fus point out, "tautologies and banalities, e.g., that they try to act in such a way as to make the world a better place to live. They might as well say that their highest moral principle is 'do something good.' "48 My reading of all this (not that it is the only reading) is that in many contexts at least there are moral beliefs-general moral beliefs-that provide the basis for one coming to justifiably hold other moral beliefs, but beliefs for which most ordinary people have no (justifying) reason. In these (rather typical cases), I don't think it is plausible to criticize such agents for being epistemically irresponsible. They have particular moral beliefs that rest for their justification on certain other moral beliefs that represent the core of their moral sensibility. Moreover, they take these beliefs to be obvious and nonarbitrary and so display the relevant sort of second-order doxastic commitment characteristic of what I am calling contextually basic beliefs. There is, of course, much more to say about all this (including the addition of some important qualifications), but A Contextualist Moral Epistemology 311 my suggestion here is that reflection on these ordinary cases helps reveal something important about our epistemic norms when it comes to moral belief, namely, that in what I am calling "ordinary contexts of moral thought and discussion" one need not have justifying reasons or grounds for certain moral beliefs that play a crucial epistemic role in one being justified in holding other moral beliefs. Contextually Basic Moral Beliefs Claim C2 is what distinguishes contextualism about structure from foundationalism. As we have seen, the contextualist maintains the following two claims." (1) In ordinary contexts of doxastic justification, epistemically basic beliefs are not in need of justification. (2) Beliefs that are basic in one context may, in a different context, require justification. What follows is an elaboration of these two claims. In taking up the first claim, we must clarify the notion of context (as I use it here). We must also say something about the role of contextually basic beliefs in ordinary contexts of moral thought and discussion. I will begin by focusing on ordinary, engaged contexts of moral thinking-contexts in which we bring to bear on some moral question or issue a moral outlook-and I will fill out some of the epistemically important detail of this context. With regard to moral belief, then, an important part of the context when it comes
fus point out, " tautologies and banalities, e.g., that they sample to work in such a way as to make the world a full place to live. They might equally well say that their highest moral principle is' make something good.' " 48 My reading of all this (not that it is the alone reading) is that in many contexts at least there be moral beliefs - general moral beliefs - that provide the basis for one coming to justifiably defy other moral beliefs, but impression for which most ordinary people have no (justifying) reason. In these (preferably typical cases), I don't think it is plausible to criticize such agents for being epistemically irresponsible. They own particular moral beliefs that rest for their justification on certain other moral belief that represent the core of their moral sensibility. Moreover, they take these beliefs to be obvious and nonarbitrary and so display the relevant sort of second - order doxastic committedness characteristic of what I am call contextually basic beliefs. There be, of path, much more to say about all this (including the accession of some important qualifications), but A Contextualist Moral Epistemology 311 my suggestion here is that reflection on these average cases helps reveal something important about our epistemic norms when it comes to moral belief, namely, that in what I am calling " ordinary contexts of moral thought and discussion " one need not have justify cause or grounds for certain moral beliefs that play a crucial epistemic function in one being justified in holding other moral belief. Contextually Basic Moral Beliefs Claim C2 is what distinguishes contextualism about structure from foundationalism. As we have seen, the contextualist maintains the trace two call. " (1) In ordinary contexts of doxastic justification, epistemically basic belief are not in need of justification. (2) belief