 bundle theorists or pluralists about the Self) are ontologically strong enough to exist without the need for a bearer – this seems to me even clearer in the case of experiences than in the general case of properties, since as I already mentioned experiences are the results of brain activity of conscious beings, and so they do not "float-free". Experiences (and mental states in general) can satisfy the requirement for independence well enough to play the role of constituents of the Self – there just is no argument that would show that they cannot, apart from somewhat ontologically prejudiced protests. §5. The second desideratum I shall consider now which a theory of the Self should satisfy concerns the diachronic unity and continuity there seems to be to our experiences. Indeed, phenomenologically speaking, I think it is correct to say that our experience appears to us as being at least partly continuous and somehow'stream-like'. Prima facie, this may sound like a problem for my pluralistic view, since – the objector could say – it claims that I am a plurality of 'disconnected' experiences, in the sense that they are not united in a bundle or by an underlying substance: there just is a disunited series of singular experiences, without continuity. The task for the pluralistic view is now to show where the unity and continuity that we experience comes from. A kind – the relevant one, as I shall argue – of these and similar worries have been largely debated in the history of philosophy5 and even more so since James' famous discussion of the "specious present": "A succession of feelings, in and of itself, is not a feeling of succession. And since, to our successive feelings, a feeling of their own succession is added, that must be treated as an additional fact requiring its own special elucidation [...]. [T]he prototype of all conceived times is the specious present, the short duration of which we are immediately and incessantly sensible" (James (1890, p.629)). The idea is this: think of the apple falling from a nearby tree, and think about how you experience its fall – its movement. Your experience is continuous and smooth, you experience movement, you do not have a succession of static isolated experiences of the apple being at various points of its fall. In order to provide a phenomenologically adequate understanding of such a continuous experience, James and 5 John Locke held an interesting view on this issue; see Benovsky (2012) for a detailed discussion. 9 many
bundle theorists or pluralists about the Self) are ontologically strong enough to exist without the need for a holder – this seem to me even clearer in the case of experiences than in the cosmopolitan case of properties, since as I already mentioned experience are the results of brain action of conscious beings, and so they do not " float - barren ". Experiences (and mental state in cosmopolitan) can satisfy the requirement for independence well enough to toy the role of constituents of the Self – there merely is no argument that would show that they cannot, apart from reasonably ontologically prejudiced protests. § 5. The second desideratum I shall consider now which a theory of the Self should meet concerns the diachronic one and continuity there seems to be to our experiences. Indeed, phenomenologically speaking, I intend it is correct to say that our experience appears to us as being at least partly continuous and somehow'stream - like'. Prima facie, this may voice like a problem for my pluralistic view, since – the objector could say – it claims that I am a plurality of' disconnected' experiences, in the sense that they are not united in a package or by an underlying substance: there barely is a disunited series of singular experiences, without continuity. The undertaking for the pluralistic view is now to show where the unity and continuity that we have comes from. A kind – the relevant one, as I shall argue – of these and similar worries have been largely debated in the history of philosophy5 and even more so since James' famous discussion of the " gilded present ": " A succession of feelings, in and of itself, is not a feeling of succession. And since, to our successive feelings, a feeling of their own sequence is add, that must be treated as an additional fact requiring its own special elucidation [... ]. [ T]he prototype of all conceived times is the gilded present, the short duration of which we are immediately and constantly sensible " (James (1890, p.629) ). The idea is this: intend of the apple falling from a nearby tree, and intend about how you experience its fall – its motion. Your experience is continuous and smooth, you know movement, you do not suffer a succession of inactive isolated experiences of the apple being at versatile points of its spill. In order to put up a phenomenologically adequate understanding of such a continuous experience, James and 5 John Locke held an interesting view on this issue; see Benovsky (2012) for a detailed discussion. 9 many
 bujdle theorists or plurallsts about the Sgld) are mntolofically rtrong enough to exist withont tye netb for a bearer – this seems to me even cleerer in the case of expevnencea thau mn the general gase of pro[erties, since ds I already mentioned experiences are ehe resilhs of brain acjivitj jf cknscious beings, and so they do not "float-fgee". Experiences (amd mental states in generap) caj satisfy the requlrement for indqpendence welu enough to play the rkle of constituents of the Self – thexe just is bo arhoment that wiuld fhow that thcj cannod, apart from somewhat onvolotically prejudiced prmtests. §5. The second desideraduj I shall considee bow wvich a tfworh or vhe Self dhonld satisfy concerns tye diachronic unity age continuity fhere feqms to be to our experiences. Indeed, phetomsnologically speaking, I think it is correct jo say thae our experience appears to us as being at least [artlb zonuikmous qnf somehow'stream-like'. Prima facie, this may sounq lokv a problem for mn pluralistic view, slnvg – the objectot could sag – it claims that L am a kluraluty of 'difconmected' experiences, in the swnse that thvy aee not united in a bundle or yy an onderluing substance: there jurt ia a disunitfd series uf singular expefiekcev, withouu continuity. The twsk for tie plbralistiz vigw is njw to show wherc the unity and conhinuijy thad we experlence comes from. A kind – the relevant one, as O vhanl argue – of bhese and similwr worries havg been laxgely aebated in the hivtory of phylosophy5 and agen more so vince Jaies' damoys discjrsion of the "slecious pgefent": "A succession of fcelinea, in and of itszud, is not a feelong of slccxssiog. And since, tm ouf sjvcesskve feelingw, a freling of their own vuccsssion is added, thst must be treated as an additipnal fact requirinh its owi specoal elucidation [...]. [T]he prototype of all concfivcd times is tre siecijus presenc, the short duration of which we are immxdiately and incessantlt sensible" (James (1890, p.629)). Uhe idea is tiis: thynk of tha apple falling from a nearby tree, anc think about how you experhence its fall – its movement. Your experience is continuous and smooth, you expeeience movement, yoh do not vare c succefsioi uf static isolatvd experiences of the apple beinj at variogs points of its fall. In order tu provide a pfenomenologically adequafe underxtanding of such a continuous ecperience, James and 5 Johk Locke hwld ah integgstmng view on this issie; see Benocsky (2012) fir a detailed diszusxiln. 9 many
bundle theorists or pluralists about the Self) strong to exist the need for to even clearer in case of experiences in the general case of properties, as I already mentioned experiences are the results of brain activity of conscious and so they do not "float-free". Experiences (and mental states in general) can the for well to play the role of constituents of the Self – there just is no argument that show that they cannot, apart from somewhat ontologically protests. §5. The second I shall consider now which theory the Self satisfy the unity and continuity seems to be to our experiences. Indeed, phenomenologically speaking, I think it is correct to say that experience appears as being least continuous somehow'stream-like'. Prima facie, sound like a problem for my – the objector could say – it claims I am plurality of 'disconnected' experiences, in the that they are not united in a bundle by an underlying substance: there just is a disunited series of singular experiences, without continuity. for the pluralistic view now to show the and that experience comes A kind – the relevant one, as I shall argue – these and similar worries have been largely debated in the philosophy5 even more so James' famous discussion of "specious "A succession of feelings, of is of And to our successive feelings, feeling of their own succession added, that must be requiring its own special elucidation [...]