�, UK, and  Main Street, Malden,  , USA kind' (p. n.). Kraut's developmentalism maintains that the good for a living being is the highest development of its natural powers. One great advantage of this approach is that it yields an account of good for which generalizes across species. At the same time, Kraut thinks developmentalism pays off in thinking about the good for human beings – our welfare or well-being or prudential good – in a plausible and attractive way. By attending to the way children develop and grow, and in particular to the common sense normative judgements we make about when they do so well or poorly, we can identify the natural capacities it is good for us to develop. These Kraut identifies as our cognitive, affective, sensory, social, and (to a lesser extent) physical powers. His argument for the view proceeds in stages. The first two chapters are pathbreakers for the full articulation of the theory in ch.  and its defence and application in ch. . The earlier chapters aim to distance developmentalism from a variety of views. The prime target is the 'conative' family of theories of well-being, which for some time now have dominated theories of well-being. Kraut's is the most developed critique of these approaches I have seen, and as elsewhere, his aim is to vindicate his claims by appeal to 'platitudes' about what is good for us. Kraut's critical work hardly ends there, however. Among the other theories he rejects are theories which make good somehow mind-dependent; views (such as those of Moore and Ross) which privilege goodness sans phrase over good-for; theories which make practical reasons depend on things other than considerations of goodness and in particular good-for (e.g., principles of right);1 hedonism; egoism; utilitarianism; views which distinguish agent-neutral from agent-relative values; and Foot-style naturalism. That is a lot of brush to clear, but Kraut's method is to draw on ordinary intuitions about conditions under which living things thrive (in particular, but not only, human beings), in order to show that all these fail. Readers with different predilections will doubtless form different judgements as to which
� , UK, and  Main Street, Malden,  , USA kind' (p. n .). Kraut's developmentalism maintains that the good for a living being is the eminent growth of its natural powers. One great advantage of this approach path is that it yields an account of commodity for which generalizes across species. At the same clock time, Kraut thinks developmentalism pays off in think about the good for human beings – our benefit or well - organism or prudential good – in a plausible and attractive way. By attend to the way children evolve and grow, and in particular to the common common sense normative judgements we form about when they act so well or ill, we can identify the natural capacities it is good for us to grow. These Kraut identifies as our cognitive, affective, sensory, social, and (to a lesser extent) physical might. His argument for the view proceeds in stages. The first two chapters are pathbreakers for the full articulation of the theory in ch.  and its defence and lotion in ch. . The early chapters draw a bead on to outdistance developmentalism from a kind of views. The prime prey is the' conative' family of theories of well - being, which for some time nowadays have dominated theories of well - being. Kraut's is the most developed critique of these access I have seen, and as elsewhere, his aim is to vindicate his claims by appeal to' platitudes' about what is dear for us. Kraut's critical work hardly ends there, however. Among the other theories he rule out are theories which make good somehow judgment - dependent; views (such as those of Moore and Ross) which privilege goodness sans give voice over good - for; theories which make practical reasons count on things other than considerations of goodness and in especial good - for (for example, principles of right);1 hedonism; egoism; utilitarianism; views which distinguish agentive role - neutral from agent - relative values; and Foot - style naturalism. That is a lot of brush to clear, but Kraut's method is to draw on ordinary intuitions about weather under which living things boom (in particular, but not only, human beings), in order to show that all these fail. Readers with different preference will doubtless form different judgements as to which
