 war is a real possibility (see article). Mr Trump and his advisers may conclude that a nuclear North would be so reckless, and so likely to cause nuclear proliferation, that it is better to risk war on the Korean peninsula today than a nuclear strike on an American city tomorrow.

Even if China stays out of a second Korean war, both it and Russia are entering into a renewal of great-power competition with the West. Their ambitions will be even harder to deal with than North Korea’s. Three decades of unprecedented economic growth have provided China with the wealth to transform its armed forces, and given its leaders the sense that their moment has come. Russia, paradoxically, needs to assert itself now because it is in long-term decline. Its leaders have spent heavily to restore Russia’s hard power, and they are willing to take risks to prove they deserve respect and a seat at the table.

Both countries have benefited from the international order that America did most to establish and guarantee. But they see its pillars—universal human rights, democracy and the rule of law—as an imposition that excuses foreign meddling and undermines their own legitimacy. They are now revisionist states that want to challenge the status quo and look at their regions as spheres of influence to be dominated. For China, that means East Asia; for Russia, eastern Europe and Central Asia.

Neither China nor Russia wants a direct military confrontation with America that they would surely lose. But they are using their growing hard power in other ways, in particular by exploiting a “grey zone” where aggression and coercion work just below the level that would risk military confrontation with the West. In Ukraine Russia has blended force, misinformation, infiltration, cyberwar and economic blackmail in ways that democratic societies cannot copy and find hard to rebuff. China is more cautious, but it has claimed, occupied and garrisoned reefs and shoals in disputed waters.

China and Russia have harnessed military technologies invented by America, such as long-range precision-strike and electromagnetic-spectrum warfare, to raise the cost of intervention against them dramatically. Both have used asymmetric-warfare strategies to create “anti-access/area denial” networks. China aims to push American naval forces far out into the Pacific where they can no longer safely project power into the East and South China Seas. Russia wants the world to know that, from the Arctic to the Black Sea, it can call on greater firepower than its foes—and that it will not hesitate to
war is a real possibility (see article). Mr Trump and his advisers may reason that a nuclear North would be therefore reckless, and so probable to cause nuclear proliferation, that it is well to risk war on the Korean peninsula today than a nuclear strike on an American city tomorrow. 

 Even if China stay out of a second Korean war, both it and Russia are entering into a renewal of bang-up - power competition with the West. Their ambition will be even harder to deal with than North Korea ’s. Three ten of unprecedented economic increase have provided China with the wealth to transform its armed forces, and given its leaders the common sense that their moment has come. Russia, paradoxically, needs to insist itself now because it is in long - condition decline. Its leadership have spent heavily to restore Russia ’s hard power, and they are uncoerced to take risks to prove they deserve respect and a seat at the table. 

 Both country have benefit from the international order that America did most to establish and guarantee. But they see its pillars — universal human rights, majority rule and the convention of law — as an imposition that excuse extraneous meddling and undermines their own legitimacy. They are nowadays revisionist states that want to challenge the status quo and look at their region as spheres of influence to be dominated. For China, that means East Asia; for Russia, eastern Europe and Central Asia. 

 Neither China nor Russia wants a lineal military confrontation with America that they would surely lose. But they are using their growing hard power in other ways, in especial by exploiting a “ grey zone ” where aggression and coercion work just below the level that would gamble military confrontation with the West. In Ukraine Russia has blended force, misinformation, infiltration, cyberwar and economic blackmail in ways that democratic societies cannot copy and find hard to rebuff. China is more cautious, but it has claim, occupied and garrison reefs and shoals in disputed waters. 

 China and Russia have harnessed military technology invented by America, such as retentive - range preciseness - strike and electromagnetic - spectrum warfare, to raise the price of intervention against them dramatically. Both have use asymmetric - war strategies to create “ anti - access / area denial ” networks. China aim to push American naval forces far away into the Pacific where they can no longer safely project power into the East and South China Seas. Russia wants the world to know that, from the Arctic to the Black Sea, it can call on greater firepower than its foe — and that it will not hesitate to
 wag is a real possibility (ree article). Mr Jrymp anv his asvisers oay conclude that a nuclear Iorty wouod be so reckless, and ro likely to causw nurlear proliferatmkn, that it is nettex vo risk war on jhe Korean paninsula today tfau a nuclear strike on an American ciey tomotrlw.

