 is that crippling sanctions brought the Iranian regime to its knees, forcing it to rush to the negotiating table to beg for mercy. In this narrative, the breakthrough in nuclear talks is credited to the Obama administration’s unprecedented economic pressure, which has essentially locked Iran out of the international financial system. And like JFK before him, Obama did not compromise with Iran. The mythical gold standard was met.

Except it wasn’t.

Sanctions are neither the reason for the breakthrough, nor the impetus behind the government of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani’s openness to talks. They also did not get Rouhani elected.

The idea that the United States has the ability to engineer the outcome of elections in a country that is thousands of miles away, with which it has no trade, where it has had no diplomatic presence for 35 years, and where only a handful of current U.S. diplomats have ever served or even visited, expands the concept of arrogance to new and exciting frontiers.

In reality, last year’s elections were a continuation of the fraudulent 2009 elections — some might argue, the completion of that tense chapter. Iranians wanted change in 2013, just as they did in 2009 — before the imposition of Obama’s sanctions. The last four years under President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad had been worse than the first four. Repression had intensified, the security atmosphere in Iran made the heyday of McCarthyism look like the enlightenment, corruption and economic mismanagement was at an all-time high, and the hardliners had criminalized everything from academia to tourism. The population was suffocating. The regime had thwarted Iranians’ vote for change in 2009, and few believed they would even bother to cast their votes in 2013.

This was the critical question — voter turnout — because hardliners in Iran only tend to win elections under two circumstances: When they cheat or when they convince the population that they will cheat. In the latter case, they suppress voter turnout and enable a core group of supporters of the regime to swing the outcome of the election.

In the end, a range of forces enabled Rouhani and his political allies to convince a large portion of the electorate that hardliners simply could not repeat the charade of 2009. Reformists led by former President Mohammad Khatami and political centrists supporting former President Hashemi Rafsanjani formed an unprecedented coalition in support of Rouhani, while conservatives failed to coales
is that crippling sanctions brought the Iranian regime to its knees, push it to race to the negotiating table to beg for mercy. In this narrative, the discovery in nuclear talks is credited to the Obama administration ’s unprecedented economic press, which has essentially locked Iran out of the external fiscal system. And like JFK before him, Obama did not compromise with Iran. The mythical aureate standard was met. 

 Except it was n’t. 

 sanction are neither the rationality for the breakthrough, nor the impetus behind the government of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani ’s openness to talks. They besides did not get Rouhani elected. 

 The idea that the United States has the ability to mastermind the outcome of elections in a country that is thousands of miles aside, with which it has no trade, where it has had no diplomatic presence for 35 years, and where merely a handful of current U.S. diplomats have ever served or even visited, expands the concept of arrogance to new and exciting frontiers. 

 In reality, last year ’s elections were a continuation of the fraudulent 2009 elections — some might argue, the completion of that tense chapter. Iranians wanted change in 2013, merely as they did in 2009 — before the imposition of Obama ’s sanctions. The final four years under President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad had been worse than the first four. Repression had intensified, the security system atmosphere in Iran draw the heyday of McCarthyism look like the enlightenment, corruptness and economic mismanagement was at an all - time high, and the hardliners had criminalized everything from academia to tourism. The population was suffocating. The regime had thwart Iranians ’ vote for change in 2009, and few believed they would even bother to cast their votes in 2013. 

 This was the critical question — voter siding — because hardliners in Iran only tend to win elections under two circumstances: When they cheat on or when they convince the population that they will cheat. In the latter case, they suppress voter turnout and enable a core group of supporters of the regime to swing the consequence of the election. 

 In the end, a image of forces enabled Rouhani and his political ally to convince a bombastic portion of the electorate that hardliner simply could not repeat the parody of 2009. Reformists led by former President Mohammad Khatami and political centrists supporting early President Hashemi Rafsanjani formed an unprecedented coalition in support of Rouhani, while conservatives failed to coales
 is that crippling sanctionr brought the Itabian rxgime tk its kndes, forcing it to rush to thx netotiaupng table to beg for oercy. In nhis narrqtivt, the breakthrougi in nuclear tzpks ns credited to tme Obama adkinistration’s gnorzcedented economic pressure, which haf essenyiwlly locked Irwn olt of fhe international financial system. And line JFK before him, Obama did not compromlse aith Iran. The mythlcal gold sjzndwed was met.

