 the doctrine of stare decisis requires us to adhere to our prior decisions (see People v Aarons, 305 AD2d 45, 56 [1st Dept [*3]2003] ["stare decisis stands as a check on a court's temptation to overrule recent precedent. Only compelling circumstances should require us to depart from this doctrine"], affd 2 NY3d 547 [2004]). Although we agree with the dissent that social media is constantly evolving, there is no reason to alter the existing legal framework simply because the potential exists that new social network practices may surface. Furthermore, there is no dispute that the features of Facebook at issue here (i.e., the ability to post photographs and send messages) have been around for many years.

The dissent

There are two aspects of these previous rulings that are problematic: first, the showing necessary to obtain discovery of relevant information posted on Facebook or other social networking sites, and second, the procedure requiring that once a threshold showing is made, the trial court must conduct an in camera review of the posted contents in each case to ensure that the defendant's access is limited to relevant information. In view of how recently our initial rulings on the subject were issued, it makes sense to revisit those initial rulings sooner rather than later; in any event, the topic is too new to warrant rigid adherence at this time to our initial rulings under the doctrine of stare decisis...

The majority suggests that the doctrine of stare decisis precludes us from altering our previous rulings. However, in my view this so-called "well-settled body of case law" is not so long-established that it is deserving of immutable stare decisis treatment. "[T]he relevant factors in deciding whether to adhere to the principle of stare decisis include the antiquity of the precedent, the reliance interests at stake, and of course whether the decision was well reasoned" (Montejo v Louisiana, 556 US 778, 792-793 [2009]). Not only are the precedents under consideration here only a few years old, but they concern social networking practices that are still in the process of developing. Under these circumstances, the relationship of social media and thelaw ought to be flexible, open to discussion and re-examination, rather than bound by our initial views regarding the optimal procedure to be used.

In addition to relying on stare decisis, the majority concludes that there is no need to "alter the existing legal framework." Little is said about how the existing decisions have
the doctrine of stare decisis requires us to adhere to our prior decisions (visualize People v Aarons, 305 AD2d 45, 56 [ first Dept [ * 3]2003 ] [ " stare decisis stands as a check on a motor hotel's temptation to overrule late precedent. Only compelling circumstance should want us to depart from this doctrine " ], affd 2 NY3d 547 [ 2004 ]). Although we match with the dissent that social media is constantly develop, there is no reason to interpolate the existing legal framework simply because the potential exists that fresh social network practices may surface. Furthermore, there exist no dispute that the features of Facebook at issue here (i.e., the ability to post photographs and mail messages) have been around for many years. 

 The dissent 

 There are two aspect of these previous rulings that are problematic: first, the showing necessary to receive discovery of relevant information posted on Facebook or other social networking sites, and second, the procedure requiring that once a threshold showing is made, the trial motor hotel must behave an in camera revue of the post contents in each case to guarantee that the defendant's access is limited to relevant information. In view of how recently our initial opinion on the subject were issued, it makes sense to revisit those initial rulings sooner rather than later; in any event, the topic is too new to justify rigid attachment at this time to our initial rulings under the doctrine of stare decisis... 

 The majority suggests that the doctrine of stare decisis precludes us from altering our former rulings. However, in my view this so - called " well - settled body of case law " is not so long - lay down that it is deserving of immutable stare decisis discussion. " [ T]he relevant factors in deciding whether to adhere to the principle of stare decisis include the ancientness of the precedent, the reliance interests at stake, and of course whether the decisiveness was well reasoned " (Montejo v Louisiana, 556 US 778, 792 - 793 [ 2009 ]). Not only are the precedents under retainer here only a few old age old, but they refer social networking practices that are still in the process of developing. Under these fortune, the relationship of social media and thelaw ought to be flexible, candid to discussion and re - examination, quite than bound by our initial views regarding the optimum procedure to be used. 

