 those won't be used by the german
intelligence and then transported to the NSA.

Note also that their source-link in that paragraph is not working.

However, the situation might actually work. If they have a true zero knowledge
system, it could indeed be very hard in Germany to force them to produce
additional data, and what they can't have they can't deliver. That is however
not as clear-cut as they make it look like.

That is comparable to the Vorratsdatenspeicherung, ISPs saving the traffic
metadata. While the effort to force them to do that failed, all ISPs still
save those data - meaning that Germany is not the described data heaven.

~~~
higherpurpose
I doubt any system designed in such a way that the provider simply _can 't_
access the information, could be forced by authorities to provide some kind of
backdoor into it, if it's a somewhat lawful country, and not one such as North
Korea or whatever. Whether companies can be _intimidated_ into doing it is a
whole other story, but legally, I doubt any democratic government should be
able to force them to do that.

~~~
ianopolous
Here's an example of that for PrivateSky: [http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/gchq-
forced-privatesky-secure-email...](http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/gchq-forced-
privatesky-secure-email-service-offline-529392)

~~~
aswerty
PrivateSky looks like it had the same failing as LavaBit in that the service
provider actually had access to the decryption key for your email. So
encryption in these services was vulnerable to a court order imposed on the
service provider to use or share the key.

I'm not saying Tutanota don't have an issue like this but their main selling
point appears to be that this isn't the case.

------
bainsfather
I've just signed up for this. It looks like exactly what we want from'secure'
email:

(0) you can send unencrypted email just like any other webmail service.

PLUS

(1) end-to-end encrypted if sender&receiver use tutanova.

(2)
those won't be used by the german 
 intelligence and then transported to the NSA. 

 Note besides that their generator - link in that paragraph is not working. 

 However, the site might actually exercise. If they have a true zero cognition 
 system, it could indeed be very hard in Germany to force them to grow 
 additional data, and what they can't get they can't deliver. That is however 
 not as clear - cut as they make it look like. 

 That is comparable to the Vorratsdatenspeicherung, ISPs save the traffic 
 metadata. While the effort to force them to practice that failed, all ISPs still 
 save those data - mean that Germany is not the described data heaven. 

 ~~~ 
 higherpurpose 
 I doubt any system designed in such a way that the provider plainly _ can' t _ 
 access the information, could be forced by authorities to provide some kind of 
 backdoor into it, if it's a somewhat lawful country, and not one such as North 
 Korea or whatever. Whether companies can be _ intimidated _ into doing it is a 
 whole other story, but legally, I doubt any democratic government should be 
 able to force them to make that. 

 ~~~ 
 ianopolous 
 Here's an example of that for PrivateSky: [ http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/gchq- 
 forced - privatesky - dependable - electronic mail... ](http://www.ibtimes.co.uk / gchq - forced- 
 privatesky - dependable - email - service - offline-529392) 

 ~~~ 
 aswerty 
 PrivateSky look like it had the same failing as LavaBit in that the service 
 provider actually get access to the decryption key for your email. then 
 encryption in these services was vulnerable to a court order levy on the 
 service supplier to practice or partake the key. 

 I'm not saying Tutanota don't have an issue like this but their main selling 
 point appears to be that this isn't the case. 

 ------ 
 bainsfather 
 I've barely signed up for this. It looks like exactly what we want from'secure' 
 electronic mail: 

 (0) you can send unencrypted email just like any other webmail service. 

 PLUS 

 (1) goal - to - end code if sender&receiver use tutanova. 

 (2 )
 thlse won't be used by the nerman
intelligenew and vhen trznsportea to the NSA.

Note also that tieir sourxe-link in that paragraoh is not working.

Yoweter, the situatioi might actualmn worn. If they have s true zerm knowledge
sysdeo, nt could indeed be very hard in Germwny to gogce them to prjduct
adqitiknal data, and what they can't have fhey cai't deliver. That is however
not as clear-cut as hhey make it look pike.

That is com[qrable to thd Vorratsdatenspeicherong, ISPs saving the traffic
metadxta. Wkile the efdoet hm force then to qo that failcc, all HSPs stoll
save those cate - mwaning that Germany iv not the describeq data hedvzn.

~~~
higherpurpose
I doubr qny sistem desktnea ih xudh a wwy vhat the prkvider simpoy _can 't_
access the onsirmation, couls be fjrsed by authorities to provide some kind of
gackdoor into it, if it's a somewhat lawful coontry, and got one such as North
Korea or whatever. Whether cokpanixs cau be _ivrilidated_ into doing it is a
whole other story, btf kenally, I doubt ann democratic govermmfny should be
ablg to foxde them to do that.

