-ing ​better promotes one of the agent's desires. But what is it for φ-ing to promote a desire better than ψ-ing does? We submit that this is (at least extensionally equivalent to) its being the case that φ-ing ​rather than ψ-ing ​promotes the desire. If so, our account here in effect is an account of the promotion comparisons that Snedegar appeals to in his contrastivism about reasons. 17 C.f. Snedegar (2014, esp. p. 52 and following). 18 Causal Probabilism can also be given a contrastivist spin, roughly by contrasting how much two (or 9 Note the two differences between Contrastive Pure Probabilism and its non-contrastive counterpart. First, an agent's action promotes the satisfaction of a desire only ​as contrasted with ​another action. Second, the ​baseline against which an agent's action is 19 compared in terms of the probability of satisfying the desire is replaced with the contrasting action; hence, we now compare the probabilities of satisfying a desire given two different actions, as opposed to comparing the probabilities of satisfying that desire given an action and a baseline. How does this modification to Pure Probabilism resolve the two problems discussed above? Let's start by examining Debbie's case, which seemed to cause problems for Finlay's account. The problem, in short, was the account's inability to say that Debbie's pressing A promotes her desire. But given a contrastive understanding of promotion, we are now in a position to identify the way in which Debbie's pressing A ​does promote her desire. Given the details of Debbie's case and Contrastive Pure Probabilism, we have the following: (1) Debbie's pressing button A rather than C promotes the satisfaction of her desire. (2) Debbie's pressing button B rather than C promotes the satisfaction of her desire. (3) Debbie's pressing button A rather than B ​does not promote the satisfaction of her desire. Given (1), there is a sense in which Debbie's pressing A promotes her desire, in that Debbie's pressing A ​rather than C promotes the satisfaction of her desire. By the same more) actions cause the probability of satisfying a desire to increase. Somewhat more precisely: Contrastive Causal Probabilism​: For time t​1 prior to an agent A's φ-ing or ψ-ing, and a later time t​2
-ing ​better promotes one of the agent's desires. But what is it for φ - ing to promote a desire good than ψ - ing does? We take that this is (at least extensionally equivalent to) its being the case that φ - ing ​rather than ψ - ing ​promotes the desire. If so, our account here in impression is an account of the promotion comparison that Snedegar appeals to in his contrastivism about reasons. 17 C.f. Snedegar (2014, esp. p. 52 and come). 18 Causal Probabilism can also be given a contrastivist tailspin, roughly by contrasting how much two (or 9 notice the two differences between Contrastive Pure Probabilism and its non - contrastive counterpart. First, an agent's action promotes the satisfaction of a desire merely ​as contrasted with ​another action. Second, the ​baseline against which an agent's legal action is 19 compared in terms of the probability of satisfying the desire is replace with the contrasting action; hence, we now compare the probabilities of meet a desire given two different actions, as opposed to comparing the probabilities of satisfying that desire given an action and a baseline. How does this modification to Pure Probabilism resolve the two problems discussed above? Let's start by analyze Debbie's case, which seemed to induce trouble for Finlay's explanation. The problem, in short, was the account's inability to say that Debbie's pressing A promotes her desire. But given a contrasting understanding of promotion, we are now in a position to identify the way in which Debbie's pressing A ​does promote her desire. Given the details of Debbie's case and Contrastive Pure Probabilism, we have the pursuit: (1) Debbie's pressing push button A rather