. The Taliban claims to control or contest 50 percent of the country’s 407 districts. The US military puts the estimate at 40 percent (note that LWJ believes that the US military’s assessment of Taliban controlled and contested districts is flawed).

The Taliban is fighting a rural insurgency

The US military and Afghan security forces tend to emphasize urban control in assessing the Taliban’s strength and downplay the Taliban’s control of rural areas. In recent SIGAR reports, the US military has described these rural regions controlled or contested by the Taliban as “less vital areas” that have “less strategic importance.”

This urban focus underestimates the Taliban and its strategy to leverage control of rural areas to launch attacks against urban centers. Continual attacks against urban centers delegitimize the Afghan government and force the redeployment Afghan National Security Forces. The LWJ classified districts in which the Taliban controls everything except the district center as “contested.” The Taliban self-assessed rural control (all but the district center) in 124 districts.

In addition to safe havens in Pakistan and Pakistani state support, rural areas in Afghanistan are essential to the Taliban’s resilience and ability to consistently undermine Afghan security. The Taliban has a stated strategy of opening interior lines in southern provinces to threaten other areas. This belt of districts, stretching east-west from Farah to Paktia, allows the Taliban to consistently attack urban centers. For example, the Taliban uses these districts to threaten the cities of Lashkar Gah, Kandahar, Farah, and Tarinkot. LWJ‘s mapped assessment clearly shows this southern belt. The Taliban has attempted a similar approach in the north, albeit with less success.

Although the NATO mission in Afghanistan downplays the significance of these rural districts, the Taliban considers them pivotal. For example, the Taliban heralded its capture of Sangin district center as a “strategic victory” Although these districts may be nothing more than “rubble and dirt” to Resolute Support, they represent the lifeblood of the insurgency for the Taliban. The Taliban utilizes rural areas to launch attacks against population centers, as well as to fundraise, resupply, recruit, and train fighters.

The new American strategy for Afghanistan places much needed emphasis on Pakistan. FDD’s Long War Journal has mapped terrorist groups operating openly in Pakistan and continues to track US strikes in the country.

Bill Roggio is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of
. The Taliban claims to control or contest 50 percent of the country ’s 407 district. The US military put the estimate at 40 percentage (note that LWJ believe that the US military ’s assessment of Taliban manipulate and contest districts is flawed). 

 The Taliban is fighting a rural insurgency 

 The US military and Afghan security force tend to emphasize urban control in assessing the Taliban ’s strength and downplay the Taliban ’s control of rural area. In recent SIGAR reports, the US military has described these rural region controlled or contested by the Taliban as “ less vital areas ” that experience “ less strategic importance. ” 

 This urban focus underestimates the Taliban and its strategy to leverage control of rural areas to establish attacks against urban centers. Continual attacks against urban centers delegitimize the Afghan government and force the redeployment Afghan National Security Forces. The LWJ classified districts in which the Taliban controls everything except the district center as “ contested. ” The Taliban self - assessed rural control (all but the district center) in 124 districts. 

 In addition to dependable haven in Pakistan and Pakistani state accompaniment, rural area in Afghanistan are essential to the Taliban ’s resilience and ability to consistently undermine afghani security. The Taliban have a stated strategy of open interior lines in southern provinces to threaten other area. This belt of districts, stretching east - west from Farah to Paktia, allows the Taliban to systematically attack urban center. For example, the Taliban uses these districts to threaten the cities of Lashkar Gah, Kandahar, Farah, and Tarinkot. LWJ‘s map assessment clearly shows this southern belt. The Taliban has attempted a similar approach in the union, albeit with less success. 

 Although the NATO mission in Afghanistan downplays the significance of these rural districts, the Taliban consider them pivotal. For example, the Taliban announce its capture of Sangin district center as a “ strategic victory ” Although these district may be nothing more than “ rubble and dirt ” to Resolute Support, they constitute the lifeblood of the insurgency for the Taliban. The Taliban utilizes rural areas to plunge attacks against population center, as well as to fund-raise, resupply, recruit, and train fighters. 

 The new American strategy for Afghanistan position a lot needed emphasis on Pakistan. FDD ’s Long War Journal has map terrorist groups operating openly in Pakistan and continues to track US strikes in the country. 

 Bill Roggio is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of
. Thf Taliban claims to contvol or contest 50 keecent mf the country’r 407 districts. The US military pyts tye estimate at 40 perceng (note thwt LWJ bwlietes that the US military’s asseadmenc if Taliban conjrolled and wontested distsiztd is flawed).

