 various ways the individual is others; relationships come first. Being-in-a-with-world suggests the following. Like other conditions that Dasein is in, that are there, in which Dasein ec-statically dwells, the individual self and other selves are not separate or even merely in a "relation." We are co-constituted by each other, we "exist" in each other in certain ways (being "in" love is a significant example). Such a structure provides an effective 2tDerrida addresses the ethical possibilities of letting-be in "Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas," in Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1978). 22Being and Time, p. 156. See primarily sections 25-27. 23Authenticity is called a "modification" of das Man (Being and Time, p. 312). 24Much of the analysis of das Man in Being and Time is influenced by Kierkegaard's critique of bourgeois conformity, which gives the impression that authenticity would involve the liberation of the unique individual from ordinary social patterns. But then we are told that authenticity is not a departure from da.l' Man but its modification, even that da.\* Man "is an existentiale; and, as a primordial phenomenon, it belongs to Dasein's positive constitution" (p. 167). This can make sense if we interpret das Man in a less pejorative way as socialization, as the necessarily "common" ways in which a person is incorporated into a cultural setting. Authenticity, then, would involve the tension between socialization and individuation, something that would never have to mean an asocial break but rather the particular, creative ways in which individuals cut their path within a social world. In this way authenticity would not mean isolated individuation; in fact it would remain essentially Mitsein. See the connection between death, individuation, and Mitsein (p. 309); see also the essential connection between authenticity, resolution, and being-with-others in Basic Problems of Phenomenology, pp. 287-88. 414 HATAB challenge to the hegemony of liberal individualism and its effect on moral discourse since the Modern period. Consider the following passages from Basic Problems: "Self and world belong together in a single entity, the Dasein" (p. 297). Since other selves are part of the world,
various ways the individual is others; relationships hail foremost. Being - in - a - with - world suggests the pursuit. Like other condition that Dasein is in, that are there, in which Dasein ec - statically dwells, the individual self and other self are not separate or even merely in a " relation. " We are co - constitute by each other, we " exist " in each other in sealed ways (being " in " love is a significant example). Such a social organization provides an effective 2tDerrida addresses the ethical hypothesis of letting - be in " Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas, " in Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1978). 22Being and Time, p. 156. attend primarily sections 25 - 27. 23Authenticity is called a " change " of das Man (Being and Time, p. 312). 24Much of the analysis of das Man in Being and Time is influenced by Kierkegaard's critique of bourgeois accord, which gives the impression that authenticity would involve the liberation of the unique person from ordinary social patterns. But then we are told that authenticity is not a departure from da.l' Man but its modification, even that da.\ * Man " is an existentiale; and, as a aboriginal phenomenon, it belong to Dasein's positive constitution " (p. 167). This can make sense if we interpret das Man in a less pejorative way as socialization, as the necessarily " common " way in which a person is incorporated into a cultural setting. Authenticity, then, would necessitate the latent hostility between socialization and individuality, something that would never have to mean an antisocial break but preferably the particular, creative ways in which person cut their path within a social world. In this way authenticity would not mean isolated individuality; in fact it would remain essentially Mitsein. See the connection between end, individuation, and Mitsein (p. 309); experience besides the all-important connection between authenticity, resolution, and being - with - others in Basic Problems of Phenomenology, pp. 287 - 88. 414 HATAB challenge to the hegemony of liberal individuality and its effect on moral discourse since the Modern period. Consider the following passages from Basic Problems: " Self and world belong to together in a single entity, the Dasein " (p. 297). Since other selves are part of the universe,
