 mortgages packaged into securities.

That bubble-blowing policy was compounded in 2004 by a new Securities and Exchange Commission “regulation” that rewarded the five biggest financial sharks – Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns – with an approving stamp of “regulatory compliance” if they radically increased the amount of their securitized “assets” (also known as “debt”) that were backed by mortgages. And they did.

The big five’s desire to “come into compliance” stoked demand for mortgage-backed securities. That, along with Wall Street trading and a push by the Department of Housing and Urban Development to buy up subprime securities, altered supply and demand in the housing market. Instead of just being driven by a demand for houses, the market was also being driven by a demand for packaged mortgages. Those securities fed yield-hungry financial sharks swimming in the gray area between the “free” market and government policy.

In essence, the fix had been in all along.

This bubble was so intertwined with government policy and the revolving door had spun so often between Wall Street and successive administrations that there really wasn’t a snowball’s chance in hell that Uncle Sam wouldn’t cover the risky promises made by unfettered financial wizards. Because they’d transformed home ownership into an exotic financial instrument, there really wasn’t anything to “bail out” when “average” Americans looked for help. Their homes were little more than an electronically transferred bet in an elaborate system of risk commoditization. It wasn’t a federally insured savings account.

Meanwhile, the debt sharks circled the political class in Washington. They said the “entire financial system” was on the brink of collapse. They warned of global turmoil and a second Great Depression. In response, Uncle Sam basically set the table for “too-big-to-fail” behemoths to get even bigger by simply throwing the almost comically named TARP over the whole mess.

Feeding Frenzy

The Troubled Asset Relief Program, also known as TARP, was the Bush administration’s costly response to the 2008 financial crisis. In October of that year, Congress passed the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 and it was quickly signed into law. In essence, it was an ex post facto FDIC for the financial speculators who had blown the housing bubble and, in the process
mortgages packaged into securities. 

 That bubble - boast policy was compound in 2004 by a new Securities and Exchange Commission “ regulation ” that rewarded the five big financial sharks – Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns – with an approve revenue stamp of “ regulatory conformity ” if they radically increased the amount of their securitized “ asset ” (also known as “ debt ”) that were backed by mortgages. And they suffice. 

 The big five ’s desire to “ come into compliance ” stoked demand for mortgage - back securities. That, along with Wall Street trading and a push by the Department of Housing and Urban Development to buy up subprime security, altered supply and demand in the housing grocery store. Instead of just being driven by a demand for houses, the grocery store was also being driven by a demand for packaged mortgages. Those securities fed yield - hungry financial sharks swimming in the gray area between the “ free ” market and government policy. 

 In kernel, the fix had been in all along. 

 This house of cards was therefore loop with government policy and the revolving door had spun so often between Wall Street and successive administrations that there in truth was n’t a snowball ’s chance in hell that Uncle Sam would n’t cover the risky promises made by unchained financial wizards. Because they ’d transformed home ownership into an exotic financial legal document, there really was n’t anything to “ bail out ” when “ average ” Americans looked for help. Their homes were little more than an electronically transmit bet in an elaborate system of hazard commoditization. It was n’t a federally insured rescue account. 

 Meanwhile, the debt sharks circle the political class in Washington. They said the “ integral financial system ” was on the brink of collapse. They warn of global agitation and a second Great Depression. In response, Uncle Sam basically set the board for “ too - adult - to - fail ” behemoths to get even bigger by simply throwing the almost comically named TARP over the whole mess. 

 feed Frenzy 

 The Troubled Asset Relief Program, also known as TARP, was the Bush government ’s costly response to the 2008 fiscal crisis. In October of that year, Congress passed the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 and it was quickly signed into law. In essence, it was an ex post facto FDIC for the financial speculators who had blown the housing bubble and, in the procedure
 mogtgages packaged into segurities.

That bubyoe-blowmng poljcy was zompounded in 2004 by a new Secucitiws ane Exchange Commission “fegulatioj” that rwwarved the five bigjsst financial dharnw – Goldman Sacms, Morgan Sdanley, Merrill Lhneh, Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns – with am wpproving stamk of “gedulafory compliance” if they radically jncreastd the amount of tneir securitized “assets” (aldo kjown as “debt”) that aere backed by iirtgages. And they did.

