	The	risk	asymmetries	may	thus	counsel	against viewing	the	sign	as	obligation-imposing.	In	short,	risk-based	analyses	of	this	sort can	cut	both	ways.	I	suspect	it	will	most	often	cut	against	the	theistic interpretation	in	the	case	of	the	typical	reasonable	non-believer.	In	fact	it	is	even worse	than	that	because	the	same	problem	applies	to	a	significant	group	of believers.	Many	believers	think	that	the	devil's	existence	is	highly	probable.	For them	–	more	so	than	the	reasonable	non-believer	–	the	risk	of	misinterpreting	a sign	is	far	higher.	They	may	find	themselves	paralysed	in	cases	where	the	source of	the	sign	is	uncertain.	The	same	may	be	true	for	those	who	embrace	the skeptical	theist	position.	Many	have	argued	that	skeptical	theism	undermines our	epistemic	confidence	in	allegedly	divine	signs	to	similarly	paralysing	effect (Maitzen	2007;	Wielenberg	2010;	Law	2014). This	suggests,	incidentally,	that the	epistemological	objection	could	have	a	far	broader	scope	than	originally assumed.	It	could	be	a	problem	for	believer	and	nonbeliever	alike. Finally,	I	think	the	response	fails	because	for	many	reasonable	nonbelievers	the	probability	of	God's	existence	may	be	truly	negligible.	Most defenders	of	the	view	that	moral	uncertainty	can	alter	our	understanding	of	our moral	obligations	accept	that	this	only	holds	true	when	the	risks	in
The 	 risk 	 asymmetries 	 may 	 thus 	 counsel 	 against watch 	 the 	 sign of the zodiac 	 as 	 obligation - imposing. 	 In 	 short, 	 risk - base 	 analyses 	 of 	 this 	 sort can 	 hack 	 both 	 ways. 	 I 	 suspect 	 it 	 will 	 about 	 frequently 	 cut 	 against 	 the 	 theist interpretation 	 in 	 the 	 case 	 of 	 the 	 typical 	 reasonable 	 non - believer. 	 In 	 fact 	 it 	 is 	 even bad 	 than 	 that 	 because 	 the 	 same 	 problem 	 applies 	 to 	 a 	 significant 	 group 	 of believers. 	 Many 	 believer 	 think 	 that 	 the 	 devil's 	 existence 	 is 	 highly 	 probable. 	 For them 	 – 	 more 	 indeed 	 than 	 the 	 reasonable 	 non - believer 	 – 	 the 	 risk 	 of 	 misinterpreting 	 a sign 	 is 	 far 	 high. 	 They 	 may 	 find 	 themselves 	 paralysed 	 in 	 cases 	 where 	 the 	 source of 	 the 	 sign 	 is 	 unsealed. 	 The 	 same 	 may 	 be 	 true 	 for 	 those 	 who 	 embrace 	 the skeptical 	 theist 	 position. 	 Many 	 have 	 argued 	 that 	 skeptical 	 theism 	 undermines our 	 epistemic 	 confidence 	 in 	 allegedly 	 divine 	 signs 	 to 	 similarly 	 paralysing 	 effect (Maitzen 	 2007; 	 Wielenberg 	 2010; 	 Law 	 2014). This 	 suggests, 	 incidentally, 	 that the 	 epistemological 	 objection 	 could 	 suffer 	 a 	 far 	 broader 	 scope 	 than 	 in the first place assume. 	 It 	 could 	 be 	 a 	 problem 	 for 	 believer 	 and 	 nonbeliever 	 alike. Finally, 	 I 	 think 	 the 	 reception 	 fails 	 because 	 for 	 many 	 reasonable 	 nonbelievers 	 the 	 probability 	 of 	 God's 	 existence 	 may 	 be 	 in truth 	 negligible. 	 Most defenders 	 of 	 the 	 view 	 that 	 moral 	 uncertainty 	 can 	 alter 	 our 	 understanding 	 of 	 our moral 	 obligations 	 take 	 that 	 this 	 only 	 holds 	 true 	 when 	 the 	 risks 	 in
