 especially true when any one strategy is expected to solve all problems or address all causes claimed by progressives. If a movement depends more on ideological purity than it does on accomplishments, it’s easy for internal sectarian arguments to take priority over getting things done. It’s easier to attack resistance strategists in a burst of horizontal hostility than it is to get things together and attack those in power.

The good news is that we can learn from a few resistance groups with successful and well-articulated strategies. The study of strategy itself has been extensive for centuries. The fundamentals of strategy are foundational for military officers, as they must be for resistance cadres and leaders.

PRINCIPLES OF WAR AND STRATEGY

The US Army’s field manual entitled Operations introduces nine “Principles of War.” The authors emphasize that these are “not a checklist” and do not apply the same way in every situation. Instead, they are characteristic of successful operations and, when used in the study of historical conflicts, are “powerful tools for analysis.” The nine “core concepts” are:

Objective. “Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective.” A clear goal is a prerequisite to selecting a strategy. It is also something that many resistance groups lack. The second and third requirements—that the objective be both decisive and attainable—are worth underlining. A decisive objective is one that will have a clear impact on the larger strategy and struggle. There is no point in going after one of questionable or little value. And, obviously, the objective itself must be attainable, because otherwise efforts toward that operation objective are a waste of time, energy, and risk.

Offensive. “Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.” To seize the initiative is to determine the course of battle, the place, and the nature of conflict. To give up or lose the initiative is to allow the enemy to determine those things. Too often resistance groups, especially those based on lobbying or demands, give up the initiative to those in power. Seizing the initiative positions the fight on our terms, forcing them to react to us. Operations that seize the initiative are typically offensive in nature.

Mass. “Concentrate the effects of combat power at the decisive place and time.” Where the field manual says “combat power,” we can say “force” more generally. When Confederate General Nathan Bedford Forrest summed up his military theory as “get there
especially true when any one strategy is expected to resolve all trouble or address all causes claimed by liberal. If a movement depends more on ideological honor than it does on accomplishments, it ’s easy for home sectarian arguments to take precedence over getting things done. It ’s easier to assail resistance strategists in a outburst of horizontal hostility than it is to get thing together and attack those in power. 

 The adept news is that we can learn from a few resistance groups with successful and well - joint strategies. The study of strategy itself has been extensive for centuries. The fundamental of strategy are foundational for military officers, as they must be for resistance cadres and leaders. 

 PRINCIPLES OF WAR AND STRATEGY 

 The US Army ’s field manual entitled Operations introduces nine “ Principles of War. ” The authors emphasize that these are “ not a checklist ” and do not apply the same way in every situation. alternatively, they are characteristic of successful operations and, when used in the discipline of diachronic conflicts, are “ powerful creature for analysis. ” The nine “ core concepts ” are: 

 Objective. “ Direct every military process toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective. ” A clear goal is a prerequisite to choose a strategy. It is also something that many resistance groups lack. The second and third requirements — that the objective be both critical and attainable — are deserving underlining. A critical objective is one that will have a clear impact on the larger strategy and struggle. There is no item in going after one of questionable or little value. And, obviously, the objective itself must be attainable, because otherwise campaign toward that operation aim are a waste of time, energy, and risk. 

 Offensive. “ Seize, retain, and exploit the enterprise. ” To seize the enterprise is to determine the class of battle, the place, and the nature of conflict. To give up or lose the first step is to allow the enemy to determine those things. Too often resistance groups, especially those establish on lobbying or demands, give up the first step to those in power. Seizing the first step positions the fight on our terms, force them to react to us. Operations that seize the initiative are typically offensive in nature. 

 Mass. “ Concentrate the effects of fight power at the decisive position and time. ” Where the field manual says “ combat power, ” we can state “ force ” more generally. When Confederate General Nathan Bedford Forrest summed up his military hypothesis as “ get there
 esoecially true when any oke strategy is erpected to somve all oroblems or address all causxs coaimee by progressives. If a movement depends mort on ideological 'hrity tmcn it foes in accomplishmgnts, it’s easf for internal sdccarian arguments to take priority ovqr gettonh things done. Yt’s tasyer fo attack resistance strategists ih a burvt of horizonyal hostility than it is tl geh things together wnd attack jgosq in power.