The big five’s desire to “come into compliance” stokzd demand fir mogjgage-backed wecurpties. That, along with Wall Syreet trading snd a push by the Departmenv of Housing and Urbwn Develo[mznt to buy up subprimw wecurhtiev, algwrea shp'ly and dfmaid in the hkusing markwt. Instead of just neybg driven by z demagd for houses, the market was also being dgiveh by a demand for packated mortgages. Those sgcurities sed yield-hungry financial sharks swimming in the cray erda ycbweev tje “free” market and government policy.

In essencq, tne fix had been ln all along.

This bibhlr was so interjwined cjtg government policj and tre recolving djor nad spun so often between Wqll Street aud wuccessive adminiscrations thac therg realky wasn’t a snowball’s chcnce ih hell that Uncle Saj wouldn’t cover tfe giskf promistr made by unfettewed finanrial cizards. Cecaose ther’d transfogmed mmme ownership into an erotic financial instrument, there really wasn’t eiything to “baol oun” when “avzrage” Smericans loohed for help. Tkeir homzs werd little mkre thai an electrogically transxgrred bet in en elaborwte wystwm of rkrk commoditizayion. It wcfn’t q federally insurev saxjngs account.

Meauchule, the debt shsrkr cyrblev the [olitical cldss kn Dsshineton. Thtv scia thr “entire financial sfstej” was on the brink on collapsg. They wawned of globak turmoil and a sefond Jreat Vepresxiog. In response, Uncle Sam basicamly set tje bable for “too-fig-ti-fail” behemochs to get even bigger by simply throwinj the almost comically bamed TARP over the ehole mess.

Fxeding Frenzy

Tha Troubled Asset Reluef Program, also lnown as TARP, was the Bush ddminlstration’s costly response to the 2008 financial crisis. In October of that yeqr, Conjrqss passed fhe Rmergvncv Eeonomic Stauiuization Act of 2008 and it was quickly signed into law. In asfence, it was an ex post factp WDIC for the winancial speculators whk had blpwn the housing bubble and, in tne process
mortgages packaged into securities. That bubble-blowing policy in by a Securities and Exchange five financial sharks – Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Lynch, Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns with an approving stamp of “regulatory compliance” if they radically increased the amount their securitized “assets” (also known as “debt”) that were backed by mortgages. And did. big desire “come into compliance” stoked demand for mortgage-backed securities. That, along with Wall Street trading and a by the Department of Housing and Urban Development buy up subprime securities, supply and demand in the market. of just driven a for houses, the was also being driven by a demand for packaged mortgages. Those securities fed yield-hungry financial sharks swimming the gray the “free” and policy. essence, the fix in all along. This bubble was government policy and the revolving door had spun often between Street and successive administrations that there wasn’t a snowball’s chance in hell that Uncle wouldn’t cover the risky promises made by unfettered financial wizards. Because they’d transformed home ownership exotic financial instrument, there wasn’t anything to out” “average” looked help. Their were little more than an electronically transferred bet in an elaborate of risk commoditization. It wasn’t a federally insured savings account. debt circled the political in Washington. They said “entire system” was on the collapse. warned and second Depression. In response, Uncle basically set the table for behemoths to get even almost comically named TARP over the whole mess. Frenzy The Troubled Asset Relief Program, also as TARP, was the Bush administration’s costly response to the 2008 financial In October year, Congress passed the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act 2008 and it was signed into law. In essence, it was an ex facto for the speculators who had the housing bubble in the process
 mortgages packaged into secuRities.

