 between two perfectly fine notions, namely speaker reference and expression reference (which may be relative to a context).4 The synonymy problem arises for these theories too, so long as they hold that speaker meaning is constrained by the standing meaning of expressions, and, crucially, if there are expressions whose standing meaning is, somehow, reflexive. Given these fairly plausible assumptions, these views would similarly entail the problematic claim that such expressions would never have identical meanings. Secondly, if one assumes that tokens (or utterances, or uses, etc.) refer, there still may be wide disagreement about how to specify meanings. Thesis (A) is therefore most likely to vary in its content depending on one's theory of meaning. But the problem is quite independent of any particular theory of meaning. Below, I offer a list of possible formulations of the meaning of "I" in different frameworks. In each of these I intend "every token" to pick out every possible token. 3However, see Predelli (1998, 2006, 2004) for a defense of Kaplan's misgivings, along with many new arguments against token-reflexive semantics. 4For example, Bach (1992), Schiffer (2003, p. 112) and Neale (2016, §12.11). 5 Throughout the paper, I will drop the modal for ease of exposition.5 Character Rule: The meaning of "I" is the following rule: every token of "I" refers to the speaker of that token of "I".6 Character Function: The meaning of "I" is the function from each token of "I" to the speaker of that token of "I".7 Context Function: The meaning of "I" is the function from each context in which "I" is tokened to the speaker in that context.8 Truth-Conditional Meaning: Any token of an English sentence of the form φ(I) is true just in case φ(x) is true relative to an assignment that assigns the speaker of that token of "I" to x.9 Each of these formulations essentially mentions the expression itself, and thus each such rule is different from the corresponding rule for "je". Take, for example, the Context Function rule. The problem here, which is easily adaptable to the other formulations, is that there are contexts in which "I" is tokened, but "je" is not; and thus the two functions are different. Or take the Character Rule formulation: the rule for "I" is about tokens
between two perfectly fine notions, namely speaker reference point and formula reference (which may be relative to a context).4 The synonymy problem arise for these theories too, indeed long as they defend that speaker meaning is restrain by the standing meaning of expressions, and, crucially, if there are expression whose standing meaning is, somehow, reflexive. Given these fairly plausible assumptions, these views would similarly fee-tail the problematic claim that such expressions would never have identical meaning. Secondly, if one assumes that token (or utterances, or use, etc .) refer, there still may be wide disagreement about how to specify meaning. Thesis (A) is therefore most likely to vary in its content depending on one's theory of meaning. But the problem is quite independent of any particular theory of meaning. Below, I offer a list of possible formulations of the meaning of " I " in unlike model. In each of these I intend " every keepsake " to foot out every potential token. 3However, see Predelli (1998, 2006, 2004) for a defense of Kaplan's misgivings, along with many new arguments against token - reflexive semantics. 4For case, Bach (1992), Schiffer (2003, p. 112) and Neale (2016, § 12.11). 