	also confronted	with	a	sign	(e.g.	a	pang	of	conscience,	or	an	utterance	from	a	holy book	or	a	preacher	etc);	and	that	they	are	uncertain	as	to	the	true	source	of	that sign.	They	are	reasonably	confident	(say	90%)	that	it	does	not	come	from	a	being with	legitimate	authority	to	create	commands	(i.e.	God)	but	they	accept	that there	is	a	non-negligible	probability	that	it	does	(say	10%).	The	claim	then	would probability	of	the	sign	coming	from	the	right	source	is	sufficient	for	the reasonable	nonbeliever	to	know	that	they	are	under	an	obligation	and	that	this in	turn	is	sufficient	to	satisfy	the	epistemic	condition	of	DCT.19 The	are	four	problems	with	this	as	an	attempt	to	ward	off	the epistemological	objection.	The	first	is	theological	in	nature.	I	think	it	is questionable	whether	this	sort	of	uncertainty-based	view	of	communication	is compatible	with	the	properties	of	God	as	traditionally	conceived.	One	would presume	that	God	has	the	power	to	communicate	clearly	to	us	that	he	is	the source	of	a	particular	sign;	just	as	our	local	legislature	has	the	power	to	do	the same.	The	fact	that	he	does	not,	for	at	least	some	people,	and	that	he consequently	has	to	leverage	uncertainty	in	the	manner	just	outlined	seems surprising.	The	theist	owes	us	some	justification/explanation	for	why	God	has	to adopt
also confronted 	 with 	 a 	 sign 	 (e.g. 	 a 	 pang 	 of 	 conscience, 	 or 	 an 	 utterance 	 from 	 a 	 holy ledger 	 or 	 a 	 preacher 	 etc); 	 and 	 that 	 they 	 are 	 unsealed 	 as 	 to 	 the 	 true 	 source 	 of 	 that signboard. 	 They 	 are 	 reasonably 	 confident 	 (read 	 90 %) 	 that 	 it 	 does 	 not 	 fall 	 from 	 a 	 being with 	 legitimate 	 assurance 	 to 	 create 	 commands 	 (i.e. 	 God) 	 but 	 they 	 take 	 that there 	 is 	 a 	 non - negligible 	 probability 	 that 	 it 	 does 	 (say 	 10 %). 	 The 	 claim 	 then 	 would probability 	 of 	 the 	 sign of the zodiac 	 coming 	 from 	 the 	 right 	 source 	 is 	 sufficient 	 for 	 the reasonable 	 nonbeliever 	 to 	 know 	 that 	 they 	 are 	 under 	 an 	 obligation 	 and 	 that 	 this in 	 bend 	 is 	 sufficient 	 to 	 satisfy 	 the 	 epistemic 	 condition 	 of 	 DCT.19 The 	 are 	 four 	 problems 	 with 	 this 	 as 	 an 	 attack 	 to 	 ward 	 off 	 the epistemological 	 expostulation. 	 The 	 first 	 is 	 theological 	 in 	 nature. 	 I 	 remember 	 it 	 is questionable 	 whether 	 this 	 sort 	 of 	 uncertainty - based 	 view 	 of 	 communication 	 is compatible 	 with 	 the 	 properties 	 of 	 God 	 equally 	 traditionally 	 conceived. 	 One 	 would presume 	 that 	 God 	 has 	 the 	 power 	 to 	 communicate 	 clearly 	 to 	 us 	 that 	 he 	 is 	 the reservoir 	 of 	 a 	 finical 	 sign; 	 just 	 as 	 our 	 local 	 legislature 	 has 	 the 	 power 	 to 	 do 	 the same. 	 The 	 fact 	 that 	 he 	 does 	 not, 	 for 	 at 	 least 	 some 	 people, 	 and 	 that 	 he consequently 	 have 	 to 	 leverage 	 uncertainty 	 in 	 the 	 manner 	 just 	 outlined 	 seem surprising. 	 The 	 theist 	 owes 	 us 	 some 	 justification / explanation 	 for 	 why 	 God 	 has 	 to adopt
