 is, for some purposes, we may be interested in epistemically evaluating an agent's belief from the point of view of the attributor's epistemic perspective, which, of course, for us includes those epistemic norms that we endorse. Now, in focusing on the imaginary perspective of a representative epistemically responsible believer, I am interested in epistemic evaluations that reflect what I take to be our most general and widely employed epistemic norms, and so I am interested in evaluations that are sectarian in spirit. Second, I construe my task as partly descriptive; the epistemic norms employed by the competent epistemic agent are norms that by and large characterize our current epistemic practice. But I also think that the sorts of general epistemic norms I have in mind-norms that ordinarily govern, in a most general way, the epistemically relevant tasks of gathering evidence and checking for counterpossibilities to claims we believe or are entertaining-are norms that stand up to critical scrutiny and thus represent norms that we would want to reflectively endorse. Insofar as they represent norms we would want to reflectively endorse, they represent those norms that we think should be used in epistemic evaluation and thus are the basis for nonrelativized, categorical epistemic ascriptions. 27. Actually, responsibilities having to do with gathering evidence seem, for the most part, to derive from responsibilities for dealing with relevant counterpossibilities. Moreover, the sorts of norms governing the elimination of internal inconsistencies are similar in form to those for eliminating counterpossibilities. See C. Cherniak, Minimal Rationality (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1986), chapter 1. 28. See Cherniak, Minimal Rationality, chapter 5, for a defense of a similar principle that he calls the "special reasons requirement." Much of my discussion of epistemic responsibility is influenced by Cherniak. 29. Talk of "counterpossibilities whose seriousness is indicated by one's current background beliefs" needs clarification. But here I will have to rely on the reader's intuitive understanding of this talk. 30. W. P. Keeton, D. B. Dobbs, R. E. Keeton, and D. G. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on The Law of Torts, 5th ed., (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1984), 175. 31. Cherniak, Minimal Rationality, chapter 2. 32. See Cohen, "Knowledge, Context, and Social Standards."
is, for some purposes, we may be interested in epistemically evaluating an agent's impression from the item of view of the attributor's epistemic perspective, which, of path, for us include those epistemic norms that we endorse. immediately, in focus on the imaginary position of a representative epistemically creditworthy believer, I am interested in epistemic evaluations that chew over what I take to be our most cosmopolitan and widely employed epistemic norms, and so I am interested in evaluations that are sectarian in spirit. Second, I interpret my task as partly descriptive; the epistemic norms hire by the competent epistemic agent are norms that by and bombastic characterize our current epistemic exercise. But I also intend that the sorts of general epistemic norms I own in mind - norms that ordinarily govern, in a most cosmopolitan manner, the epistemically relevant tasks of gathering evidence and checking for counterpossibilities to claims we believe or are entertaining - are norms that stand up to critical scrutiny and thus typify norms that we would want to reflectively certify. Insofar as they represent norms we would want to reflectively endorse, they present those norms that we think should be used in epistemic evaluation and thus are the footing for nonrelativized, categorical epistemic ascriptions. 27. Actually, responsibilities having to do with gathering evidence seem, for the most part, to derive from responsibilities for dealing with relevant counterpossibilities. Moreover, the sort of norms regulate the elimination of internal inconsistencies are similar in form to those for eliminating counterpossibilities. determine C. Cherniak, Minimal Rationality (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1986), chapter 1. 28. See Cherniak, Minimal Rationality, chapter 5, for a defense of a similar rationale that he calls the " especial reasons requirement. " Much of my discussion of epistemic province is influenced by Cherniak. 29. lecture of " counterpossibilities whose seriousness is indicated by one's current background beliefs " needs clearing. But here I will have to rely on the reader's intuitive understanding of this lecture. 30. W. P. Keeton, D. B. Dobbs, R. E. Keeton, and D. G. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on The Law of Torts, 5th ed. , (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1984), 175. 31. Cherniak, Minimal Rationality, chapter 2. 32. See Cohen, " Knowledge, Context, and Social Standards. "
