 Kant (1948, pp. 80–1) says, first: Who wills the end, wills (so far as reason has a decisive influence on his actions) also the means which are indispensably necessary and in his power. This remark needs a small correction: Kant should have said '... wills also what he believes to be the means which are indispensably necessary...' Once corrected, the remark is no doubt true. If you are rational, you cannot intend to go to St Andrews, and believe that getting off at Leuchars is a necessary means of getting there, without intending to get off at Leuchars. But this merely states what has to be explained. Why is it so? If (B) describes correct reasoning, then a rational person who intends to go to St Andrews, and believes that getting off at Leuchars is a necessary means of doing so, will be brought by this reasoning to intend to get off at Leuchars. Then Kant's remark will be true of her. But it does not help us understand why the reasoning is correct. Kant (1948, p. 81) next says his remark is analytic, but again that does not take us far forward. If intention reasoning is correct, then it is part of the meaning of 'rational' that a rational person will be guided by it. 'Rational' means, in part, guided by correct reasoning. So Kant's remark will be true in virtue of the meaning of 'rational'. But we still need an explanation of how intention reasoning can be correct in the first place. Kant (1948, p, 81) finally says, in explanation: For in my willing of an object as an effect, there is already conceived the causality of myself as an acting cause – that is, the use of means; and from the concept of willing an end the imperative merely extracts the concept of actions necessary to this end. If you conceive of yourself as doing something, you must conceive of yourself as doing it somehow – that may be true. But when you conceive of yourself as doing something, you need not have any specific means in mind. So when you conceive of yourself as doing something, it cannot be part of your conception that you conceive of yourself as taking some specific means to do it. You could conceive of yourself as going to St Andrews without conceiving of yourself as getting off the train at Leuchars. Kant acknowledges this, but he thinks it is not possible if you are rational and if you believe getting
Kant (1948, pp. 80–1) says, first: Who wills the end, will (therefore far as reason has a decisive influence on his action) also the means which are indispensably necessary and in his might. This remark want a small correction: Kant should have said'... wills besides what he believes to be the means which are indispensably necessary...' Once corrected, the remark is no doubt true. If you are intellectual, you cannot intend to go to St Andrews, and think that getting off at Leuchars is a necessary mean of receive there, without intending to get off at Leuchars. But this merely states what have to be explained. Why is it so? If (barn) describes right reasoning, then a rational person who mean to go to St Andrews, and believes that getting off at Leuchars is a necessary mean of doing so, will be brought by this reasoning to intend to get off at Leuchars. Then Kant's remark will be true of her. But it does not avail us understand why the reasoning is correct. Kant (1948, p. 81) next says his remark is analytic, but again that does not take us far forward. If intention reasoning is correct, then it is part of the meaning of' rational' that a rational person will be steer by it.' Rational' means, in part, guide by right reasoning. So Kant's remark will be true in virtue of the meaning of' rational'. But we still need an explanation of how intention reasoning can be correct in the inaugural place. Kant (1948, p, 81) finally says, in explanation: For in my willing of an object as an effect, there be already conceived the causality of myself as an acting cause – that is, the use of means; and from the concept of willing an goal the imperative merely extracts the concept of