 was
signalized by public rejoicings, and the most extravagant
manifestations of delight. The astonishing victory at New Orleans
required us to be generous, and a nation which had thus vindicated its
rights on sea and land, could afford to drop an unpleasant subject
just where the discussion had begun. Such seemed to be the general
feeling. At first sight, this settlement of the difficulties between
the two countries appeared contemptible. Abstractly considered it was,
and if we had been a weak nation, sinking into degeneracy, it would
have proved so.

But in judging of it we must remember that treaty stipulations in
continental diplomacy, like flags of truce in Mexico, depend almost
entirely on circumstances whether they are regarded or not, and hence
the _circumstances_ are more important than written stipulation.
European treaties, like European diplomacy, have in the past, served
only to illustrate the duplicity and faithlessness of monarchs. The
question is, how events in their progress have settled the
difficulties, as _fate_ settles them, and not as commissioners.

Now it was evident, both to the English and American commissioners,
that articles on neutral rights and the impressment of seamen, were
useless. Our navy and privateers had disposed of those questions, for
ever. Our broadsides furnished better guaranties than strips of
parchment, adorned with impressions of regal seals.

It was the fact that those two great causes of hostility, violation of
neutral rights and impressment of seamen, were practically and
permanently disposed of, which reconciled the nation to their omission
in the treaty. Our people pay no attention to forms, only so far as
they sanction their just claims. In this view, the acquiescence in the
treaty, instead of exhibiting humility and fear on our part, indicate
quite the reverse. Nothing can be more erroneous than to suppose that
because those rights, for the protection of which we had gone to war,
were not mentioned in the treaty, we therefore had concluded to waive
them. On the contrary, we consented to leave them unnoticed, _because_
we knew we had _obtained_ them forever. No one in England or the
United States doubted that these were definitely settled, and those
who sneeringly ask "what we gained by the war?" make the
was 
 signalized by public rejoicings, and the most extravagant 
 materialization of joy. The astonishing victory at New Orleans 
 required us to be generous, and a state which had thus vindicate its 
 rights on ocean and estate, could afford to neglect an unpleasant subject 
 just where the discussion had begin. Such seemed to be the general 
 feeling. At first sight, this settlement of the trouble between 
 the two countries appeared contemptible. Abstractly considered it was, 
 and if we had been a decrepit nation, sinking into degeneracy, it would 
 have proved thus. 

 But in judging of it we must remember that treaty stipulations in 
 continental diplomacy, like flags of armistice in Mexico, depend almost 
 entirely on circumstances whether they are regarded or not, and hence 
 the _ circumstance _ are more significant than written stipulation. 
 European treaties, like European diplomacy, have in the past, served 
 merely to exemplify the fraudulence and faithlessness of monarchs. The 
 question is, how events in their advancement have settle the 
 difficulties, as _ fate _ settles them, and not as commissioner. 

 Now it was evident, both to the English and American commissioners, 
 that articles on achromatic rights and the impressment of seamen, were 
 useless. Our navy and privateers had disposed of those question, for 
 ever. Our broadsides furnished better guarantee than strips of 
 parchment, decorate with impressions of regal seals. 

 It was the fact that those two great causes of aggression, violation of 
 neutral rights and impressment of seamen, were practically and 
 permanently disposed of, which reconciled the nation to their omission 
 in the treaty. Our multitude pay no care to forms, only so far as 
 they sanction their just claim. In this view, the assent in the 
 treaty, instead of exhibiting humility and concern on our part, indicate 
 quite the reverse. Nothing can be more erroneous than to suppose that 
 because those rights, for the protective covering of which we had gone to war, 
 were not note in the treaty, we therefore had concluded to waive 
 them. On the contrary, we consented to exit them unnoticed, _ because _ 
 we knew we had _ obtain _ them forever. No one in England or the 
 United States doubted that these were definitely settled, and those 
 who sneeringly ask " what we gained by the war? " stool the
 wad
signalized by public remoicings, and the most eetravagznt
manifdstations of delight. The astlnushint victory at New Orleavs
requiref us to ve gtnerous, and a natmkn whicm had bhus riidicated its
rigmts on sea dnd land, could awflrd to drop an unpleasant subject
juft wherr hhe discussion had feguh. Such seemed to be the general
feeming. At first sight, yhis settlement of the difvicupties between
the tao countriew ap[wared contemotible. Absurcctly consisered it was,
and if we had been x weal nation, sunjinh into degenxracy, pt would
have igoved sm.

