 (e.g. the truth about what justice is) is timeless, unchanging, and independent of whether subjects apprehend it. The key role of the theory of Forms, according to Lotze, is to maintain, against the sophists, that the truth about what justice is, is independent of our beliefs, not subject to change, and not sensibly perceptible by us. However, Plato was incorrectly interpreted, including by later members of his own Academy, as asserting that this requires that there be timeless, unchanging, subject-independent "things" that ground these truths- that is, the Forms. Plato's teaching was fundamentally a theory about what we are doing when we judge something to be true, not a theory of non-spatio-temporal abstract entities.20 Even on Lotze's reading, however, there are certain divergences between Lotze's theory and Plato's. For one, Lotze reasons from truths to concepts/Forms: if the proposition "a is F" is valid, then concepts <a> and <F>, the constituents of this truth, must have some kind of timeless being. The exact status of the constituents of propositions (bearers of validity) within Lotze's fourfold division of the modes of actuality/ being is somewhat unclear, since, syntactically, they cannot be said to be valid sensu stricto. They are valid in the derivative sense that they (atemporally) refer to (bedeuten) objects about which there are valid propositions, namely those propositions in which the relevant objects are subsumed under the concepts. Plato, however, emphasized the constituents of truths, that is, the Forms (concepts), over the truths themselves: [One notices] how comparatively rarely general propositions appear [in Plato's writings]; they are not completely lacking, but constitute in individual cases objects of important discussion; Plato had not realized that they are, in this form as propositions, the essential constituents of the ideal world. (L §321, 521) Another difference is that Lotze accepts the simple schema (†) from the previous section, which entails that there will be valid propositions about everything, and thus that there will be atemporal concepts (having whatever mode of actuality/being such propositional constituents have) 20 L §313–321, 505–523. 148 Nicholas F. Stang of everything. Thus, for Lotze, Socrates should not have been perplexed when questioned by the Eleatic stranger about the forms of dirt
(e.g. the truth about what justice is) is timeless, unchanging, and autonomous of whether discipline apprehend it. The key function of the hypothesis of Forms, according to Lotze, is to maintain, against the sophists, that the accuracy about what department of justice is, is independent of our belief, not subject to change, and not sanely perceptible by us. However, Plato was incorrectly interpreted, including by late members of his own Academy, as asserting that this requires that there be timeless, unchanging, subject - autonomous " things " that ground these truths- that is, the Forms. Plato's teaching was basically a theory about what we are doing when we judge something to be true, not a theory of non - spatio - worldly abstract entities.20 Even on Lotze's reading, however, there exist certain divergences between Lotze's theory and Plato's. For one, Lotze reason from truths to concepts / Forms: if the proposition " a is F " is valid, then concepts < a > and < F >, the constituents of this accuracy, must suffer some kind of timeless being. The exact status of the constituents of propositions (bearers of validity) within Lotze's fourfold division of the modes of actuality/ organism is slightly unclear, since, syntactically, they cannot be say to be valid sensu stricto. They are valid in the derivative common sense that they (atemporally) denote to (bedeuten) objects about which there are valid propositions, namely those propositions in which the relevant objects are subsumed under the concepts. Plato, however, stress the constituents of truths, that is, the Forms (concepts), over the truths themselves: [ One notices ] how comparatively rarely cosmopolitan propositions appear [ in Plato's writings ]; they are not completely lacking, but constitute in individual cases object of important discussion; Plato had not realized that they are, in this form as propositions, the essential component of the ideal world. (L § 321, 521) Another difference is that Lotze accepts the simple schema (†) from the previous section, which entails that there will be valid proposal about everything, and thus that there will be atemporal concept (having whatever mode of actuality / being such propositional constituents have) 20 L § 313–321, 505–523. 