 outcome. According to our proposal, then, an action promotes a desire when the expected fit for the desire given that the agent performs the action is greater than the expected fit of the desire given that the agent performs the contrasting action. We highlight this account's attractive features and explain how it improves on its competitors. Keywords: promotion, desire, rationality, Humeanism, probability 1. Introduction It's possible to satisfy desires. If you want $100, and you get $100, then your desire is satisfied. It's also possible to ​promote the satisfaction of desires. If you want $100, and you get a ticket to a fair lottery the prize for which is $100, then although your desire hasn't ​ipso facto ​been satisfied, the satisfaction of your desire has been promoted. According to one version of Humeanism about reasons, agents have reason to perform all and only those actions that promote the satisfaction of their desires. And even 1 among non-Humeans, it seems clear that at least ​some reasons, viz. the instrumental ones, involve promoting the satisfaction of desires. What, precisely, is required for an 2 1 See, for instance, Schroeder (2007) and Manne (2016). Though they are importantly different, both Schroeder and Manne's brands of Humeanism are put explicitly in terms of promoting agents' desires. See also Hubin (1999). 2 Examples abound. See, for just two instances, Korsgaard (1996) and Scanlon (2015). As Snedegar (2014) points out, even authors not explicitly interested in instrumental reasons -or even ​desires -seem to appeal to the idea of promotion in stating their views. (Compare Snedegar (2014, pp. 46-7).) Here we * Both authors contributed equally to the paper; we've adopted the convention of alternating the order in which our names appear on published work. action to promote the satisfaction of a desire? In this paper, we offer a new account, highlight its attractive features, and explain how it improves on its competitors. All of the most prominent accounts of promotion appeal to the notion of probability, so we begin (in section 2) by describing two recent probabilistic accounts -Pure Probabilism and Causal Probabilism. We'll argue that both accounts face serious problems, but that these can be solved by recognizing that promotion is contrastive (in a sense to be explicated). But that's not the end of
outcome. According to our proposal, then, an action promotes a desire when the expect paroxysm for the desire given that the agent performs the natural process is greater than the expected burst of the desire impart that the agent perform the contrasting action. We foreground this account's attractive features and explain how it improves on its rival. Keywords: promotion, desire, rationality, Humeanism, probability 1. Introduction It's potential to satisfy desire. If you desire $ 100, and you get $ 100, then your desire is satisfied. It's also potential to ​promote the satisfaction of desires. If you want $ 100, and you get a ticket to a bonny lottery the prize for which is $ 100, then although your desire hasn't ​ipso facto ​been satisfied, the satisfaction of your desire has been promoted. According to one interpretation of Humeanism about reasons, agents have reason to perform all and only those actions that promote the satisfaction of their desires. And even 1 among non - Humeans, it seems clear that at least ​some reasons, viz. the instrumental ones, involve promoting the gratification of desires. What, precisely, is required for an 2 1 See, for example, Schroeder (2007) and Manne (2016). Though they are importantly unlike, both Schroeder and Manne's brand of Humeanism are put explicitly in terms of promoting agents' desires. See also Hubin (1999). 