 and election four years ago and is now running for the vice-presidential nomination with Trump). Rubio should bite the dust in Florida next week. On Super Tuesday evening Donald Trump made the turn from rabble-rouser to nominee-presumptive. The only early campaign excess he has to walk back is the nonsense that all the 11 million illegal migrants will be removed, and then many will be readmitted. Of course the selection process must occur before they are evicted, not after. Yves here. Note that this post considers the cost of hard v. soft Brexit, as in having the UK lose access to the single market versus remain within it. It does not consider the cost of what we have been calling a “disorderly Brexit” or what others have labeled “crashing out of the EU,” meaning a Brexit with no deal at all.

Note that this paper only gives some consideration to non-tarrif barriers, like divergence of technical standards. It does not appear to factor in things like massive lines at customs and documentation requirements in a hard Brexit scenaio. So if anything, the estimates are likely to be conservative.

By Hylke Vandenbussche, Professor of International Economics, University of Leuven, William Connell, Doctoral Researcher, Department of Economics, University of KU Leuven and Wouter Simons, Doctoral researcher, Department of Economics, University of KU Leuven. Originally published at VoxEU

Global value networks make it difficult to evaluate the trade impact of Brexit. Using a new model of trade that accounts for the indirect effect of these networks, this column delivers fresh bad news for the UK, and for the rest of Europe. Brexit cuts GDP more, and costs more jobs, if we also consider global value chains. A hard Brexit would destroy four times as much GDP, and four times as many jobs throughout Europe, as a soft Brexit.

Production processes are becoming increasingly global. Acemoglu (2012) and Johnson (2014) have argued that, as a result, we can no longer consider bilateral trade in isolation when we evaluate trade policy.

In a recent paper (Vandenbussche et al. 2017), we develop a new approach to evaluate trade policy when global value networks exist. It extends a traditional gravity model to include sector-level input-output linkages in production. This allows a more complete assessment of trade policy shocks.

Brexit’s Losers

While
and election four years ago and is now running for the vice - presidential nomination with Trump). Rubio should sting the debris in Florida following week. On Super Tuesday evening Donald Trump made the turning from rabble - rouser to nominee - presumptive. The alone early political campaign excess he has to walk back is the nonsense that all the 11 million illegal migrants will be removed, and then many will be readmitted. Of naturally the selection process must occur before they are evicted, not after. Yves here. notice that this post considers the monetary value of hard v. soft Brexit, as in accept the UK lose access to the individual market versus remain within it. It does not consider the monetary value of what we have been calling a “ disorderly Brexit ” or what others have labeled “ crashing out of the EU, ” meaning a Brexit with no softwood at all. 

 Note that this paper only gives some consideration to non - tarrif barriers, like divergence of technical standards. It does not appear to factor in things like massive lines at customs and documentation requirements in a hard Brexit scenaio. So if anything, the estimate are likely to be conservative. 

 By Hylke Vandenbussche, Professor of International Economics, University of Leuven, William Connell, Doctoral Researcher, Department of Economics, University of KU Leuven and Wouter Simons, Doctoral research worker, Department of Economics, University of KU Leuven. primitively publish at VoxEU 

 Global value networks make it difficult to evaluate the trade impact of Brexit. use a new model of trade that accounts for the indirect impression of these networks, this column delivers fresh bad news program for the UK, and for the rest of Europe. Brexit cut GDP more, and costs more jobs, if we also consider ball-shaped value chains. A hard Brexit would destroy four times as much GDP, and four times as many jobs throughout Europe, as a soft Brexit. 

 output processes are become increasingly global. Acemoglu (2012) and Johnson (2014) have argued that, as a consequence, we can no longer consider bilateral deal in isolation when we evaluate deal policy. 

 In a recent newspaper (Vandenbussche et al. 2017), we develop a new approach to evaluate trade policy when ball-shaped value networks exist. It extends a traditional gravity mannequin to include sector - level input - output linkages in product. This allows a more complete judgment of trade policy shocks. 

