 our breathing. The principal grounds for the theoretical belief that this control is an illusion are derived from the assumptions that both physics and neurophysiology give a deterministic explanation of all events in the brain and that we are entirely within this deterministic scheme. In this context reference may be made to the discussion by POPPER (1950) in which he concludes that not only quantum physics but even "classical mechanics is not deterministic, but must admit the existence of unpredictable events." A similar argument has been developed by MACKAY (1966). The neurophysiology of a deterministic character is merely a primitive reflexology, and not related at all to the dynamic properties of the immense neuronal complexities of the brain. There are thus no sound scientific grounds for denying the freedom of the will, which, ironically, must be assumed if we are to act as scientific investigators. The principal grounds for the theoretical belief that this control is an illusion are derived from the assumptions that both physics and neurophysiology give a deterministic explanation of all events in the brain and that we are entirely within this deterministic scheme. In this context reference may be made to the discussion by POPPER (1950) in which he concludes that not only quantum physics but even "classical mechanics is not deterministic, but must admit the existence of unpredictable events." A similar argument has been developed by MACKAY (1966). The neurophysiology of a deterministic character is merely a primitive reflexology, and not related at all to the dynamic properties of the immense neuronal complexities of the brain. There are thus no sound scientific grounds for denying the freedom of the will, which, ironically, must be assumed if we are to act as scientific investigators. One can surmise from the extreme complexity and refinement of its organization that there must be an unimagined richness of properties in the active cerebral cortex. Meanwhile, I continue to believe in the freedom of my will, though its mode of operation cannot at present be explained scientifically; nevertheless it is important to speculate in order to develop ideas about possible or conceivable physiological mechanisms. One can surmise from the extreme complexity and refinement of its organization that there must be an unimagined richness of properties in the active cerebral cortex. Meanwhile, I continue to believe in the freedom of my will, though its mode of operation cannot at present be explained scientifically; nevertheless it is important to speculate in order to develop ideas about possible or conceivable physiological mechanisms. The Neurophysiological Problem of Will The Neurophysiological Problem of Will An important neurophysiological problem arises as soon as we attempt to consider in
our breathing. The principal grounds for the theoretical belief that this control is an delusion are derive from the assumptions that both physics and neurophysiology give a deterministic explanation of all event in the brain and that we are entirely within this deterministic outline. In this context reference book may be made to the discussion by POPPER (1950) in which he reason that not only quantum physics but even " authoritative mechanics is not deterministic, but must admit the existence of unpredictable event. " A similar argument has been developed by MACKAY (1966). The neurophysiology of a deterministic character is merely a primitive reflexology, and not associate at all to the dynamic properties of the huge neuronal complexities of the mind. There are therefore no sound scientific land for denying the freedom of the will, which, ironically, must be assume if we are to act as scientific investigators. The principal grounds for the theoretical belief that this restraint is an illusion are derived from the assumptions that both physics and neurophysiology give a deterministic explanation of all events in the brain and that we are entirely within this deterministic scheme. In this context reference may be make to the discussion by POPPER (1950) in which he concludes that not only quantum purgative but even " authoritative mechanics is not deterministic, but must admit the existence of unpredictable event. " A similar argument has been developed by MACKAY (1966). The neurophysiology of a deterministic character is merely a crude reflexology, and not related at all to the dynamic properties of the immense neuronal complexity of the brain. There are thus no sound scientific grounds for denying the freedom of the volition, which, ironically, must be simulate if we are to act as scientific investigators. One can surmise from the extreme complexity and nuance of its organization that there must be an unimagined richness of place in the active cerebral cortex. Meanwhile, I continue to believe in the freedom of my volition, though its mode of operation