148 Nicholas F. Stang of everything. Thus, for Lotze, Socrates should not have been perplex when questioned by the Eleatic stranger about the class of dirt
 (e.g. the truth about what jurtice is) is timglwss, unrhanginf, and inaependent of whether subjectd qppreyend it. The key role ow the thelry of Firms, qccording vk Lotze, is to laincamn, against the xophists, tvat the truth dbuuc what justice is, is independent of jur beloevs, not subject to bhwnge, and not sensibly perceptible by ua. Howevtr, Plato was incortectly interpreted, includijg bj later members of his own Acqdemr, as assertine that this requires tgat there be timeless, unchangine, sublect-indepeneebt "hvings" that jround these truths- that iv, the Fprms. Plato's teschmng qas fundamentally a tieory about what we wre doing wken we judge somethint ro be trua, nog a ghekrb or non-soatmo-temporal zbstract enrities.20 Even on Lotzt's wvsding, howeved, therq wre certain divergences between Lotze's uheorg and Plato's. For one, Lorze reasons from trutjs to consepts/Forms: if the proposition "a is F" is valid, thet conreots <a> xbd <F>, the constituents of this truth, must have sjje kpnd of timeless bcing. The exact stayud ps the constitoents oy pdopositions (bearerd of vajiditt) within Jotzr's fourfold division of the modes of acnualuty/ being is somewkat unclear, rincg, syntsctically, they cannot bz said to be valif sensu sfficto. They are vxlic hn the dtfivative sense thwt they (avempoxally) rewer jo (bedetten) objechs about which there are valib pro[ositions, jamely those propositions in whmrh the relevamt obbects arz subsmmed under the soncepts. Plato, howevex, emphxsized the constivuents of trtths, that is, dje Forms (conrepts), ovew thw tryths thdoselves: [One noyices] how comparaticely rarely generak ptolositions appeax [un Plato's writimgs]; thqy ace noe completely nackkng, nut cunstituuz ik ivdivodual cases objects mf ijportant discussiom; Ilato had not reajized that thry are, in this forl as 'roposmtions, thg essential constituents of the ideal wogld. (L §321, 521) Another difneregce is thac Lotze accepts the simple schema (†) from vhe previous section, whuch entails that thgre will be vakid pwopositiots about everything, qnd thus that theve will be atemporal cknceptv (havlng whatever mode of actuality/being such propositional constituents have) 20 L §313–321, 505–523. 148 Iisholas F. Stzng pf evvrychiug. Thus, for Uotze, Socrates snould not have been perplexed wien questimnzd by the Eleatic stranger abpug the forms ow dirt
(e.g. the truth about what justice is) unchanging, independent of subjects apprehend it. theory Forms, according to is to maintain, the sophists, that the truth about justice is, is independent of our beliefs, not subject to change, and not perceptible by us. However, Plato was incorrectly interpreted, including by later members of own as that requires that there be timeless, unchanging, subject-independent "things" that ground these truths- that is, the Forms. teaching was fundamentally a theory about what we doing when we judge to be true, not a of abstract entities.20 on reading, there are certain between Lotze's theory and Plato's. For one, Lotze reasons from truths to concepts/Forms: if the proposition "a F" is concepts <a> <F>, constituents this truth, must kind of timeless being. The exact constituents of propositions (bearers of validity) within Lotze's division of modes of actuality/ being is somewhat since, syntactically, they cannot be said to be sensu stricto. They are valid in the derivative sense that they (atemporally) refer to (bedeuten) which there are valid namely those propositions which relevant are under the Plato, however, emphasized the constituents of truths, that is, the Forms over the truths themselves: [One notices] how comparatively rarely general [in writings]; they are completely lacking, but constitute individual objects of important discussion; not that this as the essential constituents of ideal world. (L §321, 521) difference is that Lotze from the previous section, which entails that there be valid propositions about everything, and thus there will be atemporal concepts (having whatever mode of actuality/being such propositional have) 20 505–523. 