 Q follows from P. It restates this assumption at the level of mental states – of beliefs. Because Q follows from P, correct reasoning will take you from a belief in P to a belief in Q. That is to say, a belief in P rationally requires a belief in Q. At the beginning of Section 5, I said that reasoning is normatively guided. In recognizing the notion of a rational requirement, I have done nothing but make this more explicit. Some states of mind rationally require others. Reasoning is not ought-giving or reason-giving in anything but a misleading sense. Nor are the states of mind it is premised on. 7. Intentions are not reason-giving Everything I have said about belief reasoning applies to intention reasoning too. If you intend an end, and believe some act is a necessary means to it, your intention and belief rationally require you to intend the means. Reasoning will bring you to intend it. This is simply to restate the correctness of intention reasoning such at (B). It does not follow that you ought to intend the means, nor that you have a reason to intend it. For example, if you intend to go to St Andrews, and believe that getting off at Leuchars is a necessary means of getting there, it does not follow that you ought to get off at Leuchars or have a reason to do so. From one point of view, this is obvious. It might be, for instance, that 8 you ought not to be going to St Andrews in the first place. In Intentions, Plans and Practical Reason, Michael Bratman (1987, pp. 23–7) points out that a theory of practical reason must not imply 'bootstrapping', as he calls it. Just because you intend to go to St Andrews, that intention cannot possibly create a reason for you to go there if you have none already. An intention cannot justify itself, by providing itself with a reason. Still, your intention must play a role in your reasoning and lead you to other intentions, including the intention of getting off at St Andrews. The purpose of Bratman's book is to elucidate the vital role of intentions in the reasoned planning of our lives. It creates a puzzle. If your intention leads to other intentions by reasoning, does it not create a reason for those other intentions? That would still be a sort of bootstrapping; a reason is being pulled into existence out of nothing. Now we have a solution to this puzzle. There is
Q follows from P. It restates this assumption at the level of genial state – of beliefs. Because Q follows from phosphorus, correct reasoning will contract you from a belief in P to a impression in Q. That is to read, a belief in P rationally necessitate a belief in Q. At the beginning of Section 5, I suppose that reasoning is normatively guided. In recognizing the notion of a rational requirement, I have done nothing but lay down this more explicit. Some states of thinker rationally require others. Reasoning is not ought - giving or reason - giving in anything but a misleading common sense. Nor are the states of thinker it is premised on. 7. Intentions are not reason - give Everything I have said about belief reasoning applies to intention reasoning too. If you mean an end, and believe some act is a necessary means to it, your intention and belief rationally require you to intend the means. Reasoning will bring you to intend it. This is merely to restate the correctness of intention reason such at (B). It does not follow that you ought to intend the means, nor that you accept a reason to intend it. For example, if you intend to proceed to St Andrews, and believe that getting off at Leuchars is a necessary means of getting there, it does not stick to that you ought to get off at Leuchars or have a reason to do therefore. From one point of horizon, this is obvious. It might be, for instance, that 8 you ought not to be going to St Andrews in the first place. In Intentions, Plans and Practical Reason, Michael Bratman (1987, pp. 23–7) point out that a theory of practical reason must not entail' bootstrapping', as he calls it. Just because you intend to go to St Andrews, that purpose cannot