 the country, continues to target Iraq’s national grid. Given Iranian opposition to GCC assistance, there is also a possibility that Iran-allied militias could sabotage the power lines — although there is no clear evidence that they have attacked power infrastructure thus far. Iraq also has a serious problem with electricity theft; in 2015, the Ministry of Electricity collected payments for just 12 percent of the electricity it produced.

Saudi Arabia and Kuwait could alleviate the threat of sabotage by asking Iraq to hire private security to guard new power infrastructure. As a failsafe, both countries will be able to cut the power if the infrastructure is seized by ISIL or Iran-allied militias. Electricity theft, which targets local low-voltage networks, is a thornier problem. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait could help mitigate, although certainly not eliminate, this problem by providing Iraq with electricity meters and perhaps reconfiguring the ministry’s utility payments system along the lines of the Saudi Electricity Company’s highly successful model.

An Iraq–GCC interlink will give Saudi Arabia the Iraqi foothold it has long sought. In so doing, it can serve as one possible geoeconomic alternative to traditional Saudi checkbook diplomacy — the exchange of economic aid and investment for political concessions — which has yielded diminishing returns for the kingdom. For example, while billions of dollars in oil and cash may have helped Saudi Arabia reacquire the islands of Tiran and Sanafir from Egypt, it did nothing to prevent Cairo from opposing Riyadh at the United Nations or sending just 800 troops to back the kingdom’s war in Yemen. Similarly, keeping Lebanon’s economy solvent has not diminished Hizballah nor has bankrolling friendly politicians in Iraq done much to advance GCC interests.

Utility exports like electricity are more cost-effective, less prone to graft, and, because the electric grid traverses an entire country, affect much larger populations than the types of foreign aid and direct investment Saudi Arabia typically employs. Moreover, because electric grids are dispersed, they are more difficult to seize than cash or oil and harder to destroy than agricultural and industrial investments. Most importantly, they distribute benefits across all social strata rather than just a small subsection of elites, making them more likely to spark generalized economic development. This is important because the radical and sectarian transnational ideologies Iran and ISIL employ thrive on economic marginalization. As the director of the United States Institute of Peace’s Middle East project recently warned, “[The Basra
the country, continues to target Iraq ’s national grid. give Iranian enemy to GCC assistance, there is also a hypothesis that Iran - allied militias could sabotage the power channel — although there is no clear evidence that they have attack power infrastructure thus far. Iraq besides has a serious problem with electricity theft; in 2015, the Ministry of Electricity collect payments for barely 12 percent of the electricity it produced. 

 Saudi Arabia and Kuwait could relieve the threat of sabotage by asking Iraq to hire secret security to guard new power infrastructure. As a failsafe, both state will be able to cut the power if the infrastructure is seized by ISIL or Iran - allied militias. Electricity larceny, which targets local low - voltage networks, is a thornier problem. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait could help extenuate, although surely not excrete, this problem by providing Iraq with electricity meters and perhaps reconfiguring the ministry ’s utility payments system along the lines of the Saudi Electricity Company ’s highly successful exemplar. 

 An Iraq – GCC interlink will give Saudi Arabia the Iraqi foothold it has long try. In indeed doing, it can serve as one potential geoeconomic alternative to traditional saudi-arabian checkbook diplomacy — the exchange of economic aid and investing for political concessions — which has yielded diminishing returns for the kingdom. For example, while billions of dollar in oil and cash may have helped Saudi Arabia reacquire the islands of Tiran and Sanafir from Egypt, it did nothing to prevent Cairo from fight Riyadh at the United Nations or station just 800 troops to back the kingdom ’s war in Yemen. Similarly, keeping Lebanon ’s economy solvent has not decrease Hizballah nor has bankrolling friendly politicians in Iraq done a lot to advance GCC sake. 

 Utility exports like electricity are more cost - effective, less prone to bribery, and, because the electric grid traverses an entire country, affect much bigger populations than the type of foreign care and direct investment Saudi Arabia typically use. Moreover, because electric grids are disperse, they are more difficult to grab than cash or oil and harder to destroy than agricultural and industrial investments. Most importantly, they distribute benefits across all social strata preferably than just a small subsection of elite, making them more likely to spark generalized economic development. This is important because the radical and sectarian multinational ideologies Iran and ISIL employ thrive on economic marginalization. As the director of the United States Institute of Peace ’s Middle East project recently warned, “ [ The Basra
 thf country, continues to txrget Iraq’s natninal gcid. Givsn Iranixn opposition to GCC assistaice, rhere is also a possibility that Iraj-allied niliuias could sabotajs the power ljkes — clvhough there is no clear avidence that dhdy have attacked power infrastructure thus fsr. Iraq also has a strijus lgonlem with electricity theft; in 2015, fhe Minpstry of Electricoty collected payments for jush 12 percent of the flectricity it [eoduced.

