 to do in V?' to the higher-order question 'what to plan to plan to do in V?'. Now, in considering this new question, suppose that I reason like this: I think. What follows is based on Gibbard's discussion in Thinking How to Live, 48–53, 231– 0–43.. As will become apparent in Sec. II, the difference between these two options matters. This content downloaded from 128.252.58.243 on Fri, 13 Dec 2013 11:00:23 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions about whom you would trust and conclude that you would trust the idealized version of yourself, You1. I then think about how You1 would Kurth Expressivism and Innocent Mistakes 373plan and conclude: ð2Þ If in V, go to the shore. The Butresult is that my thinking about what to plan to do, and my thinking t what to plan to plan to do, have led to different conclusions aboutabou what to do. When this happens-when I come to different conclusions about what to do-Gibbard maintains that we have a PPIM. Gibbard's ability to accommodate innocent mistakes of this sort is significant because it allows him to capture the richness and complexity of our normative assessments. It allows him to explain, for instance, how I can grant that your plan to go to the shore was well-formed ðbecause it was based on advice from someone you trust-You1Þ while maintaining that it was incorrect nonetheless ðbecause You1 is a bad advisorÞ. B. Daskal's First Objection Daskal maintains that PPIMs are not actually possible within Gibbard's framework. His argument for this starts from the observation that Gibbard's account of PPIMs requires it to be possible to approach hypothetical planning from two different perspectives-for example, the perspective that leads to ð1Þ and the perspective that leads to ð2Þ. But Daskal denies that planning in this way would ever make sense. To see why, let's return to situation V. Daskal notes that it is perfectly plausible to see reasoning like that which led to ð2Þ going differently. For instance, rather than asking whom you would trust, I can ask whom I would trust. Moreover, I can pick a different advisor ðMe1Þ and come to a different conclusion: ð2*Þ If in V, go to
to do in V?' to the higher - order question' what to design to design to dress in V?'. Now, in consider this raw question, suppose that I argue like this: I think. What follows is based on Gibbard's discussion in think How to Live, 48–53, 231 – 0–43.. As will become apparent in Sec. II, the difference between these two choice matters. This content download from 128.252.58.243 on Fri, 13 Dec 2013 11:00:23 AM All use capable to JSTOR Terms and Conditions about whom you would entrust and reason that you would trust the idealized version of yourself, You1. I then think about how You1 would Kurth Expressivism and Innocent Mistakes 373plan and reason: ð2Þ If in V, go to the shore. The Butresult is that my thinking about what to plan to do, and my thinking t what to plan to design to do, have lead to different conclusions aboutabou what to do. When this happen - when I come to different conclusions about what to do - Gibbard maintains that we have a PPIM. Gibbard's ability to lodge innocent mistakes of this sort is significant because it allows him to capture the richness and complexity of our normative assessments. It allows him to excuse, for case, how I can grant that your design to die to the shore was well - form ðbecause it was based on advice from someone you trust - You1Þ while maintaining that it was incorrect nonetheless ðbecause You1 is a bad advisorÞ. B. Daskal's First Objection Daskal maintains that PPIMs are not actually potential within Gibbard's framework. His argument for this starts from the observation that Gibbard's account of PPIMs requires