 Each line deployed occupied about 2400 yards,
the first at about one mile from the enemy’s position; and not only
did this occupy much time, “several hours,”[52] but the deployment was
irregular and the advance slow. All the disadvantages of the linear
formation for attack were fully shown. Crossing the Alma, where at some
points the water was up to the men’s necks,[53] the dislocation of the
attenuated front became more manifest, while the loss was heavy. Still
the shattered and broken lines pressed on, but the Light Division had
to fall back, having lost 47 officers and 850 men, and the brigade of
Guards, with the Highlanders on their left, pressed into the fight.
Though they too were checked for a time, their advance and the front of
fire they developed were too much for the Russian columns. Assailed in
front by determined infantry, the Vladimir Regiment alone about this
time lost 49 officers and 1500 men, so Anitschkoff says, and, fired on
by two guns which Lord Raglan had fortunately got across the stream in
the very forefront of the battle, the great columns dissolved and fled.

[Illustration: THE CRIMEA.

1854-5.]

But, throughout, the evil, from a military standpoint, of the long
peace was apparent. There was want of method in the attack and want
of supreme direction. The artillery was badly handled, and was used
without combined effort. It would have been wiser if the whole force
had made a flank attack on the Russian right, and both threatened
directly his line of retreat and penned him in against the coast.[54]
And, finally, the cavalry were not used at all. “I will keep my
cavalry in a bandbox,” said Raglan, which, however cautious, was not
“_l’audace_”; and so, partly due to French advice no doubt, there
was no pursuit and no rout. Once again, as often in the Peninsula,
the battle was won by the fighting power of the men rather than the
genius of the commander. Throughout, the cavalry, instead of spreading
widely for information, were kept close to the columns they should
have covered. Finally, while the Russians admit a loss of 6000 men,
the British suffered one of 2000, and that of the
Each line deployed occupied about 2400 yard, 
 the inaugural at about one mile from the enemy ’s status; and not only 
 did this occupy much prison term, “ respective hours,”[52 ] but the deployment was 
 irregular and the advance slow. All the disadvantages of the linear 
 formation for approach were fully shown. cross the Alma, where at some 
 point the water was up to the men ’s necks,[53 ] the dislocation of the 
 attenuated front became more apparent, while the loss was heavy. Still 
 the shattered and broken line pressed on, but the Light Division had 
 to hang back, having lost 47 military officer and 850 men, and the brigade of 
 Guards, with the Highlanders on their left, pressed into the fight. 
 Though they excessively were checked for a time, their advance and the front of 
 fire they developed were too much for the Russian columns. Assailed in 
 front by determined infantry, the Vladimir Regiment alone about this 
 time lost 49 officers and 1500 men, so Anitschkoff says, and, fired on 
 by two gun which Lord Raglan had fortunately got across the stream in 
 the identical vanguard of the battle, the great columns dissolved and flee. 

 [ Illustration: THE CRIMEA. 

 1854 - 5. ] 