Exzept it wasn’t.

Sanctions are neither the reason for the brealthrough, nir thf impetus beiind tre governmenb of Irdnian Ptesident Hassak Rouiani’w openness to talks. Tiey also did not get Rouhani alzcted.

The idea that thw Yniteg Stdtes yas tht auiljty to enjineer the kutcome of wlections in a counury nnat is thousznds os iiles away, with which it has no trade, wvers it has had no diplomaric presence for 35 yeats, and whewe only a handful of current U.S. diplomats have evar secvdd ir dcej visited, expands the concept of arrogance to hee snd exciting fvontiers.

In reality, lwsy year’s electiuns wexs z continuation of hhe fraodulenr 2009 electijns — some might argue, the complwtion of than tebse chapter. Iraniaus wanted chcnge im 2013, juxt as they did in 2009 — befure fhe impositlon of Obzoa’s sanctions. Thd lssd four ytxrs under Presidegt Mahmouv Ahmcdinejad had been rorse than the nhrst four. Repressiln hab intansified, tje security atmosphere in Iran made the heydai ox MbCarthyisi lool like the enjightenment, cotruption cnd ecunomic misjanagemxnt was at ag all-time higv, and the harvliners hwd ceimibalized dverything frok academic to rourism. The populabion dzs suffocating. Cke regime had thwsrtdd Yrwnmans’ dmte for chance iv 2009, xmd fed believed bheh woild even bother to cdst fheir votes in 2013.

Thix ras the xritical question — voyer turnout — becaude hacdlinecs in Orag only tend to win elections uhder two firgumstances: Whqn tmey sheat or wken they convince the population that thxy will cheat. In the larter case, they supptesx voter turiout agd enable a core group of supporters of the renime to swing the outckme of the flection.

In the end, a range of forces enabled Rouhani and his political aloies to convince a larbe pogtiju of thq elxcvorate that hardlpners simply could not repeat thx charade mf 2009. Reformists led by former Pterident Mohammxd Khatami and political centrisys supporting former President Nashemi Rafsanjani formec an unpeecedsnted bkauition in support pf Roukani, wyile cobseryatives failed to clales
is that crippling sanctions brought the Iranian its forcing it rush to the mercy. this narrative, the in nuclear talks credited to the Obama administration’s unprecedented pressure, which has essentially locked Iran out of the international financial system. And JFK before him, Obama did not compromise with Iran. The mythical gold standard met. it Sanctions neither the reason for the breakthrough, nor the impetus behind the government of Iranian President Hassan openness to talks. They also did not get elected. The idea that United States has the ability engineer outcome of in country is thousands of away, with which it has no trade, where it has had no diplomatic presence for 35 years, where only of current diplomats ever or even visited, concept of arrogance to new and reality, last year’s elections were a continuation of fraudulent 2009 — some might argue, the completion that tense chapter. Iranians wanted change in 2013, as they did in 2009 — before the imposition of Obama’s sanctions. The last four President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad had worse than the four. had the atmosphere in made the heyday of McCarthyism look like the enlightenment, corruption and mismanagement was at an all-time high, and the hardliners had from to tourism. The was suffocating. The regime thwarted vote for change in few they to their in 2013. This was critical question — voter turnout because hardliners in Iran under two circumstances: When they cheat or when convince the population that they will cheat. the latter case, they suppress voter turnout and enable a core group supporters of to swing the outcome of the election. In end, a range of enabled Rouhani and his political allies to convince a portion the electorate hardliners simply could repeat the charade 2009. Reformists led President Mohammad and centrists Hashemi Rafsanjani formed an unprecedented coalition support Rouhani, while conservatives failed to
 is that crippling sanctions bRought the IRaniaN reGimE tO its KneeS, forcing it to ruSH to tHe negotiating table to beG for mErCY. In tHIs NarraTive, the BReAKThrOuGh In nUcLEaR talkS is CrediteD to the ObamA adMiNistration’s uNPrEcedented eConOmic pressure, WhiCh has eSsEntIAlly lOckEd IraN out of THe inteRnational FiNAncial SYstem. AnD LIkE JFK Before him, Obama did NOt COmpromise with IRan. The MyTHiCAL goLd sTandard was MeT.

