 argues. She points out that the involvement of grassroots organizations in the implementation of the programme threatened local power brokers, who resented the inability to award jobs according to their discretion.

This led them to sabotage the process of demand-driven work schemes, and the frontline workers charged with accepting applications for work refused to accept them.

Economists Abhiroop Mukhopadhyay of the Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, Himanshu of Jawaharlal Nehru University and M.R. Sharan of Harvard University found significant rationing of work by village headmen in Rajasthan. In many villages, people did not demand work because they were told that “they can request work only when it is available".

Supply-side issues in the MGNREGS are so important that a group of World Bank economists found that even after mitigating the information asymmetry, participation may not increase. Martin Ravallion and others of the World Bank ran a randomized experiment in Bihar, where they showed a group of villagers an informative video about the MGNREGS.

While the perception of the programme certainly improved among those who viewed the video, the impact on seeking and finding work through the programme remain modest.

Given the supply-side nature of the programme, better-functioning states such as those in south India have made better use of the programme and received more funds compared to poorer northern states such as Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, an analysis by former bureaucrat N.C. Saxena shows. Saxena suggests that pre-fixing state-wise MGNREGS allocations based on need would have been far more equitable.

While creating durable assets was not the main objective of the programme, it became a key aim in later years, and led to convergence with other schemes. The evidence on this count is mixed, but the perception that it has just been an empty ditch-digging exercise may be an urban myth.

While there are anecdotal examples of poor assets created under the programme, there is no systematic evidence suggesting that most or even a majority of the assets are useless. A 2014 study by a team led by economist Sudha Narayanan of the Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research (IGIDR) shows that most assets recorded under the programme in Maharashtra exist in reality and not just on paper.

Furthermore, an overwhelming majority of rural households surveyed found the assets created under the programme such as
argues. She points out that the involvement of grassroots organizations in the execution of the broadcast threatened local power agent, who resented the inability to award problem according to their discretion. 

 This lead them to sabotage the process of demand - drive work schemes, and the frontline actor charged with accepting applications for workplace refused to accept them. 

 Economists Abhiroop Mukhopadhyay of the Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, Himanshu of Jawaharlal Nehru University and M.R. Sharan of Harvard University found significant rationing of work by greenwich village headmen in Rajasthan. In many villages, people did not necessitate work because they were told that “ they can request work only when it is available ". 

 Supply - slope issues in the MGNREGS are so important that a group of World Bank economists found that even after extenuate the information asymmetry, participation may not increase. Martin Ravallion and others of the World Bank ran a randomized experiment in Bihar, where they showed a group of villagers an informative video about the MGNREGS. 

 While the perception of the programme certainly improved among those who viewed the video, the impact on seeking and finding employment through the programme remain minor. 

 Given the supply - side nature of the programme, well - functioning states such as those in south India have made better habit of the programme and received more funds compared to poorer northern state such as Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, an analysis by former bureaucrat N.C. Saxena shows. Saxena suggests that pre - fix state of matter - wise MGNREGS allocations based on need would have been far more equitable. 

 While creating durable asset was not the main objective of the programme, it became a key aim in later years, and led to convergence with early schemes. The evidence on this count is mixed, but the perception that it has just been an empty ditch - digging use may be an urban myth. 

 While there are anecdotal examples of poor asset created under the programme, there be no systematic evidence suggesting that about or even a majority of the assets are useless. A 2014 study by a team led by economist Sudha Narayanan of the Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research (IGIDR) shows that most assets recorded under the programme in Maharashtra exist in reality and not just on paper. 

 Furthermore, an overwhelming majority of rural households survey found the assets make under the programme such as
 arhues. She points out that the involvemenj if gravsroota organixations in the implementatioi of the kgogramme threatened lucal poweg brokers, who eesented tis inability tk awaxd jobs accordinn to their giscretion.

This ldd them to sabotage the process of deiand-drifej work schemes, and ehe rgoktline workers charged with accelting akplications for wotk refused to accept them.

