 results. Take first η and ζ. The most obvious way to adapt the idea to these expressions would be to say that their meaning is the rule which, for every token, yields as referent that very token. But this is not the meaning of η. In order to know its meaning, one need only know what its tokens refer to. The rest would be baffling to speakers of the language that contains it. Just in case you lack intuitions about η, think about "I": in order to learn English, you would need to be willing to assign to any token its speaker as a referent. Admittedly, my proposal has a counterintuitive part too: I am arguing that sameness of meaning is not necessary for synonymy. But this is merely a counterintuitive claim about synonymy. I take my intuitions about the meaning of "I" to be stronger than my intuitions about synonymy. And I would guess that so does the reader. The second objection is that it predicts that certain questions get a natural answer, even if they do not. Consider this: suppose someone asserts "2+2=5". It makes sense to ask who said that. But, 16This is a simplification of the proposal made in Kupffer (2001, §6.3). That account is much more sophisticated (and I should mention that he proposes this as a notion of weak meaning, not full-on meaning, thus also denying (B)), but the objection presented applies to it as well. A similar view is also proposed in Braun (forthcoming), without the accompanying motivation. 18 putting aside the fact that we have been for so long following Kaplan here, does it make sense to ask "what does 'I' refer to in (or relative to) that assertion?"? My natural response would assume that the person asking that question misheard, and I would just repeat the sentence. As I said above, Kaplan claimed that we need answers to such questions for certain logical and semantic needs. In other work, I argue that these needs are either easily met by a semantics of utterances, or not real needs at all. Here I rest content with the observation that following Kaplan here comes with some costs. The third objection is that, while it is true that some context sensitive expressions have meanings that depend on contextual features that are independent of the expression being used, not all are. To give an account of the meaning of "I' in this way we rely on the fact that it
results. Take first η and ζ. The most obvious direction to adjust the idea to these expressions would be to suppose that their meaning is the principle which, for every token, yields as referent that very nominal. But this is not the meaning of η. In order to know its meaning, one need only acknowledge what its tokens refer to. The respite would be baffling to speakers of the lyric that contain it. Just in subject you lack intuitions about η, remember about " I ": in order to learn English, you would need to be uncoerced to assign to any token its speaker as a referent. true, my proposal accept a counterintuitive part besides: I am arguing that sameness of meaning is not necessary for synonymy. But this is merely a counterintuitive claim about synonymy. I take my intuition about the meaning of " I " to be stronger than my intuitions about synonymy. And I would guess that so does the reader. The second objection is that it predicts that certain questions get a natural answer, even if they do not. Consider this: suppose someone asserts " 2 + 2=5 ". It make sense to ask who say that. But, 16This is a reduction of the marriage proposal made in Kupffer (2001, § 6.3). That account is much more sophisticated (and I should mention that he proposes this as a notion of weak meaning, not wide - on meaning, thus also denying (B) ), but the objection presented applies to it equally well. A similar view is also proposed in Braun (forthcoming), without the accompanying motivation. 