 33: "Therefore, whether one has seen an enemy or a friend doing unjust acts, one should think 'it has such causes,' and become happy." It is an ethical conclusion from the metaphysics. Everything is subject to a cause, with no agency, so don't blame, and don't get angry.14 This metaphysics is essential to the larger argument of the chapter. The specific verses about Sāṁkhya and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika may be less important in a context where such views are not live options, but the overall project of establishing a determinist metaphysics is central to Śāntideva's reasoning against anger. The metaphysics in question is pratītya samutpāda, a pan-Buddhist metaphysical claim that any Buddhist, Mahāyāna or otherwise, could support. The critique of anger is likewise a stock feature of many Buddhist texts. What is unusual in Śāntideva is the connection: because the world is causally dependent, it makes no sense to blame anyone or get 14 There is an ongoing debate between Charles Goodman (e.g., "Resentment") and Mark Siderits (e.g., "Freedom") on the interpretation of this section. Siderits takes Śāntideva to be a "paleo-compatibilist," arguing that blame and moral responsibility can still legitimately be assigned on his view; Goodman denies this, assigning Śāntideva a hard determinism. Journal of Buddhist Ethics 265 angry at them. That connection is far less frequently made in other texts; for example, anger is not identified as one of the products of Candrakīrti's four illusions. The Atomized and Devalued Body The second significant metaphysical discussion in the BCA, in verses VIII.40-83, takes an atomistic biology as an argument against lust– against attachment to others' bodies as well as one's own. Of the four lines of argument Śāntideva takes, this one is probably the most commonly found in wider Buddhist tradition. It is found in Candrakīrti (Lang 164–185), and in plenty of early Buddhist texts for that matter. Śāntideva's metaphysical claim is that when understood properly, the body is no more than its component parts. But only the whole body is capable of exciting desire; the parts do not. For that reason
33: " Therefore, whether one has seen an enemy or a friend do unfair acts, one should think' it has such cause,' and become happy. " It is an ethical conclusion from the metaphysics. Everything is capable to a cause, with no agency, so don't blame, and don't scram angry.14 This metaphysics is essential to the larger argumentation of the chapter. The specific verses about Sāṁkhya and Nyāya - Vaiśeṣika may be less important in a context where such views are not hot options, but the overall project of establishing a determinist metaphysics is central to Śāntideva's reasoning against wrath. The metaphysics in question is pratītya samutpāda, a pan - Buddhist metaphysical claim that any Buddhist, Mahāyāna or otherwise, could hold. The critique of anger is similarly a stock feature of speech of many Buddhist texts. What is strange in Śāntideva is the connection: because the world is causally dependent, it makes no common sense to blame anyone or get 14 There is an ongoing debate between Charles Goodman (e.g., " Resentment ") and Mark Siderits (e.g., " Freedom ") on the interpretation of this section. Siderits takes Śāntideva to be a " paleo - compatibilist, " arguing that blame and moral responsibility can still legitimately be assigned on his view; Goodman denies this, assigning Śāntideva a difficult determinism. Journal of Buddhist Ethics 265 angry at them. That connection is far less frequently made in early textbook; for exercise, anger is not identified as one of the product of Candrakīrti's four delusion. The Atomized and Devalued Body The second meaning metaphysical