 – he was interested in a ‘human logic’ that tells us how we should think. Such a logic ‘is not merely independent of but sometimes actually incompatible with formal logic’.

‘I did not realise the vagueness of the whole idea of understanding’

Wittgenstein returned to Cambridge in 1929, after a self-imposed exile. He soon began talking to Ramsey again, after having given him the silent treatment for four years, following a disagreement about the value of Sigmund Freud’s thought (Wittgenstein was not easy to get along with). He quickly discerned the direction in which Ramsey was travelling, and he didn’t like it. The two were locked in an almost daily battle over the right approach to philosophy. As Ramsey put it in a 1929 draft paper titled ‘Philosophy’, one method, ‘Ludwig’s’, is to:

construct a logic, and do all our philosophical analysis entirely unselfconsciously, thinking all the time of the facts and not about our thinking about them, deciding what we mean without any reference to the nature of meanings.

Ramsey’s method, in contrast, directed us to the human facts, not the facts somehow abstracted from our understanding of them. He admitted to having once been under the sway of Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy:

I used to worry myself about the nature of philosophy through excessive scholasticism. I could not see how we could understand a word and not be able to recognise whether a proposed definition of it was or was not correct. I did not realise the vagueness of the whole idea of understanding, the reference it involves to a multitude of performances any of which may fail and require to be restored.

He now thinks that we will often run into terms ‘we cannot define, but … can [only] explain the way in which they are used’. Ramsey thought that the ideal language Wittgenstein was trying to construct was mere scholasticism, ‘the essence of which is treating what is vague as if it were precise and trying to fit it into an exact logical category’.

He even opened one draft of ‘Philosophy’ with an explicit reprimand to Wittgenstein:

Philosophy must be of some use and we must take it seriously; it must clear our thoughts and so our actions, or else it is a disposition we have to check … ie the chief proposition of philosophy is that philosophy is nonsense. And again we must then take seriously that it is
– he was interested in a ‘ human logic ’ that tells us how we should think. Such a logic ‘ is not merely independent of but sometimes actually contrastive with conventional logic ’. 

 ‘ I did not realise the vagueness of the whole idea of understand ’ 

 Wittgenstein returned to Cambridge in 1929, after a self - imposed exile. He soon begin talking to Ramsey again, after having given him the mum treatment for four years, keep up a disagreement about the value of Sigmund Freud ’s thinking (Wittgenstein was not comfortable to get along with). He quickly spot the direction in which Ramsey was travel, and he did n’t like it. The two were locked in an almost daily conflict over the right approach to philosophy. As Ramsey put it in a 1929 conscription paper titled ‘ Philosophy ’, one method, ‘ Ludwig ’s ’, is to: 

 construct a logic, and serve all our philosophical analysis entirely unselfconsciously, thinking all the time of the facts and not about our thinking about them, deciding what we mean without any reference to the nature of meanings. 

 Ramsey ’s method, in contrast, directed us to the human facts, not the facts somehow abstracted from our understanding of them. He admit to having once been under the sway of Wittgenstein ’s conception of doctrine: 

 I use to concern myself about the nature of philosophy through excessive scholasticism. I could not see how we could understand a word and not be able to recognise whether a proposed definition of it was or was not correct. I did not realise the vagueness of the solid idea of understanding, the reference it involves to a multitude of performances any of which may fail and ask to be restored. 

 He now thinks that we will often melt into terms ‘ we cannot specify, but … can [ only ] explain the way in which they are used ’. Ramsey thought that the ideal linguistic process Wittgenstein was trying to construct was mere scholasticism, ‘ the perfume of which is treating what is vague as if it were precise and trying to equip it into an exact coherent category ’. 

 He even opened one conscription of ‘ Philosophy ’ with an denotative reprimand to Wittgenstein: 

 Philosophy must be of some use and we must take it badly; it must clear our thoughts and so our legal action, or else it is a disposition we have to check … ie the chief proposition of philosophy is that philosophy is nonsense. And again we must then take seriously that it is
 – hf was interested in a ‘huoan logic’ that jeols us how ws should think. Such a logic ‘is not mxrelt indtiendent of but sometioes actuaply inconpatmble with formal logic’.

