 negotiating positions. The critical decision for Scotland is the currency. Will Scotland seek to inherit the British derogation from the single currency (Protocol 15)? If it does so, will the rest of the EU agree? Strictly speaking (and why not?) as a member state of the Union Scotland will be expected to adopt the euro as and when it fulfils the Maastricht convergence criteria, according to the ordained timetable. We can only gauge Scotland’s progress in this regard once we know the extent of its legacy debt, courtesy of the UK. But why Mr Salmond would prefer to stick with the pound sterling instead of pitching into the euro as soon as possible, I cannot say. One may doubt, as Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England, has done that Scotland could truly claim to be independent if its monetary policy and fiscal disciplines were to continue to be set in London.

The deeper truth, of course, is that Scotland in the EU will be no more or less ‘independent’ than any other member state. In the EU, interdependence is the name of the game. ‘Scottish independence’ is a powerful slogan: the reality will be somewhat different whether it tried to stick with sterling or agreed to embrace the euro. As Ireland has found, although liberated from Whitehall, its autonomy under the terms and conditions of EU economic and monetary union is strictly conditional on decisions taken in Frankfurt and Brussels.

Beyond the question of the single currency are the UK’s plethora of other opt outs and exceptions which are governed by Protocol 20 on Schengen, Protocol 21 on justice and home affairs, and Protocol 30 on the Charter of Fundamental Rights. One can see that the common travel area of the British Isles should stay. But why the Scottish parliament and courts would wish to marginalise themselves like the English from the development of mainstream EU common policies in terms of immigration and asylum, the administration of justice, cooperation of police forces and the like is not self-evident.

After the question is settled of how ‘British’ Scotland wishes to be, there will still be real and somewhat tough negotiations between London, Edinburgh and Brussels about the number of MEPs each state will elect and about both the actual and relative size of their budgetary contributions.

Finally, one should note that the Scotland question will not be taken in isolation, and that the new EU arrangements for a non-UK Scotland will not be based on things as they are now. The European Union is
negotiating positions. The critical decision for Scotland is the currency. Will Scotland search to inherit the British disparagement from the single currency (Protocol 15)? If it do then, will the rest of the EU agree? rigorously speaking (and why not ?) as a member state of the Union Scotland will be expect to adopt the euro as and when it fulfils the Maastricht overlap criteria, according to the ordained timetable. We can only estimate Scotland ’s progress in this regard once we acknowledge the extent of its legacy debt, courtesy of the UK. But why Mr Salmond would prefer to lodge with the pound sterling instead of pitching into the euro equally soon as possible, I cannot say. One may doubt, as Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England, has do that Scotland could truly claim to be autonomous if its monetary policy and fiscal disciplines were to cover to be set in London. 

 The deeper truth, of path, is that Scotland in the EU will be no more or less ‘ independent ’ than any other member state. In the EU, interdependence is the name of the game. ‘ Scottish independence ’ is a powerful slogan: the reality will be somewhat different whether it tried to stick with sterling or agreed to embrace the euro. As Ireland has found, although emancipate from Whitehall, its autonomy under the terms and conditions of EU economic and monetary marriage is rigorously conditional on decision taken in Frankfurt and Brussels. 

 Beyond the question of the single currency are the UK ’s plethora of other opt outs and exception which are governed by Protocol 20 on Schengen, Protocol 21 on justice and home affairs, and Protocol 30 on the Charter of Fundamental Rights. One can see that the common locomotion area of the British Isles should stay. But why the Scottish parliament and court would wish to marginalize themselves like the English from the growth of mainstream EU common policies in terms of immigration and asylum, the presidency of justice, cooperation of police forces and the like is not self - evident. 

 After the doubt is settled of how ‘ British ’ Scotland wishes to be, there will still be real and reasonably tough negotiation between London, Edinburgh and Brussels about the number of MEPs each state will elect and about both the actual and proportional size of their budgetary contributions. 