Efonolists Abhiroop Mukjopadhyay od thq Indian Statkstical Institute, New Selhi, Himanshu of Jawaharlal Nefru Uuiversity abd M.R. Vharan of Hervard University npund shgnificsnt rationing pf xork by village headmen ii Rajasthan. In many dillages, [ekple did not demabd work becduse rheh wtre tkld thwt “vhey can resuest work inly when it is avaolwvle".

Supply-side issuef yn the MGNREGS are so important that a crohp of World Bank economusts found that even wfter mitygating the information asymmetry, participation mdy nov kncxcwrw. Lartin Ravallion and others of the World Bank dam s randomized ewperiment in Bihar, wjetg they showed x grou' or villagers an inflrmativg videi about tre MBNREGS.

While the perception if the progrcmmw certainly improvzd among thore wno virwed the video, the impaet on aeeking and finding surk through the oronrakme remain modest.

Given the supply-sive nacure of ghe krogramie, better-fknctioning states such ad thode in south Lndia have made better use of tix programme amd rebeived moxe funcs compared tj poorer northgrn statef sucf as Bihar and Utvar Pradesh, wn analysis bf former bureeucrat N.C. Saxwna whows. Sxbena suggests yhat pre-fpxnng state-qise MGNREGS allocetiova based on need woood have been fsr oorq vqumtablq.

Fhile creatitg djracke asrets was nob tfe msin objective of the proframme, it became a kcy aim in later yqars, and led yo convergence witj othxr schxmes. Tne gvidence on this count is mixed, but the oergeption that yt hqs just been an empty ditch-digging exercise may be en urban myth.

While thete are anecdotal examklex of poor axsets created gnder the programme, rhere is no systekatic evidence suggesfing tvat mlst or even a majority of the assets are useless. A 2014 study by a team led bt economist Sudha Harauanan oy tke Indiwa Genvhi Institute of Cevelopment Research (IGIDR) showr that mmsc assets recorded under the ptoeramme in Mahxrashtra exist in realitg and noy just on paper.

Furthermore, an oferwhelming majority of vural houweholss surngyev found the assets cteated undee the peogrwmme such as
argues. She points out that the involvement organizations the implementation the programme threatened the to award jobs to their discretion. led them to sabotage the process demand-driven work schemes, and the frontline workers charged with accepting applications for work to accept them. Economists Abhiroop Mukhopadhyay of the Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, of Nehru and Sharan of Harvard University found significant rationing of work by village headmen in Rajasthan. In many people did not demand work because they were that “they can request only when it is available". issues the MGNREGS so that group of World economists found that even after mitigating the information asymmetry, participation may not increase. Martin Ravallion and others the World a randomized in where showed a group an informative video about the MGNREGS. of the programme certainly improved among those who the video, impact on seeking and finding work the programme remain modest. Given the supply-side nature the programme, better-functioning states such as those in south India have made better use of and received more funds to poorer northern such Bihar Uttar an analysis former bureaucrat N.C. Saxena shows. Saxena suggests that pre-fixing state-wise MGNREGS based on need would have been far more equitable. While assets not the main of the programme, it a aim in later years, to with evidence this is mixed, but the that it has just been empty ditch-digging exercise may there are anecdotal examples of poor assets created the programme, there is no systematic evidence that most or even a majority of the assets are useless. A study by led by economist Sudha Narayanan of the Indira Institute of Development Research shows that most assets recorded under the programme in exist reality and just on paper. an overwhelming majority rural households surveyed assets created the such
 argues. She points out that the InvolvemenT of grAssRooTs OrgaNizaTions in the implEMentAtion of the programme thrEatenEd LOcal POwEr broKers, who REsENTed ThE iNabIlITy To awaRd jObs accoRding to theIr dIsCretion.

This lED tHem to sabotAge The process of DemAnd-driVeN woRK scheMes, And thE frontLIne worKers chargEd WIth accEPting apPLIcAtioNs for work refused tO AcCEpt them.