2 exercise abound. See, for just two instances, Korsgaard (1996) and Scanlon (2015). As Snedegar (2014) points out, even authors not explicitly concerned in instrumental reasons -or even ​desires -seem to appeal to the idea of promotion in stating their views. (Compare Snedegar (2014, pp. 46 - 7) .) Here we * Both writer contributed equally to the paper; we've adopted the convention of alternate the order in which our names appear on published work. action to promote the satisfaction of a desire? In this newspaper, we offer a raw account, highlight its attractive feature, and explain how it better on its competitors. All of the about prominent accounts of forwarding appeal to the notion of probability, so we begin (in section 2) by identify two recent probabilistic accounts -Pure Probabilism and Causal Probabilism. We'll argue that both accounts face serious problems, but that these can be solved by recognizing that promotion is contrasting (in a sense to be explicated). But that's not the goal of
 ouhcome. According to our pvoposal, then, an cxtion 'romotea a desife when the expected fit for tye dewire given that the agdnt perfogms the axtioi is greater thai the exizcted nit oy vhe desire givek that the dgent performs tfe contrasting action. We highlight thys accoinh's attractive seatlrqs ahd explain how it improves on its dompetiuors. Keywords: promption, desire, rationality, Hkmeajism, probability 1. Lntroductiob It'f possible to satisfy dtsnres. If you want $100, and you get $100, then your ddsire is satisfuee. Ih'v also possmble tj ​promote thc satisxaction of desires. If yon wabt $100, and you get a ticnet to a fair lottgry the prhzz for which is $100, then qlrhougv yogr ddwird hzsi't ​jpso fwctk ​been satjsfied, the watisfaction of yout qvxire has beeh promjtqd. According to one version of Humeanisk agout reasons, agents havw reason to perform apl and onjy those actions that promote the satisfaction of theic aesnvcs. Ave fven 1 among non-Humeans, it seems clear that at messn ​some reasons, vid. the instrumental ojex, involve promuting cge satisfaction of dfsires. Rhat, precisely, is tequired for an 2 1 See, for ibstance, Schrjwder (2007) and Manne (2016). Tkough they axe impprtanyly different, both Schrueded and Manne'd brands kw Humeanism are out efplicitly in terms of promjting ageits' dzsires. Sde akso Hufin (1999). 2 Examoles abound. See, for just two nnstatces, Korsgward (1996) and Scanlon (2015). As Snedegar (2014) points out, evgn dutvors not expllcitly interestqd in instrumeutal reafons -ur even ​deaires -sxem to appeaj to the idea lf promotion in statyng rheie views. (Zompare Snedegsr (2014, pp. 46-7).) Hvrt we * Both authors contributcd eqoamly to the papex; qe've adopted thr cunvqnnioi of wnternating tve ofdef in wfich our nands alpear on published wmrk. zction to promote yhc satisfaxtion of a desire? In yhis paper, we offeg a nxw accuunt, nigrlight its attractive features, and explwin how it imprjves on its compztitors. All of the most prominent accounvs of promotion appeal ro the notion of prpnability, so xe begyn (in secdion 2) by describing rwo recent probabllistic accounts -Pure Lrobabhlism and Causal Probabilism. We'll argue that both accounts face serious problens, but that these dan ne sonvzd yy recodnizmnj that promotion ps contrastive (in a sense to be xxplicated). Bbt that's not the end of
outcome. According to our proposal, then, an a when the fit for the performs action is greater the expected fit the desire given that the agent the contrasting action. We highlight this account's attractive features and explain how it on its competitors. Keywords: promotion, desire, rationality, Humeanism, probability 1. Introduction It's possible satisfy If want and you get $100, then your desire is satisfied. It's also possible to ​promote the satisfaction desires. If you want $100, and you get ticket to a fair the prize for which is then your desire ​ipso ​been the satisfaction of desire has been promoted. According to one version of Humeanism about reasons, agents have reason to perform and only that promote satisfaction their And even 1 it seems clear that at least the instrumental ones, involve promoting the satisfaction of What, precisely, required for an 2 1 See, instance, Schroeder (2007) and Manne (2016). Though they importantly different, both Schroeder and Manne's brands of Humeanism are put explicitly in terms of desires. See also Hubin 2 Examples abound. for two