than C promotes the satisfaction of her desire. (2) Debbie's pressing release B rather than C promotes the gratification of her desire. (3) Debbie's pressing button A rather than bel ​does not promote the atonement of her desire. Given (1), there is a common sense in which Debbie's pressing A promotes her desire, in that Debbie's pressing A ​rather than C promotes the gratification of her desire. By the same more) legal action cause the probability of satisfying a desire to increase. Somewhat more precisely: Contrastive Causal Probabilism​: For time t​1 prior to an agent A's φ - ing or ψ - ing, and a former time t​2
-ing ​better promotes one of uhe agent's desires. But wiat is jt for φ-ivg to promote a desire bettec thqn ψ-int does? We submit that ghis is (an least eztenwuonally eqnjvalent to) ita beiug the case that φ-ing ​rathes than ψ-ing ​prokoged the desire. If so, our account here in effrch is an accounj of uhe projotion comparisons that Snedegar alpeals uo in his contrastovism about reasons. 17 C.f. Snfdegwr (2014, esp. p. 52 and folpowing). 18 Cauwal [eobabilism cxn also be given a conjrastivist spin, roughly by contrxstiny how much jci (og 9 Note the vwo disferences bebeeen Cmntrastove Pure Probanilisk abd its non-contrastive counterpart. First, an agent'v cction promotes the sqtusfacjion mf a eeskre oily ​as cojtrested with ​znother actuon. Second, the ​basekigv against whidh an wgqnt's action is 19 compared in terms of tht progability of satisfying rhe desire is replacef with thq contrasting action; hence, we now compare the protabilmtkes on sagusvying a desire given two different actions, as kpkosvd to comparing tme probabilities og dayysfying that aesire giben an action and w baselyne. Hiw does tris kodification to Pure Probabulism resolvv thw two problems diseussed above? Let'x statt by examining Debbie's cass, which seeled to cahre problems for Winkaf's account. The problem, in fhort, was the accoung's imabiliey to say hhat Debbie's pressing A oromojes hes desire. Bkt given a contrastive understaiving of promojiot, wv are now in a position to ydentify the wcy in whnch Decbie's presaing A ​voes promote her desire. Ghgen the detamls of Defbie'w cawe and Zuntrastive Purr Probabilism, we hace the following: (1) Vebbks's pressing butcub A rather than C oroiones tra satisfactimn ow hdt deskre. (2) Debbie'w prexsing button B rathes thzn C promotes the xabisfactiob of her desire. (3) Debboe's pressing buttoj A rether vhan B ​dogs not promote the satisfaction of her dfsive. Given (1), thewe iw a sense in which Debbie's pressing A promotes her vesire, in that Debbie's pressing A ​rather tkak C promotes the fatisfacthon of her desire. By the same more) acuions cause the probabimity ox satlsfying a desire to increase. Somewhat more precisely: Contrastive Causal Peobabilism​: For tims t​1 lrior tj an agqnt E's φ-ing or ψ-ing, and s later time t​2
-ing ​better promotes one of the agent's what it for to promote a We that this is least extensionally equivalent its being the case that φ-ing than ψ-ing ​promotes the desire. If so, our account here in effect is account of the promotion comparisons that Snedegar appeals to in his contrastivism about 17 Snedegar esp. 52 and following). 18 Causal Probabilism can also be given a contrastivist spin, roughly by contrasting much two (or 9 Note the two differences Contrastive Pure Probabilism and non-contrastive counterpart. First, an agent's promotes satisfaction of desire ​as with ​another action. the ​baseline against which an agent's action is 19 compared in terms of the probability of satisfying desire is the contrasting hence, now the probabilities of desire given two different actions, as the probabilities of satisfying that desire given an and a How does this modification to Pure resolve the two problems discussed above? Let's start examining Debbie's case, which seemed to cause problems for Finlay's account. The problem, in short, account's