 1 The Problem Suppose that some expressions are token-reflexive, that is, their meaning assigns an object as a referent to each token (possibly relative to a parameter, like a context) by somehow relating that object to that very token. For instance, a theory could make the meaning of the first person pronoun "I" to be token-reflexive by saying that its meaning assigns the speaker / user of each particular token of "I" as a referent of that token. It is not important here exactly what tokens are, or how to specify the meanings. What matters is the reflexivity: the view that the formulations of the meanings of some expressions ineliminably mention those very expressions. Now suppose that we take synonymy to be sameness of meaning. We immediately run into a problem: since the meaning rules of each particular token-reflexive expression mention that very 1 expression, no two different token-reflexive expressions can be synonymous. My goal here is to give an account of synonymy for such expressions that avoids this bad consequence. In order for this to count as a real problem, I need to make some assumptions. First, one must allow some role for synonymy. If it is a notion that looks suspicious from the beginning, this problem does not arise. Second, it would be best if the reader allowed that some expressions are token-reflexive. In one sense, this is trivially true: such expressions can always be introduced by definition (and I will do some of that). But the problem is more interesting if there are natural language expressions with this property. I believe that demonstratives ("this", "she", etc.) are token-reflexive, though I will not argue for this here. Briefly, my reason is that I believe that the speaker's intentions play a role in securing a referent for each demonstrative token, and that these intentions are ineliminably aimed at that particular token of that particular expression.1 If other context-sensitive expressions work like demonstratives, then they too are token-reflexive. If the reader is not inclined to find it plausible that there are token-reflexive expressions in natural languages, they may read this paper as an argument that the alleged lack of synonymy is not a good reason to discount the view that there are token-reflexive expressions. Third, one needs to start out thinking of meanings as offered by popular theories of meaning (I will give some examples in §
1 The Problem Suppose that some expressions are token - reflexive, that is, their meaning impute an aim as a referent to each token (possibly relative to a argument, like a context) by somehow relating that aim to that very token. For instance, a hypothesis could make the meaning of the first person pronoun " I " to be token - reflexive by say that its meaning assigns the speaker / drug user of each particular token of " I " as a referent of that keepsake. It is not important here exactly what tokens are, or how to specify the meanings. What matters is the reflexivity: the view that the formulation of the meanings of some expressions ineliminably mention those identical expressions. Now think that we take synonymy to be sameness of meaning. We immediately scat into a problem: since the meaning rules of each particular token - reflexive expression note that very 1 expression, no two different token - reflexive expressions can be synonymous. My goal here is to pass an account of synonymy for such expressions that avoids this bad consequence. In order for this to count as a real problem, I need to make some premise. First, one must allow some function for synonymy. If it is a notion that looks suspicious from the beginning, this problem does not rebel. Second, it would be best if the reader allowed that some expressions are nominal - reflexive. In one sense, this is trivially true: such expressions can always be introduced by definition (and I will do some of that). But the problem is more interesting if there are natural language expressions with this place. I believe that demonstrative pronoun (" this ", " she ", etc .) are token - reflexive, though I will not argue for this here. Briefly, my reason is that I believe that the speaker's intentions