 that ethics could benefit from Heidegger's thought in a way comparable to his revision of traditional ontology. Heidegger never claimed that rational or metaphysical models of thought are false or dispensable,7 only that they are not primordial enough, that something is concealed in their disclosures-the radical finitude of Being-that needs drawing out to renovate our thinking about the world. Heidegger also never denied the importance of ethics or the need for it in our critical time of history.8 I would propose an analogy between Heidegger's approach to traditional ontology and a possible approach to ethics. Traditional ethical theories are not false or dispensable; they all show us something important about morality. But they have missed or covered over the radical finitude of human existence and the preconceptual lived world, attention to which can renovate our thinking about ethics. So the ethics that is put in question would be the traditional philosophical and metaphysical presumptions about moral values and not the matter (die Sache) of how we should live our lives. If we attend in a Heideggerian manner to the existential environment (being-in-the-world) in which and out of which the ethical life arises, such a "pre-ethical" analysis should give us clues for a more adequate ethics in regard to its fivefold task described above. In the light of Heidegger's thought ethics can be seen as a finite, existential, ungrounded world dynamic, a configuration that I think can significantly improve upon traditional models in moral philosophy. The task for ethics should not be the search for a theory or principle that can survive rational scrutiny, that can satisfy the objective cognitive standards inherited from traditional logic and the sciences, that can give us clear and certain criteria to guide adjudication. We already are shaped by ethics, before we reflect on it. We must attend to this prereflective ethical world to understand better how values function in our experience, to open up the ethical life, its conditions, demands, and difficulties. In this way ethics is not simply a philosophical specialty but a social project that keeps the existential claim of morality alive as an issue that people must continually engage. And I think that Heidegger's constellation of being-in-the-world can be effectively translated to prepare such an approach. I. BEING-ETHICAL-IN-THE-WORLD Many ethical theories have searched for an objective, rational standard that can be as decisive in morality as in the domains of mathematics, logic, and the sciences (e.g., Platonic forms, the Kantian categorical imperative, the utilitarian
that ethics could benefit from Heidegger's thought in a way comparable to his rewrite of traditional ontology. Heidegger never claim that rational or metaphysical models of opinion are fake or dispensable,7 only that they are not primordial enough, that something is conceal in their disclosure - the radical finitude of Being - that needs drawing out to renovate our thinking about the worldly concern. Heidegger also never denied the importance of ethic or the motivation for it in our critical time of history.8 I would propose an analogy between Heidegger's approach to traditional ontology and a possible access to ethics. Traditional ethical theories are not false or dispensable; they all express us something important about morality. But they have missed or covered over the extremist finitude of human existence and the preconceptual lived world, attention to which can refurbish our thinking about ethics. So the ethics that is put in question would be the traditional philosophical and metaphysical presumptions about moral values and not the matter (die Sache) of how we should live our lives. If we attend in a Heideggerian manner to the existential environment (being - in - the - world) in which and out of which the ethical life arises, such a " pre - ethical " psychoanalysis should move over us clues for a more adequate ethic in regard to its fivefold task described above. In the inner light of Heidegger's thought ethics can be seen as a finite, existential, ungrounded world moral force, a configuration that I think can significantly improve upon traditional models in moral philosophy. The task for ethics should not be the search for a theory or principle that can survive rational examination, that can satisfy the objective cognitive standard inherit from traditional logic and the sciences, that can give us clear and certain standard to guide adjudication. We already are shaped by ethics, before we chew over on it. We must attend to this prereflective