 how economic power shapes American politics and policy. For decades, most political scientists have sidestepped that question, because it has not seemed amenable to rigorous (meaning quantitative) scientific investigation. Qualitative studies of the political role of economic elites have mostly been relegated to the margins of the field. But now, political scientists are belatedly turning more systematic attention to the political impact of wealth, and their findings should reshape how we think about American democracy.

A forthcoming article in Perspectives on Politics by (my former colleague) Martin Gilens and (my sometime collaborator) Benjamin Page marks a notable step in that process. Drawing on the same extensive evidence employed by Gilens in his landmark book “Affluence and Influence,” Gilens and Page analyze 1,779 policy outcomes over a period of more than 20 years. They conclude that “economic elites and organized groups representing business interests have substantial independent impacts on U.S. government policy, while mass-based interest groups and average citizens have little or no independent influence.”

Average citizens have “little or no independent influence” on the policy-making process? This must be an overstatement of Gilens’s and Page’s findings, no?

Alas, no. In their primary statistical analysis, the collective preferences of ordinary citizens had only a negligible estimated effect on policy outcomes, while the collective preferences of “economic elites” (roughly proxied by citizens at the 90th percentile of the income distribution) were 15 times as important. “Mass-based interest groups” mattered, too, but only about half as much as business interest groups — and the preferences of those public interest groups were only weakly correlated (.12) with the preferences of the public as measured in opinion surveys.

Gilens and Page frame their study as a test of four broad theories of American politics: “Majoritarian Electoral Democracy,” “Majoritarian Pluralism,” “Economic Elite Domination” and “Biased Pluralism.” “Majoritarian Electoral Democracy,” with its emphasis on public opinion, elections and representation, provides the theoretical backbone of most contemporary political science (including mine). The training of most graduate students (including mine) is primarily couched in that framework. But Gilens’s and Page’s work makes that look like a bad scientific bet, wishfully ignoring most of what actually drives American policy-making.

The theory of “Majoritarian Pluralism” emphasizes the role of organized interests, but assumes that most ordinary citizens
how economic power shapes American politics and policy. For decades, most political scientists have hedge that doubt, because it has not seemed amenable to rigorous (meaning quantitative) scientific probe. Qualitative studies of the political character of economic elites have largely been relegated to the margins of the battlefield. But now, political scientists are late turning more systematic attention to the political impact of wealth, and their finding should reshape how we think about American democracy. 

 A forthcoming article in Perspectives on Politics by (my former colleague) Martin Gilens and (my sometime confederate) Benjamin Page marks a notable step in that summons. Drawing on the same across-the-board evidence employed by Gilens in his landmark record “ Affluence and Influence, ” Gilens and Page analyze 1,779 policy outcomes over a period of more than 20 years. They conclude that “ economic elites and organize groups representing business interests have solid independent impacts on U.S. government policy, while mass - based interest groups and average citizens have small or no independent influence. ” 

 Average citizen take “ short or no independent influence ” on the policy - making process? This must be an overstatement of Gilens ’s and Page ’s findings, no? 

 Alas, no. In their primary statistical psychoanalysis, the collective preferences of ordinary citizens had only a negligible estimated effect on policy outcomes, while the collective preferences of “ economic elites ” (approximately proxied by citizens at the ninetieth percentile of the income distribution) were 15 times as important. “ Mass - based interest groups ” count, too, but only about half as much as business interest groups — and the preferences of those public interest group were only weakly correlated (.12) with the preference of the public as measure in opinion survey. 

 Gilens and Page frame their discipline as a test of four broad theory of American politics: “ Majoritarian Electoral Democracy, ” “ Majoritarian Pluralism, ” “ Economic Elite Domination ” and “ Biased Pluralism. ” “ Majoritarian Electoral Democracy, ” with its stress on public opinion, elections and representation, provides the theoretical backbone of most contemporary political science (including mine). The training of most graduate student (including mine) is primarily frame in that framework. But Gilens ’s and Page ’s work makes that look like a bad scientific bet, wishfully ignoring most of what actually drive American policy - making. 

 The theory of “ Majoritarian Pluralism ” emphasizes the role of organized interests, but assume that most average citizens
 hoa economic power shapes Xmerican politiew and 'olicy. Ror decaaes, most political scientistd yave widestepped that questkon, becaude it haw nou seemed amenable to rigovjus (jcaniny wuantitative) sgientific itvestigation. Qgauicative studies of the political role of ecomolic elites havg mosuly beeh relegated to the margins of the rield. Blt now, political xcientists are belatedly tkrnijg more systematic attention jk trw political kmpact of wealth, and tgeir findings should reshape hod we chink about Anerlwan democrary.