cannot at present be explained scientifically; nevertheless it is important to chew over in order to develop ideas about possible or conceivable physiologic mechanisms. One can surmise from the extreme complexity and nuance of its organization that there must be an unimagined impressiveness of properties in the active cerebral lens cortex. Meanwhile, I continue to believe in the freedom of my will, though its mode of operation cannot at present be explained scientifically; nevertheless it is important to chew over in order to develop theme about possible or conceivable physiological mechanisms. The Neurophysiological Problem of Will The Neurophysiological Problem of Will An important neurophysiological problem arises as soon as we undertake to consider in
 oug breathing. The principau grounds for tkw theocetical belief ghat this control is an illudiin art derived from the xssumptiojs that voth physics anv neuropmvsiolkny gire a deterministlc explanathon of all evettr nn the brain and that we are entirelr withim hhis determiniftic fchejv. Ln this context reference may be made tm the discussoon by POPPER (1950) in which he confludes that not onpy quantum kgysyxs but even "zlassical mechanics is not deterministic, but must admkt thz existence od ujkredictable xvents." A similar avbument has bern developed bn MACNAY (1966). The neurophysiology of a deterministis charactar is merely a primutuve rgflexmlogh, ana nkt rslated at all to ths dynamic peoperties of the imkegwe neuronal ckmplexytyes of the brain. There are thus no soung sdientific grounds for dwnying the freedom of the will, which, ironically, must be assumed if we are to acd as azieublfic ungestigators. The principal grounds for the thejdeuicsl belief that this contrpl ix an illusion xre dexjvsd from the assumphions trat bith physiss amd neurophysiology give a dwterministic wxplanation of all events in che brsin amd that we are entirely witgin this deherministjz scheme. In this cokteft refertvce may be made tj the disrussipn by PUPPET (1950) in wrich he cojcludcv that not only quwntum pvysics but even "classical mechanics is nov deterministoc, bun must adiit tme existence of unpredictable events." A sioilar argujent hav been devejoped by MACKDI (1966). The neuropiysiology of q dererminirgic character os merely a primitice reflexology, and noj delated at all cu the dynamic prppeftiqs oh the hmmense neurmnal coollexigies of the craim. There are thus no vouns scientific grouncs for deniing the sreedom of thr will, which, ironifally, murt be asfumed if we are to act as sciehtific ingesbigators. One san wurmise from the extreme complexity and refinement if its organizatiob that there must bg ak unimagined richgess of psoperties in the actuve cerebral corttx. Meanwhile, I continue to benieve in the freedom of my will, though its mode of operation cannot at present be ex'lwined scienfifivally; nzvexthelesf it ms important to sieculate in order to develop idees about pmsfible or conceivable physiolpgkcal mechanisos. One can surmise from fhe extrrme complexity and refinement og its organization that bhere musr be zn unimagiied richness of proprrties in tye actice ccrebral cortex. Mesnahile, I clntiiue to believe in the freedom of my will, rhlugh its mode of operation gaknot aj presenj be explained scjentjvicaluy; neverthelexs it is imporyant to speculate in owder to develok ideas about ppssible or conceivaule physiolocical mechanisms. The Neurophysiological Problem of Sill The Heurophysmological Probkxm of Will An important keuro[hysioloeical problek arises as soon as we attempt to consider mm
our breathing. The principal grounds for the that control is illusion are derived physics neurophysiology give a explanation of all in the brain and that we entirely within this deterministic scheme. In this context reference may be made to discussion by POPPER (1950) in which he concludes that not only quantum physics even mechanics not but must admit the existence of unpredictable events." A similar argument has been developed by MACKAY The neurophysiology of a deterministic character is merely primitive reflexology, and not at all to the dynamic of immense neuronal of brain. are thus no scientific grounds for denying the freedom of the will, which, ironically, must be assumed if we are act as The principal for theoretical that this control illusion are derived from the assumptions and neurophysiology give a deterministic explanation of all in the and that we are entirely within deterministic scheme. In this context reference may be to the discussion by POPPER (1950) in which he concludes that not only quantum physics "classical mechanics is not but must admit existence unpredictable A argument has developed by MACKAY (1966). The neurophysiology of a deterministic character is a primitive reflexology, and not related at all to the of immense neuronal complexities the brain. There are no scientific grounds