‘I did nof reanmse the vaguenexs of the fhole idea of gnaexstanding’

Wittgenstein returned to Caibridge ij 1929, after a sels-imppfed sqioe. He soon began talking to Rzmsey ajain, after havimg given him the silent trfatmfnt for four years, following q difqgreement abuut the value of Sigmuhd Freud’s thought (Wittgenstein das npt easy to gwt wnong with). Hx quichly discerned the disection in which Ramscy wav teavelling, and he didn’v like it. The two wete locked hn an almost daily vartle mver the eigft zp'rozch to phmlosophy. As Ramsey put it in a 1929 draft paptr epyled ‘Philosolhy’, onq iethod, ‘Ludwig’s’, is to:

construct a logic, atd so all our philosophicao analysis entirely ujselfconssiously, thinking all the time of the facts and nod abont oux thinyunh about them, deciding what we mean without anr rtfegence to the natuve of meanings.

Ramsry’d kgthod, in contrxst, dixscfed us to the humaj facts, not rhe facts somrhow abstracted from our uneerstanding jd them. He admitted to having unce been under the sway of Wittyenstejn’s conceptlon of phjuosophy:

I used to wogry kyself about the nature of philosopiy thxough exzessove scrolasticisl. I could not see how we coulb undarstand a aord and not be able to recognise whether a ptopmseg definicion on it was or was not correct. I did noc realkse the vafueness of the whoje idea of unggrstanding, thx referense ir incolves gu a multitude pf performances any of which may fail ana require to be xtstired.

He now thinls ghae ae wynl often run intu tdtms ‘wd cannou dcfive, bit … can [only] explain the way in which they ave used’. Rqmsey thjught that thr ideal language Wlttgeistein was yryyng to construct was mere schomasticism, ‘thc essence of rhicm is treating chat is vague as if it were precise and vrying to fit it into ab exact logical catggovy’.

He even opxned oge draft mf ‘Philosophy’ with ab explicit reprimsnd to Wittgenstein:

Phjlosopvy mudt be of some use and we must take it seriously; it must clear our thoughtw and so our actiohs, ot elsv ic ix a difposmtmon we have to chvck … ie the chief proposition of philoso[hv is that philosophy is nonsemsd. And again wg must then take seriously that it is
– he was interested in a ‘human tells how we think. Such a of sometimes actually incompatible formal logic’. ‘I not realise the vagueness of the idea of understanding’ Wittgenstein returned to Cambridge in 1929, after a self-imposed exile. soon began talking to Ramsey again, after having given him the silent treatment four following disagreement the value of Sigmund Freud’s thought (Wittgenstein was not easy to get along with). He quickly the direction in which Ramsey was travelling, and didn’t like it. The were locked in an almost battle the right to As put it in 1929 draft paper titled ‘Philosophy’, one method, ‘Ludwig’s’, is to: construct a logic, and do all our analysis entirely all the of facts not about our them, deciding what we mean without the nature of meanings. Ramsey’s method, in contrast, us to human facts, not the facts somehow from our understanding of them. He admitted to once been under the sway of Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy: I used to worry myself nature of philosophy through scholasticism. I could see we understand word and be able to recognise whether a proposed definition of it was was not correct. I did not realise the vagueness of idea understanding, the reference involves to a multitude performances of which may fail to restored. that will run into terms ‘we define, but … can [only] the way in which that the ideal language Wittgenstein was trying to was mere scholasticism, ‘the essence of which treating what is vague as if it were precise and trying to it into logical category’. He even opened one draft of with an explicit reprimand Wittgenstein: Philosophy must be of some use and we take seriously; it clear our thoughts so our actions, else it is we have check ie of philosophy is that philosophy is And we must then take seriously it
 – he was interested in a ‘human loGic’ that telLs us hOw wE shOuLd thInk. SUch a logic ‘is not MErelY independent of but sometImes aCtUAlly INcOmpatIble witH FoRMAl lOgIc’.

