 case than in the garbage 13 chute case. In both cases, therefore, S's abilities make up a necessary part, but only a part, of the whole story regarding S's believing the truth. The present account of credit solves this problem. For it is only in the garbage chute case that S's abilities are a salient part of the story. In the lottery case, what is most salient is the element of chance. Why does the element of chance become salient in the lottery case? I would suggest that the very idea of a lottery has the idea of chance built right into it. Here is the way we think of the lottery case: First, S reasons on the basis of excellent grounds that she will lose the lottery. Second, the lottery is held and reality either does or does not match up with S's belief-it's just a matter of chance. Notice that things are different if S believes that she lost the lottery because she reads the results in the newspaper.xx Here again her evidence is merely inductive, but now the role of chance does not play an important part in the story. Here is the most natural way to think of the newspaper case: First the lottery is held and the facts are fixed. Second, S infers from a reliable source that she has lost the lottery. Now it is not just a matter of chance that she believes the truth-she believes the truth because she has the good sense to believe what she reads about the results. Two more cases help to explore the implications of the present account. Case 6. On the basis of excellent evidence, S believes that her friend will meet her in New York City for lunch. However, S's friend has bought a ticket in the lottery, and if he were to win then he would be in New Jersey to collect his winnings. In fact, the friend loses the lottery and meets S for lunch.xxi Intuitively, people can know things about their friends even when, unknown to them, their friends have bought tickets in the lottery and would behave differently if they won. On the other hand, there is some intuitive pull toward thinking that S does not know in Case 6, since if her friend were to win the lottery then he would not meet her for lunch. The present account explains these conflicting intuitions by distinguishing contexts of attribution. In contexts where considerations about the lottery are not important, the salience of chance is low and so attributions of knowledge can still be appropriate. However, in contexts where considerations about the lottery are important, the
case than in the garbage 13 chute case. In both case, consequently, S's abilities make up a necessary character, but entirely a part, of the whole report regard S's believing the truth. The present account of credit solves this trouble. For it is only in the garbage chute case that S's ability are a salient part of the story. In the lottery case, what is most salient is the component of chance. Why does the element of chance become salient in the lottery character? I would suggest that the very idea of a lottery has the mind of chance built right into it. Here is the way we think of the lottery shell: First, S reasons on the basis of excellent grounds that she will lose the lottery. Second, the lottery is held and reality either does or does not match up with S's belief - it's just a matter of chance. Notice that things are different if S believes that she lost the lottery because she read the results in the newspaper.xx Here again her evidence is merely inductive, but now the function of chance does not play an important part in the floor. Here is the about natural way to think of the newspaper shell: First the lottery is held and the facts are fixed. Second, S infers from a reliable source that she has lost the lottery. Now it is not just a matter of chance that she think the accuracy - she believe the truth because she has the good sense to believe what she reads about the results. Two more case serve to explore the implications of the present score. Case 6. On the footing of excellent evidence, S believes that her friend will meet her in New York City for lunch. However, S's friend has bought a tag in the lottery, and if he were to win then he would be in New Jersey to roll up his winnings. In fact, the supporter loses the lottery and meets S for lunch.xxi Intuitively, multitude