possibly create a reason for you to go there if you have none already. An intention cannot apologize itself, by providing itself with a rationality. Still, your purpose must play a role in your reasoning and moderate you to other intentions, including the intention of get off at St Andrews. The purpose of Bratman's book is to elucidate the vital role of intentions in the reasoned planning of our lives. It creates a puzzle. If your purpose leads to other purpose by reasoning, does it not create a reason for those other intentions? That would still be a sort of bootstrapping; a reason is being pull into existence out of nothing. Now we have a solution to this puzzle. There is
 Q vollows from P. It restatts this assumptiou at thx level of mentxl states – of beliefs. Becausx Q dolloqs from P, correct reasuning wilp take yiu fcom a belief in ' to a bcjief ln Q. Chet is to say, a nelief in P rationally rexukrzs a belief in Q. At the beginning of Sectiom 5, I said that rgasonpnd is normatively guided. In recognizing the nouion of a rational requirement, I have done nlthijg but make this mlre explicij. Soiw states of oind rationally requirg others. Reasoning is not ought-gkving or reason-ticinh in anythinj but w misleading sense. Nmr are yhe states of kinv it is premised on. 7. Inteitions are not reasog-giving Eeexything I have said avoyt benief rearinivg zp'liss to lntxntion reaskning too. Id you intend an end, age believe soms act ys a necessary means to it, your intention ans belief rationally reqyire you to intend thg means. Rewsoning will bring you to intend it. This is simplf to certaue the zirgectness of intention reasoning such at (B). It qkex kot follow that nou ought to intenc hhr means, nor thxt you habe a reason to intfnd it. Sor ezample, if you intend to go to St Andrews, and believe rhat getting off ac Leuchars ir a mecesxary means of getting tkere, if does not vollow thzg you ought to gdt pfx at Leuchars or have a rewson to di so. From ove ppint os view, thid is obvious. It might be, for nnstatce, that 8 jou ought not to be going to St Andrews in thg fhrsn place. Iu Intektions, Plans anq Practical Recson, Mickael Bfatman (1987, pp. 23–7) pointv out that w theory of pswctical reasmn must got umplt 'bootsgfapping', as he valls it. Lbst becauwe you intend to gp tu St Andrews, thac untention cannoy pussybpy cwaate a reasot fof yui to eo thert in yuu hsve none already. An hntehtion cannot justigy itself, vy proviqing itself woth a reason. Still, your inventiom most play a role in your reasonihg and lewd nou to other yntektiogs, includiug the intention of getting off at St Anvrews. The purpose of Btatman's book is to elocicate the vival roje of intantions in the reasobed planning of omr lives. It creates a luzzle. If ylur intention leads to other intentions by reasoning, does it not create a reasoi sor those ofher intettnonx? That woupv still be a sort of bootstrapping; a reason is bxing pulleg nnto existence out of nothing. Nuw we have a rolution to this puzzle. Fhere is
Q follows from P. It restates this the of mental – of beliefs. correct will take you a belief in to a belief in Q. That to say, a belief in P rationally requires a belief in Q. At beginning of Section 5, I said that reasoning is normatively guided. In recognizing notion a requirement, have done nothing but make this more explicit. Some states of mind rationally require others. Reasoning not ought-giving or reason-giving in anything but a sense. Nor are the of mind it is premised 7. are not Everything have about belief reasoning to intention reasoning too. If you intend an end, and believe some act is a necessary means it, your belief rationally you intend means. Reasoning will to intend it. This is simply correctness of intention reasoning such at (B). It not follow you ought to intend the means, that you have a reason to intend it. example, if you intend to go to St Andrews, and believe that getting off at a necessary means of there, it does follow you to off at or have a reason to do so. From one point of this is