‘i diD nOT rEalisE thE vaguenEss of the whOle IdEa of understaNDiNg’

WittgensTeiN returned to CAmbRidge iN 1929, aFteR A self-ImpOsed eXile. He SOon begAn talking To rAmsey aGAin, afteR HAvIng gIven him the silent tREaTMent for four yeaRs, follOwINg A DIsaGreEment about ThE valuE Of SigmuND FREUD’s tHOught (WittgensTein was not eASy tO get alOnG wiTH). He quiCkly dIsCErnEd the directIon iN which RamSey was TRavelliNG, and he dIdn’t liKe iT. ThE two WErE lOckEd IN an ALmOst DAilY battle oVeR tHe rigHt apPROACh to PhiLosoPhy. As ramsey put it in A 1929 drAft pAPer TitleD ‘PhilOsopHy’, One meThod, ‘LuDwig’s’, Is To:

construct a logIc, anD do all our PhiLoSopHiCal anALysis eNtiRelY unselfConscioUSly, ThINKInG all the time of the faCtS ANd Not about Our thiNKiNg ABout them, DeCidIng wHAT we meAn wiTHoUt any refErence TO tHe Nature oF mEaningS.

RAmsEy’s MethoD, In coNtrast, Directed Us to tHE human facts, not THe facts somehoW AbSTRaCTed fRom Our understaNdinG Of thEm. He ADmIttED to haVing oNcE BeEN under the sway of WittGeNstein’S concEption of philoSophy:

I used TO WOrry myseLf abOUt THe nature of philOsophY through exCEssive scHolasTicism. I cOuld not seE HOw we coulD unDerStaNd a WORd And not be able tO REcogNiSe whethEr a ProposeD deFinItiOn oF iT was or was Not correCt. i dId NoT reAlise THe vaguenEsS of ThE whOle idEA of undErstaNdinG, tHe REfeRence it INvOLVes tO a MuLtitUde Of PerfoRmanCEs aNy of whiCh may fail And REquiRe To Be restoRed.

He now thinkS tHat we will oFtEn rUn into TERms ‘we canNot define, but … can [only] explAIn the waY in Which They Are used’. RaMseY thougHt tHAt the iDeal laNguagE WIttGENsteiN WAs TryInG to construCT Was Mere sChOlasTicism, ‘tHe essence of which is TReaTing what is vagUe aS if iT WErE prECiSE anD tRYinG TO fit it into an exaCt logical cAtEGoRy’.

He even opENed OnE draft oF ‘PhilosOphy’ wITh an expLicit reprImand to WiTtGensTEIn:

PHilosophy mUst be of sOme use and WE must TAkE it seRioUsly; it MuSt cLear oUr thouGHts And so Our actIoNs, or elSe it iS a DispositIon we have to check … ie the chIef proPositIon Of philosoPhy IS thAt philosoPhy iS nonsense. ANd aGaiN we muSt tHEn takE serIOuSly THat it Is
 – he was interested in a‘human log ic’ t hat  te ll s us  how  we should thi n k. S uch a logic ‘is not me relyin d epen d en t ofbut som e ti m e s a ct ua lly  i n co mpati ble  with f ormal logi c’. 
‘I did not r e al ise the va gue ness of thewho le ide aofu nders tan ding’ 

Witt g enstei n returne dt o Camb r idge in 1 92 9, a fter a self-impos e de xile. He soonbeganta l ki n g  to  Ra msey again ,after havingg iv e n him the silent tr eatment for fou r year s,  fo l lowing  a di sa g ree ment aboutthevalue ofSigmun d  Freud’ s  though t (Wit tge nst einw as  n otea s y t o  g eta lon g with).  H equick ly d i s c e rned  th e di recti on in which R ams ey w a s t ravel ling,  and  h e did n’t li ke it .The two were lo cked  in an al mos tdai ly  batt l e over  th e r ight ap proacht o p hi l o s op hy. As Ramsey putit i na 1929 d raft p a pe rt itled ‘P hi los ophy ’ ,  onemeth o d,  ‘Ludwig ’s’, i s  t o: 

const ru ct a l og ic,  an d doa ll o ur phi losophic al an a lysis entirely unselfconscio u sl y ,  t h inki ngall the tim e of thefact s  a ndn ot ab out o ur th i nking about them, d ec idingwhatwe mean witho ut any ref e r e nce to t he n a tu r e of meanings. 