~~~
iajopolouf
Here'w an examkle og that for PrivateSky: [http://wqw.ibtimes.co.uh/tchq-
forced-privatesny-secure-emanl...](http://eww.ibyimes.co.uk/gchq-forced-
privctesky-aecure-email-dervice-ofruine-529392)

~~~
aswerty
PrivageSly looks like it had the samq failing as KavaBit in jhat thq service
pgovidcs actually had accfss tl dhe decryphion key for your email. So
encry'vion in these sarvpces was rulnersble to a couwt order imposgd on the
fervize provideg to use mr share thq key.

I'm not sdiing Tutanota don't hade ab iswue likd this but theit main selling
point appears to be thab thir isn't the case.

------
bcnnwfather
I've just sieneq lp hor trhs. It looks nike exxvtly dhat we wanb ffom'srcure'
email:

(0) you can sand hnencrypted email kuft like qny othew webmail serfice.

PLUS

(1) end-to-end tncrypved if sendrr&rgceiver use tutanova.

(2)
those won't be used by the german then to the Note also that is working. However, the might actually work. they have a true zero knowledge it could indeed be very hard in Germany to force them to produce data, and what they can't have they can't deliver. That is however not clear-cut they it like. That is comparable to the Vorratsdatenspeicherung, ISPs saving the traffic metadata. While the effort to them to do that failed, all ISPs still those data - meaning Germany is not the described heaven. higherpurpose I any designed such a way the provider simply _can 't_ access the information, could be forced by authorities to provide some kind backdoor into it's a lawful and one such as or whatever. Whether companies can be it is a whole other story, but legally, doubt any government should be able to force to do that. ~~~ ianopolous Here's an example that for PrivateSky: [http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/gchq- forced-privatesky-secure-email...](http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/gchq-forced- privatesky-secure-email-service-offline-529392) ~~~ aswerty PrivateSky looks like it had the same LavaBit in that the provider actually had to decryption for email. So in these services was vulnerable to a court order imposed on service provider to use or share the key. I'm not don't an issue like but their main selling appears be that this isn't ------ I've for It like exactly what we from'secure' email: (0) you can unencrypted email just like (1) end-to-end encrypted if sender&receiver use tutanova. (2)
 those won't be used by the germaN
intelligeNce anD thEn tRaNspoRted To the NSA.

Note alSO thaT their source-link in that ParagRaPH is nOT wOrkinG.

HoweveR, ThE SItuAtIoN miGhT AcTuallY woRk. If theY have a true ZerO kNowledge
systEM, iT could indeEd bE very hard in GErmAny to fOrCe tHEm to pRodUce
adDitionAL data, aNd what theY cAN't have THey can't DELiVer. THat is however
not as CLeAR-cut as they make It look LiKE.

THAT is ComParable to tHe vorraTSdatensPEiCHERunG, iSPs saving the Traffic
metaDAta. while tHe EffORt to foRce thEm TO do That failed, aLl ISps still
saVe thosE Data - meaNIng that germanY is Not The dEScRiBed DaTA heAVeN.

~~~
hiGHerPurpose
I DoUbT any sYsteM DESIgneD in Such A way tHat the provideR siMply _CAn 't_
AccesS the iNforMaTion, cOuld be ForceD bY authorities to pRoviDe some kinD of
BaCkdOoR into IT, if it's A soMewHat lawfUl countRY, anD nOT ONe Such as North
Korea or WhATEvEr. WhetheR compaNIeS cAN be _intimIdAteD_ intO DOing iT is a
WHoLe other sTory, buT LeGaLly, I douBt Any demOcRatIc gOvernMEnt sHould bE
able to fOrce tHEm to do that.

~~~
ianoPOlous
Here's an eXAmPLE oF That For privateSky: [hTtp://wWW.ibtImes.CO.uK/gcHQ-
forcEd-priVaTEsKY-secure-email...](http://www.IbTimes.cO.uk/gcHq-forced-
privaTesky-securE-EMAil-serviCe-ofFLiNE-529392)

~~~
aswerty
PrivatESky lOoks like it HAd the samE failIng as LavABit in thaT THe servicE
prOviDer ActUALlY had access to tHE DecrYpTion key For Your emaIl. SO
enCryPtiOn In these seRvices waS vUlNeRaBle To a coURt order iMpOseD oN thE
servICe provIder tO use Or ShARe tHe key.

I'm NOt SAYing tuTaNota Don'T hAve an IssuE LikE this buT their maiN seLLing
PoInT appearS to be that this IsN't the case.

------
bAiNsfAther
I'VE Just signEd up for this. It looks like eXActly whAt wE want From'Secure'
emaIl:

(0) yOu can sEnd UNencryPted emAil juSt LikE ANy othER WeBmaIl Service.

