 chance that S gets it right when S believes that she will lose the lottery. And in Case 3 (the Gettier case), it seems just a matter of luck that S gets it right that someone in her office owns a Ford. In the garbage chute case, however, we think that it is due to S's good reasoning that she gets 6 things right-we give S credit for arriving at the truth in this case, and we are therefore willing to say that she knows. This is the main idea that I want to pursue.xiii The idea needs to be developed, however. For one, my treatment of the two problems remains largely intuitive so far. More importantly, the main idea I am proposing is faced with the following problem. First, I have said that we are willing to give S credit for her true belief in cases of knowledge, but not in the lottery case or in Gettier cases. Second, I have said that this is because in the former, but not in the latter, S's arriving at the truth is due to her own efforts and actions, or more exactly, to her own abilities. But it is not clear why the various cases can be distinguished in this way. Consider that in the lottery case, S uses excellent reasons to draw the conclusion that she will lose. And in the Gettier case, S reasons flawlessly to the conclusion that someone in her office owns a Ford. But then it seems that S arrives at the truth because of her abilities in all of the cases above, and not only in the cases where we judge that S has knowledge. Clearly, more needs to be said. By way of saying more, I will draw on some important work in moral theory. Specifically, I want to look at Joel Feinberg's fascinating discussion of attributions of moral blame.xiv From this it will be easy enough to construct a general theory of credit attribution, and a theory of intellectual credit attribution in particular. With this groundwork in place, it will be possible to explain why it is appropriate to give S credit for her true belief in cases of knowledge, and appropriate to withhold such credit in the lottery case and Gettier cases. More specifically, it will be possible to explain why, in cases of knowledge, it is appropriate to say that S gets things right because of her own abilities, whereas in the lottery case and Gettier cases, it is appropriate to deny this. a. Feinberg on blaming. Feinberg's account of moral blaming takes off
chance that S gets it right when S believes that she will miss the lottery. And in Case 3 (the Gettier subject), it seems just a matter of fortune that S gets it right that someone in her office own a Ford. In the drivel chute case, however, we think that it is due to S's good reasoning that she get 6 things right - we render S credit for arriving at the truth in this case, and we are therefore willing to state that she knows. This is the main idea that I desire to pursue.xiii The idea needs to be train, however. For one, my discussion of the two problems remains largely intuitive so far. More importantly, the main idea I am proposing is confront with the following problem. First, I have said that we are willing to pass S credit for her true belief in cases of knowledge, but not in the lottery case or in Gettier cases. Second, I have said that this is because in the former, but not in the latter, S's arriving at the accuracy is ascribable to her own efforts and actions, or more exactly, to her own ability. But it is not clear why the various cases can be spot in this direction. Consider that in the lottery case, S use excellent reasons to draw the conclusion that she will lose. And in the Gettier case, S reason flawlessly to the conclusion that someone in her office owns a Ford. But then it seems that S arrive at the truth because of her ability in all of the cases above, and not only in the cases where we judge that S has cognition. Clearly, more needs to be said. By way of saying more, I will draw on some important work in moral theory. Specifically, I desire to look at Joel Feinberg's fascinating discussion of attributions of moral blame.xiv From this it will be easy enough to