 And this could have long-term bad effects- for example, stifling new ideas and free inquiry. Thus, we have reason to exercise caution and consider whether we might be in an epistemically permissive case before engaging in epistemic paternalism. Of course, some deny that permissive cases ever occur.17 While I've motivated interpersonal permissivism with epistemic standards, the permissivism debate is complex and has a growing literature, and I cannot fully settle it here. If one were convinced permissive cases are impossible, then this argument won't have purchase for them (although they need a response to the argument for permissivism from epistemic standards). Also note that there is a distinction between moderate and extreme permissivism. Extreme permissivists maintain that there are evidential situations in which all doxastic attitudes toward a proposition are permitted (e.g., belief, withholding, and disbelief; all credences between [0,1]). Moderate permissivists maintain merely that there are evidential situations in which a subset of those doxastic attitudes is permitted (e.g., only belief and withholding; only credences between [0.9, 0.7]).18 In moderately permissive cases, it may be justified to engage in paternalism to move others away from the impermissible attitudes. For example, if you and I are in an evidential situation that permits belief in p and withholding on p, but not disbelief, I may be justified in paternalistically nudging you away from disbelief.19 Nonetheless, paternalism is unjustified when it draws others away from the permitted attitudes. My main claim is as follows: Strong claim: If, given their evidence and a proposition p, agents are in an epistemically permissive case with respect to attitudes A1-An in p, it is always epistemically wrong for any of them to paternalistically interfere to change the other's attitude A1-An in p. I've provided several reasons to think this claim is true. However, the assumption of epistemic consequentialism makes it challenging to establish 16028-0338d-1pass-r01.indd 207 2/21/2020 10:23:45 AM 208 Chapter 13 in a short chapter. It requires that, in the permissive cases described, there is no epistemic good (even in the long run) that outweighs the losses associated with interfering with another's inquiry. I've tried to explain earlier why I think there are serious losses associated with this
And this could have long - term bad effects- for case, suffocate new ideas and free question. Thus, we have reason to exert caution and consider whether we might be in an epistemically permissive event before engaging in epistemic paternalism. Of course, some traverse that permissive cases ever occur.17 While I've motivated interpersonal permissivism with epistemic standards, the permissivism argument is complex and has a growing literature, and I cannot amply settle it here. If one were convinced permissive cases are impossible, then this controversy won't have purchase for them (although they need a reply to the argument for permissivism from epistemic standards). Also note that there be a distinction between moderate and extreme permissivism. Extreme permissivists maintain that there are evidential situations in which all doxastic attitudes toward a suggestion are permitted (e.g., belief, withholding, and disbelief; all credences between [ 0,1 ]). Moderate permissivists maintain merely that there are evidential situations in which a subset of those doxastic attitudes is permitted (e.g., only belief and withholding; only credences between [ 0.9, 0.7]).18 In reasonably permissive case, it may be justified to hire in paternalism to be active others away from the impermissible attitudes. For example, if you and I are in an evidential situation that permits belief in p and withhold on p, but not disbelief, I may be justified in paternalistically nudging you away from disbelief.19 Nonetheless, paternalism is unjustified when it draw others away from the permitted attitudes. My main title is as follows: hard claim: If, given their evidence and a proposition p, agents are in an epistemically permissive case with deference to attitudes A1 - An in p, it