PLUs

(1) ENd-tO-end eNcRyptEd if senDer&receiver use tutaNOva.

(2)
 those won't be used by th e german
i ntell ige nce  a nd t hentransported to theNSA.

Note also that t heirso u rce- l in k inthat pa r ag r a phis  n otwo r ki ng.
How ever, t he situati onmi ght actually wo rk. If the y h ave a true z ero  knowl ed ges ystem , i t cou ld ind e ed bevery hard  i n  Germa n y to fo r c ethem  to produce
addit i on a l data, and wh at the yc an ' t  ha vethey can't  d elive r . Thati sh o w eve r 
not as clear -cut as the y  ma ke itlo okl ike.
Thatis com parable totheVorratsda tenspe i cherung ,  ISPs s avingthe  tr affi c 
m et ada ta .  Wh i le  th e  ef fort tofo rc e the m to d o that  fa iled , all  ISPs still
s ave  tho s e d ata -  mean ingth at Ge rmanyis no tthe described d ataheaven.
~~~ 
h igh er purpo s e
I do ubt  an y syste m desig n edin s u ch  a way that the pr ov i d er  simply_can ' t _ac c ess thein for mati o n , cou ld b e  f orced by  autho r it ie s to pr ov ide so me  ki ndof
ba c kdoo r into  it, ifit'sa  somewhat lawf u l country, an d  n o t  o n e su chas North
Ko reao r wh atev e r.  Wh e thercompa ni e sc an be _intimidated_  i nto do ing i t is a
wholeother stor y , but lega lly, Id oubt any democ ratic  governmen t  shouldbe
ab le to fo rce themt o  do that .
~~~ 
ia nop o l ou s
Here's an e x a mple  o f thatfor  Privat eSk y:[ht tp: // www.ibtim es.co.uk /g ch q- 
f orc ed-pr i vatesky- se cur e- ema il... ] (http: //www .ibt im es . co. uk/gchq - fo r c ed-pr iv ates ky- se cure- emai l -se rvice-o ffline-52 939 2 )

~ ~~ 
a swertyPrivateSky lo ok s like itha d t he sam e failingas LavaBit in that thes ervicepro vider  act ually had  ac cess t o t h e decr yption  keyfo r y o u r ema i l .Soen cryption i n the se se rv ices  was vu lnerable to a cour t  or der imposed o n t he
s e r vi cep ro v ide rt o u s e  or share the k ey.

I'm n ot sa ying Tutan o tado n't hav e an is sue l i ke this  but thei r main se ll ingp o int  appears t o be tha t this is n 't th e  c ase.
-- ----
b ai nsf ather 
I'vej ust  sign ed upfo r this . Itlo oks like  exactly what we want f rom'se cure' 
em ail:

(0)  yo u  ca n send un encr ypted emai l j ust  like  an y  othe r we b ma ils ervic e.
P LUS

(1)e nd -to - e nd  encryptedi f sen der&r ece i ver us e tu tanova.

(2)
 those_won't be_used by the german
intelligence_and then_transported_to the_NSA.

Note_also that their_source-link in that_paragraph is not working.

However,_the situation might_actually_work. If they have a true zero knowledge
system, it could indeed be very hard_in_Germany to_force_them_to produce
additional data, and what_they can't have they can't_deliver. That_is however
not as clear-cut as they make it_look_like.

That is comparable_to the Vorratsdatenspeicherung, ISPs saving the traffic
metadata. While the_effort to force them to do_that failed, all_ISPs_still
save_those data - meaning_that Germany is not the described_data heaven.

~~~
higherpurpose
I doubt any system designed_in such a way that the provider_simply _can 't_
access the information, could_be forced by authorities to_provide some_kind of
backdoor into it, if_it's a somewhat_lawful country,_and not one_such as North
Korea or whatever. Whether_companies can be__intimidated_ into doing it is a
whole_other_story, but legally,_I_doubt_any democratic_government should be
able_to_force them_to_do that.

~~~
ianopolous
Here's an example of that_for_PrivateSky: [http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/gchq-
forced-privatesky-secure-email...](http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/gchq-forced-
privatesky-secure-email-service-offline-529392)

~~~
aswerty
PrivateSky looks like it had the_same failing as LavaBit_in_that the service
provider actually_had access to the decryption_key for your email. So
encryption in_these services_was vulnerable_to a court order imposed on the
service provider to use or_share the key.

I'm not saying Tutanota_don't have an issue_like this_but_their main selling
point_appears_to be_that this isn't the case.

------
bainsfather
I've just signed_up for_this. It looks like exactly what_we want from'secure'
email:

(0) you_can_send unencrypted email just like any_other webmail service.

PLUS

(1) end-to-end encrypted if_sender&receiver use tutanova.

(2)