obvious. It might be, for instance, that 8 not be going to Andrews in the first In Plans and Practical Reason, (1987, 23–7) a of reason must not imply as he calls it. Just you intend to go cannot possibly create a reason for you to there if you have none already. An cannot justify itself, by providing itself with a reason. Still, your intention play a your reasoning and lead you to other intentions, the intention of getting at St Andrews. The purpose of Bratman's book is elucidate vital role intentions in the planning of our It creates a your intention to intentions it not create a reason for other That would still be a of reason is being pulled into existence out of nothing. Now we have a solution to There is
 Q follows from P. It restates thIs assumptiOn at tHe lEveL oF menTal sTates – of beliefs. bEcauSe Q follows from P, correct ReasoNiNG wilL TaKe you From a beLIeF IN P tO a BeLieF iN q. THat is To sAy, a beliEf in P ratioNalLy Requires a belIEf In Q. At the beGinNing of SectioN 5, I sAid thaT rEasONing iS noRmatiVely guIDed. In rEcognizinG tHE notioN Of a ratiONAl RequIrement, I have done nOThINg but make this mOre expLiCIt. sOMe sTatEs of mind raTiOnallY Require OThERS. reaSOning is not ougHt-giving or rEAsoN-givinG iN anYThing bUt a miSlEAdiNg sense. Nor aRe thE states of Mind it IS premisED on. 7. InteNtions Are Not ReasON-gIvIng evERytHInG I hAVe sAid about BeLiEf reaSoniNG APPlieS to InteNtion Reasoning too. IF yoU intENd aN end, aNd belIeve SoMe act Is a necEssarY mEans to it, your intEntiOn and beliEf rAtIonAlLy reqUIre you To iNteNd the meAns. ReasONinG wILL BrIng you to intend it. ThIs IS SiMply to reState tHE cOrREctness oF iNteNtioN REasonIng sUCh At (B). It doeS not foLLoW tHat you oUgHt to inTeNd tHe mEans, nOR thaT you haVe a reasoN to inTEnd it. For examplE, If you intend to GO tO sT ANDrewS, anD believe thaT getTIng oFf at lEuChaRS is a nEcessArY MeANs of getting there, it dOeS not foLlow tHat you ought to Get off at LeUCHArs or havE a reASoN To do so. From one pOint oF view, this iS Obvious. IT mighT be, for inStance, thaT 8 YOu ought nOt tO be GoiNg tO sT ANdrews in the fiRST plaCe. in IntenTioNs, Plans And praCtiCal reAson, MichaEl BratmaN (1987, pP. 23–7) pOiNtS ouT that A Theory of PrActIcAl rEason MUst not Imply 'BootStRaPPinG', as he caLLs IT. just BeCaUse yOu iNtEnd to Go to sT AnDrews, thAt intentiOn cANnot PoSsIbly creAte a reason for YoU to go there If You Have noNE Already. AN intention cannot justify ITself, by ProVidinG itsElf with a rEasOn. StilL, yoUR intenTion muSt plaY a RolE IN your REAsOniNg And lead you TO OthEr intEnTionS, includIng the intention of gETtiNg off at St AndrEws. the pURPoSe oF brATmaN's BOok IS To elucidate the vItal role of InTEnTions in the REasOnEd plannIng of ouR liveS. it creatEs a puzzle. if your intEnTion LEAds To other intEntions bY reasoninG, Does iT NoT creaTe a Reason FoR thOse otHer intENtiOns? ThAt woulD sTill be A sort Of BootstraPping; a reason is being pullEd into ExistEncE out of notHinG. now We have a soLutiOn to this puZzlE. ThEre is
 Q follows from P. It rest ates thisassum pti onat  the  lev el of mental s t ates  – of beliefs. Because  Q fo ll o ws f r om  P, c orrectr ea s o nin gwi llta k eyou f rom  a beli ef in P to  abe lief in Q. T h at  is to say , a  belief in P  ra tional ly  re q uires  abelie f in Q .  At th e beginni ng of Sec t ion 5,I sa id t hat reasoning isn or m atively guided . In r ec o gn i z ing  th e notion o fa rat i onal re q ui r e m ent ,  I have donenothing but mak e this  m ore explic it. S om e  st ates of min d ra tionallyrequir e  others .  Reason ing is  no t o ught - gi vi ngor rea s on -gi v ing  in anyt hi ng  buta mi s l e a ding  se nse.  Norare the state s o f mi n d i t ispremi sedon . 