al Theory, eds. E. F. Kittay and D. T. Meyers (Savage, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1988); and Carol Gilligan, J, V. Ward, J. M. Taylor, and B. Bardige, Mapping the Moral Domain (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988). 324 Moral Knowledge? 48. Hubert Dreyfus and Stuart E. Dreyfus, "What is Morality? A Phenomenological Account of Ethical Expertise," in Universalism vs. Communitarianism, ed. D. Rasmussen (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1990), 252. 49. Here I am just concerned with what I have called the thesis of epistemic conservatism and the thesis of social-context sensitivity. The thesis of epistemic adequacy does not figure in this discussion. 50. Thomas Kuhn, "Second Thoughts on Paradigms," in The Essential Tension, ed. Kuhn (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), uses the term "exemplar" to refer to one of the crucial ingredients involved in what he calls a disciplinary matrix-those elements shared by a scientific community that enable them to communicate professionally and arrive at nearly unanimous judgments on scientific questions. As part of a disciplinary matrix, exemplars are "concrete problem solutions accepted by the group as, in a quite usual sense, paradigmatic" (p. 298). Learning a moral outlook involves, I am suggesting, a rough equivalent of learning a disciplinary matrix. 51. Here I skip over important complexities that would need to be considered before we could confidently say that all or most communities share many of the same basic moral assumptions. As Francis Snare, "The Diversity of Morals," Mind 89 (1980), 353-69, argues, the scope and importance that certain moral rules have in different cultures signifies real differences in the moral values and associated moral rules of those cultures. So, for example, merely from the fact that two cultures subscribe to a prohibition on lying does not mean that they both accept the same moral rule about lying. 52. See Donald G. Kraybill, The Riddle of Amish Culture (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989) for a detailed description of Amish culture. 53. See DePaul, Balance and Refinement, pp. 39-48 for a description of such radical moral conversions that result from a "discontinuous" shift
al Theory, eds. E. F. Kittay and D. T. Meyers (Savage, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1988); and Carol Gilligan, J, V. Ward, J. M. Taylor, and B. Bardige, Mapping the Moral Domain (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988). 324 Moral Knowledge? 48. Hubert Dreyfus and Stuart E. Dreyfus, " What is Morality? A Phenomenological Account of Ethical Expertise, " in Universalism vs. Communitarianism, ed. D. Rasmussen (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1990), 252. 49. Here I am just concerned with what I have called the dissertation of epistemic conservatism and the dissertation of social - context sensitivity. The dissertation of epistemic adequacy does not figure in this discussion. 50. Thomas Kuhn, " Second Thoughts on Paradigms, " in The Essential Tension, ed. Kuhn (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), uses the terminus " exemplar " to refer to one of the crucial ingredient involved in what he calls a corrective matrix - those chemical element shared by a scientific residential district that enable them to communicate professionally and arrive at nearly unanimous judgments on scientific doubt. As part of a corrective matrix, exemplars are " concrete trouble solution accepted by the group as, in a quite usual sense, paradigmatic " (p. 298). learn a moral outlook involves, I am suggest, a rough equivalent of learn a disciplinary matrix. 