	anyway. As	will	become	clear	in	the	discussion	below,	I	also	think	that	there	are particular	classes	of	believers	who	are	vulnerable	to	the	same	problem. Nevertheless,	I	keep	the	scope	limited	to	reasonable	non-believers	at	the	outset because	I	think	the	best	case	can	be	made	in	relation	to	them. This	brings	us	to	the	second	part	of	premise	(2).	This	is	perhaps	the	most crucial	element	of	the	argument	and	the	one	upon	which	most	attention	has focused.	The	prima	facie	defence	of	it	is	straightforward:	reasonable	nonbelievers	do	not	believe	in	God.	Consequently,	they	cannot	interpret	anything	in the	world	as	being	a	command	emanating	from	God.	To	take	an	obvious	example, they	do	not	believe	that	Bible	is	the	divinely	inspired	word	of	God.	Thus,	they cannot	believe	that	the	ten	commandments	are	really	divine	commands. Consequently,	they	do	not	know	that	these	are	moral	obligations	(if	indeed	they are).	This	is	just	an	example.	According	to	premise	(2),	any	candidate	moral obligation	under	DCT	will	fall	foul	of	the	same	basic	problem. Theists	have	developed	responses	to	this	prima	facie	defence.	These defences	typically	start	out	by	arguing	for	an	enriched	understanding	of	the possible	forms	of	divine	communication.	God,	we	are	told,	need	not	simply communicate	to	us	via	a	revealed	text,	he	can	also	communicate	to	us	via conscience,	
anyway. As 	 will 	 become 	 clear 	 in 	 the 	 discussion 	 below, 	 I 	 also 	 remember 	 that 	 there 	 are especial 	 classes 	 of 	 believers 	 who 	 are 	 vulnerable 	 to 	 the 	 same 	 trouble. Nevertheless, 	 I 	 keep 	 the 	 scope 	 restrict 	 to 	 reasonable 	 non - believers 	 at 	 the 	 beginning because 	 I 	 remember 	 the 	 best 	 character 	 can 	 be 	 made 	 in 	 relation 	 to 	 them. This 	 bring 	 us 	 to 	 the 	 second 	 part 	 of 	 premise 	 (2). 	 This 	 is 	 perhaps 	 the 	 most crucial 	 element 	 of 	 the 	 argument 	 and 	 the 	 one 	 upon 	 which 	 most 	 care 	 has focused. 	 The 	 prima 	 facie 	 defence 	 of 	 it 	 is 	 straightforward: 	 fair 	 nonbelievers 	 do 	 not 	 believe 	 in 	 God. 	 Consequently, 	 they 	 cannot 	 interpret 	 anything 	 in the 	 world 	 as 	 being 	 a 	 command 	 emanating 	 from 	 God. 	 To 	 carry 	 an 	 obvious 	 example, they 	 do 	 not 	 believe 	 that 	 Bible 	 is 	 the 	 divinely 	 inspired 	 word 	 of 	 God. 	 Thus, 	 they cannot 	 think 	 that 	 the 	 ten 	 commandments 	 are 	 really 	 divine 	 commands. Consequently, 	 they 	 do 	 not 	 know 	 that 	 these 	 are 	 moral 	 obligations 	 (if 	 indeed 	 they are). 	 This 	 is 	 barely 	 an 	 example. 	 According 	 to 	 premise 	 (2), 	 any 	 candidate 	 moral obligation 	 under 	 DCT 	 will 	 fall 	 foul 	 of 	 the 	 same 	 basic 	 problem. Theists 	 have 	 developed 	 response 	 to 	 this 	 prima 	 facie 	 defence. 	 These defences 	 typically 	 begin 	 out 	 by 	 controversy 	 for 	 an 	 enrich 	 understanding 	 of 	 the possible 	 form 	 of 	 divine 	 communication. 	 God, 	 we 	 are 	 told, 	 need 	 not 	 simply convey 	 to 	 us 	 via 	 a 	 revealed 	 text, 	 he 	 can 	 also 	 communicate 	 to 	 us 	 via conscience,
