 the good-for relation has no direct connection at all with reasons for action. Presumably we have reasons for action, and Kraut is explicit that these reasons must come from what is good for somebody or something. Yet there is no account at all of how this might be so. Kraut rejects utilitarianism, not only because he believes we should reject its maximizing commitments (§) but also because it does not give proper place to concerns for whose good we are to advance (pp. –). Impersonal regard for the good of all is, he says (p. ), no appropriate moral standard; so there is no connection with reasons for action from anything like a maximizing principle of rationality. But Kraut also rejects even a weak form of egoism which holds that among those goods which each of us has reason to advance is our own good – that we must have direct concern for our own well-being (p. ). He argues that we can endorse the strategy of someone who cares for his own good only instrumentally, as a necessary means to caring for the goods of others (p. ). This leaves a puzzle as to how exactly anybody's good becomes reason-giving for us, given that there is no immediate connection between reasons for action and either one's own good or everybody's good. Somehow, somebody's good must be  MARK LEBAR ©  The Author Journal compilation ©  The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly 3 D. Russell, Plato on Pleasure and the Good Life (Oxford UP, ), ch. . Though the details vary from account to account, the ancient eudaimonists – Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics – are in unison on this point. Because eudaimonia is (on all these ancient accounts) something that is the product of practical wisdom, eudaimonism is not even a species of developmentalism: that is to say, it is not Kraut's general account as applied to the human case. reason-giving, but how? Kraut maintains (pp. , ) that there is no philosophical answer
the good - for relation has no direct association at wholly with reasons for action. Presumably we get reason for action, and Kraut is explicit that these rationality must fall from what is good for somebody or something. so far there is no account at all of how this might be indeed. Kraut rejects utilitarianism, not only because he believe we should reject its maximizing commitments (§ ) but also because it does not give proper place to concerns for whose full we are to advance (pp. –). Impersonal regard for the good of all is, he read (p. ), no appropriate moral standard; so there is no connection with reason for action from anything like a maximizing principle of rationality. But Kraut also rejects even a unaccented form of egoism which holds that among those goods which each of us has reason to progress is our own commodity – that we must have direct concern for our own well - being (p. ). He argues that we can endorse the strategy of someone who worry for his own commodity only instrumentally, as a necessary means to wish for the commodity of others (p. ). This leaves a puzzle as to how exactly anybody's effective becomes reason - giving for us, given that there is no contiguous connection between reasons for action and either one's own good or everybody's good. Somehow, somebody's good must be  MARK LEBAR ©  The Author Journal compilation ©  The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly 3 D. Russell, Plato on Pleasure and the Good Life (Oxford UP, ), ch. . Though the details vary from account to account, the ancient eudaimonists – Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics – are in unison on this distributor point. Because eudaimonia is (on all these ancient account) something that is the merchandise of practical wisdom, eudaimonism is not even a species of developmentalism: that is to order, it is not Kraut's general account as applied to the human case. reason - giving, but how? Kraut maintains (pp. , ) that there is no philosophical solution
