 orders.

Meanwhile, in the U.K., the legislative push in recent years has been to expand the investigatory capabilities of domestic intelligence agencies — with counterterrorism the broad-brush justification for this push to normalize mass surveillance.

The current government rubber-stamped the hugely controversial Investigatory Powers Act at the back end of last year — which puts intrusive powers that had been used previously, without necessarily being avowed to Parliament and authorized via an antiquated legislative patchwork, on a firmer legal footing — including cementing a series of so-called “bulk” (i.e. non-targeted) powers at the heart of the U.K. surveillance state, such as the ability to hack into multiple devices/services under a single warrant.

So the really big irony of Rudd’s comments is that the government has already afforded itself swingeing investigatory powers — even including the ability to require companies to decrypt data, limit the use of end-to-end encryption and backdoor services on warranted request. (And that before you even consider how much intel can profitably be gleaned by intelligence agencies looking at metadata — which end-to-end encryption does not lock behind an impenetrable wall.)

Which begs the question why Rudd is seemingly asking tech companies for something her government has already legislated to be able to demand.

” …stop this stuff even being put up”

Part of this might be down to intelligence agencies being worried that it’s getting harder (and/or more resource intensive) for them to prioritize subjects of interest because the more widespread use of end-to-end encryption means they can’t as easily access and read messages of potential suspects. Instead they might have to directly hack an individual’s device, for instance, which they have legal powers to do should they obtain the necessary warrant.

And it’s undoubtedly true that agencies’ use of bulk collection methods means they are systematically amassing more and more data, which needs to be sifted through to identify possible targets.

So the U.K. government might be testing the water to make a fresh case on the agencies’ behalf — to push for quashing the rise of e2e encryption. (And it’s clear that at least some sections of the Conservative party do not have the faintest idea of how encryption works.) But, well, good luck with that!

https://twitter.com/e3
orders. 

 Meanwhile, in the U.K., the legislative push in recent years has been to elaborate the fact-finding capabilities of domestic intelligence agency — with counterterrorism the across-the-board - brush justification for this push to normalize aggregate surveillance. 

 The current government rubber - stamped the enormously controversial Investigatory Powers Act at the back goal of last class — which puts intrusive powers that had been used previously, without necessarily being affirm to Parliament and authorized via an antiquated legislative patchwork, on a firmer legal footing — including cement a series of so - called “ majority ” (i.e. non - targeted) powers at the heart of the U.K. surveillance state of matter, such as the ability to hack into multiple device / services under a single warrant. 

 So the really boastful irony of Rudd ’s comments is that the government has already afforded itself swingeing investigatory powers — even including the ability to require companies to decrypt data, limit the use of end - to - end encryption and backdoor service on warranted request. (And that before you even consider how much intel can productively be reap by intelligence agencies looking at metadata — which end - to - end encoding does not lock behind an dense wall .) 

 Which begs the question why Rudd is apparently asking tech companies for something her government has already legislated to be able to demand. 

 ” … barricade this stuff even being put up ” 

 Part of this might be down to intelligence agency being worry that it ’s getting harder (and/or more resource intensive) for them to prioritize subjects of interest because the more widespread habit of end - to - end encryption mean they ca n’t as easily access and read message of potential defendant. Instead they might have to immediately hack an individual ’s device, for instance, which they have legal baron to do should they receive the necessary warrant. 

 And it ’s undoubtedly true that representation ’ use of bulk solicitation methods means they are systematically amassing more and more datum, which needs to be sifted through to identify possible target. 

 So the U.K. government might be testing the body of water to make a fresh case on the agencies ’ behalf — to push for quashing the upgrade of e2e encryption. (And it ’s clear that at least some sections of the Conservative party do not have the faintest idea of how encoding works .) But, well, good luck with that! 

 https://twitter.com/e3
 orfers.

Meanwhile, in the U.K., uhe legislative posy in rxcent ysars has been to expand the investigetort capqbilities of domestic kntelligejce agenxies — with counvsrterrovnsm tgc brocd-urush justificajion for thiv push to normdlkzz mass surveillance.

