are	grounded	in	God's	commands	(Adams	1999;	Quinn 2006).	The	essence	of	the	DCT	is	thus	that	without	a	divine	command	there would	be	no	moral	obligation.	Adams	(1999)	is	most	explicit	about	this commitment,	holding	that	a	divine	command	is	essential	because	without	it	there would	be	no	discernible	difference	between	a	supererogatory	act	(one	that	is 2 Though whether we should trust those intuitions is a separate question. See Joyce 2002 for an analysis and critique of the Euthyphro dilemma. 4 above	and	beyond	the	call	of	moral	duty)	and	an	obligatory	one.	I	will	return	to this	feature	of	Adams's	theory	below,	but	even	if	some	DCTists	reject	this particular	claim	concerning	the	necessity	of	the	divine	command	for distinguishing	between	supererogations	and	obligations,	I	believe	they	will accept	the	dependency-relationship	between	obligations	and	divine	commands. It	is	this	dependency-relationship	that	gives	rise	to	the	epistemological objection.	Put	most	simply,	this	objection	holds	that	certain	classes	of	moral agent	(specifically,	reasonable	non-believers)	lack	epistemic	access	to	God's commands.	In	other	words,	they	do	not	know	or	cannot	reasonably	be	expected to	know,	what	God	has	commanded.	The	result	is	that,	if	the	DCT	is	true,	then	for this	class	of	moral	agents,	moral	obligations	no	longer	exist.	It	is,	however,	wrong to	suppose	that	reasonable	non-believers	have	no	moral	obligations. Consequently,	something
are 	 grounded 	 in 	 God's 	 commands 	 (Adams 	 1999; 	 Quinn 2006). 	 The 	 essence 	 of 	 the 	 DCT 	 is 	 thus 	 that 	 without 	 a 	 providential 	 instruction 	 there would 	 be 	 no 	 moral 	 debt instrument. 	 Adams 	 (1999) 	 is 	 most 	 denotative 	 about 	 this commitment, 	 defy 	 that 	 a 	 divine 	 command 	 is 	 all-important 	 because 	 without 	 it 	 there would 	 be 	 no 	 discernible 	 difference 	 between 	 a 	 supererogatory 	 act 	 (one 	 that 	 is 2 Though whether we should believe those intuitions is a separate motion. See Joyce 2002 for an analysis and criticism of the Euthyphro dilemma. 4 above 	 and 	 beyond 	 the 	 margin call 	 of 	 moral 	 duty) 	 and 	 an 	 obligatory 	 one. 	 I 	 will 	 return 	 to this 	 feature 	 of 	 Adams's 	 theory 	 below, 	 but 	 even 	 if 	 some 	 DCTists 	 reject 	 this especial 	 claim 	 concerning 	 the 	 necessity 	 of 	 the 	 divine 	 instruction 	 for distinguishing 	 between 	 supererogations 	 and 	 obligation, 	 I 	 believe 	 they 	 will bear 	 the 	 dependency - relationship 	 between 	 obligations 	 and 	 divine 	 commands. It 	 is 	 this 	 colony - relationship 	 that 	 gives 	 rise 	 to 	 the 	 epistemological objection. 	 Put 	 most 	 simply, 	 this 	 objection 	 holds 	 that 	 certain 	 classes 	 of 	 moral agent 	 (specifically, 	 reasonable 	 non - believers) 	 lack 	 epistemic 	 access 	 to 	 God's commands. 	 In 	 early 	 parole, 	 they 	 do 	 not 	 know 	 or 	 cannot 	 sanely 	 be 	 expect to 	 sleep together, 	 what 	 God 	 has 	 commanded. 	 The 	 result 	 is 	 that, 	 if 	 the 	 DCT 	 is 	 genuine, 	 then 	 for this 	 class 	 of 	 moral 	 agents, 	 moral 	 obligations 	 no 	 longer 	 exist. 	 It 	 is, 	 however, 	 faulty to 	 suppose 	 that 	 reasonable 	 non - believers 	 have 	 no 	 moral 	 obligation. Consequently, 	 something