A fogthcoming artlble in [erspecyives on Politlcs bb (my former colleague) Marvin Gilens and (my soietime conlcborator) Benjamin Pagw narks a nmtabuw sgep ii tgat prlceas. Drawing on the samw extensive evidenct eiikoyed by Gilsns in hys landmark book “Affluence and Influenct,” Gilsns and Page analyze 1,779 pilicy outcomes over a period os more than 20 years. They conclude that “economic elhtes ena oxnwvuzfd groups representing business interests havq sibxtantial indepcndent impacts on I.S. gpdernment polizy, while jass-based interest groups and qverage cytizrns have little or no indepwndent influvnce.”

Qverage citizens hcve “little ox no imdepemdent influence” on the 'olicy-jaking procfss? This jjst be an overstxtekett of Gilens’s and Page’s figdings, no?

Elas, uo. In thdir krimary statisticwl analysis, the collectige prgferenwes of ordlnary citizens had only a neglijmble estimatec affvct on pojicy putcomes, whilq the collectire prefexences of “econompc elites” (roughly prjxied by citisgns at the 90th percentyle if tye incood distribution) were 15 times as impirtant. “Mass-based iktererf groups” matterzb, uoi, but only aboit fals ws mtwh as businevs ivtefrst gfoups — and bhe pregerences of those putlic interest groups wrrc only weqkly corwelated (.12) with the preferences ov the puulic ax mgasured in opinion surveys.

Gilena and Pagf fvame their sttdy qs a test of four broad theories of American politirs: “Majoritarian Electotal Democracy,” “Majoritcrlan Pluralisk,” “Ecogomic Elide Domination” and “Biqsed Pluralism.” “Mamoritarian Electoral Dsmocrawy,” wihh its emphasis on public opinion, elections and representation, provides tye theoretical bacibonr of kofc conteiporerb political scienbe (including mine). The training oh most gragucte students (including mine) ix orimarily couzhed in that framework. Bht Gilenx’s and Page’s work makes that lopk like a bad scientific bet, wisyfullg ignogjnj most of what actuakly drnves Anerican pollcy-making.

The tfeoty of “Majorltarman Pluralism” emphasizes the role od orgabixed interests, buv assumes thwu most krdinaty citizens
how economic power shapes American politics and decades, political scientists sidestepped that question, amenable rigorous (meaning quantitative) investigation. Qualitative studies the political role of economic elites mostly been relegated to the margins of the field. But now, political scientists belatedly turning more systematic attention to the political impact of wealth, and their should how think American democracy. A forthcoming article in Perspectives on Politics by (my former colleague) Martin Gilens and sometime collaborator) Benjamin Page marks a notable step that process. Drawing on same extensive evidence employed by in landmark book and Gilens Page analyze 1,779 outcomes over a period of more than 20 years. They conclude that “economic elites and organized groups business interests independent impacts U.S. policy, mass-based interest groups citizens have little or no independent have “little or no independent influence” on the process? This be an overstatement of Gilens’s and findings, no? Alas, no. In their primary statistical the collective preferences of ordinary citizens had only a negligible estimated effect on policy outcomes, collective preferences of “economic (roughly proxied by at 90th of income distribution) 15 times as important. “Mass-based interest groups” mattered, too, but only half as much as business interest groups — and the those interest groups were weakly correlated (.12) with preferences the public as measured surveys. and study a of four broad theories American politics: “Majoritarian Electoral Democracy,” Pluralism,” “Economic Elite Domination” Democracy,” with its emphasis on public opinion, elections representation, provides the theoretical backbone of most political science (including mine). The training of most graduate students (including mine) primarily couched framework. But Gilens’s and Page’s work makes that like a bad scientific wishfully ignoring most of what actually drives American policy-making. theory “Majoritarian Pluralism” the role of interests, but assumes most ordinary citizens
 how economic power shapes AmeRican politIcs anD poLicY. FOr deCadeS, most political SCienTists have sidestepped thAt queStIOn, beCAuSe it hAs not seEMeD AMenAbLe To rIgORoUs (meaNinG quantiTative) scieNtiFiC investigatiON. QUalitative StuDies of the polItiCal rolE oF ecONomic EliTes haVe mostLY been rElegated tO tHE margiNS of the fIELd. but nOw, political scientIStS Are belatedly tuRning mOrE SySTEmaTic Attention tO tHe polITical imPAcT OF WeaLTh, and their finDings should REshApe how We ThiNK about ameriCaN DemOcracy.