 is, for some purposes, we man be interested nb episvemicalmy evaluxting an agent's belief from vhe point of view of the attribjtor's epidtemic pwrsptctive, which, of course, fov us jkcludzs those epistemlc norms thdt we endorse. Tod, nn focusing on the imaginary perspeceive of a representativg epixeemidally responsible believer, I am inferestev in epistemic rvaluations that reflect wjat L take to be our mlst general and qidely emplohed epistemic norms, ans so I am interested in evaluatkons chat are sextqriwt in spirit. Secogd, I construc my tavk as psrtly descriptlve; tie epistemic norms employxd by the competent gpistemic dgznt are norms that by abd latge cvarazrerkze onr durrenh e'istemic przctice. But U also think that tne worts of genedal epyseemic norms I have in mind-norms that orginzrily govern, in a most teneral way, the epistgmically rqlevant tasks of gathering evidence and checking xor ckjnttrijrwihilities to claims we believe or are entertaigjnb-age norms that stakd up to critical xcguyyny and thus tepreseuf horms that we woulf want jo refoectively endprse. Insofar as they represwnt norms we qould want to reflzctively endurse, they represent those norms chat ws think shokld be ussa in epistemic exallatimn and thus are the basis sor nonreoatirized, cagegotical e[istemic adcripbhons. 27. Actually, resoonsiyilithes having to do with gathering evidence seem, for the mpsd pdrt, to dzrive nrom responsibijities for deaking wich reldvant counnerpossibmlities. Morejver, the sortv of norms goterning tre eoimibation uw internal incpnsistencpef arw similar in form bo thuae for eliminatnug counterpossibikitkes. Sve R. Chewtiak, Minimal Ratkonxkity (Zambridge, Mcsr.: Thr MIT Press, 1986), chapter 1. 28. Sse Cherniak, Minimak Vationalijy, chaptew 5, for a defemse of a similar pginci'le thet he valjs the "special reasons requirejent." Much of my discussijn on epystemic rexponsibility is influenced by Cherniak. 29. Talk of "counterpowsibilities whose sgripusness is mndicaeed by ona's current backgroune beliefs" needs ckarification. But here I wiln havf to rely on the reader's intuitive understanding of this talk. 30. W. P. Keeton, D. B. Dobbs, R. E. Keefon, snd D. G. Pwen, Pwossxr and Keeton on Tne Law of Torts, 5th ed., (St. Paul, Mmnn.: West Pgbjishing Co., 1984), 175. 31. Cherniak, Minimsl Rationality, zhapter 2. 32. See Cohen, "Knowmedge, Comtext, and Social Standards."
is, for some purposes, we may be epistemically an agent's from the point epistemic which, of course, us includes those norms that we endorse. Now, in on the imaginary perspective of a representative epistemically responsible believer, I am interested epistemic evaluations that reflect what I take to be our most general and employed norms, so am interested in evaluations that are sectarian in spirit. Second, I construe my task as partly the epistemic norms employed by the competent epistemic are norms that by large characterize our current epistemic But also think the of epistemic norms I in mind-norms that ordinarily govern, in a most general way, the epistemically relevant tasks of gathering evidence checking for claims we or entertaining-are that stand up scrutiny and thus represent norms that to reflectively endorse. Insofar as they represent norms would want reflectively endorse, they represent those norms we think should be used in epistemic evaluation thus are the basis for nonrelativized, categorical epistemic ascriptions. 27. Actually, responsibilities having to do evidence seem, for the part, to derive responsibilities dealing relevant Moreover, the of norms governing the elimination of internal inconsistencies are similar in to those for eliminating counterpossibilities. See C. Cherniak, Minimal Rationality The Press, 1986), chapter 28. See Cherniak, Minimal chapter for a defense of principle he reasons Much my discussion of epistemic is influenced by Cherniak. 29. of "counterpossibilities whose seriousness background beliefs" needs clarification. But here I will to rely on the reader's intuitive understanding this talk. 30. W. P. Keeton, D. B. Dobbs, R. E. Keeton, D. G. and Keeton on The Law of Torts, 5th (St. Paul, Minn.: West Co., 1984), 175. 31. Cherniak, Minimal Rationality, chapter 2. See "Knowledge, Context, Social Standards."
