 ourselves are not directly undergoing the misfortune. How is something like this possible? I think that the notions of Mitsein and being-in help to show how compassion is possible, and indeed the phenomenon of compassion is a perfect illustration of the existential validity of Heidegger's configuration of being-in-the-world. In compassion we are decentered, desubjectivized, our experience dwells in the other, and so it cannot be understood as a subjective or objective condition but rather as a curious, compelling. ecstatic being-with-the-other. Compassion, then, may be the deepest indication of Mitsein. 25 There are a number of studies 25In Being and Time Heidegger speaks to this point by saying "only on the basis of Being-with does 'empathy' become possible" (p. 162). The German word here is Einfuhlung, not Mitleid. These two words are not exactly synonymous in German, but they overlap enough in the matter of sharing the experiences of others to make this passage fit my point well enough. In fact, Einfuhlung is the stronger, more heartfelt experience, and the "ein" captures an ecstatic sense of dwelling more sharply than "mit" does; moreover, "fuhlen" can apply to more positive ecstases and not simply to the sensitivity to misfortune. ETHICS AND FINITUDE 415 suggesting that compassion is something natural in humans, even in very young children, that it is not simply a matter of social conditioning. 26 If this is right, then moral theories like egoism or utilitarianism that focus exclusively on self-interest are seriously flawed. But indifference might be no less natural, either. Nevertheless the issue of compassion and indifference can be given more force if we see them as basic existential conditions; this would deepen ethical discourse to the heart of our being. Might it be, for example, that compassion is a basic ethical disposition (Befindlichkeit) or mood (Stimmung) that attunes us to the moral life in a way that mere knowledge, theories, or rules cannot? And might there be ways to cultivate this attunement or prevent its eclipse by other factors in the social environment? One thing is clear (and this is a thoroughly Heideggerian insight): attention to our finitude can open up the world in new ways; there is a fundamental connection between limit conditions and the disclosure of meaning. Specifically, our own sufferings can open us to noticing and feeling
ourselves are not directly undergoing the misfortune. How is something like this possible? I think that the notion of Mitsein and being - in aid to show how compassion is possible, and indeed the phenomenon of compassion is a perfect example of the existential validity of Heidegger's shape of being - in - the - world. In compassion we are decentered, desubjectivized, our experience dwells in the other, and thus it cannot be understood as a subjective or objective circumstance but rather as a curious, compelling. ecstatic being - with - the - other. Compassion, then, may be the deepest indication of Mitsein. 25 There constitute a number of studies 25In Being and Time Heidegger speaks to this point by saying " merely on the basis of Being - with does' empathy' become possible " (p. 162). The German word here is Einfuhlung, not Mitleid. These two word are not exactly synonymous in German, but they overlap enough in the matter of sharing the experience of others to make this passage fit my point well enough. In fact, Einfuhlung is the stronger, more dear experience, and the " ein " captures an ecstatic sense of dwelling more sharply than " mit " does; moreover, " fuhlen " can give to more cocksure ecstases and not simply to the sensitivity to misfortune. ETHICS AND FINITUDE 415 suggesting that compassion is something natural in humans, even in very young children, that it is not plainly a topic of social conditioning. 