 proposition one believes) undermine one's knowledge of that proposition depends on the reasoning abilities of a normal member of a relevant social group and whether, in particular, the fact that some evidence one possesses is a defeater would be obvious to normal members of that group. Thus, on Cohen's view, one component of knowledge is determined by certain psychological facts about society. But which social group or society serves as the basis for judging the obviousness of defeaters? Cohen's own proposal is that "the standards in effect in a particular context are determined by the normal reasoning powers of the attributor's social group."4 In light of this social dimension of knowledge, Cohen proposes that ascriptions (and denials) of knowledge are best construed as indexical or context-sensitive: the set of intersubjective standards of obviousness that apply in ascriptions of knowledge can vary from context to context depending on which group counts as the attributor group. The idea that knowledge involves a socially determined level of reasoning ability perhaps also applies to the cognitive faculties of memory and perception.5 Not only might epistemic requirements for dealing with counterevidence be gauged by certain social facts having to do with cognitive abilities, but other social factors may play a role in knowledge. Sosa, for example, argues that the extent to which members of one's social group possess some bit of information affects one's knowledge. If, for example, most everyone in one's community has information that defeats some true proposition that one otherwise has excellent evidence for believing, then arguably one fails to know. According to Sosa reflection on such cases make it "plausible to conclude that knowledge has a further'social aspect,' that it cannot depend on one's missing or blinking what is generally known."' Normative Contextualism Another contextualist claim is that justification (rationality, knowledge) depends on, or is relative to, the social practices and norms of communities of inquirers. Some contextualists like to point out how our knowledge-gathering 296 Moral Knowledge? practices are social in nature and importantly tethered to the epistemic practices and norms of the members of our group (however talk of "our group" is to be understood). Construed as a descriptive claim about our epistemic evaluations this claim is perhaps (with some qualifications) correct since it amounts to the claim that as a matter of fact our epistemic evaluations are typically made on the basis of ("relative to") the practices and norms generally accepted and used by a community of inquirers to which
proposition one believes) undermine one's knowledge of that suggestion depend on the reasoning abilities of a normal member of a relevant social group and whether, in particular, the fact that some evidence one posse is a defeater would be obvious to normal members of that group. Thus, on Cohen's view, one part of cognition is determined by certain psychological facts about society. But which social group or society suffice as the basis for judging the obviousness of defeaters? Cohen's own marriage proposal is that " the standards in effect in a particular context are determined by the normal reasoning powers of the attributor's social group. "4 In light of this social dimension of cognition, Cohen proposes that ascriptions (and denials) of cognition are best construed as indexical or context - sensitive: the set of intersubjective standards of obviousness that use in ascriptions of knowledge can vary from context to context depending on which group counts as the attributor group. The theme that knowledge involves a socially determined level of reasoning ability perhaps also applies to the cognitive faculties of memory and perception.5 Not only might epistemic requirements for dealing with counterevidence be gauged by certain social facts having to do with cognitive abilities, but early social factor may play a function in knowledge. Sosa, for example, argues that the extent to which members of one's social group own some bit of data affects one's knowledge. If, for example, most everyone in one's residential district has information that defeats some true proposition that one otherwise has excellent evidence for believe, then arguably one fails to know. According to Sosa reflection on such cases make it " plausible to reason that cognition have a further'social aspect,' that it cannot depend on one's missing or flash what is generally known. "' Normative Contextualism Another contextualist claim is that justification (rationality, cognition) depends on, or is proportional to, the social practices and norms of communities of inquirers. Some contextualists like to luff out how our knowledge - gathering 296 Moral Knowledge? practice are social in nature and importantly tethered to the epistemic practices and norm of the members of our group (however lecture of " our group " is to be understood). Construed as a descriptive title about our epistemic evaluations this claim is possibly (with some qualifications) correct since it amounts to the claim that as a matter of fact our epistemic evaluations are typically made on the basis of (" relative to ") the practices and norms generally accept and used by a community of inquirer to which
 prlposition one believes) ukdermine one's knowledge of thzt proporition depends on the reasonmng qbiliupes of a normal membef of a repevant siciao group and whether, in padbiculcr, the fact that some evidance one possevsds is a defeater would be obvious to gormal kelbers of that drouk. Trus, kn Cohen's view, one component of knkwledge is determinec by certain psychological fachs about society. Bkt which soxial troup or sockety serves as the basjs for judging the obviousness uf deyeaters? Cohgu'w oat proposal ms than "the standards in efxect in a particular gonteet aee determined by the iormal reasoning powgrs of the actributor's social groyp."4 In lhght of gyis sodiel simenslon of knowlesge, Cohen peoposes that ascripuiogw (and denials) of knjwjedge are best construed as indexical og cohtext-sensitive: the set if intersubjective stwndards os obviousness that apply in ascriptions of knowlegge cen vaxn weol context to context depending on which group doinns as the attribubor group. The idea tjay knowledge inxolves a aocially determinef level of rwasoning wbiloty perhaps also applies to the cognitine fqculties of memory and percepcion.5 Npt onky might epistemic requnremenfs for deallng with duunterevidence bd gsuced by ctftain social factf having vo do with cugnijive abylities, buh othcs social factors mwy plcy a sole in knlwledge. Sosa, for example, argues that the extemt to which mzmbers of one's sociwl group possexs some bit uf informanion afferts one's knorledge. If, for gxample, most xveryone yn obe's xommunigh has informatoon that btfeats somw true proposition thxf one otherwise haw excellent evicenze sog bxlievytg, then argudbly ond failr to know. Agcofdinb to Sosa reflection on auch cases make it "pjausible to concjude that knoeledge has a furthtr'sociel aspxct,' thst yt cannot depend on one's missihg or blijkikg what is gegeraoly known."' Noxmative Contextualism Another contextualmst claim is that justidication (rationaliti, kkowledge) depxnds og, or is ralative to, the sociao practices and nprms of communities or inquhrers. Some contextualists like to point out how our knowledge-gathering 296 Moral Jnowlevgq? practices are socidl nn natuwe aid importantly tetnered to the epistemic practicer and nosmf of the members of our groul (fowever talk uf "our group" is to be unserstood). Construed as a descriptive claom about our epistemic eyaluationw thia claim is perhaps (with some qualiyicatiins) coreect since it amojntx bo the clalm tiat as a matter of fact our epistemuc evaouwtions are typicelly made on uhe basps of ("rglative to") the przctidfs ana norms generslly accepted snd used by a communpty of inquirers uo which
proposition one believes) undermine one's knowledge of depends the reasoning of a normal group whether, in particular, fact that some one possesses is a defeater would obvious to normal members of that group. Thus, on Cohen's view, one component knowledge is determined by certain psychological facts about society. But which social group society as basis judging the obviousness of defeaters? Cohen's own proposal is that "the standards in effect in a context are determined by the normal reasoning powers the attributor's social group."4 light of this social dimension knowledge, proposes that (and of are best construed indexical or context-sensitive: the set of intersubjective standards of obviousness that apply in ascriptions of knowledge can from context depending on group as attributor group. The knowledge involves a socially determined level perhaps also applies to the cognitive faculties of and perception.5 only might epistemic requirements for dealing counterevidence be gauged by certain social facts having do with cognitive abilities, but other social factors may play a role in knowledge. Sosa, argues that the extent which members of social possess bit information affects knowledge. If, for example, most everyone in one's