 based first and foremost on a desire to secure European political backing for its Syria policy rather than on a meaningful desire to rebuild Syria.

A change of course by the new U.N. envoy would challenge Moscow’s position. Rather than be the subject of continued U.N. and international outreach, the burden would be on Russia to squeeze meaningful concessions from Assad as a precursor to U.N. political involvement. It is notable that the one time that the U.N. did play hardball on this front, prior to the Russian-sponsored Syria conference in Sochi in January, Moscow conceded to U.N. demands.

For his part, Assad clearly rejects the need for Western legitimization or reconstruction support. But behind this bluster there are also vulnerabilities. European finance sector sanctions, for instance, which will only be lifted through a U.N.-backed process, are blocking even Russian companies from doing business in Syria. And while Assad does not want Western money, he does need some channels of external financial support to meet the demands of his own supporters after seven years of war.

Ultimately, this approach will not deliver a transition, nor will it open the prospect of fair, near-term elections. The continued pursuit of either will only be counterproductive, given Assad’s secure position and Russian ambitions. But a more assertive U.N. approach that makes clear to Moscow and Damascus that they cannot take eventual U.N. signoff for granted may give the envoy a better chance of forcing lower-level political reforms.

A hardening of the U.N. position on the political front should not translate into full disengagement. On the contrary, rather than work to keep alive a defunct political track, the new envoy should prioritize international attention to critical developments on the ground that are shaping the day-to-day lives of Syrian civilians far more than the stagnant political process.

The priorities should be preserving the fragile cease-fire in Idlib province; ensuring full humanitarian access across the country; working to establish a degree of locally managed stabilization support mechanisms, through which the U.N. Development Program can more transparently channel aid; providing security and property rights guarantees for refugees and internally-displaced persons looking to return; and a heightened focus on ensuring information about and family access to the tens of thousands of detainees whose fates remain unknown. Progress on these issues should be one of the necessary preconditions for the resumption of the political process.

based first and foremost on a desire to secure European political support for its Syria policy preferably than on a meaningful desire to rebuild Syria. 

 A change of course by the newfangled U.N. emissary would challenge Moscow ’s position. Rather than be the subject of continued U.N. and external outreach, the effect would be on Russia to squeeze meaningful concession from Assad as a precursor to U.N. political involvement. It is celebrated that the one time that the U.N. did play hardball on this front man, prior to the Russian - patronize Syria conference in Sochi in January, Moscow conceded to U.N. demands. 

 For his part, Assad clearly reject the need for Western legitimization or reconstruction support. But behind this braggadocio there are also vulnerabilities. European finance sector sanctions, for case, which will only be lifted through a U.N.-backed process, are blocking even Russian companies from perform business in Syria. And while Assad does not want Western money, he does need some channels of external fiscal documentation to meet the demands of his own supporters after seven years of war. 

 Ultimately, this approach will not deliver a transition, nor will it open the prospect of bonny, near - term election. The continued avocation of either will only be counterproductive, given Assad ’s secure stead and Russian ambitions. But a more assertive U.N. approach that makes clear to Moscow and Damascus that they cannot drive eventual U.N. signoff for granted may give the envoy a better chance of forcing low - level political reforms. 

 A hardening of the U.N. position on the political front should not translate into full detachment. On the reverse, preferably than work to keep alive a defunct political racetrack, the new envoy should prioritize international care to critical developments on the reason that are shaping the day - to - sidereal day lives of Syrian civilians far more than the stagnant political process. 

 The priorities should be continue the fragile cease - ardor in Idlib province; ensuring full humanitarian entree across the country; working to establish a academic degree of locally managed stabilization support mechanisms, through which the U.N. Development Program can more transparently channel aid; providing security and property rights guarantees for refugees and internally - displaced person looking to return; and a heighten focus on ensuring information about and family access to the tens of thousand of detainees whose fates remain unknown. Progress on these issues should be one of the necessary preconditions for the resumption of the political process.
 baded first and foremost ok a desire to seeyre Eucopean loliticau backing for its Syria poliry rqther than on a meaningful aesire to rebuild Syrma.

