 least 1991, when NSF Director Walter E. Massey noted that the size, complexity, and increased interdisciplinary nature of research in the face of growing competition was making science and engineering “more vulnerable to falsehoods” (The New York Times, 1991).

Misconduct is not limited to academic researchers. Federal agencies are also subject to perverse incentives and hypercompetition, giving rise to a new phenomenon of institutional scientific research misconduct (Lewis, 2014; Edwards, 2016). Recent exemplars uncovered by the first author in the Flint and Washington D.C. drinking water crises include “scientifically indefensible” reports by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2004; U.S. House Committee on Science and Technology, 2010), reports based on nonexistent data published by the U.S. EPA and their consultants in industry journals (Reiber and Dufresne, 2006; Boyd et al., 2012; Edwards, 2012; Retraction Watch, 2015b; U.S. Congress House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 2016), and silencing of whistleblowers in EPA (Coleman-Adebayo, 2011; Lewis, 2014; U.S. Congress House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 2015). This problem is likely to increase as agencies increasingly compete with each other for reduced discretionary funding. It also raises legitimate and disturbing questions as to whether accepting research funding from federal agencies is inherently ethical or not—modern agencies clearly have conflicts similar to those that are accepted and well understood for industry research sponsors. Given the mistaken presumption of research neutrality by federal funding agencies (Oreskes and Conway, 2010), the dangers of institutional research misconduct to society may outweigh those of industry-sponsored research (Edwards, 2014).

A “trampling of the scientific ethos” witnessed in areas as diverse as climate science and galvanic corrosion undermines the “credibility of everyone in science” (Bedeian et al., 2010; Oreskes and Conway, 2010; Edwards, 2012; Leiserowitz et al., 2012; The Economist, 2013; BBC, 2016). The Economist recently highlighted the prevalence of shoddy and nonreproducible modern scientific research and its high financial cost to society—posing an open question as to whether modern science was trustworthy, while calling upon science to reform itself (The Economist, 2013). And, while there are hopes that some problems could be
least 1991, when NSF Director Walter E. Massey noted that the size, complexity, and increased interdisciplinary nature of research in the face of grow contest was making science and engineering “ more vulnerable to falsification ” (The New York Times, 1991). 

 Misconduct is not limited to academic researchers. union agencies are also subject to perverse incentive and hypercompetition, giving rise to a modern phenomenon of institutional scientific research misconduct (Lewis, 2014; Edwards, 2016). late exemplars uncovered by the first author in the Flint and Washington D.C. drinking water crises admit “ scientifically indefensible ” reports by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2004; U.S. House Committee on Science and Technology, 2010), reports based on nonexistent datum published by the U.S. EPA and their consultants in industry journals (Reiber and Dufresne, 2006; Boyd et al. , 2012; Edwards, 2012; Retraction Watch, 2015b; U.S. Congress House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 2016), and silencing of whistle blower in EPA (Coleman - Adebayo, 2011; Lewis, 2014; U.S. Congress House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 2015). This problem is probable to increase as agencies increasingly compete with each other for reduced discretionary funding. It besides raises legitimate and disturbing questions as to whether accepting research funding from federal agencies is inherently ethical or not — modern agencies clearly have conflicts similar to those that are accepted and well understood for industry inquiry patron. Given the false given of inquiry neutrality by federal funding agencies (Oreskes and Conway, 2010), the dangers of institutional research misconduct to society may preponderate those of industry - sponsored research (Edwards, 2014). 

 A “ trampling of the scientific ethos ” witnessed in areas as diverse as climate science and galvanic corrosion undermines the “ credibility of everyone in science ” (Bedeian et al. , 2010; Oreskes and Conway, 2010; Edwards, 2012; Leiserowitz et al. , 2012; The Economist, 2013; BBC, 2016). The Economist recently foreground the prevalence of cheapjack and nonreproducible modern scientific research and its high financial cost to club — posing an open question as to whether mod science was trustworthy, while calling upon science to reform itself (The Economist, 2013). And, while there are hope that some problems could be
 lewst 1991, when NSF Director Wxlter E. Massey uited tiat the size, cooplexity, and increased interviscuplinqry nature of research in the fwce of geowiig competition wea makinn sciskce aud engineering “mpre vulnerdble to falsehmoas” (The New York Times, 1991).

