, he recognizes that the limits on bank-credit inflation confronted by a fractional-reserve banking system based on gold are likely to be much less confining under a central bank than under the quasi-decentralized National Banking System put in place immediately prior to the passage of the Federal Reserve Act in 1913. The praxeological reasoning of Austrian monetary theory also leads to the conclusion that those who stand to reap the lion's share of the economic benefits from a bank-credit inflation tend to be the lenders and first recipients of the newly created notes and deposits, namely, commercial and investment bankers and their clients. Guided by the implications of this praxeological knowledge and of his thymological rule about the motives of those who lobby for state laws and regulations, Rothbard is led to scrutinize the goals and actions of the large Wall Street commercial and investment bankers, their industrial clientele, and their relatives and allies in the political arena.

Rothbard's analysis of the concrete evidence demonstrates that, beginning in the late 1890s, a full decade before the panic of 1907, this Wall Street banking axis and allied special interests began to surreptitiously orchestrate and finance an intellectual and political movement agitating for the imposition of a central bank. This movement included academic economists who covered up its narrow and venal economic interests by appealing to the allegedly universal economic benefits that would be forthcoming from a central bank operating as a benevolent and disinterested provider of an "elastic" currency and "lender of last resort." In fact, what the banking and business elites dearly desired was a central bank that would provide an elastic supply of paper reserves to supplement existing gold reserves. Banks' access to additional reserves would facilitate a larger and more lucrative bank-credit inflation and, more important, would provide the means to ward off or mitigate the recurrent financial crises that had brought past inflationary booms to an abrupt and disastrous end in bank failures and industrial depression.

Rothbard employs the approach to economic history exemplified in this treatment of the origins of the Fed consistently and dazzlingly throughout this volume to unravel the causes and consequences of events and institutions ranging over the course of US monetary history, from colonial times through the New Deal era. One of the important benefits of Rothbard's unique approach is that it naturally leads to an account of the development of the US monetary system in terms of a compelling narrative linking human motives and plans that oftentimes are hidden and devious to outcomes that sometimes are tragic. And one will learn much
, he recognizes that the limits on bank - credit ostentation confront by a fractional - reserve banking system free-base on amber are likely to be much less confining under a cardinal savings bank than under the quasi - decentralized National Banking System put in topographic point immediately prior to the passage of the Federal Reserve Act in 1913. The praxeological reasoning of Austrian monetary theory besides leads to the conclusion that those who stand to reap the lion's plowshare of the economic benefits from a bank - credit inflation tend to be the lenders and inaugural recipients of the newly created notes and deposit, namely, commercial and investment bankers and their clients. Guided by the deduction of this praxeological knowledge and of his thymological rule about the motives of those who lobby for state laws and rule, Rothbard is led to scrutinize the goals and actions of the large Wall Street commercial and investing banker, their industrial clientele, and their relatives and allies in the political arena. 

 Rothbard's analysis of the concrete evidence demonstrates that, beginning in the late 1890s, a full ten before the panic of 1907, this Wall Street banking bloc and allied special interests begin to surreptitiously orchestrate and finance an intellectual and political movement agitate for the imposition of a cardinal bank. This movement included academic economist who covered up its narrow and venal economic interests by appealing to the allegedly universal economic benefit that would be forthcoming from a central bank operating as a charitable and disinterested provider of an " elastic " currentness and " lender of final resort. " In fact, what the banking and business elites dearly desired was a cardinal bank that would provide an elastic supply of paper reserves to supplement existing gold reserves. bank' access to additional reserves would facilitate a larger and more lucrative depository financial institution - credit ostentation and, more important, would provide the mean to ward off or mitigate the recurrent financial crises that had lend past inflationary booms to an abrupt and disastrous end in bank failures and industrial depression. 

 Rothbard employs the approach to economic history exemplify in this treatment of the origins of the Fed systematically and dazzlingly throughout this volume to unravel the causes and consequences of events and institutions ranging over the class of US monetary history, from colonial times through the New Deal era. One of the important benefits of Rothbard's unique approach is that it naturally lead to an explanation of the growth of the US monetary system in terms of a compelling narrative linking human motives and plans that oftentimes are hidden and devious to result that sometimes are tragic. And one will learn much
, he recognizes that the limlts on bank-credij unflatmon conrronted cy a fractional-reserve bankiig ststem based on gold are likdly to be much lews cibfining unvsr a cekcral gwnk chen under the qussi-decentrdlized Nationan Cauking System put in place immediatelr prior tl the passage jf tnq Fesvrcl Reserve Act in 1913. The praxeolofical rtasoning of Austrisn monetary theory also lewds ho the conclusion hhat those qho frand to reap the lion's share of thg economic benefits from a bank-cfedit inflation twnd jo be the leiders wnd first regppients of the newly created noves qnd deposits, namely, cmmmercial and inveftment batkzrs and their clients. Gyided by dhe knplkcauiois kf thid pcaxeologicam knowledge and of his thymolobisql rule about the mjtyves of those who lobby for state laws dnd regulations, Rothbard iw led to scrutinize tje goals wnd actions of the large Wall Street commercial atd intertmtnb cqnners, their industrial clientele, and their relwfifex and allies ik the political arrnw.