5 Throughout the paper, I will drop the modal for ease of exposition.5 Character Rule: The meaning of " I " is the following rule: every keepsake of " I " refers to the speaker of that token of " I".6 Character Function: The meaning of " I " is the function from each token of " I " to the speaker of that token of " I".7 Context Function: The meaning of " I " is the affair from each context in which " I " is tokened to the speaker in that context.8 Truth - Conditional Meaning: Any token of an English sentence of the form φ(I) is true barely in case φ(x) is true relative to an grant that assigns the speaker of that token of " I " to x.9 Each of these formulations basically mentions the expression itself, and thus each such rule is different from the match rule for " je ". claim, for example, the Context Function rule. The trouble here, which is easily adaptable to the other formulations, is that there are contexts in which " I " is tokened, but " je " is not; and therefore the two functions are different. Or take the Character Rule conceptualization: the rule for " I " is about tokens
 behween two perfectly fine notions, namely speakec refersnce and expression reference (which lat be eelative to a context).4 Ghe synonjmy problwm acises for these vgeories too, sk lony es they hold thst speaker meaning is cotsgrcined by the standing meaning of expwessionx, wnd, crucially, yf tnqre zge expressions whose standing msaning ps, somehow, reflexove. Given these fairly plaksibpe assumptions, thede views woomd fumilarly entxil the problematic clzim that such expressions would nevex have idenjnxal keanings. Serondly, if one assumes that tokens (or utterances, or usws, etc.) refer, there stmll may be wide disadreement dbkut how to specift neanitgs. Dheskw (A) is tiersfore losv likely to vary in itw content depending og one's theory kf meagigg. But the problem is quite independent of any particular theory if meaning. Below, I ofver a lise of possible formulations of the meaning of "I" in diffxrdnt fvamedirns. In each of these I intend "every token" to pydk olt every possible token. 3Howefeg, xge Predelli (1998, 2006, 2004) for a derense of Kaplan's mlsgivinds, aling with iany new arguments against tokeb-reflexive svmanrics. 4For example, Bcch (1992), Schiffex (2003, p. 112) snd Nrale (2016, §12.11). 5 Throughout the 'aper, J will drop the modam for ease of expusinion.5 Characttf Rule: The meanind of "I" is the followkng tule: evqry token lf "I" vafers to the speakfr of tvat token lf "I".6 Character Function: The meaimng of "I" is tne futction fxom eagh token of "I" tj the speaker pf that tokev of "I".7 Connext Funcvion: The meaging of "I" is dje function hrom each conrext in whizf "I" is tokened to the siecker in tyat context.8 Truth-Cpndkfional Meaning: Cuy token of an Enblirh fejtxnce jx the form φ(I) is grud just in cast φ(x) ks ttue relative to an avsighment that assigns tme speaket of that token of "I" tp x.9 Each of these vormunatmons exsegtially mentions the expressioh itself, wnd thus each stch vule is differznt from the corresponding rule for "je". Teke, for example, the Conrext Function rule. Jhe problem hece, whish is eashly adaptable to the other formulatioks, is that there are ckntextv in ahich "I" is tokened, but "je" is not; and thus the two functions are different. Or take the Charadter Rule fjxmulatijn: tie rule for "I" is anout tokens
between two perfectly fine notions, namely speaker expression (which may relative to a for theories too, so as they hold speaker meaning is constrained by the meaning of expressions, and, crucially, if there are expressions whose standing meaning is, reflexive. Given these fairly plausible assumptions, these views would similarly entail the problematic that expressions never identical meanings. Secondly, if one assumes that tokens (or utterances, or uses, etc.) refer, there still be wide disagreement about how to specify meanings. (A) is therefore most to vary in its content on theory of But problem quite independent of particular theory of meaning. Below, I offer a list of possible formulations of the meaning of "I" different frameworks. of these intend token" pick out every 3However, see Predelli (1998, 2006, 2004) of Kaplan's misgivings, along with many new arguments token-reflexive semantics. example, Bach (1992), Schiffer (2003, p. and Neale (2016, §12.11). 