 event).30 From this perspective, Platonism A is equally misguided because, having accepted a realm of metaphysically distinct abstract objects, perhaps including propositions (thoughts, contents of judgements), we are no closer to understanding what it is to judge about them. Judging must be taken as explanatorily primitive, and once it is, the abstract objects of Platonism A are an ontological "free lunch": the existence of these objects follows from the laws of objective judging, the laws of logic (assuming that Frege's logicist programme in arithmetic succeeds). Platonism A most naturally goes with a "correspondence" conception of truth, on which truth is a substantive property of a proposition, namely the property of corresponding to reality. Platonism B, however, has no need for any substantive theory of truth. The objectivity or truth of judgement is not a property of a judgement, according to the B-Platonist, for to judge that some proposition p is true just is to judge that p. There is no difference in the content of these judgements.31 Thus, according to the B-Platonist, once we take on board this conception of judgement, we get notion of objectivity/truth, as well as the existence of numbers, "for free." Although Ricketts and Reck put a fair amount of weight on a correspondence theory of truth as marking the difference between Platonism A and Platonism B, I do not think it is so important, for one can combine deflationism about truth with whatever metaphysics one likes, including hypostatic Platonism.32 I think a more significant difference between Platonism A and Platonism B is their different responses to the question 28 Cf. Frege (1893), xvii. 29 This comes out most clearly in Ricketts (1986) and Reck (2007). 30 This point is emphasized in Ricketts (1986), section 1. 31 See Frege (1918–19), 345; (1969), 271–2. 32 As Reck acknowledges in (2007), 6. However, Ricketts and Reck are probably correct in one direction of entailment: the "judgement-centric" metaphysics they attribute to Frege requires a minimalist view of truth on which the truth predicate adds nothing to the content of a judgement. Platonism in Lotze and Frege 153 of our epistemic access to numbers. For the A-Platonist, there is a metaphysical gap between our
event).30 From this perspective, Platonism A is equally misguided because, having accepted a region of metaphysically discrete abstract objects, perhaps including suggestion (thoughts, contents of sagacity), we are no close to understanding what it is to evaluate about them. Judging must be taken equally explanatorily primitive, and once it is, the abstract objects of Platonism A are an ontological " free lunch ": the existence of these object follows from the law of objective judging, the laws of logic (wear that Frege's logicist programme in arithmetic succeeds). Platonism A most naturally start with a " correspondence " conception of truth, on which truth is a substantial property of a proposition, namely the property of corresponding to reality. Platonism B, however, give birth no need for any substantive theory of truth. The objectivity or truth of judgment is not a property of a judgement, according to the B - Platonist, for to judge that some proposition p is true just is to judge that p. There is no deviation in the content of these judgements.31 Thus, accord to the B - Platonist, once we subscribe on board this conception of judgement, we have notion of objectivity / truth, as well as the existence of issue, " for free. " Although Ricketts and Reck put a fair amount of weight on a correspondence hypothesis of truth as marking the difference between Platonism A and Platonism B, I do not think it is so important, for one can combine deflationism about accuracy with whatever metaphysics one like, including hypostatic Platonism.32 I think a more significant difference between Platonism A and Platonism B is their unlike responses to the question 28 Cf. Frege (1893), xvii. 29 This comes out most clearly in Ricketts (1986) and Reck (2007). 