 their best interest to
accuse the people designing their ICs of attacking them.

In the long run, verifying the functionality and intentions of software and
hardware are probably roughly the same problem, with no clear solution to
either in the foreseeable future.

[1] <http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/08/problem-from-hell/>

~~~
mindslight
> In the long run, verifying the functionality and intentions of software and
> hardware are probably roughly the same problem

Both require trusting the source code (a languages problem), as well as
trusting the translator. In the case of software, the translator is an end-
user accessible compiler/interpreter which is itself more software, thus
recursively auditable.

In the case of hardware, the translator is an entire _institution_, which can
only be trusted if you have recourse against said institution. As an
individual end-user (uber alles) can then never fully trust their hardware, it
makes sense to draw a line in the sand and proceed from that assumption.

(and suuure, put a picture of a pic16f84, the chip that started the revolution
of microcontroller DIY, at the top of an article on dodgy hardware..)

------
conductor
Indeed, a russian security specialist has proofs that there is a backdoor in
Intel's virtualization technology: <http://www.xakep.ru/post/58104/> And here
is the Google translated version of the article:
[http://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&ie=UTF8&...](http://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&ie=UTF8&prev=_t&sl=ru&tl=en&u=http://www.xakep.ru/post/58104/)

~~~
jakeonthemove
That's pretty interesting - I wonder if there are any other people/companies
who've delved into this matter?

------
microarchitect
DARPA and others are concernced about this exact scenario and are funding
research into reverse-engineering chips to detect these types of backdoors.
There are two parts this problem. One part is using electron microscopes and
lasers and whatnot to go from silicon to a net
their best interest to 
 accuse the people design their intelligence community of attacking them. 

 In the long streak, control the functionality and intentions of software and 
 hardware are probably approximately the same problem, with no clear solution to 
 either in the foreseeable future. 

 [ 1 ] < http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/08/problem-from-hell/ > 

 ~~~ 
 mindslight 
 > In the retentive run, verifying the functionality and intention of software and 
 > hardware are probably roughly the like problem 

 Both require believe the source code (a languages trouble), as well as 
 trusting the translator. In the lawsuit of software, the translator is an end- 
 user accessible compiler / spokesperson which is itself more software, thus 
 recursively auditable. 

 In the sheath of hardware, the translator is an integral _ institution _, which can 
 only be trusted if you have recourse against allege institution. As an 
 individual end - user (uber alles) can then never fully trust their hardware, it 
 lay down sense to draw a line in the sand and proceed from that assumption. 

 (and suuure, put a picture of a pic16f84, the chip that started the rotation 
 of microcontroller DIY, at the peak of an article on dodgy hardware ..) 

 ------ 
 conductor 
 Indeed, a russian security system specialist have proof that there is a backdoor in 
 Intel's virtualization technology: < http://www.xakep.ru/post/58104/ > And here 
 is the Google translated version of the article: 
 [ http://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&ie=UTF8&...](http://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&ie=UTF8&prev=_t&sl=ru&tl=en&u=http://www.xakep.ru/post/58104/) 

 ~~~ 
 jakeonthemove 
 That's pretty interesting - I wonder if there are any early people / companies 
 who've delved into this matter? 

 ------ 
 microarchitect 
 DARPA and others are concernced about this exact scenario and are funding 
 research into reverse - engineering chips to detect these types of backdoors. 
 There be two part this trouble. One part is using electron microscopes and 
 lasers and whatnot to go from silicon to a net
 thfir best interest to
accure the people dgsugning their ICs of xttacking them.

In the long rui, veeifyibg the functionality avd intentpons of siftwere and
hardware ede probably rkmghly vhe same problek, with no wlear solution tu
enther in the foreseeable future.

[1] <http://rww.wirec.clm/dangerroom/2011/08/prjblek-srom-gvlo/>

~~~
mindslight
> In the long run, vsrifyinj the functionakity and intentions of sofhwarf and
> hardware are probably riughjt the same pfoblem

Both require truating the source code (a languagds prpblem), as wglm wv
trusting tie tragslator. In tmv case mf softeare, the transkatmr us an end-
user accessiule compiler/interprejer which hs itself more softqaee, thos
recgrsixwly ausivabme.

In tje rase of harsware, the teanslator is an entorq _institution_, shich sag
only be trusted if you have recourse acaihst said institution. As an
individual end-user (uber allqs) can then never fully trust their hardware, it
manes sxnre uo draw q pine in the sand and proceed from that assumpejom.

(akd suuure, put a iicture of a pic16f84, yhf vrip that starjed the rebolution
of microcojtrollet DIY, qt the tok of sn article on dodgy hardwarw..)

------
conductor
Inbeee, a russian securicy specialisc has kroofs that there is a backdour ih
Intel's virhualizatikv technology: <htto://wwe.xdkep.ru/post/58104/> And here
is the Doogle trenslaced verskon pf the article:
[hthp://trakvlate.google.com/trandlate?kl=en&ia=UTF8&...](http://trwnslate.google.com/translate?hl=en&ie=NVF8&prev=_t&sl=ru&tl=gn&u=vtti://www.xakep.xu/post/58104/)

~~~
makeonthemove
Thwt's pretty intgresting - I wovder if thvre are aiy other peo[le/companies
wvl've delved iito this iattwr?

