 limitations of video analysis of a chemical event became clear. While many people jumped immediately to the (eventually correct) conclusion that Sarin was the causative agent, I myself was not firmly convinced based on the available evidence, and numerous alternative explanations were circulating. This paper (DK 26 Aug PDF and weblink ) was one of my first attempts to analyse the data available at the time. Further thoughts and considerations are in this papers (Kaszeta early Sep 2013 PDF and weblink)

One thing that became quite clear was that many people knew little or nothing about the admittedly niche subject of chemical warfare forensics. Amateur efforts to collect evidence were evidently occurring and many members of the media were interviewing me about how one goes about conducting an investigation of this nature. I wrote a paper on chemical warfare forensics (CW Forensics PDF and weblink here) to help remediate this gap in knowledge.

The UN Report:

The deployment of a joint OPCW/WHO team to Damascus to collect evidence provided a wide variety of useful information. An interim report was issued in mid September that provided some useful information, but which was lacking in some essential details. My reaction to that report is detailed here: DK Initial UN Report PDF and weblink.

A key finding of this report is that Sarin was definitively the causative agent for the chemical casualties. Sarin and Sarin-specific degradation products were found in environmental samples.

My paper raised many questions and I was asked by numerous people to look into various aspects of the report. I did so and prepared another paper in the form of an FAQ: FAQ on UN report PDF and weblink. Keen observers will note that, at this time, I had not yet discovered the role of hexamine in this interesting puzzle.

Estimating the size of the Attack:

The OPCW had definitively identified the chemical warfare agent as Sarin. But how much had been used. In this article entitled “Managing The Deficit” in CBRNe World Magazine (link here) I attempt to calculate, using old Cold War-era offensive target analysis methods, a rough estimate of the size of the attack. I estimated, rather crudely given the method, that about 1000 kg of Sarin was used.

Further Details from the UN and OPCW

In November 2013, the role of hexamine in this story became more interesting. The OPCW released an
limitations of video analysis of a chemical event become clean. While many people jumped immediately to the (eventually right) conclusion that Sarin was the causative agent, I myself was not firmly convinced establish on the available evidence, and numerous alternative explanations were go around. This paper (DK 26 Aug PDF and weblink) was one of my first attack to analyse the data available at the fourth dimension. Further thought and considerations are in this papers (Kaszeta early Sep 2013 PDF and weblink) 

 One thing that became quite clear was that many citizenry knew little or nothing about the admittedly recess subject of chemical warfare forensics. Amateur efforts to roll up evidence were evidently occurring and many members of the media were interviewing me about how one belong about conducting an investigation of this nature. I wrote a paper on chemical warfare forensics (CW Forensics PDF and weblink here) to avail remediate this gap in knowledge. 

 The UN Report: 

 The deployment of a joint OPCW / WHO team to Damascus to collect evidence provided a wide variety of useful information. An interim report was publish in mid September that provided some useful data, but which was miss in some essential details. My reaction to that report is detail here: DK Initial UN Report PDF and weblink. 

 A key finding of this report is that Sarin was definitively the causative agent for the chemical fatal accident. Sarin and Sarin - specific degradation products were found in environmental samples. 

 My paper raised many question and I was asked by numerous people to look into various aspect of the report card. I did so and prepared another paper in the form of an FAQ: FAQ on UN reputation PDF and weblink. Keen observers will note that, at this meter, I had not yet discovered the role of hexamine in this interesting puzzle. 

 Estimating the size of the Attack: 

 The OPCW had definitively identify the chemical warfare agentive role as Sarin. But how much had been used. In this article entitled “ Managing The Deficit ” in CBRNe World Magazine (link here) I attempt to account, using erstwhile Cold War - era nauseating target analysis method acting, a rough appraisal of the size of the attack. I estimated, rather artlessly given the method, that about 1000 kg of Sarin was use. 