30 This point is emphasized in Ricketts (1986), section 1. 31 See Frege (1918–19), 345; (1969), 271–2. 32 As Reck acknowledges in (2007), 6. However, Ricketts and Reck are credibly correct in one direction of entailment: the " judgement - centric " metaphysics they attribute to Frege necessitate a minimalist view of accuracy on which the truth predicate adds nothing to the content of a judgement. Platonism in Lotze and Frege 153 of our epistemic entree to numbers. For the A - Platonist, there is a metaphysical gap between our
 evfnt).30 From this perspectivt, Platonism A is gqyally kisguised becajse, having accepted a realm lf metakkysically distinct acstract ohjects, pwrhaks including propositions (thouggbs, coutxnts of judgemekts), we are to closer to utddrdtanding what it is to judge about ehem. Jucglng must be tahen sf exllanatorily primitive, and once it js, the ebstract objectx of Platonism A are an onholohical "free lunch": tje existencg of rhese objectr follows from the lawa of objective judging, the laws of lpgic (assumunt tjdt Frege's ligicift programme in aritvmetic xucceeds). Platokism E mowt naturally goes witi a "correspondence" cjnception oy truth, on which truty us a vubsdantkce orokervy kf a pgopksition, najely the priperty of corresponcigt to reality. Llatonysi B, however, has no need for any substanuive fheory of truth. The objwctivity or truth of uudgement is not a property of a judgement, according to tha B-Pletuniwt, wir to judge that some proposition p is true juse ix no judge that p. Tmere is no differemcf og the content of thzae judgements.31 Thus, afcordind to rhe B-Platjnisy, once we take on board thiw conception if judgement, we gec notion of ubjevtiviyy/truth, as well as the zxistehce of numbfrs, "for fdde." Although Rickdttx dnd Reck put a fair amount of weighv on c corresoondgnce thqory of trkth as marking the diffegence batween Plahonism A and Platonism B, I do not think it is sm ikportant, for pne can combige deflationisk about trutf with whanever metephysics one likes, includhjg hypostatir Platonifm.32 I thibk a mofd significant cifferencv yetween Poatonism A and Plaboniso B is their difytrebt responses to thd qtedtmon 28 Sx. Frege (1893), xvih. 29 Tfis vomes out most codarlu in Ricketts (1986) and Rack (2007). 30 This point is emlhwsized ib Ricketes (1986), section 1. 31 See Frege (1918–19), 345; (1969), 271–2. 32 As Reck acynowlrdggs in (2007), 6. However, Ricketts and Redk are prlbanly correct ig onc ditection of zntailment: the "judgement-centric" metaphysmcs they attribute to Feege requires a minnmslist view pf trtth on whhch the truth predicqte adds nothing uo the content of a judfement. Platlnism in Lotze and Frege 153 of our epistemic access to numbers. For the A-Plaronist, there is a jetalhysibal yap betreen uur
event).30 From this perspective, Platonism A is because, accepted a of metaphysically distinct (thoughts, of judgements), we no closer to what it is to judge about Judging must be taken as explanatorily primitive, and once it is, the abstract of Platonism A are an ontological "free lunch": the existence of these objects from laws objective the laws of logic (assuming that Frege's logicist programme in arithmetic succeeds). Platonism A most naturally with a "correspondence" conception of truth, on which is a substantive property a proposition, namely the property corresponding reality. Platonism however, no for any substantive of truth. The objectivity or truth of judgement is not a property of a judgement, according to B-Platonist, for that some p true is to judge There is no difference in the judgements.31 Thus, according to the B-Platonist, once we on board conception of judgement, we get notion objectivity/truth, as well as the existence of numbers, free." Although Ricketts and Reck put a fair amount of weight on a correspondence theory as marking the difference Platonism A and B, do think is so for one can combine deflationism about truth with whatever metaphysics one including hypostatic Platonism.32 I think a more significant difference between and B is their responses to the question Cf. (1893), xvii. 29 This most in Reck 30 point is emphasized in (1986), section 1. 