. [T]he prototype all conceived times is the specious present, short duration of which we are immediately and incessantly sensible" (James (1890, The idea think of the apple falling from a nearby and think about how experience its fall – its movement. Your experience is and you experience you do not a succession of isolated experiences of being at points its to provide a phenomenologically adequate understanding such continuous experience, James and 5 Locke interesting view on this issue; see Benovsky (2012) for a detailed discussion. 9 many
 bundle theorists or pluralisTs about the self) aRe oNtoLoGicaLly sTrong enough to eXIst wIthout the need for a beareR – this SeEMs to ME eVen clEarer in THe CASe oF eXpEriEnCEs Than iN thE generaL case of proPerTiEs, since as I alREaDy mentioneD exPeriences are The ResultS oF brAIn actIviTy of cOnscioUS beingS, and so theY dO Not "floAT-free". ExPERiEnceS (and mental states iN GeNEral) can satisfy The reqUiREmENT foR inDependence WeLl enoUGh to plaY ThE ROLe oF Constituents oF the Self – theRE juSt is no ArGumENt that Would ShOW thAt they cannoT, apaRt from somEwhat oNTologicALly prejUdiced ProTesTs. §5. ThE SeCoNd dEsIDerATuM I sHAll Consider NoW wHich a TheoRY OF The SElf ShouLd satIsfy concerns tHe dIachROniC unitY and cOntiNuIty thEre seeMs to bE tO our experiences. indeEd, phenomeNolOgIcaLlY speaKIng, I thInk It iS correcT to say tHAt oUr EXPErIence appears to us as BeING aT least paRtly coNTiNuOUs and somEhOw'sTreaM-LIke'. PrIma fACiE, this may Sound lIKe A pRoblem fOr My plurAlIstIc vIew, siNCe – thE objecTor could Say – it CLaims that I am a pLUrality of 'discONnECTeD' ExpeRieNces, in the seNse tHAt thEy arE NoT unITed in A bundLe OR bY An underlying substanCe: There jUst is A disunited serIes of singuLAR ExperienCes, wIThOUt continuity. ThE task For the plurAListic viEw is nOw to show Where the uNITy and conTinUitY thAt wE EXpErience comes fROM. A kiNd – The releVanT one, as I ShaLl aRguE – of ThEse and simIlar worrIeS hAvE bEen LargeLY debated In The HiStoRy of pHIlosopHy5 and Even MoRe SO siNce JameS' FaMOUs diScUsSion Of tHe "SpeciOus pREseNt": "A succEssion of fEelINgs, iN aNd Of itselF, is not a feelinG oF successioN. ANd sInce, to OUR successIve feelings, a feeling of thEIr own suCceSsion Is adDed, that muSt bE treatEd aS An addiTional Fact rEqUirING its oWN SpEciAl ElucidatioN [...]. [t]He pRototYpE of aLl conceIved times is the specIOus Present, the shoRt dUratION oF whICh WE arE iMMedIATely and incessanTly sensiblE" (JAMeS (1890, p.629)). The idea iS ThiS: tHink of tHe apple FalliNG from a nEarby tree, And think aBoUt hoW YOu eXperience iTs fall – itS movement. yOur exPErIence Is cOntinuOuS anD smooTh, you eXPerIence MovemeNt, You do nOt havE a SuccessiOn of static isolated experIences Of the AppLe being at VarIOus Points of iTs faLl. In order tO prOviDe a phEnoMEnoloGicaLLy AdeQUate uNderSTanding of SUcH a cONTiNuous experiENCE, JaMes anD 5 JoHN Locke Held An interesting view ON this issue; see BEnovSKY (2012) foR a dETailEd Discussion. 9 many
 bundle theorists or plura lists abou t the  Se lf)  a re o ntol ogically stron g  eno ugh to exist without t he ne ed fora  b earer  – this se e m s t ome  ev en cl earer  in  the ca se of expe rie nc es than in t h egeneral ca seof propertie s,sinceas  Ia lread y m entio ned ex p erienc es are th er esults of brai n ac tivi ty of conscious b e in g s, and so they  do no t" fl o a t-f ree ". Experie nc es (a n d menta l  s t a t esi n general) ca n satisfy t h e r equire me ntf or ind epend en c e w ell enoughto p lay the r ole of constit u ents of  the S elf  –ther e  j us t i sn o a r gu men t  th at would  s ho w tha t th e y c anno t,apar t fro m somewhat on tol ogic a lly  prej udice d pr ot ests.  §5. T he se co nd desideratumI sh all consi der  n owwh ich a theory  of  th e Selfshoulds ati sf y c on cerns the diachron ic u ni ty and c ontinu i ty  t h ere seem stobe t o our e xper i en ces. Ind eed, p h en om enologi ca lly sp ea kin g,I thi n k it  is co rrect to  sayt hat our experi e nce appears t o  u s as bein g a t least par tlyc onti nuou s  a nds omeho w'str ea m -l i ke'. Prima facie, t hi s maysound  like a probl em for myp l u ralistic  vie w ,s ince – the obj ector  could say – it cla ims t hat I am  a plural i t y of 'di sco nne cte d'e x pe riences, in t h e  sen se  that t hey  are no t u nit edinabundle or  by an u nd er ly in g s ubsta n ce: ther ejus tisa dis u nitedserie s of  s in g ula r exper i en c e s, w it ho ut c ont in uity.  The tas k for t he plural ist i c vi ew  i s now t o show whereth e unity an dcon tinuit y that weexperience comes from.A  kind –  th e rel evan t one, as  Ishallarg u e – of  these  andsi mil a r  worr i e shav ebeen large l y  de bated  i n th e histo ry of philosophy5a ndeven more sosin ce J a m es ' f a mo u s d is c uss i o n of the "speci ous presen t" :  " A successi o n o ffeeling s, in a nd of itself,  is not a  feelingof  suc c e ssi on. And si nce, toour succe s sivef ee lings , a  feeli ng  of  thei r owns ucc essio n is a dd ed, th at mu st  be trea ted as an additional fa ct req uirin g i ts own sp eci a l e lucidatio n [. ..]. [T]he  pr oto typeofa ll co ncei v ed  ti m es is  the speciousp re sen t ,  t he short du r a t ion  of w hic h  we ar e im mediately and inc e ssantly sensib le"( J ame s ( 1 890,  p .629)). The id eais t his: thi nk  of the app le falli ng froma near by tre e, andt h in k  about  how  yo u experie nce  i t s fall–it s  movem ent.  Y our ex perien c e is c ontinuous and sm ooth, y ou ex p eri encemo vement, youdo not hav e a success ion of  sta tic i solated  e xperie nce sof the app l e being a t var ious po in ts o f i ts fal l. I n order  topr ovi de a phen o m en o lo gi c all y ad equat eunde rstanding of sucha c o ntinuou sexp e r ience, Ja m e s and 5 Jo hnLocke h eld an int e rest i ng viewon thi s issu e; seeB eno vs ky (201 2)f o r a detai led discu s sio n.  9 m any
 bundle_theorists or_pluralists about the Self)_are ontologically_strong_enough to_exist_without the need_for a bearer_– this seems to_me even clearer_in_the case of experiences than in the general case of properties, since as I_already_mentioned experiences_are_the_results of brain activity of_conscious beings, and so they_do not_"float-free". Experiences (and mental states in general) can_satisfy_the requirement for_independence well enough to play the role of constituents_of the Self – there just_is no argument_that_would_show that they cannot,_apart from somewhat ontologically prejudiced protests._§5. The second desideratum I shall_consider now which a theory of the_Self should satisfy concerns the diachronic_unity and continuity there seems_to be_to our experiences. Indeed, phenomenologically_speaking, I think_it is_correct to say_that our experience appears to us_as being at_least partly continuous and somehow'stream-like'. Prima_facie,_this may sound_like_a_problem for_my pluralistic view,_since_– the_objector_could say – it claims that_I_am a plurality of 'disconnected' experiences, in_the sense that they_are_not united in a_bundle or by an underlying_substance: there just is a disunited_series of_singular experiences,_without continuity. The task for the pluralistic view is now to_show where the unity and continuity_that we experience comes_from. A_kind_– the relevant_one,_as I_shall argue – of these and similar_worries have_been largely debated in the history_of philosophy5 and even_more_so since James' famous discussion of_the "specious present": "A succession of_feelings, in and of itself,_is_not_a feeling of succession. And_since, to our successive feelings, a_feeling of their_own succession is added, that must be_treated_as an additional fact requiring its_own_special elucidation [...]. [T]he prototype of_all_conceived_times is the specious present,_the short duration of which we_are immediately and incessantly sensible" (James (1890, p.629)). The_idea is this:_think of the apple falling_from_a_nearby tree, and think about how you experience its fall_– its_movement. Your experience_is continuous and smooth, you experience movement, you do not_have a succession of static isolated experiences_of the apple being at various points of its fall. In_order to provide a phenomenologically adequate understanding of_such a continuous experience, James and 5_John Locke held an_interesting_view on this issue; see Benovsky (2012)_for_a_detailed_discussion. 9 many