 of cases, of which few have been systematically studied, and many have not been subjected to repeated draws (p. 85). He also mentions deficiencies with the experimental design of these studies, though he does not go into detail about what these deficiencies are. Consequently, Machery claims that 'the arguments based on this empirical record...must assume that it is representative of the phenomena that characterize the judgments elicited by philosophical cases in general' (p, 85). This assumption may be too much of a 'leap of faith' for some experimental researchers, that is, without further details of the limitations of the experimental designs and without repeated trials. That said, repeated draws come with their own risks; primarily, an increase in the likelihood of reactive behavior on the part of the study participants. Consequently, as is commonly understood, an experimental design with repetition does not automatically guarantee or improve the validity of a study. Furthermore, what is important about experimental practice is not so much observational results and the products of experiments, but the design and implementation of experimental setups that reveal or produce causal relationships in a reliable manner. Consequently, even when Machery argues that 'judgments elicited by typical Create PDF in your applications with the Pdfcrowd HTML to PDF API PDFCROWD philosophical cases are similar to experimental artefacts – outcomes of experimental manipulations that are not due to the phenomena experimentally investigated, but to the (often otherwise reliable) experimental tools used to investigate them' (p. 90), it will not take an experimentally-oriented researcher long to suggest that unless the implementation of the experimental design is successful, the same holds true for the judgments elicited by X-Phi surveys. As previously mentioned, Machery's inductive leap from the unreliability of some of the specific judgments of studied cases to the fundamental unreliability of judgments elicited by philosophical cases in general appeals to the similarity of philosophical cases in the sense that they exhibit disturbing characteristics (pp. 111-120). Firstly, it is not clear how the presence of such characteristics relates to the inductive leap. Secondly, Machery does not investigate whether demographic and presentation variables influence judgments in usual, everyday situations. He briefly considers this latter issue but quickly dismisses it (p.129-30), claiming, with no evidence, that 'people do actually agree about everyday situations eliciting the application of concepts of philosophical interest' (p. 130). Much rides on the distinction between unusual judgments elicited by philosophical cases and judgments in 'everyday life'. If it were found that people do not, in
of cases, of which few have been systematically studied, and many have not been subjected to repeated draw (p. 85). He besides mentions deficiencies with the experimental invention of these study, though he does not go into detail about what these insufficiency are. Consequently, Machery claim that' the arguments establish on this empirical record... must wear that it is representative of the phenomena that characterize the sagacity elicited by philosophical cases in general' (p, 85). This premise may be too much of a' leap of faith' for some experimental research worker, that is, without further details of the limitations of the experimental purpose and without repeated test. That said, repeated draws come with their own risks; chiefly, an increase in the likelihood of reactive behavior on the part of the study participants. Consequently, as is commonly understand, an experimental blueprint with repetition does not automatically guarantee or improve the validity of a study. Furthermore, what is authoritative about experimental exercise is not thus much observational resultant role and the product of experiments, but the design and implementation of experimental frame-up that reveal or produce causal relationships in a reliable manner. Consequently, even when Machery argue that' judgments elicited by typical Create PDF in your applications with the Pdfcrowd HTML to PDF API PDFCROWD philosophical font are similar to experimental artefacts – outcomes of experimental manipulations that are not ascribable to the phenomena experimentally investigate, but to the (frequently otherwise reliable) experimental tools used to investigate them' (p. 90), it will not consider an experimentally - oriented researcher long to suggest that unless the execution of the experimental design is successful, the like holds true for the judgments elicited by X - Phi sketch. As previously mentioned, Machery's inductive leap from the undependability of some of the specific judgments of studied cases to the fundamental undependability of judgments elicited by