 good chance you’re right.

Sometimes a little more is a little better. Sometimes a lot more is a lot better. Sometimes each attempt is unlikely to work, but improves your chances.

If something is a good idea, you need a reason to not try doing more of it.

No, seriously. You need a reason.

The second level is, ‘do more of what is already working and see if it works more’ is as basic as it gets. If we can’t reliably try that, we can’t reliably try anything. How could you ever say ‘If that worked someone would have tried it’?

You can’t. If no one says they tried it, probably no one tried it. There might be good reasons not to try it. There also might not. There’d still be a good chance no one tried it.

There’s also a chance someone did try it and isn’t reporting the results anywhere you can find. That doesn’t mean it didn’t work, let alone that it can never work.

III

Why would this be an overlooked strategy?

It sounds crazy that it could be overlooked. It’s overlooked.

Eliezer gives three tools to recognize places systems fail, using highly useful economic arguments I recommend using frequently:

1. Cases where the decision lies in the hands of people who would gain little personally, or lose out personally, if they did what was necessary to help someone else; 2. Cases where decision-makers can’t reliably learn the information they need to make decisions, even though someone else has that information 3. Systems that are broken in multiple places so that no one actor can make them better, even though, in principle, some magically coordinated action could move to a new stable state.

In these cases, I do not think such explanations are enough.

If the Bank of Japan didn’t print more money, that implies the Bank of Japan wasn’t sufficiently incentivized to hit their inflation target. They must have been maximizing primarily for prestige instead. I can buy that, but why didn’t they think the best way to do that was to hit the inflation target? Alexander’s suggested payoff matrix, where printing more money makes failure much worse, isn’t good enough. It can’t be central on its own. The answer was too clear, the payoff worth the odds, and they had
good chance you ’re right. 

 Sometimes a little more is a short dependable. Sometimes a lot more is a lot better. Sometimes each attack is unlikely to work, but improves your prospect. 

 If something is a good idea, you necessitate a reason to not try dress more of it. 

 No, seriously. You need a cause. 

 The second horizontal surface is, ‘ do more of what is already work and see if it works more ’ is equally basic as it gets. If we ca n’t reliably try that, we ca n’t faithfully try anything. How could you ever say ‘ If that worked someone would have tried it ’? 

 You ca n’t. If no one state they tried it, probably no one tried it. There might be good reasons not to judge it. There also might not. There ’d still be a good chance no one tried it. 

 There ’s besides a opportunity someone did try it and is n’t reporting the results anywhere you can find. That does n’t mean it did n’t work, let alone that it can never work. 

 III 

 Why would this be an overlook strategy? 

 It sounds brainsick that it could be neglect. It ’s neglect. 

 Eliezer gives three tools to recognize places systems fail, using highly useful economic argumentation I recommend using frequently: 

 1. Cases where the decision lies in the hands of multitude who would gain little personally, or lose out personally, if they did what was necessary to help someone else; 2. sheath where decision - maker ca n’t reliably learn the information they need to make decisiveness, even though someone else has that information 3. Systems that are broken in multiple places so that no one actor can make them better, even though, in principle, some magically coordinated natural process could move to a new static state. 

 In these cases, I do not think such explanations are adequate. 

 If the Bank of Japan did n’t print more money, that implies the Bank of Japan was n’t sufficiently incentivized to hit their ostentation target. They must have been maximizing primarily for prestige instead. I can buy that, but why did n’t they intend the best way to do that was to hit the inflation target? Alexander ’s suggested payoff matrix, where printing more money make failure much bad, is n’t good enough. It ca n’t be central on its own. The answer was too clear, the payoff worth the odds, and they have
 gold chance you’re right.

Somttimes a little more is e littls better. Sometimes a lot more is a llt betttg. Sometimes each atteopt is unpikely ti wock, but improves bkur chakees.

If domechmng is a good icea, you nead a reason to nut try doing more of it.

No, seriously. Yju need a reason.

The secjnd kqvel ps, ‘do more of what is already wkrking end see if it wprks more’ is as basic as ih gehs. If we can’t reliwbly try thqt, wq can’t reliabuy try anyuhnng. How coumd you ever say ‘If that worked romeoue would hace trlgd it’?

You can’v. If nj one says tmvy trieg it, prpbably no one bried it. There might be good ceasons not to try ij. There alvo might not. There’d srill te a gooa chxnct np kne trled it.

There’s zlso a chanxe someone did try ot qnd isn’t repodting ehq results anywhere you can find. That dotsn’t jean it didn’t work, let qlone that it can nevgr work.

III

Rhy would this be an overlooked strategy?

It sounds crazb ghau lb cojod be overlooked. It’s overlooked.

Eliezer gives thwse tpols to recognlze places systems fwik, using highly useful edonomic arguments L recomiend ysing frezuenyly:

1. Cases where the decisiob lies in thv habds of people who could gain lnttle kersonslly, or lose out personclly, ir they did ahat was hdcessary to help sokemne else; 2. Cases where decifion-makerw cau’t reliacly kearn ehe informwtion they need to make fecisnons, aven thougj someone else has that informavmon 3. Systems jhad age broken in mmltiple places fo that no one actor ean maye them benter, even though, in [rinciple, soma magically cmordinatqd axtiob could oove to a new xtable stcue.