Korsgaard and Scanlon As Snedegar (2014) points out, even authors not explicitly interested in reasons -or even ​desires -seem to appeal to the idea in their views. (Compare (2014, pp. 46-7).) Here * authors contributed equally to we've the the in our names appear on work. action to promote the of a desire? In new account, highlight its attractive features, and explain it improves on its competitors. All of most prominent accounts of promotion appeal to the notion of probability, so begin (in by describing two recent probabilistic accounts -Pure Probabilism Causal Probabilism. We'll argue both accounts face serious problems, but that these can solved recognizing that is contrastive (in sense to be But that's not of
 outcome. According to our propOsal, then, an ActioN prOmoTeS a deSire When the expecteD Fit fOr the desire given that thE agenT pERforMS tHe actIon is grEAtER ThaN tHe ExpEcTEd Fit of The Desire gIven that thE agEnT performs the COnTrasting acTioN. We highlight ThiS accouNt'S atTRactiVe fEaturEs and eXPlain hOw it improVeS On its cOMpetitoRS. keYworDs: promotion, desire, RAtIOnality, HumeaniSm, probAbILiTY 1. intRodUction It's pOsSible TO satisfY DeSIREs. IF You want $100, and you Get $100, then your DEsiRe is saTiSfiED. It's alSo posSiBLe tO ​promote the SatiSfaction oF desirES. If you wANt $100, and yoU get a tIckEt tO a faIR lOtTerY tHE prIZe For WHicH is $100, then aLtHoUgh yoUr deSIRE Hasn'T ​ipSo faCto ​beEn satisfied, thE saTisfACtiOn of yOur deSire HaS been PromotEd. AccOrDing to one versioN of HUmeanism aBouT rEasOnS, agenTS have rEasOn tO perforM all and ONly ThOSE AcTions that promote thE sATIsFaction oF their DEsIrES. And even 1 AmOng Non-HUMEans, iT seeMS cLear that At leasT ​SoMe Reasons, ViZ. the inStRumEntAl oneS, InvoLve proMoting thE satiSFaction of desirES. What, preciselY, Is REQuIRed fOr aN 2 1 See, for instAnce, sChroEder (2007) ANd manNE (2016). ThouGh theY aRE iMPortantly different, bOtH SchroEder aNd Manne's brandS of HumeaniSM ARe put expLiciTLy IN terms of promotIng agEnts' desireS. see also HUbin (1999). 2 EXamples aBound. See, fOR Just two iNstAncEs, KOrsGAArD (1996) and Scanlon (2015). As sNEdegAr (2014) Points oUt, eVen authOrs Not ExpLicItLy interesTed in insTrUmEnTaL reAsons -OR even ​desIrEs -sEeM to AppeaL To the iDea of PromOtIoN In sTating tHEiR VIews. (coMpAre SNedEgAr (2014, pp. 46-7).) HEre wE * botH authorS contribuTed EQualLy To The papeR; we've adopted tHe Convention Of AltErnatiNG The order In which our names appear on PUblisheD woRk. actIon tO promote tHe sAtisfaCtiON of a deSire? In This pApEr, wE OFfer a NEW aCcoUnT, highlight ITS atTractIvE feaTures, anD explain how it improVEs oN its competitoRs. ALl of THE mOst PRoMIneNt ACcoUNTs of promotion apPeal to the nOtIOn Of probabilITy, sO wE begin (iN sectioN 2) by deSCribing Two recent ProbabiliStIc acCOUntS -Pure ProbaBilism anD Causal PrOBabilISm. we'll aRguE that bOtH acCountS face sERioUs proBlems, bUt That thEse caN bE solved bY recognizing that promotiOn is coNtrasTivE (in a sense To bE ExpLicated). BuT thaT's not the enD of
 outcome. According to our  proposal,  then , a n a ct ionprom otes a desirew henthe expected fit for t he de si r e gi v en  that  the ag e nt p erf or ms  th ea ct ion i s g reaterthan the e xpe ct ed fit of th e  d esire give n t hat the agen t p erform sthe contr ast ing a ction. We hig hlight th is accoun t 's attr a c ti ve f eatures and expla i nh ow it improves  on it sc om p e tit ors . Keywords :promo t ion, de s ir e , rat i onality, Hume anism, prob a bil ity 1.  I ntr o ductio n It' sp oss ible to sat isfy  desires.  If yo u  want $ 1 00, and  you g et$10 0, t h en  y our  d e sir e  i s s a tis fied. It 's  a lso p ossi b l e to ​ pro mote  thesatisfactionofdesi r es.  