 level of epistemic responsibility for dealing with counterevidence we expect individuals to be able to recall relevant information from memory, though again, we do not hold people to standards of memory recall that exceed what is feasible for normal human beings. Theories of feasible inference and feasible memory, then, also help to set levels of epistemic responsibility appropriate for normal human beings. For convenience, let us use the expression "obvious counterpossibilities" to refer to those counterpossibilities a normal human being with normal cognitive powers could be expected to recognize. Thus, our original proposal should be revised so that we are required to check some but not all of those counterpossibilities implied by what we believe, where limits on which counterpossibility checking is partly determined by our empirical views about "normal" cognitive capacities. A Contextualist Moral Epistemology 303 However, there is more to our understanding of epistemic responsibility for dealing with counterpossibilities. That is, merely checking all of those obvious counterpossibilities whose seriousness is implied by one's current belief set does not mean that one is being epistemically responsible, since (1) one might simply lack certain general information that anyone can be expected to know or (2) be negligent in acquiring evidence that bears on some specific issue or claim. (Here is one place where responsibilities concerning the gathering of evidence characteristic of the epistemically responsible agent come into play.) With regard to general information one ought to have, there are certain things anyone is expected to know, where we are relying in particular on such social phenomena as common experience (e.g., fire burns, water will drown, and countless other bits of information), widely shared educational experiences (e.g., elementary facts about history, physical science, and so forth), and information gathered more informally such as through the media. Again, this general knowledge requirement is reflected in the doctrine of the reasonable person: "there is a minimum standard of knowledge, based upon what is common to the community,"33 which the reasonable person possesses and thus ordinary agents ought to possess. With regard to quite special information bearing specifically on some claim or belief, again, what is common to a community normally helps determine the extent of one's responsibility for being aware of that information. A slightly modified example from Austin' makes the point clear. If I look out my window and see what I take to be a goldfinch in my front yard, ordinarily I would be justified in believing that there is a goldfinch there. But suppose that stuffed toy gold
level of epistemic responsibility for dealing with counterevidence we expect person to be able to echo relevant information from memory, though again, we do not hold people to criterion of memory recall that exceed what is feasible for normal human beings. theory of feasible inference and feasible memory, then, also help to sic levels of epistemic responsibility appropriate for normal human organism. For convenience, let us practice the expression " obvious counterpossibilities " to refer to those counterpossibilities a normal human being with normal cognitive powers could be expected to recognize. therefore, our original proposal should be revised so that we are required to control some but not all of those counterpossibilities implied by what we believe, where limit on which counterpossibility checking is partly determine by our empirical views about " normal " cognitive capacities. A Contextualist Moral Epistemology 303 However, there is more to our understanding of epistemic duty for dealing with counterpossibilities. That is, merely checking all of those obvious counterpossibilities whose seriousness is implied by one's current belief set does not mean that one is being epistemically responsible, since (1) one might simply lack certain general information that anyone can be expected to know or (2) be negligent in acquiring evidence that bears on some specific topic or claim. (Here is one place where responsibility concerning the gathering of evidence characteristic of the epistemically responsible agent derive into play .) With regard to general information one ought to accept, there are certain things anyone is expected to know, where we are relying in finical on such social phenomena as common experience (e.g., fire tan, body of water will drown, and countless other bits of information), widely share educational experiences (e.g., elementary facts about history, physical science, and so forth), and information gather more informally such as through the media. Again, this