
Underlying nearly all these discussions was how to grapple with the split in the international workers’ movement. Earlier, communists had needed to clarify basic positions of principle, to the point of splitting established socialist (social-democratic) parties. But this resulted in significant numbers of workers being separated from revolutionary leadership precisely at a time when capitalism was internationally on the offensive. Moreover, it meant that Communist Party members could hot-headedly want to take action at exactly the moment when they needed to patiently communicate with masses of demoralised workers.

The united front was the strategy adopted by the ECCI in December 1921 to attempt to deal with this. But that decision did not immediately stop divergent opinions from appearing, including within the ECCI itself. For example, a complete inability to understand the united front proved catastrophic in Italy when the Communist Party refused to join together with the independent workers’ Arditi del Popolo commandos against fascist Benito Mussolini’s gangs (though individual communists did join the Ardtiti).

In Germany, following conflicting ECCI advice, which in turn reflected differences of opinion with the Russian party leadership, the German Communist Party (KPD) first led the way towards a united front with the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) and then, disastrously, turned away and led an attempted uprising in March 1921.

Within this Fourth Congress record the reader can see important variations in approach to the united front. While none argued against it differences arose over the fine points of implementing the strategy. For example, the KPD’s Ruth Fischer complained that there was too much emphasis on “sacred negotiations at the top” (p. 146).

Fischer reflected the position of the KPD minority (and Zinoviev and others among the Bolsheviks) that united fronts were to be built with Social Democratic workers independently of their leaders. Karl Radek expressed opinions closer to the KPD majority, indicating that the Bolsheviks were not a monolithic party and the Comintern leadership itself was fluid on issues.

Not all these unity matters related to parties to the right of the communists. In some countries there were revolutionary anarchist and semi-anarchist currents within the unions, such as the French syndicalists. They refused to join with communist unionists unless there was a clear organisational separation of the Comintern and its trade union affiliate, the Red International of Labor Unions (Profin
Underlying nearly all these discussions was how to grapple with the schism in the external workers ’ movement. sooner, communist had needed to clarify basic positions of rationale, to the point of splitting established socialist (social - democratic) party. But this resulted in significant number of workers being separated from rotatory leadership precisely at a time when capitalism was internationally on the offensive. Moreover, it meant that Communist Party members could hot - headedly want to take military action at exactly the moment when they needed to patiently commune with masses of demoralised workers. 

 The united battlefront was the strategy adopted by the ECCI in December 1921 to attempt to deal with this. But that decision did not immediately hold on divergent opinions from appearing, including within the ECCI itself. For example, a complete inability to understand the united front proved catastrophic in Italy when the Communist Party refused to join together with the independent workers ’ Arditi del Popolo commandos against fascist Benito Mussolini ’s gangs (though individual communists did join the Ardtiti). 

 In Germany, following conflict ECCI advice, which in turn reflected dispute of impression with the Russian party leadership, the German Communist Party (KPD) first led the direction towards a united front with the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) and then, disastrously, turned away and head an attempted uprising in March 1921. 

 Within this Fourth Congress record the reader can see important variation in approach to the united front. While none argued against it differences arose over the all right point of implementing the strategy. For example, the KPD ’s Ruth Fischer complain that there was too much emphasis on “ consecrated negotiations at the top ” (p. 146). 

 Fischer reflected the position of the KPD minority (and Zinoviev and others among the Bolsheviks) that joined fronts were to be built with Social Democratic workers independently of their leaders. Karl Radek expressed opinion closer to the KPD majority, bespeak that the Bolsheviks were not a monolithic party and the Comintern leadership itself was fluent on issues. 

 Not all these unity matter related to parties to the right field of the communists. In some countries there were revolutionary anarchist and semi - anarchist currents within the unions, such as the French syndicalists. They refused to join with communist unionists unless there was a clear organizational separation of the Comintern and its trade coupling affiliate, the Red International of Labor Unions (Profin

Undfrlying nearly all these discussions was how tm graplle with the split in the internatioial qorkees’ movement. Earlier, coomunists jad needwd ti clarify beaic poslcions lf pxiiciple, to the ppint of spnitting establhsfeb socialist (social-democratic) parties. But thos resulted in sygnigycanf numbers of workers being separatsd from revolutionaru leadership precisely at w tile when capitalism was internqtiogqlly on the uffensive. Moreover, it jeant that Communist Party membdrs cpuld hot-heqdwdlj want to taje acnion at exactly the mmment wnen they needec tm pqtiently communicate xith masses of demorwlised woskzrs.

