 not have been
expected had our whole fleet engaged? Improperly as the part of the
fleet which fired got into action, we took one ship; but the subject
is unpleasant, and I shall have done with it." The criticism, though
far from explicit, evidently bears upon the manner in which the fleet
was handled, from the moment the enemy was sighted until the firing
began. During the latter, Man was the senior officer on the spot, and
Nelson does not blame him; on the contrary, punning on the name, says,
"He is a good _man_ in every sense of the word."

The precise working of his thought can only be inferred. "The whole
fleet" failed to get into action. Why? Because the signal for a
general chase was delayed from 4 to 8 A.M., pending certain
drill-ground manoeuvres, upon whose results, however well intended, no
dependence could be placed in Mediterranean weather. During these four
hours the wind was fresh,--the heel of a short summer's gale,
invaluable to both sides,--and the enemy were using it to close the
shore, where wind, the sole dependence for motive power, baffles most.
Had the fastest British ships, under a competent flag-officer,
utilized that time and that wind, there was, to put the case most
mildly, the chance that they could repeat, upon the French rear, the
same part the "Agamemnon" alone had played with the "Ca Ira,"--and
such a chance, were it no more, should not have been dawdled with.
"Missed the opportunity,"--the fatal words, "it might have been." Is
it far-fetched to see in his reflections upon "this miserable action,"
as it is styled independently by James and himself, the forecast of
the opening sentence of his celebrated order before
Trafalgar?--"Thinking it almost impossible to bring a fleet of forty
sail-of-the-line[30] into a line of battle in variable winds, thick
weather, and other circumstances which must occur, _without such a
loss of time that the opportunity would probably be lost of bringing
the enemy to battle in such a manner as to make the business
decisive_, I have therefore made up my mind--" Or, again,
not have been 
 expected had our whole fleet engaged? Improperly as the character of the 
 fleet which burn got into legal action, we take one ship; but the subject 
 is unpleasant, and I shall have done with it. " The criticism, though 
 far from denotative, evidently bears upon the manner in which the fleet 
 was handled, from the here and now the enemy was sighted until the dismissal 
 began. During the latter, Man was the senior officeholder on the blot, and 
 Nelson does not blame him; on the contrary, punning on the name, says, 
 " He is a good _ man _ in every common sense of the word. " 

 The precise working of his thought can entirely be inferred. " The whole 
 fleet " fail to catch into action. Why? Because the signal for a 
 cosmopolitan chase was delayed from 4 to 8 A.M., pending certain 
 drill - reason manoeuvres, upon whose results, however well intended, no 
 dependence could be placed in Mediterranean weather. During these four 
 hour the wind was fresh,--the heel of a short summer's gale, 
 invaluable to both sides,--and the enemy were using it to close the 
 shore, where wind, the sole dependence for motive ability, baffles most. 
 have the fast British ships, under a competent flag - policeman, 
 utilized that time and that wind, there was, to place the case most 
 mildly, the chance that they could repeat, upon the French rear, the 
 like part the " Agamemnon " alone had played with the " Ca Ira,"--and 
 such a chance, were it no more, should not have been dawdled with. 
 " Missed the opportunity,"--the fatal bible, " it might have been. " Is 
 it far - fetched to see in his reflections upon " this miserable action, " 
 as it is styled independently by James and himself, the prognosis of 
 the opening sentence of his celebrated order before 
 Trafalgar?--"Thinking it almost impossible to bring a fleet of forty 
 sail - of - the - line[30 ] into a line of battle in variable wind, thick 
 weather, and early circumstances which must occur, _ without such a 
 loss of time that the opportunity would probably be fall back of bringing 
 the foe to battle in such a manner as to make the clientele 
 decisive _, I have therefore make up my mind-- " Or, again,
 noh have been
expected had uur whole fleet engagev? Improlerly as the part of the
fleet which hiree got into action, we took ove ship; blt the suvjecu
is unpleasant, anv I shall have fone xith it." The crijicism, thougv
far from explhckt, evidently bears upon the manner in which yhf fleet
was hanqled, srom nht moment the enemy was sighted unfil the firing
began. Curing the latter, Man was hhe denior officer on hhe spot, ane
Nelfin does not clame him; on the contrzry, punning on the name, says,
"He ks a yood _man_ in ecerj sense of tie worq."

