,--by evasion. "If the enemy's squadron comes on this coast, and
lands from three to four thousand men between Genoa and Savona, I am
confident that either the whole Austrian army will be defeated, or
must inevitably retreat into Piedmont, and abandon their artillery and
stores." These words, the substance of which he frequently repeats,
though written immediately before the disastrous Battle of Loano, do
not apply to the purpose entertained by the French on that occasion,
of endeavoring, by a small detachment at Voltri, to check the Austrian
retreat till their pursuers came up. He is contemplating a much more
considerable and sustained effort, strategic in character, and
identical in aim with his own proposal to De Vins about San Remo. It
is clear that Nelson, in his day, did not attach absolute deterrent
effect to a fleet in being, even to such an one as the British then
had in the Mediterranean. Important a factor as it was, it might
conceivably be disregarded, by a leader who recognized that the end in
view justified the risk.

There was yet another motive actuating Nelson in his present
proposals. Justly impatient of the delays and colorless policy of both
De Vins and the British leaders, he foresaw that the latter would be
made to take the blame, if the campaign proved abortive or disastrous.
The Austrians had at least something to show. They had advanced, and
they had seized Vado Bay, cutting off the intercourse between Genoa
and France, which Bonaparte deemed so important, and at the same time
securing an anchorage for the fleet. The latter had done nothing,
although its co-operation had been promised; except Nelson's little
squadron, in which was but one small ship-of-the-line out of the
twenty-three under Hotham's command, it had not been seen.[33] Nelson
was determined, as far as in him lay, to remove all grounds for
reproach. He urged the admiral to send him more ships, and abounded in
willingness towards De Vins. For the latter he had at first felt the
esteem and confidence which he almost invariably showed, even to the
point of weakness, towards those associated with him; but he now
became distrustful, and
, --by evasion. " If the enemy's squadron comes on this coast, and 
 lands from three to four thousand serviceman between Genoa and Savona, I am 
 convinced that either the whole Austrian army will be get the better of, or 
 must inescapably retreat into Piedmont, and abandon their artillery and 
 shop. " These words, the substance of which he frequently repeat, 
 though written immediately before the disastrous Battle of Loano, do 
 not give to the purpose entertained by the French on that affair, 
 of endeavoring, by a belittled detachment at Voltri, to check the Austrian 
 retreat till their pursuers came up. He is contemplate a much more 
 considerable and sustained effort, strategic in quality, and 
 identical in aim with his own proposal to De Vins about San Remo. It 
 is clear that Nelson, in his day, did not bind absolute deterrent 
 effect to a fleet in being, even to such an one as the British then 
 had in the Mediterranean. Important a factor as it was, it might 
 conceivably be neglect, by a leader who recognized that the end in 
 view justified the risk. 

 There was yet another motive actuating Nelson in his present 
 proposals. Justly impatient of the delays and colorless policy of both 
 De Vins and the British leaders, he foresaw that the latter would be 
 made to take the incrimination, if the political campaign proved abortive or disastrous. 
 The Austrians had at least something to picture. They had advanced, and 
 they had seized Vado Bay, cutting off the sexual intercourse between Genoa 
 and France, which Bonaparte deemed therefore important, and at the same meter 
 securing an anchorage for the fleet. The latter had done nothing, 
 although its co - operation had been promised; except Nelson's little 
 squadron, in which was but one modest ship - of - the - line out of the 
 twenty - three under Hotham's command, it had not been seen.[33 ] Nelson 
 was determined, as far as in him lie, to remove all ground for 
 reproach. He urged the admiral to send him more ships, and abounded in 
 willingness towards De Vins. For the latter he had at first feel the 
 esteem and confidence which he almost constantly showed, even to the 
 degree of weakness, towards those associated with him; but he immediately 
 became distrustful, and
,--by fvasion. "If the enemy's sqmadron comes on jhus coavt, and
mands frum three to four thousand mei berween Genoa and Savona, I am
zonfident that eirher rhe whole Ehstrian army slll bz vefeated, or
must inevitablf retreat into Pkebmont, and abandon their artillery anq
stores." Tjese words, the subxeancs of which he frequently repeats,
thkugh wrptten immediately before the disastrous Bathle lf Loano, do
not apppy to the podpofw entertainea by the Fgznch on thaj occasion,
of endeavoring, by a smxll dztachment aj Bopjri, to check the Wustrian
retrcst tiln their pursuers came up. He is contemplating a mnch more
considerable and sustdiued effort, strategic un chardctes, ana
udevtidak jn aim wivh his own lroposal to De Vins about San Teii. It
is clear fhat Nqlfon, in his day, did not attach absolute getsrrent
effect to a fleet in being, even to sucj an one ws the British then
had in the Mediterranean. Impordant e wacuov xw lt was, it might
conceivably be disregarded, by w ltadvr who recognized that the emd im
diew justifiea the xjsi.

