	clear	up	this confusion	and	address	these	critiques.	I	do	so	in	three	ways.	First,	I	offer	a simplified	general	version	of	the	objection.	Second,	I	address	the	leading criticisms	of	the	premises	of	this	objection,	focusing	in	particular	on	the	role	of moral	risk/uncertainty	in	our	understanding	of	God's	commands.	And	third,	I outline	four	possible	interpretations	of	the	argument,	each	with	a	differing degree	of	significance	for	the	proponent	of	the	DCT. 1.	Introduction This	article	critiques	Divine	Command	Theories	(DCTs)	of	metaethics	on the	grounds	that	they	involve	an	intimate	connection	between	moral epistemology	and	moral	ontology.	More	precisely,	it	argues	that	all	DCTs incorporate	an	epistemic	condition	into	their	account	of	moral	ontology	and because	of	this	they	are	vulnerable	to	an	objection,	viz.	an	important	class	of moral	agents	fail	to	satisfy	this	epistemic	condition.	This	casts	into	doubt	the metaethical	adequacy	of	DCTs,	and	has	significant	implications	for	anyone wishing	to	rely	upon	them. This	objection	to	DCT	is	not	new	(see:	Morriston	2009;	Peoples	2011;	and Wielenberg	2014).	It	is	referred	to	as	the	'Epistemological	Objection'	(Morriston 2009;	Peoples	2011),	though	there	is	some	confusion	as	to	whether	this	name	is appropriate	given	the	argument's	implications	(Wielenberg	2014).	In	this	article, 2 I	hope	to	clear
clear 	 up 	 this confusion 	 and 	 address 	 these 	 critiques. 	 I 	 do 	 therefore 	 in 	 three 	 way. 	 First, 	 I 	 offer 	 a simplified 	 general 	 translation 	 of 	 the 	 objection. 	 Second, 	 I 	 address 	 the 	 precede criticism 	 of 	 the 	 premises 	 of 	 this 	 objection, 	 focusing 	 in 	 particular 	 on 	 the 	 function 	 of moral 	 risk / uncertainty 	 in 	 our 	 reason 	 of 	 God's 	 commands. 	 And 	 third, 	 I outline 	 four 	 possible 	 interpretations 	 of 	 the 	 argument, 	 each 	 with 	 a 	 differ degree 	 of 	 significance 	 for 	 the 	 proponent 	 of 	 the 	 DCT. 1. 	 initiation This 	 article 	 critiques 	 Divine 	 Command 	 Theories 	 (DCTs) 	 of 	 metaethics 	 on the 	 grounds 	 that 	 they 	 involve 	 an 	 cozy 	 connection 	 between 	 moral epistemology 	 and 	 moral 	 ontology. 	 More 	 precisely, 	 it 	 argues 	 that 	 all 	 DCTs incorporate 	 an 	 epistemic 	 condition 	 into 	 their 	 account 	 of 	 moral 	 ontology 	 and because 	 of 	 this 	 they 	 are 	 vulnerable 	 to 	 an 	 expostulation, 	 viz. 	 an 	 important 	 class 	 of moral 	 agents 	 fail 	 to 	 satisfy 	 this 	 epistemic 	 condition. 	 This 	 casts 	 into 	 doubt 	 the metaethical 	 adequacy 	 of 	 DCTs, 	 and 	 has 	 significant 	 implications 	 for 	 anyone wishing 	 to 	 rely 	 upon 	 them. This 	 objection 	 to 	 DCT 	 is 	 not 	 new 	 (see: 	 Morriston 	 2009; 	 Peoples 	 2011; 	 and Wielenberg 	 2014). 	 It 	 is 	 referred 	 to 	 equally 	 the 	' epistemic 	 Objection' 	 (Morriston 2009; 	 Peoples 	 2011), 	 though 	 there 	 is 	 some 	 confusion 	 as 	 to 	 whether 	 this 	 name 	 is appropriate 	 given 	 the 	 argument's 	 implication 	 (Wielenberg 	 2014). 	 In 	 this 	 article, 2 I 	 hope 	 to 	 clear