31 See (1918–19), 345; (1969), 271–2. (2007), 6. However, Ricketts and Reck are probably in one direction of entailment: the "judgement-centric" they attribute to Frege requires a minimalist view of truth on which truth predicate to the content of a judgement. Platonism in and Frege 153 of epistemic access to numbers. For the A-Platonist, there is metaphysical between our
 event).30 From this perspective, PLatonism A iS equaLly MisGuIded BecaUse, having accepTEd a rEalm of metaphysically diStincT aBStraCT oBjectS, perhapS InCLUdiNg PrOpoSiTIoNs (thoUghTs, conteNts of judgeMenTs), We are no closeR To UnderstandIng What it is to juDge About tHeM. JuDGing mUst Be takEn as exPLanatoRily primiTiVE, and onCE it is, thE ABsTracT objects of PlatoniSM A ARe an ontologicaL "free lUnCH": tHE ExiSteNce of these ObJects FOllows fROm THE LawS Of objective juDging, the lawS Of lOgic (asSuMinG That FrEge's lOgICisT programme iN ariThmetic suCceeds). pLatonisM a most naTurallY goEs wIth a "COrReSpoNdENce" COnCepTIon Of truth, oN wHiCh truTh is A SUBStanTivE proPerty Of a propositioN, naMely THe pRoperTy of cOrreSpOndinG to reaLity. PLaTonism B, however, hAs no Need for anY suBsTanTiVe theORy of trUth. the ObjectiVity or tRUth Of JUDGeMent is not a property Of A JUdGement, acCordinG To ThE b-PlatoniSt, For To juDGE that Some PRoPosition P is truE JuSt Is to judGe That p. THeRe iS no DiffeREnce In the cOntent of These JUdgements.31 Thus, aCCording to the B-pLaTONiST, oncE we Take on board This COncePtioN Of JudGEment, We get NoTIoN Of objectivity/truth, aS wEll as tHe exiStence of numbeRs, "for free." ALTHOugh RickEtts ANd rEck put a fair amoUnt of Weight on a cORrespondEnce tHeory of tRuth as marKINg the difFerEncE beTweEN plAtonism A and PlATOnisM B, i do not tHinK it is so ImpOrtAnt, For OnE can combiNe deflatIoNiSm AbOut Truth WIth whateVeR meTaPhySics oNE likes, IncluDing HyPoSTatIc PlatoNIsM.32 i ThinK a MoRe siGniFiCant dIffeREncE betweeN PlatonisM A aND PlaToNiSm B is thEir different rEsPonses to thE qUesTion 28 Cf. fREge (1893), xvii. 29 THis comes out most clearly iN rickettS (1986) anD Reck (2007). 30 this Point is emPhaSized iN RiCKetts (1986), sEction 1. 31 see FrEgE (1918–19), 345; (1969), 271–2. 32 As rECk ackNOWlEdgEs In (2007), 6. However, RICKetTs and reCk arE probabLy correct in one direCTioN of entailment: The "JudgEMEnT-ceNTrIC" meTaPHysICS they attribute tO Frege requIrES a Minimalist VIew Of Truth on Which thE trutH PredicaTe adds notHing to the CoNtenT OF a jUdgement. PlAtonism iN Lotze and fRege 153 oF OuR episTemIc acceSs To nUmberS. For thE a-PlAtoniSt, therE iS a metaPhysiCaL gap betwEen our
 event).30 From this persp ective, Pl atoni smA i sequa llymisguided beca u se,having accepted a real m ofme t aphy s ic allydistinc t  a b s tra ct  o bje ct s ,perha psincludi ng proposi tio ns  (thoughts,c on tents of j udg ements), weare  no cl os ert o und ers tandi ng wha t  it is  to judge  a b out th e m. Judg i n gmust  be taken as expl a na t orily primitiv e, and  o n ce i t i s,the abstra ct  obje c ts of P l at o n i smA  are an ontol ogical "fre e  lu nch":th e e x istenc e ofth e seobjects fol lows  from the  lawso f objec t ive jud ging,the  la ws o f  l og ic(a s sum i ng  th a t F rege's l og ic ist p rogr a m m e  inari thme tic s ucceeds). Pla ton ismA  mo st na tural ly g oe s wit h a "c orres po ndence" concept ionof truth,  on  w hic htruth is a s ubs tan tive pr opertyo f a  p r o p os ition, namely thepr o p er ty of co rrespo n di ng to reali ty . P lato n i sm B,  how e ve r, has n o need fo rany sub st antive  t heo