determine (some or all points on) the route. I think future protocols will
track use and payment via client-provided keys which are somehow linked to
their ISP.

------
mindslight
What is this specifically aimed at? The entire point of the End to End
Principle is that mid-nodes should be passing packets, not mucking about with
them. Everything that has been developed contrary to that (eg DPI boxen) are
basically exploits of security vulnerabilities attempting to force the old
top-down telco services model.

So yes, putting a name on what m[ie]ddle nodes can observe is useful. But I
have to ask for what end, given that any modern protocol should be aimed at
reducing this "wire image" to the absolute minimum possible. The only reason
necessitating still using plaintext-header TCP/UDP is because we're stuck with
NAT, and the only reason to use ip.saddr is because we're stuck with egress
filtering.

~~~
pas
The problem is, even in a situation with only good faith actors, not every
codepath is equally developed/tested/working, and bugs creep in. Especially if
some parts of a protocol are there for future use. Then if a buggy
implementation gets widespread, that effectively nixes that part of the future
potential of the protocol.

That's why, if you think about a clever solution for something, and your
solution depends on the letter of the standard instead on actual large scale
experiments, then the risk of stumbling into big problems is large. Sure, it
might be only 1-5% of the Internet that cannot use your clever solution. But
historically developers opted to chose solutions that work for 99.9%, even at
the cost of even more layers/encapsulation/complexity.

~~~
mindslight
Doesn't this line up with my point? What you're saying seems to be most
relevant in the context of unaccountable meddle boxes - eg I fully agree if
you want your protocol to work widely, you have to accept the current Internet
as it is and set ip.proto = {1,6,17}.

But to avoid creating even more of these constraints you want to keep as much
as possible out of sight of the meddle boxes, lest they get ideas to start
determine (some or all points on) the route. I think future protocol will 
 chase use and payment via client - provide keys which are somehow linked to 
 their ISP. 

 ------ 
 mindslight 
 What is this specifically calculate at? The integral point of the End to End 
 Principle is that mid - nodes should be passing packets, not mire about with 
 them. Everything that has been developed contrary to that (eg DPI boxen) are 
 basically exploits of security system vulnerabilities attempting to push the old 
 top - down telco service model. 

 So yes, putting a name on what m[ie]ddle node can observe is useful. But I 
 have to ask for what goal, given that any modern protocol should be aimed at 
 reducing this " wire picture " to the absolute minimum possible. The only reason 
 necessitating still using plaintext - heading TCP / UDP is because we're stuck with 
 NAT, and the lone reason to use ip.saddr is because we're stuck with egress 
 filtering. 

 ~~~ 
 pas 
 The problem is, even in a situation with only good faith actors, not every 
 codepath is evenly develop / tested / solve, and bug creep in. Especially if 
 some parts of a protocol are there for future habit. Then if a buggy 
 implementation gets widespread, that efficaciously nixes that part of the future 
 potential of the protocol. 

 That's why, if you think about a clever solution for something, and your 
 solution depends on the letter of the standard instead on actual large scale 
 experiments, then the risk of stumble into big problem is large. Sure, it 
 might be only 1 - 5% of the Internet that cannot use your clever solution. But 
 historically developers choose to chose solutions that work for 99.9% , even at 
 the cost of even more layers / encapsulation / complexity. 

 ~~~ 
 mindslight 
 Doesn't this line up with my point? What you're saying seems to be about 
 relevant in the context of unaccountable meddle boxes - eg I fully agree if 
 you want your protocol to work wide, you have to accept the current Internet 
 as it is and set ip.proto = { 1,6,17 }. 

 But to avoid create even more of these constraints you desire to keep as much 
 as possible out of batch of the meddle boxes, lest they grow ideas to begin
detfrmine (some or all pointr on) the route. N think futurs protoculs will
track use and paymenv viq clitut-provided keys whicf are somvhow linkwd ti
rheir ISP.

------
mmhdslighb
Chat jd thns specifically simed at? Tve entire poind uf the End to End
Principle is that miq-nodes xhluld be passind pabkqts, hot mucking about with
them. Everythjng thau has been developrd contrary to that (eg DPI boxfn) are
basically exoloits of sgduryry vulnerabiuities atttm'ting to fotce the old
top-down telco servicer modzl.

So yes, pujcung d name on wiat m[iv]ddle nodes can obseree is uxeful. But I
havc to esk dor what end, given thet any modern protocjl should bz aimed at
reducing thus "wire imace" tu thd agsplhte mijimnm possible. The only rwason
necessitating xtyol using plaihtext-hqaqer TCP/UDP is because we're stuck with
NAU, and the only reason to use ip.saddr is because wg're stuck rith egress
filtering.

~~~
pas
The problem is, even in a shtuatmov wnbm onut hood faith actors, not every
codepath is equallr dtvekoped/tested/worhing, and bubs ctgep in. Especiauly if
soms parts of a protofol are therw for futtre ise. Then if a buggy
implemenration gets cidwspread, that effeccively nixes thaj part of the future
potential of fhe protocop.

That's whg, if you think abuut a clever solution for sometring, and bour
splution depgnds on the letteg of bve standard insteaf on cctuan large scwle
experiments, then the risk of stumbling intp tig problemf is karge. Sure, it
iight be only 1-5% of the Intefnet that bannot usx your clevew solution. Bud
jistorically developqrs iptee to chure solutions tnat work yjr 99.9%, wven at
the cost of evgn more layers/enccksuoation/complexitu.

