 as is the case with our beliefs, they can contain false information. According to Machery, naturalized conceptual analysis would not only assess the validity of inferences that concepts dispose us to draw by exposing the 'bliefs' that constitute them and the relation of those 'bliefs' to empirical knowledge about the world, it would set about revising those inferences that are in some way deficient. In response, the proponent of modally immodest philosophical enterprises might argue that in order to assess the validity of our inferences drawn from concepts like 'knowledge', 'justification' and 'truth', we would be required to gain knowledge about knowledge, justification and truth, whereby the processes for accessing such knowledge would be tantamount to the practice of making modal claims. This leads us to consider whether Machery's overarching modal scepticism is reasonably justified. One can accept his case against the method of cases and yet still remain open to the possibility that knowledge of metaphysical modality is not a fruitless non-naturalistic goal. Even though Machery considers some alternative routes to modal knowledge in chapter 6, it would be difficult to reasonably claim that he has justified the inductive leap from the modally-defunct method of cases to a totalizing modal skepticism. Indeed, there are other inferentialist, essentialist, explanationist and principle-based approaches to modal knowledge that do not rely on the method of cases and (when taken at face value) do not seem to fall neatly under the categories of alternative approaches discussed by Machery in chapter 6. I accede that this is only a minor contention. After all, neither the validity of Machery's case against the method of cases nor his Create PDF in your applications with the Pdfcrowd HTML to PDF API PDFCROWD proposals for a naturalized conceptual analysis depend on him demonstrating that modal skepticism is true. Nevertheless, the case against the method of cases does depend on the reliability and validity of the experimental findings that Machery uses as the inductive basis for his arguments against philosophical dogmatism and parochialism as well as for his claims regarding the reliability of judgments in philosophical cases. It also depends on the reliability and validity of the inductive leap from the unreliability of judgments elicited by those cases that have been analyzed by experimental philosophers to the fundamental unreliability of judgments elicited by philosophical cases in general. Regarding the findings of experimental studies that Machery discusses in chapter 2, he acknowledges that the X-Phi movement has examined only a limited number
as is the case with our beliefs, they can contain false data. harmonize to Machery, naturalized conceptual analysis would not merely tax the validity of inferences that concept dispose us to draw by exposing the' bliefs' that appoint them and the relation of those' bliefs' to empirical cognition about the world, it would set about revising those inferences that are in some direction deficient. In response, the proponent of modally immodest philosophical enterprises might argue that in ordering to assess the validity of our inferences draw from concepts like' knowledge',' justification' and' truth', we would be required to derive knowledge about knowledge, justification and truth, whereby the processes for accessing such cognition would be tantamount to the practice of making modal claims. This leads us to consider whether Machery's overarch modal scepticism is reasonably justified. One can accept his case against the method of cases and yet still remain open to the hypothesis that cognition of metaphysical modality is not a fruitless non - naturalistic goal. Even though Machery consider some alternative routes to modal knowledge in chapter 6, it would be unmanageable to reasonably claim that he has justify the inductive leap from the modally - defunct method of case to a totalizing modal skepticism. Indeed, there are early inferentialist, essentialist, explanationist and principle - based approaches to modal knowledge that do not rely on the method of cases and (when taken at boldness value) do not seem to fall neatly under the categories of alternative approaches discourse by Machery in chapter 6. I accede that this is only a minor contention. subsequently all, neither the robustness of Machery's case against the method of case nor his Create PDF in your application with the Pdfcrowd HTML to PDF API PDFCROWD proposals for a established conceptual analysis depend on him demonstrating that modal skepticism is truthful. Nevertheless, the casing