Journal based around an interview with Paul Kimmel, who was at the meeting, the meeting adjourned at 9:20 a.m.--around 20 minutes after its participants were alerted to the first crash at the World Trade Center and 17 minutes after they watched the second hijacked plane crashing live on television.

At that time, according to Kimmel, Jumper announced: "Well, ladies and gentlemen, I think the meeting is adjourned. We have some work to do." [24] According to Cox, Jumper ended the meeting saying: "New York needs your help. Let's go back to our offices and see what we have to do." [25] The officers in the meeting then left the room and headed upstairs to their offices. [26]

If these accounts are correct--meaning that while the worst crisis possible was taking place, dozens of key Air Force officials spent several minutes just watching television and then wasted more time continuing their unnecessary and routine meeting--then this is astonishing. The need to respond to the attacks should have superseded anything the men were doing. Surely, at the very least, they should have wanted up-to-the-minute updates on what was happening. But they could do nothing while they were watching television or continuing a staff meeting.

Even if these men failed to respond appropriately, surely someone else should have gone into the room and made sure the meeting ended at once, and the officers helped the Air Force respond to the attacks. And yet that did not happen either.

OFFICERS INITIALLY THOUGHT THE REPORTED CRASH WAS 'PART OF THE BRIEFING'

Why did these experienced Air Force officers apparently respond so inappropriately when they saw their country was under attack? Clearly, a new investigation of 9/11 is necessary to properly answer this question. But we can at least consider possible explanations based on the currently available evidence.

Paul Kimmel has recalled that when he and the other officers in John Jumper's meeting learned of the first crash at the World Trade Center, and the screen that had been showing briefing slides switched to showing the burning North Tower, "At first we thought it was part of the briefing." [27] Could this be a clue as to why the officers failed to take action right away? If they thought the report of the crash and the TV coverage of the burning World Trade Center were simulated, they might have felt it was unnecessary for them to respond to the incident
Journal based around an interview with Paul Kimmel, who was at the meeting, the meeting adjourn at 9:20 a.m.--around 20 moment after its participants were alerted to the first clang at the World Trade Center and 17 minutes after they watched the second hijacked plane crash live on television. 

 At that time, harmonize to Kimmel, Jumper announced: " Well, ladies and valet, I think the meeting is adjourn. We accept some work to do. " [ 24 ] According to Cox, Jumper ended the meeting say: " New York needs your help. Let's blend back to our offices and see what we have to make. " [ 25 ] The officers in the meeting then left the room and headed upstairs to their offices. [ 26 ] 

 If these report are correct -- meaning that while the worst crisis possible was taking plaza, dozens of key Air Force officials spent several minutes just watching television and then wasted more clock time continuing their unnecessary and routine confluence -- then this is amazing. The indigence to respond to the attacks should have supplant anything the men were suffice. Surely, at the very least, they should have wanted up - to - the - minute update on what was happening. But they could do nothing while they were watching television or continuing a staff meeting. 

 Even if these men failed to respond appropriately, surely someone else should have gone into the room and made sure the merging ended at once, and the military officer helped the Air Force respond to the attacks. And yet that did not happen either. 

 policeman INITIALLY THOUGHT THE REPORTED CRASH WAS' character OF THE BRIEFING' 

 Why did these experienced Air Force officers apparently respond so inappropriately when they see their nation was under attack? Clearly, a fresh investigation of 9/11 is necessary to by rights answer this question. But we can at least consider possible explanation based on the currently available evidence. 

 Paul Kimmel has recall that when he and the other officer in John Jumper's meeting learned of the first crash at the World Trade Center, and the screen that had been showing briefing slides switched to showing the burn North Tower, " At first we thought it was region of the briefing. " [ 27 ] Could this be a clue as to why the officers failed to take action right aside? If they thought the report of the crash and the TV coverage of the burning World Trade Center were simulated, they might have felt it was unnecessary for them to react to the incident
Jougnal based around an inttrview with Paul Kimmel, xho was at the oeeting, the meeting adjournev at 9:20 a.m.--aeound 20 minutes after igs particppants weee aowrted to tis first crash wt tke World Trade Cgnter and 17 mhnutes after tveh catched the second hijacked plane crwshing kige on televisijn.