Rpjhbard's analysks of cge concrete evidence demonsjrates that, begynnimg in the late 1890s, a full decqde before tke panic of 1907, this Walp Street bauking sxis snd allied special intexests gegan to sugreptitiohrly orchestrate xnd fhnance an intellectual and politicao morement aeitajing fow the impoditiok of a central bank. This mmvement influded academic economists who rpvered up itx targow and vznal egonomic intereses by appealiny to the alleeedly univvrsal ecoiomic benefies that would he forthcomiig from a cenrral bank oodrating as a brnevolent and disinrerested provider pf xh "elastic" curreuey and "lender of kasg rqslrv." In sdct, what the banyine and cusiness ellter desrly desired was a cantrzl bank that would pvovide an elastic supply of paler reserves to sukplemeit exirting gojd reserves. Banks' access to adsitional gescrves would fwcilltatg a larger cnd more lucrative bank-credit inflation end, more important, woule provide the means uo ward off oc mitidate the securrent financial xrises that had bvought past inflationady books to an abrupt and disastrous end in bank failures and industrial depression.

Rithbarv qmploys the apptoach tj econoiic iirtory exemplifiec in this treatment of the origmns of the Fzd consistently and dazzlinglu ghroughout thks volume to unravel the causes snd consequences of events and onstitutions ranging ovev the couese or US monetery history, from colpnial cimes rhrough the New Deal era. Onr lf the imoortent benefits of Rothbard's unique approach id that it naturanly leads tl an abcount jf the developmeht or the OS monetary syxtem in terms pf a compelling narrdtyve linking hunzn motives amd planv that oftenvimes are higden and devious to outcomes that sometimes are trafic. And ohe will lxarn much
, he recognizes that the limits on confronted a fractional-reserve system based on much confining under a bank than under quasi-decentralized National Banking System put in immediately prior to the passage of the Federal Reserve Act in 1913. The reasoning of Austrian monetary theory also leads to the conclusion that those who to the share the economic benefits from a bank-credit inflation tend to be the lenders and first recipients of newly created notes and deposits, namely, commercial and bankers and their clients. by the implications of this knowledge of his rule the of those who for state laws and regulations, Rothbard is led to scrutinize the goals and actions of the large Street commercial bankers, their clientele, their and allies in arena. Rothbard's analysis of the concrete beginning in the late 1890s, a full decade the panic 1907, this Wall Street banking axis allied special interests began to surreptitiously orchestrate and an intellectual and political movement agitating for the imposition of a central bank. This movement economists who covered up narrow and venal interests appealing the universal economic that would be forthcoming from a central bank operating as a and disinterested provider of an "elastic" currency and "lender of In what the banking business elites dearly desired a bank that would provide supply paper existing reserves. access to additional reserves facilitate a larger and more bank-credit inflation and, more to ward off or mitigate the recurrent financial that had brought past inflationary booms to abrupt and disastrous end in bank failures and industrial depression. Rothbard employs approach to exemplified in this treatment of the origins of Fed consistently and dazzlingly this volume to unravel the causes and consequences of and ranging over course of US history, from colonial through the New One of important of is that it naturally leads to account the development of the US system of a compelling narrative linking human motives and plans that oftentimes are hidden and devious that sometimes are tragic. one learn much
, he recognizes that the limits On bank-credIt infLatIon CoNfroNted By a fractional-rEServE banking system based on gOld arE lIKely TO bE much Less conFInING unDeR a CenTrAL bAnk thAn uNder the Quasi-decenTraLiZed National BANkIng System pUt iN place immediAteLy prioR tO thE PassaGe oF the FEderal rEserve act in 1913. The pRaXEologiCAl reasoNINg Of AuStrian monetary theORy ALso leads to the cOnclusIoN ThAT ThoSe wHo stand to rEaP the lIOn's sharE Of THE EcoNOmic benefits fRom a bank-creDIt iNflatiOn TenD To be thE lendErS And First recipiEnts Of the newlY creatED notes aND deposiTs, nameLy, cOmmErciAL aNd InvEsTMenT BaNkeRS anD their clIeNtS. GuidEd by THE IMpliCatIons Of thiS praxeologicaL knOwleDGe aNd of hIs thyMoloGiCal ruLe abouT the mOtIves of those who lObby For state lAws AnD reGuLatioNS, RothbArd Is lEd to scrUtinize THe gOaLS ANd Actions of the large WAlL sTrEet commeRcial aND iNvEStment baNkErs, TheiR INdustRial CLiEntele, anD their RElAtIves and AlLies in ThE poLitIcal aREna.

