 route alone was not possible. Southern France itself depended
upon the sea for grain, and could send nothing, even if the then
miserable Corniche road could have sufficed, as the sole line of
communications for forty thousand troops.

Thus the transfer of Corsica to Great Britain had a very important
bearing upon the military and political conditions. At the moment when
Italy was about to become the scene of operations which might, and in
the event actually did, exercise a decisive influence upon the course
of the general war, the British position was solidified by the
acquisition of a naval base, unassailable while the sea remained in
their control and the Corsicans attached to their cause, and centrally
situated with reference to the probable scenes of hostilities, as well
as to the points of political interest, on the mainland of Italy. The
fleet resting upon it, no longer dependent upon the reluctant
hospitality of Genoese or Tuscan ports, or upon the far distant
Kingdom of Naples, was secure to keep in its station, whence it
menaced the entire seaboard trade of France and the Riviera, as well
as the tenure of the French army in the latter, and exerted a strong
influence upon the attitude of both Genoa and Tuscany, who yielded
only too easily to the nearest or most urgent pressure. The fleet to
which Nelson belonged had spent the greater part of the year 1794 in
securing for itself, as a base of operations, this position, by far
the most suitable among those that could be considered at all. It
remained now to utilize the advantage obtained, to make the situation
of the French army in Italy untenable, by establishing an indisputable
control of the sea. To this the holding of Corsica also contributed,
indirectly; for the loss of the island forced the French fleet to go
to sea, in order, if possible, to expedite its re-conquest. In all the
operations resulting from these various motives, Nelson bore a part as
conspicuous and characteristic as he had done in the reduction of
Corsica. Almost always on detached service, in positions approaching
independent command, he was continually adding to his reputation, and,
what was far more important, maturing the professional character, the
seeds of which had been so bountifully bestowed
route alone was not possible. Southern France itself depended 
 upon the ocean for texture, and could air nothing, even if the then 
 miserable Corniche road could have sufficed, as the lone line of 
 communications for forty thousand troop. 

 therefore the transfer of Corsica to Great Britain had a very important 
 bearing upon the military and political conditions. At the consequence when 
 Italy was about to become the scene of operations which might, and in 
 the consequence actually did, exercise a decisive influence upon the course 
 of the general war, the British position was solidified by the 
 acquisition of a naval base, impregnable while the sea remained in 
 their control and the Corsicans attach to their cause, and centrally 
 situated with character to the probable scenes of hostility, as well 
 as to the points of political interest, on the mainland of Italy. The 
 fleet resting upon it, no longer dependent upon the loath 
 hospitality of Genoese or Tuscan ports, or upon the far distant 
 Kingdom of Naples, was secure to keep in its station, whence it 
 menace the entire seaboard trade of France and the Riviera, as well 
 as the tenure of the French army in the latter, and exerted a strong 
 influence upon the attitude of both Genoa and Tuscany, who yielded 
 only too well to the near or most pressing atmospheric pressure. The fleet to 
 which Nelson belong had spent the greater part of the year 1794 in 
 securing for itself, as a base of operations, this stead, by far 
 the most suitable among those that could be considered at all. It 
 remained now to use the advantage obtained, to make the situation 
 of the French army in Italy untenable, by establishing an indisputable 
 control condition of the sea. To this the holding of Corsica also contributed, 
 indirectly; for the loss of the island pull the French fleet to go 
 to sea, in order, if potential, to expedite its re - conquest. In all the 
 operation resulting from these various motif, Nelson bore a character as 
 conspicuous and characteristic as he had act in the reduction of 
 Corsica. about always on detached service, in positions set about 
 independent command, he was continually add to his reputation, and, 
 what was far more significant, maturing the professional quality, the 
 seeds of which had been so bountifully bestowed
 rokte alone was not possibue. Southern Frauxe itsxlf depsnded
upov the sea for grain, and coulv sebd nouking, even if the thev
miserablv Cornichw roed could have suhriced, as the alle nmne of
communicajions for fosty thousand tsoupd.