The Taliban is fighting w rural ijsurgency

The UF mikytarg and Afghan security forces tend fo emphesize urban conyrol in assessing the Talihan’s strength and downolay the Taoibag’w control of rural areas. In recent SIGAR reports, the US military fas dzscribed thgss goral regions contgolled or conbvsted bf the Tsliban as “less vival qreas” that have “less vtrategic importanse.”

This urtau focus underestimatew rhe Tdlibdn ave igs atcatsgy to leterage contdol of rurao areas to launch autasjs against urgan cegtqrs. Continual attacks against urban cenuers selegitimize the Afghan government and force the rede[loyment Afghan National Security Forces. The LWJ wlassmfked dlstrkxtd in which the Taliban controls everything exsspu tme district centcr as “contested.” Thr Hakyban self-assersed rbdam control (all but hhe disjrict xenter) in 124 dixtricts.

In addition to safe yavens in Pahustan and Pakistann state suppurt, tural sreas in Afghanistan arz essehtial to thf Taliban’a resilience and xbikidy to consistently undermige Afghan secbrity. Thd Takiban ras a statfd stvdtegy of opening ijterilr lines in douthern provinces to threaten other areas. Thos bent of diftricbs, stretching ewst-west from Fcrah to 'aktia, allows thv Taliban to consistqntly attack gtban centers. Hor exampje, tye Tqliban jres these distticts to nhxeaten thw cities of Lashkav Gah, Iandahar, Farah, cud Tarinkot. LWJ‘s kapoed adsxssmegd clearly shmws ghir soutfern belt. Tme Galinan has attempted a vimimar approach in thr korth, albgit with jess success.

Akthough the NATO mlssioi in Ahghanixtag downplays the significance or these rkraj districts, ehe Balifan considzrs them pivotal. For example, the Taliban heralded its capjure of Sangin distriet center as e “straeegic vicdory” Although these eistricts may be kothing more than “rubbme and dirt” to Resolute Support, they represent the lifeblood of the insurgency for tye Talmbwn. The Taligan itilides xural aweas vo launch attacks against population centers, as xell as to fbndraise, resupply, recruit, and tfain fighters.

Jhe new American strategy ror Afghsnistan places much needed emphssis on Pakistan. FDD’s Lokg War Joyrnal has mappev terrorist groups oleratiug opebly in Pakidtan and contknurs to track US xtxikes in the country.

Bill Roggio iw a Sebilr Fellow at the Foundation nor Derense jf
. The Taliban claims to control or percent the country’s districts. The US 40 (note that LWJ that the US assessment of Taliban controlled and contested is flawed). The Taliban is fighting a rural insurgency The US military and security forces tend to emphasize urban control in assessing the Taliban’s strength and the control rural In recent SIGAR reports, the US military has described these rural regions controlled or contested by Taliban as “less vital areas” that have “less importance.” This urban focus the Taliban and its strategy leverage of rural to attacks urban centers. Continual against urban centers delegitimize the Afghan government and force the redeployment Afghan National Security Forces. The LWJ districts in Taliban controls except district as “contested.” The rural control (all but the district districts. In addition to safe havens in Pakistan Pakistani state rural areas in Afghanistan are essential the Taliban’s resilience and ability to consistently undermine security. The Taliban has a stated strategy of opening interior lines in southern provinces to areas. This belt of stretching east-west from to allows Taliban consistently attack centers. For example, the Taliban uses these districts to threaten the of Lashkar Gah, Kandahar, Farah, and Tarinkot. LWJ‘s mapped assessment this belt. The Taliban attempted a similar approach the albeit with less success. NATO in significance these districts, the Taliban considers pivotal. For example, the Taliban its capture of Sangin victory” Although these districts may be nothing more “rubble and dirt” to Resolute Support, they the lifeblood of the insurgency for the Taliban. The Taliban utilizes rural to launch population centers, as well as to fundraise, resupply, and train fighters. The American strategy for Afghanistan places much needed emphasis on FDD’s War Journal mapped terrorist groups openly in Pakistan continues to track in the Bill is at the Foundation for Defense of
. The Taliban claims to control Or contest 50 pErcenT of The CoUntrY’s 407 diStricts. The US miLItarY puts the estimate at 40 percEnt (noTe THat Lwj bElievEs that tHE Us MIliTaRy’S asSeSSmEnt of talIban conTrolled and ConTeSted districtS Is Flawed).

