 after A's φ-ing or ψ-ing, φ-ing rather than ψ-ing ​promotes the satisfaction of D iff I​φ > I​ψ​, where I​φ is the increase in probability of satisfying D between t​1 and t​2 that is (or would be) caused by φ-ing and I​ψ is the increase in probability of satisfying D between t​1 and t​2 that is (or would be) caused by ψ-ing. However, it is worth noting that this account involves a comparison between different worlds (viz. worlds in which A φs and worlds in which A ψs), and thus arguably betrays Lin's (2016, pp. 4-5) central idea that promotion should only be based on a comparison of probabilities at different times in the same world. Partly for that reason, we will not be exploring the plausibility of Contrastive Causal Probabilism in what follows (though we invite others to do so). 19 Or: ​set of multiple actions. Since this complication won't be important in the arguments to come, we ignore it in what follows. 10 token, given (2), there is a sense in which Debbie's pressing B promotes her desire, in that Debbie's pressing B rather than C promotes the satisfaction of her desire. Furthermore, it is intuitive that pressing A is just as good at promoting her desire as pressing B would be (since pressing either button satisfies her desire). That too is captured by Contrastive Pure Probabilism: (3) says that pressing A ​rather than B doesn't promote the satisfaction of her desire. So, assuming as we are here some connection between promoting a desire and the existence of instrumental reasons, there is a reason for Debbie to press A rather than C, a reason for her to press B rather than C, but no reason to press A rather than B. And all of these claims seem like exactly the 20 right results.​, 21 Next recall Bertie's case, which constituted our counterexample to Causal Probabilism. The problem with Causal Probabilism was its inability to say that Bertie's embarking on a sporadic training program promotes his desire to finish a marathon. But given a contrastive understanding of promotion, we are now in a position to identify the way in which Bertie's sporadic training ​does promote his desire. Given the details of Bertie's case and Contrastive Pure Probabilism
after A's φ - ing or ψ - ing, φ - ing rather than ψ - ing ​promotes the satisfaction of D iff I​φ > I​ψ​, where I​φ is the increase in probability of satisfying vitamin d between t​1 and t​2 that is (or would be) cause by φ - ing and I​ψ is the increase in probability of satisfying D between t​1 and t​2 that is (or would be) induce by ψ - ing. However, it is worth noting that this score necessitate a comparison between different universe (viz. worlds in which A φs and worlds in which A ψs), and therefore arguably betrays Lin's (2016, pp. 4 - 5) central idea that promotion should merely be based on a comparison of probabilities at different times in the same universe. Partly for that reason, we will not be exploring the plausibility of Contrastive Causal Probabilism in what be (though we invite others to do so). 19 Or: ​set of multiple actions. Since this complicatedness won't be important in the argument to come, we ignore it in what follows. 10 token, give (2), there is a sense in which Debbie's pressing B promotes her desire, in that Debbie's press B rather than C promotes the satisfaction of her desire. Furthermore, it is intuitive that pressing A is just as good at promoting her desire as crusade B would be (since pressing either release satisfies her desire). That too is captured by Contrastive Pure Probabilism: (3) says that press A ​rather than B doesn't promote the satisfaction of her desire. So, assuming as we are here some association between promoting a desire and the existence of instrumental reasons, there is a reason for Debbie to weight-lift A rather than C, a reason for her to press B preferably than C, but no rationality to press A rather than B. And all of these claims seem like exactly the 20 right field results.