ishment the settled order.”

“Bomb Power,” in other words, is an ambitious work, and while Wills is incapable of being anything but provocative and erudite, his book is thought-provoking but not entirely persuasive. As a one-time Jesuit seminarian, Wills, now 75, is a reflexive Thomist: That has made him very discerning of first causes and alive to the deeper meanings of texts, like the Constitution.

It’s not an outlook, though, that copes well with the reality of historical contingency -- and that is where this book is least satisfying. We did not build the bomb on a strategic whim: We built it because some of the world’s best physicists, including the instinctual pacifist Albert Einstein, told Franklin D. Roosevelt that if we didn’t, the Nazis would. The Manhattan Project with all its attendant secrecy was a consequence of that reality.

And yet, Wills argues, “only Congress can raise money. It cannot give to another branch what the Constitution limits to it. Executive actions that raise money apart from Congress, that hide the money raised from Congress, that fail to report all expended moneys to Congress, are all violations of the Constitution. The Manhattan Project was therefore a violation of the Constitution -- a thing perhaps understandable, or forgivable, as a onetime emergency measure in war. But as a standing policy... this creates a steady erosion of the constitutional system. The National Security State is in permanent constitutional crisis.”

Or perhaps it’s in a permanent state of tension -- between its republican ideals and the demands of a modern technological world. Wills is skeptical, for example, about the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency and quotes President Harry S. Truman’s anxiety over creating a “Gestapo.”

That’s all fine, but America’s lack of an active intelligence arm left it unprepared for World War II, and the reason why the CIA became the agency it did was largely because of the Soviet KGB, whose activities, we now know, were more extensive and effective than anyone realized at the time.

Wills similarly takes a jaundiced view of the Marshall Plan as an extension of U.S. power into Western Europe rather than merely an altruistic program of reconstruction. The alternative, though, would have been to allow communist parties to take power in Greece, Italy and, perhaps, France -- parties that essentially were wholly owned subs
ishment the settled order. ” 

 “ Bomb Power, ” in other words, is an ambitious workplace, and while will is incapable of being anything but provocative and erudite, his book is thought - provoking but not wholly persuasive. As a one - time Jesuit seminarian, Wills, now 75, is a automatic Thomist: That has form him very discerning of first cause and alive to the deeper meaning of texts, like the Constitution. 

 It ’s not an outlook, though, that hook well with the world of historical contingency -- and that is where this ledger is least satisfying. We did not build the bomb calorimeter on a strategic whim: We built it because some of the world ’s good physicists, including the instinctual pacifist Albert Einstein, told Franklin D. Roosevelt that if we did n’t, the Nazis would. The Manhattan Project with all its attendant privacy was a consequence of that reality. 

 And however, Wills argues, “ only Congress can rear money. It cannot give to another branch what the Constitution limits to it. Executive actions that raise money aside from Congress, that shroud the money raised from Congress, that fail to report all expended moneys to Congress, are all violations of the Constitution. The Manhattan Project was therefore a violation of the Constitution -- a thing perhaps understandable, or excusable, as a erstwhile emergency measure in war. But as a standing policy... this create a steady erosion of the constitutional arrangement. The National Security State is in permanent constitutional crisis. ” 

 Or perhaps it ’s in a permanent state of tension -- between its republican ideal and the demands of a modern technological world. Wills is skeptical, for exemplar, about the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency and quotes President Harry S. Truman ’s anxiety over creating a “ Gestapo. ” 

 That ’s all fine, but America ’s lack of an active news arm leave it unprepared for World War II, and the rationality why the CIA became the agency it did was largely because of the Soviet KGB, whose activities, we nowadays know, were more extensive and effective than anyone realized at the meter. 

 Wills similarly takes a jaundiced view of the Marshall Plan as an extension of U.S. might into Western Europe rather than merely an altruistic broadcast of reconstruction. The alternative, though, would have been to allow communist party to take ability in Greece, Italy and, perhaps, France -- party that essentially were wholly own subs
ishlent the settled order.”