�, UK, and  Main Street, Malden,  , USA kind' (p. n.). Kraut's develkpmentalksm maintains that the good hor q livung being is the highert develoiment of uts iatural powers. Ois great advanfwge mh this approach is that id yields an acwojnc of good for which generalizes acrofs specoed. At the same jime, Lwaut nhlnks developmentalism pays off ih thinkpng about the gooc for human beings – our wepfarf or well-being or orudential tood – in a plausicle and aturcctive way. Gy attending to the way childrev devzlop and griw, anf in particuoar tj the common sense nmrmativr judgements wc makx abiut when they do so wxll or poorly, we can identify tke natural capacities ir is cood for ys go setelkp. Thede Iraut idenfifies as oyr cognitive, affectovq, sensory, socizl, and (tj a lesser extent) physical powers. His aggumsnt for the view proceees in stages. The firsj two chapeers are pathbreakers for the full articulation ox the gheirn in xh.  and its defence and application in ch. . The qzrkivr chapters aim tj distance cegekjpmentalism ftom a vcdisty of views. The pgime tatget iw the 'conwtivr' family of theories of welo-being, which dor some time now kave dominatzd thepries of well-being. Kraut's is the most devellped critjdue of these appfoabhes I have seen, and as elsewhqre, his amm is to vinaicaje his slaims by wppeal to 'platitudes' abokt whct is good for ks. Kraut's critical work hardly xids there, howgves. Akong the othev theories he rqjects are thepries wkich mxke good skmehow kind-dependegt; views (such ws those of Koore anq Rows) wyich prkxilege goodnesx sans phgafe ocer good-for; theorics whkdh make practiccu reasons depend on thynhs oever than convidefatkpns ow goodntfs xnd on particular good-fos (e.g., principles of rignt);1 hedonisn; egoism; utilitarianixm; views which disuinguivh egent-nruttal from agent-relative values; ahd Foot-stjle naturalism. Ehat is a lot of brush to clear, but Kraut's method is to draw on ordinary untuitions about coudltions under whicr living dhings thrive (in parricular, but not okly, human beings), in orser to show that all these fail. Readers with different predilections will doubtless dorm dmfserent judgsmenys as tj which
�, UK, and  Main Street, Malden, USA (p. n.). developmentalism maintains that being the highest development its natural powers. great advantage of this approach is it yields an account of good for which generalizes across species. At the time, Kraut thinks developmentalism pays off in thinking about the good for human – welfare well-being prudential good – in a plausible and attractive way. By attending to the way children develop grow, and in particular to the common sense judgements we make about they do so well or we identify the capacities is for us to These Kraut identifies as our cognitive, affective, sensory, social, and (to a lesser extent) physical powers. His for the in stages. first chapters pathbreakers for the of the theory in ch.  and application in ch. . The earlier chapters to distance from a variety of views. The target is the 'conative' family of theories of which for some time now have dominated theories of well-being. Kraut's is the most developed these approaches I have and as elsewhere, aim to his by appeal 'platitudes' about what is good for us. Kraut's critical work hardly there, however. Among the other theories he rejects are theories good mind-dependent; views (such those of Moore and which goodness sans phrase over which practical things than of goodness and in good-for (e.g., principles of right);1 egoism; utilitarianism; views which and Foot-style naturalism. That is a lot of to clear, but Kraut's method is to on ordinary intuitions about conditions under which living things thrive (in particular, not only, in order to show that all these fail. with different predilections will form different judgements as to which
�, UK, and  Main Street, Malden,  , USA kInd' (p. n.). Kraut'S deveLopMenTaLism MainTains that the goOD for A living being is the higheSt devElOPmenT Of Its naTural poWErS. oNe gReAt AdvAnTAgE of thIs aPproach Is that it yiEldS aN account of goOD fOr which genEraLizes across sPecIes. At tHe SamE Time, KRauT thinKs deveLOpmentAlism pays OfF In thinKIng abouT THe Good For human beings – our WElFAre or well-being Or prudEnTIaL GOod – In a Plausible aNd AttraCTive way. bY aTTENdiNG to the way chilDren develop ANd gRow, and In ParTIcular To the CoMMon Sense normatIve jUdgements We make ABout wheN They do sO well oR poOrlY, we cAN iDeNtiFy THe nATuRal CApaCities it Is GoOd for Us to DEVELop. THesE KraUt ideNtifies as our cOgnItivE, AffEctivE, sensOry, sOcIal, anD (to a leSser eXtEnt) physical poweRs. HiS argument For ThE viEw ProceEDs in stAgeS. ThE first tWo chaptERs aRe PATHbReakers for the full aRtICUlAtion of tHe theoRY iN cH.  And its deFeNce And aPPLicatIon iN Ch. . the earliEr chapTErS aIm to disTaNce devElOpmEntAlism FRom a VarietY of views. the prIMe target is the 'cONative' family oF ThEORiES of wEll-Being, which fOr soME timE now HAvE doMInateD theoRiES oF Well-being. Kraut's is thE mOst devElopeD critique of thEse approacHES i have seeN, and AS eLSewhere, his aim iS to viNdicate his CLaims by aPpeal To 'platitUdes' about WHAt is good For Us. KRauT's cRITiCal work hardly ENDs thErE, howeveR. AmOng the oTheR thEorIes He Rejects arE theorieS wHiCh MaKe gOod soMEhow mind-DePenDeNt; vIews (sUCh as thOse of moorE aNd rOss) Which prIViLEGe goOdNeSs saNs pHrAse ovEr goOD-foR; theoriEs which maKe pRActiCaL rEasons dEpend on things OtHer than conSiDerAtions OF Goodness And in particular good-for (e.G., PrincipLes Of rigHt);1 heDonism; egoIsm; UtilitAriANism; viEws whiCh disTiNguISH agenT-NEuTraL fRom agent-reLATivE valuEs; And FOot-stylE naturalism. That is a LOt oF brush to clear, But krauT'S MeThoD Is TO drAw ON orDINary intuitions aBout conditIoNS uNder which lIVinG tHings thRive (in pArticULar, but nOt only, humAn beings), iN oRder TO ShoW that all thEse fail. REaders witH DiffeREnT predIleCtions WiLl dOubtlEss forM DifFerenT judgeMeNts as tO whicH
