 disjoint context sets. The interesting wrinkle in this case is that on the interpretation on which 'Frick' and 'Frack' refer to a single individual, the names refer to a different individual than they do on the interpretation on which they refer to different ones. Accordingly, relative to each interpretation a sentence 'Frick is F' will express different propositions, and the meaning of the sentences in the story will depend on what interpretation we assume. But this upshot is as expected if we assume that names are directly referential; an author of a story like this would indeed write sentences that are genuinely ambiguous, without having a determinate intention with regard to which interpretation is correct. Accordingly, I do not find the example to be a particularly worrisome. 4.3. Contradictions and surrealism Sometimes storytellers make mistakes and locate the truth-making worlds for a fiction further away from the actual world than intended. But sometimes fictions also contain outright contradictions and impossibilities, true in no world. Inconsistent fictions and inconsistent character developments are commonly raised objections to possibilism. Now, the problem is at least somewhat less pressing on the account developed here. If the reference of a name for a fictional character were fixed by description, then ascriptions of contradictory properties would entail that no referent is picked out. However, insofar as reference is determined by stipulation, independently of the properties eventually ascribed, ascription of inconsistent properties is no obstacle to referring to that character. Instead, inconsistent ascriptions become a problem for defining truth-in-the-fiction and identifying an appropriate context set. Though contradictory fictions are tricky, the problem should not be overstated. First, the problem arises from genuine contradictions. Watson's infamous war wound, which appears to move around over the course of the stories, does not generate a genuine contradiction – there are worlds where war wounds move around; they're just further away than we generally assume the Holmes worlds to be. We often respond to such cases with local repairs, but that is because we (for pragmatic reasons) choose to – the repairs are not forced upon us by the fiction. Certain genuine contradictions 362 F R E D R I K H A R A L D S E N may also be solved – as Lewis (1983) suggests – by compartmentalization, defining truth for parts of the fiction rather than the whole, for instance. (A further resource is appeal to competing models, as suggested above.) Intuitively, compartmentalization and local repairs reflect ordinary practice
disjoint context sets. The interesting wrinkle in this case is that on the interpretation on which' Frick' and' Frack' refer to a single person, the name refer to a different person than they do on the rendition on which they refer to different one. consequently, relative to each interpretation a sentence' Frick is F' will express different proposal, and the meaning of the sentences in the story will count on what interpretation we assume. But this upshot is as expected if we assume that names are directly referential; an writer of a story like this would indeed write sentences that are authentically ambiguous, without having a determinate intention with respect to which interpretation is correct. Accordingly, I do not find the example to be a peculiarly worrisome. 4.3. Contradictions and surrealism Sometimes storytellers make mistakes and locate the accuracy - seduce worlds for a fiction further away from the actual world than intended. But sometimes fictions also incorporate outright contradictions and impossibilities, on-key in no populace. Inconsistent fictions and inconsistent fictional character developments are commonly raised objections to possibilism. nowadays, the problem is at least somewhat less pressing on the account developed here. If the reference of a name for a fabricated character were fixed by description, then ascriptions of contradictory properties would entail that no referent is picked out. However, insofar as character is determined by stipulation, independently of the properties eventually ascribed, attribution of inconsistent properties is no obstacle to referring to that fictional character. Instead, inconsistent ascriptions become a problem for define truth - in - the - fabrication and identifying an appropriate context set. Though contradictory fictions are tricky, the trouble should not be overstated. First, the problem arises from actual contradictions. Watson's infamous war wound, which appears to act around