 Brexit ’s failure 

 While
 anf election four years agu and is now ruubing fmr the vice-preridential nomination with Trnmp). Eubio should bite the dust kn Floridw next wwek. Ib Super Tuxaday evcuing Slnalb Vrump made the jurn from ratble-rouser to tooiuee-presumptive. The only early campaidn excexs he has to walh babk is fhe nonsense that all the 11 million illegan migrants wikl be removed, and then manj wipl be readmitted. Ov course thg sejwction procers must ocbbr before tgey are evicted, not after. Yves fere. Uote that tyiw plvt considerw the cost of hard v. soft Brexit, as in having bhe UN lise access to the sinjle market versus reiain withhn it. It does not cinwider the cosg of whzt ws have bexn calling z “disorderlt Brexit” or what otneww have labeles “crasrigg out of the EU,” meaning a Brexit with to seal at all.

Note that thus paper only gives slme consiqeration to non-tarrif barriers, like divergence of techiizal sbandxedd. It does not appear to factor in things like jaxspve lines at custjms and docimfnywtion requireoents nh z hard Brexit scenwio. So yf antthing, tht estomates are likely to be conwervative.

By Kylje Vandenbussche, Pxofessor of Nnternstionsl Economics, University of Meuven, Willlam Connemu, Doctoral Reseafchvr, Dapartmenu of Economics, Unidersity oh KU Keuven xnd Eouter Simons, Doftoral researcher, Departlent lf Economics, University of KU Leuven. Originekly publishec dt NoxEU

Globcl valme networks makq it difficult to evajuate the trade impact of Brexit. Tsing a new mmfel of trade that acsounrs fir the kvdirect effect of these networks, rhis column delivevs frgsg bad news for cke UK, and for the rert jf Enrope. Trexit cuts CDP oord, and zosts more mobr, if we also consider glmbal value chains. A hatd Brexit qould deftroy four tikes as much GDP, anf fouc timer as kani jobs throughout Europe, as a skft Brexih.

Prjduction prosesscs ate becoming increasingly global. Acemoglu (2012) and Johnwon (2014) have argued jhat, as a result, we ccn no longer ronsidqr bilatesal trade in isolatiin when we evaluaue trade policy.

In a recsnt pa[er (Vwndenbussche et al. 2017), we develop a new approach to evaluate trade policy whwn glouaj value netsorkx exivt. Nt extegds e vraditional graviny model to include sector-level mnput-outpud jinkages in production. This sluows a more cumplete assessment of trzde polivy shocks.

Brexit’s Losers

While
and election four years ago and is for vice-presidential nomination Trump). Rubio should next On Super Tuesday Donald Trump made turn from rabble-rouser to nominee-presumptive. The early campaign excess he has to walk back is the nonsense that all 11 million illegal migrants will be removed, and then many will be readmitted. course selection must before they are evicted, not after. Yves here. Note that this post considers the cost of v. soft Brexit, as in having the UK access to the single versus remain within it. It not the cost what have calling a “disorderly or what others have labeled “crashing out of the EU,” meaning a Brexit with no deal at Note that only gives consideration non-tarrif like divergence of It does not appear to factor massive lines at customs and documentation requirements in hard Brexit So if anything, the estimates are to be conservative. By Hylke Vandenbussche, Professor of Economics, University of Leuven, William Connell, Doctoral Researcher, Department of Economics, University of KU Leuven Simons, Doctoral researcher, Department Economics, University of Leuven. published VoxEU value networks it difficult to evaluate the trade impact of Brexit. Using a model of trade that accounts for the indirect effect of this delivers fresh bad for the UK, and the of Europe. Brexit cuts and more also global chains. A hard Brexit destroy four times as much and four times as a soft Brexit. Production processes are becoming increasingly Acemoglu (2012) and Johnson (2014) have argued as a result, we can no longer consider bilateral trade in isolation we evaluate In a recent paper (Vandenbussche et al. 2017), develop a new approach evaluate trade policy when global value networks exist. It a gravity model include sector-level input-output in production. This a more complete trade policy Brexit’s While
 and election four years ago anD is now runnIng foR thE viCe-PresIdenTial nomination WIth TRump). Rubio should bite the Dust iN FLOridA NeXt weeK. On SupeR tuESDay EvEnIng doNAlD TrumP maDe the tuRn from rabbLe-rOuSer to nominee-PReSumptive. ThE onLy early campaIgn Excess He Has TO walk BacK is thE nonseNSe that All the 11 milLiON illegAL migranTS WiLl be Removed, and then manY WiLL be readmitted. OF coursE tHE sELEctIon Process musT oCcur bEFore theY ArE EVIctED, not after. Yves Here. Note thaT ThiS post cOnSidERs the cOst of HaRD v. sOft Brexit, as In haVing the UK Lose acCEss to thE Single mArket vErsUs rEmaiN WiThIn iT. IT DoeS NoT coNSidEr the cosT oF wHat we Have BEEN CallIng A “disOrderLy Brexit” or whaT otHers HAve LabelEd “craShinG oUt of tHe EU,” meAning A BRexit with no deal At alL.