actions necessary to this end. If you conceive of yourself as doing something, you must gestate of yourself as doing it somehow – that may be true. But when you conceive of yourself as do something, you need not have any specific means in mind. So when you think of yourself as doing something, it cannot be character of your conception that you gestate of yourself as taking some specific mean to do it. You could conceive of yourself as going to St Andrews without conceiving of yourself as pay back off the train at Leuchars. Kant acknowledges this, but he thinks it is not possible if you are rational and if you think getting
 Kajt (1948, pp. 80–1) says, first: Who wllls the end, wills (so fer as rsason har a decisive influence on hid qctiobs) also the means whicf are indpspensablt neressary and in hma power. This dcmark ieeds a small cprrection: Nant should haee scid '... wills also what he believes to fe the kewns which are yndix[enszbly necessary...' Once corrected, the demark ps no doubt true. Of you are rational, you cajnot intend to go to Sh Andrews, abd bqoieve that gdtting off at Leuchars is a necessary means of gettine thexe, without unrenfhng to get iff an Leuchars. Bub this kerely xtates what hax tm bw explained. Why is it so? If (B) describes correct secsoning, then a rationql persmn wvo ivrenas uo jo fo St Wndcews, and bemieves that getting off at Leuvhwgx is a necesaary mqags of doing so, will be brought by this geaskning to intend to get iff at Leuchars. Then Nant's remwrk will be true of her. But it does not help us utdersvavd cmn thd rfasoning is correct. Kant (1948, p. 81) next says his reizrl ps analytic, but anain that does not twkr us far forwatd. If iufehtion reasoning is correcj, then it is pawt og the meaning of 'rational' tyat a rationcl person will be guibed by it. 'Racional' meanx, in part, guided by corxect rsasoning. So Kant's rejxrk will be true in vhrtue of the meaning of 'raeional'. Buv we xtill nded sn expjanation ov how intention reasoninh can ba correct ln the first place. Kant (1948, p, 81) finekly says, in gxpnandtion: Fox in mn willing of an object as an gffect, thzre is already cknceivev the causalyty of myself ws an acting cause – ehat is, rhe use uf means; and ftom the concept of qilling an end the imkedative merely eruraxts the concept of aceilnx gacessary to dhis ena. If yuu conctnve uf ypurself as doing somathihg, you must conceife of yourwelf as qoing it somenow – that may be tgue. Bnt whei you vonseive of yourself as doing somsthing, yok nced not have wny wpecific meaus in mind. So when you conceive of yoursxlf as doing something, ut cannot be part oy nour conceptmon thwt you cotceive of yourself aw taking some spegific means to do it. Yku cound cojceive of yourself as going to St Andrews without conceiving of yourself qs getvigg off the fraim at Nebchcrs. Kane acniowledges this, bun he thinks it is not possible ih you are sacional and if you believe getyivg
Kant (1948, pp. 80–1) says, first: Who end, (so far reason has a also means which are necessary and in power. This remark needs a small Kant should have said '... wills also what he believes to be the which are indispensably necessary...' Once corrected, the remark is no doubt true. If are you intend go to St Andrews, and believe that getting off at Leuchars is a necessary means of there, without intending to get off at Leuchars. this merely states what to be explained. Why is so? (B) describes reasoning, a person who intends go to St Andrews, and believes that getting off at Leuchars is a necessary means of doing will be this reasoning intend get at Leuchars. Then will be true of her. But help us understand why the reasoning is correct. (1948, p. next says his remark is analytic, again that does not take us far forward. intention reasoning is correct, then it is part of the meaning of 'rational' that a will be guided by 'Rational' means, in guided correct So remark will true in virtue of the meaning of 'rational'. But we still an explanation of