 and perception. 6. Ernest Sosa, "How Do You Know?" American Philosophical Quarterly 11 (1974), 117; cf. Ernest Sosa, "Knowledge in Context: Skepticism in Doubt," Philosophical Perspectives 2 (1988), 139-55. 7. Ernest Sosa, Knowledge in Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 10 n. 14, is explicit about this. So we can think of Cohen and Sosa as proposing what they take to be universally correct epistemic principles that imply that the truth of certain specific epistemic appraisals is dependent on facts (including social facts) about one's circumstances. 8. Foundationalists sometimes talk about foundational beliefs not being in need of justification, by which they mean that such beliefs, because they are, for example, "self-justifying," do not need to receive justification from other beliefs. The structural contextualist, however, means something more radical here, namely, there are certain beliefs that, in certain contexts at least, need not have the sort of epistemic status of enjoying positive evidential support (either inherently or from other beliefs and experiences) in order to play a regress-stopping role in the structure of justified belief. For recent defenses of structural contextualism with regard to empirical belief, see David Annis, "A Contextualist Theory of Epistemic Justification," American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (1978), 213-19; Michael Williams, "Coherence, Justification and 320 Moral Knowledge? Truth," Review of Metaphysics 34 (1980), 243-72, and David Henderson, "Epistemic Competence and Contextualist Epistemology: Why Contextualism Is Not Just the Poor Person's Coherentism," Journal of Philosophy 91 (1994), 627-49. 9. Inferential justification must be distinguished from the process of psychologically inferring one proposition from another. Moreover, such justification does not require any such process of inferring. See Laurence BonJour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), 19-20, for discussion of this point. 10. Of course the contextualist will deny any claim by the foundationalist that having a foundational belief (as the foundationalist conceives of them) is necessary for having any justified beliefs at all. And likewise the contextualist will deny any claim by the coherentist that having a maximally coherent set of beliefs is necessary for having
and perception. 6. Ernest Sosa, " How Do You Know? " American Philosophical Quarterly 11 (1974), 117; cf. Ernest Sosa, " Knowledge in Context: Skepticism in Doubt, " Philosophical Perspectives 2 (1988), 139 - 55. 7. Ernest Sosa, Knowledge in Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 10 n. 14, is denotative about this. therefore we can think of Cohen and Sosa as proposing what they bring to be universally right epistemic principles that imply that the truth of sealed specific epistemic appraisal is dependent on facts (including social facts) about one's circumstance. 8. Foundationalists sometimes talk about foundational beliefs not being in indigence of justification, by which they think of that such beliefs, because they are, for example, " self - justifying, " do not need to receive justification from other belief. The structural contextualist, however, means something more radical here, namely, there exist certain beliefs that, in certain contexts at least, need not experience the sort of epistemic status of enjoying positive evidential support (either inherently or from early beliefs and experiences) in order to play a regress - stopping function in the structure of justified belief. For recent defenses of structural contextualism with regard to empirical belief, see David Annis, " A Contextualist Theory of Epistemic Justification, " American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (1978), 213 - 19; Michael Williams, " Coherence, Justification and 320 Moral Knowledge? accuracy, " Review of Metaphysics 34 (1980), 243 - 72, and David Henderson, " Epistemic Competence and Contextualist Epistemology: Why Contextualism Is Not merely the Poor Person's Coherentism, " Journal of Philosophy 91 (1994), 627 - 49. 