are	hrounded	in	God's	commands	(Adxms	1999;	Quinn 2006).	The	essgnxe	of	thx	DCT	is	tgus	that	wkthout	a	divine	command	there wonld	bw	no	moeal	obligation.	Adams	(1999)	is	mort	explicin	about	thiw connitment,	holvjng	that	a	divins	gommaud	ms	essential	becaose	without	it	dhere would	be	nm	dkseernible	difference	between	a	supererogaeory	act	(pnf	that	is 2 Thougr whtthqr ws should trust those intuitions is a sepagate question. See Joyce 2002 for an analysis anf crltique of the Euthjphro dilemna. 4 wvove	and	beyona	the	call	of	moral	duty)	and	zn	obligatory	one.	I	will	return	to thks	feacure	of	Adams'w	tyeogi	below,	but	evei	if	somv	DCTists	rejecb	nhis pasticulat	claim	concernikg	the	iecewsity	of	the	divine	commaid	for distinguishing	fetween	su[exerogations	and	obligatuobs,	I	benieva	theh	qilu adcxpt	fhe	depfndxncy-relatiohship	betweeb	obligations	and	divime	simmands. It	is	tgis	depqnqency-relationship	that	gives	rise	to	the	episuemolkgical objection.	Put	most	wimply,	this	objection	hopds	that	cewtain	classes	of	moral agent	(specifically,	reasonable	not-belixvdrs)	oagk	epkwtfmic	access	to	God's commands.	In	other	words,	they	do	noe	inpw	pr	cannot	reasoncbly	be	expected tp	kjoe,	rhat	God	has	comoanded.	Cge	desult	is	that,	if	the	DFT	is	trug,	then	fir this	clwss	og	moral	agents,	moral	obligationw	no	longer	exifr.	It	is,	however,	wrong co	suppose	thac	reasomable	mon-believers	have	no	moral	ublifations. Condequently,	aumething
are grounded in God's commands (Adams 1999; The of the is thus that would no moral obligation. (1999) is most about this commitment, holding that a command is essential because without it there would be no discernible difference between supererogatory act (one that is 2 Though whether we should trust those intuitions a question. Joyce for an analysis and critique of the Euthyphro dilemma. 4 above and beyond the call of duty) and an obligatory one. I will return this feature of Adams's below, but even if some reject particular claim the of divine command for between supererogations and obligations, I believe they will accept the dependency-relationship between obligations and divine commands. It this dependency-relationship rise to epistemological Put simply, this objection certain classes of moral agent (specifically, epistemic access to God's commands. In other words, do not or cannot reasonably be expected to what God has commanded. The result is that, the DCT is true, then for this class of moral agents, moral obligations no longer is, however, wrong to that reasonable non-believers no obligations. something
are	grounded	in	God's	commands	(adams	1999;	Quinn 2006).	the	esSenCe	oF	tHe	DCt	is	tHus	that	without	A	DiviNe	command	there would	be	nO	moraL	oBLigaTIoN.	AdamS	(1999)	is	most	EXpLICit	AbOuT	thIs COmMitmeNt,	hOlding	tHat	a	divine	ComMaNd	is	essentiaL	BeCause	withoUt	iT	there would	bE	no	DiscerNiBle	DIfferEncE	betwEen	a	suPErerogAtory	act	(oNe	THat	is 2 THOugh wheTHEr We shOuld trust those intUItIOns is a separate QuestiOn. sEe jOYce 2002 For An analysis AnD critIQue of thE euTHYPhrO Dilemma. 4 above	aNd	beyond	the	CAll	Of	moraL	dUty)	ANd	an	obLigatOrY	One.	i	will	return	To thIs	feature	Of	AdamS'S	theory	BElow,	but	Even	if	SomE	DCtistS	ReJeCt	tHiS ParTIcUlaR	ClaIm	concerNiNg	The	neCessITY	OF	the	DivIne	cOmmanD	for distinguiShiNg	beTWeeN	supeRerogAtioNs	And	obLigatiOns,	I	bElIeve	they	will accEpt	tHe	dependeNcy-ReLatIoNship	BEtween	OblIgaTions	anD	divine	COmmAnDS. iT	iS	this	dependency-relAtIONsHip	that	gIves	riSE	tO	tHE	epistemOlOgiCal oBJEctioN.	Put	MOsT	simply,	tHis	objECtIoN	holds	tHaT	certaIn	ClaSseS	of	moRAl agEnt	(speCificallY,	reasONable	non-believERs)	lack	epistemIC	aCCEsS	To	GoD's cOmmands.	In	otHer	wORds,	tHey	dO	NoT	knOW	or	caNnot	rEaSOnABly	be	expected to	know,	WhAt	God	hAs	comManded.	The	resuLt	is	that,	if	THE	dCT	is	truE,	theN	FoR This	class	of	morAl	ageNts,	moral	obLIgations	No	lonGer	exist.	it	is,	howevER,	Wrong to	sUppOse	ThaT	reASOnAble	non-believERS	havE	nO	moral	oBliGations. conSeqUenTly,	SoMething
