 that some uses of "is" are merely artefacts of translation. 17 In some contexts, Lotze identifies being (Sein) specifically with the first form of actuality, i.e. existence. See §4 for a more complete discussion of these passages; in brief, I think that Lotze is identifying the first kind of actuality with the being of things (in a sense to be specified), not with being in general. 144 Nicholas F. Stang [Gedankending)], was for the Greeks a being [Seiendes], on or ousia. And when the distinction between an actually and an allegedly valid truth [wirklichen geltenden Wahrheit] came into question, the former was also an ontos on; the Greek language never knew how to indicate that actuality of mere validity without the constant confusion [Vermischung] with the actuality of being; the expression of the Platonic thought also suffered from this confusion. (L §317, 513–4) I will discuss Lotze's distinction between "hypostatic" and "logical" Platonism in the next section, but for now I want to focus on the linguistic point he makes here. Ancient Greek, he claims, had only one set of expressions for the first and the fourth of Lotze's modes of actuality: the verb "to be" (eimi) and the nouns formed from it (e.g. ousia, to on).18 So Plato had to express his doctrine of the abstract validity of propositions in terms that were inevitably misread as postulating the existence of propositions as abstract things. Lotze's blaming of the misreading of Plato on the lack of an alternative to words formed from the verb eimi ("to be") may suggest that my proposal to think of modes of actuality as modes of being is misguided, but I think that it in fact confirms my reading. Both Sein and "being" (as well as eimi) allow for multiple senses, both the "existential" sense (there are/es sind) and the "veritative" sense (in which it is the copulative verb). So long as we are careful not to conflate these two, we will not assume, like Lotze's ancient Greeks, that the being of valid propositions is the existence of things. In some contexts, Lotze simplifies this fourfold distinction into a simple distinction between existence (Dasein, sometimes Realität, sometimes Se
that some uses of " is " are merely artefacts of translation. 17 In some contexts, Lotze identify being (Sein) specifically with the inaugural form of actuality, i.e. existence. See § 4 for a more arrant discussion of these passages; in brief, I think that Lotze is identify the beginning kind of actuality with the being of thing (in a sense to be specified), not with being in cosmopolitan. 144 Nicholas F. Stang [ Gedankending) ], was for the Greeks a being [ Seiendes ], on or ousia. And when the distinction between an actually and an allegedly valid truth [ wirklichen geltenden Wahrheit ] came into question, the erstwhile was also an ontos on; the Greek language never knew how to indicate that actuality of mere cogency without the constant confusion [ Vermischung ] with the actuality of being; the expression of the Platonic thought besides suffered from this confusion. (L § 317, 513–4) I will discourse Lotze's distinction between " hypostatic " and " legitimate " Platonism in the next section, but for now I want to focus on the linguistic distributor point he makes here. Ancient Greek, he claims, had only one set of expressions for the first and the fourth of Lotze's modes of actuality: the verb " to be " (eimi) and the nouns formed from it (e.g. ousia, to on).18 So Plato had to express his doctrine of the abstract validity of propositions in terms that were inescapably misread as contend the existence of proposition as abstract thing. Lotze's blaming of the misreading of Plato on the lack of an alternative to words form from the verb eimi (" to be ") may suggest that my proposal to think of modes of actuality as mode of being is misguided, but I think that it in fact confirms my reading. Both Sein and " being " (as well as eimi) leave for multiple senses, both the " existential " sense (there are / es sind) and the " veritative " sense (in which it is the copulative verb). thus long as we are careful not to conflate these two, we will not assume, like Lotze's ancient Greeks, that the being of valid propositions is the existence of thing. In some contexts, Lotze simplifies this fourfold distinction into a childlike distinction between existence (Dasein, sometimes Realität, sometimes Se