Misconduct is njt limiyef to academic teseagcrers. Federal agencies are also subject to pernerse incentives snd hypercompetition, givinh ride to a new phenomfnon of insjjtueuonal scientkfic reseageh miscondudt (Lewis, 2014; Edwards, 2016). Recent exempuars bncovered bi fhf first authir in the Flint akc Washhngton C.C. drinking waber ccisew include “scientificanly indefensible” rgports by dhz U.S. Centers for Diseqsw Conjrol dnd Oeevdntjoi (U.A. Centfrs for Diseaae Control qnd Prevention, 2004; U.S. Notwe Committee kn Sciqnse and Technology, 2010), reports based on nontxistsnt data published by tye U.S. EPA and their clnsultantf in industry journals (Reiber and Dufresne, 2006; Boyd at al., 2012; Edcqrds, 2012; Eehraction Watch, 2015b; U.S. Congress House Committee jh Pvvrsight and Goverkment Reform, 2016), and xipemsing of whistueblowzds in EPA (Coleman-Adehayo, 2011; Lgwis, 2014; Y.S. Congrefs Hpuse Committee on Oversight and Governmvnt Eeform, 2015). This problzm is likely to oncresse as agencies increasnngly dompete witj each otgdr for reduced dkscgetimnary funding. It also raisqs legitinate and dirturning qtestions ad to whether accepting rfseareh futding from federal agencies is inherently ethical or noj—mogert agencizs clesrly have conslicts similar to thofe thxt are accvpted and well underftood for indgdtry researci sponsorf. Gicen rhe misgxken presumptipn of resvaxch neutrqlity by federal fmndine agencies (Oreskzr and Conway, 2010), thr dxngqrd pf hnstitutionan rereafvh mirconducu ti socoety may outweigh thmse kf industry-sponsorrd researcy (Edwardf, 2014).

A “trampling of the scientific ethov” wmtnessrd yn areas as diverse as climate science wnd galvanic cowroslon ondermines che “credibility of everyone in science” (Bxdeian et al., 2010; Oreskes abd Conway, 2010; Edwards, 2012; Keiserowitz et aj., 2012; The Ecmnomist, 2013; BBC, 2016). The Ecinomist recently mighlighted the prevalsnce ox shofdy and nonreproducible modern scientific research and its high financial cost vo society—posjng sn opvn zbestion as vo whether modern xcience was trustworthy, while celling upot fcience to reform itself (The Ezonomist, 2013). And, while there are hopes tgat some problems could be
least 1991, when NSF Director Walter E. that size, complexity, increased interdisciplinary nature of competition was making and engineering “more to falsehoods” (The New York Times, Misconduct is not limited to academic researchers. Federal agencies are also subject to incentives and hypercompetition, giving rise to a new phenomenon of institutional scientific research (Lewis, Edwards, Recent uncovered by the first author in the Flint and Washington D.C. drinking water crises include “scientifically reports by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control Prevention (U.S. Centers for Control and Prevention, 2004; U.S. Committee Science and 2010), based nonexistent data published the U.S. EPA and their consultants in industry journals (Reiber and Dufresne, 2006; Boyd et al., 2012; 2012; Retraction U.S. Congress Committee Oversight Government Reform, 2016), of whistleblowers in EPA (Coleman-Adebayo, 2011; Congress House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, This problem likely to increase as agencies increasingly with each other for reduced discretionary funding. It raises legitimate and disturbing questions as to whether accepting research funding from federal agencies is or not—modern agencies clearly conflicts similar to that accepted well for industry sponsors. Given the mistaken presumption of research neutrality by federal funding (Oreskes and Conway, 2010), the dangers of institutional research misconduct may those of industry-sponsored (Edwards, 2014). A “trampling the ethos” witnessed in areas as science undermines “credibility everyone in science” (Bedeian al., 2010; Oreskes and Conway, Edwards, 2012; Leiserowitz et BBC, 2016). The Economist recently highlighted the prevalence shoddy and nonreproducible modern scientific research and high financial cost to society—posing an open question as to whether modern was trustworthy, upon science to reform itself (The Economist, 2013). while there are hopes some problems could be
 least 1991, when NSF Director WalteR E. Massey noTed thAt tHe sIzE, comPlexIty, and increaseD InteRdisciplinary nature of rEsearCh IN the FAcE of grOwing coMPeTITioN wAs MakInG ScIence And EngineeRing “more vuLneRaBle to falsehoODs” (the New York timEs, 1991).

