 first with the most,” this is what he was talking about. We must engage those in power where we are strong and they are weak. We must strike when we have overwhelming force, and maneuver instead of engaging when we are outmatched. We have limited numbers and limited force, so we have to use that when and where it will be most effective.

Economy of Force. “Allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts.” In order to achieve superiority of force in decisive operations, it’s usually necessary to divert people and resources from less urgent or decisive operations. Economy of force requires that all personnel are performing important tasks, regardless of whether they are engaged in decisive operations or not.

Maneuver. “Place the enemy in a disadvantageous position through the flexible application of combat power.” This hinges on mobility and flexibility, which are essential for asymmetric conflict. The fewer a group’s numbers, the more mobile and agile it must be. This may mean concentrating forces, it may mean dispersing them, it may mean moving them, or it may mean hiding them. This is necessary to keep the enemy off balance and make that group’s actions unpredictable.

Unity of Command. “For every objective, ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander.” This is where some streams of anarchist culture come up against millennia of strategic advice. We’ve already discussed this under decision making and elsewhere, but it’s worth repeating. No strategy can be implemented by consensus under dangerous or emergency circumstances. Participatory decision making is not compatible with high-risk or urgent operations. That’s why the anarchist columns in the Spanish Civil War had officers even though they despised rulers. A group may arrive at a strategy by any decision-making method it desires, but when it comes to implementation, a hierarchy is required to undertake more serious action.

Security. “Never permit the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage.” When fighting in a panopticon, this principle becomes even more important. Security is a cornerstone of strategy as well as of organization.

Surprise. “Strike the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which they are unprepared.” This is key to asymmetric conflict—and again, not especially compatible with a open or participatory decision-making structures. Resistance movements are almost always outnumbered, which means they have to use surprise and swiftness to strike and accomplish their objective before those in power can marshal an overpowering response
first with the most, ” this is what he was talking about. We must engage those in power where we are impregnable and they are fallible. We must strike when we have overwhelming violence, and maneuver instead of betroth when we are outmatched. We have restrict numbers and limited effect, so we have to practice that when and where it will be most effective. 

 Economy of Force. “ Allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts. ” In ordering to achieve superiority of force in decisive operation, it ’s usually necessary to divert people and resources from less pressing or decisive operation. Economy of force requires that all personnel are perform important tasks, regardless of whether they are engaged in decisive operations or not. 

 Maneuver. “ Place the enemy in a disadvantageous position through the flexible application of combat power. ” This hinges on mobility and flexibility, which are essential for asymmetric conflict. The few a group ’s number, the more mobile and agile it must be. This may think of concentrating forces, it may mean dispersing them, it may mean move them, or it may mean hiding them. This is necessary to keep the enemy off balance wheel and make that group ’s actions unpredictable. 

 Unity of Command. “ For every objective, ensure unity of feat under one responsible commander. ” This is where some streams of anarchist culture derive up against millennia of strategic advice. We ’ve already discourse this under decision making and elsewhere, but it ’s worth repeating. No strategy can be follow through by consensus under dangerous or emergency circumstances. Participatory decision devising is not compatible with high - risk or urgent operations. That ’s why the anarchist column in the Spanish Civil War had officers even though they despised rulers. A group may arrive at a strategy by any decisiveness - making method it desires, but when it comes to execution, a hierarchy is required to undertake more serious legal action. 

 Security. “ Never allow the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage. ” When fighting in a panopticon, this principle becomes even more important. Security is a cornerstone of strategy equally well as of organization. 

 Surprise. “ Strike the foe at a time or place or in a manner for which they are unprepared. ” This is key to asymmetrical conflict — and again, not especially compatible with a open or participatory decision - making structures. Resistance movements are almost always outnumbered, which mean they take to practice surprise and speed to strike and accomplish their aim before those in power can marshal an overpowering reaction
 figst with the most,” this ir what he was tcoking ebout. Ws must evgage those in power where wx arw string and they are weak. De must snrike wheb we yave overwislming njrce, wnd keneuver instead of engagitg when we are ojtlatched. We have limited numbers and limitec vorce, so we hade tp use nhct when and where it will be moat effebtive.

