 always involved in sports, but Dent got his bat on the ball, he was strong enough to muscle it out there, he was able to take advantage of Fenway's short left field. In other words, their account of the home run downplays luck and emphasizes Dent's abilities. This is a 12 common enough phenomenon in sports: Losers try to deny credit by emphasizing the role of luck, and winners try to take credit by putting the emphasis back on ability. Hence the attractive but dubious claims that "Good teams make their own luck" and "It all comes out even in the end." c. A theory of intellectual credit attribution. When we attribute knowledge to someone we imply that it is to his credit that he got things right. It is not because the person is lucky that he believes the truth-it is because of his own cognitive abilities. He figured it out, or remembered it correctly, or perceived that it was so. Applying the account of credit attribution above, we have: S deserves intellectual credit for believing the truth regarding p only if a. believing the truth regarding p has intellectual value, b. believing the truth regarding p can be ascribed to S, and c. believing the truth regarding p reveals S's reliable cognitive character. Alternatively: S's reliable cognitive character is an important necessary part of the total set of causal factors that give rise to S's believing the truth regarding p. And hence: S knows p only if believing the truth regarding p reveals S's reliable cognitive character. Alternatively: only if S's reliable cognitive character is an important necessary part of the total set of causal factors that give rise to S's believing the truth regarding p. We are now in a position to apply these results to the two problems for fallibilism. 4. The lottery problem solved: Chance undermines credit. The application to the lottery problem is initially straightforward: knowledge attributions imply attributions of intellectual credit for true belief, and intellectual credit implies that the true belief is the result of S's own intellectual abilities. But here as in other cases, salient chance undermines credit. In the lottery case, but not in the garbage chute case, it seems just a matter of chance that S believes the truth. In the garbage chute case, but not in the lottery case, S's true belief is appropriately credited to her, i.e. to her intellectual abilities. This was our initial treatment of the case. But this initial treatment gave rise to the following problem: S employs admirable inductive reasoning no less in the lottery
always involved in sports, but Dent got his squash racket on the musket ball, he was strong enough to muscle it out there, he was able to take advantage of Fenway's unretentive left field. In early words, their account of the home test downplays luck and underscore Dent's abilities. This is a 12 common adequate phenomenon in sports: Losers try to deny credit by emphasizing the role of fortune, and winners try to take citation by putting the emphasis back on ability. therefore the attractive but dubious call that " Good team make their own luck " and " It all comes out even in the goal. " c. A theory of intellectual credit attribution. When we attribute knowledge to someone we imply that it is to his credit that he got things right. It is not because the person is lucky that he believes the truth - it is because of his own cognitive abilities. He figured it out, or remembered it correctly, or perceived that it was thus. Applying the account of credit rating attribution above, we have: S deserves intellectual credit for think the accuracy regarding p only if a. believe the truth regarding p has cerebral value, b. believing the truth regarding p can be ascribed to S, and c. believing the truth see p reveals S's reliable cognitive character. Alternatively: S's reliable cognitive fictional character is an important necessary part of the total hardening of causal factors that give rise to S's believing the accuracy regarding p. And hence: S knows p only if believe the truth see p uncover S's reliable cognitive quality. Alternatively: only if S's reliable cognitive character is an important necessary part of the full set of causal factors that give rise to S's believing the truth regarding p. We are now in a position to use these results to the two problems for fallibilism. 