	clewr	up	this confusion	and	addvess	these	critiqugs.	U	do	so	ii	three	wzys.	First,	K	offer	a simplified	general	verdiin	of	tye	objection.	Second,	I	addrdss	the	leafing cririciwns	of	the	premises	of	tmns	objsgtion,	yorusing	in	particukar	on	the	rone	of moral	risk/gnzextainty	in	our	understanding	of	God's	commagds.	And	tnigd,	I outline	fout	posspbje	infvrkretations	of	the	argument,	each	with	a	djfferinj degree	of	signigicance	for	the	proponent	of	thf	DCT. 1.	Introduction This	wrticle	crituquef	Eivine	Commana	Theories	(DBCs)	of	metaethjcs	on the	grounds	that	they	involve	xn	intnmate	connecjnin	bfjween	moral e'istemjlogy	and	moral	ontologf.	More	prrcisely,	it	arguex	thet	alo	DCTs incorporate	an	epmstemic	condition	into	jheir	accoutt	kf	moral	ontology	ane vecauve	of	dhis	gyey	xre	buknsrable	ho	ai	objection,	vjz.	an	importabt	class	of moral	agenus	fwpk	to	satisfy	thjs	episeeiic	condition.	This	casts	into	doubt	the metaeuhicam	adequacy	of	DCTs,	and	has	sitnificant	implications	vor	anyone wishing	to	rely	upon	them. This	objection	to	DCT	is	not	new	(vee:	Mocrkstin	2009;	Ieopuws	2011;	wnd Wielenberg	2014).	It	is	referred	to	as	the	'Epistemologiszl	Pbmection'	(Morriston 2009;	Peoples	2011),	thoigj	tngre	is	some	confurion	as	ck	wgether	this	name	is aopropriwte	gicen	the	argtmeny's	implications	(Wielenberg	2014).	In	tyis	article, 2 P	hopw	to	clear
clear up this confusion and address these do in three First, I offer the Second, I address leading criticisms of premises of this objection, focusing in on the role of moral risk/uncertainty in our understanding of God's commands. And I outline four possible interpretations of the argument, each with a differing degree significance the of DCT. 1. Introduction This article critiques Divine Command Theories (DCTs) of metaethics on the grounds that involve an intimate connection between moral epistemology and ontology. More precisely, it that all DCTs incorporate an condition their account moral and of this they vulnerable to an objection, viz. an important class of moral agents fail to satisfy this epistemic condition. casts into metaethical adequacy DCTs, has implications for anyone rely upon them. This objection to new (see: Morriston 2009; Peoples 2011; and Wielenberg It is to as the 'Epistemological Objection' (Morriston Peoples 2011), though there is some confusion as whether this name is appropriate given the argument's implications (Wielenberg 2014). In this article, 2 to clear
	clear	up	this confusion	and	adDress	these	CritiQueS.	I	dO	sO	in	tHree	Ways.	First,	I	offeR	A simPlified	general	version	oF	the	oBjECtioN.	seCond,	I	Address	THe	LEAdiNg CrItiCiSMs	Of	the	PreMises	of	This	objectIon,	FoCusing	in	partICuLar	on	the	roLe	oF moral	risk/unCerTainty	In	Our	UNdersTanDing	oF	God's	cOMmands.	and	third,	I OuTLine	foUR	possibLE	InTerpRetations	of	the	argUMeNT,	each	with	a	diffEring dEgREe	OF	SigNifIcance	for	tHe	PropoNEnt	of	thE	dCt. 1.	iNTroDUction This	artIcle	critiquES	DiVine	CoMmAnd	tHeorieS	(DCTs)	Of	MEtaEthics	on the	GrouNds	that	thEy	invoLVe	an	intIMate	conNectioN	beTweEn	moRAl EpIstEmOLogY	AnD	moRAl	oNtology.	MOrE	pRecisEly,	iT	ARGUes	tHat	All	DcTs inCorporate	an	epIstEmic	COndItion	Into	tHeir	AcCount	Of	moraL	ontoLoGy	and because	of	tHis	tHey	are	vulNerAbLe	tO	aN	objeCTion,	viZ.	an	ImpOrtant	cLass	of mORal	AgENTS	fAil	to	satisfy	this	epIsTEMiC	conditiOn.	This	CAsTs	INto	doubt	ThE meTaetHICal	adEquaCY	oF	DCTs,	and	Has	sigNIfIcAnt	implIcAtions	FoR	anYonE wishINg	to	Rely	upOn	them. ThIs	objECtion	to	DCT	is	noT	New	(see:	MorristON	2009;	PEOPlES	2011;	and wieLenberg	2014).	It	is	RefeRRed	tO	as	tHE	'EPisTEmoloGical	obJEcTIon'	(Morriston 2009;	Peoples	2011),	ThOugh	thEre	is	Some	confusion	As	to	whetheR	THIs	name	is ApprOPrIAte	given	the	argUment'S	implicatiONs	(WielenBerg	2014).	IN	this	artIcle, 2 I	hope	TO	Clear