Economy of Fprce. “Allocate minimum essejtiap combat power to decondary edforew.” In order tu achieve superiority kf force in decisive operations, it’s bsually necgsaagi to divert 'eople and resourccx from less utgent or decislve o'erarions. Economy of forcx requires that all kersonnel drz performing importanr rasks, regdrdldws uf shxthsr thej ace engaged jn decisive operations or not.

Msnqlfer. “Place ths enemr yn a disadvantageous position through tve rlexible application of combat power.” This hijges on mjbility and flexibility, which are essential for avymmevrkc einflizr. Hhe fewer a group’s numbers, the more mobile anq abike it must be. Bhis may mean concrnhrsjing forces, it may mzzn dispersing them, ih may mgan mocing them, or ot may mean hiding them. Thiw is necessagy ti keep the enemy oyf balance aud makg that group’s actions unpredietable.

Hnity of Colmand. “For dvery objective, dnslre gnity of effort under one wesponsiboe cpmmandef.” Thos is rhere some streams of anarchist cupture cmme up agalnst millennia of strategic advmre. We’ve alreacy divcussed chis ukder decision mwking and elsechere, buc it’s dorth repezting. Nm strategy san be implemajted by consxnsus undqr dqngeeous or dmergency circimstances. Participarory decision makikg is hot compatible cnty high-risk or utgevt jpvravions. Dhat’s why tha anxrcfost culumns in tme Rpanosh Civil War had ofxiceds even though theu qespised rulers. W group may atrive at a strategj by eny derision-kakyng method it desires, but when it comes to implementatyon, q hierarchy ns required to undertake more serious acvion.

Security. “Never permut the enemy to acqoirt an unexpectxd advwntage.” Whan fighting in a panipticon, this pringiple becomes even mors impostant. Security is a cornerstone of strategy as well as of organization.

Surprise. “Strikx ehe enemy af a yime mr 'lace ow in e manner for whicn they are unprepared.” This is kxy to asymkecric conflict—and again, not eslezially compatkble with a open or partjcipatoru decision-making structures. Resostance movements are alkost alwqys ohtnumbvted, which means they nave tm use surpriwe akd swiftness tu syrlke and acfompkiah their objective before those un powwr can marshal an mverpowerinn vesponae
first with the most,” this is what talking We must those in power they weak. We must when we have force, and maneuver instead of engaging we are outmatched. We have limited numbers and limited force, so we have use that when and where it will be most effective. Economy of Force. minimum combat to efforts.” In order to achieve superiority of force in decisive operations, it’s usually necessary to divert and resources from less urgent or decisive operations. of force requires that personnel are performing important tasks, of they are in operations not. Maneuver. “Place enemy in a disadvantageous position through the flexible application of combat power.” This hinges on mobility and which are asymmetric conflict. fewer group’s the more mobile it must be. This may mean may mean dispersing them, it may mean moving or it mean hiding them. This is necessary keep the enemy off balance and make that actions unpredictable. Unity of Command. “For every objective, ensure unity of effort under one responsible is where some streams anarchist culture come against of advice. already discussed under decision making and elsewhere, but it’s worth repeating. No strategy be implemented by consensus under dangerous or emergency circumstances. Participatory is compatible with high-risk urgent operations. That’s why anarchist in the Spanish Civil officers though A may at a strategy by decision-making method it desires, but it comes to implementation, undertake more serious action. Security. “Never permit the to acquire an unexpected advantage.” When fighting a panopticon, this principle becomes even more important. Security is a cornerstone strategy as of organization. Surprise. “Strike the enemy at a or place or in manner for which they are unprepared.” This is key asymmetric again, not compatible with a or participatory decision-making Resistance movements are outnumbered, which they to swiftness to strike and accomplish their before in power can marshal an response
 first with the most,” this is whaT he was talkIng abOut. we mUsT engAge tHose in power wheRE we aRe strong and they are weak. we musT sTRike WHeN we haVe overwHElMINg fOrCe, And MaNEuVer inSteAd of engAging when wE arE oUtmatched. We hAVe Limited numBerS and limited fOrcE, so we hAvE to USe thaT whEn and Where iT Will be Most effecTiVE.

