 the mountains. now we have two distinct routes to an answer to the higher-order tion 'what to plan to plan to do in V?'. Moreover, these routes lead toques conflicting conclusions. So which should we to go with-the reasoning that leads to ð2Þ or the reasoning that leads to ð2*Þ? But once we acknowledge this question, Daskal thinks we learn that PPIMs are not really possible. Here he gives two arguments. First, he argues that because the first-order question 'what to plan to do in V?' and the higher-order question 'what to plan to plan to do in V?' are so similar, the reasons that support using a particular strategy ðor advisorÞ for answering one question should carry over with equal force to support doing the same for the other question. So, for example, whatever reason I have for going with You1 for the higher-order question would seem to lead me to also go with You1 for the first-order question. And whatever reason I have for going with Me1 for the higher-order question wouldThis content downloaded from 128.252.58.243 on Fri, 13 Dec 2013 11:00:23 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions seem to lead me to also go with Me1 for the first-order question.5 The second argument builds from Gibbard's account of what planning is. To 374 Ethics January 2014plan to X is to endorse or commit to X-ing. But if this is what planning is, then PPIMs seem incoherent. After all, in my planning for V, my higher-order reasoning commits me to planning to go to the shore, and my first-order reasoning commits me to planning to go to themountains. Not only are these plans incompatible but, since we are dealing with an innocent mistake, neither is supposed to repudiate the other. But how can this be?6 Together, we can see these arguments as presenting Gibbard with a threefold challenge. First, he must explain how it is possible to use different strategies ðor advisorsÞ to come to incompatible decisions about what to do and what to plan to do. Second, he needs to explain why it makes sense to see these diverging plans as involving an innocent mistake. Finally, we need an explanation of how it is that both of these decisions nonetheless carry the endorsement that is characteristic of genuine plans. II. HOW TO MAKE A PURE
the mountains. now we have two distinct path to an solution to the higher - order tion' what to design to plan to dress in V?'. Moreover, these routes conduct toques conflicting decision. So which should we to go with - the reasoning that precede to ð2Þ or the reasoning that leads to ð2*Þ? But once we acknowledge this motion, Daskal intend we learn that PPIMs are not really possible. Here he gives two arguments. foremost, he argues that because the first - order motion' what to plan to do in V?' and the high - order doubt' what to plan to plan to do in V?' are so similar, the reason that support using a particular strategy ðor advisorÞ for answering one doubt should carry over with equal force to support doing the same for the other question. So, for example, whatever rationality I have for going with You1 for the higher - decree motion would seem to lead me to besides go with You1 for the inaugural - order question. And whatever rationality I have for going with Me1 for the higher - order question wouldThis content downloaded from 128.252.58.243 on Fri, 13 Dec 2013 11:00:23 master of arts All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions seem to head me to besides go with Me1 for the first - order question.5 The second argument builds from Gibbard's account of what planning is. To 374 Ethics January 2014plan to X is to endorse or commit to ten - ing. But if this is what planning is, then PPIMs seem incoherent. After all, in my planning for V, my higher - club reasoning commits me to plan to go to the shore, and my first - ordering reasoning commits me to plan to go to themountains. Not merely are these plans contrastive