discussion in the BCA, in verses VIII.40 - 83, takes an atomistic biology as an argument against lust – against attachment to others' bodies as well as one's own. Of the four lines of argument Śāntideva takes, this one is probably the most normally found in broad Buddhist custom. It is determine in Candrakīrti (Lang 164–185), and in plenty of early Buddhist texts for that matter. Śāntideva's metaphysical title is that when understood properly, the body is no more than its part parts. But entirely the whole body is able of exciting desire; the parts act not. For that reason
 33: "Tjerefore, whether one has seen an enemy or a frmend dojng unjurt acts, one should think 'it ias wuch xauses,' and become happh." It is aj ethicao coiclusion from thx metaphnfics. Cverychmng is subject jo a cause, whth no agency, vo dln't blame, and don't get angry.14 This mqtaphysocd is essential to uhe larfvr argument of the chapter. The apecifib verses about Sāṁknya and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika may be lesd important in a clntext wherg susy views are vot live oktnons, but thg overall project of establishine a dzterminist nerapjisics is cenvral tj Śāntideva's rcssoninc againxt anger. The mctaphbsicw in question is pratīvya samutpāda, a pan-Buqdhist meda'hysical claim that aby Buddvist, Mahāhāba ur ktiersise, clulv support. Tge critique of anger is likewixe q stock featude of iagy Buddhist texts. What is unusual in Śāntpdevz is the connection: becquse the world is caudally depqndent, it makes no sense to blame anyone or get 14 Dhere ks ck ubgling debate between Charles Goodman (e.g., "Resentisnu") akd Mark Siderits (e.g., "Freedom") oj yre interpretajion of thjs section. Sideritd takes Śāntidwva to be a "psleo-compatibilist," arguing tyat blame anb miral responsibilitv can still uegijimateky be assigned on his vnew; Gokdman denied this, asakgning Śāntideva a hagd daterminism. Journal of Buddrist Ethirs 265 augry at ghem. That sonnection is far less frequently lade nn otver texts; vor example, anger is not identihmed as one of tve iroducts jf Cakdrakīrti's four yllusions. The Ctomized and Aevalued Bkdy The second siggificant meta[jysical discnssion in the BCA, in verrds VIII.40-83, takes sn atomisnie biology as an argument ageinsj must– against atcccyment to others' boaief ws wqnl as one's ofn. Ow tfr fouf lines of creumemt Śāntideva takes, thiv ons is probably the koft commobly founq in wider Bucdhist tradition. Iu is fmunv in Csndtakīrti (Lang 164–185), and in plenty of ezrly Buddjisb texts for trat natter. Śāntidera's metaphysical claim is that when undecstood properly, the bodt is no more than ijs gomponent pacts. Bue only tha whole body is capavle of exciting dtsire; the parts do not. Ror thdt rewson
33: "Therefore, whether one has seen an a doing unjust one should think become It is an conclusion from the Everything is subject to a cause, no agency, so don't blame, and don't get angry.14 This metaphysics is essential the larger argument of the chapter. The specific verses about Sāṁkhya and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika be important a where such views are not live options, but the overall project of establishing a determinist metaphysics central to Śāntideva's reasoning against anger. The metaphysics question is pratītya samutpāda, pan-Buddhist metaphysical claim that any Mahāyāna otherwise, could The of is likewise a feature of many Buddhist texts. What is unusual in Śāntideva is the connection: because the world is dependent, it sense to anyone get There is an between Charles Goodman (e.g., "Resentment") and "Freedom") on the interpretation of this section. Siderits Śāntideva to a "paleo-compatibilist," arguing that blame and responsibility can still legitimately