And we are very good at pouring concrete. But if you give us enough forewarning, there won't be anything but concrete in the places you bomb."

This was indeed the case. On the morning of January 17, 1991, I spent hours scanning images of dozens of buildings and structures, looking for the tell-tale signs of a bomb hit that would signal "objective achieved," with no regard whatsoever for what was actually inside the structure. As a UN weapons inspector, I spent days cataloguing the sophisticated machinery that had been evacuated from these very buildings to remote sheds and warehouses days and weeks before the bombs fell. For all the planning and preparation that went into the opening attacks of the Gulf War, in the end they accomplished but very little.

I went to sleep fearing the rumor of war. The unrest in Syria and Iraq, brought on by the actions of the Islamic state (formerly known as the Islamic State in Syria, or ISIS), was threatening to spill over into the region at large. I awoke to find that the United States had, in concert with five other Arab countries, launched a concerted strike against the Islamic State inside Syria, expanding an air campaign that had up until then been limited to targets in Iraq. War was, once again, thrust upon us.

This attack had been weeks in the planning, with high profile hearings and consultations taking place in Washington, DC and in the capitals of Europe and the Middle East. The Islamic State, having demonstrated its media savvy with slick Internet videos depicting its various heinous acts, would have obviously known such an attack was coming. Given that its ranks are filled with veterans of the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003-2011 American invasion and occupation of Iraq, it can be assumed that the Islamic State is well-versed in the effects of various American air-delivered munitions and their method of delivery. Having tracked American drones and reconnaissance aircraft overflights of Syria in the past weeks, the potential areas of interest were likewise well known to the Islamic State. As was the case in the Gulf War, I am certain the United States and its Arab allies succeeded at blowing up concrete. I am equally as certain that anything of value that might have been housed in such structures, whether human or machine, had long ago departed.

Despite the pounding Iraq took over the course of 43 days of concentrated aerial bombardment in 1991, after the war ended it retained significant strategic capability, either intact or able to be reconstituted in a
And we are very good at pouring concrete. But if you give us enough forewarning, there won't be anything but concrete in the place you bombard. " 

 This was indeed the case. On the morning of January 17, 1991, I spent hour scanning images of twelve of building and structures, look for the tell - tale signal of a bomb hit that would signal " objective achieved, " with no regard whatsoever for what was actually inside the social organization. As a UN weapons inspector, I spent day cataloguing the sophisticated machinery that had been evacuate from these very building to remote sheds and warehouses days and weeks before the turkey fell. For all the planning and preparation that went into the opening attacks of the Gulf War, in the end they accomplished but very little. 

 I went to sleep fearing the rumor of war. The unrest in Syria and Iraq, brought on by the actions of the Islamic state (formerly known as the Islamic State in Syria, or ISIS), was endanger to spill over into the region at large. I wake up to witness that the United States had, in concert with five other Arab countries, launch a concert strike against the Islamic State inside Syria, expanding an tune campaign that had up until then been limited to targets in Iraq. War was, once again, thrust upon us. 

 This attack had been weeks in the planning, with gamey profile hearings and consultations taking plaza in Washington, DC and in the capitals of Europe and the Middle East. The Islamic State, having show its media savvy with slick Internet videos depicting its various flagitious acts, would have obviously known such an attack was coming. Given that its ranks are filled with veterans of the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 - 2011 American invasion and occupation of Iraq, it can be assumed that the Islamic State is well - verse in the effects of respective American air - delivered weaponry and their method of manner of speaking. Having tracked American drone and reconnaissance aircraft overflights of Syria in the past week, the potential areas of pastime were likewise well known to the Islamic State. As was the casing in the Gulf War, I am certain the United States and its Arab allies succeeded at blowing up concrete. I am equally as certain that anything of value that might have been housed in such structures, whether homo or machine, had long ago departed. 

 Despite the pound Iraq took over the course of 43 days of concentrated aerial bombardment in 1991, after the war ended it retain significant strategic capability, either intact or able to be reconstituted in a
And we are very good at pouving concrete. Buj uf you give hs enougf forewarning, there won't be enytying vut concrete in the plxces you homb."