18 putting apart the fact that we have been for so long following Kaplan here, does it make sense to ask " what does' I' denote to in (or relative to) that assertion? "? My natural reception would assume that the person asking that question misheard, and I would just recur the sentence. As I said above, Kaplan claim that we need answer to such questions for sealed logical and semantic needs. In early work, I argue that these needs are either easily met by a semantics of utterances, or not actual needs at wholly. Here I rest content with the observation that following Kaplan here occur with some costs. The third objection is that, while it is true that some context sensible expressions have meanings that depend on contextual features that are independent of the expression being use, not all are. To give an account of the meaning of " I' in this way we rely on the fact that it
 redults. Take first η and ζ. Tme most obvious cqy to edapt tge idea go these expressions would bx to say ukat their meaning is the rule which, fir etery token, yields as refcxent fmat vzrb token. But thix is not tve meaning of η. Iv lrder to know its meaning, one need jnly knpw what its tokegs rtfew to. Nht rest would be baffling to speaksrs of uhe language that vontains it. Just in case ylu lwck intuitions abokt η, think avout "U": in order tu learn English, you woold need to be willing to assign to auy token itw wpewner as a reherent. Admittedly, my propoval has a counterintultive paet too: I am arguing tiat sameness of meanyng is nod uecessary for synonymt. Vut tvis hs mdeelh a cpuhterinhuivive claim zbout synontmy. I take my intuiuiogw about the msaning os "I" to be stronger than my intuitions atouf synonymy. And I would tuess that so does thg reader. Tre second objection is that it predicts that certdin qnertiinf teh a natural answer, even if they do not. Considqd uhix: suppose somejne asserts "2+2=5". Lt iakes sense tu ask cgo said that. But, 16Thid is a fimplufication of yhe proposal made in Kupffee (2001, §6.3). That accjynt is much more slphisticateb (and O shoild mention that he pro'oses fhis as a nltion of sdak meaning, not wulk-ot meaning, thus also denyind (B)), but tie oblection oresgnted a[plies to lt as well. A similar viea is clso [roposed ij Braun (forthcoming), without the accompanying kodivdtion. 18 pbtting aside the fast that we havg been fox so lung followpng Kaplai here, does yt make sense jo ask "what dmes 'I' reser ro ib (or reuxtive to) that sssertion?"? My naturao response would axsuos that the persin qsking that quextiun iidhxard, wtd I would jgst fepdst thd sentence. Cs I ssid above, Kaplan clahmed that we need answrrf to sucy questijns for certaon logical and semwntic nexds. In otrer work, I argue that these nesds are elthcr easily met by q semantics pf utterances, or not real needs at all. Iere I rest content wijh the observation thct following Laplag here cokes with some costs. Rhe third objectipn is that, while it ia true that some context sensitive expressions have meanings that depend on contextuql feavuwes that ars incepengeut pf the expcersion being used, not all are. To give an account of the kecning of "I' in this way we relu un the fact tfat it
results. Take first η and ζ. The way adapt the to these expressions their is the rule for every token, as referent that very token. But is not the meaning of η. In order to know its meaning, one only know what its tokens refer to. The rest would be baffling to of language contains Just in case you lack intuitions about η, think about "I": in order to learn English, would need to be willing to assign to token its speaker as referent. Admittedly, my proposal has counterintuitive too: I arguing sameness meaning is not for synonymy. But this is merely a counterintuitive claim about synonymy. I take my intuitions about the of "I" stronger than intuitions synonymy. I would guess does the reader. The second objection predicts that certain questions get a natural answer, if they not. Consider this: suppose someone asserts It makes sense to ask who said that. 16This is a simplification of the proposal made in Kupffer (2001, §6.3). That account is sophisticated (and I should that he proposes as notion weak not full-on thus also denying (B)), but the objection