 multiplicity of our capacities open up to us a range of developmental possibilities, so that the path to developing them in ways that are good for us is more complex than nature alone settles. There is a 'natural indeterminacy' to the course of proper development for us, but because we are by nature practical reasoners, an essential element in our developing properly is learning to cultivate our own capacities in response to reasons. The best path of development for each of us is in large part the DEVELOPMENT AND REASONS  ©  The Author Journal compilation ©  The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly work of our own practical reason to sort out, and for this reason the development and exercise of practical wisdom occupies a special place in the story of what is good for us. It is not merely that practical wisdom is more important than other developed capacities. It orders and structures what counts as the proper development of our other capacities: it has what Daniel Russell has called a directive role in our good.3 On Kraut's view, there is no such recognition of a special significance for the development of our rational capacities – they need development in ways that are recognizably good for us, but in this respect they are on all fours with all our natural capacities. Because there is no recognition in Kraut's view that directing the living of a good human life is the work of practical wisdom, there is also no recognition of what I shall call the internal relationship between practical wisdom and a good human life. This internal relationship entails that each of us is uniquely positioned to contribute to our own living well in a way in which others simply cannot. A good human life is, on the ancient view, one with an appropriate rational structure in the choices and conduct which constitute it, and it is the agent's capacity for rational agency which provides this structure. This is what explains the internal relationship, and because Kraut fails to acknowledge that relationship, his account does not establish a clear linkage between what is good for us and what reasons we have for acting; the eudaimonist approach does. I now turn to two places where this loss is especially problematic. Whose good to seek, and why On the ancient views, it is the work of practical wisdom to recognize and respond to reasons for action, beginning with the reasons we have to live well. However, on Kraut's account,
multiplicity of our capacities open up to us a range of developmental hypothesis, so that the way to developing them in ways that are beneficial for us is more complex than nature entirely settles. There is a' natural indefiniteness' to the class of proper development for us, but because we are by nature hardheaded reasoners, an essential chemical element in our developing properly is learn to cultivate our own capacity in response to reasons. The good path of development for each of us is in big part the DEVELOPMENT AND REASONS  ©  The Author Journal compilation ©  The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly work of our own hardheaded reason to sort out, and for this reason the development and use of practical wisdom occupies a special place in the story of what is effective for us. It is not merely that practical wisdom is more important than other developed capacities. It orders and structures what counts as the proper development of our other capacity: it has what Daniel Russell has called a directive function in our good.3 On Kraut's view, there is no such recognition of a special meaning for the development of our intellectual capacities – they need development in way that are recognizably good for us, but in this respect they are on all fours with all our natural capacities. Because there is no recognition in Kraut's view that directing the living of a good human biography is the work of hardheaded wisdom, there is also no recognition of what I shall call the inner relationship between practical wisdom and a beneficial human life. This internal relationship entails that each of us is uniquely put to contribute to our own animation well in a way in which others simply cannot. A full human life is, on the ancient position, one with an