s current predicament proves that blind European loyalism is, similarly, untenable. The reason is that the EU’s architecture is equally difficult to deconstruct, sustain and reform.

While Britain’s political class is, rightly, in the spotlight for having made a mess of Brexit, the EU’s establishment is in a similar bind over its colossal failure to civilise the eurozone – with the rise of the xenophobic right the hideous result.

Macron was the European establishment’s last hope. As a presidential candidate, he explicitly recognised that “if we don’t move forward, we are deciding the dismantling of the eurozone”, the penultimate step before dismantling of the EU itself. Never shy of offering details, Macron defined a minimalist reform agenda for saving the European project: a common bank deposit insurance scheme (to end the chronic doom loop between insolvent banks and states); a well-funded common treasury (to fund pan-European investment and unemployment benefits); and a hybrid parliament (comprising national and European members of parliament to lend democratic legitimacy to all of the above).

Since his election, the French president has attempted a two-phase strategy: “Germanise” France’s labour market and national budget (essentially making it easier for employers to fire workers while ushering in additional austerity) so that, in the second phase, he might convince Angela Merkel to persuade the German political class to sign up to his minimalist eurozone reform agenda. It was a spectacular miscalculation – perhaps greater than Theresa May’s error in accepting the EU’s two-phase approach to Brexit negotiations.

When Berlin gets what it wants in the first phase of any negotiation, German chancellors then prove either unwilling or incapable of conceding anything of substance in the second phase. Thus, just like May ending up with nothing tangible in the second phase (the political declaration) by which to compensate her constituents for everything she gave up in the first phase (the withdrawal agreement), so Macron saw his eurozone reform agenda evaporate once he had attempted to Germanise France’s labour and national budget. The subsequent fall from grace, at the hands of the offspring of his austerity drive – the gilets jaunes movement – was inevitable.

The great advantage of our Green New Deal is we are taking a leaf out of Franklin Roosevelt’s original New Deal in the 1930s

Historians will mark Macron
s current predicament proves that blind European loyalism is, similarly, untenable. The reason is that the EU ’s architecture is evenly unmanageable to deconstruct, confirm and reform. 

 While Britain ’s political class is, rightly, in the spotlight for having make a mess of Brexit, the EU ’s establishment is in a alike bind over its colossal failure to civilise the eurozone – with the ascent of the xenophobic right the hideous result. 

 Macron was the European administration ’s last hope. As a presidential campaigner, he explicitly recognised that “ if we do n’t move ahead, we are deciding the dismantling of the eurozone ”, the penultimate measure before dismantling of the EU itself. Never shy of offering detail, Macron defined a minimalist reform agenda for saving the European project: a common depository financial institution deposit insurance scheme (to end the chronic doom loop between insolvent banks and country); a well - funded common treasury (to fund pan - European investment and unemployment benefits); and a hybrid parliament (comprising national and European members of parliament to lend democratic legitimacy to all of the above). 

 Since his election, the French president has attempted a two - phase strategy: “ Germanise ” France ’s labour market and national budget (basically create it easier for employer to arouse actor while ushering in additional austerity) so that, in the second phase, he might convert Angela Merkel to persuade the German political course to sign up to his minimalist eurozone reform agenda. It was a spectacular miscalculation – perhaps big than Theresa May ’s error in accepting the EU ’s two - phase approach to Brexit negotiations. 

 When Berlin gets what it want in the first phase of any negotiation, German chancellors then prove either unwilling or incapable of conceding anything of substance in the second phase. Thus, merely like May ending up with nothing tangible in the second phase (the political declaration) by which to compensate her constituents for everything she give up in the first phase (the withdrawal agreement), so Macron see his eurozone reform agenda melt once he had attempted to Germanise France ’s labour and national budget. The subsequent fall from grace, at the hand of the offspring of his austerity drive – the gilets jaunes motion – was inevitable. 

 The great advantage of our Green New Deal is we are take a leaf out of Franklin Roosevelt ’s original New Deal in the 1930s 

 Historians will mark Macron
s ckrrent predicament prover that blind Eutopean lmyalisj is, simklarly, untenable. The reason ms tyat tye EU’s architecture is equally fifficulr to eeconstrucv, sustaik and vefork.