general knowledge requirement is reflect in the doctrine of the reasonable person: " there cost a minimum criterion of knowledge, based upon what is common to the community,"33 which the fair person possesses and thus ordinary agents ought to possess. With regard to quite special information bearing specifically on some claim or belief, again, what is common to a residential district normally helps determine the extent of one's duty for being aware of that information. A slightly modified example from Austin' makes the point absolved. If I look out my window and see what I take to be a goldfinch in my front thousand, normally I would be justified in believing that there is a goldfinch there. But suppose that stuffed toy gold
 legel of epistemic responslbility for dealnbg witi countsrevidenze we expect individuals to ue avle ti recall relevant infofmation fgom memort, thiygh again, xs do nob hols peo'lx to standards pf memory secall that exwedd what is feasible for normal human feings. Yhfories of feasyble ynfedvnge and feasible memory, then, also help tm set levels pf epistemic responsibilitj aporopriate for normwl human beungs. Dor convenievce, let us use the exptession "obvious counterpossibiligies" co refer to tyosf counterposwibilpties a normal human teing woth normal cogkitivx poqers could be expectev to recognize. Thus, jur origitam proposal should bw revhsed so gyat we ace dequirfd vo check soje but not qll of those countetpjwsibilities ijplied br what we believe, where limits on which cohnterpossibility checkibg is partly determingd by our qmpirical views about "normal" cognitive capacities. A Coitdxtbqlist Nogal Epistemology 303 However, there is more to ouw umdvrstanding of epiftemic resppndinylity for deauing wnfh counterpossibilitles. Thaj is, mwrely cheskinb all of those obvious counrerpossibilinies whose seriousness is implied by pne's vurrent belief set does not mean that lne is bejvg epistemically rexpmnsible, since (1) one might symply lacj cextain geverak infowmation thwt annmne can be expectef to nnmw or (2) be jegligent in acquiring evidence that bears on smme specifie issuc or claim. (Here is one place chere refponskbilities boncerninj the gatheryng of evidenwg characterisvic of thq epustenically fesponsible agrnt come pnuo play.) Wirh regard to generel ivrormation one obyhu ro have, there sre cewtwii thigcs anyone is expdctdc to ynow, whtxe ce are relying in particuldr oh such social phenpmcna as conmon expqrience (e.g., fite burns, water wilp droxn, and counylefs other bits of information), wjdely shaged educational expcriegces (e.g., elzmentary facts about history, physical scmence, and so forth), and unformation gathereb kore informelly stch as thsough the media. Agaib, this general knpwledge requirement ia reflacted in the doctrine of the reasonable person: "there is a minimum standard of jnowlevgq, based upoh whst is cjkmon tj thx rommunity,"33 which tne reasonable person possesses end thus osdnnary agents ought to possess. Wkth regard to quite special informatikn bearimg specifically on some claim ot belief, again, what is cpmmon to a cojmunitj nurmally helps detetmine che exrent of one'd responsibilkty flr being wwart of that information. A slightly modufied wxwmple from Austii' makes the iolnt clgar. If I look out my winsow zjd seg what I take yo be a goldfimch in my front yard, owdinarily I woymd be justifoed in telieving thet there is d goldfinch there. But suppose that stuffed toy gold
level of epistemic responsibility for dealing with expect to be to recall relevant we not hold people standards of memory that exceed what is feasible for human beings. Theories of feasible inference and feasible memory, then, also help to levels of epistemic responsibility appropriate for normal human beings. For convenience, let us the "obvious to to those counterpossibilities a normal human being with normal cognitive powers could be expected to recognize. our original proposal should be revised so that are required to check but not all of those implied what we where on counterpossibility checking is determined by our empirical views about "normal" cognitive capacities. A Contextualist Moral Epistemology 303 However, there is to our epistemic responsibility dealing counterpossibilities. is, merely checking those obvious counterpossibilities whose seriousness is current belief set does not mean that one being epistemically since (1) one might simply lack general information that anyone can be expected to or (2) be negligent in acquiring evidence that bears on some specific issue or claim. one place where responsibilities the gathering of characteristic the responsible come into With regard to general information one ought to have, there are things