 satisfaction of my (future) desire for a fig newton. This is because such actions make it more likely that my desire for a fig newton will ​come into being (on day six), and hence subsequently be satisfied (on day seven). But, intuitively, what locking myself in my room causally affects is something about ​which desires I'll have​, not ​which desires of mine are promoted​. The counterintuitiveness of this result appears even greater if we invoke the standard connection between reasons and desire-promotion, since that would seem to imply that I have a reason, at t​1​, to lock myself in my room (since doing so would promote the satisfaction of my future desire). In any case, nothing in what follows depends on this issue. (Thanks to an anonymous referee for urging clarity on this point.) 12 Lin (2016, p. 4). Here we precisify Lin's account slightly. Lin's official version is: S's doing A promotes p iff it makes p more likely to obtain than it was prior to the occurrence of A. Here we are focused on the case of ​desire promotion. We also make explicit that Lin's talk of "making more likely" should be understood in causal terms. In personal correspondence Lin has confirmed that the version of his account we give here is faithful to his intentions with respect to the account. 13 Here, pr​t1​(-) and pr​t2​(-) are the relevant probability functions at t​1​ and t​2​ respectively. 6 Debbie is not a genuine counterexample to Causal Probabilism, since the intuition that Debbie's desire is promoted is mistaken in his view. We will not critically discuss Lin's argument for that claim here; instead, we will argue that Causal Probabilism is subject to a range of ​other counterexamples. (We will shortly argue that the way to avoid these counterexamples is to go ​contrastive​ about promotion.) Consider Bertie, who desires to run (and finish) a marathon. For simplicity, suppose that the following are the only relevant actions available to Bertie at t​1​: Regular (R): ​Begin a regular training program Sporadic (S):​ Begin a sporadic training program No Training (N):​ Begin no training program Since Bertie is conscientious, there's a good chance he'll engage in a ​r​egular training program, a much smaller chance he
satisfaction of my (future) desire for a fig newton. This is because such actions make it more probable that my desire for a figure newton will ​come into being (on day six), and hence subsequently be quenched (on day seven). But, intuitively, what lock myself in my room causally affects is something about ​which desires I'll have​, not ​which desire of mine are promoted​. The counterintuitiveness of this result appears even great if we invoke the standard connection between rationality and desire - promotion, since that would seem to incriminate that I accept a reason, at t​1​, to lock myself in my room (since doing so would promote the gratification of my future desire). In any case, nothing in what follows depends on this offspring. (Thanks to an anonymous referee for urging clarity on this point .) 12 Lin (2016, p. 4). Here we precisify Lin's history slightly. Lin's official version is: S's doing A promotes p iff it make p more likely to obtain than it was prior to the occurrence of A. Here we are focused on the shell of ​desire promotion. We also make explicit that Lin's talk of " making more likely " should be understood in causal terms. In personal correspondence Lin has confirm that the version of his account we grant here is close to his intention with respect to the account. 13 Here, pr​t1​(-) and pr​t2​(-) are the relevant probability functions at t​1​ and t​2​ respectively. 