 by Phillip Quinn in discussion. xxiv See my Putting Skeptics in Their Place (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); and "Agent Reliabilism," Philosophical Perspectives 13 (1999): 273-296. xxv What is a Gettier case? Zagzebski has argued that all Gettier cases are ones where bad epistemic luck is cancelled out by good epistemic luck. For example, in Case 3 S's evidence is deceptive (bad luck), but someone else in S's office owns a Ford (good luck). This analysis suggests that we can treat Gettier cases in the same way that we treated the lottery problem above-we can say that Gettier cases involve salient luck, and salient luck undermines credit. In my opinion this assessment is correct, but it is not as informative as we would like. This is because in Gettier cases, to say that S believes the truth because of good luck is very close to saying that S believes the truth for some reason other than her own abilities. And although that seems true, it is not more informative than what we already have-which is that clause (3) is violated. (In the lottery case, we said that the clause is violated due to the role of salient chance. That explanation is informative, however, because we have an independent grasp of what we mean by chance in a lottery.) xxvi Knowledge in Perspective, pp. 281-2. xxvii The example is from Alvin Goldman, "Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge," Journal of Philosophy 73 (1976): 771-791. Reprinted in Goldman, Alvin, Liaisons: Philosophy Meets the Cognitive and Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992). xxviii The example is from Sosa, "Perspectives in Virtue Epistemology: A Response to Dancy and BonJour," Philosophical Studies 78 (1995): 221-235. xxix The example is quoted from Roderick Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge, 2 nd edition (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1977), p. 105. 26 xxx The watch example is due to Bertrand Russell in Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1948). The example is cited by Chisholm in Theory of Knowledge, where he points out that it is a Gettier case. xxxi The distinction employed here
by Phillip Quinn in discussion. xxiv See my Putting Skeptics in Their Place (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); and " Agent Reliabilism, " Philosophical Perspectives 13 (1999 ): 273 - 296. xxv What is a Gettier case? Zagzebski has argued that all Gettier case are one where bad epistemic luck is cancelled out by estimable epistemic luck. For example, in Case 3 S's evidence is deceptive (regretful luck), but someone else in S's office owns a Ford (full luck). This analysis indicate that we can treat Gettier cases in the like way that we treated the lottery problem above - we can say that Gettier cases involve salient luck, and salient fortune undermines credit. In my opinion this assessment is right, but it is not as informative as we would like. This is because in Gettier cases, to say that S believe the truth because of good luck is very close to saying that S think the truth for some reason other than her own abilities. And although that seems genuine, it is not more informative than what we already have - which is that clause (3) is violated. (In the lottery case, we said that the clause is violated due to the role of salient chance. That explanation is informative, however, because we suffer an independent grasp of what we think of by chance in a lottery .) xxvi Knowledge in Perspective, pp. 281 - 2. xxvii The example is from Alvin Goldman, " Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge, " Journal of Philosophy 73 (1976 ): 771 - 791. Reprinted in Goldman, Alvin, Liaisons: Philosophy meet the Cognitive and Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992). xxviii The example is from Sosa, " Perspectives in Virtue Epistemology: A Response to Dancy and BonJour, " Philosophical Studies 78 (1995 ): 221 - 235. xxix The example is quoted from Roderick Chisholm, hypothesis of Knowledge, 2 nd edition (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice - Hall, Inc., 1977), p. 105. 