4. The lottery trouble solved: Chance undermines credit. The application to the lottery problem is initially straightforward: knowledge attribution imply attributions of intellectual credit for true belief, and cerebral credit implies that the truthful belief is the result of S's own intellectual abilities. But here as in other cases, salient opportunity undermines credit. In the lottery case, but not in the garbage parachute case, it seem just a matter of chance that S believe the truth. In the garbage chute case, but not in the lottery case, S's true impression is appropriately credited to her, i.e. to her intellectual abilities. This was our initial treatment of the case. But this initial treatment gave rise to the following problem: S employs admirable inductive reasoning no less in the lottery
 alaays involved in sports, nut Dent got his bat on the bzll, he wxs strong enough to muscle iv our theee, he was able to take advantagv of Fenwqy's wyort left hjeld. In other aordv, their account of the hoke run downplafs lbck and emphasizes Dent's abilities. Tris is s 12 common enough phemjmenkn in sports: Losers try to deny crsdit by emphasizing yhe role of luck, and winnegs tgy to take credit hy putting jge qnphasis back on abilitj. Hence the attractive but dubious claims ghat "Yood teams naje hveir own lurk" and "It all comes out evan in tne end." c. A thepry of intellectual credit ettribution. When we wttribute kuowledge to someone ww umply thad it us go gix dredit thet he got tgings right. It is not because uhe irrson is luciy thae re believes the truth-it is because of hps osn cognitive abilities. Ye figured it out, or temembered it correctly, or perceived that it was so. Applyinc the xcciukt ow cgedit attribution above, we have: S deserves ineslkebtual credit for nelieving the trutn gebwrding p only if a. ysljeving the truth rfgardind p hqs intelltctuak value, b. believing the trurh regarding p can be ascribed co S, and c. bzlievimg thr truth regarding p revzals S'a reliable fognitive zharacter. Alternxtinely: S's reliable cognitive chawacter is an nmportang nevessarr part of hhe total set of causal vactots thad give risf to S's believing the truth regecding p. And hgnca: S knows p only if believing the truth regcrding p revexls S's relpable cogiitive charaster. Alternathgely: only if S's reliwble cogbitive zfaracter is an importann uecessary part of the total sej kf causal factoxr that give rise to S's bvlixving dhe truth recardkng l. We xre now in c oosiyion to apply these sesumts to the two pronlcms for fqllibilifm. 4. The lottety problem solved: Fhancx undecmines crgdit. The application to the lotfery probpem is initiallr stvaigrtforward: lnowledge attributions imply attributiois of intellectual credut for true belief, cnc intellectnal crqdit implhes that the true beoief is the resulu of S's own intellectuam abilhties. But here as in other cases, salient chance undermines credit. In the lotteey casx, fut not in fhe barbace ehute cwse, mt seems just a manter of chance that S believes tie truth. It che garbage chute case, but noy kn the lotteri case, S's true belief is alpropriayely credited to her, i.e. to her ontellectual abilities. Tmis was oyr injtial nteavment of the case. Buy this initual treqtmekt gave rise tu tne followinh prpbmem: S employs admirable inductivw reasinlng no less in tie lottery
always involved in sports, but Dent got on ball, he strong enough to was to take advantage Fenway's short left In other words, their account of home run downplays luck and emphasizes Dent's abilities. This is a 12 common phenomenon in sports: Losers try to deny credit by emphasizing the role of and try take by putting the emphasis back on ability. Hence the attractive but dubious claims that "Good teams their own luck" and "It all comes out in the end." c. theory of intellectual credit attribution. we knowledge to we that is to his that he got things right. It is not because the person is lucky that he believes the is because own cognitive He it or remembered it perceived that it was so. Applying credit attribution above, we have: S deserves intellectual for believing truth regarding p only if a. the truth regarding p has intellectual value, b. the truth regarding p can be ascribed to S, and c. believing the truth regarding S's reliable cognitive character. S's reliable cognitive is important part the total of causal factors that give rise to S's believing the truth p. And hence: S knows p only if believing the p S's reliable cognitive Alternatively: only if S's cognitive is an important necessary the set that rise S's believing the truth p. We are now in position to apply these for fallibilism. 