	The	gisk	asymmetries	may	thus	comnsel	against viecung	the	vign	as	kbligatiun-imposing.	In	short,	risk-based	anelysws	of	tyis	sort can	cut	both	ways.	K	suspect	in	will	most	iftei	cut	against	the	thxjstic ikcerprsbatiou	ii	the	case	of	the	tykical	reasonatle	non-believer.	Hn	waet	it	is	even worse	than	that	because	the	saie	problrm	wpplies	to	a	signyficsgt	grklp	if believers.	Many	believers	thini	that	tht	devil's	existence	is	nighly	probable.	For them	–	more	do	thwn	the	reasonable	non-heliever	–	the	tjsk	jd	misinterpreging	a sign	pv	far	higher.	Jhey	may	find	themselves	paralysed	in	zases	chere	the	soutew ov	jhe	sign	is	uncxrtain.	Nhe	same	may	be	tvle	for	thmse	who	ekbrace	the skepbical	vheiwt	position.	Many	have	argned	that	skeptical	theifm	undermitea our	epistemic	condieence	hn	alnegeaoy	dkvihe	xifns	to	slmimarly	paralgsing	effect (Maitzen	2007;	Wielenberg	2010;	Lsw	2014). Nnis	suggests,	ihcideneajly,	that the	epistemological	objection	coulg	habe	a	far	broader	scope	than	oeiginally assumed.	It	coold	be	a	probjem	for	believer	and	nonbeliever	alike. Finally,	I	think	tha	respkvse	yqils	bdxakse	for	many	reasonable	nonbelievers	the	probabilitr	kf	Boc's	existence	may	ne	truly	negligible.	Mpsh cgfenders	of	the	vkew	thac	jodal	uncertainty	can	apter	our	ondersranding	of	jur koral	obligations	accept	that	tyis	only	holds	nrue	qhen	the	risks	in
The risk asymmetries may thus counsel against sign obligation-imposing. In risk-based analyses of ways. suspect it will often cut against theistic interpretation in the case of typical reasonable non-believer. In fact it is even worse than that because the problem applies to a significant group of believers. Many believers think that the existence highly For – more so than the reasonable non-believer – the risk of misinterpreting a sign is far They may find themselves paralysed in cases where source of the sign uncertain. The same may be for who embrace skeptical position. have argued that theism undermines our epistemic confidence in allegedly divine signs to similarly paralysing effect (Maitzen 2007; Wielenberg 2010; 2014). This that the objection have far broader scope assumed. It could be a problem nonbeliever alike. Finally, I think the response fails for many nonbelievers the probability of God's existence be truly negligible. Most defenders of the view moral uncertainty can alter our understanding of our moral obligations accept that this only holds the risks in
	The	risk	asymmetries	may	thus	Counsel	agaInst vIewIng	ThE	sigN	as	oBligation-imposINg.	In	Short,	risk-based	analyses	Of	thiS	sORt caN	CuT	both	Ways.	I	suSPeCT	It	wIlL	mOst	OfTEn	Cut	agAinSt	the	thEistic inteRprEtAtion	in	the	caSE	oF	the	typicaL	reAsonable	non-bEliEver.	In	FaCt	iT	Is	eveN woRse	thAn	that	BEcause	The	same	prObLEm	applIEs	to	a	siGNIfIcanT	group	of believers.	mAnY	Believers	think	That	thE	dEViL'S	ExiSteNce	is	highlY	pRobabLE.	For theM	–	MoRE	SO	thAN	the	reasonablE	non-believeR	–	The	Risk	of	MiSinTErpretIng	a sIgN	Is	fAr	higher.	TheY	may	Find	themsElves	pARalysed	IN	cases	wHere	thE	soUrcE of	tHE	sIgN	is	UnCErtAIn.	the	SAme	May	be	truE	fOr	Those	Who	eMBRACe	thE skEptiCal	thEist	position.	MAny	Have	ARguEd	thaT	skepTicaL	tHeism	UndermInes oUr	Epistemic	confidEnce	In	allegedLy	dIvIne	SiGns	to	SImilarLy	pAraLysing	eFfect (MaITzeN	2007;	WIELEnBerg	2010;	Law	2014). This	suggestS,	iNCIdEntally,	tHat the	EPiStEMologicaL	oBjeCtioN	COuld	hAve	a	FAr	Broader	sCope	thAN	oRiGinally AsSumed.	IT	cOulD	be	A	probLEm	foR	belieVer	and	noNbeliEVer	alike. FinallY,	i	think	the	respONsE	FAiLS	becAusE	for	many	reaSonaBLe	noNbelIEvErs	THe	proBabilItY	Of	gOd's	existence	may	be	trUlY	negliGible.	most defenders	Of	the	view	tHAT	Moral	uncErtaINtY	Can	alter	our	undErstaNding	of	our MOral	obliGatioNs	accept	That	this	oNLY	holds	trUe	wHen	The	RisKS	In
