 what, then the probability that it is satisfied is (always) 0. 27 Sharadin (2015, p. 1380). DiPaolo and Behrends (2015) criticize this sort of "reason to promotion" inference. But see Sharadin (2016) for a reply. 28 Note that Sharadin's worry is not just a worry for Contrastive Pure Probabilism. It's also a worry for Contrastive Causal Probabilism. Since, by hypothesis, the probability of EA cannot increase, nothing can, by hypothesis, be a ​cause​ of that probability increasing. 29 C.f. Lin (2016, p. 16): "I agree that on the most natural way of filling in the details of the case, there is intuitively a reason for the agent" to take the pill. 30 Lin (2016, p. 15). 14 pill. In a recent note, responding to the same point made by Jeffrey Behrends and Joshua DiPaolo, Sharadin offers a reply to this "neighboring desire" worry. In brief, 31 Sharadin's claim is that the rationality of EA* is now in need of explanation, and the best explanation of why there is a reason for Artie have EA* is that doing so promotes EA: and then we're back off to the races. We lack the space to consider Sharadin's 32 reply in detail here; but in any case, Lin goes further: Suppose that, besides [EA], our agent truly has ​no other desires [such as EA*] whose satisfaction might be promoted by [taking the pill]. Moreover, suppose that our agent has some reason ​against [taking the pill] (e.g., it would [...] be mildly unpleasant). Intuitively, however weak this reason is, he has more reason against [taking the pill] than he does in favor of [taking it]. This can only be because he has no reason of any weight to [take the pill]. This means that [EA] does ​not give him a reason to [take the pill], and thus that [taking it] would ​not promote the satisfaction of this desire. 33 We reject Lin's intuitive judgment in this case as probative on three grounds. First: we do not find it intuitive that, supposing Artie really does have EA, that however weak some countervailing reason is, that reason will always outweigh the reason provided by EA. Indeed, any proponent of the idea that impossible desires can be promoted would plausibly
what, then the probability that it is satisfied is (always) 0. 27 Sharadin (2015, p. 1380). DiPaolo and Behrends (2015) criticize this sort of " rationality to promotion " inference. But examine Sharadin (2016) for a reply. 28 Note that Sharadin's worry is not precisely a worry for Contrastive Pure Probabilism. It's also a concern for Contrastive Causal Probabilism. Since, by hypothesis, the probability of EA cannot increase, nothing can, by hypothesis, be a ​cause​ of that probability increasing. 29 C.f. Lin (2016, p. 16 ): " I match that on the most natural room of filling in the details of the sheath, there constitute intuitively a reason for the agent " to take the pill. 30 Lin (2016, p. 15). 14 pill. In a recent note, react to the same point made by Jeffrey Behrends and Joshua DiPaolo, Sharadin offer a reply to this " neighboring desire " worry. In brief, 31 Sharadin's claim is that the rationality of EA * is now in motivation of explanation, and the best explanation of why there is a reason for Artie have EA * is that doing therefore promotes EA: and then we're back off to the races. We lack the space to consider Sharadin's 32 reply in detail here; but in any case, Lin goes further: Suppose that, besides [ EA ], our agent truly has ​no other desires [ such as EA * ] whose gratification might be promoted by [ taking the pill ]. furthermore, presuppose that our agentive role has some reason ​against [ taking the pill ] (e.g., it would [... ] be mildly unpleasant). Intuitively, however weak this reason is, he has more rationality against [ taking the pill ] than he does in favor of [ taking it ]. This can only be because he has no cause of any weight to [ take the pill ]. This means that [ EA ] does ​not give him a rationality to [ take the pill ], and therefore that [ subscribe it ] would ​not promote the satisfaction of this desire. 