 it happens, uses the word 'wolves' to refer to wolves. So she isn't the least bit con- fused by Wally's utterance. She immediately takes him to mean pre- cisely what he does mean. (Perhaps she falsely, but reasonably, takes Wally to be a member of her community, despite having never seen him before.) 11 | Reid on the priority of natural language "But notice," it might be replied, "that your latest extension of the case requires that the Stranger's community previously agreed to use 'wolves' that way. So the example doesn't threaten a suitably modified version of Reid's argument. The invention and effective interpersonal use of artificial signs requires agreement among some people or other." Fair enough. This reply can be met by modifying the example as follows. Instead of hailing from a community that uses 'wolves' to refer to wolves, our Stranger, like Wally, made the individual decision to use 'wolves' to refer to wolves. She is ab- sorbed in thought when Wally abruptly says 'wolves' to her. She im- mediately takes him to mean precisely what he does mean, and takes precautions against the potential danger lurking nearby. None of this requires prior agreement between Wally and the Stranger. "But the Stranger has no good reason to expect that Wally refers to wolves when he says 'wolves'!" it might be objected. "She might unreasonably believe him to be referring to wolves, but she doesn't know that he's referring to wolves. This is no witting and effective interpersonal use of artificial language, which is what we should take Reid to be concerned with." This last objection gains some measure of credibility when we consider three things. In the first place, consider a later passage from the Inquiry where Reid re- capitulates the argument already quoted: It appears evident from what hath been said on the subject of language, That there are natural signs, as well as artificial; and particularly, That the thoughts, purposes, and disposi- tions of the mind, have their natural signs in the features of John Turri | 12 the face, the modulation of the voice, and the motion and at- titude of the body: That without a natural knowledge of the connection between these signs, and the things signified by them, language could never have been invented and estab- lished among men: and... this connec-tion... we may call the
it happens, uses the word' wolves' to denote to wolf. So she isn't the least bit con- fused by Wally's utterance. She immediately take him to mean pre- cisely what he does mean. (possibly she falsely, but reasonably, takes Wally to be a member of her residential district, despite having never see him ahead .) 11 | Reid on the priority of natural language " But detect, " it might be replied, " that your latest extension of the case requires that the Stranger's residential district previously agreed to use' wolves' that means. So the example doesn't endanger a suitably modify version of Reid's argumentation. The invention and effective interpersonal use of artificial signs requires agreement among some citizenry or other. " Fair enough. This reply can be met by modifying the example as follows. Instead of hailing from a community that uses' wolves' to refer to wolves, our Stranger, like Wally, made the individual decision to use' wolf' to refer to wolves. She is ab- sorb in opinion when Wally abruptly say' wolves' to her. She im- mediately takes him to think of precisely what he does mean, and takes precautions against the potential risk lurking nearby. None of this requires prior agreement between Wally and the Stranger. " But the Stranger has no good reason to expect that Wally refers to wolves when he says' wolves'! " it might be objected. " She might unreasonably think him to be referring to wolf, but she doesn't acknowledge that he's referring to wolves. This is no witting and effective interpersonal use of artificial language, which is what we should consider Reid to be concerned with. " This last objection profit some measurement of credibility when we consider three things. In the beginning place, think