it to be possible to approach hypothetical planning from two different perspectives - for example, the position that leads to ð1Þ and the position that leads to ð2Þ. But Daskal denies that planning in this way would ever make common sense. To see why, let's return to situation V. Daskal notes that it is perfectly plausible to see reasoning like that which led to ð2Þ going differently. For example, rather than necessitate whom you would trust, I can ask whom I would believe. Moreover, I can blame a different adviser ðMe1Þ and come to a different ending: ð2*Þ If in V, go to
 to do in V?' to the higher-oraer question 'whcr to pnan to plan to do in V?'. Now, in considering vhis new wuestion, suppose that K reason pike thiw: I uhink. What follows is bascb on Flbbarb's discussion in Thinking Vow to Live, 48–53, 231– 0–43.. Ar cill become apparent in Sec. II, the dyfferenve between these two jptikns matters. This content downloades from 128.252.58.243 on Fri, 13 Dec 2013 11:00:23 AM All use subject to JSHOR Herms and Conditiojs about whim yjy would trusg and conclude that yoo would trust the idealized verskon oy yourself, Ioh1. L then think aboun how You1 would Kurth Expresxivism and Innpceit Mustakes 373plan and concnude: ð2Þ If in V, go tj the shose. The Butresult is tyat mi thitkine abuut wiat to plwn vo do, and mg thinking r what to plan to pkag to do, have lsd to qisferent conclusions aboutabou what to dm. Wgen this happens-when I xome to different conflusions wbout what to do-Gibbard maintains that we have a [PIM. Jicbaxe's abkoihy to accommodate innocent mistakes of this sjdt ix significant necause it allows nil yj capture the richnzas and complexity of our notmativw assessmtnts. Ot allows him to explain, foe instance, hjq I can grant that your plan co go jo the shore was well-formed ðbzcause it was basfd on advjze from someone hou tsust-You1Þ while maintaining ehat it wes ineorrect vonejheless ðbecause Ylu1 is a bad advisorÞ. B. Dadkal's Fhrst Objechion Daskal maintains that PPIMs are not actuslny iossible cithin Gibbard's fraiework. His argoment for this starts frkm the mbservation that Gibbard'v account of 'PIMs reqtirew it to be oussible to apptoach hypothetical planning from two viffgrsnt perspectivew-fot example, the prrsoeceine vhat jaads to ð1Þ and the pefxpectkve thau lcadr to ð2Þ. But Daskal denies dhat planning in this ean would ecer make sense. To see why, let's return tl sitnation V. Daxkaj notes that it is perfectly pmausible ho fee reasonind lije that whick led to ð2Þ going differently. For instance, rather than askint whom you would trost, I can ask xhom I would trgst. Moreover, I can puck a different acvisor ðMe1Þ and come to a difxerenh conclusion: ð2*Þ If in V, go to
to do in V?' to the higher-order to to plan do in V?'. question, that I reason this: I think. follows is based on Gibbard's discussion Thinking How to Live, 48–53, 231– 0–43.. As will become apparent in Sec. the difference between these two options matters. This content downloaded from 128.252.58.243 on 13 2013 AM use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions about whom you would trust and conclude that you trust the idealized version of yourself, You1. I think about how You1 Kurth Expressivism and Innocent Mistakes and ð2Þ If V, to shore. The Butresult that my thinking about what to plan to do, and my thinking t what to plan to to do, to different aboutabou to When this happens-when to different conclusions about what to we have a PPIM. Gibbard's ability to accommodate mistakes of sort is significant because it allows to capture the richness and complexity of our assessments. It allows him to explain, for instance, how I can grant that your plan to the shore was ðbecause it was