1781), James (1890), Husserl (1964), Broad (1923), Foster (1982, 1992), Dainton (2000, 2003), Hoerl (2009), Phillips (2011). 7 See Dainton (2000, 2003, 2008b, 2010). 8 See Husserl (1964). 9 Locke (1975, Book II, especially Chap.14). 10 research in cognitive science keeps backing up by more and more experiments in the field of experimental psychology10, our perceptual abilities are limited in an interestingly relevant way. When we look at a movement such as the fall of the apple, all is fine: we have an experience as of a continuous movement. But this is not always the case. For instance, when perceiving a movement that is too slow (think of the hour hand on your watch), our perception is not one as of movement, since the movement is just too slow to be registered by us as a movement (we can see that the hour hand has moved when we compare its position at some time and at a later time, but that's an entirely different thing). Things are similar when we perceive a movement that is too fast – typical experimental examples include the case of a dot on a computer screen moving quickly along a circular path. In such a case, as before, we do not perceive it as moving, rather we have a perception as of a circle, simply because the movement of the dot is too quick. Indeed, the simple fact, already noticed by Locke, is that we are built in such a way that our perceptual system has lower and upper limits beyond which we are not capable of perceiving movement as movement. It is only in cases where a movement happens at an appropriate speed (like the apple's fall) that we have an experience as of movement. This just is the way we (that is, our brains) are built. But how exactly does it happen that we have an experience as of a continuous movement, when we have one? As we have just seen, this has nothing to do with there being (happening) a movement in the world in front of us. Indeed, on the one hand, we have seen two types of cases where we do not experience movement as movement, and on the other hand, we have all seen a movie, and so we have all had an experience as of movement when there is none – when looking at a series of static images projected at the speed of 24 images per second, we have an experience as of movement, instead of having a
1781), James (1890), Husserl (1964), Broad (1923), Foster (1982, 1992), Dainton (2000, 2003), Hoerl (2009), Phillips (2011). 7 See Dainton (2000, 2003, 2008b, 2010). 8 See Husserl (1964). 9 Locke (1975, Book II, especially Chap.14). 10 research in cognitive science keeps second up by more and more experiment in the field of experimental psychology10, our perceptual abilities are limited in an interestingly relevant means. When we look at a movement such as the twilight of the apple, all is all right: we have an experience as of a continuous movement. But this is not always the case. For instance, when perceive a movement that is too boring (think of the hour bridge player on your watch), our perception is not one as of movement, since the movement is just excessively slow to be registered by us as a movement (we can learn that the hour hand has moved when we compare its position at some time and at a late time, but that's an entirely different thing). Things are exchangeable when we perceive a movement that is too fast – typical experimental examples include the case of a dot on a computer screen moving quickly along a circular path. In such a case, as before, we do not perceive it as moving, preferably we have a perception as of a r-2, plainly because the movement of the dot is too immediate. Indeed, the simple fact, already noticed by Locke, is that we are built in such a way that our perceptual arrangement has lower and upper limits beyond which we are not capable of perceiving movement as drift. It is only in cases where a movement happens at an appropriate focal ratio (like the apple's fall) that we get an experience as of motion. This just is the way we (that is, our brains) are built. But how exactly does it happen that we have an experience as of a continuous campaign, when we have one? As we have just seen, this has nothing to practice with there being (happening) a drift in the world in front of us. Indeed, on the one hired hand, we have seen two type of cases where we do not know movement as campaign, and on the other hand, we have wholly seen a movie, and so we have all had an experience as of movement when there is none – when looking at a series of static images projected at the speed of 24 image per second, we have an experience as of movement, rather of having a
