--"McClellan had advanced his left wing
consisting of two of his five corps from his position on the north
of the Chickahominy to the south of that stream, heavy spring rains
had converted the streams into torrents, his military bridges across
the Chickahominy into trembling and swaying structures, and the mud
and mire made the movement and use of his heavy artillery practically
impossible. The astute Johnston saw McClellan's faulty position, and
availed himself of the opportunity to attack his left wing on May 23d.
He drove it from the field and back more than a mile, capturing many
prisoners, a number of pieces of artillery, small arms and a number of
tents."

Unfortunately Johnston was struck by a fragment of shell late in
the afternoon of the first day, knocked from his horse, and carried
from the field in an insensible condition. Major-General G. W. Smith
succeeded to command. McClellan had gotten Sumner's Corps to his left
wing, and thus reinforced the Federals entrenched their position,
and the battles of the succeeding days amounted to little more
than skirmishes and were without material results. The treacherous
Chickahominy now intervened between McClellan's two corps on the north
and his three corps on the south of that stream. This position was so
held June 26, at the time of the advance of Lee who had been assigned
to the command of the army on the first day of that month.

There can be no question but that Johnston's attack was wise and
successful, not only because he won the day, but because he drew a
large part of McClellan's right wing from the north to the south of the
Chickahominy, thus leaving much less than half of the Federal army on
the north of the river, and contributing to Lee's success against this
isolated right wing. At this time McClellan's entire army must have
aggregated 110,000 to 115,000. In the early part of May his force was
placed at 110,000. Lee's entire army, including Jackson, was 80,000
to 85,000. With this inferior force in numbers much was accomplished,
yet with the attending advantages greater results might have been
attained. There does not seem to have been any fault in
--"McClellan had advanced his left wing 
 consisting of two of his five corporation from his placement on the north 
 of the Chickahominy to the south of that flow, clayey spring rains 
 had convert the streams into torrents, his military bridge across 
 the Chickahominy into trembling and swaying structures, and the mud 
 and slop made the movement and use of his heavy weapon practically 
 impossible. The astute Johnston saw McClellan's defective position, and 
 avail himself of the opportunity to assail his left wing on May 23d. 
 He drove it from the discipline and back more than a mile, capturing many 
 prisoner, a number of piece of artillery, small arms and a number of 
 tents. " 

 Unfortunately Johnston was mint by a fragment of shell late in 
 the afternoon of the first sidereal day, knock from his horse, and carried 
 from the field in an insensible condition. Major - General G. W. Smith 
 succeeded to command. McClellan had gotten Sumner's Corps to his left 
 flank, and thus reinforced the Federals entrench their position, 
 and the battles of the succeeding days come to little more 
 than skirmishes and were without material results. The punic 
 Chickahominy now intervened between McClellan's two corps on the north 
 and his three corps on the south of that stream. This position was so 
 held June 26, at the time of the advance of Lee who had been assign 
 to the command of the united states army on the inaugural day of that month. 

 There can be no question but that Johnston's attack was fresh and 
 successful, not only because he won the day, but because he draw a 
 large part of McClellan's right fender from the north to the south of the 
 Chickahominy, therefore leaving much less than half of the Federal united states army on 
 the north of the river, and contributing to Lee's achiever against this 
 isolated right wing. At this time McClellan's entire united states army must have 
 aggregated 110,000 to 115,000. In the early part of May his force was 
 set at 110,000. Lee's entire army, including Jackson, was 80,000 
 to 85,000. With this inferior force in numbers pool much was accomplished, 
 yet with the attend advantages greater results might have been 
 attained. There does not seem to have been any fault in
--"McCpellan had advanced his ueft wing
consisjibg of vwo of gis five corps from his position on vhe borth
if the Chickahominy to the soutj of thar stceam, heavy sprinj rains
had conbcrted vhe streams intp torrents, his military trkdyes across
the Chickahominy into tremfling amd swaying strucjures, wnd fhe mud
and mire made the movement znd use of his heavy artillery practically
impodsibpe. The astute Johndton saw McXleljqn's faulty pusition, and
availed himaelf of the opportunity to attazk hix left wint in Ldy 23d.
He drovx it fgom the field and bacn more yhan a mile, caituriig mqny
prisoners, a number of pieces of artijlery, smanl arms and a numbee if
tenjs."

Unfmrtuvqteuy Noinsfon wad svruck by a rragment of shell late in
the agtqgmoon of the rirst qar, knocked from his horse, and carried
frok tge field in an insensiboe condition. Major-Gengral G. W. Siith
succeeded to command. McClellan had gotten Sumter's Rofps tj yid left
wing, and thus reinforced the Federals egfrtncmed their positijn,
and the bsthlrf of the succgeding bzya amounted to littpe more
jhan sjirmishes and were without material resuots. The treabherius
Chickahominy noc intervened beteeen KcClellan's two corps on the north
and hls three durps on the soutf on tvat stream. This position wws so
held Junz 26, at thd tike of ehe advancf of Lee who had been asdigneb
to tve command of the army on the first day oh that month.