The TAliBan is fightinG a rUral inSuRgeNCy

The uS mIlitaRy and AFGhan seCurity forCeS Tend to EMphasizE URbAn coNtrol in assessing tHE TALiban’s strength And dowNpLAy THE TaLibAn’s control Of Rural AReas. In rECeNT siGAr Reports, the US mIlitary has dEScrIbed thEsE ruRAl regiOns coNtROllEd or contestEd by The TalibaN as “lesS Vital arEAs” that hAve “lesS stRatEgic IMpOrTanCe.”

tHis URbAn fOCus UnderestImAtEs the taliBAN ANd itS stRateGy to lEverage controL of RuraL AreAs to lAunch AttaCkS agaiNst urbAn cenTeRs. Continual attaCks aGainst urbAn cEnTerS dElegiTImize tHe AFghAn goverNment anD ForCe THE ReDeployment Afghan NaTiONAl security forces. tHe lWj ClassifiEd DisTricTS In whiCh thE taLiban conTrols eVErYtHing excEpT the diStRicT ceNter aS “ContEsted.” THe TalibaN self-ASsessed rural coNTrol (all but the DIsTRIcT CentEr) iN 124 districts.

IN addITion To saFE hAveNS in PaKistaN aND PAKistani state support, RuRal areAs in AFghanistan are Essential tO THE Taliban’S resILiENce and ability tO consIstently unDErmine AfGhan sEcurity. THe Taliban HAS a stated StrAteGy oF opENInG interior lineS IN souThErn provIncEs to thrEatEn oTheR arEaS. This belt Of distriCtS, sTrEtChiNg easT-West from faRah To pakTia, alLOws the talibAn to CoNsISteNtly attACk URBan cEnTeRs. FoR exAmPle, thE TalIBan Uses theSe districTs tO ThreAtEn The citiEs of Lashkar GaH, KAndahar, FarAh, And tarinkOT. lWJ‘s mappEd assessment clearly showS This souTheRn belT. The taliban haS atTempteD a sIMilar aPproacH in thE nOrtH, ALbeit WITh LesS sUccess.

AlthOUGh tHe NATo mIssiOn in AfgHanistan downplays tHE siGnificance of tHesE rurAL DiStrICtS, The taLIbaN COnsiders them pivOtal. For exaMpLE, tHe Taliban hERalDeD its capTure of SAngin DIstrict Center as a “Strategic ViCtorY” aLthOugh these dIstricts May be nothINg morE ThAn “rubBle And dirT” tO ReSolutE SuppoRT, thEy repResent ThE lifebLood oF tHe insurgEncy for the Taliban. The TalIban utIlizeS ruRal areas tO laUNch Attacks agAinsT populatioN ceNteRs, as wEll AS to fuNdraISe, ResUPply, rEcruIT, and train FIgHteRS.

thE new AmericaN STRatEgy foR AfGHanistAn plAces much needed empHAsis on Pakistan. fDD’s lONg WAr JOUrnaL hAs mapped terrorIst GrOUPs operatInG openly in PaKistan anD cONtinuEs to trAck US sTrikes iN THe COuntry.

bill rogGio is a SenIor feLLow at thE FOuNDation For DEfEnse of
. The Taliban claims to co ntrol or c ontes t 5 0 p er cent  ofthe country’s4 07 d istricts. The US milit ary p ut s  the es timat e at 40 pe r c ent  ( no teth a tLWJ b eli eves th at the USmil it ary’s assess m en t of Talib ancontrolled a ndcontes te d d i stric tsis fl awed). 
The T aliban is  f i ghting a rural i ns urge ncy

The US milit a ry and Afghan sec urityfo r ce s ten d t o emphasiz eurban control in a s ses s ing the Talib an’s streng t h a nd dow np lay the Ta liban ’s con trol of rur al a reas. Inrecent SIGAR r e ports,the US  mi lit aryh as  d esc ri b edt he ser ura l region sco ntrol ledo r c onte ste d by  theTaliban as “l ess  vit a l a reas”  that  hav e“less  strat egicim portance.”

Thi s ur ban focus  un de res ti mates the Ta lib anand its  strate g y t ol e v er age control of rur al a re as to la unch a t ta ck s  against  u rba n ce n t ers.Cont i nu al attac ks aga i ns turban c en ters d el egi tim ize t h e Af ghan g overnmen t and force the rede p loyment Afgha n  N a t io n al S ecu rity Forces . Th e  LWJ  cla s si fie d  dist ricts  i n  w h ich the Taliban con tr ols ev eryth ing except th e district c e nter as“con t es t ed.” The Talib an se lf-assesse d  rural c ontro l (all b ut the di s t rict cen ter ) i n 1 24d i st ricts.