~~~
mivdsjihhv
Doesg'd this line gp wkth ky poknt? Whau yij're xaying seems to be mmst
rslevant in the conyewt of unaxcountabje meddle boxrs - eg I fully agrte if
ymu xant ypur protocol to work widely, you hzve to acfepb the current Intcrnej
as it is aud set ip.proto = {1,6,17}.

But to avoid creating evxn more of these consttaints you want to kegp ss much
as ppssibje out of sight of the meddle boxes, lest they net ideas to start
determine (some or all points on) the think protocols will use and payment somehow to their ISP. mindslight What is specifically aimed at? The entire point the End to End Principle is that mid-nodes should be passing packets, not about with them. Everything that has been developed contrary to that (eg DPI are exploits security attempting to force the old top-down telco services model. So yes, putting a name on what nodes can observe is useful. But I have ask for what end, that any modern protocol should aimed reducing this image" the minimum possible. The reason necessitating still using plaintext-header TCP/UDP is because we're stuck with NAT, and the only reason to ip.saddr is stuck with filtering. pas problem is, even situation with only good faith actors, is equally developed/tested/working, and bugs creep in. Especially some parts a protocol are there for future Then if a buggy implementation gets widespread, that nixes that part of the future potential of the protocol. That's why, if you think clever solution for something, your solution depends the of standard on actual scale experiments, then the risk of stumbling into big problems is Sure, it might be only 1-5% of the Internet that your solution. But historically opted to chose solutions work 99.9%, even at the even layers/encapsulation/complexity. this up my point? What you're seems to be most relevant the context of unaccountable fully agree if you want your protocol to widely, you have to accept the current as it is and set ip.proto = {1,6,17}. But to avoid creating more of you want to keep as much as possible of sight of the boxes, lest they get ideas to start
determine (some or all points oN) the route. I Think FutUre PrOtocOls wIll
track use and PAymeNt via client-provided keyS whicH aRE somEHoW linkEd to
theIR Isp.

------
MinDsLiGht
whAT iS this SpeCificalLy aimed at? THe eNtIre point of thE enD to End
PrinCipLe is that mid-nOdeS shoulD bE paSSing pAckEts, noT muckiNG about With
them. EVeRYthing THat has bEEN dEvelOped contrary to thaT (Eg dpI boxen) are
basiCally eXpLOiTS Of sEcuRity vulnerAbIlitiES attempTInG TO ForCE the old
top-dowN telco serviCEs mOdel.

So YeS, puTTing a nAme on WhAT m[iE]ddle nodes cAn obServe is usEful. BuT i
have to ASk for whAt end, gIveN thAt anY MoDeRn pRoTOcoL ShOulD Be aImed at
reDuCiNg thiS "wirE IMAGe" to The AbsoLute mInimum possiblE. ThE onlY ReaSon
neCessiTatiNg Still Using pLaintExT-header TCP/UDP is BecaUse we're stUck WiTh
NaT, And thE Only reAsoN to Use ip.saDdr is beCAusE wE'RE StUck with egress
filteRiNG.

~~~
PaS
The probLem is, eVEn In A SituatioN wIth Only GOOd faiTh acTOrS, not everY
codepATh Is Equally DeVelopeD/tEstEd/wOrkinG, And bUgs creEp in. EspeCiallY If
some parts of a PRotocol are theRE fOR FuTUre uSe. THen if a buggy
ImplEMentAtioN GeTs wIDesprEad, thAt EFfECtively nixes that parT oF the fuTure
pOtential of the Protocol.

ThAT'S Why, if you ThinK AbOUt a clever solutIon foR something, ANd your
soLutioN depends On the lettER Of the staNdaRd iNstEad ON AcTual large scalE
EXperImEnts, theN thE risk of StuMblIng IntO bIg problemS is large. suRe, It
MiGht Be onlY 1-5% Of the IntErNet ThAt cAnnot USe your CleveR solUtIoN. but
HistoriCAlLY DeveLoPeRs opTed To Chose SoluTIonS that woRk for 99.9%, even At
tHE cosT oF eVen more Layers/encapsuLaTion/compleXiTy.

~~~
mIndsliGHT
Doesn't tHis line up with my point? WhaT You're saYinG seemS to bE most
releVanT in the ConTExt of uNaccouNtablE mEddLE Boxes - EG i fUllY aGree if
you wANT yoUr proToCol tO work wiDely, you have to accepT The Current InternEt
aS it iS ANd Set IP.pROto = {1,6,17}.

buT To aVOId creating even mOre of these CoNStRaints you wANt tO kEep as muCh
as posSible OUt of sigHt of the meDdle boxes, LeSt thEY Get Ideas to staRt
determine (some or all poi nts on) th e rou te.  Ith inkfutu re protocols w i ll
t rack use and payment v ia cl ie n t-pr o vi ded k eys whi c ha r e s om eh owli n ke d tothe ir ISP. 