community has information defeats some true proposition that one otherwise has excellent evidence then one fails to According to Sosa reflection such make it "plausible to knowledge a it depend one's missing or blinking is generally known."' Normative Contextualism contextualist claim is that or is relative to, the social practices and of communities of inquirers. Some contextualists like point out how our knowledge-gathering 296 Moral Knowledge? practices are social in and importantly the epistemic practices and norms of the members our group (however talk "our group" is to be understood). Construed as a claim our epistemic this claim is (with some qualifications) since it amounts claim that a of evaluations are typically made on the of to") the practices and norms accepted by a community of inquirers to which
 proposition one believes) undErmine one's KnowlEdgE of ThAt prOposItion depends on THe reAsoning abilities of a norMal meMbER of a RElEvant Social gROuP ANd wHeThEr, iN pARtIculaR, thE fact thAt some evidEncE oNe possesses iS A dEfeater wouLd bE obvious to noRmaL membeRs Of tHAt groUp. THus, on cohen's VIew, one Component Of KNowledGE is deteRMInEd by Certain psychologiCAl FActs about socieTy. But wHiCH sOCIal GroUp or societY sErves AS the basIS fOR JUdgINg the obviousnEss of defeatERs? COhen's oWn ProPOsal is That "tHe STanDards in effeCt in A particulAr contEXt are deTErmined By the nOrmAl rEasoNInG pOweRs OF thE AtTriBUtoR's social GrOuP."4 In liGht oF THIS socIal DimeNsion Of knowledge, CoHen PropOSes That aScripTionS (aNd denIals) of KnowlEdGe are best constrUed aS indexicaL or CoNteXt-SensiTIve: the Set Of iNtersubJective STanDaRDS Of Obviousness that appLy IN AsCriptionS of knoWLeDgE Can vary fRoM coNtexT TO contExt dEPeNding on wHich grOUp CoUnts as tHe AttribUtOr gRouP. The iDEa thAt knowLedge invOlves A Socially determINed level of reaSOnING aBIlitY peRhaps also apPlieS To thE cogNItIve FAcultIes of MeMOrY And perception.5 Not onlY mIght epIstemIc requirementS for dealinG WITh counteReviDEnCE be gauged by cerTain sOcial facts HAving to dO with CognitivE abilitieS, BUt other sOciAl fActOrs MAY pLay a role in knoWLEdge. soSa, for exAmpLe, argueS thAt tHe eXteNt To which meMbers of oNe'S sOcIaL grOup poSSess some BiT of InForMatioN AffectS one's KnowLeDgE. if, fOr exampLE, mOST eveRyOnE in oNe's CoMmuniTy haS InfOrmatioN that defeAts SOme tRuE pRopositIon that one othErWise has excElLenT evideNCE for beliEving, then arguably one faiLS to know. accOrdinG to SOsa reflecTioN on sucH caSEs make It "plauSible To ConCLUde thAT KnOwlEdGe has a furtHER'soCial aSpEct,' tHat it caNnot depend on one's miSSinG or blinking whAt iS genERAlLy kNOwN."' norMaTIve cONtextualism AnotHer contextUaLIsT claim is thAT juStIficatiOn (ratioNalitY, KnowledGe) depends On, or is relAtIve tO, THe sOcial practIces and nOrms of comMUnitiES oF inquIreRs. Some CoNteXtualIsts liKE to Point Out how OuR knowlEdge-gAtHering 296 MoRal Knowledge? practices arE sociaL in naTurE and imporTanTLy tEthered to The ePistemic prActIceS and nOrmS Of the MembERs Of oUR grouP (howEVer talk of "OUr GroUP" Is To be understOOD). conStrueD as A DescriPtivE claim about our epiSTemic evaluatioNs thIS ClaIm iS PerhApS (with some qualiFicAtIONs) correcT sInce it amounTs to the cLaIM that As a matTer of fAct our ePIStEMic evaLuatIonS are typicAllY mADe on the BaSiS Of ("relaTive To") The praCtices ANd noRMS generally acceptEd and USEd by a COmmUnity Of InquireRS to wHich
 proposition one believes)  undermine  one' s k now le dgeof t hat propositio n  dep ends on the reasoningabili ti e s of anorma l membe r  o f a r el ev ant  s o ci al gr oup  and wh ether, inpar ti cular, the f a ct  that some  ev idence one p oss essesis  ad efeat erwould  be ob v ious t o normalme m bers o f  that g r o up . Th us, on Cohen's vi e w, one componentof kno wl e dg e isdet ermined by  c ertai n  psycho l og i c a l f a cts about soc iety. But w h ich  socia lgro u p or s ociet ys erv es as the b asis  for judg ing th e  obviou s ness of  defea ter s?Cohe n 's  o wnpr o pos a list hat  "the st an da rds i n ef f e c t  ina p arti cular  context aredet ermi n edby th e nor malre asoni ng pow ers o fthe attributor' s so cial grou p." 4Inli ght o f  thissoc ial  dimens ion ofk now le d g e ,Cohen proposes tha ta s cr iptions(and d e ni al s ) of kno wl edg e ar e bestcons t ru ed as in dexica l  o rcontext -s ensiti ve : t heset o f  int ersubj ective s tanda r ds of obviousn e ss that apply in a sc r ipti ons  of knowled ge c a n va ry f r om  co n textto co nt e xt depending on whichgr oup co untsas the attrib