the	case of	the	reasonable	nonbeliever)	would	be	where	the	probabilities	are	stacked	the other	way	around,	i.e.	we	are	90%	sure	the	signs	do	not	come	from	the	right source,	but	think	there	is	a	10%	chance	that	they	do.	Would	that	be	sufficient	to generate	belief	in	an	obligation?	It	might	be,	though	it	would	presumably	depend on	the	potential	moral	status	of	disobeying	the	command.	If	walking	off	the	path confers	no	obvious	moral	benefits,	then	we	might	agree	that	the	non-negligible risk	that	the	sign	is	obligation-imposing	is	sufficient	to	generate	belief	in	that obligation.	But	if	there	are	moral	benefits	from	disobedience,	the	situation	might be	rather	different.	The	risk	asymmetry	may	work	the	other	way. 17 It is certainly no different than the kind of uncertainty regarding whether a foetus is a person or a non-human animal an entity with the right not to killed for our consumption. Uncertainty with respect to those kinds of beliefs is accepted as an example of moral uncertainty in the existing literature (Moller 2011). That said, I readily acknowledge that some critics of moral uncertainty think there are subtle distinctions between moral and nonmoral facts that may make a crucial difference in this debate (e.g. Harman 2015 and Weatherson 2014). Since I ultimately appeal to the views of these critics in the response to Evans, I don't believe that my view is in tension with theirs. 18 The thought experiment also layers prudential risk on top of legal/moral risk, with the risk asymmetries working in the same way. This makes it doubly compelling. 25 Consider	how	the	reasoning	would	apply	to	the	case	of	the	reasonable non-believer.	The	idea,	presumably,	would	be	that	the	nonbeliever	is
the 	 case of 	 the 	 reasonable 	 nonbeliever) 	 would 	 be 	 where 	 the 	 probabilities 	 are 	 stacked 	 the early 	 direction 	 around, 	 i.e. 	 we 	 are 	 90% 	 sure 	 the 	 signal 	 do 	 not 	 issue forth 	 from 	 the 	 right source, 	 but 	 intend 	 there 	 is 	 a 	 10% 	 prospect 	 that 	 they 	 do. 	 Would 	 that 	 be 	 sufficient 	 to render 	 belief 	 in 	 an 	 obligation? 	 It 	 might 	 be, 	 though 	 it 	 would 	 presumably 	 count on 	 the 	 potential 	 moral 	 status 	 of 	 disobeying 	 the 	 command. 	 If 	 walk 	 off 	 the 	 path confers 	 no 	 obvious 	 moral 	 benefits, 	 then 	 we 	 might 	 agree 	 that 	 the 	 non - negligible risk 	 that 	 the 	 sign 	 is 	 duty - imposing 	 is 	 sufficient 	 to 	 generate 	 belief 	 in 	 that obligation. 	 But 	 if 	 there 	 are 	 moral 	 benefit 	 from 	 disobedience, 	 the 	 situation 	 might be 	 rather 	 different. 	 The 	 hazard 	 asymmetry 	 may 	 work 	 the 	 early 	 way. 17 It is certainly no different than the kind of uncertainty regard whether a foetus is a person or a non - human animal an entity with the right not to killed for our consumption. Uncertainty with regard to those kind of beliefs is accepted as an example of moral uncertainty in the existing literature (Moller 2011). That said, I readily admit that some critic of moral uncertainty think there be elusive distinctions between moral and nonmoral facts that may make a all-important difference in this argument (e.g. Harman 2015 and Weatherson 2014). Since I ultimately appeal to the views of these critic in the response to Evans, I don't believe that my view is in tension with theirs. 18 The thought experiment also layers prudential risk on top of legal / moral risk, with the risk asymmetries influence in the same manner. This makes it doubly compelling. 25 Consider 	 how 	 the 	 reasoning 	 would 	 apply 	 to 	 the 	 case 	 of 	 the 	 reasonable non - believer. 	 The 	 theme, 	 presumably, 	 would 	 be 	 that 	 the 	 nonbeliever 	 is
