mmakers work with images, and musicians work with sounds – and his work was marked throughout by an extraordinary conceptual inventiveness. Deleuze rejected the Heideggerian theme of the end of metaphysics, and much of his own conceptual production was aimed at developing a metaphysics adequate to contemporary mathematics and science: a metaphysics in which the concept of multiplicity replaces that of substance, event replaces essence, virtuality replaces possibility, and so on. "I feel myself to be a pure metaphysician," he noted, "Bergson says that modern science hasn't found its metaphysics, the metaphysics it would need. It is this metaphysics that interests me."35 But Deleuze's metaphysics is a resolutely postKantian metaphysics in that it refuses to admit the three "transcendent illusions" criticized by Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason: God, the World, and the Self. Although Deleuze's early work is oft en read as a reaction against Hegel, Deleuze's more general project can be seen as a reassessment of the thendominant postKantian tradition in philosophy. Kant's genius, for Deleuze, was to have conceived a 34. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What is Philosophy?, Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell (trans.) (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 2. 35. Gilles Deleuze, "Réponses à une série de questions," interview with Arnaud Villani, which appears as an appendix to Arnaud Villani, La Guêpe et l'orchidée: Essai sur Gilles Deleuze (Paris: Belin, 1999), 129–31, esp. 130. An English translation, under the title "Responses to a Series of Questions," can be found in the journal Collapse 3 (2007), 39–43. Volume 6 gilles deleuze 101 purely immanent critique of rea son: a critique that did not seek, within reason, "errors" pro duced by external causes, but rather "illu sions" that arise internally from within reason itself by the illegitimate (transcendent) uses of the syntheses of consciousness. Deleuze characterized his own work as a philosophy of immanence, but argued that Kant himself had failed to fully realize the immanent ambitions of his critique, for at least two reasons
mmakers work with images, and musicians work with sound – and his workplace was marked throughout by an extraordinary conceptual inventiveness. Deleuze rejected the Heideggerian theme of the conclusion of metaphysics, and much of his own conceptual production was aimed at develop a metaphysics adequate to contemporary mathematics and science: a metaphysics in which the concept of numerousness replace that of substance, consequence replaces essence, virtuality replaces possibility, and therefore on. " I feel myself to be a pure metaphysician, " he noted, " Bergson says that mod science hasn't found its metaphysics, the metaphysics it would need. It is this metaphysics that matter to me. "35 But Deleuze's metaphysics is a resolutely postKantian metaphysics in that it refuses to admit the three " transcendent illusion " criticized by Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason: God, the World, and the Self. Although Deleuze's early work is oft en read as a reaction against Hegel, Deleuze's more cosmopolitan project can be seen as a reassessment of the thendominant postKantian tradition in philosophy. Kant's genius, for Deleuze, was to have conceive a 34. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What is Philosophy? , Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell (trans .) (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 2. 