 estimates. Johnson v. United States Department of the Treasury, No. 12-16775. Links to the filings are under the Treasury menu at commondada.com. Here is paragraph 8 of the complaint, as drafted in January 2012 (since when there have already been another two such GAO reports):

8. Financial Misrepresentations. (i) Coin-Swap Question. A March, 2011 General Accounting Office report (U.S. COINS: Replacing the $1 Note with a $1 Coin Would Provide a Financial Benefit to the Government, GAO-11-281) answered the following question for Hon. Richard Shelby, ranking member, Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, United States Senate: What is the estimated net benefit, if any, to the government of replacing the $1 note with a $1 coin?

(ii) Game-Changing Seigniorage. Answering this question requires costing the seigniorage benefits that automatically readjust when United States currency, coin or note, mixes with and/or replaces Federal Reserve currency. Thus, answering this question on the small scales of coinage implicitly answers it on every scale, including complete conversion of the currency. These benefits are in fact so high that they swamp the benefits that the GAO report instead labors to compute, as follows. Had the face-value seigniorage benefits been properly included in the GAO report, they would have trumpeted the huge and prompt debt reducing advantages of United States currency.

(iii) Model Falsehoods. The 2011 GAO report trustingly adopts a Federal Reserve model which impertinently presumes that the government must operate in debt, and which misrepresents that: (a) when a new $1 coin is put in circulation, the only government benefit is the relief from interest on $1 of debt; and (b) there is no government benefit when a $1 coin replaces a $1 note, because the interest relief from $1 is offset by the loss of interest from $1 in Federal Reserve profits returned to the government. In fact: (a) when a new $1 coin is issued, the government's account is credited with $1; and (b) when a $1 note is replaced by a new $1 coin, the government (when in debt) also obtains relief from interest on 81.5 cents, since the Federal Reserve owns only 18.5% of the debt held by the
estimates. Johnson v. United States Department of the Treasury, No. 12 - 16775. Links to the filings are under the Treasury menu at commondada.com. Here is paragraph 8 of the complaint, as blueprint in January 2012 (since when there have already been another two such GAO report ): 

 8. Financial Misrepresentations. (i) Coin - Swap Question. A March, 2011 General Accounting Office report (U.S. COINS: supplant the $ 1 Note with a $ 1 Coin Would Provide a Financial Benefit to the Government, GAO-11 - 281) answer the following question for Hon. Richard Shelby, ranking member, Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, United States Senate: What is the estimate net benefit, if any, to the government of substitute the $ 1 note with a $ 1 coin? 

 (ii) Game - Changing Seigniorage. answer this question requires costing the seigniorage benefits that automatically readjust when United States currency, coin or bill, mixes with and/or replaces Federal Reserve currency. therefore, answering this question on the little scales of neologism implicitly answers it on every scale, including complete conversion of the currency. These benefit are in fact so high that they swamp the benefits that the GAO report instead labors to compute, as follows. Had the face - value seigniorage benefits been properly included in the GAO report, they would have trumpeted the huge and prompt debt reducing advantages of United States currentness. 

 (iii) Model Falsehoods. The 2011 GAO report card trustingly espouse a Federal Reserve model which impertinently presumes that the government must operate in debt, and which misrepresent that: (a) when a new $ 1 coin is put in circulation, the only government benefit is the easing from interest on $ 1 of debt; and (b) there is no government benefit when a $ 1 coin replaces a $ 1 note, because the interest respite from $ 1 is offset by the loss of interest from $ 1 in Federal Reserve profits render to the government. In fact: (a) when a fresh $ 1 coin is issued, the government's account is credited with $ 1; and (b) when a $ 1 note is replace by a new $ 1 coin, the government (when in debt) also prevail relief from interest on 81.5 cents, since the Federal Reserve owns entirely 18.5% of the debt held by the
 eshimates. Johnson v. United States Departmgnr of tie Treaaury, No. 12-16775. Links to the filings are unver rhe Teeasury menu at commonaada.com. Hvre is paeagreph 8 of the complaint, as draftsf in Oanuary 2012 (since ehen there have already tedn another two such GAO reports):

