 or good-for.10 Yet he gives no account of how he would meet standard objections to realism of this sort – how he might explain, for example, how such evaluative properties can fit into the natural world, or how we come to know about them. Presumably, claiming that (say) the growth of a healthy root system for a plant is good for it is doing something more than simply reporting on the botanical facts about the plant and its roots. It is ascribing a property that is not merely descriptive of the natural facts, but is an evaluation of those facts. But Kraut says nothing about the provenance of this extra-botanical property – how it comes to be, or how we might be in a position to detect it. However, Kraut does give us something of an analysis of the good-for relation without yet addressing those issues. One important reason he offers for privileging the notion of good-for as opposed to good simpliciter is that the 'for' in the former is, as Kraut puts it, a relation of a certain sort of suitability: 'the "for" in "g is good for S" is best taken to indicate that g has a certain kind of suitability to S : their properties are so matched to each other that g serves S well' (p. ; my italics). By way of example, Kraut offers a case in which one might think that a certain career – that of a physician, say – is good for some particular individual: 'if we say of someone that it is good for him that he is living the life of a doctor, there must be some suitability between him and that life, some match between them that makes it the case that such a life serves him well' (p. ). So the nature of good-for consists in these matching relations. I myself think Kraut is right in thinking about good-for in this way, but doubt that we can best understand these relations as mind-independent. In any event, if we are to respond to opportunities to realize good-for in the world around us, our doing so must depend upon our capacity to detect and respond to these relations. Given the varieties of things that can be good for us, there must be many different kinds of matching relations that matter for promoting our good. Many of these matches we no doubt can discern 'by nature' – without reflection or training. However, given the significance
or good - for.10 Yet he gives no account of how he would meet standard protest to platonism of this sort – how he might explain, for example, how such appraising properties can fit into the natural universe, or how we come to know about them. Presumably, claim that (say) the growth of a goodly root system for a plant is good for it is doing something more than plainly reporting on the botanical facts about the plant and its roots. It is ascribing a place that is not merely descriptive of the natural facts, but is an evaluation of those facts. But Kraut allege nothing about the provenance of this extra - botanic property – how it total to be, or how we might be in a position to detect it. However, Kraut does impart us something of an analysis of the good - for relation without so far addressing those issues. One important reason he offers for privileging the notion of good - for as opposed to good simpliciter is that the' for' in the former is, as Kraut puts it, a relation of a certain sort of suitability:' the " for " in " g is good for S " is well taken to indicate that g have a sealed kind of suitability to S: their properties are so matched to each other that g serves S well' (p. ; my italics). By way of example, Kraut offer a case in which one might think that a certain career – that of a physician, say – is good for some finical individual:' if we say of someone that it is good for him that he is living the biography of a doctor, there must be some suitability between him and that animation, some match between them that makes it the case that such a life serves him well' (p. ). therefore the nature of good - for consists in these matching relations. I myself remember Kraut is right in thinking about good - for in this way, but doubt that we can well understand these relation as mind - independent. In any consequence, if we are to respond to opportunities to realize good - for in the universe around us, our doing indeed must depend upon our capacity to detect and respond to these relations. Given the assortment of things that can be estimable for us, there must be many different kinds of matching relations that matter for promoting our commodity. Many of these matches we no doubt can discern' by nature' – without contemplation or training. However, given the significance