 Finally, one should note that the Scotland question will not be consider in isolation, and that the new EU arrangement for a non - UK Scotland will not be based on things as they are immediately. The European Union is
 nehotiating positions. The gritical decisiou for Srotland is the zurrency. Will Scotland seek vo ibheriu the British derogxtion frol the sibgle xurrency (Pcktocol 15)? If it foes wo, will the rext of the AU agree? Stricdlh dpeaking (and why not?) as a member stwte of yhf Union Scotlagd wplj be vxkected to adopt the euro as and wgen it hulfils the Maaxtricht convergence criterla, afcording to the orfained timejzblq. We can only gauge Scoulcnd’s progreas in this regard once we know ghe ertent of itw oegwwy debt, couctesy jf the UK. Bub why Ms Salmomd would prefev to vtixk with the pound stecling instead of pitshing intm che euro as soon as piswible, I cdnnog sah. Ohe mzy douht, es Mark Carhey, Governoe of the Bank of Enblwbd, has done tgat Scjtjand could truly claim to be independenu if jts monetary policy and fiscal disciplines wgre to coneinue to be set in London.

The deeper truth, of courve, is ghau Wcotlxbd in the EU will be no more or less ‘independene’ tnak any other membcr state. In the EU, ijtrtdependence is the ncje of the game. ‘Scottlsh indgpendebce’ is a kowergul slogan: the reality will be somewhat eifferent whether nt tried to rticl witn sterling or agreed to embdace the eugo. As Iremxnd has found, algholgh niberated from Whitehall, ies autonony uuder the terks and conditiond of CG economic and monftary ution is stgictly conditional on decisions taken in Franlfgrt and Brufsels.

Neyond the queseion of the siugle curxency xre the UK’a plethmra of othew opt outs ang exceptions xhich are govwrnee by Prugocol 20 on Schemgen, Protocol 21 on jystice and home afnairs, znd Protocol 30 ou uhw Charter of Findxmegtwl Rychts. One can see thxy the common trayel ares of the British Islas sgould stay. But why tme Scottiwh parliwment and coutts would wish to largiialise themxeldes like the English from the sevelopmejt jf mainstreai EU common polieies in terms of immigration and asylum, vhe administration of jystice, cooperation pn police forres anq the lika is not self-evident.

Qfter the questiok is settled of how ‘Brjtish’ Vcotlwnd wishes to be, there will still be real and somewhat tough negotiations betwexn London, Edihburbh ang Yruxsels wbouv vhe number of MEPx each state will elect and abont both tha cctual and relative size of tnekr budgetary zontributions.

Finally, one should mote that the Scotland question will not be taken in isplation, qnd tgat thv nxw EU arrangements fpr a nmn-UK Wcotlane wipl not be basdd pn things ad thty axe now. The European Union is
negotiating positions. The critical decision for Scotland currency. Scotland seek inherit the British (Protocol If it does will the rest the EU agree? Strictly speaking (and not?) as a member state of the Union Scotland will be expected to the euro as and when it fulfils the Maastricht convergence criteria, according to ordained We only Scotland’s progress in this regard once we know the extent of its legacy debt, courtesy of UK. But why Mr Salmond would prefer to with the pound sterling of pitching into the euro soon possible, I say. may as Mark Carney, of the Bank of England, has done that Scotland could truly claim to be independent if its policy and were to to set London. The deeper course, is that Scotland in the no more or less ‘independent’ than any other state. In EU, interdependence is the name of game. ‘Scottish independence’ is a powerful slogan: the will be somewhat different whether it tried to stick with sterling or agreed to embrace As Ireland has found, liberated from Whitehall, autonomy the and of EU and monetary union is strictly conditional on decisions taken in Frankfurt Brussels. Beyond the question of the single currency are the of opt outs and which are governed by 20 Schengen, Protocol 21 on home and the of Rights. One can see the common travel area of British Isles should stay. and courts would wish to marginalise themselves like English from the development of mainstream EU policies in terms of immigration and asylum, the administration of justice, cooperation police forces like is not self-evident. After the question is of how ‘British’ Scotland to be, there will still be real and somewhat negotiations London, Edinburgh Brussels about the of MEPs each will elect and the actual relative of Finally, one should note that the question not be taken in isolation, that EU arrangements for a non-UK Scotland will not be based on things as they are European Union is
 negotiating positions. The crItical deciSion fOr SCotLaNd is The cUrrency. Will ScoTLand Seek to inherit the BritisH deroGaTIon fROm The siNgle curREnCY (proToCoL 15)? If It DOeS so, wiLl tHe rest oF the EU agreE? StRiCtly speaking (ANd Why not?) as a mEmbEr state of the uniOn ScotLaNd wILl be eXpeCted tO adopt THe euro As and when It FUlfils THe MaastRIChT conVergence criteria, aCCoRDing to the ordaiNed timEtABlE. wE caN onLy gauge ScoTlAnd’s pROgress iN ThIS REgaRD once we know thE extent of itS LegAcy debT, cOurTEsy of tHe UK. BUt WHy MR Salmond wouLd prEfer to stiCk with THe pound STerling InsteaD of PitChinG InTo The EuRO as SOoN as POssIble, I canNoT sAy. One May dOUBT, As MaRk CArneY, GoveRnor of the Bank Of ENglaND, haS done That SCotlAnD coulD truly Claim To Be independent if Its mOnetary poLicY aNd fIsCal diSCiplinEs wEre To contiNue to be SEt iN LONDOn.

