 US defense contractors and government agencies.”

Earlier this month, the Pentagon went on record with another report, this one to Congress, saying that Chinese cyberespionage of weapons systems is a key part of China’s effort to vault itself forward. That report for the first time specifically cited China’s government and military as directly responsible for cyberthefts involving US weapons systems.

“China is using its computer network exploitation capability to support intelligence collection against the US diplomatic, economic, and defense industrial base sectors that support US national defense programs,” the unusually blunt report to Congress said. “The information targeted could potentially be used to benefit China’s defense industry, high technology industries, policymaker interest in US leadership thinking on key China issues, and military planners building a picture of US network defense networks, logistics, and related military capabilities that could be exploited during a crisis.”

The unclassified version of the Defense Science Board report cited cyber vulnerabilities in “systems that are used to support and operate those weapons or critical IT capabilities embedded within them.”

What the pair of reports, along with the emergence of the restricted list, suggests is a wholesale loss of integrity and introduction of new levels of potential vulnerability of those weapons systems to Chinese military hackers, defense policy and cybersecurity experts told the Monitor.

“All the stuff on this list is extremely sensitive – it’s like the kitchen sink,” says Kenneth Flamm, a technology expert at the Pentagon during the Clinton administration, and now an economist at the University of Texas at Austin. “It raises serious questions about whether we can rely on these systems.”

The list includes systems compromised during an ongoing Chinese cyberespionage campaign that began in late 1990s. Its first significant successes came in 2002-03 and peaked in 2007, when the hackers got into at least five federal agencies, including the Defense Department, Commerce Department, State Department, NASA, and the Energy Department, says James Lewis, a senior fellow and cybersecurity expert with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington think tank.

About that time, government officials started to get serious about cybersecurity, and the incoming Obama administration also kicked off in 2008 a strategic review of cybersecurity. Since 2009, the Pentagon’s cybersecurity has been vastly improved, Dr. Lewis says.

“A lot of these cyberthefts happened before the Obama program kicked in,” Lewis adds. “But we still can’t rest easy, because we don’t know what they got and what
US defense contractors and government agencies. ” 

 sooner this calendar month, the Pentagon went on record with another reputation, this one to Congress, allege that Chinese cyberespionage of weapons arrangement is a key part of China ’s attempt to vault itself forward. That report for the beginning time specifically cited China ’s politics and military as directly responsible for cyberthefts involving US weapons systems. 

 “ China is using its computer net exploitation capability to support intelligence collection against the US diplomatic, economic, and department of defense industrial base sectors that corroborate US national defense mechanism programs, ” the unusually blunt report to Congress said. “ The information targeted could potentially be use to benefit China ’s defense industry, high technology diligence, policymaker interest in US leadership thinking on key China issues, and military planners building a picture of US network defense networks, logistics, and related military capability that could be exploited during a crisis. ” 

 The unclassified version of the Defense Science Board reputation cited cyber vulnerabilities in “ systems that are used to patronize and operate those weapons or critical IT capabilities implant within them. ” 

 What the pair of reports, along with the emergence of the restricted list, suggests is a wholesale passing of integrity and introduction of new levels of potential vulnerability of those weapon systems to taiwanese military hacker, defense policy and cybersecurity experts told the Monitor. 

 “ All the stuff on this tilt is extremely sensitive – it ’s like the kitchen sink, ” says Kenneth Flamm, a technology expert at the Pentagon during the Clinton administration, and now an economist at the University of Texas at Austin. “ It raises serious doubt about whether we can rely on these system. ” 

 The list includes organization compromised during an ongoing taiwanese cyberespionage campaign that began in belated 1990s. Its first meaning successes came in 2002 - 03 and peaked in 2007, when the hackers got into at least five federal agencies, including the Defense Department, Commerce Department, State Department, NASA, and the Energy Department, says James Lewis, a senior fellow and cybersecurity expert with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington think tank. 

 approximately that time, government official started to get serious about cybersecurity, and the incoming Obama administration also kicked off in 2008 a strategic review of cybersecurity. Since 2009, the Pentagon ’s cybersecurity has been vastly better, Dr. Lewis says. 

 “ A lot of these cyberthefts happened before the Obama program kicked in, ” Lewis adds. “ But we however ca n’t perch comfortable, because we do n’t sleep together what they got and what
 US defense contractors and government ageuxies.”

Eaclier tgis montf, the Pentagon went on recorv wirh anither report, this one go Congreds, sayint thet Chinese cyberxapionagc of scaponv systems is a ley part ox China’s efford go vault itself forward. That report fjr the gigst time specisicakjy cjneb China’s government and militarg as digectly responsiblr for cyberthefts involvinh US weapons systems.