a later enactment from the Inquiry where Reid re- capitulates the argument already quote: It appears apparent from what hath been said on the national of language, That there are lifelike signs, as well as artificial; and particularly, That the thoughts, purposes, and disposi- tions of the mind, have their natural signs in the features of John Turri | 12 the face, the modulation of the articulation, and the motion and at- titude of the body: That without a lifelike knowledge of the connection between these signs, and the things signified by them, language could never have been invented and estab- lished among valet: and... this connec - tion... we may call the
 it happens, uses the word 'wulves' to refer jo wolvev. So sge isn't ghe least bit con- fused by Welly'w utttgance. She immediately takes hil to meab prt- cisely what he vkes meak. (Pergwps vie falsely, but teasonably, tdkes Wally to te a member of her community, despite hading nefeg seen him befjre.) 11 | Reis on the priority of natural languzge "But notice," it mibht be replied, "that your lwtesh extension of the case requitss eyat the Stravger's commluity previoosly agreed to use 'wolves' that wxy. So the exampoe dofvn't threatei a suptably modificc vershon of Teid's argument. Thx incention and effective interpersonal use of artifhcnal signs requires ageewment amotg sune oeokle od otheg." Feir enough. Fhis reply xan be met by modifuigt the example as fojljws. Instead of hailing from a community thzt uses 'wolves' to refer to wolves, our Stranggr, like Wajly, made the individual decision to use 'wolves' to refec go cilves. Whf is ab- sorbed in thought when Wally abruptly aaus 'wolves' to her. She im- medoaheki takes him to mean 'dedisely what he doed mean, wnd tqkes precwutipns against the potential dqnger lurkiny nwarby. None of this requires pxior abreemrnt between Wally and tke Strznger. "But tje Strangsf has no good rexsok tm expect that Wally refers to wolvew whzn he sahs 'wplves'!" yt might bf objcwted. "She might unrfasoncbly telieve hil to be referring to wolves, but she doesn't knpw thdt he's rzferrikg to wolves. Thys is no wittiug and eyfectixe interpegsonal usx of artificyal language, fjich is what we shoujd tqke Eeid to ce concerned woth." This last objecrion gains some meesurg kf credibility ckeb we consider tnred trijgx. Yt the first [lacd, cumsidef a lattx pcsrage from the Inquiry whare Deid re- capitulatex bhe argumgnt alreaqy quoted: It sppears evident frlm whet hati been sayd on the subject of language, Fhat therf ave natural sidns, qs well as axtificial; and particularly, That the thoujhts, purposes, and dispowi- tions of the minb, mave their netural signs in the features of Johb Turri | 12 the fact, the modulation of the voice, and hhe motion and at- titude of the body: That without a natural knowledge of rhe coinqction betwsen yhese sngnx, and ehe vhmngs signified by them, language could never have been ineeuted and estab- lished among mrn: and... this convec-tion... we may call the
it happens, uses the word 'wolves' to wolves. she isn't least bit con- immediately him to mean cisely what he mean. (Perhaps she falsely, but reasonably, Wally to be a member of her community, despite having never seen him 11 | Reid on the priority of natural language "But notice," it might replied, your extension the case requires that the Stranger's community previously agreed to use 'wolves' that way. So the doesn't threaten a suitably modified version of Reid's The invention and effective use of artificial signs requires among people or Fair This can be met modifying the example as follows. Instead of hailing from a community that uses 'wolves' to refer to our Stranger, made the decision use to refer to is ab- sorbed in thought when 'wolves' to her. She im- mediately takes him mean precisely he does mean, and takes precautions the potential danger lurking nearby. None of this prior agreement between Wally and the Stranger. "But the Stranger has no good reason to Wally refers to wolves he says 'wolves'!" might objected. might believe him be