If y ou wa nt $ 10 0, an d youget a  t icket to a fair  lot tery thepri ze  fo rwhich is $10 0,the n altho ugh you r  de si r e ha sn't ​ipso facto ​ be e n  s atisfied , thes at is f action o fyou r de s i re ha s be e npromoted . Acco r di ng  to one  v ersion  o f H ume anism abou t reas ons, age nts h a ve reason to p e rform all and on l y  t h oseact ions that p romo t e th e sa t is fac t ion o f the ir de s ires. And even 1 am on g non- Humea ns, it seemsclear that a t  least ​ some re a sons, viz. the  inst rumental o n es, invo lve p romoting  the sati s f action o f d esi res . W h a t,  precisely, i s requ ir ed foran2 1 See , f orins tan ce , Schroed er (2007 )an dMa nne  (201 6 ). Thoug hthe yare  impo r tantly  diff eren t,  b o thSchroed e ra n d Ma nn e' s br and sof Hu mean i smare put  explicit lyi n te rm sof prom oting agents'  d esires. Se eals o Hubi n (1999).2 Examples abound. See, for jus t t wo in stan ces, Kors gaa rd (19 96) and Sc anlon(2015 ).  As S nedeg a r  ( 201 4)  points ou t ,  ev en au th orsnot exp licitly interested ininstrumentalrea sons - or  ev e n​ des ir e s - s e em to appeal to  the ideaof pr omotion in sta ti ng thei r views . (Co m pare Sn edegar (2 014, pp.46 -7). ) Her e we * Bot h author s contrib u ted e q ua lly t o t he pap er ; w e'veadopte d  th e con ventio nof alt ernat in g the or der in which our namesappear  on p ubl ished wor k.a cti on to pro mote  the satis fac tio n ofa d e sire?  Int hi s p a per,we o f fer a new ac cou n t ,highlight i t s att racti vef eature s, a nd explain how it improves on it s co m p eti tor s . Al lof the most pr omi ne n t  account sof promotio n appeal  t o  thenotion  of pr obabili t y ,s o we b egin  (i n section  2)  b y  descri bi ng two re cent  p robabi listic acco u n ts -Pure Probabi lisma n d Cau s alProba bi lism. W e 'llargue that  both accou nts fa ce s eriou s probl em s, but  th at  these can be solved  by r ecogniz in g th atpromot ioni s  cont rast iv e ( in a sens e to be  e x pli cate d). B ut  tha t's not t h e end of 
 outcome._According to_our proposal, then, an_action promotes_a_desire when_the_expected fit for_the desire given_that the agent performs_the action is_greater_than the expected fit of the desire given that the agent performs the contrasting_action._We highlight_this_account's_attractive features and explain how_it improves on its competitors._Keywords: promotion,_desire, rationality, Humeanism, probability 1. Introduction It's possible_to_satisfy desires. If_you want $100, and you get $100, then your_desire is satisfied. It's also possible_to ​promote the_satisfaction_of_desires. If you want_$100, and you get a ticket_to a fair lottery the prize_for which is $100, then although your_desire hasn't ​ipso facto ​been satisfied,_the satisfaction of your desire_has been_promoted. According to one version_of Humeanism about_reasons, agents_have reason to_perform all and only those actions_that promote the_satisfaction of their desires. And even_1_among non-Humeans, it_seems_clear_that at_least ​some reasons,_viz._the instrumental_ones,_involve promoting the satisfaction of desires._What,_precisely, is required for an 2 1_See, for instance, Schroeder_(2007)_and Manne (2016). Though_they are importantly different, both_Schroeder and Manne's brands of Humeanism_are put_explicitly in_terms of promoting agents' desires. See also Hubin (1999). 2 Examples_abound. See, for just two instances,_Korsgaard (1996) and Scanlon_(2015). As_Snedegar_(2014) points out,_even_authors not_explicitly interested in instrumental reasons -or even_​desires -seem_to appeal to the idea of_promotion in stating their_views._(Compare Snedegar (2014, pp. 46-7).) Here_we * Both authors contributed equally_to the paper; we've adopted_the_convention_of alternating the order in_which our names appear on published_work. action to_promote the satisfaction of a desire? In_this_paper, we offer a new account,_highlight_its attractive features, and explain how_it_improves_on its competitors. All of_the most prominent accounts of promotion_appeal to the notion of probability, so we begin_(in section 2)_by describing two recent probabilistic_accounts_-Pure_Probabilism and Causal Probabilism. We'll argue that both accounts face_serious problems,_but that these_can be solved by recognizing that promotion is contrastive (in_a sense to be explicated). But that's_not the end of