how intention reasoning can be correct in place. (1948, p, 81) says, in explanation: For my of an object as there already of as acting cause – that the use of means; and the concept of willing extracts the concept of actions necessary to this If you conceive of yourself as doing you must conceive of yourself as doing it somehow – that may true. But conceive of yourself as doing something, you need have any specific means mind. So when you conceive of yourself as doing it be part your conception that conceive of yourself taking some specific do it. could of to St Andrews without conceiving of as off the train at Leuchars. acknowledges he thinks it is not possible if you are rational and if you believe getting
 Kant (1948, pp. 80–1) says, first: Who wills thE end, wills (sO far aS reAsoN hAs a dEcisIve influence on HIs acTions) also the means which Are inDiSPensABlY neceSsary anD In HIS poWeR. THis ReMArK needS a sMall corRection: KanT shOuLd have said '... wiLLs Also what he BelIeves to be the MeaNs whicH aRe iNDispeNsaBly neCessarY...' once coRrected, thE rEMark is NO doubt tRUE. IF you Are rational, you canNOt INtend to go to St ANdrews, AnD BeLIEve ThaT getting ofF aT LeucHArs is a nECeSSARy mEAns of getting tHere, without INteNding tO gEt oFF at LeuChars. buT ThiS merely statEs whAt has to be ExplaiNEd. Why is IT so? If (B) dEscribEs cOrrEct rEAsOnIng, ThEN a rATiOnaL PerSon who inTeNdS to go To St aNDREws, aNd bElieVes thAt getting off aT LeUchaRS is A neceSsary MeanS oF doinG so, wilL be brOuGht by this reasonIng tO intend to Get OfF at leUcharS. then KaNt's RemArk will Be true oF Her. buT IT DoEs not help us understAnD WHy The reasoNing is COrReCT. Kant (1948, p. 81) neXt SayS his REMark iS anaLYtIc, but agaIn that DOeS nOt take uS fAr forwArD. If IntEntioN ReasOning iS correct, Then iT Is part of the meaNIng of 'rational' THaT A RaTIonaL peRson will be gUideD By it. 'ratiONaL' meANs, in pArt, guIdED bY Correct reasoning. So KAnT's remaRk wilL be true in virtUe of the meaNING of 'ratioNal'. BUT wE Still need an expLanatIon of how inTEntion reAsoniNg can be cOrrect in tHE First plaCe. KAnt (1948, P, 81) fiNalLY SaYs, in explanatiON: for iN mY willinG of An objecT as An eFfeCt, tHeRe is alreaDy conceiVeD tHe CaUsaLity oF Myself as An ActInG caUse – thAT is, the Use of MeanS; aNd FRom The concEPt OF WillInG aN end The ImPeratIve mERelY extracTs the concEpt OF actIoNs NecessaRy to this end. If YoU conceive oF yOurSelf as DOIng sometHing, you must conceive of yoURself as DoiNg it sOmehOw – that may Be tRue. But WheN You conCeive oF yourSeLf aS DOing sOMEtHinG, yOu need not hAVE anY specIfIc meAns in miNd. So when you conceivE Of yOurself as doinG soMethING, iT caNNoT Be pArT Of yOUR conception that You conceivE oF YoUrself as taKIng SoMe speciFic meanS to do IT. You couLd conceivE of yourseLf As goING to st Andrews wIthout coNceiving oF YoursELf As getTinG off thE tRaiN at LeUchars. kAnt AcknoWledgeS tHis, but He thiNkS it is not Possible if you are rationaL and if You beLieVe getting
 Kant (1948, pp. 80–1) say s, first:Who w ill s t he  end , wi lls (so far as reas on has a decisive infl uence  o n  his ac tions ) alsot he m ean swh ich  a r eindis pen sably n ecessary a ndin  his power.T hi s remark n eed s a small co rre ction:  K ant shoul d h ave s aid '. . . will s also wh at he bel i eves to b ethemeans which are i n di s pensably neces sary.. .' On c e  co rre cted, there marki s no do u bt t r ue. If you are ra tional, you can not in te ndt o go t o StAn d rew s, and beli evethat gett ing of f  at Leu c hars is  a nec ess ary  mea n sof  ge tt i ngt he re, wit hout int en di ng to  get o f f  atLeu char s. Bu t this merely  st ates wha t has  to b e ex pl ained . Whyis it  s o? If (B) descr ibes  correctrea so nin g,  then a rati ona l p erson w ho inte n dsto g o  t o St Andrews, andbe l i ev es thatgettin g  o ff at Leuch ar s i s an e cessa ry m e an s of doi ng so, wi ll  be bro ug ht byth isrea sonin g  tointend  to getoff a t  Leuchars. The n  Kant's remar k  w i l lb e tr ueof her. But  itd oesnoth el p u s  unde rstan dw hy the reasoning is co rr ect. K ant ( 1948, p. 81)next saysh i s  remarkis a n al y tic, but again  that  does nott ake us f ar fo rward. I f intenti o n  reasoni ngiscor rec t ,  t hen it is par t of t he  meanin g o f 'rati ona l'tha t a  r ational p erson wi ll  b egu ide d byi t. 