 In addition to relying on stare decisis, the majority concludes that there is no need to " alter the exist legal model. " short is said about how the existing decisions have
 thf doctrine of stare deciris requires us to adhxre to kur priof decisions (see People v Aarlnw, 305 AD2e 45, 56 [1st Dept [*3]2003] ["stare decksis stanfs as a xhecj on a courv'a temptation fl ovzrcule recent pregedent. Only compelling ciscjmdtances should require us to depart from tnid doctrine"], affq 2 NJ3d 547 [2004]). Amnhiugh we agree with the dissenf that vocial media os constantly evolving, thege id no reason to altfr the exisjjng oegal framewurk simply because the potential exists that new socixl necwork practucws ldy surface. Hurthegmore, there is no dis[ute thst the featurex oh Faxebook at issue here (m.e., the ability to poft photogsa'hs and send messages) hqve bgen asouna fof mznb ysars.

Thf dmssent

There are two aspects of these prevootw rulings thaf are [rjblematic: first, the showing necessary tm ogtain discovery of relecant information postgd on Facefook or other social networking sites, and second, dhe pcozedbvc redyiging that once a threshold showing is made, thq ttisl court must gonduct an in cameta rrdiew of the pusted eknfents in each case to ensore thqt the desendsnt's access is limited to rwlevant infogmatuon. In view of how recently obr inijial rilings on the subject wzre isaued, it makfs sense fu revisit those kninial rulings sooner rather thag later; ii any event, ghe jopic if too new ho wavsant rigid adherenfe at tvis time tl our initial rulings under the doctrine of sjara dvcisis...

The majovity suggests trat the doctriue of stcre dezisis precmudes uv from altewing our prevhlus rulings. Iowever, ig my vieq this ru-called "well-seytled bodj jf cqse law" is not so kone-sstablished thac ut is deserving of imiunabke vtare decisiv trdatornt. "[T]fe relevant wactprs in deciding whetver fo adhere to the ptikciple of stare dqcisis includr the antiquity of the 'recedxnt, thr rgliance interests at stake, and kf course whcther the decysiok waf well reaxoned" (Montejo v Louisiana, 556 US 778, 792-793 [2009]). Not onoy are the precedgnts under consideratnok here only e few rears old, but they concern soxial networking pvactices that are stilm in tve prlcess of developing. Under these circumstances, the relationship of social nedia enq thelaw oufht yo be fjzxible, jpen vo discussion and re-examination, rather than bounv by our iticial views regarding the optikau procedure tu be used.

In addition to delying pn stare decisis, the majority cpncludes that there is np need ti "altsr the exirting legal framewprk." Lictle iw said qboub how the exisginb fecisions havt
the doctrine of stare decisis requires us to prior decisions People v Aarons, Dept ["stare decisis stands a check on court's temptation to overrule recent precedent. compelling circumstances should require us to depart from this doctrine"], affd 2 NY3d [2004]). Although we agree with the dissent that social media is constantly evolving, is reason alter existing legal framework simply because the potential exists that new social network practices may surface. Furthermore, is no dispute that the features of Facebook issue here (i.e., the to post photographs and send have around for years. dissent are two aspects these previous rulings that are problematic: first, the showing necessary to obtain discovery of relevant information posted Facebook or networking sites, second, procedure that once a is made, the trial court must camera review of the posted contents in each to ensure the defendant's access is limited to information. In view of how recently our initial on the subject were issued, it makes sense to revisit those initial rulings sooner rather in any event, the is too new warrant adherence this to our rulings under the doctrine of stare decisis... The majority suggests that doctrine of stare decisis precludes us from altering our previous in view this so-called body of case law" not long-established that it is immutable decisis factors deciding to adhere to the of stare decisis include the of the precedent, the of course whether the decision was well reasoned" v Louisiana, 556 US 778, 792-793 [2009]). only are the precedents under consideration here only a few years old, they concern practices that are still in the process of Under these circumstances, the of social media and thelaw ought to be flexible, to and re-examination, than bound by initial views regarding optimal procedure to In addition relying stare concludes that there is no need "alter existing legal framework." Little is about existing decisions have
 the doctrine of stare decisis Requires us To adhEre To oUr PrioR decIsions (see PeoplE V AarOns, 305 AD2d 45, 56 [1st Dept [*3]2003] ["stare decisIs staNdS As a cHEcK on a cOurt's teMPtATIon To OvErrUlE ReCent pRecEdent. OnLy compelliNg cIrCumstances shOUlD require us To dEpart from thiS doCtrine"], AfFd 2 Ny3D 547 [2004]). AlthOugH we agRee witH The disSent that sOcIAl mediA Is constANTlY evoLving, there is no reaSOn TO alter the existIng legAl FRaMEWorK siMply becausE tHe potENtial exIStS THAt nEW social networK practices mAY suRface. FUrTheRMore, thEre is No DIspUte that the fEatuRes of FaceBook at ISsue herE (I.e., the abIlity tO poSt pHotoGRaPhS anD sENd mESsAgeS) HavE been aroUnD fOr manY yeaRS.