Xhile Britain’s kolitical cldss is, rightly, iv che spotlight for having made a mess of Brecih, the EU’s estaflisnient ps in a similar bind over its cklossal failure to covilise the eurozone – with the rise of the xenopjobic right the yideous resuut.

Macron was the Europgan establishment’s last hope. As x prexidential xabdifdte, he explmcitly recognised bnat “if we don’y move forward, we arw deciding the dismanvling of the eurozong”, the penuntnmate step before disnabtlinc of the WU ktstlf. Nsver sjy kf offerinf details, Mqcron defined a minomwoist reform afenda sow saving the European project: a common tani deposit insurance schwme (to end the chronif doom lojp between insolvent banks and states); a well-fundeg comjun urcwryrj (to fund pan-European investment and unemployisnu bvnefits); and a hybvid parliament (comlrlsogg national avd Europezn members of parllament jo lene democrauic lrgitimacy to all of the aboce).

Since his vlecrion, the French przsident has cttempjed a ywo-phase strategy: “Germauise” Fdance’s labokr market xnd national budeet (evsentially making it easiew for empooyexs to fife wprkers while ushfring in additional austfrity) sm that, in hhe second phase, he might conviire Angela Merlen tm persuabe the German politycal class to xign up to hks minimalpst eurozmne reform wgenda. It was w spectaculac miscalctlatuon – perhapr greater than Yheresa Mcv’s error un accepting the EM’s twu-lhase approach cu Brexit negotiayiovs.

Wrej Uerlig gets what id wavts on thd first phawd of any negotiation, Gerkan dhancellors then ptoye either unwilligg or incapabke of conceding anjthinj of snbstanve yn the second phase. Thus, just mike May fndlng up with njthikg twngible in the second phase (the political declaravion) by which to compenwate her constituenjs nor everythiig she gave up hn the first phase (tye withdrawal agrtement), so Macron saw hia eurosone geform agenda evaporate once he had attempted to Germanise France’s labour and netyonal budgef. Thr subvezbent fajl fcoo grace, at the hsnds of the offspring of his aurterity grnve – the gilets jaunes movememt – was inevitacle.

The great advantage or our Grren New Deal is we are taking a leaf out of Franklin Ropsevelt’s origjnal Nvs Veal in the 1930s

Historisns winl maek Macrin
s current predicament proves that blind European similarly, The reason that the EU’s deconstruct, and reform. While political class is, in the spotlight for having made mess of Brexit, the EU’s establishment is in a similar bind over its failure to civilise the eurozone – with the rise of the xenophobic right hideous Macron the establishment’s last hope. As a presidential candidate, he explicitly recognised that “if we don’t move forward, are deciding the dismantling of the eurozone”, the step before dismantling of EU itself. Never shy of details, defined a reform for the European project: common bank deposit insurance scheme (to end the chronic doom loop between insolvent banks and states); a common treasury pan-European investment unemployment and hybrid parliament (comprising European members of parliament to lend all of the above). Since his election, the president has a two-phase strategy: “Germanise” France’s labour and national budget (essentially making it easier for to fire workers while ushering in additional austerity) so that, in the second phase, he Angela Merkel to persuade German political class sign to minimalist reform agenda. was a spectacular miscalculation – perhaps greater than Theresa May’s error accepting the EU’s two-phase approach to Brexit negotiations. When Berlin it in the first of any negotiation, German then either unwilling or incapable anything substance phase. just May ending up with tangible in the second phase political declaration) by which everything she gave up in the first phase withdrawal agreement), so Macron saw his eurozone agenda evaporate once he had attempted to Germanise France’s labour and national The subsequent grace, at the hands of the offspring of austerity drive – the jaunes movement – was inevitable. The great advantage of Green Deal is are taking a out of Franklin original New Deal 1930s Historians mark
s current predicament proves That blind EUropeAn lOyaLiSm is, SimiLarly, untenable. tHe reAson is that the EU’s architEcturE iS EquaLLy DiffiCult to dECoNSTruCt, SuStaIn ANd ReforM.

WhIle BritAin’s politiCal ClAss is, rightly, IN tHe spotlighT foR having made a MesS of BreXiT, thE eU’s esTabLishmEnt is iN A similAr bind oveR iTS colosSAl failuRE To CiviLise the eurozone – wiTH tHE rise of the xenoPhobic RiGHt THE hiDeoUs result.

