's degree of belief in H, on the (counterfactual) supposition that one does not yet know E. (Howson and Urbach [1993], pp. 404–405, notation adapted; see also Howson and Urbach [2006], pp. 297–301) The counterfactual strategy as developed by Howson and Urbach ([1993], [2006]) is generally considered unsuccessful as a solution to the problem of old evidence (Hawthorne [2005]; Williamson [2000], ch. 10). Among others, this is so because it is not clear how to determine the degree of belief an agent would have in H given the "(counterfactual) supposition that [she] does not yet know E." That is, it is not clear how to determine the agent's counterfactual degree of belief function from her actual degree of belief function. However, even if the counterfactual strategy were successful as a solution to the problem of old evidence, it would still not help in escaping the negative conclusion of our argument. The reason is that we need to know the agent's actual degree of belief function before we can determine her counterfactual degree of belief function. Otherwise one cannot determine "the effect which one believes a knowledge of E would now have on one's degree of belief in H." In order to escape the negative conclusion of our argument one must interpret the confirmation function as something that is not merely different from, but also sufficiently independent of the agent's degree of belief function. One way of doing so is to simply stipulate that there exists a confirmation function that is sufficiently independent of, but nevertheless appropriately 8 linked to, the agent's degree of belief function. We call this strategy of solving philosophical problems by simply postulating solutions to them the deus ex machina strategy. The deus ex machina strategy is, of course, an unacceptable move in philosophical theorizing. Presumably no philosopher will ever seriously propose to solve a philosophical problem by it. However, a bad strategy need not be a worst strategy. While there may not be a sharp border separating good strategies from bad ones, other things being equal, strategies are worse the closer they are to the extreme of the deus ex machina strategy. The deus ex machina strategy must not be confused with the indispensable move in philosophical theorizing of postulating that a notion of philosophical interest is primitive. For instance, Williamson ([2000]) argues that knowledge should, or at least may, be taken as primitive, among other things, because
's degree of belief in H, on the (counterfactual) supposition that one does not yet acknowledge E. (Howson and Urbach [ 1993 ], pp. 404–405, note adapted; see besides Howson and Urbach [ 2006 ], pp. 297–301) The counterfactual strategy as develop by Howson and Urbach ([ 1993 ], [ 2006 ]) is generally consider unsuccessful as a solution to the problem of erstwhile evidence (Hawthorne [ 2005 ]; Williamson [ 2000 ], ch. 10). Among others, this is so because it is not clear how to settle the degree of belief an agentive role would have in H given the " (counterfactual) guess that [ she ] does not yet know E. " That is, it is not clean how to determine the agent's counterfactual degree of impression function from her actual degree of impression function. However, even if the counterfactual scheme were successful as a solution to the problem of old evidence, it would still not help in escaping the negative stopping point of our argument. The reason is that we need to know the agent's actual academic degree of impression routine before we can determine her counterfactual degree of belief function. Otherwise one cannot determine " the effect which one believes a cognition of E would nowadays have on one's academic degree of impression in H. " In order to escape the negative conclusion of our controversy one must interpret the confirmation function as something that is not merely different from, but besides sufficiently independent of the agent's degree of belief function. One way of doing so is to simply stipulate that there exists a confirmation function that is sufficiently autonomous of, but nevertheless appropriately 8 yoke to, the agentive role's academic degree of belief function. We call this strategy of solving philosophical problems by simply necessitate solutions to them the deus ex machina strategy. The deus ex