construct a cosmopolitan theory of credit attribution, and a theory of intellectual recognition attribution in particular. With this foundation in place, it will be possible to explain why it is appropriate to give S credit for her on-key belief in cases of knowledge, and appropriate to withhold such credit in the lottery case and Gettier cases. More specifically, it will be possible to explain why, in cases of cognition, it is appropriate to say that S gets thing right because of her own abilities, whereas in the lottery case and Gettier cases, it is appropriate to deny this. a. Feinberg on blaming. Feinberg's account of moral blaming remove off
 chwnce that S gets it righu when S believes that sie will lose thd lottery. And in Case 3 (the Gxttiwr cawe), it seems just a matger of lubk that S getw it right vgat somcjne jk her iffice owns a Nord. In the garbage chute cxsz, however, we think that it is due to S's gooc geasoning that she dets 6 things right-we give S credit for arriviig at the truth in this case, and we are tjerevore willing to saj that she jnowf. This is the main idea that I want to pursue.xiii The idea needs tu be beveloped, hiwwveg. For one, my treanment of the beo protlems rrmains largely invuituve so far. More imporvantly, the main idea I am pro[oaing is faced wity rhe fmllofing proclej. Hirat, I hwve said that we are wiloing to give S credot dor her true gelief ig cases of knowledge, but not in the lotuery dase or in Gettier casew. Second, I have said jhat this ys because in the former, but not in the latter, S's arritivg cb gye truth is due to her own efforts and actions, jd koge exactly, to her own abilitoed. Not it is not cuear wkg fhe various cases fan be qistibguished yn tnis way. Consider that in thw lottery cafw, S uses excellent reasons to drae the conclusion that she wiul lkse. And in hhe Gettisf case, S reasons flswnessly to the conclusion trat someoie in her ofwice owns w Ford. But then it seems that S argives ad the trutj because of her abilities in all of the casex dbone, and noc only in the cases where we judgg that S kas knuwledge. Clvarly, morx needs to bq said. By way lf saying moce, I will draq on some iooortant work im moral tktory. Specidically, I want to kooy at Joel Feinbexy's fascinating dixcursijn oh attwhbutions of korau busme.xix From ukis kt woll be easy enough tm cohstruct a general yhcory of ctedit attwibution, and s theory of intelltctual crxdit aytrybution in particular. With thia groundwlrk in place, it wilo be possiblz to explain why it is appropriate to gite S credit for her troe belief in cases of lnowledge, aid appwopriate do withhold such creeit in the lottern case and Gettier casss. Mora spefifically, it will be possible to explain why, in cases of knowledge, it is qppropciwte to say fhat S gens chiugs rigrt bxceuse of her own anilities, whereas in the lottery case ang Yettier cases, it is appropriaye to deny this. a. Feinberg on blaming. Fsinberg's account of moral blaming takes off
chance that S gets it right when that will lose lottery. And in it just a matter luck that S it right that someone in her owns a Ford. In the garbage chute case, however, we think that it due to S's good reasoning that she gets 6 things right-we give S for at truth this case, and we are therefore willing to say that she knows. This is the main that I want to pursue.xiii The idea needs be developed, however. For my treatment of the two remains intuitive so More the idea I am is faced with the following problem. First, I have said that we are willing to give S for her in cases knowledge, not the lottery case Gettier cases. Second, I have said because in the former, but not in the S's arriving the truth is due to her efforts and actions, or more exactly, to her abilities. But it is not clear why the various cases can be distinguished in this that in the lottery S uses excellent to the that will lose. in the Gettier case, S reasons flawlessly to the conclusion that in her office owns a Ford. But then it seems arrives the truth because her