utor group . T he ideathat kn o wledge involve s a s ocially de t erminedlevel  of reas oning abi l i ty perha psals o a ppl i e sto the cognit i v e fa cu lties o f m emory a ndper cep tio n. 5 Not onl y mightep is te mi c r equir e ments fo rdea li ngwithc ounter evide ncebe  g a uge d by ce r ta i n  soc ia lfact s h av ing t o do wit h cogni tive abil iti e s, b ut  o ther so cial factorsma y play a r ol e i n know l e dge. Sos a, for example, arguest hat the  ex tentto w hich memb ers  of on e's social  group  poss es s s o m e bit o finf or mation aff e c tsone's  k nowl edge. I f, for example, mo s t e veryone in on e's  com m u ni tyh as inf or m ati o n  that defeats s ome true p ro p os ition that one  o therwis e has e xcell e nt evid ence forbelieving ,then a rgu ably one f ails toknow. Acc o rding to  Sosa  re flecti on  on  such  cases mak e it"plaus ib le toconcl ud e that k nowledge has a further' social  aspe ct, ' that it  ca n not  depend o n on e's missin g o r b linki ngw hat i s ge n er all y  know n."' Normative Co nte x t ua lism Anothe r c ont extua lis t  claim  isthat justificatio n  (rationality,  kno w l edg e)d epen ds  on, or is rel ati ve t o, the s oc ial practic es and n or m s ofcommun itiesof inqu i r er s . Some  con tex tualistslik et o point  o ut how ou r kn ow ledge- gather i ng 2 9 6  Moral Knowledge ? pra c t icesa resocia lin natu r e an d importan tly tethere d to t he e piste mic pra ct ices a ndno rms of the members o f our  group(h owev ertalk o f "o u r  grou p" i stobe unders t o od ) .Co n str uedas ade scri ptive cla i m aboutour epistem ic  ev a l uation s  t h i s claim is  pe rhaps ( with someq uali f ic a tions ) corr ect si nce ita mou nt s to th e c l a im that a s a matte r  of  f actour epis te micev alu at ions are typica lly made  on theb a sis of  (" r elat i ve to" )the practice s and  n o rms gen e r all y accep t edand  us ed b y a  com m unity of inquirers to wh ich
 proposition_one believes)_undermine one's knowledge of_that proposition_depends_on the_reasoning_abilities of a_normal member of_a relevant social group_and whether, in_particular,_the fact that some evidence one possesses is a defeater would be obvious to_normal_members of_that_group._Thus, on Cohen's view, one_component of knowledge is determined_by certain_psychological facts about society. But which social group_or_society serves as_the basis for judging the obviousness of defeaters? Cohen's_own proposal is that "the standards_in effect in_a_particular_context are determined by_the normal reasoning powers of the_attributor's social group."4 In light of_this social dimension of knowledge, Cohen proposes_that ascriptions (and denials) of knowledge_are best construed as indexical_or context-sensitive:_the set of intersubjective standards_of obviousness that_apply in_ascriptions of knowledge_can vary from context to context_depending on which_group counts as the attributor group._The_idea that knowledge_involves_a_socially determined_level of reasoning_ability_perhaps also_applies_to the cognitive faculties of memory_and_perception.5 Not only might epistemic requirements for_dealing with counterevidence be_gauged_by certain social facts_having to do with cognitive_abilities, but other social factors may_play a_role in_knowledge. Sosa, for example, argues that the extent to which members_of one's social group possess some_bit of information affects_one's knowledge._If,_for example, most_everyone_in one's_community has information that defeats some true_proposition that_one otherwise has excellent evidence for_believing, then arguably one_fails_to know. According to Sosa reflection_on such cases make it "plausible_to conclude that knowledge has_a_further'social_aspect,' that it cannot depend_on one's missing or blinking what_is generally known."'_Normative Contextualism Another contextualist claim is that_justification_(rationality, knowledge) depends on, or is_relative_to, the social practices and norms_of_communities_of inquirers. Some contextualists like_to point out how our knowledge-gathering_296 Moral Knowledge? practices are social in nature and_importantly tethered to_the epistemic practices and norms_of_the_members of our group (however talk of "our group" is_to be_understood). Construed as_a descriptive claim about our epistemic evaluations this claim is_perhaps (with some qualifications) correct since it_amounts to the claim that as a matter of fact our_epistemic evaluations are typically made on the basis_of ("relative to") the practices and norms_generally accepted and used_by_a community of inquirers to which