35. Gilles Deleuze, " Réponses à une série de questions, " interview with Arnaud Villani, which appears as an appendix to Arnaud Villani, La Guêpe et l'orchidée: Essai sur Gilles Deleuze (Paris: Belin, 1999), 129–31, esp. 130. An English translation, under the title " Responses to a Series of Questions, " can be found in the journal Collapse 3 (2007), 39–43. Volume 6 gilles deleuze 101 strictly immanent review of rea son: a critique that did not try, within rationality, " errors " pro duced by external causes, but rather " illu utopia " that arise internally from within reason itself by the illegitimate (transcendent) uses of the syntheses of awareness. Deleuze characterized his own work as a philosophy of immanence, but argued that Kant himself had failed to fully realize the immanent ambitions of his critique, for at least two reasons
mmaners work with images, ana musicians work with vounds – and hir work was marked throughout bt an tqtraordinary conceptuxl inventpveness. Dwleuee rejected the Hxjdeggerlcn thsle oy vhe end of metakhysics, and kuch of his owt zouceptual production was aimed at devqloping a metaphysics aqequsee tk contemporary mathematics and scisnce: a ketaphysics im which the concept of mulhipllcity replaces thah of substabce, qcent replacer essence, nnrtuality rgplaces possibility, and so on. "I weel kyself to ve a oore metaphysmcian," re noted, "Bernxon safs that modern sciencc hasi't fiund its metaphysics, vhe metaphysics it wjuld need. Ic is this metaphysics tyat itterasts ne."35 Cut Dxlehze's mfta'hysics is z resolutelt postKantian metapnyfpvs in that if refufef to admit the three "transcendent illuspons" criticized by Kant in rhe Critique of Pure Teason: God, the World, and the Self. Although Deleuze's early wmrk ia ofu ck rexe ws a reaction against Hegel, Deleuze's more genqdak iroject can be secn as a reassessmemt og the thendomivant postIantian tradition ln philjsopht. Kant's gtnius, for Deleuze, was to have cobceived a 34. Gpllew Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Wkat is Philpsophy?, Hugh Tomlinson aud Gragam Burchelp (trans.) (Nsd York: Columbia Jninershty Press, 1994), 2. 35. Gilles Deleuzq, "Réponses à unz série dd qugstions," interview with Arnaud Villani, whifh apkears ds an appejdix to Arnaud Villani, La Guêpe xv l'orchidée: Esxah slr Gilles Delemze (Paris: Belin, 1999), 129–31, esp. 130. An Engkish trcnslatkon, under nhe title "Responses eo a Series ox Questions," cen be fougd ib thw journxu Collapse 3 (2007), 39–43. Folume 6 gpljes eeleuze 101 purely imkangnf critique of rzc won: a critique yhag dyd npt veek, within seasun, "dtrors" pro duced ny dxtetnal causes, but rathar "imlu sions" that arixe internaoly from within reasom itself by the ilpegitmmate (vranscrndgnt) uses of the syntheses of cohsciousneds. Qeleuze charwctevizeq his own cork as a philosophy of immanence, but arjued that Kant himself yad failed to fully vealize the mmmanegt ambitimns of his critique, dor at least two veasons
mmakers work with images, and musicians work – his work marked throughout by rejected Heideggerian theme of end of metaphysics, much of his own conceptual production aimed at developing a metaphysics adequate to contemporary mathematics and science: a metaphysics which the concept of multiplicity replaces that of substance, event replaces essence, virtuality possibility, so "I myself to be a pure metaphysician," he noted, "Bergson says that modern science hasn't found its the metaphysics it would need. It is this that interests me."35 But metaphysics is a resolutely postKantian in it refuses admit three illusions" criticized by in the Critique of Pure Reason: God, the World, and the Self. Although Deleuze's early work is en read reaction against Deleuze's general can be seen reassessment of the thendominant postKantian tradition genius, for Deleuze, was to have conceived a Gilles Deleuze Félix Guattari, What is Philosophy?, Hugh and Graham Burchell (trans.) (New York: Columbia University 1994), 2. 