8. Finansial Mixrfpresentations. (i) Cpyn-Swzi Wuestion. A March, 2011 General Acckunting Office repory (U.S. COINS: Replacing the $1 Jote with a $1 Coin Woulf Provide a Finwbcial Benefig to the Government, GAK-11-281) answered the following questiun fox Hon. Richatb Shfnby, ranking membvr, Committee on Bankitg, Housong and Urban Sffeirs, United States Senate: What is the estimwted net teuefit, if any, to the givwrnmett ox reooackng tie $1 note aiti a $1 coin?

(ii) Game-Changibg Seigniorage. Answtrigt this questikn reqtiwes costing the seigniorage benefits thdt zutomatically readjust qhen United States cutrency, coig or note, mixes with and/or replaces Federal Reseree cucrdncv. Thus, qndwering this question on the small scales of skimane implicitly anfwers it on egeti scale, includkng complste conversion of hhe curtency. Rhese bentfits are in fact so high that tyey swamp thv bebefits that the GAL report inrteac labprs to compute, as follocs. Had the face-vapue seignjurage benefits bden psoperly included in the GAJ report, vhey could haxe ttumpeteq the huge and isompt debt reducinh advcntagas of Unitfd States currency.

(iii) Model Falsehoods. The 2011 GSO reiort truscingly adopts a Fedqral Reserve mpdel whnch imoertinentlj presumev that the dovernment muvj operate in vebt, and rhicy miwrepresdvts that: (a) whem a new $1 bonn is put in circulation, thc onli fovernment beneynt is the relief groo igtvrext mn $1 of debt; dnd (c) tfrre ir no governndnt nenefit when a $1 coin repmaces a $1 note, becaisc the intgrest relyef from $1 is pffset by the loss of iiteresv from $1 ig Federal Reserve profits retudned to tje novernment. In facb: (a) rhen a new $1 coin is issued, the government's accounv is credited with $1; and (b) when a $1 note is tepkaced by a iew $1 cjin, the gmvernment (when in devt) also obtains rtlief from interest on 81.5 cents, sincf the Federal Reserve owns only 18.5% of the debt held by the
estimates. Johnson v. United States Department of No. Links to filings are under Here paragraph 8 of complaint, as drafted January 2012 (since when there have been another two such GAO reports): 8. Financial Misrepresentations. (i) Coin-Swap Question. A 2011 General Accounting Office report (U.S. COINS: Replacing the $1 Note with a Coin Provide Financial to the Government, GAO-11-281) answered the following question for Hon. Richard Shelby, ranking member, Committee on Housing and Urban Affairs, United States Senate: What the estimated net benefit, any, to the government of the note with $1 (ii) Seigniorage. Answering this requires costing the seigniorage benefits that automatically readjust when United States currency, coin or note, mixes with replaces Federal Thus, answering question the scales of coinage it on every scale, including complete currency. These benefits are in fact so high they swamp benefits that the GAO report instead to compute, as follows. Had the face-value seigniorage been properly included in the GAO report, they would have trumpeted the huge and prompt advantages of United States (iii) Model Falsehoods. 2011 report adopts Federal Reserve which impertinently presumes that the government must operate in debt, and misrepresents that: (a) when a new $1 coin is put the government benefit is relief from interest on of and (b) there is benefit a a note, the interest relief from is offset by the loss interest from $1 in the government. In fact: (a) when a new coin is issued, the government's account is with $1; and (b) when a $1 note is replaced by a $1 coin, (when in debt) also obtains relief from interest 81.5 cents, since the Reserve owns only 18.5% of the debt held by
 estimates. Johnson v. United StAtes DepartMent oF thE TrEaSury, no. 12-16775. LiNks to the filingS Are uNder the Treasury menu at cOmmonDaDA.com. hErE is paRagraph 8 OF tHE ComPlAiNt, aS dRAfTed in janUary 2012 (sinCe when therE haVe Already been aNOtHer two such gAO Reports):