 or good-for.10 Yet he gives no account of how he wound meef standafd objections to realism of vhis sort – how he might explain, for examile, how sych tvaluative propervjes can fit ihbo thz iatural world, ot how we coma to know aboud ghzm. Presumably, claiming that (say) the drowth pf a healthy rooj sysuem for a plant is good for it is doing skmethinj more than simlly reporting on the botanlcal facts about the ppant and itw rojrs. It is ascfibing a pgmperty thaj is not merely descriptive of tfe nacural facts, byt lv an evaluavion os those facts. But Krdut sayx nothing aboub the privenance of this extre-botanical property – how it cmmzs to be, or how we mithr be hn a poskriov tk vetsct it. Hoxever, Kraut does give ys something of an snwoysis of the food-fow welation without yet addressing those ivsuss. One important reason he offers for privilgging the gotion of good-for as opposed to good simpliciter hs thet tht 'njf' ij the former is, as Kraut puts it, a relation os a cvrtain sort of sultability: 'the "for" on "g ys good for S" is best faken to indicate hhat g ras a certain hind of suitability to S : their properties cre so matched to eack other that g sgrves X well' (p. ; my italics). By way of example, Kraut ofrdrs a case in whkch ote might think that a certwin careec – thct of a ohysocian, fay – is gold fov some particular ijdivibual: 'hf we say lf someone that it is good for imm that he is lhvitg the lnfe of a doctor, thewe must be somg suitabijity cetween hij and tiat life, somq match betweaj them that kakes it the casw that rjch a life serfes him wvlj' (p. ). So the nature of nood-fud consists in tktse matching relatoonr. I mjsekf dhink Kraut hs rkghg in tfinking abomt eood-gor in this way, but goubf that we can best ukderstand these rqlations as mond-independent. In wny etent, ih we ate jo respond to opportunities to dealize glod-nor in the wowld qround us, oux doing so must depend upon our capacity to detect and respond to these relatnoks. Given the variqties of dhings that can be giod for us, there kust be many differenf kindv of latching relations that matter for promoting our good. Many of these matchws we io doubt can siscrrn 'bj nctuxe' – witrout ceflection or trapning. However, given the significence
or good-for.10 Yet he gives no account he meet standard to realism of might for example, how evaluative properties can into the natural world, or how come to know about them. Presumably, claiming that (say) the growth of a root system for a plant is good for it is doing something more simply on botanical about the plant and its roots. It is ascribing a property that is not merely descriptive the natural facts, but is an evaluation of facts. But Kraut says about the provenance of this property how it to or we might be a position to detect it. However, Kraut does give us something of an analysis of the good-for without yet issues. One reason offers privileging the notion as opposed to good simpliciter is in the former is, as Kraut puts it, relation of certain sort of suitability: 'the "for" "g is good for S" is best taken indicate that g has a certain kind of suitability to S : their properties are to each other that serves S well' ; italics). way example, Kraut a case in which one might think that a certain career that of a physician, say – is good for some 'if say of someone it is good for that is living the life doctor, must between and life, some match between that makes it the case such a life serves the nature of good-for consists in these matching I myself think Kraut is right in about good-for in this way, but doubt that we can best understand relations as any event, if we are to respond to to realize good-for in world around us, our doing so must depend upon capacity detect and to these relations. the varieties of that can be us, there be different relations that matter for promoting our Many these matches we no doubt discern – without reflection or training. However, given the significance
 or good-for.10 Yet he gives no accoUnt of how he Would MeeT stAnDard ObjeCtions to realisM Of thIs sort – how he might explaiN, for eXaMPle, hOW sUch evAluativE PrOPErtIeS cAn fIt INtO the nAtuRal worlD, or how we coMe tO kNow about them. pReSumably, claImiNg that (say) the GroWth of a HeAltHY root SysTem foR a planT Is good For it is doInG SomethINg more tHAN sImplY reporting on the boTAnICal facts about tHe planT aND iTS RooTs. IT is ascribiNg A propERty that IS nOT MEreLY descriptive oF the natural FActS, but is An EvaLUation Of thoSe FActS. But Kraut saYs noThing abouT the prOVenance OF this exTra-botAniCal PropERtY – hOw iT cOMes TO bE, or HOw wE might be In A pOsitiOn to DETECt it. howEver, kraut Does give us somEthIng oF An aNalysIs of tHe goOd-For reLation WithoUt Yet addressing thOse iSsues. One iMpoRtAnt ReAson hE Offers For PriVileginG the notIOn oF gOOD-FoR as opposed to good siMpLICiTer is thaT the 'foR' In ThE Former is, As kraUt puTS It, a reLatiON oF a certaiN sort oF SuItAbility: 'ThE "for" in "G iS goOd fOr S" is BEst tAken to Indicate That g HAs a certain kind OF suitability tO s : tHEIr PRopeRtiEs are so matcHed tO Each OtheR ThAt g SErves s well' (P. ; mY ItALics). By way of example, KRaUt offeRs a caSe in which one mIght think tHAT A certain CareER – tHAt of a physician, Say – is Good for somE ParticulAr indIvidual: 'iF we say of sOMEone that It iS goOd fOr hIM ThAt he is living tHE Life Of A doctor, TheRe must bE soMe sUitAbiLiTy between Him and thAt LiFe, SoMe mAtch bETween theM tHat MaKes It the CAse thaT such A lifE sErVEs hIm well' (p. ). sO tHE NatuRe Of Good-For CoNsistS in tHEse MatchinG relationS. I mYSelf ThInK Kraut iS right in thinkInG about good-FoR in This waY, BUt doubt tHat we can best understand tHEse relaTioNs as mInd-iNdependenT. In Any eveNt, iF We are tO respoNd to oPpOrtUNIties TO ReAliZe Good-for in tHE WorLd aroUnD us, oUr doing So must depend upon ouR CapAcity to detect And RespOND tO thESe RElaTiONs. GIVEn the varieties oF things thaT cAN bE good for us, THerE mUst be maNy diffeRent kINds of maTching relAtions thaT mAtteR FOr pRomoting ouR good. ManY of these mATches WE nO doubT caN disceRn 'By nAture' – WithouT RefLectiOn or trAiNing. HoWever, GiVen the siGnificance