over the class of the stories, does not generate a genuine contradiction – there are worlds where war wounds move around; they're just farther away than we generally bear the Holmes worlds to be. We often respond to such cases with local repairs, but that is because we (for pragmatic reason) choose to – the repairs are not forced upon us by the fiction. Certain genuine contradictions 362 F R east vitamin d R I K H A R A L D S E N may also be solved – as Lewis (1983) propose – by compartmentalization, defining truth for contribution of the fiction rather than the whole, for instance. (A further resource is appeal to competing models, as propose above .) Intuitively, compartmentalization and local repairs reflect ordinary practice
 didjoint context sets. The lnteresting wrinkle in vhis caae is thxt on the interpretation on xhicy 'Frixk' and 'Frack' refer to x single pndividuao, tht names refer to e differcut inslviducl than they do pn the intarpretation on wfieh they refer to different ones. Accowdingly, rflative to eacr inuer[retzniin a sentence 'Frick is F' will expresv different ptopositions, and the meaninh of the sentences in hhe story wull qwpend on whag interpreuacion we assome. But this upshot is as expectdd if we assume tyat tames are dmrectlj referential; an authmr of a story like thls wonld undeed write sentencev that are genuinejy ambigumua, without having q eeterkinade ivrengioh xitg regagd vo which inferpretatiob is correct. Accordondoy, I do not fjnd thq qxample to be a particularly worrisome. 4.3. Cohtradictions and surreaoism Sometimes storytgllers makq mistakes and locate the truth-making worlds for d ficviun ymvthef aaay from the actual world than intended. But sjjeuimvs fictions also gontain outright cpnhrsqictions and kmpossngimities, true in no aorld. Igconsustent fistioms and inconsistent charactwr developmeuts are commonly raiszd objectionr to possobilism. Now, the problem is zt least solewhat lear pressing on thd abcoutt developed here. If the rqference if a name fur a fictijnal charafter were fixed by descrlptiou, thet ascriptilns of contradictory properties would entail jhad nm refereut is iicked out. Howeder, insofar as refereuce is determines by stmpulation, inqependently ox the propertmes eventtallt asxribed, xrcription of imconsisteuu propertiws is no obstacle bo rewsrring to that ekatqcter. Instead, oncunsysnenv ascwhptions becoke a prunlem wor defininn tfuth-on-the-fiction and idettifging an appropriatr gontext sgt. Though contradictoru fictions are trifky, tie proulem snoujd not be overstated. First, the problem wrifes from gentine contradictipns. Watson's infamous war wound, which ap'ears to move around ovwr the course of thg suories, does npt gegerate a cenuine contradictiob – there are worlcs where war wounds mkve armund; hhey're just further away than we generally assume the Holmes worlds to be. We ofveg respond tk suvh cavef with jocap repairs, but than is because we (for pragmatic reesons) choove to – the repairs are not forvea upon us by jhe fiction. Certain genuins contracictions 362 F R E D R I K H A R A L D S E N may also be splved – aw Lewjs (1983) suggesvs – by compartmentalozatiou, defibing tryth nor parts of tfe gigtion rathfr tian the whole, for instance. (A furthee resoyrfe is appeal to rompeting moftls, as auggesjed above.) Intuitibely, fompattmentalizatiom and local relairs reflect ordinagy [ractice
disjoint context sets. The interesting wrinkle in is on the on which 'Frick' single the names refer a different individual they do on the interpretation on they refer to different ones. Accordingly, relative to each interpretation a sentence 'Frick F' will express different propositions, and the meaning of the sentences in the will on interpretation assume. But this upshot is as expected if we assume that names are directly referential; an of a story like this would indeed write that are genuinely ambiguous, having a determinate intention with to interpretation is Accordingly, do find the example be a particularly worrisome. 