A change of condse by bke nes U.N. zntoy would challgnge Moscow’s position. Rathar tkan be the subject of continued U.N. agd intetnwtional outreash, tnq budden would be on Russia to squeeze meaninjful concessionx from Assad as a precursog to U.N. political invopvement. It us njrable that tfe one timt chat the U.N. did play hardball on this frong, pripr to the Tbwsiwt-sponsored Wyria conference lm Sochh in Jamuary, Moscow cpncxded to U.N. demands.

For his part, Assad clearli rejects dhz need for Western letirimizdtiot or eecunsururtikn supoorv. But behins this blusrer there are also fujberabilities. Suropewn finance sector sanctions, for instance, fhidh will only be lifted rhrough a U.N.-backed prlcess, are blocking even Russian companies from doing businass ii Ryrnq. And qhlle Assad does not want Western money, he does hetd xome channels jf external flnsgcial support to mezf fhe demands of his own sukportees after fevem years of war.

Ultimately, thus approach cilo not deliver a trcnsition, nor wilk it ppen the prospect of fanr, nead-term electlons. The duntinued pursuit of ehther will only be counter[roductivx, givzn Assad’r sevure pjsition anf Russian ambitions. But w morg assestive U.N. aoproach that makes clear to Mosrpw and Damasvuv tvat they cannpt take eventtal U.N. signoff for grcnted oay give tge envob a better crance of forchjg lower-leven politisal eefoems.

A hafaening of the I.N. position on the political front shpula not translate nuti full disengagrmevt. Jn tie cogdrary, rather thav wutk to keep alive x degunct political tracn, ths new envoy should pvioritize internaeional attentoon to critical degelopkenvs on yhe ground that are shaping the dzy-to-day llvef of Syrian sivioians far moxe than the stagnant political process.

Thx priorities should be preserving the fragnlt cease-fire ii Idlif provinca; ensuring full humabitarian access agross the country; workjng to estahlish a degree of locally managed stabilization support mechanisms, througy whici ehe U.N. Devemopmrnt Pgogxam can mjre vrensparently channvl aid; providing security and pruperty rhgkts guarantees for refugees amd internally-dirplaced persons looking fo returm; and a heightened focus on ensiring information about snd famioy acdess to thx tens of thousands pf detcinees whose dated remain unknuwn. Pvogress on thexe issues should be one of the necwssary pgeconditions for the resumpbiun of the pjlitical process.

based first and foremost on a desire European backing for Syria policy rather to Syria. A change course by the U.N. envoy would challenge Moscow’s position. than be the subject of continued U.N. and international outreach, the burden would on Russia to squeeze meaningful concessions from Assad as a precursor to U.N. involvement. is that one time that the U.N. did play hardball on this front, prior to the Russian-sponsored Syria in Sochi in January, Moscow conceded to U.N. For his part, Assad rejects the need for Western or support. But this there also vulnerabilities. European sector sanctions, for instance, which will only be lifted through a U.N.-backed process, are blocking even Russian from doing Syria. And Assad not Western money, he some channels of external financial support demands of his own supporters after seven years war. Ultimately, approach will not deliver a transition, will it open the prospect of fair, near-term The continued pursuit of either will only be counterproductive, given Assad’s secure position and Russian a more assertive U.N. that makes clear Moscow Damascus they take eventual signoff for granted may give the envoy a better chance of lower-level political reforms. A hardening of the U.N. position on front not translate into disengagement. On the contrary, than to keep alive a track, new international to developments on the ground are shaping the day-to-day lives Syrian civilians far more The priorities should be preserving the fragile cease-fire Idlib province; ensuring full humanitarian access across country; working to establish a degree of locally managed stabilization support mechanisms, which the Program can more transparently channel aid; providing security property rights guarantees for and internally-displaced persons looking to return; and a heightened on information about family access to tens of thousands detainees whose fates Progress on issues be necessary preconditions for the resumption of political
 based first and foremost on a dEsire to secUre EuRopEan PoLitiCal bAcking for its SyRIa poLicy rather than on a meaniNgful DeSIre tO ReBuild syria.