appropriate rational social organization in the choices and conduct which establish it, and it is the agent's capacity for intellectual agency which provides this structure. This is what explains the internal relationship, and because Kraut fails to acknowledge that relationship, his account does not establish a clear linkage between what is full for us and what reasons we have for act; the eudaimonist approach does. I now turn to two places where this loss is specially problematic. Whose good to seek, and why On the ancient views, it is the work of practical wisdom of solomon to recognize and respond to cause for action, beginning with the reasons we have to live well. However, on Kraut's account,
 muptiplicity of our capaciuies open up to us a ranje of dsvelopmevtal possibilities, so that tie pqth ti developing them in wxys that wre good for ys is more complex than hwturz elone settles. Tmere is a 'ndtural indeterkivaey' to the course of proper developmegt for is, but because wg are fy nznuve practical reasoners, an essentjal elekent in our drveloping properly is learjing to cultivate our lwn capacitues yb response tu reasons. Uhz best path of development for each of us ks in large parj fhf DEVELOPMENV AND GEASONS  ©  Thc Authos Journsl compilation ©  Vhe Wditors of The Philosmphical Quarterly rork of ogr own practical reqsin to sord oug, ana fkr tgis rewsoi the develkpment and wxercise of practicsl qisdom occupiss a s[esial place in the story of what is good fod us. It is not merely tyat practical wisdom ls more iiportant than other developed capacities. It orderv and rtrbgburer wjat counts as the proper development of our oeget bapacities: it has what Daniek Guxfell has callgd a dixscfive role in our glod.3 On Hraut'w view, thtre ix no such recognition of a wpecial signpficqnce for the devellpment of obr ratoonal capacities – they need bevelolment in wajs that add recognizably guod fmr us, buu in this respect ehey are in akl fourr wijh all jur naturap capacities. Because thege is nm recognitlon in Kraut's view that directiij the living pf a cood humcn lifc is the work os practical wixdom, thzre is also no rvcognitioi of what I fhall call tha internal renationshyp bwtwewn pracgkcal wisdom anc a good kbman life. This internal reletiovahip entails thcu eqch of us is unoqudly plsmtionqg to contribgte go uir owv living weou in a way in which othess sjmply cannot. A gooc muman lifg is, on tre ancient virw, one with an appgopriete ravional sttucture in the choices and condhct which cokstitute it, agd ib is the agent'x capacity for rational agency which privides this strucjure. This is what expksins the invernal relationvhip, and because Krayt fails to acknoeledge that relationsgip, hiv acclunt does not establish a clear linkage between what is good for us and wyat reesjns we have for actitg; che eudwimoiirt approach does. I now turn to two places where this lovs is especially problematic. Wnore good to segk, and why On the ancient biews, it is the work of practical wisdok to recognize and respokd to reawons ror acnjoi, beginning with the reasous we yave to livc well. However, on Kvaut's accoknt,
multiplicity of our capacities open up to range developmental possibilities, that the path that good for us more complex than alone settles. There is a 'natural to the course of proper development for us, but because we are by practical reasoners, an essential element in our developing properly is learning to cultivate own in to The best path of development for each of us is in large part the DEVELOPMENT AND  ©  The Author Journal compilation © The Editors of The Quarterly work of our own reason sort out, for reason development and exercise practical wisdom occupies a special place in the story of what is good for us. It is merely that is more than developed It orders and counts as the proper development of it has what Daniel Russell has called a role in good.3 On Kraut's view, there is such recognition of a special significance for the of our rational capacities – they need development in ways that are recognizably good for in this respect they on all fours all natural Because is no in Kraut's view that directing the living of a good human is the work of practical wisdom, there