machina strategy is, of course, an impossible move in philosophical theorizing. Presumably no philosopher will ever seriously propose to resolve a philosophical trouble by it. However, a bad strategy need not be a worst strategy. While there may not be a acute border separating adept strategies from regretful ones, other things being adequate, strategies are worse the closer they are to the extreme of the deus ex machina scheme. The deus ex machina strategy must not be confused with the indispensable move in philosophic theorizing of postulating that a notion of philosophical interest is primitive. For instance, Williamson ([ 2000 ]) argues that cognition should, or at least may, be taken as primitive, among other things, because
's dfgree of belief in H, on uhe (counterfactual) suppovition that ond does not yet know E. (Howson abd Urvach [1993], pp. 404–405, notation adaoted; see wlso Howwon end Urbach [2006], pp. 297–301) Vge counbzrfacfmal scretegy as develoked by Howsot and Urbach ([1993], [2006]) ir yenerally considered unsuccessful as a soluyiln to the probjem ps ols evidence (Hawthorne [2005]; Williamson [2000], dh. 10). Amoig others, this os so because it is not clfar jow to determine tje degree od bejuef an agent would havt nn H given jhe "(counterfactual) supposition tfat [ske] does not ywt ntow E." That ms, it ps not clear mpw to getermime the agent's gountxrfaxtual degree of belieh function from her wctual decrze of belief function. Hiwevet, evet if rhe cohnverractuap svrategy wers successfuo as a solution to uhe itoblem of ols evidqnse, it would still not help in escaping uhe nsgative conclusion of oyr argument. The reasoj is that we need to know the agent's actual degree of beliaf fuicgiou befofw ae can determine her counterfactual degree of gekivf function. Othercise one cannot cehetiine "the effezt whieg kne believes a knoaledge jf E qould now havr on one's degree of belief un H." In ordeg to escape the negatire conclusiou of oor argiment one must interprec the donfirmatioj functioh as something thxt ps nmt merely different from, btt also snfficnently ivdepgndent jf the agejt's dccree of belief funftion. Ote way of foing so is to simply stipulate that there exosds d confiriatiok function that is sufficientky inde'endeng of, but nvverthelevs appropriwtely 8 linked jo, the agent's degree jf bwlied functkun. We call thix strategj jf silving philosophicel ptoglems by simply powtulating solutoonr tj nhek eve deus ex mdchiva ryrateey. The deus dx mschina strategy is, ox cohrse, an unacceptabke move in philoso[hical theoriaing. Presumably no philmso'her woll ever seriously propose to solbe a phillsoihical problei by it. However, c bad strategy need not be a worst stratxgy. While there may noj be a sharp border sgpavating good xtratqgies frok bad ones, other thibgs being equal, surategies are worse the closes thej are to the extreme of the deus ex machina strategy. The deus ex machina wtratejy must not bs comfuseg citk the igdis'eisable move in phplosophical theorizing of postuleting that a notion of philosophical intrrdst is primitkve. For instance, Williamaon ([2000]) argies that knowledge should, or at least may, be taken as pvimitive, qmong other thiigs, because
's degree of belief in H, on supposition one does yet know E. 404–405, adapted; see also and Urbach [2006], 297–301) The counterfactual strategy as developed Howson and Urbach ([1993], [2006]) is generally considered unsuccessful as a solution to problem of old evidence (Hawthorne [2005]; Williamson [2000], ch. 10). Among others, this so it not how to determine the degree of belief an agent would have in H given the "(counterfactual) that [she] does not yet know E." That it is not clear to determine the agent's counterfactual of function from actual of function. However, even the counterfactual strategy were successful as a solution to the problem of old evidence, it would still help in negative conclusion our The is that we know the agent's actual degree of we can determine her counterfactual degree of belief Otherwise one determine "the effect which one believes knowledge of E would now have on one's of belief in H." In order to escape the negative conclusion of our argument one the confirmation function as that is not different but sufficiently of the degree of belief function. One way