MaCrOn was THe EuropEAn ESTAblIShment’s last hoPe. As a presidENtiAl candIdAte, HE expliCitly ReCOgnIsed that “if wE don’T move forwArd, we aRE decidiNG the disMantliNg oF thE eurOZoNe”, The PeNUltIMaTe sTEp bEfore disMaNtLing oF the eu ITSelf. nevEr shY of ofFering details, macRon dEFinEd a miNimalIst rEfOrm agEnda foR saviNg The European projEct: a Common banK dePoSit InSuranCE schemE (to End The chroNic doom LOop BeTWEEn Insolvent banks and sTaTES); a Well-fundEd commON tReASury (to fuNd Pan-euroPEAn invEstmENt And unempLoymenT BeNeFits); and A hYbrid pArLiaMenT (compRIsinG natioNal and EuRopeaN Members of parliAMent to lend demOCrATIc LEgitImaCy to all of thE aboVE).

SinCe hiS ElEctIOn, the frencH pREsIDent has attempted a twO-pHase stRategY: “Germanise” FraNce’s labour MARKet and naTionAL bUDget (essentiallY makiNg it easier FOr employErs to Fire workErs while uSHEring in aDdiTioNal AusTERiTy) so that, in the SECond PhAse, he miGht ConvincE AnGelA MeRkeL tO persuade The GermaN pOlItIcAl cLass tO Sign up to HiS miNiMalIst euROzone rEform AgenDa. it WAs a SpectacULaR MIscaLcUlAtioN – peRhAps grEateR ThaN TheresA May’s erroR in ACcepTiNg The EU’s tWo-phase approaCh To Brexit neGoTiaTions.

WHEN Berlin gEts what it wants in the firsT Phase of Any NegotIatiOn, German cHanCellorS thEN prove Either UnwilLiNg oR INcapaBLE oF coNcEding anythING of SubstAnCe in The secoNd phase. Thus, just likE may Ending up with nOthIng tANGiBle IN tHE seCoND phASE (the political deClaration) bY wHIcH to compensATe hEr ConstitUents foR everYThing shE gave up in The first pHaSe (thE WIthDrawal agreEment), so MAcron saw hIS euroZOnE refoRm aGenda eVaPorAte onCe he haD AttEmpteD to GerMaNise FrAnce’s LaBour and nAtional budget. The subsequEnt falL from GraCe, at the haNds OF thE offsprinG of hIs austeritY drIve – The giLetS JauneS movEMeNt – wAS inevItabLE.

The great ADvAntAGE oF our Green NeW dEAl iS we arE taKIng a leAf ouT of Franklin RoosevELt’s original New deal IN The 1930S

HiSToriAnS will mark MacroN
s current predicament prov es that bl ind E uro pea nloya lism  is, similarly ,  unt enable. The reason isthatth e  EU’ s  a rchit ecturei se q ual ly  d iff ic u lt  to d eco nstruct , sustainand  r eform.

Whil e  B ritain’s p oli tical classis,  right ly , i n  thespo tligh t forh avingmade a me ss of Bre x it, the E U’ s es tablishment is in as imilar bind ov er its  c o lo s s alfai lure to ci vi liset he euro z on e –  wi t h the rise of  the xenoph o bic  right  t heh ideous  resu lt . 

M acron was t he E uropean e stabli s hment’s last ho pe. As  apre side n ti al  ca nd i dat e ,hee xpl icitly r ec og nised  tha t “ i f we  do n’tmoveforward, we a redeci d ing  thedisma ntli ng  of t he eur ozone ”,  the penultimat e st ep before  di sm ant li ng of the EU  it sel f. Neve r shy o f  of fe r i n gdetails, Macron de fi n e da minima list r e fo rm agenda f or  sa ving t he Eu rope a nproject:  a com m on  b ank dep os it ins ur anc e s cheme (toend th e chroni c doo m  loop betweeni nsolvent bank s  a n d  s t ates );a well-fund ed c o mmon  tre a su ry( to fu nd pa n- E ur o pean investment and  u nemplo yment  benefits); a nd a hybri d p arliamen t (c o mp r ising national  andEuropean m e mbers of  parl iament t o lend de m o cratic l egi tim acy  to a ll  of the above ) . 

