 particular variations in detail. Not only had many
situations been discussed, as Berry tells us, but new signals had been
inserted in the signal-book to enable the admiral's intentions to be
quickly understood. To provide for the case of the enemy being met at
sea, the force had been organized into three squadrons,--a subdivision
of command which, while surrendering nothing of the admiral's
initiative, much facilitated the application of his plans, by
committing the execution of major details to the two senior captains,
Saumarez and Troubridge, each wielding a group of four ships. Among
the provisions for specific contingencies was one that evidently
sprang from the report that the enemy's fleet numbered sixteen or
seventeen of the line,--an impression which arose from there being in
it four Venetian ships so rated, which were not, however, fit for a
place in the line. In that case Nelson proposed to attack, ship for
ship, the rear thirteen of the enemy. That he preferred, when
possible, to throw two ships on one is evident enough--the approaching
battle proves it; but when confronted with a force stronger,
numerically, than his own, and under way, he provides what was
certainly the better alternative. He engages at once the attention of
as many ships as possible, confident that he brings against each a
force superior to it, owing to the general greater efficiency of
British ships over French of that date, and especially of those in his
own squadron, called by St. Vincent the _elite_ of the Navy.

The position of the French fleet, and the arrangements made by its
commander, Admiral Brueys, must now be given, for they constitute the
particular situation against which Nelson's general plan of attack was
to be directed. Considering it impracticable for the ships-of-the-line
to enter the port of Alexandria, Brueys had taken the fleet on the 8th
of July to their present anchorage. Aboukir Bay begins at a promontory
of the same name, and, after curving boldly south, extends eastward
eighteen miles, terminating at the Rosetta mouth of the Nile. From the
shore the depth increases very gradually, so that water enough for
ships-of-the-line was not found till three miles from the coast. Two
particular variations in detail. Not only take many 
 situation been discussed, as Berry tells us, but new signal had been 
 inserted in the signal - book to enable the admiral's purpose to be 
 quickly understood. To supply for the case of the enemy being suffer at 
 sea, the force had been unionize into three squadrons,--a subsection 
 of command which, while surrendering nothing of the admiral's 
 initiative, much facilitated the lotion of his plans, by 
 committing the execution of major detail to the two senior captains, 
 Saumarez and Troubridge, each wield a group of four ships. Among 
 the commissariat for specific contingencies was one that evidently 
 sprang from the report that the enemy's fleet number sixteen or 
 seventeen of the line,--an impression which arose from there being in 
 it four Venetian ships so rated, which were not, however, fit for a 
 plaza in the line. In that case Nelson proposed to attack, ship for 
 ship, the rear thirteen of the enemy. That he preferred, when 
 possible, to throw two ships on one is evident enough -- the approach 
 battle proves it; but when confront with a power stronger, 
 numerically, than his own, and under way, he provides what was 
 surely the better option. He engages at once the attention of 
 as many ship as possible, confident that he brings against each a 
 force superior to it, owing to the cosmopolitan greater efficiency of 
 British ships over French of that date, and especially of those in his 
 own squadron, called by St. Vincent the _ elite _ of the Navy. 

 The position of the French fleet, and the arrangements made by its 
 commanding officer, Admiral Brueys, must now be given, for they constitute the 
 particular situation against which Nelson's cosmopolitan plan of attack was 
 to be directed. Considering it impracticable for the ships - of - the - line 
 to enter the port of Alexandria, Brueys had taken the fleet on the 8th 
 of July to their present anchorage. Aboukir Bay begin at a promontory 
 of the same name, and, after curving boldly south, extends eastward 
 eighteen miles, end at the Rosetta mouth of the Nile. From the 
 shore the astuteness increases very gradually, so that water enough for 
 ship - of - the - line was not found till three miles from the coast. Two
 pagticular variations in dttail. Not only hab many
smtuatiohs been aiscussed, as Berry tells us, uut bew sugnals had been
insertea in the dignal-boik ti enable thx admiral's intsktionv to be
quickly onderstood. Tm provide for dhd ease of the enemy being met at
sea, thq force hwd been organieed imeo tgget squadrons,--a subdivision
of commans which, while surrencering nothing of the admigal's
lnitiative, much fafilitated tye a[plication of his plans, by
committinf the execution of major detailr to che two senuoe cwktains,
Saumarxz and Troubridge, csch wialding s group of fouv shi's. Anong
the provisions foc specific contingensies was mnz that evidently
sprant drom jhe raporg thxt uhe ehemy's vlext numbered sixteen or
weventeen of the lime,--wb impression shich wrjse from there being in
it four Venetian shjps so rated, which were not, however, fit for w
place in the line. In that case Nelson proposed to attack, vhip hof
shni, gye rear thirteen of the enemy. That he preferred, shtn
ppssible, to thrjw two shipx ln jne is evidenj enougk--fhs approaching
battlf provef it; vut when sonftonted with a force strongee,
numerically, rhan his own, and uuder way, he 'rovidgs whay was
certainly the bettzr altsrnative. He engages zg once the attengiok ox
as many ships as possible, confidenv thac he brivgs sgainse each a
fogce sm[erior to it, owing to tke geteral greaher efficiency of
British ships over French of tvat date, anb espegially of those in his
own squcdron, cajled cy St. Vincvnt the _enite_ of the Navy.

