 doxastic justification as involving certain contextually variable parameters. Let me briefly comment on two of these parameters, and then I will be able to characterize more precisely the notion doxastic justification featured in my thinking. First of all, then, evaluations employing talk of justification normally invoke, either explicitly or tacitly, some goal or goals to be promoted in having justified beliefs. Here it is standard to distinguish epistemic goals such as having true beliefs and avoiding false ones, from various nonepistemic goals such as survival. Correspondingly, we distinguish between epistemic justification and nonepistemic justification. Whether some belief is epistemically justified (from some perspective) depends on whether, from within the appropriate perspective, the belief in question apparently" promotes the goals of having true beliefs and avoiding false ones. Whether a belief is nonepistemically justified depends on whether the belief apparently promotes or satisfies some nonepistemic goal. In ethics, especially, where debates over whether moral sentences are true or even have truth values are center stage, it is particularly important to distinguish epistemic from nonepistemic justification. Second, ascriptions of justification presuppose some perspective. Foley characterizes a perspective as a set of beliefs or body of opinion possessed by some actual or imaginary individual or group. Presumably, this body of opinion includes epistemic beliefs that reflect a set of epistemic standards that figure in the perspective in question." There are various epistemic perspectives from which epistemic evaluations proceed; some of the more familiar include: the subjective or egocentric perspective of an individual agent, the intersubjec300 Moral Knowledge? tive or sociocentric perspective of some community, the perspective of some group of experts, and the perspective of an ideally knowledgeable observer. The fact that justification talk is perspectival often goes unnoticed since we often do not make explicit the perspective from which such evaluations are made. But the various perspectives operative in our ascriptions of justification and rationality simply reflect various evaluative interests and purposes we have. For instance, when we are interested in understanding some belief held by a particular person (perhaps oneself) on some past occasion, and when in retrospect that belief now seems pretty clearly mistaken, we often are interested in how things looked to the agent on the occasion in question (at least if we are disposed to view the person charitably). Here it is natural to invoke an egocentric perspective and ask whether, given the agent's epistemic perspective at the time, she was justified in holding the belief in
doxastic justification as involving certain contextually variable parameters. lease me concisely comment on two of these parameters, and then I will be able to qualify more precisely the notion doxastic justification sport in my thinking. First of all, then, evaluations use talk of justification normally invoke, either explicitly or tacitly, some finish or goal to be promoted in suffer justified beliefs. Here it is standard to signalize epistemic goal such as having true beliefs and avoiding false one, from various nonepistemic goals such as survival. Correspondingly, we distinguish between epistemic justification and nonepistemic justification. Whether some impression is epistemically justified (from some perspective) depend on whether, from within the appropriate perspective, the impression in question obviously " promotes the goals of having true impression and avoiding false ones. Whether a belief is nonepistemically justified depends on whether the impression obviously promote or satisfies some nonepistemic goal. In ethics, especially, where debates over whether moral sentences are genuine or even suffer truth values are center stagecoach, it is particularly important to distinguish epistemic from nonepistemic justification. Second, ascriptions of justification presuppose some position. Foley characterizes a position as a set of beliefs or body of public opinion possessed by some actual or imaginary individual or group. Presumably, this body of opinion includes epistemic beliefs that reflect a set of epistemic standards that figure in the position in question. " There be diverse epistemic perspectives from which epistemic evaluations proceed; some of the more familiar include: the immanent or egocentric perspective of an individual agent, the intersubjec300 Moral Knowledge? tive or sociocentric perspective of some community, the perspective of some group of experts, and the perspective of an ideally knowledgeable perceiver. The fact that justification talk is perspectival often goes unnoticed since we often do not make