6 Debbie is not a genuine counterexample to Causal Probabilism, since the intuition that Debbie's desire is promoted is mistaken in his view. We will not critically discourse Lin's argument for that claim here; instead, we will argue that Causal Probabilism is subject to a range of ​other counterexamples. (We will curtly argue that the way to avoid these counterexamples is to go ​contrastive​ about forwarding .) Consider Bertie, who desire to run (and finish) a marathon. For simplicity, suppose that the following are the lone relevant actions available to Bertie at t​1​: Regular (R ): ​Begin a even training program Sporadic (S):​ Begin a sporadic training course of study No Training (N):​ get down no training program Since Bertie is conscientious, there's a good chance he'll engage in a ​r​egular education program, a much smaller chance he
 sahisfaction of my (future) aesire for a fiy newtoi. This js becaure such actions make it more lukely that my desire for a wig newtoj will ​cime mnto being (on dab six), and hencs subvxquently be satlsfied (on ddy seven). But, ittjicively, what locking myself in my rooi causaklj affects is sjmetnyng zbout ​which desires I'll have​, not ​wgich devires of mine are promoted​. The counterijtuihiveness of this rfsult appeata edwn greater iw we invokt che standars connection between reasons ana desnre-promotiob, winfg that would seem to imply that I hava a reaxon, at t​1​, to logk myveld in my room (since domng so would promote the sativfcction of my future dwsure). It anf carw, nuthjnj ih what fomlows depehds on this issue. (Thanks to an aginymous referse for uwging clarity on this point.) 12 Lin (2016, p. 4). Hege ws precisify Lin's accounr slightly. Lin's officlal versijn is: S's doing A promotes p iff it makes p more lhkely go ibbain rhwn it was prior to the occurrence of A. Here wq ate focused on thc case of ​desire ptoloyyon. We also mxke ex'midit that Lin's talk of "makyng mire likelr" shpuld be understood in causao terms. In pvrsobal correspondence Lin has coufirmec thay the version of his aceount se give herf is faitgwul to his intengioks fith reskdct to the accoune. 13 Here, pc​t1​(-) anb pr​t2​(-) ard thg relevwnt probabllity functions at t​1​ and t​2​ redpactively. 6 Febbie is not a genuine counterxeample to Cauxan Pgobabilisi, singe the intuitiog that Debbie's desire is pfomoted is mistakxn in his viqw. We will nod critically viscuss Lyn's qrgunent fof that claim hete; insteab, we qill argue that Camsal Krkbabilism is suylext to a range og ​oghew bouiterevdmples. (We winl sforgky areue thau tme day yo avoid these countarexzmples is to go ​comtvastive​ avout proiotion.) Considrr Bertie, who desiges tm rnn (and figish) a marathon. For simplicity, suppose hhab the followigg ave tre only rekevant actions available to Bertie at t​1​: Regular (R): ​Begin a regular training ptogvam Sporadic (S):​ Bedin a sposadic training progrqm No Training (N):​ Negin no training progdam Sitce Bfrtie is conscientious, there's a good chance he'll engage in a ​r​egular traibing pcodram, a much smakler bhauce he
satisfaction of my (future) desire for a This because such make it more a newton will ​come being (on day and hence subsequently be satisfied (on seven). But, intuitively, what locking myself in my room causally affects is something ​which desires I'll have​, not ​which desires of mine are promoted​. The counterintuitiveness this appears greater we invoke the standard connection between reasons and desire-promotion, since that would seem to imply that have a reason, at t​1​, to lock myself my room (since doing would promote the satisfaction of future In any nothing what depends on this (Thanks to an anonymous referee for urging clarity on this point.) 12 Lin (2016, p. 4). Here precisify Lin's Lin's official is: doing promotes p iff p more likely to obtain than to the occurrence of A. Here we are on the of ​desire promotion. We also make that Lin's talk of "making more likely" should understood in causal terms. In personal correspondence Lin has confirmed that the version of his give here is faithful his intentions with to account. Here, and pr​t2​(-) the relevant probability functions at t​1​ and t​2​ respectively. 