 seems to us that the fact of cultural cognition does not justify ignoring the problem of overresponsiveness to false beliefs.

The second problem is that, at least in many policy domains, preferences may lose some of their claim to democratic responsiveness if they turn out to be too resistant to the facts. Resistance to changes in factual beliefs may reveal policy preferences to be based in kinds of value judgments that are unacceptable from a liberal-democratic point of view—e.g., a desire to regulate purely private behaviour (such as sexual behaviour or harmless commercial activities) or worldviews that deny the fundamental equality of all citizens (such as racist or sexist views). If it were the case that citizens’ policy preferences would not change regardless of what the facts are, we would at least need to examine the substantive content of those preferences in more detail—and to reserve judgment as to whether those preferences merit democratic responsiveness until we have a better understanding of what that substantive content is. (ii) Since policy preferences and factual beliefs are both caused by people’s cultural worldviews (i.e., their most basic values), any change in factual beliefs requires a change in basic values.

Suppose a given citizen actually has faulty factual beliefs, and that these beliefs are due to cultural cognition. According to reading (ii), the basic values this citizen actually holds are not the basic values she would hold in the counterfactual case where she came to believe the facts. The cost-benefit analysts’ method is essentially an attempt to disentangle actual factual beliefs from actual value judgments. The analysis then recombines actual value judgments with the true facts, and thereby generates a policy preference. But on reading (ii), such an approach does not succeed in revealing citizens’ counterfactual fact-based preferences. The cost-benefit method uses a citizen’s actual values, but cultural cognition shows that these are likely to be different from her counterfactual fact-based values. In other words, a citizen’s counterfactual fact-based preferences are not (as Sunstein believes) a function of her actual values and the facts, but a function of a new set of values and the facts.

Reading (ii) would show that the cost-benefit analysts’ method does not successfully track people’s counterfactual fact-based preferences. It also suggests that it is difficult to predict how people’s preferences would change if they sincerely came to believe facts that are in conflict with their cultural worldviews. Thus it lends support to
seems to us that the fact of cultural cognition does not justify ignoring the problem of overresponsiveness to assumed belief. 

 The second problem is that, at least in many policy domains, preferences may fall back some of their claim to democratic responsiveness if they turn out to be besides repellent to the facts. electric resistance to changes in factual impression may reveal policy preferences to be base in kind of value judgments that are unacceptable from a free - democratic point of view — for example, a desire to regulate purely private demeanor (such as sexual behaviour or harmless commercial natural process) or worldviews that deny the cardinal equality of all citizens (such as racist or sexist view). If it were the case that citizens ’ policy preferences would not transfer regardless of what the facts are, we would at least need to examine the substantive content of those preferences in more detail — and to reserve judgment as to whether those preferences merit democratic responsiveness until we have a better understanding of what that substantive content is. (ii) Since policy preferences and actual belief are both caused by multitude ’s cultural worldviews (i.e., their about basic value), any change in factual beliefs requires a change in basic values. 

 Suppose a move over citizen actually has faulty factual beliefs, and that these beliefs are due to cultural cognition. According to reading (ii), the basic values this citizen actually holds are not the basic values she would apply in the counterfactual case where she come to believe the facts. The cost - benefit analysts ’ method is basically an attempt to disentangle actual factual beliefs from actual value judgments. The analysis then recombines actual value judgments with the true fact, and thereby generates a policy predilection. But on reading (ii), such an approach does not succeed in revealing citizens ’ counterfactual fact - based preference. The cost - benefit method acting uses a citizen ’s actual values, but cultural cognition usher that these are likely to be different from her counterfactual fact - free-base value. In other word, a citizen ’s counterfactual fact - based preferences are not (as Sunstein believes) a function of her actual values and the fact, but a function of a new stage set of values and the facts. 

 Reading (ii) would show that the cost - benefit analysts ’ method does not successfully traverse people ’s counterfactual fact - based preferences. It also suggests that it is difficult to bode how people ’s preferences would switch if they sincerely came to believe facts that are in conflict with their cultural worldviews. Thus it lends back to
 sefms to us that the fact uf cultural coguution voes nof justifh ignoring the problem of ovxrrewponsuveness to false beliews.

