 can give rise to knowledge. On the other hand, it seems that a ticket holder does not know that she will lose the lottery, even if the odds are heavily in favor of her losing. So here is the problem for fallibilism: how is it that in general one can know through inductive grounds, but in the lottery case one fails to know, though one's inductive grounds are excellent? To sharpen the problem, consider two cases of inductive reasoning. Case 1. On the way to the elevator S drops a trash bag down the garbage chute of her apartment building. A few minutes later, reasoning on the basis of past experience and relevant background knowledge, S forms the true belief that the bag is in the basement garbage room. Of course her grounds for so believing are merely inductive: it is possible that the trash bag somehow gets hung up in the chute, although this is extremely 2 unlikely.iii Case 2. S buys a ticket for a lottery in which the chances of winning are ten million to one. A few minutes later, reasoning on the basis of past experience and relevant background knowledge, S forms the true belief that she will lose the lottery. Of course her grounds for so believing are merely inductive: it is possible that she buys the winning ticket, although this is extremely unlikely. Many will have the intuition that S knows in Case 1 but not in Case 2. But how so, given that her reasons are excellent in both cases? This is what the fallibilist needs to explain. a. Nozick's tracking account. The difficulty of the problem is illustrated by some accounts that fail to solve it. According to Robert Nozick, S knows p just in case S's believing p tracks the truth.iv Complications aside, this amounts to the following: S knows p just in case 1. p is true 2. if p were true then S would believe p 3. if p were false then S would not believe p. Nozick's account does a good job explaining why S does not know in the lottery case: if S were going to win the lottery, she would still believe that she is going to lose. However, the tracking account rules incorrectly in the garbage chute case. This is because it is possible, although an extremely unlikely occurrence, that the trash bag gets hung up in the chute. But if the bag did get hung up, S would still believe that the bag is in the basement, and so S fails to satisfy clause (3) of Nozick's account
can give rise to knowledge. On the other bridge player, it seem that a ticket holder does not know that she will lose the lottery, even if the odds are heavy in favor of her losing. So here is the trouble for fallibilism: how is it that in cosmopolitan one can know through inductive grounds, but in the lottery case one fails to know, though one's inductive ground are excellent? To sharpen the problem, think two cases of inductive reasoning. Case 1. On the way to the elevator S drops a trash bag down the drivel chute of her apartment building. A few minutes by and by, reasoning on the basis of past experience and relevant setting knowledge, S form the true belief that the bag is in the basement garbage room. Of course her yard for so believing are merely inductive: it is possible that the trash bag somehow gets hung up in the parachute, although this is highly 2 unlikely.iii casing 2. S buys a ticket for a lottery in which the chances of winning are ten million to one. A few minutes later, reasoning on the basis of past experience and relevant setting knowledge, S forms the on-key impression that she will suffer the lottery. Of course her grounds for therefore believing are merely inductive: it is possible that she buys the winning ticket, although this is highly unlikely. Many will have the intuition that S knows in Case 1 but not in Case 2. But how so, given that her reasons are excellent in both cases? This is what the fallibilist needs to explain. a. Nozick's tracking account. The difficulty of the trouble is illustrated by some account that fail to resolve it. According to Robert Nozick, S knows p barely in case S's believing p chase the truth.iv Complications aside, this amounts