 But, passim, the evil, from a military standpoint, of the long 
 peace was apparent. There was need of method in the attack and want 
 of supreme direction. The artillery was badly handled, and was used 
 without combined effort. It would have been knowing if the whole force out 
 had made a flank attack on the Russian right, and both threatened 
 directly his lineage of retreat and penned him in against the coast.[54 ] 
 And, finally, the cavalry were not use at all. “ I will keep my 
 cavalry in a bandbox, ” said Raglan, which, however cautious, was not 
 “ _ l’audace _ ”; and so, partially due to French advice no doubt, there 
 was no pursuit and no rout. Once again, as often in the Peninsula, 
 the battle was win by the fighting ability of the men preferably than the 
 genius of the air force officer. Throughout, the cavalry, instead of spreading 
 widely for information, were keep close to the column they should 
 have covered. Finally, while the Russians admit a passing of 6000 work force, 
 the British suffered one of 2000, and that of the
 Eafh line deployed occupiea about 2400 yards,
tkw firsv at abkut one oile from the enemy’s positioi; ane not only
did this occupy mjch time, “deveral yourw,”[52] but the dxlloymenb was
jvreguner and the advakce slow. Aln the disadvandaeed of the linear
formation for attack were filpy shown. Crossyng uhe Almz, where at some
points the water waa up to the men’s necls,[53] the dislocation of the
ahtenkated front became more manifgat, ryile the losr was heavj. Still
the ahattered and broken lines presred ou, but the Lugyt Fhvision had
vo falj back, havinn lost 47 officets and 850 men, anc tie beigade of
Guards, with vhe Highlanders on treir left, pxessed into the fight.
Rhiugh jhey doo dwre chtckxd ror a himx, their advznce and thw front of
fire they dqnrloped were foo mush for the Russian columns. Assailed in
frott gy determined infantry, rhe Vladimir Regiment alone abjut this
time lost 49 officers and 1500 men, so Anitschkoxf sabs, anb, firea oj
by two guns which Lord Raglan had fortunatelr gpt across the stveam in
the very fotevrpgt of the batjle, the grsat columns dissolged and fled.

[Ullustratyon: YHE CRIMEA.

1854-5.]

But, throughout, thw evil, from c mulitary standpoint, of the lony
peace was spparent. There was want of jethod in tje attack xnd want
of supreoe cisection. Ufe artillery was fadly hanvled, cnd was jsed
eithoue combined effovd. It would have befn wides if the wjole force
had made a flank attarl on the Rusxidn gight, and both threatened
diwectly his ling of retrzat ana penned hpm in agamnst the coaft.[54]
And, finally, jhe cavalry wxre not ufed qt aol. “I wiuu keep my
cavalty in a bcudbox,” saie Raglan, which, howcver zzutious, was not
“_o’aueace_”; and so, paryly duq no Hrencr advice no dmubt, thdte
was no pursuit xnd mo rout. Once again, av offen in the Peninsuka,
bhe battlg was won by the fightong power of the mtn ratier then the
benyus of the commander. Throughouf, the cavwlrn, instead of fpreqding
widely yor information, were kept close to the cilumns they should
yave covered. Finalli, wmile the Rusxians admit a noss of 6000 men,
the Britush suffered one pf 2000, and that of the
Each line deployed occupied about 2400 yards, at one mile the enemy’s position; occupy time, “several hours,”[52] the deployment was and the advance slow. All the of the linear formation for attack were fully shown. Crossing the Alma, where some points the water was up to the men’s necks,[53] the dislocation of attenuated became manifest, the loss was heavy. Still the shattered and broken lines pressed on, but the Light Division to fall back, having lost 47 officers and men, and the brigade Guards, with the Highlanders on left, into the Though too checked for a their advance and the front of fire they developed were too much for the Russian columns. Assailed front by the Vladimir alone this lost 49 officers men, so Anitschkoff says, and, fired guns which Lord Raglan had fortunately got across stream in very forefront of the battle, the columns dissolved and fled. [Illustration: THE CRIMEA. 1854-5.] throughout, the evil, from a military standpoint, of the long peace was apparent. There was method in the attack want of supreme The was handled, was used combined effort. It would have been wiser if the whole force made a flank attack on the Russian right, and both his of retreat and him in against the And, the cavalry were not all. will in bandbox,” Raglan, which, however cautious, not “_l’audace_”; and so, partly to French advice no and no rout. Once again, as often in Peninsula, the battle was won by the power of the men rather than the genius of the commander. Throughout, cavalry, instead widely for information, were kept close to the they should have covered. while the Russians admit a loss of 6000 men, British one of and that of
 Each line deployed occupied aBout 2400 yards,
tHe firSt aT abOuT one Mile From the enemy’s pOSitiOn; and not only
did this occUpy muCh TIme, “sEVeRal hoUrs,”[52] but tHE dEPLoyMeNt Was
IrREgUlar aNd tHe advanCe slow. All tHe dIsAdvantages of THe Linear
formAtiOn for attack wEre Fully sHoWn. CROssinG thE Alma, Where aT Some
poInts the waTeR Was up tO The men’s NECkS,[53] the Dislocation of the
aTTeNUated front becaMe more MaNIfEST, whIle The loss was HeAvy. StILl
the shATtERED anD Broken lines prEssed on, but tHE LiGht DivIsIon HAd
to faLl bacK, hAVinG lost 47 officeRs anD 850 men, and thE brigaDE of
GuarDS, with thE HighlAndErs On thEIr LeFt, pReSSed INtO thE FigHt.
Though ThEy Too weRe chECKED for A tiMe, thEir adVance and the frOnt Of
fiRE thEy devElopeD werE tOo mucH for thE RussIaN columns. AssaileD in
fRont by detErmInEd iNfAntry, THe VladImiR ReGiment aLone aboUT thIs
TIME lOst 49 officers and 1500 men, sO ANITsChkoff saYs, and, fIReD oN
By two gunS wHicH LorD rAglan Had fORtUnately gOt acroSS tHe Stream iN
tHe very FoRefRonT of thE BattLe, the gReat coluMns diSSolved and fled.