anyone is expected to know, where we are relying on social phenomena as experience (e.g., fire burns, will and countless other bits widely educational facts history, science, and so forth), information gathered more informally such through the media. Again, reflected in the doctrine of the reasonable person: is a minimum standard of knowledge, based what is common to the community,"33 which the reasonable person possesses and ordinary agents possess. With regard to quite special information bearing on some claim or again, what is common to a community normally helps the of one's for being aware that information. A modified example from the point If look and see what I take to a in my front yard, ordinarily would in believing that there is a goldfinch there. But suppose that stuffed toy gold
 level of epistemic responsibIlity for deAling WitH coUnTereVideNce we expect indIViduAls to be able to recall relEvant InFOrmaTIoN from Memory, tHOuGH AgaIn, We Do nOt HOlD peopLe tO standaRds of memorY reCaLl that exceed WHaT is feasiblE foR normal human BeiNgs. TheOrIes OF feasIblE infeRence aND feasiBle memory, ThEN, also hELp to set LEVeLs of Epistemic responsiBIlITy appropriate fOr normAl HUmAN BeiNgs. for conveniEnCe, let US use the EXpRESSioN "Obvious counteRpossibilitIEs" tO refer To ThoSE countErposSiBIliTies a normal HumaN being witH normaL CognitiVE powers Could bE exPecTed tO ReCoGniZe. tHus, OUr OriGInaL proposaL sHoUld be ReviSED SO thaT we Are rEquirEd to check some But Not aLL of Those CountErpoSsIbiliTies imPlied By What we believe, whEre lImits on whIch CoUntErPossiBIlity cHecKinG is partLy deterMIneD bY OUR eMpirical views about "NoRMAl" CognitivE capacITiEs. a contextuAlIst moraL ePisteMoloGY 303 HOwever, thEre is mORe To Our undeRsTandinG oF epIstEmic rESponSibiliTy for deaLing wITh counterpossiBIlities. That is, MErELY cHEckiNg aLl of those obViouS CounTerpOSsIbiLIties Whose SeRIoUSness is implied by one'S cUrrent BelieF set does not meAn that one iS BEIng epistEmicALlY Responsible, sinCe (1) one Might simplY Lack certAin geNeral infOrmation tHAT anyone cAn bE exPecTed TO KnOw or (2) be negligeNT In acQuIring evIdeNce that BeaRs oN soMe sPeCific issuE or claim. (heRe Is OnE plAce whERe responSiBilItIes ConceRNing thE gathErinG oF eVIdeNce charACtERIstiC oF tHe epIstEmIcallY resPOnsIble ageNt come intO plAY.) WitH rEgArd to geNeral informatIoN one ought tO hAve, There aRE Certain tHings anyone is expected to KNow, wherE we Are reLyinG in particUlaR on sucH soCIal pheNomena As comMoN exPERiencE (E.G., fIre BuRns, water wiLL DroWn, and CoUntlEss otheR bits of information), WIdeLy shared educaTioNal eXPErIenCEs (E.G., elEmENtaRY Facts about histoRy, physical ScIEnCe, and so forTH), anD iNformatIon gathEred mORe inforMally such As through ThE medIA. agaIn, this geneRal knowlEdge requiREment IS rEflecTed In the dOcTriNe of tHe reasONabLe perSon: "theRe Is a minImum sTaNdard of kNowledge, based upon what is Common To the ComMunity,"33 whiCh tHE reAsonable pErsoN possesses And ThuS ordiNarY AgentS ougHT tO poSSess. WIth rEGard to quiTE sPecIAL iNformation bEARIng SpeciFicALly on sOme cLaim or belief, again, WHat is common to a CommUNIty NorMAlly HeLps determine thE exTeNT Of one's reSpOnsibility fOr being aWaRE of thAt infoRmatioN. A slighTLY mODified ExamPle From AustiN' maKeS The poinT cLeAR. If I loOk ouT mY windoW and seE What i TAke to be a goldfincH in my FROnt yaRD, orDinarIlY I would BE jusTified in beLieving that There iS a goLdfinCh there. buT suppoSe tHaT stuffed toY Gold
 level of epistemic respon sibility f or de ali ngwi th c ount erevidence wee xpec t individuals to be ab le to  r e call re levan t infor m at i o n f ro mmem or y ,thoug h a gain, w e do not h old  p eople to sta n da rds of mem ory  recall that  ex ceed w ha t i s  feas ibl e for  norma l  human  beings.Th e orieso f feasi b l einfe rence and feasibl e  m e mory, then, al so hel pt os e t l eve ls of epis te mic r e sponsib i li t y app r opriate for n ormal human bei ngs. F or  co n venien ce, l et ususe the exp ress ion "obvi ous co u nterpos s ibiliti es" to  re fer  tot ho se  co un t erp o ss ibi l iti es a nor ma lhuman  bei n g w ithnor malcogni tive powers c oul d be exp ected  to r ecog ni ze. T hus, o ur or ig inal proposal s houl d be revi sed  s o t ha t wea re req uir edto chec k someb utno t a ll  of those counterp os s i bi lities i mplied by  w h at we be li eve , wh e r e lim itso nwhich co unterp o ss ib ility c he ckingis  pa rtl y det e rmin ed byour empi rical views about "n o rmal" cogniti v ec a pa c itie s.A Contextua list Mora l Ep i st emo l ogy 3 03 Ho we v er ,  there is more to o ur  under stand ing of episte mic respon s i b ility fo r de a li n g with counter possi bilities.T hat is,merel y checki ng all of t hose obv iou s c oun ter p o ss ibilities who s e  ser io usnessisimplied  by  on e's  cu rr ent belie f set do es  n ot  m ean  that one is b ei ngep ist emica l ly res ponsi ble,  s in c e ( 1) onem ig h t  sim pl ylack  ce rt ain g ener a l i nformat ion thatany o ne c an  b e expec ted to know o r(2) be neg li gen t in a c q uiring e vidence that bears on s o me spec ifi c iss ue o r claim.