three months. While cruising for the Viceroy of Mexico, before Jervis
left Lisbon with the fleet, he had considered the possibility of the
enemy's treasure-ships, warned of their danger, taking refuge in the
Canary Islands, which belong to Spain. Meditating upon the
contingency, he had formed a project of seizing them there, and
probably had already suggested the matter to Jervis, taking advantage
of the freedom permitted him by the latter in advancing opinions.
However that be, immediately before he started to meet the Elba
convoy, the commander-in-chief asked for his plan, which he submitted
in writing, after talking it over with Troubridge, his intimate
friend, upon whose judgment Jervis also greatly relied. Regarded as a
purely naval expedition, Nelson pointed out that it was subject to
great uncertainties, because, the land being very high, the wind could
not be depended on. It might blow in from the sea, but if so it would
be by daylight, which would deprive the attack of the benefits of a
surprise; while at night the land wind was too fitful and unreliable
to assure the ships reaching their anchorage before the enemy could
discover them, and have time for adequate preparation against assault.

For these reasons, certainty of success would depend upon co-operation
by the army, and for that Nelson suggested that the Elba troops, over
three thousand strong, already in transports and on their way, would
provide a force at once available and sufficient. Save a naval dash by
Blake, more than a century before, Teneriffe had never been seriously
attacked. Probably, therefore, the heights commanding the town of
Santa Cruz had not been fortified, and could be easily seized by the
detachment designated; besides which, the water supply was exposed to
interruption by an outside enemy. If only General De Burgh could be
persuaded, Nelson was sure of success, and offered himself to command
the naval contingent. Failing the consent of De Burgh, whom he and
Jervis both thought deficient in moral courage to undertake
responsibility, could not the admiral get assistance from O'Hara, the
governor of Gibraltar, who would have at his disposal one thousand to
fifteen hundred men? More would be better, but still with that number

three months. While cruising for the Viceroy of Mexico, before Jervis 
 left Lisbon with the fleet, he had considered the hypothesis of the 
 foe's gem - ships, warned of their danger, take refuge in the 
 Canary Islands, which belong to Spain. study upon the 
 eventuality, he had formed a project of seizing them there, and 
 probably had already suggested the topic to Jervis, taking advantage 
 of the freedom permitted him by the latter in advancing opinion. 
 However that be, immediately before he depart to meet the Elba 
 convoy, the commander - in - head asked for his plan, which he submitted 
 in writing, after spill it over with Troubridge, his intimate 
 friend, upon whose judgment Jervis also greatly trust. Regarded as a 
 strictly naval expedition, Nelson pointed out that it was subject to 
 great doubt, because, the land being very high, the wind could 
 not be depended on. It might blow in from the ocean, but if thus it would 
 be by daylight, which would deprive the attack of the benefits of a 
 surprise; while at night the land wind was too fitful and unreliable 
 to assure the ship strive their anchorage before the enemy could 
 fall upon them, and receive time for adequate preparation against rape. 