 is, for some purposes, we may be iNterested iN episTemIcaLlY evaLuatIng an agent's belIEf frOm the point of view of the aTtribUtOR's epIStEmic pErspectIVe, WHIch, Of CoUrsE, fOR uS inclUdeS those ePistemic noRms ThAt we endorse. NOW, iN focusing oN thE imaginary peRspEctive Of A rePResenTatIve epIstemiCAlly reSponsible BeLIever, I AM intereSTEd In epIstemic evaluationS ThAT reflect what I tAke to bE oUR mOST geNerAl and widelY eMployED episteMIc NORMs, aND so I am interesTed in evaluaTIonS that aRe SecTArian iN spirIt. sEcoNd, I construe My taSk as partlY descrIPtive; thE EpistemIc normS emPloYed bY ThE cOmpEtENt ePIsTemIC agEnt are noRmS tHat by And lARGE CharActErizE our cUrrent epistemIc pRactICe. BUt I alSo thiNk thAt The soRts of gEneraL ePistemic norms I hAve iN mind-normS thAt OrdInArily GOvern, iN a mOst General Way, the ePIstEmICALlY relevant tasks of gaThERInG evidencE and chECkInG For countErPosSibiLITies tO claIMs We believE or are ENtErTaining-ArE norms ThAt sTanD up to CRitiCal scrUtiny and Thus rEPresent norms thAT we would want tO ReFLEcTIvelY enDorse. InsofaR as tHEy rePresENt NorMS we woUld waNt TO rEFlectively endorse, thEy RepresEnt thOse norms that wE think shouLD BE used in ePistEMiC Evaluation and tHus arE the basis fOR nonrelaTivizEd, categoRical episTEMic ascriPtiOns. 27. actUalLY, ReSponsibilitieS HAvinG tO do with GatHering eVidEncE seEm, fOr The most paRt, to deriVe FrOm ReSpoNsibiLIties for DeAliNg WitH releVAnt couNterpOssiBiLiTIes. moreoveR, ThE SOrts Of NoRms gOveRnIng thE eliMInaTion of iNternal inConSIsteNcIeS are simIlar in form to tHoSe for elimiNaTinG countERPossibilIties. See C. Cherniak, MinimaL rationaLitY (CambRidgE, Mass.: The MiT PRess, 1986), chAptER 1. 28. See ChErniak, minimAl ratIONalitY, CHaPteR 5, fOr a defense OF A siMilar PrInciPle that He calls the "special rEAsoNs requirement." mucH of mY DIsCusSIoN Of ePiSTemIC Responsibility iS influenceD bY chErniak. 29. Talk OF "coUnTerpossIbilitiEs whoSE seriouSness is inDicated by OnE's cuRREnt Background Beliefs" nEeds clariFIcatiON. BUt herE I wIll havE tO reLy on tHe readER's iNtuitIve undErStandiNg of tHiS talk. 30. W. P. KEeton, D. B. Dobbs, R. E. Keeton, and d. G. Owen, prossEr aNd Keeton oN ThE law Of Torts, 5th Ed., (St. paul, Minn.: WeSt PUblIshinG Co., 1984), 175. 31. cHerniAk, MiNImAl RATionaLity, CHapter 2. 32. See cOhEn, "KNOWlEdge, Context, AND socIal StAndARds."
 is, for some purposes, we  may be in teres ted  in  e pist emic ally evaluatin g  anagent's belief from th e poi nt of v i ew  of t he attr i bu t o r's  e pi ste mi c  p erspe cti ve, whi ch, of cou rse ,for us inclu d es  those epi ste mic norms th atwe end or se. Now,infocus ing on the im aginary p er s pectiv e  of a r e p re sent ative epistemical l yr esponsible bel iever,  I am i nte res ted in epi st emice valuati o ns t h atr eflect what I  take to be our  mostge ner a l andwidel ye mpl oyed episte micnorms, an d so I am inte r ested i n eval uat ion s th a tar e s ec t ari a nins pir it. Seco nd ,I con stru e m y  tas k a s pa rtlydescriptive;the  epi s tem ic no rms e mplo ye d bythe co mpete nt  epistemic agen t ar e norms t hat  b y a nd  larg e  chara cte riz e our c urrente pis te m i c  p ractice. But I als ot h in k that t he sor t sof generalep ist emic n ormsI ha v ein mind- normst ha tordinar il y gove rn , i n a  most gene ral wa y, the e piste m ically relevan t  tasks of gat h er i n ge vide nce  and checki ng f o r co unte r po ssi b iliti es to  c l ai m s we believe or are  e nterta ining -are norms th at stand u p t o critic al s c ru t iny and thus r epres ent normst hat we w ouldwant toreflectiv e l y endors e.Ins ofa r a s th ey representn o rmswe  wouldwan t to re fle cti vel y e nd orse, the y repres en tth os e n ormst hat we t hi nksh oul d beu sed in  epis temi cev a lua tion an d  t h u s ar eth e ba sis  f or no nrel a tiv ized, c ategorica l e p iste mi cascript ions. 27. Act ua lly, respo ns ibi lities h aving to  do with gathering evid e nce see m,for t he m ost part,  to  deriv e f r om res ponsib iliti es  fo r deali n g  w ith  r elevant co u n ter possi bi liti es. Mor eover, the sorts o f  no rms governing  th e el i m in ati o no f i nt e rna l inconsistencies  are simil ar in  form to t h ose  f or elim inating  coun t erpossi bilities.  