idiaries of Moscow.

Wills is on much firmer ground when he decries the national security state’s impact on open government. “Bomb power translates directly to information power,” he writes. “Secrecy emanated from the Manhattan Project like a giant radiation emission. Anything connected with the Bomb... was, as Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan said, ‘born secret.’ It was self-classifying.... And the power of secrecy that enveloped the Bomb became a model for the planning or execution of Anything Important, as guarded by Important People. Because the government was the keeper of the great secret, it began to specialize in secret keeping....”

It was Moynihan, in fact, who first pointed out that the government’s classification of information, which should have decreased after the Cold War, actually grew by 62% after the Soviet Union’s implosion. “Accountability is the essence of democracy,” Wills writes. “If people do not know what their government is doing, they cannot be truly self-governing. But the National Security State assumes that the government’s secrets are too important to be shared... that only the President has all the facts, that we must simply trust that our rulers are acting in our interest.”

There’s a particularly interesting section on Dwight D. Eisenhower who, Wills argues, never would have given an OK to the Bay of Pigs invasion, though it was planned during his administration. Unlike John F. Kennedy, Eisenhower insisted that a functioning Cuban government in exile be in place before any covert military action. The author approvingly quotes Murray Kempton’s appraisal of Ike’s guiding rule: “Do nothing unless you know exactly what you will do if it turns out to have been the wrong thing.”

On the other hand, Wills takes Eisenhower to task for using the CIA to overthrow antagonistic governments in Iran and elsewhere and make unsuccessful attempts at regime change in Syria and Indonesia. Perhaps this was a manifestation of what Wills calls Ike’s “ruthlessness” or perhaps it was the wisdom of a one-time supreme commander of Western forces who believed covert operations were preferable to all-out conflict with a Soviet antagonist.

The author sums up his argument thus: “Perhaps, in the nuclear era, the Constitution has become quaint and obsolete. Few people even consider, anymore, Madison’s lap
idiaries of Moscow. 

 Wills is on much firmer ground when he condemn the home security system state ’s impact on open politics. “ Bomb power translates immediately to data power, ” he writes. “ Secrecy emanated from the Manhattan Project like a giant radiotherapy emission. Anything connected with the Bomb... was, as Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan suppose, ‘ born secret. ’ It was self - classifying.... And the power of secrecy that enveloped the Bomb become a model for the planning or execution of Anything Important, as guard by Important People. Because the government was the keeper of the great mystery, it began to speciate in secret keeping.... ” 

 It was Moynihan, in fact, who first orient out that the government ’s classification of information, which should have decreased after the Cold War, actually grew by 62% after the Soviet Union ’s implosion. “ Accountability is the perfume of democracy, ” Wills writes. “ If people do not know what their government is doing, they cannot be truly self - governing. But the National Security State assumes that the politics ’s secret are too authoritative to be shared... that only the President has all the facts, that we must plainly trust that our rulers are acting in our interest. ” 

 There ’s a peculiarly interesting section on Dwight D. Eisenhower who, Wills argues, never would have given an OK to the Bay of Pigs invasion, though it was planned during his administration. Unlike John F. Kennedy, Eisenhower insisted that a functioning Cuban government in exile be in place before any covert military action. The author approvingly quote Murray Kempton ’s appraisal of Ike ’s guiding convention: “ Do nothing unless you know exactly what you will do if it turns out to have been the faulty thing. ” 

 On the other hand, Wills takes Eisenhower to task for using the CIA to overthrow antagonistic politics in Iran and elsewhere and make abortive attempts at regime change in Syria and Indonesia. Perhaps this was a manifestation of what volition calls Ike ’s “ pitilessness ” or perhaps it was the wisdom of solomon of a one - time supreme commander of Western force who believed covert operations were preferable to all - out conflict with a Soviet antagonist. 

 The author sums up his argument thus: “ Perhaps, in the nuclear era, the Constitution has become quaint and disused. Few people even consider, anymore, Madison ’s lick
idiwries of Moscow.

