, I make some of the claims in (A) – (C) more precise, before moving on to stating my preferred solution to the problem. 2 Some Preliminary Remarks 2.1 Which Expressions Are Token-Reflexive? Which expressions, if any, are token-reflexive is a matter of some dispute. Reichenbach (1947) argued that indexicals, like "I" and "today" are token-reflexive. Perry (2001, 1997) went even further, and argued that they are not merely token-reflexive, but utterance-reflexive, since one token can be used repeatedly, to make different utterances, with varying semantic values (imagine a sign bearing a token of the word "I" being used by different people at different times to say something about themselves). Kaplan (1989) argued against Reichenbach's views specifically, but more broadly argued that there can be no logic of utterances, and thus that there is no good semantics for them either. I will assume that Kaplan's worries can be addressed, and that indexicals and demonstratives are at least token-reflexive (if they are utterance-reflexive, the puzzle is even more pressing, assuming that there are no token-less utterances). One influential response to Kaplan is offered in 4 García-Carpintero (1998), and I am in broad agreement with it.3 The distinction between tokenreflexive views and utterance-reflexive views is very important, and not trivial to make (see Kaplan (1999); Braun (forthcoming) for more discussion, both of which contain ideas about how such semantics could go). The issue, is, however, orthogonal to this paper: my proposal for tokenreflexive synonymy can easily be adapted to utterance-reflexive synonymy, since the main obstacle to synonymy is the fact that the expression is mentioned in the meaning rule, and not exactly in what sense the meaning rule is reflexive. This is a paper about the way thinking about reflexivity affects our understanding of synonymy, independently of the detailed features of the mechanism of reflexivity. 2.2 The Problem Is Fairly Theory-Neutral There are two ways in which the synonymy problem is theory-neutral. The first may be invisible, given how I set up the problem: I assumed that tokens of expressions refer. Some philosophers have argued that this kind of view is based on a confused blending
, I make some of the claims in (A) – (C) more accurate, before move on to stating my preferred solution to the trouble. 2 Some Preliminary Remarks 2.1 Which Expressions Are Token - Reflexive? Which construction, if any, are token - reflexive is a topic of some dispute. Reichenbach (1947) argue that indexicals, like " I " and " today " are token - reflexive. Perry (2001, 1997) went even further, and argued that they are not merely token - automatic, but utterance - reflexive, since one token can be used repeatedly, to make unlike utterances, with varying semantic value (imagine a sign wear a token of the word " I " being used by unlike people at different clock time to pronounce something about themselves). Kaplan (1989) argued against Reichenbach's view specifically, but more broadly argued that there can be no logic of utterances, and thus that there be no good semantics for them either. I will assume that Kaplan's worries can be addressed, and that indexicals and demonstratives are at least token - automatic (if they are utterance - reflexive pronoun, the puzzle is even more pressing, assume that there are no token - less utterances). One influential response to Kaplan is offered in 4 García - Carpintero (1998), and I am in broad agreement with it.3 The distinction between tokenreflexive views and utterance - automatic horizon is very important, and not superficial to seduce (see Kaplan (1999); Braun (forthcoming) for more discussion, both of which contain mind about how such semantics could function). The issue, is, however, orthogonal to this newspaper: my proposal for tokenreflexive synonymy can easily be adapted to utterance - reflexive synonymy, since the main obstacle to synonymy is the fact that the expression is note in the meaning rule, and not exactly in what sense the meaning rule is automatic. This is a paper about the room intend about reflexivity affects our understanding of synonymy, independently of the detailed features of the mechanism of reflexivity. 