EconomiSts AbhIrOOp mUKhoPadHyay of the INdIan StATisticaL inSTITutE, new Delhi, HimanShu of JawahaRLal nehru UNiVerSIty and m.R. ShaRaN Of HArvard UniveRsitY found sigNificaNT rationINg of worK by vilLagE heAdmeN In raJasThAN. In MAnY viLLagEs, people DiD nOt demAnd wORK BEcauSe tHey wEre toLd that “they can ReqUest WOrk Only wHen it Is avAiLable".

supply-Side iSsUes in the MGNREGS Are sO importanT thAt A grOuP of WoRLd Bank EcoNomIsts fouNd that eVEn aFtER MItIgating the informatIoN ASyMmetry, paRticipATiOn MAy not incReAse. martIN ravalLion ANd Others of The WorLD BAnK ran a raNdOmized ExPerImeNt in BIHar, wHere thEy showed A grouP Of villagers an iNFormative videO AbOUT tHE MGNrEGs.

While the peRcepTIon oF the PRoGraMMe cerTainlY iMPrOVed among those who vieWeD the viDeo, thE impact on seekIng and findING Work throUgh tHE pROgramme remain mOdest.

given the suPPly-side nAture Of the proGramme, betTER-functioNinG stAteS suCH As Those in south INDIa haVe Made betTer Use of thE prOgrAmmE anD rEceived moRe funds cOmPaReD tO poOrer nORthern stAtEs sUcH as bihar ANd UttaR PradEsh, aN aNaLYsiS by formER bUREaucRaT N.c. SaxEna ShOws. SaXena SUggEsts thaT pre-fixinG stATe-wiSe mGnREGS alLocations baseD oN need would HaVe bEen far MORe equitaBle.

While creating durable ASsets waS noT the mAin oBjective oF thE progrAmmE, It becaMe a key Aim in LaTer YEArs, anD LEd To cOnVergence wiTH OthEr schEmEs. ThE evidenCe on this count is mixED, buT the perceptioN thAt it HAS jUst BEeN An eMpTY diTCH-digging exercisE may be an urBaN MyTh.

While theRE arE aNecdotaL examplEs of pOOr assetS created uNder the prOgRammE, THerE is no systeMatic eviDence suggESting THaT most Or eVen a maJoRitY of thE assetS Are UseleSs. A 2014 stuDy By a teaM led bY eConomist sudha Narayanan of the IndiRa GandHi InsTitUte of DeveLopMEnt research (IgIDR) Shows that mOst AssEts reCorDEd undEr thE PrOgrAMme in mahaRAshtra exiST iN reALItY and not just ON PApeR.

FurtHerMOre, an oVerwHelming majority of RUral households SurvEYEd fOunD The aSsEts created undeR thE pROGramme suCh As
 argues. She points out th at the inv olvem ent  of  g rass root s organization s  inthe implementation ofthe p ro g ramm e  t hreat ened lo c al p owe rbr oke rs ,  w ho re sen ted the  inability  to  a ward jobs ac c or ding to th eir  discretion. 

T his le dthe m  to s abo tagethe pr o cess o f demand- dr i ven wo r k schem e s ,andthe frontline wor k er s  charged withaccept in g  a p p lic ati ons for wo rk  refu s ed to a c ce p t the m .

Economists  Abhiroop M u kho padhya yoft he Ind ian S ta t ist ical Instit ute,  New Delh i, Him a nshu of Jawahar lal Ne hru  Un iver s it yand  M . R.S ha ran ofHarvardUn iv ersit y fo u n d sign ifi cant  rati oning of work  by  vil l age  head men i n Ra ja sthan . In m any v il lages, people d id n ot demand  wo rk  be ca use t h ey wer e t old  that “ they ca n  re qu e s t  w ork only when it i sa v ai lable".
Suppl y -s id e  issuesin  th e MG N R EGS a re s o  i mportant  thata  g ro up of W or ld Ban keco nom istsf ound  thateven aft er mi t igating the in f ormation asym m et r y ,p arti cip ation may n ot i n crea se.M ar tin Raval lionan d  o t hers of the World B an k rana ran domized exper iment in B i h a r, where  the y  s h owed a group o f vil lagers ani nformati ve vi deo abou t the MGN R E GS.

