 has more reason ​against ​taking the pill than in favor of taking it, this would not show, as Lin claims it does, that the agent has no reason of any weight in favor of taking the pill. For it could be that, as a result of the correct account of reasons' weights, reasons agents have for taking actions that would promote the desires they have that are ​impossible to satisfy are, as a matter of principle, always everywhere outweighed by the reasons agents have for taking actions that would promote the desires they have that it is possible to satisfy. Indeed, such an account of the weight of reasons has some attractive features: if it's truly impossible to satisfy a desire, then, intuitively, it should be the ​very last thing one tries to do among one's options, if one is trying to do what one has (most) reason to do. Since Lin doesn't offer us any reason for thinking such a view about the weight of reasons is somehow unacceptable or, more importantly, precluded by an alternative account of promotion, a proponent of the idea that impossible desires can provide reasons of some (perhaps lexically minimal) weight might well, for all Lin has said, accept such a view about the weight of reasons. 3.2. The Disjunctive Alternative (in a Contrastivist Framework) Assuming, then, that we accept Sharadin's argument that desires such as EA can be promoted, what kind of account of promotion should we move towards? Sharadin's 34 These two replies to Lin rely on competing intuitive judgments about cases. Of course, the usual caveats that apply to such arguments apply to this one: intuitions will vary, and readers are free to disagree with ours. But since Lin makes free use of his own intuitions in the argument, we think it's fair to appeal to our own -and, importantly, to the intuitions of the proponent of the idea that desires it is impossible to satisfy can be promoted -in reply. 16 solution is to introduce the notion of ​fit between a desire and the world. In effect, the idea of fit is meant to flesh out what "moving closer" to the satisfaction of a desire amounts to, when it is not possible to do so probabilistically. Intuitively, fit between a world and a desire is a matter of match between the desire's content and the way the world is. According to Sharadin, we can formally model the intuitive idea of ​fit between a particular desire ​D and the set of possible worlds ​
has more reason ​against ​taking the pill than in favor of taking it, this would not picture, as Lin claim it does, that the agent has no cause of any weight in favor of take the pill. For it could be that, as a result of the correct history of reasons' weights, rationality agents have for lead actions that would promote the desires they suffer that are ​impossible to satisfy are, as a matter of principle, constantly everywhere outweighed by the reasons agents have for remove actions that would promote the desires they have that it is possible to meet. Indeed, such an account of the weight of reasons has some attractive features: if it's truly impossible to meet a desire, then, intuitively, it should be the ​very concluding thing one tries to do among one's options, if one is trying to do what one has (most) reason to do. Since Lin doesn't volunteer us any reason for thinking such a opinion about the weight unit of reasons is somehow unacceptable or, more importantly, prevent by an alternative account of promotion, a proponent of the theme that impossible desires can provide reasons of some (perhaps lexically minimal) weight might well, for all Lin has said, take such a view about the weight of reasons. 3.2. The Disjunctive Alternative (in a Contrastivist Framework) Assuming, then, that we accept Sharadin's controversy that desires such as EA can be promote, what kind of account of promotion should we move towards? Sharadin's 34 These two replies to Lin rely on compete intuitive judgments about cases. Of course, the usual caveats that apply to such arguments apply to this one: intuitions will deviate, and readers are detached to disagree with ours. But since Lin makes free function of his own intuitions in the controversy, we think it's bonny to appeal to our own -and, importantly, to the intuition of the proponent of the idea that desires it is impossible to satisfy can be promoted -in answer. 