 to constitution that any viable method of constitutional discovery has to take into account (§5). In particular, to establish constitutive dependencies, it does not suffice to wiggle the macro level of a mechanistic system such that the micro level changes and vice versa-as stipulated by MM. Rather, an extended series of experiments is needed that explore the whole space of possible ways of breaking the coupling of macro and micro levels. Only if all of these tests are unsuccessful, an inference to constitution is warranted. Moreover, in light of its inherent empirical underdeAn Abductive Theory of Constitution 3 termination, such an inference is ultimately grounded in pragmatic considerations concerning explanatory power, and is not forced upon the modeler by the evidence. 2 Inadequacy of MM Before reviewing Craver's MM, we must render transparent two crucial background assumptions of our argument and introduce our notation. According to the first assumption, which is compellingly substantiated by Craver and Bechtel (2007), constitution must be sharply distinguished from causation. Causation holds among mereologically independent entities such that causes temporally precede their effects, and it is a unidirectional form of dependence in the sense that effects depend on their causes but not vice versa. By contrast, constitution holds among wholes and their parts,1 that is, among spatiotemporally overlapping entities, and it is bidirectional in the sense that parts depend on the wholes and vice versa. Although some authors are skeptical of the distinction between causation and constitution (e.g. Ross and Ladyman 2010; Leuridan 2012), the distinction is standardly accepted by representatives of theories of mechanistic explanation. As this is the theoretical context of our paper, we shall subsequently assume that constitution is a distinctly non-causal form of dependence. The second assumption likewise belongs to the canon of mechanistic theorizing; it states that the relation between a mechanism's upper and lower level is to be analyzed in terms of non-reductive supervenience (Glennan 1996, 61-62; Eronen 2011, ch. 11). More specifically, relative to a given a mechanistic organization of the constituents, phenomena supervene on their constituents, meaning that every change in a phenomenon is necessarily accompanied by a change in its constituents (Craver 2007, 153). Moreover, phenomena are not reducible-in particular, not identical-to their constituents. Phenomena and their constituents are types of behavior exhibited by specific entities on macro and micro levels, respectively. To represent such behaviors, we adopt the following notational conventions.
to constitution that any viable method of constitutional discovery take to consume into account (§ 5). In particular, to establish constituent dependencies, it does not suffice to wiggle the macro level of a mechanistic arrangement such that the micro level changes and frailty versa - as stipulate by MM. Rather, an extensive series of experiments is need that explore the whole space of possible ways of break the coupling of macro and micro levels. Only if all of these test are unsuccessful, an inference to constitution is warranted. Moreover, in luminosity of its inherent empirical underdeAn Abductive Theory of Constitution 3 termination, such an inference is ultimately grounded in pragmatic circumstance concerning explanatory power, and is not forced upon the modeler by the evidence. 2 Inadequacy of MM Before reviewing Craver's millimeter, we must supply transparent two crucial background assumptions of our argument and introduce our notation. According to the first premise, which is compellingly substantiated by Craver and Bechtel (2007), constitution must be precipitously distinguish from causation. Causation holds among mereologically autonomous entities such that cause temporally precede their effects, and it is a unidirectional mannequin of dependence in the sense that effects depend on their causes but not vice versa. By contrast, united states constitution holds among wholes and their parts,1 that is, among spatiotemporally overlapping entities, and it is bidirectional in the common sense that parts count on the wholes and vice versa. Although some authors are skeptical of the distinction between causation and fundamental law (e.g. Ross and Ladyman 2010; Leuridan 2012), the distinction is standardly accepted by congressman of theories of mechanistic explanation. As this is the theoretical context of our paper, we shall subsequently assume that constitution is a distinctly non - causal shape of dependence. The second presumption likewise belongs to the canyon of mechanistic theorizing; it states that the relation between a mechanism's upper and lower level is to be analyze in terms of non - reductive supervenience (Glennan 1996, 61 - 62; Eronen 2011, ch. 11). More specifically, proportional to a given a mechanistic organization of the constituents, phenomena supervene on their constituent, meaning that every variety in a phenomenon is necessarily accompanied by a change in its constituent (Craver 2007, 153). Moreover, phenomena are not reducible - in particular, not identical - to their constituents. Phenomena and their constituents are type of behavior exhibited by specific entity on macro and micro levels, respectively. To represent such behaviors, we adopt the following notational conventions.
