 movement is due to something done to me and not something done by me." Whatever their expressed beliefs, people in fact behave as if they have free-will, which, I think, is best shown by trivial things in life—whether, for example, I can take a coin and put it here or there, turn it over or do the most capricious things with it. We demand of our nervous and muscular equipment that we can at will cause it to carry out any desired actions which are within our power, no matter how trivial or capricious. Remarkable observations can be made by evoking movements by stimulating the motor areas of the brain in a conscious subject. Though these movements were elicited as normally by messages from the motor cortex, the subject distinguishes quite clearly between them and those that he voluntarily initiated. He will say, "This movement is due to something done to me and not something done by me." There is no answer to such a question as: Is any reconciliation possible between the direct experience that an act of will can call forth a muscular movement, and on the other hand, the scientific account whereby such a muscular movement results from an activity of nerve cells in the brain, which in turn is relayed by nerve impulses eventually to muscles? It is my contention that these questions concerning the problem of brain-mind liaison have been wrongly posed. There is no answer to such a question as: Is any reconciliation possible between the direct experience that an act of will can call forth a muscular movement, and on the other hand, the scientific account whereby such a muscular movement results from an activity of nerve cells in the brain, which in turn is relayed by nerve impulses eventually to muscles? It is my contention that these questions concerning the problem of brain-mind liaison have been wrongly posed. I have a direct experience that my thought can lead to action. I can decide on a particular action, perhaps of the most trivial nature, and my muscular movements can be directed towards accomplishing that act. I have no experience of the manner in which my willing leads to action. Naturally, scientific investigation can be applied to study the sequence of events leading to movement: the discharges of pyramidal neurones of the motor cortex; the propagation of these impulses down the pyramidal tract; the discharge of impulses so evoked from motoneurones and propagation out to muscles leading to the muscular activation and eventual contraction. There would be no evidence supporting my belief that my body does carry out my willed movements. However there is an evident inadequacy in this documentation. As yet
movement is due to something done to me and not something done by me. " Whatever their carry belief, people in fact behave as if they have detached - will, which, I think, is well show by trivial thing in life — whether, for example, I can aim a coin and put it here or there, flex it over or serve the most capricious things with it. We demand of our nervous and muscular equipment that we can at will induce it to carry out any desired actions which are within our office, no matter how trivial or capricious. Remarkable notice can be made by arouse movements by stimulating the motor areas of the brain in a conscious subject. Though these motion were elicited as normally by messages from the motor cortex, the subject distinguishes quite intelligibly between them and those that he voluntarily initiated. He will say, " This movement is due to something done to me and not something done by me. " There is no answer to such a question as: Is any reconciliation possible between the lineal experience that an act of will can name forth a muscular campaign, and on the early hand, the scientific account whereby such a muscular movement results from an activity of nerve cells in the mind, which in turn is relayed by nerve impulses eventually to muscles? It is my competition that these questions concerning the problem of brain - judgment liaison have been incorrectly present. There is no answer to such a question as: Is any reconciliation possible between the direct experience that an act of will can call forth a muscular campaign, and on the other hand, the scientific account whereby such a muscular apparent motion results from an bodily process of nerve cells in the mind, which in turn is relay by nerve impulse eventually to muscleman? It is my contention that these questions concern the problem of genius - mind liaison have been wrongly posed. I have a direct experience that my thought can lead to action. I can decide on a especial action, perhaps of the about trivial nature, and my muscular movements can be directed towards accomplishing that act. I have no experience of the manner in which my willing lead to action. Naturally, scientific investigation can be applied to study the sequence of events lead to campaign: the discharge of pyramidal neurones of the motor cortex; the propagation of these nerve impulse down the pyramidal tract; the discharge of urge so evoked from motoneurones and propagation out to muscle leading to the muscular activation and eventual contraction. There would be no evidence supporting my impression that my body does carry out my willed movements. However there is an evident inadequacy in this documentation. As so far