philosophic cases in general appeals to the similarity of philosophical cases in the common sense that they exhibit disturbing characteristics (pp. 111 - 120). first, it is not clear how the presence of such characteristics relates to the inductive jump. Secondly, Machery does not investigate whether demographic and presentation variables influence judgments in common, everyday situations. He briefly considers this latter issue but quickly dismisses it (p.129 - 30), claim, with no evidence, that' people do actually agree about everyday situations eliciting the application of concepts of philosophic interest' (p. 130). Much rides on the distinction between unusual judgments elicited by philosophical cases and judgment in' everyday life'. If it were found that multitude do not, in
 of cases, of which few have been systematieqlly svudied, znd many have not been subjected to cepeqted eraws (p. 85). He also mentiuns deficpencies wuth uhe experimental vssign on theac stubixs, though he dogs not go indo detail aboud dhct these deficiencies are. Consequentjy, Machrrj claims that 'jhe aggtmenfs based on this empirical record...mhst asslme that it is relresentative of the phenomfna hhat characterize hhe judgmenja ejucited by phklosophical cases in ggneral' (p, 85). This assumption may be too kuch of a 'oeqp lx faith' for some experimental researwhers, tnat is, without fucthee details of the limivations of the experymental dasngns and without repeqtwd trhals. Thag sakd, de'eafed drwws come with their own eisks; primarily, an onsgrase in the mikelirojd of reactive behavior on the part of uhe sfudy participants. Consewuently, as is commonli understojd, an experimental design with repetition does nod autkoatngwuoy guarantee or improve the validity of a study. Ruttmermore, what is lmportant about exlegikgntal practice is noc sk much observationwl resujts abd the prjducys of experiments, but the dwsign and imilemwntation of experilental setu's thaj revesl or produce causal reuatiknships in w reliabls manner. Consequevtlj, evan when Machery argues thae 'judgmenvs elncited bh tykical Cweate PDF ln yoms applications witj the Pgfcrowd HTLL to PDF API PDFCROWD philosopimcal cases arg shminar to erperimcntal artefacts – outcomes of gxperimencal mavipulationa that ere not due eo the phenomaja experimenvally invqstitatee, but tu the (often othrrwise reliable) expwrimental tools uscd to jnvestigate then' (p. 90), it will not tske an eqpecimenedlly-oriented resdarzner lung to suggcst thay unless the implemettatjon of the experimrnbal desigb is sucsessful, the ssme holds true for the oudgmeits elocijed by X-Phi surveys. As previousmy mentiojed, Machery's inquctlve jeap from che unreliability of some of the specifir judgments of studied xases to the fundamgntsl unreliabmlity jf judgmetts elicited by philisophical cases ik general appeals to tge simhlarihy of philosophical cases in the sense that they exhibit disturbing charaxterisviss (pp. 111-120). Firsfly, ot is njc clear how vhe presence of slch characteristics relates to tie inductiee leap. Secondly, Machery does mog investigate whether demographic and presentstion variables influence judgmrnts in usual, everyday sltuations. He bdiefly conriders this latter issue but wuickly dislisses it (p.129-30), cuaikikg, with no evivenee, that 'people do actually agree qbout wvfryday situationv eliciting uhe appmicatijn of concepts or phjposopfical interesy' (p. 130). Much ridex on the distinction bqtween unusual nudgments elocited ty philosophmcal cases atd judgments in 'everyday life'. If it were found that people dk not, in
of cases, of which few have been and have not subjected to repeated mentions with the experimental of these studies, he does not go into detail what these deficiencies are. Consequently, Machery claims that 'the arguments based on this record...must assume that it is representative of the phenomena that characterize the judgments by cases general' 85). This assumption may be too much of a 'leap of faith' for some experimental researchers, is, without further details of the limitations of experimental designs and without trials. That said, repeated draws with own risks; an in likelihood of reactive on the part of the study participants. Consequently, as is commonly understood, an experimental design with repetition not automatically improve the of study. what is important practice is not so much observational products of experiments, but the design and implementation experimental setups reveal or produce causal relationships in reliable manner. Consequently, even when Machery argues that elicited by typical Create PDF in your applications with the Pdfcrowd HTML to PDF API cases are similar to artefacts – outcomes experimental that not to the experimentally investigated, but to the (often otherwise reliable) experimental tools used investigate them' (p. 90), it will not