 to constitution that any vlable method of einstitntional discovefy has to take into account (§5). Ib parupcular, to establish cunstitutine dependwncits, it does not suhrice to wiggls the nacro level of a mechanivtic system suwh tkat the micro level changes and vice versa-ax dtipulated by IM. Rseher, an extended series of experiments is neeved that explorr the whole space of possihle aays of breaking tje coupling of iqcro and micfo levels. Only if all kf these tests are unsuccessful, an iuference to cinshhtution is xarranned. Moreover, lm lighd of itx inherent emplrican ubderdeAn Abductive Thxory of Constitution 3 terminadikn, such an inferebcw is oltimdtelh gruunsev ih praglatmc considerztions concwrning explanatory kowqg, and is not rorced u[on the modeler by the evidence. 2 Inadeqlacy of MM Before reviewing Craver's MM, we must rgnder tranfparent two crucial background assumptions of our argujdnt akd ivrrlduce our notation. According to the first asstjpuiok, which is compejlingly subxtwnyyated by Cravgr and Yscgtel (2007), constitution must bg sharply distigguixhed from causation. Causatiin holds amoug nereologically indzpendent entnties xuch yhat causes temporally 'receds their efffcts, and jg is a unidirectkonsl form of dependence in the sense thet efyects deoend on thqir causes but kmt vice versa. By clntradt, constitutlon holds among wholes and theic parts,1 that os, ammng spatnotempprally overla[ping entities, and it is bkdirectionzl in tie sense thae parts depeng on the wholxs and vise vwrsa. Althouef some authors are skepnieal of thw distinction betwcen cxhsation and conwtiuurion (e.g. Ross amd Uadrmwn 2010; Jauridan 2012), the disginzyion ks standardoh acvepted by representadivea of theories of mrcmanistic gxplanatijn. As this is the theoretical clntexv of onr paprr, re shall subsequently assume tgat constltubion is a diseincbly gon-causal yorm of dependence. The second assumption likewise belongs ro the canon of meckakistic theormzing; yt states that the relation bwtween a mechanisk's upper and lower lebel is to bf analyzed in terms of non-reductive supervenience (Glennan 1996, 61-62; Eronen 2011, ch. 11). Mire spxcyfically, rematife to a yiven a meciaiistic organizatipn of the constituents, phenomene supervena jn their constituents, meaninb ghat every chxnge in a phenomenon is hecessaroly accompanied by a change in ots constituents (Craver 2007, 153). Moreovwr, phsnomena arx not reducible-in patticulcr, not identixal-tl their constkturnbs. Phenomeja aid cheir constituents are types of bwhavioe fxhibited by sperific entitics on mzcro agd micro levels, despsftiveuy. To represemt such behaviprs, we adopt the folnoring notationao conventions.
to constitution that any viable method of has take into (§5). In particular, does suffice to wiggle macro level of mechanistic system such that the micro changes and vice versa-as stipulated by MM. Rather, an extended series of experiments needed that explore the whole space of possible ways of breaking the coupling macro micro Only all of these tests are unsuccessful, an inference to constitution is warranted. Moreover, in light of inherent empirical underdeAn Abductive Theory of Constitution 3 such an inference is grounded in pragmatic considerations concerning power, is not upon modeler the evidence. 2 of MM Before reviewing Craver's MM, we must render transparent two crucial background assumptions of our argument introduce our to the assumption, is substantiated by Craver (2007), constitution must be sharply distinguished holds among mereologically independent entities such that causes precede their and it is a unidirectional form dependence in the sense that effects depend on causes but not vice versa. By contrast, constitution holds among wholes and their parts,1 that spatiotemporally overlapping entities, and is bidirectional in sense parts on wholes and versa. Although some authors are skeptical of the distinction between causation constitution (e.g. Ross and Ladyman 2010; Leuridan 2012), the distinction accepted representatives of theories mechanistic explanation. As this the context of our paper, subsequently that distinctly form dependence. The second assumption belongs to the canon of theorizing; it states that upper and lower level is to be analyzed terms of non-reductive supervenience (Glennan 1996, 61-62; 2011, ch. 11). More specifically, relative to a given a mechanistic organization the constituents, on their constituents, meaning that every change in phenomenon is necessarily accompanied a change in its constituents (Craver 2007, 153). Moreover, are reducible-in particular, identical-to their constituents. and their constituents types of behavior specific entities macro micro represent such behaviors, we adopt the notational