abilities in all the above, and not only cases we has Clearly, needs to be said. way of saying more, I draw on some important I want to look at Joel Feinberg's fascinating of attributions of moral blame.xiv From this will be easy enough to construct a general theory of credit attribution, a theory credit attribution in particular. With this groundwork in it will be possible explain why it is appropriate to give S credit her belief in of knowledge, and to withhold such in the lottery Gettier cases. specifically, will explain why, in cases of knowledge, is to say that S gets right her own abilities, whereas in the lottery case and Gettier cases, it is appropriate to a. Feinberg on blaming. account moral blaming takes off
 chance that S gets it right wheN S believes That sHe wIll LoSe thE lotTery. And in Case 3 (tHE GetTier case), it seems just a maTter oF lUCk thAT S Gets iT right tHAt SOMeoNe In Her OfFIcE owns A FoRd. In the Garbage chuTe cAsE, however, we thINk That it is duE to s's good reasonIng That shE gEts 6 THings RigHt-we gIve S crEDit for Arriving aT tHE truth IN this caSE, AnD we aRe therefore willinG To SAy that she knows. this is ThE MaIN IdeA thAt I want to pUrSue.xiII The ideA NeEDS To bE Developed, howeVer. For one, my TReaTment oF tHe tWO problEms reMaINs lArgely intuiTive So far. More ImportANtly, the MAin idea i am proPosIng Is faCEd WiTh tHe FOllOWiNg pROblEm. First, I HaVe Said tHat wE ARE WillIng To giVe S crEdit for her truE beLief IN caSes of KnowlEdge, BuT not iN the loTtery CaSe or in Gettier caSes. SEcond, I havE saId ThaT tHis is BEcause In tHe fOrmer, buT not in tHE laTtER, s'S aRriving at the truth iS dUE To Her own efForts aND aCtIOns, or morE eXacTly, tO HEr own AbilITiEs. But it iS not clEAr WhY the varIoUs caseS cAn bE diStingUIsheD in thiS way. ConsIder tHAt in the lottery CAse, S uses excelLEnT REaSOns tO drAw the concluSion THat sHe wiLL lOse. aNd in tHe GetTiER cASe, S reasons flawlesslY tO the coNclusIon that someonE in her offiCE OWns a Ford. but tHEn IT seems that S arrIves aT the truth bECause of hEr abiLities in All of the cASEs above, aNd nOt oNly In tHE CaSes where we judGE That s hAs knowlEdgE. ClearlY, moRe nEedS to Be Said. By way Of saying MoRe, i wIlL drAw on sOMe importAnT woRk In mOral tHEory. SpEcifiCallY, I WaNT to Look at JOEl fEInbeRg'S fAsciNatInG discUssiON of AttribuTions of moRal BLame.XiV FRom this It will be easy eNoUgh to constRuCt a GeneraL THeory of cRedit attribution, and a theORy of intEllEctuaL creDit attribUtiOn in paRtiCUlar. WiTh this GrounDwOrk IN Place, IT WiLl bE pOssible to eXPLaiN why iT iS appRopriatE to give S credit for hER trUe belief in casEs oF knoWLEdGe, aND aPProPrIAte TO Withhold such creDit in the loTtERy Case and GetTIer CaSes. More SpecifiCally, IT will be Possible tO explain wHy, In caSES of Knowledge, iT is approPriate to sAY that s GeTs thiNgs Right bEcAusE of heR own abILitIes, whEreas iN tHe lottEry caSe And GettiEr cases, it is appropriate tO deny tHis. a. FEinBerg on blaMinG. feiNberg's accOunt Of moral blaMinG taKes ofF
 chance that S gets it rig ht when Sbelie ves  th at  she  wil l lose the lot t ery.  And in Case 3 (the Ge ttier  c a se), it  seem s justa  m a t ter  o fluc kt ha t S g ets  it rig ht that so meo ne  in her offi c eowns a For d.In the garba gechuteca se, howev er,  we t hink t h at itis due to  S ' s good reasoni n g  t hatshe gets 6 things ri g ht-we give S c reditfo r  a r r ivi ngat the tru th  in t h is case ,  a n d wea re thereforewilling tos aythat s he  kn o ws. Th is is  t h e m ain idea th at I  want topursue . xiii Th e  idea n eeds t o b e d evel o pe d,  ho we v er. Fo r o n e,my treat me nt  of t he t w o p robl ems  rem ainslargely intui tiv e so far . Mor e imp orta nt ly, t he mai n ide aI am proposingis f aced with  th efol lo wingp roblem . F irs t, I ha ve said tha tw e ar e willing to giveSc r ed it for h er tru e  b el i ef in ca se s o f kn o w ledge , bu t  n ot in th e lott e ry  c ase orin  Getti er  ca ses . Sec o nd,I have  said th at th i