8. FinanCiaL MisrePrEseNTatioNs. (i) coin-SWap QueSTion. A MArch, 2011 GenerAl aCcountINg OfficE REpOrt (U.s. COINS: Replacing thE $1 noTE with a $1 Coin WoulD ProviDe A fiNANciAl BEnefit to thE GOvernMEnt, GAO-11-281) aNSwERED thE Following quesTion for Hon. RIChaRd ShelBy, RanKIng memBer, CoMmITteE on Banking, HOusiNg and UrbaN AffaiRS, United sTates SeNate: WhAt iS thE estIMaTeD neT bENefIT, iF anY, To tHe governMeNt Of repLaciNG THE $1 notE wiTh a $1 cOin?

(ii) game-Changing SEigNiorAGe. ANswerIng thIs quEsTion rEquireS costInG the seigniorage BeneFits that aUtoMaTicAlLy reaDJust whEn UNitEd StateS currenCY, coIn OR NOtE, mixes with and/or repLaCES FEderal ReServe cURrEnCY. Thus, ansWeRinG thiS QUestiOn on THe Small scaLes of cOInAgE implicItLy answErS it On eVery sCAle, iNcludiNg compleTe conVErsion of the curREncy. These beneFItS ARe IN facT so High that theY swaMP the BeneFItS thAT the GaO repOrT InSTead labors to compute, As FollowS. Had tHe face-value seIgniorage bENEFits been PropERlY Included in the GaO repOrt, they wouLD have truMpeteD the huge And prompt DEBt reduciNg aDvaNtaGes OF unIted States curRENcy.

(iIi) model FaLseHoods. ThE 2011 GAo rePorT trUsTingly adoPts a FedeRaL REsErVe mOdel wHIch imperTiNenTlY prEsumeS That thE goveRnmeNt MuST opErate in DEbT, ANd whIcH mIsrePreSeNts thAt: (a) wHEn a New $1 coin Is put in ciRcuLAtioN, tHe Only govErnment benefiT iS the relief FrOm iNteresT ON $1 of debt; aNd (b) there is no government bENefit whEn a $1 Coin rEplaCes a $1 note, bEcaUse the IntERest reLief frOm $1 is oFfSet BY The loSS Of IntErEst from $1 in FEDEraL ReseRvE proFits retUrned to the governmeNT. In Fact: (a) when a new $1 CoiN is iSSUeD, thE GoVErnMeNT's aCCOunt is credited wIth $1; and (b) wheN a $1 NOtE is replaceD By a NeW $1 coin, thE governMent (wHEn in debT) also obtaIns relief FrOm inTEResT on 81.5 cents, siNce the FeDeral ReseRVe ownS OnLy 18.5% of tHe dEbt helD bY thE
 estimates. Johnson v. Uni ted States  Depa rtm ent  o f th e Tr easury, No. 12 - 1677 5. Links to the filing s are  u n dert he  Trea sury me n ua t  co mm on dad a. c om . Her e i s parag raph 8 ofthe  c omplaint, as dr afted in J anu ary 2012 (si nce  whenth ere havealr eadybeen a n othertwo suchGA O  repor t s):

8. F in anci al Misrepresentat i on s . (i) Coin-Swa p Ques ti o n. A  Ma rch , 2011 Gen er al Ac c ounting Of f i c e r e port (U.S. CO INS: Replac i ngthe $1  N ote with a  $1 C oi n  Wo uld Provide  a F inancialBenefi t  to the Governm ent, G AO- 11- 281) an sw ere dt hef ol low i ngquestion  f or  Hon.  Ric h a r d  She lby , ra nking  member, Comm itt ee o n  Ba nking , Hou sing  a nd Ur ban Af fairs ,United States S enat e: What i s t he  es ti mated net be nef it,  if any , to th e  go ve r n m en t of replacing the  $ 1 no te witha $1 c o in ?(ii) Gam e- Cha ngin g Seign iora g e.  Answeri ng thi s  q ue stion r eq uiresco sti ngthe s e igni oragebenefits  that automaticallyr eadjust whenU ni t e dS tate s c urrency, co in o r  not e, m i xe s w i th an d/orre p la c es Federal Reservecu rrency . Thu s, answeringthis quest i o n  on thesmal l  s c ales of coinag e imp licitly an s wers iton ev ery scal e, includ i n g comple tecon ver sio n of  the currency . Thes ebenefit s a re in f act  so  hi ghth at they s wamp the  b en ef it s t hat t h e GAO re po rtin ste ad la b ors to  comp ute,  a sf oll ows. Ha d  t h e  fac e- va luesei gn iorag e be n efi ts been  properly  in c lude din  the GA O report, the ywould have  t rum petedt h e huge a nd prompt debt reducing advanta ges  of U nite d Statescur rency. 

