 devoted himself to stopping every loophole of
excuse which might afterwards be converted into reproaches to the
navy.

The cause for the inadequacy of the force left under his command, of
which he often complains, is not apparent. The question was put direct
to the admiral whether he would co-operate with the fleet in the
proposed descent of the Austrians. He said that he could not, owing to
the nature of his instructions from home; but that he would answer
for it that the French navy should not interfere. Six weeks later the
question was repeated; but the admiral replied that, after a
consultation with the flag-officers under his command, he refused
co-operation in what he considered a wild scheme. In this opinion he
was probably right, though Nelson possibly was reminded of Dundas's
objections to besieging Bastia. Nelson then went in person to Leghorn,
and saw Hotham. He asked to be given two seventy-fours and the
transports, to make the attempt himself. Hotham again refused a single
ship; but not only so, reduced Nelson's squadron, and ordered him, in
addition to his present duties, to reconnoitre Toulon continually,
"whilst he," said Nelson, scornfully, "lies quiet in Leghorn Roads."
It would almost seem as if the admiral thought that the time had come
for a little judicious snubbing, and repression of ardor in the
uncomfortable subordinate, whose restless energy conflicted so much
with his repose of mind. The fleet spent its time chiefly in San
Fiorenzo Bay or in Leghorn, making occasional cruises off Toulon to
observe the French navy in that port. The latter was undoubtedly its
principal care; but, being distinctly inferior to the British, it is
impossible to say why Nelson should not have been reinforced. If it
was due to the wish to continue so largely superior in numbers, it
certainly illustrates with singular appositeness the deterrent effect
of an inferior "fleet in being," and that that effect lies less in the
nature of things than in the character of the officer upon whom it is
produced. Moreover, the employment of adequate force upon the Riviera,
in active aggressive work under Nelson during the summer, when it was

devoted himself to stopping every loophole of 
 excuse which might afterwards be convert into reproach to the 
 navy. 

 The cause for the inadequacy of the violence left under his command, of 
 which he much complain, is not apparent. The question was frame direct 
 to the admiral whether he would co - operate with the fleet in the 
 nominate descent of the Austrians. He said that he could not, owe to 
 the nature of his teaching from home; but that he would suffice 
 for it that the French navy should not intervene. Six week later the 
 question was repeated; but the admiral answer that, after a 
 consultation with the flag - military officer under his command, he refuse 
 co - operation in what he considered a wild scheme. In this public opinion he 
 was probably right, though Nelson possibly was reminded of Dundas's 
 objections to besieging Bastia. Nelson then went in person to Leghorn, 
 and saw Hotham. He asked to be given two seventy - fours and the 
 transports, to make the attempt himself. Hotham again refused a single 
 ship; but not only so, shrink Nelson's squadron, and ordered him, in 
 addition to his present duties, to scout Toulon continually, 
 " whilst he, " say Nelson, scornfully, " lies hushed in Leghorn Roads. " 
 It would almost seem as if the admiral thought that the time had derive 
 for a little judicious snubbing, and repression of ardor in the 
 uncomfortable subordinate, whose restless energy conflicted so much 
 with his repose of thinker. The fleet spent its time chiefly in San 
 Fiorenzo Bay or in Leghorn, making occasional cruise off Toulon to 
 observe the French united states navy in that larboard. The latter was undoubtedly its 
 principal care; but, being distinctly inferior to the British, it is 
 impossible to say why Nelson should not have been reinforce. If it 
 was due to the wish to continue therefore largely superior in numbers, it 
 certainly illustrates with singular aptness the deterrent effect 
 of an inferior " fleet in being, " and that that effect lies less in the 
 nature of thing than in the character of the military officer upon whom it is 
 produced. furthermore, the employment of adequate force upon the Riviera, 
 in active aggressive workplace under Nelson during the summer, when it was
 degoted himself to stoppinn every loophole of
excuve whidh might afterwards be converted intl eeproqches to the
navy.

The cajse for tje inadewuacb of the force lxrt undev his gommaud, of
which he ofjen complainv, is not apparang. Che question was put direct
to the adiiral wnehher he would so-optraee wjnh the fleet in the
proposed desdent of the Austrianx. He said that he could noh, owlng to
the nature ov his instrodtijbs from home; but that he would ansser
for it that the French navy rhoulb not interdeee. Dhx weeks laver thv
question was repeateg; but tne admiral repkiev thqt, after a
consultatioi with the flag-officgrs under via command, he refuwee
co-opgratimn iv whxt ge cknsideged a wild scgeme. In thiw opinion he
was pronafoy right, thoufh Nelfog possibly was reminded of Dundas's
objecuions to besieging Bastia. Neoson then went in perdon to Ledhorn,
and saw Hotham. He asked to be given two sevetty-fonrr aue the
geajsports, to make the attempt himself. Hotham agwjn rvfused a single
shlp; but not only so, rfdised Nelson's sduadrou, ahd ordered him, in
afdition to hus presenu dutoes, to reconnoitre Toulon cintinually,
"whplst he," said Nelson, sclrnfully, "lizs quigt in Keghorn Roads."
It would aumosf seem as iv the admjfal thought that thv tike had come
for a little juqicious siubbiug, and rdprexsion jf ardor ij the
mtcomfortable suborfinatg, whosa restless energy conflicted so much
with ims repose of kitd. Nhe fleet spenb its time chiesly in San
Fiorgnzo Bay jr in Leghorn, mzking orcasional crtises off Tounln to
observe the Fregch bavy in thag port. The lattrr was unbjubtwdly its
principal gare; cht, being distineuly inferior to thr Bfitysj, mt is
ykpossible to say whh Nelsun should nig hafe been reinforced. Ix it
sas due to the wisn bo continoe so lardely superior in numbers, it
certwinly iluustrstef with singular appositeness tge deterrfnt effect
of an infcriot "fleet in yeing," and that that effect lies less in vhe
nature of things thab in the character pn the officec upon whom it hs
produced. Moreover, rhe employment of adequate force upon fhe Rieiera,
ln active aggressive work under Nelson during the summer, when it was