The posidlon of the Fcench fleqt, abd tye arraveements made bu its
commcuder, Admieal Brueys, must nox be fiven, for they eubstitute the
paryicjlaw divuatijt against whhch Velrpn's gdneral kjak ow atyack was
to be directad. Cknsidering it imprscbicable fir the srips-of-the-line
yo enter the port lf Alxxandrma, Brurys had taken the fleet on the 8th
kf July tl tmeir present wnchirage. Aboukix Bay begins at a promontory
of the same iame, and, after curving voldly south, extendx eastward
eijhteen miles, tesminating at the Roswtta mouth of the Nile. From the
shore tge depdh infreases very gradually, so that water enough for
ships-of-the-line was not foubd till three milea frpm thv cjcst. Two
particular variations in detail. Not only had been as Berry us, but new the to enable the intentions to be understood. To provide for the case the enemy being met at sea, the force had been organized into three subdivision of command which, while surrendering nothing of the admiral's initiative, much facilitated application his by the execution of major details to the two senior captains, Saumarez and Troubridge, each wielding a of four ships. Among the provisions for specific was one that evidently from the report that the fleet sixteen or of line,--an which arose from being in it four Venetian ships so rated, which were not, however, fit for a place in line. In Nelson proposed attack, for the rear thirteen enemy. That he preferred, when possible, ships on one is evident enough--the approaching battle it; but confronted with a force stronger, numerically, his own, and under way, he provides what certainly the better alternative. He engages at once the attention of as many ships as that he brings against a force superior it, to general efficiency of ships over French of that date, and especially of those in own squadron, called by St. Vincent the _elite_ of the position the French fleet, the arrangements made by commander, Brueys, must now be they the which general of attack was to directed. Considering it impracticable for ships-of-the-line to enter the taken the fleet on the 8th of July their present anchorage. Aboukir Bay begins at promontory of the same name, and, after curving boldly south, extends eastward miles, terminating Rosetta mouth of the Nile. From the shore depth increases very gradually, that water enough for ships-of-the-line was not found till miles the coast.
 particular variations in detAil. Not only Had maNy
sItuAtIons Been Discussed, as BerRY telLs us, but new signals had beEn
insErTEd in THe SignaL-book to ENaBLE thE aDmIraL's INtEntioNs tO be
quicKly understOod. to Provide for thE CaSe of the eneMy bEing met at
sea, The Force hAd BeeN OrganIzeD into Three sQUadronS,--a subdiviSiON
of comMAnd whicH, WHiLe suRrendering nothing OF tHE admiral's
initiAtive, mUcH FaCILitAteD the applicAtIon of HIs plans, BY
cOMMIttINg the executioN of major detAIls To the tWo SenIOr captAins,
SAuMAreZ and TroubriDge, eAch wieldiNg a groUP of four SHips. AmoNg
the pRovIsiOns fOR sPeCifIc COntINgEncIEs wAs one thaT eViDentlY
sprANG FRom tHe rEporT that The enemy's fleeT nuMberED siXteen Or
sevEnteEn Of the Line,--an ImpreSsIon which arose frOm thEre being iN
it FoUr VEnEtian SHips so RatEd, wHich werE not, howEVer, FiT FOR a
Place in the line. In thAt CASe nelson prOposed TO aTtACk, ship foR
sHip, The rEAR thirTeen OF tHe enemy. THat he pREfErRed, when
PoSsible, To ThrOw tWo shiPS on oNe is evIdent enoUgh--thE Approaching
batTLe proves it; but WHeN COnFRontEd wIth a force stRongER,
numEricALlY, thAN his oWn, and UnDEr WAy, he provides what was
CeRtainlY the bEtter alternatIve. He engagES AT once the AtteNTiON of
as many ships As posSible, confiDEnt that hE brinGs againsT each a
forCE Superior To iT, owIng To tHE GeNeral greater eFFIcieNcY of
BritIsh Ships ovEr FRenCh oF thAt Date, and esPecially Of ThOsE iN hiS
own sQUadron, caLlEd bY ST. ViNcent THe _elitE_ of thE NavY.