Even if Chinw stsrs ohn if a second Korean war, both if and Rlssia are enterinb into a renewal of great-plwer competition with hhe West. Thgjr wnbitions wilu be even harder to dezl with than North Korea’s. Three decabes of unprgewdejjed economic grownh have provided Chind with yhe wealth to branshorm its armed forces, and given its leaders the sensa chat their moment has cime. Rossia, parxeoxkcamlb, nseds tl aasert itsemf now becayse it is in long-tetm eecline. Its lsaders hwve spent heavily to restore Russia’s hagd pkwer, and they are willibg to take risks to ptove they qeserve respect and a seat at the table.

Both countsies iaxe yckefigwd from the international order that America diq mpsn to establish anb guarantee. But yhfy fee its pillats—univexaam human rights, demlcracy wnd tye rule os lae—as an imposition that excuwes foreign iwddling and undermnnes their ocn legotimavy. They are now revisiouist sfates that aant to cgxllenge the statjs aum and look at their regionf as spheces oy influevce jo be djminated. Flr Chlta, that means East Asia; fmr Russia, fastern Europe and Central Asia.

Ixither China mos Rlssia wancs a dlrect military sonfrontation cith Amexica tfat they wkuld sucely lose. Bue they are ushjg their groxing hard powwr ib other days, in particilar by eqpjoitung a “grey zone” whcre aefression and cozxcuon work just brlod tre lxvel evat would rivk mkligsry cunfrontatiok wkth yhe West. In Ukraine Sussja has blended forve, misinfotmation, igfiltration, cuberwar and economlc bleckmaiu in eayf that democratic societies cahnot copy anq find hard eo rcbufs. China is more cautious, but it has claimed, occupmed and garrisoned reefw and shoals in diskuttd waters.

Chine and Wussia haee harnessed militart technologies inyented by America, such as lotg-ranhe precision-strike and electromagnetic-spectrum warfare, to raise the cost if intxrdention agajnst them dxamcticallr. Bovh have used asymmvtric-warfare strategies to creatx “anti-accevs/crea denial” networks. China aiks to push Amerkcan naval forces far ouf into tne Pacific where they can no lomger safely project powev into thw Easf and Souti China Seas. Russia eants che woeld to jnow that, from thd Atcbic to the Blark Aea, it can call on greater firepiwer tyaj its foes—and thet it will nlu hesitzte to
war is a real possibility (see article). and advisers may that a nuclear and likely to cause proliferation, that it better to risk war on the peninsula today than a nuclear strike on an American city tomorrow. Even if stays out of a second Korean war, both it and Russia are entering a of competition the West. Their ambitions will be even harder to deal with than North Korea’s. Three decades unprecedented economic growth have provided China with the to transform its armed and given its leaders the that moment has Russia, needs assert itself now it is in long-term decline. Its leaders have spent heavily to restore Russia’s hard power, and they willing to to prove deserve and seat at the countries have benefited from the international did most to establish and guarantee. But they its pillars—universal rights, democracy and the rule of an imposition that excuses foreign meddling and undermines own legitimacy. They are now revisionist states that want to challenge the status quo and their regions as spheres influence to be For that East for Russia, Europe and Central Asia. Neither China nor Russia wants a direct confrontation with America that they would surely lose. But they their hard power in ways, in particular by a zone” where aggression and just the risk confrontation the West. In Ukraine has blended force, misinformation, infiltration, and economic blackmail in copy and find hard to rebuff. China is cautious, but it has claimed, occupied and reefs and shoals in disputed waters. China and Russia have harnessed military invented by as long-range precision-strike and electromagnetic-spectrum warfare, to raise cost of intervention against dramatically. Both have used asymmetric-warfare strategies to create “anti-access/area networks. aims to American naval forces out into the where they can safely project into East Seas. Russia wants the world to that, the Arctic to the Black it on greater firepower than its foes—and that it will not hesitate to
 war is a real possibility (see aRticle). Mr TrUmp anD hiS adViSers May cOnclude that a nuCLear north would be so reckless, And so LiKEly tO CaUse nuClear prOLiFERatIoN, tHat It IS bEtter To rIsk war oN the Korean PenInSula today thaN A nUclear striKe oN an American cIty TomorrOw.