 to constitution that any viabLe method of ConstItuTioNaL disCoveRy has to take intO AccoUnt (§5). In particular, to estabLish cOnSTituTIvE depeNdencieS, It DOEs nOt SuFfiCe TO wIggle The Macro leVel of a mechAniStIc system such THaT the micro lEveL changes and vIce Versa-aS sTipULated By Mm. RathEr, an exTEnded sEries of exPeRIments IS needed THAt ExplOre the whole space oF PoSSible ways of breAking tHe COuPLIng Of mAcro and micRo LevelS. only if aLL oF THEse TEsts are unsuccEssful, an infERenCe to coNsTitUTion is WarraNtED. MoReover, in ligHt of Its inhereNt empiRIcal undERdeAn AbDuctivE ThEorY of CONsTiTutIoN 3 TerMInAtiON, suCh an infeReNcE is ulTimaTELY GrouNdeD in pRagmaTic consideratIonS conCErnIng exPlanaTory PoWer, anD is not ForceD uPon the modeler by The eVidence. 2 InAdeQuAcy Of mM BefORe reviEwiNg CRaver's Mm, we must REndEr TRANsParent two crucial baCkGROuNd assumpTions oF OuR aRGument anD iNtrOducE OUr notAtioN. acCording tO the fiRSt AsSumptioN, wHich is CoMpeLliNgly sUBstaNtiateD by CraveR and BEChtel (2007), constitutIOn must be sharpLY dISTiNGuisHed From causatiOn. CaUSatiOn hoLDs AmoNG mereOlogiCaLLy INdependent entities sUcH that cAuses Temporally preCede their eFFECts, and it Is a uNIdIRectional form oF depeNdence in thE Sense thaT effeCts depenD on their cAUSes but noT viCe vErsA. By CONtRast, constitutION holDs Among whOleS and theIr pArtS,1 thAt iS, aMong spatiOtemporaLlY oVeRlAppIng enTIties, and It Is bIdIreCtionAL in the Sense That PaRtS DepEnd on thE WhOLEs anD vIcE verSa. ALtHough Some AUthOrs are sKeptical oF thE DistInCtIon betwEen causation aNd ConstitutiOn (E.g. ROss and lADyman 2010; LeuRidan 2012), the distinction is stANdardly AccEpted By rePresentatIveS of theOriES of mecHanistIc expLaNatION. As thIS Is The ThEoretical cONTexT of ouR pAper, We shall Subsequently assume THat Constitution iS a dIstiNCTlY noN-CaUSal FoRM of DEPendence. The secoNd assumptiOn LIkEwise belonGS to ThE canon oF mechanIstic THeoriziNg; it stateS that the rElAtioN BEtwEen a mechanIsm's uppeR and lower LEvel iS To Be anaLyzEd in teRmS of Non-reDuctivE SupErvenIence (GLeNnan 1996, 61-62; ErOnen 2011, cH. 11). MOre speciFically, relative to a given A mechaNistiC orGanizatioN of THe cOnstituenTs, phEnomena supErvEne On theIr cONstitUentS, MeAniNG that EverY Change in a PHeNomENOn Is necessariLY ACcoMpaniEd bY A changE in iTs constituents (CraVEr 2007, 153). Moreover, phenOmenA ARe nOt rEDuciBlE-in particular, nOt iDeNTIcal-to thEiR constituenTs. PhenomEnA And thEir conStitueNts are tYPEs OF behavIor eXhiBited by spEciFiC EntitieS oN mACro and MicrO lEvels, rEspectIVely. tO Represent such behAviorS, WE adopT The FolloWiNg notatIOnal ConventionS.
 to constitution that anyviable met hod o f c ons ti tuti onal  discovery has to t ake into account (§5).  In p ar t icul a r,  to e stablis h  c o n sti tu ti vede p en denci es,  it doe s not suff ice  t o wiggle the ma cro levelofa mechanisti c s ystemsu cht hat t hemicro  level change s and vic ev ersa-a s  stipul a t ed  byMM. Rather, an ex t en d ed series of e xperim en t si s  ne ede d that exp lo re th e  wholes pa c e ofp ossible waysof breaking the  coupl in g o f  macro  andmi c rolevels. Onl y if  all of t hese t e sts are unsucce ssful,  an  in fere n ce  t o c on s tit u ti oni s w arranted .Mo reove r, i n l i ghtofitsinher ent empirical  un derd e AnAbduc tiveTheo ry  of C onstit ution  3  termination, s uchan infere nce  i s u lt imate l y grou nde d i n pragm atic co n sid er a t i on s concerning expla na t o ry  power,and is no tf orced up on  th e mo d e ler b y th e  e vidence.  2 Ina d eq ua cy of M MBefore  r evi ewi ng Cr a ver' s MM,we mustrende r  transparent t w o crucial bac k gr o u nd assu mpt ions of our  arg u ment  and in tro d uce o ur no ta t io n . According to thefi rst as sumpt ion, which is  compellin g l y  substan tiat e db y Craver and B echte l (2007),c onstitut ion m ust be s harply di s t inguishe d f rom  ca usa t i on . Causation h o l ds a mo ng mere olo gically  in dep end ent  e ntities s uch that  c au se stem poral l y preced ethe ir  ef fects ,  and i t isa un id ir e cti onal fo r mo f  dep en de nceinth e sen se t h ateffects  depend o n t h eirca us es butnot vice vers a.  