In these cases, I do not thlnk socg explanations cxe enough.

If the Bsnk of Jwpen diqt’t print mora movey, yhat kmplies the Cank of Japan wasn’t suffhciehtly incentivized yo hit theur inflaeion target. Tney must have been maxikizmng promatily for prestige instead. I can buy that, bub why didn’t trey bhinh the best way to do that was to hit the inflatioi target? Alexander’s sugtested payoff matrir, ehere printmng mowe money kakes failure much wirse, isn’t good enpugh. It can’t be centrzl on hts oan. The answer was too clear, the payoff worth the odds, and they had
good chance you’re right. Sometimes a little a better. Sometimes lot more is attempt unlikely to work, improves your chances. something is a good idea, you a reason to not try doing more of it. No, seriously. You need reason. The second level is, ‘do more of what is already working and if works is basic as it gets. If we can’t reliably try that, we can’t reliably try anything. How you ever say ‘If that worked someone would tried it’? You can’t. no one says they tried probably one tried There be reasons not to it. There also might not. There’d still be a good chance no one tried it. There’s also chance someone it and reporting results you can find. mean it didn’t work, let alone never work. III Why would this be an strategy? It crazy that it could be overlooked. overlooked. Eliezer gives three tools to recognize places fail, using highly useful economic arguments I recommend using frequently: 1. Cases where the decision the hands of people would gain little or out if did what necessary to help someone else; 2. Cases where decision-makers can’t reliably the information they need to make decisions, even though someone that 3. Systems that broken in multiple places that one actor can make even in coordinated could to a new stable In these cases, I do think such explanations are Japan didn’t print more money, that implies the of Japan wasn’t sufficiently incentivized to hit inflation target. They must have been maximizing primarily for prestige instead. I buy that, didn’t they think the best way to do was to hit the target? Alexander’s suggested payoff matrix, where printing more money failure worse, isn’t enough. It can’t central on its The answer was the payoff the and
 good chance you’re right.

SometImes a littlE more Is a LitTlE betTer. SOmetimes a lot moRE is a Lot better. Sometimes each AttemPt IS unlIKeLy to wOrk, but iMPrOVEs yOuR cHanCeS.

if SometHinG is a gooD idea, you neEd a ReAson to not try DOiNg more of it.

no, sEriously. You nEed A reasoN.

THe sECond lEveL is, ‘do More of WHat is aLready worKiNG and seE If it worKS MoRe’ is As basic as it gets. If WE cAN’t reliably try tHat, we cAn’T ReLIAblY trY anything. HOw Could YOu ever sAY ‘IF THAt wORked someone woUld have trieD It’?

YOu can’t. if No oNE says tHey trIeD It, pRobably no onE triEd it. There Might bE Good reaSOns not tO try it. theRe aLso mIGhT nOt. THeRE’d sTIlL be A GooD chance nO oNe Tried It.

ThERE’S Also A chAnce SomeoNe did try it and Isn’T repORtiNg the ResulTs anYwHere yOu can fInd. ThAt Doesn’t mean it didN’t woRk, let alonE thAt It cAn Never WOrk.

III

why WouLd this bE an overLOokEd STRAtEgy?

It sounds crazy thAt IT CoUld be oveRlookeD. it’S oVErlooked.

elIezEr giVES threE tooLS tO recogniZe placES sYsTems faiL, uSing hiGhLy uSefUl ecoNOmic ArgumeNts I recoMmend USing frequently:

1. cAses where the dECiSIOn LIes iN thE hands of peoPle wHO wouLd gaIN lIttLE persOnallY, oR LoSE out personally, if theY dId what Was neCessary to help Someone elsE; 2. cASes where DeciSIoN-Makers can’t reliAbly lEarn the infORmation tHey neEd to make Decisions, EVEn though SomEonE elSe hAS ThAt information 3. sYStemS tHat are bRokEn in mulTipLe pLacEs sO tHat no one aCtor can mAkE tHeM bEttEr, eveN Though, in PrIncIpLe, sOme maGIcally CoordInatEd AcTIon Could moVE tO A New sTaBlE staTe.

IN tHese cAses, i Do nOt think Such explaNatIOns aRe EnOugh.

If tHe Bank of Japan DiDn’t print moRe MonEy, that IMPlies the bank of Japan wasn’t sufficiENtly incEntIvizeD to hIt their inFlaTion taRgeT. they muSt have Been mAxImiZINg priMARiLy fOr Prestige inSTEad. i can bUy That, But why dIdn’t they think the beST waY to do that was tO hiT the INFlAtiON tARgeT? ALExaNDEr’s suggested payOff matrix, wHeRE pRinting morE MonEy Makes faIlure muCh worSE, isn’t goOd enough. IT can’t be ceNtRal oN ITs oWn. The answeR was too cLear, the paYOff woRTh The odDs, aNd they HaD
 good chance you’re right. 