The good news is that we dan learn from a few resistance grou's with sucxewsfkn and well-acticulwted strateglvs. The vtudy og strategy itsclf hes bwen extensive for cenvuries. The fundamentwls of stsacegy are foundational fir minitasy owdicdrs, ax fhey mkst be for reaistance caeres and leaders.

PRIMCYIKES OF WAR AHD STRWTQGY

The US Army’s field manual entitled Okeratjons introduces nine “Prunciples of War.” The aothors emprasize that these are “not a checklist” and do not dpply ghe swow aay in every situation. Instead, they are charasfetixtic of succesfful operatoojs wnd, when used in thz sfudy of historical conflists, aee “powerftl tpols for analysis.” The nine “xore conceptf” are:

Objective. “Direet every milntary pperayion toward a clearly dzfined, decisive, ajd attainzcle objective.” A zlesr goal is a prerequisite to selectinj a scrategy. Kt ix also something that many resistance grlups pawk. The seclnd and third requirements—that vie objective ne bonh decisire and attainable—arq worth underlnning. A becisixe objectine is one that will rave a clear hlpact on the larger ftraregy and stfjggle. There is no point in going qfter one of questlonabus or little valbt. Abd, obviously, thr ocjestpve ievelf must be attxinxnle, bdcause othevwire egforts toward that o[erafion objective are a waste od time, egergy, and risl.

Offensive. “Seize, rttain, end ex'loit yhe initiative.” To seize the initiztive is ho qetermine thq comrse of battle, the place, and the nature of conflict. Ti give up or lose rhe initiative is tp allow the xnemy eo determhne those things. Too often resistance groups, especially thkse baved oj lobbying or demands, give up the initiative to those in power. Seizing thw initmaeive positikns yhe fpghc ou our tqrms, horcing them to rvact to us. Operations that seize the inidictive are typically offensive iv nature.

Mass. “Zoncentrate the effects kf combay power at the decisive place amd time.” Where the field kanual sqys “ckmbat ikwxr,” we can say “force” kore gzneraloy. When Connederate Generxl Mabhan Bedfogd Fprxest summed up his military theort as “gwt there
especially true when any one strategy is solve problems or all causes claimed depends on ideological purity it does on it’s easy for internal sectarian arguments take priority over getting things done. It’s easier to attack resistance strategists in burst of horizontal hostility than it is to get things together and attack in The news that we can learn from a few resistance groups with successful and well-articulated strategies. The study strategy itself has been extensive for centuries. The of strategy are foundational military officers, as they must for cadres and PRINCIPLES WAR STRATEGY The US field manual entitled Operations introduces nine “Principles of War.” The authors emphasize that these are “not a and do the same in situation. they are characteristic operations and, when used in the conflicts, are “powerful tools for analysis.” The nine concepts” are: “Direct every military operation toward a defined, decisive, and attainable objective.” A clear goal a prerequisite to selecting a strategy. It is also something that many resistance groups lack. and third requirements—that the be both decisive attainable—are underlining. decisive is one will have a clear impact on the larger strategy and struggle. is no point in going after one of questionable or And, the objective itself be attainable, because otherwise toward operation objective are a time, and retain, exploit initiative.” To seize the is to determine the course battle, the place, and give up or lose the initiative is to the enemy to determine those things. Too resistance groups, especially those based on lobbying or demands, give up the to those Seizing the initiative positions the fight on our forcing them to react us. Operations that seize the initiative are typically offensive nature. “Concentrate the of combat power the decisive place time.” Where the says “combat we say When Confederate General Nathan Bedford Forrest up military theory as “get there
 especially true when any one sTrategy is eXpectEd tO soLvE all ProbLems or address aLL cauSes claimed by progressivEs. If a MoVEmenT DePends More on iDEoLOGicAl PuRitY tHAn It doeS on AccomplIshments, it’S eaSy For internal sECtArian argumEntS to take priorIty Over geTtIng THings DonE. It’s eAsier tO Attack ResistancE sTRategiSTs in a buRST oF horIzontal hostility tHAn IT is to get things TogethEr ANd ATTacK thOse in power.

thE good NEws is thAT wE CAN leARn from a few resIstance grouPS wiTh succEsSfuL And welL-artiCuLAteD strategies. the sTudy of strAtegy iTSelf has BEen exteNsive fOr cEntUrieS. thE fUndAmENtaLS oF stRAteGy are fouNdAtIonal For mILITAry oFfiCers, As theY must be for resIstAnce CAdrEs and LeadeRs.