26 If this is correct, then moral theories like egoism or utilitarianism that concenter entirely on self - pastime are seriously flawed. But nonchalance might be no less natural, either. Nevertheless the issue of compassion and indifference can be move over more force if we see them as basic existential conditions; this would deepen ethical discourse to the heart of our being. Might it be, for example, that compassion is a basic ethical disposition (Befindlichkeit) or mood (Stimmung) that attune us to the moral life in a room that bare cognition, theories, or rules cannot? And might there be ways to cultivate this attunement or prevent its eclipse by other factors in the social environment? One thing is clear (and this is a thoroughly Heideggerian penetration ): attention to our finiteness can open up the world in new ways; there is a cardinal connection between limit conditions and the disclosure of meaning. Specifically, our own sufferings can open us to noticing and feel
 ougselves are not directly undergoing the misforvune. Hos is somdthing like this possible? I vhinj thau the notions of Migsein and being-in helk to show how com'zssion lf poadiblz, end indeed the khenomenon ox compassion iv x 'erfect illustration of the existentyal valodlty of Heidegggr's cpgfighgauion of being-in-the-world. In compasaion we are decenterrd, desubjectivized, our expfriejce dwells in the lther, and si it xannot be unaerstood as a subjectibe or objective condition but rxther as a curiiuw, clkpelling. ecwtatib being-with-thc-pther. Wompassoon, then, may bc the dewpest indication of Mmtsein. 25 There are a gumber of scudies 25In Being and Tumw Heigeggar sowakr tk vhia poinh bb saying "onmy on the bqsis of Being-with dpef 'empathy' becoje posfifle" (p. 162). The German word here is Einfuhlutg, hot Mitleid. These two wirds are not exactly dynonymouf in German, but they overlap enough in the matter of siafiny the dzpfriences of others to make this passage fit mr ppikt well enough. Ik fact, Einfuhlung os tng stronger, morg heartyslf experience, and tje "ein" saptuees an ecftatoc sense of dwelling more syarply than "iut" does; moreover, "fbhlen" can ap'ly to more positive ecstases and uot sijply to the sensitivjgy to misfortune. ETMICV AND FINITUDE 415 suggesting that com'assipn is sumetning nwtural in jumans, even in very younh chipdsen, that ih is not simply a matter of socmel conditionimg. 26 Ix this if rigmt, then moral treories like eyoism or utilktarianism that fmcus exclusyvely on self-hjterest are veriouslr flqwed. But inakfference mighy be no lvsf narural, either. Neverbhelera the issue of eunpassion and incifwerqnbe ran bq given more xorcd iw we sde them as naskc ecistential conditionv; thjs would deepen etnigal discoorse to tre heart of oir being. Might it he, foc exam'le, thst sompassion is a basic ethical sispositiln (Nefindlichkeie) or mood (Stimmuug) that attunes us to the moral life in e way that mere knowledte, theories, or rulex cannot? And mighe there ba ways to cultivate rhis attunement ov prevent its eclipse gy othar faftors in the social environment? One thing is clear (and this is a thoroughoy Heivedgerian insjght): attettnon to ouw fiiivude can open up nhe world in new ways; there is a fundamettcl connection between limit cpnaitions and tfe disclosure of meaning. Specifivally, our own sufferings can oprn us to noticing and fecling
ourselves are not directly undergoing the misfortune. something this possible? think that the help show how compassion possible, and indeed phenomenon of compassion is a perfect of the existential validity of Heidegger's configuration of being-in-the-world. In compassion we are desubjectivized, our experience dwells in the other, and so it cannot be understood a or condition rather as a curious, compelling. ecstatic being-with-the-other. Compassion, then, may be the deepest indication of Mitsein. There are a number of studies 25In Being Time Heidegger speaks to point by saying "only on basis Being-with does become (p. The German word is Einfuhlung, not Mitleid. These two words are not exactly synonymous in German, but they overlap enough the matter the experiences others make passage fit my enough. In fact, Einfuhlung is the experience, and the "ein" captures an ecstatic sense dwelling more than "mit" does; moreover, "fuhlen" can to more positive ecstases and not simply to sensitivity to misfortune. ETHICS AND FINITUDE 415 suggesting that compassion is something natural in humans, very young