bring a role in securing a referent for each demonstrative token, and that these intention are ineliminably aimed at that particular token of that particular expression.1 If early context - sensitive expressions work like demonstratives, then they too are token - automatic. If the reader is not inclined to find it plausible that there are nominal - reflexive expressions in lifelike languages, they may read this paper as an argument that the alleged lack of synonymy is not a full reason to dismiss the view that there are token - reflexive construction. Third, one necessitate to start out thinking of meanings as offer by popular theories of meaning (I will give some examples in §
 1 Tje Problem Suppose that rome expressions are tmken-rerlexive, ghat is, their meaning assignd qn obhect as a referent to dach tokej (possiboy rtlative to a parameter, like a ckktext) uy somehow relajing that obbect to that varh coken. For instance, a theory could mahe the kewning of the fyrst [erskn pronoun "I" to be token-reflexive gy sayiig that its meaming assigns the speaker / kser of each particulag token of "U" as q referent ow that toktn. It is not important here exactly what toyens cre, or how jo sogcify the meenings. What matters is the reflexovity: the view thet tye formulations of thx meanings of some evpressionv nneliminably mention rhise vgry efprerwiovs. Hox shppose thet we take aynonymy to be sameness of meamigt. We immediatsly rug ynto a problem: since the meaning rules mf sach particular token-redlexive expression mejtion thae very 1 expression, no two different token-reflexiva expcersiinf xaj be synonymous. My goal here is to give an acskumt of synonymy fjr such exptedsojns that avoias this bzd consequence. In lrder fjr thus to cougt ax a real problem, I need to nake some asfymptions. First, one must allow somg role for synonymy. If it is c notikn that loons suspicjuus from the begknnpng, dhis problem does not arisq. Second, mt wobld be bdst of the reader alpowed that some expressilns ate tokan-reflexivf. In one sense, this is triviallb true: such ecpsesvions cau alwans be introduceq by definitiou (and I cill du some of nhat). But vhe problem ys more interadting if thece are naeurao labguage dbpressions witn this property. I bwlieve that demonsbratixss ("this", "she", etc.) art roken-reflexive, thuugr P wmll njd argue for dhis hefr. Bridfly, my reawun ix that I believe thad ths speaker's intentipnf play a role in securing a rrferent for each dtmonstcative tokem, agd that these intentions are iheliminabpy wimed at thae pavticolar token pf that particular expression.1 If other rontext-sensitive expreswions work like dempkstratives, tien thqy too ara token-reflexive. If rhe reader is not inclined to find it llausitle tjat there are token-reflexive expressions in natural languages, they may reqd this paper as ah arbumenn tkat the ajlegxd lack of synonymj is not a good reason to discouit the vief chat there are token-reflexive ebpressions. Thkrd, one needs to start oht thinkong of meanings as offered by pppular theories of meanikg (I will give some vsaoples in §
1 The Problem Suppose that some expressions that their meaning an object as (possibly to a parameter, a context) by relating that object to that very For instance, a theory could make the meaning of the first person pronoun to be token-reflexive by saying that its meaning assigns the speaker / user each token "I" a referent of that token. It is not important here exactly what tokens are, or how specify the meanings. What matters is the reflexivity: view that the formulations the meanings of some expressions mention very expressions. suppose we synonymy to be of meaning. We immediately run into a problem: since the meaning rules of each particular token-reflexive expression that very no two token-reflexive can synonymous. My goal to give an account of synonymy that avoids this bad consequence. In order for to count a real problem, I need to some assumptions. First, one must allow some role synonymy. If it is a notion that looks suspicious from the beginning, this problem does Second, it would be if the reader that expressions token-reflexive. one sense, is trivially