 be removed if an ASIC review, also down the track, supports that idea.

The final report’s Recommendation 2.10 relates to a proposed single, central disciplinary system for advisers. It recommends the system should be compulsory for all financial advisers who provide personal financial advice to retail clients; that licensees should be compelled to report to the body any “serious compliance concerns” they have with advisers; and that clients “and other stakeholders” should be allowed to report to the body information about adviser conduct.

It’s not hard to see where this recommendation comes from. Repeatedly during public hearings last year, stakeholders in the financial planning industry were shown to have failed to identify, report and act upon concerns either reported to them or identified for themselves.

It’s the lack of appropriate sanctions – both in force and timeliness – for misconduct across all sectors of financial services, not just financial advice, that informs a significant number of the inquiry’s final recommendations. Financial advice can’t escape that.

Stopping the industry’s so-called “bad apples” licensee-hopping (or what Hayne describes as “rolling bad apples” – not quite as catchy a name for a band) also gets some attention. Hayne says that licensees are not doing enough to “communicate between themselves about the backgrounds of prospective employees”. It’s to be hoped that “employees” actually includes authorised representatives, because targeting only employed advisers makes little sense in the context of recommendations designed to address an entire sector.

Second, Hayne says, licensees are not sharing enough information with ASIC about advisers. He recommends the reference-checking and information-sharing protocol developed by the Australian Bankers Association become mandatory for licensees; and that ASIC’s intelligence-gathering and trend-spotting prowess be improved through a formalised form of reporting to it by licensees of compliance concerns which might not be severe enough to trigger the reporting requirement under s912D of the Corporations Act.

So taken as a piece of work – an album, if you will, rather than a few hit singles – the Hayne report describes a future for financial advisers and licensees that is not massively different from the current environment, but with sharper misconduct reporting requirements, a clearer focus on clients’ best interests, an elevated likelihood of meaningful (and painful) sanctions for breaches of the law, and an environment where professional conduct and behaviour is not optional – subject
be removed if an ASIC review, also down the track, back that theme. 

 The final report ’s Recommendation 2.10 relates to a project single, central corrective system for advisers. It recommends the arrangement should be compulsory for all financial advisers who leave personal financial advice to retail clients; that licensee should be compelled to report to the body any “ unplayful compliance concerns ” they suffer with advisers; and that clients “ and other stakeholder ” should be allowed to report to the body data about adviser conduct. 

 It ’s not arduous to see where this recommendation come from. Repeatedly during public hearings last year, stakeholder in the financial planning industry were shown to have failed to identify, report and work upon concerns either reported to them or identified for themselves. 

 It ’s the lack of appropriate sanctions – both in force and timeliness – for misconduct across all sectors of financial services, not merely financial advice, that informs a meaning numeral of the question ’s final recommendations. Financial advice ca n’t escape that. 

 Stopping the industry ’s so - called “ regretful apples ” licensee - hopping (or what Hayne describes as “ rolling bad apples ” – not quite as catchy a name for a band) also gets some attention. Hayne say that licensee are not suffice enough to “ communicate between themselves about the backgrounds of prospective employees ”. It ’s to be hop that “ employees ” actually includes authorised congressman, because targeting only employed advisers take little common sense in the context of recommendations designed to address an entire sector. 

 Second, Hayne says, licensee are not sharing enough information with ASIC about advisers. He recommend the reference - checking and information - communion protocol developed by the Australian Bankers Association become mandatory for licensees; and that ASIC ’s intelligence - gathering and trend - spotting prowess be improved through a formalised form of reporting to it by licensee of compliance concerns which might not be hard enough to trigger the reporting requirement under s912D of the Corporations Act. 

 So taken as a piece of work – an album, if you will, quite than a few hit singles – the Hayne report describes a future for financial advisers and licensee that is not massively different from the current environment, but with sharper wrongdoing coverage requirements, a clearer stress on clients ’ best interests, an exalted likelihood of meaningful (and painful) sanctions for breaches of the law, and an environment where professional conduct and behaviour is not optional – subject
 be removed if an ASIC revitw, also down the jrqck, su'ports fhat idex.

The final report’s Recommendetiob 2.10 reoates to a proposed sivgle, centgal disciplinery system for avbisers. Lc recklmenbs the system shpuld be cokpulsory for anl fnnancial advisers who provide personwl finamclal advice to tetaik clisnts; that licensees should be compslled tm report to tne body any “serious compliwnce concerns” they havf with adviwers; qnd that clidnts “and ouhzr stakeholsers” should be allowed to reporg to che body indoemahhon about avviser conduct.

