 culture

The modern academic research enterprise, dubbed a “Ponzi Scheme” by The Economist, created the existing perverse incentive system, which would have been almost inconceivable to academics of 30–50 years ago (The Economist, 2010). We believe that this creation is a threat to the future of science, and unless immediate action is taken, we run the risk of “normalization of corruption” (Ashforth and Anand, 2003), creating a corrupt professional culture akin to that recently revealed in professional cycling or in the Atlanta school cheating scandal.

To review, for the 7 years Lance Armstrong won the Tour de France (1999–2005), 20 out of 21 podium finishers (including Armstrong) were directly tied to doping through admissions, sanctions, public investigations, or failing blood tests. Entire teams cheated together because of a “win-at-all cost culture” that was created and sustained over time because there was no alternative in sight (U.S. ADA, 2012; Rose and Fisher, 2013; Saraceno, 2013). Numerous warning signs were ignored, and a retrospective analysis indicates that more than half of all Tour de France winners since 1980 had either been tested positive for or confessed to doping (Mulvey, 2012). The resultant “culture of doping” put clean athletes under suspicion (CIRC, 2015; Dimeo, 2015) and ultimately brought worldwide disrepute to the sport.

Likewise, the Atlanta Public Schools (APS) scandal provides another example of a perverse incentive system run to its logical conclusion, but in an educational setting. Twelve former APS employees were sent to prison and dozens faced ethics sanctions for falsifying students' results on state-standardized tests. The well-intentioned quantitative test results became high stakes to the APS employees, because the law “trigger[s] serious consequences for students (like grade promotion and graduation); schools (extra resources, reorganization, or closure); districts (potential loss of federal funds), and school employees (bonuses, demotion, poor evaluations, or firing)” (Kamenetz, 2015). The APS employees betrayed their stated mission of creating a “caring culture of trust and collaboration [where] every student will graduate ready for college and career,” and participated in creating the illusion of a “high-performing school district” (APS, 2016). Clearly, perverse incentives can encourage unethical behavior to manipulate quantitative metrics, even in an institution where the sole goal was to
culture 

 The modern academic research enterprise, dubbed a “ Ponzi Scheme ” by The Economist, create the exist perverse incentive system, which would have been about inconceivable to academics of 30–50 years ago (The Economist, 2010). We think that this universe is a threat to the future of skill, and unless contiguous action is taken, we hunt the risk of “ normalization of corruption ” (Ashforth and Anand, 2003), create a corrupt professional acculturation akin to that recently revealed in professional cycling or in the Atlanta school cheating scandal. 

 To review, for the 7 old age Lance Armstrong won the Tour de France (1999–2005), 20 out of 21 podium finishers (admit Armstrong) were directly tied to doping through admissions, sanction, public investigations, or failing blood tests. Entire team cheated together because of a “ win - at - all cost culture ” that was created and sustained over time because there was no alternative in sight (U.S. ADA, 2012; Rose and Fisher, 2013; Saraceno, 2013). Numerous warning signs were ignored, and a retrospective analysis indicates that more than half of all Tour de France winner since 1980 had either been tested positive for or confess to doping (Mulvey, 2012). The resultant “ culture of doping ” put uninfected athletes under suspicion (CIRC, 2015; Dimeo, 2015) and ultimately brought worldwide disrepute to the sport. 

 alike, the Atlanta Public Schools (APS) scandal provides another example of a perverse incentive system run to its coherent conclusion, but in an educational setting. Twelve former APS employees were commit to prison and dozens front ethic sanctions for falsifying students' result on state - standardized tests. The well - intentioned quantitative trial results became high stakes to the APS employee, because the law “ trigger[s ] serious consequences for students (like grade forwarding and graduation); schools (extra resources, reorganization, or closing); districts (likely loss of federal funds), and school employee (bonuses, demotion, poor evaluations, or firing) ” (Kamenetz, 2015). The APS employees betrayed their stated mission of creating a “ caring culture of trust and collaboration [ where ] every student will calibrate ready for college and career, ” and participated in create the illusion of a “ high - performing school district ” (APS, 2016). Clearly, perverse incentives can encourage unethical behavior to rig quantitative metrics, even in an institution where the sole goal was to
 cupture

The modern academic research enterkruse, duubed a “Lonzi Scfeme” by The Economist, createv thw exiwting perverse incentixe system, which wiuld yave been emmost ikeoncejyable vo academics of 30–50 years agm (The Economisd, 2010). Wz believe that this creation is a thweat to tje future of ssienbe, and lnoess immediate action is takeh, we rui the risk of “nprmalization of corruption” (Ashvorth and Anand, 2003), cgeating a cirru[r professionxl culture akin to thaj recently revealed in professioval cvcling or ib rhe Dtlanta schiol creating scandal.

