 types of contempt. His Honour dismissed charge 9 and the respondents do not challenge that part of his Honour’s judgment. However, as charge 6 was a separate alleged contempt, there was no error in his Honour not also dismissing charge 6. In other words, charge 6 was not dependent on the matter charged in charge 9. In our opinion, the allegation in each of charges 2 and 6 was that the appellants’ conduct tended to interfere with Mr Barukh’s right to have a civil court determine the alleged commercial dispute and, accordingly, the charge was of an interference with the administration of justice generally. Accordingly, as his Honour did not make a finding of contempt that was not charged, the grounds of appeal the subject of the first issue have not been made out. There is, as we have said, a separate question raised under the second issue on the appeal as to whether the communications of 29 December 2016 and 28 February 2017 were attempts to interfere with administration of justice generally and thereby constituted a contempt of court.

Second issue on the appeal

Whether the primary judge erred in finding the email of 29 December 2016 and the letter of 28 February 2017 placed improper pressure on Mr Barukh not to exercise his right to have a civil court determine the alleged commercial dispute and, accordingly, had a real and definite tendency to interfere with the administration of justice, such as to constitute a contempt of court: appeal grounds 1(a), 1(a1), 1(b), 2(a), 2(b)

The question whether improper pressure was placed on Mr Barukh not to exercise his right to have a civil court determine the alleged commercial dispute depends on the antecedent question of whether the threats made by the appellants were directed to Mr Barukh’s failure to attend upon the Beth Din or whether they were directed to the bringing of proceedings in a civil court. The appellants submitted that this was the key issue in the case and, indeed, the only real issue. The primary judge found, at [254] and [266], that the threat of sanctions for failing to attend upon the Beth Din was not distinct from the threat of sanctions for resorting to the civil courts. His Honour considered that this was particularly apparent from the context in which the threats in the email of 29 December 2016 were made, namely, Mr Barukh’s suggestion two days earlier that the alleged commercial dispute be brought in a civil court.

Parties’ submissions

Conflation error

The
types of contempt. His Honour dismissed charge 9 and the respondents do not challenge that character of his Honour ’s opinion. However, as charge 6 was a separate alleged contempt, there be no error in his Honour not also displace bang 6. In other parole, charge 6 was not dependent on the topic charged in charge 9. In our opinion, the allegation in each of charges 2 and 6 was that the appellant ’ conduct tended to intervene with Mr Barukh ’s right to have a civil motor hotel specify the alleged commercial dispute and, accordingly, the charge was of an hindrance with the administration of justice generally. Accordingly, as his Honour did not make a determination of contempt that was not charged, the land of appeal the subject of the first return have not been made out. There is, as we have said, a separate question raise under the second issue on the appeal as to whether the communications of 29 December 2016 and 28 February 2017 were attempts to interfere with administration of justice generally and thereby constituted a contempt of court. 

 Second issue on the entreaty 

 Whether the primary judge stray in find the email of 29 December 2016 and the letter of 28 February 2017 placed improper pressure on Mr Barukh not to drill his right to have a civil court determine the alleged commercial dispute and, consequently, had a real and definite tendency to interfere with the administration of justice, such as to constitute a contempt of court: appeal grounds 1(a), 1(a1), 1(b), 2(a), 2(b) 

 The question whether improper pressure was place on Mr Barukh not to exercise his right field to have a civil motor hotel settle the alleged commercial dispute depends on the antecedent question of whether the threat made by the appellants were directed to Mr Barukh ’s bankruptcy to attend upon the Beth Din or whether they were target to the bringing of proceedings in a civil motor hotel. The appellants submitted that this was the key issue in the case and, indeed, the lone real topic. The primary evaluator found, at [ 254 ] and [ 266 ], that the threat of authority for failing to attend upon the Beth Din was not clear-cut from the threat of sanction for resorting to the civil courts. His Honour considered that this was particularly apparent from the context in which the threats in the email of 29 December 2016 were made, namely, Mr Barukh ’s suggestion two days sooner that the alleged commercial dispute be brought in a civil court. 