[ILLustration: THE crImea.

1854-5.]

BUT, thrOugHout, the evil, From A MiliTary STaNdpOInt, of The loNg
PEaCE was apparent. There waS wAnt of mEthod In the attack anD want
of supREME directiOn. ThE ArTIllery was badly HandlEd, and was usED
without CombiNed efforT. It would hAVE been wisEr iF thE whOle FORcE
had made a flanK ATtacK oN the RusSiaN right, aNd bOth ThrEatEnEd
directlY his line Of ReTrEaT anD pennED him in agAiNst ThE coAst.[54]
AnD, FinallY, the cAvalRy WeRE noT used at ALl. “i WIll kEeP mY
cavAlrY iN a banDbox,” SAid raglan, wHich, howevEr cAUtioUs, WaS not
“_l’auDace_”; and so, partLy Due to FrencH aDviCe no doUBT, there
waS no pursuit and no rout. Once AGain, as oFteN in thE PenInsula,
the BatTle was Won BY the fiGhting Power Of The MEN rathER ThAn tHe
Genius of thE COmmAnder. thRougHout, the Cavalry, instead of spREadIng
widely for iNfoRmatION, wEre KEpT CloSe TO thE COlumns they shoulD
have coverEd. fInAlly, while tHE RuSsIans admIt a loss Of 6000 men,
THe BritiSh suffereD one of 2000, and ThAt of THE
 Each line deployed occupi ed about 2 400 y ard s,th e fi rstat about one m i le f rom the enemy’s positi on; a nd noto nl y
did  this o c cu p y  mu ch  t ime ,“ se veral  ho urs,”[5 2] but the  de pl oyment was
i r re gular andthe  advance slo w.All th edis a dvant age s ofthe li n ear
fo rmation f or attack were fu l l yshow n. Crossing the A l ma ,  where at some 
point st he w ate r w as up to t he  men’ s  necks, [ 53 ] t hed islocation of  the
attenu a ted  front  b eca m e more  mani fe s t,while the l osswas heavy . Stil l 
the sh a tteredand br oke n l ines pr es sed  o n , b u tthe Lig ht Divis io nhad
t o fa l l b ack,  ha ving  lost  47 officersand  850 men , and  thebrig ad e ofGuards , wit hthe Highlanders  ontheir lef t,pr ess ed  into the fi ght .
T hough t hey too wer ec h e ck ed for a time, the ir a dv ance and  the f r on to f
fire t he y d evel o p ed we re t o omuch for  the R u ss ia n colum ns . Assa il edinfront by d etermi ned infa ntry, the Vladimir R e giment alonea bo u t  t h is
t ime  lost 49 of fice r s an d 15 0 0men ,  so A nitsc hk o ff says, and, fired on 
b y twogunswhich Lord Ra glan had f o r t unatelygota cr o ss the streamin
th e very for e front of  thebattle,the great c olumns d iss olv edand f le d.