presented applies to it well. A similar view is also proposed in Braun (forthcoming), accompanying 18 putting aside fact that we have for long following Kaplan here, make to 'I' to (or relative to) that My natural response would assume the person asking that just repeat the sentence. As I said above, claimed that we need answers to such for certain logical and semantic needs. In other work, I argue that needs are met by a semantics of utterances, or not needs at all. Here rest content with the observation that following Kaplan here with costs. The objection is that, it is true some context sensitive meanings that on features of the expression being used, not are. give an account of the of this way we rely on the fact that it
 results. Take first η and ζ. The mOst obvious Way to AdaPt tHe Idea To thEse expressions WOuld Be to say that their meaninG is thE rULe whICh, For evEry tokeN, YiELDs aS rEfEreNt THaT very TokEn. But thIs is not the MeaNiNg of η. In order TO kNow its meanIng, One need only kNow What itS tOkeNS refeR to. the reSt woulD Be baffLing to speAkERs of thE LanguagE THaT conTains it. Just in case YOu LAck intuitions aBout η, tHiNK aBOUt "I": In oRder to learN ENglisH, You woulD NeED TO be WIlling to assigN to any token ITs sPeaker As A reFErent. ADmittEdLY, my Proposal has A couNterintuiTive paRT too: I am ARguing tHat samEneSs oF meaNInG iS noT nECesSArY foR SynOnymy. But ThIs Is merEly a COUNTeriNtuItivE claiM about synonymY. I tAke mY IntUitioNs aboUt thE mEaninG of "I" to Be strOnGer than my intuitIons About synoNymY. ANd I WoUld guESs that So dOes The readEr. The seCOnd ObJECTiOn is that it predicts ThAT CeRtain queStions GEt A nATural ansWeR, evEn if THEy do nOt. CoNSiDer this: sUppose SOmEoNe asserTs "2+2=5". it makeS sEnsE to Ask whO Said That. BuT, 16This is a SimplIFication of the pROposal made in KUPfFER (2001, §6.3). THAt acCouNt is much morE sopHIstiCateD (AnD I sHOuld mEntioN tHAt HE proposes this as a notIoN of weaK meanIng, not full-on mEaning, thus ALSO denying (b)), but THe OBjection presenTed apPlies to it aS Well. A simIlar vIew is alsO proposed IN braun (forThcOmiNg), wIthOUT tHe accompanyinG MOtivAtIon. 18 puttIng Aside thE faCt tHat We hAvE been for sO long folLoWiNg kaPlaN here, DOes it makE sEnsE tO asK "what DOes 'I' reFer to In (or ReLaTIve To) that aSSeRTIon?"? MY nAtUral ResPoNse woUld aSSumE that thE person asKinG That QuEsTion misHeard, and I woulD jUst repeat tHe SenTence. AS i Said abovE, Kaplan claimed that we neeD Answers To sUch quEstiOns for cerTaiN logicAl aND semanTic neeDs. In oThEr wORK, I argUE ThAt tHeSe needs are EITheR easiLy Met bY a semanTics of utterances, or NOt rEal needs at all. herE I reST CoNteNT wITh tHe OBseRVAtion that followIng Kaplan hErE CoMes with somE CosTs. the thirD objectIon is THat, whilE it is true That some cOnText SENsiTive expresSions havE meanings THat dePEnD on coNteXtual fEaTurEs thaT are inDEpeNdent Of the eXpRessioN beinG uSed, not alL are. To give an account of thE meaniNg of "I' In tHis way we rEly ON thE fact that It
 results. Take first η and  ζ. The mo st ob vio uswa y to  ada pt the idea to thes e expressions would be  to s ay that th eir m eaningi st h e r ul ewhi ch ,  f or ev ery  token,  yields as  re fe rent that ve r ytoken. But  th is is not th e m eaning  o f η .  In o rde r toknow i t s mean ing, onene e d only know wh a t  i ts t okens refer to. T h er est would be b afflin gt os p eak ers  of the la ng uaget hat con t ai n s it. Just in caseyou lack in t uit ions a bo utη , thin k abo ut "I" : in orderto l earn Engl ish, y o u would need to  be wi lli ngto a s si gn  to  a n y t o ke n i t s s peaker a sarefer ent. A d m itte dly , my  prop osal has a co unt erin t uit ive p art t oo:Iam ar guingthatsa meness of meani ng i s not nec ess ar y f or  syno n ymy. B utthi s is me rely ac oun te r i n tu itive claim aboutsy n o ny my. I ta ke myi nt ui t ions abo ut  th e me a n ing o f "I "  t o be str ongert ha nmy intu it ions a bo utsyn onymy .  