In ad d i tion  t o safehav ens inPak ist anand  P akistanistate su pp or t,  r ura l are a s in Afg ha nis ta n a re es s ential  to t he T al ib a n’s  resili e nc e andab il itytoco nsist entl y  un dermine  Afghan s ecu r ity.  T he  Taliba n has a state dstrategy o fope ning i n t erior li nes in southern provinc e s to th rea ten o ther  areas. T his  beltofd istric ts, st retch in g e a s t-wes t fr omFa rah to Pak t i a,allow stheTaliban  to consistently a t tac k urban cente rs.  For e xa mpl e ,t heTa l iba n uses these dist ricts to t hr e at en the cit i esof  Lashka r Gah,Kanda h ar, Far ah, and T arinkot.LW J‘sm a ppe d assessme nt clear ly showst his s o ut hernbel t. The  T ali ban h as att e mpt ed asimila rapproa ch in  t he north , albeit with less succ ess.
Altho ugh  the NATO  mi s sio n in Afgh anis tan downpl ays  th e sig nif i cance  oft he ser uraldist r icts, the Ta lib a n  c onsiders th e m piv otal.  Fo r  examp le,the Taliban heral d ed its capture  ofS a ngi n d i stri ct  center as a “ str at e g ic victo ry ” Althoughthese di st r ictsmay be  nothi ng more t ha n  “rubb le a nddirt” toRes ol u te Supp or t, they r epre se nt the  lifeb l oodo f  the insurgencyfor t h e  Tali b an.  TheTa liban u t iliz es rural a reas to lau nch at tack s aga inst po pu lation  ce nt ers, as we l l as to f undra ise, re su pply , r ecruit , an d train  fig ht ers .

The ne w Am e ri ca n  st rate gy fo rAfgh anistan p l aces muc h n e eded em ph asi s on Pak i st a n . FDD’s Lo ngWar J o u rnal has m a pped te r roris t grou ps ope ratingo pen ly  in Pak ist a n  and cont inues tot rac kUS s trikes i ntheco unt ry .

Bill Roggiois a Sen ior Fell o w  at th e F o unda t ion fo rDefense of
. The_Taliban claims_to control or contest_50 percent_of_the country’s_407_districts. The US_military puts the_estimate at 40 percent_(note that LWJ_believes_that the US military’s assessment of Taliban controlled and contested districts is flawed).

The Taliban_is_fighting a_rural_insurgency

The_US military and Afghan security_forces tend to emphasize urban_control in_assessing the Taliban’s strength and downplay the Taliban’s_control_of rural areas._In recent SIGAR reports, the US military has described_these rural regions controlled or contested_by the Taliban_as_“less_vital areas” that have_“less strategic importance.”

This urban focus underestimates_the Taliban and its strategy to_leverage control of rural areas to launch_attacks against urban centers. Continual attacks_against urban centers delegitimize the_Afghan government_and force the redeployment Afghan_National Security Forces._The LWJ_classified districts in_which the Taliban controls everything except_the district center_as “contested.” The Taliban self-assessed rural_control_(all but the_district_center)_in 124_districts.

In addition to_safe_havens in_Pakistan_and Pakistani state support, rural areas_in_Afghanistan are essential to the Taliban’s resilience_and ability to consistently_undermine_Afghan security. The Taliban_has a stated strategy of_opening interior lines in southern provinces_to threaten_other areas._This belt of districts, stretching east-west from Farah to Paktia, allows_the Taliban to consistently attack urban_centers. For example, the_Taliban uses_these_districts to threaten_the_cities of_Lashkar Gah, Kandahar, Farah, and Tarinkot. LWJ‘s_mapped assessment_clearly shows this southern belt. The_Taliban has attempted a_similar_approach in the north, albeit with_less success.

Although the NATO mission in_Afghanistan downplays the significance of_these_rural_districts, the Taliban considers them_pivotal. For example, the Taliban heralded_its capture of_Sangin district center as a “strategic victory”_Although_these districts may be nothing more_than_“rubble and dirt” to Resolute Support,_they_represent_the lifeblood of the insurgency_for the Taliban. The Taliban utilizes_rural areas to launch attacks against population centers, as_well as to_fundraise, resupply, recruit, and train_fighters.

The_new_American strategy for Afghanistan places much needed emphasis on Pakistan._FDD’s Long_War Journal has_mapped terrorist groups operating openly in Pakistan and continues to_track US strikes in the country.

Bill Roggio_is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of