but, since we are dealing with an innocent error, neither is supposed to repudiate the other. But how can this be?6 Together, we can see these arguments as presenting Gibbard with a threefold challenge. First, he must explain how it is possible to use unlike strategies ðor advisorsÞ to come to discrepant decisions about what to do and what to plan to do. Second, he needs to explain why it makes sense to visit these diverging plans as involving an innocent mistake. Finally, we necessitate an explanation of how it is that both of these decision however hold the endorsement that is characteristic of genuine plans. II. HOW TO MAKE A PURE
 thf mountains. now we have uwo distinct routgs to an answed to the higher-order tion 'what to plen ti plab to do in V?'. Moreover, ghese rounes lead roquts conflicting coidlusions. So wglch skonld we to go wijh-the reasonhng that leads tu ð2Þ or the reasoning that leads to ð2*Þ? Bue once ee acknowledge tris atestjon, Daskal thinks we learn that PPJMs are not really ppssible. Here he gives two wrgulents. First, he argkes that bexausq the first-oraer question 'what to pman to do in V?' and the higher-oraer qbestion 'whaj fo klan to plan to dj in V?' are so similas, the rrasons that suiport usung a particular stravegy ðor advisorÞ for wnswering oue question should caert ovet witv eqjql worde tk supplrt doing the same for tye other question. Sp, sir example, whztever rqason I have for going with You1 for the hifher-order question woule seem to lead me to wlso go wyth You1 for the first-order question. And whatever seasoi K hcyc fof gling with Me1 for the higher-order question woujsTnix content downjoaded from 128.252.58.243 ln Sri, 13 Dec 2013 11:00:23 AM All use aubject to JSTOR Tfrms anq Coneitions stem tp lead me to also go with Mw1 for the figst-oeder question.5 The decond arguoent builcs from Gibbard's accounc of wgat planninh is. To 374 Sghics January 2014plxn no X is to endorse or commit tj X-ing. Buv if chis is dhat plannyng is, thej PPIMs seem incoherent. Wfter anl, in my ppanning for V, my higher-order reexoning commijs ke no planniug to no to the shore, and my first-otder reasjning commits mv to planiing to go tj themountainv. Not only arx these pjans incimpatibud but, since we are dealpny with an innocent mistake, keithgr is supposed to rekueiate the othet. Bjt roa ran trhs be?6 Togethar, wd cxm see these argundnts as presenting Gibbasd wjth a threefold chsljenge. Fitst, he muft explain hoe it is possible tl use dihfereny sjrategies ðor advisorsÞ to come tk incompahibje decisions abomt wrat to do cnd what to plan to do. Second, he needs ti explain why it mqkes sense to see tkexe diverginj planf as invonving an innocent miwtake. Finally, we keed an explanation of how id is hhat both of these decisions nonetheless carry the endorsement that is chqracteciftic of genhine planv. NI. KOW TO IAKE E PURE
the mountains. now we have two distinct an to the tion 'what to in Moreover, these routes toques conflicting conclusions. which should we to go with-the that leads to ð2Þ or the reasoning that leads to ð2*Þ? But once acknowledge this question, Daskal thinks we learn that PPIMs are not really possible. he two First, argues that because the first-order question 'what to plan to do in V?' and the higher-order 'what to plan to plan to do in are so similar, the that support using a particular ðor for answering question carry with equal force support doing the same for the other question. So, for example, whatever reason I have for going You1 for question would to me also go with the first-order question. And whatever reason going with Me1 for the higher-order question wouldThis downloaded from on Fri, 13 Dec 2013 11:00:23 All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions to lead me to also go with Me1 for the first-order question.5 The second argument Gibbard's account of what is. To 374 January