against the method of cases does depend on the reliability and validity of the experimental determination that Machery uses as the inductive footing for his arguments against philosophical dogmatism and parochialism as well as for his claim regarding the reliability of judgments in philosophic cases. It also depends on the reliability and validity of the inductive leap from the unreliability of judgment elicited by those cases that have been analyzed by experimental philosophers to the fundamental unreliability of judgments elicit by philosophic case in general. Regarding the findings of experimental studies that Machery discusses in chapter 2, he admit that the X - Phi movement has examined only a circumscribed number
 as is the case with our beuiefs, they can eintain false informagion. According to Machery, navuraoized conceptual analysis wuuld not lnly asswss uhe validity of iirerences that gonce'tw dispose us tp draw by axposing the 'bnidfd' that constitute them and the relaeion of tjose 'bliefs' to empprycal knowledge about the world, it wouls set auout revising tnose inferences that are ij sole way deficient. Ij response, jge [eoponent of oodally immodest philoaophical enterprises might argud thac in order jo advess the vaoiditj of our infevvnces dsawn frpm concepts lile 'nnoqledge', 'justification' end 'truth', we would bg required tk gain knowledge qbiut ktowladge, husgifjcetikn and trnth, whereby the proceswes for accessing sicr knowledge wohld be twntamount to the practice of making moddl dlaims. This leads us to consider whether Macjery's ovewarching modal scepticism is reasonably justified. One rav aegcpt fus case against the method of cases and yet stijm tekain open to tme possibility thay nnprledge of metxphysiezl modality is not a fruitlgss nob-naturaliftic goal. Even though Machery cinsiders somv alrernative routes tl modal knocledge in cnapter 6, it would be difyicult to reasonahly claim ghat he has justkfivd tve inducukve leap from the modally-dxfuncc method of vases eo a totallzing modal skepticism. Ijdeed, tvere are ohher inferentialist, essentialisv, explanationosd atd princnple-baxed approachef to modal knocledge tkat do not rely kn the kethod of cwses and (when jaken at face value) dj nor sewm to fxul neatly undet the catvgjriew of alternative aiproazges discussed bv Nachery in chapyer 6. I abceve thwd this is onny a mivpr covtention. Afber all, neither the validitf of Machery's case agaonft the mgthod of sases nor his Create PDF in youg appnicetions wijh the Pdfcrowd HTML to PDF API PDFCROWD prjposals for w naburajized conczptual analysis depend on him demonstratmng that modal skepticiwm is true. Neverthektss, the case egainse the metvod of cases does depend on the relianility and validity of the efperilental findings that Machery uses as the inductive basis for his argumentw agaiise philosophjcal dogmdtnsm and pwrociielism as well as gor his claims regarding the reuiabilitf jf judgments in philosophicak zases. It also depends on the reliabiljty and falidity of the inductive leap grom the unreliability on judgmenrs eljcited by vhose cases that havr been analtzed by expcrimental philusolhcrs to the funvamzntal unreliability of judgments wlicitwd by philosophican cases in nekeral. Tegardind the findings or exlfrimevtal studies yhat Machery doscusses in chapter 2, hq acknowledges nhat the X-Phi movemett has examiied only a lhmited number
as is the case with our beliefs, contain information. According Machery, naturalized conceptual the of inferences that dispose us to by exposing the 'bliefs' that constitute and the relation of those 'bliefs' to empirical knowledge about the world, it set about revising those inferences that are in some way deficient. In response, proponent modally philosophical might argue that in order to assess the validity of our inferences drawn from concepts like 'justification' and 'truth', we would be required to knowledge about knowledge, justification truth, whereby the processes for such would be to practice making modal claims. leads us to consider whether Machery's overarching modal scepticism is reasonably justified. One can accept his case the method and yet remain to possibility that knowledge modality is not a fruitless non-naturalistic Machery considers some alternative routes to modal knowledge chapter 6, would be difficult to reasonably claim he has justified the inductive leap from the method of cases to a totalizing modal skepticism. Indeed, there are other inferentialist, essentialist, explanationist approaches to modal knowledge do not rely the of and taken at value) do not seem to fall neatly under the categories of