 party ’ submissions 

 Conflation error 

 The
 tyoes of contempt. His Honomr dismissed chatgw 9 and the rsspondengs do not challenge that parv of his Yonour’s judgment. Howevdr, as chagge 6 was q sekarate alleged coifempt, tmzre wzd no xrror in his Hokour not alvo dismissing whxrye 6. In other words, charge 6 was not dqpendeny ln the matter sharbqd ih charge 9. In our opinion, the allegztion ii each of chargrs 2 and 6 was that the appeplanhs’ conduct tended ho interferg wiey Mr Barukh’s right to have a civil court determine the alleged coomercnal dispute abd, wwcordingly, vhe chwrge was of an interxerence with the admikistretiob of justice generallb. Accordingly, as his Honour dhd not make a findibg of cmntekpt gyat waa iot chargfd, vhe grounds of appeal rhe subject of the giwwt issue have not bqeg made out. There is, as we have said, a stparafe question raised undee the second issue on the appewl as to whether the communications of 29 December 2016 and 28 Webxmwft 2017 were attempts to interfere with administratijh pf justice generclly and thereby clnxjituted a contgmpt of cohrt.

Second issue on the apkeal

Whwther the prikary judge erred in finding the email oy 29 Eecember 2016 and the petter of 28 Yebruaty 2017 plsced improper pressure un Md Barukh noh to exerdkse his right to hane a civil court determine the alleged rommexcial dirputg and, ascordingly, had a real and definite tendgncy tm interferf with the administration of justice, such as jo wonvtitute c contcmpt of court: a[peal grounds 1(c), 1(a1), 1(b), 2(a), 2(y)

The qjestion whvther impcoper pressuwe was placed ln Mr Barukh not to qxerxise his rieft to have a covil courn betermine the alleged commevcial sispute depends on the antecedent qudstyoj pf fhether the dhrexts kade cy the appeouantx were directed to Ms Badukh’s failure to aytcnd upon jhe Beth Qin or whethet they were directtd to vhe brmnging of proceedings in a civil court. Fhe appelpanbs submitted ehat this was thz key issue in the case and, indeed, the oily real issue. The primqry judge found, at [254] snd [266], that tie thrqat of satctions for failing ro attend upon tht Beth Din was not distjnct fsom tje threat of sanctions for resorting to the civil courts. His Honour consieered vhwt this was paryiculdrjv apparqnt hrum the context im which the threats in the emaiu of 29 Deweiber 2016 were made, namely, Mr Batuyh’s suggestiov two days earlier that fhe allebed commercial dispute be brougnt in a civil court.

Partics’ submiswions

Donflanjoi error

The
types of contempt. His Honour dismissed charge the do not that part of charge was a separate contempt, there was error in his Honour not also charge 6. In other words, charge 6 was not dependent on the matter in charge 9. In our opinion, the allegation in each of charges 2 6 that appellants’ tended to interfere with Mr Barukh’s right to have a civil court determine the alleged commercial and, accordingly, the charge was of an interference the administration of justice Accordingly, as his Honour did make finding of that not the grounds of the subject of the first issue have not been made out. There is, as we have said, separate question the second on appeal to whether the 29 December 2016 and 28 February to interfere with administration of justice generally and constituted a of court. Second issue on the Whether the primary judge erred in finding the of 29 December 2016 and the letter of 28 February 2017 placed improper pressure on not to exercise his to have a court the commercial and, accordingly, a real and definite tendency to interfere with the administration of such as to constitute a contempt of court: appeal grounds 1(b), 2(b) The question improper pressure was placed Mr not to exercise his have civil alleged dispute on the antecedent question whether the threats made by appellants were directed to upon the Beth Din or whether they were to the bringing of proceedings in a court. The appellants submitted that this was the key issue in the and, indeed, real issue. The primary judge found, at [254] [266], that the threat sanctions for failing to attend upon the Beth Din not from the of sanctions for to the civil His Honour considered was particularly from context threats in the email of 29 2016 made, namely, Mr Barukh’s suggestion days the alleged commercial dispute be brought in a civil court. Parties’ submissions Conflation error The
 types of contempt. His Honour dIsmissed chArge 9 aNd tHe rEsPondEnts Do not challenge THat pArt of his Honour’s judgmenT. HoweVeR, As chARgE 6 was a SeparatE AlLEGed CoNtEmpT, tHErE was nO erRor in hiS Honour not AlsO dIsmissing chaRGe 6. in other worDs, cHarge 6 was not dEpeNdent oN tHe mATter cHarGed in Charge 9. iN our opInion, the aLlEGation IN each of CHArGes 2 aNd 6 was that the appelLAnTS’ conduct tended To inteRfERe WITh MR BaRukh’s right To Have a CIvil couRT dETERmiNE the alleged coMmercial disPUte And, accOrDinGLy, the cHarge WaS Of aN interferenCe wiTh the admiNistraTIon of juSTice genErally. accOrdInglY, As HiS HoNoUR diD NoT maKE a fInding of CoNtEmpt tHat wAS NOT chaRgeD, the GrounDs of appeal the SubJect OF thE firsT issuE havE nOt beeN made oUt. TheRe Is, as we have said, a SepaRate questIon RaIseD uNder tHE seconD isSue On the apPeal as tO WheThER THe Communications of 29 DeCeMBEr 2016 And 28 FebruAry 2017 werE AtTeMPts to intErFerE witH ADminiStraTIoN of justiCe geneRAlLy And therEbY constItUteD a cOntemPT of cOurt.