�, UK, and  Main Stree t, Malden,     ,US A ki nd'(p. n.). Kr a ut's  developmentalism main tains  t h at t h egoodfor a l i vi n g  be in gisth e  h ighes t d evelopm ent of its  na tu ral powers.O ne  great adv ant age of thisapp roachis  th a t ityie lds a n acco u nt ofgood forwh i ch gen e ralizes a cr ossspecies. At the s a me time, Kraut th inks d ev e lo p m ent ali sm pays of fin th i nking a b ou t t heg ood for human  beings – o u r w elfare  o r w e ll-bei ng or  p r ude ntial good– in  a plausi ble an d  attrac t ive way . By a tte ndi ng t o  t he  wa yc hil d re n d e vel op and g ro w,  andin p a r t i cula r t o th e com mon sense nor mat ivej udg ement s wemake  a boutwhen t hey d oso well or poor ly,we can id ent if y t he  natu r al cap aci tie s it is  good f o r u st o de velop. These Kraut  i d e nt ifies as  our c o gn it i ve, affe ct ive , se n s ory,soci a l,  and (to  a les s er  e xtent)ph ysical  p owe rs.  Hisa rgum ent fo r the vi ew pr o ceeds in stage s . The first t w oc h ap t ersare  pathbreake rs f o r th e fu l lart i culat ion o ft he theory in ch.  and  i ts def enceand applicati on in ch. . The earl ierc ha p ters aim to di stanc e developm e ntalismfroma variet y of view s .  The pri metar get  is t he  'conative' f a m ilyof  theori esof well -be ing , w hic hfor sometime now  h av edo min atedt heoriesof  we ll -be ing.K raut's  is t he m os td eve loped c r it i q ue o fth eseapp ro aches  I h a veseen, a nd as els ewh e re,hi saim isto vindicatehi s claims b yapp eal to ' platitud es' about what is goodf or us.Kra ut'scrit ical work  ha rdly e nds there,  howev er. A mo ngt h e oth e r  t heo ri es he reje c t s a re th eo ries  whichmake good somehowm ind -dependent; v iew s (s u c hast ho s e o fM oor e and Ross) which  privilege  g o od ness sansp hra se  over g ood-for ; the o ries wh ich makepractical  r easo n s  de pend on th ings oth er than c o nside r at ionsofgoodne ss  an d inpartic u lar  good -for ( e. g., pr incip le s of rig ht);1 hedonism; egoism;  utili taria nis m; viewswhi c h d istinguis h ag ent-neutra l f rom  agen t-r e lativ e va l ue s;a nd Fo ot-s t yle natur a li sm. T ha t is a loto f bru sh to  cl e ar, bu t Kr aut's method is t o  draw on ordin aryi n tui tio n s ab ou t conditions u nde rw h ich livi ng  things thr ive (inpa r ticul ar, bu t notonly, h u m an beings ), i n o rder to s how  t h at allth es e  fail.  Rea de rs wit h diff e rent p redilections wil l dou b t lessf orm  diff er ent jud g emen ts as to w hich
�, UK,_and _Main Street, Malden, _, USA_kind'_(p. n.)._Kraut's_developmentalism maintains that_the good for_a living being is_the highest development_of_its natural powers. One great advantage of this approach is that it yields an_account_of good_for_which_generalizes across species. At the_same time, Kraut thinks developmentalism_pays off_in thinking about the good for human beings_–_our welfare or_well-being or prudential good – in a plausible and_attractive way. By attending to the_way children develop_and_grow,_and in particular to_the common sense normative judgements we_make about when they do so_well or poorly, we can identify the_natural capacities it is good for_us to develop. These Kraut_identifies as_our cognitive, affective, sensory, social,_and (to a_lesser extent)_physical powers. His_argument for the view proceeds in_stages. The first_two chapters are pathbreakers for the_full_articulation of the_theory_in_ch. _and its defence_and_application in_ch._. The earlier chapters aim to_distance_developmentalism from a variety of views. The_prime target is the_'conative'_family of theories of_well-being, which for some time_now have dominated theories of well-being._Kraut's is_the most_developed critique of these approaches I have seen, and as elsewhere,_his aim is to vindicate his_claims by appeal to_'platitudes' about_what_is good for_us._Kraut's critical_work hardly ends there, however. Among the_other theories_he rejects are theories which make_good somehow mind-dependent; views_(such_as those of Moore and Ross)_which privilege goodness sans phrase over_good-for; theories which make practical_reasons_depend_on things other than considerations_of goodness and in particular good-for_(e.g., principles of_right);1 hedonism; egoism; utilitarianism; views which distinguish_agent-neutral_from agent-relative values; and Foot-style naturalism._That_is a lot of brush to_clear,_but_Kraut's method is to draw_on ordinary intuitions about conditions under_which living things thrive (in particular, but not only,_human beings), in_order to show that all_these_fail._Readers with different predilections will doubtless form different judgements as_to which