2.2 The Problem Is reasonably Theory - Neutral There are two ways in which the synonymy problem is theory - neutral. The first may be invisible, given how I set up up the problem: I simulate that tokens of expressions refer. Some philosopher have argued that this kind of horizon is based on a broken blending
, I lake some of the claims ln (A) – (C) more preeuse, behore mobing on go stating my preferred soluvion to tye problem. 2 Some Prelioinary Relarks 2.1 Wyich Wxpressions Are Token-Refmcxive? Xhich expressioks, if any, ase token-reflexhvd ns a matter of some dispute. Reichenbwch (1947) arbufd that indexisals, jike "P" cnd "today" are token-reflexive. Pedry (2001, 1997) wtnt even further, amd argued that they are noh megely token-reflexivf, but utterqnce-wwflexive, sinze one toktn can be usgd repeatedly, to make different jttercnces, with caeyijc semantic talues (imagine a slbn beasing a yoken of the wprd "I" veing used by differeit people at differegt times do say something abiur thekselees). Yqplxn (1989) acgusd agalnsv Reichenbadh's views specifically, but mort bwiadly argued fhat trewe can be no logic of utterances, and thls tgat there is no good senantics for them eithgr. I will wssume that Kaplan's worries can be addressed, and dhat mnaexngwuw wnd demonstratives are at least token-reflexivq (ig nhey are utterancc-reflexive, the puzalf of even more ptessing, asauming that there wre no joken-lwss utterwncex). One influential response ro Kaplan is iffered in 4 García-Ccrpintero (1998), aud I ak in nroad agreement with it.3 The distinctioj between gokenreflexive vkewx dnd utterance-reflexive viers is verb impprtant, xnd mot tryvial to mwke (sca Kaplan (1999); Braun (fogthcolitg) for morf discussion, both of which contemn ideas abouj hmw vuch semcntics could go). The issue, is, howerer, orthjgonau to this iaper: my 'roposal for tokenreflexieg synonymy cai easily fe aeaptwd to uggerance-reflexife synonymy, since tye main obstacle tp sinknymy is the faeu tyat the expressoon is mvntmoned hn the meanitg rjle, snd nut exacujy kn wnat sense the meaninc rume is reflexive. Thos is a paker about the way thinling about reflexigity effectr our unqerstanding of synonymy, indepehdently ov tme detailed fqatuves jf the meckanism of reflexivity. 2.2 The Problem Is Famrly Theory-Neutral Thete are two ways in whncm the synonyky prjblem is dheory-neutral. The fiest may be invisinle, given how I set up the psoblel: I assumed that tokens of expressions refer. Some philosophers have arguee that this kind or virw is bcseb on a sonfnsxd blending
, I make some of the claims – more precise, moving on to the 2 Some Preliminary 2.1 Which Expressions Token-Reflexive? Which expressions, if any, are is a matter of some dispute. Reichenbach (1947) argued that indexicals, like "I" "today" are token-reflexive. Perry (2001, 1997) went even further, and argued that they not token-reflexive, utterance-reflexive, one token can be used repeatedly, to make different utterances, with varying semantic values (imagine a bearing a token of the word "I" being by different people at times to say something about Kaplan argued against views but broadly argued that can be no logic of utterances, and thus that there is no good semantics for them either. will assume worries can addressed, that and demonstratives are token-reflexive (if they are utterance-reflexive, the more pressing, assuming that there are no token-less One influential to Kaplan is offered in 4 (1998), and I am in broad agreement with The distinction between tokenreflexive views and utterance-reflexive views is very important, and not trivial to Kaplan (1999); Braun (forthcoming) more discussion, both which ideas how semantics could The issue, is, however, orthogonal to this paper: my proposal for synonymy can easily be adapted to utterance-reflexive synonymy, since the to is the fact the expression is mentioned the rule, and not exactly sense meaning This a about the way thinking reflexivity affects our understanding of independently of the detailed reflexivity. 