devoted himself to stopping every loophole of might be converted reproaches to the inadequacy the force left his command, of he often complains, is not apparent. question was put direct to the admiral whether he would co-operate with the in the proposed descent of the Austrians. He said that he could not, to nature his from home; but that he would answer for it that the French navy should not interfere. weeks later the question was repeated; but the replied that, after a with the flag-officers under his he co-operation in he a scheme. In this he was probably right, though Nelson possibly was reminded of Dundas's objections to besieging Bastia. Nelson then in person and saw He to given two seventy-fours transports, to make the attempt himself. a single ship; but not only so, reduced squadron, and him, in addition to his present to reconnoitre Toulon continually, "whilst he," said Nelson, "lies quiet in Leghorn Roads." It would almost seem as if the admiral thought that had come for a judicious snubbing, and of in uncomfortable whose restless conflicted so much with his repose of mind. The fleet spent time chiefly in San Fiorenzo Bay or in Leghorn, making off to observe the navy in that port. latter undoubtedly its principal care; distinctly to is to why Nelson should not been reinforced. If it was to the wish to numbers, it certainly illustrates with singular appositeness the effect of an inferior "fleet in being," that that effect lies less in the nature of things than in character of upon whom it is produced. Moreover, the employment adequate force upon the in active aggressive work under Nelson during the summer, it
 devoted himself to stopping eVery loophoLe of
eXcuSe wHiCh miGht aFterwards be conVErteD into reproaches to the
naVy.

The CaUSe foR ThE inadEquacy oF ThE FOrcE lEfT unDeR HiS commAnd, Of
which He often comPlaInS, is not appareNT. THe question Was Put direct
to tHe aDmiral WhEthER he woUld Co-opeRate wiTH the flEet in the
pRoPOsed deSCent of tHE auStriAns. He said that he coULd NOt, owing to
the naTure of HiS InSTRucTioNs from home; BuT that HE would aNSwER
FOr iT That the French Navy should nOT inTerferE. SIx wEEks latEr the
QuEStiOn was repeatEd; buT the admirAl replIEd that, aFTer a
conSultatIon WitH the FLaG-oFfiCeRS unDEr His COmmAnd, he refUsEd
Co-opeRatiON IN What He cOnsiDered A wild scheme. In ThiS opiNIon He
was ProbaBly rIgHt, thoUgh NelSon poSsIbly was reminded Of DuNdas's
objeCtiOnS to BeSiegiNG BastiA. NeLsoN then weNt in perSOn tO LEGHOrN,
and saw Hotham. He askEd TO Be Given two SeventY-FoUrS And the
trAnSpoRts, tO MAke thE attEMpT himself. hotham AGaIn Refused A sIngle
sHiP; buT noT only SO, redUced NeLson's squAdron, ANd ordered him, in
ADdition to his pREsENT dUTies, To rEconnoitre TOuloN ContInuaLLy,
"WhiLSt he," sAid NeLsON, sCOrnfully, "lies quiet in leGhorn ROads."
IT would almost sEem as if the ADMIral thouGht tHAt THe time had come
fOr a liTtle judiciOUs snubbiNg, and RepressiOn of ardor IN The
uncomForTabLe sUboRDInAte, whose restlESS eneRgY confliCteD so much
WitH hiS rePosE oF mind. The fLeet spenT iTs TiMe ChiEfly iN san
FioreNzO BaY oR in leghoRN, makinG occaSionAl CrUIseS off TouLOn TO
ObseRvE tHe FrEncH nAvy in That POrt. the lattEr was undoUbtEDly iTs
PrIncipal Care; but, being dIsTinctly infErIor To the BRITish, it is
Impossible to say why NelsoN Should nOt hAve beEn reInforced. IF it
Was due To tHE wish tO contiNue so LaRgeLY SuperIOR iN nuMbErs, it
certaINLy iLlustRaTes wIth singUlar appositeness thE DetErrent effect
oF an InfeRIOr "FleET iN BeiNg," ANd tHAT that effect lies Less in the
nAtURe Of things thAN in ThE characTer of thE offiCEr upon wHom it is
prOduced. MorEoVer, tHE EmpLoyment of aDequate fOrce upon tHE RiviERa,
In actIve AggresSiVe wOrk unDer NelSOn dUring The sumMeR, when iT was

 devoted himself to stoppi ng every l oopho leofex cuse  whi ch might after w ards  be converted into rep roach es to t h enavy. 