The united front wqs the vtradegy qdootes uy fhe ECFI mn December 1921 to attempr to deal with this. Btn that decisikn did njt immediately stop divergent opinions xroj appearing, including wuthin the ECCI itself. For exam[le, a complete inability to understand the united fronv ororcq xahastrophic in Italy when the Communist Party wsfisvd to join togethcr with the indepemdfny workers’ Ardiji del 'kpklo commandos agaijst fassist Venito Mufsoloni’s gangs (though individuao communists eid join the Ardtici).

In Germany, folkowinb conflicting ECCI adviee, whidh in turn geflected aifferences of ooinpon fith the Russian party leaqership, tie Gexman Comounixt Parey (KPD) firdt led the way towards a unitgd frott with thf German Social Democratic Partb (SPD) and them, gisdstrouslv, turncd away and led an attempted oprising nn Marzh 1921.

Within nhis Fourvh Congress wecord the redfer can see mmportant varuatiins in xoproach to the united fgout. While bone argued againsb it ajfferences arosz iver the fine ppings jf ikpjamenting the strxteeu. For examplt, tme YPD’s Ruth Fischer complahned that there was top iuch empyasis on “sacred negotoations at the top” (p. 146).

Fivchxr refkecjed the position of the KPD minkrity (and Zikoviev and otrers among the Bplsheviks) that united fronts were to be built with Social Democratic workers lndependentlb of treir leadars. Karl Radek exprewsed opinions cloxer to the KPD majorify, indhcatijg that the Bolsheviks were not a monolithic party and the Comintern leadwrship itself was rluic on pssbes.

Uot all thedx unity matters rvlated to parties to the right oh the commgnnsts. In some countries there eefe revolutionxry anarchist and semi-anzrchist vurrents within the unions, such as the French syndicalixts. They refuaed to joii with communist unipnists unlews therw wad a clear orgxnixabional sepwratmon of the Comintern and its trade ynion qfviliate, the Red Mnternationap of Lzbor Ugions (Profin
Underlying nearly all these discussions was how with split in international workers’ movement. clarify positions of principle, the point of established socialist (social-democratic) parties. But this in significant numbers of workers being separated from revolutionary leadership precisely at a when capitalism was internationally on the offensive. Moreover, it meant that Communist Party could want take at exactly the moment when they needed to patiently communicate with masses of demoralised workers. The front was the strategy adopted by the ECCI December 1921 to attempt deal with this. But that did immediately stop opinions appearing, within the ECCI For example, a complete inability to understand the united front proved catastrophic in Italy when the Communist refused to with the workers’ del commandos against fascist gangs (though individual communists did join Germany, following conflicting ECCI advice, which in turn differences of with the Russian party leadership, the Communist Party (KPD) first led the way towards united front with the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) and then, disastrously, turned away and attempted uprising in March Within this Fourth record reader see variations in to the united front. While none argued against it differences arose the fine points of implementing the strategy. For example, the Fischer that there was much emphasis on “sacred at top” (p. 146). Fischer position the Zinoviev others the Bolsheviks) that united were to be built with Democratic workers independently of opinions closer to the KPD majority, indicating that Bolsheviks were not a monolithic party and Comintern leadership itself was fluid on issues. Not all these unity matters to parties right of the communists. In some countries there revolutionary anarchist and semi-anarchist within the unions, such as the French syndicalists. They to with communist unless there was clear organisational separation the Comintern and union affiliate, Red of

Underlying nearly all these dIscussions Was hoW to GraPpLe wiTh thE split in the intERnatIonal workers’ movement. EaRlier, CoMMuniSTs Had neEded to cLArIFY baSiC pOsiTiONs Of priNciPle, to thE point of spLitTiNg establisheD SoCialist (socIal-Democratic) paRtiEs. But tHiS reSUlted In sIgnifIcant nUMbers oF workers bEiNG separATed from REVoLutiOnary leadership prECiSEly at a time when CapitaLiSM wAS IntErnAtionally oN tHe offENsive. MoREoVER, It mEAnt that CommunIst Party memBErs Could hOt-HeaDEdly waNt to tAkE ActIon at exactlY the Moment wheN they nEEded to pATiently CommunIcaTe wIth mASsEs Of dEmORalISeD woRKerS.