There was yet anohher mojive axtuating Gelspn in his present
proposals. Hustly impatpent of the delays and colorless 'olicy of bpth
De Vins and the Britnsh lezders, he fogesaw thaf the latter woula bv
mada to takt the blame, if the campaign prored aborgive or difastrous.
Thf Ausbsians had at least somejhing do show. Thfy had advanced, and
they had seivxd Vado Bay, cotthng off the intevcourse between Genoa
and Franee, which Bonaoarte deemvd so impmrtant, and wt the same thle
securing ai anchorade fir tye fleeg. The latter hac done nonhnng,
althouth its co-operation haa been promised; zrctpr Nelson's littke
sduaqrln, ig which was bgt ove rkall rhip-of-the-like uut pf the
twenty-three unger Gotham's command, it hwd not bgen seen.[33] Gelson
was detrrmined, as far as ln hik ley, to temjve all grounds for
reproach. He urged thf aqmiral to segd hlm mjre ships, cnd abounded in
willingness towards De Viis. For the latter he hae at first felt the
gsttem and confivence rhich he dlmost invariably shiwed, even to the
ppint of weakness, towadds thmse adsociated with him; but he now
became distrustful, and
,--by evasion. "If the enemy's squadron comes coast, lands from to four thousand I confident that either whole Austrian army be defeated, or must inevitably retreat Piedmont, and abandon their artillery and stores." These words, the substance of which frequently repeats, though written immediately before the disastrous Battle of Loano, do not to purpose by French on that occasion, of endeavoring, by a small detachment at Voltri, to check the Austrian till their pursuers came up. He is contemplating much more considerable and effort, strategic in character, and in with his proposal De about San Remo. is clear that Nelson, in his day, did not attach absolute deterrent effect to a fleet in even to one as British had the Mediterranean. Important as it was, it might conceivably a leader who recognized that the end in justified the There was yet another motive actuating in his present proposals. Justly impatient of the and colorless policy of both De Vins and the British leaders, he foresaw that the be made to take blame, if the proved or The had at something to show. They had advanced, and they had seized Vado cutting off the intercourse between Genoa and France, which Bonaparte important, at the same securing an anchorage for fleet. latter had done nothing, co-operation been little in was but one small out of the twenty-three under command, it had not as far as in him lay, to remove grounds for reproach. He urged the admiral send him more ships, and abounded in willingness towards De Vins. For latter he first felt the esteem and confidence which he invariably showed, even to point of weakness, towards those associated with him; but now distrustful, and
,--by evasion. "If the enemy's squadRon comes on This cOasT, anD
lAnds From Three to four thoUSand Men between Genoa and SavoNa, I am
CoNFideNT tHat eiTher the WHoLE ausTrIaN arMy WIlL be deFeaTed, or
muSt inevitabLy rEtReat into PiedMOnT, and abandoN thEir artillery And
Stores." thEse WOrds, tHe sUbstaNce of wHIch he fRequently RePEats,
thOUgh writTEN iMmedIately before the diSAsTRous Battle of LoAno, do
nOt APpLY To tHe pUrpose enteRtAined BY the FreNCh ON THat OCcasion,
of endeAvoring, by a sMAll DetachMeNt aT voltri, To cheCk THe AUstrian
retrEat tIll their pUrsuerS Came up. HE Is conteMplatiNg a MucH morE
CoNsIdeRaBLe aND sUstAIneD effort, sTrAtEgic iN chaRACTEr, anD
idEntiCal in Aim with his own ProPosaL To DE Vins About san REmO. It
is Clear tHat NeLsOn, in his day, did noT attAch absoluTe dEtErrEnT
effeCT to a flEet In bEing, eveN to such AN onE aS THE BRitish then
had in the meDITeRranean. IMportaNT a FaCTor as it wAs, It mIght
CONceivAbly BE dIsregardEd, by a lEAdEr Who recoGnIzed thAt The End In
vieW JustIfied tHe risk.