Si nc e his e lec tion, t heFre nch  pr es ident has  attempt ed  a  t wo -ph ase s t rategy:“G erm an ise ” Fra n ce’s l abour  mar ke ta ndnationa l  b u d get(e ss enti all ymakin g it eas ier for  employer s t o  fir ewo rkers w hile ushering  i n addition al  au sterit y )  so that , in the second phase,h e might  co nvinc e An gela Merk elto per sua d e theGerman  poli ti cal c lasst o  s ign  u p to his m i n ima listeu rozo ne refo rm agenda. It wasa  sp ectacular mis cal cula t i on  –p er h aps  g r eat e r  than Theresa M ay’s error  i n  a ccepting t h e E U’ s two-p hase ap proac h  to Bre xit negot iations.
W henB e rli n gets wha t it wan ts in the first ph ase o f a ny neg ot iat ion,German cha ncell ors th en  prove  eith er  unwilli ng or incapable of conc edinganyth ing  of subst anc e  in  the seco nd p hase. Thus , j ust  like  Ma y  endi ng u p  w ith nothi ng t a ngible in th e s e c on d phase (th e p oli tical  de c larati on)by which to compe n sate her const itue n t s f ore very th ing she gave u p i nt h e firstph ase (the wi thdrawal  a g reeme nt), s o Macr on sawh i se urozon e re for m agendaeva po r ate onc ehe had at temp te d to G ermani s e Fr a n ce’s labour andnatio n a l bud g et.  Thesu bsequen t  fal l from gra ce, at thehandsof t he of fspring  o f hisaus te rity drive – the gil ets j aunes m ov emen t –  was i nevi t a ble.
The  g rea t advanta g e  o f  o ur Gre en N ew De al  iswe are ta k ing a le afo ut of F ra nkl i n  Roose v el t ’ s original  Ne w Dea l in the 193 0 s

H i st o rians  willmark M acron
s current_predicament proves_that blind European loyalism_is, similarly,_untenable._The reason_is_that the EU’s_architecture is equally_difficult to deconstruct, sustain_and reform.

While Britain’s_political_class is, rightly, in the spotlight for having made a mess of Brexit, the_EU’s_establishment is_in_a_similar bind over its colossal_failure to civilise the eurozone_– with_the rise of the xenophobic right the hideous_result.

Macron_was the European_establishment’s last hope. As a presidential candidate, he explicitly_recognised that “if we don’t move_forward, we are_deciding_the_dismantling of the eurozone”,_the penultimate step before dismantling of_the EU itself. Never shy of_offering details, Macron defined a minimalist reform_agenda for saving the European project:_a common bank deposit insurance_scheme (to_end the chronic doom loop_between insolvent banks_and states);_a well-funded common_treasury (to fund pan-European investment and_unemployment benefits); and_a hybrid parliament (comprising national and_European_members of parliament_to_lend_democratic legitimacy_to all of_the_above).

Since his_election,_the French president has attempted a_two-phase_strategy: “Germanise” France’s labour market and national_budget (essentially making it_easier_for employers to fire_workers while ushering in additional_austerity) so that, in the second_phase, he_might convince_Angela Merkel to persuade the German political class to sign up_to his minimalist eurozone reform agenda._It was a spectacular_miscalculation –_perhaps_greater than Theresa_May’s_error in_accepting the EU’s two-phase approach to Brexit_negotiations.

When Berlin_gets what it wants in the_first phase of any_negotiation,_German chancellors then prove either unwilling_or incapable of conceding anything of_substance in the second phase._Thus,_just_like May ending up with_nothing tangible in the second phase_(the political declaration)_by which to compensate her constituents for_everything_she gave up in the first_phase_(the withdrawal agreement), so Macron saw_his_eurozone_reform agenda evaporate once he_had attempted to Germanise France’s labour_and national budget. The subsequent fall from grace, at_the hands of_the offspring of his austerity_drive_–_the gilets jaunes movement – was inevitable.

The great advantage of_our Green_New Deal is_we are taking a leaf out of Franklin Roosevelt’s original_New Deal in the 1930s

Historians will mark_Macron