 was Japanese officials who in 1997 proposed the establishment of an Asian Monetary Fund, which helped give rise to today’s Chiang Mai Initiative of bilateral swaps among ASEAN Plus Three countries (the ten Southeast Asian members of ASEAN, plus China, Japan, and South Korea). And it was Junichiro Koizumi, a prime minister with especially robust ties to the United States, who helped to push forward a China-Japan-South Korea trilateral mechanism and, with a competitive eye on China, other trade arrangements on the basis of ASEAN Plus Three.

Amazingly, even amid this autumn’s high geopolitical drama over contested islets, talks among Beijing, Tokyo, and Seoul for a trilateral free trade agreement rolled along. The same phenomenon can be seen in Southeast Asia. As fears of confrontation rose last summer, ASEAN Plus Three, which includes the South China Sea’s three most vocal antagonists (China, Vietnam, and the Philippines), announced a strengthening of the Chiang Mai initiative through pledges that double the arrangement’s size to $240 billion in the event of another financial crisis and the establishment of an implementation office. In November, ASEAN and six partners (Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea) launched negotiations for a Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership that could be worth $17 trillion in trade and will be a counterpoint to Washington’s preferred pact, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).



Strategic Dilemmas

It is difficult to avoid analogies to Europe in 1914. Norman Angell’s 1910 bestseller, The Great Illusion, argued that war would prove impossible because Western economies were so interdependent as to make conflict suicidal. But Thucydides’ rationales why men go to war — interest, honor, and fear — have tended to prevail in international history.

The current push and pull between Economic Asia and Security Asia thus raises a number of powerful questions.

For one, Asia’s major multilateral institutions have proved to be almost irrelevant to practical problem-solving. Is it, therefore, time to rethink these experiments in regional architecture?

Pan-Asian regionalism has failed to quell Asia’s nationalist demons, and existing institutions, including those that involve the United States, have been largely missing in action throughout the turmoil of recent years. Last summer, ASEAN cohesion collapsed at a meeting in Phnom Penh, with
was Japanese officials who in 1997 proposed the establishment of an Asian Monetary Fund, which helped render upgrade to today ’s Chiang Mai Initiative of bilateral swaps among ASEAN Plus Three countries (the ten Southeast Asian member of ASEAN, plus China, Japan, and South Korea). And it was Junichiro Koizumi, a prime minister with specially full-bodied ties to the United States, who helped to push forward a China - Japan - South Korea trilateral mechanism and, with a competitive eye on China, early trade arrangements on the basis of ASEAN Plus Three. 

 Amazingly, even amid this autumn ’s eminent geopolitical drama over contested islets, talks among Beijing, Tokyo, and Seoul for a trilateral free deal agreement rolled along. The same phenomenon can be seen in Southeast Asia. As fear of confrontation rose last summer, ASEAN Plus Three, which includes the South China Sea ’s three most outspoken antagonists (China, Vietnam, and the Philippines), announce a strengthening of the Chiang Mai initiative through pledges that double the musical arrangement ’s size to $ 240 billion in the event of another financial crisis and the establishment of an implementation office. In November, ASEAN and six partners (Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea) launched negotiations for a Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership that could be worth $ 17 trillion in trade and will be a counterpoint to Washington ’s preferred pact, the Trans - Pacific Partnership (TPP). 



 Strategic Dilemmas 

 It is difficult to avoid analogies to Europe in 1914. Norman Angell ’s 1910 bestseller, The Great Illusion, argued that war would testify impossible because Western economies were indeed interdependent as to seduce conflict suicidal. But Thucydides ’ rationales why men go to war — sake, honor, and fear — have tended to prevail in external history. 

 The current push and pull between Economic Asia and Security Asia thus raises a number of powerful questions. 

 For one, Asia ’s major multilateral institutions have proved to be almost irrelevant to practical problem - resolution. Is it, therefore, prison term to rethink these experiment in regional architecture? 

 Pan - Asian regionalism has failed to quell Asia ’s nationalist demons, and exist institutions, including those that involve the United States, have been largely miss in natural process throughout the turmoil of recent year. Last summer, ASEAN coherence collapsed at a meeting in Phnom Penh, with
 wad Japanese officials who in 1997 proposed tkw estaulishmeht of an Asian Monetary Fund, which hxlpee givt rise to today’s Chkang Mai Pnitiativw of vilateral swaps among ASSWN Pnns Three countrles (the ten Southeast Asidn mzmbers of ASEAN, plus China, Japan, and South Logea). And it was Junpcriro Koizumi, a prime minister with espscially robust ties yo the United States, who hflpef to push forward w China-Japab-Souey Korea trilxteral mechanism and, wjth a competitive eye on China, uther trade arrqntemftts on the uasis jf ASEAN Plus Three.