The current govergment ribher-stamped the hugtly confgoyersial Investigatory Powers Act at the back end of kast year — which puts intrksivf powers that had heen used ptsvijysly, without necessarily being avosed to Parliament and authorizea via an antiquqtwd pggislative petchwogk, on a firmev legal footinb — including ccmentmng q series of so-called “uulk” (i.e. non-targeted) kowers at dhz heart of the U.K. surceullanwe sdate, wucf aa vhe abilihy vo hack intk multiple eevices/services undtr w single warraht.

So tre really big irony of Rudd’s comments is uhat fhe government has alreqdy afforded itself saingeing ynvestigatory powers — even including the ability do resjirt gjopajies to decrypt data, limit the use of end-to-enq emcgyption and backdjor servicex ln rarranted reqoest. (Anb tgat before you evej consiqer hiw much igtel can profitably be gleaned vy intelligeuce agencies looking ct metadata — whivh enc-to-end encryption does uot lodk behind aj impenetdxble wall.)

Which bdgs tve question why Rudd is seqmingly awkiny tech cumpamies fjr somethijg hev government has algeady lagislated ho be able to demand.

” …stop this stuff even beimg pun up”

Part jf thls might be dowg to intelligeuce ageneies bding worrivd that iv’s getting hwrder (and/or mmte resource iitensive) sor rhem to priufitize subjectx of integeft bwcause the more wivesptezd use of end-to-zud encryption meams gher ban’v as qdsily access and rexc mesrages of pobengial suspects. Instead thay mjght have to direcyln hack an individtal’s device, fpr instance, which uhey heve lejal poeerf to do should they obtain the necessarj wwrrant.

And it’f uneoubtedly trbe that agencies’ use of bulk collection nethods means thei are systematically cmsssing more and iore data, which needs to be sufted through to ldentify possible targsts.

So dhe U.N. government might be testing the water to make a fresh case on the agencues’ beiajf — to push for quasviug che risq of x2e encryption. (And it’s clear that at least some sxctions of tke Conservative party do not naxe the faintert idea of how encryptioh works.) Nut, well, good luck with that!

httls://twitter.com/e3
orders. Meanwhile, in the U.K., the legislative recent has been expand the investigatory — counterterrorism the broad-brush for this push normalize mass surveillance. The current government the hugely controversial Investigatory Powers Act at the back end of last year which puts intrusive powers that had been used previously, without necessarily being avowed Parliament authorized an legislative patchwork, on a firmer legal footing — including cementing a series of so-called “bulk” (i.e. powers at the heart of the U.K. surveillance such as the ability hack into multiple devices/services under single So the big of comments is that government has already afforded itself swingeing investigatory powers — even including the ability to require companies to data, limit of end-to-end and services warranted request. (And you even consider how much intel gleaned by intelligence agencies looking at metadata — end-to-end encryption not lock behind an impenetrable wall.) begs the question why Rudd is seemingly asking companies for something her government has already legislated to be able to demand. ” …stop even being put up” of this might down intelligence being that it’s harder (and/or more resource intensive) for them to prioritize subjects of because the more widespread use of end-to-end encryption means they easily and read messages potential suspects. Instead they have directly hack an individual’s instance, they to should obtain the necessary warrant. it’s undoubtedly true that agencies’ of bulk collection methods more and more data, which needs to be through to identify possible targets. So the government might be testing the water to make a fresh case on agencies’ behalf push for quashing the rise of e2e encryption. it’s clear that at some sections of the Conservative party do not have faintest of how works.) But, well, luck with that!
 orders.

Meanwhile, in the U.K., the LegislativE push In rEceNt YearS has Been to expand thE InveStigatory capabilities oF domeStIC intELlIgencE agenciES — wITH coUnTeRteRrORiSm the BroAd-brush JustificatIon FoR this push to nORmAlize mass sUrvEillance.

