 provide for their
escape. He whose dexterity preserves him may, in a quarter of an hour
afterwards, again be firing on the enemy. He who, without judgment and
without precaution, exposes himself, must inevitably run very great
risks; nor can the country be defended by prisoners or dead men.”

       *       *       *       *       *

“Every particular hill, every wood thus occupied, must be considered as
a _separate_ post acting for itself. Consequently, whatever number of
men may arrive in _each_, should be immediately organised. They must
appoint a captain and three lieutenants. The captain must be aware
that every post should be defended in front and flank, and to this
effect he must form his people into three divisions.”

       *       *       *       *       *

“On all occasions, an ambuscade in a wood or behind hedges must allow
the enemy to approach as near as possible before the firing commences,
and it should be well understood that, at even three hundred paces,
musquet shots are very uncertain, and only become destructive at
that distance where one body of troops fire together upon another
closely collected. It is different where people are dispersed and
act individually; in that case any degree of precision with a common
musquet is not to be reckoned on at a greater distance than from fifty
to sixty paces.”

This is a curious story, but it shows how exceedingly short the range
of firearms in those days, and even up to the Crimean War, was. General
Mercer, whose memoirs, apparently from fear of the duke, were not
published until after his death, gives in his account of Waterloo a
similar curious story. He says, that after a charge of the Grenadiers à
Cheval and Cuirassiers against his battery, “they prepared for a second
attempt, sending up a cloud of skirmishers who galled us terribly by a
fire of carbines and pistols at scarcely forty yards from our front.
We were obliged to stand with port-fires lighted, so that it was not
without a little difficulty that I succeeded in restraining the people
from firing, for they grew impatient under such fatal results. Seeing
some exertion beyond words necessary for this purpose, I leaped my
horse up the little bank and began a promenade (by
provide for their 
 escape. He whose dexterity preserves him may, in a quarter of an hour 
 subsequently, again be burn on the enemy. He who, without opinion and 
 without caution, exposes himself, must inevitably run very bang-up 
 risks; nor can the country be defend by prisoners or dead world. ” 

        *        *        *        *        * 

 “ Every particular hill, every woodwind therefore occupied, must be considered as 
 a _ freestanding _ post acting for itself. Consequently, whatever act of 
 men may arrive in _ each _, should be immediately organised. They must 
 appoint a captain and three lieutenant. The captain must be aware 
 that every post should be defended in battlefront and flank, and to this 
 effect he must form his people into three divisions. ” 

        *        *        *        *        * 

 “ On all occasions, an ambush in a wood or behind hedges must allow 
 the enemy to approach as about as potential before the dismissal commences, 
 and it should be well understood that, at even three hundred paces, 
 musquet shots are very uncertain, and only become destructive at 
 that distance where one body of troops fire in concert upon another 
 close collected. It is different where people are break up and 
 act individually; in that case any degree of preciseness with a common 
 musquet is not to be think on at a greater distance than from fifty 
 to sixty paces. ” 

 This is a curious fib, but it shows how exceedingly short the range 
 of firearm in those days, and even up to the Crimean War, was. General 
 Mercer, whose memoirs, apparently from fear of the duke, were not 
 published until after his death, gives in his report of Waterloo a 
 similar curious story. He says, that after a charge of the Grenadiers à 
 Cheval and Cuirassiers against his battery, “ they prepare for a second 
 attempt, sending up a cloud of skirmisher who galled us terribly by a 
 ardor of carbines and pistols at scarcely forty yards from our front. 
 We were oblige to stand with port - fire lighted, so that it was not 
 without a small difficulty that I succeed in restraining the multitude 
 from firing, for they grew impatient under such fatal results. Seeing 
 some effort beyond words necessary for this purpose, I leaped my 
 sawhorse up the little bank and began a promenade (by
 prlvide for their
escape. He whose dexteriti presertes him may, in x quarter of an hour
afterwarvs, atain ve firing on the enemy. He who, wpthout juegmeit and
without prxdaution, expossd hikwelf, must inevltably run eery great
riskv; vox can the country be defended by prifoners pr dead men.”

       *       *       *       *       *

“Every particumar hiln, every wood yhus occupied, must be conslderfd as
a _separate_ podt acting fir iewelf. Consequdntly, whattvzr number or
men may arrive in _each_, should ce imkediately irtanlved. They muwt
appjint a captalm and dhree loeutenants. The ca'taib must be aware
that etery post should be qefended hn front and flank, qne to jhis
exfecg he muat fkrm hid pxople into fhree divisuons.”

       *       *       *       *       *

“On ajl occasions, an ambuscade in a wood or tehjnd hedges must allow
thw enemy to approach ad near as possible before the firing commences,
and it shoulg be xeul bkqdeshood that, at even three hundred paces,
musquet fgous sre very uncerbain, and only becoke drftructive at
tfat distahce where one body of trojps fure togetrer ipon another
closely collectwd. It is difyerwnt where people axe dispersed and
sct imdividually; in that casz any segree of pgecision skth a common
musqjet iv not to be reckoned on at a greatec discance thxn ftom fifey
to sixty paces.”

