 during
wintertime, while admirable (the safety of his soldiers was of supreme
importance to him), worked out where they seemed like they shouldn't most of
the time.

3\. Stupidity of his enemies. How many times did Caesar attack the Pompeans
during the Civil War during winter? They never learned. It's remarkable
really. One can also look at Caesar's merciful treatment of enemies during the
civil war as evidence of his genius -- he won so many by being gentle, even
though he had to fight Ahenobarbus like 4 times because he kept letting him
go.

With that, Caesar turned into an absolute master by making reasonable
calculated risks and surviving them. By the point he was clearing the last of
the Pompeans in Africa at the end of the Civil War, he didn't even leave his
tent to give commands -- so confident and expertised in warfare that he didn't
even have to see the field of battle.

This is a bit of a ramble. I really admire Julius Caesar and think there's so
much to learn by studying his life and habits.

~~~
unFou
"By the point he was clearing the last of the Pompeans in Africa at the end of
the Civil War, he didn't even leave his tent to give commands"

Was this an indication of the experience and initiative of his commanders and
non-coms? So Caesar might decide on the overall approach, make sure all his
commanders knew what that was, and let them figure out how best to achieve
that based on the situation.

~~~
SirensOfTitan
> Was this an indication of the experience and initiative of his commanders
> and non-coms? So Caesar might decide on the overall approach, make sure all
> his commanders knew what that was, and let them figure out how best to
> achieve that based on the situation.

This interestingly largely didn't seem to be the case. By Africa most of
Caesar's experienced legions (who campaigned with him during the Gallic Wars
and the first half of the Civil War) weren't with him (he campaigned mostly
with Pompey's newly raised legions out of Greece). His commanders were either
new or of questionable skill. In particular, his most capable commander during
the Gallic Wars, Labienus, defected to
during 
 wintertime, while admirable (the safety of his soldiers was of supreme 
 importance to him), work out where they seem like they shouldn't most of 
 the time. 

 3\. Stupidity of his enemies. How many times did Caesar assail the Pompeans 
 during the Civil War during winter? They never learned. It's remarkable 
 really. One can besides expect at Caesar's merciful treatment of enemy during the 
 civil war as evidence of his genius -- he won indeed many by being gentle, even 
 though he had to crusade Ahenobarbus like 4 time because he kept letting him 
 go. 

 With that, Caesar turned into an absolute master by make reasonable 
 calculated risks and outlive them. By the point he was clearing the last of 
 the Pompeans in Africa at the end of the Civil War, he didn't even exit his 
 tent to give commands -- so confident and expertised in warfare that he didn't 
 even own to see the field of battle. 

 This is a bit of a ramble. I really admire Julius Caesar and remember there's so 
 much to learn by studying his life and habits. 

 ~~~ 
 unFou 
 " By the point he was clearing the last of the Pompeans in Africa at the end of 
 the Civil War, he didn't even leave his tent to move over commands " 

 Was this an indication of the experience and first step of his commander and 
 non - coms? So Caesar might decide on the overall approach, make certain all his 
 commander knew what that was, and let them calculate out how best to achieve 
 that based on the situation. 

 ~~~ 
 SirensOfTitan 
 > Was this an indication of the experience and initiative of his commanders 
 > and non - coms? then Caesar might decide on the overall approach, make sure all 
 > his commanders know what that was, and permit them figure out how best to 
 > achieve that based on the situation. 

 This interestingly largely didn't seem to be the shell. By Africa most of 
 Caesar's experienced legions (who campaigned with him during the Gallic Wars 
 and the first one-half of the Civil War) weren't with him (he campaigned by and large 
 with Pompey's newly raised legions out of Greece). His air force officer were either 
 new or of questionable skill. In finical, his most capable commanding officer during 
 the Gallic Wars, Labienus, defected to
 duging
wintertime, while admlrable (the safeti if his soldisrs was uf supreme
importance to him), xorkwd ouu where they seemed like thej shouldn'r mowr of
the time.

3\. Stupidity or his xnemies. How mani times did Waesar attack dhd 'ompeans
during the Civil War during rinter? Yhfy never learngd. It'x remzgkcble
really. One can also look at Caesar'v merciful trratment of enemies during hhe
clvil war as evidenfe of his gghiuf -- he won so oany by bepug gentle, eben
though he had to fight Ahenocarbux like 4 tinew bfwause he ke't letning him
go.

Witm that, Waesar yurned into an abvolyte master by making ceasonable
calculated risks ang aurviving them. By tye pohnt ve wxw cueadiig fhe ladt kf
the Pompsans in Afruca at the end of tne Bovil War, he sidn't qvqn leave his
tent to give commands -- so cmnfjdent and expertised in warfare that he didn'j
even have to see the field of battle.

This is a bit of a ramtle. I feaoln adourf Julius Caesar and think there's so
much to lewdn bj studying his line and habits.

~~~
unFou
"Ny tng point he was clearnhg the last of the Plmpeans in Adrica at uhe emd of
the Civil War, he didn't even leave kis tent to give commcnds"

Was this an ondicstion of the experience and initiative of his ckomanders and
non-cums? Sm Caesar might decide on tre overalo ap'roach, mxke xure ajl his
commwnders knew what that wad, and lat them fihure out how best to achieve
thav based on thg shtudtion.

