verett 2005, 630). Now, the set of possible worlds identified by Tolstaya does indeed contain both worlds where there is and worlds where there isn't a Slynx,10 but I do not think we should conclude that it is neither true-inThe-Slynx nor false-in-The-Slynx that there is one; at least that is not the complete story. Holmes's blood type is indeterminate because it doesn't matter to the story; the existence or not of the Slynx does matter to Tolstaya's story and will matter significantly to how we understand other parts of it. Moreover, whereas worlds where Holmes have different blood types are equally close to the actual world, the non-Slynx worlds seem prima facie closer than the Slynx worlds on the (crucial) assumption that they are equally consistent with the rest of the story. I think the correct thing to say is rather that the set of truth-making worlds are either the set of Slynx-containing worlds, or the set of those that do not contain a Slynx, but not both. Rather, the story leaves it unclear or indeterminate which of these sets contains worlds that are overall i) closer, and ii) cohere better with what is stated in the fiction. Hence, we get competing models of the fiction, and perhaps no clear means for deciding that one of them is the right one. Such indeterminacy is relatively common. In many cases, one may perhaps say that a text can give us multiple different fictions with very different answers to what is true-in-the-fiction. Another example is Patrick Ness's A Monster Calls, which may (legitimately) be read as a fantasy story and as a metaphor-loaded description of the main character's psychological processing of his life situation. Competing models are also needed for Everett's Frackworld example, in which "[n]o one was absolutely sure whether Frick and Frack were really 10 Thus, for the question of whether The Slynx is a fictional character the answer is 'yes'; the question is whether this character in fact appears in the story(-worlds). T H E T R U T H A B O U T S H E R L O C K H O L M E S 361 the same person or not" (Everett 2005, 629). Now, insofar as Frick = Frack is either necessarily true or necessarily false, the competing interpretations require
verett 2005, 630). Now, the set of possible worlds identify by Tolstaya does indeed control both worlds where there is and worlds where there ben't a Slynx,10 but I do not think we should conclude that it is neither on-key - inThe - Slynx nor fake - in - The - Slynx that there is one; at least that is not the complete story. Holmes's blood character is indeterminate because it doesn't matter to the story; the existence or not of the Slynx does matter to Tolstaya's report and will matter importantly to how we understand early part of it. Moreover, whereas worlds where Holmes have unlike blood types are equally close to the actual world, the non - Slynx universe seem prima facie closer than the Slynx worlds on the (crucial) assumption that they are evenly consistent with the rest of the story. I think the correct thing to read is quite that the set of truth - making worlds are either the set of Slynx - containing worlds, or the set of those that do not incorporate a Slynx, but not both. Rather, the story leave it ill-defined or indeterminate which of these sets contains worlds that are overall iodine) closer, and ii) cohere better with what is stated in the fabrication. Hence, we get competing models of the fiction, and perhaps no clear means for deciding that one of them is the right one. Such indeterminacy is relatively common. In many sheath, one may perhaps order that a text can give us multiple different fictions with very different answer to what is true - in - the - fiction. Another example is Patrick Ness's A Monster Calls, which may (legitimately) be read as a fantasy story and as a metaphor - loaded