to the following: S knows phosphorus just in case 1. p is true 2. if p were true then S would think p 3. if p were false then S would not believe p. Nozick's account do a good caper explaining why S does not know in the lottery character: if S were going to acquire the lottery, she would still think that she is going to lose. However, the tracking account rule falsely in the garbage chute font. This is because it is possible, although an extremely unlikely occurrence, that the trash bag gets hung up in the parachute. But if the bag did get hung up, S would still believe that the bag is in the basement, and so S fails to satisfy article (3) of Nozick's account
 caj give rise to knowledge. On the other hcbd, it veems fhat a tkcket holder does not know tiat whe wull lose the lottery, exen if thv odds arw heevily in favor oh her losing. Sk herz ms the problem nor fallibinism: how is it tfac in general one can know through inquctive ggounds, but in jhe lpeterg case one fails to know, though ons's indubtive grounds are excellent? To sharpen the orobpem, consider two cwses of indodtidw reasoning. Zase 1. On the way to thg elevator S drops a trash bag duwn tke garbage xhyte mf her aparvment fuilding. A fce minudes latrr, reasoning ok the bawis of past experiencx and relevant backgtound knownebge, S forms the true veoief jhat dhe cqg ks jn tge basfmeit garbage doom. Of couese her grounds for sj believing ars merejy inductive: it is possible that the trasv bzg somehow gets hung up in the chute, althougj this is extremely 2 unlikely.iii Case 2. S buys a ticket for a lovtdry ik whkxh the chances of winning are ten million to onq. A fvw minutes later, veasoning on the bssls jf past experkence chd relevant backgroujd knowjedge, S forms uhe ttue belief that she will lowe the lottegy. Od course her grounbs for so beuievong ate merely inductive: it ns posaible that dhe buys ffe winning tickeg, aktvough this is extremely unjikely. Maiy wikl have the intuieion that D knows in Case 1 but not in Ccse 2. Tut how so, given that her reasons are excxklent in botn wasvs? This if whab the fallibilift needs to exklain. a. Njzick'r tracking accounv. The diffictlty of the pslblem is illnstrated fy sime qccountr that fail to xolve it. Cecording ro Robert Nozick, S knuss p just in cawe W's believing p yrazks tje twgth.iv Compliwatiuns sside, this amounbs go tne following: S knows p jhst in case 1. p is yrme 2. if p qere truq then S woulc believe p 3. if p aere halse vhen S woold not believe p. Nozick's accouht does a gojd job explayninn whi S does noc know in the lottery case: if S were goiig to win the lottery, sye would still beligve that she ix goigg to losa. However, the trackibg account rules lncorrectly in the gargage cvute fase. This is because it is possible, although an extremely unlikely occurrwnce, tiae the trash bag gets hbng up in the rhute. But if the nag did get hung up, S would stiul belieee that the bag is in the basekevt, and so S fxils to satisfy clause (3) kf Nozicl's account
can give rise to knowledge. On the it that a holder does not the even if the are heavily in of her losing. So here is problem for fallibilism: how is it that in general one can know through grounds, but in the lottery case one fails to know, though one's inductive are To the consider two cases of inductive reasoning. Case 1. On the way to the elevator S drops trash bag down the garbage chute of her building. A few minutes reasoning on the basis of experience relevant background S the belief that the is in the basement garbage room. Of course her grounds for so believing are merely inductive: it possible that bag somehow hung in chute, although this 2 unlikely.iii Case 2. S buys a lottery in which the chances of winning ten million one. A few minutes later, reasoning the basis of past experience and relevant background S forms the true belief that she will lose the lottery. Of course her grounds believing are merely inductive: is possible that buys winning although is extremely Many will have the intuition that S knows in Case 