SeCond issuE on thE Appeal

Whether tHE primary judge ERrED In FIndiNg tHe email of 29 DeCembER 2016 and The lETtEr oF 28 februAry 2017 plAcED iMProper pressure on Mr BArUkh not To exeRcise his right To have a civIL COurt deteRminE ThE Alleged commercIal diSpute and, acCOrdingly, Had a rEal and deFinite tenDENcy to intErfEre WitH thE ADmInistration of JUSticE, sUch as to ConStitute A coNteMpt Of cOuRt: appeal gRounds 1(a), 1(a1), 1(B), 2(a), 2(B)

THe QuEstIon whETher imprOpEr pReSsuRe was PLaced oN Mr BaRukh NoT tO ExeRcise hiS RiGHT to hAvE a CiviL coUrT deteRminE The Alleged CommerciaL diSPute DePeNds on thE antecedent quEsTion of whetHeR thE threaTS Made by thE appellants were directed TO Mr BaruKh’s FailuRe to Attend upoN thE Beth DIn oR WhetheR they wEre diReCteD TO the bRINgIng Of ProceedingS IN a cIvil cOuRt. ThE appellAnts submitted that tHIs wAs the key issue In tHe caSE AnD, inDEeD, The OnLY reAL Issue. The primary Judge found, At [254] ANd [266], That the thrEAt oF sAnctionS for faiLing tO Attend uPon the BetH Din was noT dIstiNCT frOm the threaT of sanctIons for reSOrtinG To The ciVil Courts. hiS HoNour cOnsideREd tHat thIs was pArTiculaRly apPaRent from The context in which the thrEats in The emAil Of 29 DecembeR 2016 weRE maDe, namely, MR BarUkh’s suggesTioN twO days EarLIer thAt thE AlLegED commErciAL dispute bE BrOugHT In A civil court.

pARTieS’ submIssIOns

ConFlatIon error

The
 types of contempt. His Ho nour dismi ssedcha rge  9  and  the  respondents d o  not  challenge that part o f his  H o nour ’ sjudgm ent. Ho w ev e r , a sch arg e6  w as asep arate a lleged con tem pt , there wasn oerror in h isHonour not a lso  dismi ss ing charg e 6 . Inotherw ords,charge 6wa s  not d e pendent o nthematter charged in ch a rge 9. In ouropinio n, th e all ega tion in ea ch  of c h arges 2 an d 6  wa s  that the app ellants’ co n duc t tend ed  to interf ere w it h  Mr  Barukh’s r ight  to havea civi l  courtd etermin e theall ege d co m me rc ial  d i spu t eand ,  ac cordingl y,  t he ch arge w a s  ofaninte rfere nce with theadm inis t rat ion o f jus tice  g enera lly. A ccord in gly, as his Hon ourdid not m ake  a  fi nd ing o f  conte mpt  th at wasnot cha r ged ,t h e  g rounds of appeal t he s ub ject ofthe fi r st  i s sue have  n otbeen m ade o ut.T he re is, a s we h a ve  s aid, ase parate  q ues tio n rai s ed u nder t he secon d iss u e on the appea l  as to whethe r  t h e  c o mmun ica tions of 29  Dec e mber  201 6  a nd2 8 Feb ruary  2 0 17 were attempts to in te rferewithadministratio n of justi c e generall y an d  t h ereby constitu ted a  contempto f court. 

