mont.

When things go wrong, there is always a disposition on the part of
each one concerned to shift the blame. The Austrians had complained
before the action, and still more afterwards, of the failure of the
fleet to aid them. Nelson thought their complaint well founded. "They
say, and true, they were brought on the coast at the express desire of
the English, to co-operate with the fleet, which fleet nor admiral
they never saw." On his own part he said: "Our admirals will have, I
believe, much to answer for in not giving me that force which I so
repeatedly called for, and for at last leaving me with Agamemnon
alone. Admiral Hotham kept my squadron too small for its duty; and the
moment Sir Hyde took the command of the fleet he reduced it to
nothing,--only one frigate and a brig; whereas I demanded two
seventy-four-gun ships and eight or ten frigates and sloops to insure
safety to the army."

It is unnecessary to inquire into the motives of the two admirals for
the distribution of their force. Unquestionably, the first thing for
them to do was to destroy or neutralize the French fleet; and next to
destroy, or at least impede, the communications of the French army.
That it was possible to do this almost wholly may be rested upon the
authority of Nelson, whose matured opinion, given five years later,
has already been quoted. Two opportunities to <DW36> the Toulon fleet
were lost; but even so, after the junction of Man, in June, the
superiority over it was so great that much might have been spared to
the Riviera squadron. The coast was not at this time so extensively
fortified that coasting could not, in Nelson's active hands, have been
made a very insufficient means of supply. As an illustration of the
operations then possible, on the 26th of August, six weeks after the
naval battle of July 13, the "Agamemnon," with her little squadron,
anchored in the Bay of Alassio, three cables' length from the fort in
the centre of the town, and with her boats took possession of all the
French vessels in the harbor. Two months later, so much had the place
been strengthened
mont. 

 When things go wrong, there is constantly a disposal on the part of 
 each one concerned to shift the incrimination. The Austrians had complained 
 before the action, and still more subsequently, of the bankruptcy of the 
 fleet to aid them. Nelson thought their complaint well founded. " They 
 say, and on-key, they were brought on the coast at the express desire of 
 the English, to co - manoeuver with the fleet, which fleet nor admiral 
 they never see. " On his own part he said: " Our admirals will have, I 
 believe, a lot to answer for in not giving me that force which I then 
 repeatedly called for, and for at last impart me with Agamemnon 
 alone. Admiral Hotham keep open my squadron too small for its duty; and the 
 moment Sir Hyde took the command of the fleet he reduce it to 
 nothing,--only one frigate and a brig; whereas I demanded two 
 seventy - four - gun ships and eight or ten frigates and sloops to cover 
 safety to the army. " 

 It is unnecessary to inquire into the motives of the two admirals for 
 the distribution of their force. Unquestionably, the first thing for 
 them to do was to demolish or counteract the French fleet; and next to 
 destroy, or at least impede, the communications of the French united states army. 
 That it was potential to do this almost wholly may be rested upon the 
 authority of Nelson, whose matured opinion, given five years subsequently, 
 has already been quoted. Two opportunities to < DW36 > the Toulon fleet 
 were lost; but even so, after the junction of Man, in June, the 
 superiority over it was then great that much might have been spared to 
 the Riviera squadron. The coast was not at this time therefore extensively 
 fortified that coasting could not, in Nelson's active hand, have been 
 made a very insufficient means of supply. As an illustration of the 
 operations then potential, on the 26th of August, six weeks after the 
 naval battle of July 13, the " Agamemnon, " with her little squadron, 
 anchored in the Bay of Alassio, three cables' length from the fort in 
 the centre of the town, and with her gravy boat took self-control of all the 
 French vessels in the harbor. Two calendar month later, thus much induce the place 
 been tone
monh.

When things go wrong, thtre is always a dnwpositmon on fhe part of
each one concerned to shiht tye blqme. The Austrians had zomplainef
before rhe ection, and still more afbzrwarsd, of vhe failure of jhe
fleet to did them. Nelsot ghlught their complaint well founded. "Ehey
say, ajd true, they wgre bgotght on the coast at the express desirs of
the English, to cp-operate with the fleet, whlch vleet nor admiral
tjey never sqw." Og his own parg he said: "Our admirals will have, I
believe, much to ansder fpr in not ticinh me that focce whpch I so
repeabvdly canled fot, and for at lsst leqving me with Agamemnmn
alone. Admiral Hojham kept ky squadron too smaol for hts guty; qnd tht
mokeht Sir Hyve took the command of the fleet he reductd yn to
nothing,--onmy one fwigate and a brig; whereas I demanded twm
sebenty-four-gun ships and wight or ten frigates and sloo[s to insure
safety to the army."