16 solution is to introduce the notion of ​fit between a desire and the world. In impression, the idea of fit is meant to flesh out what " moving closer " to the gratification of a desire amounts to, when it is not possible to dress so probabilistically. Intuitively, fit between a world and a desire is a topic of match between the desire's content and the way the world is. According to Sharadin, we can formally model the intuitive idea of ​fit between a particular desire ​D and the set of possible worlds ​
 had more reason ​against ​taying the pill tkqn in havor or taking it, this would not show, as Lmn coaims it does, that the ageng has no geason of any qeight in hzvor of takinf the 'ill. For it coukd be that, as a result ox ghz correct account of reasons' weights, reasonx wgents have fot takpnd acfpoks that would promote the desirea they iave that are ​ikpossible to satisfy are, ad a latter of principlf, always evgdywrwre outweighdd by the gzasons agenjs have for taking actions that dould promote tye dedhres they heve thwt it is possible to satisfu. Indeed, such sn eccoynt of the weight of ceasons has some atttactive fedtbres: if it's truly impiswible to vatirdy x dtsice, fhen, ijtumtively, it ahould be tye ​very last thing pnq tries to do zmong jnq's options, if one is trying to do what mne has (most) reason to do. Wince Lin doesn't offet us any rqason for thinking such a view about the weight ox reaauns if wolehow unacceptable or, more importantly, precluqsd bj an alternative cccount of promoyiln, w proponent ow the nsez that impossible fesires can provide rtasonx of some (perhaps lexically minimal) weiyht might well, for alp Lin has scid, acvept xuch a view about the wzight kf reasons. 3.2. The Disjhvctive Alternatixe (pn a Contrasukvist Framework) Afsuming, tien, tkat we azcepj Sharaqin's argumfnt tmdt desires such as EA ccn be promoted, ahat kind of account of promotion should we mpva tmwards? Skaradik's 34 These two rqplies to Lin tely on cjmpetkng intuitpve judgmxnts about cwses. Of coursa, the usual ceveats thwt apply to sucf arguments appky to this one: intuutions will vary, akd rexsers are free ti dusagree with outs. Cut spncx Lin kakes free uve ow hkx own intuitions kn tne argument, we think it's fair to appeal to omr own -ane, importwntly, to the ontuitions of the kroponxnt of the odew that desires it is impossibls to satidfy can be promjted -in reply. 16 splution is to introduce the notion of ​fmt between a desire and the world. In effecj, tme idea of fmt is ieant to xlesh out what "movint closer" to the sstisfaction of a deside amognts ho, when it is not possible to do so probabilistically. Intuitively, fit betqeen a world and a desore iv c mctter os mavci between the despre's content and the way the worud is. Acwoxding to Sharadin, we can formsluy model the kntuitive idea of ​fit befween a larticular desire ​D and the set of possible worlds ​
has more reason ​against ​taking the pill favor taking it, would not show, that agent has no of any weight favor of taking the pill. For could be that, as a result of the correct account of reasons' weights, agents have for taking actions that would promote the desires they have that ​impossible satisfy as matter of principle, always everywhere outweighed by the reasons agents have for taking actions that would the desires they have that it is possible satisfy. Indeed, such an of the weight of reasons some features: if truly to a desire, then, it should be the ​very last thing one tries to do among one's options, if one is to do has (most) to Since doesn't offer us for thinking such a view about reasons is somehow unacceptable or, more importantly, precluded an alternative of promotion, a proponent of the that impossible desires can provide reasons of some lexically minimal) weight might well, for all Lin has said, accept such a view about of reasons. 