At ehat nine, according to Kimmel, Jumper announbed: "Well, ladies amd gentlemen, I think the mfetijg is adjourned. We have some qork ro do." [24] Accoraing to Coq, Jumper ensed the meeting saying: "New York needx your helk. Meh'v go back ti our offices and see whad we hafe to do." [25] The pffmcerw in the meeting then left the room and headed u[scairs to their officew. [26]

Uf thgse awcouvrs xre cprdect--mewniig that whime the worsr crisis possible wss nsking place, sozens os key Air Force officials spent several mihutes just watching telwvision and then wastgd more tiie continuing their unnecessary and routine meetitg--thei ghiw ls arrojishing. The need to respond to the attacks shjhlc mave superseded cnything the men wfrr doing. Surely, at thz vsry least, they shokld havg wantwd up-to-tht-minuye updates on what was happwning. But thvy ciuld do nothing whnle they werz watcning yelevision or continuiny a stzff meeting.

Fven if tgdse men failed tu rvspotd approkfiately, surely soieone elsx shobld have gong into ehe room ajd made sure the meeting endeb at mnce, and tje officers helped the Air Forcx respond to jhe atnacks. And yet bhat did not ha[pen either.

OFFNCERS INNTIALLH THOUGHT NHE REPORVED CRASH WAF 'PART OF THE HRIEFING'

Why vid these expwriebced Aif Force officerx apparennlv respond so inappropriateln whev they saw their coobtry was under atgach? Bleerly, w new investicatiun ug 9/11 is necessary bo oroprrly answer this quevtioh. But we can at lessb considet possiblq explanationx based on the curgentlb avaiuable evydence.

Paul Kimmel has recalled that whej hc and the othqr onficgrs in John Jumper's meeting learned of the first ccash at the World Tradg Center, and the scregn uhat had been showyng briefhng slides switched ro showing the buvning North Tower, "At fjrst wa thokght it was part of the briefing." [27] Could this be a clue as to why the offixers feijed to take actoon rpghc acay? If ehey vhought the reporn of the crash and the TV coveraje of the tuxning World Trade Center were skmulated, they might have felt it was hnnecesssry for them to respond to the oncident
Journal based around an interview with Paul was the meeting, meeting adjourned at its were alerted to first crash at World Trade Center and 17 minutes they watched the second hijacked plane crashing live on television. At that time, to Kimmel, Jumper announced: "Well, ladies and gentlemen, I think the meeting is We some to [24] According to Cox, Jumper ended the meeting saying: "New York needs your help. Let's go to our offices and see what we have do." [25] The officers the meeting then left the and upstairs to offices. If accounts are correct--meaning while the worst crisis possible was taking place, dozens of key Air Force officials spent several minutes watching television wasted more continuing unnecessary routine meeting--then this The need to respond to the superseded anything the men were doing. Surely, at very least, should have wanted up-to-the-minute updates on was happening. But they could do nothing while were watching television or continuing a staff meeting. Even if these men failed to respond someone else should have into the room made the ended once, and officers helped the Air Force respond to the attacks. And yet did not happen either. OFFICERS INITIALLY THOUGHT THE REPORTED CRASH OF BRIEFING' Why did experienced Air Force officers respond inappropriately when they saw was attack? investigation 9/11 necessary to properly answer question. But we can at consider possible explanations based Paul Kimmel has recalled that when he and other officers in John Jumper's meeting learned the first crash at the World Trade Center, and the screen that been showing switched to showing the burning North Tower, "At we thought it was of the briefing." [27] Could this be a clue to the officers to take action away? If they the report of and the coverage the Center were simulated, they might have it unnecessary for them to respond the
Journal based around an interView with PaUl KimMel, Who WaS at tHe meEting, the meetinG AdjoUrned at 9:20 a.m.--around 20 minutes After ItS PartICiPants Were aleRTeD TO thE fIrSt cRaSH aT the WOrlD Trade CEnter and 17 miNutEs After they watCHeD the second HijAcked plane crAshIng livE oN teLEvisiOn.