This was undeed the case. On the mkvning if January 17, 1991, I spent houss scanning imdgds of dozens of buildings and structuwes, loolijg for the telj-talt sygns of a bomb hit that would signal "ogjectivt achieved," with no regard whatsoever for whah wad actually inside hhe structuts. Af a UN weaponr inspectog, I spent dzys cataloguing the sophisticatdd maehinery thaj gaf been evacueted fgom these vern buildhngs to remote sheds snd waeehouses days and weens before the bombf fell. Fos cll the planning and prwparajion dhat qeng ihtp fhe opfniig attacks kf the Gulf War, in the end theu wbvomplished bht verr jittle.

I went to sleep fearing the rumor of war. The unrest in Syriq and Iraq, brought on by the astions of the Islamic state (formerly known as the Islajkc Wtwgw ln Syria, or ISIS), was threatening to spill ovew imtp the region ab large. I awoke to flnc that the Unijed Stacss had, in concert wihh five othee Arab cotntroes, launched a concerted steike against rhe Islamic State nnside Syria, expsndinb an air campaign that kad up until then been limjged to targets iv Igaq. Far was, once again, thrust tpon us.

Thms atcack had beem weekf in the ppannikc, with high profilf heatings dnd consulhations taking place in Washingvpn, DC and in tve bapitals jf Euvope and the Miqdle East. The Nslamic Ftate, having dejonstraved its mediw savvy with vpick Internev videos qepixtint its vxfious heinous scts, woulb havw obviously known xucf an attack was euning. Given that itr rwnns awa filled witv vegerxms of the 1991 Gulf Caf anc the 2003-2011 American invavion and occupation of Ivaq, it cab be asstmed that the Islamic State is aell-vxrsed mn the efsects of various American air-dslivered lunltions and thqir nethod of dekivery. Having tracked American drones aid reconnaissance airctaft overflights of Siris in the paxt weqks, the pmtential areas of inrerest were likewlse well known to the Jslamiw Stahe. As was the case in the Gulf War, I am certain the United States and its Arab eljies succeesed st blmwnng up cogcreve. I am equally as certain that anything of value that michc have been housed in such sttuztures, whethet human or machine, had lonf ago delarted.

Despite the pounding Iraq took over the course of 43 days od condentrangd eerial bombardment im 1991, aftzr the war eneed lt retained sienigigant stratfgic ccpability, either intact or able ti be rwclnstituted in a
And we are very good at pouring if give us forewarning, there won't the you bomb." This indeed the case. the morning of January 17, 1991, spent hours scanning images of dozens of buildings and structures, looking for the signs of a bomb hit that would signal "objective achieved," with no regard for was inside structure. As a UN weapons inspector, I spent days cataloguing the sophisticated machinery that had been from these very buildings to remote sheds and days and weeks before bombs fell. For all the and that went the attacks the Gulf War, the end they accomplished but very little. I went to sleep fearing the rumor of war. The in Syria brought on the of Islamic state (formerly the Islamic State in Syria, or to spill over into the region at large. awoke to that the United States had, in with five other Arab countries, launched a concerted against the Islamic State inside Syria, expanding an air campaign that had up until then to targets in Iraq. was, once again, upon This had weeks in planning, with high profile hearings and consultations taking place in Washington, and in the capitals of Europe and the Middle East. State, demonstrated its media with slick Internet videos its heinous acts, would have such attack that ranks filled with veterans of 1991 Gulf War and the American invasion and occupation assumed that the Islamic State is well-versed in effects of various American air-delivered munitions and method of delivery. Having tracked American drones and reconnaissance aircraft overflights of in the the potential areas of interest were likewise well to the Islamic State. was the case in the Gulf War, I am the States and Arab allies succeeded blowing up concrete. am equally as anything of that have such structures, whether human or machine, long departed. Despite the pounding Iraq over of 43 days of concentrated aerial bombardment in 1991, after the war ended it retained capability, either intact or to reconstituted in a
And we are very good at pouring Concrete. BuT if yoU giVe uS eNougH forEwarning, there wON't be Anything but concrete in tHe plaCeS You bOMb."

this wAs indeeD ThE CAse. on ThE moRnINg Of JanUarY 17, 1991, I spent Hours scannIng ImAges of dozens OF bUildings anD stRuctures, lookIng For the TeLl-tALe sigNs oF a bomB hit thAT would Signal "objEcTIve achIEved," witH NO rEgarD whatsoever for whaT WaS Actually inside The strUcTUrE. aS a Un weApons inspeCtOr, I spENt days cATaLOGUinG The sophisticaTed machinerY ThaT had beEn EvaCUated fRom thEsE VerY buildings tO remOte sheds aNd wareHOuses daYS and weeKs befoRe tHe bOmbs FElL. FOr aLl THe pLAnNinG And PreparatIoN tHat weNt inTO THE opeNinG attAcks oF the Gulf War, in The End tHEy aCcompLisheD but VeRy litTle.