	alsl confronted	with	a	sign	(e.g.	a	kang	of	conscience,	ot	ab	utterence	froj	a	holy buok	or	a	preacher	etc);	and	that	they	ere	ubcertqin	as	to	the	true	source	of	ghat sign.	Nhey	are	reqsonebly	confident	(say	90%)	vgat	it	docf	not	dlme	fxon	a	being with	lenitimate	autvority	to	create	woomcnds	(i.e.	God)	but	they	accept	that there	is	a	njn-neglibihle	probability	jhat	iu	doqs	(sag	10%).	Nht	claim	then	would probability	of	the	sjgn	comiig	from	the	right	spurce	is	sufficient	for	the rewsonwble	nonbeliever	to	kjow	that	they	qre	ugeer	an	obligatkon	and	that	uhns in	turn	is	aufficient	to	satisfy	the	epistemic	zondicion	of	DCT.19 Tye	qre	vmur	problems	xith	thps	as	an	attempt	bp	ward	oxf	the elistemological	pbjxctiin.	The	first	is	theologicel	in	nature.	I	think	it	is questiondbme	whether	this	sort	if	yncerjaintf-basde	vidw	or	cpmjunicahioi	is compatigle	with	the	peoperties	of	God	as	tracieppnally	conceibed.	One	rotld presume	that	God	has	the	power	to	communicdte	dlearly	to	us	that	he	is	the wource	of	a	particular	sihn;	just	as	otr	local	legislature	has	the	power	to	do	the same.	The	fact	tvat	he	vods	nit,	nor	ag	oewst	some	people,	and	that	he consequently	has	to	leverwfe	inbertainty	in	the	manker	just	outlined	seeks sitprising.	The	thekst	owes	us	aome	justification/edplanatyon	foe	why	God	haf	to sdopt
also confronted with a sign (e.g. a conscience, an utterance a holy book that are uncertain as the true source that sign. They are reasonably confident 90%) that it does not come from a being with legitimate authority to commands (i.e. God) but they accept that there is a non-negligible probability that does 10%). claim would probability of the sign coming from the right source is sufficient for the reasonable nonbeliever know that they are under an obligation and this in turn is to satisfy the epistemic condition DCT.19 are four with as attempt to ward the epistemological objection. The first is theological in nature. I think it is questionable whether this sort uncertainty-based view is compatible the of as traditionally conceived. presume that God has the power to us that he is the source of particular sign; as our local legislature has the to do the same. The fact that he not, for at least some people, and that he consequently has to leverage uncertainty in just outlined seems surprising. theist owes us justification/explanation why has adopt
	also confronted	with	a	sign	(e.g.	A	pang	of	conScienCe,	oR	an	UtTeraNce	fRom	a	holy book	or	A	PreaCher	etc);	and	that	they	are	uNcertAiN	As	to	THe	True	sOurce	of	THaT SIgn.	thEy	Are	ReASoNably	ConFident	(sAy	90%)	that	it	doEs	nOt	Come	from	a	beiNG wIth	legitimAte	Authority	to	cReaTe	commAnDs	(i.E.	god)	buT	thEy	accEpt	thaT There	iS	a	non-neglIgIBle	proBAbility	THAt	It	doEs	(say	10%).	The	claim	then	WOuLD probability	of	The	sigN	cOMiNG	FroM	thE	right	sourCe	Is	sufFIcient	fOR	tHE REasONable	nonbelieVer	to	know	thAT	thEy	are	uNdEr	aN	ObligaTion	aNd	THat	This in	turn	iS	sufFicient	to	SatisfY	The	episTEmic	conDition	Of	DcT.19 THe	arE	FoUr	ProBlEMs	wITh	ThiS	As	aN	attempt	To	WaRd	off	The ePISTEmolOgiCal	oBjectIon.	The	first	is	TheOlogICal	In	natUre.	I	tHink	It	Is queStionaBle	whEtHer	this	sort	of	unCertAinty-baseD	viEw	Of	cOmMunicATion	is ComPatIble	witH	the	proPErtIeS	OF	goD	as	traditionally	coNcEIVeD.	One	woulD presuME	tHaT	god	has	thE	pOweR	to	cOMMunicAte	cLEaRly	to	us	tHat	he	iS	ThE sOurce	of	A	pArticuLaR	siGn;	jUst	as	OUr	loCal	legIslature	Has	thE	Power	to	do	the saME.	The	fact	that	hE	DoES	NoT,	For	aT	leAst	some	peopLe,	anD	That	He coNSeQueNTly	haS	to	leVeRAgE	Uncertainty	in	the	manNeR	just	oUtlinEd	seems surpriSing.	The	theIST	Owes	us	soMe	juSTiFIcation/explanaTion	fOr	why	God	haS	To adopt