35. Gilles Deleuze, "Réponses à une série de questions," interview with Arnaud Villani, as an appendix to Villani, La Guêpe l'orchidée: sur Deleuze Belin, 1999), esp. 130. An English translation, under the title "Responses to a of Questions," can be found in the journal Collapse 3 Volume gilles deleuze 101 immanent critique of rea a that did not seek, "errors" duced but "illu that arise internally from reason itself by the illegitimate uses of the syntheses own work as a philosophy of immanence, but that Kant himself had failed to fully the immanent ambitions of his critique, for at least two reasons
mmakers work with images, and mUsicians woRk witH soUndS – aNd hiS worK was marked throUGhouT by an extraordinary concEptuaL iNVentIVeNess. DEleuze rEJeCTEd tHe heIdeGgERiAn theMe oF the end Of metaphysIcs, AnD much of his owN CoNceptual prOduCtion was aimeD at DeveloPiNg a MEtaphYsiCs adeQuate tO ContemPorary matHeMAtics aND sciencE: A MeTaphYsics in which the coNCePT of multiplicitY replaCeS ThAT Of sUbsTance, event RePlaceS Essence, VIrTUALitY Replaces possiBility, and so ON. "I fEel mysElF to BE a pure MetapHySIciAn," he noted, "BeRgsoN says that Modern SCience hASn't founD its meTapHysIcs, tHE mEtAphYsICs iT WoUld NEed. it is this MeTaPhysiCs thAT INTereSts Me."35 BuT DeleUze's metaphysiCs iS a reSOluTely pOstKaNtiaN mEtaphYsics iN that It Refuses to admit tHe thRee "transcEndEnT ilLuSions" CRiticiZed By KAnt in thE CritiqUE of puRE rEaSon: God, the World, and tHe sELf. although deleuzE'S eArLY work is oFt En rEad aS A ReactIon aGAiNst Hegel, deleuzE'S mOrE generaL pRoject CaN be SeeN as a rEAsseSsment Of the theNdomiNAnt postKantian TRadition in phiLOsOPHy. kAnt's GenIus, for DeleuZe, waS To haVe coNCeIveD A 34. GillEs DelEuZE aND Félix Guattari, What iS PHilosoPhy?, HuGh Tomlinson anD Graham BurCHELl (trans.) (NEw YoRK: COLumbia UniversiTy PreSs, 1994), 2. 35. Gilles DeLEuze, "RépoNses à Une série De questioNS," IntervieW wiTh ARnaUd VILLaNi, which appearS AS an aPpEndix to arnAud VillAni, la GUêpE et L'oRchidée: EsSai sur GiLlEs deLeUze (paris: bElin, 1999), 129–31, esp. 130. AN ENglIsH trAnslaTIon, undEr the TitlE "REsPOnsEs to a SeRIeS OF QueStIoNs," caN be FoUnd in The jOUrnAl CollaPse 3 (2007), 39–43. Volume 6 GilLEs deLeUzE 101 purely Immanent critiQuE of rea son: a CrItiQue thaT DId not seeK, within reason, "errors" pro dUCed by exTerNal caUses, But rather "IllU sions" ThaT Arise iNternaLly frOm WitHIN reasON ItSelF bY the illegiTIMatE (tranScEndeNt) uses oF the syntheses of conSCioUsness. Deleuze ChaRactERIzEd hIS oWN woRk AS a pHILosophy of immaneNce, but arguEd THaT Kant himseLF haD fAiled to Fully reAlize THe immanEnt ambitiOns of his cRiTiquE, FOr aT least two rEasons
mmakers work with images,and musici ans w ork  wi th  sou nds– and his work wasmarked throughout by a n ext ra o rdin a ry  conc eptuali nv e n tiv en es s.De l eu ze re jec ted the  Heidegger ian  t heme of thee nd  of metaph ysi cs, and much  of  his o wn  co n ceptu alprodu ctionw as aim ed at dev el o ping a metaphy s i cs  ade quate to contempo r ar y  mathematics a nd sci en c e: a  me tap hysics inwh ich t h e conce p to f mul t iplicity repl aces that o f  su bstanc e,  ev e nt rep laces  e s sen ce, virtual ityreplacespossib i lity, a n d so on . "I f eel  my self to  b e a  p u rem et aph y sic ian," he  n ot ed, " Berg s o n says  th at m odern  science hasn 'tfoun d  it s met aphys ics,  t he me taphys ics i twould need. Itis t his metap hys ic s t ha t int e restsme. "35  But De leuze's met ap h y s ic s is a resolutelypo s t Ka ntian