A fortHcomIng articlE in PerSPectiveS On PolitIcs by (mY foRmeR colLEaGuE) MaRtIN GiLEnS anD (My sOmetime cOlLaBoratOr) BeNJAMIn PaGe mArks A notaBle step in that ProCess. dRawIng on The saMe exTeNsive EvidenCe empLoYed by Gilens in hiS lanDmark book “affLuEncE aNd InfLUence,” GIleNs aNd Page aNalyze 1,779 pOLicY oUTCOmEs over a period of morE tHAN 20 yEars. They ConcluDE tHaT “Economic ElIteS and ORGanizEd grOUpS represeNting bUSiNeSs interEsTs have SuBstAntIal inDEpenDent imPacts on U.s. goveRNment policy, whiLE mass-based intEReST GrOUps aNd aVerage citizEns hAVe liTtle OR nO inDEpendEnt inFlUEnCE.”

Average citizens havE “lIttle oR no inDependent inflUence” on the POLIcy-makinG proCEsS? this must be an ovErstaTement of GiLEns’s and PAge’s fIndings, nO?

Alas, no. In THEir primaRy sTatIstIcaL ANaLysis, the colleCTIve pReFerenceS of OrdinarY ciTizEns Had OnLy a negligIble estiMaTeD eFfEct On polICy outcomEs, WhiLe The ColleCTive prEfereNces Of “EcONomIc eliteS” (RoUGHly pRoXiEd by CitIzEns at The 90tH PerCentile Of the incoMe dIStriBuTiOn) were 15 tImes as importaNt. “mass-based iNtEreSt grouPS” Mattered, Too, but only about half as muCH as busiNesS inteRest Groups — and The PreferEncES of thoSe publIc intErEst GROups wERE oNly WeAkly correlATEd (.12) wIth thE pRefeRences oF the public as measurED in Opinion surveyS.

GiLens AND PAge FRaME thEiR StuDY As a test of four brOad theorieS oF amErican poliTIcs: “maJoritarIan ElecToral dEmocracY,” “MajoritaRian PluraLiSm,” “EcONOmiC Elite DomiNation” anD “Biased PlURalisM.” “maJoritAriAn ElecToRal democRacy,” wiTH itS emphAsis on PuBlic opInion, ElEctions aNd representation, provideS the thEoretIcaL backbone Of mOSt cOntemporaRy poLitical sciEncE (inCludiNg mINe). The TraiNInG of MOst grAduaTE students (INcLudING mIne) is primarILY CouChed iN thAT frameWork. but Gilens’s and Page’S Work makes that lOok lIKE a bAd sCIentIfIc bet, wishfully IgnOrING most of wHaT actually drIves AmerIcAN poliCy-makiNg.

The tHeory of “mAJoRItariaN PluRalIsm” emphasIzeS tHE role of OrGaNIzed inTereStS, but asSumes tHAt moST Ordinary citizens
 how economic power shapes  Americanpolit ics  an dpoli cy.For decades, m o st p olitical scientists ha ve si de s tepp e dthatquestio n ,b e cau se  i t h as no t see med  amenab le to rigo rou s(meaning qua n ti tative) sc ien tific invest iga tion.Qu ali t ative  st udies  of th e  polit ical role  o f  econo m ic elit e s  h avemostly been releg a te d  to the margin s of t he fi e l d.But  now, poli ti cal s c ientist s  a r e bel a tedly turning  more syste m ati c atte nt ion to the  poli ti c alimpact of w ealt h, and th eir fi n dings s h ould re shapehow  we  thi n kab out  A m eri c an  de m ocr acy.

Afo rt hcomi ng a r t i c le i n P ersp ectiv es on Politic s b y (m y  fo rmercolle ague )Marti n Gile ns an d(my sometime co llab orator) B enj am inPa ge ma r ks a n ota ble  step i n thatp roc es s . Dr awing on the sameex t e ns ive evid ence e m pl oy e d by Gil en s i n hi s landm arkb oo k “Afflu ence a n dIn fluence ,”  Gilen sand  Pa ge an a lyze  1,779  policyoutco m es over a peri o d of more tha n  2 0 ye a rs.The y concludethat “eco nomi c  e lit e s and  orga ni z ed groups representing  b usines s int erests have s ubstantial i n dependen t im p ac t s on U.S. gove rnmen t policy,w hile mas s-bas ed inter est group s and aver age  ci tiz ens h av e little or n o inde pe ndent i nfl uence.” 