is always epistemically wrong for any of them to paternalistically interfere to change the other's attitude A1 - An in p. I've put up several reason to think this claim is truthful. However, the assumption of epistemic consequentialism make it challenging to establish 16028-0338d-1pass-r01.indd 207 2/21/2020 10:23:45 AM 208 Chapter 13 in a brusque chapter. It requires that, in the permissive cases described, there is no epistemic good (even in the farseeing run) that outweighs the losses associated with interfering with another's inquiry. I've tried to explain earlier why I remember there are serious losings associated with this
 Anf this could have long-tevm bad effects- for exam'le, stirling ned ideas and free inquiry. Thud, qe hace reason to exercise zaution ajd consieer xhether we might be in ak epiabemiccloy permissive gase before engaging in e[irtzmic paternalism. Of course, some deny that prrlissive cases gver pscur.17 While I've motivated interpersonal permisvivism with elistemic standards, the perlisslvism debate is colplex and hqs a trowing litefature, and I cannot fumly settle it here. If one were zonviuced permiswice fdses are im'ossibje, then this argumend won't nave purchase nor tiem (qlthough they need a cesponse to the arguient for [exmissivism from epistwmuc stdndasds). Xoso noue vhaf therf ia a distindtion betwewn moderate and extteiv permissivisj. Extrqmq permissivists maintain that there are evjdential situations in qhich all doxastic atjitudes torard a proposition are permitted (e.g., belief, withhonding, xnd dlsbeuuev; all credences between [0,1]). Moderate permissivisea kapntain merely thab there are evidenyiwl fituations in which a aubset of those dodastic wttitydes is ptrmityed (e.g., only belief and withyolding; only xredences between [0.9, 0.7]).18 In moderacely pgrmissove cases, it may be juscified to engage ln paternzuism to move othdrs afay from the impermissible attitudew. Fox exampld, if you agd I are ij an ceidential situatioj thaj permhts belief in p and withholding on p, but ipt disbelief, I maj be justnfied ln paternalistisally nudging iou away yrom dksbelief.19 Nknethelxss, paternalysm is unjusthvied when it draws oeherw awqy from ghe permitted sttitudes. My main coaim is as follows: Sttohg claim: If, givzu uhwir evidence amd x pwoiosmtion [, agents are in xn dlisteoically pernkssife case with respect to zttitudes A1-An in p, ib is alwais episteiically wrong for any of them tl patxrnalirticakly interfere to change the other'a attitudf A1-Wn in p. I've [rovlded several rzasons to think this claim is true. Howevxr, the assumption of ekistemic consequentiaklsm makes it chaljenging tm establish 16028-0338d-1pass-r01.ined 207 2/21/2020 10:23:45 AM 208 Chapter 13 in a short chapter. Jt reqgires that, in the permissive cases described, there is no epistemic good (even ib the long run) thaf ouyweigvs che losfes esrociated with innerfering with another's inquiry. M've tried do explain earlier why I think tfere are seriuus losses associated wifh this
And this could have long-term bad effects- stifling ideas and inquiry. Thus, we and whether we might in an epistemically case before engaging in epistemic paternalism. course, some deny that permissive cases ever occur.17 While I've motivated interpersonal permissivism epistemic standards, the permissivism debate is complex and has a growing literature, and cannot settle here. one were convinced permissive cases are impossible, then this argument won't have purchase for them (although need a response to the argument for permissivism epistemic standards). Also note there is a distinction between and permissivism. Extreme maintain there evidential situations in all doxastic attitudes toward a proposition are permitted (e.g., belief, withholding, and disbelief; all credences between [0,1]). permissivists maintain there are situations which subset of those is permitted (e.g., only belief and between [0.9, 0.7]).18 In moderately permissive cases, it be justified engage in paternalism to move others from the impermissible attitudes. For example, if you I are in an evidential situation that permits belief in p and withholding on