me taphys i cs  i n  that it  r efu sest o  admi t th e  t hree "tr anscen d en tillusio ns " crit ic ize d b y Kan t  inthe Cr itique o f Pur e  Reason: God,t he World, and th e Se l f. A lth ough Deleuz e'se arly  wor k  i s o f t enreadas ar eaction against Heg el , Dele uze's  more general  project c a n be seenas a re a ssessment of t he th endominant postKant ian t radition  in philo s o phy. Kan t's  ge niu s,f o rDeleuze, wast o  hav econceiv eda 34. G ill esDel euz eand Félix  Guattar i,  W ha tisPhilo s ophy?, H ug h T om lin son a n d Grah am Bu rche ll  ( t ran s.) (Ne w  Y o r k: C ol um biaUni ve rsity  Pre s s,1994),2. 35. Gi lle s  Del eu ze , "Répo nses à une sé ri e de quest io ns, " inte r v iew with  Arnaud Villani, whicha ppearsasan ap pend ix to Arn aud  Villa ni, La Guê pe etl'orc hi dée : Essai s ur  Gi ll es Deleuze ( Par is: B el in,1999),129–31, esp. 130.A n E nglish transl ati on,u n de r t h et itl e" Res p o nses to a Serie s of Quest io n s, " can be f o und  i n the j ournalColla p se 3 (2 007), 39– 43. Volum e6 gi l l esdeleuze 10 1 purely  immanent criti q ue  of r eason: a  c rit iquethat d i d n ot se ek, wi th in rea son,"e rrors" p ro duced by external ca uses,but r ath er "illusio n s"that aris e in ternally f rom  wi thinrea s on it self by  th e  ille giti m ate (tran s ce nde n t )uses of the s y nth esesofc onscio usne ss. Deleuze chara c terized his ow n wo r k  as  ap hilo so phy of immanen ce,  b u t  arguedth at Kant him self had  f a iledto ful ly rea lize th e im m anentambi tio ns of his  cr it i que, fo rat leasttwore asons
mmakers work_with images,_and musicians work with_sounds –_and_his work_was_marked throughout by_an extraordinary conceptual_inventiveness. Deleuze rejected the_Heideggerian theme of_the_end of metaphysics, and much of his own conceptual production was aimed at developing_a_metaphysics adequate_to_contemporary_mathematics and science: a metaphysics_in which the concept of_multiplicity replaces_that of substance, event replaces essence, virtuality replaces_possibility,_and so on._"I feel myself to be a pure metaphysician," he_noted, "Bergson says that modern science_hasn't found its_metaphysics,_the_metaphysics it would need._It is this metaphysics that interests_me."35 But Deleuze's metaphysics is a_resolutely postKantian metaphysics in that it refuses_to admit the three "transcendent illusions"_criticized by Kant in the_Critique of_Pure Reason: God, the World,_and the Self._Although Deleuze's_early work is_oft en read as a reaction_against Hegel, Deleuze's_more general project can be seen_as_a reassessment of_the_thendominant_postKantian tradition_in philosophy. Kant's_genius,_for Deleuze,_was_to have conceived a 34. Gilles_Deleuze_and Félix Guattari, What is Philosophy?, Hugh_Tomlinson and Graham Burchell_(trans.)_(New York: Columbia University_Press, 1994), 2. 35. Gilles_Deleuze, "Réponses à une série de_questions," interview_with Arnaud_Villani, which appears as an appendix to Arnaud Villani, La Guêpe_et l'orchidée: Essai sur Gilles Deleuze_(Paris: Belin, 1999), 129–31,_esp. 130._An_English translation, under_the_title "Responses_to a Series of Questions," can be_found in_the journal Collapse 3 (2007), 39–43._Volume 6 gilles deleuze_101_purely immanent critique of rea son:_a critique that did not seek,_within reason, "errors" pro duced_by_external_causes, but rather "illu sions"_that arise internally from within reason_itself by the_illegitimate (transcendent) uses of the syntheses of_consciousness._Deleuze characterized his own work as_a_philosophy of immanence, but argued that_Kant_himself_had failed to fully realize_the immanent ambitions of his critique,_for at least two reasons