children, that is not simply matter social 26 this is then moral theories like egoism or utilitarianism that focus exclusively on are seriously flawed. But indifference might be no less natural, the of compassion and can be given more if see them as basic this deepen the of being. Might it be, example, that compassion is a ethical disposition (Befindlichkeit) or to the moral life in a way that knowledge, theories, or rules cannot? And might be ways to cultivate this attunement or prevent its eclipse by other in the One thing is clear (and this is a Heideggerian insight): attention to finitude can open up the world in new ways; is fundamental connection limit conditions and disclosure of meaning. our own sufferings us to and
 ourselves are not directly unDergoing thE misfOrtUne. hoW is sOmetHing like this poSSiblE? I think that the notions oF MitsEiN And bEInG-in heLp to shoW HoW COmpAsSiOn iS pOSsIble, aNd iNdeed thE phenomenoN of CoMpassion is a pERfEct illustrAtiOn of the existEntIal valIdIty OF HeidEggEr's coNfigurATion of Being-in-thE-wORld. In cOMpassioN WE aRe deCentered, desubjectIViZEd, our experiencE dwellS iN ThE OTheR, anD so it cannoT bE undeRStood as A SuBJECtiVE or objective cOndition but RAthEr as a cUrIouS, CompelLing. eCsTAtiC being-with-tHe-otHer. CompasSion, thEN, may be tHE deepesT indicAtiOn oF MitSEiN. 25 THerE aRE a nUMbEr oF StuDies 25In BeInG aNd TimE HeiDEGGEr spEakS to tHis poInt by saying "onLy oN the BAsiS of BeIng-wiTh doEs 'EmpatHy' becoMe posSiBle" (p. 162). The German woRd heRe is EinfuHluNg, Not miTleid. tHese twO woRds Are not eXactly sYNonYmOUS In german, but they overlAp ENOuGh in the mAtter oF ShArINg the expErIenCes oF OThers To maKE tHis passaGe fit mY PoInT well enOuGh. In faCt, einFuhLung iS The sTrongeR, more heaRtfelT Experience, and tHE "ein" captures aN EcSTAtIC senSe oF dwelling moRe shARply Than "MIt" DoeS; MoreoVer, "fuHlEN" cAN apply to more positivE eCstaseS and nOt simply to the SensitivitY TO MisfortuNe. EThiCs aND FINITUDE 415 sugGestiNg that compASsion is sOmethIng naturAl in humanS, EVen in verY yoUng ChiLdrEN, ThAt it is not simpLY A matTeR of sociAl cOnditioNinG. 26 If ThiS is RiGht, then moRal theorIeS lIkE eGoiSm or uTIlitariaNiSm tHaT foCus exCLusiveLy on sElf-iNtErESt aRe serioUSlY FLaweD. BUt IndiFfeReNce miGht bE No lEss natuRal, either. nevERtheLeSs The issuE of compassion AnD indiffereNcE caN be givEN More forcE if we see them as basic exisTEntial cOndItionS; thiS would deePen EthicaL diSCourse To the hEart oF oUr bEINg. MigHT It Be, fOr Example, thaT COmpAssioN iS a baSic ethiCal disposition (BefiNDliChkeit) or mood (STimMung) THAt AttUNeS Us tO tHE moRAL life in a way that Mere knowleDgE, ThEories, or ruLEs cAnNot? And mIght theRe be wAYs to culTivate thiS attunemeNt Or prEVEnt Its eclipse By other fActors in tHE sociAL eNviroNmeNt? One tHiNg iS cleaR (and thIS is A thorOughly heIdeggeRian iNsIght): atteNtion to our finitude can opEn up thE worlD in New ways; thEre IS a fUndamentaL conNection betWeeN liMit coNdiTIons aNd thE DiSclOSure oF meaNIng. SpecifICaLly, OUR oWn sufferingS CAN opEn us tO noTIcing aNd feEling
 ourselves are not directl y undergoi ng th e m isf or tune . Ho w is something like  this possible? I thin k tha tt he n o ti ons o f Mitse i na n d b ei ng -in  h e lp  to s how  how co mpassion i s p os sible, and i n de ed the phe nom enon of comp ass ion is  a  pe r fectill ustra tion o f  the e xistentia lv alidit y  of Hei d e gg er's  configuration of be i ng-in-the-worl d. Inco m pa s s ion  we  are decen te red,d esubjec t iv i z e d,o ur experience  dwells int heother,  a nds o it c annot  b e  un derstood as  a s ubjective  or ob j ectivec onditio n butrat her  asa  c ur iou s, com p el lin g . e cstaticbe in g-wit h-th e - o t her.  Co mpas sion,  then, may be  th e de e pes t ind icati on o fMitse in. 25  Ther eare a number of  stu dies 25In  Be in g a nd  Time Heideg ger  sp eaks to  this p o int  b y s ay ing "only on the b as i s  o f Being- with d o es  ' e mpathy'be com e po s s ible"  (p. 16 2). TheGerman wo rd  here i sEinfuh lu ng,  no t Mit l eid.  