the deeper truth, of coUrSE, Is That ScotLand in THe eU WIll be no mOrE or Less ‘INDepenDent’ THaN any otheR membeR StAtE. In the Eu, iNterdePeNdeNce Is the NAme oF the gaMe. ‘ScottiSh indEPendence’ is a powERful slogan: the REaLITy WIll bE soMewhat diffeRent WHethEr it TRiEd tO Stick With sTeRLiNG or agreed to embrace tHe Euro. As irelaNd has found, altHough liberATED from WhiTehaLL, iTS autonomy under The teRms and condITions of Eu econOmic and mOnetary unION is stricTly ConDitIonAL On Decisions takeN IN FraNkFurt and bruSsels.

BeYonD thE quEstIoN of the sinGle curreNcY aRe ThE UK’S pletHOra of othEr Opt OuTs aNd excEPtions Which Are gOvErNEd bY ProtocOL 20 oN sChenGeN, PRotoCol 21 On JustiCe anD HomE affairS, and ProtoCol 30 ON the chArTer of FuNdamental RighTs. one can see tHaT thE commoN TRavel areA of the British Isles shoulD Stay. But Why The ScOttiSh parliamEnt And couRts WOuld wiSh to maRginaLiSe tHEMselvES LiKe tHe english froM THe dEveloPmEnt oF mainstReam EU common policiES in Terms of immigrAtiOn anD ASyLum, THe ADmiNiSTraTIOn of justice, coopEration of pOlICe Forces and tHE liKe Is not seLf-evideNt.

AftER the queStion is seTtled of hoW ‘BRitiSH’ scoTland wisheS to be, theRe will stiLL be reAL aNd somEwhAt tougH nEgoTiatiOns betWEen londoN, EdinbUrGh and BRusseLs About the Number of MEPs each state wiLl elecT and aBouT both the aCtuAL anD relative Size Of their budGetAry ContrIbuTIons.

FInalLY, oNe sHOuld nOte tHAt the ScotLAnD quESTiOn will not be TAKEn iN isolAtiON, and thAt thE new EU arrangementS For a non-UK ScotlAnd wILL noT be BAsed On Things as they arE noW. THE european unIon is
 negotiating positions. Th e critical  deci sio n f or  Sco tlan d is the curre n cy.Will Scotland seek toinher it theB ri tishderogat i on f rom  t he  si ng l ecurre ncy  (Proto col 15)? I f i tdoes so, wil l  t he rest of  th e EU agree?Str ictlysp eak i ng (a ndwhy n ot?) a s  a mem ber state  o f  the U n ion Sco t l an d wi ll be expected to ad o pt the euro as  and w he n  i t ful fil s the Maas tr ichtc onverge n ce c r ite r ia, according  to the ord a ine d time ta ble .  We ca n onl yg aug e Scotland’ s pr ogress in  thisr egard o n ce we k now th e e xte nt o f  i ts  le ga c y d e bt , c o urt esy of t he  U K. Bu t wh y M r  Sal mon d wo uld p refer to stic k w itht hepound  ster ling  i nstea d of p itchi ng  into the euroas s oon as po ssi bl e,Icanno t  say.One  ma y doubt , as Ma r k C ar n e y ,Governor of the Ba nk o fEngland,  has d o ne  t h at Scotl an d c ould t rulyclai m  t o be ind epende n tif  its mo ne tary p ol icy  an d fis c al d iscipl ines wer e toc ontinue to bes et in London. 
T h e  d e eper  tr uth, of cou rse, is t hatS co tla n d inthe E Uw il l  be no more or less  ‘ indepe ndent ’ than any ot her member s t ate. IntheE U, interdependenc e isthe name o f  the gam e. ‘S cottishindepende n c e’ is apow erf ulslo g a n:  the realityw i ll b esomewha t d ifferen t w het her  it  t ried to s tick wit hst er li ngor ag r eed to e mb rac ethe  euro .  As Ir eland  has  f ou n d,althoug h  l i b erat ed  f romWhi te hall,  its aut onomy u nder theter m s an dco ndition s of EU econo mi c and mone ta ryunioni s  strictl y conditional on decisi o ns take n i n Fra nkfu rt and Br uss els.
Bey o nd the  quest ion o fthe s ingle c ur ren cy  are the U K ’ s p letho ra  ofother o pt outs and except i ons  which are go ver nedb y  P rot o co l  20  o n  Sc h e ngen, Protocol21 on just ic e  a nd home af f air s,  and Pr otocol30 on the Cha rter of F undamenta lRigh t s . O ne can see  that th e commont ravel ar ea of  th e Brit is h I slesshould sta y. Bu t whyth e Scot tishpa rliament  and courts would wishto mar ginal ise  themselv esl ike  the Engl ishfrom the d eve lop mentofm ainst ream EU  co m mon p olic i es in ter m sofi m mi gration and a s ylu m, th e a d minist rati on of justice, co o peration of po lice f orc esa nd t he  like is not s elf -e v i dent.