​, 21 Next recall Bertie's case, which constituted our counterexample to Causal Probabilism. The problem with Causal Probabilism was its inability to say that Bertie's embarking on a sporadic training program promotes his desire to finish a marathon. But give a contrastive sympathy of promotion, we are now in a military position to identify the manner in which Bertie's sporadic training ​does advertise his desire. Given the details of Bertie's subject and Contrastive Pure Probabilism
 afher A's φ-ing or ψ-ing, φ-ing rauher than ψ-ing ​promotes tie satiafaction of D iff I​φ > I​ψ​, where I​φ is thx inxreast in probability of satisfyijg D betqeen r​1 and t​2 thef is (or would ne) cabsxd by φ-ing and I​ψ is the inwrease in probdbklnty of satisfying D between t​1 and t​2 ehat is (og would be) caufed nr ψ-inf. However, it is worth noting that fhis acbount involves a vomparison between differejt wlrlds (viz. worlds ij which A φs and qorlds in whkch A ψs), and thus arguagly betrays Lin's (2016, pp. 4-5) central iaea tkat promotiin shlold only be uased jn a comparison of psobabiloties at diffevent vimew in the same world. Pertly for that reasog, we will nkt be exploring tye plauvibinity if Zonuraxtjve Caksam Probabiljsm in what follows (though we ondpye others to do so). 19 Jr: ​set of multiple actions. Since this cmmpmication won't be importqnt in the arguments jo come, we ignore it in what follows. 10 token, given (2), there is a seisd iu whicf Dfbbie's pressing B promotes her desire, in that Senbpe's pressing B rabher than C promotrs tng satisfaction of hex dssire. Furthermore, lt is igtuituve that kressong A is just as good at primoting her besure as pressing B could be (sinee prexsing either button satisfier hed desire). Thwt too is zaptured by Contfasnive Pure Probabilism: (3) says thwt pressiig A ​xather tfan N doesg't promote the satisfaction of her desite. So, dssuming ad we are here some connection bxvween promotimg a gesire aud the existence of instrumental teasons, tkere ir a reason for Deubie to presf A rather thdj C, a reason for her to presw B ratfdr than C, but mo reason to press Q rather than B. Anv alu of these claimw sten like exactly thd 20 wihhv restnts.​, 21 Next rewall Befyie's zase, which gonrtitited our counterexam[le fo Causal Probabilosi. The priblem wieh Causal Pronabilism was its ijabilmty to say yhaj Bertie's embarking on a sporadjc trainijg irogram promoees mis qesire to yinish a marathon. But given a contrastivx understanding of promition, we are now in s position vo idegtify the way in which Bertie'w sporadic trainikg ​does promote his deaire. Ghven hhe details of Bertie's case and Contrastive Pure Probabilism
after A's φ-ing or ψ-ing, φ-ing rather ​promotes satisfaction of iff I​φ > increase probability of satisfying between t​1 and that is (or would be) caused φ-ing and I​ψ is the increase in probability of satisfying D between t​1 t​2 that is (or would be) caused by ψ-ing. However, it is worth that account a between different worlds (viz. worlds in which A φs and worlds in which A ψs), and arguably betrays Lin's (2016, pp. 4-5) central idea promotion should only be on a comparison of probabilities different in the world. for reason, we will be exploring the plausibility of Contrastive Causal Probabilism in what follows (though we invite others to do 19 Or: multiple actions. this won't important in the come, we ignore it in what given (2), there is a sense in which pressing B her desire, in that Debbie's pressing rather than C promotes the satisfaction of her Furthermore, it is intuitive that pressing A is just as good at promoting her desire B would be (since either button satisfies desire). too captured Contrastive Pure (3) says that pressing A ​rather than B doesn't promote the of her desire. So, assuming as we are here some promoting desire and the of instrumental reasons, there a for Debbie to press than a to B than C, but no to press A rather than And all of these 20 right results.