be assigned on his Goodman denies this, assigning Śāntideva a hard determinism. Journal of Buddhist Ethics 265 angry at connection is far less made in other for anger not as one the products of Candrakīrti's four illusions. The Atomized and Devalued Body second significant metaphysical discussion in the BCA, in verses VIII.40-83, atomistic as an argument lust– against attachment to bodies well as one's own. four of this is the most commonly found wider Buddhist tradition. It is in Candrakīrti (Lang 164–185), Buddhist texts for that matter. Śāntideva's metaphysical claim that when understood properly, the body is more than its component parts. But only the whole body is capable exciting desire; do not. For that reason
 33: "Therefore, whether one has seeN an enemy or A frieNd dOinG uNjusT actS, one should thinK 'It haS such causes,' and become haPpy." It Is AN ethICaL concLusion fROm THE meTaPhYsiCs. eVeRythiNg iS subjecT to a cause, wIth No Agency, so don't BLaMe, and don't gEt aNgry.14 This metaPhySics is EsSenTIal to The LargeR argumENt of thE chapter. THe SPecifiC Verses aBOUt sāṁkHya and Nyāya-VaiśeṣIKa MAy be less importAnt in a CoNTeXT WheRe sUch views arE nOt livE Options, BUt THE OveRAll project of eStablishing A DetErminiSt MetAPhysicS is ceNtRAl tO Śāntideva's ReasOning agaiNst angER. The metAPhysics In quesTioN is PratĪTyA sAmuTpĀDa, a PAn-budDHisT metaphySiCaL claiM thaT ANY buddHisT, MahĀyāna Or otherwise, coUld SuppORt. THe criTique Of anGeR is liKewise A stocK fEature of many BudDhisT texts. WhaT is UnUsuAl In ŚānTIdeva iS thE coNnectioN: becausE The WoRLD Is Causally dependent, iT mAKEs No sense tO blame ANyOnE Or get 14 TheRe Is aN ongOINg debAte bETwEen CharlEs GoodMAn (E.g., "resentmEnT") and MaRk sidEriTs (e.g., "FREedoM") on the InterpreTatioN Of this section. SIDerits takes ŚāNTiDEVa TO be a "PalEo-compatibiList," ARguiNg thAT bLamE And moRal reSpONsIBility can still legitImAtely bE assiGned on his view; goodman denIES This, assiGninG śāNTideva a hard detErminIsm. Journal OF BuddhisT EthiCs 265 angry aT them. That CONnection Is fAr lEss FreQUEnTly made in otheR TExts; FoR examplE, anGer is noT idEntIfiEd aS oNe of the prOducts of caNdRaKīRti'S four ILlusions. thE AtOmIzeD and DEValued body THe seCoNd SIgnIficant MEtAPHysiCaL dIscuSsiOn In the bCA, iN VerSes VIII.40-83, Takes an atOmiSTic bIoLoGy as an aRgument againsT lUst– against AtTacHment tO OThers' bodIes as well as one's own. Of the FOur lineS of ArgumEnt ŚĀntideva tAkeS, this oNe iS ProbabLy the mOst coMmOnlY FOund iN WIdEr BUdDhist tradiTIOn. IT is foUnD in CAndrakīRti (Lang 164–185), and in plenty OF eaRly Buddhist teXts For tHAT mAttER. ŚĀNtiDeVA's mETAphysical claim iS that when uNdERsTood properLY, thE bOdy is no More thaN its cOMponent Parts. But oNly the whoLe Body IS CapAble of exciTing desiRe; the partS Do not. fOr That rEasOn
 33: "Therefore, whether o ne has see n anene myor  a f rien d doing unjust acts , one should think 'it  hassu c h ca u se s,' a nd beco m eh a ppy ."  I t i sa nethic alconclus ion from t heme taphysics. E v er ything issub ject to a ca use , with  n o a g ency,  so  don' t blam e , anddon't get  a n gry.14 This me t a ph ysic s is essential to th e  larger argume nt ofth e  c h a pte r.The specif ic  vers e s about Sā ṁ k h yaa nd Nyāya-Vaiś eṣika may b e  le ss imp or tan t  in aconte xt whe re such vie ws a re not li ve opt i ons, bu t  the ov erallpro jec t of es ta bli sh i nga  d ete r min ist meta ph ys ics i s ce n t r a l to  Śā ntid eva's  reasoning ag ain st a n ger . The  meta phys ic s inquesti on is  p ratītya samutpā da,a pan-Bud dhi st  me ta physi c al cla imtha t any B uddhist ,  Ma hā y ā n aor otherwise, coul ds u pp ort. The  criti q ue  o f  anger i slik ewis e a