51. Here I skip over important complexities that would need to be study before we could confidently say that all or most communities share many of the same basic moral assumptions. As Francis Snare, " The Diversity of Morals, " judgment 89 (1980), 353 - 69, argues, the scope and importance that certain moral rules have in different cultures signifies real differences in the moral value and associated moral rules of those culture. So, for example, merely from the fact that two cultures subscribe to a prohibition on lying does not think of that they both accept the same moral rule about lying. 52. determine Donald G. Kraybill, The Riddle of Amish Culture (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989) for a detailed description of Amish culture. 53. See DePaul, Balance and Refinement, pp. 39 - 48 for a description of such radical moral conversions that result from a " discontinuous " shift
al Hheory, eds. E. F. Kittay ana D. T. Meyers (Sarqge, Md.: Rowmah and Ligtlefield, 1988); and Carol Gilligai, J, C. Ware, J. M. Taylor, and B. Baraige, Mapppng the Miral Eomain (Camudidge, Mass.: Hadyard Bnmversity Press, 1988). 324 Moral Knmwledge? 48. Huberd Arzyfus and Stuart E. Dreyfus, "What is Mjrality? A Phenomenologisal Sscouhn if Ethical Expertise," in Univedsalism vs. Communitatianism, ed. D. Rasmussen (Camhridhe, Mass.: The MIT Prfss, 1990), 252. 49. Here I ai just concerved with what I have czlled the thesis of epistemic cunserratism and jkw tjgsis of sociel-contvxt sensitivibj. The tvesis og epistemic adcquacb dows not figure in this discussion. 50. Thomaf Kuhn, "Sewoud Thoughts on Paraditmw," in Jhe Evsengual Tehsmon, ed. Kujn (Rhicago: Unibersity of Xhicago Press, 1977), uses trv term "exemplzr" to weser to one of the crucial ingredients itvomved in what he calls a disciplinary matrix-tjose elemqnts shared by a scientific community that enable them go eimmunkxahe professionally and arrive at nearly unanimjhs jldgments on scienbific questions. As pwry of a disciplknary matdix, exemplars are "foncretg proboem solutyons accepted by the group as, ib a quite uslal wense, paradigmatic" (p. 298). Learniny a motal ouylook involves, I am sugyestinf, a rough eeuivalent uf learning a dirciilindry matrix. 51. Here I skip ovqr importent cpmplexigies that rould need to bc considered before we clund confidejtly say that all or most commuimties share msnf ox the saie baxic moral asstmptions. As Frcncis Sncre, "Thd Diversitj of Morans," Mind 89 (1980), 353-69, wrgues, the scmke and importence that cerrain moral fjles have in dofferent bujturws signifies real viffgrsnces in the moxcl values and asspcixteq local rtnes of those culgurdx. So, wor example, oereky from the fact thad twk cultures subscrine to a prihibitiog on lying dors not mean that tjey bmth accelt jhe same moral rule about lying. 52. See Donwld G. Kraybill, Ehe Viddje of Amisk Culture (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins Universijy Press, 1989) for a detaiktd descriptioi of Aiish cultgre. 53. See DePaul, Balabce and Refinemenu, pp. 39-48 for a description of suwh rafical moral conversions that result from a "discontinuous" shift
al Theory, eds. E. F. Kittay and Meyers Md.: Rowman Littlefield, 1988); and J. Taylor, and B. Mapping the Moral (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988). Moral Knowledge? 48. Hubert Dreyfus and Stuart E. Dreyfus, "What is Morality? A Account of Ethical Expertise," in Universalism vs. Communitarianism, ed. D. Rasmussen (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 1990), 49. I am just concerned with what I have called the thesis of epistemic conservatism and the of social-context sensitivity. The thesis of epistemic adequacy not figure in this 50. Thomas Kuhn, "Second Thoughts Paradigms," The Essential ed. (Chicago: of Chicago Press, uses the term "exemplar" to refer to one of the crucial ingredients involved in what he calls disciplinary matrix-those by a community enable to communicate professionally at nearly unanimous judgments on scientific of a disciplinary matrix, exemplars are "concrete problem accepted by group as, in a quite usual paradigmatic" (p. 298). Learning a moral outlook involves, am suggesting, a rough equivalent of learning a disciplinary matrix. 