[Illustra t i on:TH E CRIME A.
1854-5 .]
Bu t,thr ou ghout, th e evil,fr om  a  m ili tarys tandpoin t,  of  t helongp eace w as ap pare nt .T her e was w a nt o f me th od  inthe  a ttack  and wan t
of su preme dir ect i on.Th eartille ry was badlyha ndled, and  w asused
w i t hout com bined effort. It wouldh ave bee n w iserif t he wholefor ce
had  ma d e a fl ank at tackon  th e Russi a n  r igh t,  and botht h rea tened 
d irec tly his  line of retreat a n d p enned him inaga inst t he  co a st . [54 ]A nd, f inally, the cav alry wereno t  u sed at all .  “I  w ill kee p my
ca valry in a ba ndbox,” s aid Ragla n,  whi c h , h owever cau tious, w as not
“_ l ’auda c e_ ”; an d s o, par tl y d ue to  Frenc h  ad viceno dou bt , ther e
was  n o pursui t and no rout. Once aga in, as  ofte n i n the Pen ins u la, 
the batt le w as won bythe  fi ghtin g p o wer o f th e  m enr ather  tha n  the
geni u soft h ecommander.T h r oug hout,  th e  caval ry,instead of spread i ng
widely forinfo r m ati on, were  k ept close to t heco l u mns they  s hould
havecovered.  F i nally , whil e theRussian s ad m it a l ossof6000 men, 
th eB ritishsu ff e red on e of  2 000, a nd tha t  oft h e
 Each_line deployed_occupied about 2400 yards,
the_first at_about_one mile_from_the enemy’s position;_and not only
did_this occupy much time,_“several hours,”[52] but_the_deployment was
irregular and the advance slow. All the disadvantages of the linear
formation for attack_were_fully shown._Crossing_the_Alma, where at some
points the_water was up to the_men’s necks,[53]_the dislocation of the
attenuated front became more manifest,_while_the loss was_heavy. Still
the shattered and broken lines pressed on, but_the Light Division had
to fall back,_having lost 47_officers_and_850 men, and the_brigade of
Guards, with the Highlanders on_their left, pressed into the fight.
Though_they too were checked for a time,_their advance and the front of
fire_they developed were too much_for the_Russian columns. Assailed in
front by_determined infantry, the_Vladimir Regiment_alone about this
time_lost 49 officers and 1500 men,_so Anitschkoff says,_and, fired on
by two guns which_Lord_Raglan had fortunately_got_across_the stream_in
the very forefront_of_the battle,_the_great columns dissolved and fled.

[Illustration: THE_CRIMEA.

1854-5.]

But,_throughout, the evil, from a military standpoint,_of the long
peace was_apparent._There was want of_method in the attack and_want
of supreme direction. The artillery was_badly handled,_and was_used
without combined effort. It would have been wiser if the whole_force
had made a flank attack on_the Russian right, and_both threatened
directly_his_line of retreat_and_penned him_in against the coast.[54]
And, finally, the cavalry_were not_used at all. “I will keep_my
cavalry in a bandbox,”_said_Raglan, which, however cautious, was not
“_l’audace_”;_and so, partly due to French_advice no doubt, there
was no_pursuit_and_no rout. Once again, as_often in the Peninsula,
the battle was_won by the_fighting power of the men rather than_the
genius_of the commander. Throughout, the cavalry,_instead_of spreading
widely for information, were kept_close_to_the columns they should
have covered._Finally, while the Russians admit a_loss of 6000 men,
the British suffered one of 2000,_and that of_the