	clear	up	this confusion	a nd	address 	thes e	c rit iq ues. 	I	d o	so	in	threew ays. 	First,	I	offer	a simp lifie dg ener a lversi on	of	t h eo b jec ti on .	S ec o nd ,	I	a ddr ess	the 	leading c rit ic isms	of	thep re mises	of	t his 	objection,foc usingin 	pa r ticul aron	th e	role of mor al	risk/u nc e rtaint y 	in	our u nd erst anding	of	God's	c o mm a nds.	And	third ,	I ou tl i ne f our 	po ssible	int er preta t ions	of th e a rgu m ent,	each	wit h	a	differi n g d egreeof 	si g nifica nce	f or the 	proponentof	t he	DCT. 1 .	Intr o duction This	ar ticlecri tiq uesD iv in e	C om m and Th eor i es(DCTs)	o fme taeth icso n t he	g rou ndsthatthey	involveaninti m ate 	conn ectio n	be tw een	m oral e piste mo logy	and	moralonto logy.	Mor e	p re cis el y,	it argues 	th atall	DCT s incor p ora te a n 	e pistemic	condition 	i n t otheir	ac counto fmo r al	ontol og y	a nd b e c auseof	t h is 	they	ar e	vuln e ra bl e	to	an 	o bjecti on ,	v iz. 	an	i m port ant	cl ass	of m orala gents	fail	tos atisfy	this	e p is t e mi c 	con dit ion.	This	c asts into 	dou b tthe metae thica la de q uacy	of	DCTs,	and	h as 	signi fican t	implication s	for	anyo n e wishingto	r e ly upon	them. Thi s	obj ection	toD CT	is	no t	new 	(see:	M orriston2 0 09;	Peop les 	20 11; 	an d Wi elenberg	2014 ) . 	Itis 	referr edto	as	t he'Ep ist emo lo gical	Obj ection'(M or ri st on2009; Peoples20 11) ,tho ugh	t h ere	is 	some 	con fu si o n	a s	to	wh e th e r 	thi sna me	i s a pp ropri ateg ive n	the	a rgument's 	im p lica ti on s	(Wiel enberg	2014). 	I n	this	art ic le,  2 I	h o p e	to	cle ar
	clear	up	this confusion	and	address	these	critiques.	I	do	so	in	three	ways.	First,	I	offer	a_simplified	general	version	of	the	objection.	Second,	I	address	the	leading criticisms	of	the	premises	of	this	objection,	focusing	in	particular	on	the	role	of_moral	risk/uncertainty	in	our	understanding	of	God's	commands.	And	third,	I outline	four	possible	interpretations	of	the	argument,	each	with	a	differing degree	of	significance	for	the	proponent	of	the	DCT. 1.	Introduction_This	article	critiques	Divine	Command	Theories	(DCTs)	of	metaethics	on the	grounds	that	they	involve	an	intimate	connection	between	moral_epistemology	and	moral	ontology.	More	precisely,	it	argues	that	all	DCTs_incorporate	an	epistemic	condition	into	their	account	of	moral	ontology	and because	of	this	they	are	vulnerable	to	an	objection,	viz.	an	important	class	of_moral	agents	fail	to	satisfy	this	epistemic	condition.	This	casts	into	doubt	the_metaethical	adequacy	of	DCTs,	and	has	significant	implications	for	anyone wishing	to	rely	upon	them. This	objection	to	DCT	is	not	new	(see:	Morriston	2009;	Peoples	2011;	and_Wielenberg	2014).	It	is	referred	to	as	the	'Epistemological	Objection'	(Morriston 2009;	Peoples	2011),	though	there	is	some	confusion	as	to	whether	this	name	is appropriate	given	the	argument's	implications	(Wielenberg	2014).	In	this	article,_2 I	hope	to	clear