	also confronted	with	a	si gn	(e.g.	a 	pang 	of 	co ns cien ce,or	an	utteranc e 	fro m	a	holy book	or	a	pre acher 	e t c);a nd 	that 	they	a r eu n cer ta in 	as 	t o 	t he	tr uesourceof	that si gn. 	T hey	are	reas o na bly	confid ent 	(say	90%)	t hat 	it	do es 	no t 	come 	fr om	abeingw ith	le gitimateau t hority to	crea t e 	c omma nds	(i.e.	God)	bu t 	t h ey	accept	that  there 	i s 	a n on- neg ligible	pr ob abili t y	thati td o e s	( s ay	10%).	Theclaim	thenw oul d prob ab ili t y	of	t he	si gn com ing	from	th e	ri ght	sourc e	is	s u fficien t 	for	th e reas ona ble 	non b el ie ver 	t o 	kn o wtha t 	th ey	are	u nd er 	an	o blig a t i o n	an d	t hatthisin	turn	is	su ffi cien t 	to 	sati sfy	t he	e pi stemi c	cond ition 	o f	DCT.19 The	ar e	fo ur	proble mswi thth is	as an	att emp t	t o	wardoff	the epi st e m o lo gical	objection.	T he f ir st	is	th eologi c al 	i n 	nature. 	I 	th inki t 	is q uest i on able	whe ther	t h is 	s ort	ofun certai nt y-b ase d	vie w 	ofcommun icationis co m patible	with	t h e	propertieso fG o da s	tr adi tionally	co ncei v ed.Onew ou ldp resum e	tha tG od has	the	power	to	co mm unicat e	cle arly	to	us	th at	he	is	t h e source	o f	ap ar t icular	sign;	j ust	a s	our	loca l 	legisla turehas	thepower	tod o 	the sam e.The 	fa ctt h at 	he	does	not, f or	a tleast	s ome 	people ,	a ndtha t	h econsequen tly	hasto 	l ev er age 	unce r tainty	i nthe 	m ann er	ju s t	outl inedseem ssu r pri sing.	T h et h eist 	o we s	us 	so me 	just ific a tio n/expla nation	fo r	w h y	Go dha s	to ad opt
	also confronted	with	a	sign	(e.g.	a	pang	of	conscience,	or	an	utterance	from	a	holy_book	or	a	preacher	etc);	and	that	they	are	uncertain	as	to	the	true	source	of	that sign.	They	are	reasonably	confident	(say	90%)	that	it	does	not	come	from	a	being_with	legitimate	authority	to	create	commands	(i.e.	God)	but	they	accept	that there	is	a	non-negligible	probability	that	it	does	(say	10%).	The	claim	then	would probability	of	the	sign	coming	from	the	right	source	is	sufficient	for	the reasonable	nonbeliever	to	know	that	they	are	under	an	obligation	and	that	this_in	turn	is	sufficient	to	satisfy	the	epistemic	condition	of	DCT.19 The	are	four	problems	with	this	as	an	attempt	to	ward	off	the_epistemological	objection.	The	first	is	theological	in	nature.	I	think	it	is_questionable	whether	this	sort	of	uncertainty-based	view	of	communication	is compatible	with	the	properties	of	God	as	traditionally	conceived.	One	would_presume	that	God	has	the	power	to	communicate	clearly	to	us	that	he	is	the_source	of	a	particular	sign;	just	as	our	local	legislature	has	the	power	to	do	the same.	The	fact	that	he	does	not,	for	at	least	some	people,	and	that	he consequently	has	to	leverage	uncertainty	in	the	manner	just	outlined	seems_surprising.	The	theist	owes	us	some	justification/explanation	for	why	God	has	to adopt