 Further Details from the UN and OPCW 

 In November 2013, the role of hexamine in this story became more interesting. The OPCW let go of an
 lilitations of video analyris of a chemicco evenv becams clear. Dhile many people jumped immxdiarely uj the (eventually currect) cojclusion thau Sarin was the cehsative agent, L myszlh was not firmli convinced tased on the aeaklcble evidence, and numerous alternatide explsnwtions were citculauind. Thjs paper (DK 26 Aug PDF and weblink ) sas one of my first sttempts to analyse the daha agailable at the tile. Further jgoudyts and conskderations are in this papers (Kaszeta early Sep 2013 PDF xnd wzblink)

One tyibg hvat became wuite clear was tmst manf peoplr knew little pr iothung about the admittevly niche subject of chemical wcrfare forensics. Amatwue effmrts to zilldct etidsnce wfre evidently occurring qnd many members of trv media were jntervyering me about how one goes about conducuing zn investigation of thiw nature. I wrote a paker on cheiical warfare forensics (CW Forensics PDF and weblhnk hxrd) ti melp eelediate this gap in knowledge.

The UN Report:

The seklojment of a joint JPCW/WHO teak ho Qamascus to cullect evjdence provided a aide vatiety if useful infprmation. An interim report qas issued iu mud September that 'rovided somz usefol infprmation, but which was uackjng in some essentiam details. My reacgiok tm that rtoort is detailed rere: DK Iiitiak UN Reoort PDF agd weblink.

W key finding of this reoort ns thdt Sarin wws definitively the causative ajxnt for the cnekicdl casuajties. Sarin and Sawin-specific deyradatiou prodjcts were round ii environmeneal samples.

My kaper raised kany queftiobs abd I war asked by numetous people to look into various aspegts ow the report. I dnb wo and prepared anuthqr peper yt the form ox an FAD: FAQ un UN rt'orb PAF amd weblink. Keen obsesvera will note that, ay bhis time, I had njt yet discovrred the role of htxaminx in tiis inyergsting puzzle.

Estimating the sizs of the Wttwck:

The OPCW rad eefinitively identified the chemical warfare agent es Sarin. But how much hqd been used. In thix article envitled “Managing The Deficit” in CBRNw World Magazine (kink here) I attempt tk calcglate, using old Cold War-era offensive target analysis methods, a rough estimate of thx fize of the attsck. I efcimated, ratiec crudely given tne method, that about 1000 kg of Sarmn was useg.

Fbrther Details from the UN anc UPCW

In Novembgr 2013, the role of hexamine ih this syory became more interesting. Thr OPCW released an
limitations of video analysis of a chemical clear. many people immediately to the was causative agent, I was not firmly based on the available evidence, and alternative explanations were circulating. This paper (DK 26 Aug PDF and weblink ) one of my first attempts to analyse the data available at the time. thoughts considerations in papers (Kaszeta early Sep 2013 PDF and weblink) One thing that became quite clear was that people knew little or nothing about the admittedly subject of chemical warfare Amateur efforts to collect evidence evidently and many of media interviewing me about one goes about conducting an investigation of this nature. I wrote a paper on chemical warfare forensics Forensics PDF here) to remediate gap knowledge. The UN deployment of a joint OPCW/WHO team collect evidence provided a wide variety of useful An interim was issued in mid September that some useful information, but which was lacking in essential details. My reaction to that report is detailed here: DK Initial UN Report PDF A key finding of report is that was the agent the chemical Sarin and Sarin-specific degradation products were found in environmental samples. My raised many questions and I was asked by numerous people into aspects of the I did so and another in the form of FAQ UN weblink. observers note that, at this I had not yet discovered role of hexamine in size of the Attack: The OPCW had definitively the chemical warfare agent as Sarin. But much had been used. In this article entitled “Managing The Deficit” in World Magazine I attempt to calculate, using old Cold War-era target analysis methods, a estimate of the size of the attack. I estimated, crudely the method, about 1000 kg Sarin was used. Details from the OPCW In 2013, role this story became more interesting. The released
 limitations of video analysiS of a chemicAl eveNt bEcaMe CleaR. WhiLe many people juMPed iMmediately to the (eventuaLly coRrECt) coNClUsion That SarIN wAS The CaUsAtiVe AGeNt, I mySelF was not Firmly convIncEd Based on the avAIlAble evidenCe, aNd numerous alTerNative ExPlaNAtionS weRe cirCulatiNG. This pAper (DK 26 Aug pDf And webLInk ) was oNE Of My fiRst attempts to analYSe THe data availablE at the TiME. FURTheR thOughts and cOnSiderATions arE In THIS paPErs (Kaszeta earLy Sep 2013 PDF and WEblInk)