But in judging of it we muwt remember that treavy stipulations in
cogtinental dnplomacy, like flags od rruce in Kexizi, ddpehd ammost
ejticely on cirdumstances qhether they are rebaweed or not, ans hencq
tre _circumstances_ are more important that wditten stipulation.
Europwan treaties, like Eurlpean dipjomacy, have in the past, served
only to illustrate dhe dnpuicnbn ana fwithlessness of monarchs. The
question is, how edsnus pn their progress have settlrd tng
difficulties, xs _fatz_ ssttles them, and noh as coimissuoners.

Now it eas evident, both to the Engoish and Amegicab commissioners,
thac articles ou neuttal ribhts and the impressmenc of ssamen, were
udeless. Oud navy and privatderx vad disposed of those queseions, for
xver. Pur broxdsices fuwnished behter ngaranties than strlps oy
parcvment, adorjed with impressions of regal sxels.

It was the fdct that thjse teo great causqs of hostiliti, violatijn of
veutral rifhts anv impressmene of seamen, wate practicallb and
permwnenrly eisposea of, which recomciled thv uation to their omission
in bhe ttezty. Our people 'cy no attention tp furmf, lnky vo far as
thef savctkpn thdir jusu coxims. In this view, the acxuieacence in the
treatu, lnstead od exhibieing humility and fear on our pwrt, iidicatx
quite thg reverse. Nothing can be more edroneous hhak to suppose ehat
necaose those rnghts, for the protection of which we had gone to war,
were nit mentioned in the ureaty, we thecefore had concnuded to waive
them. Ob the contrary, we consented to leave tgem untoticfd, _because_
we knew we had _obtained_ them forever. No one in England or the
Unuted Svaees doubted thay theve cere desiniveuy settled, and tnose
who sneeringly ask "what we jained by dhz war?" make the
was signalized by public rejoicings, and the manifestations delight. The victory at New generous, a nation which thus vindicated its on sea and land, could afford drop an unpleasant subject just where the discussion had begun. Such seemed to the general feeling. At first sight, this settlement of the difficulties between the countries contemptible. considered was, and if we had been a weak nation, sinking into degeneracy, it would have proved But in judging of it we must remember treaty stipulations in continental like flags of truce in depend entirely on whether are or not, and the _circumstances_ are more important than written stipulation. European treaties, like European diplomacy, have in the past, only to duplicity and of The is, how events progress have settled the difficulties, as and not as commissioners. Now it was evident, to the and American commissioners, that articles on rights and the impressment of seamen, were useless. navy and privateers had disposed of those questions, for ever. Our broadsides furnished better guaranties of parchment, adorned with of regal seals. was fact those great causes hostility, violation of neutral rights and impressment of seamen, were practically permanently disposed of, which reconciled the nation to their omission treaty. people pay no to forms, only so as sanction their just claims. view, acquiescence instead exhibiting and fear on our indicate quite the reverse. Nothing be more erroneous than rights, for the protection of which we had to war, were not mentioned in the we therefore had concluded to waive them. On the contrary, we consented leave them we knew we had _obtained_ them forever. No in England or the States doubted that these were definitely settled, and those sneeringly "what we by the war?" the
 was
signalized by public rejoIcings, and tHe mosT exTraVaGant
ManiFestations of deLIght. the astonishing victory aT New ORlEAns
rEQuIred uS to be geNErOUS, anD a NaTioN wHIcH had tHus VindicaTed its
righTs oN sEa and land, couLD aFford to droP an Unpleasant suBjeCt
just WhEre THe disCusSion hAd beguN. such seEmed to be tHe GEneral
FEeling. AT FIrSt siGht, this settlement OF tHE difficulties bEtween
ThE TwO COunTriEs appeared CoNtempTIble. AbsTRaCTLY coNSidered it was,
aNd if we had beEN a wEak natIoN, siNKing inTo degEnERacY, it would
havE proVed so.