1781), Jales (1890), Husserl (1964), Broad (1923), Fosuer (1982, 1992), Dainton (2000, 2003), Hoerl (2009), Piillips (2011). 7 See Dxinton (2000, 2003, 2008b, 2010). 8 See Husserl (1964). 9 Llcje (1975, Biok II, especially Chap.14). 10 researcj in cogbitite science keeps backing up by lore end more experikents in tve field of ex[efilental psychology10, our perceptual abylities age limited in wn imeereanikgly relevant way. When we look af a movtment such as the gall of the apple, all is flne: ae have an experiejce as of a coneunuous movemdnt. But thpv is not amways the case. For instance, whev pereeiving a mivwmejj that is toi slor (think of tmv hour vand on your watch), ouv perreptuon is not one as of kovement, since the movement ia just too slow ti ve recistared vy js zs a movemfnt (we can ses that the your hand has moved wrvm we compare its pjsytion at some time and at a later time, tut that's an entirely diffwrent thing). Things arg similar rhen we perceive a movement that is too fast – typhcal xxoernnentau edamples include the case of a dot on a computqd xcgeen moving quickjy along a vigcijar path. In soch a ccae, as before, we do nlt percgive ir as movigg, rsther we have a perception qs of a circjw, simply because tke movement uf tne doy is too quick. Indeed, tke simlle fact, algeady notjzed by Locke, is ghan we are built in such a way trat our pxrcepcual sysgem nas lorer and upoer llkits beyond which ae arg not wapable of perceiving movement as movemenv. It is only on caves wherz a moyement happens wt an appropricte speeb (like the apple'a fall) vhat we have an experienca as of movemxnt. This tust is rhe way de (that is, our brains) age buiot. But how exactly dogs it happen that we have an experirncd af lf a wontinuous mmvemdnt, ehen de have one? Xs wr have just seen, thiv haa nothing to do wiyh there bging (happqning) a movemrnt in the world ij froit of ns. Indred, on the one hand, we have seen fwo types of cases where we eo not expernence movement as movement, and on the otier hand, we have all sgen a movie, and so we mave all had an evperience as of movement when there is none – wmen looking at a seriea of sdatic images projected at the speed of 24 images per second, we have an experiencw as oh iovement, inateac of variny a
1781), James (1890), Husserl (1964), Broad (1923), 1992), (2000, 2003), (2009), Phillips (2011). 2008b, 8 See Husserl 9 Locke (1975, II, especially Chap.14). 10 research in science keeps backing up by more and more experiments in the field of psychology10, our perceptual abilities are limited in an interestingly relevant way. When we at movement as fall of the apple, all is fine: we have an experience as of a continuous movement. this is not always the case. For instance, perceiving a movement that too slow (think of the hand your watch), perception not as of movement, the movement is just too slow to be registered by us as a movement (we can see the hour moved when compare position some time and later time, but that's an entirely are similar when we perceive a movement that too fast typical experimental examples include the case a dot on a computer screen moving quickly a circular path. In such a case, as before, we do not perceive it as we have a perception of a circle, because movement the is too Indeed, the simple fact, already noticed by Locke, is that we built in such a way that our perceptual system has upper beyond which we not capable of perceiving as It is only in a happens speed the fall) that we have experience as of movement. This is the way we built. But how exactly does it happen that have an experience as of a continuous when we have one? As we have just seen, this has nothing do with (happening) a movement in the world in front us. Indeed, on the hand, we have seen two types of cases where do experience movement movement, and on other hand, we all seen a so we all an movement when there is none – looking a series of static images at of 24 images per second, we have an experience as of movement, instead of having
1781), James (1890), Husserl (1964), Broad (1923), Foster (1982, 1992), DaInton (2000, 2003), Hoerl (2009), phillIps (2011). 7 see daIntoN (2000, 2003, 2008b, 2010). 8 SeE Husserl (1964). 9 Locke (1975, BOOk II, Especially Chap.14). 10 research In cogNiTIve sCIeNce keEps backINg UP By mOrE aNd mOrE ExPerimEntS in the fIeld of expeRimEnTal psychologY10, OuR perceptuaL abIlities are liMitEd in an InTerEStingLy rElevaNt way. WHEn we loOk at a moveMeNT such aS The fall OF ThE appLe, all is fine: we have AN eXPerience as of a cOntinuOuS MoVEMenT. BuT this is not AlWays tHE case. FoR InSTANce, WHen perceiving A movement thAT is Too sloW (tHinK Of the hOur haNd ON yoUr watch), our pErcePtion is noT one as OF movemeNT, since tHe moveMenT is Just TOo SlOw tO bE RegIStEreD By uS as a moveMeNt (We can See tHAT THe hoUr hAnd hAs movEd when we compaRe iTs poSItiOn at sOme tiMe anD aT a latEr time, But thAt'S an entirely diffErenT thing). ThiNgs ArE siMiLar whEN we perCeiVe a MovemenT that is TOo fAsT – TYPiCal experimental exaMpLES iNclude thE case oF A dOt ON a computEr ScrEen mOVIng quIcklY AlOng a circUlar paTH. IN sUch a casE, aS beforE, wE do Not PerceIVe it As moviNg, rather We havE A perception as oF A circle, simply BEcAUSe THe moVemEnt of the dot Is toO QuicK. IndEEd, The SImple Fact, aLrEAdY Noticed by Locke, is thaT wE are buIlt in Such a way that oUr perceptuAL SYstem has LoweR AnD Upper limits beyOnd whIch we are noT Capable oF percEiving moVement as mOVEment. It iS onLy iN caSes WHErE a movement hapPENs at An ApproprIatE speed (lIke The AppLe's FaLl) that we hAve an expErIeNcE aS of MovemENt. This juSt Is tHe Way We (thaT Is, our bRains) Are bUiLt. bUt hOw exactLY dOES it hApPeN thaT we HaVe an eXperIEncE as of a cOntinuous MovEMent, WhEn We have oNe? As we have jusT sEen, this has NoThiNg to do WITh there bEing (happening) a movement iN The worlD in Front Of us. indeed, on tHe oNe hand, We hAVe seen Two typEs of cAsEs wHERe we dO NOt ExpErIence movemENT as MovemEnT, and On the otHer hand, we have all seEN a mOvie, and so we haVe aLl haD AN eXpeRIeNCe aS oF MovEMEnt when there is nOne – when looKiNG aT a series of STatIc Images pRojecteD at thE Speed of 24 Images per Second, we hAvE an eXPEriEnce as of moVement, inStead of haVIng a
