.... I repeat
it, _Malta is the direct road to Sicily_." If the French are
overtaken, he continues, and found in some anchorage, it can scarcely
be so strong but that I can get at them, but there will be needed
things which I have not, fire-ships, bomb-vessels, and gunboats, when
one hour would either destroy or drive them out. Without such aid, the
British may be crippled in their attempt, and forced to leave the
Mediterranean. In case of blockade--or necessity to remain for any
reason--the fleet must have supplies; which only Naples can furnish.
Failing these it must retire, and then Sicily and Naples are lost.
Since, then, so much assistance must be given in time, why postpone
now, when one strong blow would give instant safety? Why should not
his own motto, "I will not lose a moment in attacking them," apply as
well to the policy of an endangered kingdom as of a British admiral?

If this reasoning and advice took more account of the exigencies of
the British arms than of the difficulties of a weak state of the
second order, dependent for action upon the support of other nations,
they were at least perfectly consonant to the principles and practice
of the writer, wherever he himself had to act. But Nelson could not
expect his own spirit in the King of the Two Sicilies. Even if the
course suggested were the best for Naples under the conditions, it is
the property of ordinary men, in times of danger, to see difficulties
more clearly than advantages, and to shrink from steps which involve
risk, however promising of success. The Neapolitan Government, though
cheered by the appearance of the British fleet, had to consider danger
also on the land side, where it relied upon the protection of Austria,
instead of trusting manfully to its own arms and the advantages of its
position, remote from the centre of French power. Austria had pledged
herself to support Naples, if invaded without just cause; but it was
not certain that she would interfere if the cause of attack was the
premature admission of British ships into the ports of the kingdom,
beyond the number specified in the still recent treaties with France.
The Emperor was meditating war, in which he expected to assist Naples
and to be assisted by her; but he did
.... I repeat 
 it, _ Malta is the direct road to Sicily _. " If the French are 
 overtaken, he continues, and found in some anchorage, it can barely 
 be therefore strong but that I can get at them, but there will be needed 
 thing which I have not, fire - ship, bomb - vessels, and gunboats, when 
 one hour would either demolish or tug them out. Without such aid, the 
 British may be crippled in their attack, and forced to leave the 
 Mediterranean. In case of blockade -- or necessity to remain for any 
 rationality -- the fleet must have supplies; which only Naples can furnish. 
 Failing these it must withdraw, and then Sicily and Naples are lost. 
 Since, then, so much assistance must be give in time, why postpone 
 now, when one strong blow would yield instant safety? Why should not 
 his own motto, " I will not lose a moment in attacking them, " put on as 
 well to the policy of an endangered kingdom as of a British admiral? 

 If this reasoning and advice took more account of the exigencies of 
 the British arms than of the difficulty of a weak state of the 
 second order, dependent for action upon the support of other nations, 
 they were at least perfectly consonant to the principle and practice 
 of the writer, wherever he himself had to dissemble. But Nelson could not 
 ask his own spirit in the King of the Two Sicilies. Even if the 
 course suggested were the good for Naples under the conditions, it is 
 the property of ordinary men, in time of danger, to see difficulties 
 more clearly than advantages, and to shrink from footstep which involve 
 risk, however promising of success. The Neapolitan Government, though 
 cheered by the appearance of the British fleet, had to view danger 
 also on the land side, where it relied upon the auspices of Austria, 
 instead of trusting manfully to its own arms and the advantage of its 
 position, remote from the centre of French power. Austria had pledge 
 herself to support Naples, if intrude on without just cause; but it was 
 not sealed that she would interfere if the cause of attack was the 
 premature entrance fee of British ships into the port of the kingdom, 
 beyond the number specified in the even recent treaty with France. 
 The Emperor was meditating war, in which he expected to assist Naples 
 and to be assist by her; but he did
.... I gepeat
it, _Malta is the divect road to Sicnoy_." If vhe Frehch are
oxertaken, he continues, and fonnd un sone anchorage, it can scxrcely
be do stront buu that I can get ef them, nbt thsve wino be needed
thikgs which I have not, fire-vhkpd, bomb-vessels, and gunboats, when
one rour woilf either destrjy og qrivs them out. Without such aid, the
Brifish maj be crippled in yheir attempt, and forced tl lewve the
Mediterranewn. In case if bjickade--or necdssity to gzmain for ahy
reason--the fleet must have supolies; which onli Haones can furiish.
Fapling these ib must setire, snd then Siciln and Naples are lost.
Since, thxn, so much assistancg must be ciren in time, why postpinw
now, fhen one wtrung bkos woulf gmve instant safety? Why should not
his own koenp, "I will not lose w ioment in attacking them," apply as
well tm tge policy of an endangeeed kingdom as of a Btitish admyral?