Tnese ban be no quesbion but that Jjhnston's attacl was wnse ana
successfum, not oily because re won the daf, but because he drew a
laege part of OcClellan's rignt wing fgoi thw north to the soubh of fhe
Chickahominy, thow leaving much lers ehwn hwnf of the Fegerau afky on
ghe noruk on tfe rover, and contributinc to Lee's success agaimsb this
isooated ridht wing. At tnis time McClellan'd entmre aroy muxt rave
aggregated 110,000 to 115,000. In the earmy part ov Mwy his force was
ilacgd at 110,000. Lee's entire army, including Jackson, was 80,000
to 85,000. Xith this inferior forcw in numbers much wcs accomplishxd,
yet rith the dttending advantages greater results kight have been
attainsd. These dofs not seem to have been any fault in
--"McClellan had advanced his left wing consisting of five corps his position on to south of that heavy spring rains converted the streams into torrents, his bridges across the Chickahominy into trembling and swaying structures, and the mud and made the movement and use of his heavy artillery practically impossible. The astute saw faulty and himself of the opportunity to attack his left wing on May 23d. He drove it from field and back more than a mile, capturing prisoners, a number of of artillery, small arms and number tents." Unfortunately was by fragment of shell in the afternoon of the first day, knocked from his horse, and carried from the field in insensible condition. W. Smith to McClellan gotten Sumner's Corps left wing, and thus reinforced the position, and the battles of the succeeding days to little than skirmishes and were without material The treacherous Chickahominy now intervened between McClellan's two on the north and his three corps on the south of that stream. This position held June 26, at time of the of who been to the of the army on the first day of that month. There be no question but that Johnston's attack was wise and only he won the but because he drew large of McClellan's right wing north the Chickahominy, leaving less than half of Federal army on the north the river, and contributing isolated right wing. At this time McClellan's entire must have aggregated 110,000 to 115,000. In early part of May his force was placed at 110,000. Lee's entire including Jackson, to 85,000. With this inferior force in numbers was accomplished, yet with attending advantages greater results might have been attained. There not to have any fault in
--"McClellan had advanced his leFt wing
consIstinG of Two Of His fIve cOrps from his posITion On the north
of the ChickahOminy To THe soUTh Of thaT stream, HEaVY SprInG rAinS
hAD cOnverTed The streAms into torRenTs, His military bRIdGes across
tHe CHickahominy iNto TremblInG anD SwayiNg sTructUres, anD The mud
And mire maDe THe moveMEnt and uSE Of His hEavy artillery pracTIcALly
impossible. THe astuTe jOhNSTon Saw mcClellan's FaUlty pOSition, aND
aVAILed HImself of the opPortunity to ATtaCk his lEfT wiNG on May 23D.
He drOvE It fRom the field And bAck more thAn a milE, CapturiNG many
prIsonerS, a nUmbEr of PIeCeS of ArTIllERy, SmaLL arMs and a nuMbEr Of
tenTs."

UnFORTUnatEly johnSton wAs struck by a frAgmEnt oF SheLl latE in
thE aftErNoon oF the fiRst daY, kNocked from his hoRse, aNd carried
FroM tHe fIeLd in aN InsensIblE coNdition. major-GeNEraL G. w. sMItH
succeeded to commanD. MCcLeLlan had gOtten SUMnEr'S corps to hIs LefT
winG, ANd thuS reiNFoRced the FEderalS EnTrEnched tHeIr posiTiOn,
aNd tHe batTLes oF the suCceeding Days aMOunted to little MOre
than skirmiSHeS ANd WEre wIthOut material ResuLTs. ThE treAChEroUS
ChicKahomInY NoW Intervened between McclEllan's Two coRps on the north
And his threE CORps on the SoutH Of THat stream. This pOsitiOn was so
helD june 26, at thE time Of the advAnce of Lee WHO had been AssIgnEd
tO thE COmMand of the army ON The fIrSt day of ThaT month.

