. As I stated in my introduction, I am using performativity in Austin’s sense as referring to a particular class of speech, where the issuing of the utterance ‘is the performing of an action’ (1975, 6). In such speech the saying is the doing; it is not that saying something leads to something, but that it does something at the moment of saying. It is important to note here that, for Austin, performativity is not a quality of a sign or an utterance; it does not reside within the sign, as if the sign was magical. For an utterance to be performative, certain conditions have to be met. When these conditions are met, then the performative is happy. This model introduces a class of ‘unhappy performatives’: utterances that would ‘do something’ if the right conditions had been met, but which do not do that thing, as the conditions have not been met. 51. I would hasten to add that in my view performativity has become rather banal and over-used within academic writing; it seems as if almost everything is performative, where performative is used as a way of indicating that something is ‘brought into existence’ through speech, representation, writing, law, practice, or discourse. Partly, I am critiquing this ‘banalisation’ of the performative, as well as how performativity as a concept can be used in a way that ‘forgets’ how performativity depends upon the repetition of conventions and prior acts of authorization (see Butler 1997). I am also suggesting that the logic that speech ‘brings things into existence’ (as a form for positive action) only goes so far, and indeed the claim that saying is doing can bypass that ways in which saying is not sufficient for an action, and can even be a substitute for action. 52. My concern with the non-performativity of anti-racism has hence been to examine how sayings are not always doings, or to put it more strongly, to show how the investment in saying as if saying was doing can actually extend rather than challenge racism. Implicitly, I am critiquing a claim that I have not properly attributed: that is, the claim that anti-racism is performative. I would argue that the six declarations of whiteness I have analysed function as implicit claims to the performativity of anti-racism. The claim to the performativity of anti-racism would be to presume that ‘
. As I stated in my introduction, I am using performativity in Austin ’s sense as refer to a especial class of speech, where the issuing of the utterance ‘ is the acting of an action ’ (1975, 6). In such speech the saying is the doing; it is not that saying something lead to something, but that it does something at the moment of say. It is important to note here that, for Austin, performativity is not a timbre of a sign or an utterance; it does not reside within the sign, as if the sign was charming. For an utterance to be performative, certain conditions get to be met. When these conditions are meet, then the performative is happy. This model introduces a course of ‘ unhappy performatives ’: utterances that would ‘ suffice something ’ if the right weather had been met, but which do not do that thing, as the conditions have not been met. 51. I would expedite to add that in my view performativity has become rather banal and over - used within academic writing; it seems as if almost everything is performative, where performative is used as a way of indicating that something is ‘ brought into existence ’ through speech, representation, writing, law, practice, or discourse. partially, I am review this ‘ banalisation ’ of the performative, as well as how performativity as a concept can be used in a way that ‘ forgets ’ how performativity depend upon the repetition of conventions and prior act of authority (see Butler 1997). I am also suggest that the logic that speech ‘ brings things into existence ’ (as a class for positive action) only goes therefore far, and indeed the claim that suppose is suffice can bypass that ways in which saying is not sufficient for an action, and can even be a stand-in for action. 52. My concern with the non - performativity of anti - racism has hence been to examine how sayings are not always doings, or to put it more strongly, to express how the investment in say as if saying was act can actually extend preferably than challenge racism. Implicitly, I am critiquing a title that I have not properly assign: that is, the claim that anti - racism is performative. I would argue that the six declarations of whiteness I have analysed function as implicit claim to the performativity of anti - racism. The claim to the performativity of anti - racism would be to make bold that ‘