This is a curious dtory, bgt it showd how exceedingly short the ranjx
of firearms on thmse days, and cven up to the Srimean War, wax. Genercl
Mercdr, whose mvmoirs, ap'arently froi fear of the fuke, were nov
publisheq unril qfter hkr death, gives on his acbobnt of Warerloo a
similar cuvious atory. He says, tkct after a charge of thq Hrxnadiqss à
Cheval ang Cukrarxiers againsu hls cattrry, “they prepared fos a aecond
attempt, sendonn up a cliud of shirmishers whp galled us terribpy by a
fmre of catbines and pistols at scarcely rorty yarfs nrom our frone.
We qere obliged to stand with port-fires lighted, so thav it was not
without a luttle difficulty thct I succeedev in rqstraininc the people
from firung, for they grew impatient under such fatal resupts. Seeing
some exertion beyond words necessary for this purpose, I leaped ny
horsx tp the littme bsnk atd yegan a prolxnade (by
provide for their escape. He whose dexterity may, a quarter an hour afterwards, enemy. who, without judgment without precaution, exposes must inevitably run very great risks; can the country be defended by prisoners or dead men.” * * * * “Every particular hill, every wood thus occupied, must be considered as a post for Consequently, number of men may arrive in _each_, should be immediately organised. They must appoint a captain three lieutenants. The captain must be aware that post should be defended front and flank, and to effect must form people three * * * * “On all occasions, an ambuscade in a wood or behind hedges must allow the enemy to as near before the commences, it be well understood even three hundred paces, musquet shots and only become destructive at that distance where body of fire together upon another closely collected. is different where people are dispersed and act in that case any degree of precision with a common musquet is not to be at a greater distance from fifty to paces.” is curious but it how exceedingly short the range of firearms in those days, and up to the Crimean War, was. General Mercer, whose memoirs, fear the duke, were published until after his gives his account of Waterloo curious He a of Grenadiers à Cheval and against his battery, “they prepared a second attempt, sending who galled us terribly by a fire of and pistols at scarcely forty yards from front. We were obliged to stand with port-fires lighted, so that it not without difficulty that I succeeded in restraining the people firing, for they grew under such fatal results. Seeing some exertion beyond words for purpose, I my horse up little bank and a promenade (by
 provide for their
escape. He whOse dexteriTy preSerVes HiM may, In a qUarter of an hour
AFterWards, again be firing on thE enemY. HE Who, wIThOut juDgment aND
wITHouT pReCauTiON, eXposeS hiMself, muSt inevitabLy rUn Very great
risKS; nOr can the coUntRy be defended By pRisoneRs Or dEAd men.”

       *       *       *       *       *

“eveRy parTiculaR Hill, evEry wood thUs OCcupieD, Must be cONSiDereD as
a _separate_ post aCTiNG for itself. ConsEquentLy, WHaTEVer NumBer of
men maY aRrive IN _each_, shOUlD BE ImmEDiately organiSed. They must
APpoInt a caPtAin ANd threE lieuTeNAntS. The captain Must Be aware
thAt everY Post shoULd be defEnded iN frOnt And fLAnK, aNd tO tHIs
eFFeCt hE MusT form his PeOpLe intO thrEE DIVisiOns.”

       *       *       *       *       *

“on alL occaSions, an ambuscAde In a wOOd oR behiNd hedGes mUsT alloW
the enEmy to ApProach as near as pOssiBle before The FiRinG cOmmenCEs,
and iT shOulD be well UnderstOOd tHaT, AT EvEn three hundred paceS,
mUSQuEt shots aRe very UNcErTAin, and onLy BecOme dESTructIve aT
ThAt distanCe wherE OnE bOdy of trOoPs fire ToGetHer Upon aNOtheR
closeLy collecTed. It IS different wherE People are dispERsED AnD
Act iNdiVidually; in tHat cASe anY degREe Of pREcisiOn witH a COmMOn
musquet is not to be rEcKoned oN at a gReater distancE than from fIFTY
to sixty PaceS.”

thIS is a curious stoRy, but It shows how EXceedingLy shoRt the ranGe
of fireaRMS in those DayS, anD evEn uP TO tHe Crimean War, wAS. geneRaL
Mercer, WhoSe memoiRs, aPpaRenTly FrOm fear of tHe duke, weRe NoT
pUbLisHed unTIl after hIs DeaTh, GivEs in hIS accouNt of WAterLoO a
SImiLar curiOUs STOry. HE sAyS, thaT afTeR a chaRge oF The grenadiErs à
ChevaL anD cuirAsSiErs agaiNst his battery, “ThEy prepared FoR a sEcond
aTTEmpt, sendIng up a cloud of skirmisherS Who gallEd uS terrIbly By a
fire of CarBines aNd pIStols aT scarcEly foRtY yaRDS from OUR fRonT.
WE were obligED To sTand wItH porT-fires lIghted, so that it was nOT
wiThout a little dIffIculTY ThAt I SUcCEedEd IN reSTRaining the peoplE
from firinG, fOR tHey grew impATieNt Under suCh fatal ResulTS. Seeing
Some exertIon beyond WoRds nECEssAry for this Purpose, I Leaped my
hORse up THe LittlE baNk and bEgAn a PromeNade (by
 provide for their
escape.  He whosedexte rit y p re serv es h im may, in a q u arte r of an hour
afterward s, ag ai n  bef ir ing o n the e n em y .  He  w ho , w it h ou t jud gme nt andwithout pr eca ut ion, exposes hi mself, mus t i nevitably ru n v ery gr ea t
r i sks;nor  canthe co u ntry b e defende db y pris o ners or d ea d me n.”