true: such expressions can always be introduced by definition I will do some of that). But the problem is if are natural language with this property. I that ("this", "she", etc.) are I not here. my is that I believe the speaker's intentions play a in securing a referent that these intentions are ineliminably aimed at that token of that particular expression.1 If other expressions work like demonstratives, then they too are token-reflexive. If the reader not inclined it plausible that there are token-reflexive expressions in languages, they may read paper as an argument that the alleged lack of is a good to discount the that there are expressions. Third, one start out of as theories of meaning (I will give examples §
 1 The Problem Suppose that some ExpressionS are tOkeN-reFlExivE, thaT is, their meaninG AssiGns an object as a referent To eacH tOKen (pOSsIbly rElative TO a PARamEtEr, LikE a COnText) bY soMehow reLating that ObjEcT to that very tOKeN. For instanCe, a Theory could mAke The meaNiNg oF The fiRst PersoN pronoUN "I" to be Token-reflExIVe by saYIng that ITS mEaniNg assigns the speakER / uSEr of each particUlar toKeN Of "i" AS a rEfeRent of that ToKen. It IS not impORtANT HerE Exactly what toKens are, or hoW To sPecify ThE meANings. WHat maTtERs iS the reflexiVity: The view thAt the fORmulatiONs of the MeaninGs oF soMe exPReSsIonS iNEliMInAblY MenTion thosE vErY exprEssiONS. nOw suPpoSe thAt we tAke synonymy to Be sAmenESs oF meanIng. We ImmeDiAtely Run intO a proBlEm: since the meaniNg ruLes of each ParTiCulAr Token-REflexiVe eXprEssion mEntion tHAt vErY 1 EXPrEssion, no two differeNt TOKeN-reflexiVe exprESsIoNS can be syNoNymOus. MY GOal heRe is TO gIve an accOunt of SYnOnYmy for sUcH expreSsIonS thAt avoIDs thIs bad cOnsequenCe. In oRDer for this to coUNt as a real probLEm, i NEeD To maKe sOme assumptiOns. FIRst, oNe muST aLloW Some rOle foR sYNoNYmy. If it is a notion thaT lOoks suSpiciOus from the begInning, this PROBlem does Not aRIsE. second, it would bE best If the readeR Allowed tHat soMe expresSions are tOKEn-reflexIve. in oNe sEnsE, THiS is trivially tRUE: sucH eXpressiOns Can alwaYs bE inTroDucEd By definitIon (and I wIlL dO sOmE of That). BUT the probLeM is MoRe iNtereSTing if There Are nAtUrAL laNguage eXPrESSionS wItH thiS prOpErty. I BeliEVe tHat demoNstrativeS ("thIS", "she", EtC.) aRe token-Reflexive, thouGh i will not arGuE foR this hERE. Briefly, My reason is that I believe tHAt the spEakEr's inTentIons play a RolE in secUriNG a refeRent foR each DeMonSTRativE TOkEn, aNd That these iNTEntIons aRe InelIminablY aimed at that particULar Token of that paRtiCulaR EXpResSIoN.1 if oThER coNTExt-sensitive expRessions woRk LIkE demonstraTIveS, tHen they Too are tOken-rEFlexive. if the readEr is not inClIned TO FinD it plausibLe that thEre are tokEN-reflEXiVe expResSions iN nAtuRal laNguageS, TheY may rEad thiS pAper as An argUmEnt that tHe alleged lack of synonymy Is not a Good rEasOn to discoUnt THe vIew that thEre aRe token-refLexIve ExpreSsiONs. ThiRd, onE NeEds TO starT out THinking of MEaNinGS As Offered by poPULAr tHeoriEs oF MeaninG (I wiLl give some exampleS In §
 1 The Problem Suppose tha t some exp ressi ons  ar etoke n-re flexive, thati s, t heir meaning assigns a n obj ec t  asa  r efere nt to e a ch t oke n(p oss ib l yrelat ive  to a p arameter,lik ea context) b y  s omehow rel ati ng that obje ctto tha tver y  toke n.For i nstanc e , a th eory coul dm ake th e  meanin g of  the  first person pro n ou n  "I" to be tok en-ref le x iv e bysay ing that i ts  mean i ng assi g ns t h e s p eaker / userof each par t icu lar to ke n o f  "I" a s a r ef e ren t of that t oken . It is n ot imp o rtant h e re exac tly wh attok ensa re ,orho w  to sp eci f y t he meani ng s.  What  mat t e r s  isthe  ref lexiv ity: the view  th at t h e f ormul ation s of  t he me anings  of s om e expressions i neli minably m ent io n t ho se ve r y expr ess ion s. Nowsuppose tha tw e ta ke synonymy to besa m e ne ss of me aning. We  i m mediatel yrun  int o a pro blem :  s ince the  meani n gru les ofea ch par ti cul artoken - refl exiveexpressi on me n tion that very 1 expression, no t wo diff ere nt token-re flex i ve e xpre s si ons can b e syn on y mo u s. My goal here isto  givean ac count of syno nymy for s u c h  express ions th a t avoids thisbad c onsequence .  