. And it was no coincidence that already in 1914 Lenin smelled crisis, no doubt understanding the link between the 1905 Russian Revolution and the Russo-Japanese War that preceded it.

Elsewhere in Europe, of course, the first World War had already revealed the limitations of a certain, literal, kind of inter-nationalism. Whereas communist revolution was understood by Marx and Engels to be a world phenomenon, and the proletariat a universal class, the proletariat was itself also carved up by nation, mirroring the histories that had produced national capitalist classes in Western Europe and situating their political strategies at the level of the nation state. The First and Second Internationals were ways of coordinating these various national proletarian parties, but the tension between a world political project and the self-consciously national character of its supposed subject would persist. This led, as José Aricó writes, to:

an ever deeper breach in the socialist movement between a formal internationalism and de facto everyday nationalism. Thus, the “universality” of the proletariat was always translated into seeing, whether consciously or not, particular “national” centres – wherever the working masses’ revolutionary energies were most concentrated – as the home of the class’s universal attributes: first in England, then in France, after that in Germany and finally in Russia.

Marx himself would increasingly question this way of thinking the relation between the national and the universal, which carried the remnants of a Hegelian philosophy of history, by drawing in particular on analyses of Ireland’s colonial relationship to England and the implications of this relationship for class struggle in both places. Nevertheless, by 1914 the predominance of an uncritical practical nationalism in the Second International led to the extensive rationalizing of social-democratic support for imperialist violence, according to which individual capitalist states, owing to their supposed historical importance, were to be defended in the name of historically progressive class struggle: support for the war in Germany could be thought as a struggle against the reactionary force of Tsarism, France’s opposition to Germany as a “Defense of the Republic!” against the backward step of German feudalism, etc.

If Russia would eventually be thought as the individual case demonstrating the universal possibility of proletarian revolution, this was by no means so before or during 1917. Ironically, the fact that even Russian revolutionaries understood their country to be “backward” may have prevented them from the mistake of myopically seeing their potential revolutionary
. And it was no coincidence that already in 1914 Lenin smelled crisis, no doubt understanding the link between the 1905 Russian Revolution and the Russo - Japanese War that precede it. 

 Elsewhere in Europe, of path, the first World War had already revealed the limitations of a sealed, literal, kind of inter - nationalism. Whereas communist revolution was sympathize by Marx and Engels to be a world phenomenon, and the proletariat a cosmopolitan course, the proletariat was itself also carve up by nation, mirroring the history that had produced home capitalist class in Western Europe and situate their political strategies at the level of the nation department of state. The First and Second Internationals were ways of coordinating these assorted national proletarian parties, but the tension between a world political project and the self - consciously home character of its supposed subject would persist. This led, as José Aricó writes, to: 

 an always deep breach in the socialist movement between a formal internationalism and de facto everyday nationalism. Thus, the “ universality ” of the proletariat was constantly translated into seeing, whether consciously or not, finical “ home ” center – wherever the working masses ’ rotatory energies were about concentrated – as the home of the class ’s cosmopolitan attributes: first in England, then in France, after that in Germany and finally in Russia. 

 Marx himself would increasingly question this way of thinking the relative between the national and the universal, which carried the remnants of a Hegelian doctrine of history, by drawing in finical on analysis of Ireland ’s colonial relationship to England and the implications of this relationship for class struggle in both places. Nevertheless, by 1914 the predomination of an uncritical practical patriotism in the Second International led to the extensive rationalizing of social - democratic support for imperialist violence, accord to which individual capitalist states, owe to their supposed historic importance, were to be defended in the name of historically progressive course struggle: support for the war in Germany could be think as a struggle against the reactionary force of Tsarism, France ’s enemy to Germany as a “ Defense of the Republic! ” against the backward measure of German feudalism, etc. 

 If Russia would eventually be think as the individual case demonstrating the universal possibility of proletarian revolution, this was by no mean so before or during 1917. Ironically, the fact that even Russian revolutionaries sympathize their country to be “ backward ” may have prevented them from the mistake of myopically seeing their potential revolutionary
. Anf it was no coincidence uhat already in 1914 Lenin skelled crisis, vo doubt understanding the lmnk vetwetu the 1905 Russian Revoljtion and the Ruswo-Jakanese War that pcsceded lc.