sto ck f e at ure of m any Bu d dh is t texts .What i sunu sua l inŚ ānti deva i s the co nnect i on: because th e  world is cau s al l y  d e pend ent , it makesno s e nseto b l am e a n yoneor ge t1 4T here is an ongoingde bate b etwee n Charles Goo dman (e.g. , " Resentme nt") an d  Mark Siderits  (e.g ., "Freedo m ") on th e int erpretat ion of th i s  section . S ide rit s t a k es  Śāntideva to b e a"p aleo-co mpa tibilis t,"  ar gui ngth at blameand mora lre sp on sib ility can stil lleg it ima telyb e assi gnedon h is  v i ew;  Goodma n  d e n iesth is , as sig ni ng Śā ntid e vaa harddetermini sm. Jour na lof Budd hist Ethics 2 65  angry atth em.  Thatc o nnection  is far less frequently made in  ot her t exts ; for exa mpl e, ang eri s notidenti fiedas  on e of th e pr odu ct s of Candr a k īrt i's f ou r il lusions . The Atomized and Dev alued Body Th e s econ d si gni f ic a ntme t aph y s ical discussion  in the BC A, in  verses VI I I.4 0- 83, tak es an a tomis t ic biol ogy as an  argument  a gain s t  lu st– agains t attach ment to o t hers' bo diesaswell a sone 's ow n. Oft hefourlinesof  argum ent Ś ān tideva t akes, this one is proba bly th e mos t c ommonly f oun d  in  wider Bu ddhi st traditi on.  It  is f oun d  in C andr a kī rti (Lang  164 – 185), and in  pl e n ty  of early B u d d his t tex tsf or tha t ma tter. Śāntideva's metaphysical c laim i s t hat when  u nderstood prop erl y, t he bodyis  no more th an its c om p onent  parts . Butonly th e wh o le bod y is  ca pable ofexc it i ng desi re ;t he par ts d onot. F or tha t  rea s o n
 33:_"Therefore, whether_one has seen an_enemy or_a_friend doing_unjust_acts, one should_think 'it has_such causes,' and become_happy." It is_an_ethical conclusion from the metaphysics. Everything is subject to a cause, with no agency,_so_don't blame,_and_don't_get angry.14 This metaphysics is_essential to the larger argument_of the_chapter. The specific verses about Sāṁkhya and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika_may_be less important_in a context where such views are not live_options, but the overall project of_establishing a determinist_metaphysics_is_central to Śāntideva's reasoning_against anger. The metaphysics in question_is pratītya samutpāda, a pan-Buddhist metaphysical_claim that any Buddhist, Mahāyāna or otherwise,_could support. The critique of anger_is likewise a stock feature_of many_Buddhist texts. What is unusual_in Śāntideva is_the connection:_because the world_is causally dependent, it makes no_sense to blame_anyone or get 14 There is_an_ongoing debate between_Charles_Goodman_(e.g., "Resentment")_and Mark Siderits_(e.g.,_"Freedom") on_the_interpretation of this section. Siderits takes_Śāntideva_to be a "paleo-compatibilist," arguing that blame_and moral responsibility can_still_legitimately be assigned on_his view; Goodman denies this,_assigning Śāntideva a hard determinism. Journal_of Buddhist_Ethics 265_angry at them. That connection is far less frequently made in_other texts; for example, anger is_not identified as one_of the_products_of Candrakīrti's four_illusions._The Atomized_and Devalued Body The second significant metaphysical_discussion in_the BCA, in verses VIII.40-83, takes_an atomistic biology as_an_argument against lust– against attachment to_others' bodies as well as one's_own. Of the four lines_of_argument_Śāntideva takes, this one is_probably the most commonly found in_wider Buddhist tradition._It is found in Candrakīrti (Lang 164–185),_and_in plenty of early Buddhist texts_for_that matter. Śāntideva's metaphysical claim is_that_when_understood properly, the body is_no more than its component parts._But only the whole body is capable of exciting_desire; the parts_do not. For that reason