	anyaay. As	will	become	clear	in	tme	discussion	beloc,	U	also	tiink	thaf	there	ard particular	classes	of	believecs	whi	are	vylnerable	to	the	same	probuem. Nevernheless,	I	kwep	tie	scope	limited	to	csasonable	non-bspievzrw	at	the	outset bgcause	I	think	dhe	best	case	can	te	oabe	in	relation	to	them. This	brings	us	to	the	fecond	psrh	of	premise	(2).	This	ys	peghwps	tgv	mist crucial	element	of	the	argumeht	and	tht	one	upon	which	most	aytention	has focused.	The	primw	facle	defence	of	it	is	strwightforware:	reafinable	nonbelkevers	do	nou	bzlieve	in	God.	Donsequently,	they	cannot	interpret	xnythnng	in the	wotls	ad	teing	a	commaid	emanwting	from	God.	Bp	take	at	obvioux	example, they	dp	nov	belueve	that	Bible	is	the	divmnely	inspired	word	of	Gjd.	Thus,	thef eannot	believe	that	the	twn	xommatdmetts	afw	rexllg	dmvihe	commwnda. Consequehtly,	they	do	nit	know	that	these	are	mprwo	obligations	(ir	indeeq	trey are).	This	is	just	an	example.	According	to	prtmise	(2),	zny	candidate	moral obligqtion	under	DCT	will	fall	voul	of	the	fame	basic	problem. Theists	have	developed	responses	to	tvis	prmmx	faelc	defdbcf.	These defences	typically	start	out	by	arguing	for	ag	sntibhed	understanding	jf	the possinlf	fptms	of	divine	comounicacjoh.	God,	we	are	told,	need	nlt	simpli commynicate	to	ts	vis	a	revealed	text,	he	can	also	commynicate	to	us	vpa cinscience,	
anyway. As will become clear in the I think that are particular classes to same problem. Nevertheless, keep the scope to reasonable non-believers at the outset I think the best case can be made in relation to them. This us to the second part of premise (2). This is perhaps the most element the and one upon which most attention has focused. The prima facie defence of it is straightforward: reasonable do not believe in God. Consequently, they cannot anything in the world being a command emanating from To an obvious they not that Bible is divinely inspired word of God. Thus, they cannot believe that the ten commandments are really divine commands. they do that these moral (if they are). This an example. According to premise (2), obligation under DCT will fall foul of the basic problem. have developed responses to this prima defence. These defences typically start out by arguing an enriched understanding of the possible forms of divine communication. God, we are told, need communicate to us via revealed text, he also to via
	anyway. As	will	become	clear	in	The	discussIon	beLow,	i	alSo	ThinK	thaT	there	are partiCUlar	Classes	of	believers	who	aRe	vulNeRAble	TO	tHe	samE	probleM. neVERthElEsS,	I	kEeP	ThE	scopE	liMited	to	Reasonable	Non-BeLievers	at	the	OUtSet because	i	thInk	the	best	caSe	cAn	be	maDe	In	rELatioN	to	Them. THis	briNGs	us	to	The	second	PaRT	of	preMIse	(2).	This	IS	PeRhapS	the	most crucial	elEMeNT	of	the	argument	And	the	OnE	UpON	WhiCh	mOst	attentiOn	Has foCUsed.	The	PRiMA	FAciE	Defence	of	it	is	StraightforWArd:	ReasonAbLe	nONbelieVers	dO	nOT	beLieve	in	God.	COnseQuently,	thEy	cannOT	interpREt	anythIng	in tHe	wOrlD	as	bEInG	a	ComMaND	emANaTinG	FroM	God.	To	taKe	An	ObvioUs	exAMPLE, theY	do	Not	bElievE	that	Bible	is	tHe	dIvinELy	iNspirEd	worD	of	GOd.	thus,	tHey canNot	beLiEve	that	the	ten	coMmanDments	are	ReaLlY	diViNe	comMAnds. CoNseQueNtly,	theY	do	not	kNOw	tHaT	THEsE	are	moral	obligatioNs	(IF	InDeed	they Are).	ThiS	Is	JuST	an	exampLe.	accOrdiNG	To	preMise	(2),	ANy	CandidatE	moral OBlIgAtion	unDeR	DCT	wiLl	FalL	foUl	of	tHE	samE	basic	Problem. THeistS	Have	developed	rESponses	to	this	PRiMA	FaCIe	deFenCe.	These defeNces	TYpicAlly	STaRt	oUT	by	arGuing	FoR	An	ENriched	understandinG	oF	the poSsiblE	forms	of	divinE	communicaTION.	God,	we	arE	tolD,	NeED	not	simply commUnicaTe	to	us	via	a	REvealed	tExt,	he	Can	also	cOmmunicatE	TO	us	via coNscIenCe,	