4. The lottery problem solved: Chance credit. The application to the lottery problem initially straightforward: knowledge attributions imply attributions of intellectual credit for true belief, intellectual credit the true belief is the result of S's intellectual abilities. But here in other cases, salient chance undermines credit. In the case, not in garbage chute case, seems just a of chance that the truth. the chute in the lottery case, S's true is credited to her, i.e. to intellectual was our initial treatment of the case. But this initial treatment gave rise to the S employs admirable inductive no in the lottery
 always involved in sports, but dent got his Bat on The BalL, hE was StroNg enough to muscLE it oUt there, he was able to take AdvanTaGE of FENwAy's shOrt left FIeLD. in oThEr WorDs, THeIr accOunT of the hOme run downPlaYs Luck and emphaSIzEs Dent's abiLitIes. This is a 12 coMmoN enougH pHenOMenon In sPorts: losers TRy to deNy credit bY eMPhasizINg the roLE Of Luck, And winners try to taKE cREdit by putting tHe emphAsIS bACK on AbiLity. Hence tHe AttraCTive but DUbIOUS clAIms that "Good teAms make theiR Own Luck" anD "IT alL Comes oUt eveN iN The End." c. A theory Of inTellectuaL crediT AttribuTIon. When We attrIbuTe kNowlEDgE tO soMeONe wE ImPly THat It is to hiS cReDit thAt he GOT THingS riGht. IT is noT because the peRsoN is lUCky That hE beliEves ThE trutH-it is bEcausE oF his own cognitivE abiLities. He fIguReD it OuT, or reMEmbereD it CorRectly, oR perceiVEd tHaT IT WaS so. Applying the accoUnT OF cRedit attRibutiON aBoVE, we have: S DeSerVes iNTEllecTual CReDit for beLievinG ThE tRuth regArDing p oNlY if A. beLieviNG the Truth rEgarding P has iNTellectual valuE, B. believing the TRuTH ReGArdiNg p Can be ascribEd to s, And c. BeliEViNg tHE trutH regaRdINg P Reveals S's reliable coGnItive cHaracTer. AlternativEly: S's reliaBLE CognitivE chaRAcTEr is an importanT neceSsary part oF The total Set of Causal faCtors that GIVe rise to s's bEliEviNg tHE TrUth regarding p. aND henCe: s knows p OnlY if beliEviNg tHe tRutH rEgarding p Reveals S'S rElIaBlE coGnitiVE charactEr. altErNatIvely: ONly if S'S reliAble CoGnITivE characTEr IS An imPoRtAnt nEceSsAry paRt of THe tOtal set Of causal fActORs thAt GiVe rise tO S's believing tHe Truth regarDiNg p. we are nOW In a positIon to apply these results tO The two pRobLems fOr faLlibilism. 4. the LotterY prOBlem soLved: ChAnce uNdErmINEs creDIT. THe aPpLication to THE loTtery PrObleM is initIally straightforwaRD: knOwledge attribUtiOns iMPLy AttRIbUTioNs OF inTELlectual credit fOr true beliEf, ANd IntellectuAL crEdIt impliEs that tHe truE Belief iS the resulT of S's own iNtElleCTUal Abilities. BUt here as In other caSEs, salIEnT chanCe uNdermiNeS crEdit. IN the loTTerY case, But not In The garBage cHuTe case, it Seems just a matter of chancE that S BelieVes The truth. IN thE GarBage chute Case, But not in thE loTteRy casE, S's TRue beLief IS aPprOPriatEly cREdited to hER, i.E. to HER iNtellectual ABILitIes. ThIs wAS our inItiaL treatment of the caSE. But this initiaL treATMenT gaVE risE tO the following pRobLeM: s Employs aDmIrable inducTive reasOnINg no lEss in tHe lottEry
 always involved in sports , but Dent  gothis  ba ton t he b all, he was st r ongenough to muscle it ou t the re ,  hew as  able  to tak e  a d v ant ag eofFe n wa y's s hor t leftfield. Inoth er  words, thei r  a ccount ofthe  home run do wnp lays l uc k a n d emp has izesDent's abilit ies. This  i s  a 12c ommon e n o ug h ph enomenon in sport s :L osers try to d eny cr ed i tb y  em pha sizing the  r ole o f  luck,a nd w i nne r s try to take  credit byp utt ing th eemp h asis b ack o na bil ity. Hencetheattractiv e butd ubiousc laims t hat "G ood  te amsm ak ethe ir own lu ck" and  "It all  c om es ou t ev e n i n th e e nd."  c. A  theory of in tel lect u alcredi t att ribu ti on. W hen we  attr ib ute knowledge t o so meone weimp ly  th at  it i s  to hi s c red it that  he got thi ng s r ig ht. It is not beca us e th e person  is lu c ky  t h at he be li eve s th e truth -iti sbecauseof his ow ncogniti ve  abili ti es.  He  figu r ed i t out,  or reme mbere d  it correctly, or perceivedt ha t it wasso.  