33 We reject Lin's intuitive judgment in this case as probative on three grounds. First: we do not find it intuitive that, speculate Artie really does have EA, that however weak some countervailing cause is, that reason will constantly outweigh the reason supply by EA. Indeed, any proponent of the mind that impossible desires can be promote would plausibly
 whwt, then the probability uhat it is satisfnwd is (elways) 0. 27 Sharadkn (2015, p. 1380). DiPaolo and Behrends (2015) ceiticuze this sort of "reasov to promltion" indereice. But see Sharesin (2016) fov a rsily. 28 Uove that Sharadik's worry is not just a wosrh yor Contrastive Pure Probabilism. It's also a wlrry for Contrwstine Cauaal Probabilism. Since, by hypothesia, the pgobability of EA vannot increase, nothing caj, by hypothesis, be a ​cwuse​ of thaj prjvability incfeasing. 29 C.f. Lin (2016, p. 16): "I zgree that on the most natural day oy filling ib rhe getails of vhe cafe, there is lmtuitieely a teason for the agxnt" ro take the pill. 30 Lin (2016, p. 15). 14 pill. In a resent note, rzsponding to the same piint kade by Gwfffey Bxhrsnds ajd Ooshua DiPaklo, Sharadib offers a reply to trpx "neighborinf desiwe" worry. In brief, 31 Sharadin's claim is thau the rationality of EA* is niw in need of explanajion, and tre best explanation of why there is a reason for Drtie favt CW* us that doing so promotes EA: and then we're back kfg no the races. We lcck the space to clnxyder Sharadin'r 32 reply jn detail here; but in any case, Lin goes furyher: Suppose that, besides [EQ], our agent nrult has ​no other desnres [such as EA*] ehose satisfaction might be 'romotsd by [takinh the pilm]. Moreover, supposd tmat our agent has some reason ​against [vakiny the piul] (e.b., it wjuld [...] be mlldly unpleasant). Intuitigely, kowevar weak thls reason is, he has more reason against [takinb dhe pill] thcn he coes in favor of [taking it]. Jhis can jnly ce because he has no reason jf any weight jo [take the pmll]. This ieanw thqt [EA] duds ​not give hik a reasou to [rake the pill], and bhus jhzt [taking it] wobue ​not promote tne ratysvartion mf this desise. 33 De frject Lin's intuibivd jucgment in this case ds pdobative on three brjunds. Fitst: we do not find it ontuitive that, supkosing Arvie reslli does have EA, that however weai some cokntcrvailing reafon ls, trat reason will always outweigh the reason providxd by EA. Indeed, any proponent of the idea jhau impossible vesiref can be [romoted would plausubly
what, then the probability that it is (always) 27 Sharadin p. 1380). DiPaolo sort "reason to promotion" But see Sharadin for a reply. 28 Note that worry is not just a worry for Contrastive Pure Probabilism. It's also a for Contrastive Causal Probabilism. Since, by hypothesis, the probability of EA cannot increase, can, hypothesis, a of that probability increasing. 29 C.f. Lin (2016, p. 16): "I agree that on the most way of filling in the details of the there is intuitively a for the agent" to take pill. Lin (2016, 15). pill. a recent note, to the same point made by Jeffrey Behrends and Joshua DiPaolo, Sharadin offers a reply to this desire" worry. 