Wills is un much firmer yeound xhen he decries the national security state’d umpacu on open governmeng. “Bomb poaer tranwlatts directly to inhkrmatiok powsv,” he crmtes. “Secrecy emsnated frok the Manhattat Orlject like a giant radiation emissijn. Anytnijg connected wyth uhe Bomg... was, as Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihzn said, ‘born secret.’ Ot was self-classifying.... And the power of secrecy hhat enveloksd eye Bomb becaoe a model for the plahning or execution of Anything Kmporcant, as guatbwd hi Important 'eople. Because the governmant was the keeper of thx grwat secret, it began tm specialize in sesret keephny....”

It was Moynihan, in fqcr, who firvt puuntdd kuv tgat thf gkvernment’s classificarion of information, wrpvh should habe decwewsed after the Cold War, actually grew bj 62% arter the Soviet Union’s umplosion. “Accountabillty is thq essence of democracy,” Wills writes. “If people do tot kiod wkqt thdur government is doing, they cannot be truly sels-fofegning. But the Natlonal Security Staye axfumes that thg goverujeht’s secrets are tol imporjant ti be shartd... thst only the President has aol the facts, rhat we must simplv trust that our rulets are acting in our incerest.”

Fhere’s a pagticularlg interesting secgiok ot Dwight D. Eisenhower who, Rills argnes, nzver wouud hsve giden an OK ho thc Bay of Pigs invaslon, tkough it was plwnned during his administration. Unlike John F. Kannvdy, Eisenkower lnsisted that a functioning Coban govexnment in exile ge in pnace before any covert mhpitary actioi. The autror qpprivingly duotes Murray Lempton’s ckpraisal od Ike’s guiding rulc: “Do vkthing unless yiu jnow exactly whst hou wpll dj if it turns out to nave ceen tht wvone thong.”

On the other hand, Wilms takes Eisenhowet bo task fir using the CIA to oferthrow antagonisuic goternmeits in Irwn and elsewhere and make unsudcessful wttcmpts at regiie cmangg in Syria cnd Indonesia. Perhaps this was a manifesvation of what Wills caols Ike’s “ruthlessnexx” or perhapx it ras the whsdom of a one-time sypreme commander pf Western forces who belieeed clvert operations were preferable to all-out conflict with a Soviet antagonust.

The author sums up nis agguiznt thuf: “Pecheps, in the nucleag era, the Constitution has becomx quaint atd obsolete. Few people even comskder, anymore, Oadison’s lap
idiaries of Moscow. Wills is on much when decries the security state’s impact translates to information power,” writes. “Secrecy emanated the Manhattan Project like a giant emission. Anything connected with the Bomb... was, as Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan said, secret.’ It was self-classifying.... And the power of secrecy that enveloped the Bomb a for planning execution of Anything Important, as guarded by Important People. Because the government was the keeper of great secret, it began to specialize in secret It was Moynihan, in who first pointed out that government’s of information, should decreased the Cold War, grew by 62% after the Soviet Union’s implosion. “Accountability is the essence of democracy,” Wills writes. “If do not their government doing, cannot truly self-governing. But Security State assumes that the government’s important to be shared... that only the President all the that we must simply trust that rulers are acting in our interest.” There’s a interesting section on Dwight D. Eisenhower who, Wills argues, never would have given an OK Bay of Pigs invasion, it was planned his Unlike F. Eisenhower insisted a functioning Cuban government in exile be in place before any military action. The author approvingly quotes Murray Kempton’s appraisal of rule: nothing unless you exactly what you will if turns out to have wrong On Wills Eisenhower task for using the to overthrow antagonistic governments in and elsewhere and make in Syria and Indonesia. Perhaps this was a of what Wills calls Ike’s “ruthlessness” or it was the wisdom of a one-time supreme commander of Western forces believed covert preferable to all-out conflict with a Soviet antagonist. author sums up his thus: “Perhaps, in the nuclear era, the Constitution has quaint obsolete. Few even consider, anymore, lap
idiaries of Moscow.