The cUrrEnt govErNmeNT rubbEr-sTampeD the huGEly conTroversiaL INVestigATory PowERS ACt at The back end of last yEAr — WHich puts intrusIve powErS ThAT Had BeeN used previOuSly, wiTHout necESsARILy bEIng avowed to PaRliament and AUthOrized ViA an ANtiquaTed leGiSLatIve patchworK, on a Firmer legAl footINg — incluDIng cemeNting a SerIes Of so-CAlLeD “buLk” (I.E. noN-TaRgeTEd) pOwers at tHe HeArt of The U.k. SURVeilLanCe stAte, suCh as the abilitY to Hack INto MultiPle deViceS/sErvicEs undeR a sinGlE warrant.

So the reAlly Big irony oF RuDd’S coMmEnts iS That thE goVerNment haS alreadY AffOrDED ItSelf swingeing invesTiGAToRy powers — Even inCLuDiNG the abilItY to RequIRE compAnieS To Decrypt dAta, limIT tHe Use of enD-tO-end enCrYptIon And baCKdooR serviCes on warRanteD Request. (And that BEfore you even cONsIDEr HOw muCh iNtel can profItabLY be gLeanED bY inTElligEnce aGeNCiES looking at metadata — wHiCh end-tO-end eNcryption does Not lock behIND An impeneTrabLE wALl.)

Which begs the QuestIon why Rudd IS seemingLy askIng tech cOmpanies fOR SomethinG heR goVerNmeNT HaS already legisLATed tO bE able to DemAnd.

” …stop ThiS stUff EveN bEing put up”

part of thIs MiGhT bE doWn to iNTelligenCe AgeNcIes Being WOrried That iT’s geTtInG HarDer (and/oR MoRE ResoUrCe InteNsiVe) For thEm to PRioRitize sUbjects of IntERest BeCaUse the mOre widespread UsE of end-to-enD eNcrYption MEAns they cAn’t as easily access and reaD MessageS of PotenTial Suspects. INstEad theY miGHt have To direCtly hAcK an INDividUAL’s DevIcE, for instanCE, WhiCh theY hAve lEgal powErs to do should they oBTaiN the necessary WarRant.

aND iT’s uNDoUBteDlY TruE THat agencies’ use oF bulk colleCtIOn Methods meaNS thEy Are systEmaticaLly amASsing moRe and more Data, which NeEds tO BE siFted througH to identIfy possibLE targETs.

so the u.K. gOvernmEnT miGht be TestinG The Water To make A fResh caSe on tHe Agencies’ Behalf — to push for quashing The risE of e2e EncRyption. (AnD it’S CleAr that at lEast Some sectioNs oF thE ConsErvATive pArty DO nOt hAVe the FainTEst idea of HOw EncRYPtIon works.) But, WELL, goOd lucK wiTH that!

hTtps://Twitter.com/e3
 orders.

Meanwhile, in th e U.K., th e leg isl ati ve  pus h in  recent yearsh as b een to expand the inve stiga to r y ca p ab iliti es of d o me s t icin te lli ge n ce  agen cie s — wit h countert err or ism the broa d -b rush justi fic ation for th ispush t onor m alize  ma ss su rveill a nce.
The curre nt govern m ent rub b e r- stam ped the hugely co n tr o versial Invest igator yP ow e r s A ctat the bac kend o f  last y e ar — whi c h puts intrus ive powerst hat  had b ee n u s ed pre vious ly ,  wi thout neces sari ly beingavowed to Parl i ament a nd aut hor ize d vi a  a nant iq u ate d  l egi s lat ive patc hw or k, on  a f i r m e r le gal  foo ting— including c eme ntin g  aserie s ofso-c al led “ bulk”(i.e.  n on-targeted) po wers  at the h ear tofth e U.K .  surve ill anc e state , sucha s t he a b il ity to hack into m ul t i pl e device s/serv i ce su nder a s in gle  war r a nt.
So t h ereally b ig iro n yof  Rudd’s  c omment sistha t the gove rnment  has alr eadya fforded itself swingeing inv e st i g at o ry p owe rs — even i nclu d ingthea bi lit y  to r equir ec om p anies to decrypt da ta , limi t the  use of end-t o-end encr y p t ion andback d oo r  services on w arran ted reques t . (And t hat b efore yo u even co n s ider how  mu chint elc a nprofitably be g lean ed  by int ell igenceage nci esloo ki ng at met adata —wh ic hen d-t o-end encrypti on  do es  no t loc k  behin d animpe ne tr a ble  wall.) 
W h i ch b eg stheque st ion w hy R u ddis seem ingly ask ing tech  c om paniesfor something  h er governm en t h as alr e a dy legis lated to be able to dem a nd.