See C. C he rnia k ,  Mi nimal Rati onality(Cambridg e , Mas s .:  TheMIT  Press ,198 6), c hapter 1.28. S ee Che rn iak, M inima lRational ity, chapter 5, for a d efense  of a  si milar pri nci p lethat he c alls  the "spec ial  re asons  re q uirem ent. "  M uch of my  dis c ussion of ep ist e m ic  responsibi l i t y i s inf lue n ced by  Che rniak. 29. Talk o f  "counterpossi bili t i eswho s e se ri ousness is ind ica te d by one's  c urrent back ground b el i efs"needsclarif ication . Bu t  hereI wi llhave to r ely  o n  the re ad er ' s intu itiv eunders tandin g  oft h is talk. 30. W.P. Ke e t on, D .  B.  Dobb s,  R. E.K eeto n, and D.G. Owen, Pr osserandKeeto n on Th eLaw of  To rt s, 5th ed. ,  (St. Pau l, Mi nn.: We st  Pub lis hing C o.,1 9 84),175.  3 1.Cherniak, M in i ma lR ati onal ity,ch apte r 2. 32.S ee Cohen , " K nowledg e,  Co n t ext, a n dS o cial Stand ard s."
 is,_for some_purposes, we may be_interested in_epistemically_evaluating an_agent's_belief from the_point of view_of the attributor's epistemic_perspective, which, of_course,_for us includes those epistemic norms that we endorse. Now, in focusing on the_imaginary_perspective of_a_representative_epistemically responsible believer, I am_interested in epistemic evaluations that_reflect what_I take to be our most general and_widely_employed epistemic norms,_and so I am interested in evaluations that are_sectarian in spirit. Second, I construe_my task as_partly_descriptive;_the epistemic norms employed_by the competent epistemic agent are_norms that by and large characterize_our current epistemic practice. But I also_think that the sorts of general_epistemic norms I have in_mind-norms that_ordinarily govern, in a most_general way, the_epistemically relevant_tasks of gathering_evidence and checking for counterpossibilities to_claims we believe_or are entertaining-are norms that stand_up_to critical scrutiny_and_thus_represent norms_that we would_want_to reflectively_endorse._Insofar as they represent norms we_would_want to reflectively endorse, they represent those_norms that we think_should_be used in epistemic_evaluation and thus are the_basis for nonrelativized, categorical epistemic ascriptions._27. Actually,_responsibilities having_to do with gathering evidence seem, for the most part, to_derive from responsibilities for dealing with_relevant counterpossibilities. Moreover, the_sorts of_norms_governing the elimination_of_internal inconsistencies_are similar in form to those for_eliminating counterpossibilities._See C. Cherniak, Minimal Rationality (Cambridge,_Mass.: The MIT Press,_1986),_chapter 1. 28. See Cherniak, Minimal_Rationality, chapter 5, for a defense_of a similar principle that_he_calls_the "special reasons requirement." Much_of my discussion of epistemic responsibility_is influenced by_Cherniak. 29. Talk of "counterpossibilities whose seriousness_is_indicated by one's current background beliefs"_needs_clarification. But here I will have_to_rely_on the reader's intuitive understanding_of this talk. 30. W. P._Keeton, D. B. Dobbs, R. E. Keeton, and D._G. Owen, Prosser_and Keeton on The Law_of_Torts,_5th ed., (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1984), 175._31. Cherniak,_Minimal Rationality, chapter_2. 32. See Cohen, "Knowledge, Context, and Social Standards."