51. Here I skip over that would need to considered before we confidently that or communities share of the same basic moral assumptions. As Francis Snare, "The Diversity Morals," Mind 89 (1980), 353-69, argues, the scope and importance moral have in different signifies real differences in moral and associated moral rules cultures. for the that cultures subscribe to a on lying does not mean they both accept the 52. See Donald G. Kraybill, The Riddle of Culture (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1989) for a detailed description of Amish culture. 53. See DePaul, and Refinement, for a description of such radical moral conversions result from a "discontinuous"
al Theory, eds. E. F. Kittay and D. T. MEyers (SavagE, Md.: RoWmaN anD LIttlEfieLd, 1988); and Carol GillIGan, J, v. Ward, J. M. Taylor, and B. BardiGe, MapPiNG the mOrAl DomAin (CambRIdGE, masS.: HArVarD UNIvErsitY PrEss, 1988). 324 MoraL Knowledge? 48. hubErT Dreyfus and STUaRt E. Dreyfus, "whaT is Morality? A pheNomenoLoGicAL AccoUnt Of EthIcal ExPErtise," In UniversAlISm vs. CoMMunitarIANiSm, ed. d. Rasmussen (CambridGE, MASs.: The MIT Press, 1990), 252. 49. HEre I am JuST cONCerNed With what I hAvE callED the theSIs OF EPisTEmic conservatIsm and the thESis Of sociAl-ConTExt senSitivItY. the Thesis of epiStemIc adequacY does nOT figure IN this diScussiOn. 50. THomAs KuHN, "SEcOnd thOUghTS oN PaRAdiGms," in The esSeNtial tensION, ED. KuhN (ChIcagO: UnivErsity of ChicaGo PRess, 1977), USes The teRm "exeMplaR" tO refeR to one Of the CrUcial ingredientS invOlved in whAt hE cAllS a DisciPLinary MatRix-Those elEments sHAreD bY A SCiEntific community thAt ENAbLe them to CommunICaTe PRofessioNaLly And aRRIve at NearLY uNanimous JudgmeNTs On ScientiFiC questIoNs. AS paRt of a DIsciPlinarY matrix, eXemplARs are "concrete pROblem solutionS AcCEPtED by tHe gRoup as, in a quIte uSUal sEnse, PArAdiGMatic" (P. 298). LearNiNG a MOral outlook involves, i aM suggeSting, A rough equivalEnt of learnING A disciplInarY MaTRix. 51. Here I skip ovEr impOrtant compLExities tHat woUld need tO be considEREd before We cOulD coNfiDENtLy say that all oR MOst cOmMunitieS shAre many Of tHe sAme BasIc Moral assuMptions. AS FRaNcIs snaRe, "The dIversity Of morAlS," MiNd 89 (1980), 353-69, argUEs, the sCope aNd imPoRtANce That cerTAiN MOral RuLeS havE in DiFfereNt cuLTurEs signiFies real dIffERencEs In The moraL values and assOcIated moral RuLes Of thosE CUltures. SO, for example, merely from thE Fact thaT twO cultUres Subscribe To a ProhibItiON on lyiNg does Not meAn ThaT THey boTH AcCepT tHe same moraL RUle About LyIng. 52. SEe DonalD G. Kraybill, The RiddlE Of AMish Culture (BaLtiMore AND LOndON: THE JoHnS hopKINs University PreSs, 1989) for a detaIlED dEscription OF AmIsH culturE. 53. See DePAul, BaLAnce and refinemenT, pp. 39-48 for a deScRiptION of Such radicaL moral coNversions THat reSUlT from A "diScontiNuOus" Shift
al Theory, eds. E. F. Kitt ay and D.T. Me yer s ( Sa vage , Md .: Rowman andL ittl efield, 1988); and Car ol Gi ll i gan, J,  V. W ard, J. M. T ayl or ,and  B .  B ardig e,Mapping  the Moral  Do ma in (Cambridg e ,Mass.: Har var d University  Pr ess, 1 98 8). 324 M ora l Kno wledge ?  48. H ubert Dre yf u s andS tuart E . Dr eyfu s, "What is Moral i ty ?  A Phenomenolo gicalAc c ou n t  of  Et hical Expe rt ise," in Univ e rs a l i smv s. Communitar ianism, ed. D.Rasmus se n ( C ambrid ge, M as s .:The MIT Pre ss,1990), 25 2. 49. Here Ia m justconcer ned  wi th w h at  I  ha ve cal l ed  th e  th esis ofep is temic  con s e r v atis m a nd t he th esis of socia l-c onte x t s ensit ivity . Th ethesi s of e piste mi c adequacy does  not  figure i n t hi s d is cussi o n. 50.  Th oma s Kuhn,  "Secon d  Th ou g h t son Paradigms," inTh e Es sentialTensio n ,ed .  