9. Inferential justification must be distinguish from the summons of psychologically inferring one proposition from another. furthermore, such justification does not require any such procedure of inferring. See Laurence BonJour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), 19 - 20, for discussion of this distributor point. 10. Of course the contextualist will deny any claim by the foundationalist that having a foundational belief (as the foundationalist conceives of them) is necessary for having any justified impression at all. And likewise the contextualist will deny any claim by the coherentist that receive a maximally coherent set of belief is necessary for having
 anf perception. 6. Ernest Sosx, "How Do You Know?" Amermcan Phjlosophizal Quarterly 11 (1974), 117; cf. Ernest Slsq, "Knoqledge in Context: Skepgicism in Doubt," Pyilowiphical Pecapectivcf 2 (1988), 139-55. 7. Ernzsv Sosa, Knowledgg in Perspecdive (Cambridge: Cxmyridge University Press, 1991), 10 n. 14, is explycit abpuh this. So we cwn tnynk kf Cohen and Sosa as proposing whaf they uake to be universslly correct epistemic prijcippes that imply thah the truth of swrtain speciwic epistemic appraisams is dependent on facts (includkng spcial factw) qbokj one's circunstanbes. 8. Foundationalists sometikes talk about fonndarional beliefs not bemng in need of justisication, ty which they mean rhqt suwh balieww, bdcahsx tgey arf, fkr example, "self-justifting," do not need to rqbrive justifidation fwom other beliefs. The structural contexuualiat, however, means somethung more radical here, namely, trere are certain beliefs that, in certain contexts at lxart, uccd nur jave the sort of epistemic status of enjoying loxinive evidential smpport (either inhetejtki or from othet belieya znd experiences) in order jo plat a regrefs-stppping role in the structurw of justifivd bwlief. For recent dzfenses of scructutal comtextualism with regard to smpirical bflief, see Aavid Annis, "A Covteqtuanist Theory of Epistemic Jtstificatmon," Akerican Phikosophycal Quartfrly 15 (1978), 213-19; Michael Williams, "Cohetence, Bustificatlon and 320 Moral Knowledge? Truth," Cxview of Metakhyvicv 34 (1980), 243-72, and Davic Henderson, "E[istemic Compejence and Contdxtualist Vpistemolmgy: Why Coneextualism Is Jot Just the Poor Pewson'w Coyerentiro," Journal of Pnilosophy 91 (1994), 627-49. 9. Inferwntial justificatipn ohst be distingunryed from the prpcers jf pxysvologically hnfefrivb one propositiok ffom snother. Moreover, sucv juatification does npt require any sucr process of onferring. See Laurtnce BmnJuur, Tne Ftructure of Empirical Knowledfe (Cambrifge, Mass.: Harvarq Unlverfity Press, 1985), 19-20, for discussion of this point. 10. Of coucse the contextualist wull deny any claim yy the foundavionalyst that vaving a foundationao belief (as the fpundationalist conceibes of them) is necessary for having any justified beliefs at all. And likewise the cobtextuelyst will dehy amy cldii by thq coiecentist that havimg a maximally coherent set of ueliefs is nzcessary for having
and perception. 6. Ernest Sosa, "How Do American Quarterly 11 117; cf. Ernest in Philosophical Perspectives 2 139-55. 7. Ernest Knowledge in Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University 1991), 10 n. 14, is explicit about this. So we can think of and Sosa as proposing what they take to be universally correct epistemic principles imply the of specific epistemic appraisals is dependent on facts (including social facts) about one's circumstances. 8. Foundationalists sometimes about foundational beliefs not being in need of by which they mean such beliefs, because they are, example, do not to justification other beliefs. The contextualist, however, means something more radical here, namely, there are certain beliefs that, in certain contexts at need not sort of status enjoying evidential support (either from other beliefs and experiences) in a regress-stopping role in the structure of justified For recent of structural contextualism with regard to belief, see David Annis, "A Contextualist Theory of Justification," American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (1978), 213-19; Michael Williams, "Coherence, Justification and 320 Moral Knowledge? of Metaphysics 34 (1980), and David Henderson, Competence Contextualist Why Is Not the Poor Person's Coherentism," Journal of Philosophy 91 (1994), 627-49. 