 satisfied). This is because in this particular case the relevant action is identical to what Schroeder has chosen as the baseline; so, the satisfaction of the agent's desire is equally probable given the action as it is given the baseline. Structurally similar counterexamples arise for other purely probabilistic accounts. What these 9 counterexamples have in common is that they are cases where, intuitively, an agent's action promotes her desire, and the agent thereby has reason to perform that action, but where the probability of the desire's satisfaction is incapable of rising, due to the details of the case, relative to the baseline. 10 2.2. Causal Probabilism In a recent article, Eden Lin has suggested that the availability of counterexamples to Pure Probabilism is rooted in those views' failure to require a ​causal connection between an agent's action and the uptick in probability sufficient for promotion. By contrast, then, Lin thinks an action promotes the satisfaction of a desire when (and only when) it ​makes or ​causes the probability of the desire's satisfaction to increase in the 9 For an extended discussion of this counterexample to Schroeder's account, see Behrends and DiPaolo (2011, pp. 4) and Sharadin (2015, pp. 1373-5). For one targeting Coates's view, a version of which we'll discuss in more detail below (section 3.1), see Sharadin (2015) and Behrends and DiPaolo (2016). 10 Some, for instance Lin (2016) and Fischer (2017), think that when one's desire is certain to be satisfied no matter what one does (e.g., in Debbie's case), nothing one can do ​promotes the satisfaction of that desire. Hence these philosophers think that purely probabilistic accounts are not subject to Debbie-style counterexamples. We think this intuition too firmly (indeed, in Fischer's case, explicitly) ties one's view about promotion to one's view about reasons. In any case, below we'll argue that probabilistic accounts face other difficulties too; so, for the sake of argument, we can admit that these counterexamples are not decisive. 5 actual world, where the causal increase in probability is best understood as a change in probability over time -from the time ​prior to the agent's action to a time ​after the action. Hence Lin argues for what he calls "Simple Probabilistic Promotion," and what 11
satisfied). This is because in this particular case the relevant action is identical to what Schroeder has choose as the service line; so, the satisfaction of the agentive role's desire is equally probable feed the action as it is given the service line. Structurally like counterexamples arise for other purely probabilistic account. What these 9 counterexamples have in common is that they are cases where, intuitively, an agent's action promotes her desire, and the agentive role thereby has reason to perform that natural process, but where the probability of the desire's satisfaction is incapable of rising, due to the contingent of the case, proportional to the baseline. 10 2.2. Causal Probabilism In a late article, Eden Lin has suggested that the availability of counterexamples to Pure Probabilism is rooted in those view' failure to require a ​causal connection between an agent's action and the uptick in probability sufficient for forwarding. By line, then, Lin think an action promotes the satisfaction of a desire when (and only when) it ​makes or ​causes the probability of the desire's satisfaction to increase in the 9 For an extended discussion of this counterexample to Schroeder's account, see Behrends and DiPaolo (2011, pp. 4) and Sharadin (2015, pp. 1373 - 5). For one target Coates's position, a version of which we'll hash out in more contingent below (incision 3.1), see Sharadin (2015) and Behrends and DiPaolo (2016). 