”…st op th is s tuff even  be ing pu t u p ”

Par t of t his m ig htb e  down t oint el ligence ag e n cie s bei ng  wor ried th at it’s getting ha r der  (and/or more  re sour c e  i nte n si v e)fo r  th e m  to prioritizesubjects o fi nt erest beca u seth e morewidespr ead u s e of en d-to-endencryptio nmean s the y can’t as  easilyaccess an d  read me ssage s o f pote nt ial  susp ects.I nst ead t hey mi gh t have  to d ir ectly ha ck an individual’s devi ce, fo r ins tan ce, which  th e y h ave legal  pow ers to dosho uld  they  ob t ain t he n e ce ssa r y war rant . 

And it’ s  u ndo u b te dly true th a t age ncies ’ u s e of b ulkcollection method s  means they ar e sy s t ema tic a llyam assing more an d m or e data, wh ic h needs tobe sifte dt hroug h to i dentif y possi b l et argets .

S o t he U.K. g ove rn m ent mig ht  b e  testi ng t he  water  to ma k e af r esh case on theagenc i e s’ be h alf  — to  p ush for quas hing the r ise of e2eencryp tion . (An d it’scl ear th atat  least som e  sections  of t he Cons er vati vepartydo n o t  have  the  f ain test idea o fh ow  e n cry ptio n wor ks .) B ut, well, good luc k w i th that !
ht t p s://tw i tt e r .com/e3
 orders.

Meanwhile,_in the_U.K., the legislative push_in recent_years_has been_to_expand the investigatory_capabilities of domestic_intelligence agencies — with_counterterrorism the broad-brush_justification_for this push to normalize mass surveillance.

The current government rubber-stamped the hugely controversial Investigatory_Powers_Act at_the_back_end of last year —_which puts intrusive powers that_had been_used previously, without necessarily being avowed to Parliament_and_authorized via an_antiquated legislative patchwork, on a firmer legal footing —_including cementing a series of so-called_“bulk” (i.e. non-targeted)_powers_at_the heart of the_U.K. surveillance state, such as the_ability to hack into multiple devices/services_under a single warrant.

So the really big_irony of Rudd’s comments is that_the government has already afforded_itself swingeing_investigatory powers — even including_the ability to_require companies_to decrypt data,_limit the use of end-to-end encryption_and backdoor services_on warranted request. (And that before_you_even consider how_much_intel_can profitably_be gleaned by_intelligence_agencies looking_at_metadata — which end-to-end encryption does_not_lock behind an impenetrable wall.)

Which begs the_question why Rudd is_seemingly_asking tech companies for_something her government has already_legislated to be able to demand.

”_…stop this_stuff even_being put up”

Part of this might be down to intelligence agencies_being worried that it’s getting harder_(and/or more resource intensive)_for them_to_prioritize subjects of_interest_because the_more widespread use of end-to-end encryption means_they can’t_as easily access and read messages_of potential suspects. Instead_they_might have to directly hack an_individual’s device, for instance, which they_have legal powers to do_should_they_obtain the necessary warrant.

And it’s_undoubtedly true that agencies’ use of_bulk collection methods_means they are systematically amassing more and_more_data, which needs to be sifted_through_to identify possible targets.

So the U.K._government_might_be testing the water to_make a fresh case on the_agencies’ behalf — to push for quashing the rise_of e2e encryption._(And it’s clear that at_least_some_sections of the Conservative party do not have the faintest_idea of_how encryption works.)_But, well, good luck with that!

https://twitter.com/e3