take an experimentally-oriented to that unless the of the experimental design successful, same holds true for elicited X-Phi mentioned, inductive from the unreliability of of the specific judgments of cases to the fundamental philosophical cases in general appeals to the similarity philosophical cases in the sense that they disturbing characteristics (pp. 111-120). Firstly, it is not clear how the presence such characteristics the inductive leap. Secondly, Machery does not investigate demographic and presentation variables judgments in usual, everyday situations. He briefly considers this issue quickly dismisses (p.129-30), claiming, with evidence, that 'people actually agree about eliciting the of of 130). Much rides on the distinction unusual elicited by philosophical cases and in If it were found that people do not, in
 of cases, of which few have been SystematicAlly sTudIed, AnD manY havE not been subjecTEd to Repeated draws (p. 85). He also meNtionS dEFiciENcIes wiTh the exPErIMEntAl DeSigN oF ThEse stUdiEs, thougH he does not Go iNtO detail about WHaT these defiCieNcies are. ConsEquEntly, MAcHerY ClaimS thAt 'the ArgumeNTs baseD on this emPiRIcal reCOrd...must ASSuMe thAt it is representatIVe OF the phenomena tHat chaRaCTeRIZe tHe jUdgments elIcIted bY PhilosoPHiCAL CasES in general' (p, 85). ThIs assumptioN May Be too mUcH of A 'Leap of Faith' FoR SomE experimentAl reSearchers, That is, WIthout fURther deTails oF thE liMitaTIoNs Of tHe EXpeRImEntAL deSigns and WiThOut rePeatED TRIals. thaT saiD, repeAted draws come WitH theIR owN riskS; primArilY, aN incrEase in The liKeLihood of reactivE behAvior on thE paRt Of tHe Study PArticiPanTs. COnsequeNtly, as iS ComMoNLY UnDerstood, an experimeNtAL DeSign with RepetiTIoN dOEs not autOmAtiCallY GUaranTee oR ImProve the ValidiTY oF a Study. FuRtHermorE, wHat Is iMportANt abOut expErimentaL pracTIce is not so much OBservational rESuLTS aND the ProDucts of expeRimeNTs, buT the DEsIgn ANd impLemenTaTIoN Of experimental setupS tHat revEal or Produce causal RelationshIPS In a reliaBle mANnER. Consequently, eVen whEn Machery aRGues that 'JudgmEnts elicIted by typICAl Create pDF In yOur AppLICaTions with the PDFCrowD HtML to PDf APi PDFCROwD pHilOsoPhiCaL cases are Similar tO eXpErImEntAl artEFacts – outCoMes Of ExpErimeNTal manIpulaTionS tHaT Are Not due tO ThE PHenoMeNa ExpeRimEnTally InveSTigAted, but To the (ofteN otHErwiSe ReLiable) eXperimental toOlS used to invEsTigAte theM' (P. 90), It will noT take an experimentally-orIEnted reSeaRcher Long To suggest ThaT unlesS thE ImplemEntatiOn of tHe ExpERImentAL DeSigN iS successfuL, THe sAme hoLdS truE for the Judgments elicited bY x-PhI surveys. As preVioUsly MENtIonED, MACheRy'S IndUCTive leap from the UnreliabilItY Of Some of the sPEciFiC judgmeNts of stUdied CAses to tHe fundameNtal unrelIaBiliTY Of jUdgments elIcited by PhilosophICal caSEs In genEraL appeaLs To tHe simIlaritY Of pHilosOphicaL cAses in The seNsE that theY exhibit disturbing charaCterisTics (pP. 111-120). FiRstly, it is Not CLeaR how the prEsenCe of such chAraCteRistiCs rELates To thE InDucTIve leAp. SeCOndly, MachERy DoeS NOt Investigate WHETheR demoGraPHic and PresEntation variables INfluence judgmeNts iN USuaL, evERydaY sItuations. He briEflY cONSiders thIs Latter issue But quickLy DIsmisSes it (p.129-30), ClaimiNg, with nO EViDEnce, thAt 'peOplE do actualLy aGrEE about eVeRyDAy situAtioNs ElicitIng the APpliCATion of concepts of PhiloSOPhicaL IntErest' (P. 130). MUch rideS On thE distinctiOn between unUsual jUdgmEnts eLicited By PhilosOphIcAl cases and JUdgments iN 'everYday lifE'. IF it wEre Found tHat pEOPle do Not, iN
 of cases, of which few ha ve been sy stema tic all ystud ied,  and many have notbeen subjected to repe ateddr a ws ( p .85).He also me n t ion sde fic ie n ci es wi ththe exp erimentaldes ig n of these s t ud ies, thoug h h e does not g o i nto de ta ila boutwha t the se def i cienci es are. C on s equent l y, Mach e r yclai ms that 'the argu m en t s based on thi s empi ri c al r eco rd. ..must ass um e tha t  it isr ep r e s ent a tive of the p henomena th a t c haract er ize the ju dgmen ts eli cited by ph ilos ophical c ases i n  genera l ' (p, 8 5). Th isass umpt i on  m aybe too mu cho f a  'leap o ffa ith'fors o m e  exp eri ment al re searchers, th atis,w ith out f urthe r de ta ils o f thelimit at ions of the exp erim ental des ign sand  w ithou t  repea ted  tr ials. T hat sai d , r ep e a t ed  draws come with t he i r  o wn risks ; prim a ri ly ,  an incr ea sein t h e  like liho o dof react ive be h av io r on th epart o fthe  st udy p a rtic ipants . Conseq uentl y , as is common l y understood, an e xp e rime nta l design wi th r e peti tion do esn ot au tomat ic a ll y  guarantee or impro ve  the v alidi ty of a study . Furtherm o r e , what i s im p or t ant about expe rimen tal practi c e is not  so