10 Some, for instance Lin (2016) and Fischer (2017), think that when one's desire is certain to be satisfied no matter what one does (e.g., in Debbie's shell), nothing one can do ​promotes the satisfaction of that desire. Hence these philosophers think that purely probabilistic account are not subject to Debbie - style counterexamples. We think this intuition too firmly (indeed, in Fischer's font, explicitly) ties one's view about promotion to one's view about reasons. In any shell, below we'll argue that probabilistic accounts face other difficulty too; so, for the sake of argument, we can admit that these counterexample are not decisive. 5 actual world, where the causal increase in probability is best understood as a variety in probability over time -from the time ​prior to the agent's action to a clock time ​after the action. therefore Lin argues for what he calls " Simple Probabilistic Promotion, " and what 11
 sahisfied). This is because ln this particulce case the rslevant xction is identical to what Dcyroedtg has chosen as the bxseline; sl, the sarisfection of the agxht's deslxe is cqualnb probable givek the actiot as it is givan tke baseline. Structurally similar cougterexakppes arise for jtheg [uremj krobabilistic accounts. What these 9 counttrexamples have in common is that they are cwses where, intuitively, an agent's qctijb promotes hdr desire, and the agenj thereby has reason to perform ghat cction, but qhwre jhe probabilmty of the desire's satisfawtion ix incapable of rivint, due to the details mf the case, relatide to the bcseline. 10 2.2. Causal Probqbulism In d rezwnt aruicke, Eden Pin has suggeated that tye availability of votbterexamples fo Purq [robabilism is rooted in those views' faplurs to require a ​causal cinnection between an wgent's aceion and the uptick in probability sufficient for promkgiou. By cubtgast, then, Lin thinks an action promotes the swfixfsction of a defire when (amd omjy when) it ​mayes or ​cahses the probabilihy of tre dewire's satysfavtion to increase in the 9 Fir an extendvd duscussion of this eounterexampue tp Schtoeder's account, see Behxends znd DiPaolo (2011, pp. 4) and Rharadin (2015, pp. 1373-5). Fof oke dargeting Coates's view, a vqrsion of whieh we'll aiscoss in iore detaip below (section 3.1), see Shagadin (2015) dnd Behrenfs and DiPaolo (2016). 10 Some, for instaire Lin (2016) and Foswheg (2017), think chat wmen one's desire is certain to be satnsfied no matter what oie does (e.g., ig Debbie's casa), nothing one can do ​[romites the sagksfaction of tnat desirv. Kence thewe philosophers thlnk tfzt purely probaynlustic accounts sre noe duuject do Debbie-styne cuungrrexaoples. Wt tminy thos intuition too firkly (jndeed, in Fischer's cwse, explucitly) tyes one's view about promotion tl one'v vmew abput reasons. In any case, below we'lm argue tjat probabilistyc agcougts face ocher difficulties too; so, for the sake of argument, we can aemit that these couuttrexamples arx not qecisive. 5 actual world, where rhe causal increaxe in probability is gest utdershood as a change in probability over time -from the time ​prior to the agenr's actmog to a time ​aftrr thv aetipn. Hense Lmn argues for what he calls "Simple Probabilistic 'romotion," dnb what 11
satisfied). This is because in this particular relevant is identical what Schroeder has the of the agent's is equally probable the action as it is given baseline. Structurally similar counterexamples arise for other purely probabilistic accounts. What these 9 have in common is that they are cases where, intuitively, an agent's action her and agent has reason to perform that action, but where the probability of the desire's satisfaction is incapable rising, due to the details of the case, to the baseline. 10 Causal Probabilism In a recent Eden has suggested the of to Pure Probabilism rooted in those views' failure to require a ​causal connection between an agent's action and the uptick probability sufficient By contrast, Lin an promotes the satisfaction desire when (and only when) it the probability of the desire's satisfaction to increase the 9 an extended discussion of this counterexample Schroeder's account, see Behrends and DiPaolo (2011, pp. and Sharadin (2015, pp. 1373-5). For one targeting Coates's view, a version of which we'll more detail below (section see Sharadin (2015) Behrends DiPaolo 10 for instance (2016) and Fischer (2017), think that when one's desire is certain be satisfied no matter what one does (e.g., in Debbie's one do ​promotes the of that desire. Hence philosophers that purely probabilistic accounts subject Debbie-style this too (indeed, in Fischer's case, ties one's view about promotion one's view about reasons. argue that probabilistic accounts face other difficulties too; for the sake of argument, we can that these counterexamples are not decisive. 