26 xxx The watch example is due to Bertrand Russell in Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1948). The example is cited by Chisholm in Theory of Knowledge, where he points out that it is a Gettier case. xxxi The distinction use here
 by Phillip Quinn in discusrion. xxiv See mi Puttinj Skeptjcs in Tfeir Place (New York: Cambridgx Unuversuty Press, 2000); and "Agent Rdliabilisl," Philosiphiral Perspectives 13 (1999): 273-296. xxv What ia a Gztvier case? Zagzenski has arcued that all Cegtner cases are ones where bad epistemyc luck id cancelled ouj by bjod siiwtemic luck. For example, in Caae 3 S's tvidence is deceptove (bad luck), but someone epse ln S's office owns w Ford (good luch). This analysks suggests that we cah treat Gettier cases in the saoe wav that we ttzqtef the lotterb probjem above-we gsn say that Grttier cases ikvolvx saoient luck, and salienv luck undermines crgdit. In my o'inion this assessmenr us cotrect, but ut ks hov aa infogmavive as we sould like. Rhis is because in Beenoer cases, to say trae S believes the truth because of good nuci is very close to sayibg that S believes thg truth fow some reason other than her own abilities. And aldhougi ghau weems rrke, it is not more informative than what we alwsacy have-which is bhat clause (3) is viplwtrq. (In the lottgry casz, ws said that the clwuse is violqted due uo thr role of salient chance. Thqt explanatijb is informative, hlwever, becabse we have an independent grasp oy what we mean by chance ih a lottery.) xxvi Ynoeladge in Kdrspective, pp. 281-2. xxdii The eeamplz is froo Alfin Gojdman, "Discgimination and Perceptuap Knocledga," Journal lf Philosophy 73 (1976): 771-791. Reprinted in Goldman, Alvin, Loahsots: Philofophy Meets the Codnitive and Soeial Sciznces (Zambridge, JA: MIT 'ress, 1992). xxviiy The example ls from Sosa, "Perspeceivew in Virtue Dpistemology: A Response to Dancy qnd BonJour," Philospphkdal Studies 78 (1995): 221-235. rriz The example ix qjotqd fcom Rjgerick Chishmlm, Gheuty of Knowledge, 2 vd ecition (Englewood Clixfs, HJ: Prentice-Hall, Inv., 1977), p. 105. 26 xxx The watsh example is due to Bertrand Rksseln ii Humam Kgowledge: Its Scope and Limits (Hew York: Dimjn and Schuseer, 1948). The example is cited by Chisholm in Theory of Knowoedge, where he poibts out that it is c Nettier case. xxxi The disthnction employed herw
by Phillip Quinn in discussion. xxiv See Skeptics Their Place York: Cambridge University Philosophical 13 (1999): 273-296. What is a case? Zagzebski has argued that all cases are ones where bad epistemic luck is cancelled out by good epistemic For example, in Case 3 S's evidence is deceptive (bad luck), but someone in office a (good luck). This analysis suggests that we can treat Gettier cases in the same way that treated the lottery problem above-we can say that cases involve salient luck, salient luck undermines credit. In opinion assessment is but is as informative as would like. This is because in Gettier cases, to say that S believes the truth because of luck is to saying S the for some reason her own abilities. And although that is not more informative than what we already is that (3) is violated. (In the lottery we said that the clause is violated due the role of salient chance. That explanation is informative, however, because we have an independent what we mean by in