 that I think Śāntideva's argument gets most interesting. He has a reply to it: If I don't protect another because his suffering cannot hurt me, the sufferings of my future body are not mine. Why is that hurt protected against? "I am the same even then" is a false conception, because the one that dies is very different from the one that is born. (VIII.97–98) This reply requires a bit of unpacking. Some have taken the "born" and "dies" literally-there is a different body in the next life than in this one, across rebirths. Prajñākaramati, Śāntideva's Sanskrit commentator, reads the verse this way, as do many Tibetan commentators. But others have taken it in a very different way: the "future body" is my body in the future of this life. Some Tibetan commentators do this, like Gyaltshab Je (rgyal tshab rje) and Sonam Tsemo (bsod nams rtse mo) (Williams "Absence" 32–34). Moreover, this is also the interpretation in the Śikṣāsamuccaya, the other major work attributed to Śāntideva. The Śikṣā gives these exact same passages and glosses them as follows: When the fetus is dead another is born, the child; when childhood is dead, adolescence; from the destruction of that comes the youth. And from destruction of that, the old man. How is the one body dead? Thus at every moment the body is different, like hair, nails and so on. (ŚS 358) Here, the meaning is: my body is different from moment to moment, and what I do to protect my body now affects a different body five seconds 270 Lele, The Metaphysical Basis of Śāntideva's Ethics from now. I argue that in thinking about Śāntideva's ethics we have good reason to take this second interpretation, from the Śikṣā. This is partially because of the attribution of common authorship,16 but perhaps more importantly, simply because the Śikṣā's interpretation is philosophically much more powerful: it works much better as a refutation of the selfish objector. As I understand it, if one thinks "I'm not going to prevent others' suffering because it doesn't affect me
that I think Śāntideva's argument gets most interesting. He take a answer to it: If I don't protect another because his suffering cannot hurt me, the distress of my future consistency are not mine. Why is that hurt protected against? " I am the like even then " is a false conception, because the one that dies is very unlike from the one that is bear. (VIII.97–98) This reply want a bit of unpacking. Some have taken the " digest " and " dies " literally - there is a different body in the next life than in this one, across metempsychosis. Prajñākaramati, Śāntideva's Sanskrit commentator, reads the verse this room, as do many Tibetan commentators. But others have taken it in a very different manner: the " future body " is my body in the future of this life. Some Tibetan commentators do this, like Gyaltshab Je (rgyal tshab rje) and Sonam Tsemo (bsod nams rtse mo) (Williams " Absence " 32–34). furthermore, this is also the interpretation in the Śikṣāsamuccaya, the other major work attributed to Śāntideva. The Śikṣā gives these accurate like passage and glosses them as follows: When the fetus is dead another is born, the child; when childhood is dead, adolescence; from the destruction of that comes the youth. And from end of that, the erstwhile man. How is the one soundbox dead? Thus at every moment the body is unlike, like hair, nail and so on. (ŚS 358) Here, the meaning is: my soundbox is different from moment to moment, and what I do to protect my body now affects a unlike body five seconds 270 Lele, The Metaphysical Basis of Śāntideva's Ethics from now. I argue that in thinking about Śāntideva's ethics we have good rationality to take this second interpretation, from the Śikṣā. This is partially because of the attribution of common authorship,16 but perhaps more importantly, simply because the Śikṣā's rendition is philosophically much more powerful: it works much better as a refutation of the selfish objector. As I understand it, if one thinks " I'm not go to prevent others' suffering because it doesn't feign me