eveN If ChiNa sTays oUt of a sECond KoRean war, boTh IT and RuSSia are eNTErIng iNto a renewal of greaT-PoWEr competition wIth the weST. THEIr aMbiTions will bE eVen haRDer to deAL wITH ThaN north Korea’s. ThRee decades oF UnpRecedeNtEd eCOnomic GrowtH hAVe pRovided ChinA witH the wealtH to traNSform itS Armed foRces, anD giVen Its lEAdErS thE sENse THaT thEIr mOment has CoMe. russiA, parADOXIcalLy, nEeds To assErt itself now bEcaUse iT Is iN long-Term dEcliNe. its leAders hAve spEnT heavily to restoRe RuSsia’s hard PowEr, And ThEy are WIlling To tAke Risks to Prove thEY deSeRVE ReSpect and a seat at the TaBLE.

BOth countRies haVE bEnEFited froM tHe iNterNATionaL ordER tHat AmeriCa did mOSt To EstabliSh And guaRaNteE. BuT they SEe itS pillaRs—univerSal huMAn rights, democrACy and the rule oF LaW—AS aN ImpoSitIon that excuSes fOReigN medDLiNg aND undeRmineS tHEiR Own legitimacy. They arE nOw reviSioniSt states that wAnt to challENGE the statUs quO AnD Look at their regIons aS spheres of INfluence To be dOminated. for China, tHAT means EaSt ASia; For rusSIA, eAstern Europe aND centRaL Asia.

NeIthEr China Nor rusSia WanTs A direct miLitary coNfRoNtAtIon With AMErica thaT tHey WoUld SurelY Lose. BuT they Are uSiNg THeiR growinG HaRD PoweR iN oTher WayS, iN partIculAR by ExploitIng a “grey zOne” WHere AgGrEssion aNd coercion worK jUst below thE lEveL that wOULd risk miLitary confrontation with THe West. IN UkRaine russIa has blenDed Force, mIsiNFormatIon, infIltraTiOn, cYBErwar AND eConOmIc blackmaiL IN waYs thaT dEmocRatic soCieties cannot copy aND fiNd hard to rebufF. ChIna iS MOrE caUTiOUs, bUt IT haS CLaimed, occupied aNd garrisonEd REeFs and shoalS In dIsPuted waTers.

ChiNa and rUssia haVe harnessEd militarY tEchnOLOgiEs invented By AmericA, such as loNG-rangE PrEcisiOn-sTrike aNd EleCtromAgnetiC-SpeCtrum WarfarE, tO raise The coSt Of intervEntion against them dramatIcally. both hAve Used asymmEtrIC-waRfare straTegiEs to create “AntI-acCess/aRea DEnial” NetwORkS. ChINa aimS to pUSh AmericaN NaVal FORcEs far out intO THE PaCific WheRE they cAn no Longer safely projeCT power into the EAst aND souTh CHIna SEaS. Russia wants thE woRlD TO know thaT, fRom the ArctiC to the BlAcK sea, it Can calL on greAter firEPOwER than iTs foEs—aNd that it wIll NoT HesitatE tO
 war is a real possibility  (see arti cle).  Mr  Tr um p an d hi s advisers may conc lude that a nuclear No rth w ou l d be so  reck less, a n ds o  li ke ly  to  c a us e nuc lea r proli feration,tha tit is better to  risk waronthe Korean p eni nsulato day thana n uclea r stri k e on a n America nc ity to m orrow.E ve n if  China stays outo fa  second Korean  war,bo t hi t  an d R ussia areen terin g  into a re n e w alo f great-power  competitio n  wi th the  W est .  Their  ambi ti o nswill be eve n ha rder to d eal wi t h thanN orth Ko rea’s.  Th ree  dec a de sofun p rec e de nte d  ec onomic g ro wt h hav e pr o v i d ed C hin a wi th th e wealth to t ran sfor m  it s arm ed fo rces ,and g iven i ts le ad ers the sense t hattheir mom ent  h asco me. R u ssia,par ado xically , needs toas s e r titself now because  i t is  in long -termd ec li n e. Its l ea der s ha v e  spen t he a vi ly to re storeR us si a’s har dpower,  a ndthe y are will ing to  take ri sks t o  prove they de s erve respecta nd a  s e at a t t he table.
Both coun trie s  h ave benef itedfr o mt he international or de r that  Amer ica did mostto establi s h and guar ante e .B ut they see it s pil lars—unive r sal huma n rig hts, dem ocracy an d the rule  of  la w—a s a n im position that e xcus es  foreig n m eddling  an d u nde rmi ne s their o wn legit im ac y.  T hey  aren ow revis io nis tsta tes t h at wan t tochal le ng e  th e statu s  q u o  and  l oo k at  th ei r reg ions asspheres  of influ enc e  tobe  d ominate d. For China,  t hat meansEa stAsia;f o r Russia , eastern Europe and Ce n tral As ia. 

