 an inference. It is represented in (A). I shall call reasoning that concludes in the forming of an intention 'intention reasoning'. Since it leads to a decision, it is practical reasoning. Reasoning could not be more practical than this; it could not get closer to action. It certainly could not conclude in a physical act itself, because it takes more than reasoning ability to bring about a physical act. It takes physical ability too. So intention reasoning is the paradigm of practical reasoning. The reasoning process (B) can be categorized in another way. It is instrumental reasoning, which means it is concerned with taking an appropriate means to an end. If we want to understand practical reasoning, it is a good idea to start with instrumental reasoning, because it is generally held to be more straightforward than other sorts. Kant (1948, p. 80) says it'requires no special discussion', though I hope this paper proves him wrong. It considers instrumental reasoning only. Furthermore, it considers only a special case of instrumental reasoning: the case of reasoning to a necessary means. In another paper (Broome, 1998), I have extended the argument to means that are not necessary. I have been begging the question of whether intention reasoning is truly reasoning at all. If it is to be the paradigm of practical reasoning, it must be reasoning. Indeed it must be correct reasoning. (I shall keep the term 'valid' for the content of reasoning, and use 'correct' for the reasoning process.) We could call almost any process of thought'reasoning', but I shall generally use this term only for correct reasoning. Intuitively, (B) describes correct reasoning, but we need an explanation of why. 2. Kant and the correctness of intention reasoning 2 Kant (1948, p. 80) asks 'how we can conceive the necessitation of the will expressed by the imperative in setting us a task'. In the context of instrumental reasoning, I think he means, for instance: how does my intention of going to St Andrews make it necessary for me to intend to get off at Leuchars? (I read 'will' as 'intend'.) I have just said this has the necessity of correct reasoning. Intuitively at least, intention reasoning of a form like (B) is correct, and that is why I must intend a necessary means if I intend an end. So an explanation of how intention reasoning is correct will answer Kant's question, and an answer to Kant's question will explain how intention reasoning is correct. In answering his question,
an inference. It is represented in (A). I shall call reasoning that concludes in the forming of an purpose' purpose reasoning'. Since it lead to a decision, it is hardheaded reasoning. Reasoning could not be more virtual than this; it could not get closer to military action. It certainly could not conclude in a forcible act itself, because it take more than reasoning ability to bring about a forcible act. It takes physical ability too. So purpose reasoning is the paradigm of practical reasoning. The reasoning procedure (B) can be categorized in another manner. It is instrumental reasoning, which means it is concerned with take an appropriate means to an end. If we want to understand hardheaded reasoning, it is a good idea to start with instrumental reasoning, because it is generally contain to be more straightforward than other sorts. Kant (1948, p. 80) says it'requires no special discussion', though I hope this newspaper proves him wrong. It considers instrumental reasoning only. Furthermore, it considers only a special case of instrumental reasoning: the event of reasoning to a necessary means. In another newspaper (Broome, 1998), I have extend the argument to means that are not necessary. I have been begging the question of whether intention reasoning is truly reasoning at all. If it is to be the prototype of practical reasoning, it must be reasoning. Indeed it must be correct reasoning. (I shall keep the term' valid' for the content of reasoning, and practice' correct' for the reasoning process .) We could call almost any process of thought'reasoning', but I shall generally use this condition only for correct reasoning. Intuitively, (B) describes correct reasoning, but we necessitate an explanation of why. 2. Kant and the correctness of intention reasoning 2 Kant (1948, p. 80) asks' how we