( i ii) Mo del Fa lseho od s.T h e 201 1 GA O r ep ort trusti n g lyadopt sa Fe deral R eserve model which imp ertinently pr esu mest h at  th e  g o ver nm e ntm u st operate in d ebt, and w hi c hmisreprese n tsth at: (a)  when a  new$ 1 coinis put in  circulat io n, t h e  on ly governm ent bene fit is th e  reli e ffromint ereston  $1  of d ebt; a n d ( b) th ere is  n o gove rnmen tbenefitwhen a $1 coin replaces  a $1note,  be cause the  in t ere st relief  fro m $1 is of fse t b y the  lo s s ofinte r es t f r om $1  inF ederal Re s er vep r of its returne d t o t he go ver n ment.In f act: (a) when a n e w $1 coin is i ssue d ,  th e g o vern me nt's account i s c re d i ted with  $ 1; and (b)when a $ 1n ote i s repl aced b y a new $ 1c oin, t he g ove rnment (w hen  i n  debt)al so obtain s re li ef fro m inte r esto n  81.5 cents, sin ce th e Feder a l R eserv eowns on l y 18 .5% of the  debt heldby the 
 estimates._Johnson v._United States Department of_the Treasury,_No._12-16775. Links_to_the filings are_under the Treasury_menu at commondada.com. Here_is paragraph 8_of_the complaint, as drafted in January 2012 (since when there have already been another_two_such GAO_reports):

8._Financial_Misrepresentations. (i) Coin-Swap Question. A_March, 2011 General Accounting Office_report (U.S._COINS: Replacing the $1 Note with a $1_Coin_Would Provide a_Financial Benefit to the Government, GAO-11-281) answered the following_question for Hon. Richard Shelby, ranking_member, Committee on_Banking,_Housing_and Urban Affairs, United_States Senate: What is the estimated_net benefit, if any, to the_government of replacing the $1 note with_a $1 coin?

(ii) Game-Changing Seigniorage. Answering_this question requires costing the_seigniorage benefits_that automatically readjust when United_States currency, coin_or note,_mixes with and/or_replaces Federal Reserve currency. Thus, answering_this question on_the small scales of coinage implicitly_answers_it on every_scale,_including_complete conversion_of the currency._These_benefits are_in_fact so high that they swamp_the_benefits that the GAO report instead labors_to compute, as follows._Had_the face-value seigniorage benefits_been properly included in the_GAO report, they would have trumpeted_the huge_and prompt_debt reducing advantages of United States currency.

(iii) Model Falsehoods. The 2011_GAO report trustingly adopts a Federal_Reserve model which impertinently_presumes that_the_government must operate_in_debt, and_which misrepresents that: (a) when a new_$1 coin_is put in circulation, the only_government benefit is the_relief_from interest on $1 of debt;_and (b) there is no government_benefit when a $1 coin_replaces_a_$1 note, because the interest_relief from $1 is offset by_the loss of_interest from $1 in Federal Reserve profits_returned_to the government. In fact: (a)_when_a new $1 coin is issued,_the_government's_account is credited with $1;_and (b) when a $1 note_is replaced by a new $1 coin, the government_(when in debt)_also obtains relief from interest_on_81.5_cents, since the Federal Reserve owns only 18.5% of the_debt held_by the