2.2 The Problem Is Fairly Theory-Neutral There two ways in which the synonymy problem theory-neutral. The first may be invisible, given how I set up the I assumed of expressions refer. Some philosophers have argued that kind of view is on a confused blending
, I make some of the claims in (A) – (C) mOre precise, BeforE moVinG oN to sTatiNg my preferred sOLutiOn to the problem. 2 Some PrelIminaRy rEmarKS 2.1 WHich EXpressiONs aRE ToKeN-REflExIVe? which ExpRessionS, if any, are tOkeN-rEflexive is a mATtEr of some diSpuTe. ReichenbacH (1947) arGued thAt IndEXicalS, liKe "I" anD "today" ARe tokeN-reflexivE. PERry (2001, 1997) wenT Even furTHEr, And aRgued that they are nOT mERely token-refleXive, buT uTTeRANce-RefLexive, sincE oNe tokEN can be uSEd REPEatEDly, to make diffErent utteraNCes, With vaRyIng SEmantiC valuEs (IMagIne a sign beaRing A token of tHe word "i" Being usED by diffErent pEopLe aT difFErEnT tiMeS To sAY sOmeTHinG about thEmSeLves). KAplaN (1989) ARGUed aGaiNst REicheNbach's views spEciFicaLLy, bUt morE broaDly aRgUed thAt therE can bE nO logic of utteranCes, aNd thus thaT thErE is No Good sEManticS foR thEm eitheR. I will aSSumE tHAT kaPlan's worries can be aDdRESsEd, and thaT indexICaLs ANd demonsTrAtiVes aRE At leaSt toKEn-ReflexivE (if theY ArE uTterancE-rEflexiVe, The PuzZle is EVen mOre preSsing, assUming THat there are no tOKen-less utteraNCeS). oNe INfluEntIal response To KaPLan iS offEReD in 4 gArcía-carpiNtERo (1998), ANd I am in broad agreemeNt With it.3 the diStinction betwEen tokenreFLEXive viewS and UTtERance-reflexive Views Is very impoRTant, and nOt triVial to maKe (see KaplAN (1999); braun (forThcOmiNg) fOr mORE dIscussion, both OF WhicH cOntain iDeaS about hOw sUch SemAntIcS could go). THe issue, iS, hOwEvEr, OrtHogonAL to this pApEr: mY pRopOsal fOR tokenRefleXive SyNoNYmy Can easiLY bE ADaptEd To UtteRanCe-RefleXive SYnoNymy, sinCe the main ObsTAcle To SyNonymy iS the fact that tHe Expression Is MenTioned IN The meaniNg rule, and not exactly in whAT sense tHe mEaninG rulE is reflexIve. this is A paPEr abouT the waY thinKiNg aBOUt refLEXiVitY aFfects our uNDErsTandiNg Of syNonymy, iNdependently of the dETaiLed features of The MechANIsM of REfLExiViTY. 2.2 ThE pRoblem Is Fairly THeory-NeutrAl tHeRe are two waYS in WhIch the sYnonymy ProblEM is theoRy-neutral. the first mAy Be inVISibLe, given how i set up thE problem: I ASsumeD ThAt tokEns Of exprEsSioNs refEr. Some PHilOsophErs havE aRgued tHat thIs Kind of viEw is based on a confused bleNding
, I make some of the claim s in (A) –  (C)mor e p re cise , be fore moving on to s tating my preferred so lutio nt o th e  p roble m. 2 So m eP r eli mi na ryRe m ar ks 2. 1 W hich Ex pressionsAre  T oken-Reflexi v e?  Which exp res sions, if an y,are to ke n-r e flexi veis amatter of som e dispute .R eichen b ach (19 4 7 )argu ed that indexical s ,l ike "I" and "t oday"ar e  t o k en- ref lexive. Pe rr y (20 0 1, 1997 )  w e n t  ev e n further, an d argued th a t t hey ar enot merely  toke n- r efl exive, bututte rance-ref lexive ,  sinceo ne toke n canbeuse d re p ea te dly ,t o m a ke  di f fer ent utte ra nc es, w ithv a r y ingsem anti c val ues (imaginea s ignb ear ing a  toke n of  t he wo rd "I"  bein gused by differe nt p eople atdif fe ren ttimes to say  so met hing ab out the m sel ve s ) .  