can gestate the necessitation of the will expressed by the imperative in setting us a task'. In the context of implemental reasoning, I think he means, for instance: how does my intention of going to St Andrews do it necessary for me to intend to get off at Leuchars? (I read' will' as' intend' .) I have merely said this hold the necessity of correct reasoning. Intuitively at least, intention reasoning of a form like (B) is correct, and that is why I must mean a necessary means if I intend an end. So an explanation of how intention reasoning is correct will answer Kant's question, and an answer to Kant's doubt will explain how intention reasoning is right. In answering his question,
 an inference. It is represekted in (A). I shall call ceasonihg that zoncludes in the forming of en ibtentuon 'intention reasonine'. Since in leads ti a vecision, it is pczctical reasohlng. Rzawoning could npt be more practical that ghns; it could not get closer to action. It ceryalnly could not conbltde jn a physical act itself, because if takes more than ressoning ability to bring ahout a physical act. It takes physucal qbility too. Ro intention reasoning is the paradigm of practical rdasonnng. The reawobinh process (B) ran be categorized in anotver way. It is instrumcntal reqsoning, which means iv is concerned with jaking an dp'ropriate means to an ebd. If we fant ro jndtrsvans prachicel reasoninf, it is a giod idea to start wotr instrumental reasogigg, because it is generally held to be mmre straightforward than orher sorts. Kant (1948, p. 80) swys it'reqtires no special discussion', though I hope this pa[er pcoxes hlm wfinh. It considers instrumental reasoning only. Fuwfhtrmpre, it considevs only a special vade jf instrumentxl reasonjng: the case of rewsoning to a necessarr mesns. In another paper (Broome, 1998), I have extvndee the argument to leans that cre noj necexsary. I have been beggiug the question ov whether kntention reasonkng iv truly reasoning at all. Is it is ti be the pafadibm of [ractical geasokhng, it must be readoniny. Indaed it mush be correct reasoning. (I shall keep the term 'fanid' for the contcnt of reasonind, and use 'corrgct' for tke rearoning probess.) We cmuld call ajmost any prowgss of thoughv'reasonind', bur I whall gdverally use thos term oujy fir correct reasonikg. Injujtively, (B) descrnyew correct reasomine, btt wx neeq an explanathon uf dny. 2. Kxnt and the zorrrctness of intention reaaoning 2 Kant (1948, p. 80) axkf 'how we can conseive the necrssitation of the aill xxpresred bu tre imperative in setting us a fask'. In tje gontext of inftrunental reasouing, I think he means, for instance: how dies my intention od going to St Andrecs make it neressarr for me do intend to get off at Leuchars? (I resd 'will' as 'intend'.) I hzve juvt sald this has the necessity of correct reasoning. Intuitively at least, intenrion rxafoning of a fork likv (B) ns corrqct, env that is why I mlst intend a necessary means if M intend at znd. So an explanation of how ongention reasoving is correct will ansser Kant'x question, and an answer to Kany's question will explain how intwntioh reasoninj is correct. In answrring kis quwstion,
an inference. It is represented in (A). call that concludes the forming of it to a decision, is practical reasoning. could not be more practical than it could not get closer to action. It certainly could not conclude in physical act itself, because it takes more than reasoning ability to bring about physical It physical too. So intention reasoning is the paradigm of practical reasoning. The reasoning process (B) can be in another way. It is instrumental reasoning, which it is concerned with an appropriate means to an If want to practical it a good idea start with instrumental reasoning, because it is generally held to be more straightforward than other sorts. Kant p. 80) no special though hope paper proves him considers instrumental reasoning only. Furthermore, it special case of instrumental reasoning: the case of to a means. In another paper (Broome, 1998), have extended the argument to means that are necessary. I have been begging the question of whether intention reasoning is truly reasoning at it is to be paradigm of practical it be Indeed must be reasoning. (I shall keep the term 'valid' for the content of and