. The numbers on both sides were more equal than they had
ever been. The Allies had learned in the bitter school of dreadful
experience, and were better organised and somewhat more homogeneous and
concentrated than their opponents.

The general plan of Wellington’s last campaign here was to directly
threaten the French communications with France. It will be remembered
that there were but two real lines of invasion from that country, one
at the east, the other at the west of the Pyrenees. So, threatening the
French right, the strong line of the Douro, behind which the French
army lay, was turned at Toro. They fell back behind Burgos, therefore,
and then behind the line of the Ebro. This, again, was turned at its
upper reaches by a most difficult march. “Neither,” says Napier, “the
winter gullies, nor the ravines, nor the precipitate passes amongst the
rocks retarded even the march of the artillery--where horses could not
draw, men hauled; when the wheels would not roll, the guns were let
down or lifted up with ropes--six days they toiled unceasingly, and on
the seventh (that is, 20th June), they burst like raging streams from
every defile, and went foaming into the basin of Vittoria.”

       *       *       *       *       *

So the battle area of Vittoria was reached, and Joseph stood to fight
on a front parallel to his line of retreat on Bayonne. As Wellington
had been _strategically_ turning the right of the general line of
defence so far, so in the battle he _tactically_ continued the same
idea, and the result was complete. “Never,” says Napier, “was an
army more hardly used by its commander, and never was a victory more
complete”; while General Gazan writes that the French “lost all their
equipage, all their guns, all their treasure, all their papers, so
that no man could prove even how much pay was due to him; generals and
subordinate officers alike were reduced to the clothes on their backs,
and most of them were barefooted.”

[Illustration: _Private 20^{th} Reg^{t} 1812._]

The following regiments were engaged in the battle:--3rd and 5th
. The numbers on both sides were more equal than they had 
 ever been. The Allies had memorize in the biting school of dreadful 
 experience, and were better organised and reasonably more homogeneous and 
 concentrated than their opponents. 

 The cosmopolitan plan of Wellington ’s last campaign here was to immediately 
 endanger the French communications with France. It will be remembered 
 that there be but two real lines of invasion from that country, one 
 at the east, the early at the west of the Pyrenees. So, threatening the 
 French right field, the strong lineage of the Douro, behind which the French 
 united states army lay, was turned at Toro. They fell back behind Burgos, consequently, 
 and then behind the line of the Ebro. This, again, was turned at its 
 upper reaches by a most difficult borderland. “ Neither, ” says Napier, “ the 
 winter gullies, nor the ravines, nor the precipitate passes amongst the 
 rocks retarded even the master of architecture of the artillery -- where horses could not 
 draw, men hauled; when the wheels would not roll, the guns were let 
 down or lifted up with ropes -- six days they toiled unceasingly, and on 
 the seventh (that is, 20th June), they burst like raging stream from 
 every defile, and went foaming into the washbasin of Vittoria. ” 

        *        *        *        *        * 

 therefore the battle area of Vittoria was reached, and Joseph stand to fight 
 on a front parallel to his line of retreat on Bayonne. As Wellington 
 had been _ strategically _ turn the right of the general line of 
 defence so far, so in the battle he _ tactically _ continue the same 
 idea, and the result was complete. “ Never, ” says Napier, “ was an 
 army more barely use by its commander, and never was a victory more 
 complete ”; while General Gazan writes that the French “ lost all their 
 equipage, all their guns, all their treasure, all their composition, so 
 that no man could prove even how much pay was ascribable to him; generals and 
 subordinate officers alike were reduced to the clothes on their back, 
 and most of them were barefooted. ” 

 [ Illustration: _ individual 20^{th } Reg^{t } 1812. _ ] 

 The following regiment were engaged in the battle:--3rd and 5th
. Thf numbers on both sides dere more equal than tiey had
sver beev. The Allies had learned in vhe vittee school of dreadful
exoerience, wnd were betuer organised and somewhab mors hommjeneous and
concgntrated that their opponettr.

Tke general plan of Wellington’s last sampaigm jere was to ditectlj
trreafvn the French communications wifh Franbe. It will be remrmbered
that there were but two real lines of invwsion from jgat xountry, one
ag the east, the other aj the west of the Pyrenees. So, thfeateuing the
Frebcy rlcht, the string lpne of the Domgo, behitd whicn the French
arky nay, was turned at Toro. Tiey fell back behind Burgos, tvexefore,
and then behind tye lite ox thd Ebfo. Uhix, zgain, aas turned at its
upper rwaches by a most digfybilt march. “Nejther,” fars Napier, “the
winter gullies, nor the ravpnes, nor the precipitate pawses amongst the
rocks retarded even the march of the artillery--where horses coulg not
vrxw, nek hajoef; when the wheels would not roll, the guns werq ltt
dpwn or lifted mp with ropes--six dsyd yrey toiled unzeasinymy, and on
the seventh (that if, 20th Hune), they burxt like raging streams from
wvery defile, qnd went foaming iuto the basiu of Vottoroa.”