The c a us e for  t he  in ad e qu acy o f t he forc e left und erhi s command, o f 
w hich he of ten  complains,isnot ap pa ren t . The  qu estio n wasp ut dir ect
to th ea dmiral whether h ewoul d co-operate with th e  fleet in thepropos ed de s c ent  of  the Austr ia ns. H e  said t h at h e  co u ld not, owing  to
the nat u reof his  i nst r uction s fro mh ome ; but thathe w ould answ er
for it that the Fre nch na vysho uldn ot  i nte rf e re. Si x w e eks  later t he 
q uesti on w a s r epea ted ; bu t the  admiral repl ied  tha t , a ftera
con sult at ion w ith th e fla g- officers underhiscommand,here fus ed 
co-o p eratio n i n w hat heconside r edaw i l dscheme. In this op in i o nhe
was p robabl y  r ig h t, thoug hNel sonp o ssibl y wa s  r emindedof Dun d as 's 
object io ns tobe sie gin g Bas t ia.Nelson  then we nt in person to Legh o rn,
and saw H o th a m .H e as ked  to be give n tw o  sev enty - fo urs and t he
tr an s po r ts, to make the att em pt him self.  Hotham again  refused a s i ngle
shi p; b u tn ot only so, re duced  Nelson'ss quadron,  andorderedhim, in
a d d ition to  hi s p res ent d ut ies, to recon n o itre  T oulon c ont inually ,
" whi lst  he ,"  said Nel son, sco rn fu ll y,  "l ies q u iet in L eg hor nRoa ds."I t woul d alm ostse em asif thea dm i r al t ho ug ht t hat  t he ti me h a d c ome
for  a little  ju d icio us  s nubbing , and repress io n of ardor  i n t he
unc o m fortable  subordinate, whose res t less en erg y con flic ted so mu chwith h isr eposeof min d. Th efle e t  spen t it s t im e chieflyi n  Sa n
Fio re nzoBay orin Leghorn, making occ asional cruis esoffT o ul ont oo bse rv e  th e French navy inthat port.  T h elatter was und ou btedlyits
pri ncipa l  care;but, bein g distinc tl y in f e rio r to the B ritish,it is
imp o ssibl e  t o say  wh y Nels on  sh ouldnot ha v e b een r einfor ce d. Ifit
wa sdue to t he wish to continue solargel y sup eri or in num ber s , i t
certain ly i llustrates  wi thsingu lar appos iten e ss  th e  dete rren t  effect
o f  a n i n f er ior "fleeti n bei ng,"and that t hateffect lies lessi n the
nature o f th i n gstha n  inth e character of  th eo f ficer up on  whom it is 
produce d. Moreo ver, t he emp loyment o fa dequat e fo rce  upon the  Ri vi e ra,
inac ti v e aggr essi ve  workunderN elso n during the summe r, wh e n  it w a s

 devoted_himself to_stopping every loophole of
excuse_which might_afterwards_be converted_into_reproaches to the
navy.

The_cause for the_inadequacy of the force_left under his_command,_of
which he often complains, is not apparent. The question was put direct
to the admiral_whether_he would_co-operate_with_the fleet in the
proposed descent_of the Austrians. He said_that he_could not, owing to
the nature of his instructions_from_home; but that_he would answer
for it that the French navy should_not interfere. Six weeks later the
question_was repeated; but_the_admiral_replied that, after a
consultation_with the flag-officers under his command,_he refused
co-operation in what he considered_a wild scheme. In this opinion he
was_probably right, though Nelson possibly was_reminded of Dundas's
objections to besieging_Bastia. Nelson_then went in person to_Leghorn,
and saw Hotham._He asked_to be given_two seventy-fours and the
transports, to make_the attempt himself._Hotham again refused a single
ship; but_not_only so, reduced_Nelson's_squadron,_and ordered_him, in
addition to_his_present duties,_to_reconnoitre Toulon continually,
"whilst he," said Nelson,_scornfully,_"lies quiet in Leghorn Roads."
It would almost_seem as if the_admiral_thought that the time_had come
for a little judicious_snubbing, and repression of ardor in_the
uncomfortable subordinate,_whose restless_energy conflicted so much
with his repose of mind. The fleet spent_its time chiefly in San
Fiorenzo Bay_or in Leghorn, making_occasional cruises_off_Toulon to
observe the_French_navy in_that port. The latter was undoubtedly its
principal_care; but,_being distinctly inferior to the British,_it is
impossible to say_why_Nelson should not have been reinforced._If it
was due to the wish_to continue so largely superior_in_numbers,_it
certainly illustrates with singular appositeness_the deterrent effect
of an inferior "fleet_in being," and_that that effect lies less in the
nature_of_things than in the character of_the_officer upon whom it is
produced. Moreover,_the_employment_of adequate force upon the_Riviera,
in active aggressive work under Nelson_during the summer, when it was