ROthbarD's analysIs of tHE concrete evideNCe demonstrateS ThAT, BeGInniNg iN the late 1890s, a fUll dECade BefoRE tHe pANic of 1907, This WAlL stREet banking axis and alLiEd specIal inTerests began tO surreptitIOUSly orcheStraTE aND finance an inteLlectUal and poliTIcal moveMent aGitating For the impOSItion of a CenTraL baNk. THIS mOvement includED AcadEmIc econoMisTs who coVerEd uP itS naRrOw and venaL economiC iNtErEsTs bY appeALing to thE aLleGeDly UniveRSal ecoNomic BeneFiTs THat Would be FOrTHComiNg FrOm a cEntRaL bank OperATinG as a benEvolent anD diSInteReStEd proviDer of an "elastiC" cUrrency and "LeNdeR of lasT REsort." In fAct, what the banking and busINess eliTes DearlY desIred was a cEntRal banK thAT would ProvidE an elAsTic SUPply oF PApEr rEsErves to supPLEmeNt exiStIng gOld reseRves. Banks' access to aDDitIonal reserves WouLd faCILiTatE A lARgeR aND moRE Lucrative bank-crEdit inflatIoN AnD, more imporTAnt, WoUld provIde the mEans tO Ward off Or mitigatE the recurReNt fiNANciAl crises thAt had broUght past iNFlatiONaRy booMs tO an abrUpT anD disaStrous ENd iN bank FailurEs And indUstriAl DepressiOn.

Rothbard employs the appRoach tO econOmiC history eXemPLifIed in this TreaTment of the OriGinS of thE FeD ConsiStenTLy And DAzzliNgly THroughout THiS voLUMe To unravel thE CAUseS and cOnsEQuenceS of eVents and institutiONs ranging over tHe coURSe oF US MOnetArY history, from coLonIaL TImes throUgH the New Deal Era. One of ThE ImporTant beNefits Of RothbARD's UNique aPproAch Is that it nAtuRaLLy leads To An ACcount Of thE dEvelopMent of THe US MONetary system in teRms of A COmpelLIng NarraTiVe linkiNG humAn motives aNd plans that OftentImes Are hiDden and DeVious tO ouTcOmes that soMEtimes are TragiC. And one WiLl leArn Much
, he recognizes that the l imits on b ank-c red itin flat ionconfronted bya  fra ctional-reserve bankin g sys te m  bas e don go ld arel ik e l y t obe  mu ch le ss co nfi ning un der a cent ral  b ank than und e rthe quasi- dec entralized N ati onal B an kin g  Syst emput i n plac e  immed iately pr io r  to th e  passag e of  the  Federal ReserveA ct in 1913. The p raxeol og i ca l rea son ing of Aus tr ian m o netaryt he o r y  al s o leads to th e conclusio n  th at tho se  wh o  stand  to r ea p  th e lion's sh areof the ec onomic benefit s  from a  bank- cre dit  inf l at io n t en d  to be  th e  le nders an dfi rst r ecip i e n t s of  th e ne wly c reated notesand  dep o sit s, na mely,  com me rcial  and i nvest me nt bankers andthei r clients . G ui ded  b y the implic ati ons  of thi s praxe o log ic a l kn owledge and of his  t h y mo logicalrule a b ou tt he motiv es  of  tho s e  wholobb y  f or state  lawsa nd  r egulati on s, Rot hb ard  is  ledt o sc rutini ze the g oalsa nd actions oft he large Wall St r e et comm erc ial and inv estm e nt b anke r s,  th e ir in dustr ia l  c l ientele, and theirre lative s and  allies in th e politica l a rena.

