 submarine attack and the hit on Yamato was simply one more example to add to many others. What was far more significant for the leaders of the Imperial Japanese Navy was the extent of the damage. The explosion had occurred on the starboard side beneath the after l8in main triple gun turret. Quoting from her Captains report to the Navy Ministry the damage was as follows:



"A hole about l6ft (5m) deep extending downwards from the



MIDSHIP SECTION OF YAMATO CLASS BATTLESHIP top of the bulge connection and S2ft (25m) in length between frames 151 and 173. Water flooded into No 3 turret upper magazine from a small hole in the longitudinal bulkhead caused by caving in of the waterline armor"



Put simply, her underwater defenses had been breached by a single torpedo and she had shipped over 3000 tons of water, something which her designers had worked assiduously to avoid. The resultant concern deepened when it was learnt that the torpedo had been running shallow and had struck only four



SECOND HOLD DECK PLAN feet below the surface, where the explosive effect, which increases with the depth of water, had not been particularly great. What is interesting is how and why the design failed on a ship which the Japanese had always intended to he the pinnacle of battleship excellence and one certainly capable of stopping a single torpedo. From the time the, Japanese Naval General Staff ordered the Bureau of Naval Construction to study such a proposal in the autumn of 1934 it was clear the vessel would he enormous since the only sure way of building in superiority in the three key elements of speed, firepower and protection, was to increase the size of the vessel. The first calculations of her principal designers, Yuzura Hiraga and Keiji Fukuda, proved too ambitious even for the Admirals of the Naval General Staff It was speed that was sacrificed since the length and depth of the hull proposed, which were vital prerequisites for high speed, would simply not fit Japanese parts without unacceptable additional expense. On the other hand, a shorter and beamier hull which was still thought likely to confer a speed comparable with future US ships was not without compensations which they did their best to exploit.



Despite this she still had a draft of l0.8m when fully loaded and some dredging was required at the approaches to naval bases and dry docks. Nonetheless, the final trial displacement of
submarine attack and the hit on Yamato was simply one more case to lend to many others. What was far more significant for the leaders of the Imperial Japanese Navy was the extent of the damage. The plosion had occurred on the starboard side beneath the after l8 in main ternary gun turret. quote from her Captains report to the Navy Ministry the damage was as keep up: 



 " A hole about l6 ft (5 thousand) deep extending downwards from the 



 MIDSHIP SECTION OF YAMATO CLASS BATTLESHIP top of the bulge connection and S2 ft (25 m) in length between skeleton 151 and 173. Water flooded into No 3 turret upper cartridge holder from a small hole in the longitudinal bulkhead cause by caving in of the waterline armor " 



 frame simply, her underwater defenses had been breached by a single electric ray and she had shipped over 3000 tons of water, something which her designers had worked assiduously to avoid. The resultant concern deepened when it was learnt that the torpedo had been running shallow and had struck only four 



 SECOND HOLD DECK PLAN infantry below the surface, where the explosive effect, which increase with the astuteness of urine, had not been particularly great. What is interesting is how and why the design failed on a ship which the Japanese had always intended to he the pinnacle of battleship excellence and one surely capable of stopping a single torpedo. From the time the, Japanese Naval General Staff ordered the Bureau of Naval Construction to study such a proposal in the autumn of 1934 it was clear the vessel would he enormous since the only sure direction of building in transcendence in the three cardinal element of speed, firepower and protection, was to increase the size of the vessel. The first calculation of her principal designers, Yuzura Hiraga and Keiji Fukuda, proved excessively ambitious even for the Admirals of the Naval General Staff It was speed that was sacrificed since the length and depth of the hull nominate, which were vital prerequisite for high speed, would simply not fit Japanese parts without impossible additional expense. On the other hand, a shorter and beamier hull which was even thought likely to confer a speed comparable with future US ships was not without compensations which they do their best to exploit. 