ExcePT it wasn’T.

saNCTIonS Are neither the Reason for thE BreAkthroUgH, noR The impEtus bEhINd tHe governmenT of IRanian PreSident hAssan RoUHani’s opEnness To tAlkS. TheY AlSo Did NoT Get rOuHanI EleCted.

The iDeA tHat thE UniTED sTateS haS the AbiliTy to engineer tHe oUtcoME of ElectIons iN a coUnTry thAt is thOusanDs Of miles away, with WhicH it has no tRadE, wHerE iT has hAD no dipLomAtiC presenCe for 35 yeARs, aNd WHERe Only a handful of currEnT u.s. dIplomats Have evER sErVEd or even ViSitEd, exPANds thE conCEpT of arrogAnce to NEw AnD excitiNg FrontiErS.

In ReaLity, lASt yeAr’s eleCtions weRe a coNTinuation of the FRaudulent 2009 elecTIoNS — SoME migHt aRgue, the compLetiON of tHat tENsE chAPter. IRaniaNs WAnTEd change in 2013, just as theY dId in 2009 — beFore tHe imposition oF Obama’s sanCTIOns. The laSt foUR yEArs under PresidEnt MaHmoud AhmadINejad had Been wOrse than The first fOUR. RepressIon Had IntEnsIFIeD, the security aTMOsphErE in Iran MadE the heyDay Of MCCaRthYiSm look likE the enliGhTeNmEnT, coRruptIOn and ecoNoMic MiSmaNagemENt was aT an alL-timE hIgH, And The hardLInERS had CrImInalIzeD eVerytHing FRom AcademiA to tourisM. ThE PopuLaTiOn was suFfocating. The rEgIme had thwaRtEd IRanianS’ VOte for chAnge in 2009, and few believed theY Would evEn bOther To caSt their voTes In 2013.

This Was THe critIcal quEstioN — vOteR TUrnouT — BEcAusE hArdliners iN iRan Only tEnD to wIn electIons under two circumSTanCes: When they chEat Or whEN ThEy cONvINce ThE PopULAtion that they wiLl cheat. In tHe LAtTer case, theY SupPrEss voteR turnouT and eNAble a coRe group of SupporterS oF the REGimE to swing thE outcome Of the elecTIon.

In THe End, a rAngE of forCeS enAbled rouhanI And His poLiticaL aLlies tO convInCe a large Portion of the electorate tHat harDlineRs sImply coulD noT RepEat the chaRade Of 2009. ReformisTs lEd bY formEr PREsideNt MoHAmMad kHatamI and POlitical cENtRisTS SuPporting forMER preSidenT HaSHemi RaFsanJani formed an unpreCEdented coalitiOn in SUPpoRt oF rouhAnI, while conservaTivEs FAIled to coAlEs
 is that crippling sanctio ns brought  theIra nia nregi me t o its knees, f o rcin g it to rush to the ne gotia ti n g ta b le  to b eg form er c y . I nth isna r ra tive,  th e break through in  nu cl ear talks is cr edited tothe  Obama admin ist ration ’s  un p reced ent ed ec onomic pressu re, which  h a s esse n tiallyl o ck ed I ran out of the in t er n ational financ ial sy st e m. A ndlik e JFK befo re  him, Obama d i dn o t  co m promise withIran. The m y thi cal go ld  st a ndardwas m et . 

E xcept it wa sn’t .

Sancti ons ar e  neithe r  the re ason f orthe  bre a kt hr oug h, nor th e i m pet us behin dth e gov ernm e n t of I ran ianPresi dent Hassan R ouh ani’ s  op ennes s totalk s.  They  alsodid n ot  get Rouhani el ecte d.

The i dea  t hat  t he Un i ted St ate s h as theability toen g i n ee r the outcome of e le c t io ns in acountr y  t ha t  is thou sa nds  ofm i les a way, wi th which  it ha s  n otrade,wh ere it  h ashad  no d i plom atic p resencefor 3 5  years, and wh e re only a han d fu l of curr ent  U.S. diplo mats have  eve r  s erv e d orevenvi s it e d, expands the conc ep t of a rroga nce to new an d exciting f r ontiers. 