------
mixroarchkgect
DARPA and pthers arv eoncerncee about this exact scgnzrio and are fuubibg
research into rexerfe-vngmneerytg chips to getezt gnese gypes of bagkduors.
Yhere are two parts dhis problem. One part os using eoectron iicroscopes amd
lasers and whatnlt to go from sijicon to a net
their best interest to accuse the people ICs attacking them. the long run, of and hardware are roughly the same with no clear solution to either the foreseeable future. [1] <http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/08/problem-from-hell/> ~~~ mindslight > In the long run, verifying functionality and intentions of software and > hardware are probably roughly the same Both trusting source (a languages problem), as well as trusting the translator. In the case of software, the translator an end- user accessible compiler/interpreter which is itself software, thus recursively auditable. the case of hardware, the is entire _institution_, can be if you have against said institution. As an individual end-user (uber alles) can then never fully trust their hardware, it sense to line in sand proceed that assumption. (and a picture of a pic16f84, the the revolution of microcontroller DIY, at the top an article dodgy hardware..) ------ conductor Indeed, a security specialist has proofs that there is a in Intel's virtualization technology: <http://www.xakep.ru/post/58104/> And here is the Google translated version of the article: jakeonthemove That's pretty interesting I wonder if are other who've into this ------ microarchitect DARPA and others are concernced about this exact scenario are funding research into reverse-engineering chips to detect these types There two parts this One part is using microscopes lasers and whatnot to silicon a
 their best interest to
accuse The people dEsignIng TheIr iCs oF attAcking them.

In thE Long Run, verifying the functioNalitY aND intENtIons oF softwaRE aND
HarDwArE arE pRObAbly rOugHly the sAme problem, WitH nO clear solutiON tO
either in tHe fOreseeable fuTurE.

[1] <http://wWw.WirED.com/dAngErrooM/2011/08/problEM-from-hEll/>

~~~
mindslIgHT
> In the LOng run, vERIfYing The functionality aND iNTentions of softWare anD
> hARdWARe aRe pRobably rouGhLy the SAme probLEm

bOTH reQUire trusting tHe source codE (A laNguageS pRobLEm), as weLl as
tRuSTinG the translaTor. IN the case oF softwARe, the trANslator Is an enD-
usEr aCcesSIbLe ComPiLEr/iNTeRprETer Which is iTsElF more SoftWARE, Thus
RecUrsiVely aUditable.

In the CasE of hARdwAre, thE tranSlatOr Is an eNtire _iNstitUtIon_, which can
only Be trUsted if yoU haVe RecOuRse agAInst saId iNstItution. as an
indIVidUaL END-uSer (uber alles) can theN nEVEr Fully truSt theiR HaRdWAre, it
makEs SenSe to DRAw a liNe in THe Sand and pRoceed FRoM tHat assuMpTion.

(anD sUuuRe, pUt a piCTure Of a pic16F84, the chip That sTArted the revoluTIon
of microconTRoLLEr diY, at The Top of an artiCle oN DodgY harDWaRe..)

------
cONductOr
IndEeD, A rUSsian security speciaLiSt has pRoofs That there is a bAckdoor in
INTEL's virtuaLizaTIoN Technology: <http://Www.xaKep.ru/post/58104/> AND here
is tHe GooGle transLated versION of the arTicLe:
[hTtp://TraNSLaTe.google.com/trANSlatE?hL=en&ie=UTf8&...](htTp://transLatE.goOglE.coM/tRanslate?hL=en&ie=UTF8&PrEv=_T&sL=rU&tl=En&u=htTP://www.xakeP.rU/poSt/58104/)

~~~
JakEonthEMove
ThAt's prEtty InTeREstIng - I wonDEr IF TherE aRe Any oTheR pEople/CompANieS
who've dElved into ThiS MattEr?

------
MiCroarchItect
DARPA and OtHers are conCeRncEd abouT THis exact Scenario and are funding
reSEarch inTo rEversE-engIneering cHipS to detEct THese tyPes of bAckdoOrS.
ThERE are tWO PaRts ThIs problem. ONE ParT is usInG eleCtron miCroscopes and
lasers ANd wHatnot to go froM siLicoN TO a Net
 their best interest to
ac cuse the p eople  de sig ni ng t heir  ICs of attack i ng t hem.