to is endorse or to X-ing. But if this is what planning is, then PPIMs incoherent. After all, in my planning for V, my higher-order me planning to go the shore, and my reasoning me to planning to themountains. only incompatible since are dealing with an mistake, neither is supposed to the other. But how can see these arguments as presenting Gibbard with threefold challenge. First, he must explain how is possible to use different strategies ðor advisorsÞ to come to incompatible about what and what to plan to do. Second, he to explain why it sense to see these diverging plans as involving an mistake. we need explanation of how is that both these decisions nonetheless endorsement that characteristic genuine TO MAKE A PURE
 the mountains. now we have two dIstinct rouTes to An aNswEr To thE higHer-order tion 'whAT to pLan to plan to do in V?'. MoreovEr, theSe ROuteS LeAd toqUes confLIcTINg cOnClUsiOnS. so Which ShoUld we to Go with-the rEasOnIng that leads TO ð2þ or the reasOniNg that leads tO ð2*Þ? but oncE wE acKNowleDge This qUestioN, daskal Thinks we lEaRN that PpiMs are nOT ReAlly Possible. Here he givES tWO arguments. FirsT, he argUeS ThAT BecAusE the first-oRdEr queSTion 'whaT To PLAN to DO in V?' and the higHer-order queSTioN 'what tO pLan TO plan tO do in v?' aRE so Similar, the rEasoNs that supPort usINg a partICular stRategy Ðor AdvIsorþ FoR aNswErINg oNE qUesTIon Should caRrY oVer wiTh eqUAL FOrce To sUppoRt doiNg the same for tHe oTher QUesTion. SO, for eXampLe, WhateVer reaSon I hAvE for going with YoU1 for The higher-OrdEr QueStIon woULd seem To lEad Me to alsO go with yOu1 fOr THE FiRst-order question. AnD wHATeVer reasoN I have FOr GoINg with Me1 FoR thE higHER-ordeR queSTiOn wouldTHis conTEnT dOwnloadEd From 128.252.58.243 on frI, 13 DeC 2013 11:00:23 AM all usE SubjEct to JsTOR TermS and CONditions seem to LEad me to also go WItH mE1 fOR the FirSt-order quesTion.5 tHe seCond ARgUmeNT builDs froM GIBbARd's account of what plaNnIng is. TO 374 EthiCs January 2014plan To X is to endORSE or commiT to X-INg. bUt if this is what PlannIng is, then PpiMs seem iNcoheRent. AfteR all, in my pLANning for v, my HigHer-OrdER ReAsoning commitS ME to pLaNning to Go tO the shoRe, aNd mY fiRst-OrDer reasonIng commiTs Me To PlAnnIng to GO to themoUnTaiNs. not Only aRE these Plans IncoMpAtIBle But, sincE We ARE deaLiNg With An iNnOcent MistAKe, nEither iS supposed To rEPudiAtE tHe other. but how can this Be?6 together, we CaN seE these ARGuments aS presenting Gibbard with a THreefolD chAllenGe. FiRst, he must ExpLain hoW it IS possiBle to uSe difFeRenT STrateGIEs Ðor AdVisorsÞ to cOME to IncomPaTiblE decisiOns about what to do anD WhaT to plan to do. SeConD, he nEEDs To eXPlAIn wHy IT maKES sense to see thesE diverging PlANs As involvinG An iNnOcent miStake. FiNally, WE need an ExplanatiOn of how it Is That BOTh oF these deciSions nonEtheless cARry thE EnDorseMenT that iS cHarActerIstic oF GenUine pLans. II. hOw TO MAKe A PURe
 the mountains. now we hav e two dist inctrou tes  t o an  ans wer to the hig h er-o rder tion 'what to pla n topl a n to do  in V ?'. Mor e ov e r , t he se  ro ut e sleadtoq ues con flicting c onc lu sions. So wh i ch  should we  to  go with-the  re asonin gtha t  lead s t o ð2Þ  or th e  reaso ning that  l e ads to ð2*Þ? B u t  o ncewe acknowledge th i sq uestion, Daska l thin ks we l ear n t hat PPIMsar e not reallyp os s i b le. Here he gives  two argume n ts.  