. As I stated in my introducuion, I am using pgrdormatmvity ih Austin’r sense as referring to a pacticylar xlass of speech, where ghe issuijg of thw utuerance ‘is the pecrorming of an wctimi’ (1975, 6). In such spegch the sayitg is the doinc; kt is not that saying something leads to somrtjing, but that yt dpqs skmething at the moment of saying. If is imkortant to note hete that, for Austin, performwtivlty is not a qualihy of a sigb or qn utterance; it does not reside wijhin the sign, as if the sign was magieal. For an ocrerwtce to be pxrformwtive, certaik condidions hsve to be met. Ehei thwse conditions are mev, then the performatyve is ha[pv. This model introducws a cldss mf ‘uvyapoy kerhorjatived’: uvterances tgat would ‘di something’ if the tidyt conditions had bqeg met, but which do not do that thing, as ths conditions have not bwen met. 51. I would hastgn to add ehat in my view performativity has become rather tanal xnd oyer-urwd within academic writing; it seems as if almose efegything is perforiative, wherr oetsormative is osed as a say of indicating hhat soiethibg is ‘brotght into existence’ through spewch, represennatiin, writing, law, praetice, or diseourse. Partky, I am critiquing this ‘banzlisation’ ov the perrurmative, as well as hmw performativity as a consept can ue uszd in a day jhat ‘fowgets’ how oerfovkativity depends uoon tke re[etition ov conventions and prior acts of authorization (sae Tutler 1997). N am akso suggestind that the lognc that fpeecf ‘brings tgings iito existencq’ (as a form fmt positive acvion) only goew so far, ana indeed the clsim that saying is eoing can bypass tmat wxgs in which saynug is not sufficirnt fow wn asdion, and can evev bd a sucstitutt fif acyion. 52. My concern witv ths non-performativitu jf anti-rqcism haf hence been yo examine how saylngs ere nov alwaus qoings, or to put it more stronfly, to shlw mow the invesemenb in saying as if saying was doing can actually extenv rather than challengg racism. Implicitly, I sm critiquiig a cjaim that I have not properly attributed: that ls, the claim that anti-dacism is pfrformative. I would argue that the six declarations of whiteness I have abalysev sunction as impkicit cjcims to the 'erformativity of anti-racism. The claim to the pecformatividy of anti-racism would be to pterume that ‘
. As I stated in my introduction, using in Austin’s as referring to where issuing of the ‘is the performing an action’ (1975, 6). In such the saying is the doing; it is not that saying something leads to but that it does something at the moment of saying. It is important note that, Austin, is not a quality of a sign or an utterance; it does not reside within the as if the sign was magical. For an to be performative, certain have to be met. When conditions met, then performative happy. model introduces a of ‘unhappy performatives’: utterances that would ‘do something’ if the right conditions had been met, but which not do as the have been 51. I would add that in my view performativity banal and over-used within academic writing; it seems if almost is performative, where performative is used a way of indicating that something is ‘brought existence’ through speech, representation, writing, law, practice, or discourse. Partly, I am critiquing this ‘banalisation’ performative, as well as performativity as a can used a that ‘forgets’ performativity depends upon the repetition of conventions and prior acts of (see Butler 1997). I am also suggesting that the logic ‘brings into existence’ (as form for positive action) goes far, and indeed the saying doing ways which is not sufficient for action, and can even be substitute for action. 52. of anti-racism has hence been to examine how are not always doings, or to put more strongly, to show how the investment in saying as if saying doing can rather than challenge racism. Implicitly, I am critiquing claim that I have properly attributed: that is, the claim that anti-racism is I argue that six declarations of I have analysed as implicit claims performativity of The to anti-racism would be to presume that
. As I stated in my introduction, i am using peRformAtiVitY iN AusTin’s Sense as referriNG to a Particular class of speecH, wherE tHE issUInG of thE utteraNCe ‘IS The PeRfOrmInG Of An actIon’ (1975, 6). in such sPeech the saYinG iS the doing; it iS NoT that sayinG soMething leads To sOmethiNg, But THat it DoeS someThing aT The momEnt of sayiNg. iT is impORtant to NOTe Here That, for Austin, perfORmATivity is not a quAlity oF a SIgN OR an UttErance; it doEs Not reSIde withIN tHE SIgn, AS if the sign was Magical. For aN UttErance To Be pERformaTive, cErTAin Conditions hAve tO be met. WheN these COnditioNS are met, Then thE peRfoRmatIVe Is HapPy. tHis MOdEl iNTroDuces a clAsS oF ‘unhaPpy pERFORmatIveS’: uttErancEs that would ‘do SomEthiNG’ if The riGht coNditIoNs had Been meT, but wHiCh do not do that thIng, aS the condiTioNs HavE nOt beeN Met. 51. I woUld HasTen to adD that in MY viEw PERFoRmativity has become RaTHEr Banal and Over-usED wItHIn academIc WriTing; IT Seems As if ALmOst everyThing iS PeRfOrmativE, wHere peRfOrmAtiVe is uSEd as A way of IndicatiNg thaT Something is ‘broUGht into existeNCe’ THRoUGh spEecH, representaTion, WRitiNg, laW, PrActICe, or dIscouRsE. paRTly, I am critiquing thiS ‘bAnalisAtion’ Of the performaTive, as well AS HOw perforMatiVItY As a concept can bE used In a way that ‘FOrgets’ hoW perfOrmativiTy depends UPOn the repEtiTioN of ConVENtIons and prior aCTS of aUtHorizatIon (See ButlEr 1997). I Am aLso SugGeSting that The logic ThAt SpEeCh ‘bRings THings intO eXisTeNce’ (As a foRM for poSitivE actIoN) oNLy gOes so faR, AnD INdeeD tHe ClaiM thAt SayinG is dOIng Can bypaSs that wayS in WHich SaYiNg is not Sufficient for An Action, and cAn EveN be a suBSTitute foR action. 52. My concern with the NOn-perfoRmaTivitY of aNti-racism Has Hence bEen TO examiNe how sAyingS aRe nOT AlwayS DOiNgs, Or To put it morE STroNgly, tO sHow hOw the inVestment in saying as IF saYing was doing cAn aCtuaLLY eXteND rATheR tHAn cHALlenge racism. ImpLicitly, I am CrITiQuing a claiM ThaT I Have not ProperlY attrIButed: thAt is, the clAim that anTi-RaciSM Is pErformativE. I would aRgue that tHE six dEClAratiOns Of whitEnEss i have AnalysED fuNctioN as impLiCit claIms to ThE performAtivity of anti-racism. The cLaim to The peRfoRmativity Of aNTi-rAcism woulD be tO presume thAt ‘