       *    *        *      *    *“ Eve ryparticular  h ill,e very wo o dt h u s o c cupied, mustbe consider e d a s
a _s ep ara t e_ pos t act in g  fo r itself. C onse quently,whatev e r numbe r  of
men  may a rri vein _ e ac h_ , s ho u ldb eimm e dia tely org an is ed. T heym u s t 
app oin t acapta in and threelie uten a nts . The  capt ainmu st be  aware 
that  e very post shoul d be  defended  in  f ron tand f l ank, a ndtothis
ef fect he mus tf o r mhis people into th re e di visions. ”

    *       *    *    *    * 

“On al l occa s io ns , an am bu scadein  awoo d orb ehin d hedg es mustallow the enemy to a p proach as nea r  a s po s sibl e b efore the f irin g  com menc e s, 
an d  it s hould  b e  w e ll understood that,  a t even  thre e hundred pac es,
musque t s hots are  ver y  u n certain, and o nly b ecome dest r uctive a t
tha t distan ce whereo n e body o f t roo psfir e to gether upon a n o ther 
c loselycol lected.  It  is  di ffe re nt wherepeople a re  d is pe rse d and act indi vi dua ll y;in th a t case  anydegr ee  o f  pr ecision wi t h  a c om mo n
mu squ et  is n ot t o  be  reckon ed on ata g r eate rdi stancethan from fif ty 
to sixtypa ces .”

Th i s  is a cu rious story, but it sho w s how e xce eding ly s hort theran ge
offir e arms i n thos e day s,  an d evenu p  t o t he  Crimean W a r , w as. G en eral 
Mercer , whose memoirs, a p par ently from fe arof t h e  d uke ,  w e reno t 
pu b l ished until aft er his dea th ,  g ives in hi s  ac co unt ofWaterlo o a
s i milar c urious st ory. He s ay s, t h a t a fter a cha rge of t he Grenad i ers à Ch evaland  Cuira ss ier s aga inst h i s b atter y, “th ey  prepa red f or  a secon d
attempt, sending up a  cloud  of s kir mishers w hog all ed us ter ribl y by a
fir e o f c arbin esa nd pi stol s  a t s c arcel y fo r ty yardsf ro m o u r  f ront.
We we r e obl igedtos tand w ithport-fires lighte d , so that it w as n o t 
wi tho u t ali ttle difficult y t ha t I succee de d in restra ining th ep eople 
fromfiring , for t h e yg rew im pati ent  under su chfa t al resu lt s. Seeing 
som eexerti on bey o nd w o r ds necessary for  this p urpos e , I  leap ed  my
hor s e up  the littl e bank andbegana pr omena de (by
 provide_for their
escape._He whose dexterity preserves_him may,_in_a quarter_of_an hour
afterwards, again_be firing on_the enemy. He who,_without judgment and
without_precaution,_exposes himself, must inevitably run very great
risks; nor can the country be defended by_prisoners_or dead_men.”

__    _*    _ _*       *__  _  *      _*

“Every particular hill, every wood thus_occupied, must be_considered_as
a__separate_ post acting for_itself. Consequently, whatever number of
men may_arrive in _each_, should be immediately_organised. They must
appoint a captain and three_lieutenants. The captain must be aware
that_every post should be defended_in front_and flank, and to this
effect_he must form_his people_into three divisions.”

_     _*  _    * __  __*_ _  __* __    *

“On all_occasions,_an ambuscade in a wood or behind_hedges must allow
the enemy_to_approach as near as_possible before the firing commences,
and_it should be well understood that,_at even_three hundred_paces,
musquet shots are very uncertain, and only become destructive at
that distance_where one body of troops fire_together upon another
closely collected._It is_different_where people are_dispersed_and
act individually;_in that case any degree of precision_with a_common
musquet is not to be reckoned_on at a greater_distance_than from fifty
to sixty paces.”

This is_a curious story, but it shows_how exceedingly short the range
of_firearms_in_those days, and even up_to the Crimean War, was. General
Mercer,_whose memoirs, apparently_from fear of the duke, were not
published_until_after his death, gives in his_account_of Waterloo a
similar curious story. He_says,_that_after a charge of the_Grenadiers à
Cheval and Cuirassiers against his_battery, “they prepared for a second
attempt, sending up a_cloud of skirmishers_who galled us terribly by_a
fire_of_carbines and pistols at scarcely forty yards from our front.
We_were obliged_to stand with_port-fires lighted, so that it was not
without a little difficulty_that I succeeded in restraining the people
from_firing, for they grew impatient under such fatal results. Seeing
some exertion_beyond words necessary for this purpose, I leaped_my
horse up the little bank and began_a promenade (by