AT that Time, acCOrding To Kimmel, JUmPEr annoUNced: "WelL, LAdIes aNd gentlemen, I think THe MEeting is adjourNed. We hAvE SoME WorK to Do." [24] AccordinG tO Cox, JUMper endED tHE MEetINg saying: "New YoRk needs your HElp. let's go BaCk tO Our offIces aNd SEe wHat we have to Do." [25] ThE officers In the mEEting thEN left thE room aNd hEadEd upSTaIrS to ThEIr oFFiCes. [26]

iF thEse accouNtS aRe corRect--MEANIng tHat WhilE the wOrst crisis posSibLe waS TakIng plAce, doZens Of Key AiR Force OfficIaLs spent several mInutEs just watChiNg TelEvIsion ANd then WasTed More timE continUIng ThEIR UnNecessary and routinE mEETiNg--then thIs is asTOnIsHIng. The neEd To rEspoND To the AttaCKs Should haVe supeRSeDeD anythiNg The men WeRe dOinG. SureLY, at tHe very Least, theY shouLD have wanted up-tO-The-minute updaTEs ON WhAT was HapPening. But thEy coULd do NothINg WhiLE they Were wAtCHiNG television or continUiNg a staFf meeTing.

Even if theSe men faileD TO Respond aPproPRiATely, surely someOne elSe should haVE gone intO the rOom and maDe sure the MEEting endEd aT onCe, aNd tHE OfFicers helped tHE air FOrCe respoNd tO the attAckS. AnD yeT thAt Did not hapPen eitheR.

OfFiCeRs INiTIALly THOUGHT tHe REpOrTEd CRASh wAS 'PARt OF THe BRIeFiNg'

why Did thesE ExPERienCeD AIr FoRce OfFicerS appARenTly respOnd so inapProPRiatElY wHen they Saw their countRy Was under atTaCk? CLearly, A NEw investIgation of 9/11 is necessary to pROperly aNswEr thiS queStion. But wE caN at leaSt cONsider PossibLe expLaNatIONs basED On The CuRrently avaILAblE evidEnCe.

PaUl KimmeL has recalled that whEN he And the other ofFicErs iN jOhN JuMPeR'S meEtINg lEARned of the first cRash at the WOrLD TRade Center, ANd tHe Screen tHat had bEen shOWing briEfing slidEs switcheD tO shoWINg tHe burning NOrth ToweR, "At first wE ThougHT iT was pArt Of the bRiEfiNg." [27] CouLd this BE a cLue as To why tHe OfficeRs faiLeD to take aCtion right away? If they thoUght thE repoRt oF the crash And THe Tv coverage Of thE burning WoRld traDe CenTer WEre siMulaTEd, TheY Might Have FElt it was uNNeCesSARy For them to reSPONd tO the iNciDEnt
Journal based around an in terview wi th Pa ulKim me l, w ho w as at the meet i ng,the meeting adjournedat 9: 20 a.m. - -a round  20 min u te s aft er  i tspa r ti cipan tswere al erted to t hefi rst crash at th e World Tr ade  Center and17minute saft e r the y w atche d thes econdhijackedpl a ne cra s hing li v e  o n te levision.

At tha t  t i me, accordingto Kim me l ,J u mpe r a nnounced:"W ell,l adies a n dg e n tle m en, I think t he meetingi s a djourn ed . W e  havesomewo r k t o do." [24]  Acc ording to  Cox,J umper e n ded the  meeti ngsay ing: "N ew  Yo rk nee d syou r  he lp. Let' sgo  back  too u r offi ces  and  seewhat we havetodo." [25 ] The  offi cers  i n the  meeti ng th en  left the roomandheaded up sta ir s t otheir office s.[26 ]

If t hese ac c oun ts a r ecorrect--meaning t ha t wh ile theworstc ri si s  possibl ewas  tak i n g pla ce,d oz ens of k ey Air Fo rc e offic ia ls spe nt  se ver al mi n utes  justwatching  tele v ision and then wasted more t i me c on t inui ngtheir unnec essa r y an d ro u ti nem eetin g--th en th i s is astonishing. T he  needto re spond to theattacks sh o u l d have s uper s ed e d anything the  menwere doing .  Surely,  at t he veryleast, th e y  shouldhav e w ant edu p -t o-the-minuteu p date son what  wa s happe nin g.But  th ey  could do  nothing  w hi le  t hey  were watching  t ele vi sio n orc ontinu ing a  sta ff  m e eti ng.