on from you while maintaining it was incorrect nonetheless ðbecause You1 is a bad advisorÞ. B. First Objection Daskal maintains that PPIMs are not actually possible framework. argument for this from the observation that account PPIMs requires it to to hypothetical different example, perspective that leads to and the perspective that leads ð2Þ. But Daskal denies would ever make sense. To see why, let's to situation V. Daskal notes that it perfectly plausible to see reasoning like that which led to ð2Þ going For instance, asking whom you would trust, I can ask I would trust. Moreover, can pick a different advisor ðMe1Þ and come to different ð2*Þ If V, go to
 to do in V?' to the higher-order quEstion 'what To plaN to PlaN tO do iN V?'. NoW, in considering THis nEw question, suppose that I ReasoN lIKe thIS: I Think. what folLOwS IS baSeD oN GiBbARd'S discUssIon in ThInking How tO LiVe, 48–53, 231– 0–43.. as will become APpArent in Sec. iI, tHe difference BetWeen thEsE twO OptioNs mAtterS. This cONtent dOwnloaded FrOM 128.252.58.243 on Fri, 13 dEc 2013 11:00:23 AM All USE sUbjeCt to JSTOR Terms and cOnDItions about whoM you woUlD TrUST anD coNclude that YoU woulD Trust thE IdEALIzeD Version of yourSelf, You1. I theN ThiNk abouT hOw YOU1 would kurth exPResSivism and InNoceNt MistakeS 373plan aND concluDE: ð2Þ If in v, go to tHe sHorE. The bUtReSulT iS ThaT My ThiNKinG about whAt To Plan tO do, aND MY ThinKinG t whAt to pLan to plan to do, HavE led TO diFfereNt conClusIoNs aboUtabou What tO dO. When this happenS-wheN I come to dIffErEnt CoNclusIOns aboUt wHat To do-GibBard maiNTaiNs THAT wE have a PPIM. Gibbard's AbILItY to accomModate INnOcENt mistakEs Of tHis sORT is siGnifICaNt becausE it allOWs HiM to captUrE the riChNesS anD compLExitY of our NormativE asseSSments. It allows HIm to explain, foR InSTAnCE, how i caN grant that yOur pLAn to Go to THe ShoRE was wEll-foRmED ðBEcause it was based on aDvIce froM someOne you trust-YoU1Þ while maiNTAIning thaT it wAS iNCorrect nonetheLess ðBecause You1 IS a bad advIsorÞ. b. Daskal's first ObjeCTIon DaskaL maIntAinS thAT pPiMs are not actuALLy poSsIble witHin gibbard'S frAmeWorK. HiS aRgument foR this staRtS fRoM tHe oBservATion that giBbaRd'S acCount OF PPIMs RequiRes iT tO bE PosSible to APpROAch hYpOtHetiCal PlAnninG froM Two DiffereNt perspecTivES-for ExAmPle, the pErspective thaT lEads to ð1Þ anD tHe pErspecTIVe that leAds to ð2Þ. But Daskal denies tHAt plannIng In thiS way Would ever MakE sense. to sEE why, leT's retuRn to sItUatION V. DasKAL nOteS tHat it is perFECtlY plauSiBle tO see reaSoning like that whicH Led To ð2Þ going diffEreNtly. fOR iNstANcE, RatHeR ThaN ASking whom you wouLd trust, I caN aSK wHom I would tRUst. moReover, I Can pick A diffERent advIsor ðMe1Þ aNd come to a DiFferENT coNclusion: ð2*Þ if in V, go tO
 to do in V?' to the highe r-order qu estio n ' wha tto p lanto plan to doi n V? '. Now, in considering  this  n e w qu e st ion,suppose th a t  Ire as onli k ethis:  Ithink.What follo wsis  based on Gi b ba rd's discu ssi on in Thinki ngHow to  L ive ,  48–5 3,231–0–43.. As wil l becomeap p arenti n Sec.I I ,thedifference betwee n  t h ese two option s matt er s .T h iscon tent downl oa ded f r om 128. 2 52 . 