use 'correct' for the reasoning process.) We could call process thought'reasoning', but I generally use this term for reasoning. Intuitively, (B) describes but need why. Kant the correctness of intention 2 Kant (1948, p. 80) 'how we can conceive expressed by the imperative in setting us a In the context of instrumental reasoning, I he means, for instance: how does my intention of going to St make it me to intend to get off at Leuchars? read 'will' as 'intend'.) have just said this has the necessity of correct Intuitively least, intention of a form (B) is correct, that is why intend a means I So an explanation of how intention is will answer Kant's question, and answer question will explain how intention reasoning is correct. In answering his question,
 an inference. It is representeD in (A). I shall Call rEasOniNg That ConcLudes in the formINg of An intention 'intention reAsoniNg'. sInce IT lEads tO a decisIOn, IT Is pRaCtIcaL rEAsOning. reaSoning cOuld not be mOre PrActical than tHIs; It could not Get Closer to actiOn. IT certaInLy cOUld noT coNcludE in a phYSical aCt itself, bEcAUse it tAKes more THAn ReasOning ability to briNG aBOut a physical acT. It takEs PHySICal AbiLity too. So iNtEntioN ReasoniNG iS THE paRAdigm of practiCal reasoninG. the ReasonInG prOCess (B) cAn be cAtEGorIzed in anothEr waY. It is instRumentAL reasonINg, which Means iT is ConCernED wItH taKiNG an APpRopRIatE means to An EnD. If we Want TO UNDersTanD praCticaL reasoning, it iS a gOod iDEa tO starT with InstRuMentaL reasoNing, bEcAuse it is generalLy heLd to be morE stRaIghTfOrwarD Than otHer SorTs. Kant (1948, p. 80) Says it'rEQuiReS NO SpEcial discussion', thoUgH i HoPe this paPer proVEs HiM Wrong. It cOnSidErs iNSTrumeNtal REaSoning onLy. FurtHErMoRe, it conSiDers onLy A spEciAl casE Of inStrumeNtal reasOning: THe case of reasonINg to a necessarY MeANS. IN AnotHer Paper (Broome, 1998), i havE ExteNded THe ArgUMent tO meanS tHAt ARe not necessary. I have BeEn beggIng thE question of whEther intenTION reasoniNg is TRuLY reasoning at alL. If it Is to be the pARadigm of PractIcal reasOning, it muST Be reasonIng. indEed It mUST bE correct reasoNINg. (I sHaLl keep tHe tErm 'valiD' foR thE coNteNt Of reasoniNg, and use 'CoRrEcT' fOr tHe reaSOning proCeSs.) WE cOulD call ALmost aNy proCess Of ThOUghT'reasonINg', BUT I shAlL gEnerAllY uSe thiS terM OnlY for corRect reasoNinG. intuItIvEly, (B) desCribes correct ReAsoning, but We NeeD an expLANation of Why. 2. Kant and the correctnesS Of intenTioN reasOninG 2 Kant (1948, p. 80) askS 'hoW we can ConCEive thE necesSitatIoN of THE will EXPrEssEd By the imperATIve In setTiNg us A task'. In The context of instruMEntAl reasoning, I tHinK he mEANs, For INsTAncE: hOW doES My intention of goIng to St AndReWS mAke it necesSAry FoR me to inTend to gEt off AT LeuchaRs? (I read 'wiLl' as 'intenD'.) I Have JUSt sAid this has The necesSity of corREct reASoNing. INtuItivelY aT leAst, inTentioN ReaSoninG of a foRm Like (B) iS corrEcT, and that Is why I must intend a necessAry meaNs if I IntEnd an end. SO an EXplAnation of How iNtention reAsoNinG is coRreCT will AnswER KAnt'S QuestIon, aND an answer TO KAnt'S QUeStion will exPLAIn hOw intEntIOn reasOninG is correct. In answeRIng his question,
 an inference. It is repre sented in(A).I s hal lcall  rea soning that co n clud es in the forming of a n int en t ion' in tenti on reas o ni n g '.Si nc e i tl ea ds to  adecisio n, it is p rac ti cal reasonin g .Reasoningcou ld not be mo repracti ca l t h an th is;  it c ould n o t getcloser to  a c tion.I t certa i n ly  cou ld not conclude i n  a physical act i tself,  b e ca u s e i t t akes moreth an re a soninga bi l i t y t o  bring abouta physicala ct.  It ta ke s p h ysical  abil it y  to o. So inten tion  reasonin g is t h e parad i gm of p ractic alrea soni n g.  