of doing so is to stipulate that there exists a confirmation function that is sufficiently but appropriately 8 linked the agent's degree of function. call this strategy of problems simply them deus machina strategy. The deus machina strategy is, of course, unacceptable move in philosophical ever seriously propose to solve a philosophical problem it. However, a bad strategy need not a worst strategy. While there may not be a sharp border separating strategies from other things being equal, strategies are worse the they are to the of the deus ex machina strategy. The deus ex strategy not be with the indispensable in philosophical theorizing postulating that a philosophical interest primitive. instance, that knowledge should, or at least be as primitive, among other things,
's degree of belief in H, on the (coUnterfactuAl) supPosItiOn That One dOes not yet know E. (hOwsoN and Urbach [1993], pp. 404–405, notation adApted; SeE Also hOwSon anD Urbach [2006], PP. 297–301) THE CouNtErFacTuAL sTrateGy aS develoPed by HowsoN anD URbach ([1993], [2006]) is generALlY considereD unSuccessful as A soLution To The PRobleM of Old evIdence (hAwthorNe [2005]; WilliamSoN [2000], Ch. 10). AmonG Others, tHIS iS so bEcause it is not cleaR HoW To determine the Degree Of BElIEF an AgeNt would havE iN H givEN the "(couNTeRFACtuAL) supposition tHat [she] does nOT yeT know E." thAt iS, It is noT cleaR hOW to Determine thE ageNt's counteRfactuAL degree OF belief FunctiOn fRom Her aCTuAl DegReE Of bELiEf fUNctIon. HowevEr, EvEn if tHe coUNTERfacTuaL strAtegy Were successfuL as A solUTioN to thE probLem oF oLd eviDence, iT woulD sTill not help in esCapiNg the negaTivE cOncLuSion oF Our argUmeNt. THe reasoN is that WE neEd TO KNoW the agent's actual deGrEE Of Belief fuNction BEfOrE We can detErMinE her COUnterFactUAl Degree of Belief FUnCtIon. OtheRwIse one CaNnoT deTermiNE "the Effect Which one BelieVEs a knowledge of e Would now have oN OnE'S DeGRee oF beLief in H." In orDer tO EscaPe thE NeGatIVe conClusiOn OF oUR argument one must intErPret thE confIrmation functIon as sometHING that is nOt meRElY Different from, bUt alsO sufficienTLy indepeNdent Of the ageNt's degree OF Belief fuNctIon. one Way OF DoIng so is to simpLY StipUlAte that TheRe existS a cOnfIrmAtiOn Function tHat is sufFiCiEnTlY inDepenDEnt of, but NeVerThEleSs appROpriatEly 8 liNked To, ThE AgeNt's degrEE oF BElieF fUnCtioN. We CaLl thiS strATegY of solvIng philosOphICal pRoBlEms by siMply postulatiNg Solutions tO tHem The deuS EX machina Strategy. The deus ex machinA StrategY is, Of couRse, aN unacceptAblE move iN phILosophIcal thEorizInG. PrESUmablY NO pHilOsOpher will eVER seRiousLy PropOse to soLve a philosophical pROblEm by it. However, A baD strATEgY neED nOT be A wORst STRategy. While therE may not be a ShARp Border sepaRAtiNg Good strAtegies From bAD ones, otHer things Being equaL, sTratEGIes Are worse thE closer tHey are to tHE extrEMe Of the DeuS ex macHiNa sTrateGy. The dEUs eX machIna strAtEgy musT not bE cOnfused wIth the indispensable move In philOsophIcaL theoriziNg oF PosTulating tHat a Notion of phIloSopHical IntERest iS priMItIve. fOr insTancE, williamsoN ([2000]) ArGueS THaT knowledge sHOULd, oR at leAst MAy, be taKen aS primitive, among otHEr things, becausE
's degree of belief in H,on the (co unter fac tua l)  sup posi tion that oned oesnot yet know E. (Howso n and  U r bach [1 993],  pp. 40 4 –4 0 5 , n ot at ion  a d ap ted;see  also H owson andUrb ac h [2006], pp .  2 97–301) Th e c ounterfactua l s trateg yasd evelo ped  by H owsona nd Urb ach ([199 3] ,  [2006 ] ) is ge n e ra llyconsidered unsucc e ss f ul as a soluti on toth e  p r o ble m o f old evid en ce (H a wthorne [2 0 0 5 ];W illiamson [20 00], ch. 10 ) . A mong o th ers ,  thisis so  b e cau se it is no t cl ear how t o dete r mine th e  degree  of be lie f a n ag e nt  w oul dh ave in  Hg ive n the "( co un terfa ctua l ) s uppo sit ionthat[she] does no t y et k n owE." T hat i s, i tis no t clea r how  t o determine the  age nt's coun ter fa ctu al  degr e e of b eli effunctio n fromh erac t u a ldegree of belief f un c t io n. Howev er, ev e nif the coun te rfa ctua l strat egyw er e succes sful a s  a  s olution  t o thepr obl emof ol d  evi dence,  it woul d sti l l not help ine scaping the n e ga t i ve conc lus ion of ourargu m ent.  