ethical earth to understand better how value function in our experience, to afford up the ethical life, its conditions, demand, and difficulties. In this manner ethics is not merely a philosophical specialization but a social project that keeps the experiential claim of morality alive as an issue that people must continually engage. And I think that Heidegger's constellation of being - in - the - world can be effectively translated to prepare such an access. I. BEING - ETHICAL - IN - THE - WORLD Many ethical theories have searched for an objective, intellectual standard that can be as decisive in morality as in the domains of mathematics, logic, and the sciences (e.g., Platonic form, the Kantian categorical imperative, the utilitarian
 thwt ethics could benefit nrom Heidegger's jhiught mn a wag comparxble to his revision of tradmtiobal obtology. Heidegger nevef claimed that rarionel or metaphysicem models of tglughc ere false or dixpensable,7 mnly that they afe not primordial enough, that somethigg is cpnfealed in theit disbljsurss-the radical finitude of Being-thaf needs drawing out yo renovate our thinking ahout the world. Heideggfr also nevgd dqbied the impurtance of ethics or tge need for it in our critical gime pf history.8 I woknd propose en anajogy between Heideggar's apptoach to tradibionan obtology and a possiblx approach to ethics. Traditiotam ethical theoriew qre nmt fdlse ir aiskenxagle; thfy ell show us something umportant about morslynu. But they hzve mifsqd or covered over the radical finitude of human existence and thw preconceptual lived world, ateention to which can renovate our thinking about athica. So tme egyifs that is put in question would be the tradiejomak philosophicaj and metapnydivwl presumptiovs abobf joral values and nlt the iattee (die Sacre) og how we should live our lices. If we atnend in a Heideggerian manner to che exostenyial environment (being-iu-the-wodld) in whicj and out uf which the ethkcak nife arises, such a "pre-ethisal" analywis xhould eive us cltes for a lore adequate ethics in gegarb to hts fivefopd task described above. In the light of Heidebgar's thought ethigs can be seen ws a finite, exnstentiaj, ungfounded wogld dynammc, a configuwation that I jhink can sigiificantlr improvw upon gfaditional modrls in mogaj phulosophy. The task nor ejhjcs should not yt tye search for a thdorr lr pwhnciple that can suffive fational scvutkny, yhat can satisfy the objsctive cognitive syakdards inyerited srom traditiomal logic and the dcienres, thet can gide us clear and certain criterja to guife wdjudication. We qlready are xhaped by ethics, before we reflect on iv. We must attend to thiw prereflective ethncsl world to undewstand bedter how values funcrion in our experlence, to open up the efhical life, its conditions, demands, and difficulties. In this way ethics is not simply a philosophical slecislty tuc a sociaj prloect that keeps tne existential claim of moralitb alive as au issue that people must contonjally engage. Xnd I think that Heideggsr's consyellation of being-in-the-world cam be effectively translabed to prwpare such an a'proach. I. BEING-ETHICSL-IN-THZ-WORLD Many erhicwl theories hxve scarched fog an oyjective, rational standard that cqn be qs decisive in morelity as in bht domaihs of iathematics, logid, ans the rciences (e.g., Pkatonic forms, yhe Kantian categoribal imperative, tht utilitarian
that ethics could benefit from Heidegger's thought way to his of traditional ontology. or models of thought false or dispensable,7 that they are not primordial enough, something is concealed in their disclosures-the radical finitude of Being-that needs drawing out renovate our thinking about the world. Heidegger also never denied the importance of or need it our critical time of history.8 I would propose an analogy between Heidegger's approach to traditional ontology a possible approach to ethics. Traditional ethical theories not false or dispensable; all show us something important morality. they have or over radical finitude of existence and the preconceptual lived world, attention to which can renovate our thinking about ethics. So the that is question would the philosophical metaphysical presumptions about and not the matter (die Sache) should live our lives. If we attend in Heideggerian manner the existential environment (being-in-the-world) in which out of which the ethical life arises, such "pre-ethical" analysis should give us clues for a more adequate ethics in regard to its described above. In the of Heidegger's thought can seen a existential, ungrounded dynamic, a configuration that I think can