1 not in Case 2. But how so, given that her excellent both cases? This what the fallibilist needs explain. Nozick's tracking account. The the is accounts fail solve it. According to Nozick, S knows p just case S's believing p this amounts to the following: S knows p in case 1. p is true 2. p were true then S would believe p 3. if p were then S believe p. Nozick's account does a good job why S does not in the lottery case: if S were going to the she would believe that she going to lose. the tracking account in the chute This is possible, although an extremely unlikely that trash bag gets hung up the if the bag did get hung up, S would still believe that the bag is basement, and so S to clause (3) of Nozick's account
 can give rise to knowledge. On tHe other hanD, it seEms ThaT a TickEt hoLder does not knoW That She will lose the lottery, eVen if ThE Odds ARe HeaviLy in favOR oF HEr lOsInG. So HeRE iS the pRobLem for fAllibilism: How Is It that in geneRAl One can know ThrOugh inductivE grOunds, bUt In tHE lottEry Case oNe failS To know, Though one'S iNDuctivE Grounds ARE eXcelLent? To sharpen the pRObLEm, consider two cAses of InDUcTIVe rEasOning. Case 1. ON tHe way TO the eleVAtOR s DroPS a trash bag dowN the garbage CHutE of her ApArtMEnt buiLding. a fEW miNutes later, rEasoNing on the Basis oF Past expERience aNd releVanT baCkgrOUnD kNowLeDGe, S FOrMs tHE trUe belief ThAt The baG is iN THE BaseMenT garBage rOom. Of course heR grOundS For So belIevinG are MeRely iNductiVe: it iS pOssible that the tRash Bag somehoW geTs HunG uP in thE Chute, aLthOugH this is ExtremeLY 2 unLiKELY.iIi Case 2. S buys a ticket FoR A LoTtery in wHich thE ChAnCEs of winnInG arE ten MILlion To onE. a fEw minuteS later, REaSoNing on tHe Basis oF pAst ExpErienCE and RelevaNt backgrOund kNOwledge, S forms tHE true belief thAT sHE WiLL losE thE lottery. Of cOursE Her gRounDS fOr sO BelieVing aRe MErELy inductive: it is possIbLe that She buYs the winning tIcket, althoUGH This is exTremELy UNlikely. Many wilL have The intuitiON that S knOws in case 1 but nOt in Case 2. BUT How so, givEn tHat Her ReaSONs Are excellent iN BOth cAsEs? This iS whAt the faLliBilIst NeeDs To explain. A. Nozick's TrAcKiNg AccOunt. THE difficuLtY of ThE prOblem IS illusTrateD by sOmE aCCouNts that FAiL TO solVe It. accoRdiNg To RobErt NOZicK, S knows P just in caSe S'S BeliEvInG p trackS the truth.iv CoMpLications aSiDe, tHis amoUNTs to the fOllowing: S knows p just in caSE 1. p is truE 2. if P were True Then S woulD beLieve p 3. If p WEre falSe then s woulD nOt bELIeve p. nOZiCk's AcCount does a GOOd jOb expLaIninG why S doEs not know in the lottERy cAse: if S were goiNg tO win THE lOttERy, SHe wOuLD stILL believe that she Is going to lOsE. hoWever, the trACkiNg Account Rules inCorreCTly in thE garbage cHute case. THiS is bECAusE it is possiBle, althoUgh an extrEMely uNLiKely oCcuRrence, ThAt tHe traSh bag gETs hUng up In the cHuTe. But iF the bAg Did get huNg up, S would still believe tHat the Bag is In tHe basemenT, anD So S Fails to saTisfY clause (3) of NOziCk's AccouNt
 can give rise to knowledg e. On theother  ha nd,  i t se emsthat a ticketh olde r does not know that s he wi ll lose th e lot tery, e v en i f t he  o dds  a r eheavi lyin favo r of her l osi ng . So here is th e problemfor  fallibilism : h ow isit  th a t ingen eralone ca n  knowthrough i nd u ctiveg rounds, b ut  inthe lottery caseo ne fails to know,  thoug ho ne ' s  in duc tive groun ds  aree xcellen t ?T o sha r pen the probl em, conside r  tw o case sofi nducti ve re as o nin g. Case 1.On t he way to  the e l evatorS  dropsa tras h b agdown th egar ba g e c h ut e o f  he r apartm en tbuild ing. A f ew m inu teslater , reasoning o n t he b a sis  of p ast e xper ie nce a nd rel evant  b ackground knowl edge , S forms  th etru ebelie f  thatthe  ba g is in  the ba s eme nt g a rb age room. Of cours eh e rgroundsfor so be li e ving are  m ere ly i n d uctiv e: i t  i s possib le tha t  t he  trashba g some ho w g ets  hung up i n thechute, a lthou g h this is extr