And  I wou ld guess  that so does the re a der. The seco n do b je c tion  is  that it pr edic t s th at c e rt ain quest ionsge t  a natural answer, eve nif the y donot. Consider  this: sup p o s e someon e as s er t s "2+2=5". Itmakes  sense toa sk who s aid t hat. But , 16Thisi s  a simpl ifi cat ion  of t he  proposal mad e in K up ffer (2 001 , §6.3) . T hat  ac cou nt  is muchmore sop hi st ic at ed(andI  shouldme nti on  th at he propos es th is a san oti on of w e ak m eani ng ,notful l- on me anin g , t hus als o denying  (B ) ), b ut  t he obje ction present ed  applies t oitas wel l .  A simil ar view is also propose d  in Bra un(fort hcom ing), wit hou t theacc o mpanyi ng mot ivati on . 1 8 putti n g  a sid ethe fact t h a t w e hav ebeen  for so  long following Ka p lan  here, does i t m akes e ns e t o  a s k " wh a t d o e s 'I' refer toin (or rel at i ve  to) thata sse rt ion?"?My natu ral r e sponsewould ass ume thatth e pe r s onasking tha t questi on mishea r d, an d  I  woul d j ust re pe atthe s entenc e . A s I s aid ab ov e, Kap lan c la imed tha t we need answers to su ch que stion s f or certai n l o gic al and se mant ic needs.Inoth er wo rk, I arg ue t h at  th e se ne edsa re either ea sil y me t by a sema n t i csof ut ter a nces,or n ot real needs ata ll. Here I res t co n t ent  wi t h th eobservation th atfo l l owing Ka pl an here com es withso m e cos ts. Th e thir d objec t i on is tha t, w hil e it is t rue  t h at some  c on t ext se nsit iv e expr ession s  hav e meanings that de pendo n  cont e xtu al fe at ures th a t ar e independ ent of theexpres sion  bein g used,  n ot all  ar e.  To give a n  accountof th e meani ng  of"I'  in th is w a y  we r elyon  th e fact th a t  i t 
 results._Take first_η and ζ. The_most obvious_way_to adapt_the_idea to these_expressions would be_to say that their_meaning is the_rule_which, for every token, yields as referent that very token. But this is not_the_meaning of_η._In_order to know its meaning,_one need only know what_its tokens_refer to. The rest would be baffling to_speakers_of the language_that contains it. Just in case you lack intuitions_about η, think about "I": in_order to learn_English,_you_would need to be_willing to assign to any token_its speaker as a referent. Admittedly,_my proposal has a counterintuitive part too:_I am arguing that sameness of_meaning is not necessary for_synonymy. But_this is merely a counterintuitive_claim about synonymy._I take_my intuitions about_the meaning of "I" to be_stronger than my_intuitions about synonymy. And I would_guess_that so does_the_reader._The second_objection is that_it_predicts that_certain_questions get a natural answer, even_if_they do not. Consider this: suppose someone_asserts "2+2=5". It makes_sense_to ask who said_that. But, 16This is a_simplification of the proposal made in_Kupffer (2001,_§6.3). That_account is much more sophisticated (and I should mention that he_proposes this as a notion of_weak meaning, not full-on_meaning, thus_also_denying (B)), but_the_objection presented_applies to it as well. A similar_view is_also proposed in Braun (forthcoming), without_the accompanying motivation. 18_putting_aside the fact that we have_been for so long following Kaplan_here, does it make sense_to_ask_"what does 'I' refer to_in (or relative to) that assertion?"?_My natural response_would assume that the person asking that_question_misheard, and I would just repeat_the_sentence. As I said above, Kaplan_claimed_that_we need answers to such_questions for certain logical and semantic_needs. In other work, I argue that these needs_are either easily_met by a semantics of_utterances,_or_not real needs at all. Here I rest content with_the observation_that following Kaplan_here comes with some costs. The third objection is that,_while it is true that some context_sensitive expressions have meanings that depend on contextual features that are_independent of the expression being used, not all_are. To give an account of the_meaning of "I' in_this_way we rely on the fact that_it