 We have no choice but to rely on all sorts of beliefs, skills, and abilities we do have when we engage in any intellectual pursuit. Reflection on our finitary predicament, then, makes it plausible to suppose that one is epistemically responsible in holding a belief unless there are concrete reasons for suspicion. (Recall Peirce's methodological remark quoted in the third epigraph.)37 And this allows that one may be responsible in believing some proposition even if one no longer has, or indeed, has never had, positive evidence of a sort that would serve as justifying reasons for the proposition in question. The idea that one may be epistemically responsible in holding certain beliefs without needing justification is central to what I have been calling structural contextualism. Let us consider that thesis in more detail. More on Structural Contextualism Having partially sketched a notion of epistemic responsibility that is the basis for the sort of epistemic evaluation I am interested in describing, I want to return to structural contextualism for purposes of clarifying that thesis. Recall that according to structural contextualism, certain beliefs, at least in certain contexts, do not need justification although they may provide one with justifying reasons for holding other beliefs. Let us take a closer look at the claim that certain beliefs, at least in certain contexts, may not need justification. As I am understanding the basic structural contextualist thesis, it is comprised of three basic tenets: (1) One may be epistemically responsible in holding certain beliefs at some time t even though one has no justifying evidence or justifying reasons for holding those beliefs at t. (2) Such beliefs may serve as an epistemic basis for being justified in holding other beliefs. (3) Which beliefs need justification depends crucially on certain facts about one's social circumstances-one's social context. Let us take these one by one. 1. The thesis that it is possible for someone to be epistemically responsible in holding a belief without justification is one way to express what has come to be called epistemic conservatism. The epistemic conservative claims that mere doxastic commitment may be enough to create some degree of epistemic respectability for certain beliefs. There are two basic versions of this conservative doctrine.3' According to first-order conservatism, epistemic respectability may accrue to a belief as a result of simply holding that belief or, more plausibly, as a result of holding that belief so long as it does not conflict with other beliefs one has. According to second-order conservatism,
We have no choice but to rely on all sorts of belief, skill, and abilities we do have when we engage in any cerebral pursuit. Reflection on our finitary predicament, then, makes it plausible to think that one is epistemically responsible in holding a impression unless there be concrete reasons for misgiving. (Recall Peirce's methodological remark quoted in the third epigraph.)37 And this allows that one may be creditworthy in believing some proposition even if one no longer has, or indeed, has never had, positive evidence of a sort that would serve as justify reasons for the proposition in question. The theme that one may be epistemically responsible in holding certain belief without needing justification is central to what I have been calling structural contextualism. Let us study that thesis in more detail. More on Structural Contextualism Having partially sketched a notion of epistemic responsibility that is the footing for the kind of epistemic evaluation I am concerned in describing, I want to return to structural contextualism for purposes of clarifying that thesis. echo that harmonize to structural contextualism, certain impression, at least in sealed context, do not need justification although they may provide one with justify reason for holding other belief. Let us take a closer look at the claim that certain beliefs, at least in certain contexts, may not need justification. As I am understanding the basic geomorphologic contextualist thesis, it is consist of three basic tenets: (1) One may be epistemically responsible in holding certain beliefs at some meter t even though one has no justifying evidence or justifying reasons for hold those beliefs at t. (2) Such beliefs may serve as an epistemic footing for being justified in holding other beliefs. (3) Which beliefs necessitate justification depends crucially on sealed facts about one's social circumstances - one's social context. Let us take these one by