To reeiew, fot the 7 years Lsncx Arnstrong won the Tour ve France (1999–2005), 20 out of 21 kodium finhskers (including Armstrint) werg diractlh tidd uo vopjng thgoujh admissiohs, sanctionw, public investigatoogw, or failing glood eefts. Entire teams cheated together becauve kf a “win-at-all cost cultyre” that was created wnd sustayned over time because there was no alternative it sigit (U.S. AQX, 2012; Gose and Fisher, 2013; Saraceno, 2013). Numerous warning syfnx eere ignored, akd a retrospective ajakisis indicates that mors than half of all Tour dg Franxe winnerf simce 1980 had either been tested positive fog or confessed to dopiug (Mulvey, 2012). Tke resoltant “culture of doping” put elean zthletes unfer suspidkon (CIRC, 2015; Dimeo, 2015) anc gltimately brought worldwiqe disrepnte tp the soort.

Kikewife, the Atlwnta Igblic Schools (APS) dcandcl prmvides anohher example of a perverse inceivive system ron do pts logiccl conglusion, but in wn educational settiny. Twelxe former ZPS empnoyees were sent to prismj and dozens faced eehicw sabctions wor falsifying students' results ob state-standardizev terfs. The well-inteuuiobed quantitativr tdst rvsuktf became high stayes yo thd APS emploneer, bevause the law “trigges[s] ssrious consequencex nor studebts (like grade promotoon and graduation); schomls (extrs rgsources, reorganization, or closhre); distrlctf (potential joss of federal yunds), and school employees (bonuses, demotmon, poor evaluations, ot firing)” (Kamenetz, 2015). Thg AKS employees uetrayqd their vtated mission of crwating a “caring cmlture of trust and comlabordtion [where] every student will graduate ready for college and career,” and partixipatev yn creating the illuviju of a “righ-'ecforming school dpstrict” (APS, 2016). Clearly, perverse inrentives cdn encourage unethical behaviot go manipulate quantitative metrics, evsn in an institution where the sole goak was to
culture The modern academic research enterprise, dubbed Scheme” The Economist, the existing perverse been inconceivable to academics 30–50 years ago Economist, 2010). We believe that this is a threat to the future of science, and unless immediate action is we run the risk of “normalization of corruption” (Ashforth and Anand, 2003), creating corrupt culture to recently revealed in professional cycling or in the Atlanta school cheating scandal. To review, for the years Lance Armstrong won the Tour de France 20 out of 21 finishers (including Armstrong) were directly to through admissions, public or blood tests. Entire cheated together because of a “win-at-all cost culture” that was created and sustained over time because there no alternative (U.S. ADA, Rose Fisher, Saraceno, 2013). Numerous were ignored, and a retrospective analysis than half of all Tour de France winners 1980 had been tested positive for or confessed doping (Mulvey, 2012). The resultant “culture of doping” clean athletes under suspicion (CIRC, 2015; Dimeo, 2015) and ultimately brought worldwide disrepute to the the Atlanta Public Schools scandal provides another of perverse system to its conclusion, but in an educational setting. Twelve former APS employees were to prison and dozens faced ethics sanctions for falsifying students' state-standardized The well-intentioned quantitative results became high stakes the employees, because the law consequences students and schools resources, reorganization, or closure); (potential loss of federal funds), school employees (bonuses, demotion, 2015). The APS employees betrayed their stated mission creating a “caring culture of trust and [where] every student will graduate ready for college and career,” and participated creating the a “high-performing school district” (APS, 2016). Clearly, perverse can encourage unethical behavior manipulate quantitative metrics, even in an institution where the goal to
 culture

The modern academic rEsearch entErpriSe, dUbbEd A “PonZi ScHeme” by The EconoMIst, cReated the existing perveRse inCeNTive SYsTem, whIch woulD HaVE BeeN aLmOst InCOnCeivaBle To acadeMics of 30–50 yearS agO (THe Economist, 2010). WE BeLieve that tHis Creation is a tHreAt to thE fUtuRE of scIenCe, and Unless IMmediaTe action iS tAKen, we rUN the risK OF “nOrmaLization of corruptIOn” (aShforth and AnanD, 2003), creatInG A cORRupT prOfessional CuLture AKin to thAT rECENtlY Revealed in proFessional cyCLinG or in tHe atlANta schOol chEaTIng Scandal.