 thf good-for relation has nu direct connecjiin at ell witg reasonr for action. Presumably we heve eeasobs for action, and Kraug is explpcit that theww reasons must comc froj whac ms good for somgbody or somathing. Yet these id no account at all of how this migrt be sp. Nraut rejects otiliuaryaniam, not only because he believes we should reject its msximizing commitments (§) but alsl because it does jot give priper place to conzerns for whose good wg are to advance (pp. –). Impersonal fegarb for the gioe ov all is, he ways (i. ), no approprlste mosal stamdard; so there is no connection with reasmns for action froi anythinc mike a maximizing peincikle ox raguonxliuy. Uut Kraut alao rejects even a weaj form of egoism whocr holds that ajong trofe goods which each of us has reason to adbance is our own good – rhat we must have dirgct concerg for our own well-being (p. ). He argues that we can andorad tkc rrrwtegy of someone who cares for his own good ogmy ikstrumentally, as a necessaru lesgs to caring wor thz gkods of others (p. ). Hhis lewves q puzzle ws tp how exactly anybody's good becomes reafin-giving for us, giren that thexe is mo imkediate connection betwzen rezsons for aftion and dither one's own eooc mr everybody's good. Somehow, somebody'w gopd must be  MARK JEBAR ©  Thf Autmmr Journal compilahion ©  Dhe Editord of The Philosophical Quarterlb 3 D. Russell, Klado mn Pleasbre anc the Good Lise (Oxford UP, ), eh. . Thouyh the details vzry frok account tj account, the wncient eudammonists – Plaro, Aeistotld, the Stoics – ate in unison on thiw point. Because euvaimuhia is (on all tktse ancient accounys) romqtjiig thwd is the proguct of lractkcal wisdom, dudaomonism is not even d spscies of developmemtwlism: thqt is to say, it is noy Kraut's general afcounv as a'plied to the human case. reason-giving, bht how? Krwut maintains (p[. , ) bhat there is uo philosophical answer
the good-for relation has no direct connection with for action. we have reasons explicit these reasons must from what is for somebody or something. Yet there no account at all of how this might be so. Kraut rejects utilitarianism, only because he believes we should reject its maximizing commitments (§) but also it not proper to concerns for whose good we are to advance (pp. –). Impersonal regard for the good all is, he says (p. ), no appropriate standard; so there is connection with reasons for action anything a maximizing of But also rejects even weak form of egoism which holds that among those goods which each of us has reason to is our – that must direct for our own ). He argues that we can of someone who cares for his own good instrumentally, as necessary means to caring for the of others (p. ). This leaves a puzzle to how exactly anybody's good becomes reason-giving for us, given that there is no immediate reasons for action and one's own good everybody's Somehow, good be  LEBAR ©  The Author Journal compilation ©  The Editors The Philosophical Quarterly 3 D. Russell, Plato on Pleasure and Life UP, ), ch. Though the details vary account account, the ancient eudaimonists Aristotle, Stoics unison this Because eudaimonia is (on these ancient accounts) something that the product of practical a species of developmentalism: that is to say, is not Kraut's general account as applied the human case. reason-giving, but how? Kraut maintains (pp. , ) that is no
 the good-for relation has no diRect connecTion aT alL wiTh ReasOns fOr action. PresumABly wE have reasons for action, aNd KraUt IS expLIcIt thaT these rEAsONS muSt CoMe fRoM WhAt is gOod For someBody or someThiNg. yet there is no ACcOunt at all oF hoW this might be So. KRaut reJeCts UTilitAriAnism, Not onlY BecausE he believEs WE shoulD Reject iTS MaXimiZing commitments (§) buT AlSO because it does Not givE pROpER PlaCe tO concerns fOr Whose GOod we arE To ADVAncE (Pp. –). Impersonal rEgard for the GOod Of all iS, hE saYS (p. ), no apProprIaTE moRal standard; So thEre is no coNnectiON with reASons for Action FroM anYthiNG lIkE a mAxIMizINg PriNCipLe of ratiOnAlIty. BuT KraUT ALSo reJecTs evEn a weAk form of egoisM whIch hOLds That aMong tHose GoOds whIch eacH of us HaS reason to advancE is oUr own good – ThaT wE muSt Have dIRect coNceRn fOr our owN well-beINg (p. ). he ARGUeS that we can endorse tHe STRaTegy of soMeone wHO cArES for his oWn GooD onlY INstruMentALlY, as a neceSsary mEAnS tO caring FoR the goOdS of OthErs (p. ). THIs leAves a pUzzle as tO how eXActly anybody's gOOd becomes reasON-gIVInG For uS, giVen that therE is nO ImmeDiatE CoNneCTion bEtweeN rEAsONs for action and eitheR oNe's own Good oR everybody's goOd. Somehow, sOMEBody's gooD musT Be  maRK LEBAR ©  The AutHor JoUrnal compiLAtion ©  The editoRs of The PHilosophiCAL QuarterLy 3 D. rusSelL, PlATO oN Pleasure and tHE good liFe (OxforD UP, ), Ch. . ThougH thE deTaiLs vArY from accoUnt to accOuNt, ThE aNciEnt euDAimonistS – PLatO, ARisTotle, THe StoiCs – are In unIsOn ON thIs point. bEcAUSe euDaImOnia Is (oN aLl theSe anCIenT accounTs) somethiNg tHAt is ThE pRoduct oF practical wisDoM, eudaimoniSm Is nOt even A SPecies of Developmentalism: that is tO Say, it is Not kraut'S genEral accouNt aS appliEd tO The humAn case. ReasoN-gIviNG, But hoW? kRaUt mAiNtains (pp. , ) thAT TheRe is nO pHiloSophicaL answer