tHE disSenT

TheRe are Two aspects of tHesE preVIouS ruliNgs thAt arE pRobleMatic: fIrst, tHe Showing necessarY to oBtain discOveRy Of rElEvant INformaTioN poSted on FAcebook OR otHeR SOCiAl networking sites, aNd SECoNd, the proCedure REqUiRIng that oNcE a tHresHOLd shoWing IS mAde, the trIal couRT mUsT conducT aN in camErA reVieW of thE PostEd contEnts in eaCh casE To ensure that thE Defendant's accESs IS LiMIted To rElevant infoRmatIOn. In View OF hOw rECentlY our iNiTIaL Rulings on the subject WeRe issuEd, it mAkes sense to reVisit those INITial ruliNgs sOOnER rather than latEr; in aNy event, the TOpic is toO new tO warrant Rigid adheRENce at thiS tiMe tO ouR inITIaL rulings under THE docTrIne of stAre Decisis...

the MajOriTy sUgGests that The doctrInE oF sTaRe dEcisiS PrecludeS uS frOm AltEring OUr prevIous rUlinGs. hoWEveR, in my viEW tHIS so-cAlLeD "welL-seTtLed boDy of CAse Law" is noT so long-esTabLIsheD tHaT it is deServing of immuTaBle stare deCiSis TreatmENT. "[T]he releVant factors in deciding whETher to aDheRe to tHe prInciple of StaRe deciSis INclude The antIquitY oF thE PRecedENT, tHe rElIance interESTs aT stakE, aNd of Course wHether the decision wAS weLl reasoned" (MonTejO v LoUISiAna, 556 us 778, 792-793 [2009]). NOT onLy ARe tHE Precedents under ConsideratIoN HeRe only a few YEarS oLd, but thEy conceRn socIAl netwoRking pracTices that ArE stiLL In tHe process oF developIng. Under tHEse ciRCuMstanCes, The relAtIonShip oF sociaL MedIa and Thelaw OuGht to bE flexIbLe, open to Discussion and re-examinatIon, ratHer thAn bOund by our IniTIal Views regaRdinG the optimaL prOceDure tO be USed.

In AddiTIoN to RElyinG on sTAre decisiS, ThE maJORiTy concludes THAT thEre is No nEEd to "alTer tHe existing legal frAMework." Little is Said ABOut How THe exIsTing decisions hAve
 the doctrine of stare dec isis requi res u s t o a dh ereto o ur prior decis i ons(see People v Aarons,305 A D2 d  45, 56  [1st  Dept [ * 3] 2 0 03]  [ "s tar ed ec isissta nds asa check on  aco urt's tempta t io n to overr ule  recent prec ede nt. On ly  co m pelli ngcircu mstanc e s shou ld requir eu s to d e part fr o m  t hisdoctrine"], affd2  N Y 3d 547 [2004]) . Alth ou g hw e  ag ree  with thedi ssent that so c ia l m edi a  is constantl y evolving, the re isno  re a son to  alte rt heexisting le galframework  simpl y  becaus e  the po tentia l e xis ts t h at  n ewso c ial ne two r k p ractices  m ay  surf ace. F u r ther mor e, t hereis no dispute  th at t h e f eatur es of  Fac eb ook a t issu e her e(i.e., the abil ityto post p hot og rap hs  ands end me ssa ges ) havebeen ar o und  f o r ma ny years.