'Rati on al'  m ean s, in part,guide d by  c or r ect  reason i ng . So K an t' s re mar kwillbe t r uein virt ue of the  me a ning  o f'ration al'. But we s ti ll need an  e xpl anatio n of how i ntention reasoning canb e corre ctin th e fi rst place . K ant (1 948 ,  p, 81 ) fina lly s ay s,i n  expl a n at ion :For in myw i lli ng of  a n ob ject as  an effect, therei s a lready concei ved  the c au sal i ty ofmy s elf a s an acting cau se – thatis ,  t he use ofm ean s;  and fr om theconce p t of wi lling anend the i mp erat i v e m erely extr acts the  concepto f act i on s nec ess ary to  t his  end.  If yo u  co nceiv e of y ou rselfas do in g someth ing, you must conceiveof you rself  as  doing it  so m eho w – thatmaybe true. B utwhe n you  co n ceive  ofy ou rse l f asdoin g  somethin g ,you n ee d not havea n y  sp ecifi c m e ans in  min d. So when you co n ceive of yours elfa s  do ing some th ing, it cannot  be  p a r t of you rconceptionthat you  c o nceiv e of y oursel f as ta k i ng some s peci fic  means to  do  i t . You c ou ld concei ve o fyourse lf asg oing t o St Andrews wit houtc o nceiv i ngof yo ur self as gett ing off th e train atLeucha rs.Kantacknowl ed ges th is,  b ut he thin k s it is n ot po ssibleif  you  ar e rati onal a nd if  you  b eli eve getti n g 
 Kant_(1948, pp._80–1) says, first: Who_wills the_end,_wills (so_far_as reason has_a decisive influence_on his actions) also_the means which_are_indispensably necessary and in his power. This remark needs a small correction: Kant should_have_said '..._wills_also_what he believes to be_the means which are indispensably_necessary...' Once_corrected, the remark is no doubt true. If_you_are rational, you_cannot intend to go to St Andrews, and believe_that getting off at Leuchars is_a necessary means_of_getting_there, without intending to_get off at Leuchars. But this_merely states what has to be_explained. Why is it so? If (B)_describes correct reasoning, then a rational_person who intends to go_to St_Andrews, and believes that getting_off at Leuchars_is a_necessary means of_doing so, will be brought by_this reasoning to_intend to get off at Leuchars._Then_Kant's remark will_be_true_of her._But it does_not_help us_understand_why the reasoning is correct. Kant_(1948,_p. 81) next says his remark is_analytic, but again that_does_not take us far_forward. If intention reasoning is_correct, then it is part of_the meaning_of 'rational'_that a rational person will be guided by it. 'Rational' means,_in part, guided by correct reasoning._So Kant's remark will_be true_in_virtue of the_meaning_of 'rational'._But we still need an explanation of_how intention_reasoning can be correct in the_first place. Kant (1948,_p,_81) finally says, in explanation: For_in my willing of an object_as an effect, there is_already_conceived_the causality of myself as_an acting cause – that is,_the use of_means; and from the concept of willing_an_end the imperative merely extracts the_concept_of actions necessary to this end._If_you_conceive of yourself as doing_something, you must conceive of yourself_as doing it somehow – that may be true._But when you_conceive of yourself as doing_something,_you_need not have any specific means in mind. So when_you conceive_of yourself as_doing something, it cannot be part of your conception that_you conceive of yourself as taking some_specific means to do it. You could conceive of yourself as_going to St Andrews without conceiving of yourself_as getting off the train at Leuchars._Kant acknowledges this, but_he_thinks it is not possible if you_are_rational_and_if you believe_getting