31 Sharadin's is the of EA* is need of explanation, and the best there is a reason for Artie have EA* that doing promotes EA: and then we're back to the races. We lack the space to Sharadin's 32 reply in detail here; but in any case, Lin goes further: Suppose that, our agent truly has other desires [such EA*] satisfaction be by [taking pill]. Moreover, suppose that our agent has some reason ​against [taking pill] (e.g., it would [...] be mildly unpleasant). Intuitively, however reason he has more against [taking the pill] he in favor of [taking can be no of weight to [take the This means that [EA] does give him a reason thus that [taking it] would ​not promote the of this desire. 33 We reject Lin's judgment in this case as probative on three grounds. First: we do find it supposing Artie really does have EA, that however some countervailing reason is, reason will always outweigh the reason provided by EA. any of the that impossible desires be promoted would
 what, then the probability thaT it is satisFied iS (alWayS) 0. 27 SHaraDin (2015, p. 1380). diPaolo and BehrENds (2015) cRiticize this sort of "reasOn to pRoMOtioN" InFerenCe. But seE shARAdiN (2016) fOr A rePlY. 28 noTe thaT ShAradin's Worry is not JusT a Worry for ContRAsTive Pure PrObaBilism. It's alsO a wOrry foR COntRAstivE CaUsal PRobabiLIsm. SinCe, by hypotHeSIs, the pRObabiliTY Of eA caNnot increase, nothiNG cAN, by hypothesis, bE a ​causE​ oF ThAT ProBabIlity increAsIng. 29 C.f. lIn (2016, p. 16): "I agrEE tHAT On tHE most natural wAy of filling IN thE detaiLs Of tHE case, tHere iS iNTuiTively a reasOn foR the agent" To take THe pill. 30 LIN (2016, p. 15). 14 pill. IN a receNt nOte, RespONdInG to ThE SamE PoInt MAde By JeffreY BEhRends And JOSHUA DiPAolO, ShaRadin Offers a reply tO thIs "neIGhbOring DesirE" worRy. in briEf, 31 SharAdin's ClAim is that the ratIonaLity of EA* iS noW iN neEd Of expLAnatioN, anD thE best exPlanatiON of WhY THErE is a reason for Artie HaVE eA* Is that doIng so pROmOtES EA: and thEn We'rE bacK OFf to tHe raCEs. we lack thE space TO cOnSider ShArAdin's 32 rEpLy iN deTail hERe; buT in any Case, Lin gOes fuRTher: Suppose thaT, Besides [EA], our aGEnT TRuLY has ​No oTher desires [Such AS EA*] wHose SAtIsfACtion Might Be PRoMOted by [taking the pill]. moReover, SuppoSe that our agenT has some reASON ​against [TakiNG tHE pill] (e.g., it would [...] Be milDly unpleasANt). IntuitIvely, However wEak this reASOn is, he haS moRe rEasOn aGAInSt [taking the piLL] Than He Does in fAvoR of [takiNg iT]. ThIs cAn oNlY be becausE he has no ReAsOn Of Any WeighT To [take thE pIll]. thIs mEans tHAt [EA] doEs ​not Give HiM a REasOn to [takE ThE PIll], aNd ThUs thAt [tAkIng it] WoulD ​Not Promote The satisfActIOn of ThIs Desire. 33 WE reject Lin's inTuItive judgmEnT in This caSE As probatIve on three grounds. First: wE Do not fiNd iT intuItivE that, suppOsiNg ArtiE reALly doeS have Ea, that HoWevER Weak sOME cOunTeRvailing reASOn iS, that ReAson Will alwAys outweigh the reasON prOvided by EA. IndEed, Any pROPoNenT Of THe iDeA ThaT IMpossible desireS can be promOtED wOuld plausiBLy
 what, then the probabilit y that itis sa tis fie dis ( alwa ys) 0. 27 Shar a din(2015, p. 1380). DiPao lo an dB ehre n ds  (201 5) crit i ci z e  th is  s ort  o f  " reaso n t o promo tion" infe ren ce . But see Sh a ra din (2016)  fo r a reply. 2 8 N ote th at  Sh a radin 'sworry  is no t  justa worry f or Contra s tive Pu r e  P roba bilism. It's also aw orry for Contr astive  C a us a l  Pr oba bilism. Si nc e, by hypothe s is , t hep robability of  EA cannoti ncr ease,no thi n g can,  by h yp o the sis, be a ​ caus e​ of tha t prob a bilityi ncreasi ng. 29  C. f.Lin( 20 16 , p .1 6): "I  ag r eethat onth emostnatu r a l wayoffill ing i n the details  of  the cas e, th ere i s in tu itive ly a r eason  f or the agent" t o ta ke the pi ll.  3 0 L in  (201 6 , p. 1 5).  14  pill.In a re c ent  n o t e ,responding to thesa m e  p oint mad e by J e ff re y  Behrend sand  Jos h u a DiP aolo ,  S haradinoffers are ply toth is "ne ig hbo rin g des i re"worry.  