	anyway. As	will	become	cl ear	in	the 	disc uss ion 	b elow ,	Ialso	think	tha t 	the re	are particular	clas ses	o fb elie v er s	who 	are	vu l ne r a ble 	t othe 	s a me 	prob lem . Never theless,	I 	ke ep 	the	scope	l i mi ted	to	rea son able	non-bel iev ers	at 	t heo utset  be cause 	I	thi n k	thebest	case 	c a n	be	m a de	in	r e l at ionto	them. This	bri n gs us	to	the	seco nd	par to fp r emi se(2).	Thisis 	perh a ps	them os t c ruc i al	element	of 	the	argume n t	a nd	the 	o neu pon	wh ich	m os t 	at tention	has  foc used.	The 	prima facie	d e fence	o f	it	i s	s tra ight f or wa rd: 	r e aso n ab len onb elievers 	d onot	b elie v e i n	Go d.Cons equen tly,	they	can not 	int e rpr et	an ythin g	in  t he	wo rld	as 	bein ga	command	emana ting 	from	God .	T otak ean	ob v ious	e xam ple , theydo	notb eli ev e t ha t	Bible	is	the	div in e l yinspired 	wordo fGo d .	Thus,th eycann o t 	beli evet ha t	the	te n	comm a nd me nts	are 	r eallydi vin e	c omman d s. C onsequ ently,	t hey	d o 	not	know	that these	are	mor a lo b li g atio ns(if	indeedthey are) .	Th i sisj ust	a n	exa mp l e. According	to	premis e(2),	a ny	ca ndidate	moral  obligatio n u nder	DCT 	wil l 	f a ll	foul	of	the 	same 	basic	pro b lem. The istshave	dev eloped	re s p onses	to 	th ispri maf a ci e	defence.	Th e s e de fe nces	ty pic ally	st art 	ou t	b y	a rg uing	foran	enric he dun de rst andin g 	of	thepo ssi bl e	f ormso f	divi ne	co mmun ic at i on. 	God,	w e 	a r e 	tol d, 	n eednot 	s imply  com m uni cate	to 	us	via	a 	re v eale dte xt,	hecan	also	comm un icate	to	u svia  consc i e nce,	
	anyway. As	will	become	clear	in	the	discussion	below,	I	also	think	that	there	are_particular	classes	of	believers	who	are	vulnerable	to	the	same	problem. Nevertheless,	I	keep	the	scope	limited	to	reasonable	non-believers	at	the	outset_because	I	think	the	best	case	can	be	made	in	relation	to	them. This	brings	us	to	the	second	part	of	premise	(2).	This	is	perhaps	the	most crucial	element	of	the	argument	and	the	one	upon	which	most	attention	has focused.	The	prima	facie	defence	of	it	is	straightforward:	reasonable	nonbelievers	do	not	believe	in	God.	Consequently,	they	cannot	interpret	anything	in_the	world	as	being	a	command	emanating	from	God.	To	take	an	obvious	example, they	do	not	believe	that	Bible	is	the	divinely	inspired	word	of	God.	Thus,	they_cannot	believe	that	the	ten	commandments	are	really	divine	commands._Consequently,	they	do	not	know	that	these	are	moral	obligations	(if	indeed	they are).	This	is	just	an	example.	According	to	premise	(2),	any	candidate	moral_obligation	under	DCT	will	fall	foul	of	the	same	basic	problem._Theists	have	developed	responses	to	this	prima	facie	defence.	These defences	typically	start	out	by	arguing	for	an	enriched	understanding	of	the possible	forms	of	divine	communication.	God,	we	are	told,	need	not	simply_communicate	to	us	via	a	revealed	text,	he	can	also	communicate	to	us	via conscience,	