 the Opposition as prime minister instead. This would seem to be unlikely in the current circumstances for two reasons.

A mere vote of no confidence in the Gillard government would not necessarily show confidence in an Abbott government. Unless there was a “constructive” vote - where the House of Representatives not only voted no confidence in the Gillard government but also stated that it had confidence in Abbott to form a government - it is unlikely that the governor-general would have sufficient evidence to support a conclusion that a stable Abbott government could be formed in the current House of Representatives.

It is now also so close to the expiry of parliament that there would be little point in forming a new government when an election needs to be held in the next few months anyway.

The most likely result of a successful vote of no confidence in the Gillard government would be that the prime minister would advise the governor-general to dissolve parliament and hold an election - and that the governor-general would do so.

Two problems would arise, however. The first is that the budget would not yet have passed and that supply would need to be secured before an election was held to ensure that the money did not run out.

It is likely that the governor-general would therefore only accept advice to dissolve parliament on the condition that a temporary supply bill was passed first, so that there was adequate money to fund the public service until a newly elected government could bring down and pass a new budget.

The second problem is that there are strict timetabling rules that then apply, leading to the outcome that only an election for the House of Representatives (and the four Senate seats for the territories) could be held, with a half-Senate election having to be held later. This would double the number of elections to be held.

The timetabling problems are these. The Constitution requires that the writs for the election of the House of Representatives be issued within ten days of its dissolution. Legislation then requires that the nomination date be between ten and 27 days after the date of the writs, and that polling day be between 23 and 31 days after the nomination date.

At most, therefore, the polling day (which must be on a Saturday) can be 68 days after the dissolution of parliament. This would mean that if the vote of no confidence was successful this week (for example, May 16) and the House of Representatives was dissolved, then the general election could at latest be held on July 20.


the Opposition as prime minister instead. This would seem to be improbable in the current context for two reasons. 

 A mere vote of no assurance in the Gillard government would not necessarily show assurance in an Abbott politics. Unless there was a “ constructive ” vote - where the House of Representatives not only voted no confidence in the Gillard politics but also stated that it had confidence in Abbott to imprint a government - it is unlikely that the governor - general would have sufficient evidence to support a decision that a stable Abbott government could be formed in the current House of Representatives. 

 It is immediately also so close to the expiry of fantan that there would be little compass point in forming a new government when an election need to be held in the next few months anyway. 

 The most likely result of a successful vote of no confidence in the Gillard government would be that the prime minister would advise the governor - general to dissolve parliament and hold an election - and that the governor - general would make so. 

 Two problems would get up, however. The inaugural is that the budget would not yet have passed and that supply would necessitate to be secured before an election was held to ensure that the money did not run out. 

 It is probable that the governor - general would therefore only accept advice to dissolve parliament on the condition that a temporary supply bill was passed first, so that there be adequate money to fund the public overhaul until a newly elected government could bring down and pass a new budget. 

 The second trouble is that there are strict timetabling rules that then apply, leading to the outcome that only an election for the House of Representatives (and the four Senate seats for the territories) could be hold, with a half - Senate election having to be halt later. This would double the act of elections to be control. 

 The timetabling problems are these. The Constitution requires that the writs for the election of the House of Representatives be issue within ten days of its dissolution. Legislation then want that the nomination date be between ten and 27 sidereal day after the date of the writs, and that polling day be between 23 and 31 days after the nomination date. 

 At most, therefore, the polling day (which must be on a Saturday) can be 68 days after the dissolution of fantan. This would mean that if the vote of no assurance was successful this week (for example, May 16) and the House of Representatives was dissolved, then the cosmopolitan election could at latest be held on July 20.
 thf Opposition as prime mikister instead. Tkus wound seej to be jnlikely in the current circnmstqnces for two reasons.

A mere vote of jo confieenct in the Gillard jkvernmekc woumf noc iecessarily shoe confidenwe in an Abbotd eorernment. Unless there was a “construceive” voye - where the Hoose og Repdvstntatives not only voted no confisence ii the Gillard gpvernment but also stated hhat it had confidence in Abbott jk fjem a governmdnt - it is unlikely thzt the governor-general would haxe suyficient evudwncf to support a cogclusion thab a statle Abbptt government conld ve formed in the currxnt House of Represegtatives.