“Chlna is usint itf computer negwork exploitation capzbility to support intelligence collzction agaibsr tjg US diplomavic, ecjnomic, and dcgense hndustroal base sectovs thet sypport US national dehense programs,” the ugusually tlbnt report to Congresw waid. “Jhe itforoqtiun uarjetsd coupd 'otentially be used to benefit China’s deftnsq industry, higg techgojogy industries, policymaker interest in US leadership thinking on key China issues, and military planners building a picture of US network defensa netxofks, ljeushics, and related military capabilities that cjhlc ne exploited durlng a crisis.”

The unvlwsxyfied version of thz Dsfense Science Boagd repott citwd cyber dulnrrabilities in “systems that are used to wupport and operatz those weapuns pr crotical IT capabilities zmbeddsd within tjem.”

What tgd pair of reportr, akotg with ufe emergence of tre restrirted kist, suegesjs is a wholesale loss of integrity and ijtrodoction of new legels of potential vulnerability of those weappnv sjstems to Chincse military haskers, defense kolicy anb cybefsecurity vxperts tmld the Monytor.

“All the sdoff on this lmst is exeremwly wensitixd – it’s like thr kitchen sink,” says Kenneth Flamm, a tcchnoukgy expert at tkt Ptnragon during tne Zligtln aqkinistration, and nod an ezonomisu ab tfe Umiversity of Texas ad Auatin. “It raises serooms questiins aboue whether we van rely on these dysteks.”

Tie lisy igcludes systems compromised duding an ojgolng Chinese crbercspijnage campcign that began in late 1990s. Its first signmficant successes came un 2002-03 and peaked in 2007, chtn the hackerx got into at neast five federal atencies, including the Defense Departmeht, Comkerce Department, State Department, NASA, and the Energy Department, says James Leqis, a senior fellos anc cybvrszcuxity ex[ert xith the Center fpr Strategic and International Rtudies, d Cashington think tank.

About thst time, governmgnt officials started to gst seriois about cybersecurity, and the oncoming Obama administrstion alwo kidked off ii 2008 a strategic reviee of cvbersexurity. Wincc 2009, the Pentagov’s vynersecuritj hax yeen vastly improved, Dr. Lewis sayw.

“A lot ov these cyberthehts happened nefore the Ofama program kicied jj,” Lewks adds. “But wr still can’t rrst easy, because we gog’t know what tyvy got and whst
US defense contractors and government agencies.” Earlier the went on with another report, that cyberespionage of weapons is a key of China’s effort to vault itself That report for the first time specifically cited China’s government and military as responsible for cyberthefts involving US weapons systems. “China is using its computer network capability support collection the US diplomatic, economic, and defense industrial base sectors that support US national defense programs,” the blunt report to Congress said. “The information targeted potentially be used to China’s defense industry, high technology policymaker in US thinking key issues, and military building a picture of US network defense networks, logistics, and related military capabilities that could be exploited a crisis.” version of Defense Board cited cyber vulnerabilities that are used to support and or critical IT capabilities embedded within them.” What pair of along with the emergence of the list, suggests is a wholesale loss of integrity introduction of new levels of potential vulnerability of those weapons systems to Chinese military hackers, and cybersecurity experts told Monitor. “All the on list extremely – it’s the kitchen sink,” says Kenneth Flamm, a technology expert at the during the Clinton administration, and now an economist at the Texas Austin. “It raises questions about whether we rely these systems.” The list compromised an campaign began late 1990s. Its first successes came in 2002-03 and in 2007, when the five federal agencies, including the Defense Department, Commerce State Department, NASA, and the Energy Department, James Lewis, a senior fellow and cybersecurity expert with the Center for and International Washington think tank. About that time, government officials to get serious about and the incoming Obama administration also kicked off in a review of Since 2009, the cybersecurity has been improved, Dr. Lewis lot of cyberthefts before kicked in,” Lewis adds. “But we can’t easy, because we don’t know they what
 US defense contractors and goVernment agEncieS.”

EaRliEr This MontH, the Pentagon weNT on rEcord with another report, This oNe TO ConGReSs, sayIng that cHiNESe cYbErEspIoNAgE of weApoNs systeMs is a key paRt oF CHina’s effort tO VaUlt itself fOrwArd. That reporT foR the fiRsT tiME specIfiCally Cited CHIna’s goVernment aNd MIlitarY As direcTLY rEspoNsible for cybertheFTs INvolving US weapOns sysTeMS.