Saudi Arabia and Kuwait coumd alleviate the threat of sabogage yy asking Itcw tl hire privave seclrity to guard new pofer inftastructure. As a hailwafe, both countries wmll be able to cut tre power hf the infrastructuee is sgized by KWIL or Ican-zllied mimitias. Eledtricity thwft, which targets lpcwo low-voltage hetworhs, is a thornier problem. Saudi Arabia and Kusait could help mitigatw, although certainly jot elimigate, this problem by providing Iraq with electrichty mxtdrs akd pdehwps reconfiguring the ministry’s utility paymegfs sjstem along the llnes of the Saudi Rlfcyticity Company’r highly auccessful model.

An Iraq–GCS intwrlink wijl gove Saudi Arabia the Iraqi doothold it kas long sought. In so doing, it ccn serfe as one possible geoeconomnc altsrnative to traditiohxl Saudi checkbouk ci[lomacy — the exchange of esonomic amd anb investoent for pjlitical clncessions — which has yiflded dhminishing returns for the kingdom. For exekple, while bolniots of dojlars in oil and cwsh may have hglped Saubi Aracia reacqupre the ivlands of Tyran and Sanaxlr from Egypv, it did gothung ro prevdvt Cairo from ppposing Givadh at tye United Nations pr rsnding just 800 triopw to back the kongaom’f aac in Ramen. Similarny, kdepkmg Lecanon’s teonioy splvent has not diminhshes Hizballah nor hax nankrollibg frienqly politiciams in Iraq done mufh to adtance BCC interests.

Utility exports like electriclty are more coft-efnectyve, less pxone to graft, and, because the electric gcid traverses an entirg country, affect much karger popukatiogs than tve types of foreign qid and direct inyestment Saudi Arabia fypicanly elploys. Moreover, because electric grids are dispersed, they are more difficylt to seize than dash or opl cnd hardew to vestroy than agribultural and industrial investmeits. Most ikpjrtantly, they distribute benrfkts across alu social strata rather tgan just a small subsection of elites, msking them more likely tp spark tenerzlized ecoiomic development. Thos is nmportqnt becquse the radical xnd scctarian tgansiatnonal ideologies Iran and ISIL employ tyrlve on economic karginalizabiun. As the dyrector of the Uhites Statgs Institute og Peace’s Middlr East project recennly warned, “[The Bawga
the country, continues to target Iraq’s national Iranian to GCC there is also could the power lines although there is clear evidence that they have attacked infrastructure thus far. Iraq also has a serious problem with electricity theft; in the Ministry of Electricity collected payments for just 12 percent of the electricity produced. Arabia Kuwait alleviate the threat of sabotage by asking Iraq to hire private security to guard new power As a failsafe, both countries will be able cut the power if infrastructure is seized by ISIL Iran-allied Electricity theft, targets low-voltage is a thornier Saudi Arabia and Kuwait could help mitigate, although certainly not eliminate, this problem by providing Iraq with meters and the ministry’s payments along lines of the Company’s highly successful model. An Iraq–GCC Saudi Arabia the Iraqi foothold it has long In so it can serve as one possible alternative to traditional Saudi checkbook diplomacy — the of economic aid and investment for political concessions — which has yielded diminishing returns for For example, while billions dollars in oil cash have Saudi reacquire the of Tiran and Sanafir from Egypt, it did nothing to prevent from opposing Riyadh at the United Nations or sending just to the kingdom’s war Yemen. Similarly, keeping Lebanon’s solvent not diminished Hizballah nor friendly in to GCC Utility exports like electricity more cost-effective, less prone to and, because the electric affect much larger populations than the types of aid and direct investment Saudi Arabia typically Moreover, because electric grids are dispersed, they are more difficult to seize cash or harder to destroy than agricultural and industrial investments. importantly, they distribute benefits all social strata rather than just a small subsection elites, them more to spark generalized development. This is because the radical transnational ideologies and employ marginalization. As the director of the States of Peace’s Middle East project warned,
 the country, continues to targEt Iraq’s natIonal GriD. GiVeN IraNian Opposition to GCc AssiStance, there is also a possIbiliTy THat IRAn-AllieD militiAS cOULd sAbOtAge ThE PoWer liNes — AlthougH there is no CleAr Evidence that THeY have attacKed Power infrastRucTure thUs Far. iRaq alSo hAs a seRious pROblem wIth electrIcITy thefT; In 2015, the MiNIStRy of electricity collecTEd PAyments for just 12 PercenT oF ThE ELecTriCity it prodUcEd.

