 called “proof of activity”. The idea behind proof of activity is simple: blocks are produced via proof of work, but every block randomly assigns three stakeholders that need to sign it. The next block can only be valid once those signatures are in place. In this system, in theory, an attacker with 10% stake would see 999 of his 1000 blocks not being signed, whereas in the legitimate network 729 out of 1000 blocks would be signed; hence, such an attacker would be penalized in mining by a factor of 729.

However, there is a problem: what motivates signers to sign blocks on only one chain? If the arguments against pure proof of stake are correct, then most rational stake-miners would sign both chains. Hence, in hybrid PoS, if the attacker signs only his chain, and altruists only sign the legitimate chain, and everyone else signs both, then if the attacker can overpower the altruists on the stake front that means that the attacker can overtake the chain with less than a 51% attack on the mining front. If we trust that altruists as a group are more powerful in stake than any attacker, but we don’t trust that too much, then hybrid PoS seems like a reasonable hedge option; however, given the reasoning above, if we want to hybridize one might ask if hybrid PoW + TaPoS might not be the more optimal way to go. For example, one could imagine a system where transactions need to reference recent blocks, and a blockchain’s score is calculated based on proof of work and coin-days-destroyed counts.

Conclusion

Will we see proof of stake emerge as a viable alternative to proof of work in the next few years? It may well be. From a pure efficiency perspective, if Bitcoin, or Ethereum, or any other PoW-based platform get to the point where they have similar market cap to gold, silver, the USD, EUR or CNY, or any other mainstream asset, then over a hundred billion dollars worth of new currency units will be produced per year. Under a pure-PoW regime, an amount of economic power approaching that will be spent on hashing every year. Thus, the cost to society of maintaining a proof-of-work cryptocurrency is about the same as the cost of maintaining the Russian military (the analogy is particularly potent because militaries are also proof of work; their only value to anyone is protecting against other militaries). Under hybrid-PoS
called “ proof of activity ”. The idea behind validation of natural process is simple: blocks are produce via validation of work, but every block randomly assigns three stakeholder that want to sign it. The following block can only be valid once those key signature are in place. In this system, in hypothesis, an attacker with 10% stake would see 999 of his 1000 blocks not being signed, whereas in the legitimate network 729 out of 1000 blocks would be sign; hence, such an attacker would be penalized in mining by a factor of 729. 

 However, there exist a problem: what motivates signers to sign block on only one chain? If the arguments against pure proof of interest are correct, then most rational stake - miners would sign both chains. Hence, in hybrid PoS, if the attacker signs only his chain, and altruists only sign the legitimate chain, and everyone else signs both, then if the attacker can overpower the philanthropist on the interest front that mean that the attacker can overtake the chain with less than a 51% attack on the mining front. If we entrust that altruists as a group are more powerful in stake than any attacker, but we do n’t trust that excessively much, then hybrid PoS seems like a reasonable hedge option; however, given the reasoning above, if we want to hybridize one might necessitate if hybrid PoW + TaPoS might not be the more optimal way to go. For example, one could imagine a system where transactions necessitate to reference recent blocks, and a blockchain ’s score is calculated based on validation of work and coin - days - destroyed counts. 

 Conclusion 

 Will we see proof of stake emerge as a viable alternative to validation of work in the next few years? It may well be. From a pure efficiency perspective, if Bitcoin, or Ethereum, or any early PoW - based platform get to the point where they suffer similar grocery store cap to gold, silver medal, the USD, EUR or CNY, or any early mainstream asset, then over a hundred billion dollars worth of new currentness units will be produced per year. Under a pure - PoW regimen, an sum of economic power approaching that will be spend on hashing every year. Thus, the cost to society of maintaining a proof - of - oeuvre cryptocurrency is about the same as the cost of maintaining the Russian military (the analogy is particularly potent because military are also proof of employment; their only value to anyone is protecting against other militaries). Under hybrid - PoS
 capled “proof of activity”. Tme idea behind ptoif of ectivitg is simole: blocks are produced via 'rood of qork, but every block rxndomly adsigns tyree wtakeholdeca that kzed tk sigu mt. The next blogk can only be valid once tfode signatures are in place. In this fystem, on theory, an attwckeg rith 10% stake would see 999 of his 1000 blocks hot beiig signed, wheress in the legitimate netwogk 729 lut of 1000 blocks woupd be signee; hegxe, such an agtacker wolnd be penamized in mining by a factor of 729.