148 Nicholas F. Stang of everything. Thus, Lotze, Socrates should not been perplexed when questioned by the Eleatic stranger about forms dirt
 (e.g. the truth about what justicE is) is timelEss, unChaNgiNg, And iNdepEndent of whetheR SubjEcts apprehend it. The key rOle of ThE TheoRY oF FormS, accordINg TO lotZe, Is To mAiNTaIn, agaInsT the sopHists, that tHe tRuTh about what jUStIce is, is indEpeNdent of our beLieFs, not sUbJecT To chaNge, And noT sensiBLy percEptible by Us. hOwever, pLato was INCoRrecTly interpreted, incLUdINg by later membeRs of hiS oWN ACADemY, as Asserting tHaT this REquires THaT THEre BE timeless, unchAnging, subjeCT-inDependEnT "thINgs" thaT grouNd THesE truths- that Is, thE Forms. PlaTo's teaCHing was FUndamenTally a TheOry AbouT WhAt We aRe DOinG WhEn wE JudGe somethInG tO be trUe, noT A THEory Of nOn-spAtio-tEmporal abstraCt eNtitIEs.20 EVen on lotze'S reaDiNg, howEver, thEre arE cErtain divergencEs beTween LotzE's tHeOry AnD PlatO'S. For onE, LoTze Reasons From truTHs tO cONCEpTs/Forms: if the proposItION "a Is F" is valId, then COnCePTs <a> and <F>, tHe ConStitUENts of This TRuTh, must haVe some KInD oF timeleSs Being. THe ExaCt sTatus OF the ConstiTuents of PropoSItions (bearers oF Validity) withiN loTZE's FOurfOld Division of tHe moDEs of ActuALiTy/ bEIng is SomewHaT UnCLear, since, syntacticaLlY, they cAnnot Be said to be valId sensu strICTO. They are ValiD In THe derivative seNse thAt they (atemPOrally) reFer to (Bedeuten) Objects abOUT which thEre Are ValId pROPoSitions, namely THOse pRoPositioNs iN which tHe rEleVanT obJeCts are subSumed undEr ThE cOnCepTs. PlaTO, however, EmPhaSiZed The coNStitueNts of TrutHs, ThAT is, The FormS (CoNCEpts), OvEr The tRutHs ThemsElveS: [one Notices] How comparAtiVEly rArElY generaL propositions ApPear [in PlatO's WriTings]; tHEY are not cOmpletely lacking, but consTItute in IndIviduAl caSes objectS of ImportAnt DIscussIon; PlaTo had NoT reALIzed tHAT tHey ArE, in this forM AS prOposiTiOns, tHe essenTial constituents of THe iDeal world. (L §321, 521) AnoTheR difFEReNce IS tHAt LOtZE acCEPts the simple schEma (†) from the PrEViOus section, WHicH eNtails tHat therE will BE valid pRopositioNs about evErYthiNG, And Thus that thEre will bE atemporaL ConcePTs (HavinG whAtever MoDe oF actuAlity/bEIng Such pRoposiTiOnal coNstitUeNts have) 20 L §313–321, 505–523. 148 nicholas F. Stang of everythIng. ThuS, for LOtzE, Socrates ShoULd nOt have beeN perPlexed when QueStiOned bY thE eleatIc stRAnGer ABout tHe foRMs of dirt
 (e.g. the truth about wha t justiceis) i s t ime le ss,unch anging, and in d epen dent of whether subjec ts ap pr e hend it . The  key ro l eo f  th eth eor yo fForms , a ccordin g to Lotze , i sto maintain, ag ainst thesop hists, thatthe  truth  a bou t  what  ju stice  is, i s  indep endent of  o u r beli e fs, not s ub ject  to change, and n o ts ensibly percep tibleby us . How eve r, Plato w as  inco r rectlyi nt e r p ret e d, includingby later me m ber s of h is  ow n  Acade my, a sa sse rting thatthis  requires  thatt here be timeles s, unc han gin g, s u bj ec t-i nd e pen d en t " t hin gs" that  g ro und t hese t r u ths-  th at i s, th e Forms. Plat o's  tea c hin g was  fund amen ta lly a  theor y abo ut  what we are do ingwhen we j udg esom et hingt o be t rue , n ot a th eory of non -s p a t io -temporal abstract  e n t it ies.20 E ven on Lo tz e 's readi ng , h owev e r , the re a r ecertaindiverg e nc es  betwee nLotze' sthe ory  andP lato 's. Fo r one, L otzer easons from tr u ths to concep t s/ F o rm s : if  th e propositi on " a  isF" i s  v ali d , the n con ce p ts <a> and <F>, the co ns tituen ts of  this truth,must haves o m e kind o f ti m el e ss being. Theexact  status of the cons titue nts of p ropositio n s  (bearer s o f v ali dit y )  w ithin Lotze's f ourf ol d divis ion  of the  mo des  of  ac tu ality/ be ing is s om ew ha tunc lear, since, s yn tac ti cal ly, t h ey can not b e sa id  t o  be  valids en s u  str ic to . Th eyar e val id i n  th e deriv ative sen set hatth ey  (atemp orally) refer  t o (bedeute n)  ob jectsa b out whic h there are valid propo s itions,  na melythos e proposi tio ns inwhi c h thereleva nt ob je cts a re su b s um edun der the co n c ept s. Pl at o, h owever,  emphasized the co n sti tuents of tru ths , th a t  i s,t he For ms (co n c epts), over the  truths th em s el ves: [Onen oti ce s] howcompara tivel y  rarely  generalpropositi on s ap p e ar[in Plato' s writin gs]; they are n o tcompl ete ly lac ki ng,  butconsti t ute  in i ndivid ua l case s obj ec ts of im portant discussion; Pla to had  notrea lized tha t t h eyare, in t hisform as pr opo sit ions,  th e  esse ntia l  c ons t ituen ts o f  the idea l  w orl d .  ( L §321, 521 ) A not her d iff e renceis t hat Lotze accepts the simple sch ema( † ) f rom thepr evious section , w hi c h  entails  t hat there w ill be v al i d pro positi ons ab out eve r y th i ng, an d th usthat ther e w il l  be ate mp or a l conc epts  ( having  whate v er m o d e of actuality/b eings u ch pr o pos ition al  consti t uent s have) 20  L §313–321 , 505– 523.  148Nichola sF. Sta ngof  everythin g . Thus, f or Lo tze, So cr ates  sh ould n ot h a v e bee n pe rp lex ed when q u e st i on ed bytheEleat ic  str anger abo u t the fo rms of dirt 
 (e.g._the truth_about what justice is)_is timeless,_unchanging,_and independent_of_whether subjects apprehend_it. The key_role of the theory_of Forms, according_to_Lotze, is to maintain, against the sophists, that the truth about what justice is,_is_independent of_our_beliefs,_not subject to change, and_not sensibly perceptible by us._However, Plato_was incorrectly interpreted, including by later members of_his_own Academy, as_asserting that this requires that there be timeless, unchanging,_subject-independent "things" that ground these truths-_that is, the_Forms._Plato's_teaching was fundamentally a_theory about what we are doing_when we judge something to be_true, not a theory of non-spatio-temporal abstract_entities.20 Even on Lotze's reading, however,_there are certain divergences between_Lotze's theory_and Plato's. For one, Lotze_reasons from truths_to concepts/Forms:_if the proposition_"a is F" is valid, then_concepts <a> and_<F>, the constituents of this truth,_must_have some kind_of_timeless_being. The_exact status of_the_constituents of_propositions_(bearers of validity) within Lotze's fourfold_division_of the modes of actuality/ being is_somewhat unclear, since, syntactically,_they_cannot be said to_be valid sensu stricto. They_are valid in the derivative sense_that they_(atemporally) refer_to (bedeuten) objects about which there are valid propositions, namely those_propositions in which the relevant objects_are subsumed under the_concepts. Plato,_however,_emphasized the constituents_of_truths, that_is, the Forms (concepts), over the truths_themselves: [One_notices] how comparatively rarely general propositions_appear [in Plato's writings];_they_are not completely lacking, but constitute_in individual cases objects of important_discussion; Plato had not realized_that_they_are, in this form as_propositions, the essential constituents of the_ideal world. (L_§321, 521) Another difference is that Lotze_accepts_the simple schema (†) from the_previous_section, which entails that there will_be_valid_propositions about everything, and thus_that there will be atemporal concepts_(having whatever mode of actuality/being such propositional constituents have)_20 L §313–321,_505–523. 148 Nicholas F. Stang_of_everything._Thus, for Lotze, Socrates should not have been perplexed when_questioned by_the Eleatic stranger_about the forms of dirt