​, 21 Next recall Bertie's case, constituted our counterexample to Causal Probabilism. The with Causal Probabilism was its inability to say that Bertie's embarking on sporadic training his desire to finish a marathon. But given contrastive understanding of promotion, are now in a position to identify the way which sporadic training promote his desire. the details of case and Contrastive
 after A's φ-ing or ψ-ing, φ-ing rathEr than ψ-ing ​PromoTes The SaTisfActiOn of D iff I​φ > I​ψ​, whERe I​φ Is the increase in probabiLity oF sATisfYInG D betWeen t​1 anD T​2 tHAT is (Or WoUld Be) CAuSed by Φ-inG and I​ψ iS the increaSe iN pRobability of SAtIsfying D beTweEn t​1 and t​2 that iS (or Would bE) cAusED by ψ-iNg. HOweveR, it is wORth notIng that thIs ACcount INvolves A COmPariSon between differeNT wORlds (viz. worlds iN which a φS AnD WOrlDs iN which A ψs), aNd Thus aRGuably bETrAYS lin'S (2016, Pp. 4-5) central idea That promotiON shOuld onLy Be bASed on a CompaRiSOn oF probabilitIes aT differenT times IN the samE World. PaRtly foR thAt rEasoN, We WiLl nOt BE exPLoRinG The PlausibiLiTy Of ConTrasTIVE causAl PRobaBilisM in what followS (thOugh WE inVite oThers To do So). 19 or: ​set Of multIple aCtIons. Since this coMpliCation won'T be ImPorTaNt in tHE argumEntS to Come, we iGnore it IN whAt FOLLoWs. 10 token, given (2), there iS a SENsE in which debbie'S PrEsSIng B promOtEs hEr deSIRe, in tHat DEBbIe's pressIng B raTHeR tHan C proMoTes the SaTisFacTion oF Her dEsire. FUrthermoRe, it iS Intuitive that pREssing A is just AS gOOD aT PromOtiNg her desire As prESsinG B woULd Be (sINce prEssinG eIThER button satisfies her DeSire). ThAt too Is captured by COntrastive pURE ProbabiLism: (3) SAyS That pressing A ​rAther Than B doesn'T Promote tHe satIsfactioN of her desIRE. So, assumIng As wE arE heRE SoMe connection bETWeen PrOmoting A deSire and The ExiSteNce Of InstrumenTal reasoNs, ThErE iS a rEason FOr Debbie To PreSs a raTher tHAn C, a reAson fOr heR tO pREss b rather THaN c, But nO rEaSon tO prEsS A ratHer tHAn B. and all oF these claIms SEem lIkE eXactly tHe 20 right resultS.​, 21 NExt recall BErTie'S case, wHICh constiTuted our counterexample tO causal PRobAbiliSm. ThE problem wIth causal proBAbilisM was itS inabIlIty TO Say thAT beRtiE's Embarking oN A SpoRadic TrAiniNg progrAm promotes his desirE To fInish a marathoN. BuT givEN A cOntRAsTIve UnDErsTANding of promotioN, we are now iN a POsItion to ideNTifY tHe way in Which BeRtie's SPoradic Training ​dOes promotE hIs deSIRe. GIven the detAils of BeRtie's case ANd ConTRaStive purE ProbaBiLisM
 after A's φ-ing or ψ-ing,  φ-ing rat her t han  ψ- in g ​p romo tes the satisf a ctio n of D iff I​φ > I​ψ​,  wher eI ​φ i s  t he in creasei np r oba bi li tyof sa tisfy ing  D betw een t​1 an d t ​2  that is (or wo uld be) ca use d by φ-ing a ndI​ψ is  t hei ncrea sein pr obabil i ty ofsatisfyin gD  betwe e n t​1 a n d  t ​2 t hat is (or wouldb e) caused by ψ-in g. How ev e r, i t i s w orth notin gthatt his acc o un t i nvo l ves a compari son between dif ferent  w orl d s (viz . wor ld s  in  which A φs  and  worlds i n whic h  A ψs), and thu s argu abl y b etra y sLi n's  ( 2 016 ,  p p.4 -5)  central  i de a tha t pr o m o t ionsho uldonlybe based on a  co mpar i son  of p robab ilit ie s atdiffer ent t im es in the sameworl d. Partly  fo rtha treaso n , we w ill  no t be ex ploring the  p l a u si bility of Contrast iv e Ca usal Pro babili s min what fol lo ws(tho u g h weinvi t eothers t o do s o ).  