Id ns now also so close ro the gxpirf of paruiajeit fhat tjerx would be mittle poinr in forming a new bodvtnment when zn elestyon needs to be held in the next few mottha anyway.

The most likely result of a successfol vote of no confidence in the Gillard government would be that ghe pvime nijister would advise the governor-general to difaokvv parliament and mold an election - snf yrat the govervor-genzdam would do so.

Two pgoblems woule arise, hjwevrr. The first is that the bueget would njr yet have passed cnd that sup'ly woold nerd to be secured before an slection wad held to dnsure that the oonvy dhd not run out.

It is likely that the govzrnor-gendral would therefore only accept advice to dlssolre pasliament oj the condition that a temporarb supply bill wds iassed fixst, so that there wws adequate mouey to fbnd thd public svrvice unvil a newly qlected govertlent could bcing down and pasw a new cudget.

The secomd problem is that rhere are strict tlmetacming rules that thtn apply, leading to thq luvcome dhat only an eleztium for the House iw Relresentatives (and tha fohr Senate seats fot bhe terrijories) cotld be held, woth a half-Senate epectimn iaving to be held later. This would doubme the nulbev of electionf to be held.

The cimetabling problems are these. The Constmtution requires that jhe writs for the eleetlon of the Hpuse jf Represantatives be issued qithin ten days on its dissolution. Legialatiot thej requires that the nomination date be between ten and 27 days after the dare of vhq writs, and thay polniug bay be fetwxei 23 and 31 days afteg the nomination date.

At most, thecefore, the pjlling day (which must be on s Raturday) can ce 68 days after the dissomution og parliament. This would mean thst if the vote of no connidence wqs sudcessflm vhis week (for examplr, May 16) and rhe Houwe on Representatixes wws dissolged, uhen the general election could at lqtest ve held on July 20.


the Opposition as prime minister instead. This to unlikely in current circumstances for of confidence in the government would not show confidence in an Abbott government. there was a “constructive” vote - where the House of Representatives not only no confidence in the Gillard government but also stated that it had confidence Abbott form government it is unlikely that the governor-general would have sufficient evidence to support a conclusion that a Abbott government could be formed in the current of Representatives. It is also so close to the of that there be point forming a new when an election needs to be held in the next few months anyway. The most likely result a successful no confidence the government be that the would advise the governor-general to dissolve an election - and that the governor-general would so. Two would arise, however. The first is the budget would not yet have passed and supply would need to be secured before an election was held to ensure that the not run out. It likely that the would only advice dissolve parliament the condition that a temporary supply bill was passed first, so there was adequate money to fund the public service until elected could bring down pass a new budget. second is that there are rules then the that an election for the of Representatives (and the four seats for the territories) half-Senate election having to be held later. This double the number of elections to be The timetabling problems are these. The Constitution requires that the writs for election of of Representatives be issued within ten days of dissolution. Legislation then requires the nomination date be between ten and 27 days the of the and that polling be between 23 31 days after date. At therefore, polling be on a Saturday) can be days the dissolution of parliament. This mean the vote of no confidence was successful this week (for example, May 16) and the Representatives was dissolved, then general could at latest be held on July 20.
 the Opposition as prime minisTer instead. this wOulD seEm To be UnliKely in the curreNT cirCumstances for two reasonS.

A merE vOTe of NO cOnfidEnce in tHE GILLarD gOvErnMeNT wOuld nOt nEcessarIly show conFidEnCe in an Abbott GOvErnment. UnlEss There was a “conStrUctive” VoTe - wHEre thE HoUse of represENtativEs not only VoTEd no coNFidence IN ThE GilLard government but ALsO Stated that it haD confiDeNCe IN abbOtt To form a govErNment - IT is unliKElY THAt tHE governor-geneRal would havE SufFicienT eVidENce to sUpporT a COncLusion that a StabLe Abbott gOvernmENt could BE formed In the cUrrEnt housE Of rePreSeNTatIVeS.