one. 1. The dissertation that it is possible for someone to be epistemically responsible in holding a impression without justification is one way to express what has come to be called epistemic conservatism. The epistemic conservative claims that mere doxastic commitment may be enough to create some degree of epistemic respectability for certain belief. There are two basic versions of this cautious doctrine.3' According to first - order conservatism, epistemic respectability may accrue to a belief as a result of simply hold that belief or, more plausibly, as a result of holding that belief thus long as it does not conflict with early beliefs one has. According to second - order conservatism,
 We have no choice but to rtly on all sorts of belixfs, skimls, and xbilities we do have when we ebgage in any intellectual pjrsuit. Revlection on iyr finitarb predicament, fmen, mckxs it plausible to supposa that one is apkscemically responsible in holding a bqlief umlfss there are soncgeee rsasons for suspicion. (Recall Peirce'a methovological remarl quoted in the third epiggaph.)37 And this allows tjat one may be wwsponsible iv believing some propoaition even if one no longer har, or nndeed, has becer vad, positivx evidvnce of a sorb that fould srrve as justifning ceasins for the propositimn in question. The idea thad kne may be epistenixally res[onskvle in hplsing cfrtein beliefs without newding justification if central to wgat I rade been calling structural contextualisk. Lst us consider that thewis in more detail. Mote on Strustural Contextualism Having partially sketched a totioi uf tplfgwmlc responsibility that is the basis for the sjdt on epistemic evalmation I am interextfd yn describing, I wanc tk return to structkral cogtextyalism fow putposes of clarifying that tyesis. Recall rhat according to dtructural eontexjualisk, certain beliefs, at lecst in certain cojtexts, do vot need justifizatpon dlthough they may provide jne with oustiyying rexsonx for rolding otjer bcniefs. Let us take w clodes look at hhe claim that certain beliefs, ev least in cettahn bontexts, iay npt need justisication. As I cm underftandkng the baaic strnctural contqxtualist thevls, it is com'rised of thrwe bqsic tevdts: (1) One may br epistempcclly respinsible in holding cettzin beliefs at womt rime t even thpugf oge hes no bustifying eeidevce pr jurtifying recsuns gor holding those beniefa at t. (2) Such beliegs may serce as an epistemic baxis for being justlfied in holdong other beliefs. (3) Which beliefs heed justlfigation dependf crmciajly on cercain facts about one's social circumstancxs-one's social context. Lwt us take these ong bn one. 1. The tiesis ehat it iv possible for someobe to be epistemigally responsible in hklding a bepief without justification is one way to express what has come to be callwd epistemic consedvatosm. Tve zpistemyc cliservative claims that mere doxastic commitment oay be etobgh to create some degree of rpkstemic respeztability for certain bemiefs. Thrre are two basic versions of tnis conservative doctrinc.3' Accordibg to first-ordec conservatism, epistrmic rzspectqbility may accrue to a celoen as a resklt pf simply holding that belief or, mire plqudibly, as a resulv of holding uhat bemief sj long as it doea nof confuict with othrr beliefs one has. According to sebonq-order conservqnism,
We have no choice but to rely sorts beliefs, skills, abilities we do any pursuit. Reflection on finitary predicament, then, it plausible to suppose that one epistemically responsible in holding a belief unless there are concrete reasons for suspicion. Peirce's methodological remark quoted in the third epigraph.)37 And this allows that one be in some even if one no longer has, or indeed, has never had, positive evidence of a sort would serve as justifying reasons for the proposition question. The idea that may be epistemically responsible in certain without needing is to I have been structural contextualism. Let us consider that thesis in more detail. More on Structural Contextualism Having partially sketched notion of that is basis the of epistemic evaluation interested in describing, I want to contextualism for purposes of clarifying that thesis. Recall according to contextualism, certain beliefs, at least in contexts, do not need justification although they may one with justifying reasons for holding other beliefs. Let us take a closer look at that certain beliefs, at in certain contexts, not justification. I understanding the structural contextualist thesis, it is comprised of three basic tenets: (1) may be epistemically responsible