significantly improve upon traditional in moral philosophy. The task for ethics should not be for theory or principle can survive rational scrutiny, can the objective cognitive standards traditional and can us and certain criteria to adjudication. We already are shaped ethics, before we reflect to this prereflective ethical world to understand better values function in our experience, to open the ethical life, its conditions, demands, and difficulties. In this way ethics not simply specialty but a social project that keeps the claim of morality alive an issue that people must continually engage. And I that constellation of can be effectively to prepare such approach. I. BEING-ETHICAL-IN-THE-WORLD theories have for objective, can be as decisive in morality in domains of mathematics, logic, and sciences forms, the Kantian categorical imperative, the utilitarian
 that ethics could benefit froM Heidegger'S thouGht In a WaY comParaBle to his revisiON of tRaditional ontology. HeidEgger NeVEr clAImEd thaT rationAL oR MEtaPhYsIcaL mODeLs of tHouGht are fAlse or dispEnsAbLe,7 only that thEY aRe not primoRdiAl enough, that SomEthing Is ConCEaled In tHeir dIsclosURes-the Radical fiNiTUde of BEIng-that NEEdS draWing out to renovate OUr THinking about thE world. heIDeGGEr aLso Never denieD tHe impORtance oF EtHICS or THe need for it in Our critical TIme Of histOrY.8 I wOUld proPose aN aNAloGy between HeIdegGer's approAch to tRAditionAL ontoloGy and a PosSibLe apPRoAcH to EtHIcs. tRaDitIOnaL ethical ThEoRies aRe noT FALSe or DisPensAble; tHey all show us sOmeThinG ImpOrtanT abouT morAlIty. BuT they hAve miSsEd or covered over The rAdical finItuDe Of hUmAn exiSTence aNd tHe pReconcePtual liVEd wOrLD, ATtEntion to which can reNoVATe Our thinkIng aboUT eThICs. So the eThIcs That IS Put in QuesTIoN would be The traDItIoNal philOsOphicaL aNd mEtaPhysiCAl prEsumptIons abouT moraL Values and not thE Matter (die SachE) Of HOW wE ShouLd lIve our lives. if we ATtenD in a hEiDegGErian ManneR tO ThE Existential environmEnT (being-In-the-World) in which aNd out of whiCH THe ethicaL lifE ArISes, such a "pre-ethIcal" aNalysis shoULd give us Clues For a more Adequate eTHIcs in regArd To iTs fIveFOLd Task described ABOve. IN tHe light Of HEideggeR's tHouGht EthIcS can be seeN as a finiTe, ExIsTeNtiAl, ungROunded woRlD dyNaMic, A confIGuratiOn thaT I thInK cAN siGnificaNTlY IMproVe UpOn trAdiTiOnal mOdelS In mOral phiLosophy. ThE taSK for EtHiCs shoulD not be the searCh For a theory Or PriNciple THAt can surVive rational scrutiny, thaT Can satiSfy The obJectIve cognitIve StandaRds INheritEd from TradiTiOnaL LOgic aND ThE scIeNces, that caN GIve Us cleAr And cErtain cRiteria to guide adjuDIcaTion. We already Are ShapED By EthICs, BEfoRe WE reFLEct on it. We must atTend to this PrEReFlective etHIcaL wOrld to uNderstaNd betTEr how vaLues functIon in our eXpErieNCE, to Open up the eThical liFe, its condITions, DEmAnds, aNd dIfficuLtIes. in thiS way etHIcs Is not Simply A pHilosoPhicaL sPecialty But a social project that keEps the ExistEntIal claim oF moRAliTy alive as An isSue that peoPle MusT contInuALly enGage. aNd i thINk thaT HeiDEgger's conSTeLlaTIOn Of being-in-thE-WORld Can be EffECtivelY traNslated to prepare sUCh an approach. I. BeING-ethICaL-In-tHE-WoRlD Many ethical tHeoRiES Have searChEd for an objeCtive, ratIoNAl staNdard tHat can Be as decISIvE In moraLity As iN the domaiNs oF mAThematiCs, LoGIc, and tHe scIeNces (e.g., platonIC forMS, The Kantian categoRical IMPeratIVe, tHe utiLiTarian
 that ethics could benefit  from Heid egger 'stho ug ht i n away comparable to h is revision of traditi onalon t olog y .Heide gger ne v er c lai me dtha tr at ional  or  metaph ysical mod els  o f thought ar e  f alse or di spe nsable,7 onl y t hat th ey  ar e  notpri mordi al eno u gh, th at someth in g  is co n cealedi n  t heir  disclosures-ther ad i cal finitude o f Bein g- t ha t nee dsdrawing ou tto re n ovate o u rt h i nki n g about the w orld. Heide g ger  alsone ver denied  theim p ort ance of eth icsor the ne ed for it in o u r criti cal ti meofhist o ry .8  Iwo u ldp ro pos e  an  analogy  b et weenHeid e g g e r'sapp roac h totraditional o nto logy and  a po ssibl e ap pr oachto eth ics.Tr aditional ethic al t heories a reno t f al se or dispen sab le;  they a ll show usso m e t hi ng important about  m o r al ity. But  theyh av em issed or  c ove redo v er th e ra d ic al finit ude of hu ma n exist en ce and  t hepre conce p tual  lived  world,atten t ion to which c a n renovate ou r  t h i nk i ng a bou t ethics. S o th e  eth icst ha t i s  putin qu es t io n  would be the tradi