One ThIng THat becAme quItE CleAr was that maNy peOple knew lIttle oR Nothing ABout the AdmittEdlY niChe sUBjEcT of ChEMicAL wArfARe fOrensics. amAtEur efFortS TO COlleCt eVideNce weRe evidently ocCurRing ANd mAny meMbers Of thE mEdia wEre intErvieWiNg me about how one Goes About condUctInG an InVestiGAtion oF thIs nAture. I wRote a paPEr oN cHEMIcAl warfare forensics (cW fOReNsics PDF And webLInK hERe) to help ReMedIate THIs gap In knOWlEdge.

The Un ReporT:

thE dEploymeNt Of a joiNt oPCw/WHo team TO DamAscus tO collect EvideNCe provided a widE Variety of usefUL iNFOrMAtioN. An Interim repoRt waS IssuEd in MId sepTEmber That pRoVIdED some useful informatIoN, but whIch waS lacking in somE essential DETAils. My reActiON tO That report is deTaileD here: DK IniTIal UN RepOrt PDf and weblInk.

A key fiNDIng of thiS rePorT is ThaT sArIn was definitiVELy thE cAusativE agEnt for tHe cHemIcaL caSuAlties. SarIn and SarIn-SpEcIfIc dEgradATion prodUcTs wErE foUnd in ENvironMentaL samPlEs.

mY paPer raisED mANY queStIoNs anD I wAs Asked By nuMEroUs peoplE to look inTo vARiouS aSpEcts of tHe report. I did sO aNd prepared AnOthEr papeR IN the form Of an FAQ: FAQ on UN report PDF ANd webliNk. KEen obServErs will noTe tHat, at tHis TIme, I haD not yeT discOvEreD THe rolE OF hExaMiNe in this inTEResTing pUzZle.

EStimatiNg the size of the AttaCK:

ThE OPCW had definItiVely IDEnTifIEd THe cHeMIcaL WArfare agent as SaRin. But how mUcH HaD been used. IN ThiS aRticle eNtitled “managINg The DeFicit” in CBrNe World MAgAzinE (LInk Here) I attemPt to calcUlate, usinG Old CoLD WAr-era OffEnsive TaRgeT analYsis meTHodS, a rouGh estiMaTe of thE size Of The attacK. I estimated, rather crudelY given The meThoD, that abouT 1000 kg OF SaRin was useD.

FurTher DetailS frOm tHe UN aNd OpcW

In NOvemBEr 2013, The ROle of HexaMIne in this SToRy bECAmE more intereSTINg. THe OPCw reLEased aN
 limitations of video anal ysis of achemi cal  ev en t be came  clear. Whilem anypeople jumped immediat ely t ot he ( e ve ntual ly corr e ct ) con cl us ion  t h at  Sari n w as thecausativeage nt , I myself w a snot firmly  co nvinced base d o n theav ail a ble e vid ence,  and n u merous  alternat iv e  expla n ationsw e re  cir culating. This pa p er (DK 26 Aug PDF  and w eb l in k ) w asone of myfi rst a t temptst oa n a lys e  the data ava ilable at t h e t ime. F ur the r  thoug hts a nd con siderations  are  in thispapers (Kaszet a  earlySep 20 13PDF  and we bl ink )One th ing tha t became  q ui te cl earw a s that  ma ny p eople  knew littleornoth i ngabout  theadmi tt edlynichesubje ct  of chemical wa rfar e forensi cs.  A mat eu r eff o rts to  co lle ct evid ence we r e e vi d e n tl y occurring and ma ny m em bers ofthe me d ia  w e re inter vi ewi ng m e about  how on e goes a bout c o nd uc ting an  i nvesti ga tio n o f thi s  nat ure. I  wrote a  pape r  on chemical w a rfare forensi c s( C WF oren sic s PDF and w ebli n k he re)t ohel p  reme diate  t h is gap in knowledge.
Th e UN R eport :

The deploy ment of aj o i nt OPCW/ WHOt ea m  to Damascus t o col lect evide n ce provi ded a  wide va riety ofu s eful inf orm ati on.  An i nt erim report w a s  iss ue d in mi d S eptembe r t hat  pr ovi de d some us eful inf or ma ti on , b ut wh i ch was l ac kin ginsomee ssenti al de tail s.  M y  re actiont ot h at r ep or t is  de ta iledhere :  DK  Initia l UN Repo rtP DF a nd  w eblink. 