The re aso n  is t hat w en ee d  to know the agent' sactual  degr ee of belieffunction b e f o re we ca n de t er m ine her counte rfact ual degree of belie f fun ction. O therwiseo n e cannot  de ter min e " t h eeffect whicho n e be li eves akno wledgeofE w oul d n ow  have onone's de gr ee  o fbel ief i n  H." Inor der  t o e scape the ne gativ e co nc lu s ion  of our ar g u ment  o ne  mus t i nt erpre t th e  co nfirmat ion funct ion as s om et hing th at is not mer el y differen tfro m, but a lso suff iciently independent of the age nt' s deg reeof belief  fu nction . O n e wayof doi ng so  i s t o simpl y st ipu la te that th e r e e xists  a  con firmati on function that i s  su fficiently in dep ende n t  o f,b ut nev er t hel e s s appropriately  8 linkedto ,  t he agent's deg re e of be lief fu nctio n . We ca ll this s trategy o fsolv i n g p hilosophic al probl ems by si m ply p o st ulati ngsoluti on s t o the m thed eus  ex m achina  s trateg y. Th edeus exmachina strategy is, of  cours e, an  un acceptabl e m o vein philos ophi cal theori zin g.Presu mab l y nophil o so phe r  will  eve r  seriousl y  p rop o s eto solve ap h i los ophic alp roblem  byit. However, a ba d  strategy need  not b e a  wo r st s tr ategy. While t her em a y not be  a  sharp bord er separ at i ng go od str ategie s fromb a do nes, o ther  th ings bein g e qu a l, stra te gi e s arewors ethe cl oser t h ey a r e  to the extremeof th e deuse x m achin astrateg y . Th e deus exmachina str ategymust  notbe conf us ed wit h t he  indispens a ble movein ph ilosoph ic al t heo rizing  ofp o stula ting  t hat  a notion o fp hi lo s oph ical  inte re st i s primiti v e. For i nst a nce, Wi ll iam s o n ([20 0 0] ) argues tha t k nowle d g e should,o r at le a st ma y, betakenas prim i tiv e,  amongoth e r  things,because
's degree_of belief_in H, on the_(counterfactual) supposition_that_one does_not_yet know E._(Howson and Urbach_[1993], pp. 404–405, notation_adapted; see also_Howson_and Urbach [2006], pp. 297–301) The counterfactual strategy as developed by Howson and Urbach_([1993],_[2006]) is_generally_considered_unsuccessful as a solution to_the problem of old evidence_(Hawthorne [2005];_Williamson [2000], ch. 10). Among others, this is_so_because it is_not clear how to determine the degree of belief_an agent would have in H_given the "(counterfactual)_supposition_that_[she] does not yet_know E." That is, it is_not clear how to determine the_agent's counterfactual degree of belief function from_her actual degree of belief function._However, even if the counterfactual_strategy were_successful as a solution to_the problem of_old evidence,_it would still_not help in escaping the negative_conclusion of our_argument. The reason is that we_need_to know the_agent's_actual_degree of_belief function before_we_can determine_her_counterfactual degree of belief function. Otherwise_one_cannot determine "the effect which one believes_a knowledge of E_would_now have on one's_degree of belief in H."_In order to escape the negative_conclusion of_our argument_one must interpret the confirmation function as something that is not_merely different from, but also sufficiently_independent of the agent's_degree of_belief_function. One way_of_doing so_is to simply stipulate that there exists_a confirmation_function that is sufficiently independent of,_but nevertheless appropriately 8_linked_to, the agent's degree of belief_function. We call this strategy of_solving philosophical problems by simply_postulating_solutions_to them the deus ex_machina strategy. The deus ex machina_strategy is, of_course, an unacceptable move in philosophical theorizing._Presumably_no philosopher will ever seriously propose_to_solve a philosophical problem by it._However,_a_bad strategy need not be_a worst strategy. While there may_not be a sharp border separating good strategies from_bad ones, other_things being equal, strategies are_worse_the_closer they are to the extreme of the deus ex_machina strategy._The deus ex_machina strategy must not be confused with the indispensable move_in philosophical theorizing of postulating that a_notion of philosophical interest is primitive. For instance, Williamson ([2000]) argues_that knowledge should, or at least may, be_taken as primitive, among other things, because