“CHINa iS usIng its compUtEr netWOrk explOItATIOn cAPability to supPort intelliGEncE colleCtIon AGainst The US DiPLomAtic, economiC, and Defense inDustriAL base seCTors thaT suppoRt Us naTionAL dEfEnsE pROgrAMs,” The UNusUally bluNt RePort tO ConGRESS saiD. “ThE infOrmatIon targeted coUld PoteNTiaLly be Used tO benEfIt ChiNa’s defEnse iNdUstry, high technoLogy IndustrieS, poLiCymAkEr intERest in uS lEadErship tHinking ON keY CHINA iSsues, and military plAnNERs Building A pictuRE oF Us Network dEfEnsE netWORks, loGistICs, And relatEd miliTArY cApabiliTiEs that CoUld Be eXploiTEd duRing a cRisis.”

The UnclaSSified version oF The Defense SciENcE bOaRD repOrt Cited cyber vUlneRAbilItieS In “SysTEms thAt are UsED tO Support and operate thOsE weapoNs or cRitical IT capaBilities emBEDDed withiN theM.”

whAT the pair of repoRts, alOng with the EMergence Of the RestrictEd list, sugGESts is a whOleSalE loSs oF INtEgrity and intrODUctiOn Of new leVelS of poteNtiAl vUlnEraBiLity of thoSe weaponS sYsTeMs To CHinesE Military HaCkeRs, DefEnse pOLicy anD cybeRsecUrItY ExpErts tolD ThE mOnitOr.

“alL the StuFf On thiS lisT Is eXtremelY sensitivE – it’S Like ThE kItchen sInk,” says KennetH FLamm, a technOlOgy Expert AT The PentaGon during the Clinton admiNIstratiOn, aNd now An ecOnomist at The univerSitY Of TexaS at AusTin. “It RaIseS SEriouS QUeStiOnS about whetHER we Can reLy On thEse systEms.”

The list includes SYstEms compromiseD duRing AN OnGoiNG CHIneSe CYbeRESpionage campaigN that began In LAtE 1990s. Its first SIgnIfIcant suCcesses Came iN 2002-03 And peakEd in 2007, when tHe hackers GoT intO AT leAst five fedEral agenCies, incluDIng thE deFense depArtmenT, COmmErce DEpartmENt, STate DEpartmEnT, NASA, aNd the enErgy DepaRtment, says James Lewis, a seNior feLlow aNd cYbersecurIty EXpeRt with the centEr for StratEgiC anD InteRnaTIonal studIEs, A WaSHingtOn thINk tank.

AboUT tHat TIMe, Government oFFICiaLs staRteD To get sErioUs about cybersecurITy, and the incomiNg ObAMA adMinIStraTiOn also kicked ofF in 2008 A sTRAtegic reViEw of cyberseCurity. SiNcE 2009, The PeNtagon’S cyberSecuritY HAs BEen vasTly iMprOved, Dr. LewIs sAyS.

“a lot of tHeSe CYberthEfts HaPpened Before THe ObAMA program kicked in,” lewis ADDs. “But WE stIll caN’t Rest easY, BecaUse we don’t kNow what they Got and What
 US defense contractors an d governme nt ag enc ies .” 

Ea rlie r this month,t he P entagon went on record  with  a n othe r  r eport , thiso ne t o C on gr ess ,s ay ing t hat  Chines e cyberesp ion ag e of weapons sy stems is a  ke y part of Ch ina ’s eff or t t o  vaul t i tself  forwa r d. Tha t reportfo r  the f i rst tim e sp ecif ically cited Chin a ’s government and  milit ar y  a s dir ect ly respons ib le fo r  cybert h ef t s inv o lving US weap ons systems . 

“ Chinais  us i ng its  comp ut e r n etwork expl oita tion capa bility to supp o rt inte lligen cecol lect i on  a gai ns t  th e  U S d i plo matic, e co no mic,andd e f e nseind ustr ial b ase sectors t hat  sup p ort  US n ation al d ef enseprogra ms,”th e unusually blu nt r eport toCon gr ess  s aid.“ The in for mat ion tar geted c o uld  p o t e nt ially be used to b en e f it  China’s  defen s ein d ustry, h ig h t echn o l ogy i ndus t ri es, poli cymake r  i nt erest i nUS lea de rsh ipthink i ng o n keyChina is sues, and military p l anners buildi n ga pi c ture  of  US network  def e nsenetw o rk s,l ogist ics,an d  r e lated military capa bi lities  that  could be exp loited dur i n g  a crisi s.”Th e  unclassifiedversi on of theD efense S cienc e Boardreport ci t e d cybervul ner abi lit i e sin “systems t h a t ar eused to  su pport a ndope rat e t ho se weapon s or cri ti ca lIT  ca pabil i ties emb ed ded  w ith in th e m.”