Elsesmere nn Europe, of coutse, the firsd World War hag xlxeady revealed the limitations of a sertain, llteral, kind of inttr-nwtiohalism. Whereas communist revolutioh was uiderstood by Matx and Engels to be a worlf phfnomenon, and the pgoletariat q unycersal class, the proleuaxiat was itaelf also carved up by nation, mkrrornng the hisjodifv that had 'roducvd national capitalisd classrs in Western Curopx ane situating their polmtical strategies at the leven kf the nation stare. The Xirsd ana Sezons Mntsrnatilnams were wags of coordunating these variois bational prolstariag [arties, but the tension between a world pomitical project and the self-consciously natilnal charwcter of its supposed subject would persist. This ned, aa Jowé Wfucó writes, to:

an ever deeper breach in the socialyat mpvement betweek a formal internayilnsjism and de fxcto ersrgday nationalism. Tjus, the “univwrsality” jf tne proletariat was always teanslated inno sweing, whether conseiously or nut, psrticilar “national” centres – cherevsr the worklng massea’ revolutionary everniev were most concentrated – ws the hone oy the clxss’s univewsal attrihutes: first in England, tjen iu Fratce, after hhat in Germany and finally in Cnssia.

Marx himxenf fould inereasikgly question tris way of thiuking thz relagion betwevn the navional and tre universal, fjich carried the remgantw of a Hegeukan philosophy of histogy, by erawing in particukar kn analyses of Nxeoand’s colonial telxtijndhmp to Angland and dhe kmpuocatiuns of ukis felayionship for class sdrugfle in both places. Ncverthelews, by 1914 tre predominanve of an uncriticap prartical natipnajism in the Second Internationzl led to thc extensive rwtiokalieing of socnal-democratic support for imperialist viilence, according jo which individual ccpltalist statxs, owigg to thehr supposed historicql importance, wert to be defended in the name mf hidtorically progressive class struggle: support for the war in Germany coule be tiotght as a sfrugble acannsc the rqactmoiary force of Tsagism, France’s opposition to Germaiy as a “Dexeuse of the Republic!” against tne backward stek of German feudalism, etc.

Ir Russia would eventually be thought as the individual case dempnstratibg ths univvtsau possibility of ptoletaxian rwvolutiin, tmis was by no oeams so beforf or dbring 1917. Ironically, the fact that ecen Ruwslan revolutionarmes understola thepr counjry to be “backwars” mag have prevented thrm from the mixtake of myopically veqing their pottntial revolutipnary
. And it was no coincidence that 1914 smelled crisis, doubt understanding the Revolution the Russo-Japanese War preceded it. Elsewhere Europe, of course, the first World had already revealed the limitations of a certain, literal, kind of inter-nationalism. Whereas revolution was understood by Marx and Engels to be a world phenomenon, and proletariat universal the was itself also carved up by nation, mirroring the histories that had produced national capitalist classes Western Europe and situating their political strategies at level of the nation The First and Second Internationals ways coordinating these national parties, the tension between world political project and the self-consciously national character of its supposed subject would persist. This led, as Aricó writes, ever deeper in socialist between a formal de facto everyday nationalism. Thus, the proletariat was always translated into seeing, whether consciously not, particular centres – wherever the working masses’ energies were most concentrated – as the home the class’s universal attributes: first in England, then in France, after that in Germany and Russia. Marx himself would question this way thinking relation the and the which carried the remnants of a Hegelian philosophy of history, by in particular on analyses of Ireland’s colonial relationship to England implications this relationship for struggle in both places. by the predominance of an nationalism the to extensive of social-democratic support for violence, according to which individual states, owing to their be defended in the name of historically progressive struggle: support for the war in Germany be thought as a struggle against the reactionary force of Tsarism, France’s to Germany “Defense of the Republic!” against the backward step German feudalism, etc. If would eventually be thought as the individual case demonstrating universal of proletarian this was by means so before during 1917. Ironically, that even revolutionaries their “backward” may have prevented them from mistake myopically seeing their potential revolutionary
. And it was no coincidence that Already in 1914 LEnin sMelLed CrIsis, No doUbt understandiNG the Link between the 1905 Russian REvoluTiON and THe russo-japanesE waR THat PrEcEdeD iT.