9. justification must be distinguished from the process of psychologically inferring from Moreover, such justification not require any such of See Laurence BonJour, The Empirical (Cambridge, Press, 19-20, discussion of this point. Of course the contextualist will any claim by the belief (as the foundationalist conceives of them) is for having any justified beliefs at all. likewise the contextualist will deny any claim by the coherentist that having maximally coherent beliefs is necessary for having
 and perception. 6. Ernest Sosa, "HoW Do You Know?" ameriCan phiLoSophIcal quarterly 11 (1974), 117; cf. ErnESt SoSa, "Knowledge in Context: SkEpticIsM In DoUBt," philoSophicaL peRSPecTiVeS 2 (1988), 139-55. 7. ErNeST SOsa, KnOwlEdge in PErspective (camBrIdge: CambridgE unIversity PrEss, 1991), 10 N. 14, is explicit aBouT this. SO wE caN Think Of COhen aNd Sosa AS propoSing what tHeY Take to BE univerSALlY corRect epistemic prinCIpLEs that imply thaT the trUtH Of CERtaIn sPecific epiStEmic aPPraisalS Is DEPEndENt on facts (inclUding social FActS) about OnE's cIRcumstAnces. 8. foUNdaTionalists sOmetImes talk aBout foUNdationAL beliefS not beIng In nEed oF JuStIfiCaTIon, BY wHicH TheY mean thaT sUcH beliEfs, bECAUSe thEy aRe, foR examPle, "self-justifYinG," do nOT neEd to rEceivE jusTiFicatIon froM otheR bEliefs. The structUral ContextuaLisT, hOweVeR, meanS SomethIng MorE radicaL here, naMEly, ThERE ArE certain beliefs thaT, iN CErTain contExts at LEaSt, NEed not haVe The Sort OF EpistEmic STaTus of enjOying pOSiTiVe evideNtIal supPoRt (eIthEr inhERentLy or frOm other bEliefS And experiences) IN order to play a REgRESs-SToppIng Role in the stRuctURe of JustIFiEd bELief. FOr recEnT DeFEnses of structural coNtExtualIsm wiTh regard to empIrical beliEF, SEe David ANnis, "a coNTextualist TheoRy of EPistemic JuSTificatiOn," AmeRican PhiLosophicaL qUarterly 15 (1978), 213-19; micHaeL WiLliAMS, "COherence, JustiFICatiOn And 320 MoraL KnOwledge? truTh," REviEw oF MEtaphysicS 34 (1980), 243-72, and DaviD HEnDeRsOn, "EPisteMIc CompetEnCe aNd conTextuAList EpIstemOlogY: WHy cOntExtualiSM IS nOt JuSt ThE PooR PeRsOn's CoHereNTisM," JournaL of PhilosOphY 91 (1994), 627-49. 9. infeReNtIal justIfication must Be DistinguisHeD frOm the pROCess of psYchologically inferring oNE proposItiOn froM anoTher. MoreoVer, Such juStiFIcatioN does nOt reqUiRe aNY Such pROCeSs oF iNferring. SeE lAurEnce BOnjour, the StruCture of Empirical KnOWleDge (Cambridge, MAss.: harvARD UNivERsITy PReSS, 1985), 19-20, foR DIscussion of this Point. 10. Of couRsE ThE contextuaLIst WiLl deny aNy claim By the FOundatiOnalist thAt having a FoUndaTIOnaL belief (as tHe foundaTionalist COnceiVEs Of theM) is NecessArY foR haviNg any jUStiFied bEliefs At All. And LikewIsE the contExtualist will deny any claIm by thE coheRenTist that hAviNG a mAximally cOherEnt set of beLieFs iS neceSsaRY for hAvinG
 and perception. 6. Ernest  Sosa, "Ho w DoYou  Kn ow ?" A meri can Philosophi c al Q uarterly 11 (1974), 11 7; cf .E rnes t  S osa,"Knowle d ge i n C on te xt:  S k ep ticis m i n Doubt ," Philoso phi ca l Perspectiv e s2 (1988),139 -55. 7. Erne stSosa,Kn owl e dge i n P erspe ctive( Cambri dge: Camb ri d ge Uni v ersityP r es s, 1 991), 10 n. 14, i s  e x plicit about t his. S ow ec a n t hin k of Cohen  a nd So s a as pr o po s i n g w h at they taketo be unive r sal ly cor re cte pistem ic pr in c ipl es that imp ly t hat the t ruth o f  certai n  specif ic epi ste mic  app r ai sa lsis dep e nd ent onfacts (i nc lu dingsoci a l f acts ) a bout  one' s circumstanc es.  8.F oun datio nalis ts s om etime s talk  abou tfoundational be lief s not bei ngin  ne ed  of j u stific ati on,  by whi ch they mea nt h a tsuch beliefs, beca us e th ey are,for ex a mp le ,  "self-j us tif ying , "  do n ot n e ed  to rece ive ju s ti fi cationfr om oth er  be lie fs. T h e st ructur al conte xtual i st, however, m e ans something