 question. However, for certain purposes we might be interested in evaluating an individual relative to the epistemic standards prevalent in her community, in which case our evaluation involves a sociocentric perspective. Still, in other contexts, we have an interest in questions about justification apart from some subjective or intersubjective perspective and the perspective of an ideally knowledgeable spectator-a way of capturing an objective perspective-is appropriate. The most important lesson to learn from all this talk about perspectives is nicely expressed by Foley: "There is no single perspective that is adequate for understanding the entire range of our judgments of rationality. We make such judgments for a variety of purposes and in a variety of contexts, and the kind of judgment we are inclined to make varies with these purposes and contexts."' Obviously, there is much more to be said about these contextually variable parameters of doxastic justification, and some understanding of how they operate will emerge as we proceed. But having said this much, I can now indicate more clearly the focus of my thinking about moral justification. First, I am interested in the epistemic appraisal of individuals's beliefs-doxastic epistemic appraisal-where the primary goal involved in such appraisal is the having of true beliefs and the avoiding of false ones. Second, I am particularly interested in the sort of epistemic appraisal that is operative in our everyday, common epistemic appraisals of individuals.25 The sort of appraisal I have in mind concerns questions about how one might be epistemically responsible in the beliefs one holds. Now one illuminating way of evaluating the epistemic responsibility of an agent is to invoke the perspective of what we might call an "epistemically responsible agent" on analogy with the idea of the "reasonable person" standard from Anglo-American law.26 The idea is to use this model as a basis for investigating the basic epistemic norms (and general epistemic sensibility) that we normally do and should use in evaluating the epistemic status of moral belief. There are two crucial features that this model must have if it is going to serve in this role. First, if it is to have any sort of normative bite and thus be useful as a measure of a person being epistemically responsible in the beliefs she holds, then it must take on the character of an idealization. The epistemically responsible agent is one whose A Contextualist Moral Epistemology 301 epistemic activities serve as a norm for our epistemic activities: we ought to conform to those norms characteristic of the responsible agent. Second,
question. However, for certain purposes we might be interested in measure an individual relative to the epistemic standard prevalent in her community, in which case our evaluation involve a sociocentric perspective. Still, in early contexts, we have an interest in question about justification apart from some subjective or intersubjective position and the perspective of an ideally knowledgeable spectator - a way of capture an objective perspective - is appropriate. The about important example to memorize from all this talk about perspectives is nicely expressed by Foley: " There exist no single perspective that is adequate for understanding the entire scope of our judgments of rationality. We make such judgments for a variety of purposes and in a variety show of contexts, and the kind of judgment we are inclined to make varies with these purposes and contexts. "' Obviously, there is much more to be said about these contextually variable parameters of doxastic justification, and some understanding of how they operate will emerge as we proceed. But having said this much, I can now indicate more intelligibly the focus of my thinking about moral justification. First, I am concerned in the epistemic appraisal of person's impression - doxastic epistemic appraisal - where the primary goal involve in such appraisal is the having of true beliefs and the avoiding of false ones. Second, I am peculiarly interested in the sort of epistemic appraisal that is operative in our everyday, common epistemic appraisals of individuals.25 The sort of appraisal I have in mind concerns questions about how one might be epistemically responsible in the belief one holds. nowadays one illuminating way of evaluating the epistemic responsibility of an agent is to raise the perspective of what we might call an " epistemically responsible agentive role " on analogy with the estimate of the " reasonable person " standard from Anglo - American law.26 The idea is to practice this model as a basis for investigating the basic epistemic norms (and general epistemic sensitivity) that we normally do and should use in evaluating the epistemic status of moral impression. There are two crucial feature that this model must have if it is function to serve in this function. First, if it is to give birth any sort of normative bite and thus be useful as a bill of a person being epistemically responsible in the beliefs she carry, then it must take on the character of an idealization. The epistemically creditworthy agent is one whose A Contextualist Moral Epistemology 301 epistemic activities serve as a norm for our epistemic activities: we ought to conform to those norms characteristic of the responsible agent. Second,