A ver age  ci ti zens have  “little  o rno  i nde pende n t influe nc e”on  th e pol i cy-mak ing p roce ss ?T his  must b e  a n over st at emen t o fGilen s’sa ndPage’sfindings,  no ? 

Al as ,no. Intheir primary  s tatistical  a nal ysis,t h e collec tive preferences of ord i nary ci tiz ens h ad o nly a neg lig ible e sti m ated e ffecton po li cyo u tcome s ,  w hil ethe collec t i veprefe re nces  of “ec onomic elites” (ro u ghl y proxied bycit izen s at  th e  9 0 thpe r cen t i le of the incom e distribu ti o n)  were 15 t i mes  a s impor tant. “ Mass- b ased in terest gr oups” mat te red, t oo,  but onlyabout ha lf as muc h  as b u si nessint erestgr oup s — a nd the pre feren ces of  t hose p ublic  i nterestgroups were only weakly  corre lated  (. 12) withthe pre ferencesof t he publicasmea sured  in opini on s u rv eys . 

Gil ensa nd Page f r am e t h e ir  study as a t e stof fo urb road t heor ies of American p o litics: “Major itar i a n E lec t oral  D emocracy,” “Ma jor it a r ian Plur al ism,” “Econ omic Eli te Domin ation”  and “ BiasedP l ur a lism.”  “Ma jor itarian E lec to r al Demo cr ac y ,” wit h it semphas is onp ubli c opinion, electio ns an d repre s ent ation ,provide s  the  theoretic al backbone  of mo st c ontem porarypo litica l s ci ence (incl u ding mine ). Th e train in g of  mo st gra duat e stude nts(i ncl uding min e )  i s  p ri m ari ly c ouche din t hat frame w ork. But  Gi l ens’s a nd  Pa g e ’s wor k  m a k es that lo oklikea bad scient i ficb et ,  wish fullyignori ng most ofwh at actu all y drives Am erican po l icy -m akin g.

Theth eory  o f “ Ma joritarian Plur alism” e mphasize s the ro leo f or g anized  i nterests, bu t ass um e s thatm o stordinar y  ci tiz ens 
 how_economic power_shapes American politics and_policy. For_decades,_most political_scientists_have sidestepped that_question, because it_has not seemed amenable_to rigorous (meaning_quantitative)_scientific investigation. Qualitative studies of the political role of economic elites have mostly been_relegated_to the_margins_of_the field. But now, political_scientists are belatedly turning more_systematic attention_to the political impact of wealth, and their_findings_should reshape how_we think about American democracy.

A forthcoming article in Perspectives_on Politics by (my former colleague)_Martin Gilens and_(my_sometime_collaborator) Benjamin Page marks_a notable step in that process._Drawing on the same extensive evidence_employed by Gilens in his landmark book_“Affluence and Influence,” Gilens and Page_analyze 1,779 policy outcomes over_a period_of more than 20 years._They conclude that_“economic elites_and organized groups_representing business interests have substantial independent_impacts on U.S._government policy, while mass-based interest groups_and_average citizens have_little_or_no independent_influence.”

Average citizens have_“little_or no_independent_influence” on the policy-making process? This_must_be an overstatement of Gilens’s and Page’s_findings, no?

Alas, no. In_their_primary statistical analysis, the_collective preferences of ordinary citizens_had only a negligible estimated effect_on policy_outcomes, while_the collective preferences of “economic elites” (roughly proxied by citizens at_the 90th percentile of the income_distribution) were 15 times_as important._“Mass-based_interest groups” mattered,_too,_but only_about half as much as business interest_groups —_and the preferences of those public_interest groups were only_weakly_correlated (.12) with the preferences of_the public as measured in opinion_surveys.

Gilens and Page frame their_study_as_a test of four broad_theories of American politics: “Majoritarian Electoral_Democracy,” “Majoritarian Pluralism,”_“Economic Elite Domination” and “Biased Pluralism.” “Majoritarian_Electoral_Democracy,” with its emphasis on public_opinion,_elections and representation, provides the theoretical_backbone_of_most contemporary political science (including_mine). The training of most graduate_students (including mine) is primarily couched in that framework._But Gilens’s and_Page’s work makes that look_like_a_bad scientific bet, wishfully ignoring most of what actually drives_American policy-making.

The_theory of “Majoritarian_Pluralism” emphasizes the role of organized interests, but assumes that_most ordinary citizens