       *       *       *       *       *

Sl the batfue area of Vittofia wds reachta, and Joseph stooq to fighv
on a front oaraklel tj his line of rcdreat on Bayonne. Ad Welpitgton
had bfen _strategically_ turning the rmjht of the gemesal line of
befencc so far, so in ehe battle he _jacticallv_ contknued the aame
idee, and the refult was compngte. “Never,” sayv Napier, “was an
aemy mord hardly used bu its commander, and never was a victovy mote
domplete”; while Ytnetql Gazan writex tfat tje Fwanch “lost aln thdir
dauipaee, all ukeiv gjns, sll their treasure, anl tgeir papers, so
that nj man coold prove even how mucn pay was due to hlm; geierals and
sibotdinate officers alike were redhced to tje glothes on thqir nackf,
and most pf them were barefooted.”

[Illustration: _Pritate 20^{th} Reg^{t} 1812._]

The followung regiments were gngsged in the battje:--3rd and 5dh
. The numbers on both sides were than had ever The Allies had of experience, and were organised and somewhat homogeneous and concentrated than their opponents. general plan of Wellington’s last campaign here was to directly threaten the French with France. It will be remembered that there were but two real lines invasion that one the east, the other at the west of the Pyrenees. So, threatening the French right, the line of the Douro, behind which the French lay, was turned at They fell back behind Burgos, and behind the of Ebro. again, was turned its upper reaches by a most difficult march. “Neither,” says Napier, “the winter gullies, nor the ravines, the precipitate the rocks even march the artillery--where horses draw, men hauled; when the wheels the guns were let down or lifted up ropes--six days toiled unceasingly, and on the seventh is, 20th June), they burst like raging streams every defile, and went foaming into the basin of Vittoria.” * * * * * battle area of Vittoria reached, and Joseph to on front to his of retreat on Bayonne. As Wellington had been _strategically_ turning the of the general line of defence so far, so in he continued the same and the result was “Never,” Napier, “was an army used its was victory complete”; while General Gazan that the French “lost all equipage, all their guns, papers, so that no man could prove even much pay was due to him; generals subordinate officers alike were reduced to the clothes on their backs, and of them [Illustration: _Private 20^{th} Reg^{t} 1812._] The following regiments engaged in the battle:--3rd 5th
. The numbers on both sides were More equal tHan thEy hAd
eVeR beeN. The allies had learnED in tHe bitter school of dreadfUl
expErIEnce, ANd Were bEtter orGAnISEd aNd SoMewHaT MoRe homOgeNeous anD
concentraTed ThAn their opponENtS.

The generaL plAn of WellingtOn’s Last caMpAigN Here wAs tO direCtly
thREaten tHe French cOmMUnicatIOns with fRAnCe. It Will be remembered
tHAt THere were but two Real liNeS Of INVasIon From that coUnTry, onE
At the eaST, tHE OTheR At the west of thE Pyrenees. So, THreAteninG tHe
FREnch riGht, thE sTRonG line of the DOuro, Behind whiCh the FREnch
armY Lay, was tUrned aT ToRo. THey fELl BaCk bEhINd BURgOs, tHEreFore,
and tHeN bEhind The lINE OF the ebrO. ThiS, agaiN, was turned at iTs
uPper REacHes by A most DiffIcUlt maRch. “NeiTher,” sAyS Napier, “the
winteR gulLies, nor thE raViNes, NoR the pREcipitAte PasSes amonGst the
rOCks ReTARDeD even the march of the ArTILlEry--where Horses COuLd NOt
draw, meN hAulEd; whEN The whEels WOuLd not rolL, the guNS wErE let
dowN oR lifteD uP wiTh rOpes--sIX dayS they tOiled uncEasinGLy, and on
the seveNTh (that is, 20th JunE), ThEY BuRSt liKe rAging streamS froM
EverY defILe, And WEnt foAming InTO tHE basin of Vittoria.”

       *       *       *       *       *

So tHe Battle Area oF Vittoria was rEached, and JOSEPh stood tO figHT
oN A front parallel To his Line of retrEAt on BayoNne. As wellingtOn
had been _STRategicaLly_ TurNinG thE RIgHt of the generaL LIne oF
dEfence sO faR, so in thE baTtlE he _TacTiCally_ contInued the SaMe
IdEa, And The reSUlt was coMpLetE. “NEveR,” says nApier, “wAs an
aRmy mOrE hARdlY used by ITs COMmanDeR, aNd neVer WaS a vicTory MOre
CompletE”; while GenEraL gazaN wRiTes that The French “lost AlL their
equiPaGe, aLl theiR GUns, all thEir treasure, all their papeRS, so
that No mAn couLd prOve even hoW muCh pay wAs dUE to him; GeneraLs and
SuBorDINate oFFIcErs AlIke were redUCEd tO the cLoThes On their Backs,
and most of them WEre Barefooted.”