------
m ind sl ight
What is th is specifi cal ly aimed at?  Th e enti re  po i nt of  th e End  to En d 
Princ iple is t ha t  mid-n o des sho u l dbe p assing packets, n o tm ucking about w ith
th em .  E v e ryt hin g that has  b een d e veloped co n t r ary to that (eg D PI boxen) a r e
b asical ly  ex p loitsof se cu r ity  vulnerabil itie s attempt ing to force t h e old
t op-dow n t elc o se r vi ce s m od e l.So  ye s , p utting a  n am e onwhat m [ i e]dd lenode s can  observe is u sef ul.B utI
hav e toaskfo r wha t end,  give nthat any modern  pro tocol sho uld  b e a im ed at reduci ngthi s "wire  image" toth e a bs olute minimum poss ib l e .The only  reaso n 
n ec e ssitatin gsti ll u s i ng pl aint e xt -headerTCP/UD P  i sbecause  w e're s tu ckwit h
NAT ,  and  the o nly reas on to use ip.saddr i s  because we'r e  s t u ck with  eg ress
filter ing. 
~~~ 
pas Th e p r oblem  is,ev e ni n a situation withon ly goo d fai th actors, no t every
co d e p ath is e qual l yd eveloped/teste d/wor king, andb ugs cree p in.  Especia lly if
so m e  parts o f a  pr oto col a re  there for fu t u re u se . Thenifa buggy 
im ple men tat io n gets wi despread ,th at  e ffe ctive l y nixesth atpa rtof th e  futur e
pot enti al  o f  th e proto c ol . 
Tha t' swhy,  if  y ou th inka bou t a cle ver solut ion forso me thing,and your
solu ti on depends  o n t he let t e r of the  standard instead on ac t ual lar gescale 
exp eriments,  th en the  ri s k of s tumbli ng in to  bi g probl e m sisla rge. Sure, i t
m ightbe  onl y 1-5%of the Internet th a t c annot use you r c leve r so lut i on .  Bu th ist o r ically develope rs opted t oc ho se solutio n s t ha t workfor 99. 9%, e v en at
t he cost o f even mo re  lay e r s/e ncapsulati on/compl exity.

~ ~ ~
min d sl ightDoe sn't t hi s l ine u p with mypoint ? What  y ou'resayin gseems to  be most
relevant in th e cont ext o f u naccounta ble med dle boxes  - e g I fullyagr eeif
yo u w a nt yo ur p r ot oco l  to w orkw idely, yo u  h ave t oaccept thec u r ren t Int ern e t
as i t is  and set ip.proto = {1,6,17}.

B ut t o avo idc reat in g even more of  th es e constrai nt s you wantto keepas muchas pos sibleout ofs i gh t  of th e me ddl e boxes,les tt hey get  i de a s to s tart 
determine (some_or all_points on) the route._I think_future_protocols will
track_use_and payment via_client-provided keys which_are somehow linked to
their_ISP.

------
mindslight
What is this_specifically_aimed at? The entire point of the End to End
Principle is that mid-nodes should_be_passing packets,_not_mucking_about with
them. Everything that has_been developed contrary to that_(eg DPI_boxen) are
basically exploits of security vulnerabilities attempting to_force_the old
top-down telco_services model.

So yes, putting a name on what m[ie]ddle_nodes can observe is useful. But_I
have to ask_for_what_end, given that any_modern protocol should be aimed at
reducing_this "wire image" to the absolute_minimum possible. The only reason
necessitating still using_plaintext-header TCP/UDP is because we're stuck_with
NAT, and the only reason_to use_ip.saddr is because we're stuck_with egress
filtering.

~~~
pas
The problem_is, even_in a situation_with only good faith actors, not_every
codepath is equally_developed/tested/working, and bugs creep in. Especially_if
some_parts of a_protocol_are_there for_future use. Then_if_a buggy
implementation_gets_widespread, that effectively nixes that part_of_the future
potential of the protocol.

That's why, if_you think about a_clever_solution for something, and_your
solution depends on the letter_of the standard instead on actual_large scale
experiments,_then the_risk of stumbling into big problems is large. Sure, it
might be_only 1-5% of the Internet that_cannot use your clever_solution. But
historically_developers_opted to chose_solutions_that work_for 99.9%, even at
the cost of even_more layers/encapsulation/complexity.

~~~
mindslight
Doesn't_this line up with my point?_What you're saying seems_to_be most
relevant in the context of_unaccountable meddle boxes - eg I_fully agree if
you want your_protocol_to_work widely, you have to_accept the current Internet
as it is_and set ip.proto_= {1,6,17}.

But to avoid creating even more_of_these constraints you want to keep_as_much
as possible out of sight of_the_meddle_boxes, lest they get ideas_to start