 For these reasons, certainty of achiever would depend upon co - operation 
 by the united states army, and for that Nelson suggested that the Elba troops, over 
 three thousand strong, already in transports and on their way, would 
 provide a power at once available and sufficient. Save a naval dash by 
 Blake, more than a century before, Teneriffe had never been seriously 
 attacked. credibly, consequently, the high commanding the town of 
 Santa Cruz had not been fortified, and could be easily seized by the 
 detachment designated; besides which, the urine supply was exposed to 
 interruption by an outside foe. If only General De Burgh could be 
 persuaded, Nelson was sure of success, and offered himself to dominate 
 the naval contingent. Failing the consent of De Burgh, whom he and 
 Jervis both think deficient in moral courage to contract 
 responsibility, could not the admiral get aid from O'Hara, the 
 governor of Gibraltar, who would have at his disposal one thousand to 
 fifteen hundred world? More would be better, but even with that number
thrfe months. While cruising for the Viceroi if Mexmco, befkre Jervks
left Lisbon with the fleet, hw had considered the possibklity of nhe
enemy's treesure-ships, warnev of thelx danfcr, tanmng refuge in tme
Canary Isnands, which benovg to Spain. Meditating upon the
contindency, hr jad formed a ptojecu os sejdikg them there, and
probably had aldeady slggested the mattrr to Jervis, taking advantwge
ov the freedom permltted him bi thq latter in aavancing okiuions.
Howevet that be, immediately before he rtartzd to meet jkw Epta
convoy, thx commwnder-in-chief asked fmr his llan, which he xubkitred
in writing, after telking it over with Jroubridge, hns intimate
friend, upob qhose judcmeng Jefvia elsk greahly relied. Refarded as a
purely naval expediuiog, Nelson pointsd out trat it was subject to
great uncertaintiev, bscause, the land being vwry high, the wind coupd
not be qepended on. It might blow in from the sea, but if vo it douod
ne bh dwylight, which would deprive the attack of the gemenits of a
surprisc; while at night tne lsgd wind was tuo fityhl and unreliable
to wssure jhe shups reachyng yheir anchorage before the wnemy could
dpscocer them, and have cime for adeduatg prepsration against assault.

Yor thsse reasons, certaintg of success woula dvpeng upon co-operation
by the awmy, and fir tkat Nelsun soggesteq that the Elba troops, over
three tjousaud stsong, alreafy in transports and on their web, would
providg a fogce at onee avallable and suffycient. Save a uaval dafh by
Clake, more than a century besore, Teneriffa had never bxen seriotsly
qttaxked. Prucably, thereforr, the heiykts commabding the town of
Senta Druz had not bezu dortified, and cpula bq vasmly sqhzed by the
datacfmevy deskgnated; beslder whoch, the water supply was exposed to
interrultlon by an outside enemy. If onlu General De Burgh coulv be
pecsuadec, Nglson was sure of success, and orfered hilsejf to commanq
the naval contiugent. Failing the consent of De Burgh, whim he and
Jervis borh thought deficienj ik moral courege to undertaka
responsibility, coule not the admiral get assistance from K'Hara, dhe
gogernor of Gibraltar, who would have at his disposal one thousand to
fifteen hundrxd men? More wkuld be bvttzr, yut stijl wmti that number

three months. While cruising for the Viceroy before left Lisbon the fleet, he the treasure-ships, warned of danger, taking refuge the Canary Islands, which belong to Meditating upon the contingency, he had formed a project of seizing them there, probably had already suggested the matter to Jervis, taking advantage of the freedom him the in opinions. However that be, immediately before he started to meet the Elba convoy, the commander-in-chief asked his plan, which he submitted in writing, after it over with Troubridge, intimate friend, upon whose judgment also relied. Regarded a naval Nelson pointed out it was subject to great uncertainties, because, the land being very high, the wind could not be on. It in from sea, if it would be which would deprive the attack of a surprise; while at night the land wind too fitful unreliable to assure the ships reaching anchorage before the enemy could discover them, and time for adequate preparation against assault. For these reasons, certainty of success would depend upon the army, and for Nelson suggested that Elba over thousand already in and on their way, would provide a force at once available sufficient. Save a naval dash by Blake, more than a Teneriffe never been seriously Probably, therefore, the heights the of Santa Cruz had fortified, could by detachment besides which, the water was exposed to interruption by outside enemy. If only persuaded, Nelson was sure of success, and offered to command the naval contingent. Failing the of De Burgh, whom he and Jervis both thought deficient in moral to undertake not the admiral get assistance from O'Hara, the of Gibraltar, who would at his disposal one thousand to fifteen hundred men? would better, but with that number
three months. While cruising fOr the VicerOy of MExiCo, bEfOre JErviS
left Lisbon witH The fLeet, he had considered the PossiBiLIty oF ThE
enemY's treasURe-SHIps, WaRnEd oF tHEiR dangEr, tAking reFuge in the
CAnaRy islands, which BElOng to Spain. medItating upon tHe
cOntingEnCy, hE Had foRmeD a proJect of SEizing Them there, AnD
ProbabLY had alrEADy SuggEsted the matter to JERvIS, taking advantaGe
of thE fREeDOM peRmiTted him by tHe LatteR In advanCInG OPIniONs.
However that Be, immediateLY beFore he StArtED to meeT the ELbA
ConVoy, the commaNder-In-chief asKed for HIs plan, wHIch he suBmitteD
in WriTing, AFtEr TalKiNG it OVeR wiTH TrOubridge, HiS iNtimaTe
frIEND, Upon WhoSe juDgmenT Jervis also grEatLy reLIed. regarDed as A
purElY navaL expedItion, neLson pointed out tHat iT was subjeCt tO
gReaT uNcertAInties, BecAusE, the lanD being vERy hIgH, THE wInd could
not be depenDeD ON. IT might blOw in frOM tHe SEa, but if sO iT woUld
bE BY daylIght, WHiCh would dEprive THe AtTack of tHe BenefiTs Of a
SurPrise; WHile At nighT the land Wind wAS too fitful and uNReliable
to assURe THE sHIps rEacHing their anChorAGe beFore THe EneMY coulD
discOvER tHEm, and have time for adeQuAte preParatIon against assAult.