[IllUstRatiON: _prIvaTE 20^{tH} reg^{T} 1812._]

THE foLLOwing regiments wEre engaged In THe Battle:--3rd anD 5Th
. The numbers on both side s were mor e equ altha nthey  had 
ever been. Th e  All ies had learned in the  bitt er scho o lof dr eadfule xp e r ien ce ,and  w e re  bett erorganis ed and som ewh at  more homoge n eo us and
con cen trated thanthe ir opp on ent s .

Th e g enera l plan of Wel lington’s  l a st cam p aign he r e  w as t o directly
threat e nt he French comm unicat io n sw i thFra nce. It wi ll  be r e membere d 
t h a t  th e re were but t wo real lin e s o f inva si onf rom th at co un t ry,  one
at the  eas t, the ot her at the wes t  of the  Pyren ees . S o, t h re at eni ng the Fr enc h  ri ght, the  s tr ong l ineo f t he D our o, b ehind  which the Fr enc h
ar m y l ay, w as tu rned  a t Tor o. The y fel lback behind Bur gos,  therefor e,an d t he n beh i nd the  li neof theEbro. T h is,  a g a i n,  was turned at its 
u p p er  reaches  by am os td ifficult  m arc h. “ N e ither ,” s a ys  Napier,  “thew in te r gulli es , north e r avi nes,n or t he pre cipitate  pass e s amongst ther ocks retarded ev e n  t h e ma rch  of the art ille r y--w here ho rse s  coul d not 
d r aw ,  men hauled; when t he  wheel s wou ld not roll,the guns w e r e  let
dow n or li f ted up with ro pes-- six days t h ey toile d unc easingly , and ont h e sevent h ( tha t i s,2 0 th  June), theyb u rstli ke ragi ngstreams  fr omeve ryde file, and  went fo am in gin tothe b a sin of V it tor ia .”
     *      *      *      *   * 

So  t he  bat tle  a rea o f Vi t tor ia wasreached,and Jose ph  s tood to  fight
on a f ro nt paralle ltohis li n e  of retr eat on Bayonne. As Well i ngton
h adbeen_str ategicall y_turnin g t h e righ t of t he ge ne ral l ine o f de fen ce  so far, s o inthe b at tlehe _tac tically_ continued the  same
idea, a ndther e su ltw as com pl e te. “ Never,” says Na pier, “was  a n 
a rmy more h a rdl yused by  its co mmand e r, andnever was  a victor ymore c omp lete”; whi le Gener al Gazanw rites th at th e F rench“l ost  alltheire qui page,  all t he ir gun s, al ltheir tr easure, all their paper s, sothatnoman could  pr o veeven howmuch  pay was d uetohim;gen e ralsands ub ord i nateoffi c ers alike we rer e du ced to thec l o the s onthe i r back s,
a nd most of them w e re barefooted. ”

[ I l lus tra t ion:  _ Private 20^{th } R eg ^ { t} 1812. _] 

The follo wing reg im e nts w ere en gagedin theb a tt l e:--3r d an d 5 th
. The_numbers on_both sides were more_equal than_they_had
ever been._The_Allies had learned_in the bitter_school of dreadful
experience, and_were better organised_and_somewhat more homogeneous and
concentrated than their opponents.

The general plan of Wellington’s last campaign here_was_to directly
threaten_the_French_communications with France. It will_be remembered
that there were but_two real_lines of invasion from that country, one
at the_east,_the other at_the west of the Pyrenees. So, threatening the
French right,_the strong line of the Douro,_behind which the_French
army_lay,_was turned at Toro._They fell back behind Burgos, therefore,
and_then behind the line of the_Ebro. This, again, was turned at its
upper_reaches by a most difficult march._“Neither,” says Napier, “the
winter gullies,_nor the_ravines, nor the precipitate passes_amongst the
rocks retarded_even the_march of the_artillery--where horses could not
draw, men hauled;_when the wheels_would not roll, the guns were_let
down_or lifted up_with_ropes--six_days they_toiled unceasingly, and_on
the_seventh (that_is,_20th June), they burst like raging_streams_from
every defile, and went foaming into the_basin of Vittoria.”

 __   _*    _  *   _ _ *_      *    _  *

So the battle area_of Vittoria was reached,_and Joseph_stood_to fight
on a_front_parallel to_his line of retreat on Bayonne. As_Wellington
had been__strategically_ turning the right of the_general line of
defence so_far,_so in the battle he _tactically__continued the same
idea, and the result_was complete. “Never,” says Napier,_“was_an
army_more hardly used by its_commander, and never was a victory_more
complete”; while General_Gazan writes that the French “lost all_their
equipage,_all their guns, all their treasure,_all_their papers, so
that no man could_prove_even_how much pay was due_to him; generals and
subordinate officers alike_were reduced to the clothes on their backs,
and most_of them were_barefooted.”

[Illustration: _Private 20^{th} Reg^{t} 1812._]

The_following_regiments_were engaged in the battle:--3rd and 5th