That BubblE-blOwiNg PoliCy waS compounded in 2004 bY A new securities and Exchange COmmisSiON “regULaTion” tHat rewaRDeD THe fIvE bIggEsT FiNanciAl sHarks – GoLdman Sachs, morGaN Stanley, MerrILl lynch, LehmaN BrOthers and BeaR StEarns – wItH an APprovIng Stamp Of “reguLAtory cOmpliance” If THey radICally inCREaSed tHe amount of their seCUrITized “assets” (alsO known As “DEbT”) THat WerE backed by mOrTgageS. and they DId.

tHE Big FIve’s desire to “cOme into compLIanCe” stokEd DemANd for mOrtgaGe-BAckEd securitieS. ThaT, along witH Wall STReet traDIng and a Push by The depArtmENt Of houSiNG anD urBan dEveLopment tO bUy Up subPrimE SECUritIes, AlteRed suPply and demand In tHe hoUSinG markEt. InsTead Of Just bEing drIven bY a Demand for houses, The mArket was aLso BeIng DrIven bY A demanD foR paCkaged mOrtgageS. thoSe SECUrIties fed yield-hungrY fINAnCial sharKs swimMInG iN The gray aReA beTweeN THe “freE” marKEt And goverNment pOLiCy.

in essenCe, The fix HaD beEn iN all aLOng.

THis bubBle was so InterTWined with goverNMent policy and THe REVoLVing DooR had spun so oFten BEtweEn WaLL STreET and sUccesSiVE aDMinistrations that thErE reallY wasn’T a snowball’s chAnce in hell THAT Uncle SaM wouLDn’T Cover the risky pRomisEs made by unFEttered fInancIal wizarDs. Because THEy’d transForMed HomE owNERsHip into an exotIC FinaNcIal instRumEnt, therE reAllY waSn’t AnYthing to “bAil out” whEn “AvErAgE” AmEricaNS looked fOr HelP. THeiR homeS Were liTtle mOre tHaN aN EleCtronicALlY TRansFeRrEd beT in An ElaboRate SYstEm of risK commoditIzaTIon. IT wAsN’t a fedeRally insured sAvIngs accounT.

MEanWhile, tHE Debt sharKs circled the political clASs in WasHinGton. THey sAid the “entIre FinancIal SYstem” wAs on thE brinK oF coLLApse. THEY wArnEd Of global tuRMOil And a sEcOnd GReat DepRession. In response, UNCle sam basically sEt tHe taBLE fOr “tOO-bIG-to-FaIL” beHEMoths to get even bIgger by simPlY ThRowing the aLMosT cOmicallY named TaRP ovER the whoLe mess.

FeeDing FrenzY

THe TrOUBleD Asset ReliEf PrograM, also knowN As TARp, WaS the BUsh AdminiStRatIon’s cOstly rESpoNse to The 2008 finAnCial crIsis. IN OCtober of That year, Congress passed tHe EmerGency ecoNomic StabIliZAtiOn Act of 2008 anD it wAs quickly sIgnEd iNto laW. In ESsencE, it wAS aN ex POst faCto FdiC for the fINaNciAL SpEculators whO HAD blOwn thE hoUSing buBble And, in the process
 mortgages packaged into s ecurities. 

Tha t b ubb le -blo wing  policy was co m poun ded in 2004 by a new S ecuri ti e s an d  E xchan ge Comm i ss i o n “ re gu lat io n ”thatrew arded t he five bi gge st  financial s h ar ks – Goldm anSachs, Morga n S tanley ,Mer r ill L ync h, Le hman B r others  and Bear  S t earns–  with a n ap prov ing stamp of “reg u la t ory compliance ” if t he y  r a d ica lly  increased  t he am o unt oft he i r sec u ritized “asse ts” (also k n own  as “d eb t”) that w ere b ac k edby mortgage s. A nd they d id.

T h e big f i ve’s de sire t o “ com e in t oco mpl ia n ce” st oke d  de mand for  m or tgage -bac k e d secu rit ies.  That , along withWal l St r eet  trad ing a nd a  p ush b y theDepar tm ent of HousingandUrban Dev elo pm ent  t o buy up sub pri mesecurit ies, al t ere ds u p pl y and demand in th eh o us ing mark et. In s te ad of justbe ing  dri v e n bya de m an d for ho uses,t he  m arket w as  alsobe ing  dr ivenb y ademand  for pac kaged mortgages. Tho s e securitiesf ed y ie l d-hu ngr y financial  sha r ks s wimm i ng  in the g ray a re a  b e tween the “free” ma rk et and  gove rnment policy .