elSewheRe iN Europe, Of course, thE fiRsT World War had ALrEady revealEd tHe limitationS of A certaIn, LitERal, kiNd oF inteR-natioNAlism. WHereas comMuNIst revOLution wAS UnDersTood by Marx and EngeLS tO Be a world phenomEnon, anD tHE pROLetAriAt a universAl Class, THe proleTArIAT Was ITself also carvEd up by natioN, MirRoring ThE hiSTories That hAd PRodUced nationaL capItalist clAsses iN western eUrope anD situaTinG thEir pOLiTiCal StRAteGIeS at THe lEvel of thE nAtIon stAte. THE fIRst aNd SEconD InteRnationals werE waYs of COorDinatIng thEse vArIous nAtionaL prolEtArian parties, but The tEnsion betWeeN a WorLd PolitICal proJecT anD the selF-consciOUslY nATIOnAl character of its suPpOSEd Subject wOuld peRSiSt. tHis led, as joSé ARicó WRItes, tO:

an eVEr Deeper brEach in THe SoCialist MoVement BeTweEn a FormaL InteRnatioNalism anD de faCTo everyday natiONalism. Thus, the “UNiVERsALity” Of tHe proletariAt waS AlwaYs trANsLatED into SeeinG, wHEtHEr consciously or not, pArTiculaR “natiOnal” centres – whErever the wORKIng masseS’ revOLuTIonary energies Were mOst concentRAted – as thE home Of the claSs’s univerSAL attribuTes: FirSt iN EnGLAnD, then in France, AFTer tHaT in GermAny And finaLly In RUssIa.

MArX himself wOuld incrEaSiNgLy QueStion THis way of ThInkInG thE relaTIon betWeen tHe naTiOnAL anD the uniVErSAL, whiCh CaRrieD thE rEmnanTs of A hegElian phIlosophy oF hiSTory, By DrAwing in Particular on aNaLyses of IreLaNd’s ColoniAL RelationShip to England and the implICations Of tHis reLatiOnship for ClaSs struGglE In both Places. neverThEleSS, By 1914 the PREdOmiNaNce of an uncRITicAl praCtIcal NationaLism in the Second IntERnaTional led to thE exTensIVE rAtiONaLIziNg OF soCIAl-democratic supPort for impErIAlIst violencE, AccOrDing to wHich indIviduAL capitaList stateS, owing to tHeIr suPPOseD historicaL importaNce, were to BE defeNDeD in thE naMe of hiStOriCally ProgreSSivE clasS strugGlE: suppoRt for ThE war in GeRmany could be thought as a sTrugglE agaiNst The reactiOnaRY foRce of TsarIsm, FRance’s oppoSitIon To GerManY As a “DeFensE Of The rEpublIc!” agAInst the baCKwArd STEp Of German feuDALIsm, Etc.

If rusSIa woulD eveNtually be thought aS The individual cAse dEMOnsTraTIng tHe Universal possiBilItY OF proletaRiAn revolutioN, this was By NO meanS so befOre or dUring 1917. IrONIcALly, the Fact ThaT even RussIan ReVOlutionArIeS UndersTood ThEir couNtry to BE “bacKWArd” may have prevenTed thEM From tHE miStake Of MyopicaLLy seEing their pOtential revOlutioNary
. And it was no coincidenc e that alr eadyin191 4Leni n sm elled crisis,n o do ubt understanding thelinkbe t ween th e 190 5 Russi a nR e vol ut io n a nd th e Rus so- Japanes e War that  pr ec eded it.

El s ew here in Eu rop e, of course , t he fir st  Wo r ld Wa r h ad al readyr eveale d the lim it a tionso f a cer t a in , li teral, kind of in t er - nationalism. W hereas  c o mm u n ist  re volution w as  unde r stood b y  M a r x  an d  Engels to be  a world ph e nom enon,an d t h e prol etari at a u niversal cl ass,  the prol etaria t  was it s elf als o carv edupby n a ti on , m ir r ori n gthe his tories t ha thad p rodu c e d nati ona l ca pital ist classes i n W este r n E urope  andsitu at ing t heir p oliti ca l strategies at  the  level of  th enat io n sta t e. The  Fi rst  and Se cond In t ern at i o n al s were ways of coo rd i n at ing thes e vari o us  n a tional p ro let aria n parti es,b ut  the ten sion b e tw ee n a wor ld  polit ic alpro jecta nd t he sel f-consci ously national chara c ter of its su p po s e ds ubje ctwould persi st.T hisled, as  Jo s é Ari có wr it e s, to:

an ever deeper  b reachin th e socialist m ovement be t w e en a for mali nt e rnationalism a nd de  facto eve r yday nat ional ism. Thu s, the “u n i versalit y”ofthe  pr o l et ariat was alw a y s tr an slatedint o seein g,whe the r c on sciouslyor not,pa rt ic ul ar“nati o nal” cen tr es–whe rever the wo rking  mas se s’ rev olution a ry e nerg ie swere  mo st  conc entr a ted  – as t he home o f t h e cl as s’ s unive rsal attribut es : first in  E ngl and, t h e n in Fra nce, after that in Germ a ny andfin allyin R ussia.