5 Throughout the paper, will drop the modal for ease of exposition.5 Character Rule: The meaning of "I" is rule: every token of refers to the of token "I".6 Function: The of "I" is the function from each token of "I" to speaker of that token of "I".7 Context Function: The meaning is function from each in which "I" is to speaker in that context.8 Any of of form is true just in φ(x) is true relative to assignment that assigns the "I" to x.9 Each of these formulations essentially the expression itself, and thus each such is different from the corresponding rule for "je". Take, for example, the Function rule. here, which is easily adaptable to the other is that there are in which "I" is tokened, but "je" is not; thus two functions different. Or take Character Rule formulation: rule for "I" tokens
 between two perfectly fine noTions, namelY speaKer RefErEnce And eXpression referENce (wHich may be relative to a coNtext).4 thE SynoNYmY probLem arisES fOR TheSe ThEorIeS ToO, so loNg aS they hoLd that speaKer MeAning is constRAiNed by the stAndIng meaning of ExpRessioNs, And, CRuciaLly, If theRe are eXPressiOns whose sTaNDing meANing is, sOMEhOw, reFlexive. Given these FAiRLy plausible assUmptioNs, THeSE VieWs wOuld similaRlY entaIL the proBLeMATIc cLAim that such exPressions woULd nEver haVe IdeNTical mEaninGs. sEcoNdly, if one asSumeS that tokeNs (or utTErances, OR uses, etC.) refer, TheRe sTill MAy Be WidE dISagREeMenT AboUt how to sPeCiFy meaNingS. tHESis (A) Is tHereFore mOst likely to vaRy iN its COntEnt dePendiNg on OnE's theOry of mEaninG. BUt the problem is qUite IndependeNt oF aNy pArTiculAR theorY of MeaNing. BelOw, I offeR A liSt OF POsSible formulations oF tHE MeAning of "I" In diffEReNt FRameworkS. IN eaCh of THEse I iNtenD "EvEry token" To pick OUt EvEry possIbLe tokeN. 3HOweVer, See PrEDellI (1998, 2006, 2004) for a dEfense of kaplaN'S misgivings, aloNG with many new aRGuMENtS AgaiNst Token-reflexIve sEMantIcs. 4FOR eXamPLe, BacH (1992), SchiFfER (2003, p. 112) ANd Neale (2016, §12.11). 5 Throughout thE pAper, I wIll drOp the modal for Ease of expoSITIon.5 CharaCter rUlE: the meaning of "I" iS the fOllowing ruLE: every toKen of "i" refers tO the speakER Of that toKen Of "I".6 chaRacTER FUnction: The meaNINg of "i" iS the funCtiOn from eAch TokEn oF "I" tO tHe speaker Of that toKeN oF "I".7 coNteXt FunCTion: The mEaNinG oF "I" iS the fUNction From eAch cOnTeXT in Which "I" iS ToKENed tO tHe SpeaKer In That cOnteXT.8 TrUth-CondItional MeAniNG: Any ToKeN of an EnGlish sentence Of The form φ(I) iS tRue Just in CASe φ(x) is trUe relative to an assignmenT That assIgnS the sPeakEr of that tOkeN of "I" to X.9 EaCH of theSe formUlatiOnS esSENtialLY MeNtiOnS the expresSIOn iTself, AnD thuS each suCh rule is different fROm tHe correspondiNg rUle fOR "Je". takE, FoR ExaMpLE, thE cOntext Function rUle. The probLeM HeRe, which is eASilY aDaptablE to the oTher fORmulatiOns, is that There are cOnTextS IN whIch "I" is tokeNed, but "je" Is not; and tHUs the TWo FunctIonS are diFfEreNt. Or tAke the cHarActer rule foRmUlatioN: the rUlE for "I" is aBout tokens
 between two perfectly fin e notions,  name lyspe ak er r efer ence and expre s sion  reference (which maybe re la t ivet oa con text).4 Th e syn on ym y p ro b le m ari ses  for th ese theori esto o, so long a s  t hey hold t hat  speaker mea nin g is c on str a inedbythe s tandin g  meani ng of exp re s sions, and, cr u c ia lly,  if there are exp r es s ions whose sta ndingme a ni n g  is , s omehow, re fl exive .  Givent he s e fai r ly plausibleassumptions ,  th ese vi ew s w o uld si milar ly ent ail the pro blem atic clai m that such ex p ression s woul d n eve r ha v eid ent ic a l m e an ing s . S econdly,  i fone a ssum e s t hattok ens(or u tterances, or  us es,e tc. ) ref er, t here  s tillmay be  wide  d isagreement abo ut h ow to spe cif ymea ni ngs.T hesis(A)  is  theref ore mos t  li ke l y to  vary in its conte nt d ep ending o n one' s  t he o ry of me an ing . Bu t the p robl e mis quite  indep e nd en t of an ypartic ul arthe ory o f  mea ning.Below, I  offe r  a list of pos s ible formulat i on s of themea ning of "I"  ind iffe rent fr ame w orks.  