 qufstion. However, for certaln purposes we mntht be interssted in evaluating an individual reparive uj the epistemic stxndards pgevalent un htr community, in wijch casc our cvaluctmon involves a xociocentrhc perspective. Sgipl, in other contexts, we have an intqrest im euestions abouj jusuifycatjon apart from some subjective or jntersuujective perspevtive and the perspective lf aj ideally knowledgfable spectqtor-w way of captjring an objective perapective-is appropriate. The most impoxtant lessob ro pgarn from alo thif talk about perspecdives ix nicely exprexsev by Foley: "There is no siigle perspective thaj is adequdtz for understanding tye entite ratge ud ojr nuvgmsnts ov retionality. Se make sucy judgments for a vsryvyy of purposss and ig a variety of contexts, and the kind of jusgment we are inclined ro make varies with tjese purpjses and contexts."' Obviously, there is much more to be seia ayiut tfwsf contextually variable parameters of doxastis jisnification, and soie understamdlnb of how they uperatz wjll emerge as we pgoceed. Fut hqving saiq thos much, I can now indicate nore clearly rhe focus of my thnnking about morsl juxtification. First, I am nntereated in the epistemid appraisal of inaivpduans's belitws-doxastic episteiic appramsal-wkere the prikary gjal involvfd in such appraisal is hhe hcving of true bfliefs and the avoiding of falsx ones. Second, I am particujarly interested ig the sort of gpistemic apprxisal that is opecative in ouw everyday, coklon epistemir appraiswls if ibdividuxus.25 The sort of appraisal I have ib mind concerns qucstiova about how one mitht be epistemivaluy wedppnfhble in the telidfs pne hulds. Now onc iulumonating way of evaludtinf the epistemic rexpjnsibilijy of an wgent is to imvoke the perspectlve oh what we moghj call an "epistemically responsjble agenh" ok analogy witr thc idga of the "rzasonable person" standard from Anglo-Amermcan law.26 The idea is to use this model as c nasis for intestigwting the basic epistemic norns (and general eplstemic sensibility) thzt we tormaply do and should use in evaluating the epistemic status of moral belief. Rhere erq two crucizl fraturvs chac this iodep must have if it is going to serve in this role. First, ix nt is to have any sort of norkagive bite and thus be useful as a meaaure of s person being epistemically rexponsible in the beliefs she holes, thsn it must take on the charavter oy an ieealizarion. The epistemizalky responsihle egeut is one whose A Contextualist Miral Epidtemology 301 epistxmic activitler serne as a norm for our epjstejlc acjivities: we oubht to conform to those norms chardceeristic of tht responsible abent. Sebond,
question. However, for certain purposes we might in an individual to the epistemic in case our evaluation a sociocentric perspective. in other contexts, we have an in questions about justification apart from some subjective or intersubjective perspective and the of an ideally knowledgeable spectator-a way of capturing an objective perspective-is appropriate. The important to from this talk about perspectives is nicely expressed by Foley: "There is no single perspective that is for understanding the entire range of our judgments rationality. We make such for a variety of purposes in variety of and kind judgment we are to make varies with these purposes and contexts."' Obviously, there is much more to be said about contextually variable doxastic justification, some of they operate will we proceed. But having said this now indicate more clearly the focus of my about moral First, I am interested in the appraisal of individuals's beliefs-doxastic epistemic appraisal-where the primary involved in such appraisal is the having of true beliefs and the avoiding of false I am particularly interested the sort of appraisal is in everyday, common appraisals of individuals.25 The sort of appraisal I have in mind questions about how one might be epistemically responsible in the holds. one illuminating way evaluating the epistemic responsibility an is to invoke the what might responsible on with the idea of "reasonable person" standard from Anglo-American The idea is to basis for investigating the basic epistemic norms (and epistemic sensibility) that we normally do and use in evaluating the epistemic status of moral belief. There are two features that must have if it is going to serve this role. First, if is to have any sort of normative bite and be as a of a person epistemically responsible in beliefs she holds, must take the of epistemically responsible agent is one whose Contextualist Epistemology 301 epistemic activities serve a our epistemic activities: we ought to conform to those norms characteristic of the responsible agent.
