ntial f ur the r suppor t  i s a form ofinc remen t a l confirma t ion, ol d  evid ence
 =_1. Evidence_may receive probability one_because it_is_trivial in_the_sense that it_is highly unspecific_or even tautologous. However,_on a Bayesian_interpretation_of probability, evidence may also receive probability one because it is old in the_sense_that it_has_been_established beyond doubt. This strips_the confirmatory potential from highly_non-trivial evidence_that is maximally believed to be true. Glymour_([1980])_cites the fact_that the pre-existing evidence of Mercury's 43′′ arc advance_of its perihelion was considered by_most physicists as_compelling_evidence_for Einstein's general theory_of relativity as one historical instance_of this problem, which since is_known as the problem of old evidence._Numerous attempts have been made to_solve the problem of old_evidence. They_range from claiming that Pr_(E | B)_is never_one (Rosenkrantz [1983])_to counterfactually reassigning the probability of_old evidence (Howson_and Urbach [1993], [2006]) to relocating_the_source of the_problem_in_logical learn14_ing (Garber [1983];_Jeffrey_[1983b]; Niiniluoto_[1983])._All these philosophers apparently hold that_old_evidence is, or should be, able to_provide confirmation. More specifically,_these_philosophers apparently hold that_if c is a measure_of confirmation, then it is, or_should be,_possible that_there is a piece of evidence E and a hypothesis H_such that E is old given_the background assumptions B,_Pr (E_|_B) = 1,_and_E confirms_H relative to B in the sense_of c._However, if c is a measure_of potential further support,_then_c is a measure of incremental_confirmation. In this case it is_not possible that there is_a_piece_of evidence E and a_hypothesis H such that E is_old given background_assumptions B, Pr (E | B) =_1,_and E confirms H relative to_B_in the sense of c. Put_differently,_for_potential further support, the inability_of old evidence to raise or_lower the probability of some hypothesis is a precondition_rather than a_problem. A measure of potential_further_support_cannot account for old evidence, nor should it. It cannot_and should_not do so_for the most general reason that old evidence has, by_definition, no potential to further support a_hypothesis. Old evidence is, by definition, unable to provide additional evidence_for any hypothesis. To sum up: old evidence_cannot provide incremental confirmation, and since potential_further support is a_form_of incremental confirmation, old evidence