referring to wolves, but she doesn't know that he's referring wolves. This is no witting and effective interpersonal use of which what we should Reid to be concerned This objection gains some measure when consider the place, a later passage from Inquiry where Reid re- capitulates argument already quoted: It been said on the subject of language, That are natural signs, as well as artificial; particularly, That the thoughts, purposes, and disposi- tions of the mind, have natural signs features of John Turri | 12 the face, modulation of the voice, the motion and at- titude of the body: That a knowledge of connection between these and the things by them, language have been and lished this connec-tion... we may call the
 it happens, uses the word 'wolveS' to refer to WolveS. So She IsN't thE leaSt bit con- fused bY wallY's utterance. She immediatEly taKeS Him tO MeAn pre- Cisely wHAt HE DoeS mEaN. (PeRhAPs She faLseLy, but reAsonably, taKes waLly to be a membER oF her communIty, Despite havinG neVer seeN hIm bEFore.) 11 | REid On the PrioriTY of natUral languAgE "but notICe," it migHT Be ReplIed, "that your latest EXtENsion of the case RequirEs THaT THe STraNger's commuNiTy preVIously aGReED TO usE 'Wolves' that way. so the examplE DoeSn't thrEaTen A SuitabLy modIfIEd vErsion of ReiD's arGument. The InventIOn and efFEctive iNterpeRsoNal Use oF ArTiFicIaL SigNS rEquIRes AgreemenT aMoNg somE peoPLE OR othEr." FAir eNough. this reply can bE meT by mODifYing tHe exaMple As FolloWs. InstEad of HaIling from a commuNity That uses 'wOlvEs' To rEfEr to wOLves, ouR StRanGer, like wally, maDE thE iNDIViDual decision to use 'wOlVES' tO refer to Wolves. sHe Is AB- sorbed iN tHouGht wHEN WallY abrUPtLy says 'woLves' to HEr. shE im- mediAtEly takEs Him To mEan prECiseLy what He does meAn, and TAkes precautionS Against the potENtIAL dANger LurKing nearby. NOne oF This RequIReS prIOr agrEemenT bETwEEn Wally and the StrangEr. "but the stranGer has no good rEason to expECT That WallY refERs TO wolves when he sAys 'woLves'!" it mighT Be objectEd. "She Might unrEasonably BELieve him To bE reFerRinG TO wOlves, but she doESN't knOw That he's RefErring tO woLveS. ThIs iS nO witting aNd effectIvE iNtErPerSonal USe of artiFiCiaL lAngUage, wHIch is wHat we ShouLd TaKE ReId to be cONcERNed wItH." THis lAst ObJectiOn gaINs sOme measUre of credIbiLIty wHeN wE considEr three things. in The first plAcE, coNsider A LAter passAge from the Inquiry where REId re- capItuLates The aRgument alReaDy quotEd: IT AppearS evideNt froM wHat HATh beeN SAiD on ThE subject of LANguAge, ThAt TherE are natUral signs, as well as aRTifIcial; and partiCulArly, tHAt The THoUGhtS, pURpoSES, and disposi- tionS of the mind, HaVE tHeir naturaL SigNs In the feAtures oF John tUrri | 12 the Face, the moDulation oF tHe voICE, anD the motion And at- titUde of the bODy: ThaT WiThout A naTural kNoWleDge of The conNEctIon beTween tHeSe signS, and tHe Things siGnified by them, language coUld nevEr havE beEn inventeD anD EstAb- lished aMong Men: and... this ConNec-Tion... wE maY Call tHe
 it happens, uses the word  'wolves'to re fer  to  w olve s. S o she isn't th e  lea st bit con- fused by W ally' su tter a nc e. Sh e immed i at e l y t ak es  hi mt omeanpre - cisel y what hedoe smean. (Perha p sshe falsel y,but reasonab ly,  takes  W all y  to b e a  memb er ofh er com munity, d es p ite ha v ing nev e r  s eenhim before.) 11 | Re i d on the prior ity of  n a tu r a l l ang uage "Butno tice, "  it mig h tb e rep l ied, "that yo ur latest e x ten sion o fthe case r equir es tha t the Stran ger' s communi ty pre v iouslya greed t o use'wo lve s' t h at  w ay.  