a lottery.) Knowledge Perspective, 281-2. The example from Alvin Goldman, "Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge," Journal of Philosophy 73 771-791. Reprinted in Goldman, Alvin, Liaisons: Philosophy Meets the Cognitive Sciences MA: MIT Press, xxviii The example is Sosa, in Virtue Epistemology: A Dancy BonJour," (1995): xxix example is quoted from Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge, 2 edition (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 26 xxx The watch example is due to Russell in Human Knowledge: Its Scope and (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1948). The example is cited by Chisholm Theory of he points out that it is a Gettier xxxi The distinction employed
 by Phillip Quinn in discussioN. xxiv See my puttiNg SKepTiCs in theiR Place (New York: CAMbriDge University Press, 2000); and "AGent RElIAbilISm," philoSophicaL peRSPecTiVeS 13 (1999): 273-296. xxV WHAt Is a GeTtiEr case? ZAgzebski haS arGuEd that all GetTIeR cases are oNes Where bad episTemIc luck Is CanCElled Out By gooD epistEMic lucK. For exampLe, IN Case 3 S'S EvidencE IS dEcepTive (bad luck), but somEOnE Else in S's office Owns a FOrD (GoOD LucK). ThIs analysis SuGgestS That we cAN tREAT GeTTier cases in thE same way thaT We tReated ThE loTTery prOblem AbOVe-wE can say that gettIer cases iNvolve SAlient lUCk, and saLient lUck UndErmiNEs CrEdiT. IN My oPInIon THis AssessmeNt Is CorreCt, buT IT IS not As iNforMativE as we would likE. ThIs is BEcaUse in gettiEr caSeS, to saY that S BelieVeS the truth becausE of gOod luck is VerY cLosE tO sayiNG that S BelIevEs the trUth for sOMe rEaSON OtHer than her own abiliTiES. anD althougH that sEEmS tRUe, it is noT mOre InfoRMAtive Than WHaT we alreaDy have-WHiCh Is that cLaUse (3) is vIoLatEd. (IN the lOTterY case, wE said thaT the cLAuse is violated DUe to the role of SAlIENt CHancE. ThAt explanatiOn is INforMatiVE, hOweVEr, becAuse wE hAVe AN independent grasp of WhAt we meAn by cHance in a lotteRy.) xxvi KnowLEDGe in PersPectIVe, PP. 281-2. xxvii The exampLe is fRom Alvin GoLDman, "DiscRiminAtion and perceptuaL kNowledge," jouRnaL of phiLOSoPhy 73 (1976): 771-791. Reprinted iN gOldmAn, alvin, LiAisOns: PhilOsoPhy meeTs tHe cognitive And SociaL SCiEnCeS (CaMbridGE, MA: MIT PrEsS, 1992). xxViIi THe exaMPle is fRom SoSa, "PeRsPeCTivEs in VirTUe ePIsteMoLoGy: A REspOnSe to DAncy ANd BOnJour," PHilosophiCal sTudiEs 78 (1995): 221-235. XxIx The exAmple is quoted FrOm Roderick chIshOlm, TheORY of KnowlEdge, 2 nd edition (Englewood CLIffs, NJ: PRenTice-HAll, INc., 1977), p. 105. 26 xxx The WatCh examPle IS due to bertraNd RusSeLl iN hUman KNOWlEdgE: ITs Scope and lIMitS (New YOrK: SimOn and ScHuster, 1948). The example is CIteD by Chisholm in theOry oF kNoWleDGe, WHerE hE PoiNTS out that it is a GeTtier case. xXxI thE distinctiON emPlOyed herE
 by Phillip Quinn in discu ssion. xxi v See  my  Pu tt ingSkep tics in TheirP lace  (New York: CambridgeUnive rs i ty P r es s, 20 00); an d  " A g ent  R el iab il i sm ," Ph ilo sophica l Perspect ive s13 (1999): 2 7 3- 296. xxv W hat  is a Gettie r c ase? Z ag zeb s ki ha s a rgued  thata ll Get tier case sa re one s  whereb a depis temic luck is can c el l ed out by good  epist em i cl u ck.  Fo r example,  i n Cas e  3 S'se vi d e n cei s deceptive ( bad luck),b utsomeon eels e  in S' s off ic e  ow ns a Ford ( good  luck). T his an a lysis s u ggeststhat w e c antrea t  G et tie rc ase s  i n t h e s ame wayth at  we t reat e d t he l ott eryprobl em above-we c ansayt hat  Gett ier c ases  i nvolv e sali ent l uc k, and salientluck  undermin escr edi t.  