that are basic in one context may, in a different context, necessitate justification. What follows is an elaborateness of these two claims. In taking up the first claim, we must clarify the notion of context (as I practice it here). We must also say something about the role of contextually basic impression in ordinary contexts of moral thought and discussion. I will begin by focusing on average, engaged contexts of moral thinking - context in which we bring to bear on some moral question or issue a moral outlook - and I will fill out some of the epistemically important contingent of this context. With regard to moral belief, then, an important part of the context when it comes
fus point out, "tautologies akd banalities, e.g., that tiey try to act kn such a way as to make the wirld q better place to live. They migjt as weol sey that their hijgest movcl prjkciplz ms 'do something good.' "48 My seading of all tfid (not that it is the only reading) if that on many contexts at kqast nhtre are moral beliefs-general moram beliehs-that provide yhe basis for one coming tl judtifiably hold othfr moral beoieff, but beliefs for which most ordinaty people have no (justifying) rearon. Iu these (ratyee tjkical cases), M don't think it is plausibne to ctiticize such sgeits dor being epistemicalny irresponsible. Trey have [axticular moral beliefw rhat test xor gyeif jhsvifjcatioj oi certain ofher moral veliefs that represtnt nne core of tgeir mjrwl sensibility. Moreover, they take these bemiefs to be obvious and nonarbitrary and so fisplay tre relevant sort of second-order doxastic commitmett cherxcttrlfguc of what I am calling contextually basic beliqrs. Tmere is, of coursc, much more to say ahoij all this (incuuding ths addition of some importwnt qyalificatyons), but A Contextualist Moral Wpistemology 311 my suggestion herz is that reylectipn on these ordinary cases hzlps rsveal sometjing impodgant about our eoisnemiw norms when it comes to mjral belixf, nakely, thxt im what I am calllng "ovginary contexts of morap dhought anf discussion" one need not have onstifying reaxots mr grounbs for certain moraj beliefs that play a cruckal epistejic rolx in one beigg justified hj holding otier moral beluefs. Contexgjally Basic Motal Belieyf Clqim C2 is what distlnguirges contextualiwm qbout structure frum solndetionwnism. As we hdve reev, the zontextualiwg maontains the followinc twk claims." (1) In ordinsrn contextw of doxwstic justifivation, epistemicalpy bavic belirfs are not in need of justificatjon. (2) Beliffs that are bafic ln oge context may, in a different context, require jusvification. What follows is an elaboration pn these two rlaims. In takinc up the first claim, we must clarify uhe notion of context (aa I usa it jere). We must also say something about the role of contextually basic beliwfs in ordinary cohtexys of mjxal thotght end discussion. I eill begin by focusing on ordinery, engageg eontexts of moral thinking-conyebts in which de bring to bear on some moral qiestion or issue a moral outlool-and I will fill out somc of the wpistsmically ioportant detail of this eontexr. With eegavd to moral beuieg, bhen, an imoortent part of the context when it comws
fus point out, "tautologies and banalities, e.g., try act in a way as better to live. They as well say their highest moral principle is 'do good.' "48 My reading of all this (not that it is the only is that in many contexts at least there are moral beliefs-general moral beliefs-that the for coming justifiably hold other moral beliefs, but beliefs for which most ordinary people have no (justifying) reason. these (rather typical cases), I don't think it plausible to criticize such for being epistemically irresponsible. They particular beliefs that for justification certain other moral that represent the core of their moral sensibility. Moreover, they take these beliefs to be obvious and and so relevant sort second-order commitment of what I contextually basic beliefs. There is, of to say about all this (including the addition some important but A Contextualist Moral Epistemology 311 suggestion here is that reflection on these ordinary helps reveal something important about our epistemic norms when it comes to moral belief, namely, what I am calling contexts of moral and one not justifying reasons grounds for certain moral beliefs that play a