Thus the transfer of Corsica to Grqat Briyaln had a very ympogtwnt
bsaring upon the military and politjcal coiditions. At the moment when
Italy was abouh to become the scene lf operatiobs wruch might, ana in
the evtnc actually sid, exercise a decisive influenze uppn the coutss
ov the generao war, the British positiot was splidified by tme
acqnisirion of a naval base, nnassailable while tre sea rekanned in
their control qne the Corvicavw agtadhxd fo thelr rause, and csntrally
sityated with referenct tj the probable scenef jf hostilities, as well
as to the points mf lolitical interest, on tye mainland of Italy. Jhe
fleet rqsting upon it, no longer dependent upon the relucdant
hkrpiuaoity ud Henoese or Tuscan ports, or upon the far distagf
Konndom of Naples, wcs secure to keel ln yts station, wfence nf
msnaced the entire deaboarq traee of Fragce snd the Riviera, as well
as tye tenure of rhe French army in the latter, and exeryed a strong
influence u'on ths attitude lf both Gsvoa and Tuscany, dho yhelded
only too easily to tre nearesv or kost ureent presstre. The flfet to
which Nelson belonhed hcd spant the grfater part of the year 1794 in
securmig for itself, av a base of operstions, this pjsition, by far
jhe most fuitacle among nhose thav could be cjnsidered at dpl. It
remainev now to ttiluze rhe advxvtage obtained, to make nht situatiob
of the French armn in Kfaly untenable, yv tsrablishing an ondkspttwbke
smntrol of tha sex. Tu this the holdinn ow Cotsica also contributad,
insirectly; for the lpsf of the island sorced the Frrnch fleet to go
to sea, mn ordxr, if losfible, to expedite its re-conqueat. In all thc
operations rqsulbing from thesz various motives, Nelson bore a part as
cinspicuous and chaeacteristic as he hcd done in thx redustion of
Cmrsica. Almost always on detached servlce, in positions approzching
hndepfndent command, he was continually adding to his reputation, and,
what was fae more important, mzturong tve 'rofessyonap character, the
sevds of which had been so bountifnlly bestofeb
route alone was not possible. Southern France upon sea for and could send miserable road could have as the sole of communications for forty thousand troops. the transfer of Corsica to Great Britain had a very important bearing upon military and political conditions. At the moment when Italy was about to become scene operations might, in the event actually did, exercise a decisive influence upon the course of the general war, British position was solidified by the acquisition of naval base, unassailable while sea remained in their control the attached to cause, centrally with reference to probable scenes of hostilities, as well as to the points of political interest, on the mainland of The fleet it, no dependent the hospitality of Genoese ports, or upon the far distant was secure to keep in its station, whence menaced the seaboard trade of France and the as well as the tenure of the French in the latter, and exerted a strong influence upon the attitude of both Genoa and yielded only too easily the nearest or urgent The to Nelson belonged spent the greater part of the year 1794 in securing for as a base of operations, this position, by far the among that could be at all. It remained to the advantage obtained, to situation the Italy by an indisputable control of sea. To this the holding Corsica also contributed, indirectly; island forced the French fleet to go to in order, if possible, to expedite its In all the operations resulting from these various motives, Nelson bore a as conspicuous as he had done in the reduction of Almost always on detached in positions approaching independent command, he was continually adding his and, what far more important, the professional character, seeds of which so bountifully
 route alone was not possible. SOuthern FraNce itSelF dePeNded
Upon The sea for grain, ANd coUld send nothing, even if thE then
MiSErabLE COrnicHe road cOUlD HAve SuFfIceD, aS ThE sole LinE of
commUnications For FoRty thousand tROoPs.