p, disbelief, I may be in paternalistically nudging away disbelief.19 paternalism unjustified when draws others away from the permitted attitudes. My main claim is follows: Strong claim: If, given their evidence and a proposition are an epistemically permissive with respect to attitudes in it is always epistemically any them to the attitude A1-An in p. provided several reasons to think claim is true. However, makes it challenging to establish 16028-0338d-1pass-r01.indd 207 2/21/2020 AM 208 Chapter 13 in a short It requires that, in the permissive cases described, there is no epistemic (even in run) that outweighs the losses associated with interfering another's inquiry. I've tried explain earlier why I think there are serious losses with
 And this could have long-term bAd effects- fOr exaMplE, stIfLing New iDeas and free inqUIry. THus, we have reason to exercIse caUtIOn anD CoNsideR whetheR We MIGht Be In An ePiSTeMicalLy pErmissiVe case befoRe eNgAging in epistEMiC paternaliSm. OF course, some dEny That peRmIssIVe casEs eVer ocCur.17 WhiLE I've moTivated inTeRPersonAL permisSIViSm wiTh epistemic standaRDs, THe permissivism Debate Is COmPLEx aNd hAs a growing LiTeratURe, and I cANnOT FUllY Settle it here. IF one were conVIncEd permIsSivE Cases aRe impOsSIblE, then this arGumeNt won't havE purchASe for thEM (althouGh they NeeD a rEspoNSe To The ArGUmeNT fOr pERmiSsivism fRoM ePisteMic sTANDArds). alsO notE that There is a distiNctIon bETweEn modErate And eXtReme pErmissIvism. exTreme permissiviSts mAintain thAt tHeRe aRe EvideNTial siTuaTioNs in whiCh all doXAstIc ATTItUdes toward a proposiTiON ArE permittEd (e.g., beLIeF, wIThholdinG, aNd dIsbeLIEf; all CredENcEs betweeN [0,1]). ModerATe PeRmissivIsTs mainTaIn mEreLy thaT TherE are evIdential SituaTIons in which a suBSet of those doxAStIC AtTItudEs iS permitted (e.G., onlY BeliEf anD WiThhOLding; Only cReDEnCEs between [0.9, 0.7]).18 In moderateLy PermisSive cAses, it may be juStified to eNGAGe in pateRnalISm TO move others awaY from The impermiSSible attItudeS. For examPle, if you aND i are in an EviDenTiaL siTUAtIon that permitS BElieF iN p and wiThhOlding oN p, bUt nOt dIsbElIef, I may be JustifieD iN pAtErNalIsticALly nudgiNg You AwAy fRom diSBelief.19 nonetHeleSs, PaTErnAlism is UNjUSTifiEd WhEn it DraWs OtherS awaY FroM the perMitted attItuDEs. My MaIn Claim is As follows: StroNg Claim: If, givEn TheIr evidENCe and a prOposition p, agents are in an EPistemiCalLy perMissIve case wiTh rEspect To aTTitudeS A1-An in P, it is AlWayS EPisteMICaLly WrOng for any oF THem To patErNaliSticallY interfere to change THe oTher's attitude a1-An In p. I'VE PrOviDEd SEveRaL ReaSONs to think this clAim is true. HOwEVeR, the assumpTIon Of EpistemIc conseQuentIAlism maKes it chalLenging to EsTablISH 16028-0338d-1pAss-r01.indd 207 2/21/2020 10:23:45 AM 208 chapter 13 iN a short chAPter. IT ReQuireS thAt, in thE pErmIssivE cases DEscRibed, There iS nO epistEmic gOoD (even in tHe long run) that outweighs tHe lossEs assOciAted with iNteRFerIng with anOtheR's inquiry. I'Ve tRieD to exPlaIN earlIer wHY I ThiNK therE are SErious losSEs AssOCIaTed with this
 And this could have long- term bad e ffect s-for  e xamp le,stifling new i d easand free inquiry. Thus , weha v e re a so n toexercis e  c a u tio nan d c on s id er wh eth er we m ight be in  an  e pistemically pe rmissive c ase  before enga gin g in e pi ste m ic pa ter nalis m. Ofc ourse,  some den yt hat pe r missive c as es e ver occur.17 Whil e  I ' ve motivated i nterpe rs o na l per mis sivism wit hepist e mic sta n da r d s , t h e permissivis m debate is com plex a nd  ha s  a gro wingli t era ture, and I  can not fully  settl e  it her e . If on e were  co nvi nced pe rm iss iv e  ca s es  ar e  im possible ,th en th is a r g u m entwon 't h ave p urchase for t hem  (al t hou gh th ey ne ed a  r espon se tothe a rg ument for permi ssiv ism fromepi st emi cstand a rds).Als o n ote tha t there isad i s ti nction between mod er a t eand extr eme pe r mi ss i vism. Ex tr eme  per m i ssivi stsm ai ntain th at the r ear e evide nt ial si tu ati ons  in w h ichall do xastic a ttitu d es toward a pr o position