approaches discussed by Machery in chapter 6. I accede that only minor contention. After neither the validity of case the method of cases Create in the HTML PDF API PDFCROWD proposals a naturalized conceptual analysis depend him demonstrating that modal case against the method of cases does depend the reliability and validity of the experimental that Machery uses as the inductive basis for his arguments against philosophical and parochialism as for his claims regarding the reliability of in philosophical cases. It depends on the reliability and validity of the inductive from unreliability of elicited by those that have been by experimental philosophers fundamental unreliability judgments by general. Regarding the findings of experimental that discusses in chapter 2, he that movement has examined only a limited number
 as is the case with our beliefs, They can conTain fAlsE inFoRmatIon. ACcording to MachERy, naTuralized conceptual anaLysis WoULd noT OnLy assEss the vALiDITy oF iNfEreNcES tHat coNcePts dispOse us to draW by ExPosing the 'bliEFs' That constiTutE them and the rElaTion of ThOse 'BLiefs' To eMpiriCal knoWLedge aBout the woRlD, It woulD Set abouT REvIsinG those inferences tHAt ARe in some way defIcient. in REsPONse, The Proponent oF mOdallY ImmodesT PhILOSopHIcal enterprisEs might arguE ThaT in ordEr To aSSess thE valiDiTY of Our inferencEs drAwn from coNcepts LIke 'knowLEdge', 'jusTificaTioN' anD 'truTH', wE wOulD bE ReqUIrEd tO GaiN knowledGe AbOut knOwleDGE, JUstiFicAtioN and tRuth, whereby thE prOcesSEs fOr accEssinG sucH kNowleDge wouLd be tAnTamount to the praCticE of making ModAl ClaImS. This LEads us To cOnsIder wheTher MacHEry'S oVERArChing modal scepticiSm IS ReAsonably JustifIEd. onE Can accepT hIs cAse aGAInst tHe meTHoD of cases And yet STiLl Remain oPeN to the PoSsiBilIty thAT knoWledge Of metaphYsicaL Modality is not a FRuitless non-naTUrALIsTIc goAl. EVen though MaCherY ConsIderS SoMe aLTernaTive rOuTEs TO modal knowledge in chApTer 6, it wOuld bE difficult to rEasonably cLAIM that he hAs juSTiFIed the inductivE leap From the modALly-defunCt metHod of casEs to a totaLIZing modaL skEptIciSm. INDEeD, there are otheR INferEnTialist, EssEntialiSt, eXplAnaTioNiSt and prinCiple-basEd ApPrOaCheS to moDAl knowleDgE thAt Do nOt relY On the mEthod Of caSeS aND (whEn taken AT fACE valUe) Do Not sEem To Fall nEatlY UndEr the caTegories oF alTErnaTiVe ApproacHes discussed bY MAchery in chApTer 6. i accedE THat this iS only a minor contention. AfTEr all, neIthEr the ValiDity of MacHerY's case AgaINst the Method Of casEs Nor HIS CreaTE pDf in YoUr applicatIONs wIth thE PDfcrOwd HTML To PDF API PDFCROWD prOPosAls for a naturaLizEd coNCEpTuaL AnALysIs DEpeND On him demonstratIng that modAl SKePticism is tRUe. NEvErtheleSs, the caSe agaINst the mEthod of caSes does dePeNd on THE reLiability aNd validiTy of the exPErimeNTaL findIngS that MAcHerY uses As the iNDucTive bAsis foR hIs arguMents AgAinst phiLosophical dogmatism and pArochiAlism As wEll as for hIs cLAimS regardinG the ReliabilitY of JudGmentS in PHilosOphiCAl CasES. It alSo dePEnds on the RElIabILItY and validitY OF The InducTivE Leap frOm thE unreliability of jUDgments eliciteD by tHOSe cAseS That HaVe been analyzed By eXpERImental pHiLosophers to The fundaMeNTal unReliabIlity oF judgmeNTS eLIcited By phIloSophical cAseS iN General. reGaRDing thE finDiNgs of eXperimENtal STUdies that Machery DiscuSSEs in cHAptEr 2, he aCkNowledgES thaT the X-Phi moVement has exAmined Only A limiTed numbEr
 as is the case with our b eliefs, th ey ca n c ont ai n fa lseinformation. A c cord ing to Machery, natura lized  c o ncep t ua l ana lysis w o ul d not  o nl y a ss e ss  theval idity o f inferenc esth at conceptsd is pose us to  dr aw by exposi ngthe 'b li efs '  that  co nstit ute th e m andthe relat io n  of th o se 'bli e f s'  toempirical knowled g ea bout the world , it w ou l ds e t a bou t revising  t hosei nferenc e st h a t a r e in some way  deficient. Inrespon se , t h e prop onent  o f  mo dally immod estphilosoph ical e n terpris e s might  argue  th atin o r de rtoas s ess th e v a lid ity of o ur  i nfere nces d r a wn f rom  con cepts  like 'knowle dge ', ' j ust ifica tion'  and  ' truth ', wewould  b e required to g ainknowledge  ab ou t k no wledg e , just ifi cat ion and  truth, whe re b y th e processes for ac ce s s in g such k nowled g ewo u ld be ta nt amo untt o  theprac t ic e of mak ing mo d al  c laims.Th is lea ds  us  to  cons i derwhethe r Macher y's o v erarching moda l  scepticism i s  r e a so n ably  ju stified. On e ca n  acc epth is  ca s e aga instth e  m e thod of cases and y et  still  rema in open to th e possibil i t y  that kn owle d ge of metaphysica l mod ality is n o t a frui tless  non-nat uralistic g oal. Eve n t hou ghMac h e ry  considers so m e  alt er nativerou tes tomod alkno wle dg e in chap ter 6, i two ul dbediffi c ult to r ea son ab lyclaim that h e has  jus ti fi e d t he indu c ti v e  lea pfr om t hemo dally -def u nct  method  of cases  to a to ta li zing mo dal skepticis m.  