“Boob Power,” in othgr words, is an ambitiojs work, and while Wills is iicapqble if being anything but orovocatine and eryditt, his book is thonfht-provoking gmt noc xntirely persuaxive. As a mne-time Jesuit sdmnnarian, Wills, now 75, is a reflexive Thjmist: Tnah has made him verj qiscsgnlng of first causes and alive to the detper meanings of trxts, like the Constitution.

Lt’s jot an outlook, thokgh, that cokss rwll with the reality of historical contingency -- and that is where this book is lgcwt ddtisfying. Wx did got build thc bomb mn a sttategic whim: Wc buint ut because some of thx world’s best physicysts, inclgdnng the instinctual pqcufist Albart Dunsgeih, vols Frannlii D. Roosevemt that if qe didn’t, the Nazis eotod. The Manhatfan Prjjqct with all its attendant secrecy was d cknsequence of that realuty.

And yet, Wills argugs, “only Coggress can raise money. It cannot give to another tranci dhau bme Cubshitution limits to it. Executive actions that wzixe money apart fvom Congress, that nife jhe money raisgd from Cohgress, that fail tl reporj all wxpended ioneus to Congress, are all violqtions of thv Cobstitution. The Mankattan Projeet was therrfore a violation of thz Consfitution -- a thing pedfaps understandacle, os forgivable, as a onetime qmergency meaxure in war. But af a standijg policy... this creates a steaby ermsion of tje constitutional system. The Navmonal Securiti Sdatv is in pzrmanekt constitutionwl crisis.”

Or pethaps it’s in a permanent state mf tension -- between its sgpublican ideels and tre dwmanes of a oodern technolpgical woglb. Wills iw skeptical, for exemplg, zbout the creatnub of the Centrak Ivtejlpgeice Adancy and quodes Orerodent Harry S. Trmmav’s amxiety over creating a “Gsstapo.”

That’s all fime, but Ametica’s lach of an activr intelligence arm left it unprrpated for World War II, and the rezson why hhe CIA became ehe qgency it dib was largely because of the Soviet KGB, xhose activities, we now know, were more extgnslve and effertive ehan anyote realized at the tume.

Wills similarln takes a jaundiced visw of dhe Mwrshall Plan as an extension of U.S. power into Western Europe rather than nerely an altruistjc ptograk jy reconftrurtmon. The alternatine, though, would have been to alluw commutift parties to take power in Brdece, Italy ana, perhaps, France -- partiea that exsentially were wholly owned suns
ishment the settled order.” “Bomb Power,” in is ambitious work, while Wills is provocative erudite, his book thought-provoking but not persuasive. As a one-time Jesuit seminarian, now 75, is a reflexive Thomist: That has made him very discerning of causes and alive to the deeper meanings of texts, like the Constitution. It’s an though, copes with the reality of historical contingency -- and that is where this book is least satisfying. did not build the bomb on a strategic We built it because of the world’s best physicists, the pacifist Albert told D. that if we the Nazis would. The Manhattan Project with all its attendant secrecy was a consequence of that reality. yet, Wills Congress can money. cannot to another branch Constitution limits to it. Executive actions apart from Congress, that hide the money raised Congress, that to report all expended moneys to are all violations of the Constitution. The Manhattan was therefore a violation of the Constitution -- a thing perhaps understandable, or forgivable, as emergency measure in war. as a standing this a erosion the constitutional The National Security State is in permanent constitutional crisis.” Or perhaps in a permanent state of tension -- between its republican the of a modern world. Wills is skeptical, example, the creation of the Agency quotes Truman’s over a “Gestapo.” That’s all but America’s lack of an intelligence arm left it and the reason why the CIA became the it did was largely because of the KGB, whose activities, we now know, were more extensive and effective than realized at Wills similarly takes a jaundiced view of the Plan as an extension U.S. power into Western Europe rather than merely an program reconstruction. The though, would have to allow communist to take power Italy and, France parties wholly owned subs
ishment the settled order.”

“BomB Power,” in otHer woRds, Is aN aMbitIous Work, and while WiLLs is Incapable of being anythiNg but PrOVocaTIvE and eRudite, hIS bOOK is ThOuGht-PrOVoKing bUt nOt entirEly persuasIve. as A one-time JesuIT sEminarian, WIllS, now 75, is a refleXivE ThomiSt: thaT Has maDe hIm verY disceRNing of First causEs ANd alivE To the deEPEr MeanIngs of texts, like thE coNStitution.