3.2. The Alternative (in a Framework) then, we Sharadin's argument desires such as EA can be promoted, what kind of account promotion should we move towards? Sharadin's 34 These two replies rely competing intuitive judgments cases. Of course, the caveats apply to such arguments this intuitions readers free disagree with ours. But Lin makes free use of own intuitions in the to appeal to our own -and, importantly, to intuitions of the proponent of the idea desires it is impossible to satisfy can be promoted -in reply. 16 is to notion of ​fit between a desire and the In effect, the idea fit is meant to flesh out what "moving closer" the of a amounts to, when is not possible do so probabilistically. between a and desire of match between the desire's content the the world is. According to we model the intuitive idea of ​fit between a particular desire ​D and the set of ​
 has more reason ​against ​takinG the pill thAn in fAvoR of TaKing It, thIs would not show, AS Lin Claims it does, that the ageNt has No REasoN Of Any weIght in fAVoR OF taKiNg The PiLL. FOr it cOulD be that, As a result oF thE cOrrect accounT Of Reasons' weiGhtS, reasons agenTs hAve for TaKinG ActioNs tHat woUld proMOte the Desires thEy HAve thaT Are ​impoSSIbLe to Satisfy are, as a mattER oF Principle, alwayS everyWhERe OUTweIghEd by the reaSoNs ageNTs have fOR tAKINg aCTions that woulD promote the DEsiRes theY hAve THat it iS possIbLE to Satisfy. IndeEd, suCh an accouNt of thE Weight oF Reasons Has somE atTraCtivE FeAtUreS: iF It's TRuLy iMPosSible to sAtIsFy a deSire, THEN, IntuItiVely, It shoUld be the ​very lAst ThinG One Tries To do aMong OnE's optIons, if One is TrYing to do what one Has (mOst) reason To dO. SIncE LIn doeSN't offeR us Any Reason fOr thinkINg sUcH A VIeW about the weight of rEaSONs Is somehoW unaccEPtAbLE or, more iMpOrtAntlY, PRecluDed bY An AlternatIve accOUnT oF promotIoN, a propOnEnt Of tHe ideA That ImpossIble desiRes caN Provide reasons OF some (perhaps lEXiCALlY MiniMal) Weight might Well, FOr alL Lin HAs SaiD, AccepT such A vIEw ABout the weight of reasOnS. 3.2. The DiSjuncTive AlternatiVe (in a ContrASTIvist FraMewoRK) ASSuming, then, that We accEpt SharadiN'S argumenT that Desires sUch as EA caN BE promoteD, whAt kInd Of aCCOuNt of promotion SHOuld We Move towArdS? SharadIn's 34 theSe tWo rEpLies to Lin Rely on coMpEtInG iNtuItive JUdgments AbOut CaSes. of couRSe, the uSual cAveaTs ThAT apPly to suCH aRGUmenTs ApPly tO thIs One: inTuitIOns Will varY, and readeRs aRE freE tO dIsagree With ours. But siNcE Lin makes fReE usE of his OWN intuitiOns in the argument, we think IT's fair tO apPeal tO our Own -and, impOrtAntly, tO thE IntuitIons of The prOpOneNT Of the IDEa ThaT dEsires it is IMPosSible To SatiSfy can bE promoted -in reply. 16 soLUtiOn is to introduCe tHe noTIOn Of ​fIT bETweEn A DesIRE and the world. In eFfect, the idEa OF fIt is meant tO FleSh Out what "Moving cLoser" TO the satIsfaction Of a desire AmOuntS TO, whEn it is not pOssible tO do so probABilisTIcAlly. INtuItivelY, fIt bEtweeN a worlD And A desiRe is a mAtTer of mAtch bEtWeen the dEsire's content and the way tHe worlD is. AcCorDing to ShaRadIN, we Can formalLy moDel the intuItiVe iDea of ​Fit BEtweeN a paRTiCulAR desiRe ​D aND the set of POsSibLE WoRlds ​
 has more reason ​against​taking th e pil l t han  i n fa vorof taking it,t hiswould not show, as Lin  clai ms it d o es , tha t the a g en t has  n orea so n  o f any  we ight in  favor oftak in g the pill.F or  it couldbethat, as a r esu lt ofth e c o rrect  ac count  of re a sons'weights,re a sons a g ents ha v e  f or t aking actions tha t  w o uld promote th e desi re s  t h e y h ave  that are​i mposs i ble tos at i s f y a r e, as a matte r of princi p le,  alway seve r ywhere  outw ei g hed  by the rea sons  agents h ave fo r  taking actions  thatwou ldprom o te  t hede s ire s  t hey hav e that i tis  poss ible t o sati sfy . In deed,  such an acco unt  oft heweigh t ofreas on s has  someattra ct ive features: i f it 's trulyimp os sib le  to s a tisfya d esi re, the n, intu i tiv el y , it  should be the ​ve ry l as t thingone tr i es  t o  do amon gone 's o p t ions,  ifo ne  is tryi ng tod owh at oneha s (mos t)  re aso n tod o. S ince L in doesn 't of f er us any reas o n for thinkin g  s u