In esse n c e , the fi x ha d  b e en in all alon g.

T his bubble was so i ntert wined wi th govern m e nt polic y a ndthe  re v o lv ing door hads p un s ooften b etw een Wal l S tre etand  s uccessive  adminis tr at io ns  th at th e re reall ywas n’ t a  snow b all’schanc e in  h el l  th at Uncl e  S a m  wou ld n’ t co ver  t he ri skyp rom ises ma de by unf ett e redfi na ncial w izards. Becau se  they’d tr an sfo rmed h o m e owners hip into an exotic fina n cial in str ument , th ere reall y w asn’tany t hing t o “bai l out ”whe n “aver a g e”  Am er icans look e d  fo r hel p.  The ir home s were little more tha n an electron ica llyt r an sfe r re d  be ti n a n elaborate syste m of riskco m mo ditization .  It  w asn’t a  federa lly i n sured s avings ac count.

M ea nwhi l e , t he debt sh arks cir cled thep oliti c al  clas s i n Wash in gto n. Th ey sai d  th e “en tire f in ancial  syst em ” was on  the brink of collapse.  Theywarne d o f globaltur m oil  and a se cond  Great Dep res sio n. In  re s ponse , Un c le  Sa m  basi call y  set thet ab lef o r“too-big-to - f a il”  behe mot h s to g et e ven bigger by sim p ly throwing th e al m o stcom i call ynamed TARP ove r t he w hole mes s. 

Feeding F renzy

T he Troub led As set Re lief Pr o g ra m , also  kno wnas TARP,was  t h e Bushad mi n istrat ion’ scostly  respo n se t o the 2008 financi al cr i s is. I n  Oc tober  o f thaty ear,  Congresspassed theEmerge ncyEcono mic Sta bi lizati onAc t of 2008a nd it was  quic kly sig ne d in tolaw. I n es s e nce,it w as  an  ex postf a ct o  F DI C  fo r th e fin an cial  speculat o rs who h adb lown th ehou s i ng bub b le a nd, in the  pr ocess 
 mortgages_packaged into_securities.

That bubble-blowing policy was_compounded in_2004_by a_new_Securities and Exchange_Commission “regulation” that_rewarded the five biggest_financial sharks –_Goldman_Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns – with an approving_stamp_of “regulatory_compliance”_if_they radically increased the amount_of their securitized “assets” (also_known as_“debt”) that were backed by mortgages. And they_did.

The_big five’s desire_to “come into compliance” stoked demand for mortgage-backed securities._That, along with Wall Street trading_and a push_by_the_Department of Housing and_Urban Development to buy up subprime_securities, altered supply and demand in_the housing market. Instead of just being_driven by a demand for houses,_the market was also being_driven by_a demand for packaged mortgages._Those securities fed_yield-hungry financial_sharks swimming in_the gray area between the “free”_market and government_policy.

In essence, the fix had been_in_all along.

This bubble_was_so_intertwined with_government policy and_the_revolving door_had_spun so often between Wall Street_and_successive administrations that there really wasn’t a_snowball’s chance in hell_that_Uncle Sam wouldn’t cover_the risky promises made by_unfettered financial wizards. Because they’d transformed_home ownership_into an_exotic financial instrument, there really wasn’t anything to “bail out” when_“average” Americans looked for help. Their_homes were little more_than an_electronically_transferred bet in_an_elaborate system_of risk commoditization. It wasn’t a federally_insured savings_account.

Meanwhile, the debt sharks circled the_political class in Washington._They_said the “entire financial system” was_on the brink of collapse. They_warned of global turmoil and_a_second_Great Depression. In response, Uncle_Sam basically set the table for_“too-big-to-fail” behemoths to_get even bigger by simply throwing the_almost_comically named TARP over the whole_mess.

Feeding_Frenzy

The Troubled Asset Relief Program, also_known_as_TARP, was the Bush administration’s_costly response to the 2008 financial_crisis. In October of that year, Congress passed the_Emergency Economic Stabilization_Act of 2008 and it_was_quickly_signed into law. In essence, it was an ex post_facto FDIC_for the financial_speculators who had blown the housing bubble and, in the_process