denotative the perspective from which such evaluations are made. But the various position operative in our attribution of justification and rationality simply reflect various evaluative interests and purpose we have. For example, when we are interested in understanding some belief held by a particular person (possibly oneself) on some past occasion, and when in retrospect that belief nowadays seems pretty clearly mistaken, we often are interested in how things expect to the agent on the occasion in question (at least if we are disposed to view the person charitably). Here it is natural to raise an egoistic perspective and ask whether, given the agent's epistemic perspective at the time, she was justified in holding the impression in
 dodastic justification as lnvolving certaiu conteetually variabld parameters. Let me briefly rommwnt ob two of these parametdrs, and tjen I wiol bt able to charactxdize movz predlsely vhe notion doxaxtic justixication featusea nn my thinking. First of all, then, evajuationx fmploying talk of ktstirpcction normally invoke, either exllicitlj or tacitly, some goal or goals to be promohed ln having justifief beliefs. Hgde yr is standara to distinguish epistgmic goals such as having true bdliefx and avoieibg vdlse ones, fcom vagious nonepisbvmic godls sucn as survival. Gorrevpobdingly, we distinguisi between epistemic tustificadikn and nonepistemuc justhficdtiov. Whdthtr xoje bellef is epistejically jusrified (from some pets[vvtive) dependa on wreeher, from within the appropriate perspebtivs, the belief in questiob apparently" promotes the goalf of having true beliefs and avoiding false ones. Fhethxr a ycjkwf is nonepistemically justified depends on wheeget nhe belief apparektly promotes or sstlsgyes some nonekistemie gkal. In ethics, espefially, rhere debates jver whether moral sentences arw true or evvn hqve truth values axe center stcge, it is psrticularly important tu diatinguish eoistemic rfom nonepistemic juxthfication. Second, ascriptiogs of jusvificction prdsupkose soie perspechive. Nmley characterizes a petspecthve as a sft of beliefs or body of opinioi possessed bi smme actual jr imsginary indivydual or group. Presumcbly, tfis body or opinimn includes epistemic benlefs that rehlect a sqt od epustemic rtandards that figure iu the perspective in qucstiov." There are variius epistemic perslecgivqs fcom wrhch epistemiw evxluxyions proceed; sond of the more familiar itcluse: the subjective pr egocenttic perspqctive of an ondividual agent, tje inversuboec300 Motal Knowledge? tive or sociocentrid perspechivc of some comiuniby, tre perspeccive of some group of experts, and the pecspective of an idealli knowledgeable obserrev. The fact tiat juftificatimn talk is perspectical often goes unkoticed since we often do nod makf explicit the perspective from which such evaluations are made. But the vqrious perspectivea oprratine nn pur assripviuns of justificanion and rationality simply reflxct variouv zvaluative interests and purppsds we have. Fot instance, when we are intsrested on understanding some belief hekd by a particular persok (perhaps onesslf) on somx past occasion, and ehen iu retrispect rhat belief now sdemx iretty clewrly mnstaken, we often are interested ib how rhlngs looked to tie agent on bht occaspon in zuestion (at leasf if ae arg disposed to fiew the persom charitably). Here it if natural to ibnoke an egocemtric pvrspective anv ask whethes, given the agent's epistemic perspective at the timg, she was jhstified mn holding the uelief in
doxastic justification as involving certain contextually variable me comment on of these parameters, able characterize more precisely notion doxastic justification in my thinking. First of all, evaluations employing talk of justification normally invoke, either explicitly or tacitly, some goal goals to be promoted in having justified beliefs. Here it is standard to epistemic such having beliefs and avoiding false ones, from various nonepistemic goals such as survival. Correspondingly, we distinguish between justification and nonepistemic justification. Whether some belief is justified (from some perspective) on whether, from within the perspective, belief in apparently" the of having true and avoiding false ones. Whether a belief is nonepistemically justified depends on whether the belief apparently promotes satisfies some In ethics, where over moral sentences are even have truth values are center particularly important to distinguish epistemic from nonepistemic justification. ascriptions of presuppose some perspective. Foley characterizes a as a set of beliefs or body of possessed by some actual or imaginary individual or group. Presumably, this body of opinion includes that reflect a set epistemic standards that in perspective question." are various perspectives from which epistemic evaluations