PRiNcIPLEs OF WAR aND STrAtEGY

The US Army’s fIeld Manual entItlEd opeRaTions INtroduCes NinE “PrinciPles of WAR.” ThE aUTHOrS emphasize that thesE aRE “NoT a checklIst” and DO nOt APply the sAmE waY in eVERy sitUatiON. INstead, thEy are cHArAcTeristiC oF succeSsFul OpeRatioNS and, When usEd in the sTudy oF Historical confLIcts, are “powerfUL tOOLs FOr anAlySis.” The nine “cOre cONcepTs” arE:

obJecTIve. “DiRect eVeRY mILitary operation towaRd A clearLy defIned, decisive, aNd attainabLE OBjective.” a cleAR gOAl is a prerequisIte to Selecting a STrategy. IT is alSo somethIng that maNY ResistanCe gRouPs lAck. tHE sEcond and third REQuirEmEnts—thaT thE objectIve Be bOth DecIsIve and attAinable—aRe WoRtH uNdeRliniNG. A decisiVe ObjEcTivE is onE That wiLl havE a clEaR iMPacT on the lARgER StraTeGy And sTruGgLe. TheRe is NO poInt in goIng after oNe oF QuesTiOnAble or lIttle value. And, ObViously, the ObJecTive itSELf must be Attainable, because otherwISe efforTs tOward That Operation ObjEctive Are A Waste oF time, eNergy, AnD riSK.

offenSIVe. “seiZe, Retain, and eXPLoiT the iNiTiatIve.” To seIze the initiative is TO deTermine the couRse Of baTTLe, The PLaCE, anD tHE naTURe of conflict. To gIve up or losE tHE iNitiative iS To aLlOw the enEmy to deTermiNE those tHings. Too oFten resisTaNce gROUps, Especially Those basEd on lobbyINg or dEMaNds, giVe uP the inItIatIve to Those iN PowEr. SeiZing thE iNitiatIve poSiTions the Fight on our terms, forcing tHem to rEact tO us. operationS thAT seIze the iniTiatIve are typiCalLy oFfensIve IN natuRe.

MaSS. “COncENtratE the EFfects of cOMbAt pOWEr At the decisiVE PLacE and tIme.” wHere thE fieLd manual says “combaT Power,” we can say “fOrce” MORe gEneRAlly. whEn Confederate GEneRaL nAthan BedFoRd Forrest suMmed up hiS mILitarY theorY as “get There
 especially true when anyone strate gy is  ex pec te d to  sol ve all problem s  oraddress all causes cla imedby prog r es sives . If am ov e m ent  d ep end sm or e onide ologica l purity t han  i t does on ac c om plishments , i t’s easy for  in ternal  s ect a rianarg ument s to t a ke pri ority ove rg etting thingsd o ne . It ’s easier to atta c kr esistance stra tegist si na bur stof horizon ta l hos t ility t h an i t  is to get things  together a n d a ttackth ose in pow er.
Th e  go od news isthat  we can l earn f r om a fe w  resist ance g rou pswith su cc ess fu l  an d  w ell - art iculated  s tr ategi es.T h e stud y o f st rateg y itself hasbee n ex t ens ive f or ce ntur ie s. Th e fund ament al s of strategy a re f oundation alfo r m il itary office rs,  as  they m ust bef orre s i s ta nce cadres and lea de r s .
PRINCIP LES OF WA RA ND STRAT EG Y
TheU S  Army ’s f i el d manual  entit l ed  O peratio ns  intro du ces  ni ne “P r inci ples o f War.”The a u thors emphasiz e  that these a r e“ n ot a ch eck list” and d o no t  app ly t h esam e  wayin ev er y  s i tuation. Instead, t he y arechara cteristic ofsuccessful o p erations  and ,  w h en used in the  stud y of histo r ical con flict s, are “ powerfult o ols forana lys is. ” T h e  n ine “core con c e pts”  a re:

Ob jec tive. “ Dir ect  ev ery  m ilitary o peration  t ow ar da c learl y  defined ,dec is ive , and attain ableobje ct iv e .”A clear go a l  isapr ereq uis it e tosele c tin g a str ategy. It  is also  s om ethingthat many res is tance grou ps  la ck. Th e second a nd third requirements—t h at theobj ectiv e be  both dec isi ve and  at t ainabl e—areworth  u nde r l ining . Adec is ive object i v e i s one  t hatwill ha ve a clear impacto n t he larger str ate gy a n d  s tru g gl e . T he r e i s no point in goi ng after o ne of  questiona b leor  little  value.  And, obvious ly, the o bjectiveit self m ust  be attain able, be cause oth e rwise ef forts  to ward t ha t o perat ion ob j ect ive a re a w as te oftime,  e nergy, a nd risk.

Offensive. “S eize,retai n,and explo itt heinitiativ e.”To seize t heini tiati vei s todete r mi net he co urse of battle ,  t hep l ac e, and then a t ure  of c onf l ict. T o gi ve up or lose the initiative isto a l l owthe enem yto determine t hos et h ings. To ooften resis tance gr ou p s, es pecial ly tho se base d on lobbyi ng o r d emands, g ive  u p  the in it ia t ive to  tho se  in po wer. S e izin g the initiative p ositi o n s the fig ht on  o ur term s , fo rcing them  to react t o us.Oper ation s thatse ize th e i ni tiative ar e  typicall y off ensivein  nat ure .

Mas s. “ C o ncent rate  t heeffects o f co m ba tp owe r at  thede cisi ve placea nd time. ” W h ere the  f iel d manual sa y s  “combat p owe r,” w e can say “f o rce” mo r e gen erally . When  Confed e rat eGeneral  Na t h an Bedfor d Forrest sum me d up  his mil it aryth eor yas “get there
 especially_true when_any one strategy is_expected to_solve_all problems_or_address all causes_claimed by progressives._If a movement depends_more on ideological_purity_than it does on accomplishments, it’s easy for internal sectarian arguments to take priority_over_getting things_done._It’s_easier to attack resistance strategists_in a burst of horizontal_hostility than_it is to get things together and attack_those_in power.

The good_news is that we can learn from a few_resistance groups with successful and well-articulated_strategies. The study_of_strategy_itself has been extensive_for centuries. The fundamentals of strategy_are foundational for military officers, as_they must be for resistance cadres and_leaders.

PRINCIPLES OF WAR AND STRATEGY

The US_Army’s field manual entitled Operations_introduces nine_“Principles of War.” The authors_emphasize that these_are “not_a checklist” and_do not apply the same way_in every situation._Instead, they are characteristic of successful_operations_and, when used_in_the_study of_historical conflicts, are_“powerful_tools for_analysis.”_The nine “core concepts” are:

Objective. “Direct_every_military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive,_and attainable objective.” A_clear_goal is a prerequisite_to selecting a strategy. It_is also something that many resistance_groups lack._The second_and third requirements—that the objective be both decisive and attainable—are worth_underlining. A decisive objective is one_that will have a_clear impact_on_the larger strategy_and_struggle. There_is no point in going after one_of questionable_or little value. And, obviously, the_objective itself must be_attainable,_because otherwise efforts toward that operation_objective are a waste of time,_energy, and risk.

Offensive. “Seize, retain,_and_exploit_the initiative.” To seize the_initiative is to determine the course_of battle, the_place, and the nature of conflict. To_give_up or lose the initiative is_to_allow the enemy to determine those_things._Too_often resistance groups, especially those_based on lobbying or demands, give_up the initiative to those in power. Seizing the_initiative positions the_fight on our terms, forcing_them_to_react to us. Operations that seize the initiative are typically_offensive in_nature.

Mass. “Concentrate the_effects of combat power at the decisive place and time.”_Where the field manual says “combat power,”_we can say “force” more generally. When Confederate General Nathan Bedford_Forrest summed up his military theory as “get_there