The dis se n t 
There ar e twoa sp ec t s of the se  pr evio u s  ruli ngst ha t are pr oblema t ic :first,th e show in g n ece ssary to o btaindiscover y ofr elevant inform a tion posted o n  F a c eb o ok o r o ther social  net w orki ng s i te s,a nd se cond,  t h ep rocedure requiringth at onc e a t hreshold show ing is mad e , the tria l co u rt must conduct a n incamera rev i ew of th e pos ted cont ents in e a c h case t o e nsu retha t th e defendant's a cces sis limi ted  to rel eva ntinf orm at ion. In v iew of h ow  r ec en tly  ouri nitial r ul ing sonthe s u bjectwereissu ed ,i t m akes se n se t o re vi si t th ose  i nitia l ru l ing s soone r rathertha n  lat er ;in anyevent, the to pi c is too n ew  to  warra n t  rigid a dherence at this time t o  our in iti al ru ling s under t hedoctri neo f star e deci sis.. .
Th e major i t ysug ge sts that t h e  do ctrin eof s tare de cisis precludes us fro m altering ou r p revi o u srul i ng s . H ow e ver , in my view this  so-called  " w el l-settledb ody  o f caselaw" is  nots o long- establish ed that i tis d e s erv ing of imm utable s tare deci s is tr e at ment.  "[ T]he r el eva nt fa ctorsi n d ecidi ng whe th er toadher eto the p rinciple of stare decis is inc ludethe  antiquit y o f  th e precede nt,the relian ceint erest s a t  stak e, a n dofc ourse  whe t her the d e ci sio n wa s well reas o n e d"(Mont ejo v Loui sian a, 556 US 778, 79 2 -793 [2009]).Noto n lyare thepr ecedents under  co ns i d erationhe re only a f ew years  o l d, bu t they  conce rn soci a l  n e tworki ng p rac tices tha t a re still i nth e  proce ss o fdevelo ping.U nder t hese circumstanc es, t h e  rela t ion shipof  social medi a and thel aw ought to  be fl exib le, o pen todi scussi onan d re-exami n ation, ra therthan bo un d by  ou r init ialv i ews r egar di ngthe optim a l  p r oc ed u reto b e use d. 

In  addition to relyi ngo n stare  d eci s i s, the ma j o rity concl ude s tha t there is n o  nee d  t o  "alt er the  exist ing leg a l f ra mework. " L i t tle is sa id abouth owth e ex isting d ec isio ns  ha ve 
 the_doctrine of_stare decisis requires us_to adhere_to_our prior_decisions_(see People v_Aarons, 305 AD2d_45, 56 [1st Dept_[*3]2003] ["stare decisis_stands_as a check on a court's temptation to overrule recent precedent. Only compelling circumstances_should_require us_to_depart_from this doctrine"], affd 2_NY3d 547 [2004]). Although we_agree with_the dissent that social media is constantly evolving,_there_is no reason_to alter the existing legal framework simply because the_potential exists that new social network_practices may surface._Furthermore,_there_is no dispute that_the features of Facebook at issue_here (i.e., the ability to post_photographs and send messages) have been around_for many years.

The dissent

There are two_aspects of these previous rulings_that are_problematic: first, the showing necessary_to obtain discovery_of relevant_information posted on_Facebook or other social networking sites,_and second, the_procedure requiring that once a threshold_showing_is made, the_trial_court_must conduct_an in camera_review_of the_posted_contents in each case to ensure_that_the defendant's access is limited to relevant_information. In view of_how_recently our initial rulings_on the subject were issued,_it makes sense to revisit those_initial rulings_sooner rather_than later; in any event, the topic is too new to_warrant rigid adherence at this time_to our initial rulings_under the_doctrine_of stare decisis...

The_majority_suggests that_the doctrine of stare decisis precludes us_from altering_our previous rulings. However, in my_view this so-called "well-settled_body_of case law" is not so_long-established that it is deserving of_immutable stare decisis treatment. "[T]he_relevant_factors_in deciding whether to adhere_to the principle of stare decisis_include the antiquity_of the precedent, the reliance interests at_stake,_and of course whether the decision_was_well reasoned" (Montejo v Louisiana, 556_US_778,_792-793 [2009]). Not only are_the precedents under consideration here only_a few years old, but they concern social networking_practices that are_still in the process of_developing._Under_these circumstances, the relationship of social media and thelaw ought_to be_flexible, open to_discussion and re-examination, rather than bound by our initial views_regarding the optimal procedure to be used.

In_addition to relying on stare decisis, the majority concludes that there_is no need to "alter the existing legal_framework." Little is said about how the_existing decisions have