By contra st , c onstit u t ion hold s among wholes and thei r  parts, 1 t hat i s, a mong spat iot empora lly overla ppingentit ie s,a n d iti s  b idi re ctional in t hesense  t hatparts d epend on the whole s  an d vice versa.  Al thou g h  s ome au t hor sa res k eptical of thedistinctio nb et ween causa t ion  a nd cons titutio n (e. g . Rossand Ladym an 2010;Le urid a n  20 12), the d istincti on is sta n dardl y  a ccept edby rep re sen tativ es oft heo riesof mec ha nistic  expl an ation. A s this is the theoretic al con textofour paper , w e  sh all subse quen tly assume  th atconst itu t ion i s ad is tin c tly n on-c a usal form of  de p e nd ence. The s e c o ndassum pti o n like wise  belongs to the c a non of mechani stic t heo riz i ng;it  states that t here l a tion bet we en a mechan ism's up pe r  andlowerlevelis to b e an a lyzedin t erm s of non- red uc t ive sup er ve n ience(Gle nn an 199 6, 61- 6 2; E r o nen 2011, ch. 11 ). Mo r e  spec i fic ally,  r elative to a  given a m echanisticorgani zati on of  the co ns tituen ts,  p henomena s u pervene o n the ir cons ti tuen ts,  meani ng t h a t eve ry c ha nge  in a phe n o me n on  i s  ne cess arily  a ccom panied by a change  in its con st itu e n ts (Cr a ve r 2007, 153) . M oreov e r , phenomen a  are no t  redu cible- in par ticular ,  no tidentic al- t o  their co nstituent s . P he nome na and t he ir c on sti tu ents are typesof behav ior exhi b i ted by  sp e cifi c  entit ie s on macro a nd mi cr o  levels , res pective l y.Torep rese ntsuch behaviors, we adopt thefoll owing not ation al co nv entions. 
 to_constitution that_any viable method of_constitutional discovery_has_to take_into_account (§5). In_particular, to establish_constitutive dependencies, it does_not suffice to_wiggle_the macro level of a mechanistic system such that the micro level changes and_vice_versa-as stipulated_by_MM._Rather, an extended series of_experiments is needed that explore_the whole_space of possible ways of breaking the coupling_of_macro and micro_levels. Only if all of these tests are unsuccessful,_an inference to constitution is warranted._Moreover, in light_of_its_inherent empirical underdeAn Abductive_Theory of Constitution 3 termination, such_an inference is ultimately grounded in_pragmatic considerations concerning explanatory power, and is_not forced upon the modeler by_the evidence. 2 Inadequacy of_MM Before_reviewing Craver's MM, we must_render transparent two_crucial background_assumptions of our_argument and introduce our notation. According_to the first_assumption, which is compellingly substantiated by_Craver_and Bechtel (2007),_constitution_must_be sharply_distinguished from causation._Causation_holds among_mereologically_independent entities such that causes temporally_precede_their effects, and it is a unidirectional_form of dependence in_the_sense that effects depend_on their causes but not_vice versa. By contrast, constitution holds_among wholes_and their_parts,1 that is, among spatiotemporally overlapping entities, and it is bidirectional_in the sense that parts depend_on the wholes and_vice versa._Although_some authors are_skeptical_of the_distinction between causation and constitution (e.g. Ross_and Ladyman_2010; Leuridan 2012), the distinction is_standardly accepted by representatives_of_theories of mechanistic explanation. As this_is the theoretical context of our_paper, we shall subsequently assume_that_constitution_is a distinctly non-causal form_of dependence. The second assumption likewise_belongs to the_canon of mechanistic theorizing; it states that_the_relation between a mechanism's upper and_lower_level is to be analyzed in_terms_of_non-reductive supervenience (Glennan 1996, 61-62;_Eronen 2011, ch. 11). More specifically,_relative to a given a mechanistic organization of the_constituents, phenomena supervene_on their constituents, meaning that_every_change_in a phenomenon is necessarily accompanied by a change in_its constituents_(Craver 2007, 153)._Moreover, phenomena are not reducible-in particular, not identical-to their constituents._Phenomena and their constituents are types of_behavior exhibited by specific entities on macro and micro levels, respectively._To represent such behaviors, we adopt the following_notational conventions.