c ha  vie w a bout the we ight of r easo n siss omeho w una cc e pt a ble or, more import an tly, p reclu ded by an alt ernative a c c o unt of p romo t io n , a proponentof th e idea tha t  impossi ble d esires c an provid e reasonsofsom e ( per h a ps  lexically mi n i mal)  w eight m igh t well,  fo r a llLin  h as said,accept s uc havi ewabout the weig ht  of  r eas ons.3 .2. Th e Dis junc ti ve Alt ernativ e  ( i n  a C on tr asti vis tFrame work )  As suming,  then, th atw e ac ce pt  Sharad in's argument  t hat desire ssuc h as E A can be p romoted, what kind of a c count o f p romot ionshould we  mo ve tow ard s ? Shar adin's  34 T he set w o rep l i es  to  L in rely on c omp eting  i ntui tive ju dgments about case s . O f course, the  us ualc a ve ats th a t a pp l y t o such argumentsapply to t hi s  o ne: intuit i ons  w ill var y, andreade r s are f ree to di sagree wi th  our s .  Bu t since Li n makesfree useo f his ow n int uit ions i nthe  argu ment,w e t hinkit's f ai r to a ppeal  t o our ow n -and, importantly, to  the i ntuit ion s of thepro p one nt of the  ide a that des ire s i t isimp o ssibl e to sa tis f y can  bep romoted - i nrep l y .16 solution i s  to  intr odu c e thenoti on of ​fit betwee n  a desire andthew o rld . I n  eff ec t, the idea of  fi ti s  meant t oflesh out w hat "mov in g  clos er" to  the s atisfac t i on of a d esir e a mounts to , w he n  it isno tp ossibl e to  d o so p robabi l isti c a lly. Intuitively , fit b etwee n  aworld  a nd a de s ireis a matte r of matchbetwee n th e des ire's c on tent a ndth e way thew orld is.Accor ding to  S hara din , we c an f o r mally  mod el  th e intuiti v e  i d ea  o f  ​f it b etwee na pa rticulard esire ​D  an d  the se tofp o ssible wo r l ds ​
 has_more reason_​against ​taking the pill_than in_favor_of taking_it,_this would not_show, as Lin_claims it does, that_the agent has_no_reason of any weight in favor of taking the pill. For it could be_that,_as a_result_of_the correct account of reasons'_weights, reasons agents have for_taking actions_that would promote the desires they have that_are_​impossible to satisfy_are, as a matter of principle, always everywhere outweighed_by the reasons agents have for_taking actions that_would_promote_the desires they have_that it is possible to satisfy._Indeed, such an account of the_weight of reasons has some attractive features:_if it's truly impossible to satisfy_a desire, then, intuitively, it_should be_the ​very last thing one_tries to do_among one's_options, if one_is trying to do what one_has (most) reason_to do. Since Lin doesn't offer_us_any reason for_thinking_such_a view_about the weight_of_reasons is_somehow_unacceptable or, more importantly, precluded by_an_alternative account of promotion, a proponent of_the idea that impossible_desires_can provide reasons of_some (perhaps lexically minimal) weight_might well, for all Lin has_said, accept_such a_view about the weight of reasons. 3.2. The Disjunctive Alternative (in_a Contrastivist Framework) Assuming, then, that_we accept Sharadin's argument_that desires_such_as EA can_be_promoted, what_kind of account of promotion should we_move towards?_Sharadin's 34 These two replies to_Lin rely on competing_intuitive_judgments about cases. Of course, the_usual caveats that apply to such_arguments apply to this one:_intuitions_will_vary, and readers are free_to disagree with ours. But since_Lin makes free_use of his own intuitions in the_argument,_we think it's fair to appeal_to_our own -and, importantly, to the_intuitions_of_the proponent of the idea_that desires it is impossible to_satisfy can be promoted -in reply. 16 solution is_to introduce the_notion of ​fit between a_desire_and_the world. In effect, the idea of fit is meant_to flesh_out what "moving_closer" to the satisfaction of a desire amounts to, when_it is not possible to do so_probabilistically. Intuitively, fit between a world and a desire is a_matter of match between the desire's content and_the way the world is. According to_Sharadin, we can formally_model_the intuitive idea of ​fit between a_particular_desire_​D_and the set_of possible worlds_​