in holding certain beliefs at some even one has no evidence or justifying reasons holding beliefs at t. (2) may as for justified holding other beliefs. (3) beliefs need justification depends crucially certain facts about one's us take these one by one. 1. The that it is possible for someone to epistemically responsible in holding a belief without justification is one way to what has be called epistemic conservatism. The epistemic conservative claims mere doxastic commitment may enough to create some degree of epistemic respectability for beliefs. are two versions of this doctrine.3' According to conservatism, epistemic respectability to a as result that belief or, more plausibly, as result holding that belief so long it conflict with other beliefs one has. According to second-order conservatism,
 We have no choice but to rely on All sorts of BelieFs, sKilLs, And aBiliTies we do have whEN we eNgage in any intellectual PursuIt. rEfleCTiOn on oUr finitARy PREdiCaMeNt, tHeN, MaKes it PlaUsible tO suppose thAt oNe Is epistemicaLLy ResponsiblE in Holding a beliEf uNless tHeRe aRE concRetE reasOns for SUspiciOn. (Recall PEiRCe's metHOdologiCAL rEmarK quoted in the third EPiGRaph.)37 And this allOws thaT oNE mAY Be rEspOnsible in bElIevinG Some proPOsITIOn eVEn if one no longEr has, or indeED, haS never HaD, poSItive eVidenCe OF a sOrt that woulD serVe as justiFying rEAsons foR The propOsitioN in QueStioN. thE iDea ThAT onE MaY be EPisTemicallY rEsPonsiBle iN HOLDing CerTain BelieFs without needIng JustIFicAtion Is cenTral To What I Have beEn calLiNg structural conTextUalism. Let Us cOnSidEr That tHEsis in MorE deTail. MorE on StruCTurAl cONTeXtualism Having partIaLLY sKetched a Notion OF ePiSTemic resPoNsiBiliTY That iS the BAsIs for the Sort of EPiStEmic evaLuAtion I Am IntEreSted iN DescRibing, i want to rEturn TO structural conTExtualism for pURpOSEs OF claRifYing that theSis. RECall That ACcOrdINg to sTructUrAL cONtextualism, certain bElIefs, at Least In certain contExts, do not nEED JustificAtioN AlTHough they may prOvide One with jusTIfying reAsons For holdiNg other beLIEfs. Let us TakE a cLosEr lOOK aT the claim that CERtaiN bEliefs, aT leAst in ceRtaIn cOntExtS, mAy not need JustificAtIoN. AS I Am uNdersTAnding thE bAsiC sTruCturaL ContexTualiSt thEsIs, IT is ComprisED oF THree BaSiC tenEts: (1) onE may bE epiSTemIcally rEsponsiblE in HOldiNg CeRtain beLiefs at some tiMe T even thougH oNe hAs no juSTIfying evIdence or justifying reasoNS for holDinG thosE belIefs at t. (2) SuCh bEliefs May SErve as An episTemic BaSis FOR beinG JUsTifIeD in holding OTHer BelieFs. (3) whicH beliefS need justification DEpeNds crucially oN ceRtaiN FAcTs aBOuT One'S sOCiaL CIrcumstances-one'S social conTeXT. LEt us take thESe oNe By one. 1. ThE thesis That iT Is possiBle for somEone to be ePiStemICAllY responsibLe in holdIng a belieF WithoUT jUstifIcaTion is OnE waY to exPress wHAt hAs comE to be cAlLed epiStemiC cOnservatIsm. The epistemic conservaTive clAims tHat Mere doxasTic COmmItment may Be enOugh to creaTe sOme DegreE of EPisteMic rESpEctABilitY for CErtain belIEfS. ThERE aRe two basic vERSIonS of thIs cONservaTive Doctrine.3' According TO first-order conServATIsm, EpiSTemiC rEspectability mAy aCcRUE to a beliEf As a result of Simply hoLdINg thaT belieF or, morE plausiBLY, aS A resulT of hOldIng that beLieF sO Long as iT dOeS Not conFlicT wIth othEr beliEFs onE HAs. According to secOnd-orDER consERvaTism,
 We have no choice but torely on al l sor tsofbe lief s, s kills, and abi l itie s we do have when we e ngage  i n  any in telle ctual p u rs u i t.Re fl ect io n  o n our  fi nitarypredicamen t,th en, makes it pl ausible to  su ppose that o neis epi st emi c allyres ponsi ble in holdin g a belie fu nlesst here ar e co ncre te reasons for su s pi c ion. (Recall P eirce' sm et h o dol ogi cal remark  q uoted in thet hi r d epi g raph.)37 Andthis allows tha t onema y b e  respo nsibl ei n b elieving so me p ropositio n even if onen o longe r has,  or  in deed ,  h as  ne ve r  ha d ,pos i tiv e eviden ce  o f a s ortt h a t  wou ldserv e asjustifying re aso ns f o r t he pr oposi tion  i n que stion.  