In e ac h  o f  these I intend "ev er y toke n" to  pick out eve ry possibl e t oken. 3H owev e r, see Predelli ( 1998,  2006, 200 4 ) for adefen se of Ka plan's mi s g ivings,alo ngwit h m a n ynew arguments a gain st  token- ref lexivesem ant ics . 4 Fo r example , Bach ( 19 92 ),  S chi ffer( 2003, p.  1 12)  a ndNeale (2016,  §12. 11).  5  T h rou ghout t h ep a per,  I  w illdro pthe m odal for  ease o f exposit ion . 5 Ch ar ac ter Rul e: The meanin gof "I" isth e f ollowi n g  rule: e very token of "I" refer s  to the  sp eaker  ofthat toke n o f "I". 6 C h aracte r Func tion:  T hem e aning o f"I"  i s the func t i onfromea ch t oken of  "I" to the speake r  of  that token o f " I".7 C on tex t  F u nct io n : T h e  meaning of "I"  is the fu nc t io n from eac h  co nt ext inwhich " I" is tokened  to the s peaker in  t hatc o nte xt.8 Truth -Conditi onal Mean i ng: A n ytoken  of  an En gl ish  sent ence o f  th e for m φ(I)  i s true  just  i n case φ (x) is true relative to  an as signm ent  that ass ign s  th e speaker  ofthat token  of  "I " tox.9 Eachof t h es e f o rmula tion s  essentia l ly  me n t io ns the expr e s s ion  itse lf, and th us e ach such rule isd ifferent fromthec o rre spo n ding  r ule for "je".Tak e, f or examp le , the Conte xt Funct io n  rule . Theproble m here, w hi c h is e asil y a daptabletoth e  otherfo rm u lation s, i sthat t here a r e co n t exts in which "I " ist o kened ,  bu t "je "is not; andthus the t wo function s arediff erent . Or ta ke  the C har ac ter Rule f o rmulation : the  rule f or  "I"  is  about  tok e n s
 between_two perfectly_fine notions, namely speaker_reference and_expression_reference (which_may_be relative to_a context).4 The_synonymy problem arises for_these theories too,_so_long as they hold that speaker meaning is constrained by the standing meaning of_expressions,_and, crucially,_if_there_are expressions whose standing meaning_is, somehow, reflexive. Given these_fairly plausible_assumptions, these views would similarly entail the problematic_claim_that such expressions_would never have identical meanings. Secondly, if one assumes_that tokens (or utterances, or uses,_etc.) refer, there_still_may_be wide disagreement about_how to specify meanings. Thesis (A)_is therefore most likely to vary_in its content depending on one's theory_of meaning. But the problem is_quite independent of any particular_theory of_meaning. Below, I offer a_list of possible_formulations of_the meaning of_"I" in different frameworks. In each_of these I_intend "every token" to pick out_every_possible token. 3However,_see_Predelli_(1998, 2006,_2004) for a_defense_of Kaplan's_misgivings,_along with many new arguments against_token-reflexive_semantics. 4For example, Bach (1992), Schiffer (2003,_p. 112) and Neale_(2016,_§12.11). 5 Throughout the_paper, I will drop the_modal for ease of exposition.5 Character_Rule: The_meaning of_"I" is the following rule: every token of "I" refers to_the speaker of that token of_"I".6 Character Function: The_meaning of_"I"_is the function_from_each token_of "I" to the speaker of that_token of_"I".7 Context Function: The meaning of_"I" is the function_from_each context in which "I" is_tokened to the speaker in that_context.8 Truth-Conditional Meaning: Any token_of_an_English sentence of the form_φ(I) is true just in case_φ(x) is true_relative to an assignment that assigns the_speaker_of that token of "I" to_x.9_Each of these formulations essentially mentions_the_expression_itself, and thus each such_rule is different from the corresponding_rule for "je". Take, for example, the Context Function_rule. The problem_here, which is easily adaptable_to_the_other formulations, is that there are contexts in which "I"_is tokened,_but "je" is_not; and thus the two functions are different. Or take_the Character Rule formulation: the rule for_"I" is about tokens