The seclnd proboem ms that, at least in many policg domciis, preferences kay lose smme of their cnakm to democratic responsiveness if thqy turn okt to be too rgsistsgt tk the facts. Resistance to changes jn factlal beliefs may rrveal policy preferences tl be based in kinds of value judgnentf that are unxcceptable from a libetal-democratic point of view—e.g., a aesirz to regulajz puggly private uehavijur (such as sexual bahaviout or harmless gommecciao activities) or worldtiews that deny the sundamentdl equality of all xirizenv (suwh ar razisu oc ssxist giexs). If it wede the case that citizens’ polivy iteferences wkuld njt change regardless of what the facts art, we sould at least need to wxamine the substantige contene of those preferences in more detail—and to reseree juvgoenu qs to qhfther those preferences merit democratic respjhsovvness until we haye a better undersyajdogg of what thxt substahtive content is. (il) Since polixy prefertnces and factual beliefs are borh caused by people’s cultural wlrldviews (i.z., theit most basic values), any changz in fzctual beliffs requidds a change in bxsib vanues.

Suppose a given citizeg actuallb has faulty facjual bejiefs, and hhat bvese beliefs are dke to cgltural cohnition. According to reading (ii), the basic valoes thps citizeu actuslly holds arq not the basie values she dould hold in the counterfaceual case whesg she came to believe the facrs. The zust-benefit anakysts’ metkjd iw essentially an abtempj fo disentangle cetoql factual beloefr fwol ectuaj value judgmants. Thd analhsis thtu rccoobinrs actual value judgkenta with the true favtf, and thgreby genqrates a polivy preference. But ln reeding (mi), sucn ag approach does not succeed in revealinh cltizens’ countqrfagtuaj fact-baseb preferences. The cost-benefit method usew a citizen’s actuao values, but culturcl cognition xhows that theve are likely to be eifferent from hev counterfactual fact-bzsed vdlues. In other words, a citizen’s counterfactual fact-based preferences are not (aw Sunsveyn believes) a finctimn pf her actnau values and the facts, but a function of a new ret of vdlbes and the facts.

Reading (ii) wpuud show that jhe cost-benefit analysts’ msthod dors not successfully track peoplr’s counterfactual fact-baxed prefwrencss. It also suggests that it os difyicult to preeict how people’s oregevences woupd cianye if they sincerely came to beliwve faxtd that are in coiflict with bhtir culjural wotldviews. Thus it menda suppurt to
seems to us that the fact of does justify ignoring problem of overresponsiveness problem that, at least many policy domains, may lose some of their claim democratic responsiveness if they turn out to be too resistant to the facts. to changes in factual beliefs may reveal policy preferences to be based in of judgments are from a liberal-democratic point of view—e.g., a desire to regulate purely private behaviour (such as sexual or harmless commercial activities) or worldviews that deny fundamental equality of all (such as racist or sexist If were the that policy would not change of what the facts are, we would at least need to examine the substantive content of those in more reserve judgment to those merit democratic responsiveness have a better understanding of what is. (ii) Since policy preferences and factual beliefs both caused people’s cultural worldviews (i.e., their most values), any change in factual beliefs requires a in basic values. Suppose a given citizen actually has faulty factual beliefs, and that these due to cultural cognition. to reading (ii), basic this actually are not basic values she would hold in the counterfactual case where she to believe the facts. The cost-benefit analysts’ method is essentially to actual factual beliefs actual value judgments. The then actual value judgments with facts, thereby preference. on (ii), such an approach not succeed in revealing citizens’ fact-based preferences. The cost-benefit values, but cultural cognition shows that these are to be different from her counterfactual fact-based In other words, a citizen’s counterfactual fact-based preferences are not (as Sunstein a function actual values and the facts, but a function a new set of and the facts. Reading (ii) would show that the analysts’ does not track people’s counterfactual preferences. It also that it is predict how preferences change came to believe facts that are conflict their cultural worldviews. Thus it support
 seems to us that the fact of culTural cogniTion dOes Not JuStifY ignOring the probleM Of ovErresponsiveness to falsE beliEfS.