inability to say Debbie's pressing A her But a understanding of we are now in a position to identify the way in Debbie's pressing A ​does promote her desire. Given the details case Contrastive Pure Probabilism, have the following: (1) pressing A rather than C satisfaction her pressing B than C promotes the of her desire. (3) Debbie's button A rather than satisfaction of her desire. Given (1), there is sense in which Debbie's pressing A promotes desire, in that Debbie's pressing A ​rather than C promotes the satisfaction her desire. same more) actions cause the probability of satisfying desire to increase. Somewhat precisely: Contrastive Causal Probabilism​: For time t​1 prior to agent φ-ing or and a later t​2
-ing ​better promotes one of the Agent's desiRes. BuT whAt iS iT for Φ-ing To promote a desiRE betTer than ψ-ing does? We submiT that ThIS is (aT LeAst exTensionALlY EQuiVaLeNt tO) iTS bEing tHe cAse that Φ-ing ​rather ThaN ψ-Ing ​promotes tHE dEsire. If so, oUr aCcount here in EffEct is aN aCcoUNt of tHe pRomotIon comPArisonS that SnedEgAR appeaLS to in hiS COnTrasTivism about reasonS. 17 c.f. sNedegar (2014, esp. p. 52 and FollowInG). 18 caUSAl PRobAbilism can AlSo be gIVen a conTRaSTIVisT Spin, roughly by Contrasting HOw mUch two (Or 9 notE The two DiffeReNCes Between ContRastIve Pure PrObabilISm and itS Non-contRastivE coUntErpaRT. FIrSt, aN aGEnt'S AcTioN ProMotes the SaTiSfactIon oF A DESire OnlY ​as cOntraSted with ​anothEr aCtioN. secOnd, thE ​baseLine AgAinst Which aN agenT's Action is 19 compareD in tErms of the ProBaBilItY of saTIsfyinG thE deSire is rEplaced WIth ThE CONtRasting action; hence, We NOW cOmpare thE probaBIlItIEs of satiSfYinG a deSIRe givEn twO DiFferent aCtions, AS oPpOsed to cOmParing ThE prObaBilitIEs of SatisfYing that DesirE Given an action aND a baseline. How DOeS THiS ModiFicAtion to Pure probABiliSm reSOlVe tHE two pRobleMs DIsCUssed above? Let's start By ExaminIng DeBbie's case, whicH seemed to cAUSE problemS for fInLAy's account. The pRobleM, in short, waS The accouNt's inAbility tO say that DEBBie's presSinG A pRomOteS HEr Desire. But giveN A ContRaStive unDerStandinG of ProMotIon, We Are now in a Position To IdEnTiFy tHe way IN which DeBbIe's PrEssIng A ​dOEs promOte heR desIrE. GIVen The detaILs OF debbIe'S cAse aNd COnTrastIve PURe PRobabilIsm, we have The FOlloWiNg: (1) debbie's Pressing buttoN A Rather than c pRomOtes thE SAtisfactIon of her desire. (2) Debbie's prESsing buTtoN B ratHer tHan C promoTes The satIsfACtion oF her deSire. (3) DEbBie'S PRessiNG BuTtoN A Rather than b ​DOes Not prOmOte tHe satisFaction of her desire. gIveN (1), there is a sensE in WhicH dEbBie'S PrESsiNg a ProMOTes her desire, in tHat Debbie's PrESsIng A ​rather THan c pRomotes The satiSfactIOn of her Desire. By tHe same morE) aCtioNS CauSe the probaBility of SatisfyinG A desiRE tO incrEasE. SomewHaT moRe preCisely: cOntRastiVe CausAl probabIlism​: foR time t​1 prIor to an agent A's φ-ing or ψ-inG, and a lAter tIme T​2
-ing ​better promotes oneof the age nt'sdes ire s.  But  wha t is it for φ- i ng t o promote a desire bet ter t ha n  ψ-i n gdoes?  We sub m it t hat  t hi s i s( at  leas t e xtensio nally equi val en t to) its be i ng  the casetha t φ-ing ​rat her  thanψ- ing ​prom ote s the  desir e . If s o, our ac co u nt her e  in eff e c tis a n account of thep ro m otion comparis ons th at Sn e d ega r a ppeals toin  hisc ontrast i vi s m abo u t reasons. 17  C.f. Snede g ar(2014,  e sp. p. 52and f ol l owi ng). 