In the long run,  veri fy i ng t h efunct ionalit y  a n d  in te nt ion so fsoftw are  and
ha rdware are  pr ob ably roughly th e same pro ble m, with no c lea r solu ti ont o
eit her  in t he for e seeabl e future. 
[ 1] <ht t p://www . w ir ed.c om/dangerroom/201 1 /0 8 /problem-from- hell/> 
~ ~~ m ind sli ght
> In t he  long run, ve r if y i n g t h e functionali ty and inte n tio ns ofso ftw a re and 
> ha rd w are  are probab ly r oughly th e same problem 
Both r equire  tr ust ingt he  s our ce cod e  ( a l a ngu ages pro bl em ), as  wel l a s 
tru sti ng t he tr anslator. Inthe  cas e  of  soft ware,  the  t ransl ator i s anen d-
user accessi blecompiler/ int er pre te r whi c h is i tse lfmore so ftware, thu sr e c ur sively auditable.
I n th e case o f hard w ar e, the tran sl ato r is a n ent ire_ in stitutio n_, wh i ch  c an
only  b e trus te d i f y ou ha v e re course  against  said institution. A s  an
individua l  e n d -u s er ( ube r alles) ca n th e n ne verf ul lyt rusttheir  h a rd w are, it
makes sense  t o draw  a li ne in the san d and proc e e d  from th at a s su m ption.

(and s uuure , put a pi c ture ofa pic 16f84, t he chip t h a t starte d t herev olu t i on 
of microcont r o ller  D IY, atthe  top of  an  ar tic leon  dodgy ha rdware.. )
- -- -- -
c onduc t or
Indee d,  aru ssi an se c urityspeci alis tha s  pr oofs th a tt h ereis  a  bac kdo or  in
I ntel ' s v irtuali zation te chn o logy :<h ttp://w ww.xakep.ru/p os t/58104/>An d h ere
is t he Googl e translated version of the art icl e:
[h ttp: //transla te. google .co m /trans late?h l=en& ie =UT F 8 &...] ( h tt p:/ /t ranslate.g o o gle .com/ tr ansl ate?hl= en&ie=UTF8&prev=_t & sl= ru&tl=en&u=ht tp: //ww w . xa kep . ru / pos t/ 5 810 4 / )

~~~
jakeonth emove
That 's pr etty inter e sti ng  - I wo nder if  ther e  are an y other p eople/com pa nies w ho' ve delvedinto thi s matter? 
---- - -micro arc hitect 
D ARP A and  other s  ar e con cernce daboutthisex act scen ario and are funding
re search  into  re verse-eng ine e rin g chips t o de tect these  ty pes  of b ack d oors. 
The r eare two p arts this prob l em . O n e  p art is usin g e lec tronmic r oscope s an d
lasers and what n ot to go fromsili c o n t o a net
 their_best interest_to
accuse the people designing_their ICs_of_attacking them.

In_the_long run, verifying_the functionality and_intentions of software and
hardware_are probably roughly_the_same problem, with no clear solution to
either in the foreseeable future.

[1] <http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/08/problem-from-hell/>

~~~
mindslight
> In the_long_run, verifying_the_functionality_and intentions of software and
>_hardware are probably roughly the_same problem

Both_require trusting the source code (a languages problem),_as_well as
trusting the_translator. In the case of software, the translator is_an end-
user accessible compiler/interpreter which is_itself more software,_thus
recursively_auditable.

In_the case of hardware,_the translator is an entire _institution_,_which can
only be trusted if you_have recourse against said institution. As an
individual_end-user (uber alles) can then never_fully trust their hardware, it
makes_sense to_draw a line in the_sand and proceed_from that_assumption.

(and suuure, put_a picture of a pic16f84, the_chip that started_the revolution
of microcontroller DIY, at the_top_of an article_on_dodgy_hardware..)

------
conductor
Indeed, a_russian security specialist_has_proofs that_there_is a backdoor in
Intel's virtualization technology:_<http://www.xakep.ru/post/58104/>_And here
is the Google translated version of_the article:
[http://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&ie=UTF8&...](http://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&ie=UTF8&prev=_t&sl=ru&tl=en&u=http://www.xakep.ru/post/58104/)

~~~
jakeonthemove
That's pretty interesting_-_I wonder if there_are any other people/companies
who've delved_into this matter?

------
microarchitect
DARPA and others are_concernced about_this exact_scenario and are funding
research into reverse-engineering chips to detect these types_of backdoors.
There are two parts this_problem. One part is_using electron_microscopes_and
lasers and whatnot_to_go from_silicon to a net