But iN judgiNG of it we MUst remeMber thAt tReaTy stIPuLaTioNs IN
coNTiNenTAl dIplomacy, LiKe Flags Of trUCE IN MexIco, DepeNd almOst
entirely on CirCumsTAncEs wheTher tHey aRe RegarDed or nOt, and HeNce
the _circumstaNces_ Are more imPorTaNt tHaN writTEn stipUlaTioN.
EuropeAn treatIEs, lIkE eURoPean diplomacy, have iN tHE PaSt, served
Only to ILlUsTRate the dUpLicIty aND FaithLessNEsS of monarChs. The
QUeStIon is, hoW eVents iN tHeiR prOgresS Have SettleD the
diffIcultIEs, as _fate_ settleS Them, and not as cOMmISSiONers.

now It was evidenT, botH To thE EngLIsH anD ameriCan coMmISsIOners,
that articles on NeUtral rIghts And the impressMent of seamEN, WEre
useleSs. OuR NaVY and privateers Had diSposed of thOSe questiOns, foR
ever. Our BroadsideS FUrnished BetTer GuaRanTIEs Than strips of
pARChmeNt, Adorned WitH impresSioNs oF reGal SeAls.

It was tHe fact thAt ThOsE tWo gReat cAUses of hoStIliTy, VioLatioN Of
neutRal riGhts AnD iMPreSsment oF SeAMEn, weRe PrActiCalLy And
peRmanENtlY disposEd of, which RecONcilEd ThE nation To their omissiOn
In the treatY. OUr pEople pAY No attentIon to forms, only so far as
thEY sanctiOn tHeir jUst cLaims. In thIs vIew, the AcqUIescenCe in thE
treaTy, InsTEAd of eXHIbItiNg Humility anD FEar On our PaRt, inDicate
qUite the reverse. NothINg cAn be more erronEouS thaN TO sUppOSe THat
BeCAusE THose rights, for thE protectioN oF WhIch we had goNE to WaR,
were noT mentioNed in THe treatY, we therefOre had conClUded TO WaiVe
them. On thE contrarY, we consenTEd to lEAvE them UnnOticed, _BeCauSe_
we kNew we hAD _obTaineD_ them fOrEver. No One in enGland or tHe
United States doubted thAt thesE were DefInitely seTtlED, anD those
who SneeRingly ask "wHat We gAined By tHE war?" mAke tHE
 was
signalized by publicrejoicings , and  th e m os t ex trav agant
manifest a tion s of delight. The asto nishi ng vict o ry  at N ew Orle a ns r equ ir ed  us  t o  b e gen ero us, and  a nationwhi ch  had thus vi n di cated itsrig hts on sea a ndland,co uld affor d t o dro p an u n pleasa nt subjec tj ust wh e re thed i sc ussi on had begun. Suc h  s e emed to be the  gener al fe e l ing . A t first si gh t, th i s settl e me n t oft he difficulti es betweent hetwo co un tri e s appe aredco n tem ptible. Abs trac tly consi deredi t was,a nd if w e hadbee n a  wea k  n at ion ,s ink i ng  in t o d egenerac y,  i t wou ld
h a v e prov edso.
Butin judging of  it  wem ust  reme mberthat  t reaty  stipu latio ns  in
continental  dip lomacy, l ike  f lag sof tr u ce inMex ico , depen d almos t 
en ti r e l yon circumstances w he t h er  they ar e rega r de do r not, a nd  he ncet h e _ci rcum s ta nces_ ar e more im po rtant t ha n writ te n s tip ulati o n.
E uropea n treati es, l i ke European di p lomacy, havei nt h ep ast,  se rved
only t o il l ustr atet he  du p licit y and  f a it h lessness of monarch s.  The
q uesti on is, how ev ents in th e i r  progres s ha v es ettled the
dif ficul ties, as _ f ate_ set tlesthem, an d not asc o mmission ers .
Now  it w as  evident, bot h to t he  Englis h a nd Amer ica n c omm iss io ners,
tha t articl es  o nne utr al ri g hts andth e i mp res sment of sea men,were 
u se l ess . Our n a vy a nd p ri va teer s h ad  disp osed ofthose q uestions,  fo r 
eve r.  O ur broa dsides furnis he d better g ua ran ties t h a n strips  of
parchment, adornedw ith imp res sions  ofregal sea ls. 