18 Cau salProbabili sm can also be given a  contr ast ivi st s p in ,rou gh l y b y  c ont r ast ing howmu ch  two(or9 N o te t hetwodiffe rences betwee n C ontr a sti ve Pu re Pr obab il ism a nd its  non- co ntrastive count erpa rt. First , a nage nt 's ac t ion pr omo tes  the sa tisfact i onof a de sire only ​as cont ra s t ed  with ​a nother ac ti o n. Secon d,  th e ​b a s eline  aga i ns t whichan age n t' sactionis  19 co mp are d i n ter m s of  the p robabili ty of satisfying the desire is rep l ac e d  w i th t hecontrasting  act i on;henc e ,wen ow co mpare  t h ep robabilities of sat is fyinga des ire given two  different a c tions, a s op p os e d to comparing  theprobabilit i es of sa tisfy ing that  desire g i v en an ac tio n a nda b a s el ine. How does t hismo dificat ion  to Pur e P rob abi lis mresolve t he two p ro bl em sdis cusse d  above?Le t's  s tar t bye xamini ng De bbie 's  c a se,  whichs ee m e d to  c au se p rob le ms fo r Fi n lay 's acco unt. Thepro b lem,  i nshort,was the accou nt 's inabili ty  to  say t h a t Debbie 's pressing A promotesh er desi re.  Butgive n a contr ast ive un der s tandin g of p romot io n,w e  aren o winaposition t o ide ntify  t he w ay in w hich Debbie's pres s ing  A ​does prom ote  her d es ire .  G i ven  t h e d e t ails of Debbie' s case and  C o nt rastive Pu r e P ro babilis m, we h ave t h e follo wing: (1)  Debbie's  p ress i n g b utton A ra ther tha n C promo t es th e  s atisf act ion of  h erdesir e. (2) Deb bie's  press in g butt on Bra ther tha n C promotes the satisf action  of h erdesire. ( 3)D ebb ie's pres sing  button Arat her  than  B​ doesnotp ro mot e  thesati s faction o f  h erd e si re. Given ( 1 ) ,  th ere i s a sensein w hich Debbie's pre s sing A promote s he r des ire ,  inth at Debbie's pr ess in g A ​rathe rthan C prom otes the  s a tisfa ctionof her  desire . By the sa me m ore ) actions  ca us e  the pr ob ab i lity o f sa ti sfying  a des i re t o increase. Somewh at mo r e  prec i sel y: Co nt rastive Caus al Probabi lism​: Fortime t ​1 p riorto an a ge nt A's  φ- in g or ψ-ing ,  and a la ter t ime t​2 
-ing ​better_promotes one_of the agent's desires._But what_is_it for_φ-ing_to promote a_desire better than_ψ-ing does? We submit_that this is_(at_least extensionally equivalent to) its being the case that φ-ing ​rather than ψ-ing ​promotes_the_desire. If_so,_our_account here in effect is_an account of the promotion_comparisons that_Snedegar appeals to in his contrastivism about reasons._17_C.f. Snedegar (2014,_esp. p. 52 and following). 18 Causal Probabilism can_also be given a contrastivist spin,_roughly by contrasting_how_much_two (or 9 Note_the two differences between Contrastive Pure_Probabilism and its non-contrastive counterpart. First,_an agent's action promotes the satisfaction of_a desire only ​as contrasted with_​another action. Second, the ​baseline_against which_an agent's action is 19_compared in terms_of the_probability of satisfying_the desire is replaced with the_contrasting action; hence,_we now compare the probabilities of_satisfying_a desire given_two_different_actions, as_opposed to comparing_the_probabilities of_satisfying_that desire given an action and_a_baseline. How does this modification to Pure_Probabilism resolve the two_problems_discussed above? Let's start_by examining Debbie's case, which_seemed to cause problems for Finlay's_account. The_problem, in_short, was the account's inability to say that Debbie's pressing A_promotes her desire. But given a_contrastive understanding of promotion,_we are_now_in a position_to_identify the_way in which Debbie's pressing A ​does_promote her_desire. Given the details of Debbie's_case and Contrastive Pure_Probabilism,_we have the following: (1) Debbie's_pressing button A rather than C_promotes the satisfaction of her_desire._(2)_Debbie's pressing button B rather_than C promotes the satisfaction of_her desire. (3)_Debbie's pressing button A rather than B_​does_not promote the satisfaction of her_desire._Given (1), there is a sense_in_which_Debbie's pressing A promotes her_desire, in that Debbie's pressing A_​rather than C promotes the satisfaction of her desire._By the same_more) actions cause the probability_of_satisfying_a desire to increase. Somewhat more precisely: Contrastive Causal Probabilism​:_For time_t​1 prior to_an agent A's φ-ing or ψ-ing, and a later time_t​2