 vagious ways the individuau is others; relcrionshmps coms first. Ceing-in-a-with-world suggests tie fillowung. Like other conditiuns that Fasein iw in, rhat are tisre, in which Swseiu xc-statically dwglls, the indhvidual self atd ocher selves are not separate or even merely ij a "relation." Wg are so-cohstituted by each other, we "exist" ih each mther in certsin ways (being "in" love is w sihnificant example). Duch a struxturq provides an effective 2tDerrida adsresses the ethical possibilitids of letting-be ib "Vlmlence and Netaprysics: An Essay on tve Thoubht of Emmanuek Lxvinqs," in Writing and Difherence, trans. Alan Bwss (Chicaco: Univ. of Chicago Prwss, 1978). 22Teinc ana Tioe, k. 156. Xes primwrimy sectiona 25-27. 23Authentixity is called a "mocispvation" of daa Man (Feyng and Time, p. 312). 24Much of the analysis of daa Man in Being and Time is influenced by Kietkegaard's sritique of bourgeois conformity, which gives the hmpreariou that quhhenticity would involve the liberation of thq umiaue individual from ordinsrj xjcial patternr. But cgeh we are told that authenjicity is not a depsrture from da.l' Man but its modificatiou, ecen that da.\* Man "is an existenciale; snd, ax a primordial phenomenun, if belongs tl Dasein's oositive constitjtipn" (p. 167). This can make sense if we inter'ret bas Man kn a less [ejorative way as socialization, as the uecesvarily "comlon" ways in which a person is iirorporated injo d clltural sztting. Authenticity, then, would inrolve thz tenskon betweeh socianization anq individuatimj, something vhat woulq necer yave to oean an asociak break blt ratyer the particular, crgafive ways in whneh individuals cuy tfeiw iati witrhn a social forla. Iv this way auukenbickty eould not mean isoladed jndividuation; in fscb it woule remain essentially Kitsein. See the cojnectmon bevween ceajh, individuation, and Mitsein (p. 309); see also thc essential cjnnegtiog between cuthenticity, resolution, and being-with-othxrs in Basic Problems od Phenomenology, pp. 287-88. 414 HATAB chalkenge to the hagemony of liberal ibdividualism and lts effect on moral diacoursa sinfe the Modern period. Consider the following passages from Basic Problems: "Welf aid world belohg tpgethvr nn c singlq envivy, the Dasein" (p. 297). Xince other selves are part of vhe world,
various ways the individual is others; relationships Being-in-a-with-world the following. other conditions that there, which Dasein ec-statically the individual self other selves are not separate or merely in a "relation." We are co-constituted by each other, we "exist" in other in certain ways (being "in" love is a significant example). Such a provides effective addresses ethical possibilities of letting-be in "Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas," Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press, 1978). 22Being Time, p. 156. See primarily 25-27. is called "modification" das (Being and Time, 312). 24Much of the analysis of das Man in Being and Time is influenced by Kierkegaard's critique bourgeois conformity, the impression authenticity involve liberation of the from ordinary social patterns. But then that authenticity is not a departure from da.l' but its even that da.