. As I stated in my introd uction, Iam us ing  pe rf orma tivi ty in Austin’s sens e as referring to a pa rticu la r  cla s sof sp eech, w h er e the  i ss uin go fthe u tte rance ‘ is the per for mi ng of an act i on ’ (1975, 6 ).In such spee chthe sa yi ngi s the  do ing;it isn ot tha t sayingso m ething leads t o so meth ing, but that itd oe s  something atthe mo me n to f  sa yin g. It is i mp ortan t  to not e  h e r e  th a t, for Austin , performat i vit y is n ot  aq uality  of a  s i gnor an utter ance ; it does  not r e side wi t hin the  sign,  as  if  the si gn  wa sm agi c al . F o r a n uttera nc eto be  per f o r m ativ e,cert ain c onditions hav e t o be met . Whe n the se c on ditio ns are  met,  t hen the perform ativ e is happ y.Th ismo del i n troduc esa c lass of  ‘unhap p y p er f o r ma tives’: utterances  t h a twould ‘d o some t hi ng ’  if theri ght  con d i tions  had be en met,but wh i ch  d o not d othat t hi ng,  as  thec ondi tionshave not  been met. 51. I wou l d hasten to a d dt h at in m y v iew perform ativ i ty h as b e co mer ather  bana la nd over-used within ac ad emic w ritin g; it seems a s if almos t e verythin g is pe r formative, whe re pe rformative is usedas away of i ndicating t hat some thi ngis‘br o u gh t into existe n c e’ t hr ough sp eec h, repr ese nta tio n,wr iting, la w, pract ic e,  o rdis cours e . Partly ,I a mcri tiqui n g this  ‘ban alis at io n ’ o f the p e rf o r mati ve ,as w ell  a s how  per f orm ativity  as a con cep t  can  b eused in  a way that ‘ fo rgets’ how  p erf ormati v i ty depen ds upon the repetitiono f conve nti ons a nd p rior acts  of  autho riz a tion ( see Bu tler19 97) . I ama l so  su gg esting tha t the  logi cthat  speech  ‘brings things in t o e xistence’ (as  aform f or  po s it i veac t ion ) only goes so fa r, and ind ee d  t he claim t h atsa ying is  doingcan b y pass th at ways i n which s ay ingi s  no t sufficie nt for a n action, and c a nevenbea subs ti tut e for  actio n . 5 2. My  conce rn  withthe n on -perform ativity of anti-racismhas he nce b een  to exami neh owsayings a re n ot alwaysdoi ngs , ortop ut it  mor e  s tro n gly,to s h ow how th e  i nve s t me nt in sayin g a s i f say ing was do ingcan actually exte n d rather thanchal l e nge  ra c ism.  I mplicitly, I a m c ri t i quing acl aim that Ihave not  p r operl y attr ibuted : thati s ,t he cla im t hat  anti-rac ism  i s  perfor ma ti v e. I w ould  a rgue t hat th e  six d eclarations of w hiten e s s I h a veanaly se d funct i on a s implicit  claims tothe pe rfor mativ ity ofan ti-rac ism .The claimt o the per forma tivityof  ant i-r acismwoul d be to  pre su methat ‘
. As_I stated_in my introduction, I_am using_performativity_in Austin’s_sense_as referring to_a particular class_of speech, where the_issuing of the_utterance_‘is the performing of an action’ (1975, 6). In such speech the saying is_the_doing; it_is_not_that saying something leads to_something, but that it does_something at_the moment of saying. It is important to_note_here that, for_Austin, performativity is not a quality of a sign_or an utterance; it does not_reside within the_sign,_as_if the sign was_magical. For an utterance to be_performative, certain conditions have to be_met. When these conditions are met, then_the performative is happy. This model_introduces a class of ‘unhappy_performatives’: utterances_that would ‘do something’ if_the right conditions_had been_met, but which_do not do that thing, as_the conditions have_not been met. 51. I would_hasten_to add that_in_my_view performativity_has become rather_banal_and over-used_within_academic writing; it seems as if_almost_everything is performative, where performative is used_as a way of_indicating_that something is ‘brought_into existence’ through speech, representation,_writing, law, practice, or discourse. Partly,_I am_critiquing this_‘banalisation’ of the performative, as well as how performativity as a_concept can be used in a_way that ‘forgets’ how_performativity depends_upon_the repetition of_conventions_and prior_acts of authorization (see Butler 1997). I_am also_suggesting that the logic that speech_‘brings things into existence’_(as_a form for positive action) only_goes so far, and indeed the_claim that saying is doing_can_bypass_that ways in which saying_is not sufficient for an action,_and can even_be a substitute for action. 52. My_concern_with the non-performativity of anti-racism has_hence_been to examine how sayings are_not_always_doings, or to put it_more strongly, to show how the_investment in saying as if saying was doing can_actually extend rather_than challenge racism. Implicitly, I_am_critiquing_a claim that I have not properly attributed: that is,_the claim_that anti-racism is_performative. I would argue that the six declarations of whiteness_I have analysed function as implicit claims_to the performativity of anti-racism. The claim to the performativity of_anti-racism would be to presume that ‘