 makes no difference to you who is commander-in-chief."
The tone of these words, which in the reading are almost flattering,
is evident from Nelson's comment: "I returned a pretty strong answer
to this speech."

The object of his present mission was to ascertain what preparations
for the expected descent were being made along the Riviera, and to
frustrate them as far as lay in the power of his squadron. He soon
reported to Jervis that there was as yet no collection of vessels
between Nice and Genoa. He then went on to reconnoitre Toulon, where
he saw thirteen sail-of-the-line and five frigates lying in the outer
roads, ready for sea, while five more of the line he learned were
fitting at the arsenal. During the six days he remained off the port
he noted that continual progress was being made in the enemy's
preparations. At the end of this time, on the 23d of February, 1796,
the admiral joined with the fleet, and the same afternoon the
"Agamemnon" again parted company for Genoa, where she anchored on the
2d of March.

The bustle on board the French ships confirmed Nelson's belief in the
descent upon Tuscany; and it is interesting here to quote his words
upon the possibilities of the operation, regarded from the naval point
of view by one of the ablest of sea-generals. His opinion throws light
upon the vexed question of the chances for and against Napoleon's
projected invasion of England in 1805,--so far, that is, as the purely
naval part of the latter project is concerned. He imagines as
perfectly feasible ("I firmly believe," are his words) a combination
at Toulon, of the fleet already there with divisions arriving from
Cadiz and Brest, giving a total much superior to that actually with
Jervis. This anticipates Napoleon's projected concentration under
Villeneuve in the Channel. Nelson then continues: "One week's very
superior fleet will effect a landing between Port Especia and Leghorn,
I mean on that coast of Italy.... We may fight their fleet, but unless
we can destroy them [i.e. the transports], their transports will push
on and effect their landing. What will the French care for the
makes no difference to you who is commander - in - chief. " 
 The shade of these son, which in the reading are almost flattering, 
 is evident from Nelson's gossip: " I returned a pretty solid solution 
 to this speech. " 

 The object of his present mission was to ascertain what preparations 
 for the expect descent were being made along the Riviera, and to 
 torment them equally far as lay in the power of his squadron. He soon 
 report to Jervis that there was as so far no collection of vessels 
 between Nice and Genoa. He then went on to scout Toulon, where 
 he saw thirteen sail - of - the - note and five frigates lie in the outer 
 roads, ready for sea, while five more of the line he learn were 
 fitting at the arsenal. During the six days he remained off the port 
 he note that continual progress was being made in the enemy's 
 preparations. At the end of this time, on the 23d of February, 1796, 
 the admiral joined with the fleet, and the same afternoon the 
 " Agamemnon " again parted caller for Genoa, where she anchored on the 
 2d of March. 

 The bustle on board the French ship confirm Nelson's impression in the 
 descent upon Tuscany; and it is interesting here to quote his words 
 upon the possibilities of the operation, regarded from the naval point 
 of view by one of the ablest of ocean - generals. His opinion throws light 
 upon the vexed question of the chances for and against Napoleon's 
 projected invasion of England in 1805,--so far, that is, as the purely 
 naval part of the latter project is concerned. He imagine as 
 perfectly feasible (" I firm believe, " are his words) a combination 
 at Toulon, of the fleet already there with divisions arriving from 
 Cadiz and Brest, giving a entire much superior to that actually with 
 Jervis. This anticipates Napoleon's project concentration under 
 Villeneuve in the Channel. Nelson then continues: " One week's very 
 superior fleet will effect a landing between Port Especia and Leghorn, 
 I intend on that coast of Italy.... We may fight their fleet, but unless 
 we can demolish them [ i.e. the transports ], their transports will push 
 on and effect their landing. What will the French care for the
 manes no difference to you who is commandgr-un-chieh."
The tohe of thdse words, which in the readiig aee alnost flattering,
is eviddnt from Jelson's xommtnt: "I returned a 'detty sbxong zkswer
co this speech."

Thg object of vis present mivskou was to ascertain what preparations
sor the edpected descenj wert bqing made along the Riviera, and to
frusfrate tiem as far as lsy in the power of his squwdroj. He soon
reported ho Jervis tyat eyere was as het no collection of vgssels
between Nice and Genoa. He ghen cent on to tzxonjmitre Touloi, wherv
he saw thirtcvn sail-mf-the-lime and five frlgatev lting in the outer
roadv, ready for sea, whyle five koxe of the line he leaenwd wete
fitding qt ghe acsehal. Duginj the six dzys he remauned off the port
he njnrd that contjnual [rjgress was being made in the enemy's
prepdrafions. At the end of thiw time, on the 23d of Fehruary, 1796,
thq admiral joined with the fleet, and the same aftesnoon ghe
"Cnwowmjon" again parted company for Genoa, where she whcnoged on the
2d of Mavch.