For theSE REasons, ceRtaiNTy OF success would dEpend Upon co-operATion
by thE army, And for thAt Nelson sUGGested thAt tHe ELba TroOPS, oVer
three thousAND strOnG, alreadY in TranspoRts And On tHeiR wAy, would
prOvide a foRcE aT oNcE avAilabLE and suffIcIenT. SAve A navaL Dash by
blake, More ThAn A CenTury befORe, tENeriFfE hAd neVer BeEn serIousLY
atTacked. PRobably, thEreFOre, tHe HeIghts coMmanding the toWn Of
Santa CruZ hAd nOt been FORtified, aNd could be easily seized by THe
detacHmeNt desIgnaTed; besideS whIch, the WatER supplY was exPosed To
IntERRuptiON By An oUtSide enemy. IF ONly generAl de BuRgh coulD be
persuaded, Nelson WAs sUre of success, aNd oFferED HiMseLF tO ComMaND
thE NAval contingent. FAiling the cOnSEnT of De Burgh, WHom He And
JervIs both tHoughT DeficieNt in moral Courage to UnDertAKE
reSponsibiliTy, could nOt the admiRAl get ASsIstanCe fRom O'HaRa, The
GoverNor of GIBraLtar, wHo woulD hAve at hIs disPoSal one thOusand to
fifteen hundred mEn? More Would Be bEtter, but sTilL WitH that numbEr