Note that ThiS pApeR oNly giVEs some ConSidEration To non-taRRif BaRRIErS, like divergence of tEcHNIcAl standaRds. It dOEs NoT Appear to FaCtoR in tHINgs liKe maSSiVe lines aT custoMS aNd DocumenTaTion reQuIreMenTs in a HArd BRexit sCenaio. So If anyTHing, the estimatES are likely to bE CoNSErVAtivE.

By hylke VandenBussCHe, PrOfesSOr Of INTernaTionaL ECOnOMics, University of LeuVeN, WilliAm ConNell, Doctoral REsearcher, DEPARtment of econOMiCS, University of Ku LeuvEn and WouteR simons, DoCtoraL researcHer, DepartMENt of EconOmiCs, UNivErsITY oF KU Leuven. OrigINAlly PuBlished At VOxEU

GloBal ValUe nEtwOrKs make it dIfficult To EvAlUaTe tHe traDE impact oF BRexIt. usiNg a neW Model oF tradE thaT aCcOUntS for the INdIREct eFfEcT of tHesE nEtworKs, thIS coLumn delIvers fresH baD News FoR tHe UK, and For the rest of EUrOpe. Brexit cUtS GDp more, aND Costs morE jobs, if we also consider glOBal valuE chAins. A Hard brexit wouLd dEstroy FouR Times aS much GdP, and FoUr tIMEs as mANY jObs ThRoughout EuROPe, aS a sofT BRexiT.

ProducTion processes are beCOmiNg increasinglY glObal. aCEmOglU (2012) AnD johNsON (2014) haVE Argued that, as a reSult, we can nO lONgEr consider BIlaTeRal tradE in isolAtion WHen we evAluate traDe policy.

IN a ReceNT PapEr (VandenbuSsche et aL. 2017), we develoP A new aPPrOach tO evAluate TrAde PolicY when gLObaL valuE netwoRkS exist. it extEnDs a tradiTional gravity model to incLude seCtor-lEveL input-outPut LInkAges in proDuctIon. This allOws A moRe comPleTE asseSsmeNT oF trADe polIcy sHOcks.

BrexiT’S LOseRS

whIle
 and election four years a go and isnow r unn ing  f or t he v ice-presidenti a l no mination with Trump).Rubio  s h ould bi te th e dusti nF l ori da  n ext  w e ek . OnSup er Tues day evenin g D on ald Trump ma d ethe turn f rom  rabble-rous erto nom in ee- p resum pti ve. T he onl y  early  campaign  e x cess h e  has to w al k ba ck is the nonsens e  t h at all the 11millio ni ll e g almig rants will  b e rem o ved, an d  t h e n  ma n y will be rea dmitted. Of cou rse th esel e ctionproce ss mus t occur bef orethey areevicte d , not a f ter. Yv es her e.Not e th a tth ispo s t c o ns ide r s t he costof  h ard v . so f t B rexi t,as i n hav ing the UK lo seacce s s t o the  sing le m ar ket v ersusremai nwithin it. It d oesnot consi der  t heco st of what w e h ave  been c allinga  “d is o r d er ly Brexit” or what  o t h er s have l abeled “c ra s hing out  o f t he E U , ” mea ning aBrexit w ith no de al  at all .
Noteth atthi s pap e r on ly giv es someconsi d eration to non - tarrif barrie r s, l ik e  div erg ence of tec hnic a l st anda r ds . I t  does  notap p ea r  to factor in thing slike m assiv e lines at cu stoms andd o c umentati on r e qu i rements in a h ard B rexit scen a io. So i f any thing, t he estima t e s are li kel y t o b e c o n se rvative.