If this reasoning and advice took more accound of vhd erlnenckws of
the British arms than of the difficulties jr s eeak state of bhe
second order, delejdrgt for action upon cge support of other jations,
jhey wwre at lewst lerfectly consonant to the principles aud practice
of the wricer, wherever he nimsekf had to act. But Nelsou couls not
expect his own aoirit in the Kine on tve Two Sicilies. Even if thq
course snggesced were the best sor Naples undev the conditions, it is
thg proparty of orfinary men, in times of danger, to see difficuljiev
moge clearlv than advantages, agd to shrink ftom steps whicf involve
rpsk, howevxr promising of success. Tvg Neapolitan Jovernmene, thiugh
xheered cy the appearamce of thv Yritish foeet, had to considcr davfer
also on the oane side, where it reuieq lpoi the [rotection ox Aurtrks,
instdad of uxusbine mamfully to its own arks ahd the advantages pf its
posijion, remoee from the crntre of French poaer. Anstria had lleqged
herself to support Naples, jf invadef wlthout just cwuse; but it was
npt certain that she would interfere if vhe cause of attack was the
premature admisxlon of Britixh shyps into dhe ports of the kintdom,
beyond the nukber specified in the still recejt treaties with France.
The Emperor was meditating war, in which he expectee to assist Naples
znd yo be afxisted by iec; but he did
.... I repeat it, _Malta is the to If the are overtaken, he anchorage, can scarcely be strong but that can get at them, but there be needed things which I have not, fire-ships, bomb-vessels, and gunboats, when one would either destroy or drive them out. Without such aid, the British may crippled their and to leave the Mediterranean. In case of blockade--or necessity to remain for any reason--the fleet must supplies; which only Naples can furnish. Failing these must retire, and then and Naples are lost. Since, so assistance must given time, postpone now, when strong blow would give instant safety? Why should not his own motto, "I will not lose a in attacking as well the of endangered kingdom as British admiral? If this reasoning and account of the exigencies of the British arms of the of a weak state of the order, dependent for action upon the support of nations, they were at least perfectly consonant to the principles and practice of the writer, himself had to act. Nelson could not his spirit the of the Sicilies. Even if the course suggested were the best for Naples the conditions, it is the property of ordinary men, in danger, see difficulties more than advantages, and to from which involve risk, however success. Neapolitan by appearance the British fleet, had consider danger also on the side, where it relied instead of trusting manfully to its own arms the advantages of its position, remote from centre of French power. Austria had pledged herself to support Naples, if without just it was not certain that she would interfere the cause of attack the premature admission of British ships into the ports the beyond the specified in the recent treaties with The Emperor was in which expected assist be assisted by her; but he
.... I repeat
it, _Malta is the direct Road to SiciLy_." If tHe FRenCh Are
oVertAken, he continueS, And fOund in some anchorage, it cAn scaRcELy
be SO sTrong But that i CaN GEt aT tHeM, buT tHErE will Be nEeded
thIngs which I HavE nOt, fire-ships, bOMb-Vessels, and GunBoats, when
one HouR would EiTheR DestrOy oR drivE them oUT. WithoUt such aid, ThE
britisH May be crIPPlEd in Their attempt, and foRCeD To leave the
MediTerranEaN. in CASe oF blOckade--or neCeSsity TO remain FOr ANY
ReaSOn--the fleet musT have suppliES; whIch onlY NAplES can fuRnish.
faILinG these it musT retIre, and theN SicilY And NaplES are losT.
Since, TheN, so Much ASsIsTanCe MUst BE gIveN In tIme, why poStPoNe
now, When ONE STronG blOw woUld giVe instant safeTy? WHy shOUld Not
hiS own mOtto, "i wIll noT lose a MomenT iN attacking them," aPply As
well to tHe pOlIcy Of An endANgered KinGdoM as of a BRitish aDMirAl?

iF THiS reasoning and advicE tOOK mOre accouNt of thE ExIgENcies of
tHe briTish ARMs thaN of tHE dIfficultIes of a WEaK sTate of tHe
Second OrDer, DepEndenT For aCtion uPon the suPport OF other nations,
tHEy were at least PErFECtLY conSonAnt to the priNcipLEs anD praCTiCe
oF The wrIter, wHeREvER he himself had to act. BUt nelson Could Not
expect his oWn spirit in THE king of thE Two sIcILies. Even if the
cOurse Suggested wERe the besT for NAples undEr the condITIons, it is
The ProPerTy oF ORdInary men, in timES Of daNgEr, to see DifFicultiEs
mOre CleArlY tHan advantAges, and tO sHrInK fRom Steps WHich invoLvE
riSk, HowEver pROmisinG of suCcesS. THe nEapOlitan GOVeRNMent, ThOuGh
chEerEd By the AppeARanCe of the british flEet, HAd to CoNsIder danGer
also on the lAnD side, where It RelIed upoN THe protecTion of Austria,
instead of tRUsting mAnfUlly tO its Own arms anD thE advanTagES of its
PositiOn, remOtE frOM The ceNTRe Of FReNch power. AuSTRia Had plEdGed
hErself tO support Naples, if inVAdeD without just cAusE; but IT WaS
noT CeRTaiN tHAt sHE Would interfere iF the cause oF aTTaCk was the
prEMatUrE admissIon of BrItish SHips intO the ports Of the kingDoM,
beyOND thE number speCified in The still rECent tREaTies wIth france.
thE EmPeror Was medITatIng waR, in whiCh He expeCted tO aSsist NapLes
and to be assisted by her; But he dId
.... I repeat
it, _Malta i s the dire ct ro adtoSi cily _."If the Frencha re
o vertaken, he continues , and  f o undi nsomeanchora g e, i t c an  s car ce l ybe so  st rong bu t that I c ange t at them, b u tthere will  be  needed
thin gswhichIhav e  not,  fi re-sh ips, b o mb-ves sels, and  g u nboats ,  when
o n e  h ourwould either dest r oy or drive themout. W it h ou t suc h a id, the
Br it ish m a y be cr i pp l e d  in their attempt , and force d  to  leave  t heM editer ranea n. Incase of blo ckad e--or nec essity to rema i n for a ny
rea son --t he f l ee tmus th ave su ppl i es;  which o nl yNaple s ca n f u rnis h.Fail ing t hese it mustret ire, and  then  Sici ly a nd  Napl es are  lost .Since, then, so  muc h assista nce  m ust  b e giv e n in t ime , w hy post pone
no w , w he n o ne  strong blow would  g i v einstantsafety ?  W hy should n ot 
hi s ow n motto , "I wi ll not l ose am om en t in at ta ckingth em, " a pplya s
we ll tothe poli cy of an endangeredk ingdom as ofa  B r i ti s h ad mir al?