I weNt to sLeEp fearing the rumOr of War. The unrEst In syrIa And IrAQ, brougHt oN by The actiOns of thE islAmIC STaTe (formerly known as tHe iSLaMic State In SyriA, Or iSis), was threAtEniNg to SPIll ovEr inTO tHe region At largE. i aWoKe to finD tHat the unIteD StAtes hAD, in cOncert With five Other aRab countries, laUNched a concertED sTRIkE AgaiNst The Islamic STate INsidE SyrIA, eXpaNDing aN air cAmPAiGN that had up until then BeEn limiTed to Targets in Iraq. war was, once AGAIn, thrust Upon US.

THIs attack had beeN weekS in the planNIng, with hIgh prOfile heaRings and cONSultatioNs tAkiNg pLacE IN WAshington, DC anD IN the CaPitals oF EuRope and The midDle easT. THe Islamic state, havInG dEmOnStrAted iTS media saVvY wiTh SliCk IntERnet viDeos dEpicTiNg ITs vArious hEInOUS actS, wOuLd haVe oBvIouslY knoWN suCh an attAck was comIng. gIven ThAt Its rankS are filled witH vEterans of tHe 1991 gulF War anD THe 2003-2011 AmericAn invasion and occupation OF Iraq, it Can Be assUmed That the IsLamIc StatE is WEll-verSed in tHe effEcTs oF VAriouS aMeRicAn Air-deliverED MunItionS aNd thEir methOd of delivery. Having TRacKed American drOneS and RECoNnaISsANce AiRCraFT Overflights of SyRia in the paSt WEeKs, the potenTIal ArEas of inTerest wEre liKEwise weLl known to The IslamiC STate. aS Was The case in tHe Gulf WaR, I am certaIN the UNItEd StaTes And its arAb aLlies SucceeDEd aT blowIng up cOnCrete. I Am equAlLy as certAin that anything of value tHat migHt havE beEn housed iN suCH stRuctures, wHethEr human or mAchIne, Had loNg aGO depaRted.

dEsPitE The poUndiNG Iraq took OVeR thE COuRse of 43 days of CONCenTrateD aeRIal bomBardMent in 1991, after the war ENded it retained SignIFIcaNt sTRateGiC capability, eitHer InTACt or able To Be reconstitUted in a
And we are very good at po uring conc rete.  Bu t i fyougive  us enough for e warn ing, there won't be an ythin gb ut c o nc retein thep la c e s y ou  b omb ." 
T his w asindeedthe case.Onth e morning of Ja nuary 17,199 1, I spent h our s scan ni ngi mages  of  doze ns ofb uildin gs and st ru c tures, looking f or  the  tell-tale signso fa  bomb hit that  would  s i gn a l  "o bje ctive achi ev ed,"w ith nor eg a r d  wh a tsoever for w hat was act u all y insi de  th e  struc ture.  A s  aUN weaponsinsp ector, Ispentd ays cat a loguing  the s oph ist icat e dma chi ne r y t h at  ha d  be en evacu at ed  from  the s e v erybui ldin gs to  remote sheds  an d wa r eho usesdaysandwe eks b eforethe b om bs fell. For al l th e plannin g a nd  pr ep arati o n that  we ntinto th e openi n g a tt a c k sof the Gulf War, i nt h eend they  accom p li sh e d but ve ry  li ttle . 
I we nt t o  s leep fea ring t h eru mor ofwa r. The  u nre stin Sy r ia a nd Ira q, broug ht on by the actions of the Islami c  s t a te (for mer ly known as  the Isla micS ta tei n Syr ia, o rI SI S ), was threateningto  spill  over  into the reg ion at lar g e .  I awoke  tof in d  that the Unit ed St ates had,i n concer t wit h five o ther Arab c ountries , l aun che d a c on certed strike a gain st  the Is lam ic Stat e i nsi deSyr ia , expandi ng an ai rca mp ai gnthath ad up un ti l t he n b een l i mitedto ta rget sin Ira q. Warw as , once  a ga in,thr us t upo n us . 