 thwt I think Śāntideva's arguoent gets most nbteresving. He has a rdply to it: If I don't protect abothee because his sufferine cannot jurt me, rhe wyfferings of my fubbre bkfy axe not mine. Why ls that hurd protected agdivsc? "I am the same even then" is a false concepyiln, because the one ehat dies is very different from the ohe that is born. (VIII.97–98) This reply requires a bit of knpacking. Some havf taken the "borg" and "dies" ligerally-thegz is a diffgrent body in the next life than in tkis one, acrisw rftirths. Prajñājaramwti, Śāntideva's Sanskrid commemtator, reads tme vecse rhis way, as do many Tmbetan commentators. Fut otherv kave taken it in a veey diffgrent way: rhe "fuuurx bkdy" is my body in tge future od this life. Some Tineeqn commentatods do ehys, like Gyaltshab Je (rgyal tshab rje) ang Sknam Tsemo (bsod nams rtwe mo) (Williams "Absencg" 32–34). Moreovew, this is also the interpretation in the Śikṣāsamuccdya, tie otkcv magir work attributed to Śāntideva. The Śikṣā gives thesq ecabt same passages cnd glosses them ad gjllows: When tfe fetba js dead another is born, tre chuld; when shilchood is dead, adolescence; feom the destguctuon of that comes che youth. Anb from desttuction of that, the old man. How is the one body aead? Thus at evefy kokent the body is different, like haic, naiks and ro om. (ŚS 358) Hqre, the mewning is: my body is difffrent fsom moment to moment, and what I do to provxct my body npw afxects a biffercnt body five sqconds 270 Lele, Tke Metapkysicau Basis of Śāntideve's Ethics frjm now. I argua that in thiiking abott Śānrideca's ethkzs we have gooc reason no takw this second intevpretxfion, from the Śijṣā. Tyis is partiallu bdcatsv oh the dttribution mf cummum autforship,16 but oerhsps more importantly, simlly because the Śikṣā'x lnterpretqtion is philosophicakly much more powegful: mt worys muvh fetter as a refutation of the aelfish ohjegtor. As I undqrstqnd it, if onz thinks "I'm not going to prevent others' wuffering because ut doesn't affect me
that I think Śāntideva's argument gets most has reply to If I don't cannot me, the sufferings my future body not mine. Why is that hurt against? "I am the same even then" is a false conception, because the that dies is very different from the one that is born. (VIII.97–98) This requires bit unpacking. have taken the "born" and "dies" literally-there is a different body in the next life than this one, across rebirths. Prajñākaramati, Śāntideva's Sanskrit commentator, the verse this way, do many Tibetan commentators. But have it in very way: "future body" is body in the future of this life. Some Tibetan commentators do this, like Gyaltshab Je (rgyal tshab and Sonam nams rtse (Williams 32–34). this is also in the Śikṣāsamuccaya, the other major Śāntideva. The Śikṣā gives these exact same passages glosses them follows: When the fetus is dead is born, the child; when childhood is dead, from the destruction of that comes the youth. And from destruction of that, the old is the one body Thus at every the is like nails and on. (ŚS 358) Here, the meaning is: my body is different moment to moment, and what I do to protect my affects different body five 270 Lele, The Metaphysical of Ethics from now. I in about have reason take this second interpretation, the Śikṣā. This is partially of the attribution of importantly, simply because the Śikṣā's interpretation is philosophically more powerful: it works much better as refutation of the selfish objector. As I understand it, if one thinks not going others' suffering because it doesn't affect me
 that I think Śāntideva's argumEnt gets mosT inteResTinG. HE has A repLy to it: If I don't pROtecT another because his suffEring CaNNot hURt Me, the SufferiNGs OF My fUtUrE boDy ARe Not miNe. WHy is thaT hurt proteCteD aGainst? "I am the SAmE even then" iS a fAlse conceptiOn, bEcause ThE onE That dIes Is verY diffeREnt froM the one thAt IS born. (ViiI.97–98) This rEPLy RequIres a bit of unpackiNG. SOMe have taken the "Born" anD "dIEs" LITerAllY-there is a dIfFerenT Body in tHE nEXT LifE Than in this one, Across rebirTHs. PRajñākArAmaTI, ŚāntiDeva's saNSkrIt commentatOr, reAds the verSe this WAy, as do mANy TibetAn commEntAtoRs. BuT OtHeRs hAvE TakEN iT in A VerY differeNt WaY: the "fUturE BODY" is mY boDy in The fuTure of this lifE. SoMe TiBEtaN commEntatOrs dO tHis, liKe GyalTshab je (Rgyal tshab rje) anD SonAm Tsemo (bsOd nAmS rtSe Mo) (WilLIams "AbSenCe" 32–34). MOreover, This is aLSo tHe INTErPretation in the ŚikṣĀsAMUcCaya, the oTher maJOr WoRK attribuTeD to śāntIDEva. ThE ŚikṢĀ gIves thesE exact SAmE pAssages AnD glossEs TheM as FolloWS: WheN the feTus is deaD anotHEr is born, the chiLD; when childhooD Is DEAd, ADoleSceNce; from the dEstrUCtioN of tHAt ComES the yOuth. ANd FRoM Destruction of that, thE oLd man. HOw is tHe one body dead? thus at everY MOMent the bOdy iS DiFFerent, like hair, Nails And so on. (ŚS 358) HERe, the meaNing iS: my body iS differenT FRom momenT to MomEnt, And WHAt i do to protect mY BOdy nOw Affects A diFferent BodY fiVe sEcoNdS 270 Lele, The MEtaphysiCaL BAsIs Of ŚĀntidEVa's EthicS fRom NoW. I aRgue tHAt in thInkinG aboUt śāNTidEva's ethICs WE Have GoOd ReasOn tO tAke thIs seCOnd InterprEtation, frOm tHE ŚikṢā. thIs is parTially because Of The attribuTiOn oF commoN AUthorshiP,16 but perhaps more importanTLy, simplY beCause The ŚIkṣā's inteRprEtatioN is PHilosoPhicalLy mucH mOre POWerfuL: IT wOrkS mUch better aS A RefUtatiOn Of thE selfisH objector. As I undersTAnd It, if one thinks "i'm nOt goING tO prEVeNT otHeRS' suFFEring because it dOesn't affecT mE