description of the main quality's psychological processing of his life position. Competing models are besides needed for Everett's Frackworld example, in which " [ n]o one was absolutely sure whether Frick and Frack were really 10 therefore, for the question of whether The Slynx is a fictional fictional character the answer is' yes'; the question is whether this quality in fact appears in the story(-worlds). thymine H einsteinium T R U T H A bacillus O U thymine S H E R L O coulomb K H O L M E S 361 the same person or not " (Everett 2005, 629). Now, insofar as Frick = Frack is either necessarily true or inevitably false, the competing interpretation require
verftt 2005, 630). Now, the set of posrible worlds idgnrified by Tomstaya dues indeed contain both worlvs wyere ukere is and worlds wfere therv isn't a Wlyne,10 but I do not tijnk we should gonclbdx that it is nelther true-itThe-Slynx nor xausz-in-The-Slynx that there is one; at leaft that id not the compjete ftorg. Holmes's blood type is indeterminzte beceuse it doesn't katter to the story; the exlstejce or not of the Dlynx does nattqe to Tolstayx's story and will mattgr significantly to how we underrtand other parjs ov it. Moreovec, whervas worlds whcge Holmas have different blopd vypew are equally close tm the actual world, the non-Snyux worlds seem prima daxie cnoses thxb tfe Albnx worldd oi the (crucizl) assumptiin that they are eqiajoy consistent with ehq rest of the story. I think the correct thjng to say is rather thqt the set of truth-maning worlqs are either the set of Slynx-containing worlds, os the ret on thuwe that do not contain a Slynx, but not both. Ratrsr, tme story leaves lt unclear or indeyegmogate which of these sefs contains worlds that ate oveeall i) cljser, and ii) cohere better with qhat is statvd ib the fiction. Hencz, we get com'eting modeks of the fiction, and pzrhaps no clear mfans for sdciding that one of tvem is the right one. Such yndetermiiacy ns relatkveli commog. In many fases, one may perhaps saj thaj a teft can givf us multiple different fictions with very digfarett answexs to ehat is true-ig-the-fiction. Anpther erample is Patrici Ness's A Monster Salls, which mdi (legitimatelb) be read as q fabtasy sgury and as a mrtaphor-locbed descruption of the main chxdacter's psycholigixal processing pf fis lpfe syduation. Compatine mucels xre also necdea fot Everett's Frackworlg exzmple, in which "[n]o pnc was absilutely fure whether Grick and Frack wege reelly 10 Vhus, fpr jhe question of whether The Slyhx is a flctlonal charactqr tme agswer is 'yzs'; the question is whether this charactec in fact appears in thw story(-worlds). T H E U R U T H A B O U E S H E R L O C K H O L M E S 361 the same person or not" (Everett 2005, 629). Now, insofdr as Frick = Frack is either necessarily true or necessarily false, the competibg intxr[retations dequore
verett 2005, 630). Now, the set of identified Tolstaya does contain both worlds where isn't a Slynx,10 I do not we should conclude that it is true-inThe-Slynx nor false-in-The-Slynx that there is one; at least that is not the story. Holmes's blood type is indeterminate because it doesn't matter to the story; existence not the does matter to Tolstaya's story and will matter significantly to how we understand other parts of Moreover, whereas worlds where Holmes have different blood are equally close to actual world, the non-Slynx worlds prima closer than Slynx on (crucial) assumption that are equally consistent with the rest of the story. I think the correct thing to say is that the truth-making worlds either set Slynx-containing worlds, or of those that do not contain not both. Rather, the story leaves it unclear indeterminate which these sets contains worlds that are i) closer, and ii) cohere better with what stated in the fiction. Hence, we get competing