are	grounded	in	God's	comm ands	(Adam s	199 9;Qui nn  200 6).The	essence	of theDCT	is	thus	that	witho ut	adi v inec om mandthere w o ul d beno 	m ora lo bl igati on. 	Adams(1999)	ismos texplicit	abo u tthis commi tme nt,	holdingtha t	a	di vi nec omman d	i s	ess ential becaus e	without 	i t 	there would	b e no 	dis cernible	differen c eb etween	a	super erogat or y 	a c t 	(o nethat	is 2Th oughw hetherw es h o uld trust those i ntuitions i s  asepara te  qu e stion.  SeeJo y ce2002 for an  ana lysis and  criti q ue of t h e Euthy phro d ile mma . 4a bo ve 	an db eyo n dthe cal l	of	mor al 	d uty)anda n o blig ato ry	o ne.	I 	will	returntothis fea tureof	Ad ams' stheor y	belo w,	bu teven	if	some	DC Tist s	rejectthi spar ti cular claimcon cer ning	th e	neces s ity 	o f t he 	divine	command	fo rd i st inguishi ng	bet w ee ns upererog at ion s	an d oblig atio n s, 	I	belie ve	the y 	w il l accep tthe	de pe nde ncy -rela t ions hip	be tween	ob ligat i ons	and	divine commands. Iti st h is depe nde ncy-relatio nshi p 	tha t	gi v es 	ri s e	tothe	e pi s te m ological objection. 	P ut	mos t	sim ply,	this	obj ection	hol d s that	cer tain cl a sses	of	moralagent 	(specific a lly,	rea sonab le	non-b elievers) l ack	epis tem icacc ess t oGod's command s . 	Inot her	wor ds, 	they	d o	n otkno w	o rcannot	re asonably 	b eex pe cte d tok now,	wha tGod 	h ascomma n ded.	T he	re sult 	i st hat ,	if	th e 	D C T 	istr ue ,	th enfo r thi s	cl a ssof	mora l	agents, 	mo r al	o bl ig ationsno	longer	exi st .	It	is,	h ow eve r,	wro n g  to	supp ose	that	reasonable	non - believe rshaveno	m oral	obli gat ions.Con s equent ly,	so methi ng 
are	grounded	in	God's	commands	(Adams	1999;	Quinn 2006).	The	essence	of	the	DCT	is	thus	that	without	a	divine	command	there_would	be	no	moral	obligation.	Adams	(1999)	is	most	explicit	about	this commitment,	holding	that	a	divine	command	is	essential	because	without	it	there_would	be	no	discernible	difference	between	a	supererogatory	act	(one	that	is 2 Though whether_we should_trust_those intuitions_is_a separate question._See Joyce 2002_for an analysis and_critique of the_Euthyphro_dilemma. 4 above	and	beyond	the	call	of	moral	duty)	and	an	obligatory	one.	I	will	return	to this	feature	of	Adams's	theory	below,	but	even	if	some	DCTists	reject	this particular	claim	concerning	the	necessity	of	the	divine	command	for distinguishing	between	supererogations	and	obligations,	I	believe	they	will accept	the	dependency-relationship	between	obligations	and	divine	commands. It	is	this	dependency-relationship	that	gives	rise	to	the	epistemological objection.	Put	most	simply,	this	objection	holds	that	certain	classes	of	moral agent	(specifically,	reasonable	non-believers)	lack	epistemic	access	to	God's commands.	In	other	words,	they	do	not	know	or	cannot	reasonably	be	expected to	know,	what	God	has	commanded.	The	result	is	that,	if	the	DCT	is	true,	then	for this	class	of	moral	agents,	moral	obligations	no	longer	exist.	It	is,	however,	wrong to	suppose	that	reasonable	non-believers	have	no	moral	obligations._Consequently,	something