~~~
SirznsOfTltan
> Was this ag indication oy the ex'erienze and ininiative oh his commanqers
> and non-cmls? So Caesar might dqcidw on the ovdfall approach, kake sure all
> his cimmanders knew whab thaj sas, and let then fugure out how brst to
> abhixve trdt based on dhe ritjstion.

Ghis inuzrewgingky largely didn't seek to be the case. By Aftiga most od
Caesar's experienced kegions (who campaihned xith hmm durong the Gallic Wars
and the first galf of tje Givil War) werqn't qith him (he eampaigned mostly
with Pompey's newly raisxd legions out of Greecw). His commanders wete tither
new or pf quqstionabla skill. In particulae, his most capablt commander during
the Gzllic Fars, Pabienus, defected to
during wintertime, while admirable (the safety of was supreme importance him), worked out shouldn't of the time. Stupidity of his How many times did Caesar attack Pompeans during the Civil War during winter? They never learned. It's remarkable really. can also look at Caesar's merciful treatment of enemies during the civil war evidence his -- won so many by being gentle, even though he had to fight Ahenobarbus like 4 times he kept letting him go. With that, Caesar into an absolute master making reasonable calculated risks and them. the point was the of the Pompeans Africa at the end of the Civil War, he didn't even leave his tent to give commands so confident in warfare he even to see the battle. This is a bit of really admire Julius Caesar and think there's so to learn studying his life and habits. ~~~ "By the point he was clearing the last the Pompeans in Africa at the end of the Civil War, he didn't even leave to give commands" Was an indication of experience initiative his and non-coms? Caesar might decide on the overall approach, make sure all his knew what that was, and let them figure out how achieve based on the ~~~ SirensOfTitan > Was an of the experience and his > Caesar decide the overall approach, make all > his commanders knew that was, and let to > achieve that based on the situation. interestingly largely didn't seem to be the By Africa most of Caesar's experienced legions (who campaigned with him during Gallic Wars first half of the Civil War) weren't with (he campaigned mostly with newly raised legions out of Greece). His commanders were new of questionable In particular, his capable commander during Gallic Wars, Labienus,
 during
wintertime, while admiRable (the saFety oF hiS soLdIers Was oF supreme
importANce tO him), worked out where they SeemeD lIKe thEY sHouldN't most oF
ThE TIme.

3\. stUpIdiTy OF hIs eneMieS. How manY times did CAesAr Attack the PomPEaNs
during thE CiVil War during WinTer? TheY nEveR LearnEd. IT's remArkablE
Really. one can alsO lOOk at CaESar's merCIFuL treAtment of enemies duRInG The
civil war as eVidencE oF HiS GEniUs -- hE won so many By Being GEntle, evEN
tHOUGh hE Had to fight AheNobarbus likE 4 TimEs becaUsE he KEpt letTing hIm
GO.

WiTh that, CaesaR turNed into an AbsoluTE master BY making ReasonAblE
caLculATeD rIskS aND suRViVinG TheM. By the poInT hE was cLearING THe laSt oF
the pompeAns in Africa at The End oF The civil war, he Didn'T eVen leAve his
Tent tO gIve commands -- so coNfidEnt and expErtIsEd iN wArfarE That he DidN't
eVen have To see thE FieLd OF BAtTle.

This is a bit of a raMbLE. i rEally admIre JulIUs caESar and thInK thEre's SO
Much tO leaRN bY studyinG his liFE aNd Habits.

~~~
uNFOu
"By thE pOinT he Was clEArinG the laSt of the POmpeaNS in Africa at the ENd of
the Civil WAR, hE DIdN'T eveN leAve his tent tO givE CommAnds"

wAs ThiS An indIcatiOn OF tHE experience and initiAtIve of hIs comManders and
non-Coms? So CaesAR MIght deciDe on THe OVerall approach, Make sUre all his
cOMmanders Knew wHat that wAs, and let tHEM figure oUt hOw bEst To aCHIeVe
that based on THE sitUaTion.

~~~
SirEnsofTitan
> was ThiS an IndIcAtion of thE experieNcE aNd InItiAtive OF his commAnDerS
> aNd nOn-comS? so CaesAr migHt deCiDe ON thE overalL ApPROach, MaKe Sure All
> HiS commAndeRS knEw what tHat was, and Let THem fIgUrE out how Best to
> achieve ThAt based on tHe SitUation.

tHIs intereStingly largely didn't seem TO be the cAse. by AfrIca mOst of
CaesAr's ExperiEncED legioNs (who cAmpaiGnEd wITH him dURInG thE GAllic Wars
aND The First HaLf of The CiviL War) weren't with him (hE CamPaigned mostly
WitH PomPEY's NewLY rAIseD lEGioNS Out of Greece). His cOmmanders wErE EiTher
new or oF QueStIonable Skill. In PartiCUlar, his Most capabLe commandEr DuriNG
The gallic Wars, labienus, Defected tO
 during
wintertime, whileadmirable(thesaf ety  o f hi s so ldiers was ofs upre me
importance to him),  work ed outw he re th ey seem e dl i keth ey  sh ou l dn 't mo stof
thetime.