Theid ea that one may  beepistemic all yres po nsibl e  in ho ldi ngcertain  belief s  wi th o u t  n eeding justificati on i scentralto wha t  I  h a ve beenca lli ng s t r uctur al c o nt extualis m. Let us  c onsider  t hat th es isinmored etai l. Mor e on Str uctur a l Contextualis m  Having parti a ll y sk e tche d a  notion ofepis t emic  res p on sib i litythatis th e  basis for the sort  o f epis temic  evaluation I  am intere s t e d in des crib i ng ,  I want to ret urn t o structur a l contex tuali sm for p urposes o f clarifyi ngtha t t hes i s .Recall that a c c ordi ng  to str uct ural co nte xtu ali sm,  c ertain be liefs, a tle as tincerta i n contex ts , d onot  need justif icati on a lt ho u ghthey ma y  p r o vide  o ne  wit h j us tifyi ng r e aso ns forholding o the r  bel ie fs . Let u s take a clos er  look at t he  cl aim th a t  certain  beliefs, at least in c e rtain c ont exts,  may  not need  ju stific ati o n. AsI am u nders ta ndi n g  theb a si c s tr uctural co n t ext ualis tthes is, itis comprised of th r eebasic tenets:  (1 ) On e ma y b e  e p ist em i cal l y  responsible in  holding c er t ai n beliefsa t s om e timet eventhoug h  one ha s no just ifying ev id ence o r j ustifyingreasonsfor holdi n g tho s ebelie fsat t.(2 ) S uch b eliefs may  serv e as a nepiste mic b as is for b eing justified in holdi ng oth er be lie fs. (3) W hic h  be liefs nee d ju stificatio n d epe nds c ruc i allyon c e rt ain facts  abo u t one's s o ci alc i rc umstances-o n e ' s s ocial  co n text.Letus take these one by one. 1. The  the s i s t hat it i spossible for s ome on e to be ep is temically r esponsib le in ho ldinga beli ef with o u tj ustifi cati onis one wa y t oe xpresswh at has co me t obe cal led ep i stem i c  conservatism. T he ep i s temic con serva ti ve clai m s th at mere do xastic comm itment  may  be e nough t ocreate  so me  degree of epistemic  resp ectabil it y fo r c ertain  bel i e fs. T here  a retwo basic v er s io ns ofthis  cons er vati ve doctri n e.3' Acc ord i ng to f ir st- o r der co n se r v atism, epi ste mic r e s pectabilit y  may ac c rue t o a be lief a s a res u ltof  simply  ho l d ing thatbelief or ,  mo re  pla usibly,as  a r es ult  o f holding thatbelief s o long a s it doe s n o t co n flictwi th other bel iefson e  has. A c c ord ing tos eco nd- ord er c ons erva t ism,
 We_have no_choice but to rely_on all_sorts_of beliefs,_skills,_and abilities we_do have when_we engage in any_intellectual pursuit. Reflection_on_our finitary predicament, then, makes it plausible to suppose that one is epistemically responsible_in_holding a_belief_unless_there are concrete reasons for_suspicion. (Recall Peirce's methodological remark_quoted in_the third epigraph.)37 And this allows that one_may_be responsible in_believing some proposition even if one no longer has,_or indeed, has never had, positive_evidence of a_sort_that_would serve as justifying_reasons for the proposition in question._The idea that one may be_epistemically responsible in holding certain beliefs without_needing justification is central to what_I have been calling structural_contextualism. Let_us consider that thesis in_more detail. More_on Structural_Contextualism Having partially_sketched a notion of epistemic responsibility_that is the_basis for the sort of epistemic_evaluation_I am interested_in_describing,_I want_to return to_structural_contextualism for_purposes_of clarifying that thesis. Recall that_according_to structural contextualism, certain beliefs, at least_in certain contexts, do_not_need justification although they_may provide one with justifying_reasons for holding other beliefs. Let_us take_a closer_look at the claim that certain beliefs, at least in certain_contexts, may not need justification. As_I am understanding the_basic structural_contextualist_thesis, it is_comprised_of three_basic tenets: (1) One may be epistemically_responsible in_holding certain beliefs at some time_t even though one_has_no justifying evidence or justifying reasons_for holding those beliefs at t._(2) Such beliefs may serve_as_an_epistemic basis for being justified_in holding other beliefs. (3) Which_beliefs need justification_depends crucially on certain facts about one's_social_circumstances-one's social context. Let us take_these_one by one. 1. The thesis_that_it_is possible for someone to_be epistemically responsible in holding a_belief without justification is one way to express what_has come to_be called epistemic conservatism. The_epistemic_conservative_claims that mere doxastic commitment may be enough to create_some degree_of epistemic respectability_for certain beliefs. There are two basic versions of this_conservative doctrine.3' According to first-order conservatism, epistemic_respectability may accrue to a belief as a result of simply_holding that belief or, more plausibly, as a_result of holding that belief so long_as it does not_conflict_with other beliefs one has. According to_second-order_conservatism,