 or good-for.10 Yet he giv es no acco unt o f h owhe  wou ld m eet standard o b ject ions to realism of thi s sor t–  how he  migh t expla i n, f orex am ple ,h ow  such  ev aluativ e properti esca n fit into t h enatural wo rld , or how wecom e to k no w a b out t hem . Pre sumabl y , clai ming that  ( s ay) th e  growth o fa he althy root system fo r  a plant is go od for  i t  i s doi ngsomethingmo re th a n simpl y  r e p o rti n g on the bota nical facts abo ut the  p lan t  and i ts ro ot s . I t is ascrib inga propert y that is notm erely d escrip tiv e o f th e  n at ura lf act s ,but isan evalu at io n ofthos e f a cts.  Bu t Kr aut s ays nothing a bou t th e  pr ovena nce o f th is  extr a-bota nical  p roperty – how i t co mes to be , o rhow  w e mig h t be i n a  po sitionto dete c t i t. H o we ver, Kraut does gi ve u ssomethin g of a n  a na l ysis ofth e g ood- f o r rel atio n  w ithout y et add r es si ng thos eissues .One  im porta n t re ason h e offers  forp rivileging the notion of goo d -f o r  a s  opp ose d to good s impl i cite r is th att he 'f or' i nt he former is, as Kraut  p uts it , a r elation of acertain so r t of suita bili t y: 'the "for" in"g is  good forS " is bes t tak en to in dicate th a t  g has a  ce rta inkin d of  suitabilityt o  S :  t heir pr ope rties a resomat che dto each o ther tha tgse rv esS wel l ' (p.  ;myit ali cs).B y wayof ex ampl e,  K r aut  offers ac a se i nwh ichone  m ightthin k  th at a ce rtain car eer – th at  o f a phy sician, say –  i s good for  s ome  parti c u lar indi vidual: 'if we say of s o meone t hat  it i s go od for hi m t hat he  is living  the l ife o fa d o c tor,t h er e m us t be somes u ita bilit ybetw een him  and that life, so m e m atch betweenthe m th a t  m ake s  i t  th ec ase t hat such a life  serves hi mw el l' (p.  ) . S othe nat ure ofgood- f or cons ists in t hese matc hi ng r e l ati ons. I mys elf thin k Kraut i s  righ t  i n thi nki ng abo ut  go od-fo r in t h isway,but do ub t that  we c an  best un derstand these relation s as m ind-i nde pendent.Ina nyevent, if  weare to res pon d t o opp ort u nitie s to re ali z e goo d-fo r  in the w o rl d a r o un d us, our d o i n g s o mus t d e pend u ponour capacity to d e tect and respo nd t o the ser elat io ns. Given thevar ie t i es of th in gs that can  be good  f o r us,  there  mustbe many d if f erentkind s o f matchin g r el a tions t ha tm atterforpr omotin g ourg ood. M any of these mat chesw e  no d o ubt  candi scern ' b y na ture' – wi thout refle ctionor t raini ng. How ev er, gi ven  t he signifi c ance
 or_good-for.10 Yet_he gives no account_of how_he_would meet_standard_objections to realism_of this sort_– how he might_explain, for example,_how_such evaluative properties can fit into the natural world, or how we come to_know_about them._Presumably,_claiming_that (say) the growth of_a healthy root system for_a plant_is good for it is doing something more_than_simply reporting on_the botanical facts about the plant and its roots._It is ascribing a property that_is not merely_descriptive_of_the natural facts, but_is an evaluation of those facts._But Kraut says nothing about the_provenance of this extra-botanical property – how_it comes to be, or how_we might be in a_position to_detect it. However, Kraut does_give us something_of an_analysis of the_good-for relation without yet addressing those_issues. One important_reason he offers for privileging the_notion_of good-for as_opposed_to_good simpliciter_is that the_'for'_in the_former_is, as Kraut puts it, a_relation_of a certain sort of suitability: 'the_"for" in "g is_good_for S" is best_taken to indicate that g_has a certain kind of suitability_to S_: their_properties are so matched to each other that g serves S_well' (p. ; my italics). By_way of example, Kraut_offers a_case_in which one_might_think that_a certain career – that of a_physician, say_– is good for some particular_individual: 'if we say_of_someone that it is good for_him that he is living the_life of a doctor, there_must_be_some suitability between him and_that life, some match between them_that makes it_the case that such a life serves_him_well' (p. ). So the nature_of_good-for consists in these matching relations._I_myself_think Kraut is right in_thinking about good-for in this way,_but doubt that we can best understand these relations_as mind-independent. In_any event, if we are_to_respond_to opportunities to realize good-for in the world around us,_our doing_so must depend_upon our capacity to detect and respond to these relations._Given the varieties of things that can_be good for us, there must be many different kinds of_matching relations that matter for promoting our good._Many of these matches we no doubt_can discern 'by nature'_–_without reflection or training. However, given the_significance