A ft er the ques tion isse t tledof how  ‘Brit ish’ Sc o t la n d wish es t o b e, therewil ls till be  r ea l  and s omew ha t toug h nego t iati o n s between London , Edi n b urgha ndBruss el s about thenumber ofMEPs each s tate w illelect  and ab ou t both  th eactual and relativesizeof thei rbudg eta ry con trib u t ions. 

Fi na lly , one sho u l dn ot et hat  the  Scot la nd q uestion w i ll not b e t a ken inis ola t i on, an d  t h a t the newEUarran g e ments fora  non - UK Scotl and wi ll not  be bas e d o nthingsast h ey are no w. The Eu r ope an  Uni on is
 negotiating_positions. The_critical decision for Scotland_is the_currency._Will Scotland_seek_to inherit the_British derogation from_the single currency (Protocol_15)? If it_does_so, will the rest of the EU agree? Strictly speaking (and why not?) as_a_member state_of_the_Union Scotland will be expected_to adopt the euro as_and when_it fulfils the Maastricht convergence criteria, according to_the_ordained timetable. We_can only gauge Scotland’s progress in this regard once_we know the extent of its_legacy debt, courtesy_of_the_UK. But why Mr_Salmond would prefer to stick with_the pound sterling instead of pitching_into the euro as soon as possible,_I cannot say. One may doubt,_as Mark Carney, Governor of_the Bank_of England, has done that_Scotland could truly_claim to_be independent if_its monetary policy and fiscal disciplines_were to continue_to be set in London.

The deeper_truth,_of course, is_that_Scotland_in the_EU will be_no_more or_less_‘independent’ than any other member state._In_the EU, interdependence is the name of_the game. ‘Scottish independence’_is_a powerful slogan: the_reality will be somewhat different_whether it tried to stick with_sterling or_agreed to_embrace the euro. As Ireland has found, although liberated from Whitehall,_its autonomy under the terms and_conditions of EU economic_and monetary_union_is strictly conditional_on_decisions taken_in Frankfurt and Brussels.

Beyond the question of_the single_currency are the UK’s plethora of_other opt outs and_exceptions_which are governed by Protocol 20_on Schengen, Protocol 21 on justice_and home affairs, and Protocol_30_on_the Charter of Fundamental Rights._One can see that the common_travel area of_the British Isles should stay. But why_the_Scottish parliament and courts would wish_to_marginalise themselves like the English from_the_development_of mainstream EU common policies_in terms of immigration and asylum,_the administration of justice, cooperation of police forces and_the like is_not self-evident.

After the question is_settled_of_how ‘British’ Scotland wishes to be, there will still be_real and_somewhat tough negotiations_between London, Edinburgh and Brussels about the number of MEPs_each state will elect and about both_the actual and relative size of their budgetary contributions.

Finally, one should_note that the Scotland question will not be_taken in isolation, and that the new_EU arrangements for a_non-UK_Scotland will not be based on things_as_they_are_now. The European_Union is