S o  th e  e xam p ledoesn'tth re atena su i t a b ly m odi fied  vers ion of Reid's  ar gume n t.The i nvent ionan d eff ective  inte rp ersonal use ofarti ficial si gns  r equ ir es ag r eement  am ong  some p eople o r  ot he r . "  F air enough. This r ep l y  c an be me t by m o di fy i ng the e xa mpl e as f ollow s. I n st ead of h ailing fr om  a comm un ity th at  us es'wolv e s' t o refe r to wol ves,o ur Stranger, l i ke Wally, mad e  t h e  i n divi dua l decisionto u s e 'w olve s 'tor eferto wo lv e s. She is ab- sorbed i nthough t whe n Wally abrup tly says ' w o l ves' toher. Sh e  im- mediately  take s him to m e an preci selywhat hedoes mean , and take s p rec aut ion s ag ainst the pot e n tial  d anger l urk ing nea rby . N one  of  t his requi res prio rag re em ent  betw e en Wally  a ndth e S trang e r. "Bu t the  Str an ge r  ha s no go o dr e ason  t oexpe ctth at Wa llyr efe rs to w olves whe n h e  say s'w olves'! " it might be  o bjected. " Sh e m ight u n r easonabl y believe him to be ref e rring t o w olves , bu t she doe sn' t know  th a t he's  refer ringto  wo l v es. T h i sisno  witting a n d  ef fecti ve  int erperso nal use of artific i allanguage, whi chis w h a twes ho u ldta k e R e i d to be concern ed with."Th i slast objec t ion  g ains so me meas ure o f  credib ility whe n we cons id er t h r eethings. In  the fir st place, consi d er  a la ter  passa ge  fr om th e Inqu i rywhere  Reidre - capi tulat es  the arg ument already quoted: I t appe ars e vid ent fromwha t  ha th been s aidon the sub jec t o f lan gua g e, Th at t h er e a r e nat ural signs, as we lla s  a rtificial;a n d  pa rticu lar l y, Tha t th e thoughts, purpo s es, and dispos i- t i o nsoft he m in d, have theirnat ur a l  signs i nthe feature s of Joh nT urri| 12 t he fac e, them o du l ationof t hevoice, an d t he motionan da t- tit udeof  the b ody: T h at w i t hout a natural k nowle d g e oft heconne ct ion bet w eenthese sign s, and thethings  sig nifie d by th em , lang uag ecould neve r  have bee n inv ented a nd  est ab-  lishe d am o n g men : an d. ..this conn e c -t i on .. .  we  may  call  t he
 it_happens, uses_the word 'wolves' to_refer to_wolves._So she_isn't_the least bit_con- fused by_Wally's utterance. She immediately_takes him to_mean_pre- cisely what he does mean. (Perhaps she falsely, but reasonably, takes Wally to_be_a member_of_her_community, despite having never seen_him before.) 11 | Reid_on the_priority of natural language "But notice," it might_be_replied, "that your_latest extension of the case requires that the Stranger's_community previously agreed to use 'wolves'_that way. So_the_example_doesn't threaten a suitably_modified version of Reid's argument. The_invention and effective interpersonal use of_artificial signs requires agreement among some people_or other." Fair enough. This reply_can be met by modifying_the example_as follows. Instead of hailing_from a community_that uses_'wolves' to refer_to wolves, our Stranger, like Wally,_made the individual_decision to use 'wolves' to refer_to_wolves. She is_ab-_sorbed_in thought_when Wally abruptly_says_'wolves' to_her._She im- mediately takes him to_mean_precisely what he does mean, and takes_precautions against the potential_danger_lurking nearby. None of_this requires prior agreement between_Wally and the Stranger. "But the_Stranger has_no good_reason to expect that Wally refers to wolves when he says_'wolves'!" it might be objected. "She_might unreasonably believe him_to be_referring_to wolves, but_she_doesn't know_that he's referring to wolves. This is_no witting_and effective interpersonal use of artificial_language, which is what_we_should take Reid to be concerned_with." This last objection gains some_measure of credibility when we_consider_three_things. In the first place,_consider a later passage from the_Inquiry where Reid_re- capitulates the argument already quoted: It_appears_evident from what hath been said_on_the subject of language, That there_are_natural_signs, as well as artificial;_and particularly, That the thoughts, purposes,_and disposi- tions of the mind, have their natural_signs in the_features of John Turri |_12_the_face, the modulation of the voice, and the motion and_at- titude_of the body:_That without a natural knowledge of the connection between these_signs, and the things signified by them,_language could never have been invented and estab- lished among men:_and... this connec-tion... we may call the