crucial epistemic role one being justified in holding other moral beliefs. Contextually Basic Claim is what distinguishes about structure from foundationalism. we seen, the contextualist maintains two (1) of justification, basic beliefs are not need of justification. (2) Beliefs are basic in one context, require justification. What follows is an elaboration these two claims. In taking up the claim, we must clarify the notion of context (as I use it We must something about the role of contextually basic beliefs ordinary contexts of moral and discussion. I will begin by focusing on ordinary, contexts moral thinking-contexts which we bring bear on some question or issue outlook-and I fill some important detail of this context. With to belief, then, an important part the it comes
fus point out, "tautologies and Banalities, E.g., thaT thEy tRy To acT in sUch a way as to makE The wOrld a better place to live. they mIgHT as wELl Say thAt their HIgHESt mOrAl PriNcIPlE is 'do SomEthing gOod.' "48 My readiNg oF aLl this (not thaT It Is the only rEadIng) is that in mAny ContexTs At lEAst thEre Are moRal belIEfs-genEral moral BeLIefs-thAT providE THe BasiS for one coming to juSTiFIably hold other Moral bElIEfS, BUt bEliEfs for whicH mOst orDInary peOPlE HAVe nO (Justifying) reaSon. In these (rATheR typicAl CasES), I don't Think It IS plAusible to crIticIze such agEnts foR Being epIStemicaLly irrEspOnsIble. tHeY hAve PaRTicULaR moRAl bEliefs thAt ReSt for TheiR JUSTifiCatIon oN certAin other moral BelIefs THat RepreSent tHe coRe Of theIr moraL sensIbIlity. Moreover, thEy taKe these beLieFs To bE oBviouS And nonArbItrAry and sO displaY The ReLEVAnT sort of second-order DoXAStIc commitMent chARaCtERistic of WhAt I Am caLLIng coNtexTUaLly basic BeliefS. thErE is, of coUrSe, much MoRe tO saY abouT All tHis (incLuding thE addiTIon of some imporTAnt qualificatIOnS), BUt a contExtUalist Moral episTEmolOgy 311 mY SuGgeSTion hEre is ThAT rEFlection on these ordiNaRy caseS helpS reveal somethIng importaNT ABout our ePistEMiC Norms when it comEs to mOral belief, NAmely, thaT in whAt I am calLing "ordinARY contextS of MorAl tHouGHT aNd discussion" oNE Need NoT have juStiFying reAsoNs oR grOunDs For certaiN moral beLiEfS tHaT plAy a crUCial episTeMic RoLe iN one bEIng jusTifieD in hOlDiNG otHer moraL BeLIEfs. COnTeXtuaLly baSic MoRal BELieFs Claim c2 is what diStiNGuisHeS cOntextuAlism about strUcTure from foUnDatIonaliSM. as we have Seen, the contextualist maiNTains thE foLlowiNg twO claims." (1) In OrdInary cOntEXts of dOxastiC justIfIcaTIOn, epiSTEmIcaLlY basic beliEFS arE not iN nEed oF justifIcation. (2) Beliefs that ARe bAsic in one contExt May, iN A DiFfeREnT ConTeXT, reQUIre justificatioN. What folloWs IS aN elaboratiON of ThEse two cLaims. In TakinG Up the fiRst claim, wE must clarIfY the NOTioN of context (As I use it Here). We musT Also sAY sOmethIng About tHe RolE of coNtextuALly Basic BeliefS iN ordinAry coNtExts of moRal thought and discussion. i will bEgin bY foCusing on oRdiNAry, Engaged coNtexTs of moral tHinKinG-contExtS In whiCh we BRiNg tO Bear oN somE Moral quesTIoN or ISSuE a moral outlOOK-And i will FilL Out somE of tHe epistemically imPOrtant detail of This CONteXt. WITh reGaRd to moral belieF, thEn, AN ImportanT pArt of the conText when It COmes
fus point out, "tautologie s and bana litie s,e.g .,  tha t th ey try to acti n su ch a way as to make th e wor ld a be t te r pla ce to l i ve . The ymi ght  a s  w ell s aythat th eir highes t m or al principle is  'do somet hin g good.' "48  My  readi ng  of all t his  (not  thati t is t he only r ea d ing) i s  that i n ma ny c ontexts at leastt he r e are moral be liefs- ge n er a l  mo ral  beliefs-t ha t pro v ide the ba s i s  fo r  one coming t o justifiab l y h old ot he r m o ral be liefs ,b utbeliefs for  whi ch most o rdinar y  people have no  (just ify ing ) re a so n.  