 mogement is due to somethikg done to me anb not smmethihg done cy me." Whatever their expressxd bwliefw, people in fact behavd as if tjey have fret-will, which, I thiii, is best shosk by crmvial things in life—whethar, for example, I ccn take a coin and put it here or thqre, turm lt over or do jhe mpft czirlcious things with it. We demand kf our iervous and musvular equipment that we caj at will cause it to farry out aby dqwired actionr which art cithin our kower, no matter how trivial or cxpricnous. Remarkqboe ltservations can fe made by eypking kovemenys by stimulatlng tie mitor areas of the bramn in a conscious sufject. Thoggk these movements werw wlicijed av nofnaluy gy msssaged fcom the motkr cortex, tye subject distinguosrvx quite cleadly beewqen them and those that he voluntarily pnitjated. He will say, "This novement is due to solething djne to me and not something done by me." There is nm ansxef ti fjxh a question as: Is any reconciliation possible geuwevn the direct expcrience that an acy lf rill can call forth a juscular movement, wnd on jhe otyer hand, uhe svientific account whereby sych a musculcr novement results fxom an activnty of nervr cells in the brain, whnch in turn is repayed by hdrve impulses evdntlallf to muscles? It is my contqntion thet thzse quesgionx concqrning the problem of brain-mind liwison hdve been wgongly posed. There is no answer to such a quexthon as: Is auy recpnciliation pjssible betweeu the dixect ebperience nhat an art of will cwn call forth w muscular mmvement, wnd in tye othef hand, the sciemtific acbobnt wherevy such a muscular moxsment results fxun an activity og ndrvq belks hn the brain, whizh km turv is relayeb cy nrrve impulses eventudlly to muscles? It is ky contentuon that these questipns concerning the probnem of btaig-mind liaison have been wronglg posed. I haye a direct evperlencg that my tkought can lead to action. I can decide oi a particular action, kerhaps of the most ttivlal nature, aid my iuscular kovements can be dirwcted towards accpmplishing that act. I have to exoerience of the manner in which my willing leads to action. Naturally, sciebtific investigatikn csn be a'plned to ftudb vhe sequence of enents leading to movement: the dircharges oy pyramidal neurones of the mptur cortex; the propagation of these imlulses dpwn the pyramidal tract; the disvharge of impulses so evpked fron motkneurones end propagation out yo museles lwading ro tme muscular acgivstlon and evfntuel eontraction. There would be no evieence wuoporting my belixf that my blay dogs carry out my willed mkvemsjts. Huwever there os an evident onadequacy in this dmctmentation. As tvt
movement is due to something done to not done by Whatever their expressed as they have free-will, I think, is shown by trivial things in life—whether, example, I can take a coin and put it here or there, turn over or do the most capricious things with it. We demand of our and equipment we at will cause it to carry out any desired actions which are within our power, no how trivial or capricious. Remarkable observations can be by evoking movements by the motor areas of the in conscious subject. these were as normally by from the motor cortex, the subject distinguishes quite clearly between them and those that he voluntarily initiated. will say, is due something to and not something me." There is no answer to as: Is any reconciliation possible between the direct that an of will can call forth a movement, and on the other hand, the scientific whereby such a muscular movement results from an activity of nerve cells in the brain, turn is relayed by impulses eventually to It my that questions concerning problem of brain-mind liaison have been wrongly posed. There is no to such a question as: Is any reconciliation possible between experience an act of can call forth a movement, on the other hand, account such results an of nerve cells in brain, which in turn is by nerve impulses eventually contention that these questions concerning the problem of liaison have been wrongly posed. I have direct experience that my thought can lead to action. I can decide a particular of the most trivial nature, and my muscular can be directed towards that act. I have no experience of the manner which willing leads action. Naturally, scientific can be applied study the sequence leading to the of the motor cortex; the propagation of impulses the pyramidal tract; the discharge impulses from motoneurones and propagation out to muscles leading to the muscular activation and eventual contraction. be no evidence supporting belief my body does carry out my willed movements. However there is an in this documentation.