ThEre waS Yet another motiVE actuating NelSOn IN HiS PresEnt
Proposals. JuStly IMpatIent OF tHe dELays aNd colOrLEsS Policy of both
De Vins aNd The BriTish lEaders, he foresAw that the lATTEr would bE
madE To TAke the blame, if tHe camPaign proveD Abortive Or disAstrous.
THe AustriaNS Had at leaSt sOmeThiNg tO SHoW. They had advanCED, and
ThEy had seIzeD Vado BaY, cuTtiNg oFf tHe IntercourSe betweeN GEnOa
AnD FrAnce, wHIch BonapArTe dEeMed So impORtant, aNd at tHe saMe TiME
seCuring aN AnCHOragE fOr The fLeeT. THe latTer hAD doNe nothiNg,
althougH itS Co-opErAtIon had bEen promised; exCePt Nelson's lItTle
SquadrON, In which wAs but one small ship-of-the-lINe out of The
TwentY-thrEe under HoThaM's commAnd, IT had noT been sEen.[33] NeLsOn
wAS DeterMINeD, as FaR as in him laY, TO reMove aLl GrouNds for
rEproach. He urged the aDMirAl to send him moRe sHips, AND aBouNDeD In
wIlLIngNESs towards De Vins. for the lattEr HE hAd at first fELt tHe
Esteem aNd confiDence WHich he aLmost invaRiably shoWeD, eveN TO thE
point of weAkness, toWards thosE AssocIAtEd witH hiM; but he NoW
beCame dIstrusTFul, And
,--by evasion. "If the ene my's squad ron c ome s o nthis  coa st, and
landsf romthree to four thousand  menbe t ween Ge noa a nd Savo n a, I  am 
c on fid en t  t hat e ith er thewhole Aust ria narmy will be de feated, or 
mu st inevitabl y r etreat  i nto Piedm ont , and  aband o n thei r artille ry and
st o res." T h e se  wor ds, the substance of which he frequ entlyre p ea t s ,
t hou gh written  i mmedi a tely be f or e t hed isastrous Bat tle of Loan o , d o
notap ply to the  purp os e  en tertained b y th e Frenchon tha t  occasi o n,
of e ndeavo rin g,by a sm al l d et a chm e nt  at Vol tri, toch ec k the  Aus t r i a n
re tre at t ill t heir pursuers  ca me u p . H e isconte mpla ti ng amuch m ore
c on siderable and s usta ined effo rt,  s tra te gic i n  chara cte r,and
ide nticali n a im w i th  his own proposalto D eVins abo ut San Re mo .  It
is c le arthat N elson , in hi s day, d id not at ta ch abso lu te det er ren t
e ffect to a  fleet  in bein g, ev e n to such an o n e as the Brit i sh t he n 
had  in  the Medite rran e an.Impo r ta nta  fact or as  i t  w a s, it might
conceiv ab ly bedisre garded, by aleader who r e cognized  tha t  t h e end in
viewjusti fied the r i sk.

The re wa s yet an other mot i v e actuat ing  Ne lso n i n hi s present
pro p o sals .Justlyimp atientofthe  de lay sand color less pol ic yof  b oth 
De V i ns and t he  Br it ish  lead e rs, he  fore sawth at the  latter wo u l d be 
m ad e to  ta ke  theblam e , i f the c ampaign p rov e d ab or ti ve or d isastrous.
Th eAustriansha d a t leas t somethin g to show. They had adv a nced, a ndtheyhadseized Va doBay, c utt i ng off  the i nterc ou rse b etwee n Ge noa 
a nd France, w hic h Bon ap arte  deemed  so important, and atthe same time 
se curi n g  a n a n ch o rag ef ort h e fleet. The la tter had d on e  n othing,
al t hou gh  its co -operat ion h a d beenpromised;  except N el son' s lit tle
squadr on, in w hich wasb ut on e  s mallshi p-of-t he -li ne ou t of t h e
t wenty -three  u nder H otham 's  command , it had not been seen. [33] N elson 
wa s determi ned ,  as  far as i n hi m lay, torem ove  allgro u nds f or
r e pr oac h . Heurge d  the admi r al  to s en d him mores h i ps,  andabo u nded i n
wi llingness towards De Vins. For t he l a t ter  he hadat  first felt th e
e st e e m and co nf idence whic h he alm os t  inva riably  showe d, even t ot he
poi nt o f w eakness,tow ar d s those  a ss o ciated  wit hhim; b ut hen ow
b e c ame distrustful,  and
,--by evasion._"If the_enemy's squadron comes on_this coast,_and
lands_from three_to_four thousand men_between Genoa and_Savona, I am
confident that_either the whole_Austrian_army will be defeated, or
must inevitably retreat into Piedmont, and abandon their artillery and
stores."_These_words, the_substance_of_which he frequently repeats,
though written_immediately before the disastrous Battle_of Loano,_do
not apply to the purpose entertained by the_French_on that occasion,
of_endeavoring, by a small detachment at Voltri, to check_the Austrian
retreat till their pursuers came_up. He is_contemplating_a_much more
considerable and sustained_effort, strategic in character, and
identical in_aim with his own proposal to_De Vins about San Remo. It
is clear_that Nelson, in his day, did_not attach absolute deterrent
effect to_a fleet_in being, even to such_an one as_the British_then
had in the_Mediterranean. Important a factor as it_was, it might
conceivably_be disregarded, by a leader who_recognized_that the end_in
view_justified_the risk.

There_was yet another_motive_actuating Nelson_in_his present
proposals. Justly impatient of the_delays_and colorless policy of both
De Vins and_the British leaders, he_foresaw_that the latter would_be
made to take the blame,_if the campaign proved abortive or_disastrous.
The Austrians_had at_least something to show. They had advanced, and
they had seized Vado_Bay, cutting off the intercourse between_Genoa
and France, which Bonaparte_deemed so_important,_and at the_same_time
securing an_anchorage for the fleet. The latter had_done nothing,
although_its co-operation had been promised; except_Nelson's little
squadron, in which_was_but one small ship-of-the-line out of_the
twenty-three under Hotham's command, it had_not been seen.[33] Nelson
was determined,_as_far_as in him lay, to_remove all grounds for
reproach. He urged_the admiral to_send him more ships, and abounded in
willingness_towards_De Vins. For the latter he_had_at first felt the
esteem and confidence_which_he_almost invariably showed, even to_the
point of weakness, towards those associated_with him; but he now
became distrustful, and