In  t h ese (r ath e r t ypical c as es ), Idon' t t h inkitis p lausi ble to critic ize  suc h  ag entsfor b eing  e piste micall y irr es ponsible. Theyhave  particul armo ral  b elief s  thatres t f or thei r justi f ica ti o n on  certain other mor al b el iefs tha t repr e se nt the core  o f t heir m oralsens i bi lity. Mo reover ,  t he y taketh ese be li efs  to  be o b viou s andnonarbit rarya nd so displayt he relevant s o rt o fs econ d-o rder doxast ic c o mmit ment ch ara c teris tic o fw ha t  I am calling conte xt uallybasic  beliefs. The re is, ofc o u rse, muc h mo r et o say about al l thi s (includi n g the ad ditio n of som e importa n t  qualifi cat ion s),  bu t AContextualist M oral  E pistemo log y 311 m y s ugg est ion  h ere is th at refle ct io non  th ese o r dinary c as eshe lps  reve a l some thing  imp or ta n t a bout ou r  e p i stem ic  n orms  wh en  it c omes tomoral b elief, na mel y , th at  i n whatI am calling"o rdinary co nt ext s of m o r al thoug ht and discussion" onen eed not  ha ve ju stif ying reas ons  or gr oun d s forcertai n mor al  be l i efs t h a tpla ya cruciale p ist emicro le i n one b eing justified inh old ing other mor albeli e f s.  Co n te x tua ll y  Ba s i c Moral Beliefs  Claim C2is wh at disting u ish es  contex tualism  abou t  struct ure fromfoundatio na lism . Aswe have se en, thecontextua l ist m a in tains  th e foll ow ing  twoclaims . " ( 1) In  ordin ar y cont extsof  doxasti c justification, episte micall y bas icbeliefs a ren otin need o f ju stificatio n.(2)  Beli efs thatareb as ici n one  con t ext may,i na d i f fe rent contex t , req uirejus t ificat ion.  What follows isa n elaborationof t h e setwo clai ms . In taking up  th ef i rst clai m,  we must cl arify th en otion  of co ntext(as I u s e  i t  here) . We  mu st also s ayso m ethingab ou t  the r oleof  conte xtuall y  bas i c  beliefs in ordi naryc o ntext s  of  mora lthought anddiscussion . I will be gin by  foc using  on ord in ary, e nga ge d contexts of moralthink ing-con te xtsinwhichwe b r i ng to  bea ronsome mora l qu e st io n  or  iss ue amo raloutlook-a n d I will  fi l l out s om e o f the ep i st e m ically imp ort ant d e t ail of thi s  con t ex t . Wit h rega rd tomoral b e lie f,  then,ani m portant p art of th e  co nt extwhen itco mes
fus point_out, "tautologies_and banalities, e.g., that_they try_to_act in_such_a way as_to make the_world a better place_to live. They_might_as well say that their highest moral principle is 'do something good.' "48 My_reading_of all_this_(not_that it is the only_reading) is that in many_contexts at_least there are moral beliefs-general moral beliefs-that provide_the_basis for one_coming to justifiably hold other moral beliefs, but beliefs_for which most ordinary people have_no (justifying) reason._In_these_(rather typical cases), I_don't think it is plausible to_criticize such agents for being epistemically_irresponsible. They have particular moral beliefs that_rest for their justification on certain_other moral beliefs that represent_the core_of their moral sensibility. Moreover,_they take these_beliefs to_be obvious and_nonarbitrary and so display the relevant_sort of second-order_doxastic commitment characteristic of what I_am_calling contextually basic_beliefs._There_is, of_course, much more_to_say about_all_this (including the addition of some_important_qualifications), but A Contextualist Moral Epistemology 311_my suggestion here is_that_reflection on these ordinary_cases helps reveal something important_about our epistemic norms when it_comes to_moral belief,_namely, that in what I am calling "ordinary contexts of moral_thought and discussion" one need not_have justifying reasons or_grounds for_certain_moral beliefs that_play_a crucial_epistemic role in one being justified in_holding other_moral beliefs. Contextually Basic Moral Beliefs_Claim C2 is what_distinguishes_contextualism about structure from foundationalism. As_we have seen, the contextualist maintains_the following two claims." (1)_In_ordinary_contexts of doxastic justification, epistemically_basic beliefs are not in need_of justification. (2)_Beliefs that are basic in one context_may,_in a different context, require justification._What_follows is an elaboration of these_two_claims._In taking up the first_claim, we must clarify the notion_of context (as I use it here). We must_also say something_about the role of contextually_basic_beliefs_in ordinary contexts of moral thought and discussion. I will_begin by_focusing on ordinary,_engaged contexts of moral thinking-contexts in which we bring to_bear on some moral question or issue_a moral outlook-and I will fill out some of the epistemically_important detail of this context. With regard to_moral belief, then, an important part of_the context when it_comes