 question. However, for certain Purposes we Might Be iNteReSted In evAluating an indiVIduaL relative to the epistemiC stanDaRDs prEVaLent iN her comMUnITY, in WhIcH caSe OUr EvaluAtiOn involVes a sociocEntRiC perspective. sTiLl, in other cOntExts, we have an IntErest iN qUesTIons aBouT justIficatIOn aparT from some SuBJectivE Or interSUBjEctiVe perspective and tHE pERspective of an iDeally KnOWlEDGeaBle Spectator-a WaY of caPTuring aN ObJECTivE Perspective-is Appropriate. tHe mOst impOrTanT Lesson To leaRn FRom All this talk AbouT perspectIves is NIcely exPRessed bY Foley: "theRe iS no sINgLe PerSpECtiVE tHat IS adEquate foR uNdErstaNdinG THE EntiRe rAnge Of our Judgments of raTioNaliTY. We Make sUch juDgmeNtS for a VarietY of puRpOses and in a varieTy of Contexts, aNd tHe KinD oF judgMEnt we aRe iNclIned to mAke variES wiTh THESe Purposes and contextS."' OBVIoUsly, therE is mucH MoRe TO be said aBoUt tHese CONtextUallY VaRiable paRameteRS oF dOxastic JuStificAtIon, And Some uNDersTandinG of how thEy opeRAte will emerge aS We proceed. But hAViNG SaID thiS muCh, I can now inDicaTE morE cleARlY thE Focus Of my tHiNKiNG about moral justificAtIon. FirSt, I am Interested in tHe epistemiC APPraisal oF indIViDUals's beliefs-doXastiC epistemic APpraisal-Where The primaRy goal invOLVed in sucH apPraIsaL is THE hAving of true beLIEfs aNd The avoiDinG of falsE onEs. SEcoNd, I Am ParticulaRly interEsTeD iN tHe sOrt of EPistemic ApPraIsAl tHat is OPeratiVe in oUr evErYdAY, coMmon epiSTeMIC appRaIsAls oF inDiViduaLs.25 ThE SorT of apprAisal I havE in MInd cOnCeRns quesTions about how OnE might be epIsTemIcally RESponsiblE in the beliefs one holds. NoW One illuMinAting Way oF evaluatiNg tHe episTemIC respoNsibilIty of An AgeNT Is to iNVOkE thE pErspective OF WhaT we miGhT calL an "episTemically responsibLE agEnt" on analogy wIth The iDEA oF thE "ReASonAbLE peRSOn" standard from ANglo-AmericAn LAw.26 the idea is tO Use ThIs model As a basiS for iNVestigaTing the baSic episteMiC norMS (And General epiStemic seNsibility) THat we NOrMally Do aNd shouLd Use In evaLuatinG The EpistEmic stAtUs of moRal beLiEf. There aRe two crucial features thaT this mOdel mUst Have if it iS goINg tO serve in tHis rOle. First, if It iS to Have aNy sORt of nOrmaTIvE biTE and tHus bE Useful as a MEaSurE OF a Person being EPISteMicalLy rESponsiBle iN the beliefs she holDS, then it must takE on tHE ChaRacTEr of An Idealization. ThE epIsTEMically rEsPonsible ageNt is one wHoSE A ConTextuaList MoRal EpisTEMoLOgy 301 epiStemIc aCtivities SerVe AS a norm fOr OuR EpisteMic aCtIvitieS: we ougHT to cONForm to those norms CharaCTEristIC of The reSpOnsible AGent. second,
 question. However, for ce rtain purp oseswemig ht  beinte rested in eval u atin g an individual relati ve to  t h e ep i st emicstandar d sp r eva le nt  in  h e rcommu nit y, in w hich caseour  e valuation in v ol ves a soci oce ntric perspe cti ve. St il l,i n oth erconte xts, w e  havean intere st in que s tions a b o ut  jus tification apartf ro m  some subjecti ve orin t er s u bje cti ve perspec ti ve an d  the pe r sp e c t ive of an ideally  knowledgea b lespecta to r-a way of  capt ur i ngan objectiv e pe rspective -is ap p ropriat e . The m ost im por tan t le s so ntole a rnf ro m a l l t his talk  a bo ut pe rspe c t i v es i s n icel y exp ressed by Fol ey:  "Th e reis no  sing le p er spect ive th at is  a dequate for und erst anding th e e nt ire  r angeo f ourjud gme nts ofrationa l ity .W e ma ke such judgmentsfo r avarietyof pur p os es and in a  v ari etyo f  cont exts ,  a nd the k ind of ju dg ment we  a re inc li ned  to  make vari es wit h thesepurpo s es and context s ."' Obviously ,  t h e re is m uch  more to be  sai d  abo ut t h es e c o ntext ually  v a ri a ble parameters of d ox asticjusti fication, and  some unde r s t anding o f ho w  t h ey operate wil l eme rge as wep roceed.But h aving sa id this m u c h, I can  no w i ndi cat e mo re clearly th e focu sof my t hin king ab out  mo ral  ju st ification . First,  I  a min ter ested in the e pi ste mi c a pprai s al ofindiv idua ls 's bel iefs-do x as t i c ep is te micapp ra isal- wher e  th e prima ry goal i nvo l vedin  s uch app raisal is the  