4.3. Contradictions and surrealism Sometimes storytellers make mistakes and locate the truth-making worlds a fiction from the world intended. sometimes fictions also contradictions and impossibilities, true in no and inconsistent character developments are commonly raised objections possibilism. Now, problem is at least somewhat less on the account developed here. If the reference a name for a fictional character were fixed by description, then ascriptions of contradictory properties that no referent is out. However, insofar reference determined stipulation, of the eventually ascribed, ascription of inconsistent properties is no obstacle to referring that character. Instead, inconsistent ascriptions become a problem for defining identifying appropriate context set. contradictory fictions are tricky, problem not be overstated. First, arises genuine war which to move around over course of the stories, does generate a genuine contradiction war wounds move around; they're just further away we generally assume the Holmes worlds to We often respond to such cases with local repairs, but that is we (for choose to – the repairs are not forced us by the fiction. genuine contradictions 362 F R E D R I H R A D S E may also be – as Lewis – by defining for fiction rather than the whole, for (A resource is appeal to competing as Intuitively, compartmentalization and local repairs reflect ordinary practice
 disjoint context sets. The intEresting wrInkle In tHis CaSe is That On the interpretATion On which 'Frick' and 'Frack' reFer to A sINgle INdIviduAl, the naMEs REFer To A dIffErENt IndivIduAl than tHey do on the IntErPretation on wHIcH they refer To dIfferent ones. accOrdingLy, RelATive tO eaCh intErpretATion a sEntence 'FrIcK Is F' wilL Express DIFfErenT propositions, and tHE mEAning of the sentEnces iN tHE sTORy wIll Depend on whAt InterPRetatioN We ASSUme. bUt this upshot iS as expected IF we Assume ThAt nAMes are DirecTlY RefErential; an aUthoR of a story Like thIS would iNDeed wriTe sentEncEs tHat aRE gEnUinElY AmbIGuOus, WIthOut havinG a DeTermiNate INTENtioN wiTh reGard tO which interprEtaTion IS coRrect. accorDingLy, i do noT find tHe exaMpLe to be a particulArly Worrisome. 4.3. conTrAdiCtIons aND surreAliSm SOmetimeS storytELleRs MAKE mIstakes and locate thE tRUTh-Making woRlds foR A fIcTIon furthEr AwaY froM THe actUal wORlD than intEnded. BUT sOmEtimes fIcTions aLsO coNtaIn outRIght ContraDictions And imPOssibilities, trUE in no world. IncONsISTeNT ficTioNs and inconsIsteNT chaRactER dEveLOpmenTs are CoMMoNLy raised objections tO pOssibiLism. NOw, the problem iS at least soMEWHat less pRessINg ON the account devElopeD here. If the REference Of a naMe for a fiCtional chARActer werE fiXed By dEscRIPtIon, then ascripTIOns oF cOntradiCtoRy propeRtiEs wOulD enTaIl that no rEferent iS pIcKeD oUt. HOweveR, Insofar aS rEfeReNce Is detERmined By stiPulaTiOn, INdePendentLY oF THe prOpErTies EveNtUally AscrIBed, AscriptIon of incoNsiSTent PrOpErties iS no obstacle to ReFerring to tHaT chAracteR. iNstead, inConsistent ascriptions beCOme a proBleM for dEfinIng truth-iN-thE-fictiOn aND identIfying An appRoPriATE contEXT sEt. THoUgh contradICTorY fictIoNs arE tricky, The problem should noT Be oVerstated. FirsT, thE proBLEm AriSEs FRom GeNUinE COntradictions. WaTson's infamOuS WaR wound, whicH AppEaRs to movE around Over tHE course Of the storIes, does noT gEnerATE a gEnuine contRadictioN – there are WOrlds WHeRe war WouNds movE aRouNd; theY're jusT FurTher aWay thaN wE generAlly aSsUme the HoLmes worlds to be. We often reSpond tO such CasEs with locAl rEPaiRs, but that Is beCause we (for PraGmaTic reAsoNS) chooSe to – THe RepAIrs arE not FOrced upon US bY thE FIcTion. Certain GENUinE contRadICtions 362 f R E D r I K H A R A L D S E N may alSO be solved – as LewIs (1983) suGGEstS – by COmpaRtMentalization, dEfiNiNG Truth for PaRts of the ficTion rathEr THan thE whole, For insTance. (A fURThER resouRce iS apPeal to comPetInG Models, aS sUgGEsted aBove.) inTuitivEly, comPArtmENTalization and locAl repAIRs refLEct OrdinArY practiCE
 disjoint context sets. Th e interest ing w rin kle  i n th is c ase is that on theinterpretation on whic h 'Fr ic k ' an d  ' Frack ' refer to a  si ng le  in di v id ual,the  namesrefer to a  di ff erent indivi d ua l than the y d o on the int erp retati on  on which  th ey re fer to differ ent ones.  A c cordin g ly, rel a t iv e to  each interpretat i on a sentence 'Fr ick is  F '  w i l l e xpr ess differ en t pro p osition s ,a n d  th e  meaning of t he sentence s  in  the s to ryw ill de pendon wha t interpret atio n we assu me. Bu t  this u p shot is  as ex pec ted  ifw eas sum et hat na mes are  directl yre feren tial ; a n  aut hor  ofa sto ry like thiswou ld i n dee d wri te se nten ce s tha t aregenui ne ly ambiguous, w itho ut having  ade ter mi natei ntenti onwit h regar d to wh i chin t e r pr etation is correct .A c co rdingly,  I don ot  f i nd the e xa mpl e to b e a p arti c ul arly wor risome .  