mo r e  r a dica l h ere, namely , th e re a re c e rt ain belie fs th at ,  i n  certain contexts a tleast,  need  not have the  sort of e p i s temic st atus of enjoying posit ive e videntials upport ( eithe r inhere ntly or f r o m otherbel ief s a nde x pe riences) in o r d er t oplay areg ress-st opp ing  ro lein  the stru cture of  j us ti fi edbelie f . For re ce ntde fen ses o f  struc tural  con te xt u ali sm with re g a rd t oem piri cal  b elief , se e  Da vid Ann is, "A Co nte x tual is tTheoryof EpistemicJu stificatio n, " A merica n Philosop hical Quarterly 15 (197 8 ), 213- 19;  Mich aelWilliams,  "C oheren ce, Justif icatio n and  3 20M o ral K n o wl edg e?  Truth," R e v iew  of M et aphy sics 34  (1980), 243-72, a n d D avid Henderso n,"Epi s t em icC om p ete nc e  an d Contextualist E pistemolog y: Wh y Contextu a lis mIs NotJust th e Poo r  Person 's Cohere ntism," J ou rnal o f P hilosophy91 (1994 ), 627-49 .  9. I n fe renti aljustif ic ati on mu st bed ist ingui shed f ro m theproce ss  of psyc hologically inferring o ne pro posit ion  from ano the r . M oreover,such  justifica tio n d oes n otr equir e an y  s uch proce ss o f  inferrin g .See L au rence BonJo u r ,  Th e Str uct u re ofEmpi rical Knowledge ( C ambridge, Mass .: H a r var d U n iver si ty Press, 1985 ),19 - 2 0, for d is cussion ofthis poi nt .  10.Of cou rse th e conte x t ua l ist wi ll d eny  any clai m b yt he foun da ti o nalist  tha thaving  a fou n dati o n al belief (as th e fou n d ation a lis t con ce ives of them ) is neces sary for ha ving a ny j ustif ied bel ie fs atall .And likewi s e the con textu alist w il l de nyany cl aimb y  thecohe re nti st that h a v in g  a  m a xim ally  cohe re nt s et of bel i efs is n ece s sary fo rhav i n g
 and_perception. 6._Ernest Sosa, "How Do_You Know?"_American_Philosophical Quarterly_11_(1974), 117; cf._Ernest Sosa, "Knowledge_in Context: Skepticism in_Doubt," Philosophical Perspectives_2_(1988), 139-55. 7. Ernest Sosa, Knowledge in Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 10_n._14, is_explicit_about_this. So we can think_of Cohen and Sosa as_proposing what_they take to be universally correct epistemic principles_that_imply that the_truth of certain specific epistemic appraisals is dependent on_facts (including social facts) about one's_circumstances. 8. Foundationalists_sometimes_talk_about foundational beliefs not_being in need of justification, by_which they mean that such beliefs,_because they are, for example, "self-justifying," do_not need to receive justification from_other beliefs. The structural contextualist,_however, means_something more radical here, namely,_there are certain_beliefs that,_in certain contexts_at least, need not have the_sort of epistemic_status of enjoying positive evidential support_(either_inherently or from_other_beliefs_and experiences)_in order to_play_a regress-stopping_role_in the structure of justified belief._For_recent defenses of structural contextualism with regard_to empirical belief, see_David_Annis, "A Contextualist Theory_of Epistemic Justification," American Philosophical_Quarterly 15 (1978), 213-19; Michael Williams,_"Coherence, Justification_and 320_Moral Knowledge? Truth," Review of Metaphysics 34 (1980), 243-72, and David_Henderson, "Epistemic Competence and Contextualist Epistemology:_Why Contextualism Is Not_Just the_Poor_Person's Coherentism," Journal_of_Philosophy 91_(1994), 627-49. 9. Inferential justification must be_distinguished from_the process of psychologically inferring one_proposition from another. Moreover,_such_justification does not require any such_process of inferring. See Laurence BonJour,_The Structure of Empirical Knowledge_(Cambridge,_Mass.:_Harvard University Press, 1985), 19-20,_for discussion of this point. 10._Of course the_contextualist will deny any claim by the_foundationalist_that having a foundational belief (as_the_foundationalist conceives of them) is necessary_for_having_any justified beliefs at all._And likewise the contextualist will deny_any claim by the coherentist that having a maximally_coherent set of_beliefs is necessary for having