1781), James (1890), Husse rl (1964),  Broa d ( 192 3) , Fo ster  (1982, 1992), Dain ton (2000, 2003), Hoer l (20 09 ) , Ph i ll ips ( 2011).7  S e e  Da in to n ( 20 0 0,  2003 , 2 008b, 2 010). 8 Se e H us serl (1964). 9Locke (197 5,Book II, esp eci ally C ha p.1 4 ). 10  re searc h in c o gnitiv e science  k e eps ba c king up b ymore  and more experim e nt s  in the fieldof exp er i me n t alpsy chology10,  o ur pe r ceptual ab i l i tie s  are limitedin an inter e sti ngly r el eva n t way.  When  w e  lo ok at a mov emen t such as  the f a ll of t h e apple , allisfin e: w e  h av e a ne xpe r ie nce asof a con ti nu ous m ovem e n t .  But  th is i s not  always the c ase . Fo r  in stanc e, wh en p er ceivi ng a m oveme nt  that is too sl ow ( think ofthe  h our  h and o n  yourwat ch) , our p ercepti o n i sn o t  o ne as of movement,  s i n ce  the mov ementi sju s t too sl ow  to  ber e giste redb yus as amoveme n t(w e can s ee  thatth e h our  hand hasmovedwhen wecompa r e its position at some timea nd a ta  lat ertime, but t hat' s  anenti r el y d i ffere nt th in g ). Things are similarwh en weperce ive a movemen t that ist o o  fast –typi c al experimental e xampl es include the case  of a  dot ona compute r screen m ovi ngqui ckl y al ong a circula r path .In such  acase, a s b efo re,  we  d o not per ceive it  a smo vi ng,  rath e r we hav ea p er cep tiona s of a  circ le,si mp l y b ecauset he m ovem en tof t hedo t istooq uic k. Inde ed, the s imp l e fa ct ,already  noticed by L oc ke, is tha tweare bu i l t in suc h a way that our percep t ual sys tem  haslowe r and upp erlimits  be y ond wh ich we  areno t c a p ableo f  p erc ei ving movem e n t a s mov em ent.  It isonly in cases wher e  amovement happ ens  ata n  a ppr o pr i ate  s p eed ( like the apple' s fall) th at we  have an e x per ie nce asof move ment. This ju st is the  way we ( th at i s ,  ou r brains)are buil t. But ho w  exac t ly  does  it  happe ntha t wehave a n  ex perie nce as  o f a co ntinu ou s moveme nt, when we have one? A s we h ave j ust  seen, th ish asnothing t o do  with ther e b ein g (ha ppe n ing)a mo v em ent in th e wo r ld in fro n tofu s .Indeed, ont h e  on e han d,w e have  see n two types of ca s es where we do  not e xpe rie n ce m ov ement as movem ent ,a n d on the  o ther hand,we haveal l  seen  a mov ie, an d so we h av e  all h ad a n e xperience  as  o f  moveme nt  w h en the re i snone –  whenl ooki n g  at a series ofstati c image s  pr oject ed  at the spee d of 24 im ages per se cond,we h ave a n exper ie nce as  of  m ovement, i n stead ofhavin g a
1781), James_(1890), Husserl_(1964), Broad (1923), Foster_(1982, 1992),_Dainton_(2000, 2003),_Hoerl_(2009), Phillips (2011)._7 See Dainton_(2000, 2003, 2008b, 2010)._8 See Husserl_(1964)._9 Locke (1975, Book II, especially Chap.14). 10 research in cognitive science keeps backing_up_by more_and_more_experiments in the field of_experimental psychology10, our perceptual abilities_are limited_in an interestingly relevant way. When we look_at_a movement such_as the fall of the apple, all is fine:_we have an experience as of_a continuous movement._But_this_is not always the_case. For instance, when perceiving a_movement that is too slow (think_of the hour hand on your watch),_our perception is not one as_of movement, since the movement_is just_too slow to be registered_by us as_a movement_(we can see_that the hour hand has moved_when we compare_its position at some time and_at_a later time,_but_that's_an entirely_different thing). Things_are_similar when_we_perceive a movement that is too_fast_– typical experimental examples include the case_of a dot on_a_computer screen moving quickly_along a circular path. In_such a case, as before, we_do not_perceive it_as moving, rather we have a perception as of a circle,_simply because the movement of the_dot is too quick._Indeed, the_simple_fact, already noticed_by_Locke, is_that we are built in such a_way that_our perceptual system has lower and_upper limits beyond which_we_are not capable of perceiving movement_as movement. It is only in_cases where a movement happens_at_an_appropriate speed (like the apple's_fall) that we have an experience_as of movement._This just is the way we (that_is,_our brains) are built. But how_exactly_does it happen that we have_an_experience_as of a continuous movement,_when we have one? As we_have just seen, this has nothing to do with_there being (happening)_a movement in the world_in_front_of us. Indeed, on the one hand, we have seen_two types_of cases where_we do not experience movement as movement, and on the_other hand, we have all seen a_movie, and so we have all had an experience as of_movement when there is none – when looking_at a series of static images projected_at the speed of_24_images per second, we have an experience_as_of_movement,_instead of having_a