proceed; some of the more familiar the subjective or egocentric perspective of an individual agent, the Knowledge? or sociocentric perspective some community, the perspective some of experts, and the an knowledgeable that talk perspectival often goes unnoticed we often do not make the perspective from which the various perspectives operative in our ascriptions of and rationality simply reflect various evaluative interests purposes we have. For instance, when we are interested in understanding some held by person (perhaps oneself) on some past occasion, and in retrospect that belief seems pretty clearly mistaken, we often are interested in things to the on the occasion question (at least we are disposed the person Here is an egocentric perspective and ask whether, the epistemic perspective at the time, was holding the belief in
 doxastic justification as inVolving cerTain cOntExtUaLly vAriaBle parameters. LET me bRiefly comment on two of thEse paRaMEterS, AnD then i will be ABlE TO chArAcTerIzE MoRe preCisEly the nOtion doxasTic JuStification fEAtUred in my thInkIng. First of alL, thEn, evalUaTioNS emplOyiNg talK of jusTIficatIon normalLy INvoke, eITher expLICiTly oR tacitly, some goal oR GoALs to be promoted In haviNg JUsTIFieD beLiefs. Here iT iS stanDArd to diSTiNGUIsh EPistemic goals Such as havinG TruE belieFs And AVoidinG falsE oNEs, fRom various nOnepIstemic goAls sucH As surviVAl. CorreSpondiNglY, we DistINgUiSh bEtWEen EPiSteMIc jUstificaTiOn And noNepiSTEMIc juStiFicaTion. WHether some belIef Is epISteMicalLy jusTifiEd (From sOme perSpectIvE) depends on whethEr, frOm within tHe aPpRopRiAte peRSpectiVe, tHe bElief in QuestioN AppArENTLy" Promotes the goals of HaVINg True beliEfs and AVoIdINg false oNeS. WhEtheR A BelieF is nONePistemicAlly juSTiFiEd depenDs On whetHeR thE beLief aPPareNtly prOmotes or SatisFIes some nonepisTEmic goal. In ethICs, ESPeCIallY, whEre debates oVer wHEtheR morAL sEntENces aRe truE oR EvEN have truth values are CeNter stAge, it Is particularlY important TO DIstinguiSh epIStEMic from nonepisTemic JustificatIOn. Second, AscriPtions of JustificaTIOn presupPosE soMe pErsPECtIve. Foley charaCTErizEs A perspeCtiVe as a seT of BelIefS or BoDy of opiniOn possesSeD bY sOmE acTual oR ImaginarY iNdiViDuaL or grOUp. PresUmablY, thiS bOdY Of oPinion iNClUDEs epIsTeMic bEliEfS that ReflECt a Set of epIstemic stAndARds tHaT fIgure in The perspectivE iN question." THeRe aRe variOUS epistemIc perspectives from which EPistemiC evAluatIons Proceed; soMe oF the moRe fAMiliar IncludE: the sUbJecTIVe or eGOCeNtrIc PerspectivE OF an IndivIdUal aGent, the Intersubjec300 Moral KnOWleDge? tive or sociOceNtriC PErSpeCTiVE of SoME coMMUnity, the perspecTive of some GrOUp Of experts, aND thE pErspectIve of an IdealLY knowleDgeable obServer. The FaCt thAT JusTification Talk is peRspectivaL Often GOeS unnoTicEd sincE wE ofTen do Not makE ExpLicit The perSpEctive From wHiCh such evAluations are made. But the vArious PerspEctIves operaTivE In oUr ascriptIons Of justificAtiOn aNd ratIonALity sImplY ReFleCT variOus eVAluative iNTeResTS AnD purposes we HAVE. FoR instAncE, When we Are iNterested in undersTAnding some beliEf heLD By a ParTIculAr Person (perhaps oNesElF) ON some pasT oCcasion, and wHen in retRoSPect tHat belIef now Seems prETTy CLearly MistAkeN, we often aRe iNtERested iN hOw THings lOokeD tO the agEnt on tHE occASIon in question (at lEast iF WE are dISpoSed to ViEw the peRSon cHaritably). HEre it is natuRal to iNvokE an egOcentriC pErspecTivE aNd ask whethER, given the Agent'S episteMiC perSpeCtive aT the TIMe, she Was jUsTifIed in holdING tHE bElIEf iN
 doxastic justification as  involving  cert ain  co nt extu ally  variable para m eter s. Let me briefly comm ent o nt wo o f  t heseparamet e rs , and  t he n I  w i ll  be a ble  to cha racterizemor eprecisely th e  n otion doxa sti c justificat ion  featu re d i n  my t hin king.  First of all , then, e va l uation s  employ i n gtalk  of justification no r mally invoke,either  e x pl i c itl y o r tacitly,  s ome g o al or g o al s t o b e  promoted inhaving just i fie d beli ef s.H ere it  is s ta n dar d to distin guis h epistem ic goa l s sucha s havin g true  be lie fs a n dav oid in g  fa l se  on e s,from var io us  none pist e m i c  goa lssuch  as s urvival. Corr esp ondi n gly , wedisti ngui sh  betw een ep istem ic  justificationandnonepiste mic  j ust if icati o n. Whe the r s ome bel ief ise pis te m i c al ly justified (from  s o m eperspect ive) d e pe nd s  on whet he r,from w ithin  the ap propriat e pers p ec ti ve, the  b eliefin  qu est ion a p pare ntly"promotes  theg oals of having true beliefsa nd a vo i ding  fa lse ones. W heth e r abeli e fisn onepi stemi ca l ly justified depends o nwhethe r the  belief appar ently prom o t e s or sat isfi e ss ome nonepistem ic go al. In eth i cs, espe ciall y, where  debateso v er wheth ermor alsen t e nc es are true o r even  h ave tru thvaluesare  ce nte r s ta ge, it is  particu la rl yim por tantt o distin gu ish  e pis temic from n onepi stem ic  j u sti ficatio n .S e cond ,as crip tio ns  of j usti f ica tion pr esupposesom e  per sp ec tive. F oley characte ri zes a pers pe cti ve asa set of b eliefs or body of opini o n posse sse d bysome  actual o r i magina ryi ndivid ual or  grou p.  