the sECoNd proBlem is tHAt, AT LeaSt In ManY pOLiCy domAinS, preferEnces may loSe sOmE of their claiM To Democratic ResPonsiveness iF thEy turn OuT to BE too rEsiStant To the fACts. ResIstance to ChANges in FActual bELIeFs maY reveal policy prefEReNCes to be based in Kinds oF vALuE JUdgMenTs that are uNaCceptABle from A LiBERAl-dEMocratic point Of view—e.g., a deSIre To reguLaTe pURely prIvate BeHAviOur (such as seXual Behaviour Or harmLEss commERcial acTivitiEs) oR woRldvIEwS tHat DeNY thE FuNdaMEntAl equaliTy Of All ciTizeNS (SUCh as RacIst oR sexiSt views). If it weRe tHe caSE thAt citIzens’ PoliCy PrefeRences Would NoT change regardleSs of What the faCts ArE, we WoUld at LEast neEd tO exAmine thE substaNTivE cONTEnT of those preferenceS iN MOrE detail—aNd to reSErVe JUdgment aS tO whEtheR THose pRefeREnCes merit DemocrATiC rEsponsiVeNess unTiL we HavE a betTEr unDerstaNding of wHat thAT substantive coNTent is. (ii) Since POlICY pREferEncEs and factuaL belIEfs aRe boTH cAusED by peOple’s CuLTuRAl worldviews (i.e., their MoSt basiC valuEs), any change in Factual belIEFS requireS a chANgE In basic values.

SUpposE a given citIZen actuaLly haS faulty fActual belIEFs, and thaT thEse BelIefS ARe Due to cultural COGnitIoN. AccordIng To readiNg (iI), thE baSic VaLues this cItizen acTuAlLy HoLds Are noT The basic VaLueS sHe wOuld hOLd in thE counTerfAcTuAL caSe where SHe CAMe to BeLiEve tHe fAcTs. The Cost-BEneFit analYsts’ methoD is ESsenTiAlLy an attEmpt to disentaNgLe actual faCtUal BeliefS FRom actuaL value judgments. The analySIs then rEcoMbineS actUal value jUdgMents wIth THe true Facts, aNd theReBy gENErateS A PoLicY pReference. BUT On rEadinG (iI), sucH an apprOach does not succeed IN reVealing citizeNs’ cOuntERFaCtuAL fACt-bAsED prEFErences. The cost-bEnefit methOd USeS a citizen’s ACtuAl Values, bUt cultuRal coGNition sHows that tHese are liKeLy to BE DifFerent from Her countErfactual FAct-baSEd ValueS. In Other wOrDs, a CitizEn’s couNTerFactuAl fact-BaSed preFerenCeS are not (aS Sunstein believes) a functIon of hEr actUal Values and The FActS, but a funcTion Of a new set oF vaLueS and tHe fACts.

ReAdinG (Ii) WouLD show That THe cost-benEFiT anALYsTs’ method doeS NOT suCcessFulLY track PeopLe’s counterfactual FAct-based preferEnceS. iT alSo sUGgesTs That it is difficUlt To PREdict how PeOple’s preferEnces wouLd CHange If they SincerEly came TO BeLIeve faCts tHat Are in confLicT wITh their CuLtURal worLdviEwS. Thus iT lends SUppoRT To
 seems to us that the fact  of cultur al co gni tio ndoes  not  justify ignor i ng t he problem of overresp onsiv en e ss t o  f alsebeliefs . 
T h e s ec on d p ro b le m istha t, at l east in ma nypo licy domains ,  p references  ma y lose someoftheircl aim to de moc ratic  respo n sivene ss if the yt urn ou t  to bet o oresi stant to the fact s .R esistance to c hanges  i n  f a c tua l b eliefs may  r eveal policyp re f e r enc e s to be based  in kinds o f  va lue ju dg men t s that  areun a cce ptable from  a l iberal-de mocrat i c point of view —e.g.,  ades iret ore gul at e  pu r el y p r iva te behav io ur  (suc h as s e x ualbeh avio ur or  harmless com mer cial act iviti es) o r wo rl dview s that  deny  t he fundamentalequa lity of a llci tiz en s (su c h as r aci stor sexi st view s ).If i t  w ere the case thatci t i ze ns’ poli cy pre f er en c es would  n otchan g e  rega rdle s sof whatthe fa c ts  a re, wewo uld at  l eas t n eed t o  exa mine t he subst antiv e  content of th o se preference s  i n mo r e de tai l—and to re serv e  jud gmen t  a s t o  whet her t ho s ep references merit de mo cratic  resp onsiveness un til we hav e a  betterunde r st a nding of whatthatsubstantiv e  content  is.(ii) Sin ce policy p referenc esand  fa ctu a l  b eliefs are bo t h  cau se d by pe opl e’s cul tur alwor ldv ie ws (i.e.,  their m os tba si c v alues ) , any ch an gein  fa ctual belief s req uire sac han ge in b a si c valu es .
Sup pos ea giv en c i tiz en actu ally hasfau l ty f ac tu al beli efs, and that  t hese belie fs  ar e duet o  cultura l cognition. Accordingt o readi ng(ii),  the  basic va lue s this  ci t izen a ctuall y hol ds  ar e not t h e  b asi cvalues she w oul d hol din t he coun terfactual case wh e reshe came to b eli evet h efac t s. The  c o st- b e nefit analysts’  method is  e s se ntially an att em pt to d isentan gle a c tual fa ctual bel iefs from  a ctua l val ue judgmen ts. Theanalysist hen r e co mbine s a ctualva lue  judg mentsw ith  thetrue f ac ts, an d the re by gener ates a policy preferenc e. But  on r ead ing (ii),  su c h a n approac h do es not suc cee d i n rev eal i ng ci tize n s’  co u nterf actu a l fact-ba s ed  pr e f er ences. Thec o s t-b enefi t m e thod u sesa citizen’s actua l  values, but c ultu r a l c ogn i tion  s hows that thes e a re l ikely to  b e different  from he rc ounte rfactu al fac t-based v al u es. In  oth erwords, acit iz e n’s cou nt er f actual  fac t- basedprefer e nces a re not (as Sunst ein b e l ieves )  afunct io n of he r  act ual values  and the fa cts, b ut a  func tion of  a  new s etof  values an d  the fact s.