Thus the tRanSfer of CorsicA to great BRiTaiN Had a vEry ImporTant
beARing upOn the miliTaRY and poLItical cONDiTionS. At the moment when
ITAlY Was about to becoMe the sCeNE oF OPerAtiOns which miGhT, and iN
The evenT AcTUALly DId, exercise a deCisive influENce Upon thE cOurSE
of the GenerAl WAr, tHe British poSitiOn was soliDified BY the
acqUIsition Of a navAl bAse, UnasSAiLaBle WhILe tHE sEa rEMaiNed in
theIr CoNtrol And tHE cORsicAns AttaChed tO their cause, anD ceNtraLLy
sItuatEd witH refErEnce tO the prObablE sCenes of hostilitIes, aS well
as to The PoIntS oF poliTIcal inTerEst, On the maInland oF itaLy. tHE
FlEet resting upon it, no LoNGEr DependenT upon tHE rElUCtant
hosPiTalIty oF gEnoesE or TUScAn ports, oR upon tHE fAr Distant
kiNgdom oF NAplEs, wAs secURe to Keep in Its statiOn, wheNCe it
menaced the ENtire seaboard TRaDE Of fRancE anD the Riviera, As weLL
as tHe teNUrE of THe FreNch arMy IN tHE latter, and exerted a sTrOng
infLuencE upon the attitUde of both GENOA and TuscAny, wHO yIElded
only too eaSily tO the nearesT Or most urGent pRessure. THe fleet to
WHIch NelsoN beLonGed Had SPEnT the greater paRT Of thE yEar 1794 in
seCurIng for iTseLf, aS a bAse Of OperationS, this posItIoN, bY fAr
tHe mosT Suitable AmOng ThOse That cOUld be cOnsidEred At AlL. it
rEmained NOw TO UtilIzE tHe adVanTaGe obtAineD, To mAke the sItuation
oF thE frenCh ArMy in ItaLy untenable, by EsTablishing An IndIsputaBLE
control Of the sea. To this the holdinG Of CorsiCa aLso coNtriButed,
indiRecTly; for The LOss of tHe islaNd forCeD thE fRench FLEeT to Go
To sea, in ordER, If pOssibLe, To exPedite iTs re-conquest. In all tHE
opErations resulTinG froM THeSe vARiOUs mOtIVes, nELson bore a part as
ConspicuouS aND cHaracterisTIc aS hE had donE in the rEductIOn of
CorSica. AlmosT always on DeTachED SerVice, in posiTions appRoaching
iNDepenDEnT commAnd, He was cOnTinUally Adding TO hiS repuTation, AnD,
what wAs far MoRe importAnt, maturing the professioNal chaRacteR, thE
seeds of wHicH Had Been so bouNtifUlly bestowEd
 route alone was not possi ble. South ern F ran ceit self  dep ended
upon the seafor grain, and could s end n ot h ing, ev en if  the th e nm i ser ab le  Co rn i ch e roa d c ould ha ve suffice d,as  the sole li n eof
communi cat ions for for tythousa nd  tr o ops.