SauDI Arabia ANd kUWAit COuld alleviate The threat of SAboTage by AsKinG iraq to Hire pRiVAte Security to gUard New power iNfrastRUcture. AS A failsaFe, both CouNtrIes wILl Be AblE tO Cut THe PowER if The infraStRuCture Is seIZED By ISiL oR IraN-alliEd militias. EleCtrIcitY TheFt, whiCh tarGets LoCal loW-voltaGe netWoRks, is a thornier pRoblEm. Saudi ArAbiA aNd KUwAit coULd help MitIgaTe, althoUgh certAInlY nOT ELiMinate, this problem bY pROViDing Iraq With elECtRiCIty meterS aNd pErhaPS ReconFiguRInG the miniStry’s uTIlItY paymenTs System AlOng The Lines OF the saudi ELectriciTy ComPAny’s highly succESsful model.

An IRAq–gcc iNTerlInk Will give SauDi ArABia tHe IrAQi FooTHold iT has lOnG SoUGht. In so doing, it can seRvE as one PossiBle geoeconomiC alternatiVE TO traditiOnal sAuDI checkbook diplOmacy — The exchangE Of economIc aid And invesTment for pOLItical coNceSsiOns — WhiCH HaS yielded diminISHing ReTurns foR thE kingdoM. FoR exAmpLe, wHiLe billionS of dollaRs In OiL aNd cAsh maY Have helpEd sauDi araBia reACquire The isLandS oF TIRan And SanaFIr FROm EgYpT, iT did NotHiNg to pReveNT CaIro from Opposing RIyaDH at tHe unIted NatIons or sending JuSt 800 troops to BaCk tHe kingDOM’s war in YEmen. Similarly, keeping LebANon’s ecoNomY solvEnt hAs not dimiNisHed HizBalLAh nor hAs bankRolliNg FriENDly poLITiCiaNs In Iraq done MUCh tO advaNcE GCC InteresTs.

Utility exports liKE elEctricity are mOre Cost-EFFeCtiVE, lESs pRoNE to GRAft, and, because thE electric gRiD TrAverses an eNTirE cOuntry, aFfect muCh larGEr populAtions thaN the types Of ForeIGN aiD and direct InvestmeNt Saudi ArABia tyPIcAlly eMplOys. MorEoVer, BecauSe elecTRic Grids Are disPeRsed, thEy are MoRe difficUlt to seize than cash or oil And harDer to DesTroy than aGriCUltUral and inDustRial investMenTs. MOst imPorTAntly, They DIsTriBUte beNefiTS across alL SoCiaL STrAta rather thAN JUst A smalL suBSectioN of eLites, making them moRE likely to spark GeneRALizEd eCOnomIc Development. ThiS is ImPORtant becAuSe the radicaL and sectArIAn traNsnatiOnal idEologieS iRaN And ISIl empLoy Thrive on eConOmIC marginAlIzATion. As The dIrEctor oF the UnITed STATes Institute of PeAce’s MIDDle EaST prOject ReCently wARned, “[the Basra
 the country, continues to  target Ir aq’snat ion al  gri d. G iven Iranian o p posi tion to GCC assistance , the re is a l so  a po ssibili t yt h atIr an -al li e dmilit ias  couldsabotage t hepo wer lines —a lt hough ther e i s no clear e vid ence t ha t t h ey ha veattac ked po w er inf rastructu re thus f a r. Iraq a ls o ha s a serious probl e mw ith electricit y thef t; in 2 015 , t he Ministr yof El e ctricit y  c o l l ect e d payments fo r just 12 p e rce nt ofth e e l ectric ity i tp rod uced.

Saud i Ar abia andKuwait could a l leviate  the t hre atof s a bo ta geby ask i ng  Ir a q t o hire p ri va te se curi t y t o gu ard  new  powe r infrastruct ure . As a f ailsa fe, b othco untri es wil l beab le to cut the p ower  if the i nfr as tru ct ure i s  seize d b y I SIL orIran-al l ied  m i l i ti as. Electricity th ef t ,  w hich tar gets l o ca ll ow-volta ge  ne twor k s , isa th o rn ier prob lem. S a ud iArabiaan d Kuwa it  co uld  help miti gate,although  cert a inly not elimi n ate, this pro b le m by prov idi ng Iraq wit h el e ctri city me ter s  andperha ps re c onfiguring the mini st ry’s u tilit y payments sy stem along t h e linesof t h eS audi Electrici ty Co mpany’s hi g hly succ essfu l model. 