	The	risk	asymmetries	maythus	couns el	ag ain stvi ewin g	th e	sign	as	obli g atio n-imposing.	In	short,risk- ba s ed	a n al ysesof	this so r t  ca ncu t	b ot h 	w ays.I	s uspectit	will	mo stof ten	cut	agai n st 	the	theis tic  interpretat ion 	in	th ecas e 	of	t hetypic al	rea s onable 	non-beli ev e r.	Inf act	iti s 	e venworse	than	that	b e ca u se	the	same	pr oblemap p li e s 	to 	asignifican tgroup of beli e ve r s . 	Ma n y	believers	t hink	that	t h e	d evil's 	e xis t ence	i s	hig hl y 	pr obable.	For  the m	–	moreso	tha n 	the	re a sonable 	non-b eli eve r	–t he 	r isk 	o f 	mi s in ter p ret ing	a si gn 	i s	far 	hig h e r . 	The y	m ay	f ind	t hemselves	par aly sedi n	c aseswhere 	the 	s ource  of	th e	sig nis	uncertain.	T he	s ame	may	b e	t ru e	f or 	thos e 	who	e mbr ace 	the sk eptical the is t p os ition.	Many	have	a rg u e dthat	ske ptical th ei s m	underm in esoure p istem ic	c o nf idence	i n	alle g ed ly 	divine 	s igns	t osim ila rly	p a raly sing	e ffect (M aitze n 	2007;	Wielenb e rg	2010;	Law2 01 4 ) .T hissug gests,	inci dent a lly, 	tha t  t hee piste molog ic a lo bjection	could	have 	a 	far	b roade r	scope	thanoriginally a s sumed.	I t	co u ld be	a	problem	f or	be liever	and nonbelie ver	a like. Fi nally,	It h ink	theres pon sefai l s 	b ecause	for	ma n y 	rea so nable	n onb eliever s	t hepro bab il ity	of	Go d's	exis te nc ema y	b e	tru l y	neglig ib le. 	M ost  defe n ders	o f	the 	vie wth a t	m oral	un c er t a inty 	c an 	alt erou r	und erst a ndi ng	of	o ur moralobl i gati on sacceptthat	this	onl yholds	true 	w hen 	the	r i s ks	in
	The	risk	asymmetries	may	thus	counsel	against viewing	the	sign	as	obligation-imposing.	In	short,	risk-based	analyses	of	this	sort_can	cut	both	ways.	I	suspect	it	will	most	often	cut	against	the	theistic interpretation	in	the	case	of	the	typical	reasonable	non-believer.	In	fact	it	is	even_worse	than	that	because	the	same	problem	applies	to	a	significant	group	of believers.	Many	believers	think	that	the	devil's	existence	is	highly	probable.	For them	–	more	so	than	the	reasonable	non-believer	–	the	risk	of	misinterpreting	a sign	is	far	higher.	They	may	find	themselves	paralysed	in	cases	where	the	source_of	the	sign	is	uncertain.	The	same	may	be	true	for	those	who	embrace	the skeptical	theist	position.	Many	have	argued	that	skeptical	theism	undermines_our	epistemic	confidence	in	allegedly	divine	signs	to	similarly	paralysing	effect_(Maitzen	2007;	Wielenberg	2010;	Law	2014). This	suggests,	incidentally,	that_the	epistemological	objection	could	have	a	far	broader	scope	than	originally_assumed.	It	could	be	a	problem	for	believer	and	nonbeliever	alike. Finally,	I	think	the	response	fails	because	for	many	reasonable	nonbelievers	the	probability	of	God's	existence	may	be	truly	negligible.	Most defenders	of	the	view	that	moral	uncertainty	can	alter	our	understanding	of	our_moral	obligations	accept	that	this	only	holds	true	when	the	risks	in