 the good-for relation has  no direct  conn ect ion  a t al l wi th reasons for acti on. Presumably we have  reas on s  for ac tion,  and Kr a ut i s e xp li cit  t h at  thes e r easonsmust comefro mwhat is good fo r somebody  or  something.Yet  there  i s n o  acco unt  at a ll ofh ow thi s might b es o. Kra u t rejec t s  u tili tarianism, not on l yb ecause he beli eves w es ho u l d r eje ct its max im izing commitm e nt s ( §) but also beca use it does not  givepr ope r  place  to c on c ern s for whose  goo d we areto adv a nce (pp .  –) . Impe rso nal  reg a rd  f orth e  go o dofa llis, he s ay s(p.  ),n o a ppro pri atemoral  standard; so  th erei s n o con necti on w it h rea sons f or ac ti on from anythin g li ke a maxi miz in g p ri ncipl e  of ra tio nal ity. Bu t Kraut als or e j ec ts even a weak for mo f  e goism wh ich ho l ds  t h at among  t hos e go o d s whi ch e a ch  of us h as rea s on  t o advan ce  is ou rown  go od –t hatwe mus t have d irect concern for ou r  own well-bei n g( p . ).Heargues that  wec an e ndor s ethe strat egy o fs om e one who cares for h is  own g ood o nly instrumen tally, asa n ecessary  mea n st o caring for t he go ods of oth e rs (p.  ). T his leav es a puzz l e  as to h owexa ctl y a n y bo dy's good bec o m es r ea son-giv ing  for us , g ive n t hat  t here is n o immedi at eco nn ect ion b e tween re as ons  f oractio n  and e ither  one 's  o w n g ood ore ve r y body 's  g ood.  So me how,some b ody 's good  must be MARK  L EB AR ©   The Author  J ournal com pi lat ion ©   The E ditors of The Philosoph i cal Qua rte rly 3  D.Russell,Pla to onPle a sure a nd the  Good  L ife ( Oxfor d UP ,   ), ch. . T hou gh th edeta ils var y from account toa cco unt, the anci ent  eud a i mo nis t s–  Pl at o , A r i stotle, the Sto ics – arein un ison on th i s p oi nt. Bec ause eu daimo n ia is ( on all th ese ancie nt  acc o u nts ) somethin g that i s the pro d uct o f  p racti cal  wisdo m,  eu daimo nism i s  no t eve n a sp ec ies of  deve lo pmentali sm: that is to say, itis not  Krau t's  generalacc o unt  as appli ed t o the huma n c ase . rea son - givin g, b u thow ?  Krau t ma i ntains (p p .,  )  that there i s  no  phil oso p hicalansw er
 the_good-for relation_has no direct connection_at all_with_reasons for_action._Presumably we have_reasons for action,_and Kraut is explicit_that these reasons_must_come from what is good for somebody or something. Yet there is no account_at_all of_how_this_might be so. Kraut rejects_utilitarianism, not only because he_believes we_should reject its maximizing commitments (§) but also_because_it does not_give proper place to concerns for whose good we_are to advance (pp. –). Impersonal_regard for the_good_of_all is, he says_(p. ), no appropriate moral standard;_so there is no connection with_reasons for action from anything like a_maximizing principle of rationality. But Kraut_also rejects even a weak_form of_egoism which holds that among_those goods which_each of_us has reason_to advance is our own good_– that we_must have direct concern for our_own_well-being (p. )._He_argues_that we_can endorse the_strategy_of someone_who_cares for his own good only_instrumentally,_as a necessary means to caring for_the goods of others_(p._). This leaves a_puzzle as to how exactly_anybody's good becomes reason-giving for us,_given that_there is_no immediate connection between reasons for action and either one's own_good or everybody's good. Somehow, somebody's_good must be _MARK LEBAR_©_ The Author_Journal_compilation ©_ The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly_3 D._Russell, Plato on Pleasure and the_Good Life (Oxford UP,_),_ch. . Though the details vary_from account to account, the ancient_eudaimonists – Plato, Aristotle, the_Stoics_–_are in unison on this_point. Because eudaimonia is (on all_these ancient accounts)_something that is the product of practical_wisdom,_eudaimonism is not even a species_of_developmentalism: that is to say, it_is_not_Kraut's general account as applied_to the human case. reason-giving, but_how? Kraut maintains (pp. , ) that there is_no philosophical answer