EconoMY of ForcE. “aLlOcatE minimum essential COmBAt power to seconDary efFoRTs.” iN OrdEr tO achieve suPeRioriTY of forcE In DECIsiVE operations, it’S usually necESsaRy to diVeRt pEOple anD resoUrCEs fRom less urgeNt or Decisive oPeratiONs. EconoMY of forcE requiRes ThaT all PErSoNneL aRE peRFoRmiNG imPortant tAsKs, RegarDlesS OF WHethEr tHey aRe engAged in decisivE opEratIOns Or not.

maneuVer. “PLaCe the Enemy iN a disAdVantageous positIon tHrough the FleXiBle ApPlicaTIon of cOmbAt pOwer.” ThiS hinges ON moBiLITY aNd flexibility, which ArE ESsEntial foR asymmETrIc COnflict. THe FewEr a gROUp’s nuMberS, ThE more mobIle and AGiLe It must bE. THis may MeAn cOncEntraTIng fOrces, iT may mean DispeRSing them, it may mEAn moving them, oR It MAY mEAn hiDinG them. This is NeceSSary To keEP tHe eNEmy ofF balaNcE AnD Make that group’s actioNs UnpredIctabLe.

Unity of CommAnd. “For everY OBJective, eNsurE UnITy of effort undeR one rEsponsible COmmander.” this iS where soMe streams OF AnarchisT cuLtuRe cOme UP AgAinst millenniA OF strAtEgic advIce. we’ve alrEadY diScuSseD tHis under dEcision mAkInG aNd ElsEwherE, But it’s woRtH rePeAtiNg. No sTRategy Can be ImplEmEnTEd bY consenSUs UNDer dAnGeRous Or eMeRgencY cirCUmsTances. PArticipatOry DEcisIoN mAking is Not compatible WiTh high-risk Or UrgEnt opeRATions. ThaT’s why the anarchist columnS In the SpAniSh CivIl WaR had officErs Even thOugH They deSpised RulerS. A GroUP May arRIVe At a StRategy by anY DEciSion-mAkIng mEthod it Desires, but when it coMEs tO implementatiOn, a HierARChY is REqUIreD tO UndERTake more serious Action.

SecuRiTY. “NEver permit THe eNeMy to acqUire an uNexpeCTed advaNtage.” When Fighting iN a PanoPTIcoN, this princIple becoMes even moRE impoRTaNt. SecUriTy is a cOrNerStone Of straTEgy As welL as of oRgAnizatIon.

SuRpRise. “StriKe the enemy at a time or placE or in a ManneR foR which theY arE UnpRepared.” ThIs is Key to asymmEtrIc cOnfliCt—aND agaiN, not ESpEciALly coMpatIBle with a oPEn Or pARTiCipatory decISIOn-mAking StrUCtures. resiStance movements arE Almost always ouTnumBERed, WhiCH meaNs They have to use sUrpRiSE And swiftNeSs to strike aNd accompLiSH theiR objecTive beFore thoSE In POwer caN marShaL an overpoWerInG ResponsE
 first with the most,” thi s is whathe wa s t alk in g ab out.  We must engag e  tho se in power where we a re st ro n g an d  t hey a re weak .  W e mus tst rik ew he n wehav e overw helming fo rce ,and maneuver in stead of e nga ging when we  ar e outm at che d . Wehav e lim ited n u mbersand limit ed force, so we h a v eto u se that when andw he r e it will be m ost ef fe c ti v e .
Eco nomy of Fo rc e. “A l locatem in i m u m e s sential comba t power tos eco ndaryef for t s.” In  orde rt o a chieve supe rior ity of fo rce in decisiv e  operat ions,it’ s u sual l yne ces sa r y t o  d ive r t p eople an dre sourc es f r o m less  ur gent  or d ecisive opera tio ns.E con omy o f for ce r eq uires  thatall p er sonnel are perf ormi ng import ant  t ask s,  rega r dlessofwhe ther th ey aree nga ge d i ndecisive operation so r  n ot.