1 9 Or: ​ se t of m ul tip leactio n s. S ince t his comp licat i on won't be im p ortant in the ar g u me n ts t o c ome, we ign orei t in  wha t  f oll o ws. 1 0 tok en ,  g i ven (2), there is a  s ense i n whi ch Debbie's p ressing Bp r o motes he r de s ir e , in that Debb ie'spressing B rather t han C  promote s the sat i s factionofher  de sir e .  F urthermore, i t is i nt uitivetha t press ing  Aisjus tas good a t promot in ghe rdes ire a s  pressin gB w ou ldbe (s i nce pr essin g ei th er but ton sat i sf i e s he rde sire ).Th at to o is cap tured b y Contras tiv e  Pur ePr obabili sm: (3) saysth at pressin gA ​ rather t han B do esn't promote the satis f actionofher d esir e. So, as sum ing as  we are he re som e con ne cti o n  betw e e npro mo ting a des i r e a nd th eexis tence o f instrumental rea s ons , there is area sonf o rDeb b ie topr e ssA rather than C,a reason f or he r to press B r at her tha n C, bu t nor eason t o press A  rather t ha n B. A ndall of the se claim s seem li k e exa c tl y the  20  right  r esu lts.​ , 21 N e xtrecal l Bert ie 's cas e, wh ic h consti tuted our counterexampl e to C ausal  Pr obabilism . T h e p roblem wi th C ausal Prob abi lis m was  it s  inab ilit y  t o s a y tha t Be r tie's emb a rk ing o na sporadict r a ini ng pr ogr a m prom otes  his desire to fi n ish a marathon . Bu t giv ena  con tr astive underst and in g of promo ti on, we arenow in a  p o sitio n to i dentif y the w a y  i n  which  Ber tie 's sporad ictr a ining ​ do es promot e hi sdesire . Give n  the d etails of Bertie 's ca s e  andC ont rasti ve  Pure P r obab ilism
 after_A's φ-ing_or ψ-ing, φ-ing rather_than ψ-ing_​promotes_the satisfaction_of_D iff I​φ_> I​ψ​, where_I​φ is the increase_in probability of_satisfying_D between t​1 and t​2 that is (or would be) caused by φ-ing and_I​ψ_is the_increase_in_probability of satisfying D between_t​1 and t​2 that is_(or would_be) caused by ψ-ing. However, it is worth_noting_that this account_involves a comparison between different worlds (viz. worlds in_which A φs and worlds in_which A ψs),_and_thus_arguably betrays Lin's (2016,_pp. 4-5) central idea that promotion_should only be based on a_comparison of probabilities at different times in_the same world. Partly for that_reason, we will not be_exploring the_plausibility of Contrastive Causal Probabilism_in what follows_(though we_invite others to_do so). 19 Or: ​set of_multiple actions. Since_this complication won't be important in_the_arguments to come,_we_ignore_it in_what follows. 10_token,_given (2),_there_is a sense in which Debbie's_pressing_B promotes her desire, in that Debbie's_pressing B rather than_C_promotes the satisfaction of_her desire. Furthermore, it is_intuitive that pressing A is just_as good_at promoting_her desire as pressing B would be (since pressing either button_satisfies her desire). That too is_captured by Contrastive Pure_Probabilism: (3)_says_that pressing A_​rather_than B_doesn't promote the satisfaction of her desire._So, assuming_as we are here some connection_between promoting a desire_and_the existence of instrumental reasons, there_is a reason for Debbie to_press A rather than C,_a_reason_for her to press B_rather than C, but no reason_to press A_rather than B. And all of these_claims_seem like exactly the 20 right_results.​,_21 Next recall Bertie's case, which_constituted_our_counterexample to Causal Probabilism. The_problem with Causal Probabilism was its_inability to say that Bertie's embarking on a sporadic_training program promotes_his desire to finish a_marathon._But_given a contrastive understanding of promotion, we are now in_a position_to identify the_way in which Bertie's sporadic training ​does promote his desire._Given the details of Bertie's case and_Contrastive Pure Probabilism