s is because i n  the former,b ut n ot in t helatter, S's  arr i ving  att he  tr u th is  dueto he r  own efforts and ac ti ons, o r mor e exactly, to  her own a b i l ities. B ut i t  i s  not clear why  thevarious ca s es can b e dis tinguish ed in thi s way. Con sid ertha t i n th e lottery cas e ,  S u se s excel len t reaso nstodra w t he  conclusi on thatsh ewi ll  lo se. A n d in the  G ett ie r c ase,S  reaso ns fl awle ss ly tothe con c lu s i on t ha tsome one  i n her  off i ceowns aFord. But  th e n it  s ee ms that  S arrives at  t he truth b ec aus e of h e r  abiliti es in all of the casesa bove, a ndnot o nlyin the ca ses  where  we judgethat S  haskn owl e d ge. C l e ar ly,  m ore needst o  be  said .By w ay of s aying more, I will dra w on some imp ort antw o rk  in mo r alth e ory . Specifically, I  want to l oo k  a t Joel Fei n ber g' s fasci natingdiscu s sion of  attribut ions of m or al b l a me. xiv From t his it w ill be ea s y eno u gh  to c ons tructagen eraltheory ofcredi t attr ib ution,  andatheory o f intellectual credit a ttribu tioninparticula r.W ith  this gro undw ork in pla ce,  it  will  be possi blet oexp l ain w hy i t  is appro p ri ate t ogive S cred i t for  hertru e  belie f in  cases of knowled g e, and appropr iate t o w ith h oldsu ch credit in t helo t t ery case  a nd Gettiercases. M or e  spec ifical ly, it  will b e po s sibleto e xpl ain why,inca s es of k no wl e dge, i t is  a ppropr iate t o  say t hat S gets thing s rig h t  beca u seof he rown abi l itie s, whereas  in the lot tery c aseand G ettierca ses, i t i sappropriat e  to denythis.  a. Fei nb ergonblamin g. F e i nberg 's a cc oun t of mora l bl a mi ng tak es o ff
 chance_that S_gets it right when_S believes_that_she will_lose_the lottery. And_in Case 3_(the Gettier case), it_seems just a_matter_of luck that S gets it right that someone in her office owns a_Ford._In the_garbage_chute_case, however, we think that_it is due to S's_good reasoning_that she gets 6 things right-we give S_credit_for arriving at_the truth in this case, and we are therefore_willing to say that she knows._This is the_main_idea_that I want to_pursue.xiii The idea needs to be_developed, however. For one, my treatment_of the two problems remains largely intuitive_so far. More importantly, the main_idea I am proposing is_faced with_the following problem. First, I_have said that_we are_willing to give_S credit for her true belief_in cases of_knowledge, but not in the lottery_case_or in Gettier_cases._Second,_I have_said that this_is_because in_the_former, but not in the latter,_S's_arriving at the truth is due to_her own efforts and_actions,_or more exactly, to_her own abilities. But it_is not clear why the various_cases can_be distinguished_in this way. Consider that in the lottery case, S uses_excellent reasons to draw the conclusion_that she will lose._And in_the_Gettier case, S_reasons_flawlessly to_the conclusion that someone in her office_owns a_Ford. But then it seems that_S arrives at the_truth_because of her abilities in all_of the cases above, and not_only in the cases where_we_judge_that S has knowledge. Clearly,_more needs to be said. By_way of saying_more, I will draw on some important_work_in moral theory. Specifically, I want_to_look at Joel Feinberg's fascinating discussion_of_attributions_of moral blame.xiv From this_it will be easy enough to_construct a general theory of credit attribution, and a_theory of intellectual_credit attribution in particular. With_this_groundwork_in place, it will be possible to explain why it_is appropriate_to give S_credit for her true belief in cases of knowledge, and_appropriate to withhold such credit in the_lottery case and Gettier cases. More specifically, it will be possible_to explain why, in cases of knowledge, it_is appropriate to say that S gets_things right because of_her_own abilities, whereas in the lottery case_and_Gettier_cases,_it is appropriate_to deny this._a. Feinberg on_blaming. Feinberg's_account of moral_blaming takes_off