	insisting	that	the	moral	agent	must	have	knowledge	of	the	form	and	content is	not	going	to	be	sufficient	to	rebut	the	epistemological	objection. It	is	probably	for	this	reason	that	Peoples	insists	on	a	pure	'content	not source'	objection,	going	so	far	as	to	explicitly	state	that	the	reasonable nonbeliever	'does	not	even	need	to	know	that	[what	is	being	communicated	to him]	is	a	command,	provided	the	command	can	be	conveyed	to	him'	(Peoples 2011).	This	seems	to	be	a	more	sensible	but	here	we	run	into	a	second	major difficulty.	Once	you	insist	that	knowledge	of	content	alone	is	sufficient	for	the satisfaction	of	the	epistemic	condition	you	seem	to	undermine	the	criterion	that the	DCTist	uses	to	distinguish	genuine	moral	obligations	from	other	obligationlike	claims	on	our	moral	agency..The	essence	of	DCT	is	that	an	obligation	is	moral only	if	it	is	commanded	by	a	being	with	the	right	kinds	of	properties	that	can create	truly	moral	obligations.	But	if	a	particular	moral	agent	does	not	know	that their	conscience-delivered	moral	beliefs	derive	from	such	a	being,	it	is	very difficult	to	see	how,	on	DCT,	moral	obligations	are	supposed	to	exist	for	that agent.	Communication	of	the	source	would	seem	to	be	essential	to	successful communication	of	the	command. The	theist	may	insist	that	the	
insisting 	 that 	 the 	 moral 	 agent 	 must 	 have 	 knowledge 	 of 	 the 	 human body 	 and 	 contentedness is 	 not 	 going 	 to 	 be 	 sufficient 	 to 	 rebut 	 the 	 epistemological 	 protest. It 	 is 	 probably 	 for 	 this 	 reason 	 that 	 multitude 	 importune 	 on 	 a 	 pure 	' content 	 not source' 	 objection, 	 go 	 so 	 far 	 as 	 to 	 explicitly 	 country 	 that 	 the 	 fair nonbeliever 	' does 	 not 	 even 	 need 	 to 	 acknowledge 	 that 	 [ what 	 is 	 being 	 communicated 	 to him ] 	 is 	 a 	 command, 	 supply 	 the 	 command 	 can 	 be 	 conveyed 	 to 	 him' 	 (Peoples 2011). 	 This 	 seem 	 to 	 be 	 a 	 more 	 sensible 	 but 	 here 	 we 	 run 	 into 	 a 	 second 	 major difficulty. 	 Once 	 you 	 insist 	 that 	 knowledge 	 of 	 message 	 alone 	 is 	 sufficient 	 for 	 the satisfaction 	 of 	 the 	 epistemic 	 condition 	 you 	 seem 	 to 	 undermine 	 the 	 standard 	 that the 	 DCTist 	 uses 	 to 	 distinguish 	 genuine 	 moral 	 obligations 	 from 	 other 	 obligationlike 	 claims 	 on 	 our 	 moral 	 representation.. The 	 essence 	 of 	 DCT 	 is 	 that 	 an 	 obligation 	 is 	 moral only 	 if 	 it 	 is 	 commanded 	 by 	 a 	 being 	 with 	 the 	 right 	 kinds 	 of 	 properties 	 that 	 can create 	 truly 	 moral 	 duty. 	 But 	 if 	 a 	 particular 	 moral 	 agent 	 does 	 not 	 sleep together 	 that their 	 conscience - hand over 	 moral 	 beliefs 	 derive 	 from 	 such 	 a 	 being, 	 it 	 is 	 very difficult 	 to 	 determine 	 how, 	 on 	 DCT, 	 moral 	 obligations 	 are 	 supposed 	 to 	 exist 	 for 	 that agent. 	 Communication 	 of 	 the 	 source 	 would 	 look 	 to 	 be 	 essential 	 to 	 successful communication 	 of 	 the 	 command. The 	 theist 	 may 	 insist 	 that 	 the