T his att ack had b een week sin  the pl anning, withhi gh profile  h ear ings a n d  consult ations taking place inW ashingt on,  DC a nd i n the cap ita ls ofEur o pe and  the M iddle  E ast . The I s l am icSt ate, havin g dem onstr at ed i ts medi a savvy with slick Int ernet videosdep icti n g  i tsv ar i ous  h e ino u s  acts, would ha ve obvious ly kn own such a n  at ta ck wascoming.  Give n  that i ts ranksare fille dwith v ete rans of th e 1991 G ulf War a n d the 20 03-20 11Americ an  in vasio n ando ccu patio n of I ra q, itcan b eassumedthat the Islamic Stateis wel l-ver sed  in the e ffe c tsof variou s Am erican air -de liv eredmun i tions  and th eir metho d of delivery. Ha vin g tr acked Ameri c a n  dr onesand reconn aiss ance aircraft ove r flights of Syr ia i n the  pa s t we ek s, the potenti alar e a s of int er est were li kewise w el l  know n to t he Isl amic St a t e. As was  the  ca se in the  Gu lf War, Iam  c e rtaintheUn ited S tatesa nd i t s  Arab allies suc ceede d at bl o win g upco ncrete. I am  equally a s certain t hat an ythi ng of  valueth at mig htha ve been ho u sed in su ch st ructure s,  whe the r huma n or m achin e, h ad  lo ng ago de p a rt e d. 
D esp itethe p ou ndin g Iraq to o k over t hec ourse o f43d a ys ofc on c e ntrated ae ria l bom b a rdment in1 991, af t er th e warendedit reta i ned  s ignific ant s trategiccapabilit y , e it herintact o rable  t o b ereconstituted i n a
And we_are very_good at pouring concrete._But if_you_give us_enough_forewarning, there won't_be anything but_concrete in the places_you bomb."

This was_indeed_the case. On the morning of January 17, 1991, I spent hours scanning images_of_dozens of_buildings_and_structures, looking for the tell-tale_signs of a bomb hit_that would_signal "objective achieved," with no regard whatsoever for_what_was actually inside_the structure. As a UN weapons inspector, I spent_days cataloguing the sophisticated machinery that_had been evacuated_from_these_very buildings to remote_sheds and warehouses days and weeks_before the bombs fell. For all_the planning and preparation that went into_the opening attacks of the Gulf_War, in the end they_accomplished but_very little.

I went to sleep_fearing the rumor_of war._The unrest in_Syria and Iraq, brought on by_the actions of_the Islamic state (formerly known as_the_Islamic State in_Syria,_or_ISIS), was_threatening to spill_over_into the_region_at large. I awoke to find_that_the United States had, in concert with_five other Arab countries,_launched_a concerted strike against_the Islamic State inside Syria,_expanding an air campaign that had_up until_then been_limited to targets in Iraq. War was, once again, thrust upon_us.

This attack had been weeks in_the planning, with high_profile hearings_and_consultations taking place_in_Washington, DC_and in the capitals of Europe and_the Middle_East. The Islamic State, having demonstrated_its media savvy with_slick_Internet videos depicting its various heinous_acts, would have obviously known such_an attack was coming. Given_that_its_ranks are filled with veterans_of the 1991 Gulf War and_the 2003-2011 American_invasion and occupation of Iraq, it can_be_assumed that the Islamic State is_well-versed_in the effects of various American_air-delivered_munitions_and their method of delivery._Having tracked American drones and reconnaissance_aircraft overflights of Syria in the past weeks, the_potential areas of_interest were likewise well known_to_the_Islamic State. As was the case in the Gulf War,_I am_certain the United_States and its Arab allies succeeded at blowing up concrete._I am equally as certain that anything_of value that might have been housed in such structures, whether_human or machine, had long ago departed.

Despite the_pounding Iraq took over the course of_43 days of concentrated_aerial_bombardment in 1991, after the war ended_it_retained_significant_strategic capability, either_intact or able_to be reconstituted_in a