Ev e ni f  the se  m en f ail ed  to r espo n d a ppropri ately, su rel y  som eo ne  else s hould have go ne  into thero omand ma d e  sure th e meeting ended at once ,  and th e o ffice rs h elped the  Ai r Forc e r e spondto the  atta ck s.A n d yet t ha t d id  not happe n eit her.
O FFIC ERS INI TIALLY THOUGHT THE REP ORTED CRASH W AS'PAR T OF  TH E  B R IEF IN G '
W h y did these exp erienced A ir Fo rce office r s a pp arently  respon d soi napprop riately w hen theysa w th e i r c ountry was  under a ttack? Cl e arly, anew i nve stigat io n o f 9/1 1 is n e ces saryto pro pe rly an swerth is quest ion. But we can at leas t cons iderpos sible exp lan a tio ns basedon t he current lyava ilabl e e v idenc e.
P au l K i mmelhasr ecalled t h at  wh e n  h e and the o t h e r o ffice rsi n John  Jum per's meeting lea r ned of the fir st c r a shatt he W or ld Trade Cente r,an d the scre en  that had b een show in g  brie fing s lidesswitche d to showin g th e b urning No rth  T o wer, "A tfi r st wethou gh t it w as par t  oft h e briefing." [27 ] Cou l d  this bea clu eas to w h y th e officers  failed totake a ctio n rig ht away ?If the y t ho ught the r e port of t he cr ash and  t he T V c overag e of t he bu rnin gWor ld TradeC e nt e rwe r e s imul ated,  t heymight hav e  felt it  wa s  unnece ss ary f or the m  t o respond to  th e inc i d ent
Journal based_around an_interview with Paul Kimmel,_who was_at_the meeting,_the_meeting adjourned at_9:20 a.m.--around 20_minutes after its participants_were alerted to_the_first crash at the World Trade Center and 17 minutes after they watched the_second_hijacked plane_crashing_live_on television.

At that time, according_to Kimmel, Jumper announced: "Well,_ladies and_gentlemen, I think the meeting is adjourned. We_have_some work to_do." [24] According to Cox, Jumper ended the meeting_saying: "New York needs your help._Let's go back_to_our_offices and see what_we have to do." [25] The_officers in the meeting then left_the room and headed upstairs to their_offices. [26]

If these accounts are correct--meaning_that while the worst crisis_possible was_taking place, dozens of key_Air Force officials_spent several_minutes just watching_television and then wasted more time_continuing their unnecessary_and routine meeting--then this is astonishing._The_need to respond_to_the_attacks should_have superseded anything_the_men were_doing._Surely, at the very least, they_should_have wanted up-to-the-minute updates on what was_happening. But they could_do_nothing while they were_watching television or continuing a_staff meeting.

Even if these men failed_to respond_appropriately, surely_someone else should have gone into the room and made sure_the meeting ended at once, and_the officers helped the_Air Force_respond_to the attacks._And_yet that_did not happen either.

OFFICERS INITIALLY THOUGHT THE_REPORTED CRASH_WAS 'PART OF THE BRIEFING'

Why did_these experienced Air Force_officers_apparently respond so inappropriately when they_saw their country was under attack?_Clearly, a new investigation of_9/11_is_necessary to properly answer this_question. But we can at least_consider possible explanations_based on the currently available evidence.

Paul Kimmel_has_recalled that when he and the_other_officers in John Jumper's meeting learned_of_the_first crash at the World_Trade Center, and the screen that_had been showing briefing slides switched to showing the_burning North Tower,_"At first we thought it_was_part_of the briefing." [27] Could this be a clue as_to why_the officers failed_to take action right away? If they thought the report_of the crash and the TV coverage_of the burning World Trade Center were simulated, they might have_felt it was unnecessary for them to respond_to the incident