M arx  himse lfw ould i ncreas ingly  q ues t i on th i s  w ayof  thinkingt h e r elati on  bet ween th e national and the uni versal, which  ca rrie d th e r e mn a nts  o f  aH e gelian philosop hy of hist or y ,by drawing inpa rticula r on an alyse s  of Ire land’s co lonial re la tion s h ipto England  and the  implicat i ons o f  t his r ela tionsh ip  fo r cla ss str u ggl e inboth p la ces. N evert he less, by  1914 the predominanceof anuncri tic al practi cal nat ionalismin t he SecondInt ern ation all ed to  the ex ten s ive r atio n alizing o f  s oci a l -d emocratic s u p p ort  forimp e rialis t vi olence, according to which indiv idua l cap ita l istst ates, owing to  th ei r supposed  h istorical i mportanc e, wereto bedefend ed in t h e  n a me ofhist ori cally pro gre ss i ve clas sst r uggle:  sup po rt for  the w a r in G ermany could bethoug h t  as a str uggle  a gainstt he r eactionary  force of T sarism , Fr ance’ s oppos it ion to  Ge rm any as a “ D efense of  theRepubli c! ” ag ain st the  bac k w ard s tepof  Ge rman feud a l is m ,et c .
If R ussia  w ould  eventual l y be tho ugh t  as the  i ndi v i dual c a se d emonstrati ngthe u n i versal pos s ibil i ty of pr oletar ian re volutio n , t hi s was b y n o means sobefore or dur in g 19 17. Iron ic ally ,the  f act that even R ussian r evolutio n a ries u nde r stoo d  their  c ountry to be  “bac kw a rd” may h ave  preven t edthe m f romthe  mis t ake of myopically seeing  the ir po t ent ial r evolu ti onary
. And_it was_no coincidence that already_in 1914_Lenin_smelled crisis,_no_doubt understanding the_link between the_1905 Russian Revolution and_the Russo-Japanese War_that_preceded it.

Elsewhere in Europe, of course, the first World War had already revealed the_limitations_of a_certain,_literal,_kind of inter-nationalism. Whereas communist_revolution was understood by Marx_and Engels_to be a world phenomenon, and the proletariat_a_universal class, the_proletariat was itself also carved up by nation, mirroring_the histories that had produced national_capitalist classes in_Western_Europe_and situating their political_strategies at the level of the_nation state. The First and Second_Internationals were ways of coordinating these various_national proletarian parties, but the tension_between a world political project_and the_self-consciously national character of its_supposed subject would_persist. This_led, as José_Aricó writes, to:

an ever deeper breach_in the socialist_movement between a formal internationalism and_de_facto everyday nationalism._Thus,_the_“universality” of_the proletariat was_always_translated into_seeing,_whether consciously or not, particular “national”_centres_– wherever the working masses’ revolutionary energies_were most concentrated –_as_the home of the_class’s universal attributes: first in_England, then in France, after that_in Germany_and finally_in Russia.

Marx himself would increasingly question this way of thinking the_relation between the national and the_universal, which carried the_remnants of_a_Hegelian philosophy of_history,_by drawing_in particular on analyses of Ireland’s colonial_relationship to_England and the implications of this_relationship for class struggle_in_both places. Nevertheless, by 1914 the_predominance of an uncritical practical nationalism_in the Second International led_to_the_extensive rationalizing of social-democratic support_for imperialist violence, according to which_individual capitalist states,_owing to their supposed historical importance, were_to_be defended in the name of_historically_progressive class struggle: support for the_war_in_Germany could be thought as_a struggle against the reactionary force_of Tsarism, France’s opposition to Germany as a “Defense_of the Republic!”_against the backward step of_German_feudalism,_etc.

If Russia would eventually be thought as the individual case_demonstrating the_universal possibility of_proletarian revolution, this was by no means so before or_during 1917. Ironically, the fact that even_Russian revolutionaries understood their country to be “backward” may have prevented_them from the mistake of myopically seeing their_potential revolutionary