ti onal p hilos ophical and m etaphysica l p resumpti onsa bo u t moral values  andnot the ma t ter (die  Sach e) of ho w we shou l d  live ou r l ive s.Ifw e  a ttend in a He i d egge ri an mann erto theexi ste nti alen vironment  (being- in -t he -w orl d) in which an dout  o f w hicht he eth icallife  a ri s es,  such a "p r e -eth ic al " an aly si s sho uldg ive  us clu es for amor e  ade qu at e ethic s in regard t oits fivefo ld  ta sk des c r ibed abo ve. In the light of Hei d egger's  th ought  eth ics can b e s een as  af inite,  exist entia l,  un g r ounde d wo rld  d ynamic, ac o nfi gurat io n th at I th ink can significan t lyimprove upontra diti o n al  mo d el s  in  m o ral p hilosophy. Thetask for e th i cs  should no t  be  t he sear ch fora the o ry or p rinciplethat cansu rviv e rat ional scru tiny, th at can sa t isfyt he  obje cti ve cog ni tiv e sta ndards inh erite d from  t raditi onallo gic andthe sciences, that cangive u s cle arand certa inc rit eria to g uide  adjudicat ion . W e alr ead y  areshap e dbye thics , be f ore we re f le cto n  i t. We musta t t end  to t his preref lect ive ethical world to understandbett e r  ho w v a lues  f unction in our  ex pe r i ence, to  o pen up theethicalli f e, it s cond itions , deman d s ,a nd dif ficu lti es. In th iswa y  ethics  i sn ot sim plyaphilos ophica l  spe c i alty but a socia l pro j e ct th a t k eepsth e exist e ntia l claim of  morality a live a s an  issu e thatpe ople m ust  c ontinually engage. A nd Ithink t ha t He ide gger's  con s t ellat ionof  be ing-in-th e - wo r ld  c a n b e ef fecti ve ly t ranslated to prepa res uch anap pro a c h. I.B EI N G -ETHICAL-I N-T HE-WO R L D Many eth i calt he o rieshave s earche d for a n  ob je ctive,rat i o nal stand ard thatc anbe  asdecisive  i n mo ra lit yas in the domai ns of ma thematic s ,  logic , a n d th e  scien ce s (e.g., Pla tonic  f o rms, th e Kan tian ca t ego ric alimpe rat ive, the utilitarian
 that_ethics could_benefit from Heidegger's thought_in a_way_comparable to_his_revision of traditional_ontology. Heidegger never_claimed that rational or_metaphysical models of_thought_are false or dispensable,7 only that they are not primordial enough, that something is_concealed_in their_disclosures-the_radical_finitude of Being-that needs drawing_out to renovate our thinking_about the_world. Heidegger also never denied the importance of_ethics_or the need_for it in our critical time of history.8 I_would propose an analogy between Heidegger's_approach to traditional_ontology_and_a possible approach to_ethics. Traditional ethical theories are not_false or dispensable; they all show_us something important about morality. But they_have missed or covered over the_radical finitude of human existence_and the_preconceptual lived world, attention to_which can renovate_our thinking_about ethics. So_the ethics that is put in_question would be_the traditional philosophical and metaphysical presumptions_about_moral values and_not_the_matter (die_Sache) of how_we_should live_our_lives. If we attend in a_Heideggerian_manner to the existential environment (being-in-the-world) in_which and out of_which_the ethical life arises,_such a "pre-ethical" analysis should_give us clues for a more_adequate ethics_in regard_to its fivefold task described above. In the light of Heidegger's_thought ethics can be seen as_a finite, existential, ungrounded_world dynamic,_a_configuration that I_think_can significantly_improve upon traditional models in moral philosophy._The task_for ethics should not be the_search for a theory_or_principle that can survive rational scrutiny,_that can satisfy the objective cognitive_standards inherited from traditional logic_and_the_sciences, that can give us_clear and certain criteria to guide_adjudication. We already_are shaped by ethics, before we reflect_on_it. We must attend to this_prereflective_ethical world to understand better how_values_function_in our experience, to open_up the ethical life, its conditions,_demands, and difficulties. In this way ethics is not_simply a philosophical_specialty but a social project_that_keeps_the existential claim of morality alive as an issue that_people must_continually engage. And_I think that Heidegger's constellation of being-in-the-world can be effectively_translated to prepare such an approach. I._BEING-ETHICAL-IN-THE-WORLD Many ethical theories have searched for an objective, rational standard_that can be as decisive in morality as_in the domains of mathematics, logic, and_the sciences (e.g., Platonic_forms,_the Kantian categorical imperative, the utilitarian