Sec ond issu e on thea p peal

Wh eth erthe  pr i m ar y judge erred i n fi nd ing the  em ail of29Dec emb er20 16 and th e letter  o f28  F ebr uary2 017 plac ed  im pr ope r pre s sure o n MrBaru kh  n o t t o exerc i se h is r ig ht  tohav ea civ il c o urt  determ ine the a lle g ed c om me rcial d ispute and, a cc ordingly,ha d a  reala n d defini te tendency to interfer e  with t headmin istr ation ofjus tice,suc h  as to  const itute  a  co n t empto f  c our t:  appeal gr o u nds  1(a) ,1(a1 ), 1(b) , 2(a), 2(b)

Theq ues tion whetherimp rope r pr ess u re was  p l ace d on Mr Barukh no t to exerc is e  h is right t o  ha ve  a civi l court  dete r mine th e alleged  commerci al  dis p u tedepends on  the ant ecedent q u estio n  o f whe the r theth rea ts ma de byt heappel lantswe re dir ected  t o Mr Bar ukh’s failure to attend  uponthe B eth  Din or w het h erthey were  dir ected to t hebri nging  of proce edin g sina  civi l co u rt. The a p pe lla n t ssubmitted t h a t  th is wa s t h e keyissu e in the case and ,  indeed, the o nlyr e aliss u e. T he  primary judge  fo un d ,  at [254 ]and [266],that the  t h reatof san ctions  for fa i l in g  to at tend  up on the Be thDi n  was no tdi s tinctfrom  t he thr eat of sanc t i ons for resortin g tot h e civ i l c ourts .His Hon o ur c onsideredthat this w as par ticu larly  appare nt  fromthe  c ontext inw hich thethrea ts in t he  ema ilof 29Dece m b er 20 16 w er e m ade, name l y ,M rBa r ukh ’s s ugges ti on t wo days e a rlier th att he alle ge d c o m mercia l  d i s pute be br oug ht in a  civil cou r t.
P ar t ies’submis sions
Confla t ion  e rror

T he
 types_of contempt._His Honour dismissed charge_9 and_the_respondents do_not_challenge that part_of his Honour’s_judgment. However, as charge_6 was a_separate_alleged contempt, there was no error in his Honour not also dismissing charge 6._In_other words,_charge_6_was not dependent on the_matter charged in charge 9._In our_opinion, the allegation in each of charges 2_and_6 was that_the appellants’ conduct tended to interfere with Mr Barukh’s_right to have a civil court_determine the alleged_commercial_dispute_and, accordingly, the charge_was of an interference with the_administration of justice generally. Accordingly, as_his Honour did not make a finding_of contempt that was not charged,_the grounds of appeal the_subject of_the first issue have not_been made out._There is,_as we have_said, a separate question raised under_the second issue_on the appeal as to whether_the_communications of 29_December_2016_and 28_February 2017 were_attempts_to interfere_with_administration of justice generally and thereby_constituted_a contempt of court.

Second issue on the_appeal

Whether the primary judge_erred_in finding the email_of 29 December 2016 and_the letter of 28 February 2017_placed improper_pressure on_Mr Barukh not to exercise his right to have a civil_court determine the alleged commercial dispute_and, accordingly, had a_real and_definite_tendency to interfere_with_the administration_of justice, such as to constitute a_contempt of_court: appeal grounds 1(a), 1(a1), 1(b),_2(a), 2(b)

The question whether_improper_pressure was placed on Mr Barukh_not to exercise his right to_have a civil court determine_the_alleged_commercial dispute depends on the_antecedent question of whether the threats_made by the_appellants were directed to Mr Barukh’s failure_to_attend upon the Beth Din or_whether_they were directed to the bringing_of_proceedings_in a civil court. The_appellants submitted that this was the_key issue in the case and, indeed, the only_real issue. The_primary judge found, at [254]_and_[266],_that the threat of sanctions for failing to attend upon_the Beth_Din was not_distinct from the threat of sanctions for resorting to the_civil courts. His Honour considered that this_was particularly apparent from the context in which the threats in_the email of 29 December 2016 were made,_namely, Mr Barukh’s suggestion two days earlier_that the alleged commercial_dispute_be brought in a civil court.

Parties’ submissions

Conflation_error

The