Fowevzr, there is a prltlem: what mitivanes signers to sign bnocks om only one chaln? If thw arguments against pnre proof of stake ate correct, tken most rational staje-ninerv wogld rugn bouh rhajns. Hejce, in hybrid PoS, if the attacker signs onlu rpx chain, and zltruiftf only sign the legitimate chain, and evtryons else signs both, then uf the attacker can ogerpower ehe altruists on the stake front that means that dhe avtxcktr can ucegtake the chain with less than a 51% attack on trs kiking front. If we trust that apttoists as a groop are mors powerful in stakf than wny artacker, btt wr don’t trust that too much, rhen hybrid IoS weems like a reasouable hedge uptipn; hoeever, given the reasoniug abobe, if we wajt to hybdkdize one might xsk ix hybrid PoW + TaPoS might got be thx morz optimau wai to go. For examppe, onc could imagine a sjstem wvere transwctions need to reference recenv blocks, and s tlobkchain’s fcore is calculateq based on propf of wjrk avd coin-daya-destrobed counts.

Cogclusion

Will fg see proof oh stake eiergw as a viabud alternative yo proof of work in the next few yearx? Ij jay well be. Fron a pure efficiencu pdrs[ebtite, if Titcoin, or Edherdum, pr anh other PoW-nasdd pkatform get to the pmint where they have somllar markgt cap to gold, silver, yhe USD, EUR or CNY, or aiy othxr maimstteam asset, then over a hundred gillion dlllwrs worth of new currency unnts will be produced per year. Under a puce-PoW regime, an amount if economic power akprpaching thav will be spent on hashing every yeqr. Thus, the cost uo society of maintainihg a psoof-ov-work cryptocurrency is about the same as the cost of maintaining the Ruswian mmlytary (the ahaloby is pcrtncularlr poveit because militagies are also proof of work; theic only valge to anyone is protecting agaonrt other milijaries). Under hybrid-PoS
called “proof of activity”. The idea behind activity simple: blocks produced via proof randomly three stakeholders that to sign it. next block can only be valid those signatures are in place. In this system, in theory, an attacker with stake would see 999 of his 1000 blocks not being signed, whereas in legitimate 729 of blocks would be signed; hence, such an attacker would be penalized in mining by a factor 729. However, there is a problem: what motivates to sign blocks on one chain? If the arguments pure of stake correct, most stake-miners would sign chains. Hence, in hybrid PoS, if the attacker signs only his chain, and altruists only sign the chain, and signs both, if attacker overpower the altruists stake front that means that the the chain with less than a 51% attack the mining If we trust that altruists as group are more powerful in stake than any but we don’t trust that too much, then hybrid PoS seems like a reasonable hedge given the reasoning above, we want to one ask hybrid + TaPoS not be the more optimal way to go. For example, one imagine a system where transactions need to reference recent blocks, blockchain’s is calculated based proof of work and counts. Will we see proof emerge a proof work the next few years? may well be. From a efficiency perspective, if Bitcoin, PoW-based platform get to the point where they similar market cap to gold, silver, the EUR or CNY, or any other mainstream asset, then over a hundred dollars worth currency units will be produced per year. Under pure-PoW regime, an amount economic power approaching that will be spent on hashing year. the cost society of maintaining proof-of-work cryptocurrency is the same as of maintaining Russian (the potent because militaries are also proof work; only value to anyone is against Under hybrid-PoS
 called “proof of activity”. The iDea behind pRoof oF acTivItY is sImplE: blocks are prodUCed vIa proof of work, but every bLock rAnDOmly ASsIgns tHree staKEhOLDerS tHaT neEd TO sIgn it. the Next bloCk can only bE vaLiD once those siGNaTures are in PlaCe. In this systEm, iN theorY, aN atTAcker WitH 10% stakE would SEe 999 of hiS 1000 blocks noT bEIng sigNEd, whereAS In The lEgitimate network 729 oUT oF 1000 Blocks would be sIgned; hEnCE, sUCH an AttAcker would Be PenalIZed in miNInG BY A faCTor of 729.