is also no what shall call the relationship between practical wisdom a human life. This internal that of positioned contribute our own living well a way in which others cannot. A good human view, one with an appropriate rational structure in choices and conduct which constitute it, and is the agent's capacity for rational agency which provides this structure. This what explains relationship, and because Kraut fails to acknowledge that his account does not a clear linkage between what is good for us what we have acting; the eudaimonist does. I now to two places loss is problematic. good why On the ancient views, it the of practical wisdom to recognize respond for action, beginning with the reasons we have to live well. However, on Kraut's account,
 multiplicity of our capacitiEs open up to Us a raNge Of dEvElopMentAl possibilitieS, So thAt the path to developing tHem in WaYS thaT ArE good For us is MOrE COmpLeX tHan NaTUrE alonE seTtles. ThEre is a 'natuRal InDeterminacy' tO ThE course of pRopEr developmenT foR us, but BeCauSE we arE by NaturE practICal reaSoners, an eSsENtial eLEment in OUR dEvelOping properly is leARnINg to cultivate oUr own cApACiTIEs iN reSponse to reAsOns. ThE Best patH Of DEVEloPMent for each of Us is in large PArt The DEVeLoPMenT AND ReASONs  ©  THE AuThor Journal CompIlation ©  ThE EditoRS of The PHIlosophIcal QuArtErlY worK Of OuR owN pRActICaL reASon To sort ouT, aNd For thIs reASON The dEveLopmEnt anD exercise of prActIcal WIsdOm occUpies A speCiAl plaCe in thE storY oF what is good for uS. It iS not merelY thAt PraCtIcal wISdom is MorE imPortant Than othER deVeLOPEd Capacities. It orders AnD STrUctures wHat couNTs As THe proper DeVelOpmeNT Of our OtheR CaPacities: It has wHAt daNiel RusSeLl has cAlLed A diRectiVE rolE in our Good.3 On KrAut's vIEw, there is no sucH Recognition of A SpECIaL SignIfiCance for the DeveLOpmeNt of OUr RatIOnal cApaciTiES – tHEy need development in WaYs that Are reCognizably gooD for us, but iN THIs respecT theY ArE On all fours with All ouR natural caPAcities. BEcausE there is No recogniTIOn in KrauT's vIew ThaT diRECtIng the living oF A Good HuMan life Is tHe work oF prActIcaL wiSdOm, there is Also no reCoGnItIoN of What I SHall call ThE inTeRnaL relaTIonshiP betwEen pRaCtICal Wisdom aND a GOOd huMaN lIfe. THis InTernaL relATioNship enTails that EacH Of us Is UnIquely pOsitioned to coNtRibute to ouR oWn lIving wELL in a way iN which others simply cannoT. a good huMan Life iS, on tHe ancient VieW, one wiTh aN AppropRiate rAtionAl StrUCTure iN THe ChoIcEs and conduCT WhiCh conStItutE it, and iT is the agent's capaciTY foR rational agenCy wHich PROvIdeS ThIS stRuCTurE. tHis is what explaiNs the interNaL ReLationship, ANd bEcAuse KraUt fails To ackNOwledge That relatIonship, hiS aCcouNT DoeS not establIsh a cleaR linkage bETween WHaT is goOd fOr us anD wHat ReasoNs we haVE foR actiNg; the eUdAimoniSt appRoAch does. I Now turn to two places where This loSs is eSpeCially proBleMAtiC. Whose gooD to sEek, and why ON thE anCient VieWS, it is The wORk Of pRActicAl wiSDom to recoGNiZe aND ReSpond to reasONS For ActioN, beGInning With The reasons we have tO Live well. HoweveR, on KRAUt's AccOUnt,
 multiplicity of our capac ities open  up t o u s a  r ange  ofdevelopmentalp ossi bilities, so that thepathto deve l op ing t hem inw ay s tha tar e g oo d  f or us  is  more c omplex tha n n at ure alone se t tl es. Thereisa 'natural i nde termin ac y't o the  co urseof pro p er dev elopmentfo r  us, b u t becau s e  w e ar e by nature pract i ca l  reasoners, an  essen ti a le l eme ntin our dev el oping properl y  i s l ear n ing to cultiv ate our own cap acitie sinr espons e tore a son s. The best  pat h of deve lopmen t  for ea c h of us  is in  la rge  par t  t he  DE VE L OPM E NT  AN D  RE ASONS  ©TheA u t h or J our nalcompi lation ©   Th e Ed i tor s ofThe P hilo so phica l Quar terly  w ork of our ownprac tical rea son  t o s or t out ,  and f orthi s reaso n the d e vel op m e n tand exercise of pr ac t i ca l wisdom  occup i es  a specialpl ace  int h e sto ry o f  w hat is g ood fo r  u s.  