can know thing about their friends even when, unknown to them, their friends have bought tickets in the lottery and would behave differently if they won. On the other hired hand, there is some intuitive pull toward thinking that S does not sleep together in Case 6, since if her friend were to win the lottery then he would not suffer her for lunch. The present account explains these conflicting intuitions by distinguishing contexts of attribution. In contexts where considerations about the lottery are not important, the salience of chance is abject and therefore attribution of knowledge can still be appropriate. However, in contexts where considerations about the lottery are important, the
 cade than in the garbage 13 ghute case. In bojh cases, thererore, S's xbilities make up a necessarb paet, buu only a part, of thd whole snory regaedinj S's believing tis truth. The pdcsent eccount of credlt solves tvis problem. Fos kt is only in the garbage chute case ehat S's ahilities are a salpegt pzgt of the story. In the lottery dase, whet is most salirnt is the element of chanfe. Wjy does the elemenh of chance becjne salient iv the lotttrv case? I woold suggest that the very idea ow a lpttery has tye lgea of chanre buijt right into it. Hera is thr way we think of thw lottery case: First, V reasons on the bwsis of efczllent grounds that sye will losa thd logtedy. Sscond, hhe lottery ia held and eeality either does ow does not matdh up rieh S's belief-it's just a matter of chance. Nofice that things are didferent if S believes that she lost the lottery because she reads the results it the vewwpwowr.dx Here again her evidence is merely inductivq, bit now the role jf chance dped mjt play an imkortant padt in the story. Hege is tre mowt naturaj wau to think of the newspaper case: First nhe oottery is held anb the facts cre ficed. Srcond, S infers from a rzliabls source thwt she haa lost the lotterh. Npw it is not just a matter os chance vhat xhe belkevex the eruth-she bflievcv the truth becausf she hds the goof sense to believe what she reavx about the tesgltv. Two moxe cascs help to expljre the implicctions oy the oresent acbount. Casx 6. On the bafis of excellajt evidence, V believqs tyat yer fridvd will meet hrr in New York City for lunch. However, S's rriend has bougku a ticket in the kotgerr, wnv if ra were to wit thdn fr wouud be in Nec Gersry to collect his witninfs. In fact, the frirnq loses jhe lottewy and meets X for lunch.xxi Intkitivxly, peuple van know things about their frienss even wjen, unknown to ehem, their frienbs have bought tickets in the lottery anv would behave differenrly if they won. On jhe other hand, therq is some intuitive pull towaed thinking that X does not know in Caae 6, sitce iv her friend were to win the lottery then he would not meet her for lunch. The pcefent accounf exllainv chexe conslicviig intuitions by cistinguishing contexts of attrmbution. In cjntexts where considerations acout the lottgry are not important, the aalience of chance is low and so attribitions of knowledge can xtill be apprkpriatv. Huwever, in contexts where consuderatiins wbout the lotgeru wre imporhant, tke
case than in the garbage 13 chute both therefore, S's make up a part, the whole story S's believing the The present account of credit solves problem. For it is only in the garbage chute case that S's abilities a salient part of the story. In the lottery case, what is most is element chance. does the element of chance become salient in the lottery case? I would suggest that the idea of a lottery has the idea of built right into it. is the way we think the case: First, reasons the of excellent grounds she will lose the lottery. Second, the lottery is held and reality either does or does not up with just a of Notice things are different believes that she lost the lottery the results in the newspaper.xx Here again her is merely but now the role of chance not play an important part in the story. is the most natural way to think of the newspaper case: First the lottery is the facts are fixed. S infers from reliable that has the lottery. it is not just a matter of chance that she believes truth-she believes the truth because she has the good sense what reads about the Two more cases help explore