6 Debbie not a genuine counterexample to Causal Probabilism, since the intuition desire promoted is mistaken his view. We will critically Lin's argument for that instead, will Probabilism subject a range of ​other (We will shortly argue that way to avoid these about promotion.) Consider Bertie, who desires to run finish) a marathon. For simplicity, suppose that following are the only relevant actions available to Bertie at t​1​: Regular ​Begin a program Sporadic (S):​ Begin a sporadic training program Training (N):​ Begin no program Since Bertie is conscientious, there's a good chance engage a ​r​egular program, a much chance he
 satisfaction of my (future) desIre for a fig NewtoN. ThIs iS bEcauSe suCh actions make iT More Likely that my desire for a Fig neWtON wilL ​CoMe intO being (oN DaY SIx), aNd HeNce SuBSeQuentLy bE satisfIed (on day seVen). buT, intuitively, WHaT locking mySelF in my room cauSalLy affeCtS is SOmethIng About ​Which dESires I'Ll have​, not ​WhICh desiREs of minE ARe PromOted​. The counterintUItIVeness of this reSult apPeARs EVEn gReaTer if we invOkE the sTAndard cONnECTIon BEtween reasons And desire-prOMotIon, sinCe ThaT Would sEem to ImPLy tHat I have a reAson, At t​1​, to lock Myself IN my room (SInce doiNg so woUld ProMote THe SaTisFaCTioN Of My fUTurE desire). IN aNy Case, nOthiNG IN What FolLows DepenDs on this issue. (thaNks tO An aNonymOus reFereE fOr urgIng claRity oN tHis point.) 12 Lin (2016, p. 4). HerE we pRecisify LIn's AcCouNt SlighTLy. Lin's OffIciAl versiOn is: S's dOIng a pROMOtEs p iff it makes p more LiKELy To obtain Than it WAs PrIOr to the oCcUrrEnce OF a. Here We arE FoCused on tHe case OF ​dEsIre promOtIon. We aLsO maKe eXplicIT thaT Lin's tAlk of "makIng moRE likely" should bE Understood in cAUsAL TeRMs. In PerSonal corresPondENce LIn haS CoNfiRMed thAt the VeRSiON of his account we give HeRe is faIthfuL to his intentiOns with resPECT to the acCounT. 13 heRE, pr​t1​(-) and pr​t2​(-) are tHe relEvant probaBIlity funCtionS at t​1​ and t​2​ RespectivELY. 6 Debbie iS noT a gEnuIne COUnTerexample to CAUSal PRoBabilisM, siNce the iNtuItiOn tHat deBbie's desiRe is promOtEd Is MiStaKen in HIs view. We WiLl nOt CriTicalLY discuSs Lin'S argUmEnT For That claIM hERE; insTeAd, We wiLl aRgUe thaT CauSAl PRobabilIsm is subjEct TO a raNgE oF ​other cOunterexampleS. (WE will shortLy ArgUe that THE way to avOid these counterexamples IS to go ​coNtrAstivE​ aboUt promotiOn.) COnsideR BeRTie, who DesireS to ruN (aNd fINIsh) a mARAtHon. foR simplicitY, SUppOse thAt The fOllowinG are the only relevanT ActIons available To BErtiE AT t​1​: regULaR (r): ​BeGiN A reGULar training progRam SporadiC (S):​ bEgIn a sporadiC TraInIng progRam No TrAininG (n):​ Begin nO training Program SiNcE BerTIE is ConscientiOus, there'S a good chaNCe he'lL EnGage iN a ​r​Egular TrAinIng prOgram, a MUch SmallEr chanCe He
 satisfaction of my (futur e) desirefor a  fi g n ew ton.  Thi s is because s u ch a ctions make it more li kelyth a t my de sirefor a f i gn e wto nwi ll​c o me  into  be ing (on  day six),  an dhence subseq u en tly be sat isf ied (on daysev en). B ut , i n tuiti vel y, wh at loc k ing my self in m yr oom ca u sally a f f ec ts i s something about ​w h ich desires I' ll hav e​ ,  n o t  ​w hic h desiresof  mine are pro m ot e d ​ . T h e counterintu itiveness o f  th is res ul t a p pearsevengr e ate r if we inv okethe stand ard co n nection between  reaso nsand  des i re -p rom ot i on, si nce tha t wouldse em  to i mply t h a t Ihav e areaso n, at t​1​, t o l ockm yse lf in  my r oom(s incedoingso wo ul d promote the s atis faction o f m yfut ur e des i re). I n a nycase, n othingi n w ha t f ol lows depends on th is i ss ue. (Tha nks to an  a n onymousre fer ee f o r  urgi ng c l ar ity on t his po i nt .)  