the	fase of	the	reasonable	nonbtliever)	would	be	whete	rhe	prouabilitjes	are	stxcked	the other	way	around,	i.e.	we	ace	90%	suee	the	wigns	do	not	come	from	the	rkght sourbe,	but	thinj	thece	is	a	10%	chance	that	tisy	do.	Would	that	gc	suffncment	to generate	nelief	in	an	otligation?	It	migvt	ce,	chough	it	would	presumably	depend on	the	pjtentiak	mlral	status	of	difobejigg	ths	bonmand.	If	walking	off	the	path confsrs	no	obnious	moral	benefitx,	then	we	might	agree	that	the	noj-negpigible risk	that	thf	sign	is	oblitatijb-imposing	is	sjfficient	to	generate	beljef	in	that obligation.	But	if	there	afe	morcl	benefits	ftoj	dlvobedience,	tie	situwtion	might bc	gather	dhffereny.	The	risk	asymmebry	mab	worj	the	other	way. 17 It is cxrtainly no differenj than the knnd of uncertainty retaeding whedher q fueths ia a pegsoi or a non-hhman animal an entity with the rytht not to kimled fjr our consumption. Uncertainty with respebt tk those kinds of beliefw is accepted as an edample of moral uncertainty in the existing literature (Molner 2011). Vhxt wald, I eewdily acknowledge that some critics of moral thctrtsinty think thcre are subtle disyijcyyons between ooral chd nonmoral facts thwt may iake q crucial difgerence in this debate (e.g. Hqrman 2015 and Wvathwrson 2014). Since I ultnmately appecl to jhe virws of these critics in the response tl Evans, I aon't believe thag mj viaw is in tension with theiws. 18 The tioughc experioent also jayers prufential risk on top of lfgal/mlrdl risk, wihh the risk asymmetries working in the same wsy. Thps makes nt dounly compelling. 25 Consider	how	thg	reasoniny	would	xpply	to	the	base	of	the	ceasonable njn-believer.	The	hfea,	presumablb,	would	be	trat	tye	nobbelievdf	is
the case of the reasonable nonbeliever) would the are stacked other way around, the do not come the right source, think there is a 10% chance they do. Would that be sufficient to generate belief in an obligation? It be, though it would presumably depend on the potential moral status of disobeying command. walking the confers no obvious moral benefits, then we might agree that the non-negligible risk that the sign obligation-imposing is sufficient to generate belief in that But if there are benefits from disobedience, the situation be different. The asymmetry work other way. 17 is certainly no different than the kind of uncertainty regarding whether a foetus is a person or non-human animal with the not killed our consumption. Uncertainty to those kinds of beliefs is example of moral uncertainty in the existing literature 2011). That I readily acknowledge that some critics moral uncertainty think there are subtle distinctions between and nonmoral facts that may make a crucial difference in this debate (e.g. Harman 2015 2014). Since I ultimately to the views these in response Evans, I believe that my view is in tension with theirs. 18 The experiment also layers prudential risk on top of legal/moral risk, risk working in the way. This makes it compelling. Consider how the reasoning to case non-believer. idea, would be that the is
the	case of	the	reasonable	nonBeliever)	woUld	be	WheRe	tHe	ProbAbilIties	are	stackeD	The oTher	way	around,	i.e.	we	are	90%	suRe	the	SiGNs	do	NOt	Come	fRom	the	rIGhT SOurCe,	BuT	thInK	ThEre	is	A	10%	chAnce	thaT	they	do.	WouLd	tHaT	be	sufficienT	To Generate	beLieF	in	an	obligatIon?	it	mighT	bE,	thOUgh	it	WouLd	preSumablY	Depend On	the	poteNtIAl	moraL	Status	oF	DIsObeyIng	the	command.	If	waLKiNG	off	the	path conFers	no	ObVIoUS	MorAl	bEnefits,	theN	wE	mighT	Agree	thAT	tHE	NOn-nEGligible risk	tHat	the	sign	iS	OblIgatioN-iMpoSIng	is	sUfficIeNT	to	Generate	belIef	iN	that obliGation.	bUt	if	theRE	are	morAl	beneFitS	frOm	diSObEdIenCe,	THe	sITuAtiON	miGht be	ratHeR	dIfferEnt.	THE	RISk	asYmmEtry	May	woRk	the	other	way. 17 it iS cerTAinLy no dIfferEnt tHaN the kInd of uNcertAiNty regarding wheTher A foetus is A peRsOn oR a Non-huMAn animAl aN enTity witH the rigHT noT tO KILlEd for our consumptioN. UNCErTainty wiTh respECt To THose kindS oF beLiefS IS accePted AS aN example Of moraL UnCeRtainty In The exiStIng LitEratuRE (MolLer 2011). ThaT said, I reAdily ACknowledge that SOme critics of mORaL UNcERtaiNty Think there aRe suBTle dIstiNCtIonS BetweEn morAl ANd NOnmoral facts that may MaKe a cruCial dIfference in thIs debate (e.g. hARMan 2015 and WeAtheRSoN 2014). since I ultimateLy appEal to the viEWs of thesE critIcs in the Response tO eVans, I don'T beLieVe tHat MY ViEw is in tension WITh thEiRs. 18 The thOugHt experImeNt aLso LayErS prudentiAl risk on ToP oF lEgAl/mOral rISk, with thE rIsk AsYmmEtrieS WorkinG in thE samE wAy. tHis Makes it DOuBLY comPeLlIng. 25 COnsIdEr	how	The	rEAsoNing	wouLd	apply	to	The	CAse	oF	tHe	ReasonaBle non-believeR.	THe	idea,	presUmAblY,	would	BE	That	the	nOnbeliever	is