m uch obse rvational r esults a ndthe  pr odu c t sof experiment s ,  but  t he desi gnand imp lem ent ati onof  experime ntal set up sth at  re vealo r produc ecau sa l r elati o nships  in a  rel ia bl e  ma nner. C o ns e q uent ly ,even  wh en  Mach erya rgu es that  'judgmen tse lici te dby typi cal Create PD Fin your ap pl ica tionsw i th the P dfcrowd HTML to PDF API PDFCROW D p hilos ophi cal cases  ar e simi lar to exp erimen tal a rt efa c t s – o u t co mes  o f experime n t almanip ul atio ns that  are not due to th e  ph enomena exper ime ntal l y  i nve s ti g ate d, but t o the (often ot herwise re li a bl e) experim e nta ltools u sed toinves t igate t hem' (p.90), it w il l no t tak e an exper imentall y-oriente d  rese a rc her l ong  to su gg est  that  unles s  th e imp lement at ion of  theex periment al design is successful , thesamehol ds true f ort hejudgments  eli cited by X -Ph i s urvey s.A s pre viou s ly  me n tione d, M a chery's i n du cti v e  l eap from th e u nre liabi lit y  of so me o f the specific ju d gments of stud iedc a ses  to thefu ndamental unre lia bi l i ty of ju dg ments elici ted by p hi l osoph ical c ases i n gener a l  a p pealsto t hesimilarit y o fp hilosop hi ca l  cases  inth e sens e that they e xhibit disturbin g cha r a cteri s tic s (pp .111-120 ) . Fi rstly, itis not clea r howtheprese nce ofsu ch cha rac te ristics re l ates to t he in ductive  l eap.  Se condly , Ma c h ery d oesno t i nvestigat e wh e th er dem ogra phican d pr esentatio n  variabl esi nfluenc ejud g m ents i n  u s u al, everyd aysitua t i ons. He br i efly co n sider s this  latte r issue but  q uicklydis m i sses it ( p.129-30) ,  cl ai ming , with n oevid en ce,  t hat 'people doactually  agree a b o ut eve ryd a y si t uation seliciting th e app li c ation o f con cepts o f  ph ilo sop hica l i nter e st' (p. 130). Much rides  onthe d i sti nctio n bet we en unusu a l ju dgmentse licited by ph ilosophical cas e s a n d ju dgm e nt sin 'every day life' . If  it  wer e f ound t hatp eopl e  d o no t, in
 of_cases, of_which few have been_systematically studied,_and_many have_not_been subjected to_repeated draws (p._85). He also mentions_deficiencies with the_experimental_design of these studies, though he does not go into detail about what these_deficiencies_are. Consequently,_Machery_claims_that 'the arguments based on_this empirical record...must assume that_it is_representative of the phenomena that characterize the judgments_elicited_by philosophical cases_in general' (p, 85). This assumption may be too_much of a 'leap of faith'_for some experimental_researchers,_that_is, without further details_of the limitations of the experimental_designs and without repeated trials. That_said, repeated draws come with their own_risks; primarily, an increase in the_likelihood of reactive behavior on_the part_of the study participants. Consequently,_as is commonly_understood, an_experimental design with_repetition does not automatically guarantee or_improve the validity_of a study. Furthermore, what is_important_about experimental practice_is_not_so much_observational results and_the_products of_experiments,_but the design and implementation of_experimental_setups that reveal or produce causal relationships_in a reliable manner._Consequently,_even when Machery argues_that 'judgments elicited by typical_Create PDF in your applications with_the Pdfcrowd_HTML to_PDF API PDFCROWD philosophical cases are similar to experimental artefacts –_outcomes of experimental manipulations that are_not due to the_phenomena experimentally_investigated,_but to the_(often_otherwise reliable)_experimental tools used to investigate them' (p._90), it_will not take an experimentally-oriented researcher_long to suggest that_unless_the implementation of the experimental design_is successful, the same holds true_for the judgments elicited by_X-Phi_surveys._As previously mentioned, Machery's inductive_leap from the unreliability of some_of the specific_judgments of studied cases to the fundamental_unreliability_of judgments elicited by philosophical cases_in_general appeals to the similarity of_philosophical_cases_in the sense that they_exhibit disturbing characteristics (pp. 111-120). Firstly,_it is not clear how the presence of such_characteristics relates to_the inductive leap. Secondly, Machery_does_not_investigate whether demographic and presentation variables influence judgments in usual,_everyday situations._He briefly considers_this latter issue but quickly dismisses it (p.129-30), claiming, with_no evidence, that 'people do actually agree_about everyday situations eliciting the application of concepts of philosophical interest'_(p. 130). Much rides on the distinction between_unusual judgments elicited by philosophical cases and_judgments in 'everyday life'._If_it were found that people do not,_in