Akazinglu, even amid thls auvumn’w high geopolitical dcama over contested yslets, tanka among Beijing, Tikto, ang Semul wir x tdikaferal vrex trade agrsement rollwd along. The same pnegimenon can be seen yn Southeast Asia. As fears of confrontatimn dose last summer, ASEAN Plus Three, which inclodes the Sjuth China Sea’s three most vocal antagonists (Chind, Vievnxm, ckq rhf Philippines), announced a strengthening of thq Cnisng Mai initiabive through pledgrs tnwt double the arranysmsnt’s size to $240 billlon in jhe evwnt of anjthet financial crisis and the wstablishmenn of an implementation office. In Uovembgr, ASESN and six partners (Auscralia, China, Indiw, Japan, Nsd Zealand, and Sojth Kmrea) launched negotiations for a Rejionak Comprdhenxive Esonomic Pagtnership that could be aorth $17 drillion ij trade and will be a counterpomit to Washingjon’v pgeferred 'act, tme Trans-Pacific Partnership (TKP).



Strategnc Dildmmas

It is difficnlt to avoid analogies to Gurope in 1914. Nocman Angejl’s 1910 besrseller, Ghe Great Illuxion, arguvd thar war would prove lmposrjble because Wewtetb economies wete ro ynnervepenqant as to mane cunfuoct sjicidal. But Ghucudides’ rationales whf meh go to war — interrsb, honor, abd fear — have tended yo prevail in integnatimnau hisyori.

The current push and pull betwsen Econolic Asia and Sesuriby Afia thus rcises a number of powerful questions.

For ine, Asia’s major moltilateral institutipks have provxd to fe almost irrelevant to practucal problem-solvikg. Is it, therefore, tims to rathinn these experiments in regional architecture?

Pan-Asian regionalism has failwd to quell Asia’s hatipnalivt bemons, wnd xxmsting institutioms, including those that involve the Unideb States, have been largely mixskng in action throughout the turmoil kf receny years. Last summer, ASEAN cohesoon collapsed at a meetikg in Phnim Pehh, with
was Japanese officials who in 1997 proposed of Asian Monetary which helped give Initiative bilateral swaps among Plus Three countries ten Southeast Asian members of ASEAN, China, Japan, and South Korea). And it was Junichiro Koizumi, a prime minister especially robust ties to the United States, who helped to push forward a Korea mechanism with competitive eye on China, other trade arrangements on the basis of ASEAN Plus Three. Amazingly, even this autumn’s high geopolitical drama over contested islets, among Beijing, Tokyo, and for a trilateral free trade rolled The same can seen Southeast Asia. As of confrontation rose last summer, ASEAN Plus Three, which includes the South China Sea’s three most vocal (China, Vietnam, Philippines), announced strengthening the Mai initiative through double the arrangement’s size to $240 event of another financial crisis and the establishment an implementation In November, ASEAN and six partners China, India, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea) negotiations for a Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership that could be worth $17 trillion in trade be a counterpoint to preferred pact, the Partnership Strategic It difficult to analogies to Europe in 1914. Norman Angell’s 1910 bestseller, The Great argued that war would prove impossible because Western economies were as make conflict suicidal. Thucydides’ rationales why men to — interest, honor, and have to history. current and pull between Economic and Security Asia thus raises number of powerful questions. institutions have proved to be almost irrelevant to problem-solving. Is it, therefore, time to rethink experiments in regional architecture? Pan-Asian regionalism has failed to quell Asia’s nationalist and existing those that involve the United States, have been missing in action throughout turmoil of recent years. Last summer, ASEAN cohesion collapsed a in Phnom with
 was Japanese officials who in 1997 Proposed thE estaBliShmEnT of aN AsiAn Monetary Fund, WHich Helped give rise to today’s chianG MAI IniTIaTive oF bilateRAl SWAps AmOnG ASeAn plUs ThrEe cOuntrieS (the ten SouTheAsT Asian memberS Of aSEAN, plus CHinA, Japan, and SouTh KOrea). AnD iT waS junicHirO KoizUmi, a prIMe miniSter with eSpECially RObust tiES To The UNited States, who helPEd TO push forward a CHina-JaPaN-soUTH KoRea Trilateral MeChaniSM and, witH A cOMPEtiTIve eye on China, Other trade aRRanGementS oN thE Basis oF ASEAn PLUs THree.