However, tHere is a probLEm: wHat motIvAteS SignerS to siGn BLocKs on only one ChaiN? If the argUments AGainst pURe proof Of stakE arE coRrecT, ThEn MosT rATioNAl StaKE-miNers woulD sIgN both ChaiNS. hENce, iN hyBrid poS, if The attacker siGns Only HIs cHain, aNd altRuisTs Only sIgn the LegitImAte chain, and everYone Else signs BotH, tHen If The atTAcker cAn oVerPower thE altruiSTs oN tHE STaKe front that means thAt THE aTtacker cAn overTAkE tHE chain wiTh LesS thaN A 51% AttacK on tHE mIning froNt. If we TRuSt That altRuIsts as A gRouP arE more POwerFul in sTake than Any atTAcker, but we don’t TRust that too muCH, tHEN hYBrid poS Seems like a rEasoNAble HedgE OpTioN; HowevEr, givEn THe REasoning above, if we waNt To hybrIdize One might ask if Hybrid PoW + TApOs might noT be tHE mORe optimal way to Go. For Example, one COuld imagIne a sYstem wheRe transacTIOns need tO reFerEncE reCENt Blocks, and a bloCKChaiN’s Score is CalCulated BasEd oN prOof Of Work and coIn-days-deStRoYeD cOunTs.

ConCLusion

WiLl We sEe ProOf of sTAke emeRge as A viaBlE aLTerNative tO PrOOF of wOrK iN the NexT fEw yeaRs? It MAy wEll be. FrOm a pure efFicIEncy PeRsPective, If Bitcoin, or EtHeReum, or any oThEr POW-baseD PLatform gEt to the point where they haVE similaR maRket cAp to Gold, silveR, thE USD, EUr or cnY, or anY other MainsTrEam ASSet, thEN OvEr a HuNdred billiON DolLars wOrTh of New currEncy units will be proDUceD per year. Under A puRe-Pow REgIme, AN aMOunT oF EcoNOMic power approacHing that wiLl BE sPent on hashINg eVeRy year. THus, the cOst to SOciety oF maintainIng a proof-Of-Work CRYptOcurrency iS about thE same as thE Cost oF MaIntaiNinG the RuSsIan MilitAry (the ANalOgy is ParticUlArly poTent bEcAuse miliTaries are also proof of worK; their Only vAluE to anyone Is pROteCting agaiNst oTher militaRieS). UnDer hyBriD-poS
 called “proof of activity ”. The ide a beh ind  pr oo f of  act ivity is simpl e : bl ocks are produced viaproof  o f  wor k ,but e very bl o ck r and om ly  as si g ns  thre e s takehol ders thatnee dto sign it.T he  next bloc k c an only be v ali d once  t hos e  sign atu res a re inp lace.In this s ys t em, in theory, a natta cker with 10% sta k ew ould see 999 o f his10 0 0b l ock s n ot being s ig ned,w hereasi nt h e  le g itimate netwo rk 729 outo f 1 000 bl oc ksw ould b e sig ne d ; h ence, suchan a ttacker w ould b e  penali z ed in m iningbya f acto r  o f729 .How e ve r,t her e is a p ro bl em: w hatm o t i vate s s igne rs to  sign blocksononly one  chai n? If  the  a rgume nts ag ainst  p ure proof of st akeare corre ct,  t hen  m ost r a tional  st ake -miners  woulds ign  b o t h  c hains. Hence, in h yb r i dPoS, ifthe at t ac ke r  signs o nl y h is c h a in, a nd a l tr uists on ly sig n  t he  legiti ma te cha in , a ndevery o ne e lse si gns both , the n  if the attack e r can overpow e rt h ea ltru ist s on the st akef ront  tha t  m ean s  that  theat t ac k er can overtake the  c hain w ith l ess than a 51 % attack o n t he minin g fr o nt .  If we trust t hat a ltruists a s  a group  aremore pow erful ins t ake than  an y a tta cke r ,  b ut we don’t t r u st t ha t too m uch , thenhyb rid  Po S s ee ms like a  reasona bl ehe dg e o ption ;  however ,giv en  th e rea s oningabove , if  w ew ant  to hyb r id i z e on emi ghtask  i f hyb ridP oW+ TaPoS  might no t b e  the  m or e optim al way to go.  F or example ,one  could i magine a  system where transacti o ns need  to  refe renc e recentblo cks, a nda  block chain’ s sco re  is c alcul a t ed  ba se d on proof o f w ork a nd  coi n-days- destroyed counts.Con clusion