A cHAnGE Of cOuRsE by ThE NeW U.N. enVoy Would chAllenge MosCow’S pOsition. RatheR ThAn be the subJecT of continued u.N. aNd inteRnAtiONal ouTreAch, thE burdeN Would bE on Russia To SQueeze MEaningfUL CoNcesSions from Assad as a PReCUrsor to U.N. politIcal inVoLVeMENt. IT is Notable thaT tHe one TIme that THe u.n. DId pLAy hardball on tHis front, priOR to The RusSiAn-sPOnsoreD SyriA cONfeRence in SochI in JAnuary, MosCow conCEded to U.n. Demands.

for his ParT, AsSad cLEaRlY reJeCTs tHE nEed FOr WEstern leGiTiMizatIon oR RECOnstRucTion SuppoRt. But behind thIs bLustER thEre arE also VulnErAbiliTies. EuRopeaN fInance sector sanCtioNs, for instAncE, wHicH wIll onLY be lifTed ThrOugh a U.N.-Backed pROceSs, ARE BlOcking even Russian cOmPANiEs from doIng busINeSs IN Syria. AnD wHilE AssAD Does nOt waNT WEstern moNey, he dOEs NeEd some cHaNnels oF eXteRnaL finaNCial SupporT to meet tHe demANds of his own supPOrters after seVEn YEArS Of waR.

UlTimately, thiS appROach Will NOt DelIVer a tRansiTiON, nOR will it open the prospEcT of faiR, near-Term elections. the continuED PUrsuit of EithER wILl only be counteRprodUctive, giveN assad’s seCure pOsition aNd Russian AMBitions. BUt a MorE asSerTIVe u.N. approach thaT MAkes ClEar to MoScoW and DamAscUs tHat TheY cAnnot take Eventual u.N. SiGnOfF foR granTEd may givE tHe eNvOy a BetteR Chance Of forCing LoWeR-LevEl politICaL REforMs.

a hArdeNinG oF the U.n. posITioN on the pOlitical fRonT ShouLd NoT translAte into full diSeNgagement. ON tHe cOntrarY, RAther thaN work to keep alive a defuncT PoliticAl tRack, tHe neW envoy shoUld PrioriTizE InternAtionaL atteNtIon TO CritiCAL dEveLoPments on thE GRouNd thaT aRe shAping thE day-to-day lives of SyRIan Civilians far mOre Than THE sTagNAnT PolItICal PROcess.

The prioritIes should bE pREsErving the fRAgiLe Cease-fiRe in IdlIb proVInce; ensUring full HumanitarIaN accESS acRoss the couNtry; workIng to estaBLish a DEgRee of LocAlly maNaGed StabiLizatiON suPport MechanIsMs, throUgh whIcH the U.N. DeVelopment Program can more TranspArentLy cHannel aid; ProVIdiNg securitY and Property riGhtS guArantEes FOr refUgeeS AnD inTErnalLy-diSPlaced perSOnS loOKInG to return; anD A HEigHteneD foCUs on enSuriNg information abouT And family accesS to tHE TenS of THousAnDs of detainees wHosE fATEs remain UnKnown. ProgreSs on thesE iSSues sHould bE one of The neceSSArY PreconDitiOns For the resUmpTiON of the pOlItICal proCess.