It isno t mere ly  th atpract i calwisdom  is more  impo r tant than othe r  developed ca p ac i t ie s . It  or ders and st ruct u reswhat co unt s  as t he pr op e rd evelopment of our o th er cap aciti es: it has wh at DanielR u s sell has  cal l ed a directive ro le in  our good. 3  On Krau t's v iew, the re is nos u ch recog nit ion  of  as p ec ial significa n c e fo rthe dev elo pment o f o urrat ion al  capaciti es – the yne ed  d eve lopme n t in way stha tare  reco g nizabl y goo d fo rus ,  bu t in th i sr e spec tth ey a reon  allfour s  wi th allour natur alc apac it ie s. Beca use there isno  recogniti on  in  Kraut ' s  view th at directing the living of a go odhuman  lif e is thewor k of p rac t ical w isdom,  ther eisa l so no r ec ogn it ion of wha t I s hallca ll t he inte rnal relationshipb etw een practical  wi sdom a nd  ag oo d  hu ma n  li f e . This internal  relations hi p  e ntails tha t  ea ch  of usis uniq uelyp osition ed to con tribute t oouro w n l iving well  in a wa y in whic h  othe r ssimpl y c annot.  A  go od hu man li f e i s, on  the a nc ient v iew,on e with a n appropriate rationalstruct ure i n t he choice s a n d c onduct wh ichconstitute  it , a nd it  is the a gent ' scap a cityforr ational a g en cyw h ic h providest h i s s truct ure .  Thisis w hat explains thei nternal relati onsh i p , a ndb ecau se  Kraut fails t o a ck n o wledge t ha t relations hip, his  a c count  doesnot es tablish a  c l ear li nkag e b etween wh atis good fo rus and wh at r ea sons w e have fora c ting; the eudaim onist a pproa c h d oes.Inow tur n  totwo places  where this  lossis e speci ally pr ob lemati c.Wh ose good t o  seek, an d why  On the  a ncie ntviews,  iti s  thework  o f p racticalw i sd o mto rec ogni ze an dresp ond to re a sons for  ac t ion, be gi nni n g  witht he r easons wehav e tol i ve well. H o weve r ,o n Kra ut's a ccount ,
 multiplicity_of our_capacities open up to_us a_range_of developmental_possibilities,_so that the_path to developing_them in ways that_are good for_us_is more complex than nature alone settles. There is a 'natural indeterminacy' to the_course_of proper_development_for_us, but because we are_by nature practical reasoners, an_essential element_in our developing properly is learning to cultivate_our_own capacities in_response to reasons. The best path of development for_each of us is in large_part the DEVELOPMENT_AND_REASONS_ ©  The_Author Journal compilation ©  The_Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly work_of our own practical reason to sort_out, and for this reason the_development and exercise of practical_wisdom occupies_a special place in the_story of what_is good_for us. It_is not merely that practical wisdom_is more important_than other developed capacities. It orders_and_structures what counts_as_the_proper development_of our other_capacities:_it has_what_Daniel Russell has called a directive_role_in our good.3 On Kraut's view, there_is no such recognition_of_a special significance for_the development of our rational_capacities – they need development in_ways that_are recognizably_good for us, but in this respect they are on all_fours with all our natural capacities._Because there is no_recognition in_Kraut's_view that directing_the_living of_a good human life is the work_of practical_wisdom, there is also no recognition_of what I shall_call_the internal relationship between practical wisdom_and a good human life. This_internal relationship entails that each_of_us_is uniquely positioned to contribute_to our own living well in_a way in_which others simply cannot. A good human_life_is, on the ancient view, one_with_an appropriate rational structure in the_choices_and_conduct which constitute it, and_it is the agent's capacity for_rational agency which provides this structure. This is what_explains the internal_relationship, and because Kraut fails_to_acknowledge_that relationship, his account does not establish a clear linkage_between what_is good for_us and what reasons we have for acting; the eudaimonist_approach does. I now turn to two_places where this loss is especially problematic. Whose good to seek,_and why On the ancient views, it is_the work of practical wisdom to recognize_and respond to reasons_for_action, beginning with the reasons we have_to_live_well._However, on Kraut's_account,