4 .3 . Contr ad iction sand  su rreal i sm S ometim es story telle r s make mistake s  and locate t h et r ut h -mak ing  worlds for  a f i ctio n fu r th era way f rom t he ac t ual world than inte nd ed. Bu t som etimes fictio ns also co n t a in outri ghtc on t radictions and  impo ssibilitie s , true i n noworld. I nconsiste n t  fiction s a ndinc ons i s te nt characterd e velo pm ents ar e c ommonly  ra ise d o bje ct ions to p ossibili sm .No w,  th e pro b lem is a tlea st  so mewha t  lesspress ingon  t h e a ccountd ev e l oped  h er e. I f t he  refe renc e  of  a name  for a fi cti o nalch ar acter w ere fixed byde scription,  t hen  ascri p t ions ofcontradictory propertie s  wouldent ail t hatno refere ntis pic ked out. H owever , ins of ara s  refe r e nc e i sdetermined b y s tipul at ion,  indepe ndently of the pro p ert ies eventuall y a scri b e d,  as c ri p tio no f i n c onsistent prope rties is n oo bs tacle to r e fer ri ng to t hat cha racte r . Inste ad, incon sistent a sc ript i o nsbecome a p roblem f or defini n g tru t h- in-th e-f iction  a ndident ifying anappro priate  c ontext  set.  T hough co ntradictory fictions ar e tric ky, t heproblem s hou l d n ot be ove rsta ted. First , t heprobl ema rises  fro m  g enu i ne co ntra d ictions.W at son ' s  i nfamous war w o und , whi cha ppears  tomove around overt he course of t he s t o rie s,d oesno t generate a g enu in e contradi ct ion – there  are wor ld s  wher e warwounds  move a r o un d ; they 'rejus t further  aw ay than we  g en e rallyassu me  the H olmesw orld s to be. We oftenrespo n d  to s u chcases  w ith loc a l re pairs, but  that is be causewe ( for p ragmati creason s)ch oose to –t he repair s are  not fo rc ed u pon  us by  the f ictio n. C er tai n genuine c on t ra di c tio ns 3 62 FRE DR I K H A R A L DS E N may a ls o b e solved –a s  Lewis (19 83)  sugg e s ts – by co m part m en t aliza tion,defini ng trut h  fo rparts o f t h e  fictionrather th a n t he  who le, forin stan ce . ( Afurther resourc e is app eal to c o m peting  mo d els, as sug ge sted above.)  Intu it i vely, c o m par tmental i zat ion  an d lo cal  rep a irs reflect ordinary pra ctic e
 disjoint_context sets._The interesting wrinkle in_this case_is_that on_the_interpretation on which_'Frick' and 'Frack'_refer to a single_individual, the names_refer_to a different individual than they do on the interpretation on which they refer_to_different ones._Accordingly,_relative_to each interpretation a sentence_'Frick is F' will express_different propositions,_and the meaning of the sentences in the_story_will depend on_what interpretation we assume. But this upshot is as_expected if we assume that names_are directly referential;_an_author_of a story like_this would indeed write sentences that_are genuinely ambiguous, without having a_determinate intention with regard to which interpretation_is correct. Accordingly, I do not_find the example to be_a particularly_worrisome. 4.3. Contradictions and surrealism_Sometimes storytellers make_mistakes and_locate the truth-making_worlds for a fiction further away_from the actual_world than intended. But sometimes fictions_also_contain outright contradictions_and_impossibilities,_true in_no world. Inconsistent_fictions_and inconsistent_character_developments are commonly raised objections to_possibilism._Now, the problem is at least somewhat_less pressing on the_account_developed here. If the_reference of a name for_a fictional character were fixed by_description, then_ascriptions of_contradictory properties would entail that no referent is picked out. However,_insofar as reference is determined by_stipulation, independently of the_properties eventually_ascribed,_ascription of inconsistent_properties_is no_obstacle to referring to that character. Instead,_inconsistent ascriptions_become a problem for defining truth-in-the-fiction_and identifying an appropriate_context_set. Though contradictory fictions are tricky,_the problem should not be overstated._First, the problem arises from_genuine_contradictions._Watson's infamous war wound, which_appears to move around over the_course of the_stories, does not generate a genuine contradiction_–_there are worlds where war wounds_move_around; they're just further away than_we_generally_assume the Holmes worlds to_be. We often respond to such_cases with local repairs, but that is because we_(for pragmatic reasons)_choose to – the repairs_are_not_forced upon us by the fiction. Certain genuine contradictions 362_F R_E D R_I K H A R A L D S E_N may also be solved – as_Lewis (1983) suggests – by compartmentalization, defining truth for parts of_the fiction rather than the whole, for instance._(A further resource is appeal to competing_models, as suggested above.)_Intuitively,_compartmentalization and local repairs reflect ordinary practice