ByH y lkeVa ndenbus sch e, Prof ess orofInt er nationalEconomic s,  U ni ve rsi ty of Leuven,Wi lli am  Co nnell ,  Docto ral R esea rc he r , D epartme n to f  Eco no mi cs,Uni ve rsity  ofK U L euven a nd Wouter  Si m ons,  D oc toral r esearcher, De pa rtment ofEc ono mics,U n iversity  of KU Leuven. Original l y publi she d atVoxE U

Global  va lue ne two r ks mak e it d iffic ul t t o evalu a t ethe  t rade impac t ofBrexi t.  Usi ng a ne w model of trade t h ataccounts forthe  ind i r ec t e f fe c t o ft hes e networks, thiscolumn del iv e rs  fresh bad new sfor the  UK, an d for the res t of Euro pe. Brexi tcuts G DPmore, andcosts mo re jobs,i f wea ls o con sid er glo ba l v aluechains .  AhardBrexit  w ould d estro yfour tim es as much GDP, and fou r time s asman y jobs th rou g hou t Europe,  asa soft Bre xit .
Produ cti o n pro cess e sare becom ingi ncreasing l yglo b a l.  Acemoglu ( 2 0 1 2)and J ohn s on (20 14)have argued that, as a result, w e ca n nolon g er c on sider bilatera l t ra d e  in isol at ion when we  evaluat et radepolicy .

Ina recen t pa p er (Va nden bus sche et a l.20 1 7), wede ve l op a n ew a pp roachto eva l uate t rade policy when  glob a l  valu e  ne twork sexist.I t ex tends a tr aditional g ravity  mod el to  includ esector -le ve l input-ou t put linka ges i n produ ct ion.  Th is all owsa morecomp le teassessmen t of tr ad e  po licy  shoc ks .

B rexit’s L o sers

Wh ile 
 and_election four_years ago and is_now running_for_the vice-presidential_nomination_with Trump). Rubio_should bite the_dust in Florida next_week. On Super_Tuesday_evening Donald Trump made the turn from rabble-rouser to nominee-presumptive. The only early campaign_excess_he has_to_walk_back is the nonsense that_all the 11 million illegal_migrants will_be removed, and then many will be readmitted._Of_course the selection_process must occur before they are evicted, not after._Yves here. Note that this post_considers the cost_of_hard_v. soft Brexit, as_in having the UK lose access_to the single market versus remain_within it. It does not consider the_cost of what we have been_calling a “disorderly Brexit” or_what others_have labeled “crashing out of_the EU,” meaning_a Brexit_with no deal_at all.

Note that this paper only_gives some consideration_to non-tarrif barriers, like divergence of_technical_standards. It does_not_appear_to factor_in things like_massive_lines at_customs_and documentation requirements in a hard_Brexit_scenaio. So if anything, the estimates are_likely to be conservative.

By_Hylke_Vandenbussche, Professor of International_Economics, University of Leuven, William_Connell, Doctoral Researcher, Department of Economics,_University of_KU Leuven_and Wouter Simons, Doctoral researcher, Department of Economics, University of KU_Leuven. Originally published at VoxEU

Global value_networks make it difficult_to evaluate_the_trade impact of_Brexit._Using a_new model of trade that accounts for_the indirect_effect of these networks, this column_delivers fresh bad news_for_the UK, and for the rest_of Europe. Brexit cuts GDP more,_and costs more jobs, if_we_also_consider global value chains. A_hard Brexit would destroy four times_as much GDP,_and four times as many jobs throughout_Europe,_as a soft Brexit.

Production processes are_becoming_increasingly global. Acemoglu (2012) and Johnson_(2014)_have_argued that, as a result,_we can no longer consider bilateral_trade in isolation when we evaluate trade policy.

In a_recent paper (Vandenbussche_et al. 2017), we develop_a_new_approach to evaluate trade policy when global value networks exist._It extends_a traditional gravity_model to include sector-level input-output linkages in production. This allows_a more complete assessment of trade policy_shocks.

Brexit’s Losers

While