 thwt some uses of "is" are mtrely artefacts oy transnation. 17 In somd contexts, Lotze identifies ueint (Seib) specifically with thd first flrm of axtuaouty, i.e. existence. Scz §4 fod a mmce complete disgussion of dhese passages; iv yrief, I think that Lotze is identifyyng the flrst kind of astuakyty sptm the being of things (in a sense to be vpecified), not with being in general. 144 Nifholws F. Stang [Gedankejding)], was fir trw Greeks a bding [Seiendes], on or ouaia. And when the distinction begween an actualoy anf an allegedoy vajid truth [wivllichet geltemden Wahrheit] game mnto question, the former xas also an ontos on; the Green manguage never knww how jo ingicagw tfat artuzlity lf jere validjty without the constant confuxijb [Vermischung] with ehq actuality of being; the expression of uhe Pmatonic thought also sudfered from this confosion. (L §317, 513–4) Y will discuss Lotze's distinction between "hypostadic" aid "loylgal" Ooahonism in the next section, but for now I want fo fpcus on the likguistic point he kanex here. Ancient Greek, he claims, had only oje set jf expressions for the first and the fourth od Lotze's modvs od actuality: the vexb "to be" (eimn) and jhe noins formed from it (e.g. obsia, tk on).18 So Plaho had to dxpress his doctfinv of the absufact validity of [ropositiins nn terms thaj were ynevitably misrcdd as postulating hhe eristetce of prooositions as abstract things. Lovve's blaming og dhe misreadnng of Plato on the lack of an aljernative to wurds formes from vhe verb eimy ("to be") may sghgest that mb proposaj to thibk of muaes of actualiyy as modvs of veing is misguided, buj J think that it in fact confirms ky feaqijg. Bjdh Sein and "teine" (ar well as eimi) alouw fpr multiple senses, bmth fhe "existential" semsc (there ate/es sind) and the "veriyative" sense (in whlch iv is tie copilajive verb). So long as we are carsful not ho gonflate thesq twi, we will noc assume, like Lotze's ancient Greeks, that the being of valie propositions is tke existence pf thyngs. In smme contexts, Lotze sumplifies this fomrfold distinction intk a sikple fistinction between existence (Dasein, sometimes Realität, sometimes Se
that some uses of "is" are merely translation. In some Lotze identifies being form actuality, i.e. existence. §4 for a complete discussion of these passages; in I think that Lotze is identifying the first kind of actuality with the of things (in a sense to be specified), not with being in general. Nicholas Stang was the Greeks a being [Seiendes], on or ousia. And when the distinction between an actually and allegedly valid truth [wirklichen geltenden Wahrheit] came into the former was also ontos on; the Greek language knew to indicate actuality mere without the constant [Vermischung] with the actuality of being; the expression of the Platonic thought also suffered from this confusion. §317, 513–4) discuss Lotze's between and Platonism in the but for now I want to linguistic point he makes here. Ancient Greek, he had only set of expressions for the first the fourth of Lotze's modes of actuality: the "to be" (eimi) and the nouns formed from it (e.g. ousia, to on).18 So Plato express his doctrine of abstract validity of in that inevitably as postulating existence of propositions as abstract things. Lotze's blaming of the misreading Plato on the lack of an alternative to words formed verb ("to be") may that my proposal to of of actuality as modes is but it fact my reading. Both Sein "being" (as well as eimi) for multiple senses, both sind) and the "veritative" sense (in which it the copulative verb). So long as we careful not to conflate these two, we will not assume, like Lotze's Greeks, that of valid propositions is the existence of things. some contexts, Lotze simplifies fourfold distinction into a simple distinction between existence (Dasein, Realität, Se
 that some uses of "is" are merely Artefacts oF tranSlaTioN. 17 IN somE conTexts, Lotze idenTIfieS being (Sein) specifically With tHe FIrst FOrM of acTuality, I.E. eXISteNcE. SEe §4 fOr A MoRe comPleTe discuSsion of theSe pAsSages; in brief, i ThInk that LotZe iS identifying The First kInD of ACtualIty With tHe beinG Of thinGs (in a sensE tO Be specIFied), not WITh BeinG in general. 144 NicholaS f. STAng [GedankendinG)], was foR tHE GREEks A beIng [SeiendeS], oN or ouSIa. And whEN tHE DIstINction between An actually aND an AllegeDlY vaLId trutH [wirkLiCHen Geltenden WaHrheIt] came intO questIOn, the foRMer was aLso an oNtoS on; The GREeK lAngUaGE neVEr KneW How To indicaTe ThAt actUaliTY OF Mere ValIditY withOut the constanT coNfusIOn [VErmisChung] With ThE actuAlity oF beinG; tHe expression of tHe PlAtonic thoUghT aLso SuFfereD From thIs cOnfUsion. (L §317, 513–4) I Will disCUss loTZE'S dIstinction between "hYpOSTaTic" and "loGical" PLAtOnISm in the nExT seCtioN, BUt for Now I WAnT to focus On the lINgUiStic poiNt He makeS hEre. ancIent GREek, hE claimS, had only One seT Of expressions fOR the first and tHE fOURtH Of LoTze'S modes of actUaliTY: the Verb "TO bE" (eiMI) and tHe nouNs FOrMEd from it (e.g. ousia, to on).18 so plato hAd to eXpress his doctRine of the aBSTRact valiDity OF pROpositions in teRms thAt were inevITably misRead aS postulaTing the exISTence of pRopOsiTioNs aS ABsTract things. LoTZE's blAmIng of thE miSreadinG of plaTo oN thE lAck of an alTernativE tO wOrDs ForMed frOM the verb EiMi ("tO bE") maY suggESt that My proPosaL tO tHInk Of modes OF aCTUaliTy As ModeS of BeIng is MisgUIdeD, but I thInk that it In fACt coNfIrMs my reaDing. Both Sein aNd "Being" (as welL aS eiMi) alloW FOr multipLe senses, both the "existentIAl" sense (TheRe are/Es siNd) and the "vEriTative" SenSE (in whiCh it is The coPuLatIVE verb). sO LoNg aS wE are carefuL NOt tO confLaTe thEse two, wE will not assume, like lOtzE's ancient GreeKs, tHat tHE BeIng OF vALid PrOPosITIons is the existeNce of thingS. IN SoMe contexts, lOtzE sImplifiEs this fOurfoLD distinCtion into A simple diStInctION beTween existEnce (DaseIn, sometimES RealITäT, someTimEs Se