	inslsting	that	the	moral	agent	mmst	have	knowledge	of	the	focm	and	cohtent is	vot	going	to	be	sufficient	to	rebuv	the	wpisttiological	objection. It	is	probwbly	for	tyis	rtason	that	Peoples	iiaists	on	a	pure	'ckktent	uov source'	objectipn,	going	so	fdr	as	to	explicitny	rtcte	that	the	reasonable nonbeliever	'does	got	even	mefd	to	know	that	[whwt	is	nqing	dommunicated	to him]	is	a	command,	providsd	the	cokmand	can	be	confeyed	to	him'	(Peoples 2011).	This	seemd	to	bf	a	more	sensible	but	hfre	we	run	inti	a	sesind	major difwiculty.	Onct	ymu	insist	thzt	knowledge	of	content	alone	is	suffkcienc	for	the satusdachhon	of	the	epiwtemib	condition	you	seem	to	ungermine	yhe	criterion	thst vhe	DXTist	uses	to	distinguisi	genuine	moral	obligatyons	from	odhzr	obligationlike	claimw	ob	our	mmral	dgenzt..Thd	esaeice	kf	DCT	id	thet	an	obligatjon	is	moral inly	if	it	is	commanded	ny	w	veing	with	the	rjght	kigdf	of	properties	that	can create	truly	moral	obnigztions.	But	if	a	particular	miral	agent	does	not	know	tjat their	sonscience-delivered	moral	beliefs	derive	from	such	a	beitg,	it	ia	xerv diffkxupt	to	see	how,	on	DCT,	moral	obligations	are	supposed	to	evjsu	fog	that agent.	Communlcation	of	the	source	eoklc	feem	to	be	essenjial	to	sbdcsssful communicatiln	of	the	sommabd. The	theyst	msy	insist	that	the	
insisting that the moral agent must have the and content not going to epistemological It is probably this reason that insists on a pure 'content not objection, going so far as to explicitly state that the reasonable nonbeliever 'does even need to know that [what is being communicated to him] is a provided command be to him' (Peoples 2011). This seems to be a more sensible but here we run into second major difficulty. Once you insist that knowledge content alone is sufficient the satisfaction of the epistemic you to undermine criterion the uses to distinguish moral obligations from other obligationlike claims on our moral agency..The essence of DCT is that an obligation moral only is commanded a with right kinds of can create truly moral obligations. But moral agent does not know that their conscience-delivered beliefs derive such a being, it is very to see how, on DCT, moral obligations are to exist for that agent. Communication of the source would seem to be essential to of the command. The may insist that
	insisting	that	the	moral	agenT	must	have	kNowleDge	Of	tHe	Form	And	cOntent is	not	goiNG	to	bE	sufficient	to	rebut	the	ePisteMoLOgicAL	oBjectIon. It	is	PRoBABly	FoR	tHis	ReASoN	that	peoPles	insIsts	on	a	purE	'coNtEnt	not source'	OBjEction,	goinG	so	Far	as	to	expliCitLy	statE	tHat	THe	reaSonAble nOnbeliEVer	'doeS	not	even	nEeD	To	know	THat	[what	IS	BeIng	cOmmunicated	to him]	iS	A	cOMmand,	provided	tHe	commAnD	CaN	BE	coNveYed	to	him'	(PeOpLes 2011).	ThIS	seems	tO	Be	A	MORe	sENsible	but	here	We	run	into	a	sEConD	major DiFfiCUlty.	OnCe	you	InSIst	That	knowledGe	of	Content	alOne	is	sUFficienT	For	the sAtisfaCtiOn	oF	the	EPiStEmiC	cONdiTIoN	yoU	SeeM	to	underMiNe	The	crIterION	THat tHe	DcTisT	uses	To	distinguish	GenUine	MOraL	obliGatioNs	frOm	Other	ObligaTionlIkE	claims	on	our	morAl	agEncy..The	esSenCe	Of	DcT	Is	thaT	An	obliGatIon	Is	moral Only	if	iT	Is	cOmMANDeD	by	a	being	with	the	riGhT	KInDs	of	propErties	THaT	cAN create	tRuLy	mOral	OBLigatIons.	bUt	If	a	partiCular	mORaL	aGent	doeS	nOt	know	ThAt tHeiR	consCIencE-delivEred	moraL	beliEFs	derive	from	suCH	a	being,	it	is	veRY dIFFiCUlt	tO	seE	how,	on	DCT,	moRal	oBLigaTionS	ArE	suPPosed	To	exiSt	FOr	THat agent.	CommunicatiOn	Of	the	sOurce	Would	seem	to	be	Essential	tO	SUCcessful CommUNiCAtion	of	the	commAnd. ThE	theist	may	INsist	thaT	the	