Will  we  see p ro ofo fs tak ee mer g e  as a viable al ternativeto pr oof of wor k  in  t he next  few ye ars?I t may w ell be. F rom a pur eeffi c i enc y perspect ive, ifBitcoin,o r Eth e re um, o r a ny oth er  Po W-bas ed pla t for m get  to th epointwhere  t hey have  similar market cap togold,silve r,the USD,EUR orCNY, or a ny o ther mains tre amasset , t h en ov er a hu ndr e d bil lion dollars w o rt h o f ne w currencyu n i tswillbep roduce d pe r year. Under a p u re-PoW regime,  ana m oun t o f  eco no mic power appr oac hi n g  that wi ll  be spent o n hashin ge veryyear.Thus,the cos t to societ y of  ma intaining  apr o of-of-w or kc ryptoc urre nc y is a bout t h e sa m e  as the cost ofmaint a i ningt heRussi an  milita r y (t he analogy  is particu larlypote nt be cause m il itarie s a re  also proo f  of work;  thei r onlyva luetoanyone  isp r otect ingag ain st otherm i li t ar ie s ).Unde r hyb ri d-Po S
 called_“proof of_activity”. The idea behind_proof of_activity_is simple:_blocks_are produced via_proof of work,_but every block randomly_assigns three stakeholders_that_need to sign it. The next block can only be valid once those signatures_are_in place._In_this_system, in theory, an attacker_with 10% stake would see_999 of_his 1000 blocks not being signed, whereas in_the_legitimate network 729_out of 1000 blocks would be signed; hence, such_an attacker would be penalized in_mining by a_factor_of_729.

However, there is a_problem: what motivates signers to sign_blocks on only one chain? If_the arguments against pure proof of stake_are correct, then most rational stake-miners_would sign both chains. Hence,_in hybrid_PoS, if the attacker signs_only his chain,_and altruists_only sign the_legitimate chain, and everyone else signs_both, then if_the attacker can overpower the altruists_on_the stake front_that_means_that the_attacker can overtake_the_chain with_less_than a 51% attack on the_mining_front. If we trust that altruists as_a group are more_powerful_in stake than any_attacker, but we don’t trust_that too much, then hybrid PoS_seems like_a reasonable_hedge option; however, given the reasoning above, if we want to_hybridize one might ask if hybrid_PoW + TaPoS might_not be_the_more optimal way_to_go. For_example, one could imagine a system where_transactions need_to reference recent blocks, and a_blockchain’s score is calculated_based_on proof of work and coin-days-destroyed_counts.

Conclusion

Will we see proof of stake_emerge as a viable alternative_to_proof_of work in the next_few years? It may well be._From a pure_efficiency perspective, if Bitcoin, or Ethereum, or_any_other PoW-based platform get to the_point_where they have similar market cap_to_gold,_silver, the USD, EUR or_CNY, or any other mainstream asset,_then over a hundred billion dollars worth of new_currency units will_be produced per year. Under_a_pure-PoW_regime, an amount of economic power approaching that will be_spent on_hashing every year._Thus, the cost to society of maintaining a proof-of-work cryptocurrency_is about the same as the cost_of maintaining the Russian military (the analogy is particularly potent because_militaries are also proof of work; their only_value to anyone is protecting against other_militaries). Under hybrid-PoS