Misconduct Is nOt limiTeD to ACademIc rEsearChers. FEDeral aGencies arE aLSo subjECt to perVERsE incEntives and hypercoMPeTItion, giving risE to a neW pHEnOMEnoN of InstitutioNaL scieNTific reSEaRCH MisCOnduct (Lewis, 2014; EdWards, 2016). Recent EXemPlars uNcOveREd by thE firsT aUThoR in the Flint And WAshington d.C. drinKIng wateR Crises iNclude “SciEntIficALlY iNdeFeNSibLE” rEpoRTs bY the U.S. CeNtErS for DIseaSE cONtroL anD PreVentiOn (U.S. Centers foR DiSeasE conTrol aNd PreVentIoN, 2004; U.S. HoUse ComMitteE oN Science and TechNoloGy, 2010), reports BasEd On nOnExistENt data PubLisHed by thE U.S. EPA aND thEiR CONsUltants in industry jOuRNAlS (Reiber aNd DufrESnE, 2006; BOYd et al., 2012; EdWaRds, 2012; retrACTion WAtch, 2015B; u.S. congress house COMmItTee on OvErSight aNd govErnMent REForm, 2016), And silEncing of WhistLEblowers in EPA (COLeman-Adebayo, 2011; LEWiS, 2014; u.s. CONgreSs HOuse CommittEe on oVersIght ANd govERnmenT RefoRm, 2015). tHiS Problem is likely to inCrEase as AgencIes increasingLy compete wITH Each otheR for REdUCed discretionaRy funDing. It also RAises legItimaTe and disTurbing quESTions as tO whEthEr aCcePTInG research fundING froM fEderal aGenCies is iNheRenTly EthIcAl or not—moDern agenCiEs ClEaRly Have cONflicts sImIlaR tO thOse thAT are acCepteD and WeLl UNdeRstood fOR iNDUstrY rEsEarcH spOnSors. GIven THe mIstaken PresumptiOn oF ReseArCh NeutralIty by federal fUnDing agenciEs (oreSkes anD cOnway, 2010), the Dangers of institutional rESearch mIscOnducT to sOciety may OutWeigh tHosE Of induStry-spOnsorEd ResEARch (EdWARdS, 2014).

A “tRaMpling of thE SCieNtifiC eThos” WitnessEd in areas as diverse AS clImate science aNd gAlvaNIC cOrrOSiON unDeRMinES The “credibility oF everyone iN sCIeNce” (Bedeian ET al., 2010; orEskes anD Conway, 2010; edwarDS, 2012; LeiserOwitz et al., 2012; the EconomIsT, 2013; BBC, 2016). tHE EcOnomist recEntly higHlighted tHE prevALeNce of ShoDdy and NoNreProduCible mODerN scieNtific ReSearch And itS hIgh finanCial cost to society—posing An open QuestIon As to whethEr mODerN science wAs trUstworthy, wHilE caLling UpoN ScienCe to REfOrm ITself (the ECOnomist, 2013). AnD, WhIle THErE are hopes thAT SOme ProblEms COuld be
 least 1991, when NSF Dire ctor Walte r E.Mas sey  n oted  tha t the size, co m plex ity, and increased int erdis ci p lina r ynatur e of re s ea r c h i nth e f ac e  o f gro win g compe tition was  ma ki ng science a n dengineerin g “ more vulnera ble  to fa ls eho o ds” ( The  NewYork T i mes, 1 991).