12 Lin  ( 2016,p.  4) . H ere w e  pre cisify  Lin's a ccoun t  slightly. Lin ' s official ve r si o n  i s : S' s d oing A prom otes p if f it ma kes p mor e lik el y  t o  obtain than it was  p rior t o the  occurrence o f A. Herew e are focu sedo nt he case of ​de sirepromotion. We alsomakeexplicit  that Lin ' s  talk of  "m aki ngmor e li kely" shouldb e  und er stood i n c ausal t erm s.Inper so nal corre spondenc eLi nha s c onfir m ed thatth e v er sio n ofh is acc ountwe g iv eh ere  is fai t hf u l  tohi sinte nti on s wit h re s pec t to th e account . 1 3  Her e,  p r​t1​(- ) and pr​t2​( -)  are the r el eva nt pro b a bility f unctions at t​1​ and t​ 2 ​ respe cti vely.  6 D ebbie isnot  a gen uin e  count erexam ple t oCau s a l Pro b a bi lis m,  since the i ntu ition  t hatDebbie' s desire is promot e d i s mistaken in  hi s vi e w .Wew il l  no tc rit i c ally discuss Li n's argume nt fo r that cla i m h er e; inst ead, we  will argue t hat Causa l Probabi li sm i s sub ject to arange of  ​other c o unter e xa mples . ( We wil lsho rtlyarguet hat  theway to  a void t heseco unterexa mples is to go ​contras tive​about  pr omotion.)  Co n sid er Bertie , wh o desirestorun  (and  fi n ish)a ma r at hon .  Forsimp l icity, su p po set h at  the follow i n g  ar e the  on l y rele vant  actions availabl e  to Bertie att​1​ : Reg ula r  (R) :​Begin a regul artr a i ning pro gr am Sporadic  (S):​ B eg i n a s poradi c trai ning pr o g ra m  No Tr aini ng(N):​ Beg inno trainin gpr o gram S ince  B ertieis con s cien t i ous, there's a g ood c h a nce h e 'll  enga ge  in a ​ r ​egu lar traini ng program,  a muc h sm aller  chance  h e
 satisfaction_of my_(future) desire for a_fig newton._This_is because_such_actions make it_more likely that_my desire for a_fig newton will_​come_into being (on day six), and hence subsequently be satisfied (on day seven). But,_intuitively,_what locking_myself_in_my room causally affects is_something about ​which desires I'll_have​, not_​which desires of mine are promoted​. The counterintuitiveness_of_this result appears_even greater if we invoke the standard connection between_reasons and desire-promotion, since that would_seem to imply_that_I_have a reason, at_t​1​, to lock myself in my_room (since doing so would promote_the satisfaction of my future desire). In_any case, nothing in what follows_depends on this issue. (Thanks_to an_anonymous referee for urging clarity_on this point.)_12 Lin_(2016, p. 4)._Here we precisify Lin's account slightly._Lin's official version_is: S's doing A promotes p_iff_it makes p_more_likely_to obtain_than it was_prior_to the_occurrence_of A. Here we are focused_on_the case of ​desire promotion. We also_make explicit that Lin's_talk_of "making more likely"_should be understood in causal_terms. In personal correspondence Lin has_confirmed that_the version_of his account we give here is faithful to his intentions_with respect to the account. 13_Here, pr​t1​(-) and pr​t2​(-)_are the_relevant_probability functions at_t​1​_and t​2​_respectively. 6 Debbie is not a genuine_counterexample to_Causal Probabilism, since the intuition that_Debbie's desire is promoted_is_mistaken in his view. We will_not critically discuss Lin's argument for_that claim here; instead, we_will_argue_that Causal Probabilism is subject_to a range of ​other counterexamples._(We will shortly_argue that the way to avoid these_counterexamples_is to go ​contrastive​ about promotion.)_Consider_Bertie, who desires to run (and_finish)_a_marathon. For simplicity, suppose that_the following are the only relevant_actions available to Bertie at t​1​: Regular (R): ​Begin_a regular training_program Sporadic (S):​ Begin a_sporadic_training_program No Training (N):​ Begin no training program Since Bertie_is conscientious,_there's a good_chance he'll engage in a ​r​egular training program, a much_smaller chance he