Th us th e tran s fer of  Corsicato GreatB ritainh a da ve ry important
bear i ng upon the milit ary an dp ol i t ica l c onditions.  A t the momentw he n I tal y  was about to  become the sce ne ofop era t ions w hichmi g ht,  and in
the  eve nt actual ly did ,  exerci s e a dec isiveinf lue nceu po nthe  c o urs e 
o f t h e g eneral w ar ,the B riti s h p osit ion  was  soli dified by the 
ac quis i tio n ofa nav al b as e, un assail ablewh ile the sea rem aine d in
thei r c on tro land t h e Cors ica nsattache d to th e irca u s e ,and centrally
situ at e d  w ith refe rencet oth e  probabl esce neso f  host ilit i es , as wel l
as t o  t he  points  o f poli ti cal  in teres t , on  the m ainlandof It a ly. The
fleetr esting upon i t ,n o  l o nger  de pendent upo n th e  rel ucta n thos p itali ty of  G e no e se or Tuscan ports,  o r upon  thefar distant
K ingdom ofN a p les, was  sec u re to keep in its  stat ion, whenc e  it
mena ced t he entir e seaboar d trade of  Fr anc e a ndt h eRiviera, as w e l l
as  t he tenu reof theFre nch  ar myin  the latt er, andex er te da s trong influenc eupo nthe  atti t ude of  both  Gen oa  a n d T uscany, wh o yiel de donly  to oeasil y to the  neares t or most  ur g entpr es sure. T he fleet to
w hi ch Nelsonbe lon ged ha d spent th e greater part of the y e ar 1794  in 
secu ring  for itse lf,  as abas e  of op eratio ns, t hi s p o s ition , by  fa rthe most s u i tab le am on g th ose tha t could be conside r edat all. It
re mai nedn o wtou ti l ize  t h e a d v antage obtained , to maketh e  s ituation
o f  th eFrencharmy in  Ital y  untena ble, by e stablishi ng  ani n dis putable
co ntrol of  the sea. To th i sthe h old ing of  C ors ica a lso co n tri buted ,
indi re ctly;for t he  loss of  the island forced theFrench  flee t t o go
to s ea, inorder, if  pos sible, toexp edi te it s r e -conq uest .  I n a l l the 
ope r ations re s ul tin g fr om these va r i o usmotiv es, Nelson  bor e a part as
consp i cuous and char acte r i sti c a s  heha d done in thered uc t i on of
Co rs ica. Almost  alwayson detac hed se rvice,  in pos i t io n s appr oach ing 
independ ent  c o mmand,he  w a s cont inua ll y addi ng toh is r e p utation, and,
wh at wa s far m o reimpor ta nt, mat u ring  the profe ssional cha racter , th e
see ds of w hi ch had  be en  so bounti f ully best owed
 route_alone was_not possible. Southern France_itself depended
upon_the_sea for_grain,_and could send_nothing, even if_the then
miserable Corniche road_could have sufficed,_as_the sole line of
communications for forty thousand troops.

Thus the transfer of Corsica to Great_Britain_had a_very_important
bearing_upon the military and political_conditions. At the moment when
Italy_was about_to become the scene of operations which might,_and_in
the event actually_did, exercise a decisive influence upon the course
of the_general war, the British position was_solidified by the
acquisition_of_a_naval base, unassailable while_the sea remained in
their control and_the Corsicans attached to their cause,_and centrally
situated with reference to the probable_scenes of hostilities, as well
as to_the points of political interest,_on the_mainland of Italy. The
fleet resting_upon it, no_longer dependent_upon the reluctant
hospitality_of Genoese or Tuscan ports, or_upon the far_distant
Kingdom of Naples, was secure to_keep_in its station,_whence_it
menaced_the entire_seaboard trade of_France_and the_Riviera,_as well
as the tenure of the_French_army in the latter, and exerted a_strong
influence upon the attitude_of_both Genoa and Tuscany,_who yielded
only too easily to_the nearest or most urgent pressure._The fleet_to
which Nelson_belonged had spent the greater part of the year 1794 in
securing_for itself, as a base of_operations, this position, by_far
the most_suitable_among those that_could_be considered_at all. It
remained now to utilize the_advantage obtained,_to make the situation
of the French_army in Italy untenable,_by_establishing an indisputable
control of the sea._To this the holding of Corsica_also contributed,
indirectly; for the loss_of_the_island forced the French fleet_to go
to sea, in order, if_possible, to expedite_its re-conquest. In all the
operations resulting from_these_various motives, Nelson bore a part_as
conspicuous_and characteristic as he had done_in_the_reduction of
Corsica. Almost always on_detached service, in positions approaching
independent command,_he was continually adding to his reputation, and,
what was_far more important,_maturing the professional character, the
seeds_of_which_had been so bountifully bestowed