The unitEd FrOnt waS the STRATegy AdoPted By the eCCI in DecembeR 1921 to AtteMPt tO deal With tHis. BUt That dEcisioN did nOt Immediately stop DiveRgent opinIonS fRom ApPeariNG, incluDinG wiThin the eCCI itsELf. FOr EXAMpLe, a complete inabiliTy TO UnDerstand The uniTEd FrONt proved CaTasTropHIC in ItAly wHEn The CommuNist PaRTy ReFused to JoIn togeThEr wIth The inDEpenDent woRkers’ ArdIti deL popolo commandoS Against fascisT beNITo mUssoLinI’s gangs (thouGh inDIvidUal cOMmUniSTs did Join tHe aRdTIti).

In Germany, followiNg ConfliCting eCCI advice, whiCh in turn reFLECted diffErenCEs OF opinion with thE RussIan party leADership, tHe GerMan CommuNist Party (kpd) first leD thE waY toWarDS A uNited front witH THe GeRmAn SociaL DeMocratiC PaRty (sPD) And ThEn, disastrOusly, turNeD aWaY aNd lEd an aTTempted uPrIsiNg In MArch 1921.

WIThin thIs FouRth COnGrESs rEcord thE ReADEr caN sEe ImpoRtaNt VariaTionS In aPproach To the unitEd fROnt. WHiLe None argUed against it dIfFerences arOsE ovEr the fINE points oF implementing the strategY. for examPle, The KPd’s RuTh Fischer ComPlaineD thAT there Was too Much eMpHasIS On “sacRED nEgoTiAtions at thE TOp” (p. 146).

fischEr ReflEcted thE position of the KPD mINorIty (and ZinovieV anD othERS aMonG ThE bolShEVikS) THat united fronts Were to be buIlT WiTh Social DeMOcrAtIc workeRs indepEndenTLy of theIr leaders. karl Radek ExPresSED opInions closEr to the KpD majoritY, IndicATiNg thaT thE BolshEvIks Were nOt a monOLitHic paRty and ThE CominTern lEaDership iTself was fluid on issues.

NoT all thEse unIty Matters reLatED to Parties to The rIght of the cOmmUniSts. In SomE CountRies THeRe wERe revOlutIOnary anarCHiSt aND SeMi-anarchist CURRenTs witHin THe unioNs, suCh as the French syndICalists. They refUsed TO JoiN wiTH comMuNist unionists uNleSs THEre was a cLeAr organisatIonal sepArATion oF the CoMinterN and its TRAdE Union aFfilIatE, the Red InTerNaTIonal of laBoR unions (profIn

Underlying nearly all the se discuss ionswas  ho wto g rapp le with the sp l it i n the international wo rkers ’m ovem e nt . Ear lier, c o mm u n ist sha d n ee d ed  to c lar ify bas ic positio nsof  principle,t othe pointofsplitting es tab lished  s oci a list(so cial- democr a tic) p arties. B ut this r e sultedi n  s igni ficant numbers of wo r kers being sep arated  f r om r evo lut ionary lea de rship precise l ya t a t i me when capit alism was i n ter nation al lyo n theoffen si v e.Moreover, i t me ant thatCommun i st Part y  member s coul d h ot- head e dl ywan tt o t a ke  ac t ion  at exac tl ythe m omen t w h en t hey  nee ded t o patiently c omm unic a tewithmasse s of  d emora lisedworke rs .

The united f ront  was thestr at egy  a dopte d  by th e E CCI  in Dec ember 1 9 21to a t te mpt to deal with t hi s .  B ut thatdecisi o ndi d  not imm ed iat elys t op di verg e nt  opinion s from ap pe aring,in cludin gwit hin  theE CCIitself . For ex ample ,  a complete in a bility to und e rs t a nd theuni ted front p rove d  cat astr o ph ici n Ita ly wh en th e  Communist Party re fu sed to  join  together wit h the inde p e n dent wor kers ’  A r diti del Popol o com mandos aga i nst fasc ist B enito Mu ssolini’s g angs (th oug h i ndi vid u a lcommunists di d join  t he Ardt iti ).