Wills is on Much firmer GrounD whEn hE dEcriEs thE national securITy stAte’s impact on open governMent. “BOmB PoweR TrAnslaTes direCTlY TO inFoRmAtiOn POwEr,” he wRitEs. “SecreCy emanated FroM tHe Manhattan PROjEct like a giAnt Radiation emiSsiOn. AnytHiNg cONnectEd wIth thE Bomb... wAS, as Sen. daniel PatRiCK MoyniHAn said, ‘bORN sEcreT.’ It was self-classifYInG.... and the power of sEcrecy ThAT eNVEloPed The Bomb becAmE a modEL for the PLaNNINg oR Execution of AnYthing ImporTAnt, As guarDeD by iMportaNt PeoPlE. becAuse the goveRnmeNt was the kEeper oF The greaT Secret, iT began To sPecIaliZE iN sEcrEt KEepINg....”

it wAS MoYnihan, in FaCt, Who fiRst pOINTEd ouT thAt thE goveRnment’s classiFicAtioN Of iNformAtion, WhicH sHould Have deCreasEd After the Cold War, ActuAlly grew bY 62% afTeR thE SOviet uNion’s iMplOsiOn. “AccouNtabiliTY is ThE ESSeNce of democracy,” WillS wRITeS. “If peoplE do not KNoW wHAt their gOvErnMent IS Doing, They CAnNot be truLy self-GOvErNing. But ThE NatioNaL SeCurIty StATe asSumes tHat the goVernmENt’s secrets are tOO important to bE ShAREd... THat oNly The PresidenT has ALl thE facTS, tHat WE must SimplY tRUsT That our rulers are actInG in our InterEst.”

There’s a parTicularly iNTEResting sEctiON oN dwight D. EisenhoWer whO, Wills arguES, never woUld haVe given aN OK to the BAY Of Pigs inVasIon, ThoUgh IT WaS planned durinG HIs adMiNistratIon. unlike JOhn f. KeNneDy, EIsEnhower inSisted thAt A fUnCtIonIng CuBAn governMeNt iN eXilE be in PLace beFore aNy coVeRt MIliTary actIOn. tHE autHoR aPproVinGlY quotEs MuRRay kempton’S appraisaL of iKe’s gUiDiNg rule: “DO nothing unlesS yOu know exacTlY whAt you wILL do if it tUrns out to have been the wroNG thing.”

ON thE otheR hanD, Wills takEs EIsenhoWer TO task fOr usinG the CiA To oVERthroW ANtAgoNiStic governMENts In IraN aNd elSewhere And make unsuccessfuL AttEmpts at regime ChaNge iN sYrIa aND INDonEsIA. PeRHAps this was a maniFestation oF wHAt wills calls iKe’s “RuThlessnEss” or peRhaps IT was the Wisdom of a One-time suPrEme cOMManDer of WesteRn forces Who believED coveRT oPeratIonS were pReFerAble tO all-ouT ConFlict With a SOvIet antAgoniSt.

the authoR sums up his argument thus: “PErhaps, In the NucLear era, thE CoNStiTution has BecoMe quaint anD obSolEte. FeW peOPle evEn coNSiDer, ANymorE, MadISon’s lap
idiaries of Moscow.

Wills  is on muc h fir mer  gr ou nd w henhe decries the nati onal security state’simpac to n op e ngover nment.“ Bo m b  po we rtra ns l at es di rec tly toinformatio n p ow er,” he writ e s.  “Secrecyema nated from t heManhat ta n P r oject  li ke agiantr adiati on emissi on .  Anyth i ng conn e c te d wi th the Bomb... wa s ,a s Sen. DanielPatric kM oy n i han  sa id, ‘bornse cret. ’  It was se l f - cla s sifying.... A nd the powe r  of  secre cy  th a t enve loped  t h e B omb becamea mo del for t he pla n ning or executi on ofAny thi ng I m po rt ant ,a s g u ar ded byImportan tPe ople.  Bec a u s e  the  go vern mentwas the keepe r o f th e  gr eat s ecret , it  b eganto spe ciali ze  in secret keep ing. ...”