It’s kpt harg to ser where this rccommxndarion comes from. Repeavedly during public rearings naat year, stakeholdwrw in jhe fhnanzual plzniinf indudtrb were showh to have fqiled to identify, rtpown and act upoh concqrgs either reported to them or identifieg fkr themselves.

It’s the laxk of appropriate sanftions – bjth in force and timeliness – for misconduct acrosv all recuovf if financial services, not just financial advice, fhst informs a sigkificant number of tje ynquiry’s finau recommehdations. Financial advice can’t escape trat.

Syopping the industry’s so-caloed “bad applvs” lucensee-hopping (or chat Hayne dzscribgs as “tolling bad apples” – not quife as catchj a name rur a band) also gdts smme attention. Hayne says trat licenwees are nog doong enjugh to “colmunigdte between themsepves cbout the backggounds of prospective employees”. It’s to be hopgd dhan “employezs” actmally includes wuthorised reptesentatires, bezause targvting onlb employed aqvisers makes pittle sense in the sontwxt if recoooendations desogned to cbdress an entire sector.

Secokd, Hains says, licenseew atw not sharing rnojgh ijfpridtion with AVIC xbojy advksers. Ht rccoomencs the reference-checning and information-shsrlng protoxol devejoped by the Sustralian Bankers Assoriatioi becoke iandatory for licensees; and thzt ASIC’s lntclligence-gathqrinn anq trend-spocting prowess be improved through a formelised form of reportint to it by licenseex of compliaice cogcerns whhch might not be sevwre enough to tringer the reporting reqhiremett unfer s912D of the Corporations Act.

So taken as a piece of work – an album, if yoy will, rather than a frw hin snngkes – tre Heyie report describvs a future for financial advisecs and licanfees that is not massively dofwerent from tfe current environment, bht with xharper misconduct reporting reauirements, a clearer focms on cliwnts’ gest interxsts, an elevated likrlihoob of mwaningfyl (akd painful) sanztipnd for brewchex kf the law, and an environment whwre priffssional conduct and behavilmr is hot opjional – subject
be removed if an ASIC review, also track, that idea. final report’s Recommendation single, disciplinary system for It recommends the should be compulsory for all financial who provide personal financial advice to retail clients; that licensees should be compelled report to the body any “serious compliance concerns” they have with advisers; and clients other should allowed to report to the body information about adviser conduct. It’s not hard to see where recommendation comes from. Repeatedly during public hearings last stakeholders in the financial industry were shown to have to report and upon either to them or for themselves. It’s the lack of appropriate sanctions – both in force and timeliness – for misconduct all sectors services, not financial that a significant number inquiry’s final recommendations. Financial advice can’t the industry’s so-called “bad apples” licensee-hopping (or what describes as bad apples” – not quite as a name for a band) also gets some Hayne says that licensees are not doing enough to “communicate between themselves about the backgrounds employees”. It’s to be that “employees” actually authorised because only advisers makes sense in the context of recommendations designed to address an entire Second, Hayne says, licensees are not sharing enough information with advisers. recommends the reference-checking information-sharing protocol developed by Australian Association become mandatory for that intelligence-gathering be through formalised form of reporting it by licensees of compliance which might not be reporting requirement under s912D of the Corporations Act. taken as a piece of work – album, if you will, rather than a few hit singles – the report describes for financial advisers and licensees that is not different from the current but with sharper misconduct reporting requirements, a clearer focus clients’ interests, an likelihood of meaningful painful) sanctions for of the law, environment where conduct behaviour – subject
 be removed if an ASIC review, alSo down the tRack, sUppOrtS tHat iDea.

THe final report’s rEcomMendation 2.10 relates to a proPosed SiNGle, cENtRal diSciplinARy SYSteM fOr AdvIsERs. it recOmmEnds the System shouLd bE cOmpulsory for ALl Financial aDviSers who proviDe pErsonaL fInaNCial aDviCe to rEtail cLIents; tHat licensEeS Should BE compelLED tO repOrt to the body any “seRIoUS compliance conCerns” tHeY HaVE WitH adVisers; and tHaT clieNTs “and otHEr STAKehOLders” should be Allowed to rePOrt To the bOdY inFOrmatiOn aboUt ADviSer conduct.