 Despite this she still had a draft of l0.8 m when fully loaded and some dredging was required at the approach to naval bases and dry docks. however, the final trial displacement of
 suhmarine attack and the hlt on Yamato was simply one mkre examole to add to many others. Whet wqs fae more significant for the leadvrs of thw Imkerial Japanese Neby was bke exfcnt oy vhe damage. The gxplosion hag occurred on dhd dtarboard side beneath the after l8ig main yrlple gun turrej. Quouind frkm her Captains report to the Navy Ministgy the damage was as follows:



"A hole about l6fh (5m) feep extending dowjwards from the



IUDSHIP SECTIUN OF YAMAUO CLASS BATJLESHIP top of the bulge connectkon aud S2ft (25m) in lwnghv between fcames 151 and 173. Water nkooded into Np 3 turret uppev magezinw from a small hole ii the longitudinal bolkhead cagszd by caving in of thw qaternine armue"



Pug sjm'ly, her ujdecwater defehses had bewn breached by a simgjv torpedo and she hwd shipped over 3000 tons of water, something fhidh her designers had woeked assiduously to agoid. The wesultant concern deepened when it was learnt thad the gorkeeo haa bfen running shallow and had struck only four



SQDOMD HOLD DECK PLAK feet below the sirvavg, where the exklosive efrect, which increasfs with the eepth of ratet, had not been particularly great. What ps ibteresting is how cnd why the besign failrd on a ship which the Lapaneae had alwajs intendsa to he the pinnxclv of battleship excellence and one certeinly capabld of stoppyng a singpe tov[edo. From the time the, Lapanase Naval Heneral Staff ordered the Burean of Naval Comsdrubtion to ftudy such a propofal in the automn of 1934 ic was zlear the nessel wonld he enormjus since the lnly sure wab of builqing in wuperiofkty in the thrre key elvmtnts of spwed, firepower and irotezfion, was to incxtast rhe size of thr vdssql. Tie fiwvt calculatimns uf frr prkncipal deslgndrs, Uuzura Hiraga and Kehji Rukuda, proved too smnitious ecen for ehe Admirals pf the Naval Generwl Steff It was xpegd that was sacrificed since ths length wnd depth of thq huol proposed, chich were vital prerequisites for high wpeed, would simpli not fit Japanese patts without unecceptwble addidional expense. On thw other hand, a shprter and beamier hulm whicv was still thought likely to confer a speed comparable with future US ships wqs not without comlensstionv chieh they did vheir best to expkoit.



Despite this she still had e draft of l0.8i when fully loaded and some dfedging was rgquired at the approaches fo naval bases and dry docks. Nonethelesx, the final trial displagement of
submarine attack and the hit on Yamato one example to to many others. for leaders of the Japanese Navy was extent of the damage. The explosion occurred on the starboard side beneath the after l8in main triple gun turret. from her Captains report to the Navy Ministry the damage was as follows: hole l6ft deep downwards from the MIDSHIP SECTION OF YAMATO CLASS BATTLESHIP top of the bulge connection and S2ft in length between frames 151 and 173. Water into No 3 turret magazine from a small hole the bulkhead caused caving of waterline armor" Put her underwater defenses had been breached by a single torpedo and she had shipped over 3000 tons water, something designers had assiduously avoid. resultant concern deepened was learnt that the torpedo had and had struck only four SECOND HOLD DECK feet below surface, where the explosive effect, which with the depth of water, had not been great. What is interesting is how and why the design failed on a ship which had always intended to the pinnacle of excellence one capable stopping a torpedo. From the time the, Japanese Naval General Staff ordered the of Naval Construction to study such a proposal in the 1934 was clear the would he enormous since only way of building in the key firepower protection, to increase the size the vessel. The first calculations her principal designers, Yuzura too ambitious even for the Admirals of the General Staff It was speed that was since the length and depth of the hull proposed, which were vital for high simply not fit Japanese parts without unacceptable additional On the other hand, shorter and beamier hull which was still thought likely confer speed comparable future US ships not without compensations they did their exploit. Despite she had l0.8m when fully loaded and some was at the approaches to naval and Nonetheless, the final trial displacement of
 submarine attack and the hit oN Yamato was SimplY onE moRe ExamPle tO add to many otheRS. WhaT was far more significant For thE lEAderS Of The ImPerial JAPaNESe NAvY wAs tHe EXtEnt of The Damage. THe explosioN haD oCcurred on the STaRboard side BenEath the after L8in Main trIpLe gUN turrEt. QUotinG from hER CaptaIns report To THe Navy mInistry THE dAmagE was as follows:



"A holE AbOUt l6ft (5m) deep exteNding dOwNWaRDS frOm tHe



MIDSHIP SeCtION Of yAMATO ClaSs batTLesHIP top of the bUlge connectIOn aNd S2ft (25m) In LenGTh betwEen frAmES 151 anD 173. Water floodEd inTo No 3 turreT upper MAgazine FRom a smaLl hole In tHe lOngiTUdInAl bUlKHeaD CaUseD By cAving in oF tHe WaterLine ARMOR"



Put SimPly, hEr undErwater defensEs hAd beEN brEacheD by a sInglE tOrpedO and shE had sHiPped over 3000 tons of wAter, Something WhiCh Her DeSigneRS had woRkeD asSiduousLy to avoID. ThE rESULtAnt concern deepened WhEN It Was learnT that tHE tOrPEdo had beEn RunNing SHAllow And hAD sTruck onlY four



SecOnD hOLD DECk PlAN feeT bEloW thE surfACe, whEre the ExplosivE effeCT, which increaseS With the depth oF WaTER, hAD not BeeN particularLy grEAt. WhAt is INtEreSTing iS how aNd WHy THe design failed on a shIp Which tHe JapAnese had alwayS intended tO HE The pinnaCle oF BaTTleship excelleNce anD one certaiNLy capablE of stOpping a sIngle torpEDO. From the TimE thE, JaPanESE NAval General StAFF ordErEd the BuReaU of NavaL CoNstRucTioN tO study sucH a proposAl In ThE aUtuMn of 1934 iT Was clear ThE veSsEl wOuld hE EnormoUs sinCe thE oNlY SurE way of bUIlDINg in SuPeRiorIty In The thRee kEY elEments oF speed, firEpoWEr anD pRoTection, Was to increase ThE size of the VeSseL. The fiRST calculaTions of her principal desiGNers, YuzUra hiragA and keiji FukuDa, pRoved tOo aMBitiouS even fOr the adMirALS of thE nAvAl GEnEral Staff IT WAs sPeed tHaT was SacrifiCed since the length aND dePth of the hull pRopOsed, WHIcH weRE vITal PrEReqUISites for high speEd, would simPlY NoT fit JapaneSE paRtS withouT unaccePtablE AdditioNal expensE. On the othEr Hand, A SHorTer and beamIer hull wHich was stILl thoUGhT likeLy tO confeR a SpeEd comParablE WitH futuRe US shIpS was noT withOuT compensAtions which they did their Best to ExploIt.



DEspite thiS shE StiLl had a draFt of L0.8m when fullY loAdeD and sOme DRedgiNg waS ReQuiREd at tHe apPRoaches to NAvAl bASEs And dry docks. nONEthEless, The FInal trIal dIsplacement of
 submarine attack and thehit on Yam ato w assim pl y on e mo re example toa dd t o many others. What wa s far  m o re s i gn ifica nt fort he l ead er softh e  I mperi alJapanes e Navy was  th eextent of th e  d amage. The  ex plosion hadocc urredon  th e  star boa rd si de ben e ath th e after l 8i n  maint riple g u n  t urre t. Quoting from h e rC aptains report  to th eN av y Min ist ry the dam ag e was as foll o ws : 

" A  hole about l 6ft (5m) de e p e xtendi ng  do w nwards  from  t h e


MIDSHIP S ECTI ON OF YAM ATO CL A SS BATT L ESHIP t op ofthe  bu lgec on ne cti on and S2 ft( 25m ) in len gt hbetwe en f r a m e s 15 1 a nd 1 73. W ater floodedint o No 3 t urret  uppe r ma ga zinefrom a  smal lhole in the lon gitu dinal bul khe ad  ca us ed by caving  in  of  the wa terline arm or " 
Put simply, her un de r w at er defen ses ha d  b ee n  breache dbya si n g le to rped o  a nd she h ad shi p pe dover 30 00  tonsof  wa ter , som e thin g whic h her de signe r s had worked a s siduously toa vo i d .T he r esu ltant conce rn d e epen ed w h en  it was l earnt  t h at the torpedo had bee nrunnin g sha llow and hadstruck onl y f our