It w ast he fac t that  thos etwo g reatc a us esof  hostility , vio latio nof
n eutralrights and impress m ent  of seamen, w ere  pra c t ic all y  a n d
p er m ane n t ly disposed of,  which rec on c il ed the nat i onto  theiromissio n
int he trea ty. Our p eople pay  n o at t e nti on to form s, onlyso far as theys an ction  th eir ju st  cl aims.  In th i s v iew,the ac qu iescen ce in  t he
treat y, instead of exhibitin g humi lityand  fear onour par t, indica te
q uite the r eve rse . Not hin g  canbe m o re  er r oneou s th a n to supp o se  th a t 
b ecause thos e r igh ts, f ort he pro tect ion of which we h a d gone to war, 
wer e not  me n tion ed  in the treaty , w et h ereforeha d concluded  to waiv et hem.On the  contr ary, we c on s entedto l eav e them un not ic e d, _bec au se _ 
we kn ew w ehad _o btaine d _ th e m  forever. No one  in E n g lando r t he
Un it ed Stat e s do ubted that  these were  defin itel y set tled, a nd  those 
wh osneeringly ask "what  we g ained b ythewar ?" mak e th e 
 was
signalized_by public_rejoicings, and the most_extravagant
manifestations of_delight._The astonishing_victory_at New Orleans
required_us to be_generous, and a nation_which had thus_vindicated_its
rights on sea and land, could afford to drop an unpleasant subject
just where the_discussion_had begun._Such_seemed_to be the general
feeling. At_first sight, this settlement of_the difficulties_between
the two countries appeared contemptible. Abstractly considered it_was,
and_if we had_been a weak nation, sinking into degeneracy, it would
have_proved so.

But in judging of it_we must remember_that_treaty_stipulations in
continental diplomacy, like_flags of truce in Mexico, depend_almost
entirely on circumstances whether they are_regarded or not, and hence
the _circumstances_ are_more important than written stipulation.
European treaties,_like European diplomacy, have in_the past,_served
only to illustrate the duplicity_and faithlessness of_monarchs. The
question_is, how events_in their progress have settled the
difficulties,_as _fate_ settles_them, and not as commissioners.

Now it_was_evident, both to_the_English_and American_commissioners,
that articles on_neutral_rights and_the_impressment of seamen, were
useless. Our navy_and_privateers had disposed of those questions, for
ever._Our broadsides furnished better_guaranties_than strips of
parchment, adorned_with impressions of regal seals.

It_was the fact that those two_great causes_of hostility,_violation of
neutral rights and impressment of seamen, were practically and
permanently disposed_of, which reconciled the nation to_their omission
in the treaty._Our people_pay_no attention to_forms,_only so_far as
they sanction their just claims. In_this view,_the acquiescence in the
treaty, instead of_exhibiting humility and fear_on_our part, indicate
quite the reverse. Nothing_can be more erroneous than to_suppose that
because those rights, for_the_protection_of which we had gone_to war,
were not mentioned in the_treaty, we therefore_had concluded to waive
them. On the contrary,_we_consented to leave them unnoticed, _because_
we_knew_we had _obtained_ them forever. No_one_in_England or the
United States doubted_that these were definitely settled, and_those
who sneeringly ask "what we gained by the war?"_make the