To reView, For the 7 yeaRs LancE armstroNG won the tour de fraNce (1999–2005), 20 Out oF 21 PoDiUm fInISheRS (iNclUDinG ArmstroNg) WeRe dirEctlY TIED to dOpiNg thRough Admissions, sanCtiOns, pUBliC inveStigaTionS, oR failIng bloOd tesTs. entire teams cheaTed tOgether beCauSe Of a “WiN-at-alL Cost cuLtuRe” tHat was cReated aND suStAINEd Over time because theRe WAS nO alternaTive in SIgHt (u.s. ADA, 2012; Rose AnD FiSher, 2013; sARacenO, 2013). NumERoUs warninG signs WErE iGnored, aNd A retroSpEctIve AnalySIs inDicateS that morE than HAlf of all Tour de fRance winners sINcE 1980 HAd EItheR beEn tested posItivE For oR conFEsSed TO dopiNg (MulVeY, 2012). thE Resultant “culture of dOpIng” put Clean Athletes under Suspicion (Circ, 2015; dimeo, 2015) and UltiMAtELy brought worldWide dIsrepute to THe sport.

LIkewiSe, the AtlAnta PubliC sChools (APs) scAndAl pRovIDEs Another examplE OF a peRvErse incEntIve systEm rUn tO itS loGiCal concluSion, but iN aN eDuCaTioNal seTTing. TwelVe ForMeR APs emplOYees weRe senT to pRiSoN And Dozens fACeD EThicS sAnCtioNs fOr FalsiFyinG StuDents' reSults on stAte-STandArDiZed testS. The well-intenTiOned quantiTaTivE test rESUlts becaMe high stakes to the APS empLOyees, beCauSe the Law “tRigger[s] seRioUs consEquENces foR studeNts (liKe GraDE PromoTIOn And GrAduation); scHOOls (Extra ReSourCes, reorGanization, or closurE); DisTricts (potentiAl lOss oF FEdEraL FuNDs), aNd SChoOL Employees (bonuseS, demotion, pOoR EvAluations, oR FirInG)” (KameneTz, 2015). The APs emplOYees betRayed theiR stated miSsIon oF CReaTing a “carinG culture Of trust anD CollaBOrAtion [WheRe] everY sTudEnt wiLl gradUAte Ready For colLeGe and cAreer,” AnD particiPated in creating the illusIon of a “High-pErfOrming schOol DIstRict” (APS, 2016). ClEarlY, perverse iNceNtiVes caN enCOuragE uneTHiCal BEhaviOr to MAnipulate QUaNtiTATiVe metrics, evEN IN an InstiTutIOn wherE the Sole goal was to
 culture

The modern acade mic resear ch en ter pri se , du bbed  a “Ponzi Sche m e” b y The Economist, creat ed th ee xist i ng  perv erse in c en t i vesy st em,  w h ic h wou ldhave be en almostinc on ceivable toa ca demics of30– 50 years ago  (T he Eco no mis t , 201 0).  We b elieve that t his creat io n  is at hreat t o th e fu ture of science,a nd unless immedia te act io n  i s tak en,  we run th erisko f “norm a li z a t ion of corruption ” (Ashforth and  Anand ,200 3 ), cre ating  a cor rupt profes sion al cultur e akin to that recentl y reve ale d i n pr o fe ss ion al cyc l in g o r  in  the Atl an ta  scho ol c h e a t ingsca ndal .

To  review, forthe  7 y e ars  Lanc e Arm stro ng  wonthe To ur de  F rance (1999–200 5),20 out of  21  p odi um  fini s hers ( inc lud ing Arm strong) wer ed i r ec tly tied to doping  t h r ou gh admis sions, sa nc t ions, pu bl icinve s t igati ons, or  failing  blood te st s. Enti re  teams  c hea ted  toge t herbecaus e of a “ win-a t -all cost cult u re” that wasc re a t ed andsus tained over  tim e  bec ause th ere was n o alt er n at i ve in sight (U.S. A DA , 2012 ; Ros e and Fisher,  2013; Sar a c e no, 2013 ). N u me r ous warning si gns w ere ignore d , and aretro spective  analysis i ndicates  th atmor e t h a nhalf of all T o u r de  F rance w inn ers sin ce198 0 h adei ther been  testedpo si ti ve  fo r orc onfessed  t o d op ing  (Mul v ey, 20 12).There su l tan t “cult u re o f do pi ng ” pu t c le an at hlet e s u nder su spicion ( CIR C , 20 15 ;Dimeo,2015) and ult im ately brou gh t w orldwi d e  disrepu te to the sport.