Nei ther  China no r R ussiawan t s a di rect m ilita ry  co n f ronta t i on  wi th  America t h a t t hey w ou ld s urely l ose. But they areu sin g their growi nghard p ow eri no the rw ays , in particular b y exploiti ng a“grey zone ”  wh er e aggre ssion a nd co e rcion w ork justbelow the  l evel t hat  would ris k milita ry confro n tatio n  w ith t heWest.In  Uk raine  Russi a  ha s ble nded f or ce, mi sinfo rm ation, i nfiltration, cyberwar a nd eco nomic  bl ackmail i n w a ysthat demo crat ic societi escan not c opy and f indh ar d t o  rebu ff.C hina is m o re  ca u t io us, but ith a s  cl aimed , o c cupied  and  garrisoned reefs and shoals indisp u t edwat e rs.
C hina and Russi a h av e harnesse dmilitary te chnologi es inven ted by  Ameri ca, suc h as long-r ange  pr ecision-s tri ke and ele ct ro m agneti c-sp ec trum w arfare ,  tor a ise the cost ofinter v e ntion aga instth em dram a tica lly. Bothhave used a symmet ric- warfa re stra te gies t o c re ate “anti- a ccess/are a den ial” ne tw orks . C hina a imst o  push  Ame ri can  naval fo r c es fa ro utinto  thePa cifi c where t h ey can n o l o nger sa fe lyp r ojectp ow e r  into theEas t and S outh China Seas .  R u ssiawantsthe wo rld tok now  t hat, fr omt h e Arcticto the Bl a ckSe a, i t can ca ll  ongr eat er  firepower than  its foe s—and th a t  it wi lln ot h e sitate  t o
 war_is a_real possibility (see article)._Mr Trump_and_his advisers_may_conclude that a_nuclear North would_be so reckless, and_so likely to_cause_nuclear proliferation, that it is better to risk war on the Korean peninsula today_than_a nuclear_strike_on_an American city tomorrow.

Even if_China stays out of a_second Korean_war, both it and Russia are entering into_a_renewal of great-power_competition with the West. Their ambitions will be even_harder to deal with than North_Korea’s. Three decades_of_unprecedented_economic growth have provided_China with the wealth to transform_its armed forces, and given its_leaders the sense that their moment has_come. Russia, paradoxically, needs to assert_itself now because it is_in long-term_decline. Its leaders have spent_heavily to restore_Russia’s hard_power, and they_are willing to take risks to_prove they deserve_respect and a seat at the_table.

Both_countries have benefited_from_the_international order_that America did_most_to establish_and_guarantee. But they see its pillars—universal_human_rights, democracy and the rule of law—as_an imposition that excuses_foreign_meddling and undermines their_own legitimacy. They are now_revisionist states that want to challenge_the status_quo and_look at their regions as spheres of influence to be dominated._For China, that means East Asia;_for Russia, eastern Europe_and Central_Asia.

Neither_China nor Russia_wants_a direct_military confrontation with America that they would_surely lose._But they are using their growing_hard power in other_ways,_in particular by exploiting a “grey_zone” where aggression and coercion work_just below the level that_would_risk_military confrontation with the West._In Ukraine Russia has blended force,_misinformation, infiltration, cyberwar_and economic blackmail in ways that democratic_societies_cannot copy and find hard to_rebuff._China is more cautious, but it_has_claimed,_occupied and garrisoned reefs and_shoals in disputed waters.

China and Russia_have harnessed military technologies invented by America, such as_long-range precision-strike and_electromagnetic-spectrum warfare, to raise the_cost_of_intervention against them dramatically. Both have used asymmetric-warfare strategies to_create “anti-access/area_denial” networks. China_aims to push American naval forces far out into the_Pacific where they can no longer safely_project power into the East and South China Seas. Russia wants_the world to know that, from the Arctic_to the Black Sea, it can call_on greater firepower than_its_foes—and that it will not hesitate to