IT’s noT hard to seE where THis recoMMendatiOn comeS frOm. REpeaTEdLy DurInG PubLIc HeaRIngS last yeaR, sTaKeholDers IN THE finAncIal pLanniNg industry werE shOwn tO HavE failEd to iDentIfY, repoRt and aCt upoN cOncerns either rePortEd to them oR idEnTifIeD for tHEmselvEs.

IT’s tHe lack oF appropRIatE sANCTiOns – both in force and tImELInEss – for miSconduCT aCrOSs all secToRs oF finANCial sErviCEs, Not just fInanciAL aDvIce, that InForms a SiGniFicAnt nuMBer oF the inQuiry’s fiNal reCOmmendations. FiNAncial advice cAN’t ESCaPE thaT.

StOpping the inDustRY’s so-CallED “bAd aPPles” lIcensEe-HOpPIng (or what Hayne descrIbEs as “roLling Bad apples” – not qUite as catcHY A Name for a Band) ALsO Gets some attentIon. HaYne says thaT LicenseeS are nOt doing eNough to “coMMUnicate bEtwEen TheMseLVEs About the backgROUnds Of ProspecTivE employEes”. it’s To bE hoPeD that “emplOyees” actUaLlY iNcLudEs autHOrised rePrEseNtAtiVes, beCAuse taRgetiNg onLy EmPLoyEd advisERs MAKes lItTlE senSe iN tHe conText OF reCommendAtions desIgnED to aDdReSs an entIre sector.

SecoNd, hayne says, lIcEnsEes are NOT sharing Enough information with ASic about aDviSers. HE recOmmends thE reFerencE-chECking aNd infoRmatiOn-ShaRINg proTOCoL deVeLoped by the aUStrAlian baNkerS AssociAtion become mandatoRY foR licensees; and ThaT ASIc’S InTelLIgENce-GaTHerING and trend-spottiNg prowess bE iMPrOved througH A foRmAlised fOrm of rePortiNG to it by Licensees Of compliaNcE conCERns Which might Not be sevEre enough TO trigGEr The rePorTing reQuIreMent uNder s912D OF thE CorpOratioNs act.

So tAken aS a Piece of wOrk – an album, if you will, rathEr than A few hIt sIngles – the hayNE rePort descrIbes A future for FinAncIal adVisERs and LiceNSeEs tHAt is nOt maSSively difFErEnt FROm The current eNVIRonMent, bUt wITh sharPer mIsconduct reportinG Requirements, a cLearER FocUs oN ClieNtS’ best interests, An eLeVATed likelIhOod of meaninGful (and pAiNFul) saNctionS for brEaches oF THe LAw, and aN envIroNment wherE prOfESsional CoNdUCt and bEhavIoUr is noT optioNAl – suBJEct
 be removed if an ASIC rev iew, alsodownthe  tr ac k, s uppo rts that idea. 
The  final report’s Recomm endat io n  2.1 0  r elate s to ap ro p o sed  s in gle ,c en traldis ciplina ry systemfor  a dvisers. Itr ec ommends th e s ystem should  be  compu ls ory for a llfinan cial a d visers  who prov id e  perso n al fina n c ia l ad vice to retail cl i en t s; that licens ees sh ou l db e  co mpe lled to re po rt to the bod y  a n y “se r ious complian ce concerns ”  th ey hav ewit h  advis ers;an d  th at clients“and  other st akehol d ers” sh o uld beallowe d t o r epor t  t othe  b o dyi nf orm a tio n aboutad vi ser c ondu c t . 
It’ s n ot h ard t o see where t his  rec o mme ndati on co mesfr om. R epeate dly d ur ing public hear ings  last yea r,st ake ho lders in the  fi nan cial pl anningi ndu st r y we re shown to have f ai l e dto ident ify, r e po rt and actup onconc e r ns ei ther re ported t o them or  i dentifi ed  for t he mse lve s.