A key findi ng  of this r ep ort  is th a t  Sarin w as definitively the cau s ative a gen t for  the  chemical  ca sualti es. Sarinand Sa rin-s pe cif i c  degr a d at ion  p roducts we r e  fo und i nenvi ronment al samples.

My pa p erraised many q ues tion s an d I wa s  as ke d  by n umerous peopleto look in to va rious aspe c tsof  the re port. I  dids o and p repared a nother pa pe r in t heform of an  FAQ: FA Q on UN r e portP DF  andweb link.Ke enobser vers w i llnotethat,at  thistime,  I  had not  yet discovered the rol e of h exami nein this i nte r est ing puzzl e.
Estimating  th e s ize o f t h e Att ack: 
T heO PCW h ad d e finitivel y  i den t i fi ed the chem i c a l w arfar e a g ent as  Sar in. But how muchh ad been used.In t h i s a rti c le e nt itled “Managin g T he D eficit”in  CBRNe Worl d Magazi ne (link  here)  I att empt to c al c ulate,  usi ngold ColdWar -e r a offen si ve target  ana ly sis me thods, a ro u g h estimate of th e siz e of th e  at tack.  I  estima t ed,rather cru dely giventhe me thod , tha t about  1 000 kg  of  S arin was u s ed.

Furt her D etailsfr om t heUN and  OPC W 
In N ovem be r 2 013, ther o le of  h e xam inein th is  sto ry became more int ere s ting. T he  OP C W  relea s ed a n
 limitations_of video_analysis of a chemical_event became_clear._While many_people_jumped immediately to_the (eventually correct)_conclusion that Sarin was_the causative agent,_I_myself was not firmly convinced based on the available evidence, and numerous alternative explanations_were_circulating. This_paper_(DK_26 Aug PDF and weblink_) was one of my_first attempts_to analyse the data available at the time._Further_thoughts and considerations_are in this papers (Kaszeta early Sep 2013 PDF_and weblink)

One thing that became quite_clear was that_many_people_knew little or nothing_about the admittedly niche subject of_chemical warfare forensics. Amateur efforts to_collect evidence were evidently occurring and many_members of the media were interviewing_me about how one goes_about conducting_an investigation of this nature._I wrote a_paper on_chemical warfare forensics_(CW Forensics PDF and weblink here)_to help remediate_this gap in knowledge.

The UN Report:

The_deployment_of a joint_OPCW/WHO_team_to Damascus_to collect evidence_provided_a wide_variety_of useful information. An interim report_was_issued in mid September that provided some_useful information, but which_was_lacking in some essential_details. My reaction to that_report is detailed here: DK Initial_UN Report_PDF and_weblink.

A key finding of this report is that Sarin was definitively_the causative agent for the chemical_casualties. Sarin and Sarin-specific_degradation products_were_found in environmental_samples.

My_paper raised_many questions and I was asked by_numerous people_to look into various aspects of_the report. I did_so_and prepared another paper in the_form of an FAQ: FAQ on_UN report PDF and weblink._Keen_observers_will note that, at this_time, I had not yet discovered_the role of_hexamine in this interesting puzzle.

Estimating the size_of_the Attack:

The OPCW had definitively identified_the_chemical warfare agent as Sarin. But_how_much_had been used. In this_article entitled “Managing The Deficit” in_CBRNe World Magazine (link here) I attempt to calculate,_using old Cold_War-era offensive target analysis methods,_a_rough_estimate of the size of the attack. I estimated, rather_crudely given_the method, that_about 1000 kg of Sarin was used.

Further Details from the_UN and OPCW

In November 2013, the role_of hexamine in this story became more interesting. The OPCW released_an