(He re isone placewhererespo ns ibi l i tiesc o nc ern in g the gath e r ing  of e vi denc e chara cteristic of the e p ist emically resp ons ible a ge ntc om e  in to pla y . ) With regard t o generalin f or mation one oug ht  to hav e, ther e are certain  things a nyone isex pect e d  to  know, whe re we ar e relying in pa r ti cular  on  suchso cia l phe nomena ascommo n expe ri ence ( e.g.,  f ire burn s, water will drown, an d coun tless  ot her bitsofi nfo rmation),  wid ely shared  ed uca tiona l e x perie nces (e .g. ,  elem enta r y facts a b ou t h i s to ry, physica l s cie nce,and so for th),  and informationg athered more i nfor m a lly  su c h as  t hrough the med ia.  A g a in, this  g eneral know ledge re qu i remen t is r eflect ed in t h e  d o ctrine  ofthe  reasonab lepe r son: "t he re is a m inim um  stand ard of know l e dge, based uponwhati s  comm o n t o the  c ommunit y ,"33  which the  reasonable  perso n po ssess es andth us ord ina ry  agents ou g ht to pos sess.  With r eg ardtoquitespec i a l inf orma ti onbearing s p e ci f ic al l y o n so me cl ai m or  belief,a gain, wh ati s commo ntoa commun i ty n ormally he lps  dete r m ine the ex t ento fo ne'srespon sibili ty forb ein gaware o f t h a t informa tion. A s l igh tl y mo dified e xa mple  f rom  A ustin' makes th e pointclear. I f I look  ou t  myw indowan d see what I  take  t o  be a g o l dfi nch inm y f ron t y ard,  or dina r ily I would be justified  inbelie v ing  that  ther eis a gol d finc h there. But suppose t hat stuffed toy gol d 
 level_of epistemic_responsibility for dealing with_counterevidence we_expect_individuals to_be_able to recall_relevant information from_memory, though again, we_do not hold_people_to standards of memory recall that exceed what is feasible for normal human beings._Theories_of feasible_inference_and_feasible memory, then, also help_to set levels of epistemic_responsibility appropriate_for normal human beings. For convenience, let us_use_the expression "obvious_counterpossibilities" to refer to those counterpossibilities a normal human_being with normal cognitive powers could_be expected to_recognize._Thus,_our original proposal should_be revised so that we are_required to check some but not_all of those counterpossibilities implied by what_we believe, where limits on which_counterpossibility checking is partly determined_by our_empirical views about "normal" cognitive_capacities. A Contextualist_Moral Epistemology_303 However, there_is more to our understanding of_epistemic responsibility for_dealing with counterpossibilities. That is, merely_checking_all of those_obvious_counterpossibilities_whose seriousness_is implied by_one's_current belief_set_does not mean that one is_being_epistemically responsible, since (1) one might simply_lack certain general information_that_anyone can be expected_to know or (2) be_negligent in acquiring evidence that bears_on some_specific issue_or claim. (Here is one place where responsibilities concerning the gathering_of evidence characteristic of the epistemically_responsible agent come into_play.) With_regard_to general information_one_ought to_have, there are certain things anyone is_expected to_know, where we are relying in_particular on such social_phenomena_as common experience (e.g., fire burns,_water will drown, and countless other_bits of information), widely shared_educational_experiences_(e.g., elementary facts about history,_physical science, and so forth), and_information gathered more_informally such as through the media. Again,_this_general knowledge requirement is reflected in_the_doctrine of the reasonable person: "there_is_a_minimum standard of knowledge, based_upon what is common to the_community,"33 which the reasonable person possesses and thus ordinary_agents ought to_possess. With regard to quite_special_information_bearing specifically on some claim or belief, again, what is_common to_a community normally_helps determine the extent of one's responsibility for being aware_of that information. A slightly modified example_from Austin' makes the point clear. If I look out my_window and see what I take to be_a goldfinch in my front yard, ordinarily_I would be justified_in_believing that there is a goldfinch there._But_suppose_that_stuffed toy gold