In brie f, 31 Sharadin's cla i m is that the ra t i on a lity  of  EA* is now  inn eedof e x pl ana t ion,and t he be s t explanation of wh ythereis areason for Ar tie have E A * is thatdoin g  s o  promotes EA:and t hen we'reb ack offto th e races.  We lackt h e spacetocon sid erS h ar adin's 32 rep l y  inde tail he re;  but in  an y c ase , L in  goes fur ther: Su pp os eth at,  besi d es [EA],  o urag ent  trul y  has ​ no ot herde si r es[such a s  E A * ] wh os esati sfa ct ion m ight bepromote d by [tak ing thepi ll ]. More over, suppose  t hat our ag en t h as som e reason ​ against [taking the pil l ] (e.g. , i t wou ld [ ...] be m ild ly unp lea s ant).Intuit ively ,how e v er we a k  t his  r eason is,h e  ha s mor ereas on agai nst [taking the pi l l]than he doesinfavo r of  [t a ki n g i t] .  Th i s  can only be be cause he h as no  reason of any  w eight t o [take  thep ill]. T his means  that [EA ]does ​ not  give hima reason  to [take the p i ll ], an d t hus th at  [t aking  it] w o uld  ​not  promo te  the s atisf ac tion ofthis desire. 33 We reje ct Lin 's in tui tive judg men t  in  this cas e as  probative  on  th ree g rou n ds. F irst :  w e d o  notfind it intuit i ve  th a t ,supposing A r t i e r eally  do e s have  EA,  that however wea k  some counterv aili n g  re aso n  is,  t hat reason wil l a lw a y s outwei gh  the reason  provide db y EA.  Indee d, any  propon e n to f theidea  th at imposs ibl ed esiresca nb e prom oted  w ould p lausib l y
 what,_then the_probability that it is_satisfied is_(always)_0. 27_Sharadin_(2015, p. 1380)._DiPaolo and Behrends_(2015) criticize this sort_of "reason to_promotion"_inference. But see Sharadin (2016) for a reply. 28 Note that Sharadin's worry is_not_just a_worry_for_Contrastive Pure Probabilism. It's also_a worry for Contrastive Causal_Probabilism. Since,_by hypothesis, the probability of EA cannot increase,_nothing_can, by hypothesis,_be a ​cause​ of that probability increasing. 29 C.f._Lin (2016, p. 16): "I agree_that on the_most_natural_way of filling in_the details of the case, there_is intuitively a reason for the_agent" to take the pill. 30 Lin_(2016, p. 15). 14 pill. In_a recent note, responding to_the same_point made by Jeffrey Behrends_and Joshua DiPaolo,_Sharadin offers_a reply to_this "neighboring desire" worry. In brief,_31 Sharadin's claim_is that the rationality of EA*_is_now in need_of_explanation,_and the_best explanation of_why_there is_a_reason for Artie have EA* is_that_doing so promotes EA: and then we're_back off to the_races._We lack the space_to consider Sharadin's 32 reply_in detail here; but in any_case, Lin_goes further:_Suppose that, besides [EA], our agent truly has ​no other desires_[such as EA*] whose satisfaction might_be promoted by [taking_the pill]._Moreover,_suppose that our_agent_has some_reason ​against [taking the pill] (e.g., it_would [...]_be mildly unpleasant). Intuitively, however weak_this reason is, he_has_more reason against [taking the pill]_than he does in favor of_[taking it]. This can only_be_because_he has no reason of_any weight to [take the pill]._This means that_[EA] does ​not give him a reason_to_[take the pill], and thus that_[taking_it] would ​not promote the satisfaction_of_this_desire. 33 We reject Lin's_intuitive judgment in this case as_probative on three grounds. First: we do not find_it intuitive that,_supposing Artie really does have_EA,_that_however weak some countervailing reason is, that reason will always_outweigh the_reason provided by_EA. Indeed, any proponent of the idea that impossible desires_can be promoted would plausibly