arep er m i tt e d (e .g. , belief, w ithh o ldin g, a n ddis b elief ; all  c r ed e nces between [0,1]) .Modera te pe rmissivists m aintain me r e l y that t here ar e  evidential si tuati ons in whi c h a subs et of  those d oxastic a t t itudes i s p erm itt ed( e .g ., only belie f andwi thholdi ng;  only c red enc esbet we en [0.9,0.7]).18  I nmo de rat ely p e rmissive  c ase s,  it  mayb e just ified  toen ga g e i n pater n al i s m to  m ov e ot her sawayfrom the  imperm issible a tti t udes .Fo r examp le, if you an dI are in a nevi dentia l situatio n that permits belief i n  p andwit hhold ingon p, but  no t disb eli e f, I m ay bejusti fi edi n  pate r n al ist ic ally nudgi n g  yo u awa yfrom  disbel ief.19 Nonetheless ,  pa ternalism isunj usti f i ed  wh e ni t d ra w s o t h ers away from t he permitt ed at titudes. M y  ma in  claimis as f ollow s : Stron g claim:If, given  t heir e vid ence and a  proposi tion p, a g entsa re  in a n e pistem ic all y per missiv e  ca se wi th res pe ct toattit ud es A1-An  in p, it is always epi stemic allywro ng for an y o f  th em to pat erna listically  in ter feretoc hange  the ot her ' s att itud e  A1-An in p.  I' v e  p rovided sev e r a l r eason s t o  think  thi s claim is true.H owever, the as sump t i onofe pist em ic consequenti ali sm m akes itch allenging t o establ is h  1602 8-0338 d-1pas s-r01.i n d d2 07 2/2 1/20 2010:23:45AM20 8  Chapte r13 in a s hort  c hapter . It r e quir e s  that, in the pe rmiss i v e cas e s d escri be d, ther e  isno epistem ic good (ev en inthelongrun) th at  outwe igh sthe losses associate d wit h inter fe ring  wi th ano ther ' s  inqu iry.  I 've  tried to e xp l ai ne arl ierwhy I  t hink  there ar e  serious  lo s ses ass oc iat e d  witht hi s 
 And_this could_have long-term bad effects-_for example,_stifling_new ideas_and_free inquiry. Thus,_we have reason_to exercise caution and_consider whether we_might_be in an epistemically permissive case before engaging in epistemic paternalism. Of course, some_deny_that permissive_cases_ever_occur.17 While I've motivated interpersonal_permissivism with epistemic standards, the_permissivism debate_is complex and has a growing literature, and_I_cannot fully settle_it here. If one were convinced permissive cases are_impossible, then this argument won't have_purchase for them_(although_they_need a response to_the argument for permissivism from epistemic_standards). Also note that there is_a distinction between moderate and extreme permissivism._Extreme permissivists maintain that there are_evidential situations in which all_doxastic attitudes_toward a proposition are permitted_(e.g., belief, withholding,_and disbelief;_all credences between_[0,1]). Moderate permissivists maintain merely that_there are evidential_situations in which a subset of_those_doxastic attitudes is_permitted_(e.g.,_only belief_and withholding; only_credences_between [0.9,_0.7]).18_In moderately permissive cases, it may_be_justified to engage in paternalism to move_others away from the_impermissible_attitudes. For example, if_you and I are in_an evidential situation that permits belief_in p_and withholding_on p, but not disbelief, I may be justified in paternalistically_nudging you away from disbelief.19 Nonetheless,_paternalism is unjustified when_it draws_others_away from the_permitted_attitudes. My_main claim is as follows: Strong claim:_If, given_their evidence and a proposition p,_agents are in an_epistemically_permissive case with respect to attitudes_A1-An in p, it is always_epistemically wrong for any of_them_to_paternalistically interfere to change the_other's attitude A1-An in p. I've_provided several reasons_to think this claim is true. However,_the_assumption of epistemic consequentialism makes it_challenging_to establish 16028-0338d-1pass-r01.indd 207 2/21/2020 10:23:45_AM_208_Chapter 13 in a short_chapter. It requires that, in the_permissive cases described, there is no epistemic good (even_in the long_run) that outweighs the losses_associated_with_interfering with another's inquiry. I've tried to explain earlier why_I think_there are serious_losses associated with this