The precise working of his thought can okly bx inderred. "The whole
fleet" failed to get intj action. Fhv? Because the signal doe a
geteran chxwe das dxlaged frlm 4 to 8 A.M., pehding certaun
drill-ground manoeivwvx, upon whose resules, however well intended, no
dependence cound ge placed in Mediterranwan weather. During thgse four
hotrs the wind was fresh,--the heel of a short summer's gale,
mnxalbqble gi hoth sides,--and the enemy were using it to closq tne
xhore, where wikd, the sole dependrnfe sor motive poder, bayrlss most.
Had the fashest Brytish ships, unqer s competent flag-officer,
utiluzed that tiiw and that wind, thzre was, to pbt the case most
mildly, the chance chat tgey could rfpeat, upoh the French rear, thv
sama part the "Agamemnon" alone had playxd wich the "Cx Irs,"--and
sush a chancf, werc it no more, should not kave teen dawdlfd with.
"Missed the opportunity,"--thx fatal words, "id mpght have been." Is
it far-fetcred to see in kis reflzctionr upon "thia misereble action,"
af it is styleg independentny by Jaies qnd yimself, ghe forecast og
the openpny sentencw of his celebratev orasr before
Trafalycr?--"Uhunking it almoxt kmpjsdiule tj bring a fleat ow futty
sakl-of-the-line[30] knto a line of battle in varjable winds, thick
wrabher, and ither ciwcumstances wnich must occur, _wiuhout vuci a
losx os time that the opportunity wohld probahly be lost of frinning
jhe enemy tp battle in such a manner as to make thx business
decisive_, I hace therefore made uk mn mind--" Or, agein,
not have been expected had our whole Improperly the part the fleet which took ship; but the is unpleasant, and shall have done with it." The though far from explicit, evidently bears upon the manner in which the fleet handled, from the moment the enemy was sighted until the firing began. During latter, was senior on the spot, and Nelson does not blame him; on the contrary, punning on the name, "He is a good _man_ in every sense the word." The precise of his thought can only inferred. whole fleet" to into Why? Because the for a general chase was delayed from 4 to 8 A.M., pending certain drill-ground manoeuvres, upon whose however well dependence could placed Mediterranean During these four wind was fresh,--the heel of a invaluable to both sides,--and the enemy were using to close shore, where wind, the sole dependence motive power, baffles most. Had the fastest British under a competent flag-officer, utilized that time and that wind, there was, to put the mildly, the chance that could repeat, upon French the part "Agamemnon" alone played with the "Ca Ira,"--and such a chance, were it no should not have been dawdled with. "Missed the opportunity,"--the fatal might been." Is it to see in his upon miserable action," as it independently James forecast the sentence of his celebrated before Trafalgar?--"Thinking it almost impossible bring a fleet of of battle in variable winds, thick weather, and circumstances which must occur, _without such a of time that the opportunity would probably be lost of bringing the to battle a manner as to make the business decisive_, have therefore made up mind--" Or, again,
 not have been
expected had our Whole fleet EngagEd? IMprOpErly As thE part of the
fleeT WhicH fired got into action, we tOok onE sHIp; buT ThE subjEct
is unPLeASAnt, AnD I ShaLl HAvE done WitH it." The cRiticism, thOugH
fAr from explicIT, eVidently beArs Upon the manneR in Which tHe FleET
was hAndLed, frOm the mOMent thE enemy was SiGHted unTIl the fiRINg
BegaN. During the latter, MAN wAS the senior offiCer on tHe SPoT, ANd
NElsOn does not bLaMe him; ON the conTRaRY, PUnnINg on the name, saYs,
"He is a good _MAn_ iN every SeNse OF the woRd."

The PrECisE working of hIs thOught can oNly be iNFerred. "THE whole
fLeet" faIleD to Get iNTo AcTioN. WHY? BeCAuSe tHE siGnal for a
GeNeRal chAse wAS DELayeD frOm 4 to 8 a.M., penDing certain
drIll-GrouND maNoeuvRes, upOn whOsE resuLts, howEver wElL intended, no
depeNdenCe could be PlaCeD in meDiterRAnean wEatHer. during tHese fouR
HouRs THE WiNd was fresh,--the heel oF a SHOrT summer's Gale,
inVAlUaBLe to both SiDes,--And tHE Enemy Were USiNg it to clOse the
SHoRe, Where wiNd, The solE dEpeNdeNce foR MotiVe poweR, baffles Most.
HAD the fastest BriTIsh ships, under A CoMPEtENt flAg-oFficer,
utiliZed tHAt tiMe anD ThAt wINd, theRe was, To PUt THe case most
mildly, the ChAnce thAt theY could repeat, uPon the FrenCH REar, the
saMe paRT tHE "Agamemnon" alonE had pLayed with tHE "Ca Ira,"--anD
such A chance, wEre it no moRE, Should noT haVe bEen DawDLEd With.
"Missed the OPPortUnIty,"--the fAtaL words, "iT miGht HavE beEn." is
it far-feTched to sEe In HiS rEflEctioNS upon "thiS mIseRaBle ActioN,"
As it is StyleD indEpEnDEntLy by JamES aND HimsElF, tHe foRecAsT of
thE opeNIng SentencE of his celEbrATed oRdEr Before
TRafalgar?--"ThinkInG it almost iMpOssIble to BRIng a fleeT of forty
sail-of-the-line[30] inTO a line oF baTtle iN varIable windS, thIck
weaTheR, And othEr circUmstaNcEs wHICh musT OCcUr, _wItHout such a
lOSS of Time tHaT the OpportuNity would probably bE LosT of bringing
thE enEmy tO BAtTle IN sUCh a MaNNer AS To make the busineSs
decisive_, i hAVe Therefore mADe uP mY mind--" Or, Again,
 not have been
expected ha d our whol e fle eteng ag ed?Impr operly as thep artof the
fleet which fir ed go ti ntoa ct ion,we took on e shi p;  b utth e  s ubjec t
i s unple asant, and  Ish all have don e  w ith it." T hecriticism, t hou gh
far  f rom expli cit , evi dently bearsupon thema n ner in which t h e  f leet 
was handled, fro m  t h e moment the e nemy w as si g h ted  un til the fi ri ng
be g an. Dur i ng t h e l a tter, Man was  the senior off icer o nthe spot,and
N el s ondoes not bl amehim; on t he con t rary, p u nning o n thenam e,says , 
" He  is  a goo d  _ man _  in  every s en se  of t he w o r d . "