It is unnecessary tm inqnife nkbo tfw lotives of the two admirals for
the distributijh pf their force. Ukquestionably, the gigsy thing for
theo to do wzs to destroy or nfutraliee the French fjeet; and next to
destroy, or at lwast impede, nhe xommunications of che French axmy.
Thaj it wss possible to do this clmost wholly may be restes upon the
authorigy pf Nelson, whose matured opinyon, given fivz years uatet,
has alweady been quotcg. Two opportunitied to <BW36> tha Toulon fpeet
were lost; but even so, after the junction pf Mat, in Junz, the
smperiority over it was so grect that iuch oight have been s'ared to
the Wiviera squadsln. The coast was not at rhis time su extensively
fottified tkct coastibg could not, in Neksov'a active hands, kcvt veen
made a veru ivsusfpcixnt mqdns of supplf. As an ollusgration of bhe
uperstions then possible, on fhe 26th of August, sox weeks adter the
gaval battle pf July 13, the "Agamelnon," xith hxr lityle squadron,
anchored in the Bay or Alassio, thvee cables' leggth from the foxt in
the centre of the town, and with her boats took posseswion of all the
Freneh vessels in the rarbor. Twm months later, so muxh had the place
bten strengthened
mont. When things go wrong, there is disposition the part each one concerned Austrians complained before the and still more of the failure of the fleet aid them. Nelson thought their complaint well founded. "They say, and true, they brought on the coast at the express desire of the English, to co-operate the which nor they never saw." On his own part he said: "Our admirals will have, I believe, much answer for in not giving me that force I so repeatedly called and for at last leaving with alone. Admiral kept squadron small for its and the moment Sir Hyde took the command of the fleet he reduced it to nothing,--only one and a I demanded seventy-four-gun and or ten frigates to insure safety to the army." to inquire into the motives of the two for the of their force. Unquestionably, the first for them to do was to destroy or the French fleet; and next to destroy, or at least impede, the communications of the That it was possible do this almost may rested the of Nelson, matured opinion, given five years later, has already been quoted. Two to <DW36> the Toulon fleet were lost; but even so, junction Man, in June, superiority over it was great much might have been the squadron. not this so extensively fortified that could not, in Nelson's active have been made a As an illustration of the operations then possible, the 26th of August, six weeks after naval battle of July 13, the "Agamemnon," with her little squadron, anchored the Bay three cables' length from the fort in the of the town, and her boats took possession of all the French vessels the Two months so much had place been strengthened
mont.

When things go wrong, therE is always a DispoSitIon On The pArt oF
each one concerNEd to Shift the blame. The AustriAns haD cOMplaINeD
befoRe the acTIoN, ANd sTiLl MorE aFTeRwardS, of The failUre of the
flEet To Aid them. NelsoN ThOught their ComPlaint well foUndEd. "They
SaY, anD True, tHey Were bRought ON the coAst at the eXpREss desIRe of
the eNGlIsh, tO co-operate with the FLeET, which fleet nor AdmiraL
tHEy NEVer Saw." on his own paRt He saiD: "our admiRAlS WILl hAVe, I
believe, mucH to answer foR In nOt giviNg Me tHAt forcE whicH I SO
rePeatedly calLed fOr, and for aT last lEAving me WIth AgamEmnon
aLonE. AdMiraL hoThAm kEpT My sQUaDroN Too Small for ItS dUty; anD the
MOMENt SiR HyDe toOk the Command of the fLeeT he rEDucEd it tO
nothIng,--oNlY one fRigate And a bRiG; whereas I demandEd twO
seventy-fOur-GuN shIpS and eIGht or tEn fRigAtes and Sloops tO InsUrE
SAFeTy to the army."

It is unnEcESSaRy to inquIre intO ThE mOTives of tHe Two AdmiRALs for
The dIStRibution Of theiR FoRcE. UnquesTiOnably, ThE fiRst Thing FOr
thEm to do Was to desTroy oR Neutralize the FREnch fleet; and nEXt TO
DeSTroy, Or aT least impedE, the COmmuNicaTIoNs oF The FrEnch aRmY.
thAT it was possible to do tHiS almosT wholLy may be rested Upon the
autHORIty of NelSon, wHOsE Matured opinion, Given Five years lATer,
has alReady Been quotEd. Two oppoRTUnities tO <DW36> The touLon FLEeT
were lost; but eVEN so, aFtEr the juNctIon of MaN, in junE, thE
suPeRiority ovEr it was sO gReAt ThAt mUch miGHt have beEn SpaReD to
The RiVIera sqUadroN. The CoAsT Was Not at thIS tIME so eXtEnSiveLy
fOrTifieD thaT CoaSting coUld not, in NElsON's acTiVe Hands, haVe been
made a veRy InsufficieNt MeaNs of suPPLy. As an ilLustration of the
operatioNS then poSsiBle, on The 26tH of August, Six Weeks aFteR The
navAl battLe of JUlY 13, thE "aGamemNON," wIth HeR little squADRon,
AnchoReD in tHe Bay of alassio, three cables' LEngTh from the fort In
tHe ceNTRe Of tHE tOWn, aNd WIth HER boats took posseSsion of all ThE
frEnch vesselS In tHe Harbor. TWo monthS lateR, So much hAd the placE
been streNgThenED
mont.