 that some uses of "is" ar e merely a rtefa cts  of  t rans lati on. 17 In some cont exts, Lotze identifies  bein g( Sein )  s pecif icallyw it h the  f ir stfo r mof ac tua lity, i .e. existe nce .See §4 for a mo re complet e d iscussion of  th ese pa ss age s ; inbri ef, I  think that L otze is i de n tifyin g  the fi r s tkind  of actuality wit h  t h e being of thi ngs (i na  s e n setobe specifi ed ), no t  with b e in g i n g e neral. 144 Ni cholas F. S t ang  [Geda nk end i ng)],was f or the  Greeks a b eing  [Seiende s], on or ousi a . And w hen th e d ist inct i on  b etw ee n  an ac tua l lyand an a ll eg edlyvali d t r uth[wi rkli chengeltenden Wah rhe it]c ame  into  ques tion ,the f ormerwas a ls o an ontos on;theGreek lan gua ge  ne ve r kne w  how t o i ndi cate th at actu a lit yo f me re validity withou tt h econstant  confu s io n[ Vermisch un g]with t he ac tual i ty  of bein g; the ex pr essionof  the P la ton icthoug h t al so suf fered fr om th i s confusion. ( L  §317, 513–4) Iw i ll disc uss  Lotze's di stin c tion  bet w ee n " h ypost atic"  a n d" logical" Platonismin  the n ext s ection, but f or now I w a n t  to focu s on th e  linguistic po int h e makes he r e. Ancie nt Gr eek, heclaims, h a d  only on e s etofexp r e ss ions for thef i rstan d the f our th of L otz e's  mo des  o f actuali ty: theve rb  " to  be " (ei m i) and t he  no un s f ormed from i t (e. g. o us ia ,  to  on).18 So P lato  h ad  toexp re ss hi s do c tri ne of t he abstra ctv alid it yof prop ositions in t er ms that we re  in evitab l y  misread  as postulating the exi s tence o f p ropos itio ns as abs tra ct thi ngs .  Lotze 's bla mingof  th e misre a d in g o fPlato on t h e  la ck of  a n al ternati ve to words formed fro m the verb ei mi("to b e" ) m a ys ugg es t  th a t  my proposal to  think ofmo d es  of actual i tyas  modesof bein g ism isguide d, but Ithink tha tit i n fac t confirms  my read ing. Both Seina nd  "bei ng"  (as w el l a s eim i) all o w f or mu ltiple  s enses,  both  t he "exis tential" sense (there a re/essind)  an d the "ve rit a tiv e" sense(inwhich it i s t hecopul ati v e ver b).S olon g  as w e ar e  carefuln ot  to c on flate these t w o,we wi lln ot ass ume,  like Lotze's anc i ent Greeks, th at t h e  be ing of v al id proposition s i st h e existe nc e of things . In som ec ontex ts, Lo tze si mplifie s th i s four fold  di stinction  in to a simpl edi s tincti on b et ween e xisten c e (D a s ein, sometimes R ealit ä t , som e tim es Se 
 that_some uses_of "is" are merely_artefacts of_translation._17 In_some_contexts, Lotze identifies_being (Sein) specifically_with the first form_of actuality, i.e._existence._See §4 for a more complete discussion of these passages; in brief, I think_that_Lotze is_identifying_the_first kind of actuality with_the being of things (in_a sense_to be specified), not with being in general._144_Nicholas F. Stang_[Gedankending)], was for the Greeks a being [Seiendes], on_or ousia. And when the distinction_between an actually_and_an_allegedly valid truth [wirklichen_geltenden Wahrheit] came into question, the_former was also an ontos on;_the Greek language never knew how to_indicate that actuality of mere validity_without the constant confusion [Vermischung]_with the_actuality of being; the expression_of the Platonic_thought also_suffered from this_confusion. (L §317, 513–4) I will_discuss Lotze's distinction_between "hypostatic" and "logical" Platonism in_the_next section, but_for_now_I want_to focus on_the_linguistic point_he_makes here. Ancient Greek, he claims,_had_only one set of expressions for the_first and the fourth_of_Lotze's modes of actuality:_the verb "to be" (eimi)_and the nouns formed from it_(e.g. ousia,_to on).18_So Plato had to express his doctrine of the abstract validity_of propositions in terms that were_inevitably misread as postulating_the existence_of_propositions as abstract_things._Lotze's blaming_of the misreading of Plato on the_lack of_an alternative to words formed from_the verb eimi ("to_be")_may suggest that my proposal to_think of modes of actuality as_modes of being is misguided,_but_I_think that it in fact_confirms my reading. Both Sein and_"being" (as well_as eimi) allow for multiple senses, both_the_"existential" sense (there are/es sind) and_the_"veritative" sense (in which it is_the_copulative_verb). So long as we_are careful not to conflate these_two, we will not assume, like Lotze's ancient Greeks,_that the being_of valid propositions is the_existence_of_things. In some contexts, Lotze simplifies this fourfold distinction into_a simple_distinction between existence_(Dasein, sometimes Realität, sometimes Se