It’s noT an outLoOK, tHOUgh, ThaT copes well WiTh the REality oF HiSTORicAL contingency -- aNd that is wheRE thIs book Is LeaST satisFying. we DId nOt build the bOmb oN a strategIc whim: wE built iT Because Some of The WorLd’s bESt PhYsiCiSTs, iNClUdiNG thE instincTuAl PacifIst ALBERT EinSteIn, toLd FraNklin D. RooseveLt tHat iF We dIdn’t, tHe NazIs woUlD. The MAnhattAn ProJeCt with all its attEndaNt secrecy Was A cOnsEqUence OF that rEalIty.

and yet, WIlls argUEs, “oNlY cONgRess can raise money. IT cANNoT give to aNother BRaNcH What the COnStiTutiON LimitS to iT. exEcutive aCtions THaT rAise monEy Apart fRoM CoNgrEss, thAT hidE the moNey raiseD from cOngress, that faiL To report all exPEnDED mONeys To COngress, are aLl viOLatiOns oF ThE CoNStituTion. THe mAnHAttan Project was therEfOre a viOlatiOn of the ConstiTution -- a thiNG PErhaps unDersTAnDAble, or forgivabLe, as a Onetime emeRGency meaSure iN war. But aS a standinG POlicy... thiS crEatEs a SteADY eRosion of the coNSTituTiOnal sysTem. the NatiOnaL SeCurIty stAte is in peRmanent cOnStItUtIonAl criSIs.”

Or perhApS it’S iN a pErmanENt statE of teNsioN -- bEtWEen Its repuBLiCAN ideAlS aNd thE deMaNds of A modERn tEchnoloGical worlD. WiLLs is SkEpTical, foR example, about ThE creation oF tHe CEntral iNTelligenCe Agency and quotes PresidENt Harry s. TrUman’s AnxiEty over crEatIng a “GeStaPO.”

That’s All finE, but AMeRicA’S Lack oF AN aCtiVe IntelligenCE Arm Left iT uNprePared foR World War II, and the rEAsoN why the CIA becAme The aGENcY it DId WAs lArGEly BECause of the SovieT KGB, whose aCtIViTies, we now kNOw, wErE more exTensive And efFEctive tHan anyone Realized aT tHe tiME.

wilLs similarlY takes a jAundiced vIEw of tHE MArshaLl PLan as aN eXteNsion Of U.S. poWEr iNto WeStern EUrOpe ratHer thAn Merely an Altruistic program of recoNstrucTion. THe aLternativE, thOUgh, Would have Been To allow comMunIst PartiEs tO Take pOwer IN GReeCE, ItalY and, PErhaps, FraNCe -- ParTIEs That essentiALLY weRe whoLly OWned suBs
ishment the settled order. ”

“Bomb P ower, ” i n o th er w ords , is an ambiti o us w ork, and while Wills i s inc ap a bleo fbeing  anythi n gb u t p ro vo cat iv e  a nd er udi te, his  book is t hou gh t-provokingb ut  not entir ely  persuasive.  As  a one -t ime Jesui t s emina rian,W ills,now 75, i sa  refle x ive Tho m i st : Th at has made him v e ry discerning offirstca u se s and  al ive to the  d eeper meaning s  o f t ext s , like the Co nstitution. 
It ’s not  a n o u tlook,  thou gh ,  th at copes we ll w ith the r eality of hist o rical c onting enc y - - an d  t ha t i sw her e  t his boo k is lea st  s atisf ying . W e  did  no t bu ild t he bomb on astr ateg i c w him:We bu iltit  beca use so me of  t he world’s best  phy sicists,inc lu din gthe i n stinct ual  pa cifistAlbertE ins te i n ,  t old Franklin D. Ro os e v el t that i f we d i dn ’t ,  the Naz is  wo uld. T he Ma nhat t an  Project  witha ll  i ts atte nd ant se cr ecy  wa s a c o nseq uenceof thatreali t y.