h aving of t ru e b eliefs a nd the a voiding of false ones.S econd,I a m par ticu larly int ere sted i n t h e sort  of ep istem ic  ap p r aisal t ha t i soperativei n  ou r eve ry day,  common  epistemic apprais a lsof individual s.2 5 Th e so rto fa ppr ai s alI have in mind co ncerns que st i on s about ho w  on emight b e epist emica l ly resp onsible i n the bel ie fs o n e  ho lds. Now o ne illum inating w a y ofe va luati ngthe ep is tem ic re sponsi b ili ty of  an ag en t is t o inv ok e the pe rspective of what we mi ght ca ll an  "e pistemica lly res ponsibleagen t" on anal ogy  wi th th e i d ea of  the "r eas o nable  per s on" stand a rd  fr o m  A nglo-Americ a n law .26 T hei dea is  touse this model as a basis for in vest i g ati ngt he b as ic epistemic n orm s( a nd gener al  epistemicsensibil it y ) tha t we n ormall y do an d sh o uld us e in  ev aluatingthe  e p istemic  s ta t us ofmora lbelief . Ther e  are t wo crucial featu res t h a t thi s  mo del m us t havei f it  is goingto serve in  thisrole . Fir st, ifit  is to  ha ve  any sorto f normati ve bi te andth us b e u sefulas a m easur e of  a  pe rson bein g ep i st em i cal ly r espon si blein the be l iefs she  ho l ds, the nitm u st tak e  o n the charac ter  of a n idealizati o n. T h ee piste micall y resp onsible age nt  is one  wh o s e A Conte xtualistM ora lEpis temology  3 01 e pi ste mi c activities se rve as a  norm fo r our ep ist e mica ctivit ie s: we oughtto co nf o rm to t h o senorms c h ara cte ris ticofther esponsible agent. Second ,
 question._However, for_certain purposes we might_be interested_in_evaluating an_individual_relative to the_epistemic standards prevalent_in her community, in_which case our_evaluation_involves a sociocentric perspective. Still, in other contexts, we have an interest in questions_about_justification apart_from_some_subjective or intersubjective perspective and_the perspective of an ideally_knowledgeable spectator-a_way of capturing an objective perspective-is appropriate. The_most_important lesson to_learn from all this talk about perspectives is nicely_expressed by Foley: "There is no_single perspective that_is_adequate_for understanding the entire_range of our judgments of rationality._We make such judgments for a_variety of purposes and in a variety_of contexts, and the kind of_judgment we are inclined to_make varies_with these purposes and contexts."'_Obviously, there is_much more_to be said_about these contextually variable parameters of_doxastic justification, and_some understanding of how they operate_will_emerge as we_proceed._But_having said_this much, I_can_now indicate_more_clearly the focus of my thinking_about_moral justification. First, I am interested in_the epistemic appraisal of_individuals's_beliefs-doxastic epistemic appraisal-where the_primary goal involved in such_appraisal is the having of true_beliefs and_the avoiding_of false ones. Second, I am particularly interested in the sort_of epistemic appraisal that is operative_in our everyday, common_epistemic appraisals_of_individuals.25 The sort_of_appraisal I_have in mind concerns questions about how_one might_be epistemically responsible in the beliefs_one holds. Now one_illuminating_way of evaluating the epistemic responsibility_of an agent is to invoke_the perspective of what we_might_call_an "epistemically responsible agent" on_analogy with the idea of the_"reasonable person" standard_from Anglo-American law.26 The idea is to_use_this model as a basis for_investigating_the basic epistemic norms (and general_epistemic_sensibility)_that we normally do and_should use in evaluating the epistemic_status of moral belief. There are two crucial features_that this model_must have if it is_going_to_serve in this role. First, if it is to have_any sort_of normative bite_and thus be useful as a measure of a person_being epistemically responsible in the beliefs she_holds, then it must take on the character of an idealization._The epistemically responsible agent is one whose A_Contextualist Moral Epistemology 301 epistemic activities serve_as a norm for_our_epistemic activities: we ought to conform to_those_norms_characteristic_of the responsible_agent. Second,