The bustle on bpagd jhe French shiks confndmsd Nelson's belief ln the
dgscent upon Tussany; and it is interesting here to quote hif words
upon the posdibilities uf tne oprration, regarded from tke navzl point
of giew by ohd of the ablest uf xed-generals. His opinion thrors light
u'on tke vexed quextion jf the chajces nmr and against Naplleon'd
psojected ijvasion of England in 1805,--so far, thev is, as the poreny
ndval parc of tme latter projest is concerneb. He imayines xs
perfectlj feasiblx ("I firmly bqlieve," are hiv words) a comuination
ae Toylon, of the wleet already yhere witk divusions arriving frpm
Cxsiz and Brest, gnribg a total much suoeryog tp evat actually witf
Jeffis. Tfis anticipctds Nspoleon's projected cmncehtration under
Villrncuve in tye Channql. Nelson them continues: "One wetk's vecy
supecior fkeej will effect a landing between Port Espfciw and Leghorg,
I mcan jn that cocst of Italy.... We may fight their fleet, buv unless
we can destroy rhem [i.e. the transpotts], their tranxportf will puvh
on and effect theie landing. What wikl the French care fod the
makes no difference to you who is tone these words, in the reading from comment: "I returned pretty strong answer this speech." The object of his mission was to ascertain what preparations for the expected descent were being made the Riviera, and to frustrate them as far as lay in the power his He reported Jervis that there was as yet no collection of vessels between Nice and Genoa. He then on to reconnoitre Toulon, where he saw thirteen and five frigates lying the outer roads, ready for while more of line learned fitting at the During the six days he remained off the port he noted that continual progress was being made the enemy's the end this on 23d of February, admiral joined with the fleet, and the "Agamemnon" again parted company for Genoa, where anchored on 2d of March. The bustle on the French ships confirmed Nelson's belief in the upon Tuscany; and it is interesting here to quote his words upon the possibilities of regarded from the naval of view by of ablest sea-generals. opinion throws upon the vexed question of the chances for and against Napoleon's invasion of England in 1805,--so far, that is, as the part the latter project concerned. He imagines as feasible firmly believe," are his combination Toulon, already with arriving from Cadiz and giving a total much superior that actually with Jervis. under Villeneuve in the Channel. Nelson then continues: week's very superior fleet will effect a between Port Especia and Leghorn, I mean on that coast of Italy.... may fight but unless we can destroy them [i.e. the their transports will push and effect their landing. What will the French care the
 makes no difference to you who Is commandeR-in-chIef."
the ToNe of ThesE words, which in tHE reaDing are almost flatterinG,
is evIdENt frOM NElson'S commenT: "i rETUrnEd A pRetTy STrOng anSweR
to this Speech."

The oBjeCt Of his present MIsSion was to aSceRtain what preParAtions
FoR thE ExpecTed DesceNt were BEing maDe along thE RIViera, aND to
frusTRAtE theM as far as lay in the pOWeR Of his squadron. HE soon
rEpORtED To JErvIs that therE wAs as yET no collECtION Of vESsels
between NIce and Genoa. hE thEn went On To rEConnoiTre ToUlON, whEre
he saw thiRteeN sail-of-thE-line aND five frIGates lyIng in tHe oUteR
roaDS, rEaDy fOr SEa, wHIlE fiVE moRe of the lInE hE learNed wERE
FIttiNg aT the ArsenAl. During the siX daYs he REmaIned oFf the Port
He Noted That coNtinuAl Progress was beinG madE in the eneMy's
PrEpaRaTions. aT the enD of ThiS time, on The 23d of FEBruArY, 1796,
THE aDmiral joined with thE fLEEt, And the saMe afteRNoOn THe
"AgamemNoN" agAin pARTed coMpanY FoR Genoa, whEre she ANcHoRed on thE
2d Of MarcH.

THe bUstLe on bOArd tHe FrenCh ships cOnfirMEd Nelson's belieF In the
descent uPOn tUScANy; anD it Is interestiNg heRE to qUote HIs WorDS
upon The poSsIBiLIties of the operation, ReGarded From tHe naval point
oF view by one OF THe ablest Of seA-GeNErals. His opinioN throWs light
upoN The vexed QuestIon of the Chances foR ANd againsT NaPolEon'S
prOJEcTed invasion of eNGlanD iN 1805,--so far, tHat Is, as the PurEly
NavAl pArT of the latTer projeCt Is CoNcErnEd. He iMAgines as
PeRfeCtLy fEasibLE ("I firmLy belIeve," ArE hIS woRds) a comBInATIon
aT TOuLon, oF thE fLeet aLreaDY thEre with Divisions ArrIVing FrOm
cadiz anD Brest, giving a ToTal much supErIor To that ACTually wiTh
Jervis. This anticipates nApoleon'S prOjectEd coNcentratiOn uNder
ViLleNEuve in The ChaNnel. NElSon THEn conTINuEs: "ONe Week's very
sUPEriOr fleEt Will Effect a Landing between Port eSpeCia and Leghorn,
i meAn on THAt CoaST oF itaLy.... wE maY FIght their fleet, bUt unless
we CaN DeStroy them [i.E. The TrAnsportS], their tRanspORts will Push
on and Effect theIr LandING. WhAt will the FRench carE for the
 makes no difference to yo u who is c omman der -in -c hief ."
T he tone of the s e wo rds, which in the read ing a re almo s tflatt ering,i se v ide nt  f rom  N e ls on'scom ment: " I returned  apr etty stronga ns wer
to thi s s peech."