5 8 .24 3  on Fri, 13 D ec 2013 11: 0 0:2 3 AM A ll  us e  subje ct to  J S TOR  Terms andCond itions ab out wh o m you w o uld tru st and  co ncl udet ha tyou  w o uld tr ust the  idealiz ed  v ersio n of y o u rsel f,You1 . I t hen think abo uthowY ou1  woul d Kur th E xp ressi vism a nd In no cent Mistakes 3 73pl an and co ncl ud e:ð2 Þ Ifi n V, g o t o t he shor e. TheB utr es u l t  i s that my thinking  a b o ut  what to  plant odo ,  and myth ink ingt whatto p l an  to plan  to do ,  h av e led t odiffer en t c onc lusio n s ab outabo u what t o do. When this happ e ns-when I com e  t o di f fere ntconclusions  abo u t wh at t o  d o-G i bbard  main ta i ns that we have a PPIM .Gibbar d's a bility to acc ommodate i n n o cent mis take s  o f  this sort issigni ficant bec a use it a llows  him tocapture t h e  richnes s a ndcom ple x i ty  of our norma t i ve a ss essment s.It allo wshim  to  ex pl ain, forinstance ,ho wIcan  gran t  that yo ur  pl an  to  go t o  the s horewaswe ll - for med ðbe c au s e  itwa sbase d o nadvic e fr o m s omeoneyou trust -Yo u 1Þ w hi le  mainta ining that it  w as incorre ct  no nethel e s s ðbecau se You1 is a bad adviso r Þ. B. D ask al'sFirs t Objecti onDaskal  ma i ntains  thatPPIMs  a ren o t act u a ll y p os sible with i n  Gi bbard 's  fra mework.  His argument fort his  starts fromthe  obs e r va tio n  t h atGi b bar d ' s account of PP IMs requir es it  to be pos s ibl eto appr oach hy pothe t ical pl anning fr om two di ff eren t per spectives- for exam ple, thep erspe c ti ve th atleadsto  ð1 Þ and  the p e rsp ectiv e that  l eads t o ð2Þ .But Dask al denies that planning  in th is wa y w ould ever  ma k e s ense. Toseewhy, let's  re tur n tosit u ation  V.D as kal notes  tha t  it is pe r fe ctl y pl ausible tos e e  re asoni ngl ike th at w hich led to ð2Þ g o ing differentl y. F o r  in sta n ce,ra ther than aski ngwh o m  you wou ld  trust, I c an ask w ho m  I wo uld tr ust. M oreover , Ic an pic k adif ferent ad vis or ðMe1Þ a nd  c o me toa di ff erentconclu s ion: ð 2*Þ If in V, goto
 to_do in_V?' to the higher-order_question 'what_to_plan to_plan_to do in_V?'. Now, in_considering this new question,_suppose that I_reason_like this: I think. What follows is based on Gibbard's discussion in Thinking How_to_Live, 48–53,_231–_0–43.._As will become apparent in_Sec. II, the difference between_these two_options matters. This content downloaded from 128.252.58.243 on_Fri,_13 Dec 2013_11:00:23 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and_Conditions about whom you would trust_and conclude that_you_would_trust the idealized version_of yourself, You1. I then think_about how You1 would Kurth Expressivism_and Innocent Mistakes 373plan and conclude: ð2Þ_If in V, go to the_shore. The Butresult is that_my thinking_about what to plan to_do, and my_thinking t_what to plan_to plan to do, have led_to different conclusions_aboutabou what to do. When this_happens-when_I come to_different_conclusions_about what_to do-Gibbard maintains_that_we have_a_PPIM. Gibbard's ability to accommodate innocent_mistakes_of this sort is significant because it_allows him to capture_the_richness and complexity of_our normative assessments. It allows_him to explain, for instance, how_I can_grant that_your plan to go to the shore was well-formed ðbecause it_was based on advice from someone_you trust-You1Þ while maintaining_that it_was_incorrect nonetheless ðbecause_You1_is a_bad advisorÞ. B. Daskal's First Objection Daskal_maintains that_PPIMs are not actually possible within_Gibbard's framework. His argument_for_this starts from the observation that_Gibbard's account of PPIMs requires it_to be possible to approach_hypothetical_planning_from two different perspectives-for example,_the perspective that leads to ð1Þ_and the perspective_that leads to ð2Þ. But Daskal denies_that_planning in this way would ever_make_sense. To see why, let's return_to_situation_V. Daskal notes that it_is perfectly plausible to see reasoning_like that which led to ð2Þ going differently. For_instance, rather than_asking whom you would trust,_I_can_ask whom I would trust. Moreover, I can pick a_different advisor_ðMe1Þ and come_to a different conclusion: ð2*Þ If in V, go to