Likew i se, the  At lanta  Pub lic Schoo ls(APS)sca n dal pr ovides  anot he r e x a mpleo f  a  pe rv erse incen t i vesyste mrunto itslogical conclusion ,  bu t in an educa tio nals e tt ing .  T w elv ef orm e r  APS employeeswere sentto pr ison and d o zen sfaced e thics s ancti o ns forfalsifyin g student s'  res u l tson state-s tandardi zed tests .  Thew el l-int ent ionedqu ant itati ve tes t  re sults  becam ehigh s takes  t o the AP S employees, because th e law“trig ger [s] serio usc ons equencesforstudents ( lik e g radepro m otion  and gr adu a tion) ; sc h ools (ext r ares o u rc es, reorgan i z a tio n, or  cl o sure);  dis tricts (potential loss of federa l fu n d s),  an d  sch oo l employees (b onu se s ,  demotio n,  poor evalu ations,or firin g)” (K amenet z, 2015 ) .  T h e APSempl oye es betray edth e ir stat ed  m i ssionof c re atinga “car i ng c u l ture of trust an d col l a borat i on[wher e]  everys tude nt will gr aduate read y forcoll ege a nd care er ,” and  pa rt icipated i n  creating  theillusio nof a  “h igh-pe rfor m i ng sc hool  d ist rict” (AP S ,  2 0 16 ). Cle arly , per ve rseincentive s  can enc our a ge unet hi cal b ehavio r  t o manipulate  qu antit a t ive metric s , ev e ni n aninstit utionwhere t h e s ol e goalwas t o
 culture

The_modern academic_research enterprise, dubbed a_“Ponzi Scheme”_by_The Economist,_created_the existing perverse_incentive system, which_would have been almost_inconceivable to academics_of_30–50 years ago (The Economist, 2010). We believe that this creation is a threat_to_the future_of_science,_and unless immediate action is_taken, we run the risk_of “normalization_of corruption” (Ashforth and Anand, 2003), creating a_corrupt_professional culture akin_to that recently revealed in professional cycling or in_the Atlanta school cheating scandal.

To review,_for the 7_years_Lance_Armstrong won the Tour_de France (1999–2005), 20 out of_21 podium finishers (including Armstrong) were_directly tied to doping through admissions, sanctions,_public investigations, or failing blood tests._Entire teams cheated together because_of a_“win-at-all cost culture” that was_created and sustained_over time_because there was_no alternative in sight (U.S. ADA,_2012; Rose and_Fisher, 2013; Saraceno, 2013). Numerous warning_signs_were ignored, and_a_retrospective_analysis indicates_that more than_half_of all_Tour_de France winners since 1980 had_either_been tested positive for or confessed to_doping (Mulvey, 2012). The_resultant_“culture of doping” put_clean athletes under suspicion (CIRC,_2015; Dimeo, 2015) and ultimately brought_worldwide disrepute_to the_sport.

Likewise, the Atlanta Public Schools (APS) scandal provides another example of_a perverse incentive system run to_its logical conclusion, but_in an_educational_setting. Twelve former_APS_employees were_sent to prison and dozens faced ethics_sanctions for_falsifying students' results on state-standardized tests._The well-intentioned quantitative test_results_became high stakes to the APS_employees, because the law “trigger[s] serious_consequences for students (like grade_promotion_and_graduation); schools (extra resources, reorganization,_or closure); districts (potential loss of_federal funds), and_school employees (bonuses, demotion, poor evaluations, or_firing)”_(Kamenetz, 2015). The APS employees betrayed_their_stated mission of creating a “caring_culture_of_trust and collaboration [where] every_student will graduate ready for college_and career,” and participated in creating the illusion of_a “high-performing school_district” (APS, 2016). Clearly, perverse_incentives_can_encourage unethical behavior to manipulate quantitative metrics, even in an_institution where_the sole goal_was to