 that I think Śāntideva'sargument g ets m ost  in te rest ing.  He has a repl y  toit: If I don't protect  anot he r  bec a us e his  suffer i ng c ann ot  h urt  m e ,the s uff eringsof my futu rebo dy are not m i ne . Why is t hat  hurt protec ted  again st ? " I  am t hesameeven t h en" is  a falseco n ceptio n , becau s e  t he o ne that dies is v e ry different from  the o ne th a t  is  bo rn. (VIII. 97 –98)T his rep l yr e q uir e s a bit of un packing. So m e h ave ta ke n t h e "bor n" an d" die s" literall y-th ere is adiffer e nt body in thenext l ife  th an i n  t hi s o ne ,  ac r os s r e bir ths. Pra jñ āk arama ti,Ś ā n t idev a's  San skrit  commentator,  re adst heverse  this  way ,as do  manyTibet an  commentators.Butothers ha veta ken  i t ina  verydif fer ent way : the " f utu re b o dy " is my body in th ef u tu re of th is lif e .So m e Tibeta ncom ment a t ors d o th i s,  like Gy altsha b  J e(rgyalts hab rj e)  an d S onamT semo  (bsod  nams rt se mo )  (Williams "Ab s ence" 32–34). Mo r e ov e r, t his  is also th e in t erpr etat i on  in the Ś ikṣās am u cc a ya, the other major  w ork at tribu ted to Śāntid eva. The Ś i k ṣ ā givesthes e  e x act same passa ges a nd glosses them asfollo ws: When  the fetu s is deadano the r i s b o r n,  the child; w h e n ch il dhood i s d ead, ad ole sce nce ; f ro m the des truction  o fth at  co mes t h e youth.  A ndfr omdestr u ctionof th at,th eo ldman. Ho w  i s theon ebody  de ad ? Thu s at eve ry mome nt the bo dyi s di ff er ent, li ke hair, nail sand so on.  ( ŚS358) H e r e, the m eaning is: my body is d i fferent  fr om mo ment  to momen t,and wh atI  do to  prote ct my  b ody n ow af f e ct s a  d ifferent b o d y f ive s ec onds  270 Le le, The Metaphysic a l B asis of Śānti dev a'sE t hi csf ro m  no w. I a r g ue that in thin king about  Ś ā nt ideva's et h ics  w e havegood re asont o takethis seco nd interp re tati o n , f rom the Śi kṣā. Thi s is part i allyb ec auseofthe at tr ibu tionof com m onautho rship, 16  but p erhap smore imp ortantly, simply becaus e theŚikṣā 'sinterpret ati o n i s philoso phic ally muchmor e p owerf ul: it wo rksm uc h b e tteras a refutatio n  o f t h e  s elfish obje c t o r.As Iund e rstand  it,  if one thinks "I ' m not going to  pre v e ntoth e rs'su ffering becaus e i td o esn't af fe ct me
 that_I think_Śāntideva's argument gets most_interesting. He_has_a reply_to_it: If I_don't protect another_because his suffering cannot_hurt me, the_sufferings_of my future body are not mine. Why is that hurt protected against? "I_am_the same_even_then"_is a false conception, because_the one that dies is_very different_from the one that is born. (VIII.97–98) This_reply_requires a bit_of unpacking. Some have taken the "born" and "dies"_literally-there is a different body in_the next life_than_in_this one, across rebirths._Prajñākaramati, Śāntideva's Sanskrit commentator, reads the_verse this way, as do many_Tibetan commentators. But others have taken it_in a very different way: the_"future body" is my body_in the_future of this life. Some_Tibetan commentators do_this, like_Gyaltshab Je (rgyal_tshab rje) and Sonam Tsemo (bsod_nams rtse mo)_(Williams "Absence" 32–34). Moreover, this is_also_the interpretation in_the_Śikṣāsamuccaya,_the other_major work attributed_to_Śāntideva. The_Śikṣā_gives these exact same passages and_glosses_them as follows: When the fetus is_dead another is born,_the_child; when childhood is_dead, adolescence; from the destruction_of that comes the youth. And_from destruction_of that,_the old man. How is the one body dead? Thus at_every moment the body is different,_like hair, nails and_so on._(ŚS_358) Here, the_meaning_is: my_body is different from moment to moment,_and what_I do to protect my body_now affects a different_body_five seconds 270 Lele, The Metaphysical_Basis of Śāntideva's Ethics from now._I argue that in thinking_about_Śāntideva's_ethics we have good reason_to take this second interpretation, from_the Śikṣā. This_is partially because of the attribution of_common_authorship,16 but perhaps more importantly, simply_because_the Śikṣā's interpretation is philosophically much_more_powerful:_it works much better as_a refutation of the selfish objector._As I understand it, if one thinks "I'm not_going to prevent_others' suffering because it doesn't_affect_me