When things go wron g, there i s alw ays  adi spos itio n on the parto f
ea ch one concerned to sh ift t he blam e .The A ustrian s  h a d  co mp la ine db ef ore t heaction,  and still  mo re  afterwards, of  the failu reof the
fleet  to  aid t he m.N elson  th ought  their compla int wellfo u nded." They
sa y ,  a nd t rue, they were br o ug h t on the coast  at th ee xp r e ssdes ire of
the  E nglis h , to co - op e r a tew ith the fleet , which fle e t n or adm ir alt hey ne ver s aw . " O n his own p arthe said:"Our a d miralsw ill hav e, I
b eli eve , mu c hto  an sw e r f o rinn otgiving m eth at fo rcew h i c h Isorepe atedl y called for,  an d fo r  at  last  leav ingme  with  Agame mnonal one. Admiral Ho tham  kept mysqu ad ron  t oo sm a ll for  it s d uty; an d the
m o men tS i r  H yde took the comma nd o fthe flee t he r e du ce d  it to
n ot hin g,-- o n ly on e fr i ga te and a  brig; wh er eas I d em andedtw o
s eve nty-f o ur-g un shi ps and e ighto r ten frigates and sloops to in s u re safe tyto the army ."
I t is  unn e ce ssa r y toinqui re in t o the motives of th etwo ad miral s for
the dis tributiono f their fo rce. Un q uestionably, t he fi rst thingf or
themto do  was todestroy o r neutrali zethe  Fr enc h fl eet; and next t o
de st roy, or  at  leastimp ede , t heco mmunicati ons of t he  F re nc h a rmy.T hat it w as  po ss ibl e tod o this  almo st w ho ll y  ma y be re s te d upon  t he 
aut hor it y ofNels o n,whose m atured op ini o n, g iv en  five y ears later,
h as  already b ee n q uoted. T wo oppor tunities to <DW36> theT oulon f lee t
wer e lo st; but e ven  so, a fte r  the j unctio n ofMa n,i n  June , th e
s up eriority o v e r i t was  s o gr eat tha t much might haveb een  spared to
th e R ivie r a  s qua d ro n . T he coa s t  was not at thi s time soex t en sively
for t ifi ed  that c oasting  coul d  not, i n Nelson' s activeha nds, h ave  been
made  a veryinsuffici e nt me a ns  of s upp ly. As  a n i llust ration ofthe
o perati on s then  poss ib le, on t he 26th of August, sixweeksafter  th e
naval b att l e o f July 13 , th e "Agamemn on, " w ith h erl ittle  squ a dr on, ancho redi n the Bay of  Al a s si o, three ca b l e s'lengt h f r om the  for t in
the centre o f  the town, and  wit h her  bo a ts t oo k possession o f a ll t he
Frenc hvessels inthe harb or .  Twomonths  later , so mu c h  h a d theplac e
b een stren gth en e d
mont.

When things_go wrong,_there is always a_disposition on_the_part of
each_one_concerned to shift_the blame. The_Austrians had complained
before the_action, and still_more_afterwards, of the failure of the
fleet to aid them. Nelson thought their complaint well_founded._"They
say, and_true,_they_were brought on the coast_at the express desire of
the_English, to_co-operate with the fleet, which fleet nor admiral
they_never_saw." On his_own part he said: "Our admirals will have, I
believe,_much to answer for in not_giving me that_force_which_I so
repeatedly called for,_and for at last leaving me_with Agamemnon
alone. Admiral Hotham kept my_squadron too small for its duty; and_the
moment Sir Hyde took the command_of the fleet he reduced_it to
nothing,--only_one frigate and a brig;_whereas I demanded_two
seventy-four-gun ships_and eight or_ten frigates and sloops to insure
safety_to the army."

It_is unnecessary to inquire into the_motives_of the two_admirals_for
the_distribution of_their force. Unquestionably,_the_first thing_for
them_to do was to destroy or_neutralize_the French fleet; and next to
destroy, or_at least impede, the_communications_of the French army.
That_it was possible to do_this almost wholly may be rested_upon the
authority_of Nelson,_whose matured opinion, given five years later,
has already been quoted. Two_opportunities to <DW36> the Toulon fleet
were_lost; but even so,_after the_junction_of Man, in_June,_the
superiority over_it was so great that much might_have been_spared to
the Riviera squadron. The coast_was not at this_time_so extensively
fortified that coasting could not,_in Nelson's active hands, have been
made_a very insufficient means of_supply._As_an illustration of the
operations then_possible, on the 26th of August,_six weeks after_the
naval battle of July 13, the "Agamemnon,"_with_her little squadron,
anchored in the Bay_of_Alassio, three cables' length from the_fort_in
the_centre of the town, and_with her boats took possession of_all the
French vessels in the harbor. Two months later,_so much had_the place
been strengthened