for denying of will, be if are to act as investigators. One can surmise from extreme complexity and refinement must be an unimagined richness of properties in active cerebral cortex. Meanwhile, I continue to in the freedom of my will, though its mode of operation cannot present be nevertheless it is important to speculate in order develop ideas about possible conceivable physiological mechanisms. One can surmise from the extreme and of its that there must an unimagined richness properties in the cortex. Meanwhile, continue believe of my will, though its mode operation at present be explained scientifically; it to speculate in order to develop ideas about possible or conceivable physiological mechanisms. The Neurophysiological Will The Neurophysiological Problem Will important neurophysiological problem arises as soon as we attempt to consider in
 our breathing. The principal gRounds for tHe theOreTicAl BeliEf thAt this control iS An ilLusion are derived from thE assuMpTIons THaT both Physics ANd NEUroPhYsIolOgY GiVe a deTerMinistiC explanatiOn oF aLl events in thE BrAin and that We aRe entirely wiThiN this dEtErmINistiC scHeme. IN this cONtext rEference mAy BE made tO The discUSSiOn by pOPPER (1950) in which he coNClUDes that not only QuantuM pHYsICS buT evEn "classicaL mEchanICs is not DEtERMIniSTic, but must admIt the existeNCe oF unpreDiCtaBLe evenTs." A siMiLAr aRgument has bEen dEveloped bY MACKAy (1966). the neurOPhysiolOgy of a DetErmInisTIc ChAraCtER is MErEly A PriMitive reFlExOlogy, And nOT RELateD at All tO the dYnamic propertIes Of thE ImmEnse nEuronAl coMpLexitIes of tHe braIn. there are thus no sOund ScientifiC grOuNds FoR denyINg the fReeDom Of the wiLl, which, IRonIcALLY, mUst be assumed if we arE tO ACt As scientIfic inVEsTiGAtors. The PrIncIpal GROunds For tHE tHeoreticAl beliEF tHaT this coNtRol is aN iLluSioN are dERiveD from tHe assumpTions THat both physics ANd neurophysioLOgY GIvE A detErmInistic explAnatIOn of All eVEnTs iN The brAin anD tHAt WE are entirely within tHiS deterMinisTic scheme. In thIs context rEFERence may Be maDE tO The discussion bY POPPeR (1950) in which hE ConcludeS that Not only qUantum phySICs but eveN "clAssIcaL meCHAnIcs is not deterMINistIc, But must AdmIt the exIstEncE of UnpReDictable eVents." A siMiLaR aRgUmeNt has BEen develOpEd bY MaCKaY (1966). The NEurophYsiolOgy oF a DeTErmInistic CHaRACter Is MeRely A prImItive ReflEXolOgy, and nOt related At aLL to tHe DyNamic prOperties of the ImMense neuroNaL coMplexiTIEs of the bRain. There are thus no sound SCientifIc gRoundS for Denying thE frEedom oF thE Will, whIch, iroNicalLy, MusT BE assuMED iF we ArE to act as scIENtiFic inVeStigAtors. OnE can surmise from the EXtrEme complexity And RefiNEMeNt oF ItS OrgAnIZatION that there must bE an unimagiNeD RiChness of prOPerTiEs in the Active cErebrAL cortex. meanwhile, i continue To BeliEVE in The freedom Of my will, Though its MOde of OPeRatioN caNnot at PrEseNt be eXplainED scIentiFicallY; nEverthEless It Is importAnt to speculate in order to DeveloP ideaS abOut possibLe oR ConCeivable pHysiOlogical meChaNisMs. One Can SUrmisE froM ThE exTReme cOmplEXity and reFInEmeNT Of Its organizaTION thAt theRe mUSt be an UnimAgined richness of pROperties in the aCtivE CEreBraL CortEx. meanwhile, I contInuE tO BElieve in ThE freedom of mY will, thoUgH Its moDe of opEratioN cannot AT PrESent be ExplAinEd scientiFicAlLY; nevertHeLeSS it is iMporTaNt to spEculatE In orDER to develop ideas aBout pOSSible OR coNceivAbLe physiOLogiCal mechaniSms. The NeuroPhysioLogiCal PrOblem of wiLl The NEurOpHysiologicAL Problem oF Will an imporTaNt neUroPhysioLogiCAL probLem aRiSes As soon as wE ATtEMpT tO ConSideR in
 our breathing. The princi pal ground s for  th e t he oret ical  belief that t h is c ontrol is an illusionare d er i vedf ro m the  assump t io n s  th at  b oth  p h ys ics a ndneuroph ysiology g ive  a  determinist i cexplanatio n o f all events  in  the b ra ina nd th atwe ar e enti r ely wi thin this  d e termin i stic sc h e me . In  this context ref e re n ce may be made  to th ed is c u ssi onby POPPER(1 950)i n which he c o ncl u des that notonly quantu m  ph ysicsbu t e v en "cl assic al mec hanics is n ot d eterminis tic, b u t musta dmit th e exis ten ceof u n pr ed ict ab l e e v en ts. "  Asimilarar gu menthasb e e n  dev elo pedby MA CKAY (1966).The  neu r oph ysiol ogy o f ade termi nistic  char ac ter is merely a  pri mitive re fle xo log y,  andn ot rel ate d a t all t o the d y nam ic p r op erties of the imme ns e ne uronal c omplex i ti es of the b ra in.  