First ,hea rguesthatbe c aus e the first -ord er questi on 'wh a t to pl a n to do  in V? ' a ndtheh ig he r-o rd e r q u es tio n  'w hat to p la nto pl an t o d o  inV?'  are  so s imilar, the r eas onst hat  supp ort u sing  a  part icular  stra te gy ðor advisorÞ  for  answerin g o ne  qu es tions houldcar ryover wi th equa l  fo rc e t osupport doing thesa m e  f or the o ther q u es ti o n. So, f or  ex ampl e ,  what ever re ason I h ave fo r  g oi ng with  Y ou1 fo rthe  hi gher- o rder  quest ion woul d see m  to lead me to also go withY ou 1 fo r  the  fi rst-order q uest i on.Andw ha tev e r rea son I  h a ve for going with Me1fo r thehighe r-order quest ion wouldT h i s  content  dow n lo a ded from 128.2 52.58 .243 on Fr i , 13 Dec  2013  11:00:2 3 AM Allu s e subjec t t o J STO R T e r ms  and Conditio n s  see mto lead  me  to als o g o w ith  Me 1for the f irst-ord er  q ue st ion .5 Th e  secondar gum en t b uilds from G ibbar d'sac co u ntof what pl a n ning  i s.  To374  E thics  Jan u ary  2014pl an to X i s t o  end or se  or com mit to X-ing.  B ut if this  i s w hat pl a n ning is,  then PPIMs seem incohe r ent. Af ter  all,  inmy planni ngfor V,  my higher -order  reas on ing c ommit s me  to  p lanning to g o t o the  s hore , and m y first-order reas o nin g commits metoplan n i ng  to go toth e mou n t ains. Not onlyare thesepl a ns  incompati b lebu t, sinc e we ar e dea l ing wit h an inno cent mist ak e, n e i the r is suppo sed to r epudiatet he ot h er . But  ho w canth isbe?6Togeth e r,we ca n seeth ese ar gumen ts  as pres enting Gibbard with a t hreefo ld ch all enge. Fir st, hemust expl ainhow it ispos sib le to  us e  diff eren t  s tra t egies  ðor advisorsÞ to  co m e  t o incompati b l e  de cisio nsa bout w hatto do and what to plan to do. Se cond , henee d s to  e xplain why itmak es s ense tose e these div erging p la n s asinvolv ing an  innoce n t  m i stake.  Fin all y, we nee d a ne xplanat io no f howit i sthat b oth of thes e decisions noneth eless c arryt heendor se ment th a t is  character istic of ge nuineplan s. II . HOW T OMAKE A  PU RE 
 the_mountains. now_we have two distinct_routes to_an_answer to_the_higher-order tion 'what_to plan to_plan to do in_V?'. Moreover, these_routes_lead toques conflicting conclusions. So which should we to go with-the reasoning that leads_to_ð2Þ or_the_reasoning_that leads to ð2*Þ? But_once we acknowledge this question,_Daskal thinks_we learn that PPIMs are not really possible._Here_he gives two_arguments. First, he argues that because the first-order question_'what to plan to do in_V?' and the_higher-order_question_'what to plan to_plan to do in V?' are_so similar, the reasons that support_using a particular strategy ðor advisorÞ for_answering one question should carry over_with equal force to support_doing the_same for the other question._So, for example,_whatever reason_I have for_going with You1 for the higher-order_question would seem_to lead me to also go_with_You1 for the_first-order_question._And whatever_reason I have_for_going with_Me1_for the higher-order question wouldThis content_downloaded_from 128.252.58.243 on Fri, 13 Dec 2013_11:00:23 AM All use_subject_to JSTOR Terms and_Conditions seem to lead me_to also go with Me1 for_the first-order_question.5 The_second argument builds from Gibbard's account of what planning is. To_374 Ethics January 2014plan to X_is to endorse or_commit to_X-ing._But if this_is_what planning_is, then PPIMs seem incoherent. After all,_in my_planning for V, my higher-order reasoning_commits me to planning_to_go to the shore, and my_first-order reasoning commits me to planning_to go to themountains. Not_only_are_these plans incompatible but, since_we are dealing with an innocent_mistake, neither is_supposed to repudiate the other. But how_can_this be?6 Together, we can see_these_arguments as presenting Gibbard with a_threefold_challenge._First, he must explain how_it is possible to use different_strategies ðor advisorsÞ to come to incompatible decisions about_what to do_and what to plan to_do._Second,_he needs to explain why it makes sense to see_these diverging_plans as involving_an innocent mistake. Finally, we need an explanation of how_it is that both of these decisions_nonetheless carry the endorsement that is characteristic of genuine plans. II._HOW TO MAKE A PURE