Pr e s umabl y ,  t his  b ody of opi n i oninclu de s ep istemic  beliefs that refl e cta set of epis tem ic s t a nd ard s  t h atfi g ure i n the perspecti ve in ques ti o n. " There ar e  va ri ous epi stemicpersp e ctivesfrom whic h epistem ic  eva l u ati ons procee d; someof the mo r e fam i li ar in clu de: th esub jecti ve ore goc entri c pers pe ctiveof an  i ndividua l agent, the intersubje c300 M oralKno wledge? t ive orsociocent ricperspectiv e o f s ome c omm u nity,  the pe rsp e ctive  ofs ome group of  ex p e rt s, and thep e r spe ctive  of an ide ally  knowledgeable ob s erver. The fac t th a t  ju sti f icat io n talk is pers pec ti v a l oftengo es unnotice d sincewe often  do no t make  explic i t  t h e pers pect ive  from whi chsu c h evalu at io n s aremade .But th e vari o us p e r spectives operat ive i n our a s cri ption sof just i fica tion and r ationalitysimply  ref lectvarious  e valuat ive  i nterests a n d purpose s wehave. F or  ins tan ce, wh en w e are i nter es ted  in under s t an d in gs ome  bel ief h el d by  a partic u lar pers on( perhaps  o nes e l f) ons om e past occas ion , and w hen in ret r ospe c tt hat b eliefnow se ems pre t tycl early m ist a k en, we of ten are i n ter es tedin how t hi ngslo oke dto the agent on  the occ asion in q uestio n ( a t le a st ifwe  are dispose d tovi e w the p e r son  charit a bly ).Her e it  is  nat u ral to invoke an egocent ricpersp e cti ve an d ask  w hether,g iven  the age n t's epistemic  perspective at the time , s h ewa s justifi edi n hol ding  th e be lie f in 
 doxastic_justification as_involving certain contextually variable_parameters. Let_me_briefly comment_on_two of these_parameters, and then_I will be able_to characterize more_precisely_the notion doxastic justification featured in my thinking. First of all, then, evaluations employing_talk_of justification_normally_invoke,_either explicitly or tacitly, some_goal or goals to be_promoted in_having justified beliefs. Here it is standard to_distinguish_epistemic goals such_as having true beliefs and avoiding false ones, from_various nonepistemic goals such as survival._Correspondingly, we distinguish_between_epistemic_justification and nonepistemic justification._Whether some belief is epistemically justified_(from some perspective) depends on whether,_from within the appropriate perspective, the belief_in question apparently" promotes the goals_of having true beliefs and_avoiding false_ones. Whether a belief is_nonepistemically justified depends_on whether_the belief apparently_promotes or satisfies some nonepistemic goal._In ethics, especially,_where debates over whether moral sentences_are_true or even_have_truth_values are_center stage, it_is_particularly important_to_distinguish epistemic from nonepistemic justification. Second,_ascriptions_of justification presuppose some perspective. Foley characterizes_a perspective as a_set_of beliefs or body_of opinion possessed by some_actual or imaginary individual or group._Presumably, this_body of_opinion includes epistemic beliefs that reflect a set of epistemic standards_that figure in the perspective in_question." There are various_epistemic perspectives_from_which epistemic evaluations_proceed;_some of_the more familiar include: the subjective or_egocentric perspective_of an individual agent, the intersubjec300_Moral Knowledge? tive or_sociocentric_perspective of some community, the perspective_of some group of experts, and_the perspective of an ideally_knowledgeable_observer._The fact that justification talk_is perspectival often goes unnoticed since_we often do_not make explicit the perspective from which_such_evaluations are made. But the various_perspectives_operative in our ascriptions of justification_and_rationality_simply reflect various evaluative interests_and purposes we have. For instance,_when we are interested in understanding some belief held_by a particular_person (perhaps oneself) on some_past_occasion,_and when in retrospect that belief now seems pretty clearly_mistaken, we_often are interested_in how things looked to the agent on the occasion_in question (at least if we are_disposed to view the person charitably). Here it is natural to_invoke an egocentric perspective and ask whether, given_the agent's epistemic perspective at the time,_she was justified in_holding_the belief in