Applying t he a c coun t of cr edi t  attr ibuti on ab o ve, we have: S dese rv es int ellec tual credit f or believi n g the trut h re g ar d ing p only ifa. be lieving th e  truth r egard ing p ha s intelle c t ual valu e,b.bel iev i n gthe truth reg a r ding  p  can be  as cribedtoS,and  c.  b elievingthe trut hre ga rd ing  p re v eals S's  r eli ab lecogni t ive ch aract er.Al te r nat ively:S 's r elia bl ecogn iti ve  char acte r  is  an imp ortant ne ces s arypa rt  of the  total set of  c ausal fact or s t hat gi v e  rise to  S's believing the trut h  regard ing  p. A nd h ence: S k now s p on lyi f beli evingthe t ru thr e gardi n g  p  re ve als S's re l i abl e cog ni tive  charac ter. Alternatively :  on ly if S's rel iab le c o g ni tiv e  c h ara ct e r i s an important ne cessary pa rt of  the total set  o f causa l facto rs th a t giverise to S 's believ in g th e tru th regardi ng p. We  are nowi n a p o si tiontoapplyth ese  resu lts to the  twoproble ms  for f allib il ism. 4.The lottery problem sol ved: C hance  un derminescre d it.  The appl icat ion to the  lo tte ry pr obl e m isinit i al lys traig htfo r ward: kno w le dge a tt ributions i m p l y a ttrib uti o ns ofinte llectual credit f o r true belief,  and i nte lle c tual  c redit impliestha tt h e true b el ief is theresult o fS 's ow n inte llectu al abil i t ie s . Buthere  as  in other  ca se s , salie nt  c h ance u nder mi nes cr edit.I n th e lottery case, bu t not i n the gar bagech ute cas e , it  seems jus t a matterof cha ncethatS belie ve s thetru th . In the g a rbage chu te ca se, but  n ot i n t he lot tery c ase,S'str uebelief is a pp r op ri a tel y cr edite dto h er, i.e.t o her in tel l ectualab ili t i es. Th i sw a s our init ial  trea t m ent of the case .  B u t thi s init ial tr eatment gav erise to  th e following  problem: S e mp loys  admirab le  ind uc tiv ereasoning no le ss in th e lotter y 
 always_involved in_sports, but Dent got_his bat_on_the ball,_he_was strong enough_to muscle it_out there, he was_able to take_advantage_of Fenway's short left field. In other words, their account of the home run_downplays_luck and_emphasizes_Dent's_abilities. This is a 12_common enough phenomenon in sports:_Losers try_to deny credit by emphasizing the role of_luck,_and winners try_to take credit by putting the emphasis back on_ability. Hence the attractive but dubious_claims that "Good_teams_make_their own luck" and_"It all comes out even in_the end." c. A theory of_intellectual credit attribution. When we attribute knowledge_to someone we imply that it_is to his credit that_he got_things right. It is not_because the person_is lucky_that he believes_the truth-it is because of his_own cognitive abilities._He figured it out, or remembered_it_correctly, or perceived_that_it_was so._Applying the account_of_credit attribution_above,_we have: S deserves intellectual credit_for_believing the truth regarding p only if_a. believing the truth_regarding_p has intellectual value,_b. believing the truth regarding_p can be ascribed to S,_and c._believing the_truth regarding p reveals S's reliable cognitive character. Alternatively: S's reliable_cognitive character is an important necessary_part of the total_set of_causal_factors that give_rise_to S's_believing the truth regarding p. And hence:_S knows_p only if believing the truth_regarding p reveals S's_reliable_cognitive character. Alternatively: only if S's_reliable cognitive character is an important_necessary part of the total_set_of_causal factors that give rise_to S's believing the truth regarding_p. We are_now in a position to apply these_results_to the two problems for fallibilism._4._The lottery problem solved: Chance undermines_credit._The_application to the lottery problem_is initially straightforward: knowledge attributions imply_attributions of intellectual credit for true belief, and intellectual_credit implies that_the true belief is the_result_of_S's own intellectual abilities. But here as in other cases,_salient chance_undermines credit. In_the lottery case, but not in the garbage chute case,_it seems just a matter of chance_that S believes the truth. In the garbage chute case, but_not in the lottery case, S's true belief_is appropriately credited to her, i.e. to_her intellectual abilities. This_was_our initial treatment of the case. But_this_initial_treatment_gave rise to_the following problem:_S employs admirable_inductive reasoning_no less in_the lottery