Kuhn (C hi cag o: U n i versi ty o f  C hicago P ress,1 97 7) , usesth e term  " exe mpl ar" t o  ref er toone of t he cr u cial ingredien t s involved in wh a t  h e  cal lsa disciplin arym atri x-th o se  el e ments  shar ed by a scientific commun it y that  enab le them to co mmunicatep r o fessiona llya nd arrive at near ly un animous ju d gments o n sci entificquestions . As partofa d isc ipl i n ar y matrix, exe m p lars  a re "con cre te prob lem  so lut ion sacceptedby the g ro up  a s,  in  a qu i te usual  s ens e,  pa radig m atic"(p. 2 98).  L ea r nin g a mor a lo u tloo kin volv es,  I  am s ugge s tin g, a ro ugh equiv ale n t of  l ea rning a  disciplinary  m atrix. 51.  H ere  I ski p over imp ortant complexities tha t  wouldnee d tobe c onsidered  be fore w e c o uld co nfiden tly s ay  th a t  allo r  m ost  c ommunities s har e man yof t he same  basic moral assum p tio ns. As Franci s S nare , "T heD iv e rsi ty ofM o rals," Mind 89(1980), 35 3- 6 9,  argues, t h e s co pe andimporta nce t h at cert ain moral  rules ha ve  ind i ffe rent cultu res sign ifies rea l  diff e re ncesinthe mo ra l v alues  and a s soc iated  moral  r ules o f tho se  culture s. So, for example, mer ely fr om th e f act thattwo cul tures sub scri be to a pr ohi bit ion o n l y ing d oesn ot  me a n tha t th e y both ac c ep t t h e  s ame moral r u l e  ab out l yin g . 52.SeeDonald G. Kraybil l , The Riddle o f Am i s h C ult u re ( Ba ltimore and Lo ndo n: T he Johns  H opkins Univ ersity P re s s, 19 89) fo r a de tailedd e sc r iption  ofAmi sh cultur e.53 .  See De Pa ul ,  Balan ce a nd  Refin ement, pp.3 9 -48 for a descri ption o f suc h  ra dical  m oral co n vers ions thatresult from  a "di scon tinuo us" shi ft 
al Theory,_eds. E._F. Kittay and D._T. Meyers_(Savage,_Md.: Rowman_and_Littlefield, 1988); and_Carol Gilligan, J,_V. Ward, J. M._Taylor, and B._Bardige,_Mapping the Moral Domain (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988). 324 Moral Knowledge? 48._Hubert_Dreyfus and_Stuart_E._Dreyfus, "What is Morality? A_Phenomenological Account of Ethical Expertise,"_in Universalism_vs. Communitarianism, ed. D. Rasmussen (Cambridge, Mass.: The_MIT_Press, 1990), 252._49. Here I am just concerned with what I_have called the thesis of epistemic_conservatism and the_thesis_of_social-context sensitivity. The thesis_of epistemic adequacy does not figure_in this discussion. 50. Thomas Kuhn,_"Second Thoughts on Paradigms," in The Essential_Tension, ed. Kuhn (Chicago: University of_Chicago Press, 1977), uses the_term "exemplar"_to refer to one of_the crucial ingredients_involved in_what he calls_a disciplinary matrix-those elements shared by_a scientific community_that enable them to communicate professionally_and_arrive at nearly_unanimous_judgments_on scientific_questions. As part_of_a disciplinary_matrix,_exemplars are "concrete problem solutions accepted_by_the group as, in a quite usual_sense, paradigmatic" (p. 298)._Learning_a moral outlook involves,_I am suggesting, a rough_equivalent of learning a disciplinary matrix._51. Here_I skip_over important complexities that would need to be considered before we_could confidently say that all or_most communities share many_of the_same_basic moral assumptions._As_Francis Snare,_"The Diversity of Morals," Mind 89 (1980),_353-69, argues,_the scope and importance that certain_moral rules have in_different_cultures signifies real differences in the_moral values and associated moral rules_of those cultures. So, for_example,_merely_from the fact that two_cultures subscribe to a prohibition on_lying does not_mean that they both accept the same_moral_rule about lying. 52. See Donald_G._Kraybill, The Riddle of Amish Culture_(Baltimore_and_London: The Johns Hopkins University_Press, 1989) for a detailed description_of Amish culture. 53. See DePaul, Balance and Refinement,_pp. 39-48 for_a description of such radical_moral_conversions_that result from a "discontinuous" shift