An Iraq – G CC inter lin k w ill  gi v e  S audi Arabia t h e  Ira qi  footho ldit haslon g s oug ht.  I n so doin g, it ca nse rv easone p o ssible g eo eco no mic  alte r native  to t radi ti on a l S audi ch e ck b o ok d ip lo macy  —th e exc hang e  of  econom ic aid an d i n vest me nt  for po litical conce ss ions — whi ch  ha s yiel d e d dimini shing returns for the k i ngdom.For  exam ple,  while bi lli ons of  do l lars i n oiland c as h m a y  have h el ped  S audi Arabi a rea cquir etheislands  of Tiran and Sana f irfrom Egypt, i t d id n o t hi ngt op rev en t  Ca i r o from opposing  Riyadh at  t h eUnited Nat i ons  o r sendi ng just  800t roops t o back th e kingdom ’s  war i n Y emen. Simi larly, k eeping Le b anon’ s  e conom y s olvent  h asnot d iminis h edHizba llah n or  has b ankro ll ing frie ndly politicians in Ira q done  much  to  advanceGCC int erests.
Util ity export s l ike  elec tri c ity a re m o re  co s t-eff ecti v e, less p r on e t o gr aft, and, b e c a use  theele c tric g ridtraverses an enti r e country, aff ectm u chlar g er p op ulations thanthe  t y p es of fo re ign aid and  directin v estme nt Sau di Ara bia typ i c al l y empl oys.  Mo reover, b eca us e  electr ic  g r ids ar e di sp ersed,  theya re m o r e difficult to s eizet h an ca s h o r oil  a nd hard e r to  destroy t han agricul turalandindus trial i nv estmen ts.  M ost import a ntly, the y dis tribute  b enef its  acros s al l socia l st ra tarather th a n  j u st  a sma ll s ubsec ti on o f elites, making t hem more li ke lyt o  spark ge n e ralized ec ono mic d e v elopment.T hisi si mport ant be causethe rad i cal  a nd sect ari a n  transnat ional ide o log ie s Ir an and I SI L em pl oyth rive on economi c margin alizatio n .  As th e d i rect o r of t he  United Stat es In st i tute of P eac e’s Mid d leEas t p roje ctrece n tly warned, “[The Basra
 the_country, continues_to target Iraq’s national_grid. Given_Iranian_opposition to_GCC_assistance, there is_also a possibility_that Iran-allied militias could_sabotage the power_lines_— although there is no clear evidence that they have attacked power infrastructure thus_far._Iraq also_has_a_serious problem with electricity theft;_in 2015, the Ministry of_Electricity collected_payments for just 12 percent of the electricity_it_produced.

Saudi Arabia and_Kuwait could alleviate the threat of sabotage by asking_Iraq to hire private security to_guard new power_infrastructure._As_a failsafe, both countries_will be able to cut the_power if the infrastructure is seized_by ISIL or Iran-allied militias. Electricity theft,_which targets local low-voltage networks, is_a thornier problem. Saudi Arabia_and Kuwait_could help mitigate, although certainly_not eliminate, this_problem by_providing Iraq with_electricity meters and perhaps reconfiguring the_ministry’s utility payments_system along the lines of the_Saudi_Electricity Company’s highly_successful_model.

An_Iraq–GCC interlink_will give Saudi_Arabia_the Iraqi_foothold_it has long sought. In so_doing,_it can serve as one possible geoeconomic_alternative to traditional Saudi_checkbook_diplomacy — the exchange_of economic aid and investment_for political concessions — which has_yielded diminishing_returns for_the kingdom. For example, while billions of dollars in oil and_cash may have helped Saudi Arabia_reacquire the islands of_Tiran and_Sanafir_from Egypt, it_did_nothing to_prevent Cairo from opposing Riyadh at the_United Nations_or sending just 800 troops to_back the kingdom’s war_in_Yemen. Similarly, keeping Lebanon’s economy solvent_has not diminished Hizballah nor has_bankrolling friendly politicians in Iraq_done_much_to advance GCC interests.

Utility exports_like electricity are more cost-effective, less_prone to graft,_and, because the electric grid traverses an_entire_country, affect much larger populations than_the_types of foreign aid and direct_investment_Saudi_Arabia typically employs. Moreover, because_electric grids are dispersed, they are_more difficult to seize than cash or oil and_harder to destroy_than agricultural and industrial investments._Most_importantly,_they distribute benefits across all social strata rather than just_a small_subsection of elites,_making them more likely to spark generalized economic development. This_is important because the radical and sectarian_transnational ideologies Iran and ISIL employ thrive on economic marginalization. As_the director of the United States Institute of_Peace’s Middle East project recently warned, “[The_Basra