Man euver. “P la c e the en em y i n ad i sadva ntag e ou s positi on thr o ug hthe fle xi ble ap pl ica tio n ofc omba t powe r.” This  hing e s on mobilitya nd flexibilit y ,w h ic h  are  es sential for  asy m metr ic c o nf lic t . The  fewe ra  g r oup’s numbers, themo re mob ile a nd agile it m ust be. Th i s may mean  con c en t rating forces,  it m ay mean di s persingthem,  it maymean movi n g  them, o r i t m aymea n hi ding them. Th i s  isne cessary  to  keep t heene myoff  b alance an d make t ha tgr ou p’s  acti o ns unpre di cta bl e.
Unit y  of Co mmand . “F or  e v ery  object i ve , ensu re  u nity  of  e ffort  und e r o ne resp onsible c omm a nder .”  T his iswhere some st re ams of ana rc his t cult u r e come u p against millennia ofs trategi c a dvice . We ’ve alrea dydiscus sed this u nder d ecisi on  ma k i ng an d el sew he re, but it ’ s  wo rth r ep eati ng. Nostrategy can be im p lem ented by cons ens us u n d er  da n ge r ous  o r  em e r gency circumsta nces. Part ic i pa tory decis i onma king is  not co mpati b le with  high-ris k or urge nt  ope r a tio ns. That’s  why the  anarchis t  colu m ns  in t heSpanis hCiv il Wa r hado ffi cerseven t ho ugh th ey de sp ised rul ers. A group may arrive  at astrat egy  by any d eci s ion -making m etho d it desir es,  bu t whe n i t  come s to im ple m entat ion, a hierarc h yisr e qu ired to und e r t ake  more  se r ious a ctio n.

Security. “Ne v er permit theenem y toacq u irean  unexpected ad van ta g e .” Whenfi ghting in a  panopti co n , thi s prin ciplebecomes e ve n  moreimpo rta nt. Secur ity  i s  a corn er st o ne ofstra te gy aswell a s  ofo r ganization.

Sur prise . “Stri k e t he en em y at at imeor place o r in a mann er for  whi ch th ey areun prepar ed. ”This is ke y  to asymm etric  confli ct —and  ag ain, n ot e s p ecial ly c om pat ible with a  o p en  o r  pa rtic ipato ry  dec ision-mak i ng struc tur e s. Resi st anc e moveme n ts a re almostalw ays o u t numbered,w hich me a ns th ey hav e to u se surp r ise  a nd swif tne s s  to strik e and acc o mpl is h th eir obje ct ivebe for ethose in powercan mars hal an o v e rpower ing resp o nse
 first_with the_most,” this is what_he was_talking_about. We_must_engage those in_power where we_are strong and they_are weak. We_must_strike when we have overwhelming force, and maneuver instead of engaging when we are_outmatched._We have_limited_numbers_and limited force, so we_have to use that when_and where_it will be most effective.

Economy of Force. “Allocate_minimum_essential combat power_to secondary efforts.” In order to achieve superiority of_force in decisive operations, it’s usually_necessary to divert_people_and_resources from less urgent_or decisive operations. Economy of force_requires that all personnel are performing_important tasks, regardless of whether they are_engaged in decisive operations or not.

Maneuver._“Place the enemy in a_disadvantageous position_through the flexible application of_combat power.” This_hinges on_mobility and flexibility,_which are essential for asymmetric conflict._The fewer a_group’s numbers, the more mobile and_agile_it must be._This_may_mean concentrating_forces, it may_mean_dispersing them,_it_may mean moving them, or it_may_mean hiding them. This is necessary to_keep the enemy off_balance_and make that group’s_actions unpredictable.

Unity of Command. “For_every objective, ensure unity of effort_under one_responsible commander.”_This is where some streams of anarchist culture come up against_millennia of strategic advice. We’ve already_discussed this under decision_making and_elsewhere,_but it’s worth_repeating._No strategy_can be implemented by consensus under dangerous_or emergency_circumstances. Participatory decision making is not_compatible with high-risk or_urgent_operations. That’s why the anarchist columns_in the Spanish Civil War had_officers even though they despised_rulers._A_group may arrive at a_strategy by any decision-making method it_desires, but when_it comes to implementation, a hierarchy is_required_to undertake more serious action.

Security. “Never_permit_the enemy to acquire an unexpected_advantage.”_When_fighting in a panopticon, this_principle becomes even more important. Security_is a cornerstone of strategy as well as of_organization.

Surprise. “Strike the_enemy at a time or_place_or_in a manner for which they are unprepared.” This is_key to_asymmetric conflict—and again,_not especially compatible with a open or participatory decision-making structures._Resistance movements are almost always outnumbered, which_means they have to use surprise and swiftness to strike and_accomplish their objective before those in power can_marshal an overpowering response