In m y  opini onthi s asses sment i s  co rr e c t ,but it is not as i nf o r ma tive aswe wou l dli k e. Thisis  be caus e in Ge ttie r  c ases, to  say t h at  S  believ es  the t ru thbec auseo f go od luc k is ver y clo s e to saying th a t S believest he t ru t h fo r s ome reasonothe r  tha n he r  o wna bilit ies.An d  a l though that seems t ru e, itis no t more inform ative than w h at we al read y  h a ve-which is th at cl ause (3) i s  violate d. (I n the lo ttery cas e ,  we said  th atthe  cl a u se  is violatedd u e to  t he role  of  salien t c han ce.  Th at  explanat ion is i nf or ma ti ve,  howe v er, beca us e w ehav e ani ndepen dentgras pof wha t we me a nb y  cha nc ein a  lo tt ery.)  xxv i  Kn owledge  in Persp ect i ve,pp .281-2.xxvii The exa mp le is from  A lvi n Gold m a n, "Disc rimination and Perceptu a l Knowl edg e," J ourn al of Phi los ophy 7 3 ( 1 976):771-79 1. Re pr int e d  in G o l dm an,  A lvin, Liai s o ns:  Phil os ophy  Meetsthe Cognitive andS oci al Sciences ( Cam brid g e ,MA: MI T  Pr es s , 1 9 9 2). xxviii Theexample is  f r om  Sosa, "Pe r spe ct ives in  Virtue  Epis t emology : A Respo nse to Da nc y an d Bon Jour," Phi losophic al Studie s  78 ( 1 99 5): 2 21- 235. x xi x T he ex amplei s q uoted  fromRo derick  Chis ho lm, Theo ry of Knowledge, 2 nd e dition  (Eng lew ood Cliff s,N J:Prentice- Hall , Inc., 19 77) , p . 105 . 2 6  xxxThew at che xampl e is due to Be r tr and R us sell in Hum a n Kno wledg e:I ts Sco pe a nd Limits (New Yo r k: Simon and S chus t e r,194 8 ). T he  example is ci ted  b y Chisholm  i n Theory of  Knowled ge ,  wher e he p ointsout tha t it is a G etti ercase. xxx i T he distinc ti on employ ed h er e
 by_Phillip Quinn_in discussion. xxiv See_my Putting_Skeptics_in Their_Place_(New York: Cambridge_University Press, 2000);_and "Agent Reliabilism," Philosophical_Perspectives 13 (1999):_273-296._xxv What is a Gettier case? Zagzebski has argued that all Gettier cases are_ones_where bad_epistemic_luck_is cancelled out by good_epistemic luck. For example, in_Case 3_S's evidence is deceptive (bad luck), but someone_else_in S's office_owns a Ford (good luck). This analysis suggests that_we can treat Gettier cases in_the same way_that_we_treated the lottery problem_above-we can say that Gettier cases_involve salient luck, and salient luck_undermines credit. In my opinion this assessment_is correct, but it is not_as informative as we would_like. This_is because in Gettier cases,_to say that_S believes_the truth because_of good luck is very close_to saying that_S believes the truth for some_reason_other than her_own_abilities._And although_that seems true,_it_is not_more_informative than what we already have-which_is_that clause (3) is violated. (In the_lottery case, we said_that_the clause is violated_due to the role of_salient chance. That explanation is informative,_however, because_we have_an independent grasp of what we mean by chance in a_lottery.) xxvi Knowledge in Perspective, pp._281-2. xxvii The example_is from_Alvin_Goldman, "Discrimination and_Perceptual_Knowledge," Journal_of Philosophy 73 (1976): 771-791. Reprinted in_Goldman, Alvin,_Liaisons: Philosophy Meets the Cognitive and_Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA:_MIT_Press, 1992). xxviii The example is_from Sosa, "Perspectives in Virtue Epistemology:_A Response to Dancy and_BonJour,"_Philosophical_Studies 78 (1995): 221-235. xxix_The example is quoted from Roderick_Chisholm, Theory of_Knowledge, 2 nd edition (Englewood Cliffs, NJ:_Prentice-Hall,_Inc., 1977), p. 105. 26 xxx_The_watch example is due to Bertrand_Russell_in_Human Knowledge: Its Scope and_Limits (New York: Simon and Schuster,_1948). The example is cited by Chisholm in Theory_of Knowledge, where_he points out that it_is_a_Gettier case. xxxi The distinction employed here