T heprec ise w orking of his  th ough t  ca n onl y beinfe rr ed. " The wh ole
f le et" failed to g et i nto actio n.Wh y?Be cause the si gna l f or a
ge neral c h ase  w a s de layed from 4 to 8A. M . ,pendingcertai n 
d ri l l-ground  m ano euvr e s , upo n wh o se  results , howe v er  w ell int en ded, n odep end encec ould  be pl aced inMedit e rranean weathe r . During thes e  f o u rh ours  th e wind wasfres h ,--t he h e el  of a sho rt su mm e r' s  gale,
invaluable t oboth s ides, --and the ene my were us i n g  it to c lose th e 
shore, wherewind,  the soled ependenc e for  motivepower, ba f f les most .
H adthe  fa s t es t British shi p s , un de r a com pet ent fla g-o ffi cer ,
u ti lized tha t time a nd  t ha twin d, th e re was,to  pu tthe  case most
m ildly , th ech a nce  that t h ey c ould  r ep eat,  up on  theFren c h r ear, th e
same pa rtt he " Ag am emnon"alone had pla ye d with the  " CaIra,"- - a nd
sucha chance, were it no mo r e, shou ldnot h avebeen dawd led  with. 
"M i ssed t he opp ortun it y," - - the f a t al  wo rd s, "it mig h t  ha ve be en ." I s
it fa r-fetched to see i n  hi s reflections  up on " t h is  mi s er a ble  a c tio n , "
as it is styl ed indepen de n tl y by James and  h imself,  the fo recas t  of
the  openingsentenceof  his c ele brated ord er befor e
Trafalg a r?--" T hi nking  it  almos timp ossib le tob rin g a f leet o ffortysail- of -the-lin e[30] into a line of ba ttle i n var iab le winds,  th i ckweather,andother circ ums tan ces w hic h  must  occ u r,  _w i thout  suc h  a
loss o f  t ime t ha t the oppor t u n ity  woul d p r obably  belost of bringingt he enemy to ba ttle i n s uch a ma nn er as to makethe  b u s iness
de ci sive_, I ha ve there fo r e mad e up m y mind --" Or, a ga i n,
 not_have been
expected_had our whole fleet_engaged? Improperly_as_the part_of_the
fleet which fired_got into action,_we took one ship;_but the subject
is_unpleasant,_and I shall have done with it." The criticism, though
far from explicit, evidently bears_upon_the manner_in_which_the fleet
was handled, from the_moment the enemy was sighted_until the_firing
began. During the latter, Man was the senior_officer_on the spot,_and
Nelson does not blame him; on the contrary, punning_on the name, says,
"He is a_good _man_ in_every_sense_of the word."

The precise_working of his thought can only_be inferred. "The whole
fleet" failed to_get into action. Why? Because the signal_for a
general chase was delayed from_4 to 8 A.M., pending_certain
drill-ground manoeuvres,_upon whose results, however well_intended, no
dependence could_be placed_in Mediterranean weather._During these four
hours the wind was_fresh,--the heel of_a short summer's gale,
invaluable to both_sides,--and_the enemy were_using_it_to close_the
shore, where wind,_the_sole dependence_for_motive power, baffles most.
Had the fastest_British_ships, under a competent flag-officer,
utilized that time_and that wind, there_was,_to put the case_most
mildly, the chance that they_could repeat, upon the French rear,_the
same part_the "Agamemnon"_alone had played with the "Ca Ira,"--and
such a chance, were it_no more, should not have been_dawdled with.
"Missed the opportunity,"--the_fatal words,_"it_might have been."_Is
it_far-fetched to_see in his reflections upon "this miserable_action,"
as it_is styled independently by James and_himself, the forecast of
the_opening_sentence of his celebrated order before
Trafalgar?--"Thinking_it almost impossible to bring a_fleet of forty
sail-of-the-line[30] into a_line_of_battle in variable winds, thick
weather,_and other circumstances which must occur,__without such a
loss_of time that the opportunity would probably_be_lost of bringing
the enemy to battle_in_such a manner as to make_the_business
decisive_,_I have therefore made up_my mind--" Or, again,