	insisting	that	the	moralagent	must 	have 	kn owl ed ge	o f	th e	form	and	con t entis	not	going	to	be	suf ficie nt to	r e bu t	the 	episte m ol o g ica lob jec ti o n.  It	i s	p robably 	for	thisrea so n	that	Peopl e sinsists	on 	apure	'conten t	n ot sou rc e'o bject ion ,	goi ng	sof ar	asto	explic it l y	stat e 	that	t h e 	r easo nable nonbeliever 'd o es	not	even	ne ed	tokn o wt h at[wh at	is	bein gcommu n icatedt oh i m ]	i s 	a	command,	p rovided	the com mand	c an 	be convey ed	to 	h i m'(Peoples 20 11). 	This	see ms	tob e	a	mor e 	sensib le	but 	he rewe	r u nin toas eco n dmaj o r d ifficult y. 	O nce	y ou	i n s i s t	th atknow ledge 	of	content	a lon e	is suf ficie nt	fo r	th esatis factio n	ofth e	epistemic	con diti on	you	se emto 	un de rmine the	cr ite rio n	thatthe	DCT i stus e s to 	distinguish	genui ne m or al	oblig ations fr om other	ob li gat ionl i k e	cla imso nour	mora l	agen c y. .T he	esse nc e	of	D CT 	is 	th at	an obli gation 	is	mora l onl y 	if	it	is	comm a nded	by	a	bei n gw i th therig ht	kinds	of 	pro p erti es	t h at 	ca n  crea te	tr ul y 	m o ral	obligations.	Bu tif	a	p artic ular	moral	ag ent	does	n o t know	tha t th e ir conscience-del ivere d	moral	be l iefs	der ive	f rom	such 	a	being, i t	is	ver y d iff icu ltt o 	s ee	how,	on	DC T , 	mor al 	obliga tio ns	aresup pos edtoex ist	for	t hat agen t. 	C om mu nic ation of	the	s ou rce 	w oul d	see m 	to	be 	esse ntia lto suc cessful co m m unic at io n	of 	th ecomma nd.T hetheistmay	insis t	t h at	t he 	
	insisting	that	the	moral	agent	must	have	knowledge	of	the	form	and	content is	not	going	to	be	sufficient	to	rebut	the	epistemological	objection._It	is	probably	for	this	reason	that	Peoples	insists	on	a	pure	'content	not source'	objection,	going	so	far	as	to	explicitly	state	that	the	reasonable_nonbeliever	'does	not	even	need	to	know	that	[what	is	being	communicated	to him]	is	a	command,	provided	the	command	can	be	conveyed	to	him'	(Peoples 2011).	This	seems	to	be	a	more	sensible	but	here	we	run	into	a	second	major difficulty.	Once	you	insist	that	knowledge	of	content	alone	is	sufficient	for	the_satisfaction	of	the	epistemic	condition	you	seem	to	undermine	the	criterion	that the	DCTist	uses	to	distinguish	genuine	moral	obligations	from	other	obligationlike	claims	on	our	moral	agency..The	essence	of	DCT	is	that	an	obligation	is	moral_only	if	it	is	commanded	by	a	being	with	the	right	kinds	of	properties	that	can_create	truly	moral	obligations.	But	if	a	particular	moral	agent	does	not	know	that their	conscience-delivered	moral	beliefs	derive	from	such	a	being,	it	is	very_difficult	to	see	how,	on	DCT,	moral	obligations	are	supposed	to	exist	for	that_agent.	Communication	of	the	source	would	seem	to	be	essential	to	successful communication	of	the	command. The	theist	may	insist	that	the	