In orde r for  this to  count as a  real pr obl em,  Inee d to  make some as s u mpti on s. Firs t,one mus t a llo w s ome  r ole for s ynonymy.  I fit  i s a  noti o n that l oo kssu spi cious from t he be ginn in g, thi s probl e md o es n ot  a rise . S ec ond,it w o uld  be bes t if therea d er a ll ow ed that  some express io ns are tok en -re flexiv e .  In onesense, this is triviall y  true:suc h exp ress ions canalw ays be  in t roduce d by d efini ti on( a nd Iw i ll  do  s ome of tha t ) . B ut th eprob lem ismore interesting i f  th ere are natur allang u a ge  ex p re s sio ns wit h this property.I believeth a tdemonstrat i ves  ( "this",  "she",  etc. )  are to ken-refle xive, tho ug h Iw i llnot arguefor this  here. Br i efly, my  reas onis tha tI b eliev e that the  spea ker'sin tentio ns pl ay  a rolein securing a referentfor ea ch de mon strativetok e n,and thatthes e intentio nsare  inel imi n ablyaime d  a t t h at pa rtic u lar token of  th a t  p articular e x p r ess ion.1  If othercont ext-sensitive exp r essions work l iked e mon str a tive s,  then they too  ar et o ken-refl ex ive. If the  readeris not i ncline d to f ind itp l au s ible t hatthe re are to ken -r e flexive  e xp r ession s in  n atural  langu a ges, t hey may read thi s pap e r  as a n  ar gumen tthat th e  all eged lackof synonymy  is no t agoodreasonto  disco unt  t he view th a t there a re to ken-ref le xive  ex pressi ons. T hird,  one  n eed s to star t ou t  t hi n kin g of  mean in gs a s offered by popul art heories  o f m e a ning ( I  w i l l give som e e xampl e s  in §
 1_The Problem_Suppose that some expressions_are token-reflexive,_that_is, their_meaning_assigns an object_as a referent_to each token (possibly_relative to a_parameter,_like a context) by somehow relating that object to that very token. For instance,_a_theory could_make_the_meaning of the first person_pronoun "I" to be token-reflexive_by saying_that its meaning assigns the speaker / user_of_each particular token_of "I" as a referent of that token. It_is not important here exactly what_tokens are, or_how_to_specify the meanings. What_matters is the reflexivity: the view_that the formulations of the meanings_of some expressions ineliminably mention those very_expressions. Now suppose that we take_synonymy to be sameness of_meaning. We_immediately run into a problem:_since the meaning_rules of_each particular token-reflexive_expression mention that very 1 expression,_no two different_token-reflexive expressions can be synonymous. My_goal_here is to_give_an_account of_synonymy for such_expressions_that avoids_this_bad consequence. In order for this_to_count as a real problem, I need_to make some assumptions._First,_one must allow some_role for synonymy. If it_is a notion that looks suspicious_from the_beginning, this_problem does not arise. Second, it would be best if the_reader allowed that some expressions are_token-reflexive. In one sense,_this is_trivially_true: such expressions_can_always be_introduced by definition (and I will do_some of_that). But the problem is more_interesting if there are_natural_language expressions with this property. I_believe that demonstratives ("this", "she", etc.)_are token-reflexive, though I will_not_argue_for this here. Briefly, my_reason is that I believe that_the speaker's intentions_play a role in securing a referent_for_each demonstrative token, and that these_intentions_are ineliminably aimed at that particular_token_of_that particular expression.1 If other_context-sensitive expressions work like demonstratives, then_they too are token-reflexive. If the reader is not_inclined to find_it plausible that there are_token-reflexive_expressions_in natural languages, they may read this paper as an_argument that_the alleged lack_of synonymy is not a good reason to discount the_view that there are token-reflexive expressions. Third,_one needs to start out thinking of meanings as offered by_popular theories of meaning (I will give some_examples in §