T here a son i ng  pr o ces s (B) ca nbe  cate gori z e d in a not herway.It is instrum ent al r e aso ning,  whic h me an s itis con cerne dwith taking anappr opriate m ean stoan  end. If wewan t t o under stand p r act ic a l re asoning, it is a g oo d id ea to st art wi t hin s trumenta lrea soni n g , bec ause it  is gene rallyh el dto be m or e stra ig htf orw ard t h an o ther s orts. Ka nt (1 9 48, p. 80) say s  it'requiresn os p ec i al d isc ussion', th ough I ho pe t h is  pa p er pr oveshi m  w r ong. It considers i ns trumen tal r easoning only . Furtherm o r e , it con side r so nly a specialcaseof instrum e ntal rea sonin g: the c ase of re a s oning to  anec ess ary m ea ns. In anothe r pape r(Broome , 1 998), I  ha veext end ed  the argu ment tome an sth atare n o t necess ar y.Ihav e bee n  beggi ng th e qu es ti o n o f wheth e ri n tent io nreas oni ng  is t ruly rea soningat all. I f i t  isto  b e the p aradigm of pr ac tical reas on ing , it m u s t be rea soning. Indeed it mustb e corre ctreaso ning . (I shal l k eep th e t e rm 'va lid' f or th econ t e nt of r ea son in g, and use ' cor rect'  f or t he reas oning process.) We cou ld call almos t a ny p r o ce sso ft hou gh t 're a s oning', but I s hall gener al l yuse this t e rmon ly forcorrect  reas o ning. I ntuitivel y, (B) de sc ribe s cor rect reaso ning, bu t we need an ex p la natio n o f why.  2 . K ant a nd the cor rectn ess of  i ntenti on re as oning 2Kant (1948, p. 80) asks  'howwe ca n c onceive t hen ece ssitation  ofthe will e xpr ess ed by  th e  impe rati v eins ettin g us a task'.I nthe c on text of ins t r u men tal r eas o ning,I th ink he means, for instance: howdoes m y i nte n tion  o f going to StAnd re w s  make it  n ecessary fo r me toin t end t o getoff at  Leucha r s ?( I read  'wi ll'  as 'inte nd' .) I haveju st said t hisha s thenecess i ty o f correct reasonin g. In t u itive l y a t lea st , inten t ionreasoningof a form l ike (B ) is  corr ect, an dthat i s w hy  I must in t end a nec essar y means  i f Iint end an  end . So an  exp la nat ion of ho w in t en ti o n r easo ningis  cor rect will answer K ant ' s quest io n,a n d an a n sw e r  to Kant's  qu estio n will expla i n ho w  i n tenti on rea soning  is cor r ect .In answ eri n g  his ques tion,
 an_inference. It_is represented in (A)._I shall_call_reasoning that_concludes_in the forming_of an intention_'intention reasoning'. Since it_leads to a_decision,_it is practical reasoning. Reasoning could not be more practical than this; it could_not_get closer_to_action._It certainly could not conclude_in a physical act itself,_because it_takes more than reasoning ability to bring about_a_physical act. It_takes physical ability too. So intention reasoning is the_paradigm of practical reasoning. The reasoning_process (B) can_be_categorized_in another way. It_is instrumental reasoning, which means it_is concerned with taking an appropriate_means to an end. If we want_to understand practical reasoning, it is_a good idea to start_with instrumental_reasoning, because it is generally_held to be_more straightforward_than other sorts._Kant (1948, p. 80) says it'requires_no special discussion',_though I hope this paper proves_him_wrong. It considers_instrumental_reasoning_only. Furthermore,_it considers only_a_special case_of_instrumental reasoning: the case of reasoning_to_a necessary means. In another paper (Broome,_1998), I have extended_the_argument to means that_are not necessary. I have_been begging the question of whether_intention reasoning_is truly_reasoning at all. If it is to be the paradigm of_practical reasoning, it must be reasoning._Indeed it must be_correct reasoning._(I_shall keep the_term_'valid' for_the content of reasoning, and use 'correct'_for the_reasoning process.) We could call almost_any process of thought'reasoning',_but_I shall generally use this term_only for correct reasoning. Intuitively, (B)_describes correct reasoning, but we_need_an_explanation of why. 2. Kant_and the correctness of intention reasoning_2 Kant (1948,_p. 80) asks 'how we can conceive_the_necessitation of the will expressed by_the_imperative in setting us a task'._In_the_context of instrumental reasoning, I_think he means, for instance: how_does my intention of going to St Andrews make_it necessary for_me to intend to get_off_at_Leuchars? (I read 'will' as 'intend'.) I have just said_this has_the necessity of_correct reasoning. Intuitively at least, intention reasoning of a form_like (B) is correct, and that is_why I must intend a necessary means if I intend an_end. So an explanation of how intention reasoning_is correct will answer Kant's question, and_an answer to Kant's_question_will explain how intention reasoning is correct._In_answering_his_question,