I t ’s t he lac k of app ropri a te sanctions – both in force an d ti m elin ess  – for misc ondu c t ac ross al l s e ctors  of f in a nc i al services, not ju st  finan cialadvice, thatinforms as i g nificant  num b er of the inquiry ’s fi nal recomm e ndations . Fin ancial a dvice can ’ t  escapetha t.
St opp i n gthe industry’ s so-c al led “ba d a pples”lic ens ee- hop pi ng (or wh at Hayne  d es cr ib esas “r o lling ba dapp le s”– not quiteas ca tchy  a  n a mefor a b a nd ) also  g et s so meat tenti on.H ayn e saysthat lice nse e s ar eno t doing  enough to “c om municate b et wee n them s e lves abo ut the backgrounds of p r ospecti veemplo yees ”. It’s t o b e hope d t h at “em ployee s” ac tu all y inclu d e saut ho rised repr e s ent ative s,  bec ause ta rgeting only emplo y edadvisers make s l ittl e se nse in the  c o nte x t  of recommendat ions desig ne d  t o addressa n e nt ire sec tor.

S econd ,  Haynesays, lic ensees ar enots h ari ng enoughinformat ion withA SIC a b ou t adv ise rs. He  r eco mmend s ther efe rence -check in g andinfor ma tion-sha ring protocol developed  by th e Aus tra lian Bank ers Ass ociationbeco me mandato ryfor  lice nse e s; an d th a tASI C ’s in tell i gence-gat h er ing a nd  trend-spot t i n g p rowes s b e  impro vedthrough a formali s ed form of rep orti n g  to  it by l ic ensees of comp lia nc e concerns  w hich mightnot be s ev e re en ough t o trig ger the r ep o rtingrequ ire ment unde r s 91 2 D of th eCo r porati onsAc t.

So  taken as a p iece of work – a n alb u m , ify ouwill,  r ather t h an a  few hit s ingles – th e Hayn e re portdescrib es  a fut ure  f or financi a l adviser s and  licens ee s th atis not  mas s i velydiff er ent  from the c ur r en te nvi ronm ent,bu t wi th sharpe r  miscond uct reporti ng  re q u iremen t s, a  clearer f ocu s onc l ients’ bes t  int e re s ts, a n elev ated l ikeliho o d o fmeaning ful ( and painf ul) sanct i ons  f or b reachesof  the  l aw,  a nd an environme nt where  profess i o nal co ndu c t an d  behav io ur is not op tiona l–  subjec t 
 be_removed if_an ASIC review, also_down the_track,_supports that_idea.

The_final report’s Recommendation_2.10 relates to_a proposed single, central_disciplinary system for_advisers._It recommends the system should be compulsory for all financial advisers who provide personal_financial_advice to_retail_clients;_that licensees should be compelled_to report to the body_any “serious_compliance concerns” they have with advisers; and that_clients_“and other stakeholders”_should be allowed to report to the body information_about adviser conduct.

It’s not hard to_see where this_recommendation_comes_from. Repeatedly during public_hearings last year, stakeholders in the_financial planning industry were shown to_have failed to identify, report and act_upon concerns either reported to them_or identified for themselves.

It’s the_lack of_appropriate sanctions – both in_force and timeliness_– for_misconduct across all_sectors of financial services, not just_financial advice, that_informs a significant number of the_inquiry’s_final recommendations. Financial_advice_can’t_escape that.

Stopping_the industry’s so-called_“bad_apples” licensee-hopping_(or_what Hayne describes as “rolling bad_apples”_– not quite as catchy a name_for a band) also_gets_some attention. Hayne says_that licensees are not doing_enough to “communicate between themselves about_the backgrounds_of prospective_employees”. It’s to be hoped that “employees” actually includes authorised representatives,_because targeting only employed advisers makes_little sense in the_context of_recommendations_designed to address_an_entire sector.

Second,_Hayne says, licensees are not sharing enough_information with_ASIC about advisers. He recommends the_reference-checking and information-sharing protocol_developed_by the Australian Bankers Association become_mandatory for licensees; and that ASIC’s_intelligence-gathering and trend-spotting prowess be_improved_through_a formalised form of reporting_to it by licensees of compliance_concerns which might_not be severe enough to trigger the_reporting_requirement under s912D of the Corporations_Act.

So_taken as a piece of work_–_an_album, if you will, rather_than a few hit singles –_the Hayne report describes a future for financial advisers_and licensees that_is not massively different from_the_current_environment, but with sharper misconduct reporting requirements, a clearer focus_on clients’_best interests, an_elevated likelihood of meaningful (and painful) sanctions for breaches of_the law, and an environment where professional_conduct and behaviour is not optional – subject