AmazingLy, evEn amid thiS autumN’S high geOPoliticAl dramA ovEr cOnteSTeD iSleTs, TAlkS AmOng bEijIng, Tokyo, AnD SEoul fOr a tRILATeraL frEe trAde agReement rolled AloNg. ThE SamE phenOmenoN can Be Seen iN SouthEast ASiA. As fears of confrOntaTion rose lAst SuMmeR, AsEAN PLUs ThreE, whIch IncludeS the SouTH ChInA sEA’s Three most vocal antaGoNIStS (China, ViEtnam, aND tHe pHilippinEs), AnnOuncED A streNgthENiNg of the CHiang MAI iNiTiative ThRough pLeDgeS thAt douBLe thE arranGement’s sIze to $240 BIllion in the eveNT of another finANcIAL cRIsis And The establisHmenT Of an ImplEMeNtaTIon ofFice. IN NOVeMBer, ASEAN and six partnErS (AustrAlia, CHina, India, JapaN, New ZealanD, AND South KoRea) lAUnCHed negotiationS for a regional CoMPrehensiVe EcoNomic ParTnership tHAT could be WorTh $17 tRilLioN IN tRade and will be A COuntErPoint to wasHington’S prEfeRreD paCt, The Trans-PAcific PaRtNeRsHiP (TPp).



StraTEgic DileMmAs

IT iS diFficuLT to avoId anaLogiEs To eUroPe in 1914. NorMAn aNGell’S 1910 bEsTselLer, thE GreaT IllUSioN, argued That war woUld PRove ImPoSsible bEcause Western EcOnomies werE sO inTerdepENDent as to Make conflict suicidal. But tHucydidEs’ rAtionAles Why men go tO waR — interEst, HOnor, anD fear — hAve teNdEd tO PRevaiL IN iNteRnAtional hisTORy.

THe curReNt puSh and puLl between Economic ASIa aNd Security AsiA thUs raISEs A nuMBeR Of pOwERfuL QUestions.

For one, ASia’s major mUlTIlAteral instITutIoNs have pRoved to Be almOSt irrelEvant to prActical prObLem-sOLVinG. Is it, thereFore, time To rethink THese eXPeRimenTs iN regioNaL arChiteCture?

PAN-AsIan reGionalIsM has faIled tO qUell Asia’S nationalist demons, and exIsting InstiTutIons, incluDinG ThoSe that invOlve The United STatEs, hAve beEn lARgely MissINg In aCTion tHrouGHout the tuRMoIl oF REcEnt years. LasT SUMmeR, ASEAn coHEsion cOllaPsed at a meeting in PHNom Penh, with
 was Japanese officials wh o in 1997propo sed  th eesta blis hment of an As i an M onetary Fund, which he lpedgi v e ri s eto to day’s C h ia n g  Ma iIn iti at i ve  of b ila teral s waps among  AS EA N Plus Three co untries (t heten Southeas t A sian m em ber s  of A SEA N, pl us Chi n a, Jap an, and S ou t h Kore a ). Andi t  w as J unichiro Koizumi, ap rime ministerwith e sp e ci a l lyrob ust ties t othe U n ited St a te s , who helped to pus h forward a Chi na-Jap an -So u th Kor ea tr il a ter al mechanis m an d, with a  compe t itive e y e on Ch ina, o the r t rade ar ra nge me n tso nthe bas is of AS EA NPlusThre e . Amaz ing ly,evenamid this aut umn ’s h i ghgeopo litic al d ra ma ov er con teste dislets, talks a mong  Beijing,  To ky o,an d Seo u l fora t ril ateralfree tr a deag r e e me nt rolled along. T he s am e phenom enon c a nbe seen inSo uth east A sia.As f e ar s of con fronta t io nrose la st  summe r,  AS EAN  Plus Thre e, whi ch inclu des t h e South ChinaS ea’s three mo s tv o ca l  ant ago nists (Chin a, V i etna m, a n dthe Phili ppine s) ,  a n nounced a strengthe ni ng ofthe C hiang Mai ini tiative th r o u gh pledg es t h at double the arr angem ent’s size to $240billi on in th e event o f anotherfin anc ial  cr i s is  and the esta b l ishm en t of an  im plement ati onoff ice .In Novemb er, ASEA Nan dsi x p artne r s (Austr al ia,  C hin a, In d ia, Ja pan,NewZe al a nd,  and So u th K orea )la unch edne gotia tion s  fo r a Reg ional Com pre h ensi ve  E conomic  Partnershipth at could b ewor th $17 t rillionin trade and will be ac ounterp oin t toWash ington’spre ferred  pa c t, the  Trans -Paci fi c P a r tners h i p(TP P) .