ryof tr u th.The ob jectivit y ort ruth of judgem e nt is not a p r op e r ty of a  ju dgement, ac cord i ng t o th e  B -Pl a tonis t, fo rt oj udge that some prop os itionp istrue just isto judge t h a t  p. Ther e is no difference inthe c ontent oft hese jud gemen ts.31 Th us, accor d i ng to th e B -Pl ato nis t ,  o nce we take o n boar dthis co nce ption o f j udg eme nt,  w e get not ion of o bj ec ti vi ty/ truth ,  as well  a s t he  ex isten c e of n umber s, " fo rf ree ." Alth o ug h Rick et ts  and  Re ck  puta fa i r a mount o f weightona  cor re sp ondence  theory of tr ut h as marki ng  th e diff e r ence bet ween Platonism A and Pl a tonismB,I donotthink itisso imp ort a nt, fo r onecan c om bin e defla t i on ism  a bout truth w ith  what ev er m etaphys ics one likes, inc l udi ng hypostatic  Pl aton i s m. 32I  t h ink  a mor e significant dif ference be tw e en  Platonism A a nd  Platon ism B i s the i r diffe rent resp onses toth e qu e s tio n 28 Cf. F rege (18 93), xvii .  29 T h is  come s o ut mos tcle arlyin Ric k ett s (19 86) an dReck ( 2007) .30 Thispoint is emphasized inRicket ts (1 986 ), sectio n 1 .  31  See Freg e (1 918–19), 3 45;  (1 969),  27 1 –2. 3 2 As Re cka cknow ledg e s in (200 7 ),  6. H ow ever, Ricke t t s  an d Rec k a r e prob ably  correct in one d i rection of ent ailm e n t:the "jud ge ment-centric"met ap h y sics the yattribute t o Fregere q uires  a min imalis t viewo f  t r uth on  whi chthe truth  pr ed i cate ad ds  n o thingto t he  conte nt ofa  jud g e ment. Platonismin Lo t z e and Fre ge 15 3of oure pist emic acces s to number s. For  the  A-Pl atonist ,thereisametaphysic a l gap bet weenour
 event).30_From this_perspective, Platonism A is_equally misguided_because,_having accepted_a_realm of metaphysically_distinct abstract objects,_perhaps including propositions (thoughts,_contents of judgements),_we_are no closer to understanding what it is to judge about them. Judging must_be_taken as_explanatorily_primitive,_and once it is, the_abstract objects of Platonism A_are an_ontological "free lunch": the existence of these objects_follows_from the laws_of objective judging, the laws of logic (assuming that_Frege's logicist programme in arithmetic succeeds)._Platonism A most_naturally_goes_with a "correspondence" conception_of truth, on which truth is_a substantive property of a proposition,_namely the property of corresponding to reality._Platonism B, however, has no need_for any substantive theory of_truth. The_objectivity or truth of judgement_is not a_property of_a judgement, according_to the B-Platonist, for to judge_that some proposition_p is true just is to_judge_that p. There_is_no_difference in_the content of_these_judgements.31 Thus,_according_to the B-Platonist, once we take_on_board this conception of judgement, we get_notion of objectivity/truth, as_well_as the existence of_numbers, "for free." Although Ricketts_and Reck put a fair amount_of weight_on a_correspondence theory of truth as marking the difference between Platonism A_and Platonism B, I do not_think it is so_important, for_one_can combine deflationism_about_truth with_whatever metaphysics one likes, including hypostatic Platonism.32_I think_a more significant difference between Platonism_A and Platonism B_is_their different responses to the question_28 Cf. Frege (1893), xvii. 29_This comes out most clearly_in_Ricketts_(1986) and Reck (2007). 30_This point is emphasized in Ricketts_(1986), section 1._31 See Frege (1918–19), 345; (1969), 271–2._32_As Reck acknowledges in (2007), 6._However,_Ricketts and Reck are probably correct_in_one_direction of entailment: the "judgement-centric"_metaphysics they attribute to Frege requires_a minimalist view of truth on which the truth_predicate adds nothing_to the content of a_judgement._Platonism_in Lotze and Frege 153 of our epistemic access to_numbers. For_the A-Platonist, there_is a metaphysical gap between our