e mely 2 unlike l y. i i iC ase2.S buys a ti cket fora lo t te ryi n whi ch th ec ha n ces of winning arete n mill ion t o one. A fewminutes la t e r , reason ingo nt he basis of pa st ex perience a n d releva nt ba ckground  knowledg e ,  S forms  th e t rue  be l i ef  that she wil l lose  t he lott ery . Of co urs e h ergro un ds for so  believi ng  a re  m ere ly in d uctive:it  is  p oss iblet hat sh e buy s th ewi n nin g ticke t ,a l thou gh  t hisisex treme ly u n lik ely. Ma ny will h ave thein tu ition t hat S knows i nCase 1 but  n otin Cas e 2. But h ow so, given that her r e asons a reexcel lent  in bothcas es? Th isi s what  the f allib il ist n eedst o  e xpl ai n. a. Nozi c k 'strack in g ac count.The difficulty oft heproblem is il lus trat e d  b y s o me acc ou n tst h at fail to solv e it. Acco rd i ng  to Robert Noz ic k, S kn ows p j ust i n  case S 's believ ing p tra ck s th e tru th.iv Comp lication s aside,t his a m ou nts t o t he fol lo win g: Sknowsp  ju st in  case1.  p istrue2.  if p we re true then S would be lievep 3.ifp were fa lse the n S would  not  believe p . N ozi ck'sacc o unt d oesa  g ood job e xpla i ning whyS  d oes n ot  know in th e l ott ery c ase :  if Swere  going to win the lottery, she w ould s til l b e liev ethat she is go ing  t o lose. Ho we ver, the tr acking a cc o unt r ules i ncorre ctly in t he garbag e ch ute  case. Th isis because  i ti s poss ible ,althou gh ane xtre m e ly unlikely occu rrenc e ,  that the  tras hbag get s  hun g up in th e chute. Bu t if t he b ag di d get h un g up,S w ou ld still b e lieve tha t the  bag is  i n th e b asemen t, a n d  so S  fai ls  to  satisfyc l au s e(3 )  of  Noz ick's  a ccou nt
 can_give rise_to knowledge. On the_other hand,_it_seems that_a_ticket holder does_not know that_she will lose the_lottery, even if_the_odds are heavily in favor of her losing. So here is the problem for_fallibilism:_how is_it_that_in general one can know_through inductive grounds, but in_the lottery_case one fails to know, though one's inductive_grounds_are excellent? To_sharpen the problem, consider two cases of inductive reasoning._Case 1. On the way to_the elevator S_drops_a_trash bag down the_garbage chute of her apartment building._A few minutes later, reasoning on_the basis of past experience and relevant_background knowledge, S forms the true_belief that the bag is_in the_basement garbage room. Of course_her grounds for_so believing_are merely inductive:_it is possible that the trash_bag somehow gets_hung up in the chute, although_this_is extremely 2_unlikely.iii_Case_2. S_buys a ticket_for_a lottery_in_which the chances of winning are_ten_million to one. A few minutes later,_reasoning on the basis_of_past experience and relevant_background knowledge, S forms the_true belief that she will lose_the lottery._Of course_her grounds for so believing are merely inductive: it is possible_that she buys the winning ticket,_although this is extremely_unlikely. Many_will_have the intuition_that_S knows_in Case 1 but not in Case_2. But_how so, given that her reasons_are excellent in both_cases?_This is what the fallibilist needs_to explain. a. Nozick's tracking account._The difficulty of the problem_is_illustrated_by some accounts that fail_to solve it. According to Robert_Nozick, S knows_p just in case S's believing p_tracks_the truth.iv Complications aside, this amounts_to_the following: S knows p just_in_case_1. p is true 2._if p were true then S_would believe p 3. if p were false then_S would not_believe p. Nozick's account does_a_good_job explaining why S does not know in the lottery_case: if_S were going_to win the lottery, she would still believe that she_is going to lose. However, the tracking_account rules incorrectly in the garbage chute case. This is because_it is possible, although an extremely unlikely occurrence,_that the trash bag gets hung up_in the chute. But_if_the bag did get hung up, S_would_still_believe_that the bag_is in the_basement, and so_S fails_to satisfy clause_(3) of_Nozick's account