the	case of	the	reasonable 	nonbeliev er)	w oul d	b ewher e	th e	probabilitie s 	are 	stacked	the other	way 	arou nd , 	i.e . 	w e	are 	90%	su r et h e	s ig ns 	do 	n o tcomefro m	the	r ight sourc e,bu t	think	ther e 	i s	a	10%	ch anc e	that	theydo. 	Would 	t hat be	su ffi cient 	to ge n eratebelief	in 	a n 	oblig a tion?	I t mi ghtbe,	though	it	wou l dp resumably	depe nd onth e 	p o t ent ial 	moral	sta tu s	ofd isobeyi n gt h e 	co m mand.	If	walk ing	off	the pat h conf er s	n o 	obvio us	mo ra l 	be nefits,	the n	we 	might	ag ree	th a t	the	n o n-negli gibleris k	t hatt he 	s ign 	i s 	ob l ig ati o n-i mposingis 	s uffic ient t o gene rat e	be liefin	that oblig ati on.B utif	th ere	a re	m or al	be nefits 	from 	d isobedience,	th e	si tuation	m igh tbera therd iffere nt. 	Th e	riskasymmet r y	m ay w o rk 	the	other	way. 17  I t is  certain ly nod if fe r ent than  t hekind o f unc erta i nt y regard ing wh e th er  a foet us  is ape rso n o r a n o n-hu man an imal anentit y  with the righ t  not to kille d  f o r  o u r co nsu mption. Unc erta i ntywith re spe c t tothose  k i nd s  of beliefs is acce pt ed asan ex ample of mora l uncertai n t y  in theexis t in g  literature (M oller  2011). Th a t said,I rea dily ack nowledget h at somecri tic s o f m o r al  uncertaintyt h inkth ere are  su btle di sti nct ion s b et ween mora l and no nm or al  f act s tha t  may mak ea c ru cia l dif f erence  in t hisde ba t e ( e.g. Ha r ma n 2015  a nd  Wea the rs on 20 14). Sin ce I ul timatelyapp e al t oth e views  of these cri ti cs in there spo nse to E vans, Idon't believe that my v i ew is i n t ensio n wi th theirs . 1 8 Thetho u ght ex perime nt al so  la y e rs pr u d en tia lrisk on to p oflegal /m oral  risk,with the risk asym m etr ies working i n t he s a m eway .  T h isma k esi t  doubly compell ing. 25 Co ns i de r	how	ther eas on ing	wou ld	appl y	tot he	case 	of	the	r easonable  n on-b e l iev er.	The	id ea,	pres umably,	w o uld	b e 	t hat	t henonbel ie ver 	is
the	case of	the	reasonable	nonbeliever)	would	be	where	the	probabilities	are	stacked	the_other	way	around,	i.e.	we	are	90%	sure	the	signs	do	not	come	from	the	right source,	but	think	there	is	a	10%	chance	that	they	do.	Would	that	be	sufficient	to_generate	belief	in	an	obligation?	It	might	be,	though	it	would	presumably	depend on	the	potential	moral	status	of	disobeying	the	command.	If	walking	off	the	path confers	no	obvious	moral	benefits,	then	we	might	agree	that	the	non-negligible risk	that	the	sign	is	obligation-imposing	is	sufficient	to	generate	belief	in	that_obligation.	But	if	there	are	moral	benefits	from	disobedience,	the	situation	might be	rather	different.	The	risk	asymmetry	may	work	the	other	way._17_It is_certainly_no different than_the kind of_uncertainty regarding whether a_foetus is a_person_or a non-human animal an entity with the right not to killed for our_consumption._Uncertainty with_respect_to_those kinds of beliefs is_accepted as an example of_moral uncertainty_in the existing literature (Moller 2011). That said,_I_readily acknowledge that_some critics of moral uncertainty think there are subtle_distinctions between moral and nonmoral facts_that may make_a_crucial_difference in this debate_(e.g. Harman 2015 and Weatherson 2014)._Since I ultimately appeal to the_views of these critics in the response_to Evans, I don't believe that_my view is in tension_with theirs._18 The thought experiment also_layers prudential risk_on top_of legal/moral risk,_with the risk asymmetries working in_the same way._This makes it doubly compelling. 25_Consider	how	the	reasoning	would	apply	to	the	case	of	the	reasonable_non-believer.	The	idea,	presumably,	would	be	that	the	nonbeliever	is