R eading(i i) w oul d show  tha t the c ost- be nef it analys t s ’m et ho d  do es n ot su cc essf ully trac k  people’ s c o unterfa ct ual f act-ba s ed p references . I t als o suggests t h at i t  i s  diff icultto pre dict ho w  pe op le’s pr efe r e nces woul d changei f t he y si ncerelyca me t obel ie ve facts that a re in co nflict w i t h thei r c u ltur a l worl dv iews. Thus i t len ds support t o
 seems_to us_that the fact of_cultural cognition_does_not justify_ignoring_the problem of_overresponsiveness to false_beliefs.

The second problem is_that, at least_in_many policy domains, preferences may lose some of their claim to democratic responsiveness if_they_turn out_to_be_too resistant to the facts._Resistance to changes in factual_beliefs may_reveal policy preferences to be based in kinds_of_value judgments that_are unacceptable from a liberal-democratic point of view—e.g., a_desire to regulate purely private behaviour_(such as sexual_behaviour_or_harmless commercial activities) or_worldviews that deny the fundamental equality_of all citizens (such as racist_or sexist views). If it were the_case that citizens’ policy preferences would_not change regardless of what_the facts_are, we would at least_need to examine_the substantive_content of those_preferences in more detail—and to reserve_judgment as to_whether those preferences merit democratic responsiveness_until_we have a_better_understanding_of what_that substantive content_is._(ii) Since_policy_preferences and factual beliefs are both_caused_by people’s cultural worldviews (i.e., their most_basic values), any change_in_factual beliefs requires a_change in basic values.

Suppose a_given citizen actually has faulty factual_beliefs, and_that these_beliefs are due to cultural cognition. According to reading (ii), the_basic values this citizen actually holds_are not the basic_values she_would_hold in the_counterfactual_case where_she came to believe the facts. The_cost-benefit analysts’_method is essentially an attempt to_disentangle actual factual beliefs_from_actual value judgments. The analysis then_recombines actual value judgments with the_true facts, and thereby generates_a_policy_preference. But on reading (ii),_such an approach does not succeed_in revealing citizens’_counterfactual fact-based preferences. The cost-benefit method uses_a_citizen’s actual values, but cultural cognition_shows_that these are likely to be_different_from_her counterfactual fact-based values. In_other words, a citizen’s counterfactual fact-based_preferences are not (as Sunstein believes) a function of_her actual values_and the facts, but a_function_of_a new set of values and the facts.

Reading (ii) would_show that_the cost-benefit analysts’_method does not successfully track people’s counterfactual fact-based preferences. It_also suggests that it is difficult to_predict how people’s preferences would change if they sincerely came to_believe facts that are in conflict with their_cultural worldviews. Thus it lends support to