These  two wor ds ar e  not exactly s y nonymous in G e rm a n ,b ut t hey  overlap en ough in t he m a tt ero f sha ringth e  e x periences of others  t o make  this  passage fitmy point w e l l  enough.  Inf ac t , Einfuhlung i s the  stronger, more hea rtfel t experi ence, and t he "ein"  ca ptu res  an e cs tatic sense o f dwel li ng more  sh arply t han  "m it"  do es ; moreove r, "fuhl en "ca napp ly to more pos it ive  e cst asesa nd not  simp ly t oth e  se nsitivi t yt o  mis fo rt une.  ET HI CS AN D FI N ITU DE 415suggestin g t h at c om pa ssion i s something n at ural in hu ma ns,  eveni n  very yo ung children, that it i s  not si mpl y a m atte r of soci alcondit ion i ng. 26  If th is is  r igh t ,  then m or alth eories lik e ego ism o rutil itarian ism that focus exc l usi vely on self- int eres t ar e s e ri o usl yf law e d . But indiffere nce mightbe no  less natu r al,  e ither.Neverth eless the iss ue of com passion a nd  ind i f fer ence can b e givenmore forc e  if w e  s ee th emas bas ic  ex isten tial c o ndi tions ; this  w ould d eepen  e thical d iscourse to the heart o f ourbeing . M ight it b e,f orexample,that  compassio n i s a  basi c e t hical  dis p os iti o n (Be find l ichkeit)o rmoo d (S timmung) th a t att unesust o themora l life in a way t h at mere knowle dge, t heo rie s , or  r ules cannot? A ndmi g h t therebe  ways to cu ltivateth i s att unemen t or p reventi t se clipse  byoth er factor s i nt he soci al  e n vironm ent?  O ne thi ng isc lear ( and this is a th oroug h l y Hei d egg erian  i nsight) :  att ention toour finitud e canopen  up t he worl din new  wa ys ; there is a fundame ntalconnect io n be twe en lim it c o n ditio ns a nd  th e disclos u r eo fme a nin g. S pecif ic ally , our own sufferin gsc an open  u s t o notici n ga n d feeling
 ourselves_are not_directly undergoing the misfortune._How is_something_like this_possible?_I think that_the notions of_Mitsein and being-in help_to show how_compassion_is possible, and indeed the phenomenon of compassion is a perfect illustration of the_existential_validity of_Heidegger's_configuration_of being-in-the-world. In compassion we_are decentered, desubjectivized, our experience_dwells in_the other, and so it cannot be understood_as_a subjective or_objective condition but rather as a curious, compelling. ecstatic_being-with-the-other. Compassion, then, may be the_deepest indication of_Mitsein._25_There are a number_of studies 25In Being and Time_Heidegger speaks to this point by_saying "only on the basis of Being-with_does 'empathy' become possible" (p. 162)._The German word here is_Einfuhlung, not_Mitleid. These two words are_not exactly synonymous_in German,_but they overlap_enough in the matter of sharing_the experiences of_others to make this passage fit_my_point well enough._In_fact,_Einfuhlung is_the stronger, more_heartfelt_experience, and_the_"ein" captures an ecstatic sense of_dwelling_more sharply than "mit" does; moreover, "fuhlen"_can apply to more_positive_ecstases and not simply_to the sensitivity to misfortune._ETHICS AND FINITUDE 415 suggesting that_compassion is_something natural_in humans, even in very young children, that it is not_simply a matter of social conditioning._26 If this is_right, then_moral_theories like egoism_or_utilitarianism that_focus exclusively on self-interest are seriously flawed._But indifference_might be no less natural, either._Nevertheless the issue of_compassion_and indifference can be given more_force if we see them as_basic existential conditions; this would_deepen_ethical_discourse to the heart of_our being. Might it be, for_example, that compassion_is a basic ethical disposition (Befindlichkeit) or_mood_(Stimmung) that attunes us to the_moral_life in a way that mere_knowledge,_theories,_or rules cannot? And might_there be ways to cultivate this_attunement or prevent its eclipse by other factors in_the social environment?_One thing is clear (and_this_is_a thoroughly Heideggerian insight): attention to our finitude can open_up the_world in new_ways; there is a fundamental connection between limit conditions and_the disclosure of meaning. Specifically, our own_sufferings can open us to noticing and feeling