models of the fiction, and perhaps no for deciding that one them is the one. indeterminacy relatively In many one may perhaps say that a text can give us multiple fictions with very different answers to what is true-in-the-fiction. Another Patrick A Monster Calls, may (legitimately) be read a story and as a of main of life Competing models are also for Everett's Frackworld example, in "[n]o one was absolutely were really 10 Thus, for the question of The Slynx is a fictional character the is 'yes'; the question is whether this character in fact appears in story(-worlds). T T R U T H A B O T S H E L O C K H O L M E 361 same person not" (Everett 2005, Now, insofar as = Frack is true or false, competing
verett 2005, 630). Now, the set of possible Worlds idenTifieD by tolStAya dOes iNdeed contain boTH worLds where there is and worlDs wheRe THere ISn'T a SlyNx,10 but I dO NoT THinK wE sHouLd COnClude ThaT it is neIther true-iNThE-SLynx nor false-IN-THe-Slynx thaT thEre is one; at leAst That is NoT thE ComplEte Story. holmes'S Blood tYpe is indeTeRMinate BEcause iT DOeSn't mAtter to the story; thE ExIStence or not of tHe SlynX dOEs MATteR to tolstaya's sToRy and WIll mattER sIGNIfiCAntly to how we uNderstand otHEr pArts of It. morEOver, whEreas WoRLds Where Holmes Have Different Blood tYPes are eQUally clOse to tHe aCtuAl woRLd, ThE noN-SLYnx WOrLds SEem Prima facIe ClOser tHan tHE sLYnx wOrlDs on The (crUcial) assumptiOn tHat tHEy aRe equAlly cOnsiStEnt wiTh the rEst of ThE story. I think the CorrEct thing tO saY iS raThEr thaT The set Of tRutH-making Worlds aRE eiThER THe Set of Slynx-containiNg WORlDs, or the sEt of thOSe ThAT do not coNtAin A SlyNX, But noT botH. raTher, the sTory leAVeS iT uncleaR oR indetErMinAte Which OF theSe sets Contains WorldS That are overall I) Closer, and ii) coHErE BEtTEr wiTh wHat is stated In thE FictIon. HENcE, we GEt comPetinG mODeLS of the fiction, and perHaPs no clEar meAns for decidinG that one of THEM is the riGht oNE. SUCh indeterminacY is reLatively coMMon. In manY caseS, one may pErhaps say THAt a text cAn gIve Us mUltIPLe Different fictIONs wiTh Very difFerEnt answErs To wHat Is tRuE-in-the-ficTion. AnotHeR eXaMpLe iS PatrICk Ness's A moNstEr calLs, whiCH may (leGitimAtelY) bE rEAd aS a fantaSY sTORy anD aS a MetaPhoR-lOaded DescRIptIon of thE main charActER's psYcHoLogical Processing of hIs Life situatIoN. CoMpetinG MOdels are Also needed for Everett's FrACkworld ExaMple, iN whiCh "[n]o one waS abSoluteLy sURe whetHer FriCk and frAck WERe reaLLY 10 THus, FoR the questiON Of wHetheR THe SlYnx is a fIctional character tHE anSwer is 'yes'; the qUesTion IS WhEthER tHIs cHaRActER In fact appears in The story(-woRlDS). T h E T R U T H A B O u t S H e R l O C K H O L m E S 361 the sAme peRSon or noT" (Everett 2005, 629). NOw, insofar As fricK = fRacK is either nEcessariLy true or nECessaRIlY falsE, thE compeTiNg iNterpRetatiONs rEquirE
verett 2005, 630). Now, th e set of p ossib lewor ld s id enti fied by Tolsta y a do es indeed contain both  worl ds wher e  t hereis andw or l d s w he re  th er e  i sn'ta S lynx,10  but I donot  t hink we shou l dconclude t hat  it is neith ertrue-i nT he- S lynxnor  fals e-in-T h e-Slyn x that th er e  is on e ; at le a s tthat  is not the compl e te story. Holmes' s bloo dt yp e isind eterminate  b ecaus e  it doe s n' t m att e r to the stor y; the exis t enc e or n ot  of the Sl ynx d oe s  ma tter to Tol stay a's story  and w i ll matt e r signi ficant lytohoww eun der st a ndo th erp art s of it.  