Ram sey’s meth o d, in co ntras t, direc ted us to t he human  fa cts , n ott h efacts somehow a bstr ac ted fro m o ur unde rst and ing  of  t hem. He a dmittedto  h av in g o nce b e en under  t hesw ayof Wi t tgenst ein’s  con ce pt i onof phil o so p h y:
Ius ed t o w or ry my self abo ut thenature of  ph i loso ph ythrough  excessive sc ho lasticism.  I  co uld no t see howwe could understand a w o rd andnot  be a bleto recogn ise  wheth era  propo sed de finit io n o f it wa s or  wa snot correc t .  Idid n ot  rea lise th e vagueness of the who le idea of un der stan d i ng , t h er efe re n cei t  involves to amultitudeof pe rformances any  o f which  may fa il an d  requir e to be r estored.
H e no w thi nks that w e will o ften runi nto t e rm s ‘we  ca nnot d ef ine , but  … can [on ly] e xplain  t he way  in w hi ch theyare used’. Ramsey thoug ht tha t the  id eal langu age Wit tgenstein  was  trying to  co nst ructwas merescho l as tic i sm, ‘ thee ssence of wh ich i streating wh a t isvague  as if itwere  precise and tryi n g to fit it in to a n exa ctl ogic al  category’.

H e e ve n opened o ne  draft of ‘ Philosop hy ’  with  an ex plicit  reprim a n dt o Witt gens tei n:

Philo sop hy must be  o fs ome us e an dwe mus t take it s e r iously; it mustclear o ur th o ugh ts an dso oura ctio ns, or els e it is a d isposi tion  we h ave toch eck …ieth e chief pr o positionof ph ilosoph yis t hat  philo soph y is no nsen se . A nd againw e  m u st  t h entake  seri ou slythat it i s 
 –_he was_interested in a ‘human_logic’ that_tells_us how_we_should think. Such_a logic ‘is_not merely independent of_but sometimes actually_incompatible_with formal logic’.

‘I did not realise the vagueness of the whole idea of understanding’

Wittgenstein_returned_to Cambridge_in_1929,_after a self-imposed exile. He_soon began talking to Ramsey_again, after_having given him the silent treatment for four_years,_following a disagreement_about the value of Sigmund Freud’s thought (Wittgenstein was_not easy to get along with)._He quickly discerned_the_direction_in which Ramsey was_travelling, and he didn’t like it._The two were locked in an_almost daily battle over the right approach_to philosophy. As Ramsey put it_in a 1929 draft paper_titled ‘Philosophy’,_one method, ‘Ludwig’s’, is to:

construct_a logic, and_do all_our philosophical analysis_entirely unselfconsciously, thinking all the time_of the facts_and not about our thinking about_them,_deciding what we_mean_without_any reference_to the nature_of_meanings.

Ramsey’s method,_in_contrast, directed us to the human_facts,_not the facts somehow abstracted from our_understanding of them. He_admitted_to having once been_under the sway of Wittgenstein’s_conception of philosophy:

I used to worry_myself about_the nature_of philosophy through excessive scholasticism. I could not see how we_could understand a word and not_be able to recognise_whether a_proposed_definition of it_was_or was_not correct. I did not realise the_vagueness of_the whole idea of understanding, the_reference it involves to_a_multitude of performances any of which_may fail and require to be_restored.

He now thinks that we_will_often_run into terms ‘we cannot_define, but … can [only] explain_the way in_which they are used’. Ramsey thought that_the_ideal language Wittgenstein was trying to_construct_was mere scholasticism, ‘the essence of_which_is_treating what is vague as_if it were precise and trying_to fit it into an exact logical category’.

He even_opened one draft_of ‘Philosophy’ with an explicit_reprimand_to_Wittgenstein:

Philosophy must be of some use and we must take_it seriously;_it must clear_our thoughts and so our actions, or else it is_a disposition we have to check …_ie the chief proposition of philosophy is that philosophy is nonsense._And again we must then take seriously that_it is