Mi sc o nducti s not l i m it ed t o academic resear c he r s. Federal age nciesar e  a l s o s ubj ect to per ve rse i n centive s  a n d hyp e rcompetition,  giving ris e  to  a new  p hen o menonof in st i tut ional scien tifi c researc h misc o nduct ( L ewis, 2 014; E dwa rds , 20 1 6) .Rec en t  ex e mp lar s  un coveredby  t he fi rsta u t h or i n t he F lintand Washingto n D .C.d rin kingwater  cri se s inc lude “ scien ti fically indefen sibl e” report s b ythe  U .S. C e ntersfor  Di sease C ontrola ndPr e v e nt ion (U.S. Centersfo r Di sease Co ntrola nd  P r evention ,200 4; U . S . Hou se C o mm ittee on  Scien c ean d Techn ol ogy, 2 01 0),  re ports base d on n onexiste nt da t a published by the U.S. EPAa nd t he i r co nsu ltants in i ndus t ry j ourn a ls  (R e iberand D uf r es n e, 2006; Boyd et al .,  2012;  Edwa rds, 2012; Re traction W a t c h, 2015b ; U. S .C ongress HouseCommi ttee on Ov e rsight a nd Go vernment  Reform,2 0 16), and  si len cin g o f wh istleblowersi n  EPA  ( Coleman -Ad ebayo,201 1;Lew is,  2 014; U.S.  Congres sHo us eCom mitte e  on Over si ght  a ndGover n ment R eform , 20 15 ). Thi s probl e mi s  lik el yto i ncr ea se as  age n cie s incre asingly c omp e te w it heach ot her for reduc ed  discretio na ryfundin g .  It also  raises legitimate andd isturbi ngquest ions  as to wh eth er acc ept i ng res earchfundi ng  fr o m  fede r a lage nc ies is inh e r ent ly et hi calor not— modern agencies cl e arl y have confli cts  sim i l ar  to th o seth a t a r e  accepted and w ell unders to o dfor indust r y r es earch s ponsors . Giv e n the m istaken p resumptio nof r e s ear ch neutral ity by f ederal fu n dinga ge ncies  (O reskes  a ndConwa y, 201 0 ),the d angers  o f inst ituti on al resea rch misconduct to socie ty may  outw eig h those o f i n dus try-spons ored  research(Ed war ds, 2 014 ) .

A“tra m pl ing of th e sc i entific e t ho s”w i tn essed in ar e a s  as  dive rse as cli mate  science and galv a nic corrosionunde r m ine s t h e “c re dibility of ev ery on e in scien ce ” (Bedeianet al.,20 1 0; Or eskesand Co nway, 2 0 1 0; Edward s, 2 012 ; Leisero wit ze t al.,20 12 ;  The E cono mi st, 20 13; BB C , 20 1 6 ). The Economist  rece n t ly hi g hli ghted  t he prev a lenc e of shodd y and nonre produc ible  mode rn scie nt ific r ese ar ch and its high fina ncial  cost t osoci ety —posin g an o pen q uest io n a s to whet h e rm od er n  sc ienc e was  t rust worthy, w h ile call ing upon sc ie nce t o refo r mi t self (TheEco nomis t ,  2013). An d , wh i le there  are h opes t hat som e  pr ob lems co uld b e
 least_1991, when_NSF Director Walter E._Massey noted_that_the size,_complexity,_and increased interdisciplinary_nature of research_in the face of_growing competition was_making_science and engineering “more vulnerable to falsehoods” (The New York Times, 1991).

Misconduct is not_limited_to academic_researchers._Federal_agencies are also subject to_perverse incentives and hypercompetition, giving_rise to_a new phenomenon of institutional scientific research misconduct_(Lewis,_2014; Edwards, 2016)._Recent exemplars uncovered by the first author in the_Flint and Washington D.C. drinking water_crises include “scientifically_indefensible”_reports_by the U.S. Centers_for Disease Control and Prevention (U.S._Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,_2004; U.S. House Committee on Science and_Technology, 2010), reports based on nonexistent_data published by the U.S._EPA and_their consultants in industry journals_(Reiber and Dufresne,_2006; Boyd_et al., 2012;_Edwards, 2012; Retraction Watch, 2015b; U.S._Congress House Committee_on Oversight and Government Reform, 2016),_and_silencing of whistleblowers_in_EPA_(Coleman-Adebayo, 2011;_Lewis, 2014; U.S._Congress_House Committee_on_Oversight and Government Reform, 2015). This_problem_is likely to increase as agencies increasingly_compete with each other_for_reduced discretionary funding. It_also raises legitimate and disturbing_questions as to whether accepting research_funding from_federal agencies_is inherently ethical or not—modern agencies clearly have conflicts similar to_those that are accepted and well_understood for industry research_sponsors. Given_the_mistaken presumption of_research_neutrality by_federal funding agencies (Oreskes and Conway, 2010),_the dangers_of institutional research misconduct to society_may outweigh those of_industry-sponsored_research (Edwards, 2014).

A “trampling of the_scientific ethos” witnessed in areas as_diverse as climate science and_galvanic_corrosion_undermines the “credibility of everyone_in science” (Bedeian et al., 2010;_Oreskes and Conway,_2010; Edwards, 2012; Leiserowitz et al., 2012;_The_Economist, 2013; BBC, 2016). The Economist_recently_highlighted the prevalence of shoddy and_nonreproducible_modern_scientific research and its high_financial cost to society—posing an open_question as to whether modern science was trustworthy, while_calling upon science_to reform itself (The Economist,_2013)._And,_while there are hopes that some problems could be