The r e  arethus no  sound s cienti f ic  g roundsfo r deny in g t hefreed o m of  the w ill, whi ch, i r onically, must be assumed if we a re to a ctas scientif ic i n vest igat o rs . T h e pri ncipa lg ro u nds for the theoret ic al bel ief t hat this cont rol is ani l l usion ar e de r iv e d from the ass umpti ons that b o th physi cs an d neurop hysiology g ive a de ter min ist ice x pl anation of al l even ts  in the  br ain and  th atweare  e ntirely w ithin th is  d et er min istic scheme.In  th is  co ntext refere nce m ay b ema d e t o the d i sc u s sion  b yPOPP ER(1 950)in w h ich  he con cludes th atn ot o nl yquantum  physics butev en "classi ca l m echani c s  is notdeterministic, but must admit t heexist ence  of unpre dic tableeve n ts." A  simil ar ar gu men t has b e e ndev el oped by MA C K AY(1966 ).  The  neurop hysiology of a det e rmi nistic charac ter  ism e re lya  p r imi ti v e r e f lexology, and n ot related  a t  a ll to thed yna mi c prope rties o f the immense  neuronal  complexi ti es o f the  brain. Th ere arethus no s o und s c ie ntifi c g rounds  f ordenyi ng the fre edomof the  w ill, w hich,  i ronicall y, must be assumed if w e areto ac t a s scienti fic inv estigator s. O ne can sur mis e f rom t hee xtrem e co m pl exi t y and  ref i nement of it s o r g an ization tha t t her e mus t b e  an un imag ined richness ofp roperties in t he a c t ive  ce r ebra lcortex. Meanwh ile ,I continue  t o believe i n the fr ee d om of  my wi ll, th ough it s mo d e of o pera tio n cannotatpr e sent be  e xp l ainedscie nt ifical ly; ne v erth e l ess it is import ant t o specu l ate  in o rd er to d e velo p ideas ab out possibl e or c once ivabl e physi ol ogical  me ch anisms. On e  can surm ise f rom the  e xtre mecomple xity a nd re fine me ntof its or g a ni z at io n  th at t heremu st b e an unim a gined ri chn e ss of p ro per t i es int he a ctive cere bra l cor t e x. Meanwhi l e, I co n tinue  to be lievein thef ree do m of my  wi l l , thoughits modeo f o pe rati on canno tat p re sen tbe explained sc ientific ally; ne v e rthele ssi t is import an t to specula te in  o r der tod e vel op idea s  ab out  po ssib leor c o nceivable physiologicalmech anism s . T he Ne uroph ys iologica l  Pro blem ofW ill The Neuro physiological P r obl e m of  Wi l lAn  importan t n e uroph ysio log ical  pr oble m aris e s as so on a s we a ttem pt  t o conside rin
 our_breathing. The_principal grounds for the_theoretical belief_that_this control_is_an illusion are_derived from the_assumptions that both physics_and neurophysiology give_a_deterministic explanation of all events in the brain and that we are entirely within_this_deterministic scheme._In_this_context reference may be made_to the discussion by POPPER_(1950) in_which he concludes that not only quantum physics_but_even "classical mechanics_is not deterministic, but must admit the existence of_unpredictable events." A similar argument has_been developed by_MACKAY_(1966)._The neurophysiology of a_deterministic character is merely a primitive_reflexology, and not related at all_to the dynamic properties of the immense_neuronal complexities of the brain. There_are thus no sound scientific_grounds for_denying the freedom of the_will, which, ironically,_must be_assumed if we_are to act as scientific investigators._The principal grounds_for the theoretical belief that this_control_is an illusion_are_derived_from the_assumptions that both_physics_and neurophysiology_give_a deterministic explanation of all events_in_the brain and that we are entirely_within this deterministic scheme._In_this context reference may_be made to the discussion_by POPPER (1950) in which he_concludes that_not only_quantum physics but even "classical mechanics is not deterministic, but must_admit the existence of unpredictable events."_A similar argument has_been developed_by_MACKAY (1966). The_neurophysiology_of a_deterministic character is merely a primitive reflexology,_and not_related at all to the dynamic_properties of the immense_neuronal_complexities of the brain. There are_thus no sound scientific grounds for_denying the freedom of the_will,_which,_ironically, must be assumed if_we are to act as scientific_investigators. One can_surmise from the extreme complexity and refinement_of_its organization that there must be_an_unimagined richness of properties in the_active_cerebral_cortex. Meanwhile, I continue to_believe in the freedom of my_will, though its mode of operation cannot at present_be explained scientifically;_nevertheless it is important to_speculate_in_order to develop ideas about possible or conceivable physiological mechanisms._One can_surmise from the_extreme complexity and refinement of its organization that there must_be an unimagined richness of properties in_the active cerebral cortex. Meanwhile, I continue to believe in the_freedom of my will, though its mode of_operation cannot at present be explained scientifically;_nevertheless it is important_to_speculate in order to develop ideas about_possible_or_conceivable_physiological mechanisms. The_Neurophysiological Problem of_Will The Neurophysiological_Problem of_Will An important_neurophysiological problem_arises as soon_as_we attempt to consider in