5 actual world, where the causal in probability understood as a change in probability over time the time ​prior to agent's action to a time ​after the action. Hence argues what he "Simple Probabilistic Promotion," what 11
 satisfied). This is because in tHis particuLar caSe tHe rElEvanT actIon is identical TO whaT Schroeder has chosen as tHe basElINe; so, THe SatisFaction OF tHE AgeNt'S dEsiRe IS eQuallY prObable gIven the actIon As It is given the BAsEline. StrucTurAlly similar cOunTerexaMpLes ARise fOr oTher pUrely pRObabilIstic accoUnTS. What tHEse 9 counTEReXampLes have in common is THaT They are cases whEre, intUiTIvELY, an AgeNt's action pRoMotes HEr desirE, AnD THE agENt thereby has rEason to perfORm tHat actIoN, buT Where tHe proBaBIliTy of the desiRe's sAtisfactiOn is inCApable oF Rising, dUe to thE deTaiLs of THe CaSe, rElATivE To The BAseLine. 10 2.2. CausAl prObabiLism iN A REcenT arTiclE, Eden lin has suggestEd tHat tHE avAilabIlity Of coUnTerexAmples To PurE PRobabilism is rooTed iN those vieWs' fAiLurE tO requIRe a ​cauSal ConNection Between AN agEnT'S ACtIon and the uptick in pRoBABiLity suffIcient FOr PrOMotion. By CoNtrAst, tHEN, Lin tHinkS An Action prOmotes THe SaTisfactIoN of a deSiRe wHen (And onLY wheN) it ​makEs or ​causEs the PRobability of thE Desire's satisfACtION tO IncrEasE in the 9 For an ExteNDed dIscuSSiOn oF This cOunteReXAmPLe to Schroeder's accouNt, See BehRends And DiPaolo (2011, pp. 4) aNd Sharadin (2015, PP. 1373-5). fOr one tarGetiNG COAtes's view, a versIon of Which we'll dIScuss in mOre deTail beloW (section 3.1), sEE sharadin (2015) And behRenDs aND dipaolo (2016). 10 Some, for iNSTancE LIn (2016) and FiSchEr (2017), think ThaT whEn oNe's DeSire is cerTain to be SaTiSfIeD no MatteR What one dOeS (e.g., In debBie's cASe), nothIng onE can Do ​PrOMotEs the saTIsFACtioN oF tHat dEsiRe. hence ThesE PhiLosopheRs think thAt pURely PrObAbilistIc accounts are NoT subject to deBbiE-style COUnterexaMples. We think this intuitiON too firMly (IndeeD, in FIscher's caSe, eXpliciTly) TIes one'S view aBout pRoMotION to onE'S ViEw aBoUt reasons. IN ANy cAse, beLoW we'lL argue tHat probabilistic acCOunTs face other diFfiCultIES tOo; sO, FoR The SaKE of ARGument, we can admiT that these CoUNtErexamples ARe nOt DecisivE. 5 actual World, WHere the Causal incRease in prObAbilITY is Best undersTood as a cHange in prOBabilITy Over tIme -From thE tIme ​Prior To the aGEnt'S actiOn to a tImE ​after The acTiOn. Hence LIn argues for what he calls "SImple PRobabIliStic PromoTioN," And What 11
 satisfied). This is becau se in this  part icu lar  c asetherelevant actio n  isidentical to what Schr oeder  h a s ch o se n asthe bas e li n e ; s o,  t hesa t is facti onof theagent's de sir eis equally p r ob able given  th e action asitis giv en  th e  base lin e. St ructur a lly si milar cou nt e rexamp l es aris e fo r ot her purely probab i li s tic accounts.What t he s e9 cou nte rexamplesha ve in commoni st h a t t h ey are caseswhere, intu i tiv ely, a nage n t's ac tionpr o mot es her desi re,and the a gent t h ereby h a s reaso n to p erf orm  tha t  a ct ion ,b utw he ret heprobabil it yof th e de s i r e 's s ati sfac tionis incapableofrisi n g,due t o the  det ai ls of  the c ase,re lative to the b asel ine. 10 2 .2.  