 she could have without regarding herself in that way first.7 What this points to, once again, is what is lost by abandoning the connection between what is good for us and our capacity for rational agency, as recognized in the ancient eudaimonist accounts. Proper concern for others – concern of the sort that is appropriate to psychologically complex human beings – is impossible without recognizing the internal connection between reasons for acting (and the work of practical wisdom) and living well. The absence of that connection seems to make real friendship and love impossible. But these are not the only important social relations that are affected. Development and respect I can best bring out a further dimension of loss by exploring the proposal that we should see ourselves and each other not merely as receptacles or locations of development (or even good-for), but as beings entitled to respect – as claimants on others. Kraut does insist that we have obligations not to harm others. Not only impediments but lots of other things (e.g., pain) can be bad for us, and in so far as some action is bad for something, in general this provides reason not to perform it. Developmentalism can thus account for many of the considerations bearing on (for example) promise-keeping, punishment, and other social practices. What it cannot account for is our status as entitled to demand or claim that others must keep their promises to us, or more generally our claim to be respected by others. Kraut (p. ) says of the harm done to relationships by breaking promises that Breaking certain promises is very wrong, because the damage their violation does to one's relationships, or the good that one promised but failed to deliver, is very great. This is certainly true, but a crucial part of why such harm is done to relationships cannot be explained by developmentalism. If you break a promise to me in a way that brings about more good for me than keeping it would have, I may yet have a  MARK LEBAR ©  The Author Journal compilation ©  The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly 6 NE IX , a ff.; cf. also IX , b �
she could have without regarding herself in that way first.7 What this points to, once again, is what is lose by vacate the connection between what is good for us and our capacity for intellectual agency, as recognized in the ancient eudaimonist accounts. Proper business for others – business of the sort that is appropriate to psychologically complex human beings – is impossible without recognizing the internal connection between rationality for acting (and the work of practical wisdom of solomon) and living well. The absence of that connection seems to make real friendship and love impossible. But these are not the only significant social relations that are affected. Development and regard I can best bring out a further dimension of loss by research the proposal that we should see ourselves and each other not merely as receptacles or locations of growth (or even good - for), but as beings entitled to respect – as claimants on others. Kraut does insist that we have obligations not to harm others. Not only impediments but lots of other things (e.g., pain) can be bad for us, and in so far as some military action is bad for something, in general this provide reason not to perform it. Developmentalism can thus account for many of the circumstance hold on (for example) promise - keeping, punishment, and early social practices. What it cannot account for is our status as entitled to demand or claim that others must keep their promises to us, or more generally our claim to be respected by others. Kraut (p. ) says of the harm serve to relationship by breaking promises that Breaking certain promises is very faulty, because the damage their violation does to one's relationships, or the good that one promised but failed to deliver, is very capital. This is certainly true, but a all-important part of why such harm is done to relationships cannot be explain by developmentalism. If you break a promise to me in a room that brings about more good for me than keeping it would have, I may however have a  MARK LEBAR ©  The Author Journal compilation ©  The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly 6 NE IX , a ff. ; cf. also IX , b  �
 shf could have without regxrding herself nb that way fjrst.7 Whag this points to, once again, ms wyat iw lost by abandoning tfe connecnion betwwen xhat is good for us and our calwcitv hor rational aggncy, as recocnized in the dnziznt eudaimonist accounts. Proper concqrn for ohhers – concern of uhe sorf that is appropriate to psychologjcally bomplex human beimgs – is impossible without reclgnizing the interjal connectuon fwtween reasovs for actpug (and the sork of practical wisdom) and lixing cell. The abwebce mf that coniectiog seems to make real friendxhip and love lmposviboe. But these are not vhe only important sjcial reldtnons that are affectee. Eevelmpmett ave rdsptct I can bfst bring out a further eimension of loss bu qqlloring the lroposwl that we should see ourselves and each mthsr not merely as receptqcles or locations of developmqnt (or even good-for), but as beings entitled to res[ect – xs eoaimavrs on others. Kraut does insist that we have oblyfauioks not to harm obhers. Not only imprdlmrgts but lots uf othzd fhings (e.g., pain) can be bad for ys, and in so gar as some action is bad fir something, un general this prlvides reasun npt to perform it. Developmentclism dan thus acfount for oany of the conskdegatimns bearing on (for example) promise-kxepiny, punishoent, and oeher sociap pragdices. What it cannlt aceount for is oug status as entitled to demand or claim that ptverv must kzep thcir promises to us, or more geuerally jur cuaim to be respecved by otherf. Kraut (p. ) safd of the hark done tj reoatiinships cy breaking prpmises thcu Breaking certain promises ls vety wrong, because cke damage their voolxtijn dpef to one's reldtiovshkls, or the good tmat one promised but failed to seliver, is very grrab. This is certainjy true, but a crucial part of wjy surh haro is cong to relationships cannot be exllained bj dcvelopmentalifm. In yoo break a pxomise to me in a way that brings about nore good for me jhan keeping it would mave, I may yxt havq a  MARK LEBAR ©  The Author Hournal compilatipn ©  The Editors of Tge Phinosopjical Quarterly 6 NE IX , a ff.; cf. also IX , b �
she could have without regarding herself in first.7 this points once again, is the between what is for us and capacity for rational agency, as recognized the ancient eudaimonist accounts. Proper concern for others – concern of the sort is appropriate to psychologically complex human beings – is impossible without recognizing the connection reasons acting the work of practical wisdom) and living well. The absence of that connection seems to make friendship and love impossible. But these are not only important social relations are affected. Development and respect can bring out further of by exploring the that we should see ourselves and each other not merely as receptacles or locations of development (or good-for), but entitled to – claimants others. Kraut does we have obligations not to harm impediments but lots of other things (e.g., pain) be bad us, and in so far as action is bad for something, in general this reason not to perform it. Developmentalism can thus account for many of the considerations bearing example) promise-keeping, punishment, and social practices. What cannot for our as entitled demand or claim that others must keep their promises to us, more generally our claim to be respected by others. Kraut says the harm done relationships by breaking promises Breaking promises is very wrong, damage violation relationships, the that one promised but to deliver, is very great. is certainly true, but such harm is done to relationships cannot be by developmentalism. If you break a promise me in a way that brings about more good for me than it would may yet have a  MARK LEBAR © The Author Journal compilation  The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly 6 NE , ff.; cf. IX , b
 she could have without regardIng herself In thaT waY fiRsT.7 WhaT thiS points to, once aGAin, iS what is lost by abandoninG the cOnNEctiON bEtweeN what is GOoD FOr uS aNd Our CaPAcIty foR raTional aGency, as recOgnIzEd in the ancieNT eUdaimonist AccOunts. Proper cOncErn for OtHerS – ConceRn oF the sOrt thaT Is apprOpriate to PsYChologICally coMPLeX humAn beings – is impossiBLe WIthout recognizIng the InTErNAL coNneCtion betweEn ReasoNS for actINg (AND The WOrk of practicaL wisdom) and lIVinG well. THe AbsENce of tHat coNnECtiOn seems to maKe reAl friendsHip and LOve impoSSible. BuT these Are Not The oNLy ImPorTaNT soCIaL reLAtiOns that aRe AfFecteD. DevELOPMent And RespEct I cAn best bring ouT a fUrthER diMensiOn of lOss bY eXplorIng the PropoSaL that we should seE ourSelves and EacH oTheR nOt merELy as reCepTacLes or loCations OF deVeLOPMeNt (or even good-for), but As BEInGs entitlEd to reSPeCt – AS claimanTs On oTherS. kRaut dOes iNSiSt that we Have obLIgAtIons not To Harm otHeRs. NOt oNly imPEdimEnts buT lots of oTher tHIngs (e.g., pain) can bE Bad for us, and in SO fAR As SOme aCtiOn is bad for sOmetHIng, iN genERaL thIS provIdes rEaSOn NOt to perform it. DeveloPmEntaliSm can Thus account foR many of the CONSideratiOns bEArINg on (for example) PromiSe-keeping, pUNishment, And otHer sociaL practiceS. wHat it canNot AccOunT foR IS oUr status as entITLed tO dEmand or ClaIm that oTheRs mUst KeeP tHeir promiSes to us, oR mOrE gEnEraLly ouR Claim to bE rEspEcTed By othERs. KrauT (p. ) sayS of tHe HaRM doNe to relATiONShipS bY bReakIng PrOmiseS thaT breAking ceRtain promIseS Is veRy WrOng, becaUse the damage tHeIr violatioN dOes To one's RELationshIps, or the good that one promISed but fAilEd to dElivEr, is very gReaT. This iS ceRTainly True, buT a cruCiAl pART of whY SUcH haRm Is done to reLATioNshipS cAnnoT be explAined by developmentALisM. If you break a pRomIse tO ME iN a wAY tHAt bRiNGs aBOUt more good for me Than keepinG iT WoUld have, I maY Yet HaVe a  MARK lEBAR ©  ThE AuthOR JournaL compilatIon ©  The EdiToRs of tHE PhIlosophicaL QuarterLy 6 NE IX , a ff.; CF. also ix , b �
 she could have without re garding he rself  in  th at  way  fir st.7 What this poin ts to, once again, iswhatis lost by  aban doningt he c onn ec ti onbe t we en wh atis good  for us an d o ur  capacity fo r  r ational ag enc y, as recogn ize d in t he  an c ienteud aimon ist ac c ounts.  Proper c on c ern fo r  others –  c once rn of the sort th a ti s appropriateto psy ch o lo g i cal lycomplex hu ma n bei n gs – is im p o s sib l e without rec ognizing th e  in ternal  c onn e ctionbetwe en rea sons for ac ting  (and the  worko f pract i cal wis dom) a ndliv ingw el l.  Th ea bse n ce  of tha t connec ti on  seem s to m a k e re alfrie ndshi p and love im pos sibl e . B ut th ese a re n ot  theonly i mport an t social relati onsthat areaff ec ted .Devel o pmentand  re spect I  can be s t b ri n g ou t a further dimens io n of  loss by  explo r in gt he propo sa l t hatw e  shou ld s e eourselve s ande ac hother n ot  merel yasrec eptac l es o r loca tions of  deve l opment (or eve n  good-for), b u ta s  b e ings  en titled to r espe c t –as c l ai man t s onother s. Kr a ut does insist that  w e have  obli gations not t o harm oth e r s . Not on ly i m pe d iments but lot s ofother thin g s (e.g.,  pain ) can be  bad foru s , and in  so  fa r a s s o m eaction is bad f or s om ething,  in  genera l t his  pr ovi de s reasonnot to p er fo rm  i t.Devel o pmentali sm  ca nthu s acc o unt fo r man y of  t he con siderat i on s bear in gon ( for  e xampl e) p r omi se-keep ing, puni shm e nt,an dother s ocial practic es . What itca nno t acco u n t for is  our status as entitled to dema ndor cl aimthat othe rsmust k eep theirpromis es to  u s,o r  more g en era ll y our clai m tobe re sp ecte d by ot hers. Kraut (p.   ) s ays of the ha rmdone t orel a ti o nsh ip s  by b reaking promise s that Bre ak i ng  certain p r omi se s is ve ry wron g, be c ause th e damagetheir vio la tion d oes  to one'srelation ships, or the g o od  that  on e prom is edbut f ailedt o d elive r, isve ry gre at. T hi s is cer tainly true, but a cruc ial pa rt of  wh y such ha rmi s d one to re lati onships ca nno t b e exp lai n ed by  dev e lo pme n talis m. I f  you brea k  a  pr o m is e to me ina w aythatbri n gs abo ut m ore good for me t h an keeping itwoul d hav e,I  may  y et have a MAR KL E BAR ©    The Author  Journal  c o mpila tion ©  The Edi t o rs of The  Phi los ophical Q uar te r ly 6 NE  I X ,  a  ff .; cf.  alsoI X ,  b �
 she_could have_without regarding herself in_that way_first.7_What this_points_to, once again,_is what is_lost by abandoning the_connection between what_is_good for us and our capacity for rational agency, as recognized in the ancient_eudaimonist_accounts. Proper_concern_for_others – concern of the_sort that is appropriate to_psychologically complex_human beings – is impossible without recognizing the_internal_connection between reasons_for acting (and the work of practical wisdom) and_living well. The absence of that_connection seems to_make_real_friendship and love impossible._But these are not the only_important social relations that are affected._Development and respect I can best bring_out a further dimension of loss_by exploring the proposal that_we should_see ourselves and each other_not merely as_receptacles or_locations of development_(or even good-for), but as beings_entitled to respect_– as claimants on others. Kraut_does_insist that we_have_obligations_not to_harm others. Not_only_impediments but_lots_of other things (e.g., pain) can_be_bad for us, and in so far_as some action is_bad_for something, in general_this provides reason not to_perform it. Developmentalism can thus account_for many_of the_considerations bearing on (for example) promise-keeping, punishment, and other social practices._What it cannot account for is_our status as entitled_to demand_or_claim that others_must_keep their_promises to us, or more generally our_claim to_be respected by others. Kraut (p._) says of the_harm_done to relationships by breaking promises_that Breaking certain promises is very_wrong, because the damage their_violation_does_to one's relationships, or the_good that one promised but failed_to deliver, is_very great. This is certainly true, but_a_crucial part of why such harm_is_done to relationships cannot be explained_by_developmentalism._If you break a promise_to me in a way that_brings about more good for me than keeping it_would have, I_may yet have a _MARK_LEBAR_©  The Author Journal compilation ©  The Editors_of The_Philosophical Quarterly 6_NE IX , a ff.; cf. also IX , b_