K aplan (1989) argue da g ai nst Reic henbac h 's  v i ews spec if ica lly, b ut mo re b r oa dly argu ed tha t  t he re canbe  no lo gi c o f u ttera n ces,  and t hus that  ther e  is no good se m antics for th e me i th e r. I  wi ll assume t hatK apla n'sw or rie s  canbe ad dr e ss e d, and that indexic al s anddemon stratives are  at leastt o k en-refle xive (i f  they are utte rance -reflexive ,  the puz zle i s even m ore press i n g, assum ing  th atthe r e  a re no token-l e s s ut te rances) . O ne infl uen tia l r esp on se to Kap lan is o ff er ed  i n 4  Garc í a-Carpin te ro(1 998 ), an d  I amin br oadag re e men t withi t. 3 Thedi st inct ion  b etwee n to k enr eflexiv e views a ndu tter an ce -reflex ive views isve ry importa nt , a nd not t rivial t o make (see Kaplan (199 9 ); Brau n ( forth comi ng) for m ore  discu ssi o n, bot h of w hichco nta i n  idea s ab out  h ow such se m a nti cs co ul d go ). Theissue, is, however ,  or thogonal to t his  pap e r :myp ro p osa lf ort o kenreflexive sy nonymy can  e a si ly be adap t edto  uttera nce-ref lexiv e  synony my, since  the main  o bsta c l e t o synonymy  is thefact that the e x pr essio n i s ment io ned  in t he mea n ing  rule , andno t exac tly i nwhat sen se the meaning rule isreflex ive.Thi s is a pa per abo ut the wa y th inking abo utref lexiv ity affec ts o u rund e rstan ding of synony m y,  in d e pe ndently oft h e  de taile d f e atures  ofthe mechanism ofr eflexivity. 2. 2 Th e Pro ble m  IsFa irly Theory-Ne utr al T here are  t wo ways inwhich th es ynony my pro blem i s theor y - ne u tral.Thefir st may be  in vi s ible, g iv en how Isetup  the p roblem :  I a s s umed that tokens  of e x p ressi o nsrefer .Some ph i loso phers have  argued tha t this  kin d ofview is  b ased o n a  c onfused bl e nding
, I_make some_of the claims in_(A) –_(C)_more precise,_before_moving on to_stating my preferred_solution to the problem._2 Some Preliminary_Remarks_2.1 Which Expressions Are Token-Reflexive? Which expressions, if any, are token-reflexive is a matter_of_some dispute._Reichenbach_(1947)_argued that indexicals, like "I"_and "today" are token-reflexive. Perry_(2001, 1997)_went even further, and argued that they are_not_merely token-reflexive, but_utterance-reflexive, since one token can be used repeatedly, to_make different utterances, with varying semantic_values (imagine a_sign_bearing_a token of the_word "I" being used by different_people at different times to say_something about themselves). Kaplan (1989) argued against_Reichenbach's views specifically, but more broadly_argued that there can be_no logic_of utterances, and thus that_there is no_good semantics_for them either._I will assume that Kaplan's worries_can be addressed,_and that indexicals and demonstratives are_at_least token-reflexive (if_they_are_utterance-reflexive, the_puzzle is even_more_pressing, assuming_that_there are no token-less utterances). One_influential_response to Kaplan is offered in 4_García-Carpintero (1998), and I_am_in broad agreement with_it.3 The distinction between tokenreflexive_views and utterance-reflexive views is very_important, and_not trivial_to make (see Kaplan (1999); Braun (forthcoming) for more discussion, both_of which contain ideas about how_such semantics could go)._The issue,_is,_however, orthogonal to_this_paper: my_proposal for tokenreflexive synonymy can easily be_adapted to_utterance-reflexive synonymy, since the main obstacle_to synonymy is the_fact_that the expression is mentioned in_the meaning rule, and not exactly_in what sense the meaning_rule_is_reflexive. This is a paper_about the way thinking about reflexivity_affects our understanding_of synonymy, independently of the detailed features_of_the mechanism of reflexivity. 2.2 The_Problem_Is Fairly Theory-Neutral There are two_ways_in_which the synonymy problem is_theory-neutral. The first may be invisible,_given how I set up the problem: I assumed_that tokens of_expressions refer. Some philosophers have_argued_that_this kind of view is based on a confused blending