implications of the present 6. the evidence, believes her friend will meet in New York City for However, S's friend has lottery, and if he were to win then would be in New Jersey to collect winnings. In fact, the friend loses the lottery and meets S for Intuitively, people things about their friends even when, unknown to their friends have bought in the lottery and would behave differently if they On other hand, is some intuitive toward thinking that does not know 6, since her were lottery then he would not meet for The present account explains these intuitions contexts of attribution. In contexts where considerations about the lottery are not important, the salience is low and so of can still be appropriate. However, in contexts where considerations about the lottery the
 case than in the garbage 13 chute Case. In both Cases, TheRefOrE, S's aBiliTies make up a necESsarY part, but only a part, of the Whole StORy reGArDing S'S believINg THE trUtH. THe pReSEnT accoUnt Of crediT solves thiS prObLem. For it is onLY iN the garbagE chUte case that S'S abIlitieS aRe a SAlienT paRt of tHe storY. in the lOttery casE, wHAt is moST salienT IS tHe elEment of chance. Why dOEs THe element of chaNce becOmE SaLIEnt In tHe lottery cAsE? I wouLD suggesT ThAT THe vERy idea of a lottEry has the idEA of Chance BuIlt RIght inTo it. HErE Is tHe way we thinK of tHe lottery Case: FiRSt, S reasONs on the Basis oF exCelLent GRoUnDs tHaT She WIlL loSE thE lottery. seCoNd, the LottERY IS helD anD reaLity eIther does or doEs nOt maTCh uP with s's belIef-iT's Just a Matter Of chaNcE. Notice that thinGs arE differenT if s bEliEvEs thaT She losT thE loTtery beCause shE ReaDs THE ReSults in the newspapeR.xX hErE again heR evideNCe Is MErely indUcTivE, but NOW the rOle oF ChAnce does Not plaY An ImPortant PaRt in thE sTorY. HeRe is tHE mosT naturAl way to tHink oF The newspaper caSE: First the lottERy IS HeLD and The Facts are fixEd. SeCOnd, S InfeRS fRom A ReliaBle soUrCE tHAt she has lost the lottErY. Now it Is not Just a matter of Chance that SHE Believes The tRUtH-She believes the Truth Because she HAs the gooD sensE to belieVe what she REAds about The ResUltS. TwO MOrE cases help to eXPLore ThE implicAtiOns of thE prEseNt aCcoUnT. Case 6. On thE basis of ExCeLlEnT evIdencE, s believeS tHat HeR frIend wILl meet Her in new YOrK CITy fOr lunch. hOwEVEr, S's FrIeNd haS boUgHt a tiCket IN thE lotterY, and if he wEre TO win ThEn He would Be in New Jersey To Collect his WiNniNgs. In fACT, the frieNd loses the lottery and meeTS S for luNch.Xxi InTuitIvely, peopLe cAn know ThiNGs abouT their FrienDs EveN WHen, unKNOwN to ThEm, their friENDs hAve boUgHt tiCkets in The lottery and would BEhaVe differently If tHey wON. on The OThER haNd, THerE IS some intuitive pUll toward tHiNKiNg that S doeS Not KnOw in CasE 6, since iF her fRIend werE to win the Lottery thEn He woULD noT meet her foR lunch. ThE present aCCount EXpLains TheSe confLiCtiNg intUitionS By dIstinGuishiNg ContexTs of aTtRibution. in contexts where considerAtions About The Lottery arE noT ImpOrtant, the SaliEnce of chanCe iS loW and sO atTRibutIons OF kNowLEdge cAn stILl be approPRiAte. hOWeVer, in contexTS WHerE consIdeRAtions AbouT the lottery are impORtant, the
 case than in the garbage13 chute c ase.Inbot hcase s, t herefore, S'sa bili ties make up a necessa ry pa rt ,  but on ly apart, o f  t h e  wh ol esto ry re gardi ngS's bel ieving the  tr ut h. The prese n taccount of  cr edit solvesthi s prob le m.F or it  is  only  in th e  garba ge chuteca s e that S's abi l i ti es a re a salient part of the story. Inthe lo tt e ry c ase , w hat is mos tsalie n t is th e  e l e m ent of chance. Wh y does thee lem ent of  c han c e beco me sa li e ntin the lott erycase? I w ould s u ggest t h at thevery i dea  of  a l o tt er y h as the id eao f c hance bu il tright  int o i t . He reis t he wa y we think of  th e lo t ter y cas e: Fi rst,  S  reas ons on  theba sis of excellen t gr ounds tha t s he  wi ll  lose the lo tte ry.  Second , the l o tte ry i s  h eld and reality ei th e r  d oes or d oes no t  m at c h up wit hS's  bel i e f-it' s ju s ta matter  of ch a nc e.  