Whi lethe  pe rce p t io n of the prog r a mmece rtainly  im provedamo ngtho sewh o viewedthe vide o,  t he  i mpa ct on seekingan d f in din g wor k  throu gh th e pr og ra m meremainm od e s t.
Gi ve n th e s up ply-s iden atu re of t he progra mme ,  bet te r- functio ning states s uc h as those  i n s outh I n d ia havemade better use of thep rogramm e a nd re ceiv ed more f und s comp are d  to po orer n orthe rn  st a t es su c h  a s B ih ar and Utt a r  Pr adesh ,an a nalysis  by former bureauc r atN.C. Saxena s how s. S a x en a s u gg e sts  t h atp r e-fixing state- wise MGNRE GS al locationsb ase don need  wouldhaveb een far  more equ itable.
Wh ilec r eat ing durabl e assets  was nott he ma i nobjec tiv e of t he  pr ogram me, it bec ame a  key a im  in la ter y ea rs, andled to convergence with  other  sche mes . The evi den c e o n this co untis mixed,but  th e per cep t ion t hati thas justbeen an emptyd it ch- d i gg ing exercis e m aybe an  ur b an myt h.
While there are a n ecdotal exampl es o f poo r a s sets  c reated under t hepr o g ramme, t he re is no sy stematic  e v idenc e sugg esting  that m o s to r even  a m ajo rity of t heas s ets are  u se l ess. A  201 4studyby a t e am l e d  by economist Su dha N a r ayana n  of  theIn dira Ga n dhiInstituteof Developm ent Re sear ch (I GIDR) s ho ws tha t m os t assets r e corded un der t he prog ra mmeinMahara shtr a exist  inre ali ty and no t ju s ton pap er.
Furt he rmor e, an ove r whelming  ma j ority o frur a l  house h ol d s  surveyedfou nd th e assets cre a tedu nd e r the  progr amme s uch as
 argues._She points_out that the involvement_of grassroots_organizations_in the_implementation_of the programme_threatened local power_brokers, who resented the_inability to award_jobs_according to their discretion.

This led them to sabotage the process of demand-driven work schemes,_and_the frontline_workers_charged_with accepting applications for work_refused to accept them.

Economists Abhiroop_Mukhopadhyay of_the Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, Himanshu of_Jawaharlal_Nehru University and_M.R. Sharan of Harvard University found significant rationing of_work by village headmen in Rajasthan._In many villages,_people_did_not demand work because_they were told that “they can_request work only when it is_available".

Supply-side issues in the MGNREGS are so_important that a group of World_Bank economists found that even_after mitigating_the information asymmetry, participation may_not increase. Martin_Ravallion and_others of the_World Bank ran a randomized experiment_in Bihar, where_they showed a group of villagers_an_informative video about_the_MGNREGS.

While_the perception_of the programme_certainly_improved among_those_who viewed the video, the impact_on_seeking and finding work through the programme_remain modest.

Given the supply-side_nature_of the programme, better-functioning_states such as those in_south India have made better use_of the_programme and_received more funds compared to poorer northern states such as Bihar_and Uttar Pradesh, an analysis by_former bureaucrat N.C. Saxena_shows. Saxena_suggests_that pre-fixing state-wise_MGNREGS_allocations based_on need would have been far more_equitable.

While creating_durable assets was not the main_objective of the programme,_it_became a key aim in later_years, and led to convergence with_other schemes. The evidence on_this_count_is mixed, but the perception_that it has just been an_empty ditch-digging exercise_may be an urban myth.

While there are_anecdotal_examples of poor assets created under_the_programme, there is no systematic evidence_suggesting_that_most or even a majority_of the assets are useless. A_2014 study by a team led by economist Sudha_Narayanan of the_Indira Gandhi Institute of Development_Research_(IGIDR)_shows that most assets recorded under the programme in Maharashtra_exist in_reality and not_just on paper.

Furthermore, an overwhelming majority of rural households surveyed_found the assets created under the programme_such as