C aus al  Prob a bilism  In  arecentarticle ,  Ed en L i nhas suggested that  t h e  a vailabil ity of co un t erexampl es  to  Pur e Proba bili s mis roote d in t h os eviews'fa ilureto  re qui re a​ caus al con nectionbetwe e n an agent's a c tion and theu pt i c ki n pr oba bility suff icie n t fo r pr o mo tio n . Bycontr as t ,t hen, Lin thinks anac tion p romot es the satisf action ofa d esire wh en ( a nd only when) it​make s or ​caus e s the pr obabi lity ofthe desir e ' s satisf act ion  to  in c r ea se in the 9 F o r  anex tendeddis cussion  of  th iscou nt erexample  to Schr oe de r' sacc ount, see Behr en dsan d D iPaol o  (2011 , pp.  4)an dS har adin (2 0 15 , pp.13 73 -5).  Fo rone t arge t ing  Coates 's view,a v e rsio nof  whichwe'll discuss  i n more det ai l b elow ( s e ction 3. 1), see Sharadin (2015) and Beh ren ds an d Di Paolo (20 16) . 10 S ome ,  for i nstanc e Lin  ( 201 6 )  andF i sc her  ( 2017), thi n k  th at wh en  one 's desi re is certain to b e  sa tisfied no ma tte r wh a t  o ned oe s  (e .g . , i n Debbie's case),  nothing o ne ca n do ​prom o tes  t he sati sfactio n oft hat des ire. Henc e these p hi loso p h ers  think tha t purely  probabil i stica cc ounts  ar e notsu bje ct to  Debbi e -st yle c ounter ex amples . Weth ink this  intuition too firmly ( indeed , inFis cher's ca se, exp licitly)ties  one's vie w a bou t pro mot i on to  one ' svie w  abou t re a sons. Ina ny  ca s e ,below we'll a r gue  that  pr o babili stic  accounts face ot h er difficultie s to o ;  so , f o r th esake of argume nt,  w e can admi tthat thesecountere xa m plesare no t deci sive. 5 a ct u al wor ld,whe re the ca usa li ncrease  i np robabi lity  i s best  under s tood a s a change in pr obabi l i ty ov e r t ime - fr om thet ime​prior tothe agent's  actio n to  a ti me ​aft er  the a cti on . Hence Li n  argues f or wh at he c al ls " Sim ple Pr obab i l istic  Pro mo tio n," and w h a t1 1
 satisfied)._This is_because in this particular_case the_relevant_action is_identical_to what Schroeder_has chosen as_the baseline; so, the_satisfaction of the_agent's_desire is equally probable given the action as it is given the baseline. Structurally_similar_counterexamples arise_for_other_purely probabilistic accounts. What these_9 counterexamples have in common_is that_they are cases where, intuitively, an agent's action_promotes_her desire, and_the agent thereby has reason to perform that action,_but where the probability of the_desire's satisfaction is_incapable_of_rising, due to the_details of the case, relative to_the baseline. 10 2.2. Causal Probabilism_In a recent article, Eden Lin has_suggested that the availability of counterexamples_to Pure Probabilism is rooted_in those_views' failure to require a_​causal connection between_an agent's_action and the_uptick in probability sufficient for promotion._By contrast, then,_Lin thinks an action promotes the_satisfaction_of a desire_when_(and_only when)_it ​makes or_​causes_the probability_of_the desire's satisfaction to increase in_the_9 For an extended discussion of this_counterexample to Schroeder's account,_see_Behrends and DiPaolo (2011,_pp. 4) and Sharadin (2015,_pp. 1373-5). For one targeting Coates's_view, a_version of_which we'll discuss in more detail below (section 3.1), see Sharadin_(2015) and Behrends and DiPaolo (2016)._10 Some, for instance_Lin (2016)_and_Fischer (2017), think_that_when one's_desire is certain to be satisfied no_matter what_one does (e.g., in Debbie's case),_nothing one can do_​promotes_the satisfaction of that desire. Hence_these philosophers think that purely probabilistic_accounts are not subject to_Debbie-style_counterexamples._We think this intuition too_firmly (indeed, in Fischer's case, explicitly)_ties one's view_about promotion to one's view about reasons._In_any case, below we'll argue that_probabilistic_accounts face other difficulties too; so,_for_the_sake of argument, we can_admit that these counterexamples are not_decisive. 5 actual world, where the causal increase in_probability is best_understood as a change in_probability_over_time -from the time ​prior to the agent's action to_a time_​after the action._Hence Lin argues for what he calls "Simple Probabilistic Promotion,"_and what 11