S ECON D  H O LD DECK PLAN f eet b elow the s u rface, w herethe expl osive eff e c t, which  in cre ase s w i t hthe depth ofw a ter,  h ad notbee n parti cul arl y g rea t.  What isinterest in gis  h owand w h y the de si gnfa ile d ona  shipwhich  the  J ap a nes e had a l wa y s  int en de d to  he  t he pi nnac l e o f battl eship exc ell e ncean done cer tainly capabl eof stoppin ga s inglet o rpedo. F rom the time the, Japan e se Nava l G enera l St aff order edthe Bu rea u  of Na val Co nstru ct ion t o stu d y  s uch  a  proposali n  th e aut um n of  1934 i t was clear the ve s sel  would he eno rmo us s i n ce  th e  o n lysu r e w a y  of building in  superiori ty in  the three key  e lements  of spe ed, f i repower  and prot ection, w as  toi n cre ase the si ze of th e vessel. The f i rs t cal cul ations  o f h er pr incipa l  de signe rs, Yu zu ra Hir aga a nd  Keiji F ukuda, proved too ambit ious e ven f orthe Admir als ofthe Naval  Gen eral Staff  It  wa s spe edt hat w as s a cr ifi c ed si ncet he length an d d e p th  of the hul l p rop osed,  wh i ch wer e vi tal prerequisites for high speed , wo u l d s imp l y no tfit Japanese p art sw i thout un ac ceptable ad ditional  e x pense . On t he oth er hand , as horter  and  be amier hul l w hi c h was s ti ll though t li ke ly toconfer a sp e e d comparable wit h fut u r e USs hip s was  n ot with o ut c ompensatio ns which th ey did  the ir be st to e xp loit.

De spite this she still  hada draft  o f l0 .8m  whenfull y loade d an dsom e dredgin g wa s  r eq u ire d at  theap proa ches to n a val base s a n d dry d oc ks. N onethe l es s ,  the final  tr ial d i s placemento f
 submarine_attack and_the hit on Yamato_was simply_one_more example_to_add to many_others. What was_far more significant for_the leaders of_the_Imperial Japanese Navy was the extent of the damage. The explosion had occurred on_the_starboard side_beneath_the_after l8in main triple gun_turret. Quoting from her Captains_report to_the Navy Ministry the damage was as follows:



"A_hole_about l6ft (5m)_deep extending downwards from the



MIDSHIP SECTION OF YAMATO CLASS_BATTLESHIP top of the bulge connection_and S2ft (25m)_in_length_between frames 151 and_173. Water flooded into No 3_turret upper magazine from a small_hole in the longitudinal bulkhead caused by_caving in of the waterline armor"



Put_simply, her underwater defenses had_been breached_by a single torpedo and_she had shipped_over 3000_tons of water,_something which her designers had worked_assiduously to avoid._The resultant concern deepened when it_was_learnt that the_torpedo_had_been running_shallow and had_struck_only four



SECOND_HOLD_DECK PLAN feet below the surface,_where_the explosive effect, which increases with the_depth of water, had_not_been particularly great. What_is interesting is how and_why the design failed on a_ship which_the Japanese_had always intended to he the pinnacle of battleship excellence and_one certainly capable of stopping a_single torpedo. From the_time the,_Japanese_Naval General Staff_ordered_the Bureau_of Naval Construction to study such a_proposal in_the autumn of 1934 it was_clear the vessel would_he_enormous since the only sure way_of building in superiority in the_three key elements of speed,_firepower_and_protection, was to increase the_size of the vessel. The first_calculations of her_principal designers, Yuzura Hiraga and Keiji Fukuda,_proved_too ambitious even for the Admirals_of_the Naval General Staff It was_speed_that_was sacrificed since the length_and depth of the hull proposed,_which were vital prerequisites for high speed, would simply_not fit Japanese_parts without unacceptable additional expense._On_the_other hand, a shorter and beamier hull which was still_thought likely_to confer a_speed comparable with future US ships was not without compensations_which they did their best to exploit.



Despite_this she still had a draft of l0.8m when fully loaded_and some dredging was required at the approaches_to naval bases and dry docks. Nonetheless,_the final trial displacement_of