And yet, W i lls argues, “ o nl y Co n gres s c an raise mo ney. It c anno t  g ive to an other  b r an c h what the Constitu ti on lim its t o it. Executi ve actions t h at raise  mon e ya part from Cong ress,  that hide the mone y rai sed from  Congress , that fai l t o r epo rta l lexpended mone y s  toCo ngress,  ar e all v iol ati ons  of  t he Consti tution.Th eMa nh att an Pr o ject was  t her ef ore  a vi o lation  of t he C on st i tut ion --a  t h i ng p er ha ps u nde rs tanda ble, orforgiva ble, as a  on e time  e me rgencymeasure in wa r.  But as ast and ing po l i cy... th is creates a steady ero s ion ofthe  cons titu tional sy ste m. The  Na t ionalSecuri ty St at e i s in pe r m an ent  c onstitutio n a l c risis .” 

Or  perhap s it’s in a perman e ntstate of tens ion  --b e tw een it s  re pu b lic a n  ideals and the  demands o fa  m odern tech n olo gi cal wor ld. Wil ls is skeptic al, for e xample, a bo ut t h e  cr eation ofthe Cent ral Intel l igenc e  A gency  an d quot es  Pr eside nt Har r y S . Tru man’san xietyovercr eating a  “Gestapo.”

That’s all  fine,  butAme rica’s la cko f a n activeinte lligence a rmlef t itunp r epare d fo r  W orl d  WarII,a nd the re a so n w h y  t he CIA beca m e the  agen cyi t didwaslargely because o f  the Soviet KG B, w h o seact i viti es , we now know,  we re m ore exte ns ive and eff ective t ha n  anyo ne rea lizedat thet i me . 

Will s si mil arly take s a  j a undiced  v ie w  of th e Ma rs hall P lan as an e x t ension of U.S. p oweri n to We s ter n Eur op e rathe r  tha n merely a n altruisti c prog ramof re constru ct ion. T heal ternative, though, w ouldhave be en  toall ow com muni s t  part iesto  ta ke poweri n  G r ee ce ,  It alyand,pe rhap s, France -- parti est hat ess en tia l l y were wh o l ly owned s ubs 
ishment the_settled order.”

“Bomb_Power,” in other words,_is an_ambitious_work, and_while_Wills is incapable_of being anything_but provocative and erudite,_his book is_thought-provoking_but not entirely persuasive. As a one-time Jesuit seminarian, Wills, now 75, is a_reflexive_Thomist: That_has_made_him very discerning of first_causes and alive to the_deeper meanings_of texts, like the Constitution.

It’s not an outlook,_though,_that copes well_with the reality of historical contingency -- and that_is where this book is least_satisfying. We did_not_build_the bomb on a_strategic whim: We built it because_some of the world’s best physicists,_including the instinctual pacifist Albert Einstein, told_Franklin D. Roosevelt that if we_didn’t, the Nazis would. The_Manhattan Project_with all its attendant secrecy_was a consequence_of that_reality.

And yet, Wills_argues, “only Congress can raise money._It cannot give_to another branch what the Constitution_limits_to it. Executive_actions_that_raise money_apart from Congress,_that_hide the_money_raised from Congress, that fail to_report_all expended moneys to Congress, are all_violations of the Constitution._The_Manhattan Project was therefore_a violation of the Constitution_-- a thing perhaps understandable, or_forgivable, as_a onetime_emergency measure in war. But as a standing policy... this creates_a steady erosion of the constitutional_system. The National Security_State is_in_permanent constitutional crisis.”

Or_perhaps_it’s in_a permanent state of tension -- between_its republican_ideals and the demands of a_modern technological world. Wills_is_skeptical, for example, about the creation_of the Central Intelligence Agency and_quotes President Harry S. Truman’s_anxiety_over_creating a “Gestapo.”

That’s all fine,_but America’s lack of an active_intelligence arm left_it unprepared for World War II, and_the_reason why the CIA became the_agency_it did was largely because of_the_Soviet_KGB, whose activities, we now_know, were more extensive and effective_than anyone realized at the time.

Wills similarly takes a_jaundiced view of_the Marshall Plan as an_extension_of_U.S. power into Western Europe rather than merely an altruistic_program of_reconstruction. The alternative,_though, would have been to allow communist parties to take_power in Greece, Italy and, perhaps, France_-- parties that essentially were wholly owned subs