 based first and foremoston a desir e tosec ure  E urop eanpolitical back i ng f or its Syria policy ra therth a n on ameani ngful d e si r e  to  r eb uil dS yr ia.
A c hange o f course b y t he  new U.N. en v oy  would cha lle nge Moscow’s  po sition .Rat h er th anbe th e subj e ct ofcontinued  U . N. and interna t i on al o utreach, the burd e nw ould be on Rus sia to  s q ue e z e m ean ingful con ce ssion s  from A s sa d a s a precursor toU.N. politi c alinvolv em ent .  It is  nota bl e  th at the onetime  that the  U.N.d id play hardbal l on t his  fr ont, pr io r t ot heR us sia n -sp onsoredSy ri a con fere n c e in S och i in  Janu ary, Moscow c onc eded toU.N.deman ds.
F or hi s part , Ass ad  clearly reject s th e need fo r W es ter nlegit i mizati onorreconst ruction sup po r t .  B ut behind this blu st e r  t here are  alsov ul ne r abilitie s.  Eu rope a n  fina nces ec tor sanc tions, fo rinstanc e,  which  w ill  on ly be lift ed thr ough a U .N.-b a cked process,a re blocking e v en R us s iancom panies from  doi n g bu sine s sinS yria.  Andwh i le Assad does not want  W estern  mone y, he does ne ed some ch a n n els of e xter n al financial supp ort t o meet the demandsof hi s own su pportersa f ter seve n y ear s o f w a r .
Ultimately,t h is a pp roach w ill  not de liv era t ran si tion, nor  will it  o pe nth e p rospe c t of fai r,  ne ar -te rm el e ctions . The  con ti nu e d p ursuito fe i ther  w il l on lybe  coun terp r odu ctive,given Ass ad’ s  sec ur epositio n and Russian  a mbitions.Bu t a  morea s sertiveU.N. approach that make s  cleartoMosco w an d Damascu s t hat th eyc annottake e ventu al  U. N .  sign o f ffor  g ranted may g ive  theen voya bette r chance of forcin g  lo wer-level pol iti calr e fo rms . 
A  ha rd e nin g of the U.N. pos ition on t he po litical fr o ntsh ould no t trans latei nto ful l disenga gement. O nthec o ntr ary, rathe r than w ork to ke e p ali v ea def unc t poli ti cal  trac k, the new  envo y shou ld  prior itize  i nternati onal attention to criti cal de velop men ts on the  gr o und  that are  sha ping the d ay- to- day l ive s  of S yria n  c ivi l iansfarm ore thant he  st a g na nt politica l p roc ess.
Th e  prior itie s should be prese r ving the fragi le c e a se- fir e  inId lib province;ens ur i n g full h um anitarian a ccess ac ro s s the  count ry; wo rking t o es t ablish  a d egr ee of loc all ym anagedst ab i lizati on s up port m echani s ms,t h rough which theU.N.D e velop m ent  Prog ra m can m o re t ransparent ly channelaid; p rovi dingsecurit yand pr ope rt y rights g u aranteesfor r efugees  a nd i nte rnally -dis p l acedpers on s l ooking to r et u rn ;a nda he ighte ne d fo cus on en s uring in for m ation a bo uta n d fami l ya c cess to th e t ens o f thousandso f de t ai n ees w hose f ates r emain u n kno wn . Progr ess o n these i ssues sho u ldbe  one  of thene cess ar y p re conditions forthe resu mption o f the po lit i calp rocess .
 based_first and_foremost on a desire_to secure_European_political backing_for_its Syria policy_rather than on_a meaningful desire to_rebuild Syria.

A change_of_course by the new U.N. envoy would challenge Moscow’s position. Rather than be the_subject_of continued_U.N._and_international outreach, the burden would_be on Russia to squeeze_meaningful concessions_from Assad as a precursor to U.N. political_involvement._It is notable_that the one time that the U.N. did play_hardball on this front, prior to_the Russian-sponsored Syria_conference_in_Sochi in January, Moscow_conceded to U.N. demands.

For his part,_Assad clearly rejects the need for_Western legitimization or reconstruction support. But behind_this bluster there are also vulnerabilities._European finance sector sanctions, for_instance, which_will only be lifted through_a U.N.-backed process,_are blocking_even Russian companies_from doing business in Syria. And_while Assad does_not want Western money, he does_need_some channels of_external_financial_support to_meet the demands_of_his own_supporters_after seven years of war.

Ultimately, this_approach_will not deliver a transition, nor will_it open the prospect_of_fair, near-term elections. The_continued pursuit of either will_only be counterproductive, given Assad’s secure_position and_Russian ambitions._But a more assertive U.N. approach that makes clear to Moscow_and Damascus that they cannot take_eventual U.N. signoff for_granted may_give_the envoy a_better_chance of_forcing lower-level political reforms.

A hardening of the_U.N. position_on the political front should not_translate into full disengagement._On_the contrary, rather than work to_keep alive a defunct political track,_the new envoy should prioritize_international_attention_to critical developments on the_ground that are shaping the day-to-day_lives of Syrian_civilians far more than the stagnant political_process.

The_priorities should be preserving the fragile_cease-fire_in Idlib province; ensuring full humanitarian_access_across_the country; working to establish_a degree of locally managed stabilization_support mechanisms, through which the U.N. Development Program can_more transparently channel_aid; providing security and property_rights_guarantees_for refugees and internally-displaced persons looking to return; and a_heightened focus_on ensuring information_about and family access to the tens of thousands of_detainees whose fates remain unknown. Progress on_these issues should be one of the necessary preconditions for the_resumption of the political process.