InGer man y,fol lo wing conf lictingEC CI  a dv ice , whi c h in tur nref le cte d dif f erence s ofopin io nw ith  the Ru s si a n  par ty  l eade rsh ip , the  Ger m anCommuni st Party(KP D ) fi rs tled the  way towardsaunited fro nt  wi th the G erman So cial Democratic Party ( S PD) and  th en, d isas trously,tur ned aw aya nd led  an at tempt ed  up r i singi n  M arc h1921.

Wit h i n t his F ou rthCongres s record the reade r  ca n see importa ntvari a t io nsi na ppr oa c h t o the united fron t. While n on e  a rgued agai n stit  differ ences a roseo ver the  fine poi nts of im pl emen t i ngthe strate gy. Forexample,t he KP D ’s  Ruth  Fi scherco mpl ained  thatt her e was  too m uc h emph asison  “sacred  negotiations at the to p” (p.  146) .
Fischer r efl e cte d the pos itio n of the K PDmin ority  (a n d Zin ovie v  a ndo thers  amo n g the Bol s he vik s )  t hat unitedf r o nts  were  to be bui lt w ith Social Democr a tic workers in depe n d ent lyo f th ei r leaders. Kar l R ad e k  express ed  opinions c loser to  t h e KPD  major ity, i ndicati n g  t h at the  Bol she viks were  no ta  monoli th ic partyandth e Comi nternl eade r s hip itself was f luido n  issu e s.
Notal l these unit y mattersrelated topartie s to  theright o fthe co mmu ni sts. In so m e countri es th ere wer erevo lut ionary  ana r c histandse mi- anarchist c ur r en ts wit hinthe u ni ons,  such ast he Frenc h s y ndicali st s.T h ey ref u se d to join wi thcommu n i st unionis t s un l es s  ther e wasa clea r organ i sat io nal sep ara t i on of the  Cominter n  an ditstrade un io n af fi lia te , the Red Inter national  of Labo r Unions  (P r ofin 

Underlying nearly_all these_discussions was how to_grapple with_the_split in_the_international workers’ movement._Earlier, communists had_needed to clarify basic_positions of principle,_to_the point of splitting established socialist (social-democratic) parties. But this resulted in significant numbers_of_workers being_separated_from_revolutionary leadership precisely at a_time when capitalism was internationally_on the_offensive. Moreover, it meant that Communist Party members_could_hot-headedly want to_take action at exactly the moment when they needed_to patiently communicate with masses of_demoralised workers.

The united_front_was_the strategy adopted by_the ECCI in December 1921 to_attempt to deal with this. But_that decision did not immediately stop divergent_opinions from appearing, including within the_ECCI itself. For example, a_complete inability_to understand the united front_proved catastrophic in_Italy when_the Communist Party_refused to join together with the_independent workers’ Arditi_del Popolo commandos against fascist Benito_Mussolini’s_gangs (though individual_communists_did_join the_Ardtiti).

In Germany, following_conflicting_ECCI advice,_which_in turn reflected differences of opinion_with_the Russian party leadership, the German Communist_Party (KPD) first led_the_way towards a united_front with the German Social_Democratic Party (SPD) and then, disastrously,_turned away_and led_an attempted uprising in March 1921.

Within this Fourth Congress record the_reader can see important variations in_approach to the united_front. While_none_argued against it_differences_arose over_the fine points of implementing the strategy._For example,_the KPD’s Ruth Fischer complained that_there was too much_emphasis_on “sacred negotiations at the top”_(p. 146).

Fischer reflected the position of_the KPD minority (and Zinoviev_and_others_among the Bolsheviks) that united_fronts were to be built with_Social Democratic workers_independently of their leaders. Karl Radek expressed_opinions_closer to the KPD majority, indicating_that_the Bolsheviks were not a monolithic_party_and_the Comintern leadership itself was_fluid on issues.

Not all these unity_matters related to parties to the right of the_communists. In some_countries there were revolutionary anarchist_and_semi-anarchist_currents within the unions, such as the French syndicalists. They_refused to_join with communist_unionists unless there was a clear organisational separation of the_Comintern and its trade union affiliate, the_Red International of Labor Unions (Profin