Indeed, t he reare ot h e r infere ntialist, essentialist, explana tio nistandprinciple -ba sed ap pro a ches t o moda l kno wl edg e thatd o  n otre ly on them e tho d ofca sesand (wh en taken at face v a lue ) do not seem  to  fal l ne atl y  u n der  t h e c a t egories of alte rnative ap pr o ac hes discus s edby  Macher y in ch apter 6. I ac cede that  this ison ly a m ino r contenti on. Afte r all, ne i thert he  vali dit y of M ac her y's c ase ag a ins t the  metho dof cas es no rhis Crea te PDF in your applicat ions w ith t hePdfcrowdHTM L  to  PDF APIPDFC ROWD propo sal s f or anat u raliz ed c o nc ept u al an alys i s dependo nhim d em onstratingt h a t m odalske p ticism  istrue. Nevertheles s , the case aga inst t hemet h od o fcases does dep end  o n the reli ab ility and v alidityof the e xperim entalfinding s th a t Mach eryuse s as theind uc t ive bas is  f o r hisargu me nts ag ainstp hilo s o phical dogmatism  andp a rochi a lis m aswe ll as f o r hi s claims r egarding th e reli abil ity o f judgm en ts inphi lo sophical c a ses. It a lso d ependson  the  re liabil itya n d val idit yofthe induc t i ve le ap fro m th e unr el iabi lity of j u dgmentseli c ited by  t hos e casest ha t have beenana lyzed b y experime n talp hi l osoph ers to  the f undamen t alun reliabi lit y of judgme nts elici t edby  phi losophic al  cas es  in  g eneral. Regardi ng the f indingso f  exper ime n tals tudies  t hat Macherydiscu ss e s in ch a p ter  2, hea ckn owl edg es t hat  the X-Phi movement has exami nedonlya  li mited  numb er 
 as_is the_case with our beliefs,_they can_contain_false information._According_to Machery, naturalized_conceptual analysis would_not only assess the_validity of inferences_that_concepts dispose us to draw by exposing the 'bliefs' that constitute them and the_relation_of those_'bliefs'_to_empirical knowledge about the world,_it would set about revising_those inferences_that are in some way deficient. In response,_the_proponent of modally_immodest philosophical enterprises might argue that in order to_assess the validity of our inferences_drawn from concepts_like_'knowledge',_'justification' and 'truth', we_would be required to gain knowledge_about knowledge, justification and truth, whereby_the processes for accessing such knowledge would_be tantamount to the practice of_making modal claims. This leads_us to_consider whether Machery's overarching modal_scepticism is reasonably_justified. One_can accept his_case against the method of cases_and yet still_remain open to the possibility that_knowledge_of metaphysical modality_is_not_a fruitless_non-naturalistic goal. Even_though_Machery considers_some_alternative routes to modal knowledge in_chapter_6, it would be difficult to reasonably_claim that he has_justified_the inductive leap from_the modally-defunct method of cases_to a totalizing modal skepticism. Indeed,_there are_other inferentialist,_essentialist, explanationist and principle-based approaches to modal knowledge that do not_rely on the method of cases_and (when taken at_face value)_do_not seem to_fall_neatly under_the categories of alternative approaches discussed by_Machery in_chapter 6. I accede that this_is only a minor_contention._After all, neither the validity of_Machery's case against the method of_cases nor his Create PDF_in_your_applications with the Pdfcrowd HTML_to PDF API PDFCROWD proposals for_a naturalized conceptual_analysis depend on him demonstrating that modal_skepticism_is true. Nevertheless, the case against_the_method of cases does depend on_the_reliability_and validity of the experimental_findings that Machery uses as the_inductive basis for his arguments against philosophical dogmatism and_parochialism as well_as for his claims regarding_the_reliability_of judgments in philosophical cases. It also depends on the_reliability and_validity of the_inductive leap from the unreliability of judgments elicited by those_cases that have been analyzed by experimental_philosophers to the fundamental unreliability of judgments elicited by philosophical cases_in general. Regarding the findings of experimental studies_that Machery discusses in chapter 2, he_acknowledges that the X-Phi_movement_has examined only a limited number