It IS noW also so cLoSe To the ExpiRY OF ParlIamEnt tHat thEre would be litTle PoinT In fOrminG a new GoveRnMent wHen an eLectiOn Needs to be held in The nExt few monThs AnYwaY.

THe mosT Likely ResUlt Of a succEssful vOTe oF nO CONfIdence in the Gillard GoVERnMent woulD be thaT ThE pRIme minisTeR woUld aDVIse thE govERnOr-generaL to disSOlVe ParliamEnT and hoLd An eLecTion - aND thaT the goVernor-geNeral WOuld do so.

Two proBLems would arisE, HoWEVeR. the fIrsT is that the bUdgeT WoulD not YEt HavE PasseD and tHaT SuPPly would need to be secUrEd befoRe an eLection was helD to ensure tHAT The money Did nOT rUN out.

It is likely That tHe governor-GEneral woUld thErefore oNly accept ADVice to diSsoLve ParLiaMENt On the conditioN THat a TeMporary SupPly bill Was PasSed FirSt, So that theRe was adeQuAtE mOnEy tO fund THe public SeRviCe UntIl a neWLy elecTed goVernMeNt COulD bring dOWn AND pasS a NeW budGet.

thE secoNd prOBleM is that There are sTriCT timEtAbLing rulEs that then appLy, Leading to tHe OutCome thAT Only an elEction for the House of ReprESentatiVes (And thE fouR Senate seAts For the TerRItorieS) could Be helD, wIth A HAlf-SeNATe EleCtIon having tO BE heLd latEr. this Would doUble the number of eleCTioNs to be held.

The TimEtabLINg ProBLeMS arE tHEse. tHE Constitution reQuires that ThE WrIts for the eLEctIoN of the HOuse of REpresENtativeS be issued Within ten DaYs of ITS diSsolution. LEgislatiOn then reqUIres tHAt The noMinAtion dAtE be BetweEn ten aND 27 daYs aftEr the dAtE of the Writs, AnD that polLing day be between 23 and 31 days After tHe nomInaTion date.

AT moST, thErefore, thE polLing day (whiCh mUst Be on a satURday) cAn be 68 DAyS afTEr the DissOLution of pARlIamENT. THis would meaN THAt iF the vOte OF no conFideNce was successful tHIs week (for exampLe, MaY 16) ANd tHe HOUse oF REpresentatives Was DiSSOlved, theN tHe general elEction coUlD At latEst be hEld on JUly 20.


 the Opposition as prime m inister in stead . T his  w ould  see m to be unlike l y in  the current circumsta ncesfo r  two re asons .

A me r ev o teof  n o c on f id enceinthe Gil lard gover nme nt  would not n e ce ssarily sh owconfidence i n a n Abbo tt  go v ernme nt.  Unle ss the r e wasa “constr uc t ive” v o te - wh e r etheHouse of Represen t at i ves not only v oted n oc on f i den cein the Gil la rd go v ernment bu t a lso stated that i t had confi d enc e in A bb ott to for m a g ov e rnm ent - it is  unl ikely tha t theg overnor - general  would  ha vesuff i ci en t e vi d enc e  t o s u ppo rt a con cl us ion t hata s t able  Ab bott  gove rnment couldbeform e d i n the  curr entHo use o f Repr esent at ives.

It is no w al so so clo seto  th eexpir y  of pa rli ame nt that  therew oul db e li ttle point in form in g anew gove rnment wh en an elect io n n eeds t o beheld in  the nex t fewm on th s anywa y. 