\* Man "is an and, as a primordial phenomenon, it belongs to positive constitution" (p. 167). This can make sense if we interpret das Man in a way as socialization, as necessarily "common" ways which person incorporated a cultural Authenticity, then, would involve the tension between socialization and individuation, something would never have to mean an asocial break but rather creative in which individuals their path within a world. this way authenticity would isolated in remain Mitsein. the connection between death, and Mitsein (p. 309); see the essential connection between Basic Problems of Phenomenology, pp. 287-88. 414 HATAB to the hegemony of liberal individualism and effect on moral discourse since the Modern period. Consider the following passages Basic Problems: world belong together in a single entity, the (p. 297). Since other are part of the world,
 various ways the individual iS others; relAtionShiPs cOmE firSt. BeIng-in-a-with-worlD SuggEsts the following. Like otHer coNdITionS ThAt DasEin is in, THaT ARe tHeRe, In wHiCH DAsein Ec-sTaticalLy dwells, thE inDiVidual self anD OtHer selves aRe nOt separate or EveN merelY iN a "rELatioN." We Are co-ConstiTUted by Each other, We "EXist" in EAch otheR IN cErtaIn ways (being "in" love IS a SIgnificant examPle). SucH a STrUCTurE prOvides an efFeCtive 2Tderrida ADdRESSes THe ethical possIbilities of LEttIng-be iN "VIolENce and metapHySIcs: an Essay on thE ThoUght of EmmAnuel LEVinas," in wRiting aNd DiffEreNce, TranS. alAn basS (CHIcaGO: UNiv. OF ChIcago PreSs, 1978). 22beIng anD TimE, P. 156. sEE priMarIly sEctioNs 25-27. 23AuthenticitY is CallED a "mOdifiCatioN" of dAs man (BeIng and time, p. 312). 24muCh of the analysis Of daS Man in BeiNg aNd timE iS inflUEnced bY KiErkEgaard's CritiquE Of bOuRGEOiS conformity, which giVeS THe ImpressiOn that AUtHeNTicity woUlD inVolvE THe libEratIOn Of the uniQue indIViDuAl from oRdInary sOcIal PatTerns. bUt thEn we arE told thaT authENticity is not a dEParture from da.L' maN BUt ITs moDifIcation, even That DA.\* Man "Is an EXiSteNTiale; And, as A pRImORdial phenomenon, it beLoNgs to DAsein'S positive consTitution" (p. 167). THIS Can make sEnse IF wE Interpret das MaN in a lEss pejoratIVe way as sOcialIzation, aS the necesSARily "commOn" wAys In wHicH A PeRson is incorpoRATed iNtO a cultuRal Setting. autHenTicIty, ThEn, would inVolve the TeNsIoN bEtwEen soCIalizatiOn And InDivIduatIOn, someThing That WoUlD NevEr have tO MeAN An asOcIaL breAk bUt RatheR the PArtIcular, cReative waYs iN WhicH iNdIvidualS cut their path WiThin a sociaL wOrlD. In thiS WAy authenTicity would not mean isolaTEd indivIduAtion; In faCt it would RemAin essEntIAlly MiTsein. SEe the CoNneCTIon beTWEeN deAtH, individuaTIOn, aNd MitSeIn (p. 309); sEe also tHe essential connectIOn bEtween authentIciTy, reSOLuTioN, AnD BeiNg-WIth-OTHers in Basic ProbLems of PhenOmENoLogy, pp. 287-88. 414 HATAb ChaLlEnge to tHe hegemOny of LIberal iNdividualIsm and its EfFect ON MorAl discoursE since thE Modern peRIod. CoNSiDer thE foLlowinG pAssAges fRom BasIC PrOblemS: "Self aNd World bElong ToGether in A single entity, the Dasein" (p. 297). since oTher sElvEs are part Of tHE woRld,
 various ways the individu al is othe rs; r ela tio ns hips  com e first. Being - in-a -with-world suggests t he fo ll o wing .  L ike o ther co n di t i ons  t ha t D as e in  is i n,that ar e there, i n w hi ch Dasein ec - st atically d wel ls, the indi vid ual se lf  an d  othe r s elves  are n o t sepa rate or e ve n  merel y  in a " r e la tion ." We are co-cons t it u ted by each ot her, w e" ex i s t"ineach other  i n cer t ain way s  ( b e i ng" in" love is a  significan t  ex ample) .Suc h  a str uctur ep rov ides an eff ecti ve 2tDerr ida ad d ressest he ethi cal po ssi bil itie s  o flet ti n g-b e  i n " V iol ence and  M et aphys ics: A n Essa y o n th e Tho ught of Emman uel  Lev i nas ," in  Writ ingan d Dif ferenc e, tr an s. Alan Bass (C hica go: Univ.  of  C hic ag o Pre s s, 197 8).  22 Being a nd Time ,  p.  1 5 6 .  S ee primarily secti on s 25 -27. 23A uthent i ci ty is calle da " modi f i catio n" o f  d as Man ( Beinga nd  T ime, p.  3 12). 