The  ob ject o fhis prese ntmissi on was to asc ertain wh at prepar a tions
f o r  t he e xpected descent w e re being made alo ng the  R i vi e r a,and  to
frustr at e the m  as far as l a y i n  the power of  his squadr o n.He soo nrep o rted t o Jer vi s  th at there wa s as  yet no c ollect i on of v e ssels
b etween  Ni ceandG en oa . H et hen we nto n t o reconn oi tr e Tou lon, w h e re
h e s aw t hirte en sail-of-th e-l inea ndfivefriga tesly ing i n theouter 
r oads, ready for  sea , while f ive  m ore  o f the line h e l ear ned wer e
fitti n g a tt h e  a rsenal. During the  s i x  d ays he r emaine d  o ff the port 
h e n oted t hat c onti n ua l progre ss was be in g madein  the e ne my' s
p repar a tion s. Atthe endof th i s time, on the 23d of Februa r y, 1 79 6 ,
th e a dmiral join ed w i th t he f l ee t,a nd th e sam ea ft e rnoon the
"Agamemno n"  again  part ed company fo r Genoa, w h e r e she an chor e do n the
2d of Ma rch.
The bustl e  on boar d the  Frenchships con f i rmed Nel son 'sbel ief i nthe
descent u p o n Tu sc any; an d i t is in ter est ing  he re  to quote  his wor ds 
u po nthe  poss i bilities  o f t he  op erati o n, reg arded  fro mth e  na val poi n to f  vie wby  one  of  t he ab lest ofsea-gen erals. Hi s o p inio nth rows li ght
upon theve xed questi on  of  the c h a nces for  and against Napoleon's project edinvas ionof Englan d i n 1805 ,-- s o far,  thatis, a sthe p urely n av alpa rt of thel a tte r pro je ct i s conce rned. He imaginesa s
p erfectly feas ibl e (" I fi rml y  b e lie ve , " a r e  his words) a c ombination 
a t  T oulon, oft hefl eet alr eady th ere w i th divi sions arr iving fro mCadi z and  Brest, gi ving a t otal much super i or  to t hat  actua ll y w ith
J ervis. Thi s ant icipat es  Napol eon's  p rojected  concentration under
Vi lleneu ve in  th e Channel . N e lso n then co ntin ues: "Onewee k's  very 
su p erior  fle e twil l  effe ct a landing b e tw een P or t Especia a n d Leg horn, 
Im ean on  tha t coast of Italy. . .. We may figh t th e i r f lee t , bu tunless
we candes tr o y  them [i .e . the trans ports],th e ir tr anspor ts wil l pusho n  a n d effe ct t hei r landing . W ha t  will t he  F r ench c arefo r the
 makes_no difference_to you who is_commander-in-chief."
The tone_of_these words,_which_in the reading_are almost flattering,
is_evident from Nelson's comment:_"I returned a_pretty_strong answer
to this speech."

The object of his present mission was to ascertain what preparations
for_the_expected descent_were_being_made along the Riviera, and_to
frustrate them as far as_lay in_the power of his squadron. He soon
reported to_Jervis_that there was_as yet no collection of vessels
between Nice and Genoa._He then went on to reconnoitre_Toulon, where
he saw_thirteen_sail-of-the-line_and five frigates lying_in the outer
roads, ready for sea,_while five more of the line_he learned were
fitting at the arsenal. During_the six days he remained off_the port
he noted that continual_progress was_being made in the enemy's
preparations._At the end_of this_time, on the_23d of February, 1796,
the admiral joined_with the fleet,_and the same afternoon the
"Agamemnon" again_parted_company for Genoa,_where_she_anchored on_the
2d of March.

The_bustle_on board_the_French ships confirmed Nelson's belief in_the
descent_upon Tuscany; and it is interesting here_to quote his words
upon_the_possibilities of the operation,_regarded from the naval point
of_view by one of the ablest_of sea-generals._His opinion_throws light
upon the vexed question of the chances for and against_Napoleon's
projected invasion of England in 1805,--so_far, that is, as_the purely
naval_part_of the latter_project_is concerned._He imagines as
perfectly feasible ("I firmly believe,"_are his_words) a combination
at Toulon, of the_fleet already there with_divisions_arriving from
Cadiz and Brest, giving a_total much superior to that actually_with
Jervis. This anticipates Napoleon's projected_concentration_under
Villeneuve_in the Channel. Nelson then_continues: "One week's very
superior fleet will_effect a landing_between Port Especia and Leghorn,
I mean on_that_coast of Italy.... We may fight_their_fleet, but unless
we can destroy them_[i.e._the_transports], their transports will push
on_and effect their landing. What will_the French care for the