R othb a rd ' s analysis ofthe c oncrete ev i dence de monst rates th at, begin n i ng in th e l ate  18 90s , afull decade b e f oreth e panic  of  1907,thi s W all  St re et bankin g axis a nd  a ll ie d s pecia l  interes ts  be ga n t o sur r eptiti ously  orc he st r ate  and fi n an c e  anin te llec tua land p olit i cal  moveme nt agitat ing forth eimposit ion of a cent ra l bank. Th is  mo vement i ncludedacademic economists who covered  up  itsnarr ow and ve nal  econo mic intere sts by  appe al ing t o the a ll ege dl y universa l eco nomic  b enef its tha t would be forthco m ing  from a centr albank o pe rat i ng asab ene v o lent and disint erested pr ov i de r of an "e l ast ic " curre ncy and  "len d er of l ast resor t." In fa ct , wh a t  th e bankingand busi ness elit e s dea r ly  desi red  was a  c ent ral b ank th a t w ouldprovid ean ela sticsu pply ofpaper reserves to suppl ementexist ing  gold res erv e s.Banks' ac cess  to additi ona l r eserv esw ouldfaci l it ate a lar gera nd more l u cr ati v e  b ank-crediti n f lat ion a nd, more i mpor tant, would provi d e the means to  war d off  or miti ga te the recurre ntfi n a ncial cr is es that had  brought  p a st in flatio nary b ooms to a na bruptanddis astrous e ndin bank fa il ur e s andindu st rial d epress i on.R othbard employsthe a p p roach toecono mi c histo r y ex emplifiedin this tre atment  ofthe o riginsof  the F edco nsistently and dazzl ingly  throug ho ut t his  volum e to u nrave l th ecau ses and c o n se q ue nc e s o f ev entsan d in stitution s  ranging  ov e r the c ou rse o f US m o ne t a ry history , f rom c o l onial time s  thr o ug h  theNew De al era . One o f  th eimporta ntb e nefits of  Rothbard ' s u ni queapproach  i s th at  it  n aturally leadsto an ac count of t he dev elo p ment of the  U S monetary s ystem  i n  termso f  acompell i ngnar rat ivelin king human motives and plansthat  ofte n tim es ar e hid de n and de v ious  to outc o mes that some times are tragi c . A n d on e w i ll  l earn much 
, he_recognizes that_the limits on bank-credit_inflation confronted_by_a fractional-reserve_banking_system based on_gold are likely_to be much less_confining under a_central_bank than under the quasi-decentralized National Banking System put in place immediately prior to_the_passage of_the_Federal_Reserve Act in 1913. The_praxeological reasoning of Austrian monetary_theory also_leads to the conclusion that those who stand_to_reap the lion's_share of the economic benefits from a bank-credit inflation_tend to be the lenders and_first recipients of_the_newly_created notes and deposits,_namely, commercial and investment bankers and_their clients. Guided by the implications_of this praxeological knowledge and of his_thymological rule about the motives of_those who lobby for state_laws and_regulations, Rothbard is led to_scrutinize the goals_and actions_of the large_Wall Street commercial and investment bankers,_their industrial clientele,_and their relatives and allies in_the_political arena.

Rothbard's analysis_of_the_concrete evidence_demonstrates that, beginning_in_the late_1890s,_a full decade before the panic_of_1907, this Wall Street banking axis and_allied special interests began_to_surreptitiously orchestrate and finance_an intellectual and political movement_agitating for the imposition of a_central bank._This movement_included academic economists who covered up its narrow and venal economic_interests by appealing to the allegedly_universal economic benefits that_would be_forthcoming_from a central_bank_operating as_a benevolent and disinterested provider of an_"elastic" currency_and "lender of last resort." In_fact, what the banking_and_business elites dearly desired was a_central bank that would provide an_elastic supply of paper reserves_to_supplement_existing gold reserves. Banks' access_to additional reserves would facilitate a_larger and more_lucrative bank-credit inflation and, more important, would_provide_the means to ward off or_mitigate_the recurrent financial crises that had_brought_past_inflationary booms to an abrupt_and disastrous end in bank failures_and industrial depression.

Rothbard employs the approach to economic history_exemplified in this_treatment of the origins of_the_Fed_consistently and dazzlingly throughout this volume to unravel the causes_and consequences_of events and_institutions ranging over the course of US monetary history, from_colonial times through the New Deal era._One of the important benefits of Rothbard's unique approach is that_it naturally leads to an account of the_development of the US monetary system in_terms of a compelling_narrative_linking human motives and plans that oftentimes_are_hidden_and_devious to outcomes_that sometimes are_tragic. And one_will learn_much