Themo stlik ely r e sult  of asuccessf ul vo t e of no confid e nce in the Gi l la r d  g o vern men t would bethat theprim e  m ini s ter w ouldad v is e  the governor-gener al  to di ssolv e parliamentand hold a n e lection- an d  t h at the governo r-gen eral would do so.
Two p roblemswould ari s e , howeve r.The  fi rst i sthat the budg e t  wou ld  not ye t h ave pas sed  an d t hat  s upply wou ld needto  b ese cur ed be f ore an e le cti on  wa s hel d  to en surethat  t he mon ey didn ot r un o ut .
Itisli kelythat the  govern or-genera l w o uldth er efore o nly accept ad vi ce to diss ol veparlia m e nt on th e condition that a temp o rary su ppl y bil l wa s passedfir st, so  th a t ther e wasadequ at e m o n ey to f un d t he  public se r v ice  unti la ne wly ele cted government co u ldbring down an d p assa ne w b u dg e t.
T h e s e c ond problem isthat there  a r estrict tim e tab li ng rule s thatthena pply, l eading to  the outc om e th a t  on ly an elec tion for  the Hous e  of R e pr esent ati ves (a nd  th e fou r Sena t e s eatsfor th eterrit ories )could be  held, with a half-Sena te ele ction  ha ving to b e h e ldlater. Th is w ould doubl e t henumbe r o f  elec tion s  t o b e  held .

T h e timetab l in g p r o bl ems are the s e .  Th e Con sti t utionrequ ires that the wri t s for the elec tion o f t heH ouse  o f Representati ves  b e issued w it hin ten day s of its  d i ssolu tion.Legisl ation t h e nr equire s th atthe nomin ati on date be  b et w een te n an d27 day s afte r  the d ate of the writs , and t hat p o lli ng da ybe betw e en 2 3 and 31 d ays after t he nom inat ion d ate.

A tmost,the re fore, thep olling da y (wh ich mus tbe o n a  Satur day) c an be  68da ysafter the d is s ol ut i onof p arlia me nt.This woul d  mean th ati f the v ot e o f no con f id e n ce was suc ces sfult h is week (f o r ex a mp l e, Ma y 16)and th e House ofRe present ati v e s was dis solved, t h enth e ge neral el ec tion  c oul dat latest be he ld on Ju ly 20.

 the_Opposition as_prime minister instead. This_would seem_to_be unlikely_in_the current circumstances_for two reasons.

A_mere vote of no_confidence in the_Gillard_government would not necessarily show confidence in an Abbott government. Unless there was a_“constructive”_vote -_where_the_House of Representatives not only_voted no confidence in the_Gillard government_but also stated that it had confidence in_Abbott_to form a_government - it is unlikely that the governor-general would_have sufficient evidence to support a_conclusion that a_stable_Abbott_government could be formed_in the current House of Representatives.

It_is now also so close to_the expiry of parliament that there would_be little point in forming a_new government when an election_needs to_be held in the next_few months anyway.

The_most likely_result of a_successful vote of no confidence in_the Gillard government_would be that the prime minister_would_advise the governor-general_to_dissolve_parliament and_hold an election_-_and that_the_governor-general would do so.

Two problems would_arise,_however. The first is that the budget_would not yet have_passed_and that supply would_need to be secured before_an election was held to ensure_that the_money did_not run out.

It is likely that the governor-general would therefore only_accept advice to dissolve parliament on_the condition that a_temporary supply_bill_was passed first,_so_that there_was adequate money to fund the public_service until_a newly elected government could bring_down and pass a_new_budget.

The second problem is that there_are strict timetabling rules that then_apply, leading to the outcome_that_only_an election for the House_of Representatives (and the four Senate_seats for the_territories) could be held, with a half-Senate_election_having to be held later. This_would_double the number of elections to_be_held.

The_timetabling problems are these. The_Constitution requires that the writs for_the election of the House of Representatives be issued_within ten days_of its dissolution. Legislation then_requires_that_the nomination date be between ten and 27 days after_the date_of the writs,_and that polling day be between 23 and 31 days_after the nomination date.

At most, therefore, the_polling day (which must be on a Saturday) can be 68_days after the dissolution of parliament. This would_mean that if the vote of no_confidence was successful this_week_(for example, May 16) and the House_of_Representatives_was_dissolved, then the_general election could_at latest be_held on_July 20.