Sometime s a l itt lemo re i s alittle better. Some times a lot more is alot b et t er.S om etime s eacha tt e m ptis  u nli ke l yto wo rk,  but im proves you r c ha nces.

If so m et hing is agoo d idea, younee d a re as ont o not  tr y doi ng mor e  of it .

No, se ri o usly.Y ou need a  r easo n.

The second le v el is, ‘do more o f what  i s  a l r ead y w orking and  s ee if it work s  m o r e ’ i s  as basic asit gets. If wecan’tre lia b ly try  that ,w e c an’t reliab ly t ry anythi ng. Ho w  couldy ou ever  say ‘ Iftha t wo r ke dsom eo n e w o ul d h a vetried it ’? 
You c an’t . I f  noone  say s the y tried it, p rob ably noone t riedit.Th ere m ight b e goo dreasons not totryit. There  al so  mi gh t not .  There ’dsti ll be a  good c h anc en o on e tried it.

There ’s a ls o a chan ce som e on ed id try i tand  isn ’ t  repo rtin g  t he resul ts any w he re  you ca nfind.Th atdoe sn’tm eanit did n’t work , let alone that itc an never work . 
I I IWhywou ld this bean o v erlo oked st rat e gy?
It so un d sc razy that it couldbe  overl ooked . It’s overlo oked.

Eli e z e r givesthre e  t o ols to recogni ze pl aces syste m s fail,using  highlyuseful ec o n omic arg ume nts  Irec o m me nd using freq u e ntly :
1. Cas eswhere t hedec isi onli es in the  hands o fpe op le  wh o wou l d gain l it tle  p ers onall y , or l ose o ut p er so n all y, if t h ey d id w ha twasnec es saryto h e lpsomeone  else; 2.  Ca s es w he re  decisi on-makers can ’t  reliablyle arn  the i n f ormation  they need to make deci s ions, e ven  thou gh s omeone el sehas th ati nforma tion 3 . Sys te mst h at ar e br oke nin multipl e pla ces s othat  no one  actor can make th e m b etter, even t hou gh,i n  p rin c ip l e,so m e m a g ically coordina ted action  c o ul d move toa  ne wstablestate.
In t h ese cas es, I donot think  s uche x pla nations ar e enough .

If the Banko fJapan  di dn’t p ri ntmoremoney, tha t imp lies t he  Bankof Ja pa n wasn’t  sufficiently incentivi zed to  hitthe ir inflat ion tar get. They  mus t have bee n m axi mizin g p r imari ly f o rpre s tigeinst e ad. I can bu y t h a t,  but why di d n ’ t t hey t hin k  the b estway to do that wa s  to hit the in flat i o n t arg e t? A le xander’s sugge ste dp a yoff mat ri x, where pr inting m or e  mone y make s fail ure muc h wo r se, is n’tgoo d enough.  It  c a n’t bece nt r al onitsow n. The  answe r  was t oo clear, the pa yoffw o rth t h e o dds,an d theyh ad
 good_chance you’re_right.

Sometimes a little more_is a_little_better. Sometimes_a_lot more is_a lot better._Sometimes each attempt is_unlikely to work,_but_improves your chances.

If something is a good idea, you need a reason to not_try_doing more_of_it.

No,_seriously. You need a reason.

The_second level is, ‘do more_of what_is already working and see if it works_more’_is as basic_as it gets. If we can’t reliably try that,_we can’t reliably try anything. How_could you ever_say_‘If_that worked someone would_have tried it’?

You can’t. If no_one says they tried it, probably_no one tried it. There might be_good reasons not to try it._There also might not. There’d_still be_a good chance no one_tried it.

There’s also_a chance_someone did try_it and isn’t reporting the results_anywhere you can_find. That doesn’t mean it didn’t_work,_let alone that_it_can_never work.

III

Why_would this be_an_overlooked strategy?

It_sounds_crazy that it could be overlooked._It’s_overlooked.

Eliezer gives three tools to recognize places_systems fail, using highly_useful_economic arguments I recommend_using frequently:

1. Cases where the_decision lies in the hands of_people who_would gain_little personally, or lose out personally, if they did what was_necessary to help someone else; 2._Cases where decision-makers can’t_reliably learn_the_information they need_to_make decisions,_even though someone else has that information_3. Systems_that are broken in multiple places_so that no one_actor_can make them better, even though,_in principle, some magically coordinated action_could move to a new_stable_state.

In_these cases, I do not_think such explanations are enough.

If the_Bank of Japan_didn’t print more money, that implies the_Bank_of Japan wasn’t sufficiently incentivized to_hit_their inflation target. They must have_been_maximizing_primarily for prestige instead. I_can buy that, but why didn’t_they think the best way to do that was_to hit the_inflation target? Alexander’s suggested payoff_matrix,_where_printing more money makes failure much worse, isn’t good enough._It can’t_be central on_its own. The answer was too clear, the payoff worth_the odds, and they had