THe POsiTion of tHE FRENch fLeEt, And tHe aRrAngemEnts MAde By its
coMmander, AdMirAL BruEyS, mUst now bE given, for they CoNstitute thE
pArtIcular SITuation aGainst which Nelson's generAL plan of AttAck waS
to bE directed. conSideriNg iT ImpracTicablE for tHe ShiPS-Of-the-LINe
To eNtEr the port oF aLexAndriA, BRueyS had takEn the fleet on the 8th
oF julY to their preseNt aNchoRAGe. aboUKiR bay BeGIns AT A promontory
of thE same name, aNd, AFtEr curving bOLdlY sOuth, extEnds easTward
EIghteen Miles, termInating at ThE RosETTa mOuth of the NIle. From tHe
shore thE Depth INcReaseS veRy gradUaLly, So thaT water ENouGh for
Ships-oF-tHe-line Was noT fOund till Three miles from the coast. TWo
 particular variations indetail. No t onl y h adma ny
s itua tions been dis c usse d, as Berry tells us,but n ew sign a ls  hadbeen
in s er t e d i nth e s ig n al -book  to  enable  the admir al' sintentions t o  b e
quicklyund erstood. Topro vide f or  th e  case  of  theenemyb eing m et at
sea ,t he for c e had b e e norga nized into threes qu a drons,--a subd ivisio no fc o mma ndwhich, whi le  surr e ndering no t h i ngo f the admiral 's
initiati v e,much f ac ili t ated t he ap pl i cat ion of hisplan s, by
com mittin g  the ex e cutionof maj ordet ails to  t hetw o  se n io r c a pta ins,
Sau ma re z and  Tro u b r i dge,  ea ch w ieldi ng a group of  fo ur s h ips . Amo ng
th e pr ov ision s forspeci fi c contingencies  was  one that  ev id ent ly 
spra n g from  th e r eport t hat the ene my ' s fl eet numbered sixte en o rseventee n of t h eli n e,--an i mp res sion w hicharos e  f rom ther e bein g  i nit four  V enetia nshi psso ra t ed,whichwere not , how e ver, fit for a place in thel in e .  I n  tha t c ase Nelsonprop o sedto a t ta ck, shipfor
s hi p ,t he rear thirteen of  t he ene my. T hat he prefer red, whenp o s sible, t o th r ow two ships on o ne is  evident e n ough--th e app roaching 
battle p r o ves it;but  wh encon f r on ted with a fo r c e st ro nger,
n ume rically , t han  hi s o wn , and und er way,he  p ro vi des  what was
cert ai nly  t hebette r  alter nativ e. H een g age s at on c et h e at te nt ionofas  many  shi p s a s possi ble, conf ide n t th at  h e bring s against eac ha
force su pe rio r to i t ,  owing t o the general greater e f ficienc y o f
Bri tish  ships ov erFrench  of that d ate, a nd es pe cia l l y oft h os e i nhis
own sq u a dro n, ca ll ed b y St. V incent the _elite_ ofthe Navy.

Th e p osit i o noft he Fre nc h  fl e e t, and the arra ngements m ad e  b y its
comm a nde r,  Admira l Bruey s, mu s t now b e given,for theyco nsti t u tethe
partic ular sit uation ag a instw hi ch Ne lso n's ge ne ral  plan  of at t ack  wasto bedi rected . Con si dering i t impracticable for the  ships -of-t he- line
to e nte r  th e port of  Ale xandria, B rue yshad t ake n  theflee t  o n t h e 8th 
ofJ uly to th e ir  pr e s en t anchorage . A bou kir B ayb eginsat a  promontory
of th e  same name, an d, a f t ercur v ingbo ldly south, ex ten ds e astwardei ghteen mile s, termi na t ing a t theRosett a mouth o ft he Nil e. F rom  the
shor e t he depth i nc re a ses ve ry g ra dually , so t h at w a t er enough for
sh ips-o f - the-l i newas n ot  foundt illthree mile s from thecoast.  Two 
 particular_variations in_detail. Not only had_many
situations been_discussed,_as Berry_tells_us, but new_signals had been
inserted_in the signal-book to_enable the admiral's_intentions_to be
quickly understood. To provide for the case of the enemy being met at
sea,_the_force had_been_organized_into three squadrons,--a subdivision
of command_which, while surrendering nothing of_the admiral's
initiative,_much facilitated the application of his plans, by
committing_the_execution of major_details to the two senior captains,
Saumarez and Troubridge, each_wielding a group of four ships._Among
the provisions for_specific_contingencies_was one that evidently
sprang_from the report that the enemy's_fleet numbered sixteen or
seventeen of the_line,--an impression which arose from there being_in
it four Venetian ships so rated,_which were not, however, fit_for a
place_in the line. In that_case Nelson proposed_to attack,_ship for
ship, the_rear thirteen of the enemy. That_he preferred, when
possible,_to throw two ships on one_is_evident enough--the approaching
battle_proves_it;_but when_confronted with a_force_stronger,
numerically, than_his_own, and under way, he provides_what_was
certainly the better alternative. He engages at_once the attention of
as_many_ships as possible, confident_that he brings against each_a
force superior to it, owing to_the general_greater efficiency_of
British ships over French of that date, and especially of those_in his
own squadron, called by St._Vincent the _elite_ of_the Navy.

The_position_of the French_fleet,_and the_arrangements made by its
commander, Admiral Brueys, must_now be_given, for they constitute the
particular situation_against which Nelson's general_plan_of attack was
to be directed. Considering_it impracticable for the ships-of-the-line
to enter_the port of Alexandria, Brueys_had_taken_the fleet on the 8th
of_July to their present anchorage. Aboukir_Bay begins at_a promontory
of the same name, and, after_curving_boldly south, extends eastward
eighteen miles, terminating_at_the Rosetta mouth of the Nile._From_the
shore_the depth increases very gradually,_so that water enough for
ships-of-the-line was_not found till three miles from the coast. Two