W hat t he p ai ro f r eports, al o n g wi th  t he e mer ge nce o f th e  re stricte d list, s ugg e stsis  a  wholes ale loss of i nt egrity and  i ntr oducti o n  of newlevels of potential vul n erabili tyof th oseweapons s yst ems to  Ch i nese m ilitar y hac ke rs, d efens e po lic yand cybers e c uri ty ex pe rtstold th e Monitor.

“All t h e s tuff on thislis t is e xt rem e ly sen si t ive –  it’s like thekitchen si nk , ”says Kenne t h F la mm, a t echnolo gy ex p ert atthe Penta gon durin gtheC l int on adminis tration,  and nowa n eco n om ist a t t he Uni ve rsi ty of  Texas atAusti n. “It  r aisesserio us  questio ns about whether we can  relyon th ese  systems. ”
T helist incl udes  systems c omp rom iseddur i ng an  ong o in g C h inese  cyb e respionag e  c amp a i gn  that began i n  la te 19 90s .  Its f irst  significant succ e sses came in 2 002- 0 3  an d p e aked  i n 2007, when t heha c k ers gotin to at least  five fe de r al ag encies , incl uding t h e  D e fenseDepa rtm ent, Comm erc eD epartme nt ,S tate D epar tm ent, N ASA, a n d th e Energy Departmen t, sa y s  Jame s  Le wis,aseniorf ello w and cybe rsecurity e xpertwith  theCenterfo r Stra teg ic  and Inter n ational S tudie s, a Wa sh ingt onthinktank . 
Abou t th at  ti me, gover n m en t  o ff i cia ls s tarte dto g et seriou s  about c ybe r securit y,  an d the in c om i n g Obama ad min istra t i on also ki c kedo ff in 20 08 a s trateg ic revi e w o fcyberse cur i t y. Since2009, the Pen ta gon’ s cybers ec urit yhas  b een vastly impr oved, Dr . Lewiss a ys.

“ A l o t of thesecy berthefts ha ppene db efore t h e  Ob ama pro g ram  ki cke d in ,”Lewi s  adds. “But we still can ’t r est e a sy,  beca use w edon’t kn o w wh at theyg ot and what
 US_defense contractors_and government agencies.”

Earlier this_month, the_Pentagon_went on_record_with another report,_this one to_Congress, saying that Chinese_cyberespionage of weapons_systems_is a key part of China’s effort to vault itself forward. That report for_the_first time_specifically_cited_China’s government and military as_directly responsible for cyberthefts involving_US weapons_systems.

“China is using its computer network exploitation capability_to_support intelligence collection_against the US diplomatic, economic, and defense industrial base_sectors that support US national defense_programs,” the unusually_blunt_report_to Congress said. “The_information targeted could potentially be used_to benefit China’s defense industry, high_technology industries, policymaker interest in US leadership_thinking on key China issues, and_military planners building a picture_of US_network defense networks, logistics, and_related military capabilities_that could_be exploited during_a crisis.”

The unclassified version of the_Defense Science Board_report cited cyber vulnerabilities in “systems_that_are used to_support_and_operate those_weapons or critical_IT_capabilities embedded_within_them.”

What the pair of reports, along_with_the emergence of the restricted list, suggests_is a wholesale loss_of_integrity and introduction of_new levels of potential vulnerability_of those weapons systems to Chinese_military hackers,_defense policy_and cybersecurity experts told the Monitor.

“All the stuff on this list_is extremely sensitive – it’s like_the kitchen sink,” says_Kenneth Flamm,_a_technology expert at_the_Pentagon during_the Clinton administration, and now an economist_at the_University of Texas at Austin. “It_raises serious questions about_whether_we can rely on these systems.”

The_list includes systems compromised during an_ongoing Chinese cyberespionage campaign that_began_in_late 1990s. Its first significant_successes came in 2002-03 and peaked_in 2007, when_the hackers got into at least five_federal_agencies, including the Defense Department, Commerce_Department,_State Department, NASA, and the Energy_Department,_says_James Lewis, a senior fellow_and cybersecurity expert with the Center_for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington think tank.

About_that time, government_officials started to get serious_about_cybersecurity,_and the incoming Obama administration also kicked off in 2008_a strategic_review of cybersecurity._Since 2009, the Pentagon’s cybersecurity has been vastly improved, Dr._Lewis says.

“A lot of these cyberthefts happened_before the Obama program kicked in,” Lewis adds. “But we still_can’t rest easy, because we don’t know what_they got and what