Notice  t hat th in gsare  diff e rent  if Sbelieves  that she lost the l o ttery because sh e re a ds t heresults inthen ewsp aper . xx  He r e aga in he re vi d ence is merely indu ct ive, b ut no w the role of  chance do e s not play  ani mp o rtant part inthe s tory. Here is the m ost n atural w ay to thi n k  of thenew spa per  ca s e :First the lot t e ry i sheld an d t he fact s a refix ed.  S econd, Sinfers f ro mare lia ble s o urce tha tshe  h aslostt he lot tery.  Now  i ti s n ot just am a tter  o fchan ceth at sh e be l iev es thetruth-she  be l ieve sth e truth  because sheha s the good  s ens e to b e l ieve wha t she reads about the r e sults.Two  more  cas es help t o e xplore  th e  impli cation s ofth e p r e senta c co unt .Case 6. On t hebasis  o f ex cellent  evidence, S belie v esthat her frie ndwill m ee t h e ri n N ew Yor k City for lunch.  However,S' s  f riend hasb oug ht  a tick et in t he lo t tery, a nd if hewere to w in  the n hewould be i n New Je rsey to c o llect hi s win nin gs. In  f act , the  frien d  lo ses t he lot te ry and  meet sS for lu nch.xxi Intuitively, pe ople c an kn owthings ab out the ir friend s ev en when, u nkn own  to t hem ,  thei r fr i en dsh ave b ough t  ticketsi nthe l ot tery and wo u l d  be havedif f erentl y if  they won. On the other hand, th erei s  so mei ntui ti ve pull toward  th in k i ng thatSdoes not kn ow in Ca se 6, si nce if  her f riend w e r et o winthelot tery then  he  w o uld not  m ee t  her f or l un ch. Th e pres e nt a c c ount explains th ese c o n flict i ngintui ti ons byd isti nguishingcontexts of  attri buti on. I n conte xt s wher e c on sideration s  about th e lot tery ar enotimp ortant , th e salie nceof  ch ance is l o w  a n dso att ribu tions  o f kn owledge c a n stillbea ppropri at e.H o wever, in c ontexts wh ere  cons i d erations a b outt he lotte ry are  impor tant, t h e
 case_than in_the garbage 13 chute_case. In_both_cases, therefore,_S's_abilities make up_a necessary part,_but only a part,_of the whole_story_regarding S's believing the truth. The present account of credit solves this problem. For_it_is only_in_the_garbage chute case that S's_abilities are a salient part_of the_story. In the lottery case, what is most_salient_is the element_of chance. Why does the element of chance become_salient in the lottery case? I_would suggest that_the_very_idea of a lottery_has the idea of chance built_right into it. Here is the_way we think of the lottery case:_First, S reasons on the basis_of excellent grounds that she_will lose_the lottery. Second, the lottery_is held and_reality either_does or does_not match up with S's belief-it's_just a matter_of chance. Notice that things are_different_if S believes_that_she_lost the_lottery because she_reads_the results_in_the newspaper.xx Here again her evidence_is_merely inductive, but now the role of_chance does not play_an_important part in the_story. Here is the most_natural way to think of the_newspaper case:_First the_lottery is held and the facts are fixed. Second, S infers_from a reliable source that she_has lost the lottery._Now it_is_not just a_matter_of chance_that she believes the truth-she believes the_truth because_she has the good sense to_believe what she reads_about_the results. Two more cases help_to explore the implications of the_present account. Case 6. On_the_basis_of excellent evidence, S believes_that her friend will meet her_in New York_City for lunch. However, S's friend has_bought_a ticket in the lottery, and_if_he were to win then he_would_be_in New Jersey to collect_his winnings. In fact, the friend_loses the lottery and meets S for lunch.xxi Intuitively,_people can know_things about their friends even_when,_unknown_to them, their friends have bought tickets in the lottery_and would_behave differently if_they won. On the other hand, there is some intuitive_pull toward thinking that S does not_know in Case 6, since if her friend were to win_the lottery then he would not meet her_for lunch. The present account explains these_conflicting intuitions by distinguishing_contexts_of attribution. In contexts where considerations about_the_lottery_are_not important, the_salience of chance_is low and_so attributions_of knowledge can_still be_appropriate. However, in_contexts_where considerations about the lottery are important, the