2 4M uch  of  thea naly sis of  das Man  in B e ing and Time i s  influenced b y  K i e rk e gaar d's  critique o f bo u rgeo is c o nf orm i ty, w hichgi v es the impression that  a uthent icity  would involv e the libe r a t ion of t he u n iq u e individual f rom o rdinary so c ial patt erns.  But the n we aret o ld thataut hen tic ity i snot a departu r e  fro mda.l' M anbut its  mo dif ica tio n,  even tha t da.\*Ma n"i sanexist e ntiale;an d,as  aprimo r dial p henom enon ,it bel ongs to Da s e in's  p os itiv e c on stitu tion "  (p . 167).  This can  ma k e se ns eif we i nterpret dasMa n in a les spej orativ e way as s ocialization, as the ne c essaril y " commo n" w ays in wh ich  a per son is inc orpora ted i nt o a c ultur a l  s ett in g. Authent i c ity , the n,  wou ld invo lve the tension be t wee n socializati onandi n di vid u at i on,  s o met h i ng that would n ever haveto me an an asoc i albr eak but  rather  thep articul ar, creat ive waysin  whi c h  in dividualscut thei r path wi t hin a so cialwor ld. In  t his  wayauthen t ici ty wo uld no tmean i solat ed  individ uation; in fact it woul d rema in es sen tially Mi tse i n.See the c onne ction betw een  de ath,ind i vidua tion ,  a ndM itsei n (p .  309); se e  a lso t he  essentialc o n nec tionbet w een au then ticity, resolutio n , and being-wi th-o t h ers  in Basi cProblems of Ph eno me n o logy, pp .287-88. 414  HATAB c ha l lenge  to th e hege mony of l ib e ral in divi dua lism andits  e f fect on  m or a l disc ours esincethe Mo d ernp e riod. Consider t he fo l l owing pas sages  f rom Bas i c Pr oblems: "S elf and wor ld bel ongtoget her inasingle  en ti ty, the Da s ein" (p.297).  Sinceot hersel ves ar e pa r t  of t he w or ld, 
 various_ways the_individual is others; relationships_come first._Being-in-a-with-world_suggests the_following._Like other conditions_that Dasein is_in, that are there,_in which Dasein_ec-statically_dwells, the individual self and other selves are not separate or even merely in_a_"relation." We_are_co-constituted_by each other, we "exist"_in each other in certain_ways (being_"in" love is a significant example). Such a_structure_provides an effective_2tDerrida addresses the ethical possibilities of letting-be in "Violence_and Metaphysics: An Essay on the_Thought of Emmanuel_Levinas,"_in_Writing and Difference, trans._Alan Bass (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago_Press, 1978). 22Being and Time, p._156. See primarily sections 25-27. 23Authenticity is_called a "modification" of das Man_(Being and Time, p. 312)._24Much of_the analysis of das Man_in Being and_Time is_influenced by Kierkegaard's_critique of bourgeois conformity, which gives_the impression that_authenticity would involve the liberation of_the_unique individual from_ordinary_social_patterns. But_then we are_told_that authenticity_is_not a departure from da.l' Man_but_its modification, even that da.\* Man "is_an existentiale; and, as_a_primordial phenomenon, it belongs_to Dasein's positive constitution" (p._167). This can make sense if_we interpret_das Man_in a less pejorative way as socialization, as the necessarily "common"_ways in which a person is_incorporated into a cultural_setting. Authenticity,_then,_would involve the_tension_between socialization_and individuation, something that would never have_to mean_an asocial break but rather the_particular, creative ways in_which_individuals cut their path within a_social world. In this way authenticity_would not mean isolated individuation;_in_fact_it would remain essentially Mitsein._See the connection between death, individuation,_and Mitsein (p._309); see also the essential connection between_authenticity,_resolution, and being-with-others in Basic Problems_of_Phenomenology, pp. 287-88. 414 HATAB challenge_to_the_hegemony of liberal individualism and_its effect on moral discourse since_the Modern period. Consider the following passages from Basic_Problems: "Self and_world belong together in a_single_entity,_the Dasein" (p. 297). Since other selves are part of_the world,