three months. While cruisi ng for the  Vice roy  of  M exic o, b efore Jervis
l e ft L isbon with the fleet,he ha dc onsi d er ed th e possi b il i t y o fth e
e ne m y' s tre asu re-ship s, warnedofth eir danger,t ak ing refuge  in  the
CanaryIsl ands,wh ich belon g t o Spa in. Me d itatin g upon th ec onting e ncy, he h ad  for med a project ofs ei z ing them there , andpr o ba b l y h adalready su gg ested the mat t er t o  Je r vis, taking a dvantage
of the  freed om  pe r mitted  himby the  latter inadva ncing opi nions. However that be , imme dia tel y be f or ehest a rte d  t o m e etthe Elba 
c on voy,thec o m m ande r-i n-ch ief a sked for hispla n, w h ich  he s ubmit tedin  writ ing, a fterta lking it over w ithTroubridg e,hi s i nt imate friend , u pon  whosejudgmen t  Je rv i s al so greatly relied.  R e g ar ded as a 
purel y  n av a l expedi ti on,  Nel s o n poi nted ou t that i t wass ub je ct to
g re at unc er tai nti es, b e caus e, the  land be ing v e ry high, the w i nd could
notb ed e pe n dedon.  It might b lowi n fr om t h esea ,  butif so  i t  w o uld
be by daylight,  w hich w oulddeprive the a ttack of t h e benefits  ofa 
s u rprise; whileat ni ght the la n d wind w as to o fitful  and unre l i able
toass ure  th e s h i ps  reaching the i r  anc ho rage be for e the e nem y c oul d
d is cover the m, and h av eti me  fo r ade q uate pre pa rat io n a gains t  assau lt.
Forth es e  re asons,c er t a inty  o fsucc ess  w oulddepe n d u pon co- operation 
by thear my , and f or that Nelso nsuggestedth atthe El b a  troops,  over
three thousand st r ong, al rea dy in  tra nsports a ndon the irw ay, wo uld
pr ovide  a  fo r c e ato n ce  av ai lable ands u ffi cient .Save  a nava l dash by
Blake, m o rethan a centur y b efor e ,  T ene r if f e h ad nev e r  been seriously 
attacked.  P r ob ably, ther e for e,  the he ights c omman d ing the  town ofSanta Cru zhadn o t b een fortif ied, and  could be easil y  s eized  by  the
d et ach mentdesign a ted ; bes ides w hi ch, th e wat er  supplywas exposed to
interrup tion b y anout side enem y.I f o nly Gener al D e Burgh co uld  be 
pers uad e d, Ne lson wa s s u re of  suc c ess, ando ff ere d hi mself to co m m a ndthe n ava l  conti ngen t. Failing the co n sent of De Bur gh,w h omhea nd
J er vis both thoug htde f i cient in  m oral courag e to und er t ake
r espons ibilit y, coul d no t  the a dmir alget assis tan ce from O' Ha ra ,  the
g over no r of G ibralt a r, w h o  would have at h is di s p osalo nethous an d to
fi f teen  hundred m en? More wo uld be  bet ter,but sti ll  withtha tnumber

three months._While cruising_for the Viceroy of_Mexico, before_Jervis
left_Lisbon with_the_fleet, he had_considered the possibility_of the
enemy's treasure-ships, warned_of their danger,_taking_refuge in the
Canary Islands, which belong to Spain. Meditating upon the
contingency, he had formed_a_project of_seizing_them_there, and
probably had already suggested_the matter to Jervis, taking_advantage
of the_freedom permitted him by the latter in advancing_opinions.
However_that be, immediately_before he started to meet the Elba
convoy, the commander-in-chief_asked for his plan, which he_submitted
in writing, after_talking_it_over with Troubridge, his_intimate
friend, upon whose judgment Jervis also_greatly relied. Regarded as a
purely naval_expedition, Nelson pointed out that it was_subject to
great uncertainties, because, the land_being very high, the wind_could
not be_depended on. It might blow_in from the_sea, but_if so it_would
be by daylight, which would deprive_the attack of_the benefits of a
surprise; while at_night_the land wind_was_too_fitful and_unreliable
to assure the_ships_reaching their_anchorage_before the enemy could
discover them, and_have_time for adequate preparation against assault.

For these_reasons, certainty of success_would_depend upon co-operation
by the_army, and for that Nelson_suggested that the Elba troops, over
three_thousand strong,_already in_transports and on their way, would
provide a force at once available_and sufficient. Save a naval dash_by
Blake, more than a_century before,_Teneriffe_had never been_seriously
attacked._Probably, therefore,_the heights commanding the town of
Santa Cruz_had not_been fortified, and could be easily_seized by the
detachment designated;_besides_which, the water supply was exposed_to
interruption by an outside enemy. If_only General De Burgh could_be
persuaded,_Nelson_was sure of success, and_offered himself to command
the naval contingent._Failing the consent_of De Burgh, whom he and
Jervis both_thought_deficient in moral courage to undertake
responsibility,_could_not the admiral get assistance from_O'Hara,_the
governor_of Gibraltar, who would have_at his disposal one thousand to
fifteen_hundred men? More would be better, but still with_that number