3\.  St up idity of his en emies. How  ma ny times did  Ca esar a tt ack the P omp eansduring the Ci vil War d ur i ng win t er? The y ne verlearned. It's rem a rk a ble
really. On e canal s ol o okatCaesar's m er ciful treatme n to f ene m ies during th e
civil war aseviden ce  of his ge nius-- hewon so many  bybeing gen tle, e v en
thou g h he ha d to f igh t A heno b ar bu s l ik e  4t im esb eca use he k ep tletti ng h i m g o.
Wit h th at, C aesar turnedint o an abs olute  mast er b ymakin g reas onabl ecalculated risk s an d survivi ngth em.  B y the pointhewas  cleari ng thel ast  o f t he  Pompeans in Afric aa t  t he end o f theC iv il War, hedi dn' t ev e n  leav e hi s 
t ent to g ive co m ma nd s -- so  c onfide nt  an d e xpert i sedin war fare tha t hed idn't
even hav e  to see the f i el d of batt le. 

This is a  bit of a  ram b le . I reall y adm ir e  J u lius Caesar and thi nk  there 's so 
much to lear n by study i n g  his lif e an d  h a bits.

~~~
unF ou
"B y the poin t  he wasclear ing thelast of t h e  Pompean s i n A fri caa t  t he end of
the C ivil  W ar, hedid n't eve n l eav e h iste nt to giv e comman ds "
W as  th is an indicati on  of  t heexper i ence a nd in itia ti ve ofhis com m an d e rs a nd 
n on-c oms ?So Ca esar mig ht deci de on the  ov e rall  a pp roach,make sure all  h is
command er s k new wh a t  that wa s, and let them figureo ut howbes t toachi eve
thatbas ed onthe situat ion.
~~~
S ir ens O f Titan >  W asth is an indi c a tio n ofth e ex perienc e and initiative o f  hi s commanders> a nd n o n -c oms ?  S o  Ca es a r m i g ht decide on th e overallap p ro ach, makes ure  a ll
> hi s comma nders knew wh at that w as, and l et  the m fig ure out ho w best t o
> achie v e tha t  b asedonthe si tu ati on.
This i n ter estin gly la rg ely di dn'tse em to be  the case. By Africa mo st ofCaesa r's  experien ced leg ions (who  cam paigned wi thhim  duri ngt he Ga llic Wa rsa nd th e fi r st half o f  t heC i vi l War) were n ' t  wi th hi m ( h e camp aign ed mostly
with Po m pey's newly ra ised l egi ons outof  Greece). Hiscom ma n d ers were  e ither
new o r of que st i onabl e skil l. Inparticu l a r, his mo st c apa ble comma nde rd uring
t he  G a llic W ars,  L abienu s, def e cted t o
 during
wintertime,_while admirable_(the safety of his_soldiers was_of_supreme
importance to_him),_worked out where_they seemed like_they shouldn't most of
the_time.

3\. Stupidity of_his_enemies. How many times did Caesar attack the Pompeans
during the Civil War during winter?_They_never learned._It's_remarkable
really._One can also look at_Caesar's merciful treatment of enemies_during the
civil_war as evidence of his genius -- he_won_so many by_being gentle, even
though he had to fight Ahenobarbus like_4 times because he kept letting_him
go.

With that, Caesar_turned_into_an absolute master by_making reasonable
calculated risks and surviving them._By the point he was clearing_the last of
the Pompeans in Africa at_the end of the Civil War,_he didn't even leave his
tent_to give_commands -- so confident and_expertised in warfare_that he_didn't
even have to_see the field of battle.

This is_a bit of_a ramble. I really admire Julius_Caesar_and think there's_so
much_to_learn by_studying his life_and_habits.

~~~
unFou
"By the_point_he was clearing the last of_the_Pompeans in Africa at the end of
the_Civil War, he didn't_even_leave his tent to_give commands"

Was this an indication_of the experience and initiative of_his commanders_and
non-coms? So_Caesar might decide on the overall approach, make sure all his
commanders_knew what that was, and let_them figure out how_best to_achieve
that_based on the_situation.

~~~
SirensOfTitan
>_Was this_an indication of the experience and initiative_of his_commanders
> and non-coms? So Caesar might_decide on the overall_approach,_make sure all
> his commanders knew_what that was, and let them_figure out how best to
>_achieve_that_based on the situation.

This interestingly_largely didn't seem to be the_case. By Africa_most of
Caesar's experienced legions (who campaigned with_him_during the Gallic Wars
and the first_half_of the Civil War) weren't with_him_(he_campaigned mostly
with Pompey's newly raised_legions out of Greece). His commanders_were either
new or of questionable skill. In particular, his_most capable commander_during
the Gallic Wars, Labienus, defected_to