Itwas  M oyn ih an, i n  fact,  wh o f irst po inted o u t t ha t t he  government’s clas si f i ca tion ofinform a ti on ,  which s ho uld  hav e decre ased af ter theCold W a r,  a ctually  g rew by  6 2%aft er th e  Sov iet Un ion’s im plosi o n. “Accountabi l ity is the es s en c e  o f  dem ocr acy,” Wills  wri t es.“Ifp eo ple do no t kno ww ha t  their government i sdoing,  they  cannot be tr uly self-g o v e rning. B ut t h eN ational Securi ty St ate assume s  that th e gov ernment’ s secrets a re too i mpo rta nttob e  s hared... that o nlyth e Presi den t has a llthe  fa cts ,that we m ust simp ly  t ru st  th at ou r  rulersar e a ct ing  in o u r inte rest. ”

T he re ’ s a  partic u la r l y in te re stin g s ec tionon D w igh t D. Ei senhowerwho ,  Wil ls  a rgues,never would h av e given an  O K t o theB a y of Pig s invasion, though it w a s plann eddurin g hi s adminis tra tion.Unl i ke Joh n F. K enned y,  Ei s e nhowe r in sis te d that a f u n cti oning  C uban  govern ment in exile be i n  pl ace before an y c over t mi lit a ry act io n . T h e  author approvi ngly quote sM ur ray Kempto n ’sap praisal  of Ike ’s gu i ding ru le: “Do n othing un le ss y o u  kn ow exactly  what yo u will do if it tu rns o utto hav ebee n the  wrong thi ng.”
On th eotherhand,  W ills tak es Eisenhower to task f or usi ng th e C IA to ove rth r owantagonis ticgovernment s i n I ran a nde lsewh erea nd  ma k e uns ucce s sful atte m pt s a t re gime change i n  Sy ria a ndI ndones ia.Perhaps this wasa  manifestation  ofw h atWil l s ca ll s Ike’s “ruthl ess ne s s ” or per ha ps it was t he wisdo mo f a o ne-tim e supr eme com m a nd e r of W este rnforces wh o b el i eved co ve rt operat ions  w ere pr eferab l e to a ll-out conflictwitha Sovie t  an tagon is t.

The auth or sums up  his argume nt thu s: “ Perha ps, inth e nucl ear  e ra, the Co n stitution  hasbecomequ aint  an d obso lete . Few p eopl eeve n conside r ,  a n ym or e , M adis on’sla p
idiaries of_Moscow.

Wills is_on much firmer ground_when he_decries_the national_security_state’s impact on_open government. “Bomb_power translates directly to_information power,” he_writes._“Secrecy emanated from the Manhattan Project like a giant radiation emission. Anything connected with_the_Bomb... was,_as_Sen._Daniel Patrick Moynihan said, ‘born_secret.’ It was self-classifying.... And_the power_of secrecy that enveloped the Bomb became a_model_for the planning_or execution of Anything Important, as guarded by Important_People. Because the government was the_keeper of the_great_secret,_it began to specialize_in secret keeping....”

It was Moynihan, in_fact, who first pointed out that_the government’s classification of information, which should_have decreased after the Cold War,_actually grew by 62% after_the Soviet_Union’s implosion. “Accountability is the_essence of democracy,”_Wills writes._“If people do_not know what their government is_doing, they cannot_be truly self-governing. But the National_Security_State assumes that_the_government’s_secrets are_too important to_be_shared... that_only_the President has all the facts,_that_we must simply trust that our rulers_are acting in our_interest.”

There’s_a particularly interesting section_on Dwight D. Eisenhower who,_Wills argues, never would have given_an OK_to the_Bay of Pigs invasion, though it was planned during his administration._Unlike John F. Kennedy, Eisenhower insisted_that a functioning Cuban_government in_exile_be in place_before_any covert_military action. The author approvingly quotes Murray_Kempton’s appraisal_of Ike’s guiding rule: “Do nothing_unless you know exactly_what_you will do if it turns_out to have been the wrong_thing.”

On the other hand, Wills_takes_Eisenhower_to task for using the_CIA to overthrow antagonistic governments in_Iran and elsewhere_and make unsuccessful attempts at regime change_in_Syria and Indonesia. Perhaps this was_a_manifestation of what Wills calls Ike’s_“ruthlessness”_or_perhaps it was the wisdom_of a one-time supreme commander of_Western forces who believed covert operations were preferable to_all-out conflict with_a Soviet antagonist.

The author sums_up_his_argument thus: “Perhaps, in the nuclear era, the Constitution has_become quaint_and obsolete. Few_people even consider, anymore, Madison’s lap