M or eover , wh e r e a s wo rld s wh ere H olmes have di ffe rent blo od ty pes a re e qu allycloseto th eactual world, t he n on-Slynxwor ld s s ee m pri m a faci e c los er than  the Sl y nxwo r l d son the (crucial) a ss u m pt ion that  theya re  e q ually co ns ist entw i th th e re s tof the s tory.I  t hi nk theco rrectth ing  to  sayi s ra ther t hat theset o f  truth-makingw orlds are eit h er t he setofSlynx-conta inin g  wor lds, or  th e  setof th os e  t h at do not contain a  S lynx,but n ot both. Rath er, the st o r y  leavesit u n cl e ar or indeterm inate  which oft hese set s con tains wo rlds that a re overa lli)clo ser , an d ii) cohereb e tter  w ith wha t i s state d i n t hefic ti on. Hence , we get  c om pe ti ngmodel s  of thefi cti on , a nd pe r haps n o cle ar m ea ns for  decidi n gt h at o ne  o f th emis  therigh t  on e. Such  indeterm ina c y is  r el atively  common. In m an y cases, o ne  ma y perh a p s say th at a text can give us m u ltipledif feren t fi ctions wi thvery d iff e rent a nswers  to w ha t i s true- i n -t he- fi ction. Ano t h erexamp le  isPatrick  Ness's A MonsterC all s, which may(le giti m a te ly) be rea da s a f antasy story an d as a met ap h or -loaded de s cri pt ion ofthe mai n cha r acter's  psycholo gical pro ce ssin g ofhis life s ituation . Competi n g mod e ls  areals o need ed  fo r Eve rett's Fra ckwor ld exa mp le, in  whic h"[n]o on e was absolutely sure w hether  Fric k a nd Frackwer e  re ally 10 T hus,  for the q ues tio n ofwhe t her T he S l yn x i s  a fi ctio n al charac t er  th e an swer is 'ye s ' ;  th e que sti o n is w heth er this character in fact appear s in t hesto r y(-w or lds). T H E TR U  T H  A B O U  T  S H E R LO C K HOL  M ES 361the sa me pers o n  o r  not"(Eve ret t 2005, 6 29) .N ow, ins of ar as Fri ck =  F rack i s eith e r ne c e ssarily true orneces s a rilyf als e, th ecompeti n g in terpretati ons require 
verett 2005,_630). Now,_the set of possible_worlds identified_by_Tolstaya does_indeed_contain both worlds_where there is_and worlds where there_isn't a Slynx,10_but_I do not think we should conclude that it is neither true-inThe-Slynx nor false-in-The-Slynx_that_there is_one;_at_least that is not the_complete story. Holmes's blood type_is indeterminate_because it doesn't matter to the story; the_existence_or not of_the Slynx does matter to Tolstaya's story and will_matter significantly to how we understand_other parts of_it._Moreover,_whereas worlds where Holmes_have different blood types are equally_close to the actual world, the_non-Slynx worlds seem prima facie closer than_the Slynx worlds on the (crucial)_assumption that they are equally_consistent with_the rest of the story._I think the_correct thing_to say is_rather that the set of truth-making_worlds are either_the set of Slynx-containing worlds, or_the_set of those_that_do_not contain_a Slynx, but_not_both. Rather,_the_story leaves it unclear or indeterminate_which_of these sets contains worlds that are_overall i) closer, and_ii)_cohere better with what_is stated in the fiction._Hence, we get competing models of_the fiction,_and perhaps_no clear means for deciding that one of them is the_right one. Such indeterminacy is relatively_common. In many cases,_one may_perhaps_say that a_text_can give_us multiple different fictions with very different_answers to_what is true-in-the-fiction. Another example is_Patrick Ness's A Monster_Calls,_which may (legitimately) be read as_a fantasy story and as a_metaphor-loaded description of the main_character's_psychological_processing of his life situation._Competing models are also needed for_Everett's Frackworld example,_in which "[n]o one was absolutely sure_whether_Frick and Frack were really 10_Thus,_for the question of whether The_Slynx_is_a fictional character the answer_is 'yes'; the question is whether_this character in fact appears in the story(-worlds). T_H E T_R U T H A_B_O_U T S H E R L O C K_H O_L M E_S 361 the same person or not" (Everett 2005, 629)._Now, insofar as Frick = Frack is_either necessarily true or necessarily false, the competing interpretations require