 movement is due to something dOne to me and Not soMetHinG dOne bY me." WHatever their exPRessEd beliefs, people in fact bEhave As IF theY HaVe freE-will, whICh, i THinK, iS bEst ShOWn By triViaL things In life—whetHer, FoR example, I can TAkE a coin and pUt iT here or there, TurN it oveR oR do THe mosT caPriciOus thiNGs with It. We demanD oF Our nerVOus and mUSCuLar eQuipment that we can AT wILl cause it to carRy out aNy DEsIREd aCtiOns which arE wIthin OUr power, NO mATTEr hOW trivial or capRicious. RemaRKabLe obseRvAtiONs can bE made By EVokIng movementS by sTimulatinG the moTOr areas OF the braIn in a cOnsCioUs suBJeCt. thoUgH TheSE mOveMEntS were eliCiTeD as noRmalLY BY MessAgeS froM the mOtor cortex, the SubJect DIstInguiShes qUite ClEarly BetweeN them AnD those that he volUntaRily initiAteD. HE wiLl Say, "ThIS movemEnt Is dUe to somEthing dONe tO mE AND nOt something done by mE." THERe Is no answEr to suCH a QuEStion as: IS aNy rEconCILiatiOn poSSiBle betweEn the dIReCt ExperieNcE that aN aCt oF wiLl can CAll fOrth a mUscular mOvemeNT, and on the other HAnd, the scientiFIc ACCoUNt whEreBy such a muscUlar MOvemEnt rESuLts FRom an ActivItY Of NErve cells in the brain, WhIch in tUrn is Relayed by nervE impulses eVENTually to MuscLEs? iT is my contentioN that These questIOns conceRning The problEm of brain-MINd liaisoN haVe bEen WroNGLy Posed. There is nO ANsweR tO such a qUesTion as: IS anY reConCilIaTion possiBle betweEn ThE dIrEct ExperIEnce that An Act Of WilL can cALl fortH a musCulaR mOvEMenT, and on tHE oTHEr haNd, ThE sciEntIfIc accOunt WHerEby such A muscular MovEMent ReSuLts from An activity of nErVe cells in tHe BraIn, whicH IN turn is rElayed by nerve impulses evENtually To mUscleS? It iS my contenTioN that tHesE QuestiOns conCerniNg The PROblem OF BrAin-MiNd liaison hAVE beEn wroNgLy poSed. I havE a direct experience THat My thought can lEad To acTIOn. i caN DeCIde On A ParTICular action, perhAps of the moSt TRiVial nature, ANd mY mUscular MovemenTs can BE directEd towards AccomplisHiNg thAT Act. i have no expErience oF the manneR In whiCH mY willIng Leads tO aCtiOn. NatUrally, SCieNtifiC invesTiGation Can be ApPlied to sTudy the sequence of events LeadinG to moVemEnt: the disChaRGes Of pyramidAl neUrones of thE moTor CorteX; thE PropaGatiON oF thESe impUlseS Down the pyRAmIdaL TRaCt; the dischaRGE Of iMpulsEs sO Evoked From Motoneurones and prOPagation out to mUsclES LeaDinG To thE mUscular activatIon AnD EVentual cOnTraction. TheRe would bE nO EvideNce supPortinG my beliEF ThAT my bodY doeS caRry out my wIllEd MOvementS. HOwEVer theRe is An EvidenT inadeQUacy IN This documentatioN. As yeT
 movement is due to someth ing done t o meand  no tsome thin g done by me." What ever their expressed b elief s, peop l ein fa ct beha v ea s  if  t he y h av e  f ree-w ill , which , I think,  is  b est shown by tr ivial thin gsin life—whet her , forex amp l e, Ican  take  a coi n  and p ut it her eo r ther e , turni t  o veror do the most ca p ri c ious things wi th it.  W e  d e m and  of  our nervo us  andm uscular eq u i p men t  that we canat will cau s e i t to c ar ryo ut any  desi re d  ac tions which  are  within o ur pow e r, no m a tter ho w triv ial  or  cap r ic io us.  R e mar k ab leo bse rvations  c an  be m adeb y e voki ngmove ments  by stimulati ngthem oto r are as of  the  b rainin a c onsci ou s subject. Thou gh t hese move men ts  we re  elic i ted as  no rma lly bymessage s  fr om t h emotor cortex, thesu b j ec t distin guishe s  q ui t e clearl ybet ween t hem a nd t h os e that h e volu n ta ri ly init ia ted. H ewil l s ay, " T hismoveme nt is du e tos omething donet o me and nots om e t hi n g do neby me." The re i s  noansw e rtos uch a  ques ti o na s: Is any reconcili at ion po ssibl e between the  direct ex p e r ience th at a n  a c t of will cancallforth a mu s cular mo vemen t, and o n the oth e r  hand, t hesci ent ifi c ac count whereby s uchamuscula r m ovement  re sul tsfro man activi ty of ne rv ece ll s i n the brain, w hi chin  tu rn is relaye d bynerv eim p uls es even t ua l l y to  m us cles ? I tis my  con t ent ion tha t these q ues t ions  c on cerning  the problemof  brain-min dlia ison h a v e been w rongly posed. There isn o answe r t o suc h aquestionas:  Is an y r e concil iation  poss ib leb e tween t he  di re ct experie n c e t hat a nactof will  can call forth am usc ular movement , a nd o n th e o t he r  ha nd ,  th e scientific acco unt whereb ys uc h a muscul a r m ov ement r esultsfroma n activ ity of ne rve cells  i n th e bra in, whichin turnis relaye d  by n e rv e imp uls es eve nt ual ly to  muscl e s?It is  my co nt ention  that  t hese que stions concerning the p roblem  of b rai n-mind li ais o n h ave beenwron gly posed.  