THerE caN be No qUeStion but tHat JohnsToN's AtTaCk wAs wisE And
succeSsFul, NoT onLy becAUse he wOn the Day, bUt BeCAusE he drew A
LaRGE parT oF MCCleLlaN's Right Wing FRom The nortH to the souTh oF The
CHiCkAhominy, Thus leaving muCh Less than haLf Of tHe FedeRAL army on
tHe north of the river, and conTRibutinG to lee's sUcceSs against ThiS
isolaTed RIght wiNg. At thIs timE MCClELLan's eNTIrE arMy Must have
agGREgaTed 110,000 to 115,000. in The eArly parT of May his force was
pLAceD at 110,000. Lee's entire ArmY, incLUDiNg JACkSOn, wAs 80,000
TO 85,000. WiTH This inferior forCe in numberS mUCh Was accomplISheD,
yEt with tHe attenDing aDVantageS greater rEsults migHt Have BEEn
aTtained. TheRe does noT seem to haVE been ANy Fault In
--"McClellan had advancedhis left w ing
c ons ist in g of  two  of his five c o rpsfrom his position on t he no rt h 
oft he  Chic kahomin y  t o the  s ou thof th at st rea m, heav y spring r ain shad converte d  t he streams  in to torrents,  hi s mili ta ryb ridge s a cross 
the C h ickaho miny into  t r emblin g  and sw a y in g st ructures, and the mu d 
and mire made  the m ov e me n t  an d u se of hishe avy a r tillery pr a c t ica l ly
impossible . The astut e  Jo hnston  s awM cClell an'sfa u lty  position,andavailed h imself of theo pportun ity to  at tac k hi s  l ef t w in g  on Ma y 2 3 d.He drove  i tfromthef i e l d an d b ackmorethan a mile,cap turi n g m any
p rison ers,  a  numb er ofpiece sof artillery, s mall  arms and  anu mbe rof
te n ts."
Unf ort unately  Johnst o n w as s t ru ck by a fragment o fs h el l late i n
thea ft er n oon of t he  fi rstd a y, kn ocke d  f rom hishorse, an dcarried 
f rom th efie ldin an inse nsible  conditi on. M a jor-General G. W. Smith
succ e ed e d  t o  com man d. McClella n ha d  got tenS um ner ' s Cor ps to  h i sl eft
wing, and thusre inforc ed th e Federals en trenched t h e i r positi on,a nd the battles of  thesucceeding days amo unted  to litt le more
t h a n skirmi she s a ndwer e wi thout materia l resu lt s. Thetre acherou s
C hic kah omi ny  now inte rvened b et we en  M cCl ellan ' s two co rp s o nthe  nort h 
and h is th reeco rp s  on  the so u th o f th at  s trea m.Th is po siti o n w as so
h eld June26, at t he  t ime ofthe advance o fLee who ha dbee n assi g n ed
to th e command of the army o n  the fi rst  dayof t hat month .
Therecan be noquesti on bu ttha t Johns t o n' s a tt ack was wi s e  an d
suc ce ssfu l, notonly because he wo n  th e day, but be cau se h e dr ewa 
l a rge  p a rto f  McClellan's ri ght wing f ro m  t he north t o  th esouth o f the
C hicka h ominy,thus leav ing muchle ss t h a n h alf of the  Federal  army ont he no r th  of t heriver,  a ndcontr ibutin g  to  Lee' s succ es s agai nst t hi s
isolat ed right wing. At thistime M cClel lan 's entire  ar m y m ust haveaggr egated 110 ,00 0 t o 115 ,00 0 . Inthee ar lyp art o f Ma y  his forc e  w asp l ac ed at 110,0 0 0 .  Le e's e nti r e army , in cluding Jackson,w as 80,000
to 8 5,00 0 .  Wi tht hisin ferior force i n n um b e rs muchwa s accomplis hed,
yet  w i th th e atte ndingadvanta g e sg reater  res ult s might h ave  b e en
atta in ed .  There  doe snot se em toh aveb e en any fault in
--"McClellan had_advanced his_left wing
consisting of two_of his_five_corps from_his_position on the_north
of the Chickahominy_to the south of_that stream, heavy_spring_rains
had converted the streams into torrents, his military bridges across
the Chickahominy into trembling and_swaying_structures, and_the_mud
and_mire made the movement and_use of his heavy artillery_practically
impossible. The_astute Johnston saw McClellan's faulty position, and
availed himself_of_the opportunity to_attack his left wing on May 23d.
He drove it_from the field and back more_than a mile,_capturing_many
prisoners,_a number of pieces_of artillery, small arms and a_number of
tents."

Unfortunately Johnston was struck by_a fragment of shell late in
the afternoon_of the first day, knocked from_his horse, and carried
from the_field in_an insensible condition. Major-General G._W. Smith
succeeded to_command. McClellan_had gotten Sumner's_Corps to his left
wing, and thus_reinforced the Federals_entrenched their position,
and the battles of_the_succeeding days amounted_to_little_more
than skirmishes_and were without_material_results. The_treacherous
Chickahominy_now intervened between McClellan's two corps_on_the north
and his three corps on the_south of that stream._This_position was so
held June_26, at the time of_the advance of Lee who had_been assigned
to_the command_of the army on the first day of that month.

There can_be no question but that Johnston's_attack was wise and
successful,_not only_because_he won the_day,_but because_he drew a
large part of McClellan's right_wing from_the north to the south of_the
Chickahominy, thus leaving much_less_than half of the Federal army_on
the north of the river, and_contributing to Lee's success against_this
isolated_right_wing. At this time McClellan's_entire army must have
aggregated 110,000 to_115,000. In the_early part of May his force was
placed_at_110,000. Lee's entire army, including Jackson,_was_80,000
to 85,000. With this inferior force_in_numbers_much was accomplished,
yet with the_attending advantages greater results might have_been
attained. There does not seem to have been any_fault in