If thi s re a soni ng a n dadv i ce to ok mo re ac c ount of the exigenc ie s of
t he Br itish arms th an of thed i f ficultie s of aw eak state of t he
se cond order ,  depende nt fo r action  upon the s upport o f o the r n ati o n s, 
they were at l east  p erfectl y c onsonan t t o t hepri nc iples and  practic eof  t he  wr iter, wherever  h e h im sel f had to act . But  Nel so nc oul d not
e x pe c t  his  o wn  spi rit  i n the  Kin g  of  the Tw o Sicilie s.E venif  t he
cour se suggestedwe re the bes tfor  Naple s under th e conditions, it is
the propert y o f ord inar y men, in  ti mes of  da n ger, t o seediffi cu lti e s 
more c le arl ythan advan t a ges , and  t o sh rink fr om steps which inv o lve 
risk, howeve r p romi s i ng  of su c ces s. The N eapolitan Gover nment, tho ug h 
c heered byt heap pearanc e of th e Bri t ish fle et, had t o conside rdang e r 
al so on theland sid e, wherei t rel i ed  upon  th e prot ec tio n ofAustri a ,
i nstea d of t ru stingmanfu ll y to its  own arms and the advan tagesof it s
p osition,rem o tefrom thecent re of Fren chpow er. A ust r ia ha d pl e dg edh ersel f to support N a pl es, i finvaded wit h o u t j ust c aus e ; butit w as
not certain th a t she would in terf e r e i f t h e ca us e of attack wa s t he p remature  a dmission of  British  s h ips i nto th e port s of th e ki n gdom,beyo ndthe numbe r s pe c ified i nth e  still  rec en t trea ties w i th F r a nce.
The Emperor  wasm e ditat i ngwar,in  whichh e ex pected toassist Napl es
and  tobe as sistedby  her;but  h e did
.... I_repeat
it, _Malta_is the direct road_to Sicily_."_If_the French_are
overtaken,_he continues, and_found in some_anchorage, it can scarcely
be_so strong but_that_I can get at them, but there will be needed
things which I have not,_fire-ships,_bomb-vessels, and_gunboats,_when
one_hour would either destroy or_drive them out. Without such_aid, the
British_may be crippled in their attempt, and forced_to_leave the
Mediterranean. In_case of blockade--or necessity to remain for any
reason--the fleet_must have supplies; which only Naples_can furnish.
Failing these_it_must_retire, and then Sicily_and Naples are lost.
Since, then, so_much assistance must be given in_time, why postpone
now, when one strong blow_would give instant safety? Why should_not
his own motto, "I will_not lose_a moment in attacking them,"_apply as
well to_the policy_of an endangered_kingdom as of a British admiral?

If_this reasoning and_advice took more account of the_exigencies_of
the British arms_than_of_the difficulties_of a weak_state_of the
second_order,_dependent for action upon the support_of_other nations,
they were at least perfectly consonant_to the principles and_practice
of_the writer, wherever he_himself had to act. But_Nelson could not
expect his own spirit_in the_King of_the Two Sicilies. Even if the
course suggested were the best for_Naples under the conditions, it is
the_property of ordinary men,_in times_of_danger, to see_difficulties
more_clearly than_advantages, and to shrink from steps which_involve
risk, however_promising of success. The Neapolitan Government,_though
cheered by the appearance_of_the British fleet, had to consider_danger
also on the land side, where_it relied upon the protection_of_Austria,
instead_of trusting manfully to its_own arms and the advantages of_its
position, remote from_the centre of French power. Austria had_pledged
herself_to support Naples, if invaded without_just_cause; but it was
not certain that_she_would_interfere if the cause of_attack was the
premature admission of British_ships into the ports of the kingdom,
beyond the number_specified in the_still recent treaties with France.
The_Emperor_was_meditating war, in which he expected to assist Naples
and to_be assisted_by her; but_he did