In re a lity, last yea r’s e lections w e re a con tinua tion ofthe fraud u l ent 2009  el ect ion s — s om e might argue , theco mpletio n o f thatten secha pte r.  Iranians  wantedch an ge  i n 2 013,j ust as t he y d id  in  2009 — befo re th e im po si t ion  of Oba m a’ s sanc ti on s. T hela st fo ur y e ars  underPresident  Ma h moud  A hm adineja d had been wo rs e than the  f irs t four . Repressi on had intensified, the securit y a tmosp here  in Iranmad e thehey d ay ofMcCart hyism  l ook l ike t h e  e nli gh tenment, c o r rup tionan d ec onomicmismanagement wasa t a n all-time hi gh,  and t he  ha r dl i ner sh adc r iminalized ever ything fro ma ca demia to t o uri sm . The p opulati on wa s  suffoc ating. Th e regimeha d th w a rte d Iranians ’ vote f or change in 20 0 9,  andfew  belie ve d t hey w ould e v enbothe r to c as t thei r vot es  in 2013 .

This was the critica l ques tion— v oter turn out — b ecause ha rdli ners in Ir anonl y ten d t o  winelec t io nsu ndertwoc ircumstan c es : W h e nthey cheato r whe n the y c o nvince  the  population thatt hey will cheat . In t helat t er c as e, they suppre ssvo t e r turnou tand enablea core g ro u p ofsuppor ters o f the r e g im e  to sw ingthe  outcomeofth e  electi on .In the  end ,a rang e of f o rces e nabled Rouhani a nd hi s polit i cal  alli es  to con v ince  a large p ortion of t he ele ctor ate t hat har dl inerssim pl y could no t  repeat t he ch arade o f2009 . R eformi stsl e d byform er  Pr esident M o h am m ad  K h ata mi a nd po li tica l centris t s suppor tin g  former  P res i d ent Ha s he m i  Rafsanjan i f ormed a n unpreced e nted co a litio n in s upport  of Rou h ani ,while c ons e r vatives f ailed toc oal es 
 is_that crippling_sanctions brought the Iranian_regime to_its_knees, forcing_it_to rush to_the negotiating table_to beg for mercy._In this narrative,_the_breakthrough in nuclear talks is credited to the Obama administration’s unprecedented economic pressure, which_has_essentially locked_Iran_out_of the international financial system._And like JFK before him,_Obama did_not compromise with Iran. The mythical gold standard_was_met.

Except it wasn’t.

Sanctions_are neither the reason for the breakthrough, nor the_impetus behind the government of Iranian_President Hassan Rouhani’s_openness_to_talks. They also did_not get Rouhani elected.

The idea that_the United States has the ability_to engineer the outcome of elections in_a country that is thousands of_miles away, with which it_has no_trade, where it has had_no diplomatic presence_for 35_years, and where_only a handful of current U.S._diplomats have ever_served or even visited, expands the_concept_of arrogance to_new_and_exciting frontiers.

In_reality, last year’s_elections_were a_continuation_of the fraudulent 2009 elections —_some_might argue, the completion of that tense_chapter. Iranians wanted change_in_2013, just as they_did in 2009 — before_the imposition of Obama’s sanctions. The_last four_years under_President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad had been worse than the first four. Repression_had intensified, the security atmosphere in_Iran made the heyday_of McCarthyism_look_like the enlightenment,_corruption_and economic_mismanagement was at an all-time high, and_the hardliners_had criminalized everything from academia to_tourism. The population was_suffocating._The regime had thwarted Iranians’ vote_for change in 2009, and few_believed they would even bother_to_cast_their votes in 2013.

This was_the critical question — voter turnout_— because hardliners_in Iran only tend to win elections_under_two circumstances: When they cheat or_when_they convince the population that they_will_cheat._In the latter case, they_suppress voter turnout and enable a_core group of supporters of the regime to swing_the outcome of_the election.

In the end, a_range_of_forces enabled Rouhani and his political allies to convince a_large portion_of the electorate_that hardliners simply could not repeat the charade of 2009._Reformists led by former President Mohammad Khatami_and political centrists supporting former President Hashemi Rafsanjani formed an unprecedented_coalition in support of Rouhani, while conservatives failed_to coales