7.Intent ionsar e not reason-gi ving  Everythi ngIhav esaida bout b eli efreasoni ng appl i esto i n te ntion reasoning to o. I fyou inte nd ane nd ,a nd belie ve  so me a c t  is a  nec e ss ary mean s to i t ,yo ur inte nt ion an dbel ief  rati o nall y requ ire youto in t end the means. Reasoning wil l  b r i ng youtointend it.This is s impl y  t o r e state  theco r re c tness of intentionre asonin g suc h at (B). Itdoes not f o l l ow thatyouo ug h t to intend th e mea ns, nor th a t you ha ve areason t o intendi t . For ex amp le,  if  yo u in tend to go to S t An dr ews, an d b elievetha t g ett ing  o ff at Leu chars is  a  n ec es sar y mea n s of get ti ngth ere , itd oes no t fol lowth at you  oughtt og e t of fat  Leu cha rs  or h avea  re ason to  do so. F rom onepo in t of vi ew, this is o bv ious. It m ig htbe, fo r instance , that 8 you ought nott o be go ing  to S t An drews inthe  first  pl a ce. In  Inten tions ,Pla n s  andP r ac tic al  Reason, M i c hae l Bra tm an ( 1987, p p. 23–7) points ou t  th at a theory o f p ract i c al  re a so n  mu st not i mply 'bootstrap ping', ashe ca lls it. Ju s t b ec ause yo u inten d tog o to St  Andrews,  that int en tion c ann ot possibl y create  a reason for y o uto go  th ere if  y ouhavenone a l rea dy. A n inte nt ion ca nnotju stify it self, by providing itse lf wit h a r eas on. Still , y o urintention  mus t play a r ole  in  your  re a sonin g an d  l ead you t o ot h er intent i on s,i n cl uding the i n t e nti on of  ge t ting o ff a t St Andrews. The purpose of Bra tman ' s  bo oki s to  e lucidate the v ita lr o le of in te ntions in t he reaso ne d  plan ning o f ourlives.I t  c r eatesa pu zzl e. If you r i nt e ntion l ea ds to oth er i nt ention s by r e ason i n g, does it not c reate a  reas o n f or th os e other inte ntions? Th at would st ill be  a s ort o f boots tr apping ; a  r eason is b e ing pulle d int o exist en ce o utof not hing . Now w e ha ve  asolutiont o  t h is  p u zzl e. T hereis 
 Q_follows from_P. It restates this_assumption at_the_level of_mental_states – of_beliefs. Because Q_follows from P, correct_reasoning will take_you_from a belief in P to a belief in Q. That is to say,_a_belief in_P_rationally_requires a belief in Q._At the beginning of Section_5, I_said that reasoning is normatively guided. In recognizing_the_notion of a_rational requirement, I have done nothing but make this_more explicit. Some states of mind_rationally require others._Reasoning_is_not ought-giving or reason-giving_in anything but a misleading sense._Nor are the states of mind_it is premised on. 7. Intentions are_not reason-giving Everything I have said_about belief reasoning applies to_intention reasoning_too. If you intend an_end, and believe_some act_is a necessary_means to it, your intention and_belief rationally require_you to intend the means. Reasoning_will_bring you to_intend_it._This is_simply to restate_the_correctness of_intention_reasoning such at (B). It does_not_follow that you ought to intend the_means, nor that you_have_a reason to intend_it. For example, if you_intend to go to St Andrews,_and believe_that getting_off at Leuchars is a necessary means of getting there, it_does not follow that you ought_to get off at_Leuchars or_have_a reason to_do_so. From_one point of view, this is obvious._It might_be, for instance, that 8 you_ought not to be_going_to St Andrews in the first_place. In Intentions, Plans and Practical_Reason, Michael Bratman (1987, pp._23–7)_points_out that a theory of_practical reason must not imply 'bootstrapping',_as he calls_it. Just because you intend to go_to_St Andrews, that intention cannot possibly_create_a reason for you to go_there_if_you have none already. An_intention cannot justify itself, by providing_itself with a reason. Still, your intention must play_a role in_your reasoning and lead you_to_other_intentions, including the intention of getting off at St Andrews._The purpose_of Bratman's book_is to elucidate the vital role of intentions in the_reasoned planning of our lives. It creates_a puzzle. If your intention leads to other intentions by reasoning,_does it not create a reason for those_other intentions? That would still be a_sort of bootstrapping; a_reason_is being pulled into existence out of_nothing._Now_we_have a solution_to this puzzle._There is