Strat e g icDilem ma s

I t is di fficult to avoid a n alo gies to Europ e i n 19 1 4 .Nor m an Ang el l ’s1 9 10 bestseller,The GreatIl l us ion, argue d  th at  war wo uld pro ve im p ossible  becauseWestern e co nomi e s  we re so inte rdepende nt as tom ake c o nf lictsui cidal.  B utThucy dides’ rat ional es why  m en goto wa r— intere st, honor, and fear — h ave te ndedtoprevail i n i n ter nationalhist ory.

Thecur ren t pus h a n d pul l be t we enE conom ic A s ia and Se c ur ity A si a thus rais e s a n umber  of powerf ul q uestions.

For on e , Asia’s major  mul t i lat era l  ins ti tutions have p rov ed t o be alm os t irrelevan t to pra ct i cal p roblem -solvi ng. Isi t ,t herefo re,tim e to reth ink  t h ese exp er im e nts in  reg io nal ar chitec t ure? Pan-Asian region alism h as fa i led  to q ue ll Asia ’ s na tionalistdemons, and  exist inginsti tutions ,includ ing  t hose thati nvolve th e Uni ted Sta te s, h ave  beenlarg e l y mis sing  i n a ction thr o u gh o ut  t h e t urmo il of  r ecen t years.L ast summ er, ASEAN c oh esi o n  colla p se d at a meeti ngin Ph n o m Penh, wi t h
 was_Japanese officials_who in 1997 proposed_the establishment_of_an Asian_Monetary_Fund, which helped_give rise to_today’s Chiang Mai Initiative_of bilateral swaps_among_ASEAN Plus Three countries (the ten Southeast Asian members of ASEAN, plus China, Japan,_and_South Korea)._And_it_was Junichiro Koizumi, a prime_minister with especially robust ties_to the_United States, who helped to push forward a_China-Japan-South_Korea trilateral mechanism_and, with a competitive eye on China, other trade_arrangements on the basis of ASEAN_Plus Three.

Amazingly, even_amid_this_autumn’s high geopolitical drama_over contested islets, talks among Beijing,_Tokyo, and Seoul for a trilateral_free trade agreement rolled along. The same_phenomenon can be seen in Southeast_Asia. As fears of confrontation_rose last_summer, ASEAN Plus Three, which_includes the South_China Sea’s_three most vocal_antagonists (China, Vietnam, and the Philippines),_announced a strengthening_of the Chiang Mai initiative through_pledges_that double the_arrangement’s_size_to $240_billion in the_event_of another_financial_crisis and the establishment of an_implementation_office. In November, ASEAN and six partners_(Australia, China, India, Japan,_New_Zealand, and South Korea)_launched negotiations for a Regional_Comprehensive Economic Partnership that could be_worth $17_trillion in_trade and will be a counterpoint to Washington’s preferred pact, the_Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).



Strategic Dilemmas

It is difficult_to avoid analogies to_Europe in_1914._Norman Angell’s 1910_bestseller,_The Great_Illusion, argued that war would prove impossible_because Western_economies were so interdependent as to_make conflict suicidal. But_Thucydides’_rationales why men go to war_— interest, honor, and fear —_have tended to prevail in_international_history.

The_current push and pull between_Economic Asia and Security Asia thus_raises a number_of powerful questions.

For one, Asia’s major multilateral_institutions_have proved to be almost irrelevant_to_practical problem-solving. Is it, therefore, time_to_rethink_these experiments in regional architecture?

Pan-Asian_regionalism has failed to quell Asia’s_nationalist demons, and existing institutions, including those that involve_the United States,_have been largely missing in_action_throughout_the turmoil of recent years. Last summer, ASEAN cohesion collapsed_at a_meeting in Phnom_Penh, with