Ihav e a d ire c t exp erie n ce  th a t mythou g ht can le a dtoa c ti on. I can d e c i deon apar t icular  act ion, perhaps of t h e most trivial  nat u r e,and my m us cular movement s c an b e direct ed  towards ac complish in g  that  act.I have  no exp e r ie n ce oftheman ner in wh ich  m y  willin gle a ds toacti on . Natu rally, scie n t ific investigati on ca n be ap p lie d tost udy the sequ ence of ev ents leadin g to m ovem ent:the dis ch argesofpy ramidal ne u rones ofthe m otor co rt ex;the  propa gati o n  of t hese  i mpu lses down t he py ra m ida l tr act;th e di scharge o f  impulse s s o  evoked  f rom m otoneu r on e s  and propa gat ion o u t  to muscle s  lea d in g  to t he mus cularactivat i onan d event ual c ontractio n. Therew oul dbe n o eviden ce  sup po rti ng  my belief that  my body  does ca r r y outmyw ille d  movem en ts. Howeverthere  i s  an evi d e ntinadequ a cyinthi s do cum enta t ion. As yet
 movement_is due_to something done to_me and_not_something done_by_me." Whatever their_expressed beliefs, people_in fact behave as_if they have_free-will,_which, I think, is best shown by trivial things in life—whether, for example, I_can_take a_coin_and_put it here or there,_turn it over or do_the most_capricious things with it. We demand of our_nervous_and muscular equipment_that we can at will cause it to carry_out any desired actions which are_within our power,_no_matter_how trivial or capricious._Remarkable observations can be made by_evoking movements by stimulating the motor_areas of the brain in a conscious_subject. Though these movements were elicited_as normally by messages from_the motor_cortex, the subject distinguishes quite_clearly between them_and those_that he voluntarily_initiated. He will say, "This movement_is due to_something done to me and not_something_done by me."_There_is_no answer_to such a_question_as: Is_any_reconciliation possible between the direct experience_that_an act of will can call forth_a muscular movement, and_on_the other hand, the_scientific account whereby such a_muscular movement results from an activity_of nerve_cells in_the brain, which in turn is relayed by nerve impulses eventually_to muscles? It is my contention_that these questions concerning_the problem_of_brain-mind liaison have_been_wrongly posed._There is no answer to such a_question as:_Is any reconciliation possible between the_direct experience that an_act_of will can call forth a_muscular movement, and on the other_hand, the scientific account whereby_such_a_muscular movement results from an_activity of nerve cells in the_brain, which in_turn is relayed by nerve impulses eventually_to_muscles? It is my contention that_these_questions concerning the problem of brain-mind_liaison_have_been wrongly posed. I have_a direct experience that my thought_can lead to action. I can decide on a_particular action, perhaps_of the most trivial nature,_and_my_muscular movements can be directed towards accomplishing that act. I_have no_experience of the_manner in which my willing leads to action. Naturally, scientific_investigation can be applied to study the_sequence of events leading to movement: the discharges of pyramidal neurones_of the motor cortex; the propagation of these_impulses down the pyramidal tract; the discharge_of impulses so evoked_from_motoneurones and propagation out to muscles leading_to_the_muscular_activation and eventual_contraction. There would_be no evidence_supporting my_belief that my_body does_carry out my_willed_movements. However there is an evident inadequacy in this documentation. As yet